Does the repugnant conclusion have any probative force?
Published version
Peer-reviewed
Repository URI
Repository DOI
Change log
Authors
Cowie, Christopher https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5503-4695
Abstract
In engaging with the repugnant conclusion many contemporary philosophers, economists and social scientists make claims about what a minimally good life is like. For example, some claim that such a life is quite good by contemporary standards, and use this to defend classical utilitarianism, whereas others claim that it is not, and use this to uphold the challenge that the repugnant conclusion poses to classical utilitarianism. I argue that many of these claims—by both sides—are not well-founded. We have no sufficiently clear sense of what a minimally good life is like. It is a result of this that the repugnant conclusion doesn’t license us in drawing any interesting conclusions.
Description
Keywords
repugnant conclusion, wellbeing, population ethics
Journal Title
Philosophical Studies
Conference Name
Journal ISSN
0031-8116
1573-0883
1573-0883
Volume Title
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC