Dualism in Tibetan Cosmogonic Myths
and the Question of Iranian Influence

PER KVAERNE

It is generally supposed that a number of cultural elements, including certain religious ideas, have entered Tibet at some point of time from Iran, or, more vaguely, from the "Iranian world."

However, the facts have been—and are—elusive. It is not a question of a massive and easily distinguishable influence, as is the case with the cultural influence emanating from India or China. On the contrary, it is a question of disparate elements which may, moreover, have been transmitted indirectly and reached Tibet at different times.

The need to formulate more precise questions when discussing the "Iranian influence" should, therefore, be emphasized. Instead of speaking, in a general way, of "Iranian" elements, we should start asking questions such as: at what historical time did the element in question reach Tibet—before the establishment of the national dynasty in the 7th century AD, during the dynastic period, or possibly even after the disintegration of the Tibetan empire in the 9th century? From what part of the Iranian world did the transmission take place: from Persia itself, or from Central Asian centres such as Khotan? Perhaps the transmission was indirect—through Kashmir, or China, or through the Uighurs? Again, the Iranians themselves may only have transmitted influences the sources of which lie further west—say, in Mesopotamia or in the Byzantine empire. And what is meant by "origins" anyway? Certain ideas, for example those connected with the nature and function of the king, are important in the history of Iranian culture and have assumed specific forms in the various Iranian empires; nevertheless they have their ultimate source in the civilizations of the ancient Near East.

If we assume that an Iranian influence, in one form or another, has been present in the course of Tibet's history, two criteria should be insisted on: we should only accept instances of such influence which are reasonably certain because they are specific, and which have been transmitted in a way and at a time which can be reasonably well established. Although there doubtlessly are others, I will limit myself to pointing out two instances which seem to me to be particularly well documented and which possess these two criteria.
The first concerns Tibetan medicine and has been dealt with by Christopher I. Beckwith in his article “The Introduction of Greek Medicine into Tibet in the Seventh and Eighth Centuries” (Beckwith 1979). As pointed out by R.A. Stein as early as 1962 (Stein 1962:40), Tibetan historians, starting with Dpa'-bo gtsug-lag 'phreng-ba (16th century), inform us that among the physicians attached to the court in the royal period was a certain Ga-le-nos. This is obviously the greek Galenos. While this name probably refers to the medical tradi-
tion of Galenos rather than to a particular person, there is no doubt, as Beckwith concludes, “that at the Tibetan court the Greek medical tradition was sufficiently well known to be esteemed more highly than either the Indian or the Chinese tradition” (Beckwith 1979:301). However, how was a Greek medical tradition transmitted to Tibet? Ga-le-nos is said to have originated from “Khrom in Stag-gzig,” “Khrom or Stag-gzig,” or simply from “Tazig.” While Khrom ultimately is derived from “Rome” and should, strictly speaking, designate the Byzantine empire, Stag-gzig indicates Iran or the Muslim Caliphate. However, the two terms tend to be confused in Tibetan as well as Chinese tradition. It therefore seems likely that the direct source of the Greek medical tradition in Tibet was Iranian. This is supported by the title of the successor of Galenos at the Tibetan court, which is given as Bi-ji. This obviously non-Tibetan word may quite reasonably be taken as a rendering of Sogdian ḵyč, “physician.” It would seem that this Bi-ji came to Tibet via China (Beckwith 1979:303), which is not surprising since “Persian or Arab doctors could be found not only in Ch’ang-an, the T’ang capital, but in nearly every port of China” (Beckwith 1979:297).

The other instance I want to mention is the use of the lion in Tibetan myth and ritual. R.A. Stein has pointed out that during the eighth century several elements of the Iranian New Year rites, including the lion dance and what he calls “the mythology of the lion” travelled from Iran to Turkistan—Samarkand, Kucha, Turfan—and thence to China and Tibet (Stein 1972:60, 218-219). Once again, we have specific historical evidence: from the beginning of the ninth century Chinese sources report that the Chinese army on the Tibetan-Chinese border not far from Ch’ang-an was entertained by a lion dance performed by what were probably Sogdians (Demiéville 1952:206 n.2). As a symbol of power, the lion is of Mesopotamian origin; transmitted via Iran, Turkestan, and China it became the national symbol of Tibet, a country in which the actual animal is unknown.

