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Who takes bribes and how much? Evidence from the China Corruption Conviction Databank

Accepted version
Peer-reviewed

Type

Article

Change log

Authors

Aidt, TS 
Hillman, AL 
Qijun, LIU 

Abstract

Numerous empirical studies have sought to compare corruption across regions or countries, but it is individuals who are corrupt, not regions or countries. Studies of corruption should therefore investigate individual behavior. This has not been previously possible because of lack of data. We use individual-level data from the China Corruption Conviction Databank compiled at Huazhong University of Science and Technology to investigate bribe-taking among officials in local-government public-administration and parallel Communist Party bureaucracies. We find that bribes that officials received systematically increase with positions at higher levels of official hierarchies. Economic authority to decide on spending and regulation is associated with receiving greater bribes than being in administrative positions. Consistent with life-cycle incentives, entry-level and retirement-approaching officials take higher bribes than middle-aged officials. Being more educated does not deter corruption but on the contrary is associated with taking higher bribes. Gender is not correlated with the size of the bribes taken. We link our empirical results on bribes to rent seeking in bureaucratic hierarchies.

Description

Keywords

3801 Applied Economics, 38 Economics, 44 Human Society, 4407 Policy and Administration, 4408 Political Science, 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

Journal Title

World Development

Conference Name

Journal ISSN

0305-750X
1873-5991

Volume Title

133

Publisher

Elsevier BV