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Does the repugnant conclusion have any probative force?

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Peer-reviewed

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Abstract

In engaging with the repugnant conclusion many contemporary philosophers, economists and social scientists make claims about what a minimally good life is like. For example, some claim that such a life is quite good by contemporary standards, and use this to defend classical utilitarianism, whereas others claim that it is not, and use this to uphold the challenge that the repugnant conclusion poses to classical utilitarianism. I argue that many of these claims—by both sides—are not well-founded. We have no sufficiently clear sense of what a minimally good life is like. It is a result of this that the repugnant conclusion doesn’t license us in drawing any interesting conclusions.

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Keywords

repugnant conclusion, wellbeing, population ethics

Journal Title

Philosophical Studies

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Journal ISSN

0031-8116
1573-0883

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Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC