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The Argument from Surprise

Accepted version
Peer-reviewed

Type

Article

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Authors

Currie, AM 

Abstract

I develop an account of productive surprise as an epistemic virtue of scientific investigations which does not turn on psychology alone. On my account, a scientific investigation is potentially productively surprising when (1) results can conflict with epistemic expectations, (2) those expectations pertain to a wide set of subjects. I argue that there are two sources of such surprise in science. One source, often identified with experiments, involves bringing our theoretical ideas in contact with new empirical observations. Another, often identified with simulations, involves articulating and bringing together different parts of our knowledge. Both experiments and simulations, then, can surprise.

Description

Keywords

5003 Philosophy, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies, 5002 History and Philosophy Of Specific Fields, Clinical Research

Journal Title

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Conference Name

Journal ISSN

0045-5091
1911-0820

Volume Title

48

Publisher

Taylor & Francis
Sponsorship
Templeton World Charity Foundation (TWCF) (177155)
Some of the research for this publication was made possible through the support of a grant from Templeton World Charity Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Templeton World Charity Foundation.