These instances of Iranian influence, which would appear to be reasonably certain, have two traits in common: firstly, they were transmitted via China (and not, as far as can be seen, through—for example—Western Tibet) in the period of the Tibetan empire, and, secondly, they only marginally concern religious ideas.
However, it is precisely in the sphere of religious ideas, and not least that of mythology, that various authors have taken an Iranian influence for granted. In Tibetan cosmogonic myths, i.e. myths which relate how the world came into being, we regularly find an opposition between light and darkness, good and evil, often personified as two demiurgic figures, a Lord of Light whose creation is good, and a Lord of Darkness whose corresponding activity is harmful. In other words, we find a dualistic scheme which cannot fail to call the well-known Iranian dualism to mind, and I would like to devote the rest of my paper to this particular question.

I hasten to confess that I have myself until recently been among those who have brought an ‘‘Iranian connection’’ into play in order to explain such myths (Kvaerne 1981). However, I have had good company. As early as 1949, Giuseppe Tucci wrote a chapter in Tibetan Painted Scrolls entitled ‘‘The Origin of Mankind and some Iranian Influences’’ (Tucci 1949:730-731), in which, having given a resume of a cosmogonic myth to which we shall return, he concluded that ‘‘the parallelism with Iranian ideas concerning the creation of the god of evil and the good god is so evident that we need not dwell upon it.’’ In 1970 he returned to the same myth in his Die Religionen Tibets (Tucci 1970, quoted from Tucci 1980:214) stating: ‘‘Other, clearly older, elements indicate perceptible influences of Iranian beliefs, especially, it would seem, those of Zurvanism.’’ He also suggests the way such influences were transmitted to Tibet: ‘‘These came about either through contacts with Central Asiatic peoples, through the intermediation of Manicheism, which was widespread in these regions, or later on, through the influence of the Uighurs’’ (Tucci 1980:271 n. 5).

In 1975, Helmut Hoffmann emphasized the Iranian element in Tibetan religion, particularly the Bon religion (Hoffmann 1975). ‘‘The Bon religion seems to have been a rather primitive animism, but by the time Zhang-zhung was incorporated into the new Tibetan empire the religion must have undergone certain changes connected with the adoption of ideas from Iran and India. This is not surprising since the western Himalayan districts were at all times open to the neighbouring Iranian peoples (as shown, for instance, by the Sogdian Nestorian inscription in Ladakh) . . .’’ (Hoffmann 1975:102, my italics). He further states that ‘‘The great journey of gShen-rab to convert Tibet and adjacent countries is a replica of Padmasambhava’s conversion of the demons and spirits of Tibet, which in turn may have been inspired by Manicheism, a rather powerful religion in Inner Asia at that time’’ (Hoffmann 1975:103). He suggests that the use of divine pentads in Bon as well as in Buddhism ‘‘probably originated from Manicheism where the equivalent of the Primordial Buddha, the ‘‘Father of Greatness’’ or ‘‘Father of Light,’’ also has five spiritual sons which emanate form him’’ (Hoffmann 1975:106). Turning specifically to Bon cosmogonic myths, Hoffmann considers the influence of
Iranian religion to be "especially evident" (Hoffmann 1975:107). He, too, refers to the same myth that Tucci had presented, and concludes: "This myth is obviously a replica of primordial events as described in the documents of Zurvanism and Manicheism" (Hoffmann 1975:107).

In an excellent presentation of Tibetan religion published in 1976, Anne-Marie Blondeau likewise speaks of a type of Bon cosmogony that "reflects Zurvanistic influences probably transmitted by Manicheans installed in Central Asia" (Blondeau: 1976:313), and refers to myths of the same kind as that discussed by Tucci in 1949 and 1970. Finally, Samten G. Karmay, discussing a different Bonpo cosmogonic myth (but one which likewise has a dualistic structure) states that "what is certain is the Iranian influence of duality" (Karmay 1975:195).

