

# Conceptual schemes and human (inter)action: disentangling fact and value for a broader vision

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This thesis is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Conceptual schemes and human (inter)action:  
disentangling fact and value for a broader vision

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This thesis investigates the role of conceptual schemes in shaping how we make sense of experience in human affairs. Conceptual schemes involve values and beliefs, assumptions and presuppositions that originate in past experience and, projected onto new observations, guide what is seen, what is considered salient, and what is overlooked or dismissed. Paradigms (in the sense of exemplars) and loaded concepts play a decisive role in these dynamics, which I explore through cases, each showing how an opposing pair of conceptual schemes leads to contrasting descriptions of what is apparently the same problem. Disagreement in the study and measurement of intelligence rests on contrasting conceptions of success, science, and education. Different characterisations of identity, power, and religion lead to seeing aspects of international relations and terrorism that involve different explanations. Finally, divergent approaches to criminal justice rest on contrasting conceptions of the human being that involve different views of responsibility, motivation, and rehabilitation. All approaches present their positions as matters of fact: intelligence *does predict success*; identity *is* defined by antagonism, *or not*; criminals *do* lack self-control. However, descriptive statements are often loaded with value. I propose disentangling descriptive and evaluative elements to reveal the specific features that are endorsed, or deprecated, when we use certain expressions. Disentangling increases awareness of what we do when we talk about a phenomenon in a certain manner; it shows what is presupposed and allows the critical examination of elements that have become tacit. Contrast with other conceptual schemes, and focus on difference, shows us where to look for disentangling and opens a venue to unusual ways of seeing. Uncomfortable as it may seem, engaging across different schemes, rather than seeking to transcend them, is thus proposed as a way to expand possibilities for understanding, and action.

*To my Mother,  
the quintessential free spirit.  
To my Father,  
the wisdom of tradition.  
We need both.*

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## Introduction

This thesis was inspired by an interest in choice and action: I was puzzled, and fascinated, by the very different accounts that people could form about an apparently identical situation, and by how such different accounts justified different repertoires of action. This could be explained with different beliefs; after all, belief is generally taken to be a preparation for action. Beliefs are factual; they consist in descriptive accounts of a matter of fact that can be true or false, and their truth-conditions are found in states of the world. My belief that there is food in the fridge is true if there is food in the fridge. To demonstrate that my belief is false, you would provide evidence that the fridge is empty. If, upon observation, we find four eggs, we may discuss what we mean with the term ‘empty’, but it would hardly be a contentious discussion. Once we set our parameters straight, we can continue the conversation. However, disagreement is seldom so easy to solve, particularly when it involves the peculiarly human matters that permeate our lives. In such cases, the parties involved tend to invoke conflicting facts, presenting them as irrefutable evidence. Consider debates on immigration; opponents of immigration ground their claims in factual evidence that demonstrates higher crime rates among immigrants while advocates of open borders provide factual evidence to the contrary. If facts indicate the true state of the world, we may be confused. Even more so when we observe that contrasting evidence does not lead either of the two parties to revise their position. The question, after all, is simple: do immigrants commit more crime? The dispute should be settled by evidence, i.e. opening the fridge. However, gathering evidence about human matters is somewhat more complex than opening the fridge.

In philosophy of science we are well acquainted with debates about evidence, under-determination, induction, falsification, and the theory-ladenness of observation. Thomas Kuhn published *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* in 1962, shaking the established epistemological ground and sparking debates that are on-going. These debates culminated with the post-modernist proposal that voided the concepts of truth and hard facts. From a conception of science, and truth, based on pure fact we have been swayed in the opposite direction. Interestingly enough, realms that inherently involve value, such as politics, justice and security to name a few, rely heavily on a conception of the scientific method that presupposes objectivity in the sense of value-freedom. Even in ethics we witness a resurgence of the notion of objective ethical truth. This trend is not surprising; to stand on a moving ground is immensely more trying than having one’s feet solidly planted and, traditionally, value represents a disturbance to the solidity of facts. Certainty carries a certain comfort in which, perhaps, it is natural to seek refuge. But if we do so, we miss opportunities to see the world differently from how we are accustomed. Indeed, we may refuse such opportunities and hold on to our certainty, entrenched in the conviction that what we see is how things really are, but the path to certainty may be paved with narrow-mindedness. And this would be unfortunate. We may have something to gain from understanding why others form beliefs that are different from our own. Indeed their beliefs may be plainly false, in which case we need to show where evidence gathering went astray. However, it may also be the case that they see something that is unavailable to us. After all, the principle of charity is an established philosophical practice. Thus, without necessarily embracing relativism or post-modernism, we may accept that there are reasons why others gather different facts and form different beliefs. The question would be: what are these reasons?

Philosophy, and the philosophy of science in particular, can contribute considerably to understanding what is going on. We need not posit different worlds although, often, the

observer may wonder whether the people involved in these debates do live in the same world. When we investigate a concept we engage in operationalization; we treat it so to identify its manifestations in order to conduct observation and gather evidence. Percy Bridgeman introduced the expression operationalism in 1927: ‘we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of operations; the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of operations.’ (Chang, 2009, p. 1) We choose a certain set of operations based on the purpose of our investigation, the tools we consider adequate, existing theories. These guide our investigation; the choice of a different set of operations may lead to different factual evidence. Still, we need to understand what underlies the choice of a different set of operations and, in fact, my leading question was initially ‘why do people see some choice options while they seem blind to others?’ That they have different beliefs is not satisfactory; why do they have different beliefs? They have factual evidence that supports their beliefs, and thus we wonder how can they have different factual evidence. I became increasingly interested in examining why people see what they see, physically and metaphorically. Although operationalization is associated with scientific enquiry, what I am going to propose in this thesis has a wider scope that has to do with how we make sense of human matters. We use concepts all the time and, in a weak manner, using them involves operationalizing them in ways that elude definition. For instance, the term Muslim may evoke the image of a terrorist to some, while others may envision an oppressed woman, or a mild old man. What underlies these different images? This matters because what we see may reflect in how we gather evidence and provide explanation.

I then set out to understand where that image comes from, inspired by Kuhn’s account of incommensurability — Lavoisier who *saw* oxygen where Priestley *saw* dephlogisticated air. (Kuhn, 1962/2012) The hard-core scientific realist would say that Lavoisier saw what was there all along while Priestley was wrong. Many decades of discussion in the philosophy of science have taught us, among other things, that the matter is more subtle and complex: we see differently, we *focus* on different aspects and features that give different shapes to our observations, we deem different features as salient. This prompts more questions: why do we see differently? Indeed our physical sensory apparatus plays a considerable role as pointed out by Thomas Nagel (1974) in ‘What it is like to be a bat’, but the debates I am interested in take place among people who do not seem to have significant sensory differences, and they speak the same language, often even using the same words. This is bewildering: using the same words while talking, supposedly, about the same thing provides contrasting observations that inform contrasting beliefs. The relation between language and observation became my primary interest.<sup>1</sup>

Our use of terms is guided by the system of concepts and relations among them that is available to us in virtue of past experience. I call this system a conceptual scheme, an expression that is far from uncontroversial, as we will see. A conceptual scheme sets the scope for the beliefs that we form about a specific phenomenon and guides further observation, and the formation of further beliefs, which inform explanation. We can only explain phenomena in ways that are conceivable to us; the conceivable is set by the scheme, and so is the inconceivable. Concepts indicate salient features that guide observation. Gathering evidence about trees involves looking for things with branches and leaves, and also *not looking* for pink things with feathers. Since observation is the primary source of evidence, the ways in which the scheme directs observation also directs belief formation.

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<sup>1</sup> Previously and during my MPhil at HPS that resulted in a chapter published with Erik Bjurström, ‘Coordination and Language, disentangling linguistic boxes for improved collaboration’, in Hafting, T. Ed. (2017). Crisis management, planning and action (original title: *Krisehåndtering, planlegging og handling*). Oslo: Fagbokforlaget.

This is not a unidirectional process; a scheme shapes new experience and is also shaped by it. We may allow for a scheme to be theoretically revisable. However, revision is often a practical challenge even in the face of contrasting evidence; some presuppositions are particularly resistant.

I consider how paradigms and loaded concepts contribute to the consolidation of a scheme guiding observation. The former are exemplary problem solutions that, in Kuhn's theory, play an important role in generating a scheme and, subsequently, confirming its validity, protecting its rationale from revision. Loaded concepts involve a combination of description and evaluation that guides thought and action by suggesting what features are salient in virtue of evaluation. Both paradigms and loaded terms have rhetorical power in that they convince of the validity of the existing approach and guide new experience, shaping it, according to the logic of the given scheme. They do so by way of suggesting, implying and whispering rather than yelling, tacitly guiding the inferences and associations that tell us where to look, what to look for, and what we see, i.e. what features are salient and how to interpret them. Our descriptive accounts are often, though not always, tacitly guided by value. If this is the case we may argue that the search for factual evidence is hopelessly and irremediably coloured with value, and give it up. Or, we may look for ways to rid ourselves of value and restore the purity of fact. My proposal involves none or, perhaps, parts of both; we need not choose between fact and value, we can accept that both contribute to understanding, but this needs not to imply the negation of either.

This is the core element of this thesis. Many words have been spent by eminent philosophers in discussions of conceptual schemes and the relation of language with reality: Carnap, Quine, Davidson, Kuhn, Frege, and Wittgenstein only to name a few. While the vast literature on conceptual schemes focuses predominantly on factual-descriptive elements, the peculiarity of this thesis lies in the attention paid to evaluation, which often accompanies description, in guiding belief and judgement. Evaluation is not examined as a disturbance to truth, as in the value-free ideal, nor as an advocacy of relativism or post-truth, as in Putnam or Rorty. Evaluation is a constitutive element of how we make sense of the world; rather than ridding of it, I find it worthwhile to understand its role.

Chapter 1 examines conceptual schemes, paradigms, and loaded concepts. I propose disentangling loaded terms to reveal the implicit assumptions involved in the use of these terms and to increase awareness of how they guide thought and action. Each of the three subsequent chapters examines a case study of a pair of conceptual schemes underlying people's contrasting observations and explanations of an apparently same phenomenon. Chapter 2 examines the conceptual schemes that inform two contrasting theories of intelligence: the 'selective' scheme identifies intelligence with the general intelligence factor, *g*, measured by IQ, while the scheme that I have called 'divergent' proposes a broader 'triarchic' theory that challenges the primacy of *g*. Both employ terms such as success, science and education, but the uses of these terms differ in virtue of different associations of description and evaluation that guide observation in different directions, giving different shapes to the concept 'intelligence.' Chapter 3 considers how Huntington's theory of 'clash of civilisations' guides observations and explanations of international relations and terrorism. This, called the 'clash' scheme, is contrasted with the approach proposed by Kamali and Ramadan, informed by a conceptual scheme that I have called 'integrated.' Similar terms, such as identity, power, and religion, are used in both schemes, but they are used differently; they imply different features and evaluations that guiding observation in different directions and lead to contrasting explanations. Chapter 4

contrasts two approaches to criminal justice that are found in official documents from the United Kingdom and Sweden. More precisely, the former are documents that refer to England and Wales, since Scotland has a separate criminal justice system. Both describe rehabilitation as an aim of criminal justice, but rehabilitation takes considerably different contours in the two schemes, which I have called 'reformatory' and 'enabling.' Also in this case, similar terms are used in different ways that suggest different combinations of description and evaluation directing observation, and action, in different directions. These differences are tacitly guided by different conceptions of the human being that permeate the two schemes. Finally, Chapter 5 is dedicated to final remarks that follow from the previous chapters. That different observations find their rationale in different schemes does not involve that all schemes are equally satisfactory in epistemic terms. Some schemes are better than others in that they favour an expansion of the conceptual horizon to broader possibilities for understanding. Understanding, as intended in this thesis, refers to human matters and it does not solely indicate an intellectual endeavour, but also, and perhaps even more, first person experience that involves feeling and sensing.

## Chapter 1: Conceptual Schemes, Seeing, and Blinkering

*'Our attempts to make sense of the world are necessarily informed by the network of possibility that we bring to bear on the world'.*

(Grimm, 2008, p. 486)

We naturally tend to make sense of the world and find explanations for the phenomena we encounter; these attempts involve judgment, but how we judge a situation depends on what we see, i.e. what elements we take to constitute it and consider relevant to understanding it. One could reply that explanation and understanding rest on facts, but how do we gather the facts that inform our inquiry? This work is dedicated to explore what is involved in this process looking at the relation between conceptual schemes<sup>2</sup> and possibilities for understanding. Conceptual schemes are inevitable; we only have finite access to the world, constrained by what kind of creatures we are, and by the way in which past experience has shaped our explanatory repertoire. This involves implicit choices concerning elements that are considered salient in making sense of something, and elements that are not seen, or dismissed as irrelevant.

A treatment of conceptual schemes cannot disregard Donald Davidson's critique: accepting conceptual schemes involves dualism and non-intertranslatability. This is not necessarily the case, as I discuss in section 1 through an account of theoretical positions, including Davidson's. My treatment of conceptual schemes is guided by what they do; concepts, and their linguistic expressions, provide the conceptual horizon that shapes new experience and belief formation. We find a fluctuating structure where concepts make sense in virtue of their relation with other concepts, rather than static definitions. This structure results from previous experience,<sup>3</sup> informs beliefs, and shapes new experience. Thus, accepting conceptual schemes does not involve accepting the sharp dualism criticised by Davidson where a framework of interpretation is imposed on pure sense data. Nor it needs to involve *a priori* concepts akin to Kantian categories; the framework is itself a product of previous experience and, as such, it is continuously shifting. It scopes what is seen and also prevents us from seeing elements that lie outside its conceptual horizon, which provides the boundaries of the conceivable. People may have different beliefs about the same thing, in which case we have disagreement, but they may also use the same words while talking about different things. In the latter case, we have different conceptual schemes, and the incommensurability that we face is far from the non-intertranslatability posited by Davidson; *it involves nearly imperceptible grey areas rather than sharp contrast.*

Section 2 examines how past experience settles into a scheme and comes to shape new experience. If concepts are not fixed, how can we have a somewhat stable framework, as suggested by the challenges posed by belief revision? A scheme becomes established and consolidates with use, and some elements of past experience become particularly ingrained; they constitute the ground for the presuppositions that shape new experience through inferential habits of thought.<sup>4</sup> Particularly central to the consolidation of a scheme are paradigms and loaded concepts. Paradigms, intended as exemplary problem solutions, have been widely discussed by Thomas Kuhn (1962/2012) who considered them prior to theory; on this reading, a paradigm contributes to the establishment of a conceptual

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<sup>2</sup> Conceptual schemes can also be referred to as 'conceptual frameworks'.

<sup>3</sup> Experience used in this thesis in a wider sense than 'sensory experience'.

<sup>4</sup> These processes may seem akin to the phenomenon called 'unconscious bias' in psychology, although I am not fond of the term 'bias.'

scheme. I hold that, even when an exemplar seems to appear out of sheer genius, it emerges from existing presuppositions that may be implicit, but nevertheless contribute to the development and success of the paradigm. This success, in turn, further enforces the presuppositions from which it originates. Section 2 introduces concepts that combine fact and value, and discusses their role in guiding observation. Known in meta-ethics as thick concepts, I call them loaded following Blackburn (in Kirchin, 2013) to stress that what is loaded can be unloaded, or defused as I like to say. It is often the case that supposedly factual explanations rest in conceptual schemes permeated with loaded concepts that, with paradigms, contribute to the consolidation of existing inferential habits of thought.

If what we see is set by the scope of the conceptual horizon provided by the conceptual scheme, enforced by paradigms and loaded concepts, we may be doomed to only seeing what coheres with our scheme. Can we access what is beyond our conceptual horizon? If with 'beyond' we intend a neutral reality, as if taking off coloured glasses, the answer is no. However, 'beyond' may indicate engagement with different schemes, which sheds light on the elements where they are 'out of tune' or dissonant; focussing on these elements may expand the conceptual horizon. However, this may not be possible if people with different conceptual schemes talk past each other. The situation is not so dramatic. Even when people talk past each other there is some level of communication, and nothing, in principle, that hinders their ability to learn another language, be it metaphorically or literally. Some cases may be more difficult, but it is not a theoretical impossibility. Davidson was right about this.

But identifying where conceptual schemes are out of tune does not help us to understand why this is the case. If I call intelligent a math wiz, and you call intelligent the Eskimo kid, in virtue of him being Eskimo, we may notice that we are out of tune but the conversation ends here, unless we reveal our respective, and contrasting, assumptions and presuppositions, which are often implicit. In section 3 I propose disentangling to increase awareness of the implicit elements that are taken for granted when we use a concept within a conceptual scheme. This involves identifying the specific descriptive features and evaluations they trigger in order to understand what we actually do when we use the term, i.e. what features we endorse, or deprecate. Disentangling shows that the same terms, used in different conceptual schemes, presuppose different combinations, and opens a venue for widening the conceptual horizon that does not solely rest in the confrontation of facts, but also in an expansion of the evaluative and emotional experience involved in how facts are gathered and assessed.

## 1 Conceptual Schemes

Michael P. Lynch (1997) identifies two predominant models of conceptual schemes and names them Kantian and Quinean. In the Kantian model 'conceptual schemes are frameworks of categorical concepts which are used in cognising any possible experience.' (Lynch, 1997, p. 408) On this view, categorical concepts are faculties of the mind that organise 'raw unconceptualised intuitions into conscious experience' (Ibid. p. 409), and conceptual schemes are constituted by these categorical concepts. Schemes are identical if they share the same categorical concepts. These frameworks are fixed and presuppose a sharp distinction between what is formed and what is being formed; a sharp analytic/synthetic distinction. Categorical concepts are foundational in the sense that all possible experience presupposes them. Since categorical concepts are hard wired, there cannot be different schemes. The Quinean model is currently predominant in philosophy

and it posits that a conceptual scheme is a ‘language’, constituted by the ‘sentences accepted as true.’ (Lynch, 1997, p. 412) Schemes are identical if they are translatable in the extensional sense, i.e. the terms of CS1 and CS2 refer to the same extension. The analytic/synthetic distinction is abandoned. It follows that a scheme is coherent, i.e. there are no foundational concepts, and meets ‘the tribunal of experience’ as a whole; belief revision involves the adjustment of the whole structure. Unlike the Kantian model, the Quinean model contemplates schemes pluralism.

We now examine Davidson’s critique: that conceptual relativism entails dualism and non-intetranslatability before examining my position on conceptual schemes.

## 1.1 Dualism

‘Conceptual schemes, we are told, are ways of organising experience; they are systems of categories that give form to the data of sensation; they are points of view from which individuals, cultures, or periods survey the passing scene.’ (Davidson, 1973, p. 5)<sup>5</sup> Davidson seems to presuppose that conceptual schemes necessarily involve positing a reality beyond the scheme, be it constituted of pure sense data, the given, or a noumenal world; this is a neutral reality that, seen from different viewpoints, takes different forms as if conceptual schemes were filters. As Nicholas Rescher (1980) points out ‘it is always problematic to postulate the existence of something whose existence we cannot possibly describe... no one can possibly say what the given is – that it is inherently and necessarily beyond the reach of conceptualisation. .... If all “objects of thought” are constituted relative to conceptual schemes (which, after all, represents the role and mission of such schemes), then there cannot – *ex hypothesi* – be a thought-accessible pre schematic something for such schemes to schematise.’ (Ibid. p. 336-337)

A pre-schematic reality is not necessary for conceptual schemes. However, rejecting sharp dualism does not imply rejecting any distinction. For Simon Blackburn (2005) Davidson overreacts ‘against the idea of “blind intuitions” or “the myth of the given”’ (ibid. p. 7), an overreaction that, as often is the case, leads to the other extreme of the spectrum; the coherentism proposed by Davidson where ‘nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief.’ (Ibid.) And this is also inappropriate, since ‘it completely fails to take proper account of the role of the senses ... and the necessity of experience to justification.’ (Ibid.) Davidson concentrates his critique of conceptual schemes on the metaphors of organising and fitting, disregarding that ‘the metaphor that actually dominates modern empiricist thought – thought sensitive, for instance to “the myth of the given” – is neither of those. It is instead the metaphor of experience being shaped by what else is in the mind, including the deposits of previous experience and perhaps expectations, emotions, language, training and practice of all kinds. The idea is that experience would not be as it is, were it not for those things.’ (Ibid. p. 5) Being surrounded by people who speak a language unknown to us, goes Blackburn’s argument, is a disconcerting experience; we cannot make sense of anything. With time, ‘patterns emerge, sensitivities develop, habits of interpretation and expectation start up’ (ibid p. 6) and *the experience that we have at*

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<sup>5</sup> That there is ‘neutral content waiting to be organised’ (Davidson, 1973, p. 12) is attributed to Kuhn, but I would not be so quick to conclude that it appropriately renders Kuhn’s thought. Kuhn (1962/2012) questioned the idea of the given: ‘but is sensory experience fixed and neutral? Are theories simply man made interpretations of given data? The epistemological viewpoint that has most often guided Western philosophy for three centuries dictates an immediate and unequivocal, Yes! In the absence of a developed alternative, I find it *impossible to relinquish entirely that viewpoint. Yet it no longer functions effectively, and the attempts to make it do so through the introduction of a neutral language of observation now seem to me hopeless*’. (Ibid. p. 125)

*this point 'is not like Davidson's closet with the same elements in it, but differently arranged. The experience is different from top to bottom. ... Experience has been shaped, although ... it has been shaped in this case by practice at listening'* (Ibid. italics added), rather than by a conceptual scheme. For Rescher (1980) people with different conceptual schemes do not say different things about the same thing: they are not rearranging previous 'tokens', they are talking about something different. Similarly, Kuhn's scientists were not talking 'differently about the same object' (Rescher, 1980, p. 338); they said different things 'on the same theme.' (Ibid)

Accepting schemes amounts, for Davidson, to reintroducing the analytic-synthetic distinction that W.V.O. Quine (1951, 1969) had successfully challenged demonstrating that empirical data are theory-laden; the web of beliefs proposed by Quine meets the tribunal of experience in its entirety. However, it is Quine who is the target of Davidson's critique: 'retaining the idea of language as embodying a conceptual scheme ... means that in place of the dualism of the analytic-synthetic we get the dualism of conceptual scheme and empirical content ... I want to urge that this second dualism of scheme and content, of organising system and something waiting to be organised, cannot be made intelligible and defensible.' (Davidson, 1973, p. 11) Why does Davidson accuse Quine of reintroducing dualism, when he was the one who successfully questioned the analytic-synthetic distinction? For Quine all sentences express belief, that is synthetic, and none is immune from revision. Some are harder to revise because their revision requires more experience, as opposed to no experience, as would be the case if he endorsed the analytic-synthetic distinction. Statements at the edge of the web of beliefs are more easily revised in the light of disconfirming evidence, but their revision does not take place in isolation; adjustment at the edges involves adjustments throughout the whole web. The difference between more and less easily revisable beliefs is a matter of degree rather than the difference of kind implied by the analytic-synthetic distinction. (Quine, 1951, 1969) For Davidson, even a difference of degree won't do it. If adjustments of some beliefs at the edge lead to adjustments throughout the web, how does this adjustment take place? The web seems to presuppose a structure of relations among beliefs, which could be dangerously close to an analytic organising function. This may have been Davidson's concern.

However, a conceptual scheme needs not be analytic or *a priori*, certainly not in the strict sense of these expressions. The traditional characterisation of the *a priori* in philosophy involves that which is 'absolutely independent of all experience' (Kitcher, 1981, p. 218) or 'knowable with justification independent of experience' (Chalmers, 2011, p. 387), and 'immune to revision' (Kitcher, 1981, p. 222). In a weaker sense it may indicate that past knowledge informs new knowledge without implying that new knowledge is justified with no recurrence to experience or that is non-revisable. (Ibid.) Similarly, relations among beliefs need not be true in virtue of meaning regardless of experience, which would be the case with the scheme-content dualism denounced by Davidson. Rescher (1980) views conceptual schemes as non-fixed, evolving ways of thinking that fluctuate in past experience, hence *a posteriori* in relation to it, and weakly *a priori* in respect to new experience. (Ibid.) This does not involve theoretical a priority, but rather the projection of past experience into new experience.

## 1.2 Intertranslatability

The second objection advanced by Davidson addresses incommensurability: if there were different conceptual schemes, they would be incommensurable and, since Quine equated conceptual schemes with languages, incommensurable conceptual schemes would be non-

intertranslatable. 'We may accept the doctrine that associates having a language with having a conceptual scheme. The relation may be supposed to be this: if conceptual schemes differ, so do languages. But speakers of different languages may share a conceptual scheme provided there is a way of translating one language into the other. Studying the criteria of translation is therefore a way of focussing on criteria of identity for conceptual schemes.' (Davidson, 1973, p. 6)

He then sets off to demonstrate that the impossibility of translation, therefore incommensurability, does not obtain. Hence, there are no different conceptual schemes. Note that, for Davidson, something is a language if its utterances can be translated into our own. (Rescher, 1980) He identifies two types of incommensurability. Strong incommensurability indicates total failure of translatability where 'no significant range of sentences in one language could be translated into the other.' (Davidson, 1973, p. 7) Partial failure indicates that 'some range can be translated and some range could not.' (Ibid.) The idea of different conceptual schemes requires incommensurability, incommensurability implies non-intertranslatability, but something that is not intertranslatable cannot be called a language. And, if we call it a language, it means that we accept that it can be translated, which implies that it is not incommensurable. Thus, the impossibility to find a language that cannot be translated demonstrates the impossibility of incommensurability, and partial intertranslatability can do even less at providing proof of incommensurability.

The argument is demonstrated by observing that proponents of conceptual relativism translate into English supposedly alien conceptual schemes. Hence, Davidson seems to ask, how can they claim that they are incommensurable? 'Whorf, wanting to demonstrate that Hopi incorporates a metaphysics so alien to ours that Hopi and English cannot, as he puts it "be calibrated", uses English to convey the contents of sample Hopi sentences. Kuhn is brilliant at saying what things were like before the revolution using – what else? – our post revolutionary idiom.... The dominant metaphor of conceptual relativism, that of differing points of view, seems to betray an underlying paradox. Different points of view make sense, but only if there is a common coordinate system on which to plot them.' (Davidson, 1973, p. 6) And indeed Hopi sentences have been translated into English; the argument is logically impeccable, but do we understand Hopi from a literal translation? The following Melanesian utterance is translated into English, but we can hardly make sense of it: 'we run front-wood ourselves; we paddle in place; we turn, we see behind their sea-arm Pilolu.' (Rescher, 1980, p. 327) We need to look closer at what is meant with language, and translation for that matter.

Quine brought language, and meaning, in the 'public domain': sentence S in language L translates into sentence S1 in language L1 if they have the same extension. For Davidson, this is no different than saying that translatability is based on what speakers take to be true. A different conceptual scheme would then involve sentences that are taken to be true, but cannot be translated, but this cannot be the case since we cannot take utterances to be true if they cannot be translated. To posit translation as a criterion for something to be a language is debatable, as also stressed by Lynch (1997). Even accepting this criterion, a language is not solely constituted of declarative sentences with different truth conditions. As illustrated in the Hopi and Melanesian examples, literal translation does not take us far in terms of communication: 'language is a social art which we all acquire on the evidence solely of other people's overt behaviour under publicly recognizable circumstances'. (Quine, 1969, p. 27) And 'meaning is not a psychic existence; it is primarily a property of behaviour.... Language is specifically a mode of interaction of at least two beings.... It is therefore a relationship.' (Dewey in Quine, Ibid.) Whorf can understand Hopi because he

has learnt their language by *entering into this relationship* while the English speaker cannot make sense of the literal translation of the Hopi sentence because she is alien to the relationship; she has no more than signs. Quine's objection to reductionism (1951) posits that meaning does not rest in a word-to-word or sentence-to-sentence correspondence, but in the totality of statements that surrounds the utterance. Understanding involves identifying and acquiring the totality, although it inevitably involves applying our own patterns in a 'rationalisation of the *native* language that is simple and natural to us'. (Quine, 1969, p. 5) Understanding Hopi involves learning the relations that give meaning to the terms used. While I subscribe to the public dimension of language, I want to stress that the modes of interactions among beings do not only involve statements, but also first person experience.

But this, for Davidson, just confirms that there are no different conceptual schemes: that Whorf was able to learn Hopi indicates that even total incommensurability can be overcome, which demonstrates the absurdity of the idea of incommensurability. Indeed, if we take incommensurability to indicate universal impossibility, Davidson would be right, but there is no need to be so extreme. One's conceptual scheme can be expanded. Kuhn, for instance, mentioned learning another language where another language is more than words and their definitions; it involves the rearrangement of a system. (Kuhn, 1962/2012) I can learn Hopi and, potentially, overcome incommensurability, but this does not cancel that, right now, I could not understand what Hopis say even if it were translated into English.

What is incommensurability then? As treated here, we have incommensurability when 'communication breaks down' (Rescher, 1980, p. 328) and we need not look at extreme cases like Hopi. People may speak the same natural language, and yet speak 'different languages'; rather than distributing truth-conditions differently, they talk about different things. 'An insistence on intertranslatability into our language as test-criterion of the presence of a conceptual apparatus aborts any prospect of grasping how the differences between conceptual schemes actually work. For such schemes differ precisely where and just to the extent that the resources of paraphrase and circumlocution become necessary.' (Ibid. p. 327) 'Translation does not involve assigning precise labels to determinate objects where 'to switch languages is to change the labels.' (Quine, 1969, p. 27) We need to look at the whole structure and the whole structure is not only lexical; it also involves attitudes, emotions, and sensations. These too contribute to meaning.

### 1.3 A Third Model

After discussing the Kantian and the Quinean model of conceptual schemes, Lynch (1997) proposes an approach that he calls Neo-Kantian (NK) or Wittgensteinian. Since my proposal builds on Lynch's yet differs from it, I use the main elements of NK to introduce my approach.

According to Lynch 'conceptual schemes are schemes of concepts ... not the totality of sentences one accepts as true. Rather, it is a network of general and specific concepts used in the propositions we express in language and thought.' (Lynch 1997, p. 418) A concept is 'whatever composes the propositional content of our assertions and beliefs. Therefore, to have or grasp a concept involves being able to use it when asserting or believing. To have a concept of a tree is being able to pick out trees from non-trees.... This functional

characterisation of concepts does not itself imply any particular ontological view about what plays the role of concepts.’ (Ibid. p. 419)

Indeed, having the concept of a tree involves being able to pick out trees from non-trees, and I subscribe to the non-ontological characterisation of concepts, but this leaves us exposed to the Quinean’s rebuttal: to pick out trees from non-trees amounts to having certain beliefs about trees, why complicate the matter with concepts? Lynch does not address this problem, but if we retain concepts we need to explain why. After all, the questions that inspire this thesis may be formulated in terms of beliefs. One could ask: why do some scientists believe that intelligence is IQ and others believe that it is something else? Or, why do some believe that terrorism is motivated by religion and others believe that it is not? Or, why do some believe that crime prevention requires control while others believe that it requires growth? In fact, I had initially formulated these questions in terms of beliefs; ‘why believe p instead of q’, and ‘why are some beliefs so hard to revise even in the light of disconfirming evidence?’

I then came to realise that there is another layer that shapes and guides beliefs; this layer may well be constituted by other beliefs, but also by psychological and evaluative elements that guide belief formation in different directions. The relevant difference, i.e. the difference that I find of interest, is not necessarily a difference of kind, but rather a difference of function; concepts and beliefs do different things and acknowledging this functional difference helps understanding how we form certain beliefs and not others. Thus, retaining concepts helps us to understand belief formation and the difficulty of belief revision even in the face of the ‘tribunal of experience’.

This does not require an ontological stance about concepts nor the re-introduction of a sharp analytic/synthetic distinction. We can maintain that the difference is in degree, if we so wish, and not in kind. However, difference in degree is still difference. Indeed my having a certain concept of tree involves believing that a tree has a certain shape and is made of a certain material. However, once I have the concept of a tree, I have provided a scope to the beliefs that I can have about trees; the conceivable propositions about trees are limited by the parameters set by the concept. I do not formulate propositions where trees fly or have ears, for instance. That concepts provide a scope to beliefs, I want to stress, does *not* imply that what we empirically ought to believe depends entirely on choice of concepts: the physical sensory process of smelling does not change because I change its definition, nor do the cells in my hand on a hot stove react differently because I do not call it ‘burning.’ However, the themes that I treat in this dissertation (intelligence, terrorism, and rehabilitation) are further away from sensory experience, and in these cases concepts significantly guide experience, evidence gathering, and explanation.

That concepts set the scope for propositions and beliefs leads to another element that needs clarification. Lynch’s NK model ‘is consistent with, although it does not demand, taking these networks of concepts as essentially dependent upon or connected to language.’ (Lynch, 1997, p. 419) This requires clarifying what we mean with language. If we conceive of language in lexical terms, as Davidson seems to do, then I agree with Lynch; conceptual schemes are intertwined with language in the sense that language expresses them and, in turn, influences them, but they are not identical. On the other hand, if we consider language in the broader communicative sense, a literal translation does not help understanding what is said; translation obtains, but communication breaks down. An example may help. Kathrine Gluer (2011) uses the Swedish term *lagom* to support Davidson’s intertranslatability argument: the term is peculiar to Swedish culture, she

argues, and so it should be impossible to translate it into English. However, it can be easily translated as *not too much and not too little*. Indeed, if translation is the search for corresponding words from one language to another, we can say that we have translated *lagom*. But the literal translation would be of little support to the English speaker in using the term or understanding Swedes when they use it. At times she may succeed, but it would be a success due to chance more than competence. To grasp the application of the term one has to understand the situational nuances that guide its uses, which involve sensitivity to contextual elements that are not only factual or about a correspondence between words or systems of words or sentences. It is not application of rules either, if not loosely. More importantly, it involves experience of situations where the term is used. We may choose other, less loaded, examples. Lynch (1997) uses the concept of cow; it may be the case that, in hearing the word, both him and a Hindu will point at the animal, but this is hardly evidence that they have the same concept.

So, if we take language to be a system of terms, I agree with Lynch's proposal: conceptual schemes and language are linked but different. If we consider language in the broader sense of communication, conceptual schemes are languages and we may have different conceptual schemes even among people who speak the same natural language; they use the same words and do not understand each other. I do not have a strong position on whether the former or the latter account of language shall be adopted. What I think is important is to clarify what we mean with language when we discuss its implications with conceptual schemes. It should also be stressed that when the foreigner does not properly grasp the term *lagom*, there is no obstacle in principle to learning the cultural, contextual, experiential elements that lead to use the term appropriately. The theoretical possibility of expanding one's conceptual scheme, however, does not cancel the fact that at time  $t$  the conceptual schemes are different. Such difference may decrease, vanish, change, or increase at  $t + 1, 2, \dots n$ . That there is a difference in schemes does not imply that they will always be different or that such difference will be constant in time.

The next element that characterises Lynch's NK model consists in the requirement of a 'distinction between form (concept) and content (belief).... This in turn naturally implies that there is a distinction between analytic and synthetic statements.' (Lynch, 1997, p. 419) Although Lynch clarifies that this needs not be a sharp distinction, he holds that we can still 'maintain that there are some truths properly understood to be true in virtue of their component concepts, some truths which are true in virtue of the way the world is, and some truths (perhaps a great many in fact) which do not determinably fall into either of the other two categories.' (Ibid.) I do not think that discussing conceptual schemes requires the re-introduction of the analytic/synthetic distinction. Some propositions are taken to be true in virtue of meaning. Let us take the classic 'bachelors are unmarried men.' This is indeed analytic in that we do not need experience to say whether it is true or false. However, what is now an analytic statement has required, at some point, an experience of men and an experience of not being married that has been conceptualised as bachelor. As we will see in the following chapters, concepts that we take to be 'set' have considerably changed shape in the past, have different shapes in current debates, and will likely adopt different shapes in the future. Lynch allows that our concepts are not fixed; they 'change and grow.' (Ibid.) My reservation is that the introduction of the distinction in terms of analytic and synthetic does not capture the different function of concepts and beliefs and, more importantly, it does not capture how they contribute to *shaping each other*. We will get back to this shortly, but first we need to look at the last element of Lynch's NK model.

For Lynch '*schemes are contextually foundationalist*.... According to the Kantian model some set of categorical or basic concepts were absolutely basic.... But according to NK, basic concepts are *not* absolutely basic. They are contextually basic – basic ... within a context.... This is consistent with acknowledging that changes in which concepts are basic, or changes in the nature of those concepts, can occur *over time*.' (Lynch, 1997, p. 419) We have said earlier that, there needs not be a difference in kind between concepts and beliefs; the focus is on what they do. Concepts are used *locally a priori* in the sense that they scope the beliefs that one can possibly have once the concept is consolidated, though they originate from past experience. This does not necessarily imply that concepts are *a priori* in the classical sense, i.e. not threatened by experience. We can then concede that 'our conceptual mechanisms evolve in a historical dialectic of feedback between cognitive<sup>6</sup> projection on the one hand and experiential interaction with nature upon the other.' (Rescher, 1997, p. 340) As we will discuss shortly, my proposal involves that some elements of a conceptual scheme are more deeply rooted, and thus less questioned and revised. We may call this weak foundationalism, or contextual foundationalism, but we need to discuss why this is the case.

## 2 My Proposal

A network of concepts and relations amongst them is what I call a conceptual scheme. A scheme guides belief formation setting the 'conceptual horizon' (Rescher, 1980) of the conceivable. Concepts and beliefs are different in grammatical terms; a belief can be true or false while I cannot say that 'tree' is false (or true). But the difference that concerns me has to do with what concepts and beliefs do. Or rather, I should say, how we use them. In order to form beliefs about trees, I need to have the concept of tree and it is in virtue of this very concept that I form certain beliefs, while I do not consider others. And so concepts are central to my question: why do we see X and not Y? Seeing takes place within the scope of the conceivable (trees have branches) and not seeing, blinkering, has to do with what is outside the scope of the conceptual horizon. Rather than different truth-conditions, blinkering involves the unavailability of certain beliefs.

It may be the case that concepts originate in past beliefs that have been verified. These past beliefs, and the experiences they involve, become part of the concept and guide new experience and the formation of new beliefs, providing a direction to observation. The other element that differentiates concepts and beliefs has to do with truth conditions. We said that a concept is not true or false while beliefs are factual. Thus, beliefs are true or false, but the concepts that shape them may comprise non-factual elements. When we examine beliefs we look for evidence that verifies or refutes them, but we do not consider that *where* and *how* to look for evidence is guided by the concepts that are involved in the formation of the specific beliefs, i.e. a conceptual scheme. This guidance often involves fact *and* value. As we see in chapter 2, the belief that intelligence is *g* or IQ and predicts success in life is verified by evidence showing that people with high IQ succeed more than others. If we stop here the belief is verified, we have a truth. But if we look at what guides the belief, we find a certain concept of intelligence (that involves fact *and* value) that is linked with a certain concept of success (that involves fact *and* value), and that the measurement of intelligence so conceived is linked with a certain concept of science (that involves fact *and* value). Belief formation, and revision, involves a system that is not only factual, but also evaluative.

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<sup>6</sup> I would use projection here, without characterizing it as *cognitive*.

Conceptual schemes are expressed in language, if with language we refer to words and sentences, but they are not identical with language. People with different conceptual schemes may use similar terms, and yet speak different ‘languages’ in the richer sense. For Rescher (ibid.): ‘to move from one conceptual scheme to another is in some way *to change the subject*. It is not a quarrel about the same old issues. If the conceptual scheme C1 is to be thought of as an alternative to C ... then one cannot think of C1 as involving a different assignment of truth-values to the (key) propositions of C. ... C1 involves different propositions altogether. ... *The key contrast is that between saying something and saying nothing – not that between affirmation and counter-affirmation, but that between affirmation and silence. The difference ... turn not on what they do say but on what they do not and cannot say at all, on matters that simply defy any attempt at actual translation.*’ (Ibid. p. 331 italics added) This introduces a central element: discussions of conceptual schemes have predominantly focussed on identity of meaning, extension, and truth conditions. In contrast, I want to stress the epistemic relevance of difference. Rather than an obstacle, difference may be a door to wider possibilities for understanding.

Conceptual schemes need not be *a priori* or constituted by analytic statements: ‘They are globally *a posteriori* as products of past experience; they are only locally *a priori* in a weak sense in that we bring them to the context of current experience and never encounter situations with a conceptual *tabula rasa*.’ (Rescher, 1980, p. 340) Rejecting sharp dualism does not necessarily involve rejecting that past experience, the ‘thick experience of our everyday life’ (C.I. Lewis in Baghramian, 1998, p. 290), informs our concepts that, in turn, shape new experience, *and are shaped by it*. If they were *a priori*, they could not be shaped by new experience. Instead, ‘as our beliefs change and alter, so do our concepts; and as our concepts alter, so do our beliefs.’ (Lynch, 1997, p. 417) Thus, a sharp distinction of form and content is not required by the idea of conceptual schemes.

So far, we have discussed what concepts and schemes do, but this does not explain how and why they have this role. An explanation could be the conventionalism proposed by Henri Poincaré (see Stump, 2015). Some empirical observations become established conventions that are no longer questioned, and take the status of laws. This may help explain one of the cases I examine; we could say that empirical observations have led to associate intelligence with *g*, and this has become an established and unquestioned convention. However, it is not a law; once a convention becomes a law it is fixed, and this is not the case. Even less it is a law that offenders are thugs or that Islam fosters violence, yet these presuppositions guide observation and explanation, as is examined in the following chapters.

Perhaps we have to go back to Quine. After all, even with conventionalism we have beliefs turned laws. In principle they are all beliefs; some are harder to revise than others, but difficulty does not imply impossibility. Empirical observations turned laws could still be changed, as Kuhn has compellingly demonstrated in his account of scientific revolutions. Quine is right in saying that, in principle, all elements of the web are revisable, but Kuhn and Poincaré are right in observing that the theoretical possibility of revision does not obtain in practice. Meeting the tribunal of experience most often leads to readjustment of evidence so that it coheres with the existing presuppositions. How to explain the many cases where disconfirming evidence does not lead to revision? Imre Lakatos (1970) may come in our rescue; he proposed that the hard core of a theory is surrounded by auxiliary hypotheses that constitute a protective belt. Disconfirming evidence leads to revision of the auxiliary hypotheses, protecting the hard core from revision. This brings us back to

Lynch's weak foundationalism and Strawson's basic concepts, 'the grasp of which are presupposed in our employing the large extent of our other more specific concepts.... Going without such a concept would severely limit and re-shape our conceptual life to the point of unrecognizability.' (Lynch, 1997, p. 417) Even if we accept Lynch's weak, or contextual, foundationalism, we need to understand how the weak foundation comes to constitute a foundation.

The interaction between concepts and beliefs is well exemplified by Wittgenstein's analogy of the river-bed: 'the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division between one or the other.' (1969, p. 15 and Lynch, 1997, p. 418) Concepts are not fixed entities; they may seem so if we consider them at a given time, but if we look at the long period we see that they change in virtue of the erosion of the water whose course is, in turn, guided by the shape of the river-bed. Concepts may be constituted by previous beliefs that have consolidated; like sediments transported by water they become part of the river-bed, and guide the course of new water. The consolidation of the river-bed and its guiding function is as much a matter of fact as it is of value.<sup>7</sup>

Particularly, the use of paradigms, as exemplary problem solutions, and loaded concepts contribute to the consolidation of a scheme. They do so in different ways, as we will see later, but both re-enforce the assumptions and presuppositions that are implicit to the scheme. With use, what is assumed and presupposed is internalised and becomes tacit. They become habits. These elements are shared, public, but what is public and shared interacts with the individual dimension that is constituted by personal experiences. To identify how a scheme guides what we see does not require the dualism criticised by Davidson. That observation is theory-laden does not necessarily imply that the two are inseparable; difference does not require sharp dualism. However, being aware and precise about the assumptions that we project onto experience may help to refine the relation between evidence and theory. That a bomb goes off is a fact. That the man who planted the bomb is Muslim, if that is the case, is also a fact. However, these two facts, by themselves, do not constitute evidence of religious terrorism; the latter is the case *if and only if* he acted *because* of his faith. A background theory that presupposes Islam to be a violent religion and Muslims hating the West guides observation and directs where to look for evidence: was the man Muslim? In which case we would infer that his action is explained by religion, while the observation of elements that may have no relation with religion is unavailable, although it may be critical to explanation. I am not suggesting that we should look for a supposedly neutral reality *beyond* the scheme. Between the extreme represented by an Archimedean point, and the extreme of conflating theory and observation, we can find ways to be aware of what constitutes our facts, and of what role theory and value play in their constitution. Contrasting different schemes, and moving *across* them, highlights differences, and it is precisely there, where we find dissonance, that we have an opportunity to learn a different language, and a different way of seeing. Contrast reveals what is tacitly implied in how we use certain terms by engaging with those who do other things with them. It is a more demanding endeavour than looking for similarity and coherence, not the least because different schemes often involve different combinations of fact and value; engagement is in the first person.

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<sup>7</sup> In some schemes more than others, as we will see.

### 3 Paradigms and Loaded Concepts

Before examining how to widen the conceptual horizon we need to consider how the current one comes to take its shape. Paradigms and loaded concepts contribute to consolidating a scheme and the beliefs it involves. They are not necessarily connected; a paradigm may involve evaluative load, or not. A loaded concept may function as a paradigm, but it is not necessarily so. Both have rhetorical power in that they convince that the current approach is correct, although they assist this function in different ways; the former in virtue of efficacy and the latter in virtue of evaluation.

#### 3.1 Learning to See Through Exemplars

Thomas Kuhn (1962/2012) studied the significance of paradigms in scientific practice, although his use of the term in the *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (SSR) was rather broad.<sup>8</sup> At times he seemed to talk of paradigms as I do of conceptual schemes: ‘the existence of the paradigm sets the problem to be solved; often the paradigm theory is implicated in the design of apparatus able to solve the problem’ (ibid. p. 27), ‘paradigms determine fact gathering: which [facts] are important, which give predictions’ (ibid. p. 26), ‘restrictions that bound the admissible solutions to theoretical problems’ (ibid. p. 39), ‘network of commitments (conceptual, methodological) is a principal source of the metaphor that connects normal science to puzzle solving because it provides rules that tell the practitioner (of a mature science) what the world and his science are like.’ (Ibid. p. 42)

He later clarified that there are essentially two ways to characterise a paradigm: ‘On the one hand, it stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques shared by the members of a given community’, and ‘on the other, *it denotes one sort of element of that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science*’. (Kuhn, 1962/2012, p. 174 italics added) For Kuhn the latter was ‘the most novel and least understood aspect of [SSR].’ (Ibid. p. 186; Bird, 2005, p. 101) For Kuhn, paradigms were prior to theory and, as such, they contributed to the generation and establishment of a conceptual scheme. However, I propose that the appearance of a paradigm also happens within a conceptual scheme that sets the scope for what can be conceived as a problem solution. The scheme may not be established, it may be implicit, and the success of the paradigm may indeed contribute to its establishment and consolidation, but I disagree with the priority thesis, unless we clarify: prior in respect to what? An example is in order. The general intelligence factor,  $g$ , is the established paradigm of the mainstream study of intelligence, where it is used nearly as synonymous with IQ. When  $g$  was first calculated, the field was fragmented among various approaches that included Alfred Binet’s work on tests and Charles Spearman correlations that resulted in  $g$ . Until then scientists debated lively as to what approach was best and, not the least, what intelligence was. When  $g$  was calculated it seemed as if the enigma had been solved; there was *scientific* proof of a general innate ability, which quickly came to denote intelligence itself. However, this finding, and its quick rise to success, presupposed the belief that intelligence is an innate general ability that cannot be developed. Binet developed tests as well, but did not share this view, and did not orient his empirical work in search of an innate, largely fixed, ability that determines a cognitive difference among individuals. So,  $g$  did indeed appear on the scene as the solution to a

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<sup>8</sup> In the first edition of SSR he used the term in twenty-two different ways, as pointed out by Masterman (in Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970).

puzzle that catalysed and oriented further mainstream work, but it rested on certain presuppositions. Once calculated, it proved to be successful in many respects; it allowed the establishment of psychology as a true science, on the model of the natural sciences based on quantitative calculations, measurements, and predictions. It was also successful in practical terms in that it allowed the development of standardised tests, solving the problem of allocating people to different education paths and occupations in a way that was coherent with the belief of innate abilities, thereby confirming the presuppositions from which it originated, i.e. there is a distinctive mark at birth that underlies success in life. The success of *g*, in scientific and practical terms, consolidated the conceptual scheme and directed further scientific research: ‘The new paradigm implies a new and more rigid definition of the field. Those unwilling to accommodate their work to it must proceed in isolation or attach themselves to some other group’. (Kuhn, 1962/2012, p. 19)

In grammar, paradigms are often employed to learn the conjugation of verbs; they are models or patterns to be replicated. In science they are rarely an object of replication, rather ‘an object for further articulation and specification under more stringent conditions, like in common law. At its first appearance it is very limited in scope and precision ... then paradigms gain their status because they are more successful than their competitors in solving a *few problems that the group of practitioners has come to recognise as acute*.’ (Kuhn, 1962/2012, p. 24, italics added) In this way it strengthens the conceptual scheme: ‘success is at the start largely a promise of success discoverable in selected and still incomplete examples. Normal science consists in the actualisation of that promise ... achieved by extending the knowledge of those facts that the paradigm displays as particularly revealing, by increasing the extent of the match between those facts and the paradigm’s predictions, and by further articulation of the paradigm itself.’ (Ibid.) We see here that the rhetorical power of paradigms starts to emerge in that it further scopes what is considered salient providing a direction for further refinement of the theory, a direction that convinces of the validity of its presuppositions: ‘Only a change in the rules of the game could have provided an alternative.’ (Ibid. p. 40) We will talk later about how to change the rules of the game, or at least how to make it conceivable. For now, let us look closer into how the exemplary problem solution contributes to the consolidation of the conceptual scheme.

