

Music, number, and logic in Eriugena's reading of Augustine's *De musica*

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This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

Nicholas Ball,
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This thesis examines John Scotus Eriugena's reading of Augustine's *De musica*. It argues that material from Augustine's text is presented within a nexus of musical, logical, and numerical traditions and that it contributes to those traditions. Eriugena was a careful and imaginative reader of Augustine's text. His development of the ideas that he drew from this text always remains rooted in *musica*, but it point far beyond Augustine's own immediate concerns.

A first part examines the material circumstances of Augustine's *De musica* in the early middle ages through the manuscripts themselves as well as ninth- and tenth-century library catalogues. Moreover, it argues that Eriugena knew a glossed copy of the text, which may still survive in Tours. It further posits that Eriugena developed his idea of the *uita generalis* from glosses on Augustine's text, though he used it in the first instance to explain parts of Plato's *Timaeus*.

A second part concerns the definition of *musica* in the first book of the *Periphyseon*. Two versions of the definition are found in the earliest copies of this text. One is written in an Irish hand now believed to be the autograph of Eriugena himself, and the other, a revision of the first, by an Irish scribe with a close and longstanding connection to Eriugena, who is known after his hand as *i*². This part of the thesis examines the material and intellectual context of the two definitions and the different relations here negotiated between the musical and logical traditions.

Finally, a third part argues that Augustine's *De musica* made a specific and important contribution to Eriugena's metaphysics of number. Augustine's text is the principal source for Eriugena's writing about number. In particular Eriugena develops an account of number framed by Augustine's narrative of the double motion of number into memory. The changes made to this narrative better to assimilate it within his own metaphysical outlook again reveal Eriugena to be a careful and imaginative reader of Augustine's text.

The thesis demonstrates a rich and productive relation between *musica* and other philosophical traditions in the ninth century.

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Introduction

This research took as its starting point my interest in the reception of antique knowledge about music in the early middle ages. Perhaps it would be more correct to say that I was interested in the reception of an antique intellectual tradition, which I shall call *musica*. It is not easy to define this tradition or to distinguish it from other kinds of knowledge about music, but the immediate reception of ancient texts about *musica* in the ninth century reveals interests and concerns that may stand in for a partial definition. Initially, we may note that *musica* was not concerned with practical music-making. Instead, it sought to examine the rational and numerical relations that produce musical sonority and could be made present to the senses as musical sonority, but which in fact lie behind all things and are even productive of all things. This definition is only partial. In fact, it omits the most important part of *musica*. By exploring the different relations between number and various sensible phenomena, and indeed by exploring the relations between different kinds of number and different kinds of sensible phenomena, the study of *musica* could produce metaphysical narratives that extend far beyond anything we would now call ‘music’. These narratives and the different arrangements of material that produce them are what I shall examine in this thesis.

I began with Augustine’s *De musica*. One finds this text in a number of manuscripts that were copied in the early middle ages, including one that was copied early in the ninth century at Saint-Martin in Tours and subsequently filled with a large body of commentary.¹ These glosses were written only a little later than the text itself, and they are therefore one of the

¹Tours, Bibliothèque municipale 286. See below, pp. 28–32.

earliest traces of the reception of the ancient tradition of *musica* in the early middle ages. The evidence of these manuscripts and the library catalogues in which further copies of the text are recorded attest that *De musica* was read widely and, it seems, with some enthusiasm.

Beyond the physical evidence provided by the manuscripts and catalogues, previous musicological work has not been able to trace a reception of the text in the early middle ages. This is for two reasons. On the one hand, musicologists have attempted to trace the reception of *De musica* only within a narrow tradition of writing that sought to theorise the collection of melodies which together comprise the Frankish recension of the chant. This may be seen, for instance, in the writing of Michael Bernhard and Nancy Phillips, who each published a study of the medieval reception of *musica* in 1990.² Each author notes a discrepancy between the interest in Augustine's text attested by the large number of manuscript copies and the apparently insignificant influence of that text over the developing theories about chant. Bernhard conjectures that the text may have been copied only on account of the great authority enjoyed by its author in the middle ages.³ In the first chapter, I shall argue that the patristic authorship of *De musica* does indeed seem to have informed its reception, but this is certainly not to the exclusion of any further engagement with the text. It was likely even an inducement to further study.⁴

On the other hand, and perhaps more significantly, musicologists have superficially or even wrongly characterised Augustine's argument in a way that obscures his more important ideas about *musica*. In the writing of Bernhard and Phillips, the first five books of the text are said to comprise an elementary textbook on Latin verse, whereas the sixth is vaguely characterised as philosophical or speculative and sometimes more specifically as Neoplatonic.⁵

²Michael Bernhard, 'Überlieferung und Fortleben der antiken lateinischen Musiktheorie im Mittelalter', in *Rezeption des antiken Fachs im Mittelalter*, edited by Michael Bernhard *et al.* (Darmstadt: 1990), pp. 7–36, at pp. 14–18 and Nancy Phillips, 'Classical and late Latin sources for ninth-century treatises', in *Music theory and its sources: antiquity and the middle ages*, edited by André Barbera (Notre Dame, Indiana: 1990), pp. 100–35, at pp. 120–6.

³Bernhard, 'Überlieferung und Fortleben', p. 15.

⁴This point is developed in relation to my discussion of library catalogues. See below, pp. 38–43.

⁵Bernhard, 'Überlieferung und Fortleben', pp. 15; Phillips, 'Classical and late Latin sources', pp. 123.

None of this is untrue, and indeed, it goes some way toward explaining why *De musica* did not inform to any great extent the kind of Carolingian reflections about the chant studied by these scholars, but it is not a good summary of Augustine's text and it does not seem to reflect the reception of that text in the early middle ages.

Other readings of *De musica* are closer to my own, but do not quite capture the parts of Augustine's argument that seem to me to have been most significant in the early middle ages. For instance, Frank Hentschel's account of the text in the *Augustinus Lexikon* focusses on the structure of Augustine's argument as pedagogy and the relation between the linguistic and mathematical arts.⁶ In the introduction to his German translation of the first and final books of Augustine's text, he presents an accurate summary of Augustine's argument, but his consideration of the relation between eternity, time, and place is not sufficiently developed for my own purposes.⁷ Moreover, I am not confident that we can dispense with the central books quite so easily. Finally, Stephen Gersh has written usefully about some parts of the text, but the relation between eternity, time, and place again remains unclear and perhaps understated.⁸

The importance of Augustine's *De musica* in the early middle ages has been overlooked largely because its argument has not been well understood. Before all else, Augustine's *De musica* is about *equality*. Where this has been realised, we find a more positive account of the reception of the text. For instance, Werner Beierwaltes traces the development of a distinctive medieval aesthetic – which he finds expressed above all in the writings of Eriugena – back to certain texts by Augustine, among which we find *De musica*.⁹ Augustine draws two distinctions in his

⁶Frank Hentschel, 'Musica, De –', in *Augustinus Lexikon*, 4 volumes (Basel: 1986–), volume 4, pp. 130–7.

⁷Frank Hentschel, *Aurelius Augustinus, De musica, Bücher I und VI. Vom ästhetischen Urteil zur metaphysischen Erkenntnis* (Hamburg: 2002).

⁸Stephen Gersh, 'The metaphysical unity of music, motion, and time in Augustine's *De musica*', in *Christian humanism. Essays in honour of Arjo Vanderjagt*, edited by Alasdair A. MacDonald et al. (Leiden: 2009), pp. 303–16.

⁹Werner Beierwaltes, 'Aequalitas numerosa: zu Augustins Begriff des Schönen', *Wissenschaft und Weisheit* 38 (1975), pp. 140–57 and the related paper 'Negati affirmatio: Welt als Metapher. Zur Grundlegung einer mittelalterlichen Ästhetik durch Johannes Scotus Eriugena', in *Jean Scot Érigène et l'histoire de la philosophie*, edited

text. In the first five books, he separates equality from the other species of numerical relation and demonstrates the superiority of equality to these various kinds of inequality. In the final book, he distinguishes between true equality, which is only found only among eternal things, and the appearance or imitation of equality in times and places. These distinctions reveal an underlying framework that comprises two narratives. At first, Augustine traces the procession of number, which is itself eternal, prior to the world, and prototypical (or even constitutive) of the world, successively into time, as a measure of duration, and then into place, as a measure of corporeal extension. Subsequently, he narrates the return of the soul, as it turns from the body and its own temporal motions towards the consideration and love of eternal equality and truth. Of course, Augustine's text reveals more than this about his thought, but these narratives seem fundamental to his idea of *musica*.

The two narratives were likewise recognised and appreciated in the early middle ages and were important to the reception of *De musica*. I shall argue this point more thoroughly in the following chapters, but for now, we may make a single observation about the material. In the early middle ages, all six books of Augustine's text were copied together.¹⁰ We may therefore at least begin to think that the early medieval reception of the text in some way encompassed it as a whole. If we begin from Augustine's examination of equality and the associated narratives of procession and return, we can ask new questions about the material and its reception in the early middle ages. This reading of *De musica* will allow me to look far beyond its limited role in the theorisation of sounding music.

by René Roques (Paris: 1977), pp. 263–76.

¹⁰See below, 18–38.

Medieval receptions

The Tours copy of *De musica* is typical of the transmission of such texts and bodies of knowledge in this period. It is glossed extensively. In the early middle ages, and especially in the ninth century, texts written in late antiquity were newly copied, and their margins were often filled with new commentary. Such commentary was often written at the same time as the main text and sometimes in special columns which had been ruled to accommodate a large number of glosses.¹¹ Commentary was, in other words, expected. This commentary allows us a window into the medieval reception of *musica* in direct contact with the antique texts on which it was based.

The Tours manuscript is the single surviving witness to a commentary tradition on Augustine's text which may once have been more widespread. It is therefore important to explore the use of this commentary in the work of ninth-century scholars, and perhaps in the writing of Eriugena before all else. In the following chapters I shall examine this question only in relation to Eriugena's speculation about the Platonic *anima mundi*, but there are further points of similarity. For instance, Eriugena's distinction between general and specific times and places in the first book of the *Periphyseon*¹² seems to have been drawn from a gloss that survives in the Tours manuscript.¹³ Eriugena's possible access to the Tours manuscript itself deserves further examination.

Recent work has focussed the attention of intellectual historians on such glosses and commentary traditions, despite their many physical and intellectual difficulties.¹⁴ The examination of texts about *musica* has been fundamental to shaping a history of the reception

¹¹Mariken Teeuwen, 'Writing between the lines: reflections of scholarly debate in a Carolingian commentary tradition', in *Carolingian scholarship on Martianus Capella: ninth-century commentary traditions on De nuptiis in context*, edited by Mariken Teeuwen and Sinéad O'Sullivan (Turnhout: 2011), pp. 11–34, at p. 17.

¹²*Periphyseon* I, 483B.

¹³The gloss is found on f. 103v in the upper margin. For the text of this gloss, see below, pp. 68–9.

¹⁴See Mariken Teeuwen 'Marginal scholarship: rethinking the function of Latin glosses in early medieval manuscripts', in *Rethinking and recontextualizing glosses: new perspectives in the study of late Anglo-Saxon glossography*, edited by Patrizia Lendinara *et al.* (Porto: 2011), pp. 19–37, at pp. 19–23 for an assessment of these difficulties.

of the knowledge and traditions of thought from antiquity that encompasses medieval glosses and commentaries. Indeed, the first substantial corpus of glosses to be published as a tradition was the commentary material on Boethius' *De institutione musica*, which was edited by Bernhard and Calvin M. Bower as the *Glossa maior in institutionem musicam Boethii*.¹⁵ Further commentary material on Martianus Capella's *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii* has since been published, again beginning with the book on *musica*,¹⁶ as well as a broader selection of antique texts.

Bernhard and Bower were able to overturn a number of earlier historiographical assumptions regarding this sort of commentary material. For instance, it was once thought that glosses written in the early middle ages recorded the subjective impressions of individual readers.¹⁷ This was dismissed by Bernhard and Bower, since they were able to trace a textual tradition that was independent of the main text among the glosses.¹⁸ Sometimes, even single words were copied between manuscripts for decades. Certainly, these traditions have their own idiosyncrasies, and they were informed by types of scribal-scholarly intervention that we do not find in the copying of antique literary texts, but this seems to reflect a vital tradition of scholarship. Each manuscript may therefore contain a version of the tradition or a reading of the tradition that is coloured by local interests and priorities. This point has been best made by Henry Mayr-Harting in his study of the glosses found in manuscripts from Ottonian Cologne,¹⁹ although it can be traced all the way back to David Ganz's study of Corbie in the

¹⁵Michael Bernhard and Calvin M. Bower, *Glossa maior in institutionem musicam Boethii*, 4 volumes (Munich: 1993–2011).

¹⁶Mariken Teeuwen, *Harmony and the music of the spheres: the ars musica in ninth-century commentaries on Martianus Capella* (Leiden: 2002), pp. 357–565 contains the glosses on book 9 as well as the parts of books 1 and 2 that include important reflections on the subject of *musica*. All of the glosses contained in a single manuscript (Leiden, Universiteitsbibliotheek VLF 48) are available online. See *Carolingian scholarship and Martianus Capella: the oldest commentary tradition*, edited by Mariken Teeuwen et al. (digital edition, first published 2008). Further glosses on the first two books can be found in *Glossae aevi Carolini in libros I–II Martiani Capellae De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii*, edited by Sinéad O'Sullivan (Turnhout: 2010).

¹⁷This is not the place to rehearse older arguments regarding glossed manuscripts as 'classbooks' or 'library books', which is in any case more relevant to the eleventh century than to the ninth. See the articles by A. G. Rigg and G. R. Wieland, Michael Lapidge, and Malcolm Godden cited in the bibliography.

¹⁸Bernhard and Bower, *Glossa maior* 1, pp.xii–xvi in German and xxxix–xlii in English.

¹⁹Henry Mayr-Harting, *Church and cosmos in early Ottonian Germany: the view from Cologne* (Oxford: 2007).

Carolingian renaissance.²⁰ Both scholars trace the particular reading of texts found at a specific centre, which they relate to the other texts produced or read at that centre; Mayr-Harting, moreover, draws out a second relation to the glosses and commentary written on the same texts at different centres, which often reflect different local concerns. Although we now have a better understanding than we have had before of the kinds of variation that we find within gloss traditions, it is much harder to get behind the gloss texts in order to work out what sort of writing activity they may represent. This task is further frustrated by the relations among the earliest surviving manuscripts of many gloss traditions, which are at best ambiguous.²¹

Our understanding of the purpose of glosses has also been overturned. We can no longer think of them as principally pedagogical.²² Bower has demonstrated that the glosses on Boethius' *De institutione musica* represent a corpus of annotations written by a number of scholars that establishes their understanding of the text and adds a learned commentary.²³ This point has been amplified by Mariken Teeuwen in her study of the glosses on part of Martianus Capella's *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii*, which has re-orientated our understanding of these commentary traditions towards the methods and preoccupations of Carolingian scholarship. She writes:²⁴

A new hypothesis concerning the practice of glossing books suggests that in some cases, it fits best the character of a scholarly practice, reflecting intellectual

²⁰David Ganz, *Corbie in the Carolingian renaissance* (Sigmaringen: 1990).

²¹See, for instance, Bernhard and Bower, *Glossa maior* 1, pp. xvi–xvii in German and xliii in English. See also Calvin M. Bower, 'Die Wechselwirkung von philosophia, mathematica und musica in der karolingischen Rezeption der „Institutio musica“ von Boethius', in *Musik – und die Geschichte der Philosophie und Naturwissenschaften im Mittelalter. Fragen zur Wechselwirkung von 'musica' und 'philosophia' im Mittelalter*, edited by Frank Hentschel (Leiden: 1998), pp. 163–83, at p. 168.

²²See note 17.

²³Bower, 'Die Wechselwirkung', p. 167.

²⁴Mariken Teeuwen, 'The master has it wrong'. Dissenting voices in commentary texts', in *Auctor et Auctoritas in Latinis Medii Aevi Litteris. Author and Authorship in Medieval Latin Literature*, edited by Edoardo D'Angelo and Jan Ziolkowski (Firenze: 2014), pp. 1097–1108, at p. 1098. Related arguments are found throughout the items cited in the bibliography.

debates that were sparked by the texts to which the marginalia were added. In the ninth century, when glossing activity was at a peak, monastic scholars glossed books to create collections of learning, tying as many references to other texts to the text at hand as possible.

The promiscuity of these references ties *musica* into a scholarly nexus that spans the intellectual life of the early middle ages. This point may be developed in two ways. In the first instance, it is clear that the same scribes who copied glosses on *musica* also copied glosses on other texts and with reference to other areas of knowledge. This is seen perhaps most clearly in the manuscripts of *De nuptiis*, in which the same scribes often enter the commentary material on all nine books of the text. It is also an intellectual point. Material from one text circulates in the margins of another. Bower has shown that material from Martianus Capella appears in the margins of Boethius,²⁵ and Teeuwen has shown that the converse is also true.²⁶

The glosses in the Augustine manuscript make it clear that even early in the ninth century, the study of *musica* was not confined to its own area of activity but was very much part of a broader intellectual endeavour. Edward Kennard Rand was initially keen that these glosses should be studied in some detail.²⁷ Nonetheless, where they have been examined, the conclusions drawn have often (and inexplicably) downplayed their interest.²⁸ In this thesis, they are examined only in relation to one of Eriugena's borrowings from them. Nonetheless, even here, we find the glossing scribe commenting with easy familiarity on Augustine's

²⁵Bower, 'Die Wechselwirkung', p. 167.

²⁶Teeuwen, *Harmony and the music of the spheres*, pp. 162–83.

²⁷Edward Kennard Rand, 'A nest of ancient *notae*', *Speculum* 2:2 (1927), pp. 160–76, at p. 164.

²⁸The most detailed study of these glosses is found in an unpublished dissertation by Patrick le Boeuf, which was submitted to the École nationale des chartes in 1986 to satisfy the requirements of the diplôme d'archiviste-paléographe. His conclusion is reported by Martin Jacobsson and Lukas J. Dorfbauer in their introduction to the CSEL edition of *De musica*, p. 17: 'The great majority of the glosses are pure paraphrase and add nothing new to Augustine's text.' (La grande majorité de ses gloses est purement paraphrasante et n'apporte rien au texte de saint Augustin.) Le Boeuf's work is often the only work referenced regarding the content of the glosses. This can be seen, for example, in Phillips, 'Classical and late Latin sources', pp. 120. Unfortunately, his conclusion simply is not true.

metaphysical speculations regarding the Platonic *anima mundi* or speculating on the different mediations between eternity, times, and places.

Study of Augustine's text alone therefore cannot suffice for examining how thought about *musica* developed in the early middle ages. Not only are there other texts from antiquity on the subject that were commented on throughout the ninth, tenth, and later centuries, but there were texts beyond *musica* which nonetheless informed how parts of *musica* were conceived. Specific ideas which were fundamental to the study of *musica* also had long histories in other disciplines. Bower has made the point well. He writes:²⁹

While one might speak of a tradition of musical thought during the early Middle Ages, the integrity of that tradition is achieved not by any continuous thread that runs through the whole, but by a number of overlapping strands that give strength to a broad tradition. Often these strands forming the very core of musical thought draw their character from traditions other than music, and the continuity of musical reflections must be viewed from proximate perspectives.

This statement is borne out by the work of Charles M. Atkinson on *tonus* as a concept drawn from both grammar and *musica* and the work of Bower on the earliest surviving layers of the *Glossa maior*.

Atkinson has shown that the term *tonus* was not only important for the study of *musica* in the early middle ages, but that it also had a long history of use in relation to grammar.³⁰ The musical and grammatical usages of this term in ancient texts were not neatly distinguished in the early middle ages. Indeed, they were often read against one another in order to describe and even to produce new Carolingian realities. For this reason, Atkinson has described the use

²⁹Calvin M. Bower, 'The transmission of ancient music theory into the middle ages', in *The Cambridge history of western music theory*, edited by Thomas Christensen (Cambridge: 2002), pp. 136–67, at p. 136.

³⁰Charles M. Atkinson, 'Tonus in the Carolingian era: a terminological *Spannungsfeld*', in *Quellen und Studien zur Musiktheorie des Mittelalters*, 3 volumes, edited by Michael Bernhard (Munich: 1990–2001), volume 3, pp. 19–46 and *The critical nexus: tone-system, mode, and notation in early medieval music* (Oxford: 2009), pp. 49–146. See also the other items in the bibliography.

of *tonus* in the early middle ages as a *Spannungsfeld* ('charged field'). Three notions of *tonus* were available to the scholars of the ninth century, two of which had descended from antiquity. The first was derived from the grammatical description of prosodic accents. In this connection *tonus* could describe the movement of the voice described by the accent but also the graphic sign by means of which this movement was visually represented. The term also had a history in harmonic theory, which was if anything more diverse. Here *tonus* could refer to a musical sound, a specific interval or intervallic magnitude, or a transposition scale. In Boethius' *De institutione musica* the term is used almost exclusively to refer to an intervallic magnitude in the sesquioctave proportion (9:8), but his careful restriction of the term is unusual. Other writers used two or more of the senses together. The grammatical and harmonic notions of *tonus* were already entwined in the encyclopaedic writings of Cassiodorus and Isidore of Seville, which were read widely in the early middle ages. Finally, the term has a distinctly Carolingian usage. It was used to describe the classification of melodies that together comprise the Frankish recension of the chant. This notion of *tonus* was given additional material expression in the production of tonaries, which survive from the end of the eighth century.³¹

Atkinson's work has shown that the scholars of the early middle ages were aware of these different notions of *tonus*, but they did not attempt to keep them apart in their writing. Indeed, the medieval treatment of *tonus* reveals a great deal of cross-fertilisation. Ideas important for the study of *musica* are found in the commentary on Donatus' *Ars maior* by Murethach of Auxerre and, following him, Sedulius Scottus and the *Ars Laureshamensis* and in the glosses on the grammatical book of *De nuptiis*. We find the same sorts of mixed relations in the books on *musica*. With reference to a gloss on *tonus* in Besançon, Bibliothèque municipale 594, a ninth-century copy of *De nuptiis*, Atkinson writes:³²

³¹ Michel Huglo, *Les tonaires: inventaire, analyse, comparaison* (Paris: 1971), pp. 25–45 and Atkinson, *The critical nexus*, pp. 86–91.

³² Atkinson, 'Tonus in the Carolingian era', p. 31.

In this passage it is hard to tell whether music or grammar is the primary referent, so complete is the interweaving of elements from the two disciplines.

My remarks on the relation between grammar and *musica* have necessarily been rather brief. Grammar does not play a large part in the rest of my thesis, but in this instance it demonstrates something about the nature of musical reflection in the early middle ages. The boundaries between these disciplines were porous and permeable. Ideas developed in one area could flow freely into another. Even more characteristic of early medieval scholarship is the way in which the different meanings of the same terms are read and understood in relation to each another in the context of Carolingian scholarship.

The free flow of ideas and material between *musica* and grammar which is drawn out in Atkinson's writing seems in fact to be typical of Carolingian scholarship and the Carolingian approach to antique knowledge. With reference to a completely different grouping of intellectual traditions, Bower has written:³³

I have tried to avoid terms like 'subject' or 'discipline', since I should like to demonstrate before all else that the borders of philosophy, mathematics, and music overlapped, or at least were only vaguely determined, and that at least in the Carolingian period, they were part of a unified concept of education, which mirrored the Carolingian idea of reality.

Bower makes these remarks with reference to the earliest layers of the *Glossa maior*. I shall return to his unified concept of education below, since it is here that we come best to understand the idea of *musica* in the early middle ages. It is important to underline Bower's observation that the concerns of music, mathematics, and philosophy as they pertain to the medieval study of *musica* as so completely interwoven that they can scarcely be separated.³⁴ In

³³Bower, 'Die Wechselwirkung', p. 164. 'Dabei versuche ich, Begriffe wie „Fach“ oder „Disziplin“ zu vermeiden, da ich vor allem darlegen möchte, daß sich die Grenzen von Philosophie, Mathematik und Musik überlappten oder zumindest nur sehr vage bestimmt wurden, und daß sie – wenigstens für die Karolingerzeit – Teil eines einheitlichen Bildungskonzeptes waren, das ihre Vorstellung der Wirklichkeit spiegelt.'

³⁴Bower, 'Die Wechselwirkung', p. 168.

this connection, he examines the divisions of philosophy found in the *Glossa maior* and their relation to other divisions found elsewhere in the writings of the early middle ages. Likewise, he sets out a theory of sense that is found in both these glosses and Eriugena's *Periphyseon*. Concluding this part of his discussion, he writes:³⁵

I do not wish to assert that Eriugena relied directly on the Carolingian Boethius commentary or even that he wrote it. Eriugena's theory is very much improved and more developed than the theory in the glosses. Instead, I believe that this theory was part of the common educational material of the early ninth century, and that both the Boethius commentator and Eriugena had knowledge of this theory.

This common fund of material would be a subject for further fruitful study. Its traces are most likely to be found in the very great number of unedited Carolingian glosses. Bower's examination of the mathematical and musical content of these glosses continually refers back to his observation regarding the inseparability of these intellectual traditions.

We begin to understand Bower's notion of a unified concept of education in these overlapping areas of knowledge and their separation by only vaguely determined borders. Indeed, it becomes clear that any idea of more definite disciplinary boundaries is unnecessary and even unhelpful within the purview of such a notion. The idea sketched by Bower has antecedents in Augustine's *De ordine* and Boethius' *De institutione arithmetica* but came to fullest expression in Alcuin's *De uera philosophia*. Namely, the arts were to be regarded as seven steps toward the knowledge of divine wisdom. In Alcuin's image, they were the seven columns of Solomon's temple or the seven pillars of wisdom.³⁶ Bower presents several examples drawn

³⁵Bower, 'Die Wechselwirkung', pp. 173–4. 'Ich möchte nicht behaupten, daß Eriugena direkt von dem karolingischen Boethius-Kommentar abhängt, oder ihn sogar geschrieben hat. Eriugenas Theorie ist weitaus verfeinerter und entwickelter als die Theorie in den Glossen. Ich glaube vielmehr, daß diese Theorie Teil des im frühen neunten Jahrhundert verbreiteten allgemeinen Bildungsgutes war und daß beide, der Boethius-Kommentator und Johannes Scotus Eriugena, Kenntnis von dieser Theorie besaßen.'

³⁶John Marenbon, 'Carolingian thought', in *Carolingian culture: emulation and innovation*, edited by Rosamond McKitterick (Cambridge: 1994), pp. 171–92, at pp. 172–4.

from the *Glossa maior* to demonstrate the participation of the commentary material in this tradition.

In this connection, we may return to Augustine's *De musica*. The purpose of Augustine's text is to lead the soul from corporeal things to incorporeal and from the things that are in time to the eternal truth beyond time. Augustine's idea of *musica* is in important respects similar to the Carolingian educational concept identified by Bower. For this reason, the integration of this text into the intellectual world of the early middle ages may have been straightforward.

When we turn to the reception of Augustine's text, we may therefore ask two kinds of questions. The first examines how the scholars of the early middle ages articulate the narratives of procession and return and the long consideration of equality with which I began this introduction. The second kind of question investigates the other areas of knowledge with which *De musica* is drawn into dialogue. In the following chapters, I shall address both kinds of question, but it is first worth making a further point about my methodology.

Methodologies and manuscripts

Before all else, this project is about texts and ideas. Throughout my work, I have examined the texts directly through the medium of their transmission in manuscripts copied in the early middle ages. The manuscripts are not, as it were, transparent to the text, but overwrite it with their own materially determined meaning. Working on texts and ideas *in the medium of their transmission* therefore makes available kinds of meaning that are simply not recorded in a modern edition.

This can be seen in the first instance in the organisation of the texts into larger codicological units within a manuscript.³⁷ The collection and arrangement of texts in a manuscript was not

³⁷On the importance of codicology in the study of texts, see also Thomas J. Mathiesen, 'Ars critica and the *fata libellorum*: the significance of codicology to text critical theory', in *Music theory and its sources: antiquity and the middle ages*, edited by André Barbera (Notre Dame, Indiana: 1990), pp. 19–37.

arbitrary or haphazard. Indeed, it seems to have been carefully considered, and it is therefore meaningful. Examining the compilation of *De musica* may therefore reveal a great deal about how the text was read and understood in the early middle ages and the sorts of contexts to which its ideas were thought to contribute. The binding together of texts within a single book invites us to read them together and to draw them into a single, if not a univocal, whole.

A second clear benefit from working with the texts as they were copied in early medieval manuscripts concerns the identification of individual scribes and writing activities. The way in which a text is copied reveals at least to a certain extent the writing activity that produced it and therefore the status of the text itself. By relating ideas and individual scribes, we may come to understand how material was written and circulated in the early middle ages, and indeed we may better understand what a text is and how it was produced. The physical presentation of material on the page may therefore guide our questions and shape our understanding of that material. My work on the early medieval reception of Augustine's *De musica* is therefore closely tied to the manuscript transmission of that text and also to the transmission and copying of the texts that attest early medieval scholars' engagement with Augustine's work.

In the following chapters, I shall attempt to trace the specific negotiations and cultural situations – both intellectual and material – that inform Eriugena's reading of Augustine's *De musica*. It has long been known that Eriugena was familiar with Augustine's text. It is cited several times in the *Periphyseon*,³⁸ and one of those citations has been studied at some length.³⁹ Nonetheless, there has been no study of his reading of *De musica* as a whole nor any attempt to look for moments of contact between the two texts that have not been flagged by name.

³⁸See, for example, *Periphyseon* I, 482B, *Periphyseon* 3, 732A, etc.

³⁹The first point cited above is discussed in John Marenbon, *From the circle of Alcuin to the school of Auxerre: logic, theology, and philosophy in the early middle ages* (Cambridge: 1981), pp. 83–6 and Carlos Steel, 'Maximus the Confessor and John Scottus Eriugena on time and place', in *Eriugena and Creation*, edited by Willemien Otten and Michael I. Allen (Turnhout: 2014), pp. 291–318. Both authors give a number of further references.

This is what I shall attempt here. By resituating *De musica* as a text about equality and number, and especially equality and number as they are mediated by times and places, I shall be able for the first time to examine the close and imaginative reception of Augustine's text that is suggested by its extensive manuscript tradition. In one sense, the result is not cohesive. My thesis does not present a single version of Eriugena's usage. In fact, I shall argue that there *was* no single usage. Augustine's *De musica* made available to Eriugena a wealth of ideas and vocabulary that resonated with other ideas and terms across a great part of Carolingian intellectual life. Three terms that are fundamental to Augustine's treatment of *musica* – *locus*, *numerus*, and *tempus* – appear in each of the chapters precisely because they could be addressed in a variety of ways and by calling on a variety of different kinds of knowledge. The specific negotiations that characterise Eriugena's reading of Augustine's text draw in areas of scholarly enquiry that have not before been considered in relation to *musica*.

Throughout this thesis, I have used the following editions: Augustine, *De musica*, edited by Martin Jacobsson, CSEL (Berlin: 2017); and John Scottus Eriugena, *Periphyseon*, edited by Édouard Jeuneau, CCCM, 5 volumes (Turnhout: 1996–2003). These editions will be identified as *De musica* and *Periphyseon* respectively. Other editions of these or other texts will receive a standard bibliographical reference. My preference for the CSEL edition of *De musica* is easily explained; it is the first modern edition of the text since *Patrologia Latina*, which itself reprints a much older text. The *Periphyseon* editions receive further comment in the second chapter.⁴⁰ All the translations are my own. The specific meanings and resonances of much of the technical vocabulary used in the discussion of *musica* is not reflected in earlier translations of either text.

⁴⁰See below, pp. 82–4

Chapter 1: Materially mediated meanings. Eriugena's access to Augustine's *De musica*

The material circumstances of Augustine's *De musica* in the early middle ages can be understood, if only in part, from the surviving copies of the text that were made in the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries and from the booklists and library catalogues that record these copies. The evidence provided by the manuscripts and catalogues is incomplete; even among the copies of the text that have survived we find traces of further copies that have not, and the library catalogues of many major centres especially in western Francia have been lost or survive only from the twelfth or later centuries. Nonetheless, the manuscripts and catalogues suggest a number of contexts through which Eriugena's use of the text can be examined. *De musica* did not exist in isolation, and its material circumstances give some indication of the cultural mediations through which it was known and by which its meaning was negotiated in the early middle ages.

This chapter comprises two parts. The former is by far the more general. In it I shall examine the manuscript copies of *De musica* and the medieval library catalogues in which the work is recorded. It is important to remain attentive to the differences among these sources and the different kinds of information that each can provide. In this respect, the manuscripts are at times frustratingly incommensurable: some attest a considered compilation that sets the text within a meaningful intellectual context, whereas others contain only *De musica*, although this too is an intellectual context of sorts; likewise, some reveal a great deal about the

circumstances of their production and their exemplars, whereas others are silent regarding their ‘prehistory’. The booklists and library catalogues are similarly various in their detail, even if the arrangement of their texts seems to follow the same general plan. In this connection we should take seriously Rosamond McKitterick’s argument that the catalogues should be understood as ‘a dynamic expression of literate and intellectual aspirations’ and that they ‘not only record the possession of knowledge [...] but themselves constitute bibliographical guides to book accessions and the acquisition of knowledge’.¹ Taken in sum, the manuscripts and catalogues reveal that *De musica* was copied and presumably also read with enthusiasm in the early middle ages. Moreover, the placement of the text in the library catalogues and the other texts alongside which it was copied and bound begin to suggest some of the contexts in which it was understood. We can examine Eriugena’s use of *De musica* in much greater detail than that suggested by the manuscripts and catalogues, but we should try always to situate it in relation to this broader context.

In the second part of the chapter, I shall argue that we might even know something about the kind of manuscript in which Eriugena read *De musica*. In brief, Eriugena read a glossed copy of *De musica*. It is possible that the exact manuscript still survives in Tours. Eriugena’s reading of *De musica* was therefore already mediated by an earlier ninth-century reading that was entered as glosses in at least one copy of the text. In this part of the chapter, my argument will focus on the relation between two terms: ‘uita generalis’ and ‘uitalis motus’, general life and vital motion. In the final chapter of *De musica*, a passage well known to and frequently used by Eriugena, Augustine introduces a notion of the *uitalis motus* which seems to explain the vegetative power of the *anima mundi*. In other words, it explains the basic, life-giving power of the soul in relation to its body, in this instance the bodies of the four elements. This was acknowledged in the Tours glosses, which additionally label the *uitalis motus* as the *uita generalis* and *anima generalis*. Eriugena’s use of the two terms – *uita generalis* and *uitalis motus* – demonstrates beyond question that he knew this gloss or one very much like it. In the

¹Rosamond McKitterick, *The Carolingians and the written word* (Cambridge: 1989), p. 166 and 209.

first book of the *Periphyseon*, Eriugena addresses the Platonic *anima mundi*, which he knew from the Latin translation by Calcidius. He describes the vegetative power of this universal soul as the *uita generalis*. Nonetheless, by the time he wrote the third book of the *Periphyseon*, Eriugena had expanded this notion to include the intellectual, rational, sensible as well as the vegetative life of the soul. In this book, when he wants to isolate the vegetative life, he uses Augustine's own preferred term, *uitalis motus*. Eriugena's easy movement between these terms suggests that he knew them together most likely in the glosses on Augustine's *De musica* written earlier in the ninth century.

In this chapter, my arguments about the *uita generalis* and the *uitalis motus* are introduced in the first instance to illustrate the material circumstances of Eriugena's access to *De musica*. Nonetheless, these arguments also illustrate one of the broader themes of my thesis. On the basis of my argument about Eriugena and the Tours glosses, it is possible to understand how *musica* contributes to a network of Platonic speculation that encompasses a range of Augustine's writings and their reception in the early middle ages, as well as the Latin tradition of the *Timaeus*. It cannot be isolated as an intellectual activity but was part of a much broader nexus of overlapping traditions.

The manuscript tradition of Augustine's *De musica* in the early middle ages

Six copies of *De musica* survive from the early middle ages: one from the eighth century, four from the ninth, and one from the first half of the tenth. The earliest of these is now only a fragment, but it seems likely that it was once a complete copy of the text. Three of these copies are bound alongside other texts, and each of these manuscripts seems to reflect a genuinely early medieval collection, *i.e.* they are not later composites. Almost all of the copies reveal something about their exemplar whether from the physical structure of the book, the text that it contains, or the surrounding apparatus such as subscriptions or colophons. *De musica* is also mentioned in a number of booklists and library catalogues from the early

middle ages, and these provide information about the place of *De musica* in ninth-century approaches to the organisation of knowledge. In this section, I shall sketch what we may know about the material circumstances of *De musica* in the early middle ages on the basis of the manuscripts in which it is copied and the library catalogues that record its presence.

The manuscript copies of De musica

The following manuscript descriptions detail in the first instance the contents, structure, and script of the books as well as their date and place of origin. The following, more discursive, material will assess some of my initial claims with reference to the palaeographical literature. Especially important here is the archival material from the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek that makes up Bernhard Bischoff's *Nachlass*.² This material allows us to sidestep some of the shortcomings of his published catalogue of all ninth-century continental manuscripts in Latin scripts (excluding the Visigothic),³ which have been detailed by Donald Bullough,⁴ David Ganz,⁵ and most extensively by Hartmut Hoffmann.⁶ In brief, the second and third volumes of the *Katalog*, which include all of the manuscripts to be examined here, were not written up before Bischoff's death in 1991. Instead, they were assembled from his notes by Birgit Ebersperger. The notes themselves often contain far more detail than is published in these later volumes, and Bischoff often took care to note the date of the successive layers of his observations. Supplemented by these notes, the importance of the *Katalog* for the study of ninth-century manuscripts cannot be overstated. My examination of the manuscripts will then focus on two specific areas. In the first instance I shall set out what we can know about the exemplars of each manuscript and the circulation of material implied by these exemplars.

²Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Ana 553, Nachlass Bernhard Bischoff.

³Bernhard Bischoff, *Katalog der festländischen Handschriften des neunten Jahrhunderts (mit Ausnahme der wisigotischen)*, 4 volumes (Wiesbaden: 1998–2017).

⁴Donald Bullough, 'A scholar's work is never done', *Early medieval Europe* 12:4 (2003), pp. 399–407.

⁵David Ganz, Reviews in *Francia* 27:1 (2000), pp. 273–8 and *Francia* 32:1 (2005), pp. 231–2 and 'Carolingian manuscripts: the verdict of the master', *Francia* 42 (2015), pp. 253–74.

⁶Hartmut Hoffmann, 'Bernhard Bischoffs Katalog der karolingischen Handschriften', *Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters* 72:1 (2015), pp. 1–56.

Thereafter I shall examine the contextual information that is suggested by the three manuscripts in which *De musica* is copied alongside other texts. This provides one of the most significant indications of how *De musica* was read in the early middle ages.

*Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, latin 7200*⁷

1. ff. 1r–85v, Boethius, *De institutione musica*;
2. ff. 86r–93v, related diagrams;
3. ff. 94r–207r, Augustine, *De musica*;
4. ff. 207v–218v and 221r, Martianus Capella, *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii* book 9;
5. ff. 219r and 220, later material.

ff. i + 162;⁸

270 × 220 mm, < 195 × 130 > mm, 23 long lines at ff. 1–93, 30 long lines at ff. 94–218 and 221, pricking for 23 long lines at ff. 94–101, new style ruling;

the manuscript is tightly bound and could not be collated; no gathering signatures; where gatherings could be identified (e.g. ff. 94–101), they comprised eight leaves;

Caroline minuscule;

titles and headings in red capitals, the word ‘proemium’ on f. 1r in red uncial and the first line of the text here in capitals; initials in red capitals sometimes writing over erased red uncials at the beginning of the manuscript; minor initials in capitals;

⁷Palaeographical descriptions of this manuscript are found in: Bischoff, *Katalog* 3, 4430; *Nachlass*, Paris 9; and Claudio Leonardi, ‘I codici di Marziano Capella’, *Aevum* 33 (1959), pp. 443–89 and 34 (1960), pp. 1–99 and 411–524, at number 155. The *Nachlass* material comprises a single sheet dated 6 August 1958. The great majority of this material is written in blue-black ink, but there are a few later interventions in blue biro and pencil of various colours. The manuscript itself can be seen on Gallica.

⁸The foliation skips 60 folios between f. 104 and f. 165, which is partially corrected through the rest of the manuscript. Leonardi corrects this error in his references to the manuscript, and it is corrected also in the CSEL edition of Augustine’s *De musica*. It remains uncorrected on Gallica, and since this is the way that most people will access the manuscript, I have chosen to follow the original foliation. There is an unnumbered folio between f. 36 and f. 37, which is never corrected.

s. IX med., northern France in the region of Laon or Soissons.

In the *Nachlass* material, Bischoff argues that this manuscript was written in northeastern France in the region of Laon or Soissons in the middle of the ninth century. The *Katalog* relates a very similar judgement, as does Claudio Leonardi, who cites Bischoff as his source. Nancy Phillips attests a previous dating to the very end of the tenth century, but prefers a date in the ninth.⁹ The manuscript was written for the most part by two scribes; one copied Boethius, and the other Augustine and Martianus Capella. Nonetheless, there are other scribes, who write smaller parts within this broad division of material.

The compilation of this manuscript is interesting. The anonymous text on ff. 219–20 titled ‘de dimensione monocordi’ is not part of the original production. Bischoff writes that it was interpolated between the tenth and eleventh centuries, but notes that the following leaf is again original. Leonardi additionally observes that it has been badly bound. Nonetheless, the other texts in the manuscript seem to have been written together as part of a single collection. A number of factors at first seem to dissuade us from this conclusion; for instance the principal scribe and the ruling of the page change together between the Boethius and Augustine. Yet the evidence in favour of this conclusion is in the end stronger. The hands of the two principal scribes are similar, and their work could easily be the product of a single scriptorium. Moreover there is no change in decorative scheme between the work of the two scribes. The definitive evidence comes in the first gathering of Augustine’s text; two sets of pricking are visible in the margin: the 30 lines on which the text is copied but also the 23-line scheme used for Boethius. This does not necessarily indicate that the texts were copied sequentially, but it certainly suggests that they were produced as parts of a single activity.

The manuscript contains additional traces of its reception, which may help us further to

⁹Nancy Phillips, ‘Classical and late Latin sources for ninth-century treatises’, in *Music theory and its sources: antiquity and the middle ages*, edited by André Barbera (Notre Dame, Indiana: 1990), pp. 100–35, at p. 121.

understand the place of this compilation in the early middle ages. Boethius' *De institutione musica* is overwritten by very many marginal and interlinear annotations. Bischoff at first believed that the glosses were in part contemporary with the production of the manuscript and in part from the tenth century, but he subsequently revised his dating of the earlier glosses to the end of the ninth century. Michael Bernhard and Calvin M. Bower have written about these hands in greater detail in their edition of the *Glossa maior*.¹⁰ They distinguish three ninth-century hands and at least five tenth-century hands. The material written by these hands may help us to understand the early reception of the texts in this manuscript.

The manuscript has been described as 'a remarkable [...] collection of late antique texts relevant for the study of music'.¹¹ Nonetheless, a close look at the glosses and commentary material in this manuscript reveals that its notion of *musica* is not in the first instance concerned with practical traditions of music making, and that it is instead tied up with a broader range of numerical and philosophical concerns. Bower has examined the glosses in this manuscript in his study of the earliest surviving layers of commentary material on Boethius' *De institutione musica*.¹² His most important conclusions were outlined in the introduction,¹³ but it is worth restating one of them here. Bower argues that the musical, mathematical, and philosophical concerns of this material are so interwoven that one can hardly separate them.¹⁴ This collection is not, at least not in any straightforward sense, directed toward the study of music. Instead, the earliest traces of its use seem to indicate an interest in numerical and philosophical speculations, which certainly have some bearing on music, but which might more properly be called *musica*. Certainly, there is no direct evidence

¹⁰Michael Bernhard and Calvin M. Bower, *Glossa maior in institutionem musicam Boethii*, 4 volumes (Munich: 1993–2011). For their discussion of the glossing hands in this manuscript see volume 4, pp. 19–21.

¹¹See the introduction to the CSEL edition of Augustine's *De musica* by Martin Jacobsson and Lukas J. Dorfbauer, pp. 1–67, at p. 18.

¹²Calvin M. Bower, 'Die Wechselwirkung von philosophia, mathematica und musica in der karolingischen Rezeption der „Institutio musica“ von Boethius', in *Musik – und die Geschichte der Philosophie und Naturwissenschaften im Mittelalter. Fragen zur Wechselwirkung von 'musica' und 'philosophia' im Mittelalter*, edited by Frank Hentschel (Leiden: 1998), pp. 163–83.

¹³See above, 6–8.

¹⁴Bower, 'Die Wechselwirkung', p. 168.

in this manuscript regarding precisely how Augustine's text was read, but its place within the collection suggests that it cannot be separated from this nexus of intellectual traditions.

*Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, latin 13375*¹⁵

1. ff. 1r–108v, Augustine, *De musica*.

ff. i + 109, any final flyleaves not shown on microfilm;

225 × 135 mm, < 178 × ca 110 > mm, 23 long lines, old style ruling;

I–XII⁸ XIII⁶ XIV⁶⁺¹, with the additional leaf at f. 107, gatherings signed alphabetically in the centre of the lower margin of the final verso;

Maurdramnus minuscule;

titles and headings mostly written in red uncial but sometimes red on alternating lines; final explicit at f. 108r written in capitals; initials large and decorative with red fill; minor initials written in uncials;

s. IX between the first and second quarters, Corbie.

Palaeographers agree that this manuscript was made at Corbie in the early part of the ninth century. David Ganz has identified the script of the manuscript as Maurdramnus minuscule, which was written exclusively at Corbie, and catalogues the manuscript as a product of that centre. Bischoff seems to agree with Ganz, though the *Nachlass* material suggests further complexity in the production of the manuscript; the top of the sheet is labelled 'Corbie', but lower down we find a partially illegible note that reads 'several hands, northern French, in

¹⁵Palaeographical descriptions of this manuscript are found in Bischoff, *Katalog* 3, 4903; *Nachlass*, Paris 15; and David Ganz, *Corbie in the Carolingian renaissance* (Sigmaringen: 1990), pp.139–40. The *Nachlass* material comprises a single sheet dated 10 October 1962. The great majority of this material is written in blue biro, though several details were later underlined in red. The manuscript can be seen on Gallica.

part <one illegible word> but obviously not Corbie'.¹⁶ Likewise, the *Katalog* attributes the manuscript probably to Corbie, but suggests that it is not a typical product of that centre. Nonetheless, on the front flyleaf we find a note written in a ninth-century Corbie hand, which reads 'In hoc uolumine continentur sex beati augustini de musica libri'.

Ganz dates the manuscript to the ninth century. Bischoff tries to be more precise, but the *Nachlass* material is here again not straightforward. It contains two dates. One is found within the examination of abbreviations, ligatures, and other features of the script, and on the basis of these features dates the manuscript to the first quarter of the ninth century. The other contains several layers or reworking, and appears to be the more definitive. It dates the manuscript to the first or second quarter of the century. The *Katalog* suggests only the first quarter of the ninth century.

The interest of this manuscript for the purposes of this chapter relates almost entirely to the question of its exemplar. Bischoff and Ganz have each tried to say something about the exemplar from which the manuscript was copied on the basis of its script. Ganz writes that 'the script uses frequent ligatures, but certain letterforms suggest a possible half-uncial exemplar'.¹⁷ Bischoff suggests instead in the *Nachlass* material that there was likely an insular exemplar. He illustrates this with examples of insular remnants, such as the decorative *L* found throughout the minor initials as part of 'Lic[entius]' and the word 'Greci' at f. 27r line 20. I shall return to the question of an insular tradition of *De musica* in my discussion of the following manuscript.

We may also learn something about the circulation of copies of *De musica* by examining more closely how the manuscript is put together. Something clearly happens on f. 107r. The last three lines of the page are written in a very different hand, which continues to the end of the manuscript. Moreover, in the lower margin there is what appears to be a gathering signature, which follows the alphabetical ordering of the previous signatures, but is placed unusually on

¹⁶[...] mehrere Hände, nordfranzösisch, zum Teil <one illegible word> aber offensichtlich nicht Corbie.

¹⁷Ganz, *Corbie*, p. 139.

the recto instead of the verso. The gathering structure is rather complicated. The scribes began with a regular gathering of six leaves. Thereafter they inserted an additional leaf, which is now f. 107. This is confirmed by the interruption at this point of the regular arrangement of hair and flesh sides; f. 107v (hair) faces f. 108r (flesh).

The significance of these observations is revealed in a consideration of the textual traditions reflected in the manuscript. Martin Jacobsson and Lukas J. Dorfbauer, the most recent editors of *De musica*, have argued on the basis of textual tradition that the material written by the new hand beginning on f. 107r was copied from a different exemplar than that used for the rest of the manuscript.¹⁸ They suggest that this is confirmed by the fact that another manuscript, Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, latin 7231, breaks off at exactly the same point and was likely copied from the same deficient exemplar. This leaves us with a problem; for the structure of the book does not nicely reflect the evidence of the textual traditions. The scribe at the top of f. 107r is found in other parts of the manuscript. It therefore seems likely that this leaf was added to the gathering structure during the original copying activity. The fact that they added a leaf suggests that they knew the material that they had left to copy would not fit in the remaining space of the original gathering structure and perhaps therefore that they had access to a second exemplar before they finished working from the first. But if this were the case, we might wonder why the same scribe did not just keep working through the second exemplar. These difficulties are perhaps insoluble, but the questions are, I think, worth raising, since they allow us to look into the production of the book and the kinds of manuscript circulation that made it possible.

¹⁸Jacobsson and Dorfbauer, Introduction to the CSEL edition of *De musica*, p. 17.

*St Gallen Stiftsbibliothek 1395 at pp. 436–7*¹⁹

1. pp. 436–7, Augustine, *De musica* 5. 4. 7–5. 10.

f. 1;

ca 230 × ca 180 mm, <195 × ca 135> mm, 32 long lines;

Irish minuscule;

s. VIII–IX, presumably Ireland.

It seems likely that this single leaf was once part of a full copy of Augustine's *De musica*; there is certainly nothing to suggest that this was not the case. It is written by a single hand in a peculiarly angular Irish minuscule, which is heavily abbreviated. It is therefore possible that this manuscript attests an insular tradition of *De musica*. E. A. Lowe writes that the manuscript of which this leaf is the only surviving fragment was 'written presumably in Ireland'. Material in Bischoff's *Nachlass* which was used in the preparation of *CLA* contains the same judgement. In his descriptions of manuscripts written in an Irish script, Lowe uses a variety of terms to define their relation to Ireland. For instance, among the numerous Irish manuscripts today at St Gallen we find manuscripts that are 'written presumably in Ireland', 'written apparently in Ireland', 'written doubtless in Ireland', or 'written in an Irish centre, presumably on the Continent'.²⁰ It is clear that Lowe is being careful, but he does not always give the reasons that lie behind his quite precise distinctions. Perhaps for this reason, other writers have attributed the manuscript either to Ireland or to an Irish community on the

¹⁹Palaeographical descriptions of this manuscript are found in: Bischoff, *Nachlass*, St Gallen 9; and E. A. Lowe, *Codices Latini Antiquiores: a palaeographical guide to Latin manuscripts prior to the ninth century*, 11 volumes (Oxford: 1934–71), volume 7, 990. The *Nachlass* material comprises a single undated printed form, which was produced in preparation for the entry in *CLA*. It is filled out in black ink. The text was later identified at the top of the page in blue pen, and there are a few interventions in pencil. The manuscript can be seen on the St Gallen e-codices page.

²⁰These manuscripts are listed at *CLA* 7, p. x.

continent.²¹ Jacobsson and Dorfbauer write that an Irish origin ‘should be regarded only as one (and perhaps not the most plausible) possibility’.²² They note that if this manuscript were written in Ireland, it would be a unique witness to the Precarolingian reception of *De musica* outside the continent. Nonetheless, the survival of Irish manuscripts from the early middle ages is so slight that it seems unsafe to draw any firm conclusion from the lack of further witnesses. Jacobsson and Dorfbauer also write that ‘there were many Irish scribes travelling and working on the continent, and especially in the monastery of St. Gallen, in the 8th and 9th centuries’, and that ‘we even know the names of some Irish scholars who were active on the continent in the 9th century and were acquainted with the *De musica*’.²³ They appear to be arguing that an interest in *De musica* was characteristic of certain continental Irish circles, but we cannot for this reason discount the possibility that the interest was first nurtured in Ireland itself. Unfortunately Bischoff’s treatment of Irish scribes on the continent does not resolve this palaeographical difficulty.²⁴ David Ganz has suggested in conversation that nothing in the hand of this manuscript suggests any contact with a continental, non-Irish scriptorium, and there seems to be no strong reason to prefer a continental origin for this manuscript. The possibility of an insular tradition of *De musica* suggested here and by certain palaeographical details of the preceding manuscript is one well worth considering.

²¹ See, for instance, *Clavis litterarum hibernensium: medieval Irish books and texts (c. 400–c. 1600)*, edited by Donnchadh Ó Corrain (Turnhout: 2017), 386.

²² Jacobsson and Dorfbauer, Introduction to the CSEL edition of *De musica*, p. 39.

²³ Jacobsson and Dorfbauer, Introduction to the CSEL edition of *De musica*, p. 39.

²⁴ Bernhard Bischoff, ‘Irische Schreiber im Karolingerreich’, in *Jean Scot Érigène et l’histoire de la philosophie*, edited by René Rocques (Paris: 1977), pp. 47–58. This paper is reprinted in the author’s *Mittelalterliche Studien: Ausgewählte Aufsätze zur Schriftkunde und Literaturgeschichte*, 3 volumes (Stuttgart: 1966–81), volume 3, pp. 39–54.

*Tours Bibliothèque municipale 286*²⁵

1. ff. 1r–115r, Augustine, *De musica*;
2. f. 115v, material (definitions, etymologies, etc.) written in part in Tironian notes.

ff. i + 115 + i;

275 × 200 mm, <210 × 140> mm, 23 long lines, old style ruling;

I–VI⁸ VII⁸⁺¹ VIII⁶ IX–XIII⁸ XIV⁴, the additional leaf at f. 53 leaves a stub before the following folio, gatherings signed variously in the lower margin of the final verso ‘q’ followed sometimes at a distance by roman numerals, gathering signatures on ff. 72v, 88v, and 104v altered by a contemporary hand, sometimes the collation mark ‘requisitum est’ is written in Tironian notes at the end of the gatherings, which is found in several other Tours manuscripts from this period;²⁶

Caroline minuscule;

titles and headings written mostly in uncial and red on alternating lines; initials written mostly in uncials which are sometimes red; minor initials written in uncials;

s. IX in., Saint-Martin, Tours.

²⁵Palaeographical descriptions of this manuscript are found in Bischoff, *Katalog* 3, 6134; *Nachlass*, Tours; Edward Kennard Rand, ‘A nest of ancient *notae*’, *Speculum* 2:2 (1927), pp. 160–76; and *Studies in the script of Tours*, 3 volumes (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1929–34), 18. The *Nachlass* material comprises one undated folded sheet and two stapled leaves. The folded sheet is written in blue ink. The stapled leaves are typewritten with many later interventions first in pencil and then in biro of various colours. They were apparently written in preparation for *CLA* 6. They are dated in pencil 12 May 1934 and initialled ‘MD’, presumably the *chartiste* Mlle M. Dulong, who is thanked in the prefaces to several volumes of *CLA*. At the top of the first sheet, we read that this manuscript was ‘rejected’ by Bernhard Bischoff, ‘BB’, on 15 September 1949. This is presumably a reference to *CLA* 6, from which the manuscript is explicitly excluded. See note 28. It is written in pencil, and is perhaps contemporary with the other interventions. I have seen this manuscript in microfilm and in Rand’s plates in the second volume of *Studies*.

²⁶Bernhard Bischoff, *Latin palaeography: antiquity and the middle ages*, translated by Dáibhí Ó Cróinín and David Ganz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 43.

Bischoff and Edward Kennard Rand agree that this manuscript was written at Tours, but the dates that they suggest for its production are slightly different. Rand has described the script used in the manuscript as ‘Prealcuinian’.²⁷ He writes that this label does not mean that the manuscript was necessarily written prior to 796, when Alcuin was made abbot of Saint-Martin, and some of Rand’s Prealcuinian manuscripts may even have been written after Alcuin’s death in 804. Nonetheless, Rand writes that the script used in these manuscripts is typical of the style that had been practiced just before his arrival. Bischoff and E. A. Lowe prefer a later date within this range. The *Nachlass* material dates the manuscript to be beginning of the ninth century, and the *Katalog* to around 800. Lowe writes that this manuscript was ‘considered too late for *C. L. A.*’, which places it in the ninth century.²⁸

For the most part, the manuscript was copied by two scribes; one copied the first seven gatherings (ff. 1–58), and the other the last (ff. 59–115). Further scribes copy shorter passages within this division of material. Rand has suggested correspondences between the hands found in this manuscript and hands found in other Tours books both before and after the Alcuinian script reforms.²⁹

The text copied in this manuscript raises some problems. It is not copied in the correct order, but the misordering does not occur between the gatherings; the manuscript is not simply misbound. This problem was noticed by the glossing scribe, who notes at each break how to get to the next section of text. A close look at this problem reveals something about how the manuscript was copied. The text should be ordered: ff. 1r–66r line 14, 81r line 18–95r line 8, 66r line 14–81r line 18, 103v line 16–110v line 10, 95v line 8–103v line 15, and finally, 110v line 11–115r. Although the problem is not the binding of this manuscript, the root of the

²⁷For Rand’s discussion of the label ‘Prealcuinian’, see *Studies* 1, pp. 35–8 and ‘A nest of ancient *notae*’, p. 162.

²⁸Lowe, *CLA* 6, p. viii. Likewise, on p. ix, Lowe notes that ‘if a manuscript is not included in *C. L. A.*, it may as a rule be taken for granted that it has been omitted intentionally, because it seemed later than our period’.

²⁹Rand, ‘A nest of ancient *notae*’, pp. 163–4 and *Studies*, p. 99.

problem seems to be misordered gatherings. All the misordering occurs in the material copied by the second scribe. There is some regularity in the units of text set out above: ff. 59r–66r line 14 is a little less than fifteen sides; from here to f. 81r line 18 a little more than 30; and so on. The correspondence is not exact, but it is suggestive. The scribe was working from units of text slightly shorter than the regular eight-leaf gatherings of the Tours manuscript. It seems likely that these were regular gatherings in a slightly smaller manuscript or a manuscript written in a slightly larger script and that some of these gatherings were copied into the Tours manuscript in the incorrect order. Each scribe was likely given eight gatherings and copied them into seven. The 57 folios copied by the first scribe approximate these proportions.³⁰

The manuscript has been discussed for the most part with reference to the history of abbreviation. For instance the *Nachlass* material is headed ‘Aug[ustinus] de musica m[it] d[em] Notae iuris’. The manuscript is full of abbreviations which Rand believed to be ‘ancient’ (his translation of W. M. Lindsay’s *notae antiquae*).³¹ Rand suggests that the Tours scribes copied these abbreviations from their exemplar with such care that we might surmise the system of abbreviation used in that manuscript.³² Indeed, he writes that ‘many or most of the errors due to the misinterpretation of symbols had already been made in the ancient manuscript’.³³ The unresolved signs of abbreviation found in the Tours manuscript allow Rand also to say something about the script of its exemplar, since they were often traced with great fidelity to their original shape, and therefore survive as remnants of their original script. Rand concludes that we may be certain ‘first that the scribe is struggling with an original in continuous script and second that this script was uncial’.³⁴

The pages of the manuscript are also dense with marginal and interlinear annotations, and

³⁰The correspondence was initially exact, but f. 53 was added to the final gathering copied by this scribe.

³¹W. M. Lindsay, *Notae antiquae: an account of abbreviation in Latin MSS. of the early minuscule period* (c. 700–850) (Cambridge: 1915)

³²Rand, ‘A nest of ancient *notae*’, p. 164

³³Rand, ‘A nest of ancient *notae*’, p. 172–3.

³⁴Rand, ‘A nest of ancient *notae*’, p. 175.

since these are more important to the argument of the chapter, I shall examine them here in greater detail. This additional material was also written in Tours, and Bischoff dates it to probably the second quarter of the ninth century. Rand notes only that it is contemporary with or a little later than the text itself.³⁵ The glosses were written in two stages, but it is not clear whether they represent the activity of two scribes or two passes by the same scribe. There is no cooperation between the scribes; the second layer accommodates the first and sometimes expands and corrects its material, but is not itself accommodated, expanded, or corrected. The scribes share a number of characteristic writing habits, most notably a long final *s* that extends down to the *x*-height of the following line and often touches it several letters previously. This letter is frequently found in ligature with a penultimate *u*. Moreover there is as much difference within the writing of each layer as there is between the layers, and there are no significant differences of letterforms or writing habits. I am therefore happy that these are likely two layers of material written by the same scribe. This seems also to be the opinion of Bischoff and Rand, who each refer to only a single glossing hand or scholiast. The interventions made by these hands expand many of the abbreviations used in the text, provide alternate readings, and include a body of commentary or glossing material. Rand argues that the scribe who copied this material likely had access to the exemplar used for the text and that it is possible that some of the glosses or variants descended in that manuscript from antiquity.³⁶ I believe that it is much more likely to be a ninth-century reading, and in any case Rand presents no evidence to support his conjecture. Much of the subsequent discussion of these glosses has rested on an unpublished dissertation by Patrick le Boeuf submitted to the École nationale des chartes in 1986 to satisfy the requirements of a diplôme d'archiviste-paléographe. In their introduction to the CSEL edition of *De musica* Jacobsson and Dorfbauer report his conclusion that the great majority of the glosses are pure paraphrase and add nothing new to Augustine's text.³⁷ Although this is not the place for a full

³⁵Rand, 'A nest of ancient *notae*', p. 164

³⁶Rand, 'A nest of ancient *notae*', p. 164.

³⁷Jacobsson and Dorfbauer, Introduction to the CSEL edition of *De musica*, p. 17.

reassessment of the commentary material, it seems that the glossator had a much more productive engagement with Augustine's text that was realised by le Boeuf. I shall discuss one instance of this in the second part of the chapter.³⁸

*Valenciennes Bibliothèque municipale 384*³⁹

1. ff. 1r–4v, Isidore, *Etymologiarum* 3. 15. 1–23. 2;
2. ff. 4v–5r, prefatory material including an excerpt from Censorinus, *De die natali* 12. 3–13. 1;
3. ff. 5v–85v, Augustine, *De musica*.

ff. 85;

285 × 203 mm, <198 × 130> mm, 27 long lines, new style ruling;

I–VII⁸ VIII⁶ IX–X⁸ XI⁸⁻¹, the final leaf from the final gathering used as a pastedown, gatherings signed in the centre of the lower margin of the final verso with Roman numerals;

Caroline minuscule;

titles and headings written in red uncials, initials written in red square capitals, minor initials written in uncials;

s. IX between the second quarter and med., northeastern France in the region of Saint-Amand.

This manuscript was written in northeastern France. In the *Nachlass*, Bischoff notes that it

³⁸See below, 43–80.

³⁹Palaeographical descriptions of this manuscript are found in: Bischoff, *Katalog* 3, 6380; and *Nachlass*, Valenciennes. The *Nachlass* material comprises a single sheet dated 27 March 1957. The great majority of this material is written in blue-black ink, but there are a few later interventions in pencil. The manuscript can be seen on Gallica.

was copied a little to the south or southwest of Saint-Amand. The *Katalog* is less specific and locates the manuscript only in northeastern France. Nancy Phillips suggests instead that the manuscript may have been produced in Reims.⁴⁰ The *Nachlass* material and the *Katalog* both date the manuscript to between the second quarter and the middle of the ninth century. It was written by a number of scribes. In addition to several text hands, Bischoff describes a correcting hand, which writes in the manner of Saint-Amand in the *Nachlass* material. There are a few marginal notes, some of which are written by ninth-century hands.

On the front pastedown we find a booklist and a brief note each written in a different ninth-century hand. If the booklist relates to the contents of a particular library, it has not been identified.⁴¹ The texts are entirely patristic; we find works by Gregory, Jerome, and Augustine only. The note also affirms a patristic context for *De musica*, since it lists the other works written by Augustine in his youth.

Dorfbauer has examined the texts contained in this manuscript.⁴² He argues that the compilation is not original to this manuscript, but reflects a collection of music theory that has not until now been recognised as such. He writes that ‘this collection may be understood as a product of the cultural renaissance that we associate with the work of Charlemagne and his court’.⁴³ The extract from Censorinus’ *De die natali* was, he suggests, first taken from the full text contained in the eighth-century manuscript, Cologne Diözesan- und Dombibliothek 166. Nonetheless he argues that in this instance it was copied from an intermediate, in which the text had already been excerpted and the music theory collection put together. His argument rests on the unusual position of the prefatory material between

⁴⁰Phillips, ‘Classical and late Latin sources’, p. 121

⁴¹Phillips suggests that the contents of this booklist resemble the sources used by Hincmar of Reims in his writings against Gottschalk and Arianism. The booklist therefore plays a part in her ascription of this manuscript to Reims. See Phillips, ‘Classical and late Latin sources’, p. 121.

⁴²Lukas J. Dorfbauer, ‘Ein Exzerpt aus Censorins „De die natali“ (12,3–13,1) in einer karolingischen Sammlung von musiktheoretischen Texten’, *Hermes* 145 (2017), pp. 79–89.

⁴³Dorfbauer, ‘Ein Excerpt’, p. 84–5. ‘Es ist somit sehr gut möglich, dass die Kollektion ein Produkt jener kulturellen „Renaissance“ darstellt, die man gern mit dem Wirken Karls des Großen und seines Hofes in Verbindung bringt.’

the texts by Isidore and Augustine, to which it is addressed, and the fact that the prefatory material and Censorinus excerpt are not given a title or initial on f. 4v. While he may be correct in his conclusion, we should note that space was also left for absent titles for each book of Augustine besides the first on ff. 18v, 28v, 53r, and 64v, and that the initials were only filled in later. Perhaps related to the function of this collection, Dorfbauer notes that the Augustine contains a number of changes, which could be understood as deliberate interventions to make it easier to understand the linguistically and substantively difficult text, and suggests that these changes may go back to the compiler of this collection. On the basis of textual variants, he argues that the collection is independent from the circulation of the full text of Censorinus' *De die natali* alongside an epitome of Augustine's *De musica* in other ninth-century manuscripts. This may be true in a strictly philological sense, but it would be premature to conclude that the association was not recognised and played no part in the intellectual life of the early middle ages.

*Vercelli Biblioteca capitolare CXXXVIII*⁴⁴

1. ff. 1v–6r, Boethius, Latin translation of Porphyry, *Isagoge*;
2. ff. 6r–15r, Boethius *et al.*, Latin translation of Aristotle, *Categories*;⁴⁵
3. ff. 15r–26v, Pseudo-Augustine, *Categoriae decem*;
4. ff. 27r–32r, Pseudo-Augustine, *De dialectica*;
5. ff. 33r–71v, Boethius, *De institutione arithmetica*;
6. ff. 72r–99v, Bede, *De natura rerum*;

⁴⁴Palaeographical descriptions of this manuscript are found in: Bischoff, *Katalog* 3, 7004; *Nachlass*, Vercelli; and Margaret T. Gibson, Marina Passalacqua, and Lesley Smith, editors, *Codices Boethiani: a conspectus of manuscripts of the works of Boethius*, 4 volumes (London: 1995–2009), volume 3, 392. The *Nachlass* material comprises a single undated sheet. A first layer of material is written in blue-black ink, but much more was later added in blue biro. There are a few interventions in pencil. I have not been able to see this manuscript or images of this manuscript.

⁴⁵John Marenbon writes that this is in fact a composite translation 'formed from the lemmata from Boethius' Commentary on the *Categories* with the missing passages supplied by an unknown translator'. He suggests that 'the earliest surviving manuscripts of Boethius' own translation are from the eleventh century', and that 'there is no evidence of its use in the Middle Ages before then'. See *From the circle of Alcuin to the school of Auxerre* (Cambridge: 1989), p. 16.

7. ff. 100r–142r, Augustine, *De musica*;
8. ff. 143r–147, later material.

ff. 147, possibly with initial or final flyleaves;

298 × 253 mm, <213 × 180> mm, 36 lines in two columns;

I have not been able to see this manuscript or images of this manuscript, and for this reason it could not be collated;

Italian Caroline minuscule;

probably s. X first half, northern Italy.

In the *Nachlass*, material Bischoff writes that this manuscript was copied by several scribes in an Italian Caroline minuscule. The date of the manuscript is worked out over several layers of his material and reflects Bischoff's developing thought. In a first layer he suggests a date between the ninth and tenth centuries, but this is later refined to a date probably in the first half of the tenth. The *Katalog* reproduces both readings. Other commentators have preferred a date in the ninth century. We find this for instance in *Codices Boethiani*. Jacobsson and Dorfbauer write in their introduction to the CSEL edition of *De musica* that the script 'does not appear to be any older than the last third of the 9th century'.⁴⁶

The manuscript contains a colophon that may suggest something about the circulation of *De musica* in the ninth century. On f. 142r we read in capitals:⁴⁷

aur[eliu] aug[ustini] de musica liber VI
Itus finit karolo regi magno francorum et
langobardorum ac patricio romanorum. bodus contulit sollicito obqua[m] siquid
ambiguum forte postea fuerit tale opus compertum rationis uel peritiae est

⁴⁶Jacobsson and Dorfbauer, Introduction to the CSEL edition of Augustine's *De musica*, p. 19.

⁴⁷An image of this subscription is found in Kirsten Wallenwein, *Corpus subscriptionum: Verzeichnis der Beglaubigungen von spätantiken und frühmittelalterlichen Textabschriften* (saec. IV–VIII) (Stuttgart: 2017), p. 153.

The Charles referred to here is clearly Charlemagne, and we may therefore conclude that the colophon was composed no later than 814. Since this is much earlier than the hand in which it is written, it seems likely that it was copied from a much earlier exemplar that passed from Francia into Italy. This manuscript is therefore an important witness to transalpine knowledge exchange in the early middle ages.

The compilation of texts in the manuscript also reveals something about the place of *De musica* in the intellectual life of the early middle ages. We may worry about the date of this compilation; the blank page between the Pseudo-Augustinian *De dialectica* and Boethius' *De institutione arithmetica* in particular may suggest that whatever the date of the texts themselves, their compilation may be separate and later. In fact this appears not to be the case. A full list of the manuscript's contents written on f. 1r in a tenth-century hand demonstrates that the compilation of the manuscript is early, even if it is not original to the production of the manuscript. Nonetheless, in his *Nachlass*, Bischoff appears to suggest that it is indeed a single production; he distinguishes no separate parts before f. 143 in his examination of the manuscript's palaeographical characteristics. Several of the texts in this manuscript have been overwritten with marginal and interlinear interventions. Bischoff dates this material in several layers to the tenth and eleventh centuries. Commentary is attached to Boethius' *Isagoge* translation, the first few folios of the *Categoriae decem*, and Boethius' *De institutione arithmetica*. None of this material has been edited.⁴⁸ In this manuscript we find *De musica* in the company of texts on logic and number. Indeed the selection of texts is remarkably similar to the texts

⁴⁸For instance, the material accompanying Boethius' translation of Porphyry's *Isagoge* is not published in Clemens Baeumker and Bodo Sartorius, Freiherr von Waltershausen, *Frühmittelalterliche glossen des angeblichen Jeps zur Isagoge des Porphyrius* (Münster: 1924), but see also the discussion in Marenbon, 'Medieval Latin commentaries and glosses on Aristotelian logical texts before c. 1150AD', in *Glosses and commentaries on Aristotelian logical texts: the Syriac, Arabic and medieval Latin traditions*, edited by Charles Burnett (London: 1993), pp. 77–127; the material accompanying the *Categoriae decem* is not published in Marenbon, *From the circle of Alcuin*; and the material accompanying Boethius' *De institutione arithmetica* is not published in either Michael Bernhard, 'Glossen zur Arithmetik des Boethius', in *Scire litteras: Forschungen zum mittelalterlichen Geistesleben*, edited by Sigrid Krämer and Michael Bernhard (Munich: 1988), pp. 23–34 or Henry Mayr-Harting, *Church and cosmos in early Ottonian Germany* (Oxford: 2007).

that I shall discuss in the later parts of this thesis. With further work it may be possible to show that the kind of reading of *De musica* – and of *musica* itself – that I shall examine in the writing of Eriugena was in fact more widespread and longer lasting in the early middle ages.

Summary

The surviving copies of Augustine's *De musica* that were made in the early middle ages reveal a great deal about how the text was read at that time. The evidence provided by each of the copies is not all of a kind, and it does not all point in the same direction; we should be wary of suggesting that there was a single place for the text in medieval intellectual life.

Nonetheless, a few more general conclusions can be drawn out of the preceding accounts. In the first place it is clear that *De musica* was read whole. By this I do not mean to exclude the circulation of excerpts, which certainly exist, but rather to suggest that there was not at this time an independent circulation of the sixth book, as is found in later copies. In fact, Jacobsson and Dorfbauer have shown on the basis of variants in the textual tradition that the independent circulation of this book can be traced to several distinct beginnings in the thirteenth century, but that each of these depends on the earlier circulation of the full text.⁴⁹ In other words, even if there had been an independent circulation of this book in Augustine's own time, as is suggested in one of his letters, this was not known in the early middle ages. Moreover we can know something about the circulation of these copies. The Corbie manuscript seems to suggest that several exemplars could be collected in one place at one time. This may also be suggested by the variant readings that are recorded in several of the manuscripts.⁵⁰ Finally, we should acknowledge the possibility that one or more of these

⁴⁹Jacobsson and Dorfbauer, Introduction to the CSEL edition of *De musica*, p. 35 note 92. 'The errors of the relevant manuscripts can be used to identify coherent groups, and it seems likely that there was not a single hyparchetype to which all extant manuscripts offering only book 6 go back, but that the process of isolating this book from the rest of the work happened repeatedly and independently in the 13th century.' See also the discussion of the text's early history on pp. 9–10 and in Frank Hentschel, 'Musica, De –', in *Augustinus Lexikon*, 4 volumes (Basel: 1986–), volume 4, pp. 130–7, at pp. 130–1.

⁵⁰Jacobsson and Dorfbauer, Introduction to the CSEL edition of *De musica*, pp. 21–2 and thereafter.

exemplars came from England or Ireland. We may possess a fragment of one such Irish exemplar in St Gallen, and the earliest definitively continental witness to the text comes from a centre under the influence of Alcuin.

The manuscripts also reveal something about the contexts in which *De musica* was read. Some of this evidence is circumstantial. The booklist and note on Augustine's early writings in the manuscript now in Valenciennes may suggest that the patristic context of this work was important. This is, in fact, reinforced by its position in many of the library catalogues that I shall discuss below. We should also consider the texts with which *De musica* is bound. In every case these seem to be original or early compilations. Two of the manuscripts contain other texts on *musica*, but even here the focus of the collections seems to point away from practical music making and toward a tradition of numerical and philosophical speculation. I have discussed this above with reference to the Boethius glosses in Paris, but we can reach the same conclusion regarding the Valenciennes manuscript, especially in relation to the excerpt from Censorinus. The Vercelli manuscript is more obviously removed from the immediate concerns of a practical musical tradition. As I hope to show in the remaining parts of this thesis, there is a way of reading its logical, musical, and numerical contents such that they contribute to a single metaphysical tradition. Eriugena's use of Augustine's *De musica* should be understood within this context and indeed fits it nicely. Further information about the place of *De musica* in the intellectual life of the early middle ages is provided by the medieval library catalogues in which it is recorded.

The early medieval library catalogues that record De musica

The library catalogues that were drawn up in the early middle ages complement what we have learned from the surviving copies of *De musica* by pointing toward further copies of the text that have not survived and further circulations of the text that have left no trace in the manuscript record. If we better understand the role played by the catalogues in early medieval intellectual life, it is possible to trace even more closely the place of *De musica*. In her study of

the library catalogues and booklists produced in the eighth and ninth centuries, McKitterick suggests that even the practical function of the catalogues extended beyond the enumeration of the contents of the library in question.⁵¹ She argues that library catalogues were prepared for circulation and exchange between centres. Catalogues of the Reichenau library were made for Constance and Murbach, a catalogue from Lorsch may have been sent to Saint-Vaast, and another Lorsch catalogue includes also the contemporary holdings of Fulda. Further evidence of catalogue circulation is found in the correspondence of ninth-century scholars.

McKitterick suggests that one purpose of this exchange may have been to indicate the location of texts and availability of exemplars. She therefore concludes that these catalogues and booklists 'not only record the possession of knowledge [...] but themselves constitute bibliographical guides to book accessions and the acquisition of knowledge'.⁵²

There is another sense in which the library catalogues were bibliographical guides; the information that the catalogues provide is not limited to practical questions concerning the availability of texts and their circulation. The catalogues also offer information about the valuation of different sorts of texts. McKitterick writes that 'the booklists should be understood as a dynamic expression of literate and intellectual aspirations'.⁵³ These aspirations are communicated by the very organisation of the catalogues, which seems to have been standardised early in the ninth century or a little before. McKitterick writes:⁵⁴

[The catalogues] represent, in other words, a systematization of the written word, and an organization of knowledge, with far-reaching consequences. For one thing, they effectively defined the intellectual framework within which literate skills were to be exercised. It was an intellectual framework within which the Bible and the need to understand the Christian faith were paramount, and for which the great fathers of the Church acted as the main supports.

⁵¹ McKitterick, *The Carolingians and the written word*, pp. 165–210.

⁵² McKitterick, *The Carolingians and the written word*, p. 209.

⁵³ McKitterick, *The Carolingians and the written word*, p. 166.

⁵⁴ McKitterick, *The Carolingians and the written word*, p. 210.

The standard organisation of the catalogues can be outlined as follows: the catalogues begin with the full text of the Bible followed by its individual books; thereafter the patristic authors are listed, and though the exact order in which their works appear varies between catalogues, it tends to be loosely chronological; finally we find other kinds of text, for example, those concerning the arts or history or collections of classical poetry. McKitterick argues that this ordering was developed at least in part under the influence of late-antique bibliographical guides, such as the Jerome-Gennadius *De uiris illustribus* and the *De libris recipiendis et non recipiendis*, which has often been attributed to Gelasius but is more likely a product of Frankish Gaul.⁵⁵ The position of Augustine's *De musica* in the library catalogues and booklists may therefore reveal something about its place in the intellectual life of the early middle ages, though we should remain aware that its position is at least in part determined by the generic constraints of this kind of catalogue, which may not be sensitive at the level of individual texts.

Augustine's *De musica* is recorded in eight early medieval catalogues and booklists. This does not imply that there were eight further copies of the text, if only because the centres with multiple catalogues likely record the same copy more than once. Nonetheless at least five copies seem to be recorded across the catalogues. It is possible that none of these has survived. Indeed the contrasting distributions of manuscripts and catalogues makes this more likely than it sounds; with the exception of Saint-Riquier all the surviving catalogues were made in the eastern part of Francia, whereas all the extant copies were made much further west. The Irish fragment now in St Gallen may have come from Reichenau or Bobbio and therefore may be one of those recorded in one or another of the surviving catalogues, and we should not discount the possibility that manuscripts were exchanged even over considerable distances, but it seems more probable than not that the catalogues record several copies that have not survived.

⁵⁵McKitterick, *The Carolingians and the written word*, pp. 200–209.

De musica is recorded twice in a catalogue from Bobbio.⁵⁶ In both instances it is found among later additions to the catalogue, the former being added around 830, and the latter in the tenth century. The original part of the list follows the organisation outlined above, but the internal organisation of the later parts is haphazard, perhaps because they represent smaller collections of books donated or owned by individual monks. The first entry is found in a section titled ‘Item de libris, quos Dunghalus praecipimus Scottorum obtulit beatissimo Columbano’ and reads ‘Librum sancti Augustini de musica’. The contents of this section – some 27 books – are mainly patristic. The second entry appears under the heading ‘Item de libris fratrem Smaragdi’ and reads ‘Librum Augustini de musica’. There are only eight volumes in this part of the list, and half of them relate to the arts. Augustine’s text also appears in three catalogues from Lorsch, which date between 830 and 860.⁵⁷ Each of these is organised according to the standard pattern set out above, and in every instance *De musica* is found among the works of Augustine. In catalogue B the entry reads ‘De arte musica libri VI in uno volumine’, and in catalogues Ca and D we find ‘De arte musica libri VI in uno codice’. A catalogue from Murbach likewise follows the standard organisation.⁵⁸ *De musica* is found among the works of Augustine in an entry that reads ‘De musica libri VI’. Augustine’s text is recorded in two catalogues from Reichenau.⁵⁹ The first of these was drawn up by the Abbey’s librarian, Reginbert, in around 824. It follows the standard order set out above and includes *De musica* among the works of Augustine under the entry ‘De musica libri VI in codice I’. The second catalogue in which *De musica* appears was written in the second half of the ninth

⁵⁶M. Tosi, ‘Il governo abbaziale di Gerberto a Bobbio’, in *Gerberto: scienza, storia e mito*, edited by M. Tosi (Bobbio, Piacenza: 1985), pp. 197–214, with these entries at numbers 522 and 676.

⁵⁷Angelika Häse, *Mittelalterliche Bucherverzeichnisse aus Kloster Lorsch: Einleitung, Edition und Kommentar* (Wiesbaden: 2002), with these entries in catalogue B at number 87, catalogue Ca at number 120, and catalogue D at number 39. For the relation between these catalogues, see pp. 19–52 and Bernhard Bischoff, *Lorsch im Spiegel seiner Handschriften* (Munich: 1974), pp. 8–18. See also McKitterick, *The Carolingians and the written word*, pp. 185–91.

⁵⁸Wolfgang Milde, *Der Bibliothekskatalog des Klosters Murbach aus dem 9. Jahrhundert: Ausgabe und Untersuchung von Beziehungen zu Cassiodors „Institutiones“* (Heidelberg: 1968), with this entry at number 71. See also McKitterick, *The Carolingians and the written word*, pp. 192–5.

⁵⁹Paul Lehmann, *Mittelalterliche Bibliothekskataloge Deutschlands und die Schweiz*, 4 volumes (Munich: 1917–77), with these entries in volume 1, catalogues 49 and 54. See also McKitterick, *The Carolingians and the written word*, pp. 179–82.

century and is less clearly organised. The text comes toward the very end of the catalogue among the books on the *artes*. The entry reads ‘Augustinus de musica VI’. The text is not recorded in the other, intervening lists from Reichenau, one of which records the books copied by Reginbert himself, and which should probably be understood as additions to the first catalogue. Finally, *De musica* is recorded in a booklist from Saint-Riquier, which is found in Hariulf’s Chronicle of the Abbey for the year 831.⁶⁰ It is found in a section titled ‘De libris sancti Augustini’ with the entry ‘de arte musica’. The text is not found in the catalogues from Cologne⁶¹ or St Gallen.⁶² Nor is it found in the booklist associated with the library of Charlemagne, though only the latter part of this list survives, and it contains no works at all by Augustine.⁶³ The early material from Fulda, Saint-Wandrille, and Würzburg is brief, and the absence of *De musica* is therefore perhaps not surprising.⁶⁴

This examination of the library catalogues and booklists that were drawn up in the early middle ages and record the presence of *De musica* complements the preceding discussion of the manuscripts in which it is copied. We may again conclude that the text was known in its entirety. The catalogues of Lorsch, Murbach, and Reichenau each relate that all six books were held by the libraries. Moreover, those of Lorsch and Reichenau add that they were bound in a single volume. No further codicological information is given in the catalogues, but this does not necessarily mean that *De musica* was only ever found alone; it is clear that some of the compilers (*e.g.* Reginbert) were much more concerned to provide this kind of information than others. The second observation to be made is that *De musica* is most frequently listed among the other writings of Augustine. The fact that it was a patristic text

⁶⁰Hariulf, *Chronique de l’abbaye de Saint-Riquier*, edited by Ferdinand Lot (Paris: 1894), with this entry on p. 90. See also McKitterick, *The Carolingians and the written word*, pp. 176–8.

⁶¹Anton Dekker, ‘Die Hildebold’sche Manuscriptensammlung der Kölner Domes’, in *Festschrift der 43. Versammlung deutscher Philologen und Schulmänner*, edited by August Chamblu *et al.* (Bonn: 1895), pp. 217–53

⁶²Lehmann, *Mittelalterliche Bibliothekskataloge* 1, catalogues 16–22.

⁶³Bernhard Bischoff, ‘Die Hofbibliothek Karls des Großen’, in *Mittelalterliche Studien* 3, pp. 149–69.

⁶⁴See Gangolf Schrimpf, *Mittelalterliche Bücherverzeichnisse des Klosters Fulda und andere Beiträge zur Geschichte der Bibliothek des Klosters Fulda im Mittelalter* (Frankfurt am Main: 1992); Pascal Pradié, *Chronique des abbés de Fontenelle (Saint Wandrille)* (Paris: 1999); and Bernhard Bischoff and Josef Hofmann, *Libri Sancti Kyliani: die Würzburger Schreibschule und die Dombibliothek im VIII. und IX. Jahrhundert* (Würzburg: 1952) respectively.

seems to have been important to the compilers of the catalogues and booklists. We should, however, be careful about how we weigh this information. Two of the concerns addressed in the library catalogues that have been identified by McKitterick – namely to enumerate accurately the contents of a library and to organise a canon of knowledge in a new way – sometimes appear to be in tension, and since the catalogues often provide only very little information regarding the compilation of texts within a manuscript, it is difficult to know how or to what extent these tensions were dissipated. In other words, we need a better understanding of how the catalogues would treat something like the Vercelli manuscript with its diverse and extensive collection of writings before we can assess what significance we should give to their insistent treatment of *De musica* as a patristic text. This is a question for another, much more widely ranging study. For the present chapter, it is sufficient to conclude that *De musica* was read widely and in its entirety in the early middle ages. Moreover, it is clear that its meaning was negotiated through several contextual mediations: the text is most frequently catalogued as a patristic text (as opposed to, for example, a text on the arts) and set among the writings of Augustine, and the manuscripts in which it is copied set it alongside a range of other writings. These strands will become important in my later discussion of Eriugena. In the final part of this chapter, I shall examine a more specific context in which Eriugena may have read the text.

From *uitalis motus* to *uita generalis*: Eriugena reading glosses on Augustine's *De musica*

It seems likely that Eriugena read *De musica* in a manuscript that was already overwritten with an earlier ninth-century commentary or gloss tradition. One such manuscript still exists in Tours, and it is possible that this is exactly the copy used by Eriugena. The glosses in this manuscript were likely written in the second quarter of the ninth century and therefore predate Eriugena's own writing by a number of years. Nonetheless, certain terms used in the

Tours glosses reappear in Eriugena's writing and are treated at length in the *Periphyseon*. The most significant of these terms is 'uita generalis' or 'general life'. The relation between this term and one used in *De musica*, 'uitalis motus' or 'vital motion', provides the strongest evidence that Eriugena read glosses on Augustine's text. This mediation is much more specific than the mediation that I discussed in the preceding parts of the chapter, and it therefore requires a much more detailed examination of ideas drawn from Augustine's text.

In order to understand what is meant by *uita generalis* or *uitalis motus*, we therefore need to know a little more about the relations between eternity, time, and place described in *De musica*. Augustine's text is framed by a division of all things into the things that are eternal, the things that are in time (which can be measured in terms of duration), and the things that are in both time and place (which can be measured in terms of both duration and corporeal extension). Augustine presents time as an image or imitation of eternity, an idea with a long history in the Platonic tradition. His treatment of place relies on a particular relation between the body and the soul. In *De musica* he writes that whatever in a body imitates constancy and eternity is thrown into the body through the soul. This seems to rely on an argument certainly implied in *De musica* and made explicit elsewhere that all bodies depend on a soul by which they are animated. Augustine therefore establishes an order of priority among these kinds of number: eternal numbers are prior to the numbers in time, which are in turn prior to the numbers in both time and place. This tripartition and its relations are not unique to *De musica*, and I shall trace them also through a small number of Augustine's other writings namely *De immortalitate animae*, *De Genesi ad litteram*, and the *Retractationes*. At the end of *De musica* Augustine introduces a fourth part, which is neither eternal nor measured by specific intervals of time. He calls this the *uitalis motus*. This term can also be traced through Augustine's writing, where it refers to the incorporeal extension of the soul in the body and the animation of the body by the soul. In the passage from the end of *De musica*, Augustine therefore seems to be referring to a universal soul, which extends throughout the universal body and animates it, an idea that he had previously explored in *De immortalitate animae*. This was well understood by the

compiler of the Tours glosses. Drawing on a prolonged consideration of the relation between times and places and between the whole and its parts, which we find elsewhere in the glosses, the Tours scribe identifies this as the *uita* or *anima generalis*. The term was in turn taken up by Eriugena, who used it in his explanation of the Platonic *anima mundi*, which he had read about in Calcidius' Latin translation of the *Timaeus*. In the first book of the *Periphyseon*, Eriugena uses the term exactly as it is found in the Tours glosses. It describes the vegetative power of the Platonic *anima mundi*. Here, the vegetative power is described in terms of motion and rest instead of time and place. These ideas are also found in *De musica*, though they are not included in the Tours glosses. The change was perhaps informed by a lexical coincidence between Augustine and Calcidius, who also ascribes motion and rest to the *anima mundi*.⁶⁵ When he wrote the third book of the *Periphyseon*, Eriugena had a very much expanded notion of the *uita generalis*. In this book, it includes the intellectual, rational, and sensible life as well as the vegetative life of the *anima mundi*. Where Eriugena wishes to refer specifically to the vegetative power of this soul, he uses Augustine's own preferred term, *uitalis motus*. The easy movement between the two terms – *uita generalis* and *uitalis motus* – suggests that Eriugena knew them together in a glossed copy of Augustine's text. This has an immediate application in the present chapter: we can know that Eriugena had access to an earlier commentary tradition on *De musica*, which is represented by the glosses in the Tours manuscript. Nonetheless, it also engages with the broader themes of the thesis; for it shows that *musica* could and did contribute to a much broader tradition of philosophical speculation.

⁶⁵Nonetheless, it is not limited to lexical coincidence. As I shall argue in chapter 2, Eriugena often avoids time and place when discussing Augustine's *De musica*, perhaps to accommodate the fact that he has very different ideas about their definition.

Times, places, and the anima mundi in the writings of Augustine

The material to be examined in this section coalesces around a passage from the very end of *De musica*, in which Augustine sets out the relations between eternal and unchanging number, number that is separated by intervals of time (as measures of duration), and number that is also distributed into space (as measures of corporeal extension). A fourth part of this scheme, a 'uitalis motus' or 'vital motion' that is neither eternal nor yet separated into specific intervals of time or place, is mentioned by Augustine but not explained in any great detail. We can trace the basic tripartition of eternal, temporal, and local things throughout Augustine's career; it is found in more or less the same form even in much later works than *De musica*, such as *De Genesi ad litteram*. The *uita generalis* can also be traced throughout Augustine's writings both as a particular term and as an identifiable idea. It becomes clear, as it is expounded in *De musica*, that it should be understood as some version of the Platonic *anima mundi*. There are two parts to my contextualisation of ideas drawn from *De musica* in Augustine's other writings. In the first part, which is by far the longer, I shall examine the relation between soul and body described by Augustine in terms of times and places. In the *Retractationes*, Augustine connects this relation to his examination of the *anima mundi* in *De immortalitate animae*. The second part examines in greater detail the words 'uitalis motus' and other related terms ('uitalis motio', 'uitalis intentio', and so on) as they are found elsewhere in Augustine's writings in relation to the soul's extension through the body and animation of the body.

Eternity, times, and places in Augustine's De musica

In the final chapter of the sixth book of *De musica*, Augustine attempts to demonstrate that all things are made by God and made from nothing. The examination of this question is, in the first instance, sparked by a comparison between the universe and number. Drawing on conclusions reached earlier in the text, Augustine writes that, like number, the universe desires unity and order, and therefore we must admit that, like number, it comes from one

beginning.⁶⁶ Augustine presents three examples better to address the problem. The first of these makes a distinction between rational, temporal, and local numbers in the activity of a craftsman. Augustine writes:⁶⁷

For this reason, the verse that we have recited, *Deus creator omnium*, is not only very pleasing to the ears on account of its harmonious sound but much more pleasing to the soul on account of the soundness and truth of its meaning, unless perhaps you are afflicted by the slowness of those [...] who deny that something is made from nothing, when it is said that omnipotent God made it. Or can the craftsman produce with the rational numbers, which are in his art, the sensual numbers, which are in his habit, and produce with the sensual numbers the *progressores*,⁶⁸ with which he moves his limbs as he works, and to which belong the intervals of time, and again make with these numbers harmonious visible forms out of wood, which are in intervals of place, and yet the nature of things serving the will of God not make the wood itself from earth and the other elements?

In this first example, Augustine demonstrates that the numbers in reason, which he has shown to be eternal,⁶⁹ are prior to the numbers in times, and these are in turn prior to numbers in places. In the following example, Augustine demonstrates that the same relations are found in the production or growth of the wood itself. Continuing from the passage quoted above he

⁶⁶*De musica* 6, 17, 56

⁶⁷*De musica* 6, 17, 57. 'Quare ille uersus a nobis propositus *Deus creator omnium* non solum auribus sono numeroso, sed multo magis est animae sententiae sanitate et ueritate gratissimus, nisi forte moueat te tarditas eorum, [...] qui negant de nihilo fieri posse aliquid, cum id omnipotens deus fecisse dicatur. An uero faber potest rationabilibus numeris, qui sunt in arte eius, sensuales numeros, qui sunt in consuetudine eius, operari et sensualibus numeris progressores illos, quibus membra in operando mouet, ad quos iam interualla temporum pertinent, et his rursus formas uisibiles de ligno fabricari locorum interuallis numerosas – et rerum natura dei nutibus seruiens ipsum lignum de terra et ceteris elementis facere non potest?'

⁶⁸See below, pp. 186–91.

⁶⁹See below, pp. 192–200.

writes:⁷⁰

Indeed, the temporal numbers of a tree also necessarily precede its local numbers. For there is no kind of plant that does not in determined measurements of time take root and germinate from its seed, break forth into the air, unfurl its leaves, become strong, and return either fruit or the power of the seed by means of the most secret numbers of the wood itself again.

The final stage of Augustine's argument returns again to the elements. He argues that just as the tree is made from the elements, so too the elements are made from nothing. Nonetheless, the conclusion that local numbers are necessarily preceded by temporal numbers is not forgotten, and it is from this conclusion that Augustine works out his most general ordering of eternity, times, and places. In the first part of this argument, Augustine demonstrates that the elements are made from nothing. He writes:⁷¹

Can these things be made from the elements, and the elements not from nothing? As if there were something among them lesser and lower than earth, which in the first place has the general appearance of a body, in which we can clearly see a certain unity and numbers and order. For any part of it, however small, is necessarily extended from an indivisible point into length, third into breadth, and fourth into height, by which the body is completed. From where,

⁷⁰*De musica* 6, 17, 57. 'Immo de arboris locales numeros temporales numeri antecedant necesse est. Nullum est enim stirpium genus, quod non certis pro suo semine dimensionibus temporum et coalescat et germinet et in auras emicet et folia explicet et roboretur et siue fructum siue ipsius ligni occultissimis numeris uim rursus seminis referat.'

⁷¹*De musica* 6, 17, 57. 'An ista de elementis fieri possunt et ipsa elementa non potuerunt de nihilo? Quasi uero quidquam sit in eis uilius et abiectius quam terra est; quae primo generalem speciem corporis habet, in qua unitas quaedam et numeri et ordo esse conuincitur: Namque ab aliqua impartili nota in longitudinem necesse est porrigatur quaelibet eius quantumuis parua particula, tertiam latitudinem sumat et quartam altitudinem, qua corpus impletur. Vnde ergo iste a primo usque ad quartum progressionis modus? Vnde et aequalitas partium, quae et in longitudine et in latitudine et in altitudine reperitur? Vnde corrationalitas quaedam – ita enim maiori analogiam uocare –, ut quam rationem habet longitudo ad impartilem notam, eandem latitudo ad longitudinem et ad latitudinem habeat altitudo? Vnde, quaeso, ista nisi ab illo summo atque aeterno principatu numerorum et similitudinis et aequalitatis et ordinis ueniunt? At haec si terrae ademeris, nihil erit. Quocirca et omnipotens deus terram facit et de nihilo facta est.'

then, is this manner of progression from the first to the fourth? From where the equality of parts, which we discover in length and breadth and height? From where the certain ‘corrationality’ – which is what I prefer to call *analogia* – by which whatever relation we find between length and the indivisible point is found also between breadth and length and between height and breadth? From where, I ask, does this come except from the highest and eternal originator of numbers and likeness and equality and order? And if you should take this away from earth, it would be nothing. For which reason the omnipotent God made earth, and he made it from nothing.

Augustine continues through the remaining elements – water, air, and whatever is found in the highest circuit of the heavens – each of which more closely approaches unity and has a greater likeness among its parts than the last. Augustine’s conclusion is here only implied, but it is clear enough: these elements are also made from nothing. Whatever numbers we find in these elemental bodies are local, since they are measures of corporeal extension. In the culmination of his argument Augustine generalises the relations between the local numbers, which are found in bodies, and the temporal and eternal numbers, which were set out in the preceding examples. He writes:⁷²

Yet surely all these things, which we number with the aid of the bodily senses, and whatever is in them could neither receive nor possess local numbers, which seem to be at rest, unless they were preceded in silence by the innermost temporal numbers, which are in motion. In the same way these numbers, which are agile in the intervals of time, are preceded and controlled by a vital motion

⁷²*De musica* 6, 17, 58. ‘Ista certe omnia, quae carnalis sensus ministerio numeramus, et quaecumque in eis sunt locales numeros, qui uidentur esse in aliquo statu, nisi praecedentibus intimis in silentio temporalibus numeris, qui sunt in motu, nec accipere possunt nec habere. Illos itidem in temporarum interuallis agiles praecedit et modificat uitalis motus seruiens domino rerum omnium non temporalia habens digesta interualla numerorum suorum, sed tempora ministrante potentia, supra quam rationales et intellectionales numeri beatarum animarum et sanctarum legem ipsam dei [...] nulla interposita natura excipientes usque ad terrena et inferna iura transmittunt.’

that serves the Lord of all things, which does not possess distinct intervals of time, but by its power directs the times. And above this power the rational and intellectual numbers of blessed and holy souls receive the very law of God [...] with no nature set between them and transmit it to the earthly and infernal judgements.

This is undoubtedly a complex passage. The relations between eternal, temporal, and local numbers can be recognised from the previous examples; the local numbers that measure and comprise the elemental bodies depend on temporal numbers, and these depend in turn on the rational and intellectual numbers, which were shown to be eternal earlier in the text.⁷³

Nonetheless, new complexities are introduced among the relations described in this passage. I shall discuss the prototypical role of the intellectual numbers in chapter 3. The priority of temporal to local numbers was relatively straightforward in the preceding examples, but this final example poses further difficulties. What, for example, are the temporal numbers that are prior to the local numbers of the elemental bodies, and what is the nature of their priority? Moreover, the *uitalis motus*, which is neither eternal nor yet separated into distinct intervals of time, did not appear in the preceding examples, and it is not clear how it should be accommodated in this passage. Is it a new requirement of the elemental bodies, or was it tacitly assumed in the preceding material? I shall suggest later in the chapter that the sudden and unexplained appearance of the *uitalis motus* required the glossators to draw on their further reading for its explanation. We may do something similar. The complexities of the passage can, at least to a certain extent, be resolved by tracing the same ideas and terms through Augustine's other writings.

In the first instance, I shall demonstrate that the temporal motions of the soul are placed before the local extension of the body throughout Augustine's writing. This is expressed clearly in *De musica* but also in much later texts, such as *De Genesi ad litteram*. One group of references is especially important here. Commenting in the *Retractationes* on an earlier passage

⁷³ See below, 192–200.

in *De musica*, which also sets out this priority in the relation between body and soul, Augustine examines in some detail his reference to the universal body and universal soul in *De immortalitate animae*. By the time he wrote the *Retractationes*, Augustine had become critical of the Platonic *anima mundi*, but earlier in his career, its validity seems to have been assumed and required no special comment. Thereafter, I shall argue that the *uitalis motus* can also be recognised in Augustine's writing as one of a small number of terms used to describe the incorporeal extension of the soul through the body and the animation of the body by the soul. The passage from the end of *De musica* may therefore also be read as a comment on the *anima mundi*. Indeed exactly this sort of reading characterises the ninth-century reception of the text.

Towards the anima mundi

Two relations must be explained in order to understand the *uitalis motus* that Augustine introduces in the final chapter of *De musica*: the relation between eternity and the numbers in time, and the relation between the numbers in time and those also in place. With regard to the former, Augustine espouses the Platonic position, which is familiar from the *Timaeus*, that time and temporal things are an image of eternity and eternal things.⁷⁴ This can most clearly be seen in a passage from the sixth book, in which he writes:⁷⁵

What things are greater [than the soul] except those in which we find the highest, undisturbed, unchangeable, eternal equality? Here there is no time, because nothing can be changed, and from here the times are made and ordered and regulated in imitation of eternity [...]

The idea that time is the imitation of eternity has significant consequences for Augustine's

⁷⁴ *Timaeus a Calcidio translatus, commentarioque instructus*, edited by Jan Hendrik Waszink (London: 1962), beginning at 37c. See also the English translation of Calcidius' Latin text by John Magee, *On Plato's Timaeus* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 2016).

⁷⁵ *De musica* 6, 11, 29. 'Quae uero superiora sunt nisi illa, in quibus summa, inconcussa, incommutabilis, aeterna manet aequalitas, ubi nullum est tempus, quia mutabilitas nulla est, et unde tempora fabricantur et ordinantur et modificantur aeternitatem imitantia [...]'

treatment of equality, and it will be discussed at greater length in the final chapter. The second relation, *i.e.* between temporal and local numbers, is the more important for understanding the *uitalis motus* introduced at the end of *De musica*. The priority of temporal to local numbers is often bound up with Augustine's account of the soul's activity in a body. The passage from the end of *De musica* is not the first time that the idea has been introduced in the text. Indeed, an earlier passage provides the way into a network of references that connects Augustine's *uitalis motus* to the Platonic *anima mundi*. In this passage Augustine writes:⁷⁶

The soul does not find what it seeks in the world, namely constancy and eternity, since the lowest beauty is completed by the passing of things. Whatever in this beauty imitates constancy is thrown through the soul by God, since the species that is changeable only in time is prior to that which is changed in time and places.

In the *Retractationes*, Augustine comments on this passage extensively.⁷⁷ He relates it to a passage in *De immortalitate animae*, in which he had attested in passing the existence of a universal soul for the universal body. In the *Retractationes*, Augustine takes a much more critical stance on this conclusion, and censures what he calls his earlier rashness. Nonetheless his revisions do not reject the premise that the soul is moved only in time but the body in both time and place. Nor do they question the priority of the temporal motions of the soul to the local motions of the body. Indeed, these remain important parts of Augustine's thinking throughout his career. We find a very similar set of ideas in *De Genesi ad litteram*. In the eighth book of this text Augustine writes:⁷⁸

⁷⁶*De musica* 6, 14, 44. 'Quod enim in illo [mundo] anima quaerit, constantiam scilicet aeternitatemque, non inuenit, quoniam rereum transitu completur infima pulchritudo, et quod in illa imitatur constantiam a summo deo per animam traicitur, quoniam prior est species tantummodo tempore commutabilis quam ea, quae et tempore et locis.'

⁷⁷Augustine, *Retractationum libri duo*, edited by Almut Mutzenbecher (Turnhout: 1984), book 1, 11, 4.

⁷⁸Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim*, edited by Joseph Zycha (Prague: 1894), book 8, 20. 'Spiritalis autem creaturam corporali praeposuit, quod spiritalis tantummodo per tempora mutari posset, corporalis autem per tempora et locos. Exempli enim gratia per tempus mouetur animus uel reminiscendo, quod oblitus erat, uel discendo, quod nesciebat, uel uolendo, quod nolebat; per locos autem corpus uel a terra

The spiritual creature was placed before the corporeal creature, since spiritual things can only be changed through times, whereas corporeal things can be changed through times and places. For the sake of an example, the mind is moved through time when it remembers what it had forgotten or learns what it used not to know or wants what it used not to want; but the body is moved through place either from the earth into the heavens or from the heavens onto the earth or from east to west or wherever else in like manner. Whatever is moved through place cannot be moved unless it is at the same time moved through time, but not everything that is moved through time is also necessarily moved through place.

In this passage, Augustine has established the two premises set out above: that the soul is moved in only time but the body in both time and place, and that the motions in time are prior to those also in place. As the passage continues, it is made clear that the local motions of the body are produced by the temporal motions of the soul. Augustine writes:⁷⁹

Therefore, just as a substance that is moved through both time and place is preceded by a substance that is moved only through time, this substance is likewise preceded by a substance that is moved through neither place nor time. For this reason, just as the created spirit moves the body through time and place, while it is moved only through time, it is likewise moved through time by the

in caelum uel a caelo in terram uel ab oriente ad occidentem uel si quo alio simili modo. Omne autem, quod mouetur per locum, non potest nisi et per tempus simul moueri; at non omne, quod mouetur per tempus, necesse est etiam per locum moueri.'

⁷⁹*De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim* 8, 20–21. 'Sicut ergo substantiam, quae mouetur per tempus et locum, praecedat substantia, quae tantum per tempus, ita ipsam praecedat illa, quae nec per locum nec per tempus. Ac per hoc, sicut per tempus et locum mouet corpus ipse tantum per tempus motus conditus spiritus, ita per tempus mouet conditum spiritum ipse nec per tempus nec per locum motus conditor spiritus. Sed spiritus creatus mouet se ipsum per tempus et per tempus ac locum corpus; spiritus autem creator mouet se ipsum sine tempore ac loco, mouet conditum spiritum per tempus sine loco, mouet corpus per tempus et locum. Quocirca quisquis intellegere conatur, quemadmodum aeternum, uere aeternus et uere immortalis atque incommutabilis deus, ipse nec per locum nec per tempus motus, moueat temporaliter et localiter creaturam suam, non eum puto posse adsequi, nisi prius intellexerit, quemadmodum anima, hoc est spiritus creatus non per locum, sed tantum per tempus motus, moueat corpus per tempus et locum.'

Creator spirit, which is moved through neither place nor time. The created spirit moves itself through time but the body through time and place, whereas the Creator spirit moves itself through neither place nor time, the created spirit through time without place, and the body through time and place. For this reason I do not think that anyone who tries to understand how the eternal – truly eternal and truly immortal and unchangeable – God, who is moved through neither place nor time, can move his creature temporally and locally is able to understand this, unless the first understand how the soul, *i.e.* a created spirit moved not through place but only through time, can move the body through both time and place.

The broader context of this passage clearly informs the conclusion towards which it points, but the arrangement between times and places in the relation of the body and the soul is far more important for the purposes of this chapter. Three points have been made in the passages quoted from *De Genesi ad litteram*: the soul is moved only in time, whereas the body is moved in both time and place; the temporal motions of the soul are prior to the local motions of the body; and the temporal motions of the soul cause the local motions of the body. These points seem to tally closely with the passage from *De musica* quoted above. We may, therefore, wonder whether the passage from the end of that text, in which Augustine introduces the *uitalis motus*, should also be read in this context. Might the temporal numbers that precede the local numbers of the elemental bodies be associated with the motions of some soul? By the time Augustine wrote the *Retractationes*, he would not have supported this statement, but it seems to fit well with his earlier writing. Indeed, Augustine's comments on the passage from *De musica* quoted above examine whether the local numbers in every body are caused by a soul or whether this is true only of certain kinds of bodies or rather bodies animated by certain kinds of souls. It is worth quoting these remarks at some length. Reflecting on the

passage from *De musica*, Augustine writes:⁸⁰

In another place [in *De musica*] I said: 'The love of the world is more laborious. For the soul does not find what it seeks in the world, namely constancy and eternity, since the lowest beauty is completed by the passing of things. Whatever in this beauty imitates constancy is thrown through the soul by God, since the species that is changeable only in time is prior to that which is changed in time and places.' Reason clearly defends these words, if they can be taken so that the lowest beauty is understood only in human bodies and in the bodies of animals that live by bodily sense. Indeed whatever is beautiful in this way imitates constancy, since these bodies remain (in so far as they do remain) in their joining together, and this is thrown into bodies through the soul. Indeed the soul maintains this joining together, so that it does not disintegrate or dissolve; we see this in the bodies of animals from which the soul has departed. But if the lowest beauty is understood to be in all bodies, this sentence forces us to believe that the world itself is an animal, in order that whatever in the world imitates constancy may also have been thrown into it through a soul. But I have not been able to examine by definite reason nor have I been persuaded by the authority of the divine scriptures that the world is an animal, as Plato and many

⁸⁰*Retractationes* 1, 11, 4. 'Alio loco *Laboriosa est*, inquam, *huius mundi amor*. *Quod enim in illo [mundo] anima quaerit, constantiam scilicet aeternitatemque, non inuenit, quoniam rereum transitu completur infima pulchritudo, et quod in illa imitatur constantiam a summo deo per animam traicitur, quoniam prior est species tantummodo tempore commutabilis quam ea, quae et tempore et locis*. Haec uerba, si eo modo accipi possint, ut non intellegatur infima pulchritudo nisi in corporibus hominum omniumque animalium quae cum sensu corporis uiuunt, ratio manifesta defendit. Hoc quippe in ea pulchritudine imitatur constantiam, quod in conpage sua manent eadem corpora, in quantum manent; id autem a summo deo in ea per animam traicitur. Anima quippe ipsam conpagem tenet, ne dissoluatur et diffuat; quod uidemus in corporibus animalium anima discedente contingere. Si autem infima pulchritudo in omnibus corporibus intellegatur, cogit ista sententia etiam ipsum mundum animal credere, ut etiam in ipsum, quod in illo imitatur constantiam, a summo deo per animam traiciatur. Sed animal esse istum mundum, sicut Plato sensit alique philosophi plurimi, nec ratione certa indagare potui, nec diuinarum scripturarum auctoritate persuadere posse cognoui. Vnde tale aliquid a me dictum quo id accipi possit, etiam in libro *De immortalitate animae* temere dictum notaui, non quia hoc falsum esse confirmo, sed quia nec uerum esse conprehendo, quod sit animal mundus.' The passage from *De musica* has been quoted above. The passage from *De immortalitate animae* will be quoted below. The passage from *Retractationes* in which Augustine censures the latter is found at *Retractationes* 1, 5, 3.

other philosophers imagine. For this reason, I noted that I spoke rashly in the book *De immortalitate animae* when I said that such a thing could be accepted, not because I now confirm it to be false, but because I do not perceive it to be true that the world is an animal.

