1. The difference according to Johnson is that universals of law apply over a wider range than do universals of fact, i.e. over a wider range than everything, which is impossible (since even non-existing things are everything).

2. The difference according to Bracteate many is that when א is ב, all have ב is a universal of fact it is short for this א is ב, that א is ב ...; this is not true; the fact was universal may in the 1st instance be discovered in this sense, but as soon as it is told to someone else it ceases to have this sense, because the hearer does not know how many אs there are, but merely that all that they are are ב. But this does not mean that to the hearer the universal is one law.

3. The difference according to Braithwaite is that universals of law are believed for on grounds which are not demonstrative. This will not do because:
   
   (a) some universals of law are not believed at all 
   (b) some universals of fact are believed on non-demonstrative grounds 
   (c) some universals of law are believed on grounds which in his sense are demonstrative.

   Anyone of these contentions is enough to upset his distinction. 
   Let us take them in turn.
4 (a) we many of us think many characteristics of animals are caused by characteristics of the parent chromosomes of the uniting cells; but on Brathwaites view to think this is to think that we know what characteristics of the chromosomes they are; it is not enough to say (QP1: q chromosomes Y R(WH)X(R)); if we say the causal is causal we mean (QP1: q chromosomes Y R(WH)X(R)) is believed which is patently false until q has been discovered.

It might be replied that what we want is not to be believed but either “will be believed”, “would be believed”, “could be believed”

5 of these amended versions “will” clearly will not do; the causes of hereditary characteristics are not altered, if a new barbarian invasion checks the progress of science; “would” would be circular as it means “if certain circumstances would cause it to be believed”, could “be believed” would either mean this too or something else subsequently radically different to be considered later

6 (b) What is clearly only a universal of fact e.g. “everyone was asked” may easily not be believed on demonstrative grounds; e.g. it may be believed on testimony; or because I said something which anyone who was awake would probably have assumed

7 (c) This point is not so clear as the others, owing to an ambiguity as to what “universal of law” is supposed to include; if it means a universal whose application is not explicitly mentioned, particularisation of statement subject term does not contain any explicit or implicit statio-terminal limitation, it would be better to make this clearly part of the definition. Otherwise take
Whenever this balloon was filled with hydrogen and let go, it 
rose; this is such a universal of law and yet might be 
believed as a result of observing all its instances.

In order to get nearer a correct solution let us classify universals 
a little more precisely: we have the following classes

1) The ultimate laws of nature

2) Derivative laws of nature, i.e., general propositions deducible 
   from the ultimate laws

3) What are called laws in a loose sense; i.e., general propositions 
   deducible from the ultimate laws together with various 
   facts of existence assumed to be known by everyone 
   e.g., bodies fall.

4) Universal of fact; but these cannot be sharply 
   distinguished from (3) ; on a determinist view all of 
   them could be deducible from the ultimate laws together 
   with enough facts of existence.

This table of classes might perhaps suggest the following solution;
the fundamental distinction is between (1) and (2) on the one 
hand, and (3) and (4) on the other, and it is that universals in 
classes (1) and (2) mention no particular portion of space-time 
whereas those in (3) and (4) do; hence the need for particular 
information to deduce them. Between (1) and (2), and between (3) 
and (4) the distinction is a vague one, on the first case of artificial 
arrangement; in the second, if at least one fact required for their deduction
This solution would not, however, do, because there are universals belonging to (3) and (4), which mention no particular portion of space time but still do not follow from the ultimate laws. Thus all conservative prime ministers of England between 1903 and 1928 have names beginning with B; and so probably all conservative prime ministers of a country with 40,000,000 - 50,000,000 inhabitants, whose capital is called London and has 7,000,000 inhabitants — at a time when that country has between 2 - 27 years previously lost a queen who has ruled for 64 years and have their names beginning with B. If we had in enough detail we shall (unless the world repeats itself endlessly with just one detail different each time) get a true generalisation which mentions no particular portion of space time but this would not be a law of nature.

Looking at the table again it is clear that if we can define class (1), the distinction of (a) follows at once, and the difference between (2) and (4) would easily be explained as follows: often no further difficulty.

What then is the difference between universals of classes (1 and 2) and (3 and 4)? We have seen that it is not their historical-temporal difference, nor that they are believed; nor we may remark combination of these characters, for whatever is not the fact that it is believed or might be believed is quite irrelevant; any thing whatsoever can be believed on authority or testimony. Also the difference would still be true if we knew everything.
This last point gives us the clue to the matter; even if we knew everything, we should still want to systematise our knowledge as a deductive system, and the general axioms in that system would be the fundamental laws of nature. The choice of axioms is bound to some extent to be arbitrary, but what is likely to be arbitrary is a body of fundamental generalisations, some to be taken as axioms and others declined. Other true generalisations will then only be able to be declined from these by the help of particular facts of existence. These fundamental generalisations will then be our universal of classes (1) and (2) the axioms forming class (1).

As it is, we do not know everything, but what we do know, we tend to organise as a deductive system and call its axioms laws, and we consider how that system could be extended if we knew a little more and called it the further axioms there would then be laws (we think there would be one of a certain kind but not all truth know exactly what). We also think how everything could be organised as a deductive system and call its axioms ultimate laws.

The property of a universal to be an axiom in a deductive system covering everything is not really hypothetical; the concept of a universal comprises it as such; if we assert it is simply something about the whole truth, that it is such that one general proposition is of such forms that they would have to be true. It is a system, the form in question is known not unknown; that they form a system of the required sort; that form it is not people’s beliefs in them in virtue of what is known.

Of course the system is required to be as simple as possible, that is another formal property that we can describe.
It will be objected that when we use the notion of a law as in a statement of causal implication, we do not know say anything about a grand deductive system. The answer is that we do do this so soon as we pass through beyond material implication. But that the important part of statements of causal implication is always just the material or formal implication which has no reference to system. It is only the philosopher or moralist who or emotionalist who is interested in the rest. All the practical man scientist wants to know is that all people who take arsenic die, not that this is a causal implication, for a universal of fact is within to see something just as good a guide to conduct as a universal of law.

16 A danger always to be thought of, is that belief being a causal fact we must not involve it in the analysis of cause. The above theory avoids that see § 14. Another way of avoiding it is to say that the belief of any, that occurs in the analysis of cause is belief shared of causalities is with the causal implications reduced to material ones.

17 The laws involved in causal implications are classes (1, 2) above. Not class (3); in the cases in which we should naturally appeal to a universal of class (3) we can by extending our make for an instance of one of class (2) instead; and it is the possibility of doing this which in effect destroys universal class (3) from class (4) within the implied limitations.