The Merchant of Genoa:
The Crusades, the Genoese and the Latin East, 1187 – 1220s

Thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of Cambridge.

Merav Mack
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*The Merchant of Genoa* is a study of the Genoese engagement in the affairs of the eastern Mediterranean during the late Middle Ages. In particular, the dissertation examines Genoa’s involvement in three crusades following the fall of the first kingdom of Jerusalem as well as the role played by Genoese in commerce and in the re-establishment of the Latin society in the crusader states. The research focuses on the people of Genoa, merchants and travellers who explored the Mediterranean Sea, crusaders and the Genoese who settled in the crusader states, far away from Genoa. What these people had in common, apart from being Genoese, is that they left records of their activities in the form of notarial documents. This is probably the earliest time in the history of Europe in which such documents were not only recorded but also preserved for posterity. The existence of this collection of documents from the time of the crusades, many of which are as yet unpublished, is therefore an opportunity for a fresh examination of the events from the perspective of individual merchants and exploring the economic interests of the commune.  

This dissertation addresses questions about the connection between crusade and commerce. What motivated the Genoese to help the crusaders in 1187-1192? Why did they not provide ships for the participants of the Fourth Crusade? How did the crusade affect Genoa’s web of commerce? Special attention is given to individual and families of Genoese who settled in the Latin East. The case of the aristocratic Genoese family of the Embriaco is particularly interesting because of that family’s integration into the aristocracy in the kingdom of Jerusalem. Issues concerning the loyalties and identities of Genoese settlers in the crusader states are addressed and examined in parallel with the examination of the activities of other Genoese, merchants and travellers, who were involved in commerce in Muslim centres in the same period.
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AOL Archives de l'Orient latin

ASI Archivio Storico Italiano

ASLSP Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria

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GC Guglielmo Cassinese (1190-1192), eds. Margaret W. Hall, Hilmar C. Krueger and Robert L. Reynolds, in *Notai Liguri del Sec. XII*, vol. 2 (Turin, 1938).


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OS, 1190 Oberto Scriba de Mercato (1190), eds. Mario Chiaudano and Raimondo Morozzo della Rocca, in *Notai Liguri del Sec. XII*, vol. 1 (Turin, 1938).


RRH  Röhrich, Reinhold (ed.), *Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani (1097-1291)* (Innsbruck, 1893), *Additamentum* (Innsbruck, 1904).


Trattati  Lisciandrelli, Pasquale (ed.), *Trattati e negoziazioni politiche della repubblica di Genova (958-1797)*, in *ASLSP* 75 (1960).


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Introduction:

The merchant of Genoa is the figurative hero of this dissertation. The real heroes were many people, merchants who lived in Genoa, travellers who explored the Mediterranean Sea, men of war and peace, crusaders and also the Genoese who settled in the crusader states, far away from Genoa. What these people had in common, apart from being Genoese, is that they left records of their activities in the form of notarial documents. These records were registered in large notebooks, better known as cartularies, and were later deposited in the archive of Genoa, where whatever remains is nowadays accessible. Probably this is the earliest time in the history of Europe in which such documents were not only recorded but also preserved for posterity. Coincidentally, the period in which these documents were written was also one of the most interesting periods in the history of Europe and the Mediterranean, the time of the crusades. This means that from the perspective of the history of the crusades, there is a bulk of documents that have not been previously utilised. It is also exciting from the perspective of the Genoese history, because it provides a special opportunity to examine the Genoese contribution to the crusades and to the crusading states. This was the reason for pursuing this research beginning with the examination of thousands of such notarial documents, published and unpublished ones, covering a period of several decades.

Historians who have examined the evolvement of Italian commerce have raised the question of the impact of the crusade on the patterns of trade. In particular, it has been asked if the foundation of the crusader states created an alternative to trade in Alexandria. In his article 'Trade and Crusade, 1050-1250', David Abulafia reviewed the existing historiography on the matter. Adolf Schaube's theory was that the crusader states were used as a station for the Italian merchants in order to sell their commodities for local bezants before they continued to Egypt to purchase goods with this money. Abulafia argued against this theory utilising notarial evidence that reveals that many merchants who travelled to the Latin East did not travel to Alexandria while many others sailed directly to Alexandria where they sold merchandise and bought other goods. The current study will take this issue a step further by examining the ways in which three crusades affected commercial activities, trade with the Latin East and with Alexandria, and how

the crusades are reflected on the activities of individual Genoese whose records were registered by the notaries.

One of the main arguments in this dissertation is that it is possible to learn much about the crusading period from the commercial contracts. This argument is especially true regarding the involvement of the Genoese in the Third Crusade because almost every commercial and travelling contract that was signed in the years 1190 to 1192 (that is the only period of the Third Crusade from which cartularies remain) concerns, in one way or another, the movement of the crusade's contingents. This argument also applies to the Fourth and Fifth Crusades. Despite the fact that Genoa did not take part in the Fourth Crusade, it was still highly affected by it, for example, a significant effect of the crusade was that some of the routes followed by Genoese merchants had changed. It will also be argued that gaining knowledge about merchants' activities in the Mediterranean Sea during this period provides insight into peoples' perceptions of the Fourth Crusade. Many questions are addressed in the various chapters about the involvement of the Genoese in each crusade, their motivations to cooperate or not to get involved and their reaction to the activities of other powers. More attention is given to those individuals and families who established strong relationships with the crusader states, and especially to those who settled in the Latin East. How were such individuals and families affected by their emigration from Genoa? Is there evidence of change in their economic situation, social status or even identity? In what ways did the permanent presence of Genoese in the Latin East affected Genoa's commercial web? Many other questions spring to mind when these issues are carefully analysed. These questions will be introduced at the beginning of each chapter.

The first three chapters concern the crusading experience of the Genoese over several decades, from the time of the Third Crusade until the Fifth Crusade. Chapters Four and Five are about the Genoese in the Latin East: in Byblos, which was a crusader town in the County of Tripoli, and in the kingdom of Jerusalem. Each of the three crusades was a special enterprise, with its own collection of chronicles and diplomatic documents. Each has different methodological concerns, which explains why in modern historiography the crusades are usually studied separately. Monographs have been written about the Fourth and the Fifth Crusades and many works have been dedicated to different aspects of the Third Crusade. This is the reason that there are literature reviews included as part of the introduction at the beginning of each chapter. Nonetheless, there is a large body of works that has been used throughout this dissertation. Studies on commerce in the Mediterranean and on Genoa are frequently mentioned in the different chapters. Such are the works on the history of the Genoese in the Middle-Ages by Erik Bach, Geo Pistorino, Roberto Lopez, Eliyahu Ashtor, Eugene Byrne, and more recently by David Abulafia, Gabriella Airaldi, Laura Balletto, Steven Epstein, David Jacoby, Michel Balard,
Benjamin Kedar, Marie-Luise Favreau-Lilie and Sandra Origone. Works by these authors are referred to in many chapters. Inevitably, the above authors have also dealt with aspects of commerce in the Mediterranean. However, on the medieval Mediterranean and on commerce there are also the monumental works, though dated, of Wilhelm von Heyd, Adolf Schaubé, Fernand Braudel and Claude Cahen, which were often consulted during the research. Finally, this list includes many general works on the crusades, and especially titles by Hans Mayer, Jean Richard and Jonathan Riley Smith.

The cartularies:
The cartularies are notebooks in which notaries wrote down a large variety of records, from business partnership to travelling contracts, sea-loans, purchase of goods for credit and individuals’ last wills (see Figure 1: a photo of an open page in the cartulary of Giovanni di Guiberto showing nine contracts with horizontal lines separating them from one another). The cartularies which are available nowadays contain only part of the total number of contracts composed during these years in Genoa. They therefore provide the opportunity to observe Genoese life for rather short and scattered spans of time during the crusade. From the years of the Third Crusade, cartularies remain only from 1190 to 1191, written by the notaries Oberto Scriba de Mercato, Guglielmo Cassinese and Guglielmo di Sori. From the time of the Fourth Crusade, two cartularies remain, but only from the year 1203. These cartularies are attributed to Giovanni di Guiberto and to Lanfranco. Finally, from the period of the Fifth Crusade cartularies are available from 1213 (Oberto Scriba), 1216-7 (Lanfranco) and from 1222-3 (Magister Salmonis). These latter cartularies therefore apply to the years of planning the Fifth Crusade, the preparations for it and the period shortly after the defeat of the crusaders at Damietta. In order to establish patterns of commerce it is also necessary to study the activities of merchants in peacetime. Many other cartularies from the 1170s until 1226 were thus used in this research. This broad view of Genoa’s commercial activities opens up the opportunity to track the career of individuals before, during, and after the crusades. It also enables the recognition of changes in travel routes. The establishment of commercial relations in markets that were not previously visited by Latin merchants are revealed. It will be argued in Chapter One, for example, that one of the results of the Third Crusade was that a commercial link was created between Genoa and England. Similarly, it will be argued that the growing interest of the Genoese in the northern parts of the crusader states and the opening of the route to Aleppo were carried out in response to the Venetian conquest of Constantinople. The research in the wider context also allows the

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2 The cartulary of Lanfranco contains records of other notaries too. Not all of them were identified.
identification of changes in the price of commodities, the introduction of goods to new markets, and the impact of wars on the contemporary currencies.

Figure 1: The cartulary of Giovanni di Guiberto from September 1203, cart. 6, pp. 211V-212R

The unique style of each notary is significant. Even more important is the nature of his clientele: their social status and wealth as well as the areas of Genoa in which they lived. The nature of contracts corresponded also to seasons, for example, a cartulary from the winter is less likely to contain many commercial contracts to the eastern Mediterranean, since the nearest sailing time was not until the spring. Domestic contracts and travel to short distance destination along the Liguria or to the French Riviera are, therefore, more likely to appear in the cartularies at the beginning of each year. In March and April merchants signed contracts to the western Mediterranean. For example, the cartulary of Lanfranco from the winter of 1203 is poor in respect of international commerce: out of 501 documents only 77 are travelling records, more than half of which are to the North African ports of Ceuta or Bougie. There are hardly any records concerning ventures to the eastern Mediterranean. In fact, the vast majority of the contracts attributed to the

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notary Lanfranco from the first eight months of 1203 were of a domestic nature. They concern properties, mobile and immobile goods, wills as well as marriage agreements. By contrast, the cartulary of Giovanni di Guiberto from the same year contains 508 records out of which 302 are travelling contracts. Significantly, all the documents in this cartulary were written in a span of two and a half months from 19 September 1203, during the autumn sailing period. When the trade routes and the travel history of Genoese ships are being examined, it is important to bear in mind that the contracts present the sailing plans only before setting off from Genoa. The way the routes changed later on in the journey is not known. Shelomo Goitein, for example, argued that "it was common for the people represented in the Geniza records to travel on Genoese, Pisan or Gaetan ships, as well as vessels of other western powers." In the records of Genoa, however, the story is one-sided.

Unlike letters of concessions, charters and other diplomatic documents, a single notarial record only rarely tells a complete story. Even when information is gathered from several notarial records they generally reveal just scattered parts of the sequence of events. Remie Constable noted how "notarial materials are more suited to showing the results of change than change itself." This observation holds an important lesson for whoever wishes to use notarial documents in research. Patterns must be identified first, before one can recognise any change that may have occurred. The time factor is important too. From the instant major political or military changes occurred, it took some time until the change could become noticeable in notarial acts. For example, it will be argued that the earliest written permission given to merchants by their residing partners to travel to Aleppo was granted in September 1203. The diplomatic negotiations that made this route available, however, must have taken place beforehand. Moreover, none of the contracts explains when this travel route was opened or why merchants wanted to travel to Aleppo to begin with. In Chapter Two, these permissions will be examined in the context of the changes in the Mediterranean’s web of commerce during the course of the Fourth Crusade. It will be argued that there is some correlation between these events. The opening of the route to Aleppo will be discussed in the context of the relationship between Genoa and Byblos, a city on the route between the ports of the kingdom of Jerusalem and Aleppo. Importantly, Byblos was originally granted to the cathedral church of St Lawrence and the commune of Genoa and was ruled by descendents of the noble Genoese family Embriaco. This family connection and the history of the

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relationship between Genoa and Byblos will be discussed in Chapter Four. These are also important to the understanding of the significance of the diplomatic agreement with Aleppo.

The vocabulary employed by the notaries is sometimes difficult to comprehend. For example, the terminology used in a contract between a ship builder and the owners of that ship may contain many medieval terms that usual dictionaries do not contain. Several linguistic tools are helpful in such cases, Nilo Calvini’s *Nuovo glossario medievale Ligure*, despite being incomplete, is useful. On nautical terms, Augustin Jal, *Nouveau glossaire nautique*. Although dated, Pietro Rocca, *Pesi e misure antiche di Genova e del Genovesato*, is a valuable guide for Genoese units of measure. An Italian – Genoese dictionary is sometimes helpful too. A general introduction to the contracts’ style and the formulae employed may be found in Robert Lopez’s and Irving Raymond’s *Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World*. Finally, in Eugene Byrne’s book, *Genoese Shipping in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries*, there is a collection of documents with some more explanations about notaries’ writing styles. The references to the unpublished documents in this dissertation follow a common formula. First is the name of notary to whom the cartulary is attributed, followed by the cartulary number as it is catalogued in the state archive in Genoa, then the page number. Because the notaries used both sides of each page the letters R and V are used to differentiate between them. Finally, the number at the end was added here to signify the contract number on the page (usually up to six contracts per page).

**Methodology**

‘Because the contracts will not sustain any meaningful statistical analysis, we must go beyond the numbers and look for some deeper patterns and meanings.’ Steven Epstein wrote in his book on medieval Genoa. For several reasons, the analysis of the notarial documents is a challenge. The gaps of information make the use of statistical analysis problematic. There is also a problem with other methods of analysis. For example, almost every book on Genoa’s commercial activities in the Mediterranean contains long lists of merchants’ first travelling destinations and the total amount of money taken for investments but no mention of subsequent destinations of equal importance. Such tables were used to evaluate the commercial importance of each market. Copying from the studies of Erik Bach and David Abulafia, Geo Pistorino and Steven Epstein have recently republished a table of first place of destination to which Genoese merchants carried

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money or merchandise. These tables are based on the cartulary of Giovanni Scriba (1155-64). Recently, Sandra Origone followed the same methodology in her analysis of Genoese commerce at the beginning of the thirteenth century (1200-3; 1205-16; 1222-7). In the same volume, Laura Balletto produced a similar table for the commercial activities in the years 1257-8. During the research for the current dissertation there was an attempt to follow a similar methodology concerning ventures in the year 1191. The exercise, however, proved this methodology insufficient. In that year, 53 contracts were made to Sicily as a first destination. A few other contracts directed the travellers to Naples or Sardinia before they went to Sicily. However, in the spring of 1191 most of the shipowners and travellers did not end their journeys in Sicily, they only stopped there to meet up with the crusaders. Many were on the way to the Latin East. It would have been a mistake to employ the traditional analysis in this case. In order to estimate which ship headed only to Sicily and which was to return to Genoa it is possible to use the type of vessel as an indication, because only large ships sailed over long distance. Another factor that might be misleading is the number of contracts made for each destination. For various reasons, different merchants would handle their business in different manners, some merchants tended to make separate contracts with each investor, while other merchants registered their agreement with many partners in one contract. Therefore, it is more accurate to count the number of travellers who made contracts to each destination rather than the total number of contracts. These are only few examples of how complicated utilising the notarial cartularies as a historical source might be.

The data these documents contain might seem meaningless until a certain arrangement of the documents reveals patterns or the break of patterns. There is so vast an array of information, however, that it is overwhelming too: names, destinations, merchandise, currencies and many more details. In order to go beyond the statistical analysis the documents must be rearranged and put together in a new order that corresponds to the topic under discussion. It is difficult to process this information using traditional methods of historical analysis. But aided by computing software it is possible to map the data and display the relevant material in a sensible manner. The documents were summarised on a large table (Excel spreadsheet) which includes 32 columns
(Figure 2). With these categories it is possible to sort and select information that is of interest. Other columns were often added for themes or comments of different sort. For example, this often happened when there was a change in the notarial formulae. A category of ship-name was unnecessary for cartularies which were compiled before 1198, and the time factor was only introduced by notaries at the beginning of the thirteenth century. With these tools, it is possible to make use of the cartularies for the purpose of answering many questions. One example is the use of currencies' exchange rates. In the appendices to the dissertation there are tables showing the exchange rates between several currencies that are discussed in the text. These are based on information in the contracts, drawing mainly on sea-loans, in which the exchange rates in various destinations were agreed upon in advance. All these rates included certain percentage of interest on top of the local exchange rate. For example, the interest varied in different contracts depending on the amount of money borrowed, the length of loan, the distance and supposedly the danger rate. For example, contracts from 1214 mention an interest rate of between 24% and 30% for sea-loans to the Latin East. Another contract from 1203 shows that the merchants took into account that the exchange rate

<table>
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<td>Type of contract</td>
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</table>

12 Steven Epstein observed that the notary Oberto Scriba regularly wrote down the time of the day in 1200 but not previously in the 1180s and 1190s. Steven Epstein, Wills and Wealth in Medieval Genoa, 1150-1250 (Cambridge, Mass. 1984), p. 54; See also Hilmar C. Krueger, Navi e proprietà navale a Genova seconda metà del sec. XII, in ASLSP: Nuova serie, vol. 25 (99) (Genoa, 1985), p. 57f
13 Lanfranco 1216, no. 1248 from 18 October 1216. Interest of 30% for a loan of £50 and no. 1280, from 08 November 1216, interest of 25% on loan over £100. Both contracts were of travelling to Ultramare. In 1182 a traveller to Sardinia borrowed £3 and promised to pay back with interest of 15% if he makes it there safely. A contract to Sardinia under similar conditions in 1225 included an interest of 25% on a loan of £10.
they used was dated and therefore might be wrong.\textsuperscript{14} Despite these problems, this information is valuable and was often used in the analysis of the economic meaning of the crusades and other questions. Moreover, Spufford’s book on medieval currencies did not often utilise the cartularies as source and did not cover the period under discussion here.\textsuperscript{15} Therefore, it proved even more important to include such extracts from the table in the appendices of the thesis.

![Figure 3: An example of part of the cartularies’ spreadsheet sorted by theme](image)

Importantly, the cartularies provide an opportunity to follow the career of individual merchants at home and abroad. This implies that the discussion is not restricted to economic and commercial aspects of this period but includes human aspects too. Thus the personal aspect of the crusades comes to light; the stories of people who got involved in impossible debts as a result of the crusade will be related alongside some incomplete stories of the Genoese who never returned home from the Latin East, either because they were taken captive or died. This by no means implies that the cartularies give access to the complete stories. Because they are usually concerned with instructions and their fulfilment, the contracts rarely explain the reasoning or

\textsuperscript{14} GG, 1203, no. 574 from 17 September 1203.

\textsuperscript{15} Spufford, Peter, Handbook of Medieval Exchange (London, 1986).
background that had brought the two sides to the notary. For example, when a lady from Jerusalem approached the notary in Genoa at the beginning of 1190 she asked to appoint one of her sons as a messenger. He received a large sum of money that he had to deliver to his siblings, two brothers and a sister, who were in the Latin East. This case shows how technical the contracts often were, allowing only a narrow glimpse into the story of this family that clearly escaped the disaster of 1187 alive, but was spread around the world.
1 Genoa and the Third Crusade

This chapter is about the people of Genoa at the time of the Third Crusade, from the reception of the news of the fall of the kingdom of Jerusalem until the contingents of the Third Crusade made their way to the Latin East. How was the news received in Genoa? What actions were taken in response to the news? In particular, this chapter will concentrate on the stories of the Genoese whose activities can be followed through the contracts they signed during these years and which remain in the notarial archive. Many of these documents, from the 1170s onwards, were included in the research for this chapter but particular interest is found in the period immediately before the fall of Jerusalem (1186) and from the years 1190-2, which were two important years of the Third Crusade. In the past, the relationship between crusade and commerce has attracted the interest of scholars such as Aziz Atiya and more recently David Abulafia. 16 Having a direct window into the acts of the merchants who transported and organised a crusade in the form of commercial contracts is especially valuable for any discussion of the nature of the relationship between crusade and commerce. This chapter touches on some aspects of a complex historical and social issue and might have been subtitled 'the economic value of religious sentiment.'

Some particular questions are targeted in the following discussion: what did the crusade mean to the working people of Genoa? Were the Genoese expected to contribute to the war efforts by investing their money or perhaps volunteering their ships and expertise? It should be further asked whether the Genoese, as individuals or as a commune, expected to profit from their contribution to the war efforts. With these questions in mind the objective is also to examine those parts of society that did not necessarily participate in the crusade as warriors, but provided supplies and support for the fighting people. Such is especially the case of the other residing merchants, men and women.

The sources utilised in the research for this chapter include two historical works which were compiled in Genoa at the time: the Genoese annals and a chronicle about the kingdom of Jerusalem. The annals' prime interest is Genoa and its population while the Regni Iherosolymitani brevis historia is a short chronicle about the crusader states with several interesting entries elaborating the Genoese contribution to the foundation of the kingdom and the Genoese role in the following years. A third source is the cartularies of the Genoese notaries. Unfortunately, no cartulary remains from the years 1187-9 when the news of the fall of Jerusalem reached Genoa.

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and the first Genoese fleets made their way to assist the Latin East. Over 2000 documents are, however, available for the years 1190 – 1192, from the cartularies of Oberto Scriba, Guglielmo Cassinesi, and a few dozen documents by Guglielmo di Sori. For the period before the crusade there exist over 1000 more documents; all are attributed to Oberto Scriba di Mercato. The comparison between the periods of commerce before 1187 and the beginning of the 1190s is interesting in itself; however, the contracts from the period of the crusade, 1190-2, are especially significant for the study of the Third Crusade.

The cartularies contain many documents that may contribute to the above questions; they open a window into commercial life during times of crisis and war. Hundreds of commercial contracts deal with investments as well as imports and exports of a variety of goods. Some of the contracts that were made between shipowners and merchants, sailors or even crusaders are especially significant. These documents will be examined closely in this chapter. Importantly, although the crusade is not explicitly mentioned in the contracts, every travelling contract to Ultramare is, in a direct or indirect way, about the crusade.

Based on this research it will be argued that scholarship on the Third Crusade has underappreciated the contribution of individual Genoese and the activity of the commune’s contingent that sailed to Tyre in 1189. The fighting spirit of the Genoese had left a remarkable impression in the Latin East. Moreover, it will be argued that Genoa paid a heavy price when some of the distinguished personnel of the commune, who led the crusade, perished in the Latin East. Similarly, some individuals’ dedication can be traced throughout the period from the spontaneous acts of shipowners and merchants in 1187 to the continuous support, including donations of money and the shipping of supplies, in the following years. The commitment of Genoa as a commune is distinguishable in the shipping contract it signed with the king of France in February 1190, after which it did not allow private enterprise until the French failed to embark in time and caused economic disturbance in Genoa.

On the other hand, it will be argued that the Third Crusade, which was organised during times of profound emotional distress over the fall of Jerusalem, also created great expectations in Genoa of vast profits. When a shipping contract was signed between Genoa and France for the shipping of thousands of French knights to the Latin East, it meant a commitment on both sides. This contract is important for the understanding of the practicalities of the crusade as well as the mentality of the Genoese merchants who organised and embarked on the crusade. The various implications of the Genoese commitment to the crusade will be examined. It will be argued, for

17 An index to the cartularies was published by the archive of Genoa. See Marco Bologna, Cartolari notarili Genovesi: inventario (Genoa, 1990). However, this index contains many mistakes. I would like to thank David Abulafia and Steven Epstein for their helpful warning on the errors in this index and for referring me to a corrected copy, which is only available in Genoa, in the archives’ main reading room.
example, that shipowners and sailors did not volunteer their services for the crusade without charge. On the contrary, they clearly expected to profit from the expedition. It will be further argued that even local merchants, the suppliers of food, wine and other goods shared similar economic expectations. The prospects of a lucrative crusade were not fulfilled in the summer of 1190, because the French contingent failed to embark on time. Consequently, the Genoese suffered a financial crisis and a similar anxiety that the Venetians must have felt in 1202 when there were not enough knights to pay for the already equipped ships. At the end of the summer of 1190, the crusade became a source of financial disappointment to the people of Genoa.

Finally, it will be argued that as much as Genoa contributed to the crusading movement it was also affected by it. The crusade caused a change in the lives of many Genoese, crusaders as well as the seamen who transported them across the Mediterranean Sea. Genoa itself was affected too. Because it was a crossroads to many crusaders, merchants and pilgrims, Genoa was inevitably introduced during the crusade to new commodities and to different cultures. The people of Genoa witnessed the traffic of people who passed through their city twice, on their way to the Latin East and on their back.

1187 - The response in Genoa to the fall of Jerusalem:

The fall of the first kingdom of Jerusalem was a major event in the history of Europe and the Mediterranean in the twelfth century. It directly affected the lives of people throughout western Europe. The loss of Jerusalem was felt, if not in the hearts of all Europeans, at least in their pockets when a special tax was imposed in many countries. Although collecting such taxes for the purpose of the crusade had been a familiar phenomenon since the days of the Second Crusade, the preparations for the Third Crusade introduced in the west a collection of a general tax – the famous Saladin tithe. In Genoa, like in many other cities, the news of the fall of Jerusalem was received in amazement. The city’s annals, written by Ottobono Scriba, describe the war with the Muslims in 1187 and the eventual fall of Jerusalem into the hands of Saladin. In particular, Ottobono mentions the capture of the Holy Cross and of the king of Jerusalem by the enemy. At this point the scribe abruptly interrupted his rather dry and informative narrative with the deepest, if somewhat short, emotional expression: ‘proh dolor!’ Ottobono then describes the heroism of Conrad of Montferrat who saved Tyre ‘with divine inspiration.' Special tribute is given in the text to the Genoese who took Conrad aboard their ship and assisted him in the first crucial steps. Finally, Ottobono Scriba mentions Conrad’s appeal for help to the leaders of the world. In particular, he sought the help of the people of Genoa and Pisa.

Genoa responded to the fall of Jerusalem in two manners. From the first announcement of the news, the Genoese became involved in diplomatic negotiations, with an attempt to coerce the contemporary superpowers into an agreement to embark on a joint crusade. As soon as the news reached Genoa the Genoese wrote a letter to the pope to inform him about the events in the Latin East as they were narrated by ‘lugubri civis nostri de ultramarinis partibus redeuntis’. The letter related the events from the beginning of July 1187, including the fall of Tiberias and Acre. Ascalon, however, was still in Christian hands: ‘Ascalona bene victualibus et bellatoribus inclytis est bene munita’. This remark suggests that the Genoese ship must have hurried to return to Genoa before the usual autumn sailing period in September, because the authors of the letter did not know of the surrender of Ascalon on 05 September 1187. Unfortunately, the date of compilation is not given in the letter, which means that there is no indication how long it took the ship to sail from (presumably) Tyre to Genoa. There is no doubt, however, that the Genoese seriously perceived the urgency of their mission to spread the news in western Europe. Interestingly, the line in the letter in which the capture of the king and the Holy Cross are mentioned is followed by the same phrase of grief used by the author of the Genoese annals: proh dolor!

While the messages were sent, the citizens of Genoa took an active role as participants in the crusade. Some Genoese happened to be in the Latin East during the time of the crisis and, as mentioned above, they were praised in the annals for their assistance to Conrad of Montferrat. Many Genoese arrived shortly afterwards from Constantinople and Sicily, according to the Genoese chronicle of the kingdom of Jerusalem: maximam quantitatem Ianuensium qui ibidem [in civitatem Tyri] accesserant de Romania et de partibus Sicilie. The contribution of these groups of Genoese was appreciated in the Latin East. In particular, Prince Bohemond III of Antioch bestowed the commune of Genoa with concessions in return for their help in saving Antioch. It is not known, however, who were the leaders of these Genoese troops that hastened from Sicily and Byzantium to provide what may be regarded as spontaneous military help. The

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20 ‘Epistola Ianuensium ad Urbanum papam’ in Roger of Howden, ibid, p. 12
22 ‘Epistola Ianuensium ad Urbanum papam’ in Roger of Howden, ibid, p. 12.
23 Regni Iherosolymitani brevis historia, in Ann. Ian., vol. 1, p. 143
24 For Bohemond concession see: I Libri Iurium, vol. 1/2, 342, p. 161; See more about these Genoese troops in the discussion in Chapter Five of the management and leadership of the Genoese community in the Latin East.
annals from that period, written by Ottobono Scriba, do not volunteer much information about the activities of these Genoese individuals: shipowners, warriors and merchants who acted in the Latin East in 1187. Importantly, Genoa as a commune is not known to have sent troops on a spontaneous mission in 1187 or 1188. According to the annals, the Genoese were engaged in 1188 with problems much closer to home. Fulco de Castello (also referred to as Fulco de Castro), who was later one of the leaders of the Genoese crusaders, was put in charge in 1188 of a 10-galley fleet, with which he sailed to Sardinia to fight the Pisans. The Genoese annals appear to have been more concerned with the death of the archbishop of Genoa and the factional wars between the de Turca family and the Balbi, than the fate of Jerusalem. When the annals refers to the international affairs of that year it begins with the description of the peace that was concluded between Genoa and Majorca (Balearics) and only then does it mention that Rosso (or Rubeo) della Volta was sent to England ‘causa tractandi cum rege ipso de succursu prestanto terre Suriacae.’ However, Rosso della Volta was not just a messenger. He was probably one of the most knowledgeable diplomats in Genoa when it came to the Latin East and Egypt. In 1178 he went as a legate of the commune to Alexandria: ‘ad Saladinum regem Egypti... cum quo pacem firmavit.’ His firsthand knowledge of the enemy and the territory must have contributed much to his mission. After the establishment of the first diplomatic contacts on the matter in 1188, the following year saw another mission sent to the kings of England and France. The descriptions of the annals in 1189 reveal a change of attitude, and that the Third Crusade was taken seriously in Genoa thereafter. Two messengers, Ansaldo Buffeio (or Buferio) and Enrico Deitesalve, were sent to Philip of France and Richard of England, ‘et alii baronibus et principibus de ultramontibus.’ Part of their mission was probably to help the two kings bridge the rift between them but mainly to discuss the logistics of the crusade. Presumably, they wanted to ensure that Genoa would be used as the leading port city for the contingents: if all worked as planned, the expedition to the east could put the Genoese commune in line with the strongest monarchs of Europe. Moreover, a successful crusade could be profitable in terms of territorial concessions, and could result in a share in the booty won. Finally, if they secured a contract to transport the crusaders to the Latin East, even the process itself could be lucrative. According to Roger of Howden the meeting between King Richard and King Philip took place shortly after Christmas,

26 Ann. Ian., vol. 2 p. 11. The truce with Alexandria, like all the charters which were granted to the Genoese in Egypt, cannot be found in the diplomatic archive of Genoa. See more about this lack of documentation in Chapter Three, in the discussion of Genoa’s relations with Egypt.
and the final agreement was signed in festo St Hilarii (13 January 1190). The kings agreed to be ready to sail together on the day of St John the Baptist.28

This mission marked the beginning of the institutionalised response in Genoa to the fall of Jerusalem: when the entire commune took part in the preparations for the crusade, as opposed to the sporadic acts of 1187-8. Ansaldo Bufferio and Enrico Deitesalve had a complicated diplomatic mission, because the kings of England and France had many other problems to encounter before they could commit to certain dates or tasks. Consequently, the arrangements for this important wave of the Third Crusade took much longer than expected; it took the kings of England and France nearly three years from the fall of Jerusalem to finally embark on the crusade and then a further year, which they spent en route, wintering in Messina, Sicily. In Genoa too, the logistics of a crusade were complicated. Importantly, the arrangements involved large scale investment by many in Genoa, long before the first troops of crusaders stepped into the city’s harbour. Still, these funding problems were only part of the picture when considering the full meaning of organising an international, simultaneous crusade.

The next stage of the crusade, from Genoa’s point of view, was the embarkation of the main Genoese contingent in the autumn of 1189. Why did the Genoese not wait to embark with the English and the French? The contemporary sources do not provide a direct answer to this question, but many reasons come to mind. The first reason was obviously the urgent need in the Latin East to stop the progress of the enemy. The Genoese history of the kingdom of Jerusalem employs powerful words when it explains what motivated the Genoese reaction: ‘pro Deo et intuitu pietatis terram non permitterent subiugari a Sarracenis....’29 This sentence reflects peoples’ feeling not only in 1187, when it was written, but surely later on too, when more details had reached the west and the full meaning of the fall of the crusader states was comprehended. Perhaps the rewards in the form of more privileges and concessions, to individuals and to the commune, had encouraged the Genoese to embark early. The death of William II of Sicily, who was the first ruler to send troops on the crusade, Genoese warriors among them, might have been another reason for the urgency. Finally, it is possible that this early embarkation was part of the agreed plan with France: that Genoa would embark separately and not together, which would have required more ships. For one reason or another the Genoese embarked approximately nine months before the French and English troops were suppose to meet in Sicily and sail on to the Latin East. Because of the eventual delay in the embarkation from Sicily, the result was that the Genoese had spent two years in the Latin East before the English and French troops stepped ashore.

28 Roger of Howden, Gesta Regis Ricardi, ibid, p. 105
29 Regni Iherosolymitani brevis historia, in Ann. Ian., vol. 1, p. 143
The first wave of Genoese crusaders was led by seven of the most influential figures in Genoa: Guido Spinola, Nicola Embriaco, Fulco de Castello, Simone Doria, Baldovino Guercio, Spezzapietra and Rosso della Volta. All of them had served as consuls of the commune in the past, and Guido Spinola embarked as an acting consul and leader of the mission. The dedication to the cause of the crusade was very high in Genoa. It can be seen not only in the fact that these important personnel went on the crusade, but also in the light of the Genoese contribution in battle. The annals mention many other knights and war machines that the Genoese shipped to the Latin East: ‘et multi alii nobiles milites et pedites civitatis Ianuae, qui in castris et obsidione predicte ciuitatis [i.e. Acre] viriliter steterunt, et castella lignea et machina et alia bellica instrumenta ibi erexerunt.’ Even more impressive are Conrad of Montferrat’s descriptions of the Genoese contribution. These descriptions are found in the charter Conrad granted the commune on 11 April 1190:

Recolentes igitur quam magnifice et laudabiliter civitas Ianue pro liberatione orientalis regionis... cognoscentes probitatem eorumdem civium in principio huius captivitatis quam viriliter illud modicum christianorum quod supererat de faucibus paganorum eripere et defendere studuerit, quam etiam magnifice in presenti obsidione ciuitatis Accoensis consul prenominatus [i.e Guido Spinola] una cum nobilibus civibus et reliquo populo suo tanquam veri Machabei castello, machinis, militibus, peditibus, ballistariis et sagittariis se habuerint, marl terraque laboraverint... [my emphasis]"

These descriptions of the Genoese contribution to the war efforts in the Latin East are repeated, with similar superlatives, in all of the concessions granted to the Genoese in this period. It is interesting to note, however, that the paragraphs that proclaim the merits of the Genoese refer in particular to the contribution of the Genoese at the siege of Acre. This is interesting because contemporary charters do not usually relate long stories. For example, in Conrad’s confirmation of the Venetians privileges in 1191 his language was very technical, and in the reconfirmation of the Pisan rights he briefly mentioned that they worked hard and had casualties: ‘...labores et varios sudores ac sanguinis effusionem civium Pisarum.’ Privileges that were granted to the Pisans in these years do not elaborate on the details of their contribution.

Was the Genoese help really conspicuous? Interesting evidence for the significance of the Genoese help may be deduced from the short list of seven Genoese personnel who were mentioned by name as participants in the crusade. As mentioned above, all seven were previously

31 I Libri Iurium, vol. 1/2, no. 331, p. 138.
32 See I Libri Iurium, vol. 2, nos. 332, 333 (charters by Guy of Lusignan), 334 (Conrad of Montferrat), 335 and 336 (Henry of Champagne), the latter repeats the comparison between the Genoese and the Maccabees whilst describing the siege of Acre. These charters are from 1190 to 1195. See detail analysis of these charters in Chapter Five.
33 TTh, no. 76, pp. 212-215.
34 Müller, no. 23, p. 26.
consuls of the commune in Genoa and often appear in the contemporary Genoese sources. Rosso della Volta had been to Alexandria and England and negotiated with Saladin as well as Richard the Lion Heart. In the light of the prominence of these people it is interesting that apparently some of them did not return alive from the Third Crusade. The retired consuls Spezzapietra (1182; 1188) Nicola Embriaco (1176; 1179; 1185; 1188) and Simone Doria (1176; 1180; 1186; 1188) are not known to have returned to Genoa or remained in the east. Their names, which often appeared in documents and in the annals before the crusade, are not mentioned again in any of the contemporary sources. They could have perished or been taken captive, there is no way of telling. This is interesting because they were the leaders of the Genoese crusade and it is rare to find people in such position fighting and perishing at war. Another Genoese, Rubaldo de Bontommaso, was held in captivity in Egypt at the beginning of 1192, where he probably died; his own granddaughter married Filippo Spezzapietra in 1200. It is interesting to imagine the marriage of two Genoese whose ancestors perished in different circumstances during the Third Crusade. These fragments of evidence are what known about the Genoese contribution to the crusade. The fact that the Genoese help, their dedication and bravery were remembered years later, to be explicitly re-related by Henry of Champagne, is another sign of the gap left in the narrated history.

The appointment of Guido Spinola as a representative of the Genoese in the Latin East is another indication of the seriousness in which the crusade was perceived by the Genoese. Guido was an elected consul of the year 1189 in Genoa itself, which means that he was the actual leader of the enterprise. He remained in the Latin East and became the local representative of the Genoese commune in the kingdom of Jerusalem for a couple of years. This was not an easy mission. He had to manoeuvre between various rival powers; a struggle over the throne of Jerusalem, and later on, between the vigorous monarchs who joined the turmoil and amply contributed to it. During that time, a ruthless competition over concessions began. Lands, legal rights and property were promised to naval and land forces and fought over before the territory was even recovered from the Muslims. Between 1187 and 1191, Count Raymond III of Tripoli, Conrad of Montferrat and King Guy of Lusignan issued charters to the three Italian powers, the Genoese amongst them. These records sometimes contradicted one another and changed in accordance with the political transformations. It is very significant to find a person like Guido Spinola at the head of the commune at that stage, and as will be discussed in chapter five, it contributed much to the fast recovery of the commune in the Latin East. Interestingly, this was also an opportunity for individual Genoese to acquire possessions and new status in the Latin

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35 GC, 1192, no. 1504, an act from 22 January 1192. See more about Rubaldo in Chapter Three.
36 Guglielmo di Sori, MS 102, p. 158, R1.
East, especially under Conrad of Montferrat. Genoese knights and merchants such as Ansaldo and Baldovino Bonvicino, Marino Mazuc and Marino Rocia were such individuals.\(^{37}\)

While Guido Spinola and the Genoese knights were fighting in Acre and establishing the commune in Tyre, the preparations in Genoa continued for the shipping of thousands more crusaders to the Latin East in the following year. More Genoese were preparing for embarkation. Under the leadership of two consuls of the year 1190, Maurino Rodoani and Simone Vento, a new wave of the Genoese crusade was organised. The activities of the Genoese as crusaders in the year 1190 gained less prominence in the annals of that year, probably because the preparations of the English and French contingents and their arrival at the ports of Genoa and Messina were more noticeable. However, few examples may demonstrate the attitude in Genoa to the progressing crusade. The will of a Genoese merchant in the cartulary of Oberto Scriba is evidence of support of the crusade at the time. Anselmo Buxono bequeathed £10 in his will of August 1190 to the consul Simone Vento, to be given to him if Anselmo died before they embarked on the crusade ‘Si obiero ante quam Symon Ventus transeat Ultramare, lego ei ad suum pasare de Ultramare £10.’ Anselmo also bequeathed his land to his wife to use as long as she lived or to his relative Guglielmo when she died. When Guglielmo died the property should be given to charity: to hospitals, churches ‘et in recuperare Terram Ultramaris.’\(^{38}\) Steven Epstein did not include this bequest in his list of bequests for the crusade because the will did not spell out the reason for Simone Vento’s travel to the Latin East. As was mentioned above, however, Simone Vento was a consul of Genoa and one of the two leaders of the Genoese contingent sent in that year and Anselmo’s bequest should, therefore, be regarded as a bequest for the crusade.\(^{39}\)

Anselmo Buxono was not the only Genoese to include bequests for the Holy Land in his will. In the winter of the following year, on March 1191, approximately one month before the embarkation from Messina, Guglielmo Gallo bequeathed £7½ ‘in servicio Dei et de Ultramare.’\(^{40}\) Guglielmo himself did not plan to go on the crusade. He was involved in the family business, a shop that belonged to his brother and himself,\(^{41}\) and in the autumn of that year he travelled to Ceuta.\(^{42}\) His wife Agnes, however, invested £20 in a commercial venture that shipped grain to Ultramare in January 1192. It will be discussed below that the shipping of grain to the Latin East might have involved an act of crusading charity in addition to the purely business investment.\(^{43}\)

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\(^{37}\) See the discussion in Chapter Five of the opportunities offered to the Genoese by Conrad of Montferrat.

\(^{38}\) OS, 1190, no. 609.


\(^{40}\) GC, 1191, no. 334, from 21 March 1191

\(^{41}\) GC, 1191, nos. 325 and 952

\(^{42}\) GC, 1191, nos. 1218-1219, from 11 October 1191

\(^{43}\) GC, 1192, no. 1526, from 27 January 1192
The involvement of the Genoese in the Third Crusade, as participants and supporters, is therefore evident in many ways. One interesting record from 20 March 1191 is a *societas* and *commenda* contract between Guido Bonaventura and Rogerio Noxentio. Guido took with him £225 as *societas* (for 50% of the profit) to Sicily and thence wherever he thought best (*in Sicilian et inde quo sibi videbitur melius*), of which £75 was from Guido’s own capital. Guido also received from Rogerio £186 as a *commenda* from which he was to receive one-quarter of the profit. The venture to Sicily was clearly made on a ship that was part of the Genoese crusading fleet, stopping in Sicily to collect the French crusaders and then carry them to the Latin East. At the very end of the contract Rogerio added that from the above mentioned *commenda* £20 was ‘*in servicio Dei et de Ultramare, vel mittat*.’ This final clause *vel mittat* suggests that Guido Bonaventura did not necessarily plan to pursue his commercial venture with the crusaders to the Latin East, but did not exclude this option either. Dozens of merchants made their way to Sicily in the spring of 1191. Some of them stopped first in Naples or Sardinia and other sailed there directly. How many of them did it merely for profit is not known. There is no doubt, however, that many were trying to assist the crusade too.

**Merchants organising the crusade — the shipping contract:**

What was the meaning of a crusade being organised by the seamen and merchants of Genoa? One of the interesting aspects of the Third Crusade which can be credited to the commercial and legal experience of the Genoese, or in other words to the Genoese mentality, is the shipping contract that the commune signed with the representatives of the king of France at the beginning of the year 1190. The contract may be seen as a result of long experience in international trade. Composing such a legal contract meant that both sides had to provide exact details. A payment arrangement was set and specific numbers of people, horses and provisions had to be supplied and agreed upon in advance. A war economy was obviously not an unknown practice for the contemporary lords and kings; presumably they had to manage a war budget before the crusade. However, the Genoese added their legal supplement in the form of the crusade shipping contract. The regulations of the Third Crusade were, therefore, determined, in advance, at a summit between France and Genoa in February 1190. The contract is printed in the *Codice diplomatico della repubblica di Genova* (CDG). Genoa was represented at that important summit by its six consuls of that year: Maurino Rodoani, Raimundo de Fresia, Simone Vento, Ido de Carmandino, Lanfranco Piper and Enrico Piccamilio. Representing King Philip in this colloquium was Hugh III, duke of Burgundy. Like Hugh of Burgundy, the Genoese consuls had personal interest in the

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44 GC, 1191, no. 318, from 20 March 1191
crusade. Two of them, Maurino and Simone, planned to join the crusade in the summer of 1190. The appearance of Lanfranco Piper in this document, shortly before his assassination, is also significant. His relative Guglielmo Piper was in Tyre in 1187 and represented the Genoese commune when it received its first concessions in the city of Tyre from the barons of the kingdom.\footnote{David Jacoby, 'Conrad, Marquis of Montferrat, and the Kingdom of Jerusalem (1187-1192)', in Laura Balletto (ed.), \textit{Dal feudi monferrini e dal Piemonte ai nuovi mondi oltre gli Oceani}, in Biblioteca della società di storia, arte e archeologia per le province di Alessandria e Asti, 27 (1993), p. 203; and see more about the significance of the position of Guglielmo Piper in Chapter Five.} By the beginning of the winter of 1190, Genoa had already had several fleets travelling to and from Tyre with arms and warriors. The first contingent embarked from Sicily in 1188 and, as discussed above, the second left Genoa only several months earlier, in the autumn of 1189. Therefore, in February 1190 the consuls had in-depth knowledge of the immediate needs in Tyre, as well as the supplies and arms available there for the new crusaders. This must have contributed to the discussions and the decision-making at the Genoese-French summit. Following the famous Venetian precedent of the \textit{pactum Warmundi} from 1124, as well as the long experience the commune had gained in dealing with privileges and commercial status in the east, the consuls of Genoa secured in advance privileges and concessions if territory was conquered.

The understandings reached at that summit in February 1190 signify the beginning of serious preparations for the departure of the French crusaders. Throughout the winter of 1190 messengers working on behalf of King Philip had negotiated with the Genoese the arrangements and logistics of the crusade.

According to the agreement with the consuls, King Philip planned to bring along 650 knights, 1300 squires '\textit{cum armis et arnesio ipsorum}', and 1300 horses with sufficient provisions '\textit{vianda et blada}' for eight months, and sufficient wine for four months. The consuls promised to be ready to ship the king and his men by mid-June and the total guaranteed payment to Genoa for the transportation of the French crusaders was 5,850 silver marks (\textit{marce argenti}), 2,000 of which were paid in advance. The price was determined as 9 marks per knight with two horses and two squires and the basic supplies. This was rather high fee which can be deduced from the fact a small group of crusaders managed to get a better offer for the same terms several months later. The fee requested from the lord of Salins and his knights was 8½ marks per knight (8½ marks equal approximately £19, 2/3s in Genoa. See appendix 1).\footnote{CDG, vol. 2, no. 192, pp. 366-368. In most documents from the years 1190 – 1191 the exchange rate between the Genoese pound and the silver mark was 45s Genoese to a silver mark. Between July and September 1191 there were slight alterations in the mark's value, between 45s Genoese and 48s. See GC, 275, 423, 588, 828, 936, 963, 979, 1044. See also Appendix 1. On the lord of Salins see note 49.} This private contract is interesting in many respects and will be analysed in more details in the following pages. The French-Genoese contract from February 1190 is very significant for the understanding of the way the Third
Crusade had been planned and its aftermath. It will be argued here that, although the consuls demanded a high price, Genoa promised in return to secure its entire fleet for the crusade in a similar manner to the way Venice acted during the preparations for the Fourth Crusade.

The full meaning of the shipping contract and the high degree of commitment to the crusade during the winter of 1190 are evident in the notarial cartularies as well. From the time the agreement was signed in February until the beginning of July no private contracts were made for the Latin East except for one. This is a contract within a family, Magalda and Wulfielmus of Jerusalem, a mother and son, on the one side and Martinus, another son of Magalda on the other. Martinus was sent to deliver some money to his siblings, two brothers and a sister, who were apparently left behind in Tyre. This contract, however, is a single exception and the transfer of money does not interfere with the plans of the crusade. Therefore, although this is an *ex silentio* argument, a study of the pattern of commerce of Genoa at the time, reveals that the absence of commercial contracts to the Latin East in the winter and spring of 1190 cannot be a coincidence. In return for the high transportation fee, Genoa in 1190, like Venice in 1202, secured her entire fleet for the purpose of the crusade. Therefore, it could not allow private contracts during the winter. Moreover, as soon as the embarkation date of the crusade passed dozens of private contracts suddenly appear in the cartulary. The French delay in embarkation was a great disappointment in Genoa. It was already suggested that the early embarkation of the Genoese was timed in accordance with the arrangements made with the French. However, instead of starting the large campaign in the autumn of 1190, the Genoese crusaders had to spend another winter awaiting the main contingent of the French and English to arrive. It must have caused some difficulties in Genoa too when the shipowners and suppliers learned about the delay.

One important contribution of the shipping contract was that it regulated the logistics of the crusade. The terms agreed upon in February were valid even when the departure of the main wave was delayed. On 06 August 1190 a contract was concluded between two Genoese shipowners, Ansaldo Mallone and Lanfranco Malfigliastro, and the messengers of the lord of Salins. The messengers specified in the contract that the lord planned to come in the company of thirteen knights, who according to the same ratio as agreed with King Philip were to bring along with them 26 horses and 26 squires (*scutiferes*): two horses and two squires per knight.

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48 *OS*, 1190, 356. See more about this family in the discussion of the Genoese inhabitants of the kingdom of Jerusalem in Chapter Five.

Provisions (vianda) for each person and every horse were also calculated, in accordance with the main contract, to last eight months and the wine, enough to last four months. Indeed, the number of horses and squires required per knight, as well as the measures of food and wine taken abroad were all regulated by the king of France. The private contract emphasises this point, ‘...hec faciemus vobis secundum conventum regis et ducis.’ Assumingly the warriors planned to carry armour and war machines with them. In the previous year the annals mentioned the equipment carried by the Genoese crusaders: ‘machina et alia bellica instrumenta.’ In the ship the lord of Salins and his knights were promised whichever two rooms they choose under the ship’s castle as well as the castle itself. The agreed fee for the transportation was 8½ silver marks of Troyes inclusive per knight, with two horses and two squires. As mentioned above the fee requested in August was lower than the agreed fee of 9 marks which was specified in the initial contract with the messengers of King Philip Augustus in February.