It is through exemplars that the sensitivity to perceive similarities is developed, but this happens within the scope of the existing conceptual horizon. Bird identifies the following characteristics (2005, p. 102):

- Selecting puzzles, solving them, and assessing the quality of the solution is *driven by perceived similarity* with exemplary puzzles and solutions (paradigms)
- The ability to perceive those similarities is acquired through training with paradigms
- This ability is an ability to perceive patterns, and
- It does not involve following rules.<sup>9</sup>

Exemplars are the practical, heuristic, way through which members who share a conceptual scheme ‘learn to see the same things when confronted with the same stimuli by being shown examples of situations that their predecessors in the group have already learned to see as like each other and as different from other sorts of situations.’<sup>10</sup> (Kuhn, 2012, p.

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<sup>9</sup> Bird does not specify if this refers to explicit or implicit rules.

<sup>10</sup> Without this, Kuhn explains, people exposed to the same sensory stimuli would have different sensations. This is due to the fact that, in spite of the tendency to associate stimulus with sensation, the same stimulus

192) For Kuhn, learning takes place in action through the exposure to similar patterns and the identification of similarities and analogies. This helps the formation of analogical inferences through the development of sensitivity to the patterns to which one has been exposed. This process rests upon a capacity to recognise patterns at a glance rather than following rules, which was the predominant view of the time dominated by computational models of cognition. (Bird, 2005) The use of paradigms participates, *though not necessarily*, in the development of inferential habits of thought within a conceptual scheme that sets the scope and the logic that guides pattern identification. This process rests on analogical reasoning.

Analogical reasoning involves seeing patterns and recognising analogies with such patterns when meeting novel situations; it 'leads one to see the objects of thought as related to one another in a structure of ideas. ... So, just as one recognizes a face as a whole by perceiving the spatial relations of eyes, nose, mouth, and so on, one recognizes a puzzle or puzzle-solution by understanding the abstract relations of its parts.' (Bird, 2005, p. 106) But to compose a puzzle of a face, i.e. to see the relations among the parts as representing a face, one has to have seen a face before (or to have the concept of a face?). How can we 'recognise' something that was never seen before? New inferences are based on previous inferences; outputs become inputs. In this way, previous inferences are projected onto the new situation, or problem. At the simple level of a single operation it may be hard to see the difference with the dominant model based on logical rule following. However, in more complex processes, inferential habits that rest on analogies function as an internalised *intuition of patterns*. The paradigm provides a model for such internalised intuition of patterns based on the rationale that generated them, and perpetuates it. These analogies become nearly untouchable: 'paradigms are not corrigible by normal science at all' (Kuhn, 2012, p. 122) because they become tacit, silent axiomatic truths shared by those who share the scheme.

### 3.2 Rhetorical Power

Kuhn's description of the role of paradigms in normal science indicates a rhetorical function. In the preface to the 4<sup>th</sup> edition of the *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Ian Hacking (in Kuhn, 1962/2012) draws a parallel with *paradeigma* in Ancient Greek rhetoric (Hacking, 2012);<sup>11</sup> a salient example that provides guidance. (Arthos, 2003)

In rhetoric, the best argument is the one that convinces the audience as opposed to a dialectical argument where the aim is finding truth or a best course of action. A typical rhetorical argument takes the form of a monologue and it is spoken *to* an audience that often has short attention spans. Thus, brief arguments are preferred to long ones and are based on a *generally agreed common knowledge, which is often assumed and not stated*. (Hacking, 2012) A conceptual scheme constitutes generally agreed common knowledge and contains tacit assumptions that do not need to be made explicit; since the scheme is shared we have the same tacit assumptions and understand each other. This anchors rhetorical exemplars in the established conceptual scheme: 'A paradigm, or exemplar, is an instance that lends itself to a generalisation: we argue for x by citing y, which suggests generalisation G under which both x and y fall. So, *there is an empty space that can be filled with the similarity relations that*

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can produce different sensations, as well as different stimuli can produce the same sensation. 'The route from stimulus to sensation is in part conditioned by education' (Kuhn p. 192) and may be influenced by other elements as well that may have to do with the biology of the individual, see Blackburn (2010).

<sup>11</sup> Ian Hacking's lecture at Fishbein's conference, 2012: <https://vimeo.com/74681007>

*best fit the 'needs' of the context*'. (Hacking, 2012) But the empty space is filled with similarity relations that, as we have seen above, rest in analogies: 'these arguments by likeness look like analogies ... have a strong *hold on memory* ... examples must be *vivid*.... [They] work in a community only when they are ritualised, that is when there is a *rote procedure*.' (Ibid.)

In contrast, a dialectic process takes the form of a dialogue between parties, i.e. we talk *with* others rather than *to* them and all parties are engaged in listening and formulating a counter-argument. However, this is a matter of *form*, which may be deceptive. The rhetorical monologue does not necessarily take place with a speaker on stage and a listening audience; it may very well take place between two or more parties who appear to be engaged in a discussion. In other words, it may take the *form* of a dialectic interaction although the *substance* is that of the rhetorical monologue because the parties talk *to* each other in an attempt to convince, rather than being engaged with each other, in listening and talking, in an attempt to understand.

The exemplar, as used in this thesis, embodies the salient elements of the conceptual scheme and provides vivid examples that project these salient elements onto new problems. Similarly to the Greek *paradeigma*, it convinces of the validity of the adopted approach, not the least in virtue of the empirical verification that it provides. Its reliance on shared knowledge, often assumed and not stated, contributes to ruling out alternatives that are extraneous to the analogies and assumptions that constitute *our* common knowledge.

### 3.3 Loaded Concepts and Action

Loaded terms or concepts combine description and evaluation, fact and value, and like paradigms contribute to enforcing a conceptual scheme. Loaded concepts move to action in a certain direction.

Evaluation is here treated as closely related to the expression of attitudes, such as approval or disapproval, admiration, or rejection. A critic may argue that also terms like 'cold' and 'hot' are evaluative. They are indeed adjectives that indicate qualities, but these are not the focus on my enquiry. The critic may rebut that these too guide action; that I appreciate 'cold weather' is an evaluation and an endorsement of spending my holidays in Alaska rather than Greece. However, in endorsing Alaska I am not suggesting, nor expecting, everyone else to spend their holidays there instead of Greece. I may be surprised if they do not, and even wonder what is wrong with them, but I do not expect my evaluation to have normative implications. If I say that John is a terrible photographer, I am not merely saying that I would not hire him for a photo-shoot, but I am also suggesting that nobody should hire him. Here we start to see the elements involved in load, and action-guidance. Calling John a 'terrible' photographer indicates certain features in virtue of which I disapprove of him as a photographer. Telling you that he is a terrible photographer I am also, implicitly, prompting you not to hire him, although I would not hold it against you if you did hire him.

The concepts and terms that interest me have stronger normative implications; they are formulated as descriptions, but also implicitly suggest what one ought to do in virtue of evaluation. Such suggestion is subtle rather than explicit; it moves to action by way of whispering rather than shouting. For this very reason, it is important to pay attention to them and, as we will see later, to disentangle so that we become aware of how their

apparent innocuousness moves to action in powerful ways. Loaded concepts need not be ever present, but they are present enough to raise questions about the utter focus attributed to fact when we talk about evidence, particularly in cases like the ones that I investigate in this thesis that are themselves loaded: intelligence, terrorism, and rehabilitation in criminal justice.

Concepts that combine description and evaluation are known in philosophy as ‘thick’, a term made famous<sup>12</sup> by Bernard Williams (1985) in his *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*. For Williams they are world-guided and action-guiding; their use depends on the way the world is and they provide reasons for action. Since the 1950s they have been central to meta-ethical debates concerning the fact-value distinction.<sup>13</sup> Philippa Foot (1958) and Iris Murdoch (1956) argued that the very existence of thick concepts demonstrates the collapse of the fact value distinction, also extensively theorised by Hilary Putnam (2002). Proponents of the collapse of the fact-value distinction, such as Foot, Murdoch, Putnam, McDowell (1981, 1998) argue that the statement ‘John is kind’ identifies a property of John, i.e. ‘kindness’. On the other hand, we find those, like Hare (1952), Blackburn (1998, 2010), and Gibbard (1990, 1992), who argue that we can identify a descriptive element, fact, and an evaluative element, value. Following Blackburn, (ibid.) I call these concepts ‘loaded’ rather than ‘thick’ to highlight that they can be unloaded, or defused, which is what I propose with disentangling.

For now, we focus on the action-guiding element. Let us consider the following statements:

- 1 Jane hit John and he died
- 2 Jane caused John’s death
- 3 Jane killed John
- 4 Jane murdered John
- 5 Jane is a murderer

When we say that Jane hit John and he dies we are merely describing what happened and, similarly, when we say that Jane caused John’s death we provide a description, though we are adding an element that presupposes a theory of causation. That Jane has killed John implies that her actions caused John’s death, and so it may be seen as identical to 2 in merely linguistic terms. However, the term killing is slightly more evaluative than ‘caused’, i.e. it may have been an accident, but it invites blame more than talking about causes does. Or at least so it seems to me. If we say that Jane murdered John we add implicit detail not only in descriptive terms, but also in evaluative terms, i.e. if it was an accident we would not call it murder and the fact that we call it murder tells us that it wasn’t an accident (description) and that it was a despicable action (evaluation). If we go on to call Jane a ‘murderer’ we are not only reporting what she has done, but also suggesting features that have to do with the kind of person she is; not only her action is despicable, but this action reflects what sort of person she is and we despise her for it. Our attitudes and actions towards Jane change as well; we could be inclined to sympathise if it was an accident and, probably, avoid her if we are told that she is a murderer. Furthermore, in telling others that she is a murderer, we do not only justify our avoiding her, but also prompt them to do so.

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<sup>12</sup> The term was first introduced by Gilbert Ryle (1949) and Clifford Geertz (1973) made wide use of thick descriptions in ethnography.

<sup>13</sup> I will discuss the meta-ethical debate to the extent it concerns this enquiry, but cannot treat it at length. A suggestion for further work would be to examine the loaded terms that I present in the following chapters in relation with the meta-ethical debate.

The attitude involved in the evaluation, for instance sympathy, rejection or contempt, moves us to act in different ways: console Jane, avoid her, warn others against her. For Williams (1985; Kirchin, 2013) these concepts are practical in ways that others are not in that they provide reasons for action: ‘we apply these concepts to people, actions, and institutions ... to shape our view of how we should act in relation to them.’ (Kirchin, 2013, p. 63) The relation with action is variable: ‘what reason for action is provided, and to whom, depends on the situation, in ways that may well be governed by this and by other ethical concepts, but some general connection with action is clear enough.’ (Williams, 1985, p. 140) If I call Jane ‘murderer’ I express and justify my contempt; I have a reason to avoid her, and I am also giving you a reason to do so. This is of course an overly simplified example, since there will be other elements into play, such as other values and beliefs. Smith argues that these terms make ‘salient to users features that bear in some very direct way on what they have reasons to do’ (in Kirchin, 2013, p. 103), and I want to highlight that these salient features have to do with emotions; we avoid Jane not because of certain features or behaviours *per se*, but because we deprecate those features; they trigger emotions that move us away from her. It is in virtue of deprecating those features that we call her murderer. If we admired her for killing John we would call her something else than murderer, and would be disposed to act differently towards her.

We now need to look at the relation between world-guidedness and action-guidance. On some readings, world-guidedness indicates that the application of the term is determined by the way the world is, i.e. the concept is instantiated. On this view, to say that Jane is ‘kind’ indicates that she instantiates kindness, i.e. description and evaluation both manifest in an amalgam. Contrast the term ‘kind’ with the thin term ‘good’; if we say that a person or an action are good we are not communicating the elements in virtue of which we say that she is good. On the other hand, we find those who, like R.M. Hare (1952), argue that using terms like ‘kind’ involves identifying certain descriptive features and indicating that having such features is good, i.e. being ‘kind’ does not instantiate kindness, but rather instantiates certain descriptive features that are appreciated as kind. We find then Allan Gibbard’s (1990) analysis of the term ‘lewd’ that identifies four elements:

- 1) A description (display of sexuality)
  - 2) An attitude that is expressed (he calls it L-censoriousness)
  - 3) The acceptance of a presupposition (the importance of limiting sexual displays)
  - 4) The judgment that the feeling of L-censoriousness is warranted
- (Gibbard, 1990; Blackburn, 2010)

According to Gibbard the first three elements (description, attitude expressed, and acceptance of a presupposition) provide a rationale for the fourth element; the judgment that L-censoriousness is warranted. He considers all the four elements to be features of the meaning of the term. Blackburn (2010), however, points out that 3) and 4) are general presuppositions rather than features of meaning. For example, he writes, the utterance ‘John is using the computer’ does not contain acceptance of a system of norms just like yawning at dinner does not contain acceptance of a system of norms concerning ‘boredom’. (Blackburn, 2010) For Blackburn these are general presuppositions, rather than truths about the meaning of the term or utterance. Instead, he suggest that we ‘have an implicit or tacit practical epistemology’ (ibid. p. 135) that justifies the utterance. This practical epistemology, I want to stress, does not tell us something about the term; it guides how we use the term. Even more so, if we say that ‘John is using the computer like a nerd’, we imply descriptive features that we probably deride, and it is in virtue of such derision

that we call him nerd. I may admire these very features, in which case I may call him 'computer genius', but I may also call him 'nerd' with admiration. The system of norms by way of which we react with a certain attitude to certain features manifests in use, and Blackburn has a point; it is not 'inside' the meaning of the term and, even less it is fixed, because the term is used differently.

This is a subtle, but relevant, distinction. In uttering the sentence I am not necessarily consciously thinking about the background system of norms that regulates the use of the term and, even less, I intend to express, enforce or communicate this system of norms. I use the term this way because the system is in my background, *tacitly*: 'it is the fact that my utterance is norm-governed, rather than our capacity to bring the norms to consciousness, that matters to our capacity to give my utterance its sense. I do not express my system of epistemological norms when I utter, because I may not know what they are.... In this way, a norm governed epistemology is in the *background* of meaning.' (Blackburn, 2010, p. 136) One could say that my calling you 'rude' when you yawn at dinner implies the acceptance of a system of norms. These norms are not about 'rudeness', but rather about behaviours that elicit annoyance. However, in practical terms, my calling you 'rude' when you yawn at dinner does not only *presuppose* the system of norms in the background, but also *re-enforces* this system and it may seem to me, the user, that they are in the meaning of the term. It is obvious to me that yawning at dinner *is* 'rude'; I consider myself justified in being annoyed at you, because the background system is consolidated in my way of thinking (and feeling), but this differs saying that it is contained in the term. Nor it indicates that I have identified instantiations of 'rudeness.' What feature we admire or condemn varies in context and can go in many directions. Skinner (2002) exemplified this extensively in his analysis of the shifting use of evaluative and descriptive terms in early modern capitalism. Variations can happen in different ways. For instance, descriptive features change, as when 'providence' became associated with the 'exercise of care and foresight in monetary affairs' (ibid. p. 153), therefore commending such behaviour. In other cases descriptive features remain constant while evaluation shifts, as in the case of 'ambitious'; used predominantly in a derogatory way until the early-modern period when it became more neutral or even used to commend behaviour that had been previously disapproved. Similarly, the term 'shrewd' was used until that time to indicate disapproval and then came to express approbation. (Ibid.)

How does this relate to this thesis? Intelligence, objectivity, success, civilisation, power, identity, terrorism, rehabilitation, criminal, to name some, are loaded terms that figure in the following chapters. These terms 'float on a sea of associations that provide only a shifting, impermanent set of pressures on their applications.' (Blackburn, 2010, p. 140) They tend to be used as if the features, valuations, and system of norms that guide their use were set, i.e. as if they identified actual properties that are uncontested. And indeed, within the scheme they are uncontested; users of a scheme share the same system of norms, presuppositions and assumptions. However, if we open the scope and look across schemes, as Skinner shows in his historical perspective and in his genealogies there is no such specific general theory. Rather, various passing theories combine elements in different ways; what was commended becomes neutral, or disapproved of, and the very features that are commended, admired, or deprecated vary across time, and space. Concepts change shape like a river-bed eroded by the movement of the waters and, in turn, they guide the course of fresh water. People who share a conceptual scheme and its background system of norms tend to share the same attitude towards certain features, but this does not tell us that  $x$  features and  $y$  attitude are constitutive of the meaning of the term. And it does not tell us that we are pointing at instantiations of 'kindness', 'intelligence', or 'lewdness.'

Language is more ductile than that. Rather, it tells us that people who share a scheme *tend to* respond with certain attitudes to certain features. ‘Attitudes to these things are complex, fluid, and mobile’ (ibid, p. 138); these concepts carry ‘a complex drapery of religious, cultural and ritual history that thinking of it as tied to just one attitude is impossible ... we have no way of identifying the attitude expressed ... because there is no such thing as *the* attitude.’ (Blackburn, 2010, p. 139)

As we see in the following chapters, different uses of ‘intelligence’, ‘objectivity’, and ‘identity’ involve different features and attitudes. Intelligence as analytic capability is admired by some, but can be met with irony or rejection by others and, in turn, it may comprise features that are outside the scope of the former. Each use of the term rests on a background system that guides action in different directions ‘*encouraging a different practical cognitive attitude or direction of thought that the other does not.*’ (Blackburn, 2010, p. 145) The sea of associations in which these terms float does indeed set pressures on their application. This is a recurrent theme that does not only concern loaded concepts; as we have seen with paradigms, inferences and analogies fill the empty space with associations that rest on, often implicit, assumptions.

### 3.4 Assumptions and Blinkering

In the section on paradigms we saw that they guide inferences and now we have discussed loaded concepts and terms in relation to the background system that guides their use. The chain of inferences does not examine and justify every step. Some assumptions have become so ingrained and internalised that they are no longer manifest, i.e. they have become tacit, and some are never articulated. This does not solely concern paradigms and loaded concepts, but these are highly instrumental in this process that contributes to the consolidation and re-enforcement of a conceptual scheme, i.e. the system that provides a rationale for these inferences. This is why there is an advantage in examining conceptual schemes as opposed to beliefs; the core concepts of a scheme, the river-bed, may well originate in past experience, but by now they have come to be internalised and unquestioned. There is something to gain, epistemically and ethically, from questioning them.

We are often unaware of our tacit assumptions and discuss different topics at the level of explicit elements; puzzled by the conclusions reached by the other party, we tend to dismiss them as irrational. When we share a conceptual scheme, we understand each other because our implicit assumptions are, to a great extent, aligned, i.e. what is presupposed, and not said, needs not be made explicit. In other cases, we witness discussions that seem to be about the same explicit elements, particularly due to the employment of similar terms, but the use of these terms is guided by a different system of tacit assumptions. Since we cannot be omniscient, we have to establish points of reference in building our knowledge. When a paradigm is established, the previous assumptions and presuppositions that led to it are taken for granted; they become truths that no longer need to be stated and, even less, discussed or questioned. There is no need to discuss each concept that is introduced. (Kuhn 2012) Similarly, once I *know* what ‘rudeness’ is, I do not examine the background elements that guide how I use the term, particularly if I communicate with others who share my assumptions.

Thus, the implicit criteria of inferential thought and pattern recognition, harmonic with the logic of the conceptual scheme, guide what is seen and how it is taken into the existing

theory. With use, they become habits. Exemplars and loaded terms embody these criteria and also perpetuate them: potentially disconfirming evidence that lies outside the conceptual scope is not seen, and so it cannot lead to revision. Or, it may be seen but formulated in ways that cohere with the rationale provided by the scheme, enforced by paradigms and loaded terms. For instance, in the case of intelligence, if we subscribe to *g* theory, we may see that some people with high IQ commit crime or divorce or make fatal mistakes, but these observations do not lead to questioning the theory or the role of *g*. Instead, they are explained or adjusted so that they accommodate the theory; these observations ‘just’ show that nobody is perfect and that even intelligent people make mistakes but, when they do, they quickly get back on their feet, unlike the unintelligent. Mistakes committed by people with high IQ are seen as learning opportunities. Paradigms and load guide us towards incorporating and explaining new evidence into the existing theory in a way that avoids disruption.

But this is a problem, I call it ‘blinking’, and it works at two levels. Within one conceptual scheme we are blinkered from seeing how our observations are shaped by tacit assumptions and presuppositions. Between different schemes, ‘certain key questions, theses, and issues of one scheme are *unavailable* in the other’ (Rescher, 1980, p. 333), and so we have contrasting theories, each verified by facts, and debates take place at the level of evidence without considering the different systems that led to evidence gathering.

## 4 Disentangling

Disentangling involves identifying the descriptive and evaluative elements that constitute a loaded term or concept, and I propose it as a way to reveal the assumptions and presuppositions that implicitly guide inference and action. Through disentangling we become aware of what we do when we use loaded terms and concepts.

Disentangling is a contentious issue in meta-ethics and the core of the contention is the idea of thickness, briefly mentioned earlier. Proponents of thickness hold that fact and value are entangled in the meaning of a thick concept and cannot be separated. As the reader may anticipate, disentangling conflicts with thickness, which is one of the reasons why I call these terms loaded. But why care about thickness? We have already seen that its proponents (Murdoch, 1956; Foot, 1958, 1959; McDowell, 1998; Putnam, 2002) consider thickness to demonstrate the collapse of the fact-value distinction; if I say that John is kind, am I describing a feature of John or am I evaluating? I am doing both. That I am doing both is not a problem for advocates of disentangling who, however, hold that I am doing two things: I am detecting certain features and call John kind in virtue of how I evaluate those features. Entanglement, or thickness, on the other hand, involves detecting a property that is an amalgam of fact and value. If this is the case, the statement represents a state of the world, and can be true or false depending on whether John instantiates kindness. How do I recognise kindness? Being exposed to it in a cultural context, Williams’ social world (1985), I learn to recognise the property and its instantiations, as I learn to recognise colours.

On the other side we find those, like Blackburn (1981, 1992, 1998, 2010) and Gibbard (1990, 1992), who argue that the combination of description and evaluation does not preclude identifying the features (description) that prompt the sort of appreciation (evaluation) that I call kind. That there is synergy between two elements does not cancel that they are two elements. The debate is often characterised as taking place between

cognitivists and non-cognitivists: cognitivism holds that ethical statements involve beliefs that can be true or false while non-cognitivism is characterised by the view that ethical statements express attitudes, which are not true or false in the descriptive sense. For the cognitivist, to say that murder is wrong expresses a belief that is T or F based on the way the world is. For the non-cognitivist, saying that 'x is wrong' expresses condemnation of murder. I am not reporting a description of the action 'murder' nor describing a mental state; I am expressing an attitude. Similarly, if we take the loaded term 'kind', to say that John is kind is, for the cognitivist, a statement of fact that involves the detection of the property 'kindness.'<sup>14</sup> For the non-cognitivist the descriptive component of a thick concept identifies features that prompt a certain emotional response; it is in virtue of the evaluation of certain features that we apply the term to a specific extension, rather than in virtue of detecting a thick property.

I apologise for this very simplified account; since I am endorsing disentangling, mentioning the debate was in order, but cognitivism and non-cognitivism comprise a rich variety of approaches<sup>15</sup> that cannot be treated in depth here. Moreover, not all cognitivists oppose disentangling (Kirchin, 2013) or at least can accept a weak version of it and, to some extent, I hope that my proposal could accommodate both approaches.

I have suggested that loaded concepts and terms are important elements that contribute to the consolidation of a scheme, and shaping experience, and that disentangling is needed to reveal the implicit assumptions and presuppositions that guide action. We learn indeed to recognise 'kindness', and treat it as a property, by being exposed to its manifestations in a specific context. We learn to evaluate certain features by being exposed to a shared, social, context, Williams' (1985) 'social world.' This provides the background system of norms that we have discussed above; a system that has become habitual. It is within this system that we learn to make inferences based on analogies, but this is how we learn anything, not kindness in particular, and it does not necessarily indicate that kindness *is* something. Rather, it tells us how we use the concept. This is, in fact, also how Kuhn explained the role of paradigms in rote learning: we are exposed to birds and we learn to recognise birds. Likewise, we are exposed to (what others in our 'social world' call) 'kindness' and we learn to recognise a kind person or act. We develop a sensibility, as McDowell (1981, 1998) would probably say rather than identifying specific features and evaluations, just like when we see a bird we know that it is a bird; we do not check if it has wings and feathers.

Loaded concepts are 'shapeless'; there is no exhaustive list of common features that characterise *all* conceptions of kindness, which is an argument used by proponents of thickness to support the view that we can only rely on our special sensibility to detect the property.<sup>16</sup> The difference between McDowell and Blackburn, who have been at the centre of this debate, is that the former holds that the special sensibility identifies 'kindness' as one property while the latter holds that the special sensibility involves responding with a certain attitude to specific features. I call John 'geek' because he is interested in computers (descriptions) and, *in virtue of that*, I dislike him (evaluation). (Blackburn, 1981, 1992, 2010, and in Kirchin, 2013) But I may have the utmost admiration for people who are interested in computers, in which case I may call John 'ace' and the person I call 'geek' would

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<sup>14</sup> This is a particular view within cognitivism; McDowell's Sensibility Theory, and I use it here because the debate has developed originally between McDowell and Blackburn.

<sup>15</sup> For instance, Blackburn's quasi-realism originates in non-cognitivism, but allows that ethical statements can be true or false on a deflationist conception of truth; Error Theorists are cognitivists and hold that all ethical statements are false, thus we are always in error when we utter them.

<sup>16</sup> One could argue that we face a similar problem with birds, or any other concept for that matter.

probably have other features. I propose to use sensitivity instead of sensibility, since the latter suggests sensing something while sensitivity indicates that we learn to respond, emotionally, in certain ways to certain features. We learn what features are praised, blamed, admired, mocked. That these features are praise-, blame- or mock-worthy is not a property of the features, but rather indicates the tacit system of presuppositions to which we have been habituated. We admire social status and call it success because this is what others around us do; the sensitivity is learnt and shared, but it is not solely a matter of sensing, it also involves what makes us feel accomplished and admired. When we get a good grade in school and others praise us calling us intelligent we feel proud and moved to doing it again; we like to be praised, and we also learn that *that* is what intelligence is. But, *is* it?

If we support entanglement, or thickness, the tacit elements involved in the supposed sensibility remain tacit. They continue to guide action by way of whispering a direction; we learn to detect and appreciate success, and are moved to be successful, but we are not aware what specific features we call successful and why they are admired. 'The delicate ways in which language encourages and discourages, invites and often profits from, movements of the mind that are nothing to do with logical implications, are too often invisible' (Blackburn, 2010, p. 145) and this is a problem because we cannot see in what ways theory, in the loose sense of background system and also in the scientific sense, guides thought and action. Thus, blinkering is strengthened and so are tacit inferential habits; certain extensions are chosen as obvious instantiations of the 'property' while others are unconceivable. I say that Brazilian street children are intelligent and you say that they are absolutely not. Why, I ask. Because their tests show that they have low IQ. That's rubbish, I say, they are successful. This short exchange involves loaded concepts, intelligence and success, clearly applied to different extensions. We can close the discussion and agree to disagree; after all, we may have acquired different sensibilities to 'intelligence' and 'success' in our respective social worlds, and the matter cannot be settled. We are incommensurable. But even if the matter could not be settled, there is something to gain from understanding what we are doing when we call the Brazilian children intelligent, or not, because we are identifying some descriptive features as salient in virtue of how we evaluate, and this guides attention when we gather evidence.

But identifying what is admired or disapproved of in virtue of some features and not others (not that the features that are excluded are as significant as the ones that are salient) involves identifying description and evaluation. It involves disentangling. We may then find that, in applying the attribute 'intelligent' differently, I express admiration for those who succeed in a dire environment and, perhaps, annoyance at those who do well in school. You, on the other hand, value and admire those who do well in school, period. Both views rely on tacit elements that remain tacit when we talk with people who share our scheme; we all know what intelligence is and, we conclude, have the same sensibility. However, it may also be that we have the same sensibility because our shared, habitual, criteria imply the same combinations of description and evaluation and this is why we understand each other. In Gricean terms we would say that we share the same implicatures (Grice, 1989), but we call it a special sensibility to detect a property. If we endorse thickness we close the door to exploring what this sensibility consists of. Disentangling opens these doors revealing what is implied and not said, and shows that sensitivity is involved. Why would we want to open these doors? After all, ignorance is bliss, some would say.

Firstly, the unreflective use of certain terms and concepts, precisely because it relies on assumptions that are tacit and unquestioned, may perpetrate the appreciation or deprecation of features that we are not aware of. Let us take the famous example of a

community where women are appreciated for being cute, and thus strive to be called cute. (Blackburn, 2010 and in Kirchin, 2013) On the entanglement view people learn to recognise cuteness when they see it, and in so doing they perpetuate the tacit criteria that are implied in their use of the term. If we disentangle, on the other hand, we see that there are descriptive features of cuteness that make a woman cute in virtue of having them, which guides women to displaying such features, since they want to be appreciated. These features are: childlike, naïve, not so witty, helpless, which prompts a condescending attitude. Women are appreciated as cute in virtue of those very features. (Ibid.) Perhaps, but not necessarily, upon consideration of the specific features, women may no longer be so eager to be called cute, and question whether these are the features they want to be *appreciated for*. The answer may well be a strong ‘yes’. Nevertheless, we cannot have the conversation, nor decide whether or how we want to use the term, had we not disentangled. If we take the use of loaded terms as detection of something that involves a ‘single simple experience whose content is not describable in any other terms’, as proponents of thickness suggest (Blackburn in Kirchin 2013, p. 124), we perpetuate the existing background presuppositions, and keep them hidden. As I have explained in the previous section, we reinforce blinkering, and deny the variable, fluctuating, subtle workings of these concepts, and language in general, as lively elements of human experience.

Secondly, and more importantly to the aim of this thesis, it confines our understanding of phenomena to possibilities available in the conceptual horizon that we share with our inner circle. We are able to talk with those who have the same presuppositions and tacit assumptions, favouring what Blackburn calls a ‘creeping complacency’ (ibid. p. 127) that encourages ‘a separation of those with whom we can talk from those whom we cannot, and an easy excuse for turning our backs on the latter excluding them from the sphere of discourse.’ (Ibid.) But the ones with whom we cannot talk are the ones who may be seeing what we are blinkered from, and vice-versa; they are precisely the ones we should engage with. The various passing theories involve ‘projecting, staining, and gilding’ (ibid. p. 124), this is simply how we make sense of things and it is not good or bad. What I think is bad, however, is missing the chance to understand how this guides observation; to understand what constitutes *our* facts and to consider the facts that others see, but are unavailable to us.

When I talk about understanding or widening the conceptual horizon I am not proposing that this is solely an intellectual activity. Increased awareness and understanding, as I discuss them here, follow from first person engagement with ideas and attitudes. For instance, one may have previously associated the term cute with delicacy or grace, which may evoke admiration. Disentangling brings to attention features such as childlike behaviour and helplessness, which may prompt different attitudes, perhaps irritation, annoyance, or even shame. Experiencing the different attitudes evoked by the new features may lead one to avoid the term, to be more cautious, or to ‘see’ helplessness when others use it. Were this to happen, it would be more in virtue of the new, felt, experienced attitudes and less due to logical reasoning. Thus, increased awareness of what we do when we use concepts, widening the conceptual horizon, expanding possibilities for understanding are not proposed in this thesis as intellectual exercises; they call upon all human faculties and involve thinking as much as feeling and sensing. When attitudes change also the conceptual horizon changes, and so does what we see.

## 5 Conclusion

Retaining concepts and conceptual schemes, as opposed to only considering beliefs, helps to understand how we form certain beliefs and not others. This does not presuppose the dualism criticised by Davidson, and it does not require the reintroduction of a sharp analytic/synthetic distinction; accepting that observation is guided by theory, and sometimes by evaluation, does not necessarily imply that we cannot identify how the two interact. In fact, I urge that we should identify these elements. Some concepts come to constitute a core of assumptions and presuppositions that are largely assumed and not said; they tacitly shape new experience suggesting associations and inferences that are murmured rather than shouted. “When you are criticising the philosophy of an epoch do not chiefly direct your attention to those intellectual positions which its exponents feel it necessary explicitly to defend. There will be some fundamental assumptions, which adherents of all the variant systems within the epoch unconsciously presuppose. Such assumptions appear so obvious that people do not know what they are assuming because no other way of putting things has ever occurred to them. With these assumptions a certain limited number of types of philosophic systems are possible, and this group of systems constitutes the philosophy of the epoch”. (Alfred North Whitehead, 1926, p. 61, in Lawson, 2016) Tacit assumptions are consolidated and perpetuated by the use of a scheme and, particularly, by paradigms and loaded terms and concepts. The latter guide action in virtue of their combination of fact and value protecting the existing conceptual horizon. Disentangling reveals the tacit presuppositions involved in the use of loaded concepts.

One could object that, if what we see is shaped by a scheme, we cannot access the unavailable. Looking at different schemes and examining elements of contrast we open doors to new ways of seeing. The critical reader may argue that this is still done from one conceptual scheme, i.e. the author’s. Indeed, I do not claim that my proposal leads to a neutral account of how things are in the realist sense. My claim is more modest: if observation is theory-laden, there is something to gain from understanding *what we do* when we use a theory, and what we do *not* do, but *others* do.

The following chapters examine contrasting positions in the study of intelligence, international relations and terrorism, and rehabilitation in criminal justice. As in Whitehead’s words, these approaches propose descriptive positions that are explicitly defended, but they rest in different conceptual schemes that imply assumptions and patterns of inference that guide what is seen as salient evidence. In all cases the explicit contrast takes place at the level of fact, but the conceptual schemes contain loaded concepts, including the very phenomena under study. Often, though not always, what we factual evidence is shaped by tacit evaluation. Disentangling shows that tacit evaluations associated with description guide thought and action in different directions.

## Chapter 2: Facts are Facts and Intelligence is IQ.

### 1 Introduction

In everyday language it is often assumed that intelligence is IQ<sup>17</sup>. However, intelligence researchers are involved in animated debates concerning the relation between intelligence and  $g$ , the general intelligence factor measured by IQ, and its implications. In this chapter we examine the contrasting approaches proposed by Linda Gottfredsson and Robert J. Sternberg. The former holds that intelligence is a natural ability captured by  $g$ , and measured by IQ, that predicts success in life. The latter questions the significance attributed to  $g$ , arguing that it measures a limited manifestation of intelligence, i.e. analytic ability, but overlooks other crucial elements that are as constitutive of intelligence as  $g$ , if not more. Do these scholars disagree about the same phenomenon or do they talk about different things? We examine their conceptual schemes and find that they use similar, if not identical, words, but their concepts of success, education, science, involve different descriptive and evaluative features that guide belief formation, and action, in different directions.

Before examining the two schemes I take a short excursus into the various shapes that intelligence has taken throughout history. As Quentin Skinner often highlights in his remarkable genealogies, concepts are hardly fixed by a definition, but rather change in the use of language that is situated in historical and social context. Far from being an exhaustive genealogy, this short historical background shows that intelligence, understood as IQ, and its paradigm  $g$ , emerged in a specific historical and social context in response to specific scientific and social demands.

#### 1.1 The Many Shapes of Intelligence in History

For the ancient Greeks intelligence represented what distinguished humans from other species (Curtis and Glaser, 1981). Plato wrote about intelligence as the ability to learn, while Aristotle saw it as quick wit. (Sternberg, 1990) Montaigne dissociated intelligence from the acquisition of notions; for him intelligence had to do with an inquisitive mind and with the awareness of one's strengths and weaknesses. The unintelligent were the ones who conformed: 'who by reverence and obedience simply believe and are constant in their belief'. (Ibid. p. 26) Thus for Montaigne, the ability to change beliefs was a manifestation of intelligence. Hobbes distinguished between 'natural' and 'acquired wit'. People are not very different at birth, i.e. natural wit is not remarkably different, although may involve different skills. A significant difference among people, however, Hobbes finds in motivation, which he called 'passions': 'the causes of these differences of wits are in the passions, and the difference of passions proceedeth partly from the different constitution of the body, and partly from different education.' (Ibid. p. 27)

Blaise Pascal identified two sorts of intellect, 'the one able to penetrate acutely and deeply into the conclusions of given premises, and this is the precise intellect; the other able to comprehend a great number of premises without confusing them, and this is the mathematical intellect.' (Sternberg, 1990, p. 28) Some people are more intuitive and non-sequential; they judge at a single glance. Others are more analytical and proceed deductively

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<sup>17</sup> This chapter is inspired by my MPhil dissertation *Facts are Facts, the objective measurement of intelligence*.

from premises to conclusions. Adam Smith held that difference among individuals does not depend on natural talent, but on work: ‘the difference between the most dissimilar characters, between a philosopher and a common street porter, for example, seems to arise not so much from nature as from habit, custom, and education. When they came into the world ... they were perhaps much alike ... [and] come to be employed in very different occupations. The difference of talents comes then to be taken notice of, and widens by degrees, till at last the vanity of the philosopher is willing to acknowledge scarce any resemblance.’ (Sternberg, 1990, p. 30)

How to reconcile the variety of these approaches with the current predominance of intelligence as IQ? Some would argue that the latter is the result of scientific progress; the tools of science have allowed us to identify what intelligence actually is, and to measure it. This belief informs current *g*-theory, and relies on the significance of *g* (the general intelligence factor), calculated by Charles Spearman in 1904.

## 1.2 Emergence of a Paradigm

Towards the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century psychology begun its transition into a fully-fledged science. For this transition to be successful, the employment of methods that allowed objective measurement, on the model of the natural sciences, was paramount. In this period Alfred Binet (1898, 1904)<sup>18</sup> conducted his studies on intelligence and its testing. His work was France’s cultural context at this time, permeated by solidarism; reliable tests were needed in order to identify pupils who had actual learning difficulties (as opposed to those deemed as such by the subjective judgment of a physician), and to monitor their progress, i.e. to evaluate the effectiveness of pedagogical methods in supporting and improving their learning. (Foschi and Cicciola, 2006) This presupposes the plasticity of cognitive capability. In fact, Binet was a proponent of the so-called ‘mental orthopaedics’, i.e. he believed that mental ability could be developed and improved through exercise and was a proponent of the Nouvelle École.<sup>19</sup> Fully committed to establishing psychology as a science, nevertheless Binet repeatedly pointed out that the phenomena that involved the superior faculties of the mind, which characterised individual psychology, could not be reduced to a series of physiological interactions, so dear to general psychology. The latter are easier to capture with the methods of the natural sciences, while individual psychology escaped these methods, but this, for Binet, did not constitute a good enough reason to reduce complex cognitive functions to general psychology. Rather, he advocated that a *plurality of methods* was required to meet the complexity of the phenomenon. Although reluctant to provide definitions, he associated intelligence with judgment, which involved cognitive and also moral and emotional elements. (Binet, 1898; 1904)

His stark resistance to reductionism drove Binet into conflict with Charles Spearman who calculated the general intelligence factor *g* drawing statistical correlations among tests. Spearman’s work took place in a context<sup>20</sup> that imposed new practical demands that differed from the ones of Binet’s France, in addition to the scientific demand of

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<sup>18</sup> Both sources originally in French, my translation.

<sup>19</sup> A pedagogical approach that contrasted with traditional teaching methods; it stressed the centrality of the pupil and the formative importance of education through practical, manual, sensorial, and affective engagement. Maria Montessori, pioneer of the ideas of the Nouvelle École, in 1926 criticised the wide use made of tests: ‘Instead of testing the results of learning, psychologists examine human value of the students and their mental abilities.’ (Cicciola, Foschi, Lombardo 2014, p. 230)

<sup>20</sup> UK and US

establishing psychology as a true science. A school reform that grouped pupils into ability classes, the selection of immigrants, and the need to allocate large numbers of people to occupations required the development of standardised tools and measurements. In this context, the idea of 'progress' was increasingly acquiring weight, and 'the thesis that status in life was a function of ability rather than birth right was used as justification for the breakdown in social hierarchies that were occurring.' (Curtis and Glaser, 1981, p. 113)

In this context Charles Spearman (1904) conducted his work on intelligence, with the additional presupposition that the proper topics of science are functional uniformities; those that produce like reactions under like conditions. In 1904 he calculated  $g$  through factor analysis in order to determine general intelligence in an objective manner and to discover ways of measuring it with precision and without bias. (Ibid.) With  $g$ , psychology has a rightful place in science: 'it is the method of tests that has brought psychology down from the clouds and made it useful to men; that has transformed the 'science of trivialities' into the 'science of human engineering.' (Terman in Curtis and Glaser, 1981, p. 120) The view of intelligence shifts: from the feature that differentiates humans from other species, as it was for the ancient Greeks, it became the feature that determines differences among individuals. Grounded in objective science, and aptly measured by  $g$ , it is an innate ability: 'the possibility of cultivating any general ability, or anything else of a general character, admits of grave doubt.' (Spearman, International Examination Inquiry, 1931, p. 134)

The  $g$  factor quickly became the paradigm of the study of intelligence; the exemplary problem solution that demonstrates that psychology is a true science and, at the same time, responds to the practical demand for a standardised method of measurement. As suggested by Kuhn, the paradigm has a sort of 'priority', since it emerged suddenly from a wide variety of approaches, and quickly became a point of reference that guided further enquiry; the unquestioned presupposed element on which further mainstream research would be founded. However, this does not mean that it appeared out of sheer intuition. Rather, it emerged from implicit assumptions and presuppositions that it contributed to establish more solidly thanks to its success. One such presupposition is that any true science follows the model of the natural sciences and adopts the same methods; it is based on fact and mathematical measurements. A further presupposition is that there is an innate ability that distinguishes individuals at birth. Without presupposing such innate ability we would not be looking for its manifestations. These presuppositions are still present in the conceptual scheme of contemporary proponents of  $g$ -theory that I have called the 'selective' scheme, proposed in the following section. We first examine the conceptual horizon of the scheme, i.e. what is seen, and then disentangle the descriptive and evaluative elements discussing how they guide thought and action. But having a scope also implies that something is left out of the scope. Thus, after disentangling we consider the elements that are unavailable in the conceptual horizon of the selective scheme. The remainder of the chapter examines the contrasting proposal of Robert J Sternberg, which I call the 'divergent' scheme where intelligence takes a remarkably different shape to some extent reminiscent of Binet and Montaigne's ideas. Also in this case, core concepts are identified and disentangled. In the blinkering section we consider what is unavailable in this conceptual horizon.

## 2 The Selective Scheme

*Is there indeed a general mental ability we commonly call ‘intelligence’, and is it important in the practical affairs of life? The answer, based on decades of intelligence research, is an unequivocal yes. ... Intelligence as measured by IQ tests is the single most effective predictor known of individual performance at school and on the job. It also predicts many other aspects of well-being, including a person’s chances of divorcing, dropping out of school, being unemployed or having illegitimate children’.*

(Gottfredson, 1998, p. 26)

G-theorists talk about intelligence as an actual entity: an innate and heritable ability that manifests in specific ways and can hardly be developed or improved. This ability is reliably measured by IQ tests that correlate with Spearman’s *g*; intelligence, IQ or *g* are often used interchangeably. Standardised tests measure intelligence reliably and objectively and they can be employed universally with no need for adaptation to context because cultural bias is easily eliminated with translation into the local language. ‘All intelligence tests measure the same intelligence ... the spread of people along an IQ continuum can be represented well by the Bell Curve ... Intelligence tests are not culturally biased. ... The Bell Curves for some groups are centred somewhat higher than others.’ (Gottfredson, 1997 p. 13-14)

Intelligence represents mental horsepower, or brainpower, and the shape that it takes in this conceptual scheme rests in its relation with other elements of the scheme, such as success, science, and education. All provide evidence of the relevance of *g*.

### 2.1 Mental Horsepower

Intelligence is a cognitive ability that represents speed of processing data, often expressed in machine-like analogies: ‘mental horsepower’ (Gottfredson, 2003, p. 293) or ‘brainpower.’ (Ibid. p. 298) It indicates a unitary ability; *g* is the ‘common core of all cognitive abilities’ (Wainer et al. 2009, p. 399); people with high IQ are good at, essentially, everything, contrary to the widely shared belief that different tasks or jobs require different abilities. The utmost manifestation of brainpower is the *look ahead* of a chess-playing program, quintessential ideal of calculating, planning, and foreseeing: ‘The number of moves ahead that a chess playing program can examine before settling on the next move, perhaps by algorithmic weighing of consequences and thus the probabilities of opposing moves, defines its look ahead.’ (Gordon, 1997, p. 218) The intelligent person has look-ahead, i.e. can calculate in advance and foresee. This translates into control of as many variables as possible, and control of emotions. A connection is identified between mistakes and stress or emotions, but ‘techniques of recognizing and managing stress are often themselves cognitively controlled: noting situations likely to reduce stress, rehearsing until a difficult task becomes automatic, and assigning an even higher priority to remaining calm.’ (Gordon, 1997, p. 217)

In similar guise, intelligent people can control and prevent situations that are usually attributed to chance, such as accidents. ‘Fire ... drowning, firearms, vehicles, lightning. ... They are all preventable using the mind’s eye (emphasis). This is important, humans have a mind’s eye that no other species has; you have to look at it (emphasis). You have to see things that aren’t obvious, but could develop.’ (Gottfredson, 2011; Gottfredson and Deary, 2004; Wainer et al. 2009) Accident prevention requires ‘keeping a system under control (emphasis). It’s a cognitive process; you have to spot the problem first. We have hazards everywhere, we do prevention, but ... the less bright people, engage in prevention

technology less: bicycle helmets, seat belts, keep batteries in the fire alarm... smoke.’ (Gottfredson, 2011)

Where does this idea of intelligence as a super calculator come from and what does it imply? To understand how intelligence takes this shape we explore its relation with the other elements of this scheme.

## 2.2 Success

Intelligence manifests in success and IQ is a predictor of success, but what is success? The main parameters of success are set in terms of social status (income and occupation), school performance, and a lifestyle characterised by stable relations and conformity to certain values. Not meeting these goals represents failure, for example in terms of less paid and physically demanding occupations, poor school performance, crime, divorce, and welfare dependence. (Gordon, 1997; Herrnstein and Murray, 1994; Gottfredson, 2003, 2004a)<sup>21</sup> People with low IQ commit the highest number of mistakes: ‘life in some ways resembles a test of general intelligence.’ (Gordon, 1997, p. 203; Gottfredson, 1997)

People with the highest IQ are the most successful and success manifests in occupations such as lawyer, surgeon, and executive (Gottfredson, 1998; 2003) that ‘are often high pressure, emotionally draining, and socially demanding, but these jobs are prestigious and generally pay well.’ (Gottfredson, 1997, p. 120) Intelligent people commit mistakes, but have the ability to rise back quickly when encountering problems ‘such as divorce, illness, and occasional unemployment’ (ibid.), and ‘rarely become trapped in poverty or social pathology’. (Ibid.) Their preferred readings are Time Magazine, the New York Times’ editorials, articles in Scientific American, and ‘novels by Joseph Conrad and Thomas Mann.’ (Gottfredson, 1997, p. 120)

Success, like intelligence, manifests at different levels, and so people with average intelligence are ‘readily trained for the bulk of jobs in society: clerks and secretaries, dispatchers, and insurance sales representatives’ (Gottfredson, 1997, p. 119); occupations that are not demanding in terms of cognitive complexity. Their preferred readings are ‘simple popular magazines’ and ‘most newspaper stories and novels.’ (Ibid.) They lead normal lives with better outcomes than individuals with lower IQ in terms of economic stability and lifestyle: ‘life is more secure and rates of poverty and pathology are much lower than individuals in the [lower] range: dropout rates are lower and poverty, illegitimacy, and chronic welfare dependence all fall by half.’ (Ibid.)

The lowest level of intelligence characterises ‘production workers, welders, machine operators, custodians. The work is atypically dangerous,<sup>22</sup> physically difficult, and/or performed in unpleasant circumstances.’ (Gottfredson, 1997, p. 119) The rates of poverty, reliance on welfare, school dropouts and crime increase considerably in this IQ range. (Ibid.)

More recent versions of the theory relate intelligence with success in terms of health and accident prevention. The intelligent person exercises, and looks after her diet and health. She has the cognitive ability to control the complex system involved in the management

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<sup>21</sup> I use also Gordon and Herrnstein & Murray since Gottfredson amply refers to them.

<sup>22</sup> It is somewhat puzzling that these jobs are assigned to people who lack the cognitive ability to prevent accidents.

of diseases like diabetes and high blood pressure. The unintelligent tends to smoke, drink, and eat unhealthy food, thus being unsuccessful in terms of health. 'Intelligence has been linked with various health behaviours and outcomes. On the positive side, physical fitness, a preference for low-sugar and low-fat diets, and longevity increase with high intelligence; on the negative side, alcoholism, infant mortality, smoking and obesity increase with lower intelligence.' (Gottfredson and Deary, 2004, p. 1; Gottfredson, 2011)

### 2.3 A Race Open to Everyone

The conception of success that we have just examined rests in the idea that individuals are involved in a race to reach the top of the social ladder. Setting of the race is the 'new economy' where progress is abandonment of physical work, which represents 'less complex societies.' (Gottfredson, 1996, p. 15) In the latter, one may have been able to carry on by relying on 'physical prowess and the sheer willingness to work hard' (ibid.), but now 'gone are the many simple farm and factory jobs where a strong back and willing disposition were sufficient to sustain a respected livelihood.' (Herrnstein & Murray in Gottfredson, 1997, p. 121) The new environment involves higher demands on cognitive ability and the playing field has been levelled from the unfairness of the old world ruled by birth-privilege. In the new world everyone has a fair enough chance to succeed and win the race based on capabilities: 'As equality of social condition strips away the importance of class and caste in developing and using natural talents, technological advance adds to the relative importance of intelligence in economic and social life.' (Gottfredson, 1996, p. 15)

This equality of opportunity, however, highlights intrinsic differences among individuals concerning innate abilities, and the ability that is critical to winning the race is IQ. 'The probability of success steadily improves at successively higher levels of IQ. These outcomes reflect the decathlon of socioeconomic life in a free society –citizens competing with one another in a long series of events to gain, and keep, a congenial place on the social ladder. The competitions are not entirely fair and open, of course, but they are free and open enough for competence –and hence *g*- to make a considerable difference in who succeeds.' (Gottfredson, 2003, p. 333) Even when they start the race from the lowest positions, people with high IQ tend to succeed: 'People with higher IQ have a remarkable ability to make their way out of even the most dire environments. This protection ... guarantees that talent will emerge from even the worst of environments, in turn ensuring considerable social mobility in any free society.' (Gottfredson 2004b, schools and the *g* factor, p. 45)

That the race<sup>23</sup> is sufficiently fair for everyone to have a chance to succeed, and people with high IQ succeed even when they have the odds against them, proves that there is indeed an innate feature that differentiates people at birth: 'we'll have to acknowledge that God or nature did not make us all equal intellectually.' (Gottfredson, 2004b, p. 45) In the modern world 'there exists a cognitive hierarchy that has biological roots and portends people's fates.' (Gottfredson, 1996, p. 18) This is the work of evolution.

