

Logic combination and performance across occupational communities:

The case of French film directors

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Abstract

This article analyzes the effects of logic combination on cultural entrepreneurs' performance in both their original (artistic) and new (business) occupational communities. An analysis of the impact of the director-producer logic combination on artistic and commercial performance in French cinema confirms an asymmetry in outcomes: (1) although performance in the original artistic community is impaired by repeated logic combination (receiving less awards), (2) performance in the new business community benefits from logic combination (increased box office returns) as long as directors remain close to the boundary separating their original and new occupational communities.

Keywords

Logic combination, cinema, occupational community, cultural entrepreneur, France

Cultural entrepreneurs differ radically in the degree to which they are willing and able to diversify their activities and embrace multiple logics within an industry. Whereas some tend to “stick to their knitting” throughout their career, others at certain times draw on the resources they have accumulated to embrace new logics (Zuckerman, Kim, Ukanwa and Von Rittmann, 2003). Institutional logics are defined as the norms, expectations, values and rules specific to an occupational community and distinct from others, including within the same industry (Thornton, 2002). Institutional logics serve as a basis for collective identity. They allow individuals and organizations to produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality. Logic combination occurs when an industry actor from an established occupational community concurrently embraces the institutional logic and becomes accountable for the norms, expectations, values and rules of another occupational community. Existing research focuses on the consequences of logic combination relative to the *original* occupational community’s norms and expectations and on how industry actors frame, maintain, and control new markets’ logics (Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001; Durand, Rao and Monin, 2007). In general, logic combination is found to be detrimental to performance (Hsu, Hannan and Koçak, 2009).

Our study questions the consequences of logic combination for cultural entrepreneurs’ output performance relative to *both* original and new occupational communities. Our setting is the French cinema industry where directors embrace an artistic logic and producers embrace a commercial logic (Farchy, 1999; Durand and Jourdan, 2012). The historical, cultural, and legal characteristics of the French cinema industry reinforce the power of the director over that of the producer. In this respect, the French cinema industry stands in contrast to more commercially-driven cinema industries, such as Hollywood (see Appendix A). We define film directors as cultural entrepreneurs and analyze all the 983 films involving the 338 individual film directors who made at least two movies released in France between

1988 and 1997. Analyzing whether logic combination (achieved when directors are also producers) is associated with higher or lower artistic and commercial film performance contributes to enriching the theory of logic combination and the discussion of the consequences of spanning genres, categories, and occupations (Durand and Paoletta, 2013).

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Cultural entrepreneurs may combine logics in search of advantages across occupational communities (Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001): For instance, the opportunity to capitalize on their credentials and legitimacy across communities, to increase their revenue, or to bring to existence new products or services. Logic combination may also appear as a natural progression in the career of cultural entrepreneurs. Thus, experienced chefs will be inclined to open their own restaurants, and to expand into franchising by using their name to enter new geographical markets (e.g., in various cities), or in some cases media (e.g., by becoming television presenters and producers). By participating in two occupational communities, cultural entrepreneurs who combine logics must respond to two distinct sets of expectations pertaining to their original and new community (e.g., artistic and business logics).

Logic combination goes beyond the temporary extension of activities from one category to another defined as “stretchwork” (O’Mahony and Bechky, 2006: 919). Logic combination involves the conjunction of clearly distinct sets of credentials, expectations, and performance criteria (Lamont and Molnar, 2002). In the creative industries, the different sensibilities in orientation and training of artists and managers make logic combination extremely difficult: artists are “creative, unpredictable, iconoclastic, spontaneous and social critics; and managers [are] rational, ordered, [they plan and work] within the social order” (Reid and Karambayya, 2009: 1081).

The original occupational community of cultural entrepreneurs who engage in a new occupation and abide by its fresh logic may interpret this move as an abandonment of its

original credo, and a tarnishing of its attachment to certain norms, expectations, and performance criteria. In a given occupational community, incumbents patrol the category borders and levy sanctions against straddlers – that is, against cultural entrepreneurs who explicitly combine the logic of their own occupational community with that of another (Polos, Hannan and Carroll, 2002; Rao, Monin and Durand, 2005). Conformity to expectations pays (Zuckerman et al., 2003; Hsu, 2006); Ebbers and Wijnberg, 2012; O'Mahony and Bechky, 2006), whereas boundary spanning and dual occupancy don't (Hsu *et al.*, 2009). Incumbents seek to preserve the social valuation of observable characteristics and long-elaborated inferences between these characteristics and performance rewards (Berger, Ridgeway, Fisek and Norman, 1998; Webster and Hysom, 1998).

When cultural entrepreneurs espouse a new logic alien to that of their original occupational community, they do not fulfill the latter's norms and expectations. Logic combination challenges the definition of the original community, for which risks of delegitimation and of identity blurring increase (Berger *et al.*, 1998; Hsu et al, 2009). Straddlers are therefore likely to face opposition and resistance from their original occupational community. Hence:

Hypothesis 1 (H1): Cultural entrepreneurs who combine the logic of their original occupational community with the logic of another occupational community will experience lower valuation of their output in their original occupational community.

