The Revenge of the Market on the Rentiers
Why neo-liberal reports of the end of history turned out to be premature

José Gabriel Palma
Faculty of Economics
Cambridge University
jgp5@cam.ac.uk

Abstract
Starting from the perspective of heterodox Keynesian-Minskyan-Kindlebergian financial economics, this paper begins by highlighting a number of mechanisms that contributed to the current financial crisis. These include excess liquidity, income polarisation, conflicts between financial and productive capital, lack of appropriate regulation, asymmetric information, principal-agent dilemmas and bounded rationalities. However, the paper then proceeds to argue that perhaps more than ever the ‘macroeconomics’ that led to this crisis only makes analytical sense if examined within the framework of the political settlements and distributional outcomes in which it had operated. Taking the perspective of critical social theories the paper concludes that, ultimately, the current financial crisis is the outcome of something much more systemic, namely an attempt to use neo-liberalism (or, in US terms, neo-conservatism) as a new technology of power to help transform capitalism into a rentiers’ delight. And in particular, into a system without much ‘compulsion’ on big business; i.e., one that imposes only minimal pressures on big agents to engage in competitive struggles in the real economy (while inflicting exactly the opposite fate on workers and small firms). A key component in the effectiveness of this new technology of power was its ability to transform the state into a major facilitator of the ever-increasing rent-seeking practices of oligopolistic capital. The architects of this experiment include some capitalist groups (in particular rentiers from the financial sector as well as capitalists from the ‘mature’ and most polluting industries of the preceding techno-economic paradigm), some political groups, as well as intellectual networks with their allies – including most economists and the ‘new’ left. Although rentiers did succeed in their attempt to get rid of practically all fetters on their greed, in the end the crisis materialised when ‘markets’ took their inevitable revenge on the rentiers by calling their (blatant) bluff.

Key words: Ideology, Neo-liberalism, Foucault, Causes of financial crisis, Investment, Risk, Income distribution, Rent-seeking

JEL classifications: E22, E24, F02, F36, F59, G20, G30, N20, O16, O43

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They constantly try to escape
From the darkness outside and within
By dreaming of systems so perfect that no one will need to be good.

*T S Eliot*

I believe that banking institutions are more dangerous
to our liberties than standing armies.

*Thomas Jefferson*

Today the appeal to newness, of no matter what kind,
provided only that it is archaic enough,
has become universal

*Theodor Adorno*

[... and, above all, let finance be primarily national.

*John Maynard Keynes*

1.**Introduction**

The dance of the trillions

Even for those familiar with events and figures in international financial markets, the sheer magnitude of the numbers both in the upswing and in the downswing of the current cycle is truly remarkable. For example, in the upswing (1980-2007), in real terms the four components of the stock of global financial assets (equity, public and private bonds and bank assets) jumped *9-fold*, increasing from US$27 to US$241 trillion (US$ at 2007 value). As a result, the multiple of the stock of financial assets to world output augmented nearly 4-fold (from just under 1.2 to 4.4; see Figure 1).

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2 During this 27-year period, the capitalization of equity markets increased from US$7 to US$65 trillion; the value of private and government debt securities from US$9 to US$80 trillion; and bank assets from US$11 to US$96 trillion (on the latter number, see notes below Figure 1; all figures in US$ at 2007 value).
In turn, Figure 2 indicates the remarkable size of the second financial bubble of the period (following the recovery from 9/11). This bubble was especially large in some countries of the European periphery (such as Iceland, Ireland and Spain), and in emerging markets.
And in terms of the legendary size of the derivatives markets, according to the BIS (2009) in just the last ten years the amounts outstanding of over-the-counter derivative contracts jumped 7.5-fold (from US$92 to US$683 trillion) – or from 2.4 to 11 times the size of global output. In turn, their gross market value increased even faster, 10-fold, or from US$3.3 to US$34 trillion; i.e., the gross market value of these ‘financial weapons of mass destruction’ (as Warren Buffett famously labelled them) grew about eight times faster than world output (all figures in US$ at 2008 value). In turn, derivative contracts involving commodities (excluding gold) increased 59-fold during this decade – or at an average annual real rate of growth of 51%, reaching in June 2008 a gross market value of US$2.2 trillion (and a notional one of US$12.6 trillion). In fact, this frantic speculation is probably much more

3 Unfortunately, the IMF does not report data on Iceland. According to a senior IMF official, what one has to understand is that “Iceland is now no longer a country. It is a hedge fund” (quoted in Lewis, 2009).
important than demand from China in explaining the relatively generalized boom in commodity prices in the years preceding the onset of the current crisis (and the differential behaviour of commodity prices since then).

As is well known, one of the main problems of the current crisis is that the globalisation of financial markets brought a huge increase in the volatility and in the correlation of returns on financial assets. In fact, now shockwaves are transmitted – and amplified – to such an extent that a simple way to look at the onset of the current crisis would be to say that concerns over US$400 billion sub-prime lending in the US housing market led to the wiping off of about US$40 trillion in global asset markets... This phenomenon has major policy implications; for example, what is the optimal level of capital account openness for a developing country under these circumstances?4

Turning to the core country of the system, Figure 3 illustrates the remarkable increase in the level of domestic debt in the US economy.

\footnote{As Keynes argued, what is needed (and is probably needed today more than ever) is an international financial and payments system that at least partially insulates nations from the economic maladies of other nations. It is the equivalent of quarantining nations where swine flu develops so they do not affect other people around the world (see Davidson, 2009). He also argued (and especially successfully at Bretton Woods) for the right of nations to defend themselves from the predatory nature of international finance.}
Of the many issues that emerge from Figure 3, from the perspective of this paper the two outstanding ones are the (better-known) increasing detachment of the growth of overall domestic debt from that of output; and the (lesser-known) fact that the rapid acceleration of the rate of growth of domestic debt after the 1997 East Asian crisis (and the 1998 Brazilian one) is entirely due to the non-financial private sector (both business and household). As middle-income developing countries turned less attractive (and more able to generate their own foreign-exchange denominated finance), and as the US’s public sector began to tap into this ever growing Asian ‘savings glut’, the US’s and other industrialised countries’ non-financial private sectors became the target of ever more liquid financial markets. That is, they increasingly became the financial markets’ customers of ‘last resort’.
And if the demand from these private agents was not growing fast enough, imaginative ‘financial engineering’ could give it a bit of a push. In fact, household mortgage debt, after having grown between 1982 and 1997 at exactly the same pace as between 1950 and 1982 (about 5.7% per annum), it then jumped to an 8.7% annual real rate of growth (1997-2007). And that of the non-financial business sector nearly doubled from 3.5% (1982-1997) to 6% (1997-2007) – all figures in US$ at 2007 value. Figure 4 shows the same data, but as a share of GDP.

**FIGURE 4**

US: domestic debt outstanding by the financial and non-financial sectors as % of GDP, 1950-2007

- **Household** = total household sector domestic debt (consumer and mortgage debt);
- **public** = total public sector domestic sector debt (local and federal);
- **business** = total non-financial business sector domestic debt (corporate and non-corporate);
- **financial** = total financial sector domestic debt. Percentages shown in the graph are average annual real rates of growth of overall domestic debt and of gross domestic product (GDP) in each period, respectively. **Source**: US Federal Reserve (2009).

As could have been already deduced from Figure 3 above, total domestic debt remained relatively stable as a share of GDP before 1980 (increasing only from 140% to 158% in the nearly three decades between 1950 and the year before the appointment of Paul Volker to the Fed). After that, it jumped from 158% to 247% in the next nearly two decades (1978 to 1997), to add no less than a whole 100
percentage points in the next decade. How anyone could think that such remarkable increases in the level of debt by both the financial and the non-financial sectors could be sustainable in the long run? Or how could anyone think that if (as a result of the inevitable financial fragilities emerging from this debt explosion) banks could not dazzle investors and regulators with might, it was perfectly acceptable that they could puzzle them with increasingly fudged balance sheets?5 How anyone could think that the markets would never call this blatant bluff is anybody’s guess!

Turning to the downswing and bust of the cycle, Greenspan (2009) estimates that “[...] the aggregate equity loss amounts to well over US$40 trillion, a staggering two-thirds of last year’s global gross domestic product.” Recent estimates have increased this figure to over US$50 trillion, as just the loss in terms of household net worth in the US has already reached US$14 trillion.6 Furthermore, according to the Stiglitz UN-Commission, up to 50 million people could become unemployed in 2009, and “[s]ome 200 million people, mostly in developing economies, could be pushed into poverty [...]”. (Stiglitz, 2009).

2.- How did we get into such a mess?

According to the central postulate of mainstream economics of the neo-classical-type, if rational (i.e., utility-maximising) and selfish economic agents are allowed to interact freely in competitive markets, the outcome will be something called ‘equilibrium’. Furthermore, this equilibrium is not only bound to be optimal, but also intrinsically stable and capable of ‘self-correction’. All that is required to achieve these remarkable features are that the markets are allowed to work freely (i.e., prices and wages are allowed to adjust without restraint so that the markets can

5 At the end of 2008 the US’s four biggest banks by assets did not have that much less assets in ‘off-balance-sheet vehicles’ than on their books (US$5.2 and US$7.2 trillion, respectively). As Reilly explains, “[o]ff-balance-sheet vehicles helped inflate the credit bubble by letting banks originate and sell loans without having to put aside much capital for them. So as lending soared, banks didn’t have an adequate buffer against losses” (http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&refer=columnist_reilly&sid=aRPE735Qh18U).

6 See http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/.
clear), and that property rights are well-defined and properly enforced (so that this can be achieved with minimum transaction costs). 7

Furthermore, according to this approach, financial markets are supposed to play only an essentially passive rôle of discounting a future that is predictable (in a probabilistic sense), and are able to do so with amazing accuracy. So, within this framework, financial crises can only occur due to external interference in otherwise perfectly efficient market mechanisms such as governments behaving irresponsibly (e.g., monetising large fiscal deficits, as in so-called ‘first generation’ models of financial crisis); due to bad luck (e.g., self-fulfilling runs on central banks without enough reserves, as in ‘second generation’ models); or due to something – it could be almost anything – causing a sudden large currency depreciation in economies that are not fundamentally unsound (e.g., a moral-hazard-driven bubble with an excessive build-up of external debt, open-economy bank-runs, or currency mismatches on the liability side of balance sheets, as in different versions of ‘third generation’ models).

Additionally, according to the ‘efficient capital market theory’, in financial markets prices at all times reflect all available information; basically, there cannot be an endogenous gap between market prices and fundamentals – let alone a bubble. That is, asset prices deserve a pedestal, and stock options are the most rational reward for good performance. At the same time, stock prices are supposed to be a ‘random walk’; i.e., particularly under risk neutrality, there is no scope for profitable speculation because a rational stock market cannot be beaten on any consistent basis. The key point here is that if financial markets get misaligned, they always ‘self-correct’. Smart market players would simply force stock prices to become rational by doing exactly the opposite of what they do in real life: take the other side of trades if prices begin to develop a pattern (as this is bound to have no substance). In other words, for the efficient market theology a ‘rational surfer’ is

7 The unspoken exception, of course, is intellectual property rights (IPRs) – the better defined and enforced, the higher the associated transaction costs... The implicit assumption is that if their aim is to capture Schumpeterian (rather than just monopoly) rents; and if these are used effectively; and if they result in further innovations; and if the resulting new innovations are again priced ‘Schumpeterianly’ (rather than just monopolistically), and so on, then everybody could benefit in the long-term. That is, as usual, a rather long sequence of ‘ifs’...
not the one that has fun riding waves, but the one that gets drowned trying to create undertows.  

In sum, in the words of the current Director of the White House's National Economic Council, “[in financial markets] prices will always reflect fundamental values [...]. The logic of efficient markets is compelling.” (Summers and Summers, 1989). In fact, we now know that Alan Greenspan was even against tightening regulation against financial fraud, as rational markets can take care of themselves.  

In turn, in some mainstream economics of the ‘new’ type endogenous market failures are finally allowed to exist, and they can lead to sub-optimal (and multiple) equilibria; i.e., the first law of Welfare Economics is obviously wrong. Nevertheless, although a rôle for policy is therefore (reluctantly) accepted, but only under very strict governance structures, these outcomes (including those in financial markets) are still understood as intrinsically of the ‘equilibrium’ type. In fact, New Keynesian theorists (like New Classicals) still work within a ‘complete markets paradigm’, and with the strongest version of the efficient markets hypothesis (see Buiter, 2009B).  

Furthermore, within mainstream economics the acceptable range of ideas has narrowed down continuously since the famous ‘capital controversies’, and the monetarists versus Keynesian debates of the 1970s. A student of economics today could be forgiven for believing that the range of debate in economic theory only spans two competing schools of thought within dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models: those that engineer them as real business cycles and those that do so as micro-foundations models. More specifically, mainstream economics tells us that endogenous market outcomes depend only on whether or not prices and wages are a bit "sticky" (due to potential price and wage inflexibilities) and related

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8 When I participated in 2008 in a panel to nominate candidates for the biannual ‘Deutsche Bank Prize in Financial Economics’ (worth 50,000 euros), organised by The Center for Financial Studies of the Goethe University in Frankfurt, I learned that the first prize, awarded in 2005, had been given to Eugene Fama from Chicago University. According to the citation, "he had been honoured for his theory of efficient markets"; that is, for developing what proved to be a rather remarkable intellectual weapons of mass destruction (see http://www. ifk-cfs.de/index.php?id=901). As with the traders who got bonuses for placing silly bets, maybe one day someone will ask him to donate the money to charity...

9 As always happens when there is an unremitting need to idealise something, for neo-classical analysis to be able to sustain its remarkable idealisation of competitive markets it needs simultaneously to demonise constantly something else – in this case normally anything to do with ‘governments’. On idealisation, see Sodré (2009).

market failures. That is, market outcomes depend only on (say) whether ‘markets’ perform as smoothly and predictably as a car made in Japan, or bit more capriciously (like one made in Britain).\(^\text{11}\)

And as far as whether money and finance can affect long-term growth, Lucas’ proposition that only real forces can truly affect employment and production became the only game in town (see Lucas, 1995). So, in first and second generation models of financial crises, as these are mainly about ill-avised monetary policy, crises are supposed to be harmless to the real economy. Only in third-generation models can crises become ‘real’, but this is only due to sudden currency depreciations causing havoc in features such as balance sheets – so the real economy can plunge into a crisis (see Krugman, 2001).

Therefore, within the mainstream framework it is simply not possible to understand the complexities of current events – let alone devise effective policies to avoid their repetition. In fact, in his recent Lionel Robbins Memorial Lecture at the London School of Economics Paul Krugman argued that in much of the past 30 years macroeconomics was "spectacularly useless at best, and positively harmful at worst."\(^\text{12}\) And according to Willem Buiter, writing in the *Financial Times*, "[...] the typical graduate macroeconomics and monetary economics training received at Anglo-American universities during the past 30 years or so, may have set back by decades serious investigations of aggregate economic behaviour and economic policy-relevant understanding. It was a privately and socially costly waste of time and other resources" (2009B).\(^\text{13}\)

\(^{11}\) In his Marshall Lecture at Cambridge University, Stiglitz told the story that when he was appointed by Bill Clinton to the Council of Economic Advisers his first task was to try to do something about the problem of rising unemployment. He needed staff, so he advertised for an economist; when interviewing he had to go down to something like number 15 in the shortlist to find the first candidate who thought that unemployment was a problem a bit more complex than just workers refusing to accept a market wage...

