ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF DHARMA—PALA’S COMMENTARY

In order to light up the wisdom in the poisoned-and dull-minded men and in order to let them extirpate their evils who spoke, I pay homage to Him and investigate the true meaning of that.

The Sastra says:—“Of the consciousness of the eye, and others:—

The fruit of investigation comprises the rejection of what is rejectable and adoption of what is worth adopting, therefore what is rejectable and the opponents’ perverted cause thereof are demonstrated here.

The word “others” (ādi) includes the five-fold consciousness which arises having support of the material objects and the senses as accepted by other schools of philosophy. They conceive that the senses are directed each to an [invariable external] real object. But the consciousness born of the mind is not so; for it is not directed to an invariable real object, but to an object which is only conventionally true, for example, the chariot and the like. Though it may be permitted that the non-senseous consciousness is conditioned by a real object and becomes endowed with its image yet it also grasps an object which is not its own and which lacks form reflected in the consciousness. But for the consciousness of the eye and others, there is established a separate object invariably associated with each of the senses. Therefore no effort is needed (to include it in (ādi)
Moreover, the atom-form which is to be cognized by the contemplation-achieved knowledge never, really, falls within the perview of the discriminative thought (tarka-mano-vijñāna); and again it appears as though it is perceivable, and it is to be understood (in this Śāstra) that it becomes object of only the wisdom born of listning and thinking (śrut-cintā.) Thus the object of the ordinary non-sensuous consciousness becomes absolutely non-existent; for it grasps neither the atom nor the aggregate as alambana. Things past and future are unreal like unmanifest things [and hence cannot act as objects to it]. For this reason the word “others” is said to include the body of five sorts of consciousness.

Then; if [you say] the mind cognizes whichever is brought home by the sensuous consciousness; how is that also possible? It cannot take place either in the same moment of the sensuous consciousness or in the immediate next moment; for it takes as its alambana the past things [which are unreal] Nor does it take so the present things; because the letter are cognized by the sensuous consciousness.

[If you say that] the non-sensuous consciousness grasps naturally the external object of its own accord, then there will not possibly exist the blind and deaf, etc. [To accept] a sense-faculty other than the eye, etc. is contradictory to the inferential knowledge. The denial of the extra material object [which may suit to the non-sensuous consciousness] being accepted, there is no need to entertain any bias for inclusion of the non-sensuous consciousness.
in *adi*. To the visual consciousness, etc. there are material things functioning as supporting causes. [There is no such thing for the non-sensuous consciousness] The thing-like *Avijñapti* is in the nature of non-action; hence it is admitted as a non-existent thing. Likewise the mind as a sense-faculty is to be denied.

The [external] object-cause (*ālambana*),

would be perceptible. Since it consists in the nature of cognized aspect of the mind and since it (causes to) move astray in a wrong and perverted path, nature of the external thing as *ālambana* is rejected in order to establish a right view. Basing upon it, its nature of being support is also rejected. However, (the author) will establish that it is a visible aspect (*rūpa*) of the forces which constitute the senses and operate simultaneously (with the consciousness).

"An external thing"

The opponents hold that there is an external thing apart from the mind. This exhibits their pervertedness. They hold that the thing other than the mind is called *artha* because it is cognized (according to them).

How could you say: the mind grasps the aggregate of atoms (*Sanghāta*), and in case there exists no aggregate as real it ought to be a substance ( = ātom)? There are logical errors as will be stated below. That ( = your standpoint) is contradictory to preceding and following reasons, but it causes no harm to me. As for you, it
is accepted by you that the mind grasps the substance as well as the aggregate. We shall demonstrate other errors on your thesis, therefore this error is presently dropped.

"They postulate the Subtle atoms"

Though the subtle atoms being assembled perish no sooner than they appear, nevertheless each atom becomes separately ālambana and not in their aggregate form. For example, the visible (rūpa) and others, though they are simultaneously present before the senses, become objects [only of their respective senses] without any confusion on account of the fact that the faculty of grasping a particular object is fixedly assigned to each sense. Although things are endowed with the capacity being definite and distinguished from each other, yet each atom serves as object separately. [Syllogism will be this: Atoms are objects] "Because the atom serves as the cause for that". [But no example has been given here].

The word "that" means the consciousness of the eye, etc. It arises on contact (of the sense-organ) with object which is constituted of parts. So say some (Ācāryas): Among the causes that which acts as the productive cause becomes its actual object.

"Others postulate the aggregate of atoms"

The advocate of this thesis say that the aggregate formed of atoms serves as the actual object of consci-
ousness. [Here also the syllogism will be this: The aggregate is ālambana;

"Because consciousness arises representing the image of the aggregate of atoms". (No example is available here).

The aggregate is believed to be the actual object of consciousness, since the latter is born of the aggregate. It is so as somebody says: "A thing whose form is represented in a consciousness is really its object"—these two advocates say: "Consciousness is endowed with that image and it is logically correct.

When the hetu is stated, that hetu has no example. Just as the (avayā-) hetu etc. achieve (in the paksā-hetu) the nature of the being hetu, etc. the atom and the aggregate (sāmānya) which are in the nature of ālambana achieve that. If you accept that the ālambana is not within the consciousness itself but exists substantially outside of it, there will be contradiction with dharmin (=Sāsana=teaching). The (Mahāyāna) dharma does not accept that there exists ālambana externally. This (proposition) has been accepted by opponents also, and (so) the same is considered to be drṣṭānta, example. If what is stated (by opponents is only example), probandum also will be only what is accepted by opponents. (The commentator) says having
in view the first (two) syllogisms, pramāṇas (set forth by the opponents): “The hetus, proposition which are the source of the dispute are mere prepositions displaying the hetus. They not, in fact, hetus because there exists no example accepted by both parties.” Hence it follows: in what manner may the representation of the image in consciousness be established as valid reason?

Then the author will show a conclusive reasoning. By employing the ablative usage, the consent of opponents has been exhibited.

(1a) “Though atom serves as the cause” as accepted generally, nevertheless the atom serves as no cause because things that are non-existent, i.e., non-recognized are bereft of their own nature. Though the selves of atoms may act as the cause of consciousness, they serves as ālambana only while uncollected together.

(1c) “Because the consciousness does not bear the image of that” i.e. of atoms.

(1d) “Atoms are not the objects of the sensuous consciousness like the senses”

Just as a sense-faculty, though it serves as the base to the consciousness and to the contact with the object never becomes its object; because it does not bear the image of the sense faculty. The same is the case with atoms. Hence it is concluded that what do not posses
the image of consciousness are never considered to be its objects.

Therefore the author says:—

"That is the object, etc".

"Its own being" means the image of consciousness itself. "It is cognized precisely" means "it is determined."

How is it cognized precisely?

"Because it arises in that form."

The idea of the passage is this: Consciousness arises in a form similar to that of an object (grahyabhāga). When there is a mutual co-ordination between the consciousness and its object then we call it precisely cognizing the object by consciousness. (The commentary criticises:) When there is no cognizable other than consciousness, how is it possible that the cognizable causes the consciousness to arise? (You may assume thus:) there is already the image of the object (in the atom); when that object-image is brought home in the self of consciousness just like an image in the mirror, it is considered that the consciousness has precisely cognized its object (and also that the latter has produced the former). Nevertheless the consciousness exhibits no image of each atom whereby the atom would become the actual object.

Though the atom is considered to be the cause, it becomes by no means the actual object.

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"like the sense-organ"

If you accept that whichever is cause, becomes object, then the sense-faculty also could possibly become object of consciousness. The other reason previously stated, viz. possession of the image by consciousness suffers a fallacy of its being not established: this has been pointed out already.

Thus the following is the main purport: The mere capacity of being cause is not sole criterion for its being object of consciousness. (Accepting this proposition) the sense-faculty would also assume the nature of being *ālambana*, (since it acts as cause for consciousness). If (you persist that) the said reason will be a factor (to achieve the proposition), does it follow that the atom becomes object? Then the sense-faculty being the cause; would also become *ālambana*. Thus a fallacy of reason, called inconclusiveness (*anaikāntika*) has been proved.

Then, of what use is this sentence: Because consciousness does not represent the image of that? It purports to establish our own proposition. One cannot consider one's proposition to be established by merely criticising other's thesis. This is in order to formulate this proposition: The object of consciousness is not the atom like the sense-faculty, because it does not produce the consciousness bearing its own form.

If the above sentence speak of the reason for the proposition, it would follow that the author of this Śāstra (i.e., Dinnāga) having set forth at the outset the opponents' propositions discloses their consent. With a
view to denying what is stated by the opponents the author points out the defect on their propositions and places accordingly their statements. By doing so the author apparently accords his own consent partly to the item of the propositions which stands the logical test, and expresses his dissent to what stands no such test (by saying) that it is not acceptable to us

The disclosure at the outset (i.e. in first logical formulation) of the defect of the opponent's inconclusive reasoning serves itself as a criticism. How false a syllogism you have maintained? Even the ordinary folk says that the reason which is found separated from and never associated with the object to be proved is not at all a reason, but it gives rise to the doubt as to the existence of probandum. Therefore other syllogism must be set forth. It may perhaps happen that the atom is bereft of the image reflected in the consciousness (atasthabha) while atoms are indeterminate nature. But the resolve that consciousness always arises in co-ordination with the image of the object is not correct. Since that resolve cannot at all be possibly upheld, we must say that atoms are of indeterminate nature. However, this much follows that what produces consciousness does not become its object just like the atom of the sense-faculty. There are well-known other causes which produce the visual consciousness; none of them makes known to us the innate natures of atoms, because the consciousness never exhibits that form like the other sensuous consciousness. What has been said in respect of the sensuous consciousness must also be equally applied to other types of consciousness.

The sense-faculty given above as example is in fact
stated with a view to particularisation \(pradāraṇānāhām\). Other examples may also be obtained by way of implication \(arthāpatti\). Then (the author's) statement accepting the productivity \(Kārnatā\) (of the sense-organs) is without any value; because the sense-organs, though functioning as causes become no actual objects of consciousness. So also is the case with this \(atom\); thus the statement becomes really full of value. But nevertheless the atoms of the sound and others would not cause to rouse up the consciousness of other sense-organs \(the\ eye, \ etc.\)

Someone says: "In the self of consciousness the gross form is not perceived; "hence does not become object just like the atom of the sense-faculty. Because the theory that the image of consciousness is due to the bringing home of the object-image upon consciousness is not acceptable, the saying that no gross form is perceived \(in\ the\ self\ of\ consciousness\) is very appropriate. Thus, so far we have spoken that "atoms are not objects of consciousness". The reason for this is that they do not possess the form \(that\ is\ experienced\ in\ consciousness\) and the hypothesis that they are its objects \(is\ not\ well\ proved\ by\ any\ source\ of\ knowledge\ \(pramāṇa\). \(II\ II\).

If so, \(the\ opponent\ says:) then let the aggregate of atoms be its object. \(That\ could\ not\ be\ possible\). If you, \(says\ Dharmapāla\) desire to have a Mahāyānic thesis by proving the atoms and their aggregates above spoken of; then I may reply that your reason is not an established one; this will be a true logic.
"Though the aggregate possesses the image of consciousness" and this may become an apparent object: it does not, nevertheless, act as its cause.

"Consciousness does not arise from the aggregate".

The aggregate does not produce the consciousness which bears a form (similar to that of) the aggregate. How can this (consciousness) arise depending upon that (aggregate)? It means that the aggregate does not become its object because it is endowed with no characteristic of an object (ālambanālokaśāna). Therefore the said reason of bearing the aggregate-form is not proved.

What is, then, characterised as object (ālambana)? "What object (artha) produces the consciousness reflecting the image similar to itself (=object) that is said to be its proper object.”

In accordance with the object, consciousness arises; so what is productive cause of consciousness, that is only its object. Some Hinayanists also say: "What object is properly said to be the cause of the mind and mental elements, that being produced and cognized as an object is spoken of in a common parlance.” What object possesses the two-fold characteristic (i.e., causality and form) that alone combined with that characteristic is called ālambuna. What is productive of consciousness, that becomes its object; To this effect the author (i.e. Dinnāga) cites an Āgama:

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“That above is said to be the productive cause of consciousness”.

Therefore what is productive cause, that is the condition for production of its consciousness; that is regarded as its perceivable object. There is experienced (in the mind) its very self-same image; Therefore the reflection of the object-image is not stated (in the Āgama).

“The aggregate of atoms does not produce (its consciousness); because it is not an entity in substance.”

The aggregate is not a real entity; because it cannot be either different from or one with its constituents. Whichever is non-entity has possibly no efficiency of producing any result.

(2b) “Like the double moon”.

No second moon could produce the consciousness possessed of the form of the second moon. If so, what is the cause of representing that image that is experienced (in the consciousness)?

“Because of the defect of the sense-organs”

When the eye has its sight disturbed by cataract and other diseases, then there arises the appearance of the double moon in a person of defective sense-organ; and that too is not as a real entity.

“The double moon-cognition has not its object, though the image of the double moon is reflected in it”.

Just as the double moon is not spoken of as object of its consciousness though the latter is endowed with the image
of the former (i.e. double moon); because this does not produce its consciousness.

“(Similarly) the aggregate, as it does not exist in substance, does not act as cause of its consciousness”.

Since it is not a real entity just like the double moon it is not at all the cause. Hence

“it does not become its object”.

Here again the word “the double moon” is to be repeated. This repeated double moon-example, it is to be understood, points out that the reason, the possession of the object-image (by consciousness) is an inconclusive one. The existence of an object internally as a part of consciousness could also be proved by a sound logic; hence there lurks a defect of contradiction. The (visual) consciousness arises depending upon the eye only and not upon the aggregatcatoms of the blue, etc; because the consciousness is not produced from the latter, like the consciousness born of other sense-organs. This example is acceptable to all and hence no other example is needed.

The example “double moon” does not exist in substance; hence, it is to be understood that this (double moon) being in the nature of no cause (of double-moon-consciousness) proves the same (i.e., its non-objectivity). (Similarly) the aggregate previously stated, though it is endowed with image (of its consciousness) cannot become a real object (corresponding to its consciousness). This statement again (says that) this (aggregate) is bereft of causality; (hence lacks objectivity).
If you ask me: Well, there exists no second moon; how does one directly perceive the two images of the moon? Let me explain this. Because of some potent force (sakti) laid down within consciousness, this consciousness appears as though it is endowed with the image of double moon. Just as a man, while asleep, dreams that he actually sees many objects, and also imagines in dream that he discharges so many false acts; so also he imagines another moon upon the single one.

Some philosophers say: When the visual consciousness perceives the moon twice (i.e., in consequetive two moments), and when the order of perceiving it in two moments being hardly noticed, one mistakes that perception to be simultaneous, immediately after this twice perceived image a mental thought arises murmuring: I perceive the second moon.

Some others say: It is due to a mistake in number (of the two for one) in the moon, that mistakes, too, happens out of the defect in the organ of the sight. Even for (us) who do not hold the external things to be real such vision of gross form is merely a perversive thought.

(Dharmapala criticises the first view.) No mental impression that is brought about just after (twice) perception of alambana by the visual consciousness grasps alambana in double form simultaneously. Then how could there be a sub-thought that "I see the double moon." Does it happen that even in the case of sound, etc. while the non-sensuous consciousness has arisen depending upon the sound, etc. (twice perceived) and not noticing their order the (mental) perception of the double sound, etc. takes place?
Even for the person of sound sense-organs the non-sensuous consciousness and its order are hardly noticeable in several cases. What to speak of that (there is an order) in the case of consciousness based on the visible (rupa) and the sense-organ, and in estimating its distinctions. Then, in such case the perception in double form (or in triple form), etc. would conveniently be proved. When one accepts that there is one moon substantially existing apart from consciousness, with what labour would he too maintain the mistake in number falsely assuming the double moon?

(2cd) “There are two things grasped externally apart from consciousness”.

Because the atoms and their aggregate are both devoid of one or other of two constituents (of alambana) and because of the force of logical principle criticising what it has been established previously,

“both of them are not proper objects”.

Alambana consists of two parts, viz. presentation of its own image and causality for its consciousness. The atom lacks in the first part, i.e. its image not being presented in consciousness, and the second in the second, i.e., causality. Then these two defects as have been discussed so far, point out to the identity between the object and its consciousness. II 2 11

[3] “Some Acaryas hold that integrated form of atoms (saucitakara) is the cause of consciousness.”

In each atom there exists the integrated form. That alone is perceived as an object and imageful. The
atoms obtained there either more or less in number are all substantially existing. The integrated form (existing there) produces the consciousness of the form of itself. Because it exists substantially,

"It would become an actual object"; for, it fulfils the said two conditions. This (integrated form) is already an accomplished fact. Hence no question arises whether the integrated form is the same as the atom or different.

"All things are possessed of many forms".

These atoms themselves are regarded as possessed of atomic form as well integrated form. How can a single substance be properly described to possess two forms? All things of many forms lie in the combination of material elements, i.e., are constituted of four great elements, earth, etc. They are naturally possessed each of distinct forces (Śakti). The image of the blue and other colours is experienced each in accordance with (the nature of) the substance and the sense-organ. Amongst atoms of varied forms,

"that integrated form exists"

Only this form becomes domain of the visual and other consciousness; so it serves as

"the direct object of perception".

If so, why do you not say that the cognition of atoms is possessed of the integrated form? (You admit that) the atom is of the integrated form. Why do you not likewise admit that its cognition is also of the integrated form? Therefore says the author:
"There exists the integrated form at atoms".

This sentence having the nature of a sentence formulated to that effect, shows as well that their cognition is possessed of the integrated form of atoms. If so, each atom has the form of its own. How do you say that it has the integrated form?

