A NEW APPROACH TO GAUDAPADAKARIKA

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Gaudapada’s work, that is, his Karika in four chapters, may be regarded an important landmark in the development of the Advaita Vedantic thought. His exposition of Advaitism is unique and without parallel in the Vedantic literature. He does not follow the traditional line of argument for upholding his thesis. The language he has adopted is Buddhistic in many parts. He employed several expressions which are common to Buddhism and its philosophy and which create impression in the mind of readers that the author (Gaudapada) was a follower of Buddhism (v.V. Bhattacharya’s edition of the Karika). It is mysterious indeed why Gaudapada should have at all adopted such an ambiguous language betraying his trustfulness to the Advaitic thought and tradition. He is traditionally regarded a disciple of the sage Suka in the Sveta. up. bhasya ad I,8, and a grandpreceptor of Sri Sankara through Govindabha­gavatpada (v.R.D. Karmarkar’s edn. of the Karika, Introduction). He has, perhaps, been influenced by Buddhism, especially in its later developed form, because he was a native of the Gauda country where Buddhism was a prominent and popular faith in his days. He might have aimed at propagation of Advaitism in the popular language and style of Buddhism which might appeal to the lay as well as the learned men of the society in those days. This appears to be the most plausible explanation of the riddle why Gaudapada adopted such an ambiguous style which being improperly understood would convey the converse of what he intends to convey.

Thus we meet with two sets of interpretations of the text one tending towards Buddhism and the other opposing it (e.g. V. Bhattacharya and R.D. Karmarkar). I shall confine myself in the following pages mainly to clear off the wrong interpretations of the ambiguous expressions employed by Gaudapada in the course of upholding his fundamental thesis of Advaitism.

The text consists of four chapters, of which the first contains 29 verses explaining the Mandukyopanishad. The central theme of the Upanishad is the description of four stages of Atman, Brahman known as Visva, Taijasa, Prajna and Turya (fourth) who is Sarvadrk, perceiver of
the whole. The first three stages are represented in the following states
in order: Waking (Jagarita), Dream, and Deep Sleep. The fourth is
the transcendental state. Atman in the first three stages generally
stays in the three places of the body; the left eye, mind and heart
respectively. The mystic syllable ‘Om’ while considered to be consisting
of three parts: a, u and m represents the first three states of Brahman.
While considered as partless and one unit it represents the fourth
Advaita state of Brahman (Karika, 29). Gaudapada points out the dis-
tinction between the third and the fourth state thus: the non-grasping
of dualism is common to both states, but the Atman in the third is un-
der the influence of avidya, nescience and sleep, while in the fourth Atman
is relieved of both (K.19). He says further that the living being who
is caught in the slumber of immemorial Maya (Illusion) gets awakened,
then he realizes Advaita (Monism) which is freed from birth and sleep
(K.16).

This idea is common to Yogacara Buddhism. If we substitute
Cittamatrata for Advaita the passage would turn into a Buddhistic maxim.
This chapter is rightly styled as Omkaraprakarana, an exposition of the
Om syllable. Read for fuller contents of the chapter Karmarkar, Intro-
duction, X.f.

The second chapter named Vaitathya-prakarana consists of
38 verses. The chapter starts with the elucidation of the external
world and its futility on the analogy of dream phenomenon. The
illusory character of our objective universe is a common doctrine of
both the Vedantic and the Yogacara Buddhist and the dream analogy is
also a common weapon to demonstrate their position. Reference to
Vasubandhu’s Vimsatika, verse 1 with bhasya. Another common exam-
ple for the purpose is the illusory notion of the Serpent on the Rope in
the twilight. Gauda says: Just as the idea of serpent is imagined on
the rope in the dark, just so is the idea of Jiva-atman imposed on the Brah-
man. When true knowledge of the rope is gained the illusion of serpent
disappears; likewise one atman is discriminated as diverse through the
influence of Maya and when the true character of atman’s oneness is
ascertained the discrimination disappears (KK. 16-17).

Then the author elaborates the views of different thinkers who
assume erroneously as the ultimate reality things such as Prana, breath,
elements, Guna etc. Gauda does not omit to mention in the list the
ultimate reality of Buddhist, viz. mind, manas, citta (K.25). Here the
absence of Jnana, Vijnana or Prajñana is noteworthy because it is charac-
teristic of Atman, Brahman stated in the Upanisads. It has been in fine remarked that the entire universe is to be considered by the Vedantin as a dream, illusion or castle in the air. The highest truth is that there is no annihilation, nor origination, no fettered person nor aspirer of truth and no desirous of release nor released (K.32). This utterance of Gauda, resembles very closely to Nagarjuna’s characteristic Nihilism. If the stanza is detached from the context one could hardly think that this utterance comes from a Vedantin. Gauda, comes very close to Nagarjuna because both of them plead for the unreality of the diverse world and for one absolute Whole. They, however, differ in their approach to the ultimate truth. Naga, would designate it Sunyata, or the highest perfection of wisdom whereas for Gauda, it is Atman or Brahman, an embodiment of the highest knowledge. cfr. Sveta. up. bhasya, Gitapress, p.46, citing the Brahmapurana.

Gauda closes this chap (II) with the declaration that Non-dualism is auspicious (अद्वैतावता दर्शन, K.33) and the same as Advaita or Tattva. He further says: Advaya which implies the negation of plurality and of the mind’s constructive states has been revealed by the Sages that have reached the yonder shore of Vedic lore (K.35). The Advaya doctrine is common to the Mahayanic Buddhists. It is probably for this reason that Gauda adds that his doctrine of Advaya has been revealed by the Vedic Sages with the implication that he is not speaking of the Buddhist doctrine. We may likewise find several times in Sankara’s bhasya on the Upanisads the expression of Advaya in relation to Brahman.

It is to be noted here that Amarasinha, the Sanskrit Lexicographer has credited Buddha with preaching the Advaya doctrine probably for the first time. Both schools of later Buddhism, the Madhyamika and the Yogacara proudly acclaim themselves as great champions of the Advaya doctrine though the import of the term, advaya, is quite different for each school. For the Madhyamika it conveys the idea of middle path, Madhyama-pratipad whereas for the Yogacara it signifies the absence of subject and object अद्वैताप्रकारानां. Though Gauda and Sankara characterize Brahman as advaya they probably intend to convey the idea of advitiya, “without the second”, i.e. Advaita. Now I leave it to future studies to decide which school initiated the doctrine and which one adopted it later.

The third chap (III) named Advaita-prakarana contains 48 verses. The exposition of Advaita in this chapter is quite logical in
succession after establishing the futility of the diverse world in the second chapter. This chapter may also be named as Akarpanya-prakarana as the author starts in the second stanza as अकर्पण्यायकारण्यम्, “I shall elucidate unpitiableness”. In the first stanza Gauda has stated that the worship, upasana, is related to the Karya-Brahman, Hiranya-garbha etc. The worshipper being different from the worshipped occupies a pitiable state, krpana. In fact every body is Aja, unborn, ie. Brahman prior to an illusory creation. For this reason, says Gauda—I shall elucidate Akarpanya, unpitiableness which is a quality of Brahmic state अज्ञातिसमन्त गतम्. It appears therefore that Akarpanya may fittingly be equated to the Advaitic state. Brah. Up. mentions krpana as opposed to Brahmana, v. passage cited below, comm. No. 16.

The main arguments of this chapter may be summed up as follows:

1. There is nothing born; some philosophers advocate the birth of what is unborn. The unborn is immortal, how could it be reduced to mortality? (K.20) No Jiva, person is born; this is the ultimate truth comprising an absolute non-existence of birth (K.48).

2. Relation between Jiva and Brahman is similar to that between the vast space and the space within the pot (ghata-akasa); that is to say the difference between them is made by the limiting adjunct (Upadhi-ghata). The moment the pot is destroyed the difference disappears (K.3-4). This illustration of space is made in respect of birth. So ghata-akasa is neither a product nor a part of Akasa. Likewise are Jiva and Brahman (K.7). The aggregates (material objects) are creations of one’s own illusion, maya and similar to those in dream (K.16). Hence the identity of Jiva and Brahman is much extolled in the scripture Upanishads and their differentiation is severely censured there—which position is quite rational (K.13). Thus non-dualism is the Absolute Truth and dualism is only its variety (K.18). The same idea is echoed in the Vishnudharmottara cited in Sveta.Up.bhashya, p. 48.

3. In the light of non-dualism stressed in several Upanishads the passages dealing with the process of creation of the universe are to be explained away as a devise for leading people to the ultimate purpose of identity of Jiva with Brahman (Kk.15,24-25).
4. Mind is a sole factor for dualism, ज्ञानश्रेयः विद्याम् दैत्यम् when the mind is reduced to a non-entity (amanibhava) dualism vanishes (K.31). The mind is so reduced when one does not conceive anything as a result of realizing and experiencing the truth of Atman, Brahman (K.32). The same topic has been elaborated in Kk.34,38,40. In deep sleep the mind is laid low and being controlled it is cut off from its activity; then it becomes Brahman which is embodied in an all-round illumination of knowledge (Kk.35,46). It is unborn, sleepless, dreamless, devoid of name and form, omniscient and flashing up once only (K.36, cp.Kk.37-40). One should therefore control the mind through proper means when it becomes distracted by pleasure and enjoyment. Recollecting that everything is miserable one should turn its back from pleasure and enjoyment, and recollecting that everything is unborn one sees nothing as born (K.43). When the mind becomes low-spirited it should be awakened; being distracted it should be pacified; being contaminated with impurities it should be watched with care, and being attained to the state of equilibration it should not be shaken up. One should not enjoy pleasure out of concentration, but should get detached from it through his wisdom; the mind being steady and motionless one should with efforts free it from its dualistic tendency. When the mind is not laid low and not distracted, the mind which is now motionless and freed from its dualistic reflection turns into Brahman (Kk.44-46).

Comment. Now let us see whether any of the above topics of Gauda can be compared with ideas of the Buddhist authors.

1) Our comment on the Ajativada is deferred to the next chapter on the same topic.

2) The space-example is also found in a Mahayana sutra cited in M. vrtti, p. 375 which insists on the identity of all entities on the analogy of space. The passage runs: तदवधाति नाम देवपुन्य यथा मृदुञ्जन्ययान्तर्यामकां यथा रत्नाणस्यान्तर्यामकां आषाधातुरेवं: तत्पर- मार्गेन्तो न किष्ठि त्वात्ताकारणम्।।

3) Gauda says that the Upanishadic doctrine of creation is a devise for some ultimate purpose (K.15); this looks like an echo of Vasubandhu’s explanation of Buddha’s utterences about skandha, ayatana and dhatu (V. Vasubandhu’s Vimsatika, ver. 8-10). Buddha is regarded as Upayakusala, clever in employing devices suitable to convert people to his own faith (Cp. Satyasiddhi, ch. 1.p.5,n.3). It is likely therefore that
Gauda was convinced of the advantage of the Buddhist argument to explain away the sayings contradictory to their favourite conclusions.

4) "This dualistic appearance is a vision of the mind" मनोद्र्यामि द्वैतम् (K.31′), this expression seems to be resulted from the dream example employed several times in the Treatise by Gauda (cp. K.30 also). According to the Upanishads it is the mind that creates a new imaginary world in dream, cp e.g. Prasna; up. IV, 5: अनीव देवः (सः मजः) स्वयम् महासाताध्युतवति . . . . . . . . . . . . since the same axiom is applicable to the waking state the above expression "manodrsyam" has perhaps been coined. The Vedantin would otherwise express it as मायाकल्पत् or मायाविष्कृष्टतम् etc. Since the Yogacara Buddhists also plead that the universe is imaginary and a creation of mind they would repeat the idea as मनोद्र्यामि स्वयम् using ‘sarvam’ instead of ‘dvaitam’. The above statement would also result authentically into another axiom: मनसो नियाधायतं . . . . . / उपाखयः . . . . . the end of misery is brought about by the mind’s control (K. 40).

It is interesting to note that the above ideas of Gauda have some parallels in the Vishnudharma (in the group of six chapters) as follows:—

अविधा च क्रिया: सर्वं विद्या ज्ञानं प्राप्ति।
कर्मणं जातस्तः अनुविधाय च विमुच्यते॥
अहृतं परमार्थं हि अहृतं तदर्जनं वचने॥
अजानमेवति तत्स्तः अहृतं भूस्तं परसः॥
मम भविष्मितं गच्छावियुक्तं अविभक्तकं॥
अविवक्तयमनस्ते यमुन्मुन्ययते॥
मनोद्र्यामि हैि तदद्वैतं परमार्थं॥
मनसो ज्ञातं तदन्तः धर्मर्धीनमिलता॥
निरोद्ययः निरोदिष्टः हैि नैौपपत्ति॥
मनोद्र्यामितं सर्वं यथाभिन्नतः वर्जति॥
मनसो ततः तथामितं सर्वं तदात्मणां॥
कर्मभावनयतात्मं स्वयं विज्ञानस्य विज्ञानाय।।
ताद् सतिः निर्विद्विद्यावशो खलु सतिः॥
क्षे कस्यं तस्यं परं ज्ञानं स्वयंमेव अवक्षेत॥
“All actions are (the result of) nescience, (avidya) and vidya is regarded as knowledge. The creature takes birth as a result of its action and it gets released as a result of vidya, (knowledge). The ultimate truth is Advaita, (monism) and dualism is only its variety. The notion ‘I’ and ‘mine’ arises from the lack of wisdom; Advaita, on the other hand, is experienced as freed from conceptions and as unspeakable, Dvaita is embodied in the mind’s activities which are born of their causes, dharma and adharma, merit and demerit. They are to be made ceased and at their cessation dualism dvaitam becomes utterly irrational. This entire universe is imagined by the mind alone and the monistic state is secured when the mind becomes non-entity (amanibhava) or non-mind. The cognitive experiences arise in accordance with the resultant forces of action karma-vasana, that is the consciousness arises in such a fashion as the forces assume and as soon as it is removed or stopped the ultimate Truth; Brahman shines forth of its own accord” (cited in the Svet. bhasha, pp. 48-49, Gita press).

Note. Vijñana and Vijnapti are employed in the same import as in Yogacara Buddhism. The idea that at the stoppage of mind’s activities Truth shines forth can be compared with the Yoga Sutra I, 1,2: तद्व इस्यः स्वयंप्रेष्वस्थानम्। cp. Sankara bhasha on Gita, XVIII, 50: नामप्रमनालयानाएषाैषा विनिमण्डलित: कार्यम्।

K.35. The idea of Gauda that the mind being controlled and checked in its activity turns out into Brahman (cp. K.46) looks like the Yogacara’s favourite thesis that the mind being stopped in its creation of dualism गङ्गाश्राविहङ्क्षलावः turns out into Dharmadhatu, i.e. Tathagata (v. Trimsika, ver.28 with bhasha). It does not, however, follow that Gauda formed his idea after the pattern of Yogacara Buddhism. The Vedantin has his own reasoning for it. Sankara pleads once: Mind (manas) is Brahman because the latter is the inner core of the former तत्सत्वात्मकममकालुः Kena. Up bhasha II, 2,4. The Vedantin’s definition of Jiva is: conscious spirit circumscribed by the limiting adjunct, the inner organ, i.e. the mind, etc (Vedantaparibhasha.) When the inner organ is made deprived of its functioning it becomes pure consciousness, caitanya like Ghatakaśa becoming the vast space at the destruction of the pot.

K.36. Sakrt-vibhatam, flashing up once. This expression again appears in chap IV, K. 81. Its synonym is Sakrt-jiyotis found in chap III, K. 37. Atman is also stated to be Svayamjyotis in Br.Up.
IV, 3, 14. Gauda made it svayam-prabhatam (IV, 81). The Mahasanghi-
ka Buddhist have also characterised their original mind as Prakrti-prabhasa-
ram. The Sakrt-vibhatam may be considered in relation with some
Buddhists' theory of Eka-kshana-abhisambodha, one moment's intuition
of Truth. This theory has been advocated by the Madhyamikas and also
in the Satya-siddhi (ch.26-27) as against the Vaibhashikas' theory of
gradual intuition of the four Truths (anupurvabhisamaya), The one
moment's intuition is advocated for the reason that the Truth is only
one, viz. Cessation-Truth, Nirodha-satya. May we guess now that
there may be some link between these two theories of the Vedantin
and the Buddhist? Sankara perhaps refers to this one moment's intuition
theory while commenting on the Kena. Up. II, 2,4: प्रतिविद्धिव्यविद्यत
as सुक्रियायां प्रतिमोच हिःश्चरे “according to some pratibodha implies
one moment's consciousness”. We may also take note here of
the Br. Up. II, 3.6: .........यथा सूक्रियायां सूक्रियायं सुक्रियायस्तेव हा अथ
श्रीमयूर्ति य एवं वेद and Sankara's bhashya thereon.

K. 44. Gauda's prescription of cure for the mind's concentra-
tion-ills is comparable with that of the Buddhist authors. Gauda says
that the mind gets distracted due to its inclination to enjoy the sensuous
pleasures and it becomes low-spirited on account of some mental illness
etc. Both the states are detrimental to the ultimate goal. So Gauda
advises that the mind should be pacified when it becomes distracted, and
it should be awakened when it becomes low-spirited.

According to the Buddhists mind's stubbornness and low-spirits
are two impediments to the Enlightenment. When the mind is stubborn
one should cultivate calmness, concentration and equanimity because
through these three factors the stubborn mind can easily be pacified.
When the mind becomes low-spirited the yogin should cultivate analy-
tical thinking, exertion and joy because through these factors the
low-spirited mind can easily be awakened (Samyutta V, 12 ff). The S.
Siddhi discusses this point in greater details. When it is distracted the
act of controlling should be applied; when it is too subdued the act of
slackening should be applied. The goldsmith, thus melts the gold,
heats it, waters and keeps it on timely. If it is too heatened it
becomes fluid being too cooled it becomes thickened and being kept
on it becomes expanded Likewise is the yogin's mind (ch. 156). The
tamed horse also may be compared here (Ibid).

The Yogasutra refers to about nine factors of distraction and their
satellites about five in all (I, 30-32). In order to check them an exercise
of contemplation on Eka-tattva, single truth is advised; the mind may
again be appeaced by means of contemplation of four devices Maitri,
love, Karuna, compassion, Mudita, joyfulness and Upeksha, indiflerelce
(I. 33), or by some such other means (1,34). The Yogasutra speaks
nothing about the kinds of unfavourable mental states as the Buddhist
sources or Gauda describe.

It is therefore most likely that Gauda was acquainted with the
Buddhist tradition regarding the Dhyana process and made use of it in
his own fashion to suit his favourite thesis. The mind's distraction
(=stubbornness in Buddhism) which arises due to sensuous pleasure should
be checked by recollecting the affective axiom that everything is miserable,
a formula quite popular in Buddhism (K.43). Gauda says in the
same breath that by recollecting everything as unborn one does not see
anything as born. But the link between the first and the second state­ment is not quite obvious and logical. Gauda probably adopts Patanjali's
opinion of Eka-tattva-abhyasa, contemplation-exercise on single truth
(Yogasutra I, 32). It appears to us in that case that we should interpret
"aja" unborn as Brahman and "jata" born as illusory things. Cf. our remark on the title of the third chapter above.

K. 46. Our comment on this chapter may be closed with
Gauda's instructive remark on the mind and its ultimate reality. He
states: When the mind is not low-spirited and distracted, the same
which is now motionless and freed from its dualistic reflection turns
out into Brahman—which statement may suggest to us that Gauda expresses
a Buddhistic idea in the Vedantic terminology. How it could be justi­fied from the Advaita Vedantin's standpoint of view that has been made
clear previously v. comment on K. 35.

Chap IV

The fourth chapter traditionally styled as Alatasanti prakarana
consists of just a hundred stanzas eight of which are repetitions from the
previous chapters. This chapter contains several puzzling and enigmatic
expressions which led some scholars to doubt whether the author was
truly an Advaita Vedantin. Hence the chapter is intrcsting to us in
more than one respect. Its theme is the same as that of the previous
chapter viz. elucidation of Advaitism in greater details.

The main topics may be summed up as below:—

1. Criticism of Jati-rada, theory of origination. The origination-
thorists are all dualistic thinkers, viz, Sankhya, Vaiseshika, the Buddhists
with the exception of the Madhyamikas. They may be grouped into two: a) Some plead for origination of what is non-existent, b) others plead for the origination of what is clearly existent, thus they both dispute each other and lead ultimately to non-origination which we approve and never dispute with them.

The author ridicules the theory of origination, Jativada as it does not stand a moment’s scrutiny; hence Ajativada, non-origination is only rationally acceptable conclusion (Kk 3-23,71). The important factor that brightens ajati, non-origination is the non-recognition of the order of sequence between the cause and the effect (K.21); it becomes thus obvious that nothing originates from itself or something else, nor does anything originates whether it is existent or non-existent etc. (K.22). cp. Nagarjuna’s maxim न स्वतः नापि परतो Madh. Sastra.

Likewise the non-existent is not caused by the non-existent nor is the existent caused by the non-existent. The existent cannot be caused by the existent. How can the non-existent be caused by the existent? (K.40). This looks like Nagarjuna’s dialectic. The origination, however, has been preached by the enlightened sages, Buddhas for those who are frightened at the doctrine of non-origination and those who believe in the true existence of things as they experience their activites (K.43); viewing thus the wise enter into the truth of non-origination of the cause and the effect (K.54).

2. Prajnapati. The Empirical experience, prajanapti is conditioned by its cause; if it is not so, dualism or diversity (that is experienced by us) would be destroyed. Because the defilement is operative its causal production (paratantia) is accepted (in the empirical field of dualism). Prajnapati (the worldly experience) is regarded as conditioned by causes (nimitta) from the viewpoint of logic. The cause, (nimitta) becomes non-cause (animitta) from the viewpoint of Truth (Kk. 24-25).

3. Dream. The dream-example is elaborated and applied to things experienced in the waking state (Kk.32-37,39,61-68). Waking experience is applied to dream state in K. 41. Just as one experiences the unthinkable objects (acintya) as real in the waking state, just so one experiences things in dream; perversion (viparyaya) is the causing factor in both cases.

4. Maya and Nirmitaka. The magic elephant is regarded as real because it moves and causes experiences; likewise are the external
things (K.44). Buddha (-Gautama) preached: "Things are originated on account of causes and conditions"; this origination is comparable with magic, and the magic too does not at all exist (K.58). The illusory person is born and dies; likewise the living beings are existent (born) and non-existent (die) (K.69). The same is repeated with the illustration of Nirmitaka, created being (K.70).

5. Alata, firebrand, whirling of the firebrand causes the appearance of a wheel, so the vibration of consciousness gives rise to the appearance of the subject-object notions. When the firebrand is stopped it causes no such appearance but remains in its unborn state. While the firebrand is whirling the appearance of wheel does not come from the the outside and enters into the firebrand, nor does the wheel appearance go out of the firebrand, because it is not a substance; so is the case with Vijnana being at vibration, the appearance of the subject and object does not come from the outside and enters into Vijnana, nor does the appearance go out of it because the subject-object appearance is not a substance. The appearance is always unthinkable (acintya) because no law of causation between the two (Vijnana and appearance) is operative (Kk.4-7-P).

6. Citta and artha. Mind does not touch the object nor does it reflect the object, because the object is unreal and so is its reflection. The mind touches no cause (nimitta) in all three times-Perversion is causeless by itself, how will it cause the appearance? Hence the mind has no birth, nor does the mind’s vision have it. The person who perceives its birth will also perceive the footprint in the sky (K,26-28). The mind and its object have no birth; the person who understands this fact will never fall in perversion (k.46). Dualism of subject and object appearance is the result of the mind’s vibration, citta-spandita. The mind in fact is object-free; hence it is proclaimed to be contact-free, asanga (K.72) cp. k. 96.

7. Samsara and Moksha. For samsara which is beginningless, no end can be achieved and for Release, moksha which has a beginning, no endlessness can be achieved (k.30). As long as one has obsession with cause and effect so long he will have the causal production. The obsession being removed the causal production ceases to exist. As long as one is obsessed with the cause and effect, so long will his samsaric life continue; his obsession with the cause and effect being removed he will not be caught in samsara (K.55-56).

8. Kshanti. All entities are by nature freed from decay and death. Those who conceive their decay and death are dropped from their goal
due to their wrong conception (K.10). All entities are beginningless and to be understood as similar to sky by nature. All entities by nature are confirmed as enlightened from the beginning; one who has perseverance to this effect will become worthy of immortality (Kk.91-92).

9. **Sasvata-uccheda-drshti.** Everything is born in the empirical plane of existence, hence they are not permanent. Everything is unborn as they exist (for all time), hence they are not annihilated (K.57). From a magic seed springs up the magic sprout, then the latter is neither permanent nor impermanent. The same rule is to be applied in respect of all entities (K.59). No talk of eternal or non-eternal is possible with reference to the unborn things. Where no letters (i.e. words) are applicable, no discrimination (of permanent or impermanent) can be applied thereto (K.60).

10. **Advaya,** non-dual. Consciousness which is in fact unborn, unmov ing, object-free, calm and non-dual appears as though having birth movement and object (k.45). Everything is unborn; its birth is a vision of our mind. The mind being causeless, its non-birth, anutpatti is invariably non-dual (k.77). The mind being retreated and inactivated, its status is motionless; this state which is invariable, unborn and non-dual becomes the sole domain of Buddhas, the enlightened sages (k.80).

11. **Kalpita and Paratantra.** What exists in the imaginary sphere of existence (samvrti) does not exist in the absolute sense. Something may, perhaps, exist from the viewpoint of empirical law of causation, that too does not exist in the absolute sense. The absolute may be unborn from the viewpoint of imaginary spheres of existence. **Kalpita-samvrti,** it is not at all unborn in the absolute. It takes birth from the view point of empirical law of causation (kk.73-74).

