Newspapers of the French Left in Provence and Bas-Languedoc during the First World War

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Preface

This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration.
Introduction

The term 'left' or 'gauche' in France may define a number of concepts, depending on the historical period or the political context to which it refers. During the period covered by this thesis, French citizens may have been active in the politics of the Radicals or S.F.I.O. socialists, or members of the C.G.T. trade union congress, independent trade unions and related groups, or even the anarchists. All fell under the canvas of 'gauchiste'.

All as well were represented by newspapers during this period, although the influence and circulations of many were tiny. Chosen for study were newspapers whose reach was not tiny, but substantial, based on high circulation and regional diffusion. Both therefore represented a comparatively moderate current of 'gauchisme', reflecting Radical, trade union, and socialist concerns—even occasionally reflecting anarchist concerns in Le Petit Provençal—but as a whole moderate 'journaux d'information'. Compared with conservative and royalist newspapers such as L'Eclaireur of Montpellier and Le Soleil du Midi of Marseille, they are the newspapers to which local readers would have turned when wishing to read a daily mass circulation newspaper 'on the left'.

An annotated list of archives and libraries consulted in
France for this study is as follows:

Marseille, Archives Départementales. Complete boxed collection of newspapers, and substantial material on censorship and police activities during the war.

Marseille, Bibliothèque Municipale. Collections of newspapers, including *Le Bavard*, not available at the AD. Secondary sources.

Marseille, Archives Municipales. Little of use for this subject.

Aix-en-Provence, Bibliothèque universitaire, Université d'Aix-Marseille. Strong collection of secondary sources.

No material from this period has survived in local newspaper archives.

Montpellier, Archives Départementales. Complete bound collection of newspapers, but little material on censorship during this period. Some police material.

Montpellier, Archives Municipales. Little material on this period.

Montpellier, Bibliothèque Municipale. Some secondary sources useful to this subject.

Montpellier, Bibliothèque interuniversitaire. Useful collection of secondary material.

Montpellier, Bibliothèque universitaire Paul Valéry. Useful secondary material, dissertations.

Local newspaper archives of *Le Midi Libre* are open to
researchers, but offer little material from this period.

Paris, B.D.I.C., Université de Paris-X Nanterre. Nearly comprehensive collection of French newspapers, although *Le Paris Méridional* is not represented. Strong collection of primary material on censorship. Many important secondary sources were destroyed by the Nazis in 1944.

Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale. Newspaper collection and comprehensive secondary sources, but the library will not allow some of them to be consulted due to their fragile state.

Paris, Service historique de l'armée de la terre. Extensive collection of primary material on wartime censorship.

Paris, Archives Nationales. Newspaper and censorship material during this period are comparatively weak.

Toulouse, Bibliothèque universitaire, Université de Toulouse-Le Mirail. Good secondary sources and dissertations.
Aims

The purpose of this thesis is to offer a contribution to the debate concerning the nature and extent of the union sacrée in France during the First World War, which is a central issue in First World War historiography. This phenomenon has been considered in recent scholarship by French historians Becker and Audoin-Rouzeau. Jean-Jacques Becker has examined the phenomenon from the perspective of the home front using police and other official reports. Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau has examined it from the perspective of trench newspapers, wherein he reconceptualises the discourse of the union sacrée using the articulation of 'sentiment national'. Numerous historians refer to the union sacrée in a variety of other studies, from general works on French history to histories of French politics, regional histories, and histories of the French press. No study exists, however, which addresses the concept in a thorough and methodical manner through concise study of specific civilian newspapers in France, although it can be affirmed with a fair amount of certainty that these newspapers played a major role in developing, sustaining, and reflecting the
mutations of the union sacrée through the four and one-half years of conflict. The paramount importance of large circulation daily newspapers in France during the war is illustrated not only by the fact that in the pre-broadcast modern world newspapers formed the major medium by which events of socio-political import reached citizens in democratic nations, but also by the documents of succeeding French governments themselves, which during the war exhibited a sustained and sometimes almost obsessive interest in published material. The elaborate system of propaganda developed by the French government during the war clearly addressed a perceived need to maintain the union sacrée through deliberate attempts to shape morale by many means but, as it pertains to the home front, mostly through the press. A war not only creates a supply of news, but a demand for it; a flow easily diverted by government censorship and propaganda which needs only to defend itself by evoking demands of 'the war effort'. Or in Lasswell's words, the propagandist 'discovers a political reservoir of discontent or aspiration and searches for way of discharging the discontent and harnessing the aspiration so that they harmonise with his policy objectives.' Thus the French government during the war controlled a powerful system of forces able to shape the press, gathered under

1Wrote an editor of a Northcliffe newspaper in Britain during the war, 'So deep-rooted is the fascination for war and all things pertaining to it...that a paper has only to be able to put up on its placard "a great battle" for sales to mount up.' Quoted in Knightley, Phillip, The First Casualty (London, 1975 and 1989), 85.

the single term 'censorship'. This is somewhat of a misnomer, because it became so much more. In turn, the press stood at the confluence of attitudes and sentiments which shaped the union sacrée. This explains the need of this study to cover not only the newspapers themselves, but the regime of censorship as well.

This is the first time systematic use has been made of French civilian newspapers during the entire period of August 1914-November 1918, not only in relation to the union sacrée, but in any context at all. The most extensive examination of the French press during the war may be found in the Bellanger history, but some of its conclusions are not borne out by this study. It seems clear that additional work is necessary.

In spite of the indisputable influence of the press on the public during the war, it is useful to point out that it alone did not set morale parameters. Posters and films had considerable importance during this period. Books and other publications competed with the mass-circulation press. Soldiers home on leave surely contributed to, or rather detracted from, union sacrée, especially after the Nivelle Offensive. Rumour and church sermons played a not insignificant role. Doubtless these influences deserve study, but they do not seem to detract from the argument that a central role, perhaps the central role, was played by mass-circulation newspapers.

Analysis of the evidence gained from a comprehensive study of two of these newspapers enables us to test the concepts of the union sacrée as described by Becker and Audoin-Rouzeau. This thesis
attempts to show how the evidence of the press in two provincial cities supports the argument of these historians. There are some qualifications. But in general, we may state that this thesis shows union sacrée to be a confluence of concepts, most palpably gathered under the single definition of trève. Evidence here shows that the trève really did not last very long, perhaps no longer than August 1914, and later chapters illustrate how the trève unravelled in spite of repeated declarations by the newspapers themselves that it continued to exist. It is worth noting with some bemusement that, while the editors and commentators of these newspapers continually called for the union sacrée, other articles in their very own newspapers were slowly undermining their efforts. Perhaps this is merely an example to show that the rapid demands contingent upon publication of a daily newspaper leave editors themselves with mistaken perceptions of what their newspapers are telling their readers.

Although the weight of evidence posits a conception of the trève similar to that found by historians referred to above, it also indicates that many historians, perhaps one may say most, have a perception of the French press during the First World War which needs some adjustment. This older view is even demonstrated in major reference works, suggesting again that this subject needs further study. Numerous historians contend that bourraxe de crâne lasted for some time, perhaps years, perhaps throughout the war. 3

3 See for example Kupferman, Fred, review article, Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine (1976), 316 (by Pierre Albert); Baumont, Michel, 'La presse nicoise de 1914 à 1916', Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine (October-December 1971), 632.
One major work notes that during the war, la lecture des journaux de l'époque laisse une curieuse impression de malentendus: leur conformisme, leur optimisme, à peine nuancé par l'actualité, leur naïveté, leur manière d'écrire la vie au front est en tel contrast avec les réalités de la guerre.

Becker contends that the topics addressed generally by the press during the war included the spirit and spartan-like character of the French, the base nature of Germany, the superiority of French arms, the excellence of French soldiers, and the strength of Russia. Manevy wrote of the press during the war, 'Quelle désillusion! Tous semblent coulés dans le même moule: mêmes commentaires, mêmes titres, même disposition....' While these and other opinions concerning the French press during the war contain an element of truth, the research presented in this thesis offers many exceptions to the generalities, and certainly seems to lead one to a revised view of the supposed censored banality of the entire French press during the war.

It has been suggested that no scholar has directed attention to this period because newspapers were anodyne and not worth serious analysis. Studies of the press during the war are rare, it is noted.

in the Bellanger work, because 'peut-être...le monde du journalisme a-t-il, inconsciemment, cherché à oublier ces années difficiles qui lui laissaient un mauvais souvenir'. This fact leaves us in difficulty, however, for it is useful to verify if the findings here are at variance to material published by newspapers outside the Midi. Is the south indeed a special case? Unfortunately, no studies of French newspapers during the war can be compared directly to this one. As noted in chapter one, historical development of Provence and Languedoc established their radical character, their propensity to strike, their sentiment of separatism, and their defensive mood based on the suspicion that the north 'had it in' for them.

The 'XV Corps Affaire', beginning as it did just days after the Germans invaded, could only sustain Midi mistrust, and evidence appears to show that the incident was never really put right in the eyes or the Midi, nor forgotten in the eyes of the rest of the country. One may surmise that newspapers studied here devoted commentary on this issue considerably in excess of that offered by papers in the north, although no study exists to prove that. One may also infer from this that Le Petit Provencal and Le Petit Méridional responded to the insult with increased hostility toward the government. The evidence seems to support this only in the case of Le Petit Provencal, but it is to be noted that the Marseille newspaper was before the war the only mass-circulation daily

Bellanger, Claude, et al., Histoire générale de la presse française, 428.
newspaper in France politically to the left of the Radicals, with the exception of the Réveil du Nord of Lille. It is hard to escape the conclusion that this, and not the XVe Corps Affaire, dictated its wartime stance.

Perhaps contributing as well to the differences of these papers vis-à-vis the rest of France was the area's distance from Germany. Andréani believes this to have affected Languedoc's attitude to war with Germany, but without comparable studies of the press outside the south it is difficult to say how newspaper coverage differed. Geographical detachment during the war meant that in the south, commercial enterprises such as newspapers were more prosperous, contends Lerner, but statistics cited below show inflation was higher, especially in Marseille, and the newspaper complained repeatedly that the city was suffering unfair hardship. Until research is extended to allow detailed comparisons with other regions of France, one can only conclude with fair reliability that the newspapers studied here reflected a stronger-than-average defense of the Midi, and that Le Petit Provencal's political leanings made it generally more adversarial in tone than average.

—Ibid., 403.


Scope

This thesis seeks to explore the phenomenon of the *union sacrée* in the French civilian press, and to establish base parameters for this formerly neglected archive. Inherent to the nature of this task rests the daunting obstacle of size; in 1914, fifty-seven daily newspapers were published in Paris, and 242 in the provinces.¹¹ French press historian Pierre Albert admits the subject is 'too vast, too varied'.¹² It has been necessary in this study to reduce the field of research considerably, choosing to emphasise two specific newspapers in one specific political context. Chosen for study are two major provincial daily newspapers in the south of France, both of comparatively large circulation, designed for a mass audience, and situated politically on the French *gauche*. The south of France was chosen because it exemplifies a strong political culture, as described by Judt, Sagnes, and other historians. It is regionally an entity historically at variance in many ways with the rest of the country. Newspapers from the cities of Marseille and Montpellier were chosen particularly because the former dominated Provence, and the latter dominated Bas-Languedoc, that is, the area around the Mediterranean littoral.

¹¹Ibid., 138.
¹²Quoted in *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* (1982), 687.
Because this thesis analyses evidence pertaining to the dialogue of the *union sacrée*, and because the newspapers analysed are politically *gauchiste*, material presented concentrates upon the themes of trade union, socialist, and parliamentary matters, as well as matters of specific importance to morale, and other home-front related issues, particularly censorship. It is not a study of history as reported by the newspapers, nor is it primarily a study of the history of the newspapers themselves, that is, corporate history. Albert calls these two methods, respectively, 'imperialiste' and 'départementaliste'. It is instead a study of the role of these newspapers, 'autonomiste', in Albert's terminology.\(^{13}\)

Limits of this work are evident; it focusses on two (plus one weekly after 1916, published by *Le Petit Provencal*) newspapers out of hundreds in France. Much work needs to be done in this area, especially in the realm of the conservative press, which may well have reflected more accurately the criticism of First World War journalism quoted above. This thesis does, however, attempt to make a worthwhile contribution to historiography in this area by choosing two influential provincial newspapers for analysis, and by comparing their material to a review of the operation of censorship which is more comprehensive than that found in other published sources.

The period chosen, 15 June 1914 (to include material published prior to and after the archduke's assassination) through 31
December 1918 (to include the response to the armistice), offers a coherent frame of reference by reaching through the nearly four and one-half years of actual fighting. This inevitably defines the limitations of any arbitrarily-chosen historical period, as the actual march of historical events does not really present on close inspection such artificial seams; like an artist drawing from life, the contours of a supposed historical period seem to disappear as soon as one tries to portray them in two dimensions on a page. This study could have continued to the end of censorship in October 1919, the Congress of Tours in December 1920, perhaps even the end of Russian hostilities in 1921. But as the period of the First World War is generally accepted by historians to have begun at the beginning of August 1914, and to have ended 11 November 1918, it seems best to employ similar dates for analysis. Again, post-war material in the French press should offer a fertile field for further scholarship.
I. Political Environment

Historians who have studied this area of France from a socio-political perspective generally seem to conclude that the region moved vigorously to the left between 1848 and 1914. Before that time, the Midi was generally Royalist and agrarian; Marseille workers were among the most conservative of France. But at the time of the second republic and the second empire the area became, in turn, a centre of revolt, a stronghold for anti-empire sentiment, a base for Radical politicians, and a base for...
socialism. The Marseille Commune of 1871 was second in strength only to Paris, and suppressed using methods of great brutality. Marseille lived under martial law until 1876. But although the entire Midi was generally and fairly accurately defined as 'red' during this period, the situation developed somewhat differently in different parts of Provence and Languedoc.

The scope of this study is limited to newspapers in two specific departments, Bouches-du-Rhône and Hérault. The transition from conservative to liberal in both areas has a conceptual framework in common, although differences seem to indicate that each should be examined separately. The two departments did share, most notably, an ancient tradition of exchange of ideas, due to their position as crossroads between north and south of Europe. In the political altercations of 1848-1871, 'le Midi occupe une position d'avant-garde'. Indeed, Willard contends that the two important bases for the Guesdist POP in the Midi were Bas-Languedoc and Bouches-du-Rhône.

The Bouches-du-Rhône department is dominated by Marseille, which, by the eve of the First World War, still stood as the

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5Ibid., 288.

most important port in the Mediterranean. Its position as shipping centre between France and its colonies encouraged enthusiastic support of colonialism among business leaders, and the role attracted a cosmopolitan population to the port.

Population grew at a rate greater than that of the rest of France: 132,000 in 1831; 261,000 in 1861; 357,000 in 1891; 550,000 in 1911. The growth, reflecting another tradition of the city as facilitator of foreign immigration, was particularly strong in immigrants from other Mediterranean countries. Of a total population of 566,340 in 1921, 120,000 were Italians, 14,195 were Spanish, 2,489 were Greeks, and 12,489 belonged to 38 other nationalities. Italian immigration had been most prevalent in the years prior to the war; 19 percent of the city in 1911 were Italian immigrants. During the war a high refugee population increased the city's numbers to 750,000. The strongly cosmopolitan accent of Marseille significantly affected organisation of its working class. 'A cette explosion démographique correspond évidemment un accroissement de la population ouvrière,' writes Bianco. In 1911, the working class represented 21 percent of the Bouches-du-Rhône population.

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7 Masson, P., Marseille pendant la guerre (Paris, 1926), 41.
8 Guiral, P., and Amargier, P., Histoire de Marseille, 123.
9 Ibid., 124.
10 Masson, P., Marseille pendant la guerre, 4.
11 Ibid., 3.
than two-thirds of the department's population lived in Marseille by that date,\(^{13}\) but it had become a 'ville ouvrière' by 1850.\(^{14}\)

Industrialisation came somewhat late to Marseille.\(^{15}\) Although it had become the most important port in France by 1845, poor rail service kept the commercial sector from growing.\(^{16}\) Nineteenth century politicians from the department realised the inhospitable terrain tended to cut the area industrially from the rest of France, and strongly promoted the necessity of a rail link, which came in 1848. This technological advance, along with the steamship revolution in Marseille in the 1850s and promotion of tourism, encouraged industrial growth and agricultural changes.\(^{17}\) Principal industries centred around soap manufacturing, sugar, chemicals, and olive oil refineries. Metallurgy industries especially brought with them workers who spread advanced socialist ideals,\(^{18}\) and the heavy immigration in general after 1850 influenced the character of the working class in Marseille, at first strongly Radical.\(^{19}\) At the beginning,


these immigrants formed a 'proletariat' who had little class consciousness, and often were happy only to make more money in Marseille than they could in their home country. But by 1913 the average salary for a Marseille worker of 1,500 francs a year had not kept pace with the cost of living, estimated at 2,710 francs a year for a family of four. The increase in prostitution and supposed deterioration of morality in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Marseille was at least partially due to hardship; a story published in La Tribune Ouvrière 22 September 1894 contended that in Marseille, 'une veuve, mère de famille, avait trop forte la tentative de se prostituer pour ajouter quelque chose aux deux francs qui formaient son salaire quotidien'. This reflection was made more than forty years after the beginning of worker immigration to Marseille in the last century. In these years, the working class of the city had grown increasingly more militant and aware of itself as a separate entity, while voters in the department moved towards socialism. C.G.T. membership in Marseille grew rapidly from 1900-14, but still salaries in the city in 1910 were generally inferior to those in the rest of France. Workers

20 Gaillard, Lucien, La naissance du parti socialiste à Marseille, 17.


22 Gaillard, Lucien, La naissance du parti socialiste à Marseille, 92.

usually spent at least ten hours a day at their jobs, sometimes
twelve hours, garçons de café, fourteen hours.24

Change is shown not only in the industrialisation of the
city, but in agricultural patterns in rural areas. Farmers in
the Midi generally moved from a multi-crop exploitation to a
monoculture, dominated by vineyards.25 The traditional produce of
olives and flowers declined. The wine monoculture brought its
growers prosperity in good times, but when wine prices fell,
farmers had no diversity to rely on. In addition, extensive
vineyards in the Midi were highly susceptible to the ravages of
phylloxera from 1871-1886. Output of wine in hectolitres in 1875
fell to 7 percent of its 1871 volume.26 This economic change
encouraged discontented country people, in particular vinyard
growers, to join the political left, an 'agricultural
proletariat'.27

Economic change in the country and industrialisation in the
city did much to alter the traditional perception that the
people of the Midi were especially gregarious, friendly, and
easy-going. Judt quotes Midi historian Maurice Agulhon arguing
that the Provencal 'sociability' declined with its small towns.

25Sagnes, Jean, Le Midi rouge, 217. Judt, Tony, Socialism in
Providence 1871-1914. (Cambridge, 1979), 27.
26Judd, Tony, Ibid., 30.
27Ibid., 149.
damaged by an angry, organised population which had risen up in
response to the hardship of the phylloxera crisis.\(^{28}\)

But if the old Midi was evolving, the reasons seem to be
more complex than a crisis of agriculture. The Provencal
language, widely spoken in the 1850s, had decayed by the eve of
the war, its loss blamed on heavy immigration, the development
of business interests, and compulsory military service, all of
which required French.\(^{29}\) In one militant attempt to reassert the
memory of the south's independence, a 'Ligue du Midi' was
established at the time of the Commune.\(^{30}\) The group denied the
authority of the central government, and tried to reintroduce
the power of old Provence lost after 1480, and lost in Languedoc
after 1271. Mistral, the great nineteenth century poet of
Provence, wrote in provençal.

The rebirth of a true liberal republic in France in 1876
also marked the return of party political liberalism in the
Bouches-du-Rhône. \(L'Égalité\) was one of many new left-leaning
political newspapers to appear in Marseille that year, designed
primarily to instruct the working class in socialism or trade
unionism.\(^{31}\) \(La Jeune République,\) precursor to \(Le Petit Provençal,\)
also appeared. This socialist newspaper was directed by Clovis
Hugues, pre-Commune editor of \(Le Peuple.\) Hugues' new paper

\(^{28}\)Ibid., 50-51.

\(^{29}\)Guiral, P., and Amargier, P., \(Histoire de Marseille.\) 289.

\(^{30}\)Gaillard, Lucien, \(La naissance du parti socialiste à Marseille,\)
131.

\(^{31}\)Ibid., 163.
quickly adopted the extreme left Guesdist strand of socialism. In
1879, the pivotal congress establishing the Third Republic
socialist party in France was held in Marseille, and organised
by Marseille socialist Jean Lombard. Representation from the
city was substantial: fifty-four delegates, compared with
sixteen from Paris, and six from Lyon. In total, two-thirds of
the 541 who signed the conference’s manifesto came from Provence
and Bas-Languedoc. In 1881 Hugues, running for parliament from
Marseille, became the first socialist elected to the chamber in
France. The working class from the department moved to organise
trade unions in numbers only second in size to Paris. Between
1892 and 1902 Siméon Flaissières, a socialist physician
converted to Guesdism, was mayor of Marseille. Flaissières was
called ‘le bon docteur’ because ‘ses actes de bienfaisance lui
valent rapidement une grande popularité, surtout parmi les
ouvriers’. Flaissières declared from the mayor’s office after
his 1892 victory, ‘pour la première fois une assemblée
exclusivement composée de socialistes siège dans cette
enceinte’. Flaissières became a socialist senator in 1906, one
of France’s first.

32Guiral, P., and Amargier, P., Histoire de Marseille, 279.
Sagnes, Jean, Le Midi rouge, 24.
33Anderson, R.D., France 1870-1914. Politics and Society,
34Gaillard, Lucien, La vie quotidienne des ouvriers provencaux au
35Jolly, Jean, Dictionnaire des parlementaires français (5 Vols.,
36Bleitrach, Danielle, et al., Classe ouvrière et social-
démocratie: Lille et Marseille, 31.
From 1893 to 1901, strikes in Marseille became more frequent, and more violent. The city also served as a centre of Mediterranean anarchism. Marseille gained a reputation as a city prone to strikes and working-class trouble, and conservative elements blamed immigrants who 'mangent notre pain, jettent partout le désastre et commettent des crimes sans nombre'. The city already was well on its way toward its modern reputation as troubled and violent.

By the eve of the First World War the department seemed converted to the left. Although the mayor of Marseille during the war, Eugène Pierre, was not a socialist, in the elections of 26 April and 10 May 1914, voters chose four socialists: Fernand Buisson, Bernard Cadenat, Flaissières, and Sixte Anatole Quenin (Sixte-Quenin). Two more elected called themselves 'républicain socialiste'; three, 'radicale socialiste'; one, 'gauche radicale'; two, 'gauche démocratique'. Only one politician clearly represented the conservative point of view, Joseph Thierry, a lawyer who supported the Catholic church. Statistics of the 1914 election show 25 percent of the department voted

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"Jolly, Jean, Dictionnaire des parlementaires français, 1696."

"Ibid."


"Guiral, P. and Amargier, P., Histoire de Marseille, 280."


"Jolly, Jean, Dictionnaire des parlementaires français, passim."
socialist, one of only nine indicating a left vote at this high a level. The Hérault department voted socialist in the range of 15 percent and 20 percent, one of only ten departments with a percentage this high.\textsuperscript{43} Strikes in Marseille between 1900 and 1914 averaged 42.6 a year; between 1911 and 1913, 47 percent of strikers asked primarily for salary increases.\textsuperscript{44} Anti-militarism in trade unions was strong.\textsuperscript{45} As well, the trade union movement in Marseille at this time was closely associated with the socialists, according to one historian, unlike the situation in most of France, where trade unions and socialists developed separately, and often distrusted each other after 1900.\textsuperscript{46} This was to be the case in Languedoc. The area of Bas-Languedoc, including Montpellier as its dominant city, but leaving out the Haute-Languedoc city of Toulouse, shared with Provence many common factors establishing its politically \textit{gauchiste} character.

\begin{quote}
Ce radicalisme méridional (au sens cette fois général, et etymologique du mot radicalisme), cet extrémisme si l'on veut, s'est exercé sur deux terrains successivement, celui des luttes religieuses, celui des luttes sociales.\textsuperscript{47}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{43}Olivesi, Antoine, and Nouschi, André, \textit{La France de 1848 à 1914} (Paris, 1970), 177.

\textsuperscript{44}Barrau, Patrick, \textit{Le mouvement ouvrier à Marseille (1900-1914)}, 154-5.

\textsuperscript{45}Ibid., 78.

\textsuperscript{46}Ibid., 94.

\textsuperscript{47}Baratier, Edouard, editor, \textit{Histoire de la Provence}, 515. Cf. also Olivesi, Antoine, and Nouschi, André, \textit{La France de 1848 à 1914}, 177.
Languedoc, like Provence, had moved from an agricultural polyculture to a monoculture. The wine monoculture dominated Bas-Languedoc even more completely than Provence from 1850. Replanted vineyards after phylloxera devastation led to renewed prosperity. By 1892, 41.8 percent of arable land in Hérault was planted in vineyards, and by 1901, at 192,000 hectolitres of wine annually, Hérault produced more wine than any other French department. Unlike the Bouches-du-Rhône department, on the eve of the war in Hérault, 'l'agriculture est plus que jamais la première activité économique du département'. Most industry in the primarily bourgeois university city of Montpellier was related to the wine trade. Paradoxically to this economic domination of agriculture, the department itself was by 1900 one of the most urban in France: 64 percent of its population lived in towns, as viticulture favoured concentrations of people. Forty-three percent of the population by 1921 were agricultural workers. The population of Montpellier itself was 80,230 in 1911, substantially smaller than Marseille. Despite this agricultural dominance of the economy and the workforce, however, Languedoc (no less than Provence) shared a reputation for extremes, social disturbances, anti-patriotism, and even

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Ibid., 15.

Ibid., 24.
laziness. From 1900 to 1910 the price of wine collapsed due to overproduction. The crisis led in 1904 to agricultural strikes sufficient in number to place the area in third place after the Bouches-du-Rhône and Nord for number of strikers.\(^{53}\) In 1907 a depression in the areas of the Midi tied to the wine monoculture led to a violent uprising. Wine growers were particularly incensed at the competition of Algerian wine, and formed great demonstrations taking on revolutionary overtones.\(^{54}\) The movement was supported by the socialist mayors of the region: 'le mouvement de mécontentement des viticulteurs parut sur le point de dégénérer en une véritable insurrection, d’autant plus grave que le 17e régiment d’infanterie de ligne se mutina à Béziers.'\(^{55}\) The incident added weight to the assumption by the rest of the country that the Midi was not to be trusted; referring to the 'mutiny' of a regiment from Agde (Hérault) during the crisis, Chef de Bataillon Bouysson wrote in a 1907 report that the people of the Midi in general were morally suspect, 'des paresseux et des jouisseurs'. Some historians contend the

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\(^{53}\)Sagnes, Jean, *Le mouvement ouvrier en Languedoc*, 84.


supposed mutiny was a myth, but it nevertheless set the stage for the ‘lâche Midi’ legend.

Politically Bas-Languedoc evolved to the left as did the rest of the Midi, attracted by economic frustrations ascribed to the vineyard monoculture. But socialism did not command as great a place in Hérault affairs by 1914 as it did in Bouches-du-Rhône. Voting statistics of that year’s election show a socialist tally in the range of 15 to 20 percent, still one of only ten departments in France at that high a level, but lower than the vote of Bouches-du-Rhône. This seems to reflect the powerful Radical influence in the department, noted by Sagnes in his study of a 19th century socialist newspaper. This strength was built on a foundation of an issue which had taken a leading role in Languedoc politics for centuries, religion. The 1907 crisis renewed ‘un lointain héritage de résistance transmis par les Albigeois et les Camisards en entrant en rébellion contre le pouvoir central’. Anti-clericalism in the region was a matter


58 Oliveri, Antoine, and Nouschi, André, La France de 1848 à 1914, 177.


of class: agricultural proprietors were often royalist and Catholic, while workers were often anti-clerical.61 Socialists in Hérault reflected this strong Radical tendency by forming a strain of socialism called 'Bartheism' after its leader, Edouard Barthe. This socialism approved of Millerandism and 'combattent moins le capitalisme (ils laissent cette tâche aux syndicalistes) que la droite cléricale, et les socialistes révolutionnaires sont rares'.62 Socialists in Hérault refused to participate with Radicals after 1904, and repudiated freemasonry for its Radical associations, but still, 'il s'agit donc d'une variété de républicanisme plus que de socialisme'.63 This anti-clerical conservatism seems different from the interests of the left in the Bouches-du-Rhône. In the elections of 1914 Hérault gained two socialist deputies, Barthe and Camille Reboul. Leader of Bas-Languedoc socialism, Barthe, a pharmacist from Béziers, represented the department as a deputy from 1910 to 1940, and as a senator from 1948 to his death in 1949. He was an indefatigable defender of winegrowers' interests, and a regular contributor to Le Petit Méridional and other newspapers.64 Reboul, on the other hand, did not reflect the same bourgeois background, having been a café waiter and owner, a vineyard owner, a wine merchant and, after 1919, a printer. His

61Sagnes, Jean. Le mouvement ouvrier en Languedoc, 42.
62Ibid., 65.
63Ibid., 145.
64Jolly, Jean. Dictionnaire des parlementaires français, 474-5.
strong activity in trade unions led him into politics: 'militant politique, il organisa le parti socialiste à l'Hérault'.

While Barthe represented a conservative socialism, apparently, Reboul represented a more doctrinaire interpretation. Others elected in 1914 were two listed as 'radicale socialiste'; one, 'gauche radicale'; two 'radicale'; one 'républicain socialiste'; two 'gauche démocratique'. No clearly conservative politicians were elected in 1914, but Louis Lafferre, deputy from 1898 to 1919, and senator from 1920 to 1924, had been president of the freemason 'grand-orient de France', regular contributor to *Le Petit Méridional*, and 'la première personnalité politique de l'Hérault'.

Trade unions in Bas-Languedoc during this period shared the strong growth of those in the Bouches-du-Rhône. But unlike the Provençal group, trade unions here refused after 1905 to collaborate with the socialists. Reformist trade unionism held majority representation in Hérault, although revolutionary syndicalism was represented. The Hérault trade unions were often hostile to the national C.G.T.

Although socialism seems to have been interpreted differently in Bouches-du-Rhône and Hérault, it is clear nevertheless that the two areas turned more and more gauche to solve their problems, and were not hesitant to use the

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Sagnes, Jean, *Le mouvement ouvrier en Languedoc*, 171.

weapons of strike and social unrest. Anderson notes that in the Midi, socialism became integrated into normal life, and tended to become reformist and parliamentary. Sagnes contends that, at least in Hérault,

Carrot emphasises this 'intérêt supérieur' in the context of the 1907 Midi revolt, which he says cut across class lines and contributed to the belief that the Midi must defend its regional integrity: 'Cette unanimité remarquable des esprits et des coeurs dépassait le problème purement matériel du prix du vin pour embrasser celui de l'avenir matériel et moral de cette région méridionale.' Wolff emphasises that, even today, 'bien qu'aucun mouvement autonomiste n'ait jamais réussi à s'implanter sérieusement parmi eux, il ont le provincialisme à fleur de peau....C'est une province qui a toujours eu l'impression d'être un peu une colonie.' Yet this concept of regional identity did

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not preclude an extension into the larger sphere of 'la patrie', a certain feeling of patriotism that after 1870 became 'une habitude de pensée' in Languedoc, surpassing any serious thoughts of separatism.\(^7\) Andréani cites the area's inability to solve its economic problems, the low French birthrate, and fear of invasion, 'la conscience de la fragilité française.... Paradoxalement, la languueur économique et l'anémie démographique contribuent à souder plus étroitement la région à la France.'\(^7\)

In Provence, despite a comparatively extreme gauchiste posture and a distinct anarchist movement, the population in August 1914 also joined the rest of France in nearly unanimous support of the war.\(^7\)

II. Journalism of the 'Gauche' Before 1914

The large daily newspapers in this study reflect a formula of modest support to groups on the political left, and a rejection of extreme left views. This shows the intentions of both Le Petit Provençal and Le Petit Méridional to move toward editorial formulae based on the concept of 'presse d'information'. This concept, as opposed to the 'presse d'opinion', produces a newspaper designed to attract a large number of readers by

\(^7\)Maurin, Jules, unpublished manuscript covering the first world war in Hérault and Lozère, 964.

\(^7\)Andréani, Roland, 'Armée et nation en Languedoc méditerranéen', 368-9.

\(^7\)Collection 'le passé présent', La Provence de 1900 à nos jours, 112.
offering local and world news, 'faits divers', serialised novels, and restrained opinions and commentary, usually limited to only one front-page leader. The 'presse d'opinion', conversely, offers many columns of political commentary based on the opinion of a political group, a proprietor, or an individual. The 'presse d'opinion', strong in France before the Third Republic, had lost most of its readers by 1914: 'ce sont les matières non-politiques qui ont servi de moteur au journalisme du XXe siècle et par là commandé l'évolution de la presse.' This does not mean, however, that the newspapers of this study were politically neutral. While large daily newspapers in Paris eschewed politics, dailies in the provinces tended still to write polemically and support rival politicians in elections. An editorial strategy was attached to the more political papers to attract a mass audience by emphasising those topics readers would expect to find in a 'presse d'information'. It became necessary to attract a mass audience to survive financially: most newspapers from 1876 until 1917 sold for five centimes, the 'penny press' of France. This meant that by subscription alone a newspaper could not make enough money to pay its bills. Although the 'penny press' in England and the

76 Gellanger, Claude; Godechot, Jacques; Guiral, Pierre; Terrou, Fernand; Histoire générale de la presse française Volume 1: 1871-1914 (Paris, 1972), 143.
77 Ibid., 254.
78 In 1907, of daily newspapers outside of Paris, 232 sold at 5 centimes, 12 at 10 centimes, 3 at 15 centimes. Pigelet, Jacques, Organisation intérieure de la presse périodique française (Orléans, 1909), 75-6.
The United States could still survive on the strength of its advertising, France never developed a strong base of advertising able to recoup the costs of publishing a newspaper. A 1902 calculation of the cost of operating a Paris daily publishing 20,000 issues a day was set at 22,400 francs a month, while receipts were set at 17,600 francs a month. "L'influences maîtresses d'argent en cette matière sont plus terribles que par le passé." Most large provincial dailies having been organised basically with the same structure as that of mass-circulation Paris newspapers, it may be assumed that this calculation is roughly accurate for the south. Newspapers, especially in Paris, sometimes accepted bribes to make up the shortfall. By 1914, however, this system seems to have been replaced in most larger dailies by a reliance on advertising revenue.

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80 Destrem, Hugues, 'Les conditions économiques de la presse' (doctoral thesis, Université de Paris), 1902, 143-5. This calculation assumes only half a daily press run was actually sold. Because most readers did not have subscriptions, a press run ('tirage') and circulation ('diffusion') might have been drastically different.

81 Spiegel, Jacques, Organisation intérieure de la presse périodique française, 117.

82 Fay, Sidney Bradshaw, The Influence of the Pre-War Press in Europe, extract of proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 64 (March 1931), 24.

The question of circulation is difficult, as publishers at this time often produced a large number of unsold newspapers. In addition, circulation was considered a trade secret; no bureau existed before 1922 to objectively verify circulations. The Annuaire de la presse listed circulations, but modern historians believe its figures are so inaccurate as to be worthless. Nevertheless, by comparing sources, it seems safe to say that Le Petit Provencal on the eve of the war had a daily circulation of about 100,000, and Le Petit Méridional, about 70,000.

The Marseille newspaper traced a socialist lineage to 1876. In that year politicians Hugues and Velten founded La Jeune République in Marseille. It was administrated by Alfred Fontaine, and writers included Camille Pelletan, Edouard Durranc, Benoît Malon, and Jules Guesde.

Aux premier temps, le caractère dogmatique prédominait....Au début du XXe siècle, les nécessités d'une existence essentiellement...

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64Bellanger, et al., Histoire générale de la presse française, 148, 151.

65100,000-150,000 according to Watelet, Jean, Bibliographie de la presse française, politique et d'information générale 1865-1914, tome 14, Bouches-du-Rhône, (Paris, 1974), 13; 100,000 to 110,000 according to Masson, Paul, director, Les Bouches-du-Rhône. Encyclopédie départementale, volume 5, 621.

6680,000, according to Lacave and Sagnes, L'Hérault d'autrefois, 101; 100,000 in 1932, according to Demail, André, Les voix de la France: La presse de provence au XXe siècle, 73; 70,000 to 75,000 before the war, according to Sagnes, Jean, Le mouvement ouvrier en Languedoc, 46.

In 1880 Le Jeune République changed its name to Le Petit Provencal, and soon became the second largest newspaper in the southeast, after the Radical Le Petit Marseillais. The newspaper developed an editorial formula strongly sympathetic to socialism, but often supporting Radical points of view. ‘En dépit de cette hospitalité offerte aux idées les plus avancées, Le Petit Provencal avait constamment combattu les candidats collectivistes.’

Historians of this period are in unanimous agreement that the newspaper was Radical-leaning socialist, not extreme, but nevertheless the only large-circulation daily newspaper sympathetic to the left of the Radical point of view in provincial France outside Lille. In 1902 a note from the departmental prefect called it ‘socialiste ministériel’. Although not always supporting the extreme left point of view, Le Petit Provencal often gave activists a voice, even anarchists:

‘C’est le seul quotidien qui ait signalé à peu près régulièrement les titres successifs des organes publiés par les

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Maxson, Paul, Ibid., 615.

Ibid., 157-8.


Yet the newspaper denounced antimilitarism and, when accused of supporting international socialism, declared its patriotism. In a commentary published in 1897 in L'ami du Peuple, weekly publication of the Union Socialiste, the writer observed Le Petit Provencal was ‘ni exclusivement socialiste, ni exclusivement radical, ni opportuniste, ni libéral, mais un peu tout’.93

Historians generally agree, however, that this hybrid socialism attracted strong readership from the working class in Marseille and in a large circulation area reaching most of southeast France, nearly into Montpellier.94 It also became the unofficial publication of Flaissières, and in elections of 1890 and 1900 strongly supported all socialist candidates, even Guesdists.95 But one historian contends that, while agreeing Le Petit Provencal held its readership first among the working class, found a second large group of readers from ‘des milieux
Another believes Le Radical, an evening daily more closely related to the modern popular press, was more commonly read by workers' groups than Le Petit Provencal. Changes in staff of Le Petit Provencal during this period are difficult to trace. Many newspaper archives in France were destroyed after the Second World War, and those of Le Petit Provencal, restarted after the war as Le Provencal by Gaston Defferre, are no exception to this rule. (The post-war Le Midi Libre of Montpellier acquired a small archive, but it contains little of interest from this period.) Some staff members of Le Petit Provencal referred to in other publications as active in the eve of the First World War include:

- B. Martin, editor ('directeur').
- A. Cristini, assistant editor ('secrétaire de la direction').
- A. Clérissy, sub-editor or managing editor ('secrétaire de la rédaction').
- Camille Ferdy, political editor ('réacteur politique').
- Pierre Roux, political editor ('réacteur politique').

Added to this information is Olivesi's observation that political editor Camille Ferdy had been a newswriter ('chroniqueur') beginning in 1895, and that he later became

96Liens, Georges, 'L’opinion à Marseille en 1917', 59.
97Collection 'Le passé présent', La Provence de 1900 à nos jours, 104 (by Pierre Guiral).
editor-in-chief, apparently by 1914. A former journalist on La Radical who joined Le Petit Provencal in 1924 (he noted it was common for journalists then to do an apprenticeship on an evening newspaper before moving on to a morning newspaper) referred to André Négis, a daily columnist during the war, as an editor, and said that when he joined the newspaper, the business manager ('administrateur') was Jules Recolin, the personnel chief was named Bouterin, and the proprietor ('directeur') was Girbon. Titles on different newspapers did not always mean the same thing, making it difficult to ascertain precisely the responsibilities of each staff member. For instance, the editor of Le Petit Meridional was called 'secrétaire de la rédaction', but he was replaced in 1913 by a 'réacteur en chef', holding the same responsibilities.

Flaissières wrote occasional columns for Le Petit Provencal, as did Henri Michel. Michel was a deputy (Bouches-du-Rhône) from 1898 to 1910, a senator (Basses-Alpes) from 1910-1921, and a deputy (Basses-Alpes) from 1924-1928. Son of a baker from Lambesc (Bouches-du-Rhône), he became a journalist before becoming a 'radical-socialiste' politician, writing for several Paris newspapers in addition to Le Petit Provencal.

100Tourette, Jean, Marseille au temps du transbordeur, 42.
101Andréani, Roland, 'La presse quotidienne à Montpellier des origines à 1944', 973.
102Jolly, Jean, Dictionnaire des parlementaires français, 2454-5.
Marius Richard, Paris political correspondent, had begun his journalism career as correspondent in Nîmes for La Dépêche of Toulouse, having left his position there as schoolteacher and prefecture employee. He joined Le Petit Provençal in 1910, became its editor-in-chief ('directeur') after the war, and also in 1910 ran unsuccessfully for deputy under the 'socialiste indépendant' label. Richard was active in journalism societies in Paris during the war; in 1917 he was secretary for the Syndicat des quotidiens régionaux in Paris, and one of twenty-four members representing the press on the government's Commission interministérielle de la presse. Richard apparently also spent at least some time working in the Paris Bureau de la Presse, the wartime office of the censor. André Lefèvre, also a columnist, is known because of his political activities. He was a deputy (Bouches-du-Rhône) from 1910 to 1924, and minister of war after the armistice (20 January-16 December 1920). An engineer, he had been editor of La Petite République, a Paris socialist newspaper, and during the war worked in the munitions industry. As Andréani points out, however, although these columnists ('collaborateurs') were the most identifiable

Andreani, Roland, 'La presse quotidienne à Montpellier des origines à 1944', 820, 883.
Paris, Archives Nationales, packet F18 2380.
Jolly, Jean, Dictionnaire des parlementaires français, 2209-10.
of those who contributed to a newspaper, they were not always staff members, but politicians and professionals. 107

**Le Petit Méridional**, smaller than its Marseille counterpart, apparently could not rely on the same resources to hire journalists, and while **Le Petit Provençal** always offered a daily column and leader on its front page written by staff members, **Le Petit Méridional** did not. The Montpellier newspaper borrowed more from the Paris press, and relied more often on academics and politicians for its content. The ratio of advertisements to the entire surface of the paper in February 1914 was 17 percent, while that of **Le Petit Provençal** was 20 percent. Advertising ratios are a key factor in gauging the prosperity of a daily newspaper. Nevertheless, the newspaper was the most important daily in Bas-Languedoc, overshadowing the Nîmes press, and rivaling its prestigious nationally-known competitor, **La Dépêche** of Toulouse. 108 The Montpellier newspaper seldom, however, competed directly with **Le Petit Provençal**. While **La Dépêche** set up a network of local correspondents in Bas-Languedoc, the Marseille newspaper did not, and "ainsi l'influence marseillaise ne semble-t-elle guère contrercher la prépondérance montpelliéraine en Bas-Languedoc". 109 **Le Petit Méridional** made no

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107 Andréani, Roland, "La presse quotidienne à Montpellier des origines à 1944", 977.


109 Andréani, Roland, "La presse quotidienne à Montpellier des origines à 1944", 997.
pretence of socialism, siting itself squarely in the camp of the Radicals, reflecting their preeminence in Hérault. Except for a three-year period between 1911 and pre-war 1914, it was the only newspaper on the left from the department, and its influence extended to the departments of Drôme, Pyrénées-Orientales, Haute-Garonne, and even Bouches-du-Rhône. Most of its readership, however, was centred in Gard, the Narbonnais, and Hérault.110 Established in March 1876 by Antoine Sereno, with printer Laurent-Mathieu Etienne Camboin, incorporated January 1882, it was ‘le grand organe radical du Languedoc Méditerranéen’.111

The historian of the workers’ movement in Languedoc observes that despite socialist efforts to found a newspaper, only Le Petit Méridional successfully offered a voice for trade unions and gauchiste political groups, and it was the newspaper most of them read.

Telle est la presse qui est chargée de l’éducation politique des ouvriers et des socialistes héraultais qui, par ailleurs, lisent quotidiennement, à l’exception de quelques militants abonnés au Socialiste ou au Combat Social, les journaux radicaux.112

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110Sagnes, Jean, Ibid., 46.
111Bellanger et al., Histoire générale de la presse française, 400. Also Demaison, André, Les voix de la France: la presse de provinces au XIXe siècle, 73; Andréani, Roland, ‘La presse quotidienne à Montpellier des origines à 1944’, 674.
112Sagnes, Jean, Le mouvement ouvrier en Languedoc, 64.
The Montpellier newspaper often gave workers' groups its support during strikes: 'Lors des grandes grèves agricoles du printemps 1904, par exemple, La Dépêche et Le Petit Méridional... contribuent largement à l'isolement des grands propriétaires dans l'opinion et donc au succès sans précédent des ouvriers de la terre.' This support became more reserved during later strikes, but Sagnes contends it never turned to hostility.\(^{113}\)

The only socialist newspaper in Hérault to last more than several issues was a weekly, L'Étincelle, which was edited in Agde at the turn of the century. The newspaper promulgated a conservative socialism, however, ignoring questions of the class struggle, revolutionary proletariat, and Marxism. Like Le Petit Méridional it was anti-clerical: 'ce socialisme est très proche du radicalisme.'\(^{114}\) Le Midi Socialiste, a small-circulation daily (10,000) from Toulouse, must have reached a few socialist readers in Bas-Languedoc.\(^{115}\)

The staff of Le Petit Méridional was led by Augustin-Etienne-Marie Blaquière, always referred to as 'Commandant Blaquière' by the newspaper, the editor ('rédacteur en chef'). Blaquière had been appointed in 1913, a Montpelliérien by birth but at that time squadron commander ('chef d'escadron') for the military in Toulon.\(^{116}\) He is listed during the war as a...

\(^{113}\)Sagnes, Jean, *Le Midi rouge*, 118.


\(^{115}\)Bouyoux, Pierre, 'L'opinion public à Toulouse...', 41.

\(^{116}\)Andréani, Roland, 'La presse quotidienne à Montpellier des origines à 1944', 971-2.
representative on the government's Commission interministérielle de la presse in 1917. The newspaper referred to Michel Derville as president of its board of directors and others on the board were Clément Massol; a lawyer, Trautwein; and a doctor, Kleinschmidt, the last two with German names but from Montpellier. Sagnes identifies a 1912 'Groupe des Radicaux du Petit Méridional', all freemasons and staff members of the newspaper: Jules Gariel, editor-in-chief ('secrétaire de la rédaction') from 1886 to 1913, several times member of the executive committee of the Radical party, and member of the council of the Grand Orient in France from 1902-5 and 1911-13; Hippolyte Poggiol, proprietor; Fernand Chazot, nephew of Gariel, Paris correspondent. 'J. Gariel se distinguait par la sévérité de ses principes laïques, son républicanisme intransigeant.' Front-page leaders, in contrast to those of Le Petit Provencal, were usually signed, simply, 'Le Petit Méridional', or 'P.M'. Occasionally local politicians wrote for the paper, but few contributed regularly during the war. Louis Lafferre was one who did. He was deputy from 1898 to 1919 (Hérault), senator from 1920 to 1924 (Hérault). A candidate under 'l'union des radicaux et radicaux-socialistes', this school teacher and 'franc-maçon militant' was also president of the executive committee of the Radical party. His support of the agricultural workers during a

118Andréani, Roland, 'La presse quotidienne à Montpellier des origines à 1944', 972.
119Sagnes, Jean, Le Midi rouge, 113.
strike was rewarded with strong support from workers' groups. Gaston Doumergue, a Radical politician representing Gard department who had been president du conseil from 9 December 1913 to 9 June 1914, and who held several ministerial positions during the war, had also collaborated with Le Petit Méridional. He began writing again after resigning as minister of colonies on 20 March 1917. Doumergue would later become president of the republic (1924-31), and one of France's most important inter-war statesmen.

Le Bayard of Marseille was a weekly satirical newspaper published until 1 August 1914, then restarted 5 February 1916. It is included in this study because, although a separate paper, it had merged with Le Petit Provencal in 1901, and regularly exchanged writers and editors.

One of the most difficult questions to consider when studying the press is that of influence. How does one ascertain the power of a newspaper to form opinions about an issue within its readership area? Historians have no scientific surveys on which to rely, and newspapers themselves considered

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120Joly, Jean, Dictionnaire des parlementaires français, 2091-2.

121Ibid., 1476-1481.


circulation and penetration information to be trade secrets. Before 1881, the press in France was monitored by the government, and this material offers helpful direction to the historian, but after the Law of 29 July 1881, government surveillance was eliminated. We often are forced between this time and the First World War to rely on information of an anecdotal nature. The question is made more complicated by the diversity of published media at this time. Although one does not have to contend with the modern competition between broadcast and printed media, before the war the influence of a newspaper would vary greatly, depending on if it were a 'journal d'opinion', a 'journal d'information', from Paris, or locally produced. Magazines competed, too, as did posters, which were more important in France during this period than in other countries.124 'The fact must be taken note of that the papers mostly create public opinion,' wrote the Kaiser in a letter to the Tsar dated 8 May 1909.125 Noting that the majority of politicians also wrote for newspapers, a major study calls the press the 'antichamber' of parliament, and notes that, although it can't be measured, its influence 'fut considérable'.126 The 'presse d'opinion', however, ceded much of its influence by 1914: 'Ils n'étaient lus que par des convaincus.'127 Concerning

125 Fay, Sidney Bradshaw, *The Influence of the Pre-War Press in Europe*, 5.
127 Ibid., 256.
newspaper content, a historian writes, 'l'effet de ce contenu sur le public échappe en fait à une étude aussi précise car la manière dont chaque lecteur appréhende ce contenu reste très personnelle'. Another notes that in France, 'une importante minorité s'est, dans chaque cas, révélée hostile aux thèses du journal qu'elle lit chaque matin'. Despite this pessimistic point of view, the author of a doctoral thesis which examines public opinion in Toulouse during the war observes that the press itself emphasised its attempts to form public opinion, writing, for example, as did Le Midi Socialiste in 1917, 'C'est la presse qui fait l'opinion, c'est elle qui influe sur les gouvernements, c'est elle qui dirige le peuple.' If this kind of assertion may seem a bit self-serving, Bouyoux nevertheless contends, 'Chaque journal également, parce qu'il veut toucher et garder sa clientèle, doit bien la connaître et transmettre, peu ou prou, ses désirs, ses préoccupations.' But it can be misleading to compare circulations of newspapers with election results. In 1956, for example, while the circulations of communist dailies in France dropped 30 percent, votes for

128 Albert, Pierre, La presse. 60.
130 Bouyoux, Pierre, 'L'opinion publique à Toulouse pendant la première guerre mondiale', 19.
131 Ibid., 492.
communist candidates increased 10 percent. Does the press therefore form public opinion or reflect it? Writes Kayser:

J' ai entendu à quelques minutes d'intervalle, le même homme interrompre un interlocuteur crédul: 'c'est faux! Allons, c'est un bobard de plus que vous avez lu dans le journal!' Et opposer au scepticisme d'un autre interlocuteur cette affirmation catégorique: 'c'est vrai, je vous l'assure. Je l'ai lu dans le journal'.

Nevertheless it remains true that during the First World War the French government established an elaborate network to control public opinion through the press. Pétain observed in 1917 that 'le moral des troupes est directement influencé par la lecture des journaux'. During the mobilisation, 'en quête de renseignements, on court vers les journaux'. In the smaller towns, 'on va attendre le train et les journaux'. Tudesq writes that from 1880 to 1940, 'la grande presse d'information devient la principale source de connaissance des événements ainsi que la principale expression de l'opinion publique'. Becker asserts that if the press does not necessarily reflect a

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133: Ibid., 19 (by Jacques Kayser).
general opinion, it at least reflects many opinions, and cannot be discounted by historians. Writing during the war, Arbouin believed the press follows attitudes of its public as much as it forms them.

It is easier to make a comparison between the influence of the Paris press and that of the local press. The large Paris dailies circulated throughout the country, and competed for readership with regional dailies such as the two studied here. It does not seem, however, that Paris newspapers strongly influenced readers in the Midi. Writes Guiral, 'Les marseillais en effet lisaient assez peu les quotidiens et hebdomadaires de Paris.' Another historian notes, 'L'influence de la presse parisienne sur les électeurs était probablement bien inférieure à celle des quotidiens départementaux.' Conversely, notes another source, Le Petit Journal and Le Petit Parisien, two of Paris' largest dailies, 'grâce aux expéditions par chemin de fer, sont en mesure de leur disputer une partie de la clientèle régionale.' Analysis of the circulation of Le Petit Parisien in 1910, however, shows that while it penetrated widely into the

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141 Keyser, Jacques, La presse de province sous la Troisième République, vhl, preface by François Goguel.
142 Olivetti, Antoine, Nouschi, André, La France de 1848 à 1914, 174.
north, it did not circulate widely in the southeast. Of 1,327,409 daily circulation, 0.26 of 1 percent reached the Bouches-du-Rhône, and 0.19 of 1 percent reached Hérault. This is sixth least of all French departments per capita for Bouches-du-Rhône, twelfth least per capita for Hérault. Statistics of November 1922 show the in Montpellier, 370 bought Le Petit Parisien daily; 1,260, Le Journal; and 905, Le Matin. By comparison, in Dijon, a north central city with nearly the same population as Montpellier in 1922 (Dijon, 78,578, 304 km from Paris, Montpellier, 81,548, 750 km from Paris) 2,743 copies of Le Petit Parisien were sold a day, 1,633 of Le Journal, and 3,025 of Le Matin. Statistics for this date are not available for Marseille. But the situation in Toulouse seems similar; Bouyoux notes that in this Haut-Languedocien city, 'la presse parisienne compte peu'.

It seems clear that Le Petit Provencal and Le Petit Méridional were widely read by workers’ and gauchiste groups and individuals, and that the newspapers were influential, but to what degree may be impossible to estimate.

144 Bouyoux, Pierre. 'L'opinion publique à Toulouse...'. 34.
Chapter Two:

**Bourrage de Crâne**

and Censorship in 1914

Many historians contend that the *Bourrage de Crâne* was the central aspect of the French press during the war, and that most French newspapers followed this formula from the same perspective. DeLivois separated newspapers during the war into three categories. The first category completely facilitated use of *Bourrage de Crâne*, and that category covered most of the French press. The second category covered objective and critical newspapers, very few. The third category was anarchist-socialist (minoritaire)-pacifist, unknown before 1917 and after that, small, and seldom produced daily. Bouyoux separates the *bourrage de crâne*.

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2DeLivois, René, *Histoire de la presse française tome II: de 1861 à nos jours* (Lausanne, 1965), 407.
into three categories: unbelievable information, such as that German bombs don't explode; false, but possible news, such as famine in Germany; excessive optimism. Concerning bourrage de crâne, Audoin-Rouzeau emphasises it continued until at least 1916, and undermined the morale of soldiers, but he observes the style was not universal in all newspapers. One needs to examine this phenomenological perspective of wartime journalism to objectify concisely what is meant by bourrage de crâne. To do this, it seems useful to separate the concept into four categories:

1. Outrageous untruths. These would include assertions such as 'Cossacks Near Berlin'; 'Kaiser Dying'; 'French Troops Routing Germans'; etc. Such fanciful accounts, made often in the form of headlines, come to mind most immediately as the main form of bourrage de crâne.

2. Calumnies on Germany. Stories of base German character and barbaric culture, including atrocity stories.

3. Heroic treatment of French troops. Brave poilus fearing neither bullet nor shell, easy victories over a cowardly enemy, the pleasant life of the trenches. This material was the kind of writing soldiers disliked most.

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For Paris examples, see Becker, Jean-Jacques, 1914: Comment les français sont entrés dans la guerre, (Paris, 1977), 442-3.

Audoin-Rouzeau, Stéphane, 14-18: Les combattants des tranchées, 111.
4. Odes to patriotism, a glorious and just war, a purification of the spirit. This was inspired by pre-war writing of young conservatives, led by Maurras and Barrès, under the group L'Action française.1

A chronological thematic analysis of *Le Petit Provençal* and *Le Petit Méridional* indicates that these categories of *bourrage de crâne* were not present throughout the war period, and that some were not used at all. Most distinctly absent was category four in these newspapers. Neither newspaper suggested the war was a good thing, that young soldiers should happily join the troop trains, that a war purifies the culture or the soul. The conflict was treated as an unavoidable tragedy, and the most positive encouragement these newspapers could offer centred around a framework of duty and resolve. This treatment seemed to suggest the politically *gauchiste* underpinnings of the two newspapers, and that they were not willing to join the point of view of the conservative press, even under parameters of the *union sacrée*. Bouyoux’s analysis of the Toulouse press during the war agrees with this, noting the conservative, Catholic press was most enthusiastic about the war.8

The heroic-style treatment of troops described under point three, common in the Paris press for at least the first months of war, is totally absent from *Le Petit Méridional*, and nearly so in *Le Petit Provençal*. If it is part of the latter, it is published only during the first weeks, and then only in

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1Becker, Jean-Jacques, 1944: *Comment les français ont entré dans la guerre*, 442-3.

2Bouyoux, Pierre, 'L'opinion publique à Toulouse...', 74.
editorials, or columns borrowed from other newspapers. It never became part of regular news columns. We may read leader-writer Camille Ferdy write on 9 August of 'les veritables prodiges d'héroisme accompli par ces petits soldats qui tiennent infatigablement tête à la "kolossale" armée du kaiser...Il neurent sans peur comme sans faiblesse, dans la belle sérénité du sacrifice librement consenti...' (21 October), and the paper reprinted on rare occasions the commentaries of General Cherfils from the conservative L'Echo de Paris, notorious for his bouchage de crâne (4 October). This did not continue, however, much beyond 1914, and it was limited with a few exceptions to Ferdy's columns.

Bouchage de crâne aspects one and two present a different case. Both newspapers continued to repeat atrocity stories through the first year of war, comparing Germany's invasion to the brutality of Attila the Hun (Ferdy, 29 September), using names like 'barbarians, vandals' (column by Négis, 2 September), describing 'les femmes éventrées, les enfants mutilés, les vieillards brulés, les villages incendiés....' (Négis, 2 September), and adding a litany of detailed description of German 'cruautés'. (Le Petit Méridional, 20 August). One longer example articulates the tone of this style of writing, an article by Paris correspondent Marius Richard in Le Petit Provençal 17 December 1914. Under the standing headline 'German Atrocities' he wrote:

le cas d'une vieille femme...son corps fut retrouvé, quelques jours après, dans une cave. Après avoir abusé d'elle, les misérables l'avaient étranglée. De même ils violèrent, au nombre de plus de vingt, une fillette de quinze ans, sous les yeux de ses parents, qui la relevèrent morte.

It might be worth considering the point of view of the censor vis-à-vis this material. Was censorship responsible for encouraging these two newspapers to publish atrocity stories? Not necessarily, it seems; censors were not enthusiastically in support of grisly stories and ugly attacks, believing such material would traumatise the public. In a communiqué from Millerand dated 15 September 1914 from Bordeaux, the war minister warned censors, 'Ne pas permettre des récits d'atrocités allemandes qui risquent en terrorisant les populations, de provoquer les exodes les plus lamentables.' The prefect of Seine-et-Marne on 30 August reported that German atrocity stories spread fear and demoralised citizens. Knightley, however, contends that the Bureau de la Presse itself heavily disseminated such stories.

Despite the articles, Le Petit Provençal on 9 September published a plea from the German socialist newspaper Vorwärts. While Vorwärts admitted isolated instances of brutality may have taken place, the report said, 'one must recognise exaggeration, either voluntary or involuntary'. It may be surprising to read this defence of the German point of view in a

\begin{itemize}
\item[10] Marseille, Archives Départementales, packet AD VI T 6/2, censorship 1914–18.
\end{itemize}
French newspaper during wartime, but both of these newspapers actually allowed the enemy's point of view to be published from time to time throughout the war. *La Petit Meridional*, usually more restrained in its hyperbole than its Marseille counterpart, with few exceptions described German 'brutalities' in more general terms than did *Le Petit Provencal*. In an example of 13 December, a Montpellier prisoner of war in Germany was complaining, modestly considering the time, that he was not being fed and was insulted.

The *bourrage de crâne* of point one produces a material basis of obvious untruths, German routs, and related matter. Neither of these newspapers is free of *bourrage de crâne* in this context. On 18 August *Le Petit Meridional* printed in banner headline, 'Sur Le Front Nos Troupes Sont En Progression,' and 'L'Ennemi Fuit En Déroute.' *Le Petit Provencal* exaggerated more: 'La Situation De l'Armée Belge Est Toujours Fort Bonne;' (17 August); 'La Situation De Nos Armées Est Excellente' (5 September). A variation on a well-known headline in *Le Matin* of Paris found favour in *Le Petit Provencal* on 25 August: 'Les Russes Marchent Sur Berlin.' The article underneath this title explained, 'le projet de l'état-major russe est de marcher droit sur Berlin.' But it seems that this style of *bourrage de crâne* was employed by these editors nearly exclusively during the first weeks of the war in part because they had nothing else to fill pages for readers understandably impatient to know war news.
French generals began the war highly suspicious of the press, and determined to keep secret any news of military nature. The French army had blamed the press for the Sedan defeat of 1870 and, although they detested the press and almost never granted interviews, Joffre, Pétain, and Foch soon realised the power of the press to influence troop morale. In August 1914, Joffre defined nearly any information as news of a military nature, to be kept secret. Newspapers were denied access to the front, were for several weeks not offered any communiqué from G.Q.G., and had to rely on sketchy information from equally frustrated foreign newspapers. On 29 August Le Petit Méridional, noted in a front-page leader signed 'P.M.',

> Un communiqué officiel dit que Longwy a capitulé après 24 heures de bombardement....Nous ignorions que Longwy était assiégé, comme nous avons ignoré d'autres combats, et comment Lunéville a été occupé par les allemands. Mais, nous ne voulons pas récrimer aujourd'hui....

On 4 August, however, Le Petit Provencal complained:

> En l'état du peu de nouvelles publiées par les journaux, on répand à travers la population des nouvelles fantaisistes que égarent l'opinion et qui risquent de l'enéver et de l'affoler.


Le Petit Provençal agreed with a suggestion made by Clemenceau in his L'Homme Libre that the government publish a detailed daily dispatch, whether the news was good or bad. The civilian government at this date may not have been a good source, however, as leaders apparently were little better informed than the press. With two to four blank pages a day to fill, almost no advertising, and a public at this point caring only about news of the war, editors responded by copying, commenting, and inventing material. Copied were dispatches from foreign and other newspapers, and in fact the inaccurate news of French successes were usually based on a source, if sometimes a nebulous one. The papers borrowed most often from British newspapers and the Paris press, often those generally reflecting their political viewpoint. Doubtless editors believed they knew what their readers most wanted to hear, and sources of good news were accentuated, while sources of bad news were given less prominence. Observing this phenomenon, Guiral writes that readers of a newspaper wish to read statements which they are already convinced are true, to reinforce their convictions. Voyenne observes that papers must emphasise that which unites people, as polemical articles lose readers. The editors of these newspapers were perhaps conscious of this need. In

16 Becker, J.-J., 1914: Comment les français sont entrés dans la guerre, 225.

addition to these dispatches, writers filled gaps with long commentaries, whether odes to the '75', and the 'poilu', tirades against the hun, compilations of atrocities (often related without citing a source), or descriptions of the military situation taken from whatever parcels of information they could find. Le Petit Provençal larger of the two, drew more resources to the task, relying on Richard, Négis, and Ferdy. The three wrote front-page columns nearly every day for the duration of the war, Richard commenting on the military situation, Négis on the home front, and Ferdy to inspire readers to virtues helpful to the war effort, notably resolve, perseverance, and hatred of the enemy. The smaller Le Petit Méridional lacked resources of these regular writers, and relied on commentaries from politicians as well as unsigned editorials, although not every day. The Marseille paper seemed more interested in presenting a human face of actual signed columns, in exception to the common practice of the day of emphasising pseudonyms and anonymous reports. 18

There were those editors who felt no compunction against inventing news themselves. Marseille journalist Jean Tourette (pen name of Alphonse Cornellier), a journalist for Le Petit Provençal after the war, and for Le Radical, a Marseille evening daily, during the war, explained what his popular-style evening newspaper did to fill gaps in the coverage of the early battles. One of the paper's sub-editors, Ferri Pisani, told editor

Jacques Leon Reybaud, 'Achetez des cartes d'état-major et je commenterai le communiqué quotidien des opérations comme si cela venait en direct du front.' Reybaud acquiesced, and

bientôt Le Radical publia ces premiers récits vivants qui firent monter son tirage de cinquante mille à cent trente-cent mille numéros. Mais les censeurs militaires... ne tardèrent pas à poser des questions sur l'origine de ces articles. Bien entendu on demeura dans le vague.19

There is no evidence that either of the two morning daily newspapers covered in this study resorted to invention, but this example seems to show to what lengths newspapers of the era could go to fill their pages, and it helps us to understand why the press of this era was not always respected and believed.20

The enthusiasm with which military and government authorities sometimes fulfilled their roles as censors is not incomprehensible, given this style of reporting and a belief that the press could be of strong influence over the populace. The circulation aspect mentioned by Tourette indicates that newspapers were still interested during the war in competing with rival newspapers. Habits built by vigorous competition in the peacetime French press did not automatically change with the

19Tourette, Jean, Marseille au temps du transbordeur, (Marseille, 1965), 28.

coming of the war, which was, at first, an attractive way to sell newspapers: a paper has only to be able to put up on its placard "a great battle" for sales to mount up.22

In an early version of what was to become routine throughout most of the French press during the war, La Petite Provencal published 24 November a front-page dispatch condemning the conduct of the Bureau de la Presse, Paris headquarters for a system of censorship throughout the country. The dispatch, from French news bureau Havas, used as its source a report by the Commission de la Presse. The commission had been set up 13 August under the direction of Jean Dupuy, publisher of Le Petit Parisien, France's largest circulation daily newspaper, as a liaison between the press and the government. Given an advisory role, the association's members were drawn from a spectrum of daily and non-daily periodicals. It was this group that initially approved strongly the regime of censorship proposed by the government at the outbreak of war. In fact, the press had proposed itself that censorship of military and diplomatic news be established.24 But members of the press soon realised they had

21 Marseille had five daily newspapers, Montpellier, two, and they competed with regional papers from Nice, Toulouse, and to a lesser extent, Paris.
22 British sub-editor quoted in Knightley, Phillip, The First Casualty, 85.
been misled about the nature of not only the war, which was lasting longer than the expected few weeks, but of the conceptual framework of censorship that the government had established. When it became clear to editors that the government under counsel from the military was creating a programme of censorship the parameters of which extended well beyond simple reports of purely military matters, newspapers began to respond with repeated complaints. Protest against 'Anastasie' began in September 1914. The first published protest documented by historians came from Le Figaro of Paris 18 September. It was a complaint about 'political' censorship. The first suspension of a newspaper for disobeying the censor was 13 September, 15 days. A report dated 22 September from Louis Matte, a barrister from Paris sent to Montpellier to set up local censorship, read that L'Eclair, called 'royaliste', the city's second daily, had already been suspended six days. Concerning Le Petit Meridional, he wrote, 'L'organe républicain Le Petit Meridional a toujours fait preuve de la plus grande correction et s'est montré soucieux d'apporter le concours le plus dévoué à

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25 The French custom of depicting the censor as a wrinkled witch-like woman with a huge pair of scissors dates from at least the 1870s. Delivois traces it to a report in L'Eclipse 3 August 1873, describing a picture showing an old woman above the caption, 'La déesse Anastasie Fulbert.' Fulbert, Delivois observed, was the uncle of Heloise who had Abelard castrated. Gabriel-Robinet traces 'M'amie Anastasie' to a caricature by André Gill in L'Eclipse of 19 July 1874. Delivois, René, Histoire de la presse française Tome II: de 1881 à nos jours, 101-2. Gabriel-Robinet, L., La censure. (Paris, 1965), 12.

Despite the government's failure to extend its concept of the union sacrée far enough to take royalists and arch-conservatives into government positions, its censors do not seem to have served conservative periodicals with any greater leniency than more liberal ones. A quantitative analysis of censorship reports from 1914-18 shows no particular pattern based on a newspaper's political perspective. Leader of the journalists protesting against the censor was Clemenceau. When the war began, he was director of a small-circulation Paris daily 'journal d'opinion', L'Homme Libre. Clemenceau soon attracted attention by writing repeated attacks against the censor and the government. His first major confrontation came 29 September on publication of an article complaining about infected French troop trains. According to Berger, the story had been approved by a civilian censor, Marius Richard of the Le Petit Provencal, which illustrates the somewhat incestuous relationships between newspapers, politicians, the military, and the censorship bureau. According to Berger and Allard, the

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24Berger and Allard, Ibid., 69.
25André Billy, one of the city's well-known journalists, worked as a censor but beginning in 1915 reported for L'Oeuvre, one of the censor's biggest troublemakers, note Berger and Allard. Calabru (page 88) claims more than half of the chamber of
military refused to let Clemenceau's story pass, despite Richard's approval as a civilian censor, and Clemenceau complained to Malvy about 'this two-headed censor, like Janus, but with no brains'. Malvy offered no sympathy, which, Berger and Allard suggest, Clemenceau would not forget when he became leader of France in 1917. Clemenceau decided to try a ruse, by changing the name of his suspended newspaper to L'Homme Enchaîné, in hopes it might slip by censors. This might have worked, contend Berger and Allard, had a careless assistant not forgotten to change the L'Homme Libre masthead on the inside pages.

This was the first of several suspensions Clemenceau endured, but he strengthened his position as crusader for a free press and firm government leadership during the war. Clemenceau, as de facto leader of France's anti-censorship forces, also innovated attempts to sidestep the rules. Consequently, L'Homme Enchaîné was first to post censored articles to subscribers. At the top of these posted articles, Clemenceau wrote, 'Je prends la liberté de soumettre à votre appréciation sans y changer une virgule, l'article ci-contre, écrit pour L'Homme Enchaîné (date), et dont une partie a été supprimée, en violation de la

deputies also wrote for or directed newspapers, and conscripted journalists often joined the military's censorship staff. The Section d'Information, army press bureau, was created by Lieutenant André Tardieu, who as a civilian was a deputy from Seine-et-Oise and an editor of Le Temps. Tardieu left that position and the military in 1915 to establish L'Œuvre.

Berger and Allard, ibid., 70-1.

Ibid.
One press historian contends that Clemenceau's persistent struggle against the censor actually led to his regaining his position in 1917 as leader of the government. This does not seem to be an overstatement, and it helps to show that newspapers during the war could carry considerable influence. It must be noted, however, that Clemenceau's extensive experience in government and prominence, along with his journalism, contributed to his stature.

Clemenceau's contention that the censor had extended his power into areas not sanctioned by French law was to be emphasised in later parliamentary debates. But at this point the French government affirmed its right to extend the parameters of its censorship framework, citing as evidence a law then sixty-five years old. The government had declared a state of siege at the beginning of the war. Under the state of siege, the Law of 1849, Article Nine, Section Four, stated, 'L'autorité militaire a le droit d'interdire les publications et les réunions qu'elle juge de nature à exciter ou à entretenir le désordre.' The government firmly held this law against critics to support its programme of censorship. Whether or not the words of the law could be used to sanction the extent of government censorship, however, was a question open to varying interpretations. It is

34Paris, Archives Nationales, F7 13950, police, Clemenceau matters, 1906-22.
to be noted that in a thirteen-page report prepared by the war ministry and dated June 1914, almost two months before war, the ability of present French laws to support strong wartime censorship was questioned. This essay, entitled 'Etude relative à l'organisation d'un bureau des "communications publiques" ou d'un "bureau de la presse" au ministère de la guerre, au moment de la mobilisation,' concluded, 'il est indispensable de prévoir dès le temps de paix des mesures efficaces pour les empêcher...'

"indiscretions" of the press). This report recommended a plan it said had been established by a German colonel identified as A.D. Brosse, and dated 14 December 1911. The plan established a Bureau de la Presse to control information through military censors, aided by a group of war correspondents accredited by the army. The writer of the unsigned 1914 report continued,

Pour empêcher les indiscretions...il sera nécessaire de faire appel au patriotisme des journalistes mais, afin de prévoir le cas ou ils passeraient outre aux avertissements donnés, il convient d'armer l'autorité de pouvoirs nouveaux: le loi sur l'état de siège, en effet, n'augmente pas les pénalités pour délit de presse et les défère à un tribunal trop accessible aux influences du debas (jury). [Sic. débat?]38

The report argued that a new law would be necessary to assure a smooth implementation of the censorship, and that the entire operation should be planned during peacetime, because a

38S.H.A.T., carton 5N373.
war would come too rapidly for efficient implementation under a state of siege. Although the government did follow this report's advice far enough to set up a Bureau de la Presse, it did not set up a reporter accreditation system until well into the war, and had to use the laws as they already existed. Although this report argued censorship cases by law could be referred to juries, no such action was taken during the war. This gave censors great power over the lives of newspapers, especially at its main bureau at 110 rue de Grenelle, which one journalist called a sumptuous building, complete with chandeliers, formerly occupied by the ministry of public instruction. The bureau moved to the Bourse in September 1917 for the convenience of the Paris press, most of which operated from offices on rue Montmartre and rue du Croissant (second arrondissement), the 'Fleet Street' of Paris. The operation was set up 3 August 1914, welcomed by the press, which agreed with the concept of military, especially, and probably diplomatic censorship. These were two of three separate categories of censorship recognised by the press and the government during the war:

1. Military censorship. This pertains specifically to plans made by French generals for troop and ship movements which, if known by the enemy, could compromise the tactical effectiveness of the war effort.

2. Diplomatic censorship. This includes negotiations between the government and allied, neutral, or possibly enemy

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Willy, André, La guerre des journaux, (Paris, 1919), 14.

Ibid.
nations, which could, if made public, compromise the strategic effectiveness of the war effort.

3. Political censorship. Although most French newspapers acquiesced to censorship in the first category, and even in the second category, they opposed this category of censorship from the beginning. Political censorship was taken to mean criticism of the government and, sometimes, the military. In addition, it covered discussion of anything which might hurt the war effort and morale, meaning use of the word 'paix', discussion of strikes and labour issues, discussion of soldiers killed, wounded, or taken prisoner, reporting of accidents in factories, etc. This ambiguous category could apparently cover nearly any kind of reporting the government or the military disliked. Dupuy and his association were not thinking of political affairs when they agreed to censorship in August 1914. As the government implemented its concepts of press control along this framework, journalists articulated a theme of published protest in newspapers. On 23 November, Le Petit Méridional reported a manifesto issued by the Paris Commission de la Presse, decrying political censorship, and asserting, 'Le pays saura désormais que, si ses réclamations auprès des journaux ne trouvent pas un écho légitime, c'est que le silence est imposé à la presse en dehors de toute considération militaire.' A bit later, an article signed 'Jean-Bernard' in the same newspaper claimed, 'Elle est terrible cette censure, toujours bien intentionnée.'

44Bellanger, et al., Histoire générale de la presse française, 414-16.
mais quelquefois maladroite'. Nevertheless, he added, 'notez que je suis de ceux qui n'ont jamais protesté et qui ne protestent pas contre la censure', and acknowledging the censor's utility for preserving the union sacrée, 'une censure administrative qui a empêché, de ci, de là, d'inutiles polémiques qui auraient donné de l'agitation au moment où nous avons besoin d'union.'
(25 December 1914).

Le Petit Provencal employed a more aggressive manner of protest, publishing a much longer version of the Commission de la Presse manifesto in its 24 November 1914 edition, a harsh denunciation of the censor, advising, 'La liberté de la presse, la liberté d'opinions ne sont pas moins nécessaires à une nation en état de guerre qu'à une nation en état de paix.' This formed the beginning of what would become a persistent campaign in both of these newspapers throughout the war against 'Anastasie' or 'Mme Coupe Toujours'.

The government, from its point of view, publicly denied political censorship existed. 'Il n'y a pas de censure politique, il y a une censure civile,' stated Viviani in parliament 4 March 1915 (reported in Le Petit Méridional 5 March 1915), apparently referring to the duality of military and civilian censors existing until 21 May 1917. The duplicity of Viviani's statement seems clear by comparing his public comments to a circular dated Bordeaux, 22 September 1914, and signed A. Millerand. According to this document, not only was the necessity of political censorship beyond the debating stage, it was already being set up in this early period of the war:
The dual nature of the censor, civilian and military, appeared to be Millerand's idea, but was not specified by the Law of 1849, and was destined to lead to disputes between the two sides until suppressed two and one-half years later, according to archival material described below in this dissertation. The interior ministry asked prefects in each major French city to appoint members to a commission of censors charged locally with the not insignificant task of examining every publication in the city or area. The commission, consisting of civilian representatives and military censors, was under the command of a regional officer of press control, named by the regional commander in each of France's twenty-one military regions, excluding Paris. Also part of the commission was a delegate from the local press, acting in an advisory capacity. This commission would usually drive to each daily newspaper office to examine page proofs ('morasses') on site, but periodicals appear less frequently would commonly be brought to the commission, usually meeting at the prefecture.

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43 S.H.A.T., carton 5H372.
Local commissions would meet daily to discuss censorship requirements, and to examine 'consignes générales', directives issued by Paris. If questions arose, the commission or individual censors were encouraged to telephone the Bureau de la Presse in Paris, which had final control over all decisions. The Paris bureau was divided into these areas: departmental press control (daytime only); telegrams and press agency control (day and night); non-daily press control (daytime only); daily Paris press control (day and night, teams of censors directed by a military officer).44

The task of Paris censors was slightly different. Instead of leaving the office, newspapers themselves brought brush proofs in for approval. They could leave before the censors looked at the pages,45 and could even begin their printing run, but if censors found offensive material, they would have to re-make the page or, failing that, would subject the edition to seizure.46 Should it become necessary for the bureau to seize an edition, the command would be transferred to local prefects.

"Ibid. Also Liens, Georges, 'La commission de censure et la commission de contrôlè postale à Marseille pendant la première guerre mondiale', Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, 18 (October-December 1971), 651.

"Calabra, L., La liberté individuelle et la liberté de la presse en temps de guerre, 105. The daily workload of censors was considerable. In Paris, the men's censor list of 171 people published after the war included no women's names: Association amicale des anciens censeurs, Le crayon bleu, Annuaire pour 1919, Paris, 1919, read 240 made-up pages a night.

throughout France, who would send police to rail stations and newstands to collect bundles. Serious offenders who ignored dictates of the censure would be subject to suspension, forcing the newspapers out of business for up to two weeks. Deprived of income, 'une suspension même de moyenne durée, entraîne fatalement le ruine de la feuille'. Galabru adds newspapers had no legal recourse in the courts to the judgement of the censors.

Along with establishing the Bureau de la Presse, Messimy on 11 August sent a circular through the prefects to all French publishers, describing the operation of the censor, and asking the press,

Renseigner exactement le public; ne publier que des faits contrôlés par l'autorité compétente, exclure résolument tous les autres; souligner et développer tout ce qui est de nature à exalter le sentiment national et à renforcer la confiance du pays dans son admirable armée; rejeter sans exception tout ce qui risquerait de l'alarmer ou de le troubler, voilà, monsieur le Directeur, le rôle de la presse.48

In a letter to the interior ministry dated 23 November 1917, Marius Richard, writing as secretary for the Syndicat des quotidiens régionaux in Paris, observed, 'Tous les chefs de gouvernement qui se sont succédés depuis la guerre ont admis que

48Pérou, J.-C., and Nicot, J., 'La censure de la presse pendant la guerre de 1914-1918', La diffusion du savoir de 1610 à nos jours, 345.
la presse devait être considérée comme une industrie de défense nationale." This comment helps to clarify the sometimes severe actions of the Bureau de la Presse, for if the press was no longer an institution of Third Republic democracy, but a tool for war in the same way as a munitions plant, then the government could allow no room for free speech from editors, who must be considered to be employed for the war effort. This is apparently the way successive French governments set up conceptual parameters for the French press from autumn 1914, and it has been suggested by historians that the press filled this role very well. 'En soutenant le moral de la nation pendant la longue épreuve de la guerre, la presse remplissait entièrement le rôle qu'elle se sentait à même de jouer.' Knightley agrees, emphasising that both the French and British allies constructed this role for their newspapers, and adding that in the case of The Times, Churchill in fact asked Asquith to commandeer the newspaper for 'an authoritative means of guiding public opinion'. Asquith demurred.

From an analysis of these sources, it seems possible to adduce evidence that the French press and the government, with military encouragement, agreed to a union of censorship in

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4Paris, Archives Nationales, F18 2380.


6Devos, J.-C., and Nicot, J., 'La censure de la presse pendant la guerre de 1914-1918', La diffusion du savoir de 1610 à nos jours, 355.

7Knightley, Phillip, The First Casualty, 94.
August from two different points of view. It is perhaps even
difficult to affirm without doubt that a union sacrée existed
between the press and the authorities during the first weeks of
war, as apparently newspaper proprietors agreed without
understanding to what conceptual articulations they were
agreeing. But once established, the power of the Bureau de la
Presse maintained control without substantive alteration until
at least November 1917, when Clemenceau changed the regime, if
only slightly.

When the government left for Bordeaux in early September,
part of the bureau's censors followed, and part stayed in Paris,
under control of General Galliéni. Lucien Klotz directed the
bureau. This deputy from the Somme was minister of finances from
1911 to 1913, and again from 1917 to 1920, and also a
journalist, editor-in-chief of Voltaire in 1895. At
mobilisation, he was given the title, 'chef d'escadron
d'artillerie au gouvernement militaire de Paris' and directed
the censorship bureau until November 1914. After the government
returned to Paris in December, the bureau was taken over by Paul
Bourelly, deputy from Ardèche and 'sous-secrétair de l'etat aux
finances' in 1913 and 1917. A Section presse was created at the
war ministry as a liaison between the ministry and censorship
 commissions in departments.51

The Bureau de la Presse may be viewed as a way to influence
the press negatively, by dictating to editors what they must not

51Ibid., 347-9. Jolly, Jean, Dictionnaire des parlementaires
print, and by punishing them for printing it. The French authorities in the First World War soon realised they may influence the press positively as well, by writing and offering material they wished to see published. After several weeks without news of any kind, military headquarters began issuing a terse daily _Communiqué officiel_, a description of activity on the western front nearly always published in a front-page box in _Le Petit Provençal_, _Le Petit Méridional_, and other French daily newspapers. Explaining the necessity of army communiqués was a confidential report by General Graziani, deputy chief of the army general staff ('sous-chef d'état-major de l'armée'), who presented the report to the war ministry 24 October 1914. According to Commander Bordeaux, one of the men employed by the military to chronicle the Verdun battle for the press in 1916, in a report describing the 'history and functioning' of the army news service dated 21 April 1918, in 1914 Graziani 'soulignait le tort moral que faisait à la cause française chez les neutres et les alliés l'absence de communiqués à la presse française', and advised the army to create its own press bureau to produce more than brief communiqués. The office, called the _Service d'information aux armées_ (S.I.A.), was created 28 October 1914 under direction of André Tardieu, a mobilised journalist. The service began supplying information to the press as well as to the troops through its official publication, _Bulletin des Armées_, and through other activities attached to the service as the war developed. This service and

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the Maison de la Presse were to take on strong roles as active propagandists for the French government's cause.
Chapter Three:

1914: The First Months of War

I. Development of the Union Sacrée and French Morale

Historians agree that at the very beginning of the First World War in France nearly every political group and French citizen joined Poincaré's call for harmony and a united front against Germany. Protests against mobilisation were rare. This, it may be proposed, is what Poincaré meant by the union sacrée: la patrie, a union of political and social strata in a single struggle against a common enemy. Becker, however, contends that the concept of the union sacrée must be more closely examined as a nexus of discrete sentiments and paradoxical ambitions. The phenomenon actually suggests two messages, one, a socio-political...
union of all French people, and two, a willingness to fight against the enemy, while it is clear the country united behind the latter of the two concepts, and that the great majority persevered in following that notion through four and one-half years of war, it is not as certain that France united behind the former point. Becker observes that while the phrase union sacrée was introduced at the very beginning of the war, many newspapers were slow to employ it in published material. More often the preferred word was 'la trêve'. This suggests less of a union than of a temporary agreement to drop disputes for a brief period of time. The period suggested by Becker is based on the ubiquitous assumption by belligerent powers that the war would be short, a few weeks or months. 'Personne ne renonçait à ce qu'il était, syndicaliste, socialiste, nationaliste, catholique, anticlérical. En d'autres termes, le mot d'union, avec l'acceptation de fusion qu'il comporte, ne correspondait pas à la réalité.' The strength of the truce was enhanced by Malvy's refusal to implement Carnet B, the government's association with the funeral of Jaurès, and the inability of trade unions to organise a strike against a war which came too quickly. Becker discounts the importance of a burgeoning nationalist sentiment before the war, and notes that in August 1914, the union sacrée cabinet did not go so far as to include

Becker, *Comment les français sont entrés dans la guerre*, 581.

Ibid.


Becker, *Comment les français sont entrés dans la guerre*, 579, 582.
representatives of the nationalist right and Catholic right, such as Albert de Mun and Denys Cochin.

Closely related to the phenomenon of the union sacrée is a conceptual framework of the moral situation during the war based on the perspective defined by the words 'patriotisme' and 'nationalisme'. The strength of these two concepts before the war bases itself on movements led by writers such as Péguy, Maurras, Barrès, and the group 'L'Action française'. Like Becker, Audoin-Rouzeau does not believe nationalism and patriotism posed strong moral reasons to the French to fight in the war. Audoin-Rouzeau instead prefers to introduce the phrase 'sentiment national' to suggest an attitude forming the moral force of the French people to persevere until the end of the war. While nationalism is a political ideology, he observes, 'sentiment national' suggests an emotional feeling between a French citizen and his country which encouraged him to support the war. This sentiment, a bond between the Frenchman and his soil invaded by an enemy, and a sense of duty to the nation, preserved the country's morale more than ideals of nationalism or patriotism, Audoin-Rouzeau contends, a 'patriotic feeling', but not 'patriotism'. 'Sentiment national', while weakest in the

working classes, was prevalent in all social groups during the war, observes Audoin-Rouzeau.

While the concept of 'sentiment national' is certainly related to the framework of the union sacrée, it is not quite the same, because it does not suggest the French were ready abandon their political disputes, or even to call a truce to them. It does help to illuminate the psychological reasons which made successful both the call to mobilisation and the tenacity of participation in a long and brutal conflict.

It is clear, therefore, that in studying these Midi newspapers during the war, we must be aware of the complexity of these disparate aspects composing the union sacrée, which emphasised, first, a willingness to wage war against Germany, and second, a willingness to forget pre-war political and social divisions, and to support fully the government and the military in its conduct of the war. Concerning the second point, it seems safe to say that nearly everyone was willing to support the government and put an end to political polemics in August 1914. It seems as safe to say that by 11 November 1918 this aspect of the union sacrée had long ended. In his analysis of public opinion in Toulouse during the war, Bouyoux agrees with the concept of 'trève', writing that La Dépêche did not deny its political convictions and 'n'entend pas qu'à la faveur de la trève des parties adversaires du régime'. He adds that Toulouse socialists and labour unions, when socialists left the government in September 1917, approved, stating, 'à vrai dire, l'union sacrée n'avait jamais fait chez eux l'unanimité, sauf
It seems useful to suggest in connection with journalism during the war still another strand of the union sacrée. This one centres around the theme of censorship and other forms of press control. To the French press, the union sacrée in August 1914 also meant an agreement to the regime of censorship proposed by the government. Like Becker, some press historians also compare this aspect of the union sacrée to a truce,¹¹ and not to a denial of political positions and free press issues supported by the press before the war. In agreeing with Becker's observation that the truce was based on the concept of 'short', it appears true that in the case of press censorship, as already observed, the truce was based on an incomplete understanding of the potential extent of censorship. From the point of view of the press, the union sacrée was espoused in ignorance.

Turning our attention to the closely related phenomenon of morale during the war, it is easy to see that the issue must be related to material people read in their newspapers. Precisely the extent and flux of that relationship, however, is difficult to ascertain, as we have noted above. In his assessment of morale during the war, Becker notes the press is an important aspect, but one difficult to assess for the historian trying to establish a basis of public opinion either quantitatively or

¹²Welli, Georges, 'Les gouvernements et la presse pendant la guerre', Revue d'histoire de la guerre mondiale, 1933, 104.
qualitatively during the period in question. Documents, on the other hand, may have been written by politicians, bureaucrats, homemakers, soldiers, or others, and usually reflect personal opinions. Becker has attempted to create a nexus of these documents, drawing specifically on observers from professional positions who observed the public mood during the first months of war, focusing on the possibility of facilitating the objectification of the concept of morale employing this methodology.13

It may be illuminating to establish a synthesis of opinions using a similar methodology for Marseille during the first weeks of war, but in this case relating it to a context of journalism in the city. Although documentation of this manner of sampling is often rare, it is fortunate that in the case of Marseille, the chief commissioner of police ("commissaire central de police") instructed borough police commissioners ("commissaires de police") for twenty-six Marseille arrondissements to keep a day-by-day assessment of morale in respective arrondissements, based on observations by the commissioner or by police officers. Daily reports were filed by each of these commissioners between 5 August and 31 October 1914.14 As trained professional observers, commissioners who prepared these reports may have offered an unusually accurate picture of morale in Marseille.

13Becker, J.-J., Comment les français sont entrés dans la guerre, 10-12.
14Ibid., 260-7.
during these months, just as reports by professionals and prefects offered such a picture in Becker's work. Turning to the relationship of these reports and the circulation patterns of *Le Petit Provençal*, it is to be noted that precise assessment of circulation from district to district is difficult, as statistics are not available. It is possible, however, to use a statement by Camille Perdy, who affirmed that his newspaper penetrated most readily into worker milieux in suburban areas surrounding Marseille, as well as in rural areas of the department. Rival newspaper *Le Petit Marseillais* penetrated more strongly into the city centre. A methodological framework employing five categories has been set up to reflect the state of morale as described by police commissioners, from category one, the highest morale, to category five, the lowest. Each category reflects denotation and possibly connotation of words used by these policemen to describe the populace. When several words were used, the first one in the report was chosen, or the one which seemed to reflect most closely the mood of the entire report.

Analyses of the state of morale were made for twenty-six arrondissements on 5 August, 15 August, 26 August, 2 September, 3 September, 14 September, and 10 October. Particularly notable are reports for 26 August, the date *Le Petit Provençal* reported German troops in France, and for early September, when German troops were advancing on Paris. After 10 October there was

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little change in reports of morale. A brief glance at the graphs in the appendix shows the state of morale generally was the highest on 5 August. It may be possible to pinpoint this more accurately by totalling numbers representing states of morale for each arrondissement, and dividing by the number of arrondissements. The total for 5 August is 49, divided by 26 equals 1.88, the highest morale generally for the reporting period. (1=highest morale; 5=lowest.)

Morale on 15 August, when defeats in Belgium were clearly indicated in the press, dropped to an average of 2.34. Following the report that Germans were on French territory, the average dropped to 2.96 on 26 August. It rose slightly on 2 September, 2.65, only to drop to its lowest point 3 September, 3.03, corresponding to news reported that day in La Petite Provencal that the government intended to leave Paris. By 14 September, however, reports that France had 'won' the battle of the Marne seem to be reflected by an average morale of 2.61. On 10 October the average morale of 2.61 became the standard until the end of these reports.

Analyses of reports by arrondissement, on the other hand, show wide variations. While the police commissioner in the eleventh arrondissement (north side of the city near the port, but out of the city centre) wrote 'excellent' on every single report, the commissioner in the first arrondissement (city centre, north of the Vieux Port, part of 'old Marseille') ranged his report from 'excellent' on 5 August to 'grosse emotion, pessimisme' on 3 September.
Marseille's suburbs at that time comprised arrondissements eighteen through twenty-six. The average state of morale in these districts was 2.40. The average for the rest was 2.68. Although this shows morale in suburbs was slightly better than in the metropolitan arrondissements, perhaps it is more revealing to monitor the fluctuations in morale from date to date, which may reflect a stronger response to news. Analysed from that point of view, we see the strongest fluctuations were in arrondissements one, five, seven, fifteen, seventeen, and eighteen (each had at least one '5'). Of these districts, five are in the metropolitan area, including 'old Marseille', at that time the Italian quarter. One would be considered suburban, Mazargues, at the south end of the city. Analysis of these data indicates that arrondissements more strongly penetrated by Le Petit Provençal, with the exception of Mazargues, reflected a more restrained emotional reaction to events than did arrondissements in the city centre.

Occasionally police commissioners in these reports made more lengthy observations on the state of morale or on an aspect of the press. The commissioner of the first arrondissement on 3 September observed, 'La nouvelle du départ de Paris du gouvernement a produit une très grosse emotion. L'optimisme qui faiblissait depuis quelques jours a tourné en pessimisme.' The seventh arrondissement commissioner on 25 August credited the press for playing a central role: 'la population est calme et son état se maintient bon, malgré les nouvelles un peu défavorables que les journaux ont fait connaître...', but the chief of police for the entire city, writing to the prefect,
complained, 'je dois vous signaler que le manque de nouvelles de
l'armée, en ce qui concerne les mobilisés, commence à
impressionner défavorablement la population de notre ville. La
mairie et les commissariats de police sont assiégés de demandes
de renseignements.'

We may compare this result with that found by Becker, who
used as a source journals kept by prefects and teachers. He
reports that on the first day of war, a fair amount of
enthusiasm was shown.16 This corresponds positively to the
Marseille findings for 5 August. On 23 August, Becker reports
increasing anxiety and worry.17 This finding too corresponds
positively to the Marseille analysis of 26 August. Becker
reported morale became slightly better by the end of August.18
This corresponds positively with the Marseille analysis for 2
September. In contrast with Becker's findings, however, morale
according to the analysis for Marseille dropped to its lowest
point on 3 September. By this time Becker found morale had risen
to a more neutral state, which he attributed to more neutral
headlines from newspapers, and a realisation that the war was
not going to be as easy for the French as previously thought.
Becker's findings indicate that the lowest state of morale was
23 August, and he observed that the departure of the government
for Bordeaux seemed not to be a factor to his sources.19 After

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16 Becker, J.-J., Comment les français sont entrés dans la guerre,
916-9.
17 Ibid., 532-3.
18 Ibid., 536.
19 Ibid., 542-57.
the Marne battle, Becker noted, newspapers took up a positive but reserved tone, and morale as reflected by his documents also became more positive yet restrained. The same finding is shown in the Marseille analysis. We therefore have a positive correlation of data in all cases except that of the beginning of September, when Marseille morale seemed to be at its lowest point while morale elsewhere was improving. It seems that the drop in Marseille morale corresponds to the announcement by the press that the government was to leave Paris, also announced the morning of 3 September by Le Petit Provençal.

II. Le Petit Provençal and Le Petit Méridional in 1914

Agreeing with findings of Becker and Bouyoux in reference to other gauchiste newspapers, analysis of Le Petit Provençal and Le Petit Méridional on the eve of war indicates these newspapers showed little optimism or enthusiasm for the impending conflict. In Marseille, published Le Petit Provençal (28 July), under a grey sky and cold wind 'on ne plaisante plus; une gravité résolu se lit sur les visages'. A leader by André Lefèvre (29 July) reflected optimism in favour of peace, because 'une conflagration européenne serait une telle catastrophe que

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20Ibid., 580.
21Ibid., 280; Bouyoux, Pierre, 'L'opinion publique à Toulouse...'.
tant qu'on causera, on aura une chance de l'éviter'. Louis Martin (30 July) called the prospect 'un cauchemar abominable'. A leader in *Le Petit Méridional* signed 'P.M.', suggested on 1 August that while there was still hope for peace, readers must guard against 'un optimisme excessif'. Although both newspapers advised calm, *Le Petit Méridional* seemed particularly concerned about the state of morale, suggesting 'toute la presse est unanime pour louer le bon sens, la tranquillité de la population et recommander le plus grand sang-froid' (31 July).

Neither newspaper suggested its readers should, or did, refuse the call to arms by the mobilisation on 2 August 1914. As France was thought to be pacific (30 July 1914, *Le Petit Méridional*), a union against a belligerent foreign power was accepted by 2 August: 'Avec le calme le plus absolu, l'union complète était fait entre tous les citoyens....Ce n'est pas la France qui portera, devant l'histoire impartiale, la responsabilité de la conflagration épouvantable....' (2 August, signed 'Le Petit Méridional'). Ferdy observed, 'Depuis le début de la crise, nous n'avons cessé de montrer ce pays faisant trève à tout ce qui le divisait....' It is to be noted that, as emphasised by Becker and Bouyoux, the word 'trève' is used, and not the phrase *union sacrée*.

Both newspapers had indicated that teutonic peoples were militaristic. After the archduke's assassination, Flaissières wrote on 7 July 1914 that the Balkan nations, defined as sheep for the archduke's plan of conquest, 'ne pleurent pas sur la mort du loup'. *Le Petit Méridional* portrayed Germany as clearly belligerent. Patriotic and conservative Germans, it declared,
imaginent qu’une guerre heureuse sera un remède à une crise économique dont l’Allemagne est sérieusement menacée'. (20 June 1931.) The two newspapers seem to have accepted the concept of German militarism even before the war became a clear probability in late July. At the moment of mobilisation these two newspapers did not immediately set out on a strong anti-German campaign, however. It is difficult to explain why the two were quite tardy in moving toward a strongly 'bochiste' thematic emphasis, but possibly both newspapers, realising that many of their readers sympathised with socialist internationalism, wished to assess public opinion before risking an editorial strategy which could offend readership. In addition, people in this part of France were particularly familiar with Germans on an individual basis. The littoral had long been a destination of German vacationers, some of whom had formed personal ties with their French hosts in hotels and restaurants. Relating the plight of a Montpellier native captured by the enemy (16 October), Le Petit Meridional reported in a style quite sympathetic to the German people, considering the amount of anti-German bourrage de crâne which by this time had reached the Paris press:

Alors, le major revint. "Mangeot, Vous êtes du Midi! Seriez-vous parent d’un Mangeot, restaurateur à Montpellier, près de la Place de la Comédie?" "Oui, je suis son fils."
"Et bien, j’ai été autrefois le client de vos parents durant 5 ans. J’ai même été soigné admirablement par votre mère d’une fièvre typhoïde attrapée là-bas chez vous. Cela, je ne puis l’oublier et, de ce jour, vous êtes sous ma protection. Vous ne risquez plus rien. Écrivez à votre famille, je ferai parvenir la lettre."
Voici comment, à Montpellier, on vient de recevoir des nouvelles du disparu.