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<sup>23</sup> As an interesting note, the race may also be 'to the bottom', as when 'questionable practices' are employed to level out test scores of people from different races in the search for equality. In these cases we find a 'race to the psychometric bottom- less reliable, less valid selection procedures.' (Gottfredson, 2009, p. 399)

## 2.4 Evolution: Natural Selection of the Best

Our society, and its hierarchical structure, is the natural result of an evolutionary process that places people where they belong in virtue of their innate characteristics. The environment, in this case the new economy, is itself the result of evolution: bright people have driven innovation throughout history, and created ‘evolutionary novel tasks’ (Gottfredson, 2011) that require high cognitive ability. People of lower ability were hit harder by these innovations because not ‘evolutionarily prepared’ (ibid.) and are selected away: ‘smart people create a lot of idiots by generating a lot of complex tasks. ... Innovation creates new tasks, which evoke phenotypes and it changes the phenotypes evolved.’ (Ibid)

Genetics plays a central role: success is the manifestation of a natural state of things as opposed to the artificial superiority established by the privilege of lineage. We now live in a world where lack of success indicates that one has not been equipped by nature. Studies show that environmental factors may impact a child’s performance in standardised tests during the early years of life, but these effects are washed away by adolescence. ‘Genetics plays a bigger role than does environment in creating IQ differences ... individuals are not born with fixed, unchangeable levels of intelligence. IQs do gradually stabilize during childhood, however, and generally change little thereafter.’ (Gottfredson, 1997, p. 14)

Social hierarchies are the natural result of the aggregation of people with similar levels of intelligence; ‘societies structure themselves around their members’ differences in intelligence.’ (Wainer et al., 2009, p. 414) Since intelligence is heritable, the children of smart people are also smart, and this is why they tend to have a social position similar to the one held by their parents. (Gordon, 1997; Gottfredson, 2003) ‘Parents from higher social classes are brighter on average than parents from lower social classes and their children are advantaged both genetically and environmentally.... Low IQ people have the odds stacked against them virtually everywhere they turn.’ (Gottfredson, 1996, p. 28) This is a matter of fact determined by nature; *g*-theory saw this all along and its validity rests in science.

## 2.5 Science is Objective and Value-Free

Science discovers truths: ‘Spearman *discovered* the general intelligence factor ... *g* is a highly general ability (Gottfredson, 2004a, p. 174 italics added; Gottfredson and Deary, 2004) Hence, *g* was not invented or calculated: ‘These measured abilities (latent constructs) are not psychometric chimera; they are not created by the measurement process but are important phenomena in the real world.’ (Gottfredson and Saklofske, 2009, p. 188) How does science discover truths? Scientists follow data: ‘evidence kept pointing me in that direction’ (Gottfredson, 2009, p. 397) and evidence is untainted of preconceptions. ‘Following a trail. ... I went into science having no particular opinion of intelligence, but everything I studied went in that direction: the importance of *g*, the existence of *g*.’ (Gottfredson, 2016) This presupposes that data are untainted from previous knowledge and, even more, from value. ‘Perhaps it is more ethical to speak benevolent lies than “dangerous” truths.’ (Gottfredson, 2009, p. 415) and good science may lead to dangerous truths, but ‘simply reciting the evidence is not enough when popular wisdom is diametrically opposed, especially when so many people are so emotionally invested in it.’ (Ibid.) So, efforts must be done ‘trying to educate people about the evidence and what it

means and doesn't. One has to be very clear about what one means particularly 'when emotions are likely to impede understanding.' (Ibid.)

Evidence converges towards truth and the way to get there is identifying regularities thanks to factor analysis of large datasets: 'what is remarkable about research involving intelligence is that it's so regular ... most of my career spent on finding those regularities partly to predict where and why  $g$  matters ... samples of thousands and tens of thousands, and you could see ... trending very clearly. Patterns are so regular, [it's] great to look at trends.' (Gottfredsson, 2016) The stable trends and regularities that characterise large data sets point towards clear answers as opposed to the irregularities and fuzziness of small data sets. Science provides methods that even out irregularities, correct error, and reduce variety, allowing predictions and control. Before Schmidt and Hunter developed meta-analysis 'there was situational validity, things could go up and down for this reason and that, you could not predict anything with that kind of data.' (Ibid.) This variety is eliminated in search of order: 'if you took error off researching the range, sampling error, and unreliability, the results started to fall in line. I urge you all to pay attention to those statistical artefacts, it makes so much difference in interpreting information, really, so much difference.' (Ibid.) This method, the scientific method, is the one that led to discovering  $g$ : large datasets converge to  $g$  as the unitary underlying element of success.

## 2.6 Education Selects the Brightest and Prepares for Success

A treatment of intelligence cannot disregard education. As we have seen in the historical background, the first attempts to measure intelligence were prompted by educational needs. The need to select and allocate pupils to specific curricula that marked the success of  $g$  was indeed different from the need to assess pedagogical efficacy that inspired Binet's work, but in both cases the ultimate purpose is to serve education.

In this conceptual scheme schools have the mandate to 'produce young people fully prepared for citizenship and ready to meet the competitive challenges of the modern economy.' (Gottfredson, 2004b p. 35) This statement is fully in line with the overall rationale of the conceptual scheme: the use of the verb 'to produce' is coherent with the focus on the new economy, being prepared for citizenship is less vague now that we know what social pathology is, and competitive challenges remind of the race to the top. There is, however, a problem in this scenario; the greater public also often considers schools as equalizers (ibid.), i.e. they are seen as tools to provide equality or 'level the playing field.' (Ibid.) There is a tension, according to Gottfredson, between producing young people fully prepared for citizenship and for the challenges of the modern economy and, on the other hand, equalise the race because people do not have equal abilities, no matter how much they train, which is demonstrated by the fact that achievement tests and IQ tests tend to provide similar results. Scholars like Gardner, who theorised different independent intelligences, have developed different teaching styles to accommodate different abilities. Gottfredson provides an example where learning photosynthesis involves practical exercises, 'but it's unlikely that students kept so busy walking through multiple doorways will have much time to advance very far once they get through them. .... [It] may allow students with special talents to express their understanding in ways that are personally gratifying, but science is inherently analytical, and understanding it ultimately requires the application of strong reasoning and analysis skills – period.' (Gottfredson, 2004b, p. 37) Other abilities may be 'useful qualities to ... help a person get by in the world, but they will not help that person *apprehend* the world. For that you need  $g$ .' (Ibid. p. 40) Thus,

education involves, first and foremost, apprehension, which rests on reasoning and analytic skills.

The representative talented student is the ‘math wiz’ (Gottfredson, 2004b, p. 40) who perhaps does not excel at all subjects, but generally succeeds rather well. This is what is needed for ‘mastering school curricula’. (Ibid.) Homogeneous classes help to get the best out of education because teachers can focus on providing students with what they need; students with low IQ need detailed instructions, supervision, and more practical tasks while more gifted students ‘are more self-instructing and better able to organise and develop their knowledge on their own.’ (Ibid. p. 44) Close supervision damages these students and frustrates their need for stimulation while more abstract instructions may confuse ‘low *g* learners.’ (Ibid.) Thus, attempts to inclusive and pluralistic classes as opposed to ‘curriculum tracking’ or ‘ability grouping’ (ibid. p. 42) damage all students: ‘placing the intellectually unequal in proximity forces students to observe their differences in capability more directly.’ (Ibid. 43) Furthermore, the application of ‘cooperative learning and peer tutoring ... [may] enhance the performance of low ability students without stigmatising them ... [but also] preclude what helps the more able students the most: accelerating their curriculum, allowing them to interact with their intellectual peers. ... Accelerated and compacted curricula can double the speed at which highly able students advance, but such differential treatment is decried as elitist and exclusionary.’ (Ibid.)

However, universities want to be able to identify ‘students who have taken demanding courses.... The inescapable reality is that it’s very difficult to produce good results for *any* students when they are placed in heterogeneous classes.’ (Gottfredson, 2004b, p. 44) In fact ‘experts have concluded that untracking brings no guarantee of high-quality instruction for everyone but may instead lead all to a common level of educational mediocrity.’ (Ibid.) Curriculum tracking is criticised as discriminatory, but untracking ‘is far more likely to harm than to help these students, robbing them of the motivation to learn, depriving them of their full potential, and hampering their prospects in a world that increasingly requires (and rewards) well-educated people. Depriving fast learners of curricula that allow them to make the most of their abilities is likewise an injustice to them and to the society that stands to benefit from their eventual contributions.’ (Ibid. p. 45)

The discovery of *g* did a great service to education because it allowed the selection of talented students and their separation from those who delayed their progress. This was the purpose of the SAT, used for admitting students to college was ‘meant to be largely independent of specific high school curricula and leaned heavily on general intelligence.’ (Wainer et al. 2009, p. 396) In fact, the acronym originally stood for Scholastic Aptitude Test, but ‘political forces led to a change in the name of the SAT, first to the redundant Scholastic Assessment Test and finally to the undefined acronym SAT.’ (Ibid.)

### 3 Disentangling the Selective Scheme

The core elements of this conceptual scheme are presented as descriptive matter of fact. However, they involve evaluation. As introduced in chapter 1, disentangling reveals how the combination of description and evaluation guides thought and action. Intelligence as conceived in this scheme involves presuppositions about success, the environment, and science that are also loaded. We find then various layers, and the ones presented here do not have the ambition to be exhaustive. ‘Intelligence’ identifies mental-horse power as the key to success, but this rests heavily on what is meant by success, i.e. on what features are

appreciated and, in virtue of such appreciation, considered successful. Success so conceived rests in a certain view of the environment that also involves descriptive and evaluative features. It is a race to the top in an equal and free world; a race deservingly won by people with the highest IQ. Could there be other explanations? Not really, alternative lines of inquiry are closed by the conclusiveness attributed to *g*, grounded in a conception of science that does not leave room for questioning.

### 3.1 Mighty Horsepower

The most prominent descriptive feature associated with intelligence is cognitive ability, mental horsepower, and we have seen in the analogy with the chess-playing computer that this has to do with speed of processing large amounts of data. It manifests in foresight and control. This may well merely report a descriptive finding. However, a brain that resembles a chess-playing machine is not solely a matter of fact, it is a positive matter of fact; one that is admired. This positive evaluation is enhanced by the sarcasm and deprecation prompted by the lack of mental horsepower. For instance, Gordon (1997), to whom Gottfredson refers extensively, uses two dumb robbers and their clumsy mistakes as the typical example of low IQ and presents them in a parody-like fashion. Their lack of look-ahead, which translates in the inability to control and foresee how their robbery will play out, is met with derision and contempt. Gordon concedes that the mistakes of the two robbers may be caused by stress, but this too is a deprecated feature that characterises lack of intelligence; brainpower also involves the ability to control stress and emotions.

This is the case also concerning accidents, since prevention depends on the power to ‘see’ things before they happen through the mind’s eye: a characteristically human ability that marks those who are superiorly fit, in evolutionary terms, because it allows them to survive while others perish. (Gottfredson, 2011) To understand why these features of mental horsepower are valued we disentangle the other elements of this conceptual scheme.

### 3.2 Admiring Status

Intelligence as mental horsepower is a predictor of success in life and success in life is determined by status, income, and lifestyle. This we know already, but success indicates specific features that are admired and respected.

Rarity characterises very intelligent individuals (Gottfredsson, 1997), but to recognise that something is rare does not necessarily express evaluation: it may indicate ‘not frequent’ where ‘not frequent’ does not imply that rarity is good or bad. Here, however we have features that characterise people who are ‘highly sought after’, ‘yours to lose’ and ‘their lot in life and their prospects for living comfortably are comparatively rosy.’ (Ibid. p. 120) They occupy prestigious positions, go to graduate school and live exciting lives that can be demanding, but also rewarding in terms of status and income. They are prized and pursued in virtue of the fact that they represent ‘performance’ (Gottfredson, 2000, p. 135), they are ‘greater assets’ (Ibid.), ‘show greater promise for moving up’ (Gottfredson, 1997, p. 92), and are represented by professions like surgeon (Gordon, 1997), lawyer, chemist or executive. (Gottfredsson, 1997; 2003) They are named ‘out ahead’ somewhat indicating that they are out of reach; they lead the race and are admired for that. They can choose whatever they want to do among most occupations (Gottfredsson, 2000), which indicates

a privilege, the power to choose, met with admiration<sup>24</sup> because, as we will see later, it is *deserved*.

Average intelligence is enlightening in virtue of the label attached to it: 'keeping up'. (Gottfredson, 1997; 2003) We can readily note that this is not particularly flattering. It suggests an effort to keep the pace with those who lead the race and is associated with 'normal' occupations such as secretary or salesperson. The overall evaluative orientation of this scheme celebrates people who emerge from the mass, are exceptional, win, and distinguish themselves in virtue of control, economic achievement, and professional prestige. These are the features and behaviours that are admired and provide a direction to patterns of thought and inferences in the study of intelligence; this is where to look for manifestations of intelligence, since intelligence is associated with success. The portrait of the normally intelligent strengthens these patterns of thought in that it conveys anonymity.

Features of the unintelligent contrast even more starkly with success, and embody failure. Levels of intelligence below average are labelled 'uphill battle' and 'high risk' (Gottfredsson, 1997, p. 91), both expressions unmistakably dooming; these people struggle and are at risk (of social pathology, as we will discuss shortly). These expressions, however dooming, or precisely *because* they are dooming, may prompt solidarity, compassion, sympathy, contempt or rejection. That there is a load is clear, but we don't know its direction yet. People in this group cover occupations that, although dangerous, involve lower cognitive demand and physical work. But this conceptual scheme is a celebration of the new world and of contrast between body and mind where the former is demeaned as reminiscent of the world we left behind that characterises less complex societies. Brain, on the other hand, is celebrated as driver of progress. And heart is missing.

Thus, the unintelligent are 'marginal men' (Gottfredson, 1997, p. 91; 2000), 'cast off youth' (ibid.), and need to be 'recycled one or more times through basic or technical training' (Ibid.); an expression that reminds of decayed goods and ineptness, also suggested by the fact that 'no one seems to want people of low-aptitude, at least for long ... not even the military wants them because they are difficult and costly to train and perform at 'lower average.' (Ibid. p. 92) These expressions are clear devaluations; we do not admire these features nor we sympathise with them. But this is not necessarily the case; rather, it is so because the conceptual scheme sets the scope of what is valued and appreciated, what is derided or what is despised. In other words, these features have this evaluative load in virtue of the overall rationale provided by the conceptual scheme where high income and cognitive work are valued and respected while physical labour and living on the edge of poverty are features of failure, which is scorned. At the same time, the use of these expressions re-enforces the rationale from which they originate; they send a clear signal about what is admired and what is despised, of how we should behave to be revered as successful, and what we should avoid. In a different conceptual scheme these people could be appreciated rather than represent failure. For instance, if the criteria for appreciation were not determined by social status and income, the sacrifice and risks involved in these jobs, or the struggles of these sorts of life, could induce respect or admiration rather than symbolise marginality and uselessness.

The group with lowest IQ is at 'high risk of failing elementary school, unmasked as incompetent in daily affairs (making change, reading a letter, filling out a job application, understanding doctors' instructions, monitoring one's young children), being cheated by

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<sup>24</sup> It could be met with resentment, for example, but this is not the case.

merchants and exploited by friends and relatives.’ (Edgerton, 1993 p. 222 in Gottfredson, 1997, p. 118) Being ‘incompetent’ and ‘failing’ express devaluation. I want to highlight ‘being cheated by merchants and exploited’, since it seems to suggest a feature of intelligent people that the unintelligent lack: the intelligent watch their back. A trusting attitude is associated with the lowest IQ and suggests the inference that being cheated and exploited is a sign of stupidity. It is a characteristic that we may eventually pity, not admire and even less see as successful. The negative evaluation is not oriented towards those who cheat or exploit in an ethos that endorses mistrust and ridicules trust.

One may counter-argue that this only reports a factual correlation between low IQ and observation. However, correlations depend on the input, i.e. what data one introduces. These data are coherent with, and confirm, the rationale of this conceptual scheme: intelligence characterises winners, and winners have specific features, such as foresight and control. Being cheated, rather than cheating, is a feature of losers. This is coherent with the importance attributed to control: trust involves mitigation of control while mental horsepower is the ability to control nearly everything.

### 3.2.1 Appreciating Control

Appreciation of control guides the identification of salient features of failure. Reliance on help, unpredictability or lack of stability is not merely observed, but denigrated. The unintelligent ‘eventually lead satisfying lives, but only with the help of a benefactor or strong social support network ... tend to live volatile, unpredictable lives, because they lack the stabilising resources that greater competence brings: networks of concerned and capable friends and relatives, job security, savings, credit, health insurance, marketable skills.’ (Edgerton 1993, p. 198 in Gottfredson, 1997, p. 118) The disapproval is enforced by contrast with ‘competence’, undeniably positive. Likewise ‘unpredictable lives’ remind of people who are lost, particularly if contrasted with the ‘stability’ of more cognitively competent people, manifested in a secure job, savings, credit, health insurance, and marketable skills. Again, unpredictability does not fare well with the appreciation of control while stability does.

Bright people make mistakes as well but, in these cases, mistakes are seen as learning opportunities: ‘to reduce medical errors further, it has been urged that mistakes be viewed less as moral lapses and character flaws that must be concealed to protect careers, and more as opportunities to look honestly for systemic problems in the organisation and conduct of everyday medicine.’ (Leape, 1994, in Gordon 1997, p. 204) Error committed by people with high IQ, or in prestigious positions, prompts understanding and/or solidarity instead of rejection or condemnation. This provides guidance to action; these errors should not be morally stigmatising, but rather call into question systemic problems and be seen as learning opportunities and this is the case in virtue of the understanding and/or solidarity that they prompt. On the other hand, errors committed by people with low IQ prompt condemnation and do not call into question systemic problems, but rather indicate a flaw of the individual.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> The gravity of losing a patient versus being a welfare recipient may be up for debate.

### 3.2.2 Shameful Social Pathology

Social pathology indicates a group of features that are the utmost expression of failure and characterise the unintelligent. The term ‘pathology’ suggests disease and incites distancing. Similarly, the expression ‘chronic welfare recipient’ prompts rejection associated with disease, and also hopelessness (chronic). An example of social pathology is crime, which originates in the lack of cognitive ability to resist temptation (Gordon, 1997). Other features of social pathology are: ‘bearing illegitimate children, living in poverty or women going on welfare after the birth of the first child, men being incarcerated, mothers becoming a chronic welfare recipient, or dropping out of high school.’ (Gottfredson, 1997, p. 120; 1996). Further features are young delinquency, adult criminality, single motherhood, HIV infection, poverty rates, age of first intercourse, and belief in conspiracy rumours. They all correlate with low IQ. (Gordon, 1997)

There is no doubt that all the above-mentioned features are despised. In addition to social pathology they are also called ‘unacceptable deviance’, ‘socially unacceptable behaviour’, ‘deviant choices’, ‘departure from socially accepted behaviour’, and ‘misbehaviour’. (Gordon, 1997; Gottfredson, 1997; 2003). The, not so implicit, inference is that we find a demarcation between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour in, for example, the age of the first sexual intercourse or in the conditions of a pregnancy or in the fact that a person is infected by HIV. In all these cases low IQ plays a role; low cognitive ability involves less control over circumstances. For example, HIV is imputed to less control over ‘bed and needle partners’ (Gordon, 1997) expressing not only condemnation for the use of drug, or sexual promiscuity, or both, but also the assumption that someone affected by HIV is either a drug addict or sexually promiscuous, or both.

These are rather explicit elements of load that, as such, may not require much attention. However, they are worthy of notice because they highlight the reliance of this theory on its notion of success. Social pathology indicates behaviours that deviate from the conception of success held here, and reinforces this idea of success that rests on another pillar of this scheme: the race to the top.

### 3.3 Deserved Victory in a Fair Race

The characterisation of success as winning the race to the top rests on the presupposition that the race takes place in a levelled playfield where everybody has a chance to succeed; this is the new world, distinct from the old one governed by birth privilege. The distinction is evaluative; this is not only a different world, it is a better one. The injustice of lineage has been eliminated, and this is something to be proud of: ‘Americans have always prided themselves in repudiating Old World aristocracies and urging meritocracy instead ... release from the bondage (and advantage) of lineage.’ (Gottfredson, 1996, p. 19). Being at the top in the old world represented the unfairness of an unjust system; a system where birth counted more than merit. In contrast, winning the race is admired: ‘Making it’ socioeconomically ... does represent a common, valued pursuit in American life.’ (Gottfredson, 2003, p. 333). It is admired because this is a deserved victory.

Hierarchy, *per se*, is not ‘bad’. In fact, it seems to be appreciated, since the elimination of hierarchies is a ‘lost egalitarian utopia’ (Gottfredson, 1996, p. 18; 2004b) and egalitarian utopias, in this scheme, are not appreciated. There seems to be good and bad hierarchies. The hierarchy of IQ is good because it is just. But this shows even more prominently that

there is indeed an innate cognitive ability that differentiates individuals: ‘The current paradox is that differences are not eradicated but rather in some sense replaced under a meritocracy. Intellectual advantage replaces social privilege in the competition to get ahead. ... The fortunes of the brightest rise yet higher, while those of the least bright fall further back. ... *The cognitive elite looks to be the new aristocracy.*’ (Gottfredson, 1996, p. 19, italics added) Vindication is expressed towards old unfair structures in the establishment of a new privilege that responds to the natural state of things; a just state of things that reveals a ‘paradox endemic to democracy...democracy does not eliminate social hierarchy but only shifts its basis from the conventional toward the genetic, especially the genetic differences in intelligence.’ (Gottfredson, 1996, p. 16) In the current world meritocracy makes it possible for natural elements to determine outcomes. In a way, the birth privilege set by IQ seems to be a true birth privilege, and the cognitive elite is the new, rightful, aristocracy.

But the fact that this is a ‘just’ privilege also involves the deprecation of interferences with this just order, such as the ones that involve the egalitarian utopia; these adjustments are unfair towards people who possess better abilities and unjust towards society as a whole. For example, ‘depriving fast learners of curricula that allow them to make the most of their abilities is likewise an injustice to them and to the society that stands to benefit from their eventual contributions.’ (Gottfredson, 2004, p. 45) Thus, those who have the features of winners are admired because *they really are* winners: they reach the top because they are better and deserve it. This is the work of nature, and nature is revered. The new order has biological roots, *g* demonstrates it, and *g* is the undisputable result of objective science.

### 3.4 The Objectivity of Science Crowns *g*

As introduced earlier, *g* emerged as a scientific paradigm in the Kuhnian sense in the beginning of the 20th century and emerged from a network of values and beliefs that it contributed to perpetuate, still present in this conceptual scheme. Objectivity is the utmost feature of good science, but this is almost a tautology: who would deny it? Itself a loaded concept, objectivity takes here a specific shape that prescribes the criteria by which scientific results are judged. Objective science is data-driven<sup>26</sup> and value-free. However, the treatment of value-freedom is itself rather passionate and considerably evaluative, which constitutes somewhat a paradox.

#### 3.4.1 The Excitement and Fulfilment of Finding Truths

The search for answers is free from preconceptions; data guide scientists like clues guide a detective, and this is commended: ‘I told you I like to read detective stories, and I love them, it’s the pursuit that is so fascinating and the reward when something clicks ... things like that, like the aha, oh my god I can move forward now! It’s wonderful, it’s hard ... you read some more, no that’s not it, but it’s an amazing job.’ (Gottfredson, 2016) The search is exciting, rewarding, and culminates with the satisfaction of finding the right answer. Like cracking the code to a safe; it clicks. This is puzzle solving à la Kuhn; it presupposes a definite solution. However, it also limits possibilities to question the trail. It is unlikely that a detective would dwell on implications of the meaning of ‘murder’ or ‘killing’ or the variety of reasons for committing the crime; what matters is finding who did it.

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<sup>26</sup> Data here are intended as quantitative.

This is the only way to do good science and rests on the assumption that data are followed without preconceptions. Moreover, that data are followed without preconceptions is commended, which contributes to reinforcing the assumption. Approaches that reach different conclusions are ‘misconceptions: mythologies, lies, misrepresentations’. (Gottfredson, 2016) Since the right scientific answer is  $g$ , if scientist do not find  $g$  at the end of their trail they are either making an epistemological mistake (misconceptions, misrepresentations) or they are intentionally lying or providing mythologies, which suggests fable-like features not to be taken seriously. These theories present ‘inaccurate information... mistaken impressions that non mainstream theories are as empirically supported as  $g$  theory’ (Warne et al. 2018, p. 32) and are tainted by ideology, emotions, or ignorance, none of which is appreciated. Note that ‘empirically supported’ indicates something specific: the importance of data in guiding the researcher has been already mentioned. We need however to consider ‘what’ data, and the data commended here are based on large datasets that allow statistical calculations. ‘Data’ and ‘empirical’ indicate ‘quantitative’. Small data sets are not scientific, i.e. they do not fit the conception of science endorsed in this conceptual scheme, and hence are dismissed, since they do not lead to finding regularities and clear patterns. I do not use the verb ‘finding’ casually: it seems to be presupposed that patterns and regularities are there to be found. The inference, the movement to action, is that ‘if you want to be a good scientist’ you ought to use large sets of quantitative data and then you will find these patterns and regularities.

### 3.4.2 Pride in Value-Free Science

Indeed we need to take ethics into account when we do science, although ‘many would agree ... that medical advances could take place more easily and more quickly if scientists were not burdened by ethical restraints such as informed consent.’ (Wainer et al. 2009 p. 396) To burden indicates an obstacle that hinders the optimal pursuit of science. Ethics constitutes ‘placing limits on the freedom of science to advance’ (ibid.) and to ‘walk the fine line between the requirements of ethical behaviour and the gains associated with discovery requires information, open debate, and a willingness to accept empirical evidence as the arbitrator of the debate.’ (Ibid. p. 396) Ethics involves requirements that impinge science’s advancement and gains. Open debate concerns evidence that, as such, has the last word: ‘Sir Francis Bacon established the scientific method as a way of learning things, supplanting alchemy and methods of the occult.’ (Ibid.) The scientific method, highly valued, is contrasted with discredited forms of inquiry that involve alchemy and, even worse, methods of the occult. These are the alternatives; we either do science, and there is one way to do it properly, i.e. value-free, or we are charlatans. This distinction is not properly understood, which suggests some disappointment: ‘the idea of using data and rigorous logical inferences (i.e. mathematics) has not fully permeated all aspects of our society.’ (Ibid.) Dissenters of  $g$  theory do ‘dishonest science’ (ibid. p. 399), ‘driven by ideology’ (ibid. p. 400), ‘such as egalitarian and civil rights movement’ (ibid. p. 404), move ‘lurid charges’ (ibid. p. 412), and endorse ‘fringe views’. (Ibid. p. 413) These are ‘falsehood made seem true, and truth made to seem false’ (ibid. p. 415), where ‘emotions drive common misconceptions’ (ibid.), and ‘emotional stumbling blocks’ lead to ‘empirical falsehoods... logical fallacies... fallacious conclusions.’ (Ibid. p. 416)

The evaluative load is unmistakeable, and it prescribes the direction for (good scientific) action. Since objectivity, read value-freedom, is the only way to truth, and it leads to  $g$ , other findings are *necessarily* false, misguided, and tainted by ideology. If they were valid, they would also lead to  $g$ . To accept them as valid implies questioning  $g$ , but this is not up

for discussion; advancement in the field is marked by others realising that *g*-theory was right all along: ‘Enormous progress has been done since I started, it was a wasteland... not a wasteland, a lot of it was known, but it was dominated by misconceptions, people weren’t very confident. I mean we were still arguing whether tests are biased, some people still argue they are, but that’s not scientific.’ (Gottfredson, 2016) And then ‘overnight *g* was a concept in the field and people understood why they couldn’t create tests that did away with this.’ (Ibid.)

Features of good science are embodied by iconic figures; greatly admired models of conduct. ‘These scientists aim at conclusive science (Wainer et al. 2009, p. 412), and provide dangerous truths.’ (Ibid. p. 415) The most praised is Arthur Jensen, who conducted ‘relentlessly objective, methodologically impeccable, and experimentally incisive investigations on human intelligence.’ (Gottfredson, 2007, p. 217) Further features of his scientific excellence are lack of ideology and politics ‘he was interested in nothing but the science ... he didn’t have a political bone in his body even though they said “he must be biased, he must be pseudoscientific and so.”’ (Ibid.) Note the association of value with politics, clearly negative, and with bias and pseudoscience. The treatment of these iconic figures is far from value-free, however: ‘Someone I really admired for their scientific brilliance and for their scientific integrity ... he was experimentally very clever in ways that I could never be. ... I admired him greatly and to get praised by someone like that it means a lot.’ (Gottfredson, 2016) Jensen is presented as superior: ‘clever in ways that I could never be’. Being praised by someone we admire expresses validation, approval, and implicitly indicates that one is doing what is right.

Other iconic figures are Lloyd ‘honest, earnest, hard-core empiricists’ (Wainer et al. 2009, p. 403) and Hans Eysenk: ‘Objective, experimental, biological, analytical, and the list goes on of all the things that I am inspired to be, but he also marched to his own drummer.’ (Gottfredson, 2011) Integrity and ‘marching to one’s own drummer’ introduce another valued feature. These scientists provided hard truths about natural differences among individuals and have been unjustly criticised for fulfilling their mission: science finds truths regardless of ethical implications. ‘Controversy is simply not part of their calculations ... in doing science. They neither seek it nor avoid it. They march to their own drummers, and that drummer is empirical truth, wherever it leads. *They are detectives on cases, not social workers, or politicians, or academic ambulance chasers.* They are interesting, independent, and resolute, and they are models of scientific integrity. I have always strived to be like them’. (Wainer et al. 2009, p. 428) Note the contrast between those whose job is to find truths, such as detectives and good scientists, who are praised, and the ‘others’, such as ambulance chasers; a demeaning expression used for unethical lawyers who use accident sites to find clients. The use of ‘politicians’ suggests lying to gain approval, and is deprecated, particularly in contrast with those who are admired for their integrity in the search for truth. Similarly, social workers take care of people who belong to the social pathology group. If there is any admiration for them, it is nowhere expressed and here they are mentioned in stark contrast with people who represent models of behaviour.

### 3.4.3 Victims and Heroes

Reverence for iconic scientists is further enforced by the hardships they have to undergo for telling uncomfortable truths: ‘the pressures of prevailing views remain as strong today as they were four centuries ago when Galileo faced the inquisition.’ (Wainer et al. 2009, p. 396) Advocates of the theory of general intelligence are associated with Galileo;

‘commended for reporting basic facts on the science that others outside the field often deny or distort’ (ibid. 2009, p. 428), and suffer ‘political intimidation against reporting such findings.’ (Ibid.) They are ostracised: ‘Some people were writing very explicitly that basically it’s your moral duty not to talk about it, and you were treated as if there was something peculiar about your character if you did.’ (Gottfredson, 2016) Pursuing the science under such pressures is nearly heroic: ‘in high school, I would come home and watch old movies on TV. Many were about heroism during WWII. ... I always asked myself whether I would have done what they did. I hoped I could. It has been like that, watching these *scholars over the years, and I hope I have inspired others like they inspired me*’. (Wainer et al. 2009, p. 428)

The rhetorical and emotional elements suggest that this is a just fight for a good cause and move towards defending and protecting. Critical examination is obstructed: when under attack the primary focus is on fighting back and there is no time, or energy, for reflection. That the attackers are wrong is presupposed, in this case they are driven by ideology or politics, terms used in a way that suggests corruption, manipulation, or partisan interests. In contrast, the interests of good scientists are of a noble sort, since they involve discovering truths that have important implications for people’s lives: ‘I’m hoping to make a difference in health because *people die* there [repeated several times and emphasised by intonation] and practitioners are desperate for something to do. I don’t know, right now *I’m an army of one* plus my colleague who *I have converted*. But *she’s not a scientist*. That’s a real interesting challenge: to communicate to a profession that is run by standards, not scientific standards, but practice standards ... hmm you don’t question them ... there is reluctance and immense ignorance. (Gottfredson, 2016) To the demarcation between good and bad scientists is here added a demarcation between scientists and practitioners who do not use scientific standards; the fact that the colleague is ‘converted’, which suggests saving, indicates that practice standards are not appreciated. Moreover, even if converted, the fact that she is not a scientist suggests that something is still lacking. The urgency of matters of life and death adds to the pathos of the war metaphor (army of one) reinforcing that this is a noble fight.

Heroism and sacrifice are recurrent themes in this conceptual scheme: scientists who tell uncomfortable truths had to commit ‘collective capitulation’, ‘retreat to their labs’ (Wainer et al, 2009, p. 416), ‘fallacies... destroy the scientist’s chief means of self-defense. ... [fallacies] operate by stealth.’ (Ibid.) But scientists resist, they ‘march by their own drummer, and that drummer is empirical truth wherever it leads’ (ibid. p. 421); the editorial published after the *Bell Curve* (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994) ‘was an effort ... to protect the science’. (Gottfredson, 2016) The recurrent use of language that evokes wartime heroes and resistance does not only express admiration for people who are doing the right thing, but also incites to support them and doing the same. The urgency of people dying enhances the emotional movement to action and conveys some impatience, or annoyance, at those who, due to ideology or bad science, obstruct the accomplishment of this noble mission.

### 3.5 Blinkering

That the combination of description and evaluation guides thought and action in a specific direction also involves guiding thought and action away from other directions; the conceptual horizon provides a scope to what is conceivable, and also blinkers us from noticing what is outside the scope, i.e. the unconceivable. We now examine a few possibilities that lie outside this conceptual horizon.

Mental horsepower modelled on a chess-playing supercomputer emphasises foresight and calculation where cognitive capability manifests in the control of a complex system. However, chess, like most games, follows clear rules and regularities. The extraordinarily high number of possible combinations is bound to the rules that govern the basic moves: stable and regular relations of cause-effect among pieces on the chessboard. The analogy between the chess-playing computer and the control of complexity rests on the implicit assumption that complexity involves a high number of elements with regular cause-effect relations. But many scholars point out that complexity is characterised precisely by the lack of stable and regular cause-effect relations, if any, and involves open systems that change in unexpected ways and where prediction is impossible. (Rittel and Webber, 1973; Poli, 2013; Miller and Sandford, in Poli, 2019; Lawson, 2003, 2012; Bigo, 2006) This conception of complexity is unavailable in a scheme that appreciates control because it characterises complexity as uncontrollable. Thus, g theorists call ‘complex’ something that, for complexity scholars, is ‘complicated’ or a ‘closed’ system: a system with a high number of elements kept together by regular cause-effect relations. On this view, complicated systems are not particularly challenging. Precisely as g theorists point out, a supercomputer can very well handle a closed system. The challenge rests in complex systems because, in virtue of the irregularity that characterises them, they cannot be met with the tools of analysis and reduction. The enthusiastic appreciation of the chess-playing computer, regularities and stability hinders, or erases, the consideration of complexity as irregular and unpredictable. How is the super-calculator going to perform face a problem that is novel, unpredictable, and extraneous to the rules of the game?

The appreciation of the ‘mind’s eye’ in preventing accidents and health problems blinkers the observer from considering other causes of accidents that may reveal that correlations between accidents (or health) and IQ do not take place *ceteris paribus*, as is presupposed in this scheme. For example, people may have done everything possible to prevent the accident, but the negligence of third parties was involved. Or it may be the case that people with lower socio-economic status have to manage multiple jobs where the heavy workload may affect their attention spans due to fatigue. Similarly, health issues may have to do with resources or availability rather than with a preference for unhealthy food.

Admiration for social status blinkers us from holding mistakes made by people with (supposedly) high IQ to the same standard as those made by people with (supposedly) low IQ, leading to different explanations. The mistake of a surgeon is an opportunity for learning while the mistake of a person with HIV instantiates lack of morality due to the incapability of controlling temptation. Moreover, examples of intelligence only portray the behaviours or statuses that are appreciated; psychopaths or successful criminals are not included as examples of intelligence. Bright people make mistakes as well but, we are told, they do not fall into social pathology. How are we to treat a serial killer? Would it be comprised in social pathology since it involves the repetition of mistakes? It does not seem so. Cases of low status or debatable moral conduct and high IQ are not treated. Similarly, are there successful people with low IQ? These may be interesting cases to investigate further, not the least from a scientific perspective, but this conceptual scheme is silent about them. The admiration of status, combined with the appreciation of regularities and trends as the only valuable scientific evidence, impedes the consideration of irregularities that are not considered epistemically interesting.

If intelligence involves cognitive ability, we may expect to find high levels of IQ in academic positions, however academics are absent. Success, and high IQ, manifests in high

income and social status; shall we deduce that academics are not successful? Are they examples of low success and high IQ? Or are they not intelligent? Whatever the answers, the absence of academics is puzzling.

Education as conceived of in this conceptual scheme involves a few assumptions, some more implicit than others. The first assumption is not particularly implicit: learning requires analytical skills, effectively measured by *g*. This assumption leads to infer a unique cognitive style, met by traditional teaching, and to further infer that lack of progress is due to lack of ability in the analytic sense, or eventually laziness. This blinkers the observer from considering that students may have different cognitive styles; the presupposition that there is one way to be cognitively bright, i.e. the math wiz, rules out alternatives. In turn, different teaching styles are dismissed. One cannot consider that children would progress if met with the appropriate teaching style because this would imply that cognitive ability manifests otherwise than analytically. It follows that the role of teachers in learning is not examined; that the reason of poor performance may lie in teaching rather than lack of innate ability cannot be considered. This is combined with another implicit assumption that views students as little soldiers; if they do as they are told, they will do well, which blinkers us from considering students' needs and teachers' responsibility in meeting these needs. Finally, the role of students' life, such as living situation, affective elements, or even poor diet, is excluded from the explanation of school results, as well as motivation and self-efficacy's impact on school progress. The presupposition that people with high IQ emerge even from the direst conditions leads to dismissing, or not seeing at all, the effects of dire conditions from scrutiny.

The hierarchical structures of the modern world are explained and justified as results of evolution in an equal environment; we live in a fair world where everyone has access to the race to the top. This blinkers us from a critical examination of such structures because it presupposes that they are right. To question the selection criteria involves questioning the evolutionary validity and fairness of the status quo, which is outside the scope of this scheme. Egalitarians are met with derision, and dismissed. A more provocative question would be: what if, in the old world, members of the aristocracy did not gain their privilege unjustly, but because they were more intelligent?

Lastly, the sense of urgency and the emphasis expressed in defence of the only true science, represented by *g*, blinkers supporters of *g* theory from examining the very assumptions on which the theory is founded. Science is either conducted properly, in which case it leads to *g*, or it is driven by ideology and politics; the former must be protected from the latter. It follows that calling *g* into question would imply that it is not the result of proper science, which is inconceivable. Let us now examine the approach proposed by prof. Robert J. Sternberg where intelligence takes a peculiarly different shape.

## 4 The Divergent Scheme

On this account intelligence is *'the ability to succeed in life, within one's cultural context, by capitalising on strengths and compensating for weaknesses, through adapting to, shaping and selecting environments, by a combination of analytical, creative, practical, and wisdom based-ethical skills and attitudes. So, it's not your IQ or your SAT score; it's how well you can succeed within the context in which you live'*.

(Sternberg, 2013b)

The selective scheme valued narrowing and simplification of the scope of inquiry that converges towards a common yardstick (*g*). Sternberg, on the other hand, widens the scope; *g* is not sufficient<sup>27</sup> and intelligence is more than analytic ability: ‘Western tests reflect a relatively small subset of even Western notions of what constitutes intelligent behaviour. ... And this is not to say that intelligence tests are terrible, this is not the message; it’s that they are incomplete, they are part of the story, they are not the whole story and what I’ll argue is that it’s scary that we put so much reliance on them’. (Sternberg, 2013b) Without further ado, let us examine the core elements that characterise this scheme and the Theory of Successful Intelligence<sup>28</sup> that, as the previous one, contemplates concepts like success, science and education.

#### 4.1 Carving Ways to Succeed

Intelligence is a complex phenomenon that has to do with success in the contingent environment; different environments pose different requirements to succeed and intelligence manifests in adaptation paired with shaping and selecting environments. ‘Part of the time you change yourself to fit the environment, part of the time you try to change the environment to fit you, ... and sometimes you select environments; you just say I’m in the wrong place I’m gonna leave. ... And you do it with a combination of ... skills and attitudes to come up with new ideas, you need analytical skills and attitudes to say whether they are good ideas, you need practical skills and attitudes to put your ideas into practice.’ (Sternberg, 2013b) Intelligence does not only involve possessing skills, but also developing and using them to reach goals, and consists of the following elements:

- a. Knowledge of one’s own strength and weaknesses,
- b. Modification, to a certain degree, of strengths and weaknesses,
- c. Adjustment (fit) to external conditions,
- d. Change of external conditions (by shaping the environment or rejecting it)

(Ibid.)

As in the selective scheme, success is crucially related to intelligence. However, ‘the definition of success for an individual is idiographic. In the Theory of Successful Intelligence the conceptualisation of intelligence is situated within sociocultural contexts. Although ‘the processes of intelligence may be common across such contexts, what constitutes success is not.’ (Sternberg, 2003, p. 141) Success is relative to personal goals, i.e. achieving the goals that one has set for herself (be it becoming a tennis player, a plumber, or a banker), and contextual, since different contexts require different skills. The child who has to survive yellow fever develops a different set of abilities, such as curing diseases with herbs, which are nonetheless manifestations of success that do not correlate with *g*.

The concept of intelligence is expanded: if success is relative to personal goals and to contextual requirements ‘intelligence is multidimensional, the full range of these dimensions is not completely captured by one single general ability.’ (Sternberg, 1996, p. 11) Analytic skills are not enough; unpredictable and unexpected problems require ‘creative intelligence’ to develop novel solutions while ‘practical intelligence’ assists in sensing, selecting, and shaping environments. The latter involves ‘what one needs to know in order to work effectively in an environment that one is not explicitly taught and that often is not

<sup>27</sup> It is unclear if it is necessary.

<sup>28</sup> Also called Triarchic Theory (Sternberg, 1990; 1996; 1997; 2003; 2010; 2013b; 2017).

verbalised.’ (Sternberg, 2003, p. 146) Intelligence so conceived presupposes that capabilities *can* be cultivated and the focus is not on finding a measure of a general innate ability, but rather on identifying what is involved in adaptation and shaping of the environment to reach one’s goals. Genetic elements are not eliminated, but are pondered with self-awareness, modifiability, and with the variety of manifestations that take place in different environments. Learning is paramount. Thus we have a Triarchic model that comprises analytic, creative, and practical intelligence; all three are needed for success. This different shape of intelligence rests in the relation with the other elements of this scheme.

## 4.2 A Wide World

Manifestations of intelligence are observed in the world as a whole including different conceptions of intelligence across cultures. Also the selective scheme considered the whole world, in the sense that intelligence tests are administered globally, but based on a construct of intelligence that is specific to one context with one idea of success. Almost all psychologists agree that ‘intelligence involves adaptation to the environment ... what is left unclear is just what environment is being talked about. If we are talking about cultural environment, it is quite clear that the overwhelming majority of theories and tests have been tailored to Western environments.’ (Sternberg, 1996, p. 11)

In this scheme the Western view is one among many. For instance, in Taiwan intelligence comprises cognitive factors, and also interpersonal competence, intrapersonal competence, intellectual self-assertion and intellectual self-effacement. In Kenya we find knowledge and skills, respect, comprehension of how to handle real life problems, and initiative. The Confucian conception ‘emphasizes benevolence and doing what is right.’ (Sternberg, 2007, p. 149) Even within the United States, different sub-cultures have different approaches: Hispanic parents tend to privilege social competence while Asian parents privilege traditional analytic skills. (Sternberg, 2003) The assumption is that different conceptions of intelligence have something to offer and the variety discovered by this expansion of the investigation inspires refinement of the construct and its study.

Across contexts, and within the Western world, people do not have the same possibilities to reach the top of the social ladder. In addition, success is here conceived differently. In other words a. not everyone has fair access to the race to the top, and b. getting to the top is not a universal manifestation of success, but rather it is tied to a specific context and sub-culture. What is success then?

## 4.3 Success in Context

Broadening the scope to the whole world shows that criteria of success depend on what is needed and appreciated in each context: ‘The forms of developing expertise that may be viewed as practically or otherwise intelligent may differ from one society to another. For example, procedural knowledge about natural herbal medicines, on the one hand, or Western medicines, on the other, may be critical to survival in one society and irrelevant to survival in another (e.g. where one or the other type of medicine is not available).’ (Sternberg, 2003, p. 149)

There are many ways to be successful. First, what is meant by success is cultural: ‘Cultures evaluate their members, as well as members of other cultures, in terms of their own

conceptions of intelligence. Almost all of the judgments of intelligence that are made in the world are made on the basis of implicit theories.’ (Sternberg, 2007, p. 149) In contrast with winning the social race with a definite positioning on the podium, success here manifests in many shapes and forms, and may require different capabilities in each context; successful skills in one context may be fatal in another. This is more prominent across significantly different environments; recognising and using herbal medicines in Kenya is fundamental while in Greenland one needs to orient on the ice.

Secondly, even apparently homogeneous cultural environments have sub-contexts where success requires the development of different capabilities. A child who grows up in the streets of the Bronx needs to develop different skills compared to the child from the Upper East Side. Note the assumption that one develops the skills that are needed in the specific context, as opposed to having them at birth and being selected based on them. Having abilities at birth, which is not denied, is intertwined with developing the ones required by context. Even in one context, like academia, there are different ways to be successful; some are good at publishing, others are good at thinking, others prefer to stay in labs, and some are more effective in going out and conduct their research in the world. (Sternberg, 2013b)

Thirdly, success has to do with personal goals. One may want to be a politician, an actor, a statesperson, a professional tennis player, a violinist, artist or plumber: ‘the question ... is not so much what goals individuals have chosen, but rather, what the individuals have done so that they can realise these goals in a meaningful way.’ (Sternberg, 2005b, p. 204) Since intelligence is linked to success, and success is contextual and personal, we cannot say that the Eskimo child is less successful than the one who passes SATs or that a nurse is less successful than a broker because they are not comparable: ‘the two dimensions do not collapse well into one scale ... oranges and apples ... the question is not how well people do on some common scale, but rather, how well they do on whatever scales are relevant to their making the most of their own aspirations.’ (Sternberg, 2005b, p. 206) There is indeed a core of underlying abilities necessary to succeed, but they cannot be identified observing one context and one model of success. Observing different manifestations of success and different contexts leads to identifying these abilities as analytic, creative, and practical intelligence. These conclusions, and the view of success that leads to them, rest on what is meant here with evolution.

#### 4.4 Adapt, Shape or Reject

Intelligence represents evolutionary success, which manifests in survival, and survival requires understanding the environment. (Sternberg, 1997, p. 1030) In the selective scheme survival involves selection based on innate abilities that fit the environment. Here survival involves acting on oneself *and* on the environment finding ways to succeed, and this involves also professional success: ‘There is no single way to success ... that works for everyone.’ (Sternberg, 2005b, p. 205) Innate talents are not denied, but they are also to some extent modifiable, and their plasticity is the focus of interest. ‘Nobody’s good at everything, the theory of general intelligence notwithstanding, and that theory says that if you are good at one thing you tend to be good at a lot of things, and if you’re not good at one thing you tend to be bad at lots of things, and this view is that really nobody is good at everything, not even if you are high in *g*’. (Sternberg, 2013b) Adaptation involves awareness of one’s strengths and weaknesses and their modification; strengths are enhanced and weaknesses compensated. But this is only the beginning of the story.

The foci of the selective scheme were a general innate ability (provided by Nature, or God) and the environment that selects people in virtue of their innate abilities. To some extent, individuals have contributed to shape the environment, i.e. criteria of selection are determined by innovations driven by intelligent people while others cannot do much else than hoping to fit the criteria. In the divergent scheme individuals have different innate abilities, and success involves being aware of them, develop them, adapting to environmental requirements, *and also* act on the environment to change it so that it fits one's abilities, or leave the environment for another. 'Human beings do not just adapt to the environment: they shape their environment and, at times, select a new environment.' (Sternberg, 1997, p. 1030) 'There is still selection, but here the individual is the subject of the action while in the selective scheme the subject was the environment.'

We may still argue that self-awareness and adapting, shaping, and selecting require the general ability measured by *g*. This is not the case. Tests conducted by Sternberg on various cases of success in context, such as Kenyan children who cure diseases with herbal medicines, correlate negatively with *g*. The theory of general intelligence does not contemplate negative correlations so these are not manifestation of intelligence, would be the argument. To this Sternberg rebuts that these are indeed examples of success and survival: rather than dismissing the evidence because it does not fit the established theory, he argues that this is evidence that the theory must be revised. (Sternberg, 2007; 2013b) Revising an established theory is somewhat novel, particularly since we are accustomed with the concept of science that we found in the selective scheme.

## 4.5 Science

According to the divergent scheme scientific theories are always influenced by implicit assumptions and science does not discover absolute truths. This does not undermine its relevance, and does not deny that some theories are better than others. However, reliance on statistical tools as guarantee of objectivity is rejected: 'A factor is not an invariant property of a test. A factor is a statistic produced by the interaction between the abilities evaluated in a test battery and the distribution of those abilities in the sample being tested ... Different types of people may systematically respond to a test in different ways, thus tapping different underlying psychological variables.' (Hunt in Sternberg, Rainer and Zhang, 2013, p. 507)

Since explicit theories rest upon implicit theories, science is as much a process of discovery as it is of construction; implicit theories guide what one considers worthy of study, determine how questions are formulated, which influences answers. (Sternberg, 1990; 2003) Thus, value-freedom may be unattainable: 'Using tests and scoring them in itself represents a value judgment ... studying so called races represents a value judgment because race is a social construction, not a biological concept ... deciding to study group differences represents a value judgment – that the problem is worth studying. Deciding to show that a group is genetically inferior on an index is a value judgment as to what is worth showing. ... Supposedly value-free science reflects the values of investigators who cannot see their own values underlying their research.' (Sternberg, 2005a, p. 295) However, this does not imply an advocacy of partiality or partisanship; it rather points out that the use of correlations and quantitative methods per se does not secure objectivity because scientists choose what to correlate based on their implicit theories. 'Scholars such as Herrnstein and Murray ... believe they have discovered a natural law that is, in fact, a societal invention.' (Sternberg, 1997, p. 1033) Thus, awareness of implicit theories does a

better service to objectivity than factor analysis. G-theorists often present results as 'irrefutable' (Sternberg, 2008, p. 418), but Sternberg urges to caution, since these claims are based on an implicit theory that conceives of intelligence according to the metaphor of the brain; this is but one of many metaphors that may guide the study of intelligence. (Sternberg, 1990) 'Someday brain science may give us conclusions that clearly point in one direction or another. We are not there yet. For the most part the brain metaphor is comforting, and may even be useful. But it does not provide us with unequivocal conclusions.' (Sternberg, 2008, p. 419)

#### 4.6 Education Prepares Citizens

As we saw in the selective scheme, education and intelligence are closely related, since the first tests were developed for educational purposes. The conception of education that characterises the divergent scheme contrasts considerably with the one held in the selective scheme, and in some respect resembles the ideas of the Nouvelle École that inspired Binet's work; the student is the centre of the educational process, as opposed to traditional methods that are teacher's centred, and the purpose of education is to form citizens, also ethically, rather than the assimilation of notions.

School performance does not only concern students' abilities, but also their preferences in how to use their abilities; thinking 'styles are propensities rather than abilities.' (Sternberg, 1990, p. 366) These propensities apply to students and teachers influencing their interactions, performance, and assessment. Sternberg has developed a comprehensive theory that identifies various dimensions of thinking styles. One such dimension is function: some individuals prefer tasks and situations that require creation and the generation of new ideas, while others favour structure and rule-following, and others prefer tasks that involve evaluation, comparison, and analysis. They are named, respectively legislative, executive, and judicial in an analogy with functions of government. Another dimension concerns the form of tasks and projects. The so called monarchic indicates preference for dealing with situations in a step-wise manner, accomplishing one thing at a time, while the hierarchic prefers projects and situations that allow the identification of a hierarchy among goals and tasks to be accomplished in a sequential manner. The oligarchic prefers projects and situations that involve a variety of approaches and goals, and the anarchic is at ease with situations and tasks that require flexibility and anti-systematic approaches. Further dimensions are internal, i.e. preference to work individually, and external, i.e. preference for collaboration. Moreover, a local approach prefers attention for detail while a global approach tends to focus on large, abstract ideas. The different dimensions combine in different ways, each with strengths and weaknesses, and manifest in how the student engages with the given material, and also in how teachers teach, since they also have thinking styles that affect how they work. (Sternberg, 1990; Sternberg and Zhang, 2005; Sternberg, Grigorenko and Zhang, 2008)

When assignments and assessments match the style of the student, performance improves. This is often interpreted as a sign of ability while, in fact, it indicates an affinity between teacher and student's thinking style. This is the case for two reasons; students do better when they work with teachers that match their thinking style *and* teachers tend to evaluate more positively students with a thinking style similar to their own. 'Teachers tend to confuse style with quality of mind. Since teaching often reflects teachers' personal thinking styles we inadvertently reward students whose style correspond to ours at the expense of

those whose style differ. Thus we label as "slow" or even "stupid" those students who think and learn well but in ways that are different from our own.' (Sternberg, 1990, p. 368)

Traditional education focuses on executive functions and well-structured, hierarchical, organised tasks and solutions. This is reflected in the students that are rewarded and in the large preponderance of these thinking styles among teachers. But since no style is best and since they indicate preferences, not abilities, 'education should foster students' ability to shift from one style to another as the situation warrants. This means that teachers must be trained to use styles flexibly as well.' (Sternberg, 1990, p. 371) The contrast with the selective scheme is remarkable, since it associates *the* ability, intelligence, with success in traditional schooling based on what here is called executive style, i.e. one style among many. Sternberg, on the other hand, shows that different performance does not necessarily depend on ability. First and foremost, we have abilities in the plural and, secondly, there is an intermediate step between ability and performance that has to do with the interaction of thinking styles between student and teacher.

The purpose of education is expressed nearly with the same words as in the selective scheme: preparing the citizens of tomorrow. However, what is meant is rather different and indicates thinking critically and acting wisely, i.e. ethically, and the focus is on asking questions more than providing answers: 'As John Dewey recognized, how one thinks is often more important than what one thinks. Schools need to teach students how to ask the right questions (questions that are good, thought-provoking, and interesting) and lessen the emphasis on rote learning.' (Sternberg, 2005b, p. 231) Similarly, 'school in particular, and society in general, tend to make a pedagogical mistake by emphasizing the answering and not the asking of questions. The good student is perceived as the one who rapidly furnishes the right answers.' (Ibid. p. 230) This leads to focussing on answering questions, i.e. repeating what others have said and thought, rather than developing the capability to think for themselves: 'schools teach students to be consumers of knowledge, not producers of knowledge. A consumer style is one in which the individual prefers learning what is already known. The consumer generally likes courses in which the goal is to become as well-acquainted as possible with a field. A producer, by contrast, creates the knowledge that others learn.' (Sternberg, 1990, p. 371)

#### 4.7 Ethics and Wisdom

The importance of ethics and wisdom is treated more extensively in the disentangling section, since it clearly involves valuation that guides the development of the theory. However, I introduce it here because a description of what intelligence involves in this conceptual scheme would be otherwise incomplete. An implicit ethical focus permeates this approach since its early years, and has become more explicit in Sternberg's latest work, where ethical skills are constitutive of intelligence together with analytic, creative and practical aspects: 'and you need wisdom based and ethical skills to make sure this is all for the common good'. (Sternberg, 2013b)

## 5 Disentangling the Divergent Scheme

As has been the case in the selective scheme, also this scheme is constituted by concepts that involve evaluative load; we now disentangle them to identify how the combination of description and evaluation guides action. Variety among contexts is not only a matter of fact; it is valued. This guides us towards seeing diverse manifestations of success; they are seen and considered successful because they are appreciated. This is enhanced by empathy for those who are excluded by the standard model and moves to action for their vindication. A sense of empowerment permeates this theory of intelligence in contrast with conformity. The rejection of conformity, and appreciation of dissent, moves to debunking *g*-theory.

### 5.1 Celebrating Variety

The broader scope of this conceptual scheme highlights variety. However, a broader scope is not enough to make variety as central to a theory as it is here. After all, proponents of *g*-theory also consider the broader world, and there find confirmation of the centrality of *g* to success. The difference is in the appreciation that underlies Sternberg's encounter with diversity, and the disapproval of standardised approaches. Appreciation of variety permeates the scheme: the views of intelligence that originate in different cultural contexts inspire and, to some extent influence, Sternberg's own theory. This indicates that they are valued and appreciated; if this weren't the case, they would be dismissed, ignored, or criticised. Success in this scheme manifests in a variety of ways, all valued in a celebration of peoples who succeed in different contexts, and who are excluded by *g*-theory. Different thinking styles would not be seen, and appreciated, if one style was the only one that is valued. The importance of variety also manifests in a conception of science that is continuous search for new explanations as opposed to the convergence of a monistic approach. It is thus the appreciation of variety that guides this inquiry and permeates it throughout. The broader scope is adopted in virtue of this appreciation, but why is variety valued?

### 5.2 Vindication of the Downtrodden

The setting is not a levelled playfield. On the contrary, the fairness presupposed by the selective scheme, and the claim that people with high IQ can emerge even from the direst environments, prompt indignation: 'Can one seriously believe that there are not inequalities that foster differences in outcomes? Children growing up in the slums of India ... have almost no chance of ever leaving those slums, regardless of their IQs. ... Watts in Los Angeles or Harlem in New York. ... Were Rushton and Jensen or any of us reading this article to have grown up or lived in these environments, what would have become of us? Would we have the luxury of writing such articles or would we have to spend our time attending to basic food and safety needs?' (Sternberg, 2005a, p. 300) The idea that the race to the top is open to everyone prompts resentment: 'It would be easy for middle and upper middle class majority group individuals ... to state that, if they were born into poverty, they or others like them would have achieved socially desirable outcomes in life. But is this so?' (Sternberg, 2005a, p. 297) Large groups of people are excluded from the race, and to presuppose that they are excluded solely because they lack cognitive ability provokes a stark reaction; these are people who suffered the injustice of not having chances to succeed in the conventional way, added to the further injustice of being judged as failures due to

the universal model imposed by standardised tests. The appreciation of variety guides the observer towards seeing diverse features of success and this vindicates the excluded.

The dismissal of people who are different, or less fortunate, as failures is supported by *g*-theory and is deprecated as manifestation of hypocrisy: 'we would prefer to think that those who do not achieve at high levels fail, not because they are blocked, but because they are incapable of succeeding. This has been the stand of privileged majorities throughout history. And these majorities have routinely provided arguments of various kinds, including so-called scientific ones, to support their positions.' (Sternberg, 2005a, p. 298) Indeed *g*-theory has been used, in some cases, to support these positions, and this moves towards providing scientific theories that do otherwise, correcting the wrong.

### 5.2.1 Small Heroes with Small IQs

One standard does not apply to the variety of the world, and its injustice; empathy with the marginalised moves towards seeing that, they too, succeed, but they do so in different ways.

We meet colourful examples of success in different contexts that evoke respect and admiration. Brazilian street children manage street trades that require difficult mathematical operations, in spite of failing the math section in IQ tests. Eskimo children find their way in the Alaskan ices where we would all probably die. Kenyan children cure deadly diseases with herbal medicines and do not score well on intelligence tests, yet they are indeed successful and admired. (Sternberg, 2007; 2013b) The children of the Bronx and Roxbury in Boston live among danger and violence, and develop the skills they need to survive rather than the ones required to pass an intelligence test: 'some of them have to get between their home and school in the face of potential violence and other threats to their safety.' (Sternberg, 2010, p. 83) That they are held high is enforced by a rhetorical contrast with 'us': 'how many of us comfortably could walk those streets, especially in the dark, and make it from point A to point B safely?' (Ibid.)

These are all descriptive examples of success, each with different features, all celebrated. All these cases require problem solving and cognitive ability, yet these children fail standardised tests. One could conclude that they are not intelligent, and eventually sympathise. However, admiration moves in a different direction; these are children who face adversities unthinkable for most of us, and manage to stay alive, and it is in virtue of the fact that they are admired for these features that they are successful. Thus, rather than dismissing them as non-intelligent, we need to revise what we mean with intelligence, and success for that matter. If intelligence is the cognitive ability necessary for success, and these kids clearly succeed, they are manifestations of cognitive ability necessary to success. Hence, they are manifestations of intelligence. Seeing this requires valuing their actions at least as equally successful as being admitted at Yale. If being admitted at Yale is seen as utmost manifestation of success while curing yellow fever with herbs is seen merely as 'getting by'<sup>29</sup>, we would not consider these children to be evidence that leads to revise the theory. The movement in the direction of revision is enforced by empathy combined with some exasperation at the presupposed supremacy of success in *g* terms.

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<sup>29</sup> Or, as Gottfredson said, they may be useful skills to get by in the world, but not helpful to apprehend the world.

### 5.2.2 The 'Written-Off' in School

A further feature of exclusion concerns education where teachers are primarily trained to the criteria of *g*-theory: 'Focus on state wide mastery tests and SATs may undervalue certain kids and consistently lead to other kids being in a sense overvalued.' (Sternberg, 2010; 2013b) Some kids are undervalued, i.e. judged negatively compared to their actual capability, while others are overvalued, i.e. judged positively solely based on their fitting the criteria. This suggests that skills not captured by *g* are more valuable, as demonstrated by the fact that the very teachers who undervalue these students would die, were they to face the same challenges: 'Students may have critical knowledge that is important for their adaptation that teachers may not have, and vice versa. This is something you need to take seriously: these Yuk Ip kids can tell you to go from one village to another that may be hundreds km away in the frozen tundra and they'll get there. If their teachers, who view the kids as not very smart, tried to do the same task they'd die. So, who's smart?' (Sternberg, 2013b) There is a hint of retaliation enhanced by the suggestion that students not only have different skills than teachers, but they have 'superior' skills: 'The teachers made it clear that they considered the children to be not particularly bright. And indeed, in terms of the knowledge and skills emphasised in traditional schooling, they did not fare well. But, at the same time ... had developed *superior skills* of other kind ... other topics that their teachers did not possess ... their teachers would die if they attempted to do the same.' (Sternberg, 2007, p. 150, italics added) Contrary to the traditional view of education where students are subordinate to teachers, here we are often reminded that this is not necessarily the case; highly valuable features are possessed by the students, and not by teachers. Yet, teachers are the ones who decide based on their own parameters, which are here not particularly valued, as we can gather from the repeated suggestion that they would not be able to survive, were they to face the same challenges that their students face every day. However, deciding who is smart, or not, is in the hands of teachers: 'Children had adaptive skills relevant to their own environments that the teachers lacked. But of course, *it is the teachers whom society sanctions to do the evaluations, not the students.*' (Ibid. italics added) Whose features are considered failures as opposed to successful thus depends on who is sanctioned to judge, and this seems to address a prejudice: children 'could not be faulted for lacking learning skills. They merely have applied those skills to content other than that sanctioned by the schools.' (Ibid.) An underlying polemical tone permeates this discussion; practical features that allow survival in various practical contexts are valued more than the analytic features captured by *g*, but the latter are privileged by the way in which the system works, which leads to the unjust assessment of students.

This injustice manifests also in more homogeneous contexts: 'Many of those with lower test scores, including some with high levels of creative and practical intellectual abilities, simply are not given the chance to show whether they can succeed, because they are denied admission to the access routes to many kinds of success that society, at least, values'. (Sternberg, 1997, p. 1033) Note the use of 'at least', which suggests that the writer does not necessarily value this sort of success. 'Schools do not reward all styles equally. Rather, they tend to reward individuals who exhibit an executive/hierarchic style' (Sternberg, 1990b, p. 370) because these styles are predominant among teachers. Thus, teachers 'tend to confuse style with quality of mind' (Ibid. p. 368) and 'may deprive able people of opportunities, while giving opportunities to those who are less able.' (Sternberg and Zhang, 2005, p. 252) To say that people are 'deprived' of opportunities expresses that they are prevented from succeeding, i.e. they do not fail because they lack the ability, but rather because of an external influence that does not allow them to succeed. Moreover,

opportunities are given to people who are 'less able', suggesting that (some of) those who succeed do not do so in virtue of merit.

### 5.3 Empowerment and Hope

Empathy with those who are excluded by a specific conception of success moves to defending them and to expanding manifestations of success that are excluded by the traditional definition of intelligence. Thus, intelligence changes shape and its characterising features are the ones needed for succeeding in one's own terms, not those of others. Analytic, Creative and Practical intelligence are instrumental to self-awareness, self-development, adaptation, shaping of environment, and rejection of environment. These features are presented as matters of fact, but are also appreciated and express empowerment and hope. This load permeates the whole discourse.

People are different, and it is a *good* thing, as we have already seen. The wide range of abilities that characterises different people underlies different aspirations, and ways to carry out the same task. Some people have creative skills while others have practical or relational skills; none of them is better, all are valued as sources of possibilities. Awareness of strengths and weaknesses allows tailoring action based on the goal one wants to reach in a way that suits one's abilities: 'people develop their intellectual skills in line with where in life they wish to go.' (Sternberg, 2007, p. 148) In contrast with the selective scheme where notable talent was of one type we have 'not one way, many possibilities.' (Sternberg, 2013b) Power is handed to the individual. Being different is not dooming; it can be a source of success. 'Intelligence involves formulating a meaningful and coherent set of goals, and having the skills and dispositions to reach those goals ... the question typically is not so much what goals individuals have chosen, but rather, what the individuals have done so that they can realise those goals in a meaningful way.' (Sternberg, 2005b, p. 214)

The centrality of individually set goals in the conception of success rests on the contempt for externally imposed standards, and indignation for the injustices caused by these standards. Status, core feature of success in the selective scheme, almost prompts irony while valuable goals are the ones that are meaningful to the individual: 'Some people choose to concentrate on extracurricular activities, such as athletics or music, and pay less attention to grades in school; others may choose occupations that are personally meaningful to them, but that never will yield the income they could gain doing work that is less personally meaningful.' (Sternberg, 2003, p. 141) Applying a common scale to judge people's outcomes is belittled: 'The point is not how well people do on some common scale, but rather, how well they do on whatever scales are relevant to their making the most of their own aspirations.' (Sternberg, 2005b, p. 206) Success starts with 'finding what one loves to do' (Ibid. p. 234)

Acting on the environment, by shaping or rejecting it, is an important feature of this theory and expresses empowerment. The somewhat helpless individual who is selected or rejected because of innate features is replaced with an agent who acts upon herself, indeed, but also upon the environment, eventually rejecting the latter. The logic of the selective scheme is reversed. The empowering load that comes with valuing adaptation, shaping, and rejecting opens doors, not the least by envisioning the possibility that it may be the individual who wants to close the door to a specific environment. The use of the term 'reject' is telling and expresses disdain. One could say 'changing' or 'choosing another environment', but

Sternberg predominantly uses 'reject'. Intelligence so conceived evokes hope and communicates that nearly everyone can 'make it'.

## 5.4 Rebellion Against Conformity

I have previously suggested that empathy with those who are excluded from success moves to reconfiguring the concept of success. However, empathy may be necessary, but it is not sufficient to explain this movement. Gottfredson presumably empathises with the unintelligent. Nevertheless, empathy does not move her to questioning the fairness of the race to the top, nor the selection criteria presupposed by g. Sternberg, on the other hand, does not accept the criteria and proposes different ones; this is guided by empathy and indignation for injustice, but also by rejection of convention, which leads to recognising unconventional manifestations of success as valuable.

Traditional education embodies the utmost features of convention, and is met with irony. Sternberg tells the story of one of his children, whose teachers considered hopeless; after dropping out of school he became a successful entrepreneur, proving the teachers wrong. He did not lack ability and we are left to draw our own conclusions about whether it was the teachers who missed something. On the other hand, 'almost all teachers thought Sarah was smart, and Sarah is the one who went to Yale, and then Yale Law School, and Harvard Grad school; she's just a conventionally smart student (laughs with irony).' (Sternberg, 2013b) The term conventional may be used neutrally to indicate an established shared practice without evaluation. However, the use made here suggests limitation, and a damaging such. Another student 'was brilliant academically and at the kinds of memory and analytical skills that conventional psychometric tests of intelligence emphasize' (Sternberg, 2010, p. 90), but then 'ranked near the bottom [and] the reason was transparent: ... brilliant analytically, [she] showed only the most minimal creative skills.' (Ibid.) Conventional education values analytic skills at the expense of others, such as creative, practical, and ethical, which are here highly appreciated. It is this appreciation that reveals the limitation of convention and underlies its deprecation, combined with the injustice that it causes. Some students who 'by conventional definitions would be classified as gifted' (Ibid. p. 97), are unable to 'recognize unethical behaviour when it stared them in the face.' (Ibid.) Test results of Kenyan students correlated negatively with 'conventional tests of intelligence' (Ibid. p. 80) even though they are undeniable examples of success. Conventional becomes the symbol of standards that, in this conceptual scheme, are not only established, but also criticised because of the injustice they represent: 'the identification of a general factor of human intelligence on conventional tests, may tell us more about how well an applicant's abilities match up with expectations ... based on Western patterns of education, than it does about his or her ability to succeed in life.' (Ibid. p. 81)

Features of traditional education, such as emphasis on assimilation, are openly criticised in that they perpetuate conventional thinking hindering critical thinking. Teaching answers without encouraging questions does a disservice to education, and to society in general because *it rewards followers rather than leaders*. (Sternberg, 1990) The valuation of empowerment guides Sternberg from the background; traditional education is disempowering. 'The expert in a field thus becomes the extension of the expert student-the one who knows and can recite a lot of information.' (Sternberg, 2005b, p. 230) A subtle, yet powerful hit at experts: 'institutions perhaps do not wish to identify as educational leaders those who merely are experts in spitting back what others have previously said.' (Ibid. p. 231) The term 'spitting' is denigrating and expresses almost detestation for a

system that rewards the lack of critical thinking. The denigration for conventional thinking is enhanced by enthusiasm and esteem reserved for those who diverge from the mass.

Icons of this conceptual scheme, the counterparts of Jensen and Eysenk in the selective scheme, are rebels and disruptors. The heroes are the Mozarts, not the Salieris. Examples of revolutionary thinkers, and rhetorical exemplars, are the visionaries par excellence: Leonardo da Vinci, but also Munch, Darwin, Wallace, Picasso, Freud and Wundt in Psychology. They represent disruptors, people who challenged convention and, as a consequence, endured hardship, but for these reasons they are admired. Disruptors are often ostracised: ‘when creative ideas are proposed, they often are viewed as bizarre, useless and even foolish, and are summarily rejected. The person proposing them often is regarded with suspicion and perhaps even with disdain and derision.’ (Sternberg, 2005b, p. 228) But ‘bizarre’ and ‘foolish’ indicate features that surprise, break convention and, to some extent, disturb the status quo; all features that are endorsed, although they lead to trouble: ‘People who defy the crowd almost inevitably encounter resistance. ... Pay the short term price because they recognise that they can make a difference in the long-term.’ (Ibid. p. 232)

Admiration for standing up against resistance may remind of Gottfredsson’s scientists who ‘marched to their own drummer’. There is, however, a difference. Gottfredsson’s evaluation rests on a demarcation between the good scientists who find truth, and those who are against them. Here the disruption of convention is commended in others and also oneself, i.e. questioning is also self-questioning and involves redefining problems, probing assumptions, and ‘willingness to take sensible risks.’ (Sternberg, 2005b, p. 232) The goal is continuous learning, highly valued, as opposed to rewards: ‘Learning must be a lifelong process, not one that terminates when a person achieves some measure of recognition.’ (Ibid. p. 231) Learning involves taking risks and failing, while avoiding risks is disdained: ‘In taking these risks ... sometimes make mistakes, fail, and fall flat on their faces ... many got to where they are by not taking risks. They played the academic game with consummate gamesmanship, doing what needed to be done and playing it safe so that they would not get “burned”.’ (Ibid. p. 233) Note that ‘consummate gamesmanship’ suggests compromising one’s integrity to the rules of the game. This is an exhortation to leave the comfort and sense of certainty of the *status quo*, and taking risks: ‘people often like things in black and white ... the problem is that there are a lot of greys ... without the ability to tolerate ambiguity, many may jump to a less than optimal solution.’ (Sternberg, 2005b, p. 233) And so, challenging the authority of *g* naturally follows.

## 5.5 Defying the Sacred Word

The scientific solidity of *g* is addressed with a playful mockery suggesting that scientists take themselves too seriously, lacking the ability to question their assumptions. Kenyan children’s test results correlate negatively with *g*; according to *g* theory this is impossible. ‘That’s a funny result if you believe in the theory of general intelligence because ... all correlations of ability measures should be positive, at worst they are low, but you have a positive manifold on the table; here you don’t. So, why would that be? Well you can say whooo it’s not an intelligence test, but in terms of adaptation in their culture that’s more important to know than academic knowledge.’ (Sternberg, 2013b; 2007) Observations that contradict the conventional model are dismissed, rather than calling the model into question, prompting Sternberg’s sarcasm and, dare I suggest, also some satisfaction since it challenges the convention.

The term ‘solid’ is often used to indicate proper scientific conduct and results;  $g$  is often associated with solid science, which is the target of irony. That all intelligence tests correlate positively with  $g$  ‘was a very solid finding in the field of intelligence research, so you can see how solid the field is. (sarcastic tone, smiles) ... Could it be the helmet of hate? I mean, a lot of you waste a lot of time in the lab, I go out there and look at the serious causes of these problems (jokes). So one possibility is Jimmy Ohlson helmet of hate, another is the wheel of misfortune, so there are different scientific explanations (emphasis, smiles and audience laughs) for what’s going on?’ (Sternberg, 2013b) The mockery of solid science explicitly demeans those who ‘waste’ time in the lab but, in light of what we know of this conceptual scheme, I would draw other conclusions. Rather than attacking those who work in labs, I think that what is actually being communicated here is resentment and deprecation for a specific attitude of superiority that has characterised  $g$ -theory, and its proponents. More specifically, the proclaimed solidity of value-free science (qua value-free), which supposedly validates  $g$ , but also the incapability of such theorists to see that we do not live in a world where merit wins; they live in their theory where they have found truth, a truth that causes a lot of damage, and this seems to be what prompts Sternberg’s irritation. Serious science does not rest in claims of value-freedom: ‘supposedly value-free science reflects the values of investigators who cannot see their own values underlying their research.’ (Sternberg, 2005a, p. 295) Given the appreciation of self-awareness and critical thinking to this conceptual scheme, this is not a gentle remark.

Rejection of convention leads to attacking its very symbol. The paradigm,  $g$ , is an arbitrary sorting tool: ‘societies choose their bases for sorting, and abilities measured by current cognitive tests are simply one of many bases for sorting. The abilities for which societies sort change ... people in higher prestige occupations in the United States have higher IQs. Of course they do: their passage through the gates that enable them to enter those occupations generally requires that they take cognitive tests. ... If you do not score well on these tests, your ability to pass through the gates for entry into the most prestigious occupations is severely curtailed. ... We might have chosen to focus on other attributes. ... If we decided only to admit tall people to selective colleges ... we would notice some years after our decision that people in high-prestige occupations tend to be tall.’ (Sternberg, 1996, p. 12) The use of ‘curtail’ indicates a restriction or restraint of something that would not otherwise be the case, and enforces the sense of injustice that we have discussed earlier. This is not only a critique of  $g$  as inappropriate criterion for selection, but also an attack to its, undeserved, status: ‘Factor analysis does not produce some God given map of the abilities of humankind’ (Hunt in Sternberg, Rainer and Zhang, 2013, p. 507); it produces a man-made map that has been elevated to the status of God-given, seems to be the message. Reference to God expresses scornful annoyance at dogmatic ‘Truths’ accepted without questioning, and at the damage these cause, as enforced by the expression ‘to pass through the gates’ that evokes passing through the gates of heaven, or hell, depending on one’s IQ. The mainstream church rests on  $g$  as its cornerstone, and Sternberg dismantles it from the heart.

## 5.6 Smart Fools

An ethical stance was playing in the background all along, permeating this conceptual scheme, and guiding it. Indignation for injustice, celebration of diversity, vindication of the excluded, annoyance at conformism and its consequences, and admiration of disruption drive inquiry towards the shape that intelligence takes here. The ethical elements

were, however, implicit. In his later work, Sternberg (2002; 2005b; 2010; 2013; 2017) makes the ethical explicit in an outspoken call for wisdom as constitutive of intelligence.

Gottfredson would agree that we need wisdom. However, she may argue that it does not have to do with intelligence; it is a separate matter. Or, more likely, she would argue that wisdom follows from high IQ, as was discussed in the relation between IQ and crime. In fact, *g*-theorists do not consider cases of unethical action with high IQ, and Sternberg won't have it: 'not all correlates of high IQ are socially desirable, although Rushton and Jensen (2005) only mention the desirable ones. ... Being able to design and fabricate sophisticated bombs, ... and planning terrorist attacks without getting caught. In these cases, higher IQ may be correlated with socially devalued outcomes. Arguably, these outcomes do more social harm than divorce (associated, according to Rushton and Jensen, with low IQ). ... A problem with our society is its emphasis on intelligence and its correspondingly lack of emphasis on wisdom'. (Sternberg, 2005a, p. 297) In contrast, Sternberg shows negative correlates of IQ emphasising that 'if one looks at contemporary problems, ... one wonders whether higher IQ has been indifferent or even averse to solving serious world problems. ... If you look at the country leaders, many of them are educated at top colleges, but they are an historic embarrassment ... what are we doing wrong?' (Sternberg, 2017) Note the use of 'averse' that suggests that high IQ is not necessarily a valued feature, and could even be detrimental, on ethical criteria

Wisdom involves 'the use of knowledge and skills towards a common good, by balancing one's, others', and higher order interests, over the long as well as short terms, through the infusion of positive ethical values.' (Sternberg, 2013, p. 45) The appreciation of wisdom combined with commending disruption moves towards revolutionising the whole enterprise. Other scholars have criticised *g*-theory, but they focussed on test-bias while the problem is more radical: 'Critics of tests have focussed on the obstacles in the race, but I think that the problem is rather that we are running the wrong race. The qualities that our country and the world need are not fully measured by alphabet tests. We focus on *g* because it's easy to measure, but it's like the man who has lost his keys in the dark, but looks for them under the street lamp because it's easier to see'. (Sternberg, 2017) He is not only criticising the scientific validity of *g*; he is *changing the subject* as to what intelligence is. This is an explicit normative move that provides direction for new developments, a direction that he is taking. He can propose a revolution because his theory is grounded in the appreciation of disruption and change as valued means to learning. This would not be the case if he favoured stability, regularity, control, and absolute Truths.

Ethics explicitly becomes part of the theory of intelligence. 'We need smart wise people but are only producing smart ones, namely that are good at adaptation to the environment thinking only about their own benefit.' (Sternberg, 2017) Shaping the environment involves also making a difference: 'Many of the great people ... had the sense to find something else to do where they really had a contribution to make.' (Sternberg, 2005b, p. 207) Success involves meaningful goals, and they need not be grand, as would be the case if the criterion were status. Meaningful goals simply take others into account: 'many who have made some kind of lasting impact may have left as their legacy their impact only on family and friends, not an impact on the history books.' (Sternberg, 1997, p. 1031) One could counter-argue that also the designer of an atomic bomb leaves a lasting impact, but the weight of wisdom makes this hypothesis highly improbable.

Changing the environment for others also involves correcting the wrongs caused by standardised tests: science has ethical responsibilities that cannot be washed away by claim

of value-freedom. Valuing wisdom makes these harms visible and guides action towards their correction. Here the tone becomes more explicitly vitriolic: ‘The quest to show that one socially defined racial, ethnic or other group is inferior to another ... has what I believe to be a long, sad history. ... Scientists might argue that their work is value free and that they are not responsible for the repugnant or even questionable values or actions of opportunistic leaders.’ (Sternberg, 2005a, p. 295) The load involved here needs no disentangling; it is rather self-explanatory. What I want to point out is the repeated attack to (claims of) value-freedom: ‘When we use a psychological measuring instrument in assessing people, we are imposing a set of values. ... What good is research of the kind done by Rushton and Jensen supposed to achieve? ... Demonstration that certain groups are, on average, genetically inferior to other groups ... used to promote social engineering unsupported by the data.’ (Sternberg, 2005a, p. 296) This is important because subtle: some claims are justified with value-freedom, i.e. they are uncomfortable truths, but still truths, according to the selective scheme. Sternberg emphasises the hypocrisy involved in this procedure; using value-freedom to justify despicable outcomes is loathed because there is no such thing as value-freedom. Thus, claims that broadcast value-freedom are faulty of endorsing the values communicated by the theory; if the theory is racist, the scientists proposing it endorse its racist value-ladenness, regardless of them using factor analysis.

Everyone has ethical responsibilities, and scientists do too: ‘Since ancient times, cynical, political, religious and other leaders have used such arguments to justify discriminatory ideological positions. Does science want to provide them with ammunition?’ (Sternberg, 2005a, p. 295) The creation of opportunities for growth is a valued feature of science as opposed to their limitation: ‘APA ... [is] devoted to creating, not restricting, opportunities for growth and advancement. The quality of science is determined not only by the quality of problem solving, but also by taste in the selection of problems to solve.’ (Sternberg, 2005a, p. 300) This seems to imply that theories like Rushton and Jensen’s not only lack scientific rigor, in that they advocate a non-existent value freedom and lack critical thinking, but also limit opportunities for growth and advancement, whose support is the primary mission of science. This moves towards developing scientific theories that do support growth, and to dismantling those that deprive it.

## 5.7 Blinkering

The core elements of this conceptual scheme, and the evaluative load that they involve, set the scope for what is seen, and for what is not seen, which we now examine.

The deprecation of conventional standards, particularly those that preclude access to success, guides the reconfiguration of intelligence with features that empower and increase possibilities to succeed. This may blinker us from seeing that not everything is possible. One may work hard on her strengths and weaknesses, adapt and select environments, without achieving the desired goals. How would such case be explained; chance, not enough work, inequality? These elements are not considered. The emphasis on agency may lead to overlook, or dismiss, the role of innate elements.

The concept of failure is unavailable in this conceptual scheme. More precisely, ‘making mistakes’ and ‘failing’ are mentioned in relation to taking risks, but it is unclear what constitutes failing, although we can infer that it is not related with status. The desire of rendering success available to those who are excluded blinkers Sternberg from examining failure. While the selective scheme focuses extensively on features of failure, here we have

the other extreme; articulating a richer view of success does not seem to leave room for failure.

The conception of science as theory-, and value-, laden opens to debating the validity of results, a debate that *g*-theorists need not have because their validation rests in the supposed objectivity of quantitative data and statistical analysis. Sternberg does not propose that ‘anything goes’ and often invites to caution about claims that are not uncontroverted, which sets more stringent demands on scientific results. Given the weight and inevitability of implicit theories, how do uncontroverted claims obtain and what is their relation with objectivity? This scheme is silent about objectivity, and it is unclear whether it considers the concept irrelevant or whether it rests on a different, implicit, conception of objectivity.

The inclusion of wisdom as constitutive of intelligence leads to developing tests address analytic, creative, practical intelligence, and wisdom. However, this raises the problem of how to determine the right answer to an ethical question in a test format. This is not an uncontroversial matter, and indeed an interesting one to examine further, but seems ousted by the urgency of including wisdom in the theory, and related tests.

The last element of blinkering that I want to highlight is somewhat provocative. The desire to correct the wrongs of *g*-theory guides Sternberg to reformulating intelligence and its measurement; however, that there is a need to measure is presupposed. Thus, action is directed at developing tests that are more ‘just’ without questioning whether they are needed at all, and why. *G*-theorists are clear: we need them to select people with the innate ability. If this presupposition falls, as seems to be the case in Sternberg’s theory, why proposing different tests instead of questioning their very existence? And what would intelligence look like without being bound by measurement? It may be the case that practical needs limit how much disruption one can cause; advocating the abolition of tests may lead to leaving the field to *g*-theory, while proposing alternative ones does, to some extent, correct the wrongs that Sternberg has set out to correct.

## 6 Conclusion

We have examined two conceptual schemes that provide different accounts of what intelligence *is*. These accounts are informed by the core elements of the schemes, enforced by evaluative load, which set different purposes for the use of the concept ‘intelligence’ and inform its operationalization. Disentangling reveals how thought and action are guided by the evaluation of different features. In the selective scheme the admiration of status and meritocracy guide people towards conceiving intelligence as the innate distinctive mark that characterises success, where its study aims at the identification and selection of individuals who possess the innate ability. The divergent scheme is guided by admiration for those who manage a variety of adversities that, combined with a deprecation of convention, leads to challenging the established paradigm represented by *g*, proposing an alternative theory that corrects the injustices caused by *g*.

The selective scheme has an orientation that I call *aut-aut* in virtue of inherent disjunction; science is either value-free or ideology, people either succeed or fail. In contrast, the divergent scheme is characterised by an *et-et* orientation that inherently involves examining various alternatives; both the child who succeeds at tests and the Brazilian street children are successful, science involves both data and also inherent theories, intelligence comprises

g and also practical, creative, and ethical ability. Both schemes guide what is seen, and both blinker. However, an *aut-aut* orientation blinkers us more in virtue of its inherent disjunctive character that prevents us from examining alternatives. This will be further discussed in the concluding chapter.

## Chapter 3: Clashes of Civilisations?

In 1990 Bernard Lewis published an article titled 'The Roots of Muslim Rage' introducing the idea of a clash of civilisations between the West and Islam. Samuel Huntington further developed these thoughts in 'The Clash of Civilisations?' (1993a), followed by *The Clash of Civilisations and the remaking of world order* (1996a). Huntington's theory became a widely adopted explanatory model in popular discourse as well as international relations and security studies, particularly concerning terrorism. This culminated with the events of the 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001 when the Muslim terrorist became a fully-fledged paradigm in the Kuhnian sense of exemplary problem solution, and in the more explicitly rhetorical sense.

Samuel Huntington had the explicit goal of providing a new paradigm that would orient foreign policy after the Cold War. He uses the term paradigm as synonymous of 'map' (Huntington, 1996a, p. 30) in a broader sense than exemplar, as I use it. (Kuhn, 1962/2012) Key function of a paradigm, for Huntington, is the generation of predictions: 'a crucial test for a paradigm's validity and usefulness is the extent to which the predictions derived from it turn out to be more accurate from those of alternative paradigms.' (Ibid. p. 37) There is no universally good or bad paradigm; like a map, it may be too detailed or too general. 'We need a map that both portrays reality and simplifies reality in a way that best serves our purposes' (ibid. p. 31), and the purpose was guiding international politics. In this respect, it did indeed generate predictions and inspired policy. It remains to be seen whether such predictions were self-fulfilling prophecies.

The model provides an easily grasped framework for distinguishing what is important from what is unimportant; however, the criteria that determine what is important and unimportant are set by the conceptual scheme, as well as what is seen and not seen. This is the case for all conceptual schemes; changing the conceptual repertoire, which is not solely factual, we see previously unavailable elements. This chapter examines the conceptual scheme that informs the clash of civilisations in the writings of Lewis and Huntington, and the conceptual horizon that it sets. Their theories are descriptive but, as we will see, they rest on assumptions and presuppositions that involve evaluation. The disentangling section identifies descriptive features and evaluations, and examines how they direct action and thought, i.e. what is seen of international relations and terrorism, followed by what it not seen, i.e. blinkering.

The second part of the chapter presents a contrasting approach proposed by prof. Mohammed H. Kamali, and prof. Tariq Ramadan; I call it the integrated scheme. These two scholars employ similar terms to the ones used by Huntington, but they are informed by a different conceptual scheme, loaded with different combinations of description and evaluation. Thus, when these scholars talk about power, religion, modernity or terrorism, all terms also employed by Huntington and Lewis, they see different features, provide different explanations, and propose different solutions. Also in this case we identify the core elements of the conceptual scheme, disentangle them, and then consider how the conceptual scheme and its load shape what is seen in this conceptual horizon, as well as blinkering.

This is in no way a comparison between a supposedly Western view and a Muslim view; conceptual schemes are examined, not who adopts them.<sup>30</sup> There are probably several

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<sup>30</sup> For instance, if we examined the conceptual scheme of Dabiq, the official magazine of ISIS, we would find it akin to the clash scheme.

other conceptual schemes that pertain to this topic. This chapter has no ambition of providing an exhaustive account of the possible ways to understand terrorism, but rather, to show how different schemes influence understanding, explanation, and action. It is with this objective in mind that the two approaches were chosen.

## 1 The Clash Scheme

‘There is clearly a need for a new model that will help us to order and to understand central developments in world politics. What is the best simple map of the post cold-war world?’  
(Huntington, 1993c, p. 187)

According to Huntington (1993a, 1993c, 1996a), the relevant actors after the Cold War will be civilisations; macro entities that aggregate peoples with shared culture and kinship, with religion at their core. Civilisations provide identity and will be the protagonists of future conflicts, driven by power. Other ways to classify international actors are available, but they are either too simple or too detailed, and are incompatible with each other: ‘the world cannot be both one and fundamentally divided between East and West or North and South. Nor can the nation state be the base rock of international affairs if it is fragmenting and torn by proliferating civil strife. The world is either one, or two, or 184 states, or potentially an almost infinite number of tribes, ethnic groups, and nationalities.’ (Huntington, 1996a, p. 36) Classification according to civilisations is a better solution because it ‘does not sacrifice reality to parsimony’ nor ‘parsimony to reality’ and provides an ‘easily grasped and intelligible framework for understanding the world, *distinguishing what is important from what is unimportant* among the multiplying conflicts, *predicting* future developments, and *providing guidelines* for policy makers.’ (Ibid. italics added) What is important or unimportant seems to be a matter of fact, and facts are indeed identified, but the selection of relevant, or irrelevant, facts is guided by purpose: identifying the new enemy.

### 1.1 Civilisations: Ultimate Human Tribes

Civilisations represent (not so imaginary) boundaries in a scenario where the ones of the cold war are no longer relevant: ‘global politics is being reconfigured along cultural lines.... Political boundaries increasingly are redrawn to coincide with cultural ones, ethnic, religious, and civilizational.’ (Huntington, 1996a, p. 125) Huntington identifies civilisations through a cultural common denominator: ‘civilisations and culture both refer to the overall way of life of a people, and a civilisation is a culture writ large’. (Huntington, 1996a, p. 41) ‘They both involve the “values, norms, institutions, and modes of thinking to which successive generations in a given society have attached primary importance.’ (Bozeman in Huntington, *ibid.*) Thus, ‘a civilisation is the broadest cultural entity’ (*ibid.* p. 43), and becomes the ‘base rock’ (*ibid.* p. 36) of international affairs, since nation states can be too volatile and sharp dualist divisions too simplistic. Culture is nested in civilisations; placeholders of shared values and beliefs, under the presupposition that such commonalities are geographically located. Similarity is central; a given civilisation involves shared language, ethnicity, religion, values, and beliefs. (Huntington, 1993, 1993a, 1993b, 1996a) Culture is not static (1993a), ‘cultures interact and overlap’ (Huntington, 1996a, p. 43) and civilisations have ‘no clear-cut boundaries’, but they are ‘nonetheless meaningful entities, and while the lines between them are seldom sharp, they are real.’ (*Ibid*)

It follows that civilisations delineate actual similarities in terms of 'blood, language, religion, way of life.' (Huntington, 1996a, p. 42) Huntington identifies the following civilisations: 'Sinic, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox (separated from the rest of Christendom because of Bizantine influence), Western (most scholars include Latin America, but it should be separated), Latin American, and possibly African, even though most scholars do not recognise a distinct African civilisation'. (Ibid. pp. 45-47) Civilisations are talked about as agents whose repertoire of action involves conquering or being conquered, attacking or being attacked: 'Civilisations are the ultimate human tribes and the clash of civilisations is tribal conflict on a global scale.' (Ibid. p. 207)

Interactions among these entities involve conflict: 'Civilisations are the natural successors to the three worlds of the cold war. At the macro level world politics are likely to involve conflicts and shifting power, violent, prolonged ... conflicts are likely to be between states and groups from different civilisations.' (Huntington, 1993c, p. 187) Clashes are inevitable: 'the world is not one. Civilisations unite and divide humankind. The forces making for clashes between civilisations can be contained only if they are recognised.' (Ibid. p. 194) This is the case because politics concerns power.

## 1.2 Power and Politics

That conflict permeates interactions among civilisations presupposes a specific conception of politics. Since 'political science is, indeed, the study of why, how, and with what consequences people get and exercise power' (Huntington, 1993b, p. 69), politics consists in the exercise of power. But what is power? In this conceptual scheme it is the ability to coerce others into doing what one wants: 'politics is concerned with primacy in power ... [which is] the ability of one actor to influence the behaviour of others.' (Ibid. p. 68) Power so conceived permeates all relations, not only political ones: 'power matters... in most human relationships, even in families' (ibid.), and manifests in dominance and supremacy. This is natural: 'Competition- the struggle for primacy- we all recognize as natural among individuals, corporations, political parties, athletes, and universities; it is no less natural among countries.' (Ibid. p. 71)

Power is central to politics because 'to be powerful and to be viewed by others as such surely enhances the self-esteem of individuals and nations. Power enables an actor to shape his environment so as to reflect his interests. In particular it enables a state to protect its security and prevent, deflect, or defeat threats to that security. It also enables a state to promote its values among other peoples and to shape the international environment so as to reflect its values.' (1993b, p. 69-70) Note the assumption that self-esteem rests in the ability to bend others to one's will and to one's values and interests. From assuming that everyone aims at bending others, it follows that encounters between entities with different values and interests necessarily generate clashes. Thus history is a sequence of victories and defeats, of conquerors and conquered: 'the most dramatic and *significant* contacts between civilisations were when people from one civilisation conquered and eliminated or subjugated the people of another.... For four hundred years intercivilisational relations consisted of the subordination of other societies to Western civilisation.' (Huntington, 1996a, pp. 50-51)

The will of others may be bent with the exercise of force, hard power, or soft power, in which case a state may be able to 'get "other countries to *want* what it wants" through the appeal of its culture and ideology... if a state's "culture and ideology are attractive, others

will be more willing to follow” its leadership, and hence soft power is “just as important as hard command power”. (Nye in Huntington, 1996a, p. 92) However, for Huntington soft power requires hard power: ‘The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion (to which few members of other civilisations were converted) but rather by the superiority in applying organised violence.’ (Ibid. pp. 50-51) People follow those they consider winners, and those they consider winners are the ones who dominate.<sup>31</sup> A culture or ideology are not attractive *per se*, they ‘become attractive when they are seen as rooted in material success and influence. Soft power is power only when it rests on a foundation of hard power. Increases in hard economic and military power produce enhanced self-confidence, arrogance, and belief in the superiority of one’s own culture or soft power compared to those of other peoples and greatly increases its attractiveness to other peoples. Decreases in economic and military power lead to self-doubt, crises of identity, and efforts to find in other cultures the keys to economic, military and political success.’ (Ibid. p. 92) Self-confidence lies in the subordination of others to follow one’s will, be it by force or by seduction. In both cases a leader and a follower are presupposed by the very nature of the relation that characterises this conception of power.

### 1.3 Identity

Identity is the most significant distinction among peoples. Civilisations ultimately represent a shared identity: ‘in the post cold-war world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political or economic. They are cultural. Peoples and nations are attempting to answer the most basic question humans can face: who are we? ... People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs and institutions.’ (Huntington, 1996a, p. 21)

Identity is defined in negative terms, ‘people define their identity by *what they are not*’ (Ibid. p. 67 italics added), and antagonism is essential; being implies being against, since identity does not merely indicate difference, but involves enmity. ‘We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against.’ (Ibid. p. 21) Defining identity requires an enemy who is seen as worse:<sup>32</sup> ‘Identity, at any level—personal, tribal, racial, civilizational - can only be defined in relation to an “other”, a different person, tribe, race, or civilisation. Historically ... separate codes governed behaviour toward *those who are “like us” and the “barbarians” who are not.*’ (Ibid. p. 129) If others are barbarians, and everyone aims at supremacy, as implied by power, civilisations necessarily clash. We find then a world carved into factions with shared identity whose very existence rests on conflict: ‘the question “which side are you on?” has been replaced with “who are you?” every state has to have answers. That answer, its cultural identity, defines the state’s place in world politics, its friends and its enemies.’ (Huntington, 1996a, p. 125) This is a truth and delineates the borders of civilisations: ‘The unfortunate truth in these old truths cannot be ignored by statesmen and scholars. *For peoples seeking identity and reinventing ethnicity, enemies are essential*, and the potentially most dangerous enmities occur across the fault lines between the world’s major civilisations.’ (Ibid. p. 20)

Similarity and alterity regulate the constitution of identity and patterns of aggregation: ‘people rally to those with similar ancestry, religion, language, values and institutions, and distance themselves from those with different ones.’ (Huntington, 1996a, p. 126)

<sup>31</sup> This is the case under this conception of power and winning, but it may be otherwise.

<sup>32</sup> This is not an evaluative position taken by Huntington; he describes how people define their identity as a matter of fact.