12. **Abhinivesa.** There is adherence to a false idea of dualism, but that dualism is not there. Realizing the absence of dualism one takes no birth as he has no cause for the birth (k.75). The mind on account of adherence to false idea of dualism, activates itself in an apparently similar object (e.g. the idea of silver on the nacre) but when one realises the absence of the mistaken object he retreats himself from it and becomes detached from it (K.79).
13. Catuskoti. By apprehending some or other object the noble Atman is perpetually concealed as being happy, but disclosed as being miserable. The ignorant encompasses Him in four attributes; Ens, non-Ens, both Ens and non-Ens and neither Ens nor non-Ens, which attributes signify four ideas in order: "unsteady", "steady", "and" the absence of both". These are four extreme points by which the noble Atman is perpetually concealed. The person who recognizes Him as being untouched by these attributes becomes omniscient (Kk., 82-84).

14. Laukika, Suddha-laukika and Lokottara-jnana. The empirical knowledge (laukika-jnana) is what consists of two: object and its experience; pure empirical knowledge is what has the phenomenon of experience but is deprived of its object. The transcendental knowledge (lokottara) is considered as what is deprived of both the object and its experience. The Enlightened Sages, Buddhas have always proclaimed that the knowledge and the knowable (Jnana, Jneya) are to be understood well. When the three-fold knowledge and the knowable are understood in their order the wise will acquire omniscience in respect of everything (Kk. 87-89). Those whoever are convinced in respect of birthlessness and identity (of all things) are indeed possessed of the highest knowledge in the world and in this fact the world does not delve (K. 95).

15. Agrayana. What is to be discarded, what is knowable, what is to be acquired and what is to be matured are to be understood from the Agrayana, the highest Upanishadic path. Of these the ignorance-oriented experience has been accepted in the three states except the cognizable-Turya state (K. 90).

16. Brahmanya. Having reached to the complete omniscience, Brahmanhood, and a non-dual position not amenable to the beginning middle and end, what more than this one may yearn for? This discipline of Brahmans is spoken of as their innate calm state. It is also stated as dama because they by nature are controlled in their senses; the wise knowing thiswise should acquire the calm state (Kk. 85-86).

17. Vaisaradya. Having realized truly the absence of causation and not finding any distinct cause for anything one secures the fearless state which is devoid of grief and desire (K. 78). All entities are calm from the beginning, unborn, very quiet by nature and undifferentiated; their identity (samya) is unborn (i.e. Brahman) and fearless, visarada. Those who walk in things' differentiation have no fearlessness. All
different doctrines are deeply bent on differentiations; therefore they are pitiable (Kk. 93-94). Having realized the state which is hardly visible, too deep, unborn, undifferentiation, fearless and freed from diversity, we salute our preceptor to the best of our ability (K. 100).

18. Avarana. If there is even a subtle notion of diversity lingering in his mind the unwise will have no detachment. What to speak of that he will slip away his veil of nescience? All dharmas (i.e. sentient beings) are never covered by any veil, free from impurities by nature, enlightened and liberated from the outset—thus understand our teachers (Kk. 97-98).

19. Jnanam na kramata. Buddha’s knowledge does not cross over into entities, nor do the entities likewise cross over into knowledge—this has not been declared by (Gautama) Buddha (K. 99). The unborn knowledge is not regarded to be crossing over into unborn entities. Since the knowledge does not cross over into entity it is declared as relation-free (K. 96 cp. 72 under the head 6).

20. Asparsa-yoga. I salute to him who has preached yoga freed from contact, which is pleasant and beneficial to all sentient beings, dispute-free and contradiction-free (K. 2). cp. III, 39: the contact-free yoga is hardly experienced by any meditator who is frightened from this yoga thinking that is dreadful, though it is in fact otherwise.

Comment. 1. Ajativada. This is the most characteristic feature of Gauda’s philosophy. Nagarjuna (hereafter referred as Naga) too has made use of this thesis as one of the most powerful weapons to uphold his favourite philosophy of Nihilism, Sunyavada. Though Gauda and Naga concur in pleading very strongly for non-origination of things their ultimate purpose is quite different. Gauda by declaring the separate non-existence or non-origination of things aims at upholding Atman or Brahman as one sole principle, Advaita. Whereas Naga aims at an absolute voidness, sunyata. Though our modern mind tends to identify them as one and the same neither Gauda would say that he aims at voidness, nor would Naga say so at the Upanishadic Brahman. They differ thus in their purposes which oppose each other.

The circumstances which led them to their different conclusions must also be different. Since Gauda cites on several occasions instances from the Upanishads and other Vedic sources we may fairly be sure that
he has been inspired by those sources. We find in the Upanishads several passages to the effect that one Atman or Brahman alone is true and other phenomenal things are untrue or false; e.g. Aitareya. Up. 1,1,1:

\[ \text{रात्मा वा इदमर्य आसीत तत्त्वं किम्बन निष्पत्तः} \]

Br. Up III, 5,1: तेन ईदेश्व एव अत्योप्युत्त आतमः। ..... When things other than Brahman are declared untrue they deserve to be termed non-existent and their apparent existence and appearance are to be explained away as the effects of our mind’s illusion like a notion of the serpent on the rope. When the notion of the serpent disappears on a close observation the serpent and the rope become one and the same and the serpent has not a separate existence. Likewise to say that things other than Brahman are untrue and false implies that they have no separate existence and to be viewed as identical with Brahman itself. To confirm this idea the Sveta. Upanishad says:—

This Brahman that remains always within is knowable.
There is nothing other than this Brahman realizable.
The enjoyer, enjoyable and commander:
All these three are stated to be this Brahman alone. I.12.

On the basis of this identity all the attributes that are applicable to Brahman can also be applied to other phenomenal things. This is the reason why Gauda declares that things (dharmanas) are adi-santa, adi-buddha and adi-mukta (serene, released and enlightened from the outset) etc. The most characteristic of all attributes is aja, ajata ‘unborn’. Upanishads always prefer the expression: aja, ajata, na jayate, etc. to qualify Brahman or Atman. It may now appear quite obvious why Gauda generally calls phenomenal things as aja, ajata, ajati, etc. This is perhaps the background on which Gauda’s ajati-vada has been worked out.

In the case of Naga’s ajati or anutpattivada non-origination proposition the following facts may be considered as basis: Asvajit, one of the foremost disciples of Buddha, has credited his master with the discovery of a true cause of things that are brought about by causes in this stanza:

\[ \text{ये घर्मृ हृदुपम्व गुदुं तेषां तथावली हपाय}। \]

“Tathagata (-Buddha) has proclaimed the true cause of things that arise on account of their causes” (v. Salistamba sutra, p.26, note on p. 31 more particulars about the stanza). It is called there as Pratitya-samutpada-gatha implying thereby a formula
of Dependent Origination. The formula is said to contain twelve members such as Avidya, Samskara, Vijnana and others arranged in a progressive order to the effect that the first member causes the second, the second causes the third and the latter causes the fourth and so on. The formula explains how a human being comes into existence from its embryonic stage to a full grown up stage. In other words it makes plain how the truth of origin of misery, Samudaya-satya operates. The same formula is said to lead to the cessation-truth, nirrodha-satya by a cessation process, i.e. the cessation of the first member leads to that of the second member and so on. This doctrine obviously proves that both the origin and cessation are conditioned by causes. The law of causation, Pratitya-samutpada, thus forms a central theme in early Buddhism explaining how the phenomenal world originates and how it ceases to originate at the end.

This position turns to be quite different when Buddhism assumes Mahayanic form and introduced a monistic teaching. The Madhyamikas headed by Naga and a large number of Mahayana Sutras credited no more Buddha to be the discoverer of the law of causation in its early form. The doctrine of Pratitya-samutpada implies for Naga the reverse of origination, i.e. non-origination and non-cessation. Note the first stanza of this Madhyamaka Sastra:

अनिरोधमुत्तांग ्त् य: प्रतीत्यसम्पुत्तां ्त ।
देवशामास सम्बुदः तं कड़े बद्धस बर्म् ॥

This idea of non-origination is confirmed in the Mahayanic scripture: य: प्रतीत्यसमुपत्ति स हृत्ति:। 'What is originated through causes is not originated in fact' (cited in the Madh. vrtti, p. 239 from the Anavatapta Sutra). The reversal of origination into non-origination was necessitated in view of changing pattern of the Madhayamikas' outlook in respect of universe and their declared monistic principle. Now the Pratityasamutpada gatha has no more its original value, it has been since then relegated to an obsolete position. Gauda has also noticed this Gatha and its principal idea of origination (v.IV, 58).