Le Petit Provençal on 27 October published a letter from German universities to foreign universities, asking enemy nations, 'fermer les oreilles à ces insultes adressées au peuple allemand'. Le Petit Provençal asked Marseille residents to treat departing German expatriots with respect (5 August), and Le Petit Méridional agreed (1 August). These two newspapers differed in their treatment of the enemy, however. While Ferdy in Le Petit Provençal established a routine of anti-German tirades as early as 7 August ('barbares', 'bordes germaniques', 'l'ogre teuton'), Le Petit Méridional restrained itself for the most part from using strong adjectives. The word 'boche' did not appear in Le Petit Provençal before 21 August, possibly because it was picked up from returning troops, as first references quote soldiers. But Le Petit Méridional did not use the word before 1 November, and after that used it quite sparingly, often only in headlines, often (but clearly not always) to replace the longer word 'allemand' when there was no space. Le Petit Méridional and Le Petit Provençal almost never used the word in regular news columns. It was reserved for commentary and quotations.

It seems useful in assessing thematic accuracy of these two newspapers during this early period to employ a model based on a sampling of significant historical aspects of the war, comparing these with the same aspects as reported by each newspaper. An analysis of this model using Le Petit Provençal and Le Petit Méridional indicates that, despite a few obvious exceptions,
many of the main aspects of the autumn 1914 events were reported as rapidly as they might have been using contemporary standards. In Table One actual dates of several important 1914 events are compared with the dates they were reported in each of the two newspapers. This analysis does not totally agree with other accounts. For example, a major work asserts that many newspapers in France did not report the German invasion of French territory before the end of August. Lasswell writes 'the facts came out' on 30 August. Bouyoux observes that Le Télégramme (conservative) on 1 September was still writing in the future tense, ‘Les allemands entrent peut-être en France.’ While battles on the western front were reported in fair detail, if sometimes rather

Table One

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<td>Archduke Murdured</td>
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<td>29/6</td>
<td>28/6</td>
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<td>Germans invade Belgium</td>
<td>3/8</td>
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<td>Germans take Brussels</td>
<td>23/8</td>
<td>23/8</td>
<td>20/8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germans enter France</td>
<td>26/8</td>
<td>29/8</td>
<td>24/8</td>
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</table>

late, reports of battles in the east tended to be inaccurate or nonexistent. During late August and early September in France, headlines declared that Russian troops were making spectacular advances while news of the western front became anodyne. This corresponds with Becker's findings for Paris newspapers.23 Other reports were accurate, some perhaps unexpectedly so, considering censorship, bourrage de crâne, no war correspondents at the front, and the limits of understanding of events as they were unfolding. Le Petit Provençal proved strongest of the two in

23 Becker, J.-J., Comment les français sont entrés dans la guerre, 344.
this area. Writing as early as 15 August, Henri Michel described Germany's plan to march through Belgium, attack France from the north, and quickly take Paris before Russia had a chance to mobilise. But Germany had met unexpected resistance in Belgium, Michel observed, slowing its advance, to France's favour.

Careful readers with maps would have been able to trace lines of the front from day to day, as after the German invasion was announced, _Le Petit Provencal_ included detailed daily descriptions of the front line under 'Communiqué officiel'. On 8 September, the line was described as passing Nanteuil-le-Haudouin, Meaux, Sezanne, Vitry-le-François, Verdun, and other cities and villages. A 'Communiqué officiel' was prepared by the army after the end of August; _Le Petit Provencal_ reports must have been taken from this source.

On 10 September, Ferdy wrote, 'Les français sont résolus à accueillir avec sang-froid les bonnes comme les mauvaises nouvelles, car il serait aussi fâcheux d'exagérer l'importance des unes que celle des autres.' The tone of this article represents a marked alteration from that of one month before, when hyperbole was normal. The last _bourrage de crâne_ style of headline was published on page one of _Le Petit Provencal_ 15 September 1914: 'Les Allemands Jetés Hors de France.' The next day the headline was corrected; _Le Petit Provencal_ reflected only that German troops 'se replient encore au nord de Reims'. On 18 September, the newspaper seemed to have made a decision to eliminate this style of reporting. Instead of a headline suggesting strong optimistic action by allied troops, a neutral construction was presented, lacking a verb: 'La Nouvelle
Bataille. 'De L'Oise A La Meuse;' 'Elle Fit Rage Sur Tout Le Front.' In a much less prominent position than before, a subhead used a temporising verb: 'Sur Certains Points L'Ennemi Fléchit.' Bourrage de crâne style of the preceding weeks did not return to this newspaper. This sort of exaggerated headline was also eliminated by Le Petit Méridional at an even earlier date, 24 August. A front-page leader signed 'A.A.' explained, 'De même que nous devions hier nous garder d'un optimisme exagéré, de même aujourd'hui nous avons le devoir de ne pas nous laisser envahir par un pessimisme déraisonné. Les sautes brusques et exagérés d'opinions ne servent qu'à créer un énervement général qui peut, à la longue, devenir dangereux.' It seems unmistakable from this statement that the newspaper recognised this kind of bourrage de crâne as a negative factor in its reporting of the war. Two days after, on 26 August, La Dépêche similarly asked for the 'truth of the situation,' the only Toulouse daily to do so on this date. On 31 August, the censorship bureau forbade large banner headlines running across the width of the page, and hawking of newspapers on the streets. On 1 September, Le Petit Méridional, under a headline 'Nos Opérations Militaires,' reflected greater restraint: '...certaines de nos troupes ont subi des échecs partiels qui les ont contraintes à s'appuyer sur la Meuse....' In reference to the 'lâche Midi' story, the newspaper declared in a leader, 'refusons-nous résolument à accepter aucune nouvelle sans contrôler, carte à la main, si les faits annoncés peuvent avoir été réalisés'. (28 August.)

Bouyoux, Pierre, 'L'opinion publique...', 98.
The nature and significance of 'lâche Midi' seems highly relevant to a discussion of the union sacrée in newspapers of the French Midi. It is an articulation of the entire confluence of political and social discourse between this region and the rest of France, not only during the war, but before and after it as well. It was noted in chapter one that the reputation of the Midi vis-à-vis the rest of France had suffered due to its putative affinity for strikes and revolts. The chronic strikes of Marseille in 1914 before the war affected 515 firms, the largest number in France. These facts plus a possible resentment in the north based on perceptions that people of the south lived easily in a mild holiday climate probably laid the groundwork for the controversy perpetuated during the war that troops from the Midi were cowardly, patriotically suspect, and poor fighters. The 'lâche Midi' story was established by an article published in Le Matin of Paris on 24 August 1914, under the signature of Gervais, a Radical senator from the Seine. Gervais stated that during battles in Morhange and Lorraine, when Germans advanced, 'une division du XVe corps, composée des contingents d'Antibes, de Toulon, de Marseille, et d'Aix, a lâché pied devant l'ennemi....surpris sans doute par les effets terrifiants de la bataille, les troupes de l'aimable Provence ont été prises d'un subit affolement.'

\[\text{Ministère du Travail, Statistique des grèves, 1914 (Paris, 1921).}\]

\[\text{Quoted in Baratier, Edouard, editor, Histoire de la Provence, (Toulouse, 1969), 519-20.}\]
Modern historians of the region agree that although French troops retreated generally at this point, no evidence can be found to prove the XVe Corps behaved any differently from the rest. Concerning the French retreat, "Le gouvernement et l'état-major essayaient d'en camoufler l'ampleur par le procédé classique du "bouc émissaire"." Baratier observes, "Cette première défaite française ayant donné un cruel démenti au chauvinisme officiel qui paraît notre nation de toutes les supériorités, il fallait pouvoir l'imputer à des Français un peu moins français." In reality, suggest historians, it was not Gervais at all who instigated the campaign to blame Provence for the retreats. It was the government, specifically Messimy. Liens observes that in December 1916 Gervais wrote to Charles Fromentin, a journalist for the evening daily Le Radical in Marseille, declaring that he had written the 'lâche Midi' story on behalf of Messimy. In February 1917 Fromentin invited Gervais to write an article stating publicly the truth about the affair, but Gervais refused. Gervais died in August 1917, in a road accident. On 4 September 1919, Le Radical published the 1916 Gervais letter, but Fromentin admitted Gervais had had "un très

2"Gaillard, Lucien, Ibid.
3"Baratier, Edouard, editor, Histoire de la Provence, 520.
whether or not Gervais was telling the truth about his connection to Messimy is an open question, but Baratier believes as well that Messimy instigated the rumour. Whatever the source or the reason, it seems certain that the 'XVe Corps Affaire' was internalised by a large proportion of French civilians and soldiers. Liens believes the episode merely formed another chapter of a long anti-Midi campaign from the north, and Baratier and Bouyoux observe that soldiers from the south were insulted by other soldiers throughout the war. Languedocian Louis Barthas observed in an August 1914 diary entry that a quarrel had broken out between north and south soldiers, 'les raisons en étaient toujours les mêmes: l'antagonisme, la haine existant entre le Midi d'une part et les autres parties de la France'. Tourette blamed Le Journal, one of Paris' largest daily newspapers, for systematically denigrating Marseille, and said the 'XVe Corps Affaire' stained the reputation of the city well into the 1920s.

31 Baratier, Edouard, editor, Histoire de la Provence, 520.
32 Liens, Georges, 'L'opinion à Marseille en 1917', 77.
33 Baratier, Edouard, editor, Histoire de la Provence, 520; Bouyoux, Pierre, L'opinion publique..., 298.
34 Montpellier, Archives Départementales, Collection 'la mémoire de 14-18 en Languedoc, No. 9', La Vie des Audrey en 14-18 documents choisis.
35 Tourette, Jean, Marseille au temps du transbordeur, (Marseille, 1945), 50.
Whether or not Messimy was responsible for establishing the myth, the Bureau de la Presse apparently soon realised it threatened to damage the union sacrée. In Circular No. 1000, a typewritten handbook for the censor published in its final form 30 September 1915, 'Feuille 18' declared under the heading 'Midi (Troupes du)'

"Le Service de Contrôle de Presse a été invité à ne pas laisser réveiller dans la presse la controverse sur la conduite des troupes du Midi (10 février 1915)."  
The date likely refers to the date of the original press bureau directive on this matter. Despite this directive, Le Petit Provençal and Le Petit Méridional continued to publish defences of the XVe Corps. In Toulouse, however, reporting of the affair did indeed disappear in September 1915.  

If both newspapers studied defended persistently the honour of Midi troops against the 'XVe Corps Affaire', it must be pointed out that the Gervais letter did not cast allegations against the troops of Languedoc which is, in fact, part of the XVe and XVIIe military regions. Nevertheless, the newspapers of Toulouse as well as Le Petit Méridional wrote as if their own region had been criticised. Liens explains that this was the case because newspapers of southeast France in general preferred to stand together in defence of the Midi. In addition, it seems possible to assume the tendency existed in France to categorise

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137 Bouyoux, Pierre, 'L'opinion publique...', 300.
138 Liens, Georges, 'L'opinion à Marseille en 1917', 77.
Assez de ces discussions byzantines, auxquelles se complaisent beaucoup de parlementaires qui, tel le sénateur Gervais, navrés de ne plus avoir le tribune, s’en créent une nouvelle dans les couloirs du Parlement et dans la presse et ne craignent pas, par des propos inconsiderés, de jeter autour d’eux l’inquiétude.

On 25 August Le Petit Provencal had been more explicit. The text of Gervais’ letter published in Le Matin is recounted in part, followed by Ferdy’s comment, ‘ce communiqué officiel n’est pas seulement une calomnie. C’est un infamie,’ and reflected that Parisians had never liked the Midi anyway, but should declare a truce to their criticism. Published this same day is the admission that troops in Lorraine ‘ont eu un mouvement de recul, laissant entre les mains de l’ennemi des prisonniers et quelques canons’. This comment is quite strongly negative for this early phase of the war, and may reflect the newspaper’s determination to emphasise that losses must not be blamed on the Midi alone. It is confusing that Ferdy called the Gervais letter a ‘commissaire officiel’, because in other uses the phrase seems to refer only to communiqués from the military authorities. At this point newspaper editors may not have yet defined the term as referring explicitly to military news.

Between this date and the end of August, Le Petit Provencal published several accounts stressing the bravery of the XVe Corps, in an obvious attempt to balance the damage of the
Gervais letter. On 2 November, Paul Goget, mobilised into the xve corps, is quoted in the newspaper to emphasise 'les splendides états de service de nos régiments méridionaux et à détruire une douloureuse légende'.

It is difficult to say whether this divisive incident, striking against 'sentiment national' of the Midi only three weeks after mobilisation, influenced the conceptualisation of the *union sacrée* in these two newspapers. It is possible to identify a qualitative sampling of statements at variance with a traditional framework of the *union sacrée* in this context. Even the more conservative of the two, *Le Petit Méridional*, emphasised the transitory nature of the union: 'Qui voudrait essayer, quand la France se bat, de faire penser à ce qui, hier, nous a divisés, à ce qui, demain, nous divisera encore?' (leader signed 'P.M.', 21 September). On 4 September, *Le Petit Provencal* emphasised the 'union absolu', but did not use the term *union sacrée*, even though it was now a month after Poincaré's speech. Indeed, this newspaper did not use the phrase before 9 December, and then only in quoting a speech by Viviani. It may be that the Marseille newspaper believed the *union sacrée* to be so obvious a concept that it was not even necessary to refer to it. If this is true, however, why would editors feel it necessary to stress a 'union absolu' which, while positing the same conceptualisation as the *union sacrée*, does not actually use the term? It may also be suggested that editors of an anti-clerical paper such as *Le Petit Provencal* would be uncomfortable with the word 'sacrée'. But *Le Petit Méridional*, strongly anti-clerical, employed the phrase consistently that autumn. It seems possible
to suggest that the editors of *Le Petit Provencal* avoided articulating the concept of the union sacrée because they could not quite internalize the connotation in all its dimensions, and while *Le Petit Méridional* did employ the phrase, they stressed the phenomenon of 'temporary'. From the beginning of the war, the union sacrée, whether due to 'lâche Midi', harsh censorship, or just habits hard to break, seems to have been a phenomenon somewhat difficult to swallow for these newspapers.

In addition, *Le Petit Méridional* found it necessary to apply itself in leaders and commentary to a long-standing political squabble based on its anti-clerical position in opposition to the city's other daily newspaper, the royalist *L'Eclair*. In a leader published 18 September and signed 'P.M'.*, the editor declared that a reader had asked him to glorify teachers, trade unionists, or noted republicans killed by the enemy, because 'des journaux conservateurs ou républicains modérés glorifient les actes de courage, la mort au feu, de membres du clergé, d'officiers, et soldats à particule ou de combattants de rang social élevé'. However, wrote the editor, 'Notre journal n'entrera pas dans la voie qui lui est signalée....Français et républicains nous ne saurions tenter aucune œuvre de division entre les enfants de ce pays, aucune classification.' The newspaper let this issue drop until 27 November, when under the headline 'Pour La Trêve Des Partis,' a leader stated:

*Depuis l'ouverture des hostilités, nous sommes résolument interdit de rien publier qui pût affecter l'allure d'une polémique....Mais notre réserve n'implique*
D'où nous, la nécessité de jouer le rôle de dupes. Elle ne peut persister que si nos confrères de Droite observent, à l'égard de nos amis, la même neutralité bienveillante. Cela, nous le constatons avec regret, L'Eclair persiste à n'en pas tenir compte. Il n'est pas de jour où, dans ses colonnes, ne se glisse quelque coup d'épingle, voire même quelque coup de griffe, contre un républicain, ou un association républicaine.

On 29 November, Le Petit Méridional exhibited a case of animosity between itself and L'Eclair which went beyond political ideology. Under the headline, 'Soyez Juste, Confrère!,' Le Petit Méridional complained,

Notre invite à une courtoisie réciproque n'est pas du goût de L'Eclair qui traite Le Petit Méridional de 'censeur improvisé' et de 'croquemitaine' ... L'Eclair insinue, en effet, que Le Petit Méridional n'aurait pas été fâché de pouvoir 'suspendre pendant un mois' un confrère qui est en même temps un concurrent. Il y a là, de la part de L'Eclair, une injure gratuite à notre égard... Il n'ignore pas que, loin de tirer profit des circonstances, Le Petit Méridional sait mettre, sans qu'on le lui demande, ses bureaux, ses presses, et ses linotypes à la disposition d'un concurrent privé pour plusieurs mois de son propre matériel.

A consultation of documents in Paris shows the conservative newspaper had been suspended by the censor for six days in 1914; Andréani indicates the paper offended by reporting the opulent tastes of ministers in Bordeaux.39 The commentary is apparently referring instead to a suspension of...
1908, Gariel lent his facilities to *L'Eclair* after fire had destroyed the latter's offices. The statement does illuminate two salient aspects of journalism during this era, one, that two ideologically opposed newspapers could suspend disagreements to give one another assistance, and two, that the disagreements nevertheless remained vigorous. On 4 December, *Le Petit Méridional* again complained under the headline 'Soyons Justes' that *L'Eclair* was singling out Catholics and priests for noteworthy acts when, in fact, they were not any more effective than any other social group. This theme would continue in succeeding war years. It is important to note that while Marseille also supported a conservative and pro-Catholic daily newspaper, *Le Soleil du Midi*, this perspective articulated by *Le Petit Méridional* was not mentioned in *Le Petit Provençal* at all before autumn 1918, and then only in a casual manner. The two newspapers posited distinctly separate spheres of action in this context. But the Radical *La Dépêche* of Toulouse attacked conservative dailies in that city as early as 6 October, and in April 1915 opened a new column to pursue its anti-Catholic polemic. Bouyous believes that anti- and pro-clerical factions understood the *union sacrée* from two points of view. For 'laiques' it meant maintaining the pre-war status quo; for 'cléricaux' it meant suppression 'de ce qui avait divisé les Français'.

40Andréani, Roland, 'La presse quotidienne à Montpellier...', 944.

41Bouyous, Pierre, 'L'opinion publique...', 456-7.
III. Political Aspects of the Gauche

Socialists and trade union groups in Marseille and Montpellier reacted to the appeal to the union sacrée as did their comrades in the rest of France at the beginning of the war, by supporting it, or at least acquiescing to it. The threat of a general strike in case of war, advocated for years by both socialists and trade unionists, was not implemented in these two cities, reflecting a situation similar to that of the rest of the country. La Vie Sociale, a bi-monthly publication established in 1918 by the minoritaire socialists of Hérault department, said trade unions there did nothing to stop mobilisation in 1914: 'soit indifférence, soit (afin de) n'être pas accusé de troubler l'ordre de l'intérieur pendant les moments critiques que nous traversions...le monde du travail de notre ville ne bougeait pas'. (Issue of 15 December 1918.) In Marseille, however, despite Malvy's decree that Carnet B was not to be executed, authorities believed it necessary to report on 2 August, 'Ce matin, il a été procédé à l'arrestation des étrangers autrichiens inscrits au Carnet B.' Twenty more were arrested 7-8 August, and fifty-seven 'suspects' on 9 August. Among those, police listed only one arrested for 'political' reasons, Carolus Victorien Martin, 'anarchiste-très...'

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42 Masson, P., Marseille pendant la guerre, (Paris, 1926), 51.

43 Quoted in Sagnes, Jean, Le mouvement ouvrier en Languedoc, 246.
suspect au point de vue militaire (français). Others were listed as arrested for being without papers, vagabondage, or as a measure of security. On 29 July, a report from the police commissioner to the prefect stamped 'Confidentiel' declared that workers at the Bourse du travail planned no protest against the war, and that Spanish and Italian anarchists have decided not to demonstrate: 'Ils ont résolu de rester dans l'expectative, car ils craignent de s'exposer à des mesures de rigueur si certains d'entre eux prenaient l'initiative d'une manifestation quelconque.' The report added, however, that the anarchists hoped the Bourse du travail would hold a meeting of workers in an attempt to force a revolutionary movement. This report suggests that opinion in Marseille, while appearing unanimous in its acceptance of mobilisation, did include anti-war elements suspicious enough to arouse police interest.

In contrast, an analysis of the newspapers in this study during the first few days of August reflects nothing but support by socialists and trade unions for the war. Le Petit Provençal reported 3 August in a front-page headline, 'Les Socialistes Feront Leur Devoir.' The newspaper regularly gave space to local socialists and trade unions to announce meetings and agendas, and one such notice appeared on 3 August. It read that the Marseille socialist committee planned to meet to 'prendre toutes les dispositions nécessaires et urgentes en vue de l'aide à Marseille, Archives Départementales, cartons M6/4826, M6/4832, Prefecture: Carnet B arrests are from a report of the Marseille Police Commissioner to 'Monsieur le Colonel Gouverneur de Marseille.'
appeler à nos camarades mobilisés pour la défense du pays et à leurs familles. Le Petit Méridional reported nothing at all about socialists at this time. Although it did cover the Jaurès funeral in some detail, it reflected no news of socialists or trade unions before 19 August, and then a tiny notice, that the local socialists planned to meet, a 'réunion extraordinaire à la prolétarienne'. The agenda was not specified, but it may well have been similar to that of the Marseille socialists on 3 August. However, on 26 August, Le Petit Méridional did publish a manifesto from the French socialist party in support of the war. One year later, commemorating the first day of mobilisation, a newspaper column on page one recalled that 'les divisions politiques intenses dans les régions méridionales ont absolument disparu; personne n'a même l'air d'y penser'.

After the Marne battle, however, reports of socialist and trade union activity increased. The first report of trade union activity in Le Petit Méridional was 26 September, a meeting of 'Syndicat des ouvriers tonneliers et entonneurs, réunion de la prolétarienne: secours aux mobilisés du syndicat'. This category of meeting announcements soon became routine. By 11 November, the newspaper was publishing reports of trade union members protesting hardships brought by war. On that date, the Union des syndicats confédérés, at a general meeting, issued a complaint 'contre la majoration du prix de vente du sucre', and asked government to stop 'toute spéculaton'. On 5 December, Le Petit Méridional published a report that deputy Camille Reboul had analysed the war at a local socialist meeting. Most of the report was censored, leaving blocks of white space around the
words 'seul le service de santé mérite certains critiques'.

Toward the end of the year, in an article 24 December, the newspaper reported for the first time a disagreement among socialists: 'On remarque que, si tous les socialistes réclament la ruine de l'empire allemand, deux opinions différentes commencent à se faire jour parmi eux. Il en est qui veulent la guerre à outrance ne comptant sur aucun mouvement intérieur allemand contre le Kaiser, il en est d'autres qui font entrer ce mouvement dans leur prévisions.'

_Le Petit Provencal_ established a critique of war profits very early on in the war, in the context of a report of the department's socialists. The group was reported on 5 August to have organised a Comité de secours, not to help mobilised soldiers this time, but to aid the 'working classes' generally and, in emphasised, to monitor employers who may attempt to take advantage of the war to increase their profits. On 28 August, after the announcement the day before of a new government ministry, Ferdy observed that socialists had been taken into the government. 'C'est sans doute un spectacle inattendu de voir Marcel Sembat et Jules Guesde signer dans les conseils du pouvoir à côté de Briand, de Millerand, et de M Ribot.' He continued without apparent irony that foreign affairs minister Delcassé must have been 'un homme clairvoyant' for his diplomacy which 'porte aujourd'hui ses fruits'. The 1 September issue brought socialist party promises to support the war, seconded by Ferdy, who quoted Patrie en danger by Blanqui.

The domesticity of daily life in Marseille reflected in _Le Petit Provencal_ seemed to be reappearing by October, as notices
of routine meetings returned to the paper. On 24 October the newspaper announced the government planned to re-establish itself in Paris. The Bouches-du-Rhône 'groupe des socialistes unifiés' were to meet, the newspaper announced on 15 October, to hear Sembat and Guesde speak of their efforts to sustain 'la défense de la république'. The Belgian socialist leader Vandervelde was given a fairly large amount of space on page two of the 20 October edition to observe that, although he was 'pacifiste', he looked upon the conflict as a war on war. This marked the first appearance of this theme in *Le Petit Provencal*. Vandervelde was also reported as saying that Marseille socialists should have some sympathy for their German comrades: 'Ceux qui jettent la pierre à nos camarades d'Allemagne oublient trop, ou veulent oublier les immenses difficultés de leur situation.' It is incongruous considering strong anti-German *bourrage de crâne* to read defences of the German point of view which appeared continually in these two newspapers throughout the war.

By the end of 1914, as reflected in *Le Petit Provencal*, socialists, while still supporting the war, were seeming to display signs of discontent with government operations, war profits, and censorship. A report dated 27 December on page two, under the title, 'Le Parti Socialiste et la Guerre,' was described as extracts from a manifesto of the socialist party to the proletariat. It asserted, 'Nous défendons notre pays brutalement attaquée,' and hoped German socialistes would join Liebknecht in protesting their government's war. But the report added:
Les restrictions nécessaires apportées à l'information militaire arrivent à limiter parfois les droits de la critique utile. Les familles des mobilisés et des chômeurs demeurent parfois victimes de la lutte inconsciente des classes. Et dans les administrations de la guerre, le capitalisme corrupteur ou la bureaucratie indolente tentent de réintroduire leurs vices.

This statement seems to suggest a nascent reconceptualisation of pre-war socialist ideology by the end of 1914, and an intention by the editors of Le Petit Provencal to allow this reconstitution of class consciousness to appear in apparent disregard of union sacrée paradigms. Socialist deputy Henri Michel, writing 20 December, indicated the first parliamentary session since mobilisation would be 'extraordinaire', especially considering the money already spent on the war, 525 million francs in six months. The cost of the war, he observed, would be heavy. Le Petit Méridional estimated the government would need 8,525,246,407 francs to fight the war (17 December). If statistics of the total number of French soldiers killed in the war were censored until after the armistice, statistics of the material cost were sometimes allowed. But much of Michel's prospective parliamentary agenda in this report was censored, leaving blank spaces as indicated: 'les services postal aux armées, les allocations aux familles, les embusqués, les du service de santé, les de la censure, le moratorium, la reprise de la vie économique du pays, etc.' Censorship of particular words, however, was often ineffectacious; common themes discussed in the press at this time make it fairly straightforward to guess the
probable censored words: 'le punissment des embusqués, les
fautes du service du santé, les fautes de la censure....' These
censorship blanks would become more common in Le Petit Provencal
as time passed, and would involve entire sections instead of
single words. In Le Petit Méridional, the censor's blanks were
more common early in the war, while in Le Petit Provencal, the
blanks were more common at the end (see graph).

Also part of the 27 December report was a call for peace:
'Socialistes, nous luttons encore pour que cette guerre, cette
guerre atroce, soit la dernière...non pour la paix menteuse des
armements, mais la douce paix des peuples libérés, règne sur
l'Europe et sur le monde.' It is sometimes asserted by post-war
writers that censors in 1914 and 1915 forbade newspapers from
publishing the word 'paix', or that they allowed it only in
connection with the concept of total victory, as in a peace
signed at the surrender of the German armies in Berlin. A Paris
censor himself contended they had orders to censor the word,
unless written 'paix victorieuse'. "Feuille 21' of Circular No.
1000, which gathered together directives of the censure,
declared under 'Paix (Publications en faveur de la)': 'Ces
publications interdites, en principe, peuvent être autorisées
lorsqu'elles spécifient qu'il s'agit d'une paix victorieuse,

"Berger, Marcel, and Allard, Paul, Les secrets de la censure
pendant la guerre, (Paris, 1932), 39. Ducasse, A., Meyer, J,
Ferrez, G., and Genevoix, M., Vie et mort des français, 1914-
censure tranche jusqu'au mot de "paix." Il faut dire l'après-
censure. Une jeune femme propose devant moi qu'on dise à la
censure: "foutez-nous l'après-guerre".'
basse sur la justice et le triomphe du droit, ou répondant très
nettement à cette pensée." This consigne may not have existed,
however, in 1914. In contrast to this perspective, the
newspapers studied here did use the word 'paix' in reference to
objectives of lesser scope than total victory. The report above
does not seem to ask clearly for a 'paix victorieuse', and while
it reflected a socialist point of view common by 1917, it is
less common to find the point of view this early in the war. Le
Petit Méridional announced 13 November that socialists in
neutral countries planned a congress in Copenhagen 'dans le but
de propagande en faveur de la paix', and the Pope's 1914 call
for peace was not censored: 'le pape recommande de prier de Dieu
de paix', wrote the Montpeller newspaper on 18 November. The
report was, however, relegated to page three at the bottom. Le
Petit Provençal, on the other hand, did not publish the Pope's
call; it is difficult to know whether the censor was to blame.
Although it is true that discussion of peace was not censored
entirely from these two newspapers, 'pacifist' material such as
Romain Rolland's Au dessus de la mêlée, published in 1914 but
held back from nearly all of the French press, was not published
in these newspapers at all during the war. No reports of strikes
were found in either newspaper in autumn 1914, but statistics
indicate there was no strike in either city during this period.4

Recalling the concept of a short war, it is worth noting
that both newspapers referred seldom to the idea, perhaps
because it was too obvious, or because it was censored, although
"Ministère du Travail, Statistique des grèves, (Paris, 1919 and
1922), statistical tables for Bouches-du-Rhône and Hérault.
this aspect is not listed as forbidden in Circular No. 1000 of 1915. Yet both Le Petit Provencal and Le Petit Méridional suggested as early as 1914 that the war may be longer, although the concept of long still did not extend beyond about a year.

The Montpellier newspaper began 3 August by repeating a belief that the war would be short, in an observation that the editor, Commandant Blaquiere, 'quitte la plume pour prendre l'épée. A tous les amis, lecteurs et personnel du journal, il dit "au revoir". Pour quelques semaines ou quelques mois, il reprend, avec ses frères d'armes, l'uniforme des armées de la nation.' But by 29 September, the newspaper published a report that, after interviewing sixty United States officers, the consensus was that the war would last an average of one year. Le Petit Provencal, in contrast, never suggested at all during this period that the war would be short. On 23 November it published an article taken from the London Daily Mail but referring to France, 'Ce que j'ai vu et entendu, me laisse l'impression que la perspective d'une longue guerre n'a rien qui puisse effrayer la République.' A dispatch 6 December giving credit again to London, the Westminster Gazette, admitted, 'il est insensé de parler à légère de la fin de la guerre au nouvel an ou au printemps.' Bouyoux found similar reports beginning 2 October in his study of the Toulouse press, observing a 'désenchantement général'.

In this study, too, a more and more pessimistic reality seemed to be reflected in both newspapers. Le Petit Provencal on
2 October described for the first time the nature of a battle, quoting a soldier named Paul Souchon, admitting, 'Il faut d'abord, quand on parle de bataille moderne, abandonner toutes les conceptions romantiques ou moyenâgeuses que nous en avions. On ne voit pas l'ennemi, on ne sait rien de l'ensemble des événements...,' and while the frightful statistics of men killed in the bloody autumn battles were not published, the newspapers did not seem to wish to hide the human costs of the war. The first of the nearly daily lists of local soldiers 'morts au champ d'honneur' appeared in Le Petit Provençal 12 September, and in Le Petit Méridional 9 October. In Le Petit Provençal of 22 November, under the headline 'Comment Meurent Les Soldats Marseillais,' a letter from an officer to a Mme Gallo describes the death of one of her five children, beginning 'J'ai le regret d'avoir à vous faire part d'une nouvelle douloureuse.' On 1 December the same newspaper suggested the scale of death in the war by a calculation of cost per man killed: 102,000 francs per man in the Russo-Japanese war; 105,000 francs in the Franco-Prussian war; and in this war, 'malgré les énormes sacrifices de vie humaines, le chiffre de la dépense atteindra certainement un total fantastique'.

On 3 December the first photograph of a mutilated Marseille soldier is published, Louis-Xavier Chatelain, who holds two crutches supporting two wooden legs. 'On peut le rencontrer dans les rues de notre ville s'appuyant patiemment sur des béquilles.' This photo published only four months into the war.

*See illustration. The next day, however, the newspaper reported it had been duped: Châtelain had been arrested in Nice, accused
seems particularly significant; it illustrates a clear decision by editors of *Le Petit Provencal* to present a true version of the war's suffering in local terms, not in abstraction, but in reality based on actual lives in Marseille. Moreover, a photo likely captures a more emotional and powerful message than words.

This evidence articulates a contrast to the assertions of modern writers who have observed that the effects of the autumn assaults were completely eliminated from the 1914 press. Kupferman observes, 'si les mobilisés découvrent que le feu tue, les journaux assurent à leurs familles qu'ils ne risquent rien'. This seems to be clearly not the case from evidence in the two newspapers studied here, especially *Le Petit Provencal*. From this material, it cannot be assumed that *Le Petit Provencal* believed in all the imperatives of *bourrages de crâne* by the end of 1914, and its concept of the *union sacrée* by this date seems to have shifted away from an emphasis on maintaining morale by avoiding painful realities. *Le Petit Méridional*, while not publishing photographs of allied war victims until 29 January 1915, when allied troops are shown identifying bodies of comrades (see illustration), did offer frank descriptions of trench life on 7 December and, in an article inexplicably passed by the censor, described fraternisation: 'un français et un

of falsifying military papers and buying a medal for 135 francs to turn him into a 'glorieux blessé'.


allemand, sortis respectivement de leur trou, se sont avancés l'un vers l'autre et, après s'être serrés la main, ont échangé de ratac. Des deux côtés, les hommes étaient debout, sans armes, sur les tranchées.

In *Le Petit Provençal* of 25 December, Négis recalled a Christmas on a different battlefield, and wondered if something similar were happening that day. During the Franco-Prussian war, he wrote, on Christmas eve, both sides began singing, 'les deux chants montent dans la nuit, alternant, semblent se répondre, puis meurent, et dans le silence rétabli, une voix crie, "qui vive". Une autre répond, "Deutschland". Et un coup de feu éclate soudement. La trêve est finie.' The Christmas 1914 fraternisation itself was not reported in either newspaper.

IV. The Business of Journalism in 1914

Mobilisation emptied French newspaper offices, leaving a skeleton staff to publish editions reduced at the beginning to two pages form the usual four to six. Rail transport appropriated for military use left newspapers with few ways both to distribute editions and to obtain ink and newsprint. Advertising dwindled to nearly nothing. Describing the situation 3 August, *Le Petit Méridional* wrote that the mobilisation had deprived the newspaper of its publisher ('directeur'), its editor-in-chief ('secrétaire générale de la rédaction'), two sub-editors ('secrétaires de la rédaction'), members of the editorial staff ('rédacteurs'), administrative employees,
...in total more than one third of its personnel. The paper continued, 'La mobilisation des chemins de fer, les départs d'ouvriers des fabriques de papier, d'encre, d'accessoires indispensables à notre industrie, la difficulté et peut-être l'arrêt complet des communications télégraphiques et téléphoniques pour le service des journaux, vont nous acculer à l'impérieuse nécessité de restreindre le nombre des pages du journal.' The newspaper reported it would try to fulfill its responsibility to readers by reducing local news to an absolute minimum, suspending for the time being publication of commentary from non-staff contributors (mostly politicians), and suspending the serialised novel, until this time a fixture of France's daily press. Two-page newspapers became the standard until 15 November, when the papers returned to four pages a day. The serialised novel *L'Enfant du divorce* by Hector de Montperreux returned 16 November. *Le Petit Provençal*, while not describing in the same detail its constraints, dropped its number of pages to two as well, and dropped the serialised novel upon its completion on 17 August. The feature reappeared 21 January 1915 with a more appropriate work, *Soldats de France*. Four-page editions reappeared 21 August, although six pages had been common before the war.

The events of August 1914 not only forced a reduction in pages, but changed design elements as well. On 11 September the Montpellier newspaper announced the decision by Paris censors to forbid banner headlines ('manchettes'), and to force newspapers to publish discreet titles no more than two columns wide. Street
hawking of editions was also forbidden. In addition, the two newspapers changed the custom of publishing illustrations and photographs, which had become more and more common in the 20th century press. Pages became grey, with small, difficult to read print. Illustrations and photos were eliminated from Le Petit Méridional. The first illustration reappeared on 17 November, and the first photo, 5 December. Le Petit Provençal reduced the number of photos and illustrations, but did not eliminate them completely, as did the Montpellier newspaper. Its first war-related photograph appeared 13 September, a French 75mm gun on a battlefield.

Advertising remained at its normal level in the Marseille newspaper until 9 August, when it fell to nearly nothing. By 20 September, advertisements in this newspaper began to grow, and by 16 October, they were back to nearly their pre-war number. Le Petit Méridional suffered a similar drop in advertising in August, but the smaller newspaper did not recover its advertising income as quickly. By November 1915, advertising was still only slightly more than half of its pre-war norm. The Montpellier newspaper also never managed to hold an advertising ratio, that is, a percentage of advertisements to news material, as high as Le Petit Provençal, even before the war (see graph).

Advertisers in both newspapers quickly took advantage of the war's demands for related products, and later used the theme of war in their selling strategies. The first military-related advertisement appeared in Le Petit Méridional on 24 November 1914: 'Envoyer à nos cher soldats-le cuirasse parapluie. Elle couvre et protège de la pluie, le poitrine, les épaules, le
first military-related advertisement on 10 October: 'Pour la guerre-corset blindé brevete', posted directly to the soldier at the front, costing nine francs. On 22 November: 'Pour nos soldats le parapluie du soldat....' On 2 December, an advertisement stated that all soldiers look forward to coffee for breakfast on the front, but 'heureux ceux qui peuvent y mélè une cuillerée de "Phoscao"....' Other items offered to soldiers in the Marseille newspaper included chocolate, pens ('Pour écrire sur le champ de bataille avec de l'eau, du vin, du café, etc.-indispensable aux militaires'), overcoats, or an entire Christmas package, including socks, tobacco, and a 1915 diary. For the home front, books describing the history of the war appeared in time for the new year ('en 4 forts volumes'). These advertisements would become more elaborate in 1915, constructing a category of propaganda separate from that articulated by articles, but significant to the concept of the union sacrée as reflected in these newspapers.

Although newspapers faced significant hardship in 1914, the war did make one positive contribution to press operations in the provinces. The shortage of rail transport frustrated circulation of competing newspapers from Paris or other cities, thereby reducing competition for the local press. 'L'état de guerre semble offrir une chance aux quotidiens locaux face aux organes régionaux gênés par les restrictions apportées au trafic ferroviaire civil: c'est dans les feuilles imprimées sur place que les lecteurs peuvent trouver les nouvelles fraîches
Impatiemment attendues. 

Le Petit Méridional declared on 11 August that its circulation had quadrupled, but it dropped back down as war news became a more familiar routine. 

Sources:

Andréani, ‘La presse quotidienne à Montpellier...’, 993.

Chapter Four: 1915

I. Discourse of the Union Sacrée and Influences on Morale

The model of the union sacrée employed in chapter three posited three articulations related to, but not identical to, the concept of 'sentiment national': consensus over pursuit of the war, consensus over elimination of political discourse and divergence, and consensus over extent and implementation of censorship. At the end of 1914 disagreements began to appear in the discussion of these themes, reflected both in Le Petit Provençal and Le Petit Méridional. These reconceptualisations of initial perspectives established a pervasive adversarial discourse in 1915. By the end of the year, journalists were suggesting that union sacrée was mortally threatened. Editors of Le Petit Provençal hardly mentioned the phrase in 1914. By 1915 both newspapers seemed to be using it as a tool to berate political foes. Neither newspaper seemed any longer to take the concept for granted.
In the gauchiste provincial press, the 1915 discourse of the union sacrée focussed on the planned return of parliamentary debate. Although parliament met briefly before the new year, it was not until 1915 that both newspapers began extensive discussions of the merits of parliamentary debates, and their effect on the union sacrée. Le Petit Méridional, despite its strongly republican pre-war posture, had not enthusiastically endorsed the return of parliament, beginning before the new year (22 December 1914) with a front-page leader signed 'F.M.':

Le 4 août, le parlement accomplit un acte de haute portée morale [in adjourning] qui aura son retentissement dans l'histoire. Il saura aujourd'hui—nous en avons la conviction intime—montrer à nouveau que les mandataires du pays n'ont qu'un cœur, une raison, une voix pour acclamer les armées de la République Française.

A column signed 'Jean-Bernard' on 20 December had observed, 'Que dirions-nous à des interventions parlementaires? Quelques discours, un peu de bruit? A quoi bon?'

Le Petit Provençal, in contrast, strongly supported the return of parliament. In a criticism of conservative politics, Ferdy observed on 13 January 1915,

les partis hostiles aux institutions parlementaires auraient volontiers applaudi à une sorte de suspension provisoire du parlement durant la guerre, suspension provisoire que, bien entendu, ils se seraient ensuite efforcés de transformer en suppression définitive.

That would be a mistake, Ferdy continued. Suggesting again the concept of the union sacrée as 'trève', he wrote, 'le parlement
ne pouvait cependant pas pousser l'esprit de conciliation jusqu'au suicide'. He added in this front-page leader, 'personne n'est autorisé à douter que nos parlementaires ne soient pas prêts à se soumettre à la discipline de ce patriotique devoir', an apparent request that politicians refrain from pre-war political squabbles. The choice of words used by Ferdy in this article seems to suggest he was not at all certain such a union of politicians in parliament could be possible. In fact, the newspaper itself suggested parliamentary debate themes certain to be controversial, if not explicitly, in effect by the newspaper's development of anti-government points of view, some dating in origin from the first days of war, notably the attack on profiteers. On 20 July the newspaper noted that, at fifty centimes a kilo, bread was more expensive in Marseille than in Paris, and pointed out that the union sacrée should mean cooperation, not enrichment of a few. On 10 August Ferdy wrote, 'chacun peut se rendre compte des tristes gaspillages dont a souffert depuis les débuts de la guerre notre infortuné trésor public'.

As early as 24 January, in his first direct criticism of government, Ferdy called politicians to task for inefficient handling of pensions for war widows, 'qui rend illusoire les bonnes intentions du gouvernement de la république'. On 23 March the newspaper devoted several columns to its first report of a wartime scandal: several profiteers, including François Descaux, identified as former cabinet chief for Joseph Caillaux, were accused of misappropriating food for the army. A report 22 July said a baker in nearby Aix-en-Provence was
served one year in prison and fined 5,000 francs for adding foreign material to increase the weight of bread loaves packed for the army. On 20 February Négis complained that the government’s promise to favour single men over married men at the front was wrong, suggesting it was a declaration to calibaires that ‘vous êtes inutile, un égoïste, vous n’avez droit à aucun ménagement, tant pis pour vous!’

Anti-government commentary in Le Petit Provencal shifted to a more general point of view in August, when Ferdy wrote in a front-page leader (12 August):

Certains sont d’avis que l’on doit pour cela faire confiance au gouvernement. On veut bien faire confiance au gouvernement qui représente à l’heure actuelle le pays tout entier, puisque l’union sacrée a supprimé toutes nos querelles et tous nos divisions politiques. Mais... Les ministres en France, comme dans la plupart des pays, se laissent trop souvent diriger par une bureaucratie irresponsable, et la guerre, hélas! n’a pas changé grand chose à cette fâcheuse pratique.

Ferdy strongly reiterated his insistence on parliamentary control, observing in this same article, ‘le gouvernement gouverne et le parlement contrôle: voilà la vérité constitutionnelle’. On 21 August he invoked the union sacrée to this end:

Nous n’avons jamais voulu insister ici, par scrupule de fidélité, à l’égard de l’union sacrée, sur le malaise qui se manifestait depuis quelques temps autour du gouvernement et des chambres.... Il apparaissait à tous les yeux que les adversaires du régime s’efforçaient de plus en plus d’exploiter, au profit de leurs idées politiques et de leurs partis, cette union sacrée.
On 18 October Négis referred to German newspaper accounts suggesting disagreements which had become evident that year proved that France was 'falling apart'. No, Négis responded, 'la vérité est que la guerre se prolongeant, l'irritabilité naturelle de notre caractère national s’est accrue'.

Generally it seems possible to conclude that in 1915 the Marseille newspaper often posited a distinctly adversarial tone in its treatment of government affairs, while straining to marginalise the force of anti-parliamentarianist currents. Although it evoked the union sacrée many more times than in 1914, it seems to have used it as a weapon to shame its foes, whether they be anti-parliamentarians, bureaucrats, or war profiteers.

Le Petit Méridional articulated a distinctly different sphere of action in this context. At no time in 1915 did its editors publish a leader explicitly criticizing the government, nor did the newspaper feel constrained to strongly support parliamentarianism, suggesting politicians should stay silent. In a leader signed 'Le Petit Méridional', published 15 October, the writer attacked those deputies who criticized government operations: "Pourvu qu'ils tiennent," a-t-on dit des civils. On devrait dire surtout, "pourvu qu'ils tiennent leur langue."

Revelations of the misappropriation of food as reported above by Le Petit Provencal were published in the Montpellier paper much earlier, however, as part of a leader signed by the newspaper. The censor had left two blocks of white space in the editorial, which laid blame on conservatives for exploiting the matter: 'Aussitôt la campagne anti-républicaine qui, depuis
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plusieurs mois se faisait en sourdine dans la presse réactionnaire, prend des éclats de fanfare. La raison: le payeur principal arrêté, le percepteur Desclaux, est un ancien chef de cabinet de M. Caillaux.'

This criticism of anti-republican forces, however, was eclipsed by a litany of anti-clerical diatribes already common here by the end of 1914, but non-existent in Le Petit Provencal. On 3 February, a leader called accused the Camerota du roi of taking advantage of the war to improve their royalist position. On 5 April, Lafferre warned in a commentary, 'si les partis de domination religieuse s'imaginent tirer bénéfice de la guerre actuelle, ils se trompent'. A similar attack came by way of a leader of April. On 7 May, a leader explained the newspaper's concept of the union:

L'union sacrée n'a jamais été synonyme de renoncement aux convictions personnelles. Elle a simplement et c'est là sa force-voulue signifier le désir de chacun de ne pas faire publiquement état de ce qui, dans ses opinions, pourrait être de nature à gêner ou à irriter le voisin.

This statement seems to show that the union sacrée had evolved in eight months. The concept of 'trève' was obvious, but even less permanent than that as a wartime phenomenological perspective, union sacrée had now become more or less merely good manners.

Sickering between Le Petit Méridional and L'Eclair became a regular feature in 1915, with leaders in the former newspaper accusing L'Eclair of not heeding the spirit of the union sacrée, 'en réveillant les anciennes divisions de catholiques et non-
Nous avons voulu l'"union sacrée" pour cimentier en un faisceau inébranlable tous les français dans le but de chasser l'allemand de notre territoire...mais nous voudrions bien n'être pas les seuls à respecter cette union, tandis que les cléricaux au front et à l'intérieur ne cessent de combattre ouvertement la république.

This criticism of the supposed defections from the union sacrée was not limited to anti-clericals, however. Writing 27 October, Lafferre referred to damage of a parliamentary vote of 4 October: 'Pour la première fois, l'union sacrée avait subi une assez grave atteinte, puisqu'une minorité importante avait osé marquer sa dissidence par un vote public.' In a brief divergence from the government's viewpoint, the first published in the Montpellier newspaper, a 31 October leader signed 'La Petit Meridional' observed,

Nous constatons à regret que, depuis quelques temps, le gouvernement ne réussissait plus l'unanimité nécessaire à une action vigoureuse. L'union sacrée, à laquelle tous les gens de cœur ont apporté leur concours absolu, risquait de se désagrégérer....

This statement was made, however, after Briand's government had already replaced Viviani's: 'Le Petit Meridional, qui a toujours
travaillé, pour sa part, au maintien de l'union sacrée, appauvrit le cabinet Briand.' At the end of the year (5 December), the newspaper placed in a prominent front-page position the story of a scandal under the title, 'Les Mauvaises Françaises.' Described was a mayor who fabricated a certificate showing a soldier had six children, and therefore could avoid the draft. This is the first time a scandal involving a soldier was described in this newspaper, a distinctly pessimistic contrast to the bourrage de crâne theme of brave, heroic poilus. Both newspapers in 1915 conceptualised the nature and significance of the war with greater realism.

