

Considering the true nature of things the force is a particular stage (of consciousness) and is true only nominally (*samvrtisat*); and as such it is not to be specified as either different from or identical with the consciousness. Considering the worldly talk one can say as he likes. It is sometimes quite different from the consciousness or sometimes identical with it. For, people talk both ways of things which are empirically true. They having in view the idea of difference talk, for example, "the fragrance of the sandal" (*candanagandha*) etc. The idea of identity is also sometimes expressed in this talk: Pitcher is *rupa* (visible), etc.

Any way, in both cases, the object-condition (*ālambana*) has been elucidated as existing internally and to this effect the author says in conclusion: Thus the interior object is endowed with two characteristics (image and causality), and therefore it is logically deduced [that the consciousness alone is transferred into the (external) object (*visaya*).]

KUE-CHI'S COMMENT ON 'ĀLAMBANA

The following are the remarks on *Ālambana* made by Kue-chi while commenting on Vasubandhu's *Viṃśatikā*. In view of the fact that those comments are quite useful to understand and appreciate the respective positions of the realists whose opinions Dignaga has taken great pains to combat in composing his treatise, *Ālambanaparīkṣā*. There are such three groups of the realists whose theories are set forth by way of *Pūrvapakṣā* in this treatise. Now we are at a loss to specify who are they and which group of the realists uphold which type of system. The two *Tikas* that are now available in translations (one in Tibetan and the other in Chinese) are not much of help to us in this respect. However, Kue-chi, the renowned Chinese commentator, though not writing a regular comment

on the treatise has shed invaluable light on the problems that we are confronting in this context. This is the reason which prompted me to reproduce his observations relevant to the problems. With regard to the first proposition, viz. the proposition of the atoms-object-view,¹ Kue-chi says :—

1. “This master (i.e. old Sarvastivadin)² considers that many dharmas (atoms included) in the base of visible, rūpa, etc. become the object of visual perception. Why is this so? Their indivisible atoms (*paramāṇu*) each substantially existing (*dravyasat*), constitute jointly one *aṇu* or molecule. This *aṇu* is *prajñaptisat*, phenomenally real and therefore not at all substantially existing.”

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“Five-fold consciousness relies on (*ālambate*) the substantially existing dharma as its object and hence it does not really rely on *aṇu*. Thus the compound of atoms are things which are only conventionally real (*prajñaptirūpa*). Therefore, while the bases of the visible, etc. (*rūpāyatamādi*), become objects of visual perception (*cakṣur-vijnāna*), etc. each of the indivisible atoms (*paramāṇu*) which are substantially real, serves their object (*ekaikam*). Visual consciousness, etc. do not rely on (*alumbate*) the thing which is phenomenally real (*prajñaptisat*) because what is substantially existing (*dravyasat*) can (alone) produce consciousness”.

The above extract shows that Dignaga in the first proposition refers to the standpoint of the old Sarvāstivādi-vaibhāsikas.

In regard to the second and the third propositions, Kue-chi makes the following observations:

“The master of the Sutra-sect says: the indivisible atoms (*paramanu*) that are substantially existing are not the object of the five-fold consciousness because no indivisible atoms

are manifested there (-five-fold consciousness). These seven indivisible (atoms) constitute jointly one *anurūpa*, gross atom. This gross body of atoms (*samhata-anu*) though phenomenally true (*prajñapti*) is the object of five-fold consciousness, because there this (gross) form is reflected. No single substance atom can be manifested as *ulambana*, object-cause. Therefore, necessarily, the compound (of atoms, *anu*) constitute jointly one gross phenomenal (form), then only the five-fold consciousness takes it as object. Therefore the Sastra

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(-Vimsatikā) says: Multitude of indivisible atoms substantially existing constitute the objects in their combined form.