By espousing a new logic, cultural entrepreneurs consent to abiding by the norms and expectations of the new occupational community and to having their output assessed according to the performance criteria enforced in the new occupational community. Members of the original occupational community do not customarily rule the performance attribution process in the new community. For instance, peers of Chef Alain Ducasse do not have direct control on the commercial performance of his business ventures. Therefore, whereas the

original occupational community has the capacity to stop rewarding its members who combine logics (Hypothesis 1), it will most likely not be able to affect the performance of straddlers in the new occupational community.

Cultural entrepreneurs combine logics when the capital (symbolic, social or economic) accumulated in their original community has some value in the target community (Bourdieu, 1986). Thus, performance achieved in the original community may become an exchange resource in the new community (Baker and Faulkner, 1991). For instance, a chef who becomes a television presenter and culinary program producer retains her culinary credentials and legitimacy while increasing her commitment to the culinary arts by disseminating recipes and know-how to a broader audience. Cultural entrepreneurs who straddle logics obtain positive outcomes in their new community when their prior performance is fungible with the performance criteria of the new community. Resource selection is also fundamental for any project, and cultural entrepreneurs who straddle logics can help attract talent and better select the resources necessary for success: When they cross boundaries, they bring their expertise, experience, and networks with them. Therefore, new community members help valuing straddlers' assets and align operations in a way that meet their objectives and contribute to success.

However, the norms, expectations and performance criteria of the new occupational community contradict to some extent expectations from the original community (Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007; Durand and Jourdan, 2012). The positive relationship between straddling and performance in the new community is therefore likely to be higher when straddlers stay close to the boundary separating logics than when they purport to fully embrace the new occupation. In the latter case, incumbents feel threatened, straddlers may lack full expertise in the new occupation, and audiences may not recognize straddlers as pure members of the

community, reducing significantly the expected positive relationship between logic combination and performance in the new community. Hence (see Figure 1):

Hypothesis 2 (H2): Cultural entrepreneurs who combine the logic of their original occupational community with the logic of another occupational community will experience higher valuation of their output in the new occupational community the closer they stay to the logic boundary separating the original and new occupational communities.

Figure 1 here.

CONTEXT AND METHODS

The double allegiance of creative industries, including cinema, to the artistic and business logics makes them an appropriate terrain to study logic combination by cultural entrepreneurs and its consequences (Delmestri, Montanari and Usai, 2005; Hirsch, 2000). Attributing the often conflicting artistic and commercial responsibilities to two different leaders customarily permits dealing with the contradictions between the artistic and business logics (Reid and Karambayya, 2009; Voss, Cable and Voss, 2000). Long-standing disputes are also pervasive between those who see cultural goods as untainted expressions of their creators and those who consider that the latter must respond to consumers' needs within clearly stated economic constraints (Alvarez, Mazza, Strandgaard Pedersen and Svejenova, 2005; Glynn, 2000; Lampel, Lant and Shamsie, 2000).

In cinema, the entrepreneurial act of artistic creation is usually regarded as separate from the financial and managerial occupations of production and distribution (Alvarez *et al.*, 2005; Ebbers and Wijnberg, 2012; Jones, 2001). The film director is in charge of the movie's artistic completion and has significant influence over the selection of its most prominent creative and technical contributors. The director, who is under less direct economic pressure than the producer, feels more accountable for the artistic merit of the movie than for its commercial success. By contrast, the film producer is a business project manager

contractually responsible for the completion of the film within set financial, location and time constraints, and for estimating its commercial success. This polarization of logics is reinforced in France for historical, cultural, and legal reasons (see Appendix A and Ghertman and Hadida, 2005), hence the present article's choice of setting.

The research led to extensive documentation of the French film industry and the collection of secondary data from various industry sources. Interviews with twelve persons in four key groups (directors, producers, cinema experts and financiers, to maximize heterogeneity in responses) corroborate the stark separation of the artistic and business logics. All of them comment on how directors and producers belong to two occupational communities that do not share the same norms and expectations, and do not respond to the same logics (also in Durand and Jourdan, 2012). Interviews also indicate that whereas straddling logics may elicit negative views in the directors' original (artistic) occupational community, producers generally adopt a more neutral to positive attitude towards directors entering their (business) occupational community (see also Appendix A). Producers can leverage directors' prior expertise and networks, particularly when directors have been celebrated: past artistic merit is partly fungible into the pursuit of commercial performance in new projects (Hadida, 2010, 2013). Last, interviewees confirm the large variety of professional activities embraced by the term "producer" with varying degrees of commitment to the producing logic. Accounting for those degrees is essential to the test of Hypothesis 2.

Data

The primary dataset consists of all the 983 films involving the 338 individual directors who made at least two movies released in France between 1988 and 1997. Using the full population of films and directors eliminates the risk of selection bias. We define the original community as the "artistic logic" holders and the target or new community as the "business

logic” holders. Logic combination (or straddling) corresponds to directors embracing both the directing and producing logics.