II. Pessimism and Realism

It was noted in chapter three that by the end of 1914 a more pessimistic reality centred around the imperatives of the war began to reach readers of the newspapers in this study. This theme was to continue to a greater extent in 1915. Négis, writing in Le Petit Provençal on 24 February, observed the 'bavards', for whom 'rien ne fonctionne, tout s'en va à vau-l'eau'. On 30 June, he found lassitude; 'on est impatient, on voudrait que cela finit ou, tout au moins, que cela marchait plus vite'. Le Petit Méridional noted on 10 July, 'il y a une minorité-infine il est vrai—dont l'unique mission est de jeter le doute et le découragement'. In a commentary in the Montpellier newspaper signed 'Georges Rocher' (16 July), the
writer observed pessimists who said, 'nous n'avançons pas', and that Germany was stronger, but he urged patience, 'chaque jour qui passe affaiblit notre ennemie'. On 25 August a leader signed, 'Le Petit Méridional' noted that after one year of war, 'l'énergie morale de ceux de l'arrière est restée intacte', (but) 'nous n'assistons plus à ces accès subits de pessimisme, auxquels succédaient de non moins subits accès d'optimisme, qui ont marqué le mois d'août 1914'. The editorial continued with a comment which seems to suggest a subtle criticism of the military: 'De même que les offensives irraisonnées ont disparu, de même la vivacité excessive des impressions s'est atténuée.'

In a report by Abraham Schrameck, Bouches-du-Rhône prefect, this pessimism was also directed toward the press. In a letter to the interior minister dated 13 July, he emphasised that while he believed, 'on y est assez exactement renseigné', he added,

Chacun juge d'après les faits à sa connaissance, en tire ses déductions, ne croit guère aux commentaires tout faits qu'on lui donne et manifeste le plus parfait scepticisme à l'égard des prévisions qui se lisent dans la presse en matière militaire et, surtout, en matière économique et qui se sont trop souvent trouvées en défaut.

This corresponds positively with the observation by contemporary press historians that in 1915 readers began to believe less and less in the credibility of newspapers.7

7Marseille, Archives Départementales, carton AD VI T 6/2.
Schrageck added that at a meeting with mayors and municipal officials, 'Tous se rendent compte que la guerre devra être de longue durée.' This theme was also reflected in the press. On 29 April, an article in *La Petit Méridional* signed 'G.-F. C', declared that the war's length would be impossible to predict, but that two factors, the blockade of Germany and possible neutral intervention, would be crucial. 'Cette guerre sera longue', the writer concluded. An article that same day borrowed from *Le Démocrate* of Switzerland set up a bleak prognosis for Europe.

On arrive à cette conclusion que notre vieille Europe court au suicide avec une effroyable rapidité. On a, comme nous l'avons déjà établi, fixé à 150 milliards le déficit qui résultera des douze premiers belligérants....C'est donc aux États-Unis que passera le sceptre du monde.

In addition to the more sober, even pessimistic, reflection of the war, these newspapers showed a strong current of opinion repudiating *bourrage de crâne*, particularly *La Petit Provençal*. On 18 July, Mégis quoted a letter he said he received from a reader criticising both journalists and entertainers who say,

les boches sont des poltrons, des lâches qui se débinent en foule devant en seul polis...Pourquoi s'effortuer à représenter comme très agréable, très enviable la vie des tranchées, devant les hommes qui n'ont supporté cette vue que parce qu'ils étaient soutenus par la grandeur du devoir à accomplir?
Editors of these newspapers seemed to agree with this letter writer, for 1915 was the year grim reality of the war arrived through graphic descriptions of the soldiers' life. Poison gas, shells, tanks, flammable liquids, lice, rats, and death all were described in considerable detail. On 23 August, Paul Emmanuel, writing 'from the front', established a sober anti-houmange de crime critique in Le Petit Provençal, designed to mock heroic style writers, whom he called imbeciles:

Le Poilu Classique a un culte, de sa baïonnette que l'on nomme, paraît-il, Rosalie. Il faut voir les misérables Boches se sauver comme lapins devant le Poilu Classique armé de sa Classique Rosalie.... Imbéciles! Je t'aime mieux ô mon pauvre poilu tel que tu es.... Si, le poilu a des poux!.... Le poilu ne se plaint pas. Mais lorsqu'il entend raconter, sur les tranchées, les stupidités dont on abreuve le public.... Immobiles, entendez-vous, alors qu'autour de vous s'écrasent les balles ou que les marmites vous assourdissent de leur fracas et vous couvrent de terre. A ces moments-là, on a peur, oui, on a peur et on reste, on reste parce qu'il faut rester.

The likelihood of death is not hidden from readers in this writing, nor is it depicted as particularly heroic.

Un jour j'ai vu partir des soldats qu'on envoyait à la mort. Ils le savaient: on les avait avertis. Ils devaient attirer sur eux le feu des mitrailleuses ennemies, les occuper pendant un instant. Au moment de sortir de la tranchée, j'ai vu que les yeux de plusieurs étaient emplis de larmes. Elles coulaient sur leurs joues et ils ne les cachaient point. Ils aimant la vie. Ils aimait leurs enfants, ces poilus! Au signal, ils sont tous partis, tous, sans hésitation, vers la mort.
A report on 1 February titled 'Dans Une Tranchée de Première Ligne' described death and fear in a fashion presaging Barbuse, and a report of a new shell on 13 April described clinically, 'Il en résulte que les organes internes des individus situés à proximité de cette zone redoutable sont soumis à une alternance brusque de pression et de relâchement qui provoque en eux des ruptures de vaisseaux et de véritables détériorations des tissus profondes.' A report May 13 described rats on the Yser battlefield: 'Pour chaque bête tuée, il en vient dix; en plein jour, les bêtes affamées s'attaquent aux soldats, à leur sac, à leurs souliers, à leur pain.' In Le Petit Méridional of 1 December, readers were reminded of mutilated French soldiers: 'On connaît bien les mutilés des membres, amputés de bras ou de jambes, car ils sont légions et défilent dans nos rues.' A report several months before (16 February) concluded that so far ninety-six local soldiers 'ont payé, de leur sang, la défense du droit et du justice'. The front-page commentary (signed F. Aubes) admitted that 'ce total est énorme' and that 'en présence de tant de deuils, de tant de désastres, de tant de misères, certains osent parler de paix avant d'avoir détruit la cause du mal'. But the commentary used these statistics in an attempt instead to strengthen the morale which the writer apparently feared may have been weakening, by observing, 'Quels que soient les sacrifices à faire, pas de paix sans que nous ayons supprimé cette cause et sans que nous ayons rendu impossible les guerres futures.'

The newspaper on 1 December estimated the war had left 2,000 blind soldiers in France, ten times that many with one
eye, ten times that many more amputees. On 1 November, the same newspaper reported ministry of public instruction statistics showing that of 30,000 teachers mobilised, 2,000 had been killed, 8,000 wounded seriously enough to be 'hors de combat'. But 700 were cited for bravery; 'c'est du patriotisme en action!' commented the newspaper. *Le Petit Provençal* continued to publish a daily list of local soldiers 'morts au champ d'honneur', at least six a day, and on 26 June published its first photograph of a local man killed in the war, Joseph Clausmann. Although total French losses were not reported in either paper, both reported some British Casualties: 139,347 according to the Montpellier paper on 16 April; 98,899 in the Dardanelles campaign, according to the Marseille newspaper on 17 October. In his 13 July letter to the interior minister Schrameck noted, 'On s'est habitué jusqu'à un certain point à l'arrivée et aux récits des blessés, à la lecture des listes quotidiennes des morts, quelquefois un peu longues, que la presse publie.'

It must be pointed out, of course, that these statistics still greatly underestimate the extent of the losses, 422,000 in France by the end of 1914. Circular No. 1000, a handbook for French censors, required censors to allow publication of local soldiers killed only on the request of the family, a precaution,
in noted, to assure soldiers still alive were not accidentally listed as dead.  

Black humour also began to appear in 1915 press accounts. Meglis wrote on 14 April that one sees amputees almost everywhere, noting he was standing on a shaking tramway platform when he accidentally bumped into a former soldier. He excused himself, but the man replied,

"Y'a pas de mal, vous ne risquez pas de me marcher sur le pied." Il avait un pilon de bois tout neuf qui dépassait de son pantalon. Il riait franchement de son trait, et les voyageurs, eux, souriaient aussi, mais d'un sourire qui leur crispait la bouche et leur serrait la gorge certainement.

It seems therefore that these two newspapers reflected morale in 1915 as accepting of the war, but with grim and tired determination based on the concept, as written in the depiction of trench life, that il faut. This compares positively with the articulation of Becker that the censor wished to portray an attitude of 'resigned acceptance' to the war, but does not reflect his observation that censors struck out all bad news and items critical to the planning and conduct of the war. On 7 December, *Le Petit Méridional*, in an unsigned article, complained.

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Paris (Château de Vincennes), Service historique de l'armée de la terre (S.H.A.T.), cartons SN335 and SN336; 'Circulaire No. 1006, Feuille 199'.


Ibid., 58.
Il importe que nous sachions quelle est l'autorité civile qui est intervenue. Qui a donné l'ordre d'évacuer Lille sans coup férir, alors que le général d'Amade disposait de 80.000 hommes pour cette défense? ... Quelles sont les autorités civiles qui ont abandonné Lille à l'ennemi?

However, this criticism of military operations was nearly unique in the press of 1915 studied here, and it seems carefully to avoid placing blame on military commanders. In general, however, if we measure high morale as enthusiasm, determination, self-confidence, absence of carping criticism, and absence of complaint, the body of empirical detail examined here seems to illustrate a distinct downward shift of morale in 1915.

The myth of the soldier as fearless hero or noble knight in shining armour was therefore repudiated in 1915 by these reports of the poilu surrounded by rats, lice, fear, and death. The new word poilu itself suggested humbleness. It seems that the heroic myth was not totally eliminated from the press studied here, however; it was instead transferred to a new kind of fighter unknown before the First World War, the pilot. Négis established a transference of the old theme of knightly chivalry onto aviators in a column published 26 April. While no accounts of fraternisation between poilus slipped by the censor after December 1914, pilots, who were not called poilus, were set up.

as a breed apart, members of a noble fraternity regardless of nationality. Négis observed:

Si les aviateurs français n'ont pas le monopole de la bravoure—les pilotes allemands ne manquent pas de courage—il faut bien reconnaître que les nôtres, possèdent à un degré extraordinaire, cette vaillance tranquille jointe à cette élégance morale qui en fait les égaux des chevaliers d'antan.

Négis went on to describe an air battle in which the French pilot shot down his German adversary. After landing, the French pilot jumped out of his airplane and caught the German aviators. The pilot recounted, according to Négis, that,

L'observateur, blessé au cou, me regardait avec des yeux où je lis sa pensée. Ce fut plus fort que moi: je lui tendis la main et je la serrai fortement. Nous nous étions compris.

On 9 September, the same newspaper described the death of a famous French ace ('as'). The German pilot 'a jeté une couronne pourtant comme inscription, "à Pégoud, mort en héros, son adversaire"'. Le Petit Méridional did not cover this 'knights of the air' theme as energetically, but did occasionally refer to 'noble aces'. It seems that this theme developed as a counterbalance to the reality of the trenches, and it likely had a propaganda role to bolster morale, illustrative of Lasswell's technique of compensation.8

II. Regional Antagonism

*Note: The end of the page is not visible.*
Discussion of the 'XV Corps Affaire' and its effect on the relationship between the Midi and the rest of France continued to be unabated in 1915. Not limited to newspapers of Provence and Languedoc, Toulouse newspapers complained that the Midi was becoming a scapegoat, and La Dépêche even established a regular series defending army corps from the Midi, beginning with the XVe, under the title 'L'Histoire vérifiée.' A special order from Paris eliminated these articles in September 1915, Bouyoux notes. Reflecting similar concern with the south's reputation, both newspapers studied here pursued their defense of the Midi.

In its edition of 23 January, Le Petit Méridional published an article signed by Marcelle Capy, identified as having been written for La Bataille Syndicaliste, Paris trade union daily. Capy referred to the newspaper (Le Matin) which first published Gervais article, without naming it, but attributing to it the blame for the controversy:

"Il y a un journal qui méritait d'être mis au ban de la presse française....Ce journal, c'est celui qui, aux premiers jours de lutte, essaya de jeter la discorde entre les populations du sud et celles du nord, celui qui osa taxer de lâcheté les fils du Midi."

This article emphasized the deleterious effect the story was having:

"Ces jours-ci, dans un tramway parisien, je me trouvais auprès de quelques femmes qui se..."
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communiquaient leurs douleurs de mères et d'épouses, bien naturelles...les unes et les autres exprimèrent leur surprise d'une lutte aussi longue. Il se trouva quelqu'un pour donner l'explication: "Ce sont les méridionaux qui en sont la cause. Sans eux, il y a longtemps que ce serait fini." L'auditoire approuva. Le Midi est le bouc émissaire sur lequel on fait retomber les fatalités de la guerre....

On 6 February, writing in Le Petit Provencal, Ferdy observed,

Les sinistres plaisanteries dont nos vaillants soldats du Midi sont victimes continuent. Il ne se passe pas de jour que nous ne recevions à ce sujet des lettres émouvantes....En voilà assez et en voilà trop! Est-ce qu'il n'y a pas quelque part une autorité capable d'imposer silence aux calomniateurs....?

It seems significant that Ferdy referred to letters from readers, apparently reaching him in quantity. This may indicate that the 'XVe Corps Affaire' was not merely a press phenomenon, but was based on genuine concern from the region's residents. It is also notable that while Ferdy was an implacable foe of political censorship throughout the war, in this case he seems to ask for it.

On 26 February André Lefèvre in Le Petit Provencal revealed that 'everyone' knew Gervais wrote his letter at the instigation of Messimy, when 'Paris était menacé'. He asked the war ministry to issue a dispatch designed to negate the effect of the letter. On 24 July, Negis asked, 'Ne pourrait-on faire taire les abominables bavards qui, par sottise, ne craignent pas de calporter les insanités venues de dehors?' On 29 July, a front-page leader signed 'Le Petit Méridional' complained that numerous Paris newspapers were finding fault with the Midi. 'Aussi, après avoir contesté le courage de nos soldats, on les
Comparing positively to findings of Bouyoux, no further debate on the 'XVe Corps Affaire' was published in these two newspapers in 1915 after the end of September. Circular No. 1000 dated 30 September 1915 under 'Midi (Troupes du)' stated ('Feuille 18'):

Le service de contrôle de presse a été invité à ne pas laisser réveiller dans la presse la controverse sur la conduite des troupes du Midi (10 Février 1915). Cependant la circulaire du 25 Février a autorisé explicitement la publication d'un article d'un journal de Paris relatif aux troupes du Midi: elle ajoute qu'il y aura lieu d'interdire tous commentaires qui seraient de nature à incriminer, par comparaison ou autrement, la conduite de nos troupes à quelques régions qu'elles appartiennent.10

There seems to be little doubt that 'antagonism' between the Midi and the rest of France, now crystallised around the 'XVe Corps Affaire', continued to have a particular impact on morale in the south as opposed to the rest of the country. While no further articles concerning the 'XVe Affaire' appeared from September to the end of 1915, on 24 September Le Petit Méridional established yet another topic of criticism against the Midi, a call by Le Figaro to boycott Midi wine to punish growers for price increases. 'Cet appel au boycottage du produit d'où le Midi tire la plupart de ses revenus mérite d'être retenu...il est logique que les prix se relèvent cette année où la récolte est fortement déficitaire.'

Le Figaro, S.H.A.T., cartons 5N335, 5N336.
II.I. Political Aspects of the Gauche

Beginning in 1915, political discourse was reconstructed around parliamentary debate, and it is in the confluence of these dialogues, and of socialist conferences, that one may establish an analysis of the gauche in these newspapers until the end of the war. Evidence employed above seems to posit development of a distinct divergence of opinion, from flawless support of the government in August 1914 to substantial independence and criticism having a clear impact upon the substance of the union sacrée. Reflection of this perspective through parliamentary proceedings and political commentary as reported by the newspapers shows a similar divergence, but more pronounced, especially at the end of the year, and strongly related to socialist or Radical-socialist politicians. As will be demonstrated in a discussion of censorship in 1915, this divergence began early in the year as a strong separation from the government's direction of its censorship function.

On 14 January, reported Le Petit Provençal, 'le groupe du parti socialiste au parlement estime que le principe de la liberté de la presse doit être respecté en temps de guerre comme en temps de paix'. The next day the newspaper noted in a news report that Sembat, Guesde, and Vandervelde had met in Paris to arrange a conference of allied socialists, 'pour examiner les conditions dans lesquelles la guerre doit se poursuivre et exprimer leur point de vue sur la guerre'. Although the report reemphasised the socialists' support of the war and allied victory, the question of war aims and suggestion that socialists
must have a point of view independent of the government's
suggests socialists as reported in *Le Petit Provençal* were
distancing themselves from automatic support as implied by the
unions sacrées. The conference was planned for 14 February in
London, according to the newspaper, and the C.G.T. had agreed to
take part. Locally, the newspaper reported on 9 February that
Marseille socialists had set up a 'Commission d'étude et de
solidarité' to 'assurer la cohésion des membres du parti,
d'adresser des encouragements moraux et matériels aux camarades
mobilisés, et généralement d'étudier toutes les questions
économiques posées par la situation actuelle'. While the topics
of this announcement appear banal, they also may suggest that
local socialists intended to establish a policy independent of
the government's.

As noted above, some writers of First World War history
contend the censor would not allow the word peace to be
published unless attached to a concept of total victory.¹¹ *Le
Petit Méridional*, however, reported also on 14 January that
neutral socialists were planning a conference in Copenhagen, and
on 20 January that delegates of that conference

**déclare que c'est un devoir pour tous les partis
socialistes de travailler au rétablissement de la
paix la plus vite possible avec les conditions
pouvant servir de base au désarmement
international et à la démocratisation de la
politique étrangère.**

¹¹ Bauer and Allard, *Les secrets de la censure pendant la guerre*
Mort des français 1914-18* (Paris, 1959), 274. Corday, Michel,
While this hardly suggests defeatism, it certainly refers to peace in a context less extreme than 'jusqu'au boutisme'. It also introduces proto-Wilsonian aims. *La Petit Provencal* on 19 January announced the Copenhagen conference was being held 'pour la paix'.

None of these articles was prominently placed in the newspaper, however, nor were they given substantial amounts of space. The first major front-page article concerning French socialism, including photographs of Sembat and Guesde, was published 12 February in *La Petit Provencal*. Guesde was quoted in a reflection of the government's point of view, that German imperialism must be crushed before peace is possible, 'lutte jusqu'au bout'. He continued that the war was not against the entire German people, but against Prussian imperialism and the kaiser and 'c'est aussi que la victoire française, ainsi remportée, sera, en même temps que la condition, la préface de la victoire socialiste de demain'. This opinion did not reflect union sacrée; many conservatives, in contrast, did believe the war was against the entire German people, and surely did not hope its end would lead to socialism. On 15 February the newspaper began its coverage of the London allied socialist conference, emphasising conference demands that the war not be turned into a war of conquest, that an 'Etats-Unis d'Europe' be set up, and that 'les classes ouvrières des tous les pays industriels doivent s'unir dans l'internationale afin de supprimer la diplomatie secrète, mettre fin aux intérêts du militarisme...et établir une autorité internationale pour régler les divergences entre nations'. 
Le Petit Provençal was not necessarily in favour of the conference, however. 'S'il voulaient élever la voix au nom du parti socialiste, les délégués de Londres pouvaient et devaient se borner à dénoncer les abominables provocations et à flétrir les crimes monstrueux de l'Allemagne...,' Ferdy complained that the statement of the conference 'ne répond plus au sentiment public, pas plus d'ailleurs qu'au sentiment de la grande masse des socialistes qui ont compris leur devoir patriotique exactement de la même façon que les autres citoyens'. Le Petit Meridional, in reporting the same conference, made no editorial comment, but on 19 February a leader signed 'P.M'. remarked generally that politicians in conferences and in parliament should avoid polemics, 'un état d'esprit contraire à celui qu'exige l'union sacrée devant l'ennemi commun'.

These polemics, while not apparently reflecting this newspaper's editorial policies in 1915, were nevertheless reported as they emanated from parliament. The first criticism of government in the Montpellier newspaper not concerned directly with censorship appeared 5 March 1915, by deputy Paul Meunier, who said, 'L'état de siège, c'est le droit à l'arbitraire, c'est la suppression de la presse, c'est la dictature contre l'insurrection.' On 16 June, a commentator for the same newspaper signing an article 'Pas-Perdus', ridiculed comments by deputy Raffin-Dugens,

si tant est que l'on puisse appeler cela un discours, avait presque amusé la chambre, qui ne prenait pas au sérieux les affirmations du fougueux unifié de l'Isère, disant que le Parlement préparait les voies à la dictature parce qu'il laissait le ministère gouverner à
decrets, au lieu de se servir des lois votées par les chambres... M. Raffin-Dugens s'en prit ensuite à la commission de l'armée, dont il compara les membres à un tas d'écureuils qui auraient tourné à vide dans un cylindre.

Editorials in *Le Petit Méridional* hardly supported Raffin-Dugens' point of view, but it is worth pointing out that this article reflects the first serious non-leader criticism of government in the Montpellier newspaper which the editor apparently judged necessary to publish. The Marseille newspaper, in contrast, took more seriously Raffin-Dugens' point of view, as noted above in Ferdy's 12 August call for parliamentary control of government. On 9 April, Sembat, visiting Marseille, is quoted in *Le Petit Provençal*: 'M. Sembat constate que l'union sacrée dont nous avons en ce moment sous les yeux le merveilleux spectacle ne sera pas et ne peut pas être éternelle.' That political factions reformed in parliament to oppose official policy is first clearly indicated in a report of on 21 August of a debate concerning money for war procurements. While the 'groupe socialiste uniifié' demanded more information from Millerand, the 'groupe des républicains de gauche' and 'union radicale et radicale-socialiste' 'ont décidé de ne pas se séparer du gouvernement'. An interview of Guesde borrowed from the Milan newspaper *Le Popolo d'Italia* on 21 August stated, 'M. Guesde a déclaré que la guerre constituerait pour les classes prolétariennes une terrible leçon, et que le socialisme internationaliste, après la guerre, renaitrait plus puissant que jamais.' *Le Petit Méridional*, however, remained silent on the parliamentary disagreements of August, and does not suggest a break with the *union sacrée* until 14 October, on the resignation
of Delcassé from the government. At this point, both newspapers clearly indicate considerable discord between parliamentary factions and the government. 'Il déclare, en termes très nets, qu'il se voit forcé de se séparer du gouvernement, celui-ci ayant décidé de donner à notre politique internationale...une direction opposée à ses propres opinions.' (Le Petit Méridional.) Painlevé is quoted in the chamber saying, 'C'est donc seulement la question de la coordination de nos efforts militaires qui est en jeu pour épargner le sang de nos soldats,' and asking for acts, not words. Noted the parliamentary article, 'Le groupe socialiste pousse des exclamations bruyantes qui dégénèrent en un véritable brouhaha....' On the same date, Le Petit Provencal described deputy Jules Delahaye stating, "Il n'y a rien de plus dangereux pour la Patrie qu'une division entre nous."...Le discours de M. Delahaye est couvert par les interruptions des socialistes et leur bruit de pupitres que M. Deschanel s'efforce en vain de calmer.' The newspaper's published record of the vote of confidence in the government showed the extent of disagreement: 372 for, 143 abstentions, 9 against.

Front-page leaders in both newspapers discussed this incident. Perdy on 15 October blamed attacks of right-wing politicians: 'On avouera que le moment serait mal choisi pour recommencer les querelles et les batailles politiques auxquelles le pacte de l'union sacrée avait heureusement mis en terme.' A leader the same day in the Montpellier newspaper signed 'P.M.' asked politicians to keep quiet, and commented of Viviani,

Il s'est refusé à entrer dans les explications diplomatiques et militaires qu'on lui
Nous approuvons les belles paroles de gouvernement qu'il a dites et nous regrettons que certains députés n'aient pas compris.

Referring again to the incident, Lafferre commented,

''Pour la première fois, l'union sacrée avait subi une assez grave atteinte, puisqu'une minorité importante avait osé marquer sa dissidence par un vote public.''

Both newspapers announced the resignation of the Viviani cabinet on 30 October, and the accession of Briand. In a leader the next day, Le Petit Méridional wrote, 'Nous constatons regret, depuis quelques temps, le gouvernement ne réunissait plus l'unanimité nécessaire à une action vigoureuse... Le Petit Méridional a toujours travaillé, pour sa part, au maintien de l'union sacrée, applaudit le cabinet Briand.' Ferdy in Le Petit Provencal expressed only his wish that Briand would be less obstinate concerning censorship (4 November), and the same day socialist deputy Renaudel is quoted as speaking for socialists in asking the new government, 'ne permettra pas à la presse de laisser croire plus longtemps au public que nos ennemis sont à bout, affamés, sans hommes et sans munitions'.

Reports of socialist and trade union activity illustrate a phenomenon of divergence similar to that shown by parliamentary news. The first complaint during the war from a trade union was published in Le Petit Méridional 12 June, an open letter from 'Le syndicat des pilotes de Cette' (contemporary spelling, Sète) addressed to parliament. The trade union protests de toute son énergie contre le projet de loi tendant à exonérer de la moitié des droits du
concerning salaries, complained,

les gains des aspirants pilotes du port de Cette sont très minimes...ci-joint, le relevé de nos salaires depuis le commencement des hostilités jusqu'à ce jour.

This was followed by a block of white space left by censorship.

On 8 September, the same newspaper published an open letter from 'Ouvrières et ouvriers de l'habillement', complaining that between 3,000 and 4,000 Montpellier clothing industry workers were unemployed, and when they did work, wages were low and employers' profits, scandalous. The workers asked for a commission to eliminate exploitation of workers, and a minimum salary. Added to this letter was a comment by the newspaper, noting a meeting of this union was attended by 600. 'Nous sommes convaincus que les pouvoirs publics examineront avec la plus grande bienveillance les doléances ci-dessus relevées et trouveront les solutions.'

The first report of a strike in either newspaper was published in *Le Petit Méridional* on 12 September, under a Narbonne dateline. The striking Spanish vineyard workers menaced police, according to the report, who opened fire, killing one of the strikers. Reasons or size of the strike were not reported. A second strike was reported 19 November, in Sète. Thirty-two of thirty-four tramway employees struck after their employer refused to award them a salary increase to cover inflation, the newspaper reported. However, mechanics continued to work, 'par patriotism, ne voulant pas que la Fonderie du Midi arrête la
fabrication des obus'. The connection with the foundry and the tramway is not explained. On 20 and 21 November the strike, called 'cessation de travail', continued, and it was noted women were replacing the strikers. After this date no further report was published. All reports of strikes in 1915 were placed discreetly on inside pages under small headlines.

Le Petit Provençal did not publish a single strike report in 1915. Its first report of trade union activity did not appear until 19 August, a C.G.T. declaration reprinted from L'Humanité fait appel au prolétariat international pour que la paix, paix de tant de sacrifices et de tant d'horreurs, soit le triomphe du droit sur la force'. The declaration also called for obligatory arbitration in case of war threat, suppression of secret diplomacy, end of 'armements à outrance', and possibility of a federation of nations. The declaration further asks the proletariat to accept a proposal from the American Federation of Labour in favour of an international conference to prepare the conditions for peace. This, however, was the only substantive trade union news in the Marseille newspaper for the year.

Socialist activity, however, was covered in considerably more detail than in Le Petit Meridional. A pacifist declaration by Dutch socialists was reported 30 June, confirming that the internationale, 'quoique brisé actuellement, reviendra pour l'agitation en faveur de la paix'. On 9 July a meeting of the Bouches-du-Rhône socialists produced a declaration asking the party to continue its work for the national defense,
paix honorable et durable garantissant pour l'avenir le respect de toutes les nationalités, restant opposé à toute idée de conquête, et en répudiant toutes exagérations chauvines.

The Zimmerwald Conference is mentioned for the first time in *Le Petit Provençal* on 10 November, but not until 7 December in *Le Petit Méridional*. The conference had taken place at two months earlier, in September. The Montpellier newspaper named Mermheim and Bouderon on its front page in connection with a meeting of a 'Fédération de la Seine' socialist conference, 'qui fit le déplacement de Zimmerwalle (sic.), tenta d'expliquer les raisons qui l'avaient incité à prendre part à cette conférence pacifiste. Il (Bouderon) fut violemment interrompu.'

The report in *Le Petit Provençal* was less cryptic, explaining, as part of a declaration of the 'Commission administrative du parti socialiste', that two French socialists attended a meeting in Zimmerwald, Switzerland, to discuss peace, without mandate from the commission. 'La C.A.F. rappelle qu'elle s'est refusée à participer à cette réunion, comme aux réunions de même ordre organisées depuis le début de la guerre', and reaffirmed that the only peace will be through 'la ruine de l'impérialisme et militarisme allemand'. A second reference to Zimmerwald published 18 November reflected the socialist federation of Nord's declaration: 'Ils considèrent criminelles toutes tentatives de propagande pour la paix immédiate.' Referring to Zimmerwald the next day, Perdy wrote, 'Les socialistes allemands, qui ne sont plus que les laquais en livrée rouge du Kaiser, seraient bien aises de nous prendre dans leurs filets.'
The year-end French socialist congress reflected strong criticism of the government. In a report published 20 December, Boudon, identified as one of two French socialists who went to Immerwalt without authorization, asked for a 'censure' against the 'Groupe parlementaire socialiste' and 'Commission administrative du parti socialiste', resignation of socialist ministers, and refusal of parliament to grant further war credits. Another delegate, Maurin, 'estime que les ministres socialistes sont les collaborateurs d'un gouvernement bourgeois'. In a story published 21 December Bourdon asked for rapprochement with German socialists 'sans conditions', and denounced the union sacrée 'qui n'a été constituée dans tous ses pays que pour entraîner les masses populaires dans une guerre qui n'est pas la leur'. Alternative motions supporting a rapprochement between French and German socialists under certain conditions were proposed by Longuet and Fiancette, but in a vote of delegates, Bourdon's motion received 545 votes of 10,292 cast. In a leader concerning actions taken by the socialists, Fédor wrote (21 December), 'le congrès de dimanche a accusé dans les organisations du parti certaines tendances qui nous paraissent plus que fâcheuses...notre sentiment est qu'il n'y a pas de conciliation possible entre la démocratie socialiste française et ceux que l'on a trop justement appelés les socialistes du kaiser.' He called the Bourdon motion a 'sacrilege'.

Le Parti Méridional reflected disagreement within the socialist party in an article published 5 December observing,
Concerning the rapprochement between French and German socialists, however, a commentary 13 December observed that at 5:30 p.m. the newspaper posted its daily dispatches in front of its offices, as usual. Of the 300 to 400 people waiting to read the material, a report from the German socialist newspaper Vorwärts asking for direct talks between French and German socialists 'pour discuter les conditions d'une paix éventuelle' was greeted by protest: 'L'esprit de cette protestation fut admirablement résumé par cette phrase d'un ouvrier: "c'est eux qui ont commencé, n'est-ce pas. Eh bien, c'est nous qui finirons."

On 21 December the Bouderon motion vote was reported, with the added observation that Longuet feared the possibility of a schism between French socialists. On 1 January 1916, a leader signed 'Le Petit Méridional' was satisfied that the majority of socialists voted to support the government: 'Ils sont internationalistes certainement, mais leur internationalisme ne consiste pas à donner à nos plus irréconciliables ennemis les clefs de nos cités.'

Other reports betraying controversy under guise of the union sacrée are shown by substantial reporting of divergent points of view. The existence of Carnet B was revealed in Le Petit Méridional 31 October, as part of a report borrowed from
Le Monde Rouge of Paris, stating, 'le gouvernement ne fit pas usage du Carnet B, sur lequel figuraient quelques milliers de citoyens, considérés comme suspects qui devaient être arrêtés au jour de la mobilisation'. The German viewpoint of the war was extensively reported in both newspapers 21 August, in the text of a speech by Bethmann-Hollweg filling three columns of type in the Montpelier newspaper, and two columns in the Marseille newspaper. The speech included specific descriptions of territory held by German armies, the German encirclement and mobilisation justifications, the Franco-Russian treaties, and the German view of England's belligerence. A leader commenting on the speech the next day did not use epithets or vituperative accusations, but concluded, 'Préparons la victoire finale sans nous préoccuper de ce que peut raconter le premier ministre du kaiser.' A second long speech by Bethmann-Hollweg was published in both newspapers on 11 December, but Le Petit Méridional called German peace proposals 'un bluff'.

In a counterpoint to the French government’s viewpoint perhaps more credible than the German chancellor's speech, Le Petit Provençal on 26 July published a review of a pamphlet published in the United States by 'General Bernhardi', contending England violated the 'esprit' of Belgian neutrality, that France was looking for an excuse to 'tirer l'épée', that Russia prepared for war to crush Austria and conquer Constantinople, that war could have been avoided if England had not been joined by treaty to France and Russia, and other anti-
No comment was made of the review, which was not published in *Le Petit Méridional*.

The year 1915 seems to have been differentiated from the previous year by a marked increase in reports of *gauchiste* agitation against the authorities, and a confluence of perspectives at variance with the spirit of *union sacrée*. Editors of both newspapers, while apparently believing it necessary to report the increased divergence of political discourse, attempted to marginalise its possible negative import through editorial argument, although *Le Petit Provençal* did suggest tempered criticism of government not presented in *Le Petit Méridional*. 
Chapter Five:
Censorship In 1915

The situation of censorship in 1915 may be analysed in two domains, that of the operation of the censor, and that of press and political reaction to it. Censorship procedures will be examined first.

I. Operation

Authorities in September 1914 created two bureaux of censorship outside Paris, one civil, the other military. According to censorship documents, civilian censors were directed to work 'in cooperation' with the military, but were given the separate duty of controlling news relating to politics and interior affairs, that is, to 'political' censorship. "Deux censures entièrement distinctes, l'une, dite politique, confiée aux préfets, l'autre,..."
militaire, rentrant dans les attributions de l'autorité militaire. By 1915 this dual system appeared to be exhibiting certain weaknesses, according to censorship documents. The two authorities found it difficult to make clear separations between material of a military nature and of a political nature, and disagreed over censorship decisions. Interior ministry communiqués of 2 February, 15 February, and 19 February merged the two arms into a single censorship commission under ultimate control of the military command. Military authorities, consulting prefects, invited civilians to be part of this board, mostly government employees who represented prefectural authority on the commissions. This apparently did not end disputes between soldier censors and civilian censors, however. In a war ministry communiqué dated 3 April, authorities asked the two sides to present a single front to the press. Separate opinions, one military, the other civil, suggested disagreement within the commission, and should be avoided, the report suggested. This communiqué was signed, as were many during this period, by Buat, 'Le Colonel, Chef du Cabinet'. It stated:

\[\text{Paris, S.H.A.T., carton SN373, report from the war ministry to President du Conseil and foreign affairs ministry dated 13 March 1917.}\]

\[\text{S.H.A.T., carton SN373.}\]

\[\text{S.H.A.T., Carton SN373.}\]
Lorsque le censeur civil demande la suppression d'un article contenant des attaques contre le gouvernement ou le parlement, la publication est interdite. Le désaccord semble ne pouvoir surgir, et ce sera évidemment exceptionnel, que dans le cas où le censeur civil serait d'avis d'autoriser une publication que l'autorité militaire, de son côté, considérerait comme dangereuse ou inopportune. On peut dire en définitive que le désaccord entre le censeur civil et le censeur militaire aboutira la plus souvent à l'interdiction de publier.

Apparemment ces cas ne furent pas aussi exceptionnels qu'on l'espérait, cependant, pourtant en 1917 l'armée entière des censeurs civils serait éliminée. Paris demanda à chaque commission de censure de chaque ville de transmettre chaque jour un exemple de chaque journal censuré, avec le document censuré. Le ministère de la Guerre, la Section de la Presse, supervisait cette opération. Le Service de la Presse ne peut ainsi vérifier le contrôle exercé et donner l'attention aux services locaux sur les erreurs commises et qui proviendraient soit d'une trop grande facilité, soit d'une sévérité excessive, soit enfin d'inadéquation. Ajoutons à cette tâche la promesse du cabinet de fonctionnement comme un centre de coordination pour les questions des commissions locales, au numéro 14 de la rue Saint-Dominique. En pratique, les questions ne furent pas d'une telle importance que le Ministère de la Guerre, Section de la Presse, Circular No. 1000, daté du 30 septembre 1915, expliquait que le réseau serait divisé en sept régions, qui se transmettraient des questions des commissions à Paris, et transmettraient les réponses, ainsi que d'autres informations générales.

Most of this was handled by telephone. The situation at the local level is revealed by a report dated 30 April 1915, signed by Captain de Vaisseau Florius, military officer in charge of press control for the XVe military region (Marseille). Actual censors changed during the war, but on this date Florius names five, three from the military and two civilians, plus Bourrageas, proprietor of Le Petit Marseillais, representing the city's press in an advisory role. The report stated that in 1914 censors asked newspapers to bring page proofs daily to the prefecture, but that editors complained they could not meet their deadlines under this arrangement. Censors, therefore, agreed to travel to each newspaper office. This method made the censor's task more difficult, however, Florius said. The noise and last-minute deadlines kept censors from examining pages as carefully as they should, and transport was difficult, as the military denied the commission access to a vehicle. Le Radical, an evening newspaper farthest from the city centre, lent a car to the men.

Each afternoon at 4:15 p.m., before leaving for appointments (Le Petit Provencal was censored at 6 p.m. and 10:30 p.m.), the

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1 Paris, S.H.A.T., carton 5N335 and 5N336, 'Circulaire No. 1000, feuille 3'. This document may also be found in departmental archives, and in the Archives Nationales.

2 Marseille, Archives Départementales, packet AD VI T 6/2, censorship 1914-18.

3 Others named were De Malval, retired 'chef de bataillon breveté'; Delmon, 'Capitaine de cavalerie'; Broc, 'lieutenant'; Denizet, chief engineer for bridges and highways department; Oullevigue, professor.
The commission assessed five daily newspapers and about forty other periodicals. Concerning 'political' censorship, the author noted Marseille censors had found little to cut. In the area of diplomatic news of other countries, however, he said censors had to cut substantially. Moreover, concerning the two evening dailies *Le Républicain* and *Le Soleil Du Midi*, 'c'est la guerre continue aux manchettes qui tiennent une place relativement plus importante que les articles et qui, pour le moindre prétexte, prennent une rédaction sensationnelle.' Florius said that censors never modified the literary style of articles, but in seeing the quality of some of the poetry and songs published in the newspapers, he wished they could. In general, he concluded, in Marseille, 'les coupures y sont relativement peu nombreuses'. This would change by 1918, however.

Separate from this network of what may be called control of the press by negative means was the development of control by positive means, propaganda. As noted, the army by the end of 1914 had established a Section d'Information (S.I.) to generate its own stories on military operations, as well as to control press access to generals and battlefields. André Tardieu, a mobilised journalist

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10 Marseille, Archives Départementales, AD VI T 6/2.
11 Marseille, Archives Départementales, AD VI T 6/2.
and first director of the office, originally wrote most of the S.I. material himself, and was responsible for setting the conceptualisation of a previously untried operation. He resigned in March 1915, and was replaced by Captain Pueaux, identified as a publicist, who in turn was replaced by Pernot, identified as an interpreter. In November 1915, according to a report issued by the war ministry and signed by Commander Bordeaux, an officer in each French army command was designated as correspondent for the S.I., and asked to report on operations of his unit. But this system was not useful during major battles, the report pointed out, because the officer could not find time to file reports to S.I. A reorganisation would be made in 1916-17.

In addition to the S.I., a second division of army propaganda was set up under G.O.G. cabinet control, the Bureau d'Information Militaire (B.I.M.). It shared duties with the S.I. as the service expanded into photography, film, control of war correspondents, and other areas, and by the end of 1915 was given the task of military liaison to the press, handling enquiries and requests. But until the establishment of the Maison de la Presse, a central clearing house for all propaganda and censorship operations suggested by the foreign affairs ministry report dated 15 December 1915, and established the next year, the Bureau de la Presse acted as a principal source for enquiring press representatives, even though that apparently was not its original purpose. According to


Office also was disseminator of most German atrocities stories published in French newspapers during this period. In autumn 1915 the Bureau had as its basic reference a twenty-seven-page typewritten booklet (expanded to thirty-one pages on 31 May 1916) purporting to answer nearly every common question a censor might confront. 'La Circulaire No. 1000', referred to in numerous government and censorship communiqués from the end of 1915 until the armistice, was the 'catéchisme-dictionnaire du parfait censeur. Elle est à la source: elle étouffe dans l'oeuf l'information toute fraîche.' In final form it was stamped 'confidentiel' and issued to censor commissions throughout the country. Devos and Nicot indicate Circular No. 1000 went through a number of editions, the one of 30 September 1915 being the most common.

The document, issued by the press section of the war ministry, was signed by Buat, and is entitled, 'Instruction sur le service de contrôle de la presse.' It was divided into these sections, in order: introduction, organisation of censorship in Paris, departments and military ports, local control services, role of press delegates, publications subject to control, method of transmission of proofs, reasons for censorship, results, layout of


newspapers, general rules, and sixteen alphabetised pages of specific topics to be censored. The document began by citing the Law of 3 August 1849, giving censors legal means to stop, suspend, and seize publications 'de nature à exciter ou entretenir le désordre'. Paragraph three noted, however, that those measures should be avoided if possible.

Pour ne recourir que le moins possible à ces mesures rigoureuses, fort préjudiciables aux journaux, et qui, intervenant après coup, risquent d'être insuffisamment efficaces, l'autorité militaire a estimé préférable, dans l'intérêt général, comme dans l'intérêt des journaux, de prévenir le mal avant sa réalisation: de là le contrôle préalable que les pouvoirs publics, d'accord avec la presse, se sont préoccupés d'organiser dès le début des hostilités.

This passage established the concept of prior censorship as being of paramount importance to the operation, based on an interpretation of agreements made between the press and authorities in August 1914. The document described the transmission of censorship 'consignes', as well as questions from regional censors, the power structure of commissions, and the logistics of censorship (see diagram). Article One of the Law of 5 August 1914 establishing censorship was published in its entirety, and page eight addressed political censorship:

Le contrôle exercé est, en définitive, un contrôle militaire. Ainsi que l'a déclaré M. le Président du Conseil dans une note en date du 15 février 1915: "Si l'on veut entendre des idées, d'instituer des débats sur les opinions, sur les actes généraux du gouvernement, il n'y a pas de censure politique".
Despite this directive to censors, the alphabetical list of material to be censored seemed often to transcend strict military and diplomatic parameters. For example, publications may not exalt African colonial troops to the detriment of other troops (Afrique, Troupes d', Feuille 12); blame generals (Commandement, Haut, Feuille 14); debate the question of food distribution (Nourriture, Feuille 23); or criticise public services 'de tout ce qui serait de nature à surexciter l'opinion et surtout à affaiblir le moral de l'armée ou du public' (Services Publics, Critique Contre les, Feuille 23). The topic of strikes was not mentioned. Concerning the word 'paix', (Paix, publications en faveur de la, Feuille 21), censors were instructed, 'Ces publications, interdites en principe, peuvent être autorisées lorsqu'elles spécifient qu'il s'agit d'une paix victorieuse, basée sur la justice et le triomphe du droit, ou répondant très nettement à cette pensée.' Under 'Paix, Conditions de', it was emphasised, 'Il y a lieu d'interdire toute publication posant ou discutant des conditions de paix.' As has been noted, the newspapers in this study nevertheless published occasional material which seemed to be forbidden by this document, but sometimes, as is illustrated in a headline reproduced in the work by Berger and Allard, usage of the word 'paix' was severely curtailed: 'Après la nuit vient le jour. Après la guerre vient la (ce mot supprimé par la censure).'
censorship is so patently foolish that it is hard to avoid concluding the editor was being sarcastic, but other censored words sometimes were nearly as obvious. A quantitative analysis of usage of the word 'paix' in the newspapers studied here (see graph) does show low usage of the word between March 1915 and March 1916. It is difficult to say whether censorship was to blame.

While Circular No. 1000 remained the censor's principal reference through the end of the war, the war ministry also issued many dozens of 'consignes générales' to accompany it (see graph for quantitative analysis), at one point advising censor offices to group them alphabetically in a scrapbook for easy reference. 18

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II. Press and Political Reactions to Censorship

In 1915 editors and politicians reacted most stridently against censorship. The press studied here clearly lost faith in the August 1914 agreements, and their complaints against government control found support in parliament. Almost immediately after convening in 1915, reported *Le Petit Provencal* (14 January), a group of deputies, senators, and journalists met under leadership of Clemenceau to issue a protest against 'political' censorship. 'La presse ne saurait être soumise à une censure politique et administrative,' declared the delegation. Another report the same day stated, 'le groupe du parti socialiste au parlement estime que le principe de la liberté de la presse doit être respecté en temps de guerre comme en temps de paix.' At a meeting reported 11 March, the Marseille socialist federation (S.F.I.O.) joined the protest, issuing a declaration 'contre la censure politique et demandent que la presse puisse librement insérer des critiques et des réclamations que les citoyens ont à adresser à l'administration et aux pouvoirs publics'.

*Le Petit Meridional* did not report these protests of political groups. During this time the newspaper suffered repeated censorship in the form of blocks of white space left in articles or under titles. This kind of censorship was much more severe in the Montpellier newspaper in 1915 than it was in *Le Petit Provencal* (see graph). On 15 February a commentary signed 'Jean-Bernard'
entitled, 'Les De La Censure' (line indicates a blank space) contained a blank block five column inches long, suggesting the censored material had criticized the censor's operation. Writing 31 March, Charles-Gras, identified as 'ancien député de Paris', showed skepticism:

De divers côtés, nous parvenaient des révélations invraisemblables émanant de "sources sûres" ou de "personnages bien informés." De ces "personnages bien informés" délivrez-nous, Seigneur! Ils abusent décidément de leurs informations fantaisistes. . . . Personne n'ignore que la censure ayant pour objet la défense de l'État a surtout pour objet d'étouffer les critiques des actes des gouvernements.

He blamed censorship for leaving the French public in ignorance concerning diplomatic negotiations between France and Italy, leading to 'des suppositions, des hypothèses, des espérances, peut-être trompeuses, des renoncement peut-être non-fondés'. Bellanger's press history agrees with this contemporary observation.19

While Le Petit Méridional had suffered numerous examples of large blank spaces marring newspaper columns, Le Petit Provencal had been almost totally free of this kind of censorship before 22 June, when a six-inch block of blank space was left under the title, 'Le Pape Et La Guerre—L'Interview De M. Latapie.' Editors of the Montpellier newspaper had not complained in print about such censorship, possibly because their complaints, too, were removed, but this was not the case in the Marseille newspaper. On 23 June, Perdy wrote in a front-page leader,

19Bellanger, et al., Histoire générale de la presse française, 416.
La censure marseillaise, dont les caprices d'arbitraire deviennent en vérité excessifs, et qui nous impose avec un peu trop de sans-gêne le régime de son bon plaisir, a empêché Le Petit Provençal de publier l'interview du pape parue lundi soir dans un journal de Paris, la Liberté.

Ferdy suspected the problem lay in the old persecutions of the south by the north:

on a donc considéré qu'il serait dangereux de laisser lire aux populations du Midi des déclarations pontificales dont la communications à la population parisienne était considérée par la censure de la capitale comme inoffensive.

Ferdy added the press had accepted with 'une patience exemplaire' the censor for eleven months, but that the entire press industry 'va finir par s'insurger d'une façon unanime si le bon sens et la loyauté du gouvernement ne se décident pas à mettre un terme à des excès et à des abus devenus véritablement intolérables'.

The censor had apparently changed his mind this time, for the pope's comments were published under this editorial. They stressed the pope's neutrality, and his request for peace, even a negotiated peace. As for alleged atrocities, the pope said he had been informed of a number of Russian and Italian atrocities as well. The pope asked for a reasonable attitude toward the sinking of the 'Lusitania', observing that the allied blockade of Germany 'condamne à la famine des millions d'êtres innocents', and asked if this 's'inspire aussi de sentiments bien humains'. It is not surprising censors hesitated before relenting to the newspaper's request to publish this point of view, which hardly supported the government's
propaganda positions. According to Circular No. 1000, the fact of material having been published in other French newspapers did not automatically give any editor the right to use it.

Il est possible que la publications dont il s'agit ait été faite par suite d'une erreur ou d'inattention d'un service local de contrôle....Des instructions spéciales venues de Paris pourront toujours interdire la reproduction en province de certains articles même déjà parus à Paris.26

It is useful to observe that Le Petit Provencal seemed strongly intent on using this material, even though it reflected quite the opposite of propaganda in favour of the union sacrée. One might surmise that either the newspaper wished to present a more objective point of view concerning allied actions, or, as an anti-clerical move, hoped the pope's remarks would discredit French conservatives. No evidence can be found to support either hypothesis, but the fact remains that Le Petit Provencal seemed uninterested in holding exclusively pro-government and bourrage de crain positions.