Individual cultures within a civilisation may have occasional conflicts, but they come together against another civilisation: 'a younger boy will bandwagon with his older brother when they confront other boys; he is less likely to trust his older brother when they are alone at home.' (Ibid. p. 233) As placeholders of kinship 'these broader levels of civilizational identity mean deeper consciousness of civilizational differences and of the *need to protect* what distinguishes "us" from "them".' (Ibid. p. 129) The people we trust are the ones who are like us: 'Trust most easily springs from common values and culture ... by and large single civilisation organisations do more things and are more successful than multicivilisational organisations.' (Ibid. p. 131)

## 1.4 Religion

The core of identity, and civilisations, is religion: 'In coping with identity crises what counts for people are blood and belief, faith and family' (Huntington, 1996a, p. 126); these are 'the central defining characteristic of civilisations.' (Ibid. p. 47) Since self-definition involves antagonism, religion is the core of civilizational identity *and* of inter-civilisational conflict: 'To a very large degree, the major civilisations in human history have been closely identified with the world's greatest religions; and people who share ethnicity or language but differ in religion may slaughter each other.' (Ibid. p. 42) If defining who we are requires being against, and it is clear by now that this is the case, the criteria of 'otherness' set by religion are precise and stark. There are no grey areas: 'religions give people identity by positing a basic distinction between believers and non-believers, between a superior in-group and a different and inferior out-group.' (Ibid. p. 97) It follows that the revival of non-Western religions represents the 'most powerful representation of anti-Westernism in non-Western societies.' (Ibid. p. 101)

Little is said about religion *per se*; it is assimilated to culture and treated as constitutive of a cultural context. A common view associates religion with 'superstitions, myths, irrationalities, and rituals' as opposed to economic and social modernisation, and a 'tolerant, rational, pragmatic, progressive, humanistic, and secular' society. (Huntington, 1996a, p. 95) However, some societies have modernised and democratised more than others without abandoning religion. How is this explained? Huntington (1984, 1991, 1996a) analyses different religions on the basis of their expression in different political cultures presupposing that, since religion is the most essential feature of culture, a certain political culture is rooted in religion. Thus, religions are examined from a political perspective in terms of how they fare with democracy. 'Political culture is, presumably, rooted in the broader culture of a society that involves those beliefs and values, often religiously based, concerning the nature of humanity and society, the relations among human beings. Significant differences in their receptivity to democracy appear to exist among societies with different cultural traditions.' (Huntington, 1984, p. 207)

Christianity, 'first Catholicism and then Protestantism, is the single most important historical characteristic of Western civilisation'. (Huntington 1996b, p. 31) The conflicts that led to the separation between Catholicism and Protestantism, 'and the political and intellectual consequences of that rift, are also distinctive features of Western history, totally absent from Eastern Orthodoxy and removed from the Latin American experience.' (Ibid.) Protestantism favours democracy thanks to its emphasis on 'individual conscience' (Huntington, 1991, p. 30) and the 'supremacy of the congregation with no, or only a limited, bishopric.' (Ibid.) It 'encouraged economic enterprise, the development of a bourgeoisie, capitalism, and economic wealth, all of which facilitated the emergence of

democratic institutions.’ (Ibid.) It also favours market economy, which is ‘more likely to give rise to economic wealth and the resulting more equitable distribution of income that provides the infrastructure of democracy.’ (Huntington, 1984, p. 205) Catholicism, in contrast, has an authoritarian structure where the ‘dividing line between the spiritual and the temporal may be very fine or even confused.’ (Huntington, 1991, p. 30) In many countries the Catholic Church was ‘associated with the local establishment, land-owning oligarchy, and authoritarian government.’ (Huntington, 1991, p. 31) This changed from the 1960s when the Catholic Church actively opposed dictatorships, and in the years to come when it facilitated democratisation and opposed authoritarian regimes in several countries. (Huntington, 1991; 1996a; 1996b)

The utterly unique characteristic of Western Christianity, and of Western civilisation, is the separation of Church and State. Bernard Lewis reminds us that ‘Christians are enjoined in their Scriptures to “render ... unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s and unto God the things which are God’s.” (1990, p. 47) Both Huntington and Lewis mention God and Caesar as ‘a prevailing dualism in Western culture’ (ibid.), the only other case being Hindu civilisation. ‘In Islam God is Caesar; in China and Japan Caesar is God; in Orthodoxy Caesar is God’s junior partner.’ (Ibid. and Lewis, 1990) The separation that took place in Western civilisation is not observable elsewhere, ‘it contributed immeasurably to the development of freedom in the West’ (ibid.), and is ‘essentially American’ (Lewis, 1990 p. 47) in that ‘it was in the United States that the principle was first given the force of law and gradually, in the course of two centuries, became a reality.’ (Ibid.)

Confucianism does not fare well with freedom and democracy, since it ‘emphasises the group over the individual, authority over liberty, and responsibility over rights. Confucian societies lacked a tradition of rights against the state; to the extent that individual rights did exist, they were created *by* the state.’ (Huntington, 1991, p. 36) Note the assumption that individualism and an emphasis on rights favour democracy while collectivism and emphasis on responsibility are taken to be obstacles to it. Disagreement is obstructed by preference for cooperation and hierarchy, ‘the conflict of ideas, groups, and parties was viewed as dangerous and illegitimate. ... Confucianism merged society and the state and provided no legitimacy for autonomous social institutions to balance the state at the national level.’ (Ibid.) Main obstacle to democratic institutions and practices is the fact that ‘political legitimacy rested on the mandate of Heaven, which defined politics in terms of morality.... There were no legitimate grounds for limiting power because power and morality are identical, and to think that power may be corrupt and requires institutional check and balances is a contradiction in terms.’ (Ibid.) Morality and religion seem to be one and the same, contrasted with politics.

Islam may favour democracy and modernisation in virtue of ‘unitarianism, rule-ethic, individualism, scripturalism, puritanism, an egalitarian aversion for mediation and hierarchy, a fairly small load of magic.’ (Ernest Gellner in Huntington, 1991, p. 40) However, it rejects ‘any separation between the religious community and the political community’ (ibid.), which implies that there is no counterbalancing between the two. Fundamentalism requires rulers to be practicing Muslims, *shariah* as basic law and that the *ulama* have a decisive role in all governmental policy. ‘To the extent that the governmental legitimacy and policy flow from religious doctrine and religious expertise, Islamic concepts of politics differ from and contradict the premises of democratic politics.’ (Ibid. p. 40) Moreover, the experience of Muslim countries like Lebanon, Pakistan, Egypt, and Algeria, shows that democracy is a challenge for Islam. (Huntington, 1984, 1991, 1993, 1996a, 1996b)

The difficulty to achieve democracy is attributed to whether one has a consummatory or instrumentalist approach. The former indicates very little or no difference between intermediate and ultimate ends, for instance Islam does not separate between 'religion and politics, or between the spiritual and the secular, and political participation was historically an alien concept.' (Huntington, 1984, p. 208) Confucianism is also consummatory, characterised by holism where 'the culture was conceived of as total entity, no part of which could be changed without threatening the whole.' (Ibid.) In contrast, instrumental cultures separate between intermediate and ultimate ends, so 'ultimate ends do not colour every concrete act.' (Ibid.)

Lastly, Islam and Christianity are 'triumphalist' religions in that both believe to be the bearers of the last word of God and, consequently, aim at the conversion and submission of people who believe in the wrong God. This contrasts with 'relativist' religions, like Judaism, which accept that others 'may be right too'. (Lewis, 2010, 1990; Huntington, 1996a)

## 2 Disentangling the Clash Scheme

The elements of the conceptual scheme that we have seen above are presented as matters of fact; people *are* governed by power, identity *is* defined by antagonism, and religion *is* the core of inter-civilizational conflict. However, they imply evaluation. We now disentangle the evaluative load, revealing the direction it provides to thought and action.

### 2.1 Attractive Supremacy

The hypothetical extra-terrestrial observer may notice that most relations among earthlings involve that someone is compelled to do something, and they call this power. There needs not be any evaluation involved in the observation; the earthlings may attribute evaluative elements to their concept of power, but this would also be a description. The narrator of this story, however, is not an observer alien to the concept of power; he grasps it well, and considers it to be an inevitable disposition of humankind. This too is not explicitly evaluative. However, the alien observer who did not share the background system of norms that justifies this conception of power would be puzzled: why, (s)he would wonder, do people interact this way? Furthermore, if the observer's background system were dissonant with conceiving of power as supremacy, (s)he would probably voice dissent. None of these obtains. The assumption that human relations are regulated by supremacy, and that it is a fact of nature, is not discussed or questioned. Posited as an axiomatic truth, it contributes considerably to directing the rest of the theory.

Power, characterised by domination, is admired and this implicitly endorses the supremacy view: who does not desire to be admired? Self-confidence, arrogance, and belief in one's superiority are 'attractive' features: 'Increases in hard economic and military power produce enhanced self-confidence, arrogance, and belief in the superiority of one's own culture ... and greatly increases its attractiveness to other peoples' (Huntington, 1996a, p. 92) On the other hand, lack of power is unattractive and leads to identity crises 'Decreases in economic and military power lead to self-doubt, crises of identity.' (Ibid.)

That power is the very essence of politics is also implicitly endorsed. If this were not the case, one would question whether politics should be guided by power. Instead, we are told that power can be used for evil purposes, but it is ‘also the pre-requisite to doing good.... Almost nothing beneficial in the world happens except by the exercise of power.’ (1993b, p. 70) This does not only express appreciation, but also prescribes and justifies actions aimed at achieving supremacy; those who have ‘good’ values and beliefs ought to gain power in order to spread the good. Suggesting that *either* the ‘good’ peoples have power *or* there would be war enforces the call to action: ‘primacy is desirable not primarily to achieve victory in war but to achieve the state's goals without recourse to war. Primacy is thus an alternative to war.’ (Ibid.) Gaining power is mandatory for the greater good.

## 2.2 Necessary Antagonism, or Betrayal

Identity requires differentiating ‘those who are “like us” and the “barbarians” who are not’ (Huntington, 1996a, p. 129), which implies that others are seen with disdain. Again, one could argue that this is a description of how earthlings define that thing they call identity. This descriptive account, however, is not offered from a supposedly external viewpoint; it comes from a narrator situated within Western civilisation. It follows that others are antagonists also to the observer. That this is necessarily how things go is treated by Huntington as *a priori* and not discussed or questioned. People *need* enemies; it makes us who we are. ‘It is human to hate. *For self-definition and motivation people need enemies.* ... The disappearance of one enemy generate personal, social and political forces that give rise to new ones.’ (Ibid. p. 130 italics added) This is not only a description of conditions that are necessary to identity definition; it is an endorsement. Enemies are a threat, and so people with shared culture come together to ‘protect what distinguishes “us” from “them.”’ (Ibid. p. 129) But not having enemies is also a threat; since ‘being’ requires hating who we are not, lack of enemies would imply ‘not being’, which is a rather threatening prospect. Thus, identity denotes features that are valued because they represent the essence of who we are: ‘Faith and family, blood and belief are what people identify with and what they will fight and die for.’ (Huntington 1993c, p. 194)

This necessary antagonism is proposed as a hard truth, and an endorsed such, an endorsement that is enforced by addressing dissenting views as ‘sentimental cant’: ‘There can be no true friends without true enemies. Unless we hate what we are not, we cannot love what we are. These are the old truths we are painfully rediscovering after a century and more of sentimental cant.’ (Michael Dibdin’s *Dead Lagoon*, in Huntington, 1996a, p. 20) ‘Sentimental’ as used here is demeaning and is addressed at those who do not accept the necessity of antagonism to identity. Denying these truths amounts to ‘deny[ing] their family, their heritage, their culture, their birthright, their very selves! They will not lightly be forgiven.’ (Ibid.) To deny that identity needs hate amounts to betrayal; this clearly expresses reproach, and involves a prescription, but also suggests an inference from family to civilisation. One *ought* not to betray oneself or one’s family, or one’s civilisation.

## 2.3 Better Religions

Religion is central to civilizational identity as the driving force of antagonism and conflict; it is the primary element of identification with those who are like us, our family, and hate for the barbarians. We have just seen that questioning this postulate amounts to betrayal. Thus, features of *our* religion are, and ought to be, valued while features of *other* religions

symbolise what we do, and ought to, reject. This guides the supposedly descriptive account of various religions, and civilisations, that are examined in respect to democracy and liberty<sup>33</sup> (Huntington, 1984, 1991, 1996a); the most cherished features of Western civilisation. Democracy is the utmost expression of advancement in a society, and, as such, highly valued. Liberty is the ‘peculiar virtue of democracy; hence, if one is concerned with liberty as an ultimate social value, one should be concerned with the fate of democracy.’ (Huntington, 1984, p. 194)

It follows that the descriptive assessment of various religions is guided by implicit evaluation in two ways: 1. At a general level, ‘our’ religion, whatever it may be, is the core of what we love, and of the hate for others: it identifies the ‘us’ that we ought to protect from the barbarians, and for these very reasons, it is valued 2. At the particular level, Christianity is valued in virtue of its unique features, which underlie the supremacy of the West, its advancement and democracy.

Protestantism is the most appreciated: ‘Originally, Protestantism and democracy were linked with each other. The first democratic impulse in the Western world came with the Puritan revolution in the seventeenth century.’<sup>34</sup> (Huntington, 1991, p. 30) The majority of democratic countries is Protestant, ‘the higher the proportion of the population that is Protestant, the higher the level of democracy.’ (Ibid.) This is due to specific features of Protestantism: individualism and the fact that protestant ethics favoured economic growth and wealth, which favour democracy: ‘there is ... a positive correlation between economic development and political competitiveness (Huntington, 1984, p. 198) ... all democracies have market-oriented economies.’ (Ibid. p. 204)<sup>35</sup> Catholicism has improved thanks to economic growth: ‘with economic development ... the role of the church changed, and in most Catholic countries now the church is identified with support for democracy.’ (Huntington, 1984, p. 208) Thus, that Christianity, and Protestantism support democracy is not solely a descriptive matter of fact; it is endorsed, as are the features that are associated with Christianity, and thus democracy, individualism and capitalism at the forefront.

Other feature of Christianity, also highly valued is the separation of Church and State. Lack of separation favours corruption, authoritarian regimes, and hinders democracy because decision-makers cannot be questioned. (Huntington, 1984, 1991, 1993, 1996a) These features represent what we do not want to be, and are embodied particularly by Confucianism and Islam, i.e. the ‘other’ civilisations not only in virtue of the antagonism intrinsic to identity, but also due to their hostility to democracy. Features of Confucianism are collectivism, hierarchy, hostility to ‘social bodies independent of the state’ (Huntington, 1984, p. 208), no separation of spiritual and temporal sphere, and economic growth that does not rely on a market-economy. (Huntington, 1991, 1996) All negative because they hamper political democracy and liberalism *as we know it*. Islam is characterised chiefly by the lack of separation of Church and State, which is a considerable obstacle to democracy. (Huntington, 1984, 1991, 1993, 1996, Lewis, 1990)

The use of the expression ‘triumphalist’ to characterise Christianity and Islam communicates a threat, reinforced by the necessary antagonism that permeates the scheme. It suggests that Christianity ought to gain supremacy, or Islam will; we do want Christianity

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<sup>33</sup> Democracy in the Shumpeterian sense of fair elections. It is not specified what conception of liberty, but it would seem negative liberty. For a more thorough treatment see Berlin, I. (2002), Cohen, G.A. (2011), Taylor, C. (1979), and Skinner (2002) for a more thorough treatment of the concept of Liberty.

<sup>34</sup> Regardless of Ancient Greece.

<sup>35</sup> Although the contrary cannot be said. (Ibid.)

to win, and we ought to want it for two reasons. Firstly, doing otherwise would imply betrayal. Secondly, development, modernity, freedom and democracy, all highly valued, are rooted in Christianity while Islam is hostile to them. Thus, we are moved to protect Christianity, which is the cradle of our very identity.

## 2.4 Civilisations and Civilisation

Huntington highlights a difference between *civilisations*, as cultural entities that ‘provided the broadest identification for people’ (Huntington, 1996, p. 40), and *civilisation*, which denotes a ‘civilised society that differed from primitive society because it was settled, urban, and literate. To be civilised was good, to be uncivilised was bad.’ (Ibid.) Civilisations, in the plural, are for Huntington a natural and neutral way to divide the world according to cultural differences that are there nonetheless. (Huntington, 1993, 1996) He specifies that he uses civilisations in the plural and we could then settle with them being classification tools that do not involve evaluation of sort. However, we should not be so quick. There is a rather strong load in the use of civilisations.

Civilisations represent a shared identity defined by antagonistic relations with others. They represent warring factions, indeed loaded with pathos, belonging, pride, safety, fear of the ‘barbarians’, and determination to protect what is dear to us. This could have been the case even if the agents were States. However, the use of civilisations is more rhetorically powerful and suggests glory and celebration. ‘In a world where culture counts, the platoons are tribes and ethnic groups, the regiments are nations, and the armies are civilisations.’ (Huntington, 1996, p. 128) We think of the Roman legions, the Greeks, or the Egyptians. Civilisations evoke pride, more so than ‘nation states’. Secondly, a civilisation is the placeholder of identity, not in terms of citizenship, but in the much deeper and emotional sense of belonging to a history, a tradition, a *family*. Shared cultural heritage is the force around which people aggregate in the safety of belonging against the external threat. We *trust* the ones who are like us (and distrust others): ‘Trust most easily springs from common values and culture.’ (Huntington, 1996, p. 131) This too is hardly a mere description.

The key descriptive features of Western civilisation, rooted in Christianity, turn out to indicate the difference between ‘Civilisation’, in the singular, and ‘barbarism.’ Huntington proposes a commonality rule: ‘peoples in all civilisations should search for and attempt to expand the values, institutions, and practices they have in common with peoples of other civilisations.’ (Huntington, 1996a, p. 320) This would limit the effects of clashes among civilisations, but would also strengthen ‘Civilisation in the singular.’ (Ibid.) But if we examine the common values and practices suggested to lead all civilisations towards Civilisation, we find that they are akin to the features that characterise Western civilisation. ‘Is there a general, secular trend, transcending individual civilisations, towards higher levels of Civilisation? If there is such a trend, is it a product of the processes of modernisation that increase the control of humans over their environment and hence generate higher and higher levels of technological sophistication and material well-being? In the contemporary era, is a higher level of modernisation thus a prerequisite to a higher level of Civilisation?’ (Ibid.)

Let us not forget that purpose of this scheme is providing guidance for international relations where politics concerns power.<sup>36</sup> Political entities compete for supremacy, and the entity with the 'good' values ought to have power so that the good will triumph; power leads other cultures to emulate the winner. If the agent with 'bad' or 'evil' values and beliefs takes over, we are doomed. Supremacy is mandatory for the greater good.

The 'better civilisation' is characterised by a higher level of Civilisation: 'Conceivably modernisation and human moral development produced by greater education, awareness, and understanding ... produce sustained movement toward higher and higher levels of Civilisation. Alternatively, levels of Civilisation may simply reflect phases in the evolution of civilisations.' (Huntington, 1996a, p. 320) The contrast is sharp: civilisations at an early evolutionary stage are 'vigorous, dynamic, brutal, mobile, and expansionist. They *are relatively uncivilised*.' (Ibid. italics added) This explicitly negative set of features is juxtaposed with highly valued features of Civilisation: 'a flowering of morality, art, literature, philosophy, technology, and martial, economic, and political competence.' (Ibid.) The way to Civilisation seems to be modernisation, which also contributes to developing the moral and cultural dimension: 'Slavery, torture, vicious abuse of individuals, have become less and less acceptable.... Is this, however, simply the result of the impact of Western civilisation on other cultures and hence will a moral *reversion* occur as Western power declines?' (Ibid. italics added) this suggests that moral and cultural development originate in Western values and may have been adopted by other civilisations only in virtue of Western power, since power leads to emulation. If this is the case, the decline of the West may provoke a moral reversion, a verb that suggests decline thereby hinting that other civilisations would not, on their own, be able to sustain this level of moral development. In fact, features that characterise lack of Civilisation such as the evaporation of law and order (Ibid. p. 321) are prominent in 'Africa, Latin America, the former Soviet Union, South Asia and the Middle East ... while also under serious assault in China, Japan, and the West.' (Ibid.)

Thus, civilisations may well be a classification tool, but it seems that some civilisations are more civilised than others. In fact, we are told that 'the real clash' is the one 'between Civilisation and barbarism' (Huntington, 1996a, p. 321), and the load implied in the whole scheme points at one civilisation as the most Civilised.

### 3 International Relations and Terrorism in the Clash Scheme

We now consider what is seen within this conceptual horizon in terms of international relations, and terrorism. If we need enemies to define identity, the end of the Cold War has left a vacuum, and a question: who is the enemy now? If others need enemies to define themselves, this should be the case for us as well, but the focus is on who hates us.<sup>37</sup> It follows that other civilisations are a threat to us, while the possibility that we could constitute a threat to them is not entertained.

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<sup>36</sup> This is amply debated in political philosophy between proponents of ideal and non-ideal/realist theories. Huntington presupposes that the primary element of politics is power, but this is not uncontroversial. See: Williams (2005), Sleat and Rossi (2014), Runciman (2012), Geuss (2008), Cohen (2003).

<sup>37</sup> Except for a brief mention of antagonism between Europe and immigrants from different cultures that could strengthen European identity. (Huntington, 1996a)

### 3.1 Arch-Enemies: Crusaders and Jihadists

The West is characterised by modernisation: ‘industrialisation; urbanisation; increasing levels of literacy; education, wealth and social mobilisation.’ (Huntington, 1996b, p. 29) Modernisation is as significant as the shift from ‘primitive to civilised societies that began in the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, the Nile, and the Indus about 5.000 A.C.’ (Ibid.) The connection between modernisation and Civilisation leads to infer that industrialisation, urbanisation, and so forth are also features of Civilisation, while those who lack these features are ‘primitive.’

Western civilisation existed long before modernisation, but it is thanks to its characterising features that it did modernise while others did not. These features are: the Classical legacy (Greek philosophy and rationalism, Latin, Roman law, and Christianity), Western Christianity, European languages, secularism, rule of law while ‘in other civilisations law has been a much less important factor in shaping thought and behaviour’ (Huntington, 1996b, p. 32), social pluralism and civil society, representative bodies ‘that evolved into the institutions of modern democracy’ (ibid. p. 33), and individualism. Pluralism here means ‘class pluralism’, and it is ‘good’: ‘most Western European societies included a relatively strong and autonomous aristocracy, a substantial peasantry, and a small but significant class of merchants and traders. The strength of the feudal aristocracy was particularly important in limiting absolutism’s ability to take firm root in most European nations.’ (Ibid.) Individualism is a commended feature associated with ‘individual rights and liberties.’ (Ibid.) The co-presence of these elements enabled democracy, and they belong to Western civilisation: ‘individual liberty, political democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and cultural freedom . . . These are European ideas, not Asian, nor African, not Middle Eastern ideas, except by adoption. . . . These concepts and characteristics are also in large part the factors that enabled the West to take the lead in modernizing itself and the world. They make Western civilization unique, and Western civilization is precious not because it is universal but because it is unique.’ (Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. in Huntington, 1996b, p. 35) Needless to add, we find here features that represent the finest development in terms of human, political, scientific, and economic life.

In contrast, Muslims are humiliated and enraged by the long lasting supremacy of the West, and by their failure to modernise. They are angry, as expressed in Bernard Lewis’ (1990) original article ‘*The roots of Muslim rage.*’ Huntington developed this idea expanding it to many civilisations, but we are pulled back to the original clash; the one between the West and Islam, whose attempts to emulate the West failed because ‘modernisation requires Westernisation. Islam does not offer an alternative way to modernise. . . . Secularism cannot be avoided. Modern science and technology require an absorption of the thought processes which accompany them; so too with political institutions. Because content must be emulated no less than form, the predominance of Western civilisation must be acknowledged so as to be able to learn from it. European languages and Western educational institutions cannot be avoided, even if the latter do encourage freethinking and easy living. Only when Muslims explicitly accept the Western model will they be in a position to technicalize and then to develop.’ (Pipes in Huntington, 1996a, pp. 73-74) Secularism, science and technology, and political institutions are features of Western culture (and of Civilisation, seems to be implied) and associated with development. The verb to *develop* suggests progress, advancement, which presupposes a position of backwardness. Such development requires European languages (unclear why) and Western education *even if* they encourage freethinking, which implies that freethinking is difficult to accept and contrary to Muslim culture.

Rage and resentment due to failure, combined with the diminished power of the West, triggered a process of identity 'rediscovery' and identity, in this scheme, implies antagonism. The resurgence of Muslim identity involves rejecting the West that, for Huntington<sup>38</sup>, represents values and beliefs contrary to Islam. This process is called 'indigenisation' (Huntington, 1996a), a term that prompts an association with tribes. Since modernisation is celebrated in opposition to primitive societies, a reference to tribes is demeaning. A mere description would refer to the rediscovery of ancestral traditions and values, without the belittling tone expressed by contrast between primitive and Civilised. Being religion the core of identity, rediscovering Muslim identity involves rediscovering Islam in antagonism with Christianity through fundamentalism; a term that, as used by Huntington, denotes a threatening dogmatic religiosity that contrasts with the cherished freedom and democracy. 'Among Islamic countries ... the prospects for democratic development seem low. The Islamic revival ... would seem to reduce even further the likelihood of democratic development, particularly since democracy is often identified with the very Western influences the revival strongly opposes. In addition, many of the Islamic states are very poor'. (Huntington, 1984, p. 216)

This animosity is not surprising; Christianity and Islam are archenemies since the birth of the latter. Their history is characterised by a sequence of conquests and counter-conquests. Islam has attempted twice to conquer the West, and we now witness a third attempt that takes place by way of conversion and demographic. (Huntington, 1996; Lewis, 1990, 2010) This conveys a sense of siege. That Islam wants to conquer the West is what civilisations do, strengthened by the fact that both envision 'a supreme force of evil engaged in a cosmic struggle against God' (Lewis, 1990, p. 48) and are characterised by a 'perception of problems as a stark and single conflict between matching forces of pure good and pure evil.' (Ibid.) These are 'triumphalist' religions that see the other as a force of evil. However, the West has grown from these irrationalities of the past (Lewis, 1990; and in Huntington, 1996a, p. 213), which indicates that it has evolved, i.e. improved, while Islam is still entrapped in these irrational dynamics. Note that the use of irrational denotes something that is absurd, void of legitimate reason.

In Islamic teaching, Christians and Jews are respected as 'peoples of the book', but this is precisely the problem, since Muslims believe that Christians have left the book: 'Muslims ... see Western culture as materialistic, corrupt, decadent, and immoral. ... Increasingly Muslims attack the West not for adhering to an imperfect, erroneous religion, which is nonetheless a "religion of the book", but for not adhering to any religion at all. In Muslim eyes Western secularism, irreligiosity, and hence immorality are worse evils than the Western Christianity that produced them.' (Huntington, 1996a, p. 213) The rejection of materialism, corruption or decadence need not be moved by religious fanaticism; however, it is here identified solely with religious dogmatism, which is irrational.

Moreover, Muslims are intrinsically violent; they cannot live under the rule of others, and do not accept to be ruled by infidels. (Lewis, 1990) Involved in conflicts more than other civilisations, Islam has bloody borders: 'wherever one looks ... Muslims have troubles living peaceably with their neighbours.' (Huntington, 1996a, p. 256) They have troubles with Buddhists, with Jews in Israel, in Assam, Kashmir, Philippines, Thailand, and much more. 'Muslim bellicosity and violence are ... facts which neither Muslims or non-Muslims can deny' (Ibid. p. 258), characterised by 'mistrustful coexistence and vicious violence'

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<sup>38</sup> This is important because it is not necessarily the case, but Huntington presupposes it.

(Ibid. p. 259), it is a 'history of off-again-on-again slaughter.' (Ibid.) We are presented with extremely violent features (slaughter, vicious violence) combined with suspicion and distrust, which strengthens the antagonism between 'us' and the 'barbarians.' Former Yugoslavia is extensively treated; Muslim population boomed demographically, outnumbering Orthodox Serbs who were excluded from public life and terrorised. Muslims imposed their power and Serbs retaliated, which suggests that they did so rightfully. (Huntington, 1996a)

The 'indigestibility of Muslims' (Huntington, 1996a, p. 264) indicates that 'even more than Christianity Islam is an absolutist faith' (ibid.) that 'demarcates between believers and non-believers.' (Ibid.) The term indigestibility suggests something uncomfortable, difficult to process, troublesome, and some features that make Muslims indigestible are their incapability to accept others due to religious absolutism. Another feature of indigestibility is Islam's violence: 'Islam has from the start been a religion of the sword and ... it glorifies military virtues.' (Huntington, 1996a, p. 263) The Prophet himself was a warrior (Lewis, 1990); 'no one would say this about Christ or Buddha'. (Huntington, 1996a, p. 263) Islam originated 'among "warring Bedouin nomadic tribes ... this violent origin is stamped in the foundation of Islam.... The doctrines of Islam ... dictate war against unbelievers.... The Koran and other statements of Muslim beliefs contain few prohibitions on violence, and a concept of non-violence is absent from Muslim doctrine and practice.' (Ibid.) Violence is intrinsic to Islam, it is 'stamped' in its very core, which suggests that it cannot be otherwise; being Muslim involves following a religion that has no concept of non-violence. It is a primordial sort of violence, as hinted by association with the sword and Bedouin nomadic tribes, all features that prompt rejection, fear, and reinforce antagonism: 'some Westerners... have argued that the West does not have problems with Islam but only with violent Muslim extremists. Fourteen hundred years of history demonstrate otherwise.' (Ibid. p. 209)

This is the (not so) new enemy,<sup>39</sup> the cold war fades in comparison: 'Marxism-Leninism is only a fleeting and superficial historical phenomenon compared to the continuing and deeply conflictual relation between Islam and Christianity.' (Huntington, 1996a, p. 209) Crusade and *jihad* are parallel concepts (ibid.); both indicate 'Holy war'. But if *jihad* and crusade are parallel concepts, why are we not doing it as well? They have remained irrational: this is the 'perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both. It is crucially important that we on our side should not be provoked into an equally historic but also equally irrational reaction against this rival.' (Lewis, 1990; and in Huntington, 1996a, p. 213) We, on the other hand, have evolved thanks to secularism: 'The United States have adventured upon a great and noble experiment... of total separation of Church and State.... The conscience is left free from all restraints and each is permitted to worship ... after his own judgment. The offices of the Government are open alike to all. No tithes are levied to support an established Hierarchy.... The Mahomedan ... will have the privilege guaranteed to him by the constitution.... Such is the spirit of toleration inculcated by our political Institutions.... Such is the great experiment ... our system of free government would be imperfect without it. The body may be oppressed and manacled and yet survive but if the mind of man be fettered, its energies and faculties perish.' (John Tyler, 1843 in Lewis, 1990, p. 60)

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<sup>39</sup> A Confucian-Islamic connection, particularly military, is also discussed. (Huntington, 1993, pp. 46-47 and 1996a) The events of 9/11 have however contributed to prioritising Islam.

### 3.2 American Identity Saves the West

The secular society is noble, and free, in contrast with the fear, threat, and rejection prompted by descriptions of irrationality and slaughter in Islam. We are guided to find refuge from this threat in a civilisation characterised by democracy, freedom, and nobility. The decline of Western power is a problem and may leave us with two options: 'a major war', (Huntington, 1996a, p. 302) or the West needs to rise again and regain its power, thereby 'reconfirm its position as the leader whom other civilisations follow and imitate.' (Ibid.) The former option is rather preoccupying, particularly considering Islam's propensity for violence. If we are to avoid war and domination the West must regain supremacy, and this starts with American identity.

The most relevant threat against American identity is multiculturalism. Muslims and Asians, particularly, assert the moral superiority of their culture, and standing up to them involves challenges: 'immigrants ... reject assimilation and continue to adhere to and *propagate* the values, customs, and cultures of their home societies. This phenomenon is most notable among Muslims in Europe.... If assimilation fails the United States will become a cleft country with all the potentials for internal strife.' (Ibid. italics added) Note the use of the verb 'to propagate', which evokes a disease, addressed at values, customs and cultures. Since identity builds upon homogeneity and similarity, it is not surprising that multiculturalists are deleterious: 'they wish to create a country of many civilisations, which is to say a country not belonging to any civilisation and lacking a cultural core.... No country so constituted can long endure.' (Ibid. p. 306) Identity requires an enemy, and it works as long as we can keep the enemy at fair distance, but multiculturalism opens the gates to the enemy within.

Multiculturalism signifies the end of American identity and, so goes the inference, of Western civilisation. 'If the United States is de-Westernised, the West is reduced to Europe.... Without the United States the West becomes a minuscule and declining part of the world's population on a small and inconsequential peninsula at the extremity of the Eurasian land mass.' (Huntington, 1996a, p. 307) Note that the celebration of the European roots of Western civilisation seems to take a toll in that, without America, there would only be Europe left, addressed as minuscule, declining, small, and inconsequential; not particularly flattering. However, if we bear in mind the rationale of this scheme, we can understand where this comes from: one needs power to get others to emulate one's values, and power is military and economic, i.e. hard power. Europe is small, tends to prefer diplomacy to hard power, and so it is declining, and inconsequential. As we treated in the section on power, it is not the depth of ideas that determines outcomes, but rather the amount of military ammunitions determines which ideas will be followed. Thus, saving American identity is urgent: the future of Western civilisation, and the world, depends on it since it is the only power that can stop the advancement of 'barbarians.' America has the responsibility to 'preserve, protect, and renew the unique qualities of Western civilisation' (ibid. p. 311) that are 'Christianity, pluralism, individualism, and rule of law, which made it possible for the West to invent modernity, expand throughout the world, and become the envy of other societies.' (Ibid.)

Thus, power must be regained to serve a noble cause; influencing others to establish the supremacy of democracy against uncivilised threats. 'The ability of the United States to affect the development of democracy elsewhere is limited. There is little that the United States ... can do to alter the basic cultural tradition and social structure of an-other society or to promote compromise among groups of that society that have been killing each other.'

(Huntington, 1984, p. 218) This suggests that other civilisations are prone to violence in virtue of their culture, and therefore are 'worse.' The only way to adjust these tendencies is favouring modernisation and economy, features that are valued because they led to democracy and the advancement of the West. 'The United States could contribute to democratic development. ... Assist ... economic development. ... Encourage developing countries to foster market economies and the development of vigorous bourgeois classes.' (Ibid.) This is done through the exercise of hard power: 'Refurbish its own economic, military, and political power so as to be able to exercise greater influence ... help the elites ... to move ... in a more democratic direction.' (Huntington, 1984, p. 218) But hard power is needed for commendable reasons of general security: 'A world without U.S. primacy will be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United States continues to have more influence than any other country in shaping global affairs. The sustained international primacy of the United States is central to the welfare and security of Americans and to the future of freedom, democracy, open economies, and international order in the world.' (Huntington, 1993b, p. 83) If the United States do not regain supremacy, the 'not impossible alternative' is a war, 'most likely involving Muslims on one side and non-Muslims on the other.' (Huntington, 1996a, p. 312)

### 3.3 Paradigm: the Islamic Terrorist

Following the 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001, Huntington's words sounded as a prophecy. The clash of civilisations became the favoured explanatory model, guided by the image of the Islamic terrorist as its powerful paradigm; a salient exemplar that answered the question 'why did this happen?' without threatening the conceptual scheme. On the contrary, it reinforced the presupposed violence and resentment attributed to Muslims against Western values. The paradigm explains phenomena affirming the importance of American identity, democracy, and supremacy. Since identity rests in antagonism, it prompts cohesion against the irrational Muslim, blinded by a violent religion, alien to the light of reason, who kills innocent Westerners in the name of God. The Manichean dualism, absolute good and evil, is re-proposed as 'war on terror' or 'axis of evil.' Similarly, some Muslims fully adopt the rationale of this scheme, effectively calling for *jihad* against the infidel crusaders. ISIL makes ample use of this rhetoric.<sup>40</sup>

Some scholars advanced explanations that did not fit the conceptual horizon of the clash scheme, and examined United States' foreign policy, social, economic, and psychological elements.<sup>41</sup> They were silenced, set aside, or accused of betrayal. (Abrahamian, 2003) The New York Times titled: 'Yes, this is about Islam', 'This is a religious war', 'Jihad 101', 'The one true faith', 'Dictates of faith', 'Defusing the holy bomb', 'The force of Islam', 'Divine inspiration', 'The core of Muslim rage', 'Dreams of Holy war', 'Mosque and State', 'Word for word: Islam's argument', 'the deep intellectual roots of Islamic rage', 'The age of Muslim wars'. (Abrahamian, 2003 p. 531) Mainstream scholars enforced the paradigm; a professor of Religion at Yale held that Muslims are anti America because 'we Americans lack religious zeal, separate church from state, privatise belief and thereby inflame and affront their faith'. (Ibid.) A letter signed by 60 academics titled 'what we are fighting for: letter from America' stated the reasons why the war on terror is a just war, in defence of American values and way of life.<sup>42</sup> These are all explicitly loaded expressions that

<sup>40</sup> See Rumiya or Dabiq

<sup>41</sup> Conversation with a correspondent for *The Time*.

<sup>42</sup> The Institute for American Values, 'Sixty prominent US academics say war on terrorism is just',

presuppose what is whispered in the background. The sediments transported by the water deposit in the river-bed consolidating it and providing a course to fresh water; this does not happen by chance, but in virtue of a certain affinity, while the residues that lack such affinity are washed away.

### 3.4 Blinkering

Thus far we have examined what is seen in this conceptual scheme, and now look at what is unavailable.

Situating identity in a specific culture presupposes a circumscribed view of culture. Huntington concedes that culture changes, but does so internally to specific boundaries. Outside these boundaries we find antagonism, constitutive of identity, and necessary conflict. This blinkers the observer from considering that interactions may lead to improvement, which would presuppose contemplating that others may have features that are better than, or at least as good as, ours, and that we could learn from them. This cannot be seen because identity involves antagonism, which involves devaluation; it sets the boundary with barbarians, and what is there to learn from barbarians?

If everyone needs enemies to define their identity, this should be the case for, precisely, everyone. However, we are told who hates the West and why, but not whom the West needs to hate to define its identity. Similarly, threats to the West are examined, but that the West may constitute a genuine threat to others is not contemplated, or dismissed. Western values may threaten fundamentalism, but this is rhetorical, since it is clear that fundamentalism is used in a demeaning way and, thus, it is good that Western values threaten it. Colonialism and its effects on Middle Eastern societies are mentioned as damaging, but is in the past and should be forgotten by now. (Lewis, 1990; Huntington, 1996a)

Scholars of political philosophy have debated for decades about the role of principles and ethics in political affairs. The appreciation of power and of the separation between intermediate means and ends blinkers from acknowledging the debate, which is far from settled.<sup>43</sup> Similarly, democracy and freedom are treated according to specific positions, the Schumpeterian model and a negative conception of liberty, that also are far from the only available approaches on these matters. A discussion of the concepts of democracy and liberty may highlight shortcomings of the Western model. This discussion is avoided.

The clash is proposed as a new paradigm to understand international relations where ‘the question “which side are you on?” has been replaced with “who are you?” However, identity necessarily implies taking sides. Thus, ‘which side are you on’ is formulated differently, but meaning is unchanged; who you are and which side you are on are effectively the same in this conceptual scheme. Thus, the logic that governed the Cold War is re-proposed.

Secularism characterises modern democratic civilisations. This presupposes that religion is dogmatic, and that dogmatism is avoided with the separation of church and state, but blinkers us from seeing that dogmatism is a way of thinking and from considering that: a.

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at [www.Gulf2000-14@Columbia.Edu](http://www.Gulf2000-14@Columbia.Edu).

<sup>43</sup> See Cohen G.A. (2003), Geuss, R. (2008), Williams, B. (2005), Runciman, D. (2012), Sleat, M. and Rossi, E. (2014)

dogmatism manifests in many spheres, including politics, and b. formal separation does not hinder influence. Secondly, it blinkers us from seeing that formal separation does not hinder influence. For instance, American presidents address the nation wishing God's blessing, nearly unthinkable in supposedly more religious countries such as Italy or Germany. In the United Kingdom bishops sit in the House of Lords. Lastly, it is unlikely that the United States or any European state would welcome a Muslim President in spite of their formal secularism.

The resurgence of non-Western religions is seen solely as rejection of the West, due to the assumption that Western civilisation is modern and envied combined with the permeating antagonism that characterises identity. This blinkers one from considering that people may choose religion based on ethical values rather than political alignment. Likewise, rejection of the West may be driven by moral or ethical considerations that may elude religion. Could not an atheist, or even a Christian, reject Western values? Perhaps it would amount to betrayal or self-denial.

The terms Arab, Muslim, Fundamentalist and Islamist are used almost interchangeably, and in association with violence and hatred. Fatima Mernissi's words (Huntington, 1996a, p. 214) a writer praised as 'modern, liberal, female Muslim' (ibid.) are used to testify Islam's hostility. She says that the West is "militaristic" and "imperialistic" ... [it has] "traumatised" other nations through colonial terror. ... Western power is fearful. The West "alone decides if satellites will be used to educate Arabs or to drop bombs on them. ... It crushes our potentialities and invades our lives.' (Ibid.) These undoubtedly hard words are used to demonstrate that even moderate Muslims talk like fundamentalists (Ibid.), and are evidence of the 'Islamic threat' (ibid.) that sees 'their opponent as a Godless West' (ibid.) and confirms that Islam is 'a source of nuclear proliferation, terrorism and, in Europe, unwanted migrants.' (Ibid. p. 215) However, the conflation of religion with culture, of Islam with extremism and of identity with confrontation blinker the observer from considering that Mernissi's argument addresses political and/or humanitarian, rather than religious, issues. Further, the conflation and search for homogeneous threats, blinkers us from seeing that not all Arabs are Muslims and not all Muslims are Arabs. Some fundamentalists support violence, but fundamentalism, as scholarly movement, does not necessarily imply extremism and literalism. Similarly, Islamism originated around a strong social and ethical agenda<sup>44</sup> that indeed contrasts with capitalism, highly valued in this scheme, but the contrast is not necessarily religious. Some Islamists are dogmatic and encourage violence and the term, as used in this scheme, suggests that these are the only features of Islamism, overlooking social elements. It is conceded that some, or the majority, of Muslims are peaceful, but they are dismissed from the analysis, as are, for example, Christian literalists.

Lastly, presupposing that this is a factual account of the way the world is, blinkers us from considering how the attitudes, and actions, that follow from characterising others in a certain way may prompt those very actions and attitudes. Without suggesting a stimulus-response mechanism where equal action causes equal reaction, identifying people as enemies involves that we treat them as enemies, which may induce attitudes and action that are far from friendly on their part. Where this to happen, we would promptly conclude that our model was predictive while we have actively contributed to its fulfilment.

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<sup>44</sup> See the work of prof. Jan Hjärpe

## 4 The Integrated Scheme

We now examine a contrasting approach that provides different descriptions of international relations and explanations of violence, exemplified in the work of prof. Mohammed H. Kamali and prof. Tariq Ramadan<sup>45</sup>. Both are Muslim scholars although, naturally, their views are not representative of *all* Muslims, just as Huntington's approach is not representative of all Westerners. As noted earlier, some Muslims abide by the rationale of the clash, others have different positions not necessarily in line with the one proposed here and, most importantly, this is not a contrast between Muslim and non-Muslim views.<sup>46</sup> We are investigating the relation between conceptual schemes, seeing, and blinkering and find that this scheme uses similar terms to the ones of the clash scheme. They are, however, used differently, and scope a remarkably dissimilar conceptual horizon.

I have called this conceptual scheme 'integrated' due to its permeating focus on integration, in contrast with the antagonism and disjunction of the clash. Classifications are broken down and focus is on actions rather than entities. Actions are appropriate, or not, based on their purpose and outcome in the specificity of each situation; what was done is relevant, not who did it. To understand why this is the case we identify the core concepts of the scheme, and then disentangle them to examine how description and evaluation guide what is seen. Finally we consider blinkering.

Before we begin, a clarification is in order. Kamali and Ramadan's are scholars of ethics and jurisprudence, as well as theology, thus their work has normative elements. This may appear to pose a problem; I am concerned with how evaluative elements influence apparently descriptive, factual, and objective accounts. One could argue that the normativity of these scholars' work makes my argument a straw man, if not a plain tautology: I am after all showing the normativity of something that is normative. I do not think this is a problem for two reasons. First, their theories are descriptions of the 'true message' of the Koran, and normative implications follow. These descriptions rest on the presuppositions set by the scheme, and its evaluative load. Secondly, their explanations of violent events are not normative. Their descriptive account of the normative content of Islam, guides the way in which they see, describe, and explain violence.

### 4.1 Dialectic Processes

Dichotomies are explicitly rejected: the 'the global world has shattered the old categories, and the world has become for all nations a global area of attestation. The old binary perception belongs to the past.' (Ramadan, 2017, pp. 243-44) However, this conceptual scheme is not free from dualism. The difference with the clash scheme is in dualism being *conceived differently*; it implies different relations. The dualism of the clash involves confrontation and antagonism: us against them, friend against enemy, superior against inferior, conqueror against conquered, good against bad, advanced against backwards, Civilised against barbarian. It's all about fighting. Here we have many dichotomies, such as body and soul, universal and particular, eternal and contingent, moral and political, global and local, but *they are not in conflict*. They involve continuous dialectic interactions with the goal of finding balance, rather than supremacy of one over the other, which requires 'a certain degree of parity between dialogic and co-related concepts such as reason

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<sup>45</sup> Ramadan, 2002, 2008 and 2015: my translation from French.

<sup>46</sup> However, an examination of Islam without Muslim scholars would be crippled.

and revelation, matter and spirit, rights and duties, individualism and socialism, compulsion and voluntarism, text and *ijtihad*<sup>47</sup>, ideal and reality, continuity and change, and between the past realities and future prospects.’ (Kamali, 2015, p. 49) ‘The goal is to achieve ‘a balanced vision ... that is inclusive of the interests both of the individual and society, keeping in sight also its spiritual, rational and scientific dimensions, just as it seeks to strike a middle ground between traditional and modernist understandings.’ (Ibid.)

Diversity is central to individuals’ freedom and choice and ‘it requires that we learn to manage difference, which is itself essential.’ (Ramadan, 2004, p. 202) Difference does not imply mutual negation. Universal principles and contingency inform each other, they are not alternative to each other; universal principles provides ultimate ends, while particular situations require adapting universal principles to context, be it cultural or historical. Diverse peoples interact and are all part of the same humankind. A relation between parts and whole is presupposed as constitutive of both: ‘It is through the understanding and recognition of different and sometimes opposing views, ... and one’s openness toward reconciling different interests and concerns, that well-balanced solutions to issues can be expected to emerge.’ (Kamali, 2015, p. 112) Body and soul are different, and both constitutive of human beings, which is a balance of both. (Ramadan, 2017) Nothing is ‘intrinsically good or evil’ (Ibid. p. 68), in contrast with views where the body represents corruption and the soul represents purity.<sup>48</sup> Reason and faith are not each other’s negation; they need each other. ‘There is absolutely no contradiction here between the realm of faith and the realm of reason.... The spark of faith ... needs intellect.’ (Ramadan, 2004 p. 17) The perspective is constantly switching in a continuous dynamic process similar to the hermeneutic cycle. ‘Disagreement can enrich understanding and widen one’s horizons’ (Kamali, 2015 p. 111), in the ‘quest to develop better and well-moderated responses’ (ibid. p. 63) various positions are examined. There is no denial that diversity could render the process more difficult; it is certainly easier to agree if the people involved have similar views. However, ‘without recognising reasonable levels of disagreement, the value of *ijtihad* is likely to be greatly diminished.’ (Ibid. p. 112) Thus we have here a pluralist orientation.

## 4.2 Multiple Identities

A conception of identity as stable and clearly defined is foreign to this conceptual scheme. Particularly in the current world, people with different ancestry, cultures and religions live together, and focus on one single identity favours polarisation; identifying ‘others’ as enemies may lead them to adopt this ‘otherness’ stance. ‘The “assigned identity” ... has been distorted by the binary manner in which issues are formulated. They reveal a mind-set that has already cast Muslims as “others”, while at the same time the prevailing political and social climate has induced many Muslims to adopt a sense of “otherness” for themselves. No one, however, has a single identity. Every single individual has multiple identities.’ (Ramadan, 2017, p. 243)

Antagonism is debunked: identity does not involve the conflict that is essential in the clash scheme. Who we are is not defined by whom we hate, and choosing side is impossible with multiple identities. Religious identity ‘responds to the question of being. ... [It] is a

<sup>47</sup> *Ijtihad* is the interpretative work undertaken where texts do not provide clear guidance, i.e. most often. It involves study of the texts in their holistic context to extract universal principles and objectives, such as dignity or social justice, and the translation of such principles into practices that are adapted to the contingent historical, geographical or cultural context. See Kamali (2008; 2015), Ramadan (2002; 2004; 2015; 2017)

<sup>48</sup> As the Christian original sin.

response to the question: “Why?” (Ramadan, 2004, p. 93) National identity responds to ‘how’, i.e. ‘it organises ... the way in which a man or woman is related to his or her fellow-citizens and to other human beings.’ (Ibid.) Cultural identity and religious identity do not coincide. Cultural elements have been incorporated in religions, as well as religion may have influenced culture, but we should not identify culture with religion. People with different cultural identities may share a religious identity and, likewise, people with different religious identities may share a cultural identity or a national identity, the latter for instance if they are all citizens of the same nation.

In the clash scheme multiculturalism was the end of a civilisation and its identity. Here various identities participate in the dialectic process: ‘Pluralism is a powerful moderator that ensures accommodation of differential interests from within. The essence of a positive approach to pluralism is in the openness of its various component parties and groups to recognise each other’s legitimate concerns and work together to address them.’ (Kamali, 2015, p. 238) This would not be possible if identity were defined antagonistically; it presupposes the legitimacy of all concerns.

### 4.3 Power

Power is used in two ways. Political power indicates authority, top-down orientation (Ramadan, 2017, p. 179; Kamali, 2015), and is not the focus of attention. The most prominent use of the term indicates inner strength that manifests in ‘gentleness, kindness and compassion.’ (Kamali, 2015, p. 187) It rests in balance and moderation, which permeate every element of this conceptual scheme, and involves ‘balancing ... in light of wisdom and good judgment.’ (Ibid. p. 13)

Power lies with forgiveness rather than retaliation, which may indicate that there is an element of supremacy also in this scheme; supremacy over anger. However, anger is considered natural, and is not suppressed or denied. (Kamali, 2015) That power lies with forgiveness indicates internal equilibrium, manifested in ‘calm wisdom’ (ibid. p. 13), which is ‘active power.’ (Ibid. p. 188) Forgiveness is the utmost manifestation of strength, ‘reminding us that the distinction and the grandeur of human beings lies within them.’ (Ramadan, 2017, p. 183)

The balance of calm wisdom that leads to forgiveness rests in the acknowledgement that cannot know what moves others: ‘Precisely because they do not know the secrets that lie in the hearts of others, human beings are expected to have a balanced attitude, to remain indulgent and filled with leniency when judging visible actions. For every heart has its secrets ... none of us can be judge and, even less, executioner.’ (Ramadan, 2017, p. 183) The undulating balance among anger and leniency contrasts with the image of power offered in the clash scheme characterised by peaks of domination.