**Commercial aspects of the crusade:**

The main difference between the situation at the beginning of 1190 and the summer of the same year was that the French army had decided to postpone its departure. This meant that individual Genoese had to negotiate private contracts thereafter. When King Philip arrived in Genoa in August he made a new concession to the Genoese. This document is very different to the contract from February. The king confirmed all the promises made by Hugh of Burgundy. The Genoese were promised vast concessions and territory in the land conquered by the French during the crusade as well as part of the booty taken. Interestingly, this document does not specify what was Genoa expected to do in return. There is no discussion of the shipping arrangement. But evidence from the notarial archive indicates a fundamental change. Merchants registered a large bulk of commercial contracts to Sicily and *Ultramare*. From the summer of 1190 throughout the winter of 1191 commerce blossomed alongside the preparation for the crusade. The same ship in which the lord of Salins and his knights planned to travel on was also offered to merchants and the transfer of commodities. Moreover, this ship is only one among many. In the contracts that were registered by the notaries there is evidence of at least four large ships (navis) as well as one or two cogs (cocca) that were prepared for embarkation to *Ultramare* in the year 1190.54

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50 OS, 1190, no. 599.
52 ‘...et duas cameris cum castello de supra camenis, sicut camere determinant, dabimus vobis’, OS, 1190, no. 599.
53 CDC, vol. 2, no. 198, pp.378-381.
54 See OS, 1190, nos. 49, 599, 602, 634, 657-8, 661, 663-4; GC, 1191, nos. 511, 950; GC, 1192, nos. 1488, 1615; Useful list of ships and a discussion of Genoese ships and their destinations can be found in Hilmar C. Krueger, *Navi e proprietà navale a Genova seconda metà del sec. XII*, in *ASLSP: nuova serie*, vol. 25
According to John Pryor, the cog was introduced into the Mediterranean at this period of the eve of the Third Crusade. Two of the large ships are mentioned by name: *Navis de Clavari* (Chiavari) and the *Navis Nova de Sarçano*. Altogether, in the cartularies of Oberto Scriba and Guglielmo Cassinese from 1190-2, there is evidence of eight large ships going to *Ultramare*. Moreover, over one hundred shipping contracts, whose destination was *Ultramare*, were signed in Genoa between the summer of 1190 and the beginning of 1192. In one way or another, all of them concern the crusade. Crusaders, merchants and pilgrims took sea-loans and made their way to Tyre and Acre; the supplies taken were mostly war supplies and in the centre of these contracts were the shipowners who had to fulfil the promise to merchants and crusaders but also to keep their ships safely away from the enemy's reach.

The private shipping contract of the French crusaders, which was registered in the summer of 1190, provides a rare opportunity to get a close look at one of the crusading ships on its way to participate in the Third Crusade. Lanfranco Malfigliastoso and Ansaldo Mallone were the owners of this crusading ship. From the end of July they made a series of contracts for that venture to *Ultramare*. Most of the contracts are commercial ones of a typical nature. The two merchants were given money or goods to take aboard. Lanfranco and Ansaldo also secured independent contracts with other merchants. Lanfranco signed a partnership with Giovanni di Pontremoli, who travelled to *Ultramare* separately and stopped on his way in Portovenere and Sardinia, probably to buy grain. Ansaldo Mallone lent a sea-loan of £35 to a merchant named Antechino for 93 bezants of Acre, which were to be paid within fifteen days after the safe arrival of the ship Antechino sailed on in *Ultramare*. These contracts are probably part of the total number of contracts that Ansaldo and Lanfranco signed before the departure of their ship the Latin East. Evidently, their vessel had a dual purpose of shipping crusaders with their armour and merchants with their commodities.

Two of the contracts they signed are especially interesting. These are the contract with the crusaders and a contract with two seamen that they hired for the venture. One of the conditions detailed in the contracts concerns the travel routes and destination ports. The small differences between the contracts allow an insight into the concerns and requirements of the various interest groups on board. One of these issues is the travel route. In the usual formula of

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(99) (Genoa, 1985), pp. 74-90. Note that Krueger listed ships by the name of the owner. Most ships, however, had several owners and were entered into the index more than once.


56 *OS*, 1190, nos. 677, 679.

57 *OS*, 1190, nos. 541, 570, from the end of July 1190. See the following pages about the export of grain to the Latin East during the Third Crusade.

58 *OS*, 1190, no. 569.
the travelling contracts of the time, merchants and shipowners did not restrict each other to a single destination. Sea-loans were guaranteed a fulfilment in local money in Ultramare, and in the travel contracts merchants used a common legal formula according to which they promised to travel to Ultramare, with no specification of the targeting port city. Furthermore, they left it open for themselves to travel from the kingdom of Jerusalem to wherever they thought best from a commercial point of view.

The crusaders, however, required unusual arrangements because they wanted to get as near as possible to the battlefield where they could unload their horses, armour and food supplies. In the crusaders' contract there is an exceptional specification of the destination cities. The two shipowners thus promised 'portabimus domino vestro Guagerio Ultramare ad Acri vel Sur' (i.e. Acre or Tyre). In the contract with the seamen from Gaeta, another condition was added. Giovanni and Ricardo Bona Fides from Gaeta apparently required that the trade route following the ports of Ultramare would be restricted to Christian land only: '... et inde rediemus vobiscum in terra christianorum.' Why did they insist on such restriction? This restriction obviously ruled out the option of travelling to Muslim Alexandria. It also seems to exclude the empire of the Almohads on the shores of North-West Africa, a favoured target for many Genoese merchants during that year. The dual nature of the ship led the knights to detail the destination ports. Acre under siege was closed for trade at that period of time; it could only offer risks of war and a waste of valuable trading time, especially for those merchants who planned to return to Genoa in the same autumn. Even if previous waves of crusaders were to conquer this sea-port town before their arrival, which was not the case, it is doubtful if Acre would be ready to greet them in commercial terms. For the crusading knights, however, this was a vital question. In the year 1250, a similar problem of an argument over the sea route and destination ports brought shipowners and furious crusading passengers, participants in the Seventh Crusade, to court in Messina.

The salaries promised to the seamen Giovanni and Ricardo from Gaeta for this crusading venture were 17 and 15 bezants of Acre respectively, or £5½ and £5 in Genoese pounds. Half of this sum was to be paid in Genoa and another half in Ultramare. What was the role of these seamen on board? The contract vaguely says that they were to take care of the ship, the passengers and their belongings: '...et navem et vos et socios et res vestras salvabimus bona

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59 OS, 1190, no. 599.
60 OS, 1190, no. 640. For a different interpretation of this instruction see David Abulafia, The Two Italies, Economic Relations between the Norman Kingdom of Sicily and the Northern Communes (Cambridge, 1977), p. 175.
fide,\textsuperscript{62} which does not volunteer enough information. However, a comparison between the conditions in this contract and other contracts with members of the crew from the time of the Third Crusade provides a better answer to the question. In February 1191, a Genoese shipowner named Guglielmo de Pallo made a series of similar contracts with seamen. The ships' main destination was the Latin East as well. Moreover, because the contract was signed on the eve of the embarkation of the French contingents from Messina to the Latin East it was probably suppose to take some part in the shipping of crusaders or cargo for the crusaders. Guglielmo de Pallo made explicit contracts with his crew. A comparison between the contracts, and especially the agreed wages for their service, is therefore useful. In the first contract, Guglielmo de Pallo promised Arnaldo Baotus £15 (whoich equals 45 bezants) for the navigation of the ship first to portus pisanorum then to Ultramare and then back.\textsuperscript{63} This sum is nearly three times the wages promised to Giovanni and Ricardo in 1190. A contract offering similar wages of 20 bezants was concluded with Giovanni Mosengo \textit{pro magistrare... navi}.\textsuperscript{64} The other four seamen were paid up to half this sum, between 7 bezants and 10 bezants. Their job description, however, was different \textit{... pro marinario et pro facere omnia servicia navi que sint necessaria et que sciat facere, bona fide} [my emphasis].\textsuperscript{65} Judging from this payment scale, it seems that Giovanni and Ricardo from Gaeta who served on the crusading ship to the Latin East in 1190 were paid a reasonable fee; they were neither the simplest mariners nor professional navigators.

Many other contracts tell other parts of the story of the Third Crusade. It is unfortunate that no notarial records survive from the year 1189 when most of the Genoese embarked on the crusade. Consequently, it is difficult to examine the implications of this important phase of the crusade and the activities of so many members of the Genoese community who sailed to Tyre in that year. Nevertheless, several hints from records of commercial activities dating from the

\textsuperscript{62} OS, 1190, no. 640, half their salary was paid in advance in Genoese pound for which the rate is specified: \textit{ad rationem de biçantis tribus per libram}.

\textsuperscript{63} GC, 1191, no. 37. The reference to the route passing via portus pisanorum is an interesting indication of the exceptional state of peace between Pisa and Genoa at the time. A truce between the two cities was concluded under the pressure of Pope Clement III early in 1188. In the cartulary of Oberto Scriba from 1190-1191 there is ample evidence of a Pisan presence in Genoa for all sorts of commercial reasons. This fact stands out especially in comparison to Oberto's cartulary from 1186 in which no Pisans are mentioned. In addition, two contracts reveal that the situation was more complex. OS, 1190, no. 239 concerns an insurance for a Pisan merchant who was meant to travel to Pisa and return to Genoa by sea. This contract was signed on 11 March 1190. On the following day, however, Oberto recorded a contract between a shipowner and two merchants who rented a vessel from him and explicitly promised \textit{et bucium defendere a Pisanis et fortia Pisanorum} (OS, 1190, 243). In the light of this evidence there is room to re-examine the relations between Genoa and Pisa at the time of the Third Crusade. For documentation regarding the peace contract CDG, vol. 2, nos. 322-339; see also David Abulafia, \textit{The Two Italics: Economic Relations between the Norman Kingdom of Sicily and the Northern Communes} (Cambridge, 1977) p. 174. Steven Epstein, \textit{Genoa and the Genoese, 958-1528} (Chapel Hill, 1996), p. 87.

\textsuperscript{64} GC, 1191, no. 178.

\textsuperscript{65} GC, 1191, nos. 205, 210, 215, 216.
following year supply some leads to uncover the nature of relations between the two important engagements the Genoese had at the time - war and commerce.

It is surely not a coincidence that three Spinolas chose Ultramare as the first destination for their commercial venture in 1190. When Guido Spinola was at the head of the commune in Tyre, they could have expected some benefits. Guglielmo and Ingo, two of the three sons of Oberto Spinola, signed contracts in which they were to travel together to Ultramare, namely to Tyre, which was the main port city then in Latin hands and the beach-head for the Third Crusade. Their brother Oberto travelled at the same time and was in commercial relations with his relative, Consul Guido Spinola, from whom he was supposed to receive some money. Consuls of the commune were often sent abroad to handle a variety of diplomatic issues, such as the negotiation of peace treaties. It is not unusual to find consuls or other diplomatic representatives involved in commercial activities while on official missions abroad. In 1186, for example, Nicola Mallone and Lanfranco Piper, two eminent figures in Genoa, were sent to Constantinople. The tension between Genoa and the Byzantine Empire had escalated after the ‘great massacre of resident Italians’ in Constantinople in 1182 which turned the Genoese and Pisans in Ralph-Johannes Lilie’s words ‘into implacable enemies of the Emperor.’ Nicola and Lanfranco were sent to Isaac II Angelos after the coup which overthrew Andronikos I Komnenos in September 1185. But their mission did not bear the desired diplomatic fruits for their home town or bridge the hatred. However, it may have possessed a more personal agenda: Nicola is known to have combined this journey with a business trip, in which he was joined by his brother Ugo. In a societas contract between the brothers, from 24 September 1186, they declared a partnership of £150 and a commenda contract of £200 which, according to the contract, they intended to take to Constantinople and wherever they mutually decided thereafter: ‘quo tibi et michi videbitur proficuum’ [my emphasis]. This is only one example of the mixture of diplomacy and private enterprise. However, the Third Crusade was not like any other diplomatic activity that could easily combine trade and diplomacy. Commerce during the crusade involved serious risks to the lives of the travelling partners and to the commodities taken. It cannot be determined whether the

66 OS, 1190, nos. 642, 647. The commercial arrangement between Oberto and Guido Spinola is mentioned in OS, 1190, 655. For another commenda contract that involved the consuls in Tyre and Alamanno Quartano, see GC, no. 525.
69 OS, 1186, no. 40.
Genoese merchants saw their travels to the Latin East between 1188 and 1192 more as aid or as business enterprise. The involvement of younger relatives of the leaders of the crusade in trade to the Latin East in 1190-1 suggests that there was a correlation between the two goals. Apart from the younger generation of the Spinola family, there is evidence of other merchants who are related to the leaders of the crusade. In August 1190, Sergius de Castello and Fulco, the son of Fulco de Castello, invested in a cog that sailed to Ultramare.\textsuperscript{70} Fulco de Castello had already been in the Latin East since 1189 where he served as one of the Genoese leaders of the expedition. Nicola Embriaco was also one of the leaders. In April 1192, probably after the death of Nicola Embriaco in the Latin East,\textsuperscript{71} his two sons Guglielmo and Ugo leased the family lands in the Liguria for two years. One of the conditions in the contract was that if Guglielmo Embriaco remained in Ultramare at the end of two years the lease would be extended for another year.\textsuperscript{72} It is not known if Guglielmo plan to join the crusade for two years or to trade. There is no way to know if he ever considered settling in the Latin East because by 1194 he was back in Genoa where he was appointed a consil of the commune.\textsuperscript{73} Furthermore, this evidence of a firm family relationship between the leadership of the crusade and the younger generation of merchants who travelled to the Latin East strengthens the question about what motivated the Genoese in this period. It is not that coupling crusade and commerce was an unfamiliar concept at the time. The crusaders obviously needed supplies and it was not uncommon for merchants and crusaders to share ships. For example, in his chronicle of the Fourth Crusade, Villehardouin mentioned several occasions in which crusaders re-embarked from Zara or other places on merchants' ships for their journey to the kingdom of Jerusalem. Jean Richard and Benjamin Kedar show how in 1233 Templars and Hospitallers carried merchants and peregrine from Marseilles.\textsuperscript{74} In the light of the evidence presented above, it seems this was indeed another case in which the two interests, crusade and commerce, were combined.

The analysis of the travelling contracts in comparison to patterns of commerce in peaceful times reveals further interesting points about Genoa's contribution to the Third Crusade.

\textsuperscript{70} OS, 1190, no. 663, from 19 August 1190.
\textsuperscript{71} As mentioned above, there is no evidence that Nicola Embriaco returned to Genoa. Furthermore, in their contract, Ugo and Guglielmo acted also on behalf of their minor brothers who had been appointed guardian (tutor); Guglielmo himself was referred to as \textit{filius quondam Nicole}
\textsuperscript{72} GC, 1192, no. 1862 from 18 April 1192.
\textsuperscript{73} Ann. Ian., vol. 2, p. 44. The activities of two Nicolas in Genoa in these years are sometimes confusing. However, in the description of the annals in 1194, it is explicitly explained that this was Guglielmo the son of Nicola. In later documents the two are usually known as Guglielmo maior and Guglielmo junior. See more about their activities in Chapter Two.
For example, the years 1190 to 1192 are the only period in which there is evidence in the cartularies that Genoa exported grain (grani) and wheat (frumenti) to the Latin East. Lynn White showed that Emperor Henry VI renewed on 30 December 1194 a concession to the church of St Mary's of the Latins to export annually 200 salmas of grain to the Latin East. White suggested that this privilege was originally granted by Roger II or William I. He wrote that 'it seems probable that an abbey as conspicuous as St Mary's of the Latins at Jerusalem would have had a permanent station in Messina from the time of the First Crusade, simply to attend the shipment of supplies to the Holy Land through that great entrepôt of Mediterranean trade.' However, it may be argued that the urgent reconfirmation of this privilege five days after Henry VI's coronation reveals that there was greater need of supplies in the Latin East during this period of the years of the re-established kingdom of Jerusalem. Evidence from the Genoese cartularies shows that merchants had to travel to Sardinia and other places to purchase the basic commodities and then ship them over to Tyre. For example, one document from 16 January 1190 was made between shipowners and mariners. The contract specifies the sailing route, from Genoa to Gaeta and Sardinia to purchase grain and then to sail on to Ultramare. These contracts clearly reflect the needs of the crusaders outside the walls of Acre and the inhabitants of the Latin East at the time. Moreover, the description of famine in the Latin East covers many pages of the Itinerarium from the years 1190-1. The titles of some of the chapters are enough to give an idea about how desperate the situation was: 'the harsh famine and the enormous price of goods' (ch. 66), 'perishing with hunger, our people devour the corpses of their horses' (ch. 67), 'even noblemen steal when they cannot afford to buy bread' (ch. 73), 'the starving... die from drinking wine' (ch. 76). Eventually, according to the chronicle, a ship loaded with grain saved the people from hunger. Most people were obviously delighted, but the author added a remark that contributes to the understanding of the role of the merchants in the Latin East during these years of the Third Crusade, according to which some of the merchants regretted the loss of profit: 'dolentibus solis,  

76 Lynn White, Latin Monasticism, p. 227.  
77 OS, 1190, no. 17; another contract from 11 June 1191 suggests travelling to north Africa first GC, 708-709, and a contract from 27 January 1192 instructed the travelling merchants to sail to Guaranum first to purchase grain and then Ultramare. See GC, vol. 2, no. 1526  
et male zelantibus cupidis negotiatoribus, ex soliti quaestus diminutione." This statement implies that some merchants were playing a double role in this situation of famine; some were saving people from hunger while others took advantage of the starving people.

It is also interesting to contemplate the economic meaning of such an investment in comparison with the export of commodities in peaceful years. The Itinerarium twice remarks that the price of one measure of wheat, which was small enough to be carried under one's arm, amounted to 100 golden coins: 'modii tritici, mensura modica quam videlicet quis facile portaret sub ascella, centum aureis vendebatur.' Ambroise also wrote about the lack of supplies and the high price of wheat, which indeed amounted to 100 bezants: 'Mult iert li mais de ble pesanz, / Qui costoit en l'ost cent besanz.' Later on in the text. He repeated this information:

Qui esteit as gerniers gisanz, / Que cil vendeient cent besanz, / Sil mist de cent besanz a quyte: / Tel marcheans s'il dut enbatre / Qui tant et si tost embati. [my emphasis]

Other sources provide similar information about the high price of commodities and especially grain. In Merton Hubert's translation of Ambroise, John La Monte noted about these prices that contemporary Muslim chronicles also wrote that a sack of grain was purchased in Acre for 100 bezants. The value of grain and wheat was usually much lower of course. The Genoese merchants who delivered the supplies to the Latin East had purchased these products in Europe for much lower sums. For example, a merchant named Ugo Papazella was sent in the spring of 1190 from Genoa to Corneto to purchase 10 modii frumenti. He was instructed to pay 18s per modium.

The evidence of famine and great demand for grain suggests that even when the price of grain had been reduced because the loaded ships arrived the revenues for the merchants were high. This also explains why some Genoese mariners asked to be paid in grain rather than coins. In the sailing contract between the shipowner, Bernardo Ricio, and two mariners from Camogli

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79 Ibid, Ch. 79, Stubbs, p. 136; 'the only ones who were sad and resentful were the greedy merchants, because the profits that they had been making would be reduced', trans. by Nicholson, p. 136.
81 Ambroise, 4493-6; Hubert translated: What corn the granaries contain- / A hundred besants cost the grain - / And from a hundred cut the rate/ To Four. Well doth negotiate/ A merchant who thus lowers price.
82 Merton Hubert (ed.), The Crusade of Richard Lion-Heart, p. 181, n. 24
they were promised part of the payment in grain. Presumably, with some luck and access to the black market they could have made larger profit. Interestingly, the Itinerarium mentioned in the context of the famine a case of one Pisan merchant who stored grain to sell in the future. He was punished by God when his house, loaded with wheat, caught fire: ‘domum illius Pisani, tritico refertam, igne subito vehementer succendi.’

Commerce in other commodities was not completely withheld during this period: there was still demand for other items in 1191 to be transported through the port of Genoa to the Latin East and to be delivered back in Genoa. Fabrics and clothes are the obvious examples. Baldinelli, clothes, were shipped to the Latin East in the autumn of 1191, and other merchants were instructed to buy in the Latin East the famous cotton-linen fabric fustian, which owes its name to Fustat, today’s Old Cairo. The latter evidence suggests that not all supplies were necessarily war supplies. It is also interesting to find some merchants who were instructed to travel to other destinations, Constantinople for example, but were given instructions in case the ships call at Sicily or Ultramare. Baldovino Scoto was one such merchant, who on 25 September 1191 received a sea-loan of £19 2s 0d and promised to pay ‘perperos 3 mundos minus quartam per libram ad Constantinopolim. Et si in Sicilia fecerint portum, pro sol. 42, unciam 1 auri. Et si in Ultramare, bis 3 per libram mundos sarracenales, salva eunte nave...’ This latter example implies that not all merchants had the aid of the crusade as a principal motivation for action, indeed, some had carried on with their commercial ventures driven by personal and economic interests.

**Genoa as a crossroads:**

What impression did the Third Crusade leave on Genoa and its inhabitants? So far this chapter concentrated on the travelling people of Genoa, the crusaders, shipowners and merchants. What role did the residents of Genoa play in the preparations for the crusade, and how did the crusade affect their lives? The preparations for the Third Crusade in Genoa are evident in many other notarial documents. Looking at the war from the focal point of Genoa as a city, the Third Crusade had the potential to promote economic prosperity for the commune and for individual Genoese.

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84 OS, 1190, no. 17, from 16 January 1190
85 See for example a contract between Berardo Ricci and his sailors: OS, 1190, no. 17, from 16 January 1190. This ship sailed to Gaeta and Sardinia before its main destination - the Latin East.
86 Itinerarium, ch. 80, p. 137.
87 GC, 1013 from 16 September 1191; Baldinelli were eastern clothes or a western imitation. See Abulafia, The Two Italies, p. 234.
88 GC, 1105; on the fustian see David Abulafia, ‘The Role of Trade in Muslim-Christian Contact during the Middle Ages’, p. 1.
89 GC, 1191, no. 1134, dated 25 September 1191.
The crusade meant a mounting demand not just for ships and crews, but also for supplies of every sort.

From the beginning of 1190 there is evidence of preparations for the crusade. Soon after the French-Genoese summit in February in which the shipping contract was signed, the merchants of Genoa began their arrangement. An interesting document from the cartulary of Oberto Scriba shows merchants’ enthusiasm. In 20 March 1190 a contract was made between three messengers, representing King Philip Augustus and a Genoese lady named Mabilia, wife of the late Opizio Lecavello. Mabilia promised to supply all the wine that she had, 13 vegetables in total, made from her vines in Quarto (east of Genoa). The messengers paid £10 in advance and promised to pay the rest upon collection, which was agreed to be St Peter’s Day in June (29 June 1190). The price was calculated to be 7s per mezzarola of wine. It was also agreed that if the wine spoils (fuerit magagna) they would not have to buy it.90 John Pryor has calculated that each vegetable contained 6 or 12 mecarsolae. One mecarola equals 148.86 litres or 32.75 gallons.91 According to these figures, King Philip ordered from Mabilia a total of 11,611 litres (or 2554.437 gallons) of wine and was to pay £27.30.92 This makes a large quantity of wine, sold for much money. An initial investment in a tavern in Genoa in the following year reached £6, which was aimed solely at ‘negotiandi et comperandi vinum’.93 The comparison with the investment in wine in a tavern gives perhaps an interesting indication of the amount of wine taken on the crusade.

Mabilia was a successful businesswoman. After her husband’s death she managed the property herself and made many contracts before the notary: she rented out shops, sold lands and lent money.94 She was mostly engaged in the marriage of Adalaxia, her 16-year-old daughter. Mabilia had for her daughter’s dowry the largest sum recorded in the cartularies from these years - £1000.95 Moreover, the contract with Philip’s messengers was surely a satisfactory conclusion of the negotiations for her. She secured the transaction early in the year and sold her wine for a higher price than average. In 1186 Bocardo de Clavari paid Ermelina de Vignolio 6s per mecarola of wine. A record in the cartulary of Lanfranco from 1216 mention 33⅓ mecarolae of

90 OS, 1190, no. 271.
91 John H. Pryor, Geography, Technology and War, pp. 77-78. In the estimation of the mecarola Pryor followed H. Doursther, Dictionnaire universel des poids et mesures anciens et modernes (Brussels, 1840), pp. 69, 432. Byrne, however, used different figures. He followed Rocca and determined that mecarola equals 91.480 litres: Eugene H. Byrne, Genoese Shipping in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries (Cambridge Mass., 1930), pp. 41-42, n. 3; Pietro C. Rocca, Pesi e Misure antiche di Genova e del Genovesato (Genoa, 1871), p. 108.
92 Interestingly, when comparing the agreement reached in this document to the payment arrangement with the consuls of Genoa, it appears that in both cases the advance payment was equal to one third of the total sum. This might supports the translation of vegetes to six mecarola.
93 GC, 1191, no. 974.
94 see for example: GC, 1191, nos. 94, 183, 796-7, 808, 826
95 GC, 1191, no. 189
wine exported to Bougie and sold for £7 namely for a little more than 4s per meçarolia. Mabilia in 1190 sold her wine for 7s per meçarolia.\textsuperscript{96}

Undoubtedly, Mabilia Lecavello had timed the signature of the wine contract well, because the reality of the crusade in the summer of 1190 did not stand up to the expectations in February and March. Shortly after the arrival of King Richard in mid-August, it became evident that the greatest part of the French contingent was not going to cross the sea in that year. The immediate implication of that realisation was that the shipping needs changed significantly. Most of the Genoese ships were not required, nor much of the secured supplies. Can this explain the decline of transportation fees that we have noticed? For the participants in the crusade it was obviously not just the length of the crusade that mattered. The above documentation points out that the Third Crusade was an expensive enterprise. At the end of the First Crusade, the historian Caffaro rejoiced in the booty won by the Genoese, which in Eugene Byrne's words was 'enormous'.\textsuperscript{97} However this booty divided among the participants included only £2 8s 0d and two pounds of pepper per person, and the leaders and consuls received special honoraria and a share in the ships. Compared to these figures, the above-mentioned travel fee per knight and his companions in the Third Crusade which was approximately £20 seems a phenomenal price.

Genoa was affected by the crusade in many other ways. Some aspects of the economic impact were mentioned above: the expectations of the early part of 1190, the rapid profit of some merchants and the troubles caused by the delay in the embarkation. Genoa, however, was also affected by the traffic of people that crossed through the city. These people contributed to the city's economy and affected many other aspects of life. Several cases will illustrate the implications of Genoa standing at the crossroads between the Holy Land and Europe. In the years 1190 to 1192, the people of Genoa saw the leading personnel of Europe crossing through their city. Many conducted business during their visits. In the cartularies there is evidence of the acts of people such as Emperor Henry VI of Hohenstaufen.\textsuperscript{98} The Genoese also witnessed the failures of some of the crusaders. The poor bishop of Liège, for example, made his way back from the Holy Land where he lost his money and was therefore forced to borrow money in Genoa: 'cum dominus episcopus Ragul Legiensis rediret de Ultramarinis partibus, et quam magnas expensas

\textsuperscript{96} OS, 1186, 335; Lanfranco, 1216, no. 1041, from 25 July 1216. It is interesting to note that David Abulafia found that in 1287 a Florentine merchant carried 900 meçarolias to Tunis on board a Catalan ship, for which the agreed price was 300 dinars. Compared to the above cases, the wine carried to Tunis was significantly cheaper. On this case and on thirteenth-century wine trade, see David Abulafia, 'A Tyrrenhian Triangle: Tuscany, Sicily, Tunis, 1276-1300', in C. Violante, ed., \textit{Studi di storia economica toscana nel Medioevo e nel Rinascimento in memoria di Federigo Melis} (Pisa, 1987), pp. 63-66.


\textsuperscript{98} GC, 1191, no. 1323 from 12 November 1191. The emperor appointed notaries. In another contract, signed at the house of the archbishop of Genoa, Emperor Henry declared legitimate Guglielmo, son of Robert de Levi and Agnes. GC, 1337.
fecisset et pecunia egeret' [my emphasis]. The bishop borrowed 200 silver marks which he promised to pay back to Nicola Blondo 'in terra comitis Flandrie in seculare loco' [my emphasis].

This was a very significant amount of money, a sum that according to the contract of 1190 was sufficient for the transportation of more than 60 people and 40 horses with enough supplies (a ratio of 9 marks per knight with two squires and two horses). The large sum and possibly also the suspicious meeting place for the repayment, explain why the bishop of Liège had to supply a long list of guarantors. The list included his archdeacon, the chaplain, his two seneschals as well as his own nephew. It is amusing to find that this list also included the bishop's butler (pincerna) and his chamberlain (camerarius eius). There was no shame in borrowing money in Genoa. The bishop of Nice, for example, borrowed £50 when he went for one-year pilgrimage to Rome, which he proclaimed was 'pro honore ecclesie niciensis.'

Moriscotus archiepiscopi took a sea-loan of £50 when he travelled to the Latin East in the summer of 1190. On the other hand, in 1198 a commander of the order of St John in Capo Arena received a deposit from an English physician, magister John of England. John planned to claim this money back when he returns from his pilgrimage journey to Canterbury.

Whoever the travellers who crossed through Genoa were, the Genoese bankers and merchants had made a profit: from the travellers' failures and success alike. There were indeed people who made some fortune during the Third Crusade in the Latin East. Raul from Châteaudun (Ragul de Castello Londono) sent back from Ultramare una bota, which was placed in the ship of Gugleilmo de Pallo. This bota contained plura ferramenta.

Importantly, the Third Crusade established a link between these remote parts of Europe; the English found in Genoa a market and home. For the first time in 1191, fabrics were imported from Stamford: dyed and some expensive black fabric, 'cannas de Stanfort nigro.' In time, the Stamford fabric became a commonly imported product, which was simply called stanforti. In 1200 Genoese merchants were exporting it even to Alexandria and the Latin East. Furthermore, the English arrived in Genoa with their families and their activities are documented throughout the year 1191. In 26 May 1191 John of London (Lundrex) and Nicolas son of Henry, also from London, signed a partnership between them. Each took £10 that he had to invest and trade with until the following Easter. Only one condition was specified, according to which Nicolas was not

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99 GC, 1191, no. 761
100 GC, 1192, no. 1678, from 04 March 1192
101 OS, 1190, no. 546. from 24 July 1190.
102 Bonvillano, no. 55, from 30 September 1198.
103 GC, 1192, no. 1488, from 13 January 1192. On the identification of Chateaudun see 'castrodunum'
Johann G. T. Graesse, Orbis latinus: Lexikon lateinischer geographischer Namen des Mittelalters und der
Neuzeit (Braunschweig, 1972), vol.1, p. 458.
104 GC, 1191, no. 300, from 15 March 1191.
105 OS, 1200, cart. 4, p. 258V6.
allowed to carry this money with him if he decided to travel to Ultramare. This is quite interesting because the crusade was obviously the reason for their arrival in Genoa in the first place. The same Nicolas sold his house in London to a fellow merchant named Richard (Rizardo) Lovello for £10 Genoese. Nicolas’s father Henry produced a security note (carta securitatis) for this transaction and Nicolas promised to repay this sum if the deal was cancelled. Did Nicolas sell his house because he ran short of money? Perhaps he preferred to stay in Genoa for a while.

It is also interesting that most of the English merchants preferred to make partnerships among themselves. The witness list to the above contract included Robert of London, William Anglicus, Jordan of London and three others. The small English community in Genoa maintained some sort of community life, as may be demonstrated by a marriage arrangement that Robert and Robin from London agreed on. Robin was to marry Robert’s niece Margarita for a dowry (dote) of £40 of which £15 were paid when the contract was signed and the rest was to be paid within three years. Robin was clearly reluctant to follow Genoese customs, because in the subsequent contract, which he made with Margarita herself, Robin was asked to state a sum for an antifacti. He promised Margarita £35 and ‘quicquid voluerit faciendum, pro more et consuetudine civitatis Ianue.’

Only one English merchant seems to have settled permanently in Genoa. This was Simon of Stamford. His activities are documented in various contracts from the year 1191 and later again in 1198 and frequently from 1200 until 1203. Raul Anglicus on the other hand, promised not to remain in Genoa. In 30 September 1191, Raul signed an apprenticeship contract with Guglielmo de Turre for four years. Guglielmo promised to feed him and take care of his clothing (victum et vestitum), and obviously to ‘docere eum de suo officio.’ At the end of four years he would also pay Raul £1. The condition that Raul was not allowed to stay in Genoa must have been a professional interest of Guglielmo who wanted professional employees but not competitors. This series of cases of English merchants in Genoa was therefore not directly linked to the progress of the Third Crusade but it is an example of the results of the crusade and the way it created new commercial links across Europe.

Another extraordinary case is the appearance of a merchant named Abram de Stanforti. The name indicates that he was a Jewish merchant from England. Abram was mentioned in a contract from 03 June 1191. He must have arrived from England with the English contingents

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106 GC, 1191, no. 655, from 26 May 1191.
107 GC, 1191, no. 1446, from 22 December 1191
108 GC, 1191, no. 1448, from 22 December 1191
109 GC, 1191, nos. 230, 638, 839, 841; Bonvillano, no. 40; OS, 1200, cart. 4, p. 129 V4; GG, 1203, nos. 526, 568, 584, 634, 659, 820, 863, 988. The lack of cartularies from 1192 to 1198 makes it impossible to determine if this is the same person, or a different merchant with the same name.
110 GC, 1191, no. 675 from 03 June 1191.
that were on their way to participate in the Third Crusade. In a recent book on England's Jewish Solution, Robin Mundill wrote that 'Stamford was clearly a Jewish colony of some importance in the south of the county' [of Lincolnshire].\textsuperscript{111} However, like the Jews of York, the Jewish community in Stamford was massacred by English mob shortly before the departure of King Richard the Lion Heart and his troops on the crusade. Jonathan Riley Smith wrote how 'in Lent 1190, anti-Jewish massacres spread from London to Stamford...culminating in the hideous butchery of the Jewish community in York, ushering in a century of persecutions.'\textsuperscript{112} William of Newburgh wrote in his chronicle about this massacre. On 07 March 1190, a group of young crusaders, \textit{juvenum, qui signum Dominicum Ierosolymam prefecturi susceperant}, attacked the Jews of Stamford and confiscated their money: \textit{magna vis pecuniae capta}.\textsuperscript{113} The link between the preparations in England for the Third Crusade and the massacre of the Jews was discussed by Christoph Cluse.\textsuperscript{114} Some of the people who took part in the attacks of the Jews in York hurried to set out on the crusade early, according to William, in order to escape the investigations of these crimes. 'illi ex conjuratis, qui signum Domini acceperant, ante ommem quaestionem iter propositum arripuerunt.'\textsuperscript{115} Clearly, Abram made a narrow escape from the fate of many members of the Jewish community. In the light of this evidence of the popularity of the hatred towards Jews among the crusaders, it is surprising to find that a Jewish merchant travelled to Genoa with them. In Genoa, Abram negotiated with local merchants in June 1190, however, evidence from his contract suggests that he did not remain in Genoa but requested instead that his part of the payment due to him at the beginning of August will be handed on his behalf to Simon of Stamford.\textsuperscript{116} This interesting collection of cases relates part of the English experience in Genoa. It is an example of how the Third Crusade had made a change in Genoa and elsewhere in the western web of commerce and culture.

\textbf{Lessons of the Third Crusade:}

The Third Crusade marked a change in the conceptualisation and the administration of the crusading movement. Jean Richard already noticed how 'Barberousse est le dernier qui ait suivi l'itinéraire de la Première Croisade,' and further identified transportation as a fundamental

\textsuperscript{115} \textit{William of Newburgh}, p. 322.
\textsuperscript{116} \textit{GC}, 1191, no. 675, from 03 June 1191.
transition marked by the Third Crusade. Indeed, the Third Crusade contributed to the shape of many of the characteristics of the future crusades; it structurally embedded many features of the nautical crusades while bequeathing them some insidious patterns. The dependence on naval transportation meant that embarkation could only occur within a limited period, during the spring season. The Third and Fourth Crusades followed the long established naval and commercial experience of the Venetians and Genoese and therefore chose St Peter’s day, at the end of June for their embarkation. Naval expeditions during the winter were avoided whenever possible, as John Pryor explains, storms and ‘dangerous squally conditions created in winter by localised meteorological phenomena... because of the hazards caused by reduced visibility.’ Consequently, the embarkation date was set as early as possible in the spring, allowing enough time for the contingents to gather in the western-Mediterranean and send troops into battle in the east.

The dependence on the Italian navies and the dealing with merchants and shipowners affected the mindset of the crusaders. When the French knights approached Genoa for assistance in shipping them to the Holy Land, they were introduced to its commercial, maritime and most importantly to its legal way of thinking. In the Genoese mind, freighting crusaders was not dissimilar to shipping other goods, and thus required a similar legal contract. The long-term effect of the contracts and regulations for the Third Crusade was vast. It marked a major step on the way to further institutionalising the crusades. By the time of the Fourth Crusade, it was taken for granted that a transportation contract needed signing. But the transmission of ideas and actions is evident in many other details of the arrangements. Calculation of the costs of the crusades was determined in the same manner: a charge per unit of a knight with his two squires and two horses. This formula must have been a result of previous experience of the Italians in the shipping of troops. However the changes that occurred in the contracts of the following crusades suggest a learning process and an evolution of the organisation of the crusades. On the eve of the Fourth Crusade, the number of horses taken was reduced by half to only one horse per knight. The total cost, however, increased by thirty percent. The high fee, coupled with wrong estimation of the needs, were the leading reasons that the Fourth Crusade was a financial disaster for its

organisers. The interesting consequence of the learning experience can be seen in the ways the contract was changed by the time of Fifth Crusade. Venice agreed then with King Andrew of Hungary and Duke Leopold VI of Austria to charge the crusaders per ship used and not per knight.

Calculations of the provision required for the crusade had been through interesting changes as well. The estimation at the time of the Third Crusade was that the crusaders should take a food supply for up to eight months. The experience of famine in the Latin East in 1190 probably led to the increased of the supplies to last for a year when the Fourth Crusade was arranged.120 Interestingly, at the time of the Fifth Crusade the regulation of supplies seems to have been reduced again. James of Vitry mentioned in a letter that he carried with him provisions for only three months. He sailed, however, from Genoa in October, and he explains that his supplies were less likely to get spoiled ‘quod tali tempore (tempore hiemali) victualia in navi non facile corrumpuntur nec aqua sicut estivo tempore in navi putrescit.’121 This is evidence of change also in technology and the quality of ships at the time. The crusaders who departed from Venice in the late spring must have carried more supplies. Nonetheless, shortly after their arrival in the kingdom of Jerusalem they are known to have suffered from ‘severe food shortages due to a drought during the previous two years.’122 Another problem in the shipping of the crusaders was the shortage in the number of ships awaiting the crusaders in Venice on the eve of the Fifth Crusade in 1217. It must have been a result of the miscalculation and overestimation of the number of crusaders who embarked on the Fourth Crusade. The leaders of the Austrian and Hungarian contingents, therefore, overreacted in there cautious estimation of the attendance of their troops in the Fifth Crusade.

The Third Crusade contributed to the shape of the following crusades not just at the preparation level. It turned almost into a pattern to delay departures, to arrive late in the western Mediterranean and eventually to spend winter in one of this region’s seaport towns. James Powell noticed how the crusaders from Austria and Hungary delayed their embarkation from the fall of 1217 to the late spring of 1218. This delay ‘was not a matter of chance, but was premised on the leader’s knowledge of the general state of preparations for the crusade.’123 This probably explains the role Messina had played in many crusades.

The transformation of the crusading movement into completely nautical crusades resulted in the exclusion of the experience because the crusades became very expensive. During the

120 Donald E. Queller and Thomas F. Madden, The Fourth Crusade, p. 11.
122 James Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade, p. 130.
Fourth Crusade, there was an increase of approximately thirty percent in the charge per knight with a horse and squires. Some crusaders must have also concluded that it would be cheaper to share merchants' ships and embark separately, preferably departing later than the main crusading wave. Additionally, this increase in prices spelled trouble for the leadership of the Fourth Crusade in 1202, which failed to recruit enough crusaders. It was not until the Seventh Crusade that maritime transportation became more accessible. As Benjamin Kedar showed, in August 1246, on the eve of the crusade, travel fees to the Middle East mounted to £4 tournois per person for a first class place, £3 and £2 tournois for second and third places (platea) respectively. Unlike the situation in Genoa in 1190 the demand for ships on the French Riviera on the eve of the crusade in 1248 'exceeded by far the facilities available.' Nevertheless, third-class places remained relatively cheap. In Marseilles they mounted to 45s tournois.124 According to the data in Peter Spufford's *Handbook of Medieval Exchange*, the Genoese pound was slightly stronger than the French tournois in 1248 and was, on the average, exchanged for 18s.125 By that time the journey was both much cheaper and also much safer, but there were no doubts that a crusade to the Holy Land meant a maritime expedition.

The sea was a challenge every crusader had to face from the time of the Third Crusade onwards. There were new rules for the crusading expeditions to the Holy Land which forced inherent changes both in the conceptualisation and the practicalities of the crusades. Genoa's contribution to the formation of the crusading movement at the early stages of the Third Crusade may be compared with the contribution that Pope Innocent III made to the institutionalisation of the movement at the time of the Fourth Crusade. He then acknowledged the need for even further control over the crusaders, from the preaching and recruitment stages, through regulating the fund-raising and taxation, and most importantly the fixing of crusading rights and formulation of indulgences.

**The economic value of religious sentiment:**

The Genoese involvement in the Third Crusade was studied in this chapter through the commercial activities of the Genoese as recorded in the notarial cartularies. Drawing on sources which were not used thus far in the historiography of the Third Crusade led to many new conclusions. Ample evidence revealed that the Genoese were highly committed to the crusade.

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125 The exchange data is taken from Peter Spufford, *Handbook of Medieval Exchange* (London, 1986), pp. 108-9. The data includes eighteen cases of money exchange between the Genoese pound to the French-pound tournois recorded between 1248 and 1291. In twelve cases the Genoese pound was purchased for less than 15s tournois. In 1248, however, the Genoese pound was slightly stronger. In three out of five records, the Genoese pound equalled between 17s and 19s tournois. For Spufford's data online, as published in the *Handbook*, see MEMDB on http://sccol.rutgers.edu/memdb last accessed on 10 December 2002.
Individual Genoese and Genoese ships hastened to the Latin East as soon as the news of the crisis in the kingdom of Jerusalem reached them. Especially valuable was the contribution of the Genoese contingent that sailed to Tyre in 1189. Careful examination of the list of Genoese crusaders showed that many of them perished during the crusade while others were taken captive. The notarial records contain evidence of Genoese crusaders who joined the French and English contingents also in 1190. Some merchants who could not join the crusade themselves had donated money and supplies for their fellow crusaders. The Genoese aid was therefore offered by supplying the ships for the transportation of the crusaders but also by providing supplies to the crusaders who were suffering from hunger at the siege of Acre.

The people of Genoa, however, also expected to profit from the crusade. The shipping contract signed between the consuls of Genoa and the French at the beginning of 1190 was followed by preparations for the embarkation. The consuls of Genoa did not hesitate to charge the king of France high price for the despatching of his army. It was made clear that individual merchants anticipated high profit too. Thus, the Genoese wine-merchant Mabilia Lecavello sold her wine for higher price than usual. Moreover, sailors in cargo ships loaded with grain travelled to the Latin East to assist the crusaders. However, they suspiciously requested their payment in grain which they could obviously sell for a much higher price than their usual salary. The shipping of the crusaders involved social aspects, such as the relationship between the shipowners, the merchants, the crusaders and the sailors. The reconstruction of these travel experiences was one of the main achievements of the analysis of the notarial records from the years of the Third Crusade. It also highlights the gap in the story of the Third Crusade by the lack of such documents from the year 1189, in which Genoese took direct part in the crusade and the defence of what remained of the kingdom of Jerusalem.

Another aspect of the crusade which was examined in this chapter was the impact of the crusade on the Genoese web of commerce. Trade in English clothes was one such effect but also remarkable were some social aspects of the crusade witnessed through the English experience in Genoa, when a community of English merchants began to establish itself in the city. Other people who travelled through the port of Genoa enriched the locals with the unfamiliar products and must have exposed them to new cultures and ideas. Bankers profited from the pilgrims and crusaders who required more money. Genoa was a crossroad to all these people during the time of the Third Crusade. The inhabitants of Genoa bequeathed the crusade with their maritime and legal experience and were also influenced by the travellers who visited their city.
The impact of a crusade: the reaction in Genoa to the Fourth Crusade

This chapter is about Genoa and a crusade in which it did not take part. Why did Genoa not join the Fourth Crusade? This question will stand at the core of the first part of this chapter. The main methodological problem that arises from the fact that Genoa did not join the crusade is that Genoa was not frequently mentioned in the chronicles of this crusade. The analysis in this chapter, therefore, draws primarily on the sources from Genoa itself, particularly on the evidence from the notarial archive. Documents are available in the notarial archive from 1198 to 1202 and from the year 1203. There is special interest in the cartularies of 1201 because a large number of contracts were made by the consuls of that year in Genoa. This provides an opportunity to examine the commune’s needs as well as the interests of the consuls as individuals during that period, on the eve of the crusade. In particular, the questions of Sicily and of the problem of piracy deserve special attention, because these were the two most pressing issues Genoa was engaged with at the beginning of the thirteenth century.

Another objective of this chapter is to examine the impact of the crusade on the people of Genoa. How did the fact that a crusade had been under way affect Genoa’s trade? What was the impact on Genoa’s relationships with the Latin East? In order to assess the impact of the crusade on the trade patterns of the Genoese it will be necessary to examine first some of the patterns of trade in peacetime. It will be argued that one of the important effects of the progress of the crusade was Genoa’s search for new markets in the Mediterranean and ultimately the opening of the route to Aleppo. The role of corsairs who were acting on Genoa’s behalf will be examined too. It will be argued that the aggression involved in the pirates’ activities in Tripoli needs to be examined in the context of the conflicts in the islands of Sicily, Malta and Crete and largely in the light of the relationship with Venice and Pisa, during and after the crusade.

Sicily and Guglielmo Embriaco maior

One of the most pressing issues Genoa engaged with before the Fourth Crusade was Sicily. The problem started already in 1197 because Henry VI died on 28 September and his heir was still a baby. As a result, Riley Smith wrote that ‘the kingdom of Germany and the empire were bound to be disputed.’126 This premature death happened six days after the arrival of the main German fleet in Acre. There were major consequences to the death of Henry, for example, the German crusade was withdrawn shortly afterwards when many crusaders hurried back to Germany. Importantly, because Jerusalem had not been recovered from the Muslim enemy it remained an object for the immediate organisation of another crusade.

Another major consequence of Henry’s death, however, was the outbreak of a power struggle in Sicily. David Abulafia discussed this troubled period in Sicily’s history in *The Two Italies*, in *Frederick II, A Medieval Emperor* and in his article on ‘The Kingdom of Sicily under the Hohenstaufen and Angevins’.[127] Abulafia demonstrated how the problems in Sicily had a complex history that went back long before the events of 1197. Furthermore, the question of Sicily involved the papacy and Germany as well as Sicily. Many people had claims in Sicily and the death of its lords often brought tension and wars to the island. Thus, the death of Tancred in 1194 led to the conquest of Sicily by Henry VI, who was joined by his seneschal, Markward von Anweiler, as well as Genoese and Pisan contingents.[128] Henry’s own death in 1197 followed by his wife’s death in 1198 resulted in more tension in Sicily. ‘Pope Innocent III...took on the functions of guardian of the boy king (Frederick II)’ but Markward von Anweiler, who functioned as a regent of Sicily, rejected the pope’s claims: ‘Innocent attempted to tame Markward, and even threatened a crusade against Markward in 1198-9; had this occurred it would have been the first “political crusade” launched against the Christian enemies of the Church.’[129] Genoa was trapped between these powers, on the one hand, it had been in good terms with Markward for many years but, on the other hand, there were many reasons to keep the pope happy, as will be demonstrated in the following paragraphs.

