
Reviewed by Fabienne Jagou

To examine how the actions of Tibetan Buddhists shaped the emergence of modern China, Gray Tuttle presents a broad overview of two and a half centuries of Sino-Tibetan relationships. He intends to show the role played by Buddhists, both Chinese and Tibetans, in the construction of the new China based on the idea of the nation-state; the influence of these Buddhists on Sino-Tibetan relations; and how modern ideas such as nationalism, race, and religion have affected the relations between Chinese and Tibetans.

In the first part of his book, Tuttle offers a useful synthetic analysis of the relationship between Manchus and Tibetans. Tuttle emphasizes cultural issues. He first describes the relationship between Manchus and Tibetans as inherited from traditional patronage and the previous imperial tradition that can be dated back to the eleventh century. For him, the early relationship was characterized by cordial cooperation, as neither tried to implement policies to change the culture of the other state. Tuttle points to three main Tibetan Buddhists sites that served as links between Tibet and the Manchu Qing court: Mount Wutai, from the beginning of the eighteenth century; the Yonghe gong, after the lCang-skya Qutughtu (Rol pa’i rdo rje 1717-1786) founded it in 1744; and the Forbidden City’s Zhongzheng dian. Lhasa appointed Tibetan masters at these sites from the end of the seventeenth century until the 1930s. From the Manchu side, these relationships were handled by the Emperor first, then the Imperial Household (nei wu fu) and the Court for Managing the Frontiers (Lifan yuan). Then, Tuttle suggests, the relations between the elites of the Qing Empire and the Tibetan Buddhist cultural world became political ones after the British invasion of Tibet in 1904 (p. 34) and the growing involvement of Chinese, not Manchus, in Tibetan affairs. As such, Tibet was included “in the Western model of nation-state relations and Chinese officials used the British acknowledgment of Qing suzerainty to claim Qing sovereignty of Tibet.” From then on, the Chinese tried to impose cultural and political reforms on the Tibetans in order to secure their western border.

According to Tuttle, the question of the integration of the Tibetan territory inside the Qing Empire derives also from this shift from cultural to political relations. The author clearly states that the Manchus did not intend to incorporate Tibet into their Empire, as the first Chinese representatives of the Manchu Court did.

Tuttle claims that the Manchu interest in Tibetan Buddhism was linked to the concept of a “patronage tradition,” but it is also true that on the Qing side the relationship became more and more institutionalized (Emperor, Imperial Household, Court for Managing the Frontiers, and, I would add,
the Grand Council). It would have been useful for the reader to know more about how the Tibetan affairs were shared between the Imperial Household, the Court for Managing the Frontiers, and the Grand Council. Granted, on the Tibetan side, relations with foreign countries were not institutionalized, as the Tibetans did not inaugurate new administrative organs in their government nor, more precisely, did they include Manchu affairs into a single political structure. For the Tibetans, it is obvious that the relationship was instituted from one person to another, as between the Dalai Lama and the Manchu Emperor. However, his emphasis on cultural relations leads Tuttle to neglect the Manchu side, which saw Tibetan affairs incorporated into specific administrative organs.

According to Tuttle, the Tibetan response to this newly aggressive policy of the Qing Court (the signing of treaties between the British and the Chinese regarding Tibet and the progressive incorporation of the Khams territory inside the administrative structure of their Empire) came mainly from the 13th Dalai Lama (1875-1933) who, at that time, became a nationalist. The 13th Dalai Lama, thanks to the meeting he held with politicians from different countries during his two exiles (in China after the raid of the British in 1904 and in British India after the Chinese invasion of Lhasa in 1909), was trained in modern world politics. And then, in Tuttle’s account, with the fall of the Manchu dynasty in 1911, Tibetans succeeded in becoming de facto independent and tried, without success, to be a nation. These efforts toward independence led to economic and administrative reforms in Tibet that contributed to the decision of a number of lamas to leave Tibet—men who would become important actors in Sino-Tibetan relations during the first half of the twentieth century.

Referring to the theory of James Millward, Tuttle suggests that during the Qing dynasty multi-ethnic unity was not achieved and the Qing maintained the cultural divisions of China, Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet, and the Muslims till the end of the dynasty. For Tuttle, the ethnic debates at court became important in the early twentieth century after the return of Chinese and Manchu intellectuals from Japan who wanted to be part of the emergent new Chinese Empire. The Chinese were in favor of the elimination of the Manchus, while the Manchus and some Chinese supporters proposed the creation of a multi-ethnic state. Finally, the policy of unity of the five peoples and of racial equality was implemented with the creation of the Republic of China in 1912. But from the perspective of the Inner Asian countries and their effort to separate from the new China, Tuttle argues that it was not simply assumed that the Republic of China should reclaim all of the Qing imperial territories.

In the context of the multi-ethnic nation, what place was to be given to Tibetan Buddhists? According to Tuttle, Tibetan Buddhists did not intervene one way or another in the emergence of the theory of the unity of the five peoples, but some of them were courted. For Tuttle, Buddhists, whether Chinese or Tibetans, redefined the religious community in order to “exercise power over politicians, nationalists, and colonialists”. This new community, born after the Parliament of World Religions held in Chicago in 1893, became real after Chinese Buddhists found support from the Tibetan monks, the I Cang skya Qutughtu (1890-1957) at the beginning of the Republic and then the 9th Panchen Lama (1883-1937), to preserve their holdings. Tibetan
monks and monasteries which were totally dependent from the imperial support during the Qing dynasty had also to find a way to survive in the new Republic of China. And at the same time, the laity found in Tibetan Buddhism a way to help their country.

According to Tuttle, the main actors for the propagation of Tibetan Buddhism in Modern China were Bai Puren (1870-1927), rDo rje gcod pa (1874-?), the 9th Panchen Lama (1883-1937), Nor lhA Qutughtu (1865-1936), and Chinese Buddhists monks—mainly Dayong (1893-1929), Fazun (1902-1980), and Nenghai (1886-1967)—who went to Tibet to be trained into Tibetan Buddhist teachings before returning to China to transmit these teachings. Tuttle organizes their actions into historical periods:

- 1925-1927, Tibetan masters in China dedicated their time to teach Buddhism and were not involved in politics. However, leaders of the Beijing government looked for the spiritual help of Tibetan masters. Duan Qirui (1865-1936) sponsored a ritual led by Bai Puren in 1925, was impressed by those given by Nor lhA Qutughtu, recognized officially the Panchen Lama.
- 1929-1931, Tibetan Masters and Chinese Buddhist monks were helped by Sichuan warlords who, in their turn, became involved in the process to link China and Tibet through religion. On the other hand, racial and nationalist ideologies failed, as Tibetan members of the Nationalist government tried to create separate counties in the Tibetan Khams area.
- 1931-1935, Tibetan masters became members of the Nationalist government and Tibetan Buddhism was included in a new definition of the Buddhist religion; the Nationalist ideologue Dai Jitao (1890-1949) advocated the use of religion for political ends.
- 1935-1950, the idea to join the Chinese and Tibetan cultures emerged and became reality through the foundation of institutionalized educational and religious exchanges. New institutions had to find teachers first and then funding. The warlords first participated in the creation of such institutes and then the Nationalist government became their main financial backer. These institutes gained students who, through translations, made the link between the Chinese and Tibetan cultures more vivid.

Tuttle’s narrative of the first contacts between the Beijing government president and Buddhists shows that from both side the aim of the Buddhist activities was to renew with the Qing imperial tradition: the only physical link between the imperial tradition and the Nationalist China was Bai Puren, who apparently came from a lineage that was sponsored by the Qing Emperor; Nor lhA Qutughtu followed the Imperial tradition (but nothing is said about his intention to do so); and the Panchen Lama received a title from Duan Qirui (1865-1936), then president of the Beijing government. All three men received financial support from the Beijing government through Duan Qirui. Duan had personal connections with Bai Puren and Nor lhA Qutughtu, but not with the Panchen Lama. As such, the Panchen Lama was granted a special status from the beginning. The Chinese monks who went to Tibet had different motivations (mainly Nenghai and Fazun who returned
to China to teach Tibetan Buddhism there and left writings). Nenghai wished to study esoteric Buddhism while Fazun wanted to bring back to China what he considered to be authentic Buddhism.

The second part of this book deals with the relationships between Tibetan and Chinese Buddhist monks and the warlords. However, the transition between the two periods (1925-1927 and 1929-1931) is not obvious for the reader. We have seen that the Tibetan monks received support from the Beijing government and the Panchen Lama received special treatment, but the author considers that the Sichuan warlords were “more concerned” with Tibet and more interested in Buddhism than the leaders of the Beijing government. Tuttle also suggests that because Sichuan is close to Tibet the ex-warlords were “more responsive to the religious developments occurring around them”. But mainly, he credits the Sichuan warlords with a national vision for China by “imagining a role of religion in state matters” while the state, incarnated in the Nanjing government, still wanted religion and politics to be separated. In this very interesting section, Tuttle explains how the Sichuan laity supported the Tibetan monks from Khams such as rDo rje gcod pa and Nor lha Qutughtu and how Chinese monks such as Dayong and Nenghai originated from the province. Indeed, once in Sichuan, and in Kangding in particular, the Chinese monks who wanted to go to Tibet had to overcome financial, linguistic, cultural and political (on the part of the Tibetan government) barriers. First, Dayong was their main sponsor. When he died in 1929, the Chinese Buddhist monks became dependent on Tibetan monks from dKar mdzes and Li thang and succeeded in getting access to the prestigious Tibetan monastery of ‘Bras spungs. They benefited too from the teaching given by rDo rje gcod pa in Sichuan, who redistributed his benefits to them.

As a matter of fact, Sichuan was the domain of various warlords, a situation that continued through the end of the 1930s, and, facing the rise of the Nationalists, it seems more likely that they were less concerned to “support a cause popular with the local people” and more concerned to support their own people, their own army and their own territory. Sichuan lay Buddhists, after many refusals, succeeded in inviting rDo rje gcod pa, whose teaching would become the most important in Sichuan given by a Tibetan monk in 1930. His message of peace transcended Sichuan’s borders and even China’s borders as he dedicated it to the saving of the world. And it was only after this event that the Sichuan province warlords began to support Tibetan Buddhism.

It was Liu Xiang, a Sichuan warlord who, thanks to funding from Buddhist associations, sent Chinese monks to Tibet to study Tibetan Buddhism and founded the new Sino-Tibetan Buddhist Institute. As such, according to Tuttle, and contrary to government officials, he heard and realized the message of Taixu who promoted the idea that Japanese, Tibetan, and Chinese Buddhists unity would lead to “a mutually supportive relationship” with the state. Tuttle shows brilliantly how the Sichuan warlords acted despite the inaction of the central Chinese government and were precursors in establishing political support for the religious activities of the Chinese and Tibetan Buddhists.

The Nanjing government, on the contrary, continued to base its relationship with Tibetans on political grounds and incorporated the Tibetan masters into the structure of the government through the creation of a
political office for the Panchen Lama and the nomination of Nor Iha Qutughtu as a member of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission. On his side, the Dalai Lama used his existing representatives to Mount Wutai and the Yonghegong temple, opening official offices at those sites but the reader doesn’t know if they were recognized as such by the Nanjing government. At the same time, Dai Jitao and others attempted to open schools dedicated to the education of borderlands people with the official ideology of Sun Yat-sen’s *Three People’s Principles*.

According to Tuttle, the main obstacle facing the Tibetan Buddhist lamas was linguistic. He considers that the Panchen Lama did not know Chinese (pp. 140, 142, 179) and had to rely on the Tibetan language. Tutte took the example of the corpus of the Panchen Lama’s published Chinese writings, or so-called Panchen Lama Chinese writings, to demonstrate that the Panchen Lama or his representatives used the racial rhetoric (*wuzu, wuzu gonghe*) very occasionally and only when that was beneficial for them to do between 1925 and 1933 (141-142). The author considers that from 1933 on, the Panchen Lama (or his translators) began to use the Chinese racial rhetoric (pp. 179-180). He first considered these sources biased because they were published under Communist rule (p. 142) and mainly because he noticed the use of words that seem anachronistic (terms such as “Xizang minzhong” and “Xizang minzu” for example) (pp. 179-180). Tuttle, then, searched for occurrences, that would confirm the opinion expressed in the Chinese published sources he read, in the Panchen Lama’s Tibetan language works.

Analyzing them, he finds no evidence that the Panchen Lama adhered to the racial rhetoric. As such, for Tuttle, the new racial and ethnic divisions were rarely incorporated into the Panchen Lama’s works (p. 144). Tuttle, then, analyzes the terms used in the Panchen Lama biography to designate the so-called ethnic groups and concludes that the Muslims were never included among “other races” because they are not associated with Buddhism, contrary to Chinese practice (pp. 143-144). Instead, the use of “being” (*skyê bo*) is adopted to show an ethnic category. He questions the use of “mi rigs” that appears to be used as “an indicator of a type of person” in the Panchen Lama’s biography (pp. 144-145) and “would only be define under the Western standard during the Communist period” (p. 146).

In sum, Tuttle insists that we do not know who wrote the discourses (only one was published in Tibetan) and the entire correspondence of the Panchen Lama in Chinese. The reader will agree that the question is very important regarding what we must attribute to the Panchen Lama and what the influence of the prelate’s entourage was.

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1 Zhongguo di er lishi dang’anguan, comp. 中國第二歷史檔案館. *Jiu shi Banchan neidi huodong ji fan Zang shouzu dang’an xuanbian* 九世班禪內地活動及返藏受阻檔案選編 (Selections from the archives concerning the ninth Panchen’s activities in China and the restrictions on his return to Tibet), (Nanking: Zhongguo Zangxue, 1992).

2 Shakya dge slong Blo bzang ‘Jam dbyangs Ye shes bsTan pa’i rgyal mtshan, *skyêbs mgon thams cad mkhyen pa Blo bzang thub bstan chos kyi nyi ma dge legs nram rgyal bzang po’i zhal snga nas kyi lhan mong pa’i rnam bar thar pa rin chen dbang gi rgyal po’i ’phreng ba* (Biography of the Panchen Blo bzang thub bstanchos kyi nyi ma), Reproduced from the bKra shis lhun po blocks, 1944; *lHa mkhar yongs ’dzin bstan pa rgyal mtshan, Pan chen thams cad mkhyen pa je btsun Blo bzang thub bstan chos kyi nyi ma dge legs nram rgyal bzang po’i gsung ’bum* (The Collected works of the Panchen Lama Blo bzang chos kyi nyi ma), reproduced from bKra shis lhun po blocks, 1973 [1944].
However, the limitations of Tuttle’s arguments need to be noted. Regarding the sources, Tuttle uses the Chinese archives published in 1993 and as such considers them biased with reason. He did not have access to any original Chinese sources related to the Panchen Lama and convincingly suggests that if the discourses of the Panchen Lama have not been published by the actual Chinese government, they must contain words and ideas that not suit the present Chinese authorities (p. 163). From a practical point of view, Tuttle argues that the Panchen Lama was a non-Chinese speaker and could not have written his correspondence or his discourses by himself. However, contemporary testimony (to be taken with caution) says that the Panchen Lama spoke Chinese very badly and understood it. Indeed, we still have no evidence that he could write or read Chinese and as such, even if he pronounced his discourses in Tibetan and understood the immediate translation, he was not able to examine later translations and “often was deliberately misinformed.” Tuttle questions very carefully the Chinese sources and measures them against the Tibetan biography and collected writings of the Panchen Lama. However, the reader will search in vain for a historical analysis of these Tibetan sources. Tuttle’s faith in their veracity may also be challenged and, like the Chinese sources, should in fact be used with caution. The author should have studied the Tibetan biography and collected writings of the Panchen Lama with the same critical eye as he read the Chinese published sources. This study would have benefited from a discussion of the nature of the biography and collected works, their historical context, their authors, and the dates of their publication.

In a nutshell, the biography and collected works were written for disciples who wanted to follow an example of spiritual realization and to learn how to attain Enlightenment. In that kind of writing, little room is left for political correspondence. As a corollary example, any of the correspondence exchanged between the 13th Dalai Lama and the 9th Panchen Lama has been compiled into the 13th Dalai Lama’s biography, which does not prove that any problems occurred and that any letters have been exchanged between them.