No evidence of this interview was found in Le Petit Meridional. It may seem that this newspaper had a better relationship with its censors, as in one instance (20 May), the newspaper announced the departure of 'notre excellent confrère et ami, M. Jules Vergely....l'aimable censeur qui manie avec tant de tact et de discrétion les ciseaux d'Anastasie.' Le Petit Provencal

26Paris, S.H.A.T., Cartons SN335, SN336, 'Circulaire No. 1000, Feuilles 9-10'.

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never published any accolades to censors. But the Montpellier newspaper in general seldom reflected a positive view of the system. In a front-page commentary published 16 June, Charles-Gras observed, 'Elle coupa impitoyablement et elle continue à couper impitoyablement tout ce qui paraît être-a ses yeux inquiets-d'une publication imprudente ou dangereuse, ou inutile, ou inopportune, ou ironique, ou déplaisante, ou etc. etc.' This commentary continued in an analysis of the influence of propaganda in the press during the war:

C'est ainsi qu'ont pénétré et que se sont solidement implantés dans l'esprit de la foule-et même de l'élite de la nation-des promesses ou des espérances enracinées à un moment, comme des certitudes: cylindre compresseur! Famine allemande! Pain K.K.!

Pénurie de munitions en Germanie et en Autriche! Maladie du Kaiser!

Malheureusement, si l'on peut arrêter à coups de ciseaux un article au passage, on ne peut pas arrêter la marche des événements. Des événements, ça ne se met pas dans un sac.

On nous affirmait que nos ennemis allaient, à courte échéance, manquer absolument de cartouches et d'obus: maintenant on nous crie que c'est nous les alliés, tous les alliés, qui en manquions . . .

Eh bien! et nous qui étions persuadées que....

Mais, du coup, nous perdons aussi notre confiance dans les pains K.K., dans les cylindres et dans toutes les bonnes avec lesquelles on a assoupi nos préoccupations.... Pour un autre peuple que le nôtre le réveil eut été terrible. Pour nous, cela n'a qu'une importance relative. Notre crédulité est toujours doublée d'un doute qui nous protège heureusement comme une cuirasse d'acier! Ne disons pas de mal de notre scepticisme naturel, mais ne le prenez pas pour l'indifférence.... Le peuple exige des vérités.

This commentary seems to indicate, as do Ferdy's comments
above, that both newspapers had reappraised their wartime role, but that censorship prevented them from carrying out such measures.

Disagreement between the government, the press, and politicians over the extent of censorship grew more pronounced by the summer of 1915, as reflected in press accounts. On 26 August Ferdy reported that his editor, Martin, had signed a petition of the French press opposing the censor's abuses. Galabru notes that Le Figaro had initiated this petition in August to limit the role of the censor to matters only affecting national defence. It was presented to the government 22 September. Ferdy wrote that the petition at least gave newspapers the right to criticise parliament, because 'une assemblée non contrôlée, ce serait le despotisme'. He added that the press had already complained several times, received government assurances that the system would be changed, but had so far been deceived. He asked rhetorically if this petition would do any good. 'Nous voudrions le croire, mais nous n'osons trop d'espérer.' (26 August.) On 31 October the newspaper supported its conservative competitor Le Soleil du Midi against a suspension, calling the censorship 'un régime dénué de toute justice'. As for the newspapers studied here, censorship documents seem to indicate neither Le Petit Provençal nor Le Petit Méridional was suspended during the war, and a quantitative analysis of 'incidents' between the newspapers and the censor shows they suffered less than did some of their competitors. Material

21 Galabru, L., La liberté individuelle et la liberté de la presse en temps de guerre (Montauban, 1918), 92.

22 Paris, S.H.A.T., cartons 5N376 and 5N391, reports, clippings and
held under newspaper title shows thin complaint files for the two newspapers, although, on 28 December 1915, *Le Petit Provencal* was given 'avertissement sévère' for having published, despite a censor's request, information concerning the torpedoing of the ship 'La Ville de la Ciotat'. The file for *Le Soleil du Midi* dated 20 October 1915 indicated it was suspended for having published, despite a censor's request, an article entitled, 'Les Sous-marins En Méditerranée, Ou Les Caprices De La Censure.'

On 13 October *Le Petit Provencal* published a manifesto by the 'Comité du syndicat de la presse parisienne' condemning the government for seizing or suspending five newspapers in the past fifteen days, and declaring that the censor 'tend à fausser les directions normales de l'opinion in France'. This was indeed the aim of government propaganda.32 On 28 August, *Le Petit Méridional* asked in an article containing a one-half inch block of white space, 'Comment la censure... est-elle aujourd'hui si discutée, si combattue? Parce qu'elle a commis de nombreuses erreurs, de lourdes fautes.'

A bill by deputy Paul Meunier to eliminate political censorship was reported in *Le Petit Provencal* 12 November. The bill called for censorship to be limited to diplomatic and military material, and declared suspensions could only be made by the government.

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32 See careful analyst of this phenomenon concludes that during the First World War, 'No government could have a united nation behind it unless it controlled the minds of its people.' Lasswell, Harold C., *Propaganda Technique in World War I*, 10.
In presenting the proposal to parliament, Meunier recalled Viviani's declaration of 4 March, 'il n'y a pas de censure politique.' ‘Malheureusement,' he said, 'le Bureau de la Presse n'a jamais voulu consentir à conformer ses actes à cette vérité légale et ministérielle.' Clemenceau pledged his support: ‘Je suis heureux d'apporter mon témoignage à la commission de législature civile contre la censure politique.' (Letter dated 5 October.) Clemenceau wrote that he was particularly angry because, he contended, at 3 p.m. 17 August, a censor informed him he was stopping Clemenceau's commentary in L'Homme Enchaîné, which, Clemenceau said, he had not even written yet; he wrote the article anyway and said his newspaper was suspended. Meunier reported this to parliament 21 January 1916 to illustrate his outrage that a censor could even control thoughts not yet on paper. This story was widely quoted at the time in articles and debates on censorship. It was, however, a lie. As a censor wrote after the war, at the time Clemenceau claimed that this incident occurred, his newspaper was not even being published. It had already been suspended for

25S.H.A.T., 5N374, material relating to Meunier bill.
26S.H.A.T., 5N374.
27Gébray, La liberté individuelle et la liberté de la presse en temps de guerre (1918), 107.
28Herger, Marcel, and Allard, Paul, Les secrets de la censure pendant la guerre (1932), 77.
four days. Verification in archives shows Berger and Allard are
deed correct. The Meunier proposal would not be taken up by
parliament until the beginning of 1916.

It is not possible to know if French journalists in 1915
seriously considered organised revolt against the regime of
censorship, as Ferdy warned in his leader. The body of empirical
detail examined here does seem to illustrate development in 1915 of
an exceptionally strong and persistent current of anti-government
sentiment in its operation of censorship, not only from the press,
but from parliament as well. The analysis also indicates that, with
a few exceptions, the censor did not eliminate publication in these
newspapers of criticism relating to its own role.

Paris (Université de Paris X-Nanterre), Bibliothèque de
documentation internationale contemporaine (B.D.I.C.).
Chapter Six:
The Business of Journalism in 1915

In use of articles and photographs, number of pages, and number of advertisements, Le PetitProvencal in 1915 approached its pre-war standard most closely of all the war years. As noted on the graph displayed in the appendix, the newspaper’s advertising ratio, calculated as the ratio of column centimetres of advertising compared with total column centimetres of the entire edition, approached 20 percent by the end of 1914. This ratio, nearly the same as that of February 1914, did not change until 1917. The first entire page of display advertising to appear in Le Petit Provencal after commencement of hostilities was found on 22 January 1915, a full back page. By the end of this year, this level of advertising was common, and up to one third of this space was filled by classified advertising. Six-page issues, appearing often before the war, returned occasionally after 17 October. Otherwise, the newspaper published four-page issues. Regular news of civilian sport reappeared in March. Photographs appeared regularly, mostly reflecting trench activities and damaged buildings or property. The
serialised novel also reflected a war-related theme beginning 21 January, *soldats de France* by Jules Mary, written, as noted in its introduction, a few months before the war began 'par une sorte de divination quasi prophétique'.

*Le Petit Méridional* also established a war theme in its serialised novel, but somewhat later, beginning 5 September with the first installment of *Le Poilu du 20e*. By this time, however, *Le Petit Provençal* had dropped the war theme from its own serialised novels, on 16 October announcing *Le dernier des troubadours: roman historique de cape et d'épée*. These novels were essential aspects of nearly all French mass-circulation daily newspapers at this time, as proprietors relied on the feature to help attract readers. It seems worth noting that the choice of topic was based upon an editor's judgement of what readers wished to see.

Apparently the editor of the Marseille newspaper believed his audience was tired of exposure to the war, and wanted relief, at least in the newspaper's fiction section.

Unlike the Marseille newspaper, however, *Le Petit Méridional* did not regain advertising revenue lost after August 1914. As shown in the graph, by the end of 1914 the ratio of advertising space to total space had reached to less than 5 percent, compared with a pre-war ratio of 17 percent. In 1915, the ratio did increase, but still was only at about 9 percent by November. It must be noted that to use a quantitative methodology in analysis of advertising

this newspaper is sometimes difficult because, to a degree
greater than that of Le Petit Provencal, advertisements and
editorial material were not always easily distinguishable.
Sometimes advertising was included in columns of local news,
written in a style similar to that of news. For basis of comparison
in this study, it is assumed for both newspapers that any notice
for a commercial establishment or service was paid for, but that
meeting notices were not. City and government notices listed
separately in an obvious display-advert style were counted as paid
for, as were such notices in 'legal' advertising columns. Charity
appeals were not included in the count, nor were obituaries,
although it is possible some were paid for. 'House' adverts, that
is, those promoting services of the newspaper itself, were
obviously not included as income-generating.

Le Petit Méridional did not publish six-page editions in 1915.
In other ways it was similar in editorial mix to Le Petit
Provencal, except that after July 1915 the newspaper published
photographs only in exceptional circumstances. Photographs of
military life and war damage had been a regular feature between
December 1914 and June 1915.

It is not possible to objectively verify circulation figures
of these two newspapers in 1915. Le Petit Provencal did publish a
'house' advertisement on 24 May to promote its classified section,
asserting, 'Le Petit Provencal est d'entrée chaque matin dans cent
mille ménages.' If this were indeed accurate, then the circulation
of this newspaper was at about the same level in 1915 as before the
Severe newsprint shortages of 1914 in France were filled in 1915 by newsprint imports from Scandinavia. This assured a fairly stable stock, and prices (see graph), although 14 percent higher than before the war at the beginning of 1915, and 35 percent higher at the end, still proved to be modest in comparison with increases of succeeding war years. This year would prove to be easiest during the war for newspapers trying to obtain adequate supplies at a reasonable cost.

The theme of war from the perspective of display and classified advertising in 1915 illustrates a category of discourse developed to a slightly more refined level than that of the first year of war. The war theme in advertising of these newspapers may be separated into several categories. The first covers items of use for the happiness and well-being of soldiers at the front. Examples of this position were published in both papers by autumn 1914, as illustrated by advertisements for pens, umbrellas, protective vests, chocolate, breakfast drinks, and other items. At the beginning of 1915 such advertisements continued, as in this example from Le Petit Provencal of 22 January: 'Pour nos soldats et nos blessés-confectionnez économiquement de bonnes cigarettes avec le moule et les papiers Alésia.' However this theme was used less and less as the year progressed, having been replaced in most cases by the theme of health and avoidance of malady.

[1] Ibid., 419.
[2] Ibid., 450.
The second theme is health at the front. Barely identifiable in 1914, this theme became central to most war-related advertisements in 1915. It is closely related to the well-known pre-war advertisements promoting pills, tonics, and other medicines, and therefore must have been easily accepted by consumers. On 23 January, a display advertisement in *Le Petit Provençal* announced,

> Pour nos soldats, anti-rhumatisant le "Palmol". Mères, épouses, parents, amis, qui avez un être cher face à l'ennemi, joignez à vos envois une boîte de *Palmol*, le seul extrait de plantes. Guérit rhumatismes, crevasses, angelures... Envoyer une boîte de *Palmol* à chacun de nos soldats est un acte de patriotisme.

In the same newspaper 9 March: 'OCCIPoux—Contre la vermine des tranchées. Envoyer à nos chers soldats...' On 28 March: 'Les poilus en ont peur!! Les poilus se moquent des balles allemandes mais tous redoutent le *mal de dents*... Le trousse dentaire de L'Abbé Arnoi...' After several months of very few advertisements of a military nature, this theme began appearing again in autumn in the Marseille newspaper:

> ... Ces douleurs sont non seulement la torture pour le présent, mais aussi une menace pour l'avenir d'être impotent, comme la plupart de ces braves vieux que 1870 a laissé perdus de douleurs. Heureusement les pilules Foster sont là pour préserver et guérir pendant qu'il en est temps...[15 October]

Intimacies which might threaten such an outcome were not specified. *Le Petit Méridional* published fewer advertisements of
this theme, but did publish on 26 January an appeal from a pharmacy
in Béziers.

Pour nos soldats au front. Dans les tranchées, la
neige, la pluie, le froid occasionnent à nos
vaillants soldats des souffrances quotidiennes.
P'où pour eux des rhumatismes, etc. Pour remédier à
ce état de choses, la Pharmacie du progrès à
Béziers a décidé de créer la pochette du soldat....

The third theme touches on needs of the home front. This
formula posited construction of a marketing framework under which
consumers would be attracted to products of a wartime significance
for consumption in the home. The only evidence of this theme in
1914 was in the Christmas advertisement for books of wartime
history. In 1915, the theme was not used in *Le Petit Provencal*, but
was extended in *Le Petit Méridional* to cover 'feminine needs',
expansion of a theme long-established in pre-war advertising
formulae. The Montpellier newspaper of 2 May carried this display
advertisement:

Les hommes au front. Les femmes aux affaires. Les
femmes françaises travaillent. Elles ont remplacé
dans le commerce, dans les affaires, le mari, le
père, le parent parti au front.... Certaines,
cependant, de tempérament délicat, n'ont pu
impudemment s'atteler à ces travaux d'homme, ni
assurer sans grande fatigue depuis plusieurs mois,
de direction de commerces et d'affaires
importants.... Aux vaillantes qui lutte malgré leur
grande fatigue, nous recommandons l'usage des
Pilules Pink, Source De Force.

Advertisements for 'Pilules Pink' were widespread during this
period, often aimed at woman. This was the first advertisement in
either newspaper, however, which specifically relied on home front
social imperatives as a marketing strategy to sell products destined to remain at the home front.

The fourth theme is that of the war as a connotative symbol. This theme relies upon attempts to present the war not as a palpable phenomenon demanding specific responses, but instead as a metaphor, an image around which to build a concept of action or battle in a realm of abstraction, whether it be to sell an idea or an actual product. Much of this was presented in the form of iconography, for example, a drawing of a soldier shooting down an illness, addressing the connotation of war instead of the denotation. But this more sophisticated symbolic framework had not yet developed during the first eighteen months of war in the newspapers studied here.

The fifth theme is the impact of war on the individual. Classified advertisements sometimes reflected an appeal not for the sale of a product, but for the satisfaction of a need created by unavoidable social frustrations brought about by external events. The war was a clear example of such an event, and classified advertising in Le Petit Provençal reflected needs of individuals imposed by the war, notably advertisements for friendship and marriage. The first such ad appeared 16 March: 'Mr 39 ans, com. 600 cestes, épouserait veuve militaire par la guerre. Rép. let. sig. ser. Enr. col. poste Colbert.' Women also advertised under this theme: 'Jeune Femme bien désir. mariage avec Monsieur riche, age ind. même mutilé guerre, très sérieuse, prendre adresse allées de Melian, 44.' (Le Petit Provençal, 21 September.) Le Petit
The Montpellier newspaper did warn against certain appeals of advertisers. In an article (not an advertisement) published 7 November, a member of the 'conseil supérieur de l'hygiène publique' was quoted as warning that advertisements for certain products designed to be posted to soldiers have no use, 'malgré de merveilleuses réclames', notably water purification tablets, bullet proof vests, and certain kinds of gas masks.
This period has been chosen in an attempt to include important military and political events of the war under a single category for coherent analysis. The choice is clearly somewhat arbitrary, but it does include themes which form a separate segment in that it emphasises the period of major 1916 battles, viz. Somme and Verdun, and the events of early 1917, viz. the first Russian revolution, the fall of Briand’s government, the entry of the United States into the war, and the Nivelle Offensive. Winter calls this period ‘the great slaughter’. The months covered in this study, however, are slightly fewer than those covered in Winter’s definition (through 31 July). It seems necessary here to treat the strikes of summer 1917 as part of the succeeding section, as this thesis is particularly concerned with journalism covering these home front events, and to include those months in this section would leave chapters unduly long.

I. The Union Sacrée
and Influence on Morale

The French home front press during this period presented two central sentiments. One, that the war had become routine, and two, that the trêve of the union sacrée was coming to an end. Becker shows that by 1916 women were going to dances, reservists were getting drunk, and generally people were tending to forget about the war. Although the government encouraged school teachers to explore patriotic themes in their classrooms, after 1916 these efforts declined because, as a primary school inspector from Ornans remarked, the war was not a subject 'one keeps trotting out year after year'. At the same time the imperatives of the government's union sacrée became more and more difficult to sustain in daily life on the home front, and that change was reflected in the press. Lerner observes that by 1916 the concept of trêve in La Dépêche of Toulouse had 'badly deteriorated'. Reports from the Marseille prefecture indicated greater surveillance against stronger peace propaganda. Included


Ibid., 158.


Marseille, Archives Départementales, carton M6/4836.
The newspapers of this study reflect positively the viewpoint expressed here, indicating that while the commitment to the union sacrée waned, the treatment of war as a way of life grew. The ability to mould the war into humorous discourse is illustrated by the reappearance of Le Bavard, the satirical newspaper published by Le Petit Provencal. Its reappearance in February 1916 was presented with a front-page introduction:

"A la fin, il devenait vexant et anormal qu'il se publïait tant de bavardages et pas le Bavard... C'est présenter en blague bien des vérités à dire, qui, sans notre journal, ne se diraient pas."

This conceptual framework depicting the verities of war from a humorous perspective deviates from that illustrated by newspapers of 1915, which tended more to conceptualise a strain of bitter 'black' humour, as reflected in the conversation with a mutilated war veteran related by Négis. Strong skepticism of press accounts seems clearly suggested by the Bavard leader, an incredulity not incompatible with a skepticism of the union sacrée parameters. The banalisation of war into routine was reflected in a critical front-page commentary by Négis in Le Petit Provençal on 2 February 1916. The author noted women's fashions that year included elaborate and colourful outfits, ribbons for hats, and skirts reaching only to the knee, which he found inappropriate during wartime. In another illustration of war internalised by the home front as routine, Négis on 1 January 1916 wrote, this time without disapproval, that local merchants now produced various war-related items, including gold jewellery shaped like the '75', a soldier's kepi in enamel printed with the regiment number of the 'cher absent', boxes of chocolate shaped like 'casques de poilus', and other items. Again on 5 March 1916, Négis complained women were not taking the war seriously. Relating a complaint by a Marseille resident that the Verdun battle was delaying her mail-ordered merchandise, Négis commented, 'Ainsi que tant d'autres femmes en ce moment, elle ne sent pas la guerre, elle ne la vit pas. Pour elle, la guerre c'est quelque chose qui se passe quelque part et qui empêche les colis postaux d'arriver avec autant de régularité que par le passé....'
Writing in a commentary 15 October 1916, André Grignan noted, "La guerre se prolongeant, on s'habitue aux événements." His statistics proved his point: total monthly receipts for concerts, cinemas, and theatres in Marseille had reached 379,550 francs by June 1916, compared with only 147,901 for June 1915, and a pre-war June total of 320,655 francs. Le Petit Méridional also reflected the return to routine in the home front, in a commentary signed 'Dr. Doubleme', which observed that alcoholism among soldiers on leave has become a problem, forcing authorities to punish 'normally fine and brave men' who committed crimes while intoxicated. Cautious to separate in this vineyard region the effects of wine ('a hygienic drink') and spirits, the writer suggested a tax on the latter. On 8 February 1916, the newspaper published a decree by the commander of the XVIe military region (covering Montpellier) that soldiers could not enter cafés between 8 a.m. and 11 a.m., and between 2 p.m. and 5:30 p.m., and must leave by 8:30 p.m.

Corresponding to this return of routine on the home front, calls to the union sacrée fell during this period from a higher level the year before. Le Petit Méridional continued to attack conservative newspapers and groups for anti-republican campaigns, as reflected in a front-page leader 7 February 1916 signed 'Le Petit Méridional': 'Il nous appartient à nous républicains de ne pas laisser se continuer, sans y répondre, une campagne qui vise à dissoudre la Nation, à désorganiser cette merveilleuse unité morale que le monde entier admire....' Writing 18 March 1916, Alexandre Bérrard claimed anti-union forces had been working from the beginning of the war: 'Alors
que nous fassions l'union sacrée... dès les premières heures de la guerre, certains ont cherché à exploiter les affres de la France pour leurs passions religieuses et politiques.

In contrast, *Le Petit Provençal* continued to show no interest in this theme, defending only the republic against anti-parliamentary forces. Leaders and commentaries in 1916 did not address the *union sacrée* specifically, with the exception of a quote by Camille Jullian of 'L'Institut de France' published 19 February 1916, observing, 'Cette union, ce silence des passions, est un moment unique dans notre histoire.' This statement seems hardly credible given the strong growth in critical articles concerning the government, censorship, and 'la vie chère' in the Marseille newspaper. On 29 June 1916 Négis wrote that the Verdun battle had shaken the confidence of a man he encountered in a café, and 'Il ne faut pas croire que cet homme est seul à tenir de pareils propos. Depuis trois ou quatre jours on voit comme cela des visages allongés, des mines soucieuses....' Négis warned readers to guard against such pessimism, however, as Germans had advanced in Verdun only at great cost, and that their success was small. Six months later, however, Ferdy warned that political events of the year had shown French people would not be endlessly patient: 'Le beaucoup de nos parlementaires continuent à se laisser endormir par l'éclat des paroles, la France est en train de devenir moins complaisante.' (15 December 1916.) In a declaration from the *Groupe socialiste* in parliament published 20 March 1916, deputies made the assertion that the *union sacrée* did not mean 'l'abandon du droit de critique et de contrôle des actes du
As formulated by Poincaré in August 1914, however, the *union sacrée* seemed indeed to mean that, from the point of view of the *gauche*, its meaning had apparently made a considerable shift by 1916. In another reference a few months later, Marius Richard observed two parliamentarians from opposing viewpoints in a cordial discussion. This was, he concluded, "une petite manifestation qui indique que l'union sacrée n'est pas un vain mot pour tous les parlementaires." ([17 June 1916](https://example.com)). This sentence seems to indicate the concept apparently was "un vain mot" by this time for many of them.

The suggestion that civilians were becoming impatient may be associated with a theme which had taken on new dimensions of importance in 1916, "la vie chère". The development of this phenomenon in newspapers of this study seems to have been connected to the conceptualisation of the Midi as an entity at variance with the rest of France. A former manifestation of this concept, the 'XVe Affaire', had now become totally absent from these newspapers, with a single exception: in an account of parliamentary proceedings published in *Le Petit Provencal* 26 January 1916, deputy Brousse is quoted as remarking, "Il n'y eut qu'une erreur de la presse, c'est l'article de M Gervais contre les soldats du Midi, et celui-là la censure l'a laissé passer." It is almost certain that the 'XVe Affaire' was otherwise eliminated from the press by censors, based on the directive in Circular No. 1000.

Imperatives of "la vie chère" were another matter, however, and Marseille writers accused profiteers of victimising the south. Declaring that nearly everything is more expensive in
Marseille. Négis concluded in a front-page commentary 15 March 1917, 'Et dire que malgré cela, il y a encore des gens qui en veulent notre bonheur!' Complaints against scarcity, high costs, and excessive profits figured repeatedly in *Le Petit Provençal* by 1916, offering a standard topic to writers of leaders and commentary. On 21 February 1916 Négis observed milk producers had lowered prices, but 'ne croyez pas que ce soit une victoire du public. Le public remporte rarement de victoires.' He accused producers of adding water to the milk. A complaint by Jules Bernex published 13 August 1916 compares pre-war prices to current ones: potatoes, from 15 centimes-20 centimes, now from 30 centimes-60 centimes; rice, from 80 centimes-1 franc 20 centimes, now 1 franc 60 centimes, etc. He concluded 'Et, seuls, les salaires n'ont pas augmenté.' Journalists repeatedly called for justice to workers and families whose salaries or government payments were insufficient. A train conductor, wrote Négis 1 September 1916 in one of many similar stories published in the Marseille newspaper, took home 125 francs a month:

Il faut nourrir trois enfants et remplir pour l'homme chaque jour un panier de nourriture....Et cette femme (of the worker) n'a pas droit à l'allocation....Il a demandé à aller au front afin d'avoir les avantages de l'emploi. On lui a répondu: "Vous êtes mobilisé à la Compagnie, restez-y, tout le monde ne peut pas être sur le front."

For each complaint Négis related, he wrote, he received a dozen others, and always he expected the government to provide a solution, either through direct payments or control of
employers. This greater reliance in this newspaper on the
government to solve social problems perhaps stems from the
system of payments to wives of soldiers instituted at the
beginning of the war, which created new expectations as the
conflict engendered 'la vie chère'. Writers in Le Petit
Provencal often ask for extensions of this system to new
categories of civilians, as in the example above. While the
demands of the public against employers and shopkeepers
multiplied in this newspaper, defense of employers was almost
never reflected.

Debate concerning 'la vie chère' was not given nearly as
much importance in Le Petit Méridional. The title, 'La Vie
Chère' first appeared in the Montpellier newspaper much later
than in its Marseille counterpart, 15 January 1916. The debate
was treated in a cursory way compared with its prominent place
in Le Petit Provencal, and the first major article covering 'la
vie chère' did not appear before 30 October 1916, a page-two
interview with Montpellier mayor Paul Pezet to explain what the
politician proposed to do to reduce costs of food items.
Polemics against the government's role in these matters were
rare in 1916 in this newspaper, in contrast to the issue as
presented in Le Petit Provencal. While censorship may have been
to blame, it is to be observed that the Montpellier newspaper
throughout the war supported the government, while Le Petit
Provencal took on more and more of an adversarial role. Possibly
this differentiation between the two newspapers was also based
on the economic fact that, as contended by the newspaper, the
cost of living in Marseille did increase at a rate greater than
that of the rest of France. The cost of living in Marseille had been greater than in comparable French cities before the war, and by 1920, prices were 415 percent higher than their pre-war level, the highest inflation rate in France. Marseille mayor Eugène Pierre, a free market supporter, was hostile to government intervention during the war, and this, added to a historically high cost of living, was blamed for the city's higher than average wartime inflation. On the other hand, Marseille suffered less than average from food shortages.

Reflecting the banalisation of the war routine, this analysis agrees with Becker's comment that at this time economic problems, more than dying soldiers, seemed to be most important to the home front.

These newspapers also seem to reflect Becker's findings that throughout 1916, and even into 1917, people continued to believe in the concept of a short war. Although on 11 February 1916 Mégis remarked that the English believed the war would be long and 'À l'heure qu'il est, personne au monde ne peut savoir quand la guerre finira; ceci posé, pourquoi s'obstiner à vouloir

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2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
soulever le voile qui cache l’avenir? Writing 9 August 1916, Négis quoted a reader assuming the war will last “encore des années”. Here, however, the writer denied such a prediction, responding, “ma chère lectrice, la guerre ne durera pas “encore des années”.” In two places in February 1916, the newspaper published assurances that, while the end was still months away, “elle est beaucoup plus proche que les pessimistes ne se l’imaginent.” Le Petit Méridional published between 1 and 8 January 1916 in five separate places the prediction that 1916 would be the last year of war. The references to concerns of readers and pessimists, however, seem to suggest readers of these newspapers did not share the optimism. Reflecting this scepticism, Négis wrote 1 June 1916 that the many newspaper articles suggesting Germany was exhausted and ready to capitulate must be eliminated.

“L’Allemagne en a assez,” disent-ils….Ce petit refrain est charmant. Son seul défaut est de n’être pas utile. Primo: nous n’avons pas besoin qu’on nous représente nos ennemis à bout de souffle pour nous redonner du cœur. Les soldats qui ont affaire aux Boches sachant mieux que les économistes et les stratèges de rédaction qu’ils ont encore devant eux des gens résolus. Secondo: je ne demande quel est celui des belligérants qui n’a pas assez de la guerre.

This passage reflects a distinct shift from the newspaper’s previous theme suggesting Germany was at the end of its tether, while the allies were willing to go on forever. The perception was not shared by Le Petit Méridional at this date. Between 1
And 7 August 1916, a number of articles suggested that in Germany, 'la confiance diminue, l'angoisse augmente.' Both points of view may have been objectively tenable; socio-economic dispositions did grow in Germany as the war lengthened. So did they in every other belligerent, as Négis suggested.

The decision to emphasise different perspectives seems to posit two interpretations of editorial strategy vis-à-vis the war during this period. Le Petit Provençal appears to have taken the point of view that articles suggesting Germany was soon to be worn out no longer had credibility and could not be of use in sustaining morale. Le Petit Méridional, conversely, appears to have decided that any news or hearsay emanating from Germany suggesting economic and social problems was still worth reporting. In a commentary published on page one of the Montpellier newspaper 17 September 1916, M. Moye reported a letter posted to the newspaper from the front, asking that the press be 'D'abord fournir au public les faits, ensuite naturellement et avec une égale exclusion des faux bruits, bêtement optimistes et des rumeurs sourdement décevantes.' Moye replied that the newspaper agreed. It had recently been accused of suggesting the war was nearly over, but 'nous, nous disons que tout va bien, ce qui n'est pas la même chose'.

While this perspective that 'tout va bien' seems to have lasted without major alteration in Le Petit Méridional throughout this period, it seems to end definitively in Le Petit Provençal on 20 February 1917. On that date, Paul Abram, identified as writing the soldier's point of view from the front, declared that Le Feu by Barbusse was 'entre toutes les
The same day Népis demonstrated his own scepticism, asking if Germany were indeed seriously short of food.

This newspaper seemed to reflect positively Becker's observation that by 1917 morale on the home front was weakening. Becker believes soldiers on leave influencing civilians were responsible for this shift, and the series of letters from Abram 'at the front' also demonstrated this viewpoint. It illustrates the soldiers' perception of unbridgeable separation between

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realities of the front and insouciance of the rear, as described by Audoin-Rouzeau. Writing 14 April 1916 under the title, '2e Lettre Pour Le Filleul De L'Arrière', Abram declared,

J'ai simplement essayé de vous faire comprendre combien il pouvait être pénible pour nos vaillants poissons de sentir, sous la protection vivante de leur héroïsme, le pays reprendre peu à peu sa vie normale et se laisser aller à ses petites habitudes d'antan....Derrière le rempart du front, les français ont repris l'habitude de faire la controverse....

No similar series 'at the front' reflecting a soldier's point of view appeared in Le Petit Méridional. This effort of the Marseille newspaper to bridge the gap between soldiers and civilians was apparently rare; the Bellanger work contends the press itself was mainly to blame for the rupture between the two. Despite the soldier's regret, however, both newspapers during this period reflected a return to normality and controversy.

II. Political Aspects of the Gauche

Strong reflections of opposition to the war and divergence of opinion from the government's point of view reached readers


2Bellanger, et al., Histoire générale de la presse française.
of the newspapers studied here in four distinct ways: reports of strikes; extracts of speeches by Bethmann-Hollweg; accounts of socialist conferences; proceedings of parliament. Of these four aspects of political reporting, the latter two were most comprehensive. Strike reports, while growing steadily by 1916, were often short and elliptical; the German leader’s speeches, while filling many columns of front-page type in both newspapers and faithfully proffering the German point of view that Russian mobilisation was to blame for war, that the Tsar was supported by France in a goal of taking Constantinople, and that England supported both allies to eliminate German economic growth, could not have been thought of as credible, considering the time.


Published proceedings of parliament offered a strong account of dissent within the union sacrée which reached into areas far more controversial than that supplied by leaders and commentaries. The framework of dissent within France as depicted by political leaders was facilitated through polemical dialogue published extensively in both newspapers. The first direct criticism of the military command can be found through these proceedings, in a debate published in both newspapers 17 March 1916, but not presented in the same manner by both editors. In the version published in Le Petit Provencal, deputy
Accambray, after calling the government a constitutional monarchy, read a letter he said he wrote to Viviani on 18 November 1914, stating,

La plus dangereuse erreur est de croire que les fautes commises par un chef militaire portent en elles leur sanction et que l'expérience de ces fautes l'empêche d'en commettre d'autres....Lorsque M. Millerand annonçait au Sénat que 138 officiers généraux avaient été rendus à la vie civile, on aurait pu croire que des sanctions allaient être prises à la suite des opérations engagées après la bataille de la Marne. Comment expliquer que le chef ait été toujours épargné?

Accambray, continuing despite considerable vocal protest, was warned by Deschanel that his comments could give information to the enemy, but Accambray responded, 'Il faut que l'opinion publique soit saisie.' He specifically criticised Joffre's military tactics, observing, 'Le général en chef décide, tardivement d'ailleurs, d'attaquer la droite allemande, qui se trouvait vers Roye et Lassigny, avec des troupes, tirées du reste du front....' After being denied permission to continue his criticism of tactics, Accambray responded amid protest, 'Je n'ai aucune confiance dans le gouvernement.'

While also giving some account of Accambray's remarks, the version published by Le Petit Méridional is marked by censorship in the form of a blank block four inches long. The censor undoubtedly removed the material on tactics quoted in Le Petit Provencal, because the blank space is followed by the words, 'M. Accambray veut continuer sa lecture de son document où
This comparison does seem to make clear that censorship of the two newspapers was not equal, and that even official proceedings of parliament could be removed if censors wished to do so.

Three days later the ‘groupe socialiste’ of the chamber of deputies issued a manifesto declaring their doubt that the rich classes were doing their share to support the cost of the war, and that parliament had not been able to design a fair tax structure due to ‘le brutal licenciement des chambres jusqu'en décembre 1914’. Proceedings in Le Petit Méridional did not include this manifesto.

The Montpellier newspaper did, however, include a declaration by deputy Brizon, one of three deputies who had attended the Kienthal conference, stating ‘nous refusons de voir nos soldats pour donner Constantinople à la Russie. Nous regrettons le mauvais emploi des milliards perdus pour le peuple et nous votons contre les crédits de guerre pour la paix, pour la France, pour le socialisme.’ (27 June 1916.) Commenting on these remarks the same day, Lafferre wrote,

Pour la première fois, les pèlerins de Zimmerwald et de Kienthal ont osé manifester officiellement leur pensée à la tribune du parlement....Dans notre démocratie pacifique, victime d'une agression odieuse, dont la folie égale la brutalité, de quel droit une poignée de socialistes se refusent-ils à tenir compte de cette différence de situation?

The first suggestion by a French politician that Germany was not solely responsible for the war was part of parliamentary
proceedings a month earlier. Both newspapers reported on 27 May that another 'Kienthalien', Raffin-Dugens, had said, 'les peuples qui se sont rués les uns contre les autres'. Conservative politicians protested this statement suggested Germany was not solely to blame. Raffin-Dugens responded, 'J'ai affirme que les peuples, trompes par des gouvernements plus ou moins mauvais, etaient conduits aux abimes.' The version of these comments published in the Marseille newspaper added, 'Il ne faudrait pas que, dans certains pays alliés, certains erreurs puissent etre la cause de la prolongation de la guerre.'

An account of parliamentary proceedings published in the Marseille newspaper 20 September 1916 included a direct call for pacifism. Deputy Roux-Costadau declared, 'Le devoir du gouvernement est de penser que la France, pour se faire entendre au Congres de la paix, ne devra pas etre moribonde, mais devra parler debout. La France est arrivée au bout de son effort. Elle a dépensé 60 milliards et appelé plus de 5 millions d'hommes. Nous arriverons à 100 milliards.'

In response, Briand said it was the duty of France to continue 'la defense de la civilisation du monde', and that, 'Ce que l'on veut c'est que tant de sang versé ne l'ait pas été pour rien.' This statement was not published in the Montpellier paper. But in the proceedings published 10 November, *Le Petit Meridional* quoted a discourse by Ribot, 'Il faut presser la victoire,' interrupted by Brizon, 'La victoire par la paix!' Both newspapers displayed Brizon's pacifist declarations a few days later, quoting the deputy on 22 November in *Le Petit Meridional*, and on 23 November in *Le Petit Provençal*, recounting
In the version of the former paper, "Plusieurs députés debout dans l’hémicycle menacent Brizon, qui répond par ces cris: "À bas la guerre! À bas la guerre! La victoire par la paix," and in the version of the latter paper, "M Brizon interrompt cette lecture par les cris de "À bas la guerre!" Le tumulte est général...." Le Petit Méridional described the 'tumulte' in greater detail, observing that Brizon continued by saying,

au lieu de demander encore des soldats, on ferait mieux de s'adresser aux responsables de cette guerre, à ce pays de 180 millions d'hommes. Cette allusion à la Russie soulève de véhémentes protestations....La chambre donne à ce moment un triste spectacle. Quelques socialistes, notamment M Raffin-Dugens, appuient M Brizon, que d'autres députés traitent de lâche en menaçant du poing. Les protestations de M Dion contre l'attitude de M Brizon mettent en rage les amis de ce dernier qui accusent le député de la Loire-Inférieure de s'enrichir de la guerre. "Rendez vos millions!" lui crie-t-on.

In a report published 12 December 1916 in the same newspaper, Brizon said he believed that while 'pas un pouce' of French territory was menaced, 'Vous allez encore sacrifier des millions d'hommes.' In protest, deputy Laniel countered, "Pourquoi peut-on dire des choses qu'on n'a pas le droit de dire sur la voie publique sans risquer d'être mis en prison?" The same session reported by Le Petit Provencal also quoted Brizon's accusation that Delcassé signed a secret treaty with Russia promising the latter the Bosphorus and Constantinople, and as for the war, 'On les aura, messieurs, les cent milliards de
In response, deputy Robic said, 'Le jour où l'on défendra aux journaux de reproduire ce que vous dîtes à cette tribune, vous n'aurez même plus la tentation d'y monter.' This statement suggests censorship did not extend to parliamentary proceedings, but as pointed out above, it apparently had the right to do so. Similar polemics were not, however, published in either newspaper in the first four months of 1917.

Growing disunity over questions concerning the conduct of the war were articulated in articles covering French socialism, on both the local and the national level. While Le Petit Provençal published very little specific news of local socialist matters, but limited its material to meeting announcements, on 29 March 1916 topics listed on the agenda of a Marseille S.F.I.O. meeting included, 'Reprise par le parti des relations internationales.' This was the first of two central points of argument among socialists as reflected in an account of a meeting of the national council of socialists in Paris 10 April; the second question was 'celle de la participation ministérielle.' A report of the national congress published in the Marseille newspaper the same day noted that Bourderon, a C.G.T. member who had participated in the Zimmerwald meeting, asked again for re-establishment of relations with other socialist parties. His request was denied by a vote of members, 1,996 to 960, 12 abstentions, according to the report.
reports of local socialists in *Le Petit Méridional*

reflected a slightly more complete account of a meeting published 11 April 1916. Having discussed the possibility of unconditional rapprochement with other socialist parties, members present voted 23-2 with 9 abstentions against the proposal. Proceedings of the national congress in Paris were not offered.

On 18 May 1916, eighteen days after the Kienthal meeting had ended, *Le Petit Provençal* reported that the 'Commission Administrative Permanente (C.A.P.)' of the socialist party asked the three French socialists who were at the Kienthal meeting to appear before the commission. None of the three, Blanc, Brizon, and Raffin-Dugens, turned up. Blanc declaring that he would not appear unless Sembat, Guesde, and Thomas also appeared. This was the first report of the Kienthal meeting in the Marseille newspaper, although its significance was not explained. But on 10 May, *Le Petit Méridional* reported in its first reference to Kienthal a declaration by the C.A.P. saying the commission had given no one authorisation to represent the French socialists at Kienthal. The event was called an international conference organised by the Zimmerwald participants. The next day the newspaper named the Kienthal participants from France, said they had met with four Germans, and called them 'diplomates-amateurs'. On May 15 the newspaper published a notice from the socialist federation of Allier, represented by Brizon, saying the federation did not authorise its deputy to go to Kienthal.

Although the vote of the local S.F.I.O. was not revealed in *Le Petit Provençal*, a report 1 June 1916 noted that, concerning
the question of 'reprise des relations internationales', the congress of the 'Union départementale des syndicats ouvriers des Bouches-du-Rhône' voted 17 to 5 with 1 abstention that it vassit l'ideal de lutte de classes et approuve le geste de Zimmerwald et de Kienthal, auquel il demande à la C.G.T., de s'associer'. Reports in these newspapers by August 1916 showed clearly the growing socialist split between the minoritaire and the majoritaire elements. On 7 August, _Le Petit Provencal_ 's report of a national socialist congress explained the minoritaire faction demanded 'la reprise immédiate des relations internationales, conférence qui pourrait agir auprès des gouvernements alliés pour entamer des pourparlers de paix; exiger du gouvernement français la définition exacte des buts de guerre'. The majoritaires, on the other hand, explained the article, 'ne se montrent pas opposés, en principe, à la reprise des relations internationales, mais ils y mettent certaines conditions dont la principale est le renversement de l'impérialisme allemand au moyen d'une révolution....' The minoritaire declaration was defeated by a vote of 1,824 to 1,075, an article of 8 August reported, but the angry majoritaires responded by singing 'L'Internationale', and Raffin-Dugens reproche à certains majoritaires leur attitude, et d'avoir embusqué leurs parents et amis'. In a leader published the next day, Perdy observed that while 'l'esprit de cet ordre du jour porte donc la marque d'une louable inspiration patriottique', in contrast, 'on doit enregistrer avec tristesse la relative importance numérique de ces minoritaires....D'un congrès à l'autre, le nombre de ces opposants augmente, dans les
proportions fâcheuses et qui commencent à devenir inquiétantes pour l'avenir du parti....'

Le Petit Méridional published a similar explanation of the disagreements 7 August, also its first usage of the two terms, and the vote total. The session following the vote was described as 'houlouse, et même des plus agitées; à certains moments, des délégués ont failli en venir aux mains'. In its leader 9 August, 'Le Petit Méridional' commented, 'C'est une forte minorité est opposée à la motion votée: elle veut la cessation immédiate de la guerre et la reprise des relations avec les allemands assassins et pillards.' It warned that if the minority should become the majority, 'C'est son existence qui serait en jeu.'

The advance of the minoritaires can easily be traced in both newspapers through this period. By 6 March 1917, Le Petit Méridional reported the vote of a socialist congress in Paris, 1,553 majoritaire, 1,377 minoritaire, and 'tumulte' between the two factions; the figures in Le Petit Provencal 5 March were 1,549 against 1,389, 34 abstentions.

On 10 March 1917 Ferdy wrote, 'La pacte de l'union sacrée vient d'être renouvelé en une solennelle et imposante manifestation qui s'est déroulée dans le grand amphithéâtre de la Sorbonne....' He continued with a list of dignitaires representing various groups declaring their 'volonté de soutenir la lutte jusqu'au bout'. No socialist was on the list.

While strikes occurred according to Marseille police reports in 1915 as well as 1916 (see graphs), Le Petit Provencal did not publish an account of trade union activity in 1916 until
3 May, in a front-page leader by Ferdy observing that May Day in Marseille was calm. Neglecting, apparently, to consider the demands of women, Ferdy quotes a C.G.T. delegate from Paris saying no demonstration could be organised, 'la majeure partie des syndiqués de toutes les corporations étant mobilisés'. For the first time since the inception of the union sacrée, however, Ferdy suggested workers may have goals differing from those of other social groups: 'Cela ne veut point dire que des travailleurs renoncent pour toujours à leurs revendications.' A report in the same newspaper 3 May recounted a manifesto by the Seine C.G.T., reaffirming 'leur inébranlable attachement à l'internationale prolétarienne' and supporting the concepts of self-determination of all peoples, an end to secret diplomacy, general disarmament, and obligatory arbitration between nations in conflict.

Le Petit Méridional, in contrast, published a great deal of material relating to workers and trade union issues during the first months of 1916. Hérault trade unions, as noted in chapter one, were separate from socialists, reflecting the situation generally in France (but not in Bouches-du-Rhône). A report dated 4 March described a local meeting of the 'Syndicat des ouvrières de la couture' with a membership of 700 women hearing an address promoting a minimum wage and a strong organisation of women workers to press post-war demands. A meeting of a port workers' union recounted 12 March included the observation that 450 workers in attendance had voted that the union 'se voit dans l'obligation d'augmenter quelques marchandises pour compenser la cherté de la vie'. The national union of railway workers of the
(Paris-Lyon-Marseille) in Dijon, according to a report of April, 'souhaite que la victoire certaine de nos armées amène la fin des guerres', and asked for a salary increase. In an article on 27 April, the 'Syndicat des travailleurs de terre, vigneron et agriculteurs de Montpellier' asked that reservists be sent home to help with vineyard work.

May Day 1916 was given more prominence in the Montpellier newspaper, beginning with word on 29 April that the C.G.T. 'probablement' will not call for strikes on 1 May. The Montpellier Bourse du Travail agreed, 'après la paix victorieuse qui suivra le syndicalisme retrouvera toute sa force et sa prospérité'. But on 2 May, the newspaper reported from Paris that certain industries did strike: 'Les syndicats de l'alimentation, du bâtiment, de la chapellerie et de l'habillement, par exemple, ont invité leurs membres à se croiser les bras.' Response was 'plutôt modeste'. That strength of the regional union movement worried authorities by this time is shown by a report published 27 May, in which deputy Blanc was forbidden by Malvy to speak at a meeting of the railway workers' union ('cheminots') in Avignon. Malvy is quoted as saying, 'le préfet savait que des manifestations sérieuses se préparaient'.

On 19 July the Montpellier union of railway workers, saying companies have turned a deaf ear to their claims, indicated their intention to act for 'leur justes revendications basées sur le maintien de leurs maigres salaires depuis la guerre'. The report did not specify an actual threat of strike. A report published 15 August quoted vineyard workers' union members asking also for pay rises, and a report dated 23 August related
a demand by 2,000 'sous-agents des P.T.T.' of the right to form a trade union, as well as a 200 francs per year cost-of-living pay rise, and other benefits.

Inevitably, it seems, these demands gave way to strike reports. The first such report in the Montpellier newspaper in 1916 appeared on 27 August, called 'incident de travail', at a local sulphur refinery, whose workers returned to work the next day despite being denied a one-franc-a-day increase. The next day vineyard workers asked for five francs fifty centimes a day plus two litres of good quality wine, or six francs fifty centimes a day without the wine. Salary questions were discussed in a meeting of Montpellier railway workers on 21 September, and on 1 October a small front-page story described a meeting of the workers with Briand: 'la délégation a de nouveau exposé la situation pénible faite aux cheminots par la modicité des salaires qui leur sont donnés, et par le surmenage auquel ils sont astreints'.

By 14 October the vineyard workers' union had resorted to veiled threats: 'Que les vieux militants syndicalistes s'agitent dans leur milieu, avec toute la courtoisie indispensable et, si c'est nécessaire, se tiennent prêts à tout appel éventuel du syndicat.' A meeting announced on 23 October of the port workers' union of Sète added: 'compte rendu grève.' Finally, on 21 October, the newspaper first actually used the word 'grève' to describe a work stoppage in France, but it was not a local strike. The Seine tramway workers in Paris demanded wage concessions, refused by the company. The next day the government declared that in case of a strike which might disrupt national
Le gouvernement prend, en conseil des ministres, toutes les mesures nécessaires pour assurer la continuité de l'exploitation.

Le Petit Provençal published no strike report between 4 August 1914 and 1 November 1916, when an account of 'La Grève Des Tramways De Paris' is offered. No account of local union activity is reflected in 1916, while Le Petit Méridional continued its reports, in one case including a commentary supporting the case of railway workers. (20 November.) Nearly all of these examples were published on inside pages, however, until 13 January 1917, the first time news of a strike was displayed on the front page. Entitled 'Les Grèves Dans Les Usines De Guerre,' it quoted Albert Thomas in Le Petit Parisien saying, 'Depuis que la grève a éclaté, j'ai convoqué les représentants des chambres syndicales et patronales, et des délégués des ouvriers et de leurs organisations... Nous comparerons, examinerons, et fixerons.' Although this is the first published article concerning a 1917 Paris strike, it is presented in a backhanded way, suggesting readers had already been apprised of the situation. This was a common way of presenting bad news during the war, however, extending as well to battle and other reports.

