jats:titleAbstract</jats:title>jats:pThe post‐<jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">M</jats:styled-content>aastricht period is marked by an integration paradox. While the basic constitutional features of the <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">E</jats:styled-content>uropean Union have remained stable, <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">EU</jats:styled-content> activity has expanded to an unprecedented degree. This form of integration without supranationalism is no exception or temporary deviation from traditional forms of <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">E</jats:styled-content>uropean integration. Rather, it is a distinct phase of <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">E</jats:styled-content>uropean integration, what is called ‘the new intergovernmentalism’ in this article. This approach to post‐<jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">M</jats:styled-content>aastricht integration challenges theories that associate integration with transfers of competences from national capitals to supranational institutions and those that reduce integration to traditional socioeconomic or security‐driven interests. This article explains the integration paradox in terms of transformations in <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">E</jats:styled-content>urope's political economy, changes in preference formation and the decline of the ‘permissive consensus’. It presents a set of six hypotheses that develop further the main claims of the new intergovernmentalism and that can be used as a basis for future research.</jats:p>