The choice of the stable 1988 to 1997 decade reduces the effects of major changes in propensity in becoming a producer and in the economic conditions of film exhibition that could affect commercial performance. First, the SOFICA tax shelters established in 1985 and private pay-tv channel Canal Plus’s steady investments in cinema production created stable and homogeneous sources of funding throughout our study period. Second, from 1997 onward, digital technology changed industry conditions. The first DVD players reached the French market in early 1998 and the initial digital television offering of seven channels in 1992 was increased in 1996 to more than 300 altogether –including specialist cinema channels. The post-study period also saw the rise of multiplex cinemas in France, from 12 in 1995 to 53 between 1996 and 1999 and 188 in 2013. Therefore the decade 1988-1997 is a unique window of observation with reasonably stable and comparable financial, economic, and strategic characteristics. Nevertheless, the analysis includes variable constructions and robustness checks to explore long-standing effects before and after this decade.

The Centre National de la Cinématographie (CNC) in Paris provides all financial and market data used in the study and cited in the paragraph above. Additional information, including all data relative to the careers of producers, distributors, directors, and leading actors come from reference trade publications “Studio Magazine” and “Les Saisons Cinématographiques”, and from the websites of the Internet Movie Database (IMDb), Oscars, Cesars and International Cannes Film Festival. All sources were carefully verified and crosschecked.

Dependent and Independent Variables

Two performance variables serve to test the hypotheses. In line with the artistic (directing) logic, *ArtisticPerformance* takes the value of one when the movie received an

award (Oscar, Cesar, and Cannes) and zero otherwise (e.g., Ginsburgh and Weyers, 1999; Hadida, 2013). The US (Oscar) and French (Cesar) Academy Awards represent the two most important indicators of professional (peer) consecration worldwide and in France, respectively (Lampel and Nadavulakere, 2009). The Cannes International Film Festival confers global “expert selection” (Wijnberg and Gemser, 2000; Elsaesser, 2005; Lampel and Nadavulakere, 2009), and is particularly visible in France. Results are similar when using only the awards received by directors (*DirectorAward*) and without counting Oscars or Cannes in *ArtisticPerformance*. In line with the business (producing) logic, *CommercialPerformance* is the total domestic box-office of each film over its theatrical run in millions French Francs (also in Eliashberg and Shugan, 1997; Ravid, 1999; Zufryden, 2000).

Logic Combination is a binary variable equal to one when the director is one of the producers of the movie, and zero otherwise. *CumulLogicComb* is the logged number of logic combinations a director experienced over her career. It serves to compare the occurrence of logic combination with its cumulative effects. The percentage of films with a combinatorial pattern varies between 6 % and 14 % of all films over the period under scrutiny.

Figure 2 here.

Official records of the ownership structure of all the production companies in the dataset, together with additional data collected from the IMDb and Unifrance websites, serve to develop the logic combination indexes used to test the hypotheses. They clarify the directors’ actual responsibilities in production. *Logic Combination Ordered* takes the value of zero for stand-alone directors with no involvement in also producing the movie, and one for directors who are also ‘associate producers’ (i.e., they do not play an active part in production, but receive a share of the film’s returns in addition to their directing fees and authors’ rights. This arrangement may involve granting directors lower fixed fees in exchange for profit shares).

Directors coded two are typically partners in a production company undertaking “delegate producer” duties (i.e., taking financial and legal responsibility for the timely and successful completion of the movie). These directors play a moderately active part in production, which they partially delegate to the full-time producer(s) they have partnered with. Last, directors coded three are the actual “delegate producers” of the movie, and fully embrace both the directing and producing logics.

Since the total number of producers varies across films, the relative number of producers on a film provides another way to assess the involvement of a director-producer. *Logic Combination Relative* is the ratio of *Logic Combination* to the total number of producers for a given movie. In case of logic combination with a reduced number of producers, *Logic Combination Relative* indicates a greater level of director’s involvement than when more producers are involved.

Controls

While not reported for the sake of brevity, all the models include dummy variables to control for the effects of a movie’s *Year of Release* and of its *Genre*. *Genre* consists of several categories grouped under five types: comedy, drama, thriller, historical movie, and others. *Nationality* is an ordinal variable characterizing the sources of funding of the motion picture, from 1 (no French producers) to 4 (movie solely financed by French producers), following CNC official reporting standards.

Sequel takes the value one if the movie is a sequel and zero otherwise (as in Ravid, 1999; Sawhney and Eliashberg, 1996; Swami, Eliashberg and Weinberg, 1999). *Adaptation* is worth one when the movie is adapted from existing material (e.g., a television program, novel or video-game), and zero otherwise. *Sequel* and *Adaptation* are expected to influence film commercial performance positively, since characters and story are familiar to audiences

(Lampel *et al.*, 2000), and artistic performance negatively, since the odds of promoting the film as original are reduced (see Hadida, 2009 for a review).

A film's *Budget* (i.e., the total production cost of a film, excluding all investments in marketing and advertising: see also Ravid, 1999; Robins, 1993; and Zufryden, 2000) may positively impact its box-office performance, as the stakes get higher with bigger budgets. Budget figures come directly from proprietary CNC archives, and are indexed around the yearly average budget of released films to reduce over-dispersion. *ScreenCoverage* is the logged number of screens displaying the movie in the first week of its release, an indicator of expected commercial success commonly used in past studies (e.g., by Neelamegham and Chintagunta, 1999).