Unfortunately, the Genoese annals do not provide details of how the pact between Genoa and Sicily had evolved. The impression is that it was partly based on positive experience and steady relations between the commune and the German seneschal Markward von Anweiler. Markward was an extraordinary figure in the diplomatic sphere of the late twelfth century. Marc Bloch wrote about him that ‘few men stand out so prominently as the uncouth figure of the seneschal Markward of Anweiler, who died regent of Sicily.’[130] Genoa assisted Markward and his lord, Emperor Henry VI, to conquer Sicily in 1194.[131] In return for their help, Henry VI promised the Genoese many privileges. Otobono Scriba wrote about these privileges that: ‘ipse imperator multa maximaque promisit et iuravit.’[132] David Abulafia noted that this privilege was primarily ‘a

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renewal and extension of Barbarossa's privilege of nearly thirty years earlier... As far as Sicily was concerned, there was no change.¹³³

Even before Henry's death, however, requests to fulfil these promises had led to some tension between Genoa and the Germans. In December 1200, a new letter of privileges was eventually granted to Genoa by the cancellarius of Sicily in the name of the minor, rex Sicilie, Frederick II. This charter was granted by Markward's rival, Walter of Palear, whom David Abulafia described as 'a worldly south Italian prelate who held the office of chancellor.'¹³⁴ The concessions granted in Palermo included properties in Messina, Syracuse as well as various legal rights. Importantly, the new agreement included a payment of '10,000 untiarum auri: ...ad hoc 2,000 et annuatim 2,000 usque ad complementum summe ipsarum untiarum.'¹³⁵ The golden ounce of Sicily was equal to approximately two Genoese pounds. This calculation is based on numerous cases in the notarial cartularies from these years, according to which an ounce was purchased at between 37s and 43s Genoese. The ounce of Messina was, however, slightly stronger than the ounce of Palermo, which was probably the coin referred to in this charter by Walter who was based in that town (appendix 2). This vast amount of money was at stakes as a result of the growing conflict in Sicily. David Abulafia remarked about the tension between the pope and Markward that 'Innocent painted Markward in lurid colours as a worse Saracen than Saladin.'¹³⁶

Genoa was also risking its good relations with the Germans in Sicily, friendship which as David Abulafia demonstrated was one of most fruitful political investments Genoa had made in this period.¹³⁷ From 1198 until 1200 Genoa was thus in a delicate position between the two enemies. For some time Genoa seem to have played between the two sides. 'Markward bestowed total tax exemption on Genoese merchants trading in the kingdom,'¹³⁸ but there is evidence that Markward's opponent, the chancellor Walter of Palear sent messengers to Genoa too. A notarial record was signed in 9 May 1201 between a shipowner of a distinguished Genoese family named (a rather odd first name) Heredes de Mari and messengers of Walter of Palear. The messengers promised to free Lanfranco de Mari, presumably a relative of Heredes, within eight days from their return to Palermo: 'juramus...quod infra dies viii postquam pervenerimus panoramam in curiam domini nostri Regis faciemus liberari Lafrancum de mari....'¹³⁹

¹³³ David Abulafia, The Two Italies, p. 191.
¹³⁴ David Abulafia, Frederick II, p. 95
¹³⁵ I Libri Iurium., vol. 1/2, document 292, p. 52.
¹³⁶ David Abulafia, 'The Kingdom of Sicily under the Hohenstaufen and Angevins', p. 501.
¹³⁷ David Abulafia, The Two Italies, in particular see Abulafia's conclusions to the chapter 'Quid plura? 1191-5', pp. 212-3.
¹³⁸ David Abulafia, Frederick II, p. 103
¹³⁹ The following statement at the end of the contract makes it clear that Heredes was his first name 'Ego Heredes de Mari promitto...', Guglielmo di Sori, MS, 102, p. 192, R3-V1.
Many promises were made to the Genoese in 1200 but their fulfilment was not guaranteed. This problem might explain Genoa's reaction in the following year. The consuls of the year 1201 were some of Genoa's most powerful personnel, including Nicola Doria and Guglielmo Embriaco major. Some of the activities of these consuls are documented in an unusual manner in a series of notarial contracts. The contracts were written down by the notary Guglielmo di Sori, who is to be considered the notary of the Embriaco family. The fact that the contracts were registered by this notary suggests that the decision was probably made under the influence of Guglielmo Embriaco major. In the same cartulary one may find many commercial contracts that Guglielmo Embriaco major and his nephew Guglielmo Embriaco junior had registered. An analysis of this unpublished cartulary will therefore be interesting in order to understand, on the one hand, what was Genoa's position on the eve of the Fourth Crusade, and the other hand, what commercial interests were driving individual merchants into action. Guglielmo Embriaco the elder and the younger registered contracts concerning the crusader states too. The Embriaco family had been in close relationship with the crusader states since the days of the First Crusade. One contract is particularly interesting because it concerns the administration of some of Genoa's property in Acre. Furthermore, a branch of the family had settled permanently in the Latin East, but their story will be discussed separately in Chapter Four.

The six consuls of the year 1201 made a series of unusual notarial contracts, in which they ordered the supply of eight ships for the service of the commune but for which they paid with their private capital. When reading these documents, the first impression is that the consuls were engaged in private business. Partly, this is because the contracts were written using formulae commonly employed by the notaries. For example, one of the consuls signed a contract as a personal guarantor, in which he promised to fulfil the agreements made by the other consuls. A formula usually employed in contracts between individuals had been used in this case even though the money pledged was from the commune's treasury. It is possible to speculate that there might have also been an element of risk and secrecy involved in this enterprise that encouraged the consuls to approach this mission as if it was a private business. In any case, the manner in which the consuls handled the affairs of the commune is not usual and thus deserves a closer look.

On 09 May 1201, a contract was signed between the consuls of Genoa and a shipowner named Otto Pulpo. Otto represented in this record three other shipowners: Lanfranco Roco, 

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140 see David Abulafia, *The Two Italies*, p. 19.
141 This document has been published. See Sandra Origone, ‘Genova, Costantinopoli e il regno di Gerusalemme (prima metà sec. XIII)’, in Gabriella Airaldi and B.Z. Kedar (eds.) *I comuni italiani nel regno crociato di Gerusalemme* (Genoa, 1986), pp. 283-316. Appendix II/2, pp. 312-314.
142 Guglielmo di Sori, MS 102, p. 193, R4.
Oberto Malocello, and Heredes de Mari. Five out of the six appointed consuls of Genoa of that year were present. They promised to pay for the galleys which Otto would equip and arm for them. The agreed fee was £55 per ship, and a total of £440 for a fleet of eight vessels which they instructed Otto ‘armasti in servicium comunis.’ The consuls promised to pay their debt within fifteen days of the return of the main Genoese fleet from Ultramare and Alexandria. There was still no hint in the contracts to explain what were the ships required for and how the payment day related to the date of the arrival of the fleet. On 18 May 1201, nine days after the registration of the first contract, the sixth consul of Genoa, Giordano Richerio, signed as a guarantor to his colleagues. The contract was a pledge for the entire sum of £450. As mentioned above, this contract appears at first glance like a private security contract. This contract is conspicuous because the notary mentioned Giordano’s title, consul of the commune (incidentally, the title was inserted above the line). It is also unusual because Giordano offered as security, in addition to his own property, also the commune’s property: ‘Ego Jordanus Richerius (sup. lin. consul comunis) confiteor tibi Otoni Pulpe et promitto et me atque mea et (sup. lin. res) comunis Januensis tibi obligo....’

The shipowners were probably short of cash during the period of preparations, so several weeks later Otto Pulpo made another contract in which he borrowed a large sum. It is probably not a coincidence that the contract was signed with Ugo Embriaco, a relative of Guglielmo maior. Ugo was the podestà of Noli in that year and in the contract he officially purchased ‘goods’ for £425. In reality it must have been a loan on the sum that Otto Pulpo expected the consuls of Genoa to pay in the autumn. Several hints suggest that there is a connection between this record and the contracts with the Genoese consuls. Otto Pulpo, the shipowner, is not a well known figure in the contemporary sources. The arrangements for the Genoese venture in 1201 were in fact the only time he was mentioned in the notarial sources. Furthermore, Ugo Embriaco made this contract ‘consilio et voluntate’ of the consuls of Genoa as well as the commune of Noli, which suggests that this was certainly not private business. Finally, the objective of this vague transaction was explicitly aimed at the ‘bona et utilitate comunis Ianue et de Nauli.’ The presence and the signature of the consuls of Genoa, as witnesses for this contract, implies that this contract is part of the series of the sea-loans and security contracts that were composed on the eve of the fleet’s departure to the east.

Going back to the contracts these individuals had registered during that period reveals that the main contract for the enterprise was signed already on 30 April. It was made between Guglielmo Embriaco maior on the one side, and the four shipowners mentioned above on the

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143 Guglielmo di Sori, MS 102, p. 192, V2.
144 Guglielmo di Sori, MS 102, p. 193, R4.
other side. This contract contains no sign that they were dealing with a general matter of the commune, especially because Guglielmo was referred to without his consular title. Furthermore, Guglielmo is not said to have acted with the consent or the agreement of the other consuls or the people of Genoa either. Because Guglielmo registered many other commercial contracts concerning private investments it is not clear at first that this contract was different. This contract was, however, the main contract of this expedition. The shipowners promised to pay Guglielmo Embriaco one-sixth of the capital and two-thirds of the profit from the venture: Nos...promittimus et convenimus tibi Wilielmo Embriaco maior...quod aliquo modo lucriferimus vel habuerimus in hoc itur...sumus facturi cum galeis vel aliqua occasione tam mobilis quam immobileis...dabimus tibi Wilielmo predicte Embraco maiori aut cui tibi placuerit sextam partem tracto...capitali cum proficuo de duabus tertia.145 Guglielmo’s share of one-sixth probably hints at the equal investment of the other five consuls of Genoa, as is evident from the contract they made on 09 May 1201.146 This approach suggests that this venture was indeed handled as a private enterprise. In the second part of the contract, the shipowners specified several limitations on their financial commitments to Guglielmo. Importantly, if the seneschal Markward from Sicily pays them for their service, si senescale Marquvaldo nobis dederit aliquod pro servicio quod ei feciens aut faciens non debens tibi dare partem, sed nostrum esse debet. Equally, if they capture a ship they would not have to share the profit. Finally they promised to obey Guglielmo Embriaco maior’s commands, given directly or by letter or through Nicola Doria.147 Interestingly, one of the shipowners, named Heredes de Mari, made separate promises of fidelity to the king of Sicily. As has been seen, he signed a contract with several messengers from Palermo that in exchange for the release of his relative Lanfranco de Mari from prison in Palermo he would ensure that nobody on his ship would hurt the king or his property.148 Nicola Doria who was another consul of the commune that year was to be the de facto commander. In a contract between Gugliemo Embriaco and the four shipowners on one side and Nicola Doria on the other side, Nicola’s command of the fleet was established. It was made clear, however, that Nicola had to follow the instructions of Guglielmo Embriaco.149 To establish his full authority, Guglielmo Embriaco maior required that in addition to Nicola’s own promises, he would also supply a guarantor to ensure that he obeys his commands. Nicola’s guarantor was the wealthy Bonifacio de Volta who thus signed a special security contract with Guglielmo Embriaco maior. In this contract he guaranteed that Nicola

145 Guglielmo di Sori, MS 102, p. 189, R4
146 Guglielmo di Sori, MS 102, p. 192, V2. See above, note 143
147 Guglielmo di Sori, MS 102, p. 189, V2.
148 MS, 102, p. 192, R3-V1.
149 Guglielmo di Sori, MS 102, p. 189, V2.
would sail in custodiam navium and will obey Guglielmo’s instructions. If Nicola, however, fails to do so, Bonifacio will have to pay £500, which is a larger sum than the original investment.\textsuperscript{150}

What was this enterprise all about? The consuls of Genoa were clearly building a fleet for some purpose. What was the objective of the mission to Sicily? The notarial documents do not provide a direct answer to these questions. It is possible to deduce that Nicola Doria was put in charge of the eight-galley fleet, and that it was heading towards Sicily, because the sailors mentioned the option that Markward might pay them for their past services. Why did they wait for the fleet to return from Ultramare and Alexandria? The description in the Genoese annals supplies a surprising answer. In his description Ogerio Pane paid high tribute to Nicola Doria for his command of this venture. The description in the annals dismisses the impression that the contracts in the cartulary of Guglielmo di Sori concern a private commercial enterprise. Nicola Doria and Guglielmo Embriaco\textit{ maior} were acting in the general interest of the commune. Nicola travelled according to the annals with the eight ships, and in Sicily they joined forces with the fleet that was on its way back from the eastern parts (partibus orientis), which is the Latin East and Alexandria that are mentioned in the contracts. The annals then briefly noted that a peace truce was signed in Sicily: ‘ibique cum regno pacem firmavit’, and that the outcome of this venture was very successful. Nicola returned to Genoa carrying thousands of pounds in gold, silver, expensive jewels and money: ‘aurum et argentum et lapides preciosos tantum adduxit, \textit{unde comune Ianue habuit ultra libras 1500}.\textsuperscript{151}

Clearly the consuls who invested the capital earned their money, but the commune of Genoa too benefited from this enterprise. The annals describe Guglielmo Embriaco’s last activity during this year. It was a failed attempt to release the Genoese admiral, pirate and count of Malta, Guglielmo Grasso from his imprisonment by Markward in Sicily.\textsuperscript{152} This remark makes it clear that the Genoese operation in Sicily in the autumn of 1201 was in a way a fulfilment of the promises in the charter of Walter of Palear of December 1200. The fleet must have been equipped to challenge Markward in Sicily and to ensure the agreement with the chancellor. Genoa therefore turned its back on Markward and more than tripled the initial investment of £450. What was the motivation, though, for this expedition? Did Genoa do it for ideological reasons or just for the profit? Jonathan Riley Smith wrote about the crusade against Markward von Anweiler that ‘for nearly a year the pope had been envisaging a crusade against Markward as a last resort, but in fact the plans came to very little. Only a few men, the most important being Count Walter of Brienne, who was more concerned to assess the rights he claimed to the fief of Taranto, were enlisted...
and Markward’s death in 1203 ended the reason for the enterprise.\textsuperscript{153} However, from the
evidence just cited it seems likely that the Genoese enterprise, which was described in only a few
sentences in the annals, may have nonetheless been Genoa’s contribution to the papal minor
crusade against Markward.

Sicily therefore played a central role in Genoese politics between 1199 and 1202, but it
was also an important commercial destination for the Genoese merchants. Sicily provided
exceptional opportunity for merchants to make vast profits, which applied to the commune in
general and to individual merchants. The Embriaci, in particular, are known to have registered a
large number of contracts to Sicily. In March 1200, Guglielmo Embriaco junior, a shipowner,
signed eight contracts with various merchants bound for Sicily.\textsuperscript{154} Many of his activities in the
island involved mobile and immobile properties that belonged to him and to his uncle, Guglielmo
Embriaco \textit{maior}.\textsuperscript{155} Evidence of Genoese private ownership of property in Sicily is not surprising
as it had been common for many decades beforehand. Abulafia wrote about the Genoese
Guglielmo Scarsaria who mentioned in his will of 1162 land and vineyard in Sicily.\textsuperscript{156} The
contracts do not specify what the main destination in Sicily was. One of the contracts suggests
that Guglielmo junior had considered the sell a ship that belonged to both of them in Sicily.\textsuperscript{157}
Guglielmo Embriaco junior sailed to Sicily sometime in the spring of 1201. In July he was not yet
back in Genoa, and his uncle arranged his marriage in his absence to Toscana, the daughter of
Pietro Vento, for £250. This contract was contingent upon the confirmation of Guglielmo junior
within five years.\textsuperscript{158} Did Guglielmo Embriaco junior remain in Sicily throughout this time?
Unfortunately the contemporary sources do not provide an answer to this question.

\textsuperscript{153} Riley Smith, \textit{The Crusades, A Short History}, p. 133.
\textsuperscript{154} These contracts are from the cartulary of Guglielmo di Sori, MS 131, pp. 131V – 133V.
\textsuperscript{155} Guglielmo di Sori, MS 102, p. 131, V4.
\textsuperscript{156} David Abulafia, \textit{The Two Italies}, pp. 230-1.
\textsuperscript{157} Guglielmo di Sori, MS 102, p. 131, V3.
\textsuperscript{158} Guglielmo di Sori, MS 102, p. 197 V1-3; p. 198, R1.
The preparations for the Fourth Crusade

When Ogerio Pane commenced writing his continuation of Genoa’s annals in 1197, Genoa had already been at war with Pisa. In John Pryor’s words: ‘Genoa and Pisa became embroiled in incessant conflict at sea, notably over their rights and possessions in Corsica and Sardinia, as well as in Sicily.’¹⁵⁹ This conflict had continued for many years and was considered a major obstacle in the way of the organisation of both the Fourth and the Fifth Crusades. In 1202, there was an attempt to force a truce on the two communities. Urgent circumstances led to this attempt: the Fourth Crusade was underway and its leaders were seeking support from maritime powers in order to secure enough means of transportation. What was Genoa’s reaction to the call for the Fourth Crusade?

Historians of the Fourth Crusade have traditionally emphasised the viewpoint of the leaders of the crusade. The activities of the leaders of the crusade and their messengers have been examined as they travelled to Venice, Genoa and Pisa in search of a reliable partner for the important task of shipping the crusaders abroad.¹⁶⁰ In particular, there has been a tendency among historians to rely primarily on Villehardouin’s chronicle of the crusade, and accept most of his account of events. It is assumed, for example, that it was the crusade leaders’ preference to embark from Venice and not from Genoa or any other city.¹⁶¹ Donald Queller further argued that ‘Genoa may also have been opposed by the French knights, for there had been numerous complaints concerning Genoese fulfilment of their contract to transport the army of Philip Augustus on the Third Crusade.’¹⁶² Whether there had been a real basis to such accusations or not, it seems clear that Genoa’s point of view has not been taken into account in Queller’s analysis. Indeed, not much has changed since John Fotheringham’s observation in 1910 that ‘while the part taken by Venice in the Fourth Crusade has received its full share of attention from modern writers, very little has as yet been written on... Genoa.’¹⁶³ Unfortunately, the point of

¹⁶⁰ Robert de Clari claimed that the messengers approached Genoa first, which turned them down by saying that it was unable to help: ‘...Il Genevois disent qu’il ne leur en porroient nient aider’. See Robert de Clari, La Conquete de Constantinople, ed. Philippe Lauer (Paris, 1924) ch. 6, p. 7. Quelers and Madden, however, accepted Villehardouin’s argument that the messengers went directly to Venice. According to them ‘the Picard knight (Robert de Clari) is notoriously misinformed about the preliminaries of the crusade...’, Donald E. Queller and Thomas F. Madden, The Fourth Crusade: The Conquest of Constantinople, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia, 1997), p. 7.
¹⁶² Queller, The Fourth Crusade, p. 7. Queller relied in this accusation on an article by H. Vreins, ‘De kwestie van den vierden kruistocht’, Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis, 37 (1922), 50-82. It was impossible, however, to trace the grounds for this claim.
view taken by Fotheringham in his article was primarily from the angle of the consequences in Constantinople and the diplomatic turmoil, violence and the open conflict between Venice and Genoa over the hegemony of the eastern Mediterranean. The commercial aspects were thus ignored; nonetheless, this study is still relevant.

It is interesting to compare the events in Genoa during the preparations for the Third Crusade to the situation on the eve of the Fourth Crusade. There are signs of an unequivocal shift in the city's involvement in the crusading movement. Genoa took a leading role in the Third Crusade already from the preparations stage, when it had to mediate between the kings of England and France. Moreover, Genoa took part in the crusade and it also committed its fleet for the transport of other crusaders. As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, Genoa had eventually paid a high economic price as a consequence of the delay in the embarkation on the crusade. It therefore seems likely that in the light of the effects of the Third Crusade, Genoa was not ready to take the risk of committing its fleet to another crusade.

Presumably, the annals reflected the general attitude of the Genoese public; thus the fact that there were no records of the call for the crusade in 1198 suggests that the issue was not highly important to the Genoese. International affairs closer to home, the conflict with Pisa and the question of Sicily, were more immediate. The first time the annalist Ogerio Pane mentioned events related to the preparations for the crusade was in 1202. Ogerio Pane described the efforts of the Marquis Boniface of Montferrat to bring peace between Pisa and Genoa. However, he did not spell out the urgency of the pact or the grounds for the international interest in ending a local war. Ogerio's focal point throughout this time had been the self-interest of Genoa, particularly with regard to the conflict with Pisa. Furthermore, the lack of diplomatic efforts to maintain the peace after the imposed truce was signed, led almost immediately to renewed conflict. It seems clear that Genoa and Pisa did not make serious efforts to bring the war to a true end or even to suspend the conflict for a certain period for the sake of the crusade. Considering this attitude, it is almost ironic that Villehardouin wrote in his chronicle that the leaders of the crusade preferred to embark from Venice because there were more ships available there. Furhtermore, this statement stands out in contradiction to Robert de Clari’s descriptions of the events, according to which Genoa and Pisa were indeed approached first but declined the crusaders’ offer. Queller wrote about the difference between these two account that Robert de Clari ‘cannot be relied upon for details before his own arrival in Venice’, however, the following analysis will show that

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166 Robert de Clari, ch. 6, p. 8.
perhaps he was more accurate than usually assumed.\textsuperscript{167} Genoa's foreign policy in the period of preparations for the crusade reveals that it was busy handling other matters. It seems that the leadership of the crusade had less choice than Villehardouin wanted his audience to believe they had. Some clues that emerge from other Genoese sources lead to the same conclusion. The notarial cartularies from 1203 do not mention the war or any sort of Genoese involvement in it. This is interesting because evidence from the cartularies from the years 1190 to 1192 and from 1201 contain a large variety of documents relating to the international affairs of Genoa. For example, contracts for the shipping of crusaders or the supply of food and wine for the Third Crusade were discussed in Chapter One. Previously in this chapter, a series of notarial contracts was analysed which uncovered the plans of the Genoese leadership in the conflict in Sicily. However, the records from the time of the Fourth Crusade contain no such information. Two cartularies by the notaries Lanfranco and Giovanni di Guiberto cover most of the year 1203. Together they contain approximately 1,000 documents, yet none mentions the war. This sign of a detached attitude in Genoa towards the Fourth Crusade call for explanation; how should this approach be interpreted? Did the war affect the Genoese at all, or were they capable of completely separating their commercial activities from it?

In December 1202 Villehardouin reported how the troops of the Fourth Crusade assembled at Zara to discuss their options and the best way to pursue the crusade. Alexios IV Angelos, the deposed ruler of Constantinople approached the leaders of the crusade with a new suggestion. He offered the crusaders a contribution of money and troops, 'provisions for every man' and a further 10,000 soldiers who would join the crusade on its way to Egypt. His only condition was that the crusaders would help him to regain his position as emperor in Constantinople. This, according to Villehardouin, was the first time the idea of diverting the crusade to Constantinople was ever spelled out in front of the wide assembly of crusaders. 'There was a great divergence of opinion in the assembly...' Villehardouin recorded, 'there was discord in the army.'\textsuperscript{168} In Queller's words: 'for the vast majority of crusaders...the story of Alexios's sorry plight and his request for assistance came as a complete surprise.'\textsuperscript{169} Nonetheless, seven months later, in the summer of 1203, the crusaders besieged Constantinople.

It is interesting to examine Genoa's commercial activities during this time. The cartulary of Giovanni di Guiberto contains many document from this period. Hundreds of Genoese merchants were sent to the eastern Mediterranean in the September 1203. By this time the

\textsuperscript{167} Queller, p.223 note 1. See also his argument in p. 21.
\textsuperscript{169} Queller, The Fourth Crusade, p. 82.
crusaders had been in and around Constantinople for a couple of months already. How much did the Genoese know about the events in Constantinople? Were they concerned with the progress of the crusade or were they carrying on with their business plans regardless of the crusade’s course of development? Evidence suggests that by September 1203, Genoa had enough information about the movements of the Fourth Crusade and about the plans to head from Constantinople towards Egypt. Villehardouin mentioned several occasions in which crusaders left the crusading army on merchants’ ships and sailed separately to the Latin East. Five hundred crusaders had already left from Zara,170 and another group left the crusading army at Corfu.171 These large groups of crusaders must have met many Genoese in the kingdom of Jerusalem. According to one of the contracts in the cartulary of Giovanni di Guiberto from September 1203, the latest information from the Latin East had come few months earlier, with merchants who departed from Acre at the beginning of April. The document provides this information in an indirect way, as part of the merchants’ agreement on the exchange rate, which they calculated on the basis of the bezant’s value in the kingdom of Jerusalem as it was in April.172 It is therefore safe to conclude from the variety of sources that the merchants of Genoa knew by September 1203 of the diversion of the crusade. This is also clear from the commercial ventures planned in the same autumn. Indeed, the reaction of the Genoese to these developments is interesting. The contracts from that season do not mention Constantinople as a commercial destination. On the contrary, the few contracts in which Byzantium is mentioned, or ‘Romania’ as it was often referred to, appears as a boycotted destination.173 What is the meaning of this boycott?

The restriction has to be examined in the context of the commercial contracts which contain similar prohibitions. What do they have in common and how should they be interpreted? Such formulae or phrases boycotting different destinations can be found in the cartularies from the twelfth century. It was, therefore, not a new phenomenon. On the other hand, such restrictions were quite rare, which implies that they were not written off-hand or mindlessly. However, because there are only few such cases it makes it difficult to draw meaningful conclusions about the motives for their inclusion. Several examples will explain the complexity of the analysis of these cases.

170 Villehardouin, vol. 1, p. 100.
172 GG, no. 574, from 17 September 1203
173 Six merchants who travelled to various destinations were instructed not to travel to Constantinople. Anselmo from Asti went to Sicily first (GG, 779, 788), Bartholomew from Gaeta and Anselmo Calderono travelled to the Latin East (GG, 835, 640) Giovanni Sardo and Vivaldo from Rapallo travelled to Alexandria but were instructed not to continue to Constantinople and several other destinations (GG, 649, 661) . Some of these cases will be further discussed in the following pages.
All the records that contain such restrictions in the instructions to the travelling merchants begin by specifying the first destination of the venture. From the first destination the merchants were given the permission to proceed wherever they think best. Then the restrictions were inserted. For example, a Genoese merchant named Buonovassallo Cabella registered two contracts that had such restrictions in 1203. Interestingly, the two travelling merchants were both instructed to travel to Alexandria first on board the same ship called the Torexana. This in itself is quite a rare condition. Contracts from these years usually specified ship names only in cases that involved pledges, particularly, sea-loans or maritime insurance. One of the travelling partners, Giovanni Sardo, is an extraordinary example of a slave who was sent on a venture. Ansaldo Rapallino, his master, allowed this journey to the east and the commenda contract, therefore, specified that it was signed ‘jussu Ansandi (sic) Rapallini sui domini’ [my emphasis]. In that contract Buonovassallo instructed Giovanni to join Guglielmo Buccucio in Alexandria and travel with him wherever he goes, except for the kingdom of Jerusalem and Byzantium.174

Vivaldo Rapallino Fabiano was the second merchant with whom Buonovassallo signed a contract. He was similarly instructed to sail on the Torexana to Alexandria and then his travel route became complicated because he had to proceed ‘quo sibi Deus aministraverit causa mercandi, excepto Ultramare et in Romania et in Siciliam.”175 These two cases contained detailed instructions, including the name of the ship as well as the lists of prohibited destinations. Because both contracts were signed with the same residing merchant it seems likely that these cases represent personal preferences. They tell more about the personality of Buonovassallo de Cabella, the merchant who dictated the restrictions.

In another case, the detailed instructions seem to be related to the age of travelling merchants or their lack of experience. Guglielmo Batifoglio signed two consecutive contracts in which he promised to travel to the kingdom of Jerusalem with two different residing merchants. In both records Guglielmo declared himself over twenty at the time of the signature. In addition, there are also uncommon details specified, such as the freights taken abroad, their quantities and their values. Guglielmo gained permission to continue from Ultramare to wherever he thought best; however, both contracts then limit his decision making: ‘excepto in Romania et in Siciliam et in stallo de Ultramare.”176 There is no explanation in the text why these destinations were prohibited. There is also no more information provided to what was meant by ‘stallo de Ultramare.”177 The elaborate details and the list of prohibited destinations seem to suggest that it

174 GG, no. 649, from 20 September 1203.
175 GG, no 661, from 20 September 1203.
176 GG, nos. 694 – 695 from 21 September 1203.
177 These two contracts are the only time this term was mentioned in the cartularies examined in this dissertation. David Jacoby suggested that there is a misreading for Satalia, visited by Genoese since 1156 at
was Guglielmo's inexperience that motivated his partners in their instructions. Comparing the above case to other contracts made with merchants in the process of training, it can be inferred that Guglielmo was in fact given here wider responsibilities than was typical of his age. Inexperienced merchants were usually sent along with other merchants, more experienced ones. For example, in 1186 Simon Bonithome was given explicit instructions from Ugo Embriaco. Simon was instructed to travel to Ceuta first and then continue to Alexandria. From Alexandria he had to return to Ceuta, but only if Oglerio Agoxino or Guglielmo Bonithome undertook this voyage. Otherwise, Simon was allowed to travel from Ceuta with one of the above mentioned experienced merchants to a third destination and then return to Genoa. Alternatively, he could return from Alexandria to Genoa, with no further changes of the journey. Another merchant in training was Obertino, nephew of Guglielmo Bonithome. Guglielmo registered a commenda contract with Obertino's mother, in which they agreed that Obertino must travel with his uncle to Ceuta and negotiate with the money his mother had invested. From Ceuta only Guglielmo had the right to decide where to travel next. In 1203 Guglielmo Batifoglio was twenty-years old, however, he was sent on a long distance route to the Latin East with the permission to decide how to proceed thence. Moreover, he was not attached to another merchant or required to sail on a particular ship. The only indication that he was inexperienced was in the restricted destinations in his contract. It is not clear, however, why Guglielmo was not allowed to travel to Sicily. Vivaldo from Rapallo was another merchant who was asked in the same year not to travel to Sicily. Other rare cases of prohibitions are found on travels to Apulia and Malta. The most likely reason for these prohibitions is that the residing merchants wished to direct the travelling merchants to the markets where the merchandise on board could be sold in the most profitable way and other goods purchased with the proceeds of the sales. There might have been political reasons for these prohibitions too, but the small number of cases does not allow one to draw more specific conclusions. The series of cases presented above shows that restrictions could have been a

the latest, although it is in Asia Minor and not exactly in what is generally considered as Ultramare. David Abulafia suggested to read stallum as 'place' or 'harbour' perhaps deriving from 'stabulum'. I would like to thank Professor Jacoby and Professor Abulafia for these comments.  

178 'porto Setam causa mercandi et inde Alexandriam et de Alexandria Setam, si Oglerieus agoxinus vel Gullielmus Bonithome hoc fecerint viagium et si hoc non fecerint, de Seta in unum iter quod ipse fecerit vel alter illorum me reverso de Alexandriam non mutato alio itinere...' OS, 1186, no. 136.

179 OS 1186, no. 190, from 22 October 1186

180 With regard to Apulia see document GG, no. 779; on Malta GG, no. 793 (related to these are GG, nos. 773 and 788). In his article on Henry Count of Malta, David Abulafia suggested a few reasons for the prohibition on Malta: it 'may have implied that Malta was not yet a safe haven, either because of Henry's rapacity...or because control of Malta was still in dispute' alternatively, Abulafia suggested that it was because 'there was no market for cloth in Malta'. David Abulafia, 'Henry, count of Malta and his Mediterranean activities: 1203-1230', in Anthony T. Luttrell, ed., Studies on Malta before the Knights (London, 1975), p. 107.
result of various reasons including the character of the individuals involved, and should therefore not be taken as a sign of a wider pattern or a general policy.

The restrictions are very meaningful, however, in at least two cases: the boycotts on Alexandria in 1191 and on Constantinople in 1203. No contracts were signed to these particular destinations in these respective years. The prohibition on travelling to Alexandria is mentioned in the case of four merchants in 1190-1 and Constantinople is excluded in the records of six merchants. David Jacoby concluded from the lack of contracts to Alexandria that there were no commercial ventures to Egypt between 1187 and September 1192.181 Claude Cahen and David Abulafia argued similarly that Italian commerce with Egypt was significantly reduced and even brought to an end: ‘la troisième Croisade marque un tournant décisif dans l’histoire des marchands italiens au Porche-Orient. En interrompant tout commerce avec l’Egypte, elle a attiré leur attention sur l’utilité d’activités de substitution, et de places de sécurité en Orient latin.’182 Abulafia wrote that ‘the Third Crusade certainly concentrated the attention of the Italians on Acre in several ways. It spelled the end of the ascendancy of Alexandria.’183 These conclusions, however, are problematic for several reasons. They will be further examined and challenged in Chapter Three, however, it should be already asked: if none of the Genoese merchants travelled to Egypt until 1192, why was the restriction mentioned in the contracts? The reality of commerce was more complex than simply avoiding all sort of contact with Egypt. It will be argued that some Genoese trading ships did approach the warring ports.

The reason for the explicit prohibition was the nature of the travel contracts that dictated such cautious statements. Even when contracts were written on the eve of ventures, they were based on dated information. Individual merchants or groups of them sailing on certain ships were therefore given the sort of flexibility witnessed in the contracts, which allowed them to make their own judgment of the situation when they came nearer to the area of conflict. More evidence of a different nature supports this hypothesis. The Genoese chronicle Regni iherosolymitani brevis historia describe the heroism of Conrad of Montferrat upon his arrival at the harbour of Acre in the summer of 1187. Everyone on board was frightened when they realised that the Saracens had taken Acre. Saladin sent a patrol boat to find out ‘what type of people they were.’ Conrad warned the people on the ship that nobody should speak apart from himself, and he replied:

This excuse apparently convinced Saladin, and surely pleased Conrad’s audience who praised his wit. Reading between the lines, however, this story shows that Saladin allegedly agreed to let Genoese merchants carry on trading in the conquered land. Furthermore, it reveals that the people of Genoa found the story plausible. If it made sense to the readers that Genoa’s merchant vessels were able to cross the lines and trade on both sides there is no reason to believe this was not indeed the case. Furthermore, in Chapter Three the issue of Christians in Muslim captivity will be discussed. It will be argued that Italian merchants had played an important role in ransoming those captives as well as paving the ground for diplomatic negotiations between the enemies.

To summarise this issue, it seems that the evidence from 1190, 1191 and 1203 suggests that keeping away from war zones was a general policy of merchants. A combination of a lack of contracts on commonly followed trade routes, with explicit prohibitions, signified a war zone, a danger to merchants and a market to be avoided unless things would have changed by the time of the merchants’ actual arrival in the east. The Genoese trusted their experienced merchants to act in the best possible way for the profit of all sides. They therefore rarely sent a merchant directly to such destination were the commodities would be at risk.

In the light of this conclusion, it is striking to find that Alexandria maintained its popularity as a commercial destination as late as the autumn of 1203. In his descriptions of the events of that summer, Villehardouin claimed time and again that the crusaders were assured of embarking to Egypt at the latest at Michaelmas of that year. But in the cartularies, Genoa’s merchants showed no signs of concern about the war approaching Alexandria. Therefore, we must assume that the Genoese either did not know or did not believe that the troops of the Fourth Crusade intended to reach Egypt in 1203. It is highly unlikely that Genoa did not know in September 1203 what the crusaders’ plans were. Alexios IV, according to Villehardouin, promised publicly as early as January 1203 to join the crusade on its way to Egypt (Babilloine) with 10,000 men. On the eve of Alexios’ coronation in Constantinople these terms were

184 Regni Iherosolymitani brevis historia, in Ann. Ian., vol. 1, p. 145. ‘We are Christians, and particularly Genoese merchants, who as soon as we have heard of the victory Saladin accomplished, we came to his land safely with trust (securiter cum fidutia); we pray and ask to have from himself (Saladin) an arrow, as a token of trust (causa fidutiae)’
185 Only one such case can be found in the years of the Third Crusade, when a merchant was sent to ransom a Genoese captive at the beginning of 1192. This case will be discussed in the following chapter.
186 Villehardouin, vol. 1, p. 92, sec. 93.
reconfirmed.  

The plan was therefore well known around Constantinople by September 1203, to both crusaders and Byzantines. By then it must have reached Genoa as well. It may have been the case that some crusaders, and perhaps Villehardouin amongst them, believed that they were to set out to Alexandria in the same autumn of the year 1203. Indeed, Villehardouin reported, that the crusaders were still seriously considering re-embarking on a crusade to Alexandria at Michaelmas. 

In Genoa, however, diplomatic sobriety did not let anyone believe this would be the case. Merchants’ vessels were thus sent to Alexandria. Some ships sailed there directly while other merchants and ships planned to reach Alexandria as their second or third destination. A large number of 25 merchants registered 63 contracts in September 1203 that included Alexandria as a destination port at some point in their venture. This figure is somewhat misleading, because many other contracts included instructions for a first destination only, which implies that potentially many other merchants could have planned to trade in Alexandria.

The road to Aleppo

The travel routes followed by Genoese merchants in the year 1203 are interesting to analyse. Most of the known Genoese ships sailed in the autumn of that year to the kingdom of Jerusalem. Genoese merchants travelled on board of at least three different ships: the Donna, the Dedonna, and the Navara headed east together, in one large fleet. This fleet probably included also the Torexana that sailed to Alexandria, as well as three ships that headed to Sicily, namely the Luna, the San Giovanni and the Sposara. All contracts to the east had to be registered before the joint embarkation date, which was probably 24 September 1203 because the last contracts of that season were registered before that day, including a large number of nearly 150 contracts dated 23 September 1203 (though the date could have been inserted at a later date when the contracts were put together). It is hard to estimate how many merchants went to each destination, because most of them were only directed to their first destination and then given the choice of their subsequent destinations. This was the case of dozens of travellers to Sicily. It is known that the Donna planned to stop in Sicily on its way to the Latin East. It is safe to assume that the Dedonna and the Navara did the same because Sicily was on the way and in order to maintain the safety of the fleet. Some of the travellers of the Luna and the San Giovanni planned to stay in Messina for at least fifteen days or in other cases at least a month; however, it is clear that they planned to proceed with their ventures to further destinations before returning to Genoa. Some of the 42

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187 Villehardouin, vol. 1, p. 190, sec. 188.
188 Villehardouin, vol. 1, pp. 198-202, sections 195-199; See however Alfred Andrea’s essay, which shows how ‘the leaders, including Villehardouin, deliberately misled the army’ at several different occasions ‘probably out of a sense that certain information was dangerous in the wrong hands’, Alfred j. Andrea, ‘Essay on Primary Sources’, in Queller, The Fourth Crusade, 2nd ed., p. 303.
merchants who sailed to Sicily must have joined the large number of over 50 merchants who travelled to the kingdom of Jerusalem and registered nearly 90 commercial contracts in the autumn of 1203.

After a stop in Messina, part of the fleet headed to the kingdom of Jerusalem. Many merchants followed traditional trade routes. One example can be seen in a detailed sea-loan which was signed between Enrico di Soziglia and Diotisalvi di Piazzalunga. This insured loan was contingent upon the safe arrival of the Donna in Ultramare. Enrico pledged to Diotisalvi 6½ places (loci) on this ship in security.\(^{189}\) The money borrowed consisted of a large sum of £180 that was to be paid in local money at a rate of ‘bis 3 saraccenales de Solia (Syria)’ per Genoese libra. The transfer of the money was to take place one and a half months ‘postquam navis que dicitur Donna fecerit portum ad Acri... vel alio loco quo fecisset portum dicta navis.’\(^{190}\) It is possible to discern more about the merchants’ travel plans from two other contracts, which Enrico and his travelling partner Villano de Castelleto signed with Lamberto Fornario. The three merchants sailed together on the Donna to the Latin East where they planned to stay for at least two months before re-boarding the Donna and sailing to either Genoa or to Ceuta. They all signed a contract in which each promised his commitment to their plan: ‘ita promitto vobis attendere et complere et contra non venturum.’\(^{191}\) The impression is that this particular ship followed the traditional route, to the kingdom of Jerusalem and then to the western Mediterranean, probably calling at Alexandria on its way to Ceuta. The case of Amor Tagliatore is another example of a merchant who indeed planned in 1203 to follow the same route. Amor travelled to the Latin East ‘...et inde Alexandriam vel Septam ...et inde videlicet ad Alexandria vel Septa.’\(^{192}\) Contracts from 1186 show that this was indeed a common travel route before 1187. In 1186, for example, one merchant detailed his plan to travel from Genoa to the Latin East then to Alexandria and finish his venture in either Bougie or Ceuta before he returned to Genoa.\(^{193}\) Other travellers of 1203 started their venture in Ceuta and then sailed on to Alexandria, a route commonly followed by many Genoese merchants before the fall of the first kingdom of Jerusalem and again from 1198 onwards.\(^{194}\) Commercial evidence suggests that already from 1192 Alexandria had regain its position at the core of Genoa’s commerce in the Mediterranean.\(^{195}\)

\(^{189}\) On this sort of *cambium nauticum* and the evolvement of marine insurance, see: Florence Edler de Roover, ‘Early Examples of Marine Insurance’, *Journal of Economic History*, vol. 5:2 (November, 1945), pp. 175-178.

\(^{190}\) *GG*, 574.

\(^{191}\) *GG*, 612. Enrico di Soziglia and Villano de Castello promised the same. See *GG*, 613.

\(^{192}\) *GG*, 768.

\(^{193}\) *OS*, 1186, no. 32, from 24 September 1186

\(^{194}\) See, for example, *OS*, 1186, nos. 136, 171, 172, 196; Bonvilanno (1198), nos. 135-6; see several examples in *OS*, 1200, cart. 4, p. 247

\(^{195}\) *OS*, 1200, cart. 4, p. 258, R2 and V6.
Not all merchants detailed their plans in their contracts. This is a major problem in the analysis of trade routes, as was already demonstrated previously in this chapter. Sometimes one finds hints of merchants' plans in other documents. For example, two members of the Bulgarian originated Genoese family, de Bulgaro, made a series of contracts concerning the family's commercial ventures in 1203.\textsuperscript{196} Marino de Bulgaro registered eight contracts in which he stated only his first destination, namely Sicily.\textsuperscript{197} However, from other contracts it is possible to discern that he actually planned to travel to the Latin East because he arranged to meet his brother Simon de Bulgaro. From the ports of the Latin East he planned to travel along the coast to Alexandria.\textsuperscript{198}

Apart from the traditional trade routes, however, the contracts from 1203 indicate several alterations and novelties. The Third and Fourth Crusades led to a change in some of the trade routes and affected the relations between Genoa and various eastern Mediterranean markets. The case of a banker named Giovanni is an example of some new opportunities that became available to Genoese merchants. Giovanni went first to the Latin East whence he planned to travel along the coast, either to the north, towards Aleppo, or to the south to Alexandria. He was not the only merchant to pursue this route in the direction of Aleppo. There is a series of cases in which the notary Giovanni di Guiiberto mentioned a special licence given to some merchants to travel along the Syrian shore and proceed towards Aleppo: \textit{et dat ei licentiam mittendi et portandi per riveiram Solie usqua ad Halep cum testibus.} Two versions of this type of licence exist. A general one stated that the merchant is allowed to travel along the Syrian shore with no further details. This permission was included in 29 contracts in the year 1203 and the licence applied to eighteen merchants. Seven of these merchants, however, were explicitly directed, like the banker Giovanni, towards Aleppo.

The emergence of Aleppo in the commercial contracts is an additional proof of the important link connecting trade and diplomacy. Aleppo was mentioned as a destination market but it also defined a territory, because it was located at the north-east edge of the crusader states and it represented an entire travel zone for the merchants who were travelling from Acre or Tyre. The emergence of Aleppo in the notarial documents also demonstrates the potential contribution of the notarial cartularies as historical sources for the history of the Latin East. A licence to travel to Aleppo signified the opening of a 'new' trade route for the Latin merchants, which in fact hints at a major change in the commercial approach of Genoa and other key trading players in the Latin East. This licence also reveals that Genoese merchants were not necessarily restricted to trade

\textsuperscript{196} See Sandra Origone, 'La famiglia “de Bulgaro” a Genova (secc. XII-XV)' in Genova e la Bulgaria nel medioevo (Genoa, 1984), pp. 125-147. On the family's records of 1203 see p. 132.
\textsuperscript{197} See \textit{GG}, 726, 727, 736, 784, 787, 814, 815 and 849. However, from \textit{GG}, 874, it is clear that he planned to get to Messina.
\textsuperscript{198} \textit{GG}, 636 from 20 September 1203 and \textit{GG}, 874 from 24 September 1203.
within cities along the shoreline. This evidence thus calls us to re-examine Jonathan Riley Smith’s hypothesis that the number of Europeans who were ‘engaged in the traffic of merchandise… and organising caravans from Damascus and other Muslim centres to the Levantine sea-board must have been negligible.’\textsuperscript{199} The merchants who headed north in 1203 faced some complicated challenges. \textit{The Continuation of William of Tyre} described how a small group of crusaders left Acre in the same year and travelled towards Antioch. On their way they passed by enemy territory, not far from Jabala, which was in the hands of the ruler of Aleppo. They were attacked by the Muslims and were eventually defeated near Latakia.\textsuperscript{200} According to Heyd, the hostile atmosphere between the Christians and Muslims in the northern regions of the crusader states remained so until 1207. Heyd believed that 1207 marked a turning point in the relations between Christians and Muslims in the north, when a commercial pact was signed between Venice and al-Malik az-Zahir, son of Saladin.\textsuperscript{201} Evidence from the notarial contracts provides a different impression of the relationship between Christian travellers and the Ayyubids at the beginning of the thirteenth century, especially with regard to commercial relations. How should the evidence from the Genoese sources be interpreted? The contracts were the fruits of a political change that must have taken place before 1203. When did the relations with Aleppo change, and what motivated such a change?

The importance of Aleppo had already been recognised at the time of the First Crusade. Aleppo was considered a strategic key place in the eyes of the Muslims in Syria as well as the crusades and the Latin inhabitants of the northern states. Aleppo was considered an important agricultural centre especially for the production of cotton and it was famous for its glass industry.\textsuperscript{202} More importantly, however, was the location of Aleppo because it stands in a junction of one of the leading trade and \textit{hajj} routes between the Mediterranean and the east (Figure 4). Evidence from the beginning of the twentieth century reveals that Aleppo maintained its centrality as late as the First World War (see Figure 5).

\textsuperscript{200} \textit{La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr}, in RHC. Oc., vol. 2, pp. 247-249; Wilhelm von Heyd, \textit{Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen-Âge} (Amsterdam, 1959), vol. 1, p. 373.
What motivated Genoa to search for new markets? One reason concerns local developments in the Latin East. Genoa’s position in the kingdom of Jerusalem had been through major changes as a consequence of the Third Crusade and the establishment of the Second Kingdom. Genoa lost all of its possessions in the crusader states in 1187. However, the Genoese received their first concessions and legal privileges in Tyre already in 1187 because of their assistance to Conrad of Montferrat and the survivors of the first kingdom of Jerusalem. This was a beginning of a fast recovery of the commune which will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five. During the years 1190-1, Tyre became the main harbour for the European merchants. In April 1190 Conrad gave the Genoese further concessions and expanded their neighbourhood, which

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203 Carole Hillenbrand, *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives* (Edinburgh, 1999) figure 6.64, entitled ‘The Islamic heartlands showing the main trade and hajj routes’, p. 400
went through further developments in the following years. In the eyes of the Genoese, the opportunity to trade with Aleppo must have been better appreciated in the light of Genoa’s establishment in Tyre and the attempts to strengthen the city’s ties with the lords in the northern crusader states. It is interesting how much the focus of attention of the Italian communes had turned towards the north during this period. Riley Smith listed the towns in which western merchants gained commercial rights at the beginning of the thirteenth century. Interestingly, this list included many northern port towns, including Botron, Tripoli, Beirut, Jubail and Antioch.

Figure 5: Map of Aleppo 1:500,000, c. 1910, indicating the first ‘metalled roads’ in the region, between Aleppo and Antioch.

Marie-Luise Favreau-Lilie followed Erik Bach by arguing that Genoa showed interest in the northern parts of the crusader states already before the fall of the first kingdom of Jerusalem. In 1186, Genoa asked the pope to intervene and help the commune regain its possessions and rights in Gibelet, Tripoli and Antioch as well as the kingdom of Jerusalem itself. This argument

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204 In 1195 Henry of Champagne gave his permission to complete the building of the Church of San Lorenzo in Tyre. Sec I Libri iurium no. 336, p. 151.
206 Extract from a map entitled – Ottoman Empire, 1:500,000, G.S.G.S 4011 (Aleppo), published by the survey of Egypt under the authority of the war office. Compiled from GSGS 2321; IDWO 1522; Richard Kiepert, Karthen von Kleinasien
is correct and the significance of the 1186 correspondence will be discussed in length in Chapter Four. However, the developments at the beginning of the thirteenth century have very little to do with the pre-war demands of the Genoese. In 1186, Pope Urban III instructed the bishop of Tripoli to encourage the count of Tripoli to give the Genoese one-third of the city of Tripoli as had been promised to them at the beginning of that century: ‘...eundem comitem diligenter moneas et inducas ut vel eisdem civilibus terciam illum partem absque difficultate restituas.’ The bishop was also instructed to use the ecclesiastical stick if necessary: ‘si facere forte noluerit, tu eum ad hoc ecclesiastica districione appellatione cessante compellas.’ The letter which the pope wrote to the count himself was along the same lines, only more polite. These demands were never realised, of course, because the conflict became irrelevant when Saladin conquered the territory. Interestingly, when the crusader states were re-established these Genoese demands in Tripoli and Gibelet were not simply reduced but never mentioned again. Genoa did not bring up its old claims even when it later negotiated with Bohemond IV in 1203 and in 1205.

Local developments in Tripoli and Antioch urged these political changes too. Bohemond IV was the person behind many of the changes that happened in the northern states in this period. In 1201, Bohemond made his first military collaboration with the Ayyubid ruler of Aleppo al-Malik az-Zähir. Peter Edbury suggested that the motivation for this Ayyubid support was that al-Malik ‘preferred a comparatively weak Latin prince in Antioch to the king of a much enlarged Armenian kingdom.’ This comment puts the political and economic developments in the region in the context of the conflict between King Leon of Armenia and Prince Bohemond III over Antioch, a conflict which began shortly after the end of the Third Crusade. However, when Bohemond IV became the Prince of Antioch in 1201 he made a strategic decision and came to terms with al-Malik az-Zähir.

This political step had opened up many new commercial opportunities which spelled economic prosperity for all sides involved. The Genoese hastened to seize this opportunity. At the beginning of the thirteenth century the relationship between Bohemond IV and the de Biblio was strong. One of Bohemond’s closest companions at the time was Guy de Biblio, the lord of Gibelet. Guy descended from the Genoese family Embriaco but, as will be discussed in Chapter Four, he did not refer to himself as an Embriaco or as Genoese. Bohemond IV married Placentia de Biblio, Guy’s sister and he gave his own sister’s hand to Guy. The important role that the members of the de Biblio family played in Bohemond’s court may be seen in the fact that they

208 I Libri lurium, vol. I/2, number 323, p. 128.
appeared at the top of the witness lists in the charters that Bohemond granted to Genoa in 1203 and in 1205. Presumably, Guy de Biblio also helped to make the arrangements that allowed the consuls of Genoa access to Tripoli and thus opened the diplomatic channel and the commercial route to Aleppo.