Le Petit Provençal employs the same technique, publishing in a front-page commentary by Négis on 11 January 1917, 'Après les ouvriers des usines d'Ivry, les couturières de la rue de la Paix viennent de se mettre en grève.' This is the first report to Marseille readers of the Paris strikes. Négis blamed the employers, affirming, 'Le gouvernement doit montrer la sagesse...
Also on 13 January 1917, the Marseille newspaper announced 'des grèves qui ont éclaté ces jours-ci dans des usines de munitions de la région parisienne'. On 26 January 1917 in Le Petit Provençal, and 25 January in Le Petit Méridional, strikes in the Schneider munitions factory were reported, the Montpellier paper noting that Thomas had appealed to workers to return to their duties, the Marseille newspaper quoting him in detail: 'Avez-vous pensé à la gravité de la faute que vous commettez?' The outcome of this strike is not reported in Le Petit Provençal, but Le Petit Méridional on 27 January reported that the strikers, all women, returned to work after salary concessions were made. No further material of this nature was published in Le Petit Provençal during this period. Le Petit Méridional actively pursued the theme, however; on 5 February 1917 Charles-Gras indicated his surprise that strikes should have occurred, but his relief that they ended quickly. The next day the newspaper reported a strike of Avignon milk sellers over taxes, and a protest by miners in the Loire Valley against two hours a day overtime asked of them for national defense. On 12 March women metallurgy workers met in Gironde, according to a report, 'de faire cesser l'exploitation de la femme', and a week later the same workers from Tarn met to set salary demands. In the last report on this subject for this period, Montpellier railway workers met in a report 20 April to protest the slow implementation of their allocations for 'la vie chère'.

It is difficult to explain why these two newspapers reacted so differently to claims of trade unions and reports of strikes.
in 1916-April 1917. Police statistics show it was clearly not due to lack of workers' movements in Marseille; in fact, according to official strike statistics published after the war, the department of Hérault suffered only one strike in all of 1916. On the other hand, Hérault unemployment statistics show seventy-eight men and twenty-one women out of work November 1916, compared with zero and zero in Bouches-du-Rhône. It would perhaps be an exaggeration to emphasise this difference; both sets of figures reflect very little unemployment.

Looking beyond these statistics, one might suggest that censorship or political slant of the newspapers played a role in this domaine, or perhaps a Marseille editor's decision that small strikes and workers' demands were not important enough to overcome the harm they constituted to wartime morale. This editorial concept as it related to strikes in Le Petit Provencal was revised by that newspaper after this period. Otherwise, in material related to socialist ideology and parliamentary debate, the Marseille newspaper exhibited a greater tendency to publish comments unfavourable to the government's positions, while Le Petit Méridional remained more circumspect.

Turning briefly to the portrayal of military and international issues, the two newspapers reported battles of the
moderate delay and in considerable detail.

The Nivelle Offensive of 16-29 April 1917 was reported beginning 17 April in Le Petit Provençal. In Le Petit Méridional, launch of a French offensive was described beginning 19 March; a second offensive was reported beginning 20 April, but the difference between the two was not made clear. Both newspapers reported in a moderately sanguine tone emphasizing advances, such as the 18 April headline in the Marseille newspaper, 'La Victorieuse Offensive Franco-Anglaise.' Marius Richard called it 'La plus grande bataille depuis celle de la Marne qui fixa le destin...'.

But when its failure became clear, Richard was forced to defend his having placed the battle's importance at such a high level by arguing that it had at least reduced German reserves: 'Bien loin d'avoir échoué, notre offensive nous a valu des résultats très importants...'. (28 April 1917.) Pétain's accession to 'chef d'état-major général au ministère de la guerre' was announced 20 April.

In contrast, Le Petit Méridional offered no suggestion of failure or rationale for the offensive, and did not announce Pétain's promotion until 1 May. Neither newspaper explicitly declared that Nivelle had been replaced, just as neither had explicitly declared that Joffre had been replaced. As observed above concerning strike news, events of possible negative import were often treated by the newspapers in this backhanded fashion. Berger and Allard indicate that this had indeed often become explicit strategy for censors by 1916; when Fort Douaumont was
The Zimmermann Telegram and the United States war declaration were presented without delay by both newspapers, as was the German declaration to resume unrestricted submarine warfare, reported by both on 2 February 1917 in a formal announcement by Bethmann-Hollweg. The Tsar's abdication and its revolutionary import appeared in both on 17 March 1917. The next day the Montpellier newspaper welcomed the event, observing in a commentary signed P. Lafue, 'La Russie libérée d'une autocratie déserte prépare la Russie victorieuse.' But enthusiasm was brief; both newspapers quickly reflected doubt over Russia's continuing participation in the war. In the Montpellier newspaper, a commentary by Charles-Gras published 10 April stated, 'Ce n'est pas sans une profonde angoisse que j'ai analysé les dangers que court la nation.' The first Marseille commentary of a similar nature was reflected in a front-page leader by Ferdy on 7 May: 'Il s'agit de savoir si la nation qui s'est délivrée de la tyrannie tsariste aura la clairvoyance et l'nergie nécessaire pour compléter cette victoire de la liberté à l'intérieur par la victoire sur les ennemis du dehors.' The influence of Lenin, initially presented as derisory, was introduced to Montpellier readers beginning 17 April, and to Marseille readers beginning 21 April.

"Berger, Marcel, and Allard, Paul, Les secrets de la censure pendant la guerre (Paris, 1932), 52-3."
Chapter Eight: Censorship in 1916-April 1917

In order to employ the same methodology as in previous chapters on censorship, this material will be divided into two areas, the operation of censorship, and reaction of the newspapers and politicians.

I. Operation

On 3 January 1916, Jules Gautier was given the position of 'directeur générale des relations avec la presse' by the war ministry. Slightly more than one month later, on 21 February, the ministry publicly announced that a 'Maison de la Presse' had been created, to operate from a six-storey Paris town house at 3 rue Francois ler. A military officer, Lieutenant de Jouvenal, was

Paris (Château de Vincennes), Service historique de l'armée de la terre (S.H.A.T.), carton 59336.

S.H.A.T., 59336. The building formerly housed the United States embassy, according to the report.
named liaison between the *Maison* and the war ministry. Berthelot, a minister from the foreign affairs ministry, assumed leadership of the *Maison.* These two developments mark the most significant changes in operation of censorship during this period, suggesting a shift in government policy on the press, moving away from simple censorship and toward formalised propaganda.

The *Maison de la Presse* had been suggested to the Briand government by the foreign affairs ministry in a report dated 15 December 1915. Ministers argued that its role would be to centralise diverse press and propaganda functions, whether they emanated from private groups or government agencies, forming, as an unsigned report noted April 1916, 'une sorte de palais de la presse'. Under control of the foreign affairs ministry, the *Maison* was designed as a clearing house, both to respond to queries from the press as well as to circulate material created by the *Bureau de la Presse,* which was under the war ministry. According to a booklet dated May 1916, the *Maison* was separated into four departments:

- 'Service diplomatique'. In telephone contact with other nations worldwide, this service according to the booklet 'rédige les radios lancées dans le monde par la Tour Eiffel... à huit reprises'.

*Cevos, J.-C., and Nicot, Jean, 'La censure de la presse pendant la guerre 1914-1918', Actes du 105e Congrès national des sociétés savantes, Cannes, 1980. La diffusion du savoir de 1610 à nos jours, 43.

tion militaire'. Designed to organise visits of
journalists to the front, and to coordinate the military
photography section, this office was 'en liaison constante avec le
S.O.G. et la guerre'.

3) 'Section de traduction et d'analyse de presse étrangère'.

4) 'Service de propagande', divided into subsections covering
three areas: general section to produce propaganda world-wide;
neutral countries section to produce material for Switzerland,
olland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and other nations; allied section
to produce material for allied nations. Brochures and tracts were
most commonly produced by this service.

The booklet described the Maison staff as diplomats,
journalists, university professors, and disabled veterans.
Ponsonby, who observed the Maison 'realised the great importance of
propaganda, and went to work with a will', maintained 'a French
chief editor' saw the office's cinema operation on the top floor,
its principal work

- making photographs and cuts of wooden figures
- with cut-off heads, torn-out tongues, gouged-out
- eyes, crushed skulls, and brains laid bare. The
- pictures thus made were sent as unassailable
- evidence of German atrocities to all parts of
- the globe, where they did not fail to produce the
- desired effect.'

This story seems almost impossible to believe, yet Ponsonby added

the French editor assured him, 'during the war, the lie became a patriotic virtue'.

Jouvenal, replaced 28 June 1916 by Poncetton, 'Aide-major de 1er classe', also served a propaganda role. A ministry of war document dated 21 February 1916 said the liaison 'viendra se procurer les renseignements de nature à intéresser le public français et à servir notre propagande au dehors'.

The importance of the role of propaganda was reaffirmed in a communiqué from the same ministry dated 7 September 1916: 'Le moral du pays et des troupes s'est toujours montré, depuis le début des hostilités, à la hauteur des événements. On contribuera certainement à maintenir cet état d'esprit en propagant, aussi bien parmi les troupes que dans les régions où elles sont recrutées, les récits des actions glorieuses de nos soldats.'

An undated 'essai' emanating from Jules Gautier's office apparently during the same period, stated that the press must be viewed from two perspectives, its role in supporting morale, and its role in revealing state secrets to the enemies. Therefore, two responses must be envisioned, direction and control.

Cette action, qui, au point de vue militaire, doit avoir son origine dans l'organe commandement, ne peut s'exercer en fait que par l'organe gouvernement. Il ne faut pas que le commandement soit en contact avec la presse. Si le commandement ne peut ignorer la presse, par contre, la presse doit ignorer le commandement.


The Service d'Information (S.I.) of the Bureau de la Presse, therefore, must 'enlighten' and 'control' by means of directives which 'indique le sens général dans lequel, sur les différentes questions d'actualité, il y a intérêt à orienter l'opinion publique.' The goal of what began as a censorship bureau, as well as function of the Maison de la Presse, are clearly defined in this document.

The role of the S.I. was most successful during the battle of Verdun, according to contemporary accounts. The army instructed three officers, Madelin, Bordeaux, and Tessan, to report the battle from the front, reports to be relayed to the press. 'Ce petit groupe eut l'honneur de mettre en evidence l'oeuvre accomplie par l'armée de Verdun,' reports published in newspapers around the world, according to a report dated 21 April 1918, by commander Bordeaux, apparently one of the group. A slightly more objective assessment of Verdun may be offered by Lytton, who concurred, "The result of their labours was sent all over the world....The work of these French "officiers informateurs" was most successful during the battle of Verdun, which was admittedly the best advertised show of the whole war." However, Lytton himself apparently had represented the military in Britain as a 'travelling censor' to accompany civilian war correspondents.12


According to Bordeaux' report, a reorganisation of the G.Q.G. in December 1916 eliminated the S.I. role as generator of information for the front. This decision, he contended, had serious consequences during the Nivelle Offensive:

"d'une part, notre effort militaire n'apparut pas dans toute sa grandeur; d'autre part, nos troupes, déjà fatiguées de cet effort même, n'entrevirent pas sa compensation, puisque notre presse ne l'exultait point et n'en montrait pas les résultats. Nul doute qu'une information militaire mieux employée et dirigée n'eût contrebattu, sinon empêché, une dépression, un désenchantement qui ne furent pas étrangers aux troubles de mai parce qu'ils préparèrent le terrain à toutes les mauvaises influences."

This may be an overstatement, but it does illustrate the importance the military placed on managing 'news' by this time. An unsigned report from this same source said these S.I. efforts were preferable to the censor, 'moyen brutal, mais souvent insuffisant'.

The report stated with apparent regret that the 'Mission de presse anglo-américaine', created November 1916 in conjunction with the French G.Q.G. to guide British and American civilian war correspondents, had played the largest role in reporting of the Nivelle Offensive.
Opposition to censorship during this period shifted from a campaign by the newspapers themselves to a campaign in parliament, led by socialist deputies. This parliamentary protest may be separated into two distinct periods, the first centring around a bill proposed by deputy Paul Meunier to control the system, and the second in response to an admission by Ribot that the system needed to be changed.

Meunier's bill was actually presented to parliament at the end of 1915, but was not called up for debate until January 1916. Its purpose was to limit the government to its role as censor of diplomatic and political material only, eliminating political censorship, as noted in Article Two (see appendix). In presenting the bill, Meunier called the censorship system 'stupid and dangerous', and declared the of the seizures, suspensions, and elimination of material, 'rien de tout cela n'est autorisé par nos lois'.

Parliamentary debate on this proposition was published in both newspapers studied here at the beginning of 1916. In an account of debate published 22 January in Le Petit Provençal, Meunier declared, 'on doit la vérité aux citoyens français, il faut autre chose que la vérité officielle, il faut la vérité....la censure politique est une arme dangereuse. Il est temps de la briser.' Deputy Roche, Andrieux, and Brosse also spoke in favour of the bill. See Les états, S.H.A.T., carton 5N374, material relating to Meunier bill.
Briand's bill, designed to eliminate political censorship, but Briand continued to underscore the public position taken by the government since the beginning of the war, denying political censorship existed.

J'affirme que ce qu'on a appelé la censure, ce que j'appellerai le régime spécial de la presse, n'a pas atteint un seul article politique (murmurs)...Où est le critérium qui me permettra de savoir si une nouvelle est d'ordre diplomatique et militaire? [26 January.]

Briand brought to this defense of censorship the argument that the press must make sacrifices just as soldiers and others. 'Prenez-y garde, les allemands rôdent autour de nous, ils cherchent la fissure par où ils passeront.' He added, 'Aujourd'hui, il n'y a pas de censure en France, comme l'a dit M. Andrieux, il y a un contrôle.' Andrieux responded that if censorship did not exist, then 'les blancs des journaux sont le resultat de réunions amicales avec la presse'.

Le Petit Méridional reported this debate without comment, instead borrowing commentaries from several other newspapers. La Provence carried a leader by Ferdy published 27 January critical of Briand's discourse. 'Ce n'est pas seulement le droit pour les journalistes d'écrire ce qu'ils pensent mais aussi et surtout le droit du public d'être sincèrement renseignés et de voir ses propres sentiments traduits par la voix des journaux.' He continued two days later to observe that all republican journalists except Gustav Hervé had united against Briand's concept of censorship. 'Seuls, les royalistes—et encore ne s'agit-il que des
royalistes intransigeants approuvent la censure telle qu'elle fonctionne et la façon dont le gouvernement s'attache à la défendre.

On 26 January, the bill was sent back to committee, where it stayed. Galabru believes deputies would not support it because its effect might have made the situation worse instead of better, legally recognising political censorship, the existence of which the government continued to deny, without defining military and diplomatic news. The resolution to return the bill to committee, qui clôt le débat montre bien qu'un accord ne paraît plus possible et qu'une solution légale ne peut intervenir. Failure of the Ménier bill brought a period of resignation lasting through the rest of the year: 'Chambre et presse sentent nettement que nul effort n'aura raison de la force d'inertie qui leur est opposée.'

Le Petit Méridional reflected this lassitude, publishing no further articles on this subject until the end of the year, but Le Petit Provençal did publish on 23 April a demand by deputy Charles Bernard asking the chamber to fix a date for questioning the government over its 'suppressions abusives de la censure'. The day before, the newspaper reported a Paris sweet shop was producing a new Easter novelty. An old lady sits near a well.

D'une main elle soutient une corbeille pleine

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Galabru, L., *La liberté individuelle et la liberté de la presse en temps de guerre* (Montauban, 1918), 94.

Ibid., 99.
d'oeufs d'où s'élance une canne couveuse. Le panier porte cette étiquette: "Je lance mes canards"; de l'autre main, la vieille dame armée d'une paire de ciseaux coupe le cou d'une vérité qui essaye de sortir du puits....

This depiction of 'Anastasie' offers evidence that opposition to the censor was not limited to journalists and politicians, but reached the public as well. The satirical Le Bavard tried to assert its voice against the censor through ridicule in 1916, as in an example published 1 April entitled, 'Le Bon Communiqué'.

A Paris et en province, les opérations de la censure se sont ralenties au cours de la nuit. Mais aux abords des journaux hebdomadaires, les coups de ciseaux ont continué avec violence. Ils ont même permis d'occuper plusieurs colonnes de copie et de faire quelques articles prisonniers.

This weekly newspaper was censored on a massive scale, leaving huge blanks which editors filled with drawings of 'Anastasie' and scissors (see illustrations).

In December 1916 the subject of censorship reappeared in parliament under the guise of a debate concerning renewal of war credits. On 14 December, an attempt was made in parliament to reduce by 10,000 francs credits under the category of 'service spécial de la presse', the official name for the censorship office, as noted in Briand's January speech. Ribot, then finance minister, responded, 'Je suis de votre avis, il faudra faire des réformes dans l'exercice de la censure.' This attempt was actually preceded by Ferdy's front-page leader published 11 December, under
A total of forty-five blank lines with the word 'censure' in six places left the article unreadable, but Ferdy's affirmation is not very close to the article. 'A la longue, un tel régime devient intolérable.' (See illustration.)

Ferdy's comment the next day reflects again the resignation noted above.

Elle [censorship] a cru mettre en pièces notre article d'hier, qui était cependant un article de critiques très mesurées contre des abus que la presse française est unanime à condamner. . . . Nous ne protestons que pour l'honneur puisque nous savons par une déjà longue expérience que toutes les protestations sont vaines.

On 16 December, following report of the parliamentary debate, Ferdy again wrote that he had demanded the reform of censorship, but 'Messieurs les Censeurs... s'étaient vengés de notre audace en massacrant notre article.' Now, he continued, 'Le gouvernement lui-même, par l'organe de l'un de ses membres les plus autorisés, reconnaît que la censure doit devenir plus libérale, il nous sera peut-être permis de compter que l'on daignera avoir quelques égards pour notre liberté l'écrire.' He repeated phrases he claimed had been censored previously. Now approved, including, 'Nos dirigeants auraient souvent plus besoin de conseils que de louanges,' and 'La sagesse serait de ne se défier ni du public ni de la presse, car l'un et l'autre ont conscience d'avoir virilement poussé depuis près de deux ans et demi qu'ils étaient dignes de quelque confiance.'
This entire debate is absent from *Le Petit Méridional*. On 25 January 1917, however, the question of political censorship was reflected in the Montpellier newspaper through an account of a parliamentary debate. Deputy Blanc demanded that the government keep Ribot's promise to limit political censorship. Admitting more candidly than one year before that political censorship existed, Briand said, 'La censure s'applique aux informations militaires et diplomatiques et à toute polémique qui pourrait avoir pour effet de troubler profondément l'ordre public.' Deputies responded:

M. Peyroux: "La vérité la voici: c'est que votre censure baillonne ceux qui ne vous adressent pas des louanges."

M. Briand: "Des campagnes spéciales en vue de conseiller une paix autre que celle que nous voulons doivent être interdites."

M. Parvy: "Alors, censurez le message de M. Wilson."

M. Briand: "Mais les difficultés d'application sont nombreuses."

Blanc's motion to remove power from censors was defeated 323 to 141. *Le Petit Méridional* made no comment concerning this debate, but Ferdy in the Marseille newspaper observed, 'ce n'est pas seulement le droit de critique qui est refusé aux journaux, mais aussi le droit d'informer leurs lecteurs'. He concluded, nevertheless, 'Nous ne croyons plus à la réforme de la censure."

The subject was not taken up again in either newspaper until 23 March, when Ferdy asked in a leader if Ribot was going to keep his promise to reform censorship. He quoted the politician as saying he 'préfèrera des critiques, mêmes injustes, à ce mol l'optimisme qui ne peut qu'enverver les énergies de la nation'. This
statement seems to show that journalists as well as some government leaders by the beginning of 1917 agreed that the strongly positive press treatment of the war previously had been a mistake, that a neutral rendering of events was necessary, and that censors formed an obstacle to this treatment.
Chapter Nine: The Business of Journalism in 1916-April 1917

The Commission interministérielle de la presse was created 7 June 1916, becoming Office national de la presse on 2 February 1917. Directed by M.R. Schoeller, 'directeur des services commerciaux' for Le Matin, its role, according to commission documents quoted by Billy, was,

\[\text{de réaliser les moyens propres à faire obtenir à la presse française, dans les meilleures conditions et limites possibles, d'accord avec l'intérêt général et public, les éléments nécessaires à sa publication régulière.}\]

The commission was comprised of representatives from both the press and the government, notably members of ministries of foreign affairs, armament, commerce, finances, war, interior, marine transport, and public works. Renaudel, editor of L'Humanité, was President; Marius Richard of Le Petit Provençal was 'secrétaire-

\[\text{Rilly, André, La guerre des Journaux (Paris, 1919), 204-5.}\]

\[\text{Ibid., 205.}\]
Of the eight ministers and twenty-four press representatives on the commission, A. Blaquière represented *Le Petit Meridional*, but no representative from conservative and royalist newspapers is listed.  

Under this commission, according to Billy, were seven committees: administrative, technical, personnel, transports, coal, reverse products, and finance. The commission's goal was to obtain and control stocks of increasingly scarce publishing supplies, especially newsprint. The commission's control over the business affairs of newspapers grew in scope as shortages become more severe, until it assumed control over decisions regarding the number of pages a newspaper could publish, their size, and the price they could ask for each issue. In 1918 the commission was reorganised as the *Office national des papiers* under the commerce ministry, with eleven representatives of the press still serving, including Blaquière and Richard. In effect, it took on the role of a consortium, one of an extensive number controlling French industry under Clémentel’s commerce ministry by February 1918.

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*. Varis, Archives Nationales, carton F18 2380, letters concerning paper shortage 1917-18; censorship; diverse.
Varis, Archives Nationales, carton F18 2380, and Billy, André, *La guerre des journaux*, 207.
Varis, Archives Nationales, carton F18 2380.
Varis, Archives Nationales, carton F18 2380.
Also organised in 1916, according to an announcement published in Le Petit Méridional 19 July (but not announced in Le Petit Provençal), was the Syndicat de la presse régionale française. Plessis was named in this article as president of the new organisation; Richard was named secretary, and his key role was reflected in references by Billy, and in Richard's speeches and letters of 1917-18. Treasurer was listed as Gounouilhon, proprietor of Petit Gironde. The professional influence of the Marseille and Montpellier newspapers seems illustrated by the fact that two out of three leadership positions in this organisation were given to their representatives, both of whom also had roles in the ministerial commission.

The shortage of newsprint became more and more evident to the perceptive reader in 1916. Six-page Sunday issues and photos disappeared from Le Petit Provençal by mid-year. Photos had nearly disappeared from the Montpellier newspaper in 1915. It is difficult to calculate the effect that may have had on circulation; neither newspaper publicly offered figures during this period. A report to the Marseille prefect by 'La commissaire de la sûreté' dated 7 November 1916 did attempt to make such a calculation for that city, but noted that figures given by newspaper proprietors themselves 'parait considérablement exagéré'. The report reflected, for Le Petit Provençal, 'chiffre donné par le directeur,' 120,000,

Billy, André, *La guerre des journaux*, 205, and Archives Nationales, carton F18 2380.

Marseille, Archives Départementales, carton M6/4831B.
and 'chiffre approximatif réel', 60,000. Figures for Le Bavard (weekly) were 25,000 and 20,000 respectively. The estimate of 60,000 seems low, but if true it would show a drastic circulation decrease from the beginning of the war.

The first substantial reduction of pages for both newspapers was not made until 1917. Le Petit Provencal announced on 10 February that, to reduce coal consumption, newspapers in France were to reduce their size: five-centime newspapers with a total surface size of more than 2,137 square centimetres would be limited to two pages Mondays and Thursdays, and to four pages other days. For those with a one-page surface size equal to 3,137 square centimetres, or between 2,137 and 1,456 square centimetres, two pages Mondays, four pages other days. For those with less than 1,456 square centimetres, four pages all days. The one-page surface area of Le Petit Provencal was 2,160 square centimetres. The first two-page edition was published 15 February, a confusing layout of tiny articles and headlines, with no advertising. Succeeding two-page editions showed an increase in the length of stories allowing a more readable layout, but still no advertising.

Le Petit Méridional, also describing the austerity measures on 10 February, published its first government-ordered two-page edition the same day as did its Marseille counterpart. The edition contained only one tiny advertisement for chocolate. Both newspapers dropped serialised novels in two-page editions at this time. The proposal to decrease the size of newspapers had been reflected in the Montpellier newspaper in a leader published 11
November 1916, signed by Blaquièrè, who supported the plan and calculated it would save 250 tons of coal a week in France. The Marseille newspaper did not support austerity measures in its published pages at this time, but a report from the prefecture to the interior minister dated 18 October 1916 stated that of four Marseille dailies, only Le Petit Provençal reported its stock of newsprint was low enough to last one and one-half months. 'En résumé,' concluded the report, 'les quotidiens de Marseille sont hostiles à la limitation du nombre de pages, sauf Le Petit Provençal, qui est partisan de la réduction à deux pages, au moins deux fois par semaine.'

After newspapers were limited to two pages two days a week, observed Le Bavard (unsigned), it would only be fair that news be published in similar proportions, for example,

Nouvelles de la guerre. Un demi-zéppelin a jeté des moitiés de bombes sur des demi-combattants en n'a fait que des quarts de dégâts. Le zéppelin, a moitié attaqué par des portions de canons à demi anti-aériens, a été à moitié détruit.

By February 1917 (see graph), the advertising ratio had reached to nearly its pre-war standard in Le Petit Méridional, and had climbed above it in Le Petit Provençal. Classified advertising reached as high as 200 separate items in the Marseille newspaper on 1 October, 104 of them offering employment. Introduction of two-page issues did reduce advertising ratios by May 1917, especially in the Marseille paper, but ratios did not drop to the autumn 1914 levels.
level. This apparently did not signify a commensurate increase in
profits, however, as cost of newsprint (see graph) and other
materials rose steadily. According to Lerner, La Dépêche of
Toulouse also regained its advertising; "cette prospérité relative
témoin bien, à sa façon, du maintien de l'activité commerciale
dans un Sud-Ouest relativement épargné par les répercussions de la
guerre". However, commercial prosperity did not necessarily
reflect prosperity of the newspaper; profits of La Dépêche dropped,
150,000 francs in 1915, 150,000 in 1916, 200,000 in 1917. Profits
made some recovery with the introduction of ten-centime newspapers
in August 1917, Lerner notes. This situation undoubtedly existed
in other southern newspapers as well. Andréani observes that the
press in Montpellier apparently increased profits in 1918 after the
ten-centime price increase, and that despite the increase,
circulations remained steady, but the precise profit margin during
the period is not calculated.

Of war-related themes illustrated in advertisements, Le Petit
Emission offered the most extensive variety. Most significant
during this period was the development of advertising using war as
a symbol or metaphor. Advertisers had long used the war as a way to
sell products to soldiers and civilians, but these products,
notably related to health or well-being of their users, emphasised their use as an answer to problems literally caused by war. Advertisers who used of war as an icon or metaphor did not base their appeals on a literal theme, but instead extracted an analogy based on commonly-held wartime assumptions or commonly-repeated words and pictures. The first clear example of this was published in the Marseille newspaper 8 March 1916.

L'artillerie de l'hygiène.
De même que le canon tue les ennemis de la patrie, de même le Goudron-Guyot tue les mauvais microbes, qui sont les ennemis de notre santé et même de notre vie.

The advertiser here clearly believed it necessary to explain his metaphor to his readers in this early example of an advertisement employing this theme. Using the symbolic perspective, advertisements included drawings of soldiers representing medicines, shooting down 'microbes' or illnesses (see illustrations of March 1916). These advertisements employ the style of visual metaphor used by editorial cartoonists. Illustrations accompanying advertisements had increased substantially by mid-1916, from none at all to five or more in one edition. Illustrations sometimes encouraged actions contradictory to those advocated by writers of editorial copy, as in an example published in Le Petit Provençal 25 May 1916 for 'Jubol, éclaircit le teint', illustrating an engraving of a woman elaborately dressed in chic style wearing a hat with a striking feather. Writers during this period were complaining that high-fashion styles were inappropriate during wartime.

While advertisements in Le Petit Méridional were not nearly as
Sophisticated, one advertiser used the war metaphor theme in a different way. Realising, apparently, that blank spaces left by censors attracted attention, this advertiser employed them deliberately, beginning, 'Malgré la guerre', followed by one-half inch of blank space, then continuing, 'L'Union Economique, 30, rue Nationale facilite les achats dans 80 magazines de Montpellier.' (6 February 1916.) In observing that this ad appeared several times, it must be assumed that the blank was intentional.

Soldiers at the front during this period began to advertise as well. On 26 February 1916, Le Petit Provencal published an advertisement from the trench newspaper La Mitraille-journal du front, announcing, 'Naturellement, chacun peut s'y abonner. Le prix de l'abonnement? Ce qu'on...veut ou ce qu'on...peut. Ecrire: "La Mitraille", secteur postal 120.'
Chapter Ten:
May 1917-31 December 1918

I. Discourse of the Union Sacrée
and Influences on Morale

Historians who argue in favour of the existence of the union sacrée, but who contend it did not last until the end of the war, suggest it ended during this period. When during this period is open to varied interpretation. Bouyoux marks its 'official' end at September 1917, when socialist ministers left the government.¹ Maurin believes it ended May 1917, when the majority of S.F.I.O. members condemned the participation of socialists in the government.² Becker indicates the the union sacrée by August-September 1917 was gradually being rejected as strikes and class

²Maurin, Jules, 'The War in Hérault and Lozère', unpublished manuscript, 958.
antagonism reasserted themselves. Not until 1 May 1918, however, did socialist minoritaires call officially for an end to the union sacrée, notes Horne. 4

With reference to the newspapers analysed in this study, dates seem to be arbitrary: material related to the concept does not indicate a clear break on any specific date but, as noted by Becker, optimism professed by writers by the spring of 1917 seemed 'in the nature of a facade'. 5 On 4 August 1917, Ferdy admitted in a front-page leader that the union sacrée was no longer what it was in 1914, especially in its relation to criticism of the army, and among socialists. 'Mais nous voudrions que l'union sacrée compromise par de telles discussions se reconstitut sans retard.' Slightly more than one month later, Ferdy revived a theme now well-established in both newspapers, accusing conservatives of perverting the union sacrée: 'Certes, nous n'oublions l'union sacrée... Mais nous ne voulons pas que les républicains soient plus longtemps dupes de l'union sacrée.... Si les républicains ont désarmé, les réactionnaires n'ont pas partout suivi leur exemple.' The union sacrée seems to have lost so much of its moral force that

advertisers by October 1917 found it permissible to banalise the concept into marketing strategy (see chapter twelve).

The rearticulation of the union sacrée into the domain of merchandising seems to postulate final metamorphosis of an ideal which had undergone through the war years a transmission from quasi-religious dictum, to good manners, to tool against political foes. Noted Ferdy in a leader 29 October 1917,

L'union sacrée, proclamée au milieu du splendide mouvement d'enthousiasme patriotique du 4 août 1914 aurait dû raisonnablement fondre tous les partis divergents dans un seul parti d'inébranlable solidarité nationale. Et ce fut en effet ce qui se produisit tout d'abord. Mais on sait comment le pacte fut brisé plus tard et l'on sait aussi par qui il fut brisé.

'Qui', according to Ferdy, was 'l'extrême-droite'. The extent of scepticism among allies over the French union sacrée was reported to French readers in an article published 17 September 1917, quoting Albert Thomas' comments in Britain. Thomas was explaining the new conceptualisation of the union sacrée as socialists now saw it. He said he 'désire que l'opinion britannique ne croie pas à la fin de l'union sacrée, mais au désir pour les socialistes de conserver une attitude indépendante afin de poursuivre la guerre plus énergiquement encore'. On 9 November 1917 Magis added, 'Les Allemands n'étant plus à Noyon, l'union sacrée devant laquelle nous nous prosternions est remisée comme un
Use of the verb 'prosterner' seems significant, suggesting Négis now believed his public had been beguiled into believing a fallacy. Eight months later, the nature of using the union sacrée as a bromide devoid of real meaning, employed solely to make legitimate nearly any point of view, was emphasised in a description published 2 July 1918 of a new newspaper, 'organe des quarante et un socialistes dissidents'.

Noted the report, 'en terminant, les rédacteurs de cette déclaration se proclament partisans de la toujours nécessaire union sacrée'.

Le Petit Méridional did not at first reflect this level of pessimism concerning the condition of the union sacrée. Writing in a front-page commentary 19 August 1917, Gaston Doumergue declared that debate over the Stockholm Conference harmed the union sacrée. 'L'union sacrée...s'est trouvée un moment compromise par les discussions soulevées autour d'elle.' The words 'un moment' seem to suggest a union sacrée in a much stronger state than that reflected by writers in Le Petit Provençal. On 15 September, however, the tone of a leader signed 'Le Petit Méridional' seemed to have recognised facts, now that socialists had left the government: 'Si, par l'abstention volontaire des socialistes au pouvoir, la trêve d'union est rompue, l'unité morale du pays ne saurait être ébranlée....'

On 7 April 1918 Doumergue filled the front-page leader position with his admission that Germans believed France to be demoralised because 'les polémiques de partis étaient en train de
In their treatment of morale, both newspapers agreed in their reflections of a sentiment of weariness after the 1917 offensive which, taken together with repeated reports of strikes, combine to suggest that morale had reached a low point. Négis wrote 25 June 1917 that previously a soldier home on leave would be asked by family and friends to recount stories from the front. 'Aujourd'hui quand le permissionnaire arrive, il commence par déclarer, "et surtout ne parlons pas de la guerre."' In his article 'from the front' of 29 June, Abram asked civilians,

"Pourquoi cette sourde inquiétude, ce malaise trouble que j'ai senti à l'arrière pendant ma récente permission...? Comment, c'est vous qui en auriez assez, vous qui avez conservé votre vie, votre milieu, votre entourage, vos occupations.... Mais pensez donc un peu à ceux qui sont là-haut dans la tranchée."

Writing in Le Petit Méridional, Doumergue observed on 15 July 1917, "Il y a quelques semaines, une grande vague de pessimisme se répandit sur le pays." But in an accent on the positive posited more often in the Montpellier newspaper, Doumergue concluded, 'La vague a passé. L'horizon est redevenu clair.'

Affirmations that the war would not last much longer also disappeared from both newspapers during this period. A reader asked Négis (1 July 1917), 'En admettant que la guerre dure encore jusqu'en 1918, que fera-t-on l'hiver prochain pour les familles...?
pouvez qui ont leur soutien mobilisé?" Answered the journalist.

without dispute this time over the war's length, 'Je dois avouer
que je n'en ai pas la moindre idée.' He suggested more government
aid. In Le Petit Méridional during this time Ribot admitted to
parliament that 'la guerre sous-marine est grave...' and that the
'la avril offensive...n'a peut-être pas donné tous les résultats
qu'on en attendait'. (23 May 1917.) On 29 May 1917, Ferdy blamed
censorship for holding back the facts from the public, and for
treating them 'en enfant mineur.... Les intérêts sacrés de la
defense nationale interdisaient, paraît-il, de donner trop de
détails sur notre pénurie de vivres ou sur l'importance des pertes
que nous cause la campagne de piraterie boche.' Anxiety and moral
fatigue shown by these examples corroborates Becker's findings that
during this time (as noted a Parisian) morale was no longer the
same. 4

Reporting of the long-expected German offensive in early 1918,
while not explicitly reflecting the moral fatigue described the
year before, conspicuously remained more neutral in tone, as
compared with accounts of previous battles. The offensive had been
predicted as early as 7 December 1917, the Marseille paper on that
date noting that Russia was negotiating peace with Germany.

Neither newspaper had held out great hope for Russia's
continued participation in the war, especially after the summer
offensive, and both covered the Bolshevik ('maximaliste')
revolution in considerable detail. Both newspapers agreed editorially that Russia would probably no longer be a strong ally, and that Lenin was making the situation worse. Neither paper reflected much optimism, and suggestions within articles indicated writers would have been even less optimistic had censors allowed them to be, such as in an article published on 7 May 1917, Ferdy indicating in a front-page leader his scepticism that both the Karensky revolution and the Russian army would succeed. 'Il s'agit de savoir si la nation qui s'est délivrée de la tyrannie tsariste aura la clairvoyance et l'énergie nécessaires pour compléter cette victoire de la liberté à l'intérieur par la victoire sur les ennemis du dehors.'

The next day the newspaper continued its reports of Lenin's progress in Russia, marked with a disapproving yet worried tone: 'Les attentats criminels des partisans de Lénine impressionnent profondément la population tout entière...' [of Russia]. While this article said Lenin was hated by the vast majority of Russians, Ferdy worried in an editorial 16 May 1917 that, as he stated in question form: 'va-t-elle [Russia] se laisser glisser au péril anarchique?'

Lenin's plan to make a separate peace with Germany was reported by Le Petit Provencal on 26 June 1917, the newspaper adding that such a plan would 'ruin the revolution'. But news of Lenin's advance in Russia continued throughout the summer, presented in strongly negative terms, and on 4 August the paper for the first time used the reference 'bolcheviste' instead of
Despite this negative tone, the newspaper reiterated its wish that Lenin would fail. Ferdy could not disguise his fear of Lenin's growing influence. He noted on 12 September 1917 that Kerensky's army was failing, as Russian troops were throwing down their arms in front of German soldiers, and predicted 'une véritable guerre civile'. Reports continuing that autumn presented to readers the increasing advancement of the Bolsheviks. 'Les maximalistes réalisent des progrès de plus en plus sensibles, de plus en plus étendus et nous devrions ajouter de plus en plus effrayants pour l'avenir de la Russie.' (24 October.)

Also fearing Lenin's success, Le Petit Méridional tried to find a local angle in its article published 9 May 1917, which declared that a group of Russians living in Montpellier were solidly opposed to Lenin, quoted as saying, 'Nous considérons Lenine et consorts comme agissant en pires ennemis de la liberté du peuple russe et de celle du monde entier.' On 22 July the newspaper, reflecting its usual predilection for optimism beyond that of its Marseille counterpart, argued that Kerensky's assumption of the office of président du conseil would deflect Bolshevik power. The headline read, 'L'élément probogue est désormais impuissant.' Nevertheless, the pessimism over the Russian situation exhibited by writers in April ('troublée, inquiétante') returned after the summer. Writing in the editorial space on page one on 8 September 1917, Alexandre Bérard declared 'une vive émotion' was seen in France at the news that Russian troops had left Riga. 'Certes, c'est un péril qui grandit.... Du fond du
The mood in reports of both newspapers continued to be anxious. Editorials laid blame on both the tsar and Lenin. It seems probable that this point of view was guided by censorship authorities, as was indicated by an article published in Le Petit méridional on 13 October 1917. Appearing in the editorial space, a leader signed 'Charles-Gras' noted that the author wished to make predictions concerning Russia, but censors prevented him, and he could only ask, 'Combien de temps durera le nouveau ministère de coalition dont on nous annonce la formation? [in Russia.]

This repeated skepticism regarding the longevity of the Kerensky government, beginning as it did only weeks after the March revolution, must have prepared readers for the announcement of its fall in November. On 9 November 1917 Le Petit Provencal announced 'graves événements' in Petrograd: 'Les forces maximalistes (Lenine) semblent actuellement dans la capitale avec une liberté qui indiquerait qu'ils ont réussi pour le moment d'être maître de la situation sans grandes difficultés.' The next day the newspaper announced, 'Le palais d'hiver a été pris par les révolutionnaires.... Dès 10 heures du matin, le 7 novembre, une proclamation du comité révolutionnaire militaire peut annoncer la chute de l'ancien gouvernement, et de la prise du pouvoir par les soviets.' The article continued by noting that the 'président du soviet de Pétrograde' was Trotsky, for the first time naming him...
and describing his Paris connection: 'Il a publié à Paris, en 1915, un petit journal russe \textit{Masch Golok} (Notre Voix), dont le gouvernement français dut suspendre la publication en même temps qu'il invitait Trotsky [sic.] à quitter notre territoire.'

Trotsky's French connection was introduced to Montpellier readers more than one month later, in an interview taken from \textit{Le Matin} of Paris. Trotsky was quoted as saying, 'J'ai longtemps réjoui à Paris. J'en ai même été expulsé par M. Malvy.' Neither newspaper noted, however, that Lenin had also lived in Paris before the war. \textit{Le Petit Méridional} had warned as early as 3 November 1917 of 'les bruits persistents relatifs à une action armée probable des maximalistes pour s'emparer du pouvoir'. On 9 November the newspaper reported that Bolcheviks had taken over the telegraphs, switchboards, and banks, and were 'maîtres de la capitale', reported under the headline, 'Le coup d'état des maximalistes'. The newspaper was not surprised. Writing in an unsigned front-page leader the next day, the newspaper stated, 'Les événements que l'on pressentait depuis déjà longtemps, se sont maintenant produits.' As for the possibility of Russia's continued participation in the war, 'on a dit, malheureusement, depuis quelques mois, considérer le front russe comme à peu près inexistant'. The writer expected an immediate redeployment of German troops, predicting 'des troupes autro-allemandes se trouvent dirigées sur le front franco-italien'. On 12 November Lenin's accession to power in Russia was reported, and on 25 November, Lenin's armistice proposals. The seizure of power by the Bolsheviki was described in considerable
...columns, which included a long account of the
Winter Palace.

_Le Petit Provençal_ also described the revolution in detail,
with a leader indicating his disapproval in a leader published 27 November:
"Trotzki, et consorts ne sont qu'une misérable faction qui
s'est installée en maîtresse impitoyable à la tête d'un pays
dépourvu de toute organisation, et ruiné par l'anarchie la plus extravagante en même
temps de la plus hideuse." On 4 December he predicted the peace
negotiations with Germany would be a disaster for Russia. The
negotiations were reported in considerable detail during these
weeks, under the permanent title, 'La trahison russe'. Announcement
of the conclusion of the armistice negotiations at Brest-Litovsk
was made by both newspapers on 18 December 1917. Probable severity
of the Russian losses was evident in a text of the armistice
proposal published by both newspapers on 18 December.

It is not possible to find a clear editorial tie in these
newspapers between events in Russia and changes in reporting of the
union sacrée. No writer suggested during this period that the two
were connected, although it is obvious that the decay of the union
in 1917 coincided with the gradual loss of confidence in Russia
marked by writers. It seems safe to say, however, that the somber
and generally pessimistic tone of these reports could hardly have
bolstered confidence in the minds of readers. Would this
increasingly pessimistic turn of events in Russia have strengthened
or diminished the union sacrée, which ipso facto demanded support
of the government as well as continued uncompromising participation
in the war? According to newspaper accounts covered in this study, events in Russia, reported in considerable detail, actually seem to have accompanied a separation of these two tenets of the union sacrée, as reflected in the closely-related changes in morale. While strength of support for continuation of the war seemed to be growing, strength of support for the French government seemed to be declining. Both of these changes were sustained and probably strengthened by the news of revolution as well as the news of subsequent parliamentary brawls and government jeremiads, which evoked increasing fear as the last year of war began.

In 1918 insinuations of disorder and revolution may have articulated two shifts in civilian morale which affected the waning influence of the union sacrée during this last year of war, a greater mistrust of French government ministers, and a greater fear of consequences of defeat. Evidence of these phenomena in French civilian society during this period can be shown by Clemenceau’s ability to wield authoritarian power, more and more politically motivated strikes denied publicity by tighter censorship, arrests and trials of former high government leaders, and published suggestions that ‘defeatists’ should be executed. Both newspapers reported December 1917 parliamentary debate over a proposal to strengthen punishment for ‘pacifism’. Adoption of the death penalty was proposed. While Clemenceau’s ministers did not advocate a solution that drastic, Le Petit Provençal in a parliamentary report 31 December 1917 quoted Nail, Clemenceau’s minister of justice, as suggesting free speech must be censored, even in private
Rising fear of a Russia-like revolution in France was encouraged by Clemenceau and apparently by censors as a way to reduce criticism of government policy. Clemenceau had used the tactic to aid his return to power, declaring in parliament in his denunciation of Malvy for not implementing Carnet B that ‘M. Malvy et M. Ribot ont dit qu’il n’y avait pas de mouvement révolutionnaire dans les grèves.... [but] L’anarchie antipatriotique s’est introduite trop souvent dans les mouvements grévistes. Voilà la vérité.’ (Le Petit Méridional, 23 July 1917; reported by Le Petit Provencal the same date.)

That this really was happening in Russia seemed to be made obvious to readers by the tone of reports between the summer and December 1917, and in an unusually violently anti-France interview of Trotsky reported in Le Petit Méridional 17 December that may have been passed by censors under the new Clemenceau ministry in a calculated attempt to reinforce the fear. The report quoted Trotsky as declaring,
bou de deux mois notre propagande pacifiste n'a pas arrêté la guerre, nous commencerons alors notre guerre à nous: la guerre sociale, une guerre si terrible que la bourgeoisie ne peut même pas l'imaginer.

The extremist tone of this statement seems to articulate an incipient conceptualisation of relations between Soviet Russia and the West which led to decades of paranoia. It likely played into the hands of Clemenceau, who reiterated periodically in the press his fearful predictions of a revolution at home. Parliament seemed to have done what it could to inadvertently help him out, as reflected in press accounts such as an incident reported in both newspapers on 19 January 1918. It began with violent arguments between politicians:

À ce moment, M. Mayeras se précipite à travers l'hémicycle, bondit sur Pugliesi-Conti et, dans un tourbillonnement qui emporte les députés restés au pied de la tribune, on voit s'échanger des coups de poing. Cependant, Pugliesi-Conti, qui est remonté à la tribune, a tiré de sa poche un revolver, qu'il garde à la main. Personne ne se hasarde à le rejoindre.

Police evacuated the chamber, after which Clemenceau commented, 'Nous sommes décidés à poursuivre les menées de guerre civile qu'elles soient royalistes, bonapartistes, ou celles de tout citoyen.'

Le Petit Provençal did not publish the alarmist interview of Trotsky. Nevertheless, repeated suggestions in these newspapers of
the danger of civil war, punctuated by violent altercations in the
very seat of democratic government, under a backdrop of revolution
striking a former ally of long standing, must have increased fear
in the minds of many readers who also were being warned that the
entire German army was redeploying for a massive offensive on the
western front. To this was added the revelations of the secret
treaties.

On 28 December 1917 first reference to Lenin's making public
of secret treaties between Russia and the allies, including France,
was published in Le Petit Méridional. Reported as part of
parliamentary debate, a deputy identified as Moutet declared that
secret treaties between France and Russia 'fut une faute de notre
diplomatie.... C'est depuis qu'a été connu le traité secret qui
donnait Constantinople à la Russie que semble s'être evanouie la
conception idéaliste de la guerre'. Moutet was described as having
gone into further detail, but these remarks were not published. The
speaker was accused by arch-conservative deputy Pugliesi-Conti of
'une trahison contre le pays' for his revelations. This debate was
not published in Le Petit Provencal, which did not reveal secret
treaties until 17 February 1918. On that date, and on 18 February
in Le Petit Méridional, the text of 'le traité secret de l'Italie
avec l'Entente' was published. The reports noted that the text,
dated 26 April 1915, had been published already in the Italian
press, and signed by all four allied powers. Concessions promised
to Italy were specified, including the Tyrol and Dodecanese
Islands. That authorities would allow published a treaty which
directly contradicted assertions by the allies that war was against German imperialism, and not for territorial gain, can possibly be explained by the continuing interest of the Clemenceau government in discrediting preceding ministries.

News of Russia was scarce in 1918, likely not because newspapers were no longer interested, but because little was available, as editors occasionally noted. Reports succeeded contradictory reports concerning the fate of the tsar and his family from December 1917 on, leading *Le Bayard* finally to lampoon the press confusion over events in Russia in its issue of 13 July 1918:

Les événements en Russie (retardés en transmission). Les maximalistes ont mitraillé ce matin les minimalistes qui ont fusillé un certain nombre de soviétistes, lesquels ont pendu ou noyé quelques contradicteurs.... Le tsar a été assassiné hier. Ce matin, il a pris son café au lait. A dix heures, il a été guillotiné. A midi il a déjeuné avec sa famille. Le soir on l'a enterré. Demain, le tsar sera transféré dans une contrée plus calme. (Reuter.)

Publication of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk in *Le Petit Provençal* on 5 March 1918 delineated major concessions made by the Russians. Although *Le Petit Méridional* did not publish this full text, it seemed shocked by its harsh terms, observing in a front-page leader signed, 'P.M.' on 27 February 1918, 'Le coup de Brest-Litovsk renseigne avec éclat l'Europe, et les Amériques, et l'Orient. On ne peut faire aucun fort sur la parole germanique.'
Le Petit Provençal made no similar observation, but did note in an insertion of 14 May 1918 that, in addition to the published treaty, according to a Swiss newspaper several 'secret' clauses of the treaty included the demand for Russia to give Poland to Germany. Publication of the harsh treaty terms likely was allowed by the government in an attempt to restore as much of the union sacrée as possible before the expected German offensive. It is difficult to ascertain from press reports that this was indeed effective, but certainly it would have strengthened the government's viewpoint, that compromise with Germany was impossible. What might have weakened a renewal of the union sacrée, however, at least in the eyes of some socialist readers, were reports that the allies intended to oppose Lenin's revolutionary government by military means.