In other words, an Iranian influence or element has generally been taken for granted in the case of Tibetan cosmogonic myths, in particular those with a clearly dualistic structure. Anticipating my conclusion, I would hasten to assert that we are in no position to exclude such an influence. It seems to me, however, that this influence has acquired, starting with Tucci's work in 1949, the status of an established truth, and it in the justification of this that I would like to question.

I would suggest that there are at least three weak points in this theory:

1. In contradistinction to names and terms of which the Chinese or Indian origin can be ascertained with absolute certainty, no name or term of Iranian origin has so far, to the best of my knowledge, been conclusively identified in Tibetan mythology. This point should be stressed, for the Mongolians do have such borrowings, e.g. the name of the chief of the 33 tengri, viz. Qormusta, who was very early recognized as identical with the Iranian Ahura Mazda (Heissig 1970:353). I admit that a possible exception might be the name Ye-smon rgyal-po, "King Yemôn," the primeval being born from the cosmic egg according to e.g. the Rlangs po-ti bse-ru (Tucci 1949:632; Macdonald 1959:438), whose name and extraordinary beauty call to mind "King Yima the glorious" (Yima xšaēta), the first man according to Iranian mythology. 1)

2. Secondly, other possible sources of influence have a claim to serious consideration—above all, Indian traditions of a dualistic kind, focussing on the struggle between devas and asuras, gods and demons, both as collective, anonymous groups, and as individual, mythologically elaborated figures. At the moment I can do no more than simply point this out. We should note, however, that in Tibetan mythology antagonistic forces often emerge from one or several cosmic eggs, and that the theme of cosmic eggs is present not only in Iranian and Middle Eastern mythology (as pointed out by Hoffmann 1975:108), but also in Indian mythology (to which Hoffmann likewise refers). On the other hand, R.A. Stein has also emphasized, in connection with certain mythological texts among the Tun-huang documents, the importance of
the model furnished by the Chinese concept of Yin and Yang (Stein 1971:505). However, we must keep in mind that this dualism does not imply the same kind of competitive struggle that is characteristic of Iranian dualism, but rather a complementarity and balance between two cosmic forces.

3. The third and perhaps most serious weakness is that there is no consensus as to what type of Iranian influence should be postulated. We have already seen that it has been suggested that Zurvanistic ideas might have been transmitted by Manicheism to Tibet (Tucci, Blondeau); other have stressed a direct Manichean influence (Hermanns 1965:130-131); Zoroastrianism has also been mentioned (Karmay 1975:194). In fact, the material does not seem to admit a closer identification of the precise type of Iranian influence we might be dealing with.

The basic problem, then, is that an Iranian element, even if we suppose that it actually is present in Tibetan mythology, remains extremely vague. It cannot be determined when it took place, nor where, nor how, nor what type of Iranian milieu it emanated from.

At this point I would like to mention a recent experience I had in following a lead which I thought might enable me to establish precisely such an element of specificity.

My attention was caught by the cosmogonic myth in the Klus-`bum (fol. 106a-108a of the Derge edition) which has been translated by Ariane Macdonald (Macdonald 1959:441-446). This is the very myth concerning which I have earlier quoted Tucci and which has been referred to by Blondeau. Following the translation of Macdonald (who does not invoke an Iranian influence or origin for the myth) we have the following sequence of events:

First there is a state of unstructured, unmanifested chaos. It is not emptiness, however, nor is it absolute non-existence, for the world already exists, but in a non-manifested condition of unmoving potentiality. There is thunder, lightning, rain, and frost, but not distributed according to the seasons. There are rivers, but they do not run; there are houses, but they have no openings; there are wild animals, but no one to hunt them; there are gods as well as demons, but they have no power as there is no one over whom their power may be exercised. There is food, but no one to eat it.

The myth then goes on to say that thereafter two lights, a "white" and a "black," arose, apparently of themselves, and from these two lights, after several transformations, two creators appeared, one good and the other one evil, who set about creating the world in which we live.