Thus once a monistic principle becomes a declared motto, a nihilistic attitude towards other things is inevitable. This background offered Naga a great opportunity to wield his critical acumen and demolish the entire structure of dualistic thinking solely of his co-religionists, Abhidharmikas, Sarvastivadins and Vaibhasika. His polemics against these schools are met with in his Madhyamaka sastra and Dvadasamukha etc. Naga being the foremost in the field of dialectic logic, the pattern
of his critique would not have but served as model to the monistic thinkers like Gauda. Though Gauda and Naga plead for non-origination theory we should not however, over look their fundamental differences. As we clearly noticed Naga upholds Sunyavada whereas Gauda advocates Advaita-vada. The latter’s criticism of origination is directed against the Sankhyas in the main (Kk. 3-22). cp. भूतसम ज्ञातिमिच्छन्नति•••••• = Satkaryavada; the Vaiseshikas’ asatkaryavada is discussed only in one or two places (K.3 c-d, etc). Law of Causation Karana-karya-vada is the central theme of all dualists and has been criticised on several occasions (Read verses under topic No. 6,7: citta, etc and samsara, etc). The origination theory of the early Buddhists as stated in the Pratitya-samutpada-gatha has been referred to and ridiculed, read IV, 58: वर्मा य इति जाप्ते वे न तत्त्वः। with the gatha: ये वर्मा हेतुर्गम्यचा हेतु तेषां तथापि हृदायाः।

As previously remarked Naga’s target of attack in upholding the non-origination theory is in the main the early Buddhist who followed the Pratitya-samutpada-gatha closely in letter. His criticism against the Sankhyas and the Vaiseshikas can be found in the Dvadasa-mukha (my translation, ch. II). It is a well-known fact that the Madhyamikas profess no proposition of their own; they simply ridicule the opponents’ propositions cfr. Vigrahavyavartani, ver. 29, and Madh, vrtti, p.16 with Aryadeva’s citation. To the question whether Sunyavada, Nihilism is adhered to Naga replies an emphatic no. He declares eloquently:

शून्यमिति न वकृतकथमयुक्तमिति वा भवेत्।
उभयं नीतमयुर्वति प्रकटप्रथम तु कथयेत्॥

“it is not stated as void or non-void, nor is to be stated as both or non-both; it is however stated as void in order to convey an empirical understanding”

M. Sastra, XXII, II.

Likewise an exclusive ajati or anutpada theory is not acceptable to Naga, cfr. this point in his Dvadasamukha, ch. I. later portion. Gauda on the other hand sticks to the non-origination doctrine throughout the treatise and hints sometime that ajati or ajata stands for Brahman or Atman. We should not nevertheless miss to take note of some common expression between Gauda and Naga. Read e.g. Gauda’s verse.

स्वतः वा परतो वापि न किंचिद्दतु जाप्ते।
सदाभस्वस्वापि न किंचिद्दतु जाप्ते॥

31
Our reading of these verses may not be very satisfactory as they are shrouded in unfamiliar expressions which are not understandable by our ordinary intellect. Cauda has employed here apparently some Buddhist expressions like Prajnapti and Paratantra. Though the latter term can be traced in the treatises of the Sankhya and Sankara the former can hardly be traced in the Brahmanical literature. It appears therefore that Cauda adopted it from the Buddhist sources and made it of his own. The Buddhists employ the term prajnapti in the sense of ordinary talk or philosophically an empirical realm of existence. V. Satya-siddhi, ch, on this topic and cp. also Pudgala-prajnapti, Loka-jnapti, etc, which are some of the titles in Buddhist literature. Its synonym in later Buddhism is Samvrti-satya, empirical truth.

Paratantra is also Buddhist expression conveying the idea of origination dependent on causes and conditions. In Yogacara Buddhism the term conveys the sense "the mind and mental states dependent on causes and conditions". In fact it is not at all a Buddhist term when it signifies anything that depends on some ultimate cause in contrast with which is independent, Svatantara. For example, the evolutes in Sankhya system are paratantra because they are evolved from Prakrti which is svatantara because it does not evolve from anything else (v. Sankhyakarika, 10). Sri Sankara also employs paratantra in connection with our body, karya-karana-sanghata "the aggregates of effects and senses". So Cauda's sense is quite obvious, viz. paratantra, causal product i.e., the samsaric process continues and persists until sanklesa, defiling forces are present. It is an established fact in every system of thought that the defiling forces necessarily give rise to their effects, i.e., samsaric life an empirical existence.

In the next verse the author speaks of Yukti-darsana and bhutadarsana. The first is concerned with the empirical experiences and their conditioning factors whereas the latter with the absolute. Bhutadarsana, an insight into the absolute truth turns out the conditioning
factors into non-factors. The term bhuta-darsanam looks like a Buddhist expression, note Asvaghosa’s stanza:

भूतलय भूतको दृष्टा भूतदर्शन विमुक्ते।


3. Dream. Example on dream analogy read our remarks on ch.II (beginning). The only point to be noticed here is acintya, “unthinkable”. This term is again spoken of in connection with the universe of subject and object in K.47 and 52. Read comment on the fire-brand example, topic no.5.

4. Maya, etc. Maya example is common to both Buddhism and Vedanta. Nirmitaka example is most likely a Buddhist one. Sankara however, refers to the idea of a magician creating himself as walking in air etc.: यथा मात्रायणि निर्मतादन्त आत्मानेव …… आकारिन गच्छतिव निमित्तोते। (Aitareya. Up.bhashya, Gita Press, p.37). The important verse to be noted here in this section is Gauda’s refutation of Buddha’s renowned Gatha on Pratityasamutpada doctrine. Gauda says that Buddha’s teaching on the origination of things has not been stated from the absolute point of view. The origination of those things resembles a magic act which by itself is unproved as existent. Read comment on jati-vada for more details.

5. Fire-brand. This is a well-known example in Indian philosophical literature. The whirling fire-brand causes the appearance of wheel which is unthinkable, acintya, because it does not exist in the fire-brand, nor does it come from the outside or go out of the fire-brand. The wheel-appearance is unthinkable, because it is not a substance, i.e. it cannot be regarded as the actual effect of the fire-brand. Likewise the appearance of the subject-object universe on the consciousness is unthinkable, because the said appearance is not a substance; hence there cannot be a causal relation between the appearance and consciousness कार्यकारणतयोगानि। It seems that Gauda expounds the Vedantic idea in the Yogacara Buddhist terminology.

Our author on a previous occasion has also spoken of the unthinkable in K.44. The person with waking state perceives, as a result of
perversion, the unthinkable external elements as real (bhuta), etc. Ref. Dream-example No. 3. Here for Gauda, the phenomenal universe is unthinkable, because it is an imposed appearance on Brahman like the wheel appearance on the fire-brand. The wheel appearance is neither a substance nor the effect of the fire-brand. Likewise phenomenon of universe is neither substance nor the effect of Brahman but it is unthinkable (acintya): magic or false. There cannot be a causal relation between the universe and Brahman because the universe is not at all a substance.

The idea of unthinkable is also common to the Yogacara Buddhists. The Ratnagotra, thus refers to four unthinkable acintya: Samala Tathata, Nirmala Tathata, Vimala Buddhaguna and Jina-kriya. Here acintya appears to signify their characteristics inexplicable in the terms of ordinary reasoning.

The Satya-siddhi again defines the sense organ as acintya-karma-balarpupa of the four great elements. It is acintya because it cannot be stated as either one with or other than the four great elements. According to Dignaga the sense organ is a sort of Sakti inherent in the Alaya consciousness. He also refers to it alternately as anirdeśya-rupa, probably an opinion of the S. Siddhi (v. my Alambanapariksha, ver.7-8).

The Madhyamika’s doctrine of voidness which may be posited as a parallel of Vedantin’s doctrine of Illusion, mayavada appears to have sprung up as a result of their speculation about things in their indescribable character. The Madhyamikas affirm that the phenomenal world is indescribable because it does not stand their logical test. We have several reasons to make us believe that the movement of the Madhyamika analysis was not started with Naga but it must have been initiated from the early period of the Mahayana scriptures. We may cite here a few examples. The Bhavasankrantisutra says: The consciousness of next new birth is something indescribable. The last consciousness when it ceases, does not go anywhere and the first consciousness, when it arises does not come from anywhere else. For, they have no reality of their own and are void of their own substance (pp.4,15). It may now be plain that the relation between these two elements of consciousness not be specified in terms of logic. The idea is that the same consciousness does not cross over to the new birth and continues for the time (na samkramati). The same position is confirmed in the Salistamba-Sutra dealing with the Pratitya-samutpada doctrine, p.6, Na Samkrantitah . The Madh. vrtti (p.121) cites a Mahayanic sutra bearing on this topic:
The indescribable character of the relation between the cause and the effect has been argued by Naga in several places as a basis of his Sunyata doctrine. He pleads for example:

\[\text{M. Sastra XVIII, 10}\]

Cp. M. vrtti, p. 239 citation from the Anavatapta Sutra:

This topic will continue in the comment on Sasvata, etc. No. 9.