Star attests the casting in the movie of a leading performer, operationalized as the number of acting awards (Oscar, Cesar and/or Cannes) received prior to the focal movie. *Cannes* takes the value one if the movie received an award at the Cannes Film Festival, and zero otherwise. This control variable only serves in the test of Hypothesis 2 to assess whether receiving artistic recognition in the main international pre-release cinema event of the year impacts a movie's subsequent commercial performance.

Past directions (as in Zuckerman *et al.*, 2003) characterizes the director's experience. It corresponds to the number of movies she has directed since the beginning of her career. *Age* is the logged age of the director at the time of release. *SameGenre* controls for directors' specialization by indicating the number of movies which the director made in the same genre category as the focal movie in the past ten years. *DirectorAwardLife* is the count number of awards (Oscar, Cesar, and Cannes) received by the director since the beginning of her career.

Past film performance is the logged total gross domestic box-office (in constant 1988 FF millions) of a director's most recent film. Financiers focus primarily on the predicted return on investments of their next movie, which they assess based on the "bankability" (lagged

box-office potential) of its director. This control is likely to influence positively commercial performance.

To account for various network effects (Delmestri *et al.*, 2005) we control for *Past collaboration director-producer*. That is, the number of prior collaborations between a director and a specific producer over the preceding ten years. Similarly, *Past collaboration director-actor* is the number of films directed by a given director over the preceding ten years that feature at least one of the two leading actors of the focal movie (as in Zuckerman *et al.*, 2003), and *Past collaboration director-distributor* is the number of films of the director over the preceding ten years that were distributed by the same studio as the focal movie.

The direct participation of a director as a screenwriter may signal a specific and personal commitment to a film project, and should be positively related to performance. *Writing*, defined as the ratio between a director's participation in screenwriting and the total number of screenwriters, assesses this degree of engagement.

Finally, to account for the effect of a diffusion of logic combination within the industry (and its potential effects on either performance), we controlled for the logged yearly cumulated number of movies directed by director-producers in the French movie industry (*IndLogicComb*).

RESULTS

Table 1 displays the correlations among the variables used to test the hypotheses. The correlations among main effects are not problematic: although, as expected, the correlation between *Past film performance* and performance indicators, and *CumulLogicComb* and *Logic Combination* are significantly high, the models have been tested with and without the variables, and results were unchanged.

Table 1 here.

Table 2 presents the tests for *ArtisticPerformance* and Table 3 for *CommercialPerformance*. Based on the nature of the dependent variables, models 1-6 are robust effects probit models, while models 7-11 are robust effects regressions. Looking at the control variables, results from models 1-11 confirm prior findings and indicate that the more films 1) are financed on French funds, 2) have a big budget, 3) are released on a large number of screens, and 4) have a director whose last film performed well, the higher their artistic and commercial performance are. *DirectorAwardLife* influences artistic performance only. This factor is positive and significant in models 1-6 but insignificant in models 7-11, indicating a potential Matthew effect: directors having received an award in the past have a greater chance to direct a new movie that will receive awards. Some controls do not impact artistic performance, but are significant for commercial performance: *SameGenre* has a negative impact on commercial performance, whereas *Past directions*, *Star*, *Cannes* and most notably the cumulated number of past logic combinations at the level of the industry (*IndCumRealProd*) all have a positive impact on commercial performance.

Tables 2 and 3 here.

Hypotheses 1 and 2 question the influence of logic combination on output performance indicators in a cultural entrepreneur's original and new occupational communities. Model 2 adds *Logic Combination* and model 3 adds *Logic Combination Relative* to control model 1, without improving the fit. Model 4 adds *Logic Combination Ordered* to control model 1, only improving the fit marginally. *Logic Combination*, *Logic Combination Relative* and *Logic Combination Ordered* are not significant. *CumulLogicComb* (added in model 5) shows a negative and significant impact on *ArtisticPerformance*. Therefore, the effect of logic combination is insignificant on a per movie basis. However, the cumulated number of logic combinations for a director ends up being detrimental to obtaining artistic rewards, as H1 proposes.

H2 posits a diminishing positive effect on commercial performance as the director's level of responsibilities in production increases. Here again, the empirical tests confirm such effect. For commercial performance, model 8 adds *Logic Combination*, model 9 adds *Logic Combination Relative*, and model 10 adds *Logic Combination Ordered* to control model 7. Each of these variables is positively associated with commercial performance on a per movie basis. Yet, the positive association of *Logic Combination Ordered* with commercial performance decreases as the director moves away from the boundary between the direction and production occupational communities (model 10). These results support H2. Furthermore, whereas *Logic Combination* is positive and significant, *CumulLogicComb* does not contribute to model 11, suggesting that the number of a director's past logic combinations does not influence current commercial performance. The same results (not displayed in Table 3) hold for *Logic Combination Relative* and *Logic Combination Ordered*. These discrepant effects of logic combination (positive for commercial performance but negative for artistic performance) give support to the hypotheses.