### 4.4 Faith and Reason

Religion is not antithetical to reason. As the full realisation of human beings *qua* human beings, faith involves mind and heart working together: ‘The formulation of universal principles and the elaboration of a basic frame of reference, which give “the way to faithfulness” its meaning, were produced by human intelligence.... From the reading of the scriptural sources ... it is human intelligence that formulates the universal and elaborate

methodologies. ... The *shariah*, insofar as it is the expression of “the way to faithfulness”, deduced and constructed a posteriori, is the work of human intellect.’ (Ramadan, 2004, p. 34) It follows that faith differs from dogma, which can manifest in any sphere, such as ideas, politics or ways of life. Once again balance guides observation in the background. Dogmatism is excess and imbalance; it represents lack of critical thought and reasoning. Faith, on the other hand, is balance, to which reason is vital, and so is the heart. (Ramadan, 2017)

In contrast with the clash scheme, religion and culture are different, thought not separated. Religion answers questions of ‘being’, i.e. existential questions. In faith human beings find realisation and meaning, which manifests first and foremost in dignity, the ‘outstanding and innate characteristic of human beings.’ (Ramadan, 2017, p. 73) Reason and knowledge are vital to faith because they facilitate the full expression of beings in dignity. Dignity involves freedom and choice, thus knowledge is the means by which human beings ‘can manage their freedom. Only knowledge can lead to freedom.’ (Ibid. p. 76) But knowledge may be literal, such as reciting scriptures and following prescriptions. This is not the case. The realm of faith necessarily calls on the ‘intellect, which ... allows faith to be confirmed, deepened, and rooted, and to grow ... in the heart and in human consciousness.’ (Ramadan, 2004 p. 17) Knowledge of any kind needs to have ‘an ethical orientation: it must remain in the service of humankind’ (Ramadan, 2017, p. 167) and religion provides this ethical orientation reminding of the universal principles of which dignity is the first and foremost. Such ethical orientation, i.e. the meaning of being, does not manifest in unreflectively following rules; it involves inquiring and understanding if and how these rules instantiate the ethical orientation. ‘As an effort to reflect upon reality, and as an exercise in rationality ... using reason, human beings must undertake a two-sided double intellectual effort: on one hand, focus on the Texts ... and, on the other hand, focused upon reality, with the objective of transforming the world for the better. *Ijtihad*, the exercise of autonomous human ethical reasoning, stands at precisely the critical point between respect for eternal principles and the ethical imperative of making the temporal world a better place.’ (Ibid. p. 50) Note the dialectic of universal and particular at play in transforming the universality of principles into action, with reason as the medium between universal and contingent. Reason here does not involve only the mind, but *the mind and the heart*. (Ramadan, 2014; 2015; 2017) There is no knowledge without reason, and there is no faith without knowledge. Thus, there is no faith without reason.

That religion may be dogmatic is not ignored, and too many such cases involve Islam. ‘Rote learning is the rule: dates, rules and prescriptions are formally taught without any explanation of their meaning’ (Ramadan, 2017, p. 228) and this is a violation of the need for knowledge that enables freedom, and dignity. Critical thinking is thus essential to faith; it implies understanding the meaning of the overarching religious message, and its relation with action in each situation.<sup>49</sup>

## 5 Disentangling the Integrated Scheme

The core elements of this scheme, presented as descriptive accounts, involve evaluation. Let us disentangle them to consider how they guide thought and action.

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<sup>49</sup> Note the predominant use of the term ‘faith’ instead of ‘religion.’

## 5.1 Annoyance at Simplifications

Diversity is presented as a matter of fact; this is the way the world is. However, interactions of different elements, such as body and soul, eternal and contingent, global and local *are enriching*, which suggests that diversity is appreciated and presupposes that different parties are equally valued. In contrast, simplifications and classifications are openly rejected as harmful and prompt annoyance, since they hinder the enriching potential of difference: ‘the logic of conflict and unhealthy competition has elbowed dialogue aside.’ (Ramadan, 2017, p. 211) Note the use of unhealthy, addressed at features of competition that involve supremacy, deprecated because they impede dialogue. It seems that healthy competition would involve differences that interact from positions of equal legitimacy. This indicates that difference may be a problem in virtue of the attitudes of the people involved, rather than being a problem *per se*, as suggested in the clash scheme. For instance, ‘political debate has been distorted by the binary manner in which issues are formulated.’ (Ramadan, 2017, p. 243) Binary approaches are distortions because they (mis)lead to taking sides, thereby hindering dialogue. This is seen because dialogue is valued while taking sides is deprecated.

Diversity is appreciated *per se* and classifications are rejected because they damage the enriching potential of diversity. The ever-present importance of balance guides this attitude from the background, since balance requires difference, and guides the condemnation of antagonistic dichotomies that represent excess and polarise. To classify the body as corrupt and the soul as pure implies choosing which one is ‘better.’ To classify ethics or religion in opposition to politics implies deeming one ‘better’ than the other. Moralising leads to judgment and exclusion as opposed to leniency and forgiveness. Identity based on similarity and antagonism implies that those who are different are excluded. These classifications are rejected as factually wrong: societies are not homogeneous and people do live together in their difference. However, that societies are not homogeneous is endorsed; there would be no balance otherwise, and balance is utterly valued while ‘the obsession with division has produced a collective psychology equally obsessed with unity, if not unification, which more often than not is mistaken with uniformity of thought.’ (Ramadan, 2017, p. 211) Obsession is a term that indicates almost fanaticism and is addressed at homogeneity that involves one-sidedness in thinking. One-sidedness is utterly deprecated in a scheme that values dialogue, in virtue of the appreciation of difference.

Classifications are also condemned in virtue of their practical consequence, which could not be seen without appreciating diversity. They enhance polarisation between those who are *legitimate* and those who are ‘othered’ as antagonists feeding hostility and oppression. All exclusionary classifications prompt condemnation, including those enacted by Muslims. Some Muslims adopt the position of ‘external others’ and entrench themselves in their community, effectively excluding themselves from active and legitimate civic participation. Self-exclusion is equally decried: ‘the function of the pluralism of nations and cultures is to maintain equilibrium between them, the better to avoid corruption ... But pluralism also ... invites humankind to engage in positive competition to accomplish good deeds.’ (Ramadan, 2017 p. 184) Note that, as we saw earlier, competition is unhealthy when it presupposes antagonism, but may also be positive when denoting features oriented at the common good. Diversity is appreciated *per se*, as necessary for balance, and also in virtue of its practical function.

## 5.2 Legitimacy for Everyone

Appreciating diversity shows that people have various identities, which is presented as a matter of fact. A matter of fact that is, however, commended and would probably not be acknowledged if it weren't appreciated. It expresses that everyone is legitimate and relief: that everyone is legitimate involves that we do not need to be on our guard to identify if we are among friends or enemies. Friends do not have a specific shape but rather many different ones, and enemies are not the focus of this conceptual scheme.

'No obsession with identity ... on the contrary, it is a question of entering into an authentic dialogue, as between equals, with all our fellow-citizens with respect for the identical universality of our respective values, willingly open to mutual enrichment and eventually to becoming true partners in action.' (Ramadan, 2004, p. 5) The term obsession expresses disapproval for conceptions of identity aimed at demarcation; it moves towards cohesion, and away from division. The negative evaluation associated with obsession is addressed at everyone alike; Muslims overly preoccupied with affirming their identity, or with fitting in, and non-Muslims demanding assimilation. These features lead to exclusion and, as such, hamper the enriching potential of diversity, and enrichment suggests improvement. Those who are different are valuable in virtue of their difference; they are a positive presence and need not be preoccupied with assimilation, which is damaging and communicates that their presence is uncomfortable. 'The "assigned identity" foisted on Muslims is a recurrent motif in political debate in the West, which in turn has been distorted by the binary manner in which issues have been formulated'. (Ramadan, 2017, p. 243) The term 'distorted' suggests something misleading and incorrect; we are all naturally parts of the same whole, which is artificially negated by focus on binary divisions, and this moves towards wilful acceptance that would be unavailable if antagonism was appreciated. Binary classifications 'reveal a mindset that has already casted Muslims as "others" while at the same time ... has induced many Muslims to adopt a sense of "otherness" for themselves.' (Ibid.) This is not solely a matter of fact; it is a damaging matter of fact.

The desire to feel legitimate guides these scholars towards an affirmation of Islam that is, and ought to be, a Western religion while Western cultures are, and ought to be, cultures of Islam. This is the case in virtue of the valuation of diversity and of identity as multiple. Different identities involve different features and 'it would be absurd and stupid to expect geographical attachment to resolve the question of being' (Ramadan, 2004, p. 93), i.e. to posit convergence of values, traditions, kinship, or citizenship, to name a few, is wrong. Why? Because citizenship is here valued as effort for the common good, rather than allegiance to factions; good citizens 'contribute actively to the organisation and reform of their societies for the well-being of all ... take a direct interest in the dignity and public welfare of their fellow citizens and of their fellow human beings – irrespective of belief- in education and social justice.' (Ramadan, 2017, p. 250) Identity as homogeneity represents marginalisation and exclusion, and is unfair because it does not allow people *to be*: 'wiping out all allegiances in the name of national unity is a measure that maintains only a pretence or an illusion of unity.' (Ramadan, 2004, p. 146) We have a negatively and a positively loaded unity; the former involves unity of form, such as allegiance to a flag (be it an actual or metaphorical flag). In the clash scheme, this unity is the core of identity and involves antagonism, whose denial amounts to self-denial. In this scheme the appreciated unity, which also seems to have an existential bearing, has to do with being all parts of a same whole, humankind, and it is the unity of this whole that matters. This demeans allegiance to factions and establishes equal legitimacy for all, since all parts of the same, most valuable whole.

Legitimacy involves freedom to voice dissent, which is a commended constitutive element of the enriching dialectic process, silenced by univocal identity. 'The West is neither monolithic nor demonic, and its phenomenal achievements ... are realities that it would be unreasonable to minimise or reject. At the same time we must ... know how to be critical of economic or strategic [policies] that are suffocating whole societies, compromising with heartless torturers, and promoting the veritable cultural colonisation of underdeveloped countries with the help of the demeaning products of Modern western culture.' (Ramadan 2004, p. 171-172) Seeing the good and the bad is the very reason why diversity is cherished in this scheme while the legitimacy posited by multiple identities *allows* dissent, and endorses it without the threat of betrayal. A legitimised and responsible citizen is allowed to criticise, in virtue of legitimacy, and must do so to contribute to improvement. In contrast, a conception of identity that requires assimilation is condemned because it *silences* dissent. 'To be a western Muslim and speak these truths is to run the risk, almost systematically, of being considered not completely 'integrated', giving rise to suspicions about one's true loyalty; it's as if Muslims have to buy 'integration' with their silence. This kind of intellectual cant must be rejected. To be a free citizen in Northern societies means having the means and the right to make critical choices, assessments, and evaluations from within the heart of the Western frame of reference. It means recognizing and fighting for the achievements of democracy and challenging one's own government... by making it understood that it is not acceptable to betray our principles through complicity with dictatorships.' (Ibid.) Democracy is valued in this scheme as well, but its valued features seem to differ from the fair election of decision makers that we found in the clash; here the valued features of democracy concern the confrontation of different ideas in an enriching process. Huntington used the expression 'sentimental cant' to demean those who deny the harsh truths of antagonism. Here such antagonisms are demeaned as 'intellectual cant' that serves the purpose of silencing dissent portraying it as enmity, and thus doing a disservice to democracy.

### 5.3 Redeeming Religion

That religion is valued is not surprising.<sup>50</sup> It is valued in virtue of its being the full realisation of human beings. As such, its valued features have to do with how it contributes to this realisation. Reason is a constitutive element of being and, as such, an utmost valued feature of religion, but the appreciation of reason does not only address the intellect; reason involves head and heart, and good reasoning takes feelings into account, as opposed to eliminating them. Religion without reason loses its function as full realisation of humanity.

Religious dogmatism is rejected; it denies and constrains realisation since it denies the exercise of reason. This critique applies also to Muslims: 'If badly handled, reformist religious thought may produce a dangerously reactionary and conservative intellectual and political attitude: the evidence already gives reason to fear the worst among Western Muslims.' (Ramadan, 2004, p. 161) Reformism is appreciated when it involves critical thinking and it is dangerous if it excludes reasoning, as in the case of literalists 'who refuse any kind of contextualised approach,' thus negating the dialectic of universal and particular that is here endorsed. They are 'completely restrictive and out of context' and 'pressure young people to cut themselves off from all relations with their social and political

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<sup>50</sup> These scholars are theologians.

environment in order to observe a ritualistic and very literalist practice.’ (Ibid. p. 159) Dogmatism betrays religion in that it limits the full expression of being human: lack of critical thinking mortifies the utmost human feature that is reason and isolation denies an enriching dialogue with those who have different ideas, while also damaging the integration of Muslims.

There is another way in which religion, read Islam, is loaded. It has been too often accused of being an obstacle to modernisation, in virtue of its intrinsic denial of secularism. This is rejected: ‘Muslims have no particular problem with the principle of distinguishing the various orders of things... they find these distinctions articulated in the first works ... carried out by the *ulama* as early as the eighth to ninth centuries. In the history of Christianity, arriving at this distinction of orders led to the necessary establishment of a clear ‘separation’ between the two spheres of authority.’ (Ramadan, 2004, p. 146) In showing the importance of reason, the supposed dogmatism of Islam is debunked, and so is its supposed inferiority to secularism. However, the vindication goes one step further, clarifying that doing things differently does not necessarily imply doing them worse. ‘What appears to differ ... is that for Muslims the source of reference remains the same, even if it speaks differently to the heart and mind. ... Islam has not had to go as far as separation, even divorce, as in the Christian era, in order to provide humankind with rational autonomy and the ability to confront the temporal evolution of societies.’ (Ramadan, 2004, p. 146) The separation of religion and politics rests on the assumption, here rejected, that politics represents rationality in opposition to religion. ‘This is not the case; religion involves reason more than it is commonly assumed, and politics *should* involve ethics more than it is commonly assumed. Thus politics guided by social and ethical aims is commended, and this is linked with religion because it has to do with ethics, rather than dogma: ‘Muslims continue to find in their scriptural sources principles that inspire their social and political commitment without ever imposing a definitive model, a timeless code, or more broadly, a dogma for action. In fact, these principles form the body of an ethic that their constantly active reason must seek to respect as much as possible.’ (Ibid.)

That ethics permeates all aspects of life is observed, and praised, and leads to suggest a, perhaps involuntary, insincerity among advocates of secularism: ‘This approach, apparently particular to Muslims, is in fact not so: many Christians, Jews, Buddhists, agnostics, and atheists are inspired in their social and political commitments by their religious, humanist, and ethical convictions. ... They may quote their sources less often, or less directly, than Muslims, but they are perhaps inspired by them just as much.’ (Ibid.) Dogmatism, deprecated in virtue of fixedness of thought in any realm, seems to manifest not only in some religious approaches, but among some secularists as well: ‘difficulties ... arise most with people who confuse ‘separation’ and ‘conflict’ or ‘mutual rejection’ and *project onto the secular space a militant ideology opposed to any form of religious expression*. There really is a great difference between the normative constitutional order of laicity, or secularism, and the very *tendentious and ideologically oriented reading of it that certain radicals, or even extremists, would like to impose*. To them, in order to be completely integrated, people should not express their faith at all and should become religiously invisible.’ (Ramadan, 2004, p. 146 italics added) Tendentious, militant ideology, extremists all are loaded terms that express contempt and resentment for features that silence and impede dialogue among equally legitimate parties in the attempt of imposing one view.

Lastly, while in the clash scheme religion was the core of civilizational identity, yet disappeared into culture, here it is reclaimed as a means for human growth in its own right, intertwined with culture, but nonetheless different. This reclaiming is driven by the

legitimacy of many religions in different cultures, and also by the endorsement of the centrality of ethics to all aspects of life. Thus, religion is, *and ought to be*, separated from culture: 'No culture has privileged ownership of a certain religion. ... Higher ethical principles should inspire the behaviour of individuals, sometimes even against their own coreligionists if they are untruthful, treacherous, unjust or oppressive. Spiritual community is an allegiance to a body of principles and a morality, not to a community united by blood or self-interest. One gets involved in politics not in the name of "my people" but ... in the name of inalienable principles.' (Ramadan, 2004, p. 147) As anticipated earlier, politics characterised by factionalism is deprecated, and this is the case in virtue of the appreciation of diversity, while politics characterised by the realisation of ethical principles is commended in virtue of the appreciation of ethics as constitutive of being.

#### 5.4 *Wasatiyyah*: the Serenity, and Superiority, of Moderation

The concept of *wasatiyyah* indicates balance and moderation, and permeates every aspect of this conceptual scheme; it is treasured. Dialogue between perspectives, universal and particular, faith and reason *requires* difference, and difference is valued because it allows balance. *Wasatiyyah* denotes inner power characterised by calm wisdom and prompts a sense of serenity and inner peace, but also suggests that these features are 'better' and belong to 'better people.' Any sort of excess is the antithesis of *wasatiyyah*, and is deplored since it represents unbalance. This involves also excess in actions that we tend to consider good, such as praying, fasting, eating, consuming, working, or enjoying a comfortable life. These features are not good or bad *per se*; in the right measure, they are commended but taken to extremes they are deplored.

Extremism manifests in all spheres of life and is always disapproved. A particularly decried example is dogmatism: the 'fanatic advocacy of one view or opinion' (Kamali, 2015, p. 38) that often manifests in the refusal to listen and consider other views, i.e. the 'denial of all else.' (Ibid.) Extreme people 'accuse others of ignorance and transgression. Certain of their correctness [adopt a] black and white view [in the attempt to] create certainty in an uncertain world, and attract attention'. (Ibid.) This use of certainty suggests that uncertainty is, to some extent, appreciated or at least accepted. In similar vein we find the 'overzealous promotion of one view, one approach, one thought to the exclusion of all else' (Ibid. p. 45), which damages diversity and the enrichment that it enables. Further manifestations of excess are 'rampant obesity, overindulgence' (Kamali 2015, p. 167) and 'coronary capitalism' characterised by the consumption of 'cheap, fatty, sugary, salty, junk food and sedentary lifestyle' (Ibid. p. 168), all deprecated features. The 'negligent rich' (Ibid. p. 169), 'food wastage' (Ibid. p. 170), 'lack of indulgence', (Ibid. p. 171), a 'loud call to prayer that makes a neighbourhood uncomfortable' (Ibid. 176) are all decried features of excess and, particularly, an excess that overlooks the needs of others' as parts of the same whole.

More generally, *wasatiyyah* is a celebration of sobriety. For instance, humour is good, 'but not if it is offensive,' (Ibid. p. 176), and 'overexaggeration in work leads to depression' and neglecting family. (Ibid. p. 179) Extremism can also manifest in environmental imbalance, financial imbalance (Ibid. p. 137), extravagance, and waste. (Ibid. p. 147) It may be 'theological, political, practical' (Ibid. p. 39-40) and may result in 'self-immolation, excessive fasting, dieting, excessive discipline with children, and terrorism'. (Ibid.)

The importance of *wasatiyyah* guides this scheme towards the appreciation of diversity and the rejection of antagonistic dichotomies, balancing inner and outer; we tend to focus on the behaviour of others and judge them, an appreciation of balance involves also looking inside. This invites, or rather prescribes, self-examination and self-criticism, which is in contrast with the clash scheme where all focus was oriented at what others do and hate. Appreciating balance also prompts annoyance towards simplifications and dichotomous views, and irritation at overconfidence and righteousness.

## 5.5 Paradigm: The Balanced Person, Power Within

The paradigm of this conceptual scheme embodies *wasatiyyah*, and is a salient exemplar in the Kuhnian and rhetorical sense. The balanced person is the better person; a model that sets an example and is characterised by specific features: ‘moderate, reflective, sees nuances, rarely exhibits certainty’. (Kamali, 2015, p. 38) These features involve the core elements of the scheme; the appreciation of diversity and balance, of reason as combination of head and heart, self-examination and lack of judgment, the deprecation of dogmatism and excess in all its forms. The salient picture is a mild wise man, in contrast with the bully. If we conceived of power as domination, features like forgiveness and moderation would be ‘sometimes equated with mediocrity and neutrality’ (Kamali, 2015 p. 14) and often viewed as a sign of weakness particularly in international relations. (Ibid.) But here we do not have a confrontational stance, and this denotes superiority.

The paradigm contributes to perpetuating the centrality of these features, and is an exemplary problem solution. Problems, in this scheme, are factionalism, exclusion, delegitimation, and dogmatism, which are all forms of excess. The balanced person rejects excess, (s)he does not surrender to impulsiveness and vengeance, feelings that affect others negatively, or to pride and a strong ego, feelings that affect the self negatively. (Ibid.) (S)he is a ‘tranquil soul, not moved easily by anger’ (ibid.), ‘likely to avoid conflict and seek peace and reconciliation. Quality that enables to resist extremism, prejudice and injustice.’ (Ibid. p. 186) This person is ‘forbearing’ (Ibid. p. 187), which suggests a benevolent patience, and has ‘that particular kind of gentleness that emerges as the surface expression of underlying power. Gentleness based on power, forbearance based on calm wisdom.’ (Ibid.) We are offered the image of a sage, but not an ascetic sage; one who is caring and prompts utmost serenity and peace of mind. This is not someone who struggles to avoid conflict; the use of terms like tranquillity, gentleness, and reconciliation portray someone who does so with a smile on her face in virtue of a positive, non-judgmental, disposition towards others. We are not looking at someone distressed by the temptation to be angry, but rather someone who meets life with a ‘gentleness’ and ‘calm wisdom’ that seem natural.

Gentleness is ‘based on power’ and the reader has certainly anticipated that power is not supremacy over others. In this scheme the power that is celebrated is inner power. It is ‘not passive or simple patience ... in the face of provocation’ (Kamali, Ibid. p. 188), which indicates that it is not mere continence. The latter may be appreciated as well, as opposed to excess, but inner power is of a higher, more noble, sort: it involves ‘positive and active power of the soul that is strong enough to curb her impetuosity.’ (Ibid.) The balanced person is a paradigm of superiority in that she embodies inner strength ‘reminding us that the grandeur of human beings lies within them.’ (Ramadan, 2017, p. 183) This prompts to acting in ways that manifest inner strength.

In contrast, power that involves supremacy over others, endorsed in the clash scheme as the peculiar feature of politics, is here deplored. It represents extremism and ‘corrupts.’ (Kamali, Ibid. p. 45) Diversity, as opposed to homogeneity, balances it: ‘If there were no differences between peoples, if power were in the hands on one group alone (one nation, one race, or one religion), the earth would be corrupt because human beings need others to limit their impulsive desire for expansion and domination. ... If there is to be a difference of religions, the purpose is to safeguard them all.’ (Ramadan, 2004, p. 202) Note the contrast with the clash scheme where homogeneity is advocated and the greater good is secured if the civilisation with the best ‘values’ dominates. Here, ‘good’ values only triumph thanks to difference that allows for balance while homogeneity amounts to extremism.

## 6 International Relations and Terrorism in the Integrated Scheme

As for the previous approach, we now examine how the adoption of this conceptual scheme shapes what is seen in terms of international relations and terrorism.

### 6.1 Heterogeneity

Appreciating difference enforces the legitimacy of all people and leads to rejecting classifications like the West and Islam as out-dated. In fact, they do not belong much to the past either, since Europe and Islam, historically, have been more intertwined in their cultural development than many scholars would concede. (Ramadan, 2017) Currently, Muslims live, or are born, in Western countries and their identity is equally Muslim as Westerner. Likewise, many non-Muslims live in Muslim majority countries without practicing the local religion or embracing the local culture. In virtue of multiple identities this is no contradiction and moves to a critique of ‘tolerance’, since it presupposes one legitimate identity that accepts, though it would happily avoid, the other: ‘We cannot simply “suffer” the presence of others, which would implicitly place them in an inferior category – for those who “tolerate” always do so from a position of superiority. We must respect their presence on the basis of true equality, recognise their richness and singularity through knowledge, and celebrate our mutual contribution through a healthy rivalry to perform good deeds.’ (Ibid. p. 185) Tolerance not only presupposes that some people are legitimate, and others less so, but also that they have no valuable contribution to make. Instead, multiple identities presuppose that every view is valuable and their encounter is mutually enriching.

Thus, understanding and managing international matters requires abandoning generalisations. Each situation involves specific elements that must be examined case by case focussing on what was done and why, rather than on general terms like Islamic or Westerner. (Ramadan, 2002, 2004, 2015, 2017) Appreciation of balance, *wasatiyyah*, guides us towards looking at various aspects of every situation and balance them against each other. This leads to shifting focus from actors to actions. Muslim states are in the wrong violating human rights, and this a wrong committed by those states, not Islam in general. Some Western states bomb civilians and this is a wrong that pertains those states, not the West. The colonial past is deprecated, but Muslims all over the world have self-marginalised according to the narrative of a ‘colonising West’. They have responsibilities; rather than victims they must show the true meaning of Islam by doing good deeds towards

everyone, regardless of their faith, and actively engage as citizens. Legitimacy implies active civic engagement that manifests also in critique. For instance, globalisation ‘sanctions above all the absolute primacy of the logic of economics over every other consideration ... to draw us more and more into becoming better consumers. ... When faced with neoliberal economics, the message of Islam offers no way out but resistance. In the West, as in the East, we are summoned to use our minds, our imaginations, and our creative abilities, to think of an alternative ... in partnership with all those who resist and mobilise for “alternative ways”’. (Ramadan, 2004, p. 173)

## 6.2 Ethics, Secularism, and Politics

In the clash scheme, secularism is central to democracy and modernity and ‘Islamic culture explains the failure of democracy to emerge’ (Huntington, 1996a, p. 29). To some extent, it is the case. Kamali and Ramadan criticise *ulama* and Muslim thinkers who support the unification of politics and religion (Kamali, 2008; Ramadan, 2004, 2008), but also warn against simplistic reductions; we need to look at the, not irrelevant, details. Advocates of sharp separation and Muslim thinkers who reject it *are both wrong*: ‘These ... positions are clear and simple, but both reductive and wrong due precisely to the nature of their apparent clarity and simplicity. There is no religion, or spirituality, that does not, in a way or the other, have a relation with politics. ... Likewise, there do not exist political systems or practices, even in the most secular ... societies, that are completely separated from a religious reference.’ (Ramadan, 2008, p. 443)

The point is not whether to separate, but rather what ‘separation’ involves. If Western civilisation is rooted in Christianity, which inspired the development of its institutions, it would seem that Christian ideals permeate Western culture, in spite of a formal separation. So, ‘it is not important to know if religion has nothing to do with politics, since they are always related, but *rather we need to know what sort of relation we should advocate and promote*.’ (Ramadan, 2008, p. 443) This work remains to be done and they exhort to it. The guiding principle is pluralism in an open discussion about ‘the source, management, and legitimacy of authority.... Political pluralism is endangered on one side by the imposition of religious authority that derives its legitimacy from the transcendental and, on the other side, by the emergence of a dogmatic spirit deaf to the beliefs of others.’ (Ibid. p. 444) Dogmatism is not necessarily religious: the first *ulama* established a clear separation, and left the door open to human intelligence, creativity and the search of solutions in the light of principles. The role of scripture is to ‘determine the ethical coherence of the totality of human action by providing the overarching principles and objectives. It does not uniform this action under the authority of one unique institution or sealed dogmatism.’ (Ibid. p. 447) In fact ‘there is a side to the *shariah*, not commonly known, essentially civilian and secularist in character (Kamali, 2008, p. 265) that is more akin to legal positivism than theology. Political leadership is essentially civilian, elective and consultative. (Ibid.)

Islam is not adverse to democracy and does not favour obligation over individual rights; an incorrect presupposition nurtured by orientalist who deny citizenship in Islamic theory ‘except as taxpayers and submissive subjects.’ (Kamali, 2008, p. 200) This mistaken view originates in focussing on words rather than meaning. Dignity, core objective of *shariah*, is impossible without individual rights. The difference with the West is not in denying rights. Rather, Islam is concerned with human relations; people do not live in terms of rights against others, but in terms of mutual relationships. Rights and obligations are interrelated: justice is a ‘matrix of rights and duties’ (Ibid. p. 199) unified in the expression ‘*hukm*, which

subsumes them both'. (Ibid.) Orientalists equate these concepts with duties, an inaccurate reading that betrays 'more attention to linguistic analysis and style at the expense of meaning and substance. The fact that the Quran does not speak in the language of a twentieth-century constitution is taken to mean a negative position on freedom. A closer examination of the text leads us to a different conclusion.' (Ibid. p. 202) Appreciating difference and balance guides the rejection of classifications, and focuses on actions rather than actors, but also to rescuing Islam from interpretations of Western scholars and Muslim scholars alike. The former portray it as backwards and dogmatic while the latter contribute to backwardness and dogmatism. Islam does not hinder democracy. There are various reasons why democracy has not flourished in Muslim majority countries, and one of them is the support accorded to tyrants by leaders of the Cold War, on both sides. (Kamali, 2008)

Modernisation, characterised by secularisation, capitalism, and technology in the clash scheme, is here reconceptualised. Again refusing general standards, the very idea that there is one way to modernise is rejected: 'Is modernity about living within one's times or living according to the Western standard, implicitly understood as the only one that is really modern, thus universal?' (Ramadan, 2008, p. 243) 'This view presupposes a double reduction, i.e. that 'modernity is universal and that the West only provides the universal.' (Ibid.) It follows that 'all the attempts made by a religion or civilisation to find, according to its own ethics and terms of reference, answers to contemporary challenges signify the rejection of the universal and a resistance to modernity, and are portrayed as attempts to colonise or Islamise it.' (Ibid.) The indignation is palpable and enforces the emancipatory emphasis of this scheme. Diverse approaches are all valuable and the only acceptable universal results from them all: 'the universal cannot but consist in the expression of the values shared and cultivated by the historical experiences and different expressions of the multitude of societies, religions, and cultures.' (Ibid.)

### 6.3 *Shariah and Jihad*

The concepts of *shariah* and *jihad* are central to Islam and, in the clash scheme, indicate the 'holy law' and 'holy war', often associated with violence. (Lewis, 1990; Huntington, 1993, 1996a, 2001) The vindication of Islam as faith of human growth shapes these two concepts differently.

The reduction of *shariah* to a set of rules and punishments, adopted by Muslims and non-Muslims alike, is eloquently criticised. *Shariah* is the backbone of faith. Literally 'the way that leads to the source of water', it represents a prime source of life and nourishment of the soul; it involves objectives, dignity and justice, and guiding principles to achieve objectives, such as the common good. The law is *fiqh*, while *shariah* is the philosophy of law that guides the continuous adaptation of principles to a particular context. (Kamali, 2008, 2015; Ramadan, 2004, 2008, 2015, 2017) 'It is often said that the *Shariah* is immutable because it is divinely ordained. However, the divine law itself incorporates a certain amount of adaptability and change in its philosophy and outlook. Some of the basic principles and objectives of the *Shariah*, such as justice, equality, public interest, consultation, and enjoining the good and forbidding the evil, are inherently dynamic and cannot be accurately characterised as mutable or immutable. They are immutable in principle and yet remain open to adaptation and adjustment at the level of implementation, the means employed, and the conditions that need to be met for their realisation and enforcement.' (Kamali, 2015, p. 50)

The dialogue of universal and particular is again central; achieving objectives, in the respect of principles and contingency, requires flexibility. This process finds its utmost expression in *ijtihad*, i.e. the creative intellectual activity that translates the universal into contextualised action. 'The timelessness of the Quran depends on the temporal exercise of *ijtihad*: there can be no revelation without reason.... The double objective is to remain true to the principles laid down by the Quran and to change the world for the better. It requires an understanding of human societies and knowledge, and the necessity of reform, as well as a clear vision (with its priorities) to implement that reform.' (Ramadan, 2017, p. 50) *Shariah* guides *fiqh*, the law, but cannot be reduced to it; it provides overarching ethical guidance to every aspect of life. As such, it guides *jihad* as well. Thus, associating *jihad* with Holy War, in parallel with crusades, is an oxymoron; for the *shariah*, no war can ever be 'holy'.

*Jihad* is essential to Islamic ethics and involves moderation, *wasatiyyah*. (Kamali, 2015, p. 159) The most important and marginalised meaning of *jihad* is in its root, *jahada*, which means to strive, to exert effort towards oneself or the outside. (Ibid.) Remember that power in this scheme originates in inner balance and wisdom, and manifests in forgiveness rather than retaliation. The greatest and most valuable *jihad* is *jihad-al-nafs*; the effort of the soul. This is a process of self-mastering and internal growth towards calm wisdom. It has to do with balancing extreme sentiments such as pride, anger, and vengeance exerting effort towards the 'evil within, conquer ignorance, discipline ego.' (Ibid.) Rather than 'self denial or overexertion, or the renunciation of legitimate pleasures' (Ibid), it involves balance. It can orient outwards to 'combat poverty and disease, conquer ignorance, fight against corruption and abuse' (Ibid. p. 160), we find 'jihad in business, against social ills' (Ibid.) and also 'spiritual, intellectual, social, scientific, cultural, political and economic striving ... all share two vital objectives: promoting peace by respecting all its conditions (dignity, education, justice, equality) and providing human beings with the freedom to be themselves and to choose their path in life free of injustice and alienation.' (Ramadan, 2017, p. 161) Of the eighty-four meanings of the term *jihad*, one is related to armed struggle (the specific term, in that case, is *qital*) and contemplated only as defence in response to aggression. (Ramadan, 2017) Declared by a legitimate leader, under no circumstance it justifies killing innocents, be they Muslim or non-Muslim. (Kamali, 2015, p. 162) Kamali's denounces that the moderate nature of the concept has been 'distorted, maligned, misunderstood and vilified' (Ibid.) not only by western media but also by extremist Muslims: 'striving in the path of God [is] misused to justify aggression.' (Ibid.)

#### 6.4 Traitors, but...

Islamic ethics of war contemplates war only as defence; conquering or imposing a faith does not justify war. Even when attacked and provoked, the most valuable option is patience, resistance, and the search for a non-violent resolution of conflicts. (Ramadan, 2017, p. 162) In the inevitable cases when war is waged there are clear indications about its conduct; proportionality of force, protection of non-combatants, avoidance of collateral damage, as well as acceptable and unacceptable weapons. Ancient precursors of 'biological weapons' such as the poisoning of waters is strictly forbidden. (Lewis, 2010; Kamali, 2015, p. 163; Ramadan, 2017, p. 165) Bernard Lewis (ibid.) stresses that these principles are clearly stated in the Quran and adapted to the current environment through *ijtihad* following the guidance of *shariah*. Lewis, who introduced the clash of civilisations with his 1990 article, argues that those waging terrorism in the name of Islam *do not know their own religion well enough*. (Lewis, 1990; 2010 italics added)

In similar vein, and more vehemently, Ramadan and Kamali denounce: ‘We witness such a spectacle today in which states and extremist groups *betray the most elementary principles of Islam*, the ethics of war, and yet justify their horrors by invoking Islam. ... The immense silent and peaceful majority of Muslims goes astray if it remains silent. ... Based on the very precise meaning of *jihad*, an intellectual and political (and sometimes armed) struggle must be deployed against those who have perverted *jihad* for the purposes of oppression and terror and who, in the name of Islam, torture, kill and destroy ... *we need a jihad against the ‘jihadist’ fraud.*’ (Ramadan, 2017, p. 164, italics added) This is the voice of Muslims outraged by betrayal. The redemption and emancipation that we have previously discussed result in an explicit call to action directed at all Muslims; *jihad* is valued in virtue of the balance that constitutes it, using it to justify terrorism is unacceptable. ISIL is ‘massacring’ (Kamali, 2015, p. 41), ‘terrifying’, and associated to ‘XXI century crusaders and Mongols, ferocious cruelty, radicalisation ... [and] cancer.’ (Ibid.) Note the reference to crusaders and Mongols who, historically, are the most terrifying threats for Muslims.

However, the cause is not a clash of civilisations due to religion, but rather a ‘lack of basic religious fundamentals’ (Kamali, 2015, p. 41) that exposes young Muslims to be ‘easily influenced by extremist teachings’ where ‘the West is seen as an enemy and Muslims are seen as failures’. (Ibid.) When balance is lost, extremism wins resulting in polarisation. (Ibid.) We then face ‘cowardly murder behind a mask of Islam’ (ibid. p. 42) perpetrated by people who ‘are in fact, in the eyes of true Islam, murderers.’ (Ibid.) Ignoring that the protection of life is one of Islam’s ‘overriding goals’ (ibid. p. 43), they perpetrate ‘heinous violence’ (ibid. p. 45), and do ‘more harm than good to the cause of their religion’ (Ibid. p. 46.) This ‘killing without just cause’ (Kamali, 2008, p. 283) has nothing to do with martyrdom, since the Quran ‘forbids courting danger’. (Ibid. p. 284) Indeed they are traitors.

But this is a conceptual scheme guided by the value of balance; the anger provoked by betrayal of the core principles of Islam is tempered with attempts to understand the causes of such betrayal. After all, true *jihad* manifests in calm wisdom; rather than judge we should try to understand and examine each case and its specific contingencies from a variety of perspectives, such as social, psychological, political, and so forth. Understanding does not imply justifying, but moves towards further inquiry. It then emerges that manipulations of religion are sometimes involved, but there is more. ‘Muslims, in their long history, have often been far from just and peace-loving.’ (Kamali, 2015, p. 163), but ‘too often, violence attributed to Islam may be a response to aggression and humiliating violence.’ (Ibid. p. 37) However, ‘it is undeniable that there is extremism in the Muslim world, even if it is not the majority’. (Ibid. p. 38.) Some violence results from ‘oppression, discrimination, humiliation.’ (Ibid. p. 43) Robert Pape’s study of suicide attacks from 1980 to 2001 concluded that ‘religion is not the force behind suicide terrorism’ (Kamali, 2015, p. 44 and 2008, p. 287): ‘suicide bombing in the name of Islam is therefore a “socio-political phenomenon, not a theological one.”’ (Ibid.) The variety of viewpoints allowed here originates in appreciating balance and diversity, but also, I think, in some empathy with the resentment that moves these people; they choose despicable, deprecated, means, but their reasons are not altogether irrational or illegitimate. It is in virtue of empathy that these broader reasons can be examined. Addressing terrorism as a socio-political phenomenon shows that certain solutions may be counterproductive and exhorts to ‘avoid the trap of reacting with more violence’ (Kamali, 2015, p. 47) Kamali refers to Gen. Stanley McCrystal: ‘violence begets violence, militarism is itself a problem, not the solution.’ (Ibid. p. 43)

Rejecting violence as a solution involves Muslims as well, and seeing different causes leads to proposing different solutions. One of them is emancipation, previously discussed. Dichotomies involving colonisers and Muslim victims do not assist understanding and impede from seeing own responsibilities, and are part of the problem: antagonised Muslims accept to be victims placing responsibility on the oppressing coloniser, effectively declaring their impotency to act. This attitude perpetrates the master-slave dynamic, fosters resentment, and a search for consolation in whoever provides it, such as recruiters or extremist imams. (Ramadan, 2017)

Another cause of the hijacking of Islam is lack of critical thought. 'Too many Muslim schools favour rote learning and rules, instead of critical reflection about meaning and principles, which breeds dogmatism. 'Young people either turn their back on religion ... or slip into formalism and develop, often dogmatically and through imitation, *the most extreme and sectarian positions*. ... *The formalist education program has ... banished the critical mind.*' (Ibid.) This too is a betrayal of Islam, because '*while the earliest legal scholars taught their students not to accept a legal opinion without questioning its source and interpretation, today ... [they are] expected to repeat without understanding and to follow without question.*' (Ibid.) This sort of education 'is clearly deficient and makes it impossible to respond to the imperatives of meaning, direction and ethical concern' (ibid.), which are the heart of the Islamic message. Being true to Islam is not doing something because 'labelled Islamic or because its instigator is Muslim' (ibid. p. 250), but rather in following principles, ethics, and objectives that, first and foremost, secure the welfare of all human beings, regardless of their faith.

## 6.5 Blinkering

This conceptual scheme facilitates the view of elements that are unavailable in the previous one and blinkers the observer from seeing other elements that are outside its conceptual horizon. Its paradigm, the wise sage, expresses appreciation of calm wisdom and deprecates power as domination. However, Kamali also argues that 'extremists triumph not because of their inherent strength but more often because of the weakness and hesitancy of moderates.' (Kamali, 2015, p. 38) This seems to indicate that, ultimately, power as supremacy prevails. This may well describe an unfortunate state of things, but the use of 'weakness and hesitancy' is puzzling, since moderation and reflection indicate inner strength while weakness and hesitancy suggest the passivity that has been explicitly dissociated from inner strength.

Inner power is 'not passive or simple patience ... in the face of provocation' (Kamali, 2015. p. 188), but also involves 'positive and active power of the soul that is strong enough to curb her impetuosity'; this is 'power and superiority of the mind.' (Ibid. p. 188) The valued dialogue of heart and mind seems contradicted by this suggestion of explicit control of the mind. Is there a difference between balance and continence?

Armed struggle is justified only as defence declared by a legitimate leader, but who is a legitimate leader? Al Baghdadi was a legitimate leader for members of the Islamic State. Moreover, violence against innocents is deprecated, but how to determine who is innocent is unclear.

While in the clash scheme religion and politics are entirely separate realms, here we have a quest for integration guided by the valuation of ethics. However, ethics rests in eternal truths, adapted to context by interpretation and human intellect, but human intellect is

fallible. How to know then when we are truthful to eternal principles, since they posit an external authority (God) to whom we have no access? The appreciation of dialogue and of feeling what is right may blinker us from seeing that these issues may not be so simple to accommodate.

In spite of valuing pluralism, rejecting labels and classifications, such as the West and Islam, both authors use these labels, somehow contradicting their own proposal, and expressing some resentment for Western policies have affected Muslim majority countries. This seems to indicate that the authors are, at times, caught in the polarisation. However, this variety of attitudes may precisely be what guides these scholars towards emphasising emancipation: experiencing resentment may lead to enacting a clash, but the model of a balanced sage, guides them towards a positive project. The impression is that the authors are conflicted between these two approaches, and balance seems to prevail, but this dynamic is not acknowledged.

Lastly, while seeing various and complex causes of violence beyond religion is beneficial, it may also blinker one from seeing cases where religion is in fact the primary motive of violence. The movement to action provided by the impetus to vindicate Islam may blinker those who adopt this scheme from seeing such cases.

## 7 Conclusion

We have examined two contrasting positions concerning human relations that provide rather different explanations of terrorism. The two conceptual schemes that inform these positions, which I have called ‘clash’ and ‘integrated’, provide a rationale that guides observation. Observation concerns facts indeed, but the facts that are chosen as salient, and their interpretation is influenced by the tacit evaluations that permeate the scheme and direct the application of terms to different extensions. The clash scheme is characterised by what I call an *aut-aut* orientation. The core elements of the scheme are disjunctive: identity involves either friends or enemies, religion demarcates believers from infidels, and power concerns either supremacy or subordination. The evaluative load tacitly enforces the disjunction constituting a conceptual horizon that is essentially exclusive thereby hindering the consideration of alternatives. The integrated scheme is characterised by an *et-et* orientation; the consideration of alternatives is an intrinsic, and valued, feature of its core concepts. Both schemes delineate a conceptual horizon that provides a scope for what is seen, and both blinker. However, an *aut-aut* orientation blinkers us more in virtue of its inherent disjunctive flavour, an aspect reflected in the different length of the blinkering sections.

## Chapter 4: Criminal Justice and Conceptions of Being

In 2014, at a lecture for the Longford Trust in London, Nils Öberg, General Director of the Swedish Prison and Probation service, described the Swedish approach to crime and rehabilitation. At the end, he was asked: 'You make it sound much simpler than it is ... [but] when you scan the horizon, what are the new threats and risks that you think you'll be concerned with in five years' time that perhaps aren't on your agenda at the moment?' Öberg replies: 'Ah, challenges!'

One such challenge is gangs: 'they don't have a criminal identity like other gangs before them. They are just friends and commit criminal activity. It presents completely different dynamics and we must come up with new ideas about how to reach these individuals. ... We are there for them, not against them and sooner or later we have always been able to engage in a dialogue on the future'. (Öberg, 2014) The second challenge is radicalisation, since, after the Paris attacks in 2013, prisons have been identified as incubators of radicalization. 'We don't share that view, what's out there is in here. If we have a radicalization process in society of course we will have it in the prison environment as well. ... We have lots of young people who travel to Syria and they come back with pretty terrible experiences. If they commit crime they will be ... sent to us: [we] have to come up with ways of reaching them and planting that little seed of doubt in their mind.' (Öberg, 2014) He continues: 'we are engaging staff with history and context. Staff say that they need some kind of tool to meet them in a dialogue. So, with the police we are developing a basic training concept. It doesn't have much to do with religion and the religious language that is used, symbols etc. but more with the geopolitical context; what are these conflicts about, what are the dynamics and the forces that drive the various parties in these conflicts, what do they want, how are the power structures, what's the economy of this, so that there is a deeper understanding amongst staff at least of where to begin a dialogue on the various issues that preoccupy their minds'. (Ibid.)

This apparently normal exchange sounded dissonant to me and I thought that it well exemplifies a case where both parties speak English, and yet talk past each other in subtle ways. Thus, I decided to examine the two conceptual schemes that inform this dissonance.

Discussions of criminal justice are often focussed on individual responsibility and the justification of punishment, which is harm intentionally inflicted on citizens by the state. On a retributivist view the very fact that an offense was committed justifies punishment, in a backward-looking manner. Scholars prone to a consequentialist approach justify punishment with a forward-looking deterrence effect. (see Hart, 1962/2008; Duff, 1992, 1996, 2003; Kramer, 2011; Rowan, Kramer & Reiff, 2011; Lacey, 2001; Norrie, 1996, 2000, 2004; Foucault, 1975) Some scholars emphasise that legal theory should not overlook the historical and social elements of crime and punishment. Antony Duff combines retributivism and communitarianism in his theory of communicative punishment. Crime breaks the bonds between offenders and their community while punishment restores such bonds in a communicative act. Nicola Lacey stresses that criminal justice is situated in historical, economic, and social contexts and, hence, theorising should consider these aspects. Similarly, Alan Norrie has provided extensive and insightful analyses of the relation between criminal justice and contextual elements that affect choice and responsibility.

In this chapter I hope to provide inspiration for a further aspect that may add to these discussions in showing that how we talk about criminal justice expresses assumptions and

presuppositions about conceptions of the human being, and agency. These presuppositions are enforced by paradigms and loaded concepts that guide thought and action in different directions. I particularly look at the different shapes that the concept of rehabilitation takes in virtue of these differences.

A widely recognised aim of most criminal justice systems, rehabilitation involves considerably different practical measures adopted for its achievement. The so-called Scandinavian approach stands out as lenient, and has often been studied in comparison with more punitive systems, such as the United States. Since I have been personally exposed to the English criminal justice system through participation in the Cambridge Learning Together initiative<sup>51</sup>, and since rehabilitation was recently introduced by the Ministry of Justice as official goal in addition to punishment, I became interested in examining what exactly is meant by rehabilitation. The exchange that opens this chapter convinced me that this was a contrast worth investigating further. While discussions of different approaches tend to involve practical measures, I want to look at what guides and justifies such measures, more or less implicitly, i.e. what is not said, but is presupposed in the background.

I have examined official documents on prison reform and crime prevention in England and Sweden. It should be noted that I will refer to 'England' as a shortening of 'England and Wales', since the documents refer to England and Wales regulation and policy, while Scotland has a separate criminal justice system. I have used the Ministry of Justice's *Modern Crime Prevention* (2016a) and *Prison Safety and Reform* (2016b), as well as the House of Lords Library Briefing 'Rehabilitation in Prisons' (Blakey, 2017), and the RSA scoping paper *The future of Prison* (O'Brien and Robson, 2016) that provided suggestions for the Ministry of Justice. In Sweden the government sets a general mandate and the *Crime Prevention Strategy* (2017), while each institution, such as the Prison and Probation Service, delineates how to accomplish such mandate. Hence, I have focussed on how Nils Öberg, general director of Prison and Probation from 2012 to 2019, describes crime and rehabilitation in lectures and talks that he delivered in Sweden and London (Almedalen, 2014; Longford lecture, 2014; Royal Society of Arts talk, 2016; Swedish Agency for Public Management, 2019). In addition, I have reviewed issues of the *Prison Service Journal* that treat rehabilitation both in England and Scandinavia.

This led to identifying two conceptual schemes that talk differently of crime and rehabilitation. I have called them 'reformative' and 'enabling'. It is, however, important to stress that this is not quite a comparative study of two national criminal justice systems, but rather an investigation of dominant conceptions of the official discourse; we can very well find manifestations of the reformative scheme in Sweden while, in England, there are cases akin to the enabling scheme, such as HMP Grendon, the Unlocked Graduates Programme,<sup>52</sup> or the work conducted by the Portman Clinic.<sup>53</sup> Both schemes present rehabilitation as a goal, but 'rehabilitation' takes considerably different shapes also in virtue of the other core elements of the schemes. Remember what we said in chapter one about meaning; meaning is not intrinsic, and does not lie wholly in a definition, but also in its use. The two schemes incorporate different conceptions of the human being that are not explicitly discussed or acknowledged; they are presupposed and tacitly guide how terms

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<sup>51</sup> Where prisoners and university students participate in various courses: <https://www.cctl.cam.ac.uk/tlif/learning-together/details>

<sup>52</sup> <https://unlockedgrads.org.uk>

<sup>53</sup> See for instance Benefield and Jakely (2020), 'Psychoanalysis Engaging Prisons', *New Associations, British Psychoanalytic Council*, Issue 31.

are used in their application to an extension. The reformative scheme involves a combination of two conceptions, which I call 'rational' and 'conditioned', while the enabling scheme rests in a conception of being that I call 'self-actualising.'