6. Citta and artha. Naga introduces in his sastra chap, III. on a critical examination of sensory perception which leads him to the conclusion that none of the senses could possibly discharge its function with which concurs Gauda's contention that the mind does not contact with its object, etc. It is worthwhile to take note of the verse from the Bhavasankranti-Sutra:

\[\text{Cited in M. vrtti, p. 120.}\]

Gauda's statement that the person who conceives the origination of things will see the footprint in the sky is comparable with the verse cited in Madh. vrtti p. 90: शून्यविश्व नहीं विचार करिहि अन्तरिक्ष स्मृति वा पदम्। (Ratnakarasutra) cp. also आकाश नक्षत्रां च चालस्य च चालस्य च चालस्य च चालस्य च। Dhammapada, VII, 4 and Theragatha, 92. Sankara also cites the simile along with others: स नन्देव समिपि च वेद्धित्वसुमिच्छिति। सोपानमिति च पहुँचामारोलोऽज्ञे बचे च मीमांसा वायस्य च हिद्धिक्षिति।

Aitareya bhashya. p. 76-71 (Gita Press). Here Gauda might have in his mind the Yogacara Buddhists who hold that the mind though momentary continues in succession.
Citta-spandita (ver. 72). The vibration of the mind has already been spoken of in III, 29 as being happened in dream as well as in the waking state on account of maya. The Buddhists also speak of the mind noding as resulting in false assumption. Buddha says: I notion is the mind’s noding, vibration and elaboration, etc. (Samyutta, IV, 202-3 cited also in S. Siddhi, ch, 84). Note also the passage cited in Madh. vrtti p. 540 l.12: निवर्णितमि म्हणवन्य: प्रशामः सत्वनिम्नतानामपरति: सत्वबिच्छुदातामिव-तानाम् || "Nirvana is a pacification and stoppage of all causing factors and of all distraction and shaking". This idea may quite possibly tally with Gauda’s conception of the universe as a vibration of the mind.

7. Samsara and Moksha. Gauda makes clear here that he keeps the same attitude towards Samsara as Naga. and his predecessors maintain. They plead that the belief and adherence to law of causation leads to a great sequence of one being bogged down in a turbulent empirical life. The best means to get rid of it is to be detached from the false notion of causation law. The causation law is false because it falls to the ground when it is put to a critical analysis. The Madhyamika declares that things that are valued on the basis of causal relations are absolutely valueless and hence void, sunya. Gauda and his followers as a result of the same logical absurdity call the empirical things as maya or acintya. Things are acintya unthinkable because their causal relations are impossible to be made satisfactorily agreeable to our reasoning. Gauda has as a specimen, shown how absurd is to talk about the causal relation in respect of the fire-brand and its wheel like appearance (v. Comm. No.5). Naga. has on the side of Mahayana Buddhism done the same task throughout his Madh. Sastra.

8. Kshanti. This concept is much favoured by the Buddhists and found in a specific context, cp. Jnana-kshanti in Buddhism. Gauda seems to have generalized the term in a border sense of perseverance. How the entity are free from decay and birth, beginningless and enlightened by nature have already been made plain in the comment on Ajativada No. 1. Their comparison with sky is also common to the Buddhists. The comparison implies that the entities are identical and changeless, and in addition, they are void for the Madhyaminas. For the Mahayanic idea of kshanti read the Samadhiraja Sutra:

The Bodhisattva does not dispute with anybody nor does he talk about any purposeless topic and remains constantly in his objective and dharma; this is the description of the first kshanti.
He understands all things as comparable with maya and grasps no nimitta. The characteristic marks of the perceived object, nor does he run astray from his cultivated knowledge. These are specifications of the first kshanti. (v. Buddhagama-sangha, p. 238).

9. Sasvata and Uccheda. Buddha's doctrine is based on the middle path, *madhyamapratipada* avoiding two extreme ends: afflicting one self with the bodily torture and indulging in the sensuous pleasure (v. Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta) which ends are stated later as existence and non-existence (Samyutta, III, 155 cited in S. Siddhi, ch. 26. No. 315). The Mahavastu equated *bhava-drshi* (भाववृत्ति) with *Sasvata* and *vibhavadrshi* (विभववृत्ति) with *uccheda* (v. Poussin, M. vṛtti, p. 1, n. 4 and p. 372, 5). Naga then declared that Buddha's doctrine freed from eternalism and Nihilism (*Sasvatocheda-drsti* in his Madh. sastra XVIII, II-Buddha introduced Pratitya-samutpada, law of causation with a view to avoiding the two ends, so says a Sutra: "The view of non-existence (Nihilism) disappears when one understands the origin of things (*Samudaya-satya*) and the view of existence (Eternalism) disappears when one understands their cessation, *Nirodha-satya*" (Samyutta, III, 134 cited in S. Siddhi ch. 196). Naga comments: The law of causation helps to avoid those two flaws in the doctrine. He says: Whichever arises due to causes and conditions is neither identical with nor different from its cause; hence it is neither perished nor preserved (M. Sastra XVIII, 10 cp. comm. No. 5 above). The Salistamba Sutra states that the formula of causation should be viewed on the background of five aspects, the first two of which are: *na sasvata* and *na uccheda* and explains them in the same fashion as Naga does v. verse cited above). The Lalitavistara also expresses similar view: ब्रजय सतो यथाकृते न च यो ब्रजू ध चैव अजू रो । न च अनुयु तू तौ ् ध चैव ततु ् एकमुच्छेद वजायक्ष्यंशेत्तम ।

"For example, the sprout springs up from the seed; they are neither one and the same nor different from each other; thus their nature is neither permanent nor impermanent" (cited in M. vṛtti p. 377).

Aryadeva elucidates the topic in a simpler manner: Because an element comes into being there is no Nihilism. Because an element goes out of existence there is no Eternalism (Cited Ibid, p. 376).

Being enamoured of this grand idea of the Buddhists Gauda thinks his Advaita doctrine should also be made freed from these two flaws.
So he says: Because things take birth, i.e. change into another form in the empirical sense, they are not permanent; but because they are in fact unborn, i.e. do not change in their aspect of existence an inherent Brahmamic state, they are eternal. Gauda’s statement: “In regard to unborn things no talk is possible of ‘eternal’ or ‘noneternal’ (K.60) may be compared with Naga’s verse: With reference to void things what is the same, what is different, what is eternal and what is non-eternal... (XXV, 22). Note the difference between Gauda and Naga in their metaphysical outlook: for the former “things are unborn” and for the latter “things are void”.

Gauda next says (60 e-d) Where no letters are applicable, no discrimination is possibly applicable thereto, which saying implies that Truth is anakshara, inexplicable in letter; cp. Naga’s idea: Anaksharam Tattvam. Discrimination is rooted in letters=words; cp. the following idea: sources of discrimination are words and the latter is the source of the former, विकल्प्योनयः: श्रुद्धा विकल्पः: श्रव्योनयः:।

Gauda’s expression: illusory things create illusory things; likewise are the phenomenals things (K.59) is comparable with Naga’s verse: void things arise from the void things: शून्येश्व एव द्वितीय ऋष्ट्रम्। Pratitya-samutpada-hrdaya, ver. 4.

10. Advaya. Gauda seems to speak of the individual Atman by vijnana (which is identical with Brahman) when he refers to it as motionless and without second. The consciousness appears in the empirical plane of existence as though having birth, motion, etc. The idea may be compared with Dharmakirti’s saying: अप्रवृत्तिः एव शून्यत्वात्मा विकल्प्योनयः:। ग्राह्यार्थमवित निदर्शनयिनैव लक्ष्येत्। Pra. var. 3.354

Gauda says (K. 77) that the mind’s non-birth anupatti, is advaya and that the non-birth state is possible when there is no nimitta, mind’s activating cause, pravrtti-nimitta. At this state the mind becomes one with Brahman, Brhami-bhava (v. our comment on III, KK.35, 46 above and Yogasutra I, 1, 2). The same idea is expressed in a different fashion (K. 80), i.e. the motionless state which is the same as Brahmic non-dual positon is declared to be the sole domain of Buddha’s highest knowledge. Here ‘Buddha’ is in a general sense meaning an enlightened sage. v. our remark on advaya in ch. II, end).