Bohemond obviously followed his own agenda when he granted commercial privileges or encouraged political marriage. His concerns did not escape the attention of historians of the crusader states, especially Claude Cahen and Jean Richard. They clearly described the political complexity that Bohemond had faced between 1204 and 1208 and how he benefited from his close relations to the Genoese during these years. Bohemond must have been concerned also with the fact that King Leon of Armenia already granted the Genoese privileges throughout his kingdom in a charter dated March 1201. Thomas Boase described the tension between Leon and Bohemond in the following words: ‘Anti-Armenian feeling was easily roused and intermittent warfare went on with varying balance of success for some twenty years. Both side appealed to the papacy and this obscure struggle, in which neither side hesitated to call in Muslim allies, was to be the main preoccupation of the overburdened Innocent III. Furthermore, Cahen showed how these events were related to each other. King Leon faced military resistance from the local population, the Knight Templars and the army of Az-Zähir, ‘ce n’est sans doute pas par hasard que... Bohémond accorda d’Antioche aux Génois une extension de leurs privilèges à Tripoli.’ Because of this military pressure, in Bohemond’s first charter to the Genoese of December 1203, the Genoese were granted privileges but were also obliged to provide military support to protect Tripoli. Bohemond bluntly demanded that every Genoese who entered his county should promise to defend Tripoli. Whoever refused to make such a vow would be given three days to leave the county.

Hec dona suprascripta dono et concedo tali convencione, quod quociescunque Januenses vel Januensium filii venerint in terram meam, cum requisiti fuerint a me vel ab aliquo homine nomine meo, jurabunt mihi tactis sacrosanctis evangeliis, quod me juvabunt et quod contra omnem hominem juvabunt servari et defendi Tripolim ad opus meum...et eodem modo jurabunt heredibus meis post decessum meum. Si quis vero Januensibus suprascriptum juramentum requisitus facere noluerit, infra diem tercium exibit de terra mea...

213 I Libri Iurium, vol. I/2, no. 344, pp. 164-166.
216 This charter was published by Reinhold Röhricht at the appendix to his article: ‘Amalrich I., König von Jerusalem (1162-1174)’, Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung (Innsbruck, 1891), p. 489.
This paragraph is a conspicuous presentation of the Genoese commitment to the count in exchange for the privileges that he granted them. This charter was handed to the Genoese consuls Lamberto Fornario and Belmusto Lercario, who were the appointed Genoese consuls in the Latin East for a period of one year, from the autumn of 1203. As will be demonstrated in Chapter Five, the mission of these Genoese consuls represented the highest diplomatic level sent from Genoa to the Latin East since the time of the Third Crusade. Lamberto Fornario was a very experienced merchant, whose career can be traced as early as 1191, when he was still very young and was required to make his contracts with the permission of his father. In 1203, however, Lamberto sailed on the Donna to Ultramare. In Lamberto’s contract with the shipowner from 18 September 1203 he secured ten places on the Donna. It was further agreed that when the ship returned to Genoa it would be loaded with 100 canterata (contaria / cantaria) of goods sent by him from the Latin East. Interestingly, half of the freight was to be cotton and the other half contained various other merchandise (allis mercibus). Is this an indication of the Lamberto’s plan to purchase cotton in Aleppo? It is hard to answer this question because notarial evidence reveals that cotton had been imported from the ports of the kingdom of Jerusalem long before 1203. Many Genoese contracts contain evidence of trade in cotton. In 1186 and 1190, there is a clear reference to cotton of Ultramare and Sicily being purchased in Genoa. David Abulafia argued that ‘in the twelfth century, the Genoese were still able to export very significant amounts of cotton from Sicily, and it is possible that at this stage it was cotton rather than grain that drew them so enthusiastically into treaty relations with the Norman kings of Sicily from 1156 onwards, though it is generally agreed that the quality of Sicilian cotton remained relatively low.’ However, according to Abulafia there was ‘serious contraction of cotton production in Sicily after about 1200.’ This shortage of cotton supply might explain some of the urgency in the agreement with Bohemond and ultimately with Aleppo. As David Abulafia demonstrated ‘it was Egypt, Syria and ultimately India that became the major sources for raw cotton.’ Significantly, Genoa was operating under another economic pressure which was the loss of access to Constantinople in 1203, a destination which previously served as one of Genoa’s central economic destinations. Maureen Mazzaoui examined the Italian cotton industry in this period. Mazzaoui wrote that

217 GC, nos. 117, 118, 119, from 23 January 1191
218 GG, no. 612, from 18 September 1203. See Nilo Calvini, Nuovo glossario medievale Ligure (Genoa, 1984), “cantarius” and “contarium”, pp. 94, 130.
219 Documents from 1182 and 1184 do not mention the origin of the cotton which could have been imported from Sicily too. See, for example, OS, 1182, cart. 2, p. 8V, 12R, 20V, or OS, 1184, cart. 2 p. 137R.
220 OS, 1186, no. 326; OS, 1190, no. 248
222 Ibid, p. 338.
various types of cottons from Syria 'were grouped under the generic name of 'cotone soriano' exited through the ports of Beirut and Tripoli. The inland emporia of Aleppo and Damascus and the way stations of Sayhun, Hama and Homs were heavily frequented by Christian merchants who exchanged western products for caravan articles and Syrian manufactured goods as well as the natural products of the area, including cotton.'

Mazzaoui, however, traced the opening of the trade route to Aleppo to the Venetians in 1207-8 when the emir of Aleppo approved the founding in the city of a Venetian colony with warehouses and separate quarters for merchants. The Genoese contribution to the opening of this trade route and their correlation to the Fourth Crusade and the cotton problems in Sicily are thus missing in Mazzaoui analysis.

The numerous Genoese travelling merchants, who sought permission in 1203 to travel to the Latin East and then continue along the shore of the Mediterranean and inland towards Aleppo, could also benefit from the new rights of commerce in Tripoli, 'sine omni consuetudine.' The 1203 charter also states that the Genoese were allowed to 'buy certain houses in Tripoli and possess them freely': 'item dono potestatem Januensibus emendi quasdam domos in Tripoli et eas libere possidendi ad opus communis.' Those merchants who travelled to the Latin East and required longer than two months to manage their business could have used the various Genoese settlements in the crusader states, which were conveniently located between Alexandria and the newly opened market in Aleppo. In conclusion of this discussion it may be suggested that the 1203 charter reveals that Genoa preceded Venice and paved the way to Aleppo for other Italian merchants. Obviously the agreement with Aleppo was reached before 1203 because the notarial records show the result of an earlier change. The point of change itself may be dated 1201 when Bohemond concluded his military arrangement with al-Malik az-Zahir.

The case of the banker Giovanni is a good example of the use of the Muslim markets and the advantages offered by the crusader states in 1203. Giovanni made his first contract in the autumn of 1203 with Anna, the wife of Simon de Bulgaro, already mentioned above. Simon de Bulgaro had already been in Ultramare when Anna made the contract, and Anna gave the banker Giovanni £183½ worth of tellis de lecis (lace) as well as some Genoese pounds to carry over to her husband. Anna was careful, however, to give the banker explicit instructions in case he failed to meet up with Simon. Giovanni was asked to deliver the money and merchandise in that event to Marino de Bulgaro, Simon's brother and her brother in law. Marino himself travelled to the

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225 Ibid, p. 35.
east at the same time as Giovanni the banker, and in an agreement with the banker Giovanni was granted permission to travel or to send the merchandise to Alexandria. Did Giovanni plan to go to Alexandria? The same Giovanni registered another contract on the same day, with Marchesio draperius de Castello. Marchesio gave Giovanni cloths that cost nearly £100 (£93 s19 d5 implicatas in drapes) and instructed him to travel *Ultramare*. He then gave him his permission to send the merchandise *per riveiram Solie usque ad Alep cum testibus*. Presumably, these contradictory permissions imply that Giovanni did not plan to travel himself to Alexandria or to Aleppo. It is possible that he planned to stay in one of the Genoese quarters in the crusader states and conduct the business from there.

The consul Lamberto Fornario agreed in the contract with the shipowners that the merchandise would be loaded up on the ship within two months of the ship's arrival in the kingdom. In a second contract between Lamberto and the shipowners he promises to travel on the Donna to *Ultramare* and return with them, presumably in the following year, to Genoa, either directly or via Ceuta or wherever else the ship would sail. From the descriptions of the annals from 1204 it seems that the plans for the journey back had been slightly modified. Lamberto Fornario and Belmusto Lercario returned from the Latin East via Crete where they joined with other ships from Alexandria, as well as the Carrocia, a ship that belonged to the pirate Alamanno de Costa. The extended fleet sailed to Sicily where Alamanno de Costa then led a war against the Pisans over Syracuse. David Abulafia mentioned that these consuls who returned from the Latin East and other consuls coming from Alexandria ‘hastened to appoint him [Alamanno de Costa] Count of Syracuse.

**Piracy in the Mediterranean**

The unexpected way the Fourth Crusade ended had left a great mark on the region of the eastern Mediterranean. From 1202 Venice had been utilising the crusading contingents to expand its territory and authority in the Mediterranean. By 1205, the geopolitical map of the eastern Mediterranean had significantly changed. The reaction in Genoa to these developments was on

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227 *GG*, 636, 637 from 20 September 1203. Guglielmo di Sori, MS 102, p. 162, R5, from 23 September 1200. It is interesting to note that this family had managed their commercial activities together throughout this period. Guglielma, wife of Martino de Bulgaro, made a contract with Simon de Bulgaro to *Ultramare* and another contract with both of them OS, 1200, cart 4, 132, V1 from 22 April 1200. The de Bulgaro brothers also lived in the same house in Genoa. See Guglielmo di Sori, MS 102, p. 135, V3

228 *GG*, 662. Although *Iohannes bancherius* sounds like a common name, it seems that the contracts refer to the same traveller. This impression is a result of the fact that bankers hardly ever appear as travellers in the notarial cartularies. Bankers obviously had a very dominant role in Genoa's commercial life. But in over hundreds of contracts registered by such bankers, they usually invested money or gave loans. Only very few took part as travellers in the commercial ventures.

229 *GG*, no. 612.

230 *GG*, no. 613.

two levels. On the one hand, merchants and politicians sought new markets for Genoese commerce. On the other hand, individual Genoese led private enterprises to conquer lands and inevitably engage in battle with Venice and Pisa. In the light of this new era, the activities of some of the famous pirates should be studied.

The final years of the twelfth century and the beginning of the thirteenth century were years in which powerful individuals operated in Genoa. Many of them played a crucial role during this period. The activities of Guglielmo Embriaco maior as consul of Genoa who imposed his authority in Genoa during his consulate in 1201 may be seen as part of the same pattern. Much has been written about famous and infamous pirates such as Guglielmo Grasso and his relative Count Henry of Malta and Count Alamanno de Costa of Syracuse. The commune’s territorial expansion and private enterprise were linked to their activities too. Steven Epstein noted about the role of individual Genoese and the expansion of Genoa during this period that ‘enterprising Genoese had been acquiring possessions in the Mediterranean since the time of the First Crusade, and by now the pattern was well established that the commune would not directly rule in these places.’ Charles Dalli argued in his thesis about Malta and the Regno that ‘in the Sicilian case strategic considerations were paramount for Genoese commerce in Syria, as was the Pisan base at Syracuse. Similarly, Genoese feudal control over Malta through Genoese Counts who were Sicilian vassals formed part of that commune’s wider strategy of protecting Genoese shipping from corsairs who built their nests at various points on the Mediterranean coast, including Malta itself, to operate along the Levantine trade routes.’

Syracuse in Sicily and the island of Malta were only first destinations for the count of Malta ‘et amicissimi sui comitis Alamanni [de Costa].’ Their ambitions were almost unrestrained and their presence was soon felt throughout the central and eastern Mediterranean. Shortly after the conquest of Constantinople, they engaged in war with the Venetians. The confrontation was handled mainly though acts of piracy, but within a short span it was also transformed into an open conflict. One of the leading issues in this conflict was the island of Crete. It was another consequence of the Fourth Crusade because in 1204 the island was awarded to Boniface of Montferrat. He sold the island to the Venetians for 1000 silver marks. David

234 Charles Dalli, Malta in the Regno, p. 30.
Abulafia wrote about Crete that ‘strategically and politically Crete was a promising prize.’

David Jacoby examined Crete in the context of maritime navigation and trade routes. Jacoby argued that ‘only gradually was Crete integrated in that period within the shipping and commercial networks of Venice and Genoa, the two western maritime powers displaying interest in the island.’ This probably explains why before 1204 the island attracted mainly pirates.

David Abulafia mentioned that before the conquest of the island by Henry of Malta, the corsair Alamanno da Costa ‘had already been in Cretan waters, and in 1199 Genoese pirates may have been using Fraskia as a base.’

Piracy in the Mediterranean was not a new phenomenon at the beginning of the thirteenth century. According to Fotheringham, piracy was ‘practised by Genoa since the catastrophe of 1182.’ Guglielmo Grasso was a famous pirate already in 1187, when he and his Pisan colleague were described in the Genoese annals as pirates: ambo essent pyrate. The Genoese Regni Iherosolymitani Brevis Historia related how the two pirates managed to lay hands on the remains of the True Cross (crux vera), a gift that Saladin had sent to the Byzantine Emperor Isaac Angelos after the fall of the first kingdom of Jerusalem. Piracy went alongside diplomacy in the city state’s international affairs. Thomas van Cleve showed that Markward von Anweiler and Guglielmo Grasso had been on good terms for a very long time before 1201. In 1199 Grasso commanded the Genoese vessels that shipped Markward to Sicily. David Abulafia further mentioned how ‘Henry VI appointed to both offices the first Genoese Count [of Malta] and Admiral, Guglielmo Grasso.’ The reasons for Grasso’s eventual imprisonment by Markward are not known, but as was argued above and as David Abulafia summarised, ‘the quarrel was as much between Genoa and the Germans in Sicily as between Grasso and Anweiler.’ The role of these pirates – admirals in the German-Sicilian politics and the early counts of Malta were studied by Léon-Robert Ménager who also wrote about Grasso that in making this shift from piracy to acting as count and admiral of the empire Grasso was the successor of Margarit of Brindisi who

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236 David Abulafia, ‘Henry Count of Malta’, p. 114
239 Fotheringham, ‘Genoa and the Fourth Crusade’, p. 27.
was the admiral of the Sicilian fleet sent to the Latin East after Hattin: "comme lui, c'était un ancien pirate, qui opérait dès 1187 dans les eaux grecques."243

In 1205, the tension between the Italian powers reached the Latin East too. It was rather an inevitable result of the conquest of Constantinople and the dangerous position in which it left the Genoese web of commerce in the Middle East. Genoa was looking for new markets, and its pirates sought revenge and quick gains. The annals treat Henry as member of Genoese society and as its hero. According to Ogerio Pane, Henry of Malta instructed his admirals to send several galleys to attack 'our enemies' (inimicos nostros) the Venetians, off the shores of Greece. They managed to capture a loaded merchants' ship on its way from Alexandria to Constantinople. While escaping the revenge of the Venetians, the galleys sought refuge in the ports of the kingdom of Jerusalem.244

Upon their arrival at the ports of Tyre and Acre, they learnt that disembarking was impossible – 'pre multitudine Venetorum in ipsis terris existentium minime potuerunt."245 The ships thus sailed north, to Tripoli. The annals further describe how in Tripoli the ships faced a similar problem and were not admitted easily. This attitude made some 'young Maltese' (iuuenes Maltenses) who were on the galleys and ships to act in 'ira valde' according to Ogerio Pane. The identity of these Maltese is not clear; were they native Maltese or Genoese living in Malta? They besieged Tripoli until Bohemond IV agreed to let them to disembark and signed a pact with them.

Charles Dalli wrote about the incident in Tripoli. 'A striking example of how this weapon could be turned in Genoa's favour was the career of Henry, Count of Malta, who used Malta as a base for an attempted Genoese conquest of Crete, as well as the expedition against Tripoli in Syria.'246 This view, however, might be a little distorted, a result of the fact that the main account of events is derived from the Genoese annals, which sided with Henry and often presented him as a hero.

David Abulafia wrote that 'this was the year of Henry's greatest successes.' Abulafia further showed how Henry was praised by the troubadour Peire Vidal.247

But the story of Henry of Malta in the Latin East may be read differently. It is rather odd that a Genoese vessel was refused entry to the harbours of the kingdom of Jerusalem or that Genoese merchants should have felt insecure harbouring there! Furthermore, in the light of the contract between Bohemond and the Genoese consuls in 1203, what was the reason not to let

246 Charles Dalli, Malta in the Regno, p. 31.
247 David Abulafia, 'Henry Count of Malta', p. 113; Vincenzo de Bartholomaeis (ed.), Poesie provenzali storiche relative all'Italia, (Rome, 1931), vol. 1, p. 118.
Henry's fleet harbour in Tripoli? Instead of enjoying commercial privileges, Henry of Malta eventually had to pay Bohemond. Moreover, Bohemond demanded that they supply him military aid. In exchange for their help Bohemond promised privileges. It is interesting that in the charter's description Henry of Malta was fully allied with Genoa. The privileges were granted to Henry, 'per manus Alberti Galline et Armanni vicecomitis sui' and to the city of Genoa.248

The privileges granted in Bohemond's charter are significant for several reasons. In the context of Genoa's reaction to the Fourth Crusade, this charter should be considered as part of a series of letters of concessions and further privileges that the Genoese requested and received in the northern parts of the crusader states. The first charter in Tripoli was granted in 1203, followed by another one in Tripoli and Antioch in 1205.249 A third charter regarding Antioch and St Simeon was granted in 1216.250 Finally, in 1221 and 1223 the Genoese were granted rights and possessions also in Beirut.251

The 1205 charter was based on Bohemond's previous charter, from 1203. The two charters share many points, including occasional repetition of phrases. For example, both charters specify exactly who is entitled to them. The applied to omnibus Iamunienses et Iamunium filios. The expansion of the receiving body to include Genoese descendants is an interesting mirror to the changes that occurred in Genoese society and what it had been through in that age of expansion. The definition was clearly made to include the Genoese outside Genoa, or Genoese descendants who were no longer inhabitants of the home-town. However, the documents explicitly excluded those Genoese who were inhabitants of the crusader states: '...exceptis burgensibus Iamuniensibus regni Jerusalem vel comitatus Tripoli sive Cypri vel principatus Antiochiae.'252 These Genoese, now citizens of the various crusader states, did not enjoy the right to use the new Genoese court in Tripoli or the commercial privileges Genoa was granted in Tripoli and Antioch.

Several differences between the charters of Bohemond IV from December 1203 and July 1205 reveal further how important the northern states were for the merchants of Genoa. The commercial privilege from 1203 included: 'libertatem in Tripoli de omni peccunia sua vendendi emendi mittendi et traendi sine omni consuetudine et iure peccunie sue....'253 The Genoese merchants faced two problems with this privilege. The most important problem was that it was confined to Tripoli. The Genoese merchants, however, wanted to get to Aleppo. The extension of

250 I Libri Iurium, vol. I/2, number 347.
253 Röhricht 'Amalrich I., König von Jerusalem (1162-1174)', p. 489.
the free trade zone to include the territory of Antioch was of great importance: ‘Item dono et condeo eis in Antiochia tam in mari quam in terra liberaliter et integre omnes rationes et iura in introitu et exitu quas melius Ianuenses possederunt pro nullo tempore in tota vita patris mei.’

Secondly, the permission included in the contracts between the Genoese merchants suggests that the travelling partners were not always intended to carry out the inland expedition themselves. The typical contract specifies that the residing merchant ‘...dat ei [to the travelling merchant] licentiam mittendi et portandi per riveiram Solie usqua ad Halep cum testibus’ [my emphasis]. However, did the privilege apply to non Genoese carrying Genoese goods? The charter from 1205 solved this problem and clearly states: ‘Item dono eis et concedo ut ipsi salvi et secure in omni terra mea et in omni posse meo tam in personis quam in rebus et per terram et mare existere valeant et exire’ [my emphasis].

The expansion of the 1205 charter to include commercial privileges in Antioch was significant. The privileges are not clearly specified, as the document only states that they include: ‘omnes rationes et iura in introitu et exitu quas melius Ianuenses possederunt pro nullo tempore in tota vita patris mei.’ This vague sentence probably refers to the privilege that Bohemond III granted the Genoese in 1190. The important meaning of this addition is that it reveals again the growing interest of Genoa in the northern parts of the crusader states. This series of differences between the charters of 1203 and 1205 suggests that when Bohemond granted the latter he not ‘merely confirmed an earlier privilege’ as some scholars have suggested. Indeed, it was not simply an attempt to satisfy a raging gang of Genoese and Maltese pirates by the grant of old privileges. The new charter was very carefully written and corresponded to specific problems that the previous charter had left unsolved. Albertus Gallina, one of the officers who received the charter in Henry of Malta’s name, had an established career as a travelling merchant before he pursued his commanding career under Henry. For example, the unpublished part of Oberto Scriba’s cartulary from 1200 contains a contract by Alberto Gallina. He carried fabrics to Ceuta followed by a venture to Alexandria or the Latin East. It is safe to assume therefore that he was familiar with merchants’ interests and needs in the region.

No less important for the current analysis are those privileges not granted in the two charters. The Genoese annals relate the story about the expedition of the admirals of Henry of

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254 Libri lurium, vol. 1/2, no. 345.
255 Röhricht, ibid, p. 489.
256 Libri lurium, vol. 1/2, no. 345.
257 ibid, vol. 1/2, no. 343.
258 David Abulafia, ‘Henry of Malta’, p. 113, n. 41. Abulafia followed Heyd who commented about this privilege that ‘Bohémond donna... un diplôme analogue à celui qu’ils avaient obtenu deux ans auparavant’, see Heyd, Histoire du commerce du Levant, vol. 1, p. 323.
259 OS, 1200, cart 4, p. 125, V3.
Malta in Tripoli in great detail with a clear note of pride. However, in the description of the privileges obtained in Tripoli the annals’ version is somewhat different to reality: ‘et insuper iura omnia et rationes omnes que et quas lamuensis ciuitas in Tripolitana ciuitate et in Antiochia habere et tenere solita erat, et rugam et balneum et ecclesiam et cetera omnia lamuensi ciuitati concessit.’ A street, a bath-house and a church were not mentioned in any of the charters. Interestingly, this mistake attracted the attention of contemporary reader or someone who carefully read the annals in a later period. The editors of Ogerio Pane’s book have noted that in the margins of that page in the manuscript someone had commented: Non consit (concessit) balneum nec rugam nec ecclesiam. These are of course very important differences, and they indeed highlight the fact that despite its achievements, Genoa had never secured the privileges it aspired for and it had originally been granted in Tripoli. In 1186, Urban III wrote two letters about Genoese rights in Tripoli. These letters, like the letters concerning Byblos, had accomplished nothing, as a result of the fall of the entire region into the hands of Saladin’s troops in the following year. However, these letters stand out and reveal the extent to which Genoa had reduced its demands in the northern states over the years.

Was the Genoese-Maltese expedition successful? It is plausible that they could have demanded more than they received, if not one-third of Tripoli as had been originally promised in the over one hundred year old charter, then at least a ruga, a fundaco and a church, or even a small neighbourhood as Genoa had in so many markets around the Mediterranean. However, it seems that the achievement of Henry of Malta should be mainly appreciated in the light of the growing strength of the Venetians after the Fourth Crusade. The fact that Henry was unable to enter the kingdom of Jerusalem is a clear indication of how powerful and influential Venice became and how much Genoa could have lost otherwise.

**Genoa and the Fourth Crusade**

Genoa did not take direct part in the Fourth Crusade. However, this chapter revealed that it was highly affected by it. Ayyubid Aleppo became a central destination for the commercial activities of many merchants, not only Genoese. David Abulafia examined a series of medieval transcripts compiled by notaries from San Gimignano as part of court cases. He found evidence of Tuscan trade with Aleppo, which began in the middle of the 1220s. ‘Aleppo appears no less often than Tripoli in the San Gimignano law-suits.’ In particular, Abulafia argued that ‘quantities of... best saffron, were being shipped from San Gimignano via Pisa and Acre to Aleppo.’ The interests

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of the Tuscan merchants in the kingdom of Jerusalem and the northern states should be seen in the context of the transitions that the Latin East had been through during the formative years of the second kingdom.

Commerce in the region of the Middle East was particularly affected. The political and economic turbulence of 1187-92 and 1201-05 started to show their long-term effects. Acre lost its monopolistic position as the only international harbour visited by Genoese merchants in the kingdom of Jerusalem. Tyre became a convenient alternative for the merchants who were interested in travels to the northern parts of the crusader states. Moreover, with the opening of the route to Aleppo, Alexandria no longer functioned as the only Ayyubid port for Genoese ships. The Genoese, like other European merchants, discovered northern Syria. Heyd described this change with fine sarcasm, saying it seemed that 'long time had passed before the European merchants gained enough courage to risk themselves in these regions.'\footnote{Heyd, \textit{Histoire du commerce du Levant}, vol. 1, p. 373.}

Why did Genoa not join the Fourth Crusade? This question was given several answers, some of which are perhaps unexpected. Taking the impact of the Third Crusade into account, it was suggested that Genoa was economically not interested in the shipping contract for the Fourth Crusade. The geopolitics of the region, the war with Pisa and the especially the conflict in Sicily were pressing problems. It is suggested that Genoa was taking part in the war against Markward and that it managed in this way to gain great economic benefits.
3 An unprovoked crusade?

This chapter deals with several aspects of the Fifth Crusade. It aims to examine the ways in which the preparations for the Fifth Crusade affected Genoa and its activities in the Middle East. Although no cartularies remain in Genoa from 1218 until 1221, the years of the crusade itself, there is ample material remaining from the years prior to the crusade (from 1213-14, and from 1216 until January 1217). These sources thus allow an examination of several issues such as crusade and commerce, the ban on the supply of war materials to the Muslim enemy and finally, the commercial implications of Innocent III’s attitude towards the maritime cities.

Scholarship on the Fifth Crusade tended to put Pope Innocent III at the centre of research and use the papal archives as the main source for the analysis. This is because Innocent was the driving force and the leading organiser of the crusade and left much written material on the matter. It is not uncommon to find statements such as Thomas van Cleve’s that ‘the Fifth Crusade was to be above all else a papal crusade.’\(^{263}\) Innocent’s writings from the 1210s are indeed very important to the understanding of the motivations for the crusade, its organisation and the execution of the plans. In this chapter, however, documents on commercial activities at the time will be added to the traditional body of works. The objective is to change the point of view and to include the activities and interests of the common people such as merchants and shipowners. This should make an interesting supplement of economic and social material to the traditional scholarship on the Fifth Crusade.

This chapter begins by questioning the reasons for the Fifth Crusade. Innocent III had presented his plans for the crusade on several occasions, starting from his correspondence with Patriarchs Albert of Jerusalem and Patriarch Nicholas of Alexandria in 1212 through to Vineam domini and Quia maior, the famous invitation letters for the participants of the ecclesiastical council at the Lateran and the crusading encyclical, written in April 1213.\(^{264}\) The resolutions of Lateran IV were announced in 1215, which included the appendix to the decrees on the crusade, known as Ad liberandam.\(^{265}\) These papal correspondence and ecclesiastical resolutions open a window into the ways the Church and leaders of the crusade had contemplated the crusade and justified it. Apart from the liberation of the Holy Land, Innocent had introduced on these occasions a new theme – the liberation of those Christians who were held in Muslim captivity. This chapter will examine how serious was the problem of the captives on the eve of the crusade.

Did it really justify a crusade? In dealing with this issue there will be reference to theoretical scholarship on the historical notion of captivity as well as studies of the economic relationship between Christians and Muslims at the time of the crusades.

The second issue is the disposition of the maritime powers in the mind of Innocent III, his expectations of them and the actual role that they played in the crusade. A close analysis of the relationship between the Italian cities and Egypt will follow. It will be argued that the years before the Fifth Crusade were times of prosperous commercial relations between Egypt and the west in general, and between Egypt and the Italian cities in particular. There is much evidence to support this argument. This chapter will include a review of the ways in which commercial relationship had developed from the conclusion of the first peace truce between Saladin and King Richard I of England in 1192 until the idea to embark on the Fifth Crusade was formed early in the 1210s. The Italian cities had established independent diplomatic channels with Egypt over the years. It will be argued that in the two decades before the Fifth Crusade and especially as a consequence of the Fourth Crusade, the Italian powers headed by the Genoese had aspired to and sought means to expand their privileged position in Alexandria. Ambassadors were frequently sent to negotiate commercial rights; communities were established containing fondachi and churches, bath-houses and ovens.

The diplomatic and commercial relationship between the Italian cities and Egypt, which involved major economic benefits, formed a threat to Innocent’s plans. From the commercial point of view, it may be argued that the long period of peace and prosperity had potentially contradicted the interests of the crusade. Consequently, Innocent exercised a rather harsh attitude towards the maritime powers: he threatened them with severe punishments of excommunication and ordered additional preaching in their churches. Based on this analysis, it will be suggested that Innocent’s rather aggressive attitude towards the maritime powers was a result of the Italians’ close relations with Alexandria.

In 1215, Lateran IV transformed the crusade from an idea into a collective goal. But what was the impact of the threats of excommunication and the special sermons in the churches of Genoa? Based on an analysis of the cartularies from 1216, it will be argued that these efforts were not in vain. The direct and vast commerce with Egypt was withheld and many Genoese took the cross as a result of the preaching. James of Vitry was a conspicuous preacher who visited Genoa in 1216. According to his own descriptions he successfully preached to the people of Genoa when he stopped there on his way to the Holy Land. Furthermore, in his letters he took pride in his

success, especially with the women of Genoa. Interestingly, there is evidence also in the wills of several women from that year and the clear testimony of one of them to have planned to go on the *passagio de Ultramare* herself.\textsuperscript{267} This evidence, coupled with data from the other travelling acts from 1216, enables one to determine that the Genoese had cooperated with the crusading plans and suspended their commerce with Egypt.

**Christian captives and the reasons for the crusade**

Innocent’s bull from 1213 begins with the famous sentence: ‘*Quia maior nunc instat necessitas quam unquam institerit, ut terrae sanctae necessitatibus succurratur*...’ Two years later, in 1215, the letter was followed by the ecclesiastical decree, which started with an enthusiastic war cry: *Ad liberandam Terram sanctam*

The liberation of the Holy Land and especially of Jerusalem were the obvious goals of many crusades after 1187. James Powell observed that Innocent did not mention the liberation of Jerusalem in his letter. Powell argued that the Fifth Crusade was for Innocent not just about the liberation of Jerusalem, but ‘an operation to save the Latin Kingdom from total extinction.’\textsuperscript{268} The second and supposedly central reason in Innocent’s view was the need to liberate the thousands of captives who were languishing in Muslim prisons.

\begin{quote}
*sicut se ipsum, qui scit fratres suos, fide ac nomine christianos apud perfidos Sarracenos ergastulo diri carceris detineri ac iugo deprimi gravissime servitutis, et ad liberationem eorum efficacem operam non impendet, transgrediendo illius naturalis legis mandatum.*
\end{quote}

Later in the text Innocent asks: ‘*An forte nescitis, quod apud illos multa milia Christianorum in servitute ac carcere detinentur, qui tormentis innumeris cruciantur?’* [my emphasis]\textsuperscript{269}

Were there really thousands of Christians in Muslim captivity in 1213? When were they taken captive? Were there prisoners from the time of Hattin and the Third Crusade still kept in Muslim captivity? Moreover, assuming there were many Christian captives and prisoners in Alexandria, was that an adequate reason in contemporary eyes to engage in war and to embark on a crusade?

A recent study by Yvonne Friedman on captivity and ransoming in the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem suggested that liberating captive crusaders or their ransoming had not always been a priority in western Europe or in the crusading states. ‘Captives were not a main consideration in

\textsuperscript{267} Lanfranco 1216, no. 1319, from 21 December 1216. Montanaria, the wife of Martino de Mari, specified in her bequest: *s 100 lego in servitio passagio ultramarini si non iero, si autem iero illos mecum portabo.* See more about it in the following pages.


\textsuperscript{269} ‘*Quia maior*’, p. 90.

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crusader politics before 1187,' is one of Friedman's main arguments. At the beginning of the thirteenth century a change had occurred in Europe's attitude towards captives. Friedman argued that this change was primarily a consequence of the battle of Hattin, 'when many if not most of the nobles of the Latin Kingdom became captives, the public image of the captives changed.' The change was to affect many features of everyday life in Europe, from political thought to patterns of charity and other forms of religious life. One of the most significant changes Friedman indicated is the change in liturgy. This was also a result of the fall of Jerusalem, 'the Jerusalem liturgy containing prayers for peace, for the liberation of Jerusalem, and for the Christian captives detained in Saracen fetters were recited by order of the pope and the cardinals and reflect universal, not local liturgy.' Friedman demonstrated how important the role of Pope Innocent III in leading the change of attitude towards the captives was. In her words, Innocent 'opened a campaign for a new crusade, and at the same time made strenuous efforts to redeem captives... Innocent not only encouraged ransom; he transformed the image of the captive... Innocent III described the captive as weak and suffering both physical and mental humiliation, but did not depict him as a failure or as connected with shame.' The captivity of King Richard I and his ransoming did not affect his image: 'in the eyes of [his] contemporaries, Richard remained a lion-heart...'. The case of King Richard must have contributed to the changing image of captivity and captives. Friedman seems to ignore the fact that Richard's fortunate image was not shared by all of his contemporaries. For example, Guy of Lusignan, the king of Jerusalem, himself left a rather different image to posterity. In a book on captivity in the Christian and Muslim worlds at the time of Innocent III, Giulio Cipollone showed in detail how acute was the issue of captivity to the pope: 'Un profondo sentimento teologico della cattività cristiana e della necessità di redenzione e di liberazione illumina tutto il pontificato di Innocenzo III.' Cipollone argued that Innocent was not concerned only with Christian captives in Muslim hands but also with those kept in Christian regimes such as Germany. Two years before his letter to the captives in Alexandria Innocent wrote to console some captives in Morocco.

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271 Ibid, p. 236.
272 Ibid, p. 87.
274 In fact, Friedman vividly described King Guy's fear and humiliation when he was taken captive: 'the helplessness of the vanquished king was even more humiliating than the other captives' fright'. Ibid, p. 124.

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Although Friedman did not explicitly say so, she seemed to have concentrated in her book on the period of the first kingdom of Jerusalem. This is perhaps why she did not pay more attention to Innocent’s most important action with regard to captives, in the form of a crusade. Indeed, it can be argued that Innocent’s ideas about captivity and ransom had more important and direct consequences than portrayed by Friedman. It was not merely an attempt to spread a new notion or to change the image of captivity. It was not even just an effort to encourage the ransom of captives as an act of charity; Innocent III sent the people of Europe on a crusade because of that issue. The captivity and servitude of Christians were a central reason behind the embarkation of the Fifth Crusade.

The evidence of Innocent’s approach is found in numerous documents. As early as the beginning of 1212 there is evidence of communication between Innocent and the Melkite patriarch of Alexandria, through whom Innocent also managed to establish direct correspondence with the captives in Alexandria. On 19 January 1212 Innocent wrote a letter which he addressed to ‘universis captivis in Alexandria et Babyloniam.’ The letter begins with an acknowledgment of the reception of letters from the patriarch and the captives about their ‘doloribus plenas et miseriis cumulatas.’ Innocent’s letter is the first sign of direct communication between the papacy and the captives. From the pope’s reply, it was made clear that the captives’ only hope at the beginning of 1212 was to gain their freedom through exchange with Muslim captives. The pope assured the captives that he instructed the Christian leaders in the east, including the Templars and the Hospitallers, to work for the goal of their liberation and not to hesitate to utilise for that purpose the Muslims they held in captivity. 277

On 26 April 1213, Innocent wrote to the Sultan al-’Adil Sayf ad-Dīn Abū Bakr. He presented his demands in a forthright manner:

...ne propter violentam detentionem praesatae terrae plus adhuc effundatur humani sanguinis quam hactenus est effusum, saniori usus consilio restituas earn nobis, de cujus detentione, praeter inanem gloriam, forte plus tibi difficultatis quam utilitatis accrescit; ipsaque reddita, et dimissis utrinque captivis, quiescamus a mutuis impugnationum offensis; ita quod apud te non sit deterior conditio gentis nostrae quam apud nos est conditio gentis tuae (my emphasis). 278

The letter makes it clear that the liberation of the Holy Land and the Christian captives were for Innocent a casus belli. He preached this idea in western Europe and threatened the enemy in the east. Two issues spring to mind when reading these letters. The first issue concerns the captives themselves: How serious was the problem: how many Christians were in the Egyptian prisons? In other words, did this problem justify a call for a crusade? The other issue that requires some clarification is the relationship between east and west. Indeed such

278 PL, 216, no. 37, p. 832A
relationships were long established: they involved direct communication and more importantly, after many decades of peace, the commercial ties had involved also the foundation of Italian communities in Egypt. In Chapter Two it was argued that from the beginning of the thirteenth century and especially as a result of the Fourth Crusade Genoa began to invest in its commercial relations with Aleppo and Alexandria. Runciman estimated that 'in 1215 there were no fewer than 3000 European merchants in Egypt.' Are there signs of acknowledgment of the captives’ situation in the merchants’ activities? Did it affect the relationship between Christians and Muslims in Arab territories and, in particular, how did the crusade leaders deal with the well established commercial ties between the Italians and the Muslims?

There is only one case in the notarial cartularies in which ransom was discussed directly. This is a record from 1192, in which Leona, the wife of Rubaldo de Bontommaso, gave 200 Saracen bezants to Ansaldo, the son of the late Ogerio de Castello. She instructed him to use this money to ransom her husband Rubaldo. All the information she supplied about her husband was that he was 'in carcere in partibus Alexandrie.' Unfortunately, she provided no explanations of the circumstances under which Rubaldo fell into this situation in the first place: was he a crusader or an unfortunate merchant who was caught in a cross-fire? In the next sentence of the contract, Leona approved an additional payment, if necessary, which was contingent upon the consent of her husband: 'et plus si sibi videbitur et eidem Rubaldo.' Finally, Leona promised to pay the extra payment including his travel expenses when Ansaldo returns, 'Et tosum quod expenderit ultra bis 200 et bis 200 et omnes expenses.' This contract was signed on 22 January, eight months before the conclusion of the truce between the Christian and the sultan, while the war was still going on! Ansaldo, however, did not plan to go to Alexandria straight away. This is made clear in another contract that he registered on the same winter day of January with his brother Ingo de Castello. Ansaldo was sent on a commercial venture, first to Marseilles, followed by whatever destination he thought best. Maybe he planned to continue to the western parts of North Africa before pursuing his trip to Alexandria or perhaps, because it was too early to travel eastwards in January, he planned to travel to Marseilles, then return to Genoa and eventually join the spring sailing to the east.

This single document is not a true reflection of the magnitude of the problem of the Christian captives after Hattin. However, it does contain some interesting clues for the current analysis. Firstly, it gives an idea about the speed in which the news of one’s capture travelled from the enemy’s prisons to the captives’ home town. It also gives an idea of how lucrative the

279 Steven Runciman, A History of the Crusades, vol. 3, (Cambridge, 1966), p. 151, but it is not clear on what sources is this estimation based.
280 GC, vol. 2, 1504, an act from 22 January 1192.
war business could have been for the winner who managed to get hold of reasonably wealthy merchants. Leona Bontommaso may have received the news in a letter from her husband with explicit instructions, but her business approach to the problem was not untypical of the time. As Yvonne Friedman phrased it, ‘in a society where slavery was accepted, setting a price for a human being was a question of market value, not a moral quandary.’ The estimation of the ransom fee for the release of Rubaldo de Bontommaso is conspicuous in comparison to the cases that Friedman discussed in her book. The prices requested for princes, lords, and other nobles were much higher, certainly beyond the capabilities of simple merchants. Indeed, Rubaldo’s ransom was luckily not as expensive as the one demanded for Richard the Lion Heart a few years later. In fact, the price for Rubaldo’s liberty was approximately 3300 times lower. In the rough scale of ransom drawn by Yvonne Friedman the price of the Genoese merchant was approximately five times less than that of a nobleman in 1100, and 100 times less than the ransom required for the Lord of Beirut in 1260. These figures make sense considering that Leona had to raise this sum on her own, and to add a separate payment for Ansaldo de Castello, the family friend and merchant who travelled to release her husband. The 200 bezants demanded were certainly a substantial sum, even for a wealthy merchant, but not an impossible sum for Leona to raise; her own granddaughter’s dowry was larger than that.

Unfortunately, there is no sign that Rubaldo de Bontommaso ever returned from Alexandria. In the cartularies from the following decades, the activities of his brothers and son are well documented, but there are no signs of his own commercial activities. For example, at the beginning of the thirteenth century there is evidence that Rubaldo’s son Oberto had his own daughter married to the nobleman Filippo Spezzapietra (or SpezaPetra), who must have been related to the Genoese consul Spezzapietra (Spezapreda). The annals mention that Spezzapietra took the cross in 1190 with other consuls from previous years, as well as other Genoese nobles (which implies that they could have gone on the crusade together). Three years after his daughter’s marriage, by October 1203, Oberto was also dead. His wife Anna carried on with the business. Anna made contracts for the export of cotton and saffron to Ceuta with her own brother and with Ingo de Castello, the brother of the same Ansaldo de Castello who tried to liberate

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281 Friedman, p. 148.
282 In this rough calculation it is assumed that one marc equals 46s Genoese or £2.3 (see appendix 1) and £1 Genoese equals 3 bezants, which seems to be the case over the period covered in this research (the average exchange rate over 37 cases is 2.939; however, in eighteen of the 37 cases the rate was exactly 3 bezant to the pound). The ransom for Richard was 100,000 silver marks.
283 See Friedman, table 2, pp. 158-161.
284 See note 285 below.
285 Guglielmo di Sori, MS 102, p. 158, R1. Mabilia’s dowry of £100 was invested in this contract in a venture to Ultramare. Spezzapietra appears in the list of nobles from 1190. See Ann. Ian, vol. 2, p. 33.
Rubaldo in Alexandria.\textsuperscript{286} This suggests that in spite of the failure to redeem Rubaldo de Bontommaso, the families maintained their commercial and possibly also their social relationships.

With the lack of other evidence of this nature, this document is rather important. It is not just that the ransom money was calculated realistically, it was also sent through a proxy who was an experienced merchant. Above all, this case is an important supplement to Friedman's study on captivity in the Latin East. This important evidence suggests that Genoese and undoubtedly other merchants too played important role as mediators, which also enabled private negotiations to ransom captives. It is unfortunate that no other cartularies remain from the year 1192. More evidence from January until April 1192 reveals the renewal of direct sailing from Genoa to Alexandria when contracts were made for the first time since the fall of the first kingdom of Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{287} After a long period in which Alexandria appeared in the text only as a boycotted destination for the travelling merchants, it became an official, registered, destination again. It is safe to assume that the few contracts from the beginning of the winter of 1192 were the first of many. The rest were probably written at the usual time towards the spring and the autumn seasons when the merchants sailed to the Latin East.

Rubaldo of Bontommaso was not alone in prison in Alexandria as a result of the war in the Latin East. According to the Continuation of William of Tyre in 1187, captives from Gaza, Ascalon and Jerusalem were sent to Alexandria. Many of those who surrendered were granted special protection from Saladin. They were taken to Alexandria to be sent overseas. In March 1188 the chronicler claimed that the governor of Alexandria got into conflict with the Italian merchants who were in the port of Alexandria at the time with 38 ships. The governor demanded that the Italian shipowners take the poor refugees on board their ships. He refused to give them permission to leave, which meant that he held them hostage and would not hand over the ships' oars until the shipowners finally gave in to his demand.

Two major conclusions may be drawn from this story. First, it is clear that commerce continued during the war. Although the stated number of 38 ships might be exaggerated, there is no doubt that many merchants made their way to Egypt despite the war. Second, the story shows what a burden it was to take care of such great number of captives. They had to be fed, guarded and protected. This burden fell on the local Muslims:

\textsuperscript{286} \textit{GG}, 959 and 960, both from 26 October 1203.  
\textsuperscript{287} \textit{GC}, 1192, nos. 1504, 1505, and 1581 from January and February 1192. These documents concern with merchants who were instructed to travel to Alexandria. Contract no. 1563, however, boycotted Alexandria like many other contracts from the years 1190-1191.
The Egyptians had no interest in keeping captives for a long time in their prisons, especially not the poor people for whom they could not expect high ransoms. The chronicler tells how the governor addressed the merchants: `Et comment? dist le bailli, movres vos? Volés les vos donc laissier arieres perdre et estre esclas des Sarazins, et brisier la fiance que Salahadin lor a donee? ' The message was clear, the Christians who did not gain Saladin’s special protection were doomed to perish or be sold into slavery. The Egyptians would have liked to see these people ransomed quickly and for as much money as possible, or else to sell them in the slave markets.

The discussions of the fate of the captives from the kingdom of Jerusalem took place in 1188, long before the war entered its next stage which was marked with the arrival in the region of the contingents of the Third Crusade. An exchange of captives was discussed again after the conquest of Acre. These discussions are mentioned by the Continuation of William of Tyre mainly because of the atrocious way in which they ended, when King Richard massacred 16,000 of the Muslim inhabitants of Acre. The important fact is that the issue of the captives was brought up once again even if an actual exchange of captives did not occur on that occasion. It is reasonable to assume that when a truce was finally concluded between Richard and Saladin on 02 September 1192, the question of the captives was discussed again, even if the contemporary sources do not mention it explicitly.

Furthermore, a long time passed from the signature of the peace truce in the autumn of 1192 until the Lateran resolution to embark on the Fifth Crusade in 1215. During this period, peace truces for limited number of years were signed between the Muslims and the Franks at four occasions: 1192-7; 1198-1204; 1204-10 and 1211-17. Cipollone described this relatively peaceful periods in the following words: ‘il tempo di tregua è anche il tempo adatto per contare i captivi, quelli che non sono tornati a casa, e per piangere i morti che non potranno più tornare...,’ however, these were not just peaceful times, ‘...altre occasioni per fare captivi, per saccheggiare e

288 Now I shall tell you what the Saracens of Alexandria did each day. The leading men of the city came out and gave great gifts of bread, wine and money to the Christians.
289 ‘And how,’ asked the governor, ‘will you steer? Do you want them to remain behind to perish or become slaves of the Saracens, and break the safe-conduct that Saladin has given them? Morgan, La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr, p. 75; Edbury, The Conquest of Jerusalem and the Third Crusade, p. 66.
290 La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr, ch. 126, and in Edbury, The Conquest of Jerusalem, p. 108
291 The Continuation of William of Tyre, ch. 143; Edbury, The Conquest of Jerusalem, p. 121, n. 207.
Cipollone demonstrated that such hostile activities were documented in the chronicle of Abū Šāma. Indeed, in 1198 Abū Šāma mentioned an attack of an Egyptian fleet in Cilicia in which the Egyptians captured 550 people. Later, in 1203, there was a Frankish attack along the Nile in which the Franks seized much booty. More encounters occurred in Hims in 1206 and in the territory of Acre in 1210. The Ayyubid chronicle mentioned many Latin prisoners taken by al-Malik in 1207 in the region of Tripoli, as well as the plunder and the considerable booty obtained.

These incidental figures of captives taken during the years of peace truces, however, do not add up to thousands of captives or anything similar to the grave results of the war experience in 1187. According to the Muslim chronicler 'Imād ad-Dīn in Hattin and Jerusalem alone Saladin’s troops captured tens of thousands of Christians. Some captives were exchanged, according to 'Imād ad-Dīn, already in 1187: ‘in that year more than twenty thousand captives were released, whereas one hundred thousand non-believers fell into our hands.’ How many people were still in captivity in 1213 and 1215? There is no clear answer to this question. In a recent study on Innocent III and the attitude to captives, Brenda Bolton argued that Christian captives were held in Egypt for decades. Bolton reached this conclusion on the basis of Innocent III’s correspondence from 1212. In his letter to Albert the patriarch of Jerusalem Innocent expressed his concern about the spiritual state of the captives on account of the length of time they spent in prison: ‘ne propter acerbitatem poenarum quas longo tempore sunt perpessi apostatam cogantur,’ Consequently, Bolton suggested that ‘some had been held for at least twenty years.’

According to the evidence provided, Bolton’s argument does not seem plausible. All that is known for sure is that twenty thousands Christians were already exchanged in 1187; those who made special arrangement with Saladin left Alexandria in March 1188. But there is no way to determine how many more captives were released when the first peace truce was signed in 1192. It is not impossible that in the negotiations in the following years, presumably before the signing of each of the three truces, many other captives regained their freedom.

Cipollone, Cristianità – Islam cattività e liberazione in nome di Dio, p. 326.
‘Cette année là, il délivra plus de vingt mille captifs, tandis que cent mille mécréants tombèrent entre nos mains’; ‘Imād ad-Dīn al-İsfahānī, Al-Fath al-qāṣī fi l-fathal-quds i, trans. H. Massé, in Documents relatifs à l’histoire des Croisades, vol. 10, p. 38. See also Friedman, p. 86; Cipollone, pp. 327.
PL 216, no. 147, pp. 508A
Pope Innocent III and the maritime communities:

Innocent III was concerned with the possibility that the trading communities might not fully cooperate with the crusade's leaders. As late as the autumn of 1216 the Genoese had not yet taken the cross. James Powell explains this in the light of the war between Genoa and Pisa: 'despite the success of this preaching [of James of Vitry]... the Genoese were not yet ready to commit a formal contingent to the crusade....'

Powell, however, looked more into the high diplomacy of the maritime powers and general European affairs rather than the commercial considerations of the Italian cities. The pope's concern is evident already in the letter *Quia maior* from 1213. It seems that Innocent's attitude was ambiguous. On the one hand, he was dependent on the Italians for the transportation of the crusade's armies; nonetheless, he was clearly concerned with their contradictory commercial interests. The section directed to the maritime cities in *Quia maior* begins with a request for help: 'A civitatibus vero maritimis navale subsidium postulamus.'