During this time both newspapers revealed that allied troops were being sent to Russia as a counter-revolutionary force. Montpellier readers learned about the intervention first, in a one-line report published 8 April 1918 that, along with the Japanese, 'des troupes anglaises ont débarqué également à Vladivostok.' On 28 May the same newspaper Pierre Lafue wrote in the front-page leader space, 'Les alliés doivent-ils pratiquer en Russie une politique interventionniste?' Observing that Russia was currently characterised by 'l'anarchie la plus complète', he concluded, 'Il faut intervenir en Russie, théoriquement contre l'Allemagne, mais pratiquement aussi-il ne peut être autrement--contre les Bolcheviks.'
Readers of *Le Petit Provencal* did not learn of allied intervention in Russia until 25 June, in a report borrowed from the *Morning Post* that the U.S. and European allies had made an accord 'pour venir en aide à la Russie'. The article added, 'C'est une affirmation injustifiée que de prétendre que les alliés s'embrangent dans un projet d'agression dissimulée ou appuient secrètement soit le parti républicain, soit le parti monarchique de Russie.' *Le Petit Provencal* also supported this action, Ferdy writing in a 30 July 1918 leader, 'La Russie, abominablement tyrannisée depuis de trop longs mois par les bandits bolchevistes au pouvoir, ne pourra que gagner à cette intervention des soldats japonais et des soldats alliés.' A report the same day, however, advised that the socialist minoritaires condemned the intervention.

Realisation of the severity of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, combined with parliamentary disorder and dire warnings from Clemenceau, appeared in conjunction with repeated speculation by the press over the date of the expected major German offensive. The tension and paranoia of early 1918 seems to be reflected in a commentary by Mégis published 30 March 1918 in *Le Petit Provencal*. Concerning the public and governmental preoccupation with 'defeatists', Mégis declared that he had heard people exclaim often on hearing news of a war death, 'Quelle horrible guerre! Quand donc finira-t-elle?' and that comment should not be thought of as 'defeatist'.

Pour ma part, j'ai entendu cette exclamation dans la bouche de gens très droits, très
patriotes. L'idée ne m'est pas venue de les dénoncer comme défaitistes. Sous la Terreur, on usait d'un vocable de cet ordre: 'liberticide'. Quiconque se plaignait des excès des révolutionnaires-ils en commirent, hélas-était traité de liberticide et dénoncé aux comités. Cela a fait commettre de terribles injustices.

Prenons garde de tomber dans les mêmes excès.

Preparations made by the press and government for reportage of the 1918 German offensive were carefully explained to readers. Most acutely articulated was the need to avoid the *bourrane de crâne* of 1914. Writing in his occasional 'letter from the front' in *Le Petit Provencal*, Paul Abram on 8 March 1918 complained that some newspapers were still publishing *bourrane de crâne*. He asked these editors to fall into step with the advice of the government. 'Que l'on ne nous représente plus un insuccès comme un bienfait, ou la trahison russe comme un événement de peu d'importance!' On 22 March 1918 *Le Petit Provencal* published the government's advice concerning reporting of the offensive:

> Seuls pourront être publiés: comptes rendus des événements, les communiqués d'opérations émanant du G.Q.G. et les articles émanant des missions de correspondants de guerre accrédités....

In addition, no reports or commentary should contradict the official versions, and it was important that 'leurs conclusions ne soient pas entachées d'exagération ou accompagnés de commentaires qui puissent renseigner l'ennemi'.
While *Le Petit Méridional* did not publish these guidelines, its observations on the expected offensive suggested it also planned to report the battles in a restrained tone. An example was an article in the front-page leader space written by Étienne Coulon, who stated:

Depuis des mois, les Allemands nous menacent de leur prochaine et terrible offensive.... Qu'avons-nous à redouter? Sans doute encore beaucoup de ruines, de deuils et de pertes matérielles. Mais que seraient les conséquences de la défaite en regard du prix de la victoire? Un esclavage sans nom dans une France misérable et déshonorée.

Also with more realism Paul Abram, in his 20 February 1918 letter, described in *Le Petit Provençal* the evolution of tactics. Rifles, he candidly observed, were now useless, given to infantry only to inspire confidence, and seldom used. Bayonet charges also were useless. ‘Plus de charges héroïques, aux baïonnettes sous le soleil, drapeaux déployés, clairons sonnants.’ Despite ‘la laideur apparente de la tâche’, however, he still believed it to be a noble one, because soldiers were fighting to ‘save France’.

The tone of realistic determination, which did reflect the *mission sacrée* in its assumption that the war must continue, seemed to have been met with approval from censors who allowed the material to stand. Subsequent news of the actual German offensive reflected these prescriptions in its comparatively neutral stance.
In fact, the shock of the offensive, though predicted numerous times, still seemed to have brought some brief sense of renewal of the original concept of the union sacrée, a tie of all French people against the invader, if only for the first few weeks of battle, and only in Le Petit Méridional. Wrote Doumergue in the newspaper's front-page leader spot on 1 April 1918, 'Les polémiques de partis étaient en train de s'élever à un ton qu'elles avaient à peine atteint dans le temps de paix' in the months preceding the offensive. But 'la brusquerie et la violence de l'offensive ont suscité à l'arrière les mêmes miracles qu'à l'avant.... L'unanimité s'est faite spontanément pour soutenir la lutte, pour ne pas faiblir....' But Le Petit Provencal published no similar optimistic commentary concerning the union sacrée, and writers in the Montpellier newspaper did not make the same assertions again. While evidence of renewal of some union sacrée aspects seems to have been reflected in articles during this period, there is little evidence that writers and readers felt the same sentiments as they had in 1914.

Despite the more neutral stance of press accounts compared to those of previous battles, negative news of the first weeks' conflicts was presented differently by the two newspapers. Le Petit Méridional announced the beginning of the offensive on 23 March 1918, an attack on eighty kilometres of the front. By 25 March, most of the front page was filled with news of 'l'attaque en masses profondes', including bombardment of Paris. On 26 March the first clear evidence of allied retreats was reported: 'Lancés en masses
profondes sur les ligues anglaises, les troupes du kaiser ont fait momentanément fléchir nos alliés.... Mais à chaque nouveau pas en avant, la ruée perd de sa force.'

This attempt to emphasise the positive did not exist to the same degree in Le Petit Provençal. First news of the attack was not reported at all on 23 March. Marius Richard finally writing on 25 March of his skepticism: 'Nous ne pouvons que paraphraser les communiqués et ceux-ci sont tellement sobres de détails qu'en fait nous n'avons rien à apprendre à nos lecteurs.' Describing the local reaction, an unsigned article observed, 'Paris bombardé, c'était Paris menacé, et chacun se laissait aller aux craintes les plus exaspérées.' But the article continued with the observation that bombardment was made by new long-range German artillery, and 'on s'était alarmé trop vite'. Continuing war coverage headlines and commentary articulated a point of view much more realistically specific than that of Le Petit Méridional. Richard admitting, 'Nos alliés ont reculé d'environ quinze kilomètres sans se laisser dialoguer'. Writing 27 March, Ferdy observed that long preparation by the Germans forced the loss of some territory: 'Comme il arrive toujours en pareil cas, les débuts d'une offensive apparaissent comme favorables à ceux qui donnent l'assaut.' The next day it was reported that 'L'ennemi a encore réalisé aujourd'hui quelques progrès....' On 29 March, Ferdy wrote in his front-page leader, 'Jusqu'à présent, les assaillants ont obligé les troupes alliées à des replis qu'il faut déplorer et dont il serait pêchu de vouloir
dissimuler la réelle importance. La situation [censored space of one half line] reste grave."

Retreats were also described 27 March in *Le Petit Méridional*, twenty-five kilometres total by 25 March, yet 'nos contre-attaques retardent la poussée allemande'. But the front-page headline 3 April declared, 'L'ennemi est arrêté partout'. Succeeding days' reports described how the German attacks had 'failed', but after the middle of the month, all news of battles on the western front dropped to nearly nothing save exhortations to 'hold on'.

In *Le Petit Provencal*, on the other hand, reports of battles continued during this period, articles recounting German troop losses in addition to allied losses. On 11 April Richard admitted German troops had inflicted 'un échec grave' on the allies, 'mais non pas irréparable....' Three days later he continued, 'La situation est grave, sans doute, pour nous mais elle est loin d'être désespérée....' Still, he concluded, 'Aujourd'hui, ce sont des roches qui apparaissent comme les continuateurs de la pratique napoleoniennne. Et cela est triste à constater.' Again on 22 April, he wrote that the enemy was pausing to regroup forces, but

en dehors d'un gain territorial important, il est vrai, il n'a atteint aucun de ses objectifs essentiels.... Il a besoin d'en finir avant que l'Amérique n'ait jeté dans la lutte le poids formidable de ses forces.... Nous allons rapidement, à mon sens, vers des événements formidables et qui pourraient être décisifs.
Battle news in *Le Petit Provençal* continued throughout the spring under the permanent title, 'La grande bataille'. On 2 June, Richard admitted German troops had again reached the same point they had reached in September 1914. The story was told under a pessimistic headline, 'Les Allemands tentent de marcher sur Paris'.

*Le Petit Méridional* ignored all of this. Little of the German advance was reported to Montpellier readers until 31 May, when an unsigned leader admitted, 'La situation est assurément sérieuse.... [but] Il n'est pas permis, même à cette heure grave, de douter de la victoire finale. Sachons tenir et patienter encore.' On 10 June began a series of articles on how Paris might be best defended. Differences in reportage of this battle are striking: while both newspapers added hopeful predictions of the final outcome, *Le Petit Provençal* tempered those statements more strongly, while describing in specific detail the serious losses. *Le Petit Méridional*, conversely, responded to the crisis during several weeks by dropping coverage altogether, perhaps believing it was doing its duty to the union sacrée and preservation of morale by keeping bad news from its readers. The censor may have been to blame, as *Le Petit Provençal*'s more negative comments showed greater evidence of censorship blanks. But no archival evidence in censorship files has been found to piece together the story of why these two newspapers differed so drastically in their coverage of this battle. While it is possible the censors in Montpellier were more strict than those in Marseille, the operation of censorship in France was strongly centralized, with orders usually emanating from Paris. It seems
WHERE THE BURDEN OF PROOF LIES ON THE CASE OF MISSING COVERAGE ON CENSORSHIP. More likely, the Montpellier newspaper itself decided to report the battle in this manner.

By July 1918, articles covering the battle shifted in tone from negative or hortatory to optimistic, yet tempered by extreme caution. Reporting a three- to seven-kilometre allied gain on 20 July, Richard wrote, 'Oui, je sais, ne nous pressons pas trop de chanter victoire, car nous pouvons encore avoir de mauvaises heures, mais ce qui est acquis est acquis.... Ce n'est pas du bourrage de crâne que de constater cela.' Finally, on 23 August, Feny declared that 'la victoire est en tout cas certaine'.

Le Petit Méricional was even more cautious. Writing in the front-page leader space on 18 August, Doumergue agreed allied victories were encouraging, but 'C'est quand tout va bien ou paraît bien aller que l'attention se relâche, que l'effort s'atténue, que l'optimisme devient exagéré, et qu'on cesse de se tenir sur ses gardes. Nous ne sommes pas encore défiitivement victorieux.' As late as 1 September 1918, he again cautioned, 'Il ne faut évidentemt pas chanter victoire, tant que l'ennemi ne se reconnaît pas battu et ne sollicite pas la paix. La guerre est faite de surprises.' Also on this date for the first time Le Petit Méricional made an admission that the situation had been 'grave' earlier: 'Il y a à peine deux mois notre situation paraissait très grave. Elle l'était, en effet.' Finally on 5 October an article argued Alberc Milhaud concluded, 'Il n'est plus personne qui doute aujourd'hui de la paix par la victoire, de la paix libératrice.'
As rumours of armistice spread through Montpellier in November 1918, censors apparently worried again that agitation might be dangerous to public order. The newspaper, under pressure from the public as well as censors, chose this time to edify readers concerning the situation, explaining on 8 November,

La nouvelle se répandait de plus en plus et la foule se pressait devant la Préfecture, devant le "Petit Méridional".... Pour déferer aux instructions de la censure, qui désirait éviter au public toute cause d'énervement, nous nous abstinmes de faire à tous ces bruits la moindre allusion dans notre édition de l'après-midi. Mais, devant l'importance de plus en plus grande qu'ils présentent, nous avons le devoir de dire publiquement qu'à l'heure où nous mettons sous presse aucune communication officielle ne nous est parvenue qui nous permette de déclarer que l'armistice est signé.

In announcing the armistice on 12 November, the Montpellier newspaper observed that thousands of persons awaited the edition in front of the newspaper's offices. The edition left the presses and 'fut littéralement arraché des mains des vendeurs par le public enthousiaste....' This observation seems to show that despite more than four years of perverting censorship, readers still relied on these newspapers for credible reports. Observations in Le Petit Méridional agreed with this, noting on 12 November that 'Nos crieurs furent littéralement assaillis. On les immobilisait, les mains se
les feuilles s'envolaient au bout des bras. "Ca y est! Ca y est! criait-on de toutes parts.'

On reflection, however, journalists were sometimes less positive. Négis complained on 13 November that 'la fête se fait passer dans le noir' due to power conservation restrictions. 'Est-ce que pour un soir on n'aurait pas pu faire un petit effort? Ce n'est pas tous les jours que nous reprenons l'Alsace et la Lorraine.' More seriously on 14 November, Négis observed that as the war lengthened, the idea of victory had changed. 'Vainqueurs, nous savions que nous le serions, mathématiquement, par la force des choses. Mais nous nous étions fait peu à peu à l'idée d'une victoire mitigée, une victoire de compensations, de concessions mutuelles.' He admitted, however, that he personally had not even expected the allied victory to be as complete as it was. This commentary may again show the effect of censorship on Le Petit Provencal, for during the war the newspaper did not admit such misgivings. While censorship continued to leave blanks in the newspaper after the war, some reports were allowed for the first time during this period, including, on 27 December, an article in Le Petit Provencal with a complete total of men lost in the French army: 1,040,000 killed, 311,000 missing. This figure had not been published by the end of 1918 in Le Petit Méridional. Concerning news of local trade union activity, so often censored, the extent of disagreement between the editors of Le Petit Provencal and the Bouches-du-Rhône workers was illustrated by a trade union declaration published 19 November: 'L'Union départementale des
Neither newspaper reaffirmed support of the union sacrée at this time, nor did they contend that the union still existed. It seems that with the exception of a brief reknitting of the union during the first weeks of the 1918 German offensive, the union sacrée by the war's end as reported by these newspapers retained only its power to hold the majority of French people on a grim determined quest to support a hated war, and a government tolerated as the only alternative to Russia-like anarchy. The newspapers showed rejoicing that the war was at an end. They did not show the same level of support for the government in power on 11 November 1918.

II. Political Aspects of the Gauche

It seems possible to separate material related to strikes and workers' movements during this period into three chronological parts. The first is based on material published before May 1917. The second covers the 'crisis of 1917', those movements of May and June which surprised authorities' and led to an aftermath of
parliamentary revelations and recriminations, surveillance of morale through the postal system, stronger prosecution of pacifists and labour agitators, and finally the Clemenceau ministry and repressions in 1918. The third part covers material published between the end of June 1917 and the armistice. While this part addresses a period of much greater length than the other two, the newspapers examined here seem to exhibit continuity throughout in their approach to coverage of labour issues.

The first section of coverage reflects nearly without exception strike coverage limited to movements in Paris. Although Le Petit Provençal did publish on 1 May 1917 a declaration by the Bouches-du-Rhône S.F.I.O., asking not for a strike but announcing an evening meeting 'proclamer que rien n'a pu ni éteindre ou dimmer la flamme vive de votre idéal...,' the only report in the newspaper of May Day demonstrations came from Paris. 'Lorsque les manifestants sont arrivés boulevard Magenta,' reported the newspaper, 'la police est intervenue et a pu les disperser sans peine.' (2 May 1917.) Le Petit Méridional reported on 2 May only that the socialist C.A.P. (central administrative body), while reiterating its demands for an eight-hour day, had asked workers not to strike. The report did add that the 'Comité de défense syndicaliste, tendance Zimmerwaldien', had adopted an 'ordre du jour', its contents not reported.

First report of a strike during this time came 19 May 1917, from Paris 'midinettes'. 'Un établissement a été envahi par les
prévista; des vitres ont été brisées. Des arrestations ont été opérées. La Petit Provencal reported 9 May 1917 the salary-related demands of Avignon railway workers, and described in its first strike report during this period the Paris 'midinettes' strike the day after the Montpellier newspaper's article. Both newspapers noted 20 May that this strike ended after wage and work-week concessions were made with help from Malvy, but reported 22 April that 6,000 workers had struck again after employers refused to give them an 'English week'. These articles marked the start of a long series of strike reports from Paris throughout the rest of the month; 'corsetières, fourneurs, pelletteries', (25 May); 'bijoutières, banques, magasins, caoutchoucrites' (26 May); 'employés de l'alimentation, restaurants, bouillons, machinieres, boutonnières, société de câbles électriques', (27 May), etc. The Montpellier newspaper established a permanent title, 'Le mouvement gréviste à Paris', on 26 May, and the Marseille newspaper, 'Les grèves à Paris', on 27 May. Both newspapers reported 20,000 workers on strike in Paris on the latter date.

Daily reports of new Paris strikes, and strike settlements, continued in both newspapers through 1 June. On 27 May Négis defended the strikers, remarking that 'le prix de la vie a doublé depuis deux ans, tandis que les salaires sont restés ce qu'ils étaient'. He called it a 'crise sociale'.

The first report of a local strike marks the beginning of the second part, which overlaps the first; on 30 May Le Petit Méditerranéen reported that in Meze, 'Les ouvrières de l'aiguille.
It is to be noted that before this date, reports of local strikes were almost non-existent in Le Petit Provencal, despite police reports indicating strikes did take place (see graphs). No documents have been found in censorship archives to indicate whether this decision was made by authorities or editors, but in this instance it appears strikers themselves were determined to have their demands published, censorship or not. The argument that local strikes of June 1917 were reported over the opposition of the censor because the workers themselves threatened newspaper offices is supported by a similar incident in Toulouse. In June 1917, strikers invaded offices of La Dépêche and threatened to break up equipment if the newspaper did not overrule the censor and publish...
their demands, which it did. More and more from this date until the armistice protest against censorship shifted from journalists and politicians to labour and political parties.

The Marseille strikes also were reported 2 June in Le Petit Méridional, the article observing tailors, dockers, metallurgists, tramway workers, and P.T.T. (post office) workers were out. Le petit Provençal was not as specific at this time, reporting only meetings of their trade unions. Both newspapers continued to report Paris strikes. Reports in the Marseille newspaper 4 June reflected metallurgists asking Malvy by telegram to negotiate a wage increase, a delegation of dockers meeting with employers, 'employés de commerce' asking for a wage increase of at least 20 percent, sack and dye workers already on strike, and P.T.T. workers on strike. Malvy was quoted 5 June saying he had two choices, 'une politique de répression et une politique de confiance envers les ouvriers', and that he would choose the latter. Marseille strike reports continued daily to cover many trades until 13 June, after which strike reports, both local and from Paris, no longer appeared.

In Le Petit Méridional, strike reports included descriptions of those in Paris and Nîmes, the latter one of the rare ones described as political: 'Les grèves ou plutôt les pacifistes

manifestations de nos midinettes se poursuivent....' (6 June 1917.)
The first report of a strike actually in Montpellier was published
6 June, under the misleading permanent title, 'La vie chère', 190
women workers. Under the same title the next day, the newspaper
reported thirty seamstresses, after meeting at Place de la Comédie,
moved from factory to factory inciting other workers to join the
strike. On 10 June, the newspaper reported Montpellier strikes of
seamstresses, plus lingerie workers, department store employees,
printing employees, and thirty-five men from hat-making industries.
Local and national reports of strikes continued until 12 June, when
they abruptly disappeared from the newspaper. Likely this date
coinciding so closely with the last strike report in Le Petit
Provençal is no coincidence, but followed a decision by censorship
authorities to eliminate strike reports, although local archival
research shows no evidence that this was done. In contrast, La
Droite of Toulouse, according to Bouyoux, published few strike
reports during all of June; 'La censure interdisait de parler des
grèves, ou des menaces de grèves, autorisant seulement la mention
de "demandes"....' Before strikes disappeared in these newspapers,
Le Havre found it possible to satirise the movements (2 June):

Les grèves de Paris ont eu fatalement leur répercussion à Marseille. En effet, au moment
où nous mettons sous presse nous apprenons que de nombreuses corporations viennent de dresser
l'étendard de la révolte.

Bouyoux, Pierre. Ibid., 366.
Les ramasseurs de mégots se sont distingués par la violence de leurs réclamations. Depuis longtemps, ils se plaignaient du sans-gêne des fumeurs qui ont la prétention de 'tirer' jusqu'au bout leurs cigares ou leurs cigarettes....

Following this series of strike reports, the third period in both newspapers is distinguished by elliptical reports of trade union meetings, and by censorship. Both newspapers published a long and candid parliamentary debate covering these issues in editions of 23 July, including the first published speech by Clemenceau since the beginning of the war. Clemenceau castigated Malvy for not implementing the *carnet tête de mort* and disagreed with the government's assertion that the strikes had no revolutionary content, as noted above. In an oblique reference to the army mutinies, Clemenceau declared 'qu'il y a eu relation entre les incidents militaires en question et des grèves qui ont donc un caractère révolutionnaire'.

It seems possible to argue that Clemenceau had used this tactic, publicly declaring the threat of army mutiny and revolution, previously to galvanise his political power, during the 1907 vineyard strike in Bas-Languedoc. At that time, 'Cette mutinerie...sauve le gouvernement Clemenceau fortement ébranlé par les attaques des députés'. Writing after the war, Léon Daudet said the effect of Clemenceau's speech was 'immense. It startled the whole nation'.

No further reports of strikes or union activity appeared in either newspaper during the summer, but censored articles did appear in Le Petit Provençal, such as an example published 1 August 1917: ‘L'Union syndicale des marins et pêcheurs du commerce réunis en France (section de Marseille) adresse à ses adhérents l'appel suivant:

CENSURE.’

between 1 September, when both newspapers announced Malvy's resignation, and the end of the year, only two vague references to workers' movements were reported in Le Petit Provençal. One, borrowed from Le Figaro, declared military aviation factory workers threatened to strike, but the government had decided to ‘ne pas tolérer une agitation’ which might threaten a national defense industry. The other article on 8 October reported a strike by Paris bus and tram workers.

That trade union material was being censored is indicated by a complaint from Union départementale des syndicats ouvriers du département des Bouches-du-Rhône published 15 October, decrying cuts made in the organisation's brochures. Seventeen lines were censored from this article.

As in 1916, Le Petit Méridional reflected a substantially larger amount of published material covering labour matters than did its Marseille counterpart. Twelve articles on this theme were published between 1 September and 31 December 1917, seven of them

Clemenceau, A Stormy Life (London, 1940, translated by Elizabeth G. Echlin), 190.
reporting strikes in Paris and elsewhere. Other reports covered regional conferences of the C.G.T. (trade union congress) and of trade unions. A 29 September report of strikes in Paris aviation factories included a complaint from L'Oeuvre that the strike had been in progress eight days before newspapers were allowed to report it. The actual word 'grève' was almost never used in reports after June 1917, replaced by 'conflit de travail' or similar phrases. No local strikes were reported between June 1917 and the end of 1918, although statistics show twelve strikes took place in the department of Hérault in 1917, and nine in 1918. The Montpellier newspaper published few articles covering trade union matters in 1918. Two strikes in Paris were noted, and disagreements between C.G.T. minoritaires (who opposed government conduct and pursuit of the war) and majoritaires (who supported the government) were reflected in a conference report published 17 July 1918: 'Les minoritaires et majoritaires se livrent à un véritable combat; des coups sont échangés...'.

Mutinies of the army in May-June 1917, suggest some writers, were not made public before the armistice. This was not quite true in 1917, although references were sketchy, and is not true at

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All in 1918. Accounts of the trial of Malvy were published in considerable detail in July 1918 in both newspapers. On 21 July, Le Petit Méridional quoted Painlevé's declaration that 'Je suis persuadé dans ma conscience que M. Malvy n'a pas de responsabilité appreciable dans les mutineries militaires de juin'. Instead he blamed the 'déception causée par les résultats de l'offensive d'avril'. After a strong critique of tactics of the offensive published in the Montpellier newspaper 1 August and signed Charles Chaumet, deputy from Gironde, ('l'entraînement professionnel des combattants était insuffisant, le service de santé laissait à désirer.....'), the mutinies are again referred to 5 August, now under a sub-headline 'Les mutineries militaires'. Similar references are made in Le Petit Provençal of 'des mutineries qui gagnèrent de nombreux régiments'. (17 July.) While they were not emphasised by large front-page headlines, it would seem impossible for even the casual reader to miss them.

Le Petit Provençal in 1918 published sixty-seven articles covering trade union matters. Of these, fifty were censored in part or in their entirety, leaving only headlines. Between 30 October 1918 and 5 November 1918, the newspaper published seven times the headline 'Chez les boulangers', followed by a block of white space and the word 'censuré'. Censored material addressed a strike of about 200 of 543 bakers in the city. Conscripted labour was called in to replace striking workers. It is hard to explain the...
newspaper's continued insistence on wasting space with blank columns day after day. Perhaps it shows simple obstinacy, even the defiance echoed by the newspaper's periodic criticism of censorship.

Concerning material covering socialist topics, both newspapers illustrated a discourse of considerable magnitude during this period. Debate concerning the possibility of French socialists attending the Stockholm Conference of international socialists in the spring of 1917 was covered in detail, although in the beginning it was presented from a negative context in *Le Petit Méridional*, under the permanent title, 'La piège de Stockholm'. Presentation in *Le Petit Provençal* is more neutral, but Ferdy in a front-page leader 1 May condemned 'le caractère boche de la conférence'. In a leader published 11 May, Ferdy feared that socialist debate over the conference would lead the party further toward schism, as *majoritaires* separated from *minoritaires*, the former voting in favour of sending delegates, provoking 'la définitive rupture...entre la majorité et la minorité'.

Progress of the *minoritaire* faction during this period can be traced in socialist congress reports. An article in the Marseille newspaper 28 May reported a 'centriste' group had formed to attempt a compromise between the two sides, but an account of a socialist C.A.P. report published 27 July 1917 indicated two *majoritaires* and two *minoritaires* had shared the responsibility for a new report planning the responsibility of the war on colonialism, capitalism, imperialism, as well as German militarism. Nevertheless, 'trois
J. Chaliens de la Commission ont voté contre

...
Le Petit Méridional, consistent with previous war years, did not report socialist matters in as much detail as did its Marseille counterpart. Very little socialist material relating to majoritaires can be found in the newspaper in the summer of 1917, except a small cryptic report 18 July that they had met in Paris and had approved an ‘ordre du jour’, which was not described. The Bordeaux congress and majoritaire/minoritaire disputes are covered in detail similar to that offered by Le Petit Provençal. A report of the Gard department socialist federation meeting 11 February 1918 noted the minoritaire tendency had by far the majority of votes. Socialist disagreement was again explored in detail in reports of meetings beginning 22 July, reflecting in a declaration by Fernand Loriot, leader of the anti-war socialist group C.R.R.I, the Kienthalian viewpoint: ‘Le seul moyen de mettre fin à la guerre, c’est la révolution internationale.’ An account of socialist votes published 31 July indicated the minoritaire faction had gained the majority. An article published 11 October confirmed that the ‘Motion Longuet’ (minoritaire) had been approved 1,528 to 1,112. These indications that the minority had become the majority may be compared with the date reported by modern historians, July 1918.1

Reports of local socialists reflect assessments that Bouches-du-Rhône rallied early to the minoritaire viewpoint, while Hérault

supported the *majoritaire*. 'On voit *Le Petit Provencal* rester fidèle jusqu'au bout à la ligne adoptée en août 1914, alors même que la fédération S.F.I.O des Bouches-du-Rhône se riait au pacifisme.' \(^{16}\) 'Les mandats de l'Hérault, durant cette période, continuent à se porter en grande majorité, sinon en totalité, sur les actions présentées par Thomas et ses amis,' that is, supporting the government's war aims and actions. \(^{17}\) This position of the Hérault party was reflected in an article in *Le Petit Méridional* 23 May 1917, but no report of the local view was published between this date and the armistice. *Le Petit Provencal* published a manifesto of the Bouches-du-Rhône party 21 May 1917, declaring support of Stockholm and *la reprise immédiate des rapports internationaux entre les diverses sections de l'Internationale ouvrière*. Five later reports of local socialist meetings were censored in part, until an article published 5 October 1918 asserted that at a Bouches-du-Rhône socialist congress, *'La politique minoritaire fut sanctionnée une fois de plus.* After the Paris congress report of 8-11 October 1918, the local group congratulated the *minoritaires* and concluded that action of the proletariat would now lead to *la paix socialiste* telle que l'a définie glorieusement la république des soviets


This position on the extreme left of the party indicates that the considerable difference between the two departments' socialists which existed before the war survived through the conflict to reassert itself in published accounts of these newspapers. Related to this divergence were denunciations by the Bouches-du-Rhône group of a Clemenceau government (published 14 November 1917), and of the conviction and banishment of Louis Malvy, former interior minister, accused of encouraging defeatism (published 10 August 1918).

The Marseille newspaper agreed with the party on the latter two issues. Ferdy, writing of a Clemenceau ministry 5 November 1917, said that such a probability 'fait frémir d'effroi et d'horreur la plupart des gens que l'on qualifie ou qui se qualifient eux-mêmes de gens bien pensants'. Concerning Malvy's banishment, Ferdy's tone of outrage was palpable. He noted that the war had not prevented 'les Camelots du Roy et leurs complices avoués ou honteux de manigancer leur sale besogne politique....' (12 August 1918.) From the Hérault party's point of view nothing was reported, but La Petite Méridionale disagreed with its Marseille counterpart. Although its first reference to Clemenceau in a leader was not published until 1 April 1918, Blaquiére wrote, 'Georges Clemenceau a incarné l'âme de la France en guerre.... Vive Clemenceau!' Malvy's conviction left the newspaper less enthusiastic, but in an unsigned leader 8 August 1918, it declared it would remain neutral 'dans un drame dont nous ne connaissons ni les dessous, ni les mobiles réels, ni les à-côtés. Certes, nous ne
nous ne pouvons pas être irrités par la violence et l'exagération des attaques.
Chapter Eleven:

Censorship May 1917-31 December 1918

I. Operation

The most obvious alteration to the regime of censorship during this period was the advent of the Clemenceau ministry beginning 14 November 1917. A number of writers relate the story of how the formerly anti-censorship director of L'Homme Enchainé, which reverted to L'Homme Libre with the accession of Clemenceau, advised censors in November. Captain Ernest Nusillard, who had been appointed director of the Bureau de la Presse after Gautier's liaison position was eliminated 23 September 1917, was reported to have met with Clemenceau on 17 November. Nusillard is said to have asked Clemenceau if he now planned to eliminate censorship, to which he replied, 'Moi? Supprimer la censure? Je ne suis pas tout à fait idiot! Non, jamais! Vous êtes mes meilleurs gendarmes!'

"Paris (Château de Vincennes), Service historique de l'armée de la terre (S.H.A.T.), Carton 5N336."
Clemenceau added, however, according to one account, "seulement, j'ai mes petites idées sur la question." The effect these ideas had on the operation of censorship in 1918 is disputed by writers on the subject. Galabru contends that seizures and suspensions disappeared, and that "les "échoppages" sont devenues l'exception, et semble-t-il, n'interviennent jamais en matière strictement politique." This viewpoint is disputed by another contemporary, Billy, who asked a censor in December 1917 if the war had changed. "Bref, rien ne change?" "Ou si peu de chose." Berger and Allard describe one change; before Clemenceau, the government did not concern itself with the day-to-day censorship operation. After, Georges Mandel, Clemenceau's powerful secretary, issued a stream of directives, and "Très vite, on l'a vu, le régime des coupures, atténuations, prémonitions, a repris et même s'est fortifié," with one exception, that newspapers were now allowed to criticize Clemenceau, they contend.


"Delivois, René, Ibid.

"Galabru, L., La liberté individuelle et la liberté de la presse en temps de guerre (Montauban, 1918), 101.

"Billy, André, La guerre des journaux (Paris, 1919), 84."
According to primary documents, an unsigned directive to censors dated 22 November 1917 does reflect a new view on the sphere of influence inhabited by the censor:

La plus grande liberté de discussion est laissée en toute matière politique, y compris les attaques contre les personnes. En ce qui concerne les articles pacifistes, les journaux qui les présenteraient seront prévenus qu’en les publiant ils engageraient leur responsabilité.... Il ne doit rien être publié qui puisse troubler l’ordre public et notamment sur les faits de grève, sur les réunions préparatoires, ou les convocations de travailleurs en vue de grèves.... Les informations militaires et diplomatiques doivent être censurées d’après les instructions en vigueur.

It is possible to attempt a quantitative analysis of material to gauge the extent of censorship as it operated under Clemenceau. As noted in chapter ten, it was clear in 1918 that strike reports were censored, and this reflects the thrust of the directive above. Analyses of other aspects may be found in the appendix; notable is the fact that 'consignes générales' directing censorship commissions to stop material covering specific subjects dropped substantially under Clemenceau. An analysis of orders for censorship specifically for Marseille breaks the material into

Hébrard, M., and Allard, P., Les secrets de la censure pendant la guerre. 245.

This experiment shows that in 1918, despite the directive of 22 November 1917, military censorship decreased, and political censorship increased, but not as much as censorship of 'home front' issues, that is, strikes, trade union news, etc. In Montpellier directives for seizures of publications decreased. It may be true, therefore, that censors shifted their thematic emphases, but it seems that censorship was no less harsh under Clemenceau.

Poincaré after the war asserted that 'Clemenceau m'explique qu'il a l'intention de relâcher la censure, de ne prendre aucune mesure préventive contre les journaux. Je le mets en garde contre le danger d'une liberté totale.' Clemenceau's strongman tactics as président du conseil make this assertion appear incredible, but Berger and Allard believe Clemenceau truly did intend to relax censorship. Clemenceau's reliance on Mandel's energy may help explain continued vigour of censorship through 1919, when it was finally eliminated with a last 'consigne générale' dated 15 October 1919.

Gabriel-Robinet, L., *La censure*, 152, quote taken from Poincaré's memoirs.


Paris ( Nanterre), Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine (B.D.I.C.), cartons F270 Rés CNS.
Before Clemenceau entered the government, organisation of the Service de la presse had undergone a substantial change in May 1917. According to the 21 April 1918 report emanating from Commander Bordeaux in the war ministry, the Nivelle Offensive proved that organisation of the office was inadequate, and partially to blame for low morale both in the army and at home. He wrote,

Les restrictions apportées précédemment dans le Service d'information produisirent leur résultat inévitable: d'une part, notre effort militaire n'apparut pas dans toute sa grandeur; d'autre part, nos troupes, déjà fatiguées de cet effort même, n'entrevirent pas sa compensation, puisque notre presse ne l'exultait point et n'en montrait pas les résultats. Nul doute qu'une information militaire mieux employée et dirigée n'eût contrabattu, sinon empêché, une dépression, un désespoirnement qui ne furent pas étrangers aux troubles de mai parce qu'ils préparèrent le terrain à toutes les mauvaises influences.  

This statement may show excessive faith in the power of promotion to improve army morale during this period, but that the war ministry took it seriously in its report shows the ever-growing importance of the press in matters of military policy. Other evidence of the seriousness with which the government treated military publicity can be seen in Painlevé’s complaint to French editors that British operations were being covered more thoroughly...
A report dated 14 May 1917 from G.Q.G. to the section d'information (S.I.) of the Bureau de la presse complained that the dearth of French military news in the press produced 'un effet fâcheux sur l'armée. Cette disproportion apparente des efforts de nos alliés et des nôtres si contraire à la réalité ne peut qu'agir fâcheusement sur le moral de la nation.' In response, a system of twelve accredited war correspondents, civilian as well as mobilised, was created to report from the front, under the direction of Captain Moulin. Bordeaux reported that this arrangement was expanded in February 1918 using as a model the system employed by the British and United States armies. A report dated 20 May 1917 commanded that the S.I. and Bureau d'information militaire (B.I.M.) be removed from direct control of the G.Q.G. and attached to the civilian cabinet of the war ministry ('Cabinet civil du ministère de la guerre').

A directive dated the day after, signed by Painlevé, also put an end to the dual system of civilian and military censors operating in the provinces. The system of using censors chosen both by the regional military commander and by the prefect had since its

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2. Weill, Georges. 'Les gouvernements et la presse pendant la guerre', Revue d'histoire de la guerre mondiale (1933), 112.
Inception in 1914 produced repeated disputes. Painlevé's 21 May 1917 directive declared that all civilian representatives should be replaced by mobilized or reserve soldiers and that in case of disagreement among censors, the word of the commission president would be final. The directive commanded the elimination from the commissions of 'préfets, sous-préfets, secrétaires généraux, conseillers de préfecture, chefs de cabinet de préfet, commissaires de police, etc.'. This marked the end of direct interior ministry influence over provincial censorship.

At the end of 1917, the Bureau moved into the sixth floor of the Bureau to be closer to newspaper offices. At the same time, a report by Moulin (dated 14 December 1917) marked 'confidentiel' made a case for increasing the role of the Bureau de la presse as far as possible toward an extended campaign of propaganda. Noting that the Bureau kept in close contact with reporters, he noted it could become 'un véritable centre de propagande française'. With only 1,600 francs, Moulin said, a comfortable office and sufficient material from the G.Q.G. could be provided; reporters 'prendront peu à peu l'habitude de tenir de nous les renseignements les plus intéressants, et le feront tout naturellement des agents de notre propagande'.

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15 H.A.T., carton SN373, report from war ministry dated 13 March 1917.

16 H.A.T., carton SN372.
undated directive, likely emanating from the Bureau de la presse in early 1918, offered a concise list of guidelines to censors and propagandists to maintain morale: when a battle becomes 'plus dur', remind the public of German acts of cruelty; show the necessity of victory and the disaster of a 'paix blanche'; emphasise the cohesion of the allies; address post-war economic and agricultural issues; present 'le poilu' in a positive light; insist on the confidence soldiers have for their generals; have published stories of French troop successes, and of the value of their sacrifice; show the necessity of honouring the dead and maintaining war cemeteries.14

II. Press and Political Reactions to Censorship

Editors and columnists in the newspapers studied here wrote less about censorship during this period as compared with previous periods. A commentary signed Charles-Gras in Le Petit Méridional 13 October 1917 complained that censors 'massacred' his article on Russia, and again pointed out that censorship left readers with false understanding of events.

Les appréciations sur les faits et gestes de nos alliés, qui seules ont droit de

14 S.E.A.T., carton 5N363.
circulation, ne doivent porter, parmi les foules, que des illusions dont les formules sont empruntées au codex censorial. Il en résulte une atmosphère de quiétude propice aux rêves heureux et aux réveils pleins d'amertume.

So further commentary on censorship from this newspaper's writers was published during this period. The anti-censorship campaign was instead shifted to trade unions and socialists. An article published 27 June 1918 reported a declaration of the C.G.T. in Paris, signed by Léon Jouhaux, general secretary of the C.G.T., and Alphonse Merheim, Paris trade unionist who had been a delegate to the anti-war conference in Zimmerwald, Switzerland, deploring the censor: 'Depuis quatre années, la classe ouvrière avec la nation vit dans l'ignorance des événements militaires et diplomatiques....' The declaration accused the censorship as well as 'une certaine presse d'avoir faussé le jugement des masses'.

Le Petit Provençal reported a complaint from a trade union on 15 October 1917, this one from the local 'syndicat ouvrier' of the Boucher-du-Rhône, which proteste énergiquement contre la censure appliquée à la brochure du congrès d'Aix et aux statuts des cheminots d'Arles. Elle fait toutes réserves à ce sujet, parce que beaucoup de passages censurés ne sont que d'ordre corporatif, intercorporatif, et économique et que cela porte une atteinte aux libertés syndicales qui nous ont été conférées par la loi de 1884.
Seventeen lines were censored from this protest. The 'cheminots' union in Marseille lent its voice to the protest in a report published 23 October 1917, saying it 'ne peut logiquement s'abstenir de prendre position et de définir son attitude devant une si grave violation du droit de réunion, de liberté de la presse'. The group demanded right of discussion over an extensive variety of issues: cost of living, organisation of production and consumption, non-augmentation of railroad commercial transport taxes, general organisation of transport, nationalisation of railroads and public services, control of workers' organisations and federated organisations, regulation of work, placement, question of foreign workers, colonies, feminism. The group warned, in the declaration signed by 'Blanc, secrétaire général', that it dégage dès ce jour, toute responsabilité sur les conséquences économiques, pouvant survenir et causées par le refus qui, éventuellement, pourrait lui être opposé en un mot de lui interdire directement ou indirectement de défendre et de discuter les problèmes divers....'

The Bouches-du-Rhône socialist party added its complaint against censorship in a declaration published 27 March 1918, indicating its support of 'une campagne parlementaire pour que la liberté d'opinion soit rétablie'. Again on 27 May 1918, workers of the 'Syndicat ouvrier de la chaussure... protestent contre la violation de toute liberté de parole et de pensée dans une démocratie'. The C.G.T. in Paris issued a similar complaint four days later, and again on 27 June 1918, declaring, 'Depuis quatre
la classe ouvrière, avec la nation, vit dans l’ignorance des événements militaires et diplomatiques...la presse mensongère par intérêt ou incomplète par l’exercice de la censure, a abouti à fausser le jugement des masses.' After this no further complaint against censorship from socialist or trade union sources was published until after the armistice when, on 14 November, socialist party members were described as having introduced a bill in parliament to remove censorship.

In one unusual case, however, a letter written by J. Albertini, president of the Marseille vice police 'amicale', was cited as having been censored 8 September 1917, but given a visa for publication 10 September, apparently due to Albertini's protestations. The letter was in response to an article published by Le petit Provencal which recounted a complaint by Mme. Diague, identified as the wife of a consular official from Senegal. Mme. Diague, while walking along a Marseille street, had been questioned by the city's vice police. Her husband approached, according to the article, and became angry at supposedly abusive accusations the police were directing to his wife. Albertini, however, in defense of the police, said in the letter, 'La démarche des agents fut faite sur le ton le plus poli et ne s'accompagna d'aucune injure ni de la moindre expression blessante.' The letter approved by the censor still had eleven lines removed.

This seemingly trivial incident offers a rare glimpse revealing the caprice of the censor, as it is possible to see at least some of what had been censored. It is difficult to understand
what danger the censor saw in publication of the episode, unless
the action had been taken to avoid provoking the city’s large
African population.

Journalists of *Le Petit Provencal* persisted during this period
in a campaign against censorship, now joined by trade unions and
socialists. Although the newspaper’s anti-censorship commentaries
are shorter and more sarcastic than constructive, they continued
with Marius Richard’s invective on 15 May 1917 against the
government’s intention to ‘me fermer la bouche chaque fois que je
forme les critiques cependant nécessaires’.

On 23 September 1917, *Le Petit Provencal* complained of anti-Marseille bias again:

> Elle-vous l’avez deviné—c’est dame Censure
dont on ne pourra bientôt plus compter les
caprices et les incohérences.... Dans notre
numéro d’hier, après nous avoir fait subir un
retard de vingt-quatre heures, la censure nous
autorisait à publier la condamnation à mort de
l’espionne Auico, dit Regina Diana.

The article (unsigned) explained that it had been forbidden to
publish details of her arrest which Paris newspapers had been
allowed to publish immediately. ‘Pourquoi ce régime perpétuel de
délai qui nous oblige à publier le lendemain ce que d’autres
sont autorisés à publier la veille, qui nous interdit de parler de
tel torpillage, de telle collision que nous lisons ensuite dans des
journaux de province ou de Paris?’ Ferdy again found in censorship
an example of the south being treated unfairly, noting 23 December
1917 that material censored from Marseille newspapers was published
everywhere else, especially maritime issues. 'Il y a là une
différence de traitement contre laquelle nous ne saurons trop
protester.' The accession of Clemenceau gave impetus to some
newspapers to reassert their claims against censorship, as noted in
a La Provence insertion on 20 November 1917. It stated that,
in response to the new Clemenceau ministry, the Comité de
l'Association syndicale de la presse départementale de France
approved unanimously a resolution 'contre les procédés de la
censure et renouvelle sur le même sujet ses protestations
antérieures'. Again on 27 March 1918, a report (unsigned) noted
news of trade unions had again been cut. They had asked censors for
permission to insert the information, but 'La censure s'y opposa et
la note parut entièrement en blanc. Or, un journal de Paris, arrivé
hier, publie ce même ordre du jour dont la censure parisienne n'a
'écropé' que la dernière partie. Toujours deux poids et deux
mesures. Il est vrai que nous y sommes habitués.' On 1 June 1918,
Perdy reiterated his assertion that censorship in Marseille was
much stronger than in Paris, but two days later he admitted that,
despite his determination to continue his campaign against
censorship, 'la censure triomphe contre la presse.' He concluded,

De bien plus grands que nous ont dû s'avouer
vaincus et se sont vus réduits à ronger leur
frein. Ne vous en souvenez-vous,
Clemenceau?.... C'est en disant la vérité que
l'on monte la meilleure garde autour du moral
de la nation.
Ferdy's declaration here to continue fighting censorship helps explain the large number of blanks in his paper in 1918.

A day before, Négis mocked the censor for his arrogance.

Ayant écrit un jour dans un article ces deux mots: 'horrible guerre', la censure coupa 'horrible'. Je me soumis, non sans avoir fait observer à l'executeur d'Anastasie que cette épithète est employée par les plus illustres écrivains, les plus grands poètes, que, d'ailleurs, c'est une opinion assez répandue que la guerre est une chose horrible.

He said that at the time he directed a few 'epithets' at the censor, but now he was thankful that the censor had been there, because in Paris, a fellow journalist was put in jail fifteen days for writing of the German bombing in Paris, 'les dégâts sont affreux'. He concluded, 'Sachez, donc, citoyens mes frères, qu'à cette heure, horrible ne doit pas plus être accolé à guerre, qu'affreux ne doit pas être accolé à dégâts.' That this article even appeared, however, seems to indicate that censors must have had at least some sense of the ridiculous. The end of the year 1918 found Ferdy continuing to berate censorship, commenting in a front-page leader 17 December, 'Il y a toujours la censure. Cette dernière devient même plus exigeante et plus rigoureuse qu'elle ne fut jamais. Combiens de fois nous a-t-on promis la suppression de la censure politique?.... Or, à l'heure actuelle, il n'y a plus qu'une censure qui subsiste, et c'est la censure politique.'

This was one of a number of complaints against continuing post-war censorship in _Le Petit Provencal_, beginning with
announcement of the socialists' parliamentary actions 14 November aimed at forcing the government to lift censorship. On 21 November a communiqué from the Bouches-du-Rhône socialist federation asked for lifting of censorship. Two blank blocks left by censorship disrupted the declaration. A similar declaration was published from 'Union départementale des syndicats ouvriers' on 30 November, this also with two blanks. In both cases it is not obvious that censored sections concerned censorship itself. On 7 December, the interior ministry was quoted in Le Petit Provençal as announcing only that the question of censorship would be examined. On 16 December the Marseille chapter of the 'Coalition républicaine des Bouches-du-Rhône' describing itself as representing all politically 'left' groups from Radicals to S.F.I.O. in opposition to conservative forces, asked for elimination of censorship and restoration of 'toutes les libertés publiques'. The report, signed, 'A.N.' (André Negis), added that a delegate at the group's meeting stood up to wave a banner on which were written the words, 'Vive Wilson apôtre de la ligne censurée'.

In striking contrast to these protests, Le Petit Méridional published no anti-censorship protest after the war. It had also suffered from few blanks in 1918 in comparison to its Marseille counterpart (see graph).

While Le Havard must have found it hazardous to ridicule the censor (as indicated by repeated examples of huge blank spaces), but sometimes did so in pictures of 'Anastasie'. In its issue of 13
July 1918, it did manage to make a humorous mimic of a typical report after censorship:

Chambre des députés. Séance ouverte à 2h.15. Présidence Deschanel. L'ordre du jour appelle la discussion sur un certain nombre de questions. Plusieurs orateurs montent à la tribune. La séance est levée parce qu'on n'y comprend plus rien et que cela n'a du reste aucune importance.
Newspapers were forced by government decree to raise their prices from five to ten centimes on 1 September 1917. This marked the end of an era, the end of the 'golden age of the French press', as newspapers would never again be as plentiful and innovative as they had been before the war. The decision to demand an increase in cover prices was made on the advice of the Commission interministérielle de la presse, which explained in a report dated 4 October 1917 that the measure was taken to reduce the shortage of newsprint. According to the commission's report,

"La crise de quantité n'existe pas en soi.... La difficulté réside dans les moyens de transport, dans le tonnage mensuel que le gouvernement est obligé de prévoir, soit pour...


Paris, Archives Nationales, carton F18 2380.)
The commission made it clear that it advised the government to not force newspapers to raise prices, to make "impossible la concurrence déloyale". The commission calculated that the price increase would decrease circulation to produce a savings in newsprint of at least eighteen percent. Marius Richard, speaking in his role as secretary of the commission, added that the price increase would help newspapers recover profits, despite the expected reduction in circulation. He observed that newsprint prices had increased from 30 francs in January 1914 to 120-135 francs in December 1917; ink from 50-60 francs to 190-215 francs; lead from 40 francs to 250 francs (no volumes given); the price increase "devait permettre aux journaux de vivre du produit de leurs recettes normales".

