

P V ~ P

Cambridge Journal Of ^{20p}
Undergraduate Philosophy.



Bertrand Russell (aged 4).

FOR
REFERENCE ONLY

Inside.....

Metaphysics and the Novel.

The Nature Of Art.

Taking A Chance On

Induction.

Nozick's "Philosophical

Explanations!"

And More.....

ENTERPRISES PRESENTS:

"P v - P" MAGAZINE OF UNDERGRADUATE PHILOSOPHY.

ISSUE ONE: EDITORIAL.

This termly journal of undergraduate philosophy has been founded with several aims. First it is hoped that it will provide useful information about the faculty, and about discussion groups (who are invited to submit their programmes for the Michaelmas term to the editor of the next edition). Secondly it will provide in itself a forum for discussion, exposition, and generally airing ideas. Lastly, I hope that it will encourage clarity and accessibility among those who contribute to it.

In this first edition articles on a wide variety of subjects have been included, as seems appropriate. It may be possible for future editions to concentrate on some single issue of the moment. Since the magazine will have a different editor each term, however, it is hoped that the emergence of any consistent editorial policy can be prevented, to the dismay of all hacks and interests...

There is a small charge on the magazine which will cover most of the costs which have been incurred; it is hoped that this feature will encourage the teaching staff to make a small subsidy available, and so prolong the life of the magazine. Whether the teaching staff agree to take the magazine into their protection depends on the interest shown by the undergraduates, and colleagues, so if you find this useful, or even interesting, then please say as much to your student representative, or colleagues.

Finally, I should like to express my thanks to Professor A. J. P. Kenny, Master of Balliol College, Oxford, for agreeing to write an introduction to the first edition; to Dr. D. H. Mellor, of Darwin college, for humorous contributions, and all his help; and to D. J. O'Dempsey, of Clare college, for bravely undertaking the typing and secretarial work.

P. E. G. 6/3/82.

FROM THE MASTER

BALLIOL COLLEGE

OXFORD

OX1 3BJ

Each generation of undergraduates produces its own crop of magazines and periodicals. Philosophical publications, however, are comparatively rare and I salute the enterprise of those who have put together P v-P. It seems rather more serious than the journal "SM" which I helped found while a graduate student at Oxford twenty-odd years ago. I trust it will prove equally popular and rather more long-lived.

A. J. P. K.

A PROBABILITY ARGUMENT.

We can find out whether a dice is honest by throwing it a large number of times and counting the frequency with which each face comes up. If we find that each of the numbers comes up in a ratio of 1:5 to the rest of the numbers, we say that the dice is honest. Assuming that the number of test throws is sufficiently large and that the dice has not been tampered with since, we say that the *antecedent probability* of throwing a given number in one cast of the dice is $1/6$ or 1:5. Every throw of the dice must be regarded as having the same distribution of antecedent probabilities among the possible outcomes as every other throw. Thus, it is a mistake (known as the *Monte carlo Fallacy*.) to think that because we scored a "6" last go, there is little chance of throwing a "6" this go. The probability of getting a "6" this go is still $1/6$ or 1:5. But it is true that the antecedent probability of throwing two sixes in two goes is a sixth of a sixth, i.e., a thirty-sixth. Although there is only a sixth of a thirty-sixth chance (i.e. a one hundred and sixteenth chance or 1:215) of getting three sixes in three goes, before the third cast of the dice, the antecedent probability of getting a six this go is exactly $1/6$ or 1:5.

These facts about probability are extremely elementary and serve mainly to illustrate what I mean by the term *antecedent probability*.

I now wish to change tack a little and consider how we might think about the antecedent probability of events which we do not customarily regard as falling out by chance in the way that dice do. An awareness of probability is of interest to the gambler because there is minimal predictability. This is what he calls the element of chance. He knows that there is a greater chance of throwing a total of 7 on two dice than there is of throwing a total of 12 or a total of 2. Setting aside those maniacs of the casino who believe themselves to be charmed, in possession of a "system" or in the hands of a fate which has predestined the fall of the roulette ball, the cards or the dice, the prevailing view is that the outcomes of games of chance are, if fair, unpredictable. This is what gives these games a certain keenness.

I wonder, then, what it is that makes us think that there are affairs in life which *are* predictable. Consider my letting go of a medium-sized piece of dry goods fairly near the surface of the Earth. Our immediate thought is that, if unsupported, it will fall. Yet this is an odd thought when it is borne in mind that my object could equally well go up or along. We can divide a circle into a set of, say, 360 angles and have each of the radii as a possible course for my object. If we were to construct a sphere on these lines, we would have 120, 600 paths along which my object could pass once I have released it. Consequently, even allowing that my figures are arbitrarily small, we may say that the antecedent probability of the object's tending towards the gravitational centre of the Earth is $1/120, 600$ or 1:120, 600. If I repeat the experiment, the probability of getting two successful results in a row will be rather worse than one in fourteen and a half-million. Bear in mind also that this astronomical figure should be worsened yet further by the possibility that the acceleration of the object need not either be uniform or even roughly approximate to gravitational rates near the Earth (say, 10ms^2).

It seems, then, that the thrills and spills of gambling can be had in plenty merely by being clumsy in the kitchen.

But there is something so drastically wrong with this answer that we are inclined to say that it is a product of a trick. and the trick is simply that we do not regard gravity as a fit subject for this type of probabilistic treatment. Hence, the question is why we do not, and to what extent we are right in thinking so.

I began by saying that dice are found to be honest when they produce equal likelihoods for each of the faces turning up. But we do not regard gravity as "honest" in this way. Now, if what we mean by an antecedent probability of $1/6$ for throwing a given number at one go, what is the antecedent probability which we should give to the object in my hand falling directly downwards at approximately 10ms^2 when I release my grasp? To this question we can answer in three ways. First I can say that no one ratio should have precedence over any one other, since we have not carried out sufficient experiments. This is the sceptical argument that, because we do not know how to apply the so-called Law of Large Numbers to the phenomena we take causal, we need to know all the instances of objects in free-fall (or its substitute) before we can give any figure at all. Second, it may be argued from an *a priori*, or at least principled, conception of the Universe as mechanical that the only ratio applicable to causal events is $1/1$; i.e., a dead certainty. This view must always be enunciated with the proviso that we may not know what the event which is certain-to-ensue might be. Given a full and correct knowledge of an initial state, all subsequent states are *deducible*; unfortunately, neither we nor Laplace are given these givens.

The third possible answer to the question of the antecedent probability of causal consequents can be argued in two ways. The answer is $1/\infty$.* On the one hand, we may begin with the postulate that the ordering of states of affairs in the world isn't an ordering at all: there is randomness and nothing else. The seeming orderliness is either an illusion heightened by men's gullibility or actual but entirely fortuitous. In other possible (non-contradictory) worlds, initially in *all* respects like ours, the seeming orderliness has not appeared. The workings behind what happens is the same but our world is special in that the Monte Carlo Fallacy has sprouted wings and produced the most improbable of all possible worlds. The other reason for thinking that the answer is $1/\infty$ is even harder to express. It involves the idea of an indefinitely large range of possible schemes on which a world may work. A very small selection of these schemes have been presented, e.g., Fatalism, Determinism, Divine Providence, Epicureanism, Predestination &c. But the smallness of the selection does not reflect the infinity of possibilities, merely something about either philosophers' imaginations or the philosophical search for plausibility. One of the possibilities in this indefinitely large range of the causal scheme to which we unreflectingly assent and on the supposition of which scientists work. Thus, the antecedent probability of my object's falling must take into account the metaphysical improbability of causality's obtaining at all.

Great play has been made of the argument that it is only reasonable to accept that there is causality on the ground that for the world to present its affairs in the regular way it does is extremely improbable. I.e., no other contender accounts for the enormous probabilities against things turning out as they have to date. However, if we conceive of the hypothesis of causality as having an antecedent probability of $1/\infty$, it clearly follows that whatever finite number it is multiplied by in an attempt to show its reasonableness as a working hypothesis, its probability will not be raised on jot. The question is, then, whether it is justified to construe the probability of events falling as they do

* Let ∞ stand for an infinity (Ed)

as $1/\infty^0$. If it is not, the ratio will always be finite; ergo it cannot increase the probability of the hypothesis of causality. But if we are to say that the way the world falls out is infinitely improbable are we also to say that, given the corroboration this gives to our notion of causality, the hypothesis that causality obtains is *proven*? Or do we need finite ratios on both scores to give us some measure of how much trust we are to place in the future of causality?

I confess that I do not know.

R. Davies. (Trinity)

QUOTES OF NOTE.

"The correspondence theory is the only coherent one" — Anonymous first year.

" Die Logische Sprache von Wittgenstein.

Ich kann mich irren...

...aber Irren ist menschlich...

...es ist gut, menschlich zu sein...

BAMER...

...weil ich mich irre, bin ich gut...

!!!!

JA, ICH WILL SOGAR SAGEN...

... je öfter ich mich irre, desto besser bin ich." P. J. Maddrell (Mod. Langs)
(Logische Schlussfolgerung... ich muß ja fast perfekt sein!)

It might be of some benefit to point-out that Miss Maddrell is not studying Logic...

"BAMBROUGH, n,(1) a rare and umbrageous tree in the shelter of which all philosophical perplexity can be charmed away.

Where the bread fruit fall

And the penguin call

And the sound is the sound of the sea

Under the bam

Under the brough

Under the bambrough tree.

(2) (From *bang-brow*) a comment of such transcendental obviousness that were any hearer actually informed of it, he would smite his forehead with the heel of his hand. "Such a bambrough! Why didn't I think of it?"

And from the man himself:

(Pirated from the *Philosophical Lexicon*).

"An American woman once said to me at the end of a lecture "Will you please tell me what you have said? I find that I can't pay any attention to the content when I am listening to that wonderful English accent." Of course I had to refer her to somebody else, because if I had given her a summary I should inevitably done it in the same wonderful English accent."

(With thanks, from *How to read Wittgenstein*).

Here is a list of the student representatives on the staff-student committee; most of you will already have a copy, but since you paid for this, hopefully, you will take more care of it... (not that you don't take care of official communications, of course).

The Staff/Student Committee represents the interests of all the undergraduates in the Faculty. Although it has no real power, it can discuss matters of concern, and make recommendations to the Faculty Board. *The greater the use that is made of the Committee, the more weight its recommendations will carry.* The undergraduate representatives at present are:

| | | |
|--------------|----------------|----------|
| Third Year: | P M Bestley | Queens' |
| | D E Matthews | King's |
| | E E Sacks | Caius |
| | A L Spedding | King's |
| Second Year: | J K Hargreaves | King's |
| | J R Oberlander | Pembroke |
| | S C Tanburn | Jesus |
| | S F Wright | King's |
| First Year: | R Kurti | King's |
| | S B Romero | King's |
| | D J O'Dempsey | Clare |

Jon Oberlander and Sarah Tanburn are also the undergraduate representatives on the Faculty Board.

Here are the (as yet unconfirmed) minutes of the meeting of the Committee on the 8th of February 1982:

Present: Dr Craig (chairman), Dr Mellor (secretary), C H Nicholson, P M Bestley, D E Matthews, E E Sccak, A L Spedding, J K Hargreaves, J R Oberlander, S C Tanburn, R Kurti, S B Romero, D J O'Dempsey.

2. Faculty Board Minutes of its considerations on 23 November 1981 of the Committee's suggestions were noted. Besides matters considered under later agenda, the Committee considered asking the Faculty Board to allow Part II candidates submitting Extended Essays to sit the Essay Paper, the worse of their two marks being discounted: but this proposal was rejected by 7 votes to 2.

3. Hand book entry: List of Recomdded Books. The Committee agreed to suggest the following alterations:

(i) Start the sentence preceding this list: "Any of the books in the following brief list..." instead of "All the books..." to avoid making candidates think they should read every book on the list.

(ii) Add K Campbell, *Body and Mind* and I Hacking, *Why does language Matter to Philosophy?* to the list if they are still in print.

(iii) Replace G E Moore, *Ethics* with either J L Mackie, *Ethics: Inventing right and wrong* or B Williams, *Morality*.

(iv) Pick out B Russell, *Problems of Philosophy* as an especially recommended introduction to the subject.

4. Part IB. (i) it was agreed to consider changes in the Syllabus before considering whether to reduce the number of papers set or taken. Following discussion of Mr Sacks' proposals, it was agreed to recommend the following changes, partly to reduce overlap between papers, and to encourage more concrete treatment of topics in lectures:

Paper 2. Philosophy of Mind. Delete "The general character of mind and the mental". Replace "The causation of actions" with "Action". Add "Mental illness".

Paper 4. Ethics. Insert "Punishment." after "Responsibility".

Paper 6. Philosophy of Science. Include comparison of natural and social science. Delete "Space and Time". (To be added to the Part II Philosophy of Science Paper).

(If you have any views on all this, get in touch with your representative - ed)

5. Questionnaire. Miss Matthews reported that not many questionnaires distributed before Christmas had been returned. The general impression from those that had was that students preferred lecturers to put more rather than less material into their lectures, to avoid repetition and to encourage interruption with questions when material was not understood rather than to present it slowly. It was left to Miss Matthews to let Teaching Officers have such comments on their own lectures as they might wish to receive; and to the student members to consider organising further questionnaires.

These are the edited minutes which were taken by the secretary HM, our thanks are due to him.

BIZZARRE CAUSAL LOOPS.¹

We all know the one about going back and killing your own grandfather, preventing yourself from ever having been born and vanishing in a puff of metaphysical smoke. But, of course, it couldn't happen because it didn't happen: do it and you switch yourself into a different possible world— not really time travel at all. There seems nothing logically wrong, however, with postulating the existence of closed causal loops compatible with, and indeed important to, our past.

Now suppose you killed your maternal grandfather, not prior to your mother's birth, but while she was still a child. As a consequence of this she grew up an emotional cripple and battered her own children — which is of course why you came to have homicidal tendencies in the first place...

Or what if you killed him before her birth and took his place, thus becoming your own grandfather?* The family tree becomes a family loop, with no source and no culmination.

You think that's weird? Well, how about this one then: you travel back in time, kill your own earlier self, and substitute yourself for him. Not only do you form part of a causal loop, you are a causal loop! You are cyclically continuous with yourself.

But this is quite clearly absurd. You would be trapped in a causal loop for an eternity of your own personal time (eternal because cyclic). But what would happen to your bodily processes? Presumably you would age, as causality runs in one direction all the way round the loop; if it did not, the loop

* This question is addressed to the male readers... (Ed)

would not be closed. But this would involve your being an infinite number of ages at the same time, as far as the rest of world is concerned: because from outside as it were, each event in the loop is a single event, and not an infinite number of repetitions. Thus if the original substitution went unnoticed, total absurdity would result. This suggests that is simply could not happen. And if, this, strongest, possible occurrence of a causal loop is unintelligible, doesn't that suggest that weaker ones are too, less obviously, and that even backwards causation is an absurdity?

The floor is open.

S B Romero (King's)

The puppets are quite clear on this subject:

I'm my own Grandpappy....

(from one of their
shows... en)

Whilst delving in the depths of the history of Philosophy, the present editor and his assistants chanced to find various themes cropping up in the works of the great. Although the source for this material is somewhat doubtful (we believe that our source is the first time this central theme of so many philosophers, modern and ancient, was committed to paper. One could look on them as the crystallisation of an oral tradition stemming back to the 16th or possibly 17th centuries) we feel that this is a much neglected part of our philosophical heritage, and so are glad to publish various analyses of the eternal enigma of OLD KING COLE...

The earliest writers we have come across were the ancient persian Philosophers, they have nothing very interesting to say about the man they call ngingmalla, but by the time anything recognisable as the puzzle of old King Cole emerges, there seems to have developed a standard format (to be found in the original Arabic in the British Museum, Arabic manuscript codex OA 12406 — Ed.) Viz:

"Old King Cole was a merry old soul
And a merry old soul was he
He called for his pipe and he called for his bowl
And he called for his fiddlers three."

Not suprisingly Hume found this sort of Aristotelian sophistry too much to bear:

'Tis universally allow'd, that the Ebullition of the Animal Spirits, and the desire for Tobacco and the Recreation of the Muse, may be found in constant Attendance, the one upon the other. The history of this gregarious Monarch will thus occasion no suprise to those who are versed in the Customs and Civilities of the remote Age in which he liv'd. But the Insinuation, that his conduct was occasion'd by some mysterious Power or Energy in his Soul, savours more of *Sophistry and Delusion* than of just Reasoning or sound Philosophy. Whence, I beseech you, have we acquir'd the Idea of this Subtle Force? Indeed, we are got into *Faery Land*; and there we know not whether we may trust Reason or Rime..."

I think that this is one of those things which all Empiricists have felt at one time or another. After Hume there seems to have been a definite lack of interest in the problem of Cole's fiddlers, Berkely is reported to have said that it is a paradigm of Philosophy, showing how the mind is active, but that he had no sympathy with the author, who had not recognised the merits of tarwater...

However, it seems pretty certain that Bill knew of the enigma and committed it to his godson at an early age; it was to plague Russell till the day he died. At one stage he thought that he had reached an answer:

(a) It is not always false of x that if x is aged and x is royal, and x is called Cole, then x is merry, and x is aged, and x is a soul. Whatever is y, if y is aged and y is royal and y is called Cole, then x=y.

(b) Encore.

(c) For any x, if x is Cole's pipe, or x is Cole's bowl, or x is Cole's fiddler, then Cole called for x. And whatever w and y and z are, if w is a fiddler, and y is a fiddler, and z is a fiddler, then w isn't y, and y isn't z and z isn't w.

(d) Phewwww!

Many modern metaphysician's have had tangles with this strange problem, some have sought to reduce the problem to a more manageable level: thus Neurath was heard to utter:

Cole's protocol at 5. 15 pm, Jan 1st B C*/ Cole's speech thought at 5.14 p.m. Jan 1st B C was (Age, now, joy, now; craving for nicotine, now; fiddlers three, here, now, or at any rate pretty damn quick.)

but this, it can be quickly seen, is no substitute for the original; in the words of John Wisdom:

When all's said and done this is a pretty rum sort of a sentence mean isn't it damnit. Not just because it isn't punctuated because I've never been very much of a one for punctuation myself but I mean all this stuff about pipes and bowls makes you feel there's something in what Freud says or is it Kafka about the unseen whisper and the silent rainbow breaking through the unswept corridor where wanders all forlorn the spastic metaphysician hunting through his pockets for a ticket to the life to come. Who knows?

So obvious! a different approach was needed, and for a while it seemed as if Carnap had provided it

The first part of this sentence is misleading because it may deceive us into thinking that Old King Cole was a merry old pseudo-object whereas in fact he was a merry old thing-word. The latter part is patient as analysis as 'Cole uttered-in-L sentences which were intentionally isomorphic to the English sentences "Fetch me my pipe", "Fetch me my bowl" and "Fetch me my fiddlers three."

(We have thought it fit to keep to the Oxford version of this piece — hence the typing errors — Ed). This would have been thought to settle the matter, but Kyle is reported to have thought differently:

For all its air of Monday-morning-ness, this sentence contains at least one expression which may give rise to puzzlement. A soul can be neither merry nor unmerry, neither old nor young, any more than a straight flush can be either a leg-break or an off-break. Merriness, for instance, is not a twitch, tweak, spasm, tingle or quirk which one could date, or time, or expect or repeat. Does the poem imply that the fiddlers came? I think not: "call" is not a success verb, but a hit-or-miss verb, a take-it-or-leave-it verb.

Our source here gives up the attempt to unravel this insoluble problem, but the tradition is not dead, and I have even heard it reported that Dr Mellor thinks that whatever manages to fulfill the fiddlers' roles, whether by using water or any other means, i.e., to provide the recreation of the Muse for Cole, will be a fiddler. We can only hope that the present generation of undergraduates will revive the interest in this problem which has suffered so much in this century. * it seems that there is little or no evidence for this statement of a date. (Ed)

Free Will, Determinism, and the Self.