This is followed by permission to the clerics to offer indulgences. However, the second time the maritime cities are mentioned is in a section that forbids piracy under the threat of excommunication. Finally, there is a warning not to sell arms to the Saracens, in which Innocent details exactly what he means by war materials:

*Innovamus preterea excommunicationis sententiam in Lateranensi concilio promulgatam adversus eos, qui Sarracenis arma, ferrum et lignamina deferunt galearum, quique in piraticis Sarracenorum navibus curam gubernationis exercent, eosque rerum suarum privatione multari et capientium servos, si capti fuerint, fore censemus.*

Exactly how worried Innocent was about the cooperation of the maritime cities can be seen in the following instruction, which applied especially to them, in which he ordered additional preaching in the maritime cities: 'precipientes, ut per omnes urbes maritimis diebus Dominicis et festivis hujusmodi sententia publice innovetur.' Many details were still missing in this letter. When were the merchants expected to stop their commerce with Egypt? In May 1213 the letters were sent around Europe. The preachers presumably followed their orders and read the instructions every Sunday and during the holidays. The regular preaching was probably supposed to encourage crusading enthusiasm, but also to scare the Italians from the consequences of disobedience. However, the pope said that the excommunication would be announced in the Lateran Council, which meant that the merchants had at least two more years before they had to worry about withholding their trade. Even more important was the fact the king of Jerusalem John of Brienne followed the pope's behest in 1212 and signed a four-year truce with Egypt to last

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300 'Quia maior', p. 93.
301 'Quia maior', p. 95.
302 'Quia maior', p. 95.
until the end of June 1217. This official peace truce meant that there was no reason not to allow commerce to continue as usual for a period of another four years.

The reflection of these debates in *Ad liberandam* shows that this is not just an academic exercise or a speculation in hindsight. There were indeed some real problems involved in the preparation for the crusade in that sense. The first and perhaps crucial point was the timetable of the crusade, including the official beginning of the crusade and its length. In James Powell words, ‘Innocent had a fairly definite idea about the timetable to be followed.’ This was true when *Quia maior* was composed and is certainly the first impression from *Ad liberandam*. In the opening paragraph of *Ad liberandam*, 01 June 1217 was declared as the embarkation date for which the ‘crucesignati se praeparent.’ This timetable corresponded to the expiration date of the pact with Egypt.

According to the pope’s plan, the crusade was to last three years. This can be inferred from *Quia maior*, where Innocent demanded that the wealthy personnel of Europe and its cities should sponsor knights for this length of time, ‘competentem conferant numerum bellatorum cum expensis ad triennium necessariis secundum propias facultates’ [my emphasis]. The distribution of indulgences was also limited to three years period. An exception to this time plan was a prohibition on commerce with the enemy, which was scheduled for four years and presumably started one year before embarkation on the crusade:

*Prohibemus insuper omnibus christianis, et sub anathemate interdicimus, ne in terras Saracenorum, qui partes orientales inhabitant, usque ad quadriennium transmittant, aut transvehant naves suas* [my emphasis].

An announcement of *pax generaliter* that applied to all *populi Christiani* was also fixed for four years. These resolutions had affected two of Genoa’s main engagements in the sphere of its international affairs on the eve of the Fifth Crusade. First, Genoa’s relationship with its Italian rivals and especially with Pisa after decades of continuing war, and second, Genoese trade with Egypt which was flourishing until then.

From the Genoese perspective the factor of international relations and especially the question of hegemony over trading centres were of particular importance in this period. From the beginning of the century Genoa’s international relations had been through very rapid changes, the war with Pisa had been going on for nearly two decades, and the conquest of Constantinople affected Genoese trade throughout *Romania* and consequently contributed to the growing tension.

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304Alberigo et al. (eds.), *Conciliorum oecumenicorum decreta*, p. 243.
305*Quia maior*, p. 93 and *Ad liberandam*, in Alberigo, *Conciliorum*, p. 244, 16-18.
307*Ad liberandam*, p. 246, 15-18.
308*Ad liberandam*, p. 246, 24-29.
This eventually ended in a major conflict between Genoa and Venice, a conflict that involved maritime as well as land battles, acts of piracy but also quiet acts of diplomacy in an attempt to gain access to new markets or the expansion of privileges in various states in the eastern Mediterranean.

Under papal pressure, a truce was signed in 1212 between Genoa and the cities of Pisa and Venice. The implementation of these truces was not immediate, because the tension was great after long period of enmity. For example, Venice had to settle its problems with the pirates Henry of Malta and the count of Syracuse. For many decades piracy was spreading in the Mediterranean. Shortly after the Third Crusade Genoa sent one of its leading politicians, Guido Spinola, to Constantinople to defuse some of the tension caused as a result of pirate activity when Saladin’s presents to the Emperor Isaac II Angelos were stolen. In 1205, Henry of Malta and Alamanno de Costa were acting openly against Venice, with the full support of Genoa. Indeed, at that time they were considered citizens of Genoa and even diplomats. Chapter Two demonstrated that Henry of Malta concluded agreements with the count of Tripoli in the name of the commune of Genoa. Therefore, it is not surprising that in 1212 Genoa had to send special legates to mediate between these counts and pirates and the representatives of Venice. Moreover, local wars with Pisa, even though on smaller scale than before, continued, according to the Genoese annals, in 1213 and 1214. Interestingly, the cartularies from 1213 and 1214 show that as a result of the truce, commerce was quickly resumed between Genoa and Pisa, despite having been through such a long period of bitter wars. In 1216, the cartulary of Lanfranco reveals that the Ligurian and Tyrrenian seas had nonetheless remained danger zones. In a contract from 13 August 1216, Ansaldo de Mari permitted his travelling partner to send goods from Messina in a ship or ‘in galea armata’. Even more explicit are the terms in a maritime insurance contract from 06 December 1216 in which the insurance covered omnibus periculis... excepto a periculo maris et hominum de Pisi. [my emphasis]

309 On the impact of the crusade, see also Schaube, Handelsgeschichte, p. 169f. On Pisa, the papacy and trade with Egypt see also Allmendinger, Die Beziehungen, pp. 62-3.
314 Lanfranco, 1216, no. 1065.
315 Lanfranco, 1216, no. 1306.
The pope also renewed the general embargo on trade in war materials with the enemy. In a recent paper on the supply of war materials to Egypt David Jacoby argued that in the late twelfth and during the thirteenth centuries the Egyptians were dependent on the western supply of war materials, because of the European hegemony of shipping in the Mediterranean Sea. Under the threat of excommunication, Innocent banned in 1215 the selling of arms, war materials and ships to the Saracens. Innocent, therefore, made a very clear distinction between the general trade with the Saracens, which was only boycotted for the immediate period of the crusade, and the embargo on arms, which was comprehensive and already issued by the papacy in 1162, 1179 and 1195. In Jacoby’s words, Innocent ‘issued once more the customary ban on the sale of war materials, adding a prohibition against delivering ships to the Muslims or assisting them in the construction of war engines.’ Jacoby concluded his article by saying that ‘Christian merchants and ship operators were not willing to forgo this lucrative trade, even at the risk of having their goods occasionally seized or paying heavy fines when the traffic was banned by western or Frankish authorities.’ How does this presentation of the commercial relationships correspond to the organisation of the Fifth Crusade?

It is interesting to note that Abulafia and Cahen examined trade between Alexandria and the west in this period reached somewhat different conclusions. They based their study on Arabic sources and primarily on the fiscal treaties known as the Minhâdj by al-Makhzûmî: ‘Le Minhâdj d’al-Makhzûmî, rédige sous le règne de Saladin d’après une documentation essentiellement fatimide, nous permet maintenant de mieux comprendre les renseignement épars dans les actes italiens qui commencent à la même époque à se multiplier.’ Abulafia showed that local production dominated in the list of exported articles in al-Makhzûmî to the west: ‘flax and cotton were seen by the twelfth-century writer al-Makhzûmî as prime exports of Egypt.’

Moreover, Jacoby did not discuss the crusades and their commercial implications in his article, which was limited to Egypt and the supply of war materials. However, the arguments presented reveal that the role of Egypt in western trade was important and should be, therefore, examined in the particular circumstances that preceded the Fifth Crusade. The commercial relationship between the western powers and Alexandria had grown more intensive with the

319 Ibid, p. 129.
peace truces after Hattin, and especially during the sultanate of al-ʿĂdil.\textsuperscript{322} It was argued that Italian merchants played simultaneous roles, taking part in the crusades on the Christian side, but on the other side of the lines they were also conducting commerce, negotiating ransom and supplying transportation for the released Christian captives. A close examination of the disposition of Alexandria in the commercial theatre between east and west should therefore contribute to the understanding of the motivations and interests of both sides on the eve of the Fifth Crusade.

Commerce and commercial relations with Alexandria

The importance of Alexandria as a commercial centre between 1192 and 1217 is evident in many contemporary sources. It was already demonstrated that commerce had taken place during the years of war between 1187 and 1192, in Alexandria itself and possibly also in Acre during the short occupation of the seaport town by Saladin.\textsuperscript{323} Indeed, the attempt of some merchants to ransom Christians, who were held in Egyptian captivity, implies that the channels of communication and commerce were not completely shut even before the official peace truce was agreed upon. In 1192, however, commerce was officially acknowledged when merchants registered acts that involved sailing to Egypt even before the truce was concluded.

Significant changes in the commercial activities between Egypt and the west had taken place several years later, and mainly after the beginning of the new century. In an article on the Italians in Egypt in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries David Jacoby listed the privileges granted to the three maritime cities\textsuperscript{324}. Jacoby also compared the position of the various Italian cities in Alexandria and between the possessions that each commune had gained in Egypt during this period. Interestingly, the impression from the records listed is that at the time of the sultanate of al-ʿÂdil I (1199-1218) the opportunities for commerce were significantly extended. Jacoby showed how Pisa established a commercial community in Alexandria at the beginning of the thirteenth century. In 1207, an ambassador was sent to al-Malik al-ʿÂdil. The envoy was instructed, however, ‘not to promise deliveries of timber, iron, pitch or arms to Egypt.’ But later privileges ‘imply the continuation of that traffic.’\textsuperscript{325} Within a short period of time, between February 1207 and May 1208, the Pisans obtained a fondaco, a church and a bath house.
also appointed a consul or *fundacarius* to lead the Pisan community in Alexandria.\textsuperscript{326} Both the Pisan and the Venetians had citizens in residence in Alexandria between 1215 and 1245.\textsuperscript{327} The evolution of Venice’s power in Alexandria is followed in details in Jacoby’s article throughout the first half of the thirteenth century. This is made possible due to a series of concessions which were granted by the sultan, which remain in the Venetian archives. The first privilege was granted in 1208 and it was followed by others.\textsuperscript{328} By the middle of the century, the Venetians had two fondachi, a church which was dedicated to St Michael as well as a bath-house. From later treaties Jacoby inferred that from 1208 the Venetians were allowed to sell merchandise everywhere in Alexandria and not just the harbour area.\textsuperscript{329} Like the Pisans, from 1208 the Venetians had a consul representing the commune, who also had prerogative over the Venetian merchants and residents. When conflicts occurred among the Venetians or with other Latin residents, the consul applied the Venetian legal system.\textsuperscript{330}

The discussion of the relationship between Genoa and Egypt is especially interesting due to the variety of sources available for the analysis. It was already demonstrated that one of the major consequences of the Fourth Crusade was Genoa’s search for new markets as an alternative to Constantinople. Aleppo was a recent addition to their commercial web, but trade with Alexandria had gained prominence. Unfortunately, none of the privileges which were granted to the Genoese in Alexandria can be traced in the archives of Genoa. This is an extraordinary and rather confusing situation because the annals from the beginning of the thirteenth century mention several diplomatic missions of prominent personnel to Alexandria, and many such concessions have remained in the rival Italian cities of Pisa and Venice. Interestingly, despite this gap in the Genoese sources Adolf Schaube wrote that ‘für den genuesisch-ägyptischen Handelsverkehr haben wir eine ziemlich große Anzahl einzelner Nachrichten, die seine rasche Wiederaufnahme und ungeschwächte Fortdauer beweisen.’\textsuperscript{331} Schaube concentrated in his research on the Genoese annals but only rarely mentioned notarial evidence nor did he examined the implications of trade relations on the relationship between Genoa and Egypt.

In 1204, the annals mention the return of two consuls from Alexandria, Ogerio de Insulis and Belmosto Lercario junior, as well as two other consuls, Lamberto Fornario and Belmosto Lercario the elder. The latter two were mentioned in Chapter Two as the consuls who, in 1203,


\textsuperscript{327} Ibid, p. 79.


\textsuperscript{330} Jacoby, ‘Les Italiens en Égypte’ pp. 82-3.

\textsuperscript{331} Schaube, *Handelsgeschichte*, p. 180.
received concessions in Tripoli and Antioch in the name of the commune of Genoa. In 1205 and in 1208 the annals mention the mission of Guglielmo Spinola to Egypt, but once more there is no reference to the terms of the agreements reached in the meetings with the sultan. From the notarial contracts it is possible to discern that the consuls sent to Alexandria were sent for a relatively short mission. They did not leave Genoa until the autumn of 1203 and returned one year later. Ogerio de Insulis made several commercial contracts in September 1203 and registered a commenda contract for £225 that he took with him to Egypt. The cartularies from that year contain no contracts that were registered by Ogerio’s partner - Belmosto Lercario junior. However, it is known that the venture in 1203 was not Belmosto’s first visit to Alexandria. Two years previously, in 1201, he was given £100 by Sibilia Embriaco, the wife of Guglielmo Embriaco maior, to trade with in Alexandria. The members of the Lercario family were not regular clients of any of the notaries whose cartularies remain in the archives of Genoa today. This is especially unfortunate, because both father and son were sent simultaneously in 1203 on two major diplomatic missions which affected Genoa’s foreign affairs and global trade. The important role of Belmosto Lercario the elder, in particular, will be discussed in detail in the discussion of the Genoese communities and self-government in the kingdom of Jerusalem.

It is only possible to imagine the nature of the truces that were signed with the Egyptian sultan. The first concession must have been granted to Genoa before 1200 because in August 1200 Genoa is known to have possessed a fondaco and an oven in Alexandria. Like bath-houses and churches, fondachi and ovens were features which a community could only possess with special permission from the local authority. A notarial contract in the unpublished cartulary of Oberto Scriba from 1200 mentions such Genoese possessions in Alexandria. This contract was signed in Genoa between a baker named Giovanni and his apprentice Zorzio de Castello. Zorzio promised to join his master for two years in Alexandria ad servicium furni de fundico Ianuensis. The fact that such contract is found in the cartularies implies that despite the strange disappearance of the Egyptian privileges from Genoa’s archives, it is possible to conclude that the Genoese preceded their Italian rivals in obtaining concessions in Alexandria. As was already demonstrated, there is evidence of Genoese traffic to Alexandria in the cartularies from 1192. A large number of contracts concerning Levantine trade remain in the cartularies of Oberto de

332 Ann. Ian., vol. 2, p. 92. Note that the Annals mentioned the four as consuls returning from Alexandria, but this is clearly a mistake. See also note 1 in the margins of that page in the annals. For an edition of the charter from 1203 see Reinhold Röhrich, ‘Amalrich I., König von Jerusalem (1162-1174)’, Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung (Innsbruck, 1891), p. 489. See more about this charter in Chapter Five.
333 GG, 691-2, from 21 September 1203.
334 Guglielmo di Soris, MS 102, p. 206, R3.
335 See Chapter Five.
336 OS, 1200, cart 4, pp. 239 V6 - 240 R1; on this case see also Jacoby, ‘les Italiens en Égypte’, p. 81.
Placentia and Bonvillano from 1197-8: four ships, mentioned in the cartulary of Bonvillano, sailed from Genoa directly to Alexandria in 1198. These were the Ialna; the Venciguerra and two newly built ships – the Nova Naulenxium and the Nave Nova de San Pietro de Arena. The latter must have been a different ship to the probably (old) San Pietro de Arena which sailed to Catalonia at the same autumn. This information is interesting because previous cartularies do not usually mention the name of the vessels. The specification of names in the contracts is a valuable addition to the analysis of the data. For example, it often enables the determination of the total number of vessels that sailed to each destination. These numbers serve as useful indicators for the assessment of the popularity of each market. The inclusion of names makes clear few other features of the sailing patterns. For example, examining the documents over period of several years makes it clear that ships were often sent on regular routes to the same destinations. The Ialna or Ialna de Finar sailed to Alexandria in 1198 and in 1200. In 1213 the annals mentions that the Ialna returned to Genoa with the Oliva from Alexandria and Ultramare. The significance of ships' names has more implications which will be discussed in the following pages.

Not only ships followed routines, merchants did so too. Evidence from the beginning of the thirteenth century suggests that some merchants returned to Alexandria on an annual basis. As was often the case in Genoese commerce a family connection with trading centres can be traced too. The Nepitella family, which was a prominent Genoese family of merchants and shipowners, appears in all the cartularies examined, from 1179 to 1225. Hilmar Krueger followed their activities in some detail. In his words, 'i Nepitella furono una famiglia di propretari di navi per vari decenni, sia alla fine del dodicesimo secolo che all'inizio del tredicesimo.' The Nepitella often appear in conjunction with matters that concern trade with Alexandria (see appendix 3). In 1184, a ship owned by Enrico Nepitella sailed to Alexandria and one of the contracts suggests that Enrico even considered selling his ship in Egypt. A ship that belonged to Enrico Nepitella is mentioned in a contract from 1191, but the destination of that ship is not specified. Unfortunately, the lack of ship names in the documents from these years means that it is impossible to know how many ships were owned by Enrico Nepitella during this period. Enrico was dead by 1200 but there is evidence that his sons Buonovassallo and Oglerio were involved in

337 Bonvillano, nos. 47, 66, 72, 80-84, 89, 94
338 Bonvillano, no. 94 and nos. 107-109.
340 OS, 1184, cart. 2, p. 142 R3; 143, R1.
341 GC, 1191, no. 1232, from 15 October 1191.
commerce in Bougie as well as Alexandria. In 1201, Guglielmo Nepitella sent from Alexandria with Simono Streiaporco seven coras of pepper to Rosso della Volta and to Enrico Nepitella who were in Genoa at the time. Furthermore, the cartulary of Giovanni di Guiberto contains several contracts that were registered in 1203 by Buonovassallo and Enrico Nepitella. They were involved in the export of money and gold to Alexandria. Enrico alone travelled to Alexandria with more than £300. Finally, in 1213, there is evidence that Oglerio, son of Enrico Nepitella, was in Alexandria on business too. The family’s commerce in Egypt which commenced in the twelfth century had thus survived the fall of the first kingdom of Jerusalem. At the beginning of the thirteenth century the commercial web of the family had expanded. It then included more members of the family and the measure of investment was consequently extended too.

Alexandria had often been a second destination in the commercial route of Genoese merchants. For example, a merchant named Thomas de Vedereto made a contract in which he promised to sail from Genoa to Ceuta and then he planned to continue to Alexandria and return to Genoa via Ceuta. Other merchants went to Alexandria from the Latin East. In the case of competing markets such as Alexandria and Acre or Ceuta and Bougie the number of ships that reached each port was especially important. From the cartulary of Bonvillano it seems that in 1198, when four ships went to Alexandria, only two Genoese ships were contracted to sail to Ultramare. These were the Dianna and the Gazella. This is another indication of the intensity of the relationship between Genoa and Alexandria.

Jacoby concluded his article on the Italians in Egypt by claiming that the establishment of the Italian commercial institutions in Egypt was not achieved in order to create permanent colonies. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the Italians invested much time and ample effort in gaining various privileges and in utilizing to the full extent those which were granted to them. The unequivocal importance of Alexandria as a trade centre in the eyes of the merchants is attested by diplomatic and commercial sources alike. It is significant that the race for privileges reached its highest level during the sultanate of al-‘Adil, and especially between 1208 and 1215.

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342 The unpublished cartularies of Guglielmo di Sori (cart. 3/II), and mainly cart. 4, which is attributed to Oberto Scriba, both from 1200, contain many contracts that were registered by the Nepitella brothers. See for example Cart 3/II, p. 124 V and cart 4. pp. 158, 162, 239-240, 257.
343 OS, 1201, cart 4, P. 85, R2
344 GG, 672-4; 678-9. Buonovasallo invested in the venture to Alexandria, but his own venture was to Sicily and then other undecided destinations: GG, 781, 803, 805, 807. Guglielmo Nepitella and Jacomo Nepitella made similar contracts too. The three of them carried over £550 between them.
345 Bonvillano, nos. 135-6.
346 There are several examples in the contracts from 1184, 1186 and from 1200 to 1203. See OS, 1184, cart. 2, p. 138V-139R; OS, 1186, no. 32; OS, 1200, cart. 4, p. 258R-V; Guglielmo di Sori, MS 102, p. 192V; GG, 1203, no. 768.
347 Bonvillano, nos. 56, 65, 82, 88.
In the context of the discussion of the preparations for the Fifth Crusade the evidence of strong commercial relations suggests that Innocent had good reasons to be concerned with the cooperation of the Italians in the war against Egypt. However, just as much as Innocent looked askance at commercial relations with the Muslim world, there was little he could do about it. The existence of Christian communities in the Egypt, including Venetians, Genoese and Pisans, is another reason that the relationship with Egypt had to be handled carefully, because the safety of these people had to be taken into account too. Careful coordination of the crusade was, therefore, vital, which highlights the importance of the Lateran Council.

**Lateran IV as a turning point**

The resolutions of Lateran IV led Genoa as well as the other maritime cities to make significant changes in their foreign and economic policies. A peace truce was concluded in 1217 between Genoa and Pisa, followed by a truce between Genoa and Venice in 1218. The reasons for the truce were given plainly:

*Item convenimus vobis quod per litteras nostras summò pontifici notificabimus quod pax composita est inter civitatem Venetiarum et civitatem Ianue et preces quas nobis fecerat pro pace pro mandatis reputatas pro succursu Terre Sancte effectui mancipavimus (my emphasis).* 349

Fast changes occurred in Genoa’s foreign policy after 1215. Genoa suspended its wars with Venice and Pisa and also curtailed its commercial relationships with Alexandria. Schaube demonstrated that this attitude was reciprocated when western ships were seized in Egypt during the same period. 350 In 1216, the Genoese merchants did not register any contracts for Alexandria. This is highlighted also by the fact that when commerce with Alexandria was stopped, an extended fleet of six big ships went to *Ultramare* instead. Alexandria is mentioned only once, in a receipt for the export of a fabric from Liège which had already been sold in Alexandria. 351

Another interesting change may be attributed to the impact of Lateran IV and the preparations for the crusade. This change concerns the mood in Genoa on the eve of the Fifth Crusade and is related also to the Genoese ships. In the previous pages the names of some Genoese ships were mentioned. This list of ships was gathered from the cartulary of Bonvillano from 1198, and was used as evidence of the importance of Alexandria as a market which the Genoese merchants often visited during that period.

The naming of ships was a relatively new feature that the notaries employed from the end of the twelfth century. Previously, the custom was to mention the names of ships’ owners when

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351 Lanfranco 1216, no. 1237, from 7 October 1216.
such specification was necessary. It was a result in a change in the notaries’ style or formulae that they employed. More information about Genoa’s ships, however, is available in the Genoese annals. On special occasions when ships are mentioned, the names were often specified as well as other details about the ships, for example, in the descriptions of maritime confrontation, when the enemy's ships were seized or when Genoese ships were taken or shipwrecked in storms. The annals mention the Palmeta and Rosa, two Pisan ships that the Genoese captured in 1203. The Leopardus was another Pisan ship seized by the famous Genoese pirate, Count Alamanno de Costa, in 1204. Later the same ship is mentioned as the ship of Count Henry of Malta. In 1213, a new ship, Stella, entered the annals because it was accidentally set on fire when it was being caulked.

The inclusion of names of ships in the notarial documents is very valuable. By utilising this information one may follow, for the first time, the travel history of the ships in addition to the history of merchants or families of merchants. A relatively large number of vessels sailed to the Latin East in 1216. Six ships is a large number compared to the two that are known to have sailed there in 1198 (while four sailed to Alexandria), two or three in 1200, three in 1203, two in 1213, and so on. Significantly, one of the six ships that sailed to the Latin East was the Jalna de Finar. In previous years this ship often sailed to Alexandria.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Genoa - Ultramare</th>
<th>Genoa - Alexandria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1198</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200-1</td>
<td>2 or 3</td>
<td>1 or 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1203</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1213</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1214</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>1216</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>1222</td>
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<tr>
<td>1226</td>
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</table>

Why did so many ships sail to the Latin East in 1216? One of the ships, the St Peter, carried arms to Acre. Bonaventura scutarius, a shield maker, as his name suggests, borrowed £4 as a sea-loan, which he promised to pay back in Acre in local currency, 12 bezants. As a security (pignus) Bonaventura gave to the other merchant 40 shields (scuti) and 9 helmets (elmos). Did Bonaventura travel to the Latin East just in order to sell his products, or did he plan to stay there for awhile? Another merchant named Donatus de Castello calafatus (caulker) signed a

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352 See also Krueger, Navi e proprietà navale a Genova seconda metà del sec. XII, p. 57f.  
353 The St Petri de Arena is mentioned in OS, 1200, cart. 4, p. 258V6 and possibly another ship that is mentioned in the same page, R2; the Buixnigra or Buianigue is mentioned by Gugliemo di Son, MS 102, p. 162V4 and p. 164V2.  
354 The Luna returned from Ultramare, GG, no. 538; The Donna, Dedonna and Navara sailed to the Latin East see GG, nos. 572, 586, 783.  
355 The St Luchas and Meliorata, OS, 1213, Cart. 4, p. 198R2, and 198V4.  
356 Lanfranco, 1216, no. 1130, from 23 September 1216.
commenda contract in which he received £6 3s 0d invested in one coat of chain mail (osbergo). It cannot be determined, however, whether these commodities were taken along because of the crusade or in spite of it. Other interesting travellers include Conrad from Acre who took gold worth of £4 1s 0d and promised to go on the proximo passagio to Acre where he would pay it back at the usual rate of 3 bezants per libra. Another interesting sea-loan was taken by Adalardo Faber from Hermerio filio Rogerio de Ultramare. Adalardo received £20 and promised to pay 57½ ultramarinos de Acri. It is interesting to note that this is the first occasion that the currency in Acre was named ultramarinos instead of bezants.

Two other sea-loans were taken for approximately one year in the Latin East and were to be paid back in Genoa. Pietro and Enrico Doria received £50, which they promised to pay back in Genoa. The agreement specifies that they had to pay back within fifteen days postquam naves de Ultramare venerint when the Peregrina returned. But if the ship's route were to change than they should ship the commodities on the Benedicta or the Gloria. The contract specified the rate for this loan, 'ad rationem £30 per centum.' Simon Malfigliastro had a better offer, probably because he borrowed twice as much money. On 08 November 1216 Simon borrowed £100 with an interest rate of 24%. He promised to pay this money back by 01 September when the Benedicta, a ship owned by Opizio Tartaro, returned to Genoa, or when one of the other two ships came back. The date of this transaction is somewhat unusual because in previous years most of the contracts to the Latin East were made in September, shortly before the autumn sail. In 1216, improved shipping technology allowed the Genoese to depart from Genoa later than usual. James of Vitry wrote about that in his letters from the same winter when he described the advantages and disadvantages of his winter venture to Acre. James wrote about the Genoese that 'naves habent fortissimas et magne quantitatis, unde tempore hiemali consueverunt transfretare eo.' It is probable that James of Vitry therefore embarked on one of the three ships, the Benedicta, Gloria or the Peregrina. He may have even come across the above mentioned merchants, Simon Malfigliastro or one of the Doria brothers, for all three were wealthy Genoese of famous families. The sums borrowed by these merchants were also the largest registered for that venture. What was James of Vitry's opinion about these contracts and the blunt charge of interest? One of

357 Lanfranco, 1216, no. 1163, from 28 September 1216
358 Lanfranco, 1216, no. 1087, from 05 September 1216
359 Lanfranco, 1216, no. 1111, from 17 September 1216
360 Lanfranco, 1216, no. 1248, from 18 October 1216
361 Jacques de Vitry, Lettres de Jacques de Vitry (1160/1170-1240) évêque de Saint-Jean d'Acre, ed. Robert B. C. Huygens (Leiden, 1960), vol. 1 pp. 77-8. The Genoese 'have very sturdy ships of a great size, as a consequence of which they are used to crossing the sea in winter'. John Pryor translated this letter but he commented later that 'winter voyages were nevertheless the exception to the rule and the vast majority of shipping, both commercial and naval, sailed from spring to autumn.' John H. Pryor, Geography, Technology, and War: Studies in the Maritime History of the Mediterranean, 649-1571 (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 84, 89.
James's letters written to the pope from the Latin East provides access to his views on merchants' customs. He accused the Genoese, the Venetians and the Pisans of supplying war materials to the Muslim enemy. Clearly, the complexity of the situation during this time and merchants' role as mediators as demonstrated above escaped him.

The sea-loans taken by prominent Genoese merchants as well as few other records are unfortunately all the information that the Genoese archive contains regarding sea-loans from the preparation period for the Fifth Crusade. Because no Genoese cartularies remain from the years 1218 to 1221, the time of the crusade itself, there is no further evidence of sea-loans taken by merchants or crusaders to the Middle East. The famous Courtois collection contains over 200 charters, all of which were forged during the nineteenth century. They did not originate in Genoa or were they stolen from its archive, as M. Courtois suggested in the 1840s and 1850s. The general acceptance (even if sometimes reluctantly) of these documents as genuine in the 1840s led scholarship astray for many decades, until Robert-Henri Bautier proved the forgery in the second part of the twentieth century. Abulafia warned in an article on this misleading collection that because of the private ownership of many of these documents, 'individual charters will continue to surface and need to be identified....' Abulafia rightfully remarked that some scholars 'burned their fingers on Courtois documents;' among them was a leading historian of the crusades Reinhold Röhrich. In Röhrich's book on the fifth crusade, Studien zur Geschichte des Fünften Kreuzzuges, there is a list of crusaders who participated in the Fifth Crusade. Many of the names are fictitious. James Powell's monograph on the fifth crusade contains a corrected version of Röhrich's list. The real sea-loans borrowed from Genoese merchants and bankers in 1216 were not taken for the crusade. Most of the borrowers planned to pay back their debts before the proposed embarkation date of the crusade in June 1217. However, there is no doubt that some preparations for the crusade had already taken place. Furthermore, the Genoese archives do offer

362 Jacques de Vitry, Lettres de la Cinquième Croisade, no. 73, p. 119.
365 Ibid, p. 139.
367 Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade, p. 207, in his 'Note on Appendixes 2, 3, and 4'.
several names of crusaders, men and women. These people could have been influenced to bequeath money or volunteer by the powerful words of James of Vitry. Some of these cases will be discussed in the following pages.

Finally, the cartulary from 1216 contains evidence of an important change in Genoa that seems to be related to the crusade: a significant number of ships were given religious names. Some were even named after particular saints. Benjamin Kedar discussed the change of names to saints’ names in the High Middle-Ages, a phenomenon that applied also to ships’ names. He concluded that:

The great onomastic upsurge towards saints’ names occurred in the generation that was born during the early decades of the fourteenth century... the names of Genoese ships point to a similar conclusion. The examination of one series of documents has shown that in the years 1200 to 1214, only twelve out of sixty-three vessels bore a Christian name... the proportion rose to twenty-six out of fifty-five in the years 1215 to 1249... from the beginning of the fourteenth century, however, almost all ships were named after saints.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year / destination</th>
<th>1198</th>
<th>1200-1</th>
<th>1203</th>
<th>1213</th>
<th>1214</th>
<th>1216</th>
<th>1222</th>
<th>1226</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Genoa - Ultramare</td>
<td>Dianna Gazella</td>
<td>St Peter Arena the Buiznigra (or Buianigue)</td>
<td>Luna Donna Dedonna Navara</td>
<td>St Lucas Meliorata</td>
<td>Temploria</td>
<td>St James</td>
<td>St Lucas</td>
<td>Benedicta Peregrina Gloria St Peter Rosa Ialna de Finar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genoa - Alexandria</td>
<td>Venciguerra Nova - Naulenxium Ialna (Nova de) St Peter de Arena</td>
<td>Ialna de Finar [nova]</td>
<td>Torexana</td>
<td>Oliva Rosa Ferrata Santa Martha</td>
<td>-</td>
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</table>

The change in naming fashion over two hundred years is interesting and important, however, the timing of this change is significant too. It seems that the years of preparation for the Fifth Crusade signify a turning point as far as this onomastic change is concerned. In 1213, Genoa had only one such ship named after St Lucas, but in 1216 it was joined by St Peter and St James. Other new ships appear in the cartularies with the names the Benedicta, the Peregrine and the Gloria. Is it a coincidence that so many ships were given such names? Was it pure chance that

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most of the ships that sailed in 1216 to the Latin East bore Christian names? It could be suggested that perhaps these ships were carrying a message of Christian devotion. Even more remarkable is the message of feminine devotion that springs out of the list of ships' names from the year 1216. It might indeed be a coincidence that ships were given these feminine names; it is nonetheless interesting to see that a similar process had also occurred simultaneously in Genoese society in general.

'Cives michi equos abstulerunt, et ego uxores eorum crucesignavi,' James of Vitry in Genoa

James of Vitry's writings form part of the most interesting source for the understanding of the Fifth Crusade. In the autumn of 1216 James arrived in Genoa and had the opportunity to spend some time there before his embarkation for the Latin East. In his first letter to Pope Honorius III from 04 November 1216 he explains why in his opinion Genoa is potentially the power most capable of helping the Holy Land:

Sunt autem homines illi potentes et divites et strenui in armis et bellicosii, habentes copiam navium et galearum optimarum, nautas habentes peritos qui viam in mari noverunt et in terram Sarracenorum pro mercimoniiis frequenter perrexerunt, nec credo quod sit aliqua civitas, que tantum possit iuvare ad succursum terre sancte.

When James of Vitry first arrived in Genoa he was rather amazed to learn about a local custom to confiscate all horses for the purpose of war, regardless of the owners' wishes. However, in the absence of his horses and the Genoese men, James of Vitry seized the opportunity to preach to the women and the poor:

Mulieres autem in civitate remanserunt, ego vero interim feci quod potui, verbum enim Dei multis mulieribus et paucis hominibus frequenter predicavi. Multitudo autem mulierum divitum et nobilium signum crucis recept.

James then concludes this letter in a rather sarcastic tone: 'cives michi equos abstulerunt, et ego uxores eorum crucesignavi.'

James of Vitry was a skilful preacher who gained a high reputation during the Albigensian crusade. In Jonathan Riley Smith's words, 'the preaching of men like... James of Vitry for the Albigensian Crusade fired popular enthusiasm.' In his writing, it seems that James was aware of his impact on the crowd and that he took pride in it. Interestingly, notarial documents which were written in Genoa at the time of his visit prove that James' reputation was

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370 Ibid, p. 32.
justified. The cartulary of Lanfranco from 1216 contains wills with bequests for *passagio de ultramare*. As Steven Epstein showed, bequests for the crusades were not common in Genoa before the Fifth Crusade. Epstein's analysis of 190 Genoese wills compiled between 1155 and 1204 reveals that there was only one bequest for the crusades from the time of the Third Crusade.\(^{373}\) Nonetheless, Epstein wrote that 'ransoming captives from the Muslim was a meritorious act, as was donating to the crusades.'\(^{374}\) It is very significant, however, that between 23 August 1216 and 21 December 1216 a collection of such bequests suddenly appear in the wills (appendix 4). Moreover, Lanfranco documented in that period seven wills, of four women and three men. Out of the seven, five wills contain bequests for the crusade. Is that a reflection of James’ preaching in Genoa? Is it possible to identify a female response to James’s enthusiastic preaching?

Steven Epstein mentions these bequests to the crusading efforts, which he considered an act of social charity, because the crusades were, 'particularly in the Italian ports, a war effort and a kind of commercial investment.'\(^{375}\) Epstein noticed a particularly large number of such wills during the preparations for the Fifth Crusade, but James Powell was the first to suggest, in a footnote, that this phenomenon might be linked to the preaching of James of Vitry.\(^{376}\) These cases, therefore, deserve a closer observation. Berta de Gala, Aidela uxor Oberti Nigrini and Montanaria uxor Martini de Mari draperii bequeathed £½, £4 and £5 respectively.\(^{377}\) Montanaria, wife of a wool weaver, specified in her bequest that she intended to take this sum with her to the Holy Land: *s100 lego in servitio passagi ultramarini si non iero, si autem iero illos mecum portabo.*\(^{378}\) The case of Montanaria is an example of a name that should be added to Powell’s list of people who planned to embark for the Latin East. Aidela's will refers to a previous one that was thereby cancelled. Since her previous will has not remained it cannot be determined what had motivated her to make a new will and whether this was just in order to add the bequest for the crusade. Furthermore, Bertranno de Lavania and Berta de Gala both made their wills, one after the other, on the same day of 23 August 1216. In the light the sudden appearance of this series of bequests it seem inevitable to suggest a strong link to the preaching efforts on the eve of the crusade.

\(^{373}\) As was mentioned in Chapter One, Epstein did not take the will of Anselmo Buxono into account (OS, 1190, no. 609 from 10 August) or merchants’ donations for the crusade in other contracts (GC, 1191, no. 318 from 20 March 1191) or their supply of grain and other commodities for the crusaders.


\(^{376}\) Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade*, pp. 67-68.

\(^{377}\) Lanfranco 1216, nos. 1079, 1224, 1319.

\(^{378}\) Lanfranco 1216, no. 1319, from 21 December 1216.
The sum bequeathed was not related to gender. Rustico della Costa, for example, left 10s, as did Berta de Gala, while Bertranno bequeathed £2. Unfortunately, the seven cases are too few and therefore do not allow further analysis into the nature of the Genoese reaction to the preaching in terms of gender, social status and wealth. What was the content of James of Vitry's preaching to the Genoese women? Unfortunately, despite the fact that so many of his sermons remain, the ones he preached in the churches and the streets of Genoa were not identified. In a recent thesis on *The Faces of Women in the Sermons of Jacques de Vitry*, Carolyn Muessig quotes a passage from James's sermons concerning Marie d'Oignies: `who wishes to come after me, let him renounce himself and take up the Cross and follow me (Luke 9,23)... She took up the cross by chastising her body through abstinence and imitated Christ by casting herself down through humility.'

Whatever James of Vitry said to the women of Genoa, his impact was made evident. It seems that he did not exaggerate when he claimed to have been particularly successful with the women of Genoa. When James of Vitry recruited women for the crusade, however, he implemented a general policy that was ordered by Innocent III. Thomas van Cleve describes the novelty in the preaching of the time. James of Vitry and especially Robert of Courçon `permitted all who volunteered to accept the cross: old men, women, children, cripples, the deaf and the blind.' This was a reflection of policy change, or in van Cleve's words: `this was...Innocent's fault: in his anxiety lest aid to the Holy Land be unduly delayed.' James Powell, however, explains the logic behind Innocent's idea: `the redemption of vows of unsuitable crusaders, especially women, was a major innovation that was certain to raise a substantial amount of money'382. It is important to note that these Genoese wills and the James of Vitry's words to the Genoese reflect papal orders regarding the recruiting of all Christians, including women. Jonathan Riley Smith has describes this pragmatic attitude: `everyone, whatever his or her condition, was to be encouraged to take the cross, but those who were not suitable could then redeem their vows for money payments.'

In an article on women crusaders, Maureen Purcell reviews the medieval debates about women's role in the crusades. It is interesting to see that the issue had attracted the attention of some of the leading figures in Europe at the time. Purcell mentions Pope Gregory X, Alexander of Hales, Thomas Aquinas, and the canonist Hostiensis who had dealt with this issue in great length. Some of the questions discussed in their writing are directly related to women's

379 Lanfranco 1216, nos. 1078, 1086.
involvement in the crusades: may men go without the consent of their wives? Is a woman allowed to go without her husband's consent? May young women go on a crusade alone? Should prostitutes be encouraged to go? And so on.

Purcell's conclusion is that 'women crusaders remained an historical curiosity, if not an historical aberration.' Purcell did not take into consideration, however, the indirect contributions women had, raising funds and encouraging their sons and husbands to go on the crusade. In this sense there is no doubt that the Fifth Crusade was a turning point. This chapter has demonstrated that Genoese women played an important role in the commercial sphere of Genoa. They were involved in trade, and evidence suggests that long before the Fifth Crusade they were involved in raising funds and conducting the redemption of their imprisoned relatives. However, on the eve of the Fifth Crusade their contribution was even more significant, as crusaders and as supporters of the crusade.

**Genoa and the Fifth Crusade**

This chapter discussed several aspects relating to the Fifth Crusade. The question of captivity was addressed both as a cause for the crusade and also in the context of commercial relations in the Mediterranean. Genoa's relations with Egypt were examined despite the absence of the charters that were granted to Genoa by the rulers of Egypt. This examination was thus carried out in comparison the relationship between Egypt and other Italian cities and through evidence in the commercial records. It was suggested that Genoa was responsible for the breakthrough in the establishment of commercial community in Alexandria.

The impact of preaching and the ban on commerce with the Muslims were examined through the evidence found in the notarial cartularies of the year 1216. Particularly interesting was the reaction of women to the call for the crusade, fascinating correlation was found between the preaching of James of Vitry to the Genoese women and the wills that were composed in that period. The change in ship-naming was also so sudden that it was suggested that it must be related to the crusade and possibly also to the female-devotion attested at a certain social group among the wealthy Genoese women.

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Embriaco or de Biblio, what's in a name?

The Genoese who settled in the Latin East are the subject of Chapters Four and Five. The focus of attention thus shifts from Genoa in the west to the crusader states, where communities of Genoese had settled. The current chapter will concentrate on Gibelet, a sea-port town in the county of Tripoli (also known as Jubail or Byblos in the modern state of Lebanon). Gibelet and its ruling dynasty make an interesting case-study of Genoa’s relationship with the crusader states, because shortly after the end of the First Crusade Gibelet was granted in its entirety to the cathedral church of St Lawrence and the people of Genoa. This concession was the only occasion in the history of the crusader states in which a town was enfeoffed to the sovereignty of a state outside the confines of the Latin East. This extraordinary status of Gibelet calls into question the meaning of Gibelet’s special disposition between Genoa and the Latin East: what use had Genoa made of its unique ownership of a harbour and a sea-port town in the Latin East? What sort of strategic advantage did Genoa gain from it, if at all? And from the eastern point of view, was Gibelet considered a Genoese settlement or a crusader one? How did the lords of Gibelet, who descended from a noble and wealthy Genoese family, view their relationship with Genoa and with the Latin East?

Several other issues will be addressed in this chapter including a discussion of the contribution of the commune of Genoa and its individual merchants to the financial and military security of the crusader states. Special attention will be given to the question of the loyalty of the Genoese to their own families and relatives who settled in the Latin East. Another question concerns the identity change of the Genoese settlers in the crusader states. It will be argued that such a change had already occurred in the course of the first kingdom of Jerusalem. The particular case of the Embriaco family will be discussed in detail. Guglielmo I Embriaco was a famous Genoese crusader and a war hero, whose contribution to the success of the First Crusade is mentioned in several contemporary sources. Some late Genoese traditions even claim that Guglielmo was the first crusader to enter Jerusalem and later brought the Holy Basin from Caesarea (il sacro catino), better known as the Holy Grail, to Genoa and placed it in the city’s cathedral. Gibelet was leased for an annual fee to Ugo Embriaco (or Hugh I), the son of

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385 *De liberatione civitatum orientis*, in *Ann. Ian.*, vol. 1, pp. 110-117
Guglielmo Embriaco, and thus the lordship of Gibelet was founded. During the following one-hundred years, many changes occurred in the position of the Embriaco family in the Latin East and in the family’s relations with Genoa. Financial disputes led to a series of problems which affected the two branches of the Embriaco family that lived in two communities away from each other. Importantly, the story of the Embriaco family is linked to the experience of other settlers in the Latin East. It will be argued that there is some similarity between the course of action taken by members of the family from the middle of the twelfth century until the fall of the first kingdom of Jerusalem and the experience of other members of the high and low nobility of the Latin East.

In many ways, this chapter tells the story of the gradual separation of the second and third generation of settlers in the Latin East from their place of origin and the ways an independent lordship was formed in the crusader states.

The discussion in this chapter begins in the early parts of the twelfth century when Gibelet was granted to the Genoese. Sources utilised in research on this period consist primarily of the Genoese annals, contemporary chronicles concerning the Latin East and charters. The archives of Genoa contain letters, dozens of charters of concessions of properties and privileges as well as other documents that the commune retained. These were compiled in Genoa, in the Latin East or elsewhere and are concerned with Gibelet or its lordship. Other documents which were compiled in the crusader states are included in other collections. Especially useful are the documents that remain in the archives of the Order of St John, due to the fact that the Embriaco family of Gibelet was in close relationship with the Order in the county of Tripoli. Archaeological excavations of medieval Gibelet are non-existent. Available reports regarding the structure of this town consist mainly of a nineteenth-century survey which was carried out by Ernest Renan, and several descriptions of the remains by Maurice Dunand who led the excavations of another part of town where ancient Byblos was located. These excavations took place in the first half of the twentieth century. Art historians wrote about the remaining structures. Camille Enlart, Paul Deschamps and recently Jaroslav Folda contributed much to the analysis of the medieval town, despite the lack of ample excavations. It will be argued that an analysis of the remains of the

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388 Ernst Renan, Mission de Phénicie (Paris, 1864); Maurice Dunand, Byblos, son histoire, ses ruines, ses légendes (Beirut, 1963).

town may contribute to the understanding of how the Embriaci perceived their possession of Gibelet in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

Most of the cartularies in the notarial archive of Genoa contain contracts that involved members of the Embriaco family. The cartulary of the notary Guglielmo di Sori from the beginning of the thirteenth century is especially valuable, because Guglielmo di Sori is to be considered the notary of the Embriaco family and his unpublished cartularies contain dozens of acts by members of the family. These contracts make an important supplement to other sources, because they allow access to the study of the Genoese branch of the Embriaco family in the context of its members' vast commercial activities in the crusader states and elsewhere.

Gibelet and the Embriaco family in historiography

For historians of the crusades the story of the Embriaco family in Gibelet is interesting for several reasons. However, scholarship has, thus far, paid relatively little attention to the family or to Gibelet. In Genoa, the Embriaci attracted slightly more attention, because the family belonged to one of the most influential political groups in the city. In Steven Epstein's words, the Embriaci 'were at the pinnacle of Genoese society in terms of prestige and wealth.' The historiography regarding the Embriaci in the Latin East begins with Emmanuel Rey's study of the family as part of his research on the genealogy of the nobility of the crusader states. Rey published two articles about the Embriaci. Rey included the first version with his publication of Charles du Cange's manuscript entitled Les Familles d'Outre-mer (published by Rey almost 200 years after du Cange's death in 1869). Rey published an amended version in the Revue de l'Orient latin (ROL) in 1895. Rey drew primarily on the Lignages d'Outremer, a medieval collection of histories of families from the crusader states and Cyprus. In the first article he failed to make enough use of the Genoese sources. In the second version Rey utilised the Genoese Liber lurium but did not examine any of the notarial documents. Furthermore, Rey's point of view was limited to genealogy. Consequently, he paid little attention to cultural or social histories.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Eugene Byrne further contributed to the understanding of the motivations behind the activities of the Embriaci by placing their experience in the Latin East in the context of Genoese shipping and commerce at the time. Moreover, his pioneer study of the collection of cartularies in the notarial archive of Genoa proved that these

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documents contain valuable information for family histories as well as the study of Genoese and crusader societies. However, Byrne's framework was influenced by the experience of colonialism of the nineteenth-century. He compared the commercial activities of the Genoese and their settlements to colonialism in his time. He wrote, for example, of the Genoese view 'of their colonial possessions in the twelfth century.' In his opinion, the Italian communes in the crusader states 'were not regarded or treated as daughter communes, scarcely as colonies, in the modern sense of the term, but rather as trading posts, factories, where the Genoese merchants might easily conduct their commerce....'394 Despite this sort of anachronism in his study and the occasional misinterpretation of the text, Byrne made an important contribution to the study of Genoese involvement in the Latin East by utilising documents from the notarial archive. In particular, since the cartulary of Gugliemo di Sori has not been published yet, some of Byrne's notes about the Embriaci are relevant to the current study too. Furthermore, Byrne was the first to offer a theory on the development of the relationship between Gibelet and Genoa. He wrote about the Embriaco family that 'the family exercised rigid authority over its various members in Syria...' and also that 'the elder branch of the family in Gibelet proved most difficult to control...they were now on an equality with the great baronial families of Syria.'395 Byrne did not write much more about Gibelet or on the nature of the relationship between its lords and the nobility in the crusader states. The study of Genoese administration of its 'colony' and possessions stood at the core of Byrne's discussion. Similar approaches can be found in later works too. Claude Cahen dedicated his book of 1940 to the northern parts of the crusader states. A short account of the story of the Embriaci and Gibelet is included as part of the discussion of Tripoli and the noble families in that county. Cahen, perhaps as a result of his Marxist affiliation at the time, limited his discussion to the administration of the Italian communities and excluded their commercial activities.

Il ne peut être question d'étudier ici en aucune façon l'organisation du commerce maritime des Italiens, parce qu'elle ne concerne guère les habitants de la Syrie... Nous dirons seulement un mot de l'administration des colonies italiennes.'

Cahen viewed the Embriaci as Genoese in essence, although he acknowledged a growing tension between the Embriaci and Genoa. Even when the rift grew deeper between the two sides, Cahen saw it as an administrative problem of the Genoese, with some economic advantages and political disadvantages.

Les Génois transformèrent vite ou laissèrent se transformer leurs délégués à l'administration coloniale en concessionnaires à durée limitée, puis en fondateurs héréditaires; système qui limitait le contrôle de la commune-mère... mais qui... permettait de surveiller constamment l'observation des concessions par les Francs de Syrie et la sécurité des opérations commerciales génoises.  