For each scheme I identify the core elements and paradigm, if any, followed by disentangling descriptive features and evaluative load to highlight how they guide what is seen and done. Finally, the sections on blinkering examine what is unavailable in the respective conceptual horizons.

## 1 The Reformative Scheme

What I will call the 'reformative' conceptual scheme starts with the notion that committing crime is a choice. Strong evidence suggests that character plays a crucial role in the ability to make the right choices, where character indicates self-governance and control of internal emotions and of external environmental influences. The person who makes the right choices is a well-functioning person with the right character traits while bad character is characterised by lack of self-control and dysfunctional cognitive skills. That people who have a propensity for crime, due to character, will offend seems to be presupposed and inevitable, nearly a disposition that involves necessity. Thus, prevention consists in identifying individuals with a specific character, which is a predictor of crime, and control opportunities through surveillance. Rehabilitation involves teaching people to make the right choices, which manifest in the right behaviour; this requires building the right character traits through the employment of incentives and punishments.

### 1.1 Two Conceptions of Being

The two conceptions of human beings that inform this scheme are here briefly outlined before examining their involvement in each element of the scheme. A third conception will be examined in relation to the enabling scheme, although it must be noted that this is far from a comprehensive treatment of conceptions of the human being in philosophy.

#### 1.1.1 The Rational Being

Human beings are characterised by rationality conceived in opposition to sentiments; it is the superior function that exercises self-governance and keeps sentiments and temptation in check through the exercise of cognitive skills. There is a normative element to this view; rationality and control of emotions indicate a characteristic of human beings and also how human beings ought to function in order to make the *right* decisions. The very idea of agency rests on this normative ought, which is an ought *per se* rather than instrumental: 'a rational agent ought to act according to certain principles, not because some good hangs on her doing so, but simply because her doing so is constitutive of her agency.' (Smit, 2003, p. 186) The Kantian inspiration is unmistakable; being fully human involves being rational, and is characterised by the predominance of cognition over sentiments. More precisely, it indicates the control that the former exercises over the latter. 'On this account, all rational motivation consists in an agent's choosing some action out of her cognitive appreciation of the way in which its relation to the good makes it choice-worthy. In other words, all rational motivation consists in the agent's proper exercise of her will' (Ibid. p. 185) where the will is the person's capacity for rational choice. What is rational is not

relative to perspective, but rather universal; well-functioning beings, i.e. rational, converge to the same conclusion as to what is 'right.'

Character is central and the term indicates what assists following fixed and right principles in the full expression of free-will. In Kant's own words, character is the "distinguishing mark of a creature endowed with freedom" that "shows what the human being is prepared to make of himself" defined as "that property of the will by which the subject has tied himself to [...] firm principles (not shifting hither and yon like a swarm of gnats)". (Kant, quoted in Frierson, 2019 p. 510) On this account, character does not indicate behaviour, regardless of how right that behaviour may be. The person of character is moved by the right motives; the motives of rationality that is what makes human beings fully free. This position is rather hostile to consequentialism: intention determines the quality of action, not outcomes. Doing right due to coercion or the seduction of rewards does not count as character. Stability is essential; character keeps one steadfast while lack of it leads to being swayed by circumstances and review or adjust one's set of principles according to contingencies. Indeed people are free to choose that their will be moved by the motives of nature rather than those of reason. (Uleman, 2016) Most people are swayed, but it is because they are frail, particularly due to impetuosity and sentiments. 'In order to truly take charge of our own lives we need to govern ourselves by fixed and stable principles.' (Frierson, 2019, p. 512) This requires the control of inclinations, which represent the motives of nature, instable and continuously changing in the face of contingency. 'Even [the] feeling of compassion and tender sympathy, if it precedes consideration of what is duty and becomes the determining ground, is itself burdensome to right-thinking persons, brings their considered maxims into confusion, and produces the wish to be freed from them and subject to lawgiving reason alone.' (Kant KpV 5:118 quoted in Uleman, 2016, p. 219)

Character and autonomy, freedom from the influence of others and of own sentiments, are aims that require time and hard work. The self in this conception is an entity; the centre of (rational) consciousness that orders and controls stimuli and impulses. This conception of the self suggests a clear demarcation between individual and environment and seems akin to the one adopted in cognitive psychology. (Teimoori and Trappes, 2017)

### 1.1.2 The Conditioned Being

The conditioned account of beings is descriptive and based on manifested behaviour; we have no access to what happens inside the mind, and so there is no discussing the self. The association with psychological behaviourism is evident; what human beings do depends on external stimuli that trigger systematic responses through reinforcement. I call this conception 'conditioned' to highlight the somewhat passive image of beings, in contrast with the autonomy of the rational agent. While the latter is, and ought to be, fully in control from within, we have here a view where action is reaction to an external trigger, i.e. control is external. Thus, human beings are mouldable through a combination of punishments and rewards. Taken to extremes, we envision the example of lions or bears that, believed to be intrinsically ferocious, can be brought to do what we want if properly trained. Living creatures are not good or bad, dangerous or placid due to their intrinsic nature, and can be brought to act dangerously or calmly by external circumstances.

Without going to such extremes, the social psychology experiments conducted by Stanley Milgram (1974) and Philip J. Zimbardo (2007) led to the conclusion that there are no good

or bad people, just good or bad situations. Known as Situationism, these results demonstrate, according to some philosophers, most notably John Doris (2002) and Gilbert Harman (1999), that the emphasis attributed to character in ethical theories is misplaced, since it demonstrates that, otherwise very decent individuals, can be brought to behaving badly by situational determinants rather than consistently displaying character. The focus shifts. Whereas the rational being knows what is right thanks to rationality and does what is right thanks to character, we find here individuals who may well know what is right or wrong, but doing is externally determined.

There is a connection with utilitarianism in that both Bentham and Mill were concerned with showing that what we do is not determined by invisible internal states, but rather by external situational conditions. Utilitarian philosophy and Darwinian naturalism inspired B.F. Skinner's psychology that disregards mental states, since they cannot be observed.<sup>54</sup> Humans and animals are formed by circumstances. (Mengal, 2007) 'This does not necessarily manifest in the simple Pavlovian stimulus-response; Skinner's 'operant conditioning' proposes that response is a function of the consequences that the individual has already experienced in similar circumstances. Responses are triggered by the wish for positive, or fear of negative, reinforcement in interactions that presuppose a close system where responses are stable and consistent.

Does this indicate that rationality is absent? It needs not be discarded; however, it does not necessarily involve following steadfast principles, but rather utility or interest. From this perspective, acting on principles that results in punishment would not be rational. Note the contrast with the rational being in the previous section. On this account, concepts like 'character' and the 'self' become irrelevant, since what people do is externally determined, and rationality comes to represent optimal adaptation. Let us now examine the core elements of the reformative scheme and the ways in which these two conceptions of being inform them.

## 1.2 Outcomes: Reformed Subjects

Criminal justice, and rehabilitation in particular, are formulated in terms of outcomes; keeping the public safe and reducing crime levels involve reforming subjects 'to enter meaningful employment ... so that they are able to make an effective contribution towards society.' (ibid. p. 32) This takes place by building character through conditioning, and relations.

### 1.2.1 Build Character

A range of 'interventions to address attitudes and behaviour' (MoJ, 2016b, p. 30) are adopted to 'build' character. (Ibid.) For instance, the 'cognitive skills program' addresses 'factors associated with violence such as poor emotional regulation, poor problem solving, and impulsiveness; violence rates decrease for those people who complete the programme.' (MoJ, 2016b, p. 42) Building character involves learning 'new patterns of behaviour' (MoJ, 2016a, p. 17), which are fundamental to diminish reoffending and have productive citizens: 'when prisoners reach the end of their sentence, we want them to walk through the gates changed characters: better at reading, writing and maths; keen to find

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<sup>54</sup> In terms of therapy, a symptom is not the manifestation of something invisible, a deeper cause lying underneath; it is a behavior that must be corrected.

work, to be productive citizens and contribute positively to their families and communities'. (O'Brien and Robson, 2016, p. 3)

This goal is attained with treatments 'designed to correct.... dysfunctional and criminogenic thinking patterns' (Lipsey, 2001, p. 145 in Blakey, 2017) that are distorted perceptions of reality, rectified with various techniques that share a behavioural conceptual basis. For instance, Virtual Reality Training where 'the offender can practise implementing their planned response to the situational triggers of their cravings in a safe environment where no real harm can be caused. ... The therapist can also pause the simulation at any time to provide immediate reinforcement or feedback on the offender's responses'. (Ibid.) This is used to treat lack of empathy presupposes that empathy is a skill that can be acquired as a systematic response (feel the pain) to a stimulus (someone in pain).

### 1.2.2 Incentives (and Sanctions)

Incentives and sanctions are used to build the right character and behaviour with prisoners, but also more broadly. Prison governors are incentivised to succeed in achieving the desired outcomes by the 'publishing [of] prison league tables' (MoJ, 2016b, p. 23), monetary incentives are available through a 'Payment by Results mechanism' (ibid.), and economic incentives guide the work of organisations that support families with problems. (Ibid. p. 19)

Our focus here, however, is rehabilitation, and the use of incentives is key to achieve the desired outcomes of character and behaviour: 'we have not made sufficient use of all the tools available – to map out a path to a better future for each prisoner, bear down on bad behaviour and reward the good.' (MoJ, 2018 p. 6) An example is the increased or diminished time to interact with one's family used to incentivise good, or sanction bad, behaviour. (O'Brien and Robson, 2016) Bad behaviour is met with tough action, which also involves changes in legislation such as prompt sanctions: smuggling psychoactive substances into prisons 'could mean a prison sentence of up to 10 years for those found guilty.' (MoJ, 2016b p. 46) A 'system of sanctions' is put in place for those who 'break the rules. ... An independent adjudicator ... has the power to add up to 42 additional days to a prisoner's sentence.' (Ibid. p. 49) Incentives and sanctions also aid outside prisons. For instance, increased power is advocated to deliver 'swift and certain short custodial punishments for breach of custodial sentences,' (Ibid. p. 23)

### 1.2.3 Staff and Relations

Staff is central to attain desired outcomes. This is grounded in research: 'evidence is clear: to improve prison safety we need a fundamental shift in the way in which prison staff support and interact with prisoners'. (MoJ, 2016b, p. 42) This involves 'having someone within the prison who is personally responsible for them' (ibid. p. 42) and creating a 'supportive and constructive culture if they are to be places of safety and reform.' (Ibid.) Relations with staff must 'combine the right mix of authority and support through which staff can motivate and challenge the prisoner. This will ensure that they engage actively and willingly with opportunities that encourage them to turn away from crime.' (Ibid. p. 42) Attracting 'the right people' (ibid. p. 55) with the right skills is crucial: 'the brightest and the best' (ibid.) and 'address key gaps in skills.' (Ibid.) Having the right staff requires 'accredited competencies' (ibid.) and 'training to equip ... with the skills they need to tackle the root causes of worsening safety.' (Ibid. p. 53) Efforts are made to recruit former armed

forces personnel who ‘possess skills in leadership and people management as well as the strength of character to strike the balance ... between discipline and support for prisoners.’ (Ibid. p. 56) This involves a ‘whole new way of working’ (MoJ, 2016b, p. 42) that manifests in ‘each prisoner [having] a dedicated officer to support, mentor and challenge them, with each such officer having a caseload of around six prisoners. ... We expect these dedicated officers to act as mentors for their prisoners – listening out for problems, supporting changes in attitudes and behaviour, and defusing tension and frustration.’ (Ibid.) Such new role demands training in ‘the additional skills to excel in a world where they have greater power and control over their establishments’. (Ibid. p. 53)

Family relations are also addressed, not as significant *per se*, but in virtue of their eventual effect on diminishing reoffending: ‘to support prisoners to maintain links back to the community, we will work to develop a measure of the quality of prisoners’ family relationships.’ (MoJ, 2016b, p. 24) This is grounded in research: ‘research has found that prisoners who report improved family relationships are significantly less likely to reoffend or use class A drugs on release from prison.’ (Ibid. p. 32)

From this brief outline we see already the coexistence of the rational and conditioned conceptions of being. The former guides us to privileging character while the latter emphasises behaviour and the use of incentives, resulting in building character with conditioning: ‘We will set out, in more detail how we intend to *sharpen the incentives and punishments* for all prisoners in custody, so that many more *choose* cooperation and rehabilitation over violence and disruption.’ (MoJ, 2018, p. 7, italics added) And so, rehabilitation consists of ‘supporting habitual offenders to achieve long-term desistance from crime, or face swift consequences.’ (MoJ, 2016a, p. 20) To understand why this is the case we look at the other elements of this conceptual scheme.

### 1.3 Safety and Security

Unsurprisingly, safety and security are prominent concepts in the treatment of criminal justice, and here this is explicitly stated; the primary aim of the criminal justice system is to ‘keep people safe ... punish offenders and protect the public.’ (MoJ, 2016b, p. 5) This may be rather intuitive. However, we need to look more closely at what is meant with safety and security, i.e. what is the public protected from? Physical violence is mentioned extensively, as is sexual violence, as well as abuse: ‘anti-social behaviour, drugs and alcohol misuse, gangs and youth violence, domestic violence, child sexual abuse, serious and organised crime, and radicalisation’. (MoJ, 2016a, p. 19) Theft is also prominent and involves home burglaries, car theft, phone theft, and so forth. (Ibid.) Other types of crimes that are emphasised are ‘terrorist financing ... illicit commodities such as drugs and counterfeit tobacco’ (ibid. p. 26), ‘serious frauds and overseas corruption ... stolen metal ... smartphone theft ... slavery and human trafficking ... money laundering and terrorist financing.’ (Ibid. p. 28) Victims and the general public are set in contrast with those who commit crime, and the latter constitute a threat to the former: ‘Public protection therefore remains a basic duty of prisons so that our streets are kept safe, that victims of crime and the general public see that crime is punished, and that we prevent more innocent people from being the victims of crime.’ (MoJ, 2016b, p. 21)

Physical violence also characterises prisons requiring a ‘tougher response to crime in prison’ (MoJ, 2016b, p. 49) to protect staff: ‘we must not tolerate any behaviour within our prisons that undermines the essential work that they do. The rise in assaults against our

staff must be met with a robust and swift response. Prisoners who perpetrate these acts must be stopped so that other prisoners can feel safe and focus on turning their lives around.’ (Ibid.) Controlling violence in prisons also involves the ‘police providing training to prison staff in the preservation of evidence to enable them to deal with assaults on staff or prisoners more effectively and improve prosecution rates.’ (Ibid. p. 52) Lastly, safety also involves that prisoners remain confined: ‘minimising escapes is central to protecting the public’ (ibid. p. 22) and, even though it is important to provide occasions for learning and working, ‘public protection remains paramount.’ (Ibid. p. 23)

#### 1.4 Control

Protection and safety require control, which permeates this conceptual scheme in various ways, without necessarily involving the use of the term. The focus on outcomes, and the procedures identified to achieve them, suggests a planning orientation and presupposes regular cause and effect; what is regular and predictable is controllable, or at least more so than the irregular and unpredictable. Incentives and rewards also involve control: we bring others to behave or even choose what we want, if not with a backhander then with swift punishment. This is more overarching than solely concerning offenders; it involves ‘sharper inspections and scrutiny’ of prisons (MoJ, 2016b, p. 18), ‘performance measures’, ‘an annual league table.’ (Ibid. p. 20) That we face a system of actions and reactions that are predictable, and thus, controllable, is assumed, and control as such manifests in two ways: external, i.e. conditioning, and internal, i.e. self-control. Rehabilitation involves the employment of external control to obtain internal control. We now look at these two aspects of control beginning with the external.

Effective crime prevention takes place through deterrence, legitimacy, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Deterrence is ‘the theory that people refrain from committing criminal acts as a result of the fear of sanctions or punishment’ (MoJ, 2016a, p. 21). The role of control is evident; we get others to do what we want due to fear of punishment, as in the conditioned conception of being. Opportunity is identified as the second most important cause of crime (ibid.), and is addressed with surveillance and swift suppression. For instance, CCTVs, tracking devices for goods that risk being stolen, interrogation techniques, collection of data (ibid. p. 22), sharing of data with A&E, changing routes of patrol, moving officers to hot-spots, ‘satellite tracking tags’ (ibid. p. 23), ‘intelligence and data sharing.’ (Ibid. p. 34) Also the introduction of ‘a new 10 most wanted’ list (ibid. p. 27), ‘identify and disrupt money laundering,’ (ibid.), ‘strengthen legal powers’ (ibid.), enhance ‘supervisory regime’ (ibid.), provide police and local authorities with the ‘power for swift and decisive action.’ (Ibid. p. 33)

Legitimacy involves engaging with the public to ‘foster compliance with the law’ (ibid.), which indicates an externally induced obedience. Incapacitation is physical prevention, and the utmost expression of control: people who are physically restrained cannot commit crime. (Ibid.) Containment is also crucial to the very nature of criminal justice: ‘we cannot hope to reform offenders unless we are able to hold them securely. Prisons need to be able to do this to command public confidence and to deliver any of the other purposes.’ (MoJ, 2016b, p. 21) External control is central also to safety in prisons: ‘Prisons cannot be places of safety and reform unless they are effective at preventing prisoners from escaping or absconding, and at stopping illicit or harmful material from entering the prison.’ (Ibid. p. 29) This involves controlling mobile phones with ‘better quality detection equipment in bigger quantities, including new X-ray machines and high sensitivity metal detectors’ (ibid.

p. 47) and developing ‘better searching capability.’ (Ibid. p. 48) Overall, crime prevention and action within prisons, is guided by ‘increasing the perceived likelihood of being caught, and to some extent the speed with which the sanction is then delivered, [which] has a deterrent effect.’ (MoJ, 2016a, p. 21)

All these measures involve controlling the physical possibility of action or controlling behaviour with deterrence, and are external. The individual’s willingness to commit crime is not addressed, which speaks for the conditioned being but, at the same time, it is presupposed; crime is what criminals do, in virtue of their character, which is the primary cause of crime (MoJ, 2016a), which is treated more extensively in the next section. People with a certain character are predisposed to committing crime. Thus, prevention involves foreseeing and disrupting their actions by ‘pooling and analysing data across different local agencies. ... Better analysis of digital images and geolocation [and] tagging could help make the Criminal Justice System more effective at catching (and therefore deterring) criminals.’ (MoJ, 2016a, p. 37) This is ‘predictive policing’ (Ibid. p. 38) and involves ‘data analytics capability which brings together data on immigration and asylum, visa applications and organized crime’ (ibid. p. 39), and drones and other technology for ‘horizon scanning’. (Ibid. p. 40)

But control also has an internal dimension, i.e. self-control, as indicated by the emphasis on drugs and alcohol, both representing the quintessential lack of control. The use of drugs and alcohol is often associated with cognitive skills and anger management; all elements that have to do with self-restraint. One of the most stressed elements of rehabilitation is enhancing control for ‘drug addiction and programmes improving offenders’ cognitive skills, or anger management programmes.’ (Ibid. p. 21) The development of self-control requires external control, and so ‘reform can only take hold in a safe and disciplined prison environment.’ (MoJ, 2016b, p. 7) The core feature of the rational being is achieved through measures that presuppose the conditioned conception of being.

## 1.5 Character

Character is the most prominent cause of crime: ‘why do some people become criminals while others ... do not?’ The latest research suggests that ... character is an important part of the explanation.’ (MoJ, 2016a, p. 17) But what is character? The expressions ‘character’ and ‘character traits’ are used somewhat interchangeably, which can lead to confusion. On the one hand we are told that character is the reason why ‘some people become criminals *while others – often from the same neighbourhood or family-* do not’ (Ibid. italics added) In this sense it seems to indicate an inevitable propensity, almost a disposition like the disposition of glass to break when falling on a marble floor. Character as such is a more reliable indicator of the predisposition of the individual to commit crime than environmental factors: ‘evidence suggests ... that *certain character traits in individuals are related to their propensity to commit crime* ... [and are] three times better at predicting whether a person will offend than social indicators such as hanging around in crime hot-spots or in the company of delinquent peers.’ (Ibid.)

However, we are also told that “the kind of positive character traits which will protect young people from the involvement in crime can be learned – someone with low levels of self-control can be helped to improve their decision-making, making them less likely to commit crime.’ (MoJ, 2016a, p. 17) This seems to identify character with self-governance, which can be developed: people with low levels of self-control can be helped ‘to improve

their decision making, making them less likely to commit crime.’ (Ibid.) On this reading character indicates self-control and, more precisely, control of emotions and impulsivity, which are the reason why people make bad decisions.

People of character make good decisions and are resilient; they have the strength to resist the influence of others and of emotions. (MoJ, 2016a; 2016b; O’Brien and Robson, 2016) Rehabilitation ‘build[s] key character traits like resilience – for example by helping them to avoid socialising with former associates.’ (MoJ, 2016a p. 20) Note that character is built, which suggests the assembling of elements (bricks) in a systematic process that follows a plan, and results in a definite outcome. This differs from the open process suggested by terms like development, cultivation or growth that would be more likely used by a virtue ethicist or a psychologist with a psychodynamic orientation. The concept of character is here informed by the rational conception of being; it involves control of emotion and external influences, as with autonomy as opposed to heteronomy.

Self-governance is combined with a prominent emphasis on manifested behaviour rather than reasons; doing the right thing *because* it is the right thing may be contemplated, but nowhere mentioned, while attaining the desired behaviour is the focus: ‘The growing evidence on ‘character’ is that, even in adults, the brain can still learn new patterns of behaviour.’ (MoJ, 2016a, p. 17) This is a tension: if character is internal, how does this harmonise with a conception of being that denies the self and privileges external control? The more general question would be whether it makes a difference that people do not break the law because they do not want to, or whether they do so because they are afraid to be caught. The rational conception of being presupposes the former. If, on the other hand, we take character to indicate traits, i.e. a predisposition, we may favour the latter option: having the traits leads to breaking the law necessarily, thus we can only find ways to impede or change behaviour without paying too much attention to internal elements that may be left to ethicists. However character as self-governance is often emphasised, which presupposes that ‘willing’ matters, as seems to be the case, since crime is a choice in this scheme, and choice implies willingness.

## 1.6 Choice

The tension that was just pointed out culminates in the relevance of choice that permeates this scheme. Although the term is seldom explicitly employed, it is suggested. Crime involves the ‘willingness to break social norms’ (MoJ, 2016a, p. 17) and life outcomes result from ‘decision-making processes and skills.’ (Ibid.) The rational conception of being plays in the background; what one does is in her hands including the possibility to control the influence of context. The choices that people make, and the eventual criteria they may employ in making their choices, are ultimately their own; rehabilitation is helping ‘to improve their decision making, making them less likely to commit crime’ (ibid.), ‘reassess their choices’ (ibid. p. 19), and ‘achieve complete *desistance* from crime’<sup>55</sup> (ibid. p. 23, italics added) by improving ‘effective decision-making skills.’ (Ibid. p. 31)

The predominant conception of the legal subject presupposes free choice in the attribution of responsibility;<sup>56</sup> the free, rational, autonomous, and self-governing individual is the

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<sup>55</sup> ‘Desistance is the word for how people with a previous pattern of offending come to abstain from crime’ (<https://www.gov.uk/guidance/desistance>) Note that ‘to abstain’ indicates ‘to restrain oneself’.

<sup>56</sup> This is not necessarily the case, and is widely discussed also in philosophy. See Strawson (1962/2008), Rosen (2004), Smith (2008), Fricker (2016), Wallace (2004).

centre of social, political, and legal activity. (Carvalho, 2017; Lacey, 2001; Norrie, 2000) This idea of autonomous, free and rational individual suggests that decisions result from rational deliberation that can control contextual and emotional elements; the right decision is available to the individual who, doing otherwise, chooses crime. Alan Norrie (2000) calls this legal conception of the individual ‘Kantian individualism’ and, following Dennis, he points out that it rests upon a ‘legal model of human being, which accords individuals the status of autonomous moral agents who, because they have axiomatic freedom of choice, can fairly be held accountable and punishable for the rational choices... they make. ...[I]nformed voluntary choices of action are both necessary and sufficient to justify blame and punishment.’ (Norrie 2000, p. 2) This ideal presupposes that the criteria of choice are universal and not affected by context, environment, history, or personal experiences.

Thus choice is presupposed and committing crime results from a rational deliberative, and cognitive, decision-making process. Acknowledging choice does not need to involve autonomy; one may have a compatibilist approach where free will and determinism are compatible in the determination of responsibility. However, this scheme does not seem to adopt compatibilism; choice is not treated in terms of ‘could have done otherwise’, but rather implies intention, as indicated by the use of ‘willingness.’ (MoJ, 2016a; 2018) This stronger conception involving intention suggests assimilation with ‘moral choice. Thus, as pointed out by some legal scholars, legal responsibility becomes conflated with moral responsibility. For instance, Moore shows that ‘legal liability tracks moral responsibility’ (Moore, 1993, p. 154) and Antony Duff points out that ‘intentional agency provides the paradigm of responsible agency. This is why intention is the central or paradigm determinant of moral culpability... As with morality, so with law.’ (Duff, 1992, p. 102) A fully functioning individual, an individual with character, is equipped to distinguish right from wrong thanks to her cognitive ability, and she is free to choose how to act. But presupposing that one is free to choose also implies that that breaking the law is a fully voluntary act.

## 1.7 The Paradigm: a Thug

The core elements of this conceptual scheme are embodied, and driven, by a clear image of whom we are talking about when we discuss crime and rehabilitation: the terms employed most often are criminal or offender, but we are offered a specific picture of what these involve.

The portrait of a typical criminal is associated with physical violence, anger and impulsivity, use of drugs and alcohol, dysfunctional cognitive skills and lack of empathy. In general they live ‘chaotic, amoral and miserable lives.’ (O’Brien and Robson, 2016, p. 12), offend with intention, and commit crimes such as theft, home burglaries, assault and sexual assault, stolen goods and counterfeit, human trafficking, and terrorism. In addition to character and opportunity, drugs and alcohol, ‘many serious and organised crime offenders are motivated by profit’, which denotes ‘making money and accumulating wealth over and above the immediate need.’ (MoJ, 2016a, p. 26) Profit could be involved in various activities, but here it is associated with organised crime, fraud, human trafficking and financing of terrorist activities. (Ibid.) This is an exemplar in Kuhnian and rhetorical terms that embodies the core elements of the scheme in a salient image, and solves the problem of crime in a way that confirms and consolidates such core elements. This person is dangerous, acts willingly, is dysfunctional, and must be stopped or changed.

There is a clear demarcation between this person and law abiding citizens: ‘A *small minority* of people commit the majority of crimes.’ (MoJ, 2016a, p. 17) There is not much in common, if anything, between these people and us. On the contrary, ‘*most of us* simply wouldn’t consider breaking the law to be an option, however clear the opportunity.’ (Ibid.) This is reiterated: ‘*Some people* will never commit certain crimes, regardless of the situation. *But for some people* ... the degree of opportunity can make a big difference.’ (Ibid.) We know that the difference lies in character, which involves lack of self-control and dysfunctional cognitive skills. That people with a certain character will commit crime seems inevitable, as seems inevitable that they engage in violence. Thus, control is justified generally and, particularly, it is justified in prisons, since they are characterised by disorders, riots, and violence.

## 2 Disentangling

In the previous section we have identified the core elements of the conceptual scheme that I have called reformatory from an analysis of key policy documents concerning criminal justice and rehabilitation. Crime is treated descriptively; its causes are identified and presented as matters of fact, supported by strong evidence, and so are preventative and rehabilitative measures. Rehabilitation is formulated in terms of desired outcomes, such as ‘changed characters’, and something that is ‘desired’ is also normative. This is not the sort of implicit evaluation that I am trying to uncover. Rather, desired outcomes, and how to attain them, follow from the supposedly descriptive accounts of how people function and why they commit crime. These are not solely descriptive and we now disentangle them, beginning with the paradigm, to dissect how evaluation guides attention and action in a certain direction.

### 2.1 Fearful Threats

The term criminal is loaded, and clearly involves deprecation. However, how we use it, i.e. whom we call a criminal, depends on what features we deprecate and on them having such features. As we saw in the theory chapter, I call Jane ‘murderer’ if she has killed John and I deplore her in virtue of this, but if I admire Jane for killing John I will call her something else. The fact remains that Jane has killed John. So far we have established that calling someone ‘criminal’ involves deprecation, but deprecation of what? The most prominent descriptive feature is physical violence, which also elicits fear. We envision people who do not only violate the law but also do so causing physical harm. In addition to violence, general, we have abuse, child abuse, sexual abuse, human trafficking and terrorism (MoJ 2016a, p. 19), which are probably the most insufferable sorts of crime. The fearfulness of these features is enhanced by contrast with ‘vulnerable’ victims (ibid.), which indicates helplessness. This is not violence that takes place among equals; it suggests the unfair exploitation of weakness. This image of violence depicts a male offender while ‘many female offenders are often vulnerable members of society.’ (MoJ, 2016b, p. 7) With the latter we may be more prone to empathise, not the least in virtue of their vulnerability that defuses the sense of fear and condemnation.

Descriptive features of criminals also involve deprived environments; the use of drugs and alcohol, analphabetism, mental health, witnessing violence, families in need of support. (MoJ, 2016a) These features reinforce the degradation associated with crime and enhance the demarcation between normal people and offenders. This is not someone like ‘most of

us' (MoJ, 2016a, p. 17); it is someone who is dangerous and, somehow, worse. They live 'chaotic, amoral, and miserable lives.' (O'Brien and Robson, 2016, p. 12) On pain of stepping ahead, in these three terms we find: the disapproval of lack of order, 'chaotic', which coheres with appreciating control. 'Amoral' suggests lack of principles, which expresses the rationalist conception of character and the conflation of the legal and moral realm; violating the law and lacking morality may not exactly overlap, but come very close. 'Miserable lives' enhances the sense of degradation and communicates something low and sad. Even if we were to feel pity, it would underscore that we look down at this person; for those like us we feel empathy or even sympathy rather than pity, while these features move to distancing rather than empathising.

I called this paradigm 'a thug'; although the term is not explicitly used in the documents, it seemed to me that that specific referent of these discussions is a violent, dangerous individual, associated with dark, dodgy, thuggish environments, street fights, assaults, attacks on vulnerable and innocent people. The emphasis on impulsiveness and lack of control suggest that violence may manifest unexpectedly, enhancing the sense of danger. The 'shared goal of reducing crime and protecting the public' (MoJ, 2016b, p. 17) takes the shape, in the imagery conveyed by this conceptual scheme, of protection from an immediate threat. Physical violence is inescapable, this is what criminals do; fight, assault, steal or rape,<sup>57</sup> and this is an inevitable matter of fact. Prison staff represents 'those working on the frontline' (ibid. p. 5), we need 'greater authority for the frontline' (ibid.), they are 'frontline staff' (ibid. p. 6), and 'frontline officers.' (Ibid. p. 8) Soldiers at the frontline are the ones who stand between the enemy and us, and do the hardest work to protect the country. These prized features presuppose an enemy.

## 2.2 Reassuring Control

Having control as a core element of a conceptual scheme on criminal justice is not surprising, and it may simply ascertain that control is sometimes inevitable. However, here it is valued and appreciated, which is enhanced by the sense of threat conveyed by the paradigmatic offender. This image, in and outside prisons, evokes urgency and moves to 'swift' action (MoJ, 2016b, p. 10, 13, 18, 27, 46, 49, 50) that quickly contains the threat through suppression: a 'crack down on criminality.' (Ibid. p. 40) That a threat can be suppressed alleviates fear. But this is also hardly surprising.

The relevance and appreciation of control in this conceptual scheme, has to do with the combination of the conditioned and the rational conception of the human being. Control involves bringing about a desired behaviour, or preventing an undesired such, by way of external action, i.e. by way of bypassing the internal world of the subject whom we want to behave in a certain way. The internal world is bypassed not necessarily in virtue of a behaviourist stance, but also in virtue of the assumption that bad behaviour involves bad character, i.e. the inability to exert self-control. Thus, we cannot but control behaviour from the outside, particularly because we are referring to immediate and violent threats.

However control is exerted wide and broad in this conceptual scheme, not only with violent offenders. The actions of governors are controlled through incentives, such as league tables, which can also be source of punishment; a bad result would involve exposure to critique and, probably, less funds. Troubled families' support is incentivised with

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<sup>57</sup> Interestingly, killing is not mentioned in the documents.

economic rewards based on results. Indeed, the behaviour of prisoners is controlled through a wide variety of measures, including the addition or removal of family time. These examples presuppose that doing x, apply incentives, increases the likelihood of obtaining y, the desired outcome, and this adds a sense of *certainty*, which is not the case if we leave the outcome to the agency of others. The wide recourse to incentives seems to presuppose that others are not trusted to do their best, be it managing a successful prison or having a good life, were it not for the external conditioning applied to them. Thus, control seems to be valued in virtue of diminishing uncertainty. The latter is uncomfortable, as testified by the emphasis on prediction and on impulsivity in characterising bad character and criminal behaviour; illegal activity that involves planning is hardly mentioned.

### 2.3 Dangerous Emotions

Control is valuable also in respect to the self, and particularly emotions. As such, it is the utmost feature of character, which is the highly valued feature that distinguishes ‘most of us’ from the minority of people who commit the majority of crimes. The rational conception of being is at play; character concerns the internal world, the self, and not only due to the grammatical reflexive. It is the ‘self’ who does the controlling of emotions and of bad influence from the environment, such as groups of friends. Character is the ability to resist these internal and external influences while steadfastly following fixed principles. To develop this vigilant function of the self is one of the primary aims of rehabilitation.

The negative evaluation of emotions follows. It is not explicitly stated, but we are guided to draw the inference: crime is associated with physical violence, danger and fear. The primary driver of crime is lack of character, where character is control of emotions and impulsivity. Thus emotions represent the lack of control that leads to violence and crime and, in virtue of these features, are dangerous. Consider that drugs and alcohol contributes to crime in that they favour ‘increased risk taking, impulsive behaviour and heightened *emotionality*.’ (MoJ 2016a, p. 32 italics added)

That emotions are negatively loaded is not surprising, given the appreciation of control that characterises this scheme. If it is the case, as I have suggested, that there is a rationalist influence, then emotions are the utmost enemy. Here they are associated solely with dangerous behaviour, often of the worst sort such as assault, sexual assault, child abuse, and terrorism. This guides us towards seeing emotions as conductors of violence, and to appreciating their control. If this were not the case, that is if emotions were appreciated, they would not be associated *only* with violent features.

### 2.4 Faulty People

Those who commit crime are characterised by ‘*distorted* cognition’ (Lipsey, 2001, p. 157), and it is unlikely that distorted is appreciative. Let us then look more closely at the features of distorted cognition: ‘self-justificatory thinking, misinterpretation of social cues, deficient moral reasoning, schemas of dominance and entitlement, and the like.’ (Ibid.) Note that deficient moral reasoning indicates a cognitive malfunctioning, which presupposes that morality is a cognitive endeavour, in line with the rational conception of being. Deficient indicates something that is lacking, in contrast with a supposedly functional morality. Since, as we have seen, emotions are not particularly appreciated in this scheme, the valued feature that is lacking is reason; a well functioning reason involves proper interpretation of

social cues and proper morality, and controls emotions. This is presented as a matter of fact, but also expresses evaluation; deficient contrasts with efficient, that is a fully functioning cognitive subject. Misinterpretation and distortion suggest that people who commit crime often have a faulty perception of what actually is the case. Schemas of entitlement indicate the belief of having the right to something, but also suggests that it *is not the case*, i.e. a false belief. These features describe flaws, particularly in contrast with what we take to represent proper functioning, i.e. all of us who would not consider to break the law.

We are offered specific example: ‘Offenders with such distorted thinking may react to essentially benign situations as if they were threatening, for example, be predisposed to perceive comments others make about them as disrespectful or attacking.’ (Lipsey, 2001, p. 147; and in Blakey, 2017, p. 9) These features suggest paranoia in contrast with actual situations that are not threatening, perceived as such due to cognitive distortion. And distortion also affects behaviour: ‘Their behaviour may be guided by *dysfunctional* assumptions and rules about how one should behave, for example, “you have to punish people for messing with you or they won’t respect you”, “you have to rebel against authority or they will break you” ... “nobody can be trusted”, “everyone is against me,” or “society doesn’t give me a chance.”’ (Ibid.) Similarly, ‘dysfunctional’ indicates something that does not function properly, and should be fixed. It also indicates that these assumptions are mistaken, which effectively guides the observer to their dismissal. The reasons for action of offenders, whatever they may be (perceptions of how they are treated, attitudes about what is expected of them to succeed, feeling of not having a chance), are incorrect readings of a world that is not as they perceive it. This expresses and enforces dismissal. These are ‘*dysfunctional and criminogenic* thinking patterns’ (ibid. italics added) where ‘criminogenic’ ultimately puts the nail in the coffin of the eventual empathy that we may feel. The distance between those who are functional and those who are dysfunctional is enhanced; the latter is faulty (in the sense of having a fault), which guides action towards fixing the fault. Thus rehabilitation involves making the dysfunctional functional, correct the distortion, getting them to see the world as we do by teaching the *right* cognitive skills, the *right* character, and the *right* behaviour.<sup>58</sup>

## 2.5 Intention and Retributive Feelings

That punishment is used to obtain the desired behaviour may be a description, and this instrumental function expresses the conditioned conception of being. However, the way in which this scheme conceptualises crime is permeated by the relevance of free choice that characterises the rational conception of being. People do not solely offend due to circumstances; they do so intentionally, and so punishment, per se, is important and constitutive of criminal justice. ‘Punishing offenders for the crimes they have committed by depriving them of their freedom is a crucial element of what prisons are here for and a core part of our criminal justice system’. (MoJ, 2016b, p. 20)

The infliction of harm is valued in virtue of the willingness to break social norms (MoJ, 2016a) that characterises crime. Willingness involves the intention to damage not only victims, but also what keeps us together, social norms. ‘Imprisonment is not a punishment that is imposed lightly. It reflects the seriousness of an offence and the harm that an offender has caused *to the community*.’ (MoJ, 2016b, p. 21 italics added) These features

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<sup>58</sup> Reference to the ‘right cognitive skills, character, and behaviour’, as well as the ‘right staff’ and the ‘right estate’ is recurring in the documents that have been examined, particularly MoJ 2016a; 2016b

prompt a sense of betrayal towards all of us, not only victims, and moves to identifying with victims not only in virtue of the harm they have suffered. I may naturally empathise with a victim solely in virtue of her pain, and feel sorry for her, without necessarily feeling retribution. However, in stressing that harm is caused against the community, the victim becomes a representation of 'all of us', including me. Were this to happen willingly, it would more likely prompt my retributive feelings. Darley and Pittman (2003) show that 'the primary reaction to harm inflicted intentionally is moral outrage producing a desire for retribution: the harm-doer must be punished. ... The moral outrage is the product of both cognitive interpretations of the event and emotional reactions to it' (Darley and Pittman, 2003, p. 324)

As I have explained earlier, the characterisation of the stereotypical criminal marks a demarcation between 'most of us', normal functional people, and criminals enhanced by an unbalance between victims (women, girls or vulnerable people) and offenders (thugs). Willingness enhances the demarcation and also enhances, and justifies, retribution, moving towards thinking and acting in ways that would be different, were retributive feelings not elicited. This affects the shape of rehabilitation in this scheme: reformation of subjects who deserve punishment.

### 3 Blinkering

The core elements of this conceptual scheme, and their load, guide us to seeing crime as the result of choice primarily due to lack of character that is the inability to exercise self-control. These features are embodied by the paradigm, the thug, who is the referent of criminal justice in sharp contrast with normal people. A rational conception of the human being informs these elements and contributes to the retributivist flavour of this conceptual scheme. The conditioned conception of human beings, on the other hand, guides us to emphasising behaviour and conditioning. Let us now consider what is unavailable in this conceptual horizon.

To posit that crime involves cognitive dysfunction presupposes that normally functioning individuals would not commit crime and blinkers the observer from considering such cases as well as other reasons that may lead to crime that do not involve character or addiction, i.e. diminished control of emotions in different forms. The appreciation of emotional control results in programs such as 'cage the rage' or 'keep calm and carry on.' Presupposing that rage originates in a deficiency prevents people from inquiring into what caused it, and even more from contemplating that it may be justified. Asking these questions needs not imply a justification of violence. Similarly, the focus on cognitive dysfunctions that underlie thoughts such as 'society does not give me a chance' blinkers one from considering that such thoughts may be legitimate and from entertaining the possibility that crime may not represent the breaking of social bonds but, rather, indicate the absence of such bonds.

Valuing control and associating emotions with violence hinders from contemplating that the suppression of feelings, most notably anger, may lead to the desired behaviour at first, but also to increased rage and violence in the long run. Thus potentially feeding more violence and reoffending.

The reductionist stimulus-response that informs the use of incentives and punishments may blinker one from seeing other elements that affect behaviour. For instance, the

development of empathy through virtual reality presupposes that empathy consists in the *systematic* manifestation of a response (pain) to a stimulus (someone in pain). Does empathy manifest systematically as a mirroring response to anyone's pain and any sort of pain? We may empathise differently with different people, who show different sorts of 'pain' in different situations, and this may indicate other elements that concern empathy, other than cognitive dysfunctions. This is unavailable if we adopt a stimulus-response perspective.

The typical criminal is characterised in terms of what is deprecated in this conceptual scheme; violence, drugs and alcohol abuse, violence, illiteracy, sexual assault, theft, terrorism and deprived living conditions, and 'chaotic, amoral, and miserable lives.' (O'Brien and Robson, 2016, p. 12) This presupposes that crime and lack of morality go hand in hand and blinkers us from inspecting alternatives: can one be moral and break the law? Similarly, these features blinker people from considering that crime may take other shapes. One may be a productive and polished citizen, from a privileged background, self-controlled, speak and dress well, not violent, and yet engaged in drug trafficking, human trafficking, or political, economic or financial corruption. Is this crime as well and are these people criminals? This scheme is silent about such cases.

The negative evaluation of emotions guides people to conceptualising relations in impersonal terms; staff has a caseload of prisoners and relations are depicted in terms of management. This blinkers people from considering the spontaneous, personal, emotional, non-manageable and, to a large extent, non-controllable aspects of relations. This distancing is enhanced by the image of the criminal and the retributive feelings that it elicits, blinkering from seeing offenders as human beings who may have positive features as well. Similarly, family relations are valued as instrumental to attaining the desired end and discussed in terms of measurement. That they may be valuable in their own right is not contemplated.

The demarcation between faulty subjects and normal people presupposes that the latter would not commit crime. If staff is corrupted, it has been corrupted by inmates, goes the assumption: 'we continue to be concerned for the number of staff who are vulnerable to being corrupted by organised criminals and other high risk prisoners.' (MoJ, 2016b, p. 51) That staff may be corrupt on their own initiative or that they may exploit prisoners is unavailable in this scheme. Similarly, since the criminal is the violent subject per antonomasia, violence in prisons is violence perpetrated by prisoners against staff, while violence perpetrated by staff against prisoners is ignored.

Lastly, the rational conception of being involves valuing of character and free choice while the conditioned conception focuses on external control of behaviour. Their combination leads to teaching character through conditioning where character is assimilated to behaviour. But the autonomy presupposed by the idea of the legal subject, explicitly addressed by Norrie as Kantian, and the emphasis on willingness betray the influence of the rational conception of being that is in tension with the conditioned approach. Character concerns the motive of action and, on the rational view, intention matters more than outcomes. But the methods chosen to build character address manifest behaviour, not motives. Since the declared aim of rehabilitation is 'reformed character', and character is also a prominent element of the crime prevention strategy, can we say that not committing crime due to fear of punishment involves character? On the rational account it would not be the case. If the desired outcome is behaviour, why pay so much attention to character? A possible rebuttal to my objection could be that this scheme is informed by a cognitive-behavioural approach that combines elements that focus on the internal world

(cognitive) with elements of behaviourism that I have associated with the conditioned conception of human beings. Robertson (2010) grounds cognitive-behavioural therapy in Stoic Philosophy, and its conception of rational emotions, which could account for the rationalist elements that I have highlighted in this scheme. Nevertheless, this would not solve the tension; it would probably add to it.<sup>59</sup> I do not have a solution, but I want to raise the issue as worthy of further attention.

## 4 The Enabling Scheme

We now examine the approach of the Swedish Prison and Probation Service and Swedish Ministry of Justice. This conceptual scheme that I have called the ‘enabling’ scheme, is informed by a conception of human beings that presupposes that people are relationally constituted in interaction with their environment and with one another, and that affective elements are decisive to this interaction. Rehabilitation takes the shape of a process of growth from within guided by relations, and crime is considered in terms of motivation rather than opportunity, although the latter is not ignored. The Swedish Government provides the Swedish Prison and Probation System with the mandate to ‘operate detention facilities and enforce sentences in a secure, humane and efficient manner, and work to reduce the number of repeat offences.’ (SweMoJ, 2015, p. 25)<sup>60</sup>

### 4.1 The Growing Being

According to what I will call the ‘growing conception’ of the human being, people are relationally constituted in a combination of internal and external elements. In the rational being the focus is on the internal dimension and people are essentially monadic; embedded in communities, but not constituted by this. In the conditioned being the focus is on the external dimension; the self is not considered and people are moulded by external conditions. In the growing conception people are embedded in communities, and they are not shaped by external conditions in a mechanic way. However, context and environment play a central role in constituting who one is and the criteria that guide behaviour: people ‘are who they are, and they do what they do, by virtue of the relations in which they stand.’ (Martins, 2017, p. 1333) That relational interaction constitutes beings does not imply negating the individual, but it sheds a different light on action. While breaking the law is wrong, individual decisions are not weighed against a universal right, as in the rational being, but also involve contextual elements that result in the choices that people make.

Among the theories that envision human beings as growing, the one I use here is Self Determination Theory (SDT) because it best captures the presuppositions found in the Swedish approach.<sup>61</sup> SDT is inspired by Aristotelian<sup>62</sup> and Kantian philosophy, phenomenology, and psychoanalysis. There are several Kantian interpretations of SDT, probably due to the use of expressions like ‘self-determination’ and the centrality of autonomy. However, autonomy as conceived in SDT indicates a feeling, thus differing

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<sup>59</sup> Given the Kantian flavour of this scheme and the conflicting positions among scholars concerning Kant’s relation with Stoicism.

<sup>60</sup> This document, as Nils Öberg’s Longford Lecture and RSA Talk are originally in English. Other material that has been examined for this approach is in Swedish and I have translated into English.

<sup>61</sup> It must however be noted that the Swedish documents make no explicit reference to SDT.

<sup>62</sup> As with Kant, various readings of Aristotle are available that contrast with each other. For example, Nussbaum, McIntyre, Stark, McDowell. Of particular relevance to this chapter are Lear (2014) and Stark (2001).

considerably from Kantian autonomy. SDT is a descriptive theory of motivation, i.e. it is concerned with explaining why we do what we do and proposes two types of motivation, intrinsic and extrinsic, that differ in quality rather than strength. The different quality of motivation rests in the satisfaction of so-called basic needs that are predominantly affective.<sup>63</sup>

Intrinsic motivation is more powerful than extrinsic, but this is not due to rationality or strength of will. We are internally, intrinsically, motivated to do certain things rather than others because they feel aligned with our conception of ourselves. On this view, however, the self is not an entity, as in cognitive psychology; it is a process of continuous interactions between the individual and context. This process shapes the individual's perceptions, attitudes, and preferences. It also shapes the individual's perception of who she is, and aspires to be. Who we are, thus, is not fixed; rather, we continuously become in a process that involves relations with others and influences our judgment. The satisfaction of so-called basic human needs is central to this process; they are 'nutrients that are essential for growth' which is a natural tendency of all living creatures. (Ryan & Deci, 2018) These nutrients are feelings: autonomy (the feeling of not being controlled), relatedness (the need for human relations, affection, belonging), and competence (the feeling that we are good at what we do). The satisfaction of basic needs characterises intrinsic motivation and guides people to acting wholeheartedly. Extrinsic motivation indicates an external ought that may be followed for fear of punishment or convention, but the impetus to act in that direction, if any, is weaker. The relational constitution of the self as a process implies that there is not 'one' human nature; rather, there are manifestations of human natures that rest in what the subject has experienced in 'dialectical relation with ambient social contexts.' (Ibid. p. 9)

Winnicott's 'facilitating environment' is an example of basic needs satisfaction; 'an interpersonal matrix that provides a secure or stable base and a caretaker who is responsive to and validating of one's spontaneous strivings'. (Ryan & Deci, 2017, p. 60) Active engagement and loving support from a caretaker provide validation and encourage the child's<sup>64</sup> interaction with the world, strengthen her capacity to be 'in touch' with others, and facilitate the development of confidence and vitality when doing so. In contrast, an unresponsive or overly controlling caretaker distracts the child away from her inner experience and forces her to develop what Winnicott called a false-self: the self that is imposed by the overly controlling or absent caretaker. (Phillips, 1988) Similarly to Carl Jung's persona or Sigmund Freud's defence mechanisms, Winnicott's false self has a protective function: it is a form of adaptation to relations marked by an indifferent, or overly-controlling, or careless, or overly-demanding attitude displayed by the caretaker. It is adaptive in the sense that the child develops the false self in order to preserve some sort of relatedness.