The passage from *De immortalitate animae*, another early work by Augustine, which Augustine here censures as rash, sets out a more general conclusion that is much closer to the wording of *De musica*. Augustine writes:⁸¹

Finally, if the soul is joined to the body (not locally, although the body occupies a place), it is affected by the highest and eternal reasons, which remain unchangeable and are by no means contained in place, prior to the body, and not only prior but also to a greater extent. It is affected prior to the body in so far as it is closer to these eternal reasons, and for the same reason it is affected to a greater extent in so far as it is better than the body. And its nearness is not a nearness of place but a nearness in the order of nature. By this order, it is understood that form is given to the body from the highest Being through the soul, by which it exists to the extent that it exists. The body therefore subsists through the soul and exists by the very fact that it is animated either universally, like the world, or specifically, like each animal on the world.

In both *De immortalitate animae* and *De musica*, the body receives whatever it receives from the eternal reasons through the soul. Although we do not find the same clear division of eternal, temporal, and local things at this point in *De immortalitate animae* as we did in *De musica*, Augustine's arguments are here entirely consonant with such a division. In any case, this

⁸¹ Augustine, *De immortalitate animae*, edited by Wolfgang Hörmann (Vienna: 1986), 15, 24. 'Postremo, si quamvis locum occupanti corpori anima tamen non localiter iungitur, quae incommutabiliter manent nec utique continentur loco, prior adficitur anima quam corpus, nec prior tantum, sed etiam magis. Tanto enim prior, quanto propinquior, et eadem causa tanto etiam magis, quanto etiam corpore melior. Nec ista propinquitas loco, sed naturae ordine dicta sit. Hoc autem ordine intellegitur a summa essentia speciem corpori per animam tribui, qua est, in quantumcumque est. Per animam ergo corpus subsistit et eo ipso est, quo animatur, sive universaliter, ut mundus, sive particulariter, unumquodque animal intra mundum.'

division is not at issue, since it remains constant throughout Augustine's career. We may therefore begin to work our way toward a conclusion. Throughout *De musica* Augustine argues that the soul is prior to the body, just as eternal things are prior to the soul. This priority is explained by a division into eternal things, things that are moved only in time, and things that are moved in both time and place. Moreover, this arrangement is often described as an *ordo* or order, the same term used in the passage from *De immortalitate animae* that was quoted above. The temporal motions of the soul can produce local motions in the body, as was argued in the passage from *De Genesi ad litteram*, but they also appear to preserve the integrity of the body in a more remote imitation of eternity. In Augustine's early writing there is no sign that this is restricted only to human souls and the souls of sensible animals, as it was in the *Retractationes*. It therefore seems likely that Augustine was making reference to something like the *anima mundi*, when he wrote at the end of *De musica* that the local numbers that comprise the bodies of the elements are preceded by temporal numbers at the end of *De musica*. Indeed, the passage from the *Retractationes* in which Augustine criticises his earlier remarks about the *anima mundi* seems also to address the final passage from *De musica*. At the end of the passage, he makes a remark that can only refer to this point in *De musica*. He writes:⁸²

Nevertheless, it should be believed most correctly even by those who do not understand that, even if the world is not an animal, there is a spiritual and vital virtue, which in the holy angels serves God in the adornment and administration of the world. Now I would call every holy, spiritual creature constituted in the hidden and secret service of God by the name of holy angels, but holy scripture does not usually mean the angelic spirit when it uses the name of souls.

Having examined the relation between the temporal and local numbers, Augustine discusses

⁸² *Retractationes* I, 11, 4. 'Esse tamen spiritalem uitalemque uirtutem, etiam si non sit animal mundus, quae uirtus in angelis sanctis ad decorandum atque administrandum mundum deo seruit et a quibus non intellegitur, rectissime creditur. Angelorum autem sanctorum nomine omnem sanctam creaturam nunc appellauerim; sed spiritus angelicos sancta scriptura nomine animarum significare non solet.'

the other two parts that were mentioned at the end of *De musica*. There is considerable overlap between the two passages. Augustine's concern for whether scripture refers to angels as souls seems to have been sparked by his reference at the end of *De musica* to the 'rational and intellectual numbers of blessed and holy souls'. Indeed it scarcely makes sense without this context. Likewise Augustine's reference to the 'spiritual and vital virtue' in the *Retractationes* recalls the 'vital motion' from *De musica*, especially since both are said to serve God and to administer some part of the world. Augustine's change in terminology is a further significant demonstration of his more critical position regarding the *anima mundi*. In the following section, I shall trace the *uitalis motus* and some related terms through Augustine's writing to demonstrate the significance of these terms in describing the relation of the soul and the body. The fact that Augustine substitutes 'virtue' for 'motion' in the *Retractationes* therefore suggests that he is again turning himself away from the argument that the world is an animal comprising body and soul.

Vitalis motus

Augustine refers to the *uitalis motus* only twice in *De musica*. Besides the passage from the end of the text,⁸³ in which it is said to be neither eternal nor yet separated into specific intervals of time, we find it in Augustine's long consideration of sensation, where it is said to animate the body of the ears even before they are touched by sound.⁸⁴ Augustine's argument here is tied up with details of that account, which I shall examine in further detail in chapter 3, but further points about the term can be drawn out here. Indeed, Augustine's use of *uitalis motus* in the earlier passage in *De musica* is closely related to his use of the term elsewhere in his early writings. We find the term also in *De libero arbitrio* and *De uera religione* as well as several of his letters, and the same term returns in *De Genesi ad litteram*. In this section I shall trace the appearances of these terms, in order that we might better understand its use at the end of *De musica*. In this way I shall argue that this final passage even more likely refers to the Platonic

⁸³See above, p. 49.

⁸⁴*De musica* 6, 5, 11

anima mundi.

In a passage from the third book of *De libero arbitrio* the *uitalis motus* is mentioned as one of the things given by the body to the soul. Augustine writes:⁸⁵

Nevertheless the sinful soul ornaments this corruptible flesh in so far as it provides it with a most suitable form and a vital motion.

A similar term is used in Augustine's Epistula 166. In this passage, Augustine attempts to show that the soul is incorporeal by arguing that it is extended throughout the whole body and is whole in each part of the body. He writes:⁸⁶

The soul is extended through the whole body, which it animates, not by a distribution in space but by a vital attention; for the whole is at once present in each of its parts and is not lesser in the lesser parts or greater in the greater but is here more attentive and here less and in every part it is whole and in each part it is whole.

It is not possible immediately to conclude that the *uitalis intentio* is the same as the *uitalis motus*, but certainly the former term is also used in *De musica* to describe a similar activity of the soul in the body.⁸⁷ In another letter, Augustine uses the term *uitalis motus* again to describe something extended throughout the whole body.⁸⁸ The first use of the term in *De uera religione* refers to a process by virtue of which things taken into the body are separated according to their use. Augustine writes:⁸⁹

⁸⁵ Augustine, *De libero arbitrio*, edited by William M. Green (Vienna: 1966), book 3, 9, 98. 'Hanc tamen corruptibilem carnem etiam peccatrix anima sic ornat ut ei speciem decentissimam praebeat motumque uitalem.'

⁸⁶ Augustine, *Epistulae*, edited by A. Goldbacher (Vienna: 1804), 166, 2, 4. 'Per totum quippe corpus, quod animat, non locali diffusionem sed quadam uitali intentione porrigitur; nam per omnes eius particulas tota simul adest nec minor in minoribus et in maioribus maior sed alicubi intentius alicubi remissius et in omnibus tota et in singulis tota est.'

⁸⁷ See for example *De musica* 6, 5, 9. 'Ego enim ab anima animari non puto corpus nisi intentione facientis.' This point is fundamental to Augustine's account of sense, which I examine in chapter 3.

⁸⁸ *Epistulae* 137, 2, 8

⁸⁹ Augustine, *De uera religione*, edited by William M. Green (Vienna: 1861), 40, 74, 208. 'Ita renascitur

In this way, the interior man is reborn, and the exterior is destroyed day by day. But the interior examines the exterior and sees that it is loathsome in comparison, though it is beautiful in its own kind, and delights in the agreement of bodies, and destroys what it converts into its own good, namely the nourishment of the flesh. The things that are destroyed, *i.e.* that lose their form, migrate to the workshop of its limbs and reinvigorate them, passing into another form through their agreement; through a vital motion they are somehow distinguished, such that whichever of them are suitable are accepted into the structure of this visible, beautiful body and whichever are not suitable are ejected through the appropriate passages.

Later in *De uera religione*, it is clear that the *uitalis motus* refers to some action of the soul or even something prior to the action of the soul.⁹⁰ Augustine argues that we might recognise the traces of number in the sensuous pleasures of the soul. In turn he argues that the same numbers are found even more wonderfully in the *uitalis motus* of seeds. Finally he writes that:⁹¹

We must think of the harmonious and sweet beauties in sound, which are transmitted by the beaten air when the nightingale sings. This little bird could not form these beautiful sounds as it pleases, unless it held them incorporeally impressed [upon itself] by a vital motion.

As this passage continues, Augustine makes clear that this is brought about not by science but

interior homo, et exterior corrumpitur de die in diem. Sed interior exteriorem respicit et in sua comparatione foedum videt, in proprio tamen genere pulchrum et corporum convenientia laetantem, et corrumpentem quod in bonum suum convertit, alimenta scilicet carnis. Quae tamen corrupta, id est amittentia formam suam, in membrorum istorum fabricam migrant et corrupta reficiunt, in aliam formam per convenientiam transeuntia, et per vitalem motum diiudicantur quodam modo, ut ex eis in structuram huius visibilis pulchri quae apta sunt adsumantur, non apta vero per congruos meatus eiciantur.'

⁹⁰*De uera religione* 42, 79, 225.

⁹¹*De uera religione* 42, 79, 226. 'Deinde illud cogitandum est quam numerosas, quam suaves sonorum pulchritudines verberatus aer traiciat cantante luscinia, quas illius aviculae anima non cum liberet fabricaretur nisi vitali motu incorporaliter haberet inpressas.'

by the innermost limits of nature itself, since the nightingale has no reason. In this last passage from *De uera religione*, we approach more closely the use of *uitalis motus* in *De musica*, perhaps because both passages examine the relation between reason, number, and sense. Indeed, we can read the former reference to the *uitalis motus* in *De musica* with reference to this passage, and as a result, we might better understand Augustine's remark at the end of *De musica* that the *uitalis motus* is prior to any division into specific intervals of time.

In the first reference to the *uitalis motus* in *De musica*, Augustine argues that the soul animates the ears by this means even before something sounds, and that when the ears are struck by sound, the soul must move them differently.⁹² In other words, the temporal motions that are introduced into the ears by a sound require the soul to change its own prior motion in the animation of the ears. If the temporal motions are agreeable to the prior activity of the soul, they are perceived as pleasurable, and if they are disagreeable, they are rejected as unpleasant. Augustine later describes the faculty of the soul by virtue of which it is pleased or displeased in terms of numbers, which he names the *sensuales*, but I shall discuss these and the other kinds of number found in the soul in greater detail in the final chapter. My point here is more straightforward. The animation of the ears by the soul, which is prior logically if not temporally to the introduction of any specific or numerically measurable temporal interval, is here called a *uitalis motus*. Nonetheless it is on account of this *uitalis motus* that any temporal interval introduced into the ear can be apprehended and recognised.

How then might we understand Augustine's reference to the *uitalis motus* at the end of *De musica*? It seems likely that this too is best understood as the animation of a body by a soul prior to any specific activity of the soul in the body that might produce discrete intervals of time to be measured by number. This would encompass many of the above references while also reflecting the fittedness for number suggested in the final passage from *De uera religione*. In conjunction with the remarks examined in the preceding section concerning times and places, it seems likely that Augustine here understands that the elemental bodies are preceded by

⁹²*De musica* 6, 5, 11.

some version of the Platonic *anima mundi*. This was in any case exactly how the text was read in the ninth century, as will now be demonstrated.

The uitalis motus and the Tours glosses on De musica

A collection of glosses copied in the second quarter of the ninth century in the Tours manuscript provide an important mediation between Augustine's *De musica* and Eriugena's examination of the Platonic *anima mundi*.⁹³ They develop Augustine's final reference to the *uitalis motus* into an account of the *uita generalis* or general life. In turn, Eriugena adopted this term as one of his preferred names for the *anima mundi*. The glosses therefore not only furnish information about Eriugena's access to *De musica*, but also illustrate one of the ways in which *musica* could become involved in broader traditions of philosophical speculation. My examination of these glosses is in three parts. In the first part I shall examine the term *uita generalis* itself, its introduction into the glosses on *De musica*, and the claims that are there made about it. In the second and third parts I shall qualify some of those claims by contextualising the discussion of *uita generalis* within the a broader consideration of times and places and the relation between a whole and its parts respectively. The glosses reveal a careful and imaginative reader of Augustine's text, who antedates Eriugena's own writing by a number of years.

'Ista uita generalis ...'

In their examination of the *uita generalis*, the Tours glosses stick quite closely to the details of Augustine's text. Nonetheless these comments make clear a great deal about how the glossator read the text and what that person thought important in the text. The term *uita generalis* is introduced in order to explain Augustine's reference to the *uitalis motus* at the very end of *De musica*. Two broad points can be made about the introduction of the *uita generalis* in these glosses: the glossator understood well the extent of Augustine's remarks about the

⁹³See below, pp. 70–80.

uitalis motus in relation to the elements, and was especially interested in the relation between the *uita generalis* and the temporal numbers. This material is all found on f. 114v.

The first point may be illustrated by a single gloss. The glossator is careful to tie Augustine's remarks to his preceding consideration of the elements. He qualifies Augustine's remark⁹⁴

Yet surely all these things, which we number with the aid of the bodily senses
[...]

with a gloss that reads:⁹⁵

For we number the four elements through the senses.

The glosses therefore make clear the fact that Augustine's examination of times, places, and the *uitalis motus* is all to be read with reference to the preceding discussion of the elemental bodies. This is important, since it precludes any restriction being placed on the *uita generalis* of the sort we saw in Augustine's *Retractationes*; whatever is said here is said about the elements and by extension about all bodies.

The second point is substantiated in a greater number of glosses. In the first of these, the glossator attests that the times are produced from Augustine's *uitalis motus* and that this *uitalis motus* may be called instead a *uita* or *anima generalis*. The gloss on Augustine's remark that⁹⁶

In the same way these [numbers], which are agile in the intervals of time, are
preceded and controlled by a vital motion [...]

reads:⁹⁷

⁹⁴*De musica* 6, 17, 57. 'Ista certe omnia, quae carnalis sensus ministerio numeramus [...]'

⁹⁵'Nam per sensum numeramus quattuor aelementa.' See f. 114v above line 17.

⁹⁶*De musica* 6, 17, 57. 'Illos itidem in temporum interuallis agiles praecedit et modificat uitalis motus [...]'

⁹⁷'Ostendit unde temporales sint, id est ex generali anima ex generali uita.' See f. 114v above line 20.

He shows where the temporales are from, *i.e.* from the *generalis anima* or *generalis uita*.

Likewise, Augustine's remark that the *uitalis motus*⁹⁸

serves the Lord of all things and does not possess distinct intervals of time but by its power directs the times [...]

is met with a couple of glosses concerning the relation between the *uitalis motus* and the times. One of these relates Augustine's participle phrase back to the *uita generalis*, whereas the other suggests that this *uita generalis* serves God by virtue of its direction of the times. They read:⁹⁹

This *uita* does not have intervals of times.

and:¹⁰⁰

But it serves the Lord, because its power directs the times.

Finally, a long gloss at the bottom of f. 114v comments on the remaining part of the passage. The part of this material that pertains to the *uita generalis* and its relation to times and places reads:¹⁰¹

This *uita generalis* has neither times nor places, such that it can be distinguished through times and places, but by its power directs the times. Beyond which *uita generalis* there are the rational numbers in men and the intellectual numbers in angels. [...]

The second sentence of this gloss relates to the prototypical function of numbers, which I

⁹⁸*De musica* 6, 17, 57. '[...] seruiens domino rerum omnium non temporalia habens digesta interualla numerorum suorum, sed tempora ministrante potentia [...]'

⁹⁹'Quae uita non habet interualla temporum.' See f. 114v above line 21.

¹⁰⁰'Sed est seruiens domino ministrante potentia tempora.' See f. 114v above line 22.

¹⁰¹'Ista uita generalis nec tempora habet nec lococa [*sic*], ut sit distincta per tempora et loca, sed sua potentia ministrat tempora. Supra quam uitam generalem, rationales in hominibus numeri, intellectuales in angelis. [...]' See f. 114v in the lower margin.

shall examine in the final chapter. The first sentence is significant for my argument here; for by its careful qualification it seems to distinguish between time and place themselves and distinct intervals of time and place. This is an important qualification, since the *uita generalis* is undoubtedly temporal, in the sense that it is created, but its animation of the world is prior logically, if not in time, to any specific intervals of time that may be produced in the world. This conclusion reflects closely Augustine's discussion of the *uitalis motus* earlier in *De musica*.¹⁰²

A final significant gloss on this passage rearranges some of Augustine's remarks and adds comments of its own. The gloss outlines a relation between Augustine's examination of places and times and a consideration of nature that appears earlier in the commentary material. It reads:¹⁰³

And whatever are in these things [which we number with the aid of the bodily senses] could neither receive nor possess local numbers, since every local number is in a position, unless they are preceded by the temporal numbers, which are in motion, and which are innermost and in silence, *i.e.* in the very secret of nature.

We may therefore draw a number of more general conclusions about the *uita generalis* in the Tours glosses. The first and perhaps most important of these is that the glosses identify Augustine's *uitalis motus* as a *uita generalis* or more significantly an *anima generalis*. Moreover, this *uita* or *anima* is clearly understood to be the *uita* or *anima* of the elemental bodies. There are in other words no qualms about putting forward what is clearly some version of the Platonic *anima mundi*. Finally, it should be noted that the distinction drawn here between time and place themselves and specific intervals of times and places resembles to a certain extent Eriugena's own treatment of time and place in the *Periphyseon*, which I shall discuss in the next chapter. Two earlier points in *De musica* occasioned glosses that qualify the claims made

¹⁰²See above, 50–1.

¹⁰³'Et quaecumque in eis sunt nec accipere possint nec habere locales numeros, nam omnis localis numerus in situ est, nisi praecederent temporales numeri, qui sunt in motu, qui intimi et in silentio sunt, id est in ipso saecreto naturae.' See f. 114v in the lefthand margin beginning at line 18.

here: one of these considers again the relation between times and places, and the other the relation between a whole and its parts.¹⁰⁴ Each of these provides valuable contextualisation for our understanding of the *uita generalis*.

‘*Fingit fabrum ...*’

An earlier passage from *De musica* occasions useful comment in the Tours glosses. With reference to Augustine’s preceding illustrations of the priority of temporal numbers to local numbers – the examples of the craftsman and the tree examined above¹⁰⁵ – the glosses work out a more detailed account of this relation, which shows that the order of the numbers is the same in both instances. A few glosses copied between the lines of the text demonstrate that the earlier parts of the sixth book had been well understood. The relevant material is found on f. 114r. For instance the glossator annotates Augustine’s reference to the *rationales* with the phrase¹⁰⁶

which are in [the craftsman’s] art, which is in his soul,

and his reference to the *progressores* with the phrase¹⁰⁷

[...] namely the numbers by virtue of which he moves his limbs in work.

I shall discuss these and the other numbers that Augustine identifies in the faculties of the soul in greater detail in the final chapter.¹⁰⁸ For the moment, we need only know that the Tours glosses demonstrate a good understanding of Augustine’s ideas. Nonetheless, a longer gloss demonstrates an imaginative reading of Augustine’s text. In an attempt to demonstrate the same ordering of numbers in both examples – *i.e.* the craftsman and the tree – the glosses change details of Augustine’s prose. One gloss reads¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁴ *De musica* 6, 15, 57 and 7, 19.

¹⁰⁵ See above, pp. 48–9.

¹⁰⁶ ‘Qui sunt in arte, quae est in anima.’ See f. 114r above line 1.

¹⁰⁷ ‘Id est in se, uidelicet quibus mouet membra ad operandum.’ See f. 114r above line 2.

¹⁰⁸ See below, 185–200.

¹⁰⁹ ‘Fingit fabrum. Nam faber ferrarius, lignarius, argentarius in cuius arte iudiciales numeri, postea sensuales, inde progressores, postea forma uisibilis. E contra finge deum loco quasi fabri, naturam rerum

He imagines a craftsman. For we find the *iudiciales* in the art of a craftsman – whether a blacksmith, carpenter, or silversmith – and thereafter in turn the *sensuales*, the *progressores*, and the visible forms. And likewise imagine God, as it were, in the place of the craftsman, the nature of things, as it were, in the place of the *iudiciales*, and immediately the wood in the place of the visible [forms] of the preceding image. Nevertheless in order to retain the same order understand the following things, *i.e.* the temporal numbers, as it were, in the place of the *sensuales*, and the local numbers, as it were, in the place of the *progressores*, and you will have the whole in the nature of things as the craftsman in his art.

The first part of this gloss is a close restatement of Augustine's ideas, which are also familiar from earlier in the book.¹¹⁰ In the second part, the gloss attempts to accommodate Augustine's account of temporal and local numbers in the growth of a tree to the order of these numbers in the account of the craftsman. This requires a creative reading of Augustine's text, since there are not the same number of stages in each account. The most significant differences here are the separation of the local numbers from the visible forms and the identification of the local numbers with the *progressores*. In Augustine's prose, it is clear that the local numbers are a measure of the visible forms and perhaps even constitutive of those forms, and that the *progressores* are temporal and not local. Nonetheless, it is perhaps more interesting to consider why the glossator attempted to elide these two examples rather than to interrogate their success in achieving the elision. Two principles seem to be significant here: one concerns the importance of order as a metaphysical principle, which is here understood in the relation of times and places; and the other the importance of Augustine's account of the human soul as a model for understanding the workings of nature. In other

quasi loco iudicialium, statim lignum loco uisibilis supradictae imaginis. Tamen ut ipsos ordines habeas accipe sequentia id est temporales numeros loco quasi sensualium localium numeros quasi progressores et habebis totum in rerum natura quod faber in arte sua.' See f. 114r in righthand margin beginning at line 4.

¹¹⁰ *De musica* 6, 11, 31.

words the gloss invites us to read metaphysically the whole of *De musica* or at least its sixth book, which is predominantly concerned with the relation between eternal, temporal, and local numbers in the activity of the human soul. I shall examine this possibility in the writing of Eriugena in the final chapter.

Generalis siue uniuersalis

The final passage from *De musica* to be examined concerns the relation between a whole and its parts.¹¹¹ This passage occasioned glosses that relate the particular to the general or universal. The equivocation of these terms may help us better to understand what is meant by the *uita generalis*. Moreover, the discussion in these glosses of general times and places may help us to understand the preceding qualification that the *uita generalis* does not have times or places such that there are distinct intervals of time and place.

Here, Augustine argues that the human soul can grasp intervals of time only within certain limits required by the nature of mortal life. Set within this argument is the observation that things are only large or small in relation to something else, and that if every part of the whole were enlarged or diminished the size of the whole would not change. The Tours glosses do not seem to understand this latter point, and tend to reinterpret the enlargement or diminution of the parts as a comparison among the parts. The relevant material can be found on ff. 103v and 104r. One relevant gloss reads:¹¹²

But if everything were enlarged in proportion, *i.e.* if a comparison were made among the parts, one part would be preferred to another, *i.e.* it would be said to be greater. For every part is lesser than the whole. The world would be as great as it was, since nothing is great or small in itself but only in relation to something else.

¹¹¹ *De musica* 6, 7, 19. See below, pp. 194.

¹¹² 'Et si proportionem augeantur, scilicet si aliqua comparatione facta inter partes, pars praeferatur parti, id est dicatur magna. Nam omnes partes ad totum paruae per singula, tantus est mundus quantus erat. Quia nihil per se magnum aut paruum est, sed ad aliquid.' See f. 104r in righthand margin beginning at line 1.

Nonetheless, the relation between a whole and its parts has otherwise been well understood, and it is this relation that is explored more fully in the glosses' examination of the particular and the general or universal. A long gloss offers a version of Augustine's argument regarding why we can only apprehend times within certain limits. It reads:¹¹³

He says that each living thing in its proper kind is given a sense to distinguish places and times from the universal sense *i.e.* from the one general sense. Just as the body of each animal is lesser in comparison with the general body, for the part is lesser than the whole, and just as the age of one animal is lesser in comparison with the general age, of which it is a part, so too the sense of one animal is part of the general sense and agrees with the action of the animal. It is not extended further than agrees with this action, and it is able to apprehend this action. The animal produces this action in proportion to the universal action, of which the special action of each animal is a part. [...] And because one body is smaller in comparison with the general body, and the action of one animal [in comparison with] the general action, and sense [of one animal] in comparison with the general sense, we are not able to perceive the general times or places nor times or places greater than is convenient for the motion of the soul of one animal.

A number of points can be made here. In every case that the gloss uses the term 'generalis', Augustine had used 'uniuersalis'. The equivalence of these terms is made clear in the opening remark regarding the *uniuersalis* or *generalis sensus*. Nonetheless, this *generalis sensus* is an

¹¹³ 'Dicit quod unicuique animanti in genere proprio de uniuersali sensu, de uno generali sensu, tributus sit sensus ad discernendum loca et tempora. Ut quomodo corpus uniuscuiusque animalis a corrorationabilitate corporis generalis et unius paruum est, nam pars ad totum paruum est, et sicut aetas unius animalis ad comparisonem unius aetatis generalis, cuius aetas ilius unius pars est, parua est, ita sensus pars generalis sensus unius congruat eius, id est animalis unius, actioni. Non plus extenditur sensus unius nisi ut actioni conueniat eius et capere sensus actionem possit. Quam actionem agit animal a proportionem uniuersae actionis, cuius specialis unius animalis actio pars est. [...] Et quia corpus unum ad comparisonem corporis generalis, et aetas unius ad generalis, et sensus ad comparisonem generalis paruum est, nec tempora nec loca generalia possumus intueri nec amplius quam motui animae unius animalis expediat.' See f. 103 v in the upper margin.

invention of the glosses, since Augustine mentions only the universal age, body, and motion. In other words we see here the same tendency to generalise a faculty of the soul which we recognise from the *anima* or *uita generalis* introduced in the glosses at the end of *De musica*. Moreover, the relation between the general or universal and the particular is one of a whole to its parts; the special or individual sense of each animal is only one part of the *generalis sensus* and for that reason can only perceive certain parts of the *generalia tempora* and *loca*. It is possible that we should extend this relation also to the *uita generalis* and the special or individual life of each animal. If this were the case, it would be a slightly different relation to the relation proposed by Eriugena, as we shall see.

The preceding sections have allowed us better to contextualise the remarks in the Tours glosses regarding the *uita generalis*. Perhaps the most significant conclusion is that the use of the term ‘generalis’ here seems to reflect a whole that is subject to, as it were, a geometric division into its parts. This was suggested in Augustine’s text, but whereas he describes only the general action, body, and motion of which the individual actions, bodies, and motions are parts, the glosses extend this discussion to faculties of the soul (the *generalis sensus*) and perhaps also to the soul itself (the *anima* or *uita generalis*). This generalisation perhaps reflects the broader impulse illustrated in the preceding example to use the human soul as the model for metaphysical speculation, even when it leads to a distortion of Augustine’s own ideas. In the following section, I shall trace the development of these tendencies and their difference in Eriugena’s examination of the *uita generalis*.

Vitalis motus, uita generalis, and the anima mundi in the writing of Eriugena

In the final section of this chapter, I shall argue that Eriugena’s speculation regarding the Platonic *anima mundi* was informed by the idea of the *uita generalis* which he knew from glosses on Augustine’s *De musica*. It is possible that he had access to the Tours manuscript itself, though we should not discount the possibility that there were once further copies of the text that contained a similar collection of glosses. The most important conclusion is that

Eriugena's account of the *anima mundi*, which he knew from Calcidius' Latin translation of the *Timaeus*, was mediated by his reading of Augustine's *De musica*. For this reason, we may conclude also that *musica* participated in a broad tradition of metaphysical speculation and could even contribute to these Platonic narratives.

Of course, the term *uita generalis* appears elsewhere. We find it, for instance, in Bede's *De tabernaculo*¹¹⁴ and in his commentaries on Ezra and Nehemiah¹¹⁵ and on the Song of Songs.¹¹⁶ Moreover, the term is found in the grammatical tradition in the so-called *Anonymus ad Cuimnanum*¹¹⁷ and Pseudo-Marius Victorinus' *De arte grammatica*, which appears to be the source for the former.¹¹⁸ Finally, it is found in a sermon by Cesarius of Arles.¹¹⁹ Nonetheless, the meaning of this term in these other contexts is not the same as the meaning found in the glosses on *De musica*, and neither the Tours glossators nor Eriugena seem to have drawn on these wider references, if indeed they were aware of them. Only in the glosses and in the writing of Eriugena does the *uita generalis* refer to the *anima mundi*.

Eriugena's account of the *uita generalis* does not follow the Tours glosses exactly. In the first book of the *Periphyseon* and the commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius' *Celestial hierarchy*, the term refers to the vegetative power of the *anima mundi*. This, then, is similar to Tours. But by the time he wrote the third book of the *Periphyseon*, the notion had greatly expanded to include the intellectual, rational, and sensible, as well as the vegetative life of the soul. This is perhaps a consequence of a more fundamental change. Whereas the Tours glosses had presented the relation between the general and the individual as the geometric division of a whole into its parts, Eriugena presents a dialectical division of the general into its constituent genera, species, and individuals. He argues that an individual life is not a life by being some

¹¹⁴Bede, *De tabernaculo*, edited by D. Hurst (Turnholt: 1969), book 1, 1087–91.

¹¹⁵Bede, *In Ezram et Neemiam*, edited by D. Hurst (Turnholt: 1969), book 3, 445 and 1685.

¹¹⁶Bede, *In cantica canticorum*, edited by D. Hurst (Turnholt: 1983), book 5, 8, 10.

¹¹⁷*Anonymus ad Cuimnanum*, edited by Bernhard Bischoff and Bengt Löfstedt (Turnholt: 1992), 22.

¹¹⁸Pseudo-Marius Victorinus, *Ars Victorini grammatici*, edited by Heinrich Keil, in *Grammatici Latini*, 8 volumes (Leipzig: 1857–80), volume 6, pp. 187–205.

¹¹⁹Cesarius of Arles, *Sermones*, edited by D. Germani Morin, 2 volumes (Turnholt: 1953), 175, 4.

part of the *uita generalis* but by participation in the *uita generalis*. A final observation clarifies the relation to *De musica*. Where Eriugena wishes to refer only to the vegetative power of the *anima mundi* in the third book of the *Periphyseon*, he returns to Augustine's preferred term and calls it the *uitalis motus*. The easy change between these terms suggests that he knew them together in the margins of *De musica*.

Animal mundus

Eriugena's first reference to the *uita generalis* in the *Periphyseon* is made in connection with the Platonic *anima mundi*. The term is introduced with reference to the *Timaieus* as follows:¹²⁰

Plato, the greatest of those who have speculated about the world, argues with many reasons in his *Timaieus* that this visible world is, as it were, a great animal comprising body and soul. The body of this animal is joined of the four best known and general elements and the diverse bodies made from them, and its soul is the *generalis uita*, which animates and moves all things that are in motion or at rest.

The connection of the *anima mundi* to the things in motion and at rest is found in Calcidius' translation of the *Timaieus*, but it is also familiar from Augustine's *De musica*. In the same passage that we find the *uitalis motus* (and in the glosses the *uita generalis*), Augustine qualifies the temporal numbers as in motion and the local numbers as at rest.¹²¹ This suggests that Eriugena knew the term *generalis uita* in context, and that he does not simply share a common source with commentary tradition represented in the Tours glosses. As I shall show in the next chapter, the terms motion and rest are important also for Eriugena's definition of *musica*,

¹²⁰ *Periphyseon* I, 476C. 'Plato siquidem philosophantium de mundo maximus in Timeo suo multis rationibus asserit hunc mundum uisibilem quasi magnum quoddam animal corpore animaque componi, cuius animalis corpus quidem est quattuor elementis notissimis generalibusque diuersisque corporibus ex eisdem compositis compactum, anima uero est generalis uita, quae omnia quae in motu atque in statu sunt uegetat atque mouet.'

¹²¹ *De musica* 6, 17, 57

in which context they again seem to be borrowed from this passage of Augustine.¹²² In the immediate context, it is also worth noting that Augustine's discussion of the *uitalis motus* also occurs in a longer consideration of the four elements and, it seems likely, their animation by a soul. There is here an impressive density of overlapping reference. As the passage continues, Eriugena develops the relation between the *uita generalis* and the body of the world, and in turn, this further qualifies its connection to motion and rest. Eriugena writes:¹²³

But because, as he says, this soul is eternally moved in order to give life to its body, *i.e.* the whole universe, and to rule it, and to move it by bringing together and separating its diverse single bodies in various ways, and yet remains in its own nature and immovable rest, it is therefore always moved and always at rest.

In turn, Eriugena argues also that the body of the world is always in motion and always at rest. Earth is always at rest, and the ether always in motion. The two remaining elements are proportionally arranged between these, such that water is neither at rest nor moved quickly, and air is moved quickly but not so quickly as the ether. Nonetheless, this arrangement of the elements should not be understood as an opposition; for the earth is itself at rest, but all the things that originate from it are in eternal motion, and the ether is itself in motion, but the chorus of the stars keeps its unchangeable position. Eriugena's discussion of these elements and their harmony draws on Gregory of Nyssa's *De imagine*, but it also closely resembles passages from Calcidius' translation of the *Timaeus* itself.¹²⁴ My point here is straightforward: Eriugena is reading Calcidius (or Calcidius' Plato), but he is reading him through the mediation of Augustine.

¹²² See below, pp. 142–3.

¹²³ *Periphyseon* I, 477A. 'Sed quia ipsa anima, ut ait ipse, aeternaliter mouetur ad corpus suum (id est mundum totum) uiuificandum, regendum, diuersisque rationibus uariorum corporum singulorum coniunctionibus resolutionibusque mouendum, manet etiam in suo naturali immobilisque statu, mouetur ergo semper et stat.'

¹²⁴ *Timaeus a Calcidio translatus, commentarioque instructus*, 32B.

Generalissima uita siue uniuersalissima anima

Eriugena does not always seem to follow the Tours glosses closely in his examination of the *uita generalis*. This is, in fact, because Eriugena introduces two notions of the *uita generalis* in the *Periphyseon*. As I have shown, in the first book, the term is used to refer to the vegetative power of the *anima mundi*, precisely as we saw in Tours and in Augustine. Nonetheless, in the third book a second notion is introduced, which encompasses the intellectual, rational, and sensible, as well as the vegetative life of the soul. In turn, this introduces a second difference from the Tours glosses. Eriugena differently accounts for the relation between the general and the individual. Whereas the Tours glosses had described a geometric division of a whole into its parts, Eriugena prefers a dialectical division of the term, in which he reveals its constituent genera, species, and individuals, each of which participates fully in the *uita generalis*. In turn, this allows him to set the *uita generalis* within a metaphysical narrative of procession and return.

The division of the *uita generalis* is seen most clearly in the following passage. Eriugena writes:¹²⁵

Plato, the greatest of the philosophers, and those who are around him not only claim that there is a general life of the world, but also confess that no form adhering to bodies nor any body is deprived of life, and they confidently dare to call this life, whether general or specific, soul.

Eriugena is in fact happy with their claims and supports them with reference to the commentators on scripture and the nature of things itself. The latter part of his argument reads as follows:¹²⁶

¹²⁵ *Periphyseon* 3, 728A. 'Plato uero philosophorum summus et qui circa eum sunt non solum generalem mundi uitam asserunt, uerum etiam nullam speciem corporibus adhaerentem neque ullum corpus uita priuari fatentur, ipsamque uitam seu generalem seu specialem uocare animam fiducialiter ausi sunt.'

¹²⁶ *Periphyseon* 3, 728B. 'Si enim nulla materia est quae sine specie corpus efficiat, et nulla species sine substantia propria subsistit, nulla autem substantia uitali motu, qui eam contineat et subsistere faciat, expers esse potest – omne enim quod naturaliter mouetur ex uita quadam motus sui principium sumit – necessario sequitur

For if no matter produces a body without form, and no form subsists without its proper substance, and no substance can be without a vital motion, which contains it and causes it to subsist (for everything that is moved takes the beginning of its movement from some life), it necessarily follows that every creature is either life itself or participates in life and in some way is alive, whether or not the motion of this life clearly appears in it.

Eriugena argues that if every body is contained in its proper form or species, every body is therefore also ruled by virtue of some life. In turn this argument allows Eriugena to present a dialectical division of the *uita generalis* and to set it within a metaphysical framework of procession and return. He writes:¹²⁷

If every body that is naturally constituted is administered by some species of life, and every species desires its genus, and every genus takes its origin from the most general substance, then every species of life, which contains the harmony of diverse bodies, necessarily returns to the most general life, in which it participates in order to be a species.

Eriugena notes that this *uita generalis* is called the *uniuersalissima anima* by the wise, which perhaps recalls the equivocation between the *anima* and *uita generalis* in the Tours glosses. He writes that, in turn, it participates in the one substantial life, *i.e.* God, and distributes specific and individual lives according to divine ordinance. It is therefore clear that Eriugena's dialectical division of the *uita generalis* differs in an important respect from that found in the Tours glosses. I shall further discuss the details of Eriugena's division in the following section.

ut omnis creatura aut per se ipsam uita sit, aut uitae particeps et quodam modo uiuens, siue in ea motus uitae manifeste appareat, siue non appareat.'

¹²⁷ *Periphyseon* 3, 728D–729A. 'Proinde si omnia corpora naturaliter constituta quadam specie uitae administrantur, omnisque species genus suum appetit, omne autem genus generalissima substantia originem ducit, omnem speciem uitae, quae diuersorum corporum numerositatem continet, ad generalissimam quandam uitam recurrere necesse est, cuius participatione specificatur.'

One final point that can be gleaned from this passage concerns the extent to which all bodies are animate. Eriugena argues that even bodies that seem to be dead are animated by some life. Nonetheless, he begins his examination of this argument with a qualification that he is, at this point, describing only sensible and intelligible creatures. Only later in the book does he extend this to all bodies. Eriugena begins his examination of the argument with the following statement:¹²⁸

No creature, whether sensible or intelligible, can be without life. For even bodies, which seem as if they were dead to our senses, do not entirely relinquish life.

He presents a number of arguments to support this conclusion. In the first instance, he writes that since the body is composed of the elements, life played no part in its composition and is therefore not affected by its decomposition. In other words, life remains in the body even as it is dissolved into its constituent parts. In a second argument, he states that this is a dissolution only with regard to matter and our senses; it does not affect our nature. For this reason, man remains body and soul, even as the constituent elements of the body are separated from one another. Indeed, Eriugena argues that just as the soul controls its body when it is gathered together into a unity, so too it continues to control it when it is distributed among the elements. He writes that to the extent that the elements are closer to the spiritual nature than the corporeal compound of the body, they are, in fact, more easily controlled by the soul.¹²⁹ Some of these arguments seem to extend beyond the specific consideration of sensible and intellectual natures, and indeed in the following section I shall show that Eriugena's division of the *uita generalis* contains all life and all bodies.

¹²⁸ *Periphyseon* 3, 729A–B. 'Vitae uero nulla creatura seu sensibilis seu intelligibilis expers esse potest. Nam et corpora, quae nostris sensibus uidentur ueluti mortua, non omnino uita relinquuntur.'

¹²⁹ *Periphyseon* 3, 730A–B.

Intellectualis, rationalis, sensualis, et insensualis

When Eriugena returns from this consideration to the examination of the *generalissima uita* itself, he acknowledges that he has until this point only considered rational life, and that there is a greater diversity of opinions concerning the question of whether the irrational life of animals survives the death of their body.¹³⁰ I shall discuss this in the following section. The basic division of rational and irrational life prompts Eriugena to set out in greater detail the constituent species of the *uita generalis*. At the end of his demonstration Eriugena concludes that human nature uniquely contains every species and therefore occupies a unique position within creation.

Eriugena begins his examination of the species of the *generalissima uita* by noting again that the first and greatest division is into rational and irrational life.¹³¹ Thereafter, he divides this pair to produce a fourfold scheme. Eriugena writes that the rational life is distributed between angels and humans. In angels, it is called intellectual and in humans, rational. It is possible that this distinction comes from the Tours glosses also. It will be recalled that Augustine sets the intellectual and rational numbers at the top of his numerical hierarchy. The intellectual numbers had not been introduced previously in *De musica*, and for this reason, they require some explanation. Commenting on this passage – the very passage in which the *uitalis motus* was introduced and identified in the glosses as the *uita generalis* – the Tours glossator writes:¹³²

Rational numbers in men, intellectual in angels [...]

This distinction was therefore already known to Eriugena in the context of the *uita generalis*, even if it is not in this context to be understood as a division of the *uita generalis*. Nonetheless, Eriugena is obviously dissatisfied with this division, since he writes that there is no reason not to call the angelic life a rational soul or the human life intellectual; indeed he ascribes

¹³⁰ *Periphyseon* 3, 732B.

¹³¹ *Periphyseon* 3, 732C.

¹³² *Rationales in hominibus numeri, intellectuales in angelis*. See f. 114v in the lower margin.

intellectual and rational life to them in common. In the end, he accepts the above distinctions simply as the introduction of verbal difference.¹³³ The irrational life is also divided, here into life which participates in sense and life that is without sense.¹³⁴ The one is found in animals that have sense and the other in plants and trees. Eriugena writes that below this we find no other kind of life.

Eriugena therefore distinguishes four species of the *uita generalis*: the intellectual life in angels, the rational life in men, the sensible in beasts, and the insensible life in plants and other bodies, in which only the form shows a trace of life.¹³⁵ In this latter category, he also includes the bodies of the elements, whether simple or composite. Eriugena sets human nature uniquely within this hierarchy, since he writes that it encompasses every species of the *uita generalis*; this nature has both intellect and reason, as was discussed above, but also sense and the insensible animation of the body. Therefore, Eriugena writes that human nature contains the universal creature and that no creature can be found beyond man. Human nature holds a special place as the basis for metaphysical speculation.

Further considerations regarding the uita generalis

The next appearance of the *uita generalis* requires some understanding of the context in which this speculation takes place. The examination of the *uita generalis* in the third book of the *Periphyseon* has been directed toward a hexaëmeric question, to which Eriugena now returns directly: why is it that the in the works of the first four primordial days there is no mention of life or soul, but on the fifth day we find the words ‘living soul’? Eriugena here argues that the lowest species of the *uita generalis*, which we find throughout those four preceding days, is not understood as life in scripture, since it can do nothing beyond its body and reveal nothing about the more perfect life that is beyond bodies.¹³⁶ This passage reveals more about

¹³³ *Periphyseon* 3, 732D.

¹³⁴ *Periphyseon* 3, 733A.

¹³⁵ *Periphyseon* 3, 733A–B.

¹³⁶ *Periphyseon* 3, 734B.

Eriugena's hexaëmeric concerns than his understanding of the *uita generalis*, but it is worth noting that Eriugena's vocabulary here – which includes alongside the *uita generalis* also the *uitalis motus* and the numbers in times and places – recalls closely the final chapter of *De musica*.

The final mention of the *uita generalis* in this book of the *Periphyseon* concerns a question raised above: does the irrational life survive the death of its body?¹³⁷ Eriugena addresses this question from several angles. In the first place, he queries how one species of the *uita generalis*, irrational life, should perish and another, rational life, not. This problem is made particular acute, since he adopts the teaching of Pseudo-Dionysius that every species is substantially one in its genus. In a second argument, Eriugena questions how it might be that the body could be dissolved into its constitutive elements but the soul, which is superior, simple, and without composition, could be destroyed. Finally, Eriugena notes certain powers of the irrational soul, which are preferred in some instances (*e.g.* of particular sensory acuity) to the powers of the rational soul, and questions how this could be unless the irrational soul were a truly substantial soul. For these reasons, Eriugena argues that the irrational life does not perish with its body, though he acknowledges that contrary opinions that can be found elsewhere.

The anima mundi: uita generalis and uitalis motus

The two notions concerning the *uita generalis* that we find in the *Periphyseon* should, by now, be clear at least in outline. In this final part of my discussion, I shall return to the question out of which this long examination of the term emerged: what does Eriugena's treatment of the *uita generalis* reveal about his access to Augustine's *De musica*? One passage is particularly important here, since it sets out again many of the ideas that had been associated with this term in the first book of the *Periphyseon*. This time, these ideas are associated not with the *uita generalis*, which Eriugena knew from the commentary tradition on *De musica* represented in the Tours glosses, but with Augustine's own preferred term, *uitalis motus*. The great expansion

¹³⁷Beginning at *Periphyseon* 3, 737A.

of the *uita generalis* which I have traced through Eriugena's writing required his return to Augustine for a term to refer precisely to the vegetative life of the soul.

In the first book of the *Periphyseon*, a number of statements are made in connection with the *anima mundi*, the most important of which are these: the world comprises a body and soul, the soul of the world is the *uita generalis*, and as a consequence of this, the *uita generalis* moves all the things that are in motion or at rest. This, then, is more or less as the term was used in the Tours glosses. In the third book, very similar claims are made regarding the *uitalis motus*, and this is again connected to the *Timaeus*. Eriugena writes:¹³⁸

Nutritor: You are not unaware, I think, that all the philosophers who examine the world are unanimous in their opinion about this part of nature. For they say that every body that is contained within this sensible world is contained by a vital motion, whether it is at rest or in motion.

Alumnus: That is very well known to anyone who practices philosophy or reads the philosophers. For both Plato in the *Timaeus* and Pliny Secundus in his *Naturalis historia* very clearly instruct us concerning these things.

The parallels to the earlier passage are exact. We may be more precise in our estimate of when Eriugena expanded the *uita generalis* and relabelled the vegetative life of the *anima mundi* using Augustine's term. The expanded notion of the *uita generalis* is introduced in the third book of the *Periphyseon* and used consistently thereafter. Nonetheless, already in the second book of the text, Eriugena uses the term *uitalis motus* to refer only to the vegetative life. Indeed, the

¹³⁸ *Periphyseon* 3, 735C. '*Nutritor*: Non te latet, ut arbitror, omnium philosophorum de mundo disputantium de hac parte naturae unanimem esse sententiam. Aiunt enim omnia corpora, quae intra hunc mundum sensibilem continentur, uitali motu contineri, siue in statu sine, siue in motu. *Alumnus*: Omnibus philosophantibus aut philosophos legentibus illud notissimum est. Nam et Plato in Timeo et Plinius Secundus in Naturali historia manifestissime de his nos edocent.'

first introduction of that term reads as follows:¹³⁹

Indeed, we are not now discussing the universal human nature, which seems to comprise, as it were, five parts, *i.e.* the body and vital motion, sense and reason, and intellect, but only the part which we see the image and likeness of the Creator, *i.e.* the intellect, reason, and sense or, if I may, essence, power, and operation.

Thereafter, Eriugena continues to use *uitalis motus* to refer to the extension of the soul through the body and the animation of the body by the soul.¹⁴⁰ The fact that Eriugena passes between these terms suggests that he was aware of their connection in the gloss tradition represented by glosses in the Tours manuscript and perhaps even made use of this manuscript itself in his speculations regarding the Platonic *anima mundi*. Eriugena's reading of *De musica* – his reading of an earlier reading of *De musica* – informed his reading also of the *Timaeus*. This part of the chapter has been concerned with a very specific mediation of Eriugena's access to Augustine's text, but we may draw a few more general conclusions.

Conclusions

This chapter has described the material circumstances of the transmission of Augustine's *De musica* in the early middle ages and Eriugena's access to that text in particular. In my examination of the surviving copies of the text and its representation in the surviving library catalogues and booklists, I have shown that *De musica* was read widely and as a whole in the ninth century. Moreover, it was read in a number of contexts, none of which seem to have been straightforwardly musical: it was read as a patristic text and it was read alongside other texts that gave rise to numerical and philosophical speculation. One indication that *De musica*

¹³⁹ *Periphyseon* 2, 570D–571A. 'Siquidem nunc non de uniuersa humana natura sermo est, quae ueluti quinque partibus, hoc est corpore et uitali motu, sensu et ratione constare uidetur et intellectu, sed de ea solummodo parte, in qua imago et similitudo conditoris perspicitur, hoc est de intellectu et ratione et sensu interiori uel, ut ita dicam, essentia, uirtute, operatione.'

¹⁴⁰ See, for example, *Periphyseon* 2, 571A, 590A, *Periphyseon* 5, 866C, etc. There is a particularly long discussion of the relation between matter, form, and the *uitalis motus* at *Periphyseon* 4, 790B.

itself occasioned such speculation is found in a manuscript from the early ninth century that was copied at and remains in Tours. The remarks in this manuscript concerning the Platonic *anima mundi* (or perhaps the remarks in the commentary tradition represented in this manuscript) were subsequently taken up by Eriugena and worked into a sophisticated account of the *uita generalis*. For this reason we may conclude that in the early middle ages *musica* was one part of a broader nexus of intellectual traditions that encompassed Platonic metaphysical narratives. In the following chapters, I shall show how this nexus extended also to encompass speculation about the ten Categories of the logical tradition, which were known from the Pseudo-Augustinian *Categoriae decem*, as well as speculation about the nature of numbers and their relations to the world and to the human soul.

Chapter 2: Irish hands reworking the *Periphyseon*

The *Periphyseon* has survived in a number of manuscripts copied during or shortly after the lifetime of its author. The texts contained in each manuscript are significantly different from one another and seem to be successive reworkings of the *Periphyseon*. In 1905, Ludwig Traube proposed a critical edition to reveal the evolution of the text.¹ This project was attempted by I. P. Sheldon-Williams,² but was completed with much greater success by Édouard Jeauneau.³

Jeauneau distinguishes four ‘versions’ of the *Periphyseon*.⁴ Version I is found in the earliest surviving manuscript copy of the text, Reims, Bibliothèque municipale 875. The text first copied in this manuscript is now partially obscured by many additions and corrections which were entered in the ninth century by a number of hands writing Caroline or Irish minuscule. The amplified text thus created Jeauneau’s Version II. These versions of the text are incomplete, since the Reims manuscript breaks off in the fourth of five books. Version II was then copied into Bamberg, Staatsbibliothek, Philos. 2/I. Many of the additions and corrections from the Reims manuscript are here incorporated into the main text. Jeauneau’s Version III comprises this text along with many interventions in the Bamberg manuscript, which were made by one of the hands also found in Reims. This version of the text is also

¹Ludwig Traube, *Palaeographische Forschungen. Fünfter Teil, Autographa des Iohannes Scottus* (Munich: 1912), pp. 4–5.

²*Johannis Scotti Eriugena Periphyseon (De divisione naturae)*, 4 volumes, edited by I. P. Sheldon-Williams with the collaboration of Ludwig Bieler *et al.* (Dublin: 1968–95).

³*Iohannis Scotti seu Eriugena Periphyseon*, 5 volumes, edited by Édouard Jeauneau (Turnhout: 1996–2003).

⁴Jeauneau, Introduction to the CCCM edition of the *Periphyseon* 1, pp. xix–xxviii.

incomplete, since the Bamberg manuscript only contains the first three books. The final version of the text (Jeauneau's Version IV) is found in Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, latin 12964, which for the first time contains all five books of the *Periphyseon*. It incorporates further additions and corrections made in the ninth century. Even as he introduces these versions, Jeauneau acknowledges that the term 'version' is not adequate to describe the reworking of the text.⁵ He writes that Eriugena did not act as a modern author publishing 'revised and corrected' editions of his work, but returned constantly to the text. Within the succession outlined above, he suggests, we cannot date Eriugena's various revisions.

Discussion of this process of reworking has always been tied up with the question of Eriugena's autograph. The Reims and Bamberg manuscripts were discovered at the turn of the twentieth century, and their discovery was announced in print in 1900 (Bamberg) and 1904 (Reims).⁶ One year later Traube proposed an editorial project to produce a 'genetic-critical' edition.⁷ The subject of the lecture in which he made this proposal was the autograph of Eriugena, which he believed he had discovered in the Reims and Bamberg manuscripts. One of the aims of that lecture was to suggest the usefulness of palaeography to the proposed editorial project. The other was to demonstrate how palaeography, which was often used to establish the authenticity of charters, might also be used to establish the genuineness of literary texts. Discussion of Eriugena's autograph has therefore shaped how we think about the texts of the *Periphyseon*, its versions, and the authority of those versions.

More recent work on the Irish minuscule writing identified by Traube as Eriugena's autograph has drawn attention to the different prehistories of the materials in the Reims and Bamberg manuscripts. This has, in turn, raised questions about the authority of these materials, as well as any simple notion of four versions. In the first part of this chapter I shall build on this recent work. I shall argue that the Bamberg manuscript contains a reading of the

⁵Jeauneau, Introduction to the *Periphyseon* 1, pp. xxii.

⁶See references given in Édouard Jeauneau and Paul Edward Dutton, *The autograph of Eriugena* (Turnhout: 1996), p. 1.

⁷Traube, *Autographa*, p. 5.