The historical context of this biography is also very important. The biography is dated 1944. It ended in the Panchen Lama’s bKra shis lhun po Monastery three years after the return of the corpse of the Panchen Lama to Tibet and the year his stupa was completed. As a matter of fact, it was quite rapidly after the death of the Panchen Lama in 1937 while the dispute with the Lhasa’s government was not yet settled. Tuttle does not link the circumstances of the Panchen Lama departure from Tibet -- Tuttle considers that the Panchen Lama left Tibet because he “felt himself the victim of the Dalai Lama’s efforts to build a centralized Tibetan nation-state” (p. 9) and “the imprisonment of these officials [of the Panchen Lama’s monastic government] was the direct cause of the Panchen Lama’s flight from Tibet” (p. 55) -- the difficulties he encountered in returning to his monastery and the dispute between Lhasa and gZhis ka rtse was not settled in the 1940s. These circumstances could have prevented the author of the biography to include anything related to the Panchen Lama’s political actions in China.

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4 Ibid., p. 278.
that would demonstrate his adherence to Chinese government policies and threaten the life of people from bKra shis lhun po Monastery.

From another point of view, we do not know which sources this biography was based on. Did the Panchen Lama’s entourage bring documents to Tibet? What kind of documents? We know that the Chinese archives, for which his Nanjing office was responsible, had been distributed between his two hagiographers (Chen Wenjian and Liu Jiaju, *alias sKal bzang Chos ‘byor*). We know too that Liu Jiaju published the Nanjing documents in his biography of the Panchen Lama. But, we still do not know the conditions of the compilation of the Panchen Lama’s Tibetan biography.

Tuttle affirms the Panchen Lama is the author of his own biography and hesitates between calling it a “biography” (for example, p. 144) or an “autobiography” (for example, p. 186). However, the author of the Panchen Lama’s biography was not the Panchen Lama himself. It was Shakya dge slong Blo bzang ‘jam dbyangs ye shes bstan pa’i rgyal mtshan. For the reader, that modifies the conclusions of Tuttle concerning the use of Nationalist Chinese rhetoric and the acceptance of Chinese policies by the Panchen Lama. Did the Tibetans in Central Tibet hear about Sun Yat-sen’s ideology? Tuttle is very clear on that point: the answer is negative (p. 226). Did they hear about the merging of Tibetan and Chinese Buddhism? The answer is again negative. This is why the reader cannot find any reference to Chinese political ideology and why the author of the Tibetan biography used transliterations of Chinese terms to designate Chinese Buddhism (for example, pp. 70-71). I would add that most Chinese terms were translated phonetically at that time. But in any case, Tuttle seems mistaken when he writes, “the stark absence of an adoption of Chinese conceptions of racial terminology [into the Tibetan biography of the Panchen Lama] indicates the weak influence that Chinese conceptions of race and ethnicity had on Tibetans at this time” (p. 145) which in fact the biography was written by a disciple of the Panchen Lama living in Tibet who probably knew nothing about nationalist ideology.

The date of the publication of the Panchen Lama’s biography is without a doubt the year 1944. However, this biography, after years of disappearance (some people considered it destroyed, others supposed it to be kept somewhere) perhaps reappeared around 1996 though most probably not before 2003. Two volumes became available at that time. One was written by a member of the research team of the bKra shis lhun po Monastery and is dated 1996, and the other was written by Shakya dge slong Blo bzang ‘Jam

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6 Shakya dge slong Blo bzang ‘Jam dbyangs Ye shes bstan pa’i rgyal mtshan, *op.cit.*, f.834, line 1. I hesitate however to follow this idea, as the title of the biography (which seems to have been added later) bears the inscription *zhala snga nas* (in front of) after the full transcription of the Panchen Lama’s name. But, it seems that this usage is a strictly honorific expression as the disciple can not write the name without this mark of deference.
8 At that time, a second biography was written under the supervision of the bKra shis lhunpo Monastery historical research group subsidized by the Chinese State Council, vol. *stod cha*, f.601-604.
9 These volumes were scanned by the TBRC in 2003.
dbyangs Ye shes bsTan pa’i rgyal mtshan in 1944. The first question to ask is why two biographies became available suddenly? Why was a second one compiled? What are the differences between the two of them? What was the context of this sudden reappearance of the 9th Panchen Lama’s biography? In fact, these two biographies appeared during the dispute over the recognition of the 11th Panchen Lama. Could these biographies, a contemporary one and one new, be useful for China to claim a right to designate the 11th Panchen Lama?

It is also worth noting that the compiler--presumably the ‘author’ was the Panchen Lama, since they are his collected works, even if he had writers working for him--of the collected works of the 9th Panchen Lama was not the Panchen Lama himself, as claimed by Tuttle (p. 311). It was lh’ha mkhar yongs ‘dzin bstan pa rgyal mtshan. Tuttle states clearly that the collected works of the 9th Panchen Lama were compiled in 1944 but released in 1973 (p. 311). Apparently, the collected works were edited right in the middle of the Cultural Revolution when all Tibetan publications were stopped! That is an interesting point that Tuttle did not comment on. Instead, Tuttle simply considers that as there is almost no presence of the Nationalist ideology in these volumes, then the Panchen Lama was not influenced by it (p. 145). Once again, what would we expect of religious writings published at a time when the Communists were in the midst of a thorough attack on everything traditional, everything religious (!) and everything coming from the Nationalists?

To conclude, Tuttle should have questioned both the Chinese and Tibetan published materials. Both types of sources offer insights but also barriers as to what the Panchen Lama and his representatives thought. The stories of both sides need to be analyzed with caution.

From a philological point of view, as noted above, Tuttle remarks that racial rhetoric was rarely used by the Panchen Lama before 1933 while a 1933 Chinese version of the Panchen Lama’s discourse used the terminology of ethnic classification: from “Xizang minzhong” to “Xizang minzu” (pp. 179-180). However, although “Xizang minzu” is a new term introduced at the end of the discourse, Tuttle fails to note that “Xizang minzhong” and “Xizang renmin” are still used together in the same paragraph to mean the same thing. Following Tuttle’s idea, I will add that the same transformation occurred between the terms “zhongyuan,” used at the beginning of the translation, and “zhongyang,” used at the end. These two last words could be translated as “central plain” and “central government” or “center [i.e., China]” (as Tuttle suggests, p. 179), respectively. In the same way, the term “neidi” appears and “zhongyuan” disappears from then on. The point is that, in my opinion, this discourse is divided into two parts. The first recounts the history of Tibet and its relations with China before 1911, while the second is dedicated to the description of the situation in Tibet and in Mongolia in the 1930s and refers to the policies of the Chinese government—and, therefore, uses Chinese republican government’s own vocabulary. This

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is obvious too if we compare the original translation of the discourse in question with the translation reproduced in the volume quoted and used by Tuttle. The first part of the text encountered changes. Its modern Communist adaptations concern mainly the erasing of any idea related to the political status of Tibet before the founding of the Chinese republic and are very few. Thus “Qi hou Xizang wu tongyi zhi guowang” became “Qi hou Xizang wu tongyi zhi wang” (“guo,” which designates a country, has been erased). Later in the text, “Sajia zhi zhengquan” (the Sa skya political power) was erased, and “Xizang zhi fojiao” (Tibetan Buddhism) became “fojiao” (Buddhism). Into the second part, which begins with the sentence “After the founding of the Republic” (Minguo chengli yihou), the numerous changes introduced by the compilers relate mainly to the question of the borders of Chinese territory (and on the contrary the “Kang Zang renmin” used by the Panchen Lama’s translator has been changed to “Kang Zang minzhong”); “dong lai neidi” (come from the East to Inner China) has been replaced by “ru zhi neidi” (enter Inner China); “ru Nei Meng” (reach Mongolia) by “fu Meng zhi shi” (come from the East to Inner China); “ru Nei Meng” (reach Inner Mongolia) by “fu Meng zhi shi” (reach Mongolia); “Kang Qing liang qu” (both the Xikang and Qinghai region) by “Kang Qing liang sheng” (both Xikang and Qinghai provinces), and so forth.