The person who, for example commits crime, does not do so because she cannot control her emotions, or has deficient cognitive skills, but rather because of the lack, or thwarting (Ryan & Deci, 2018), of basic nutrients, which may intrinsically motivate towards aggressive or antisocial behaviour. Thus, it is an affective rather than rational or cognitive matter. The employment of rewards and incentives damages intrinsic motivation, since they deprive from feeling autonomous or competent, as does control. This approach does recognise that there may well be an externally determined right or wrong (in our case, the

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<sup>63</sup> SDT literature does not refer to Hume, although there are affinities with Hume's moral psychology that cannot be treated here and would be worthy of further examination.

<sup>64</sup> Winnicott worked predominantly with children.

law). However, at the level of individual judgment and actions, i.e. moral psychology, general moral principles are weighted with actual situations while the relational constitution of the self as a process favours growth, and the removal of obstacles to the generalised flourishing: ‘Human beings evolved as relational beings within communities in which the flourishing of each is bound up with the flourishing of all.’ (Martins, 2017, p. 1334) Let us now examine how this conception of human beings informs the core elements of the enabling scheme.

## 4.2 Open Ended Journeys

In contrast with the reformative scheme where outcomes oriented rehabilitation, this scheme is characterised by an emphasis on processes, and the term rehabilitation is not used often. Naturally there will be desired outcomes, such as diminished re-offending, but the focus is on processes of change. ‘Our work is about change’ (Öberg, 2019) and this involves also the recruitment of staff: ‘Someone who wants to be part of the team must believe in the potential of people to change.’ (Öberg, 2017) Rehabilitation addresses a journey that began before the offense took place and continues long after release.<sup>65</sup> The criminal justice system facilitates this journey that is different for each individual and tailored to each situation: ‘The service is organised so that it captures the whole journey of the person ... because it’s the same individual who goes through them. Now the probation officer is in charge, all planning is handled by probation, it comes into play already in the remand prisons and start figuring out what the problem is and what we can do to help and support; when the client reaches parole we keep working with them one year into probation’. (Öberg, 2014)

While rehabilitation requires an environment that facilitates change, crime prevention relies on creating an environment that is less conducive to crime. It seems presupposed that outcomes will follow, but we have little control over them, in contrast with the reforming scheme. That individuals are relationally constituted in their environment, but not fully determined, involves that they grow in different directions influenced by external and internal elements. The latter are processes too, in contrast with the self as entity, and comprise needs, desires, and aspirations. That growth is a natural tendency is presupposed and crime, most often, results from disturbances to this process. Thus, countering crime translates into removing external and internal obstacles to flourishing providing a supportive environment and relations that provide the necessary nutrients to growth. But this is an process that ultimately depends on the individual and her motivation, and we cannot control or predict outcomes.

### 4.2.1 Supportive Environment

A management approach is explicitly rejected in favour of centred on people’s needs: ‘People used to say that you just need to know management, and you can manage any kind of organisation. I don’t think that’s true. You need to know something about the kind of people we have here, know their needs and what we can do to help them with their needs.’ (Ugelvik, 2015, p. 12) To help with needs has to do with enabling: people ‘must receive the necessary support to allow them to change direction ... always start from his-her needs in the specific situation.’ (SweMoJ, 2017, p. 18) The expression ‘to allow them to change

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<sup>65</sup> This also involves that the Prison and Probation Service may be consulted to advise on sentencing, particularly in the case of reoffending. (Öberg, 2014)

direction’ suggests an almost subordinate position, where the centre of action (including the direction taken) is the inmate, which differs from conditioning where behaviour is a reaction. ‘My job is to offer activities, education and work to make life a bit better and at the same time make it possible for prisoners to learn something and *grow as human beings*.’ (Ulgevik, 2015, p. 18) Thus, prisons are environments of growth where the centre of the process is the inmate: ‘Instead of saying “this is your sentence and this is what will happen” we work backwards, for example “you have four years, where do you want to be in 4 years time?” And make sure that he takes ownership of the plan. It’s not our plan, it’s not the plan of a civil servant imposed on a client. A lot of effort goes into figuring out what the problems are and what we can offer in terms of programs, and when that individual reaches parole we can work on finishing what we started in prison’. (Öberg, 2014)

A supportive environment is central also for crime prevention and this is a responsibility that involves a wide variety of institutions, organisations, civil society, and individuals alike. (SweMoJ, 2017) For instance, ‘schools have a core mission to teach and anchor respect for human rights and basic democratic values. A safe school path can diminish the risk for criminality and exclusion.’ The government is engaged in ascertaining that ‘schools develop their preventive work against bullying, discrimination, and other treatments that violate integrity ... provide safe school environment ... and support to young who have committed crime.’ (SweMoJ, 2017, p. 11) This presupposes that people who commit crime, although *not all* of them, do so because of the lack of certain factors that are important for flourishing: ‘in order to counter crime’s core causes it is paramount to generate a welfare for everyone.’ (Ibid. p. 6) Welfare addresses encompassing measures directed at diminishing social inequalities, and provide possibilities to access education and occupation: ‘an unequal society with large social and economic injustice can be a hot bed for crime. Hence, all parties involved in welfare have a role to play in crime prevention.’ (Ibid.) Note that welfare here does not only involve economic conditions, but also psychological wellbeing, as will be discussed later. A relevant element is providing support to those who wish to leave a criminal circle, which may appear simple, but requires efforts beyond the decision to leave. (Ibid.)

#### 4.2.2 Staff-Inmate Interactions

Relations between staff and inmates are the pinnacle of rehabilitation: ‘we work with people ... who go towards a very uncertain future. This is where our work starts with building irreplaceable relationships ... [this is] extremely important because we work with change and this demands that we build relations: it is otherwise not possible to motivate someone to change lifestyle.’ (Öberg, 2019) The role of staff is particularly delicate because they need to find the right balance between inspiring and being strict, if needed: ‘this is difficult ... since the role of prison officers is a dual one and therefore complex. ... They are representatives of the criminal justice system charged with carrying out criminal sanctions, sometimes with the use of force. ... They are upholding law and order. But they are also part of our supportive environment. Positive and reinforcing interactions with the inmates are vital. They talk, they listen, they reason, and they guide.’ (Öberg, 2014)

Prison security also rests primarily in relations with staff: ‘Technologies are there to complement and support’ (Öberg, 2017), but ‘staff is the single most important component is our dynamic security strategy. ... Staff-prisoner relations are what makes the difference’. (Ibid.) Also important is a ‘high degree of activation: make sure that the inmates have something to do, that there is some structure in their day and that they have a sense of purpose, and lastly, this is supported with technology.’ (Ibid.) While the

reformative scheme emphasised staff's skills, training and discipline, here the utmost requirement is a certain attitude: 'Someone who wants to be part of the team must believe in the potential of people to change. A variety of formal skills is considered interesting, but the most important element that the organisation is looking for is values and value systems. If people cannot handle diversity or disrespect inmates, or look down at them because of what they did, it's better they find another career path'. (Ibid.) Relations are also essential for organisational cooperation: 'It' a complex organisation and different components must be able to work together. Cooperation is built on relations: we don't need the most skilled people on the market in various specialty areas; we need the best people at relating. The key is to find the balance among all these elements: too much focus on security can lead to problem, and so does too much focus on humanity.' (Ibid.)

The reformative scheme addressed relations too, but the way in which they are conceived is in contrast. The appreciation of control, and control of emotions, in the reformative scheme led to a managerial and impersonal approach to relations, expressed in the use of terms like 'caseload' of prisoners for each officer. In the enabling scheme, relations involve feelings, necessarily. Unlike in most other criminal justice systems, here 'taking care' and 'guarding' are combined, i.e. staff does both and the two are interrelated, while in other systems there is a division of roles, and this is the peculiarity of the 'supportive environment' that characterises the Swedish approach. (Öberg, 2019) But this involves 'talking a lot about feelings, life experiences, possibilities, and also about what has happened in one's life and try to set it in context. Naturally this involves that a lot of feelings are released.' (Ibid.) Note that feelings here are released, not controlled. And 'staff who work in the criminal justice system do not do this job because they had nothing else to do, they are professional, but invested.' (Ibid.) This hints at a divergence with views that associate 'professional' with 'impersonal' and presupposes that transformative relations cannot be impersonal. In fact, it may be difficult to set boundaries, 'we cannot build relations without being personal ... and in some cases these relations become romantic relations between staff and inmates, or friendships.' (Ibid.) Indeed, in some cases this involves manipulation, and may constitute a security problem that must be handled. However, handling these relations does not implicate forbidding them; what is required is their disclosure, so that the organization can change staff placement in a way that allows keeping the relation without putting them in situations where they could be asked to violate the rules of their job. That these relations develop is not questioned and, rather, seems inevitable, but if they are kept secret or people lie 'trust is broken' (ibid.) and there is a ground for termination of contract.

As the reader may have noticed already, rehabilitation takes a considerably different shape compared with the reformative scheme both in terms of purpose and methods. Let us now examine the other core elements of this scheme that contribute to this shape.

### 4.3 Constitutive Relations

In contrast with the individualistic approach of the reformative conceptual scheme, here individuals are not entities separated from their context. On the contrary, people are relationally constituted by the very relations they have with each other. Lawson calls this internal relatedness. (Lawson, 2014; Martins, 2017) Positioning someone as a criminal involves taking a certain stance in relation to them, a stance that involves attitudes that contribute to the way in which they see themselves, and act. Human interactions affect how we feel, what image of ourselves we constitute, and what criteria for good or bad

action we form. Human beings have the capability to feel the emotions of others through sympathy, in this sense our moral reasoning, and how we act, cannot be separated from our relations with others; to some extent, it is constituted by such relations. (Norrie, 1996; 2000; 2011) This is found, implicitly, in the relevance that this conceptual scheme attributes to relations, both in rehabilitation and crime prevention: ‘People aren’t born criminals. As human beings, the experiences we have and the people we meet in life shape us into who we are.’ (Ugelvik, 2015, p. 12) However, intersubjectivity does not deny the individual’s internal world: ‘The individual is an important figure in moral thinking, but it must be understood in a fundamentally different, non-individualistic, relational way... *dialectically* as part of a social and relational flow.’ (Norrie, 2000, p. 198-199) Who one is and what they do pertain a complex and dynamic system of interactions; while the conditioned being responds in a certain systematic way to given stimuli, and the rational being responds in the right way guided by rationality, the growing being changes all the time. Choice is not as strong as it was in the reformative scheme. Since what people do depends as much on them as on the environment, offending remains wrong, but does not exclusively denote bad character; legal responsibility and moral responsibility are separated.

If relations are central to why people have had a certain life and done certain things, they are also central in creating an environment that favours the process of change that is the purpose of rehabilitation. People involved in rehabilitation ‘talk, they listen, they reason, and they guide. They are in many ways the role models our inmates have never had in their lives.’ (Öberg, 2014) This seems to address what SDT calls the basic need for relatedness, and relatedness requires respect: ‘If you are afraid of inmates, indifferent to them as individuals and human beings, or in any way disrespect or look down on them because of the situation they are in, then you are by default disqualified from being part of our service. ... We run an operation where unconditional respect for inmates and clients is fundamental to everything that we do. It is not subject to compromise. It must be imprinted throughout the entire organisation and it is non-negotiable.’ (Ibid.) Relations also manifest in involving inmates in activities that provide a sense of purpose (Ugelvik, 2015; Öberg, 2017), which favours a sense of competence and self-efficacy. Respect presupposes that the parties involved look at each other at the same level, and contributes to the inmate feeling in charge of the process. As mentioned earlier, ‘it’s not our plan, it’s not the plan of a civil servant imposed on a client.’ (Ibid.) The basic needs identified by SDT are all at play; relations do not only satisfy relatedness, but also autonomy and competence. Thus, a supportive environment provides the conditions that are identified as necessary for growth, and that may have lacked previously. The way in which relations are conceived and enacted communicates, to inmates, equal worth as well as the fact that they have the ability to decide about their life, as opposed to telling them what to do, which communicates inability.

#### 4.4 Safety

As in the reformative scheme, safety is a central element of this scheme as well. However, safety as used here has rather different meaning. What I call ‘safety’, and Öberg also uses this term in his English talks, is expressed in Swedish as *trygghet*<sup>66</sup> and indicates safety from a threat, but also an internal state that results from affective and emotional nurturing. In fact, also in English we can say that someone feels safe or secure indicating this internal

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<sup>66</sup> We find here an example of what was discussed in chapter one about translation being more than literal translation.

state<sup>67</sup>, but it is less common. A typical example of *trygghet* would be a child who is cared for by loving and caring parents unconditionally; we say that the child is *trygg* (safe, adj.) to indicate the tranquillity and sense of self that originate in nurturing as opposed to imposing demands, expectations or objectives in terms of accomplishment or behaviour.

It is predominantly in this latter sense that the term is used in this conceptual scheme. For instance, as an important element of crime prevention, welfare not only, and not even primarily, intended in a material sense. Rather, it indicates an internal stability and the lack of worry that may well follow from material conditions, but not only nor necessarily. It is 'partially a question of economic safety, but also a matter of distributing the chances to succeed in life in a fair way and create the pre-conditions for people to choose their way at different stages of life on equal terms.' (SweMoJ, 2017, p. 8) Thus, safety as intended here does not solely refer to the satisfaction of material needs, but also to elements that have to do with sense of self, fulfilment and accomplishment. Similarly, having a job and a roof over the head do not constitute favourable conditions *per se*, but also require the 'possibility to grow in one's work' and a 'good living situation.' (Ibid.) Also 'bullying ... [and] discrimination' (ibid. p. 18) contribute to lack of safety; they communicate rejection and inadequacy. These are all elements that affect the individual within.

The lack of safety is an important area of work in the prevention of crime: 'the right to a safe childhood is perhaps the most important. ... The reasons why someone commits crime are often various and complex ... it often depends on a lack of necessary protective factors under their upbringing. It can be a deficiency in the home environment, something that went wrong in the school path or a failure of the society safety net. Psychic illness, addiction, unemployment or other sorts of insecurity can also be triggering factors.' (SweMoJ, 2017, p. 6) Here we find safety used in both ways, stressing that lack of physical safety impacts also emotional safety. Notice also that psychic illness and addiction are here considered 'sorts of insecurity', which contrasts with the dysfunctions of the reformatory scheme.

#### 4.5 Motivation

Motivation is central for crime prevention strategy and rehabilitation. The former identifies motivation as the primary element of crime, followed by opportunity, and accessibility; all elements are treated in dedicated chapters where motivation is the first to be addressed. (SweMoJ, 2017) Crime prevention is structured, first and foremost, in order to diminish the motivation to commit crime. We could say this also of the reformatory scheme: surveillance as well as the fear of swift punishment may indeed address motivation. However, this scheme seems more concerned with intrinsic motivation while conditioning addresses extrinsic motivation. People do what they do because they are moved from the inside not in virtue of cognitive (dys)functions or character, but rather by affective elements. Thus, addressing motivation does not amount to controlling emotions or ridding of them, and it does not involve deterrence. Rather, 'it is not possible<sup>68</sup> to motivate someone to change lifestyle without meaningful relations.' (Öberg, 2019)

In terms of rehabilitation and security in prisons 'the goal is to reach a point where people do not want to create trouble, rather than keeping them under constant surveillance, and

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<sup>67</sup> See Attachment Theory (Ainsworth et al. 1978) and Emotional Security Theory (Davis and Sturge-Apple, 2007).

<sup>68</sup> Note that 'it is not possible to ... without' hints at necessity.

having them to comply just because of fear.’ (Öberg, 2017) Punishment, in itself, and as a way to control behaviour is outright rejected for two reasons: it is destructive and there is no accomplishment in external control. ‘The purpose of prison is rehabilitation ... punishment by itself doesn’t do any good to anyone. Punishment by itself just makes things worse. If your kid hits the kid next door, and you hit him, he learns nothing. You accomplish nothing. Perhaps he won’t hit anyone while you are watching, because he’s scared, but that’s it. ... Punishment is destructive ... people come here with a rucksack full of problems. ... If we can help them solve some of these problems while they are in prison, we have done our job. (Ugelvik, 2015, p. 12) Note that rehabilitation and punishment are discussed in this quote as if the one were the negations of the other, and this critique addresses the retributivist and behaviourist approach alike. Rehabilitation is something else.

The affinity with SDT is remarkable. Doing something to avoid punishment does not lead the person to act wholeheartedly while long-term change involves being invested in what one does rather than merely doing it out of fear. Punishment thwarts the basic need for relatedness, human closeness and nurturing. It also thwarts the basic need for competence, communicating that one is doing wrong, and autonomy, communicating that one is not capable of deciding for oneself. Similarly, the instrumental employment of incentives also damages intrinsic motivation in that it represents explicit external control. (Ryan & Deci, 2017)

#### 4.6 Paradigm: The Troubled Person

While the reformative scheme was expressed and reinforced in its paradigm, a salient image of the criminal as a thug, it is more difficult here to find such a catalyst. The term ‘criminal’ is intentionally avoided, replaced by ‘inmate’ or ‘client’. This considerably diminishes the condemnation that, also in virtue of the implicit suggestion of intentionality is implied by terms like criminal, and accentuates the supportive role of the criminal justice system. Towards clients we provide a service while ‘prisoners’ are in a subordinate position.

The variety among those who commit crime is reiterated, and the focus is on the action, rather than the person. There is a ‘difficulty to separate between criminality as a phenomenon and the people who are sanctioned for criminal acts, [there is a] tendency to merge them. We know that they are not the same; they are two very different things’. (Öberg, 2014) Thus we have here no conflation of action with the morality of the individual and no conflation of crime with a specific typology of people. While in the reformative scheme we could almost envision a face that represented the criminal, here we are presented, literally, ten million faces... ‘Ten million people are incarcerated<sup>69</sup> ... not ten million criminals, but ten million individuals ... [and] they are not a homogeneous group, it is actually hard to find common features. Every person is an individual also when they come to the prison and probation system’. (Ibid.)

The variety of people is accompanied by variety of reasons: ‘There are many and often complex reasons<sup>70</sup> why a person commits crime. ... Often is linked with the lack of

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<sup>69</sup> In the world.

<sup>70</sup> Note that reasons are not contemplated in the reforming scheme. Causes are discussed, and identified as character, drug, alcohol, and greed. (Crime prevention strategy, 2016) But reasons and causes are different: a cause suggests a cause-effect relation while the term reason may suggest that there may be an even remote

necessary protective factors in upbringing... but the general welfare cannot prevent all types of crime ... [and] not all people who commit crime do it because of problems in their upbringing.’ (SweMoJ 2017, p. 6) Nils Öberg conveys a very similar message: ‘the general welfare cannot prevent all types of crime. ... People commit crime for a variety of reasons ... contingent situations or because one has been influenced by his environment in a particular way. For this sort of situations we need specifically tailored measures.’ (Öberg, 2016) The salient image offered in the reformative scheme is nearly shattered by the variety proposed here, which initially led me to conclude that this scheme has no paradigm.

However, in spite of this variety, there are recurrent elements that seem to be shared by, if not all, exemplified in the image of a troubled person. Troubled for a variety of reasons, and by a variety of problems, but still troubled. For instance, while the suffering of victims is not denied, we are reminded that crime also damages the offender (Öberg, 2014) and so does detention: ‘The overwhelming majority of all prisoners will be in a poorer physical and psychological shape than they were before’. (Ibid.) Being released is not as simple as it seems, ‘they will be stigmatised and ill seen by the rest of civil society when released’ (ibid.), but committing crime is seldom something of which people are proud: ‘very few of them are happy with their situation.’ (Öberg, 2014) More importantly, these people have ‘a rucksack full of problems’ (Ugelvik, 2015, p. 12), many such problems started before the crime was committed and the criminal justice system addresses them all (Öberg, 2014). They are preoccupied, and have had terrible experiences. (Ibid.) These elements provide an exemplar that embodies the core elements of this conceptual scheme, most notably the conception of human beings as growing organisms where relations play a pivotal role in the growing process. As Kuhn’s exemplary problem solution it does indeed solve a problem. In contrast with the paradigm of the reformative scheme, which served the purpose of separating thugs from normal citizens, this paradigm does the opposite; it blurs the demarcation showing that there is nothing fundamentally different between those who commit crime and everyone else. It also enforces the view that people who commit crime are not characterised by something intrinsically defective, morally or cognitively, but rather by the vicissitudes of life.

## 5 Disentangling

As in the reformative scheme, the descriptive account involves evaluation, which we now disentangle.

### 5.1 Lively Growth

Rehabilitation is described as a process, a journey in fact, and this is not any journey; it is a journey of growth. The term growth is itself loaded, and positively so; it suggests a natural disposition<sup>71</sup> that is essential to life, and to human beings qua human beings. We are reminded of growing children. In this general sense, to talk about rehabilitation as a journey associated with growth elicits inspiration and encouragement in that it indicates going towards something good, not merely going towards something, and descriptive features of

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legitimacy to why the person has done what she has done, and this is outside the conceptual horizon of the reforming scheme.

<sup>71</sup> Notice the contrast with the disposition of certain individuals to commit crime that is presupposed in the reformative scheme.

what growth involves are suggested. One could say that also the reformative scheme involves a process that leads to appreciated features: less recidivism, character, a job, reading and writing skills, and so forth. We find nothing of that sort here. These features may be implied, but are nowhere mentioned. On the other hand, growth involves learning, and not wanting to commit crime or create trouble. It has to do with having a sense of purpose, a direction, which enforces the association with life and fulfilment. The conception of beings that permeates this scheme guides us to seeing people who commit crime as human beings like any other whose growth has been hampered. Thus rehabilitation, and crime prevention, take the shape of fixing not a faulty individual, but rather the conditions for growth.

This is strengthened by the contrast between growth and punishment; they contradict each other. Punishment destroys a human being (Ugelvik, 2015), some detention centres are ‘designed to break people down’ (Öberg, 2014) and this is deprecated in virtue of the fact that inmates are human beings and, as such, valuable. Having people who follow the law because they are afraid of punishment is pointless. What is valued here is not behaviour, but what leads to it suggesting that rehabilitation is, and ought to be, focussed at a movement that originates in the internal world, and seems to represent the realisation of what it is to be human. It follows that punishment and conditioning are deprecated because they violate the human peculiar characteristic that is the tendency to grow. The process of change that describes rehabilitation, and that seems to be presupposed as a characteristic of how humans function (they change), is thus not solely descriptive but also evaluative; change is good and involves growth. This also becomes explicitly normative: ‘someone who wants to be part of the team must believe in the potential of people to change. It is non negotiable’. (Öberg, 2017) That believing in people’s potential to change is non-negotiable indicates that it is not only appreciated, but essential.

## 5.2 Meaningful Relations Involve Emotions

Relations are the most important element of rehabilitation, and of crime prevention; but relations are not good or bad *per se*; they participate in constituting who people turn out to be and what they do. As such, there may be good or bad relations based on their contribution to growth. Some relations valued in virtue of their necessity for growth. These are ‘meaningful’ and ‘irreplaceable’ (Öberg, 2014) relations, characterised by seeing inmates as worthy, as opposed to ‘judging’ or ‘looking down at inmates’, which are condemned features of damaging relations. (Ibid.) Staff is ‘not against them’ (ibid.): they ‘engage in dialogue’ (ibid.), and dialogue, as opposed to monologue, involves listening as much as talking in an interaction where all parties are legitimate. However, Öberg (ibid.) tells us that the most important relations are the ones between staff and inmates, where staff are mentors and role models. We could then argue that role models or mentors seem to contradict the equal level of people involved in the relation; mentors and role models are people we look up to. It may well be the case that inmates look up to their mentors, but the relevant element is that mentors (staff) do not look down at them. This is enhanced by the requirement of ‘unconditional respect’ (ibid.) for inmates, which is not only valued, but constitutes a necessary condition to work in prison and probation.

In contrast with meaningful relations, and enlightening as to what ‘meaningful’ means here, we have relations that are deprecated; the ones where one party is delegitimised, not

listened to, not respected or not cared for.<sup>72</sup> Consider, for instance, bullying and discrimination as targets of the crime prevention strategy. These are relations that involve demeaning, disrespecting or rejecting. Inequality in society is also such an example, deplored not only due to the unequal distribution of practical opportunities but also, and more significantly, because it communicates less worthiness that affects individuals internally. It communicates the patronising that is here deprecated, since it obstructs growth. These features, identified as conducive of crime, degrade individuals, similarly to Winnicott's absent, controlling or demanding caretaker.

Relations involve feelings<sup>73</sup>; damaging relations implicate humiliation and mortification while 'meaningful' relations feature feelings that nourish growth. These are exemplified by the concept of safety (*trygghet*) indicating the emotional care, respect and nurturing that are here presupposed to be necessary to the well functioning of a human being. Safety has to do with feelings that involve appreciation of the individual as such, as enhanced by the use of 'unconditional' as opposed to being appreciated conditionally, i.e. in virtue of satisfying external demands. We then find the nurture and care that characterise a safe childhood; respect as opposed to bullying; acceptance and belonging, denied by discrimination; and the sense of self-efficacy and fulfilment at work. (SweMoJ, 2017; Öberg, 2014, 2016) All these elements are appreciated in virtue of them being constitutive of growth. The lack of safety 'necessary protective factors' (ibid.), particularly in childhood, does not refer solely to physical protection but, most importantly, emotional. That these factors are necessary to a highly valued process, i.e. growth, valued in that it represents humanity, involves that their hampering is decried because it denies the very essence of being human. Thus, if something wrong is to be found with people who commit crime, it does not pertain inability to control emotions, but rather the fact that certain emotions have been lacking. Although this is not the only element that leads to crime, which is explicitly pointed out, it is the most emphasised. Thus action is guided towards providing meaningful relations because rehabilitation is about 'human beings' (ibid.), and doing so professionally does not involve detachment; it involves caring while being loyal to the organisation, i.e. not lying.

### 5.3 Vulnerability Defuses

People who commit crimes are 'human beings, not criminals ... some of the most vulnerable people in our welfare society.' (Öberg, 2014) The thug of the reformative scheme, who conveyed a sense of threat associated with violence, lack of control, use of drugs and alcohol, is countered with vulnerable human beings, i.e. defenceless as opposed to violent. Towards criminals we are prompted to feel condemnation and rejection while towards vulnerable human beings and victims we feel sympathy and compassion. Also the lack of protective factors that is often mentioned associates the person who commits crime with features of deprivation that invite compassion, as opposed to the person who offend intentionally towards whom we feel resentment. Even in the case where offending was intentional, it is an intention that originates in deprivation, which contributes to defusing resentment. The suffering of victims is not denied or minimised. Nonetheless, 'also the offender is affected' (ibid.), indicating that crime damages offenders too. These are people with many problems that began long before the offense, and their stories are all different, which shatters the homogeneous image that drove the reformative scheme.

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<sup>72</sup> These are not called 'meaningless' however, since they do have a powerful effect, but a negative one.

<sup>73</sup> I talk of feelings and emotions interchangeably.

Talking about radicalisation we may envision fanatics who desire to harm, while here we are told that some ‘young people’ who return from Syria have had ‘terrible experiences’. (Öberg, 2016) Staff is trained specifically on the historical and political issues so that they can ‘reach them’, ‘engage in a dialogue’ about ‘the various issue that preoccupy their minds’ which expresses valuing their concerns. Street gangs are ‘just friends who commit criminal activity’, highlighting the relational and affective bonds that characterise gangs as opposed to the criminal element, and suggesting that gangs may be a place where people find those protective factors that they have not found elsewhere.<sup>74</sup> Offenders meet ‘prejudice’, and ‘revengeful ideas’ due to ‘ignorance and anger.’ (Ibid.) This is an explicit condemnation, but also implies that if people knew of the variety of problems and damage that are involved in crime they would be more compassionate. People with a criminal record are not solely troubled and excluded; they are ‘exploited’ for economic gain by agencies ‘attempting to make money out of [their] misfortune.’ (Ibid.) Having a criminal record is a misfortune, which contrasts with choice and willingness proposed in the reformatory scheme, suggesting that offending was not entirely under their control and moves to empathy, enhanced by the idea of exploitation: not only these people have been damaged by life, they also suffer the further damage of not being allowed to change the course of their journey. All these features elicit compassion, and counterbalance the resentment channelled by the term ‘crime’ particularly when associated with someone who causes harm willingly and without remorse.

#### 5.4 Damage and Shared Responsibility

The features that characterise people who commit crime convey an image of damage, but so did the faulty subject portrayed in the reforming scheme. There is, however, a difference; the faulty subject is intrinsically faulty, as a faulty good that we return because it did not conform to the standard. Damage, on the other hand, is caused to the individual by external circumstances. As a damaged good may be damaged during transport, these people have been damaged by life, by the people around them, or by the way in which society works. While the faulty subject elicits blame and retribution, the damaged person elicits compassion, understanding, and guides us towards considering the role that we all may play in causing the damage.

Any criminal justice system presupposes responsibility, which is not under discussion. However, in this conceptual scheme the responsibility of all is emphasised together with the responsibility of the individual, as can be observed in the titles of the crime prevention strategies: *Together against crime* (SweMoJ, 2016) and *Everyone our responsibility*. (SweMoJ, 1996) This follows implicitly from the other elements that we have examined so far, particularly the relevance of relations to growth. In the reformatory scheme we had an individual who betrayed the community, and willingly broke social norms, which prompted feelings of retribution. If people are monadic entities who are free to choose autonomously and rationally, it follows that they are also entirely responsible for their actions. In this scheme, when someone does something wrong, and this is not under question, it is also because they did not have an environment that facilitated their growth. Blame is shared, since the community has betrayed the individual as well. Thus, crime is a shared failure; the offender has done something wrong indeed, but so have we.

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<sup>74</sup> This is, however, my interpretation.

This blurs the sharp demarcation between offenders and ‘all of us’, and also the demarcation between prisons and the ‘outside.’ For instance, concerning radicalisation: ‘we don’t share that view, what’s out there is in here. If we have a radicalization process in society of course we will have it in the prison environment as well.’ (Öberg, 2014) This is a description, but it also conveys disapproval of the demarcation in virtue of the fact that it presupposes a distinction between supposedly normal citizens and criminals, defusing the condemnation of single individuals, since highlights that what individuals do is interconnected with what we all do. Similarly, the criminal justice service, and rehabilitation in particular, is not isolated from the rest of the community; it depends on it. ‘[It is] important to talk about this, it has to do with the foundational norms, values and attitudes in the society. We depend on how the society works in relation to the problems we work with’. (Öberg, 2014; 2016) If someone who is released is met with prejudice and discrimination, the journey goes back to where it begun. The fact that the journey is open ended expresses hope, as we have seen earlier, but it also stresses that responsibility is shared; it may be a journey of growth, but it may also be a journey back to crime, in which case we ought not to only blame the inmate. There is a condemnation of the general public due to them having retributive feelings, and also an assumption of responsibility on part of the criminal justice system. The valuing of interconnectedness that guides this scheme in the background also guides people to seeing prejudice as a ‘failure’ of the criminal justice system (ibid.) that did not succeed in communicating the complexities involved in crime. Since creating a supportive environment is fundamental to rehabilitation, prisons are not separated from society, and rehabilitation is a journey that continues after release, a failure to contrast prejudice in the general public amounts to failure in creating a supportive environment.

## 6 Blinkering

As in the reformative scheme, also here there are elements that are unavailable to the conceptual horizon delineated by this scheme. The first and foremost element of blinkering is the lack of reference to criminals. That not everyone commits crime because of unfavourable conditions is acknowledged, but not further examined: what are these other reasons? Are there people who are ‘more’ criminal than others in this conceptual scheme and, if that is the case, what characterises them? While the reformative scheme sees only criminals of a certain shape and form, this conceptual scheme does not see them at all.

There seems to be no room for retributive feelings that may be natural. An individual who has been harmed or has lost a loved one due to criminal action, may be more inclined to feel resentment rather than compassion. Are there situations where retributive feelings are justified? While the reforming scheme conveys them extensively, here they are ignored or condemned as ‘anger, revenge or ignorance’, which almost prompts a sense of guilt in the person who feels resentment for who committed a crime. It may be the case that inmates are also victims, but does this erase the fact that some people are victims of offences?

Responsibility seems implicitly presupposed, since there is no suggestion that the criminal justice system should be abolished.<sup>75</sup> It is also clear that this approach does not adopt the strong conceptions of choice and responsibility that permeate the reforming scheme.

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<sup>75</sup> In fact, in a few interviews Nils Öberg called for alternatives to short custodial sentences lamenting that the latter do not allow enough time to the rehabilitation process.

However, these themes are not treated at all. While motivation seems to be central, and intrinsic, there is no discussion of the individual's willingness to harm besides the lack of factors conducive to growth and how this relates with responsibility. Moreover, the focus on interrelatedness, which indeed highlights the complexities of crime and action, may turn explanation into justification. Furthermore, what are the implications of this weaker conception of choice and responsibility, which deserves to be further examined, for the criminal justice system and sentencing?

The valuation of growth and hampering of protective factors seems to explain most crimes, blinkering one from considering cases where people have had all the favourable conditions of a 'facilitating environment' and yet commit crime. Are such cases contemplated? If so, how are they explained? Would these also involve vulnerability and elicit compassion or would they be treated differently? It is mentioned that not all people who commit crime do so because they lacked protective factors, but these are not treated.

Similarly, the centrality of factors that are essential to growth and the variety and specificity of each case suggests that people grow and flourish in different ways, and seems to reject the universal 'right' way that we found in the reformatory scheme. However, this also seems to presuppose that, if the ideal conditions of growth were satisfied, no crime would be committed. It seems to presuppose that human beings are essentially good.<sup>76</sup> If this were the case, it would blinker the observer from conceiving of the possibility that an individual's actualisation of their nature may involve harming others. Are there such cases? If so, would they also be explained with disturbances of the growth process? It is unclear whether there is room for evil and, eventually, how it would be conceptualised. The emphasis on engaging in dialogue and reaching individuals to address their preoccupations may blinker one from seeing cases where individuals are unreachable.

## 7 Conclusion

We have examined two approaches to criminal justice where rehabilitation takes different shapes, and manifests in different practical measures, in virtue of different conceptual schemes and the evaluative load that they imply. The reformatory scheme conceives of crime as free choice committed by dysfunctional individuals, presupposing that functional individuals do not commit crime. The combination of rational and conditioned conceptions of human beings that permeate this scheme shapes rehabilitation and directs its actions towards reforming character, essentially internal, through conditioning, essentially external. This leads to a tension, which requires further study. The enabling scheme is informed by a growing conception of being that identifies affective factors as the main driver of crime, and shapes rehabilitation towards providing a supportive environment for growth, particularly through relations. While the reformatory scheme identifies crime, primarily, with lack of emotional control, the enabling scheme is centred on the importance of emotions to rehabilitation. These divergent factual orientations are tacitly guided by evaluation.

As in the previous chapters, we find here a scheme, the reformatory scheme, characterised by an *aut-aut*, disjunctive, orientation that involves sharp demarcations between criminal and normal citizens, right and wrong, functional and dysfunctional, emotions and

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<sup>76</sup> Which would contrast with the association I have made with SDT since, in the latter, there is no such thing as human nature, but rather natures.

rationality. The enabling scheme is characterised by an *et-et* orientation that opens the conceptual horizon to the examination of variety. Thus, decisions involve both the individual and context, crime involves both harming and being harmed, and rehabilitation involves dialogue where both the inmate and staff have equal worth.

## Chapter 5: Final Remarks

In the previous chapters we have examined contrasting ways of talking about intelligence, terrorism, and criminal justice that lead to different actions concerning these phenomena. Indeed action involves different beliefs, but we have seen that beliefs are formed within the scope of what is available, or unavailable, in the horizon that is set by a conceptual scheme. Thus, I have argued, we need to examine how our use of concepts, expressed in language, guides belief formation.

### 1 The Ductility of Language

Concepts are not fixed completely by definitions; they take different shapes in virtue of their relation with other concepts in a conceptual scheme, i.e. in virtue of how they are used. The dictionary definition of intelligence is ‘the ability to learn or understand or to deal with new or trying situations ... also: the skilled use of reason.’<sup>77</sup> The two approaches to the study of intelligence that have been treated in chapter 1 satisfy this definition. However, they use the concept, and related ones such as success, science and education, in different ways that involve different shapes of intelligence. This leads to using different sets of operations in its scientific enquiry, leading to contrasting factual evidence and explanation. Similarly, the definition of terrorism as ‘the systematic use of terror especially as a means of coercion’<sup>78</sup> is accommodated by both the approaches that we found in chapter 2. Nevertheless, the different uses of concepts like identity, power and religion guide people towards explaining terrorism with religious and cultural antagonism, in the clash scheme, while the integrated scheme stresses social, political, and psychological explanations. Finally, the general definition of crime as ‘an illegal act for which someone can be punished by the government’<sup>79</sup> does not contradict either of the approaches presented in chapter 3, yet the reformative and the enabling scheme stress contrasting features of ‘how’ and ‘why’ the law is broken. The different conceptions of human beings that permeate the two conceptual schemes, which involve different presuppositions about human action, shape dissimilar pictures of ‘how’, ‘why’ and, not the least, ‘who’ commits crime.

The core concepts that characterise each scheme direct observation and inference in tacit ways that are not explicitly stated in a set of rules. Rather, this guidance rests in the background; with use, it is internalised and becomes a habit that directs attention in a discreet whispering. This process does not solely involve fact; value is critical in that it points at certain features, identifying them as salient, while others are not seen or dismissed. Let us go back to the three chapters. That John has broken the law, that Ahmed has planted a bomb, and that Kevin scored well on SAT are all facts; they provide a correct account of the way the world is. However, when we classify these facts under the heading of ‘criminal’, ‘Islamic terrorism’, and ‘intelligence’ we are applying concepts that involve also evaluation. I call John a ‘criminal’ *in virtue of* my disapproval of him breaking the law. If I were to deprecate the law, for instance because I find it unfair or because I am an anarchist, I may admire or justify his actions, and would not call him a ‘criminal.’ Calling Ahmed an Islamic terrorist presupposes that I consider Islam a violent religion, implicitly disapproving of it, and so I infer from the name Ahmed and the fact that he is Muslim

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<sup>77</sup> <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/intelligence>

<sup>78</sup> <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/terrorism>

<sup>79</sup> <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/crime>

that the cause of the attack is religion. However, if I were to value Islam for its intrinsic ethical orientation I would question the very expression ‘Islamic terrorism’ and, furthermore, I would investigate whether Ahmed’s actions originate in other reasons that may have nothing to do with him being Muslim. Lastly, that Kevin is intelligent is inferred from valuing analytical skills over practical ones, although there is room for both in the general definition.

Facts matter, and it is precisely because they matter that we need to be accurate and aware of how we process them, and how we process them often involves value. This is not always the case, but it is more recurrent than we are willing to recognise. That the use of certain terms guides people discretely rather than explicitly is even more a reason to pay attention to these elements. The relevance of concepts such as objectivity and rationality, themselves loaded, has contributed to the bad reputation of value in scientific enquiry, and in any enquiry that aims at being taken seriously. In their most frequent use, these concepts involve the appreciation of reason, logic, and pure facts in contrast with tainting evaluations, which are nearly abhorred. This amounts to advocating a third-person perspective over a first person-perspective. If we leave the house of value-freedom and visit the relativist response we find that value is everywhere and there are barely any facts. The first-person perspective takes over. This, in my view, contributes to delegitimising value even more. As we have seen in the previous chapters, the role of value is central, but this does not imply that there are no facts. Rather, we do a better service to enquiry by acknowledging the role of value and examining how it contributes to observation rather than denying its presence.

I have proposed disentangling to reveal the implicit workings of fact *and* value involved in our use of concepts and terms. What features are we endorsing, deprecating, commending or reproaching when we call John a ‘criminal’? We are disapproving of him in virtue of specific features, suggesting that *these* features, and not others, ought to be disapproved and, because of this disapproval, be named ‘criminal.’ This suggests, without stating it, that *these* are the features that characterise criminals, and in common language we say that John *is* a criminal as if we were denoting an actual property that solely describes the way the world is. It is by way of disentangling that we see the connection between tacit evaluations and descriptive features, and how these connections move thought and action in different directions.

## 2 *Aut-Aut, Et-Et, and Blinkering*

I have acknowledged that different, even contrasting, beliefs concerning the apparently same phenomenon originate in different conceptual schemes, and that within such conceptual horizon they are justified and verified by observation. However, this does not imply that all schemes provide equally good accounts of the phenomena under study. As I said, this thesis is no defence of relativism.

The conceptual horizon demarcates between available and unavailable beliefs; elements that do not cohere with the given rationale are not seen, which I called blinkering. As I have briefly noted in the conclusions of each chapter, all schemes involve blinkering, but some imply a sharper demarcation between the available and unavailable in virtue of an intrinsic disjunctive character; their core elements imply the exclusion of alternatives, and this orientation, which I called *aut-aut* (indicating disjunction in Latin), is reinforced by the use of loaded terms and paradigms. In contrast, schemes with an orientation that I called

*et-et* are characterised by core elements that involve the appreciation of alternatives, which moves away from entrenchment in the current perspective towards exploring options.

The schemes that I called ‘selective’, ‘clash’, and ‘reformative’ are characterised by an *aut-aut* orientation. For instance, intelligence is *g*, and could not be otherwise because *g* results from proper science. Proper science is value-free and cannot be otherwise, or it would amount to ideology. This effectively impedes the critical examination of *g*, since questioning *g* would imply tainting science with ‘colour’, which is inconceivable. The clash scheme characterises relations as necessarily antagonistic, and identity implies homogeneity in opposition to those who are different; denying these very truths involves denying one’s self, and betrayal, which effectively prevents people from questioning these ‘truths.’ According to the reformative scheme in chapter 3, rehabilitation involves reformation, which follows from identifying the origin of crime in lack of character and cognitive dysfunction.<sup>80</sup> From the, supposed, fact that crime originates in bad character and cognitive dysfunction follows a specific typology of ‘criminal’ that effectively demarcates crime, and criminals, from ‘the rest of us.’ To consider other features of crime may challenge the demarcation, but these alternatives cannot be seen without reconsidering the very conceptions of human beings that permeate this scheme. The blinkering sections that pertain these conceptual schemes are considerably longer than those concerning the *et-et* type schemes: enforcing one alternative as the most (if not the only) legitimate one effectively excludes more elements than it is the case with conceptual schemes that have an open orientation.

In contrast, the conceptual schemes that I have called ‘divergent’, ‘integrated’, and ‘enabling’ have an *et-et* orientation; their core concepts imply openness, reinforced by their paradigms and evaluative load. In the divergent scheme intelligence is *both* IQ *and* also practical and creative ability because success manifests in many ways, and so does intelligence, and it is good that this is the case. In the integrated scheme the world is diverse; it does not require choosing one identity, and valuing difference as enriching enforces this attitude. The enabling scheme conceives of human beings as growing organisms that may take many directions due to a variety of circumstances that are both internal and external. Thus, rehabilitation involves supporting the growth process in various ways tailored to the specific needs of each case. The broader scope of the conceptual horizon favours variety in observation; intelligence manifests in many ways, people commit terrorist acts for different reasons, and crime has many aspects that elude the distinction between good and bad people. The blinkering sections of these schemes are shorter because their very core implies a wider scope of observation.

Incommensurability is not characterised by theoretical impossibility, on this I agree with Davidson, but the lack of theoretical impossibility does not eliminate practical difficulty and its implications. And practical difficulty is enhanced by *attitudes*. Indeed all schemes blinker us and no scheme is ‘all seeing.’ However, schemes with an *et-et* orientation are epistemically more satisfactory since they facilitate and endorse openness and, in some cases, explicitly advocate the examination of own assumptions, without it constituting a threat. I am not suggesting that *et-et* schemes do not rely on assumptions and presuppositions that are deeply rooted and tacit, but they inherently endorse attitudes that open the conceptual horizon to broader possibilities for understanding not only what others do when they use a term, but also what we do ourselves. The unreflective use of

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<sup>80</sup> The relation between moral character and cognition would deserve a more thorough discussion that cannot be included here. As I have pointed out in chapter 4, the reformative scheme seems to presuppose a cognitivist approach.

concepts or terms is more likely to be internalised as a habit if protected from being challenged while, in *et-et* schemes, this process is disturbed by the openness that they imply. Engagement with contrasting schemes shows alternatives that are unavailable in the current conceptual horizon, and also shows differences that may indicate elements that have become tacit *to us*. If we only engage with people who share our scheme, we do not need to make these elements explicit; we share the same implicatures. On the other hand, engagement with different schemes may require that we explain what is tacit to us, and may involve that our assumptions and presuppositions are questioned. In Bridgman's words: 'Science is not truly objective unless it recognizes its own subjective or individual aspects.' (Chang, 2009, p. 25)

In the philosophy of science Pluralism requires that various frameworks interact. For instance, Active Normative Epistemic Pluralism demands the co-existence of multiple systems (Chang, 2012) that generate processes of 'epistemic iteration.' (Chang, 2004, ch. 5) The aim is not necessarily convergence towards a unified theory, as is the case of perspectivism, but rather the stimulation of new ways of seeing through the encounter of different frameworks. Rather than the quest for value-freedom, objectivity may rest instead in Hume's 'ability to assume a myriad other points of view, rather than the total escape from perspective.' (Daston, 1992, p.604) This would be the case even if we were talking about pure facts. The matter here is more complex. Human action and thought are not solely characterised by the factual elements captured by a third-person description, but also involve first-person evaluation (Grimm, 2016), and I have argued that past experience shapes new experience setting the frontiers of the conceivable and imaginable in a conceptual horizon. Thus, understanding human action and thought requires broadening experience and the ability to assume Hume's myriad other points of view not only in the third but also in the first person. Schemes with an *et-et* orientation facilitate the widening of experience, equipping us to better understand human matters than schemes that are intrinsically disjunctive.

### 3 Conceptual Engineering?

We may be led to readjust our concepts so they allow for a broader scope; this seems to be what Sternberg is attempting to do with 'intelligence', and Ramadan with 'modernity' and 'identity', to name examples from the previous chapters. In philosophy, scholars are increasingly discussing conceptual engineering, most notably Herman Cappelen (2018) and Sally Haslanger (2000; 2007). Their proposals cannot be examined thoroughly here; however, it would be inappropriate to disregard conceptual engineering, since it may appear to be what I have been doing in this thesis. I am cautious about proposing this work as conceptual engineering, but this also depends on what we mean with 'engineering.'

The whole of philosophy may be characterised as an enterprise in conceptual engineering: truth, reason, belief and such are concepts after all, and what we do in philosophy is to explore their meaning, representational efficacy, and verifying conditions. Even when we openly reject definitions, and argue that meaning is in use, or purpose, we are investigating the concept of meaning. We may do it by way of explication (Carnap), suggesting family resemblances (Wittgenstein), or claiming to eliminate the concept of a 'concept' (Quine); in taking these stances we have been talking about concepts all along. And talking about concepts, rather explicitly, is what I have been doing in the past chapters looking at what *we do* with concepts, rather than what they *are*.

If conceptual engineering has to do with redefining concepts, in the sense of providing a better, less damaging or ‘ameliorated’ definition, as proposed by Haslanger (2000; 2007), then conceptual engineering is not my proposal. My very argument is that the relevant aspects of what we *do* with concepts elude definitions and, rather, have to do with how we use them in virtue of the often tacit associations of fact and value that are suggested in a scheme. I do not advocate one best definition of concepts, but rather a broadening of the experience that guides their use. I have proposed disentangling to bring to consciousness the tacit associations of fact and value that characterise loaded concepts, and engaging with contrasting schemes to consider alternatives that are unavailable in our conceptual horizon. However, I have also stressed that my proposal does not involve conceptual analysis in the traditional, intellectual, sense. Engaging with other schemes and disentangling are not solely cognitive exercises; they also involve expanding our emotional repertoire, and it is in virtue of this expansion of sensitivity that we may change the way in which we use the term or concept, was this to happen.

When I realise that my use of intelligence involves the admiration of a supercomputer, I may feel uncomfortable, and be moved to use the term differently. However, it may also be the case that I feel sorry for the people who are excluded by this classification, yet continue to admire analytic skills, and continue using the term as I have previously done. I accept both, and the other effects that disentangling may have. In my proposal, changing how concepts are used, particularly if we consider such use to be damaging, involves increasing awareness of how and why we are moved to privilege certain features and not others, and this is done by expanding one’s conceptual and emotional repertoire. Engaging with different schemes and disentangling favour this expansion of experience, but people should be left free to decide how to use the concept and, hopefully, to debate the various shapes that it may take, rather than being channelled, analytically, towards one ‘right’ use. If conceptual engineering has to do with awareness of how we use concepts and of how such use shapes experience then, by all means, I have proposed conceptual engineering. If, on the other hand, conceptual engineering has to do with providing better definitions, it is not my proposal.

## 4 Conclusions

The aim of this thesis has been to show that what we see and do is shaped by the system of implicit assumptions and presuppositions that guide the way in which we use words, and by this use are reinforced. These processes testify to the complexity and variability of language and human action. Complexity is not here intended to suggest that there are no facts; there are indeed facts. However, our accounts of how the world is often involve value, i.e. how we want it to be. Thus, the modest normative element of this thesis: understanding how the world is also requires understanding why we value what we value and how this guides observation. Since what we see is guided by previous experience, factual and evaluative, understanding encompasses widening such experience in cognitive *and* emotional terms by actively engaging across contrasting schemes, and disentangling to reveal the tacit assumptions that may underlie contrast. I am indeed speaking from my own perspective, my conceptual scheme, but this needs not be a problem. My intention was never to provide a final word. Rather, I hope I have succeeded in showing that there is no such thing as a final word; seeing ‘better’ involves moving laterally across schemes, rather than ascending vertically towards a supposed Archimedean point of observation. In spite of various claims to its irrelevance, supposedly supplanted by science, philosophy is still very much needed, not the least to examine the presuppositions that guide scientific

activities such as operationalization, evidence gathering, and theory development. But philosophy also has a significant, and very much needed, contribution to offer to life outside philosophy departments. Reflection upon how we form our accounts of the world, and human action, is everything but irrelevant.

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