Scholarly Works - Trinity College
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Item Open Access Accepted version Peer-reviewed Francis Bacon and ‘The Summe of the Bible’(Oxford University Press, 2017-06-01) Serjeantson, R; Serjeantson, Richard [0000-0002-5795-8055]At some point in 1639, the scholarly Justinian Isham heard of an intriguing manuscript by Francis Bacon (1561–1626) in the possession of Sir Christopher Hatton. Samuel Hartlib recorded Isham’s information in his Ephemerides: it was apparently ‘a MS. of Verulam containing an Epitome of the Histories of the Bibel’.1 In September Isham took the opportunity to see this document.Item Open Access Accepted version Peer-reviewed Partiality and Retrospective Justification(Wiley, 2017-12) Salow, BItem Open Access Accepted version Peer-reviewed Shelley’s Vestimentary Poetics(Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018-10-01) Freer, AWThe figures of veils in Shelley’s poetics have long been understood as an inconsistent and potentially confused contribution to a debate between representational and expressive accounts of language. However, Shelley’s veils are crucial to a broader range of aesthetic and ethical questions in his poetics, and when read alongside the related figures of clothing, armor, uniform, dress and draped curtain, these vestimentary figures underwrite some of the most ambitious of Shelley’s claims: that poetry is infinite and yet tangible, that it contains “eternal truth” while existing within a historical context, and that it does not compete with but underwrites the work of reason.Item Open Access Accepted version Peer-reviewed Poetics Contra Psychoanalysis(Duke University Press, 2019-12-01) Freer, AWThis essay argues that psychoanalytic literary criticism has largely failed because it has assumed that literature and psychoanalysis share common analytical ground. I contend that psychoanalytic approaches necessarily deform literature, that literary readings deform psychoanalytic theory, and that the assumption of commonality between poetics and psychoanalysis causes psychoanalytic literary criticism to go astray. I advocate the opposite approach: setting poetics against psychoanalysis, contending that where their mutual tension and disfigurement is recognized and investigated, psychoanalysis and literature can become genuinely available to one another.Item Open Access Accepted version Peer-reviewed Transparency and the KK Principle(Wiley, 2018-03) Das, Nilanjan; Salow, BernhardAbstractAn important question in epistemology is whether the KK principle is true, i.e., whether an agent who knows that p is also thereby in a position to know that she knows that p. We explain how a “transparency” account of self‐knowledge, which maintains that we learn about our attitudes towards a proposition by reflecting not on ourselves but rather on that very proposition, supports an affirmative answer. In particular, we show that such an account allows us to reconcile a version of the KK principle with an “externalist” or “reliabilist” conception of knowledge commonly thought to make that principle particularly problematic.Item Open Access Accepted version Peer-reviewed The Externalist’s Guide to Fishing for Compliments(Oxford University Press (OUP), 2018-07-01) Salow, BernhardSuppose you’d like to believe that $\textit{p}$ (for example, that you are popular), whether or not it’s true. What can you do to help? A natural initial thought is that you could engage in $\textit{Intentionally Biased Inquiry}$: you could look into whether $\textit{p}$, but do so in a way that you expect to predominantly yield evidence in favour of $\textit{p}$. This paper hopes to do two things. The first is to argue that this initial thought is mistaken: intentionally biased inquiry is impossible. The second is to show that reflections on intentionally biased inquiry strongly support a controversial ‘access’ principle which states that, for all $\textit{p}$, if $\textit{p}$ is (not) part of our evidence, then that $\textit{p}$ is (not) part of our evidence is itself part of our evidence.Item Open Access Published version Peer-reviewed Taking a chance on KK(Springer, 2018) Goodman, J; Salow, BDorr et al. (Philos Stud 170:277–287, 2014) present a case that poses a challenge for a number of plausible principles about knowledge and objective chance. Implicit in their discussion is an interesting new argument against KK, the principle that anyone who knows p is in a position to know that they know p. We bring out this argument, and investigate possible responses for defenders of KK, establishing new connections between KK and various knowledge-chance principles.