Robustness Checks

One may suspect that independent variables included in the models are potentially choice variables (e.g., *Logic Combination*, *Logic Combination Relative* and *Logic Combination Ordered*) introducing suspicions of endogeneity. The use of the biprobit2 program in STATA (for artistic performance), a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (for commercial performance), and a treatment effects procedure (Heckman type) to correct for the potential specification error due to endogeneity (the inclusion of λ in the equation testing commercial performance) do not lead to the detection of issues or to an improvement of the results, thereby alleviating these concerns.

The introduction in model 6 of interaction variable *CumulLogicComb-DirectorAwardLife* confirms that the artistic performance of those directors who received awards in the past and

have combined logics frequently suffers more from logic combination, as the benefit of having received awards in the past is cancelled out by the cumulated effect of *CumulLogicComb* and *CumulLogicComb-DirectorAwardLife*. This result supports the idea that the awarding community has the capacity to undermine an award-winning straddler's likelihood to having her output positively singled out again in the future. The test of model 5 with a dichotomous and a count indicator of nominations (instead of awards) corroborates that having combined logics in the past does not only reduce the likelihood for a director to receive awards in the future, but also to be nominated.

Future Award (worth zero when the films of the director did not receive any Oscar, Cesar, or Cannes award, one when they received one of these awards at least one time, and two when they received two or more awards in 1998-2008) is based on additional data collected on the following decade (1998-2008), in order to account for potential changes having occurred then. Table 4 presents the results of tests using ordered probit models with robust standard errors conducted at the director level of analysis. Note that these models do not include many film or time controls. However, as robustness check models, they present an interesting result. *CumulLogicComb*, when added to control model 12 in model 13, impacts negatively and significantly the probability of a director receiving awards for her movies in the subsequent decade. This result points to the resilience of the effect revealed in model 5.

Table 4 here.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Existing research studies the harmful consequences of logic combination *within* a given community (Hsu, 2006; Hsu *et al.*, 2009), without discussing the specific conditions under which logic combination *across* communities would give a cultural entrepreneur a performance advantage or not (Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001; Alvarez *et al.*, 2005). This article shows that repeated logic combination is detrimental to cultural entrepreneurs'

performance in their *original* occupational community. Conversely, logic combination positively impacts cultural entrepreneurs' performance in their *new* occupational community, yet this effect diminishes as their engagement with the new community increases.

Straddlers risk compromising the original community by adding novel norms and expectations imported from the newly adjoined community. In the context of French cinema, the original artistic community is less inclined to bestow further recognition to directors who repeatedly combine logics (model 5, with this result holding for nominations as well). This defensive effect is reinforced for award-winners (model 6) and long-lasting (Table 4). The disconnect between the performance of directors' output in the artistic vs. commercial ambit gives support to a progressive and differential construction of occupations. While the original community (e.g., art) seems to protect its functions and expectations by sanctioning straddlers, the target community (e.g., business) seems less hesitant to accept them since artistic performance is partly fungible into commercial performance and producers can leverage straddling directors' past expertise and networks.

Moving forward, these findings contribute to analyze potential spillover effects of individual cultural entrepreneurs' logic combination choices into whole communities and industries and to the discussion on spanning occupations. In particular, the extent of sanctions imposed by the original community relative to the benefits received from the new community may explain whether or not logic combination diffuses and communities evolve, merge, or fail to do either. In the French film industry, the strength of the cultural norm that equates director with artist may account for the relatively weak diffusion of logic combination, as attested by Figure 2. For directors, artistic penalties may override commercial benefits. This may be different in other communities, for other occupations, or in other countries. Notably, Hollywood directors do not customarily benefit from the same cultural recognition as artists and from the same degree of control over their movies as their French counterparts (see

Appendix A). Logic combination grants Hollywood directors legitimacy as authors of their own movies as well as increased control over casting and final editing decisions, and may therefore represent an important threat to the power of producers. In the U.S. cinema industry, the discrepant effects of logic combination which we identify in the French cinema industry (positive for commercial performance but negative for artistic performance) may consequently no longer hold. More generally, future research could investigate the respective power of logics across occupational communities, and the ensuing struggles to break or maintain boundaries between communities.

Scope conditions of this study deserve mentioning. The chosen empirical setting brackets a period of both financial and technological stability, and of stability in the institutional conditions of filmmaking. Therefore, results should be extended with caution to periods of upheaval and change and to other institutional contexts. For instance, professional logics (e.g., lawyers, medical doctors) share more similarities with cultural industries and with the artistic logic, where gatekeeping and peer control are stricter, than with traditional industries geared toward the business logic. We therefore anticipate the penalties inflicted on logic combiners by their original community to be stronger in professional services than in traditional industries. Other indicators of success could also be used to strengthen the validity of the results. In particular, accounting for critics' perceptions of the significance of directors and films (Eliashberg and Shugan, 1997; Basuroy, Chatterjee and Ravid, 2003) may unlock a dimension of social recognition different from the intra-community markers used here. Future research may also look into other types of combinations (e.g., logic combination that concerns entrepreneurs from a business community entering the artistic realm) to determine whether symmetry exists in observable effects.

In any case, in presence of logic combination within an industry, dual indicators of performance – for each community of interest – should be included in future research to

avoid biased conclusions relative to the actions and performance of those cultural entrepreneurs who combine logics across occupational communities.