Actually, Tuttle did not get access to the original discourses of the Panchen Lama and depended mainly on the archival documents published by the Nanjing Second Historical Archives in 1993 for the Chinese point of view on that subject. Regarding the Panchen Lama’s correspondence, his translator used the expression “wuzu tongbao” (the compatriots of the five ethnic groups) in a letter dated 16 July 1926. With the original versions of the discourses of the Panchen Lama, we learn that the Panchen Lama began to use racial rhetoric from May 1931. In the discourse “Before governing the country, one as to govern itself”, the Panchen Lama’s translators used such terms as “ruoxiao minzu” (the weak ethnic group), “Meng Zang liang zu” (the two ethnic groups Mongol and Tibetans); in his 5 May 1931 discourse entitled “Xiwang Guoren renshi Xizang” (Tibetans citizens know Tibet): “ge minzu” (every ethnic group), “ruhe shi Meng Zang yu Zhongguo tuanjie cheng zhengge de minzu” (how to make the Mongols and Tibetans unite with the Chinese to become a real nation); in his 5 September 1931 discourse: “ge zu tuanjie” (the union of every ethnic group), “bing qing zhongyang genju sanmin zhuyi, fuzu ruoxiao minzu” (ask the Central Chinese government to help weak ethnic groups on the basis of the Three Principles of the People); and “Gai Zhonghua Minguo wei wuzu zhi fenzi shaozao er cheng” (Modify the Republic of China in order to eliminate separatism and stand up), and in his December 1932 discourse entitled “Zhongguo renmin aihao heping” (The people of China love peace). I would conclude that the Panchen Lama consistently used the Chinese government rhetoric but that became obvious as soon as the Nationalist government was settled in Nanjing (1928) and the territory of Inner China was unified (at least in 1930). The most important date is certainly 1931, when the Panchen Lama became a member of the Nationalist government and not, as Tuttle proposes, 1933, when he looked for the support of the Chinese government to go back to Tibet. Anyway, the question remains in its entirety as we don’t know who wrote the Panchen Lama’s discourses and who translated them.

For Tuttle, then, the Panchen Lama did not support the harmonious coexistence of races but to the Sun Yat-sen policy “in the modern context of
both nationalism and the autonomy that Sun had promised to each nation within the former Qing Empire”. And, “while the Chinese government was embracing the Buddhist religion within its administration and in the halls of governance, the lamas made greater effort to integrate Chinese rhetoric in their public teachings and lectures.” The Panchen Lama accepted the secular and religious role the Nationalist government intended him to hold. He gave a Kalacakra initiation in Hangzhou to save the country in January 1933. For Tuttle, in the context of religion, the Panchen Lama followed both Sun’s ideology and the unity of the five races. From 1934 to 1937, the Panchen Lama spread the Chinese nationalist ideology in Amdo. The Nor Iha Qutughtu received the same treatment and became a religious and political support for the Nationalist government.

This could not have been achieved without Dai Jitao. Tuttle highlights his role in introducing Buddhism into the Nationalist government policy, his efforts to include the Panchen Lama in this policy, and the actions taken by Taixu. As such, the Nationalist government endorsed its role of protector of the master and renewed the patron-priest relationship, giving the Panchen Lama political positions and granting him title, while the prelate accepted the duty to preach Buddhism to unite the country, promote the well-being of the people, and advance world peace. According to Tuttle, Dai Jitao went further by explicitly supporting a return to the Tibetan Buddhist religious-political system.

The link that Tuttle established between ‘Ba bas (sKal bzang tshe ring (1899-1941) and sKal bzang chos ‘byor (Ch. Liu Jiaju, 1900-1977)) and the Panchen Lama is very interesting regarding the involvement or at least the awareness of the Panchen Lama of their attempt to bring autonomy to ‘Ba’ thang for sKal bzang tshe ring and to “Xikang counties” for sKal bzang chos ‘byor. But the reader would wonder did the Panchen Lama never go to the Chinese province of Sichuan nor to the Tibetan province of Khams (except to die at its very north border at sKye rgu mdo) while he had two collaborators coming from these areas? These two ‘Ba’bas have educated backgrounds. sKal bzang tshe ring was very interested in politics and became the first Tibetan to join the Guomindang. He conducted a political career all his life. sKal bzang chos ‘byor was different. He was not so interested in politics and held many posts as a teacher or editor. Both became members of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, and sKal bzang tshe ring became the head of the Tibetan affairs office. Their links to the Panchen Lama were also different. sKal bzang tshe ring served as his interpreter at the arrival of the prelate in Nanjing, then passing the job on to sKal bzang chos ‘byor, who kept this responsibility and followed the Panchen Lama almost permanently (he was one of the hagiographers of the Panchen Lama under the name of Liu Jiaju) and became, at the request of the Panchen Lama, his secretary and member of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission.