Jean Richard discussed the case of Gibelet and the Embriaci in several parts of his book on the count of Tripoli. Gibelet is mentioned in the chapter on the bourgeois and Italian commerce. He wrote briefly that 'commissaires génois...ne tardèrent pas à se rendre indépendants.'  

Since Byrne concluded his work, however, many cartularies have been published while others have been examined and re-dated. These cartularies can therefore shed more light on several issues regarding the evolution of Genoa's relationship with the Latin East and the role played by the Embriaco family in these developments from the late twelfth century to the beginning of the thirteenth century. Recent scholarship on the Embriaci has carried out part of this mission. Marie-Luise Favreau-Lilie examined the family mainly as an executor of the interests of the commune of Genoa in the east. The race between the three Italian communities for rights and privileges stand at the core of her research and arguments. She traced back the origin of Genoa's unique place in the crusading states to a document from 10 August 1107 in which Bernard of St Gilles had promised the Genoese 'Gleichermaßen... sowohl für Saint-Gilles wie auch für sein künftiges Herrschaftsgebiet das Handelsmonopol.' Furthermore, Favreau-Lilie, and more recently, the Genoese historian Sandra Origone, looked into the motivation behind Genoa's lease of its property in the east at the hands of the Embriaci and pointed to the process of integration of the family into the county of Tripoli.  

Sie konnten die Verwaltung des genuesischen Besitzes durch diese im Orient ansässige genuesische Familie besser kontrollieren, als wenn die Kommune ihren Besitz selbst verwaltet hätte. Und sie mochten vielleicht hoffen, daß die Embriaci sich langfristig von ihrer Mutterstadt lösen und sich dann fest in den Lehnsverband des einigen Staatswesens integrieren lassen würden, wozu es in der Grafschaft Tripolis später auch kommen sollte.  

Origone noted, following the same line of thought: '...il Comune genovese non era interessato a gestire direttamente, perdendo col tempo il proprio legame con la città d'origine e affermandosi come dinastia feudale dipendente dai signori di Tripoli.' The consequences of the

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400 Sandra Origone, 'Gli Embriaci a Genova fra XII e XIII secolo', Festa antiqua et medievalia, forthcoming.  
401 Marie-Luise Favreau-Lilie, Die Italianer im Heiligen Land, p. 171;  
402 Sandra Origone, 'Gli Embriaci a Genova fra XII e XIII secolo', p. 4.
independence of the Embriaci and the results of this supposed integration were not followed further by these scholars. Importantly, scholarship on the Italians and the kingdom of Jerusalem has traditionally assumed the preservation of identity and ties between the communities in the commercial settlements and their home towns in Europe. The relationship between the Embriaco family and the Latin East, like Genoa’s relationship with its communities overseas, was more complex, in my opinion, than is portrayed in the historiography. This chapter, which is dedicated to the special case of Gibelet and the Embriaco clan, will examine how the relationship between Genoa and its settlers changed over the years.

Genoa and Gibelet, a background

Genoa’s relationship with the crusader states goes back to the very beginning of the First Crusade and the establishment of the crusader kingdom of Jerusalem. Ample evidence shows that Genoa made a significant military contribution to the success of the crusades. In particular, the Genoese naval assistance was conspicuous during the First Crusade and the beginning of the twelfth century. Benjamin Kedar, for example, showed how Genoese fleets and armed forces played a fundamental role in the early years of the first kingdom of Jerusalem. He argued that "...Genoese assistance was so vital to Baldwin and indispensable to the conquest of the Syro-Palestinian harbours..." Indeed, during the early years of the existence of the kingdom of Jerusalem, Genoese fleets arrived in the Latin East every year and provided help and assistance to the crusaders. No less important, however, was the role of Genoa during the Third Crusade. The commitment of the commune to that crusade, especially at its preparatory stages, was discussed in Chapter One. It was argued, for example, that Genoa committed its entire fleet for the shipping of the crusaders in 1190, an act which was as significant as Venice’s commitment in 1202 to the transportation of the crusaders during the Fourth Crusade.

In return for its help, Genoa, like Venice and Pisa, demanded and received possessions, legal rights and commercial privileges in the crusader states. When given the rights to do so, the maritime powers established communities overseas, where they then lived in special quarters. In this manner the Genoese possessed parts of many sea-port cities and towns in the Latin East, such as Acre, Antioch and Tripoli. Gibelet, however, was different because of the full ownership Genoa had over that town. The first indication of the importance the Genoese attributed to possessing Gibelet is derived from a financial dispute which took place in Genoa in the 1140s between the commune and members of the Embriaco clan. In 1145, the consuls of Genoa apparently demanded to confiscate the property of the heirs of Nicola Embriaco from Genoa,

because another branch of the family, that of Guglielmo Embriaco of Gibelet and his heirs, had failed to observe the agreement concerning Genoese possessions in Gibelet, St Symeon, Latakia and Antioch.\(^{404}\) This demand was described by the consuls of 1147 who were asked to judge in this dispute:

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\text{consules comunis Ianue... appellaverunt filios quondam Nicole Embriaci, dicentes omnia bona eisdem Nicole iure pervenissent comuni Ianue, eo quod Guillielmus Embriacus nec eis heredes non observaverint laudem et pactum de reddenda civitate Gibelli et Sollino et Lezhia et Antiochia et de redditibus earum, expletis .xx. annis preteritis.}\(^{405}\)

Eventually, in January 1147, a settlement was reached according to which the heirs of Nicola Embriaco, who were still minors at the time, paid £300 (which equals approximately a three-year fee).\(^{406}\) Genoa, in return, wrote off the debts that the Embriaci had acquired over twenty years in Gibelet. Importantly, the actual payment seems to have fully fallen on the Genoese branch of the Embriaco clan, the heirs of Nicola Embriaco. Does this imply that the Embriaco family of Gibelet did not hold possessions in Genoa that could have been confiscated? What authority did Genoa have in practice over its citizens who settled in the Latin East? How did this financial dispute affect the relationship between Genoa and Gibelet? What was the impact of this legal settlement on the relationship between the two branches of the Embriaco clan? The answer to these questions is found in a series of contracts from 1154, in which the Genoese possessions in the Latin East were divided between the two parts of the Embriaco clan. In three contracts, the commune of Genoa leased its possessions in the Latin East, separately, to the two branches of the Embriaci. The first contract was a renewal of the lease in Gibelet signed with Guglielmo II Embriaco for another 29 years for an annual payment of 280 bezants. The two other contracts were signed with the brothers Nicola and Ugo Embriaco of Genoa: one contract is a lease of parts of Antioch and the second is a lease of the possessions in Acre.\(^{407}\) The three contracts were hereditary, which means that the Embriaci were to possess the Genoese properties throughout the crusader states for at least another generation. Significantly, for the first time, the finances of the Embriaci were fully split, an important stage in the relationship within the Embriaco clan. From an administrative aspect, the 1154 contracts signify another novelty because this was the first recorded time in which Genoa leased its property in Acre. How much did possessing the Genoese quarter in Acre cost the Embriaci? Did the terms of the contract include

\(^{404}\) See note 1 in \textit{CDG}, vol. 1, no. 170, p. 218. According to this note, on the left margins of the document there is a note: `hoc fuit MCXXXXV'; see also Byrne, 'The Genoese Colonies in Syria', p. 151.

\(^{405}\) \textit{CDG}, vol. 1, no. 170, p. 218

\(^{406}\) Assuming that the initial contract was similar to the one from 1154 in which the Embriaci were requested to pay £100 for Gibelet per annum. \textit{I Libri lurium}, vol. I/1, no. 164. Giovanni Barcha was the minors guardian (\textit{tutor}), who represented them in this court case.

the entire quarter or only parts of it? The 1154 contracts provide a first opportunity to examine the value of Gibelet in comparison to other possessions in the Latin East.

**Acre and Gibelet**

What was the value of Gibelet from a Genoese perspective, in comparison to Acre? There is no doubt of the importance of Acre to Genoa in the twelfth century. Acre was the leading sea-port town in the kingdom of Jerusalem. It was, therefore, a major attraction for merchants. It was especially important for Genoa because unlike its rivals, Genoa had no official access to Tyre, the second largest sea-port town in the kingdom of Jerusalem, until the establishment of the second kingdom. When the crusaders conquered Acre in 1104, territorial concessions in the city had been first granted to Genoa, followed by concessions to Venice and Pisa. Indeed, medieval maps of Acre show the importance of the Italian communities in the city because the Italian sections were marked in some detail and were conveniently located not far away from the harbour. How accurate are these maps? This question has been asked by many historians and archaeologists. This paper is not concerned with these debates. However, it is important to bear in mind that, at any rate, these maps represent a situation at a much later period. Nonetheless, the size of this quarter and the facilities it provided are important for the comparative discussion of Gibelet and also for the assessment of the power the Embriaco family had in the Latin East.

The terms of the contract for Acre clearly include all the possessions of the commune in the city, with no exceptions: `totum illud quod comune lanue habet in Acri et eius pertinentiis, sine contradicione comunis lanue et omnium personarum pro eo...` The fee demanded from the Embriaci for Acre was 1000s Genoese (£50). Compared to Gibelet, however, this was not a

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high fee. For Antioch, Genoa requested 80 bezants, which is less than £30. Conspicuously, the lords of Gibelet were required to pay approximately £100 to the commune of Genoa. One must be cautious in the interpretation of these figures. It is tempting to conclude that Acre may have not been a lucrative source of income in the twelfth century, while in fact there were other considerations involved in the decision only to charge the Embriaci £50. The contract for Gibelet included 280 bezants and symbolic donations of one altar-cloth (pallium) that cost 10 bezants for the altar of the cathedral church of St Lawrence in Genoa. This donation was considered ‘pro censu.’ In addition, the lords of Gibelet had to deposit four silk banners (vexillum quatuor cendatorum) which were pro investiture. These banners were to be kept by the commune and eventually given back in exchange for £100.411 These feudal symbols of pallium and vexillum were probably supposed to ensure that the Embriaco family in Gibelet respected the authority of Genoa and its ownership of this territory. It must have been a reaction to the problems concerning the payment for Gibelet in the 1140s. How should these figures be interpreted? It is hard to imagine that Gibelet was twice as profitable as Acre. Was this fee a penalty for their disloyalty too? Another reason for the low charge for Acre was implied in the contract itself. Apparently, the Embriaco brothers of Genoa had offered a voluntary payment of £100 in 1154 as an advance payment. The reason for this voluntary payment was that the commune was in magna necessitate.412 In exchange for their pre-payment the consuls of the commune decided that the next payment would not be collected from the brothers for another four years. In this manner they received a 50% reduction on the payment due in the first four years. Importantly, the Embriaco brothers thus managed to gain control of Acre for a very low price. The question of the Genoese administration of Acre will be further discussed in this chapter and Chapter Five. There is no doubt, however, that in addition to the element of punishment and the desire to control the residents of Gibelet, there must have been expectations that Gibelet would become a highly profitable possession.

The archaeological remains of Gibelet have not received enough attention in the research and historiography of the crusader states. Most of the excavations in Gibelet were carried out in the hill above the harbour, where the ancient town of Byblos was located (Figures 6 and 7). The medieval town, however, which was located to the north of ancient Byblos has not been excavated. The location of the medieval town can be identified between the crusader castle and a road which still marks the location of the medieval walls of the sea-port town. These points of reference are marked on the aerial photograph below (Figure 7). Most of what has been written

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a book entitled, *Byblos, son histoire, ses ruines, ses légendes*, (Beirut, 1963), in which he briefly refers to the medieval remains of Gibelet. Although, no excavations were carried out in the medieval town itself, at the beginning of the twentieth century Camille Enlart wrote about Gibelet and its churches in *Les monuments des croisés dans le royaume de Jérusalem*. In particular, Enlart discussed the cathedral church of St John the Baptist.\textsuperscript{414} Paul Deschamps wrote about the castle of Gibelet in his monumental series *Les Châteaux des croisés en Terre Sainte* compiled in the 1970s. Deschamps also provided historical background to his descriptions and a general discussion of the shape of the town. This study is probably the most detailed account available thus far.\textsuperscript{415} Finally another short description of the castle of Gibelet is included in an article by Thomas Boase ‘Architecture and Sculpture.’\textsuperscript{416}

Unfortunately, Gibelet was not included in Denys Pringle’s recent publication, *The Churches of the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem*. Pringle does mention, however, the existence

\textsuperscript{413}Ernst Renan, *Mission de Phénicie, Atlas*, pl. 19.
\textsuperscript{414}Camille Enlart, pp. 116-124.
\textsuperscript{415}Paul Deschamps, pp. 203-215.
Unfortunately, Gibelet was not included in Denys Pringle’s recent publication, *The Churches of the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem*. Pringle does mention, however, the existence of another church of St Mary in Gibelet that belonged to the monastery of St Theodosius.417 Recently, Jaroslav Folda dedicated several pages to Gibelet in his book of *The Art of the Crusaders in the Holy Land, 1098-1187*. The castle of Gibelet, according to Folda, was ‘one of the first major crusader fortification projects whose results, though heavily rebuilt, can still be assessed.’ About Gibelet, in general, Folda wrote: ‘Beautifully sited on a rise overlooking the projected harbour andanchoring the city wall, Gibelet is an example of elemental western ideas in fortification brought Eastward.’418

**Figure 7: Gibelet - an aerial photo with an indication of the excavated area and the location of the medieval town**

N. W EDGE OF THE MEDIEVAL TOWN

CASTLE

LOCATION OF ANCIENT BYBLOS AND THE MODERN EXCAVATION AREA

N. E EDGE OF TOWN

‘Civitas...est satis parva.’ This short description of Gibelet belongs to Burchard of Mount Sion who visited the small town in 1283.420 Indeed, according to the archaeologist Maurice Dunand, the medieval city was quite small. Gibelet had a quadrilateral shape of 275m by

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418 Jaroslav Folda, *The Art of the Crusaders in the Holy Land*, p. 54
419 This photo is from the collection of GeoMaps online. However there is unfortunately no reference to the height and direction from which it was taken.
200m, which means that the crusading town covered an area of approximately 5.5 ha.\textsuperscript{421} Compared to other crusader towns listed in a table that Denys Pringle produced [Table 3], Gibelet was indeed one of the smallest towns in the crusader states, smaller even than Banyas and only slightly larger than Arsuf. Perhaps its small size has contributed to scholars' lack of interest in crusader Gibelet. When was crusader Gibelet built and how much had the Embriaci contributed to its layout?

Because only limited excavations were carried out in medieval Gibelet, these questions are difficult to answer. According to Enlart, because of the great damage caused by an earthquake in 29 June 1170, most of what remains from the crusading period therefore originated from the period subsequent to it.\textsuperscript{422} The church of St John, for example, was constructed according to Dunand around 1215,\textsuperscript{423} but Enlart was of the opinion that the church was first constructed approximately one hundred years earlier, an opinion supported by Folda.\textsuperscript{424}

Table 3: The areas enclosed by town walls [following Pringle]\textsuperscript{425}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Area enclosed in ha.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>51.5&lt;85.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ascalon</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyre</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidon</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caesarea</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlit</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banyas</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arsuf</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiberias</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iskandaruna</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When the size of the settlement is considered, it might be useful to bear in mind that Gibelet was much larger than any of the Genoese quarters elsewhere in the crusader states. For example, according to suggestions of the location and size of the Genoese quarter in Acre, the

\textsuperscript{421} Maurice Dunand, \textit{Byblos, son histoire, ses ruines, ses légendes}, p. 74. Deshamps' estimation was much larger. According to Dechamps, the northern wall was 450m, the eastern 300m and the southern 150m. The area enclosed by the walls according to this estimation was approximately 9 ha. Paul Deschamps, \textit{La Défense du comté de Tripoli}, p. 208.

\textsuperscript{422} Enlart, \textit{text}, vol. 2, p. 117

\textsuperscript{423} Maurice Dunand, \textit{Byblos}, p. 78.

\textsuperscript{424} Enlart, \textit{text}, vol. 2, p. 118. See further about the church in the following pages. See Folda, \textit{The Art of the Crusaders in the Holy Land}, p. 54.

comparative map presented by Eliezer Stern and Benjamin Kedar (based on Kesten, Benvenisti and Jacoby) suggest that the quarter was between less than 2 ha. and 3.5 ha (Figure 8).\footnote{Benjamin Z. Kedar and Eliezer Stern, ‘A Vaulted East-West Street in Acre’s Genoese Quarter?’, p. 105.}

**Figure 8: A map of Acre with suggestions of the location of the Genoese quarter**

![Map of Acre with suggestions of the location of the Genoese quarter](image)

When Gibelet is compared in its urban architecture to towns such as Arsuf and Banyas, it seems that Gibelet had been through more development than other towns of similar size. For example, the coastal towns of Jaffa, Haifa and 'Atlit had no cathedrals. Also, Jaffa and Haifa had town walls but no towers. In Gibelet, however, one finds a cathedral as well as several other churches, a castle and a town wall with towers.\footnote{Denys Pringle, *Fortification and Settlement*, table 1, p. 103.} The most elaborate medieval description of Gibelet is the account of Wilbrand of Oldenbourg from 1211. Wilbrand saw Gibelet still in the process of recovery and reconstruction after its destruction by the Muslims. Nonetheless, it is clear that he was impressed with the original fortifications and especially the castle, which was extremely well fortified so that the Muslims had failed in their attempts to demolish it:

> Hec est ciuitas parva, habens turrim (the castle) quandam amplitum et munitissimam, unicum sue defensionis solacium, in qua Sarraceni, cum ipsam auellere laborarent,
multos sudores sepìus perdiderunt et expensas, qui tamen omnem munitionem ipsius ciuitatis destruxerunt [my emphasis].

A map drawn by Ernest Renan from 1864 shows the remains of Gibelet. Most of these remains are dated to the crusader period, but the walls are from the Mameluke and Ottoman periods (Figure 6). According to Enlart, there is clear evidence that Gibelet was repaired and partly rebuilt several times. In particular, the cathedral had to be reconstructed as a result of the damaged caused by the earthquake and the enemy’s invasion.

Cette ancienne cathédrale, dédiée à saint Jean-Baptiste et desservie actuellement par les Moines de Saint-Maroun du Liban, peut avoir été commencée vers 1115 et lentement construit, restaurée après les désastres du tremblement de terre de 1170 et des invasions de 1188, 1190 et 1266, puis, plus récemment, à diverses reprises.

Interestingly, Enlart classifies the architecture of the church as French (central and southern France). This stands out in contrast to the baptistery, which according to Enlart bears evidence of local and Italian influences (Figure 9): ‘Le style est une interprétation locale de l’art roman et pourrait procéder d’une influence italienne, ce qui n’étonnerait guère dans une ville qui fuit domaine Génois.’

Figure 9: Gibelet – a photo of the baptistery by the cathedral church of St John the Baptist, taken by Galen Frysinger, 19 April 2000

Enlart wrote about the baptistery that ‘cette riche architecture est sensiblement postérieur à celle de l’église.’ In his opinion, it was costructed around 1200. Folda wrote that the church is

429 Nina Jidejian, Byblos through the Ages, with a Forward by Maurice Dunand (Beirut, 1969), p. 147.
432 www.galenfrysinger.com/byblos.htm
perhaps most notable for its handsome baptistery with its wonderful repertory of decorative sculpture on the arches and hood moldings: Arab godroons on the north side, cornices and modillions reminiscent of Roman architecture and western Romanesque ornament paralleled by French sculpture. The cathedral and the baptistery suggest that the ruling family of Gibelet was not merely interested in the defence of their town or the commercial revenues, but had made a clear attempt to design it in an impressive manner. Apparently, despite the fact that Genoa never seemed to have raised money from Gibelet, the Embriaci who lived there had enough capital to spend in their small town.

The nineteenth-century map of Gibelet by Renan is a useful piece of evidence as long as there are no excavation reports available. The reason that Renan’s account and map are so valuable is because, as Nina Jidejian described historical Gibelet: ‘with the departure of the crusaders Jebeil sank into obscurity.’ It is interesting to notice the four churches marked by Renan as well as the Khan, near the main land gate according to his plan of the sea-port town (Figure 6). The Embriaci are responsible for the reconstruction of most of this town, including the cathedral, most of the walls and towers (especially on the northern side) and the castle. Importantly, the family must have invested much of its resources in these constructions and later the reconstructions of the damaged parts. It would be interesting to further examine the remains of the medieval town to examine if there were any remains of commercial structures built in town, such as loggia or fondaco, custom houses, equivalent to the forna by the land gate and the chaine near the port, as in Tyre and Acre. These structures would have been necessary in order to accommodate the travelling merchants and for local bureaucracy. Wilbrand of Oldenbourg wrote about the small port of Gibelet: ‘portum habet paruis nauibus satis commodum, raro frequentatum, quia eius tanquam “pauperis est numerare pecus”’. However, an examination of such buildings, if they existed, might be useful for the estimation of the measure of commerce that crossed through town and how much Italian influence can be identified in the urban structure of this special crusader and Genoese town.

Hugh de Biblio

Gerald Day wrote about the Embriaco family in the Latin East that ‘the role... of the Embriaco family in the crusading states, where that family, with all Genoese property enfeoffed to them,
controlled the trade at the eastern terminus and guarded over Genoese interests.\textsuperscript{437} Later in his book Day concluded his impression comparing Genoa's place in Constantinople and in the Latin East: 'in 1182 the Latin massacre in Constantinople showed the Genoese that their long-time partners, the Montferrats, could not protect them as the Embriaci did in Syria'.\textsuperscript{438} Day's impression is a result of several assumptions, not uncommon in Genoese historiography, about the loyalty of the Embriaco family to Genoa and the preservation of its Genoese identity whilst in the Latin East. However, it was already demonstrated that Genoa had in fact faced a series of troubles, already at the first half of the twelfth-century, when it tried to enforce its authority over the Embriaco in Gibelet.

The following discussion will follow the developments of these troubled relationships later on. Indeed, Genoa may have desired to maintain control over the Embriaco family and its citizens overseas, but this mission had become difficult to accomplish. In 1168, fourteen years after the conclusion of the contract with Guglielmo II Embriaco, a delegation of Genoese was sent over to Gibelet to conclude new agreements with Guglielmo's son Hugh II, who succeeded his father as the lord of Gibelet. Lanfranco Alberico led the Genoese mission to the Latin East in 1168. He was an eminent figure in Genoa for many years. He had already served twice as consul by that time, in 1160 and 1164.\textsuperscript{439} Lanfranco remained in the Latin East for at least another year, because in 1169 he secured the old Genoese privileges in Antioch and other cities from Prince Bohemond III. In the 1169 charter, Lanfranco is described as '\textit{vir nobilissimus predicte civitatis eiusque totius senatus ac consulum venerabilis legatus}'.\textsuperscript{440} Several years later in Genoa he was also described in a similar way. In the description of a peace treaty signed between Genoa and Pisa in 1172, the Genoese annals mention the presence of Lanfranco Alberico among the \textit{viris nobilibus} who signed the contract on behalf of the commune.\textsuperscript{441} There is no doubt, therefore, that Genoa sent a mission at a high diplomatic level to head the negotiations in Gibelet.\textsuperscript{442}

The Genoese delegation travelled to Gibelet and met with Hugh II, the heir of Guglielmo II Embriaco and the lord of that town since 1163.\textsuperscript{443} The evidence of this meeting is found in a charter that Hugh II granted to the merchants of Genoa. Hugh promised the Genoese security and tax-free commerce in his territory: '...\textit{ego Hugo Ebriacus, Dei gratia Gibelleti dominus, consilio meorum hominum, condono omnem drichturam in civitate Gibelleti omnibus hominibus Ianue...}'

\textsuperscript{438} \textit{Ibid}, p. 165.
\textsuperscript{439} CDC, vol. 1, p. 378; \textit{Ann. Ian.}, vol. 1, p. 157; Agostino Olivieri, '\textit{Indice per ordine di cognomi dei consoli del comune e dei placiti}', \textit{ASLSP} 1 (1858), p. 461.
\textsuperscript{440} \textit{I Libri Iurium}, vol. I/2, no. 340, p. 159.
\textsuperscript{441} \textit{Ann. Ian.}, vol. 1, p. 248.
\textsuperscript{442} About Lanfranco Alberico see also Favreau-Lilie, \textit{Die Italianer im Heiligen Land}, p. 217 note 187.
\textsuperscript{443} Rey, \textit{ROL}, p. 401.
At first glance, this charter seems typical of the time, because of its similarity to many charters that the Genoese and other trading communities obtained over the years from the lords of various trading cities. However, considering the history of the relationship between Genoa and Gibelet this charter might seem rather odd: in 1154 Genoa claimed full ownership over Gibelet as well as the payment of taxes and lease fees from Guglielmo II Embriaco. However, the situation is presented differently in Hugh’s charter. Firstly, Hugh appears as the lord, by divine right, of Gibelet. From this position, after consulting his people in a feudal manner, he granted rights to the Genoese. The issue of outstanding debts or any sort of future payment due to the commune are never mentioned in the charter. Nonetheless, Favreau-Lilie saw in this charter an achievement for Lanfranco Alberico and the Genoese, because at least they found a way for the commune of Genoa to gain some economic benefits from Gibelet.

Lanfrancus Albericus sollte allem Anschein nach in Verhandlungen zumindest bessere Konditionen für den genuesischen Handel in Gibelet durchsetzen, wenn schon die Eigentumsansprüche Genuas und damit eine Anerkennung der jährlichen Zahlungsverpflichtung des Embriacus an die Kommune nicht durchsetzbar waren.

In her observations, Favreau-Lilie assessed the achievements of Lanfranco Alberico, by looking at these negotiations from Genoa’s point of view. It is certainly true that in this agreement Genoa at least secured some benefits, because at no point in the future was it ever able to regain the ownership of Gibelet or receive payment for these possessions. Favreau-Lilie is probably also right in saying that there are no grounds to support the hypothesis (Byrne’s) that Guglielmo II Embriaco paid Genoa the annual payment between 1154 and 1164. The question of the financial debts of the lords of Gibelet over the years will be further discussed in the following pages. However, the charter of Hugh II from 1168 requires further examination before discussion of debts can proceed. It will be argued here that Hugh’s charter to Genoa gives valuable insight into the development of the relationship between Genoa and Gibelet. Furthermore, the implications of the charter go even beyond some economic benefits.

The privileges granted by Hugh were explicitly limited to the Genoese: the inhabitants of Genoa and its archbishopric: ‘omnibus hominibus Ianue qui sunt manentes in civitate Ianue et in toto archiepiscopatu.’ The question of ‘who is a Genoese’ was an important one as far as grants of this nature are considered. For example, in a charter from 1191, the concessions granted to the Genoese, applied to the residents of all Liguria and beyond, from Portovenere to...

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444 I Libri Iurium, vol. 1/2, no 339, p. 156.
446 Byrne wrote that ‘it is evident that up to that date, under occasional judicious pressure from the home government, the family paid most of the censum’. See Byrne, ‘The Genoese Colonies in Syria’, p. 152; Favreau-Lilie criticised this theory. Die Italianer im Heiligen Land, p. 218.
447 I Libri Iurium, vol. 1/2, no 339, p. 156.
Another charter from 1192 applied to ‘universis Iauensibus vel Iauensibus dictis’. However, when Hugh II of Gibelet granted rights to the Genoese, his definition was effectively excluding himself and the Genoese inhabitants of Gibelet from this category too. This definition was financially sensible, because Hugh could not possibly allow free commerce to every Genoese, if this applied also to the residents of Gibelet.

In an article on ‘Gli Italiani fuori d’Italia,’ David Abulafia wrote about the Italians who resided outside Italy that they did not necessarily have the same commercial interests as the Italian inhabitants of the mother-cities. Merchants who settled in such trading communities away from Italy often developed commercial interests in different directions:

La presenza italiana fuori d'Italia fu così espressa anche nella costruzione di città, nella formazione di una classe mercantile residente di espatriati, e nella creazione di reti commerciali sussidiarie che spesso non erano legate alla città madre in Italia, ma guardavano in direzioni completamente opposte.

The creation of independent societies which sometimes had contradictory interests to their home-towns in Italy may not be surprising. However, in the crusader states, the Italian communes have traditionally been viewed as branches of their home-towns. For example, this line of thought predominates in Favreau-Lilie’s book, Die Italianer im Heiligen Land. In a review of this monograph, David Abulafia noted this flaw: ‘Favreau-Lilie has a tendency to speak of each major Italian city as a monolith with a single interest: the furtherance of its Levant trade at the lowest cost and lowest risk.’ The meeting between the delegates from Genoa and Hugh II in Gibelet in March 1168, as reflected in the charter of Hugh, is clearly a case against this traditional view. At the bottom of the charter the list of witnesses is split into two parts; the names of the Genoese from Genoa are followed by the names of the witnesses from Gibelet.

1. Lanfranco Alberico, legatus Iauue
2. marchio Enrico Guercio
3. Iacobo de Sarmaur
4. Iacobo de Calamandrana
5. Obertus de Oleval
6. Nicola Ebriaco
7. Nicola Belfolio
8. Mantelus

‘Et ex Gibelleto adfuerunt’

1. Girardus de Stara
2. Ioffredus de Virnucel
3. Willelmus Leo
4. Nicola
5. Willelmus scriba

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448 I Libri Iurium, vol. I/2, no. 333, p. 142. This concession was granted by King Guy of Lusignan on 26 October 1191.
One practical implication of this charter was that whatever migration of Genoese to the Latin East had occurred since the end of the First Crusade, by 1168 it reached a certain stability that made a social and geographical distinction possible. The 1168 charter may be seen as a milestone in the relationship between Genoa and the Genoese settlers in the Latin East. It implies that by 1168 a clear distinction had already formed between the two Genoese communities, that of Genoa and that of Gibelet. By 1168 most who wished to settle in Gibelet must have done so already and the migration between the two Genoas had reached equilibrium. It also suggests that Hugh II, the lord of Gibelet, who had descended from the Embriaco family saw himself and the other Genoese settlers as independent and not as part of Genoa and its society. The contract does not specify, for example, what was to be the status of a merchant who would arrive in Gibelet and might want to stay there for the short or long term. At what stage would such an individual lose his right for tax-free commerce in Gibelet, or in other words, when will he no longer be a Genoese merchant and become a resident of the crusader states? The fact that this issue was not addressed in the contract suggests that it was probably not a conceivable problem.

Another aspect of the growing rift between Genoa and the Embriaci in Gibelet involved the family's identity and the self-definition of its members. Studies thus far have not paid attention to the change in the surname of the Embriaci who settled in Gibelet. Sometime in the 1160s the Embriaci from Gibelet had abandoned their Genoese surname Embriaco as well as the name of Gibelet. Under Hugh II, the family reverted to the ancient Greek name of Gibelet—Byblos. Members of the family and the inhabitants of the sea-port town began to refer to themselves as the de Biblio. Evidence of this change is found in many documents in which members of the family are mentioned in the collection of documents of the Order of St John by Paoli and later in that by Delaville le Roulx. In documents from the first half of the twelfth century the rulers of Gibelet were referred to by their Genoese surname Embriaco. For example, between 1139 and 1157 Guglielmo II Embriaco (the father of Hugh II) is mentioned six times in documents of the Order: in five out of the six cases his name was included in witness lists in various acts by the count of Tripoli. In 1157, however, Guglielmo made a concession of some possessions in Tripoli to his wife Sanse and his son Hugh. In this record, Guglielmo is mentioned for the first time as 'Guillelmus Ebriacus, Dei gratia Gibelleti dominus.' The lordship of the Embriaci was therefore recognised in the Latin East even when the family was supposedly still

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453 Paoli, vol. 1, nos. 18, 23; Delaville, vol. 1, nos. 144, 160, 199

454 Paoli, vol. 1, doc. 33. p.35

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paying an annual fee to Genoa and recognising the city’s sovereignty in Gibelet. Unfortunately, members of the family are not mentioned again in the documents of the Order of St John until 1174. In the records from 1174, however, Hugh II and his brother Raimundo were referred to as *Hugonis de Biblio et Raimundi fratis eius*. From 1177 onwards, Hugh II frequently appeared in the documents with the title *dominus Biblii*.456

This change in the town’s name and consequently the surname of its inhabitants must not be dismissed as an insignificant semantic change. Indeed, alteration of surnames in the crusader states had played an important part in the establishment process of the Latin society. Robert Lopez demonstrated that the process of change in surnames was very common in Genoa as well, it was ‘far from complete even at the end of the thirteenth century.’457 Moreover, in an era in which surnames were often derived from place names, the change was almost inevitable. Second and third generations of settlers in the Latin East had, therefore, often adopted new names. Peter Edbury described the case of Hugh of Ibelin, who was the first person in his family to adopt the famous surname of Ibelin: in 1152, Hugh forced his stepfather Manasses into exile, ‘thereafter the fortunes of the Ibelins blossomed. Hugh evidently held Ibelin itself, and indeed he was the first member of the family known to have taken his name from it.’458 Another change occurred in the name of Hugh’s brother. ‘Evidently as a result of a shift in the fashions of pronunciation during the third quarter of the twelfth century, Barisan the younger came to be known more commonly as Balian.’459 The comparison between the *de Biblio* and the Ibelin families deserves more attention because similar process occurred in both cases at approximately the same period. The origin of the Ibelin family is disputed. Peter Edbury referred to the ‘obscure origins’ of the Ibelins and suggested that they originated in the coast of Tuscany or Italian Liguria.460 Jonathan Riley-Smith, however, recently argued against this theory. The Ibelins, according to Riley-Smith, descended from French aristocracy and were related to the viscount of Chartres; Barisan himself a descendant of the noble families of Le Puiset and Monthéry.461

455 Delaville, vol. 1, no. 467, p. 320
456 Delaville, vol. 1, nos. 458, 495, 520, 589, 596, 676 etc.
459 Ibid, p. 5.
There was some similarity between the Ibelin family and the de Biblio in the context of the Latin East. Mas Latrie already remarked about this; he wrote that ‘les familles de Giblet et d’Ibelin, presque égales en noblesse et en richesse, s’étaient liées par de nombreux mariages.’462 This impression is a result of a comparison between the families at a later period, probably in the second half of the thirteenth century when the families were established in Cyprus. This speculation, however, may be seen as part of Mas Latrie’s attempt to identify the author of the Continuation of William of Tyre commonly known as Ernoul as a descendant of the de Biblio. More recently, Ruth Morgan suggested this identification again, but this idea was criticized by Peter Edbury.463 It may be added that had the chronicler Ernoul descended from the de Biblio, one would have expected a more detailed account of the history of the de Biblio in this chronicle. Sadly, this is not the case.

It would be a mistake to assume that people such as Hugh of Ibelin, Balian of Nablus and Hugh II de Biblio acted independently of each other and that it was a coincidence that they followed similar patterns of behaviour when they were trying to promote their position in local society. These people had innovative nature part of the spirit of a generation of settlers in the Latin East. The quest for a name or new titles had sometimes proved to be rather complicated. Edbury mentioned that Balian of Ibelin ‘had made an excellent marriage’ when he married Maria Komnena and gained possession of Nablus for as long as Maria lived. Balian was not supposed to, but he nonetheless ‘took to describing himself as lord of Nablus, but it was a title he was studiously denied in documents emanating from the royal chancery.’464 In the case of the de Biblio, the alteration of their surname signifies some major changes including the break between the de Biblio and their noble clan, the Embriaci in Genoa. The 1168 charter reveals that the name Byblos was not easily accepted in Genoa, Hugh II is referred to as Hugo Ebriacus, Dei gratia, Gibelleti dominus. This title means that on the one hand he was recognised as the unequivocal lord of Gibellet. On the other hand, the document refers to him by his Genoese surname and the new name of Byblos is not mentioned at all. Interestingly, the Genoese notary who copied the original charter had also described Hugh’s seal at the bottom of the document. It reads, sigillum Guilielmi Ebriaci, which means that Hugh used his late father’s seal. It is hard to imagine that approximately five years after Hugh succeed his father as the lord of Gibelet, Hugh did not yet have a seal of his own. The reason might be that during the negotiations with Genoa in 1168 Hugh of Byblos had deliberately reverted to his noble Genoese surname, maybe because it was

464 Peter Edbury, John of Ibelin and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, p. 10.
demanded by the commune. Alternatively, it is possible to speculate that the pressure on Hugh may have derived from family demands because Hugh’s relative Nicola Embriaco attended the discussions on the Genoese side.

There is no evidence that the name de Biblio was accepted in Genoa before 1203. Alternatively, it is possible to speculate that the pressure on Hugh may have derived from family demands because Hugh’s relative Nicola Embriaco attended the discussions on the Genoese side.

There is no evidence that the name de Biblio was accepted in Genoa before 1203. However, in the Latin East, as was demonstrated above, the names of Byblos and the de Biblio were frequently used. Significantly, in the chronicle of William of Tyre the old name, Gibelet, is not mentioned at all. Other signs of the social achievements of the de Biblio derive from other contemporary sources. One of these aspects was the marriage stakes. According to the Continuation of William of Tyre, Hugh III married Stephanie, the daughter of Henry le Buffel de Milly, who was the widow of William Dorel, the lord of Botron. Guy I of Byblos, the son of Hugh and Stephanie married Alice of Antioch, the sister of Bohemond IV. Moreover, Bohemond IV, who was then the prince of Antioch as well as the count of Tripoli married Hugh III’s sister Plaisance. By implication this series of marriages, two generations after Hugh II, gave the de Biblio family firm marriage ties with the house of Antioch-Tripoli. Later, in the second part of the thirteenth century, the de Biblio climbed even further up the social ladder of the crusading nobility, when they married into the Ibelin, by now the royal dynasty of Jerusalem. The social promotion of the de Biblio may be better appreciated in the light of a comment in the Continuation of William of Tyre, according to which Italians were treated by the French with contempt, because ‘most of them’ are ‘usurers, corsairs, merchants or seafarers’: Car ciaus de France tient ciaus d’Italie en despit... Car le plus de ciaus d’Italie sont usuriers ou corsans ou marchaanz ou mariniers, et porce qu’il sont chevaliers tient il cil en despit. This explanation is given in the context of the marriage of the daughter of Stephanie (from her first marriage to William Dorel) to a Pisan merchant. In the same paragraph the author mentioned Stephanie’s second marriage to Hugh III de Biblio, however, with no reference to his Italian origins. Does this imply that the de Biblio were not considered ‘Italians’ any more? Similar connotations towards ‘Italians’ are found in other contemporary narratives as well. In the writing

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465 The first Genoese charter in which they are named de Biblio was published by Reinhold Röhrich, ‘Amalrich I., König von Jerusalem (1162-1174)’, Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung (Innsbruck, 1891), p. 489.
466 William of Tyre mentions Byblos several times. A short history of the conquest of the sea-port town and the grant to the Genoese is given in WT, 11, 9.
469 Interestingly, this marriage involved another change of surname. Henry married Isabelle of Ibelin, the daughter of Balian the lord of Beirut and their son Guy abandoned his father’s name de Biblio for his mother’s surname Ibelin. See Rey, ‘Les seigneurs de Gibelet’, ROL 3 (1895), p. 404. These developments, however, are beyond the period discussed in this thesis.
470 Ruth Morgan (ed.), La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr, 33, p. 45
of James of Vitry there is a similar paragraph about the avarice of the Genoese, the Pisans and the Venetians and people from other parts of ‘Lombardy’. James’s severe attitude towards the Italian merchants is reinforced by his famous accusation that they supplied war materials to the Saracens. In conclusion, the lords of Gibelet or Byblos had many reasons to change their name. It was suggested above that change of surname was typical of people of that generation in the Latin East. The lords of Byblos were also eager to break the financial and feudal obligations that linked them to Genoa. However, it is possible that, in addition to the reasons given above, there was also a stigma attached to the Embriaci regarding their place of origin which they were trying to eradicate when they paved their way into the aristocracy of the crusader states. It is ironic that Willibrand of Oldenbourg remarked in 1211 that the lord of Gibelet was French: ‘in ea [civitate] dominator quidam Francigena, Guido nominee,’ or is this a sign of their social success?

**Genoa’s claims of 1186**

In 1179, Genoa brought up again its demands over Gibelet. The commune turned to Pope Alexander III for help on the grounds that Gibelet was originally granted to the cathedral church of St Lawrence and was, therefore, an ecclesiastical property. Pope Alexander III wrote politely to Hugh II whom he addressed as ‘nobili viro Hugoni, domino Gibeleti.’ The pope then mentioned that he had received complaints from the archbishop and canons of St Lawrence about the payment due to them. This letter was apparently ignored because in 1186, a year before Gibelet surrendered to Saladin, Genoa was still claiming its unpaid revenues. Pope Urban III wrote new letters. The claims were addressed to Hugh III, the heir of Hugh II and his successor as the lord of the city. Erik Bach interpreted the Genoese interest in the renewal of their privileges in the 1180s in the light of some diplomatic developments in the region. In his opinion it was not a coincidence that the Genoese demands came shortly before the fall of the kingdom: ‘les Génois paraissent avoir eu connaissance de ce que Saladin préparait une offensive de grande envergure contre l’Orient chrétien, et ils ont donc jugé le moment venu d’exercer une pression par l’intermédiaire du pape sur les maîtres du pays pour faire respecter pleinement leurs privilèges.’ This argument does not hold water; moreover, it reminds one of the more recent scholarly accusations of a Genoese conspiracy during the same years to manipulate both the papacy and the rulers of the crusader states.

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473 *I Libri Iurium*, vol. 1/2, no. 315, p. 118.
475 Hans Mayer and Marie-Luise Favreau-Lilie suggested that the Genoese claims were based on forged documents. Kedar challenged this argument and dismissed the idea of what he called ‘a vast Genoese plot’.
In any case, Pope Urban III wrote fourteen letters to the ecclesiastical and lay personnel of the crusader states, all of which concern Genoese properties and rights in the Latin East. Six of the letters specifically concern the unpaid debts for Gibelet over a period of seventeen years: ‘de censu illo per annos decem et septem.’ Hugh II’s reluctance to pay the census is described in the letter as an ‘act of rebellion,’ as the pope wrote in his letters that ‘sicut pater eius fecit solita rebellione.’476 These six letters are very similar to each other, which makes the small differences between them of some interest.

The first two letters were written on 11 March 1186. The first was addressed to ‘dilecto filio Hugoni, filio Hugonis de Gibelleto,’ and the second was written to the patriarch of Antioch.477 The first letter was sent directly to Hugh III. The pope clearly avoided addressing Hugh or his late father as the lords of Gibelet, but simply used ‘Hugh of Gibelet’. He wrote that the church and the city of Genoa had asked him to act because Hugh’s father had not paid his duty for Gibelet, which is property that he had held on Genoa’s behalf. The pope bluntly stressed that Hugh III must pay because he is ‘his father’s successor’ ‘tu debes ex eius successione....’ Finally, Urban entrusted further dealing on this matter with the patriarchs of Jerusalem and Antioch and the bishops of Tripoli and Gibelet.

The next letter was addressed to the patriarch of Antioch. The pope maintained his rather severe tone. Urban mentioned the letter that he had already written to Hugh III about his father’s unpaid debts, using the same words and adding ‘sicut pater eius fecit, solita rebellione contemptuat’ [my emphasis]. The pope further mentioned that previous letters by the late popes Alexander III and Lucius III were ignored. Lucius III’s letter is not available in the archives of the Vatican, but the reference to such a letter suggests that by 1186, the issue of the relationship and commitments between Genoa and Gibelet had already required papal involvement for over three generations. Urban concluded his own letter to the patriarch in the same rigid manner. He maintained that: ‘uolumus firmiterque precipiendo mandamus quatinus ipsum ad hoc exequendum moneas attentius et inducas. Quod si ad mandatum nostrum et monita tua facere forte neglexerit, tu eum appellatione remota ad hec ecclesiastica districctione compellas.’479

On the following day, 12 March 1186, Urban III wrote two letters to the count of Tripoli. The first letter concerning Gibelet is almost a repetition of the letter to the patriarch of Antioch. The letters to the count includes a long list of flattering titles in the addressing line: 'Dilecto filio nobili uiro ... comiti Tripolitano, baiulo regni Ierosolimitani. This full title stands out in comparison to the lack of acknowledgment of Hugh’s rights over Gibelet and the belittling reference to him plainly as ‘Hugo de Gibelleto’. On 13 March 1186, the pope wrote his final three letters on the matter to the bishops of Tripoli and Gibelet and to the patriarch of Jerusalem. In the letters he asked the three to cooperate and work together to ensure that the debt is paid. ‘si pro mandati nostri reuerentia non adimpleuerit, sine appellationis obstaculo ecclesiastica censura... compellas.’ On this unequivocal these letters end. The fall of the first kingdom of Jerusalem and the crusader states in 1187 made the question of authority and the independence of Byblos and the de Biblio irrelevant for quite some time. Interestingly, after 1186, the independence of Byblos was never questioned again: there is no sign that the de Biblio ever paid the duty due to their home town, or that such payment was requested. This odd change of attitude may be linked to the contribution of the de Biblio to the military efforts to save the kingdom of Jerusalem and the crusader states. Perhaps the fact that Byblos was not recovered for 10 years had contributed to that change of attitude. Hugh III fought in the battle of Hattin and was captured by Saladin together with the king of Jerusalem, the Master of the Temple, Humphrey of Toron and many other nobles of the crusader states. The Continuation of William of Tyre describes how Hugh gained his freedom in exchange for the surrender of his city to Saladin. Shortly afterwards Saladin destroyed the walls of Gibelet, as he did in many other sea-port towns that were perceived as potential beach-heads for the advancing troops of the Third Crusade. In particular, he was worried about the approaching contingents of Frederick Barbarossa. Hugh’s son Guy was in Jerusalem among the young nobles who were with Queen Maria Komnena. When Jerusalem was besieged by Saladin, Balian of Ibelin reached an agreement with Saladin that allowed them passage to Tripoli. The de Biblio family, therefore, had largely survived the war and later regained possession of their town. It is not clear exactly what happened during the Third Crusade. The Genoese armed forces had been in the Latin East from 1190. As was mentioned in Chapter One, the retired Genoese consul Nicola Embriaco was one of the leaders of this crusade.

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480 Hiestand, nos. 132, 134; pp. 309-10; 311-12.
481 This list of titles is from letter 321, which deals with Genoese property inside the kingdom of Jerusalem.
482 Hiestand, nos. 135-37, pp. 312-14.
483 Ruth Morgan (ed.), La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr, Ch. 43.
484 Ibid, Ch. 45 and Ch. 95, translated by Edbury, The Conquest of Jerusalem, pp. 50, 89. RHC. Oc. Vol. 2, Ch. 2, p. 140
485 RHC. Oc, vol. 2, p. 84 There is a small variation of the story in this source accordingly it was not Guy son of Hugh III, but Guillemin fils de Reymont de Gibeleith, therefore, the nephew of Hugh III. Ruth Morgan (ed.), La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr, ch. 52.
Nicola’s son Guglielmo Embriaco made his way to the Latin East in 1192, probably after his father’s death there, where he planned to stay for a couple of years. How did this long-term sojourn affect the relationship between Genoa and Byblos and between the Embriaci and the de Biblio?

The Genoese contingents were praised for their contribution to the siege of Acre, but there was apparently no attempt to recover Byblos. According to the Continuation of William of Tyre the opportunity to regain the sea-port town occurred only after Saladin died. Ernoul’s account of the recovery of Byblos paid high tribute to the role of the lady of Byblos Stephanie. In 1197, ten years after the surrender of Byblos Stephanie managed to regain possession of the city through diplomatic channels.

En cel point que Salehadins fu mors, avoit une haute dame à Triple qui dame avoit esté de Gibelet. Si porcaça tant [et fist] as Sarrasins a qui Salehadins l’avoit commandé à garder, quant il ot pris le cité de Gibelet sour Crestiens, k’il s’en issirent à une ajornnée, et li dame i entra et si chevalier et si home, et si Qarni le castiel et le cité. Ens failement rendi Damediex le cite [de Gibelet] as Crestiens.

Stephanie, the wife of Hugh III, whom Runciman described as a ‘Dowager Lady’ thus allegedly managed to recover the sea-port town from after 10 years of Muslim occupation, although Jonathan Riley Smith also suggested that the recovering of this territory, including Beirut and Sidon, had more to do with the arrival of the German crusade on 1197. In any case, the significant length of time that passed until Gibelet was given back to its lords must have contributed to the fact that Genoa did not claim its taxes when the town was finally recovered. Another reason must have been the state of the town following the Muslim destruction. The repair of the walls and other urban structures that were demolished by Saladin must have cost the lords of Byblos much money. Interestingly, however, the economic strength of the de Biblio was not reduced as a result of the collapse of the first kingdom of Jerusalem in 1187. On the contrary, the construction of the impressive baptistery at the beginning of the thirteenth century shows the wealth of the family. Jonathan Riley Smith mentioned the lord of Gibelet who in 1228 lent Emperor Frederick II 30,000 bezants. This is another indication of the wealth of the family. Commercial evidence from the beginning of the thirteenth century also suggests that Byblos benefited from the opening of the route to Aleppo and the growing volume of Genoese commerce that, as already discussed in Chapter Two, crossed through the Syrian coast from the time of the Fourth Crusade. Indeed, after the establishment of a new Genoese quarter in Tyre, the merchants

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486 see Chapter One
487 Chronique d’Ernoul, p. 305. See also RHC. Oc. vol. 2, pp. 217-218.
of Genoa turned their attention more and more to the northern parts of the crusader states. Byblos, which stands at the centre of this commercial zone, between Tyre and Aleppo undoubtedly benefited from these developments.

The Embriaci and Acre

At the beginning of the thirteenth century, the Embriaco family regained ‘prominence in the home government’ in Genoa. This comment by Byrne is not entirely clear, because members of the family were at the centre of political life also beforehand, throughout the final quarter of the twelfth century. They made an important contribution during the time of the Third Crusade and three members of the family were consuls in the years 1185, 1188, 1189, 1194, 1195 and 1201. The outstanding fact about the Embriaci at the beginning of the thirteenth century is that through the cartulary of Guglielmo di Sori there is an opportunity to examine some of their activities over a period of almost three years, from January 1200 until September 1202. Dozens of contracts contain valuable information on the family. Among these documents there is an interesting case which concerns Acre.