\(^{12}\) See http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/events/event.asp?id=92.

\(^{13}\) One of a rather large number of examples of the irrelevance of mainstream economics to understand the real world, as Michael Spence of the Hoover Institute explains, is that "[...] the failure of theoretical models to explain extreme macroeconomic fluctuations makes effective action difficult to implement. Currently, economic models forecast an infinite path of either endless positive or negative growth. Economists are therefore forced to explain deviations from or transitions between these two different dynamics (e.g. moving from a period of growth to a period of recession) as a ‘jump’ onto a new model or growth path. This makes them little use for government policy formulation, as the understanding of the ‘jump’ is exogenous to the model" (http://www.magd.ox.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0012/6510/
From this perspective, perhaps what defines an alternative understanding of financial markets as 'heterodox' is that it postulates that the *endogenous* outcome of the free interaction in financial markets of intelligent, rational, utility-maximising and selfish individuals can be not just a sub-optimal equilibrium but, at times, a financial crisis proper - now, why in economics today one has to be 'heterodox' to understand such an obvious fact is another matter altogether.\(^{14}\) One of the crucial issues here, as Keynes' liquidity theory points out, is that decision makers do not really know, and cannot possible know, the future outcome of current financial decisions – the future is uncertain and not merely probabilistically risky (see Davidson, 2007). In fact, financial fragilities are part of the normal economic cycle, with speculative bubbles endogenous to financial markets; according to Minsky, "[a] fundamental characteristic of our economy is that the financial system swings between robustness and fragility and these swings are an integral part of the process that generates business cycles." (1974, p. 269). “In particular, over a protracted period of good times, capitalist economies tend to move from a financial structure dominated by hedge finance units to a structure in which there is large weight to units engaged in speculative and Ponzi finance.” (Minsky, 1992, p. 8)\(^{15}\) That is, from time to time financial markets are likely to become intrinsically unstable and (particularly with excess liquidity) unable to self-correct (see Kindleberger, 1986). In fact, instead of ‘automatic stabilisers’, they can easily be derailed even further by ‘automatic de-stabilisers’ (see Stiglitz, 2003).

From this viewpoint, Barry Eichengreen’s now famous remarks in a way miss the point:

*The Great Credit Crisis has cast into doubt much of what we thought we knew about economics. We thought that monetary policy had tamed the business cycle. We thought that because changes in central-bank policies had delivered low and stable inflation, the volatility of the pre-1985 years had been consigned to the dustbin of history; they had given way to the quaintly dubbed “Great Moderation.” We thought that financial institutions and markets had come to be self-regulating – that investors could be left largely if not wholly to their own*
devices. Above all we thought that we had learned how to prevent the kind of financial calamity that struck the world in 1929 (2009).

The Great Credit Crisis (as Eichengreen calls it) has only cast into doubt much of what mainstream economists thought they knew about economics. From Keynes to Minsky, Kindleberger, Stiglitz, Krugman, Davidson, Roubini, Buitert and many others, there was a comprehensive body of literature perfectly capable of understanding why borrowers and lenders – both in industrialised and developing countries – could easily accumulate far more risk than is privately efficient – let alone socially efficient; and that financial crises could occur for more reasons than monetised government deficits, moral hazards due to government guarantees, bad luck, mob-psychology, crony capitalism, incompetent regulations, misguided policy or other exogenous factors interfering with the otherwise perfectly efficient allocation of resources by financial markets.\(^{16}\) The current global financial crisis is a paradigmatic case of this. That mainstream economics had conveniently ignored that whole body of literature is another matter altogether.

So, it should not be that surprising that despite much effort – remember those blaming ‘liberals’ for the sub-prime crisis because of a 1977 law that helps low-income people get mortgages?\(^{17}\) – mainstream economists have not been able to produce for the current crisis a credible smoking gun explanation of the ‘exogenous’ type. That is, this time there has not been much room for market devotees’ excuses of the ‘blaming something/someone else’ type.\(^{18}\)

In fact, even Greenspan, like a general who decides to rethink his military strategy only after losing the war, has lately moved slightly in the ‘financial crises as endogenous free markets phenomena’ direction. For example, he famously acknowledged in October 2008 (in his testimony to Congress) that he – and his free-market ideology – was “in a state of shocked disbelief”. His real business cycle-type thinking had been behind his conviction that in financial markets there are no major market failures; and that the incentive of shareholders to maximise their value

\(^{16}\) For an analysis of recent financial crises in developing countries, see Palma (2008C).

\(^{17}\) See http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=did_liberals_cause_the_subprime_crisis.

\(^{18}\) This does not mean that market aficionados have given up; the contributors to Booth (2009), for example, conclude that government and central bankers must take all the blame for the financial crisis; bankers, investors and other market players, of course, should be totally exonerated.
would lead them to control the behaviour of managers and traders properly. As a result, he had entirely missed the possibility that financial deregulation could unleash such destructive forces on the economy.\textsuperscript{19} He also acknowledged that the current crisis shows that the basic premises of the traditional risk-management theory are wrong; and that financial markets can indeed be inherently unstable, especially due to their increasing complexities. Furthermore, for post-2007 Greenspan, when financial markets are shocked out of equilibrium they may well be unable to self-correct – as in the recent bubble (see Greenspan, 2009).

This paper begins by highlighting a number of mechanisms that have led to the current financial crisis from the perspective of heterodox Keynesian-Minskyian-Kindlebergian financial economics (more recently enriched by, among others, those economists mentioned above, as well as by behaviourist and psychoanalytic approaches to finance, and Neo-Schumpeterian long-term views of the relationship between technology and finance).\textsuperscript{20} However, the paper then proceeds to argue that perhaps more than ever the ‘macroeconomics’ that led to this crisis only makes analytical sense if examined within the framework of the political settlements and distributional outcomes in which it had operated. So, the analysis then takes on the perspective of critical social theories (especially Marxian and Foucauldian) and concludes that, ultimately, the current financial crisis is the outcome of something much more systemic, namely an attempt to use neo-liberalism (or, in US terms, neo-conservatism) as a new technology of power to help transform capitalism into a rentiers’ delight. And in particular, into a system without much ‘compulsion’ on big business; i.e., one that imposes only minimal pressures on big agents to engage in competitive struggles in the real economy (while inflicting exactly the opposite fate on workers and small firms).\textsuperscript{21} A key component in the effectiveness of this new

\textsuperscript{19} So, instead of behaving as a good old-fashioned central banker – one who takes away the punchbowl when the party gets going – he was happy instead to fill it up with ‘high-spirited’ easy money and easy credit.

\textsuperscript{20} On the latter three, see for example Broiianne et. al. (2008); Tuckett and Taffler (2008); and Pérez (2002), respectively.

\textsuperscript{21} For an analysis of the rôle of ‘compulsions’ within capitalism, see Foucault (2004); for him, the emergence of modernity and of capitalism was not at all about the ‘relaxation’ of compulsions (as most liberals believe), but about the development of new (and more effective) forms of compulsion. In turn, for Khan (2005) “[…] capitalism is characterised not just by the presence of market opportunities, which have always been present in societies with markets, but also by a hitherto unknown introduction of market compulsions, which ensured that both capitalists and workers continuously had to strive to improve their
technology of power was its ability to transform the state into a major facilitator of the ever-increasing rent-seeking practices of oligopolistic capital. The architects of this experiment include some capitalist groups (in particular rentiers from the financial sector as well as capitalists from the ‘mature’ and most polluting industries of the preceding techno-economic paradigm – that of the age of the automobile, oil, petrochemicals and mass production), some political groups, as well as intellectual networks with their allies – including lots of economists and the ‘new’ left. Although rentiers did succeed in their attempt to get rid of practically all fetters on their greed, in the end the crisis materialised when the markets took their inevitable revenge on the rentiers by calling the neo-liberal bluff.

So, how did we get into such a mess? This paper will argue that this crisis was the result of a unique combination of an ideology that became toxic, powerful and intrinsically rentier special-interest groups, populist politics (led by the most remarkably unimaginative and accommodating political élite for generations), bad economics, and downright incompetence.

3.- What is neo-liberalism – and why did it become so toxic?

Polanyi (1944) was one of the first to suggest that capitalism will tend to alternate between periods with little market regulation, and periods in which society intervenes actively to regulate market activity, especially in the labour market and finance. Kalecki (1943) had also envisaged long-term cycles within capitalism (see Figure 6 below). Evolutionary and neo-Schumpeterian economists also tell us that capitalism will move along long-term technological cycles due to the different nature of the ‘installation’ and the ‘deployment’ phases of new techno-economic paradigms (see Pérez, 2002). And Hirschman (1982) too discussed what he saw as long-term cycles of preferences for public versus private provision of goods. According to him, the backlash against the Keynesianism and dirigiste policies had a lot to do with the stagflation in the 1970s. This accelerated a growing collective frustration concerning the effectiveness of state regulation and led to radical calls for more laissez-faire performance just in order to survive. […] Only capitalist appropriation depends on market competition and therefore on the systematic improvement of labour productivity. Only capitalism, then, depends on constantly improving the forces of production. And only in capitalism is it necessary to grow just to stay in the same place”. (2005, p. 72)
policies. He argued that sustained frustration and disappointment with existing institutions can lead to dramatic ‘rebound effects’ demanding radical changes in policy. Long-term cycles of preferences for public versus private provision of goods may be explained by such mechanisms. For Hirschman, such disappointment must often go through a threshold before it is consciously acknowledged; people have a tendency to deny bad choices and stick to them for too long. But when they do finally admit to their disappointment, there will be a ‘rebound effect’. That is, Hirschman thinks that ‘reverse shifts’ are more radical as a result. In fact, he thinks that "a good portion of the so-called puzzle of collective action and participation in public affairs disappears when the rebound effect is taken into account" (1982, p. 81).\textsuperscript{22}

Probably the most transparent and remarkable of these ‘rebound effects’ took place towards the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s (at the same time as the new ‘IT’ technological revolution began its ‘installation’ phase). Perhaps the simplest way to illustrate statistically the nature of this ‘reverse shift’ (from the liberal-Keynesian to the neo-liberal era) is by showing what happened to the share of income of the top 1% in the US between the financial meltdowns in 1929 and in 2007 (see Figure 5).

\textsuperscript{22} See also http://www.politicalreviewnet.com/polrev/reviews/CONS/R_1351_0487_046_1005623.asp.
As is evident from Figure 5 the fortunes of the richest 1% in the US took a rather remarkable turn after the appointment of Paul Volker (and his flamboyant monetarism) to the Fed in 1979, and the election of Reagan as president a year later: including realised capital gains, the share in national income of this small group increased from 8.9% to 22.8% between then and 2006 – or from 8% to 18% if capital gains are excluded. In fact, (as evolutionary economists working on
techno-economic paradigms anticipated) by 2006 the share of the top 1% in the US had already returned to its pre-1929 level. A relatively similar scenario is found in the UK after the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 (see Atkinson, 2007), and in Australia (see Harcourt, 2001). In turn, Figure 6 shows the remarkable reversal of fortune between the top 1% and the bottom 90% of the US working population.

FIGURE 6

US: average income top 1% and bottom 90%, 1933-2006


While average income of the bottom 90% was growing four times faster than that of the top 1% during the long Keynesian cycle, during the following one the former stagnated as the latter surged ahead. In fact, as Kalecki had analysed in 1943, both Keynesian-style liberalism and neo-liberalism are basically counter-cyclical, but each liberalization, increased capital mobility, and the proliferation of ‘tax havens’ made it much easier for this income group to evade taxes (see, for example, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/22245). UBS has recently acknowledged that it helped 47,000 wealthy individuals in the US to evade taxes; see http://www.livemint.com/2009/03/05100631/UBS-says-47000-Americans-had.html.
for a different phase of the cycle. Both seek to change the balance of power between income groups: Keynesianism in order to prevent the disruptive effects of crisis-ridden capitalism, neo-liberalism in order to return power and control to their ‘rightful owners’ – capital (see Wood, 1999).

A summary along Kalecki’s lines of this switching-cycles logic is given by Sir Alan Budd (a top UK Treasury civil servant, and strong supporter of monetarism at the time, who later became Provost of The Queen’s College, Oxford):

“The Thatcher government never believed for a moment that [monetarism] was the correct way to bring down inflation. They did however see that this would be a very good way to raise unemployment. And raising unemployment was an extremely desirable way of reducing the strength of the working classes. [...] What was engineered – in Marxist terms – was a crisis of capitalism which re-created the reserve army of labour, and has allowed the capitalists to make high profits ever since” (quoted in Cohen, 2003, p. 13).

To analyse further what the new neo-liberal counter-cyclical transformation was really about one should perhaps begin by indicating that what is common to its ideological discourse and that of nineteenth-century liberal thinking is the supposed harmony between the private and the social spheres (in the context of a ‘minimal’ state).25 The implication is that this ‘harmony’ happens because the (supposedly class-blind) ‘invisible hand’ is the mechanism in charge of translating private self-interest into optimal social outcomes. So, as mentioned above (Section 2), competitive markets in which enlightened economic agents are able to maximise their own private selfish interests becomes the stuff that social optimum dreams are made of.

Of course, the automatic and necessary translation of selfish private interests into social optima is a rather useful story for the liberal discourse. Not everybody will be happy in capitalism, but whenever individuals are not happy it is because they have just had bad luck, or have lacked useful skills, have operated in an institutional setting that has hindered competitive free markets, or have themselves been guilty of resisting the harmonising magic of the invisible hand (which is their own fault anyway, and can be changed). As a result, distributive outcomes are supposedly not the product of any form of exploitation or power relations that

25 The state should also have no right to interfere in private lives (i.e., state as a ‘night-watchman’); e.g., religion should be strictly a private affair. See Hirschman (1997).
favour some and disadvantage others in any systematic way. There are bound to be winners and losers, but only in a strictly Darwinian sense. In sum, within this framework it cannot be said that in capitalism there are systematic inequalities or injustices, only anonymous market forces that produce an efficient distributive outcome (given certain conditions). Furthermore, the story of anonymous free market forces and optimum equilibria allows one to blame the state (and those who do not respect the rules of the game) rather than capitalism or unregulated markets for anything that goes wrong.

However, there are also huge differences between the classical-liberal and the neo-liberal discourses. Smith and the Enlightenment were of course right about the fundamental issue that human beings can look after their own interests without needing a Church or a King to tell them what to do. This was a remarkably progressive proposition for its time. In fact, the three pillars of the classical liberal discourse—’markets’, ‘knowledge’ (i.e., sciences and rationalism) and (individual) ‘freedom’—had this progressive characteristic. So did the Keynesian-style liberalism that emerged in the previous switching of long-run cycles (mid-1930s) mostly as a result of a ‘rebound effect’ due to the long depression and events in Russia and Germany. In actual fact, its innovative vision not only tried to reformulate all three pillars of the liberal discourse, but went so far as to question the supposed harmony between the private and the social spheres.26 Basically, for Keynesian-style liberalism unregulated market forces could, at best, offer sub-optimal equilibria and unemployment, and at worst, crises of the magnitude of that of the 1930s. So, in order to be able to translate private self-interest into optimal social outcomes what was necessary was a new strong agency from the state. In this new vision, the three pillars of the liberal discourse had to be reformulated. ‘Markets’ should only be understood as good servants, but bad masters of economic life; ‘knowledge’ now had the crucial task of helping to engineer the new agency from the state; and individual ‘freedom’ would only be meaningful if it embraced social justice (otherwise, it would be mostly empty rhetoric).