Figures

Figure 1. Conceptual Model





Figure 2. Percentage of Movies with DP Combinatorial Pattern, 1988-1997



Tables

Table 1. Descriptive statistics

		Mean	S.D.	Min	Max	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
1	ArtisticPerformance	0,07	0,26	0,00	1,00																						
2	CommercialPerformance	1,59	1,31	0,00	6,16	0,48																					
3	Nationality	2,94	1,17	1,00	4,00	0,17	0,23																				
4	Sequel	0,04	0,20	0,00	1,00	0,00	0,00	-0,03																			
5	Adaptation	0,27	0,44	0,00	1,00	0,02	0,08	-0,07	0,03																		
6	Budget	1,03	0,99	0,03	11,26	0,19	0,42	-0,19	0,00	0,14																	
7	ScreenCoverage	3,38	0,96	1,57	4,37	0,20	0,51	0,14	-0,02	0,07	0,21																
8	Star	0,34	0,75	0,00	5,00	0,13	0,30	0,12	-0,03	0,14	0,19	0,20															
9	Cannes	0,04	0,24	0,00	2,00	0,08	0,14	-0,08	0,03	0,00	0,06	0,09	0,01														
10	Past directions	3,68	2,01	2,00	10,00	0,04	0,11	-0,15	0,16	0,00	0,01	0,05	-0,01	0,00													
11	Age	3,87	0,36	3,22	7,52	0,06	0,14	0,03	0,06	0,07	0,10	0,09	0,10	-0,06	0,13												
12	SameGenre	0,36	0,65	0,00	3,00	-0,03	-0,05	-0,12	0,22	-0,03	-0,07	0,07	-0,04	0,01	0,47	0,04											
13	Past film performance	1,37	1,39	0,00	6,16	0,24	0,53	0,18	-0,02	0,06	0,37	0,35	0,19	-0,02	0,16	0,21	0,01										
14	Past collaboration director-actor	0,15	0,46	0,00	3,00	0,04	0,07	-0,05	0,10	0,00	-0,01	-0,01	0,00	0,03	0,29	0,13	0,22	0,12									
15	Past collaboration director-producer	0,29	0,68	0,00	6,00	0,06	0,10	-0,04	0,14	0,00	-0,02	0,06	0,00	0,00	0,51	0,09	0,24	0,16	0,30								
16	Past collaboration director-distributor	0,23	0,55	0,00	5,00	0,04	0,11	0,01	0,19	-0,01	0,02	0,02	-0,03	-0,01	0,40	0,08	0,24	0,20	0,28	0,48							
17	Writing	0,62	0,32	0,00	1,00	-0,06	-0,10	0,14	-0,01	-0,16	-0,25	-0,11	-0,12	0,02	0,09	-0,06	0,09	-0,12	0,04	0,13	0,08						
18	DirectorAwardLife	0,12	0,45	0,00	3,00	0,17	0,18	-0,01	-0,01	0,06	0,19	0,09	0,14	-0,02	0,07	0,10	-0,02	0,23	-0,01	-0,01	0,04	-0,14					
19	IndCumRealProd	4,03	3,32	2,40	4,57	0,00	-0,02	0,11	-0,04	-0,05	-0,01	-0,31	-0,02	-0,01	-0,09	0,07	-0,14	0,06	0,02	-0,04	-0,01	0,03	-0,01				
20	Logic Combination	0,09	0,29	0,00	1,00	0,04	0,21	-0,07	0,02	0,00	0,02	0,03	0,03	0,00	0,26	0,01	0,03	0,13	0,11	0,29	0,11	0,07	0,11	-0,02			
21	Logic Combination relative	0,04	0,17	0,00	1,00	-0,02	0,15	0,00	0,05	0,00	-0,04	0,00	-0,03	-0,02	0,20	0,02	0,04	0,07	0,05	0,20	0,08	0,10	0,04	-0,02	0,73		
22	Logic Combination ordered	0,21	0,69	0,00	3,00	0,05	0,21	-0,03	0,02	0,01	0,03	0,06	0,03	0,00	0,26	0,02	0,03	0,15	0,12	0,30	0,10	0,08	0,08	-0,02	0,90	0,75	
23	CumulLogicComb	0,66	1,43	0,00	3,18	0,00	0,14	-0,04	-0,01	0,06	0,11	0,09	0,05	-0,01	0,32	0,18	0,13	0,14	0,09	0,22	0,12	0,04	0,09	0,00	0,32	0,19	0,36