There is a problem in characterising the notion of free will which is due to the fact that, although I experience my will as cause, you only experience it as effect. This duality of the third person account of one's actions with the first person experience is why there is a controversy in my opinion. I think it is as wrong to try to treat the Self, of which I believe willing forms part of its *essence* as an object, as something passive, as it is to try to maintain that everything is a prime mover. The Self and the world belong to different categories if you like (and no doubt you don't).

This is the problem of characterising the will, and even though I talked about my own experience of the will as cause, you must take that as metaphorical. A cause is an event, and I do not want to characterise the will as an event. My reason for this is that if willing were an event, you could will willing, and I don't think that you can will willing in any real sense. You could will that you will such-and-such, but that is not willing the act of willing, it is willing the content of the act of willing, and that is not just willing that you will *simpliciter*. Willing willing is a degenerate success, it is its own happening.

The position I hold is that the self is known as agent only by its effects, one could know that one exists by doing, a thought or a deed. I would maintain the stronger position that there is no way of getting to the self by treating it as an object from which various predicates can be removed. Such a treatment can be seen in Hume's account of the self which concluded that there is no substantive self other than the impressions which come and go. This is a film-strip theory of the self without the benefit of a viewer. I would make the claim that the self is inextricably bound up with action and agency. This much seems clear from the way that people are able to direct their awareness at things, and away from things. Concentrating is a prime example of pure agency.

On the metaphysical position which I am putting forward, and to which I seem to be committed, there can be no such thing as an unfree self. For freedom is essential to the self. This is the same as saying that without free will, there would be no self.

If someone were to say that the will isn't free and mean by that that the will is just another caused event, and were to talk about the self, I would find it rather difficult to take him or her seriously. The reason why this levity would enter is because if the person were right there would be no reason why the self is special in our lives. To me it seems no good to say that the self gains its importance from being the centre of a perceptual field, for then there would be no reason why there should be any unity, there must be something which unites the otherwise disparate experiences, and this seems to require some kind of action. Again, no doubt spuriously to you, I seem to be able to say that there must be a self which is active and does this uniting. I would of course, suggest that what makes the self important is that it is the free "prime mover" of our actions. Another argument why merely being the passive centre of our perceptual field isn't good enough is that we are able to direct our attention, as I said above, and the determinist outlined above would have to explain this feeling in some other way.

A person who believed that the will is just another caused event must see the world as a system of events in which no one event has ascendancy over any of the others in terms of being a more primal mover in the world. So all causes are on a par with each other. Such a person might disagree and say that this is all very well if you assume free will to begin with, but he or she doesn't — so to say that you cannot have an event of willing willing is merely dogmatic. In reply to this straw man I would say that this is the fundamental difference between him and me²; the self does seem to me to have the

power of choice, and I say this because I have experienced' it, but he or she, looking at me, does not experience my choice as free. He or she might see my actions as voluntary or involuntary, but that is a third person distinction, largely linked with what we can blame people for and what they are physically capable of; this could remain even if determinism were true.³

The crucial difference is working from the inside out, and "experiencing" (in that metaphorical sense) the will to be free, and working from the external world, saying that all objects obey certain laws, that the self is another object, and so the self obeys those same laws; thus you see the self as an object, a passive entity, and all of this follows. Making the self thus passive is, I think, a necessary step to making man a fit subject for scientific study, but it is totally inappropriate for a metaphysical account of the way we are able to do things, the way in which we have abilities. Presumably such a person would say that they must be seen as expressed by counterfactuals in a wholly determined way; I, on the other hand, had always thought of abilities as potentialities, potential acts which happen if the agent wills them: E. g., Playing a musical instrument.

I believe that for any experience to be possible, our wills must be free (do I hear cries of "Magician's hat argument!"). The alternative as I see it is to be able to attend to things in accordance with a strict frame-work of selection through which our various perceptions are selected; the whole being governed by strict causal laws. What this picture misses out is the way in which we are able to direct our awareness, and also the awareness we have of doing things; this is the ability to distinguish between the active and the passive. I have no power to make anyone believe what I am saying, but if someone is a determinist of the above kind, then I should suggest that his or her picture of the self is radically different from mine. I would accuse him or her of making experiences fit an *a priori* notion: "All events are caused causes of other events". While I would agree with this with regard to the majority of things, with regard to the will, I would say that it is a inappropriate picture, my experience shows me that I am free.

I say this because it seems to me that the notion of determinism and the notion of the free will, are trying to account for the position of the self in the world. Now since there seems too little the one can say which the other cannot account for, I think we ought to be guided by our experience; our experience is first of being free, we learn that the world is not free in the same way that we are — it is the discovery that we fall if we jump off a bed or something like that. My point is that it is not as if we are all born determinists, that comes later. Since freedom of the will is the more elementary hypothesis, our world is structured from the inside out, it ought to be the one which we adopt.

There are several other ways in which the rival hypotheses may be assessed; one which favours the free will party is that the determinist has a very hard time talking about Truth. Put simply the argument is that in order to be able to say that something is true, we have to stand outside the system in which the thing is true, or in which it happens, and then say that it is true, but if we could never stand outside the system we could never say that things were true or false; everything would have to present itself as just being the case. There would be no possibility of realising that one had made a mistake, which one made with all the data to hand, if you really did have all the data, and continued to make a mistake, the determinist would have to say that you are bound to continue to make that mistake. But this is not so, consider a mathematical puzzle where you have all the data in front of you, and where you make a mistake because you are not attending. We can make mistakes when we have all the possible data in front of us; this is fine for the determinist, so long as you don't suddenly realise your mistake, and get the sum right. The explanations of the determinist sound faintly absurd at this point, that it was something we ate or the way a photon of light was affecting our eye...

Of course a determinist could say something like what we had for lunch made us think as we think, and do what we do. I would reply "our meals incline, but do not necessitate". I can still reason even after a particularly bad concoction of mine.

Fundamentally the difference between the determinist and the person who believes in free will is here accounted for, but I do not know whether this decides between them, by saying that the person who believes in the freedom of the will is working from the self to the world, and the determinist is working from the world to the self. I know where I stand, and it must be pretty obvious... (P. S. I hope you found this article as annoying as I did when typing it out..DOD)

D. J. O'Dempsey. (Clare)

Notes: ¹ I should have said 'folk' or 'person'

² "Leaving together

Headpiece filled with straw." T.S. Eliot: THE HOLLOW MEN.

³ This could remain because it is an external description of an action, we can say that someone's action if drunk, isn't voluntary, but I would say that it is free, for there is a choice, however muddled, to do it or to forebear; since it is not on whether the action was chosen, and so free, that we make our decisions as to responsibility, it is perfectly possible for determinism to keep the notion of responsibility. The important point is that the ascription of "voluntary" to an action is a third person job, whereas the ascription of freedom to the self is a first person activity.

DOD.

NOZICK'S "PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS".

"It's trendy" is the reason given for the request of Nozick's new book for the faculty library. There are other aspects to the book, mostly unrecognised by those who have not read it. It is a large book in every sense. The seven-hundred and fifty pages (a dauntingly large number) cover many issues of prime philosophical importance: free will, personal identity, knowledge and scepticism, and the foundations of ethics. Its more successful parts develop the thinking of recent American pragmatic philosophy in interesting and successful ways.

The "trendiness" consists in Nozick's attempt to develop a philosophy that seeks explanation rather than proof. While this is admirable it is hardly a new idea. In seeking to reap the benefits of different approaches to a problem, rather than simply refuting opponents, he is doing no more than any adequate account of an issue should. It is doubtful, for instance, whether Moore's 'proof of an external world' adds much to the philosophical debate for this same reason. Where Nozick goes beyond this he uses the excuse of possible insights as a pretext for tentative rambling which achieves little. It is also a pretext for an eclecticism which does little to advance the argument of the book. In treating 'nothing' as a species of 'something' in an Heideggerish manner, he creates only obscurity. Similarly, the frequent references to Eastern philosophy and Nozick's assorted collection of Greek heroes reveals his personal tastes and little else. (We know a lot about Nozick by the end of the book: about his family, travels, political views and academic record).

The chapter most marred by these faults is that concerning the foundations of Ethics. Here Nozick presents, in nearly two hundred pages, a theory of value as organic unity. This does explain how the world has value in the way Nozick would like it to have, and this gives him scope to idolise the spiritually

superior to put the taking of government funds for the purpose of accademic research on the same moral plane as stealing. However the theory is an old one, and he does not even attempt to defend it against standard objections such as the incommensurability of different sorts of organic unity.

This is an easy book to criticise, but there is also much of great worth in it. Of metaphilosophical interest is a fruitful account of self-sustaining explanatory principles, and as analysis of the different ways of structuring philosophical explanation which apply to a suprisingly wide range of problems. The chapter on personal identity presents a "closest-continuer" theory, where problem cases (such as brain transplants) are solved by taking the best candidate as the continuer, providing he is close enough. This solves many of the traditional cases, but there are two problems. First, if y and z tie as to being the closest continuer of x, Nozick does not allow either to be x. Thus should half of x's brain be taken from his dying body and implanted in the brainless body of y, y is the closest continuer. Yet should half of x's brain, the other half, be implanted in z, then x has no closest continuer, and a double success is counted as a failiure. Second, if we give up the sort of essentialism that only allows y to be x if it is impossible that there be a closest continuer, namely z, then there is an arbitrariness in not allowing y to be x if the closest continuer z died very soon after x did. The advantages of the theory are that it accounts for the feelings of care which are attached by us to our closest continuer, and the allowance of different metrics (weightings for physical and mental continuer) for different people fits in with Nozick's rather strange theory of a self as delimiting the boundaries of his self in an act of reflexive self-reference.

The chapter on knowledge and scepticism is the most intesting in the book. Nozick uses a modified causal account of explain knowledge. A subject S knows that a statement P is true if (1) P is true, (2) S believes that P is true, (3)if P were not true, then it is not the case that S would believe P is true, and (4) if P were to be the case, then S would believe P, and it is false that S would believe that not-P. This theory successfully solves many problem cases. The drawback is the appeal to closest possible worlds, where is left vague how far out are the alternatives that need to be considered. Yet it is intuitively satisfy- ing and explains how the skeptc can be defused. While it is true that we do not know that a sceptical possibility (such as being in a tank on Alpha Centauri being neurophysiologically stimulated by mad scientists) it does not mean that we do not know obvious facts about the world. I know there is a chair before me because if there were not, I would not believe there was in a close possible world where everything is the same apart from the non-existence of the chair.

It is for the interesting and well argued chapters, those concernin personal identity, knowledge and scepticism, and free will, that this book is well worth reading, and not for the wild woolly and "trendy".

H. Evans. (Corpus)

FRONLINE COLUMN. "Philosophy in action"

Dear Paul,

I have an admirer, and I am having difficulties in keeping her off, but interested; she is so persistant, only the other day she wrote to me:

"I love you,
Therefore I am a lover,
All the world loves a lover,
You are all the world to me
Consequently
You love me"

Is she right? What shall I do?

Philo

Dear Philo,

Just remember that logic tells us nothing about the world, so that the third premise must be false.

Try not to worry,

Paul.

WITTGENSTEIN'S "TRACTATUS" AS A THEORY.

It is vital to an understanding of Wittgenstein's early work to see him as heir to the logic of Frege and Russell. It was Russell's mathematical work which attracted Wittgenstein to Cambridge in 1912. The work culminating in the "Tractatus" occurred between then and 1918, when the book was completed.

Among the early ideas of Wittgenstein which sprang from this source is the concept of a logically perfect language: "All philosophy is a 'critique of language'...It was Russell who performed the service of showing that the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real one." (TLP, 4.0031). This notion, which once admitted, colours all our logical enterprises, is perhaps the most strongly repudiated by Wittgenstein in his later years.

What would a logically perfect language be like? It would, I think, be one which perfectly mirrored the structure of reality. Its range of expression would be coextensive with the range of meaningful talk. It would, of course, possess properties like being non-ambiguous, but perhaps these are mere consequences of the first two.

The idea of a language whose structure was that of reality and which could therefore in some sense 'underlie' all natural languages, is close to the heart of Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus'. The set of statements which Wittgenstein makes can be seen as forming a theory of this language.

Terms occurring in a theory can be defined merely by their position in the theory. A term in a number of statements which are theorems. The term will then denote anything, the substitution of which will make all these statements true. It is often hoped that such implicit definitions will be categorical; that is, that there will be only one interpretation which will make all the statements true. But the fact that this is not the case need not devalue a theory for certain purposes.

(A) — "A logical picture of facts is a thought" (3), "The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world" (3.01), "A proposition is a picture of reality. A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it" (4.01).

(B) — "The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition, asserts the existence of a state of affairs" (4.21), "an elementary proposition...is...a concatenation of names" (4.22), "A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions (An elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself)" (5).

These two groups of quotations represent two of the most basic strands of thought in the 'Tractatus'. We may see them, in the light of the Frege/Russell inheritance, as relating to the classical or correspondence theory of truth (A) and to the concept of truth-functionality as the basis of complex propositions, found in those two writers (B).

These two concepts, as developed by Wittgenstein, form what we might call the generating concepts of the theory represented by the 'Tractatus'. The core of the theory is necessarily generated by these conceptions of language.

Wittgenstein develops the notion of 'correspondence' via the metaphor of the picture, and the concept of logical form— that which two things must share for one to be capable of representing the other.

