Anglo-Moroccan Relations in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries, with Particular Reference to the Role of Gibraltar

James A. O. C. Brown, St. John’s College
Trinity Term, 2009

Supervised by Dr. Amira Bennison

This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Faculty of Asian & Middle Eastern Studies, University of Cambridge
Statements of Originality & Length

I declare that this dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration, except where specifically indicated in the text; and that it is not substantially the same as any submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at this or any other university.

I also declare that this dissertation does not exceed the word limits specified by the Degree Committee of the Faculty of Asian & Middle Eastern Studies, i.e. of 80,000 words exclusive of footnotes, appendices and bibliography, and 100,000 words exclusive of bibliography.

Signed

James A. O. C. Brown
Acknowledgements

It is sadly impossible to acknowledge here all who have helped me to complete this dissertation. Without doubt there are those who deserve my thanks but whom I have forgotten, as a result of poor memory or inflated ego. There are others whom the course of life had already taken away before I finished, who nevertheless contributed to it in many very important ways. To the former I apologise, and about the latter I express my regret. It is equally impossible to indicate the extent of my debt to those whom I can acknowledge. It is, however, a pleasure to try. The Arts & Humanities Research Council provided the financial support without which I would never been able to undertake this research. To all those I can now, with honour, call colleagues, who took a generous interest in a nascent career, I am very grateful: firstly and above all, to Dr. Amira Bennison, my supervisor, whose guidance and patience were invaluable; to Dr. Michael Brett, who cheerfully interrupted his retirement to guide my first faltering steps into Moroccan history; to Prof. William Clarence-Smith and Dr. William O’Reilly, both of whom give excellent advice and encouraged me to see the bigger picture. Others gave crucial help during the process of research, particularly Dr. Nadia Erzini in Tangier; Ustadha Hasna Da’ud in Tetuan; Dr. Khalid Ben Srhir; Dr. Sam Benady in Gibraltar; and Dr. Kate Fleet in (the scholarship of) the Ottoman Empire. Prof. David Abulafia and Prof. Mohamed El Mansour gave generously of their time to examine this dissertation, and gave very helpful feedback. Behind the scenes at the Faculty of Asian & Middle Eastern Studies, Natasha Sabah smoothed the way by dealing with voluminous paperwork efficiently and cheerfully. The staff at the National Archive, the British Library and the Gibraltar Government Archives were unfailingly professional and helpful; those at the Direction des Archives Royales and the Bibliothèque Royale in Rabat, equally so and wonderfully hospitable besides. For their practical help with accommodation and great kindness in Morocco, I am very grateful to the Sbitri family. During frequent moments of self-doubt and frustration, I was extremely fortunate always to be able to rely on the intellectual, emotional and culinary support of friends from both Cambridge and SOAS, in particular Avais Amin, Bilal Badat, Dr. Mohsin Badat, Igor Cherstich, George Damoulakis, Dr. Lejla Demiri, Chiara Formichi, Dr. Shahid Hanif, Ashraf-ul-Hoque,
Hasan Al Khoee, Samir Mahmoud, Tahmer Mahmoud, Aiysha Malik, Faris Nasrallah, Amina Nawaaz, Majid Nawaaz, Mike Perfect, William Rook, Karima Sbitri, Arash Sedighi and Mujadad Zaman. Above anyone else, I am grateful to my parents, whose love, encouragement and practical support have been unfailing, and to whom I could never adequately express my thanks. From all of these people, I should have learned much more; their efforts to teach and help me are not sufficiently reflected in this work, the responsibility for the errors and shortcomings of which is, of course, mine alone.
Summary

This dissertation presents new evidence about Anglo-Moroccan relations in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, with particular reference to the development of the links between the Gharb region of Morocco and Gibraltar and the establishment of the Moroccan consulate there. This evidence is used to re-evaluate prevailing arguments about Moroccan isolationism, especially during the reign of Mawlay Sulaymān (r. 1792-1822), linking this to the nature of the Moroccan sultanate’s foreign and trade policy over the longer term.

It is argued that the Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh’s (r. 1757-90) well-known ‘opening up’ of the country should be seen not just as a response to European expansion, but also as a continuation of the sultanate’s historical development as a state based partly on the control of trade. It is further argued that Mawlay Sulaymān and his successor Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān (r. 1822-59) essentially followed Sīdī Muḥammad’s policy.

With reference to this context, the dissertation analyses the development of the Moroccan consulate in Gibraltar, including re-dating its initial establishment. The example of the consulate is also applied to reconsidering dominant assumptions about the role of religious discourse in limiting Morocco’s contact with the outside world by assessing the wider social and economic context in which it operated, specifically the growth of trade between Gibraltar and the Gharb and the related development of a group of both Jewish and Muslim Moroccan merchants who partly conducted it. The dissertation finally assesses the political importance of these trade links and commercial interests, and how they influenced the operation of power and authority in the Gharb.

The overall case is presented in the context of a critique of civilisational or culturalist approaches to the study of reactions to European expansion and modernity that prioritise cultural difference between Western and, in this case, Muslim societies. It is argued that the Straits of Gibraltar – a ubiquitous symbol of the supposed dividing line between different civilisations – actually illustrate the importance of the interaction between different societies for accurately understanding their development and the agency of actors on both sides.
Contents

Notes on Abbreviations, Transliterations, Spellings & Dates  p. i

List of Tables & Figures  p. ii

Introduction  p. 1

Chapter 1 – Trade & Foreign Policy in Morocco before 1790  p. 27

Chapter 2 – Continuities in Makhzan Trade & Foreign Policy after 1790  p. 64

Chapter 3 – The Moroccan Consulate at Gibraltar: its Development, Function & Significance  p. 107

Chapter 4 – Trade between Gibraltar & the Gharb Ports  p. 140

Chapter 5 – Jewish & Muslim Intermediaries between the Gharb Ports & Gibraltar  p. 164

Chapter 6 – Gibraltar, the British & the Politics of the Gharb  p. 189

Conclusion  p. 210

Bibliography  p. 219
Notes on Abbreviations, Transliteration, Spellings & Dates

Abbreviations

BL – British Library
EI2 – Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edn.
GGA – Gibraltar Government Archives
HCPP – House of Commons Parliamentary Papers
KH – Al-Khizāna al-Ḥāsāniyya
MM – Ma’lamat al-Maghrib / Encyclopédie du Maroc
MWM – Muḍiriyat al-Wathā’iq al-Malikiyya
NA – National Archives
SIHM - Les sources inédites de l’histoire du Maroc

Transliteration & Spellings

Arabic is transliterated here according to the Encyclopaedia of Islam system as modified by the International Journal of Middle East Studies. The names of well-known places and dynasties are spelled according to normal English usage rather than transliterated (e.g. Tetuan and Sa’di, not Tīṭwān and Sa’dī); names of places with no common English spelling are transliterated (e.g. al-Qaṣr al-Kabīr). Adjectives of place referring to Arabic place names are given in the Anglicised form of the Arabic adjective (e.g. Fesi, Tetuani). The transliteration of names in general reflects classical Arabic usage rather than local Moroccan pronunciation wherever possible (e.g. al-‘Arabī and Muḥammad, not al-‘Arbī and M’ḥammad). Wherever an Arabic name is known only from an English source and its Arabic spelling is not obvious, it is given first in inverted commas (e.g. ‘Amegiau’, thereafter Amegiau). References to letters written in English addressed to Moroccans give the spelling of the name as it appears in the source in brackets after its transliteration (e.g. GGA Misc. 1807, Hew Dalrymple, acting governor of Gibraltar, to ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ‘Ash‘āsh, governor of Tetuan [‘El Hadgee Abdarhaman Hash Hash’], 16 December 1806). Jewish names are spelled according to the usage of the Encyclopaedia Judaica wherever possible, and in other cases according to their spellings as they appear in the sources.
Dates

Dates are given according to the Common Era, except for original sources dated according to Anno Hijrae, in which case the reference gives the A.H. date followed by the C.E. equivalent in brackets.

List of Tables & Figures

Figure 1: Value of Goods Imported into Morocco, 1835-43 between pp. 158-9
Figure 2: Value of Goods Exported from Morocco, 1835-43 " "
Figure 3: Volume of Shipping in Morocco by Nation, 1836-52 " "
Table 1: British Ships Calling at Moroccan Ports p. 160
Table 2: Number & Average Size of Ships at Moroccan Ports, 1837-43 p. 160
Figure 4: British Trade in Morocco, 1834-44 between pp. 161-2
Table 3: Number & Average Size of Moroccan Merchant Ships, 1836-45 p. 162
Table 4: Average Trade of Moroccan Ports, 1836-45 p. 162
Table 5: Merchants Guaranteed by the Moroccan Consulate at Gibraltar, 5 December 1831 – 1 December 1832 p. 174
Table 6: Moroccan Merchants Admitted to Gibraltar in 1832 & 1834 p. 176
Table 7: Applications by Moroccans for Extended Stays in Gibraltar, 1832 & 1834-5 p. 177
**Introduction**

On 14 August 1844, the army of Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahmān (r. 1822-59) was defeated by an invading French force under General Bugeaud at the Battle of Isly, west of the town of Oujda near the Moroccan-Algerian border. Along with the French bombardment of Tangier and Essaouira in the same month, the defeat marked a significant moment in Morocco’s modern relations with the rest of the world as the country was confronted directly by the growth of European strength. The following year, a Moroccan embassy under ‘Abd al-Qādir ‘Ashāsh, the governor (qā‘īd) of Tetuan, was sent to France, where the members of the mission witnessed themselves the technological and organisational developments in Europe.

Many historians see the defeat of 1844 and the subsequent Moroccan embassy to France as the dramatic end of a period of isolation that had begun the better part of half a century earlier under Mawlay Sulaymān (r. 1792-1822). According to Gilson Miller, for example, translator and editor of an account of ‘Ashāsh’s embassy by his secretary Muḥammad al-Ṣaffār, ‘the near-total break in Morocco’s relations with the West lasted more than a generation. During the interval Western Europe had metamorphosed in ways most Moroccans could not imagine’.¹ Thus part of the Moroccans’ mission in 1845 was to observe and report on these changes in an attempt to comprehend France’s power. As Gilson Miller goes on to argue, ‘through [al-Ṣaffār’s] minute descriptions of the new (and almost everything is new), we feel the texture of the cultural encounter’ as Morocco began to emerge from its self-imposed separation from the modern world.²

Focusing generally on the century between the accession of Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh (r. 1757-90) and the signing of the Anglo-Moroccan Treaty of 1856, but particularly on the reign of Mawlay Sulaymān, under whom Morocco’s isolationism is generally believed to have reached its zenith (or nadir, depending on one’s viewpoint), this thesis will consider what, it will be argued, was an important exception to this supposed isolation: the relations between Morocco and the British

---


² *ibid.*, p. 4.
colony of Gibraltar. Modern historians have generally overlooked the significance
of the links between Gibraltar and Morocco, yet these connections suggest a more
complex understanding of Morocco’s relations with the outside world during this
crucial period.

The relations between Gibraltar and Morocco links were manifest in the
establishment of the Moroccan consulate in the British town, which was Morocco’s
only permanent consulate or embassy before its independence from France in 1956.
Its significance is indicated in a letter from Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahmān to Muḥammad
‘Ash‘āsh, ‘Abd al-Qādir’s father and predecessor as governor of Tetuan, just a few
months after the Battle of Isly:

Regarding Gibraltar, it has become necessary to take care to appoint an
energetic agent [wakīl] there who can take care of the affairs of the
merchants, the pilgrims who come there and others, because it
dominate our trade and is the gateway of exports and imports [li-
annahu mu‘zam al-tijāra wa-bāb al-ṣādir wa-‘l-wārid]. Our servant Hajj
Haddu Gassūs has become too old and weak for it, and we decided to
appoint our servant, the intelligent Hajj Muḥammad al-Raẓīnī, as agent
there when we heard of his excellent conduct, his resolute ambition
and his knowledge of the laws which attends his constant presence
there undertaking the affairs of his trade.⁵

Even from this short extract, we can see that Gibraltar was well established as a key
point of contact for Morocco with wider networks of trade and transport by 1844.

From this observation arise some of the questions that this thesis is intended
to address; namely, why the Moroccan sultanate established the consulate, what its
significance was, and what the links between Morocco and Gibraltar demonstrate in
general about the nature of the country’s relationship with the wider world. To
begin to answer these, this Introduction will firstly review the prevalent
historiographical assumptions regarding the period, and explain how the research
presented here relates to them. It will then define the main sources that have been

⁵ Al-Khizāna al-Ḥasaniyya, Rabat (hereafter KH) III-2-18. For further details on references to sources
from this archive, see below, p. 22.
used before summarising the arguments that the subsequent chapters are intended to substantiate.

The widest historiographical context for the study of Morocco is defined by the country’s position as part of the Muslim world, and of the ‘non-West’ generally.\(^4\) There is not space in this study to examine the voluminous and diverse responses provoked by Edward Said’s *Orientalism*, but it is now widely accepted that at the very least modern scholarship concerning Islam and Muslims, as on other non-Western societies, was for a long time characterized by Eurocentrism, ‘the belief that the West occupies the normative starting position for constructing general knowledge [so that] almost all our categories . . . have been conceptualized primarily on the basis of Western historical experience’.\(^5\) Whether this is a useful approach or otherwise is a different question and remains open to debate. In any case, it has created a long-standing and influential sense that the Muslim world was an essentially different civilisation or culture from Europe or the West.\(^6\)

An important aspect of this sense of cultural difference, to which we have already alluded in the case of Morocco, was the contrast, whether implicit or explicit, between the dynamism of the outward-looking West and the insularity and passivity of Muslim societies. This is one of many pairs of opposites by which the relationship of ‘West’ and ‘East’ have been discursively constructed, also including rational/irrational, democratic/despotnic, economically progressive/economically

\(^4\) Obviously the use of the terms ‘Morocco’ and ‘Moroccan’ to indicate or describe a political entity or even a geographical area before the modern period is problematic. It is used in this thesis with reference to the period before the Sa’di dynasty as a purely geographical term, meaning the approximate area that is now the modern state of Morocco, to distinguish it from the rest of the wider Maghrib. Used in reference to subsequent periods, these terms refer to the place and the dynasty that ruled it, in the awareness this might strictly be considered anachronistic. Although this usage is somewhat arbitrary, it is adopted here with its shortcomings for the sake of convenience.


stagnant etc.\textsuperscript{7} Whereas the history of Europe is almost entirely defined at some level at least by the axial ‘age of expansion’, it has seemed until very recently almost absurd to write a history of Muslim perceptions of the outside world, even to those who actually did so.\textsuperscript{8} The wider theoretical literature on the nature of the encounter between ‘the West’ and ‘the Rest’ has generally accepted this picture of ‘Muslim indifference to Europe, conditioned by a negative evaluation of Christianity as a superseded revelation and by the conviction that European culture had little to admire’\textsuperscript{9}.

It is well known that this kind of Eurocentrism has been challenged on many fronts, and looks rather dated, perhaps, to some scholars, even irrelevant. However, the sense of a fundamental divide between cultures retains a powerful popular and political resonance, notably through the ‘clash of civilizations’ theory. Nor should its continued influence on scholarship be underestimated. Even some works that explicitly attempt to reject the implications of this approach seem unable to avoid its underlying assumptions that history is defined primarily by cultural differences, and that the particular culture of the ‘the West’ explains its rise to power in the modern age.\textsuperscript{10}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{7} See Hobson, Eastern Origins, pp. 8 & 16.
\textsuperscript{8} See Bernard Lewis, The Muslim Discovery of Europe (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982); Ibrahim Abu Lughod, The Arab Rediscovery of Europe: a study in cultural encounters (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963). Lewis, for example, contrasts the development of Western scholarship on ‘the Middle East’ to ‘the almost total lack of interest displayed by Middle Easterners in the languages, cultures, and religions of Europe’ (Lewis, The Muslim Discovery of Europe, p. 297).
Certainly an increasing amount of work is now being done to interrogate the validity of this approach, adding to earlier groundbreaking work. It has focused, on the one hand, on presenting detailed evidence in particular cases to show the importance of cultural hybridity and the permeability of frontiers, physical or cultural. As Jaspanoff has said in her study of this kind, 'it is easy to speak of a “clash of civilizations” when cultures are distilled to the point of abstraction. But real people in the real world do not necessarily experience other cultures in a confrontational or monolithic way'.11 On the other hand, it has also attempted to account for the agency of non-Europeans in these encounters, asserting the importance of local conditions and mutual adaptations in what has been called 'the interactive emergence of European domination'.12 This type of work has fuelled the development in recent years of new frameworks that seek to overturn the theory of

---


12 John E. Willis Jr., 'Maritime Asia, 1500-1800: The Interactive Emergence of European Domination', American Historical Review 98 (1993), pp. 83-105. Some recent work has also begun to examine this process as it continued into the colonial era, examining the means by which local officials and others shaped the nature of the colonial state (see Benjamin N. Lawrance, Emily Lynn Osborn and Richard L. Roberts, eds., Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks: African Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa (London & Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006)).
Western exceptionalism, particularly the approaches referred to collectively as world history.\textsuperscript{13}

In general, however, although researchers have overturned older, Eurocentric assumptions in many particular areas of study, and although there has been considerable debate surrounding the redefinition of the paradigm of global historical change, these achievements remain tentative and partial. Consequently, the general influence of older scholarly assumptions about the defining cultural essence of Muslim societies lingers on in the many areas of scholarship where no work has been done to consider its continuing value.

In the case of Morocco, the influence of this civilisational or culturalist paradigm remains notably strong, particularly the idea of Muslim insularity and passivity in the face of European expansion. The supposed isolationism and extreme conservatism, even xenophobia, of the Moroccan state and society have been influential themes of the historiography of the country since the beginnings of European academic study of it. They were related to the idea that Morocco had failed to develop after the more spectacular achievements of the medieval period, and had subsided into a period of stagnation from which it could only be awakened by the stimulus of the contact with Europe that it sought to avoid. This of course reflected the assumptions of the period of Europe’s colonial expansion, which were often expressed in concomitantly value-laden language, describing Morocco as, for example, ‘the most barbarous, the most backwards, the most unchanging of countries’.\textsuperscript{14}

The expression of this kind of judgmental stance has been tempered subsequently; but the assumptions implicit in it have continued to make themselves felt under the cover of the apparently more objective language of modern scholarship, as a result in particular of the ideological hierarchy given physical expression by the French protectorate between 1912 and 1956.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{13} For a recent review of the state of world history and the trends within it, see Raymond Grew, 'Expanding Worlds of World History', \textit{Journal of Modern History}, 78 (2006), pp. 878-98.


\textsuperscript{15} On the development of French study of the Maghrib and its legacy, see Edmund Burke III, 'The sociology of Islam: the French tradition', in Malcom Kerr, ed., \textit{Islamic Studies: A Tradition and its Problems} (Malibu: 1980), pp. 73-88; \textit{idem}, 'Theorizing the Histories of Colonialism and Nationalism in
prejudices of significant elements of earlier European accounts of Morocco ‘congealed into part of the established scholarly canon’.[16] Even the work of scholars who actively criticised French colonialism in North Africa was not immune to this. Julien, for example, summed up the history of Morocco in the centuries leading up to European intervention as:

one of increasingly marked withdrawal . . . Not content with holding out against political seizure, it strictly limited its commercial exchanges with the outside world. It can be said that at the death of Mulay Sliman Morocco was taking virtually no part in the economic life of a world in which commercial exchanges were developing with increasing speed.[17]

Indeed, not just Morocco but the whole of the Maghrib, he argued, was by the early nineteenth century ‘living, withdrawn into its shell, in accordance with standards that had held for thousands of years, and without having been able to evolve in the direction of statehood in its modern form’.[18]

The historiography of the post-independence period in Morocco and the Maghrib generally has challenged many of these earlier conclusions, as might be expected.[19] One significant trend has been to uncover the changing dynamics of nineteenth century Morocco, thereby deconstructing the myth of a medieval country suddenly brought into the modern era in 1912. Schroeter has identified this as one of the most important aspects of the historiography of Morocco in the last twenty-five years, although within this trend the focus has remained primarily on the European pressure that gradually eroded the sovereignty of the Moroccan

---


[18] ibid., p. 343.

sultanate, or makhzan as its government is often known (lit. ‘store house’). The work of Miège has been particularly important in amending the paradigm of Moroccan development by demonstrating the deeper roots of the social and political change engendered by the integration of the country into the capitalist world-system.

However, although very important, this work has had the perhaps unintended effect of reinforcing the perception of an isolated and passive Morocco, even if relocated more specifically on to a longer or shorter period either side of the turn of the eighteenth century, and particularly the reign of Mawlay Sulaymān. Miège, for example, has described Morocco in 1830 as ‘an increasingly closed world on the margins of a Europe on the verge of the Industrial Revolution. Each year increased its withdrawal’. He argued that the effect of the French invasion of Algeria and the commercial changes introduced by Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān together defined a fundamental break with the past. Although elsewhere Miège has rejected the idea of Moroccan isolationism in general, he still identified the period from 1790 to 1830 as one in which ‘Morocco remained isolated from the grand revolutions in Europe in politics, demography and technology, from that growth of men, ideas and money which . . . began the decisive shift in relations between Europe and the rest of the world’.

The persistence of this judgment on the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is partly due to a lack of research into the period, a fact that both reflects and reinforces the continued legacy of colonial historiography. El Moudden has defined ‘the Moroccan eighteenth century’ as, approximately, 1720 to 1830 – that is, from the decline of the sultanic system around the end of Mawlay Ismā‘īl’s reign (r.

---


1672-1727) until the shock of direct European intervention in North Africa with the French invasion of Algeria in 1830; and he has rightly identified it as ‘a gully between the peaks of Moroccan historiography’.

To some extent, this might well have been a result of the relative lack and/or inaccessibility of sources for this period. As El Mansour has noted, there is a gap of more than a century in the significant primary sources so far published, between the end of those collected by de Castries and his successors and those edited more recently under the supervision of the Direction des Archives Royales in Rabat in its journal al-Wathā‘iq (El-Outhaiq). However, the persistence of the paucity of work on this period is also an example perhaps of what Burke has suggested is the entrenchment of some of the structural assumptions of colonial historiography during the simultaneous inversion of its values by ‘nationalist’ and other approaches. Thus, although few would still unreservedly endorse Laroui’s well-known complaint about the poor quality of historians of Morocco, it still rings true perhaps in relation to the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, even if only because of the comparative lack of research into it: ‘these historians refer the reader back to each other and invoke each other’s authority. The consequence is a conspiracy, which puts the most adventurous hypotheses into circulation and ultimately imposes them as established truths’.

---


25 El Mansour, Morocco, p. 221. See also his comments on the emphasis on the nineteenth century in his review of Moroccan historiography (El Mansour, 'Moroccan Historiography', p. 115). There are twenty-four volumes of the work begun by de Castries, Les sources inédites de l’histoire du Maroc (henceforth SIHM), all published in Paris between 1905 and 1960. They collect sources on Moroccan history from the archives of various European countries. They are organised into a first and second series, collecting material on the Sa‘di and ‘Alawi dynasties respectively, each series being organised in sets according to the country the archives of which they collect. Rather than give full publication details, editors’ names etc. for each set referred to, references will be given henceforth as SIHM followed by the series number, country, volume and page number.


El Mansour, author of the only modern work to consider Mawlay Sulaymān’s reign in any depth, which is certainly an exception to Laroui’s description, has consequently noted how for a long time the period ‘constituted a parenthesis in the modern history of Morocco’. From the perspective of earlier, mostly French, historians, he argued, these years were ‘discarded as an era of premeditated isolationism dictated by the religious convictions of a xenophobic sultan’.28 Their judgement was based at least partly on the limits of the French sources of the period, which themselves reflect the attenuated state of Franco-Moroccan relations, culminating not in Morocco’s withdrawal from Europe, but in France’s withdrawal from Morocco. French scholarship subsequently explained the latter by the fiction of the former.29

Having to some degree internalised these judgements, however, Moroccan historians and others have largely skipped over the ‘Moroccan eighteenth century’ on the assumption that it was a period of internal instability and weakness abroad; as El Moudden put it, no longer ‘a stage for Berque’s “founders”, nor . . . yet the time of the European opening and penetration, or of the fevered reactions that it aroused. All-in-all, an unstable equilibrium with little magnetism’.30 In their notable synthesis, for example, Brignon et al. described this period as ‘a century of difficulty and hesitation’, culminating in the defensive isolationism of Mawlay Sulaymān’s rule.31 The ‘ternary myth’ against which Laroui warned us still lingers.32

Partly as a result of this relative lack of interest in this period, the assumption that Morocco slipped into a kind of passive decline out of which it was only jolted ultimately by being ‘opened up’ to European influence remains influential; albeit relocated more or less to the period before 1830 rather than 1912. In his study of Mawlay Sulaymān’s reign, however, El Mansour has provided a very important reassessment of this isolationist paradigm, as some of the references

29 ibid., p. 3
already made to his work indicate.\(^{33}\) In it, he used new sources to correct some factual errors that seemed to support older interpretations, for example that the sultan raised tariffs on all imports to fifty per cent in 1815, which was not in fact the case.\(^{34}\) El Mansour’s main conclusions were that Mawlay Sulaymân’s reign was for the most part stable and prosperous, that Morocco’s relations with the outside world were by no means completely severed, and that the sultan’s reputation for Wahhabi puritanism has been exaggerated.

However, these conclusions have only made themselves partially felt. The old paradigm still exerts a strong influence in different ways, and historians continue to define the crucial watersheds of Moroccan history with reference primarily to the impact of European influence on a country in supposedly willful isolation. Their emphases may vary – be it on 1830 and the French invasion of Algeria, as in Pennell’s recent synthesis; or on 1844, the end of Miller’s ‘near-total break’ with the outside world mentioned at the beginning of this Introduction; or on 1856-60 and the impact of free trade after the Anglo-Moroccan treaty and the Spanish-Moroccan war, as in the work of Burke or Ben Srhir, for example – but the fundamental framework of analysis remains the same.\(^{35}\)

The resilience of this paradigm is partly due to the persistence of the culturalist assumptions that, as we mentioned earlier, continue to define much of the debate generally about the history of Muslim societies. In the case of Morocco, this has manifested itself in both the two main models used to analyse its society and history, despite the contrast between these models in some other respects. Segmentation theory, typified by the work of Gellner, and interpretative anthropology, exemplified by Geertz, both assume a set of essential, unchanging religio-cultural norms, albeit expressed in each case at different levels of society. Both these models have therefore been criticised for failing to take account of

\(^{33}\) This thesis is deeply indebted to the details and insights of Prof. El Mansour’s study, without which it would have been infinitely poorer.


economic and social change.\textsuperscript{36} Michel has described the problem as the ‘tendency to describe non-Western societies as having rigid structures which are based not on economic logic but rather, for example, on religious logic’.\textsuperscript{37} It is through such approaches that the myth of a timeless, unchanging Morocco has continued to make itself felt, despite the many other achievements of modern scholarship.

For the purposes of establishing the framework of this thesis, we will focus on two aspects of the failure of this culturalist or essentialist approach. Firstly, it has tended to explain Morocco’s relations with the outside world primarily, even exclusively, in terms of religious attitudes that are assumed to be unchanging.\textsuperscript{38} The country has been compared, for example, to China in being ‘prevented by an oppressive cultural burden from meeting the challenges of modernization . . . [and] from joining the mainstream of world civilization’.\textsuperscript{39} This ‘cultural burden’ is normally identified with Islam as it was manifested in Morocco, particularly the rise of popular Sufism (sometimes known as ‘maraboutism’), the political role of the shura\textsuperscript{fā} ‘(descendants of the Prophet Muhammad’, sing. shari\textsuperscript{f}‘), and the pursuit of jihi\text{d} ‘(holy war’). An indication of its influence can be seen in the Encyclopaedia of Islam’s entry on the ‘Alawi dynasty, which has ruled from Morocco from the mid-seventeenth century until today:


\textsuperscript{38} It is not possible here to engage substantially with the voluminous debate about phenomenological versus historicizing approaches to the study of religion, as part of which scholars have contested the use of normative religious categories. For some useful comments on this debate with particular reference to historians of Muslim societies, with further references, see Nikki R. Keddie, ‘The Revolt of Islam, 1700 to 1993: Comparative Considerations and Relations to Imperialism’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 36 (1994), pp. 463-87.

When the ‘Alawid šurafa’ succeeded in asserting their sovereignty over Morocco, the country was rent by serious political, social and religious crisis. The great movement of maraboutism and xenophobia, for which the growth of Şūfism and Sharifism and the development of the religious brotherhoods had long paved the way, and which had manifested itself as early as the ۱۵th century, the period of incursions by Portuguese and Spanish Christians on the coasts of Morocco, assumed a new form.

The same entry goes on to assert Mawlay Ismā‘îl’s hatred for the Christian world; that his policy toward Europe was ‘fundamentally negative’, ‘based on holy war and cupidity’ with very little interest in foreign trade; that the country ‘clung obstinately to a kind of paradoxical mediaevalism . . . aloof from the modern world’; that the dynasty’s rule was typified by ‘its xenophobia and attachment to holy war’.۴۰

This approach, however, relies on a problematic circular logic that assumes that Islam has certain characteristics, and events or phenomena are taken as evidence of those assumptions. Other evidence is not allowed to disrupt this hermeneutical circle. For example, it is commonly asserted that before the colonial period Moroccan society, or at least Moroccan Muslims, had little regular contact with the outside world, particularly Europe, because of religious strictures forbidding contact and interaction with non-Muslims, or more precisely, non-Muslim states and their subjects not controlled by Islamic law. To support this, historians often cite the fatāwa (‘legal responsa’) of jurists who condemned trade with and travel to Europe as damaging to Muslim society and morally perilous to the individuals involved.۴۱ This hostility is believed to be related to Morocco’s historical position on the frontier between Christendom and Islam, and to have been reinforced by the arrival of refugees from the Iberian Peninsula over several

centuries. It is also asserted that, as a result of the impossibility of regular contact by Muslims with the outside world, that all or practically all such relationships were delegated to Moroccan Jews or, to a lesser extent, foreign Christian agents. Schroeter, for example, argues that, in as far as Morocco had any permanent diplomatic representation in non-Muslim countries, it was also delegated to Jews with family ties in both places because the residence of Moroccan Muslims in a non-Muslim country was conceptually problematic.

However, these assumptions have to be squared with various phenomena that might suggest a more complex situation. For example, it is known that some Moroccan rulers did encourage foreign trade, or that Muslim Moroccans did travel abroad to trade in Europe and elsewhere. Historians generally explain the former by saying that such policies were only motivated by practical necessity, such as the need to generate revenue or import European weapons, and as such have no bearing on understanding the nature of Moroccan society’s discourse about relations with the outside world. Schroeter has also argued, for example, that ‘foreign trade was permissible to the extent that the revenue from trade would consolidate the power of the ruler whose duty it was to conduct jihad [sic]’. That restrictions on foreign trade might have a ‘practical’ motivation is not a possibility generally entertained.

By this analysis, anything inimical to trade or interaction with other states or cultures is taken as proof of the ‘real’ nature of Moroccan society, while anything that encouraged them is set aside as anomalous. Similarly, any trade carried out by Jews in Morocco is used to assert that only non-Muslims were allowed to act as

---


intermediaries with the outside world; the role of Muslim merchants, if it is acknowledged at all, is not allowed to affect this argument.

The point here is not to deny the significance of elements of Moroccan culture that did construct the country’s relationship with the outside world as primarily confrontational, or of the particular role of Jewish merchants in facilitating commerce with Europe. It is certainly true, for example, that from the Sa’di period onwards jihād to defend Morocco against further European expansion became a crucial element of sultanic legitimacy (albeit at times rhetorical rather than practical).65 It is also true that many Moroccan scholars did oppose foreign trade at different times, and that Jews played a very important role in Morocco’s trade, one disproportionate to their numbers.

However, to use such facts in the circular way just described risks oversimplifying and misrepresenting the overall body of evidence, or closing off potential lines of historical enquiry. Some work on Muslim merchants in the Ottoman Empire has shown the effects of such distortions in that field, which shares some of the same problems on this question.66 The limiting effects of this culturalist paradigm can be seen in the terms defining the debate between different interpretations of the nature of European commercial penetration in Morocco during the nineteenth century, represented most notably by Miège on the one hand and Schroeter on the other. Whereas the former emphasised the significance of the social changes provoked by European trade, the latter argued that it was relatively unimportant, and that the groups in Morocco associated with it remained relatively unaffected.67 By these terms put simply, therefore, Morocco either changed directly as a result of external stimulus, or it did not substantially change.

The possibility that Moroccan society might have internal dynamics of its own driving, or at the very least shaping, change is implicitly excluded.

This thesis, therefore, attempts to reformulate the circularity of the culturalist approach by conceptualizing cultural and material factors as being in dialogue with one another. Eickelman has described this approach as the recognition that cultural forms do not remain unchanging over long periods; they are 'generative principles rather than rules, “a system of lasting, transposable dispositions” which make possible the “achievement of infinitely diversified tasks”’. It consequently recognizes ‘that social practice in specific historical contexts produces “objective” structures (economic relations and patterns of domination) that in turn produce dispositions toward the social world common to members of given social categories and classes’. 48 Although this critique of the culturalist approach is not in itself new, as Ahmida has pointed out there is still a great deal of work to do in actually implementing it. 49

The second weakness produced by the culturalist paradigm is an exaggerated emphasis on the role of central authority. Despotism, like stagnation or timelessness, is a theme of older scholarship on the Muslim world that continues to make itself felt beneath the surface of modern work. This was most notably manifested in the dichotomisation of bilād al-makhsan (‘government land’) and bilād al-sībā’ (‘land of rebellion’), the assumption being that Morocco was divided into exclusive areas of complete state control on the one hand and its absence on the other. 50 This focus on the state as the determining factor obscured the actual role of


50 On the influence of this model, see Edmund Burke, III, 'The image of the Moroccan state in French historical literature: new light on the origins of Lyautey’s Berber policy’, in E. Gellner and C. Michaud, eds., Arabs and Berbers (London: Duckworth, 1973), pp. 175-99. Critiques of the model of makhzan/sībā’ inherited from French colonial historiography, and of other elements of this tradition, have been an important element of more recent studies of Moroccan history. See the comments of Burke (‘The sociology of Islam’) and El Mansour (‘Moroccan Historiography’), and, for example, R. Bourqia and Susan Gilson Miller, In the Shadow of the Sultan: Culture, Power, and Politics in Morocco
local actors and sources of legitimacy with multiple and overlapping structures of authority. Although the limitations of the makhnaz/sibā’ model have been criticised, segmentation theory similarly prioritised the agency of the state over other groups, as did the influence of the Moroccan nationalist narrative. As Ahmida has pointed out nationalist historiography emphasising the role of the state has subsumed local motives and structures into ‘dichotomies of collaboration, treason, or heroism’.

While the historiography of Morocco has certainly freed itself from the limitations of these debates to a certain extent, particularly through a number of studies of local history, as Pennell has pointed out, these have not necessarily been integrated into a wider analytical framework or even narrative of the country’s history as a whole. In this respect, as in many others, therefore, this thesis draws on the example of earlier work, while at the same time trying to advance beyond its parameters. The summary and critique offered above of many aspects of previous scholarship is necessarily brief and perhaps blunt, and is not meant in any way to obscure the debts this study owes to its predecessors.

Accordingly, while this thesis does not reject the importance of the mid-nineteenth century as a period of crucial transition in Moroccan history – for it is true that until then successive rulers did try to control trade closely; that many Moroccans were suspicious and fearful of the influence of foreign powers; that after mid-century, Moroccan contact with the outside world did increase dramatically and with far-reaching consequences following this earlier period of relative isolation – it does seek to interrogate these arguments by focusing on a previously neglected aspect of Morocco’s history: its economic and political links with the British colony of Gibraltar, and the Moroccan consulate established in the town.

Thanks in part to the impact of the colonial period on Moroccan historiography to which we have already alluded, Anglo-Moroccan relations in general were for a long time rather overlooked in comparison to Morocco’s


52 Pennell, Morocco since 1830, pp. xix-xx.
relations with France and, to a lesser extent, Spain. Until recently, work on the subject was limited to a few studies of narrow diplomatic history, including the English occupation of Tangier between 1662 and 1684. More recent work has offered more complex understandings of relations between the two countries. Matar’s work on perceptions of ‘the Other’ stands out for its contribution to the social history of encounters between the English and Moroccans. Other studies have tried to contextualise the dynamics of Anglo-Moroccan relations with reference to internal Moroccan history, of which Ben Srhir’s is certainly the most significant example.\(^{53}\)

As a result of there being very little in the general field of Anglo-Moroccan relations, even less work has been done specifically studying the links between Morocco and Gibraltar, despite the fact that passing reference is often made to their...

---

importance. Miège, for example, said that around the turn of the eighteenth century Morocco was Gibraltar’s hinterland, and that conversely the British town was in effect the country’s main port.\(^{54}\) An exception to the general lack of work on this relationship is in those studies of Gibraltar’s Jewish community which highlight the important links between it and the Jewish community in Morocco, especially Tetuan and Tangier.\(^{55}\) Until the very recent work of Erzini, no work had been done at all that took as its object the Moroccan consulate in Gibraltar, again despite relatively frequent mentions of it in passing.\(^{56}\) To our knowledge, no study exists at all on these links with Morocco from the perspective of the history of Gibraltar itself, the historiography of which is heavily dominated by often rather triumphal military histories.

Consequently, assessments of the Moroccan consulate’s history and functions are limited to its role in conducting currency exchanges for the makhzan; or else are very sketchily drawn. Although the *Encyclopédie du Maroc*, for example, includes entries for several of the men who acted as consul in the nineteenth century, its information on the consulate itself is brief, noting only that it was given considerable importance and was entrusted only to notable merchants with wide


experience in European trade. Erzini’s work has been invaluable in starting to fill in the detail of the consulate’s history and significance, although this thesis proposes corrections to some aspects of it, as well as illuminating the wider economic and political context in which the consulate was established and operated.

The lack of work done on Morocco’s relationship with Gibraltar and the Moroccan consulate there reflects the relative lack also of work on Tetuan and Tangier in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Those were the most significant ports for the trade with the British town, and also for the political relationships that formed across the straits. However, their role during this period has been somewhat obscured by the far more detailed and substantial work done on Essaouira, cementing that town’s long-standing reputation as the most important Moroccan port during the nineteenth century. Tangier’s later history of course is the subject of a lot more attention, but the history of Tetuan has been, according to one of its most prominent contemporary historians, ‘generally ignored’. Tetuan’s position in the Spanish Protectorate no doubt placed it at the periphery of the Francophone scholarship so long dominant in Moroccan historiography. This may even have been compounded by the connection of the two towns with Gibraltar and the British, which this thesis will describe. After all, as Julien has said, it was Britain’s particular connection with the ‘grand families of commerce in Tetuan and Tangier’ that successfully entrenched its influence against the French and others until the establishment of the protectorate.

This study, therefore, is positioned at the overlap of several fields of historical study, all of them rather weak at this point of intersection. It focuses on the reign of Mawlay Sulaymān, long considered insignificant; on Anglo-Moroccan relations, an undeveloped area; and on the evolution of relations between Gibraltar

57 Ma’lamat al-Maghrib / Encyclopédie du Maroc (hereafter MM), Vol. 9, p. 3024. For the restricted understanding of the consulate’s significance, see Schroeter, Sultan’s Jew, p. 125.
58 See Schroeter, Merchants.
and Morocco, almost ignored. Consequently, it is concerned with an area that can be considered a ‘frontier’ both geographically and historiographically. But, of course, the designation of anywhere as a frontier or a periphery is a construction. The study of the Maghrib in general has suffered from being conceived in large part as the study of somewhere that is defined firstly by what it is not, in Laroui’s words ‘an area of conflict between two entities, always present and never defined’. As Bennison has pointed out, therefore, it is valuable to ‘question existing geo-political and chronological constructs’, to treat the ‘periphery’ as the centre; an injunction this study attempts by focusing on the northern coast of Morocco – what might be called a periphery of a periphery.

Like most of the important works on Moroccan history of the nineteenth century, this thesis relies to a large extent on European archival sources, in this case British, but also augments them with Moroccan documents. Miège showed the importance of the records of the European consulates, and despite their limitations, they still have a great deal to offer, especially, as Burke suggested, where they are used to support detailed studies of a particular topic or aspect of one country’s relations with Morocco. However, these sources undoubtedly do have weaknesses. They generally lack accurate and consistent insight into the internal dynamics of Moroccan government and society, which made the obstacles preventing easy use of the Moroccan archives all the more frustrating for scholars until their gradual alleviation. More recent studies, however, have combined Moroccan and European archival sources to great effect, and it is this model that this thesis follows.

The first set of sources comes from the National Archives in London, formerly known as the Public Record Office. The files used are mainly from the following series: FO 52, correspondence between the British consulate in Morocco and the British government; FO 174, records of the British consulate at Tangier; CO 91, correspondence of the government of Gibraltar. The first two of these were

---

63 Burke, *Prelude*, p. 228, n. 2.
64 Full details of the specific files used from these series are supplied in the Bibliography. All references to files at the National Archive (hereafter NA) are made according to the standard system
used by El Mansour in his study of Mawlay Sulaymān’s reign, but of course not with the specific focus on Gibraltar. Ben Srhir used FO 174 extensively in his study of John Drummond Hay, British consul in Morocco 1845-86, but only for the later part of the nineteenth century.

The second set of sources is from the Gibraltar Government Archives in Gibraltar. The materials used are the various letter books containing correspondence of the period between the government of Gibraltar and both the British consulate in Morocco and the Moroccan authorities, namely: Tetuan & Tangier 1769-1807; South Barbary, Minorca & the Islands 1778-97; Barbary States 1807-21; Consuls & Ambassadors 1803-12, 1812-29, 1819-35 and 1835-48. A number of documents are also used from the archives’ Miscellaneous Papers, which are filed in chronological order. These are mostly records of the administration of the town of various kinds, but also include some original Arabic letters from Morocco.65 Pennell appears to have used some material from this archive before on other subjects, but otherwise it has not been used as a source for Moroccan history.66

The third set of sources is letters of the makhzan held at Mudiriyyat al-Wathā’iq al-Malikiyya (the Direction des Archives Royales) in Rabat. The main three files used were the letters relating to Gibraltar, to Tetuan and to Tangier.67 The

---

65 References to material from the Gibraltar Government Archives (hereafter GGA) is given by the short title of the particular letter book (e.g. Letters South Barbary or Letters 1835-48) followed by the page number, or details of the document if on an unnumbered page. Documents from the Miscellaneous Papers are referred to by the year of the box in which they are filed (e.g. Misc. 1807), followed in the case of letters by the date, author and recipient, or in the case of other documents by the title and date. NB that some documents in the Miscellaneous Papers are incorrectly filed, so in some cases the year of the box and the actual date of the document do not correspond.

66 See Pennell, *Morocco since 1830*.

67 Documents in Mudiriyyat al-Wathā’iq al-Malikiyya (hereafter MWM) are catalogued both chronologically in the general files (*al-tartīb al-āmm*), and by subject or geographical area in the special files (*al-tartīb al-khāṣṣ*). References to documents from the archive are given here by the
fourth set is of the similar makhzan correspondence held at al-Khizâna al-Hasaniyya (the Bibliothèque Royale), also in Rabat, for which catalogues have recently been published.68

Using these sources in the light of the above historiographical discussion, this thesis will argue in Chapter One that the development of the state and its nature in Morocco was closely related to the control of land trade routes. This relationship was reconfigured during the eighteenth century under Sîdî Muḥammad in order to cope with the changing nature of global trade, but it preserved the relationship between state and trade in an adapted form. By doing this, Sîdî Muḥammad renewed the stability of the sultanate and defended it against the destabilising effects of European economic and political intervention. Although it is probably the case that this approach ultimately tied Morocco’s fate to maritime commerce and therefore to its relations with Europe, in the shorter term it was an effective ‘imperial system’ for managing aspects of European expansion that were already threatening the makhzan’s control. The main elements of the system were the closer integration of the country’s ports into the sultanic system; state intervention in trade to promote the conditions deemed most favourable to its rule; conscious use of Morocco’s maritime influence as a diplomatic tool; the diversification of Morocco’s diplomatic relationships; trade by state agents but also the promotion and defence of trade generally; and increased engagement with European affairs and European practices in so far as necessary to serve Morocco’s commercial and diplomatic interests.

68 Amīna al- Nāir and ‘Umār ‘Umūr, eds., Fahāris al-Khizāna al-Hasaniyya: qism al-wathā‘īq: al-majalla al-thānī – al-mūdūsīlāt, 2 vols. (Marrakesh: al-Maṭba‘a wa-l-Wirāqa al-Waṭaniyya, 2003). Documents from al-Khizâna al-Hasaniyya (hereafter KH) are referred to here by the system used in this catalogue. Note however that the labelling of the letters in the archives’ files does not always correspond to this system. In some cases they are labelled correctly, generally in pencil on the front of the letter. The labelling on the reverse of the letters appears to correspond to a different, older system. The yellow stickers used to label the plastic envelopes in which in each individual letter is kept are correct in some cases, but often they have fallen loose and either been replaced in the wrong envelope or are simply loose in the file. However, the order of the letters in each file almost always corresponds to the new catalogues, counting as if reading the file from left to right.
In Chapter Two, it will be argued that, with many of the same factors at work upon the makhzan, Sīdī Muḥammad’s successors continued his system, which thus formed the basis of the sultanate’s policy for roughly a century between his accession in 1757 and the Anglo-Moroccan Treaty of 1856. 69 Despite his historical reputation, Mawlay Sulaymān did not seek to alter the fundamental relationship between the state and the country’s trade. During his reign, the measures taken to control or limit trade were either prompted by factors outside the makhzan’s control, such as epidemic disease or the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in Europe; or conformed to Sīdī Muḥammad’s system for managing trade to the sultanate’s perceived political and economic advantage. Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān in turn continued the same system, although he did take some measures in the early part of his reign that can be seen to a certain extent as hostile to trade, such as the reintroduction of the jihād by sea, or corsairing, and the promotion of some conservative groups at the expense of commercial interests.

Chapter Three analyses the establishment and development of the Moroccan consulate in Gibraltar, in particular the fact that – contrary to previous work on the subject dating the appointment to 1815 – a Moroccan consul was working in the town from at least 1796. It is significant that the makhzan’s long-standing interests in Gibraltar were first institutionalised under Mawlay Sulaymān, a fact which, it will be argued, further undermines the argument for his supposed isolationism. The establishment of the consulate also casts a different light on the cultural barriers inhibiting the residence and work of Moroccan Muslims abroad, which this chapter shows were more nuanced than often thought. The chapter also refines the chronology of the holders of the post of consul up to the middle of the nineteenth century, including the addition of a previously unknown occupant, and also establishes the functions of the consulate, which were more extensive than some previous work has assumed.

The thesis then broadens its focus to consider the social and economic context in which the consulate was established and operated. As Chapter Four

69 Miège doubted that the trade policies of the ‘Alawi sultanate amounted to the ‘imperial system’ to which European consuls of the time sometimes referred. For example, he thought that varying tariffs in different ports indicated the lack of a coherent system, whereas here it will be argued that the manipulation of tariffs was an important element of the system to accommodate the economic and political demands on the makhzan (see Miège, Le Maroc, Vol. 2, pp. 225-40).
shows, the development of trade between Gibraltar and the Gharb, or north-west region of Morocco, created important economic interests not only for the makhzan directly but also the Moroccan merchant class upon whose support it increasingly relied. Despite the establishment of Essaouira in 1765 and its significance for maritime trade with Europe, Tetuan and Tangier remained important commercial centres in large part due to their trade with Gibraltar. This chapter will show that by the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the first period for which statistical data in significant quantities survive, there were two distinct spheres of Moroccan trade with Europe, one through Essaouira direct to Europe and the other through the Gharb to Gibraltar and beyond. The latter sphere was dominated by British trade to a greater extent and it also involved Muslim merchants and Moroccan shipping to a greater degree.

Chapter Five analyses the social groups associated with these economic interests in the Gharb. As we have said above, it is often asserted that the mediating role involved in this kind of foreign trade in Morocco was conducted primarily by Jews. However, this chapter will show that trade and other communication between Gibraltar and the Gharb were carried out by both Jews and Muslims. Both groups had strong links to the political and economic elite of northern Morocco and also to the sultan directly, and consequently acted as an intermediary class between Morocco and Europe. Many of them spoke Spanish and some also English and other European languages. Many made Gibraltar their home for longer or shorter periods of time, establishing partnerships with merchants there that also facilitated their access to foreign goods and markets. Although the two groups differed in some important respects, they were not separate but rather jointly constituted the network integrating northern Morocco into wider trade systems through Gibraltar.

---

70 The region of the Gharb (al-Gharb) was defined in various ways at different times in Moroccan history, and was often used as an administrative unit, particularly from the Sa’di period onwards (see MM Vol. 19, pp. 6315-18). Except when referring to a specific administrative title – for example, khalifat al-Gharb (‘governor of the Gharb’) – ‘the Gharb’ is used here to indicate the general geographical area understood in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century, i.e. the north-west of Morocco at the western end of the Rif mountain range to the north of Larache and the river Lukis. Although strictly speaking this region includes both the Gharb and Jbala regions, the former is used as a convenient shorthand to avoid cumbersome repetition.
It was from this class that the Moroccan consuls in Gibraltar were drawn and which in many respects they typified.

Chapter Six argues that the development of groups with the type of commercial interests just described had important political implications in Tangier and Tetuan, and to a lesser extent in the Gharb region generally. It is widely accepted that links with Europe were an important factor behind social and political change in coastal areas of Morocco in the later nineteenth century, but in the case of Gibraltar and the Gharb this process can already be seen to be underway in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The elite (khāṣṣā) of the region were partly shaped by their relationships with the British, particularly since the importance of commerce in the ports gave a greater role to merchants and commercial interests than was generally the case elsewhere in Morocco.\(^7\) Consequently, relationships of different kinds between British and Moroccans became embedded within Moroccan power structures, affecting both the makhzan’s economic and political relationship with the outside world, and also the internal dynamics of power and authority between central and regional actors.

In general, the chronological framework for this study has intentionally been left inclusive. Although the main focus is on the reign of Mawlay Sulaymān, no precise cut off date has been imposed in order to avoid imposing an artificial exceptionalism upon the period of his rule and to try and bridge the two parts of the conventional periodisation of Moroccan history discussed above. Mawlay Sulaymān’s reign is therefore situated in a wider discussion of the rough century or so defined by the use of Šīdī Muḥammad’s system of managed trade, with reference also to a longer consideration of Moroccan history. Similarly, the main focus is on Anglo-Moroccan relations, but the study attempts to relate this to the wider questions of Morocco’s relations with the outside world in general.

\(^7\) On the composition of the khāṣṣā at this time, see El Mansour, *Morocco*, pp. 11-12, and on the social significance of merchants at Tetuan in particular, see *ibid.*, p. 42.
Chapter 1 – Trade & Foreign Policy in Morocco before 1790

Morocco’s relations with the outside world underwent a definitive shift during the more than three decades of Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh’s reign between 1757 and 1790. This was a response, however, to changes that had been maturing over a much longer period. The shift was not a transition from Morocco being ‘closed’ to being ‘open’, the dichotomy often used as the criterion to analyse his policy. Trade and travel were always a feature of Moroccan life, although of course the volume and conditions of both varied. The question is not whether the country was involved in economic, political or cultural networks stretching beyond its own boundaries, since it patently always was; it never isolated itself from the world in the way that Japan did, for example, nor was it isolated by geography like, for example, Australia. The question is how this involvement was managed and what significance it had for Moroccan state and society. This chapter considers this issue over the *longue durée*, and then relates it to the changes instituted during the reign of Sīdī Muḥammad.

The development of particular dynasties and the stability of state power in general in the area we now call Morocco were closely related to the control of trade, particularly the trans-Saharan gold trade, from at least the decline of the Idrisids (780-974). Each dynasty ‘was powerful in relation to its ability to monopolise a substantial portion of the gold traffic - the principal factor in the development of power and economic importance’; consequently, ‘the North African state of the Middle Ages was not definable by its frontiers. It was essentially a political and commercial centre of gravity . . . the heart of [which] was a great commercial city which was a terminus for the Saharan caravans’.

As Braudel has suggested, the development in the Maghrib of states primarily concerned with the control and exploitation of trans-shipment activities was largely a consequence of the region’s position as an intermediary zone between the two separate economic regions of West Africa and the Mediterranean. This

---


development was retarded to some extent by the disruption of urbanised life around the Mediterranean during and following the collapse of the Roman Empire in the west, weakening the forces attracting trade northwards across the Sahara. This may partly account for the fact that under the Idrisid dynasties, rulers in Morocco relied almost exclusively on the taxation of agriculture and much less on trade than did their successors.

However, with the revival of trade and urbanisation in the western Mediterranean, and the disruption of routes across the Sahara further east, the economic importance of trade increased during the later ninth century, and with it the political importance of its control. At first, this control was more or less indirect, an aspect of the rivalry between the Fatimids (909-1171) and the Ummayads (756-1031), whose main interests lay elsewhere. It was by no means insignificant, however. The Fatimids ultimately used their access to gold supplies from West Africa to fund their invasion of Egypt. They annexed Ifriqiyya and Sijilmāsa, and by attacking Fes, Tilimsān, Tiyārat (Tahert) and Ceuta they threatened the influence of their rivals in al-Andalus over the trade coming north.

As a result of these annexations, towns developing along the new, more westerly routes across the Sahara achieved new political importance. Sijilmāsa, cradle of successive Moroccan dynasties, became the major destination for caravans crossing the desert from the south. From there, the trade either passed through Fes heading toward Spain and Europe, or Tilimsān, Tiyārat, al-Qal‘a and Qayrawān in Ifriqiya, heading toward the Levant and the Mashriq. Political structures in the western Maghrib were consequently increasingly organised to benefit from this trade through taxation or by participating directly in it.

The connection between trade and political power in Morocco became more direct under the Almoravid (1053-1147) and Almohad (1147-1269) dynasties. Both prioritized control of the gold routes during their rise to power, and in both cases their rapid collapse was accelerated and symbolized by the loss of Sijilmāsa, in 1145 and 1255 respectively. It was perhaps under the Almoravids that the riches of this

---


4 Elz, 'Sidjilmāsa'.

28
trade reached the height of their significance for state power in Morocco: as Messier has demonstrated, the coins they minted from West African gold were of such quality that they circulated in Europe, the Mashriq and even perhaps China. After the Almohads, the Marinids maintained their capital at Fes, and tried hard to dominate Tilimsân. Like Bougie and Constantine, Tilimsân also became the capital of one of the smaller successor states to the Almohads who continued to benefit on a smaller scale from the same trade.

In this respect, therefore, the Moroccan state took a fundamentally different developmental path from contemporary states in medieval Western Europe. The latter were defined much more by their control over a given territory *per se* and the exploitation of its resources; whereas the former existed to control certain activities within an area of land rather than the land itself. Lacoste has illustrated the difference in these relative attitudes by contrasting the system of *iqṭāʾ* in the Maghrib, and elsewhere in the Muslim world, with the feudal system of land tenure in Europe. Whereas in Europe, the state received service in return for the grant of title to a specific area of land with political and legal authority over the peasantry, the grant of *iqṭāʾ* was only the temporary right to usufruct and to tax a certain town or group, with no further legal implications over land or people. This crucial aspect of the state’s development of Morocco has important implications, although it has perhaps been overlooked to some extent. Although this aspect of Morocco’s development is beyond the scope of this study, it might be productive to consider it in relation to the ongoing debate about the nature of the division between *bīlād al-makhzan* and *bīlād al-sibāʾ*, for example.

This is not to suggest, of course, that the Moroccan state did not tax land or its produce during this period; it obviously did, and these resources were certainly significant. Given the lack of data, it is impossible to say whether trade or

---


6 Lacoste, 'General characteristics', pp. 5-6.
agriculture was more important in its absolute value at any given time. However, it
can be fairly said that revenue from the land was of secondary importance
compared to trade, to the extent that its collection was comparatively irregular and
often achieved only by force; whereas there existed a much closer and harmonious,
even symbiotic, relationship between the state and merchants.\(^7\) Perhaps this in part
accounts for the continuity of cities like Fes in Moroccan history, whose importance
as commercial centres allowed them to remain relatively unaffected by dynastic
ebbs and flows: as Brett has said, it may be that ‘the dynasty [was] dependent on the
cities at least as much as the cities were dependent on the dynasty’.\(^8\)

The relationship of maritime commerce to the state was similar to that of
agriculture. Each was important and merited attention, but neither was
fundamental to its concern and interests. Moroccan trade with the Genoese, Pisans,
Catalans and others did increase from the twelfth century onwards. Military
considerations attendant on the growing success of the Christian kingdoms in Spain
also increased the strategic importance of Morocco’s ports. Nevertheless, neither
the Almoravids nor the Almohads devoted significant resources to them beyond
their function as staging posts for the transport of military campaigns, most notably
in the founding and development of Rabat.\(^9\)

Moroccan ports during this period therefore tended to operate at a distance
from the direct control of the state. This was in some respects a condition for their
success. In their function as points of interface between different economic zones,
port cities necessarily ‘dealt with a diversity of commercial ties and personal
loyalties that extended outside the sphere of influence and beyond the primary
concern of the interior states.’ Although this sometimes made them relatively, even

---

\(^7\) Lacoste, 'General characteristics' p. 5.
entirely, independent from central control, this was relatively unimportant during the medieval period since ‘these coastal entrepôts were peripheral to the state not only geographically, but also economically and politically.’ Latham has provided a valuable insight into this kind of relationship in his work on the thirteenth century ‘Azafid governors of Ceuta, at that time Morocco’s most important commercial port.’

Around the final collapse of the Almohad Empire in 1269, however, a change began to manifest itself in the dynamic between the Moroccan state and maritime affairs. The growth of trade with Europe and the continuing military success of the Spanish Christians and also the Sicilians made maritime affairs increasingly central to the state’s concerns. This was exacerbated by the fragmentation of the Almohads’ domains into smaller successor states, which could no longer rely so easily on the insulating effect of a massive land empire enjoyed by that dynasty. The effect of this combination of factors then became more clearly evident by the mid-fifteenth century in the development of Portuguese influence in the Dukkala region of Morocco, which exacerbated the decline of the Marinid state and limited the influence of their Wattasid successors. In many respects, the combination of growing commercial influence and military threat anticipated the problems posed to the Moroccan state by later European expansion. Not the least of these was the destabilising effect of alliances between European interests and regional elites on Morocco’s coasts, which thereby assumed a new political importance.

The Moroccan state did continue to enjoy the protection of some important structural factors inhibiting the influence of the early phase of European expansion; namely, the continued fundamental importance of the country’s overland trade, which remained largely unaffected by these trends. Nevertheless, state power gradually became less secure in this respect during periods of instability and weak central authority. Although spasmodic, a transition was underway whereby international overland trade slowly declined in importance for the Moroccan state, to be replaced, as maritime commerce became slowly more important to the

---

10 Boone, Myers and Redman, 'Archeological and Historical Approaches', p. 638.
economic and political stability of the makhzan, by closer control of the larger ports. As Europe’s commercial and maritime power increased, it was becoming more dangerous to leave control of the revenues and resources of maritime trade in the hands of regional groups.

Overcoming this problem became the raison d’être of the Sa’di state, whose origins in the early sixteenth century lay first of all in their successful jihād against foreign encroachment. By curtailing Portuguese control of the region’s rich trade and agricultural produce, the new dynasty simultaneously strengthened its legitimacy and its practical power. To a certain extent, the Sa’dis’ rise relied on the traditional tactic of exploiting their influence over the trans-Saharan trade routes, from their bases in the Dar‘ā and, later, the Sūs valleys. They, too, relied to an important extent on co-operation with mercantile urban groups; as Abun-Nasr has noted, the dynasty’s rise pre-supposed ‘a large urban class of merchants and artisans . . . with entrenched interest in stability and order’. We see again, therefore, the important symbiosis of the state and commerce in Morocco.

A related but novel aspect of this political interest in commerce, reflecting a changing dynamic with the outside world, was that the Sa’dis also exploited their access to maritime trade with Europe. To bypass the Portuguese, they encouraged trade with the Spanish and Genoese in the Sūs region in order to increase their own revenues and purchase military equipment, particularly by developing the production of sugar for export. In the longer term, the new dynasty bolstered its position partly by co-operating with other new European maritime powers. Merchants from France, England and Holland began to visit Morocco regularly in the mid-sixteenth century, opening up the possibility of greater diplomatic and commercial links. Encouraging this in order to bypass the threat of Portugal and Spain, the Sa’dis pursued a policy that Cornell has described as an extension of the līf (pl. al-fū)f tribal alliances of southern Morocco, designed to allow groups to trade

---

14 Elż, 'Sa’dis’.
16 ibid., pp. 210-11.
over long distances by 'leapfrogging' hostile rivals between them.  These links with northern Europe began to rival the long-standing commercial relationships with the Iberian and Italian states that had largely defined Morocco’s maritime trade until the mid-sixteenth century.

This new trade and maritime orientation was certainly important to the Sa’di state during its growth and consolidation through the sixteenth century. The most notable developments were the opening of the port of Agadir (Santa Cruz) in 1541 to encourage maritime trade, and the development of the sugar industry in the Sūs region. Some of the new trade was in the hands of the Moroccans themselves, ships under the sharifian flag sailing as far as Antwerp. European trade was also an important source of firearms and other military materials; for example, the export of copper in exchange for tin from England and France that allowed the development of bronze casting in Morocco. The new dynasty also sought supplies of wood suitable for shipbuilding in order to develop its naval capacity, an often overlooked aspect of Sa’di policy as Cornell has noted.

This was the context for the development of the first significant relations between Morocco and England. Trade between them began in 1551, and the following decades saw the growth of the exchange particularly of English cloth and Moroccan sugar. Weapons, ammunition and wood for shipbuilding were also exported from England in return for saltpetre, although this trade was sometimes problematic on both sides for religious reasons. Relations between Ahmad al-

---


19 Cornell, 'Socioeconomic dimensions', p. 404.

20 ibid., p. 405.

Manṣūr (r. 1578-1603) and Elizabeth I (r. 1558-1603) were notably cordial; although
Elizabeth never committed herself to an actual treaty, their correspondence was
often invoked in later letters between the sovereigns of each side as a model for
friendship between them.  

However, Morocco’s foreign policy at this stage was still by no means
organised primarily around these developing links with Europe. Politically and
economically, the country ultimately operated in a wider context. It faced east and
south as well as north in its position ‘between three great areas of communication
and trade - the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and the Sahara Desert - and
between the two dominant powers of the sixteenth century: the Osmanli Turks and
the Spanish Habsburgs’. Although the jiḥād against Christian powers was one
aspect of Sa’di legitimacy, another important strategy was to resist Ottoman claims
to caliphal authority in the Maghrib. Ideologically as well as militarily, the dynasty
oriented itself toward two fronts.  

In the acquisition of new technologies, Morocco likewise looked east as
much as north. Military skills and personnel arrived via the Ottoman Empire as well
as from Europe. Muhammad al-Shaykh (r. 1543-57) recruited Genoese, Spanish and
Ottoman mercenaries to strengthen the gunpowder capabilities of the nascent Sa’di
state in the mid-sixteenth century. The bulk of the manpower for the new
Moroccan navy was provided by Ottoman sailors, freed after the truce between

\[22\] For example, see J. F. P. Hopkins, ed., Letters from Barbary, 1576-1774 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1982), p. 32; Rogers, Anglo-Moroccan relations, p. 85; Dominique Meunier, Le consulat anglais à Téouan
see also Matar, 'Anglo-Spanish conflict'; Matar, Turks, Moors, and Englishmen.

\[23\] Yahya, Morocco, p. xiii. See also Andrew C. Hess, The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-

\[24\] See Abderrahmane El Mouden, 'The Idea of the Caliphate between Moroccans and Ottomans:
political and symbolic stakes in the 16th and 17th century-Maghrib', Studia Islamica 82 (1995), pp. 103-
12.; Dahiru Yahya, 'The ideological framework of Sa’di foreign policy', in Le Maroc et l’Afrique
subsaarienne aux débuts des temps modernes: les Sa’diens et l’Empire Songhay. Morocco and Subsaharan
Africa at the dawn of modern times: the Sa’dis and the Songhay Empire. Actes du colloque International . . .
Marrakech, 23-25 Octobre 1992 / Al-Maghrib wa-lfriqiya jamiib al-sahra fî bidayyat al-’asr al-hadith (Rabat:

\[25\] Cornell, 'Socioeconomic dimensions', pp. 399-400.
Spain and the Sublime Porte in 1547.\textsuperscript{26} ‘Abd al-Mālik (r. 1576-8) participated in several Ottoman campaigns in North Africa during his exile after 1558, and exchanged a pledge of vassalage to the Sultan Murād III (r. 1575-94) for the soldiers and weapons that enabled him to invade Morocco and enforce his claim to the throne. Although he had reduced his reliance on these Turko-Algerian troops to some extent by the time of the Battle of Wādī al-Makhāzin (also known as al-Qaṣr al-Ṣaghīr or the Three Kings), he still took the field wearing the ceremonial robes awarded him by the sultan.\textsuperscript{27}

Economically also, overland trade to the east and especially south across the Sahara remained crucially important. Muḥammad al-Shaykh had prioritised establishment of control over this trade in the 1540s. Aḥmad al-Manṣūr reinforced this southward orientation by his conquest of Songhay in western Sudan in 1590-1.\textsuperscript{28} Having also secured Moroccan independence from Iberian and Ottoman expansion after 1578, he thereby entrenched the country’s modus vivendi as a state facing several directions at once.

The political stability and administrative centralisation achieved by the Sa’dis also made revenues from land taxation and control over the country’s resources in general much more secure, although by no means complete. This represented a partial diversification of the economic bases of the state. Al-Ifrānī recorded, for example, how the dynasty increased taxation, including by introducing extra-Qur’ānic levies. Muḥammad al-Shaykh ‘was the first to levy the tax commonly known as the nā‘ība, and he put all kinds of duties and fees on people without exempting anyone’. Aḥmad al-Manṣūr later added further taxes to those

\textsuperscript{26} A. Dziubinski, 'L’armée et la flotte de guerre marocaines à l’époque des sultans de la dynastie saadienne', Hespéris-Tamuda 13 (1972), pp. 61-94 (p. 93).


‘already so heavy in al-Shaykh’s time’. Foreign observers were certainly impressed by the reach of al-Manṣūr’s power: one English visitor, for example, noted how he ‘dividing their countrey into several divisions or cantons, in everie which he placed an alkeyd [qā‘īd] with souldiers to supresse any sudaine uproars, much like our lieutenant set over our several countyes, but that the alkeyd is continually resident, and hath greater power in executing marshall law’. Combined with the wealth from trade and tribute from the south, it was internal administrative and institutional reform more than the growth of commerce with Europe upon which the Sa‘di state depended.

Overall, therefore, Morocco remained more oriented toward the land than it was to the sea, although this was beginning to change. As we have seen, the Sa‘dis did rely to a certain extent on embracing aspects of maritime commerce and foreign interests, but one of their fundamental successes was ultimately to conduct these relationships on their own terms. This was a crucial reason for their victory over their Wattasid rivals, who remained too dependent, economically and militarily, on foreign interests, Genoese and Ottoman respectively. By consolidating power over Morocco and its resources in a manner not seen since the decline of the Almohads in the mid-thirteenth century, the Sa‘dis were able to insulate the country once again from external exploitation. Thus, although the death of Muḥammad al-Shaykh in 1557 signalled a renewed period of foreign involvement in Moroccan politics until the accession of Aḥmad al-Manṣūr just over twenty years later, he had laid the foundations for the ultimately successful rebuttal of Ottoman as well as Spanish and Portuguese ambitions in Morocco.

The state’s problem of controlling the impact of maritime commerce re-emerged, however, with the instability that attended the slow decline of the Sa‘di state after the death of Aḥmad al-Manṣūr in 1603. Relations with Europe, and to a certain extent still the Ottomans, became proportionately more important for both rival claimants to the throne and regional elites asserting their independence from

---

the makhzan. Neither of these, generally speaking, could rely to the same extent on the factors that marginalized the effect of European influence on the central government, and therefore could not control it as closely. Either their economic interests were more directly tied up with maritime trade, or their economic and political situation was simply less secure in general. This was generally clearest in coastal regions, although not restricted to them.

Examples of this during the seventeenth century included the Dilā’iyya zāwiya (‘retreat’, by extension ‘religious order’), which established itself as an independent political power in the mid-Atlas region of central Morocco under Muḥammad al-Ḥājj between the mid-1640s and 1668. To bolster his power, al-Ḥājj encouraged commercial and diplomatic links with various European states, partly through contact with Tetuan.\(^{33}\) Control of the trans-Saharan trade and its outlets to Europe was also an important strength of the Ilīgh zāwiya in the south of Morocco.\(^{34}\) Among other rulers during this time, the Moriscos at Rabat-Salé, in alliance with Muḥammad al-’Ayyāshī, the Naqṣīs family, quasi-independent governors of Tetuan and allies of the Dilā’iyya, and the warlord al-Khīḍr Ghaylān all sought diplomatic relationships with Europe to bolster their positions.\(^{35}\) These groups reversed the priorities of the makhzan, facing the sea more than the land and relying to a greater extent on maritime trade and piracy.

As a result of this, the English in particular developed more significant relationships with certain coastal cities and regions, particularly the ports of the Gharb.\(^{36}\) The Moriscos at Rabat-Salé, for example, cultivated relations with the English in the 1620s and 1630s, much to the frustration of al-Walīd (r. 1631-6), who demanded that they cease trading with rebels.\(^{37}\) Muḥammad al-Shaykh al-Asghar (r.

---


\(^{34}\) Moujetan, ‘Legitimacy’, p. 349.


\(^{36}\) For an overview of English relations with Morocco during the mid-seventeenth century, see the critical essay in SIHM 1\(^{st}\) edn Angleterre, Vol. 3, pp. 552-4.

1636-55) was similarly frustrated by arms sales to groups outside his control.\textsuperscript{38} The Naqsīs governors were also in regular contact with the English from 1618, who perceived rightly that they might be useful allies against the Spanish.\textsuperscript{39} The English were later granted permission to use Tetuan as their base for the siege of Cadiz in 1656 and to appoint a resident consul in the town from 1657, their first in Morocco.\textsuperscript{40} The English signed a treaty with ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Naqṣīs and the Dilā’īyya the same year, an agreement apparently renewed four years later.\textsuperscript{41} This co-operation was in marked contrast to the continuing tensions with the later Sa’di rulers.

After establishing himself in the Gharb around this time, al-Khiḍr Ghaylān similarly allied himself with the English in their new enclave of Tangier, signing a peace treaty in 1666 for which he received 200 barrels of gunpowder.\textsuperscript{42} Later he reversed this policy and allied with the Spanish, attacking the English port as part of a ‘jihād’ designed to enhance his legitimacy. Throughout his career, ‘he played a double game’ between the two powers.\textsuperscript{43} Ghaylān fled to Algiers in an English ship to escape the consolidation of power over the country by the new ‘Alawi dynasty under Mawlay al-Rashīd (r. 1664-72), but returned with Ottoman help and allied himself with the Naqsīs at Tetuan in a final bid to defend his power and the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[	extsuperscript{39}] Permission for English merchants to trade at Tetuan was granted in 1622 by the governor of Tetuan with the endorsement of Mawlay 'Abd Allāh, who still retained influence in the region at this stage (see Bodleian Library, Oxford, Calendar of Clarendon State Papers, Vol. 1, p. 23, no. 200).
\item[	extsuperscript{41}] For the first treaty, see \textit{SIHM 1ère} Angleterre, Vol. 3, pp. 554-5 & 588-90. The subsequent treaty of 1661 (see British Library (hereafter BL), Sloane MS 3509, ff. 2-3) falls just outside the scope of the work of de Castries et al., and was also overlooked by Rogers. More work is needed to establish its context and significance.
\item[	extsuperscript{42}] Rogers, \textit{Anglo-Moroccan relations}, p. 48.
\item[	extsuperscript{43}] \textit{SIHM 2ème} France, Vol. 1, p. 24, n. 1.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
autonomy of the north. He renewed his treaty with the English on his return in 1673 but was defeated and killed later the same year.44

A full assessment of the local political relationships developed by the English during their occupation of Tangier is unfortunately still lacking, although the sources to attempt one do exist.45 Despite the withdrawal of the English from the town in 1684, their links to the Gharb were reinforced by the capture of Gibraltar in 1704. This provided the motivation and opportunity for both the English and the Moroccans to develop further links across the straits with Tetuan and Tangier, which will be considered in more detail in subsequent chapters. From the English point of view, friendly relations and open trade with Morocco were vital for the maintenance of the garrison, as well as for the security of their shipping in and out of the Mediterranean, upon which rested their growing economic dominance in the region.46 These were ‘almost the entire raison d’etre of the Barbary states from the


45 There are, for example, records at the British Library of the correspondence between the English authorities at Tangier and the Naqṣīs governors of Tetuan, al-Khīḍr Ghaylān and other Moroccan figures from the 1660s and 1670s which fell outside the limits of the work of de Castries et al., and which were not used by Routh (for example, in BL Sloane MSS 1955 & 1958). Routh’s volume on the English occupation at Tangier is very detailed and useful in many respects but is quite badly dated and in any case does not concern itself much at all with Moroccan politics or society. Other, more recent work on the subject similarly focuses primarily on the details of the English military and civil administration (see, for example, P. Collyer, ‘The British Occupation of Tangier, 1662-1674’, *Morocco: Journal of the Society for Moroccan Studies* 1 (New Series) (1996), pp. 52-61; P. Collyer, ‘The British Occupation of Tangier, 1674-1680’, *Morocco: Journal of the Society for Moroccan Studies* 2 (New Series) (1997), pp. 77-87.; John Wreglesworth, ‘Tangier: England’s forgotten colony (1661-1684)’, *Revue d’Histoire Maghrébine / Al-Majallah al-tārīkhīyya al-Maghāribiyya* (2002), pp. 215-31. Although a fuller exploration of these sources would have undoubtedly benefited the present study, limited time prevented it. I hope to make a fuller study of this topic on another occasion.

46 For a discussion of the lively debate that took place in England about the importance of Gibraltar both before and after its conquest, see José Ignacio Martínez Ruiz, ‘De Tángier a Gibraltar: el estrecho en la praxis comercial e imperial Británica (1661-1776)’, *Hispania: Revista Española de Historia* 65 (2005), pp. 1043-62.
British point of view’; although direct trade with Morocco was also to become a significant factor as Gibraltar developed as a Mediterranean entrepôt.

Under Mawlay al-Rashid and his successor, Mawlay Isma’il (r. 1672-1727), the Moroccan sultanate again managed to minimise the destabilising effects of maritime commerce on the country’s coastal regions. As it had been for the Sa’dis, the recovery of European enclaves in Morocco was an important legitimising strategy for the ‘Alawis. Mamura, Mahdiyya and Larache were recovered from the Spanish; Tangier was taken from the English; the long siege of Ceuta was initiated. The early ‘Alawi rulers did encourage trade and diplomacy with Europe, but in overall economic and political terms, the sea and its ports were not fundamental to its power or its interests beyond securing them against rebels. The revenues of the overland trade with the south may not have provided the legendary wealth of the days of the Almohads or Ahmad al-Manṣūr, but they were not insignificant. Mawlay Isma’il also attempted to diversify the state’s revenues, as the Sa’dis had done to some extent, by increasing internal control and maximising state control over revenues produced by the land. To do this he relied on a standing (‘abid, lit. ‘slave’) army whose maintenance ultimately proved unsustainable for his successors. However, the policy of increasing internal revenues, combined with astute diplomacy, did maintain the country’s insulation from Europe’s commercial and military expansion for some decades.

The significance of this can be seen, for example, by comparing the effect of the growth of English trade and naval power in the Mediterranean on the North African regencies with its relatively muted impact on Morocco. England employed an ‘early form of gunboat diplomacy’ against Spain and Portugal as well as the

corsairs of Morocco and the North African regencies in order to entrench her military and commercial position in the second half of the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{51} Significant successes in this respect were the treaties signed with Tripoli, Tunis (both 1662), and Algiers (1682) after a series of campaigns against them by English squadrons. These agreements were regularly renewed, an indication of the regencies' growing respect for English naval power. The increasingly prohibitive cost of attacking English shipping diverted the corsairs toward the shipping of weaker states, thereby further increasing England's share of the Mediterranean carrying trade and enhancing its economic position in the region.\textsuperscript{52}

Hunter has argued that the various treaties imposed on the regencies by both England and France in the second half of the seventeenth century marked the beginning of their economic re-orientation toward Europe and the processes of colonisation normally described as phenomena of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{53} The main factor in this, Hunter argues, was the build up of English and French naval power in the Mediterranean, which underpinned their economic hegemony over the Ottoman Empire from the eighteenth century onwards. He excludes Morocco,


however, from his analysis, remarking only in a note that ‘a similar European economic and political penetration was occurring there’.\textsuperscript{54} Although the two cases bear comparison, the processes Hunter describes were in fact not advanced to the same degree in Morocco, which was less vulnerable to European pressure on its coasts. Not only were the regencies much more reliant on the sea, through trade or piracy, but their rulers were ordinarily more accessible to European consuls and merchants.\textsuperscript{55} In addition to the suppression of the regencies’ corsairs, England and France also extracted commercial privileges such as lower customs rates and anchorage fees that entrenched a new pattern of trade, including the establishment of concessions securing wheat and other agricultural products for the European market.\textsuperscript{56}

The Sa’di dynasty in Morocco had, in contrast to the Ottomans regencies, established its capital at Marrakesh, their successors the ‘Alawis at Fes and then Meknes, all far inland. Although this did not of course preclude an interest in maritime commerce, it did allow these rulers to keep European merchants and diplomats at arm’s length. Fundamentally, it reflected the persistence of the country’s medieval orientation to overland trade to the south and east, even while trade with Europe was gradually becoming more important. As Cornell has argued, although Morocco became more integrated into European trade networks this did not necessarily imply ‘peripheralization’ in the sense of a dependent and unequal relationship of the kind sometimes assumed to be inherent in that process; nor did the development of this type of inter-relationship necessarily or immediately create a single hierarchy of core, semi-periphery and periphery.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{54} Hunter, 'Rethinking Europe's conquest’, p. 23, n. 3.


\textsuperscript{56} Hunter, 'Rethinking Europe's conquest’, pp. 6-8.

\textsuperscript{57} Cornell, 'Socioeconomic dimensions’, pp. 409-10. On the classic sense of the 'world-system' and 'peripheralization', see the founding working of Immanuel Wallerstein (see Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, 3 vols. (New York & San Diego: Academic Press, 1974-89).), and with relation to this period particularly, Vol. 2 – Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600-1750. This work was notably developed in relation to the medieval period by Janet Abu-Lughod, who proposed a more complex system of multiple, regional economic sub-systems through which a large part of the world was economically integrated without the supremacy of a hegemonic ‘core’. Her work did not make substantial reference to the trade linking the Maghrib
Thus, a series of English squadrons dispatched against the corsairs of Rabat-Salé between 1682 and 1688 reduced their activities but did not produce a treaty as similar efforts had done in the regencies. Moroccan trade with France was meanwhile increasing but, although Mawlay Ismā‘īl signed a peace treaty with the French in 1682, their subsequent attempts to agree a commercial treaty were unsuccessful. The sultan wrote to Louis XIV in 1699 criticising the threats of the French officials attempting to enforce a new treaty on Morocco: ‘Do they imagine or believe they can treat us like the people of Tunis or Tripoli or Algiers? We, thank God, have nothing that interests us on the coast or for the sake of which we will negotiate a treaty with them’.59

We can see, therefore, that by the reign of Mawlay Ismā‘īl between 1672 and 1727, the Moroccan state was in transition. The growth of maritime trade, its increased revenues and the access to military supplies it brought encouraged a centrifugal tendency that made control of the country’s ports increasingly important. This trend was partially suppressed by first the Sa‘dis, especially after the conquest of Songhay renewed the economic primacy of the trans-Saharan trade, and then under the first two ‘Alawi rulers, under whom the development of a standing army allowed the more effective exploitation of agricultural taxes, while overland trade still brought significant revenues. Strong central government could marginalize the effects of foreign commercial and military influence, although they continued to put pressure on the state in times of instability.

Thus, under Mawlay Ismā‘īl the makhzan was still able to dictate the terms of the European presence in Morocco. Just as he was able to ignore French attempts to intimidate him by a show of force on the coast, he similarly resisted a British blockade in 1716–18 designed to compel him to agree to a treaty.60 ‘Believe me,’ wrote Vice-Admiral Charles Cornwall, the naval officer in charge of the blockade, ‘we must submit to Treat them by their own Forms, since no reason is

---


60 See Erzini, Moroccan-British relations
sufficient to prevail on them to alter ‘em’.61 A petition of English and Jewish merchants at Gibraltar agreed that despite Cornwall’s blockade, ‘it does not appear that the negotiation . . . is upon a better footing than when it first began’.62 On the contrary, it was Moroccan naval power in the form of corsairing, of which there was an upturn in 1715-16 and again in the early 1720s, that pushed the British toward a settlement with the treaty of 1721. The threat to British trade was significant, it being estimated that war would cost the country around £100,000 a year.63

The makhzan continued to enjoy some important advantages in the conduct of its foreign policy even during the instability that followed Mawlay Ismā‘īl’s death. The treaty with Britain was renewed and extended in 1729, and subsequent treaties confirmed its privileges in 1734, 1750 and 1751. From 1721 until the accession of Sīdī Muḥammad in 1757, Britain enjoyed a period of unrivalled foreign influence in Morocco. The Dutch were the only others to sign a treaty with Morocco during this period. As Brignon et al. concluded, ‘[the British] presence at Gibraltar after 1704 made this preponderance possible; subsequent treaties confirmed it’.64

Britain did have to make concessions of its own to achieve this position. As Anderson concluded, it could not be achieved by force alone: ‘the relative invulnerability of Morocco to attack . . . meant that relations with her were inevitably difficult and expensive’.65 The Moroccan court was not only relatively inaccessible to European consuls, but ceremonial custom required the presentation of valuable gifts on the relatively rare occasions when they were admitted to the sultan. The British and other foreign governments also made large payments for the redemptions of shipwrecked or captured subjects. The British embassy of 1721, for example, brought 15,000 gunlocks, among many other more ornamental gifts.66 In 1751, fifty-two Britons were ransomed for £8,200, and in 1757 £1,500 was offered

62 See Meunier, Le consulat anglais, p. 22.
63 See Anderson, ‘Great Britain’, p. 103; Meunier, Le consulat anglais, pp. 41-3.
64 Brignon et al., Histoire, p. 277.
66 Meunier, Le consulat anglais, p. 52. For a list of the numerous other presents for the sultan and his officials that accompanied the British embassy of 1721, for example, see ibid., pp. 44-9.
for another group held at Marrakesh.\textsuperscript{67} When Sidi Muḥammad renewed the treaty with Britain in 1760, he received a general payment of £25,000 ‘for the entire satisfaction of all difficulties, differences, pretensions [and] disputes of any sorts’, as well as another payment for the redemption of some British captives.\textsuperscript{68} The administration at Gibraltar estimated that for the period 1734-60, the British gave a total of £120,000 (more than $530,000) to the Moroccans in various settlements and agreements of this kind, a hefty sum in the context of Morocco’s foreign income at the time.\textsuperscript{69} Besides this income, trade with the British offered economic benefits in general, as well as access to valuable imports, in particular gunpowder, weapons and cloth.\textsuperscript{70} As will be seen in subsequent chapters, the Moroccans consistently insisted on their right to trade at Gibraltar as well, an indication that they too saw commercial opportunities in an Anglo-Moroccan alliance.

James Sampson, British consul at Tetuan 1770-72, had previously been consul at Algiers, and the comparative difficulty of furthering British interests in Morocco frustrated him. Soon after taking up his new post, he reported his assessment that:

\begin{quote}
the case is widely different between the situation of things with regard to the Emperor of Morocco and that Petty Dependent State [of Algiers]; the latter, on a little reflection, may be made sensible that when a British Consul is supported by His Government, they must comply with whatever He requires agreeable to Treaty or be soon convinced that they may have reason to dread the Consequence of a refusal . . . but permit me to say that the case is far otherwise with the Emperor of Morocco, who can withdraw Himself five hundred Miles from the Sea Coasts, far remote from the Army or Navy of Great Britain . . . At Algier I lived in the same Town with the Dey and could go to Him as any other Gentleman
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{67} For the often involved details of the claims and counter-claims made by each side, mostly as a result of the capture of ships whose nationality was disputed or about the payment of money to redeem British captives, see Rogers, Anglo-Moroccan relations, pp. 91-9.

\textsuperscript{68} Hertslet’s Treaties, Vol. 1, p. 109.

\textsuperscript{69} Anderson, ‘Great Britain’, p. 105. See NA FO 52/1, f. 32 for the expenses of some of these embassies. Sums given in dollars refer to $ Spanish throughout.

\textsuperscript{70} Brignon et al., Histoire, p. 253.
without the Expence of extravagant Presents every time . . . In the Empire of Morocco, the Consul General lives at a great distance from the Residence of the Monarch, and whenever He goes to Him, it must be at a very great expence for His travelling a great number of days suitable to his Character besides the Costly presents wanted to obtain an audience according to Custom.\footnote{NA FO 52/2, ff. 67-8. Sampson’s personal letter books and diary from his time as consul in Morocco survive but I was unfortunately not able to consult them for this work. They are held in the Osbourne Collection at the Beinecke Rare Book Library, Yale University.}

Sampson wanted to move to Meknes to maintain regular contact with the court, but even if the sultan had permitted such an innovation, the British government was reluctant to fund it. A later British consul, James Sholto Douglas, who served 1818-29, made the related complaint that the sheer size of Morocco, the number of its ports and the difficulty of communication made it impossible to achieve the level of consular supervision and influence practiced in the other North African states.\footnote{FO 52/24, James Sholto Douglas, British consul at Tangier, to Lord Bathurst, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, 7 October 1823.}

Despite these frustrations for the British, the privileges conceded under Mawlay Ismā‘īl and Mawlay ʿAbd Allāh (r. 1729-57 intermittently) were unprecedented in Morocco. In some ways, Britain enjoyed a position comparable to what was later to be known as most favoured nation status. The treaties of this time included concessions that could be considered the beginning of what was later to become the system of consular protection. British subjects in Morocco were put under the legal authority of their own consul, in consultation with the governor of the town where any crime was alleged to have taken place, rather than a Moroccan qāḍī (‘judge’). Their Moroccan servants were also exempted from local taxation. The Moroccans also agreed to allow the provisioning of Gibraltar and of British naval ships at any of their ports, the goods to be bought at market prices and without customs duties.\footnote{Hertslet’s Treaties, Vol. 1, pp. 93-100. The origins of the system of protection have not been analysed as much as their impact after their fuller elaboration and establishment in the nineteenth century (see, for example, M. Kenbib, Les protégés: Contribution à l’histoire contemporaine du Maroc (Casablanca: Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines, 1996), pp. 34-66). Caillé saw the origins of protection in some of the treaties concluded under Sīdī Muḥammad (see Jacques Caillé, Les accords internationaux du}
However, it is important to understand that the context of these concessions and the dynamic of the relationship underpinning them were quite different to those in the second half of the nineteenth century. Because European political and economic influence was still a relatively marginal factor, the concessions granted by the makhzan in the eighteenth century did not result in the almost irrevocable losses of its sovereignty that it suffered later on. Although there was continuity in a legal sense between the privileges granted freely in the earlier period and those demanded by Britain and others later, in a political sense the situations were quite different.

There is perhaps a valid comparison to be made between the situation in Morocco and the gradual development of the Ottoman capitulations after their grant to the French and English in the late sixteenth century. In both cases, a relatively unified, land-oriented state conceded commercial privileges to those European powers from a position of comparative security. These concessions were made to gain particular political or economic advantages, and ‘accorded as a gratuitous privilege by the sultans’, both Ottoman and sharifian. In 1790, for example, James Mario Matra, British consul 1787-1806, reported that treaties were ‘in this Country in general only signed by the Emperor & more considered as concessions than reciprocal agreements . . . [and are ] granted as a favour’. It was only after each state could no longer prevent abuses of the concessions they had themselves made that the grants began to undermine their sovereignty. As Ben Srhir has noted, these comparable processes of the erosion of sovereignty were first

sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Abdallah (1757-1790), Faculté de Droit du Maroc, Collection d’études juridiques, politiques et économiques 5 (Tangier: Éditions Marocaines et Internationales, 1960), p. 123), but the concessions he gives as evidence of this were already made in these earlier treaties with Britain. Burke remarks that ‘the status of protégé in Morocco originated with the Franco-Moroccan commercial treaty of 1767’ (see Burke, Prelude, p. 25).

74 See Burke, Prelude, pp. 19-40.

75 ibid., p. 24.

76 NA FO 52/8, f. 222. On Matra’s career before and during his consulship in Morocco, see Alan Frost, The Precarious Life of James Mario Matra (Colton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1995).

77 See EI2, ‘Intiyāzāt’.
institutionalised in the Ottoman case by the 1838 Trade Convention, and in Morocco by the 1856 Anglo-Moroccan treaty.  

Between around 1730 and 1750, however, the penetration of European influence and privileges in Morocco threatened to advance much faster. Despite Morocco’s geo-political defences and the compensations of diplomatic relations with the British, the makhzan did risk a loss of authority as a result of their growing influence and power in the region. During the unstable reign of Mawlay ‘Abd Allâh, the effect of the constant revolts of the ‘abîd soldiers and various rival claimants to the throne was compounded by a rise in illicit trade and the decline of central control over some coastal regions. As had happened during the civil wars of the seventeenth century, Morocco’s structural insulation from growing European influence was again being eroded by these centrifugal forces. The rebellion of Aḥmad b. ‘Alî al-Rîfî in the Gharb, considered below in Chapter Six, was a particular example of this.

That the makhzan was able to reassert its power was largely due to the renewal initiated by Sîdî Muḥammad. His policy toward Morocco’s ports and the country’s trade was dictated by the two inter-related problems discussed above. Firstly, as Harrak has noted, the makhzan could no longer rely on its traditional sources of revenue. The trans-Saharan trade through Morocco had declined significantly in the decades following Mawlay Ismā‘îl’s death, and never recovered; his attempt to diversify the state’s revenues by increasing effective taxation on land had failed, and even backfired, because the instability of the ‘abîd system undermined conditions conducive to trade. Although the trans-Saharan trade remained locally significant into the nineteenth century, when it was finally eroded

---

78 Ben Srrir, Britain and Morocco, p. 26. For a discussion of European trade and the Ottoman Empire, with several interesting points that suggest the useful comparison to be made with Morocco, see Edhem Eldem, 'Capitulations and Western trade', in Suraiya Faroqhi, ed., The Cambridge History of Turkey: Vol. 3 - The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603-1839 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 283-335. For a recent assessment of the 1838 Trade Convention between the empire and Britain, see Bülent Özdemir, 'A reassessment of the 1838 Trade Convention', in Kemal Çiçek, ed., The Great Ottoman-Turkish Civilisation. Vol. 2: Economy and Society (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2000), pp. 230-44.

by improved sea communications, it could no longer sustain the Moroccan state as it once had.\(^{80}\)

Secondly, as the *makhzan*'s power and prestige had declined in the second quarter of the eighteenth century, its control over the ports also weakened. The very revenues and resources necessary to reverse the *makhzan*'s decline were in the hands of increasingly autonomous regional rulers. The sultanate was in a vicious circle whereby its weakness required a new basis for effective rule, the achievement of which was made more difficult the weaker it became. This problem was exacerbated by the predominance of Britain in Morocco’s foreign trade because the *makhzan* was dependent to break out of this cycle on the co-operation of a single country, whose interests did not necessarily lie in that co-operation.

The new sultan, Sīdī Muḥammad, was intimately familiar with these problems before his actual accession to the throne in 1757. His experiences as governor of Marrakesh and his father’s viceroy in the south convinced him of the means of breaking out of the vicious circle, which formed the first element of his policy: the closer control of the ports and the more effective use of their resources in order to re-assert the *makhzan*'s authority. While still viceroy, he had established himself at Safi and used the money raised by a new treaty with Denmark to equip a large army.\(^{81}\) He used his new power to restore the sultanic control over the other important commercial ports of Agadir, Tetuan and Salé.\(^{82}\)

Encouraged by these successes, Sīdī Muḥammad as sultan adopted a similar approach on a larger scale. He made maritime commerce a central concern of the *makhzan* in a way that it had never been before in order to restore the state’s


economic and political stability. Although this is often represented as a result of his modernising and Europhile attitude, it was equally a response deeply rooted in the historical experience of the Moroccan state in that it prioritised control of trade in and around its territory. The earlier absolutist ambitions of Mawlay Ismā‘īl, with his admiration for Louis XIV and the Sun King’s palaces at Versailles, arguably represented a more truly European path for the development of the Moroccan state, and they had proved illusory. On the other hand, the new basis of Sīdī Muḥammad’s policy did engage Morocco more directly than ever before with the new currents of global maritime trade in the eighteenth century. His approach was thus at once a product of a deeply-rooted Moroccan context and an emerging international one.

Although he is often referred to as ‘opening’ the country to foreign trade, Sīdī Muḥammad did not adopt a free trade policy. On the contrary, he sought to control trade more closely to ensure its revenues would accrue to the makhzan itself. Ponasik has described this control as an example of ‘administered trade’, a description also adopted by Harrak. Historians of different fields have applied this model to several societies attempting to manage the impact of European expansion. The main characteristics of this system are defined as price controls, designated ports of trade and the use of merchants employed by the state as intermediaries.\(^3\) However, while this framework seems superficially an appropriate one within which to analyse Sīdī Muḥammad’s system, it actually requires some important amendments. It is true to say, for example, that the makhzan did administer trade in the sense of managing it closely. It did this primarily by changing customs tariffs and limiting certain groups of merchants, Moroccan and foreign, to trading at certain ports. The state also employed merchants directly as commercial agents, or indirectly by granting monopolies on certain goods at certain ports.

The aim of this system was not primarily, however, to limit trade because of its cultural impact, as Ponasik asserts.\(^4\) It did not, for example, rely only on Jewish or other non-Muslim merchants. This point must be emphasised because such an argument, applied in various ways, has generally distorted historians’ understanding of Moroccan trade and foreign policy in the late eighteenth and early

---


\(^4\) Ponasik, 'Administered Trade', p. 196.
nineteenth centuries. On the contrary, as we have seen, the whole essence of Sīdī Muḥammad’s policy was to *increase* foreign trade in order to benefit from its revenues. It was his attempt to resolve some long-standing dilemmas of the Moroccan state. It would be strange indeed if Sīdī Muḥammad had been trying to limit trade, since it increased so markedly during his reign. From 1767 to 1782, during the middle of Sīdī Muḥammad’s reign, maritime trade more than doubled.\(^{85}\)

Restrictions were placed on this valuable source of income for only two reasons. The main one was to ensure it remained under the control of the state, for the sake of the *makhzan*’s revenues and in order to avoid the growth of regional autonomy around the important ports. The other, secondary reason was that it was considered part of the sultan’s obligation to protect his subjects from shortages of goods or damage to their livelihoods; although at times this was set aside in case of the *makhzan*’s pressing need. This aspect of relations between state and society in Morocco might usefully be considered within the framework of moral economy, about which much more work in the context of Muslim societies needs to be done.\(^{86}\)

Rather than the narrow definition imposed by the model of ‘administered trade’, therefore, Sīdī Muḥammad’s system of foreign policy requires a wider analysis within the context discussed above – a specifically Moroccan context. The main elements of the system were: closer integration of the country’s ports into the sultanic system; state intervention in trade to promote the conditions deemed most favourable to its rule; conscious use of Morocco’s maritime influence as a diplomatic tool; the diversification of Morocco’s diplomatic relationships; trade by state agents but also the promotion and defence of trade generally; and increased engagement with European affairs and European practices as far as necessary to serve Morocco’s

\(^{85}\) Brignon *et al.*, *Histoire*, p. 280.

\(^{86}\) In his original work on the concept of moral economy, James C. Scott analysed the tension between the subsistence ethic of a peasant population and the marketisation of the economy. He argued that the peasants’ expectations of a secure livelihood defined their political position vis-à-vis the state, which was expressed as a set of moral or religious structures (see James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1976)). A handful of studies have been done on various Muslim societies, including Boaz Shoshan, *Grain riots and the "moral economy": Cairo, 1350-1517*, *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 10 (1980), pp. 459-78; Amalia Levanoni, *The al-Nashw episode: a case study of "moral economy"*, *Mamluk Studies Review* 9 (2005), pp. 207-20.
commercial and diplomatic interests. Taken together these measures were designed to strengthen the makhzan domestically and defend Morocco’s position abroad.

Elements of Sīdī Mūḥammad’s policy were already evident during his period as khalifā, as has been noted, and these were expanded after his succession. He reversed the growth of British influence of the previous decades by diversifying the country’s diplomatic relations. Although he renewed the treaty with the British in 1760, he also signed new treaties with Spain, France, Venice, Denmark, Portugal, Holland and Sweden during the first twelve years of his reign.87 This marked the beginning of a new period in Morocco’s diplomatic and commercial relations with Europe, and reduced the country’s potential vulnerability to unilateral British action against its commerce.88 He famously constructed the new port of Essaouira in 1765 to manage trade more closely.89 The sultan also regulated duties on different goods in different ports, awarding privileges to and withdrawing them from both Moroccan and foreign merchants as conditions dictated. As Chenier recorded, ‘The Emperor successively increased the duties . . . became a merchant himself . . . [O]bliged to sell their wares and to purchase the country’s products at such prices as the despot pleased to fix, merchants became merely his factors and were constrained to remove from port to port in his empire wherever he chose to indicate’.90

Sīdī Mūḥammad also used a network of commercial agents who were either directly commissioned by him to carry out certain business, or who were extended credit by the makhzan and remitted part of their profits in return. This system of tujjar al-sultān (‘sultan’s merchants’) was based in essence on the exchange of the merchants’ experience and connections abroad for the protection and sponsorship of the government. However, although this system is often referred to, the details of its development are not particularly well understood. Most studies of the subject focus on the later nineteenth century, but, as El Mansour has argued, while the

87 Caillé, Les accords internationaux, pp. 147-215.
88 NA FO 52/1, f. 9.
significance of the phenomenon certainly increased as European penetration of the Moroccan economy advanced, the factors behind its origins and development were longstanding and complex.\(^91\)

Bearing this in mind, it may be helpful to note the similarities between the later system of *tujjār al-sulṭān* and earlier examples of close co-operation between the Moroccan state and the country’s merchants. As Lacoste has pointed out, there was considerable interpenetration of private and state finances in the medieval period, often through the bankers or merchants who served as viziers or chief finance ministers.\(^92\) Thus, the use of *tujjār al-sulṭān* can usefully be seen as another adaptation of another deep-rooted aspect of Moroccan state practice, just as Sīdī Muḥammad refashioned the medieval model of rule based on the control of long-distance trade. In other words, the use of these merchants was not primarily a means to isolate the wider community from the corrupting effects of trade; it was simply how the *makhzan* thought it most profitable to do business.

In order to facilitate his new trade policy, Sīdī Muḥammad kept himself well informed regarding European affairs and commercial conditions abroad. Gibraltar was an important source of this information. Since 1740, it had been linked with Tetuan by a weekly courier ships which, as Miège et al. have pointed out, were a unique means of regular communication with Europe, providing the most frequent and up-to-date news in Morocco about Mediterranean markets and European news in general.\(^93\) Trade with Gibraltar was also an important conduit for this information into Morocco by the mid-eighteenth century.\(^94\) Prominent European merchants and European converts to Islam at court also helped keep the sultan informed, partly through translations of European gazettes and newspapers.\(^95\) The

---


\(^{92}\) Lacoste, 'General characteristics', p. 5.

\(^{93}\) Miège, Benaboud and Erzini, *Tétouan*, p. 56.

\(^{94}\) *ibid.*, pp. 55-6.

British consul at Tangier reported that as a result of these new types of communication and the increasing numbers of Moroccans travelling abroad, the makhzan was becoming better informed regarding commercial and political developments in Europe, and its officials had 'acquired a deal of knowledge of that kind which they were ignorant of prior to [Sīdī Muḥammad’s] reign'.

Whereas under his predecessors, the conduct of foreign affairs and trade had been largely delegated to local governors, Sīdī Muḥammad took a much more active hand in their management. Joseph Popham, British consul 1761-9, noted, for example, that ‘the Government of Barbary since the Emperor Sīdī Mohamet ben Abdallah has come to the Throne is quite different to what it was in Mulay Ishamel or Muley Abdallah’s Time’. Whereas previously a consul had only to be on good terms with governors of Tetuan and Tangier, he reported, the new sultan now paid much more attention to European affairs and expected yearly visits and presents.

Although, as we will see below, the sultan used his control over trade in order to extract the maximum benefit from his various alliances, he also appreciated the need to co-operate with European institutions to facilitate commerce. For example, he delegated powers to the European consular corps in Tangier to administer quarantine arrangements for the country. Despite the fact that measures to control infectious disease were considered controversial from a religious point of view, Sīdī Muḥammad evidently appreciated the fact that the absence of a quarantine system considered trustworthy by the European consuls would obstruct trade. Making a significant concession of Moroccan sovereignty, the sultan instituted a rota system for the appointment of one consul each month to facilitate communication between the makhzan and the consular corps on

---

96 NA FO 52/1, f. 41.
97 NA FO 52/1, ff. 47-8. On the delegation of these functions under Mawlay Ismā‘il, see Brown, 'Anglo-Moroccan relations', pp. 606-7.
98 Ibn al-Hājī, al-Durr, KH MS. 1920, pp. 429-30, cited in Harrak, 'Foundations', p. 47, n. 51. See the references to the operation of this system in, for example, GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan, pp. 314-16, 409-10 & 422. El Mansour dates this system to 1792, but without reference (El Mansour, Morocco, p. 120, n. 82). Pennell dates it to 1820 (C. R. Pennell, 'Accommodation between European and Islamic law in the western Mediterranean in the early nineteenth century', British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 21 (1994), pp. 159-89, (p. 186)).
quarantine and other matters.\textsuperscript{99} A similar system was not introduced in Tunis, for example, until much later, in 1835.\textsuperscript{100}

Sîdî Muḥammad’s new policy naturally had a significant impact on the makhzan’s relationship with the British. Their presence at Gibraltar, the sultan believed, had destabilised his father’s government through trading with groups outside its control and thereby strengthening regional autonomy. This was particularly notable in the Gharb, where Aḥmad al-Rīfī and other local leaders exploited their relations with the British at Gibraltar to buy weapons. Sîdî Muḥammad was well aware of the diplomatic and political implications of the increase in British influence during the previous decades: ‘we regret’, he said, ‘that the proximity of Gibraltar is always dangerous for us . . . The English say they are our friends, but they have treated us worse than the Spanish or the Portuguese’\textsuperscript{101}

Shortly before his accession, for example, the then khalīfa wrote a long and intemperate complaint to George II demanding that the British cease their complicity in the usurpation of the sultan’s authority, in particular the unauthorised export of grain to Gibraltar. Worse still, the authorities of the town had concluded secret agreements with the governors of certain ports. Sîdî Muḥammad threatened that ‘if I get to know that any of you have talked with the governors of the ports and concluded with them an agreement concealed from our lord . . . and God delivers him into my hands I will put him to the cruellest of deaths without delay or hesitation’. He told the English king that he had ordered the expulsion of the British consuls and merchants from the ports of the Gharb, since ‘the cause of all this is the people of your country, the English, for they are the origin of all shame and calamity in the ports of Islam’\textsuperscript{102}

There is no doubt the British did exploit Morocco’s internal dissensions for their own benefit, although the government in London was quick to blame disobedient consuls or officers in Gibraltar when this caused any serious diplomatic

\textsuperscript{99} NA FO 52/13, f. 5.
\textsuperscript{101} Brignon \textit{et al.}, \textit{Histoire}, p. 277.
\textsuperscript{102} Hopkins, ed., \textit{Letters}, pp. 77-9.
problem. During the civil war immediately following Mawlay Ismā’īl’s death, for example, the ‘divisions among the Moors were of infinite advantage to the garrison of Gibraltar . . . as both parties courted our friendship, and proper use was made of it on our side’. Matra reflected similarly, when considering the prospect of war with the country in 1788, that Sīdī Muḥammad ‘could not be ignorant how we hampered his grandfather by supplying his rebellious subjects near [Essaouira] with ammunition, a Game that may be fully as successfully plaid [sic] at this time’. Sīdī Muhammad could not end the relationship with Gibraltar; nor, given its burgeoning trade with Morocco, did he want to. Since the treaty of 1721, relations with the town had gone from strength to strength, becoming especially important in Tetuan. In line with his overall policy, however, the sultan did bring this relationship more closely under control. As we will see in more detail in Chapter Six, he confronted the leading local families, most notably the descendants of Aḥmad al-Rīfi, who had used their links to the British to resist central control under Mawlay ‘Abd Allāh. He also used his own agents to conduct the state’s business in Gibraltar, notably the purchase of the military supplies, which Mawlay Ismā’īl had largely delegated to local officials in the Gharb.

As well as asserting his control over British influence in Morocco in this way, Sīdī Muḥammad sought in turn to exploit Britain’s own weaknesses. They were vulnerable to the effects of his diplomatic diversification, for example. The economic dominance of the British in the Mediterranean rested partly on their relative security from North African privateering compared to other European shipping, a position obviously threatened by improved relations between Morocco and other European states. The British had earlier gone to some lengths, for

106 Miège, Benaboud and Erzini, Tétouan pp. 55-6.
example, to prevent the Dutch making peace with Morocco in 1751, fearing the loss of as much as half of the region’s carrying trade.107

Sīdī Muḥammad therefore used the threat of corsair activity to induce co-operation from the European powers. This conveniently dovetailed with the continued rhetorical symbolism of jiḥād, and an abortive attempt was made to achieve greater technological independence for Moroccan naval power by recruiting Ottoman experts to build a shipyard and new foundry for artillery.108 Overall, however, Sīdī Muḥammad’s use of Morocco’s limited naval resources was not intended to launch the country as a military power but rather to make diplomatic use of the threat of their disproportionate effect on European commercial interests. As Colley has recently argued, he ‘was ruthless and adroit enough to play on Christian preconceptions about arbitrary and barbaric Muslim rulers’, conducting ‘not jihad [sic] as conventionally and narrowly imagined’, but a strategy ‘not to punish or distance non-Muslims, but to force Western powers into closer dialogue and negotiation’.109 The sultan made a similar use of Britain’s particular need to supply Gibraltar. Once the trade across the straits was under firmer makhzan control, the ability to grant or withdraw the town’s supplies was a notable card in his hand.110

The makhzan’s relationship with the British, therefore, rested on a balance between the needs and weaknesses of each side. This balance was reflected by the regularly trimming of Sīdī Muḥammad’s policy toward them, which was characterised by ‘numerous moments of amity which existed simultaneously with those, no less frequent, of enmity’.111 The regular fluctuations of duties imposed on British trade generally, and on supplies to Gibraltar specifically, were an obvious

---

manifestation of this. Between 1766 and 1773, for example, duties on all types of supplies for Gibraltar were raised, in some cases by more than 100 per cent.\textsuperscript{112}

The sultan attempted to exploit the rivalries of the European powers, in particular Britain and Spain, in order to maximise the benefits of Morocco’s relations with them. This was also intended to limit the worst effects of foreign dominance, particularly when concentrated in the hands of one country, as it had been in Britain’s during the previous decades. Gibraltar was an important factor in this diplomatic calculation, since its strategic significance had long been obvious to the Moroccans. In 1709, for example, ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Aisha, the admiral of Salé, demonstrated his appreciation of it when he secretly tried to entice the French to renew their interest in Morocco by offering them help to capture and hold the town.\textsuperscript{113}

Sīdī Muhammad similarly exploited the contention over Gibraltar that fuelled Anglo-Spanish enmity, shifting his position several times in order to bolster Morocco’s diplomatic position. Lourido-Díaz divided these shifts into three main phases.\textsuperscript{114} At first, the sultan sought British military aid to pursue the traditional sharifian policy of jihād against the Spanish enclaves. This culminated in the Moroccan embassy to London of 1774, which secured thirty-six cannon and other supplies for the siege of Melilla the following year.\textsuperscript{115} The British also regularly supplied technical training to the Moroccan army, either by sending officers on secondment to Morocco or by hosting Moroccan soldiers at Gibraltar. This anticipated suggestions made later by Mawlay Sulaymān and the actual policy of Mawlay al-Ḥasan (r. 1873-94), who sent Moroccans abroad for military training first at Gibraltar and then elsewhere in Europe.\textsuperscript{116}

\textsuperscript{112} NA FO 52/3, f. 48b. See also William Lempriere, \textit{A tour from Gibraltar to Tangier Sallee, Mogodore, Santa Cruz, Tarudant; and thence, over Mount Atlas, to Morocco: including a particular account of the royal harem, &c.} (London: 1791), p. 80; Anderson, ‘Great Britain’, p. 94.

\textsuperscript{113} \textit{SIHM} 2\textsuperscript{nd} France, Vol. 6, pp. 413-23. On the context for this offer, see Brown, ‘Anglo-Moroccan relations’, pp. 611-12.

\textsuperscript{114} See Lourido-Díaz, ‘Relaciones políticas’.

\textsuperscript{115} ibid., p. 352.

The second phase was marked by the growth of Spanish influence in the Moroccan court after the treaty between the two countries in 1767. The Spaniards tried to induce the Moroccans to cut off supplies to Gibraltar and close their ports to British shipping, offering payment of $200,000 for doing so in 1770, for example. Sampson recommended spending four times this amount to recover British influence at this time. Trade with Spain was growing significantly, coming to account for four-fifths of Morocco’s total foreign trade. After the failure of the siege of Melilla, an atmosphere of even greater rapprochement took hold between the two countries. This manifested itself clearly during the Spanish siege of Gibraltar that began in 1779 after Spain took advantage of the American Revolutionary War to declare war on Britain. Not only did Sidi Muhammad close the northern ports of Tetuan, Tangier and Larache to the British in favour of a Spanish monopoly, he also allowed the Spaniards to mount cannon around Tangier to facilitate their control of the straits.

Even at this point, however, the sultan continued to attempt to balance his two main European allies-cum-enemies against one another. He sent an official to Essaouira to confirm that it was still open to British ships and merchants, who reported that they remained free to trade. He quite quickly abandoned his strong commitment to Spain and restored normal relations with the British by the treaty of 1783. This marked the beginning of a third phase, an uneasy rapprochement based on mutual self-interest. Frequent Moroccan requests for weapons or

Burke, Prelude, p. 32. As during earlier periods, Morocco also looked to the Ottoman Empire and other Muslim countries for assistance in developing its military capacity. See Amira K. Bennison, 'The "new order" and Islamic order: the introduction of the Niẓāmī army in the western Maghrib and its legitimation, 1830-73', International Journal of Middle Studies 36 (2004), pp. 591-612; Bettina Dennerlein, 'South-South Linkages and Social Change: Moroccan Perspectives on Army Reform in the Muslim Mediterranean in the Nineteenth Century', Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 27 (2007), pp. 52-61.

117 See Anderson, 'Great Britain', p. 91.
118 NA FO 52/2, f. 22.
119 Brignon et al., Histoire, p. 280.
121 NA FO 52/4, f. 190.
assistance with naval repairs followed the renewal of relations.\textsuperscript{122} There was much looser regulation on military supplies at Gibraltar, where the authorities were barely able to stop the sale of gunpowder to Morocco by British merchants even when the outbreak of war seemed likely.\textsuperscript{123} Even such controls as were in place were not always successful, as references to the unauthorised export of military supplies by Moroccans indicate.\textsuperscript{124}

Relations remained marked by underlying tensions, however. Whenever the British refused the sultan’s requests, notably when Sîdî Muḥammad asked to winter his ships at Gibraltar and for British crews to sail two frigates to Istanbul as a gift for the Ottomans, he played his constant trump card by threatening to cut off supplies to Gibraltar.\textsuperscript{125} However, his hand was often stayed by his need for military supplies. Thus, when he briefly cut off trade between Morocco and Gibraltar in 1788, he had ‘sense enough to see that by stopping the communication with Gibraltar he has only increased [sic] his difficulties in procuring the stores he is so much in need of’, particularly gunpowder and naval stores.\textsuperscript{126} The sultan’s sometimes-erratic attitude at the very end of his reign may partly have been the result of a physical or even mental illness which some sources suggest he was suffering in the last months of his life. He was also under renewed domestic pressure due to the instability provoked by his rebellious son, Mawlay al-Yazîd.\textsuperscript{127}

The success of the sultan’s policy of increasing maritime commerce also now left him, paradoxically, more vulnerable than his predecessors to its disruption, although he had successfully defended the makhzan against other problems. The

\textsuperscript{122} See, for example, Lourido-Díaz, 'Relaciones políticas', pp. 372-3; GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan, pp. 353, 357, 362 & 455. See also Frost, \textit{The Precarious Life}, p. 127.

\textsuperscript{123} On the efforts of the authorities to control trade at Gibraltar, see GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan, pp. 187-8 & 199. On the lengthy attempts to persuade the London government to authorise a prohibition on the trade in military supplies, see NA CO 91/35, O’Hara to Lord Sydney, Home Secretary, 17 April 1788, O’Hara to Sydney, 25 August 1788 & William Grenville, Home Secretary, to O’Hara, 29 June 1789.

\textsuperscript{124} GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan, pp. 375, 443-4 & 451-2.

\textsuperscript{125} GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan, pp. 443-5; NA CO 91/35, O’Hara to Sydney, 28 February 1788 & O’Hara to Matra, 10 March 1788. See Rogers, \textit{Anglo-Moroccan relations}, pp. 121-4.

\textsuperscript{126} NA CO 91/35, Matra to O’Hara, 11 April 1788. See Frost, \textit{The Precarious Life}, p. 130.

\textsuperscript{127} See R. Danziger, 'The British consular reports as a source for Morocco’s internal history during the reign of Sîdî Muḥammad b.’Abdallah (1757-1790)', \textit{Maghreb Review} 7 (1982), pp. 103-7.
growth of trade with Spain could not entirely compensate for the economic costs of severing relations completely with Britain and Gibraltar. The Spanish consul estimated the losses to Morocco to be thousands of dollars a year during the siege of 1779-83, and believed this prompted the sultan’s decision to reverse the embargo on British trade.\textsuperscript{128} The cost of economic disruption also contributed to the end of the interruption of Anglo-Moroccan relations in 1788, when the increase in trade with Spain that Sīdī Muḥammad had hoped for was not enough to meet the subsequent shortfall in customs revenues.\textsuperscript{129} Overall, some aspects of the \textit{makhzan}'s traditional defences against external interference were fading as Sīdī Muḥammad’s reign drew to a close, precisely because of his success in integrating the country into the commercial and diplomatic networks of a wider Mediterranean and even global context. As Colley has recently argued, this process was one part of the ‘forging [of] cultural and economic connections across very long distances’ that had a profound impact across the world during the middle and late eighteenth century.

This process was not simply a result of European expansion; it was also shaped by the efforts and attitudes of rulers and societies from all continents, of which Sīdī Muḥammad’s Morocco is a case in point. The sultan had responded by institutionalising what in some ways was a fundamental shift, orienting the country decisively toward Europe. From being peripheral, both literally and physically, to the \textit{makhzan}'s concerns, the country’s ports and maritime commerce had become crucial to its economic and diplomatic policy. Yet, in developing his policy to accommodate this change and confront its profoundly destabilising effects on the sultanate’s power during the mid-eighteenth century, Sīdī Muḥammad’s approach also represented continuity. He adapted the long-standing model of the Moroccan state symbiotically linked with trade. By embracing maritime instead of overland trade, he intended to boost the state’s revenues and simultaneously control the centrifugal forces threatening its control by more firmly integrating the economic and political elites of the coastal regions into the \textit{makhzan} system. His successors followed this system in its essentials, such that it became the basis of government foreign policy for a century.

\textsuperscript{128} Lourido-Díaz, ‘Relaciones políticas’, p. 368.
\textsuperscript{129} NA CO 91/35 O’Hara to Matra, 10 March 1788 & Matra to O’Hara, 14 June 1788.
However, one of the important results of this approach was that it was becoming harder to pick and choose how and when to engage with the political and commercial representatives of foreign powers in the way that the Moroccan sultanate had been accustomed to doing.\textsuperscript{130} Certain events began to show how the power to enforce the terms of the foreign presence in Morocco was slipping away. In 1788, for example, the European consuls in Morocco made a joint pledge to assist one another in enforcing the country’s adherence to its treaties.\textsuperscript{131} In the same year, the consuls began to discuss themselves how Morocco’s customs regime should be reorganised.\textsuperscript{132}

On the other hand, a balance was maintained to some extent by the fact that the British still needed Moroccan help. Emboldened by the successful defence of Gibraltar between 1779 and 1783, some British officials became more confident about supplying the town without Moroccan assistance; for example, by sending cattle and other food directly from Ireland. Lieutenant-Governor O’Hara happily reported that ‘as for the Gibraltarians, we can eat and drink and laugh and play without the assistance of the Emperor of Morocco’.\textsuperscript{133} In fact, this was an over-optimistic assessment, since the town was quite badly affected by the interruption of supplies.\textsuperscript{134} Adequate supplies from Morocco remained, ‘if not an absolute essential, at least of very high importance for the maintenance of Britain’s position in the Mediterranean’.\textsuperscript{135} In any case, the outbreak of hostilities in Europe again and the long struggle of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars were soon to disabuse the British of any idea of holding Gibraltar without good relations with Morocco.

At his death in 1790, therefore, Sīdī Muḥammad had generally been able to preserve the balance of Anglo-Moroccan relations. This was part of his wider success in renewing the sultanic system and entrenching Morocco’s independence from the creeping effects of European expansion. Nevertheless, some important underlying dynamics of the sultanate’s relationship with the outside world were

\textsuperscript{130} Colley, \textit{The Ordeal of Elizabeth Marsh}, pp. 297-8.
\textsuperscript{131} NA FO 52/7, ff. 280-4.
\textsuperscript{132} Harrak, ‘Foundations’, p. 40.
\textsuperscript{133} NA CO 91/35, O’Hara to Evan Nepean, Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, 23 June 1788.
\textsuperscript{134} NA CO 91/35, O’Hara to Sydney, 26 February 1789 & O’Hara to Grenville, 29 September 1789.
\textsuperscript{135} Anderson, ‘Great Britain’, p. 94.
changing, not least as a result of Sīdī Muḥammad’s own policies. Having tied the country’s fortunes more fully to maritime commerce, the makhzan would now stand or fall by its ability to manage its relationship with Europe with the same success as Sīdī Muḥammad. As we will see in the following chapters, his successors persisted in the core elements of his approach, especially as they related to the British and Gibraltar; but this policy was eventually subject to a law of diminishing returns as the commercial and military expansion of the European powers became more aggressive.
Chapter 2 – Continuities in Makhzan Trade & Foreign Policy after 1790

The tumultuous years immediately following Sīdī Muḥammad’s death confirmed the increased fragility of the makhzan’s structural insulation from external influences, especially in such times of instability. Sīdī Muḥammad’s successors adopted similar strategies to overcome the same problem that had dogged Sīdī Muḥammad’s own early efforts to reassert central control, namely the creeping effects of European expansion. Although the reign of Mawlay Sulaymān between 1792 and 1822, in particular, is seen as a time of isolationism, during which the makhzan turned its back on attempts to manage foreign affairs and trade beyond negatively trying to minimise their role, in fact the sultanate’s policy during the first decades of the nineteenth century continued the fundamental elements of Sīdī Muḥammad’s approach, albeit with shifts in emphasis. That is to say, in order to promote its own political and economic stability, the makhzan continued to promote maritime commerce within the framework of a market managed by adjusting customs rates and other regulations relating to foreign trade.

In doing this, the sultanate entrenched its symbiotic relationship with the economic and political elites who actually conducted relations with Europe, albeit with periodic attempts to alter the balance of the relationship in its own favour. The impression of isolationism under Mawlay Sulaymān was, as we will see in this chapter, due more to the economic and diplomatic disruptions caused by two and a half decades of war in Europe, the effects of which spilled out across the world, than to any fundamental change on the makhzan’s part.

The immediate challenge of defending the central authority of the makhzan after Sīdī Muḥammad’s death fell to his son, Mawlay al-Yazīd (r. 1790-2). During his brief reign he cultivated relations with the British in view of their diplomatic and economic importance, and because they offered the most likely support against Morocco’s traditional enemy, Spain. Franz von Dombay, the former Habsburg consul in Morocco, reported, for example, that the new sultan was ‘unusually close to the English . . . and is supposed to have expressed in the presence of a number of people that it was his intention to remain at peace only with the English and the Ragusans’. In contrast, the new sultan seemed hostile to the Spanish, ordering, for example, the immediate payment of tariffs on grain exported from Casablanca that
Sīdī Muḥammad had waived. This von Dombay attributed to the fact that the English had often ingratiated themselves with Mawlay al-Yazīd during his father's reign.\(^1\) By this he probably meant such episodes as the prince's transportation for *hajj* in an English naval ship, or the dispatch of artillery experts from Gibraltar to instruct him.\(^2\)

Mawlāy al-Yazīd's subsequent policies during his short reign bore out von Dombay's report. Despite the fact that his reign is remembered as 'a reaction against every aspect of the previous reign' of Sīdī Muḥammad, and in particular as a time of marked hostility to foreign and Jewish interests, it was impossible for the new sultan to free himself from the diplomatic and economic reality of Morocco's position.\(^3\) By the treaty of 1791 he became the first sultan officially to grant Britain 'most favoured nation' status.\(^4\) He promised to rebuild the port of al-Qṣar al-Ṣaghīr for British use, for example, since it offered easier communication with Gibraltar than Tetuan, which with certain winds prevailing could be cut off from the British port.\(^5\) He also lowered many of the export duties charged on the British; on cattle by $1 per head, for example, on wool and goat hides by $1 per *qiṇṭār* ('quintal' or 'hundredweight'), on ostrich feathers from $300 to $80 per *qiṇṭār*. Import duties on iron, steel, cotton and opium were all also reduced.\(^6\) He announced his intention to

---

\(^1\) N.A. Stillman, 'Two Accounts of the Persecution of the Jews of Tetouan in 1790', in Daniel Carpi, Yehuda Nini and Shlomo Simonsohn, eds., *Michael: On the History of the Jews in the Diaspora*, Publications of the Diaspora Research Institute 18 (Tel Aviv: The Diaspora Research Institute, 1978), pp. 130-42 (pp. 140-1); NA FO 52/10, f. 136. Von Dombay, by 1790 resident in Spain, probably received his information from the Spanish consul Juan Manuel Gonzalez Salmón, with whom he had lived for a time and who represented the Habsburg Empire in Morocco after von Domaby's departure.

\(^2\) NA CO 91/35, Secret dispatch to O'Hara, 23 October 1790; GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan pp. 261 & 263.


\(^5\) FO 174/12, Matra to the Duke of Portland, Home Secretary, 27 February 1801.

\(^6\) GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan, List of tariffs charged on the English at Tangier and Tetuan, untitled enclosure with O'Hara to Matra, 22 September 1789; GGA Letters South Barbary, 'Tariff of Duties for the Ports of Tetuan & Tangier', 28 April 1790; NA FO 52/8, f. 218.
reduce the tariff on cattle exports further still the next year, and opened Agadir to British merchants.  

Good relations with the merchants of Gibraltar offered Mawlay al-Yazīd revenue to support his efforts to secure power, as when he borrowed several thousand pounds against the future right to trade duty-free at Larache. In the uncertain conditions of the time, most trade except with Gibraltar had been severely disrupted. Moreover, the new sultan had sacrificed important sources of domestic revenue by abolishing the maks (‘non-Qur’anic taxation’, usually levied on commerce) and granting new fiscal privileges to his supporters among the religious aristocracy of the shuraṭa. In other indications of his need to secure British support, Mawlay al-Yazīd also appointed Matra, the British consul, to manage Morocco’s diplomatic relations with Spain, and made al-Ṭāhir Fannish, a notable Anglophile, governor of Tangier. Whether the Anglo-Irish origin of the sultan’s mother played any role in his favourable diplomatic attitude toward the British is unclear.  

During Mawlay al-Yazīd’s reign and after his premature death in early 1792, therefore, relations with the British remained an important factor in Morocco’s internal power struggles. This period of instability once again magnified foreign influence, external aid and the revenue of maritime trade becoming relatively more

---

7 GGA Letters South Barbary, John Raleigh, secretary to the governor of Gibraltar, to Matra, 24 October 1791; NA FO 52/10, f. 1.
8 NA FO 52/10, f. 205.
9 NA FO 52/10, f. 3b.
12 According to records of the British consulate, Mawlay al-Yazīd’s mother was the daughter of a private in the Gibraltar garrison who went to Tangier for her health and became Muslim (see NA FO 52/7, f. 77b; NA FO 52/21, f. 25). Godard records her name as ‘Lella Scersceta’ or ‘Zarzet’ (Godard, Description, p. 564). Other sources in the Gibraltar Garrison Library that I was unfortunately not able to consult suggest she was the half-Moroccan/half-Irish daughter of a soldier, sent from Gibraltar to advise Sīdī Muḥammad on artillery, who subsequently stayed on in Morocco, which seems more likely. I am very grateful to Dr. Erzini and Dr. Sam Benady for their help on this point.
important to leaders denied the country’s normal tax income. Mawlay Maslama, for example, brother of Mawlay al-Yazīd, was supported as sultan by the Idrisids of northern Morocco; he requested a loan from the British authorities at Gibraltar in late 1791, offering in return the farm of future customs duties at Moroccan ports.\(^{13}\)

He was indeed lent $4,000 on the recommendation of Matra, who had close contacts with him and considered him ‘a warm friend’ to the British, the candidate most likely to support their interests after Mawlay al-Yazīd’s death. The warmth of his friendship was quickly demonstrated when he confirmed the privileges at Larache to the Gibraltarian merchants who had advanced money to Mawlay al-Yazīd, and reduced the duty on cattle exported from Tangier and Tétuan.\(^{14}\)

Around the same time, Mawlay Hishām, another son of Ṣīdī ʿUmmāmudd, who was proclaimed sultan at Marrakesh, made a similar attempt to win British support, offering to supply their naval ships and the garrison at Gibraltar from Larache.\(^{15}\)

However, in a reprise of his father’s policy, he made similar offers to the Spanish, causing Matra to describe him as ‘a greater Enemy to the English than his father was’.\(^{16}\) Mawlay Hishām and his supporters in the south did in fact become increasingly oriented toward Spain. As we will see below, this caused Mawlay Sulaymān to curb trade in the south; not because he was against it *per se*, but because he feared the effects of his rival’s control over access to the economic and military resources offered by trade with Europe.

Mawlay Sulaymān was proclaimed sultan at Fes and joined the struggle for power in March 1792. His reign, as we noted in the Introduction, is often characterised as defined primarily by isolationism and even xenophobia. In his groundbreaking study of Mawlay Sulaymān’s rule, however, El Mansour has challenged that view, arguing that it should not be seen as a period of instability and insularity, and emphasising continuities with the policies of both Ṣīdī Muḥammad and Mawlay ʿAbd al-Rahmān.\(^{17}\) In particular, he has presented a more

---

\(^{13}\) NA FO 52/10, f. 175b. For a summary of the campaigns of the competing claimants to the throne during this period, see El Mansour, Morocco, pp. 88-98.

\(^{14}\) NA CO 91/36, Boyd to Henry Dundas, Home Secretary, 19 March 1792 & Boyd to Dundas, 3 May 1792; NA FO 52/10, ff. 200-2 & 205-6.

\(^{15}\) NA CO 91/36, Boyd to Dundas, 19 March 1792 & Boyd to Dundas, 3 May 1792.

\(^{16}\) NA FO 52/10, f. 190.

\(^{17}\) See in particular El Mansour, Morocco, pp. 3-4 & 46-7.
nuanced picture of the development of Moroccan trade during this time, correcting the picture of simple decline. On the other hand, trade did decline at Morocco’s main port, Essauira, and elsewhere, and overall Morocco’s balance of trade weakened. However, the balance of trade may have been due to rising imports as well as declining exports. Mawlay Sulaymān continued to encourage the former, his restrictions on trade being mostly directed at the latter. Despite restrictions in the south, trade in the northern ports seems to have remained more active throughout the period, with the trade axis of Fes and Tetuan particularly prosperous.

To account for this more complex picture, El Mansour makes several important arguments, including the impact of food shortages and the need to protect domestic supplies; the role of European interests in perpetuating the civil wars of the 1790s; the instability caused by the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in Europe; the lack of protection for Moroccan trade in these disrupted conditions; and the impact of epidemic disease and famine, which both reduced production in Morocco and necessitated its isolation from international trade at certain times.

However, despite the overall framework of his study and these important conclusions, El Mansour’s overall argument remains slightly ambiguous. Despite presenting convincing evidence undermining the idea, he to some extent perpetuates the idea that Mawlay Sulaymān was opposed to trade per se because of his religious or ideological convictions, thereby partly reiterating the exceptionalism of the reign that he otherwise rejects. He argues, for example, that ‘Mawlay Sulayman did not conceive of maritime trade as a tool which might serve his domestic policy, rather contact with Europeans was regarded as “an unavoidable evil”; that ‘religious considerations were the main motivation behind Mawlay Sulayman’s attitude towards European trade’, and that he prioritised religious

---

18 The Moroccan currency lost more than 50% of its value against the Spanish dollar between 1782 and 1820. See ibid., pp. 54, 62 & 66-71.
19 See ibid., pp. 50 & 66-71.
20 ibid., pp. 11, 62-3 & 71.
21 ibid., pp. 55-6 & 61.
22 ibid., pp. 56, 66 & 93.
23 ibid., pp. 56-7, 60, 67 & 107.
24 ibid., pp. 61 & 64.
25 ibid., p. 66.
strictures over state interests; that the sultan ‘for a time . . . appeared to have believed he could dispense with the outside world’ and that it was only at the end of his reign, in straitened circumstances, that he abandoned ‘the isolationist course upon which Morocco had for so long been set’.

El Mansour therefore appears at times to accept the assumption that any measures to control trade were the result of Mawlay Sulaymān’s fundamental hostility to foreign commerce, and his hostility to commerce is demonstrated by the measures he took to control trade. So, for example, El Mansour describes the promotion of trade in the 1790s as purely tactical and a measure of convenience, ‘destined’ to be abandoned. The circularity of this position is highlighted by the very success of his work overall, presenting a more complex and rounded account of Mawlay Sulaymān’s reign than any previous – or indeed subsequent – work. This contrast shows the tenacity of the scholarly assumptions he explicitly sets out to overturn.

The actual evidence for Mawlay Sulaymān’s isolationism is in fact not very strong in and of itself. Considered in the overall context of his reign it is even less compelling. As El Mansour himself notes, the sultan did not try to control imports and overall ‘took no measures to prevent trade being conducted with Europe before 1816’. It is true that he feared the adoption by his Muslim subjects of European social and business practices, but this was rarely translated into concrete prohibitions or controls that prevented trade itself because – as we will see below – the factors informing the makhzan’s trade policy cannot be reduced to some simple ‘religious prejudice’. Mawlay Sulaymān’s declaration in 1801 that European merchants were welcome to leave the country, as he had no need of them, could equally be seen as part of his desire to transfer trade from foreign into Moroccan hands as evidence of his opposition to maritime trade per se.

---

26 ibid., pp. 55 & 134.
27 ibid., pp. 68 & 219.
28 ibid., pp. 66-7.
29 ibid., pp. 50 & 71.
30 On Mawlay Sulaymān’s dislike of the spread of European practices, see ibid., p. 55.
31 See ibid., p. 67. Jackson thought that the decline in the number of European merchants was also partly attributable to the lack of effective consular support (see James Grey Jackson, An Account of the Empire of Morocco and the Districts of Suse and Tafilelt compiled from Miscellaneous Observations made during
The measures taken in 1816 support the case for the sultan’s hostility to trade more convincingly, but the evidence is not clear-cut. It seems odd, for example, that the sultan would really have banned all Moroccans from travelling abroad just months after confirming the position of the Moroccan consul at Gibraltar, a post specifically intended to aid Moroccan merchants and travellers in the town. In any case, the reversal of these measures began within a year, making them a flimsy peg on which to hang the interpretation of a reign spanning three decades.\(^{32}\) Jackson, with personal experience of dealing with the sultan on trade matters, did not perceive any essential objection to commerce on Mawlay Sulaymān’s part, rather blaming European merchants and diplomats for their

\(^{32}\) See El Mansour, *Morocco*, pp. 67-8. The implications of these measures generally are ambiguous, and do not necessarily point to the *makhzan’s* desire to ‘dispense with the outside world’. In the case of the sultan’s decree of 1816 supposedly banning all Moroccans from travelling abroad seems, for example, it is unclear from al-Ḍu’ayyīf’s record of it exactly what its intention was. It seems directed on the one hand at Moroccan sailors engaged in licentious practices (*wa-amnā al-bahrīyya fa-mushtaghilina bi-l-fisq wa sharh al-khamr wa-l-lūt wa ghayr dhālik*) and on the other at ships’ captains engaged in black marketeering, but it makes no mention of merchants travelling abroad. It is also unclear what the sultan’s order to the captains (not the sailors, who are not specified) ‘not to enter any land from the lands of the Christians’ (*an lā yadhkhul li-balad min bilād al-naṣārā*) actually meant: did it mean not to travel to any Christian land at all, or that they should not literally disembark and go on land if they visited a Christian port, or something else? (see Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Salām al-Ribāṭī, *Ṭāʾrīkh al-Ḍu’ayyīf al-Ribāṭī: tāʾrīkh al-dawla al-ʿalawīyya al-saʿūda min nashāṭiha ilā awākhir ‘ahd Mawlay Sulaymān*, ed. by Muḥammad al-Būzaydī al-Shaykhi, 2 vols. (Casablanca: Dār al-Thaqāfa, 1988), Vol. 2, p. 741. The enforcement of the traditional dress code and ‘head tax’ (*jīzā*) on Moroccan Jews caused many to leave the country and therefore damaged its trade to some extent, but it does not follow that that was the reason for its implementation. It seems more likely to have been directed toward reasserting social boundaries that were being eroded by the economic consequences of the growth of foreign trade, and therefore a measure designed to accommodate that growth rather than prevent it altogether (see below, pp. 120-1). The increased tax on Muslim merchants was not punitive, but put the same burden on them as Jewish and foreign merchants. The implications of this are intriguing: was it intended to compensate in some way for the relative disadvantage of Jewish merchants newly created by the imposition of the *jīzā*, for example? In any case, it is hard to see it purely as a means of restricting trade, even though that might have been its effect.
‘impolicy and inattention, added to ignorance of the proper mode of treating with him’.

It is true that many Moroccan ‘ulamā’ opposed travel to non-Muslim countries, and that, due to his religious training and involvement in religious debates, Mawlay Sulaymān seems to have sympathised with these views. However, this alone is not enough to rescue the argument in favour of his isolationism. The Moroccan state had to listen to the religious scholars for the sake of its legitimacy, but it did not simply take orders from them, even under Mawlay Sulaymān whose sympathy for the ‘ulamā’ is well known. Even if it did, it is not clear that there was only one single position among the ‘ulamā’ on this issue. Many Moroccan Muslims did travel abroad, as we will see in subsequent chapters. Both the Moroccan state and its subjects had a dynamic and creative relationship with the interpreters of the religious law, who themselves were part of the same society with all the personal and material interests that that might imply. The following chapter will discuss in more detail the legal position of the Moroccan consulate in Gibraltar, for example.

In the rest of this chapter, therefore, an argument will be advanced that, building on El Mansour’s study, attempts to develop his work by clearing away the remnants of the older assumptions that to some extent obscured his conclusions. In summary, Mawlay Sulaymān continued to support maritime commerce within the overall framework developed by Sīdī Muḥammad and later adopted by Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahmān. As such, his reign represents not a period of abnormal isolation, but part of an evolutionary process. Although there were shifts of emphasis within it, the elements of the makhzan’s approach to foreign trade were fundamentally the same between 1757 and 1856. In so far as Mawlay Sulaymān’s government did restrain trade it was for reasons falling into one of two categories: either the impact of factors outside its control, such as epidemic disease or the war in Europe; or as a means to fulfil certain perceived duties of the sultan and the makhzan which were discussed in the previous chapter, such as preventing unauthorised foreign trade

---

33 Jackson, *An Account of the Empire*, p. 257.
35 On the relationship of the makhzan and the ‘ulamā’ under Mawlay Sulaymān, see *ibid.*, pp. 150-6. On the legal status of the consulate, see below, pp. 114-17.
that fuelled domestic rebellion, bolstering Morocco’s diplomatic position, or ensuring a sufficient supply of certain goods for the population. Although it is true that Mawlay Sulaymâni’s fiscal policy diverged from that of Sîdî Muḥammad in some respects, this was not motivated by hostility to trade or commercial interests. Such hostility would have been completely at odds with Mawlay Sulaymân’s long-standing alliance with the mercantile classes as a counter-balance to the conservative groups that opposed many of his policies.

When Mawlay Sulaymân first came to power, he was apparently unambitious and, in particular, had little experience of foreign affairs.36 However, the experience of the civil wars of the 1790s quickly brought home the importance, not only of promoting foreign trade, but of keeping it under the makhzan’s control. Like contestants for the throne for at least a century before – mutatis mutandi – Mawlay Sulaymân needed to control the resources of trade in order to compensate for the unreliability of other income from taxation. As Matra reported, the new sultan’s ‘revenue [was] chiefly limited to the Duties of the Sea Ports, for many of the Tribes inland pay nothing’.37 The two debasements of the coinage, in 1792 and 1794, were an indication of the makhzan’s financial difficulties and hence the significance of controlling foreign trade.38 In this context, Mawlay Sulaymân came to appreciate the ‘damaging role played by European interests in perpetuating the political division of the country’ during this time, and consequently to realise that ‘the basis of the whole crisis was commercial’ in that it was perpetuated by the independent relations of coastal towns and tribes with European merchants.39

At first, Mawlāy Sūlāymān’s ambition was ostensibly limited, and he asserted only the need for every port to recognise either himself or Mawlay Hishām. In October 1793, he ordered his governor at Tangier, Aḥmad b. ‘Abd al-Ṣādiq al-Ḥamāmī, to require the consuls there to prevent any trade to the areas that refused to acknowledge them. Since Sîdî Muḥammad’s death, the governor noted:

37 NA FO 52/10, ff. 264-6.
38 See El Mansour, Morocco, pp. 52-4.
39 ibid., pp. 56 & 93.
the country has been desolated by civil Wars, every Bashaw &
Alcaide in his Government or district assuming independence . . .
[and] lately the Sea Coast from Sale to Sa[n]a Cruz which includes
the Ports of Darelbeyda, Mazagan, Saffy & Mogadore have also
shaken off their allegiance & their Chiefs resolved to govern
independent of either Prince.40

Particularly troubling to Mawlay Sulaymān was the lucrative grain trade to
Cadiz, controlled largely from the ports of Casablanca, Mazagan and Safī by the
Although at times allied to Mawlay Hishām both these rulers were ultimately trying
to defend their own areas of control. When Mawlay Hishām abdicated in April 1795,
Ibn Nāṣir urged the populations of his region and Marrakesh not to acknowledge
Mawlay Sulaymān but to live without a sultan.42 He was promised guns and
ammunition by the Spanish, who also attempted to protect their interests against
Mawlay Sulaymān’s efforts to block trade with the south by supporting the rebellion
of Mawlay ‘Abd al-Mālik b. Idrīs, the sultan’s cousin and governor of Casablanca.43
During 1795, the sultan renewed these efforts at blockade, notifying the consuls at
Tangier of the continued prohibition on trade with Safī and Mazagan because ‘it is
their Commerce which encourages them in their rebellion and gives them strength
to resist us’.44 He was only partially successful. Although several ships were
captured by his cruisers, others succeeded in reaching the rebellious ports,
including two British ships that loaded grain for Gibraltar and, the sultan feared,
brought gunpowder in exchange. In May 1796, another thirty ships arrived in Safī
despite Mawlay Sulaymān’s blockade.45

Thus it seems clear that during the 1790s Mawlay Sulaymān’s ‘restrictions’
on foreign trade were primarily attempts to defend trade from external disruption.
As had been the case during Sīdī Muḥammad’s reign, the makhzan used its trade

40 NA FO 52/10, f. 255. On al-Ḥamāmī, see below, p. 195-6.
41 NA FO 52/10, f. 268b. On the role of these two and al-Hāshimī’s brother, Muḥammad, in the revolt
in the south, see El Mansour, Morocco, pp. 92-5.
42 NA FO 52/10, ff. 271-2; FO 52/11, ff. 20 & 38.
43 NA FO 52/10, ff. 270, 276 & 278; NA FO 52/11, ff. 91 & 94.
44 NA FO 52/11, ff. 22b & 49.
45 NA FO 52/11, ff. 55, 64 & 81.
policy both as a means to suppress regional autonomy in coastal areas, and as a tool of its wider diplomatic policy, simultaneously using commerce to augment his own resources and to develop foreign alliances. The new sultan renewed permission to the Spanish to export grain, in an attempt to win Spain’s support in his dynastic struggle: consequently, Spain ‘being mainly interested in the purchase of wheat, realised that it could export it from the northern ports on almost the same conditions as those offered by the rebels [so that] Mawlay Sulayman succeeded in convincing Spain that her interests could be better served by a united and peaceful Morocco’.\(^{46}\) He did this despite some popular opposition; at Tetuan, for example, locals attacked ships loading grain for export to Ceuta in March 1794.\(^{47}\) Soon afterwards, he met with the consuls at Tangier and assured them that the treaties of Sīdī Muḥammad’s reign would be maintained – a move he hoped would produce the requisite tribute revenue from the smaller states such as Denmark and Venice.\(^{48}\) In general, any popular opposition to continued exports was outweighed during the late 1790s by plentiful harvests and the economic benefits that accrued both to merchants and the coastal tribes.\(^{49}\)

Mawlay Sulaymān’s response to the civil wars of the 1790s explains to some extent the divergence between trade in the south and the north during his reign. Commerce was on the one hand a casualty and on the other the beneficiary of the internal struggle for control. The restrictions ordered by Mawlay Sulaymān, which did suppress commerce to a certain extent, tended to be on the ports of whose loyalties he had reason to be less sure.\(^{50}\) That the expulsion of Christian merchants from Ṣafī and Mazagan in 1799 was opposed by the troublesome Ibn Nāşir, for example, shows its political significance.\(^{51}\) Foreign merchants known to have traded with the sultan’s rivals, such as the influential Venetian Chiappe brothers, were also expelled.\(^{52}\)

\(^{46}\) El Mansour, Morocco, p. 95.
\(^{47}\) NA FO 52/10, ff. 260-1. See also El Mansour, Morocco, pp. 55-6.
\(^{48}\) NA FO 52/10, ff. 264-6.
\(^{49}\) See El Mansour, Morocco, p. 47.
\(^{50}\) ibid., p. 56 & 66.
\(^{51}\) NA FO 174/6, Salvador Abudarham, British vice-consul at Tangier, to Matra, 3 September 1799.
\(^{52}\) See El Mansour, Morocco, p. 56. On the Chiappe brothers’ role during the reign of Sīdī Muḥammad , see R. Lourido-Díaz, Marruecos y el mundo exterior en la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII: relaciones político-
Trade in the north was also favoured by strengthening diplomatic ties with the British, which focused naturally on Gibraltar. Although the makhzan had been preoccupied with Spain in the 1790s, the traditional policy of playing the European powers off against each other still applied. In 1795, Mawlay Sulaymān granted free export of grain to the British, who were suffering from domestic shortages. At least two dozen ships loaded supplies at Essaouira early the next year. Although ostensibly designated for the British, the British consul suspected many ships intended to sell at Lisbon or Cadiz where returns were higher.\textsuperscript{53} As well as the revenue produced by trade, Mawlay Sulaymān needed military supplies to extend his effective control. Like his predecessors, he turned to Gibraltar, where he placed orders in 1795 for forty-eight cannon and other goods. The merchants were to be paid by waiving the duties on more grain exports.\textsuperscript{54}

After 1800, the makhzan more or less abandoned this balancing act and increasingly aligned itself with Britain. Partly this was the result of the death of Muḥammad b. Uthmān, leader of the influential pro-Spanish faction at court, but it was more to do with the changing international situation. The example of France’s attack on Egypt lent credibility to persistent rumours in Morocco of a Franco-Spanish invasion. This not only provoked popular demands for the arming of the general populace but also encouraged stronger diplomatic ties with the British.\textsuperscript{55} This position seemed vindicated by Britain’s gradual assertion of naval dominance in the Mediterranean during the Napoleonic Wars, especially after the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805. The British consul, Matra, was careful to cultivate this tendency by regularly arranging medical treatment for the sultan and leading officials, thus securing valuable access to the makhzan’s decision-makers.\textsuperscript{56} One British doctor sent in 1806, for example, was allowed to read the correspondence between Talleyrand,

\textit{comerciales del Sultan Sidi Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah con el exterior} (Madrid: Agencia Española de Cooperacion Internacional, 1989), \textit{passim}.

\textsuperscript{53} NA FO 52/11, f. 59.

\textsuperscript{54} NA FO 52/11, ff. 4b, 19 & 23.

\textsuperscript{55} Popular fear of a foreign invasion was quite widespread at this time, and the makhzan’s anxiety was exacerbated by Napoleon’s meeting with Mawlay Maslama, the sultan’s brother and former rival who had gone into exile. See El Mansour, \textit{Morocco}, pp. 18 & 111-13.

\textsuperscript{56} See, for example NA FO 52/11, ff. 94b, 143 & 296; NA FO 52/14, ff. 144, 166 & 211; NA FO 52/15, f. 11; NA FO 52/16, f. 76.
the French foreign minister, and Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Salām al-Ṣlāwī, the sultan’s own foreign minister (wazīr al-bahr).\footnote{NA FO 52/13, ff. 37 & 39. The doctor was John Buffa, who published his memoirs of the trip shortly afterwards (see John Buffa, \textit{Travels through the Empire of Morocco} (London: J. Stockdale, 1810)). Al-Ṣlāwī was ‘the outstanding personality of Mawlay Sulaymān’s Makhzan’, who served in various offices and managed the sultan’s diplomatic policy for over 15 years (see El Mansour, \textit{Morocco}, pp. 19 & 20-1.}

The British, of course, had their own substantial interests in maintaining the links between Gibraltar and Morocco. With the outbreak of the Revolutionary War against France, the strategic position of the town was even more valuable. Matra urged the government to acquiesce in Mawlay Sulaymān’s efforts to bring Morocco’s trade under his control: ‘in the present situation of Europe nothing should be done to disgust the Emperor of Fez, as he is so necessary for His Majesty’s Garrison at Gibraltar & His Fleets’.\footnote{NA FO 52/11, f. 81; NA FO 174/12, Matra to Portland, 27 February 1801.} As they had done before, the British considered during the ongoing war how to make themselves less dependent on Morocco in this respect, for example by importing cattle from Oran. For the greater part of Mawlay Sulaymān’s reign, however, this proved very difficult because of the risk of transporting supplies over any distance longer than across the Straits of Gibraltar. Nor was the dey of Algiers always as compliant as the British might have wished. Moroccan cattle were in any case consistently cheaper than any others available.\footnote{NA FO 52/11, ff. 154-5; NA FO 52/12, f. 2b; NA FO 52/13, ff. 29-30; NA CO 91/37, Charles Rainsford, governor of Gibraltar, to Portland, 27 August 1795; NA FO 174/17, John Morrison, supervisor of markets, to Rainsford, 6 October 1795; NA FO 174/10, Raleigh to Matra, 10 January 1801.}

It seems more apt to say therefore, not that Morocco closed the doors to Europe at the turn of the century, only that it reconfigured its diplomatic and economic interests according to the needs and opportunities of the time. The sultan’s neighbours at Gibraltar became once again an important source of military supplies, which the makhzan often paid for using the customs revenues of Morocco’s trade with the British town.\footnote{FO 52/15, f. 1} In 1808, for example, one of the sultan’s ships was given new rigging and freshly coppered at Gibraltar, and the following year two others were refitted and equipped with new guns.\footnote{NA FO 174/10, Commissioner Lobb to Matra, 1 February 1809; NA FO 174/17, Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Salām al-Ṣlāwī, foreign minister (wazīr al-bahr), to James Green, British consul at Tangier, early Dhū ‘l-Qa’da 1222 [= late December 1807]; NA FO 52/15, ff. 1, 5 & 30.} In 1811, the British supplied
2,000 barrels of gunpowder, twelve 18-pounder guns and 500 swords.\textsuperscript{62} In 1816, the Moroccans received 4,700 shells, 10,000 cannon balls and seventy-one gun carriages besides other supplies.\textsuperscript{63} The makhzan also purchased similar items in Britain itself, including a new ship equipped with cannon.\textsuperscript{64}

For his part, Mawlay Sulaymān offered the British commercial privileges and other co-operation. As well as ensuring supplies of beef and other provisions to Gibraltar, he also granted permission for extra exports of cattle and grain to supply British and allied troops in Spain and Portugal during the Peninsular War.\textsuperscript{65} British trade privileges in general were confirmed by the treaty of 1801.\textsuperscript{66} Mawlay al-Ṭayyib, the sultan’s brother and governor of the Gharb 1794-7, renewed Mawlay al-Yazid’s offer to rebuild al-Qaṣr al-Ṣaghīr and tried to entice the British into joint action against Ceuta, a perennial project of the sultanate revisited again in 1809.\textsuperscript{67} On the other hand, Mawlay Sulaymān did continue to offer privileges to the other powers sometimes to mitigate the country’s increasing diplomatic dependence on Britain.\textsuperscript{68}

Thus it was during the very years of its supposed isolation that the foundations were laid for the economic and diplomatic relationship with Britain that influenced Morocco so heavily throughout the nineteenth century. As El Mansour notes, it is better to speak of the withdrawal of Spain and France from the

\textsuperscript{62} NA FO 52/15, ff. 78-9, 90 & 117.  
\textsuperscript{63} NA FO 52/17, ff. 51-5.  
\textsuperscript{64} NA FO 52/18, f. 31. See El Mansour, Morocco, p. 43.  
\textsuperscript{65} BL Add. MS 41512, ff. 91-4, 101 & 144-8.  
\textsuperscript{66} NA FO 174/10, Raleigh to Matra, 16 July 1801.  
\textsuperscript{67} NA FO 174/12, Matra to Portland, 27 February 1801; NA FO 52/11, f. 87b. See Mansour, ‘Ceuta’. This project was originally proposed a century earlier (see Brown, ‘Anglo-Moroccan relations’, p. 611).  
\textsuperscript{68} In 1806, for example, the sultan permitted exports of cattle to the French, Spanish and Portuguese at the same low rate of duty he gave to the British (see MWM 24003 Titwān). It was around this time that the perceived high-handedness of the British caused the makhzan to consider renewing its diplomatic ties with France, a possibility the French tried to encourage, for example by alleging that the more likely threat of invasion to Morocco came from the British (see NA FO 52/15, ff. 175-6; MWM 14493 Britānīā 1). Although this initiative collapsed following the unsuccessful French embassy of 1808, Mawlay Sulaymān still tried to use the threat of changing his alliance as an inducement to greater reward from the British (see NA FO 52/14, ff. 147-9; NA FO 52/15, ff. 95-9).
country rather than an expulsion of European influence in general. Economic speaking, it was trade with Gibraltar that remained the most stable during the otherwise disturbed conditions of the early 1800s; a trade which expanded after the establishment of British naval dominance in the Mediterranean following the Battle of Trafalgar. In 1812, Tangier received 112 ships from the British town; in 1822, the number had increased to 156. Despite the drop in demand for agricultural supplies at the end of the war in Europe, British trade and shipping continued to dominate the foreign commerce of northern Morocco as the 1820s progressed and into the 1830s, as will be seen in more detail in Chapter Four.

It is true that the makhzan did take some measures around the turn of the century that might seem designed to minimise Morocco’s trade with Europe; for example, the revocation of passports for Moroccan subjects. However, this measure was very closely related to the general disruption of international trade resulting from the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. El Mansour has rightly highlighted the fact that neutral Moroccan ships and merchants suffered harassment from the navies and privateers of warring Europe, arguing also that ‘the fact that most of Mawlay Sulayman’s reign coincided with the Napoleonic wars determined, to a large extent, the fate of Morocco’s commercial relations with Europe’. There seems little reason to assume that Morocco was spared from the general disruption of global trade at this time, which was considerable. However, El Mansour does not relate this closely enough to the overall consideration of Mawlay Sulaymān’s trade policy. The revocation of Moroccan passports ordered by the sultan, held to

---

69 El Mansour, *Morocco*, p. 3. Jackson attributed the collapse of French trade in Morocco to the effects of British naval blockades around Marseilles, and reported that ‘the same causes have also compelled the other merchants, natives of countries now under the dominion of France, to remain also entirely inactive’ (see Jackson, *An Account of the Empire*, p. 255.). For the development of British interests in Morocco during this period, and the concomitant collapse of French and Spanish influence, see Mansour, *Morocco*, pp. 111-16; Mansour, ‘Ceuta’. For the importance of British influence later in the century, see Ben Srhir, *Britain and Morocco*.


72 *ibid.*, pp. 60-1. See also *ibid.*, pp. 56-7 & 67.

be an indication of the ‘closing of the doors’ to Morocco, was, as we will now show, 
directly related to the abuse of Moroccan neutrality and was, therefore, a measure 
designed to protect Moroccan trade, not weaken it.74

The revocation of Moroccan passports was first ordered in late 1797, as a 
direct response to abuses of Moroccan neutrality. The sultan had agreed to allow 
European ships to use Moroccan passports for some time, at the request of the 
consuls in Tangier, in order for European merchants on both sides of the war to 
escape detention by enemy ships. This system began with a measure conceived in 
some desperation by Matra to protect the transportation of provisions from 
Morocco to Gibraltar. This trade was, by the mid-1790s, in constant danger from 
French and Spanish privateers around the Straits of Gibraltar. Although Matra 
appealed to the British naval commanders in the Mediterranean several times for a 
convoy to protect the trade, no ships could apparently be spared.75 The British 
consul subsequently hit upon the idea of buying Moroccan passports for the 
merchant ships based at Gibraltar, so they could fly the flag of a neutral country and 
thereby avoid capture. The sultan permitted this, Matra admitted, ‘against the 
immediate interest of the day because he was persuaded by me that it was a benefit 
to our nation’.76

The other consuls in Tangier at first protested against this abuse of 
Morocco’s neutrality, but they soon acquiesced in it when granted the same 
privilege. Thus, by the summer of 1797, it had become common practice for 
European ships to be registered with Moroccan owners before the courts in Tangier 
in order to obtain this flag of convenience. Almost all the Gibraltarian merchant 
fleet was now sailing under Moroccan colours.77 The practice was widespread also 
among the Spanish merchant fleet: according to reports received by the British 
consulate at Tangier, there were 80 ships at Cadiz under the Moroccan flag, and 
applications in process for 63 more Moroccan passports to be issued. Very few, if 
any, of these ships satisfied the technical requirement that the captain and at least

74 See El Mansour, Morocco, pp. 60-1.
75 NA CO 91/37, Rainsford to Portland, 17 December 1795 & Rainsford to Portland, 21 December 1795.
76 NA FO 174/7, Matra to Admiral Sir John Jervis, commander of the British Mediterranean fleet, 5 
January 1797; FO 52/11, f. 91.
77 NA FO 174/7, Matra to Jervis, 1 July 1797.
two-thirds of a ship’s crew be Moroccan subjects in order to qualify to fly the sultan’s flag.78

The money paid to accomplish this deception may initially have been a useful source of revenue for the makhzan’s officers in Tangier, but this was quite quickly outweighed by the damage done to Moroccan shipping and trade. Moroccan passports were soon considered untrustworthy, and were increasingly ignored by the navies and privateers of both sides in the European war. Without the protection of recognised neutrality, actual Moroccan ships or Moroccan merchants were as likely to suffer as their compatriots of convenience. The British found the expedient increasingly ineffective anyway; in December 1797 the governor of Gibraltar banned ships of the town sailing under Moroccan colours because of repeated attacks on such vessels.79

The makhzan was understandably aggrieved by what it perceived as an abuse of its friendship and co-operation. ‘We permitted this Commerce under our Flag, that none of you might suffer so much as you otherwise would do’, the sultan reproached the consuls at Tangier; yet Moroccan ships and merchants were no longer respected, he complained. Matra himself was obliged to remonstrate tactfully with Admiral Sir John Jervis, British commander in the Mediterranean, after one of his officers detained a Moroccan ship on the suspicion that it was actually Spanish: ‘Your Lordship will be able to judge the difficulties I must encounter here when the Emperor hears that we are the first to enfringe [sic] a measure that I have been so long soliciting him to protect’.80

Mawlay Sulaymān renewed his prohibition on the issuing of Moroccan passports in late 1799, due to ‘the little respect & inattention paid to his Subjects & Colours at Sea’.81 Whether the first order on 1797 had been revoked at some point, or proved ineffective, is unclear. It seems more likely that the ban was lifted quite quickly, perhaps in the hope that a short suspension of Moroccan trade would restore respect for its neutrality. Two Moroccan merchants contesting the seizure

78 NA FO 52/11, ff. 129-30.
79 NA FO 174/3, O’Hara to Matra, 24 December 1797.
80 NA FO 174/7, Matra to Jervis, 1 July 1797.
81 NA FO 174/6, Abudarham to Matra, 9 December 1799; FO 52/11, f. 200.
of their goods relied on passports issued in December 1798, for example.\textsuperscript{82} A small number of Moroccan merchants were also carrying on the provision trade to Gibraltar in the autumn of 1799.\textsuperscript{83}

The renewal of the prohibition, however, indicated the end of any such hope for the time being. The lingering suspicion about the real status of ships under the Moroccan flag, continued to hamper the country’s commerce. British privateers captured one of the Moroccan merchants carrying supplies to Gibraltar; his ship and goods were sold at the town, on the grounds that he was alleged to be a Spanish subject.\textsuperscript{84} A Tetuani merchant returning from Baltimore in 1798 also had his cargo seized and sold as a lawful prize at Gibraltar, despite the fact he was carrying papers endorsed by Matra.\textsuperscript{85} British privateers seized another Moroccan ship, belonging to the business partner of the British vice-consul at Tangiers, on its way from Cadiz to Vigo the following year.\textsuperscript{86} Also in 1799, a Moroccan merchant returning from Amsterdam in a Danish ship had $16,000 worth of goods seized because his neutral status was not recognised.\textsuperscript{87} Another had his goods taken by an American privateer and sold at Lisbon in 1800.\textsuperscript{88}

If the makhzan can be said to have ‘closed the door’ to trade, therefore, it was primarily as a result of the war in Europe. In any case, the door remained closed but briefly. In January 1803, the sultan’s prohibition on foreign travel was lifted. Moroccan subjects and ships were permitted to travel to Europe again to alleviate the shortage of imported goods. To encourage this, the sultan also granted an allowance for them to import $2,000 worth of foreign goods tax-free.\textsuperscript{89} He also ordered the governor of Essaouira to turn away ships that came in ballast – i.e. not carrying any goods – so that foreign merchants who wanted to export Moroccan produce would have to bring imports as well.\textsuperscript{90}

\textsuperscript{82} NA FO 52/14, f. 151.
\textsuperscript{83} NA FO 52/11, f. 191.
\textsuperscript{84} NA FO 52/14, ff. 43, 48, & 53ff.
\textsuperscript{85} NA FO 52/14, ff. 121-8.
\textsuperscript{86} NA FO 174/6, Abudarham to Matra, 8 September 1799.
\textsuperscript{87} NA FO 52/14, f. 2.
\textsuperscript{88} NA FO 52/14, ff. 19-20.
\textsuperscript{89} NA FO 52/12, f. 59.
\textsuperscript{90} NA FO 52/9, f. 4.
Such policies to promote trade had mixed results. On the one hand, Moroccan merchants began to fill the vacuum created by the withdrawal of foreign traders, particularly the French.\(^{91}\) During this period European imports also increased significantly.\(^{92}\) However, after 1803 Moroccans still faced a significant risk of wrongful seizure or detention while trading abroad. The introduction of Napoleon’s continental trade system and the response in kind by Britain divided the economic system of the Mediterranean and Europe into two mutually exclusive blocs, making it even more important for merchants to be able to produce trustworthy documents proving their origins and ports of call.\(^{93}\)

In 1808, for example, three Moroccan brothers trying to ship almonds and gum from Essaouira to Amsterdam petitioned the British government for compensation after their goods were seized by a Royal Navy ship and detained at Portsmouth. This unscheduled stop made it impossible for them to sell their cargo at Amsterdam, where they believed they would get the best price, because no port under French control could accept ships coming from an English one.\(^{94}\) Another Moroccan merchant supplying Gibraltar tried to diversify by investing in a voyage to Madeira, but was captured by French privateers and ended up in the West Indies.\(^{95}\) A merchant from Fes, trying to import goods to London, had his cargo captured by Spanish privateers in 1805.\(^{96}\) Three others from Essaouira attempting the same trade had theirs taken by the French.\(^{97}\)

Despite these continued problems, however, the makhzan did not retreat to its previous policy of keeping its subjects at home. As well as trying to purge the abuses that exacerbated the vulnerability of Moroccans at sea, the sultanate managed the problems of its subjects by piecemeal intervention rather than by re-establishing the earlier comprehensive ban. Travelling by sea was still after all safer

\(^{91}\) El Mansour, 'Moroccan Perceptions', p. 64.

\(^{92}\) See El Mansour, Morocco, pp. 40-2 & 70-1.


\(^{94}\) NA FO 52/14, ff. 183-4 & 190-1.

\(^{95}\) NA FO 52/14, ff. 135-6.

\(^{96}\) NA FO 52/14, ff. 146-7.

\(^{97}\) NA FO 52/15, f. 124.
and more convenient than by land. Requests were regularly made by Moroccans for British passports, which, certainly after the British victory at Trafalgar in 1805, were the most useful travel documents.

The sultan and *makhzan* officials also regularly petitioned the British to remedy cases in which Moroccan goods or ships were wrongfully seized. Al-Šāwī wrote to Lord Bathurst, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, for example, to protest the confiscation of goods belonging to two Tetuani merchants on their way to Marseilles in 1811. Such continued harassment exasperated James Green, Matra’s successor as consul in 1806, who complained that ‘our Cruizers do not observe that respect to the Emperor’s Flag that they ought to do . . . [which] if not put a stop to will injure our interest in Morocco very materially’. Within this framework of protective measures, the *makhzan* continued to issue passports.

Besides the war in Europe, another factor outside the government’s control that inhibited Moroccan trade during Mawlay Sulaymān’s reign was disease. The plagues of 1799-1800 and 1818-20 not only severely damaged the country’s rural and urban production, they also cut it off from maritime trade for long periods. The lively maritime commerce of Tetuan, for example, was completely halted for almost four years between 1818 and 1822 by the combination of plague and civil unrest. This was symptomatic of a wider interruption to trade as both Spain and Britain restricted their intercourse with Morocco. During these episodes, the fate of Moroccan trade lay with the European consuls, by whose authorisation only could

---

99 For example, NA FO 174/17, al-SA‘dī to Green, 28 Sha‘abān 1223 [= 19 October 1808]; NA FO 174/370, ff. 37-9, 41, 44b, 82, 109 & 283-5.
100 For example, FO 52/11, f. 182; NA FO 174/10, Vice-Admiral John Knight to Matra 10 July 1805; NA FO 174/11, Admiral Purvis to Green, 17 May 1808; FO 174/17, al-Šāwī to Green, 25 Şafar 1223 [= 22 April 1808]; NA FO 174/17, al-Šāwī to Green, 25 Jumādā I 1223 [= 19 July 1808]; NA FO 174/21, al-Šāwī to Green, 7 Rabi‘a I 1225 [= 12 April 1810] & al-Šāwī to Green, 14 Rabi‘ I 1226 [= 8 April 1811].
101 NA FO 52/15, ff. 72-3; NA FO 52/16, ff. 52 & 58-61.
102 For example, NA FO 174/17, al-SA‘dī to Green, 28 Sha‘abān 1223 [= 19 October 1808] & al-Šāwī to Green, 25 Jumādā I 1223 [= 19 July 1808].
104 NA FO 52/23, f. 55.
communication between Moroccan and European ports be re-established after an outbreak of contagious disease.

Although some of the consuls had feared that Mawlay Sulaymān would discontinue the system of quarantine introduced by Sīdī Muḥammad – because his supposed dogmatism would cause him to enforce what they understood to be the Islamic rejection of attempts to avoid the decree of God in the form of illness – he in fact maintained it, along with the consular rota system to facilitate communication with the European representatives.\(^\text{106}\) If he had wanted to isolate the country, ending co-operation over quarantine arrangements would have been a very easy way to do it, since it was practically a *sine qua non* of Morocco’s involvement in international trade. As it was, the sultan retained this important means of facilitating the trade of his subjects, even though it removed an aspect of the *makhzan*’s control over economic policy by allowing interruptions to commerce ordered by foreigners. This policy was consistent with the fact the ‘Alawi sultanate was fully aware of its obligations under international legal arrangements, which, as Pennell has pointed out, it traditionally accommodated alongside Islamic law.\(^\text{107}\)

Another natural phenomenon that impacted upon the *makhzan*’s trade policy was the rise and fall of agricultural productivity. The export duties imposed on agricultural exports often varied depending on supplies in Morocco itself. However, there was no fixed relationship between the two. As El Mansour has argued, tariff adjustments ‘were subject to no rule except that they should serve the *makhzan*’s immediate interest’.\(^\text{108}\) This was in essence a continuation of Sīdī Muḥammad’s system of administered trade whereby the *makhzan* closely managed the system of trade privileges in response to what it perceived to be its own benefit and that of its subjects. Although it seems he did not have the personal interest and enthusiasm

\(^\text{106}\) NA FO 52/13, f. 5; NA FO 52/16, f. 36.

\(^\text{107}\) C. R. Pennell, 'The geography of piracy: northern Morocco in the mid-nineteenth century', *Journal of Historical Geography* 20 (1994), pp. 272-82. The powers of the European consular corps over matters of quarantine became firmly embedded, even outside Tangier where they had less immediate influence over local government. In 1843, for example, a ship carrying pilgrims returning from the *haj*, many of whom were said to be suffering from severe hunger and distress as a result of their voyage, was not allowed to disembark its passengers at Tetuan until after the inspection of the British vice-consul there (see KH I-5-21).

for European affairs of his predecessor, Mawlay Sulaymān recognised the necessity of trade within a range of factors bearing on his exercise of power and authority. As Consul Douglas recognised, he ‘has never been a great encourager of Commerce, but is just and regular in not making innovation upon the portion of Commerce which has been permitted . . . his plan having been to feel his way and put on such duties as the articles exported will bear with the greatest advantage to his Treasury’.\(^\text{109}\)

It may be concluded, therefore, the makhzan’s manipulation of tariff rates was not an attempt to isolate the country per se, but a reflection of its particular understanding of moral and political economy, which differed from the free trade model increasingly advocated in Europe and particularly Britain. It was perceived to be a fundamental responsibility of the sultan to protect domestic food supplies, and to a lesser extent domestic industry; generally speaking, therefore, the makhzan’s response to periods of low agricultural productivity was to raise duties or prohibit exports on certain goods. The large increases in export duties introduced during the early 1800s, for example, followed the severe droughts and locust damage that caused a devastating failure of the harvest in 1798. The recovery of agricultural productivity was hampered, despite good growing conditions, by the plague of the following year, which killed so many that in many areas there were not enough people to gather the harvests.

As El Mansour demonstrates this point convincingly, one supplementary example will suffice.\(^\text{110}\) In 1800, Mawlay Sulaymān closed all trade except to the British; being in debt to some of the Gibraltar merchants, he allowed them to continue to export without paying duties to the value of the debt, then to trade and pay duty at the previous rates. According to Matra’s information, the general prohibition was prompted by continued high grain prices and consequent popular opposition in the south to the export of foodstuffs.\(^\text{111}\) The duty on cattle was also raised threefold in 1801 in order to prevent exports. While Matra secured the continuing export of beef to Gibraltar, he also reported that popular sentiment remained opposed to allowing foreign merchants to buy up local supplies: ‘every street gallery in [Tangier] is filled with whispers of the danger I am leading the

\(^{109}\) NA FO 52/23, f. 34.

\(^{110}\) See El Mansour, Morocco, pp. 36-8, 45-7, 55-6, 61 & 67-8.

\(^{111}\) NA FO 52/11, f. 229.
country into, & that the health of the Empire is to be sacrificed because the Jews &
Genoese of Gibraltar are in want of fresh beef.\footnote{NA FO 52/12, f. 122.}

Thus the regulation of trade under Mawlay Sulaymān aimed not to restrict
commerce \textit{per se} but was used only when unrestricted European demand for
Moroccan produce threatened to produce or exacerbate domestic shortages, or, to a
lesser extent, when foreign imports were perceived to be damaging local industries.
It was not an attempt to isolate Morocco, but a reflection of the \textit{makhzan}'s own
understanding of political economy, which differed from the free trade model
advocated in Europe. The British in particular lobbied for the liberalisation of trade
throughout the eighteenth century. The \textit{makhzan} consistently resisted this under
successive sultans until the commercial treaty with Britain of 1856. It is instructive
to compare this resistance with the more rapid advance of the commercialisation of
agricultural produce in Algeria and Tunis.\footnote{See Hunter, 'Rethinking Europe's conquest'.}
The resulting influence of foreign merchants over such a basic domestic matter as food supply was exactly what the
Moroccan sultanate was trying to avoid. Whether the \textit{makhzan} was aware of the
comparison at the time is probably impossible now to document definitively. But it
is not unlikely that it was, given the regular communication and travel between
Morocco and the regencies.

On the other hand, as El Mansour has also shown, Mawlay Sulaymān
sometimes did prioritise other factors over the need to protect domestic supplies,
generally to secure either financial or diplomatic advantage for his government.
During the 1790s, the sultan allowed grain exports, despite popular protests, in
order to secure support from Spain and Britain during the civil war against his
brothers. After the second major agricultural downturn of his reign in 1816-18, he
actually encouraged exports in order to compensate for the loss of tax revenue
charged on crops, despite the risk of domestic food shortages. He extended these
measures during subsequent unrest that compounded the \textit{makhzan}'s financial
difficulties.\footnote{See El Mansour, \textit{Morocco}, pp. 68-70 & 188-90.}

The prohibition or granting of exports and the adjustment of tariffs were
therefore also influenced by political considerations, and used as a form of
diplomatic leverage as it had been under Sīdī Muḥammad. This tactic was shown by Mawlay Sulaymān’s temporary prohibition in 1807 on any beef exports to Gibraltar beyond the 2,000 cattle annually allocated to the British at a low duty. This, the makhzan indicated to the British consul, was a response to a domestic shortage of cattle; since the sultan was responsible before God for the welfare of his own subjects, he could not put the needs of even a close ally before them. The Moroccan government qualified this position, however, by intimating that a suitable return – specifically in the form of naval and military supplies – would be sufficient compensation, balancing the country’s loss in one respect with its gain in another. Consul Green also reported his understanding that the payment of an increased duty on cattle would be sufficient to lift the ban.\textsuperscript{115}

So religious considerations, upon which historians have placed so much emphasis, did play some part in the makhzan’s decision-making, but were interwoven with fiscal and political considerations. Mawlay Sulaymān’s reputation for religious scrupulousness is well deserved, but it is clear that his religious conviction did not manifest itself in an entirely dogmatic and inflexible approach to foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{116} Rather, religious considerations acted as a means of legitimisation and an organising principle, which both influenced decisions and were also used as a post hoc justification for them. In other words, the sultan’s policy did not proceed directly from a fixed religious position, but evolved from the interaction of religious sentiment – his own and his subjects’ – and circumstances.

The only point on which the sultan might be said to have been truly dogmatic regarding foreign trade was the export of horses to non-Muslim countries because of their military value as cavalry mounts. During this period, the makhzan never permitted the export of horses in large numbers, despite requests from both the British and French governments.\textsuperscript{117} Green believed that if the Spanish could be convinced to give up Ceuta to the Moroccans, they might allow it, but the plan was

\textsuperscript{115} NA FO 52/13, ff. 82-3 & 91-2.

\textsuperscript{116} On Mawlay Sulaymān’s religious education and his reputation as a ruler of piety and religious learning, see El Mansour, Morocco, pp. 18 & 133-4.

\textsuperscript{117} NA FO 52/13, f. 79. ‘Ulama’ in Morocco agreed that the sale of any militarily advantageous item (such as horses, metal or weapons) to Christians was forbidden, but in practice Moroccan horses were the only item that attracted European interest by the nineteenth century. See El Mansour, Morocco, p. 55.
never realised.\textsuperscript{118} The only exception to this rule were small numbers of horses given as presents to foreign dignitaries, particularly to the governors of Gibraltar.\textsuperscript{119}

Overall, therefore, the restrictions on exports adopted at various times by Mawlay Sulaymān’s government were not intended to restrict trade in general. Rather they were part of an attempt to trim the country’s economic policy in response to specific circumstances and pressures. Ensuring domestic food supplies; defusing popular resentment against exports; bringing trade firmly under the makhzan’s control, as opposed to that of the sultan’s actual or potential rivals; raising customs revenues; satisfying the expectations of allies such as the British, and in turn extracting maximum benefit from such alliances; protecting local industries – all these factors had to be balanced against one another.

In the light of this, it seems very difficult to sustain the conclusion that the makhzan under Mawlay Sulaymān ever pursued a definite policy of economic isolationism, much less that such a policy was the ideal towards which the sultan aspired. In addition, such a policy would have alienated Mawlay Sulaymān from the mercantile urban class, a group that actually formed an important part of his power base. Far from concluding that the sultan ‘did not conceive of maritime trade as a tool which might serve his domestic policy’,\textsuperscript{120} it is important to acknowledge the political importance of trade domestically and how it reflected the structures by which the makhzan accommodated the relationship between local and central interests. The role of central power under the Moroccan sultanate cannot be understood without accounting for the regional structures through which its power

\textsuperscript{118} NA FO 174/11, Admiral Cuthbert Collingwood, commander of the British fleet in the Mediterranean, to Green, 4 August 1808.

\textsuperscript{119} For example, NA FO 174/17, al-Slāwī to Green, 13 Jumādā I 1223 [= 7 July 1808]; MWM Mawlay 'Abd al-Rahmān to Būsīlāhm b. ‘Ali, 8 Rabi' II 1259 [= 8 May 1843]; KH II-12-19. The interaction between the demands of religious law and political expediency is well-illustrated by instructions of Mawlay 'Abd al-Rahmān in 1832 during the visit to Morocco of the son of the governor of Gibraltar. He acceded to the visitor’s request to buy three horses but told makhzan officials to make sure they were of poor quality in order to comply with the restriction of the shari'ah (see MWM 20227 Ṭanja). Lempriere, a doctor sent from Gibraltar to treat members of the royal family at the end of Sīdī Muḥammad’s reign, was also given horses which he said were of poor quality as a gift (see Lempriere, \textit{Tour from Gibraltar}, p. 402).

\textsuperscript{120} El Mansour, Morocco, p. 66.
operated at a local level, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters with reference to Tangier and Tetuan.

One manifestation of this was the interpenetration of governmental and commercial interests, an ongoing feature of the Moroccan state, which – as we saw in Chapter One – was reformulated under Sidi Muhammad to incorporate burgeoning maritime trade, and which continued under Mawlay Sulaymān. The merchants who had profited from the development of the Atlantic trade continued to diversify from the declining overland caravans to maritime commerce with Europe.\textsuperscript{121} Mawlay Sulaymān awarded many of them political office and influence, believing that their wealth made them more reliable and less open to corruption.\textsuperscript{122} By refusing to re-introduce the 
\textit{makhs} (‘non-Qur’ānic taxation’) and relying on the taxes mandated by the \textit{shari‘a} (i.e. zakāt and ‘ushr), the sultan also shifted the burden of taxation from towns, crafts and trade to the countryside and agriculture.

Thus, as El Mansour has demonstrated, both politically and fiscally Mawlay Sulaymān aligned himself more with urban commercial interests at the expense of the tribes and the traditional religious and military aristocracy. The weakness of this system was that the \textit{makhzan}’s tax base contracted dangerously during times of low agricultural production when revenues dropped and the tribes were less willing to pay.\textsuperscript{123} El Mansour rightly points out that the full implications of this drawback were not evident until the poor harvests of 1816-18, when Mawlay Sulaymān lowered export tariffs in an attempt to encourage trade and raise extra revenues through customs receipts.\textsuperscript{124}

However, it does not follow that because trade became more important to the \textit{makhzan} after this time that it was hostile or even just indifferent to it beforehand. Mawlay Sulaymān’s own experiences of the 1790s, not to mention the repeated institutional experience of the sultanate, had already demonstrated the utility of trade revenues during periods of internal instability when rural taxes could not be reliably collected. The revenues of agricultural prosperity,

\textsuperscript{121} Among these merchants, El Mansour mentions ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Ṭālib, al-Ṭālib b. Jallūn, the Būhlāl family and ‘Abd al-Salām Shabānī, about whom additional information is included below at pp. 88, 156-7 & 169-70 (see El Mansour, \textit{Morocco}, p. 43 & 60).

\textsuperscript{122} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 43, 46 & 191.

\textsuperscript{123} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 40, 45 & 47-52.

\textsuperscript{124} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 65-7 & 218-19.
supplemented by the windfall income from the many who died without heirs in the plague of 1799-1800, gave the makhzan greater fiscal flexibility in the early years of the century, allowing it to forgo some income from maritime trade in order to prioritise other policies, such as stimulating domestic consumption and purchasing power.\(^{125}\) It cannot be concluded from this, however, that Mawlay Sulaymân wanted actually to prevent foreign trade and thereby alienate the commercial interests whom in other respects he continued to favour and rely on. This period was also, after all, marked by high demand for Moroccan produce from Gibraltar and the Iberian Peninsula. The makhzan therefore had little need to attract trade itself by lowering export duties, which reinforced its tendency to use its fiscal policy for other ends.

If the interests of merchants and makhzan diverged for a time, therefore, they were not opposed. The alliance of the two did break down to a certain extent during the rebellion of 1820-2, but this crisis ultimately confirmed their symbiosis. As El Mansour has demonstrated, it is a mistake to attribute the rebellion to a commercial bourgeoisie that resented Mawlay Sulaymân’s anti-trade policy, as some have suggested.\(^{126}\) The case in fact was almost the direct opposite. It was an essentially conservative revolt led initially by the traditional sharifian notables of Fes, who resented their exclusion from influence in favour of merchants and other groups associated with them such as the ‘ulama’ bildiyûn (i.e scholars from Fes but of supposed Jewish origin). One of the rebels’ main complaints was the appointment of merchants to govern the city at the expense of those with the inherited privileges of the religious aristocracy of the shurafla’. Indeed, when the sultan heard of the rebellion in Fes, mistaking the background of its main supporters, he wrote to rebuke the merchants’ ingratitude for his policy in favour of trade and their interests.\(^{127}\)

It is true that some leading merchants were involved in the rebellion, both in Fes and in Tetuan after Mawlay ibrâhîm b. al-Yazîd, the rebels’ candidate as sultan, had been proclaimed there in early 1821. However, this was largely the result of the

\(^{125}\) See ibid., p. 45 & 47. On the inheritances of the munqatî‘un, see El Mansour, Morocco, p. 100.


\(^{127}\) See El Mansour, Morocco, pp. 207-8.
sultan’s perceived failure to confront some damaging disruptions to the prosperity and influence to which the merchants had become accustomed: like many revolutions, it was born in their case of the disappointment of rising expectations. Falling government income as a result of difficulties collecting rural taxes after the Battle of Azrou in 1811 had been compounded by a drop in customs revenues in the downturn following the end of the war in Europe. This was followed by the poor harvests of 1816-18. The sultan tried to compensate for these by raising import duties on Muslim merchants in 1815 to increase revenue, and lowering export duties on some major commodities in 1817 to encourage trade. He also tried to enforce the collection of import duties more effectively.128 The effect of these on commercial fortunes was mixed, the one possibly compensating for the other. The trade of Muḥammad Bajja, Moroccan consul at Gibraltar, certainly continued to be lively, for example.129 However, any passing complaints that might have faded without real effect were significantly exacerbated by the double impact of famine 1817-18 and plague 1818-20. The failure of the makhzan to preserve order and economic stability under these conditions was the main factor that pushed some merchants into supporting rebellion in 1820-2.130

The overall dynamics of the rebellion were of course much more complex than those aspects summarised very briefly here, and also included the role of tribal alliances, the relationship between the cities involved and their hinterlands, and factionalism within the ‘ulamā’.131 However, this summary is enough to support the main argument here that under Mawlay Sulaymān the makhzan’s promotion of trade remained closely intertwined with its efforts to win the support of key groups at regional level. The balancing of factors that this required to maintain it broke down under the weight of the extreme socio-economic circumstances of 1816 to

---

128 In February 1820, for example, the sultan ordered officials at Tetuan not to allow merchants to unload their goods without paying the duty, claiming to have paid it previously at another port (see MWM 34735 Tītwān).

129 Some of Bajja’s correspondence from around this time is preserved in MWM Jabal Ṭāriq, showing continued links with major Moroccan merchants and trade interests around the Mediterranean. (see below, p. 111).


131 El Mansour discusses the interaction of these various factors in much more detail (ibid., pp. 184-208).
1820; but the re-establishment of this balance was an important factor during the subsequent reassertion of central authority.

As usual, the rebels attempted to secure access to economic and military resources through control of major ports. Despite their opposition to the influence of the country’s merchants, the leaders of the rebellion soon needed access to the wealth and commercial networks those same merchants had built up. Mawlay Ibrāhīm left Fes and headed for the north in January 1821, gathering support in the countryside on the way with the intention of capturing the region’s ports. Larache and Tangier withstood thanks to strong garrisons of ‘abīd troops, but Tetuan opened its gates to the rebels of Fes, with whose grievances the townspeople identified and with whose city they had historically strong economic and religious ties. It was partly the threat of losing these major ports – with all that that implied for the rebels’ prospects of success – that provoked Mawlay Sulaymān toward decisive action after several months of hesitation and apparent defeatism.132

Once established in Tetuan, Mawlay Ibrāhīm attempted to establish links with the European powers that could assist him. He wrote to Douglas and to Sir George Don, governor of Gibraltar, to assure them of his friendship and his desire to encourage trade with the British.133 He also tried to claim the large estate of $50,000 left by Bajja, the consul at Gibraltar, on his death a few months earlier.134 Besides his political aims in this correspondence, Mawlay Ibrāhīm also hoped for medical assistance; in a letter from Tetuan confirming the continued export of cattle to Gibraltar, he also requested the dispatch of a doctor to attend him, but he died just three days later.135

The revolt continued under Mawlay Ibrāhīm’s brother, Mawlay Sa‘īd b. al-Yazīd. But with an increasing level of tribal support and military and financial support from abroad, Mawlay Sulaymān was now in the ascendant. Between 1818 and 1820, the sultan purchased more than $40,000 worth of ammunition and other military supplies from the British, including 2,000 muskets used to arm the troops

132 ibid., p. 198.
133 NA FO 52/22, ff. 10-12; NA FO 52/23, f. 36.
134 NA FO 52/22, f. 8.
135 NA FO 52/22, ff. 23 & 34; NA FO 52/23, f. 33.
besieging Tetuan and Fes. 136 France, Sweden and Britain together also supplied 50 cannon in 1820, and another 20 heavy mountain guns were sent from Gibraltar the following year, which strengthened the sultan’s position significantly. 137 Spain supplied arms through Ceuta; the Danes paid tribute in arrears totalling $100,000; and all the European consuls acquiesced in the makhzan’s request to boycott the rebels’ port at Martil. 138 The sultan was also well served by the timely receipt of Bajja’s estate in April 1821 from the authorities in Gibraltar, just when he needed extra funds to pay his troops. 139 In addition, the British supplied medical assistance to the sultan’s troops during their siege of Tetuan. 140

The way in which Mawlāy Sūlaymān was able to access this foreign support, particularly from the British, is telling: ‘the fact that the new regime [i.e. of Mawlay Ibrāhīm] was easily identified with the short-lived reign of Mawlay al-Yazid, who had depended on the same intransigent groups, further increased European fears. The consuls refused to recognise the rebels and provided Mawlay Sulayman with every possible assistance’. 141 Despite his later reputation, then, Europeans at the time did not see Mawlay Sulaymān as the representative of isolationism and anti-foreign sentiment. If they had, it is unlikely they would have missed their chance to help loosen his grip on power. On the contrary, they did all in their power to help him maintain it. It will be seen in subsequent chapters how a network of experience and interests, extending to the makhzan and the court, facilitated this relationship. One example was evident during the British assistance against the rebels in 1820–1. Mawlay ‘Ali b. Sulaymān, sent by his father to restore order around Tetuan in 1821, had ten years earlier travelled for hajj on a British naval ship with his brother,

---

136 NA FO 52/21, ff. 10 & 22-3; NA FO 52/22, ff. 10 & 57; NA FO 52/23, ff. 70-1; NA FO 52/24, ‘Account of ammunition & guns furnished to His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Morocco’, 23 February 1823.

137 El Mansour, Morocco, p. 201.


139 NA FO 52/22, ff. 26 & 46; NA CO 91/78, George Don, acting governor of Gibraltar, to Bathurst, 21 January 1821 & Don to Bathurst, 14 August 1821.

140 NA CO 91/79, Robery Sillery, Hospital Assistant at Gibraltar, to W.W. Fraser, Chief Medical Officer at Gibraltar, 16 May 1822. Appended to this letter is a report by Sillery of his six-month stay in Morocco, during which time he treated the sultan himself as well as some of his troops outside Tetuan.

Mawlay Ibrāhīm b. Sulaymān. Both remembered the journey and their hosts sympathetically.  

Partly at least due to British assistance, therefore, Mawlay Sulaymān was able to see off the second period of major rebellion during his rule. This in turn confirmed the British position as the makhzan’s allies. The strands of mutual interest and common experience linking the two sides through Gibraltar had played their part, and continued to develop. To a certain extent, the makhzan faced the old risk of becoming too dependent on one dominant foreign power as the British consolidated the ascendancy gained during the war. Their maritime predominance at this time is indicated by, for example, the ships calling at Essaouira: in 1822, eighteen arrived from England and five from Gibraltar, but none from France or Spain. El Mansour, Morocco, p. 64. Douglas reported in 1823 that apart from occasional ships from Marseilles and Genoa, almost the entire foreign trade of Morocco was with the British, either directly between London and Essaouira or indirectly between Gibraltar and Tangier and Tetuan. This problem was ameliorated by the recovery of commercial relations with France from the late 1820s, so that the sultanate was able to return to its previous policy of playing one power off against the other – albeit with diminishing returns as the demands of both France and Britain became more pressing.

In the meantime, Mawlay Sulaymān continued to promote and defend trade with Gibraltar, encouraging the Moroccan consul there to assist merchants coming from Tetuan. The trade with the British port remained a valuable source of income for the makhzan. In June 1822, for example, the revenues of customs duties charged in imports from Gibraltar were $19,000. The makhzan protested strongly to the Spanish consul when boats of the Guarda Costa found this trade too tempting a target and began to seize Moroccan goods that summer. There was popular concern in Tangier and Tetuan about such disruption, particularly because the

---

142 NA FO 52/15, f. 89; NA FO 52/16, ff. 16 & 95-7; NA FO 52/22, ff. 26b, 29 & 37.
143 NA FO 52/23, f. 35b.
144 MWM 6930 Jabal Ṭāriq
145 NA FO 52/23, ff. 58-60.
146 NA FO 52/23, ff. 58-60, 74 & 94; NA FO 52/23, Douglas to Sir William A’Court, Envoy Extraordinary to Spain, 18 May 1823.
years of increased European demand during the Peninsular War had encouraged more people in the region to support open trade.\(^\text{148}\)

After his appointment as consul in Tangier shortly before Mawlay Sulaymān’s death, Douglas therefore confidently reported that ‘the British nation stands in the highest degree of estimation with the whole population of this country from the Emperor to the peasant, it is sufficient for them to find that you are English to meet with every possible attention’.\(^\text{149}\) Whether this was a genuine sentiment or not, it symbolised the importance of a friendly relationship to both sides by the end of the sultan’s reign. In this respect, as in others, Mawlay Sulaymān’s rule represented the development of previous trends, not their interruption.

However, although in the short-term the restoration of the makhzan’s control of the country relied heavily on the external financial and material support of the British and others, of equal significance was the re-alignment of the sultanate with the commercial interests that had temporarily abandoned it. Indeed, as we have suggested, the operation of these two aspects of the makhzan’s power were closely linked through the shared factor of foreign trade. Shortly after the defeat of the rebels at Tetuan, Mawlay Sulaymān met with notables from the town, including leading merchants, and reconﬁrmed Mawlay al-Sa‘īd’s choice of governor, al-‘Arabī b. Yūsuf. The governor represented the merchants who were eager to renew the trade interrupted by their rebellion and consequent siege of the town. When he met the British consul shortly after his reconﬁrmation as governor, for example, Ibn Yūsuf declared both his support for trade generally and speciﬁcally the recent reduction of tariffs ordered at Tetuan by the sultan – presumably another attempt by Mawlay Sulaymān to smooth over the recent grievances of the town’s notables.\(^\text{150}\)

In Fes, this rapprochement between the makhzan and the merchants was typiﬁed by the position of al-Ṭālib b. Jallūn. Ibn Jallūn exempliﬁed the leading merchants of the city who had made a signiﬁcant fortune in the overland trans-

\(^{148}\) NA FO 52/23, f. 36b. One particularly infamous case involved the seizure of the Three Brothers, a ship from Gibraltar carrying goods belonging to Moroccan merchants. The details of this and similar cases are the subject of an interesting discussion in Pennell, ‘Accommodation between European and Islamic law’, pp. 176-80.

\(^{149}\) NA FO 52/23, f. 35.

\(^{150}\) NA FO 52/23, ff. 55-7. On Ibn Yūsuf, see below, p. 205.
Saharan trade before diversifying into maritime commerce during the early nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{151} He served Mawlay Sulaymān as the sultan’s chief \textit{amīn} (‘treasurer’), an appointment typical of the symbiotic relationship of the \textit{makhzān} and the mercantile class, against which the sharifian notables had rebelled in 1820. He was among the notables to whom the sultan addressed his crucially enigmatic letter after the beginning of unrest in Fes.\textsuperscript{152} However, although Ibn Jallūn joined the rebellion, frustrated like others by the collapse of order and central authority, he was swiftly forgiven, and later promoted to \textit{wazīr} (‘chief minister’) under Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān.

This continuity was more than symbolic. Despite the historiographical perception that Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān’s accession to the throne in 1822 represented a break with the previous reign and the beginning of a return toward the policies of Sīdī Muḥammad, it is clear that the new sultan did not consider himself as making significant changes to the policies of his uncle and immediate predecessor. Mawlay Sulaymān’s choice of heir was partly dictated by his desire to ensure the continuity of his own policies.\textsuperscript{153} If this seems to present a contradiction – between Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān as successor to the ‘open’ period of Sīdī Muḥammad but also to the ‘closed’ years of his uncle – it is illusory because, as we have argued, Mawlay Sulaymān’s reign was a period of continuity more than of abnormal isolationism.

Thus Consul Douglas reported his confidence that the growth of trade supported by the \textit{makzān} in the previous years would continue. He anticipated the maintenance of good relations 'as the whole empire are anxious for an extention [sic] of their commerce and the principle part of what they now have being carried on with the English it is almost necessary for the Emperor in a political point of view to be on good terms with the British nation'.\textsuperscript{154} In this the consul was not disappointed, shortly receiving Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān’s authorisation for the continued shipment of cattle to Gibraltar for the garrison there at a low duty, as well as reassurances from the sultan that he was aware of ‘the services which the

\textsuperscript{151} See El Mansour, \textit{Morocco}, p. 43 & 60.
\textsuperscript{152} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 194.
\textsuperscript{153} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 219.
\textsuperscript{154} NA FO 52/23, f. 96.
British Nation has afforded to ours, and also the high opinion that my Nation entertain of them . . . [so] depend on it that you will experience on our part every attention and consideration'. Although there was a brief period of tension due to some debts owed on ammunition and artillery purchased by Mawlay Sulaymān, this was resolved quickly.\(^{155}\)

It would be surprising not to find a significant level of continuity between Mawlay Sulaymān’s reign and that of his nephew Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, given the unusual circumstances of the latter’s succession. As the sultan’s nephew, he had been nominated by Mawlay Sulaymān outside the normal line of succession. Although this may have been related to the death of Mawlay Ibrāhīm b. Sulaymān in 1819, Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān had gained an understanding of the makhzan’s approach to the issue of foreign trade while serving as governor of Essaouira that presumably recommended him to his uncle. He had developed personal ties with both European and Jewish merchants, for example.\(^{156}\) This experience obviously resembles that of Sīdī Muḥammad, which perhaps accounts for the historiographical emphasis on his role in renewing his grandfather’s policies. In any case, it is no surprise that among his first communications to the European consuls was a reassurance that he would maintain the privileges and conditions for foreign merchants granted by his predecessors.\(^{157}\)

The new sultan’s previous experience at Essaouira and his endorsement of precedent in this regard was reinforced by the practical benefits of maintaining settled conditions for commerce. Although Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Raḥmān’s accession was relatively smooth, like previous Moroccan sultans he depended to a disproportionate amount on trade revenues while he established regular tax collection throughout the country. Douglas estimated, for example, that the duties of Essaouira, Tangier and Tetuan still formed the bulk of the makhzan’s revenue in mid-1824 as taxes were yet to be gathered from most provinces.\(^{158}\) The early years of Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān’s reign also required a careful balancing act between the

\(^{155}\) NA FO 52/23, ff. 5 & 8; NA FO 52/24, Douglas to al-Ṭālib b. Jallūn [‘Hadge Taleb Ben Zelul’], chief minister (wazīr), 23 February 1823; NA FO 52/24, Ibn Jallūn to Douglas. 21 Jumādā II 1238 [= 5 March 1823].

\(^{156}\) See El Mansour, Morocco, p. 219; Pennell, Morocco since 1830, p. 24.

\(^{157}\) NA FO 52/23, f. 5.

\(^{158}\) NA FO 52/25, Douglas to Bathurst, 5 July 1824.
conservative forces that had initiated the 1820-2 rebellion and the mercantile interests whose role within the makhzan was continuing to expand.\footnote{El Mansour, \textit{Morocco}, pp. 219-20.}

Like his uncle, Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān perceived the need to balance the promotion of trade with the need to keep it controlled as closely as possible by his own administration. In this he was somewhat limited by the extent to which he had to accommodate the interests of regional elites and networks that had their own bases of power and authority. Soon after his accession, for example, the sultan tried to bring the administration of Tetuan under more direct control, perhaps bearing in mind its recent rebellion and long-standing tendency to autonomy. He dismissed Muḥammad ‘Ashāsh as governor, in an attempt to contain the influence of that family, which was becoming another of the city’s semi-official dynasties. He also forced him to hand over $200,000 that was alleged to have been skimmed off the port’s customs receipts.\footnote{NA FO 52/24, Douglas to Bathurst, 7 October 1823.} However, ‘Ashāsh was reappointed within months to another makhzan post, this time as chief amīn of Tangier, where the sultan was again forced to discipline him for collecting revenues on his own behalf; and was shortly restored as governor of Tetuan, passing the position to his son ‘Abd al-Qādir in 1844 as it had been passed to him by his father.\footnote{NA FO 52/24, Douglas to Ibn Jallūn [‘Benzelul’], 15 October 1823 & Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān to Muḥammad ‘Ashāsh, annexed to Douglas to Bathurst, 29 November 1823. The control of the ‘Ashāsh family over the governorship of Tetuan, after various interludes, was finally ended in 1862/3 (see Pennell, \textit{Morocco since} 1830, p. 93).}

In Tangier, the sultan attempted to manage the influence of such local power structures, as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six, by appointing a new governor, Muḥammad Umaymūn, who represented a military tribal elite, with no comparable links to commercial interests. In addition, Umaymūn was one of a number of officials whom Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān promoted to key positions at court after they had served under him at Essaouira. These included Mukhtār al-Jāmi‘ī, his private secretary then made keeper of the seals, who also had familial links with an important jaysh (‘army’) tribe (i.e. one of the tribes employed by the makhzan as military auxiliaries); and Muḥammad b. Idrīs, an important merchant and previously amīn at Essaouira who became wazīr alongside Ibn Jallūn.\footnote{NA FO 52/25 Douglas to Bathurst, 5 July 1824.}
The mixed backgrounds of these men reflected a necessary balance between commercial and tribal or conservative interests at the start of Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān’s reign, although as time went on the former reasserted and then increased the influence they had had under his predecessor. Thus, Douglas’s complaint was misplaced when he reported that, as a result of the sultan’s earlier office, he was unused to dealing with foreign and commercial affairs and ‘as his friends admit [is] quite uninformed on many subjects’; the new ruler had after all governed Morocco’s most important port.\(^{163}\) However, it does seem that to a certain extent Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān and some of his appointees were used to the makḥzan in Essaouira having more direct control over commerce, and consequently faced resistance from the embedded networks of local and consular influence in Tangier.

An early example of this came when Douglas tried to protest the charge of an exit tax on two Gibraltarian Jews leaving Tangier in 1824. Following some involved negotiations, Umaymūn banned any European consuls communicating directly with the sultan on the matter in an attempt to assert a clearer hierarchy of authority and prevent alternative channels of influence.\(^{164}\) Tension between Douglas and the governor continued, manifesting itself again when Umaymūn cut off any communication between the consul and the sultan, threatening severe punishment to anyone who acted as a courier for the Briton.\(^{165}\) A year later, the governor succeeded in having Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Raḥmān demand Douglas’ removal from office by the British government. This demand was withdrawn, however, after protests both from the consular corps and ‘a strong party among the principal Moors’ who lobbied the sultan on Douglas’ behalf. A few months later, Mawlāy ‘Abd

\(^{163}\) NA FO 52/24, Douglas to Bathurst, 24 Nov 1823.

\(^{164}\) NA FO 52/25, Douglas to Bathurst, 26 April 1824. The imposition of this exit tax may have been related to the on-going ambiguity over the legal status of Gibraltarian Jews of Moroccan descent, over whom the makḥzan tried to assert authority in some cases (see Schroeter, Sultan’s Jew, pp. 117-18); however, it seems also to have been related to the imposition of new taxes on Moroccan merchants in Gibraltar, introduced as part of the new permit system developed in the 1820s (see below, p. 172). The makḥzan in general seems to have opposed the introduction of such charges, and to have responded in kind when they were imposed: in 1837, for example, Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Raḥmān complained to the Spanish and English about the imposition of new exit taxes imposed on merchants leaving Mahon and Gibraltar (see MWM 7166 Jabal Ṭārīq).

\(^{165}\) NA FO 52/28, Charles Ellis, acting British consul in Tangier, to Rt. Hon. William Huskisson, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, 2 November 1827.
al-Raḥmān visited Tangier, where he announced the dismissal of Umaymūn because of his conduct regarding the British consul, and the reappointment of al-ʿArabī al-Saʿīdī, the former governor of the town.\footnote{NA FO 52/29, Douglas to Huskisson, 6 January 1828; Douglas to Huskisson, 10 March 1828 & Douglas to Huskisson, 10 June 1828.}

Umaymūn continued to be a royal favourite until his death the following year, but evidently the sultan realised he needed to accommodate local interests in the administration of Tangier, and could not impose direct control without reference to them.\footnote{NA FO 52/32, ‘Diary of the consulate at Tangier’, 1 July 1829.} This illustrates the mediation of makhzan power through regional spheres of authority and interests, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six. Even if the sultanate’s power was sometimes exercised arbitrarily, it was not absolute. Thus the continuity of the makhzan’s policy with regard to trade and foreign policy was founded on the continuity of networks and relationships such as those linking Gibraltar and the Gharb, which existed, at least to some extent, independently of the central government.

Another example showing how Mawlay ʿAbd al-Raḥmān had to adapt his approach to foreign trade to accommodate factors that he did not face so directly while at Essaouira was the employment of the prominent Jewish merchant Meir Macnin, with whom he had developed a close economic relationship while governor.\footnote{See Schroeter, Sultan’s Jew, pp. 107-9.} The year after coming to the throne, Mawlay ʿAbd al-Raḥmān granted Macnin an exclusive right to export goods from Larache, Mazagan, Casablanca and Safi, simultaneously appointing him as a general ambassador to all European nations. The sultan thereby concentrated an unusual amount of power in his hands, which disturbed a number of other interests among the consuls and rival Moroccan officials. The performance of these wide powers, therefore, was undermined by the obstructions created by such opposition; for example, the fact that the British refused to let Macnin enter Gibraltar in any capacity because of claims against him in England for significant debts. Although Macnin also served as British vice-consul in El Jadida (Mazagan), and was later sent as Moroccan emissary to Britain, his unusually prominent role in the makhzan’s administration of foreign affairs and trade did not last beyond the failure of that last mission in 1826. The sultan’s
attempt to bypass other entrenched interests and control trade through one main channel failed with him.\textsuperscript{169}

The \textit{makhzan} under Mawlay 'Abd al-Raḥmān instead continued its symbiotic relationship with the commercial interests centred on Fes, including its important axis to Gibraltar through Tetuan and, to an increasing degree, Tangier. This continuity was symbolised by the promotion of Ibn Jallūn to wāzīr, as mentioned above. Another example is Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Razīnī, one of the notables of Tetuan who supported the rebellion of Mawlay al-Saʿīd, an act of rebellion for which Mawlay 'Abd al-Raḥmān tried to punish him a few years into his reign.\textsuperscript{170} This seems to have been another attempt during the 1820s to disrupt the independence of the established elite of the Gharb, but it also failed. After five years in exile al-Razīnī was restored to favour and eventually became Moroccan consul in Gibraltar. His career will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.

Where Mawlay 'Abd al-Raḥmān sometimes tended toward greater governmental control of trade and its social effects where possible, like his predecessors, merchants like Ibn Jallūn tended towards a quieter, conservative approach. When Mawlay 'Abd al-Raḥmān ordered, for example, that Jews should no longer serve as consular agents for the European powers, it was the combined intervention of Ibn Jallūn, 'Ashāsh in Tetuan and Benoliel in Gibraltar that resolved matters without the implementation of the prohibition.\textsuperscript{171}

The \textit{makhzan} thus continued the main elements that had characterised the sultanate's approach to trade and foreign relations during the preceding decades. Important among these was to defend the rights of Moroccan merchants trading abroad, in which many officials themselves had a direct or indirect interest. At the order of Mawlay 'Abd al-Raḥmān, for example, a Muslim agent of Benoliel's spent six months at the Spanish court in 1826 attempting to negotiate the return of goods belonging to three Moroccan merchants that had been taken by a Spanish privateer

\textsuperscript{169} NA FO 52/24, Douglas to Bathurst, 29 November 1823; NA FO 52/25, Douglas to Bathurst, 5 February 1824; NA FO 52/27, Douglas to Bathurst, 2 May 1826. On Macnin’s life and his significance, see Schroeter, \textit{Sultan’s Jew}, and on this part of his career in particular, see pp. 104-23.

\textsuperscript{170} See MM Vol.13, pp. 4327.

\textsuperscript{171} NA FO 52/41, E. Drummond Hay, British consul at Tangier, to Lord Palmerston, Foreign Secretary, 24 October 1836 & E. Drummond Hay to Palmerston, 11 November 1836; NA FO 52/43, E. Drummond Hay to Palmerston, 17 April 1837.
from an English ship four years previously.\textsuperscript{172} In 1825, Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān demanded compensation for the loss of the goods of some Moroccan merchants taken by Greek pirates from the British ship they had chartered. The complainants alleged that there was complicity between the pirates and the ship’s crew. Among the merchants was ‘Abd al-Karīm b. Ṭālib, the Tetuani notable who served as Algerian consul in Morocco, and the goods were also part-owned by the minister ibn Jallūn. In his letter to the British consul, the sultan noted that the defence of trade regularly demanded by the British from the Moroccans must be reciprocated.\textsuperscript{173} Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān even tried to mitigate the persistent insecurity facing Moroccan merchants – ultimately the result of the decline of the country’s naval power – by encouraging the policy of shipping goods from Gibraltar under the names of British merchants, who enjoyed much more effective international protection.\textsuperscript{174}

This defence of commerce included specifically the right to trade freely at Gibraltar, which the British sometimes restricted in ways the makhzan and Moroccan merchants considered to be a breach of the treaty obligations. Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān protested the imposition of a new fee introduced in Gibraltar for admission permits in 1824, for example, presenting the objections of his subjects that it was both against their religion and an infringement of the agreed mutual right of entry to trade with the British.\textsuperscript{175} In 1832, al-Sa’idi, the governor of Tangier, complained again to the British consul about the whole principle of admission permits for Moroccans in Gibraltar on the grounds that no similar requirement was made of Britons coming to Morocco. Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān himself wrote to the consul at this time on behalf of a Jewish merchant of Safi whose son had been sent to Gibraltar to act as his father’s business representative there but had been


\textsuperscript{173} NA FO 52/26 Douglas to Bathurst, 26 March 1825 & Douglas to Sir Frederick Adams, Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands, 10 March 1825; NA FO 52/27, Ibn Jallūn to Douglas 28 Dhū ’l-Ḥijja 1241 [= 2 August 1826].

\textsuperscript{174} KH IV-1-27.

\textsuperscript{175} NA FO 52/25, Douglas to Bathurst, 4 June 1824 & Douglas to Bathurst, 5 July 1824.
expelled.176 The determination of the authorities at Gibraltar to avoid what they perceived as overcrowding of the town, however, meant that such grievances persisted. In 1836, for example, Edward Drummond Hay had to give his personal sponsorship to several prominent merchants from Fes and Tangier in order to secure permission for their temporary residence in Gibraltar. Among these were ‘Abd Allāh Bannīs, nephew of the master of the royal mint in Fes, and ‘Abd al-Majīd b. Kirān, a business partner of al-Ṭayyib al-Bayyāz, governor of Fes and former amīn of Tangier.177

The second element of the makhzan’s policy that continued under Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān was the management of exports and imports in order both to protect local industries and consumers and to maximise the government’s income. Wool exports, for example, were initially closely restricted under Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān; once permitted again in 1832, steady demand allowed the makhzan gradually to increase duties until a period of poor production in 1835 caused a sharp fall in exports.178 Similarly, wheat exports were restricted at times of drought to protect supplies in Morocco.179 The role of the makhzan as guarantor of a moral economy reappears in the case of British textiles, the import of some types of which the sultan restricted because of complaints that they were of particularly poor quality. He wrote directly to the British government to explain his position that he could not allow the deception of his subjects since ‘every shepherd is responsible for his flock’ [kull rā’ mas‘ūl ‘an ra‘yatihi].180 This policy of managing foreign trade

177 NA FO 52/40, E. Drummond Hay to Palmerston, 12 June 1836.
178 NA FO 52/39, E. Drummond Hay to Robert William Hay, Under-Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, 6 February 1835; NA FO 52/41, E. Drummond Hay to Palmerston, 23 October 1836 & E. Drummond Hay to Palmerston, 28 October 1836.
180 NA FO 52/39 Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān to Lord Glenelg, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, 13 Rabi‘ II [= 7 August 1835]. On this controversy, see NA FO 52/32, ‘Report by Mr. Isaac Abensur, Interpreter to the British Consulate, of circumstances regarding British Manufactures brought into the Empire of Morocco’, 29 March 1830; NA FO 52/36, E. Drummond Hay to Hay, 9 June 1832; NA FO 52/39, E. Drummond Hay to Glenelg, 10 November 1835; NA FO 52/40, E. Drummond Hay to Palmerston, 12 June 1836.
through tariff rates and the award of monopolies to control prices continued to define the makhzan’s approach until the 1856 treaty with Britain, which had as its main object the destruction of those mechanisms.\textsuperscript{181}

Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahmān’s decision to sign new treaties with a number of European powers was another element of continuity, despite the common imputation that his diplomatic policy represented a break with that of his uncle.\textsuperscript{182} These treaties were renewals of previous agreements, and changed none of the fundamental aspects of Morocco’s diplomatic and trading relationships. Shortly after his accession in 1822, the new sultan had informed the consuls at Tangier that he intended to maintain the conditions of the treaties in effect under his uncle.\textsuperscript{183}

In the case of Britain, Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahmān defined his negotiation of a treaty with them in terms of maintaining the same essential relationship with them that had been inaugurated in 1721. He welcomed Douglas to Meknes with assurances that:

> England had been for many years the best friends of his Empire, that they were the first nation with whom his predecessor Muley Ismael had many years ago made a permanent peace, which has never been interrupted, that the English Nation were in consequence considered by him and his people as their oldest and most esteemed friends.\textsuperscript{184}

The treaty subsequently agreed by the sultan reflected this; it was an almost exact restatement of the treaty negotiated in 1801, which itself was a confirmation of the previous treaties signed during the eighteenth century. The only changes, discussed in more detail in Chapter Three, were the annulment of any special legal status for Moroccans in British territory and the concession by the makhzan of a greater judicial role for the British consul in cases involving British subjects in Morocco. In addition, the sultan agreed shortly afterwards to allow the

\textsuperscript{181} See Ben Shir, \textit{Britain and Morocco}.

\textsuperscript{182} See, for example, Pennell, \textit{Morocco since 1830}, p. 30.

\textsuperscript{183} NA FO 52/23, f. 5.

\textsuperscript{184} NA FO 52/25, Douglas to Bathurst, 5 February 1824.
establishment of a British vice-consulate in Tetuan, overturning the expulsion of Christian consuls there by Sīdī Muḥammad.¹⁸⁵

Thus the increase in foreign trade that took place under Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān during the 1820s and 1830s cannot be seen as the result of a major shift in diplomatic or commercial policy, both of which continued to be defined by the elements he inherited from Sīdī Muḥammad via Mawlay Sulaymān. The growth of trade within this framework was primarily due to more settled conditions for trade and communication generally, and a related upturn in demand for raw materials for European industrialisation at a time when Moroccan supplies were abundant enough to meet it.¹⁸⁶ The makhzan facilitated this by lowering some tariffs, but this was no more than it had done for the previous three-quarters of a century.

The makhzan maintained this approach in order both to promote its interests as it defined them and to protect its subjects. It was only a few years into Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān’s reign, for example, that severe famine in 1825 had covered parts of the country ‘in numberless . . . skulls, bones, entire skeletons, and half-rotten corpses of human beings . . . Some indeed were not even stripped of their clothes, and others but half devoured by the hyaena and the vulture, lay scattered over the plain’.¹⁸⁷

Under such circumstances, there was little incentive for the sultanate to embrace an unregulated market that could exacerbate such problems, and it resented attempts to force it to do so. As Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān wrote to an official instructing him on how to reply to British complaints about certain monopolies:

They should not intrude upon our domains, nor involve themselves in our affairs and control us, just as we have not controlled them nor intruded upon their affairs. Their intrusion into the matters of our lands encourages officiousness and deviation from the way of fair dealing and justice. They act how they please in their lands . . .

¹⁸⁵ See MWM 10776 Tiṭwān; NA FO 52/28, Douglas to Bathurst, 15 January 1827 & Ellis to Huskisson, 18 November 1827.
¹⁸⁶ See, for example, Miege’s comments on the relationship between European demand and the Moroccan economy at this time (Miège, Le Maroc, Vol. 2, pp. 77-8).
¹⁸⁷ Beauclerk, Travels, p. 68.
without the interference of anyone in their business, and with no meddling in their government. Indeed if disadvantage attends the people [al-nās], we are most concerned for the common people [al-ra‘īya].

Thus, although trade did increase under Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, this was the result of the coincidence of rising European demand for, and increased Moroccan supplies of, certain goods at particular times. Perhaps the most significant change Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān instituted was the restoration of the one major element of this system that had lapsed under his immediate predecessor, the jihād al-baḥr, ended by Mawlay Sulaymān in 1817. As Ṣīdī Muḥammad had done, Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān attempted to augment the makhzan’s revenues from foreign trade by imposing a direct tribute on those states too weak enough to resist it, while at the same time strengthening Morocco’s diplomatic bargaining position overall.

Although the attempt failed, it is suggestive that Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān attempted to reintegrate this element of the traditional mixture of means by which the makhzan managed the control and promotion of trade and foreign influence. It is another indication of the oversimplification created by treating Mawlay Sulaymān as ‘anti-trade’ and Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān as ‘pro-trade’. Although they apparently differed in their personal enthusiasm for foreign commerce, until 1856 both rulers operated essentially within a policy framework that made trade crucial to the makhzan’s internal and external relations but that also controlled its growth in order to prevent it destabilising the balance between the two.

---

188 KH IV-17-19.
Chapter 3 – The Moroccan Consulate at Gibraltar: its Development, Functions & Significance

As we saw in the previous chapter, there were important continuities during the reign of Mawlay Sulaymān that link his trade policy with that of both his predecessor and successor. These show that the makhzan continued to consider foreign trade as a vital interest, and did not attempt to isolate Morocco from it. The development of the Moroccan consulate at Gibraltar provides further evidence to support this argument.

The British colony was important for Morocco as a trading partner and source of military supplies throughout the eighteenth century, and we have already seen how both Sīdī Muḥammad and Mawlay Sulaymān exploited British interest in this relationship. However, it was under Mawlay Sulaymān that the makhzan first institutionalised its interest in Gibraltar by the establishment of a permanent consulate there, which was maintained by Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān. The consulate was another means by which Mawlay Sulaymān promoted and managed the ability of Moroccan subjects to travel and trade abroad in Gibraltar and beyond. The development of the consulate’s status and functions also indicates the makhzan’s progressive adaptation to economic and political changes in the wider world. As Sīdī Muḥammad’s trade policy in general represented an evolution of Moroccan state practice in a new context, so too did the consulate in Gibraltar evolve as the methods and values of Moroccan diplomacy adjusted to that environment.

There were Moroccan consuls or agents in a number of ports around the Mediterranean during the nineteenth century. Erzini has recently collected a number of the references to these but, as she also points out, there has been no systematic study of them or of the development of the Moroccan consular network. Some of the ports served by the consuls were important for Moroccans from the point of view of trade and also for managing the transportation of pilgrims to and from the Hijaz: among these were Gibraltar itself, as well as Tunis, Malta, Alexandria and Cairo. Other ports – Marseille, Genoa, Livorno, Istanbul and Izmir – were
manned purely to facilitate trade and to report useful political and economic information.¹

It is difficult to establish when these different offices were established, how consistently they were filled, and what their exact functions and relationship to the Moroccan sultanate were. There are references to a Moroccan consul in Gibraltar from 1796 onwards, and the office was certainly filled consistently after 1815. There were apparently attempts to appoint a consul at Marseilles in the late 1820s; although these proved abortive, the office was operating again by 1850–1. References survive indicating the presence of consuls serving the Moroccan sultanate in Egypt, at Cairo and Alexandria, from the mid-1840s onwards, and in Malta even earlier.²

The terminology used to describe these men varies. They are sometimes referred to as wakīl (‘agent’), amin (‘official’) or khādīm al-maqām al-‘āli, a generic term for anyone in the sultan’s service. They are also called quns, qunsul or even qunsul khinarāl, all derived presumably from Spanish consul or possibly English ‘consul’. An interesting variation of this is taqansūt (‘consulship’), which first appears in 1837–38 in reference to the office at Gibraltar, and constructed, as Erzini has noted, as a feminine Berber noun form often used in Moroccan Arabic.³

Whatever the term used to describe them, all these men seem to have been private merchants who also spent greater or lesser amounts of time fulfilling some public functions or trade on behalf of the sultan. This was broadly similar to the Mediterranean consular systems of other countries, at least before the 1820s when some European nations began to professionalise them.⁴ Many countries during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries employed consular agents who were

¹ Erzini, 'Hal yaslah'. This article provides many valuable references regarding the Moroccan consulate at Gibraltar. I would particularly like to thank Dr. Erzini for giving me a copy before its publication.
² Schroeter, 'Royal Power', (p. 96); Erzini, 'Hal yaslah', p. 518.
³ ibid., p. 518. See Da’ūd, Tārikh, Vol. 8, pp. 304-5.
⁴ On the reform of British consular administration in the 1820s and 1830s, for example, see Hilda I. Lee, 'The supervising of the Barbary consuls during the years 1756-1831', Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 23 (1950), 191-99. On the reform of the British consular system generally at that time, see Charles Ronald Middleton, The Administration of British Foreign Policy, 1782-1846 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1977), pp. 244-53.
not necessarily their own subjects. Many consuls at Gibraltar, for example, were British subjects in the service of foreign states.⁵

In the case of Moroccan agents, this pattern of employment probably also reflected a concept of personal service to the sultan rather than fixed concepts of nationality. This apparently persisted in Morocco whilst becoming more problematic for the European nation states, which increasingly restricted their employment of locals as consular agents or curtailed their independence through the protégé system. Even in 1772, for example, the British had refused to accept Jacob Benider as an ambassador from Sīdī Muḥammad because he claimed to be a British subject through residence at Gibraltar. What to the British appeared an intolerable case of divided loyalties, seemed to the sultan an excellent opportunity for mutual understanding: although he still considered Benider under his protection (huwa min a’yān ahl al-dhimma, ‘he is one of the leaders of the people with whom we have a covenant’ i.e. Jews in this case), he equally thought him capable of being a loyal servant to the British (innahu yuhibbukum wa ‘alā khidmatikum . . . li-annahu khadīmunā khadīmuka, ‘he loves you and serves you . . . because he is our servant and yours’).⁶

Thus, the sultan’s agents and consuls abroad were of various backgrounds. Some were Christians, such as Giovanni Ferrugia at Malta, who was succeeded by his son, Lorenzo, in 1846. Others were Jewish subjects of the sultan, such as Aaron b. Yitzak Israel who was briefly consul at Marseilles in 1828, or Jews with family origins in Morocco, most notably Judah Benoliel (in the Arabic sources, Yahūda b. ‘Ulil), one of the longest serving consuls at Gibraltar. Muḥammad Badr al-Dīn, a Muslim of Tunisian origin, served as the agent of both the bey of Tunis and the sultan of Morocco at Alexandria.⁷ Others, however, were Moroccan Muslim subjects of the sultan. They included al-Ṭayyib Sarrūkh al-Ḥasanī, Muḥammad Shaykhī and Aḥmad al-Halū, all of whom acted as consular agents in Egypt in the 1840s; al-Maḥdī

⁵ For example, see the list of consuls in NA CO 91/127, Sir William Houston, acting governor of Gibraltar, to Lord Stanley, Secretary of State for War and Colonies, 17 April 1834.
⁷ Erzini, 'Hal yaslah', p. 518; NA FO174/131, f. 15. On the attempt to create a consulate at Marseilles, see Schroeter, 'Royal Power', p. 96, n. 12.
Banūna at Marseilles, briefly; and, as we will see below, all the consuls at Gibraltar except Benoliel.⁸

The employment of Muslim consuls resident in a non-Muslim land was somewhat unusual during this period. The Tunisian beylik, for example, employed first Aaron Cardozo, a Gibraltarian Jew, and later his son Isaac, as consuls at Gibraltar.⁹ The Ottoman consul in the town was John Longland Cowell, a British Christian, although the Ottoman Empire did begin the establishment of permanent reciprocal diplomatic representation in Europe in the 1790s, a process that did involve posting Muslim officials abroad.¹⁰ However, the example of the Moroccan consulate at Gibraltar belies any generalizations about the exclusion of Muslims from these roles due to religious or cultural prohibitions. Schroeter, for example, argues that because the notion of extraterritoriality was not part of Islamic law, ‘a permanent Moroccan embassy abroad, run by Muslims, was conceptually problematic’. He assumes, therefore, that the function of the consulate at Gibraltar was not to represent Moroccan interests and merchants but only to manage foreign currency exchanges.¹¹ As will be seen below, however, this was not the case. The makhzan’s attitude with regard to the Gibraltar consulate seems to have been one of adapting to the influence of European consular practice whilst retaining some distinctive aspects too.

There is some suggestive but ultimately unsatisfactory evidence of a Moroccan consul in Gibraltar during the eighteenth century. As early as 1706 Ahmad Qardanash, a Moroccan ambassador to Britain, wrote home complaining ‘of

---

¹¹ Schroeter, 'Royal Power', p. 77. Miège also emphasises Gibraltar’s role in the makhzan’s financial policy, although he does not restrict it to that (see Miège, *Le Maroc*, Vol. 2, pp. 98-101).
the several unfortunate accidents befallen him since his arrival, as the loss of one
Moojy who was coming to him with letters and money but was taken into France; of
some money which was sent to him from Gibraltar by the consul there."12 The
Anglo-Moroccan treaty of 1721 specified that disputes between a Moroccan Muslim
and a British subject occurring in any British dominion would be jointly judged by
one Christian and one Muslim according to the laws of Great Britain; although no
specific official or person is mentioned who would fulfil this role. This provision
was explicitly renewed in 1760 and 1791, although slightly amended in the latter
case to specify the judgement of 'an equal number of Christians and Muslims.13

There certainly were numerous individuals, Moroccan subjects and others,
entrusted with various temporary commissions at Gibraltar by different sultans
throughout the eighteenth century, as we will see below. That any of them held a
permanent position we might designate as consular is unlikely, however, despite
theoretical treaty provisions. Erzini has suggested that a Moroccan Jew of the
Seruya family may have acted as consul.14 A letter of 1792 from Mawlay Maslama
alludes to the appointment of an Anglophone Tetuani merchant in some office
concerning the British, possibly consul at Gibraltar.15 Beyond such tantalising
scrapes, there is no evidence before 1796 to elevate to consul any of the agents
commissioned by the sultan for various finite tasks.

The first person definitely to have held the post of Moroccan consul was
Muḥammad b. ‘Umar Bajja. With family connections to Tetuan and Larache, he was
long active as a merchant trading across the Straits of Gibraltar. As El Mansour has
pointed out, he was typical of the merchants who prospered in the later years of
Ṣīdī Muḥammad’s reign through the trade with Spain, later switching their focus to
Gibraltar as the British increased their diplomatic and economic influence in
Morocco during the time of Mawlay Sulaymān. In Bajja’s case this was symbolized

12 BL Add. MS 61542, f. 123. See Brown, 'Anglo-Moroccan relations'.
14 Erzini, 'Hal yaslah', p. 519. Erzini raised this possibility on the basis of a suggestion by a member of
the Seruya family still living in Gibraltar, who said that an ancestor served as Moroccan consul or
agent in Gibraltar. The Encyclopaedia Judaica, 2nd edn. (hereafter EJ2), suggests that some members of
the family left Morocco during the reign of Mawlay al-Yaʿzīd and settled in Gibraltar, so it may be
possible that one of them was so appointed (see EJ2, 'Seruya').
15 NA CO 91/36, Boyd to Dundas, 19 March 1792.
by his move from Cadiz, where he resided for several years, to Gibraltar, where he settled permanently until his death in 1820.¹⁶

As we would expect from a man of this background, Bajja had wide business interests and contacts, corresponding with members of some of the most notable merchant families of his day.¹⁷ Among his interests was the import of cattle from Morocco, for which he was awarded the government contract by the British to supply the garrison in 1806.¹⁸ He also had business dealings further afield in Tunis, Algiers, and the Levant, exchanging commercial information with fellow merchants about prices and conditions in Europe and North Africa.¹⁹ His commerce was evidently successful; his credit and good standing in Gibraltar were often noted, and he was among the merchants of the town whose contributions for the construction of the Commercial and Exchange Library in 1817 is still recorded by a frieze on the building (now the Gibraltar House of Assembly).²⁰ At his death he left money and goods worth more than $40,000, as well as two houses in Gibraltar and one of noteworthy beauty in Tetuan.²¹

---

¹⁶ See MM Vol. 3, p. 1038; Erzini, 'Hal yaslah', p. 519; Lourido-Díaz, Marruecos, p. 683 (where his name is spelled 'Bigga'). The Bajja family settled in Tetuan but originated from either Larache or Algeria. Given Bajja’s commercial links to Larache, the former seems more likely.

¹⁷ Among Bajja’s correspondents, for example, were Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Karīm Labādī, a notable merchant of Tetuan later arrested by Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahmān for his part in the 1821-2 rebellion (MWM 25611, 24015, 25606 & 27798 Jabal Ṭāriq; MM Vol. 13, p. 4327); ‘Abd al-Majīd Būhlāl, of the notable merchant family (MWM 22921 Jabal Ṭāriq; see below, p. 170); and Muḥammad Bannīs, of the notable Fesi/Tetuani family (MWM 25609 Jabal Ṭāriq; see El Mansour, Morocco, p. 155).


¹⁹ Da’ūd, Tarīkh, Vol. 8, pp. 39-41 & 310; Erzini, 'Hal yaslah', p. 519. A dispute between the makhzan and the government of Tunis about business conducted between Bajja and the bey of Tunis was still ongoing in 1838 (see KH 1-3-4).

²⁰ T. Benady, 'The place of the Garrison Library in Gibraltarian society', Gibraltar Heritage Journal 6 (1999), pp. 21-34 (p. 28); GGA Letters South Barbary, pp. 68-71; GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan, pp. 496-7; NA FO 52/13, f. 80; NA FO 174/27, Don to Bathurst, 21 Jan 1821.

²¹ El Mansour, Morocco, p. 43; NA FO 52/22, ff. 8 & 26; GGA Letters 1819-35, p. 36.
As El Mansour shows, Bajja was clearly acting as consul by 1815.\(^{22}\) However, there are several pieces of evidence indicating that he was acting as a permanent agent for the sultan well before this, and he is referred to earlier as the Moroccan consul. In a letter of 10 March 1796, Governor Charles O’Hara in Gibraltar wrote to the governor of Tetuan regarding the troublesome and disorderly conduct of some Moroccans in the town who had consequently been expelled. In it he referred to Bajja as ‘authorized by His Imperial Majesty to serve as agent or consul who should represent and appear for the subjects of Morocco, and to whose report alone credit will be given when differences arise’ (\textit{autorizado por su Magestad Imperial para servir de Agente ó Consul, quien debe comparecer y hablar por los Subditos de Marruecos, y cuyo solo reporte seria acreditado quando algunas matieras de diferencia existiessen}).\(^{23}\)

Bajja’s credentials to act as ‘the person entrusted with His Imperial Majesty’s Concerns in this Garrison’ were renewed in November 1805 by a letter from Mawlay Sulaymān to the authorities at Gibraltar. An accompanying letter from ‘Abd al-Rahmān ‘Ashāsh, then governor of Tetuan and Tangier, did not describe him specifically as consul, but it did specify that he was authorized to resolve disputes between Moroccan subjects in the town, indicating that he was more than simply a commercial agent for the sultan. The British for their part expected him to facilitate the provision of supplies for Gibraltar, just as the Moroccans expected the British consul at Tangier to arrange the delivery of goods the sultan required.\(^{24}\) By 1807 at least, Consul Green regarded Bajja as his counterpart across the straits, describing him as ‘a very respectable Merchant at Gibraltar, [who] acts in the capacity of consul for H[is] I[mperial] M[ajesty].’\(^{25}\)

In 1815, notice was given again of Bajja’s appointment as the sultan’s agent at Gibraltar.\(^{26}\) It is perhaps the fact that he seems to have taken up the same post on


\(^{23}\) GGA Letters South Barbary, pp. 68-71. I am grateful to Mrs. Amina Nawaz for her assistance with the translation of this document.

\(^{24}\) GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan, pp. 496-7; MWM 18856 Tīṭwān.

\(^{25}\) NA FO 52/13, f. 80.

\(^{26}\) GGA Letters 1812-1819, p. 290.
several different occasions that has led to some confusion about his period of service. Possibly this can be explained by Bajja spending periods of time away from Gibraltar on his own or the sultan’s business, such that it was felt necessary to reiterate his commission at various times. He is known to have been at Algeciras in 1808, for example.\textsuperscript{27} It is perhaps suggestive that by far the larger part of the surviving correspondence addressed to him at Gibraltar dates from 1815 or after. Another possible explanation is that it was felt necessary for him to present his credentials to each new governor, as consuls in Morocco were expected to do upon the accession of a new sultan. Since references to his appointment or reappointment do come from the tenures of different governors, this is possible, although their dates are not close enough to the governors’ arrivals to make it likely.

However, this confusion about when Bajja’s period as consul actually began also reflects a change in the nature of his position over time. The Moroccan consulship in Gibraltar was not established by Bajja’s appointment on a particular date but during his period of service. At the beginning of his public career, he may have been considered more like one of the temporary agents who had conducted the sultan’s business in Gibraltar until that time; hence the need for the renewal of his credentials, and also the ambiguity about the nature of his office. Up until 1815 the British described him interchangeably as ‘consul’ or ‘agent’, but no surviving Moroccan source uses the term ‘consul’; nor is a formal approbation by the British of Bajja as the sultan’s representative recorded until that year.\textsuperscript{28} By his death in 1820 it is clear that he was recognized as a consul in the full sense of a representative with recognised authority over all the affairs of a foreign power in Gibraltar. In the absence of a vice-consul, the British were somewhat at a loss as to who had legal authority to take possession of the estate of Bajja as an intestate Moroccan subject once the consul himself was dead.\textsuperscript{29}

This development in the makhzan’s diplomatic practice reflected a number of factors. The appointment of a Tunisian consul in Gibraltar some time before 1805 was strongly encouraged by the British in order to facilitate better communications

\textsuperscript{27} NA FO 174/17, al-Šāfī to Green, 28 Sha’bān 1223 [= 19 October 1808].
\textsuperscript{28} MWM 21419 Jabal Ṭāriq; GGA Letters 1812-1819, p. 290.
\textsuperscript{29} NA FO 174/27, Don to Bathurst, 21 Jan 1821. Bajja died on 30 November 1820.
and consequently the support and supply of their fleets in the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{30} Perhaps the Moroccans were similarly encouraged in view of the important role of their supplies for the British military effort. Or perhaps they themselves perceived the need for a more regular and active system in the light of the disturbed conditions of the Mediterranean during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the conflict regularly impeded Moroccan trade despite the country’s neutrality.

Another reason to regularise the makhzan’s representation in Gibraltar was the growing number of Moroccan merchants with maritime commercial interests. As we have already seen, this trend started under Sīdī Muḥammad and continued after his death. As El Mansour has noted, Mawlay Sulaymān encouraged a transfer of trade away from European to Moroccan merchants. He restored the position of Jewish merchants as agents of the makhzan, for example, after Sīdī Muḥammad had suspended the practice in 1789. Thus, while the number of European trading houses in Essaouira dropped from six to four between 1805 and 1812, the number of houses owned by Moroccan Jews increased from two to six in the same period. In 1792, Mawlay Sulaymān also lowered duties charged on Muslim merchants from ten per cent ad valorem to two and a half per cent, compared with from twelve per cent to five per cent for Christians. The lowest import duties – just one per cent - were imposed on goods brought by land, which also had the effect of strengthening the position of Moroccan merchants against Europeans.\textsuperscript{31}

The treaty agreed between Britain and Morocco in 1801 is significant in this context. It elaborates the picture of the makhzan’s changing conception of the role of their agent in Gibraltar during Mawlay Sulaymān’s reign. This treaty granted for the first time that any disputes involving Muslim Moroccan subjects in Gibraltar be settled according to Islamic law, at least to the extent that any judgement could not contradict it. Article VIII provided that such cases should ‘be decided by an equal number of the Moors residing there and of Christians, according to the custom of

\textsuperscript{30} GGA Letters 1835-48, p. 41.

the place, if not contrary to Moorish law’. Previous treaties had made rather vague provision for such cases to be judged jointly by one Christian and one Muslim, without reference to the law to be applied.

This point is particularly significant bearing in mind the position of the Maliki legal school on the permissibility of Muslims travelling to or residing in non-Muslim territory. Leaving aside the historical development of this position and the social and political factors which entrenched it most strongly in the Maghrib, the most common ruling was that it was impermissible, a fact sometimes advanced as a cause for the supposed absence of Moroccan Muslim traders abroad. As Abou El Fadl has noted, however, ‘the operative legal cause in Mālik’s view is that Muslims will be forced to submit to non-Muslim law’. Although later jurists in the Maghrib adduced other reasons in addition to this – in the notable case of al-Wanshariṣī (d. 1508), for example, the potential humiliation of non-Muslims living outside dār al-Islām – the question of legal status remained a key factor in the decisions of Maliki jurists on this question. Ibn Rushd (the grandfather, d. 1122), for example, objected to Muslims subjecting themselves to non-Muslim law. The prevailing Maliki opinion in Egypt around the time of Mawlay Sulaymān, for example in the judgements of al-‘Adawī (d. 1775) and al-Ṣawī (d. 1825), was that Muslims were only

---

32 Hertslet’s Treaties. Vol. 3, p. 19. There unfortunately does not seem to be an extant Arabic version of this treaty, against which to check the wording of this clause; specifically, to confirm that ‘Moorish law’ means sharī’a, as assumed here. In a later translation of the Arabic version of the treaty, made after the publication of the relevant volume of Hertslet’s Treaties, the last part of Article VIII reads: ‘That if a dispute should arise between a Muslim and an Englishman in any part of the dominions of the King of England, and that the act of injustice was proved against one of them, arbitrators on both sides shall be named, to examine into the matter according to the English law, if it does not disagree with that of the Musleemeeen [sic]’ (see NA FO 95/518). In the light of these two translations, it is hard to know what else could have been meant in this clause except the sharī’a as applied in Morocco’s courts.

33 The Maliki madhab (‘legal school’) is one of the four major schools of legal thought in Sunni Islam, and by far the most influential in Morocco and the Maghrib generally.

34 For example, Schroeter, Sultan’s Jew, pp. 79-80. For a review of development of the Maliki position on this issue, see Khaled Abou El Fadl, 'Islamic law and Muslim minorities: the juristic discourse on Muslim minorities from the second/eighth to the eleventh/seventeenth centuries', Islamic Law and Society 1 (1994), pp. 141-87 (pp. 146-56), from which the examples given here are drawn.

35 ibid, p. 146.
prohibited from entering and remaining in non-Muslim territory where they were not subject to Muslim law.

It would require a more detailed study of the development of this legal question in Morocco around this time and its effect on Mawlāy Sulaymān’s thought to reach any definite conclusion about the significance of the new treaty provision in 1801 and its relationship to the changing status of the Moroccan consul. However, it seems unlikely that the change was mere coincidence, particularly given the specific extension of Bajja’s authority, mentioned above, to resolve disputes between Moroccan subjects from 1805 at the latest.

Certainly Mawlay Sulaymān himself was closely involved in drafting the treaty, in line with his reputation for rarely delegating official business. Remembered by history also as a renowned stickler for abiding by the shari‘a, the sultan must have been aware of significance of the clause for legitimising and facilitating Moroccan trade with Gibraltar. This was consistent with his overall policy to encourage foreign trade within the established framework of makhzan practice and the Moroccan moral economy. Many contemporary Moroccan ‘ulamā’ objected to travelling to and trading in non-Muslim countries on the grounds that it would encourage Muslims to become involved in prohibited practices. Mawlay Sulaymān sympathised with this view, despite the fact that some of his policies encouraged Moroccan merchants to take over the country’s trade from Europeans.

Thus Article VIII and the development of the consulate generally were intended to extend the makhzan’s control over its subjects abroad, simultaneously giving them greater legal protection and hindering the type of questionable practices that caused the sultan and the ‘ulamā’ such anxiety. It is suggestive that the first mention of Bajja’s role as consul in 1796 was related to disorderly and unsocial conduct, which although unspecified was very likely of the kind which

---

36 Although ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ‘Ash‘āsh conducted the treaty negotiations with Matra in 1801, he was working under the direct supervision of the sultan: as well as his conversations directly with Mawlay Sulaymān, Matra records how ‘Ash‘āsh brought papers ‘entirely written by the Emperor’ (NA FO 52/11, ff. 255 & 257-9). On Mawlay Sulaymān’s personalised style of government and his reputation for religious meticulousness, see El Mansour, Morocco, pp. 18-23.

37 On this objection to foreign travel, see ibid., pp. 54-5.
Mawlay Sulaymān disapproved. Article VII of the 1801 treaty similarly sought to assert Moroccan legal and cultural norms by limiting the role of the British consul in Morocco to judge disputes involving British citizens, specifying that their judgements could not contradict Muslim law. As will be seen below, this type of control was also motivated by the makhzan’s material interests in protecting the country’s security and the prosperity of its trade. Overall, it seems that although Mawlay Sulaymān did not want to end foreign trade, he did want to put it on what he perceived to be a legitimate footing.

Further evidence of this approach is in the 1799 treaty between Morocco and Spain, in which the makhzan similarly sought reciprocal privileges for its subjects abroad. Article VI in particular stipulated that both sides would judge and punish crimes of their own subjects in the territory of the other. This seems to support the idea that the main issue for the Moroccan authorities was not that their Muslim subjects should not travel abroad but that when doing so they should retain their legal status as Muslims and Moroccan subjects. During a slightly later controversy in the mid-1820s, for example, the makhzan complained to the Spanish authorities on behalf of Moroccan merchants living in Cadiz. The merchants, along with other foreigners, had been forced to pay new taxes previously only levied on Spaniards, but objected on the grounds that by previous treaties and practice they were not subject to local law, just as Spanish merchants in Morocco remained under the jurisdiction of their own consul.39

The significance of the 1801 treaty with Britain has been somewhat obscured, however, by the later claim of the British that they never in fact ratified it; but this controversy itself reinforces the impression of Mawlay Sulaymān’s determination on this point. When preparing a new treaty following the accession of Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, Douglas claimed that the treaty of 1801 was never in fact formally concluded and that consequently it ‘had been of no effect . . . on account of the seventh and eighth clauses being inconsistent with the laws of England’. Copies of the 1801 treaty in the records of the British consulate were

---

38 GGA Letters South Barbary, pp. 68-71. The letter mentions crimes ‘against nature and abominable to humanity’ (contra la Naturaleza y abominable a la Humanidad) and that the Moroccans had frequently been ‘the culprits of crimes against the rules of the law and have committed disturbances’ (Reos de Crímenes contra las Reglas de la Ley y de haver hecho disturbos).

amended, and later consuls maintained the assertion that Matra had never given his agreement to it.\textsuperscript{40} It may be that Matra did not in fact understand the exact terms of the treaty, which would explain the inclusion of these points so strongly repudiated subsequently.\textsuperscript{41} Nevertheless, the fact that the British objected to such concessions – whether at the time or retrospectively is not really important – shows the significance of Mawlay Sulaymān’s policy. Far from retreating into isolationism, the sultan took a conscious and difficult diplomatic position in order to insist upon the privileges of Moroccans abroad and the sovereignty of the makhzan at home.

There are, then, some uncertainties about the exact date of Bajja’s appointment and the exact timing of the development of his status as consul. The trend of events, however, is clear. Under Mawlay Sulaymān, the makhzan regularized the means of managing its economic and political interests in Gibraltar, of which attempting to secure the recognition of the applicability of Muslim law for Moroccans in Gibraltar was one. This development confirms the makhzan’s continued and growing concern with Gibraltar as a factor in its commercial and diplomatic policy.

Bajja was buried in Tetuan beside the tomb he had built for the shaykh (‘spiritual leader’) of whom he was murūd (‘disciple’), Sīdī Muḥammad b. Kirān (d. 1807-8).\textsuperscript{42} Although more successful than most, Bajja typified a class of Moroccan

\textsuperscript{40} NA FO 52/25, Douglas to Bathurst, 5 February 1824. See also NA FO 52/26, Douglas to Bathurst, 30 April 1825; NA FO 96/136, ff. 41-2; NA FO 95/518, ‘Report on the Treaty between Great Britain and Morocco [sic] signed at Fas on 14\textsuperscript{th} of June 1801 (by the Sultan of Morocco alone) and concluded on 19\textsuperscript{th} of January 1824’. These subsequent claims are confusing, but on balance are unconvincing. The published version of the 1801 treaty in Hertlet’s Treaties makes no suggestion that it was ever considered invalid, although it indicates the later amendments to Articles VII and VIII made in 1824. Equally, the 1824 treaty states that the 1801 treaty was produced by Douglas before Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahmān ‘for the purpose of renewing and confirming it’ (Hertlet’s Treaties, Vol. 3, p. 26. Despite this later repudiation of the agreement by the British, the Moroccans certainly considered it valid and acted upon it – which is more important for our argument here in any case – asserting their right, for example, to punish British subjects according to Muslim law as per Article VIII. See, for example, MWM 33329 Britānyā 1.

\textsuperscript{41} According to Jackson, Matra’s inability to speak Arabic and the absence of an interpreter capable of giving precise translation of the treaty in English prevented a clear understanding of the treaty (see Jackson, An Account of the Empire, pp. 260-1).

\textsuperscript{42} Erzini, ‘Hal yaslah’, p. 519.
merchants, Muslim and Jewish, whose commercial interests linked Fes and the ports of northern Morocco to Europe through Gibraltar. Intimately connected to this group were Jews of Moroccan origin settled in the British town whose familial and commercial ties operated in the same way. This second group was typified by Judah Benoliel, Bajja’s successor as consul. As we will see in the following chapters, these two groups together formed a network that created the distinctive relationship of Gibraltar with the ports of the Gharb region, and, though to a lesser extent, with Morocco as a whole.

Benoliel’s family probably originated from Tetuan, but he himself is recorded as having been born in Gibraltar.\textsuperscript{43} The family is listed among Jews of Moroccan origin in the town in 1779, and Benoliel’s father, Solomon, is recorded there in 1781.\textsuperscript{44} A relative on his father’s side was involved in the cattle trade between Gibraltar and Morocco in the 1770s.\textsuperscript{45} His maternal uncle, Salvador Abudarham, was British vice-consul at Tangier during Matra’s consulship.\textsuperscript{46} Like Bajja, Benoliel was a substantial merchant in his own right who also contributed to the construction of the Exchange and Commercial Library.\textsuperscript{47} He was wealthy enough to loan the government of Gibraltar $10,000 in 1796 to help pay for the garrison’s supplies.\textsuperscript{48} He owned two privateering ships that operated out of Gibraltar during the Napoleonic War.\textsuperscript{49} By the later years of his life, his business had grown to the extent that he was perhaps the most important trader in the town. In 1830, for example, thirty ships were consigned to him there, more than arrived for any other merchant. His interests ranged from Marseilles, Italy and London to Brazil and the United States. Besides his family links to Tetuan, he was connected through the Abudarhams to the great entrepôt of Livorno.\textsuperscript{50} All in all, as one British

\textsuperscript{43} \textit{ibid.}, pp. 519-20; NA CO 91/127, Houston to Stanley, 17 April 1834.

\textsuperscript{44} Howes, \textit{The Gibraltararian}, p. 32; GGA Misc. 1781, ‘List of Jews in Hardys Town &c. 30\textsuperscript{th} July 1781’.

\textsuperscript{45} GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan, p. 203.

\textsuperscript{46} NA FO 174/6, Abudarham to Matra, 9 August 1799.

\textsuperscript{47} Benady, ‘The Garrison Library’, p. 28.

\textsuperscript{48} NA CO 91/38, O’Hara to Portland, 26 November 1796.

\textsuperscript{49} Benady, ‘Jewish Community’, p. 177, n. 29.

\textsuperscript{50} Miège, ‘Communauté juive’, p. 101; GGA Letters 1803-1812, Letters out p. 3
traveler described him, he was ‘a man of great wealth and respectability at Gibraltar’.\(^{51}\)

Benoliel was appointed consul by Mawlay Sulaymān some time before 20 February 1821.\(^{52}\) The speed of this appointment after Bajja’s death seems to confirm that the consulship had become a regular office by this point, and that it was important to the sultan; despite his preoccupation with the rebellion at Fes, or indeed perhaps because of it, he did not neglect his affairs at Gibraltar. Benoliel’s first main task was to assist the settlement of Bajja’s estate, money the sultan urgently needed to fund his efforts to defend his power and an issue that was presumably important in the rapid appointment of the new consul.\(^{53}\)

After Mawlay Sulaymān’s death, his policy on the Moroccan consulate was continued by Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahmān, who within three months of his accession confirmed Benoliel’s appointment as ‘our Agent on the same terms that he held that Office in the lifetime of our Master and sanctified Uncle’. The issuing of a formal letter of credentials and its approbation by the British indicates that by this time the makhtzan managed its consulate according to the forms and practices expected in a European country. This same diplomatic instrument shows the role of Gibraltar as one of the Moroccan sultanate’s principal points of official contact with Britain and Europe in general, making Benoliel ex officio as the consul there its ‘General Agent in all Christian Dominions, in London, its territories, and elsewhere by land and sea’.\(^{54}\) During at least the later part of his consulship, which lasted over sixteen years until his death in late 1838, Benoliel was assisted by a vice-consul, a fellow Jew called


\(^{52}\) GGA Letters 1807-21, p. 38.

\(^{53}\) GGA Letters 1819-35, pp. 40 & 42; El Mansour, Morocco, p. 43.

Abraham Bitton. He also had a ‘Moorish secretary’ to translate letters in Arabic, which apparently he did not read or write, never himself having lived in Morocco.

After Benoliel’s death there are no known records of a Moroccan consul in Gibraltar for nearly two years. The hiatus may have been due to the controversy that surrounded the final year of his consulship when complaints were made that he was failing to assist Moroccan Muslim traders there properly. Although he had survived a similar allegation early on in his career, serious enquiries were made against him the year before his death.

These difficulties perhaps reflected similar sentiments to those that had hampered the establishment of the Moroccan consulate in Marseilles around the same time. Two attempts by the makhzan to appoint a consul at Marseilles, in 1828 and 1835, failed, apparently because some Muslim merchants objected to being under the authority of the proposed Jewish candidates. Generally as the nineteenth century went on, the status of Jews in Morocco was becoming a point of contention. As more Jews living or trading in the country began to benefit from the protection of European powers, whose influence was itself becoming more assertive, the makhzan reacted by trying to assert its control over them. In 1815, for example, Mawlay Sulaymān re-imposed the payment of the jizya tax levied on the Jews and ordered the enforcement of clothing regulations to prevent them

55 Da’ūd, Tarikh, Vol. 8, 317. Bitton is listed as vice-consul in many applications by Moroccans for temporary admission permits in the mid-1830s (NA CO 91/134). He was evidently a well-established merchant himself and not simply a clerk for the consul: he is listed as one of the contributors to the Exchange and Commercial Library building in 1817, and in 1832 equipped a number of ships sailing from the port. See Benady, 'The Garrison Library', p. 28; Miège, 'Communauté juive', p. 111.

56 NA FO 174/27, Don to Douglas, 7 November 1828. Benoliel signed his name in Latin characters in his letters to the makhzan (see, for example, MWM 22666 Jabal Tāriq).

57 Da’ūd, Tarikh, Vol. 8, pp. 72-3 & 304. Shortly after the first of these investigations, the sultan sent Benoliel a lion and a lioness as a gift, perhaps as a sign of his return to favour (see MWM 26439 Jabal Tāriq).


wearing European dress, a policy Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān would also later attempt to enforce.⁶⁰

Another indication of an evolving tension around the status of Jews in Morocco associated with foreign powers was an attempt by some makhzan officials in 1836-7 to convince the sultan to prohibit the employment of Jews as consular agents. Although British officials at various times also promoted the idea that their government should not employ Jews, the Moroccan attempt to impose such a restriction provoked an indignant response. In concert with the other European consuls, Muḥammad ‘Ash‘āsh at Tetuan (the son of ‘Abd al-Raḥmān and also appointed governor) and Benoliel himself, Edward Drummond Hay, the British consul in Morocco between 1829 and 1845, successfully resisted the proposed policy.⁶¹

Perhaps concepts of identity and loyalty were becoming more narrowly defined for Moroccans as they already had been in Europe. The makhzan could no longer sustain Sīdī Muḥammad’s attitude of khāḍīmūnā khāḍīmūka, which belonged to a period of greater flexibility. The employment of Benoliel as consul had on the one hand continued the long-standing Moroccan practice of using diplomatic and commercial agents of various backgrounds at Gibraltar as elsewhere. On the other hand, this system was being integrated into a different set of institutional norms defined by European consular practices, a process which created two new pressures.

Firstly, there was the general tendency toward the exclusive employment of a country’s own citizens as its representatives. Combined with the clearer assertion of foreigners’ status in Morocco, as in the case of the British Jews, this undermined earlier, relatively flexible attitudes toward the origins of the sultan’s servants. Secondly, since one of the functions of the consulate was to administer the affairs of Moroccan subjects in Gibraltar, the consul had authority over them. Benoliel’s long service shows that endowing a Jew with this authority was possible, but equally the idea was in some cases problematic for Muslims, as the complaints made against him suggest. The exact impact of these trends on makhzan policy is impossible to discern but, coincidentally or not, Benoliel’s successors as consul were all Moroccan

---


⁶¹ NA FO 52/41, E. Drummond Hay to Palmerston, 24 October 1836 & E. Drummond Hay to Palmerston, 11 November 1836; NA FO 52/43, E. Drummond Hay to Palmerston, 17 April 1837.
Muslims whose loyalty and capacity to exercise authority were still unquestioned. The practice of employing Jews, however well connected, seems to have been dropped. Solomon Benoliel, Judah’s son, for example, served as consul of the Habsburg Empire in Gibraltar but despite continued business links with Morocco did not succeed his father.⁶²

The next consul was ‘Alī b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Timsamānī, who was appointed in July 1840. His appointment was officially recognised by the British at the end of the following month, and within another two weeks he had arrived in Gibraltar to take up his post.⁶³ He is not known to have lived there before, or to have been a merchant on the scale of Bajja or Benoliel, though he did do business with British merchants in the town.⁶⁴ However, he did have some important political connections in northern Morocco. His brother, Aḥmad, was deputy governor (khalīfa) of Tangier, and the sultan appointed him on the recommendation of the governor.⁶⁵ He may also have been related to Muḥammad al-Timsamānī, an amīn at Tangier in the mid-1830s.⁶⁶ Presumably he was from the family in Tetuan that originated from the tribe of Timsamān, in the central Rif region.⁶⁷

For some reason that remains obscure, however, al-Timsamānī lasted less than six months in his post. He left Gibraltar the following June with a sum of money to be delivered to the sultan.⁶⁸ Possibly this was due to his relative inexperience regarding Gibraltar and its trade, since his replacement was another merchant better established there. During this time the affairs of the Moroccan merchants became of concern to Mawlay Ḥaḍdī b. Aḥmad ibn Sayd, who feared that some were passing information to foreigners that would damage the country. The investigation of this problem was one reason behind the appointment of Ḥaḍdū

⁶³ NA FO 174/128, ff. 83 & 88b; GGA Letters 1835-48, pp. 155, 159 & 162-3. His name is spelled by the British as ‘Sen Sil Manni’ or ‘Sensamany’.
⁶⁴ NA FO 174/132, f. 229b.
⁶⁵ NA FO 174/128, ff. 83 & 88b.
⁶⁶ See MWM 26439 Jabal Ṭāriq.
⁶⁷ See MM Vol. 8, p. 2545.
⁶⁸ GGA Letters 1835-48, pp. 179-80. Probably due to the brevity of his tenure, al-Timsamānī is not recorded in the archives of the Moroccan consulate upon which Erzini based her study and she does not include him on the list of its occupants (see Erzini, ‘Hal yaslah’).
Gassūs, the new consul, a well-established merchant from a family prominent in both trade and government service. Gassūs was appointed consul in March 1841, but he had lived in the town for at least fifteen years before that. The letter appointing him emphasized his knowledge of European laws and practices, which had obviously become an important qualification for the post.

In another sign of the consulate’s development as an institution, a particular seal was in use for its correspondence by Gassūs’s time in office, which announced him as khādīm al-maṭām al-‘āli bi-llāh bi-Jabal Ṭāriq (‘servant of the station elevated by God [i.e. the Moroccan sultanate] at Gibraltar’). Similar stamps in both Arabic and Spanish were used by his successors. It was also under Gassūs that the Moroccans secured the use of one of Bajja’s two houses in the town as a permanent site for the consulate. Because the British considered all land in Gibraltar as crown property, they had refused to consider the houses as part of Bajja’s estate that had reverted to the sultan on his death. The issue was less pressing during Benoliel’s consulship since he had a substantial property of his own, but the British did finally allow Gassūs to repair and occupy Bajja’s house on Waterport Street in 1842. Although still technically considered British property, the house was subsequently occupied by successive Moroccan consuls until at least 1886.

Thanks in part to the account of Beauclerk, a British officer who traveled from Gibraltar to Rabat in the company of Gassūs for about two weeks in 1826, there survive some important details of his character and circumstances. According to the Englishman, Gassūs was born in Rabat and had business partners there, although he may have been born in Fes. He adopted a boy and two girls, the children of the daughter of a British sergeant from the garrison at Gibraltar and

69 On this investigation, see KH IV-9-26. On the Gassūs family, see MM Vol. 9, pp. 3023-3. It is unclear whether Ḥaddū was originally from Rabat or Tetuan, in both of which the family had branches.
70 KH III-2-1; GGA Letters 1835-48, p. 172; NA FO 174/46, James Butler, British vice-consul at Tetuan, to E. Drummond Hay, 13 April 1841; Beauclerk, Journey, pp. 3-102. Gassūs was recorded as one of the few Muslim residents of the town in the census of 1834 (GGA 1834 Census, Division 2).
71 Da’ūd, Tarīkh, Vol. 8, pp. 267 & 340-1.
72 Enclosure to NA CO 91/167, Wilson to Stanley, 8 February 1844; Erzini, 'Hal yaslah', p. 521.
73 GGA Letters 1835-48, pp. 173-4 & 178-9; Erzini, 'Hal yaslah', p. 524. The makhzan provided the money to secure a property to house the consul (see MWM 19556 Jabal Ṭāriq).
74 Beauclerk spells his name as ‘El Hadge Hadoud Kissouse’ (Beauclerk, Journey, p. 3).
75 ibid., pp. 3 & 78; Erzini, 'Hal yaslah', p. 520.
another Moroccan merchant, both of whom had died. Having ‘imbibed more of
their mother’s faith than their father’s’, the children were sent to Tangier to be
educated in a more Islamic environment, although the boy was later brought back
to be schooled in Gibraltar before finishing his education in Rabat.76

Beauclerk described Gassūs as well known and respected by his fellow
merchants at Tangier, Rabat and elsewhere, as well as to the towns’ governors and
officials – observations thoroughly consistent with the Gassūs family’s prominence
and wide connections in trade and government.77 He spoke Spanish fluently, and
was at ease in European company, such that Beauclerk described him as an ‘easy
companion of the bottle’.78 On other hand, he refrained absolutely from pork,
forbearing politely in the face of his English companions’ joking attempts to add it
to his meals.79 Beauclerk found it hard to reconcile the fact that this ‘man of
generally liberal notions, who had lived among enlightened people so long as he
had’, also participated in popular ceremonies and rituals in honour of religious
leaders or saints they met during their journey.80 The Englishman nevertheless
concluded that Gassūs was ‘an example of a very superior order [among the Moors],
who are possessed of a delicate sense of politeness, and a suavity of manners, rarely
equalled even in the polished circles of Europe. Their ideas of friendship are firm
and constant, and their honour unquestionable. Such is the character of our friend
Hadoud’.81

Despite his experience and connections, however, Gassūs’s age was against
him. Less than four years after his appointment, Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahmān concluded
that he was not energetic enough to fulfill the important role of consul at
Gibraltar.82 The sultan may have been influenced in this conclusion by the fact that,
earlier the same year, Gassūs has purchased a consignment of weapons for the
makhzan that had turned out to be faulty.83 Toward the end of his life, Gassūs’s focus

---

76 Beauclerk, Journey, pp. 75-6.
77 ibid., pp. 13, 19, 25-7 & 85.
78 ibid., p. 97.
79 ibid., p. 109.
80 ibid., p. 39.
81 ibid., p. 102.
82 KH III-2-18. MM mistakenly says that he served as consul until 1856 (see MM Vol. 9, p. 3024).
83 KH V-8-23; KH V-8-34.
in Morocco had shifted to Tetuan, where he had a house and some land. Upon his
death in 1846, he left a considerable estate and, like his predecessor Bajja, was
buried in the town after many years living abroad.84

Gassū’s replacement as consul was Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Razīnī, who was
appointed in December 1844 and took up his post two months later.85 A native of
another prominent family of Tetuan, he was another merchant with long
experience of Gibraltar and other Mediterranean ports. His family connections and
successful trade allowed him to overcome his earlier association with the rebellion
of Mawlay al-Saʿīd.86 He was doing business in the British town by at least 1829,
arriving there after a period spent between Oran, Algiers and Tunis while he was
still out of favour with the sultan in Morocco. He made at least one trip to Livorno,
returning in 1832 to Gibraltar where he lived the following year, and later traveled
to Beirut and Egypt in 1840-1.87 His most important partner in Gibraltar was Moses
Levy Balensi, a Jew of Moroccan origin whose ability of speak Arabic made him a
particularly popular partner for other Muslim Moroccan merchants as well,
although he actually corresponded with al-Razīnī in Spanish.88 As a result of this
experience, al-Razīnī had already been suggested as a possible candidate for the
post during the investigation of Benoliel’s conduct.89 He had also been
commissioned to assist Gassū in 1841 to recover debts owed to the makhzan by
Benoliel’s estate, and in the same year to purchase rifles in Gibraltar for the
Moroccan army.90

Like his predecessors, al-Razīnī also had important links to the political elite
of northern Morocco. His father, Aḥmad, was amīn (‘customs official’) at Tangier
and a close friend of Muḥammad ʿAshḥāsh, governor of Tetuan. Like other officials

84 MWM 17776 Jabal Ṭāriq; Daʾūd, Tarīk, Vol. 9, pp. 300 & 320; NA FO 174/132, f. 7b. Part of Gassū’s
estate was claimed by the makhzan in payment of debts he owed to it, and his house in Tetuan later
awarded by the sultan to a refugee family from Algeria.
86 See MM Vol. 13, p. 4327.
87 NA CO 91/134, Admissions 29 October-3 November 1832; Erzini, 'Hal yaslah', p. 520.
88 ibid., p. 520; NA FO 174/129, f. 76b.
89 Daʾūd, Tarīk, Vol. 8, pp. 303-4.
90 NA FO 174/46, Butler to E. Drummond Hay, 13 April 1841.
in the region, he used his position to facilitate trade with Gibraltar.⁹¹ In 1843, for example, Ahmad wrote jointly with ‘Ash’āsh to the British consul at Tangier to ask for his help when money belonging to a group of Moroccan merchants, including two of his sons, had been misappropriated. Muḥammad al-Raẓīnī had sent more than $8,000 from Tetuan to his younger brother, ‘Abd al-Karīm, and another Moroccan merchant, ‘Abd al-Ghaffūr Labādī, at Gibraltar to pay off debts there. But when the money was passed to an agent in the town to disperse among the various creditors, he absconded leaving the debts unpaid.⁹² Drawing on his own experience of Gibraltar’s affairs, ‘Abd al-Karīm later served as his brother’s vice-consul in the latter’s periods of absence during his consulship.⁹³

The Raẓīnī family had past experience in diplomacy generally, and in the relationship between the British and northern Morocco in particular.⁹⁴ An unnamed member of the family had acted as Matra’s agent and go-between during the civil war between Mawlay al-Yazīd and Mawlay Maslama in the early 1790s. Secret correspondence from the British consul had been delivered through Mawlay Maslama’s mother, to whom the Raẓīnīs were related. Another member of the family had exploited this connection in turn to secure Matra’s help to travel from Tetuan through Gibraltar to reach Spain, having been appointed Mawlay Maslama’s ambassador to the Spanish court.⁹⁵

Like his predecessors as consul, al-Raẓīnī’s wide experience in the cosmopolitan world of Mediterranean trade facilitated his role in Gibraltar and his relations with the British authorities there. He spoke not only Spanish, but also

---

⁹¹ Ahmad al-Raẓīnī was appointed as amīn in Tangier in September 1841, and served nearly five years before being replaced by Muḥammad al-Khaṭīb. He was allowed to leave the post after complaining about the long separation from his family in Tetuan. During his service, for example, he had had to apply for special permission from the sultan to leave Tangier to attend his brother’s wedding (see KH III-2-5; KH III-3-3; KH V-6-18). On his career generally, see Da’ūd, Tarīkh, Vol. 9, passim.


⁹⁴ A Muḥammad al-Raẓīnī was sent by Sīdī Muḥammad as ambassador to Holland in 1752 and 1769 (see ‘Abd al-Ḥādī Tāzhī, Al-tarīkh al-dibā‘īmāsī li-l-Maghrib min aqādam al-‘usūr ilā al-yawm, 12 vols. (Rabat: 1986–94), Vol. 9, pp. 199-203; Lourido-Díaz, Marruecos, pp. 208 & 318). I am indebted to Dr. Erzini for drawing my attention to this, and for discussing with me the information about her family in this paragraph.

⁹⁵ NA FO 52/10, ff. 43, 200 & 202.
English, thanks to his long residence abroad. He enjoyed good relations with
Robert Wilson, governor of Gibraltar 1842-9, and was included in the social life of
the town’s leading figures, such as a ball given in honour of Queen Victoria’s
birthday. In turn he organised hunting trips around Tetuan for British officers, a
popular pastime for them to break the monotony of life in the confined garrison.

It is clear, therefore, that the Moroccan consuls at Gibraltar during the first
half of the nineteenth century shared a number of characteristics that facilitated
their role as the makhzan’s representatives there. With the brief exception of al-
Timsamānī, all are known to have had extensive experience of Mediterranean trade
and particularly Gibraltar’s role linking Morocco to its wider commercial networks.
Linguistically and socially, they were able to move between the different cultures
that made up this world.

In sum, they typified a group of Moroccans, both Jews and Muslims, and Jews
of Moroccan origin for whom the Straits of Gibraltar were a highway connecting
two parts of the same world. For the purposes of their professional lives, and in
many cases their personal lives as well, that world existed across what are
conventionally called ‘cultural boundaries’. The existence of this group, which will
be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five, was an important factor in the
development of the Moroccan consulate in Gibraltar, and the sultanate’s policy
toward the town in general. Firmly rooted in traditions of service to the makhzan,
the consuls also facilitated an accommodation with the evolving norms and
processes of European commerce and diplomacy.

In their functions, the Moroccan consuls at Gibraltar certainly resembled the
representatives of other states in the town. They were not only concerned with
currency exchange as some have argued, but also with representing the diplomatic
interests of the Moroccan government and assisting the trade and travel of its
merchants and other subjects, notably pilgrims. Thus, as we saw in the
Introduction, Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān specified the care of merchants and pilgrims
in Gibraltar as the consul’s primary duty, and required the official to have sound
experience of the town’s laws and practices. From the consistent background of

---

97 ibid., p. 521; Da‘ūd, Tarīkh, Vol. 9, pp. 158-9.
98 KH III-2-18.
the consuls as merchants themselves, we can also infer both the depth of this experience and the importance attached to it by the makhzan.

With regard to merchants, the consuls had the general task of facilitating and protecting them and their trade. At the most basic level, this consisted of acting as the guarantor of a merchant’s conduct during his residence. The Moroccan consul was held responsible in a general sense for his countrymen, resolving disputes between them or assisting the British authorities to curb any unlawful behaviour.\(^9\) Once the authorities at Gibraltar introduced a formal system for the admission and temporary residence of foreigners, it was generally the consul who acted as the necessary guarantor for the issuing of a permit, although a large proportion of Jewish Moroccan merchants relied on other, private sponsors.\(^{10}\) In addition, the consulate could provide information and assistance to help Moroccan merchants coming to Gibraltar. As part of his attempt to renew the trade of Tetuan after the rebellion of 1821-2, for example, Mawlay Sulaymān ordered Benoliel to assist one of the sons of the governor by introducing him to trustworthy merchants in the town.\(^{11}\)

As we suggested above, part of Mawlay Sulaymān’s original intention in creating the consulate was also to increase the makhzan’s control over its subjects in Gibraltar. On the one hand, he wanted to prevent practices seen as socially unacceptable, which, as we have seen, are referred to in the first document mentioning the Moroccan consul.\(^{12}\) The sultanate also tried to prevent people deemed to be of poor character travelling to the town in the first place, in order to keep Moroccan trade there in the hands of those considered respectable and trustworthy. In 1826, for example, the sultan temporarily banned embarkations from Tangier in order to stop the trade of ‘those with no morals from among the riff-raff’ (\(m\)a\(n\) lā\(a\) lā\(q\) lahu \(m\)in al-sufala\)), and ordered the governor of Tetuan to be careful only to allow merchants of ‘good character, religion and wealth’ (\(a\)hl al-murū\(a\) wa-\(l\)-\(d\)īn wa-\(l\)-\(m\)āl) to travel.\(^{13}\) In the case of disputes between Moroccans

\(^9\) MWM 18856 Tiṭwān.
\(^{10}\) On the introduction of this system, see below, p. 172.
\(^{11}\) MWM 6930 Jabal Ṭāriq.
\(^{12}\) See above, p. 112.
\(^{13}\) MWM Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān to Muḥammad ‘Ash’āsh, 11 Rajab 1241 [= 19 February 1826].
already in Gibraltar, the makhzan preferred to have the parties return to Morocco and be judged in the courts there.\textsuperscript{104}

Part of the reason behind the makhzan’s desire to control its subjects abroad was to prevent the disclosure of potentially damaging information. Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahmān feared untrustworthy Moroccans ‘may have guided the disbelieving enemy to the Muslims’ weaknesses’ (rubbāmā dallū ʿadā al-kāfīr ʿalā ‘awrāt al-muslimīn). Later he urged the investigation of rumours that a Moroccan merchant at Gibraltar was meddled with the affairs of his compatriots and assisting the Christians.\textsuperscript{105}

On the other hand, the makhzan also appreciated that disorderly or dishonest conduct on its subjects’ part would damage the reputation of the country’s commerce. Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahmān believed that his clampdown of 1826 would improve the prospects of Tetuan’s trade, for example (fi-dhālīka al-ʿamāra li-l-marsā).\textsuperscript{106} To a similar end, the consulate assisted the British and Moroccan authorities to rectify abuses by Moroccan subjects, particularly the non-payment of debts by merchants who had left Gibraltar. Resolving these cases was necessary to maintain the credit and reputation of Moroccan commerce generally in the town.\textsuperscript{107}

Examples of such commercial problems are mentioned during the office of several of the consuls during this period, but they seem to have been particularly acute during the early 1840s when merchants in Gibraltar made a number of claims against Moroccan merchants, mainly from Fes.\textsuperscript{108} This may have been a consequence of the financial problems in Morocco around this time, which led to a stark devaluation of the currency in the middle of that decade.\textsuperscript{109}

Conversely, the consul was also involved in trying to resolve any abuses committed against Moroccan subjects, such as the wrongful seizure of their

\textsuperscript{104} See, for example, KH IV–9-23. In this case of 1841, Gassūs liaised with the British authorities to have some disputed property returned to its original owners so that the three merchants involved could have the case judged in Morocco. One of the merchants was named as Muḥammad Mikwār.
\textsuperscript{106} MWM Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahmān to Muḥammad ‘Ash‘āsh, 11 Rajab 1241 [= 19 February 1826].
\textsuperscript{107} NA FO 174/133, f. 55.
\textsuperscript{108} GGA Letters 1812-1819, p. 24; NA FO 178/129, ff. 52b & 76-7; NA FO 174/130, ff. 145 & 148; NA FO 174/131, ff. 7-8, 26-7, 52b, 78 & 113.
\textsuperscript{109} See Pennell, Morocco since 1830, p. 57.
property or interference with their ships. As we saw in the previous chapter, this was a particular problem during the 1790s and early 1800s. It persisted into later decades with the privateering of the Spanish Guarda Costa and others. In May 1830, for example, Benoliel was negotiating a claim against the Spanish for the seizure of goods belonging to Moroccan merchants from a Gibraltarian ship. Later the same year, he reported to the makhzan the capture of a Moroccan ship taken to Algeciras so that a protest might be made to the Spanish government. The following year, the consul reported to the sultan the seizure of the property of two Moroccan merchants at Oran by the invading French forces. Then in 1835 Benoliel reported that he had written to the Spanish court for the release of three merchants from Tetuan who had been detained while on their way to Marseilles.¹¹⁰

The consuls also assisted Moroccan pilgrims who travelled through Gibraltar to find passage to Alexandria on their way to the Hijaz. Although it was still generally more common to go through Algeria and Egypt by land, Tetuan and Tangier were main points of embarkation for those who did travel by sea.¹¹¹ It was also common for the sultan to arrange for the consul to help dignitaries of various kinds to find passage to or from Gibraltar for other journeys.¹¹² Thus it was natural for prominent Moroccans, including members of the royal family, to travel for ḥajj via Gibraltar with the consul’s assistance. Al-Rażīnī, for example, organized passage for two of the sultan’s sons in 1846 on board a British steamer, and for two others three years later. In 1856 he accompanied four other princes himself on their pilgrimage.¹¹³ He did not only concern himself with such notables however,

¹¹⁰ NA FO 52/32, ‘Consulate diary at Tangier’, 2 May 1830; NA FO 52/34, ‘Consulate diary at Tangier’, 29 October 1830; NA FO 52/35, Nathaniel Welsford, British vice-consul at Oran, to E. Drummond Hay, 5 October 1831 & E. Drummond Hay to Hay, 6 November 1831; MWM 22666 Jabal Ṭāriq. Despite the makhzan’s attempts to ensure that only respectable men went abroad to trade, the men in the last case – also described in Benoliel’s letter as being ‘people of good reputation and virtue’ (min ahl al-‘irḍ wa-l-murā’ā) – had been arrested by the Spanish authorities for assaulting a ship’s captain.

¹¹¹ Miège, Le Maroc, Vol. 2, pp. 139 & 156. Records of some of the arrangements of these voyages survive, for example at KH I-2-38; KH I-3-22; KH I-4-3; KH I-5-1; KH I-5-14.

¹¹² See, for example, KH I-4-21; KH I-4-27; KH II-3-24.

attempts in 1846 also to simplify the quarantine arrangements for ordinary pilgrims returning to Morocco via Gibraltar.\footnote{114}{NA FO 174/131, f. 10b.}

Facilitating the medical care of Moroccans in Gibraltar was another consular responsibility, albeit more occasional. Under Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahmān, the makhzan began an allowance of thirty cattle a year to be exported to Gibraltar at the low duty of $5 a head for the use of the civil hospital there, which was ‘considered as the Emperor’s subscription towards this charitable institution’. Since Benoliel was a governor of the hospital it seems likely this policy was adopted at his suggestion or certainly with his encouragement.\footnote{115}{NA FO 52/30, Douglas to Ibn Jallūn [‘Taleb Ben Zelul’], 7 August 1828. This grant was renewed annually: see, for example, NA FO 32/34, E. Drummond Hay to Hay, 9 May 1831; NA FO 52/37, E. Drummond Hay to Hay, 5 May 1833; NA FO 52/38, E. Drummond Hay to Houston, 24 March 1834.}

Moroccan subjects were treated at the hospital, although not in great numbers.\footnote{116}{For examples of the returns of patient admissions to the hospital, which document the occasional treatment of Moroccans, see NA CO 91/120, Houston to Lord Goderich, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, 2 January 1832; NA CO 91/121, Houston to Goderich, 6 July 1832; NA CO 91/136, Woodford to Glenelg, 14 July 1836.}

Some royal family members or prominent makhzan officials were sent to Gibraltar specifically for medical treatment, which they received from the garrison’s medical officers or private doctors rather than at the civil hospital. In such cases the consul arranged lodgings and meals for the visitor.\footnote{117}{KH II-13-34; KH II-15-21; GGA Letters 1807-21, pp. 30 & 35; GGA Letters 1835-48, pp. 372, 377 & 402-4.}

Besides these consular functions, the consulate also played an important part in the diplomatic policy of the Moroccan sultanate. Until the practice stopped, for example, the tribute that guaranteed immunity from Moroccan privateering was paid by some countries through the consul at Gibraltar.\footnote{118}{See, for example, MWM 20122 Tītwān.}

According to Benoliel’s credentials, the consulate was considered the makhzan’s primary representation to the European world, the sultan’s ‘General Agent in all Christian Dominions, London, its Territories, elsewhere by land and sea’.\footnote{119}{GGA Letters 1819-35, ‘Translation of the Commission of Judah Benoliel’.} Certainly the consul was a valuable source of information about prevailing political and commercial conditions, which

\[\text{133} \]
was transmitted in regular dispatches to the makhzan through Tetuan. Sometimes this concerned Gibraltar itself, such as the presence of ships that might attack Moroccan merchants or ships. Gibraltar’s frequent communication with the major ports of the Mediterranean and northern Europe, and the circulation there of European newspapers and gazettes, including the town’s own Gibraltar Chronicle, also provided ample material from further afield. It was from Benoliel, for example, that Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān received news of the French conquest of Algiers in 1830, as well as of other international events. Sometimes the consul came to court to discuss matters directly with the sultan, as Gassūs did for example in 1842.

As a result of their varied experience and access to current information, different consuls were important figures in various diplomatic tasks. Benoliel was one of Morocco’s negotiators during the resolution of the country’s brief conflict with the Habsburg Empire in 1829; Gassūs advised the makhzan from Gibraltar during the Franco-Moroccan crisis of 1844; and while consul, al-Rażānī was dispatched as ambassador to Egypt. But not surprisingly it was in the sultanate’s relations with the British that the consulate had its biggest diplomatic role. Benoliel, for example, lobbied them on issues such as the dispute over Bajja’s land in Gibraltar and the role of Jewish vice-consuls in Morocco. Letters between the governor of Gibraltar and Moroccan officials also provided a means of negotiating with the British government that was often separate from, and sometimes in opposition to, the efforts of the British consul in Tangier. Since until 1836 the consulate in Tangier was technically subordinate to the administration of Gibraltar,

---

121 See, for example, KH IV-3-7.
122 MWM Tiṭwān Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān to Muḥammad ‘Ash‘āsh, 10 Șafar 1246 [= 2 August 1830]. Other letters mention events in Russia, Spain and the Ottoman Empire (see MWM 19223 Tiṭwān; MWM 22666 Jabal Ṭāriq).
123 KH II-11-21.
124 NA FO 52/31, ‘Vice-consulate diary at Tetuan’, 13 February 1829.
125 GGA Letters 1835-1848, pp. 315-6; NA FO 174/45, Wilson to James Murray, British vice-consul at Tangier, 8 July 1844.
127 NA FO 52/36, E. Drummond Hay to Hay, 6 July 1832; NA FO 52/43, E. Drummond Hay to Palmerston, 17 April 1837.
the garrison authorities considered it their right to communicate directly with the makhzan and its officials, and they often did so through the Moroccan consul.\textsuperscript{128}

The Moroccan government exploited this occasional lack of co-ordination between the British consulate in Tangier and the government at Gibraltar to further its own diplomatic ends. In 1828, for example, the mistaken seizure of two British ships by Moroccan privateers occasioned a serious breach between the two countries, leading to the departure of Douglas, the British consul, and the blockade of Tangier by two ships of the British Royal Navy. Al-‘Arabī al-SA‘īdī, governor of Tangier, appealed through Benoliel to Governor Don at Gibraltar for help to resolve the crisis. Don, apparently motivated by his own concerns about the supply of the garrison, encouraged him by indicating that the payment of compensation for the seizure, which the Moroccans were unwilling to pay, was a minor point. Douglas meanwhile, acting on instructions from London, was insisting that compensation was a\textit{sine qua non} for the restoration of relations.\textsuperscript{129}

Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Rāḥmān similarly exploited the sometimes competing interests of the British consul in Tangier and the authorities at Gibraltar a few years later. He requested artillery and ammunition in 1831 to fight some rebels, as well as asking for some artillermen to be sent as they were during Mawlay Sulaymān’s reign to instruct the makhzan’s troops. Edward Drummond Hay, British consul at the time, refused the request, apparently because he feared the French might interpret it as an indirect gesture of support for ‘Abd al-Qādir’s resistance in Algeria. Despite this refusal, however, the Lieutenant-Governor of Gibraltar shipped 1,000 artillery shells to the Moroccan government on his own authority after the sultan had made a separate request to him.\textsuperscript{130}

A similar attempt by the makhzan to bypass the British consul in Tangier by its direct relations with the authorities at Gibraltar came in 1849, regarding the case

\textsuperscript{128} For example, GGA Letters 1803-12, letters out p. 50; GGA Letters 1807-21, p. 23; GGA Letters 1835-48, pp. 315-16; FO 174/27, Don to Douglas, 7 November 1828. For the reform of the consulate’s administration and its position vis-à-vis Gibraltar, see Lee, ‘Supervising of Barbary consuls’.

\textsuperscript{129} NA FO 174/27, Don to Douglas, 7 November 1828; NA FO 52/30, Judah Benoliel, Moroccan consul at Gibraltar, to Don, 10 November 1828; NA FO 52/31, Douglas to George Murray, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, 14 May 1829.

\textsuperscript{130} NA FO 52/34, E. Drummond Hay to Hay, 26 June 1831; NA FO 52/35, E. Drummond Hay to Hay, 10 October 1831; NA FO 52/35, E. Drummond Hay to Hay, 25 November 1831.
of Redman & Co., a British company demanding compensation for lost goods. Al-Razînî, assisted by Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allâh al-Khaṭîb, another notable Tetuani merchant who later became Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmân’s nā‛îb (‘representative’) for foreign affairs, was ordered to negotiate directly at Gibraltar to resolve the case.131 John Drummond Hay, British consul from 1846 to 1886 who became a dominant figure in Moroccan politics, however, was much more assertive than his predecessors in defending his prerogatives as the country’s sole representative in negotiations with the Moroccan government. He wrote a stinging rebuke to the authorities at Gibraltar for even agreeing to meet al-Razînî to discuss the matter.132 Al-Razînî later tried to repay the favour by lobbying for an embassy to be sent to Britain to complain about Drummond Hay’s conduct, but the latter’s influence had grown too strong and he went on to dominate Anglo-Moroccan relations for several decades.133 By the mid-1850s, whatever diplomatic leverage the consul at Gibraltar had had was fading, as the failure of al-Razînî’s lobbying against the introduction of free trade in 1856 shows.134

A distinctive function performed by the Moroccan consuls was commerce carried out, directly or indirectly, on behalf of the makhzan. As we have seen above in Chapter One and elsewhere, the sultanate regularly ordered purchases from Gibraltar, for which the consuls often acted as agents. Despite the makhzan’s desire to free itself from dependence on European sources of weapons, Gibraltar continued to be an important source of its naval and military supplies.135 Bajja, for example, bought a ship at Algeciras for the sultan’s navy in 1808.136 In 1835, Benoliel freighted a ship at Gibraltar loaded with arms and ammunition being sent on behalf of the

131 NA FO 174/132, f. 14b. On al-Khaṭîb’s career as a merchant, amîn and nā‛îb al-sulṭân, see MM Vol. 11, pp. 3779-80. On his particular role in the negotiation of the 1856 treaty with Britain, see Ben Srhir, Britain and Morocco, pp. 24-61.
132 BL Add. MS 40033, ff. 458-63.
133 Ben Srhir, Britain and Morocco, pp. 293, n. 27. Ben Srhir gives a comprehensive account of Drummond Hay’s career and influence in Morocco in this work.
135 See, for example, MWM 12241 Tiṭwān. In this letter of 1830, the sultan orders the governor of Tetuan to identify anyone among the refugees from Algiers arriving in the town who is skilled in making weapons or ammunition.
136 NA FO 174/17, al-Slāwī to Green, 28 Sha‘bān 1223 [= 19 October 1808].
sultan to ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jazā’irī’s forces fighting the French in western Algeria.\textsuperscript{137} In 1841, the makhzan ordered gunpowder and rifles from the British port.\textsuperscript{138} Another regular commodity requested by the makhzan from Gibraltar was cloth, used for the army and the royal family.\textsuperscript{139} In general, Gibraltar was an important source for luxury and other goods unattainable in Morocco itself.\textsuperscript{140}

Related to making these kinds of purchases, Moroccan consuls also acted as tujjār al-sulṭān. The makhzan in effect lent them money to invest by waiving the payment of customs duties or awarding some other commercial privilege, loans that were later recalled when needed. It seems that sometimes money was advanced to these merchants, and sometimes they were expected to make purchases using their own money for which they were subsequently repaid.\textsuperscript{141} Bajja is addressed as tājjir in official letters, and carried out various commissions for the makzan, as we have seen.\textsuperscript{142} Benoliel certainly traded with the makhzan’s money, for example, when he was granted the right to export grain from any Moroccan port.\textsuperscript{143} He also collected money at Gibraltar owed by merchants there to the sultan, as the consuls were not the only ones to whom the makhzan advanced money.\textsuperscript{144} As a result of this system,

\textsuperscript{137} NA FO 52/40, E. Drummond Hay to Glenelg, 13 January 1836. On the purchase of arms in Gibraltar for ‘Abd al-Qādir, see also Bennison, Jihad, pp. 97, 100 & 104.

\textsuperscript{138} KH V-5-34; KH V-6-3. For other examples, see KH V-7-4; KH V-8-14; KH V-13-38; KH V-9-8. On the purchase of arms at Gibraltar generally, see Pennell, Morocco since 1830, pp. 46-7.

\textsuperscript{139} Orders for cloth were regularly made under both Mawlay Sulaymān and Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahmān. See, for example, MWM 33325 Jabal Ṭāriq; MWM 6915 Jabal Ṭāriq; MWM 20121 Rabāt; KH II-4-32; KH II-11-36; KH V-14-15.

\textsuperscript{140} In 1843, for example, the authorities at Tetuan purchased a bed from Gibraltar to include in their annual gift to the sultan on the occasion of Eid al-Fitr at the end of the fast of Ramadan (see KH II-12-31).

\textsuperscript{141} In 1844, for example, Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahmān ordered officials at Tangier not to pay Gassūs for a shipment of weapons he had bought for the makhzan, because the weapons were faulty (see KH V-8-23). An order for repaying Bajja for some purchases also survives (see MWM 6947 Jabal Ṭāriq).

\textsuperscript{142} MWM 18856 Tiṭwān; Da‘ūd, Tarikh, Vol. 8, p. 39.

\textsuperscript{143} NA FO 636/1, ‘Diary of the British vice-consulate at Tetuan’, 3 August 1831. See also Miège, Le Maroc, Vol. 2, pp. 46, 89 & 161.

\textsuperscript{144} NA FO 174/127, f. 55b. An example of a contract recording such a debt from 1828 showing the money advanced to a merchant named ‘Abd al-Salām b. ‘Abd Allāh Shallāl. The same merchant was also given money from the proceeds of the sale of some property in Tetuan (see MWM 25540 Tiṭwān;
both Benoliel and Gassūs died owing money to the makhzan.\footnote{NA FO 174/128, f. 112b; Da’ūd, Tarīkh, Vol. 9, p. 300; Erzini, ‘Hal yaslah’, p. 520.} It is unclear whether being part of this system was expected of a consul ex officio, or whether it was dependent on his own status as a wealthy merchant capable of conducting such business.

If, as we have argued here, the consulate at Gibraltar was an important aspect of the Moroccan sultanate’s approach to managing the country’s maritime trade and foreign policy, it may seem strange that the institution was not replicated at other ports and cities of interest to the makhzan during the first half of the nineteenth century. However, Gibraltar was closer to Morocco than any other port of comparable importance to Moroccan trade, and was perhaps itself the most important in any case. In addition, it should be remembered that in most other cases the right of reciprocal consular representation was denied to Morocco by its treaties with European states. As Harrak has pointed out, this was one of a number of unequal treaty provisions that contained ‘the germs of European intervention’.\footnote{Harrak, ‘Foundations’, p. 39.}

Gibraltar was therefore unusual in that the makhzan had perceived the significance of access to it at a relatively early stage, and as a result a system to institutionalise its presence there had evolved. It was Mawlay Sulaymān who brought this to its fullest expression. Whether or not the treaty of 1801 can definitively be seen as a conscious attempt to establish a sounder basis for this in Moroccan law, as seems likely, it was certainly the case that it was during his reign that the Moroccan consulate in Gibraltar was established fully for the first time. This institutionalisation withstood the later revocation, by the Anglo-Moroccan treaty of 1824, of any specific recognition in the British territory for Muslim law. The new agreement asserted that any disputes involving Moroccan subjects in Gibraltar would be decided according to British law and custom, ‘with liberty to make the customary appeals’. The 1824 treaty also undid the agreement made under Mawlay Sulaymān that judgements on British subjects in Morocco could not
contradict Muslim law; a paradigmatic example of the inequality described by Harrak.147

Nevertheless, the consulate in Gibraltar flourished during the reign of Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahmān and became an established arm of the makhzan’s administration. This reflected not only the sultanate’s continuing desire to promote Moroccan trade but the interpenetration of its interests with those of the regional elite in the Gharb from whose ranks the consuls were drawn. However, as will be seen in the following chapters, the founding and development of the Moroccan consulate under Mawlay Sulaymān and Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahmān were rooted in political and economic links between the Gharb and Gibraltar that reached back to the reign of Sīdi Muḥammad and beyond.

147 Hertlet’s Treaties, Vol. 2, p. 27.
Chapter 4 – Trade between Gibraltar & the Gharb Ports

The firm establishment of the Moroccan consulate at Gibraltar by 1815 was, as has been seen, was an evolving process based upon the makhzan’s concern to promote and safeguard its own and its subjects’ interests in the town and with Britain. We have seen in previous chapters and in general terms the diplomatic and, to a certain extent, the economic and social significance Gibraltar had for Morocco. This chapter will show in more detail the economic relationship between the two and in particular the commercial ties linking Gibraltar and the ports of the Gharb region.

The basic reason for establishing the consulate was the most obvious: the flag follows the trade. Gibraltar was important economically for the makhzan directly and for the Moroccan merchant class upon whose support it increasingly relied. It is unfortunately quite difficult to quantify in detail the economic relationship between Morocco and Gibraltar before the 1830s. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that Britain continued to be one of Morocco’s biggest trading partners even after the economic and diplomatic diversification undertaken by Sīdī Muḥammad in the 1750s and 1760s; nor that it re-emerged as Morocco’s single biggest trading partner in the closing years of the eighteenth and early decades of the nineteenth centuries.

This trade with Britain was generally divided into two spheres. Essaouira was the favoured port for direct trade with Britain, while the trade of the Gharb ports was conducted through Gibraltar. Although Essaouira grew quickly after its establishment and became by some way the largest port in Morocco, Tangier and Tetuan continued to conduct a large proportion of the country’s trade, especially its imports.

After its rebuilding at the end of the fifteenth century by Andalusian refugees from Muslim Granada, Tetuan became within a century the main port of the Gharb region and one of the most important in Morocco as a whole. It linked Fes, an

---


140
artisanal centre and the main commercial hub of the country with links to overland trade both east and south, to the Mediterranean and vice versa. Miège et al. attribute the town’s particular openness to its Andalusi heritage, which resulted in ‘a long tradition of contacts with other peoples, cultures, languages, traditions, thought and religions.’ The implied link between the inhabitants’ European background and their liberal, tolerant attitude, however, is problematic. Historians have equally cited Andalusi origins as the reason for hostility toward Christian Europe and the motivation for corsair attacks on European ships in revenge for expulsion from Spain, notably by the Moriscos of Rabat-Salé. Chefchaouen, another town founded by Andalusi refugees, was built first as a ribât (‘fortress’) from which to resist Portuguese encroachment, and later gained a reputation as fiercely hostile to foreign influences. So it seems impossible to derive a particular attitude toward other people, languages or traditions from the mere fact of an Andalusi origin.

Tetuan’s development as a port was, therefore, probably more a result of its geography than a particular cultural inheritance. As Miège et al. also note, it was the only Moroccan port between Rabat and the eastern Rif never controlled by a foreign power during the early modern period, making it a crucial outlet for exports of Moroccan products and the goods brought into the country by the trans-Saharan trade. The town’s commercial importance attracted the first permanent European consuls in the mid-seventeenth century, which in turn increased its prosperity. After the restoration of central control under the ‘Alawis it became, in a role that complemented its economic position, the leading port through which diplomatic relations with Europe and the redemption of European captives were most often managed.

development of its trade with Europe see Joly, 'Tétouan', p. 248ff; Miège, Benaboud and Erzini, Tétouan pp. 33-4 & 52-7.
2 Miège, Benaboud and Erzini, Tétouan, p. 33.
3 The assumption that the Islam of al-Andalus was more tolerant than that of North Africa, by implication because it was ‘European’, often manifests itself even in works whose explicit agenda is to break down stereotypes about Islamic cultures. See, for example, Menocal, Ornament of the World.
5 Miège, Benaboud and Erzini, Tétouan, p. 34.
The combination of Tetuan’s economic and diplomatic importance combined with its proximity – less than a day’s sailing in favourable conditions – made it the obvious link between Morocco and Gibraltar after the British conquest of the Spanish town in 1704. These factors overcame the fact that communications were sometimes difficult when, during certain seasons, prevailing winds prevented the voyage between Gibraltar and Tetuan or Tangier. The same winds made ships vulnerable to pirates operating along the Spanish and Moroccan coasts. Starting in the brief reign of Mawlay al-Yazīd, the British unsuccessfully tried to secure the right to develop the port at al-Qaṣr al-Kabīr to overcome these problems, as well as to establish their trade without the competition of other merchants, especially the Spanish.6

In spite of such problems, trade replaced Tetuan’s own artisan industries as the town’s main economic activity around the mid-eighteenth century.7 Its customs revenues consequently commanded significant attention from Śīdī Muhammad when he came to the throne. As we noted above in Chapter One, the restoration of control over Morocco’s ports was an important part of his overall policy. Once he had constrained the independence of the Gharb, a process that will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six, he took measures to develop its main port. He renewed Tetuan’s armaments industry, founded there under Mawlay Ismā‘īl, by inviting European and Ottoman technicians to work there, and he also established a new mint.8

According to Miège et al., this period saw the peak of Tetuan’s economic success. The town then ‘passed from the first tier of Moroccan ports in the 1760s to the second in the 1780s . . . Its maritime decline was inexorable.”9 As a result of the expulsion of European consuls from the town in 1772, it was increasingly replaced by Tangier as a diplomatic centre. European merchants gradually followed because of the need to access consular services.10 The building of Essaouira in 1764 also

---

6 FO 174/12, Matra to Portland, 27 Feb 1801. Certain winds from the west made it possible to reach Tetuan from Gibraltar but not Tangier (see Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p. 31.)
7 Miège, Benaboud and Erzini, Tétouan, p. 47.
8 ibid., p. 57.
9 ibid., p. 74.
10 The date of the expulsion is not completely agreed on. Joly thought that expulsion was in 1770 (see Joly, 'Tétouan', p. 260), as did Jackson (see Jackson, An Account of the Empire, pp. 30-1) which date was
contributed to the slow, irregular decline of Tetuan until the nadir of its fortunes in the 1850s.¹¹

However, the speed and extent of the transfer of trade from Tetuan to Essaouira should not be exaggerated. Tetuan was after all embedded in a well-established regional trade network whose activity could not easily be transferred to another, distant port; nor is it even clear that that was Sîdî Muhammad’s intention. Earlier historians tended to consider that the sultan’s policy stifled and even halted trade outside his new port, which was not actually the case. Lecureul, for example, asserted that he ‘wanted to gather all European merchants in Mogador [Essaouira], and during this period it was the only coastal port which, in spite of its remoteness, had continuous commercial relations with Europe’.¹² In fact, by the closing years of Sîdî Muhammad’s reign, trade remained lively in the Gharb ports. Tetuan shared the same privilege as Essaouira in being open to merchants of all nations, although they could no longer reside there after 1772. This privilege was also extended to Tangier in 1786, which encouraged its eventual development as the region’s leading port. Jackson, who lived in Morocco for sixteen years over the turn of the nineteenth century, described Tetuan at that time as still ‘rich from commerce’, and estimated it to be bigger by half than Essaouira, and nearly three times the size of Tangier.¹³

Since the ports of Morocco’s northern Atlantic coast – Larache, Rabat and Casablanca – were only open to the Spanish and Dutch, British trade was in large part channelled through Tetuan and, to a gradually increasing degree, Tangier.¹⁴ Consequently the link between Gibraltar and the Gharb became increasingly important. During the eighteenth century, the British port supplanted the other Mediterranean ports with which Tetuan had direct trading relationships – Livorno,

---

¹¹ Miège, Benaboud and Erzini, Tétouan p. 74. Other evidence, however, indicates that the consuls were not expelled until 1772 (see, for example, NA FO 52/3, Charles Logie, British consul at Tetuan, to Sîdî Muhammad, 14 December 1772; GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan, pp. 109 & 194.

¹² Xavier Lecureul, 'Historique des douanes au Maroc', Archives Marocaines 15 (1908), pp. 33-54 (pp. 45-6).


¹⁴ See GGA Misc. 1786, Charles Adam Duff, British consul at Tangier, no addressee, 18 May 1786.
Marseilles, Cadiz – although these remained not unimportant.\textsuperscript{15} As Miège has noted, Gibraltar gradually replaced Cadiz as the leading conduit of Moroccan trade abroad: ‘Gibraltar’s hinterland was Morocco, just as that place was [Morocco’s] leading port’.\textsuperscript{16}

Besides the importance of Tetuan’s commerce with Europe, it also had important links to trade east towards to the Ottoman regencies and Egypt, both overland through Fes and Tāṣa and along the North African coast, as the presence of an Algerian consul or agent in the town from at least 1779 testifies.\textsuperscript{17} So as Tetuan’s trade links were not only with Europe, this mitigated the impact of the removal of European consuls and residents from the town toward the end of Sīdī Muḥammad’s reign. The Algerian agent was treated by the \textit{makhzan} as one of the consular corps, except in the fact that he was not required to move to Tangier with the European consuls. He was summoned there, however, to hear general proclamations from the sultan to the foreign consuls.\textsuperscript{18} An Algerian agent in Morocco remained based in Tetuan until the French invasion of Algiers in 1830, after which he continued to lobby for the Algerian cause and organise supplies for the resistance led by ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jazā‘irī.\textsuperscript{19} One source also suggests that there was also a Tunisian agent in Tetuan during the reign of Mawlay Sulaymān.\textsuperscript{20}

Despite the importance of Essaouira, therefore, the trade of the Gharb with Gibraltar and elsewhere remained important during Sīdī Muḥammad’s reign. An example of his commitment to it was the renewal of the right of Moroccan subjects to trade freely at Gibraltar in the 1760 treaty with the British. This right had been an important aim for the \textit{makhzan} almost since the British established themselves there. The legal position of Moroccans in the town had initially been ambiguous

\textsuperscript{15} Miège, \textit{Le Maroc}, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{16} Miège, ‘Relations exterieures’, p. 221.
\textsuperscript{17} GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan, p. 271; GGA Letters South Barbary, p. 38; NA FO 52/6, ff. 72 & 140.
\textsuperscript{18} NA FO 52/6, f. 156
\textsuperscript{19} NA FO 52/11, f. 155; FO 52/32, E. Drummond Hay to Hay, 30 June 1830. This agent was ‘Abd al-Karīm b. al-Ṭālib (see p. 169-70 & 189). He also helped organise the reception of Algerian refugees in Tetuan (see MWM 12240 Tīṭwān).
\textsuperscript{20} KH I-3-4. This letter orders the governor of Tetuan to obtain a certified copy of a receipt given by the Tunisian agent (\textit{wakil Tūnis}) to the heirs of a merchant from Tetuan, Muḥammad al-Rakīna, who had owed money to the bey of Tunis.
due to the town’s *de jure* status as part of Spain, where non-Catholics remained proscribed. At Spanish insistence, both Jews and Muslims were prohibited from residing in Gibraltar as part of the terms of the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht, which formally ceded it to Britain. In retaliation, the authorities at Tetuan refused to allow the normal export of cattle to the garrison. The actual implementation of the prohibition was patchy until Admiral Cornwallis ordered it as part of his efforts to force a treaty on Morocco in 1716. Mawlay Ismā’īl responded by banning trade with Gibraltar completely.\(^{21}\)

The Moroccans eventually succeeded in their aim of securing their right to trade at Gibraltar through a provision of the treaty of 1721, which granted the English greater commercial access to Morocco, but also gave to the sultan’s subjects the same right of entry and unmolested trade in British territories.\(^{22}\) Without Gibraltar being mentioned specifically, this effectively overturned the prohibition of the Treaty of Utrecht. The right of Moroccans, both Jewish and Muslim, to trade in Gibraltar was explicitly recognised for the first time in the Anglo-Moroccan Treaty of 1729. The British tried to withdraw this provision during the negotiations for the 1751 treaty, but were strongly opposed by Mawlay ‘Abd Allāh. Sīdī Muḥammad continued this policy and consequently ensured the inclusion of a similar clause in the treaty of 1760. Several clauses of that agreement protected the rights of Moroccans to trade in British dominions; for example, Article VII granted the same rights to Moroccan merchants there as to British merchants in Morocco; Article XII, which prohibited the charge of duties on goods exported by Moroccan merchants from British ports being any higher than those imposed on the merchants of other states; and Article XIV, which specifically addressed the right of Moroccans, ‘Moors or Jews’, to trade freely at Gibraltar. These provisions were confirmed again by the general renewals of Mawlay al-Yazīd in 1791, Mawlay Sulaymān in 1801 and Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān in 1824.\(^{23}\)


\(^{22}\) *Hertslet’s Treaties*, Vol. 1, p. 91.

Despite these indications of its importance, however, the lack of substantial records makes it very difficult to ascertain precisely the growth of the trade between Gibraltar and the Gharb in the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century. When the British government requested statistical information on trade in Morocco from the consul in the mid-1820s, he replied that it was almost impossible to collect. The ships trading there from Gibraltar did not carry manifests since it was a free port and the Moroccan umanâ‘ (‘customs officials’) did not require them.24 It was nearly a decade more before the British consulate began collecting reasonably detailed information. Using the material that is available, however, we can see that the economic axis between Morocco and Gibraltar that established itself through the course of the eighteenth century remained important into the nineteenth century. We can also trace to a certain extent the development of the characteristics of this trade that emerge from the fuller statistical information of the 1830s and 1840s.

The period following the end of the Napoleonic Wars was the commercial heyday of Gibraltar.25 As far as the Gharb was concerned, its growing trade with Gibraltar, well established by then, had two main components. Firstly, there was the export of local agricultural produce for consumption by the garrison and town itself. Secondly, the link between the Gharb and the British port acted as an important conduit for longer distance trade in and out of Morocco. Along with Essaouira, it channelled European manufactures into the country, and Moroccan exports – mostly raw materials but including some products of artisan industry – to Europe and beyond. These exchanges across the straits, therefore, had a local, regional economic significance while also serving a role within wider economic networks, linking inland centres like Fes with global maritime commerce and vice versa.26

---

24 NA FO 52/23, f. 55; NA FO 52/24, Douglas to Bathurst, 7 October 1823; NA FO 52/27, Douglas to Bathurst, 29 June 1826.
26 As was noted in Chapter One, the relative importance of the trans-Saharan trade routes had declined significantly by the mid- to late eighteenth century. The volume of this trade continued to decline during Mawlay Sulaymân’s reign, and an increasing proportion of the remainder was controlled by the pashalik of Tripoli (see El Mansour, Morocco, pp. 57-8).
The trade in fresh supplies from Tetuan and Tangier began from the earliest days of the English occupation of Gibraltar. Although the garrison was sometimes supplied from elsewhere, such as Faro or Livorno, the proximity of the Moroccan ports made them far safer and surer sources of fresh provisions, especially the large quantities of meat considered necessary for British troops. Just three days after the conquest of Gibraltar, the Prince of Hesse-Darmstadt, leader of the joint Anglo-Dutch forces who had taken the town, reported that one of his main aims was ‘to preserve the good relations with the Moor’ to ensure the troops’ supplies. During the subsequent Franco-Spanish siege of the town, the prince’s brother wrote that ‘the best thing is that we are not lacking good food and drink, which, except the wine, we get all from Barbary from the Moors’. The possibility of the withdrawal of this trade made the British government wary of breaking relations with Morocco.

During a brief improvement in Anglo-Spanish relations in 1718, the administration in Gibraltar tried to establish regular supplies from Spain, but the frequent eruption of political tension and actual war between the two countries in the eighteenth century made this a risky policy. Despite repeated equivocation on the part of the British about the numbers of foreigners, particularly Jews, coming to the town or about becoming too dependent on Moroccan support, supplies from Morocco remained generally reliable. While the volume of this trade is hard to establish until later in the century, some more detailed records of agricultural exports to Gibraltar allow some limited observations about its overall significance for the economy of the Gharb region and the finances of the makhzan.

One indication of the volume of agricultural exports is the annual anchorage fees paid to the customs houses at Tangier and Tetuan by Gibraltarian vessels loading provisions, estimated in 1773 to be at least $800. This implies a minimum of eighty visits a year by ships conducting this local trade, or about 4,000 tons of

---


28 For example, during Cornwall’s blockade of Moroccan ports in 1718. See Meunier, Le consulat anglais, p. 15.

29 See Benady, 'Jewish Community', pp. 149-50.
shipping, since the fees worked out at $2 per ten tons of berth.\textsuperscript{30} Bearing in mind that this number of ships represents only those conducting the trade in fresh produce and excludes other types of trade mentioned above, it suggests a significant level of activity between Gibraltar and Tetuan. For the sake of comparison, a total of 231 ships called at Tetuan in 1768 to load goods for export to Spain. At Tangier, there were 252, and at Larache eighty.\textsuperscript{31}

Anchorages fees were an incidental source of income to the Moroccan ports compared to customs duties. In 1778, for example, it was estimated that Gibraltar imported around 3,000 cattle annually from Tetuan and Tangier, besides the same number of sheep and about 7,200 head of poultry. Since the same source records the duty payable at that time in those ports for these exports, it is possible to calculate that between 1774 and 1778 the makhzan earned approximately $29,100 annually in duties on this livestock trade, almost two-thirds of which came from duties on cattle. When duties were lowered at the end of 1778, it would have resulted in a drop of these revenues by about one-third to around $20,000.\textsuperscript{32} According to information given to the British ambassador while at Gibraltar on his way to Morocco in 1783, the annual duties charged on provisions for the town remained around that amount at that time, cattle accounting for the greatest part.\textsuperscript{33} During the reign of Sīdī Muḥammad, the provision trade therefore seems to have grown quite significantly, and also been brought more closely under government

\textsuperscript{30} GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan, pp. 123-5 & 267; GGA Misc. 1749-50 [sic], ‘Translation of the Emperor of Moroccos Regulations concerning the Duties on Provisions & Fees of Anchorage on the Town Vessels in the Ports of Barbary’, 15 Muḥarram 1193 [= 2 February 1779]. Although we have used anchorages rates recorded a few years later to make this calculation, they had not changed since 1773. Anchorage was paid only by ships taking on or offloading goods, not those who literally just anchored at the ports. Vessels up to fifty tons berth paid $10 anchorage, but in fact there seems to have been only one Gibraltar ship of that size at this point, most being between twenty and forty tons, and some even smaller that loaded only fowls, fruit and smaller items. Eighty visits is therefore the minimum number.

\textsuperscript{31} See Lourido-Díaz, Marruecos, pp. 411-12.

\textsuperscript{32} GGA Misc. 1749-50 [sic], ‘State of the former and present Duties on Provisions imported from Tetuan & Tangier’, 9 December 1778. This calculation allows for the different rates charged on grass-fed and stall-fed livestock.

\textsuperscript{33} NA FO 52/5, f. 26; GGA Misc. 1749-50 [sic], ‘Translation of the Emperor of Moroccos Regulations’, 15 Muḥarram 1193 [= 2 February 1779].
control. In 1750, for example, less than 500 cattle were imported from Morocco and slaughtered in Gibraltar. At the rate of duty then applicable, this would have raised less than $2,000 in customs revenue.\(^{34}\) It seems unlikely this would have reached the makhzan anyway, since the authorities at Gibraltar were making independent agreements for the importing of cattle and other supplies at this time, as we shall see in Chapter Six.

In the general absence of statistical information about government income in this period, however, it is difficult to make exact conclusions about the significance of this income. In 1771, for example, income at Tetuan from the gate tax was $1,500, but this kind of revenue was much less significant than the income from the port itself. The amīn of Tetuan, Muhammad al-Brūbī, collected a total in customs revenues of just over $48,070 in the year 1769-70, for example. Thus it would seem that customs revenues accounted for the larger part of the city’s income, and that the export of agricultural produce to Gibraltar provided a significant proportion of those revenues. The figures are, however, too fragmentary to support any definite conclusions.\(^{35}\)

Besides the revenue they raised for the makhzan, these agricultural exports naturally had an impact on the economy of northwest Morocco in general. At the beginning of the 1750s, the basic cost of a bullock for export to Gibraltar from Tetuan or Tangier was a little more than $10. Given the numbers of animals exported at that time, the towns’ cattle merchants would have received a net income from the trade with Gibraltar of less than $5,000.\(^{36}\) The price of cattle by the late 1770s is not known, but if we assume it remained the same, the increase in exports would have equalled an increase to the dealers’ net income to around $30,000. An indirect indication of cattle prices in 1776 suggests that they had increased by almost double to nearly $20 a head. However, the same source

---

\(^{34}\) GGA Misc. 1749-50, ‘A Calculation of the Profit of Cattle slaughtered in Gibraltar’ & ‘Cattle Slaughtered in the Butchery 1750’. Since the former document appears in a numbered series of papers relating to the meat trade on Gibraltar between two documents dated from 1750 and 1751, I have assumed it is from the same period.

\(^{35}\) These examples are from Da‘ūd, Tarīkh, Vol. 2, p. 283. For the conversion of different units of currency I have relied on Lourido-Díaz, Marruecos, p. 366.

estimated that the number of cattle imported from Morocco to Gibraltar was only 1,000, suggesting an income of about $20,000.\textsuperscript{37}

The overall profits to be made from the export of cattle from Tangier and Tetuan were certainly higher than these figures alone suggest since, although important, Gibraltar was not the animals’ only destination. The monopoly on exporting cattle from Tangier in 1770 was sold to a Spanish merchant for $30,000, but business was so brisk that the sultan demanded another $10,000.\textsuperscript{38} The contract for the exclusive right to this trade the following year was sold by the makhzan for $35,000. It authorised export ‘as well to Spain as Gibraltar, and other parts’.\textsuperscript{39} Overall, then, we can see that the trade in cattle from Tetuan and Tangier to Gibraltar was increasing, at least doubling between 1750 and 1776. After mainland Spain, Gibraltar was the Gharb’s most important market for agricultural exports, contributing significant sums to the region’s economy.

By the late 1770s, therefore, the supply of agricultural produce for consumption in Gibraltar was a significant trade for the economy of the Gharb region and the makhzan’s revenues there. This point should not be overstated, since the scanty documentable sums do not make these revenues a very large part of Morocco’s overall trade.\textsuperscript{40} Nevertheless, we know that, according to the Spanish consul at the time, the economic consequences of severing relations with the British in 1783 toward the end of the Great Siege of Gibraltar were very damaging for the makhzan. The quick recovery of this trade after the siege ended also indicates its significance. In 1784, for example, a committee of merchants on Gibraltar reported to the governor that ‘the Extensive Trade we enjoy with the Dominions of the Emperor of Morocco consists in the Importation of nearly all our Supplies of fresh Provisions’.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{37} GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan, p. 202. The total cost of 1,000 cattle is given as $25,000. Allowing for the duty at $8 per head for grass-fed animals and $5 per head for stall-fed, and assuming a similar proportion between the two types as recorded in 1778, these figures put the price of 1,000 cattle at $19,800.

\textsuperscript{38} FO 52/2, f. 63.

\textsuperscript{39} GGA Misc. 1770, ‘Translation of Contract for exporting Cattle from Tanjar’, 9 February 1770.

\textsuperscript{40} See Lourido-Díaz, Marruecos, pp. 641-4.

\textsuperscript{41} GGA Misc. 1784, ‘Considerations on the Trade of Gibraltar’. 
Long-distance trade through the Gibraltar-Gharb route also began soon after the English occupation of the town. Besides the food and building supplies for the garrison’s immediate needs, Morocco began to export to Gibraltar for redistribution elsewhere other goods for which it was noted, particularly wax, hides, oil, and honey, and also to import foreign manufactures. By September 1725, the garrison’s new lieutenant governor, Richard Kane, reported that good relations with Morocco ‘does greatly advance the British trade’.42 Although still small, this was ‘the beginning of the entrepot [sic] trade of Gibraltar’.43

The growth of this trade was steady but slow in the following decades. During the second quarter of the eighteenth century, while Britain was essentially unrivalled in Morocco’s maritime trade, by far the largest part of its commerce was conducted through Tetuan and Gibraltar. The British consul thought it unnecessary to establish another consul at Essaouira when it was created because almost no British trade was conducted in Morocco except between the two towns: ‘there is a daily intercourse between [Tetuan] and Gibraltar and except a few Vessels to Tangier, there is not three British vessels call at other Ports in a year.’44 Although foreign trade of different nations began to develop at the new port during the phase of Sidi Muhammad’s diplomatic diversification, trade at Tetuan remained almost exclusively with the British.45

This commerce was significantly disrupted during the Great Siege of 1779-83, but Gibraltar’s status as a port was such that by the later part of the century it had quickly recovered and then increased further. The Gibraltar merchants’ report of 1784 also mentions Moroccan agricultural products such as grain, olive oil, wool, beeswax, honey and hides, as well as minerals such as copper and gold dust, and other natural products such as ivory and ostrich feathers. These were then re-exported from Gibraltar, to France and Italy in particular. A new trade mentioned by the report and also by the French consul Chenier was the transport of Moroccan

44 NA FO 52/1, f. 90b.
45 NA FO 52/3, f. 33.
mules to the British West Indies, where Moroccan cattle were also traded. The main product of Moroccan industry exported was, of course, its famous leather, which was sent even as far as Russia and the Baltic states in part-exchange for their metals, wood and maritime supplies. Morocco in turn imported many foreign manufactures via Gibraltar. This trade expanded later in the century, including particularly British wool cloth, linen, iron, steel and lead, and also some of products ubiquitously traded by the British from the East – sugar, tea, spices and Indian cotton goods. Even opium is recorded as a British import to Morocco. The country also imported cotton from the Ottoman Empire through Gibraltar.

This trade that developed between the ports of the Gharb and Gibraltar during the eighteenth century continued to be significant for the Moroccan economy into the reign of Mawlay Sulaymān. Despite a decline in trade elsewhere in Morocco during this period, ships maintained communication between the region and the British port. Between 1804 and 1806, for example, 224 ships arrived in Gibraltar from Tangier and Tetuan, almost all of them carrying agricultural produce. Only two ships arrived from other Moroccan ports during the same period. In 1812, 123 British ships called at Tangier, either Royal Navy ships loading supplies themselves or merchants loading goods for Gibraltar. In 1822, the number had risen slightly to 156. This contrast reflected the general prosperity of the combined trade of Fes and Tetuan during the first years of the nineteenth century.

---


47 GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan, pp. 63-4, 194-5 & 486. On the growth of the use of tea in Morocco, see J. L. Miège, 'Origine et développement de la consommation du thé au Maroc', Bulletin Economique et Sociale du Maroc 80 (1957), pp. 377-98. With the notable exception of work by El Moudden (for example, Abderrahmane El Moudden, 'Sharifs and Padishahs: Moroccan-Ottoman Relations from the 16th through the 18th Centuries' PhD thesis, Princeton University, 1992), the economic and cultural relations between Morocco and the Ottoman Empire are unfortunately rather neglected subjects (see Miège, Benaboud and Erzini, Tétouan, p. 56ff); Lourido-Díaz gives an account of their diplomatic relations during the reign of Sidi Muḥammad (see Lourido-Díaz, Marruecos, pp. 651-62 & 703-14).

48 NA CO 95/1.

49 BL Add. 41512, ff. 120-7; NA FO 52/23, Douglas to Bathurst, 26 April 1822, cited in El Mansour, Morocco, p. 63.
when it flourished despite the downturn of trade in the south and in the Atlantic ports.50

For much of Mawlay Sulaymān’s reign, which largely coincided with the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in Europe, the maintenance of this trade was mainly fuelled by the increased demand of the British military. Tetuan in particular was an important source of water and fresh food for Royal Navy ships operating in the Mediterranean.51 The security of supplies for the Gibraltar garrison again became paramount, creating an almost captive market for Moroccan produce.52 Once the British had troops in the Iberian Peninsula as well, they too consumed large amounts of Moroccan produce, especially cattle. A report by the Victualling Office in Gibraltar, for example, estimated 20,000 head of Moroccan cattle had been exported to supply British and allied troops in Spain and Portugal during the Peninsular War.53

Far from being one of economic downturn, therefore, the early nineteenth century witnessed something of a boom for the Gharb that produced important revenues for the makhzan. Between January 1808 and January 1810, for example, about 8,500 cattle were exported from Tangier and Tetuan to British troops at Cadiz. The value of this trade to the vendors, excluding any duty, was about $136,000.54 As a source of government revenue, this trade was similarly significant. In 1806, the duties payable on supplies for the British military were estimated at around $20,000 to $30,000 a year.55 By early 1809, the British government owed the makhzan $80,000 for these taxes, since the Moroccans had begun to waive payment in cash in return for an equivalent value of credit to buy military equipment and supplies.56 In this

50 El Mansour, Morocco, p. 11.
51 Lord Nelson’s fleet took on provisions there shortly before the Battle of the Nile, for example (see Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p. 31).
52 As they had done previously, the British did try to diversify their supplies, e.g. from Mascara or Oran (see NA FO 52/11, f. 155; FO 52/13, ff. 29-30) but without much success because Moroccan produce was cheaper and easier to bring to Gibraltar in the disturbed wartime conditions.
53 BL Add MS. 41512, ff. 144-8.
54 NA FO 52/16, ff. 103-5; NA FO 52/21, ff. 22-3; BL Add. MS 41512, ff. 144-8.
55 NA FO 52/13, ff. 29-30.
56 NA FO 52/15, f. 3.
indirect form, the Moroccan government received nearly $220,000 in two years 1808-9. In the absence of more precise information on the makhzan’s income during this period, it is impossible to be exact about the significance of these figures. By way of comparison, we can mention that at the end of Mawlay Sulaymān’s reign, the annual Swedish tribute to Morocco was $20,000, that of the Danes $25,000. The British consul, Douglas, reported in 1822 that the estimated revenue of the entire empire in peacetime was around $1 million, although much reduced during periods of civil war or rebellion. If we can put any reliance on these figures, the cattle trade with the British at its highest point was worth the equivalent of around ten per cent of the makhzan’s annual income. Although this level was not sustained, the trade still represented a not insignificant amount.

The high level of demand created by Europe’s wars obviously distorted Morocco’s trade with the British for some time. However, commerce between the Gharb and Gibraltar continued subsequently with the encouragement of the makhzan. Douglas reported also that the benefits of the increase in trade during the Peninsular War particularly had created a strong public sentiment in favour of developing the country’s commerce. The export of vegetables, fruit and poultry to Gibraltar continued, requiring an average of fifteen shipments a month by ships between thirty and seventy tons. Although peacetime conditions made transportation easier, Moroccan cattle were still substantially cheaper than the alternatives and continued to be exported to the British town as well. Other exports to the British were well-known Moroccan products: beeswax, honey, raw silk, hides and goat skins, some ivory, ostrich feathers and gums, also oil, wool, almonds and

---

57 There was some disagreement between the British, who valued the duties on cattle exported during this period at $216,256, and the Moroccans, who valued them at $227,000 (see NA FO 52/16, ff. 16b & 22).

58 Because of a dispute over these payments, the makhzan did not actually credit the British with the equivalent value in customs duties until 1824-5 (NA FO 52/24, Douglas to Ibn Jallīn [“Taleb Ben Zelul’], 23 Feb 1823 & Douglas to Bathurst, 15 March 1823; NA FO 52/25, Douglas to Bathurst, 30 March 1824, Douglas to Bathurst, 5 August 1824 & Douglas to Bathurst, 9 September 1824).

59 NA FO 52/23, ff. 31 & 37.

60 NA FO 52/23, f. 36b.
some gold dust. In return British merchants sent primarily wool, cotton and linen textiles, iron, pottery, tin, tea, sugar and coffee.\textsuperscript{61}

Partly as result of the long wars and the consequent disruption to trade, the British had come to dominate Morocco’s foreign trade by the late 1810s, such that ‘nearly all foreign trade was limited to dealings with England and Gibraltar’.\textsuperscript{62} Some of this trade was directly between London and Essaouira and a large part was through Gibraltar and the Gharb ports. However, the recovery of Moroccan trade was delayed because of the plague of 1818, which closed the country’s ports to European shipping. Tetuan’s commerce was also interrupted by the sultan’s blockades during the town’s rebellion 1821-2. Nevertheless, Douglas expected trade across the Straits of Gibraltar to recover quickly because of the enthusiasm of local merchants and the reduction of customs rates by Mawlay Sulaymān, and in fact it did so from the early 1820s.\textsuperscript{63} In June 1822, for example, a British ship brought goods worth $70,000 to Tangier, alone generating $7,000 for the makhzan from the ten per cent \emph{ad valorem} tariff charged on imports.\textsuperscript{64} In that whole month imports from Gibraltar raised $19,000. The only downside of this development was that it attracted the attention of the Spanish Guarda Costa, who exploited the prevailing winds at a certain point near their coast to seize British and Moroccan goods on the pretext of intercepting smuggling. Douglas complained that ‘if this mode of intercourse which has prevailed for many years between this place and Gibraltar should be interfered with, it will for a great portion of the year annihilate a very advantageous Commerce, solely carried on by the English, and which is rapidly increasing’.\textsuperscript{65}

The threat of the Guarda Costa continued to suppress trade in the mid-1820s during the early years of the reign of Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahmān. This was exacerbated by the imposition of arbitrary charges and duties on ships at Tangier by the newly appointed amīn there, Muḥammad ‘Ash‘āsh; as governor of Tetuan during the European wars, his father ‘Abd al-Rahmān had taken advantage of increased demand to introduce such fees, but the same practice in peace time was now driving

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{61}] NA FO 52/23, ff. 34-38; NA FO 52/21, ff. 22-3.
\item[\textsuperscript{62}] El Mansour, Morocco, p. 64.
\item[\textsuperscript{63}] NA FO 52/23, ff. 46b & 55-7.
\item[\textsuperscript{64}] NA FO 52/23, f. 54.
\item[\textsuperscript{65}] NA FO 52/23, ff. 58-60 & 94; NA FO 52/24, Douglas to Bathurst, 23 June 1823.
\end{itemize}
away merchants who were no longer compelled by circumstance to acquiesce in
them. Mawlay 'Abd al-Rahmān soon took steps to prevent these charges, ordering
'Ashāsh not to treat foreign ships arbitrarily but according to agreed usage because
'that is the way to have ports full of trade and commerce'. With this intervention
trade continued its earlier increase: by 1824, Douglas estimated that the commerce
of Gibraltar with Tangier and Tetuan raised jointly between $450,000 and $500,000
per quarter in duties. Together with the customs revenues from Essaouira, this
constituted the greater part of the makhzan's income because not all provinces were
yet subdued to the point of paying taxes to the new sultan.

Trade with Gibraltar was again depressed to a certain extent in the wake of
the famine of 1825-6. The out-flux of hard currency to pay for grain imports had
created a shortage of money in Morocco so that British merchants became reluctant
to extend credit to their Moroccan counterparts. However, the continued strength
of the overall growth in trade encouraged the British to press the makhzan for
permission to re-establish consular representation at Tetuan, which they did in
1827. Moroccan beef and other agricultural produce remained comparatively
cheap and therefore in demand at Gibraltar. Artisanal manufactures from Fes and
other produce from further south traded through the town continued north to
Tetuan and then to Gibraltar. In return, British manufactures and other consumer
goods like tea and sugar were imported and distributed inland along the same
route. Douglas reported in 1828 that the new British vice-consul at Tetuan, Walter

---

66 NA FO 52/24, Douglas to Ibn Jallān [‘Taleb Benzelul’], 7 October 1823.
67 FO 52/24, Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahmān to Muḥammad ‘Ashāsh, annexed to Douglas to Bathurst, 29
November 1823.
68 NA FO 52/25, Douglas to Bathurst, 5 July 1824.
69 NA FO 52/27, Douglas to Hay, 26 October 1826.
70 NA FO 52/28, Douglas to Bathurst, 15 January 1827 & Ellis to Huskisson, 16 November 1827.
71 NA FO 52/26, Douglas to Bathurst, 26 January 1825.
72 The records of the controversy over the quality of imported British cloth show the strong link
between the merchants of Tetuan and Fes in this trade, for example (see NA FO 52/32, 'Report by Mr.
Isaac Abensur, Interpreter to the British Consulate, of circumstances regarding British Manufactures
brought into the Empire of Morocco, 29 March 1830 & J. E. Simpson, merchant at Gibraltar, to E.
Drummond Hay, 30 July 1830). Complaints against British cotton cloth also probably reflected the
nascent struggle of the domestic Moroccan cotton industry to resist cheap British imports, which
Price, was very busy because nearly the whole trade between Gibraltar and Fes passed through the port.\textsuperscript{73}

By the end of the 1820s, therefore, the commercial axis linking Gibraltar with the Gharb ports, and from there to other main trade routes in Morocco, was continuing to thrive. It formed one of two main spheres of the country's foreign trade, the other being the better-known long-distance trade conducted directly between Europe and Essaouira. Any threat to the trade with Gibraltar caused considerable anxiety among the merchants of Tetuan and Tangier. When an outbreak of disease in the British port necessitated the suspension of shipping in 1828, Price reported from Tetuan that ‘as emporium of Fez, Tafilet &c. [it] carries on more trade than all Morocco put together excepting Mogadore’, and that ‘the cutting off the Communication with Gibraltar is more felt by Jews and Moors than if they were excluded from all the World besides, as the only place from whence they draw their supplies and is the main spring to all their Speculations’.\textsuperscript{74}

Later the same year, the authorities and merchants of the town greatly regretted the rupture of relations with Britain, 'which Power as Christians the Moors one and all hold in the greatest estimation and particularly so here from their great intercourse with Gibraltar as the only place from whence they Import from or Export to'.\textsuperscript{75} Similar anxiety accompanied the war between Morocco and the Habsburg Empire because of the increased insecurity for Moroccan goods and merchants.\textsuperscript{76} This trade also continued to raise significant amounts of revenue for the makhzan – between $80,000 and $100,000 annually by the end of the decade.\textsuperscript{77}

Into the 1830s the improved record keeping of the British consulate in Tangier supplies greater detail about the nature of this trade axis and its significance within Moroccan trade as a whole. These valuable statistics confirm many of the characteristics of this trade that we have already noted from earlier

---

\textsuperscript{73} NA FO 52/30, Douglas to Hay, 10 September 1828.

\textsuperscript{74} NA FO 52/31, 'Diary of the vice-consulate at Tetuan', 8 September & 20 September 1828

\textsuperscript{75} NA FO 52/31, 'Diary of the vice-consulate at Tetuan', 10 November 1828. For the reasons and significance of the controversy leading to this interruption, see below pp. 208-9.

\textsuperscript{76} NA FO 52/31, 'Diary of the vice-consulate at Tetuan', 24 June 1829.

\textsuperscript{77} NA FO 52/31, 'Diary of the vice-consulate at Tetuan', 10 November 1828.
anecdotal sources. Firstly, it is clear that trade with the British formed the majority
of Morocco’s foreign trade; although to some extent the dominant position the
British had enjoyed during and immediately after the Revolutionary and Napoleonic
Wars – created by the absence of competition and reinforced by treaty – was
beginning to be eroded. The French, in particular, were increasing their share of
the market, particularly in textiles, partly because of the reduced reputation of
British cloth in Morocco.

As we can see from Figure 1, there was a marked British dominance in goods
imported to Morocco in the 1830s and 1840s. On average, British goods alone
accounted for more than three-quarters of the total throughout this period. The
lowest proportion was fifty-nine per cent in 1850. Figure 2 shows that the British
were less dominant in Moroccan exports; nevertheless, goods exported to their
ports still exceeded those to any other single country. An average of forty-three per
cent of exports went to British ports, a proportion that never dropped lower than
one-third and sometimes reached slightly more than half. This anticipated the
dominance of British trade later in the century.

The position of the British can also be seen in the volume of its shipping
carrying trade with Morocco. As Figure 3 shows, British ships annually carried
more than that of any other country during a seventeen-year period except for two
years when they were exceeded by Sardinian ships. However, the importance of
Sardinian shipping is another indication of the importance of the trade between
Morocco and Gibraltar. Many ships in the town had taken foreign registration in
the mid-1820s in order to avoid ill-planned restrictions actually designed to increase
British shipping there. Since a significant proportion of Gibraltarians were
originally Genoese, many registered to use the flag of Savoyard Sardinia, which took

78 The treaties agreed by Mawlay al-Yazīd in 1791 and Mawlay Sulaymān in 1801 both gave Britain
‘most favoured nation’ status by guaranteeing not to grant any privilege to another power without
also extending it to the British (see Hertslet’s Treaties, Vol. 1, p. 116 & Vol. 2, p. 20). This concession
was emphasised by the British as they tried to defend their position in Morocco against other foreign
powers, particularly the French, during the 1830s (see FO 52/43, Dispatch No. 7, 31 March 1837).
79 NA FO 52/37, E. Drummond Hay to Hay, 9 December 1833; NA FO 52/38, E. Drummond Hay, 20
February 1834. On the declining quality of British cloth imported to Morocco in the 1820s, see above,
pp. 103 & 155, n. 72.
80 Ben Srhir, Britain and Morocco, pp. 111–50.
Figure 1: Value of Goods Imported into Morocco, 1835-53 *


Figures for 1844 are unavailable due to the destruction of British consular records for Essaouira in the French bombardment of the town that year.

* The figures in these sources are variously recorded in Spanish dollars and pound sterling. For the sake of consistency and ease of comparison with other figures on Moroccan trade here and throughout, all those in sterling have been converted into Spanish dollars. The exchange rates for these calculations have been drawn from the following sources: for 1836-9, HCPP Reports of Committees 1840 (602) IV, pp. 96-103; for 1840, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (hereafter HCPP) Reports of Committees 1841 Session 1 (410) V, p. 317; for 1841-7, HCPP Reports of Committees 1847-48 (584) VII Pt. 1, pp. 211-17; for 1848-53, the relevant editions of the bi-weekly newspaper The Course of the Exchange: Prices of Shares in Canals, Railways, Dock Stocks, Assurance Companies &c. &c.
Figure 2: Value of Goods Exported from Morocco, 1835-53


Figures for 1844 are unavailable due to the destruction of British consular records for Essaouira in the French bombardment of the town that year.
Figure 3: Volume of Shipping in Morocco by Nation, 1836-52


Figures for 1844 are unavailable due to the destruction of British consular records for Essaouira in the French bombardment of the town that year.
control of Genoa at the Congress of Vienna. By 1834, Edward Drummond Hay, the new British consul at Tangier, estimated that as much as ninety per cent of the trade between Morocco and Gibraltar was carried in Sardinian ships.\textsuperscript{81}

There were some important distinctions between different aspects of this trade between Britain and Morocco. Firstly, although in the recorded trade figures no distinction is generally made between British trade to Britain itself or to other British ports, a large part of the trade with Morocco was with Gibraltar rather than Britain directly. This seems an obvious inference from much of the other evidence we have already mentioned, but it is even clearer where we can compare the amount of certain goods exported from Morocco to Britain on the one hand and to its dependencies on the other. In 1843, for example, Morocco exported 6,432 tons of bark to Britain and its dependencies, but only 1,530 tons were imported to Britain itself; 23,604lbs of almonds but none to Britain; 352,880lbs of wool compared to 81,788; and so on for many of Morocco’s most valuable exports.\textsuperscript{82}

The obvious explanation for these discrepancies is the large proportion of British trade with Morocco that was actually conducted with Gibraltar. By 1848, merchants at Gibraltar estimated the town’s exports to Morocco, mostly British manufactures, to be worth between £350,000 and £400,000 (between $1,451,680 and $1,659,063). Since in that year the British consulate recorded the value of all imports into Morocco as £359,424 ($1,490,767), this may have been something of an exaggeration motivated by the merchants’ plea at that time for government compensation for the disruption to trade caused by the campaign that year by the Royal Navy against the pirates of the Rif coast; or it may have reflected the fact that a proportion of what left Gibraltar for Morocco was smuggled in rather than legally declared. In any case, it was presumably a plausible exaggeration at least to support

\textsuperscript{81} NA FO 52/27 Douglas to Bathurst, 11 June 1826, & Douglas to Bathurst, 28 July 1826; NA FO 52/29, Douglas to George Don, 20 March 1828; NA FO 52/38, E. Drummond Hay to Hay, 20 February 1834.

\textsuperscript{82} HCPP Accounts & Papers 1849 [1053] LIII. 1, p. 381 & Accounts & Papers 1845 [621] XLVIII. 1, pp. 102-13. Imports to Britain are recorded from Tripoli, Tunis, Algeria and Morocco collectively, so the differences between the actual amount of goods exported from Morocco to Britain and its dependencies and the amount imported to Britain itself may have been greater.
an official request for compensation, and still indicates the high proportion of Anglo-Moroccan trade that was carried on via Gibraltar.\textsuperscript{81}

Secondly, these two elements of trade between Britain and Morocco – with the mainland and with Gibraltar – corresponded to a large extent with two different economic spheres in Morocco, i.e. foreign trade conducted through Essaouira on the one hand and Tangier and Tetuan on the other.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{British Ships Calling at Moroccan Ports}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{At Tetuan} & \textbf{Total Ships} & \textbf{Origin of Ships} & \textbf{Destination of Ships} \\
\hline
\textbf{Year} & \textbf{Gibraltar} & \textbf{Other} & \textbf{Gibraltar} & \textbf{Other} \\
\hline
1826* & 31 & 28 & 3 & 28 & 3 \\
1827 & 56 & 54 & 2 & 54 & 2 \\
1833 & 73 & 68 & 5 & 65 & 8 \\
1835 & 77 & 72 & 5 & 68 & 9 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{British Ships Calling at Moroccan Ports (continued)}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{At Tangier} & \textbf{Total Ships} & \textbf{Origin of Ships} & \textbf{Destination of Ships} \\
\hline
\textbf{Year} & \textbf{Gibraltar} & \textbf{Other} & \textbf{Gibraltar} & \textbf{Other} \\
\hline
1826* & 32 & 31 & 1 & 31 & 1 \\
1833 & 25 & 24 & 1 & 25 & - \\
1835 & 55 & 52 & 3 & 52 & 3 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{British Ships Calling at Moroccan Ports (continued)}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{At Essaouira} & \textbf{Total Ships} & \textbf{Origin of Ships} & \textbf{Destination of Ships} \\
\hline
\textbf{Year} & \textbf{Gibraltar} & \textbf{London} & \textbf{Other} & \textbf{Gibraltar} & \textbf{London} & \textbf{Other} \\
\hline
1826** & 9 & 5 & 4 & - & 4 & 5 & - \\
1827-8 + & 10 & 1 & 9 & - & unknown & unknown & unknown \\
1829 & 10 & - & 10 & - & - & 9 & 1 \\
1833 & 17 & 3 & 14 & - & - & 17 & - \\
1835 & 24 & 2 & 20 & 2 & - & 22 & 2 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\* 7 March – 31 December only

\** 17 March – 27 October
+ 1 March 1827 – 10 March 1828

Sources: NA FO 52/28, 29, 32, 38 & 41.

Table 2: Number & Average Size of Ships at Moroccan Ports, 1837-43

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Essaouira</th>
<th>Tangier</th>
<th>Tetuan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1837</td>
<td>40 ships / 138 tons</td>
<td>218 ships / 32 tons</td>
<td>104 ships / 27 tons *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1838</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>147 / 35</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1839</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>239 / 21</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1840</td>
<td>43 / 115</td>
<td>262 / 23</td>
<td>160 / 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1841</td>
<td>38 / 121</td>
<td>255 / 24</td>
<td>103 / 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1842</td>
<td>45 / 116</td>
<td>202 / 28</td>
<td>157 / 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1843</td>
<td>37 / 113</td>
<td>180 / 33</td>
<td>187 / 26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The figures for 1837 include a general return for the whole country and individual returns for every port except Tetuan; this figure is derived by subtracting the total for all the individual returns from the total given in the general return.

Sources: NA FO 174/227 & 228.

Trade at Essaouira tended to be more long-distance, carried in fewer, bigger ships and conducted directly with London. Trade at the two ports of the Gharb was carried in larger numbers of smaller ships over shorter distances and tended to be conducted through Gibraltar. Table 1, for example, compares British ships calling at these three different ports by origin and destination, while Table 2 shows the different sizes of the ships. They illustrate the contrasting types of trade quite clearly.

Another aspect of the trade of Tangier and Tetuan that contrasts with that of Essaouira was that in the Gharb foreign commerce was even more dominated by trade with the British. The proportion of total trade in the northern ports conducted with the British was consistently higher than the proportion in Morocco as a whole. Figure 4 demonstrates this by showing the total value of British imports and exports to British ports as a percentage of the total value of all imports and exports. On average over the period 1834-45, foreign trade at Tetuan was seventy-one per cent British; at Tangier sixty-six per cent; and in Morocco as a whole sixty per cent. This again reflected the importance of Gibraltar for the trade around the straits. The contrast was even greater with Essaouira, where trade was becoming more diversified. In 1833, for example, British shipping accounted for only 1,761 tons of a total of 7,832 tons, or twenty-two per cent.84

Another distinguishing characteristic of trade at Tetuan particularly was the continuing presence of Moroccan ships. In most ports of the country, foreign ships

---

84 NA FO 52/38, 'List of all Vessels that entered the Port of Mogadore and were cleared from the same', 1833.
Figure 4: British Trade in Morocco, 1834-44 *

Sources: FO 52/39 & 41; FO 174/227 & 228.

Figures for Tetuan for 1838 and 1839 are unavailable.

* The definition used here to define the percentage of trade defined as British is (value of British imports + value of goods exported in British ships) / (total value of all imports and exports). The missing figures for Tetuan could not be calculated in the same way as for Table 2 because figures for Essaouira are also missing for those years.
carried almost all trade. Moroccan merchant shipping had practically disappeared, partly as a result of the long period of maritime insecurity during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Tetuan, however, was an exception in that a high proportion of its shipping remained Moroccan. The number of Moroccan ships importing and exporting goods there compared to other Moroccan ports can be seen in Table 3. According to the British consulate records, the majority of these ships were employed between Gibraltar and Tetuan, and then in re-exporting goods from Gibraltar along the Rif coast to various smaller ports and harbours in Morocco, and beyond to Oran and Algiers. As Pennell has said, although this coastal trade was relatively insignificant from the sultanate’s point of view or that of the British, this does not diminish its importance for the region itself: ‘seen from the centre the Rif was indeed a political and economic backwater. But seen from the Rif, the Mediterranean coast was a main communication and trading route’. Again, the use of the ships around the Straits of Gibraltar and the Gharb coast distinguished the region from Essaouira, where Moroccan merchant ships were rarely sighted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tetuan</th>
<th>Tangier</th>
<th>Larache</th>
<th>Essaouira</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1836</td>
<td>78 / 11 tons</td>
<td>8 / 9 tons</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1837</td>
<td>46 / 10</td>
<td>1 / 145</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1838</td>
<td>65 / 9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1839</td>
<td>57 / 18</td>
<td>11 / 53</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1840</td>
<td>73 / 9</td>
<td>4 / 10</td>
<td>7 / 61</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1841</td>
<td>49 / 9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9 / 62</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1842</td>
<td>61 / 9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3 / 70</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1843</td>
<td>73 / 9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3 / 70</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1844</td>
<td>59 / 9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2 / 70</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1845</td>
<td>36 / 10</td>
<td>7 / 24</td>
<td>6 / 50</td>
<td>1 / 60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: NA FO 174/227 & 228.

Thus, there were two spheres of trade with some important distinctions between them. Of these, Essaouira was the most important port in the country in

---

85 NA FO 174/228, p. 1; Pennell, 'Maritime Trade', p. 93.
terms of the value of its trade and hence the revenues it generated for the makhzan; but Tangier and Tetuan were not far behind.

Table 4: Average Trade of Moroccan Ports, 1836-45

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Port</th>
<th>Exports ($ Spanish)</th>
<th>Imports ($ Spanish)</th>
<th>Volume (Tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Essaouira</td>
<td>604,213</td>
<td>389,772</td>
<td>5472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tetuan</td>
<td>167,816</td>
<td>440,500</td>
<td>3969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangier</td>
<td>148,883</td>
<td>283,139</td>
<td>6004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabat</td>
<td>121,896</td>
<td>154,079</td>
<td>2171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mazagan</td>
<td>103,729</td>
<td>23,597</td>
<td>2423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larache</td>
<td>93,888</td>
<td>59,288</td>
<td>2360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safi</td>
<td>55,643</td>
<td>13,102</td>
<td>1543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casablanca</td>
<td>98,107</td>
<td>6,034</td>
<td>2388</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: NA FO 52/39 & 41; NA FO 174/227 & 228.

Table 4 shows the average value and volume of trade at all Morocco’s main ports between 1836 and 1845. Although Essaouira was by far the most important port for exports, it was actually surpassed in the volume of trade by Tangier and value of imports by Tetuan. Since there was a ten per cent ad valorem duty on imports, the large amount of goods being brought into the country through Tangier and Tetuan represented a significant source of revenue for the Moroccan government. Certainly it cannot be said, as Miège et al. have argued, that Tetuan had dropped to the third class of Moroccan ports by this time.\(^{86}\)

Thus it is clear that Gibraltar was an important link through which the Moroccan economy and particularly that of the Gharb region was connected to wider commercial networks. It was a market in its own right for Moroccan goods as well as a very important route for Moroccan exports to and imports from Europe. It was this economic inter-dependency which made the relationship between Gibraltar and the Gharb a significant factor in makhzan policy, and which supported a network of Moroccan merchants and notables with a particular interest in this relationship. The next chapters will consider the operation of this network and its relationship to the makhzan in more detail.

\(^{86}\) Miège, Benaboud and Erzini, *Tétouan*, p. 74.
Chapter 5 – Jewish & Muslim Intermediaries between the Gharb Ports & Gibraltar

The economic links between Gibraltar and Morocco discussed in the previous chapter were naturally associated with a group or groups who effected them. As has already been discussed above, the prevailing historiographical orthodoxy tends to assume that this mediating function was carried out by groups whom the Moroccan state could use to isolate the wider population from its economic, political and cultural effects, i.e. Jews, both Moroccan and foreign, or foreign Christians. This was largely the case in Essaouira, from the example of which a general rule is often deduced. However, as this chapter will show, the merchants and diplomats who carried out the daily business of communication and trade between Gibraltar and the ports of the Gharb were both Jewish and Muslim. Both groups had strong links to the political and economic elite of northern Morocco and also to the sultan directly, and consequently acted as an intermediary class between Morocco and Europe. Many of them spoke Spanish and some also English and other European languages. Many made Gibraltar their home for longer or shorter periods of time, establishing partnerships with merchants there that also facilitated their access to foreign goods and markets. Although the two groups differed in some important respects they were not separate. They jointly constituted the network integrating northern Morocco into wider trade systems through Gibraltar.

The Jewish community on Gibraltar was re-established after the British conquest of the town in 1704 primarily by Jews from Morocco. Consequently Jews on both sides of the straits played an important role as economic and social mediators. This is probably the best-known and most fully understood aspect of the history of Gibraltar’s links with Morocco. There were Jews in the town during the Muslim period and afterwards, but their known history ended with the expulsion of several thousand conversos in 1476 by the Duke of Medina Sidonia. The history of

---

1 On the role of Jewish merchants in Essaouira, see Schroeter, Merchants, p. 21ff. See also, for their role in Moroccan trade in the second half of the nineteenth century, Abitbol, Commerçants.

2 See, for example, Hassan, The Treaty of Utrecht; Benady, ‘Settlement of Jews’; Benady, 'Jewish Community'; Miège, 'Communauté juive'; EJ2, 'Gibraltar'.

3 Benady, 'Jewish Community', p. 144.
the community that still exists there today, and which played a very important role in the development of the town as a Mediterranean entrepôt, only began after 1704.4

Besides the large numbers who came to Gibraltar from Morocco, Jews also arrived there soon after its capture from Portugal, Livorno and London, attracted in part by the town’s designation as a free port.5 The Moroccans formed the majority, however, with Jewish merchants from Tetuan particularly prominent in the early trade to supply the garrison. Around ten per cent of Tetuan’s population was Jewish – between 2,500 and 3,000 – and the community was active in the town’s commerce.6 Among them were families like Benider, Benoliel and Hassan, who were to become notable names in Gibraltar.7 The Jewish community of the town increased further once its legal status was clarified by the Anglo-Moroccan treaties of 1721 and 1729, the majority still being of Moroccan origin.8 In 1725, eighty-six of 111 adult Jewish males resident in the town were born in Morocco. Besides their role in the supply of the town, the community also distinguished itself during the 1727 siege by their service as labourers repairing its fortifications. By 1753, the Jews formed almost a third of the whole civilian population of Gibraltar of 1,793. During the following decades, the Jewish population became wealthier and more firmly established. Although as a proportion of the total population they declined slightly, more were born in the town and therefore considered British subjects – nearly three-quarters of them by 1777.

Nevertheless, the link between Gibraltar and Morocco provided by the Jewish community was not noticeably attenuated during the period of this development. The evidence that Gibraltarian Jews maintained business interests and social links in Morocco is strong. Abraham Benider, for example, was granted the garrison’s monopoly on importing fresh produce in 1740. The majority of the town’s butchers in 1750, who bought and slaughtered Moroccan livestock, were

---

4 See Benady, 'Settlement of Jews'.
5 Benady, 'Jewish Community', p. 146.
6 Miege, Benaboud and Erzini, Tétouan, p. 51.
7 ibid., p. 56.
8 The examples given here without further reference are all from Benady, 'Jewish Community', pp. 151-5. A full analysis of the origins and development of Gibraltar’s population during this period is given in Howes, The Gibraltarian, pp. 1-59.
Jewish. Moses Toledano shipped supplies from Morocco during the ‘Great Siege’ of Gibraltar between 1779 and 1783. A particularly notable Giblartarian family throughout the mid-eighteenth century was Jacob Cardozo and his sons, who all involved themselves in the Morocco trade. One son, Abraham, was made British agent for purchasing cattle at Tangier in 1773, when Solomon Serruya and Abraham Bulby were similarly appointed for Tetuan. Another Cardozo, Isaac, acted as an agent for the Moroccan government in Gibraltar. Jacob’s younger son Aaron was appointed Representative of the Hebrew Inhabitants, effectively the civil head of the Jewish community, in 1791, and also acted as consul for Algeria. He was an important intermediary in the supply of provisions to Gibraltar from North Africa during the Napoleonic Wars.