Table 2. Effect of logic combination on artistic performance

n=983, with 338 groups	ArtisticPerformance					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Year dummies included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Genre dummies included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nationality	0.45*** (4.64)	0.45*** (4.63)	0.45*** (4.65)	0.47*** (4.87)	0.46*** (4.65)	0.48*** (4.89)
Sequel	0.14 (0.39)	0.15 (0.42)	0.14 (0.39)	0.13 (0.36)	0.14 (0.38)	0.09 (0.24)
Adaptation	-0.08 (-0.49)	-0.08 (-0.50)	-0.09 (-0.53)	-0.10 (-0.59)	-0.05 (-0.27)	-0.03 (-0.19)
Budget	0.18** (2.60)	0.19** (2.61)	0.18* (2.55)	0.19** (2.64)	0.21** (2.92)	0.20** (2.79)
ScreenCoverage	0.22** (3.05)	0.22** (3.04)	0.23** (3.10)	0.23** (3.15)	0.23** (3.13)	0.24** (3.24)
Star	0.04 (0.54)	0.04 (0.52)	0.04 (0.56)	0.05 (0.62)	0.05 (0.61)	0.04 (0.47)
Past directions	0.04 (0.84)	0.04 (0.88)	0.04 (0.91)	0.03 (0.70)	0.06 (1.33)	0.07 (1.49)
Age	-0.09 (-0.55)	-0.09 (-0.54)	-0.09 (-0.59)	-0.10 (-0.61)	-0.08 (-0.50)	-0.08 (-0.51)
SameGenre	-0.10 (-0.76)	-0.10 (-0.78)	-0.10 (-0.76)	-0.11 (-0.80)	-0.10 (-0.72)	-0.10 (-0.77)
Past film performance	0.09 (1.63)	0.09 (1.60)	0.09+ (1.72)	0.09+ (1.74)	0.09 (1.63)	0.09+ (1.65)
Past-collaboration director-actor	0.07 (0.40)	0.06 (0.39)	0.07 (0.41)	0.08 (0.50)	0.07 (0.45)	0.07 (0.40)
Past collaboration director-producer	0.16 (1.22)	0.15 (1.11)	0.20 (1.49)	0.17 (1.23)	0.17 (1.23)	0.15 (1.11)
Past collaboration director-distributor	-0.09 (-0.56)	-0.09 (-0.57)	-0.09 (-0.58)	-0.08 (-0.49)	-0.10 (-0.66)	-0.08 (-0.53)
Writing	-0.17 (-0.65)	-0.17 (-0.63)	-0.14 (-0.53)	-0.17 (-0.64)	-0.11 (-0.43)	-0.11 (-0.43)
DirectorAwardLife	0.35** (2.82)	0.35** (2.81)	0.36** (2.92)	0.35** (2.84)	0.34** (2.82)	0.43*** (3.32)
IndCumRealProd	0.01 (1.11)	0.01 (1.10)	0.01 (1.11)	0.01 (1.20)	0.01 (1.13)	0.01 (1.21)
Logic Combination		0.03 (0.12)			0.16 (0.64)	0.25 (0.98)
Logic Combination Relative			-0.76 (-1.35)			
Logic Combination Ordered =1				-7.76 (-0.00)		
Logic Combination Ordered =2				0.27 (0.86)		
Logic Combination Ordered =3				-0.17 (-0.51)		
CumulLogicComb					-.041* (-1.95)	-.041* (-1.96)
CumulLogicComb x DirectorAwardLife						-.39+ (-1.70)
Constant	-3.723*** (-4.49)	-3.740*** (-4.49)	-3.707*** (-4.49)	-3.757*** (-4.71)	-3.722*** (.829)	-3.722*** (.829)
Chi²	77.88	77.72	79.76	84.87	80.76	85.55
Log likelihood	-198.69	-198.49	-197.57	-196.57	-196.36	-194.79

***p<.001, ** p<.01, *p < .05 and + p<.10.

Table 3. Effect of logic combination on commercial performance

n=983, with 338 groups	CommercialPerformance				
	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11
Year dummies included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Genre dummies included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	0.20***	0.22***	0.20***	0.22***	0.22***
	(7.06)	(7.89)	(7.34)	(7.81)	(7.86)
Sequel	0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.09)	(-0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Adaptation	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.10
	(1.60)	(1.52)	(1.42)	(1.60)	(1.58)
Budget	0.32***	0.33***	0.33***	0.33***	0.33***
	(7.51)	(7.80)	(7.74)	(7.82)	(7.80)
ScreenCoverage	0.33***	0.33***	0.33***	0.32***	0.33***
	(12.08)	(12.30)	(12.25)	(12.01)	(12.38)
Star	0.17***	0.16***	0.18***	0.17***	0.16***
	(4.40)	(4.05)	(4.50)	(4.25)	(4.06)
Cannes	0.63***	0.63***	0.64***	0.64***	0.63***
	(5.57)	(5.71)	(5.74)	(5.83)	(5.60)
Past directions	0.07***	0.05**	0.06**	0.05*	0.06**
	(3.44)	(2.59)	(2.76)	(2.38)	(2.70)
Age	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.04
	(0.08)	(0.30)	(0.05)	(0.26)	(0.38)
SameGenre	-0.18***	-0.15**	-0.16***	-0.13**	-0.15**
	(-3.68)	(-3.05)	(-3.31)	(-2.69)	(-3.02)
Past film performance	0.16***	0.14***	0.15***	0.15***	0.14***
	(4.97)	(4.56)	(4.82)	(4.75)	(4.50)
Past-collaboration director-actor	0.10	0.09	0.11	0.09	0.09
	(1.34)	(1.25)	(1.52)	(1.31)	(1.22)
Past collaboration director-producer	0.01	-0.06	-0.03	-0.05	-0.06
	(0.14)	(-1.41)	(-0.67)	(-1.15)	(-1.39)
Past collaboration director-distributor	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.04
	(0.27)	(0.77)	(0.55)	(0.60)	(0.76)
Writing	0.06	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.03
	(0.58)	(0.29)	(0.21)	(0.28)	(0.31)
DirectorAwardLife	0.13	0.09	0.11	0.08	0.09
	(1.46)	(0.97)	(1.33)	(0.88)	(0.98)
IndCumRealProd	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**
	(2.72)	(2.81)	(2.81)	(2.66)	(2.85)
Logic combination		0.77***			0.80***
		(7.02)			(6.87)
Logic combination relative			1.08***		
			(5.59)		
Logic combination ordered =1				1.08***	
				(3.84)	
Logic combination ordered =2				0.75***	
				(4.76)	
Logic combination ordered =3				0.59**	
				(3.20)	
CumulLogicComb					-0.01
					(-0.60)
Constant	-0.57	-0.70	-0.56	-0.66	-0.74
	(-1.23)	(-1.51)	(-1.20)	(-1.41)	(-1.60)
R-squared	59.59%	62.05%	61.61%	61.94%	62.06%
chi2	1385.9	1596.4	1501.2	1609.9	1593.9