In September 1200, two members of the Embriaco family appointed a fellow Genoese, named Ottone Giudice di Castello, to travel to Acre and act on their behalf for two years. This interesting document was already studied by Eugene Byrne but only recently published by Sandra Origone. Ottone was put in charge of the ruga of St Lawrence in Acre and other possessions. ‘Ego Oto Iudex de Castello iuro... quod tenebo rugam de Sancto Laurentio de Acri ad honorem Dei et communitatis civitatis Ianue et in ordinamento tui Wilielmi Embriaci maioris et Wilielmi Embriaci iunioris’ [my emphasis]. From the income of these possessions including taxes and other revenues (omnes redditus quos recepero de ruga et de omnibus aliis locis) Ottone had to pay 150 bezants. This fee was charged per annum and it equals approximately £50 Genoese.

What was the meaning of this appointment? Which property was included under Ottone’s jurisdiction? Eugene Byrne interpreted the appointment of ‘an agent’ for Acre in 1200 as a sign of a change in the Embriaco family’s attitude towards the crusader states. He thought that this contract was an indication ‘of the efforts of the older families to regain supremacy in

493 Origone, ibid, p. 312.
494 £1 equals 3 bezants. See for example, contract from 12 September 1200, cart 4, p. 251, V4. See also note 282. Otto Iudex was a guarantor for the payment of a sea-loan of £100 borrowed by Opicio Villano de Castello on his way to the Latin East for which he promised to pay 320 bezants, which is more than the ratio above. OS, 1200, cart. 4, p. 257, R3.
Genoa...marked by...an attempt at a reassertion of their ancient...control over the Genoese colony in Acre."495

When Byrne analysed this documents he was not aware of another contract that was signed at the end of two years between Ottone Giudice and Guglielmo Embriaco. Origone did not mention this contract in her discussion too. In the following discussion it will be argued that the contract from 1200 has to be read in the context of other documents concerning properties in Acre. These include the above mentioned second contract between the Embriaci and Ottone Giudice from September 1203, as well as another lease contract for the church’s property in Acre from 1222. Finally, the discussion must also take into consideration the Genoese report about the commune’s property in Acre from 1249.

The contract from 16 September 1203 is a receipt for the actual payment, according to which at the end of his service in the Latin East Ottone Giudice paid Guglielmo Embriaco £230 5s 0d. The problem in interpreting this figure is that Guglielmo Embriaco and Ottone Giudice made a series of commercial contracts between them in 1200 in addition to Ottone’s appointment in Acre.496 However, Ottone did specify that £100 5s 0d of the total sum were ‘in medietate vescontie quam habuit ab eo de rúa de Antiochia et de Ultramare.’497 It is not clear what Ottone meant in the term vescontie. The definition of his authority is also not clear, because the initial contract from September 1200 is a little vague. Guglielmo Embriaco maior asked him to collect the income ‘de rúga nostra predicta Sancti Laurentii aut aliunde et de omnibus redditibus Ultramaris’ [my emphasis]. This definition probably referred to Antioch, even though the only time Antioch was explicitly mentioned in the initial document was when Ottone was granted permission to travel there: ‘si necesse fuerit ire in Antiochiam vel Tripolim aut Gibelletum.’498

What was included in the rúga of St Lawrence? According to Jacoby this term, which usually means street or road, sometimes refers to an entire quarter.499 It might be tempting to interpret rúga sancti Laurentii as the entire Genoese quarter, based on the fact that in the 1154 document the entire Genoese possessions in Acre were explicitly leased to Nicola and Ugo Embriaco: ‘totum illud quod comune Ianue habet in Acri et eius pertinentiis, sine contradictione comunis Ianue et omnium personarum pro eo...’ [my emphasis].500 Such a conclusion, however, would be wrong. Firstly, there is no other indication that the Embriaci possessed anything in Acre in this period. Although they referred to the rúga as ‘rúga nostra’ (see above), a contract of 1222 suggests that they were only acting on behalf of the church. In 29 September 1222, two

496 OS, 1200, cart. 4, p. 252 R4 from 09 September 1200; MS 102, pp. 160-161, from 23 September 1200.
497 GG, 1203, no. 571, from 16 September 1203, pp. 269-270.
498 See above, note 493, pp. 312-313.
representatives of the church of St Lawrence, Rubaldus prepositus and magister Johannes Archidiaconus, received £50 from Ugo Ferrario junior against the tax (census) that he was to collect from the possessions of St Lawrence in Acre over a period of one year: ‘50 nomine census ecclesie sancti Laurencii quam habemus in Ancum (sic)...pro quibus damus et concedimus tibi plenam et liberam potestatem locandi administracionem dicte ecclesie.’ Clearly, Ugo Ferrario was in the same position as Ottone Giudice twenty years beforehand. They were both asked to collect the same amount of money per annum (Ottone Giudice was sent in 1200 to collect 150 bezants, which equals £50), and it is hard to avoid the impression that they were fulfilling exactly the same task. Ottone and Ugo even seem to have adopted a similar economic approach to their mission to Acre. Like Ottone Giudice, Ugo Ferrario also signed a series of commenda contracts before his departure from Genoa to the kingdom of Jerusalem. Assuming that the two contracts of 1200 and 1222 were indeed for the same mission, it is possible to reach some conclusions. When Ottone was sent to possess the ruga of St Lawrence (iuro... quod tenebo rugam de Sancto Laurentio de Acri) he was in fact sent to collect the census, for which he received wide administrative rights by the church over its own possessions.

It is interesting and probably not a coincidence that the sum of the census collected in Acre was equal to the fee that the Embriaci were asked to pay in the old contract that they signed in 1154, in which the Embriaco brothers were required to pay 1000s or £50 Genoese. The impression is obviously that the fee paid for Acre remained the same from 1154 until 1222. There is, however, a major difference between the charter of 1154 and the contracts of 1200 and 1222 in the sense that the contract from 1154 referred to the entire possessions of the commune of Genoa in Acre, while in 1200 it is about the census from the possessions of the church, mainly from the ruga of St Lawrence. The Embriaco family that was given full ownership of the Genoese possessions in Acre in 1154 was not in fact collecting the revenues from these places in the year 1200. The census belonged to the church of St Lawrence and the appointment of Ottone Giudice by the Embriaci was perhaps only symbolic. The real revenues came to the Embriaci through their commercial investments independent of their “ownership” of the ruga st Laurentii.

What was included in the ruga of St Lawrence? In the following paragraphs it will be argued that it formed only part of the Genoese quarter, most probably only the street of St Lawrence itself with not more than a dozen buildings. These calculations are based on one of the most valuable documents existing about the Genoese quarter in Acre, a report which was compiled in Acre in the year 1249 and which covers a period of two years (1248-9). This report

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501 Mag. Sal., no. 550, from 29 September 1222
502 Mag. Sal., nos. 547, 549 from 29 September 1200
contains some useful information about Genoese society in the Latin East and it will be discussed at greater length in the Chapter Five. In the following discussion, however, there will be an attempt to make use of some of the economic implications of this report that might enable a better understanding of the questions presented above.

An interesting clue emerges from the value of the sum collected from Acre as a *census* when compared to other revenues. A comparison between this figure of £50 (or 150 bezants) and the revenues of the Genoese commune from its possessions in Acre in the middle of the thirteenth century will show that it was not a significant amount of money. It was clearly not a large sum in terms of commerce but also not a significant tax. In the year 1248, the consuls Simon Malocello and Guglielmo de Bulgaro collected 1,047 bezants and 12 carats. In the following year, the consuls Simon Malocello and Ogerio Ricci were supposed to receive 1,843 bezants and 18 carats. The consuls of the commune therefore collected revenues of more or less ten times more than the sum that Ottone Giudice and Ugo Ferrario were sent to collect in 1200 and 1222! These figures are derived from the first four sections in the report concerning the rent *ad passagium* which means short term rent during the sailing season, and rent *ad annum*. A recent analysis of this text was published by Robert Kool, who identified eight sections in the text, which are also being used in the current analysis.\(^{504}\) The amount collected from the rent was probably exaggerated to some extent because the report was compiled especially to be used in the conflict between the Genoese and the Venetian communes when they presented mutual demands for compensation.\(^{505}\)

Importantly, three sections in the report concern the *census*. Kool did not explain what was this *census* paid for, but it can be easily inferred from his description that he interpreted it as land tax as opposed to ownership of the houses themselves. This seems a correct interpretation in essence and is clearly based on an old analysis of these three sections of the report by Joshua Prawer. Prawer, however, classified these three sections as one because they are all about the same tax.\(^{506}\) Prawer suggested assessing the size of houses according to the amount of tax paid for them. He wrote 'as the *cens* certainly reflects in some measure the size of the house, it is worth tabulating the respective *cens*.'\(^{507}\) This idea, however, requires careful analysis. Section number six in the report is concerned with the *census* from property that was built in one of the following parts of the Genoese quarter, the *burgensia* or in *rugam comunis Ianuae*.\(^{508}\) The total amount collected for this *census* was 358 bezants and 12 carats. Only a few houses that belonged to the

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\(^{504}\) Robert Kool, 'The Genoese Quarter in Thirteenth-Century Acre', Kool analysed the urban layout of the quarter and not the economic side of the report. The report itself was not republished by him. See Cornelio Desimoni, 'Quatre Titres des propriétés Génois à Acre et à Tyr' in *AOL* 2 (1884), *Documents*, pp. 213-222.  
\(^{505}\) See more about this report in Chapter Five.  
\(^{507}\) Prawer, *ibid*, p. 240.  
\(^{508}\) Desimoni, *ibid*, p. 219.
church of St Lawrence were on the land of the commune and were therefore required to pay to the commune only 4 bezants.

Assuming that the census reflected the size of a house and its location (see below), the small payment, of only 4 bezants could not possibly have been paid against all the property of the church in Acre. We must assume that the report did not include ruga sancti Laurentii, which had its own census. Kool failed to notice this important fact or that the report did not refer to other properties of some Genoese who also possessed land. The fact that the report did not include property on private land is clear from the text itself. Section eight (according to Kool’s numbers) refers to such private ownership: infrascriptae domus, quamvis sint in burgensia et ruga Ianuensi, liberae sunt et nihil dant nec sunt de comuni.509 Prawer wrote about this section that 'it is not impossible here that we are dealing with allodial property which came into burgenses' hands by marriage or acquisition.’510 The reference to private ownership of land in these two parts of the Genoese quarter could have been a result of the opportunity given to individuals to acquire full ownership before 1225. For, as will be discussed in Chapter Five, Genoa made it illegal in that year for the appointed consuls overseas, in particular those sent to the Latin East, to sell parts of the commune’s property.511 This legal record obviously implies that until 1225 the consuls did indeed sell the commune’s land and property.

One important implication deriving from this text is that the Genoese had held more possessions in Acre than listed in the report. This conclusion is supported by more evidence of private ownership and will be further discussed in Chapter Five. As for the property of St Lawrence, if ruga Ianuensi did not include the ruga sancti Laurenti there is still a question of its location and how many buildings were included in this section of the Genoese quarter. It seems inevitable to suggest at this point that ruga should be interpreted simply as street, and that the location of the street of St Lawrence was in the vicinity of that church.

Prawer's theory was that the census in the consuls' report reflects the size of the houses; however, the text itself adds another important variable which is the location of the houses. The following chart shows the sums paid for each house mentioned in section six, in the same order as they are mentioned in the text from house number 1 to number 39. It can be clearly seen that the census rate was between 1 bezant and 32 bezants per house.

509 Ibid, p. 221.
510 Prawer, ibid, p. 240.
511 I Libri Iurium, vol. 1/1, no. 275, pp. 410-412. See more about this legislation in Chapter Five.
Some interesting observations can be made by presenting the payments in such a chart, (Figure 10) and it might be possible to learn something about the church’s property too. The average payment for the 39 houses listed is 14.37 bezants. If all the houses paid the same rent we could have concluded that the church of St Lawrence had probably collected its 150 bezants, from approximately ten houses. The distribution of the tax payment, however, is wide. Few houses paid high fees and many paid little. There is no information about the size of the houses, but perhaps it is possible to theorise about the location of the houses. When the consuls wrote down the list, it seems clear that they followed some sort of order. It seems logical from the chart above that they started in the expensive part, probably in the Genoese street and carried on into the burgenses area of residence. The problem with the above presentation is that the quarter was not linear. It would be interesting to organise these houses in a different manner, for example in a circle around the centre of the quarter (assuming this was a high-price area). In the following version of the chart (Figure 11) using the same variables, the houses are numbered in a circle (clock-wise). This might be a better reflection of how these houses could have been organised: the street of the Genoese in a central zone of the quarter and the burgenses area of residence at the outskirts of the quarter.
One of the missing parameters in this chart is obviously the ruga St Laurentii. Presumably the possessions of the church were located in an expensive part of the quarter. Because the most expensive tax on a house in the quarter was 32 bezants it is possible to conclude that the church had between five and eight houses paying census of between 20 and 30 bezants. This may be seen more as an intellectual game compared to the traditional analysis presented at the beginning of this chapter; however, it is clear that this analysis opens up a window to a better understanding of how the church of St Lawrence had managed its property, what it included and its relative value.

This chapter dealt with a special case of Genoese settlers in the Latin East. It was the only time that an entire town was granted to a maritime city. Many questions were asked at the beginning of this chapter about the economic potential of such a special ownership of a sea-port town and the commercial advantages Genoa could have expected. The results of this research, however, came as a surprise. It became evident that the story of the de Biblio was linked to the experience of other communities and families of settlers in the Latin East. The lords of Byblos struggled with their feudal bonds to Genoa and advanced their position in the Latin society by paving their way into the higher aristocracy in the kingdom of Jerusalem. The pact signed
between Genoa and Hugh II de Biblio in 1168 marked a turning point in the relations with Genoa; the creation of a rift between the inhabitants of Byblos and the city of Genoa. From the settlers point of view it signified the assumption of a new identity and possibly a change in the mentality of the merchants of Genoa who settled in the crusader states.
The Genoese communities in the kingdom of Jerusalem

This chapter is about the Genoese who lived in the crusader kingdom of Jerusalem after the war of 1187. This topic is related to many issues already discussed in this thesis. For example, the Genoese merchants and crusaders who sailed across the Mediterranean at the time of the crusades were at the centre of previous chapters. However, the same people also travelled through the ports of the kingdom of Jerusalem and often resided in the Genoese quarters of those towns. Travelling merchants lived in the commune’s loggia or rented other available accommodation. Rental ad passagium was usually for several months between the spring and the autumn sailing periods. Other merchants stayed longer, for a year or more.512 These travelling merchants are not the direct subject of this chapter, but it is not always easy to distinguish between the various groups of people, the temporary residents and the permanent inhabitants of the Latin East. This problem is a major obstacle in the study of the Italian settlements in the Latin East and it has been discussed on various occasions in the historiography. Recently, Marie-Luise Favreau-Lilie encountered this problem in her study of the Italians in the first kingdom of Jerusalem.513

Indeed, the Genoese who settled in the Latin East stand at the core of the discussion in the current chapter. This social group will be examined here during a time of major political and social changes, a result of the Christian defeat at Hattin and the fall of the first kingdom of Jerusalem. In what ways were the Genoese inhabitants of the Latin East part of the local Latin society, and to what degree did they perceive themselves as part of the cities and communes they left back in Italy? Chapter Four discussed the case of the Embriaco family that settled and governed the seaport town of Byblos. It was demonstrated that this family eventually broke its ties with Genoa and integrated into the local aristocracy. Is it possible to identify a similar process in the case of the Genoese communities that lived in towns inside the kingdom of Jerusalem? What percentage of the Genoese population in the Latin East settled permanently in the crusader states?

The year 1187 is the starting point of the current study. The fall of Acre in that year brought an end to the Genoese settlement within the kingdom of Jerusalem, which meant a great loss of possessions. Even more remarkable was the fact that it marked an end to the Genoese privileged-status as merchants because this status was limited to Acre. It was an overwhelming change for the Genoese and it could have spelled a complete end for that commune in the Latin

513 Marie-Luise Favreau-Lilie, Die Italiener im Heiligen Land: von ersten Kreuzzug bis zum Tode Heinrichs von Champagne (1098-1197) (Amsterdam, 1989), p. 498. See more about the different approaches to this problem in the following section of sources and scholarship.
East. The first question in this chapter concerns the leadership of the Genoese community during this time of crisis. Considering this fragile, disadvantageous, position, it is interesting that the recovery process of the commune was so fast: within a few months, the Genoese were already granted two charters of privilege including possessions in Tyre. Several years later, the Genoese community became the leading Italian power in that sea-port town. The fast recovery of the commune calls for an explanation. Utilising charters and descriptions as well as evidence from the notarial archives for the years 1186, 1190-2 the process of recovery will be examined. It will be argued that the recovery of the community is related to a change that occurred in the administration of the commune in the Latin East.

The change in the administrative domain was marked by the arrival of Guido Spinola in the kingdom of Jerusalem. Guido was the leader of the Genoese contingent of the Third Crusade and his activities in the east marked the beginning of a new era in the way the commune functioned and the role it played in the political life of the crusader states. Guido Spinola was the first in a series of consuls who were appointed in Genoa to handle the commune’s affair in the Latin East. Guido’s diplomatic achievements were of major importance. He gained privileges in Tyre including possessions and various economic and jurisdictional rights. This was the beginning of a prosperous settlement.

After the end of the Third Crusade, however, another change occurred in Genoa’s attitude towards the administration of its commune in the kingdom of Jerusalem. Over a period of approximately ten years, there is evidence of decline in the level of diplomacy sent to the Latin East. This evidence calls one to correct some misconception in the existing scholarship about the Genoese consulates in the Latin East. It will be suggested here that during these years, from 1192 to 1203, the administration and government of Genoese life in the east was mostly left to those who lived in the Genoese quarters. In 1195 there were no acting consuls or if there were, they were not significant ones. Henry of Champagne granted privileges to Genoa through the admiral of its fleet rather than an official representative of the commune in the east, if there was a person in this position.

The second issue concerns the population of the Genoese quarter. Who were the people who established themselves in the new Genoese settlement in Tyre? How many of them were previously inhabitants of the Latin East who were relocated when they found refuge in Tyre? How many were new settlers who arrived from Genoa? An important part of the analysis involve social mapping of the people among those Genoese who took part in the affairs of the Latin East. The term social mapping is used here to analyse lists of names of people who are known to have stayed in the kingdom of Jerusalem at different times during the period under research. Most of the names derive from charters that remain from the Latin East, when Genoese merchants and
settlers acted as representatives of the commune or as witnesses to privileges. Many of these Genoese were prominent personnel who took an active part in the commune's life, either in Genoa or in the Latin East. By comparing this list of people to the vast database from Genoa it is possible to at least identify and track down the background of the residents of Genoa before the war, who came to the Latin East as crusaders or merchants. This analysis would enable greater understanding of the social structure of the Genoese quarters in the Latin East after their reestablishment.

The year 1187 also marked a change in the population of the Genoese commune in the Latin East. Conrad of Montferrat established himself in Tyre and offered opportunities to Genoese and other people whom he encouraged to settle in the kingdom of Jerusalem. Interestingly, none of the private charters that Conrad granted to individuals has been copied in Genoa. Was Genoa not interested in these documents? Did the commune object this sort of private enterprises? A few charters remain in a German collection, others are known from various sources like Venetian and Pisan documents. It will be argued that such grants were not isolated cases. It is significant that information about these concessions is absent from the property reports of the Genoese commune from the middle of the thirteenth century. This absence of documentation suggests that analysis of the Genoese population in the cities of Acre and Tyre cannot be based solely on these property and financial reports. It will be argued that any such research should be aware of the lack of information.

Sources and scholarship:

This chapter draws on a variety of sources concerning the kingdom of Jerusalem and, in particular, the Genoese that lived in the kingdom. Charters that were granted to the commune of Genoa between 1187 and 1195 require special attention because of their importance to the understanding of the process of reestablishment of the Genoese community in the Latin East. However, many other collections of documents were examined for the current study. These include documents from the published collections of Pisa and Venice as well as the Order of St John and the Teutonic Order. Scholarship on the activities of other commercial groups in the kingdom of Jerusalem, Venice and Pisa in particular, were consulted in order to assess the comparative value of the concessions granted to the Genoese.514 Favreau-Lilie's large volume on the Italians in the kingdom of Jerusalem, David Jacoby's article on Conrad of Montferrat and the kingdom of Jerusalem and several other works are especially important.515 The purpose of this

514 Such are the following: TTh, Müller, Paoli, Delaville and Ernestus Strehlke (ed.), Tabulae ordinis Theutonici ex tabularii regii Berolinensis codice potissimum (Berlin, 1869; University of Toronto, 1975).
515 Favreau-Lilie, Die Italiener im Heiligen Land; David Jacoby, 'Conrad, Marquis of Montferrat, and the Kingdom of Jerusalem (1187-1192)', in Laura Balletto, ed., Dal feudi monferrini e dal Piemonte ai nuovi
chapter is, however, different in its aims than these works. As explained above, this chapter aims at social mapping of the Genoese in the Latin East, to explore the nature of merchants, pilgrims, crusaders and especially the Genoese who settled in the kingdom of Jerusalem. The notarial archives and the large database of documents regarding individual Genoese is used to examine the commercial histories of individuals and families of particular interest.

The property and financial reports from 1249 are useful additions to the sources concerning the inhabitants of the Italian quarters in Tyre and especially Acre. These reports were written in the middle of the thirteenth century by the consuls or representatives of the Venetians and Genoese in the Latin East, as part of longstanding conflict between the two communities. The property and financial reports form a special genre in the Levantine literature of the time. They supply names and descriptions of houses and other features in each quarter. They specify the income that the commune used to collect for each property in peaceful times, and the shortfalls it suffered because of the war. These special documents demonstrate the nature of colonial relations between the home city and the way it governed its citizens overseas.

The reports should therefore be studied in the context of the race between the commercial and maritime powers over trade rights and privileges in the harbours of the Mediterranean. From the beginning of the twelfth century, Genoa, Venice and Pisa had competed for concessions in the Latin East. Michel Balard has pointed that in this confrontation the opportunities for gaining vast concessions had always been at times of fragility for the Latin states when the existence of the state was at stake. At times of peace, however, there was an opposite attempt by the local authorities to limit and restrict the concession granted: "Souverains et princes francs cherchent à reprendre en temps de paix ce qu’ils avaient concédé au moment des combats." However, when peace truces were signed between the crusader states and their Muslim enemy, the competition between the Italian powers entered a new phase of direct, sometimes physical, confrontation. Many decades of war with only short intervals led to severe destruction in important parts of the cities of Acre and Tyre. Marsilio Zorzi was the Venetian bailulus or representative of Venice in the Latin East from the spring of 1242 until the autumn of 1244. Zorzi was the first to write an inventory of the property of his commune, including an estimation of the income from these possessions. Following the Venetian precedent of writing inventories, the Genoese consuls in the Latin East also wrote reports detailing the commune’s property seized or damaged by the Venetians, including the specification of the income they used to collect and the shortfall they

*mondi oltre gli Oceani, in Biblioteca della società di storia, arte e archeologia per le province di Alessandria e Asti, 27 (1993).
517 Marsilio Zorzi, Der Bericht des Marsilio Zorzi, ed Oliver Berggötz in Codex Querini-Stampalia IV, 3 (Frankfurt-on-Main, 1990), p. 22, n. 2.
suffered as a result of the Venetian aggression. The Genoese report which covered a period of two consulates was compiled in 1249. These Italian reports are the main historical sources currently available about the Italian settlers and about their property in the kingdom of Jerusalem.

In an article on the Italian maritime republics, Michel Balard began the chapter on the colonies in the Latin East with the following statement: ‘L'activité commerciale est bien la raison d’être des colonies italiennes de Syrie-Palestine. Elle s'exerce par la coopération intime des résidents permanents et des marchands de passage.’ However, Balard noticed a change that occurred after several decades: ‘peu à peu, à partir du milieu du XIIe siècle des visiteurs occasionnels s’établissent en Terre Sainte. Des familles entières prennent racine: rameaux des clans familiaux de la métropole, facteurs des grandes sociétés actives dans le commerce du Levant, marines ou artisans en quête d’aventure ou de fortune.’

Following this introduction Balard quoted cases from the works of Joshua Prawer, Marie-Luise Favreau-Lilie and Geo Pistarino regarding families of Italian merchants who settled in the Latin East on a permanent basis. Balard’s own study of the population of Famagusta showed that many of the Genoese who had lived in the Latin East remained there until its fall in 1291 and then moved with many of the Latin inhabitants of the crusader states to Cyprus.

In a chapter on the Italians in the Latin Kingdom, Joshua Prawer suggested an hypothesis that in ‘Genoa the wealthy nobility controlled the eastern trade, but, as far as we can ascertain, did not settle in the east... the Venetians... organized their administration by enfeoffing a part of their land and income to Venetians of knightly origin against rents and military services.’ Prawer listed the noble Venetians that he identified as inhabitants of the kingdom of Jerusalem. These lists included the Dandolo, the Dulce, the Falieri, the Contarini and the Morosini. Prawer’s theory which was based on the reading of various Venetian documents was criticised by Marie-Luise Favreau-Lilie: ‘Eine genaue Durchsicht des von Prawer herangezogenen und sonstigen Urkundenmaterials ergibt, daß in den venezianischen Notariatsinstrumenten genau differenziert wurde zwischen den Venezianern, die sich nur temporär in den Kreuzzugstaaten aufhielten, und denen, die sich dort fest niedergelassen hatten... die meisten Venezianer, die nach seiner Interpretation schon während des 12. Jahrhunderts im Heiligen Land ansässig waren, sich dort in

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Favreau-Lilie thus highlighted the problematic conclusion in Prawer's work. She also demonstrated how many of the people counted by Prawer as permanent inhabitants of the Latin East were in fact merchants or crusaders, Venetians who passed by the crusader state but never settled there. In contrast to Prawer's theory, Favreau-Lilie therefore suggested a different approach of research, in which the survey of names would include only people who are explicitly known to have lived in the Latin East, preferably those who are known to have had family there or who were mentioned in the text with a new surname that indicates that they were indeed inhabitants of the Latin East.

Favreau-Lilie's methodology and her suggestion to exclude the names of people who are not explicitly described in the contemporary sources as inhabitants of one of the Italian quarters is problematic. It is especially so because the information given in the documents about individual merchants or settlers is often limited to people's names. As a result of this approach, Favreau-Lilie was left with not enough data to offer an alternative conclusion about the nature of the Venetian society in the Latin East. This is probably why scholars such as Michel Balard accepted Prawer's theory that the Venetian aristocracy, in particular the families listed by Prawer, had strong relations with the Latin East.

The reestablishment of the Genoese commune and the foundation of the Syrian consulate, 1187 – 1195

The Genoese inhabitants of the kingdom of Jerusalem were at a fragile state after the fall of the first kingdom. Whoever did not die or fall into Muslim captivity in 1187 found refuge in Tyre. In many respects, they were in the same boat as every other Christian inhabitant of the Latin East but in comparison to the other Italian communities the Genoese were in an inferior position. The Genoese community was the only major Italian community, which did not have a base in Tyre before 1187, let alone a quarter with full commercial and accommodation facilities, as the Venetians and Pisans had had. Therefore, with the fall of the first kingdom of Jerusalem the Genoese lost everything, mobile and immobile properties, rights and all sources of income. What happened to the Genoese who escaped to Tyre? Did the community manage to sustain its integrity despite the lack of communal facilities?

One of the interesting facts about the Genoese community in the Latin East was its fast recovery after 1187. Within a few years they gained concessions, including rights and property, sources of income in the form of bath-houses, gardens, mills and ovens as well as designated territory for the establishment of their own quarter in an advantageous location by the harbour of

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Tyre. Who was responsible to these accomplishments? Who governed the community in these times of crisis? How did it reflect on the relationships between Genoa and its settlers, inhabitants of the kingdom of Jerusalem?

The period between 1187 and 1195 was probably the most significant time in the history of the Genoese in the Latin East. Genoa’s representatives in the Latin East were granted ten charters during this short period, which enabled the reestablishment and the fast recovery of the commune. A close examination of these charters and the people involved in the political and diplomatic events is therefore important. The following table lists the charters, the names of the lords who bestowed them, and the names of the Genoese recipients who represented the commune.

**Table 4: Charters granted to the Genoese between 1187 and 1195**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1187*</th>
<th>1189</th>
<th>1190</th>
<th>1191</th>
<th>1192</th>
<th>1195</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>April</td>
<td>11/04</td>
<td>14/04</td>
<td>04/05</td>
<td>26/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Granted by:</strong></td>
<td>Barons of the kingdom</td>
<td>Barons of the kingdom</td>
<td>Conrad of Montferrat</td>
<td>King Guy</td>
<td>Archbishop Joscius of Tyre</td>
<td>King Guy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Granted in:</strong></td>
<td>Tyre</td>
<td>Tyre</td>
<td>Tyre</td>
<td>Tyre</td>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>Jaffa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recipients</strong></td>
<td>Guglielmo Pipera (Piper?)</td>
<td>not specified</td>
<td>Guido Spinola</td>
<td>Marino filio Rodoani de Platealonga</td>
<td>Guglielmo Ricio</td>
<td>Nicola Cartofigo and Ugo Lercario</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The barons of the kingdom granted the Genoese two charters of which only one remains. A summary of the missing charter from the late thirteenth century appears in the margins of the barons’ charter that was published. See CDG, vol. 2, no. 170, p. 319, note b.

An analysis of table 4 allows a better understanding of the process of recovery of the Genoese commune and the ways it gained its new status in the kingdom of Jerusalem. Several questions will be addressed in the analysis: who was appointed to manage the Genoese community and by whom? How powerful were the representatives of the commune?

The charters from 1187 were given to the Genoese during the war, when Saladin’s forces were still advancing, threatening to overtake what remained of the crusader states. The first charter was granted by the ‘barones regni Ierosolimitani,’ which explains why it is commonly known as the barons’ charter. The list of people in charge of the kingdom during the crisis as it appears in this charter included religious authorities headed by Archbishop Joscius of Tyre and the barons themselves including the lords of Caesarea, Tripoli, Jaffa, Sidon and representatives of the military orders. The charter was granted at an unknown date amid the crisis, obviously before Joscius set off to recruit crusaders in Europe and before Conrad of Montferrat became the lord of

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524 *I Libri Iurium*, vol. 1/2, no. 330
Tyre in October of the same year. Furthermore, a similar charter granted to the Pisans is dated to July 1187, probably the same time as the Genoese charters were granted. The witnesses to the charter were also leading figures from the crusading states, domino Raimundi Biblii among them.

The barons' charter was not granted as a reward for particular Genoese service or future help. The Genoese needed space and houses to conduct their military and commercial activities in Tyre. The charter provided a slaughterhouse (macellum), which meant a source of income. Guglielmo Piperata who acted as a consul et vicecomite Genuensium Tyri, did not promise anything in exchange at this stage. Presumably, he did not have the authority to promise the help of the Genoese navy and it is likely that there was no particular battle planned apart from saving whatever could be saved. David Jacoby argued that Piperata should be identified with Guglielmo Piper the younger. Jacoby relied in this interpretation on Eugene Byrne's analysis of the Genoese consulate in the Latin East.\textsuperscript{525} Jacoby also suggested that Guglielmo Piper was appointed in Genoa, before the battle of Hattin, to serve in the kingdom of Jerusalem. This hypothesis is problematic for several reasons. First, the evidence for the activities of Genoese consuls in the Latin East comes only from the period subsequent to the battle of Hattin. In other words, Guglielmo Piperata is the first known Genoese consul in a list of twenty nine consuls or vicecomites who are known to have acted in the Latin East from 1187 to 1260.\textsuperscript{526} Furthermore, Piperata's title, consul of the Genoese in Tyre, suggests that he could not have been appointed to this position in Genoa before Hattin, while Genoa did not yet possess property and rights in Tyre. Jacoby's second hypothesis, that Piperata was appointed by the Genoese refugees and merchants in Tyre in order to act on their behalf, is therefore more likely.

There are other reasons to conclude that the Genoese did not appoint consuls for Acre before 1187. In the year 1186, only one year before the fall of the kingdom of Jerusalem, Pope Urban III wrote fourteen letters to the ecclesiastical and lay personnel of the crusader states about Genoese property and rights. This series of letters was already discussed in Chapter Four because six of these letters were concerned with the outstanding debts for Byblos. However, eight letters concerned Genoese property and rights in the kingdom of Jerusalem itself. These letters do not mention consuls or any other Genoese authority, secular or ecclesiastical, that the king was requested to cooperate with in order to solve the problem. The only information known about the patterns of government of the Genoese commune before the war is that in the 1150s Acre was

\textsuperscript{526} See Table 5. According to Byrne 'nearly fifty (consuls and vicecomites) can be designated by name between 1187 and the close of the crusades', \textit{ibid}, p. 169. However, the list presented in the table of the consuls and vicecomites between the years 1187 and 1260 contains only 29 names.
leased for twenty eight years in the same manner that Gibelet was. This evidence suggests that before 1187 the Genoese had had a different type of administration than a short term consulate.527

Bohemond’s charter from 1189 is different to the other charters in many respects. It was granted to the Genoese by Prince Bohemond III of Antioch because the Genoese helped the prince to save Antioch from Saladin’s troops. Bohemond, therefore, granted the Genoese commercial and legal privileges in his territory. Who were the recipients of this charter? The charter does not name an official representative of the commune in the Latin East, its language is vague in the descriptions: ‘ego Boamundus... dono et... concedo omnibus consulibus et Ianuensibus Ianue....’528 The witness list was comprised of the bishop of Tripoli, the seneschal of Antioch and other people, all on the prince’s side, which means that there is no way of discerning who were the individual Genoese who helped the prince and received these privileges. The vague form of this charter appears elsewhere too. It is not clear, for example, what aid was supplied by the Genoese. All the document says is that the charter was given ‘propter bona eorum servitia et precipe quia ad necessitatem Antiochiae succursum suum et auxilium ylari animo transmisere.’529

Bohemond’s charter was granted in April 1189, before the large Genoese fleet embarked from Genoa. This can be inferred from the fact that on 30 April 1189 the consuls of Genoa, including Guido Spinola, were still in Genoa, which suggests that the crusaders did not leave Genoa until later in that year and could not have helped Bohemond in Antioch.530 Was the Genoese aid supplied by local Genoese, inhabitants of the kingdom of Jerusalem, or some commercial Genoese ships that happened to be in the district in 1187? One such ship belonged to the Genoese Baldovino Erminio who together with Ansaldo Binvicini assisted Conrad of Montferrat to escape from Acre and save Tyre in 1187. Ansaldo was later appointed the castellan of Tyre. There is also evidence of other Genoese that came to help the kingdom in its struggle for existence. In the Regni Iherosolymitani brevis historia, which is a short Genoese version of the history of the kingdom of Jerusalem, the chronicle mentioned many Genoese (maximam quantitatem Ianuensium) who sailed to Tyre from Romania and Sicily.531 Some of these Genoese must have embarked with the fleet despatched by the king of Sicily. Other Genoese must have been merchants who travelled from Constantinople as suggested by Jacoby.532 It is nonetheless interesting that these groups of Genoese did not appoint official leaders or representatives to act on their behalf. It is thus hard to establish who governed the Genoese community in the Latin East at that time of crisis and who the first Genoese crusaders to offer help to the kingdom of

527 I Libri Iurium, vol. 1/1, nos. 165, pp. 240-1.
529 Ibid, p. 161
530 The consuls signed a contract in Genoa on that day. See CDG, vol. 2, no. 183, pp. 352-3.
Jerusalem were. In many ways Bohemond’s charter reflects the confusion state of the principality of Antioch at the time and the general lack of order in the management of the Genoese community from the fall of the first kingdom to the appointment of Guido Spinola as consul.

An important change occurred at the end of 1189. Guido Spinola arrived in the kingdom of Jerusalem in the latter part of 1189 as part of the large Genoese crusading mission. He was a consul of the commune when he left Genoa which made him the most important person in the fleet. Guido Spinola is first Genoese mentioned in the annals’ list of the Genoese leaders of the crusade. In the kingdom of Jerusalem Guido quickly won the personal respect of many people. The Genoese annals and other contemporary sources praise Guido’s activities, even charters mention his fighting spirit in the battlefield. Moreover, with the arrival of Guido Spinola in Tyre a new era began in the relationship between Genoa and the kingdom of Jerusalem. Guido arrived as a leader of the Genoese contingent and may have been appointed in Genoa also to the position of Genoese consul in the kingdom of Jerusalem.

Guido Spinola was followed by Maurino Rodoano. These two consulates from the autumn of 1189 to the autumn of 1191 are interesting because the appointed consuls were dominant persons who shared some similarities between them. They were both in charge when the Third Crusade was at its height and it is significant that both embarked from Genoa as leaders of their fellow crusaders and as acting consuls of the commune of Genoa. Guido was consul in 1189 and Maurino, who was previously consul in 1186, left Genoa as an acting consul of the commune in 1190. Shortly before Maurino left Genoa he took part in the negotiations and conclusion of the agreement with King Philip Augustus regarding the modified plans for the Third Crusade. The consulates of Guido and Maurino are interesting also because the two consuls achieved a lot in the short period of their consulates in the Latin East. Their activities reflected Genoa’s foreign policy in the Latin East.

When Guido Spinola arrived in Tyre, he had to manoeuvre in a delicate situation between various powers. The death of many of the leaders in the east and the arrival of forces from the west caused much tension in the Latin East, especially since the leadership of Guy of Lusignan had already proved to be unreliable. The most delicate diplomatic decision to be made was which of the claimants to the crown of Jerusalem to support, King Guy who was unpopular and defeated yet the legitimate king of Jerusalem, or Conrad of Montferrat, a hero and the saviour of Tyre. David Jacoby discussed the complexity of this diplomatic decision:

The fierce power struggle between the two men was stimulated by the deep cleavage existing within the higher nobility of the kingdom, which perpetuated the party quarrels that had taken place before Hattin and had been further exacerbated by the defeat of July 1187... The two cities [Pisa and Genoa] took sides in this conflict, to the best of their own

533 Ann. Ian., vol. 2, pp. 32-33
interests, and their intense enmity became grafted upon the ongoing struggle for the throne of Jerusalem....

Guido Spinola, however, managed the negotiations carefully. He obtained the first letter of privileges from Conrad of Montferrat only after his official recognition as lord of Tyre even though Conrad had been on close terms with the Genoese already from the time of their narrow escape from the harbour of Acre in 1187. Conrad was officially entitled lord of Tyre, Sidon and Beirut, a title which he used when he granted his privilege to the Genoese (Conradus, marchionis Montisferrati filius, per gratiam Dei Tyri atque Syдонis et Berithi dominus). Once these important concessions were granted by Conrad, Guido Spinola proceeded to confirm the arrangements he reached with King Guy. In the charter of Guy, the privileges were officially granted by both Guy and his wife Sibylla because she was the successor to the throne of Jerusalem, which meant that he was the king by virtue of being the queen's consort, ‘Guido, per Dei gratiam in sancta civitate Jerusalem rex Latinorum VIIr., et domino Sibilla uxor mea.’ Importantly, at the top of the witness list of this record was the name of Conrad under the title ‘dominus Tyri.’ With this open arrangement, the Genoese secured their position and retained their privileges in Acre, long before the recovery of that town. They also managed to be given a desirable location in the city of Tyre, on the western part of the harbour. These two charters account for the personal achievement of Guido Spinola. King Guy's charter mentioned Guido’s character and bravery. The confirmation of the old rights and the new concessions were given: ‘pro fidelitate et servitio quod nobis et toti christiani in obsidione Acconensi impendistis... prudenti viro Guidoni Spinole... in obsidionem predicte civitatis Acconensis contra Sarracenos fortiter decertavit’ [my emphasis]. Guido Spinola left a positive impression in the Latin East. He made a major contribution to the establishment of the Genoese quarter in Tyre in 1190 as a commercial stronghold for visiting merchants and also as an autonomous community with legal and ecclesiastical rights for its members.

Guido Spinola and Maurino Rodoano helped to establish the commune in the kingdom of Jerusalem but they did not settle there themselves. Both of them were given new diplomatic missions as soon as they finished their duty in the Latin East. In 1192 and 1193, Guido conducted diplomatic missions as a legate in Constantinople. Guglielmo Tornello and Guido Spinola were sent to Constantinople in 1192 and, in 1193, Guido was joined by Baldovino Guercio, who

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537 In my MA dissertation on the Italian quarters in Tyre it was argued that the location of the Genoese quarter was inside the city walls on the western side of the harbour.
538 I Libri Iurium, vol. I/2, 332, p. 141. In Conrad's charter Guido was also described as a brave person: nobili viro ac strenuo Guidoni Spinule. Ibid, no. 331, p. 137.
previously embarked with him on the Third Crusade in 1189. They went together to Constantinople in 1193 to discuss with the Emperor Isaac II Angelos the pressing problem of piracy in the eastern Mediterranean and his stolen gifts that were sent to him by Saladin. Similarly, when Maurino Rodoani finished his period of consulate in the Latin East he was sent to Genoa carrying a communication from King Richard the Lion Heart who was then based in Acre.

From 1192 to the end of the century there is a noticeable change in the nature of the Genoese consulate in the kingdom of Jerusalem in the form of significant reduction in the diplomatic level employed to represent Genoa in the Latin East. Guillielmo Ricio, Nicola Cartofigo, Ugo Lercario and the admiral Gafforio are more obscure names in the contemporary sources. None of them had ever been a consul or served in an important diplomatic mission before his assumption of the position in the kingdom of Jerusalem. Ugo Lercario was previously mentioned with his brother Belmonto Lercario in the witness list of the first concession granted by Conrad of Montferrat to the Genoese in 11 April 1190. However, there is evidence that by 1195 he was back in Genoa where he financed the arming of galleys to assist the Emperor Henry VI in his Sicilian wars. Apart from these fragments of evidence there is no more information about him or any of the other consuls. Who were Nicola Cartofigo and Admiral Gafforio? In the second charter of Henry of Champagne Admiral Gafforio is described on six occasions in the charter as the admiral of the Genoese fleet - amirato victoriosi stolii Ianuensium. Michel Balard mentions other activities of Gafforio (Kaphourès), who was in fact an infamous Genoese pirate who threatened and often pillaged the islnads and the shores of the Aegean.

Byrne wrote about the Genoese consuls that they `were men of discreet age who had served the commune in civil office before they were entrusted with the colonial service,` but the current analysis shows that in reality the Genoese consulate in the Latin East had been through several transformations during the years. Not all consuls had previously been in high positions in Genoa or elsewhere; in fact some of them are not mentioned in the contemporary

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539 Trattati, p. 37 no. 161; see documents which were written as a result of that mission in CDG, vol. 3, pp. 50-78. on Genoa and its relationship with Constantinople in the light of the problem of piracy see Charles M. Brand, 'The Byzantines and Saladin, 1185-1192: Opponents of the Third Crusade', Speculum 37:2 (April, 1962), p. 172, no. 13; p. 178, n. 24
542 Trattati, 164, p. 37.
543 I Libri iurium 1/2, no 336, pp. 149-152.
Genoese sources. Perhaps some of the consuls were chosen from the local inhabitants of the Genoese commune in Latin East. It is also possible that there were several years with no appointed consul at all. This theory might explain why Admiral Gafforio represented the commune without the title of consul when the Genoese were granted privileges by Henry of Champagne.

Table 5 includes the list of all known consuls who served in the kingdom of Jerusalem including Belmuso Lercario and his associate Lamberto Fornario who were sent to Antioch and Tripoli in 1203. Highlighted are names of consuls who had been consuls of the commune in Genoa before or after their mission in the Latin East.

**Table 5: Genoese consuls and vicecomites**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Guillelmo Piperata (Piper?)</td>
<td>consul et vicecomes Genuesium Tyri</td>
<td>1187</td>
<td>RRH, 659; I Libri Iurium, V/2, 330</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Guido Spinola</td>
<td>Lanuensium consul</td>
<td>1189-1190</td>
<td>Annals, AD 1189; I Libri Iurium, V/2, 331-332; CDG vol. 2, 195</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Morino filio Rodoani de Platealonga</td>
<td>consul vester (Lamuensis). in partibus Syria</td>
<td>1191</td>
<td>I Libri Iurium, V/2, 333; CDG vol. 3, 7</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Guillelmo Ricio</td>
<td>Lanuensium consul in Syria</td>
<td>1192</td>
<td>I Libri Iurium, V/2, 334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Ugo Lercario</td>
<td>Lanuensium consules</td>
<td>1192</td>
<td>I Libri Iurium, V/2, 335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Nicola Cartofigo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Admiral Gafforio,</td>
<td>victoriosi stolii Lanuensium amirato</td>
<td>1195</td>
<td>I Libri Iurium, V/2, 336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Belmosto Lercario maior</td>
<td>consules Janae</td>
<td>1203</td>
<td>RRH, 792</td>
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<td>9. Lamberto Fornario</td>
<td></td>
<td>1203</td>
<td>RRH, 792</td>
</tr>
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<td>10. Jacobo de Marino</td>
<td>consules Janaensis in Syria</td>
<td>1211</td>
<td>RRH, 849</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Lanfranco de Mari</td>
<td>vicecomes Janaensis urbis Acon</td>
<td>1212</td>
<td>RRH, 857</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Simon Bufferio</td>
<td>consules Janaensis</td>
<td>1212</td>
<td>RRH, 858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Iacobro Mallone</td>
<td>Consul Janaensis in Acri</td>
<td>1212</td>
<td>RRH, 858</td>
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<tr>
<td>14. Ottone de Insulis</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. Ido Lercario</td>
<td>Consul Janaensis in Acri</td>
<td>1218-9</td>
<td>Mag. Sal., 736-9; I Libri Iurium, V/2, no. 369</td>
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<tr>
<td>16. Amico Streiaporto</td>
<td>Consules</td>
<td>1221</td>
<td>RRH, 950</td>
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<tr>
<td>17. Filippo Embruisco</td>
<td></td>
<td>1221</td>
<td>RRH, 950</td>
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<td>18. Ugo Cancellario</td>
<td>Consul Janaensis</td>
<td>1222</td>
<td>RRH, 956</td>
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<tr>
<td>19. Guglielmo de Orto</td>
<td>consules et vicecomes Janaensis in Syria</td>
<td>1232</td>
<td>RRH, 1037</td>
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<tr>
<td>20. Ingo Ferrario</td>
<td></td>
<td>1232</td>
<td>RRH, 1037</td>
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546 This list is based on works by Sandra Origone and Iris Shagrir. I would like to thank Iris for sharing her data with me. See Sandra Origone, ‘Genova, Costantinopoli e il regno di Gerusalemme (prima metà sec. XIII)’, in Gabriella Airaldi and Benjamin Z. Kedar (eds.), I comuni italiani nel regno crociato di Gerusalemme (Genoa, 1986), p. 298 note 5. Names of consuls are highlighted according to Agostino Olivieri’s list of Genoa’s consuls. See Agostino Olivieri, ‘Indice per ordine di cognomi dei consoli del comune e dei placiti’, ASLSP 1 (1858), pp. 461-479.
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<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>Piccamiglio</td>
<td>consules Ianuensium</td>
<td>1233-4</td>
<td>RRH, 1047, 1049</td>
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<td>Pietro de Mari</td>
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<td>1233-4</td>
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<td>Alexander</td>
<td>consul pro communi Tyrensi Ianuensium</td>
<td>1249</td>
<td>RRH, 1184</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guglielmo de Bulgaro</td>
<td>consules et vicecomites Ianuensium in Syria</td>
<td>1249</td>
<td>RRH, 1181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simone Maloccello</td>
<td>consules et vicecomites Ianuensium in Syria</td>
<td>1249</td>
<td>RRH, 1181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogerio Rici</td>
<td></td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>RRH, 1188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simone Maloccello</td>
<td></td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>RRH, 1188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guiglielmo Savignano</td>
<td>consul et vicecomes Januensium Syri</td>
<td>1260</td>
<td>RRH, 1294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacobus Spinola</td>
<td>consul et vicecomes Januensium Syri</td>
<td>1260</td>
<td>RRH, 1294</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The first years of the consulate in the second kingdom of Jerusalem were a formative period for both the position and the extended administration that was given a new start with the establishment of the Genoese quarter in Tyre. The Genoese took a leading part in the Third Crusade which was the reason that the first to assume the position of local consuls were of high diplomatic standing. It was the only time in which consuls of Genoa embarked for the Latin East to assume the new position of local consuls while still holding their home position as consuls of Genoa.

The next occasion in which eminent Genoese were appointed *consuls in Syria* is not until 1203, the time of the Fourth Crusade. Belmusto Lercario the elder and Lamberto Fornario were sent to handle important negotiations, the consequences of which were to affect the fate of Genoa's commerce in the Levant. The surviving references to that mission mention negotiations in Antioch and Tripoli but the presence of the lord and members of the *de Biblio* family suggests that Byblos was involved as well.\(^{547}\) After a period in which the Genoese diplomats in the Latin East were of low diplomatic standing, Belmusto Lercario the elder was sent on a mission as consul to the Latin East. In 1203 Belmusto was an old man, an experienced merchant who had previously spent years in the Latin East as a crusader during the Third Crusade and as a merchant later on. In the years before his mission he had served as a consul of the commune in Genoa three times (1196, 1199 and 1202).\(^{548}\) Importantly, it was argued in Chapter Two that these negotiations were related to the progress of the Fourth Crusade and the Genoese exclusion from the market of Constantinople. The agreement with Antioch and Tripoli implies further agreement with the Muslim ruler of Aleppo and the opening of one of the most important commercial routes by the

\(^{547}\) This charter by Bohemond IV was granted in December 1203. The charter was published by Reinhold Röhrich at the appendix to his article: ‘Amalrich I., König von Jerusalem (1162-1174)’, *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung* (Innsbruck, 1891), p. 489. The Genoese annals briefly mentioned the mission of Lercario and Fornario, in *Ann. Ian.*, vol. 2, p. 92.