26 According to Deane, “[t]he iconoclastic conclusion of [Keynes’] analysis was that there was no invisible hand translating private self-interests into social benefit. This was the nub of the Keynesian heresy” (1980, p. 182).
Neo-liberalism, meanwhile, is a different discursive story altogether – and one that *in practice* has taken this long line of progressive liberal thinking not forward but backwards. Its huge complexities are reflected in the fact that there are many competing narratives regarding both its nature and success. In this paper I shall concentrate on two competing narratives of its nature emanating from the perspective of critical social theories (the Marxian and the Foucauldian). According to the former, neo-liberalism is not a revolution but a *counter-revolution* (along the lines of the above quote by Sir Alan Budd). According to the Foucauldian, it is a novel reconfiguration of power leading to a new type of *Governmentality* – i.e., a new form of interaction between political power (and knowledge and discourse) and the dynamics of unregulated markets.

In the Marxian narrative, the neo-liberal project represented a counter-offensive by capital, following decades of continuous full-employment, rising real wages, improving income distribution, welfarist policies and all forms of government intervention, which reached its culmination with the difficult economic environment during the stagflation of the 1970s (due only in part to exogenous shocks, such as the oil price increase that followed the ‘Yom Kippur’ war). This counteroffensive was helped (among many other things) by the lack of credible opposition that followed the collapse (mostly from within) of communism. In short, what the neo-liberal discourse was really about was capital attempting to regain its power and control through a new form of legitimisation and more sophisticated technologies of dispossession. That is, it was an attempt by the so-called ‘angry right’ to reassert class power – ‘angry’ in the sense that although rentiers had already been furious for a long time (as they had been the main losers of the welfarist ‘pact’ between unions and industrial capital that characterised the Keynesian era – leading some analysts in the past to label the post-1980 neo-liberal period as that of ‘the revenge of the rentier’), during the 1970s they were joined in their discontent by industrial and other productive capitalists who had previously done rather well during the ‘Golden Age’. For the latter, things had become difficult due to the so-called ‘profit squeeze’ that began during the late 1960s (as the techno-economic paradigm of the time was reaching maturity), and the stagflation of the 1970s.\(^\text{27}\)

\(^{27}\) As a result, these groups were facing the combined effect of (among other things) a further decline in their share of income and a squeeze of their profit rates (Figures 5, 6 and
A complementary narrative along the lines of neo-liberalism as an overwhelming right-wing offensive can be constructed along Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) lines: the above political and (in particular) economic problems lay at the root of the ascent of neo-liberalism in the sense that they helped the different factions of the capitalist élite both (finally) to solve their ‘collective action’ problem, and to start committing sufficient economic resources to achieve the de facto political power needed to succeed in this project.

In the traditional Marxian reading, neo-liberal theories are mostly an ideological cover for the process of restoration of capitalist class power. As such, neo-liberalism as a social theory is not that relevant as it is mainly an exercise in the legitimation of the economic practices taking place (see Harvey, 2005).

The most common criticism of the Marxian account is that although it rightly unmasks the class interests behind neo-liberalism, it does not explain sufficiently how neo-liberalism came to be a dominant ideology, or how this ideology was able to reshape the social world in order to secure its goals of dispossession and restoration of class power – let alone how was it able to achieve this within a democracy via a ‘spontaneous consensus’ type of hegemony (in the Gramscian sense). To say that this happened because it was useful for capital would be a functionalist explanation. Such an explanation would lack a proper historical subject and would not provide an adequate account of the rise of neo liberalism (especially its grounding in the difficult economic and political environments that always characterises the process of switching techno-economic paradigms). Furthermore, it is not at all obvious that those (successfully) conspiring to bring about their own short-term goals had a clearly defined and spelled-out ideology/legitimisation strategy ready at hand or in mind that would work in the medium or long term (somehow without much resistance from the loser). The main point here is that the story is a lot more complex than an overwhelming right-wing offensive against a weakened opposition – although these two elements are obviously crucial components of the story of the success of neo-liberalism. This complexity is not just

7), an increase in taxation (Figure 13), a significant decline in corporate capitalisation (Figure 18; which had led to a plunge of their ‘Tobin’s Q’ – Figure 19), and a collapse of their ‘net worth’ (Figure 22).
for complexity’s sake, but absolutely necessary to understand the intricate dynamic of the switching of long-term political and economic cycles.

In short, there is no doubt that a powerful fight took place during the 1970s between those interests backing the welfare state (working class, some industrial capitalists, some political parties and intellectuals) and those wanting to dismantle it (financial rentiers, other industrial capitalists whose life was becoming increasingly difficult as the fourth techno-economic paradigm was reaching maturity and new opportunities for productivity growth were becoming scarce at the same time as competition from some East Asian countries was intensifying, some political parties and intellectuals, including a great deal of economists). Equally there is little doubt that this struggle was won by one side via varying historical processes. Furthermore, as analysed below, what followed had unintended consequences that culminated in the current financial crisis. However, there is not much evidence of a political ‘invisible hand’ guiding this transformation through the remarkable institutional and social complexities that characterised the places in which neo-liberalism was developed as an ideology.

One line of criticism to the Marxian analysis of neo-liberalism comes from the work of Michel Foucault. He attempts to provide a description of the content of the neo-liberal ideology rather than an explanation of why this ideology became hegemonic. According to Foucault the core aspect of neo-liberalism relates to the problem of the relationship between political power and the principles of a market economy – that is, the projection of the principles of a market economy onto the arts of governing. In this respect, neo-liberalism is better seen as a characteristic way of problematising social reality rather than a set of fully developed theories. It represents a ‘positive’ form of social regulation and not simply a set of ‘negative’ answers—such as the retreat of the state, the absence of regulation, or the disappearance of the nation-state (see especially Frangie, 2008).

Neo-liberalism, according to Foucault, encompasses the various problematisations of the state, the social and the economy, which followed what was perceived as a long period of inefficient state interventions, stifling both society and the economy, and bordering, in a logical series of displacements, on becoming versions of the totalitarian state. Starting from the belief in the market as the optimal form of social organisation, and acquitting markets of the ills of which they
were accused, the guiding question for neo-liberals was how to reformulate the political and the social in a way compatible with the ‘rationality of the (unregulated) market economy’. Different answers were provided to this dilemma, representing various brands of neo-liberalism, united by the “question concerning the extent to which competitive, optimizing market relations and behaviours can serve as a principle not only for limiting governmental intervention, but also rationalizing government itself” (Burchell, 2001, p. 23).

Trying to make some elements of the Marxian and the Foucauldian accounts of neo-liberalism fit together (as I attempt in this paper) is a rather problematic exercise. The upholders of the former consider the Foucauldian ‘governmentality’ understanding as missing the crux of the neo-liberal revolution, namely its grounding in a class process of dispossession. For the latter, the Marxian account is at best incomplete, and at worst ignores the novel reconfigurations of political and institutional power encapsulated by the neo-liberal revolution. Underneath the theoretical differences between these two approaches, a deeper disagreement lurks regarding the understanding of ‘critique’. Governmentality, by bracketing the evaluation of the arts of rationalities it investigates, has been opposed to Marxism or at least indifferent to its critical edge, imposing “a restriction that precludes problematising effects, and thus presumably eliminates the possibility of assigning costs to any mentality of rule” (O’Malley et al., 1997, p. 509). In other words, Foucauldian accounts of neo-liberalism suspend judgement in their analysis, grounded in their scepticism regarding Marxian accounts of agency and historical development. Neo-liberalism, according to this account, is a serious attempt at instituting new forms of rule almost irrespective of their effect on the pattern of inequality; they can be contingently used for the legitimization of increased inequalities but do not have to be so by necessity. In a traditional Marxian reading, meanwhile, neo-liberalism is just a discourse that is used to legitimise new processes of dispossession and extreme forms of rent-seeking accumulation.

From the perspective of this paper one of the few indisputable characteristics of neo-liberalism is that it emerged in opposition (in the form of an undertow) to the Keynesian consensus of the ‘Golden Age’. Then, after many years on the fringes, it suddenly became mainstream among right-wing circles during the stagflation of the 1970s. This happened at the same time than the emergence of important economic problems and of political changes in right-wing parties. Among the former the
crucial one was the beginning of the already-mentioned relative exhaustion of the fourth techno-economic paradigm; and among the political changes in right-wing parties the most important ones took place in Great Britain (this was the time when the Conservative Party switched from being ‘the party of state-owners to the party of state-agents’), and in the US (with the GOP’s ‘Southerner Strategy’ – ‘government is the problem because it takes your money and gives it to Those People’).\textsuperscript{28} So, this was the time when the neo-liberal concern with ‘prudent-macroeconomics-cum-smaller-governments’ became just a tactical discursive strategy, successfully framed within the ‘politics of resentment’ and a bogus (but remarkably ingenious) disguise of ‘modernity’.

As in Figures 5 and 6 above, Figure 7 indicates that the extreme redistributive success of the post-1980 ‘neo-liberal rebound effect’ was due to its ‘winner-takes-all’ nature (the same is found in Latin America; see Palma, 2007).

\textbf{FIGURE 7}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure7.png}
\caption{US: average income of the bottom 90\% and of the top 1\%, 1933-2006}
\end{figure}

- Percentages are average annual real rates of growth between 1933-78 and 1978-06. Includes capital gains. 3-year moving averages. \textbf{Source}: Piketty and Sáez (2003).

\textsuperscript{28} See http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/02/opinion/02krugman.html.
In fact, according to the source, in real terms (i.e., US$ at 2006 values) the average annual income of the bottom 90% actually fell during the 33-year period between the 1973-oil crisis and 2006 (from US$31,300 to US$30,700). Meanwhile, that of the top 1% increased 3.2-fold (from US$386 thousand to US$1.2 million). What a difference from the previous decades of ‘liberal-Keynesianism’!

Figure 8 shows just how little difference there is between Democrat and Republican administrations from this perspective during the neo-liberal cycle. During the seven-year period of economic expansion of the Clinton administration (1993-2000), and the four-year period of expansion of Bush’s (2002-06), ‘average’ real family incomes grew by 4% and 2.9% annually, respectively. However, these averages disguise remarkable asymmetries: in fact the overall ‘average’ corresponds to that of percentiles 95-99 (something that did not happen even in Pinochet’s Chile; see Palma, 2007).

As a result, during the seven-year period of economic expansion of the Clinton administration the top 1% of income earners captured 45% of the total growth in
(pre-tax) income, while during Bush’s four-year period of expansion no less than 73% of total income growth accrued to the top 1%.\textsuperscript{29} Perhaps the neo-liberal ideology associated with the post-1980 period (and its incredibly successful process of ‘re-legitimisation’ of capital) is just shorthand for ‘the art of getting away with such a remarkably asymmetric distributional outcome within a democracy’... An alternative formulation would be that it is shorthand for ‘the art of generating a “spontaneous consensus-type of hegemony” that such a remarkably asymmetric distributional outcome is the only game in town’. Another (related) working definition could be ‘the art of transforming a particularly asymmetric set of distributive strategic choices, and the corresponding payoffs, into a Nash equilibrium’ – as the majority becomes convinced that there is no point in trying to change such asymmetric distributive strategies while the all too powerful top income players keep theirs unchanged (despite the obvious fact that they could clearly improve their payoffs only if they could somehow agree on a strategy different from the current one – a rather good example of a Nash equilibrium that is not Pareto optimal...).\textsuperscript{30}

Figure 9 shows how the contrast between the fortunes of the great majority and those of the powerful minority gets even more extreme when the comparison is made with the very few at very top of the income distribution.

\textsuperscript{29} See Piketty and Sáez (2003). There does not seem to be much evidence in the US since the late 1970s to support a ‘median voter’ scenario, or trickle-down economics...

\textsuperscript{30} Also, given the remarkable distributional outcome of this period, and what we now know about the genesis of the current financial crisis, one could also argue that neo-liberalism is also about ‘the art of making huge amounts of money by playing the rest of us for suckers’...
While the average income of about 120 million families remained roughly stagnant during this 28-year period, the average of the top 0.01% increased 8.5 times. So the multiple between the two incomes shot up in a way that ‘defies gravity’ – from its lowest point in the 1970s to its peak in 2006 it jumped from 115 to 970. In sum, if during the ‘Keynesian-liberal’ period the ‘American Dream’ seemed to belong to the majority of the US population, it has since been hijacked by a rather tiny minority – for the rest, it has only been available on credit...

At the same time, this huge income polarisation – between 1980 and 2006 just the taxable income of the top 1% increased by nearly US$2 trillion, and that of the top 10% by US$3.5 trillion – obviously became one of the major contributors (and one probably more important than the Asian ‘savings glut’) to the increased liquidity in the US financial markets (the abundance of which transformed financial markets into fundamentally unstable institutions, totally unable to self-correct. In fact, the current crisis may have many roots, but (as discussed in more detail
below) a crucial one relates to income polarisation. In particular, as Figure 10 indicates (and as good old-fashioned Keynesian economics has always emphasised) the current crisis has again shown that developments in financial markets are closely related to the distribution of income, so the latter is a crucial component in the understanding of the crisis and in the planning of how to get out of it.

**FIGURE 10**

US: income share of the top 10% and value of financial assets as % of GDP, 1947-2007

- **fin assets** = value of financial assets as percentage of GDP; and **top 10%** = income share of the top 10% (includes realised capital gains). 3-year moving averages. **Sources**: Piketty and Sáez (2003), and US Federal Reserve (2009).

It could be argued, however, that this is a case of simultaneous causation; the rich own most financial assets, and anything that causes the value of financial assets to rise rapidly will also cause inequality to rise fast. However, this close relationship stands even when capital gains are excluded from tax-payers’ income (see Figure 11).
As Figure 10 (excluding capital gains). 3-year moving averages.

In fact, the only time when the two series temporarily diverge is a short period that starts in October 1987 with ‘Black Monday’ (the largest one-day decline in stock market history). However, this ‘glitch’ was soon reversed and both series returned to their long-standing common path – that is, like an experienced tango-dancing partnership, after suffering a minor hitch, these two series are able to return swiftly to their long-standing ‘cointegration’.