By 1791, the largest single group of merchants in Gibraltar by some distance was still ‘foreign Jews’ – which is to say, in a large majority of cases, Jews born in Morocco. On the other hand, links across the straits equally involved Jews still in Morocco. Isaac Pinto and Elihu Levy, two Jewish customs officials in Tangier are recorded as sellers of cattle to the garrison’s butchers in 1771. A Tetuani Jewish merchant, Jacob Benhabu, bought merchandise from Holland and had it sold in Gibraltar by his British business partner there the same year. A member of the Benider family was British vice-consul at Tetuan in 1769, an office he combined with trade on his own account between that town and Gibraltar. Haim Benlahsen, another Tetuani Jew, also served as vice-consul in the 1770s. Another prominent Maghrebo-Giblartarian family supplied a later vice-consul at Tangier in the 1790s,

---

10 The Toledano family was a particularly notable family of Moroccan Jews originally from Toledo in Spain (see EJ2, ‘Toledano’).
11 GGA Misc. 1749-50 [sic], Boyd to Muḥammad al-Brūbī, amīn of Tetuan, [‘Hadje Mohamet Probe’], 19 November 1773 & Boyd to al-Brūbī, 22 November 1773; GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan, Boyd to al-Brūbī, 10 December 1773.
12 GGA Misc. 1783, translation of al-qā'id Jawdar b. Muḥammad ['Caid Jowdar'] to George Eliott, governor of Gibraltar, 26 Rabi’ I 1197 [= 28 February 1783]. See EJ2, ‘Cardoso (Cardozo)’.
13 EJ2, ‘Cardozo, Aaron Nuñez’.
14 Howes, The Giblartarian, p. 43.
15 GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan, pp. 11, 65 & 72.
16 NA FO 52/7, f. 17.
Salvador Abudarham, who was also an uncle of the future Moroccan consul Judah Benoliel.\footnote{FO 174/6, Abudarham to Matra, 9 August 1799. On the Abudarham family, see EJ2, ‘Abudarham (also Abudarhan, Abudaren, Abudaram, Abudaran)’. On the Benoliel family, see ibid., ‘Benoliel’.}

Through these links across the straits Jewish merchants facilitated the development of the economic relationship between Gibraltar and Morocco. An important aspect of this was their regular role as agents of both the sultan and other Moroccan notables. Moses Benatar, Mawlay Ismâ’il’s Jewish treasurer and adviser, for example, used as his agent Samuel Ben Saphat, who lived for a number of years in Gibraltar.\footnote{Benady, ‘Jewish Community’, p. 145. On Benatar, see Nicole S. Serfaty, Les courtisans juifs des sultans marocains XIIIe-XVIIIe siècles. Hommes politiques et hauts dignitaires (Paris: Editions Bouchene, 1999), p. passim; EJ2, ‘Atar (also Attar, Ibn Atar, Benatar, Abenatar, Abiatar)’.} ‘Ali b. ‘Abd Allâh al-Ḥamâmi, viceroy of the Gharb region that included Tetuan and Tangier, conducted trade in Gibraltar from 1705 through Abraham Benider, who thereby inaugurated the long association between his family and the town.\footnote{Miège, Benaboud and Erzini, Tétouan, p. 47; NA FO 52/1, ff. 161, 187 & 195. On the Benider family, see EJ2 ‘Benider’.} A later governor of Tangier, Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Mâlik sent Jacob Hadida as his agent there. Muḥammad ‘Āshir, governor of Tetuan, commissioned Solomon Ben Zaqen to make certain purchases for him at Gibraltar in 1783. ‘Abd al-Sâlâm al-Slâwî, governor of Larache and later Mawlay Sulaymân’s minister for foreign affairs, used to order goods from Europe through Joseph Taurel, a Jewish merchant of Gibraltar with business interests in Tetuan.\footnote{GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan pp. 314 & 323; NA FO 52/6, f. 81. Corcos mentions the Hadida family as one of the first families of tujjâr al-sultân (‘merchants of the sultan’) under Sîdî Muḥammad (Corcos, Studies, p. 114). Solomon ‘Benzaquen’ was probably a member of another prominent Maghrebo-Gibraltarian Jewish family: see EJ2, ‘Ben Zaqen’. On ‘Āshir and his governorship, see Daʾūd, Tārīkh, pp. 259-70.}

The role of these Jewish agents continued for more than a century in this way, as part of a network embedded in Morocco. They had a reciprocal relationship with the Moroccan notables they served, receiving patronage in return. Moroccan officials interceded with the British authorities for their Jewish clients, for example. In 1771, Mawlay ‘Ali b. ‘Abd Allâh, the sultan’s brother, appealed to the governor of Gibraltar for help in resolving the claim of the Tetuani Jew Jacob Benhabu against a British merchant who had imported goods on his behalf from Holland. The
governor of Tangier intervened in the same year to secure the payment of debts in Gibraltar to another Moroccan Jew, Solomon Bendalac.21

The economic aspects of the business of Moroccan officials in Gibraltar had a diplomatic face also; the authorities at Gibraltar facilitated their trade partly in order to maintain good relations with their counterparts on the opposite coast. Jewish agents therefore often acted as political as well as commercial intermediaries for the makhzan or its officials. Abraham Benider, for example, acted as secretary to British ambassador Captain Charles Stewart during the negotiations over the 1721 Anglo-Moroccan treaty, thereby anticipating the similar dual role of his son, Jacob, mentioned previously. Before being sent to Britain as ambassador by Sidi Muhammad, Jacob was British vice-consul at Salé under Popham and then consul at the new port of Essaouira.22 Sidi Muhammad also sent Isaiah Bennamor as his agent to Gibraltar, for example, and later sent him to London in 1770.23 He twice employed Ma'sud Delmar, a Jewish resident of Amsterdam with relatives and business interests in Essaouira, to deliver letters to London.24 He sent Jacob Attal to Gibraltar in 1786 to settle the recurrent disputes between the British and Moroccan authorities about the duties charged on provisions for the garrison, and sent him again the following year on other business.25 The sultan also employed Gibraltar Jews, such as Abraham Taurel and Abraham Cardozo, to handle payment for goods purchased in the town, a practice that anticipated the later establishment of the permanent Moroccan consulate there.26

It is quite clear, then, that there existed an important network of Jewish intermediaries between Morocco and Gibraltar. This involved in some cases several generations of the same family. This network created familial and commercial ties

21 GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan pp. 72 &77. The Bendelac family (here spelled ‘Bendelack’) were another Tetuan Jewish family (see EJ, ‘Tetuan’).
22 On Jacob Benider’s embassy to Britain, see above, p. 108.
23 NA FO 52/2, f. 106b; GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan pp. 39 & 50.
24 NA FO 52/5, f. 10; NA FO 52/6, f. 106. His name is spelled here ‘Masahod de la Mar’. On the family, see EJ/2, ‘Delmar (De La Mar; Lebahr’).
25 GGA Misc. 1786, Duff to Elliott, 18 May 1786, Jacob Attal to Elliott, 4 June 1786 & Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Malik al-Rfii, governor of Tangier, [Mohamed Benadelmalek] to Elliott, 14 April 1787.
26 GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan pp. 22-3; GGA Misc. 1783, translation of Jawdar b. Muhammad to Elliott, 26 RabT 1 1197 [- 28 February 1783]. See above, pp.
across the Straits of Gibraltar on to which were grafted wider economic and
diplomatic activities of the Moroccan state and its officials who both exploited and
strengthened these ties by their patronage and employment. To a lesser extent, this
network also involved Christians employed by the sultan in a similar intermediary
role, such as the Minorcan Pedro Umbert, who acted as an agent for Sīdī
Muḥammad in Gibraltar, London and in dealings with foreign ambassadors in
Morocco.\(^{27}\)

However, it is important to realise that this network of intermediaries was
not made up only of non-Muslims. Despite differences of status, there was not a
fundamental structural division in this respect between Jews and Christians on the
one hand and Muslims on the other. A clear indication of this was that Muslim as
well as Jewish merchants conducted Morocco’s trade with Gibraltar and beyond. In
the 1770s, Tetuan was at its economic peak at the same time as the trade of Gibraltar
began to increase more noticeably toward the levels that made it a great entrepôt in
the first half of the nineteenth century.\(^{28}\) The business interests of the notable
merchant families of the Gharb became increasingly oriented toward the British
port. As Julien has argued, it was during the reign of Sīdī Muhammad that Britain
‘established links with the grand families of commerce in Tetuan and Tangier,
which won it a privileged position that it preserved until the establishment of the
protectorate’.\(^{29}\) This process continued across the turn of the eighteenth century
when, as El Mansour has noted, more merchants diversified from inland to maritime
trade, for which Gibraltar was the most important gateway.\(^{30}\)

Some of these Muslim traders were engaged in the local export of
agricultural produce to Gibraltar and Spain, particularly the cattle trade.
References to these merchants in the Gibraltarian archives mostly appear in the
context of disputes with the town’s butchers. ‘Abd al-Ḥādī b. Ṭāhir al-Ḥamāmī, a
member of a leading family in the region about which there will be further
discussion in the next chapter, complained to the British authorities in 1776, for

\(^{27}\) GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan, pp. 212 & 236; NA FO 51/2, ff. 1, 57 & 69; NA FO 52/2, ff. 12 & 101. On
Umbert, see Rogers, \textit{Anglo-Moroccan relations}, p. 104; M. Arribas Palau, ‘Al-Tahir Fannash en Cádiz en

\(^{28}\) Howes, \textit{The Gibraltarian}, p. 22.

\(^{29}\) Julien, \textit{Le Maroc}, p. 27.

example, about the misconduct of a butcher with whom he did business. Evidently ‘Abd al-Hāḍī’s business was not prospering since Governor Boyd later wrote to him acknowledging ‘the distress to which your family is now reduced’, and sending $50 ‘as a testimony of our attachment to the descendants of those who have at any time distinguished themselves as our Friends’. The following year, ‘Abd al-Hāḍī again appealed for the governor’s intervention regarding unpaid debts to him in Gibraltar, and he made similar representations in 1783. Another merchant, Bū’azza Shabānī, faced the same difficulty of unpaid accounts the following year. Although we lack the names of more of these cattle merchants, their presence was significant enough to prompt the appointment in 1776 of a market supervisor at Gibraltar ‘principally to assist the Moors’ selling livestock. This measure did not entirely remedy the problem of Moroccan traders accepting unsafe credit from the butchers and other merchants of Gibraltar, a problem so persistent that a clause to prevent it was included in the 1783 Anglo-Moroccan treaty.

Other Moroccan Muslim traders were involved in the long-distance commerce that passed through Gibraltar between Morocco and other Mediterranean and European ports. The Moroccan consuls exemplified the wider interests of this kind of merchant, as we have already seen, but they were by no means alone. In some cases, the sources unfortunately do not supply the names of such men or exact details of their business. In other cases we have little more than the merchants’ destination; the route between Gibraltar and Livorno seems to have been particularly important, unsurprisingly since the Italian port was still one of

---

31 GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan, pp. 197, 203, 232 & 286.
32 GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan p. 233. Here and in related letters the man is only identified as ‘Shebany’. It is only an assumption that this is the same man as ‘Hedge Bouaza Shebany’ mentioned in another letter relating to Tetuani cattle merchants several years earlier (GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan p. 149). It seems likely that this Shabānī was the father of ‘Abd al-Salām al-Shabānī, a Tetuani merchant whose memoirs were recorded by Jackson, who mentions that his father traded in supplies to Gibraltar (see below, p. 170, n. 37).
33 GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan pp. 204 & 267; NA FO 52/4, f. 127b.
35 For example, GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan p. 73; GGA Misc. 1781 [sic], Andrew Grey to James Duff, 21 October 1784.
the great entrepôts of the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{36} Other merchants are recorded travelling on from Gibraltar to Smyrna, Minorca, Algiers, Tunis and Amsterdam.\textsuperscript{37}

Among the foreign ports to which Muslim merchants travelled, London was a destination not just for trade, but to seek compensation for damages from the British government. Naturally many of these travelled to and from it via Gibraltar. One such merchant was ‘Abd al-Salām Būhlāl, who traded in London in 1786 and returned there in 1799 to petition the government for the restoration of goods he had been transporting from Amsterdam to Morocco. Travelling in a Danish ship, he had been captured by a British privateer, caught up in the difficulties caused by war in Europe described in Chapter Two. He returned to London again in 1802 with a recommendation from Mawlay Sulaymān, and once more in 1807, accompanied this time by three brothers, al-‘Abbās, ‘Abd al-Karīm and ‘Abd al-Majīd.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{36} GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan pp. 1, 59-60 & 104. On Livorno’s economy at the turn of the nineteenth century and for further references, see David G. LoRomer, Merchants and Reform in Livorno 1814-1868 (Berkeley & Los Angeles, CA; London: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 19-64.

\textsuperscript{37} GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan, pp. 150-1, 268 & 270; GGA Letters South Barbary, p. 2; NA FO 52/11, f. 182. In occasional cases, there survive more details of such merchants and their trade. In December 1789, for example, three Tetuanī merchants left from Gibraltar for Hamburg, where they bought goods valued at $10,000 to import to their home country. Unfortunately they were captured by Russian privateers on their return journey and subsequently stranded in England. The men’s names are recorded as Muḥammad ‘Abeir’, ‘Abd al-Salām ‘Shabany’ and Muḥammad ‘Ennisar’ (see NA FO 52/8, ff. 52-3). It seems this was the same ‘El Hage Abd Salam Shabeeny’ (actually Shabānī) whose memoir of Timbuctu was recorded by Jackson (see James Grey Jackson, An Account of Timbuctoo and House Territories in the Interior of Africa by El Hage Abd Salam Shabeeny with Notes, Critical and Explanatory (London: 1820; repr. 1967 by Frank Cass & Co.)), since in the Introduction to that work Jackson describes the same details of Shabānī’s capture en route from Hamburg. Shabānī had traded in his youth with his father to sub-Saharan Africa, and later travelled to the Hijaz for the ḥāji, taking and returning with merchandise. He then settled with his father in Tetuan and took up trading to Gibraltar and Europe. Misfortune also befell another group of three Tetuanīs who travelled to Holland, where they purchased earthenware, glassware, cutlery and fabric worth more than £12,000. On their return voyage they were shipwrecked near Dartmouth on the English coast and their goods plundered by locals, for which they were later compensated at Gibraltar. The receipt in Arabic for their compensation records their names as ‘Abd al-Qādir al-‘Awīdī, ‘Alī Šabbān and Ahmad Banūn (see NA CO 91/35, Nepean to O’Hara, 17 March 1788; NA FO 52/7, ff. 86 & 89).

\textsuperscript{38} NA FO 52/11, f. 264; NA FO 52/14, ff. 1-3, 8, 13, 47 & 177. Presumably these brothers were related to the notable Fesi merchant, al-Ṭāyīb Būhlāl, who was known to have extensive commercial interests in Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, and who was also sent by Sīdī Muḥammad as ambassador to
To accommodate and assist these merchants, a ‘Mr. A[braham] Benjamin’ acted as ‘agent to the Moors’ in London. Presumably he was a Jew with some connection to or experience in Morocco itself. His house, where Moroccan merchants sometimes apparently stayed, was next to the Sephardic Bevis Marks synagogue: ‘the vicinity . . . was a polyglot district. On this semi-neutral ground of international commerce, Moroccan Jews and Muslims mixed with Christians’.39 Later, a Moroccan merchant named Mubarak ‘Boubay’ or ‘Boubi’ who apparently resided permanently in London also helped his fellow countrymen there.40 He claimed at one point to be the sultan’s official agent in London, although this was disavowed by Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman. He did however continue to correspond with makhzan officials, who must have appreciated at least the longevity of his foreign experience; first recorded in London in 1818, he was still there in 1839.41

Like Bühlal, other merchants who had fallen on hard times in London also petitioned the British government for assistance to return to Gibraltar from where they could return home. Some had come to do business in London or Birmingham, others were en route from ports elsewhere, including Amsterdam, Baltimore and Smyrna. Their petitions attest to the significance Moroccan merchants attached to their sovereign’s long-standing friendship with Britain as a guarantee of their right to trade unmolested, despite the problems related to the recognition of Moroccan neutrality during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.42 In one case, for

---

39 Schroeter, Sultan’s Jew, p. 70. See NA FO 52/14, ff. 3 & 121-8.
40 NA FO 52/19, ff. 38-40,
41 NA FO 52/28, no addressee and no signature, 12 March 1827; NA FO 52/29, Douglas to Huskisson, 10 June 1829; NA FO 174/128, f. 23b.
42 NA FO 52/14, ff. 10-11, 15, 17, 24, 27-8, 39-41 & 146-7; NA FO 52/21, ff. 55 & 59-61
example, a Moroccan merchant whose ship was seized and condemned in the prize court at Lisbon travelled to London to seek assistance to get home, presumably because he expected more help there than from the Portuguese.\(^{43}\)

Considering only these anecdotal examples, of course, we are faced with perennial difficulty of quantifying this trend in a more detailed way. Thanks to the residue of the British imperial bureaucracy, that gift to future historians, we can overcome this to a certain extent, however. On 1 April 1824, the British authorities at Gibraltar began a more rigorous system for controlling the admittance of foreign subjects to the town; new permits were introduced and fees for them charged, an innovation that caused some resentment in Morocco.\(^{44}\) Over following years, this system was elaborated so that everyone in Gibraltar who was not a born native or British subject required one of four types of permits: permanent residence, granted to people living in the town for fifteen years or more; a servant’s permit, revocable if the holder lost his or her employment; a temporary permit, issued mostly to merchants in the town for a short time; or a day permit, issued to sailors and day traders coming to market across the Spanish border.\(^{45}\)

As a result of this system, detailed records were kept of people entering Gibraltar. Although the records of only a few years in the 1830s apparently survive, they give an important snapshot of the community of merchants operating between the town and Morocco.\(^{46}\) All applicants for temporary admission needed the

\(^{43}\) NA FO 52/14, ff. 19-20; NA FO 52/20, f. 39; NA FO 52/21, ff. 55 & 59-61.

\(^{44}\) NA CO 91/51, Don to Murray, 15 December 1828.

\(^{45}\) NA CO 91/113, James Rowan, Civil Police Magistrate of Gibraltar, to Don, 10 March 1831.

\(^{46}\) NA CO 91/134. This file contains thousands of records of applications by non-British subjects for admission to Gibraltar and for the renewal of temporary permits of admission. They cover the years 1831 to 1835, although not continuously. Specific references are given here by the type – admission or renewal – and date of the application. Most of the applications contain valuable but basic information on the name of the applicant, the resident who acted as their guarantor, their nationality, whence they arrived at Gibraltar, and the purpose of their visit. Some have more extensive notes describing an individual’s exact business or circumstances. The main problem for our purposes is that in the case of most Muslims and Jews who applied, their nationality is not specified further than ‘Moor’ or ‘Hebrew.’ Consequently it is hard to know from this source how many in these two categories were Moroccan subjects. Thus I have restricted my discussion of Moroccans in this records to those listed as being under the guarantee of the Moroccan consul or
endorsement of either their consulate or a permanent resident as guarantor. Thus, from these records we can see that during 1832 a total of 283 applications for admission for the purpose of trade were granted to Moroccans under the guarantee of the consulate (see Table 5).

### Table 5: Merchants Guaranteed by the Moroccan Consulate at Gibraltar, 5 December 1831 – 1 December 1832

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arriving From</th>
<th>Muslims Admitted</th>
<th>Jews Admitted</th>
<th>Total Admissions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeciras</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algiers</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadiz</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genoa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larache</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livorno</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaga</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marseilles</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oran</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabat</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salé</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangier</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tetuan</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>255</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>283</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NA CO 91/134

These data suggest a number of things about Moroccan commerce. Firstly, as we have already suggested with reference to the consuls and other anecdotal evidence, Moroccan traders conducted business in many of the ports of the western Mediterranean. On the other hand, the direct trade with more distant ports was relatively rare. By far the largest number of Moroccans were involved in the short distance trade between Gibraltar and the two closest Moroccan ports of Tetuan and vice-consul, although – as I discuss later – many of the other Jews listed as arriving from Moroccan ports may have been Moroccans but who had relations in Gibraltar to act as guarantors instead.
Tangier. They plied this trade route much more frequently, arriving from those ports approximately every fortnight.67

Another point to note is the apparent predominance of Muslim over Jewish traders by a ratio of slightly more than nine to one. However, in this respect the evidence here may be somewhat misleading, since many Jews arriving from Moroccan ports were granted permits for admission under the guarantee of someone other than the Moroccan consul or vice-consul. In the same year, another sixty-one Jews arriving from Moroccan ports applied for permits in addition to those endorsed by the Moroccan consulate. Whether they were Moroccan Jews who preferred to rely on relatives or business partners to act as guarantors, or they simply traded with Morocco and came from elsewhere is unclear. It is also impossible to tell from these records how many of the Jews who arrived from countries other than Morocco, if any, were Moroccan but were guaranteed by private individuals rather than the consul.

Unfortunately, full records to demonstrate definitely that these figures are not anomalous do not exist. The only other period for which comparable data survive is the first five months of 1834. The limited test that this allows, however, does suggest that the figures above for 1832 are not unusual. By comparing the first five months of each year, when seasonal sea-borne patterns of travel were probably not dissimilar, we can see that similar numbers of Moroccan merchants were admitted to Gibraltar in each case; and that the proportion of Muslims to Jews in 1834 was comparable to that two years before (see Table 6). There is some variation,

---
67 The minimum number of ships arriving at Gibraltar in 1832 from Tangier and Tetuan was twenty-six and twenty-four respectively. These figures were calculated from the records of permits for temporary admissions by noting the number of weeks in which permits were issued for merchants coming from that port. If more than one merchant coming from a port was issued a permit in a given week, it is assumed that they all came in one ship. Thus, although it is possible that more separate trips were made, this number is the minimum that must have taken place. The most frequent origin of Moroccan merchants arriving in Gibraltar in that year after Tangier and Tetuan was Cadiz, from where at least nine ships arrived carrying them; followed by Algiers with seven; Larache and Oran with six each; Salé with five; and the rest with four or less.
in particular the reversed positions of Tangier and Tetuan, but the overall figures are similar.\(^{18}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Arriving From</th>
<th>Muslims Admitted</th>
<th>Jews Admitted</th>
<th>Total Admissions</th>
<th>Total Admissions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>January - June 1834</td>
<td>January - June 1832</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeciras</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algiers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadiz</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genoa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larache</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livorno</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaga</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marseilles</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oran</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabat</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salé</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangier</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tetuan</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total                | 126            | 18               | 144           | 130              |

Source: NA CO 91/134

Another type of data on Moroccan merchants in Gibraltar around this time in these records is the number of applications for renewals of temporary residence permits. These survive for three full years – 1832 and 1834-35 – and shed further light on the nature of the trade links between Morocco and Gibraltar. In those three years, Moroccans made a total of 314 applications endorsed by the consulate: 278 were Muslims and thirty-six were Jews (see Table 7). Again, the number of Moroccan Jews involved in trade across the straits is probably obscured to some extent by their not applying for permission to stay through the consul. Merchants who had arrived from Tangier and Tetuan were by far the majority of those requesting an extended stay in the town: thirty-six came from other Moroccan

\(^{18}\) The breakdown between Jews and Muslims for 1832 is not provided here because the proportions are shown in Table 5.
ports; forty-one from ports in other countries. This reinforces the evidence of the previous chapter about the particularly significant role of Gibraltar in the trade of those towns at that time.

**Table 7: Applications by Moroccans for Extended Stays in Gibraltar, 1832 & 1834-5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arrived From</th>
<th>1832</th>
<th>1834</th>
<th>1835</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tangier</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tetuan</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>47</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NA CO 91/134

It seems quite clear, therefore, that the trade from Morocco that went to and through Gibraltar involved Muslim as well as Jewish merchants. As intermediaries with the non-Muslim world there was not the structural distinction between the two groups often assumed. In general, Gibraltar was such a regional hub of transport and communication that it would have been difficult indeed for Muslims travelling by sea to avoid it even if they had wanted to. Many took passage there on their way for *haji* or returning from it. Among them was the historian and *makhzan* official al-Zayānī, who travelled from Alexandria to Tetuan by way of Marseille, Barcelona and Gibraltar.⁴⁹ Others were the Tetuani amīn ‘Abd al-Karīm Rāghūn in 1776, Mawlay al-Yazīd in 1778, and a group of pilgrims in 1787 recommended by the governor of Tangier to Governor Elliot for his assistance in finding a passage.⁵⁰ Others made more prosaic journeys, such as an Algerian crew that took passage from Tetuan to Gibraltar to return home, or the Moroccans who made the same voyage in reverse after being shipwrecked near Algiers.⁵¹ Overall, the regularity of the journeys made by Moroccan Muslims from Tangier and Tetuan to Gibraltar was such that that Governor Eliott recommended that letters from the British consul in Morocco be entrusted to them. This was in order to prevent interception of the

---

⁵⁰ GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan pp. 192-3 & 263; GGA Misc. 1787, Muḥyīmm b. ‘Abd al-Mālik to Eliott, 9 Jumādā 1201 (= 29 March 1787).
correspondence by the Spanish coastguard or others who might intimidate the crews of Gibraltarian ships, ‘the Moors [being] less timorous [and] their garments being better suited to concealment’. 52

So we find, perhaps unsurprisingly, that Muslims as well as Jews also fulfilled another mediating function as official agents and diplomats in or travelling through Gibraltar. We have already seen examples of Jews who performed this role. The officials and notables of the Gharb, who were in regular correspondence with their counterparts in Gibraltar, often also employed Muslims in this way. The governor of Tetuan, ‘Abd al-Karīm b. Zakūr, who had previously himself been an ambassador to England, wrote a letter of recommendation for one agent in 1762. 53 In 1776 and 1778, Mawlay ‘Ali sent letters of recommendation with a Muslim client, ‘Hamed Abdelimi’. Similarly, Muḥammad ‘Āshir, governor of Tetuan, recommended one ‘Abd al-Karīm Gannūn, who went to Gibraltar in 1774 in order to recover debts owed to him by some of the garrison’s butchers and conduct some other trade. 54 Again indicating the recurrence of such unsettled debts, ‘Āshir sent another Tetuani merchant, ‘Hamet Briery’, to collect sums owed by butchers in Gibraltar to several cattle dealers of his town. 55 Al-Ṭāhir Fannīsh, governor of Tangier under Mawlay al-Yazīd and himself a familiar diplomatic visitor to Gibraltar as we will see in the next chapter, sent al-‘Arabī Mu’nīnū as his agent in 1791. 56 The Tetuani merchants with interests in Gibraltar also collectively sent agents to act for them in the town. 57

Muslims also acted as commercial and diplomatic agents of the sultan in Gibraltar. Sīdī Muḥammad sent many officials and notables there to conduct business of both kinds. These included ‘Abd al-Karīm Rāghūn (‘Aragon’), amīn at Tetuan and also ambassador to the Ottoman Empire and Holland, who was sent to

52 GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan p. 275.
53 NA FO 52/1, f. 12. On Ibn Zakūr’s embassy of 1755, see Rogers, Anglo-Moroccan relations, p. 97.
54 GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan p. 149.
55 GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan pp. 166-7 & 173. Possibly this ‘Bribery’ was related to the al-Bribirī, first name unknown, who served as an ‘adl (assistant judge) in Tetuan in 1188 A.H. (see Da‘ūd, Tarikh, Vol. 2, p. 209).
56 GGA Letters South Barbary p. 32. For more on al-Ṭāhir Fannīsh, see below, pp. 198. Possibly this Mū’nīnū was the same who was later amīn at Rabat-Salé, where Fannīsh’s family had its roots (see MM Vol. 21, p. 7206).
57 See, for example, NA CO 91/134, Admissions 23-28 April 1832.
Gibraltar in 1768 and 1774. Ten years later the qā‘id Jawdar b. Muḥammad was sent in order to transport some cotton on the sultan’s behalf. Other agents included al-Ṭāhir al-Fannīsh, ambassador to Istanbul among his other posts; ‘Abd al-Wahhāb Shkalānṭ (‘Escarlat’), ambassador to Paris and sent to Gibraltar in 1777 with letters from the sultan to the lieutenant-governor of Gibraltar; Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh, a cavalry commander who delivered letters from both the sultan and ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Fannīsh the following year; al-Abbas ‘Moreno’, who was ordered to discuss some points of dispute with the Gibraltar authorities when he delivered some English captives there; and Muḥammad ‘Larache’, sent with letters and oral instructions from the sultan to the governor and naval commander at Gibraltar in 1779.

Many Moroccan ambassadors sent further afield also travelled and corresponded through Gibraltar. Besides al-Ṭāhir Fannīsh’s journey to London, ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Azraq, returned home from his embassy to Lisbon in 1778 through the town, and his letters to Morocco were sent care of the governor there. Letters from the several Moroccan embassies to Constantinople in the 1780s were similarly delivered via Gibraltar after being forwarded by the British ambassador to the Ottoman Empire. The sultan also sent correspondence to his ambassador in Madrid by the same route. Under Mawlay Sulaymān, another ambassador to Istanbul took a ship at Gibraltar. Under Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, a Moroccan ambassador to the bey of Tunis was given passage by the British from Gibraltar to Tunis via Malta.

If these numerous examples have begun to seem repetitive, they are only necessary to demonstrate clearly the point that Muslims as well as Jews participated

58 GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan pp. 162-3 & 361-2. For Rāghūn’s service as one of the Tetuani ‘umāna’, see GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan p. 273. On his embassy to Istanbul, see MM Vol. 12, p. 4234.
59 GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan pp. 127-8, 141, 162-3, 212, 252-4, 260-1, 263, 272-3 & 361-2. On Raghūn, see MM Vol. 12, p. 4234; Lourido-Díaz, Marruecos, pp. 82, 144 & 307; on Shkalānṭ, who also carried out missions for the sultan at Ceuta, see Lourido-Díaz, Marruecos, pp. 284 & 464.
60 GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan p. 254-6, where his name is transliterated ‘Benzereck’. On al-Azraq’s embassy, see Ṭāzī, Al-tarikh al-dīlūmāsī, Vol. 9, p. 144. The Azraq family were prominent in both trade and the military (see MM Vol. 1, p. 336).
61 GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan, p. 331.
62 GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan p. 433.
63 NA FO 174/17, Green to al-Ślāwī, 9 October 1808.
64 NA CO 91/83, Don to Bathurst, 18 November 1823.
in the political and economic networks linking Morocco and Gibraltar. Seen within this context, the appointment by the *makhzan* of Muslims as well as one Jew to the post of consul in the town seems hardly surprising. As in some other aspects of the development of Moroccan foreign policy discussed in this thesis, there is also an important degree of continuity with previous sultanic practice. The use of Jewish diplomats under both Sa’di and ‘Alawi rule is well known, but equally both dynasties regularly sent Muslim ambassadors abroad in a variety of contexts.  

To say this is in no way to deny the differences in status between Jews and Muslims in Moroccan society as a whole. Occasions obviously arose when one was more appropriate than the other for a diplomatic or official task because of these differences. The wide network of contacts accessible to Moroccan Jews evidently made them particularly useful sometimes, as it did Gibraltarian Jews and even foreign Christians. On the other hand, it would have probably been considered inappropriate to send a Jew to supervise the redemption of Muslim captives, an important aspect of Sīdī Muḥammad’s foreign policy. The fundamental distinction between the two groups often made by historians, however, whereby the role of intermediary is attributed entirely to the Jewish community or even foreign Christians, seems problematic.

Another important difference between the two communities in regard to their roles between Morocco and Gibraltar was the relatively low number of Muslims who settled permanently or semi-permanently in the town. As we noted above, a large number of Moroccan Jews settled there and many Gibraltarian Jews today still trace their origins to Morocco, especially Tangier and Tetuan. Far fewer Muslims are recorded as settling in the town. Only five ‘Algerines & Moors’ were

---


recorded as inhabitants in 1725. An account of 1829 put the number of 'Barbary Jews' in the town as 446, but of 'Moors' only eighteen out of total population of 16,394. The census of 1834 records 347 Moroccan Jews compared to just six Muslims, although another population return of the same year lists sixteen Muslim residents. In 1844, the number of 'Moors' had dropped to nine.

Among this small number of Muslim residents, those whose details survive were involved in trade with Morocco in various forms. The earliest was one 'Hamet Amegiau', who made a successful career as a butcher and merchant. He is first recorded in 1775 and appears in a list of the other, mainly Jewish, butchers of the town made the following year. By the late 1780s, he was a prosperous household liable for taxes, a level of wealth probably achieved by supplying the British navy with fresh meat, and he is apparently recorded as the only 'Moor' in the 1791 census of Gibraltar's civilian population. He is also referred to as the garrison interpreter, although when he started that service and what it involved is unclear.

A small number of Moroccan Muslims, also merchants, followed Amegiau as permanent inhabitants later. Although a small increase in absolute terms, proportionally there was a large increase by the end of Mawlay Sulaymān's reign and into the 1820s, coinciding with the period of the Moroccan consulate's development. As we have seen above, Bajja and Gassūs both lived in Gibraltar for several years before their respective appointments as consul. In the mid-1820s, Beauclerk mentions another merchant from Rabat who married the daughter of a sergeant of the garrison. In his account of his pilgrimage in the mid-1830s, the Mauritanian shaykh Ahmad b. Tuwayr al-Janna mentions that during his stay in

---

69 GGA 1834 Census; NA CO 91/130, Houston to the Earl of Aberdeen, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, 16 March 1834.
70 NA CO 91/168, Wilson to Stanley, 6 June 1844.
71 GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan, p. 189; GGA Misc. 1749-50 [sic], 'List of Butchers', 17 October 1776.
73 GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan p. 484.
74 Beauclerk, Journey, pp. 75-6.
Gibraltar on the return leg of his journey, the governor detailed a resident Moroccan Muslim from Larache to accompany him during his visit.\textsuperscript{75} The records of permits of admission also list a few Muslim merchants who, as permanent residents, were able to act as guarantors for their countrymen, including ‘H. A. Benabdala’, ‘Hajja Abdeslam Aguary’ and ‘Haggi Abdurhman, Agent for Moors trading from Tetuan’.\textsuperscript{76} According to the population returns of 1834, seven Moroccan Muslims had resided in the town for fifteen years or more, one between ten and fifteen years, three between five and ten years, and five for less than five years.\textsuperscript{77}

Despite these examples however, the number of Muslims who lived for extended periods of time in Gibraltar clearly never approached anything like that of the Moroccan Jews, at least before the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{78} Exactly why this was the case is an open question. It may simply have been that Moroccan Muslims, unencumbered by the disabilities facing the country’s Jews, had no particular incentive to leave the country to settle elsewhere. Without this motivation there was no need to move to the British port permanently. Being less than a day’s sailing from Morocco, Gibraltar was easy enough to visit as and when necessary. In addition, a shared common language, as well as mutual links to social and economic networks in Morocco itself, facilitated partnerships between Jews and Muslims, allowing the latter to do business abroad without leaving family and home for good.\textsuperscript{79} One of Muḥammad al-Razīnī’s closest business partners, for example, was Moses Levy Balensi, mentioned above.\textsuperscript{80} The account books and letters from the papers of other Muslim merchants trading in Gibraltar indicate similar ongoing


\textsuperscript{76} NA CO 91/134, Admissions 23-28 April 1832.

\textsuperscript{77} NA CO 91/130, Houston to Aberdeen, 16 March 1834.

\textsuperscript{78} In recent decades, Moroccan Muslims have come to form a significant part of the migrant workforce in Gibraltar, beginning after the 1969 closure of the frontier between Gibraltar and Spain (see Edward G. Archer, \textit{Gibraltar, Identity and Empire} (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 46-7).

\textsuperscript{79} See, for example, NA FO 174/3, ‘Memorial of Isaac Botbol’, 5 January 1795; NA FO 174/6, Abudarham to Matra, 2 October 1799; NA FO 52/39, E. Drummond Hay to Glenelg, 10 November 1835.

\textsuperscript{80} Erzini, \textquote{Hal yaslah}, p. 520; NA FO 174/129, f. 76b.
business relationships with both European firms and Moroccan Jews.\textsuperscript{81} As well as actual partnerships, Muslim merchants used Jewish agents in Gibraltar to hold and disperse money for them, for example.\textsuperscript{82} This type of co-operation extended beyond Gibraltar, to other ports like London where both Jews and Muslims from Morocco found themselves in need of mutual assistance.\textsuperscript{83}

Thus Muslim merchants would have been able to access the networks of their Jewish colleagues to some extent, giving them the benefit of a relationship with a settled community in the town without themselves needing to create one. A cultural prejudice against the idea of Muslims living outside dār al-Islām was probably also a factor that inhibited Muslim settlement in Gibraltar. But the amount of travel and interaction across the straits shows that we cannot exaggerate the impact of this; it was not by any means the definitive factor shaping Muslim attitudes, as historians often assume it to be. It risks over-simplifying past lived reality by reconstructing it only in terms of supposed religious axioms.

Another example illustrating the overlap in functions between Jews and Muslims as intermediaries is their role as translators and consular representatives by the British. The employment of Jews by European consuls in Morocco during the later part of the nineteenth century is well known. It is usually presented in the context of the protégé system and the erosion of the makhzan’s internal legal authority.\textsuperscript{84} However, during the later eighteenth and early nineteenth century Muslims also fulfilled these roles.

The first such identifiable employee was one Muḥammad Mufaḍḍal,\textsuperscript{85} who served as interpreter at the British consulate in Tetuan from 1765 until Sīdī Muḥammad’s order for Christian consuls and merchants to relocate from Tetuan to

\textsuperscript{81} Several kanānīsh (‘registers’) held at KH and also al-Khīzāna al-Da’ūdiyya (the Dawud Library) in Tetuan include letters and receipts demonstrating this kind of relationship. I did not have enough time to analyse these fully and include them in the present study, although I hope to return to them at a later date.

\textsuperscript{82} NA CO 91/35, Nepean to O’Hara, 17 March 1788; NA FO 174/129, ff. 39-40 & 41-2.

\textsuperscript{83} NA FO 52/19, ff. 38-40

\textsuperscript{84} See, for example, Kenbib, \textit{Les protégés}.

\textsuperscript{85} His surname is spelled variously in the English sources as Fudal, Fudall, Fuddal, Fidel and M’Fuddal. He himself signed his name ‘Mohi’ Fudall’ (see GGA Misc. 1783, Mufaḍḍal to unnamed British official, Tetuan, 29 September 1783).
Tangier. There may also have been another Muslim working with him as an interpreter, since in 1771 the British consul referred to ‘one of [his] Moorish Druggerman’. Mufaḍḍal’s career until 1780 is obscure, when he was appointed in that year as vice-consul in order to address the problems encountered by British and Gibraltarian ships left without consular assistance at Martil. In May 1783, he left his post temporarily for Salé to serve as translator for Sir Roger Curtis’s embassy. Mufaḍḍal not only spoke English but also wrote it clearly and accurately. Indeed he has left us what may be the earliest surviving example of it written by a Moroccan. Despite this long service under several different consuls, however, his association with the British ended acrimoniously in 1786 when the new consul accused him of withholding consulage fees.

During his absence from Tetuan in 1783, Mufaḍḍal was replaced as British agent there by another local Anglophone, Ḥasan ‘al-Muash’, who was subsequently offered the opportunity to act as British agent at Tangier until a permanent consul arrived. Both Elliot and Curtis agreed in preferring affairs ‘being transacted by Moors ‘till a Consul comes out, rather than any other persons’, altho’ several have applied to be employed. We both entertain the highest opinion of a Moor’s integrity’. Afterwards, and presumably before, al-Muash worked as a private agent for British merchants trading at Tetuan. He was offered employment at the British consulate in Tangier but preferred not to move his family. By 1791, al-Muash was working as British vice-consul at Tetuan again, a position he seems still to have held

---

86 NA FO 52/2, f. 205b.
87 GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan pp. 295-6.
88 GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan pp. 289-90.
89 GGA Misc. 1783, Muḥammad Mufaḍḍal, British translator at Tetuan, to unnamed British official, Tetuan, 29 September 1783.
90 GGA Misc. 1786, Charles Duff to Sydney, 9 February 1786. He is generally referred to simply as ‘Hadge Hassan’ until two letters in 1791 (GGA Letters South Barbary, pp. 37-9) where his surname is given as ‘el Muash’. Since the latter of these is addressed to him as ‘Acting British Consul, Tetuan’, he must be the same man addressed earlier the same year simply as ‘Hadge Hassan, British Vice Consul at Tetuan’ (GGA Letters South Barbary p. 30). It seems only marginally less certain that this is the same man identified as ‘Hadge Hassan’, who acted as British agent in 1783.
91 GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan pp. 302-3.
92 GGA Misc. 1783, Mufaḍḍal to unnamed British official, Tetuan, 29 September 1783.
93 NA FO 52/7, f. 19.
after the death of Mawlay al-Yazīd the following year. He occasioned some surprise on the part of the Polish traveller Jean Potocki, who, when he arrived at Tetuan in 1791, met this ‘old Moor who speaks English perfectly and without the appearance of an accent’.

Whether or not al-Muash could write English he presumably read it, since all the correspondence directed to him from Gibraltar was in that language although the garrison frequently corresponded in Spanish or French where necessary. His son, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, was a merchant who made use of his father’s experience by travelling to London to purchase British manufactures.

When al-Muash refused the post of British agent at Tangier, the job went instead to ‘another Moor, who speaks the language’, one ‘Alī ‘Afsir’ or ‘Asshir’, on the recommendation of the governor of Tangier.

Perhaps he was a relative of Muḥammad ‘Āshīr, governor of Tetuan, although there is no evidence of this other than the plausible coincidence with the transliteration of his name in the British sources. In any case, he served about eighteen months until Payne’s arrival as consul in 1785. The British directed correspondence to him in Spanish, unlike Mufaḍḍal and al-Muash, suggesting perhaps that his command of English was not as good as that of the other two.

There are further examples of Anglophone Muslims of the Gharb who either worked for the British consulate or in some other capacity as intermediaries. One Tetuani merchant, Muḥammad ‘al-Harash’, who had taken employment as a translator for a group of Moroccan merchants travelling to England and Holland, found himself subsequently stranded in London in 1793. He wrote several letters to the British government – in English of course – petitioning for work as an official translator for correspondence with Morocco and the North African regencies.

Matra, the long-serving British consul, employed as secretary for a time one ‘Umar Ayyūb, a merchant of Tangier who had an interest in the export of supplies to

---

94 NA CO 91/36, Boyd to Dundas, 19 March 1792 & Boyd to Dundas, 21 March 1792; NA FO 52/10, f. 206.
96 NA FO 95/1/3, ff. 186-7.
97 GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan pp. 304-8; NA FO 52/7, f. 193.
98 NA FO 95/1/3, ff. 186-7.
Gibraltar. By the late 1820s, the British interpreter at Tangier was Isaac Abensur, a Moroccan Jew, while at Tetuan it was Muḥammad al-Sharqī, who also acted as representative of the British vice-consul there during his absence. Beauclerk met several Moroccans on his journey who spoke English; indeed, he was surprised to find one who did not speak it well despite a long residence in London, ‘which is rather uncommon, for generally the Moors . . . learn and pronounce our language with a wonderful celerity and correctness’. A particularly prominent Anglophone merchant was ‘Abd al-Karīm b. Ṭālīb, who acted as Algerian consul at Tetuan. He had been in London for a year on a commission from Mawlay Sūlaymān to buy naval armaments and spent long periods in Gibraltar and at Lisbon during the Peninsular War, presumably selling supplies to the allied forces. He spoke Portuguese as well as English. Although he turned down an offer to work as British vice-consul at Rabat, he did maintain close relations with successive British consuls in the 1820s and 1830s.

Similar examples suggest that English was not completely unknown during earlier times either. ‘Two Moors’ are mentioned among the crew of the English fleet that was famously sunk by the French in the Straits of Gibraltar in 1693. Ibn ‘Aisha, admiral of Rabat-Salé and ambassador to France in 1699, learnt English during his time as captive in England and servant to the Duke of York. A letter from Aḥmad b. ‘Alī al-Ḥamāmī survives written in English, but it is not clear who wrote it. Several elements of its style and content suggest it was not a native English speaker, but it may have been another European rather than a Moroccan.

On the other hand, Muḥammad Tamīm, another governor of Tetuan, had problems communicating with the authorities at Gibraltar and had to rely on Spanish, which

---

99 NA FO 52/11, ff 2 & 4. His name is given by Matra as ‘Omar Yub’. In 1784, he had served as the Moroccan ambassador to Holland (see Tāzī, Al-tarīkh al-dībūmāsī, Vol. 9, p. 203).
100 NA FO 52/32, Diary of the vice-consulate at Tetuan, 1 July-31 Dec 1829 & 1 Jan-13 April 1830. His name is given as ‘Asharky’.
101 Beauclerk, Journey, pp. 19, 25 & 43.
104 See Brown, 'Anglo-Moroccan relations', p. 612.
105 See Bl. Add. MS 28157 f. 70.
indeed was the usual language of correspondence between the English and Moroccan authorities during the English occupation of Tangier 1662-84.\footnote{106 See Hopkins, ed., \textit{Letters}, pp. 64-5.}

So it seems that familiarity with English only really developed in Tangier and Tetuan by the later eighteenth century, once several generations of sustained contact with the British through Gibraltar had made it a relatively familiar language, at least in certain circles in the ports of the Gharb region. Almost all the extant correspondence sent by the British from this time onwards to the governors and other officials of Tangier and Tetuan was written in English, suggesting that they were confident such letters would be understood. It was more common for the British to send letters in Spanish, or sometimes French, to officials or members of the royal family at court, indicating both the lesser degree of familiarity with English away from the northern coast, and also that there was no lack of linguistic facility on the part of the British that would have prevented them writing in Spanish if they had thought it would be better understood at Tetuan and Tangier.

The use of English was just one aspect of the wider processes detailed in this chapter whereby the particular economic relationship of Gibraltar and the ports of the Gharb engendered a network of officials and merchants who managed and benefited from it. Moroccan Jews were prominent in this mediation, but not as an external instrument through which a process was conducted that otherwise had little impact on society. Although each group played different roles to a certain extent, both Muslims and Jews participated in a network connected directly to the region’s wider political and economic structures.

The impact of this should not be exaggerated, of course: it concerned a restricted number in a few coastal cities. On the other hand, two aspects make it more significant than the absolute numbers involved might suggest. On the one hand, the network involved prominent officials and notable families, which had political implications that we will describe in more detail in the following chapter. On the other, it included ‘ordinary’ Moroccans whose status was generally unremarkable. Many of the individuals mentioned above, for example, were not sufficiently prominent to find their way into surviving Moroccan sources, official or literary, and have consequently proved difficult to identify beyond imprecise
English transliterations. The network described here, therefore, extended beyond the margins of Moroccan society in both senses.
Chapter 6 – Gibraltar, the British & the Politics of the Gharb

Burke has noted how in the late nineteenth century, the influence of European consuls in Morocco encouraged the growth of a class of ‘Muslim notables in the port cities [who] learned to cultivate relations with Europeans in addition to elements in the makhzan’. It is of course true that this process became very significant in the development of ‘a new, precolonial style of politics’, but the novelty lay more in the changing and increasingly unequal dynamics of such relationships than in their existence per se.\textsuperscript{107} We have seen in the previous two chapters that Morocco’s economic relationship with Gibraltar created a group of Moroccan merchants and officials with particular interests and experience in that relationship, most notably in Tetuan and Tangier. The makhzan’s relations with the British at Gibraltar, therefore, were to a significant degree mediated through important elements of the regional elite, a process to which we have alluded previously and will now discuss in more detail. Although these officials and merchants often acted as agents of the sultanate, they were not simply functionaries; their position as representatives or intermediaries shaped their own interests but equally those interests affected their official function. The balance between these two aspects varied at different times.

Consequently, British influence was not simply an external force to which the Moroccan state reacted, but a factor whose operation was conditioned by its reception within Moroccan power structures. Even when the central government’s authority was strong and well recognised the exercise of its authority was mediated through local interests and sources of legitimacy. The recognition of this process strengthens the criticism aimed at the traditional dichotomisation of \textit{bilād al-makhzan} and \textit{bilād al-sibā’}, which we noted in the Introduction. It shows how it may be more helpful to conceive of power in Morocco schematically as operating through overlapping and shifting spheres of authority, rather than in terms of a binary division that either exaggerates or underplays the state’s power.\textsuperscript{108}

In the case of the Gharb and its relationship with Gibraltar, the degree to which these local interests were integrated into the makhzan system varied.

\textsuperscript{107} Burke, \textit{Prelude}, p. 25.

\textsuperscript{108} See Pennell’s discussion of ‘Morocco as mosaic’ in Pennell, \textit{Morocco since 1830}, pp. 37-8.
according to the latter’s success in overcoming the centrifugal effect of maritime trade discussed in Chapter One. Mawlay Ismā’īl re-established central control in the region, but in doing so entrenched a new regional elite that re-asserted its independence during the middle of the eighteenth century, in part through its relationship with the British at Gibraltar. A similar pattern emerged later, with re-integration during the stability of Sīdī Muḥammad’s reign and independence during later periods of instability under Mawlay Sulaymān. However, even during periods of relatively strong central control, the mediating role of certain prominent families and individuals in the Gharb was never eliminated.

Among the most notable of the local elite in the Gharb who mediated between the makhzan and Gibraltar was the influential Ḫamāmī or Rifi family. ‘Alī b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Ḫamāmī was appointed viceroy (khalīfa) of the Gharb region and governor (qā’id) of Tangier, Tetuan and al-Qaṣr al-Kabīr in 1681 as part of Mawlay Ismā’īl’s reassertion of central control over the northwest of the country. His family had strong ties to the Rif tribes who formed the bulk of the ‘army of the Rif’ that recovered Ma’mura and Larache, expelled the British from Tangier, and manned the long-running siege of Ceuta, which al-Ḫamāmī led from 1694 until his death in 1713. His career laid the foundations for five generations of makhzan service and high position by the family.109

At the same time, al-Ḫamāmī was primarily responsible for the sultanate’s diplomatic relations with Europe. This role strengthened his position and that of his descendants as the leading family in the region throughout the eighteenth century. Al-Ḫamāmī himself played a leading part in the exchanges between France and Morocco during the earlier part of Mawlay Ismā’īl’s reign, and was therefore

---

109 The Rifi family, also known as the Ḫamāmī or Baṭūṭī, originated in the eastern Rif region around Nador. Most frequently, they are known by Ḫamāmī when referring to members of the family before the time of Aḥmad b. ‘Alī, and as Rifi thereafter. For the sake of consistency and clarity the former is used throughout. The first members of the family to rise to prominence were the brothers Ahmad and ‘Umar b. Ḫaddū, who were appointed to govern the north and lead the army of the Rif by Mawlay Ismā’īl. ‘Alī b. ‘Abd Allāh was their cousin. On the family’s origins and influence, see MM Vol. 11, p. 3597ff & Vol. 14, p. 4563ff. See also Miège, Benaboud and Erzini, Tétouan, pp. 43-9, which includes a family tree for five generations from ‘Alī b. ‘Abd Allāh forward. On al-Ḫamāmī’s long career, see MM Vol. 11, p. 3599; SIHM 2nd ed. France, passim, but in particular Vol. 1, pp. 594, n. 1 & 671, n. 4; Da’ūd, Tariḵī, Vol. 1, pp. 258-76 & Vol. 2, pp. 7-44.
well placed to profit by the recovery of trade with Europe in the closing years of the
seventeenth century. His political and geographical position gave him regular
contact with Europe and an immediate view of its growing power, and from 1699
until his death in 1713 al-Ḥamāmī was closely involved in the shift toward closer
relations with the British.\footnote{See Brown, 'Anglo-Moroccan relations'.}

Although appointed by Mawlay Ismā‘īl and clearly identified with the
establishment of ‘Alawi rule, ‘Alī b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Ḥamāmī also enjoyed a relatively
high degree of autonomy within his own province. He re-deployed soldiers
intended for the siege of Ceuta, for example, to farm the plains around the town for
his own benefit.\footnote{Nadia Erzini, 'El Serallo: a palace and mosque built by the Basha Ahmad b. 'Ali ar-Rifi outside
Ceuta', \textit{Hesperis-Tamuda} 32 (1994), pp. 63-79, (p. 64, n. 3).} As a result of the geographical position of his domains and his
involvement in foreign affairs, al-Ḥamāmī ‘in one sense faced northwards, and was a
reputation as a centralising ruler, his administrative system generally lacked a fixed
hierarchy, leading Mercer to describe it as more like a tribute warrior state than the
contemporary empires of the Ottomans or Safavids.\footnote{\textit{ibid.}, pp. 531-2 & 541-2. This despotism is a common theme of European accounts of his reign, among which one of the most detailed in this respect is Chenier, \textit{The Present State}.} In these circumstances, al-
Ḥamāmī was able to build up his own sphere of influence.

However, despite a level of autonomy within it, al-Ḥamāmī was still required
to work within the sultanic system and had important obligations to the central
government at Meknes.\footnote{Mercer, 'Palace and Jihad', p. 551.} Like other Moroccan officials, he had to send a yearly
tribute (ḥadiya) to the sultan as the price of his position. Merchants from Europe
and the gifts brought by envoys were important sources of valuable goods to
contribute to this, as were the redemption payments made for European captives.\footnote{\textit{ibid.}, pp. 550-3.} Success within the relatively loose, factionalised system of the \textit{makhzan} depended in
al-Ḥamāmī’s case to a large extent on the results of his dealings with foreigners.
After his first negotiations with them in 1699 and their establishment opposite the
coast of his province in 1704, the British were increasingly the most important of these. This illustrates the dialectical relationship between local and central structures, whereby the operation of one affected the other and vice versa.

Until his death in 1713, al-Ḥamāmī was involved in constant negotiations with the British to secure the money, gunpowder and other goods necessary for his position as a tributary official of the sultan. Sometimes this obliged him to deceive Mawlay Ismā‘īl as to the exact state of affairs, when he feared the truth would anger the sultan. At other times, rivals for the sultan’s favour sought to disrupt his links with the British. Al-Ḥamāmī, therefore, faced two directions at once; his relationship with the sultan was, in part at least, shaped by his own relationship with the British. Since he was the main contact for British diplomats, this in turn shaped Britain’s relationship with the sultan.

This pattern continued under his son and successor as khalīfa of the Gharb, Aḥmad b. ‘Alī al-Ḥamāmī, most often known as pasha (kāsha) Aḥmad al-Rīfī. Like his father, he was closely involved in Anglo-Moroccan affairs, jointly signing the 1721 treaty at Tetuan on behalf of the sultan. He used the perennial carrot of secure supplies for Gibraltar to improve his standing with the British, offering his help during the siege of 1727 for example. The lieutenant-governor of the town reported that ‘when it was heard in Barbary that this place was to be besieged the Basha of Tetuan wrote me a handsome Letter offering Supplys of provisions &c. And protection to all who should come under English Collours [sic], with offers of all other Services’. He was consequently reckoned ‘a great friend to the English’. He tried to use this relationship to promote his own position, as when in 1718 he apparently forged a letter from the sultan requesting special permission for a Tetuani Jewish merchant to come to Gibraltar after Moroccan merchants had been expelled from the town. Aḥmad needed the merchant to buy goods there for his tribute to the sultan at a time when he was in poor favour at court.

---

116 See Brown, 'Anglo-Moroccan relations’. Aḥmad b. ‘Aisha, admiral of Rabat-Salé, may have later made a similar attempt during the governorship of Aḥmad b. ‘Ali al-Ḥamāmī (see Erzini, 'British-Moroccan relations’, p. 13).


120 Erzini, 'British-Moroccan relations’, p. 22.
However, in the instability that followed Mawlay Ismā‘īl’s death in 1727, the significance of this relationship with the British became even clearer. In a sign of his new independence and concern for his own interests, Aḥmad lifted the long-running siege of Ceuta that he and his father had maintained for more than three decades on the sultan’s behalf.\(^{121}\) He began to use his control over the goods and revenues of foreign trade, not just to strengthen his position within the makhzan system but to increase his independence from it. This repeated the ubiquitous tactic of regional leaders in Morocco, especially on the coasts, whereby the exploitation of local resources and opportunities facilitated independence from the makhzan. The British co-operated in this ‘as part of a half-formalised policy of attempting to erode the power of the Moroccan central government so as to acquire greater leverage’.\(^{122}\)

During the civil wars of the following decades, Aḥmad acted more and more independently. He imported European wheat through Tetuan in 1739 during a period of famine, for example, but refused to allow it to be sold further south.\(^{123}\) It seems that even from 1737 he had begun to conceive of himself as an independent ruler, referring to a British ambassador for his court in a letter to the governor of Gibraltar.\(^{124}\) The style and sophistication of the art and architecture of his rule also seem to indicate regal aspirations.\(^{125}\) He did eventually rebel outright against Mawlay ‘Abd Allāh and allied himself to the sultan’s brother and rival for the throne, Mawlay al-Mustaṣfī b. Ismā‘īl, before being defeated and killed in battle in 1743.\(^{126}\) The revenue of trade from the northern ports as well as the opportunity to

---

121 Erzini, ‘El Serallo’, p. 68.
124 BL Add. MS 28157, f. 70. Interestingly, this letter, although stamped with Ahmad’s seal and therefore evidently not a translation made in Gibralta, is written in English and dated according to the Christian calendar.
purchase military supplies were vital to Aḥmad’s growing power in these years, as several modern historians have noted.¹²⁷

Even after Aḥmad’s death, Mawlay ‘Abd Allāh struggled to reassert his control in the Gharb, partly as a result of the region’s links with the British. The sultan appointed a new governor of Tetuan, Muḥammad Tamīm, who complained that despite his efforts the British preferred rebels to him. Tamīm was assassinated after only a few years in office.¹²⁸ Some of the letters published by Hopkins illustrate the nature of this struggle further, although Hopkins himself did not comment on their significance in this respect. They show the persistence of local resistance to central rule in the Gharb, at least partly organised around the relations of ‘Alī al-Rīfī. These groups were in communication with the authorities in Gibraltar and depended on them for supplies to support their autonomy.

The letters in question are all dated to 1750, but they indicate that the authors and their supporters had a relationship of some years’ standing with the British in Gibraltar. They agreed to supply cattle and other provisions to the town, receiving in turn grain and gunpowder through a Gibraltarian Jewish merchant.¹²⁹

The letters, both to Governor Humphrey Bland on behalf of ‘the army of all the people of the Rif’, are signed variously by Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Khāliq and ‘Abd al-Šādiq b. Aḥmad. The latter was almost certainly the son of Aḥmad al-Rīfī. Although little is known of his career during the early 1750s, he is known to have been

more likely in view of the report given about it by the Algerian ambassador to Morocco, ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Ḥamādūsh, who was in the country that year (see Daʿūd, Tarīkh, Vol. 2, p. 224).


¹²⁸ Hopkins, ed., Letters, pp. 64-5; al-Zayānī, Le Maroc, p. 120; Daʿūd, Tarīkh, Vol. 2, pp. 234-5.

¹²⁹ Hopkins, ed., Letters, pp. 65-72. Hopkins notes that the letters ‘reflect a relationship between a group in the Tanja region and the Governor of Gibraltar independent of the Moroccan central government. None of the more readily accessible Arabic or English sources throw any light on this episode’. He also pointed out that they were written in a much more colloquial style and by less practiced hands compared to most diplomatic letters. Evidently they were produced by a group without the clerical resources of the central government, supporting the theory that this group was autonomous. The long-standing relationship of the Ḥamāmī family with the British, and their diplomatic role, explains the preservation of these letters, which otherwise might seem surprising given their ‘semi-official’ nature.

194
prominent among the Rif leaders who met Sīdī Muḥammad at Tangier soon after his accession.\textsuperscript{130}

Despite Aḥmad’s death, Mawlay ‘Abd Allāh’s capacity to expel the influence of the Ḥamānī family and its followers was apparently mixed. He despoiled the pasha’s palace and retinue but had to offer amnesty to his sons and allow the appointment of his brother, ‘Abd al-Karīm, as governor of Tangier, and unrest continued in the region in following years.\textsuperscript{131} One of Aḥmad’s sons fled after his father’s death to Gibraltor, another example of the role of the British presence in the dynamics of regional politics in the Gharb.\textsuperscript{132} Tensions between the makhzan and the family were heightened when Mawlay ‘Abd Allāh had two of Aḥmad’s sons killed.\textsuperscript{133} Sīdī Muḥammad tried to resolve this tension by re-integrating the family into the makhzan system, appointing another son, ‘Abd al-Ṣādiq b. Ahmad, as governor of Tangier, thereby attempting to minimise the continued disruption of the Ḥamānīs to sultanic rule; he ‘was unable to dispense with the service of the sons of pasha Aḥmad b. ‘Alī.’\textsuperscript{134} This was not entirely successful, however, and the sultan later had ‘Abd al-Ṣādiq and his brother ‘Abd al-Hādī arrested for continuing to conceal treasure that had belonged to their father. He also sent several military expeditions to the Gharb to enforce his rule.\textsuperscript{135}

This persistent tension between the makhzan and the Gharb partly reflected the competition between local notables and the central government for control over the region’s trade, a large part of which was with the British. In 1762, for example, Sīdī Muḥammad tried to secure his control over the revenues of the trade of Tetuan and Tangier by selling exclusive control of it to the British for an annual fee, threatening to raise customs duties if they refused. As the British consul reported, this attempt to use the Gharb’s resources for the makhzan’s own ends provoked resentment on the part of locals: ‘The Inhabitants murmur greatly at the Communication being stopped with the English, curse the Emperor and it is the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[130] Al-Zayānī, \textit{Le Maroc}, p. 130.
\item[133] \textit{Ibid.}, Vol. 2, pp. 233 & 240. The date of his appointment is not known for certain, except that it was before April 1765 (see \textit{MM} Vol. 14, p. 4567).
\item[134] \textit{MM} Vol. 14, p. 4567.
\end{footnotes}
opinion of many if they had a proper Head would rebel against him’. Later, during the 1760s, the sultan complained to the authorities at Gibraltar about the continuing problem of illicit trade with the rebellious region and threatened to raise duties on the town’s supplies in order to induce British co-operation in bringing it under his control.