Now, returning to the idea of a non-manifested, potential existence, I unquestioningly accepted the translation to which I have just referred, and I even
paraphrased it in an article published in 1981 (Kvaerne 1981:251). Moreover, it later occurred to me that this idea of potential existence was a highly specific idea, one which would not be likely to arise simultaneously in several places. If an Iranian connection could be found at this point, we would, I felt, be treading on firm ground. To my mind an Iranian parallel immediately presented itself: the orthodox Zoroastrian cosmological doctrine according to which the world has come into being in two distinct stages, styled, in Pehlevi, mēnōk and gētik respectively. There is no need to enter into the subtleties of Zoroastrian theological speculation, nor into the discussion carried on by Iranologists concerning the proper understanding of these two important terms. We may, however, in a general way follow the interpretation of the Swedish Iranologist H.S. Nyberg when he states the “Creation is simply doubled. From the cosmogonic point of view, the cosmic stage styled mēnōk is prior to the gētik stage. All things exist in an embryonic or mēnōk stage before realizing themselves in the gētik stage. When our world assumed its present form, the universe was already there. All the universe had to do was to change its aspect: that which only existed in an invisible and hidden state became manifest” (Nyberg 1931:36).

I was very pleased with what I thought was a rather clever discovery on my part. Unfortunately, this euphoric condition did not last long. Having obtained a copy of the Tibetan text, I had the opportunity of reading the passage in question with the learned Bonpo scholar Tenzin Namdak during a visit to the Bonpo monastery in India in March 1984. Tenzin Namdak strongly emphasized the following point: the text actually describes not a transition from potential existence to manifested, structured existence, but a transition from a condition of non-existence or voidness, in which none of the phenomena mentioned exist in any form, to a state of existence in which all things—beneficial as well as harmful—come into being. Furthermore, he insisted that this transition from non-existence to existence—and not an opposition between light and darkness, good and evil, etc.—is the basic theme in all cosmogonies in Bonpo texts, although he did point out that once the world is created it usually is according to a dualistic scheme in which darkness and evil are associated with “non-existence” and light and goodness with “existence.”

It might of course be objected that with all due respect to Tenzin Namdak’s learning, his interpretation is precisely that: an interpretation of an early text in the light of later philosophic ideas. The fact remains, however, that when the text is scrutinized more closely, his interpretation appears to be preferable to that of MacDonald. I will illustrate this by means of a few examples (“M” is MacDonald’s translation; “T” is Tucci’s; the last translation in each case is my own):
'Klu-'bum' fol. 106a:

dang-po ci-yang mi-srid-pa-las/ srid-pa de-la yod bya-ste/

M: ‘‘D’abord, la création n’était pas créée. C’est cette création qu’on appelait ‘existence’.‘’

T: ‘‘In the beginning, existence did not exist’’

From primeval, absolute non-existence there (arose) existence, that which is called ‘being’.

gzung-du yang med/ dngos-po dang mtshan-ma yang med/ de-la yod dang med-pa gnis-ka mtshan-ma bzung-du med-pa-las srid ces bya-ste/ yod-pa dang snang-ba thams-cad de-nas srid-pa-las/

M: ‘‘Il n’y avait rien de tangible. Il n’y avait ni réalité ni signe. Comme (ce monde) ne possédait ni caractère d’existence, ni caractère de non-existence, on l’appela ‘le monde en puissance’ et tout ce qui existe, tout ce qui est visible en est sorti.’’

T: ‘‘there was nothing which could be perceived as existent and there was no appearance of which one could say that it was or that it was not’’

There was nothing that could be perceived, there was no substance or characteristic, in it the two characteristics of being and non-being could not be perceived—(yet) from it (arose) that which is called ‘existence’. Being and all visible things came into existence from that (primeval non-existence).

dus de-tsam-na nam-zla dus-bzhi rtag-tu mi’gyur/

M: ‘‘A cette époque, les quatre saisons ne se distinguaient pas.’’

T: ‘‘... nor the rotation of the seasons were yet known.’’