This close relationship between developments in financial markets and distributional outcomes (even when they exclude capital gains) will be the subject of Section 5; but let us first attempt to deconstruct in Section 4 the ‘art’ of achieving this remarkable polarisation of income, in such a short period of time – and within a democracy.
4. - How to achieve the new legitimisation of capital and how to develop the technologies of power with the required degree of sophistication to sustain it

Understanding what neo-liberalism is really about, and clarifying its rôle in bringing about the current global financial crisis, requires more than simply highlighting how it brought about an extreme income polarisation while avoiding the political and social tensions likely to emerge with such a remarkable process within a democracy, and how this income inequality was somehow closely associated with an increased financial ‘fragility’. It also requires an understanding of how this process of dispossession was part and parcel of a wider attempt by some capitalists (especially rentiers from financial capital, and from the ‘mature’ and the most polluting industries of the previous techno-economic paradigm), some politicians and intellectual networks to discipline the state and to transform capitalism into a system with minimal ‘compulsions’ for big business. The unintended result, of course, was to transform it into an emasculated, ‘sub-prime’ economic system that not only lost a great deal of its capacities to develop the productive forces of society, but also became particularly prone to accumulating ever-increasing financial fragilities. It is from this perspective that the current crisis can also be understood as the markets bursting the ‘ideological bubble’ that characterised the neo-liberal economic and political experiment. That is, that the global financial crisis took place when the ‘end of history’-type neo-liberal manic discourse was brought down to earth by market’s law of gravity.31

The remarkable income polarisation of the neo-liberal period (particularly in the US) does not seem to give much support to the Foucauldian proposition that the new form of ‘governmentality’ sought by neo-liberalism, even though it can be contingently used for the legitimation of increased inequalities, is not about that by necessity. Instead, it seems to support the narrative that emphasises that neo-liberalism is mostly a (particularly effective) new technology of dispossession. From this perspective, a crucial mechanism for setting in motion this transformation was

31 Only six months before the collapse of A.I.G., Joe Cassano, its chief financial officer, said of the US$441 billion portfolio of CDS’s he had bet on that “[i]t is hard for us, without being flippant, to even see a scenario within any kind of realm of reason that would see us losing one dollar in any of those transactions” (quoted in Schreiber, 2009). See also Shnayerson, (2009).
rather ingenious: the reintroduction of risk and the heightening of uncertainty at the heart of a by then too self-confident ‘welfarised’ population and a (supposedly) too autonomous state. In fact, the neo-liberal counter-revolution could thus be understood as a deliberate attempt to shift the economy (and much else) from a ‘stable’ to a somehow ‘unstable’ equilibrium. That is, a movement away from Keynesian attempts to manage risk and reduce uncertainty via national and international policy coordination, closed capital accounts, stable exchange rates, low and stable interest rates, low levels of unemployment and unemployment benefits for those out of work, public health services and the other aspects of the welfare state, and a state autonomous enough to be capable of at least some ‘disciplining’ of the capitalist élite, towards an intended movement in reverse. And this as a means to an end: to try to develop an environment in which capital could exercise both a more effective politics of dispossession and a more rent-seeking form of accumulation.

What some capitalists, politicians and intellectual networks thought best for capitalist development was that capital should regain the upper hand via an economic environment that was permanently unstable and highly insecure for the majority of the population and the state. That is, one that could have the necessary debilitating effect both on workers and the state. In this kind of environment, a highly mobile and malleable factor of production (especially finance capital) would have an unrivalled power to thrive.

In short, when ‘excessive’ Keynesian macro-stabilities, government regulations (such as tougher competition laws, more effective financial regulation, strong capital controls and greater accounting transparencies), labour-securities and social safety nets laid the grounds for both an increased degree of ‘compulsion’ for capital, and a significant challenge to its legitimacy by large segments of society, what capital urgently needed was the reintroduction of risk and the spiralling of uncertainty right into the soul of what were by then rather too self-assured ‘welfarised’ institutions and populations. So what was needed was a return to an environment in which the state had to live permanently under the logic of a ‘state of

32 Neo-liberals seem to have been the only political group who really understood Kalecki’s main message in his 1943 article on the ‘Political aspects of full employment’: capitalism just cannot endure the political consequences of sustained periods of full employment.
emergency’ (see especially Arantes, 2007); and a return to precarious jobs, higher levels of unemployment, highly-constrained unions, increasingly porous safety-nets, insufficient and insecure pensions and so on – and, of course, high levels of persecutory personal debt could also be of great help.\textsuperscript{33} The bottom line was thus the question of how to reconstruct an economic and institutional scenario in which everybody knew that capital could pull the plug whenever it wanted to.

As Tony Lawson has argued:

“[…] a central and great Darwinian insight is that a subset of members of a population may come to flourish relative to other members simply because they possess a feature, which others do not, that renders them relatively suited to some local environment. The question of the intrinsic worth of those who flourish most is not relevant to the story” (Lawson, 2003, p. 251).

Natural selection mechanisms of this sort help us understand what the neo-liberal discourse is really about: it is about an attempt to create an economic environment best suited to those features that capital has and others do not. In the jungle, capital is king!

The neo-liberal discourse may have burst onto the political scene in the 1970s promoting ‘order’, market efficiency and a new concept of the state based on freedom, individual initiative and sound macroeconomics, and about fighting paternalism. However, this discourse ended up being as transparent as a bank’s balance-sheets since what was actually on offer for workers and the state was life ‘on the edge’ – as in a high-risk and unstable ‘order’ only capital could thrive.

In developing countries the challenge for capital to develop more sophisticated forms of legitimacy and new technologies of dispossession was much greater: in the new complexities of a post-Cold-War scenario, just having a Pinochet or two may not do any longer. As it happened, in many developing countries (especially in Latin America and South Africa) the new process of legitimisation of capital has been so remarkably successful, and the new technologies of power so effective, that neo-liberalism has been able to turn the tables on progressive forces and has become (‘low-intensity’) liberal-democracy’s best friend…

\textsuperscript{33} Much has been said of Mrs Thatcher’s attempt to create a ‘property-owning’ democracy; it would be more appropriate to call it a ‘mortgage-owning’ democracy. Krugman (2005) calls it ‘the debt-peonage society’. 
Before neo-liberalism was able to become hegemonic via a ‘spontaneous consensus’ scenario (which in some countries, such as Chile, took a long time, and included periods in which brutal dictatorships imposed their own ‘not-so-spontaneous-consensus’ brand of neo-liberalism), in developing countries capital always saw democracy as its main threat. However, following the success of its new form of legitimisation, and helped by the collapse of most opposition, the remarkably precarious life of most of the working population, and the weakness of a state mostly reduced to a ‘fire-fighting’ rôle (i.e., having to live constantly under the logic of a ‘state of emergency’), ‘low-intensity’ democracy (as opposed to popular or radical democracy) has become a crucial component of capital’s new technology of power to rule and dispossess the working population, and to restrain the state and to subject it to greater market accountability.

In other words, developing countries are the best example of how neo-liberalism in practice contains elements of both narratives, the Marxian and the Foucauldian. On the one hand, what was discussed above gives strong support to Foucault’s main proposition: neo-liberalism is not a set of economic policies but a new and more effective technology of power. On the other, the capitalist élite, mainly because of its intrinsically rentier nature and the lack of credible opposition, instead of using this new technology of power for its intended ‘rationalising’ effects, ended up misusing it just to support more effective forms of dispossession and more rentier forms of accumulation. This has transformed capitalism into a (‘sub-prime’) system with much-reduced capacities to develop the productive forces of society – i.e., one that has lost most of its only historical legitimacy.

From this perspective, the good governance agenda of the World Bank – with its call for the ‘de-politicisation’ of the state, the ‘independence’ of crucial government institutions such as central banks, increased ‘transparency’, ‘accountability’ and so on – is part of an attempt at disciplining and rationalising state action along free market principles (as in a Foucauldian narrative). However, as long as all forms of opposition continue to be so weak, the life of most of the working population so precarious, and the state so caught up in its fire-fighting rôle, ‘good-governance’ democracy becomes an effective institutional structure both to chart the whole of the state’s actions on the ‘rentier will’ of the capitalist élite (including helping their ‘minimalist’ approach to ‘compulsions’) and to make possible such a remarkable ‘dispossession feat’ within a democracy.
In sum, ‘low-intensity’ democracy becomes in practice a successful instrument to block any attempt to implement a progressive nationalist development agenda, or the exercise of a Keynesian or of more radical forms of state agency. That is, it becomes a valuable insurance against any significant challenge to the rent-seeking practices of big business, and against any meaningful challenge to the new attempts at country-subordination. In this respect, for oligopolistic capital low-intensity liberal-democracy replaces the rôle of military regimes as an effective hedge against the risk that a new political élite (including, of course, the ‘new left’) might come to power and threaten their brand of rent-based capitalism. That is, the new ‘democratic’ agenda of capital ensures that the state will fulfil its sole function of reproducing the new capitalist system, and could not possibly become a threat to the (ineffective) functioning of unregulated markets, or exert restraint on some of its most detrimental rent-seeking tendencies or financial manias.

In terms of Marxian debates, neo-liberal low-intensity democracy becomes a ‘Poulantzas-type’ strategy (as opposed to a Miliband ‘social-network’ one) in the sense of providing a structural mechanism to ensure that state actions (including economic policies) will not deviate from their goal of promoting its own brand of unregulated market, irrespective of which ruling élite is in power. It is a structural mechanism to ensure that state action will remain linked to a particular ideological agenda. In fact, in the new framework even the legitimacy of the state becomes linked to the effectiveness to which it adheres to the logic of unregulated markets.

In terms of the rôle of increased risk in all this, a Foucauldian analysis would emphasise instead that neo-liberalism is not about increased risk per se, but about deploying a different understanding of risk – and of the ensuing social institutions that should regulate it. As Donzelot (1991) noted, it is about a modified conception of social risk, which shifts the emphasis from the principle of collective indemnification of

34 Perhaps the ideological epiphany of the ‘new left’ in Latin America (and other parts of the developing and industrialised worlds) could be understood partly along these lines: as it believes that in this new framework it cannot get political power to implement its own progressive agenda (or, as in South Africa, believing that it may be possible to get it but not sustain it without major economic and political upheavals), it then tries to gain power to implement someone else’s economic agenda (see Palma, 2009a; for the related concept of ‘upside-down hegemony’, see Oliveira, 2006). In fact, Mrs Thatcher once branded ‘New Labour’ as "my finest creation" (see Palma (2009A). Likewise, perhaps the greatest political achievement of Pinochet and other dictators of that time is the proliferation of Latin American ‘neo-liberal-lefts’ – with their façade of ‘modernity’ and their manic managerial defences as tactical discursive strategies acquired on their Road to Damascus.
the consequences of risks to an emphasis on the individual civic obligation to moderate the burden of risk he or she imposes on society. As such, neo-liberalism might in the end have led to an increase in risk, but as a theory it attempted to justify the dismantling of earlier Keynesian forms of social risk management through new conceptions of risk and the rôle of individuals in dealing with it.

Another important element of the analysis of the Foucauldian tradition is that although for all liberal perspectives ‘markets’ are a superior form of social organisation, there are crucial differences between a classical liberal and a neo-liberal understanding of the markets. For the former, markets are a ‘quasi-natural’ reality (whose laws have to be respected by the state), whereas for the latter the markets are historical constructions that must be constantly supported by a strong political agency of active governance (in this and what follows, see Frangie, 2008). Accordingly, for classical liberalism the state and the markets each have their own space, separate from one another. For neo-liberalism, in contrast, the distinction between the space of the state and that of the markets disappears; so the state (and everything else) should be mapped out as a function (or as a sub-set) of unregulated markets.

This view, of course, is not only different from that of classical liberalism, but is also the opposite of the Keynesian-style liberal understanding of the rôle of the state, in which the relative autonomy of the state is the most critical governance issue; this autonomy is essential for the state to be able to improve upon the sub-optimal equilibria brought about (at best) by unregulated markets (with its many market failures), and for the state to protect society from the excesses of ‘free’ markets – in particular to protect those who become redundant to the logic of capital accumulation. For neo-liberals, meanwhile, market failures are not innate to the logic of capital but have a purely contingent historical nature. As such, the market economy is ‘open’ and should be facilitated through politico-institutional agency.

So, for example, Bush asks polluters to write environmental regulation. And when ‘New Labour’ Gordon Brown (as newly appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer) created in 1997 a new regulatory body for the financial industry, the Financial Service Authority (FSA), he sets it up not only as an ‘independent non-governmental body’ (i.e., a company limited by guarantee), but one that is actually financed by the financial services industry; furthermore, he appointed ex-bankers as Chairman and as
Chief Executive Officer. That is, he set the FSA up as operationally independent of Government, funded entirely by the financial corporations it is supposed to regulate, and led by financial-industry insiders. As became evident after the onset of the current financial crisis, the FSA had been acting more as a ‘service provider’ to the financial industry than as an industry regulator. Moreover, (as well as granting him a knighthood) the British Prime Minister appointed the former CEO of a bank that had collapsed with the crisis as deputy chairman of the FSA – I suppose the idea was that convicted felons make the best prison guards...35

Thus, New Labour found a rather ingenious solution to the problem of ‘regulatory capture’; if lobbyist and industry inevitably succeed in capturing the regulators, why not make them the regulators in the first place? If all that matters is self-regulation and market discipline, why bother with unnecessary government meddling in the economy?36 Not surprisingly, self-regulation became freedom to run amok, and market discipline became irrational exuberance.

The main issue here is the reversal of the Keynesian logic of the interaction between political power and the dynamics of unregulated markets. Among other things, this reversal brought to an end the rôle of the state as a ‘constrainer’ of the rent-seeking practices of oligopolistic capital (in order to foster competition). The neo-liberal attempt to project the logic of unregulated markets into the heart of government created a *de facto* situation in which the new rôle of the state became one of a *facilitator* of the rent-seeking practices of big business. In fact, for liberals of the classical tradition (and liberal-Keynesians) governments had to preserve competition, because "[p]eople of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices". (Smith, 1776). In practice, when people of the same trade meet together to conspire against the public, neo-liberal

35 Brown appointed Sir James Crosby to the FSA in December 2007, two years after Crosby – then the chief executive of Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) and already a non-executive director of the FSA – had sacked a member of his staff who warned him that the FSA’s rules (for whose design he was partly responsible) were being broken at his own bank! (See: http://thescotsman.scotsman.com/latestnews/Brown-on-spot-as-former.4971845.jp).

36 According to Brown, his policy on financial regulation was "[n]ot just a light touch, but a limited touch" (see http://www.cbi.org.uk/ndbs/press.nsf/0363c1f07c6ca12a8025671c00381cc7/ee59d1c32ce4ec12802570c70041152c?). And, according to the present British Chancellor, this policy should not be changed now as "current financial regulation is not to blame for the credit crunch" (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8104340.stm).
governments (especially those of the ‘new’ left) don’t just turn a blind eye, they end up setting the table, cooking the meal, serving the drinks, and paying the bill... The irony is that in the end both Keynesian-liberalism and neo-liberalism ended up implementing a similar strong agency from the state; however, that agency had a very different aim.

In sum, as Foucault remarks, according to neo-liberalism what is needed is “[a] state under the surveillance of the market, rather than a market under the surveillance of the state” (2004, p. 120). From this perspective, if for Smith and the Enlightenment the fundamental (anti-feudal) issue was that human beings could look after their own interests without the need of a King or a Church to tell them what to do, neo-liberal oligopolistic capital became a de facto new King, and the neo-liberal ideology a de facto new Church, that again is able (and eager) to tell people and the state what to do.

As is obvious by now, an unintended consequence of this new environment is that it has hugely increased the likelihood that capitalism would be even more crisis-ridden from within. That is, especially the wide-ranging financial liberalisation policies at a global level and those of liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation at a local one favoured by neo-liberalism, have driven the self-destructive tendencies of capital to their extreme (as, among other things, in this kind of environment issues such as prisoner dilemmas and fallacies of compositions were brought to their head). But as in this new environment the downturns are just too horrifying even to contemplate, when instability got totally out of hand and became crushingly dysfunctional, capital, as in every good old Western, could always count on the most ancient rôle of the state – to call in the cavalry in the nick of time.