This, the master of Nyāya (Neo-Sarvastivadin) considers to be contradictory to his tenets (*Sva-paksa-viruddha*); he maintains that five-fold consciousness of the eye, etc. does not rely on (*alambate*) conventionally real thing. This distinguishes him from the Sūtra-sect (Sautrantika). If we follow the old (school) (i.e. old Sarvastivadin), then there will be

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such logical fallacy (as has been pointed out) by Dinna (-Dignāga) of no *alambana*, object-cause, because no form of indivisible atoms is reflected in the five-fold consciousness. And further (the Neo-Sarvasti-Vadin) says: the material elements, etc. (*rūpādayo dharmāḥ*) have each of them many a form (*ākāra*). Out of these only one part (*bhāga*) becomes the object of perception. Therefore, indivisible atoms, being in co-operation with one another (*paraspara-sāpekṣa*) assume each an integrated form (*Sancitakara*). This form exists in substance and produces the consciousness which resembles that form and hence becomes the object-cause (*ālambana-pratyaya*) of the five-fold consciousness. A great number of atoms, for example, become integrated to form a mountain, etc. and by mutual assistance each of atoms assumes the dimension of the mountain, etc. (*parvatādi-pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa*). While visual consciousness etc. rely on (*alambate*), the mountain, etc. the number of atoms existing substantially and being in co-operation with one another

become (one) mountain so that five-fold consciousness could be brought into play. Hence they constitute *alambana*, object-cause. In such a case there will be no fallacy involving absence of *ālambana*, because what exists substantially is accepted as *ālambana*. Therefore, the sāstra (*Vimsatikā*) says that substantially existing number of atoms all get integrated. This is explained in detail in the *Ālambanaparīkṣā* of Dinna and the *Vijnaptimātrātā - siddhi-Sāstra*, Chuan. 1.

“In the old *Vijnaptimatratā* (treatise) the tenets of the *ping-shih-shih* (-Vaisesika) and the old *Sa-pa-to*. (-Sarvastivadin) only are stated. The *Sanghāta* and *Sancita* are said to be one, viz. *paramānu-Samudāya-rūpa*, a matter constituted of indivisible atoms. This is hardly intelligible and the statement is difficult to explain ” (vf.4b.L.1-f.5a,1.6)

On another occasion Kue-chi makes the following comments: “The Sutra-sect and others (hold) that the indivisible atom (*paramanu*) being in the nature of one single substance (*ekadravya-rūpa*) becomes the object of

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non-sensuous consciousness (*mano-vijnāna*) alone. The Sarvastivadins (*Sa-po-to*), etc. also hold that each of the ten bases (*āyatana*) includes this single atom which becomes perceptible by the consciousness relevant to it. Thus one indivisible substance-atom (*dravya-paramanu*) has been accepted by you (Sarvastivadin, etc). But I (Vijnanavadin) do not accept that it is (so); because there is no logic in your argument. Therefore it is stated (by the Vijnanavadins) that indivisible atoms be in their combination form (*Sanghāta, ho-ho*) or integration form (*Sancita-ho-chi*) artha, would, in all cases, be contradictory to *pramāṇa* (i.e. perceptual experience). So the *Ālambanaparīkṣā* criticises the masters of the Sutra-sect in this way: The compound (*Sanghata*) of *rūpa*, etc. because it is experienced in the visual consciousness and because it is revealed to the consciousness in the gross, behaves as *alambana* object, it nevertheless, is not a causal factor (*pratyayārtha*), because it is not a real substance (*adravyarupa*). For example, (a man of)

disturbed eye-sight sees a double moon. That being a non-substantial image it cannot constitute the cause of that consciousness. Then the treatise establishes the syllogism (*pramāṇa*) that the compound of atom (*ho-ho-saṅghāta*), though it is *ālambana* is not a *pratyaya* (cause) because it does not exist in substance. It is like the second moon.