***p<.001, ** p<.01, *p < .05 and + p<.10.

Table 4. Long term impacts

N=338	Future Award	
	Ordered Probit model	
	Model 12	Model 13
AgeDir	-1.415** (.535)	-1.506** (.553)
Past directions	.323** (.134)	.391** (.147)
Past films performance	.192*** (.055)	.200*** (.056)
IndCumRealProd	.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)
DirectorAwardLife	.379*** (.100)	.375*** (.089)
CumulLogicComb	-	-.030** (012)
Cut point 1	-2.554	-2.784
Cut point 2	-1.778	-2.008
Wald Chi 2	33.97***	38.96***
Pseudo R2	10.64%	11.08%

***p<.00

APPENDIX A- Key specificities of the French cinema industry

France is the top European film-producing country. In 2013, the average budget of the 270 French films produced was 4.88 million euro, and attendance reached 193.59 million tickets sold. By way of comparison, 1299 films were produced and total attendance reached 947 million in the E.U. in 2012. The polarization of the artistic and business logics is reinforced in France for historical, cultural and legal reasons.

First, moviemaking in Europe has historically been ruled by personal values and social norms at odds with demand-induced analytical frameworks (Alvarez *et al.*, 2005). In France, the economic and cultural importance of cinema defines movie directors as “authors”, and places them at the core of a “cultural elite” (Heinich, 2005) and of the fight to protect the “cultural exception”, which subjects local movies to tariffs and quotas aimed at protecting them from their U.S. equivalents (Farchy, 1999). For instance, from our interviews, a director comments: “*Producers in France are merely seen as bank cashiers, with zero added value at the artistic level.*” Another adds: “*My interest hinges exclusively on the film as an object; what goes around it is outside my domain.*” Last, an expert states: “*Directors and producers are two distinct species [...] Movie directing is the real job, with a highly professional dimension. I mean, directing actors, shooting and editing film. Producers gather funds and manage financial risks*”.

Second, French film professionals and audiences view cinema as first and foremost an art (Baumann, 2001). Consequently, most French film directors have very little business training. As one of the interviewed directors states: “*the energy I devote to directing a movie, I can’t invest it in something else. The freedom of being an author is more important than everything else, including production, the market and all*”.

Third, the French Law on Authors’ Rights acknowledges directors’ moral rights in respect of their name, their authorship and the integrity of their creations. Movies cannot be modified without their agreement: “*In France, the director has the final cut: this is the law. The final cut epitomizes the whole posture of French cinema. The filmmaker directs the film he wants to make.*” (Director Philippe Garrel, in Fevret, Kaganski, Blumenfeld, Laroche and Ostria, 1993: 60). By contrast, the 1976 U.S. Copyright Act considers producers as a film’s main authors and denies moral rights to directors.

Fourth, French cinema relies on a highly structured system of domestic and European public loans and subsidies. By law, a French film producer is only required to invest 30% of a film’s total budget, and calls on television channels, other private investors and State subsidies for the remaining 70%. Thus, French producers bear fewer risks and earn less recognition for risk taking than their U.S. colleagues, who must raise the full production budget of their movies – which is also likely to be eight to ten times larger.

Last, unlike U.S. cinema (Baker and Faulkner, 1991; Zuckerman *et al.*, 2003) and very much like Italian cinema (Boccardelli, Brunetta and Vicentini, 2008), over our period of analysis French cinema is not a blockbuster industry. The French domestic market and the number of French speakers worldwide are much smaller than their North American and English-speaking counterparts. Very few fully-integrated multimedia conglomerates (e.g., Gaumont and Pathé) are similar in their approach to the U.S. Major Studios, while also being on average ten times smaller. Most French producers tend to hedge their bets by investing in a handful of smaller films in the hope that one of them will succeed rather than in one larger blockbuster.

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