37 Given current events, for most people it should come as no surprise to learn that last year 25% of countries in the world had a banking crisis. However, more surprising would be to learn that that it was exactly the same percentage which was the annual average for countries with banking crises during the 15-year period between 1986 and 2001 (see Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008; countries are weighted by their share of world income).

38 As has become evident in the current financial crisis, when in the business cycle the downswing is just too steep, the very-neo-liberal Washington Consensus also tells us (but very quietly) that we should all be ‘closet Keynesians’ and not allow market discipline to run its full course – i.e., as far as financial capital is concerned, governments should never let the chips fall where they may.
5. **Income polarisation, ‘financialisation’, and ‘sub-prime’ capitalism – one with modest capacities to develop the productive forces and intrinsically unstable**

From a macroeconomic point of view, the crucial aspect of the huge increase in inequality and in financial ‘deepening’ was that they were associated with a meagre-macro. In particular, they are linked to a disappointing rate of productivity growth; an ever-increasing level of ‘financialisation’; a massive drop in the overall level of private savings; and a particularly poor rate of private investment – poor especially since increased inequality took place side by side with a relatively dynamic increase in personal consumption, high profit rates, easy finance and social tranquillity.39

Perhaps the least surprising part of this story is the collapse in the level of personal saving (see Figure 12).

**FIGURE 12**

US: income share of the top 1% and personal savings as a % of DPY, 1913-2006

- **top 1%** = income share of the top 1%; **S/DPY** = personal saving as a percentage of disposable personal income. 3-year moving averages. Data on personal savings between 1929 and 1948 are not shown due to sharp fluctuations during both the 1930s recession and the Second World War (the same will be the case for other figures below). **Sources**: Piketty and Sáez (2003), and US Census Bureau (2008).

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39 For a pre-2007 crisis critical analysis of this period, see Harcourt (2006).
Obviously, three decades of stagnant average real income for the bottom 90%, coupled with a dynamic rate of growth of consumption expenditure, is not the ideal environment for personal saving (at least, as traditionally measured in national accounts).\textsuperscript{40}

Furthermore, contrary to what was widely predicted by the ‘supply-siders’ of the Washington Consensus, in this new neo-liberal-type capitalism a remarkable fall in corporate taxation led to a decline in corporate saving as a share of corporate profits (as opposed to what had happened for most of the ‘financially repressed’ Keynesian period; see Figure 13).

\textbf{FIGURE 13}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure13.png}
\caption{US: undistributed corporate profits and corporate taxes as % of corporate profits, 1950-2007}
\end{figure}

- \textbf{und profits/profits} = undistributed corporate profits as a share of corporate profits; and \\
- \textbf{taxes/profits} = corporate taxes as a share of corporate profits. 5-year moving averages.


\textsuperscript{40} As shown in Figure 23 below, households enjoyed a huge increase in net worth after 1980. As individuals feel richer, they may have well deceived themselves into believing that their ‘permanent’ income was growing rapidly by adding unrealised asset appreciation to their actual cash flow. That is, if individuals spend a relatively fixed proportion of their perceived income, their spending as a fraction of their income flows would tend to rise in periods of asset inflation. Thus, their conventionally GDP-measured savings rate would fall.
So, despite the many positive things that were predicted to happen if taxes on high-income groups and big corporations were to be cut, what actually happened is further evidence that (at best) “it turns out that when you cut taxes on the rich, the rich pay less taxes; when you raise taxes on the rich, they pay more taxes – end of story”.41

The combined effect of the collapse of personal savings and the decline in corporate saving led, of course, to a huge decline in the overall level of private saving – as a share of gross national income net private savings fell from 11.2% in 1984 to 3.3% in 2006. However, the really remarkable nature of this neo-liberal – and ever more financially rent-seeking – type of capitalism is revealed in the relationship between income polarisation and private investment (see Figure 14).

**FIGURE 14**

US: income share of the top 1% and share of private investment in GDP, 1913-2006

- **top 1%** = income share of the top 1%; **priv inv** = private investment as a percentage of GDP (current prices; excludes private inventories). 3-year moving averages. **Sources:** Piketty and Sáez (2003), and US Census Bureau (2008).

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Even having said all of the above, it is still truly remarkable to see how private investment failed to respond positively to the combined incentives of huge income polarisation cum political stability and dynamic growth of personal consumption, high profit rates, and overabundance of finance. Private investment instead actually declined as a share of GDP, falling cyclically from its peak of 18.5% of GDP in 1979, to just 15.5% in 2007. In fact, what happened to investment during the neo-liberal period challenges all available economic theories of investment. Low levels of investment were also a key component of Greenspan’s ‘conundrum’. That is, and not for the first time, we are faced with a ‘macro’ that only makes analytical sense if examined within the framework of the political settlement and distributional outcome in which it operates.

Figure 14 helps us in this direction by also revealing the changing nature of the process of accumulation between the Keynesian and the neo-liberal periods. In the former, the increased ‘compulsions’ for big business and the declining shares of income for top earners had forced the capitalist élite to accumulate via increasing productive capacities and moving away from sheer surplus extraction; this (more productive) orientation was also helped by the fact that the prevailing techno-economic paradigm was still in its ‘deployment’ phase. The latter period, in contrast, is characterised by a ‘scissor’ movement in reverse (see Figure 14 above), in which growing income inequality and lower ‘compulsion’ for big business took place side by side with a declining share of investment – at a time when the fourth techno-economic paradigm was becoming relatively exhausted, and the complex ‘installation’ phase of the new one was still taking shape. Figure 15 (like Section 1 above) also shows how the post-1980 process of ‘financialisation’ led to an increasing decoupling between the real and financial worlds.

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42 In a recent assessment of the Bush administration, written as a column for the *Wall Street Journal*, Karl Rove states that: “Mr. Bush [...] cut taxes on capital, investment and savings. The result was 52 months of growth” (2009, 3). But there is not much evidence in the real world that tax cuts had a positive effect on saving or investment...
During the period of so-called ‘financial repression’ that followed the Bretton Woods agreement in 1944, total financial assets remained relatively stable as a share of GDP for about three decades (at a level of about 500%), while private investment experienced some acceleration (the two extreme points in the cycle were 13.8% of GDP in 1961 and 18.5% in 1979). The subsequent period of ‘financial liberalisation’, a period of huge asset inflation (that more than doubled the value of total financial assets as a share of GDP) was accompanied by a slowdown of the rate of private investment (from 18.5% of GDP in 1979 to 15.5% in 2007). During this period the value of financial assets not only decoupled from the real economy, but the abundance of finance and the associated asset-price-led (not so) ‘irrational exuberance’, instead of having a positive pulling effect on private investment, had instead the effect of ‘friendly fire’. Therefore, there is not much evidence here to

43 According to Keynes, the reversal of the relationship between financial and productive capital was also essential for the recovery of the 1930s crisis: “[t]here cannot be a real
support the McKinnon and Shaw-type argument in favour of financial liberalisation – one of the most influential ideas behind the emergence of the Washington Consensus (see Chesnais, 2002, and Epstein, 2005).

As Figure 15 also indicates (as Figure 4 above has already shown), it may be that what financial ‘liberalisation’ was really about was an attempt at introducing a ‘unit root’ into the post-Bretton Woods stationary financial processes; once this was done, then it could be (ideologically, as well as policy) ‘shocked’ with (hopefully) permanent upward effects...

Furthermore, policy-makers totally ignored the damage that the disproportionate growth of the financial sector was inflicting on the real economy via a special version of the ‘Dutch disease’ – in this case, the crowding out of the non-financial tradable sector (both exports and import-competing sectors) by the excessive growth of the financial sector (and of construction).44 In fact, financial markets were allowed to expand to such an extent that industrialised countries moved from a situation in which banks and other financial institutions were ‘too large to fail’ (e.g. LTCM in 1998), to one in which they became almost ‘too large to be rescued’ – at the beginning of the current crisis finance and insurance accounted for 8% of GDP, more than twice their share in the 1960s (with the sector called ‘securities, commodity contracts and investments’ growing particularly fast, from only 0.3% of GDP in the late 1970s to 1.7% in 2007). Also, the share of the financial sector in overall corporate profits increased from 10% to about one-third between 1986 and 2006. In turn, the list of stocks making up the Dow Jones Industrial Average did not contain a single financial company until 1982, while at the beginning of 2008, the Dow contained five – including such ‘citadels’ as AIG, Citigroup and Bank of America (see Krugman, 2009A).

And since capitalism without compulsions and excess finance is probably as efficient as Communism without workers’ control over the bureaucracy, it should probably come as no surprise that the ‘collateral damage’ of all of the above is productivity growth (see Figure 16).

recovery, in my judgment, until the ideas of lenders and the ideas of productive borrowers are brought together again. [...] Seldom in modern history has the gap between the two been so wide and so difficult to bridge” (1931, p. 146; also quoted in Perez 2002, 167).

44 See Buiter (2009A); for analyses of the ‘Dutch Disease’, see Rowthorn and Coutts (2004), Bresser-Periera (2008), and Palma (2008B).
FIGURE 16

US: output, employment and productivity, 1950-2008

- Percentages shown in the graph are average annual real rates of growth in respective periods (1950-66, 1966-83, and 1983-08); this periodisation is due to the productivity cycle having two phases during the ‘Golden Age’. Percentages in brackets correspond to productivity *per-hour worked* for the same periods. 3-year moving averages. **Source:** GGDC (2009).

In fact, as Figure 16 indicates, the much heralded GDP growth-acceleration in the US after 1983 is not that much more dramatic than a couple of decimal points’ improvement from the average growth rate of the previous period (characterised by profit-squeezes and stagflations – 3.1% between 1983 and 2008 and 2.8% between 1966 and 1983). Nonetheless, as this minor increase came together with a drop in employment creation (from 1.8% to 1.4%, respectively), productivity growth
seemed to have increased significantly (from an average of 1% to one of 1.7%). Yet some of the huge amount of the Amazon that was deforested to keep up with publications regarding this acceleration of productivity growth could have been spared if productivity had been looked at from the point of view of output per hour-worked (rather than output per worker). From this more accurate perspective, all that happened was just a one decimal point boost (i.e., a change from an average of 1.6% to one of 1.7%...).\textsuperscript{45} And in TFP terms, despite some mild recovery during the Clinton years, productivity growth was equally disappointing – TFP not in the (not very useful) traditional Solow-residual sense, but in the sense of adjusting productivity growth by factor accumulation following the Hall and Jones (1999) methodology. In actual fact, and despite all the fuss, when the appropriate decomposition of output per worker is applied to the GGDC data, the 1.7% average rate for 1983-2008 gains a whole additional decimal point (increasing to 1.8%; see Acharya, 2009).

However, as is always the case, these average rates hide important sectoral differences; in the case of the US the sectoral range spans agriculture (4.4%) to services (0.7%). One sector that stands out is manufacturing with an apparently remarkable 4.1% average productivity growth during this period (up from 2.4% for 1966-83). However, this impressive rate has a significant ‘factor composition bias’ as this sector lost no less than one quarter of its labour force between the election of Reagan and 2008 (i.e., 5.5 million jobs) – cricket would be a very different game if tests were decided not on runs and wickets but on top batting averages; i.e., if teams could get rid of some of its middle and practically all of its lower order batting...

In turn, Figures 17 and 18 again show how the changing relationship between income distribution and private investment (found first above in Figure 14) evolved through the political cycle, but this time from the perspective of the ‘rebound effect’ of the multiple between these two variables.

\textsuperscript{45} One day someone will explain why the neo-liberal ideology was so successful in shrinking people’s ambitions and expectations... In fact, the rate of productivity growth (per hour-worked) in the US between 1983 and 2008 (1.7%) was lower than that of Japan (2.4%), and the United Kingdom (2.2%); it was also lower than that of smaller industrialised countries such as Ireland (3.1%), Finland (2.7%), Norway (2.3%), Austria (2.2%) and Sweden (1.8%). And it was identical to that of Germany despite all the upheaval of unification (see GGDC 2009; data for Germany available since the start of unification in 1989).
3-year moving averages. **Source:** US Census Bureau (2008).

This statistic could be understood as a proxy for the changing nature of the process of accumulation; i.e., for the changing relationship between what top income earners take away from the economy and what they put back into it in terms of improved productive capacities. In fact, towards the end of the period this relationship had changed so much that even the income share of the top 0.5% (i.e., only about seven hundred thousand families, earning 18.6% of the total in 2006) ended up well above the share of all private investment in GDP (15.5%).

Finally, probably no other statistic communicates better the increasingly rent-seeking nature of the capitalist élite during the neo-liberal period in the US than that in Figure 18.
It seems that the main aim of the neo-liberal capitalist élite in the US was to create a 'post-industrial' capitalism – one with only carrots but no sticks for the capitalist élite, where, among other things, productive investment could become an optional extra on top of assured rent-earnings opportunities and increased surplus extraction. And also probably no other statistic demonstrates better than that in Figure 18 how the US seems to be increasingly in a state of 'projective identification' with Latin American-style capitalism (see Palma, 2009B). That is, neo-liberalism also ended up as a de facto mechanism for bringing middle-income developing countries’ institutional structures and distributional outcomes into industrialised countries.47 In sum, US rentiers did certainly succeed in their attempt to get rid of

46 Note that the income distribution data from the US come from a different source to those of the other countries – i.e., in the former from tax returns and in the latter from household surveys. See also TDR (1997).

47 In the Preface to the first edition of Das Kapital Marx says that "[t]he country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future" (Marx, 1867). Well, maybe at that time, but not any more – now it seems to be the other way
 practically all obstacles to their greed. When the market eventually called their bluff, it became evident just how self-destructive and short-sighted this strategy had been.

6. - Six key ‘rent-seeking-à-la-post-modern’ dynamics that characterised the neo-liberal paradigm

This section discusses six rent-seeking dynamics that will help to illustrate the rôle that neo-liberalism played, as it was de facto applied in the real world, in the current global financial crisis.

6.1 Greenspan-style virtual wealth creation

According to what I call the first neo-liberal rent-seeking economic law, there is supposed to be no fundamental difference between what was happening in the paper (casino) economy and in the real economy. Therefore, the increase in net worth resulting from asset price inflation (even if it is only based on unlimited growth of finance) is tantamount to real wealth creation. For example, Figure 19 shows that since 1980 there has been a complete breakdown of the long-standing relationship between corporate capitalisation and the replacement cost of fixed (or tangible) assets – i.e., between the value of corporate equities and bonds and the replacement cost of plant and equipment.

round...
- **capitalisation** = total corporate capitalisation (equities and bonds); **tang assets** = replacement cost of tangible assets. Percentages are average annual real rates of growth between 1980-2007 (but in the case of capitalisation it excludes the two years of the collapse of the technology bubble; i.e., they are the growth rates between 1980-1999, and 2001-2007). 3-year moving averages. **Source**: Bichler and Nitzan (2009). The market value of equities and bonds is net of foreign holdings by US residents.