Wittgenstein's development of the truth-functional production of all propositions from elementary propositions has been subjected to a great deal of powerful and detailed criticism. So, also, has the general notion of truth-functionality; but perhaps less conclusively and certainly less fairly.

The contempt in which the idea of language as truth-functional is held, seems to hint at a confusion with a simpler thesis. This simpler thesis

involves truth-functionality as it occurs in elementary logic - a compound proposition is a truth-function of its elements if, given the truth-value of its elements, the truth-value of the compound is also given.

But the constituents of propositions to which Wittgenstein refers, need not be their apparent, linguistic constituents. To take the common example "A believes that p", taking believes as an operator, this patently is not a truth-function of the parts of the sentence, but to the many smaller states of affairs that go to make up the state of affairs described by "A believes that p". It is of these that the proposition is a truth-function. "Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it... (4.002)"

Wittgenstein never attempts to describe, directly, elementary propositions. If the atomic facts are read as sense-data, then the theory gives us a result, phenomenalism and the principle of verifiability.

We shouldn't ask if this is what Wittgenstein meant - that is biological. What we can ask is if this interpretation makes true all the "theorems" - the assertions of the *Tractatus*. The answer to this determines whether or not the suggested interpretation is a viable account of a truth-functional, correspondence theory of language. With the example of positivism there is reason to think the answer is "no". It is in this way that the theory, though non-categorical, yields positive results.

Finally, it should be understood that I don't suggest Wittgenstein thought of the *Tractatus* as a test for theories of language - it's obvious from his writings that he didn't. I don't even say that he thought of its theory as non-categorical, though this does seem plausible. I merely suggest that, as an artefact, this is what has been produced. If one is interested in the correspondence theory, or in the notion of truth-functionality, then the thoughts in the *Tractatus* demand attention.

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P. Griffiths. (Trinity Hall)

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| <p>P V - P ENTERPRISES PRESENT ANOTHER DAZZLING SEASON OF WIT MIRTH AND CONVIVIAL DISCUSSIONS.</p> |
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There will be two meetings a week this term, held at various venues; the following is only a rough list. For more detailed information see the notice board in the faculty library at the beginning of this term and subsequently for any last minute changes.

- RICHARD KURTI (he did promise to do the first...) PSYCHOANALYSIS & PHILOSOPHY (8.30 p.m.) THURSDAY 22nd
- ANNE MURPHY: INDUCTION Sunday 25th 2.30pm Emmanuel
- GERRY GLEESON: CHRISTIAN ETHICS Thursday 29th April 8.00pm
- MARY PEGLER: FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY. Sunday 2nd May, 2.30.
- DECLAN O'DEMPSEY: ESSENTIALISM Thursday 6th 8.00pm Clare 0 5.
- RICHARD DAVIES: to be announced Sunday 9th
- DAVID OWENS: to be announced Thursday 13th
- HUGH EVANS: to be announced Sunday 16th
- PAUL MARTIN: to be announced Thursday 20th

Then we stop for exams, and carry on ad lib...

If anyone wants to have a discussion on anything to do with philosophy, then contact anyone on that list, and we all can arrange a time.

P v - P enterprises ltd.

PERSONAL IDENTITY AS SOCIAL CONVENIENCE.

It is worth looking at the question of personal identity from at least two different points of view: the purely logical aspect which aims to 'force' us upon pain of irrationality to accept certain criteria as being logically necessary or sufficient for personal identity; and the more 'common sense' aspect which looks at the problem more in terms of what criteria are *reasonable* for personal identity.

Traditionally the criteria for personal identity have been divided into *bodily identity*, and *psychological identity*, and philosophers have fought over which of these are necessary/sufficient for identity. Prof Williams in his article "Personal identity and Individuation" shows how the possibility of duplication of memory claims and other psychological states makes psychological identity an inadequate criterion for 'forcing' personal identity: by definition identity must distinguish *individuals* from other individuals.

This conclusion leads Williams to state that bodily identity is a necessary condition of personal identity; however, he carefully avoids giving us a definition of what constitutes bodily identity. He merely says "The criterion of bodily identity itself I take for granted. I assume that it includes the notion of spatio-temporal continuity, *however that notion is to be explained*". How is 'that notion' to be explained? in such a way that it can withstand rigorous logical grilling similar to that which Williams gives to the criteria for psychological identity?

On a microscopic level the body is constantly undergoing tremendous changes: cells are dying and being replaced, fluids are moving about, the various organs are constantly changing: emotions, thoughts, perceptions, and attitudes are being constantly revised. Is it possible to take any part of this mass of mental activity that is stable and label this the essential part of a person?

In terms of rigorous logical requirement then, it seems that there is no such thing as identity; there is only change. This problem can be traced back to the greek philosopher Heraclitus. The problem Heraclitus faced was this:

How can a thing change without losing its identity? If it remains the same it does not change; yet if it loses its identity then it is no longer *that* thing which has changed.

This problem led Heraclitus to distinguish between appearance and reality. In reality, he said, everything is change; everything is the everlasting fire. Opposites are only apparent; in truth all things arteone, they are all part of the processes of the world, the everlasting fire.

The problem is thus resolved: there are no unchanging things; what appears to us to be a 'thing' is in fact a process. Matter is really like a flame; for a flame seems to be a material thing, but it is not, it is a process, it is in flux... it is like a river.

This seems to be the conclusion we reach the 'iron rails of logic'. However, the question then arises "How are we to use the concept of identity? How are we able to distinguish between one process and another?" I think the answer is that we identify things *under concepts*, which are to a certain extent arbitrary. We can choose which concepts we apply, although factors such as the size of human beings (an atom would have a different notion of personal identity to human beings) and the way our minds work affect how we view the world and what order we impose on it. 'Identity' only has any meaning once we have established a concept under which to define it; there are no right or wrong concepts, only different ones: you pay your money and you make your choice!

Some examples might help to clarify this: Example (1) Consider the ship sailing round the world and gradually being rebuilt at sea. a) If the criterion for identity is defined in terms of function, then the ship that sets out *is* the same ship as the ship that returns. b) If the criterion of identity is a strictly material one, then the ship is changing its identity all the time as it is worn down by the elements.

If the criterion is 'Approximate Material Resemblance', then the ship changes its identity somewhere during the voyage, during the rebuilding.

example (2) Consider Williams' Charles/Robert/Guy Fawkes example:

- a) If the criterion of personal identity is approximate psychological similarity then Charles and Robert are both Guy Fawkes.
- b) If the criterion is *exact* psychological similarity, then not only are Charees, Robert and Guy Fawkes all different from one another, but they are also changing their identities continually..

example (3) Consider the case where X's brain is transferred into Y's body:

- a) If psychological similarity is the criterion of personal identity, then "Y's-body-with-X's-brain" is X.
- b) If bodily similarity is the criterion, then "Y's-body-with-X's" is Y.