11. Kalpita and Paratantra. Those two verses are the most enigmatic and misunderstood. The terms Kalpita and Paratantra are the yogacara expressions adopted by Gauda and grafted to his Vedantic
ideology. Before we try to understand them we have to bear in mind the following background. Mahayana Buddhists admit two kinds of samvrti: Tathya and Mithya-samvrti. For example, the sight of water in the mirage is supplanted in the next moment on a close observation. Here the sight of water is Mithya-samvrti and the observation of the mirage is Tathya-samvrti (v. my paper: Madhyamakartha Samgraha in JORM, IX, p. 353). Gauda’s kalpita samvrti corresponds to Mithya-samvrti (cfr. Ibid, ver. 9) and Paratantra to Tathya. Sam i.e. lokasamvrti or-saty. Kalpita-sam. is the imagined water in the mirage and the Paratantra-sam. is the experience of the worldly objects which are products of causation law. For the yogacara Buddhists kalpita aspect is nonexistent and false and the paratantra aspect i.e. the mind and the mental state is existent and real. For the Madhyamikas it is also unreal and void. Now we can very well understand what Gauda means to convey in these two verses. In kalpita-samvrti i.e. in our sole imagination something appears as if real, e.g. the water in the mirage, but it turns to be unreal in the Tathyasamvrti-Loka-vyavahara which Gauda calls Paratantra and which has a bit of reality (paramartha). The objective universe may be real from the viewpoint of the law of causation, Paratantra-Sam-Loka-sam but it is unreal from the absolute point of view (K.73). The next must be understood thus: so called ultimate principle, Pradhana, etc. of other philosophers is conceived as unborn from the viewpoint of Kalpita-sam imaginary experience (Kalpita-sam-Mithya-sam), but it is not unborn from the viewpoint of the highest Truth. It takes birth etc from the viewpoint of Paratantra-sam-Tathya-sam. Paratantra-sam is so called because the law of causation is admissible in the empirical plane. It is an interesting coincidence that Candrakirti too in his Madh. avatara illustrates Mithya-sam by quoting the Sankhya and others and their so-called ultimate principles (v. my paper: Madh. sangraha op. cit. p. 45). It is strange that the Bhashya on the verse attributed to Sankara interprets paratantra into parasastra (v. comm. No. 2. more about paratantra). In the light of above finding R.D. Karmarkar’s much laboured explanation and note are not admissible (v. his notes on pp. 130-33).

12. Abhinivesa. The first line of K. 75 is a citation from the Madhyanta-vibhaga of Maitreya ch. 1, 1. ver. 1 a-b: अयोयंतामीतिशृङ्खलः द्वयंतां न विचारते | Sthiramati comments: there is a foundation i.e. Paratantra-mind mental state and on it kalpita, false ideas is imposed in which (paratantra) exists no dual, subject and object, etc. We are not to understand
Gauda in this manner. He probably means: there is abhinivesa (wrong adherence) for \textit{abhuta-dvaita}, dualism but there is no dualism in fact. If we divide the verse into two sentences all the grammatical difficulties would be saved? The K. 79 makes plain that Gauda does not intend to express the Buddhist meaning in k. 75 a-b because he says in this verse that on account of \textit{abhinivesa} for false idea of dualism, \textit{abhuta} a man engages himself in an apparently similar object. Here the subject of the verb \textit{vinivartate} is \textit{sah} a person, not the mind.

13. Catuskoti. This is the most characteristic feature of the Madhyamika philosophy. Naga eloquently proclaims that the highest Truth of his conception is free from any attribute: existence or non-existence etc. He inherited this doctrine from Buddha’s discourse to Aggivaccha about the Tathagata’s status after death which (status) has been described as ‘hoti, na hoti’ hoti ca na ca hoti, naiva na hoti na hoti’. Then Buddha gives out his opinion about the point thus: Tathagata in Nirvana is immeasurable like the great ocean (Majjhimanikaya, No. 72). It is therefore appropriate for the Madhyamikas to qualify the Truth as free from existence etc; but could it be justified on the part of Gauda who is an Advaita Vedantin and whose ultimate truth is Brahman and essentially \textit{sat}, existence in character? For this reason probably Gauda states that the four attributes signify in order: unsteady, steady etc. Thus Gauda appears to refer by \textit{astivada}, existence-thesis to the multiple principles of the dualists like the Sankhya, Vaiseshika and the early Buddhists. Their principles being more than one the existence trait does not remain attached to one principle. For the materialists (nastika) the highest principle being \textit{nil} the non-existence trait is fixed. The meaning of \textit{ubhaya} and \textit{ubhayabhava} may be understood appropriately in relation to other thesis in order.

14. \textit{Laukika-jnana} etc. The varieties of knowledge, laukika, etc. are quite common to the yogacara Buddhists though their interpretations are somewhat different. \textit{No difference can be noticed with reference to the first variety, viz. Laukika and its meaning because it is concerned with the ordinary waking experience. The difference is to be noted in the second variety, ie. \textit{Suddha-laukika}. For the Buddhists (i.e. yogacara) it is a pure empirical knowledge which is the \textit{prastha-labdha-jnana}, i.e. a knowledge acquired subsequent to the concentration \textit{Samadhi} and reflects things in their own nature namely as the reflections of the mind and the mental states, paratantra-aspect. The Yogin alone would perceive the paratantra-trait through this knowledge after rising up from the \textit{samadhi}, \textit{Lakottara}, the highest transcendental knowledge.}
known as *Asrayaparavritti*, i.e. state when Alaya-consciousness is turned into Tathata, or Dharmadhatu, etc (v. Trimsika, ver. 28-30).

It appears that Gauda employs these apparently Buddhist terms to convey his own ideas. His commentator explains the Suddhalaukika and Lokottara as dream state and deep sleep consciousness respectively. In the dream state the mind alone experiences unreal things; so it is without objects there are experiences-avastu sopalambha. In the deep sleep even the mind ceases to operate, hence it is considered to be eprived of both, objects and their experiences.

The Lankavatara Sutra speaks of the three kinds: Laukika, Lokottara and Lokottaratama and describes them as three stages of development. The first is related to other philosophers who advocate different ultimate categories of existence and non-existence. The second is concerned with all sravana and pratyeka-Buddhas' knowledge and the third with Buddhás and Bodhisattva's developed knowledge (v. the text cited by Karmarkar in his notes, p. 138).

The second line of this K. 88 is the most ambiguous. The Bhashya of Sankara comments: The knowledge through which the above said three states are understood is knowable; cognizable, vijneya is known as the fourth state (turiyakhyam), the Absolute Truth.....This interpretation appears to be somewhat uncertain in the next verse. 89 which does not mention the fourth state in a plain language. The verse reads: When three-fold knowledge and the knowable (jneya) are understood well in their order one becomes omniscient. According to the Bhashya, Sarvajnata, `omniscience' stands for the fourth state (v. the text cited in the notes, p. 140). So apparently there is no incongruity on the part of Bhashya, so Karmarker's criticism of Bhashya seems to be unfair.

15. *Agrayana*. This term is also a Buddhistic expression meaning Mahayana, generally understood as great vehicle. According to the Upanishads *yana* menas “path” in the expressions like Devayana and Pitryana etc. In Buddhism there are three yanas: Hinayana, Pratyeka Buddha-yana and Mahayana also called Agrayana sometime. On the Brahmanical side two yanas are well known, viz, Pitryana and Devayana (v. Br. Up. VI, 2,2, Prasna. I, 9 and Mundaka III, 1,6) which are concerned with the field of karman, Vedic rites and the worship of lower Brahman (upasana). It is most likely that Gauda accepted here as el ehere the Buddhist expression, agrayana to convey his Vedantic idea i.e. the highest Upanishadic path. The Buddhists call Mahayana sometimes
Buddhayana. As its counterpart the Vedantin may also call his path as Brahma-yana like Brahma-nirvana of the Gita, V, 24-26, II, 72).

Now we have to explain the Heya etc on the basis of the Upanishads. Heya, 'to be abandoned' is apara vidya, knowledge of the lower Brahman (cfr. Sankara's bhashya on Mundaka, I, 21). The knowable is paravidya, knowledge of higher order leading to Brahman-realization (v. ibid). Or it may indicate the knowable first stated in the ver. 58 (v. comment on it above). Apya, 'to be acquired' is the fruit effected by Karman, Samsaraphala (v. Bhashya on Mundaka I, 2,2: Sarvan Karana-karyam upadyam, apyam, samskaryam vikaryam va). Pakyam, 'to be matured' is the realisation of Atman and its identity with Brahman on the matura tion of one's intellect (v. Sankara's Bhashya on Taitti, I, 11, p. 90 Gita Press, cp. the expression, pakya in Sveta. Up. V, 5 and Sankara's Aparokshanubhuti, ver. येषां वृत्ति: समाबुधा परिपक्वा च सा पुनः.

ते वेन सदृशातो धाता…………………………. II 133 II

Here vrtti is Brahma-vrtti, thinking of Brahman.

An illusory experience of these four may happen in all three states, Laukika, etc. (K, 88) except in the fourth vijneya state. This interpretation may sound well. But the difficulty we encounter here is that the interpretation clashes with Gauda's description of the third state, deep sleep as devoid of objects and their experiences.