Between 1932 and 1956 both series (with different cycles) had a similar overall average annual rate of growth (8%); then corporate capitalisation surged ahead until the 1973 oil crisis, when the stagflation that followed overcorrected this asymmetry. Finally, from the early 1980s until the 2007 crisis the annual real rate of growth of corporate capitalisation nearly trebled that of the replacement cost of fixed assets. In fact, even the collapse of the ‘dotcom’ bubble in 1999 did not have much long-lasting effect.48 In turn, Figure 20 shows the changing pattern of the ratio between these two variables (representing one version of the 'Tobin’s Q').

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48 On why the collapse of the ‘dotcom’ bubble was not enough to bring an end to the casino economy, see Pérez (2009).
It is not unreasonable to expect that the capitalisation of a corporation should represent the value of its entire productive capacity (that of its tangible and non-tangible assets). However, the ‘Tobin’s Q’ only captures the ratio between capitalisation and the value of tangible assets – i.e., between the whole and only one of its parts. Therefore, under ‘normal’ circumstances this ratio should be greater than 1. The question is, by how much? Here is where a distorted version of the ‘knowledge economy’-type discourse comes to the rescue of rentiers and bubble-blowers. What was happening in equity markets was absolutely not a bubble due to the practically unlimited growth of finance; it was simply the markets doing their job properly – i.e., pricing the ever-increasing value of intangible assets accurately (intangible assets such as intellectual property rights, firm-specific knowledge, proprietary technology, goodwill and other ‘metaphysical’ assets). In short, from a real business cycle perspective all that was supposed to be happening
was an efficient market response to an exogenous transformation in the real (knowledge-based) economic environment. Bubble? What bubble?

In fact, according to a study by Standard & Poor, this ‘intangible revolution’ meant that the value of intangibles grew from 17% of total corporate assets in 1975, to 80% in 2005 (for a detailed analysis of this issue, see Bichler and Nitzan, 2009). What is ironic is that if this were true, the recent collapse of the stock market should be interpreted as the markets pricing down the value of corporate sector intangible productive capacities by more than half.49

In turn, ‘Greenspan-style virtual wealth creation’ meant that between 1982 and 2007 households’ net worth in the US increased by US$42 trillion, or by a factor of 3. Basically, each had its net worth increased on average by about US$400,000 – or by 12 times the average income of the bottom 90%.50 Conversely, since the bubble blew up, the average net worth of households has declined by US$130,000, or by an amount larger than the average household debt. In fact, as a share of personal disposable income, by mid-2009 household net worth had reverted to where it was during the third quarter of 1992.

6.2 No need for financial markets to be either boring or small

According to the second rent-seeking economic law of neo-liberalism, there is nothing as magical as financial markets, and nothing as valuable as the skills of the wizards who perform that magic (otherwise known as the new masters/mistresses of the universe, the new jugglers of perpetual profits). With the advent of neo-liberalism, gone were the years when “[b]anks attracted depositors by providing convenient branch locations and maybe a free toaster or two; [...] and then] they used the money thus attracted to make loans, and that was that” (Krugman, 2009A). And gone were the years when finance and insurance together accounted for less than 4% of GDP, and when the list of stocks making up the Dow Jones Industrial Average did not contain a single financial company.

However, with the deregulation-minded neo-liberal era, “[o]ld-fashioned banking was increasingly replaced by wheeling and dealing on a grand scale.”

(Krugman, 2009A). In fact, even using Geithner’s definition of ‘banking’, by 2007 more than half of US’s banking was being handled by (what he likes to call) a “parallel financial system” – better known as “shadow banking” (a term coined by Paul McCulley in August 2007 at a Fed’s annual symposium).

In a way, the logic of an increasingly unregulated financial market was remarkably simple. More financial innovation of the ‘slicing, dicing and repackaging financial claims’ type, and more volume, resulted in more fees and more underwriting, which in turn led to more profits. The quality of the assets became just an optional extra. And the securitisation food chain went on: mortgages become ABSs, ABSs became CDOs (of different tranches), CDOs became CDOs-Squared, CDOs-Squared became CDOs-Cubed (by this time not a soul had a clue as to the repetition of exposures in the underlying CDOs), and then even higher CDOs; and the game of Monopoly went on and on. In turn, CDOs also took the form of CLOs, CBOs, CSOs, SFCDOs, CRECDOs and CIOs. At each step there were fat fees and more underwriting, and (of course) many opportunities to transfer the risk to someone else down the line – “from those who understand it a little to those who do not understand it at all.” Or, as Stiglitz puts it, “[g]lobalization opened up opportunities to find new people to exploit their ignorance. And we found them.” That is, a new (post-modern-type) Robin Hood was born: one that robs the rich to give it to the very rich...

50 See http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current.
51 Even before the beginning of the 2007 crisis, Lehman was already leveraged to the tune of 22 times its net worth (see McDonald and Robinson, 2009).
52 In 2003 Merrill Lynch only had US$3.4 billion in CDOs; by 2006 it posted US$44 billion in sub-prime CDOs and sub-prime mortgage bonds (a figure higher than its entire shareholders’ equity value). By then, fees that flowed from financing CDOs reached $700 million. Furthermore, despite the fact that this huge position was even unhedged, ratings agencies still gave Merrill Lynch a solid investment grade. Had executives of Merrill, or of those helpful rating agencies, being involved in other professions (such as doctors or lawyers), by 2008 perhaps measures would have been taken to strike them off their professional registers. However, as these are financial markets, despite heavy losses (US$27 billion) and the exposure of what has been going on, the total bonus pool of Merrill in 2008 still reached US$3.6 billion (with the top four recipients alone receiving a total of US$121 million). See Crotty (2009). Moreover, a former chief investment strategist at Merrill Lynch thinks that he is still in a position to preach – writing in the Financial Times he complains that all what current government actions is doing is “slowing the economy’s dynamism and increasing rigidity”... (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1f64e9b6-7559-11de-9ed5-00144feabdc0.html).
In a recent article, Robert Skidelsky explains: “[…] in contrast to the dot-com boom, it is difficult to identify the technological ‘shock’ that set off the subsequent boom. Of course, the upswing was marked by superabundant credit. But this was not used to finance new inventions: it was the invention. It was called securitized mortgages. It left no monuments to human invention, only piles of financial ruin” (Skidelsky 2009, 2).

Also, financial innovations aimed at increased lack of transparency was often the name of the game as there were huge rewards for helping corporations to take “risk off-balance sheet, where it is not as readily observed and monitored”, and for helping them to “dodge taxes and accounting rules.”(ibid.). There were also financial companies that specialised in providing money managers and hedge funds with fast-trade execution (often with an ‘immediate or cancel’ feature) that insure that the trades cannot be traced.\footnote{See, for example, http://money.cnn.com/2009/07/14/news/companies/sergey_aleynikov_getco_goldman.fortune/index.htm?postversion=2009071510.} These hidden stock-trading venues, also known as ‘dark pools’ (in part because the trading takes place away from any exchange and therefore without any reports being filed) have captured an increasingly large share of US equity volume in recent years. “The leading "dark pool" is Goldman Sachs' "Sigma X," which executed about 162 million external orders in April 2008” (Ibid.).

In the meantime, the financial sector ended up generating about a third of all corporate profits in the US. No wonder gambling was one of the few industries struggling during the boom years – who needs Las Vegas if we have Wall Street's casinos offering so much more fun and hugely improved odds?\footnote{Those better odds reflected the fact that, as opposed to a normal casino, there were no near zero-sum games in Wall Street – if you win, the casino also wins (as they work on fees and virtual performance...). In fact (and with apologies to animal lovers), in a stock market bubble even a monkey can make money – all he or she needs to do is to buy a random selection of stocks (or an index-tracking one) and then hold on to them. Besides, it is unlikely that a monkey would charge you exorbitant fees for doing just that. (Probably a banana or two would do).}

The key point here is the delusion that all these financial rent-seeking and corrupt dynamics were sustainable, and that they were making a positive contribution to growth. However, as is now patently clear:

“[…] the wizards were frauds, whether they knew it or not, and their magic turned out to be no more than a collection of cheap stage tricks. Above all, the key
The promise of securitization – that it would make the financial system more robust by spreading risk more widely – turned out to be a lie. Banks used securitization to increase their risk, not reduce it, and in the process they made the economy more, not less, vulnerable to financial disruption.” (Krugman, 2009A)

Furthermore, as discussed above, the neo-liberal discourse totally ignored the damage that the disproportionate growth of the financial sector was inflicting on the real economy via ‘Dutch disease’ crowding-out effects (it more than doubled as share of GDP between the 1960s and 2007).

6.3 Capital accumulation via increased surplus extraction rather than improved productive capacities

As the income distribution and investment data above clearly show, like ‘rentier aristocrats’ whose wealth depends on their capacity to squeeze surpluses out of peasants, the post-1980 neo-liberal capitalist élite in the US also preferred to increase its wealth by developing a more effective technology of dispossession. That is, by improving its own coercive powers (on top of its remarkable talents for creating virtual financial wealth), rather than by increasing its capacities for developing further the productive forces of society – let alone by taking the risks associated with the ‘deployment’ phase of a new ‘IT’ and ‘clean’ techno-economic paradigm (although bubbles associated with the installation phase of the ‘IT’ technological revolution would do very nicely...) From this perspective, this third neo-liberal rentier economic law could also be understood as a new form of moral hazard: one characterised by the fundamental distortion of incentives.

6.4 No need any longer for paying taxes to finance free public goods

As is well known, the huge increase of the pre-tax income-share of the top income earners was actually accompanied by a remarkable fall in their tax-rates. For example, according to an IRS (US Internal Revenue Service) report obtained by the Wall Street Journal, in 2005 the top 400 income-tax payers (with a combined gross income of more than US$100 billion) controlled 1.2% of the nation’s total taxable income – twice the share they had in 1995. As if this huge increase in taxable income was not enough, this group also had their effective income tax rate cut by nearly half (from 30% to 18%; see Francis, 2008). And the 1995 effective income
tax rate of this group (30%) had already been reduced by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which had drastically cut the top marginal income tax rates (see Feldstein, 1995).

Taxes on corporate profits also declined remarkably; for example, these taxes as a percentage of public expenditure fell from 15% of the total in 1978 to just 6% in 1982, while at the same time the public deficit grew by an almost identical converse amount (from 6% to 16% of public expenditure). Again, by 2002 taxes on corporate profits were back at 6% of public expenditure, while the deficit went up again to 16%. In fact, the share of taxes on corporate profits in total public expenditure fell below even the lowest levels reached by this ratio during the difficult years of the 1930s’ recession (9%). Furthermore, as tax cuts did very little to stimulate the economy, real stimulation was left to the Fed, which took up the task with unprecedentedly low interest rates and liquidity.57

In all, it has been estimated that the Bush tax cuts amounted to $1.8 trillion.58 And that amount is almost identical to the US$ 1.7 trillion increase in the debt of the Federal Government between the beginning of the first Bush administration in 2001 and the start of the financial crisis in 2007 (see US Federal Reserve, 2009).

So, basically this fourth neo-liberal rentier economic law could be summarised in the following terms: rather than paying taxes to get free public goods, it was much more fun for the top income earners and big corporations to ‘part-pay/part-lend’ these taxes to the government. The end result of the delusion that this was a sustainable policy is that the current sum of all government liabilities (from Treasury bonds to Medicare and military pensions) amounts to the staggering figure of US$63.8 trillion.59 And if one divides this figure by the number of households in the US, the result is the rather shocking figure of US$547,000. Again, if this debt and the household private debt were to be paid in the next 30 years, and even assuming a real interest rate of 0%, each household would have to contribute no less than US$22,274 per year – an amount equivalent to more than 70% of the current average annual gross income of the bottom 90%. And this, of course,

assuming that the federal government closes the deficit, and each household does not incur any additional debt (both rather doubtful scenarios, to say the least). Thus, as so many other things these days, the ‘part-pay-part-lend’ your taxes really means ‘part-pay-part-someone-else-pays’ your taxes to the government... Also, the current outburst of public sector liabilities in many industrialised countries may signal the beginning of an inevitable period of Brazilian-style public sector Ponzi-finance (see Palma, 2006). That is, following what I have always thought to be the first law of macroeconomics – ‘one can only solve a macroeconomic problem by creating another one in the hope that that one would be easier to handle’ – I think that it is fairly safe to predict that the roots of the next financial crisis are likely to be found amid the debris of the current one...

6.5 No need any longer to pay the level of wages required for aggregate demand growth to sustain capital accumulation

An obvious question that emerges from the income distribution data discussed above is how was it politically feasible in the US to keep the average real wage of the bottom 90% stagnant for 30 years? This is an issue with many facets, with both carrots and sticks. On the economic side, the carrots included the mirage of an ever-increasing household net worth due to asset price bubbles – which was also the basis for an ever-increasing access to credit (see Figure 23 below). And on the political and ideological ones, these included some remarkably effective ‘bait and switch’ topics – e.g., the ‘refocusing passion carrots’ of what Karl Rove once called ‘wedge issues’ (God, guns, gays, abortion, military adventures and the war on terror). The sticks included the constant threat of transferring jobs to China, India and Mexico.

60 See http://business.theatlantic.com/2009/05/us_debt_668621_per_household.php. In turn, if the real interest rate is assumed to be 3% during this 30-year period, what each household would have to contribute per year rises to US$34,092; and if 5%, to US$43,469...

61 In the UK, for example, while public sector borrowing is set to increase by £175bn during the current financial year, the National Audit Office has just reported that tax receipts have fallen by 10% in the last one - the biggest fall since 1923. In all, as a percentage of GDP, by mid-2009 the total outstanding government net debt is already twice the level it had in 2004, and two-third higher than before the beginning of the 2007 crisis (see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ business/8160614.stm).
Much has been said regarding the increase in household debt before the 2007 financial crisis, and the huge dead-weight that this is bound to bring to the eventual recovery. However, not enough attention has been paid to the fact that this debt was essential to sustain the growth of aggregate demand in the face of stagnant average incomes in the bottom 90% of the population (see Figure 21).

**FIGURE 21**

- **PC** = Personal Consumption Expenditure; and **GY** = gross income of the bottom 90%.
- 3-year moving averages. Percentages are average annual real rates of growth in respective periods. **Source**: US Census Bureau (2008).

As Figure 21 indicates, the fall in the rate of growth of aggregate income of the bottom 90% (from 3.5% between 1950 and 1980 to 1.8% between 1980 and 2006) is associated with *practically the same rate of growth of personal consumption expenditure* in both periods (3.6% and 3.4%, respectively). No prizes for guessing what made up the difference.

The above gives rise to the fifth neo-liberal rent-seeking economic law: rather than paying the level of wages that were necessary to achieve the growth of aggregate demand required to sustain the process of capital accumulation, it was

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62 Note that due to lack of data, this graph compares the gross income of the bottom 90% with the level of personal consumption expenditure of the whole population (on this issue see Pollin (2005)). Also, note that in the right-hand panel the aggregate income of the bottom 90% grows at 1.8% only due to a growing population.
much more fun for the capitalist élite to ‘part-pay/part-lend’ the required level of wages. Figure 22 indicates the resulting huge increase in the level of household debt (both consumer credit and home mortgage debt) after the election of Reagan.