Evidently the re-establishment of central power in the Gharb took some time and required force and conciliation alternately. The makhzan’s efforts were clearly hindered by the relationship of some of the region’s leaders with the British at Gibraltar. These links were slowly brought back into the makhzan system under Sīdī Muḥammad, just as the region’s independence in the time of the Naqšīs governors and al-Khiḍr Ghaylān had been transmuted by Mawlay Ismā‘īl through the appointment of ‘Alī b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Ḥamāmī. Nevertheless, certain local families, in particular the Ḥamāmīs, continued to enjoy prestige and legitimacy in the Gharb that were independent of the makhzan.

The continuation of the power of local families was also encouraged by the limits of the makhzan’s power. Like his predecessor, Sīdī Muḥammad had to delegate significant power to his governors, and in the ports of the Gharb these powers included dealing with foreigners. Besides their own correspondence with the authorities in Gibraltar, for example, officials in Tetuan and Tangier forwarded almost all the letters between the town and the sultan, and later they also handled the correspondence between the Moroccan consulate and the sultan. The system of delegation inevitably inserted regional officials and notables into the management of Anglo-Moroccan relations. They were not simply neutral or passive mediators of this relationship, but shaped and were shaped by it. The means of curbing regionalism generally, and – from the sultan’s point of view – the Gharb’s problematic relationship with the British specifically, was thus also the means of preserving this regional dynamic, albeit in a different form.

136 NA FO 52/1, ff. 10-12.
139 See, for example, MWM 19638 Tiṭwān; MWM 19923 Tiṭwān.
The combination of two mutually reinforcing factors therefore promoted the position of certain notable families. The delegation of powers to local elites allowed them to manage their relationship with the British. The power and prestige accruing to them from this relationship reinforced their autonomy and the system of regional delegation. Although at times of strength the makhzan was able to intervene in this cycle to a certain extent to make the position of such notables more dependent on the sultan’s patronage alone, it could not achieve this absolutely. Although local and central spheres of authority could overlap to a greater extent, they were not identical.

This process can be seen in the later career of the Ḥamāmī family. Despite their partial suppression by Sīdī Muḥammad they maintained a relationship with the British that facilitated their commercial interests during the period of their comparatively low political fortunes. ‘Abd al-Hādī b. Aḥmad al-Ḥamāmī, for example, previously arrested by the sultan as noted above, complained in 1776 to the British consul in Tangier and the governor of Gibraltar about the misconduct of a butcher with whom he had commercial dealings. Governor Boyd replied that he was no stranger to ‘the good Character of your family and their attachment to our Nation . . . and should be very glad that it was in my power to serve a Son of Basha Hamet’. Over the next two years, the British made other payments to ‘Abd al-Hādī who reiterated his support for them in asking for help securing unpaid debts in Gibraltar, as we saw in the previous chapter.140

After Sīdī Muḥammad’s death, the family’s fortunes revived somewhat. Due to their continuing prestige in the region, they were prominent among the local notables who maintained law and order and defended the region’s interests during the instability of the 1790s. In Tangier, for example, these leaders prevented the harassment of the Europeans in the city, which would have threatened trade.141 Mawlay Sulaymān relied on the continued prestige of the Ḥamāmī family specifically when he sent ‘Abd al-Salām b. ‘Abd al-Ṣādiq al-Ḥamāmī to receive the submission of Tangier in 1792 and co-ordinate the reception of his brother Aḥmad b. ‘Abd al-Ṣādiq as governor. This appointment of one of pasha Aḥmad’s grandsons was widely perceived as the restoration of the rightful rule of his family and

140 See above, pp. 168-9.
141 NA FO 52/10, f. 224b.
contributed to the city’s acquiescence in Mawlay Sūlaymān’s succession, Matra reported:

Tangier is the only place that is quiet, the People, satisfied with the Possession of Bashaw Hamet ben Abdelsadoc [i.e. Aḥmad b. Abd al-Šādiq, grandson ofasha Aḥmad al-Rīfī], to whose Family they think the Country belongs, conduct themselves with great propriety. He was received with more pomp than ever Yezid [i.e. Mawlay al-Yazīd] was & the first night of his arrival the Reefian Chiefs at a private meeting told him that as their Brother, their Governor and the Grandson of their Great Governor, the whole country would obey him . . . but they desired that he would say nothing to them about Emperors for they neither knew them nor wished to know them.142

As well as this local legitimacy, the Ḣamāmī family exploited their continued good relationship with the British to facilitate their return to favour with the ruling dynasty. ‘Abd al-Qādir b. Abd al-Šādiq, for example, had acted as a go-between for Mawlay Maslama with the British during the negotiations over their loan to him. In communicating this offer to the British authorities, Matra described ‘Abd al-Qādir as a ‘grandson of the famous Bashaw Hamet with whom this Garrison [of Gibraltar] once had a separate Treaty and whose Family has been steadily attached to us’.143 Mawlay Maslama similarly tried to exploit the connections of other families with the British, particularly the Razīnīs and the Fannīsh family, whom we will discuss below.144

However, once Mawlay Sulaymān emerged as a more secure candidate for the throne, ‘Abd al-Qādir reconfigured his connections with the British and acted as Matra’s agent at his court.145 When Aḥmad b. ‘Abd al-Ṣādiq delivered his credentials as governor of Tangier to the governor of Gibraltar in 1792, he also remarked upon

142 NA FO 52/10, f. 230.
143 NA FO 52/175b. On this loan, see above, p. 66.
144 NA FO 52/10, ff.43, 178, 200 & 203.
145 NA FO 52/10, f. 200b.
the ‘very particular attachment of our Family to [the British].’ Governor Boyd replied that he was delighted ‘to be informed that the Government of Tangier is in the hands of a worthy descendant from the renown’d Basha Hamet whose distinguished attachment for the British Nation is universally known’.

A scion of another, less prominent branch of the Ḥamāmī family was Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Mālik, who also served as governor of Tangier and similarly mediated between the British and the makhzan. Charles Logie, British consul 1772-83, described him and his son, ‘Abd al-Mālik b. Muḥammad, as consistently reliable allies despite Spanish attempts to win them over or discredit them. On one occasion, for example, ‘Abd al-Mālik b. Muḥammad intervened with the sultan to persuade him to end an interdiction on trade with Gibraltar. Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Mālik later lent money to the British consulate, and when Matra arrived as consul in 1787 he provided detailed advice about the political situation in Morocco, later giving him also information from the court.

The example of the Ḥamāmī family shows how local power structures could shape the makhzan’s relations with the outside world. Although this was most obvious and dramatic during the rebellion of ʿĀḥmad al-Rīfī, it persisted for many decades after his death. A slightly different case is that of the Fannīsh family, whose position as intermediaries was more dependent on the sultan. They did not have the same historic legitimacy in the Gharb as the Ḥamāmīs, but they did exploit their role between the makhzan and the British for their own benefit. The careers of Ṭāhir b. ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq Fannīsh and his brother ‘Abd al-ʿAzīz show how prominent

---

146 CO 91/36, ʿĀḥmad b. ‘Abd al-Sādiq al-Rīfī, governor of Tangier [‘Hamet Benabdelsadock’], to Boyd, 23 June 1792.
147 GGA Letters South Barbary, p. 40.
148 The dates and circumstance of Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Mālik’s appointment are unclear, as is his exact relationship to the other, more well-known members of the Ḥamāmī family (see MM Vol. 14, pp. 4567-9). It seems he succeeded ‘Abd al-Ṣādiq b. ʿĀḥmad, perhaps in an attempt by Sidi Muhammad to appease local loyalties to the family while at the same time appointing a less prominent and therefore more pliable member of it.
149 GGA Misc. 1786, Duff to Sydney, 8 March 1786; NA FO 52/6, ff. 144 & 168b. ‘Abd al-Mālik b. Muḥammad assisted his father in the government of Tangier, although he does not seem to have had a definite official position (see MM Vol. 14, p. 4568).
150 GGA Misc. 1786, Duff to Elliot, 18 February 1786.
151 NA FO 52/7, ff. 16b, 21-3, 212 & 255.
officials could exploit their position in their own interests, although this is not to say that they did not consider themselves to be acting also in the best interests of the sultan and the country. The sultanic system for managing foreign affairs and trade devolved this power to certain local notables, despite the fact that it was intended ultimately to curb regional autonomy.

Al-Ţahir Fannīsh was the more notable of the two brothers, a leading Moroccan official and diplomat. During his career he was sent to France in 1777; to Istanbul twice; and to Malta and to Cadiz in 1780, as well as negotiating the famous Moroccan-American treaty of 1786.  

He seems to have developed particularly strong links with the British, who came to consider him a reliable ally at the Moroccan court. Lourido-Díaz described him as ‘an Anglophile at heart’, although elsewhere his relationship with the British has been overlooked.

Fannīsh’s first major appointment regarding the British was as ambassador to London in 1773-4.  

*En route* he stayed several weeks at Gibraltar, where he apparently developed good relations with the authorities. When he returned the British believed him well disposed to their interests and began to rely on him and his relatives as sources of information about events at court. He successfully lobbied Sīdī Muḥammad on behalf of the British to secure permission for a vice-consul to reside at Martil after the expulsion of Europeans from Tetuan. Together with ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, who visited Gibraltar in 1777, al-Ţahir negotiated the return of a British ship taken by the Moroccans, earning the gratitude of Governor Eliott for his efforts ‘to cement the friendship so long subsisting between the two Nations’.

‘Abd al-‘Azīz was later appointed to manage the supply of British naval ships calling at Tetuan for provisions, and later still to be governor of Larache from where he

---

152 MM Vol. 19, p. 6536. This does not mention his embassies to Cadiz (see Arribas Palau, 'Al-Tahir Fannash') or London. Schroeter also mentions that Fannish was sent as ambassador to Holland in 1789 (Schroeter, *Sultan’s Jew*, p. 127) On his embassy to Istanbul, see Lourido-Díaz, *Marruecos*, pp. 689-94. On the 1786 treaty, see Bookin-Weiner, 'Origins'.


154 NA FO 52/3, f. 100.


156 NA FO 52/3, ff. 132-7 & 211.

157 GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan p. 195.

158 GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan pp. 242-3.
maintained a correspondence with the Gibraltarian authorities. Al-Ṭāhir was sent again to Gibraltar in 1778 to negotiate the repair of some of the sultan’s ships.

Following the interruption of Anglo-Moroccan relations 1779-83, during which he had been sent as ambassador to Cadiz, Fannīš returned to Gibraltar in 1783 and soon restored good relations and his own position as one of the leading Anglophiles at court. Returning, at the sultan’s order, some British soldiers shipwrecked in Morocco, as well as intervening himself on behalf of a sailor stranded separately in the south, he secured British agreement to receive Moroccan vessels in the port again. He also helped secure Sīdī Muḥammad’s decision to grant all supplies to Gibraltar duty free for a year, and later smoothed over two diplomatic crises provoked by the offensive behaviour of British consuls. In a sense, the Fannīš brothers personified the persistence of a pro-British sentiment among some makhzan officials at a time when Spanish influence at court was on the rise.

Under Mawlay al-Yazīd, al-Ṭāhir was appointed governor of Tangier, which seems likely to have been at least partly motivated by the sultan’s attempts to consolidate his relationship with the British. Certainly al-Ṭāhir conceived of himself as having a particularly good relationship with the British at Gibraltar, and he also knew enough English to facilitate communication. The Fannīš family expected to benefit from this position as intermediaries and informants for the British, both financially and in terms of prestige and usefulness to the makhzan. Al-Ṭāhir and ‘Abd al-‘Azīz were both paid by the British consul for their interventions

---

160 GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan p. 263.
161 GGA Misc. 1783, al-Ṭāhir Fannīš [‘Sīdī Taher Fenish’] to Elliott, 30 Rabi’ I 1197 [4 March 1783. Translation]; GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan pp. 280-1; NA FO 52/5, f. 30.
163 NA FO 52/6, f. 74b.
164 GGA Letters South Barbary pp. 25 & 32. On Mawlay al-Yazīd’s policy toward the British, see above, pp. 64-6.
165 BL Add. MS 23666, f. 22b. Fannīš died in 1800 while on campaign with Mawlay Sulaqmān’s army (see MM Vol. 19, p. 6536).
at court.\textsuperscript{166} The sultan knew about this and expected them also to manage the British consul for him, for example by ensuring attendance at court when required in case of reluctance.\textsuperscript{167} It was considered normal at court for foreign diplomats to distribute presents and money to the sultan’s officials. When Matra became consul in 1787, he tried to curb payments to members of the Fannish family, believing his predecessor somewhat credulous for authorising them. But he quickly realised that just as they could facilitate access to the emperor if they chose, the family could also hinder it, and he reversed his policy.\textsuperscript{168} The consul’s inability to speak Arabic exacerbated his dependence on such interlocutors.\textsuperscript{169}

Thus the Fannish brothers, like other families and individuals we have mentioned in this and the previous chapter, were already, in Burke’s words, ‘cultivating relations with Europeans’.\textsuperscript{170} As Matra reported, ‘their principal business is the affairs of the Christians, of which for many years past they have made a profitable Commerce’.\textsuperscript{171} Although they benefited from their position regarding the British, however, they were not protégés in the later sense. On the contrary, the British needed them as much, if not more, than vice versa. Just as the makhzan itself was still able in many respects to control its relationship with the European powers, so individual Moroccans negotiated their relationship with Europeans on their own terms to a great extent.

Unfortunately, due to the limited sources, it is difficult to delineate the dynamics of these adaptations in other cases with as much detail. Another prominent clan whose career seems to have been also partly shaped by long dealings with the British was the Lūqash family, who provided several governors of Tetuan and also built a notable madrasa (‘Qur’anic school’) in the town.\textsuperscript{172}

\textsuperscript{166} NA FO 52/6, ff. 145b, 168, 228 & 243; NA FO 52/8, f. 10.
\textsuperscript{167} NA FO 52/6, ff. 225-39; NA FO 52/8, f. 1.
\textsuperscript{168} NA FO 52/7, ff. 256-7 & 260; NA FO 52/8, f. 10.
\textsuperscript{169} On the effect of the lack of Arabic speakers in the British consular service in Morocco, and on Matra’s situation in particular, see Jackson, An Account of the Empire, pp. 258-63.
\textsuperscript{170} Burke, Prelude, p. 25.
\textsuperscript{171} NA FO 52/7, f. 257.
\textsuperscript{172} On this important family (sometimes spelled Lūkas or Lūkash and transliterated in French sources as al-Ouaqkachi), see Da‘ūd, Tarikh, Vol. 2, passim; SIHM 2\textsuperscript{ème} France, Vol. 6, p. 501; ‘Abd al-Salām b.
Muḥammad Lūqash had converted to Christianity and served the English garrison at Tangier. He later returned to Islam and was employed as a secretary during Alḥmad b. Haddū’s embassy to England in 1682.¹⁷³ Muḥammad’s son, ‘Abd al-Salām Lūqash, was subsequently a strong advocate of ‘Alī b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Ḥamāmī’s friendly policy toward the British in the early 1700s.¹⁷⁴ In 1787, Governor Eliott of Gibraltar welcomed the appointment of ‘Abd al-Karīm Lūqash as governor of Tetuan as Boyd later approved that of Alḥmad b. ‘Abd al-Ṣādiq al-Ḥamāmī at Tangier, remarking happily on the long attachment of the new governor’s family.¹⁷⁵ Whether out of personal attachment or for policy reasons, this Lūqash demonstrated his orientation toward the British in office when the British threatened to cut off communication between Gibraltar and Tetuan because of rumours of plague inland in Morocco. He closed the town to trade coming from the Algiers-Fes caravan route rather than damage its business across the straits.¹⁷⁶

It seems reasonably clear, therefore, that the British presence at Gibraltar was integrated into the mentality and political practice of some of the most prominent families of the Gharb, consequently shaping in part their relationship with the central authority of the makhzan. This is not to say they acted simply as ‘allies’ or ‘agents’ of the British, but their relations with them were an ongoing factor in their economic and political strategies.

Some of their benefits from this relationship were relatively straightforward. Gibraltar was, for example, a refuge for wealthier Moroccans during times of epidemic disease.¹⁷⁷ In other cases, these leaders’ exploitation of their position was more delicate and convoluted. It was a constant complaint of the British authorities at Gibraltar, for example, that their Moroccan counterparts at Tangier and Tetuan were ignoring orders from the sultan and not enforcing treaty provisions. These complaints were generally followed by assurances from the

¹⁷³ SIHM 2²⁰⁰⁸ France, Vol. 2, p. 344, n. 3; Routh, Tangier, pp. 221-2.
¹⁷⁵ GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan p. 427.
¹⁷⁷ NA FO 52/11, f. 192.
makhzan that the treaty would be respected, although further complaints were usually not long following again.\textsuperscript{178} It is of course possible that the sultan was distancing himself from his officials’ behaviour in order to have his cake and eat it, just as the London government sometimes colluded in questionable policies in Gibraltar and then disclaimed responsibility if the Moroccans complained. On the other hand, some of the complaints underline the divergences between central and local interests and point to how local officials relied on their relative autonomy to bend instructions from the makhzan for their own and their communities’ benefit.

Local officials in the Gharb, for instance, used different means to maximise their benefit from the trade with Gibraltar, sometimes at the expense of the British and sometimes of the sultan. Thus, in 1772 Muḥammad al-Brūbī, the chief amīn (‘customs officer’) of Tetuan deliberately obstructed instructions from the sultan to cut off trade with Gibraltar in order, presumably, to prevent economic disruption or maintain his relationship with the British, or both.\textsuperscript{179} He also lobbied the sultan not to expel the British consul from Tetuan when Europeans in the town were required to move to Tangier.\textsuperscript{180} Officials of both Tangier and Tetuan at times competed for greater control over trade and influence with the British, fearing, for example, that their sending to Tetuan instead of Tangier for some supplies was a sign of their disfavour.\textsuperscript{181}

On the other hand, the same officials at different times promoted higher prices for goods exported to Gibraltar. In 1776, for example, the British complained that the governor and merchants of Tetuan were manipulating the system of tariffs to keep cattle prices high.\textsuperscript{182} These efforts in fact often relied on collusion between Moroccan officials and Gibraltarian merchants to inflate the price of goods exported.

\textsuperscript{178} For example, GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan pp. 55-7, 138-40, 201, 220, 227, 330, 338 & 420.
\textsuperscript{179} GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan p. 117.
\textsuperscript{180} NA FO 52/1, f. 92
\textsuperscript{181} GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan p. 47. For later examples, see GGA Misc. 1786, Duff to Elliot, 11 March 1786; NA FO 174/10, Captain Thomas Dodd to Matra, 16 Jan 1806. This competition was probably an aspect of the relative economic decline of Tetuan and rise of Tangier, although this did not develop fully until into the nineteenth century. See Miège, Benaboud and Erzini, Tétouan, pp. 74-84; J. L. Miège, 'Le crise économique de Tétouan dans la seconde moitié du XIXème siècle', in Tīwān qabla al-hīmāya (1860-1912), (Tetuan: Kulliyat al-Ādāb wa l-‘Ulūm al-Insāniyya, 1994), pp. 1-19.
\textsuperscript{182} GGA Letters Tangier & Tetuan, pp. 195-6.
to the British town. Matra reported, for example, that because of some merchants’ acceptance of higher duties in order to entrench their own position as preferred buyers in Morocco, ‘by the carelessness of the People at Gibr[altar] they have delivered themselves up to a confederacy of Butchers & some Moors here who are their agents’. 183

This problem became particularly acute for the British during the period of high demand created by the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, when ‘Abd al-Raḩmān ‘Ash‘āsh, the governor of Tetuan, was particularly active in organising the trade in provisions to his benefit. 184 The British tried to enforce a more consistent adherence to previously agreed treaties both by the merchants and Moroccans – ‘lest the lives of the soldiers, on which, the safety of this Important Fortress depends, be sacrificed to the combinations of Rapacious Bashaws, and Selfish Speculators’ – but with only sporadic success. 185

This illustrates again the role of local interests in mediating the relationship between the makhzan and Gibraltar. Although ‘Ash‘āsh and other officials generally attempted to legitimise their actions by seeking the endorsement of Mawlay Sulaymān, even if retrospectively, the sultan was often presented with a fait accompli. He came to resent these arrangements, and thought the butchers of Gibraltar ‘a set of Rascals enriched at his expense’. 186 ‘Ash‘āsh was similarly enriched, as Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḩmān’s later demands on his accumulated wealth indicate.’ 187 As well as this local trade, ‘Ash‘āsh had interests in long-distance trade to Europe: when his brother ‘Abd al-Khāliq accompanied ‘Abd al-Karīm b. Ṭālib to London in 1804, for example, he took a ‘considerable sum’ of the governor’s money to invest in goods for import to Morocco. 188

‘Ash‘āsh is another example of those Moroccans officials who were in some sense friends to the British – they regularly corresponded with them and often helped them directly or by making recommendations to the sultan – but for whom

183 NA FO 52/7, f. 194b. See also NA FO 52/8, f. 184b; FO 174/7, Matra to Rainsford, 12 October 1795.
184 See, for example, NA FO 52/11, ff. 231, 241 & 245; NA FO 174/6, Abuderham to Matra, 22 November 1799; NA FO 174/10, Dodd to Matra, 16 January 1806 & Knight to Matra, 18 February 1806.
185 NA FO 174/10, Raleigh to Matra, 10 January 1801.
186 NA FO 52/11, f. 119. See also NA FO 174/10, O’Hara to Matra, 4 February 1801.
187 NA FO 52/24, Douglas to Bathurst, 7 October 1823.
188 NA FO 52/14, f. 132.
their relationship was always a means to the greater end of their own interests and those of their supporters and constituents. ‘Ashʿāsh had actually fled involvement in a rebellion during the first unstable years of Mawlay Sulaymān’s reign and taken temporary refuge in Gibraltar. At least partly due to the intercession of Matra, he had been pardoned, allowed to return to Morocco by Mawlay al-Ṭayyib, the sultan’s brother and khalīfa in the Gharb, and was subsequently made governor of Tetuan.

In recognition of their help, ‘Ashʿāsh gave the usual kinds of assistance to the British, such as facilitating the negotiation of the 1801 treaty at court. Much later, he helped to defend the position of Jewish agents of the British consulate from restrictions proposed by the sultan. Other help was more unusual. When a prominent Tetuani and loyal supporter of Mawlay Sulaymān was killed by accident in Gibraltar, ‘Ashʿāsh prevented the death being a cause of a diplomatic break between the British and the makhzan. Nonetheless Matra complained that ‘although we are to all outward appearances the warmest of friends, [ʿAshʿāsh] would if he could as soon attack our Interest as that of any other Power’.189 From a less partisan point of view, we might say that although ʿAshʿāsh was sympathetic to the British interest in Morocco, especially in as far as it could benefit him, he was by no means beholden to it.

Another official who had a particular relationship with the British, even if naturally it did not extend to prioritising their interests over his own or his country’s, was Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Salām al-Slāwī, the most notable official of Mawlay Sulaymān’s reign. He held various positions concurrently and acted as the sultan’s foreign minister for half his reign, between 1800 and 1815.190 His influence was often useful to the British, as when he facilitated the quick provisioning of their ships at Martil or the export of mules for British troops in the Iberian Peninsula. Green considered him an important influence at court in favour of the British.191 Al-Slāwī of course in turn tried to exploit this friendship in the sultan’s service and to

189 NA FO 52/11, ff. 192-3, 195 & 265; NA FO 52/12, ff. 123-4; NA FO 52/41, E. Drummond Hay to Palmerston, 11 November 1836. ʿAshʿāsh’s rise to prominence from an obscure background was partly the result of the severe shortage of experienced makhzan officials caused by the combination of purges initiated by Mawlay al-Yazīd and deaths during the ‘Great Plague’ of 1799-1800 (see El Mansour, Morocco, p. 20).
190 See ibid., pp. 19-22.
191 NA FO 52/15, ff. 18, 22 & 102.
consolidate his own position, most notably in a proposed joint attack by Morocco and Britain on Ceuta.\textsuperscript{192}

We can see, therefore, that the position of Morocco vis-à-vis the various European interests in the country was too complex to be explained only with reference to the policies of the sultan himself. This relationship was mediated through local interests and dynamics which were of course affected to a certain degree by the actions of the makhzan but which were also crucially shaped by regional factors. This was particularly the case in the Gharb, where a long history of relationships with the British at Gibraltar, among other foreign interests, had become embedded in the local political and economic situation. This regional mediation was probably more pronounced there than in, for example, Essaouira, which did not have an elite of independent legitimacy and power comparable to the kind of aristocracy that, as we have seen, operated to defend the Gharb’s particular interests, both inside and outside the sultanic system at different times.

The resilience of the regional system remained evident at the end of the reign of Mawlay Sulaymān and in the transition to that of Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān. Although Tetuan had rebelled against Mawlay Sulaymān in 1820-1, the sultan had subsequently reconfirmed al-‘Arabī b. Yūsuf, the governor appointed by the pretender Mawlay Sa‘īd, in his post at a meeting with him and a group of other Tetuani notables that also included the merchant ‘Abd al-Karīm b. Ẓālib.\textsuperscript{193} Mawlay Sulaymān ordered port charges at Tetuan to be reduced in order to promote the recovery of the town’s trade after the disruption of plague as well as rebellion, a policy welcomed by Ibn Yūsuf, according to the new British consul, ‘as he is very favourable to the Commercial interests of England’.\textsuperscript{194} This attitude reflected the long-standing sentiment of the region in favour of foreign trade, and with the British in particular, which had been encouraged by the profitable years of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.\textsuperscript{195} Although there had been protests around Tangier and Tetuan during those years about the export of wheat to Spain, for

\textsuperscript{192} See El Mansour, ‘Ceuta’.

\textsuperscript{193} Da‘ūd, Tarīkh, Vol. 3, pp. 271-2. Al-‘Arabī b. Yūsuf was first made governor of Tetuan as deputy to al-Slāwī sometime around 1224 A.H. [= 1809-10]. His appointment was initially unpopular because he was a recent convert from Judaism (see Da‘ūd, Tarīkh, Vol. 3, pp. 241-2 & 267).

\textsuperscript{194} NA FO 52/23, f. 55.

\textsuperscript{195} NA FO 52/23, f. 36b.
example, there did not ‘appear to the least design to interrupt the British Trade, the Mountaineers declaring that their friends the English are welcome [sic] to the Country as their Commerce is an advantage to it; but that they will not be starved by the Spaniards, whom they threaten to force from [Tangier] & Larache’.\footnote{NA FO 52/10, ff. 260–1. See El Mansour, Morocco, pp. 55–6.}

When Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahmān succeeded to the throne, he attempted to some extent to renegotiate the position of the entrenched local network of the elite in the Gharb. As has already been seen in Chapter Two, this was also related to an attempt during the early part of his reign to appease the traditionalist groups that had rebelled against his uncle over the close relationship between the makhzan and pro-trade interests. As we have already noted, for example, he extracted a large proportion of the wealth accumulated by ‘Ashāsh during his governorship and removed him from office.\footnote{NA FO 52/11, f. 119.} Although ‘Ashāsh was subsequently restored to favour as amīn of Tangier, the new sultan warned him not to abuse his position.\footnote{NA FO 52/24, Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahmān to ‘Ashāsh, annexed to Douglas to Bathurst, 29 November 1823.} At the same time, Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahmān tried to bring the administration of the Gharb more closely under his control by appointing officials from outside the region, at the same time apparently attempting to appease some of the interests whose loyalty to the makhzan had wavered during the unstable last decade of Mawlāy Sūlaymān’s reign. Al-Ṭayyīb al-Bayyāz, for example, was made amīn of Tangier before being promoted to qā’id of his native Fes. Muḥammad Umaymūn, leader of the Garwān tribe of jaysh Berbers, was also appointed governor of Tangier.\footnote{See El Mansour, Morocco, pp. 219–20. For more on this aspect of Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahmān’s policy, see above, pp. 98–100.}

This policy proved problematic, however, partly because it disrupted the network of relationships formed over the previous decades between the British and the leading families of the Gharb. Douglas complained that Umaymūn was completely unsuited to his post because of his unfamiliarity with trade and European affairs.\footnote{NA FO 52/25, Douglas to Bathurst, 26 April 1824; NA FO 52/25, Douglas to Bathurst, 5 July 1824 & Douglas to Bathurst, 26 March 1825.} The consul and the governor were frequently at loggerheads over the four years of Umaymūn’s tenure, a conflict that culminated in the
governor securing the sultan’s order for the consul’s expulsion from the country.\textsuperscript{201} In response to this a number of prominent townsmen in Tangier lobbied the sultan on Douglas’s behalf, presumably reflecting their anxiety about the disruption of the relationship with the British.\textsuperscript{202} One particular problem Umaymūn had failed to resolve was a dispute over new charges introduced by the British for the admission of foreigners to Gibraltar, which Moroccan merchants considered an infringement of their treaty right to trade there.\textsuperscript{203} Besides these problems, the long term interests of Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān’s makhzan proved better served by restoring the influence of those involved more closely in trade, as opposed to the inland sharifian and military elites.

As a result, Umaymūn was removed and al-‘Arabī al-Saʿīdī, the former governor of Tangier, reappointed.\textsuperscript{204} Douglas was satisfied with this, although he was soon confronted with the familiar problem of the governor using his powers to advance the local interests with which he was connected, in this case to prefer certain merchants in the cattle trade. As a compromise, al-Saʿīdī tried to conciliate the British by ensuring the cost of beef for Gibraltar did not rise above the general market price.\textsuperscript{205} With Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān’s shift away from imposing unfamiliar officials, therefore, there was a return to the modus vivendi between the British and nexus of economic and political interests in the Gharb; although occasionally bad-tempered, it had been proven by long practice to be sustainable and to the benefit of both sides.

\textsuperscript{201} NA FO 52/28, Ellis to Huskisson, 6 January 1828; NA FO 52/29, Douglas to Huskisson, 6 January 1828.
\textsuperscript{202} NA FO 52/29, Douglas to Huskisson, 10 March 1828.
\textsuperscript{203} NA CO 91/95, Don to Murray, 15 December 1828.
\textsuperscript{204} NA FO 52/29, Douglas to Huskisson, 10 June 1828.
\textsuperscript{205} NA FO 52/35, E. Drummond Hay to Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, 3 December 1831; NA FO 52/36, E. Drummond Hay to Hay, 6 March 1832 & E. Drummond Hay to Hay, 7 June 1832; FO 52/37, ‘Diary of the British consulate at Tangier’, 3 December 1832.
Conclusion

In early August 1828, Moroccan privateers captured two British ships, the Perseverance and the John & Robert, off the coast of Morocco near Rabat-Salé and brought them into port there.\(^1\) The ships had been unable to provide the correct papers identifying themselves as British and therefore as subjects of a country at peace with Morocco. Once in port, the ships’ papers were sent to the British consul at Tangier, who confirmed that they were in fact British, upon which the ships and their crews were released, less than a month after their capture.\(^2\)

The matter did not rest there, however, because the British government demanded that the Moroccans pay demurrage, or compensation to the ships’ owners for the delay of their voyage. Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān refused to permit payment, on the grounds that, because the ships did not have the correct papers, the Moroccans were within their rights by the terms of the treaties between the two countries to detain the ships until their identity was established. He also noted that the ships and their goods had suffered no damage, and assured the British consul that British ships would not be delayed if they carried the papers that allowed them to be identified correctly at sea.\(^3\)

According to the British government’s own legal advice, the Moroccans were in fact correct that a ship without the correct pass was lawfully subject to detention.\(^4\) Despite this, the British refused to accept the sultan’s decision and sent

\(^1\) NA FO 52/30, Douglas to Murray, 11 August 1828 & Douglas to Murray, 12 August 1828.
\(^2\) NA FO 52/30, Mawlay ‘Abd al-Raḥmān to Douglas, 8 Ṣafar 1244 [= 20 August 1828] & Douglas to Murray, 2 September 1828.
\(^3\) NA FO 52/30, Ibn Jallān to Douglas, 5 Jumādā I 1244 [= 13 November 1828].
\(^4\) NA FO 52/30, ‘Opinion of the King’s Advocate’. The system of what were commonly known as ‘Mediterranean passes’ had been in long operation in order to allow sailors from Morocco and the North African regencies to identify British ships that they had agreed by treaty not to detain or attack. There had originally been a parallel system of ‘Atlantic passes’, but the threat of North African corsairs had been so attenuated for so long outside the Mediterranean that this had in effect been abandoned by the British, who no longer issued them. By the strict terms of the treaties between Morocco and Britain, however, Moroccan ships could ask for the papers identifying a ship as British anywhere outside Britain’s territorial waters.
two warships, the Orestes and the Meteor, to Tangier to reinforce their objection.\(^5\) The sultan’s continued refusal resulted in a blockade of the town’s port that lasted two months before he relented and agreed to the payment of compensation.\(^6\)

The 1828 blockade of Tangier was a relatively small incident, but nonetheless indicative of a clear trend. The tide was coming in on the sultanic system in Morocco. The terms of the country’s engagement with the outside world were becoming almost entirely dictated by the rules defined by the European powers. Until the second quarter of the nineteenth century, there was at least the semblance of reciprocity and an area of common legal ground upon which Morocco and Europe conducted their interaction; but, as elsewhere in North Africa, and notably in the case of the French invasion of Algiers, this common ground was increasingly eroded by the direct and indirect imposition of European power.\(^7\)

The waves now crept in and receded in turn, some smaller and some larger, but on each return the water was closer to swamping the makhzan’s defences. The bombardment of Larache by Austria in 1829; the French invasion of Algeria in 1830, which not only threatened Morocco’s land border directly for the first time since the retreat of the Ottomans but disrupted its overland trade to the east and increased its dependence on Atlantic commerce with Europe; the defeat by France at Isly and the French bombardment of Tangier and Essaouira in 1844; Morocco’s increasing subsequent diplomatic dependence on Britain and the resulting Anglo-Moroccan treaty of 1856, which effectively dismantled the makhzan’s control over its trade policy; defeat by Spain in 1859-60 and the massive indemnity imposed afterwards; all left the sultanate severely weakened and inaugurated, in Burke’s phrase, ‘the prelude to protectorate’. From then on it was only really the rivalry of the European powers themselves that gave Morocco any room for manoeuvre.

---

\(^5\) NA FO 52/30, Douglas to Murray, 30 September 1828.

\(^6\) NA FO 52/30, Douglas to Murray, 15 November 1828; NA FO 52/31 Douglas to Murray, 24 January 1829.

\(^7\) See Pennell, ‘Accommodation between Islamic and European law’, p. 160. Although France initiated military action against Algiers in response to what it presented as its own grievances, the whole crisis of Franco-Algerian affairs was created by the persistent refusal of the French to address the large debts owed by the French government (see Abun-Nasr, *History*, pp. 249-51).
Although the country ‘fought a pretty effective rearguard battle’ against European control, the war was already lost.\(^8\)

However, the undoubted significance and drama of the changes in Morocco that accelerated into the second half of the nineteenth century should not obscure the continuities with the earlier period. The shape of the country’s relationship with the outside world that emerged depended to a great extent on its deep roots. The waves that eventually crashed over Morocco had after all lapped at its shores from at least the first Portuguese and Spanish incursions of the fifteenth century but for a long time the sultanate had successfully channelled and even harnessed these energies. The problem was not that the Moroccan sultanate was suddenly exposed to a world the demands of which it could not meet because of shock, but that the evolving strategies that had sustained the defence of its sovereignty from European expansion for several centuries had finally failed.

As we have seen, after the tenth century political power and the development of the state in Morocco were strongly associated with control of the country’s overland trade. By the seventeenth century, however, the Moroccan sultanate was struggling to adapt to the effects of the growth of the country’s maritime commerce. Although trade with Europe was still relatively marginal to Morocco’s political and economic structures, it had begun to fuel the autonomy of some coastal regions and thereby exacerbate the instability of the sultanate. Although Mawlay Ismā’il’s reign overcame these problems to a certain extent, his solution of a large standing army to impose military control over the country and enforce regular taxation was ultimately unsustainable. Similar instability and regional autonomy re-emerged during the second quarter of the eighteenth century. During this time the British established a leading role among the foreign interests in Morocco, partly as a result of their position at Gibraltar and the relationships that developed between the town and the Gharb region.

Sīdī Muḥammad addressed these weaknesses of the makhzan by adapting its traditional control over the key aspects of overland trade to a similar relationship with maritime commerce. The country’s ports were brought under closer control by the makhzan, which intervened in trade to promote the conditions perceived as most favourable to its rule, balancing economic and political considerations. The

\(^8\) Pennell, ‘Accommodation between Islamic and European law’, p. 189.
sultan exploited Morocco’s maritime influence, both military and commercial, as a
diplomatic tool, diversifying the country’s relationships as far as possible and
playing different European powers off against each other. He facilitated trade by
state agents but also the promotion and defence of trade generally, and increased
engagement with European affairs and European practices in as far as necessary to
serve Morocco’s commercial and diplomatic interests.

Within this system, trade was controlled to ensure it remained under the
control of the state, for the sake of the makhzan’s revenues and in order to avoid the
growth of regional autonomy around the important ports. It was also considered an
obligation of the sultanate to protect its subjects from shortages of goods or damage
to their livelihoods, although this principle was at times sacrificed to the interests
of makhzan itself. The control of trade was thus part of a particular Moroccan model
of political and moral economy, rather than the product of an inherent religio-
cultural hostility to the outside world. Although Sīdī Muḥammad’s strategy in some
ways made Morocco more vulnerable in the long-term by tying it more closely to
global economic and political networks far beyond its control, it at least did so on
the sultanate’s own terms, successfully preventing further erosion of its sovereignty
for the better part of a century.

Mawlay Sulaymān adhered closely to the model adopted by Sīdī Muḥammad.
The impression of isolationism during his reign was due more to the economic and
diplomatic disruptions caused by two and a half decades of war in Europe, the
effects of which spilled out across the world, than it was to any fundamental change
on the makhzan’s part. This period probably prolonged the resilience of the sultanic
system as it had been reconfigured by Sīdī Muḥammad because it made Moroccan
co-operation more important to the rival European powers.

The restrictions on trade that Mawlay Sulaymān did enforce were responses
to specific economic and political pressures, particularly the need to protect
domestic food supplies; to defuse popular resentment against exports when they
threatened those supplies; to keep trade more firmly under the makhzan’s control
and prevent its exploitation by the sultan’s actual or potential rivals; to raise
customs revenues; and to extract the maximum benefit from the sultanate’s foreign
alliances. He did not pursue economic isolationism as an end in itself.
If anything, his adaptations of Sīdī Muḥammad’s model strengthened the link between the makhzan and the country’s commercial interests, for example by relying more explicitly on the political support of the mercantile urban class and by abandoning the jihād al-bahr, the military threat that his father had used as one among several diplomatic tools. By his response in this last case to the warning explicit in the joint Anglo-Dutch bombardment of Algiers in 1816, Mawlay Sulaymān showed not that he had isolated himself, but that he appreciated the dynamics of Morocco’s position in the world and the limits of the imperial system in managing it.

The establishment of the Moroccan consulate in Gibraltar was another example of the development of the links between the sultanate and commerce under Mawlay Sulaymān. In common with other policies, such as lower tariffs on Muslim merchants, the consulate was a means to protect and encourage Moroccan trade. Even if at the same time it was a way to extend the makhzan’s control over its subjects abroad, this in itself put trade on a firmer footing by protecting its perceived integrity abroad – ensuring only solvent merchants travelled abroad, for example – and at home – by preventing the licentious and un-Islamic behaviour that some, including the sultan, feared free association with foreigners would encourage. It was under Mawlay Sulaymān, indeed, that Moroccans achieved the greatest level of reciprocity for the treatment of its merchants abroad by the treaties with Spain and Britain in 1799 and 1801 respectively; hardly the achievements of a ruler committed to keeping his subjects locked up at home.

As might have been expected from the circumstances of his accession to the throne, Mawlay ‘Ābd al-Raḥmān in turn persisted with the system of his uncle and grandfather in its fundamental elements. To a certain extent he tried to push back against the changing dynamics of Morocco’s relationship with Europe by trying to restore Morocco’s naval threat. Generally, however, he maintained the same system of managing trade, for example through manipulating customs tariffs in response to market conditions and awarding monopolies over certain goods. In the face of the threat of domestic shortages, even famine, or other internal problems, the makhzan’s conception of its own interests and role as protector of its subjects prevented radical changes to its trade policy until under much greater foreign pressure in the 1850s. Although trade did increase under Mawlay ‘Ābd al-Raḥmān,
this was the result of the coincidence of European demand and available Moroccan supply. The *makhzan* facilitated and exploited this through its manipulation of customs tariffs in the same way that it had done for the previous three-quarters of a century.

These developments at the level of *makhzan* policy cannot be understood without reference to the regional structures through which its power operated, or sometimes was hindered, at a local level, which we have considered here with particular reference to Tangier and Tetuan and their relationship to Gibraltar. This link had economic and political implications for the Gharb region particularly but also for the *makhzan* and the management of its relationship with the outside world. The British town became one of Morocco’s most important lines of communication with the rest of the world.

During the first half of the eighteenth century, British influence through Gibraltar tended to encourage regional autonomy, culminating in the rebellion of Ahmad al-Ḥamāmī al-Rīfī. Although this tendency was curbed successfully by Sīdī Muḥammad, the Gharb still had important economic links with the town throughout the rest of the eighteenth century and into the nineteenth. These helped create the dominant position of British trade in the country and, by their connection to Fes, the inland commercial centre of Morocco, extended British influence well beyond the coast.

This economic relationship had important social and political effects in that it created a group of merchants at Tetuan and Tangier, both Jewish and Muslim, with a particular interest in it. These merchants were well travelled and familiar with European languages and customs, and it was from this group that the Moroccan consuls at Gibraltar were drawn. Of course, in absolute terms the numbers of these merchants were small, but they had significant influence on the elite of their towns where the political and commercial classes overlapped perhaps to a greater extent than in many other Moroccan towns. Although the Gharb was more fully integrated into the *makhzan* system during and after Sīdī Muḥammad’s reign, the region’s elite still had its own character and interests, partly shaped by its relations with Gibraltar, which in turn shaped its relationship to the state. As can be seen during the civil war of the 1790s or by the course of the 1820-1 rebellion and its subsequent political fallout, the *makhzan* had to take this into account.
Thus, British influence was not simply an external force to which the Moroccan state reacted, but a factor whose operation was conditioned by its reception within Moroccan power structures. The embedding of this process, mediating the *makhsan*’s relationship with Britain through the Gharb, goes a long way to explaining the nature of British influence in Morocco in the second half of the nineteenth century. As these long-standing connections show, this influence operated at different levels that reinforced one another, from ordinary merchants up to the *makhsan* itself. In 1831, for example, Moroccan merchants at Oran, at least one of whom was known to have substantial business in Gibraltar, sought protection from the British vice-consul from the invading French army. It was to Drummond Hay, the British consul, that prominent officials in Tangier turned for advice before the arrival of the French envoy to discuss the sultan’s attitude toward Tilimsân in 1832. In the end, the growth of British influence over Moroccan diplomacy increased as the century went on to the point by its end where the *makhsan* was almost completely dependent on the British to guarantee its safety from French control.

The changing dynamics of the relationship between central and local power in Morocco in the later nineteenth century thus had their roots in processes far predating the ‘opening up’ of the country. The *makhsan* could no longer survive only as the *primum inter pares* of various spheres of interests and authority, governing a relatively ill-defined area of territory. The strategy of controlling nodes of particular economic value while managing other elements at more of a distance – a fundamental characteristic of state power in Morocco from the Almoravids to Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahmân – was less and less viable. The model of the state particular to Morocco was slowly being refashioned and forced into the mould of the modern European nation state.

---

9 NA FO 52/35, Nathaniel Welsford, British vice-consul at Oran, to E. Drummond Hay, 5 October 1831 & E. Drummond Hay to Hay, 6 November 1831; NA FO 52/37, E. Drummond Hay to Hay, 9 September 1833.

10 NA FO 52/35, E. Drummond Hay to Hay, 5 March 1832.

11 See Burke, *Prelude*, pp. 41-68.

12 On the establishment of exact borders under pressure from the French, for example, see Frank E. Trout, *Morocco’s Saharan Frontiers* (Geneva: Droz, 1969).
In these circumstances, an old problem re-emerged as the sultanate lost control of trade and hence the very resources it needed to defend and renew its power. To a certain extent, this took the traditional form of geographical areas that broke away from central control by securing revenues and weapons through trade with Europeans, from Sīdī Hāshim of Iīgh and Shākh Bayrūk of Kīlmīm (Guelmin) in the 1820s to Bū Ḥimāra in the 1900s.\footnote{See Paul Pascon, \textit{La Maison d’Ilīgh et l’histoire sociale de Tazerwalt}, (Rabat: SMER, 1984), pp. 43-8; Naimi, ‘Evolution of the Tekna confederation’; Ross E. Dunn, ‘Bū Ḥimāra’s European Connexion: the Commercial Relations of a Moroccan Warlord’, \textit{Journal of African History} 21 (1980), pp. 235-53.} Increasingly, however, the sultanate’s problem was as much the loss of its sovereignty over people as over places, as the system of consular protection developed, providing another means by which the authority of the sultanate was eroded.

As these dynamics changed, therefore, the role of the Moroccan elites involved with managing the relationship with the British, and foreigners generally, changed. Where in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century they had mediated between the two sides, they increasingly became conduits for the exercise of foreign influence and even control. A symbolically important example of this shift was the decision by the British in 1837 to stop giving ceremonial gifts to Moroccan officials in return for their assistance and friendship.\footnote{See NA FO 52/43, 27 March 1837.}

Of course, this process was not clear-cut and did not happen overnight. Compare, for example, Muḥammad al-Khaṭīb, the prominent Tetuani merchant who became Mawlay `Abd al-Rahmān’s representative (nā‘īb) to the consuls in Tangier, and Muḥammad al-Raẓīnī, consul at Gibraltar. Both products of the commercial elite in the Gharb whose development we have discussed above, with long-experience of foreign trade and affairs and long periods of residence in Gibraltar, they adopted opposing attitudes to the demands of the British to liberalise the Moroccan economy in the mid-nineteenth century.\footnote{On al-Raẓīnī’s opposition to the terms of the commercial treaty with Britain and the consequent decline in his influence, see Erzini, ‘Hala yuslah’, p. 521. On al-Khaṭīb’s career as a merchant, during which he travelled to Genoa and Marseilles, and lived in Gibraltar around seventeen years, and his service in the makhzan as amīn of Tangier and later as nā‘īb al-sulṭān, see KH III-3-3; MM Vol. 11, pp. 3379-80; Miège, \textit{Le Maroc}, Vol. 2, p. 279; and on his role in the negotiations leading to the 1856 treaty, see Ben Srhir, Britain and Morocco, \textit{passim}.}

However, the direction of the
trend was clear. As the notables of the Gharb were presented with a new role, their position shifted from being partners of the British as they had been for well over a century since the occupation of Gibraltar. In the future they would only be able to choose to be protégés.

Until the full expression of these new dynamics, however, the connections between the Gharb and Gibraltar operated in a way that adds an important level to our understanding not just of Moroccan history, but also of the nature of the interaction between different societies; of the role of local groups and institutions in conditioning the process of European expansion and the world it created; and of the way Muslim societies in particular continued to manage their place in a changing world by active engagement with it, rather than simply closing their eyes to it as is often assumed. These links existed at a level upon which ‘civilisation’ is of limited use as a unit of analysis because it imposes clear lines of distinction where there in fact existed overlap and complexity. It is convenient for historians to talk about the relationship of ‘Morocco and Europe’ but this obscures the variety of relationships in which Moroccans actually engaged – with a Frenchmen as opposed to a Briton as opposed to Spaniard; with a sailor as opposed to a consul; with a business partner as opposed to a doctor; with an employer as opposed to a visiting soldier. It is debatable whether the concept of ‘Europe’ would have even had any meaning in Morocco in the early nineteenth century.

The Straits of Gibraltar are so often seen as one of the world’s great cultural dividing lines, where the geographical separation of two pieces of land mirrors the historical separation of two cultures, two religions – even the two halves into which humanity is regularly divided, ‘the West’ and ‘the Rest’. Yet, as we have seen, although Gibraltar and the Gharb were separated by a body of water, they were closely joined by a set of complex political, economic and social relationships. These relationships were not formed by the arrival in Morocco of foreigners who defined their nature and the pace of their development, but by the crossing and re-crossing of the straits from each side to the other.
Bibliography

Archival Sources

National Archives, London

FO 52/1-42; FO 174/3, 6-7, 10-12, 17, 21, 27, 45-6, 127-133, 227-8 & 370; CO 91/35-8, 51, 78-9, 83, 95, 98, 113, 120-1, 127, 130, 134, 136, 165 & 167-8; CO 95/1.

British Library, London

Additional MSS. 23666, 28157, 40033, 41512 & 61542.

Gibraltar Government Archives, Gibraltar


Mudīriyyat al-Wathā’iq al-Malikiyya (Direction des Archives Royales), Rabat

Jabal Ṭāriq; Tiṭwān; Ṭanja; Britānyā al-Użmā I.

Al-Khizāna al-Ḥasaniyya (Bibliothèque Royale), Rabat

Murāsilāt makhzaniyya - I, II, III, IV & V.

Printed Sources

Abitbol, Michel, 'Le Maroc et le commerce transsaharien du XVIIe siècle au début du XIXe siècle', Revue de l’Occident Musulman et de la Méditerranée 30 (1980), pp. 5-20


Abou El Fadl, Khaled, 'Islamic law and Muslim minorities: the juristic discourse on Muslim minorities from the second/eighth to the eleventh/seventeenth centuries', Islamic Law and Society 1 (1994), pp. 141-87


Anton, James, 'Description of Gibraltar in the 1820s', *Gibraltar Heritage Journal* 5 (1998), pp. 77-103


Beauclerk, George, *Journey to Marocco* (London: Poole & Edwards, 1828)


Benaboud, M’hammad, 'Tetuan, its History and Culture'


—, 'The place of the Garrison Library in Gibraltarian society', *Gibraltar Heritage Journal* 6 (1999), pp. 21-34


Buffa, John, *Travels through the Empire of Morocco* (London: J. Stockdale, 1810)


Caillé, Jacques, 'Le commerce anglais avec le Maroc pendant la seconde moitié du XVIe siècle: importations et exportations', *Revue Africaine* 84 (1940), pp. 186-219

—, 'Ambassadeurs et représentants officieux de la France au Maroc', *Hespéris* 38 (1951), pp. 355-65


—, 'Ambassades et missions marocaines aux Pays-Bas à l’époque des sultans saadiens', *Hespéris-Tamuda* 4 (1963), pp. 5-67


D'Angelo, Michela, 'In the "English" Mediterranean (1511-1815)', *Journal of Mediterranean Studies* 12 (2002), pp. 271-85

Da‘ūd, Muḥammad, *Tarīkh Tīwān*, 13 vols. (Tīwān: 1959 –)

Danziger, R., 'The British consular reports as a source for Morocco's internal history during the reign of Sidi Muḥammad b.'Abdallah (1757-1790)', *Maghreb Review* 7 (1982), pp. 103-7


Dennerlein, Bettina, 'South-South Linkages and Social Change: Moroccan Perspectives on Army Reform in the Muslim Mediterranean in the Nineteenth Century', *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 27 (2007), pp. 52-61


Dziubinski, A., 'L’armée et la flotte de guerre marocaines à l’époque des sultans de la dynastie saadienne', *Hespéris-Tamuda* 13 (1972), pp. 61-94


El Mansour, Mohamed, 'Ceuta in Anglo-Moroccan Relations (1806-1815)', *Maghreb Review*, 4 (1979), 129-33


El Moudden, Abderrahmane, 'Sharifs and Padishahs: Moroccan-Ottoman Relations from the 16th through the 18th Centuries', PhD thesis, Princeton University, 1992


*Encyclopaedia Judaica*, 22 vols., 2nd edn. (Detroit, MI: Macmillan Reference USA, 2007)

—, Moroccan-British diplomatic and commercial relations in the early 18th century: the abortive embassy to Meknes in 1718, (Durham: Institute of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, University of Durham, 2002) http://eprints.dur.ac.uk/archive/00000145/01/70DMEP.pdf [accessed 24/12/2006]


Flournoy, Francis R., British Policy toward Morocco in the Age of Palmerston (1830-1865) (Baltimore: 1935)


Gallagher, Nancy Elizabeth, Medicine and power in Tunisia, 1780-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983)


Godard, L., Description et histoire du Maroc comprenant la géographie et la statistique de ce pays d’apres les renseignements les plus récents et le tableau du regne des souverains qui l’ont gouverné depuis les temps les plus anciens jusqu’a la paix de Tétouan (Paris: E. Donnau, 1860)


Hajji, Muhammad, _Al-zawiya al-Dilâ’iyya wa-dawruhâ al-dînî wa-l-‘ilmî wa-l-siyasî_, 2nd edn. (Rabat: Al-Mu’allif, 1988)

Hammam, Mohammed, 'Les relations commerciales entre Pise et le Maghreb sous l’empire almohade (1166-1213)', _Hespéris-Tamuda_ 35 (1997), pp. 43-54


_Hertslet’s Complete Collection of the Treaties and Conventions, and Reciprocal Regulations at present subsisting between Great Britain & Foreign Powers . . . etc., 30 vols._ (London: Henry Butterworth, 1827-1924)


House of Commons Parliamentary Papers

Howes, H. W., _The Gibraltarrian: the origin and development of the population of Gibraltar from 1704_ (Gibraltar: n.d.)


Jackson, James Grey, *An Account of the Empire of Morocco and the Districts of Suse and Tafillelt compiled from Miscellaneous Observations made during a Long Residence in, and Various Journies through, these Countries to which is added an Account of the Western Coast of Africa and an Interesting Account of Timbuctoo, the Great Emporium of Central Africa*, 3rd edn. (1814; repr. 1968 by Frank Cass & Co.)

—, *An Account of Timbuctoo and Housa Territories in the Interior of Africa* by El Hage Abd Salam Shabeeny with Notes, *Critical and Explanatory* (London: 1820; repr. 1967 by Frank Cass & Co.)

James, Thomas, *The History of the Herculean Straits, now called the Straits of Gibraltar: including those Ports of Spain and Barbary that lie contiguous thereto*, 2 vols. (London: 1771)


—, Juifs et musulmans au Maroc, 1859-1948 (Rabat: Muhammad V University, 1994)


—, 'The Rise of the 'Azafids in Ceuta', Israel Oriental Studies, 2 (1972), pp. 263-87


Lecureuil, Xavier, 'Historique des douanes au Maroc', Archives Marocaines, 15 (1908), pp. 33-54

Lee, Hilda I., 'The supervising of the Barbary consuls during the years 1756-1831', Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 23 (1950), pp. 191-9

Lempriere, William, A tour from Gibraltar to Tangier Sallee, Mogodore, Santa Cruz, Tarudant; and thence, over Mount Atlas, to Morocco: including a particular account of the royal harem, &c. (London: 1791)


—, 'La obra redentora del sultan marroquí Sîdî Muhammad be Abd Allâh entre los cautivos musulmanes en Europa (siglo XVII)', *Cuadernos de Historia del Islam* 11 (1984), pp. 139-84


Martínez Ruiz, José Ignacio, 'De Tánger a Gibraltar: el estrecho en la praxis comercial e imperial Británica (1661-1776)', *Hispania: Revista Española de Historia* 65 (2005), pp. 1043-62

Mas Latrie, M., *Relations et commerce de l’Afrique septentrionale ou Magreb avec les nations chretiennes* (Paris: 1886)


—, *Turks, Moors, and Englishmen in the Age of Discovery* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999)


—, 'Coton et cotonnades au Maroc au milieu du XIXe siècle', *Hespéris* 46 (1959), pp. 219-38


Monk, W. F., *Britain in the Western Mediterranean* (London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1953)

Montgomery, James, Anna Akasoy and Peter E. Pormann, eds, *Islamic crosspollinations: interactions in the medieval Middle East* (Warminster: Gibb Memorial Trust, 2007)


Oddi, Abderrahim Yabbur, El Gobierno de Tetuan por la familia Al-Naqsí (1597-1673) (Tetuan: Imprenta del Majzen, 1955)


Pascon, Paul, La Maison d’Iligh et l’histoire sociale de Tazerwalt, (Rabat: SMER, 1984)


232
—, 'Accommodation between European and Islamic law in the western Mediterranean in the early nineteenth century', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 21 (1994), pp. 159-89

—, 'Dealing with pirates: British, French and Moroccans, 1834-56', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 22 (1994), pp. 54-83


Roth, Cecil, 'Jacob Benider: Moroccan Envoy at the Court of St. James (1772)', *Miscellanies of the Jewish Historical Society of England* 2 (1935), pp. 84-90


Shoshan, Boaz, 'Grain riots and the "moral economy": Cairo, 1350-1517', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 10 (1980), pp. 459-78


Thomassy, R., *Des relations politiques et commerciales d la France avec le Maroc* (Paris: 1842)