Periphyseon written and composed not by Eriugena but by one of his longtime associates. This Irish scribe copied almost all of the contemporary changes in the Bamberg manuscript. Following the work of Edward Kennard Rand, this scribe has been known as i^2 .⁸ For the most part, my argument will be palaeographical. I shall focus on one surprising feature of the Bamberg manuscript, the fact that i^2 frequently erases and reworks his own interventions in and around the text. The erasures in the Bamberg manuscript indicate the kind of writing activity and the kind of engagement with the text in which i^2 was involved. They reveal continual selection and reworking as a creative practice. It is possible that the interventions of i^2 were written in several layers, and that they reflect changing contingencies over a period of time. This complicates any discussion of *a* reading, and it will be important in the future to address this question more thoroughly than I can attempt here. Nonetheless, the palaeographical picture is clear; the interventions of i^2 in the Bamberg manuscript reflect his own reading of the *Periphyseon*.

The autograph of Eriugena

The history of the search for Eriugena's autograph, within which I shall contextualise my own argument, is perhaps best told in a sequential or narrative rather than a thematic order. The narration of this history has been closely tied to the discovery of further manuscripts. Four were known to Traube, and a further eight have since been found to contain the same Irish minuscule writing. The twelve manuscripts are listed in Table 1. The discovery of new manuscripts has often been the occasion for further discussion of Eriugena's autograph and provided the evidence to advance that discussion. A second reason to prefer a sequential ordering is that many of the assumptions about the hands themselves or about the activities in which these scribes were engaged have changed substantially over time. A thematic presentation of this history may distort some of the earlier assumptions by drawing themes from the more recent discussion. It seems both fairer and clearer to follow a sequential

⁸See below, pp. 89–91.

Manuscript	Scribe(s)	Presence of scribe(s) first announced
Bamberg, Staatsbibliothek, Patr. 46 (formerly Q VI 32)	i ²	Ludwig Traube, 'Autographa des Iohannes Scotus', in <i>Palaeographische Forschungen</i> 5 (Munich: 1912)
Bamberg, Staatsbibliothek, Philos. 2/1 (formerly HJ IV 5)	i ²	Traube, 'Autographa' (1912)
Laon, Bibliothèque municipale 24	i ¹	Terence A. M. Bishop, 'Autographa of John the Scot', in <i>Jean Scot Érigène et l'histoire de la philosophie</i> (Paris: 1977)
Laon, Bibliothèque municipale 55	i ²	Bishop, 'Autographa' (1977)
Laon, Bibliothèque municipale 81	i ¹	Traube, 'Autographa' (1912)
Leiden, Universiteitsbibliotheek, B. P. L. 67	i ¹	Bishop, 'Autographa' (1977)
Leiden, Universiteitsbibliotheek, B. P. L. 88	i ²	Claudio Leonardi, 'I codici di Marziano Capella', in <i>Aevum</i> 33 and 34 (1959–60)
Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine 561	i ²	Édouard Jeuneau, <i>Commentaire sur l'évangile de Jean</i> (Paris: 1972)
Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, latin 13345	i ¹	Bishop, 'Autographa' (1977)
Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, latin 13908	i ²	Jeuneau, <i>Commentaire sur l'évangile de Jean</i> (1972)
Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, latin 14088	i ²	Jeuneau, <i>Commentaire sur l'évangile de Jean</i> (1972)
Reims, Bibliothèque municipale 875	i ¹ and i ²	Traube, 'Autographa' (1912)

Table 1: The twelve manuscripts which contain the hands of i¹ and i²

ordering. In this chapter, I shall begin with the history of the question before turning to my own arguments about the writing activity in which i² was engaged in the Bamberg manuscript.

The early work of Traube

Discussion of Eriugena's autograph has informed how we think about the reworking of the *Periphyseon*. On 7 January 1905, Traube announced in a lecture delivered to the Bayerische Akademie that he had discovered the autograph of Eriugena. On that occasion, Traube spoke from an outline. This was not written up for publication before his death in 1907, but was published nonetheless by Traube's student, Rand, in 1912 among some of his master's papers.⁹ In the meantime, Traube had published some of his findings in the preface to Rand's *Johannes Scottus* in 1906.¹⁰ In these first forays into the question of Eriugena's autograph, it was understood that there was a close connection between the scribal hand and the authorship of the material. The hand was supposed to be Eriugena's, and so the extensive interventions in the Reims and Bamberg manuscripts must also be genuine.

Traube presented twelve images in his 1905 lecture. Ten of those showed Irish minuscule writing he believed was the autograph of Eriugena. Two images are taken from the Reims manuscript and six from Bamberg. Single images are also taken from Laon, Bibliothèque municipale 81 and Bamberg, Staatsbibliothek, Patr. 46 (then Q VI 32). Two further images which did not show the Irish minuscule writing were also presented. One was taken from Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, latin 12964 – the manuscript in which Jeaneau would later find his Version IV – and the other from Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine 561. Traube's interest in this manuscript seems to be confined to f. 219v, on which we find a booklist titled 'Bibli Vulfadi'. The nineteenth entry in this list reads 'Libri perifesion II'.

Traube's lecture outline is brief, but his foreword to Rand's book is more discursive, and

⁹See note 1.

¹⁰Ludwig Traube, Foreword to Edward Kennard Rand, *Johannes Scottus* (Munich: 1906).

together the two texts seem to give a good indication of his arguments. Traube argues that, since many of the additions and corrections entered in the Reims and Bamberg manuscripts are written in a distinctly Irish minuscule, and since much of this material reflects the distinctive thought of Eriugena, the hand that wrote the material must be Eriugena's own. For instance, he writes that 'in Reims 875 we have a copy of the *Periphyseon* with marginal remarks in the author's own hand, as the content and insular script of these marginal remarks make completely clear'.¹¹ He suggests that this manuscript is therefore the 'fair copy', which the master has 'looked through and expanded'. Traube makes a similar argument with reference to Laon 81. This manuscript contains an incomplete commentary on the Gospel of John. Traube writes that, although the manuscript does not provide the name of the author, 'its idiosyncratic philosophical views can only be associated with Eriugena'.¹² Since he found in this manuscript the same Irish hand that he had discovered in the Reims and Bamberg manuscripts, Traube was able to make a palaeographical argument to support what had previously been suspected only on textual grounds: Eriugena was the author of this commentary.¹³ Nonetheless, Traube notes that this hand is not only found in copies of Eriugena's own texts, since in Bamberg Patr. 46 it writes comments on works by Candidus Arrianus and Marius Victorinus.¹⁴

A second strand in Traube's argument seems to suggest that the physical characteristics of this hand might also reveal something about the intellectual character of the writer. In the lecture outline he writes that the Irish hand is 'completely individual and changes spiritedly'.¹⁵ In the

¹¹Traube, Foreword to Rand, *Johannes Scottus*, p. viii. 'Von *Periphyseon* haben wir in der Handschrift Reims 875 ein Exemplar mit Randbemerkungen von des Verfassers eigener Hand, wie ganz deutlich der Inhalt und die insulare Schrift dieser Randbemerkungen bezeugen. Es ist die Reinschrift, [...] die dann der Meister durchgesehen und ergänzt hat.'

¹²Traube, *Autographa*, p. 5. 'Aber man konnte die eigenartige philosophische Anschauung nur mit Iohannes in Verbindung mitbringen.'

¹³Traube, Foreword to Rand, *Johannes Scottus*, p. ix.

¹⁴Traube, *Autographa*, p. 5. Traube here identifies the second author as Arrianus, which was likely meant only to be included as the second name of the first author. See also Traube, Foreword to Rand, *Johannes Scottus*, p. ix.

¹⁵Traube, *Autographa*, p. 5. Iohannes aber schreibt ganz individuell und temperamentvoll wechselnd.

preface he writes at greater length:¹⁶

We know, therefore, the hand of Johannes from the manuscripts of his works. It is the characteristic hand of an Irish scholar. It does not fly across the parchment like the hands of his countrymen who compiled the humanistic materials in Bern [Burgerbibliothek] 363, but instead pauses firmly, thoughtfully, and even with expression over the words and sentences being written. It seldom employs abbreviations, and when this is the case, these are now and then personal creations but easily understood. I believe that it is not only the joy of making the discovery which makes the hand dear and clear to me; it is as though I were seeing in front of me the very hand of Erasmus writing the commentary on the Gospel of Mark, as painted by Holbein.

The hand itself as well as the script that it wrote and the materials that it copied all suggested to Traube that this Irish minuscule writing was the autograph of Eriugena. It is in this context that we should understand his proposed editorial project. For Traube the evolution of this text is nothing but the evolution of the ideas in the mind of its author since the hand, in which the successive manuscript copies are overwritten, guarantees the authenticity of the additions and corrections.

¹⁶Traube, Foreword to Rand, *Johannes Scottus*, p. ix. 'Also wir kennen die Hand des Johannes aus den Codices seiner Werke: eine charakteristische irische Gelehrtenhand, die aber nicht über das Pergament fliegt, wie die seiner humanistisch gerichteten, kompilierenden Landsleute im Bernensis 363, sondern nachdrücklich, nachdenklich und doch mitteilksam in den Worten und Sätzen verweilt; selten bedient sie sich einer Kürzung, wo sie es tut, mitunter einer selbstgeschaffenen, aber leicht verständlichen. Ich glaube, es ist nicht nur die Freude des Entdeckers, die mir diese Hand lieb und deutlich macht, als sähe ich sie vor mir, wie die des Erasmus auf dem Bilde Holbeins, die an der Paraphrase des Markus schreibt.'

Rand's criticisms

When Rand published Traube's lecture outline in 1912, he was enthusiastic about what he then called the 'beautiful discovery' of Eriugena's autograph.¹⁷ In an appendix he set out further details in support of his master's arguments. At that time Rand knew the manuscripts which were discussed by Traube only through the photographic plates which Traube had shown in the lecture, but in the summers of 1912 and 1913 he examined the manuscripts for himself. Reluctantly, he became convinced that the autograph of Eriugena was not yet found. He published his work in 1920.¹⁸

Rand argues that the Irish minuscule examined by Traube was not the autograph of Eriugena. He presents three arguments in support of this conclusion.¹⁹ By this time, Rand knew all four manuscripts, but he refers only to Reims 875, from which he presents eleven images. Rand first argues that this Irish writing cannot be Eriugena's autograph, because it collaborates with a number of Caroline hands. Particularly important to this argument is the material copied on f. 285v, shown in Rand's fifth plate, which was copied in two alternations of an Irish and a Caroline hand. Rand at first concedes that Eriugena may have been able to write both an Irish and a Caroline minuscule, but he considers it implausible that he would write several different varieties of the continental script. Whatever the reason for the alternation of hands, the fact that the Irish scribe collaborates with as many as five or six Caroline scribes suggests to Rand that none of them is Eriugena. A few of these further Caroline hands are shown in his second, sixth, and seventh plates. Rand suggests that we see scribes 'collaborating on what would appear to be a rather difficult original or set of originals'.²⁰

Rand's second argument concerns certain errors found in the material written in the lower

¹⁷Rand, Foreword to Traube, *Autographa*, p. 3. '[...] seines schönen Fundes der Eigenschrift des Iohannes Scottus.'

¹⁸Edward Kennard Rand, 'The supposed autographa of John the Scot', *University of California publications in classical philology* 5:8 (1920), pp. 135–41.

¹⁹Rand, 'The supposed autographa', pp. 137–40.

²⁰Rand, 'The supposed autographa', p. 138.

margin of f. 54r. Rand believes that this material was copied by the Irish scribe. He argues that errors obscure the meaning of the text to such an extent that the scribe could not have understood what he was copying. For this reason, he concludes that the Irish writing is not Eriugena's autograph.

Rand's third and final argument is the most important for the continuing discussion of the autograph; for he shows that the Reims manuscript contains not one but *two* distinct hands writing an Irish minuscule script, which he labels *i*¹ and *i*². Moreover he shows that the two hands appear in different parts of the manuscript, one in gatherings I–X and XV–XLI (ff. 11r–80v and 113r–318v), and the other in gatherings XI–XIV and XLII–LXVI (ff. 81r–112v and 319r–358r). Rand wonders why, if either hand were Eriugena's autograph, it would be confined to this businesslike separation of the gatherings. The first two arguments were made with reference to *i*¹, but Rand suggests the same features can be seen in the material copied by *i*². This is important, since he observes that the greater part of Traube's plates show the latter hand. Rand writes with some imprecision that 'the two Insular hands appear also in the manuscripts of Bamberg and of Laon'.²¹ In fact, as his footnotes show, Rand knew *i*¹ only in Laon and *i*² only in Bamberg. He concludes that neither of the Irish scribes is Eriugena; they are instead 'scribes employed by him, together with others, to correct and enlarge the manuscripts of his works', even if they are 'very possibly the most important of his workmen'.²²

Although Rand contests Traube's identification of the autograph, he does not doubt that the material written by the Irish scribes was composed by anyone other than Eriugena. Indeed, his article concludes with a reference to something like Traube's genetic-critical edition:²³

After all is said and done, the great value of Traube's discovery remains. It is positive that the enlargements in the manuscripts were made at the direction of

²¹Rand, 'The supposed autographa', p. 140.

²²Rand, 'The supposed autographa', p. 140.

²³Rand, 'The supposed autographa', p. 141.

the author himself. They present to the modern editor [...] the fascinating task of distinguishing the different revisions, and of following the growth of the subject in Johannes' mind.

Rand necessarily departs from Traube's work in his understanding of the relation between Eriugena's autograph and the authority of the reworking of the *Periphyseon*. The Irish minuscule writing has been shown to be the work of two scribes, neither of whom is believed by Rand to be the Eriugena himself. Nonetheless, because their work is understood to be a transparent witness to Eriugena's direction, in spite of the difficult originals from which they were apparently working, Rand is able to argue that all the interventions in Reims and Bamberg are genuinely Eriugenian.

Others writing at this time seem to have been convinced only in part by the arguments put forward by Traube and Rand. For instance, Paul Lehmann, another student of Traube and a friend of Rand, wrote in 1941 that 'the codices cited by Traube have been looked through, changed, and corrected by several scribes on the instructions of the author, but the features of Johannes Scottus himself have not yet been detected with certainty'.²⁴ He repeatedly refers to Rand, but never in unqualified agreement.

The 1960s: Bischoff, Leonardi, and Sheldon-Williams

Twenty years later, Bernhard Bischoff identified the Irish hand known as i² in another manuscript. His discovery was announced in print in 1960 by Claudio Leonardi in the second part of his survey of the manuscript copies of Martianus Capella's *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii*.²⁵ In Leiden, Universiteitsbibliotheek, B. P. L. 88 the ninth book of the text is

²⁴Paul Lehmann, 'Autographa und Originale namhafter lateinischer Schriftsteller des Mittelalters', in *Erforschung des Mittelalters: ausgewählte Abhandlungen und Aufsätze*, 5 volumes (Stuttgart: 1959), volume 1, pp. 366–7. '[...] die von Traube angeführten Codices sind von mehreren Schreibern im Auftrag des Verfassers durchgesehen, verändert, berichtigt worden, aber die Züge des Johannes Scottus selbst haben sich noch nicht mit Sicherheit nachweisen lassen.'

²⁵Claudio Leonardi, 'I codici di Marziano Capella', *Aevum* 33 (1959), pp. 443–89 and 34 (1960), pp. 1–99 and 411–524, at number 84.

accompanied by glosses which Leonardi here ascribes to Eriugena. He writes that the glosses are written in a contemporary hand with many insular elements, and reports Bischoff's belief that this is the autograph. In a later study Leonardi describes in greater detail the activity of i² in this manuscript, his cooperation with a contemporary scribe writing Caroline minuscule, and the division of their work between the two gatherings in which the text is copied.²⁶ In this study he sets aside the question of the autograph entirely. He suggests also that the textual tradition of these glosses also complicates their straightforward attribution to Eriugena.

All five manuscripts were known to Sheldon-Williams when he wrote the introduction to the first volume of his edition and translation of the *Periphyseon*, published in 1968. Nonetheless the greater part of his discussion of the autograph is based on Reims 875 alone.²⁷

Sheldon-Williams returns to the arguments made by Rand half a century earlier. He addresses two points in particular: that at least one of the enlargements in the Reims manuscript contains clear errors, and that some of them are written by more than one hand. In response he writes:²⁸

As to the arguments against Traube's theory, the first may be dismissed at once, since the greatest scholars make careless mistakes when they scribble notes in the margins of books, and the errors in the enlargements are of this type. The second assumes that Eriugena invariably wrote in the same hand, but this need not have been the case.

Édouard Jeuneau and Paul Edward Dutton have understood the second part of this rebuttal to refer to the distinction between the two Irish hands.²⁹ I believe that it may be read differently. Throughout the introduction to his edition Sheldon-Williams does indeed refer

²⁶Claudio Leonardi, 'Glose eriugeniane a Marziano Capella in un codice leidense', in *Jean Scot Érigène et l'histoire de la philosophie* (Paris: 1977), edited by René Roques, pp. 171–82.

²⁷Sheldon-Williams, Introduction to the *Scriptores Latini Hiberniae* edition of the *Periphyseon* 1, pp. 5–10.

²⁸Sheldon-Williams, Introduction to the *Periphyseon* 1, p. 8.

²⁹Jeuneau and Dutton, *The autograph of Eriugena*, p. 24.

to the five manuscripts, as though they contain a single Irish hand, but here he seems to refer instead to Rand's observations about the collaboration of Irish and Caroline scribes. It is therefore possible that Sheldon-Williams meant to suggest that not only all of the Irish material but also some of the Caroline material was written by Eriugena's own hand. This easy dismissal of Rand's arguments is perhaps a symptom of Sheldon-Williams's own palaeographical uncertainties; for he was not always able to distinguish Irish and Caroline minuscules, and the identification of one or the other in his edition is generally unreliable.

It should also be noted that Sheldon-Williams appears to have confused the point of Rand's arguments. For instance, he writes:³⁰

Whosoever the hand that wrote these enlargements, there can be little doubt that the matter is Eriugena's [...] Although they do not as a rule affect the argument, being for the most part qualifications of statements made in the text, or elaborations, or illustrations to point the meaning, all bear the stamp of authority. To say that Eriugena is not the author would amount to saying that he is no more than part author of the *Periphyseon*.

This was never doubted by Rand. Indeed, he went to some length to separate the question of the autograph from the authorship of the material copied by the Irish hands. The final position argued by Sheldon-Williams seems therefore to be similar to that of Traube. He believes that the material was both written and composed by Eriugena.

³⁰Sheldon-Williams, Introduction to the *Periphyseon* I, p. 9.

The 1970s: Bischoff, Jeauneau, and Bishop

The Irish hand known as i² was identified by Bischoff and T. A. M. Bishop in three further manuscripts. Their discoveries were announced in print in 1972 by Jeauneau in the introduction to his edition of Eriugena's commentary on the Gospel of St John, the text contained in Laon 81. Bischoff identified the hand in Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine 561 and Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France latin 14088. The former contains Eriugena's Latin translation of the *Ambigua ad Iohannem* by Maximus the Confessor. It had been discussed by Traube with reference only to the booklist on f. 219v,³¹ but Bischoff discovered a single gloss written by i² in the lower margin of f. 67v. The latter is a composite of various materials put together in the seventeenth century. On f. 11, i² writes several lines of verse in the form of palindromes, and on f. 1v, four excerpts from Cassiodorus' *Historia tripartita*. Bishop discovered a much greater quantity of writing by i² in Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, latin 13908. In this manuscript, i² copies many glosses around the text of Boethius' *De institutione musica*. Jeauneau does not discuss the authorship of any of this material in his introduction. Nonetheless, in a later discussion of Eriugena's autograph, Bishop cites Jeauneau's opinion that there are 'some characteristics of John's vocabulary' in the glosses in this manuscript, and in one 'an unmistakable reflection of John's mind'.³²

The further discoveries of this Irish hand informed Jeauneau's own conclusions about the autograph.³³ He had at first been tempted to identify i¹ as Eriugena's hand, but later concluded that the autograph must be i² instead. In his discussion, Jeauneau presents two images from Laon 81. Throughout this manuscript, additions and corrections are entered both in the margins and between the lines of the text. Some of these are entered by the various text hands, but others are written in Irish minuscule by the hand i¹. The notes in this

³¹See above, pp. 86–7.

³²T. A. M. Bishop, 'Autographa of John the Scot', in *Jean Scot Érigène et l'histoire de la philosophie* (Paris: 1977), edited by René Roques, pp. 89–94.

³³Jeauneau, Introduction to the Sources Chrétiennes edition of *Commentaire sur l'évangile de Jean* (Paris: 1972), pp. 70–77.

Irish hand are especially numerous in the seventh gathering, in which the commentary finally breaks off. Two features of this hand suggest to Jeauneau that it may be the autograph. He writes first that its interventions are of a kind usually permitted only to an author, that they are, in other words, authorial corrections. Jeauneau writes also that the physical characteristics of the hand reveal an author's personality.³⁴

Finally, the penmanship of the additions and corrections is not the impersonal writing of a professional scribe. It is really, as Traube saw well, the writing of an author, personal and original. We may therefore be tempted to return to Traube's opinion, and to admit that the Irish notes in Laon 81 were written by Eriugena's own hand.

Jeauneau writes that he was 'about to succumb to this temptation', when Bischoff drew his attention to the discovery of *i*² in the three additional manuscripts.³⁵ At this point, Jeauneau changed his mind; *i*¹ and not *i*² is the autograph of Eriugena. This reconsideration is based entirely on the identification of the hand in further manuscripts, since Jeauneau's argument rests on the number of manuscripts in which each hand is found. At this point, *i*¹ was known in only two manuscripts, whereas *i*² was known in seven. Jeauneau argues that if *i*² were a scribe employed by Eriugena, it would be hard to explain why he should have been retained for so long. He concludes that *i*² must be Eriugena's own hand.

Jeauneau's argument is not perfect. For one thing, he sets aside Rand's criticisms without comment. More importantly, he seems to assume that at every instance in which his hand is found, *i*² is writing on the instruction of Eriugena. If *i*² had an independent or posterior career, the apparent problem of his long association with Eriugena would evaporate. We may also wonder whether this is a problem at all, or whether there are other kinds of relation

³⁴Jeauneau, Introduction to the *Commentaire sur l'évangile de Jean*, pp. 75–6. 'Enfin, l'écriture de ces corrections et additions n'est pas celle, impersonnelle, d'un scribe de métier. C'est vraiment, comme Traube l'a bien vu, une écriture d'auteur, personnelle et originale. On serait donc tenté de revenir à l'opinion de Traube et d'admettre que les notes irlandaises du manuscrit 81 de Laon sont des autographes érigéniens.'

³⁵Jeauneau, Introduction to the *Commentaire sur l'évangile de Jean*, p. 76.

besides master and scribe with which we might describe more appropriately the two Irishmen. Whatever the case may be, Jeaneau's reliance on only the number of witnesses is not a sound basis for the identification of the autograph, and for this he was, in turn, criticised by Bishop.³⁶

The treatment of i¹ in Jeaneau's introduction also requires some further consideration, since it locates more precisely the relation between the autograph and the authorship of the materials copied in Laon 81.³⁷ Since this hand is found in both the Reims and Laon manuscripts, Jeaneau concludes that the two manuscripts were copied in the same place at approximately the same time. His discussion of the Laon manuscript seems to introduce a wrinkle into this chronology. Jeaneau suggests (after Maïeul Cappuyns) that the text breaks off incomplete, because Eriugena died before it could be finished.³⁸ Indeed, he suggests that the physical characteristics of the manuscript indicate that the seventh gathering contains only a first draft, whereas the earlier parts contain a definitive copy of the text. Many things contribute to this impression: the gathering is ruled with less care, and the text scribe's writing is hasty. More than anything else the fact that the authorial corrections – the additions, corrections, and erasures – are far more numerous in this gathering than elsewhere in the book and far less careful with regard to their effect on the prose suggested to Jeaneau that this is a first draft. Jeaneau's physical description is very good, but if he is correct on every point, Eriugena (i²) must have died shortly after his interventions in Reims 875. How then did he return to work in the Bamberg manuscript, which necessarily comes after Reims, since it incorporates all of the material added there? This point aside, it is clear that Jeaneau separates the question of the autograph from the authorship of the material:³⁹

³⁶See below, pp. 97–9.

³⁷Jeaneau, Introduction to the *Commentaire sur l'évangile de Jean*, pp. 79–80.

³⁸Cappuyns advances this only as a possibility. Jeaneau attributes to Cappuyns an opinion perhaps a little stronger than the one that he actually held. See Maïeul Cappuyns, *Jean Scot Érigène: sa vie, son œuvre, sa pensée* (Louvain and Paris: 1933), p. 231.

³⁹Jeaneau, Introduction to the *Commentaire sur l'évangile de Jean*, p. 80. 'On sait le prix qu'il faut accorder à l'esquisse d'un tableau, au premier crayon d'un portrait, quand le peintre est un grand artiste. Le Cahier VII du manuscrit de Laon n'est pas autre chose. On peut y voir Jean Scot en plein travail, corrigeant son copiste, se

We know the price of the first sketch of a painting, the first pencilling in of a portrait, when the painter is a great artist. The seventh gathering of the Laon manuscript is exactly this. We can there see John Scot at work, correcting his copyist, correcting himself, replacing one word with another, adding here or there a new phrase or part of a phrase, without worrying about the disturbance he introduces into the original text. Such a document is infinitely precious.

As was the case in Rand's argument, the Irish scribe known as *i*¹ is here, as it were, transparent. Whatever is written by this scribe is understood by Jeauneau to be the words of Eriugena himself.

In 1975, at a conference in Laon, the question of Eriugena's autograph was raised again.⁴⁰ In his treatment of the two Irish hands Bishop referred to all eight manuscripts in which they were known at the time. He presented two images, one from Reims 875 and the other from Laon 81. At this conference Bishop argued that *i*¹ and not *i*² was the hand of Eriugena. His paper almost seems to be a response to Jeauneau, since he was more concerned to demonstrate that *i*² is not Eriugena than he was to pursue a positive identification of the autograph. Perhaps out of tact Jeauneau is never mentioned in this connection.

Also almost without comment Bishop sets aside Rand's arguments, and argues that either of the Irish hands may have a claim to be the autograph.⁴¹ In this he responds to Jeauneau. For he argues that the number of manuscripts in which each hand appears cannot support the claim of one over the other. Although *i*² appears in a greater number of manuscripts, Bishop writes, the number is not absolutely large, and the difference may be simply an accident of survival.

Bishop goes on to argue that *i*² is not Eriugena. His argument rests on the observation that

corrigeant lui-même, remplaçant un mot par un autre, ajoitant ici ou là une phrase ou un membre de phrase nouveaux, sans se soucier toujours de la perturbation qu'il introduit ainsi dans le text primitif. Un tel document est infiniment précieux.'

⁴⁰Bishop, 'Autographa'.

⁴¹Bishop, 'Autographa', p. 91.

not all of what he writes is ‘certainly or unmixedly Johannine’.⁴² In this connection, Bishop discusses the glosses copied in Paris 13908 on Boethius’ *De institutione musica* and in Leiden 88 on Martianus Capella’s *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii*, but his most important discussion concerns the Bamberg copy of the *Periphyseon*.

For the first time, Bishop begins to suggest that not all of what is written by i² in this manuscript was necessarily written on the instruction of Eriugena. This suggests a new relation between the autograph and the authority of the text found in that manuscript. Bishop begins his discussion of the Bamberg manuscript by restating what had been learned from the preceding discussion:⁴³

The Bamberg manuscript of the *Periphyseon*, embodying the additions to the Reims manuscript, and carrying new additions, is by general consent the supreme example of the author’s obsessive concern to convey and develop his full and exact meaning, displayed in what Traube took to be his autograph and what scholars continue to read as his *ipsissima verba*.

His first remarks about i² do not contest this description. He writes that ‘the appearances of i² are all accountable as editorial – one of the functions of an editor being, of course, to record verbatim the latest authorized additions’.⁴⁴ The material discussed by Bishop in two further categories, which he calls ‘glosses’ and ‘marginal subheadings’, seems to slip away from Eriugena’s authority, either because it was incompletely articulated or because it was newly composed by i². Bishop argues that the glosses are inchoate notes. He suggests that these were meant to be written up and incorporated into the text, but that this never took place, because Eriugena had died in the meantime.

Bishop notes that i² had occasional difficulty with this material. For instance, on f. 215r (which is shown in Traube’s eighth plate and below in figure 1), Bishop sees i² placing and

⁴²Bishop, ‘Autographa’, p. 91.

⁴³Bishop, ‘Autographa’, p. 92.

⁴⁴Bishop, ‘Autographa’, p. 92.

replacing material in the margin, which should instead have been entered into the text, before realising and correcting his error. He concludes that the activity of i² in this manuscript displays ‘the hesitations of a conscientious and perfectly competent editor’.⁴⁵ Finally, Bishop discusses the marginal subheadings. He writes that there is no very strong reason to ascribe any of these to Eriugena, and suggests that one certainly could not have been written by Eriugena, since it praises the author or rather his argument. However we rate Bishop’s arguments, it is clear that he imagines i² as a competent and diligent disciple of Eriugena, doing his best with the materials left behind on his master’s death.

Bishop’s argument in favour of i¹ is much briefer. He refers almost in passing to Jeaneau’s initial reading of the Laon manuscript, but the substance of his argument lies in an attempt to read the intellectual character of an author from the physical characteristics of the hand:⁴⁶

If it were not a duty to refrain as far as possible from subjective opinion, and to limit remarks on physical features strictly to what incurs the risk of detection in error, it would be tempting to recognize more specious characteristics of an Irish-cosmopolitan intellectual in the rapid, nervous, dispersed, sometimes rather disorderly hand which is designated i¹. Limited to i¹, Traube’s remarks could not be improved upon.

Thus, in this paper, the relation between hands and authorship has been differently configured. In the work previously discussed, interventions in the manuscripts of the *Periphyseon* were ascribed to Eriugena, whether or not they were written by his own hand. Here, for the first time, i² is given a small measure of independence, even if it is rooted in Eriugena’s own materials.

This is not all that happened at the Laon conference. In the discussion that followed Bishop’s

⁴⁵Bishop, ‘Autographa’, p. 92.

⁴⁶Bishop, ‘Autographa’, p. 93.

paper, Bischoff announced that he had identified the hand of i¹ in three further manuscripts. He had found it in Laon, Bibliothèque municipale 24, Leiden, Universiteitsbibliotheek, B. P. L. 67, and Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, latin 13345. The first of these contains on f. 11r a letter to a certain Winibertus written by i¹. This letter was further discussed by John J. Contreni, who reaffirmed his earlier attribution of the letter to Eriugena on the basis of Bischoff's identification of the hand.⁴⁷ The second manuscript contains various works by Priscian. Here, i¹ copied a number of glosses on the first book of his *Institutiones*. The third manuscript contains among other things a life of St Dionysius by Hilduin. On f. 96v, i¹ copied some of the Greek words from this text in Greek characters in the lower margin.

Likewise, Bischoff found i² in Laon, Bibliothèque municipale 55, a copy of Bede's *Commentarius in parabolis Salomonis*. On the first front flyleaf, i² writes glosses on four biblical passages. The glosses were discussed in a separate paper at the same conference by Bischoff and Jeauneau.⁴⁸

A return to Rand

In his examination of parts of the Carolingian traditions of logic, theology, and philosophy, John Marenbon returns to the question of Eriugena's autograph.⁴⁹ His writing references all twelve of the manuscripts mentioned so far. Marenbon argues that neither of the Irish hands is Eriugena's autograph, and that they are instead the hands of two of his closest followers. He returns to Rand's arguments about the autograph, and notes that no one had yet addressed his observations regarding the collaboration between the Irish and Caroline scribes. Otherwise,

⁴⁷John J. Contreni, 'The Irish <colony> at Laon during the time of John Scottus', in *Jean Scot Érigène et l'histoire de la philosophie* (Paris: 1977), edited by René Roques, pp. 59–67, at p. 60.

⁴⁸Bernhard Bischoff and Édouard Jeauneau, 'Ein neuer Text aus der Gedankenwelt des Johannes Scottus', in *Jean Scot Érigène et l'histoire de la philosophie* (Paris: 1977), edited by René Roques, pp. 109–16.

⁴⁹John Marenbon, *From the circle of Alcuin to the school of Auxerre: logic, theology and philosophy in the early middle ages* (Cambridge: 1981), pp. 89–96. Lesley Smith adopts in passing a similar position to Marenbon regarding the autograph. See 'Yet more on the autograph of John the Scot: MS Bamberg Ph. 2/2 and its place in the *Periphyseon* tradition', in *From Athens to Chartres: Neoplatonism and medieval thought* (Leiden: 1992), edited by Haijo Jan Westra, pp. 47–70.

his remarks seem to relate more directly to Bishop. He queries the assumption that one or the other of the Irish hands must be the autograph, writing that that ‘oddest of all these oddities is that scholars as fine as Traube and Bishop should have seemed to argue as if the physical characteristics of a hand, its nervousness or spirit, could betray it as that of an intellectual, not just a scribe’.⁵⁰ Whether or not we can still maintain a clear distinction between intellectuals and ‘just’ scribes, Marenbon’s critique is fair; the substance of Rand’s arguments had not been addressed. Marenbon concludes that i¹ and i² are the hands of capable scribes who could help in the revision of Eriugena’s writings, and that they were also able to ‘pursue their own studies and thoughts, along the lines suggested by their master’s interest and example’.⁵¹

Eriugena’s autograph identified?

The most recent publication to address the question of Eriugena’s autograph is Jeaneau and Dutton’s *The autograph of Eriugena*, which was published in 1996. This book sets out a complete reconsideration of the palaeographical and textual (or ‘philological’) evidence for the attribution of the hands as well as a nuanced account of the history of the question, which reports a substantial quantity of unpublished correspondence among the scholars cited above and lecture materials. They present 99 images from all twelve manuscripts in which the Irish hands have been identified. The authors conclude that i¹ and not i² is the autograph of Eriugena.

Jeaneau and Dutton address Rand’s arguments in some detail. First, they examine his discussion of the error on f. 54r of the Reims manuscript in material which Rand believed had been written by i¹. They show that this was in fact written by a Caroline hand, and that Rand was mistaken.⁵² Rand’s observation is therefore neither here nor there for the question of the autograph. In second place, Jeaneau and Dutton address Rand’s separation of the two Irish hands among the gatherings. They argue that this is an oversimplification, since each hand

⁵⁰Marenbon, *From the circle of Alcuin*, p. 92.

⁵¹Marenbon, *From the circle of Alcuin*, p. 96.

⁵²Jeaneau and Dutton, *The autograph of Eriugena*, p. 22.

occasionally adds material in the gatherings assigned to the other.⁵³ Nonetheless, their demonstration does not seem to disturb the general truth of Rand's observation, which is then set aside. Finally, Jeauneau and Dutton show that the first instance of collaboration noticed by Rand on f. 285v of the Reims manuscript in fact indicates layers of copying, as the Irish and Caroline scribes returned to the material several times.⁵⁴ Further instances are not discussed, but it does not seem unreasonable to suppose that there may be a similar explanation. Having set aside Rand's objections, the authors ask whether either of the hands may be Eriugena's autograph. Their discussion falls in two sections; first they demonstrate that the hand of i² cannot be the autograph, and then that the hand of i¹ may be Eriugena's own.

Jeauneau and Dutton present several arguments in support of their conclusion that i² is not Eriugena's autograph.⁵⁵ First, they argue that i² had been trained as a scribe. In all of his writing he uses a full range of abbreviations and reference signs as well as a number of ligatures. Moreover, they argue that the appearance of his writing on the page in Reims 875 suggests that he was copying his material from an exemplar. He seems to know in advance the length of the material to be copied, and so enters it in neat blocks around the text. Jeauneau and Dutton argue that the 'editorial' work pursued by i² in the Bamberg manuscript also suggests that he was not the author of the text. They write that the titles and glosses in this manuscript reflect the concern of an editor to make the text more readable. Nonetheless, they note that he may also here and there have changed a few words of the text or even introduced new sentences. Finally, Jeauneau and Dutton note that many of the titles and glosses refer to the author in the third person, and others praise him or his arguments. Since i² wrote this material in the Bamberg manuscript, he cannot, they suggest, be the author that they praise. Jeauneau and Dutton conclude that, although i² was not the author of the text, he probably was the author of these glosses and titles as well as the updated cross-references.

⁵³Jeauneau and Dutton, *The autograph of Eriugena*, pp. 22–3.

⁵⁴Jeauneau and Dutton, *The autograph of Eriugena*, pp. 103–4.

⁵⁵Jeauneau and Dutton, *The autograph of Eriugena*, pp. 108–10.

The identification of i¹ as Eriugena is supported by a number of further arguments.⁵⁶

Jeauneau and Dutton first argue that i¹ was not a trained scribe, since he uses few abbreviations and only two ligatures, *et* and *eg*. Moreover, they detect signs of haste in the interventions of this hand. In particular, they observe that changes in gender and number are frequently not reflected in the surrounding text. His work also never refers to the author in the third person. The most convincing argument put forward by Jeauneau and Dutton concerns the appearance of his writing on the page. Unlike the neat blocks copied by i², the material written by i¹ in Reims 875 and Laon 81 spills around the margins of the manuscripts. Jeauneau and Dutton conclude that he did not know how long his enlargements were going to be when he began to write them, and that he was therefore not copying preexistent material from an exemplar. They argue also that he was not taking dictation. The authors therefore conclude that he was composing as he wrote. Their suggestion is convincing.

Jeauneau and Dutton conclude their argument with the following remark:⁵⁷

Since the passages he [i¹] worked on in those manuscripts are among the most characteristically Eriugenian, we would have to conclude, if i¹ is not Eriugena, that we are in the presence of an understudy, one who thought as Eriugena did, but who worked independently. A substantial amount of the *Periphyseon* would be attributable to this understudy and, therefore, not be authentic. [...] Surely a more reasonable solution is to accept i¹ as Eriugena's hand.

Jeauneau and Dutton therefore reconfigure the relations between the hands and the authority of the material in a way that takes account of the different manuscripts. All of what is written by i¹ is believed to be authorial, since this hand is believed to be the autograph. Moreover, much of what i² writes in the Reims manuscript was also composed by Eriugena and simply copied by this other Irish scribe. In the Bamberg manuscript, the situation is slightly different, and the authors suggest that i² himself may have composed many of the glosses and titles

⁵⁶Jeauneau and Dutton, *The autograph of Eriugena*, pp. 110–16.

⁵⁷Jeauneau and Dutton, *The autograph of Eriugena*, p. 114.

perhaps as well as some of his interventions into the text.

This conclusion is reflected in Jeauneau's edition of the *Periphyseon* for the Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medievalis series. The greater part of the five volumes comprises a synoptic edition from Reims 875 (Versions I and II), Bamberg Philos. 2/1 (Version III), and Paris 12964 (Version IV). This is something very much like Traube's proposed genetic-critical edition.⁵⁸ Jeauneau's own critical text from the first part of each volume is repeated in the synoptic edition as Version V. The critical text includes all of the changes made in the Reims manuscript. The titles and many of the glosses written by i² in the Bamberg manuscript are also printed in Jeauneau's critical text, but the other interventions are almost all included only in the synoptic edition. In the introduction to the first volume Jeauneau writes that i² is the author of all 250 titles, the glosses, and the cross-references in the Bamberg manuscript, and that 'he sometimes allowed himself to correct the author's own text for no apparent reason besides his fantasy'.⁵⁹ Jeauneau therefore seems to draw another distinction between what is editorial and what is a genuine and apparently impermissible intervention in the text itself.

In the preceding discussion, I have tried to show how palaeographical discussion of Eriugena's autograph has been tied up with different ideas about the reworking of the *Periphyseon* in the Reims and Bamberg manuscripts. For the most part, whatever an individual scholar has thought about the question of the autograph, they have attributed composition of the interventions in both manuscripts to Eriugena. Beginning with Bishop, and to a greater extent in the writing of Jeauneau and Dutton, the possibility has been put forward that i² may have composed some of the material which he wrote in the Bamberg manuscript. Two further papers by Jeauneau and Dutton present i² as a sensitive reader of the *Periphyseon* who does not agree with Eriugena on every point. This representation not only suggests different

⁵⁸ See above, pp. 82–4.

⁵⁹ Jeauneau, Introduction to the *Periphyseon* 1, p. xxv. 'Il s'est permis parfois de corriger le texte même de l'auteur, sans autre raison apparente que sa fantasie.'

ways to think about the authority of the text, but also destabilises any straightforward notion of four versions of the *Periphyseon*.

A recent focus on i²

The many roles of i² in the Reims and Bamberg manuscripts have proved a puzzle to palaeographers and intellectual historians who have studied the hand. At times, i² seems to be only a scribe, copying the latest additions and corrections to the text of the *Periphyseon* on the instruction of Eriugena. This is how all of his work appeared to Rand.⁶⁰ Sixty years later Bishop suggested that some of the titles in the Bamberg manuscript may have been his own invention.⁶¹ More of the material is attributed to i² by Jeaneau and Dutton, who began to acknowledge the differences between the manuscripts in *The autograph of Eriugena*.⁶² More recently they have tried to account for the relation between each of these roles, and to suggest what this might mean for the history of the text. In this more recent work Jeaneau and Dutton maintain their earlier conclusion that i¹ is Eriugena and i² is not.

Dutton has narrated the development of i² from assistant and scribe to editor and Eriugenist.⁶³ In so doing, he describes a more complicated relation between the Reims and Bamberg manuscripts and a more involved role for i² in negotiating that relation. Traube believed that the Bamberg manuscript was copied from Reims, and incorporated the material found in the margins of that manuscript, before it received additions and corrections of its own.⁶⁴ This has more recently been reaffirmed in Jeaneau's edition of the text.⁶⁵ Dutton refines this description. He notes that that the Reims manuscript contains a 'cryptic marginal

⁶⁰See above, pp. 89–91.

⁶¹See above, pp. 97–99

⁶²See above, p. 103.

⁶³Paul Edward Dutton, 'Minding Irish *ps* and *qs*: signs of the first systematic reading of Eriugena's *Periphyseon*', in *A distinct voice*, edited by Jacqueline Brown and William P. Stoneman (Notre Dame, Indiana: 1997), pp. 14–31.

⁶⁴See above, pp. 86–8.

⁶⁵See above, pp. 103–4.

code'.⁶⁶ The manuscript contains 188 large *Ps*, 221 *Qs*, and 456 *Ls*. On the basis of their letterforms, Dutton argues that these were written by *i*². Moreover, he shows that they were written after the other additions in that manuscript, since they are placed outside and accommodate these earlier additions. Infrequently, *i*² adds brief material to the letter-signs themselves. By means of a comparison with the system of marginal additions found in Bern, Burgerbibliothek 363, Dutton suggests that the function of each sign was basically a *nota bene*, but they also indicated points where further reading or comment was required.

The importance of these signs lies in the relation they suggest between the Reims and Bamberg manuscripts and the role they suggest for *i*² in mediating that relation. Dutton writes that the points at which the *Ps*, *Qs*, and *Ls* are entered in the Reims manuscript frequently correspond to places in the Bamberg manuscript where *i*² added material.⁶⁷ This correspondence seems to suggest that *i*² used the letter-signs to identify topics and questions, for which he later provided topical subheadings or longer glosses in the Bamberg manuscript. On nineteen occasions *i*² added brief headings in the margins of the Reims manuscript.⁶⁸ Dutton suggests that these titles were written after the letter signs, since their placement accommodates *Ps*, *Qs*, and *Ls* already written in the margin, and indeed after the Bamberg manuscript was copied from Reims, since the titles were not copied from the one into the other. Moreover, he suggests that when the equivalent titles are entered into the Bamberg manuscript, they are often richer and more complex. He concludes that this enrichment and the frequent correspondence of the letter signs in Reims to the additions in Bamberg seem to suggest that *i*² was directly dependent on Reims when he entered his interventions in Bamberg.

⁶⁶Dutton, 'Minding Irish *ps* and *qs*', pp. 14.

⁶⁷Dutton, 'Minding Irish *ps* and *qs*', p. 24.

⁶⁸Dutton, 'Minding Irish *ps* and *qs*', p. 24. These headings are found on ff. 60v, 69v, 133v, 166r, 181v, 191v, 207v, 208r, 252v, 253v, 254v, twice on 255v, 256r, 274v, 296r, 296v, 323v, 336v, and 357r, *i.e.* at *Periphyseon* 1, 499D and 510C; *Periphyseon* 2, 601B; *Periphyseon* 3, 634A, 652B, 663B, 680C, 681C, 730C, 731B, 732C, 733B, 733C, and 734B; and *Periphyseon* 4, 754C, 783A, 783C, 814A, 829B, and 853D. My list of twenty titles is taken from the synoptic parts of Jauneau's edition. It is not clear why there is a discrepancy here, since Dutton does not provide a list of his nineteen titles. I have not seen the Reims manuscript, and for this reason cannot adjudicate.

There are some indications in the letter-signs that i² was working in the Reims manuscript at some speed. Dutton notes that the impression of the letter-signs is sometimes printed onto the facing page, which suggests the page was turned before their ink was dry.⁶⁹ Moreover, he suggests that the letter-signs are ‘large and boldly written, almost suggesting a master’s proprietary interest in the manuscript’.⁷⁰ Dutton concludes that the *Ps*, *Qs*, and *Ls* in the Reims manuscript reveal a ‘first systematic reading’ of the *Periphyseon*, and that this reading prepared i² for his work in the Bamberg manuscript. According to Dutton, we should read the Reims manuscript as follows: the text was first entered and then overwritten by many additions and corrections under the direction and with the participation of Eriugena; a little later, and probably after the death of Eriugena, the Bamberg manuscript was copied from Reims, and incorporates the second layer of material; and at some point after this, i² returned to the Reims manuscript to enter his marginal code in preparation for his own additions to the Bamberg manuscript. The additional materials entered in this manuscript were therefore composed by i². The marginal code in Reims reflects his passage from ‘scribe and assistant of Eriugena’ to ‘editor and Eriugenist’.⁷¹

More recently, Jeaneau has suggested that i² may also have composed some of the earlier enlargements in Reims which were copied into Bamberg, and that he may even have composed some of the running text in Reims itself.⁷² Jeaneau first returns to an observation, which he had made with Dutton in *The autograph of Eriugena*.⁷³ He writes that the fact i² was able to arrange his material into neat blocks in the margins of the Reims manuscript suggests that he knew in advance how much he had to copy, and that he was therefore copying preexistent enlargements from one or more exemplars. Nonetheless, he suggests that this becomes more difficult to maintain when we examine the content of the material copied by

⁶⁹Dutton, ‘Minding Irish *ps* and *qs*’, p. 25.

⁷⁰Dutton, ‘Minding Irish *ps* and *qs*’, p. 25.

⁷¹Dutton, ‘Minding Irish *ps* and *qs*’, p. 26.

⁷²Édouard Jeaneau, ‘*Nisifortinus*: le disciple qui corrige le maître’, in *Poetry and philosophy in the middle ages* (Leiden: 2001), edited by John Marenbon, pp. 113–29.

⁷³Jeaneau, ‘*Nisifortinus*’, pp. 114–5.

i².

Jeauneau writes that at some point – perhaps after the death of Eriugena – i² had the Reims manuscript in his possession in order to complete his revisions in Bamberg. He continues:⁷⁴

On that occasion he may have been tempted to introduce in Reims some of the additions and corrections that he hoped to see in Bamberg. [...] It is therefore possible that the notes added by i² in the margins of Reims do not all belong to the same period. Some, the work of a disciple, who plays the role of a copyist, would be the transcription of texts drawn up by the author. The others, of a more recent date – perhaps after the death of Eriugena – would express the personal thought of i², which distances itself from the teaching of the master.

Jeauneau acknowledges that it is at times difficult to distinguish the two kinds of intervention. Nonetheless, in some of the material entered by i² in the Reims manuscript, he detects a desire to amend the doctrine of the text.⁷⁵ These emendations particularly concern points of disagreement between Latin and Greek theologies. Jeauneau suggests that in several cases i² attempts to lead Eriugena's predominantly Greek reading of a certain issue back to a more orthodox Latin position. This can be seen in relation to the *Filioque* controversy, the allegorical interpretation of terrestrial paradise, and the return of the created universe. Many of these interventions begin with the words 'nisi forte', and for that reason Jeauneau has given the Irish scribe the pseudonym 'Nisifortinus'.⁷⁶

Finally, Jeauneau raises the possibility that Nisifortinus composed some of the material in the

⁷⁴Jeauneau, 'Nisifortinus', p. 115. 'À cette occasion, il a pu être tenté d'introduire dans le manuscrit R certaines des corrections et additions qu'il souhaitait voir figurer dans le manuscrit B. [...] Il se pourrait donc que les notes ajoutées par i² dans les marges du manuscrit R n'appartiennent pas toutes à la même période. Les unes, œuvre d'un disciple qui joue le rôle de copiste, seraient la transcription de textes rédigés par l'auteur. Les autres, de date plus récente – postérieures peut-être à la mort d'Érigène – exprimeraient la pensée personnelle de i², une pensée qui prend ses distances par rapport à l'enseignement du maître.'

⁷⁵Jeauneau, 'Nisifortinus', pp. 128–9.

⁷⁶Jeauneau, 'Nisifortinus', pp. 116 and 120.

first text written in the Reims manuscript.⁷⁷ He suggests that, since the Reims manuscript was not the very first writing of the *Periphyseon*, whatever preceded it may have included material written and composed by i², which was then incorporated into the Reims text by its Caroline scribes. Words, sentences, or even paragraphs of the text may then be attributed to Nisifortinus. Jeauneau writes that this hypothesis is ‘not implausible’, though he does not present any direct evidence to support his case. This conclusion is certainly not disproved by Dutton’s study of the writing of the Reims manuscript, even if it is not supported wholeheartedly.

These conclusions and the conclusions reached by Dutton complicate any straightforward account of the history of the text in four versions. When Jeauneau introduced the term in his edition, he noted the difficulty in dating the revisions in each of the manuscript. By focussing on the different prehistories of the materials in each manuscript, our understanding of the relations among the manuscripts has been greatly enriched. Nonetheless, Jeauneau and Dutton work predominantly in order to reclaim the authority of the *Periphyseon*. The final remarks in Jeauneau’s article read:⁷⁸

Whatever the intentions of this disciple, who corrects his master, what matters to us is to apprehend the thought of the master in its authentic nakedness, and not dressed in the ornaments with which the disciple for filial piety or some other motive has clothed him.

Although questions about Eriugena’s autograph have now been answered with some clarity, and we now understand much more fully the reworking of the *Periphyseon*, discussion still circles around Eriugena’s authorship. In the rest of this chapter, I should like to try something else. In their work on the Reims manuscript, Jeauneau and Dutton have shown that i² was a close and imaginative reader of the *Periphyseon*. I shall argue that the palaeographical features

⁷⁷Jeauneau, ‘*Nisifortinus*’, p. 128.

⁷⁸Jeauneau, ‘*Nisifortinus*’, pp. 128–9. ‘Quelles qu’aient été les intentions de ce disciple qui corrige son maître, ce qui nous importe, c’est d’appréhender la pensée du maître dans sa nudité authentique et non ponit parée des ornements dont le disciple, par piété filiale ou pour tout autre motif, l’a revêtu.’

of the Bamberg manuscript likewise reveal a creative writing activity which is still ongoing at the point of inscription. In Bamberg, we can see i² erasing and reworking his own writing. I shall argue that this reveals his own reading of the text, and then trace a few features of this reading. Before that, it is necessary to understand how the book was put together.

Physical description of the Bamberg manuscript

1. ff. 1r–230v, John Scottus Eriugena, *Periphyseon* 1–3

ff. 230 + i;

268 × 220 mm, < 192 × 142 between inner vertical ruling lines or 160 between outer vertical ruling lines > mm; 23 long lines; the writing area is enclosed between two vertical ruling lines on each side; sometimes one or two lines extend to the edge of the page at the top or bottom of the writing area; new style ruling;

I–XIV⁸ XV⁶ XVI–XVII⁸ XVIII² XIX–XXIX⁸ XXX⁶;

two sets of gathering signatures; the first is original and runs through the whole manuscript; the first eighteen gatherings, *i.e.* books 1 and 2, signed ‘q’ or ‘Q’ followed by Roman numerals; thereafter, *i.e.* book 3, roman numerals alone; placed in the centre of the lower margin of the final verso, with many now absent due to trimming; a second set of signatures was later added from the nineteenth gathering, *i.e.* book 3; these gatherings signed with Greek majuscule letters, which are drawn imperfectly, and ordered following the Latin and not the Greek alphabet; placed variously in the lower margin, in order to accommodate the many additions, with some now absent due to trimming;

Caroline minuscule; many interventions in the writing area as well as the margins in Irish minuscule (i²);

titles added later in Irish minuscule (i²); first line of each book written in uncial or capitals;

initials written in capitals, and sometimes placed between the vertical ruling lines;
s. IX third quarter; interventions possibly fourth quarter; probably Saint-Médard,
Soissons.

There has been little discussion regarding the date at which this manuscript was copied. Since the manuscript is usually discussed with reference to the reworking of the *Periphyseon*, the date of the text often seems to stand in for the date of the manuscript. On account of the more complicated account of reworking which has emerged in the writing of Jeaneau and Dutton, it is worth reconsidering evidence for the manuscript's date. One way into the question is to consider the interventions made by i² in this and other manuscripts. This Irish scribe seems to have been active in the third and fourth quarters of the ninth century. The text of the Bamberg manuscript incorporates many of the additions and corrections entered by i² in the earlier copy of the *Periphyseon* in Reims 875, and so it cannot be earlier than the third quarter of the ninth century. In turn this text is corrected and enlarged by i², and so it cannot be later than the fourth quarter of the century. Dutton has distinguished four stages in the reworking of the Reims and Bamberg manuscripts.⁷⁹ First i² acted as a scribe working under supervision to revise and correct the text in Reims. He later returned to read the manuscript and enter the 'marginal code' of Ps, Qs, and Ls. In turn, he added nineteen titles. Finally, he added further titles, glosses, expansions, corrections, and occasional construe marks to the Bamberg manuscript. It seems likely that the Bamberg manuscript was copied from Reims at some point between the first and third stages, since the titles added by i² to the Reims manuscript are not copied by the Bamberg text scribes. Dutton writes that '[a] considerable passage of time may have separated some of those stages'.⁸⁰ It therefore seems likely that the Bamberg manuscript was copied in the third quarter of the ninth century, and the interventions made possibly in the fourth. Bischoff's *Katalog* dates the manuscript to the

⁷⁹See above, pp. 104–7.

⁸⁰Dutton, 'Minding Irish ps and qs', p. 25.

third quarter of the ninth century.⁸¹

There has been rather more discussion of the place where the manuscript was copied. Much of the earlier palaeographical discussion locates the copying of the manuscript in Reims. We find this for example in the writing of Traube⁸² and Rand.⁸³ In his early work, Bischoff also leans towards a Reims origin.⁸⁴ He writes that the hands found in the Bamberg manuscript resemble very closely those in Munich Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Clm 14171, which he believed at that time to have been copied in Reims. A few years later, he writes instead that '[i]nsofar as a more specific statement is possible, they [the manuscripts associated with the circle of Eriugena, including the Bamberg manuscript] are close to a local style that can be found in Soissons; nothing in these manuscripts has anything to do with the Reims writing style'.⁸⁵ The *Katalog* locates it only in the circle of Eriugena.⁸⁶ Bischoff oversaw the first volume of the *Katalog* before his death, so we make take this as his final opinion.

Dutton has recently complicated the attribution of the Reims copy of the *Periphyseon* to Soissons.⁸⁷ He writes that the wide variation between the scripts and conventions of the many hands found in this manuscript suggests that the scribes 'were not trained in the practices of a single scriptorium', or even that 'most of them were simply not professional scribes at all'.⁸⁸ In other words, it is difficult to compare the Reims manuscript to the manuscripts of any

⁸¹Bernhard Bischoff, *Katalog der festländischen Handschriften des neunten Jahrhunderts (mit Ausnahme der wisigotischen)*, 4 volumes (Wiesbaden: 1998–2017), volume 1, number 242.

⁸²Traube, *Autographa*, p. 4

⁸³Rand, Appendix to Traube, *Autographa*, pp. 6–7. Here, Rand's opinion is evidently dependent on that of Traube.

⁸⁴Bernhard Bischoff, *Die Südostdeutschen Schreibschulen und Bibliotheken in der Karolingerzeit*, 2 volumes (Wiesbaden: 1974–80), volume 1, *die Bayerischen Diözesen*, p. 234.

⁸⁵Bernhard Bischoff, 'Irische Schreiber im Karolingerreich', in *Jean Scot Érigène et l'histoire de la philosophie* (Paris: 1977), pp. 47–58 at p. 47–58. This paper is reprinted in *Mittelalterliche Studien: Ausgewählte Aufsätze zur Schriftkunde und Literaturgeschichte*, 3 volumes (Stuttgart: 1966–81), volume 3, pp. 39–54. 'Soweit über sie eine speziellere Aussage möglich ist, stehen sie einem lokalen Stil nahe, der in Soissons fixiert werden kann; mir dem Reimser Schriftstil hat keine von diesen Handschriften etwas zu tun.'

⁸⁶Bischoff, *Katalog* 1, 242.

⁸⁷Paul Edward Dutton, 'Eriugena's workshop: the making of the *Periphyseon* in Rheims 875', in *History and eschatology in John Scottus Eriugena and his time* (Leuven: 2002), edited by James McEvoy and Michael Dunne, pp. 141–67.

⁸⁸Dutton, 'Eriugena's workshop', p. 147.

particular scriptorium, since it was written by Eriugena's students rather than scribes working within a particular and disciplined set of conventions.

The Bamberg copy of the *Periphyseon* is a very different sort of production from the Reims manuscript, but a close examination of the text scribes precludes an immediate attribution to Soissons. The arrangement of the work of different text scribes in the manuscript can be divided into three sections: ff. 11r–79r, 79v–134v, and 135r–230v. Each section was written by a number of scribes, but the scribes in each section write in the same way. In the first layer of notes preserved in his *Nachlass*, Bischoff writes that there are many hands, some of which clearly write in the Soissons style.⁸⁹ In the third layer of notes, he underlines this point, and gives two examples, ff. 79v–118v and 119r–134v. The hands in this middle section use two forms of *a*, both a straight and a curved *d*, the *et* ligature both within words and as a conjunction, *N* as a minuscule form and in ligatures (*NS*, *NT*), and frequent ligatures with *r*, which are often tall and spiky (*ra*, *re*, *rr*, *rs*, and *rt*). In the first and last sections, the scribes prefer the upright form of *a*, only occasionally use the *et* ligature as a conjunction and never within words, and use *N* rarely as a minuscule form and exceptionally in ligature. The first and last sections are very like one another, but there is little to connect them to the Soissons style. As well as the different lettershapes discussed above, these sections appear quite different on the page. The hands of the central section are rounded and solid, whereas in the other sections, the writing seems lighter and almost rougher on the page. At least some of this effect may be explained by the tendency of these scribes to extend the final strokes of *a*, *e*, and *t*. When these letters come at the end of the line, the extension can become exuberant. It is therefore possible but by no means certain that this manuscript was copied at or near Soissons. Parts of the manuscript resemble the Soissons style, but something quite different is

⁸⁹Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Ana 553, Nachlass Bernhard Bischoff, Bamberg. The description of the Bamberg manuscript is written in three layers, none of which are dated: in the first, which is written in dark blue pen, Bischoff makes some basic observations about the physical structure of the manuscripts and introduces a few remarks about the marginal writing of *i*²; the second layer, which is written in a lighter blue biro, contains a much more detailed examination of the script and other features of the manuscript; and the third layer, which is written in red biro, clarifies a few points found in the preceding material.

also going on at the same time.

Erasures in the Bamberg manuscript

It is not yet clear how we should account for the form of the *Periphyseon* text that is contained in the Bamberg manuscript. In the literature reviewed in the preceding parts of this chapter, it was suggested that i^2 was in some sense responsible for at least some of the material in this manuscript, but the nature of that responsibility has not yet been described precisely.

Jeauneau writes that he composed the titles and glosses, updated the cross-references within the text, and ‘without doubt’ made the decision to incorporate the expansion in Reims 875 into the Bamberg text.⁹⁰ He suggests that i^2 took further liberties in his arrangement of this text. These points are not really argued, since Jeauneau’s concern was much more with the Reims than with the Bamberg manuscript. Dutton’s examination of the *Ps*, *Qs*, and *Ls* in the Reims manuscript likewise reveals something about the involvement of i^2 in Bamberg, but he does not directly address this later manuscript. Indeed, by far the greater part of the discussion has focussed on the Reims manuscript, and many of the conclusions regarding the activity of i^2 in the Bamberg manuscript have been drawn from his interventions in the earlier copy of the *Periphyseon*. The Bamberg manuscript itself has received little attention.

In this chapter, I shall return to the interventions made by i^2 in the Bamberg manuscript. This manuscript is full of erasures. There are many small erasures in the text, and corrections are entered by both i^2 and a Caroline scribe. What is perhaps more surprising is that i^2 often also erases his own interventions. I shall argue that these erasures indicate the kind of writing activity in which i^2 was involved, and that they reveal the continual selection and reworking of his material as a creative practice. In turn, we may conclude something about the content of the manuscript, namely that it contains a reading of the *Periphyseon* written and composed by i^2 himself, without Eriugena’s oversight.

⁹⁰Jeauneau, ‘*Nisifortinus*’, p. 114.

In this section, I shall discuss various kinds of erasure. Some of these are overwritten or attest the reworking of material, but others are not overwritten or do not reveal anything about the material's prehistory. Nonetheless, I am keen not to introduce anything like a taxonomy. All the erasures are witness to a single writing activity, and if we consider the writing activity and not the individual erasures, it is clear that even the material that does not exhibit the visible traces of this selection and reworking was certainly selected and may also have been reworked prior to its inscription in the manuscript. In the one instance in which we do have evidence of prior material (the nineteen titles entered in Reims 875) we can clearly see this kind of reworking; thirteen of these titles were added to the first three books, the part of the text contained in the Bamberg manuscript, and of these two are copied directly, four are omitted, and seven are reworked. Dutton writes that the seven titles reworked in Bamberg are 'richer and more complex' than their equivalents in Reims.⁹¹ At each of the seven points, there is no evidence of reworking in the writing in the Bamberg manuscript, and for this reason, it is important to consider the interventions of *i*² as a writing activity and not as individual instances of erasure. It seems likely that *i*² composed all of the material added to the Bamberg manuscript, but this is not really at issue. The fact that it appears in the Bamberg manuscript suggests that he approved it for his reading of the text.

The consideration of these erasures has a long history. Traube writes in his 1905 lecture outline that 'it is noticeable that the copyist stumbles'.⁹² The point is not developed, and Traube does not return to it in his 1906 preface to Rand's *Johannes Scottus*, but we should note that three of the six images which Traube presents from this manuscript show *i*² erasing substantial portions of his own writing on ff. 2v, 135r, and 215r respectively.⁹³ The point of Traube's lecture was to announce this Irish hand, which he did not differentiate from *i*¹, as the autograph of Eriugena. For Traube these erasures were not incompatible with the revisions of

⁹¹Dutton, 'Minding Irish *ps* and *qs*', p. 25.

⁹²Traube, *Autographa*, p. 5. Stolpern der Abschreiber ist bemerkbar.

⁹³Traube, *Autographa*, plates 3, 7, and 8. See also *Periphyseon* 1, 444B, *Periphyseon* 2, 618A, and *Periphyseon* 3, 722B.

an author.

The erasures were next picked up by Bishop at the 1975 Laon conference. Bishop refers to the erasure on f. 215r, and it is worth quoting his remarks at length:⁹⁴

Traube has an excellent facsimile of a page where the Irish scribe [i²], finding in his materials what seemed to be an inchoate enlargement, entered it as a gloss in the margin. He then discovered that it was much longer, and was for incorporation in the text; and he entered it in the lower margin, erasing the gloss. He then noticed that the passage was in replacement of existing text. He erased this, wrote in *rasura* in the body of the text so much of the substituted passage as would fit into the space, and finished it in the lateral margin, erasing what he had written – it is still partly legible – in the lower margin. These and other erasures in Bamberg betray, as they would not in modern book-production, the hesitations of a conscientious and perfectly competent editor.

Bishop distinguishes three instances in which the same material was written on the same page (f. 215r). First, the beginning of a long section of text was entered in the margin as though it were a gloss. While writing this material, i² realised that it would not all fit in the margin, and wrote it in full below the text, before erasing what he had already written in the margin. Next, i² realised that it was not a gloss at all, but should have replaced a few words of the main text. Since this new material was much longer than what had been written before, i² erased the words that were to be replaced, copied as much of the new material as would fit over the erasure, and then completed it in the margin, linked by a reference sign. Finally i² erased what he had written below the text. Bishop's palaeographical description is here more or less accurate, though he does not notice that there is also an erasure in the inner margin. Nonetheless, he ascribes motivations to i² which do not best seem to fit his writing activity in

⁹⁴Bishop, 'Autographa', p. 92.

the manuscript. I do not believe that i² ‘discovered’ that the material would not fit in the margin or ‘noticed’ that it should instead have replaced some of the text. In my own narration of this page at the end of this section, I shall argue that i² reworked the material as he wrote it, so that it would no longer fit in the margin and had to be rewritten below the text, and that he then decided to write it within the text itself. The erasures are not mentioned by Jeaneau or Dutton in *The autograph of Eriugena* nor in their later papers.⁹⁵ Nonetheless, the erasures are important for understanding the history of the *Periphyseon*, since they show how i² composed his reading of the text.

Interventions made by i² in the Bamberg manuscript

Jeaneau and Dutton have divided the types of work done by the two Irish scribes in the *Periphyseon* manuscripts into four categories: editorial work, orthographical corrections, stylistic changes, and various additions.⁹⁶ Under the first heading, they describe the addition of titles, subheadings, and more precise references to authors quoted in the text, the updating of cross-references to other points within the text, and the provision of glosses and construe marks. Orthographical correction includes the separation of words and the restoration of diphthongs as well as the correction of scribal error. Under stylistic changes, they describe, among other things, changes designed to avoid repetition or to improve the clarity or precision of the text. Their final category is rather more miscellaneous. Discussion of these types of activity is focussed on i¹. Jeaneau and Dutton do not discuss i² at all in their final category, and he is mentioned only very briefly in the second and third. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that they describe the work of i² in the Bamberg manuscript as primarily editorial.

The greater part of the activity undertaken by i² in the Bamberg manuscript comprises the addition of titles and glosses. Jeaneau and Dutton count 257 titles entered in the margins of

⁹⁵See above, pp. 101–9.

⁹⁶Jeaneau and Dutton, *The autograph of Eriugena*, pp. 85–104.

this manuscript.⁹⁷ They note that many of these begin with the words *cur*, *de*, *de eo quod*, *quare*, *quid*, or *quomodo*. Others are presented as definitions and examples, questions, or conclusions, repetitions, or summaries, and others praise the author or the argument of the text. Jeaneau and Dutton also count 39 glosses in the Bamberg manuscript, of which 22 are introduced with the tag *glo[ssa]*.⁹⁸

The information provided by these tallies is incomplete. Throughout the manuscript there are a number of shorter or single-word glosses which are not included in the above total. Moreover, Jeaneau and Dutton do not notice or at least do not acknowledge the fact that i² makes additions to the text itself, some of which are very substantial. These expansions are found especially in the second and third books, and particularly long examples can be seen on ff. 70r continuing from line 23 below the text,⁹⁹ 70v above the text cued to line 1,¹⁰⁰ 81v above the text cued to line 9,¹⁰¹ 87r above the text cued to line 8,¹⁰² 93r beginning at line 22 and continuing through line 23, below the text, and onto 93v line 1,¹⁰³ 100v below the text cued to line 12,¹⁰⁴ 103v below the text cued to line 18,¹⁰⁵ 105v lines 1–3 and continuing into the lefthand margin,¹⁰⁶ 118r above the text cued to line 4,¹⁰⁷ 119r below the text cued to line 16,¹⁰⁸ 130r continuing from line 23 below the text and onto 130v line 1,¹⁰⁹ 138v lines 9–10 continuing into the lefthand margin,¹¹⁰ 176v above the text cued to line 7¹¹¹ and below the text cued to line 19,¹¹² as well as the famous example on 215r lines 4–7 continuing in the

⁹⁷Jeaneau and Dutton, *The autograph of Eriugena*, pp. 86–7.

⁹⁸Jeaneau and Dutton, *The autograph of Eriugena*, p. 93.

⁹⁹*Periphyseon* 2, 529D.

¹⁰⁰*Periphyseon* 2, 529D.

¹⁰¹*Periphyseon* 2, 545B.

¹⁰²*Periphyseon* 2, 552C.

¹⁰³*Periphyseon* 2, 561C.

¹⁰⁴*Periphyseon* 2, 572A.

¹⁰⁵*Periphyseon* 2, 576C.

¹⁰⁶*Periphyseon* 2, 578C.

¹⁰⁷*Periphyseon* 2, 595B.

¹⁰⁸*Periphyseon* 2, 597A.

¹⁰⁹*Periphyseon* 2, 612B.

¹¹⁰*Periphyseon* 3, 621B.

¹¹¹*Periphyseon* 3, 672A.

¹¹²*Periphyseon* 3, 672C.

righthand margin.¹¹³ Some of these are simply additions to the running text, whereas others replace and greatly expand a portion of the text.

Smaller additions are found throughout the manuscript. Some of these, namely the updated cross-references to other points within the text, have been discussed by Jeuneau and Dutton,¹¹⁴ but others have not been noticed. A number of these are what Jeuneau and Dutton might call ‘stylistic changes’, namely the addition of conjunctions between sentences or adverbs within sentences, small changes to the tense or moods of verbs, and so on. One example of a purely stylistic change can be seen at f. 55r line 19, where i² substitutes *tamen* for *sed* to avoid the repetition of *sed* at the beginning of two adjacent sentences.¹¹⁵ The smaller erasures within the running text of the manuscript may indicate further changes of this sort.

Finally, we should note that the separation of additions, titles, and glosses is only satisfactory up to a point. Although i² does separately distinguish glosses either with the tag *glossa* or with a reference sign, the longer titles at times provide similar additional information about the text. Moreover, there is occasional movement of materials from the margin into the text. One instance of this on f. 215r was described above,¹¹⁶ but it can also be seen at f. 138v¹¹⁷ and elsewhere in a few cross-references.

We might make a few more general points about the writing of the Bamberg manuscript. Throughout the manuscript changes are introduced into the text by both i² and a contemporary scribe writing Caroline minuscule. It is possible that some of the small erasures within the running text were entered by this Caroline scribe. He is not responsible for any substantial additions to the text, but does make some smaller changes. For instance on f. 3r,¹¹⁸

¹¹³ *Periphyseon* 3, 722B.

¹¹⁴ Jeuneau and Dutton, *The autograph of Eriugena*, pp. 89–92.

¹¹⁵ *Periphyseon* 1, 511B.

¹¹⁶ See above, 98–99 and 115–6.

¹¹⁷ *Periphyseon* 3, 621B.

¹¹⁸ *Periphyseon* 1, 445A.

the scribe changes *apparuerunt* to *apparent et apparuerunt* as well as entering a number of other small alterations. Such changes are common. This scribe may also be one of the main text scribes. It is also possible that he is responsible for a large number of *Ps* written in the margins, since they are not drawn like the *Ps* in Reims 875, and do not appear to be the work of *i*². Throughout the manuscript there are also a number of signs which resemble the lower half of a circle with a single dot in the centre. They are likely the work of this scribe. They are described by Isidore of Seville in his *Etymologiae* under the name *cryphia*.¹¹⁹

It seems likely that *i*² worked through the manuscript at some speed. Not infrequently, the page was turned while the ink with which he had written was still wet, and the letters were printed onto the facing page. Such offset can be seen, for example, on f. 8r in the righthand margin at lines 6 and 7, which reproduces the heading from f. 7v.¹²⁰ Moreover, it seems that the manuscript was bound at this point, since the same sort of offset occurs between gatherings. This can be seen on f. 16v, with several lines of offset from f. 17r in the lefthand margin at lines 16–18.¹²¹ Nonetheless, we should note that *i*² may have passed through the manuscript several times, and it was not necessarily bound from the very beginning.¹²²

Some of the *Ps* possibly written by the Caroline scribe seem to have been entered after material written by *i*², since they are placed far out in the margin, as if to accommodate this material. Nonetheless, even when no material is written by *i*² these signs are sometimes placed near the edge of the page. Other signs were certainly entered before *i*² wrote his material,

¹¹⁹‘Cryphia, circuli pars inferior cum puncto, ponitur in his locis, ubi quaestio dura et obscura aperiri uel solui non potuit.’ Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiae siue originum libri XX*, edited by W. M. Lindsay, 2 volumes (Oxford: 1911), book 1, 21, 10. Evina Steinová writes that, although this sign was used frequently in at least one manuscript written in Irish minuscule, it should be regarded as continental. ‘Technical signs in early medieval manuscripts’, in *The annotated book in the early middle ages: practices of reading and writing*, edited by Mariken Teeuwen and Irene van Renswoude (Turnhout: 2017), pp. 37–85, at p. 57.

¹²⁰*Periphyseon* I, 451C.

¹²¹*Periphyseon* I, 464A.

¹²²If *i*² did pass through the manuscript several times, it would complicate the notion of a reading of the *Periphyseon*. This question requires palaeographical and textual examination of the Bamberg manuscript beyond what I can undertake here, and so I shall leave it raised but unsolved.

since he erased and wrote over the top of the *Ps*. This can be seen for example on f. 129v.¹²³ The relation between these marginal signs and the activity of *i*² in this manuscript certainly deserves further attention, as does their relation to the signs entered in Reims 875.

Finally, we should note that although the activity of *i*² remains consistent in its general features, it is not absolutely consistent through the whole manuscript. For instance, there are no substantial additions to the text in book 1 and few in the earlier parts of book 3. Moreover, *i*² appears less frequently in the second codicological unit of the manuscript, which contains the third book of the text. Many folios pass without intervention, though the hand does return again more frequently toward the end of the text.

Erasure and reworking as a key to the writing activity

Following this brief sketch of the interventions by *i*² in the Bamberg manuscript, I shall return to the erasures of his own writing. More than anything else these erasures reveal the kind of writing activity in which *i*² was engaged. They indicate the selection and reworking of material, and show that the interventions in this manuscript are best understood as a reading of the *Periphyseon* written and composed by *i*². At the beginning of this section, I argued that it would not be productive to produce a taxonomy of erasures, since, when they are considered together, they reveal a single writing activity which must include also the material that is not touched by erasure. Nonetheless, there is some value in separately considering the different instances of erasure, since each reveals different aspects of this writing activity.

¹²³ *Periphyseon* 2, 611A.

Total erasure

Some of the material written by i^2 in the Bamberg manuscript is erased completely. This suggests that i^2 had the authority to select what he entered into the manuscript, and that this selection was made at least in part while he made or after he had made his interventions. It is not unreasonable to suppose that this material was erased by i^2 . Elsewhere in the Bamberg manuscript, i^2 frequently writes over the erasures of his own hand. The close connection between erasure and rewriting in these instances suggests that they are both part of one writing activity. It is often difficult to say why i^2 erased his own writing in this manner. His erasures are very thorough, to the extent that the parchment is sometimes almost worn through. In many cases, we can read only enough to know that the same material has not been copied elsewhere, and sometimes we cannot read anything. Moreover, since the erasures are of significantly different lengths, they may represent different kinds of material and different reasons for erasing that material.

Erasures on a single line can be seen on ff. 21v in the lefthand margin at line 9,¹²⁴ 28r in the righthand margin at line 19,¹²⁵ 128v in the lefthand margin at line 19,¹²⁶ 132r in the righthand margin at line 5,¹²⁷ and 221r in the righthand margin at line 15.¹²⁸ These may represent brief titles, which were written and then erased, or longer materials, which were written only in part before they were erased. On f. 221r, only *de eo* was written before it was erased. There is nothing in the text to suggest that this was an attempt at one of the other nearby titles.

Longer erasures of several lines can be seen on ff. 16r, where four lines were erased in the righthand margin beginning at line 9,¹²⁹ 51v, where six lines were erased in the lefthand margin beginning at line 1,¹³⁰ 52r, where 3 lines were erased in the righthand margin

¹²⁴ *Periphyseon* 1, 469B.

¹²⁵ *Periphyseon* 1, 477D.

¹²⁶ *Periphyseon* 2, 610A.

¹²⁷ *Periphyseon* 2, 614A.

¹²⁸ *Periphyseon* 3, 769D.

¹²⁹ *Periphyseon* 1, 462C.

¹³⁰ *Periphyseon* 1, 506B.

beginning at line 11,¹³¹ 120v, where 2 lines were erased in the lefthand margin beginning at line 1,¹³² 143v, where 2 lines were erased in the lefthand margin beginning at line 7,¹³³ and 207r, where 2 long lines were erased below the text cued with a reference sign (which is also erased) to line 23.¹³⁴ At least some of this material represents glosses or expansions of the text. This can be seen, for example, on f. 207r, where the addition was once tied to the main text with a reference sign. Other instances may represent longer titles.

It therefore seems likely that i² was able to select what material was copied into the Bamberg manuscript. In the preceding instances, we see i² making this selection only after he had entered or had begun to enter his interventions in the manuscript. In other words he continued to shape his reading of the *Periphyseon*, even as he inscribed notes in the margins of the Bamberg manuscript. If we understand these erasures to be the visible trace of a writing activity, we may conclude that all of the interventions in the Bamberg manuscript whether or not they are touched by erasure were selected, and that there may have been further material, which could have been copied, but which was not selected. This certainly seems to be the case for the once instance in which we know there was prior material. Of the thirteen titles added to the first three books of the *Periphyseon* in the Reims manuscript, only nine appear in one form or another in Bamberg.¹³⁵

Repositioned material

I do not want to suggest that the writing activity involved only the selection of prior material. Seven of the titles entered in Reims were reworked before they were copied in Bamberg.¹³⁶ There is further evidence that i² made changes in his material. In a number of

¹³¹ *Periphyseon* 1, 507B.

¹³² *Periphyseon* 2, 598D.

¹³³ *Periphyseon* 3, 628A.

¹³⁴ *Periphyseon* 3, 713A.

¹³⁵ See note 68. Titles are omitted entirely at the following points: *Periphyseon* 1, 499D, *Periphyseon* 3, 652B, 731B, 733B, and 733C.

¹³⁶ See note 135. In the first three books, only the titles at *Periphyseon* 1, 510C and *Periphyseon* 3, 663B were not reworked.

instances, he seems to have reworked his material even as he wrote it. At times, this rethinking involves only replacement elsewhere in the manuscript; frequently, i² writes something, erases it, and writes it again elsewhere. We can see this for example in the titles copied on ff. 16v, where three lines were erased in the lefthand margin beginning at line 13 and rewritten on 17r in the righthand margin beginning at line 15,¹³⁷ 37r, where the words *de eo* were erased in the lefthand margin at line 7, and rewritten and expanded into a full title two lines lower,¹³⁸ 93r, where the words *de eo quod om* were erased in the righthand margin at line 16, and rewritten and expanded into a full title two lines lower,¹³⁹ 93v, where two lines were erased in the left hand margin beginning at line 23 and written on 94r in the righthand margin beginning at line 6,¹⁴⁰ and 99r, where two lines were erased in the righthand margin beginning at line 23 and rewritten on 99v in the lefthand margin beginning at line 1.¹⁴¹ We may imagine that this material has simply been misplaced and later moved to its correct position, but the reality is often more complicated. For instance, in the lefthand margin of f. 16v, i² wrote the title:¹⁴²

Concerning the fact that no Category is predicated of God properly.

This title identifies what is arguably the theme of the first book of the *Periphyseon*, but it is especially pertinent here. The text that it accompanied on f. 16v reads:¹⁴³

Nonetheless, as we said, just as almost everything which is properly predicated of the nature of created things can be said also about the Creator of things metaphorically in order to say something about Him, so too the meanings of

¹³⁷ *Periphyseon* I, 463B and 464A.

¹³⁸ *Periphyseon* I, 488D and 489A.

¹³⁹ *Periphyseon* 2, 561C.

¹⁴⁰ *Periphyseon* 2, 462C.

¹⁴¹ *Periphyseon* 2, 570B.

¹⁴² *De eo quod nulla kathēgoria proprie de deo praedicatur.*

¹⁴³ 'Attamen, ut praediximus, quemadmodum fere omnia quae de natura conditarum rerum proprie praedicantur de conditore rerum per metaphoram significandi gratia dici possunt, ita etiam kathēgoriarum significationes, quae proprie in rebus conditis dinoscuntur, de causa omnium non absurde possunt proferri, non ut proprie significant quid ipsa sit, sed ut translativae quid de ea nobis quodam modo eam inquirentibus probabiliter cogitandum est suadeant.'

the Categories, which are properly distinguished in created things, can be extended not absurdly to the Cause of all things, not in order to say properly what he is, but to persuade us in transferred meaning of what we who search for Him should probably think about Him.

The title from f. 16v was erased and rewritten on f. 17r. In its new place, it accompanies the beginning of the demonstration that none of the Categories can properly be predicated of God. It is here no more or less appropriate. Nonetheless, i² seems later to have expanded this title to read:¹⁴⁴

Concerning the fact that no Category is predicated of God properly but metaphorically.

This seems to be a later addition, since it is separated from the original title by a mark of punctuation and is written in a slightly darker ink. Possibly, it was written immediately as an afterthought. In any case, the expansion of the title borrows vocabulary from its original context on f. 16v and transfers it to 17r. Following this title, the discussion of each of the Categories is introduced with its own title. The first of these is copied in the lefthand (inner) margin, in order to accommodate the title from f. 16v. This is unusual. There is no trace of an erasure under the replaced title, so we may conclude that it was replaced before the titles for the individual Categories were copied. In sum, the explanation for the removal and replacement of the title from f. 16v cannot be so straightforward as a title being misplaced and later moved to its correct position. Each position is appropriate, and when the title is moved from the one to the other, it even gains a verbal echo of its original context. Moreover, this repositioning seems to have taken place as i² worked through the Bamberg manuscript for the first time, since the title was copied on 17r before the other titles on this page. In this instance, we can see i² thinking carefully about the placement of his material in order to communicate most clearly his reading of the text.

¹⁴⁴De eo quod nulla kathēgoria proprie de deo praedicatur, sed metaphoricē.

We can see the same thing on f. 93r. Here, i² wrote:¹⁴⁵

Concerning the fact that al—

before erasing it and completing the title below:¹⁴⁶

Concerning the fact that all things are coeternal with the Word but not in every respect coeternal.

The title works well in either position, though it is slightly more pointed in the lower. Indeed, in Jauneau's edition and even in the synoptic text at the end of the volume the title is placed at the earlier point in the text. Again, the title may not have been moved simply because it was first written in the wrong place. The sort of care that i² takes over the placement of his material as revealed by these erasures and replacements suggests something of the importance of his work in this manuscript.

A further intriguing instance of erasure and replacement can be seen on f. 62v.¹⁴⁷ Here, i² wrote the words *de pati* in the lefthand margin at line 15. Subsequently, he erased them and wrote them again a little closer to the text. It is possible that the words were erased in error, though it seems unlikely. The erasure may reveal something more significant. The words may have been written far out in the margin in order to accommodate a longer passage of material. When i² decided no longer to include the longer text, he may have repositioned the words in the margin. This hypothesis is given some support by the marginal movements of gloss material. The movement of glosses is often indicative of a more substantial reworking.

This kind of repositioning can be seen in the material which i² identifies as glosses with the tag *glossa* on ff. 62r, where three lines of material were erased in the righthand margin beginning at line 16 and rewritten at greater length in two long lines below the text,¹⁴⁸ 101r, where a small amount of material in the righthand margin at line 19 was erased, repositioned

¹⁴⁵ 'De eo quod om—'

¹⁴⁶ 'De eo quod omnia uerbo coaeterna et non omnino coaeterna sint.'

¹⁴⁷ *Periphyseon* 1, 520A.

¹⁴⁸ *Periphyseon* 1, 519C.

on the same line, and rewritten at much greater length,¹⁴⁹ and 135r, where the situation is more complicated.¹⁵⁰ In the last instance, we can see three distinct stages in the writing of the gloss material. First, i² wrote a small amount of material explaining the word *participia*. This material begins in the writing block above the beginning of this word at the end of line 16 and extends a little way into the margin over three lines. In a second stage, i² seems to have begun to write a gloss set far out in the margin in order to accommodate the material of the first stage. Finally, i² erased everything that he had written so far and wrote a gloss across the full width of the margin over the two erasures. This gloss is connected to the word *huius* in the line 15. It is no longer possible to say how the texts of the three interventions relate to one another, but it is clear that i² decided how best to negotiate between his materials. This conclusion is supported even by the more straightforward instances. For example, on f. 62r, i² began what was presumably a brief gloss in the righthand margin on the outside of a column of *diplae*. This material was then erased and rewritten below the text, where it is cued to line 16 with a reference sign. It is possible that in each of these instances i² misjudged the space required to copy his material. Nonetheless, i² is in general a neat scribe. It therefore seems more likely that he did not know how long his material would be when he started to write it. In other words, the material copied by i² was reworked, even if it was not entirely composed. Importantly, this suggests a freedom in his interventions much greater than just the selection of material.

Reworked material

The most numerous type of erasures attests just this kind of freedom to rework material. In many instances, i² replaces what he had written with something else. Among the titles, this can be seen on ff. 8r in the righthand margin at line 17,¹⁵¹ 14v in the lefthand margin

¹⁴⁹ *Periphyseon* 2, 573A.

¹⁵⁰ *Periphyseon* 2, 618A.

¹⁵¹ *Periphyseon* 1, 452C.

beginning at line 4,¹⁵² 23r in the righthand margin beginning at line 19,¹⁵³ 31r in the righthand margin beginning at line 13,¹⁵⁴ 40r in the righthand margin beginning at line 13,¹⁵⁵ 59v in the lefthand margin beginning at line 16,¹⁵⁶ 64r in the righthand margin beginning at line 4,¹⁵⁷ 87r in the righthand margin beginning at lines 3 and 9,¹⁵⁸ 175v in the lefthand margin beginning at line 6,¹⁵⁹ and 222v in the lefthand margin beginning at line 14.¹⁶⁰ One of these replacements can be explained without difficulty. It seems likely that what is now written on f. 64r in Greek letters was previously written in Latin. The new titles were not necessarily the same length as the titles that they replaced. On ff. 14v, 23r, 40r, and 127v, the new title is significantly longer than that which it replaces, whereas on ff. 31r and 222v, the new title is shorter. It should be noted that where one title which runs over several lines is replaced by another, the new title is often written a little above the old, such that the first line of the old title falls under the second line of the new. This can be seen, for example, on 31r, 40r, and 222v. On ff. 14v and 23r, the old title seems to have been significantly shorter than the new, and in both instances, an erased *de* can be seen part way through the second line. Unfortunately, it is not possible to say why i^2 may have replaced one version of a title with another. The erasures are thorough, and the original versions cannot be read. Nonetheless, the replacement and reworking itself does suggest something about the writing activity in which i^2 was involved. During or after the first inscription of his material, i^2 rethought and recomposed his titles and amended them on the page.

Where we see the same kind of freedom in the material identified as glosses, we find also the same great differences in length. Indeed, the difference is often even more pronounced in this

¹⁵² *Periphyseon* 1, 460C.

¹⁵³ *Periphyseon* 1, 471C.

¹⁵⁴ *Periphyseon* 1, 518C.

¹⁵⁵ *Periphyseon* 1, 492C.

¹⁵⁶ *Periphyseon* 1, 516C.

¹⁵⁷ *Periphyseon* 1, 521C.

¹⁵⁸ *Periphyseon* 2, 552B and C.

¹⁵⁹ *Periphyseon* 3, 670C.

¹⁶⁰ *Periphyseon* 3, 731C.

type of material. We can see this sort of reworking on ff. 74v, where an eleven line gloss is written over three erased lines in the lefthand margin beginning at line 14,¹⁶¹ 134v, where eight lines are written over four erased lines in the lefthand margin beginning at line 12,¹⁶² 135v, where four lines are written over two erased lines in the lefthand margin beginning at line 21,¹⁶³ and 229v, where eight lines are written over three erased lines in the lefthand margin beginning at line 8.¹⁶⁴ Of course, we cannot be sure that the first layer of material was entirely erased before it was rewritten, and so the extent of the difference may not be so great as it now appears, but certainly these instances attest a substantial reworking. Going the other way, on f. 53r, a five lines are written over 22 erased lines in the righthand margin beginning at line 13.¹⁶⁵ Although the erased material often falls somewhere in the middle of the later writing, the passages generally refer to the same point in the text.

A more involved reworking can be seen on f. 2v. Here, i² writes the following gloss, following the tag *glossa*:¹⁶⁶

Be aware that this is not said about man before he sinned. Here are some examples. The affirmation of man: man is a rational, mortal animal. The negation of angel: angels are not rational, mortal animals. The negation of man: man is not a rational, immortal animal. The affirmation of angel: angels are rational, immortal animals. Taken inversely, these four produce another four.

This passage is written over several erasures. We can see at least one line of erasure under the third line of the gloss, four lines beginning under the fifth line of the gloss, and at least two lines of erasure extending beyond the end of the gloss. What can be read from the second

¹⁶¹ *Periphyseon* 2, 535B.

¹⁶² *Periphyseon* 2, 617C.

¹⁶³ *Periphyseon* 2, 618C.

¹⁶⁴ *Periphyseon* 3, 740C.

¹⁶⁵ *Periphyseon* 1, 508C.

¹⁶⁶ *Periphyseon* 1, 444B. 'Notandum quod non de homine ante peccatum dictum sit. Exempla sunt haec. Affirmatio hominis: animal rationale mortale homo est. Negatio angeli: animal rationale mortale angelus non est. Negatio hominis: animal rationale immortale non est homo. Affirmatio angeli: animal rationale immortale angelus est. Haec quattuor reflexim alia quattuor efficiunt.'

portion of erasure seems very similar to what is now written, but it cannot be the whole of what is now written, since it is too short. The gloss seems to have been reworked at least in part to improve the appearance of the material on the page. Each *affirmatio* and *negatio* begins on a new line and is indented. Finally, *i*² seems to have added the opening qualification, since this is placed a little above the rest of the text and is separated from the text by the reference sign. Each of the examples mentioned above reveals that the material has been reworked substantially, either as it was being written or once it had been written. It remains difficult to determine the relation between the two layers of material, since in every case the first layer is erased thoroughly.

The same kind of freedom to rework material is suggested by a number of briefer erasures. On ff. 117r in the righthand margin beginning at line 6,¹⁶⁷ 122r in the righthand margin beginning at line 13,¹⁶⁸ and 181v in the lefthand margin beginning at line 11,¹⁶⁹ for example, we can see the word *de* erased either before or under the beginning of the titles. This may reflect nothing more than an accident: many of the titles begin *de* or *de eo quod*, and it is possible that *i*² began this way as a matter of habit, before correctly entering the titles with a different beginning. Nonetheless, these erasures may also indicate that *i*² had intended to begin this way, but reworked the titles at the moment of inscription. On ff. 41r in the righthand margin beginning at line 3¹⁷⁰ and 42r in the righthand margin beginning at line 16,¹⁷¹ two titles beginning *quid* are preceded by an erased *in*. In both instances, the position of the word *in* is unusual; on f. 41r, it is placed between the vertical ruling of the writing frame, and on f. 42r, it is placed above *quid*. It therefore seems likely that the title was written, *in* was added, and subsequently erased. In some small way, this reveals *i*² working out material as he goes along.

¹⁶⁷ *Periphyseon* 2, 594B.

¹⁶⁸ *Periphyseon* 2, 601B.

¹⁶⁹ *Periphyseon* 3, 679A.

¹⁷⁰ *Periphyseon* 1, 493C.

¹⁷¹ *Periphyseon* 1, 495B.

Other titles which begin over erasures can be seen on ff. 20r in the righthand margin beginning at line 11,¹⁷² 21r in the righthand margin beginning at line 19,¹⁷³ 63r in the righthand margin beginning at line 18,¹⁷⁴ and 74r in the righthand margin beginning at line 12.¹⁷⁵ Although these erasures are often brief, especially when compared to some of the examples described above, they may represent a more substantial reworking of material; for when we consider the sort of writing activity in which *i*² was engaged, we may begin to suspect that the erased material was not the whole of the material that he intended to write originally. Certainly, some of these small errors may be explained by accident or error, but others may attest that the material has been rethought. In these cases, the erasures differ from the more substantial erasures discussed above only to the extent that the change to the material was decided earlier as it was being written.

Erasures can also be seen in the middle and at the end of titles. On ff. 36v in the lefthand margin beginning at line 2¹⁷⁶ and 48r in the righthand margin beginning at line 20,¹⁷⁷ words are erased following the ends of titles. Each of these appears to be a continuation of the title which was then rethought and removed. The ends of titles are written over erasures on ff. 11r in the righthand margin beginning at line 10,¹⁷⁸ 22v in the lefthand margin beginning at line 20,¹⁷⁹ 52v in the lefthand margin beginning at line 15,¹⁸⁰ 73v in the lefthand margin beginning at line 7,¹⁸¹ 82v in the lefthand margin beginning at line 9,¹⁸² and 225r in the righthand margin beginning at line 7.¹⁸³ These changes are brief, but they may point towards a more extensive reworking. It is possible that the end of the title was going to extend much

¹⁷² *Periphyseon* 1, 476C.

¹⁷³ *Periphyseon* 1, 469A.

¹⁷⁴ *Periphyseon* 1, 520D.

¹⁷⁵ *Periphyseon* 2, 534C.

¹⁷⁶ *Periphyseon* 1, 488A.

¹⁷⁷ *Periphyseon* 1, 502D.

¹⁷⁸ *Periphyseon* 1, 456B.

¹⁷⁹ *Periphyseon* 1, 471A.

¹⁸⁰ *Periphyseon* 1, 508A.

¹⁸¹ *Periphyseon* 2, 534A.

¹⁸² *Periphyseon* 2, 546C.

¹⁸³ *Periphyseon* 3, 734B.

further than the few words with which it was replaced. We simply cannot tell, since many of these changes seem to have been made in the moment of writing. A longer erasure can be seen on f. 77v in the lefthand margin beginning at line 8.¹⁸⁴ A little more than a line is erased from the end of what was a three-line title. This is then overwritten by material that runs onto a fourth line.

Other small erasures may also suggest a certain amount of reworking. For instance, in the title written in the righthand margin of f. 90r beginning at line 5, the final letters of *omnia* are written over an erasure, which may suggest a change of case.¹⁸⁵ Likewise, in the title written in the righthand margin of f. 125r beginning at line 3, the *et* ligature seems to have been run into the following letter (most likely another *e*), which was then erased, and the end of the title reworked.¹⁸⁶ Certainly, it is not the case that every erasure in the Bamberg manuscript points toward this kind of reworking. For instance, in the title written in the righthand margin of f. 208r beginning at line 17, *i*² corrects a vowel from *e* to *i*.¹⁸⁷ Moreover, the erasure on f. 128v looked only to the appearance of the material on the page, to prevent *filius* from running into the writing frame.¹⁸⁸ The erasures on ff. 18v in the lefthand margin beginning at line 18,¹⁸⁹ 92v in the lefthand margin beginning at line 22,¹⁹⁰ 112r in the righthand margin beginning at line 1,¹⁹¹ 171v in the lefthand margin beginning at line 11,¹⁹² and 222r in the righthand margin beginning at line 3¹⁹³ are more difficult to characterise.

We find erasures also in the material added directly to the text or replacing parts of the text. These enlargements seem to have been part of the same writing activity as the addition of glosses and titles discussed above. There is no clear separation between the interventions in

¹⁸⁴ *Periphyseon* 2, 539B.

¹⁸⁵ *Periphyseon* 2, 556C.

¹⁸⁶ *Periphyseon* 2, 605A.

¹⁸⁷ *Periphyseon* 3, 714A.

¹⁸⁸ *Periphyseon* 2, 610A.

¹⁸⁹ *Periphyseon* 1, 466A.

¹⁹⁰ *Periphyseon* 2, 561A.

¹⁹¹ *Periphyseon* 2, 587B.

¹⁹² *Periphyseon* 3, 665A.

¹⁹³ *Periphyseon* 3, 730D.

the text itself and the interventions, which Jeauneau and Dutton have described as ‘editorial activity’.¹⁹⁴ Both produce a reading of the *Periphyseon* which seems to have been both copied and composed by i². We find a purely graphic change on f. 100r written in both margins between lines 5 and 6.¹⁹⁵ Here, i² makes more precise a cross-reference to another point within the text by adding the words *in quarto libro*. In turn, he erased the final syllable and wrote it again on the lower line before the text. A cross-reference written in the lefthand margin of f. 114v beginning at line 5 at first read:¹⁹⁶

This question will be discussed in the fourth and fifth books,
was amended to read¹⁹⁷

This question is discussed in the fourth and fifth books.

Finally, on f. 110r, the word *reparabitur* is erased at the end of a small addition to the text written in the righthand margin beginning at line 4.¹⁹⁸ This is simply the following word of the text copied again in error. All these changes are small and insubstantial.

More significant changes are also found among the enlargements of the text. This can be seen, for example, on ff. 70r,¹⁹⁹ 100v,²⁰⁰ and possibly also 130r²⁰¹ in all three instances in the material written below the text. In the first instance, several words are erased and replaced. From the penstrokes that can be seen through the erasure on f. 130r, it is just about possible that the original words were written by the Caroline scribe. Nonetheless, this seems unlikely, since he nowhere else writes outside the writing frame.

Finally, it is worth acknowledging that there are a few instances in which material was

¹⁹⁴ See above, p. 102.

¹⁹⁵ *Periphyseon* 2, 571A.

¹⁹⁶ *Periphyseon* 2, 590C. ‘De hac quaestione in quarto et in quinto disputabitur.’

¹⁹⁷ ‘De hac quaestione in quarto et in quinto disputatur.’

¹⁹⁸ *Periphyseon* 2, 584D.

¹⁹⁹ *Periphyseon* 2, 529D.

²⁰⁰ *Periphyseon* 2, 572A.

²⁰¹ *Periphyseon* 2, 612B.

repositioned on the page in order to reflect a change in its status. There are a few instances in which material was first copied in the margin and later written over an erasure in the main text. We can see this, for example, on ff. 80v in line 3²⁰² and 138v in line 9 spilling over again into the lefthand margin.²⁰³ The former is simply an updated cross-reference to another point in the text, whereas the latter is a more extended consideration of the divisions of the *uita generalis* which I examined in the previous chapter. This kind of change can, of course, also be seen on f. 215r, which I shall discuss below.

Conclusions

I cannot pretend that the material discussed above represents a comprehensive account of the erasures and interventions made by i² in the Bamberg manuscript. The whole text is full of brief erasures, for which any of the scribes may be responsible, as well as great many briefer changes and additions by i². I have chosen to focus on the instances in which i² erases material copied in his own hand, since this gives the best indication of the writing activity in which he was engaged. I have described three kinds of erasure: the total erasure of material, the erasure of material in order to reposition it elsewhere on the page, and the erasure of material in order to rework it. I think it important that these are not understood as a taxonomy, since they are each witness to a single writing activity. Moreover, if we consider the activity and not the erasures, we may come to a more complete understanding of the material in this manuscript. Nonetheless, each kind of erasure reveals something different about this activity.

The total erasure of material suggests that i² was able to select what he copied into the Bamberg manuscript. In this instance, the erasures are the visible trace of this selection after the act of inscription. Nonetheless, we must assume that all the material which i² copied into this manuscript whether or not it is touched by erasure was selected in the same way. The only difference is that in many instances the choice would have been made before inscription,

²⁰² *Periphyseon* 2, 534B.

²⁰³ *Periphyseon* 3, 621B.

and therefore left no visible trace on the page. Indeed, we have some evidence for this invisible selection in the four titles which were written in the Reims manuscript but not copied or reworked in Bamberg.²⁰⁴ It is therefore possible that further materials could have been copied into this manuscript but were not copied. This selection of material is important for our understanding of that material, since it suggests that everything written by i^2 in the Bamberg manuscript was deemed appropriate for his reading of the *Periphyseon*. For this reason, the authorship of that material is not really at issue. The fact that he selected what he copied suggests that he thought this material appropriate for his reading of the text. Nonetheless, we can go further than this, and suggest that this material was probably composed by i^2 .

In many cases, we can see i^2 reworking material as he copied it or after he had copied it in the Bamberg manuscript. This seems also the best explanation for many of the instances in which material was repositioned on the page. Since these erasures are again only the visible traces of reworking, we must also assume that the rest of the material which is not touched by erasure may also have been reworked prior to its inscription. We know that this was the case for at least the seven titles, which were copied in Reims and substantially reworked before their inscription in Bamberg.²⁰⁵

The study of erasures in the Bamberg manuscript invites us to consider i^2 in the act of writing. It reveals the kinds of engagement involved in his interventions in the manuscript and clarifies the kinds of responsibility he had for the enlargements, glosses, and titles added to the manuscript. We can now say with more certainty that this manuscript contains a reading of the *Periphyseon* produced by i^2 . Moreover, we know that it was a reading produced at least in part while it was being copied into the Bamberg manuscript. Indeed, it is possible that the erasure and reworking of material represents several layers of activity, several sets of contingencies, and possibly several readings of the text. Since the erasures are so thorough, definitive proof is difficult to establish.

²⁰⁴See note 135.

²⁰⁵See note 136.

At the beginning of this section, I quoted Bishop's narration of f. 215r.²⁰⁶ This page is shown below in figure 1. Bishop saw in the erasures and repositioning of material on this page 'the hesitations of a conscientious and perfectly competent editor'.²⁰⁷ By way of conclusion, I shall present an alternative narration of this page, which better exemplifies the kind of writing activity that has been revealed above. I do not wish to question Bishop's order of events. Instead, I shall reconsider his choice of verbs and the kinds of agency that they imply. At first, i² added a gloss to a word at the beginning of line 5. We can still see the reference sign in the text and its remnants in the margin, though we cannot read the word itself. At some point, likely as he wrote the material in the margin, he rethought and reworked it, and realised that there was no longer space in the margin to accommodate the new, expanded version. For this reason, he copied the new version below the text and erased what he had written in the margin. At some point, which may not have been until much later, i² decided to replace the original text with the text of his gloss. This required a number of changes. In the first instance, material had to be erased. This included the part of the main text that was to be overwritten but also a number of glosses. One erased gloss can be seen in the lefthand margin beginning at line 5, and another in the writing block between lines 5 and 6. Subsequently, i² wrote in the new version of the text, continued into the righthand margin where it spilled over, linked the part of the text written in the margin with a reference sign, and erased the material where it had been written below the text. It is possible that this material was reworked and written into the text because it tied together the material of the three glosses. These changes do not reveal a hesitating editor. Instead, they demonstrate some of the freedom enjoyed by i² to write and rework new material in his reading of the *Periphyseon*.

A full assessment of this reading would require us to consider the material added to the main text of the *Periphyseon* in the Bamberg manuscript as well as the glosses and titles. There are

²⁰⁶See above, pp. 98–9 and 115–6.

²⁰⁷Bishop, 'Autographa', p. 92.

nia sonorum bis diapason. ^{diapason} Prima quidē a principali principalū
 usq; ad M E C H N idē mediam; secunda uero ex M E C H C usq;
 ad N E T H N Y P E R B O L E W N hoc ē ultimā excellentiam
 pten ditur. Ita et totū spatium a terra ad solē diapason na
 tione coaptatur. mediū quippe sol obone locū & a sole ad
 duodecē sidera hoc est ad extimū stellariū ^{mo tum} alia diapason
 coniungitur. Ideo q; nationibus. & p hoc conficitur ut dia
 metros terrae tercio multiplicata terrae solis q; inter capedini
 quē admodum & lunaris circuli diametro aequalis sit; proinde
 & in diametro lunaris circuli in quē eterne ac solis int̄ fano unū
 et id ipsum spatium mensurabitur. In utroq; enī milia stadiorū
 ccc septuaginta octo computant̄; itaq; duplicato hoc numero
 inter capedinem terrae extremaeq; sphaerae reperiēs in milib;
 stadiorū septingentis quinquaginta sex! et miraberis naturae
 concordia; quot enim milia stadiorū in longitūdinem luna
 ris circuli. tot̄ in altitudine a terra usq; ad signa sp̄ciū; inu
 trisq; nanq; septingenta quinquaginta sex milia stadiorū
 colligunt̄; Si uero solaris circuli diametrum uis cognoscere. tellu
 ris diamet̄ cxxvi milia stad̄ septies multiplicat̄ &
 habet̄ dccc lxxxii milia stadiorū in diametro solaris gi
 ri. quo numero bis ducto ipsius giri longitudo colligetur
 in milib; stadiorū mille milia dccc lxiiii milia; & si quis
 fieris diametrum totius sphaerae caelestis tali reperiēs angustia.

ex bis dup
 coaptatur

/ armonie
 quae dicta
 bis diapason
 triuallū atq;
 ad sphaerā co
 fectū esse an
 tiquitatis est;

Figure 1: Bamberg, Staatsbibliothek, Philos. 2/1, f. 215r. Image reduced by 50 percent. Page measures 268 × 220 mm. © Bamberg Staatsbibliothek. Image used with permission.

some dozen really substantial additions²⁰⁸ and many more that are brief and have not been discussed above. Many of the glosses and longer titles also comment on the text in a way not clearly different to the additions themselves. Finally, the titles provide a way through the text. They do not list everything that is discussed, but outline the contours of a distinct reading. Particular concerns and particular emphases can be discerned. Nonetheless, it was not possible to produce an adequate account of this material in this chapter. I shall focus on just one intervention which i² made in the definition of *musica*. I shall set the original and amended definitions against their intellectual backgrounds, and examine what this reveals about continuity and change in musical thought among the scholars who have been associated with Eriugena.

Definitions of *musica* in the *Periphyseon*

In the first book of the *Periphyseon*, Eriugena examines each of the ten Categories of the logical tradition in order to assess whether any of them may suitably describe God. In this, he follows the example of Augustine's *De Trinitate*. Augustine had argued that none but the first Category – essence or *usia* – could describe God properly. Eriugena denies even this, but he does acknowledge that each of the Categories may be applied to God metaphorically.

For reasons that I shall examine below, Eriugena defines each of the liberal arts in his examination of place, the seventh of the ten Categories.²⁰⁹ The definitions were introduced into the Reims manuscript as an expansion of the text. They are written around three margins of f. 41r in the hand of i¹, which is now believed to be Eriugena's own.²¹⁰ Subsequently, they were incorporated into the main text of the Bamberg manuscript on f. 26r. In one of his revisions on that page, i² made changes to the definition of *musica*. In effect, these changes amount to the substitution of one definition of the art for another. In the following parts of

²⁰⁸ See above, pp. 118–9.

²⁰⁹ *Periphyseon* I, 475A–B.

²¹⁰ The addition is shown in Jauneau and Dutton, *The autograph of Eriugena*, p. 132, plate 8. For a discussion of the autograph of Eriugena, see above, pp. 84–104.

this chapter, I shall describe the difference between the definitions by situating each within a particular intellectual context and at the confluence of particular intellectual traditions.

The intervention of i^2 is focussed on one part of the definition, which I have italicised below. In the Reims manuscript we find the following definition copied by i^1 :

Musica est omnium *quae sunt siue in motu siue in statu in naturalibus proportionibus*
armoniam rationis lumine dinoscens disciplina.

And in the Bamberg manuscript, this definition is amended by i^2 to read:

Musica est omnium *quae sunt in motu scibili naturalibus proportionibus* armoniam
rationis lumine dinoscens disciplina.

I have left the definitions in Latin, since each poses some difficulties of translation. Nonetheless, if we leave aside the relative clause in which i^2 makes his changes, we might render the definition along the following lines:

Musica is the discipline that studies with the light of reason the harmony [...] of
all things.

We can make a few basic observations about what the definitions have in common. Both present *musica* as a rational discipline. It proceeds according to reason and not, for example, sense. Moreover, both present *musica* as a very capacious discipline. It is concerned not just with the harmony of voices or instruments but with the harmony of all things. The participle *dinoscens* is not so straightforward. Where the verb *dinoscere* is used elsewhere in the *Periphyseon*, it means ‘to show’, ‘to distinguish’ and sometimes ‘to discern’.²¹¹ In the passive, it often means ‘to be seen’.²¹² In this instance, ‘to study’ or ‘to demonstrate’ seems about right. Finally, we should note that both definitions present *musica* as a quantitative discipline. Although the relative clause configures the relation to quantity differently in each definition, both

²¹¹ See, for example, *Periphyseon* 1, 463C, 491D; 2, 568D, and so on.

²¹² See, for example, *Periphyseon* 3, 708C.

definitions prominently contain the idea of proportion and, more specifically, natural proportion.

The relative clause itself again presents some difficulties. In the Reims definition, it could be short ('all of the things that are, whether they are in motion or at rest ...') or longer ('all of the things that are either in motion or at rest ...'). Moreover, it is just about possible that the phrase 'in natural proportions' could be said about the things themselves instead of, or as well as, their motion and rest. The grammatical relations are rather more clear in the Bamberg definition ('all of the things that are in motion knowable by virtue of natural proportions'), though we should by no means assume that we can read these relations back into the Reims definition. I shall try to clear up some of this uncertainty in the following parts of the chapter. Working definitions of the two definitions may be suggested as follows:

Musica is the discipline that studies with the light of reason the harmony of all things that are in motion or at rest in natural proportions (Reims),

and

Musica is the discipline that studies with the light of reason the harmony of all things that are in motion knowable by virtue of natural proportions (Bamberg).