**FIGURE 22**

*US: debt outstanding of the household sector as a % of wages and salaries, 1965-2007*

- cons cred = consumer credit of households; and mortg = home mortgage debt of households; both series are expressed as percentage of wages and salaries. 3-year moving averages. **Sources:** US Census Bureau (2008), and US Federal Reserve (2009).

As Figure 22 shows, consumer credit of the household sector jumped from 25% to over 40% of wages and salaries between the early 1980s and 2007. In turn, home mortgage debt soared from 65% to 166%. And as is well known, a significant component of the increase in mortgage debt was devoted to finance consumption, because US households were allowed to transform the capital gains in their homes into ATM machines – home equity withdrawal reached US$700 billion in 2005 (see Roubini, 2009). And all this just to keep personal consumption expenditure growing at about the same pace as before neo-liberalism.

Abraham Lincoln famously said that “[y]ou can fool some of the people all of the time, and all of the people some of the time, but you cannot fool all of the people all of the time.” Well, maybe the long household net worth bubble in the US
(and in many other industrialised and developing countries of the time) was the exception in which you could fool all of the people for rather a long time! As mentioned above, one working definition of neo-liberalism could be ‘the art of making huge amounts of money by playing the rest of the population for suckers’...

Figure 23 illustrates the effects of the capitalist élite’s preference to ‘part-pay/part-lend’ the required level of wages on household debt, and the mirage of an ever-increasing net worth of households. The latter not only provided the foundations for the ever-increasing access to credit, but was probably also a fundamental component of the material foundations of the neo-liberal ‘spontaneous consensus’-type of hegemony found in the US since 1980 – with its ever-increasing tolerance for inequality, which helped the set of distributive strategic choices found during this period, and their corresponding payoffs, become (as mentioned above) the most unlikely Nash equilibrium.

**FIGURE 23**

US: household sector debt and net worth as a share of personal disposable income, 1965-2007

- **H S debt** = Household sector debt; and **H S net worth** = Household sector net worth. 3-year moving averages. **Source**: US Census Bureau (2008), and US Federal Reserve (2009).

During the 25-year period prior to 2007, while real household net worth increased (as a share of personal disposable income) from 450% to 615%, having peaked at
645% in 2006, household sector debt more than doubled as a share of disposable income (it jumped from 65% to 136%). The US was not alone in this boom of household debt; in many other industrialised countries, especially in the UK and Iceland, households were also allowed, indeed encouraged, to accumulate an excessive amount of debt. In the UK the latter reached roughly 1.7 times the level of household disposable income, and in Iceland more than 2 times. In the process, households have accumulated an amount of financial risk that has proved to be at levels that are obviously not privately efficient, let alone socially efficient. This excessive amount of risk has become evident in the alternate phase of the cycle, that of the ‘sudden stop’ to their access to additional financing.

In all, the average household in the US is currently carrying US$122,000 in personal debts; to this one should add the above figure of US$547,000, which represents the average household share in overall government liabilities (from Treasury bonds to Medicare and military pensions). The resulting two thirds of a million dollars defy belief.

6.6 Capitalism can be reconstructed as a system with asymmetric ‘compulsions’ – minimum for oligopolistic capital, maximum for workers and small and medium firms

As discussed above (and in Foucault, 2004; and Khan, 2005), classical capitalism is characterised not just by the presence of market opportunities but by market ‘compulsions’, which ensure that both capitalists (of all sizes) and workers (of all skills) continuously have to strive to improve their performance in order to remain in the market. In no other economic system does continued existence depend on market competition, and therefore on the systematic improvement of labour productivity. Only in capitalism are there continuous pressures from competitive struggles, which lead to the need constantly to improve the forces of production. Therefore, like in Alice in Wonderland, only in capitalism is it necessary to run just to stay in the same place. However, what has emerged in practice from the neo-liberal experiment is a system in which some have been left with all the running, while others have preferred to catch a lift.

The key issue here is not one of equity or fairness (though issues like these are important enough); it is (as the five previous rent-seeking economic ‘laws’ have
indicated) that those groups who have had the power to appropriate all the carrots have at the same time had the capacity to minimise the pressures they face for competitive struggles in the real economy (necessary for a historically-progressive capitalist system). As the head of Chile’s largest holding company, and former President of the Confederation of Chilean Industry explains, “[t]his is a market economy in name only. Competition has disappeared; mergers and acquisitions have led to a huge degree of oligopolistic concentration”.

At the same time, large corporations have been able to increase ‘compulsions’ for other economic agents, such as ensuring that workers have to strive continuously in order to improve their performance just to survive in precarious labour markets, and small and medium-sized firms have to strive continuously in order to improve their performance just to stay above water. What oligopolistic capital has failed to understand is that in the long run capitalist development will necessarily take place on its own terms, ‘warts and all’. Not surprisingly, the neo-liberal capitalist system has not only lost a good deal of its capacities to develop the productive forces of society, but has also become even more crisis-ridden from within.

Perhaps the key lesson here is that no matter how ‘rational’ the neo-liberal discourse may have been initially in a Foucauldian sense, an institutional environment (neo-liberal or not) in which the economic élite faces so little challenge (either politically or ideologically) is bound to self-destruct. In this, of course, most of the financial press has played a rôle especially due to the way in which they have interpreted economic news during the genesis and the outburst of the current crisis. First, in a long phase that could be called the ‘turning-a-blind-eye’ stage, good news was usually exaggerated and bad news ignored. In the second, which could be called the ‘first omnipotent stage’, when eventually bad news could no longer be ignored and at least some had to be acknowledged, this was followed by an attitude of mostly ‘nothing really to worry about, everything is under control’. In the final phase, which could be called the ‘second omnipotent stage’ (and only after a brief period of ‘shocked disbelief’), there was a turn towards an attitude best summarised by ‘I can take all this on my chin without having to have my economic ideology knocked down’…

http://www.atinachile.cl/node/4629.

For a psychoanalytical understanding of this type of awareness / lack of awareness cycle,
How could anyone have believed that a debt-fuelled bubble of asset-price inflation was actually real wealth creation? How could anyone have believed that top income earners could switch the process of accumulation towards the appropriation of an ever-increasing share of national income in a sustainable way? How could anyone have believed that the top income earners and corporations could continue to part-pay/part-lend taxes and wages forever without creating unsustainable financial fragilities? How could anyone have believed that the financial sector could keep making huge amounts of money forever by treating workers and governments as sitting ducks? How could anyone have believed that a great deal of the financial press could keep putting such a positive spin in all this in a permanently credible way? How could anyone have believed that the markets would not eventually call the neo-liberal bluff? When this happened, as Krugman (2009B) remarks, “America [began to look] like the Bernie Madoff of economies: for many years it was held in respect, even awe, but it turns out to have been a fraud all along”.

So, these six rent-seeking dynamics perfectly illustrate the ‘have your cake and eat it’ de facto nature of the neo-liberal paradigm, and its delusions that these rent-seeking dynamics were not only sustainable but even good for long-term growth. They also demonstrate the ‘bad faith’ nature of its discourse – ‘bad faith’ in Sartre’s sense of mauvaise foi (i.e., of something aiming at deceiving oneself as much as at deceiving others).

We are now clearly paying the price for allowing rent-seeking-style ‘sub-prime’ capitalism to run wild, and for the delusional optimism of policymakers and regulators who believed that capitalism is at its most effective when they happily turn a blind eye to issues such as the risks associated with extreme income polarisation, multiple asset bubbles and credit booms. ‘How can you be sure it is a bubble?’ ‘Do you know better than the market?’ In fact, no policy-maker was willing to call the ‘irrational exuberance’ of asset prices a bubble since according to the efficient market hypothesis to call a bubble a bubble is a contradiction in terms.

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see Steiner (1993).

65 According to the S&P/Case-Shiller national home-price index, between 1997 and 2006 house prices in the US rose by 124%; in the same period prices in Great Britain went up by 194%, those in Spain by 180% and those in Ireland by 253% (see http://www.economist.com/specialreports/displayStory.cfm?story_id=9972381).
Conclusions

Following Foucault, as neo-liberalism is not really a set of economic policies (as in most ideologies, these are mostly contingent) but a new technology of power, the ‘macroeconomics’ of the post-1980 era only make analytical sense when examined within the framework of the political settlement and distributional outcome in which it operates. That is, when analysed from the perspective that what emerged de facto from the neo-liberal age was a new type of capitalism – one in which large segments of the capitalist élite wanted to have all the benefits that capitalism could possibly offer without having to worry about the usual inconveniences (such as competitive struggles) that normally come with these benefits. And one that inflicted exactly the opposite fate on workers and small firms.66

To be precise, what neo-liberalism helped to unleash was a type of capitalism characterised by an economic élite that thought that it could continue to ‘split and project’ forever: keep the carrots, shift the sticks; get the upside, transfer the risks. Paraphrasing Gore Vidal, this ‘split and project’ mechanism transformed this system into one characterised by ‘socialism for the rich and capitalism for the rest’.

In fact, little seems to have changed since the onset of the 2007 crisis; while better than the plan of the former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson (which would have provided him with US$700 billion to spend at his sole discretion, without oversight or judicial review), the Geithner-Summers plan to deal with toxic assets has been labelled by Krugman as ‘lemon socialism’: “taxpayers bear the cost if things go wrong, but stockholders and executives get the benefits if things go right” (2009C). At least for Scott Fitzgerald this would have come as no surprise – just further evidence that “the rich are just different from you and me”...

It is not the first time in recent history that rentiers have tried to get rid of all fetters on their greed and transfer all associated risks; however, they have never succeeded on such a scale. When eventually the market called their bluff, it became evident how short-sighted (and self-destructive) this strategy had been.

66 My late friend and teacher Andrew Glyn argued that what came with globalisation was ‘capitalism unleashed’ (Glyn, 2006); in fact, what was really unleashed was a very specific form of capitalism.
In other words, alongside some Schumpeterian innovators in the new information technologies, some venture capital involved in their operations, and the considerable investment in infrastructure for telecommunications that characterised the period of ‘installation’ of the current techno-economic paradigm (at least until the ‘dotcom’ bubble), what has also emerged since 1980 has been a new type of capitalism. This has not only been extremely unequal and highly rent-based, but has been characterised by large segments of the capitalist élite attempting to create an economic, political and social environment in which they could not only resist change but also have their cake and eat it: call it ‘neo-liberal neo-Darwinism’. That is, a deliberate attempt (especially from financial capital, and from the ‘mature’ and the most polluting industries of the previous techno-economic paradigm) to create the economic and political environment best suited to the survival of the un-fittest – i.e., un-fittest vis-à-vis what was required for a successful deployment in the real economy of a new ‘information-technology’ and ‘clean’ techno-economic paradigm.67

What also emerged was a new neo-liberal ideology that (maybe not in theory but certainly in practice) provided the required legitimisation needed by financial groups and segments of productive capital both to block the necessary transformations, and to identify and exploit every imaginable new source of rent – so that productive investment and technological transformation could become an optional extra on top of assured rent-earnings opportunities. It also provided the technologies of power with the required degree of sophistication for accomplishing the most remarkable ‘dispossession endeavour’ ever achieved within a democracy.

67 Among the important components of that strategy were not just the abolition of most of the financial regulation erected during the ‘New Deal’ and the refusal of the Bush administration to join the ‘Kyoto agreement’, but also the lax implementation of the remaining environmental, competition and financial regulations. In financial spheres, for example, the enforcement staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) actually shrunk 11 per cent in the two-year period prior to the onset of the sub-prime crisis, and the fines and other penalties it imposed dropped by more than half during the second term of the Bush administration. It also allowed Bernard Madoff to keep operating even after having been alerted to his misdeeds by Harry Markopolos, an accountant and investment investigator who began pushing the SEC to investigate Madoff as early as 1999. (For a detailed analysis of Markopolos’s quest and the documents he submitted to the SEC to show that Madoff’s record of consistent low-double-digit returns simply couldn’t be legitimate, see the Wall Street Journal, December 18, 2008, especially the 19-page document Markopolos sent to regulators in 2005, ‘The World’s Largest Hedge Fund Is a Fraud’, where he concludes that “I am pretty confident that BM [Bernard Madoff’s hedge fund] is a Ponzi Scheme.” The WSJ article also explains how the SEC investigators had actually discovered by themselves as early as 2006 that Madoff had seriously misled the agency about how he managed customer money, yet the SEC decided not to take any action.
Maybe after the remarkable behaviour of ‘free’ agents in financial markets and in politics in the US during the recent past, mainstream economists and public choice theorists should perhaps take another look at their concept of the ‘rational agent’. Undoubtedly the most complex issue to understand is the rôle of democracy itself – especially the unmasking of the material basis for the ‘spontaneous consensus-type of hegemony’ that allowed all this.

The neo-liberal discourse was also remarkably useful for providing the necessary façade of ‘modernity’ for this spontaneous consensus, which, as Adorno reminded us (see quote at the beginning of the paper), can be the most effective disguise; he also reminded us of its new ‘quality’: “[n]ewness only becomes mere evil in its totalitarian format, where all the tension between individual and society, that once gave rise to the category of the new, is dissipated” (1974, p. 185). It can even be argued that (when it became unchallenged) post-industrial, ‘geriatric’ capitalism nearly brought to an end the specific culture in which it developed: the Enlightenment – and especially that crucial aspect that requires the submission of all authority to the scrutiny of critical reason.

There are, of course, many lessons to be learned from the current financial crisis, such as those regarding the need for intelligent and imaginative financial regulation (both global and domestic) and effective capital controls in intrinsically unstable and fast-changing financial markets. As mentioned above, Keynes argued strongly for an international financial and payments system that would insulate nations at least partially from the economic maladies of other nations, and from the predatory nature of international finance. This crisis also shows us the need for an economic environment that would favour ‘stickers’ rather than ‘snatchers’ (in Hicks’ sense; see Penrose, 1995). It has also expose the irrelevance of the ‘dismal science’ – at least in its ‘markets-always-know-best’ variety. However, the main lesson is that it exposed the high degree of toxicity of the (otherwise probably ‘rational’, in a Foucauldian sense) neo-liberal ideology when it became uncontested and put to the test by an intrinsically rent-seeking capitalist élite, and by an intrinsically compliant political class. From this perspective, the

68 One of these lessons, of course, is exactly the opposite of the rather popular view that there is not that much to be learnt from the current crisis as it is just one of those things that happens once-in-100-years...
roots of current financial crisis are not necessarily found in an ideology that is toxic per se. Rather, these roots can be found mostly in a rent-seeking and politically unchallenged capitalist élite transforming neo-liberalism into a toxic ideology capable of generating a monsoon of toxic assets.