16. Brahman.va Gauda calls the Upanishadic omniscience a non-dual Brahmanhood (Brahmanya) probably in order to distinguish his Advaita doctrine from Buddhism. The Brhadaranyaka describes who is Brahmana and who is Krpana: यो वा एवदिकरं गार्भविदित्वा अस्मात् ब्राह्मणः प्रीति स कृपण: अथ एवदिकरं गार्भिकविदित्वा अस्मात् ब्राह्मणः सः ब्राह्मणः। (III, 8,10). It is worthwhile to remember here that a counter-claim has also been made by Buddha and his disciples. Their claim is that their faith alone leads to Brahmanhood, cfr. Dhammapada, Brahmanavagga, 26. and my paper, Message of Buddha and reference on pp. 5-8, Prabuddhabharata, 1950, May.

17. Vaisaradya. This is also a Buddhist expression. It is one of the most important attributes of Buddha like Dasabala etc. The Satyasiddhi state Buddha deserves our homage because he is superior to all other religious leaders in respect of his sublime qualities like Vaisaradya, etc. (ch. 3 and my paper on this subject in Sino Indian Studies, vol.1.pt. 3). Now Gauda appears to have generalized the expression

42
and claimed that the Realizer of Brahman and Atman may also deserve to be characterized as ‘Visarada’ just like Buddha claiming to be Brahman.

18. Avarana. This is a common concept of all schools of Indian philosophy though its content may differ in each school. The most characteristic feature of avarana, veil acceptable to the Vedantin and the Buddhist is avidya, nescience which is amplified into Raga, dvesha and moha, ‘lust, indignation and infatuation’. Gauda here speaks of no avidya or maya but its effect, i.e., the notion of diversity in identity. Things, in fact, are free from veil, pure by nature, etc. Thus our leaders understand. (Ref. our comment on Ajati no. 1). Here again a generalization of Buddha’s epithet “Nayaka” has been claimed by Gauda, cp. Amarasimha’s synonyms of Buddha “Nayaka” and “Vinayaka”.

19. Jnanam na kramate. Gauda state why knowledge does not cross over into entities in K. 96. Because both knowledge and entities are unborn, ‘aja’ and essentially of identical character of Brahman one does not cross over into other. The thing other than Brahman is a myth in the highest sense of Truth. This is the reason why the knowledge is eloquently declared to be freed from any relation with its relata. Gauda has already stated that the mind never touches its object since the latter is unreal (K. 72). He now speaks aloud that this point has not been admitted by Buddha. Buddha on the other hand, proclaimed in his first sermon: In me a knowledge arose in respect of dharmas, entities: धर्मेनु श्रान्तुपादि विद्या उद्धारादि; etc which claim has been challenged by Gauda in this verse, this challenge will set at rest all speculations about Gauda and his professed faith.

20. Asparsa-yoga. This seems to be absolutely a new expression coined by Gauda. It has no parallel either in Buddhism or Brahmanism. It is a paradoxical combination joining, yoga in the absence of contact, spasas. What does it signify? The classical definition of yoga in Buddhism is to concentrate one’s mind on a particular object. This is definitely a sparsa-yoga. The Buddhists admit nine grades of dhyana: four rupa-dhyanas: four arupa-dhyanas and the last: Nirodha-samapatti which is literally a sparsa-yoga. For in the previous 8 dhyanas the mind is operating and engaged in one or other object; it is in the last samadhi the mind ceases to operate; the yogin has only the body to get into contact with the object, kayena sprstva viharati this is called sparsa vihara (Pali; phassa-vihara). This fact makes clear that Gauda’s Asparsa-yoga is unknown to the Buddhists.
The Kathopanishad defines yoga as follows: When the five sensuous knowledges together with mind cease to operate and the intellect too does not act, that state is the highest position (gati). That position is considered as yoga in which the senses including the mind and the intellect are controlled and held up steadfast (III, 2, 10-11). This is the yoga that Gauda has in mind. Since in this state all the senses, the mind and the intellect cease to operate, there is nothing that comes into contact with any object. This position may appropriately be termed "Asparsa-yoga". Sankara’s remarks in this context are noteworthy. He says: तामोदृश पददर्शां योगसंवि मन्यते वियोगमेव सन्तर्प नर्वयोगवियोगव्यक्तम् हृदययोगश्च योगिनः। (Katha. Bhashya, Gita press, p. 160)

"That suchwise state the wise consider as the yoga which in fact is only a disjoining (viyoga) i.e. contact-free, because this state of yogin, saint is characterized as an absence of contact with all sorts of evil affairs". This statement of Sri Sankara makes it quite obvious that the yoga described in the Upanishad here is truly Asparsa-yoga of Gauda.

Let us see whether the Gita sheds any light on this topic. The following passage probably helps us a good deal to resolve the riddle:

बाद्रुपश्यां असक्तकामः बिद्वस्तावपि सा युक्तम्।
स ब्रह्मयोगयुक्तकामः सुखप्यक्तमेव। न

"The yogin who being detached from the external touchables obtains the happiness in his self; he is merged in Brahma-yoga and experiences the inexhaustible happiness".

This stanza amply demonstrates that Gauda’s Asparsa-yoga is no other than Brahma-yoga of the Gita. The expression, Asparsa-yoga with reference to Brahma-yoga is the most appropriate, since Brahman being identical with the yogin’s Atman, self has no contact even of the minutest degree could be imagined.

21. Avivada and Aviryuddha. Buddha has stated on several occasions that he does not dispute with the world and that he follows what the ordinary people talk about the worldly affairs (v. Samyutta, III, 138, Majh. I. and S. Siddhi, ch. 3, p. 12).

Gauda likewise says that we approve quite happily the thesis of no-birth, aatitvada which results from the quarrelsome dispute elaborated by other schools of thought about satkarya and asatkarya etc (IV, 5). Naga would not concur with Gauda in this respect because the former
could not have any dogma of his own as a settled fact, hence he disputes every dogma of his opponents.

Sri Sankara is more eloquent in disclosing the Advaitin’s attitude towards the controversial issues set forth by other philosophers. Note his statements cited below:

अन्तः-मतमनादल्य बेदान्तार्थत्वमेकत्वमात्र श्रति आदर्शनो मुमुक्षतेः न्यूरिति तार्किकमन्तरधारणां विज्ञनधारणां अस्मात्मक: न तु तार्किकवत्तु तत्तत्त्वविशेष।

—विवदस्वेब निरुक्तिः तिरोग्धो-वृक्षारणां।

तैः सार्वतसदृढ़तिः सृष्टिः निर्वाचित वेदविविक।

"Therefore the person desirous of Release, discarding the logician’s system should take good care in respect of the doctrine of identity of Atman-Brahman. For this reason, we shall disclose some lapses in their systems but not being entangled in the systems. The following has been stated in this context: The Vedantin placing the entire burden of points of disputes, their origin and causes upon the disputants and being protected by them in our decision about the thesis of existence passes on peacefully and happily". (Prasna-Bhashya VI,3,Gita Press p.111)

Note on the last verse. Gauda pays homage to his preceptor though not expressed, after understanding and realizing the fearless deep and undifferentiated state of peace in order to show his gratitude to his preceptor. This is quite in keeping with the tradition deserved in the Upanishads, e.g. Prasna. Up. last verse, Mundaka and Brah.Up etc. A similar tradition is noticeable on the Buddhist side e.g. Sundarananda where Nanda acknowledges his gratitude to Buddha. Naga’s homage to Buddha in the last verse of his Sastra keeps the tradition quite alive.

Finally a Note on Dvipadam vara. Gauda’s paying homage to Dvipadam vara in ch. IV, stanza 1, has given rise to some controversy amongst scholars regarding the identity of the person so designated. Some scholars of Buddhism believe that Gauda refers there to Buddha while others on the Brahmanical side believe otherwise. It appears to us that though Gauda adopts the Buddhistic terminology and pattern of arguments to uphold his Advaita philosophy, he cannot be stated to have saluted Buddha in the stanza. Our reason for this surmise is that Buddha is prominently spoken as “the Superiormost teacher of all men and gods” (शास्त्र देवमनुष्याम) but not Dvi-
padam vara, ‘best of all men’. Naga accordingly pays homage to Buddha as Vadatam vara, ‘best of all speakers or teachers’ (v.the first stanza of his Sastra.... तेन्द्रे वदत्तां वरम्). Gauda’s object of reverence is the best of bipeds, i.e. Purushottama, ‘best of all persons’ which obviously refers to Good, Visnum, ref Gita: उत्तमः पुरुषोत्तमः परमात्मेत्युदात च. Ch. XV, 17, ‘the Supreme Person is different (from the lower Brahman) and known as the Supreme Self’ which passage speaks of the Supreme Being penetrating three realms of existence (loka-traya). We should not confuse between ‘Dvipadam varam’ and ‘Vadatam varam’ which two terms signify two distinct theological concepts.

It does not matter very much whether Gauda refers to Buddha or Purushottama. None can nevertheless gainsay that Gauda adopted a great deal of dialectics from Naga and other Buddhist authors and adapted them suitably to the needs of upholding his Upanishadic Monism Advaita darsana.