The Third and Fourth Crusades were times of significant change in the trade routes and many markets in the eastern Mediterranean were consequently affected but it is made clear that they marked a change also in Genoese trade routes and in Genoa’s approach towards its settlements in the Latin East.

Another indication of the importance of maintaining the community in the Latin East may be deduced from the fact that on 26 February 1225 a law that institutionalised the Syrian consulate was passed in Genoa. An assembly of the parliament of Genoa agreed that whoever is sent overseas, ‘in ultramarinis partibus sive per diversas mundi partes’, is not authorised to deal with any property of the commune of Genoa in the cities of Acre and Tyre. The exact definition forbids the following: ‘vendere, cambire, permutare seu alienare’ of lands or houses or possessions or even the lease of income from such immobile; ‘honoribus aut introilibus illis.’ The punishment for non-compliance was twice the value of the property. It is interesting that the Genoese financial and property reports from 1248-49 mention four houses which were located in the burgensia or in ruga Ianiensi but did not have to pay census to the commune because the land was privately owned. This consular-regulation act was approved by the assembly. The document, however, does not explain what circumstances encouraged the discussion of the issue of property in the kingdom of Jerusalem. Was it part of a political statement that mirrors the growing tension with Pisa and Venice over territory in Acre and Tyre? Favreau-Lilie showed that the conflict between Pisa and Genoa, which had already developed into a war in Italy at the end of the twelfth century, reached the Latin East in 1212. Was there a correlation between the fact that the Pisans set fire to parts of the Genoese quarter in Acre in 1222 and the discussions about the Genoese properties in the Latin East in 1225? The motivation behind the property-regulation act could have been the result of an economic problem with Genoese traffic to the kingdom of Jerusalem and the consuls’ inability to rent out the property. In any case this was the first occasion in which the role of the Genoese representatives in the kingdom of Jerusalem was presented in Genoa in writing.

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550 Cornelio Desimoni, ‘Quatre Titres des propriétés Génois à Acre et à Tyr’ in AOL 2 (1884), Documents, p. 219.
The Genoese inhabitants of the kingdom of Jerusalem after 1187

The Genoese community in the Latin East after 1187 had been through long trail of hardship until it established itself as a functioning body with basic facilities that could support the community. Despite the fact that, as was already demonstrated, concessions were generously bestowed on the Genoese between 1187 and 1195, the community had many basic needs, from housing and commercial facilities to spiritual rights. The move to Tyre also meant relocation of the Genoese who already lived in the kingdom of Jerusalem. One of the questions is who were the Genoese who settled in Tyre? Were they refugees from the rest of the kingdom or predominantly new immigrants, crusaders and merchants from Genoa? The issue of the 1187 refugees and their place of refuge are interesting. The notarial records from 1190 to 1192 do not provide much evidence about refugees from the crusader states in Genoa itself. Perhaps it should not be surprising considering that if people escaped as refugees they probably had no capital to invest in Genoese trade. Perhaps they could not afford to pay the notaries. It should be also made clear that there is not much evidence in the cartularies of traffic coming from the Latin East to Genoa even in peaceful times. Merchants who travelled in that direction carried out their legal arrangements in front of notaries in Acre or in Tyre. Shelomo Gotein found evidence of a similar process in the case of merchants who travelled to Genoa from Old Cairo. With this in mind, it is interesting to find several cases that seem to be related to the fall of the first kingdom of Jerusalem. One such case is of Magalda, wife of Johannes from Jerusalem who was in Genoa on 08 April 1190. She went to see the notary Oberto Scriba with her sons Wuilielmus and Martinus. Magalda and Wuilielmus made a contract with Martinus and handed over to him a large sum of £370 that he was to take to his siblings, Johannes, Symon, and Adalaxia:

Confesi fuerunt... Magalda de Jerusalem et Wuilielmus eius filius quod per Martinum filium predicte Magalde mitebant Ultramare Johanni et Symoni et Adalaxie filiiis predicte Magalde et fratribus prefati Wuilielm £370... Et bene fuit cunfesus Martinus quod predictas res portat... 554

Although the document does not specify so, the other children and siblings must have been in Tyre at the time. This is unfortunately all the information provided in the record. Furthermore, in the cartulary of Oberto Scriba it is the only example that seems to be linked to the fate of the refugees in 1187. The contract fails, however, to tell the complete story. Magalda and

553 Oberto de Bramante is one such notary who is known to have worked in Acre in 1218 and 1222. See the summary of the proceedings of a court case from 1224, which mentions the role of Oberto as notary in Acre in 1218: *Mag. Sal.*, nos. 736-739, pp. 308-316; Oberto is also mentioned as the notary of Acre in documents from 1222 which were published as an appendix to Favreau-Lille's article, ‘Friedenssicherung und Konfliktbegrenzung’, pp. 444-447. Shelomo D. Goitein, *A Mediterranean Society: An Abridgment in One Volume*, ed. Jacob Lassner, (Berkeley, 1999), pp. 36-38, 312-3.

554 OS, 1190, no. 356. The Latin names of these individuals was used here because their identity and language are not known.

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her family could have been part of the large group of refugees whom Saladin’s soldiers led from Jerusalem to Alexandria. Those refugees were the fortunate ones who won the pity of Saladin and were sent on Italian ships to the west. Perhaps Magalda and her two sons happened to be away in 1187 and thus escaped the fate shared by many of the Latin population of Jerusalem, including three of Magalda’s own children. The contract volunteers no answers to these questions. It does not even mention the fate of the father of the family or what were the sources from which Magalda raised the funds. In another record of March 1190, Hugh of Acre witnessed a contract in Genoa on behalf of merchants who travelled to Marseilles. There is no way to tell what were the circumstances that brought him to Genoa because Hugh is not mentioned in the cartularies again. The opposite phenomenon to the movement of people from the kingdom of Jerusalem is obviously the influx of crusaders who potentially were new settlers. Were there such cases of Genoese immigrating to the kingdom of Jerusalem? If so, what motivated them? Was their action religiously or economically oriented? A close examination of the charters that involved the Genoese community examines who were the Genoese active in the politics of the commune in the Latin East. Table 6 breaks the witness list into three groups: the Genoese, the local witnesses and the names that were not identified. The circles over two adjacent cells indicate that the same people witnessed in the two charters covered by each circle. Highlighted are cells that include groups of people who could have been settlers in the Genoese quarter and that will be closely observed in tables 7-9.

Table 6 provides some interesting clues about the relationship between Genoa and the Latin East. The first point is that only the charters by Conrad of Montferrat and Archbishop Joscius (who was acting under Conrad) included names of Genoese witnesses. The other charters granted by Bohemond III, King Guy of Lusignan and Henry of Champagne did not include witnesses on the Genoese side at all. On the other hand, Conrad’s men included some obscure names. Most of the people, not only the Genoese, had arrived in the Latin East at the same time or shortly after Conrad did.

555 OS, 1190, no. 270
Table 6: Witnesses to the charters granted to the Genoese 1187 – 1195

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1187</th>
<th>1189</th>
<th>1190</th>
<th>1191</th>
<th>1192</th>
<th>1195</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>July?</td>
<td>April</td>
<td>11/04</td>
<td>14/04</td>
<td>04/05</td>
<td>26/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Granted by / in:</td>
<td>Barons of Bohemon d III, in Tyre</td>
<td>Conrad 1, in Tyre</td>
<td>Joscius in Tyre</td>
<td>Guy 1 outside Acre</td>
<td>Guy 2, in Jaffa</td>
<td>Conrad 2, in Tyre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipients</td>
<td>Tyre</td>
<td>not specified</td>
<td>Guido Spinola</td>
<td>Marino filio Rodoani de Platealonga</td>
<td>Guglielm o Ricio</td>
<td>Nicola Cartofigo and Ugo Lercario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of witnesses</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Genoa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nobles from the Latin East</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity not clear</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In some of the charters’ witness lists there is a repetition of names of witnesses. These are mainly in names of nobles from the Latin East who witnessed the acts on the benefactors’ side. Such repetitions are not surprising because the kings or lords who granted the concessions had their personal advisors around them to consult with and to have them witness their acts. Hugh of Tiberias, for example, appears as witness in three of these concessions: twice on Guy’s charters and in the first charter by Henry of Champagne. Leading nobles in the Latin East often fulfilled their feudal duty in advising their lords and acting as witnesses to the acts. On the other hand, the lists of Genoese witnesses do not contain many repetitions. This might encourage one to conclude that the witnesses were crusaders or merchants who came from Genoa and acted during their short sojourns in the kingdom of Jerusalem. Was that the case? Were all the people involved in the reestablishment of the Genoese community in the kingdom of Jerusalem passers by, crusaders, pilgrims or merchants who returned to Genoa shortly afterwards?

Evidence from the year 1187 shows that Genoese were encouraged by Conrad of Montferrat to move into the kingdom that lost so many of its nobles only shortly beforehand. For example, two of the witnesses in Conrad’s charter were the brothers Ansaldo and Baldovino

556 The three knights were Milo Brebanz (Miles Brabant), Antelmus de Luca and Bernardus de Templo. They are mentioned in the Order’s documents. See Delaville, vol. 1, pp. 603, 446, 617
557 The names of Terricus de Oca (Thierry d’Orgue) and Terricus de Tenero Monte (Thierry de Tenremonde) can be found in other witness lists that include names of nobles from the Latin East. See Delaville, vol. 1, pp. 617, 603, 650. It seems that the last name in this list of Johannes de Guelinie should be regarded as part of the same group.
Bonvicino, who were indeed new settlers in the Latin East. Ansaldo Bonvicino is mentioned in the Genoese' short history of the kingdom of Jerusalem. He was an associate of Conrad of Montferrat, according to that chronicle, when they sailed in 1187 from Constantinople to Acre. Ansaldo Bonvicino is described there as *Iauense privato suo* (of Conrad of Montferrat).\(^{558}\) When Conrad became the commander and later the lord of what remained of the kingdom of Jerusalem he encouraged Ansaldo to remain in the kingdom. Ansaldo became famous because Conrad appointed him the castellan of Tyre, a title used when Ansaldo witnessed the charter from 1190.\(^{559}\) Ansaldo and his brother Baldovino Bonvicino appear at the top of the witness list on what seems to be a part that belongs to the witnesses on the side of Conrad of Montferrat. The new arrivals' destination was Tyre, Conrad's power base, where he could bestow them with responsibilities and power.

To whom did these opportunities apply? Were they offered to crusaders and merchants from Genoa like the Bonvicino brothers or to Genoese refugees from Tyre? The only surviving charter that was granted to an individual Genoese by Conrad of Montferrat is included in the *Tabulae ordinis Theutonic*\(^{560}\), a collection of documents of the Teutonic Order. On 23 September 1189, Conrad of Montferrat granted Marino Rocia (or Rocia) a house in Tyre for his faithful service, *pro bono servicio et maxima fidelitate, quam mihi in Tyro Martinus Rocia nobilis Iauensis civis exibuit*.\(^{560}\) This house previously belonged to Theodore Surriani but twenty one years later, in 1210, Marino sold the house for 60 bezants to Herman von Salza, the Master of the Teutonic Order and through him to the Order itself. A legal dispute between the Teutonic Order and Marino Rocia was the reason that this charter was copied and kept in the Order's archive.\(^{561}\) Genoa seems to have not obtained a copy of this charter, which is interesting considering that the charter relates to property owned by a Genoese citizen. Moreover, Marino Rocia was not the only individual Genoese who received such concessions. Other Genoese were given similar grants and none of these documents seem to have been copied or preserved in the archives of Genoa. Conrad's concession to Ansaldo Bonvicino is another example. Evidence of this concession originates from Venetian sources because in 1244 the Venetian *baiulus* Marsilio Zorzi complained about it. Zorzi wrote in his report that when Conrad of Montferrat appointed Ansaldo to the office of the castellan of Tyre in 1187 he gave him a house that used to belong to a Venetian named Marchio. According to the Venetians, this was a violation of their rights and

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\(^{558}\) *Regni Iherosolymitani brevis historia*, in *Ann. Ian.*, vol. 1, p. 144.

\(^{559}\) *CDG*, vol. 2, no. 194, p. 371; see also Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, pp. 234-5.

\(^{560}\) Strehlke (ed.), *Tabulae ordinis Theutonic*, no. 24, p. 21.

\(^{561}\) Ibid, no. 45, pp. 36-37.
property and they further complained that in 1244 the same house was inhabited by Baldovino Bonivicino, Ansaldo’s son.\textsuperscript{562}

Conrad’s concession to the brave Genoese knight Marino indeed illustrates the opportunities offered to newcomers during this time of instability under Conrad of Montferrat. In Conrad’s concession to Martino Rocia the witness list included, perhaps not surprisingly, the name of Ansaldo Bonvicini at the top. Following Ansaldo’s name, the list includes the names of: Obertus Malus; Osellus (Oberto Malocello?); Franciscus de Potus Veneris; Orecius Graucius; Guillelmus de Valga. Except for Oberto Malocello, if indeed the identification is correct, none of the names can be found in the contemporary sources as they appear in the German copy of the charter. It is possible that like Ansaldo Bonvicini and Martino Rocia they were also Genoese knights whom Conrad of Montferrat invited to stay in his territory in Tyre.

Marino Mazuc is another example of a Genoese settler who migrated at the time of the Third Crusade. He was apparently granted property in Acre and settled in the kingdom thereafter. On 27 April 1201 he made a concession to the Order of St John of the income from four shops (stationibus) that he possessed in Acre. These shops were located along one street. Two of them were between the shop of the Order of St John and that of Rolandi Nepotis, fratri Antelmi de Luca; the third shop was on the other side of the shop of Rolando and one that belonged to Andree Ruffi. The fourth shop was located between the shop of Andreas and that of a Pisan named Bandini Bec. According to the document, this market street was located to the north of the harbour of Acre, between the harbour and a public road (omnes vero stationes iste ex parte septentrionis adherent vie puplice (sic). et ex parte meridiei mari portus civitatis Accon).\textsuperscript{563}

The street must have been part of the royal territory of Acre, where people of different national or institutional affiliations were allowed to possess property. Thus people from Luca, Pisa and Genoa as well as the order of St John could possess shops along one street. A similar phenomenon is also evident in the case of Tyre where Genoese and Venetian individuals, even the Venetians as a commune as well as the Knights Templars possessed houses and lands in an area called Baragesse, which was part of town in the vicinity of the harbour of Tyre.\textsuperscript{564} In the example of Martino Mazuc, like the case of Martino Rocia and Ansaldo Bonvicini, Genoa did not obtain a copy of the private charters, nor did it seem to have been concerned with the rights over these properties, at least not until 1225 when the discussion of Genoese property in the Latin East

\textsuperscript{562} Marie-Luise Favreau-Lilie, Die Italiener im Heiligen Land, pp. 268-270; see also her note, no. 110.
\textsuperscript{563} Delaville, vol. 3, pp. 7-8.
\textsuperscript{564} This conclusion is derived from my dissertation on the Italians in Tyre, based on the property reports of Venice and Genoa from the middle of the thirteenth century. See Marsilio Zorzi, Der Bericht des Marsilio Zorzi, ed. Oliver Berggötz, p. 148.
was brought up in the parliament. Is it possible that there were many other such settlers? Can they be identified at all?

The conclusion derived from the series of examples presented above is that in the years 1187-92 many opportunities were offered to Genoese individuals and that they were encouraged to settle in Tyre. As a commune, Genoa was given the opportunity to possess sources of income such as an oven, bath-house and gardens. Furthermore, under Conrad’s authority Archbishop Joscius of Tyre allowed religious privileges and the appointment of a chaplain (capellanus) of the commune. \(^{565}\)

Tables 7-9 reconstruct the history of the individuals that are mentioned as witnesses in the three charters. The career of whoever can be identified is presented in the table. In particular, those bearing Genoese surnames are analysed utilising various Genoese sources. There is an attempt to examine the fate of these Genoese after the war and to establish how many of them followed the steps of the Bonvicino, Rocia and Mazuc and settled in the kingdom of Jerusalem. The names of people who did not live in Genoa before 1187 or did not return to be residents there are highlighted in the tables below.

The sources used in the composition of the following tables include a variety of documents. A list of Genoese citizens appears in an appendix to a truce that was signed in 1188 between Genoa and Pisa. Almost one thousand Genoese were required to swear to respect this truce. \(^{566}\) In addition to the information from the notarial records, it is possible to follow the career of many Genoese citizens.

### Table 7: Charter of Conrad of Montferrat, 11 April 1190

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness</th>
<th>In Genoa before the war?</th>
<th>Back in Genoa by:</th>
<th>References to acts in Genoa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ansaldo Bonvicino</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baldovino – brother of Ansaldo</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johannes Stralera</td>
<td>Wrote his will in March 1184</td>
<td>July 1190!</td>
<td>OS, cart. 2, 145V, OS, 1190, 533-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baldovino Comes</td>
<td>Witness, July 1182</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CDG vol. 2, 140, p. 282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogerio Panis (Genoese scribe)</td>
<td>List of 1188</td>
<td>14/07/1192</td>
<td>Ann. Ian vol. 2, 33-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ugo Lercario also witnessed the grant of Henry of Champagne in Tyre in 1192, which means that he remained in the Latin East for at least two years</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1195</td>
<td>CDG vol. 3, 28, p. 87 Trattati, no. 164</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness</th>
<th>In Genoa before the war?</th>
<th>Back in Genoa by:</th>
<th>References to acts in Genoa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*** Belmusto brother of Ugo Lercario</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Consul in Genoa in 1196, 1199-1200, 1202. Merchant in the Latin East in 1201; consul in the Latin East in 1203</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guillielmo de Olcimiano (san Giminiano?)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aço de Valentia.</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aço de Sancto Salvatore</td>
<td>one - presbiter Azo St Silvestre - travelled to Ceuta in 1214 (OS, 04/08/1214, Cart 4, P. 53)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** There were two Belmusto Lercario: maior and Junior. One witnessed a grant to the Order of the hospital in Acre April 1201 (Delaville, vol. 2, no. 1145, pp. 7-8). In September 1201 Belmusto Lercario made a contract to travel to Alexandria (Guglielmo di Sori, MS 102, p. 206, R3). Both maior and junior returned from their mission as consuls in Ultramare and Alexandria in 1204. See more about the Lercario’s relation with the Latin East in the following pages.

**Table 8: Charter of Archbishop Joscius, 14 April 1190**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness</th>
<th>In Genoa before the war?</th>
<th>Back in Genoa by:</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turdano presbitero</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilielmo marchione de Bosco</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Active in 1200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubeus / Rosso della Volta,</td>
<td>List of 1188</td>
<td>15 March 1191</td>
<td><em>GC</em> 1191, 297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ansaldo de Nigro</td>
<td>Witness a contract in 1174</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td><em>CDG</em> vol. 2, 90, p. 190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opizione de Sauri</td>
<td>List of 1188</td>
<td>09/1199</td>
<td><em>CDG</em>, vol. 3, 166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 9: Charter of Conrad of Montferrat, April 1192**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness</th>
<th>In Genoa before the war?</th>
<th>Back in Genoa by:</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simone Bufferio</td>
<td>Consul of 1189</td>
<td>Consul of 1195</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hengo domine Gabane (Ingo de Galiane?)</td>
<td>List of 1188, left as merchant to Naples in January 1191</td>
<td>Active merchant from 1200 until 1203.</td>
<td><em>GC</em>, 25, 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ansaldo Guaraco</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arloto vicecomes</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rollando Picio</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guillielmo <em>Beccus Rubeus</em></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Genoese names in the charters of Archbishop Joscius and Conrad of Montferrat include Ansaldo de Nigro, Ansaldo Guaraco, Arloto vicecomes and Rollando Picio. These people belonged to well known families in Genoa. However, there reason to believe that they were not residents of Genoa: their names do not appear in any contemporary sources from Genoa before 1190 or after 1192. How many of these people lived in the Latin East before 1187 and how many of them do not appear in the Genoese sources from the following years because they perished in the wars? Some, like presbyter Turdano and magister Blanco, the representatives of the religious authorities in Tyre who received the concession from Archbishop Joscius, were probably inhabitants of the Latin East before, as the document refers to them as simply Ianuensis canonici and not as canons of a particular church in Genoa. It is not impossible that those who had Genoese surnames but appear for the first time in the Genoese text as witnesses to royal acts in Ultramare, were also inhabitants of the kingdom of Jerusalem before 1187.

The analysis of the process of reestablishment of the Genoese community in the Latin East thus far showed that in many ways it was a complete new start for the commune. The influx of new blood to the kingdom of Jerusalem was encouraged by the local lords to remain in Tyre and Genoese individuals hastened to take advantage of these opportunities. The powerful leadership of the commune was able to gain privileges that spelled the fast recovery of the commune and advanced the position of the Genoese among other trading communities that were active in the Latin East.

The Genoese financial and property reports from the Latin East

An additional source of information on the Genoese settlers is found in the property and financial reports from the middle of the thirteenth century. These are interesting documents that offer some ideas about life in the Genoese quarters in Acre and Tyre. There are many ways to analyse these documents, as mentioned above, scholarship often concentrated on the geographical and urban questions with an attempt to reconstruct maps of these urban units. However, the following paragraphs will focus on several aspects concerning the people who lived in these Genoese neighbourhoods. This means that the document written about Acre is of more significance to the current analysis than the one written on Tyre, because it provides a list of house holders in the burgensia and in the ruga comunis Ianuiae. In contrast to Acre the report on Tyre only mentions individuals and their property as an indication of the location of communal property.

The report on Acre has its shortfalls too. Unlike Prawer’s assumption that the Genoese list is inclusive of all the houses owned by members of the commune, it seems that the list is only partial and excludes much of the private property. For example, the property of the church of

Saint Lawrence in Acre is not mentioned in the report probably because it was not communal but privately owned and leased by the cathedral of Genoa. It was already mentioned in Chapter Four that several notarial documents compiled in Genoa were concerned with the property of St Lawrence in Acre: a lease contract was signed in 1200 between the Embriaci and Otto Iudex de Castello for two years. Another contract was made upon the completion of Otto’s mission. On 29 September 1222, another tax-lease contract was signed between the representatives of the church and Ugo Ferrario: Ugo paid £50 in advance for the census of the church’s property in Acre.\textsuperscript{568}

Moreover, there is further information that is missing in the reports. As mentioned above, Genoa did not obtain copies of the private concessions given to individuals in Acre and Tyre. The reports on Acre and Tyre do not mention the property owned by these individuals who presumably did not have to pay taxes to the commune for that ownership. This evidence of missing information makes one wonder if these documents are really a good reflection of the property and contain the full list of the members of the commune. It is interesting to note that among the nobles mentioned in the documents who possessed property in Acre only two people seem to be related to the consuls of the commune in the Latin East. This is surprising because although Guido Spinola, Marino Rodano and Ugo Lercario did not settle in the kingdom of Jerusalem, their families had maintained long-time contact with the kingdom. The Lercario family was especially close to the Latin East. There is evidence of the presence of Ugo and Belmusto in Tyre for a couple of years after their arrival as crusaders in 1190: In April 1190, both of them witnessed Conrad’s concession and in 1192, Ugo functioned as a local consul of the commune.\textsuperscript{569} In 1201, Belmusto was again in Acre where he witnessed a concession that Marino Mazuc, a Genoese inhabitant of Acre, made to the Order of St John.\textsuperscript{570} Two years later, in 1203, Belmusto was again in the Latin East, this time as consul himself. Another member of the Lercario family, Belmusto Lercario the younger, was in the same year consul in Alexandria.\textsuperscript{571} In 1218-9, a third member of the Lercario family served as consul in the Latin East. Ido Lercario testified in a court case concerning his period of consulate in Acre in 1218.\textsuperscript{572} In a concession that was granted to the Genoese in Acre in 1219, Ido appeared as consul and Belmusto Lercario also appears among the witnesses.\textsuperscript{573} It is likely that the brothers Ugo and Belmusto Lercario lived in the kingdom for several years. Unfortunately, the property reports from the middle of the thirteenth century do not mention that the Lercario family had possessed property in Acre or

\textsuperscript{568} For Otto Iudex see MS 102, pp. 160-161 from 23 September 1200; GG, no. 571, from 16 September 1202; Mag. Sal. No. 550, from 29 September 1222.
\textsuperscript{569} I Libri Iurium, nos. 331, 335.
\textsuperscript{570} Delaville, vol. 3, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{571} Ann. Ian., vol. 2, p. 92.
\textsuperscript{572} Mag. Sal., no. 736-739, pp. 308-316. Ido Lercario’s testimony is in page 312.
\textsuperscript{573} I Libri Iurium, vol. 1/2, 369, p. 266.
Tyre. Perhaps this means that despite their frequent visits to the Latin kingdom as merchants, and although they clearly spent several years there as consuls, the Lercario family never settled in the kingdom of Jerusalem. Similar conclusion may be drawn about the Spinola family. During the time of the Third Crusade, when Guido Spinola was consul of the Genoese in Tyre, several members of his family travelled to Ultramare. What was their motivation though? Were they interested in assisting the reestablishment of the kingdom or in the commercial advantages through their family connections with Guido? The presence of two other members of the family in Tyre in 1211, the brothers Nicolaus and Ingo Spinola, is known because they witnessed selling Martino Rocia’s house in Tyre. There is no doubt that they kept in close commercial touch with the Latin East. The only exception is found in the case of the family of Marino Rodoani, which is thus conspicuous among the families of consuls. In 1249, the property report of Acre mentions two members from the Rodoani family: Marchesio and the late Iacomo (Iacobus) who possessed property in the Genoese quarter of Acre.

In the report on Acre there are dozens of names of house holders. Only a few bear surnames that indicate that they originated from powerful Genoa: Bonavia and Fantino de St Laurentio; Enrico Guercio; Guglielmo Grasso (perhaps related to the famous pirate), Giovanni Antelmi, Marchesio and the late Iacobo de Rodoano; Nicolas de San Siro. This is rather a short list compared to the number of people from famous families of merchants who were involved in commerce in the Latin East and probably possessed property in Acre and Tyre. The Embriaco, the Spinola, the de Bulgaro families are few that come to mind among those who travelled often to the Latin East and were involved in commerce there. Other surnames indicate the presence of people from Savona, Levanto and Ventimiglia under Genoa’s jurisdiction, in the Latin East as it was in Liguria. There were also non-Ligurians among the inhabitants of the quarter: Donadeus Angelerius, Johannes Malfitani, Johannes Valenta. Most of the names of other house holders seem to bear surnames which are related to their professions, like the two bankers Grimaldo and Duranto. The majority of these people, however, were related to the cloth industry: Ugonis Calderarius; Cavallaroti Piperis draperies; Obertus Filator & Johannes Filator and the late Beltramus Pilletus. Only three names are related to war and shipping - Bonusloannes admirati, Alexandrus militis and Johannes Osbergerus. It is indeed interesting to find evidence of a gradual establishment of commercial and naval shipping in the Latin East. More evidence is found in a contract from the cartulary of Guglielmo di Sori of merchants from Tripoli and Acre who travelled on their own ship to Genoa. The contract of 02 March 1200 relates how Marcho,

574 See more about the Spinola family and Tyre during the time of the Third Crusade in Chapter One.
575 Strehlke, Tabulae ordinis Theutonici, p. 37; for their family relation see CDG, vol. 2, p. 326.
576 For the meaning of the names see Nilo Calvini, Nuovo Glossario Medievale Ligure (Genoa, 1984).
Johanni and Andree de Tripoli, Arnaldo de Saona and Johanne de Acri had some trouble with their ship in the harbour of Genoa and had to rent galleys and people to lift it out the water.\textsuperscript{577}

This short discussion of the population of the Genoese communities in the Latin East should be carried further by utilising more evidence from the notarial cartularies, which were not part of this research. The impression established thus far is that from the time of Conrad of Montferrat onwards, the Latin East had attracted Genoese and Ligurian people of various social stands, however, it was special opportunity for low rank knights, merchants and sailors to promote their social position. The lack of private properties in the report of 1248-9 meant that there is gap of information about the Genoese population of the kingdom of Jerusalem, which might explain the absence of the leading trading families in these reports.

\textsuperscript{577} Guglielmo di Sori, MS 102, pp. 128 V2-129 R1, contract from the 02 March 1200.
Conclusions

The main contribution of this dissertation is in the comprehensive use of notarial evidence for the study of the history of the crusades and the Latin East. Inevitably, there are many findings that would interest historians of other fields too. Some issues regarding the financial and other economic aspects of the crusades were addressed in this dissertation, such as the meaning of the shipping of the crusaders and the supply of war-time commodities to the Latin East. This discussion proved that there is still need of a study of the economic history of the crusades to be written. The lack of such scholarship was both an obstacle and a challenge that had to be encountered several times in this thesis. This dissertation should, therefore, be seen as an attempt to fill up some of the gap in the existing historiography. In other words, it was a step in the exploration of Genoa's relations with the crusading movement and the crusading states.

The research was carried out with a particular emphasis on the view of the Genoese people as they were presented in the cartularies during certain years of the crusades. In the light of the evidence presented, several conclusions can be drawn. The commune as well as individual Genoese contributed to the success of the Third Crusade. Moreover, the full commitment of Genoa to the Third Crusade was made evident through the examination of the notarial records of the year 1190. This commitment was compared to Venice's approach to the shipping of the crusaders at the time of the Fourth Crusade. The support of individual Genoese to the crusade was evident in their donation of money to support individual knights and the Latin East in general. The supply of commodities and especially the shipping of grain were commercial investments as well as act of crusading charity.

The mercantile and legal cultures of the Genoese were used to organise the Third Crusade. Genoa thus contributed to the institutionalisation of the crusading movement as the application of similar contracts became a standard in the organisation of following crusades. In 1190, the Third Crusade seemed to indicate prospect and boom to the Genoese but by August of that year the city entered a phase of financial problems when the crusade failed to embark as planned. The impact of these years in Genoa may be seen in the city's reluctance to accept the shipping contract for the Fourth Crusade. Genoa, however, also benefited during this period when trade relations were established with new markets like England. It was also made clear that individual bankers and merchants profited from the traffic of crusaders and merchants through the port of Genoa.

The examination of Genoa at the time of the Fourth Crusade was a challenge of a different nature. Several issues were addressed, the reasons that Genoa did not join the crusade, how were Genoa and its Mediterranean web of commerce affected by the crusade and finally in
what way the progress of the crusade was viewed in Genoa. Because Genoa did not take part in
the crusade it was not discussed much in the contemporary chronicles. The notarial cartularies
served as the main source of information and especially important was the cartulary of Guglielmo
di Sori. It was suggested that one of the reasons for Genoa's reluctance to supply ships for the
crusade was its experience in the previous crusade. Genoa was engaged in other conflicts, of
which Sicily was the most important one. It was suggested that Genoa responded to Pope
Innocent III's declaration of crusade against Markward von Anweiler, however, it was also
demonstrated that there were substantial financial reasons to engage in that war.

The study of Genoa's patterns of trade in the Mediterranean and the legal implications of
the commercial contracts in the eyes of the Genoese proved that Genoa's handling of its
commerce during the time of the Fourth Crusade did not take into consideration the crusaders' plan to attack Egypt. It was suggested that some of the common scholarly perceptions of the Fourth Crusade may be wrong. For example, the fact that vast number of contracts directed merchants to Egypt in September 1203 is an indication that the merchants of Genoa did not expect a war in this region. This implies that they did not believe that the crusaders were going to proceed to Egypt in that autumn. Genoa's trade in Constantinople was stopped because of the long conflicts in that city and the diversion of Fourth Crusade. Genoa therefore sought new markets. The opening of the road to Aleppo was undoubtedly related to the progress of the crusade and Genoa's growing enmity with Venice throughout the Mediterranean Sea and, particularly, in Crete and the Latin East.

The cartularies as an alternative source of information proved to be exceptionally rich in
the cases of the study of the Genoa at the time of the Third and Fourth Crusades. In the discussion
of the Fifth Crusade, the cartularies were employed to assess the commercial implications of the
boycotts on trade in Alexandria in different periods. The issue of captives was discussed in
somewhat different manner to the recent scholarly discourse. On the one hand, captivity was
examined as a reason to engage in a crusade. On the other hand, it was suggested that the
Genoese and other merchants functioned as mediators: because of their access to Muslim centres
they could help to ransom captives.

Another aspect concerning the Fifth Crusade that emerges from the cartularies is female
response to preaching. The influence of James of Vitry was attested in contemporary wills from
the time of the Fifth Crusade, which also included the unique evidence of Genoese woman who
planned to join the crusade in person.

Chapters Four and Five dealt with the Genoese who settled in the Latin East. The case of
the Embriaco family or the de Biblio was given special consideration as a microcosms of life in
the crusader states and a case study for the examination of the changes in Genoa's attitude
towards the Latin East. The significance of the fall of the first kingdom of Jerusalem was evident in both chapters and it clearly was a turning point in the relations between Genoa and its citizens who lived in the Latin East. The year 1187 marked the end of Genoa’s claims in Byblos and the beginning of friendly relationship with the de Biblio. Other individual Genoese followed the steps of the de Biblio and established themselves independently in the Latin East.

Finally, it was demonstrated that Conrad of Montferrat offered opportunities to many Genoese and that the private ownership of properties of such people was respected in Genoa. On the other hand, the administration of the communal properties in the Latin East entered a new era during the Third Crusade. It was argued that the leadership of the Genoese contingents during the crusade assumed authority and founded the consulate in the kingdom of Jerusalem. The contribution of dominant consuls to the achievements of the commune was thus examined in critical periods of the Third and Fourth Crusades. Further research of cartularies from later parts of the thirteenth century is needed to establish how the changes in leadership had influenced Genoese life in the Latin East and how it corresponded to the ways the conflict with the Venetians evolved.
Appendix 1: The exchange rate between Genoese solidi and the French mark, 1191-1192

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>notary</th>
<th>Act number</th>
<th>date of transaction</th>
<th>Type of contract</th>
<th>to be paid by</th>
<th>destination</th>
<th>Silver Mark</th>
<th>Genoese solidi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>1434</td>
<td>19/12/1191</td>
<td>debt</td>
<td>26/02/1191</td>
<td>less than 1 month</td>
<td>Bar</td>
<td>1 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>1435</td>
<td>19/12/1191</td>
<td>debt</td>
<td>15/01/1192</td>
<td>less than 1 month</td>
<td>Laniaco</td>
<td>1 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>1437</td>
<td>20/12/1191</td>
<td>debt</td>
<td>15/01/1192</td>
<td>less than 1 month</td>
<td>Laniaco</td>
<td>1 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>1440</td>
<td>20/12/1191</td>
<td>debt</td>
<td>15/01/1192</td>
<td>less than 1 month</td>
<td>Laniaco</td>
<td>1 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>1445</td>
<td>22/12/1191</td>
<td>debt</td>
<td>15/01/1192</td>
<td>less than 1 month</td>
<td>Laniaco</td>
<td>1 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>1614</td>
<td>23/02/1192</td>
<td>debt</td>
<td>03/09/1192</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>1624</td>
<td>25/02/1192</td>
<td>debt</td>
<td>05/1192</td>
<td>2 months</td>
<td>Provins</td>
<td>1 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>1649</td>
<td>02/03/1192</td>
<td>debt</td>
<td>05/1192</td>
<td>2 months</td>
<td>Provins</td>
<td>1 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>1683</td>
<td>04/03/1192</td>
<td>debt</td>
<td>05/1192</td>
<td>2 months</td>
<td>Provins</td>
<td>1 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>1690</td>
<td>05/03/1192</td>
<td>debt</td>
<td>05/1192</td>
<td>2 months</td>
<td>Provins</td>
<td>1 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>1697</td>
<td>06/03/1192</td>
<td>debt</td>
<td>05/1192</td>
<td>2 months</td>
<td>Provins</td>
<td>1 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>1698</td>
<td>06/03/1192</td>
<td>debt</td>
<td>05/1192</td>
<td>2 months</td>
<td>Provins</td>
<td>1 46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

conclusions:

The average value of the mark in 1191, 1192: 46.58333

no correlation between length of debt to the value of the mark

no correlation between distance and the value of the mark
Appendix 2: The exchange rate between Genoese solidi and the Sicilian ounce, 1182-1216

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>notary</th>
<th>act number</th>
<th>date of transaction</th>
<th>Short description</th>
<th>destination</th>
<th>ounce</th>
<th>Genoese solidi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OS, 1182</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>21/12/1182</td>
<td>£100 for 44 uncias auri</td>
<td>Sicily</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS, 1184</td>
<td>2339</td>
<td>27/03/1184</td>
<td>£25 5s 0d = 11 uncias</td>
<td>Sicily</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS, 1186</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>17/12/1186</td>
<td>4 uncias =£8 4s 0d 55s per unciam</td>
<td>Sicily</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC, 1191</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>27/01/1191</td>
<td>£10 = 5 unciis auri in sicily or naples</td>
<td>Sicily or Naples</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC, 1191</td>
<td>1145</td>
<td>27/9/1191</td>
<td>1 uncia = 35s or 1 uncia = 40s</td>
<td>Sicily</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35 to 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC, 1191</td>
<td>1201</td>
<td>9/10/1191</td>
<td>35s = 1 uncia</td>
<td>Sicily</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC, 1192</td>
<td>1653</td>
<td>03/03/1192</td>
<td>£50 = uncias 27 ad pondus Panorami</td>
<td>Sicily: Palermo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC, 1192</td>
<td>1665</td>
<td>03/03/1192</td>
<td>£50 = uncias 27 ad pondus Panorami</td>
<td>Sicily: Palermo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC, 1192</td>
<td>1724</td>
<td>10/03/1192</td>
<td>£42=uncias 22½, cloths given in security</td>
<td>Sicily</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS, 1201</td>
<td>Cart 4, P 71, R1</td>
<td>29/04/1201</td>
<td>£50 = uncias auri 25 to be paid by 01/06</td>
<td>Sicily</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS, 1201</td>
<td>Cart 4, P 104, R1</td>
<td>22/07/1201</td>
<td>ad rationem 37s per unciam (ad uncia Messine)</td>
<td>Sicily: Messina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GG, 1203</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>20/9/1203</td>
<td>£33 12s 0d= 16 uncias auri de tarrenis ad pesum Messine</td>
<td>Sicily: Messina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GG, 1203</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>16/9/1203</td>
<td>£25 5s implicatas in 11 uncis de tareninis</td>
<td>Sicily and wherever he likes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GG, 1203</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>12/9/1203</td>
<td>42s=1 uncia auri</td>
<td>Sicily: Messina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GG, 1203</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>16/9/1203</td>
<td>£25 5s 0d invested in 11 uncis de tareninis</td>
<td>Sicily: Messina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GG, 1203</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>23/9/1203</td>
<td>£50 ad rationem de 43s per unciam</td>
<td>Sicily: Messina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GG, 1203</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>13/9/1203</td>
<td>£91½ = 45 auri de tarrenis ad peum Messine</td>
<td>Sicily: Messina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GG, 1203</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>23/9/1203</td>
<td>£22 = unciis 10½ minus 15 grana auri de tarrenenis vetullis ad pondus Messine</td>
<td>Sicily: Messina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>approx 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GG, 1203</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>20/9/1203</td>
<td>43½ per 1 uncia auri de tarrenenis vetullis... ad pondus Messine.</td>
<td>Sicily: Messina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GG, 1203</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>22/9/1203</td>
<td>£43 = 1 uncia auri de tarrenenis vetullis ad pondus Messine</td>
<td>Sicily: Messina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>notary</td>
<td>act number</td>
<td>date of transaction</td>
<td>Short description</td>
<td>destination</td>
<td>ounce</td>
<td>Genoese solidi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GG, 1203</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>23/9/1203</td>
<td>41s = 1 uncia auri de tarenis vetulis. ad pesum Mesine</td>
<td>Sicily: Messina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GG, 1203</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>19/9/1203</td>
<td>£21 = 10 uncias auri de tarenis, within a month after their arrival in Messina</td>
<td>Sicily: Messina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GG, 1203</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>24/9/1203</td>
<td>43s = 1 uncia auri de tarenis vetulis ad pondus Messine</td>
<td>Sicily: Messina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GG, 1203</td>
<td>772</td>
<td>23/9/1203</td>
<td>42s = 1 uncia auri de tarenis, in Messina</td>
<td>Sicily: Messina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GG, 1203</td>
<td>854</td>
<td>23/9/1203</td>
<td>trade in cloths in Ultramare. Et si fecerit portum in Siciliam. 40s = 1 uncia auri.</td>
<td>Sicily and Ultramare</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS, 1213</td>
<td>Cart 4, P. 189, R4</td>
<td>07/09/1213</td>
<td>de singule 41s, uncia 1 tarenorum ad uncia Mesine</td>
<td>Sicily: Messina or Syracuse</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS, 1213</td>
<td>Cart 4, P. 213, R4</td>
<td>05/11/1213</td>
<td>£31½ = uncias 15 tarenorum vetulis</td>
<td>Sicily: Messina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS, 1214</td>
<td>Cart 4, P. 21, V3</td>
<td>15/03/1214</td>
<td>42s = uncia tarenorum</td>
<td>Sicily</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>OS, 1214</td>
<td>Cart 4, P. 56, V2</td>
<td>19/08/1214</td>
<td>42s = uncia tarenorum</td>
<td>Sicily</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanfranco, 1216</td>
<td>1102</td>
<td>13/09/1216</td>
<td>£21½ for uncias 10 auri tarenorum. in Palermo</td>
<td>Sicily: Palermo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanfranco, 1216</td>
<td>1208</td>
<td>29/09/1216</td>
<td>42½s= 1 uncia auri... in Messina</td>
<td>Sicily: Messina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanfranco, 1216</td>
<td>1212</td>
<td>29/09/1216</td>
<td>40s = 1 uncia auri</td>
<td>Sicily, per terram er riveram Sicile</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3: The Nepitella family and its commercial contacts with Alexandria, 1184-1213

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notary</th>
<th>Act No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Traveller: side a</th>
<th>Investor: side b</th>
<th>Type of contract</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Investmen</th>
<th>First destination</th>
<th>Second destination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OS,</td>
<td>cart. 2, p. 142 R3</td>
<td>11/09/1184</td>
<td>Willelmus Vulcius</td>
<td>Altelia uxore quondam Arati</td>
<td>Societas</td>
<td>Side A received £27, to which he added £13. Taken to Alexandria in nave Enrici Nepitelle and wherever this ship sails to. No other venture is allowed.</td>
<td>£40</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>Continue on the ship of Enrico Nepitella</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS,</td>
<td>cart. 2, p. 143 R1</td>
<td>12/09/1184</td>
<td>Martino son of Enricus de Quinto</td>
<td>Marino [...]. &amp; Sophia uxore bonivassall mungasavali</td>
<td>Societas</td>
<td>Side A received £12 (from each) to which he added £12. Taken by his son Martino, with the concession of the investors, to Alexandria in nave Enrici Nepitelle and wherever the ship continues. If the ship is sold in Alexandria Martino must return to Genoa.</td>
<td>£36</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>Continue on the ship of Enrico Nepitella</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS,</td>
<td>1186</td>
<td>20/10/1186</td>
<td>Rolandus de Sudaca</td>
<td>Willemo Malofilastro</td>
<td>commendas</td>
<td>Side A received clothes Pannos bagadellinas 29 that cost £29, which belong to the minor Marchesio Boleti. to be taken to Setam et inde Alexandriam et illo si invenero Enricum Nepitellam sibi debebisse assignare et liberare si eum Alexandria non invenero proficuum et capitale in tua vel Rubaldi Deitasalve miere</td>
<td>£29</td>
<td>Ceuta</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS,</td>
<td>Cart. 4, p. 257, R2</td>
<td>15/09/1200</td>
<td>Bonusvas allus Enricus Nepitelle</td>
<td>Ingone Streiaporco</td>
<td>receipt</td>
<td>Receipt for £10. revenues from a contract that included a capital of £5 which was taken to Alexandria.</td>
<td>£10</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>returning from Alexandria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS,</td>
<td>Cart. 4, p. 85, R2</td>
<td>31/05/1201</td>
<td>Rubeus de Voia et Enricus Nepitelle</td>
<td>among themselves</td>
<td>agreement</td>
<td>Regarding zoras (coras) 7 piperis quas willelmus Nepitelle sent from Alexandria to Genoa with Simon Streiaporco. They agree to deposit the pepper with the wife of Guglielmo Salvatico usque ad aventus navium ultramaris.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>Willelmus Nepitelle sent with Simone Streiaporco to Genoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GG,</td>
<td>1203</td>
<td>20/9/1203</td>
<td>Henricus Nepitella</td>
<td>Willemo Streiaporco</td>
<td>commendas</td>
<td>£150 in gold taken to Alexandria and whenever he likes.</td>
<td>£150</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>wherever</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GG,</td>
<td>1203</td>
<td>20/9/1203</td>
<td>Buccius de Reco</td>
<td>Bonusvasallio Nepitella</td>
<td>commendas</td>
<td>£12.15a 0d invested in gold (farrenis), taken to Alexandria and wherever he likes.</td>
<td>£12.75</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>wherever</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notary</td>
<td>act no.</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Traveller: side a</td>
<td>Investor: side b</td>
<td>type of contract</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Investment</td>
<td>First destination</td>
<td>Second destination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
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<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GG, 1203</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>20/9/1203</td>
<td>Henricus Nepitella</td>
<td>Petro de Cruce</td>
<td>commenda</td>
<td>£50 invested in gold (in auro et tarrenis)</td>
<td>£50</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>wherever</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GG, 1203</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>20/9/1203</td>
<td>Henricus Nepitella</td>
<td>Ottone de Estorio</td>
<td>commenda</td>
<td>£21 invested in gold (in auro et tarrenis) and other goods</td>
<td>£21</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>wherever</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GG, 1203</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>20/9/1203</td>
<td>Henricus Nepitella</td>
<td>Baldecono Streiaporco</td>
<td>commenda</td>
<td>£25 invested in gold (in auro et tarrenis) and other goods</td>
<td>£25</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>wherever</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GG, 1203</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>21/9/1203</td>
<td>Henricus Nepitella</td>
<td>Pascal Marcono</td>
<td>commenda</td>
<td>£50 of which £25 belong to Dondedei Curti, invested in gold</td>
<td>£50</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>wherever</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS, 1213</td>
<td>Cart 4, P. 204, R2</td>
<td>29/9/1213</td>
<td>Ogerius filius Enrici Nepitella</td>
<td>Bertramo de Nervi</td>
<td>commenda</td>
<td>£105 of which £50 belong to the heirs of Lanfranco de Costa as well as £5 from Attilia Ravane</td>
<td>£105</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>wherever</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 4: Bequest for the crusade in Genoese wills from 1216

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notary</th>
<th>Act No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Side a</th>
<th>Type of Contract</th>
<th>Short Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lanfranco,</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>23/05/1216</td>
<td>Agnes consanguina Aude de St Georgio</td>
<td>Will</td>
<td>Nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1216</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanfranco,</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>17/06/1216</td>
<td>Adalaxia Mussa filia Romane</td>
<td>Will</td>
<td>Nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1216</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanfranco,</td>
<td>1058</td>
<td>08/08/1216</td>
<td>Hermeuina mater Rolandi medici</td>
<td>Will</td>
<td>Nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1216</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanfranco,</td>
<td>1078</td>
<td>23/08/1216</td>
<td>Bertranno de Lavanias</td>
<td>Will</td>
<td><strong>40s in servitio passagio de Ultramare</strong> other bequests: to his father Bernardo - 20s; to Simoseto, his brother - 100s; to his sister Stellea £9; to his sister Sordeella - 20s; to Girardo his brother - 20s; to Ugoni de Natali &amp; Rubaldo his brother 20s together; To Donecelia &amp; Audeta, servants of dominus Bagini from St Laurence 10s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1216</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanfranco,</td>
<td>1079</td>
<td>23/08/1216</td>
<td>Berta de Gala</td>
<td>Will</td>
<td><strong>In passagio de Ultramare 10s</strong>; £3 pro anima. 10% for burial + 10s to St John’s hospital - 5s, to infirmis de Fari 5s, to hospital St Stephano 5s (and cussinum &amp; culcitram) to St Donato 10s; to ponti pulcifere 2s; to ponti Lavanias 3s; to hospital St Lorenzo 3s; to hospital St Spirit de Roma 3s. The rest of her money she bequeathed to the orphans, to be distributed by two priests and her mother. Her investments: Oliverius de Clavica has taken ‘supra mare’ cannas 9 ad rationem 3s singula canna; Vasallus Massitius brachia tele 25 ad eandem rationem; Solia de Sexto habet cannas tele mee 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1216</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanfranco,</td>
<td>1086</td>
<td>04/09/1216</td>
<td>Rustico della Costa</td>
<td>Will</td>
<td><strong>In passagio de Ultramare 10s</strong>; £3 for burial. to his sister Aude - 20s,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1216</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanfranco,</td>
<td>1222</td>
<td>30/09/1216</td>
<td>Alegranzcia uxor Petri Lavorabene</td>
<td>Will</td>
<td>Nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1216</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanfranco,</td>
<td>1224</td>
<td>01/10/1216</td>
<td>Aidela uxor Oberti Nigrini</td>
<td>Will</td>
<td><strong>£4 in servitio passagio de ultramare.</strong> cancels previous wills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1216</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanfranco,</td>
<td>1266</td>
<td>29/10/1216</td>
<td>Rubaldo balisterio</td>
<td>Will</td>
<td>Nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1216</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanfranco,</td>
<td>1319</td>
<td>21/12/1216</td>
<td>Montanaria uxor Martini de Mari draperii</td>
<td>Will</td>
<td><strong>100s lego in servitio passagi ultramarini si non iero, si autem iero illos mecum portabo</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1216</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>
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