Also, as mentioned above, it is clear by now that capitalism without the required level of 'compulsions' for oligopolistic capital, without a critical mass of opposition, and with such an amenable political class – and despite all the ever more dazzling financial pyrotechnics, and the ever more sophisticated breaking-down of value-chains in the global economy – is probably not that much more efficient than Communism without workers’ control over the bureaucracy. I call this phenomenon "history’s impossibility theorem": an economic system (neo-liberal or not) in which the élite faces little challenge either politically or ideologically not only becomes inefficient, but also prone to self-destruct. Under those circumstances, it seems that the 'death instinct' inevitably takes over. That is, what no longer seems historically feasible is for an economic and political élite to have its cake and eat it in a sustainable way. It seems that the inevitable outcome of this is a predatory system, doomed to self-destruct. What politically and economically looks ‘to good to be true’ is bound to be indeed too good to be true. So, from a Hegelian perspective, it seems that neo-liberal manic reports of the death of history turned out to be rather premature.69

It has become fashionable to blame mathematics for the poverty of mainstream economics, and for its complete failure to understand what was going on. However, as an Oxford mathematician explains, the problem is not the use but the abuse of mathematics, particularly “[. . .] the corruption of quality and the abuse of uncertainty in mathematical models” (quoted in Davidson, 2009).70 In a way, mainstream economics of the last 30 years resembles those Hollywood films that are just special effects and little plot (consisting mostly of an unsophisticated ideological message) – with the special effects being provided by the ever more elegant algebra. By now it is fairly clear that mainstream macro and financial economists not only helped cause the crisis and then failed to spot it, but also they

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69 Manias are found as much in ideologies as in asset prices... See for example Glassman and Hassett's Dow 36,000 (1999).

70 For an analysis of mainstream economics’ 'ontological fetishism' with mathematics, see Palma (2008A).
now seem to have little idea of how to fix it and how to help prevent its repetition. However, most analysts still seem only to be surprised at the fact that practically nobody in the profession was able to predict the crisis – as if this were the only failure of mainstream economics that mattered.71

Some have argued that this failure was due to the nature of academic economists’ financial incentives and the resulting conflicts of interest – something not dissimilar to what was happening on Wall Street. For example, writing in the Financial Times, Devesh Kapur argues that:

"Many academics, [...] now have serious business interests and an array of financial ties to the very institutions that their studies address. [...] But if financial incentives shape the behaviour of mere mortal human beings, might not they shape the behaviour of academics as well? [...] There would be little chance of being invited to give a lucrative talk at Citicorp if one were in favour of sovereign debt forgiveness in the 1980s, against capital account liberalisation in the 1990s or against stock options in the 2000s. [...] Tenure was meant to ensure academic freedom, not protect academics from financial wheeler-dealing.'72

Although this is a very important point, I would argue that mainstream economics’ bad performance in predicting the future – and in understanding the present and the past – should be found mostly in its remarkable success in engineering an academic environment in which it got rid of all forms of critical thinking (see for example Pasinetti, 2008). From a psychoanalytic point of view, this then became a vicious circle; the more it succeeded in purging all diversities of ideas, the poorer it became, and the more intolerant of dissent it had to be – in relation to knowledge there seems to be a strong direct relationship between the expectation to understand the

71 Although for Friedman (1953) prediction was indeed the only thing that mattered; for him, if positive economics was to become a ‘hard’ science, prediction would have to be the only meaningful test for its ideas. If that were the case, the current crisis has shown that his economics (and disciples) have failed rather badly...

72 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6584fd56-6027-11de-a09b-00144feabdc0.html. From this perspective, Robert Schiller (one of the few economists that predicted the crisis) raised a few eyebrows with his new prescription for reducing future financial fragility: not fewer derivatives, but more of them. In his opinion "[...] errors are inevitable and we shouldn't overreact to them. [...] very few people are hedging their home-price risk. [So] We are launching on the New York Stock Exchange some single-family home securities [securities tied to house prices, and] we hope [that they] will be available to a broad spectrum of investors." (See http://www.rferl.org/content/US_Economist_Robert_Shiller_Prescribes_More_Derivatives/1512509.html).
real world and the tolerance of dissent (see Britton, 2002; especially his understanding of fundamentalism).  

Adam Smith (among others) warned us long ago that without true competition (on all fronts) there is no progress; and then Charles Darwin demonstrated that for the struggle for life to be properly successful what is required is not just competition but diversity in that competition.

Some look at this crisis as ‘opportunity’, especially those who look at it from the perspective of repeated long technological cycles. They tell us that things are bound to change for the better since this crisis is also bound to help bring about the phase of ‘deployment’ of the current ‘IT’ techno-economic paradigm. In the past, this phase has been characterised mostly by the reversal of the relationship between financial and productive capital, which allows the latter to take the lead and unleash all the potential of the new technological paradigm – including the considerable ‘creative destruction’ forces of the ‘deployment’ phase. Furthermore, in this reversal productive capital can benefit enormously from the ‘over-investment’ in new infrastructures (in this case in telecommunications) characteristic of the bubble during the ‘installation’ period (the ‘dotcom’ bubble). In sum, financial crises of the current type have in the past helped the ‘deployment’ phase of previous techno-economic paradigms which, in turn, have brought about ‘golden ages’ (see especially Pérez, 2002).

However, I think that this time recovery from the crisis may prove to be more complex and problematic than (say) in the 1930s. Basically, capitalism now faces a crisis ‘without an enemy’ – either from within (e.g. organised labour), or from the outside. That is, it is unlikely that in the 1930s Roosevelt would have been able to carry out all the political and economic transformations that were necessary to overcome the crisis, and help ‘deploy’ the fourth techno-economic paradigm were it not for the combined threat of increased domestic instability and growing external challenges from the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. In other words, the

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73 According to Britton, in fundamentalism what is important is not what you read, it is how you read it; it is not what you think, it is how you think it; it is not what you believe, it is how you believe it.

74 These transformations included tightening the regulation of financial capital – not just to control its excesses, but also to shift it towards financing productive investment (along the lines of Keynes quote above; see footnote 33); a rapid increase in the marginal rate of income taxation; and the beginning of the welfare state.
successful transformations of the 1930s had as much to do with the political 
 imperative to come out of the recession in the face of internal and external 
 challenges, as with the objective requirements of the ‘deployment’ period of the 
 fourth techno-economic paradigm (e.g., mass production needing mass 
 consumption fuelled by a fast-growing income of the bottom 90%). The latter 
 provided the logic; the former facilitated its implementation (and hugely reduced the 
 political and economic transaction costs of this transition).

The same goes for the remarkable common sense of the Bretton Woods 
 accord and the rapid development of the welfare state in many industrialised 
 countries after World War II. Keynes’ task would certainly have been more difficult 
 had the participants of that meeting at Bretton Woods not desperately wanted some 
 sanity after the madness of the war; and it was difficult for Churchill and his 
 Conservative Party to offer unemployment, poverty and destitution to returning 
 soldiers by completely opposing the welfare reforms of the new post-war Labour 
 administration.

Furthermore, current problems are compounded by the fact that both 
 financial and productive capital will probably emerge from the current crisis with an 
 even higher degree of oligopolistic power. So it is hard to imagine how it will be 
 politically feasible for the state even to start doing the necessary ‘disciplining’ of the 
 capitalist élite along the lines of increased ‘compulsions’ for big business (needed for 
 a successful transformation of the process of accumulation from its current mostly 
 rent-seeking nature to one based on increased productive capacities). In fact, in 
 Foucault’s terms, what is required even to start injecting some efficiency into the 
 system is a shift from the current neo-liberal state of affairs – in which ‘the state is 
 under the surveillance of the market’ – to a liberal-Keynesian one where ‘it is the 
 market that is under the surveillance of the state’. Unless the severity of the current 
 financial crisis is such that it finally ends up making an effective transition possible, 
 perhaps this crisis will be remembered not just for its unique difficulties but for the 
 length of time that it took to come out of it.

Those who, like Samuel Brittan, want to ‘save capitalism’ from a left-turn (as if 
 capitalism were an endangered species), tell us that the ‘danger’ ahead is that:

“The assumption that the pursuit of self-interest within the rules and 
 conventions of society will also promote the public interest is not likely to 
 survive – if only because the content of these rules is up for grabs. But it is all
too likely to be succeeded by a mushy collectivist pseudo-altruism, in which jealousy and envy are given a free ride”. (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6e92328a-35b4-11de-a997-00144feabdc0,dwp_uuid=ae1104cc-f82e-11dd-aae8-000077b07658.html).

There are two things these analysts do not seem to realise. One is that their project still needs to find a solution to a rather complex problem: how to construct a workable political and economic capitalist agenda when you are saddled with:

i).- an intrinsically rentier capitalist élite that does not even seem to know what capitalism is all about;

ii).- a remarkably short-sighted and greedy managerial set. Remember that financial executives were not the only ones quite happy to bet their institutions on wishful-thinking – i.e., not the only ones whose wishful-thinking became delusional. Also, remember that hedge fund manager who complained that an annual bonus of over US$ 200 million was not enough? Or the former AIG Chief Executive Officer who is currently accused of improperly taking US$4.3 billion in stock from his company’s pension fund (via a Bermuda-based holding company), because he was ‘angry’ at being ousted by the company amid investigations of accounting irregularities?;

iii).- the most unimaginative and lacklustre political class for generations (Obama hopefully being the exception, although unfortunately not much hope for his economic team); and

iv).- an economics profession that keeps looking at ‘markets’ mostly like creationists look at evolution.

The other thing they do not seem to realise is that the main cost of this crisis is not the many trillion dollars’ worth of asset deflation and output disruption (real as they are), let alone the ‘jealousy and envy’ that may flourish if there were a turn towards a ‘collectivist pseudo-altruism’ (fictional or valid as Brittan’s worries may be), but that this crisis leaves us wide open to the real possibility of a right-wing, xenophobic, fascist backlash.

So far, the signs are not very promising. The current economic crisis seems to be changing everything except the fundamental ways in which those in power and academia, and big market players think about economics and politics. In fact, according to Roubini (2009), policy-makers still desperately hold on to the idea that what is going on now is just:
“[...] a crisis of confidence – an animal-spirit-driven, self-fulfilling recession – that has led to a collapse of liquidity (as counterparties don’t trust one another), and of aggregate demand (as concerned households and firms cut consumption and investment in ways that can turn a regular business-cycle recession into a near-depression).”75

Perhaps nothing is more revealing in this regard than the delusion that showering money with little or no conditionality into the financial system (mostly rewarding ‘principals’ of financial institutions for their failure to oversee that their ‘agents’ run financial institutions in the shareholders’ long-term interests) means that ‘we are all Keynesians again’. For example, in October 2008 (in one of the most blatant cases of ‘crony-capitalism’ ever), the British Chancellor paid £20 billion for 60% of the shares of the Royal Bank of Scotland despite the fact that the stock market valuation of those shares at the time was less than half that amount – so, paraphrasing Joan Robinson, “we are all ‘Bastard Keynesians’ again”...76 And there is little evidence so far from financial markets of the much promised ‘invigorating reappraisal of priorities’... In fact, the prevailing idea among the chattering classes remains that the current financial crisis does not represent the failure of both a whole model of banking and finance (in which an overgrown financial sector did an untold amount of harm), and of a whole model of policy-making (in which the fundamental rôle of the state ended up being one of a facilitator of the rent-seeking practices of big business).

Indeed, by mid-2009 Morgan Stanley is already packaging downgraded collateralized debt obligations together into new securities, and these are getting investment grade ratings from Moody's and Standard & Poor's. Some are even AAA rated... And Goldman Sachs, despite being “[...] the richest welfare recipient you're likely to meet outside of the defense sector [...] has set aside an $11.4 billion bonus pool. That averages out to $400,000 per employee, which is about what Wall Street firms were paying before the credit bubble collapsed in 2007”.77

75 See also Krugman (2009A).
76 Furthermore, as the net worth of that bank at the time was in all likelihood negligible, it is questionable whether he should have even paid the market value of those shares, as all that the stock market was probably doing in pricing those shares at a positive value was pricing the likely amount of the impending government subsidy (a bit of simultaneous causation here). It is unusual to see more alcohol being prescribe as a cure for a hangover...
In this respect, it is rather depressing to see how the current Geithner-Summers plan for rescuing the US financial system, and the Brown-Darling one for the British system, have as their underlying vision that the post-crisis financial system will be more or less the same as it was before the 2007-crisis, although somewhat tamed by prudent market-friendly regulations – and anyone who disagrees, of course, is just politically naïve. And (as supposedly the current crisis is just one of illiquidity and lack of confidence) it is also depressing to see how their plan for getting from A to B consists just of easy money, the assurance that the financial system’s liabilities are now backed by an (implicit and explicit) government guarantees, and a massive fiscal stimulus – so far, in the US alone these are worth US$12 trillion in terms of liquidity support and public guarantees, insurances and recapitalisations – just the rescue of AIG has cost taxpayers US$173 billion (and counting). And, according to Neil Barofsky, the special inspector general for the Troubled Asset Relief Program set up by the Treasury Department (in testimony to a House committee), “[t]he total potential federal government support could reach up to $23.7 trillion”. So finance ministers and central bankers are prepared to become lenders of first and only resort, spenders of first and only resort, and insurers of first and last resort – but not financial architects of any resort at all.

Martin Wolf has argued in his column in the Financial Times that ‘another ideological god has failed’. Yes, no doubt, but the idolatry seems to go on and on… For example, as late as June 2009, in a Congressional testimony Mary Schapiro, the chair of the SEC, still insisted that “[d]erivatives allow parties to hedge and manage risk, which itself can promote capital formation.” And (as mentioned above) for the British Chancellor the current system of ‘light- and limited-touch’ financial regulation,

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78 As Krugman reminds us, in terms of government guarantees, “[...] the last time there was a comparable expansion of the financial safety net, the creation of federal deposit insurance in the 1930s, it was accompanied by much tighter regulation, to ensure that banks didn’t abuse their privileges. This time, new regulations are still in the drawing-board stage – and the finance lobby is already fighting against even the most basic protections for consumers” (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/17/opinion/17krugman.html?_r=1).


80 Part of the reason for this is the above-mentioned ‘once-in-a-100-year-event’ type of thinking. As Joseph Mason explains, “[t]hat absolves banks and regulators from responsibility for reforming in a meaningful fashion financial regulation.” (http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&sid=aBarTDxTnxQQ#)

81 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c6c5bd36-0c0c-11de-b87d-0000779fd2ac.html.
with its emphasis on self-regulation and market discipline, should not be changed, as it is not really to be blamed for the financial crisis. With all we know by now, how can anyone still make either claim with a straight face?\textsuperscript{82}

One should never forget Gramsci’s proposition that more often than not battles are won or lost on the terrain of ideology. Paraphrasing Bui\textsc{ter} (2009B), it may never have been so necessary to have policy-makers ‘whose cognitive abilities have not been warped by a modern Anglo-American Ph.D. education’.

Finally, from the point of view of the rôle of ‘compulsions’ in capitalism, it seems that most politicians (including the ‘new’ left), policy-makers and academics (including most economists) do not seem to understand that the key issue at stake in all this is that there are two opposite visions of how to try to make capitalism work more effectively (only some policy-makers in Asia seem to realise this). From a Marxian, Keynesian and Foucauldian points of view (as I would argue that from a Foucauldian perspective the interrelation of progress, discipline, freedom and compulsion will also support such a view), what is necessary is to keep capitalists on their toes; from a neo-liberal one it is to keep them sweet – and, as if more evidence was necessary, with the current global financial crisis we now know for sure what happens when one does just keep them sweet.

\textsuperscript{82} In other words, don’t let minor inconveniences, such as the real world, get in the way of your ideology. (This reminds us of what Einstein once said: “Two things are infinite: the universe and human stupidity; and I’m not sure about the universe”.) See http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/26/business/26norris.html?hp, and http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8104340.stm, respectively, for Shapiro’s and Darling’s remarks.
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