Newspapers themselves did not necessarily agree, according to a fair number of letters of complaint received by the commission from newspaper proprietors. *Le Radical* of Marseille tried to circumvent the order by offering five-centime newspapers to subscribers. *Le Journal de Cette* (Sète) asked for an exemption due to its small format. Authorities asked the editor, named Sottano,

Archives Nationales, carton F18 2380.
Archives Nationales, carton F18 2380.
Archives Nationales, carton F18 2380.
to be 'patriotic and professional' and follow the directive. Montano responded by offering to raise the prices to ten centimes on Thursdays, and print in a reduced format at five centimes other days, but authorities could not make an exception. *Le Petit Provençal* first announced the possibility of a price increase to its readers 25 June 1917, advising that 'L'assemblée générale de la presse républicaine départementale' had decided the public should be aware of 'les faits économiques qui justifient la vente des journaux à 0,10 centimes'. On 8 August the newspaper announced it would raise its prices 1 September, and on 1 September an unsigned leader explained that newspapers in France had been forced to choose between two possibilities, to reduce size yet again or to raise prices. Newspapers had already been severely restricted, publishing after 1 May 1917 two-page issues four times a week. According to the leader, the commission had taken the latter alternative for three reasons: to give soldiers at the front more to read, to give foreign readers a better impression of France, and to avoid the possibility of small newspapers becoming simple vehicles for government communiqués. The newspaper agreed with these reasons, adding, 'Le devoir de tous les journaux était de solidifier pour sauver la presse elle-même puisqu'elle était menacée.'

*Le Petit Provençal* first announced the price increase on 9 August 1917, without explanation. On 19 August, however, the newspaper made it clear did not necessarily approve of the measure, and therefore would not bow to pressure in the midst of
disagreement between other proprietors. In an unsigned article, the newspaper advised that some newspapers, 'peu nombreux il est vrai, ont en effet déclaré formellement qu'ils n'acceptaient pas de se soumettre à la mesure générale. Dans ces conditions, Le Petit Provençal tient à informer ses lecteurs qu'il maintiendra le prix de 5 centimes.' But on 30 August the newspaper announced that the government would strictly enforce the recommendation made by the Commission interministérielle de la presse. This apparently was not in accordance with the wishes of the commission, which had advised the government to make the prices increase merely a recommendation. while calling the measure 'regrettable', Le Petit Provençal in a letter observed that its costs had increased: paper cost 130-140 francs for 100 kilos, compared with a pre-war price of 30 francs; comparable increases had been seen for coal and ink. In addition, fewer rail cars meant the newspaper had to pay 75,000 francs a year for supplementary transport. As well, 'les annonces ont diminué, par le fait de la guerre, d'environ les deux tiers'. This calculation possibly refers to advertising since May 1917, which was eliminated from two-page editions, reducing the advertising ratio from twenty-two percent to fifteen percent (see graph), although this still doesn't reflect a two-thirds drop. The newspaper did admit circulation was up by remarking that newspapers, both in Paris and in the provinces, 'même ceux dont la situation était jusqu'ici des plus prospères, subissent fatalement des pertes en dépit d'un tirage supérieur à celui d'avant-guerre'. while circulation figures for this date are not available, this
statement seems to suggest that *Le Petit Provencal* had maintained, even increased, its circulation. It seems possible to conclude that advice by the *Commission* to raise selling prices was made not only because proprietors were selling the same number of newspapers as before the war, but that they were in some cases at least selling more than before, even by 1917.

On 8 September 1917, however, the Marseille newspaper declared it was reducing its price to five centimes again, 'puisque certains journaux se refusent à l'application de l'arrêté'. This possibly referred to *Le Radical*. Two days later, however, the newspaper again increased its tariff, observing that the competitor which had decided to remain at five centimes had been seized by authorities, who threatened to do the same to *Le Petit Provencal*. It is not clear whether the power to do this was a prerogative of the censorship network or the interior ministry, but it illustrates how control of newspapers even before the Clemenceau ministry had extended beyond matters of content and into matters of business administration. On 29 September 1917, the newspaper returned to four-page editions five times a week, plus two serialised novels a day, and the advertising ratio jumped six percent. On 18 September 1918, four-page editions were reduced to four times a week, an action *Le Petit Méridional* had taken 1 August 1918.

The phenomenon of humour which had developed by 1916 continued to find as themes the hardships blamed on shortages. *Le Bavard* (13 July 1918) wondered where the reduction in pages would end, and
advised readers facetiously that they should be prepared for still smaller editions.

Nous allons fournir le modèle.... 'Communiqués officiels. Sur le front français. Rien à signaler sur l'ensemble du front. Sur le front britannique. La brume a empêché nos soldats de boire leur thé et de se raser. Les Américains à l'œuvre. Le travail de perfectionnement de l'armée américaine comme grande force offensive future des alliés marche avec une heureuse rapidité. Tous les hommes sont pourvus d'un rasoir mécanique. Les officiers ont des jumelles qui leur permettront de voir d'un côté le pôle Nord et de l'autre le Japon. Des loco-motives de 200,000 chevaux ont été débarquées....'

In a similar vein, Négis commented 21 May 1917 that the severity of paper shortages had led some restaurant owners to advise users of the toilet, 'Prière de bien vouloir économiser le papier.' 'Le difficile', responded Négis, 'est de savoir où s'arrête l'économie et où commence le gaspillage'.

Rates for advertising were never published during the war in the Marseille newspaper, but in Le Petit Méridional a comprehensive table of advertising and rate increases published throughout the war allow a quantitative analysis of advertising revenue. As shown in the graph found in the appendix, an increase in advertising tariffs announced 9 May 1917 was not followed by a corresponding drop in advertising, allowing the newspaper to increase
substantially its income per page published. A second increase in tariffs announced 21 July 1918 held revenue at the same level despite the reduction in pages. Apparently these increases plus the doubling of the selling price were not followed by a strong reduction in sales, as observed by Andréani. This seems to correspond positively to the historians' observations that the provincial press during the war enjoyed a 'relative prosperity', despite inflation and shortages. None the less, newspapers in 1917 had complained stridently of increasing costs, as noted above.

Content of advertising during this period reflected a reduction in war themes, especially after the beginning of 1918. In Le Petit Provençal, very few war-related advertisements were published during the first six months of 1918. It seems possible to presume that advertisers, who need to be especially sympathetic and receptive to public moods, concluded the public was tired of the war. In 1917, however, two new formulae related to current topics on the home front were employed. On 17 October 1917 in Le Petit Provençal and on 14 October 1917 in Le Petit Méridional, 'Pilules Fait' borrowed the concept of union sacrée to sell its medications. Entitled, 'UNION SACRÉE', it read,
de tous les objets de discussion il n'en est qu'un qui n'a jamais donné lieu aux rigueurs de la censure. Aussi bien est-ce le seul qui loin de déchaîner les passions, ait au contraire la vertu d'apaiser les tempêtes sous les crânes, de calmer les nerfs trop vibrants et aussi de chasser la sombre neurasthénie,... une boîte de Pilules Pink est un gage d'union sacrée entre les organes du corps humain.

This formula was not pursued into 1918, however, nor was the advertising which borrowed industrial action as its theme. Published only in Le Petit Méridional (17 August 1917), the advertisement began: 'Une grève de blanchisseuses évitée à Paris.' A strike was planned, the advertisement claimed, when 'finalement un patron conciliant proposa que chaque blanchisseuse reçût, le samedi soir, en même temps que sa paye, le dernier fascicule des Numens Cinéma....'

Classified advertising played a significant role in the growth of total advertising receipts during this period. The Montpellier newspaper published sixty-four classified ads on 24 July 1918, among its highest total during the war, and Le Petit Provencal published on 28 May 1918, 222 classified ads, the majority of them 'offres d'emplois' (ninety-six) and 'marraines' (fifty-one). The appearance of large numbers of soldiers, the majority Belgian, asking for young French women to be pen-friends ('marraines') began to appear in large numbers in 1918, but only in Le Petit Provencal, not in Le Petit Méridional. Usually the wording suggested friendship, such as these examples published 28 May 1918:
Reste-t-il encore dans la ville de Marseille deux jeunes et gentilles marraines pour faire la joie de deux jeunes artilleurs, un blond et un brun...?
Hubert Hauglustaine, Z91, 1ère compagnie, armée belge, 26 ans, célibataire, au front depuis le début, demande jeune et gentille marraine.
Jeune adjutant désire marraine pour apaiser ses douleurs morales....

only occasionally did these advertisements add 'en vue mariage', although many more seemed clearly to suggest that goal. These advertisements terminated with the armistice.

At the end of October 1918 both newspapers published large display advertisements for 'Grands magasins du Louvre'. These advertisements, filling one-half page horizontal format and including illustrated fashions, along with prices, form an illustrative style distinctly different from that of previous wartime advertising, and seem to mark a step toward a more familiar modern layout to be found in post-war iconographic marketing strategies.

Advertising during the war had made a distinct shift, from straightforward argument which advertising historians have labeled 'reason-why' appeals, to emotional appeals, metaphor, and reliance on illustration to carry the message. This corresponds to changes in advertising generally during the war, in Britain and the United States as well as in France. The First World War marked a turning point in advertising, both commercial and government-sponsored. By

commercial advertisers had clearly shifted their techniques from straight argument to appeals to fear, such as warnings of body odour or malign illnesses.9

This seminal shift from rational to emotional appeal can be traced in the war-related advertising studied here. Early war advertising made arguments of a primarily rational nature: items displayed were of utilitarian usage to soldiers, merchandise such as pens, armoured umbrellas, overcoats, chocolate, etc. By 1915, the theme of 'health at the front' intimated that soldiers needed more than items of convenience and well-being. They may be sick, even impotent, a suggestion which must have struck a vital nerve in a nation traditionally concerned about its natality rate. By 1917, the use of war as a metaphor had developed, and it became increasingly sophisticated until 1918, when war-related advertising nearly disappeared, perhaps because advertisers sensed readers were growing tired of this appeal. The metaphor concept, making extensive use of the more emotion-arousing illustration as compared with simple words, reflected a shift toward a view of advertising highly developed in post-war years: a 'pre-existing structure hollowed of meaning' is used by the advertiser to place the message, the 'essence of all advertising'.10 This process is called

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"shaping out", that is, using history or ideology in any area of society as a vehicle for the advertiser. This is precisely what was done by war-related advertisers in the newspapers studied here, and its effectiveness is in its strong appeal to emotions, especially fear.

Such a strategy is well documented in its use by allied governments for propaganda purposes, in posters as well as published advertisements. The strong appeals to fear and guilt which reached a new level of sophistication under government influence during the war have been studied; what is little noticed is the same appeals in commercial war-related advertising, as is the case in these two newspapers. Government propaganda in France aimed to cement the union sacrée. If it based its appeals on fear, what influence on the union sacrée did the commercial advertisers have, also basing their appeals increasingly on fear? Quantitative evidence of a connection is difficult to find, but the rise in fear observed in 1917 and early 1918 corresponded with the greatest number of advertisements using war as a metaphor.

As difficult to document is the effect of the journalism business climate on union sacrée, and the relative prosperity of the newspapers during the war. The physical changes in 1914 newspapers roughly paralleled the early autumn crisis: advertising and paper size dropped drastically during the first battle of the Marne, then began to rebound by Christmas 1914. Both had returned to a semblance of normality, albeit somewhat restricted, in 1915-1916, the months when these newspapers reached closest to
their pre-war norms. The end of 1916 marked a series of renewed steps toward reduction of pages, an increase in selling price, and elimination of most editorial photographs and illustrations, steps which were to become increasingly severe by 1917 until the armistice. These enforced reductions, and the warning at one point that the press might not even survive, may have sustained the fear already growing during the period, and through it likely influenced the union sacrée as described in chapter ten.

A third question addresses prosperity of these newspapers during the war. As noted, historians contend that the provincial press was relatively prosperous during the war, in contrast to Paris dailies. This study shows that advertising revenues based on ratios of advertisements to editorial content did remain strong throughout much of the war, especially for Le Petit Provencal. The doubling of the newspapers' selling price and unusually high number of classified advertisements must also have had a positive effect on income. Circulation figures from 1914 to 1918 cannot be validated with any degree of certainty, but occasional indications seem to lead one to the conclusion that for these newspapers they remained fairly stable. These income-enhancing aspects must be offset of course by rampant wartime shortages and inflation. The safest conclusion is to assume that these newspapers, while not enjoying windfall profits, managed to maintain a positive balance sheet during the war.

Any influence this may have had on the union sacrée would only have been indirect; reporters and editors whose employment seems
most secure might be expected to write most courageously, but they also could be expected to write most cravenly, to avoid disrupting a delicate balance. There is no evidence in these two newspapers that content was guided by financial health, and no archival evidence found to support this hypothesis. We may conclude with a fair degree of certainty that the newspapers survived difficult times, that readers felt the effects of economic burden, and that advertisers reflected a wartime shift from rational to emotional appeals in their war-related material.

Although these journalistic phenomena cannot be proven to have affected the union sacrée in a direct way, they do reflect the general economic climate in France as the war lengthened: greater shortages, greater inflation, and increasing emotional hysteria by the beginning of 1918. Under these pressures, clearly in evidence within the pages of the newspapers studied here, the union sacrée crumbled into an army mutiny, the 1917 strikes, and the 1918 repressions.
Conclusion

The evidence offered by the newspapers studied here and by other primary sources suggests that the phenomenon of the union sacrée did not last long after August 1914. The phenomenon was reconceptualised as crève or 'sentiment national', and did continue to serve as a journalistic vehicle during the war, although changing radically as a moral force between September 1917 and May 1918, when socialists left the government and the majority of the party declared the union sacrée to be at an end. Between September 1914 and autumn 1917, the notion of the union sacrée underwent a metamorphosis toward eventual marginalisation, becoming merely a medium through which journalists attacked conservatives and defended regional integrity, until finally being trivialised into mere manners, marketing strategy, or lip-service.

These changes can be followed in a series of steps based on dates of published reports. August 1914 marked the short bourgeois or trêve period. The union sacrée was seldom mentioned explicitly, but seemed to be taken for granted in what editors assumed would be a brief war. Almost no criticism of the government or other French
groups appeared, with the exception of the first of what was to become a consistent criticism of excessive war profits, appearing in *Le Petit Provencal* on 5 August.

It is to be noted that even during this period, the two newspapers did not exhibit all tendencies found in the *bourrage de crise* of the conservative press. They did not, for example, suggest war was a purifying experience for the nation. These editors were unwilling to join the frenzied enthusiasm of newspapers in Paris and elsewhere on this point, the *union sacrée* or not.

On 25 and 28 August first reports of the 'XV Corps Affaire' appeared, complaints that Midi soldiers had been unjustly accused of cowardice. This incident was considered an important enough threat to the *union sacrée* that censors eventually forbade publication of reports and commentary on the topic.

On 18 September *Le Petit Méridional* in a front-page leader first complained that conservative adversaries were dividing French soldiers into classes, commending only clergy, officers, and aristocrats. This was first in what grew to be a major dispute between this newspaper and *L'Eclair* (royalist) as to which political group was doing most to damage the *union sacrée*. This debate did not appear in *Le Petit Provencal*.

Reports in both newspapers began to take on a more pessimistic tone by December. A report 27 December in *Le Petit Provencal* indicated, in a socialist party manifesto, a separation from the *union sacrée* support of the government, the manifesto complaining of 'capitalisme corrupteur' and 'bureaucratie indolente'.
In 1915 journalists themselves began to describe threats to the union sacrée, blaming parliament and government ministers. Bureaucratic bungling of war widow pensions was cited in a 24 January 1915 article in Le Petit Provencal, and in August political editor Camille Ferdy declared that the newspaper could not maintain its confidence in a government which allowed itself to be directed by an irresponsible bureaucracy. Le Petit Médional did not write similar critiques against parliament and government ministers during this time. It did, however, blame conservative groups for exploiting the union sacrée. On 7 May a leader explained that the union sacrée meant not an abandonment of personal opinions, but merely the good manners not to offend one's neighbours. Reports of wartime scandals appeared regularly in both newspapers, as did complaints of the 'XV Corps Affaire' leading to abuse of the Midi by the rest of France. These reports were eliminated in September 1915 by censorship directive.

On 12 June the first complaint from a trade union was published in Le Petit Médional, a protest against a government bill, and against inadequate salaries. On 12 September the same newspaper printed the first strike report, of vineyard workers. Increasing opposition to the union sacrée became clear by the end of the year, with reports of the Zimmerwald Conference on 10 November in Le Petit Provencal, and on 7 December in Le Petit Médional. Reports of socialist meetings in December included denunciations of the union sacrée made by delegates. Criticism of censorship also increased to a high level in 1915.
By 1916 indications in these two newspapers showed the union sacrée to be coming to an end. While reporting troubling problems of morale, Le Petit Méridional did continue to show interest in the union sacrée, mostly by way of attacking conservative newspapers for their anti-union activities. Le Petit Provencal dropped all reference to the union, publishing strong criticism of the government, censorship, and 'la vie chère'. By June political reporter Marius Richard was suggesting that for the majority of parliament, the union sacrée was 'un vain mot'.

Parliamentary debates published in 1916-1917 regularly recounted strong polemics against the government and, for the first time, against the military command (17 March 1916). Calls to pacifism and suggestions that France was at least partially responsible for the war also came through parliamentary reports during this period. Reports of socialist activity showed clearly the growing split between majoritaires and minoritaires. Ferdy writing 7 August his regretful observation that the anti-union sacrée minority was growing.

Le Petit Méridional, but not Le Petit Provencal, published numerous reports of threatening trade union activity, leading to reports of Paris strikes in early 1917, these published in both newspapers. Opposition to censorship seemed to shift, from the press to political groups.

By May 1917, the union sacrée was at an end, but the break was gradual, rather than based on one specific incident. References to the union became a tool for advertisers, or a habit devoid of
meaning. Installation of Clemenceau, publication of the Treaty of
Versailles, and menace of the 1918 German offensive did seem to
rekindle some interest in reconstituting the union sacrée in early
1918, but newspapers, especially Le Petit Provençal, were
restrained in their support, and it evaporated by the summer of
1918. France was never again to see the kind of union expressed in
the first few months of the First World War.

The union sacrée phenomenon may be separated into three
strands. The first two, as presented by Becker and Audoin-Rouzeau,
present categories of the union sacrée as, first, a willingness to
wage war against Germany, and second, a willingness to forget pre-
war political and social divisions and to support the government
and the military in their conduct of war. In connection with
journalism during the war, a third category may be considered,
revolving around censorship and other forms of press control. To
the French press, the union sacrée of August 1914 also meant
agreement to the regime of censorship as proposed by the
government.

In accordance with findings of these historians, the evidence
here does not show that either newspaper was willing to forget pre-
war political and social divisions. On the contrary, the idea of
Liberté and 'sentiment national', as described by Becker and Audoin-
Rouzeau, does stand up to critical scrutiny. As articulated by
these historians, the willingness of these newspapers to wage war
against Germany is clearly seen as an unshakable part of editorial
policy from beginning to end of the war. But the union sacrée as an
agreement to the government's framework of censorship decayed after September 1914.

*Le Petit Provençal* and *Le Petit Méridional* did not treat aspects of the war in identical ways. The Marseille newspaper exhibited a distinctly anti-government tendency early on, and implacably opposed the Clemenceau ministry, while the Montpellier newspaper offered little real criticism of the government, and supported the Clemenceau ministry. This divergence is not surprising, considering the political tendencies of the two newspapers before the war. Less expected is the difference in reporting of trade union and strike material. Here, *Le Petit Méridional* showed itself to be much more concerned with labour and strike issues, at least until 1918, when *Le Petit Provençal* published a litany of trade union and strike reports, nearly all of them censored in whole or in part as demanded by Clemenceau's directive. It may be possible to help explain this variance by referring to the situation of socialists and trade unions in the two cities, and their relationship with the newspapers. In Marseille, *Le Petit Provençal* traditionally was identified with socialism, one of only two mass-circulation daily newspapers in France to the left of the Radicals. It would not be surprising to see in its pages a strong interest in socialist affairs, as

compared with trade union affairs. On the other hand, Barrau contends, ‘Le Petit Provencal était le principal soutien du mouvement ouvrier dans la presse quotidienne.’ In 1917, notes Baratier, the Bouches-du-Rhône S.F.I.O. ‘se ralliait au pacifisme’, while Le Petit Provencal continued to support the majoritaire side. Could this split be related to the increased coverage of labour issues by the Marseille newspaper in 1917-18, and the decreased coverage of socialist matters? It is impossible to prove, but such a linkage is not unreasonable.

Le Petit Méridional, in contrast, was clearly a Radical newspaper, although it did offer a voice to the socialists in écrit. Like most of the rest of France, socialism here was not closely tied to trade unionism, and both were generally reformist. Socialists were more anti-clerical than anti-capitalist. This political fabric taken into consideration, it is not surprising that the Montpellier newspaper covered clerical and trade union issues more enthusiastically than did Le Petit Provencal.

Barrau, Patrick, Ibid.


Eugues, Jean, Le mouvement ouvrier en Languedoc (Toulouse, 1980), 145.

Ibid., 65.
there is evidence to suggest that the socialist party itself in some areas of France became nearly non-existent during the war. The small portion of news devoted to local socialists and trade unions in both newspapers before 1915 suggests local groups were perhaps weak during this period, but the revived activity after then suggests both groups re-established their strength. Sagnes reports forty-one voting socialists from Hérault at a congress 9 April 1916; Kriegel observes that the Bouches-du-Rhône S.F.I.O. socialist federation signed a manifesto asking for an end to the war in 1915. Both groups must therefore have been active, though no doubt at a reduced level. Reports in both newspapers described trade union meetings with dozens, sometimes hundreds, of participants, and Marseille police files after the end of 1915 reported regular meetings of both socialist groups and trade unions, although attendance was sometimes poor. Here, too,
evidence seems to indicate trade unionism sometimes operated at a
reduced level of strength, but that it was hardly moribund after
1915.

Censorship seemed to have posed a greater problem for the
Marseille newspaper; its complaints were more strident, and gaps
left by the censor more numerous after 1916. This is not to claim
that *Le Petit Méridional* supported censorship. It simply was more
docile.

Both newspapers during the war had, it seems, considerable
influence in the national debate on censorship and press issues
through representation on regional and Paris commissions. But
within the news columns themselves, *Le Petit Provençal*, more than
*Le Petit Méridional*, offered daily articles and leaders written,
not by guest politicians, but by staff writers, mainly André Négis,
Marius Richard, and Camille Ferdy. The ability of a newspaper to
fill its pages without recourse to non-staff help or borrowing from
other newspapers is considered to be an indication of quality, and
from the evidence presented here, it seems that the Marseille
newspaper was the more sophisticated of the two. It surely was the
more outspoken, especially in its campaign against *bourrage de
ordre*, although that was limited, too, in *Le Petit Méridional* after
1914. It is worth noting, in due fairness to *Le Petit Méridional*,
that its financial base was a city much smaller than Marseille, and

*avait assez duré et qu'il fallait trouver un moyen pour en finir,
Tal qu'un mouvement de grève générale....*
His circulation generally lower. Mass-circulation daily newspapers tend to be limited by the resources they are able to bring to their task, and generally, the larger the city, the more the resources, financial as well as human.

In addition to adding to our knowledge of this central discourse of the union sacrée, a number of implications follow from this study. The most obvious is the indication that the press in France was not what many historians have assumed: monotone, wildly optimistic, retrograde, sophomoric, inaccurate, and often even silly. After August 1914 journalists in the newspapers studied here seem generally to have tried diligently to fill their role to inform, and to inform objectively, though with an optimistic slant.

Most wartime issues, from Wilson’s points, to socialist demands, to Russia’s treaties, to Germany’s viewpoint, to Carnet B. and to strikes, arrests, revolutions, and troop mutinies, were at least presented sometime during the war, although not always could an event presented weeks or more after its end be considered ‘news’.

It is certainly not possible to say these newspapers offered a completely fair and honest portrayal of the war. Sometimes the censor was to blame. Sometimes editorial policy was. But it also would be unfair to say these newspapers offered a completely dishonest and skewed portrayal. The truth seems to be found somewhere in between.

As well, it appears that censorship was not supremely efficient and consistent in its control of these newspapers. Pacifist and anti-government material can be found. The censor,
none the less, used his scissors heavily, and the contention voiced repeatedly in the press that the regime was deforming the true reflection of public opinion in the newspapers no doubt has some validity.

In short, it seems clear that the newspapers studied here believed they were obliged during the war to help defend their country under siege and that, while they did not necessarily support successive governments or censorship directives, they did support the bond of duty between the French citizen, the army, and the country which required him to pursue the war. This is Audoin-Rouzeau's definition of 'sentiment national'. On 1 November 1918, this is reflected in Le Petit Provencal on the role of the press.

Je vous accorde que certains journaux ont un peu bourré le crâne de leurs lecteurs. Cela ne fut pas toujours de leur faute, ni pour leur plaisir. Quand on reçoit sur le coup de minuit une dépêche annonçant que le kaiser a les oreillons ou qu'Hindenburg a été blessé par une bombe d'avion, il est bien difficile de contrôler la nouvelle.... Malgré cela, on sera bien obligé d'avouer que la presse a été là pour un bon coup. Elle s'est laissé mettre la main sur la bouche pendant quatre ans (au moins) avec une resignation patriotique qui alla parfois jusqu'à la bonne grâce.... Il devrait donc être bien entendu que la presse française a fait pendant la guerre et librement son devoir. [Italics in original.]

It might be considered naive to accept without qualification Meis' defence of the newspaper's difficulties of verification (he says nothing about the anti-German tirades), but the article does seem to contain at least a grain of truth. His 'patriotic resignation', in sum, does suggest that in the press as on the home
front, the ideal which held the country together during the war was indeed ‘sentiment national’. This study reaffirms that point of view, and at the same time offers evidence that conventional assumptions concerning behaviour of the French press during the First World War need to be reconsidered in light of new material gleaned from this comprehensive look at two large provincial newspapers of the south. Twisting and turning to accommodate changing fortunes of armies both in the field and in the censorship office, these papers nevertheless remained distinctly different from each other as well as from the monotony of much of Paris journalism. Are they unique, or do they reflect the situation for much of the provincial press in France? Further research could extend the illumination into this central topic of First World War history.
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Berra, Patrick, 'Le mouvement ouvrier à Marseille (1900-1914)', Aix-Marseille (1971).


Gérard, René, 'Le journal de Marseille de Férréol Beaugeard, 1789-1791', Aix-Marseille (1962).

Hauzac, Nicole, 'Les ouvrières de Marseille de 1879 à 1914', Aix-Marseille (1982-83).

Notes for interpretation may be found after each set of graphs.
Marseille: state of morale 5 August

Marseille: state of morale 15 August

Marseille: state of morale 26 August
Marseille: state of morale 2 September

Marseille: state of morale 3 September

Marseille: state of morale 14 September
Marseille: state of morale 10 October

State of morale

- one
- two
- three
- four
- five
- six
- seven
- eight
- nine
- ten
- eleven
- twelve
- thirteen
- fourteen
- fifteen
- sixteen
- seventeen
- eighteen
- nineteen
- twenty
- twenty-one
- twenty-two
- twenty-three
- twenty-four
Notes: Marseille state of morale

These graphs illustrate the state of morale as described by commissioners of police in each of twenty-six police arrondissements in Marseille for selected dates during the first months of war. Arrondissement numbers are indicated on the horizontal axis. Top of graph indicates highest state of morale; centre indicates neutral state; bottom indicates lowest state.

The following categories were employed in analysing words used by police commissioners:

Category number 1 (top of graphs): 'excellent;' 'vibrant de patriotisme;' 'très montés contre l'allemands;' 'les meilleurs;' 'les plus favorables.'

Category number 2: 'bon;' 'satisfait;' 'calme et confiant.'

Category number 3: (considered neutral in tone): 'rien à signaler;' 'aucun incident;' 'néant;' 'calme;' 'normale;' 'stationnaire;' 'calme et résigné.'

Category number 4: 'calme, symptômes d'inquiétude;' 'un peu inquiet;' 'bon, mais désagréablement impressionné;' 'calme, inquiet;' 'quelques légers signes d'impatience.'

Category number 5 (bottom of graphs): 'stupeur, silence générale;' 'bon, mais désagréablement impressionnée (words following put it in this category);' 'angoisse, la colère;' 'grande émotion, pessialisme;' 'calme, mais résignée et attristée;' 'vive impression;' 'l'inquiétude.'

Average morale by arrondissement for all dates studied (1=highest morale)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arrondissement</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.85</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.71</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.14</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
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<td>2.71</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>2.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Marseille, Archives Départementales, cartons M6/4821A, M6/4822.)
Notes: percentage of advertising during the war

The advertising percentage is defined as the measurement of column centimetres of advertising as a proportion of the space available in the entire edition. Both display and classified advertising are included. Dates given cover that week's newspapers; number of pages published during the given weeks changed due to wartime shortages.

**Le Petit Provençal**

(1) 42 pages.
(2) 28 pages.
(3) 20 pages (two-page editions four times a week).
(4) 28 pages (after increase of selling price: two-page editions twice a week. Change in advertising ratio was negligible between this date and the war's end).

**Le Petit Méridional**

(1) 34 pages.
(2) 14 pages (two-page editions seven times a week).
(3) 28 pages.
(4) 24 pages.
(5) 20 pages.
(6) 24 pages (change in advertising ratio was negligible between this date and the war's end).
Appendix Three

Notes: advertising revenue in *Le Petit Méridional*

Calculations are based on advertising rates as published in the newspaper applicable to the dates indicated. Dates cover that week's newspapers. Figures do not reflect income from newspaper sales.

(1) 34 pages.
(2) 14 pages.
(3) 28 pages.
(4) 24 pages.
(5) 20 pages: advertising rates increased 15 May 1917.
(6) 24 pages.
Appendix Four

'Paix' in Le Petit Provencal

Number of times used


'Paix' in Le Petit Meridional

Number of times used

Socialism in Le Petit Provencal

Socialism in Le Petit Meridional
Notes: quantitative word/subject analyses

Analyses comprise front pages of issues for months indicated, in headlines, articles, and commentary.

Use of the word 'paix' in contexts clearly unrelated to war, e.g. 'juges de paix' or 'tu reposeras dans la paix du seigneur,' is not included.

Included for measurement of column centimetres of material related to 'socialism' are all articles, leaders, or commentary covering affairs of local, regional, and national A.F.I.O. socialist organisations, and local, regional, and national trade union activity. International socialist and trade union activity, i.e. allied or enemy, is not included.
Appendix Five

Censorship blanks, 1914-1918

Montpellier: publications seized
Notes: censorship blanks and publications seized

Included for quantitative analysis are all blanks or gaps left in articles clearly due to censorship, whether or not the word 'censure' appears in the blank space. Multiple blanks in a single article are counted as one incident. Blanks may be of varying lengths, from ten or more column centimetres to one or two lines.

The analysis of publications seized reflects orders from the XVie region (Montpellier) military command demanding the seizure of publications in that region. Orders may cover pamphlets, brochures, newspapers, and periodicals from abroad.

*Records of seizures ended May 1919; seizures from 1914-1915 are not recorded in these documents.

(Source: Montpellier, Archives Départementales, packets 42M36, 42M39, 8637.)
Appendix Six

'Consignes generales' for censorship

Number of consignes

Sept-Dec. 14 1916 1918 1917 (to Nov. 30)

Dec. 1, 17-Dec. 31, 18

'Consignes generales' per month

Average incidents per month

To Nov. 30, 17  Dec. 1, 17-Dec. 31, 18
Graphs reflect quantitative analysis of directives for censorship or control over various matters issued from Paris to local censorship commissions, as found in documents from Paris archives. The dates 1 December 1917 to 31 December 1918 reflect directives issued under the Clemenceau ministry.

The 'consignes générales' published in Circular No. 1000 are not reflected in the analysis, nor are orders for seizures of foreign publications.

(Source: Paris (Château de Vincennes), Service historique de l'armée de la terre (S.H.A.T.), cartons 5N334 and 5N376.)
1917: Orders for censorship

1918: Orders for censorship
Notes: orders for censorship 1914-1918, analysed by subject

This quantitative analysis is based on telegrams or notes from the ministry of defense, ministry of the interior, or commandment of the XVe military region (Marseille) to the Bouches-du-Rhône prefect. In the majority of cases, the censorship directive is specified as originally emanating from the ministry of defense. Only censorship orders for specific incidents are considered; the general Circular No. 1000 is not reflected in the analysis.

Classifications:

Military censorship will be defined as those orders which cover articles and commentary relating to troop movements, ship or port movements, number and constitution of regiments, trips made by political leaders, army mutinies, army tactics, news of weapons and their deployment, interviews with generals, and related material.

Diplomatic censorship will be defined as those orders which cover articles and commentary relating to negotiations between ally, neutral, or enemy powers, general situation in allied or neutral nations, peace proposals by neutral nations, and related material.

Political censorship is difficult to define, reflecting either the strict definition offered by the government—criticism of French civilian political leaders—or the more liberal definition of the press—articles and commentary on political or military leaders, strikes, economic and sanitary conditions at the front and at home, and general morale in France. For statistical purposes, 'political' censorship is divided into two categories, 'strictly political' and home front. The latter includes any news of hardships or economic conditions in France, strikes and union movements, demonstrations, French prisoners of war, conferences, food shortages, factory or rail accidents, foreigners in France, criticism of facilities at home, 'strategic' activities, and related material. Generally, 'industrial' censorship orders are defined as all material likely to stir emotions in the rear, but not likely to directly harm security of French troops or to give information to the enemy. Therefore the 'Christmas fraternisation' story would be included under 'home front,' although it refers to troops.

Military censorship includes criticism of government and military leaders, socialist or other political group activities, interviews with political leaders, and related material.

Unclassifiable includes orders too vague to judge. When judgment between categories is difficult, material is counted under 'military.'

(Source: Marseille, Archives Départementales, cartons 1R17, 2R11, VI T 6/1, VI T 6/2.)
Appendix Eight

Marseille: average number of strikers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workers per strike</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>400</td>
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<table>
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<th>1916</th>
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<th>1918</th>
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Strike reports in Le Petit Provenca

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<thead>
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<th>1918</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
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<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

Union censorship in Le Petit Provenca

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Month</th>
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<th>1918</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
1915: strikes in Marseille

1916: strikes in Marseille
1917: strikes in Marseille

1918: strikes in Marseille

Notes: strikes in Marseille 1915-1918

Strikes are based on police reports. No strikes were reported August through December 1914.

'Average number of strikers' in Marseille reflects the importance of strikes, based on the number of workers divided by the number of strikes, as reported by police. No strikes were reported in Marseille between August and December 1914.


The graph showing local strike reports in Le Petit Provençal reflects a quantitative analysis of articles published in 1917 and 1918. Each incident counted reflects a separate strike. No local strikes were reported in the newspaper in 1914, 1915, and 1916.

(1) Newspaper reports seldom specified number of workers out. But a 2 June 1917 article described 1,000 midinettes on strike in Marseille, and a 6 June 1917 article reported 1,000 dockers out.

(2) Nineteen separate strikes were reported in June 1917; analysis includes articles describing workers who have threatened to strike, but who may or may not be out at the time of the report.

(3) 15 June 1918: sack workers 'decide to return to work.' The word 'grève' was not used.

(4) October article reported that military bakers will furnish labour to keep Marseille bakeries open; the word 'grève' was not used.

The graph analysing censorship of trade union activity reflects censored blanks only in articles specifically referring to worker or trade union matters in titles, followed by the word 'censuré' or a block of white space.

(1) April 1918 strikes: according to police reports, 300 tramway workers, 160 olive oil processor workers, 428 shoemakers for the army, 100 chemical factory workers, an unspecified number of chocolate factory workers.
(2) May 1918 strikes: according to police reports, 50 sawmill workers, 1,600 munitions plant workers, unspecified number of electricity generating plant workers. Salary or other union concessions were not in question at the munitions plant; the factory had warned it would make redundant 600 of 1,500 women workers, and replace them with men decommissioned from the front. At hearing this announcement, the rest of the women workers struck in sympathy for the 600. Police reports suggested this strike was short.

(3) June 1918 strikes: according to police reports, 1,200 workers, all women, in factories making sacks and bags, including military bags, struck. Police indicated the strike lasted twelve days, and included demonstrations, arrests, and threats by strikers at several firms.

Notes: cost of newsprint

*Percentage increase per 100 kilos is based on a pre-war rate of 28.3 francs.

(Source: Bellanger, et al., Histoire générale de la presse française, Vol. 3 (Paris 1972), 450.)
Appendix Ten
Function of press control based on state of operation 30 May 1917.
(See following page for notes.)
Directives or requests for control and censorship may have been issued by various ministries, or even by allied embassies, but were distributed to censors by the Bureau de la Presse.

* Control taken by Cabinet civil du ministère de la guerre May 1917, but direction still given by C.Q.G. cabinet.

** Control taken by Cabinet civil du ministère de la guerre May 1917, but direction still given by C.Q.G. cabinet.

(Source: Paris, S.H.A.T., mainly carton 5K363, but verification through other materials in archives concerning censorship.)
Structure of local censorship commissions in May 1917
(Source: Paris, S.H.A.T., carton 5N372.)
Appendix Twelve

ILLUSTRATIONS

Notes for interpretation may be found after illustrations.
Quand réformerai-je
la Censure ?

Il est vain de réformer l'absurde
du passé de la Censure. Mais le
nouveau régime est à réformer.
La seule chose qui soit la
grosse erreur des censeurs
est de les guetter sans journalis-
ne.

2 LIGNE DES CENSUREES

Dans le même ordre d'idées, c'est par les
journalistes et par les journalistes
que la vieille Censure peut être abolie.
Le succès de la Censure peut être
obtenu par l'opinion publique en
favorisant des publications qui
grâce à des réformes importantes
et des réformes importantes d'Alliances et de
grandes alliances et de
journalistes.

3 LIGNE DES CENSUREES

Les déceptions s'accumulent plus année
que rien car c'est une nécessité d'un
ouvrage de révision.

4 LIGNE DES CENSUREES

Et la conclusion est donc qu'il
faut réformer la Censure. Mais quand
l'opinion publique n'est pas

5 LIGNE DES CENSUREES

La newsletter pour paroles de la com-
me, ce qui était une mission
ouverse, c'est par les journalis-
mes que la vieille Censure peut
être abolie.

6 LIGNE DES CENSUREES

Une opinion pour paroles de la com-
me, ce qui était une mission
ouverse, c'est par les journalis-
mes que la vieille Censure peut
être abolie.

7 LIGNE DES CENSUREES

Ce pourrait être une
représentation du régime d'au-
jourd'hui...

8 LIGNE DES CENSUREES

Quel serait le
cumul des erreurs
si ce régime s'est
documenté.

9 LIGNE DES CENSUREES

Les malheurs de
l'avenir.

10 LIGNE DES CENSUREES

Le chemin de fer
le plus septentrional

11 LIGNE DES CENSUREES

La ligne de Morvan est achevée.

12 LIGNE DES CENSUREES

La ligne de Morvan est achevée.

13 LIGNE DES CENSUREES

La ligne de Morvan est achevée.
Les Jeux de l'Arrière

Louis Latapie

Les Jeux de l'Arrière

Louis Latapie

Les Jeux de l'Arrière

Louis Latapie

Les Jeux de l'Arrière

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Les Jeux de l'Arrière

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Louis Latapie

Les Jeux de l'Arrière

Louis Latapie

Les Jeux de l'Arrière

Louis Latapie
Ces deux hommes sont amputés. L'un se tient droiument. L'autre aョsié son amputation car il posséda la jambe Française, garde à sec. Cette jambe ronge une marche, libre, naturelle et l'aspect simulait d'une jambe valides. Votre cheval bleu décrit une belle joute. Ainsi de nombreuses victimes de guerre, brûlées aux membres supérieurs, ainsi gravement."
digestions pétillantes, palpitations, fâchement, poussées, brûlures, sueurs froides, etc., tous ces malaises disparaissent en quelques jours grâce au régime de Phoscao (phosphorisation française), le plus puissant des reconstitants, le seul aliment végétal conseillé par les médecins aux anémiques, aux convalescents, aux vieillards.

Envoi gratuit de la brochure informative.

PILULES PINK.
pour personnes pâles
Editeur dans tous les pharmacies. 3 fr. 30 la boîte. 15 fr. 50 le carton.
MAUX D'ESTOMAC

Aliments pithiques, rares, préparations, traitements, pacificateurs, engrais, EXPERTIS Le plus puissant des restituants, le plus parfait régulateur des fonctions digestives. Le Phoscao régénère le sang et fortifie le système nerveux. C'est un apport au métabolisme du cerveau et du cervelet, avec une action sur la contraction des muscles de la bouche. Il est utilisé pour les douleurs et les préparation est instantanée.

Faites un essai avec la boîte-échantillon envoyée gratuitement.

PHOSCAO

9, Rue Frédéric-Barthel PARIS

En vente : Pharmaciens et Épiceries
Le Droit à triomphé de la Force
Une mer de couleurs qui frissonne au vent

Vive la France!

A LA CHAMBRE

La Signature de l'Armistice

A Paris

COMMUNIQUÉS OFFICIELS

LE COMMISSAIRE NATIONAL

A PARIS, le 11 novembre à minuit, M. le comte de Castelnau, président de la Chambre des députés, a proclamé l'armistice en vertu des conditions décrites ci-dessus, après avoir reçu le message du général Eisenhower, commandant la Force d'armistice.

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C'est un pupille de l'Assistance publique qui a noblement fait son devoir en Alsace.

Voici un héros de 19 ans, qui est un pupille de l'Assistance Publique de Marseille.

Louis-Xavier Chatelain s'engagea, au début même de la déclaration de la guerre et dans

Le soldat Chatelain

un des régiments les plus exposés dès l'abord : le 59e d'infanterie à Belfort. Il participa, en août, au combat d'Allerinch, un coup de bavette l'atteignit à l'épaule. Loin de se retirer, il se porta au secours de son caporal menacé par un hussard de la Mort et par un uhlans. Le poignet droit percé par le fer d'une lance, il abattit néanmoins les deux ennemis.

Puis après, et comme il combattait encore, un éclat d'obus le blessa au front, une balle lui perça le genou droit, un obus, enfin, lui emporta les deux jambes.

Le système nerveux dérangé, souffrant d'une surdité absolue et qui persiste, Louis-Xavier Chatelain ne regrette pourtant que d'avoir oublié la ligne de feu.

Cité à l'ordre du jour de l'armée, il a été décoré de la médaille militaire. On le peut rencontrer dans les rues de notre ville, appuyant péniblement sur des béquilles. C'est un humble encore qui donne un grand exemple !
Plate Number One
A page one leader by Camille Perdy, published in *Le Petit Provencal* 11 December 1916. The topic of the article, censorship, was in itself subject to heavy censorship.

Plate Number Two
Political censorship is clearly shown in this unusual example of a page proof before censorship, and the final published version. The example was taken from the conservative Marseille daily, *Le Soleil du Midi*, 27 February 1915. (Source: Marseille, Archives Départementales, packet AD VI T 6/2.)

Plate Number Three
Blank spaces left by censorship on the front page of *Le Bavard* were filled with ironic affirmations. (Issue of 5 August 1916.)

Plate Number Four
The advertisement on the top left (*Le Petit Méridional*, 29 September 1918) used a drawing to illustrate a war-related theme designed to address verities of the home front. Photographs from the front, as the example at bottom left from *Le Petit Méridional*, illustrated the reality of French troop deaths as early as the beginning of 1915. (Published 29 January 1915.) The censored column of type left blank in *Le Bavard* was replaced by fanciful drawings of "Anastasia" and other censors with scissors. (Published 17 February 1917.)

Plate Number Five
These advertisements from *Le Petit Provencal* (4 March 1916 and 24 July 1916) depict the wartime marketing strategies of health at the front and needs of the home front.

Plate Number Six
These advertisements from *Le Petit Provencal* (23 March 1916 and 24 July 1916) use icons of war as metaphors to sell products not necessarily related specifically to wartime needs.

Plate Number Seven
The 12 November 1918 issue of *Le Petit Méridional* announcing the armistice.

Plate Number Eight
An early photograph of a legless war veteran, published in *Le Petit Provencal* 3 December 1914.
Appendix Thirteen

The Law of 5 August 1914
Relating to Censorship of the French Press

Article I—Il est interdit de publier, par l'un des moyens numérotés à l'art. 23 de la loi sur la Presse du 29 Juillet 1881, des informations et renseignements autres que ceux qui seraient communiqués par le Gouvernement ou le Commandement sur les points suivants:

Operations de la Mobilisation et du transport des troupes ou du matériel;

Effectifs, Composition des Corps, unités et détachements, ordre de bataille;

Effectifs des hommes restés ou rentrés dans leurs foyers;

Effectifs des blessés, tués ou prisonniers, travaux de défense;

Situation de l'armement, du matériel, des approvisionnements;

Situation sanitaire;

Nominations et mutations dans le haut commandement;

Dispositions, emplacement et mouvements des armées, des détachements et de la flotte;

Et, en général, toute information ou article concernant les opérations militaires ou diplomatiques, de nature à favoriser l'ennemi et à exercer une influence fâcheuse sur l'esprit de l'armée et des populations.

(Source: 'Circulaire No. 1000, Feuilles 7 and 8,' issue of 30 September 1915.)
Appendix Fourteen

Meunier Bill

Below is the full text of the 'Proposition de Loi' by deputy Paul Meunier for the control of censorship, presented to parliament at the end of 1915.

Exposé Des Motifs

Messieurs,

Au cours des nombreuses séances qu'elle a consacrées à l'examen de notre proposition de loi relative à l'état de siège, votre Commission de la législation civile et criminelle a été conduite à penser qu'il y avait lieu de statuer à part, et, en premier lieu sur le régime de la presse périodique, en temps de guerre.

Pour répondre au sentiment unanime de la Commission, nous avons l'honneur de déposer sur le bureau de la Chambre, avec demande de discussion immédiate, la proposition de loi ci-après, qui remanie complètement le texte de la loi du 4 août 1914, relative à la répression des indiscretions de presse, en temps de guerre.

Proposition de Loi

Article premier.

En temps de guerre, le texte de chaque feuille ou livraison d'un journal ou écrit périodique doit être, avant toute publication, communiqué à l'autorité publique suivant les règles prescrites par l'article 10 ch. 2, de la loi du 29 juillet 1881.

Art. 2.

Le Ministre de l'Intérieur à Paris et dans le département de la Seine, les préfets dans les autres départements ne pourront interdire que la seule publication, communiquée à l'autorité publique suivant les règles prescrites par l'article 10 ch. 2, de la loi du 29 juillet 1881.

Art. 3.

Il est interdit de distribuer un journal ou écrit périodique, sans avoir accompli la formalité ci-dessus prescrite ou d'insérer dans l'édit écrit, malgré
l'interdiction faite dans les conditions de l'article précédent, des informations et renseignements intéressant la défense nationale.

Il est également interdit de publier des informations et renseignements de la nature indiquée à l'article 2 ci-dessus, par l'un quelconque des moyens énoncés à l'article 23 de la loi du 29 juillet 1881.

Art. 4.

L'introduction en France, la circulation et la mise en vente ou distribution de journaux, brochures, écrits ou dessins de toute nature, publiés à l'étranger pourra être interdite par simple arrêté du Ministre de l'Intérieur.

Art. 5.

Toute infraction aux prescriptions résultant des articles 3 et 4 de la présente loi sera poursuivie conformément aux règles déterminées par les articles 42, 43, et 44 de la loi du 29 juillet 1881.

Les auteurs et complices desdites infractions seront passibles d'une amende de 1.000 à 5.000 francs et d'un emprisonnement de trois mois à deux ans, ou de l'une de ces deux peines seulement.

En cas de récidive par le même journal et dans les cas prévus par l'article 58 du Code pénal, les tribunaux pourront, suivant la gravité du délit, prononcer la suspension du journal ou écrit périodique pour un temps qui ne pourra excéder deux mois, ni être moindre de deux jours.

Tous journaux, écrits, périodiques ou non périodiques, dessins, affiches, etc. incriminés, ayant servi à commettre les délits prévus par la présente loi seront préventivement saisis ou arrachés.

La destruction en sera ordonnée par le jugement de condamnation.

Art. 6.

Toutes les infractions à la présente loi sont de la compétence exclusive de la juridiction correctionnelle, L'article 463 du Code pénal leur sera toujours applicable.

Les dispositions de l'article 9 no. 4 de la loi du 9 août 1849 concernant l'interdiction des publications demeurent expressément abrogées.

La loi du 9 août 1914 tendant à réprimer les indiscretions de la presse en temps de guerre est également abrogée, ainsi qui toutes autres dispositions contraires à la présente loi.

(Source: Paris, S.H.A.T., carton 58374, material relating to Meunier Bill.)