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Epistemic normativity in Kant's “Second Analogy”

Published version
Peer-reviewed

Type

Article

Change log

Abstract

jats:titleAbstract</jats:title>jats:pIn the “Second Analogy,” Kant argues that, unless mental contents involve the concept of causation, they cannot represent an objective temporal sequence. According to Kant, deploying the concept of causation renders a certain temporal ordering of representations necessary, thus enabling objective representational purport. One exegetical question that remains controversial is this: how, and in what sense, does deploying the concept of cause render a certain ordering of representations jats:italicnecessary</jats:italic>? I argue that this necessitation is a matter of epistemic normativity: with certain causal presuppositions in place, the individual is obliged to make a judgment with certain temporal contents, on pain of irrationality. To make this normatively obligatory judgment, the subject must place her perceptual representations in a certain order. This interpretation fits Kant's text, his argumentative aims, and his broader views about causal inference, better than rival interpretations can. This result has important consequences for the ongoing debate over the role of normativity in Kant's philosophy of mind.</jats:p>

Description

Keywords

5003 Philosophy, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies, 5002 History and Philosophy Of Specific Fields

Journal Title

European Journal of Philosophy

Conference Name

Journal ISSN

0966-8373
1468-0378

Volume Title

27

Publisher

Wiley
Sponsorship
AHRC (1652932)
Leverhulme Trust