Because i² changes only one part of this definition, we may conclude that the changes made to this part were sufficient to substitute one definition of *musica* for another. In other words, this small change was enough to remove what he found unsatisfactory in the Reims definition and to replace it with something better. For this reason, in order to discern more precisely how the two definitions are different, we should focus on the part that was changed, namely the relative clause. In the following parts of the chapter, I shall first set out a more detailed palaeographical treatment of the two definitions and their appearance in the Reims and Bamberg manuscripts. In turn, I shall examine the two versions of the relative clause in the particular intellectual contexts suggested by the words that are used and the words that are

changed. This will serve not only to clarify what is distinct about the two definitions of *musica* but also to reveal how each negotiated a nexus of intellectual traditions differently. I shall conclude that the intervention of i² in the definition of *musica* is typical of his writing activity in the Bamberg manuscript as a whole. Despite its differences, the Bamberg definition may be considered a reading of the definition in Reims, since both negotiate a relation between the intellectual disciplines of *musica* and logic.

The appearance of the definitions in the Reims and Bamberg manuscripts

Definitions of the arts were added by i¹ (now believed to be Eriugena himself) to the Reims manuscript on f. 41r. Connected to the text by means of a reference sign placed on line 9, the definitions begin above the text, continue down the righthand margin, and fill up the space below the text. The definitions and the small amount of additional text within which they are accommodated together comprise the longest intervention made by i¹ in this manuscript. The definition of *musica* is found in the final nine lines written in the righthand margin. It reads:²¹³

Musica est omnium quae sunt siue in motu siue in statu in naturalibus
proportionibus armoniam rationis lumine dinoscens disciplina.

When the *Periphyseon* was copied from the Reims into the Bamberg manuscript, this addition was incorporated into the text on f. 26r beginning at line 6. Alongside these definitions, i² has written the title *Diffinitiones disciplinarum*. The definition of *musica* is found on lines 17–19, and now reads:

Musica est omnium quae sunt in motu scibili naturalibus proportionibus
armoniam rationis lumine dinoscens disciplina.

The changes made to this definition are typical of the interventions made by i² in the Bamberg manuscript, one part of which were described in the preceding section of this

²¹³ *Periphyseon* I, 475B.

chapter. The definition was originally copied as it is found in the Reims manuscript. At some later point, i² erased the words *siue* and *siue in statu in*. Finally, he wrote the word *scibili* over part of the second erasure. It is here important to stress that although we can describe this intervention as a series of changes, it constitutes a single substitution of one definition and one distinct version of *musica* for another.

In order to clarify the relation between the clauses, a small upward stroke has been added between *proportionibus* and *armoniam*. This same sign is found several times on this and the surrounding folios, and it seems to have been written by the text scribe. It was therefore likely added to the definition as it was first copied.

Two further interventions were made by i² within the definitions. In the definition of *rhetorica*, he has changed the word *disserens* to *discutiens*. He has also added a gloss to the words *septem periochis*, which is written above the text and connected by means of a reference sign. These changes are careful and deliberate, and we should take them seriously. For a definite reason, i² has concluded that *musica* no longer concerns all things whether they are in motion or at rest but only the things that are in motion. Likewise, his description of this motion as knowable or *scibilis* is not arbitrary. In the following parts of this chapter, I shall examine the reason why one definition was substituted for another. I shall first examine the phrase *siue in motu siue in statu* from the definition in Reims and then *in motu scibili* from Bamberg. Only by setting these phrases in their intellectual contexts within a nexus of intellectual traditions can we begin to understand what each suggests about *musica*.

The Reims definition

The phrase *siue in motu siue in statu* was adapted by Eriugena from a passage at the end of the sixth book of Augustine's *De musica*. This passage is quoted with a precise reference to its position in Augustine's text in the first book of the *Periphyseon* and it will be familiar from the preceding chapter, since it was also the source of Eriugena's ideas about the *uita generalis* and *uitalis motus*. In this passage, motion and rest are introduced with reference to the temporal

and local numbers, which are theorised much more extensively throughout Augustine's text. Eriugena's own ideas about time and place are considerably removed from those of Augustine, and for this reason, he seems to have preferred the related but less determined terms, motion and rest. Nonetheless, the connection between the two pairs of terms may inform our understanding of Eriugena's definition of *musica*.

'... siue in motu siue in statu ...'

It is not difficult to identify with some confidence a single source for the phrase *siue in motu siue in statu*, which is central to the Reims definition of *musica*. Many texts known in the ninth century draw a connection between *musica* and motion, but a connection to rest is much less common. In fact, I have been able to find it in only one other text. At the end of the sixth book of his *De musica*, Augustine writes:²¹⁴

Yet surely all these things [the bodies of the elements], which we number with the aid of the bodily senses, and whatever is in them could neither receive nor possess local numbers, which seem to be at rest, unless they were preceded in silence by the innermost temporal numbers, which are in motion.

In the preceding chapter I argued that this passage described a procession first into time and duration and then into place and corporeal extension.²¹⁵ The meanings of motion and rest in this passage are not quite clear. Motion is an important notion in Augustine's *De musica*. Motions in time can be measured by their duration and therefore compared by means of number. For this reason, motion mediates between *musica* and number. I shall set out this relation in greater detail in my examination of the Bamberg definition. Rest appears for the first time in this passage. Augustine treats the local numbers as the measure of corporeal extension, but the question of their rest is not examined further. We are therefore left with a

²¹⁴*De musica* 6, 17, 57. 'Ista certe omnia, quae carnalis sensus ministerio numeramus, et quaecumque in eis sunt locales numeros, qui uidentur esse in aliquo statu, nisi praecedentibus intimis in silentio temporalibus numeris, qui sunt in motu, nec accipere possunt nec habere.'

²¹⁵See above, pp. 45–50.

puzzle. How does the use of the phrase *siue in motu siue in statu* in the Reims definition relate to the motion and rest of temporal and local numbers in this passage from Augustine, from which it was undoubtedly adapted?

One way into this question is to consider some of the other ways in which motion and rest are used in the first book of the *Periphyseon*. Several descriptions of motion and rest can be distinguished, and some of them seem to reveal some of the same concerns found in the definition of *musica*. Thereafter, I shall turn to another point in the first book of the *Periphyseon*, in which the passage from Augustine's *De musica* is quoted. Eriugena here tries to align the passage from Augustine with his own very different ideas about time and place, which do not fit well Augustine's ideas about successive procession first into time and then into place. In his quotation of this passage, Eriugena removes the references to motion and rest. Nonetheless, the place of this quotation in Eriugena's argument may help us better to understand his use of these terms in his definition of *musica*. This part of the chapter, then, will be almost a sourcebook of references to motion and rest in the first book of the *Periphyseon*. The following part will help us better to pick between the possible alternatives.

Eriugena introduces two distinct uses of motion and rest in a passage examining the etymology of the Greek word for God, *theos*.²¹⁶ He explains this etymology as follows. On the one hand, the name *theos* is derived from the verb *theoro* (or *uideo* in Latin) meaning 'I see'. On the other, it is derived from the verb *theo* (or *curro* in Latin) meaning 'I run'. These verbs are related to motion and rest in the following manner. Eriugena writes that when *theos* is understood to be derived from *theoro*, it can be taken as the participle *uidens* or 'seeing'. This is because God sees everything that is within himself, and sees nothing that is beyond him, since there is nothing beyond him. When *theos* is instead understood to be derived from *theo*, it can be taken as the participle *currens* or 'running'. This is because God runs into all things and fills all things by running and is never at rest. Nonetheless, Eriugena notes that God is never

²¹⁶ *Periphyseon* I, 452B–453B.

moved either. He concludes:²¹⁷

Concerning God, we say most correctly ‘motion at rest’ and ‘rest in motion’. He is unchangeably at rest in himself, never departing from his own natural stability, but he moves himself through all things, in order that everything which essentially subsists in him may be. For by his motion all things are made.

At the conclusion of this passage, Eriugena harmonises the ideas yet further, and notes that God’s running is his seeing, and his seeing his running.²¹⁸

A second refinement of this description turns the discussion further from God toward Creation. This is achieved by reference to his will. Eriugena writes that God’s motion is nothing but the motion of his will, by which he wills all things to be made (presumably in this sense as they proceed from their reasons), whereas his rest is nothing but the unchanging resolution of his will, by which he holds all things in the unchanging stability of their reasons.²¹⁹ The harmony of God’s making, his moving, and his willing is further demonstrated in Eriugena’s account of the penultimate and final Categories, action and passion.²²⁰ Finally, Eriugena notes that neither motion nor rest is properly predicated of God, for each would introduce an opposition in the divine nature that is prohibited by reason.

The motion and rest of God (understood metaphorically) likewise causes the motion and rest of created things. Eriugena explains this second idea of motion and rest as follows:²²¹

²¹⁷ *Periphyseon* I, 452C–D. ‘De deo siquidem uerissime dicitur motus stabilis et status mobilis. Stat enim in se ipso incommutabiliter nunquam naturalem suam stabilitatem deserens, mouet autem se ipsum per omnia ut sint ea quae a se essentialiter subsistunt. Motu enim ipsius omnia fiunt.’

²¹⁸ *Periphyseon* I, 452D.

²¹⁹ *Periphyseon* I, 453A.

²²⁰ Eriugena’s discussion of action and passion begins at *Periphyseon* I, 504A.

²²¹ *Periphyseon* I, 453B. ‘Haec igitur nomina sicut et multa similia ex creatura per quamdam diuinam metaphoram ad creatorem referuntur. Nec irrationabiliter, quoniam omnium quae in statu et motu sunt causa est. Ab eo enim incipiunt currere ut sint, quoniam principium omnium est; et per eum ad eum naturali motu feruntur ut in eo incommutabiliter atque aeternaliter stent, quoniam finis quiesque omnium est. Nam ultra eum nil appetunt, in eo enim sui motus principium finemque inueniunt. Deus ergo currens dicitur, non quia extra se currant, qui semper in se ipso immutabiliter stat, qui omnia implet, sed quia omnia currere facit ex non

Just like many others, these names are referred from the Creature to the Creator through a certain divine metaphor. And this is not done without reason, since he is the cause of all things that are in motion or at rest. For from him they begin to run, in order that they may be, since he is the beginning of all things; and they are carried through him and toward him by a natural motion, in order that they may eternally and unchangeably be at rest in him, since he is the end and repose of all things. For they desire nothing beyond him, since in him they discover the beginning and end of their motion. God is therefore said to run, not because he runs outside himself, who is always unchangeably at rest in himself, who fills all things, but because he makes all things run from non-existence into existence.

We may therefore distinguish these ideas of motion and rest. The common, general, or natural motion of all things describes the procession of things from their causes into spatiotemporal existence.²²² The natural end of this motion is a return to the causes and an eternal and unchangeable rest in God. The names motion and rest may therefore be transferred to God, in order to represent metaphorically the fact that he is the cause of this motion and rest.

Later in the book, Eriugena distinguishes a third kind of motion from this common, general, or natural motion.²²³ This motion is introduced in Eriugena's discussion of action and passion, the penultimate and final Categories. Eriugena writes:²²⁴

For I am not now talking about that general motion, which is naturally common to all creatures, by which all things are moved from nothing into being, but the more usual motion in times, by which everyday changeable matter accepts various qualitative forms as it is moved either by nature or by art.

existentibus in existentia.'

²²²The three terms are used interchangeably. See, for example, *Periphyseon* I, 513D. This is, of course, a crude simplification of Eriugena's ideas about causality, which are also tempered by the idea that in order to proceed into spatiotemporal existence, all things must remain immutably in their causes. I discuss this idea in the following chapter.

²²³*Periphyseon* I, 513C–D.

²²⁴*Periphyseon* I, 513D.

The distinction between qualitative and substantial forms and that between geometric and natural bodies has been discussed by Eriugena at some length earlier in the book.²²⁵ Related to this is Eriugena's description of motion and rest in his examination of formless matter.

Eriugena writes here:²²⁶

Who using reason would dare to say that the matter of bodies was also their place, especially since when considered in itself by reason it is neither in motion nor at rest? It is not in motion, since it has not yet begun to be contained by a definite form. For matter is moved through form, and without form it is immobile, as the Greeks say. By what is it moved, if it is not yet contained in a definite place or time? Nor is it at rest, since it has not yet occupied the end of its perfection, and rest is the end of motion. How can something be at rest, which has not yet begun to move? How, therefore, can the matter of a body be the place of the body that it comprises, when it is circumscribed by no definite place or measure or form and is defined by no definite reason unless through negation?

Eriugena's references to the place of bodies will be taken up more fully in my following discussion of the Categories of time and place. For now, it is sufficient to note the further use of motion and rest in relation to form and formlessness.

Further ideas about motion and rest can be found in Eriugena's discussion of the world.²²⁷

Some of this material will be familiar from my discussion of the *uita generalis* and *uitalis motus* in the first chapter.²²⁸ Eriugena writes that the *uita generalis*, a ninth-century term for the

²²⁵ *Periphyseon* I, 495B–D.

²²⁶ *Periphyseon* I, 488A–B. 'Quis autem materiam corporum eorundem esse locum ratione utens audeat dicere, praesertim cum materia per se ipsam ratione considerata nec in motu nec in statu sit? In motu siquidem non est quod nondum inchoat certa forma contineri. Nam per formam mouetur materia, sine forma immobilis est, ut graeci uolunt. Quo enim mouebitur quod nullo loco, nullo tempore certo adhuc coartatur? Nec in statu est, quia nondum finem suae perfectionis possidet; status siquidem finis motionis est. Quomodo autem potest in statu fieri quod non coepit iam moueri? Quomodo igitur materia corporis locus corporis, quod ex ea conficitur, potest esse, cum et ipsa in se ipsa nullo certo loco seu modo seu forma circumscribatur, nulla certa ratione diffinitur nisi per negationem?' A much longer discussion of formless matter begins at *Periphyseon* I, 499C.

²²⁷ *Periphyseon* I, beginning at 476C.

²²⁸ See above, 70–80.

Platonic *anima mundi*, gives life to and moves all things that are in motion or at rest. In the first instance, this is explained with reference to its relation to the world's body. Eriugena writes:²²⁹

But because this soul [...] is eternally moved in order to give life to and rule its body (*i.e.* the whole world) and to move it by diverse reasons in the joining together and dissolving of various individual bodies, and yet remains in its own natural and unchangeable state, it is therefore always moved and always at rest.

For this reason, Eriugena extends the discussion of motion and rest to the body of this soul, which he now defines as the universe of visible things. Before all else, his discussion concerns the four elements.²³⁰ He writes that part of this body remains in eternal stability whereas part remains in eternal velocity. These are the elements of earth and the ether respectively. The other elements, air and water, are arranged with their motion proportional to their place between earth and the ethereal region. Nonetheless, Eriugena harmonises this arrangement of motion and rest and in so doing introduces a further idea about the terms. He writes:²³¹

Although the extreme parts of the world seem to differ from one another on account of the diversity of their qualities, they do not disagree in all things. For although the ethereal regions always revolve at the greatest speed, the chorus of the stars keeps its unchanging seat, such that it revolves with the ether but does not desert its natural place, in which it is like the stability earthly things. On the contrary, although the earth is eternally at rest, all things that rise from it are

²²⁹ *Periphyseon* I, 477A. 'Sed quia ipsa anima [...] aeternaliter mouetur ad corpus suum (id est mundum totum) uiuificandum, regendum, diuersisque rationibus uariorum corporum singulorum coniunctionibus resolutionibusque mouendum, manet etiam in suo naturali immobilique statu, mouetur ergo semper et stat.'

²³⁰ *Periphyseon* I, 477A–C.

²³¹ *Periphyseon* I, 477C–D. 'Sed quamuis uideantur extremae mundi partes a se inuicem discrepare propter diuersas earum qualitates, non tamen per omnia a se inuicem dissentiunt. Nam aetheria spatia quamuis semper celerrima uelocitate uoluantur, chorus tamen astrorum suam immutabilem obseruat sedem ita ut et cum aethere uoluatur et naturalem locum ad similitudinem terrenae stabilitatis non deserat. Terra uero e contrario cum aeternaliter in statu sit, omnia tamen quae ex ea oriuntur ad similitudinem leuitatis aetheriae semper in motu sunt, nascendo per generationem, crescendo in numerum locorum ac temporum, iterumque decrescendo et ad solutionem formae atque materiae perueniendo.'

always in motion, in which they are like the lightness of the ether, since they are born through generation, grow into the numbers of places and times, are likewise diminished, and arrive at the dissolution of their form and matter.

Of course, we cannot necessarily distinguish the motion described here from the common, general, or natural motion nor from the motion by which matter takes on various qualitative forms. Both kinds seem to be involved. Nonetheless, it is interesting to include the example as a further context in which Eriugena works his way around this idea, especially since it comes within his discussion of the *uita generalis* and contains a reference to the numbers in places and times, both of which will be familiar from Augustine's *De musica* and its ninth-century glosses.

The final set of ideas regarding motion and rest are more directly involved in Eriugena's treatment of the ten Categories of the logical tradition. Although they are for this reason more remote from everyday use of the terms, they are not the less significant for this. Eriugena arranges the Categories into what he calls two *superiora generalioraque genera* or superior and more general genera, motion and rest.²³² In this arrangement, four of the Categories are at rest (*usia*, quantity, situation, place), and six are in motion (quality, condition, time, action, passion). We can more closely understand this reasons underlying this arrangement from Eriugena's examination of condition and relation. Eriugena raises the question of whether these categories should not rather be at rest than in motion. He writes:²³³

For whatever condition arrives at the perfection [of that of which it is the condition] immutably remains there. For if it should be moved in any way, it is clear that it is not yet a condition. [...] Likewise, in relation, rest seems to be the

²³² *Periphyseon* I, 469A–B.

²³³ *Periphyseon* I, 469C. 'Quodcunque enim ad perfectum peruenerit habitum immutabiliter manet. Nam si quodam modo moueatur, iam non esse habitum manifestum est. [...] In relatione item status praeualere aestimatur. Relatio siquidem patris ad filium seu dupli ad simplum et e contrario immobilis est; nam pater semper pater est filii, similiter filius semper filius est patris, et caetera.'

more prominent. Indeed, the relations of father to son or double to single and *uice uersa* are immobile; for the father is always the father of the son, and the son always the son of the father, and so on.

Eriugena dismantles each of these reasons in turn. Concerning condition, his argument focusses on the motion that precedes the perfection of that condition. He writes:²³⁴

Perhaps you would not have hesitated very much, if you had more diligently given attention to the fact that everything which is not at once, naturally, and perfectly present in the creature but advances towards its inseparable and unchangeable perfection, is necessarily in motion. Every condition ascends by a certain motion to the perfection of that of which it is the condition. Who presumes that this perfection is lastingly made in this life? Condition is therefore in motion.

Eriugena's remarks concerning relation instead focus on the necessary attraction that sustains the relation. He writes:²³⁵

Likewise, I wonder that you have doubts about relation, when you see that it cannot be in one and the same thing; for it always appears in two. But who could doubt that the desire of two things for one another is made by a certain motion?

Nonetheless, Eriugena eventually presents a more general theorisation of the difference between the Categories that are in motion and those that are at rest. He writes:²³⁶

²³⁴ *Periphyseon* I, 469C–D. 'Fortassis non magnopere haesitasses, si diligentius intuereris quia omne quod non simul connaturaliter perfecte inest creaturae sed per incrementa quaedam ad inseparabilem incommutabilemque perfectionem procedit in motu esse necesse est. Omnis autem habitus motu quodam ad perfectionem ascendit in eo cuius habitus est. De qua perfectione quis firmus fieri in hac uita praesumat? Habitus igitur in motu est.'

²³⁵ *Periphyseon* I, 469D–470A. 'De relatione item miror cur dubitas, cum uideas eam in uno eodemque esse non posse; in duobus nanque semper uidetur. Duorum autem ad se inuicem appetitus motu quodam fieri quis dubitarit?'

²³⁶ *Periphyseon* I, 470A–B. 'Est item alia ratio quae apertissime ea quae in motu ab his quae in statu sunt

There is likewise another reason which most clearly distinguishes the things that are in motion from the things that are at rest. To avoid saying anything more about the most general reason which shows that all things which were made by God and after God are in motion [...] we can say properly that the things which subsist through themselves and need no other subject in order to exist are at rest; whereas the things which exist in something else, since they cannot subsist through themselves, are not unsuitably judged to be in motion. Condition and relation are in another subject, in which they always desire to be by a natural motion, since without it they cannot exist. They are therefore in motion.

Eriugena goes on to describe in greater detail which of the Categories can subsist through themselves and which require another subject. Nonetheless, his discussion introduces complexities regarding the relation between individual substances and their species that are not required for my argument in this chapter.²³⁷

These brief sketches illustrate some of the ways in which Eriugena uses motion and rest in the first book of the *Periphyseon*. The first and perhaps the most important of these concerns the common, general, or natural motion of all things as they pass from their causes into spatiotemporal existence and the rest that they find at the end of this motion. These terms can be extended metaphorically to God, since he is the beginning, middle, and end of this motion. Two further ideas are distinguished from this. One concerns the everyday motion of things in time as they take on various qualitative forms. The other forms part of Eriugena's speculation about the Categories themselves, where they are used as terms to differentiate the things that subsist in themselves from those that can exist only in something else. In order to

discernit. Vt enim de ipsa generalissima ratione nunc plura non dicam, quae omnia quae a deo post deum condita sunt in motu esse manifestat [...] ea proprie dicimus in statu esse, quae per se subsistunt nulliusque indigent subiecti ut sint; quae uero in aliquo existunt, quia per se subsistere non possunt, in motu esse non incongrue iudicamus. Habitus itaque atque relatio in aliquo subiecto sunt, in quo semper esse naturali motu appetunt, quia sine eo esse non possunt. In motu igitur sunt.'

²³⁷On this question, see Christoph Erisman, *L'homme commun : la genèse du réalisme ontologique durant le haut Moyen Âge* (Paris: 2011), pp. 193–292 and John Marenbon, 'Eriugena, Aristotelian logic, and the Creation', in *Eriugena and Creation*, edited by Willemeijn Otten and Michael I. Allen (Turnhout: 2014), pp. 349–68.

establish whether any of these may be related to the phrase *siue in motu siue in statu* from the Reims definition of *musica*, we may turn to Eriugena's analysis of the passage from which this phrase was borrowed a little later in the first book of the *Periphyseon*.

Eriugena's reading of place and time in Augustine's De musica

In order to understand how the phrase *siue in motu siue in statu* in the Reims definition relates to the other pairs of motion and rest which we have found in the first book of the *Periphyseon*, we should turn again to the passage at the end of the sixth book of Augustine's *De musica* from which it was adapted.²³⁸ In the first chapter, I argued that this passage describes a procession from eternal and unchanging number first into times, where the temporal numbers appear as measures of duration, and then into place, where the local numbers appear as measures of corporeal extension.²³⁹

Later in the first book of the *Periphyseon*, Eriugena returns to this passage in his own examination of time and place, the seventh and eighth Categories. Eriugena's ideas about time and place differ in important respects from those found in Augustine. Supported by quotations from Maximus the Confessor's *Ambigua ad Iohannem*, Eriugena argues that all things, whether corporeal or incorporeal, are contained within both time and place inseparably.²⁴⁰ This argument rests on different definitions of time and place and precludes the successive procession which we found in Augustine. When Eriugena returns to the passage from *De musica* and makes use of it in support of his own ideas about time and place, he therefore reconfigures the relation that it outlines between time and place and, in turn, between motion and rest.

At least in the first instance, Eriugena seems to relate the motion and rest found in the passage

²³⁸ See above, p. 49.

²³⁹ See above, 45–50.

²⁴⁰ For a more detailed examination of the relation between Eriugena and Maximus on this point, see Carlos Steel, 'Maximus the Confessor and John Scottus Eriugena on time and place', in *Eriugena and Creation*, edited by Willemein Otten and Michael I. Allen (Turnhout: 2014), pp. 291–318.

from *De musica* to the common, general, or natural motion of all things and the everyday motion through which they take on various qualitative forms. Nonetheless, Eriugena reads this passage in terms of the Categories, and it is possible that it was the point of departure from which he developed his account of the two more general genera. We may therefore draw two kinds of conclusion. The first concerns the definition of *musica* itself. However we read the phrase *siue in motu siue in statu*, it is clear that the Reims definition is very capacious. Perhaps the more interesting conclusion concerns the place of *musica* within a nexus of intellectual traditions. We can see here how *musica* was read together with and even informed Eriugena's treatment of metaphysical narratives of procession and return and perhaps also his speculation regarding the ten Categories of the logical tradition.

We must first examine Eriugena's ideas about place. Eriugena first defines place in his examination of the two more general genera into which the ten Categories are arranged. He writes that:²⁴¹

[...] place is nothing but the limit and definition of every finite nature.

In his following, more detailed examination of place, he writes that:²⁴²

Place [...] is constituted in the definitions of things that can be defined. It is nothing but the boundary within which each thing is enclosed by fixed terms.

Eriugena goes on to argue that there are as many kinds of place as there are things that can be defined. Here, he includes the definitions of things that are corporeal, such as bodies, as well as things that are incorporeal, such as the liberal arts. Indeed, the definition of *musica* is included as one of the examples of place. Eriugena concludes that place itself (as definition) is incorporeal and contained only in the mind.²⁴³

The greater part of Eriugena's examination of place attempts to separate ideas about place

²⁴¹ *Periphyseon* I, 470C. '[...] nil aliud locus sit nisi terminus atque diffinitio uniuscuiusque finitae naturae.'

²⁴² *Periphyseon* I, 474B. 'Locus [...] in diffinitionibus rerum quae diffiniri possunt constituitur. Nil enim aliud est locus nisi ambitus quo unumquodque certis terminis concluditur.'

²⁴³ *Periphyseon* I, 475B.

from ideas about bodies.²⁴⁴ In this, his difference from Augustine is especially marked, since Augustine had treated the local numbers as measures of corporeal extension and even suggested that they comprise the bodies which they measure.²⁴⁵ Eriugena is not always consistent in his use of place, and something very much like Augustine's more everyday understanding of the term sometimes enters the discussion.²⁴⁶ Nonetheless, where he does examine place as definition, Eriugena's ideas seem at least in one respect irreconcilable with those of Augustine; for he argues that all things, whether corporeal or incorporeal, are inseparably in time and place. At this moment of greatest difference, Eriugena returns to the passage from the end of *De musica* and reads it in the terms of his own definitions of time and place. What he says here may help us better to understand the Reims definition of *musica*.

Eriugena argues that with the sole exception of God, everything is in time and place inseparably: place cannot be understood without time, nor time without place.²⁴⁷ In this he follows Maximus the Confessor's *Ambigua ad Iohannem*.²⁴⁸ In order to demonstrate that all things are contained in place, Eriugena introduces a third definition of place within a long quotation from the *Ambigua*. He writes:²⁴⁹

Place is the boundary beyond the universe, or the position beyond the universe, or the comprehending limit, in which whatever is comprehended is comprehended.

Likewise all things are contained in time. Eriugena's quotation from the *Ambigua*

²⁴⁴ *Periphyseon* I beginning at 475B.

²⁴⁵ See above, pp. 45–50.

²⁴⁶ See, for example, the conclusion reached by John Marenbon, 'John Scottus and the "Categoriae decem"', in *Eriugena: Studien zu seinen Quellen*, edited by Werner Beierwaltes (Heidelberg: 1980), pp. 117–34, at pp. 132–3.

²⁴⁷ *Periphyseon* I, 481B–483C.

²⁴⁸ See note 240.

²⁴⁹ *Periphyseon* I, 481D–482A. 'Locus est ipse extra uniuersitatem ambitus, uel ipsa extra uniuersitatem positio, uel finis comprehensens, in quo comprehenditur comprehensum.'

continues:²⁵⁰

It is also confirmed that the universe exists in time, since whatever exists after God does not exist simply but exists after some manner, and for this reason, it does not lack a beginning.

Eriugena concludes, now in his own words:²⁵¹

Therefore, to exist in some manner is to exist locally, and to begin to exist in some manner is to exist temporally. For this reason, everything that exists (with the exception of God) is necessarily enclosed in place and time, since it subsists in some manner and began to subsist through generation.

At the end of this section, Eriugena turns to the conclusion that is implied in all of the above, namely that time and place are prior to all the things that are in them. Although Augustine likely would not dispute this conclusion, if it were understood on his own terms, the expanded notions of time and place put forward by Eriugena are entirely foreign to Augustine's writings. It is therefore surprising to find him reaching for *De musica* in order to support his argument. Since Eriugena's argument so changes the basic meanings of time and place from what was likely intended in Augustine's text, it is worth quoting it at some length. Eriugena writes:²⁵²

²⁵⁰ *Periphyseon* I, 482A. 'Sub tempore etiam uniuersa comprobantur, quoniam non simpliciter sed aliquo modo esse habent uniuersa quaecunque post deum esse habent, ac per hoc non carent principio.'

²⁵¹ *Periphyseon* I, 482A. 'Itaque aliquo modo esse hoc est localiter esse, et aliquo modo inchoasse esse hoc est temporaliter esse; ideoque omne quod est praeter deum, quoniam aliquo modo subsistit et per generationem subsistere inchoauit, necessario loco ac tempore concluditur.'

²⁵² *Periphyseon* I, 482B–483C. 'Videsne igitur locum tempusque ante omnia quae sunt intelligi? Numerus enim locorum et temporum, ut ait sanctus Augustinus in sexto de musica, praecedit omnia quae in eis sunt. Modus siquidem (id est mensura) omnium rerum quae creata sunt naturaliter conditionem earum ratione praecedit. Qui modus atque mensura uniuscuiusque locus dicitur et est. Similiter principium nascendi atque inchoatio ante omne quod nascitur atque inchoat ratione praecedere perspicitur; ideoque omne, quod non erat et est, a principio temporis coepit esse. Solus itaque deus infinitus est, caetera 'ubi' et 'quando' terminantur, id est loco et tempore; non quod locus et tempus in numero eorum quae a deo creata sunt non sint, sed quod omnia quae in uniuersitate sunt non spatiis temporum sed sole ratione conditionis praecesserint. Necessario enim ea quae continent prius intelliguntur quam ea quae continentur [...] Ac per hoc concluditur nil aliud esse locum nisi naturalem diffinitionem modumque positionemque uniuscuiusque siue generalis siue specialis creaturae, quemadmodum nil aliud est tempus nisi rerum per generationem motionis ex non esse in esse

Do you see, therefore, that place and time are understood to be prior to all the things that exist? For as Augustine says in the sixth book of *De musica*, the numbers of places and times precede all the things that are in them. The manner, *i.e.* the measure, of all things that are created naturally and by reason precedes their creation. The manner and measure of each thing is called its place. Likewise, the origin and beginning of its birth is seen by reason to precede everything that is born and begins. Only God is infinite. Everything else is circumscribed by ‘where’ and ‘when’, *i.e.* by place and time. This is not because place and time are not among the number of things created by God, but because they precede everything in the universe not by intervals of time but by reason of their condition. For whatever contains something must be understood to be prior to whatever it contains. [...] For this reason we may conclude that place is nothing but the natural definition and manner and position of each creature, whether generally or specifically, just as time is nothing but the beginning of things out of non-being into being through the generation of motion and the determined measurements of this motion of changeable things, until the enduring end comes, in which everything will be unchangeably at rest.

The argument of this passage is consistent in its own terms, but it flattens or at least differently constitutes the hierarchical procession first into times and then into places which we found in *De musica*. Although it features a reference to that text prominently, the result is far from Augustinian. We are therefore left with some questions.

In the first instance, we might ask how the use of motion and rest in this passage relates the ideas about motion and rest explored in the preceding section of the chapter.

Immediately, it is clear that Eriugena’s definition of time refers to the common, general, or natural motion of all things (the motion from non-being into being) as well as the everyday

inchoationem ipsiusque motus rerum mutabilium certae dimensiones donec ueniat stabilis finis, in quo immutabiliter omnia stabunt.’

idea of motion of things according to which they accept different qualitative forms (the motion of changeable things). In both cases, motion is distinguished from the rest achieved in the final return of all things to God. This passage therefore maintains Augustine's connection between motion and time, but it separates rest and place into two quite distinct things. Eriugena therefore seems to have read this passage with at least some idea of these two kinds of motion, but the final account does not straightforwardly reflect either of them.

We may draw a similar conclusion regarding the third kind of motion and rest introduced in the previous part of this chapter. There the terms described the more general genera into which the ten Categories could be arranged. Certainly, there seems to be some overlap. Eriugena is here reading Augustine's temporal and local numbers as though they pertained immediately to the Categories of time and place. In this passage, he therefore found the connection between these Categories and the terms motion and rest, which could subsequently be generalised to include all ten Categories. Of course, this is speculative, but certain parts of the argument are suggestive. In particular, we should note that the two more general genera are introduced in the connection to the very same ideas discussed at the end of *De musica*, namely time, place, and the relation between God and Creation.

In the end, the question of the precise meaning of *siue in motu siue in statu* in the Reims definition of *musica* must remain open; no single meaning can be argued to the exclusion of any other. Nonetheless, perhaps the more important conclusion comes a step before any attempt to produce a definite reading. Eriugena's own ideas about time and place are significantly different from those of Augustine. In turn, this prevents any straightforward reading of the Augustinian narrative of successive procession first into times and then into places, as it is found in *De musica* and more widely in his writings. For this reason, when using materials from Augustine's text, Eriugena prefers the terms motion and rest. We saw this, for instance, in his consideration of the Platonic *anima mundi* in the first chapter.²⁵³ The meaning of these terms is less closely determined by Augustine than his ideas about time and place, and

²⁵³ See above, 70–80.

in Eriugena's writing, they become even further detached from times and places. Apart from their context in Augustine's *De musica*, they expand to encompass all almost unlimited range of possible meanings, but this is not to say that they are without identifiable effect. Whether consciously or not, Eriugena's use of these terms draws *musica* into the examination of the Categories and a metaphysical narrative of procession and return. Just as the passage from *De musica* itself was read in terms of the Categories and helped to resolve a problem of Creation, so too the use of the terms motion and rest in the Reims definition of *musica* invites reference to these other areas of intellectual speculation.

The Bamberg definition

The definition of *musica* which we find in the Bamberg copy of the *Periphyseon* likewise participates in a network of references between intellectual traditions. Indeed, the traditions are similar, but they are differently negotiated. In this part of the chapter, I shall examine the phrase *in motu scibili naturalibus proportionibus* from the Bamberg definition. I argue that this phrase points towards an insistently quantitative understanding of *musica*, not only on account of its reference to natural proportions, but also because it restricts *musica* to only the things that are in motion. These ideas have histories that we can trace through Boethius' *De institutione musica* as well as Augustine's *De musica*. The term *scibilis* also has a history. It is found principally in the Latin translations and treatments of Aristotle's Categories, where it provides important examples in the treatment of the fourth Category, namely *ad-aliquid*, that is, being in relation to something. The treatment of the Categories most widely used in the early middle ages was the *Categoriae decem*, and the word *scibilis* was most likely familiar to the scribe i² from this text.²⁵⁴ In the Bamberg definition, *musica* is again read together with logic, but their relation is differently and productively negotiated.

²⁵⁴On the availability of Latin texts on logic in the early middle ages, see Marenbon, *From the circle of Alcuin*, 15–20.

‘... *in motu*...’

We may first examine why the Bamberg definition limits *musica* to the investigation only of the things that are in motion. In this part of the chapter, I shall argue that the definition reflects an insistent quantitative understanding of *musica*, which is drawn from Augustine’s *De musica* and Boethius’ *De institutione musica*. Of course, the definition in the Reims manuscript was also informed by this quantitative tradition, and even drew on some of the same texts, but the Bamberg definition inflects the tradition differently.

In the preceding part of the chapter, I argued that the phrase *siue in motu siue in statu* was drawn from a passage found at the very end of Augustine’s *De musica*, in which Augustine recounts a procession first into time and then into place. This passage is the culmination of Augustine’s examination of more and less perfect equalities, to which I shall return in the following chapter. This examination rests on a quantitative understanding of *musica*, since at least in the first instance, equality is found in the comparison of numerically measurable durations. Nonetheless, the examination of eternity, times, and places is far removed from the underlying mechanics of this quantitative idea.

In contrast, the Bamberg definition returns to the fundamental quantitative mechanics. This does not mean that it is less sophisticated than the Reims definition or that it is without metaphysical significance of its own. Indeed, texts such as Boethius’ *De institutione arithmetica* and *De institutione musica* speculate intensively about the relation between equality and inequality and the numerical basis of beauty, and this numerical speculation is of real philosophical significance. There is simply not the space to develop an account of the numerical basis of these metaphysics in this chapter. I shall instead trace the connections between *musica*, motion, and number which lie at the heart of this quantitative tradition.

The phrase *siue in motu siue in statu* in the Reims definition was drawn from a passage in Augustine’s *De musica*. Eriugena’s reading of that passage is not at all straightforward, or at

least does not straightforwardly reflect Augustine's own ideas, but it is clear enough that it was his point of departure. The phrase *in motu* in the Bamberg definition does not point toward a single text in the same way, but it does suggest a single intellectual tradition. The association of motion and *musica* is widespread among the texts known in the early middle ages, but some of these texts develop the connection at greater length and with greater significance. In the first books of Augustine's *De musica* and Boethius' *De institutione musica* motion is established as the foundation of a quantitative theory of *musica*. By this I mean that the relation between motion and *musica* facilitated at least in the first instance the consideration of musical phenomena by means of number. These texts were well known to the scribe i², and the importance of motion is recognised in the commentary material that he copied on Boethius' *De institutione musica* in Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, latin 13908. It therefore seems likely that one or another of these texts and the tradition that they represent encouraged i² to relate *musica* only to the things that are in motion and to remove Eriugena's reference to the things at rest.

The connection between *musica* and motion is established in a long argument that spans much of the first book of Augustine's *De musica*. It is introduced in the detailed examination of the three terms that comprise his definition of *musica*. Thereafter, Augustine demonstrates that all motions may be related to one another by means of number. In the following books, this demonstration becomes the foundation for his quantitative treatment of *musica*.

Augustine defines *musica* as the 'scientia bene modulandi'.²⁵⁵ We may translate this as the science of measuring well, though this is at best only a partial reflection of Augustine's meaning. Each of the three terms is examined in great detail in the following chapters, and their meaning overdetermined. Augustine introduces motion in his examination of *modulandi* and *modulatio*.²⁵⁶ He writes first that the word *modulatio* is derived from *modus* or measure. By virtue of this connection, Augustine suggests a further relation between *modulatio* and motion.

²⁵⁵ *De musica* I, 2, 2.

²⁵⁶ *De musica* I, 2, 3.

He writes that only things in motion can exceed or fall short of their measure, and that nothing can be out of measure unless it is moved. For this reason, he concludes *modulatio* may be called a certain skill in moving or at least that by which things are moved well.

In turn, Augustine presents two refinements of this definition, which focus on the idea of moving well. The first is prompted by his observation that nothing is done well unless it is moved well.²⁵⁷ For this reason, he suggests that perhaps all things are done through *musica*, but he cautions that the term *modulatio* is more commonly reserved for a particular kind of motion. Augustine's second refinement is concerned with this more particular reservation. Augustine distinguishes between motion desired for its own sake and motion desired for the sake of something else.²⁵⁸ The movements of a carpenter when he makes something are desired not for their own sake but for the sake of the thing that he is making. Contrarily, when someone dances, they move their limbs only in order to move them with beauty and elegance. Augustine argues that something that is desired for its own sake is superior to something desired for the sake of something else, and concludes that *musica*, the *scientia modulandi*, may also be called the *scientia bene mouendi*, so long as the motion thus produced is desired for itself and for this reason pleases through itself.

In the following chapter, Augustine explains how a motion may be pleasing in itself.²⁵⁹ He begins to outline the relation between motion, number, and beauty. Augustine now introduces *musica* as the *scientia bene mouendi*. He writes that everything that is moved well is moved *numerosa*, a term that may mean either with respect to number or harmoniously. In fact, it is here performing a double duty, which is worked out more fully in the following chapters and books. Augustine concludes that a motion is pleasing and desired for its own sake when it is *numerosa*, and for this reason, it is not improperly called *modulatio*.

Later in the first book, Augustine returns to the relation between motion and number.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁷ *De musica* 1, 2, 3.

²⁵⁸ *De musica* 1, 2, 3.

²⁵⁹ *De musica* 1, 3, 4.

²⁶⁰ *De musica* 1, 7, 13.

First, he distinguishes between motions only in time and motions in both time and place. He writes that it is one thing to speak for a long time or not for a long time and another to say quickly or slowly. In the first book, he retains only the first pair of words, and for this reason, the relation between motion and *musica* is mediated by time alone through the greater part of this text. In the following chapter, Augustine demonstrates that motion in time is capable of measurement, and that any two motions may therefore be related by measurement and number.²⁶¹ He gives a simple example: a motion completed in two hours and another completed in one may be compared as two to one. Augustine concludes:²⁶²

Therefore, what we call ‘for a long time’ or ‘not for a long time’ receives measurements and numbers of this sort, so that one may be compared to another as two to one, *i.e.* it takes twice as long, likewise they may be compared as three to two, *i.e.* one takes three such parts of time and the other two, and we can run through the remaining numbers, such that there are no indefinite or uncertain spaces, such that two motions may be compared by some number, either the same, where one takes as long as the other, or not the same, as one to two, two to three, three to four, or one to three, two to six, or whatever can in any way be measured against one another.

Measurement mediates the relation between *musica*, motion, and number. In the following chapters, this observation is spun into a sophisticated account first of these numerical relations and then of number itself.²⁶³ In turn, these accounts become the foundation for the material to be discussed in the following books. They not only provide a useful vocabulary for describing numerical relations, but also organise these relations into a hierarchy from

²⁶¹ *De musica* I, 8, 14.

²⁶² *De musica* I, 8, 14. ‘Recipit ergo id, quod ‘diu’ uel ‘non diu’ dicimus, dimensiones huiusmodi et numeros, ut alius motus ad alium tamquam duo ad unum sint, id est ut bis tantum habeat, alius item ad alium tamquam tria ad duo, id est ut tantas tres partes temporis habeat, quantas alius duas, atque ita per ceteros numeros licet currere, ut non sint spatia indefinita et interminata, sed habeant ad se duo motus aliquem numerum, aut eundem, ut quantum temporis unus tantum teneat alter, aut non eundem, uelut unum ad duo, duo ad tria, tria ad quattuor, aut unum ad tria, duo ad sex, et quidquid potest omnino aliquid ad sese dimensionis obtinere.’

²⁶³ *De musica* I, 9, 15–12, 26.

equality to the least species of inequality, against which the beauty of musical phenomena can be judged.

The connection between motion and number is essential to Augustine's quantitative theory of *musica*. This can be shown simply from the examination of syllables at the beginning of the second book. Augustine writes here:²⁶⁴

Don't you think that we should begin to compare syllables to one another and see by what numbers they are related, just as we have done with motions at great length? For everything that sounds is a motion, and every syllable certainly sounds.

Syllables are motions and may therefore be compared by means of number. In turn, syllables are combined into feet, and the feet arranged into rhythms, metres, and verses. These too are compared by means of number. The comparison of syllables, feet, and their larger structures throughout *De musica* rests on the numerical speculations of the first book. Moreover, the same speculations are differently expanded in the sixth book, where again the relation between equality and inequality is probed. Nonetheless, we may here draw a more basic conclusion. In Augustine's *De musica*, motion is the connection between *musica* and number. If this should be the source for the Bamberg definition, i² has chosen to emphasise the very thing that allows a quantitative treatment of *musica*.

We find the same thing in Boethius' *De institutione musica*. Although Boethius' text examines pitch and not duration, his argument works in a very similar way. Boethius argues that all sound depends on motion, and for this reason, that sounds may be compared by means of number. In turn, these numerical relations become the basis of consonance and the intervals that produce consonance, the discussion of which continues throughout the subsequent chapters and books.

²⁶⁴ *De musica* 2, 3, 3. 'Quae putas, nisi ut incipiamus sibimet syllabas comparare et uidere, quos numeros ad sese habeant, sicut de motibus iam inter nos tam longa superius rarione tractatum est? Motus est enim etiam omne, quod sonat, et syllabae utique sonant.'

Boethius introduces motion as something necessary for consonance. He writes:²⁶⁵

Consonance, which governs the arrangement of musical pitch, cannot be produced without sound, but there can be no sound without beating or percussion, and no beating or percussion unless it is preceded by motion. For if everything were immobile, one thing could not run into another or be struck by another. If all things stood still and were without motion, there could be no sound.

In turn, he demonstrates that each sound in fact comprises many motions. This is set out with greatest clarity in his examination of a vibrating string. He writes:²⁶⁶

We should not think that when a string is struck, only one sound is produced or that there is only one percussion in these sounds. The air will be moved each time it is struck by the vibrating string. Since the rapid motions of the sounds are joined together, no interruption is sensed by the ears, and a single sound, whether low or high, strikes the sense. Yet each sound comprises many motions. Low sounds comprise slower and less frequent motions, and high sounds faster and more frequent.

This observation underpins the quantitative treatment of pitch in *De institutione musica*.

Boethius argues that the difference between pitches lies in the number of motions comprised by each pitch. He writes that a low sound may be raised through the addition of motions, and

²⁶⁵Boethius, *De institutione musica*, edited by Gottfried Friedlein (Leipzig: 1867), book 1, 3. ‘Consonantia, quae omnem musicae modulationem regit, praeter sonum fieri non potest, sonus vero praeter quendam pulsum percussionemque non redditur, pulsus vero atque percussio nullo modo esse potest, nisi praecesserit motus. Si enim cuncta sint immobilia, non poterit alterum alteri concurre, ut alterum inpellatur ab altero, sed cunctis stantibus motuque carentibus nullum fieri necesse est sonum.’ See also the translation of this and the following passages by Calvin M. Bower in *Fundamentals of music* (New Haven: 1989), pp. 11–12.

²⁶⁶*De institutione musica*, 1, 3. ‘Neque enim quotiens chorda pellitur, unus edi tantum putandus est sonus aut unam in his esse percussionem, sed totiens aer feritur, quotiens eum chorda tremebunda percusserit. Sed quoniam iunctae sunt velocitates sonorum, nulla intercapedo sentitur auribus et unus sonus sensum pellit vel gravis vel acutus, quamvis uterque ex pluribus constet, gravis quidem ex tardioribus et rarioribus acutus vero ex celeribus ac spissas [...]’

a high lowered by the subtraction of motions. The difference between sounds, he concludes, is a difference of plurality.

In a final step, Boethius approaches his quantitative conclusion. He writes that plurality necessarily consists in quantity, and that they may therefore be compared to one another as number to number. Some quantities are equal and others unequal. Therefore, he writes, some sounds too are equal, and others are separated from one another by some kind of inequality. In the following chapters, Boethius examines which kinds of inequality produce consonance and classifies the intervals produced by the numerical relation of pitches.²⁶⁷ As we saw in Augustine, here too motion is the connection between *musica* and number. Motion underpins the quantitative theory of *musica*. Whichever text was the source for the Bamberg definition, the change from *siue in motu siue in statu* to *in motu* alone seems to reflect a close attention to the basic principles of the quantitative tradition.

We may, in fact, be rather more certain that i² read Boethius with an eye to the importance of motion. Two ninth-century scribes copied commentary material in Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, latin 13908, which contains in its second part a copy of Boethius' *De institutione musica*, beginning at f. 54r.²⁶⁸ This copy breaks off incomplete in its fourth book. One of the glossing scribes writes a rounded Caroline minuscule, and the other is i². It is not easy to say whether the scribes cooperated in this glossing activity or whether one of them wrote their glosses much before the other. Possibly i² is the later hand, since his glosses very occasionally seem to be placed around those written by the Caroline scribe. It is important to stress that these glosses were not necessarily composed by the scribes who wrote them.²⁶⁹ In ninth-century glossing traditions, even single word glosses were copied from manuscript to manuscript. Nonetheless, in general, scribes do seem to have chosen what they copied with

²⁶⁷*De institutione musica* 1, 4–7.

²⁶⁸Palaeographical descriptions of this manuscript are found in Bernhard Bischoff, *Katalog der festländischen Handschriften des neunten Jahrhunderts (mit Ausnahme der wisigotischen)*, 4 volumes (Wiesbaden: 1998–2017), volume 3, 4944; and Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Ana 553, Nachlass Bernhard Bischoff, Paris 16. The glossing hands are discussed in Bernhard and Bower, *Glossa maior* 4, 47–9.

²⁶⁹See above, 6–8.

some care and amended this material with some freedom. Even if they are not necessarily his own words, the glosses written by i² allow us to see more clearly how he worked through Boethius' text.

The passage summarised above is found on ff. 57v and 58r of the Paris manuscript. Boethius introduces plurality in the following sentence, beginning on f. 58r at line 22:²⁷⁰

Plurality makes the difference in these things, and plurality necessarily consists in some numerical quantity.

To this sentence i² adds a single gloss, to read:²⁷¹

The plurality <of motions> makes the difference in these things [...]

The gloss does not change Boethius' meaning. It is clear from the preceding sentences that Boethius is here referring to a difference in the number of motions, and that the word *pluralitas* refers to that difference. Nonetheless, it does reveal that i² had understood Boethius' point, and that he was keen to underline the central importance of motion. In other words, it suggests that i² was closely attentive to the quantitative ideas outlined in the preceding pages.

The restriction of *musica* to only the things that are in motion which we find in the Bamberg definition reflects an insistently quantitative idea about the discipline. The definition returns to the basic quantitative mechanics of *musica*; in both Augustine and Boethius, motion mediates between *musica* and number. In the following section, I shall suggest that the qualification of this motion in the Bamberg definition as *scibilis naturalibus proportionibus* or 'knowable by virtue of natural proportions' further underlines the concerns of this quantitative tradition, even as it draws upon quite a different sort of text.

²⁷⁰ *De institutione musica* I, 3. In quibus autem pluralitas differentiam facit, ea necesse est in quendam numerositate consistere.

²⁷¹ *De institutione musica* I, 3. 'In quibus autem pluralitas <motuum> differentiam facit [...]' See Bernhard and Bower, *Glossa maior* I, 3, 138.

‘... *scibili naturalibus proportionibus* ...’

We may ask a number of questions about the use of the word *scibilis* in the Bamberg definition. The most basic question may be, what does this word mean? We could answer simply that it means ‘knowable’, but this seems inadequate for the first book of the *Periphyseon*, which examines throughout what can be known and what escapes beyond that threshold. Indeed, the word has a much rich history, one that was familiar in the ninth century. We may therefore further ask whether this history draws *musica* into association with any other discipline or intellectual tradition. Indeed, the word was often used in the writings of the logical tradition and in particular in the Latin translations and treatments of Aristotle’s *Categories*. In these texts, the words *scibilis* and *scientia* provide important examples in the examination of the fourth Category, *ad-aliquid* or relation. Although the word *scibilis* is occasionally used elsewhere and related terms (*discibilis*, *noscibilis*) had an even greater reach, its use in this context seems particularly appropriate for the definition of something that may be called an art, a discipline, or indeed a science, and even more so because this definition comes within a long discussion of the Categories. If we accept this possibility, we may ask even more questions about the Bamberg definition. What does it mean to say that motion is knowable? And how might we understand the relation between *musica* and motion with reference to the discussions of motion set out above?

I shall argue that the word *scibilis*, which was drawn from the logical tradition, in fact reinforces much of what was said there. The kind of relation between a *scientia* and what is *scibilis* by virtue of that *scientia* described by the Category *ad-aliquid* underlines the inextricable centrality of motion to *musica*, where *musica* is the *scientia* and motion the thing that is *scibilis*. If we read the Bamberg definition against the quantitative musical tradition found in Augustine’s *De musica* and Boethius’ *De institutione musica* as well as the logical tradition found in the Latin reception of Aristotle’s *Categories*, we may begin to see a distinct version of the discipline *musica*. This version differs from what was found in the Reims

manuscript, but there are important points of similarity. Both definitions and versions of *musica* articulate a relation between intellectual traditions, although the details of this relation are differently negotiated. The changes made by i² therefore fit my general description of his writing activity well: they contribute to a reading of the *Periphyseon*.

As was the case with *in motu*, the use of the word *scibilis* in the Bamberg definition points more toward an area of intellectual activity than to a specific source. In the ninth century, the term seems to have been best known from texts that were important for the study of logic. The word was rarely used by Carolingian writers besides Eriugena, but where it is used, it often reflects this logical background.²⁷² The word is used by Eriugena in his translations of Pseudo-Dionysius' *Hierarchies* and Maximus the Confessor's *Ambigua ad Iohannem* and *Quaestiones ad Thalassium*.²⁷³ In these instances, it seems to reflect the negative theology that is also set out in the first book of the *Periphyseon*. For this reason, I shall not consider Eriugena's use of the term at any further length; as I shall illustrate below, this sort of speculation is quite remote from what i² is attempting in his definition of *musica*.

As mentioned above, the word *scibilis* is found in a number of Latin texts that examine Aristotle's doctrine of the Categories. It is found, for instance, in Boethius' translation of Aristotle's text and in his commentary on that text. John Marenbon has argued that the latter was known in the ninth century, even if it was not popular, whereas the former seems not to have been known at all.²⁷⁴ A composite translation of Aristotle's text – comprising the lemmata from Boethius' commentary joined together with passages by an unknown translator – was copied only infrequently in the ninth century and seems not to have been widely used. The original passages of this translation use the words *disciplina* and *disciplinatus*

²⁷²See, for example, Sedulius Scottus' *In Donati artem maiorem*, edited by Bengt Löfstedt (Turnhout: 1977), book 2, p. 95, beginning at line 55.

²⁷³Eriugena, *De caelesti hierarchia*, in *Patrologia Latina* 122 (Paris: 1853), 1052A; *De ecclesiastica hierarchia*, in the same volume, 1096A; *Ambigua ad Iohannem*, edited by Édouard Jeuneau (Turnhout: 1988), for example book 6, 19; *Quaestiones ad Thalassium*, edited by Carl Laga and Carlos Steel (Turnhout: 1980–90), for example 5, 31, which is also quoted in the fourth book of the *Periphyseon* at 857D. For the two instances in Dionysius, see also *Dionysiaca*, edited by Phillipe Chevallier, 2 volumes (Paris: 1937), pp. 852 and 1327.