At that time, the four seasons did not continually change (as they do now—the reason being that at that time neither the seasons nor anything else existed).

rdo dang ri-rnams kyang ‘gul-zhing ldeg-pa yang med-do/

M: ‘‘Il y avait bien des pierres et des montagnes, mais elles ne se déplaçaient pas, ne s’ébranlaient pas.’’
As for stones and mountains, there was neither quaking nor trembling (because they had in fact not yet come into existence).

\textit{khang-khyim dang rtsig-pa dang yar-ba yang med-do/}

M: "Il y avait bien des maisons avec des murs, mais ils n’étaient pas déployés."

T: "there were no houses, no huts"

Houses, walls, and ruins (?) did not exist.

\textit{dab-chags dang ri-dags bshor-zhing gsod-pa yang med-do/}

M: "Il y avait bien des oiseaux et du gibier, mais il n’y avait (personne) pour les tuer à la chasse."

There was no hunting and killing of birds and game (because birds and game had not yet come into existence).

\textit{'dre zhes bya-ste ’gal-ba byed-pa yang med-do/}

M: "Il y avait bien ce qu’on appelle des démons ’Dre, mais ils ne pouvaient pas faire opposition."

T: "no bad influence caused by demons infested the earth"

There was no opposition (to the gods) by those called demons (since neither gods nor demons had come into existence).

These examples show that the translation which I have suggested, and which I believe corresponds to Tenzin Namdak’s understanding of the text, implies a rather different ontological first condition of existence than that implied by Macdonald’s translation, whereas Tucci, as we are now in a position to affirm, had understood the text correctly. This particular understanding of the text does not in itself leave the possibility of an Iranian influence out of the question, but the call for specific, reasonably certain proof of such an influence remains unanswered.

At this point in our discussion it is perhaps in order to emphasize that dualism is a phenomenon which has a wide occurrence in the history of religions. Here as elsewhere, similarity cannot in itself establish a genetic relationship. We should hesitate to postulate a borrowing or diffusion of ideas even if we
can pinpoint specific ideas which are held in common; we should also be able to establish how, when, and where the transmission of the ideas or elements in question has taken place.

As for the idea of dualism in cosmogonic myths, it is a well-known fact that we find the idea of an evil opponent of the good creator-god throughout large areas of Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Central and North Asia, and North America (Bianchi 1975:155-158). In Asia, this idea is found in particular among Altaic and Mongolian peoples. Often creation is regarded as the work of two brothers, the older being the evil creator, while the younger is the good creator-god (Lot-Falck 1976:965). Sometimes the evil creator, assimilated with the Christian devil, is believed to have damaged the good creator’s creation by introducing elements like disease, death, etc. (Harva 1938:114).

The basic question, which has been formulated very well by Jacques Duchesne-Guillemin (Duchesne-Guillemin 1970:634-635, see also Bianchi 1975:155-158), is the following: is this “Eurasian dualism” the result of diffusionistic borrowings from Iran, or is, on the contrary, Iranian dualism in its historical forms the result of a development from a common pre-historic substratum?

Several authors have firmly opted for the diffusionist theory, one of the most prominent being Mircea Eliade, who regards dualistic beliefs among Altaic peoples as an “evident” case of syncretism with Iranian ideas (Eliade 1970:104). He also includes Tibet in this movement of religious ideas: “Iranian religious ideas and cosmological concepts have been propagated towards Northwest India and Tibet as well as towards Central Asia and Siberia” (Eliade 1970:109). A more guarded stance is taken by Ugo Bianchi, who speaks of “a possibility, indeed a probability, of the existence of profound Manichaean as well as Zoroastrian influences (or even of Russian folklore, also of Bogomile origin)” in Central Asia (in which he does not, as far as I can gather, include Tibet) (Bianchi 1975:157).

On the other hand, Manabu Waida has recently suggested a different formula for understanding North Asian dualism: “... human life is viewed as a kind of battleground where good spirits and evil spirits are engaged in ongoing fights for existence. It is hardly surprising that the people of Central Asia and Siberia have, in general, been receptive to the message of the Iranian religions colored by a dualism which depicts the setting of human history as a battleground between the opposing forces of good and evil” (Waida 1983:235).

