Comparative pride is the pride one can take in how one compares to others. In a recent paper, Christopher Morgan-Knapp (2019) argues that though such pride is commonly culturally affirmed, it is not only morally or prudentially questionable, but that it should be rejected on wholly theoretical grounds: it ‘presents things as being some way they are not’ (Morgan-Knapp 2019: 317). He thus argues that comparative pride is never warranted. I aim to show here that his main argument for thinking this is unsuccessful. First, it misidentifies the object of comparative pride, and second, it hinges on considerations that undermine the warrant for non-comparative as well as comparative pride. I then discuss a second argument suggested by his paper. I argue that though this argument is plausible, it depends on substantive ethical assumptions. I thus conclude that his arguments do not succeed in showing that comparative pride is theoretically mistaken.