²⁷⁴John Marenbon, *From the circle of Alcuin to the school of Auxerre* (Cambridge: 1989), pp. 15–19.

in preference to *scientia* and *scibilis*, but the passages drawn from Boethius' lemmata continue to use his terms. The word *scibilis* is also found in the anonymous *Categoriae decem*, which was read with enormous enthusiasm in the early middle ages and was generally attributed to Augustine. This text presents a rather free treatment of Aristotle's ideas. Indeed, Marenbon has argued that the differences from Aristotle's text may themselves account for its popularity in the early middle ages, since these differences made the text 'far more sympathetic to the concerns and aims of most thinkers of the ninth and tenth centuries'.²⁷⁵ Marenbon's study traces the use of the text in these centuries in some detail. Finally, the term is used in the discussion of the Categories in the fourth book of Martianus Capella's *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii*, which was likewise very popular among Carolingian scholars.²⁷⁶ Further afield, we may find the term in a number of Boethius' translations of other logical texts by Aristotle, though these seem not to have been well known in the early middle ages.²⁷⁷

The texts on the Categories that were known in the ninth century use the word *scibilis* with a considerable degree of similarity. We find the word used alongside *scientia*, where it illustrates the kind of relation described by the fourth Category, *ad-aliquid* or relation. The relation between a science and something that is knowable by virtue of that science is not used as an example for every point of the discussion, but our understanding of this relation may be developed, even when the example is not used. Because the texts discuss the Category as a whole, anything that is said about the Category may be said also about each relation described by that Category. The texts are not entirely consistent in their use of these words, and the *Categoriae decem* at times departs quite considerably from the others. Nonetheless it remains the best introduction to the use of the term 'scibilis' in the logical tradition, if only because it was so frequently copied and so widely used in the ninth century.

²⁷⁵ John Marenbon, *From the circle of Alcuin*, pp. 17.

²⁷⁶ John Marenbon, *From the circle of Alcuin*, pp. 19–20. On the popularity of *De nuptiis* more generally, see Mariken Teeuwen and Sinéad O'Sullivan, editors, *Carolingian scholarship and Martianus Capella: ninth-century commentary traditions on De nuptiis in context* (Turnhout: 2011).

²⁷⁷ John Marenbon, 'Medieval Latin commentaries and glosses on Aristotelian logical texts before c. 1150AD', in *Glosses and commentaries on Aristotelian logical texts: the Syriac, Arabic and medieval Latin traditions*, edited by Charles Burnett (London: 1993), pp. 77–127, at pp. 78–80.

The discussion of *ad-aliquid* in the *Categoriae decem* raises four points that may help us to understand the use of the term *scibilis* in the Bamberg definition of *musica*. First, things that are related necessarily begin and end together; neither one can exist without the other. Moreover, the relation is between specific single things. Further, the relation must be reversible. And finally, in a discussion of the grammatical cases that can be used to express relation, the text suggests that something that is knowable is knowable by means of *scientia*. The *Categoriae decem* makes a number of further points about *ad-aliquid*, but these are the ones most immediately relevant to our discussion of the Bamberg definition.

The definition of the Category as a relation between things that begin and end together falls into four parts. An initial definition is given. The text reads:²⁷⁸

We call the Category *ad-aliquid* which is said to be what it is from something else. It cannot exist unless it is joined to this other, and all of its power derives from its union with this other thing. For example, the double is called the double of a single, the greater is greater than the lesser, and something is like the thing that it is like. It is therefore clear that *ad-aliquid* consists not in its own power but in its union with something else.

Other things are also included in this Category. Two of the examples given are *disciplina* and *scientia*. These come with their own difficulties, since they seem also to be qualities, and therefore to belong to the third Category and not the fourth. The text addresses this difficulty as follows:²⁷⁹

We ought to observe the difference by which the two Categories, quality and

²⁷⁸ *Categoriae decem*, edited by L. Minio-Paluello (Bruges and Paris: 1961), section 95. “Ad-aliquid” ergo categoriam vocamus eam quae id quod est dicitur ex altero sine cuius societate esse non possit et cuius vis omnis ex alterius coniunctione descendit; ut duplum simpli dicitur duplum, maius minoris dicitur maius, simile simili dicitur simile. Claret igitur ad-aliquid non sua vi sed alterius coniunctione consistere.’

²⁷⁹ *Categoriae decem* 97. ‘Sed differentiam debemus advertere qua hae duae categoriae, id est qualitas et ad-aliquid, [...] a se invicem separantur. Quoties enim scientia cuiuslibet rei quae sit scibilis scientia dicitur, et sensus rei eius quae sit sensibilis sensus dicitur, tunc ad-aliquid debemus accipere. At cum scientia vel disciplina non rei cuiuslibet, sed hominis dicitur, qualitatem debemus agnoscere.’

ad-aliquid, are separated. Whenever a science is called the science of something which is knowable by means of that science, or a sense the sense of something that is sensible by means of that sense, then we should understand *ad-aliquid*. But when they are called not the science or discipline of something but the science or discipline of a man, then we should understand quality.

In turn, the text redefines *ad-aliquid* to avoid the kinds of difficulties outlined above. Both parts of the relation must now be coterminous. The text reads:²⁸⁰

It is truly and properly called *ad-aliquid* when the thing that is joined and the thing to which it is joined share their beginning and end.

One of the examples here given in illustration is the single and the double. The point is clear enough, but the example is actually rather confusing, since the single is prior to the double, and can be related to other things, such as the triple or quadruple. The more correct example of the half and the double is found in the translation of Boethius and the composite translation.²⁸¹ The final part of this first consideration defends the new definition against an objection raised by certain unnamed others.

In a subsequent passage, the text notes that there are some people who wish to trouble the definition with unnecessary questions. The opinions attributed to these others are, in fact, found in the other Latin treatments of the Categories, which follow Aristotle's text rather more faithfully.²⁸² The *Categoriae decem* asserts that these people believe that one thing that is said to be *ad-aliquid* can exist before the other to which it is related, and that the two things in this relation therefore do not begin and end together. The relation between a *scientia* and something that is *scibilis* is used to illustrate their argument as well as the refutation of this argument by the author of the *Categoriae decem*. It therefore receives a full treatment. The

²⁸⁰ *Categoriae decem* 98. 'Tunc ergo vere et proprie 'ad-aliquid' dicitur cum sub uno orto atque occasu et id quod iungitur et id cui iungitur invenitur [...]'

²⁸¹ *Categoriarum uel praedicamentorum translatio Boethii*, edited by Minio-Paluello (Bruges and Paris: 1961), p. 19, beginning at line 3; *Editio composita* in the same volume, p. 59, beginning at line 17.

²⁸² *Categoriarum uel praedicamentorum translatio Boethii*, p. 21; *Editio composita*, p. 61, beginning at line 3.

argument attributed to the others is given first:²⁸³

There are certain people who wish to trouble this definition with unnecessary questions, asserting that they can discover something said to be *ad-aliquid* which exists before the thing from which it should have been named, such that the two things seem not to be joined by a single beginning and end. They give the example of something that is knowable and a science, asserting that the knowable thing exists first and is only later joined by the science [...] Science is discovered in the knowable thing, and so the knowable thing exists first. By this argument, they demonstrate that there are many things in this Category which do not have a shared beginning and end.

In order to correct their error and safeguard its own definition of *ad-aliquid*, the *Categoriae decem* presents the following idiosyncratic argument:²⁸⁴

This sort of thing is said by those who have not investigated closely enough the nature of things. For all of the things that exist are said to exist either by some natural potential or by the operation of some action, which the Greeks call *dunamis* and *energeia*. Whoever wants to separate these things without disturbing their union should understand that one thing said to be *ad-aliquid* cannot exist

²⁸³ *Categoriae decem* 100. 'Sunt quidam qui huic definitioni velint movere superfluum quaestionem asserentes inveniri posse 'ad-aliquid' dictum quod ante sit, et postea nascatur quod de ipso debeat nuncupari, ut iam videantur haec duo nec orto nec occasu sibi esse coniuncta. Ac dant exempla scibilis et scientiae, asserentes ante scibili fuisse et post eius scientiam consecutam [...] proptereaue ante fuisse scibili in quo possit scientia reperiri. Hoc argumento igitur monstrant multa esse huius categoriae quibus non ortus et occasus videatur esse communis.'

²⁸⁴ *Categoriae decem* 102. 'Haec solent parum diligenter naturam rerum intuentes astruere. Omnia enim quae sunt, aut naturali potentia dicuntur esse aut operatione faciendi, quas Graeci *δύναμιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν* vocant. Quas si quis separare voluerit nec ulla societate confundere, intellet 'ad-aliquid' dictum non posse esse sine altero cuius esse dicitur; scibili enim in ipso ortu naturae scientia sociata est; simul namque ut scibile esse coepit, habuit scientiam sui, sed necdum *ἐνέργειαν* (id est operatione) monstratam. Non ergo tunc coepit esse scientia eius quando coepit operari, sed cum ipso scibili orta est, et operatio est postea consecuta. Discernere enim nos oportet operationis exordium; tunc enim possumus advertere scientiam cum scibili esse procreatam, operationem vero eius apparuisse postea indagatione prudentium. Quibus depulsis, optima definitio est ad aliquid relatorum semper ea simul vel extingui vel nasci.'

without the other thing of which this is said. The science is joined to the knowable thing in the very beginning of its nature; for as soon as the knowable thing begins, it has its science, though it is not yet apparent in *energeia* (i.e. operation). Therefore, the science does not begin with its operation but with the knowable thing itself, and its operation follows later. We should distinguish the beginning of the operation [from the beginning of the thing itself]; for then we may understand that science is created with the knowable thing, but its operation is only later apparent in the investigation of the wise. With these arguments turned away, the best definition of the things related *ad aliquid* is that they always begin and end together.

The three remaining points about this Category through which we may come better to understand the use of *scibilis* in the Bamberg definition are made much more briefly. The *Categoriae decem* remarks that this kind of relation joins single thing to single thing.²⁸⁵ For instance, a double is not generally double but the double of this specific single thing. A little later, the text examines the grammatical cases in which this relation can be expressed and gives examples in the genitive, dative, and ablative.²⁸⁶ Finally, the text remarks that the relation should be reversible, so that we can understand both parts from the mention of only one.²⁸⁷ The *Categoriae decem* raises several further points in its examination of *ad-aliquid*. For instance, the text notes that that some relations can be said to be present to a greater or lesser extent (more or less similar), whereas others cannot. Nonetheless, the four points set out above are the most important for our examination of the Bamberg definition.

At the beginning of this section I raised four questions about the use of the word *scibilis* in Bamberg definition of *musica*: What does the word mean? Does its use in the definition suggest a particular intellectual tradition or nexus of intellectual traditions, within which

²⁸⁵ *Categoriae decem* 99.

²⁸⁶ *Categoriae decem* 103.

²⁸⁷ *Categoriae decem* 104–5.

musica is situated? What does it mean to say that motion or ‘*motus*’ is knowable in the specific context of *musica*? And how might we understand the statement that it is knowable with reference to the other discussions of motion found in Augustine’s *De musica* and Boethius’ *De institutione musica*, which were set out in the preceding part of the chapter? We may now begin to answer some of these questions.

In the first instance, we may say that *scibilis* means knowable. Nonetheless, the use of the word together with *scientia* as one part of an example frequently used in the logical tradition to illustrate the fourth Category, *ad-aliquid*, complicates any straightforward definition. The use of the word in this context introduces a number of further qualifications, which are not directly related to the way in which the *scibilis res* can be known. We must therefore separate the two problems. If we accept the points made about *ad-aliquid*, we may draw a number of conclusions regarding *musica* and motion. In the first instance, the relation must be specific. Motion is made knowable by *musica*, or rather, the kind of motion that is knowable by virtue of its natural proportions is the *scibilis res* of which *musica* is the *scientia*. As such, *musica* and this motion must begin and end together; there can be no *musica* without motion, and no motion without *musica*. Finally, their relation should be reversible. From the one we can understand the other, or rather, from the fact that the one is knowable we can understand another by which it can be known. These observations do not qualify the meaning of *scibilis* itself, but they do suggest some of the work that the word may be doing in the Bamberg definition.

It is not, at first, clear how seriously we should take these further ideas that seem to accumulate around the use of the term *scibilis*. The term was almost certainly known from the logical tradition, where it is used in conjunction with *scientia*, but this does not mean that all of what was said there can immediately be taken over into the context of the Bamberg definition. One of the ways in which we may examine whether or not this is at least plausible is to compare the points made here with those raised by Augustine and Boethius in their own

treatments of *musica*. The logical resonances of the term are in fact close to what we find there. Both authors argue that there is no *musica* without motion, and Augustine argues also that there is no motion without *musica*. Moreover, both authors argue that the study of *musica* is the study of motions, either in their duration, as in Augustine, or in their plurality, as in Boethius. Finally, the two authors limit their examination of motion to certain kinds of motion that produce by their proportional relation either consonance, as in Boethius, or more broadly, beauty, as in Augustine. It is, therefore, apparent that the same ideas about knowability that we find in the discussion of *scibilis* and *scientia* in the logical tradition are also found in the examination of *musica* and motion by Augustine and Boethius.

The use of the phrase *in motu scibilis naturalibus proportionibus* in the Bamberg definition moves the definition's 'centre of gravity' towards the underlying quantitative mechanics of *musica*. At the same time, it renegotiates the relation between *musica* and the logical tradition. In the Reims definition, this had been tied up with the use of the phrase *sive in motu sive in statu* and the appearance of motion and rest in several other contexts. Although this connection is lost in the Bamberg definition by the erasure of one part of this phrase in the Bamberg manuscript, it is returned by the use of the word *scibilis*. I do not want to suggest that the word *scibilis* was used in order to renegotiate the same relation. Instead, I think it indicates the closeness with which *musica* and the logical texts were read together, such that the best term with which to express this particular definition of *musica* could be found in the Latin treatments of the Categories. In turn, this allows us to reflect again on the writing activity undertaken by *i*² in the Bamberg manuscript.

Conclusions

Earlier in the chapter, I argued that the interventions made by *i*² in the Bamberg manuscript constitute a reading of the *Periphyseon*. The text is articulated by means of the many titles and glosses written by *i*² and altered more directly by his sometimes substantial changes. Moreover, I argued that the erasure and overwriting of his own material reveals that *i*²

continued to develop this reading, even as he entered it in the manuscript. The changes in the definition of *musica* seem to exemplify many of the features of this reading. The differences between the Reims and Bamberg definitions at first appear to be slight; the interventions made by i^2 fall within the span of only a few words. Nonetheless, these small changes reveal a distinct version of the discipline *musica*, which places far greater emphasis on its quantitative basis. They repoint the definition, even if they do not change its fundamental structure. Moreover, the two definitions both work their way between the intellectual traditions of musical and logical speculation, even if they do so differently. The changes in the Bamberg definition therefore renegotiate the place of *musica* within a broader intellectual context, even if they do not change that context itself.

It would require a far more detailed study of the interventions in the Bamberg manuscript than has been possible here to establish whether or not these features are characteristic of all of i^2 's activity in that manuscript. We would need to draw on more of his interventions and ensure that these interventions represented the different kinds of relation between his activity and the material on which he was working (his titles, glosses, additions, *etc.*). Nonetheless, the sorts of conclusion that I have drawn above regarding only a single change suggest that this may be a fruitful and interesting area for further work. I have argued that the Bamberg manuscript contains i^2 's reading of the *Periphyseon*. The small part of that reading which we have examined in the context of the definition of *musica* encourages us to look further and discern its broader contours.

Chapter 3: Eriugena's metaphysics of number

In this chapter, I shall examine the relation between Augustine's *De musica* and the sophisticated account of number which we find in the third book of the *Periphyseon*. Eriugena does not cite Augustine as his source, but a few points of similarity encourage us to take a closer look. Eriugena uses an idiosyncratic vocabulary to describe certain kinds of number in the soul, which are found elsewhere only in Augustine. Moreover, the identification of a kind of number in each faculty of the soul is itself peculiarly Augustinian among the sources available to Eriugena. Beginning from this observation, I shall attempt to trace the extent of the relation between the metaphysics of number that we find in Augustine's *De musica* and Eriugena's *Periphyseon* and to assess the significance of this relation.

Number and *naturalia exempla*

Images or examples drawn from nature, which Eriugena calls *naturalia exempla*, are found throughout the *Periphyseon*. They are essential to the presentation of Eriugena's arguments, but they seem also to have informed the development and constitution of his ideas and thoughts themselves. They are not, in other words, simply discursive. Perhaps the best known and most often used natural image is that of light. Concerning the centrality of light to Eriugena's ideas, James McEvoy has written:¹

The theme of light in the writings of Eriugena is a vast one, representing as it

¹James McEvoy, 'Metaphors of light and metaphysics of light in Eriugena', in *Begriff und Metapher: Sprachform des Denkens bei Eriugena*, edited by Werner Beierwaltes (Heidelberg: 1990), pp. 149–67, at p. 149.

does a vitally important strand of his dialectic. To think it away, if the effort could be made, would be to destroy not a part only, but in a way the whole of his thought; very much would have to be re-cast, re-thought or left unspoken, if the concepts clustering around light and developed in the context of light were to be omitted, or the symbol of light suppressed.

Although this chapter is not in the first instance addressed toward Eriugena's use of natural images, these images provide a valuable context for what I want to examine in Augustine, Eriugena, and their metaphysics of number. Eriugena's most detailed consideration of number in the *Periphyseon* is introduced as a natural image, and it seems to share a purpose with other natural images. For this reason I shall begin with a brief survey of McEvoy's observations about Eriugena's use of light and Édouard Jeuneau's observations about his use of fire.

McEvoy situates Eriugena's use of natural images in a longer history of light as a concept, image, metaphor, or symbol that encompasses both the Bible and the writings of the Neoplatonically inspired philosophers and theologians known to and used by Eriugena.² In these texts, light is referred to frequently and with varying significance. McEvoy chooses to examine only two of the many possible themes in Eriugena's use of light: the sun as the chief source of light in the universe and sight or vision. His account of these images is worked out over several levels. In the first instance, he reviews the physical and physiological descriptions of the sun and of vision in order to set out the basic concepts themselves as well as the sources used by Eriugena. Next, he examines the metaphors that are built upon this basic conceptual framework and also their sources. The distinction between these first two layers is in fact only superficial, since the metaphor is often inextricable from the physical description of the concept and *vice versa*, and the two frequently travel together between texts. Finally, and most significantly, McEvoy examines the specific contribution of these concepts and metaphors to what he calls Eriugena's 'dialectical discourse'. We might summarise his argument as follows.³

² McEvoy, 'Metaphors of light', pp. 151–3.

³ McEvoy, 'Metaphors of light', pp. 154–67.

The light that is captured in Eriugena's descriptions of the sun and vision and the metaphors that are developed from these descriptions are caused by and depend upon a greater light that is included among the divine names. Eriugena's treatment of light is ultimately directed toward the realisation of this metaphysical relation, and by this relation the descriptions and metaphors are themselves more thoroughly grounded. Nonetheless, McEvoy labels this relation 'dialectical', since he sees in it also the negation of the initial concept. The greater light cannot be identified with the light of the descriptions and metaphors, and in its inaccessibility to human thought may more properly be called darkness. McEvoy has expressed this conclusion with clarity:⁴

His [*i.e.* God's] unconceptualisable reality appears to human thought as darkness; but it is in reality and truth the unlimited and undetermined plenitude of light. In the immeasurability of that darkness there shines forth the infinitely exceeding unlimitedness of light itself. Thus light is blindness and darkness for conceptual thinking, but the darkness is light in itself and for itself.

In this play of apophatic and kataphatic theologies, McEvoy traces a connection between the physical descriptions and metaphors of light and the furthest reaches of Eriugena's metaphysics.

Jeaneau follows a similar trajectory in his account of Eriugena's metaphysics of fire.⁵ In the first instance, he suggests that Eriugena was interested in fire only to the extent that it offered him metaphors with which to illustrate his philosophical ideas. Nonetheless, like McEvoy, he notes that these metaphors are rooted in physical description. He writes:⁶

It is important that we try to understand the philosophical stance that Eriugena

⁴McEvoy, 'Metaphors of light', p. 167.

⁵Édouard Jeaneau, 'Jean Scot et la métaphysique du feu', in *Études érigéniennes* (Paris: 1987), pp. 297–319.

⁶Jeaneau, 'Jean Scot et la métaphysique du feu', p. 300. 'L'important est de chercher à comprendre le parti philosophique que l'Érigène a su tirer de son observation du feu: observation naïve certes, mais entourée d'un halo de concepts que nous pouvons qualifier de préscientifiques, à condition de ne pas oublier que, pour les hommes du IX^e siècle, ils représentaient la science même.'

drew from his observation of fire, an observation that was certainly naïve but one encircled nonetheless by a halo of concepts that we can qualify as ‘prescientific’, so long as we do not forget that for the men of the ninth century they represented science itself.

As we saw in McEvoy’s account of light as a natural image, here too the physical description of a concept produces metaphors, which may in turn lead to metaphysical conclusions. Jeaneau likewise sets the descriptions and metaphors within a longer history that encompasses both Christian and non-Christian philosophy, though he refers at greatest length to the Bible and its commentators. These natural images differ in the extent to which they are assimilated to the divine nature itself. Light is an appellation confirmed by scriptural authority, and McEvoy’s account of the natural image relates Eriugena’s descriptions and metaphors of light to this divine name. Jeaneau does not quite go so far, but he does show how Eriugena’s examination of fire contributes to an understanding of the divine nature. Like God, he writes, fire is present in all things but in a hidden manner, and like God it is unknowable in itself but known in its effects, in this instance heat and light, and so on.⁷ In both cases – light and fire – the purpose of the natural image is to pass from the literal and the metaphorical to the metaphysical.

I have begun with what is in effect a long digression for a straightforward reason: the most extended discussion of number in the *Periphyseon* is introduced as an image or example drawn from nature. Eriugena’s use of number as a natural image has previously been examined by Dominic O’Meara.⁸ Although my first concern in this chapter is to demonstrate the relation between Eriugena’s account of number and his reading of Augustine’s *De musica*, it will therefore be valuable first to consider O’Meara’s remarks in some detail.

O’Meara begins by setting out the philosophical background that explains and justifies

⁷Jeaneau, ‘Jean Scot et la métaphysique du feu’, pp. 305–6.

⁸Dominic O’Meara, ‘The metaphysical use of mathematical concepts in Eriugena’, in *Begriff und Metapher: Sprachform des Denkens bei Eriugena*, edited by Werner Beierwaltes (Heidelberg: 1990), pp. 142–8. See also Édouard Jeaneau, ‘Jean-Scot et la métaphysique des nombres’, in the same volume, pp. 126–41.

Eriugena's use of number as a natural image.⁹ He identifies a Platonic tendency in Eriugena's treatment of number as something essentially independent of physical reality and as the model of that reality. He writes that these numbers, which he calls 'intellectual', exist in the human mind, but they are not invented by the mind. Instead they are discovered as an eternal truth produced from a divine origin. Although the mathematician can also derive the numbers that he studies from the visible world, he nevertheless works at a higher level when he contemplates the intellectual numbers. These then are the broad outlines of Eriugena's thoughts on number, which make possible his use of number as a natural image.

Two mathematical images are used in the *Periphyseon*: one describes the relation between number and the monad, and the other the relation between the radii of a circle and its centre. Both images are drawn from a passage in Pseudo-Dionysius' *Divine names*,¹⁰ which is itself quoted in full at the end of the second book of the *Periphyseon*. It reads:¹¹

For every number pre-exists in the monad, and the monad contains every number in itself singly, and all numbers are one in the monad; but the further they proceed from the monad, the more they are distinguished and multiplied. And all the radii of a circle coexist at its centre in accordance with the first unity, and the point contains each radius uniformly as one among themselves and with their beginning, from which they proceed, and in which centre they are universally made one. And when they are a little distant from it, they are little distinguished, and when they are further away, they are further distinguished. And to put it simply, the closer they are to the centre, the more they are made

⁹O'Meara, 'The metaphysical use of mathematical concepts', pp. 144–5.

¹⁰Eriugena, *De diuinis nominibus*, translated from the Greek text of Pseudo-Dionysius, in *Patrologia Latina* 122 (Paris: 1853), 1111–1172, book 5, 6–7, 1149A–B.

¹¹*Periphyseon* 2, 618A–B. 'Etenim in monade omnis numerus ante subsistit, et habet omnem numerum monas in semet ipsa singulariter, et omnis numerus unitur quidem in monade; quantum autem monade prouenit, tantum discernitur et multiplicatur. Et in centro omnes circuli lineae secundum primam unitatem consubstitutae sunt, et omnes habet signum in semet ipso simplas lineas uniformiter unitas ad se inuicem et ad unum principium, ex quo procedunt, et in ipso quidem centro uniuersaliter adunantur. Breuiter autem eo distantes, breuiter discernuntur, magis autem recedentes, magis. Et simpliciter, quantum centro proximiores sunt, tantum ei ipsi et sibi inuicem adunantur; et quantum eo, tantum et a se inuicem distant.'

one with it and with themselves, and the further they are from it, the further they are also from one another.

This is not a straightforward passage. It explains the relation between a cause and its effects. The effects – in these examples the numbers and the radii – pre-exist in their cause in such a way that they are indistinguishable from one another and from their cause. Distinctions are introduced only as the effects proceed from their cause. Nonetheless, Pseudo-Dionysius, like Eriugena after him, takes care not to efface the difference between a cause and its effects completely; all numbers are one in the monad and one with one another, but their subsequent differentiation seems to be anticipated in the monad as their ‘pre-existence’. In the *Divine names*, this passage illustrates the fact that God contains all being and the causes of all being, but in the *Periphyseon*, it is used to illustrate a wider variety of metaphysical truths.

O’Meara draws a number of general conclusions about Eriugena’s use of these mathematical images.¹² He writes that, like the other natural images, Eriugena introduces his consideration of the monad and the circle in order to make metaphysical relations that we would otherwise grasp only with great difficulty more comprehensible. Since they represent purely intelligible realities and are based on infallible rules, they are superior to images drawn from corporeal realities, which can be known only through corporeal conjecture. Indeed, O’Meara writes that these mathematical images offer privileged access to metaphysical truths. Nonetheless, he concludes that Eriugena always remembers that these are only images, and does not allow them to escape the requirements of apophatic and kataphatic theology. Although the mathematical images approach God perhaps more nearly than any other, ultimately they too fall short.

I shall not dispute O’Meara’s conclusions regarding number and its use as a natural image. Nonetheless, we might better understand Eriugena’s writing about number if we are more sensitive to its bibliographical and intellectual dependencies. In O’Meara’s paper, Eriugena’s

¹²O’Meara, ‘The metaphysical use of mathematical concepts’, p. 147.

writing about number is examined with reference to Proclus.¹³ The paper begins with Proclus, and many of its nicer observations about his writing emerge from a nuanced differentiation between his ideas and those of Proclus. The comparison is philosophically interesting, but it does not reflect the historical circumstances in which Eriugena was writing. Eriugena had no direct access to Proclus or other early Greek Neoplatonists.¹⁴ What he knew of their ideas was mediated by the writing of Augustine and Boethius in Latin and Maximus the Confessor and Pseudo-Dionysius in Greek. Werner Beierwaltes has shown that Pseudo-Dionysius in particular is very close to Proclus,¹⁵ and we should not forget that the two mathematical images are drawn from his *Divine names*, but this alone could not produce a historical connection between Eriugena and Proclus; the passage from *Divine names* simply does not include enough or the right kind of information.

O'Meara is, in fact, rather more circumspect than I have suggested. He notes in passing points at which Eriugena's examination of number seems to draw certain of its terms from Augustine's *De musica* or Boethius' *De institutione arithmetica*. In this chapter, I shall examine more closely the relation between Augustine's text and the *Periphyseon*. I shall argue that the sixth book of Augustine's *De musica* was the most important source for Eriugena's writing about number.. Here again Eriugena's writing shows that he was a careful and imaginative reader of Augustine's text. By tracing the changes and inflections that Eriugena introduces into the material that he drew from *De musica*, we might better understand his own ideas about number. In turn, this leads to conclusions regarding the disciplinarity of *musica* in the ninth century. Ideas about number derived from the study of *musica* participated in a much broader nexus of numerical speculation that spanned the intellectual life of the early middle ages.

¹³O'Meara, 'The metaphysical use of mathematical concepts', pp. 142–3. This is perhaps not surprising, since O'Meara has written extensively on the numerical metaphysics of Proclus. See, for example, *Pythagoras revived: mathematics and philosophy in late antiquity* (Oxford: 1989).

¹⁴On this point, see, for example, Werner Beierwaltes, 'Eriugena's Platonism', translated by Robert Douglas Headley, *Hermathena* 149 special issue: the heritage of Platonism (1990), pp. 53–72.

¹⁵Werner Beierwaltes, 'Dionysios Areopagites – ein christlicher Proklos?', in *Platonismus im Christentum*, 3rd edition (Frankfurt am Main: 2014), pp. 44–84.

My argument in this chapter is as follows: Augustine's account of the procession of number from eternal and unchangeable truth first into times and then into places produces a related but opposite narrative of return. In the sixth book of *De musica*, Augustine examines how the soul might turn away from the body and return from temporal to eternal things. As a consequence of this second narrative, Augustine argues that memory receives the numbers in times – measures of duration – from the faculties of the soul that are turned toward the body, but also eternal and unchangeable numbers from what he calls its spiritual motions. These numbers are independent of the soul, but they are prototypical of the activities of the soul and indeed provide the model for the whole universe. It is worth stressing this final point. Augustine does not distinguish between the eternal numbers in memory and the eternal truth of God itself. Indeed, their equivalence is fundamental to his aesthetic and metaphysical project.¹⁶ Eriugena adopts some parts of Augustine's account but introduces a number of quite substantial changes. Memory still receives numbers from, as it were, the inward- and outward-looking activities of the soul. Nonetheless, it receives the eternal numbers only *via* the mediating activities of intellect and reason. A further change concerns the status of these numbers in memory. When the numbers are produced in memory by reason, they are produced in certain images. These images no longer include only the place and time examined by Augustine, but also quantity, quality, and other terms drawn from the ten Categories. Augustine's account is assimilated within a philosophical framework that looks to the logical tradition. Perhaps the most important change concerns the double motion of number into memory itself. Eriugena takes care to clarify or even to emphasise this motion. The parts of Augustine that do not fit this double motion have been removed entirely or reformulated to better accommodate this strand of his thought. The double motion of number into memory has been entirely overlooked by both O'Meara and Édouard Jeuneau in their examinations of Eriugena's numerical metaphysics,¹⁷ but it was obviously extremely

¹⁶The best introduction to the role of number in Augustine's aesthetics is Werner Beierwaltes, 'Aequalitas numerosa. Zu Augustins Begriff des Schönen', *Wissenschaft und Weisheit* 38 (1975), pp. 140–57.

¹⁷See note 8.

important to Eriugena himself. In this chapter, I shall be able only to propose suggestions as to why this double motion was so important to Eriugena, but the fact that the question can be asked at all requires the recognition of *De musica* as his source. With all this said, I turn first to Augustine's *De musica* and then to the third book of the *Periphyseon*.

Number and memory in Augustine's *De musica*

Augustine's *De musica* contains two complementary metaphysical narratives. The first, examined in the first chapter, describes the procession of eternal and unchangeable truth first into time and then into place. In this text, time can be apprehended through measures of duration, and place through measures of bodily extension, and these measures can in turn be quantified in number.¹⁸ The second narrative set out by Augustine is a narrative of return, which retraces the stages of procession first from corporeal things to incorporeal and then from the numbers in the soul that are in times to the numbers that are beyond times. This narrative spans all six books of *De musica* – it is arguably the fundamental argument of the text – but it informs most completely the final book. This book may itself be divided into two parts. The first part, which runs through the first nine chapters, sets out an account of sensation which passes from the corporeal numbers in sensible bodies to certain temporal numbers in the soul. In turn it passes beyond these numbers to the eternal numbers by virtue of which we can pass judgement on our sense impressions. The second part examines in a long and detailed consideration of equality the relation of these eternal numbers to the numbers in times and places and the metaphysical significance of that relation. Three points from the first part are important for my argument in this chapter. In the first instance, Augustine establishes a hierarchy of five kinds of number within and below the soul. Cutting across this hierarchy, he acknowledges certain dependencies between the different kinds of

¹⁸I shall not examine the much more difficult question of Augustine's concept of time itself, concerning which there is an extensive literature. A useful corrective to any overly idealistic view can be found in James McEvoy, 'St. Augustine's account of time and Wittgenstein's criticisms', *The Review of Metaphysics* 37:3 (1984), pp. 547–77.

number. Finally, and at least in part on the basis of these dependencies, he concludes that each of these kinds of number fall within times, and that there must therefore be further numbers in the soul that are beyond times.

Five kinds of number in Augustine's De musica

The first stage of Augustine's narrative of return, from the numbers in bodies to the numbers in the soul, is accomplished in a single sentence. Augustine writes:¹⁹

In order that we might pass from corporeal things to incorporeal, tell me, [...] when we recite the verse *Deus creator omnium*, do you believe that the four iambs and twelve times of which it consists are only in the sound that is heard, or must we admit that these numbers are likewise in the sense of the person who hears it, which belongs to the ears, the activity of the person who recites it, and since we know the verse, also in our memory?

The numbers in sound are corporeal and are known to the soul only through the organs of sense, which are of the body. The various numbers in the soul are, of course, themselves incorporeal. In the following chapters, Augustine separates and characterises these four kinds of number, introduces a fifth, and arranges them all into a hierarchy. The terms and ideas here introduced by Augustine are taken up by Eriugena, but in Eriugena's writing they are changed in certain ways. These changes cannot be explained from only a superficial description of Augustine's text, so I shall now examine this material in some detail, beginning with the fifth kind of number.

Augustine argues that there are in fact two kinds of number in sense: the one lasts only so long as the ear is touched by sound, whereas the other remains as a natural and, as it were, judicial power by virtue of which we are pleased or displeased by the sounds that we hear.

¹⁹*De musica* 6, 2, 2. ' [...] ut a corporeis ad incorporea transeamus, responde, si uidetur, cum istum uersum pronuntiamus *Deus creator omnium*, istos quattuor iambos, quibus constat, et tempora duodecim, ubinam esse arbitreris, id est in sono tantum, qui auditur, an etiam in sensu audientis, qui ad aures pertinet, an in actu etiam pronuntiantis, an – quia notus uersus est – in memoria quoque nostra hos numeros esse fatendum est?'

His argument may be summarised as follows.²⁰ Augustine first asks whether the sense of hearing has numbers of its own, even when nothing sounds. He distinguishes these numbers from the power of perception itself, which he believes is always found in the ears, and so the presence or absence of these numbers cannot be determined simply by acknowledging that the ears have such a power. Augustine writes that sense must have some numbers of its own, since we would not otherwise be pleased by harmonious sounds or offended by dissonance. Moreover, he writes that this power of approval and disapproval is not made in the ears when they hear a sound, since the ears are open in the same way to good sounds and bad. In a remark that significantly prefigures the subsequent trajectory of *De musica*, Augustine states clearly that this judgement is made not by reason but by nature.

In a second step, Augustine separates these numbers from others also in sense, with which, he cautions, they should not be confused.²¹ His argument relies on a distinction between duration itself as a quantifiable space of time and the numbers by which different durations can be related to one another. He writes that if the same verse is recited now longer and now shorter, it will necessarily take up a greater or lesser space of time, but it will preserve the same relation among its feet. We are pleased or displeased by this relation according to the numbers examined above, but we must also account for the difference in duration. Augustine writes that the disposition of the ears when they are touched by sound is not the same as their disposition when they are not touched. Moreover, just as hearing differs from not hearing, hearing one sound differs from hearing another. Indeed, he argues that the disposition is neither longer nor shorter than the measure of the sound that made it, and is therefore one thing in an iamb, another in a tribrach, longer in a longer sound, shorter in a shorter one, and nothing in silence. Augustine suggests that the numbers made in sense in this way are like the trace of a body in water, which is not formed until the body is impressed, and does not remain once it is removed. They are, therefore, quite different from the numbers examined

²⁰*De musica* 6, 2, 3.

²¹*De musica* 6, 2, 3.

above. Augustine writes that the natural and, as it were, judicial power in the ears is not removed by silence, nor is it introduced by sound, but remains in the ears and receives sounds either to approve of them or to reject them.

The second kind of number in sense, which are introduced by sound and removed by silence, are characterised with greater precision in Augustine's account of sensation. In turn, this clarification helps us better to understand the kind of number found in the activity of someone who is, for example, reciting a verse. In order to make sense of this clarification, it is necessary to understand something about the context of his remarks on sensation. In the first part of the sixth book of *De musica*, Augustine asks three questions about the kinds of number in and below the soul: which can exist without which others, which are better than which others, and whether any is eternal. The examination of the numbers in sense summarised above falls under the first question, but it has potentially troubling implications for the second. Augustine argues that the second kind of numbers in sense are produced in sense by the numbers in sound. This points toward the unacceptable conclusion that something corporeal – the sound itself and the ears as the bodily organ of sense – can produce something in the soul, and that the soul is therefore in some sense subject to the body. Augustine's reconsideration of sensation is an attempt to safeguard the independence and superiority of the soul, while also reflecting the fact that this kind of number exists in the hearing for only so long as the sound is present.

We might summarise Augustine's argument as follows.²² In the first instance, Augustine denies that the body can produce anything in the soul, and more particularly, that the numbers in sound do not produce the numbers in sense. Instead, he proposes the following account of sensation. The soul animates the body with an active attention. It is not acted upon by the body, but acts in the body sometimes with ease and at other times with difficulty as the corporeal nature yields to it to a greater or lesser extent. Therefore, Augustine continues, whatever corporeal things are presented to the body have some effect not in the

²²*De musica* 6, 5, 8–10.

soul but in the body, but this effect will either agree with or oppose the activity of the soul. Turning more particularly to the sense of hearing, Augustine argues that the soul moves a most serene and mobile airy substance in the ears.²³ When this same airy substance is moved from without by a sound, the soul cannot stop moving it altogether nor can it move it as it had done before the sound; the soul must move the airy substance differently. Augustine concludes that to move something differently is to act and not to be acted upon, and therefore the soul acts upon the body but is not acted upon by the body. In a final step, Augustine argues that the soul is aware of these motions, and this is sensation.²⁴ When the motions it makes against the passions of the body agree with its own motions, it is pleased, and when they do not, it is displeased. Nonetheless, Augustine is keen to stress that this pleasure comes from the soul's awareness of its own motions and not from the body.

With this new account of sensation, Augustine is able better to characterise and indeed to generalise his definition of the numbers in sense and those in the activity of someone reciting a verse.²⁵ The former are the motions of the soul against the body as it is moved in sensation, whereas the latter are the motions made more freely against the body, in other words the numbers in the soul as it brings about some activity in the body independent of or prior to sensation.

The two remaining kinds of number – those in sound and in memory – require little further comment for the moment. It is, however, worth noting that, according to Augustine, the numbers in memory could not have been impressed in memory unless they had been heard or otherwise considered, and that they are, therefore, dependent on the other kinds of number in the soul, even though they remain once those numbers have passed away.²⁶

Finally, Augustine arranges these five kinds of number into a hierarchy and names them.²⁷

²³ *De musica* 6, 5, 11.

²⁴ *De musica* 6, 5, 12.

²⁵ *De musica* 6, 5, 15.

²⁶ *De musica* 6, 4, 6.

²⁷ *De musica* 6, 6, 16.

Several more general principles can be discerned behind the arrangement of his hierarchy. For instance, Augustine writes that something that passes judgement should be set above the thing that it judges.²⁸ For this reason, the numbers in the natural judicial power of the sense are placed at the top of the hierarchy. The numbers in memory are initially given the second place, since they are of greater duration than the other kinds of number.²⁹ Lying behind this argument is the general principle that eternal things should be preferred to temporal. Augustine notes, however, that, while the numbers in memory remain even as the numbers that made them pass away, they are not eternal, and they too pass away as they are forgotten. A third principle is given, that made things are inferior to the things by which they are made.³⁰ Augustine therefore places the numbers in memory below the other kinds of number in the soul, since the numbers are impressed in memory only by these other numbers. At first, this principle seems to set the number in sound above the numbers in sense, and it is for this reason that Augustine introduces the long reconsideration of sensation that I have summarised above.³¹ The numbers in sound do not produce numbers in the soul and can therefore be placed below the numbers in the soul. We might surmise a fourth principle, that incorporeal things are preferred to corporeal. The final principle is revealed in the arrangement of the numbers in sense that are made against the passions of the body and the numbers in the motions of the soul made against the body.³² These last are said to be more free than the former and are for that reason preferred to the former. On the basis of these principles the hierarchy of numbers is as follows:³³

1. *iudiciales*, which are in the natural judicial power of sense;
2. *progressores*, which are in the motions of the soul made against the body, *e.g.* when someone recites a verse;

²⁸*De musica* 6, 4, 6.

²⁹*De musica* 6, 4, 6.

³⁰*De musica* 6, 4, 6–7.

³¹*De musica* 6, 4, 7.

³²*De musica* 6, 5, 15.

³³*De musica* 6, 6, 16.

3. *occursores*, which are in the motions of the soul made against the passions of the body in sensation;
4. *recordabiles*, which are in memory; and
5. *sonantes*, which are in sound.

This hierarchy is revisited later in the book, and some of the names are changed or allocated to different kinds of number. Nonetheless, it provides a useful waypoint in Augustine's argument. In the following chapters, Augustine examines a single question – whether or not any of these kinds of number are eternal – and his arguments focus exclusively on the *iudiciales*.

The iudiciales and the numbers beyond time

Having separated and ordered the kinds of number in and below the soul, numbers that are in times and places respectively, Augustine turns to his third question: are there numbers in the soul that are immortal? This question is addressed in detail only with reference to the *iudiciales*, since Augustine notes that the others either pass away as they are made or are removed from memory as they are forgotten.³⁴ The metaphysical implications of this question are worked out most fully only in the second half of the book.

In the following chapters, Augustine presents a number of arguments concerning the relation of the *iudiciales* to time, which culminate in his demonstration of a sixth kind of number, the timeless numbers in reason. It is worth tracing the arguments themselves for two reasons. First, they reveal in greater detail how Augustine believes the *iudiciales* to function. Moreover, their function is shown to rely on a web of dependencies between the different kinds of number that cuts across the hierarchy set out above. The arguments also expand in greater detail upon Augustine's claim reported above that these numbers judge by nature and not by reason. In sum, Augustine puts forward four arguments that test the relation between the *iudiciales* and time and another that examines the same relation by probing the relation

³⁴*De musica* 6, 7, 17.

between the *iudiciales* and memory.

The iudiciales and time

Augustine's first argument concerning the relation between the *iudiciales* and time recalls the argument he made to separate the two kinds of number in sense.³⁵ It relies again on a distinction between duration itself and the numerical relations by which durations can be compared. Augustine argues that the *iudiciales* are not held by the spaces of time over which they pass judgement.³⁶ He writes that the judgement of sense will not be offended by a verse pronounced a little longer or shorter, so long as the feet are made from properly measured syllables, *i.e.* from single and double times. Nonetheless, a sound produced from more fleeting syllables cannot occupy more time than that in which it sounds. So if these *iudiciales* were held in only so great a time as that in which the *sonantes* were distributed, they could not hope to judge the same sounds, if they were recited at rather greater length. Therefore, Augustine concludes, the *iudiciales* cannot be held in the spaces of time over which they pass judgement. We may also better understand how Augustine understands the working of the *iudiciales* from this argument. His careful use of demonstrative pronouns suggests that the very same *iudiciales* judge both the longer and shorter recitation of a verse so long as it preserves the same relations among the syllables.

The second argument concerning the relation between the *iudiciales* and time presents a contrary conclusion.³⁷ Augustine argues that although the *iudiciales* are not held within the spaces of time over which they pass judgement, they are nonetheless held within certain spaces of time beyond which they cannot pass judgement. In other words, although the *iudiciales* seem to be bound up with the numerical relations between durations and not the durations themselves – since the very same *iudiciales* judge both longer and shorter recitations of a verse – they are nonetheless constrained within certain limits of duration. Augustine

³⁵See above, 186–91.

³⁶*De musica* 6, 7, 17.

³⁷*De musica* 6, 7, 18.

writes that if one syllable were recited in the time it takes to take three paces and another in double that time the same law of single and double that is found in all iambs would also be found here, yet we could not approve of these measurements with the same natural judicial power. Therefore, Augustine concludes, there are certain limits of time beyond which the *iudiciales* cannot pass judgement, and whatever exceeds those limits cannot be judged by the *iudiciales*.

While this conclusion is not further challenged in Augustine's text, Augustine does not leave its metaphysical implications unexamined. In turn he presents two arguments that question whether we can conclude from this demonstration that the *iudiciales* are not immortal. The first denies that this is the case, since the *iudiciales* can always judge whatever falls within the limits of their judgement. Nonetheless in the second argument Augustine considers more closely his remarks that this judgement is itself natural or made according to nature. He writes that the limits of time within which the *iudiciales* can pass judgement are themselves determined by human nature, and since this nature is mortal, so too are the *iudiciales*.

The first of these arguments may be summarised as follows.³⁸ Augustine writes that the *iudiciales* seem always to be able to judge whatever spaces of time they can judge. The numbers in memory are effaced as they are forgotten, and the numbers in sound as well as the *occursores* and *progressores* pass away as they are made, but the *iudiciales* remain always to judge whatever is presented to them, so long as it falls between certain limits of shortness and length. Therefore, Augustine concludes, although we can no longer assume that these numbers are immortal, they have not yet been shown to be mortal.

At the end of this first argument Augustine writes that the *iudiciales* remain in human nature and perhaps also in the soul. The following argument therefore begins by making the relation to nature more explicit and goes on to explore the consequences of that relation.³⁹ Augustine writes that our ability to judge intervals is based on both nature and practice. Nonetheless, no

³⁸*De musica* 6, 7, 18.

³⁹*De musica* 6, 7, 19.

matter how much we practice, we cannot comprehend with the judicial sense single and double spaces of hours or days or years. Augustine concludes that these limits beyond which the *iudiciales* cannot pass judgement have been established in human nature. It is here worth quoting him at some length:⁴⁰

Why can they [the *iudiciales*] not do this? Unless it is because each living thing is given a sense of places and times in its kind and in its proper proportion to the universe, such that just as its body is so much in proportion to the universal body, of which it is a part, and its age is so much in proportion to the universal age, of which it is a part, so too its sense is suited to the actions that it makes in proportion to the universal motion, of which it is a part. [...] And so if such a sense is given to human nature for the actions of this bodily life, by which it cannot judge greater spaces of time than the intervals relating to the enjoyment of this life require, since this nature is mortal, I think that the sense is also mortal.

In the four arguments summarised above, Augustine has therefore shown that the *iudiciales* are not held in the spaces of time over which they pass judgement, but that there are nonetheless certain limits beyond which they cannot pass judgement. Moreover, they can always judge whatever falls within these limits, but since the limits were themselves determined by human nature, which is mortal, the *iudiciales* too are mortal.

⁴⁰*De musica* 6, 7, 19. 'Quid ita non possunt, nisi quia animanti in genere proprio proportionem universitatis sensus locorum temporumque tributus est, ut, quomodo corpus eius proportionem universi corporis tantum est, cuius pars est, et aetas eius proportionem universi saeculi tanta est, cuius pars est, ita sensus eius actioni eius congruat, quam proportionem agit universi motus, cuius haec pars est? [...] Quapropter si humanae naturae ad carnalis vitae actiones talis sensus tributus est, quo maiora spatia temporum iudicare non possit, quam intervalla postulant ad talis vitae usum pertinentia, quoniam talis hominis natura mortalis est, etiam talem sensum mortalem puto.'

The iudiciales and memory

In a final argument, Augustine again demonstrates the relation between the *iudiciales* and time. Whereas the preceding arguments emerged from a distinction between measurable duration itself and the comparison of durations by means of number, the final argument instead rests on the relation between the *iudiciales* and memory. Augustine argues that the *iudiciales* do not judge the other numbers in the soul – the *occursores*, *progressores*, and *recordabiles* – individually, but only as each is mediated and represented by the others. The argument that connects the *iudiciales*, memory, and time is found in his discussion of the *occursores*, but it is worth examining more briefly his remarks about the *progressores* and *recordabiles* too. It becomes clear that the hierarchy of numbers presented at the end of the preceding section is overwritten by a network of dependencies that complicates any simplistic account of the kinds of number and their functions.

Augustine's examination of the *progressores* is relatively straightforward.⁴¹ He argues that, even as the *progressores* desire some harmonious activity in the body, they are regulated by the *iudiciales*, which keep us from unequal motions and tacitly demand equality. Concerning the numbers in memory, Augustine writes that the *iudiciales* can only judge these numbers as they are mediated by the *occursores* and *progressores*.⁴² He argues that the *recordabiles* are judged by the *iudiciales* to the extent that they are presented by memory. As these numbers are recalled, they are presented either in thought alone or also in the movements of our limbs. In turn, Augustine connects this representation to the *occursores* and the *progressores*. He writes that the *recordabiles* are never judged by the *iudiciales* alone but only as they are joined to the active numbers or *occursores*. Similar complications are found in Augustine's remarks about the *occursores*. The dependencies between the different kinds of number as they are presented to the *iudiciales* refine Augustine's account of sensation, but they also have significance for the relation between the *iudiciales* and time.

⁴¹ *De musica* 6, 8, 20.

⁴² *De musica* 6, 8, 22.

Augustine's opening remarks on the judgement of the *occursores* are as follows:⁴³

The *occursores*, which are produced not by their own volition but against the passions of the body, are offered for judgement and judged by the *iudiciales* to the extent that memory can retain their intervals. For we cannot by any means judge numbers that consist in intervals of times, unless we are helped by memory.

The reliance of the *iudiciales* on memory will in turn be used to demonstrate their relation to time, but there is some value in tracing more nearly the details of Augustine's argument. Augustine writes that since every syllable begins and ends, it begins at one time and ends at another and stretches over some small interval of time from its beginning through its middle to its end. For this reason, in hearing even the shortest syllable, we are helped by memory, so that when the end of the syllable sounds, we retain in the mind the motion that was made at its beginning. Otherwise, Augustine writes, we cannot say that we have heard anything, not because the *occursores* were not produced in the soul, but because they pass away as they are made. In turn, Augustine repeats the argument with two separate successive syllables, which even more clearly cannot sound together. Finally he turns these observations about memory to relate the *iudiciales* to time. He writes:⁴⁴

For this reason must the *iudiciales* not also be reckoned to be extended through a determined space of time? With the exception of the *progressores*, whose progress they regulate, they cannot judge the numbers in intervals of time unless memory, as if a servant, should present them.

There is, of course, much that could be said about the relation between memory and time in

⁴³*De musica* 6, 8, 21. 'Et illi occursores numeri, qui certe non pro suo nutu, sed pro passionibus corporis aguntur, quanta eorum interualla potest memoria custodire, in tantum his iudicialibus iudicandi offeruntur atque iudicantur. Numerus namque iste, qui interuallis temporum constat, nisi adiuuemur in eo memoria, iudicari a nobis nullo pacto potest.'

⁴⁴*De musica* 6, 8, 21. 'Quapropter iudiciales illi numeri, qui numeros interuallis temporum sitos – exceptis progressoribus, quibus etiam ipsum progressum modificant – iudicare non possunt, nisi quos eis tamquam ministra memoria obtulerit, non existimandi sunt per certum spatium temporis?'

Augustine's writing. Nonetheless, in this context, I want only to note that Augustine's argument here provides another link between the *iudiciales* and time and another dependency drawn across his hierarchy of kinds of number. The same relation between the *iudiciales* and memory is used to introduce Augustine's search for numbers in the soul that are beyond time.

The timeless numbers in reason

The connection between the *iudiciales* and memory introduces Augustine's renewed search for numbers beyond times. He begins:⁴⁵

[...] let us try, if we are able, to transcend the *iudiciales* and ask whether there are any superior numbers. For although in these numbers we now scarcely see spaces of times, we do not use them except to judge things that are made in a space of time, and not even all of these things but only what can be articulated by memory.

It is important to emphasise this connection, since Augustine's account of these superior numbers does not in fact touch upon times again. Instead, he presents a number of arguments that seem in the first instance concerned only to separate these numbers from the *iudiciales*. First, Augustine sketches the function of these superior numbers and shows that this function requires a further kind of number in the soul. Then, he suggests that this additional kind of number must be found in reason. Only in the second half of the book does he argue that these numbers are beyond times, and at that point his argument more directly addresses memory. Nonetheless, it is clear that the superiority of the numbers in reason rests on the fact that they are beyond times.

First, Augustine distinguishes between the *iudiciales* and these superior numbers by

⁴⁵*De musica* 6, 9, 23. ' [...] conemur, si possumus, istos numeros iudiciales transcendere et quaeramus, utrum sint superiores. In his enim quamquam spatia temporum iam minime uideamus, non tamen adhibentur nisi ad ea iudicanda, quae in spatio temporis fiunt, nec ipsa quidem omnia, sed quae possunt articulari memoriter.'

acknowledging their different functions.⁴⁶ He writes that when the verse *Deus creator omnium* is sung we are pleased by means of the *iudiciales*, but with further as yet unknown numbers we appraise that pleasure, which is, as it were, the judgment of the *iudiciales*, and make a second, more certain judgement. The separation of these two kinds of number is based on the distinction between the pleasure of sense and the appraisal of reason. In turn, Augustine raises a possible objection that both judgements are made by the *iudiciales* themselves. It is worth noting that in the objection itself and in Augustine's rebuttal there is no further mention of time or the relation between these numbers and time. The objection reads as follows:⁴⁷

Next I fear that the judgement of reason is nothing but the more diligent judgement of the *iudiciales* about themselves, so that there are not some numbers in pleasure and others in reason, but one and the same [kind of number] at one time judges the numbers made in the body when they are presented by memory [...] and at other times judges itself more remotely from the body and more purely.

Augustine's refutation of this argument does not at first address its substance but rather questions its motivation. He writes that the desire not to separate the two kinds of number seems to rest on the fact that both are produced by the same soul. This anxiety is easily set aside, since it has been shown already that the soul produces many kinds of number, but it also opens the way for a more compelling reiteration of why the *iudiciales* must be separated from the numbers in reason. Augustine begins by restating the difference between the natural judgement of sense, by which we are pleased or displeased by motions made in the soul, and the reason, which appraises whether or not we are rightly pleased by these things. In turn, he argues that if sense could not approve or disapprove of intervals unless it was imbued with

⁴⁶*De musica* 6, 9, 23.

⁴⁷*De musica* 6, 9, 23. 'Deinde uereor, ne nihil sit aliud aestimatio ista rationis, quam eorum de se ipsis quaedam diligentior iudicatio, ut non alii sint numeri in delectatione, alii in ratione, sed uni atque idem alias iudicent de his, qui aguntur in corpore, cum eos [...] offert memoria, alias de se ipsis remotius a corpore atque sincerius.'

certain numbers, so too reason could not judge the pleasure of sense without certain enduring numbers of its own. The difference between the activities requires a further kind of number.