The concept of personal identity, then, seems to be a very fluid concept; but this has important consequences in real life outside philosophy when social issues such as legal responsibility need to be decided. For example, can a man or woman be imprisoned for life for something he/she did when he/she was young, or is the older person sufficiently different from the younger to really be called a different person? How binding should such contracts as marriage be? Can a divorce be granted on the grounds that the two people now married are not the same people that got married so many years ago? perhaps the fluidity of the concept of personal identity will enable us to choose the particular concept we require for a particular purpose, just as Parfit uses it to justify utilitarianism.

Certainly, it is an interesting question and deserves more attention.

R. Kurti (Kings)

"Al-Shirwāni is...a late medieval Persian scholar...who must be considered obscure in view of his near total absence from the manuscript tradition. One item of biographical information which can be gleaned from our text (*The Sun Epistle*) is that the author is the great-grandson of Al-Ṣadr al-Shirwāni Ṣadiq ibn Fayḍ ibn Muḥammad Amin, also otherwise unknown."

H. Rescher (*Modal Syllogistic in Arabic Philosophy*)

P E E W!

"Thank goodness that's over".....Oh shut up!.. Sorry.

TWO TYPES OF METAPHYSICIAN.

There is a perfectly serious point of view to the effect that we can do without metaphysics altogether. Anything transcendent is of no interest: it does not affect our everyday life, and everyday life should be sufficient to occupy our minds. Metaphysics is the child of idleness or excessive inquisitiveness. But I am fairly sure that you, because you are reading this paper, have some inkling that there are questions — though open or unanswerable questions — which are traditionally called metaphysical.

When a philosopher approaches one of these questions he does something very different from what a novelist does when a metaphysical novel is in the offing. The philosopher may begin by figuring out just what the question is. He is

He is concerned to have a verbal formulation which is both precise and intelligible. Thus, he may distinguish the questions, "Why is the world as it is?", "Why is the world at all?", "How did the world come to be as it is?" and "What can we know about the answers to these questions?" He may then proceed to formulate ideas about the priority of his questions. For example, he may say that only by trying to answer these first three questions can we discover the answer to the last of them; but he might equally well ask what sorts of things we can know and see whether the 'big' questions are compatible with his epistemology.

The philosopher tries to consider all the hypotheses and then tries to reduce them all to rubble. He advances in a slow, purely linear way, if at all. The "Ethics" of Spinoza is a prime example of this painfully cautious process. Showing that the contrary of one's suppositions leads to absurdity is nine-tenths of the law. There can be no half-measures: truth and falsity cannot be the criteria. A true metaphysic is no better than a false one. Things are true or false according to whether they are part of the metaphysical scheme. What the philosopher needs is an unavoidable, necessary metaphysic; one whose denial is nonsense.

In exposing the the world must be, the metaphysician has to find a point of departure, even if it is entirely outside human experience. Leibniz, had he done for himself what Russell did for him, would have begun with his abstract logical axioms. Out of these undeniable verities, he would have constructed his system. So long as each step were truth-preserving, his conclusions would have been ineluctable.

But the traditional scholastic mode of metaphysics is obviously a very peculiar carry-on. Deadly serious but abnormal. A clash of metaphysical systems is undecidable. A says that there is one substance; B says there are two; C says that there are none at all, and that all is illusion; and D says that there are infinitely many. But there is nothing to get hold of here: metaphysicians talk at cross-purposes. Thus we get antinomies and there is nothing we can do about them.

By contrast, the method of the novelist seems to be perfectly clear. He writes a story which is more or less conformable to our beliefs about the way things are, have been, or will be disposed in the world. He does not ask us to believe that the things he describes actually occurred or that the things he names did, do, or will exist. He seems to be merely presenting a story. My own priggish bigotry is that these stories are only worth reading when they say something important. The time spent is wasted otherwise.

The question then arises of what can be important in a work in which not even the author believes. To this, I can give two replies without launching into examples. First, many novels have a point to do with what morals are. This does not mean that the novelist has privileged access to ethical knowledge. I merely mean that his considerations of what makes people do what they do are often enlightening. Illustrations of out-of-the-way dilemmas, untoward behaviour and "heightened" mental states spark off questions in the reader about what he would do under such circumstances and about whether humans are in fact capable of certain actions and convictions. Can a man act gratuitously? Can a man really embrace what he knows to be evil? What rights do men have? Can they be taken away? How are people to treat others and themselves? How is sin atoned?

On the other hand, if we stop to consider what a writer has led us to suspend disbelief about and try to work out the scheme of the events he portrays, we often find a metaphysical question lurking unformulated. The author may play with causality so as to give his story the air of being made up of a series of providential events, so we ask why we believe in causality. If there is no causality but only divine providence, what is God up to? If there is no God what is life for? Is one solution to the question of futility as good as another? If there is just a chaos of blind matter, how can we account for the fact that men have faith or for the interconnections of events — for happy endings or for tragedy? &c.

But with both of these broad topics, the authorial subliminal is not part of what he says. And if I say that it is the way he says it — what he shows by his story's being as it is — I am liable to two sorts of criticism. First, it is claimed that the whole of the text is merely what I glean from my interpretation: its only meaning is the one given to it by the reader. So my claim that my favourite novels are metaphysical is nothing but a statement of my interest in metaphysics. If I find no metaphysics in the novels of Barbara Cartland, it is because either my own metaphysical views get in the way or because I have not exerted myself sufficiently. On the other hand, if the author's intention at the time of writing and the text he has established are the only important things, I may be completely mistaken in thinking that my favourite authors were troubled by metaphysical doubts. Though I need not establish by mere quotation what novel x is about the meaning-of-life or what-have-you, it is required by this school of thought that there be a higher likelihood that the author would have agreed or that the analogies I draw between the form of the novel and the form of the question be sufficiently close.

It is not for me to decide between these two literery theories here. But on both accounts my view of what makes novels worth the time expended has at least a chance.

In sum, if it is true that some novels have metaphysical content, there are two ways of approaching questions to do with being, nothingness, the meaning and the structure of teh world. And I am not sure that the difference should not be that between *readable fiction* and *unreadable fiction*.*

**(We are sure that this article is written with both sexes in mind — Ed)*

R. DAVIES. (Trinity)

The editor would like to thank all the contributors to this first edition; you may have noticed that most of the... well, in fact all articles were by members of the first year. Does this bode ill? What happens to philosophers when they hit the second and third years? Is there life after Part One A? These are the important questions and ones which can only be answered in the next edition.....

More seriously, we would like to thank the faculty secretary for all her help; this was an unforgivable omission on our part and one for which we hope that this makes amends.

A DIALOGUE BETWEEN BEN AND DOMINIC ABOUT THE
NATURE OF A WORK OF ART.