In other words, what Waida suggests is that there is a dualistic substratum in North Asian religions which at a certain point of time was reinforced by contact with Iranian religions. This would appear to be an attractive alternative to the diffusionistic theory of Eliade and others, and a possible model for understanding Tibetan dualistic myths. However, here too we encounter seri-
ous difficulties, above all the fact that our sources regarding the religion of the traditionally non-literate peoples of North Asia are recent, being for the most part found in the ethnographic literature of the last century and the early part of this century. Hence we do not know what the religious beliefs of these peoples were in, say, the thirteenth, much less in the seventh or eighth centuries. Moving closer to Tibet, Mongolian and old Turkic religion is, of course, known from fairly old sources. Thus the earliest inscriptions of the ancient Turks date from the seventh and eighth centuries AD, in other words from a period contemporary with the emergence of Tibet on the historical scene, but in the case of the Turks the problem is that their ancient inscriptions contain no trace of dualistic concepts—on the contrary, what we find is a belief in a high god, the Sky (Tengri), and a large number of secondary gods associated with him (the Earth, the Mountains, the Water, the Springs, Rivers, etc.) (Roux 1981:511).

Do we then dare to draw any conclusions? One conclusion is perhaps that it is still too early to make definitive and general pronouncements in the field of Tibetan cosmological myths. There is a vast material awaiting study, containing innumerable problems of chronology, textual affiliation, and interpretation. There is the still enigmatic question of the nature and origin of the Bon religion, in the texts of which so many of these myths are found.

It is worth noting that the instances of Iranian influence which appear to be reasonably certain (noted at the beginning of this paper) date from the time of the Tibetan empire and do not concern mythology, whereas the documents which do contain dualistic mythologies—and which have been considered to be Iranian by Tucci, Hoffmann, and others—are of a later date. The Tun-huang documents (at least as far as their contents have been published so far) do not seem to contain myths characterized by cosmogonic dualism. The chronology of the sources would thus seem to argue against an early Iranian influence on Tibetan mythology, and a later influence—say, post-11th century—would in every way appear to be problematical. As for the early period, we now know—thanks to the research of R.A. Stein and Geza Uray—that Manicheism was known to the Tibetans in the 8th century, but this knowledge seems to have been only indirect, through Chinese sources (Stein 1980; Uray 1983). There is no indication that there ever were Manicheans in Tibet, nor definite proof that Tibetans came into direct contact with Manicheans in China or Central Asia.

The possibility of a development within the native tradition of Tibetan mythology (including cosmogonic myths) should perhaps be considered more seriously. I would suggest that we should not exclude the possibility that the dualistic ideas which are found in the Tun-huang manuscripts and which are of a Chinese “yin-yang” type might have been transformed into a dualism of an “Iranian” type without the help of outside influence. At the moment we can
hardly do more than consider this as one possibility among several others. Still, even if we take such a development of dualistic cosmogonic myths as a working hypothesis, we are unable at present to say what social circumstances or general development of ideas could have led to such a process. And we are left with the fact that the Tibetan Bonpos, for perhaps a thousand years, have been unanimous in claiming, on the authority of their sacred texts, that Staggzig—i.e. Iran in one sense or another—is the holy land from which their religion spread.

NOTES

1. Another example—which might be quite significant—is the element mu-cho found in the name of Mu-cho-Iden-drug, one of the disciples of Ston-pa Gshen-rab. H. Hoffmann has suggested that this might be a rendering of Sogdian mozay (mwtk) (Hoffmann 1938:358). Later he abandoned this identification (Hoffmann 1940:172), but finally reaffirmed it (Hoffmann 1961:96).

2. I thank Anne-Marie Blondeau for kindly sending me a copy of the relevant folios from the copy in the Migot collection in Paris.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Beckwith, Christopher I., ‘‘The Introduction of Greek Medicine into Tibet in the Seventh and Eighth Centuries,’’ JAOS 99,2 (1979): 197-313.
Harva, Uno, Die religiösen Vorstellungen der altaischen Völker, Helsinki 1938.
Hoffmann, Helmut, ‘‘Zur Literatur der Bon-po,’’ ZDMG 94 (1940): 169-188.