The addition of a sixth kind of number requires a few modifications to the hierarchy of numbers that was presented at the end of the preceding section. The revised hierarchy is as follows:⁴⁸

1. *iudiciales*, which now describes the timeless numbers in reason, which appraise the pleasure of the *sensuales*;
2. *sensuales*, which were formerly named *iudiciales*;
3. *progressores*;
4. *occursores*;
5. *recordabiles*; and
6. *corporales*, which were formerly named *sonantes*.

The renaming of the *iudiciales* as the *sensuales* and the addition of a further kind of number in reason, which takes over the name *iudiciales*, has been addressed above. The renaming of the *sonantes* as the *corporales* requires a little further comment. Augustine writes that this new name more clearly encompasses the numbers that are found in dancing and other visible motions. This should not be confused with the discussion of the numbers in times and places from the first chapter.⁴⁹ In this instance, Augustine seems to be concerned only with the temporal part of bodily numbers. Indeed, this has always been the case in his discussion of sound. At the beginning of the book, Augustine argued that sound was corporeal, but his discussion has focussed on its duration and not its local extension. Indeed, the corporeality of these numbers has been central to Augustine's account of sensation, and will remain important in the second half of this final book of *De musica*, as Augustine turns more nearly to examine the relation between temporal and eternal things.

⁴⁸*De musica* 6, 9, 24.

⁴⁹See above, 45–50.

In the first half of the sixth book of *De musica*, Augustine has distinguished five kinds of number in the soul and one below the soul, which is found in the temporal motions of bodies. His account of these numbers includes a nuanced treatment of sensation and the activity of the soul in the body, but it points ultimately far beyond the body to the eternal numbers in reason. The second half of the book will examine in greater detail the relation between the numbers in the soul that are in times and the numbers that are beyond times, and it is here that Augustine sets out many of the more concentrated metaphysical arguments that were later picked up by Eriugena. Nonetheless, in the *Periphyseon*, we also find material drawn from the first half of the book, especially concerning sensation and the lower numbers in the soul, several of which are referred to by name. Eriugena's presentation of this material reflects his close and imaginative reading of Augustine's text. The numbers themselves and the description of their functions are amended to trace more clearly and more directly a double motion of number into memory. This double motion was itself derived from the second half of the sixth book of *De musica*, and it is to that material that I shall now turn.

Equality and the double motion of number into memory

The second half of this final book of Augustine's *De musica* draws out a number of metaphysical conclusions that remained only implicit in the preceding chapters of the text. Central to this explication is a detailed reconsideration of equality, one which reflects the relations between the numbers beyond times and those in times or places that were suggested but not fully developed earlier in the book. Augustine has argued that the numbers in reason are superior to the numbers in sense because they are beyond times. In the second half of the book, he will argue that equality among the numbers beyond time is superior to the imitations of equality that we find in times and bodies. A number of further conclusions rest upon this observation. Augustine suggests that the numbers beyond time are independent of and prior to the universe, and that they are its model or prototype. Whatever equality we find in times or places is not, he suggests, equality itself but only an imitation of equality. I

shall return to this point in the following material. Nonetheless, at least in the first instance, Augustine does not draw a distinction between the numbers that are in reason and the eternal numbers themselves. Indeed, he writes that the consideration of these numbers is a motion inwards to the truth of God itself, an idea which Beierwaltes has placed centrally in Augustine's aesthetics.⁵⁰

These conclusions are closely similar to the ideas about number that O'Meara has traced in the *Periphyseon*.⁵¹ This similarity is not accidental. Eriugena was a careful reader of Augustine's text and used it extensively in his account of what may be called the metaphysics of number. His reliance on this text can be shown most clearly in his narration of a double motion of number into memory. In *De musica* as well as the *Periphyseon* number is said to flow into memory from both above – from what Augustine calls the spiritual motions of the soul – and from below – from the faculties of the soul turned toward the body. This double motion is not examined in O'Meara's account of Eriugena's numerical metaphysics. In the following section, I shall trace the importance of these motions for Augustine's *De musica*. A fuller understanding of this motion will allow us in turn better to understand Eriugena's own metaphysics of number.

Equality and the imitation of equality in times and places

The metaphysical considerations in this part of *De musica* result from a reconsideration of equality. In the preceding books, Augustine had argued that in the feet, rhythms, metres, and verses of Latin poetry we love only equality. He was there concerned to show that equality was superior to the other kinds of numerical relation by means of which durations might be compared. At the midpoint of the sixth book, equality itself is reevaluated with reference to times and places. It is worth quoting Augustine's remarks at some length, since they are so important to the following arguments and set out some of the lines of inquiry that will be

⁵⁰See note 16.

⁵¹See above, pp. 180–4.

examined there. Augustine writes:⁵²

Reason thinks things over and asks the sensuous pleasure of the soul, which used to claim the judicial role for itself, since it is pleased by equality in the numbers of temporal spaces, whether any two short syllables that it may hear are truly equal or whether the one may be drawn out a little longer than the other, not all the way to the measure of a long syllable but a little less, by which it still exceeds its peer. Can it be denied that this may be the case, when this pleasure cannot perceive those things and enjoys unequal things as though they were equal? What is more wretched than this error and inequality? For this reason we are advised to turn our enjoyment away from the things that imitate equality. We cannot tell whether they fill out equality, or perhaps we can tell that they do not, and nevertheless as far as they imitate equality, we cannot deny that they are beautiful in their own kind and order

There is a great deal to unpack in this passage, but three things are especially important for my discussion of equalities and time. In the first instance, the soul's (now illicit) pleasure in temporal things is presented as a problem of sensory acuity; we cannot tell whether one syllable is a little longer than another and therefore take pleasure in unequal things as though they were equal. At this point in the passage, it seems that the numbers in times are at least potentially equal, and that we could tell equality from inequality among these numbers, if only we had the ability to sense more precisely. A different position is sketched later in the passage. The numbers in times are said only to imitate, resemble, or even counterfeit equality. In other words something about the temporal numbers themselves precludes their being truly

⁵²*De musica* 6, 10, 28. 'Quaerit ergo ratio et carnalem animae delectationem, quae iudiciales partes sibi uindicabat, interrogat, cum eam in spatiorum temporalium numeris aequalitas mulceat, utrum duae syllabae breues, quascumque audierit, uere sint aequales, an fieri possit, ut una earum edatur productius, non usque ad longae syllabae modum, sed infra quantumlibet, quo tamen excedat sociam suam. Num negari potest fieri posse, cum haec delectation ista non sentiat et inaequalibus uelut aequalibus gaudeat. Quo errore et inaequalitate quid turpius? Ex quo admonemur ab his auertere gaudium, quae imitantur aequalitatem; et utrum impleant, non comprehendere possumus, immo quod non impleant, fortasse comprehendimus, et tamen, in quantum imitantur, pulchra esse in genere suo et in ordine suo negare non possumus.'

equal. This is emphasised in the final lines: even as these numbers imitate equality they are beautiful not absolutely or in any unqualified sense but only in their own kind and order. Each of the two strands is further developed in Augustine's ongoing argument, but it is the second that has the more immediate and more important consequences, since it is this separation of the eternal numbers from the numbers that are in times and places that provides the justification for and the material of Augustine's metaphysical narratives. Indeed, immediately following the passage quoted above Augustine begins to examine the double motion of number into memory.

The double motion of number into memory

In order to understand more fully the context and significance of Augustine's examination of number and memory, it is useful to consider how this examination relates to his remarks about equality in the passage quoted above. In that passage, Augustine separated the numbers beyond times from the numbers in times on account of their different relation to equality. The eternal numbers are truly equal, whereas the numbers in times can at best only imitate equality. This argument now becomes frequent in the remaining parts of *De musica*. Nonetheless, Augustine is keen to demonstrate that the soul that is turned toward the body and therefore receives temporal numbers from the body is not entirely cut off from the timeless numbers in reason. It is worth stressing this point: Augustine here introduces a brief account of the receipt of temporal numbers by the memory, in order to demonstrate that the soul also receives eternal numbers. Without the eternal numbers, the soul could not produce temporal numbers of its own. This is, in fact, only one part of Augustine's broader contention (which I shall here touch upon only briefly, since it has been argued much more fully in the first chapter) that the eternal numbers are always the model of the numbers in times even, for example, in the motions of the celestial bodies.⁵³ The fact that Augustine then situates the eternal numbers also in memory should therefore be considered a refinement of

⁵³See above, p. 51.

this earlier account. Given the importance of this part of *De musica* to Eriugena's own writing about number, it will be valuable to examine it in greater detail.

In the first instance, Augustine returns to the hierarchy of numbers in the soul set out in the first part of the sixth book. He argues now that the temporal numbers in the soul could not be produced without the timeless numbers in reason. This had certainly been suggested in the earlier discussion, but here for the first time it is made explicit. Augustine writes:⁵⁴

[The eternal numbers] of reason are preeminent in beauty. If we were cut off from them altogether when we are turned to the body, the *sensuales* would not regulate the *progressores*, which in turn by moving bodies produce the sensible beauties of times, and in this way the *sonantes* also make the *occursores*, which the same soul receives as its own impulses and, as it were, multiplies them in itself and makes the *recordabiles*. This power is called memory, and it is a great help in the most troublesome actions of this life.

The fact that Augustine charted his way through this hierarchy to end in memory is fortuitous; for it allows him first to examine the numbers received by memory from the body through sensation and then the eternal numbers, which are received through what he calls the mind's spiritual motions. Thereafter, he returns to consider again the relation between eternal and temporal things.

Most important in Augustine's discussion of the numbers in times that are held by the memory is his distinction between *phantasiae* and *phantasmata*.⁵⁵ Augustine writes that whatever the memory receives from the motions of the mind that are made against the passions of the body, *i.e.* the *occursores*, can be called by the Greek term *phantasiae*. From these

⁵⁴*De musica* 6, 11, 31. ' [...] hi numeri rationis pulchritudine praeminent, a quibus si prorsus abscideremur, cum inclinamur ad corpus, progressores numeros sensuales non modificarent, qui rursus mouendis corporeibus agunt sensibiles temporum pulchritudines, atque ita sonantibus obuii etiam occursores numeri fabricantur, quos omnes impetus suos eadem anima excipiens quasi multiplicat in se ipsa et recordabiles facit; quae uis eius memoria dicitur, magnum quoddam adiutorium in huius uitae negotiosissimis actibus.'

⁵⁵*De musica* 6, 11, 32.

motions memory produces further motions of its own which are not received from the body but are, as it were, images of images held in the memory, and these can be called *phantasmata*. In order to explain the difference between these things more clearly, Augustine gives an example: he has often seen his father and knows him through *phantasiae*, whereas he has never seen his grandfather and knows him only through *phantasmata*, but if he had never seen any human body, he would likely not even have these. Augustine notes in his continuing remarks the error in confusing either *phantasiae* or *phantasmata* for the things themselves, and cautions against the deleterious effect of temporal beauty, but the distinction between *phantasiae* and *phantasmata* is all that is necessary for the purposes of my discussion here.

The fact that memory receives temporal numbers through sensation should not be surprising by this point in *De musica*; although the *recordabiles* have received little individual attention, they have only ever been described as the repository for sense impressions, which are imprinted in the memory and can be recalled at some future moment. Perhaps more surprising is the fact that Augustine suggests here for the first time that memory receives – indeed always already contains – eternal numbers. In his consideration of these eternal numbers, Augustine will refine some of his earlier discussion of the numbers in reason. A number of points are important here. Augustine writes that the eternal numbers can be recalled from the memory by an inward motion. From the memory they are imprinted in the mind and become accessible to reason. Augustine therefore draws no distinction between the eternal numbers held by memory and the eternal numbers in reason, with which the first half of the book came to an end. Moreover, Augustine draws no distinction between these numbers and the eternal numbers themselves, which are here said to be divine truth itself. Indeed, it is only because the memory contains the numbers of truth itself that they can be recalled by a purely inward motion.

Augustine presents this second receipt of numbers by the memory in direct contrast to the first. He writes:⁵⁶

⁵⁶*De musica* 6, 12, 34. 'Excipit autem memoria non solum carnales motus animi, de quibus numeris supra

Memory receives not only the sensuous motions of the mind, about which numbers we have said enough already, but also its spiritual motions, about which I shall speak only briefly, since they are simpler and desire fewer words but the greatest serenity of mind.

Augustine's argument for why this must be the case is detailed, but again it hinges on the fact that numbers in times and places can at best only imitate equality. Continuing from the above, he writes:⁵⁷

We do not discover definite and lasting equality in sensible numbers but recognise it nonetheless in a shadowy sense as it passes away. Certainly the mind would not desire equality anywhere, unless it knew it somewhere, but this 'somewhere' cannot be in the spaces of places and times, for the one swells and the other passes away. [...] You do not think that it is in the forms of bodies, which you would never dare call equal with clear consideration, nor in the intervals of times, in which likewise we do not know whether something is a little longer or shorter than it should be by some small amount that escapes our sense.

Again, Augustine presents both arguments from the passage quoted at the beginning of this section; the numbers in times and places cannot be known to be equal on account of the imperfect acuity of our senses, and they cannot be equal but only imitate equality as they pass away. Yet we do know equality, since we would not otherwise desire bodies or the motions of bodies to be equal. In the following argument, Augustine argues that we can know eternal,

iam diximus, sed etiam spiritales, de quibus breuiter dicam: Quo enim simpliciores sunt, eo uerborum minus, sed plurimum serenae mentis desiderant.'

⁵⁷*De musica* 6, 12, 34. 'Aequalitatem illam, quam in sensibilibus numeris non reperiebamus certam et manentem, sed tamen adumbratam et praetereuntem agnoscebamus, nusquam profecto appeteret animus, nisi alicubi nota esset; hoc autem 'alicubi' non in spatiis locorum et temporum, nam et illa tument et illa praetereunt. [...] Non enim in corporum formis puta, quas liquido examine aequalies numquam dicere audebis, aut in temporum interuallis, in quibus similiter, utrum sit aliquid aliquanto quam oportet productius uel correptius, quod sensum fugiat, ignoramus.'

unchangeable equality only from God himself. It is worth tracing his argument in greater detail, since it makes clear why these numbers are received by memory as well as reason, as had been argued in the first part of the book.

Augustine writes that the metrical art which is used to make verses contains certain numbers according to which the verses are made.⁵⁸ Indeed, the central books of *De musica* examine these numbers in meticulous detail. Augustine notes next that these numbers remain even as the verses pass away, since the art that contains them is a state in the mind of the artist. His examination of the relation between this state and the numbers of which it is comprised allows us to draw a number of conclusions about the numbers themselves and their relation to memory. Augustine argues that these numbers are necessarily found in memory. In the first instance, he argues that someone who has forgotten the art can be recalled to it by questions alone. The numbers are not given in the questions themselves but are recovered by an inward motion within the mind itself. Augustine contrasts this with other kinds of knowledge. For instance, which syllables are long and which short in a word is agreed only by convention and as a result must be learned.⁵⁹ Augustine argues that the truth of these numbers and their relations is independent of history, and as such, that it cannot be changed by any human activity. Finally, it is worth noting precisely the relation between this inward motion, the numbers themselves, and the art that contains them. Augustine writes that the motion impresses the number on the mind and there produces the state that has been called art. In other words, the numbers exist independently of this art in the soul.

In the further characterisation of these numbers, Augustine makes clear their relation to memory. He writes that the numbers are eternal and unchangeable and that nothing is more certain than their equality.⁶⁰ For this reason, he concludes that they could have been received only from the one eternal and unchangeable God. Augustine's final remarks about the

⁵⁸*De musica* 6, 12, 35.

⁵⁹This point recalls Augustine's earlier remarks about the differences between *musica* and grammar found, for example, at *De musica* 1, 1, 1; 3, 3, 5; and 4, 16, 30–31

⁶⁰*De musica* 6, 13, 36.

numbers themselves confirm their place in memory. He writes:⁶¹

Is it not clear that whoever [...] moves themselves inwardly to God, in order to understand unchangeable truth, could not be recalled to consideration of that truth without an external reminder unless the memory held the same motion itself.

The memory therefore receives both temporal numbers from sensation and also eternal numbers. The relation of these eternal numbers to God still requires further comment. Earlier, Augustine had argued that the eternal and unchangeable numbers could only have been received from God, but in the passage quoted above he describes the inward motion as a motion *to* God, and the result of that motion as the comprehension of unchangeable truth. Likewise, in the following passage Augustine describes the numbers held by memory as the highest, unchangeable equality and writes that in turning from this equality we can only turn to something lower, since there is nothing higher and nothing that is equal but different.⁶² The distinction between these numbers and God himself is left at best ambiguous.

This passage provides a crucial turning point in Augustine's narrative. The reconsideration of equality as something found only among the eternal numbers and at best imitated in the numbers in times or places and the acknowledgement that true equality is superior to its imitations suggests the trajectory for the rest of the book. Augustine sets out a prolonged examination of how we might love only true equality, which is perhaps the moral purpose of the whole of *De musica*. Nonetheless, the numerical and philosophical arguments that explain and justify this moral examination are at this point more or less complete, and it is these arguments that seem to have been of more immediate use to Eriugena.

Augustine's argument regarding equality, memory, and time is more complex than any

⁶¹*De musica* 6, 13, 36. 'Quid tandem illus nonne manifestum est eum, qui [...] sese intus ad deum mouet, ut uerum incommutabile intellegat, nisi eundem motum suum memoria teneat, non posse ad intuendum illud uerum nullo extrinsecus admonente reuocari?'

⁶²*De musica* 6, 13, 37.

preceding part of *De musica*. It is perhaps also the most important passage of that text for Eriugena's own speculations about the metaphysics of number. For this reason, it may be valuable to draw out a few of its major themes. Augustine writes that there is a kind of number that is eternal, unchangeable, and absolutely equal. These numbers are independent of the soul, but they may be known in the soul first in memory and then in reason. When we discover these numbers in the soul, we do not invent them but rather are recalled to the contemplation of eternal truth itself. Indeed, the soul is only able to produce numbers of its own, numbers that are in times, because it contains these eternal numbers. Augustine sets out these arguments in an account of the double motion of number into memory: number flows into memory both, as it were, both from above and from below – from God and sensation. In my summary, I have not touched upon the more generally prototypical role of these numbers. Just as the eternal numbers seem to be the model for the temporal numbers in the soul, so too they provide a model for all numbers in times and places. Augustine illustrates this with a description of the rotation of the celestial bodies.⁶³ These same themes are predominant in Eriugena's own account of number in the *Periphyseon*. His most significant borrowing is also the most characteristically Augustinian – the double motion of number into memory – but many of the other ideas are present too, even as they are changed in their detail. Indeed, it is precisely these changes that reveal the significance of Augustine's text within Eriugena's thought: *De musica* has been considered and worked over by Eriugena, and this requires that it is at times accommodated to other parts of Eriugena's writing. In other words, the contribution of Augustine's *De musica* to Eriugena's own thought is anything but superficial.

⁶³*De musica* 6, 11, 29.

Eriugena's metaphysics of number

Eriugena presents a great deal of numerical material from Augustine's *De musica*, but his presentation of this material is not straightforward. At two places in the third book of the *Periphyseon*, Eriugena introduces ideas and vocabulary that are characteristic of Augustine's text, and that might be traced with some certainty to that text. Eriugena does not acknowledge these borrowings. The one exception to this general rule concerns the distinction between *phantasiae* and *phantasmata*, which Eriugena attributes to Augustine perhaps only to distinguish it from another theory, which he attributes to certain unnamed Greeks.⁶⁴ Nonetheless, some of Eriugena's vocabulary is elsewhere used only by Augustine, and it seems unlikely that Eriugena got it from anywhere besides *De musica*.

Eriugena's most significant borrowing concerns the narrative that connects number and memory. Like Augustine, Eriugena argues that memory receives numbers both externally from sensation and, as it were, inwardly. This narrative frames Eriugena's metaphysics of number. It explains on the one hand how the intellectual numbers, which are independent of the soul, progress through the soul, and on the other how these numbers are prototypical of physical reality and enter the soul through the activities of sense. In outline, Eriugena's narrative is in fact very similar to what we found in *De musica*. Its derivation from that text is confirmed by the fact that it is at one point presented in terms of the different kinds of number that Augustine distinguished in the soul. Nonetheless, Eriugena introduces a number of significant alterations in the details of this narrative. We may bring into sharper focus the concerns and priorities that lie behind Eriugena's metaphysics of number if we consider his writing against its background in *De musica*.

The alterations introduced by Eriugena may be summarised as follows: Eriugena and Augustine both believe in a kind of number that is independent of the soul and physical reality, but is accessible to the highest motions of the soul and prototypical of physical reality.

⁶⁴*Periphyseon* 3, 659B–D.

Likewise, both authors confer an almost divine status on this kind of number. In *De musica*, Augustine narrates the differentiation of these numbers successively first into times and then into places. In the *Periphyseon*, the differentiation of number is integrated within a framework provided by the ten Categories of the logical tradition; numbers are found not only in times and places but also quantities, qualities, and the other Categories. Moreover, Eriugena does not suggest that this differentiation is successive. The most significant difference between the two accounts concerns the relation between memory and the highest kind of number. In Augustine's account, the numbers that are beyond places and times are first discovered in memory and thereafter imprinted upon the mind, where they become accessible to reason. Eriugena's account differs at a number of points. He writes that number flows from the intellect through reason and only then into memory. Moreover, even as they are received internally by the memory, these numbers are clothed in images (the accidental qualities, quantities, *etc.*); the numbers appear 'purely' only in intellect and reason. Nonetheless, and perhaps corresponding to this reconsideration of memory, Eriugena reevaluates the status of these images. Whereas in Augustine the numbers in places and times had been only imitative of equality and therefore inferior to equality, Eriugena argues that the appearance of number in quantities, qualities, places, and times is entirely natural and suitable.

These changes are indicative of the intensity with which Eriugena read and absorbed Augustine's text. Material from *De musica* is not handled superficially, but is worked over and thoroughly integrated within Eriugena's intellectual framework. In this chapter, there will be space only very briefly to consider the broader motivations for the specific changes introduced by Eriugena, but my conclusions about disciplinarity and the place of *musica* within a broader intellectual tradition can be restated and developed: again it is clear that Augustine's text made a substantial contribution to Eriugena's thought, while being accommodated to other parts of that thought. I shall trace this contribution through two passages from the third book of the *Periphyseon*.

Number eternal and made

The most extended examination of number in the *Periphyseon* is presented in response to a metaphysical problem of Creation.⁶⁵ Eriugena argues that all things must be at once eternal and made; for if Creation were not eternal, it would be only accidental to God, whose simplicity and more-than-simplicity permits no accident, yet it *is* Creation, and therefore it must have been created. At the same time he argues that God makes all things and is also made in all things, since nothing that is made is made beyond God. Eriugena suggests that the complexity of these dilemmas is such that they might best be understood by means of an image or example taken from nature (*naturale exemplum*). In this context, Eriugena presents the example of the monad and number, in which number is eternal in the monad but made in its multiplications, and the monad makes all number and is made in all number.

My examination of this natural image will for the most part focus on the making of number, since it is here that Eriugena draws most extensively on Augustine's *De musica*, but it is worth first briefly summarising the earlier parts of his argument. In the first instance, Eriugena defines *arithmetica*.⁶⁶ He argues that this art as well as the numbers that it contains are natural. For this reason, he accepts the examination of number as a suitable means with which to apprehend difficult metaphysical truths about Creation. Next, Eriugena presents several arguments in order to demonstrate that all numbers are eternally and causally in the monad.⁶⁷ There is not space here to summarise each of his arguments, but a few more general points can be made. Eriugena presents material from Pseudo-Dionysius' *Divine names*⁶⁸ as well as Boethius' *De institutione arithmetica* and the seventh book of Martianus Capella's *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii*.⁶⁹ His arguments reflect a detailed reading of these texts, and many of

⁶⁵The preceding discussion of this problem is long and detailed. It begins at *Periphyseon* 3, 638c and continues to 651A, at which point number is introduced.

⁶⁶*Periphyseon* 3, 651B. Compare this to the definition given at *Periphyseon* 1, 475A.

⁶⁷*Periphyseon* 3, 652B.

⁶⁸*De diuinis nominibus* 5, 6–7.

⁶⁹For instance, compare *Periphyseon* 3, 654B–C and Martianus Capella, *Les noces de Philologie et de Mercure livre VII*, edited by Jean-Yves Guillaumin (Paris: 2003), beginning at section 732 or *Periphyseon* 3, 655B and

them are densely arithmetical in character. A further argument rests on the scriptural account of Creation and the prominence given there to the number 6.⁷⁰ Having demonstrated to his satisfaction that the numbers are eternal in the monad, Eriugena turns to the related questions of how they are made, and where, and whence.

Vis, potestas, actus, opus

Eriugena's answer to these questions rests on an essentially Aristotelian distinction between potential and actual existence. Eriugena writes that numbers are eternal in the monad and made in their multiplications. Moreover, the very same numbers that are eternal in the monad flow into and are made in the genera and species of intelligible number. The distinction therefore lies not between the numbers themselves but in the manner in which they appear. Eriugena writes that the numbers are in the monad potentially but in the genera and forms actually. The terms by means of which he articulates these distinctions – *uis* and *potestas* on the one hand and *actus* and *opus* on the other – seem in this instance to be derived from Boethius' *De institutione arithmetica*, though they are used differently in the two texts. In the first place, Boethius uses a number of further terms to articulate the difference between potential and actual existence (for instance, we find *uirtus* alongside *uis* and *potestas*).⁷¹ Eriugena uses only the four given terms. More significantly, Boethius seems to draw no further distinction within the two sets of terms that he uses to describe potential and actual existence; *uis*, *potentia*, and *potestas* together seem to describe potentiality, but they do not have a further, individuated meaning. Eriugena defines each of the terms individually. It is in the definition and examination of each of these terms that we see most clearly the influence of Augustine's *De musica*.

Boethius, *De institutione arithmetica*, edited by Henry Oosthout and Johannes Schilling (Turnhout: 1999), book 1, 32–2, 1. See also Jean-Yves Guillaumin's edition and French translation of Boethius' text, *Institution arithmétique* (Paris: 1995). Michael Masi's English translation is entirely unreliable; see *Boethian number theory: a translation of the De institutione arithmetica* (Amsterdam: 1983).

⁷⁰For information concerning the broader resonances of number in Eriugena's thought, see Édouard Jeuneau, 'Jean-Scot et la métaphysique des nombres'. The number 6 is treated especially at pp. 137–8.

⁷¹See, for example, *De institutione arithmetica* 1, 20 or 2, 30.

Eriugena defines the four terms as follows:⁷²

Vis is, I think, the substantial virtue of numbers by means of which they subsist eternally and unchangeably in the monad.

Potestas is the possibility by means of which they can be multiplied into genera and species and made clear to the intellect in definite distinctions of terms, diversities of quantities, differences of intervals, and the miraculous equality and indissoluble harmony of proportions and proportionalities.

Actus is the motion of the mind contemplating the multiplication of the numbers proceeding from the monad in itself and in themselves into their diverse genera and different species, before they come into the *phantasiae* of the imagination, that is, the motion of the mind considering with the purest eye of the intellect the numbers simply beyond any quantity, quality, place, or time with their incorporeal nature free from any image; and if I may define it more briefly, *actus* is the motion of the mind regarding the purest numbers in their own nature without any imagination.

Opus is the motion of the same mind commending to memory the same numbers, which it had considered in themselves, thickened by *phantasiae* as if by certain bodies, and ordering them there, and more easily examining their reasons, and conveying them to the knowledge of others made significant to the

⁷² *Periphyseon* 3, 657C–658A. ‘Vis est, ut aestimo, substantialis eorum uirtus, qua aeternaliter et immutabiliter in monade subsistent; potestas uero est possibilitas, qua in genera et species possunt multiplicari et intellectibus manifesti fieri certis terminorum distinctionibus, quantitatum diuersitatibus, interuallis differentiarum, proportionum proportionalitatumque mirabili aequalitate et insolubili consonantia. Actus est motus animi procedentium numerorum ex monade in diuersa genera inque species differentes multiplicationem contemplantis in se ipso et in se ipsis, priusquam in phantasias cogitationis ueniant, hoc est, simpliciter incorporea natura omni imagine carente purissimo intellectus oculo ipsos numeros supra omnem quantitatem et qualitatem et loca et tempora considerantis. Et ut breuiter diffiniam: Actus est motus animi purissimos in sua natura numeros absque ulla imaginatione intuentis. Opus uero est eiusdem animi motus purissimos numeros, quos in se ipso considerat, phantasiis ueluti quibusdam corporibus incrassatos memoriae commendantis, ibique eos ordinantis, eorumque rationes facilius tractantis, forasque quibusdam signis corporalium sensuum significatos in aliorum notitiam tradentis.’

corporeal senses by certain signs.

These definitions provide the basis for Eriugena's examination of number and its descent through the soul. In the first instance, he argues that number passes through the soul in a single descent from intellect into reason, from reason into memory, and then further into the corporeal senses and certain visible forms by which they can be made known to others.⁷³ This account has been characterised by O'Meara as 'a process of ever-increasing articulation and concretization'.⁷⁴ Nonetheless the account is only provisional. By examining some of its terms more closely, Eriugena develops an account of the double motion of number into memory that is in many important respects similar to what we found in Augustine's *De musica*.

Actus

The first point of similarity concerns the timeless numbers that Augustine sets first in the memory and Eriugena in the intellect. Both authors argue that these numbers were made by God and only discovered in the soul. Indeed, their argumentation is similar. Eriugena writes that we should not think that the intellect creates these numbers just because it contemplates them in themselves; for if they had been made by a created intellect and not by God himself they would be unchangeable nor would they contain the harmony of their reasons.⁷⁵ More than anything else, it is the unchangeability of these numbers that sets them apart in the writing of both Augustine and Eriugena. The fact that Eriugena places these numbers in intellect and not in the first instance in memory reveals the extent to which his account of these numbers has been assimilated within his philosophical framework. In an appeal to other natural arts (*artes naturales*), Eriugena writes that whatever comes from the hidden places of nature into reason comes through the activity of the intellect.⁷⁶ Nonetheless, I shall show later in this chapter that the descent of number from intellect through reason and into

⁷³ *Periphyseon* 3, 658B–659A.

⁷⁴ Dominic O'Meara, 'The metaphysical use of mathematical concepts in Eriugena', p. 144.

⁷⁵ *Periphyseon* 3, 658A–B.

⁷⁶ *Periphyseon* 3, 658B–D.

memory is one part of Eriugena's revision of Augustine's narrative.

Unlike Augustine, Eriugena describes quite closely the relation between these numbers and the numbers in reason. The numbers in reason are said to be 'revealed more openly' or 'displayed more clearly' than the numbers in intellect, while still being free from the images found in memory and sense.⁷⁷ Eriugena's clearest explanation of this relation is found in the more general examination of natural arts that I mentioned above. This examination is introduced as a parallel to or even as an illustration of the descent of number. Eriugena writes:⁷⁸

If we may use an example, just as some conclusion or some natural art, while it is held in the most hidden recesses of intellectual nature, is together and one and simple without parts or divisions, without quantity, quality, place, or time, entirely free from all accidents, and scarcely known only by the intellect – for the intellect does not make the natural arts but discovers them, though it finds them not beyond itself but within itself – but when the art begins to descend in an intelligible progression from its hidden places, in which it is together with the mind in which it is, into reason, it then begins to reveal its secret rules in clear divisions and differences, though they remain most purely free from any image [...]

Eriugena continues to trace the passage of this natural art into the memory, the corporeal sense, and out into visible figures, and the whole of this descent is then compared to the descent of number. We may therefore understand that the relation of this art in intellect and

⁷⁷ *Periphyseon* 3, 659B.

⁷⁸ *Periphyseon* 3, 658B–C. 'Nam quemadmodum, ut exemplo utamur, consilium quoddam seu qualiscunque ars naturalis, dum in secretissimis intellectualis naturae sinibus continetur, simul est et unum quoddam simplex sine partibus seu diuisionibus, sine quantitate seu qualitate, sine loco, sine tempore, et omnino omnibus accidentibus absolutum ac uix solo intellectui cognitum (non enim intellectus naturalium artium factor est sed inuentor, non tamen extra se sed intra se eas inuenit), dum uero ipsa ars ab archanis suis in quibus simul est in animo in quo est in rationem intelligibili progressionem incipit descendere, mox paulatim suas occultas regulas apertis diuisionibus atque differentiis inchoat aperire, adhuc tamen purissimas omnique imaginatione alienas [...]'

reason is not unlike the relation between the different kinds of number as they also appear in intellect and reason. Although some of the language here used by Eriugena to describe the numbers in intellect resembles his description of the numbers in the monad or more generally the preexistence of things in their causes, we should not think that the intellect contains the numbers as they are in the monad. Eriugena writes that so long as the numbers are in the monad, they surpass every intellect save that of God himself. The numbers in reason are ‘more openly displayed’ and ‘more clearly revealed’ than the numbers in intellect, but this is a difference in degree rather than one of kind.

Opus

So far, we have considered only the appearance of number *in actu*. Eriugena’s account of the double descent of number into memory also involves number *in opere*. Indeed, the double descent itself is introduced by a passage that restates the difference between the two parts of number’s actuality. Eriugena writes:⁷⁹

Unless I am mistaken, you say that the numbers that are eternally established in the monad are made in two ways. For either they are made in the mind and reason by the simple intellect alone, where they appear purely in themselves and free from any imagery, or they are made in memory and corporeal sense, where they are thickened by certain images and made, as it were, out of and in a kind of matter.

Two points may usefully clarify Eriugena’s understanding of *opus*. The first concerns the images by which number is ‘thickened’ in memory and sense. Eriugena discusses these images as *phantasiae* and *phantasmata* and refers explicitly to Augustine’s theory of the same from *De musica*. Nonetheless, Eriugena’s discussion integrates these ideas within a framework derived

⁷⁹ *Periphyseon* 3, 659D–660A. ‘Dupliciter ergo factos numeros in monade aeternaliter substitutos asseris, ni fallor. Aut enim in animo et ratione sola ac simplici intelligentia fiunt puri per se omnique imaginatione absoluti apparentes, aut in memoria sensusque corporea quibusdam imaginationibus incrassati, ac ueluti ex quadam et in quadam materia facti.’

from the ten Categories of the logical tradition and not just the times and places theorised by Augustine. The second point of clarification concerns Eriugena's suggestion that these numbers are made in and out of a kind of matter. It is in the discussion of this point that Eriugena introduces his account of the double motion of number into memory, before bringing his examination of number to a close.

Eriugena's examination of *phantasiae* and *phantasmata* at first seems very close to what we found in Augustine's text.⁸⁰ He writes that *phantasiae* are taken either from the surface of bodies by means of the external senses or from the nature of memory itself. He notes that these last are more properly called *phantasmata* and echoes some of Augustine's attitude in his description of them as 'images of images' and later 'false images'. Finally, Eriugena more precisely describes and correctly attributes Augustine's distinction between *phantasiae* and *phantasmata* and contrasts it with a definition of *phantasma* as the knowledge of sensible natures received through *phantasiae*, which he attributes to the Greeks. It is therefore clear that Eriugena has understood Augustine's writing about these images well. Nonetheless, they are integrated within a different philosophical framework in his presentation. Whereas Augustine's discussion of *phantasiae* was intended only to separate the numbers in memory that are in times from the numbers that are beyond times, Eriugena includes a broader selection of the categories in his description of these images. In the definitions of *actus* and *opus* as well as his discussion of the descent of the natural art we find references to quantities, qualities, places, and times as well as other accidents. Why this might be the case is best explained in Eriugena's examination of number in its sensible generation.

Eriugena begins his account of number and sensible generation, which follows immediately from the passage quoted above, with a distinction between bodies and the appearance of bodies. He writes:⁸¹

⁸⁰ *Periphyseon* 3, 659B–D.

⁸¹ *Periphyseon* 3, 660A–B. 'Ita est. Sed quod addidisti 'ex quadam et in quadam materia facti', non satis acute perspexisti. Phantasiae nanque, quas in memoria uel sensu accipiunt un in eis apareant, non ex quadam materia fiunt, sed ex incorporealibus incorporeales nascuntur. Non enim ex materia corporealium rerum

Quite right. But you have not examined closely enough your phrase, ‘out of and in a kind of matter’. For the *phantasiae* that number receives in memory or sense, in order to appear in them, are not made out of a kind of matter but are incorporeal things born of incorporeal things. For they are not formed from the matter of corporeal things, but from their surface, which without doubt is incorporeal, and from colours, which are understood not to be bodies but to be around bodies. For this reason nothing is more suitable nor more natural than that the intellectual numbers should display their virtue in things that are incorporeal or received from incorporeal things and having been made should proceed in a certain ineffable manner into sensible generation.

The quantities, qualities, places, and times as well as the other accidents that Eriugena has included under his discussion of *opus* are themselves incorporeal,⁸² and it is therefore not unsuitable that the intellectual numbers should appear, as it were, in these images. It is for this reason that the intellectual numbers can also appear as *phantasiae*. In his continuing remarks, Eriugena writes:⁸³

Since we have now perceived the reasons of things, we can say with some circumspection that *phantasiae*, in which the numbers reveal themselves to the interior eyes of those who are numbering, come from nowhere except the intelligible numbers themselves.

The precise relation between the intellectual numbers and memory is explained most clearly only at the end of this long passage. Eriugena argues that the memory receives numbers in

efficiuntur, sed ex specie, quae procul dubio incorporea est, et ex coloribus, qui non corpora sed circa corpora intelliguntur. Ac per hoc nil est conuenientius ac naturalius quam ut intellectuales numeri in rebus incorporeis et ex incorporealibus sumptis uirtutem suam ostendant, et modo quodam ineffabili in generationem sensibilem facti procedant.’

⁸²This point is argued extensively in the first book. See, for example, *Periphyseon* 1, 478C–D.

⁸³*Periphyseon* 3, 660B. ‘Perspectisque rerum rationibus non temere quis dixerit ipsas phantasias, in quibus numeri se interioribus numerantium oculis patefaciunt, non aliunde nisi ab ipsis intelligibilibus numeris prouenire.’

two ways: either it receives numbers from intellect through reason or it receives the same numbers as they flow out into the physical world and then back into memory through the corporeal senses. This passage is important, since it more clearly articulates also the prototypical function of intellectual number over physical reality. Eriugena writes:⁸⁴

For if the ‘numerousness’ of sensible forms in which matter is contained so that it can be perceived by sense – since in itself it is invisible and without form – takes its origin from the intellectual numbers, and from this (*i.e.* the numerousness of forms) through corporeal sense the memory is formed by *phantasiae*, there is nothing more to say except that we understand the intellectual numbers to flow from the monad in two ways and having been made in the memory to be multiplied, divided, compared, brought together, and united by the keenness of the mind. For either, as we said, they descend through the intellect into reason and from reason into the memory, or through the surfaces of visible things into corporeal sense. And from sense they flow into the same memory, in which they are made, taking on the forms of *phantasiae*, and submit to interior sense. For this reason, however the numbers are seen, they take the occasion for their appearance from nothing but themselves.

Eriugena’s account of number is in important ways similar to what we found in Augustine. Both authors propose a kind of number that is eternal and unchangeable. These numbers are made in the soul, but they are not made by the soul; they are instead discovered in some part of the soul – the memory in Augustine and the intellect in Eriugena – where they had been made by God. The other kinds of number in the soul depend more or less directly on these

⁸⁴*Periphyseon* 3, 660B–C. ‘Nam si numerositas formarum sensibilium, in quibus materia continetur ut sensibus possit percipi – siquidem per se ipsam inuisibilis est atque informis – ab intellectualibus numeris originem ducit, et ex ipsa (formarum uidelicet numerositate) per corporeos sensus memoria phantasiis conformatur, nil aliud restat nisi ut intelligamus numeros intellectuales ex monade duplici modo fluere, et in memoria facti acie mentis multiplicari, diuidi, comparari, colligi, uniri. Aut enim, ut praediximus, per intellectum in rationem et ex ratione in memoriam descendunt, aut per species rerum uisibilium in sensus corporeos. Iterumque ex ipsis in eandem memoriam confluunt, in qua phantasticas accipientes formas fiunt, interioribusque sensibus succumbunt.’

numbers. The same numbers are also the model or prototype of physical reality. In fact this argument is rather more prominent in the writing of Augustine and Eriugena than it has been in my account, since I have focussed almost entirely on one of its consequences: each of the authors argues that memory receives numbers in two ways, and it is this double motion of number into memory that reveals most clearly Eriugena's use of Augustine's *De musica*.

It is worth drawing attention to the differences between the two versions of this narrative particularly concerning the internal motion of number. In Augustine's text the numbers beyond times are made in the memory by God. From the memory they are imprinted upon the mind, where they become accessible to reason. Nonetheless, the memory is said to receive (*excipio*) these numbers, and its receipt of these numbers is presented in direct contrast to its receipt of temporal numbers from sense. In contrast, Eriugena argues that the eternal numbers are made in intellect and descend into memory through reason. Moreover, when these numbers do appear in memory, they appear in certain images or *phantasiae* and never in themselves. This is a significant divergence from Augustine's text and seems quite dramatically to change the substance of this narrative. In order to explain, or at least more clearly to illustrate, this change, it is worth turning to a second passage from the *Periphyseon*, in which Eriugena's reading of Augustine's narrative is presented in terms more closely similar to those used by Augustine himself.

Eight orders of number

In a later passage from the third book of the *Periphyseon*, in which Eriugena examines human nature as comprising always body and soul, he introduces eight kinds or orders of number and describes them in terms characteristic of Augustine's *De musica*. Although there is significant similarity between the accounts of these numbers presented by Augustine and Eriugena, there are differences too. These differences seem to reflect the same reading of Augustine's text that was outlined above, and they clarify some parts of that reading. Eriugena here presents a streamlined version of Augustine's double motion of number into

memory. The parts of Augustine's text that do not directly contribute to this narrative have been altered or removed altogether, and other parts of Augustine's text have been included if they seem to clarify the double descent. Eriugena writes:⁸⁵

Indeed, reason discovers eight orders of number. The first and highest of these is beyond intellect, among the eternal causes, according to which the rational soul discerns all things. [...] Two are entirely beyond and below the soul. The first and outermost of these is discovered in bodies, from which are formed the corporeal senses in which *phantasiae* are made. The second is formed in the corporeal senses themselves, and this is the first order of *phantasiae* that are made in the instruments of sense, *i.e.* in the eyes and ears and other sense organs. But five [orders of] number are reckoned to be naturally innate to the soul: the *occursores*, which first meet the *phantasiae* and receive them; after these the *progressores*, which are, as it were, guides to the city of memory; and when the *phantasiae* arrive, they are led into the city by the *recordabiles*; and then the *rationales* distribute them around the city, as the *intellectuales* command.

The derivation of this passage from Augustine's *De musica* would be clear enough, even if Eriugena did not immediately go on to supply the reference; the vocabulary is inescapably Augustinian. Nonetheless Eriugena's use of these terms is not straightforward, and certain differences from Augustine's own remarks here suggest more general conclusions about Eriugena's reading of that text.

As we saw earlier in the chapter, Augustine presents six kinds of number, whereas Eriugena

⁸⁵ *Periphyseon* 3, 731C–732A. 'Octo siquidem numerorum ordines ratio inuenit. Quorum primus et summus est supra intellectum in aeternis causis, secundum quem discnit anima rationalis omnia [...] Duo quoque omnino et extra et infra animam sunt, quorum quidem unus et extimus in corporibus est, ex quibus corporei sensus formantur in quibus phantasiae fiunt, alter in ipsis corporeis sensibus formatur, et ipse est phantasiarum primus ordo in instrumentis sensuum constitutus, in oculis dico et auribus caeterisque sensuum sedibus. In ipsa uero anima quinque numeri comoputantur naturaliter insiti: Occursores, qui primi occurrunt phantasiis easque recipiunt; post hos progressores ac ueluti duces quidam ad urbem memoriae; ad quam, dum phantasiae peruenerint, a recordabilibus introducuntur; deinde rationabiles per urbem distribuunt, prout intellectuales iusserint.'

presents eight. One of the additional kinds can be explained without difficulty. Eriugena includes a kind of number beyond any intellect among the eternal causes. His argument that these numbers are unknowable in themselves reflects his more general apophatic commitment found in many of his remarks about these causes. Further changes suggest a more significant reworking of Augustine's text. The *intellectuales* are also taken from *De musica*, from the passage at 6, 17, 58 that I examined in the first chapter, but their meaning and function is here altered. In that passage the *rationales* and *intellectuales* are given together, and seem not to be distinguished. The glossator of Tours, Bibliothèque municipale 286 writes that the *intellectuales* are angelic and the *rationales* human.⁸⁶ Eriugena's reading is different. He places both kinds of number in the human soul and ascribes to the *intellectuales* one part of what Augustine had ascribed to the memory. In Augustine's text, the eternal numbers in memory are made accessible to reason, and reason then returns to judge the other kinds of number that are retained by the memory. In contrast, Eriugena writes that numbers flow from intellect, through reason, and into memory. If this descent is less clear in this passage than it was in the discussion of *actus* and *opus*, it is perhaps only because Eriugena is here concerned in the first place with sensation.

This change should not be understood in isolation but rather as one part of a broader renegotiation of the place of memory in relation to the other kinds of number. This can be confirmed with reference to the *progressores*. Augustine wrote that these were the numbers that the soul produces in its body *e.g.* in the recitation of a verse. In Eriugena's account, they seem instead to mediate between the *occursores* and the *recordabiles*. The *progressores* have here been assimilated to a narrative of sensation that ends in the memory. The same assimilation can be seen in relation to the numbers that Augustine had called *sensuales*. In Augustine's account, these numbers were placed above the memory and produced the pleasure felt by the soul as it received harmonious numbers through sensation or made them in its other activities.

⁸⁶See f. 114v, in the lower margin. 'Rationales in hominibus numeri. Intellectuales in angelis.' These remarks are part of a longer series of glosses that are run together on the page.

There is no equivalent in Eriugena. They seem to have been replaced by numbers in the corporeal organs of sense themselves, which Augustine does not distinguish from the numbers otherwise in bodies. The resulting change is similar to what we saw with reference to the *progressores*: Eriugena has amended ideas drawn from Augustine's text in order to clarify or even to streamline the motion of number into memory.

As a final part of this clarification, Eriugena has effaced the dependencies between the kinds of number carefully traced by Augustine, which were especially prominent in his discussion of the *sensuales*. In sum, the same reading of Augustine's text that was apparent in the passage examined above is here expressed in terms that are more clearly Augustinian. Even as the precise use of the terms is changed, they place greater emphasis on the double motion into memory, which was Eriugena's most fundamental borrowing from *De musica*.

Augustine introduced the narrative that I have labelled the 'double motion of number into memory' in order to address a particular problem in *De musica*: how could he show that the soul contained numbers that were beyond times? The importance of this demonstration rests on Augustine's contention that equality is necessarily eternal, and that things in times can at best only imitate equality. Indeed, this contention informs the argument that sustains his narrative; for he argues that the soul could only recognise equality if it contained timeless numbers of its own. It is therefore worth emphasising that this narrative extends beyond the receipt of two kinds of number by the memory but includes also several metaphysical assumptions about number itself: that there are eternal numbers that are independent of the soul but made in the soul, that these same numbers are prototypical of physical reality either directly or mediated through the activity of the soul, and so on. All of these are found in the *Periphyseon*, and on account of the specifically Augustinian vocabulary also used by Eriugena we can conclude without particular difficulty that Augustine's *De musica* was a major source – the major source – for Eriugena's numerical metaphysics. Nonetheless, the immediate contingencies that led to the explicit thematisation of the double motion of number into

memory in *De musica* are not present in the *Periphyseon*. The fact that the soul contains eternal numbers – though here they are first placed in intellect and not memory – remains an important part of this narrative, but the narrative itself is turned toward other ends. It is perhaps for this reason that Eriugena is able so freely to change the details of this narrative, even while its framework remains intact.

One of the most striking changes made by Eriugena in fact runs counter to Augustine's examination of number. Central to Augustine's argument was the demonstration that memory contained the eternal numbers in themselves through spiritual motion as well as the *phantasiae* and *phantasmata* received and developed from sensation. For this reason, he argues that the soul contains eternal numbers. In Eriugena, memory contains only numbers in images, though these numbers enter memory by either an inward or external descent. The relocation of the eternal numbers, *i.e.* the numbers without image, from the memory to the intellect reflects a reorganisation of the human soul and a distinction between intellect and reason that Eriugena reads into Augustine's text. A related change concerns the images into which number proceeds. Augustine theorises number in times and places as measures of duration and corporeal extension. Eriugena assimilates number within all ten Categories. Moreover, since he argues that these categories are incorporeal, he can argue that the images produced in these categories are a natural and indeed a suitable appearance of number. Augustine's dismissive attitude toward the numbers in times and places is here largely absent.⁸⁷

Eriugena's work on Augustine's *De musica* is careful and imaginative. The material that he drew from this text was central to the development of his own metaphysics of number, and many of Augustine's narratives and conclusions can be traced in Eriugena's own grappling with the subject. I do not think therefore that the changes that he introduced in this material

⁸⁷It may be possible to relate this to Eriugena's 'theophanic metaphysics'. On the relation between theophany and *phantasia*, see Jean-Claude Foussard, 'Apparece et apparition: la notion de «phantasia» chez Jean Scot', in *Jean Scot Érigène et l'histoire de la philosophie*, edited by René Roques (Paris: 1977), pp. 337–48.

can be read as a sign of superficiality. Instead, they seem to index some of the great complications involved in Eriugena's attempt to read Augustine alongside his other convictions about the organisation of the faculties of the soul, the relation between the sensible world and its divine model, and so on. In this chapter, I have attempted to trace some of these mediations and negotiations in relation to Eriugena's metaphysics of number. The fact that *musica* was a genuine partner in this dialogue shows how significant it was to the development of Eriugena's thought.

Afterword

This thesis began with questions about the reception of an antique intellectual tradition in the early middle ages. For this reason, it is first and foremost a project about texts and ideas and their histories. In the three chapters, I have traced the reception of Augustine's *De musica* through the writings of Eriugena. I have focussed on the *Periphyseon*, since the reception expressed there is the most extensive and most interesting. Nonetheless, throughout my work, I have studied the materials that comprised and conditioned this reception directly through the medium of their transmission, *i.e.* as they appear in extant manuscripts copied in the early middle ages. This has allowed me to approach the medieval reception of *musica* in a new way.

The physical traces of this reception have informed my questions. In the first chapter, I examined the material circumstances of Augustine's *De musica* in the early middle ages. Manuscript copies of the text that were made in the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries were surveyed as well as the contemporary booklists and library catalogues in which these copies are recorded. The manuscripts and catalogues attest a widespread reception of the text, which is in stark contrast to the conclusions drawn in previous scholarship.

The physical traces reveal not only the fact of reception but also its character. The catalogues and manuscripts are important sources of information regarding *how* Augustine's text was read in the early middle ages. *De musica* was bound alongside other texts. These larger codicological units reveal some of the cultural mediations through which the text was known

and by virtue of which its meanings were negotiated. Importantly, they reveal connections between *musica* and other areas of knowledge that are far removed from the concerns of practical music-making. Likewise, the position of the text in library catalogues and booklists suggests a place for *De musica* in ninth-century approaches to the organisation of knowledge that is closer to the concerns of the Church Fathers than those of contemporary liturgy. A more specific mediation examined in this chapter revealed that Eriugena used material from a commentary tradition on *De musica* likely compiled earlier in the ninth century. In his treatment of the Platonic *anima mundi*, we find references to ideas found also in a Tours manuscript that preserves one version of this tradition. It is possible that Eriugena used this very book as he wrote the *Periphyseon*.

Perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn from my study of the material circumstances of *De musica* is that it was copied and likely read whole in the early middle ages. This requires an argument that does not seek to separate book 6 from the rest of the text but instead emphasises continuities between the books, or at least that shows what sort of sense they might make when they are read together. Seen in this light, *De musica* can be understood as an extended examination of equality. Such a reading of the text underpinned my discussion of the metaphysics of number in the third chapter.

In the second chapter, the manuscript tradition of the *Periphyseon* and the writing activities of individual scribes as they expanded and reworked the text were examined. Changes made to the definition of *musica* here highlight a moment at which the reception of Augustine's text became a point of contention or difficulty. By focussing on the work of the scribe i² in the Bamberg manuscript, I was able to isolate his own response to these difficulties and to trace his individual reading of Eriugena's text. I have suggested that this was just one part of a broader writing activity, which deserves further study.

In sum, it has been possible to trace for the first time a reception of Augustine's *De musica* in the ninth century. Initially, this reception may not seem to cohere into any single narrative.

In the first chapter, I showed how glosses written on the text earlier in the ninth century informed Eriugena's own reflections on the Platonic *anima mundi*. In the second chapter, my focus moved to the ten Categories of the logical and the quantitative mechanics that lay behind antique musical speculations. Finally, ideas about number and the soul were examined in the third chapter. The chapters are, at least to a certain extent, eclectic. For the most part, they are connected only by the important role played by *De musica* in each of them. Moreover, wherever traces of *De musica* were found, they had been overhauled, so that they could be more closely assimilated to Eriugena's own ideas. In fact, this reveals the most important aspect of the reception.

Despite their different topics, the three chapters reveal a single approach to Augustine's text. Eriugena did not attempt to write a critical account of *De musica*, and at no point does he seem concerned to explain Augustine's meaning clearly. Indeed, many of the most important borrowings are not even referenced to Augustine. Instead, Eriugena draws information from Augustine wherever seems expedient, and with this information, addresses whatever subject it best seems to fit. There are no niceties here regarding textual or disciplinary boundaries. This approach is, in fact, familiar. It fits exactly the description of the ninth-century commentary traditions outlined in the introduction, which surrounded the text with all kinds of relevant information and were in no sense constrained to the immediate subject of discussion.⁸⁸ These commentary traditions seem to have begun a little before the middle of the ninth century and were expanded substantially as Eriugena was writing. Eriugena's approach to *De musica* is therefore typical of Carolingian approaches to antique knowledge.

This observation leads, in turn, to a final point. Reflections on *musica* are often relegated to the peripheries in histories of music. To an extent, this makes sense. The kinds of reception that I have traced above are not in the first instance concerned with reflections on a tradition of practical music-making. Nonetheless, some of the ideas explored in the reception of *De musica* were fundamental to the earliest reflections on the chant. The same questions

⁸⁸See above, 6–8.

regarding the fundamental basis of musical sound and the relation between ‘sounding number’ and number itself are examined also in the tradition of more practical reflection. What might it mean, therefore, to write a history of that tradition, which kept in mind the metaphysical answers to those questions? How might we, then, differently draw the boundary between what is musical and what is *musica*? I raise these points as questions, since I do not yet have a ready answer to them. Nonetheless, they are surely worth exploring in a future study of Carolingian musical culture that takes into account the interdisciplinarity of early medieval scholarship.

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