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Firstā€mover disadvantage: the sovereign ratings mousetrap

Published version
Peer-reviewed

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Authors

Kraemer, Moritz 
Vu, Huong 

Abstract

jats:titleAbstract</jats:title>jats:pUsing 102 sovereigns rated by the three largest credit rating agencies (CRA), S&P, Moody's and Fitch between January 2000 and January 2019, we document that the firstā€mover CRA (S&P) in downgrades falls into a commercial trap. Namely, each sovereign downgrade by one notch by the firstā€mover CRA (S&P) results in 2.4% increase in the probability of a rating contract being cancelled by the sovereign client. The more downgrades S&P makes in a given month, the more their sovereign rating coverage falls relative to its rivals. Our results are more pronounced for downgrades on small sovereign borrowers than on large sovereign borrowers. This paper explores the interaction between three themes of the literature: herding behaviour amongst CRAs, issues of conflict of interest and ratings quality. Our empirical evidence gives credence to, and underscores the need for sovereign ratings to be made in an impartial way and independent of their commercial ramifications elsewhere in the CRA.</jats:p>

Description

Keywords

3502 Banking, Finance and Investment, 35 Commerce, Management, Tourism and Services

Journal Title

Financial Markets, Institutions &amp; Instruments

Conference Name

Journal ISSN

0963-8008
1468-0416

Volume Title

Publisher

Wiley