The treatise of the *Vijnaptimātratā-Siddhi* criticises that theory thus : compounds (*Saṅghāta-lakṣaṇa*) isolated from the indivisible atoms cannot exist in substance. With the removal of the parts of a compound, one by one, the consciousness of that gross form invariably disappears. Hence the compound as such ceases to exist in substance and can no longer, be stated to be the cause of five-fold consciousness in the same manner as the second moon. (The idea of indivisible atoms) is even more inconceivable: If indivisible atoms exist in substance, it would follow that compounds exist conventionally. (If) what constitute the whole do not exist in substance, the constituted whole cannot be established.

The *Ālambanaparīkṣā* criticises the masters of Nyaya (Neo-Sarvastivadins) thus: Just as solidity, etc. (*Kāthinatādi-Lakṣaṇa*) though existing in substance, may be reckoned as cause (*pratyayārtha*) they cannot be *ālambana*, the objects (of consciousness), because that form does not exist in visual consciousness, etc. The same will be logically the case with the integrated form (*Sancita* = *ho-chi-hsing*) of the indivisible atoms of rūpa, etc. because that form (*Sancitākāra*) is regarded as no other than the form of indivisible atoms. Then the treatise establishes this syllogism: The integrated form (*Sancitākāra*) of indivisible atoms though it is the cause (*pratyaya*) of the consciousness of eye, etc. cannot be its object (*ālambana*), because it is reckoned to be atomic form itself in the same way as solidity, fluidity, etc. (*Kāthinya-Snehādi*). But we experience (grh)

the consciousness of the eye, etc. taking as their objects the integrated form of atoms. Furthermore we have distinct cognitions of the pot, bowl, etc. These cognitions would become vague and indistinct; for, no distinction (in cognition) is admissible on the basis of distinction in their respective forms. (The cognition of distinct forms is unreal) because the distinct forms are non-entities (*adravya*). The indivisible atoms too cannot have distinct form of their own. Why is this so? Because the indivisible atoms are of equal dimension (*pāramāṇḍalya*). The distinction in forms exists only in phenomena, (*prajñapti*). When it is broken up into indivisible atoms the cognition (of distinct form) disappears invariably.

The Vijnaptimātratā-Siddhi-Sāstra moreover states: The comprehension of that (integrated form) is not possible, because while in the process of unification (*Sancitāvasthā*) the atoms are essentially the same as at the time when they were simple and non-unified. The individual atoms of the pot, bowl, etc. being equal (in their dimension) consciousness relying on these things (*talaksanam pratītya*, i.e. the atoms of pot, bowl, etc.) would be identical. Every indivisible atom at the stage of being unified would each forsake its atomic dimension (*Pārimāṇḍalya*). So cognition of the object in its gross form cannot be derived from the object in its subtle form; because cognition of one object cannot be based on another. [If you do not accept this axiom] a single consciousness would be capable of comprehending (*ālambata*) the entire world of objects." (Vol. III, f. 7b 1.3-f.3b,1.7).

The foregoing two excerpts would definitely prove that the opinions that were cited by Dignaga as the second and the third propositions are those of the Sautrantika (i.e. Sutra-sect) and the Neo-Sarvastivadin (i.e. Nyaya-master)

respectively. It is well-known that both these schools⁶ are staunch advocates of the atomic theory of matter. The fundamental difference between them is that while the Sarvastivadin regarded the indivisible atom as the direct object of our experience the Sautrantika assigned such position to the compound of atoms, the indivisible atom being cognisable (according to him) by non-sensuous consciousness (*mano-vijnana*). (v. Vol. iii.f.20a 1,7,-f. 20b, 1.1). For the Mahayanist even the indivisible atoms are conventionally real and included in the *Dharmāyatana* (12th. of 12 bases of dharmas, elements of existence). The Mahayanist further maintains that only great things can disintegrate into small particles (called atoms); but the converse is not true i.e. small particles cannot combine to constitute great things (*Ibid.* f. 20b, 11.1-3.)