BEN: I and some friends had a very interesting discussion the other day as to what, quite generally, constitutes a work of art.

DOMINIC: Quite a subject! Did you all agree on anything about it?

B: Well, we did seem to be able to agree on one point: that a work of art was a human artefact. And we seemed, tentatively, to think that it was only contingently true that some higher animals don't produce them. So we concluded that works of art were artefacts of intelligences, so as not to seem too arrogant!

D: But there are a pretty large number of "human artefacts" floating around which I, for one, wouldn't want to call works of art.

B: Well, I'm not doing anything for an hour, so waat else do you think something...

BEN.....: needs to be a work of art?

DOM: Well, perhaps we should try defining artefacts of some kind apart from artworks. Given the presupposition that someone has to have made it, a type of artefact is defined by its function. Take knives: you'd have trouble getting any non-functional definition of 'knife' to cover a Gurkha-knife, and an electric bread-knife, and a cheese knife made from a bit of wire and two wooden pegs; or a household god, an idol, I can't see what makes a household god a household god except what it was once used for...

BEN: Well, that's all very well, but just what do you reckon a work of art is "for" I thought the whole point was that they aren't a great deal of use?

DOM: That's a pretty restricted concept of 'use'. Try this: a work of art has an end with regard to the artist and also with regard to the audience. The artist wants to put something into the artefact, and the audience wants to get something, I won't say that they want the same thing, out of it. Now I'm talking mainly about poetry, which I know about, but I'll try to extend what I say to visual art to get a bit more generality. I just hope I don't show my ignorance!

All poems, even surrealist poems, use words that mean something. All pictures are just that, pictures; they picture something. Now an abstract, I think, can be seen as a picture of 2 dimensional colour patches. And a "concrete poem", as they call them, is about words *per se*, or about mere shapes on the page. I think here we sort of 'take the material for our content', a sort of reflexive process, I think Peter Fuller has a big latinism for it, but I'll just call it narcissistic, or masturbatory, if you'll excuse the phrase!

Just for a minute lets talk about representative art. Each poem says something, each picture pictures something. Now as far as representation goes, this, our subject, could be common to a number of verbal or pictorial artefacts, some of them I'd call works of art, and some I wouldn't. The point is this: how the artist says it or pictures it; the factors that the various alternatives don't have in common. Now I don't think its going to do any good to talk about better art being 'truer'. The work of art might be a perfect, detailed, picture or it might be an impression, or even a deliberate distortion. I think the range available is most obvious if you think about sculpture.

Essentially, what I'm getting at is this: what we choose as subject and the particular words or images we use to represent it; the angle, that is, from which we take it, and finally the medium and its mechanics; the sounds, forms and patterns of my words, or the physical reality of my painting, its surface and colour; these three levels all act together to create the individual artwork, that to which a single title belongs. And all these come together to produce what the art aims at: the expression of something over and above the facts by the creator, and the perception of something over and above the facts, not necessarily the same thing, mind you, by the audience.

BEN: My Goodness; that was something of an answer! But what about abstract art; I think I can see what you're going to say...

DOM: Yes, well in pure abstraction, or purely meaningless verse, I think we're just using the last of the three elements I talked about, in itself; seeing what they can hold and express. I think that when we get concerned over issues in the world, or are really moved by something concrete, some of that has to come back into our work. Especially if we're concerned with our audience, and not just self-expression, then we want to use the medium itself to 'colour' as it were, the facts that we represent in it, to say something that, while it's over and above the facts we depict, is still in some sense about them, or goes through them to give an attitude to some wider fact or issue.

BEN: Hm... that's pretty well what I expected. So that's the aim of your artistic artefacts. But what if they don't achieve their aim, are you sure you aren't ruling out bad art if you define it like that?

DOM: Yes; of course, that is a point. Come to think of it, I can think of critics who'd actually have done that, ruled out bad things as art, or "Art" with the capital 'A'. But it's like other artefacts; the aim is enough. A blunt knife doesn't fail to be a knife, it just becomes a bad one. Of course, unless we could see from its shape that it was trying to be a knife, we wouldn't know; like some poems I've

DOM:...read, only the linestop, capital letters and so on, stop you taking it for a police statement.

BEN: And another thing, what if we find artefacts that were made for a quite utilitarian end, but now figure as elements of some considerable importance in art? Such things might be found in architecture; we go to great lengths today to preserve some medieval brickwork, build it into a new building like sculpture.

DOM: Perhaps this and your last idea could be answered at the same time. As artefacts, works of art require creators, and to be works of art they require the effects I tried to describe. Perhaps we need to say that the effects must be intended by the author of the work if its to qualify as a work of art?

BEN: But there's a common example that won't be stopped by that - 'objet trouve'. What about the urinal signed by the surrealist? that's an artefact, it has a dramatic effect on the audience, and the artist intends it to have just this effect. I know you're hostile to calling that a piece of artwork, but you can't really avoid doing so.

DOM: Goodness, yes, I can't say I'm too keen on hanging those on my wall. But the author of the work is surely the person whose skill is the primary input giving it its artistic effect, and he, in this case a potter or team of potters, hardly intends the effect the urinal has when we come across it in the Hayward exhibition!

BEN: Very neat. Well, I've no more objections at present, though I'm not sure I shan't think of some. So what have we got? Art works are artefacts which express for their creator something over and above the facts they represent, and give to their audience something, but not necessarily the same thing, over and above what they represent. And finally, that they have effects of this nature must be the intention of the person primarily responsible for them being such as to have those effects? How does that sound?

DOM: Just two points: as you've said yourself, if they fail to have any effect on their audience they aren't discredited as works of art, and of course we all know that writers or artists often can't see what the effect that they have on their audience will be. So perhaps it's more the fact that, for him or her, the artefact expresses these things that defines the artist's intentions, not the effects they have on the audience?

BEN: Yes, but I think that we should try to say that it must be conceivable, to the artist, that someone may receive from the artwork something like that which he or she got into it, as a condition of its being an artwork, rather than an object of sentimental value to him or her.

DOM: Well,... I'm not sure we've reached the truth, but I hope that this will give you something to take back to your friends; it's been nice to air my views, for sure,...I hope you got something out of it.....

P. E.Griffiths (trinity Hall)

This really is the end, and so ma, I, the typist, make an appeal? my back being half broken...(on that up, get on with it) CALLING ALL PHILOSOPHICAL TYPISTS... could you please volunteer to do some of the typing for this magazine, the more who come forward the easier the production of the thing will be....(B.V.) Contact me .

THE EDITORS FOR THE NEXT ISSUE ARE

SARAH TAMBURI, (JESUS) STEVE MULVEX (I hope that's spelt correctly) and JON KAROVSKI (again I hope correctly spelt) All articles and jokes should be got to them before the end of this term. Look at the faculty notice boards for details