The question is: did these two Khampas work for the independence (or, most probably the autonomy) of their counties or did they work on behalf of the Nationalist government to abolish Liu Wenhui’s control over the region? In Tuttle’s view, they applied the Chinese Nationalist government ideology they learned in China to their own locality wishing to attain the autonomy presented by Sun Yat-sen. For Peng Wenbin, not quoted by Tuttle, and who gave a masterful analysis of these attempts, the Chinese Nationalist
government appropriated these Tibetan autonomy movements to “contain Liu Wenhui’s provincial warlordism and the dissemination of Tibetan nationalism in Khams.”

In both analysis, Tibetans did not work for the Chinese government.

Another important question is what the Tibetan masters expected from the Chinese government. According to Tuttle, the Panchen Lama and the Nor Iha Qutughtu worked for their return to Tibet and the recovery of their former positions of authority. They adapted their behaviour to the Chinese government policy to attain their aims from the beginning to the end of their stays in China. Finally, the reader can infer that they were totally immune to the Chinese government ideology as they were to the social and economic contexts in which they lived for almost fifteen years!

In his last chapter, Tuttle traces how the idea to join the Chinese and Tibetan cultures emerged and was executed through the foundation of institutionalized educational and religious exchanges. These institutes had to first find teachers and then funding. The warlords originally participated in the creation of these institutions and then the Nationalist government became their main financial support. These institutes gained students who, through translations, made the link between the Chinese and Tibetan cultures more vivid. For Tuttle, the influence of this new peaceful policy in Tibet changed the Tibetan attitude toward China through 1950. These cultural and Buddhist exchanges between Tibet and China, with much creation of institutes in Sichuan close to Tibet that develop mainly during the 1930s, were, as Tuttle put it, a way to create a link between China and Tibet.

By founding the Sino-Tibetan relationship on cultural grounds and by using and “accepting” sources mainly related to Buddhism (the review Haichao yin, archives from the Sino-Tibetan schools founded in Chongqing, the Dai Jitao archives, the biography and collected works of the Panchen Lama—and despite the Chinese published administrative sources), Tuttle concludes that Buddhists, Chinese and Tibetans played crucial roles in the foundation of the Republic of China, as the Buddhist unity became official government policy from 1930 and the link between Tibetans and Chinese. However, this conclusion makes it difficult to understand why Tuttle denies the link drawn by the Panchen Lama himself between Sun Yat-sen’s ideology and Buddhism, and is certain that the Panchen Lama did not adhere to it before 1933, when he decided to go back to Tibet and needed the help of the Chinese government to prepare his return.

This story of two and half centuries of Sino-Tibetan relationships demonstrates the decision of the Manchu court and of the Republican

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12 For the political activities of Nor Iha Qutughtu in Khams (Xikang), see Peng Wenbin, “Frontier Process,” pp. 68-71; and for the economic reform for Tibet prepared by the Panchen Lama, see F. Jagou, Le 9e Panchen Lama (1883-1937), enjeu des relations sino-tibétaines (Paris: Ecole française d’Extrême-Orient, 2004), pp. 156-158; 206-210.

13 Tuttle derives this idea from the Tibetan discourse published in the Collected Works of the Panchen Lama, Tuttle, p. 171.
government to pursue friendly relations with Tibet rather than an offensive strategy. It shows also the great importance taken by Tibet in the Manchu and Chinese policies: the relation evolved from a person to person relationship, then the management of Tibetan affairs by the Manchu Imperial Household and the court for managing the outer provinces (where Mongolia represented the main interest), and finally the creation of the Mongol and Tibetan Affairs Commission that was dedicated to Mongol and Tibetan affairs exclusively.