(The Opponent says:) The aggregate atoms of the matter consisting of different parts are admitted in this (our) system of thought. The aggregate atoms, since they themselves constitute of parts are not existent in substance: this has already been appropriately stated. Why is it then repeated again? There is a motive to do so. Though the substance-elements are each different in their nature that (integrated) form (of the atom) is present only at a place where atoms are integrated, and hence (the integrated form) is experienced there alone; then they say that only the integrated form is perceived and no other form (i.e., atomic form). Moreover although all things are essentially the aggregates of atoms, nevertheless a thing has its own qualities one being superior and the other inferior. (The superior quality overcomes the inferior one; therefore) we see it in accordance with (the nature of) things. For example the expression like "the blue colour is earthelement" is as a matter of fact correct logically.

(Dharmapala says:) In case of such an assumption (the following objection crops up) Suppose a thing deve-
lopes red colour; in the first moment of the developing the red colour other qualities which are more powerful will not become out of sight (though the inferior atomic form is invisible). (Is it not then that) your illusive talk is made (wrongly) having in view such cases where the superior possibly overcomes the inferior?

(The opponent says:) If so, how do you admit (in your Mahayana) that atoms are grasped by none of the five sense-organs, and how do you again maintain that only a man of true knowledge sees the atoms.

(3c) (The reply follows): “The atomic form becomes no object of (five-fold sensuous) consciousness”.

This does not become object of the sensuous consciousness; hence it is termed beyond the senses. The object which does not fall within the operation of senses ought to be guessed by a true (supramundane) knowledge alone. What is the argument for this? It is simply this: the atomic form never comes within the range of our direct perception,

“Just like its solidity and others”

Solidity, coldness, and others, (blueness. etc.) though existing substantially do not become objects of the visual and other consciousness because the powers of the sense-organs are fixedly assigned each to particular objects.

“So also atomic form”.

This is not contradicted to the well accepted fact.

(The opponent objects) : Let the atomic form appear (as
perceptible) and not solidity, because they both differ one from the other in their nature. (We reply): The \textit{paksadharma, probandum}, (ie, non - perceptibility) is desired to be common to ten bases \textit{ayatana}; and this latter is nothing but great elements. Therefore my statement is in no way defective.

"(Different) perceptions of the pot, cup, etc. \textit{// 3 //} will be identical".

For you who hold the above opinion, the sensuous cognition that arises relating to the pot and cup would be of identical nature; for, there is absolutely no difference in the (supposed) cognition of its one atom-object; and the sensuous cognition is only in accordance with that object (ie. real atoms) lying in our front, and has accordingly its form arison. Therefore the object of cognition does not differ. How does one know (the distinction between the pot and the cup)?

"There exists no distinction whatever amongst the atoms of the pot, cup, etc. though the atoms are many and their number varies in each case).

This statement says: Though atoms only in their integrated form become objects of our cognition, nevertheless while the self-nature of the pot, etc. being cognized, there exists in the selves of many atomic aggregates no definite division. Since we do not experience (as real) the integrated form distinct in each aggregate, apart from their own real (atomic) forms, the sensual cognition that is arising depending upon that (forms) will be identical. It is thereby settled that the objectivity
centres only on the self of atoms. Nor does exist in the undifferentiated form of atoms any element that causes to produce some discriminating and reinvestigating thought (regarding the differentiated gross form, e.g. the pot, etc.) for, such thought will be a separate one, just like a thought springing up from a blue patch, etc.

(4 c) “If, (the opponent says that) the cognition differs on account of differences in the forms (of the pot, etc.)”

Here “the form” means the image that brings forth distinction.

“The pot and cup are distinguishable in their forms by virtue of their different parts, neck, belly, bottom, etc: and our cognitions differ on that account.”

(The author replies:) It is quite true, that distinct cognition arises on account of distinct objects.

(4 d) “But (the different forms) do not exist in substance”

No atoms constituting the object that is cognized by the sensuous consciousness, are varied (in their size) Though the aggregates of atoms are empirically true, nevertheless they, being closely analysed do not fall within the cognizance of senses. Nor is it proper to say that variety of non-objective thing (avagaya visesa) can be called makers of cognitions in different forms

(The opponent asks:) How do you know that there exists no distinction in the form amongst atoms?
The author replies:

"(It is so) because the atoms are absolutely identical in their dimension".

All things are constituted of parts and these things necessarily admit of distinct forms. The selves of atoms, however, are devoid of any spetial distinction where an extreme limit can be reached. Therefore how can we assign to it any distinction of form?

"Though the pot, cup, etc. are (apparently) are varied objects, there exists absolutely no distinction in their atomic nature.

For, anything destitute of parts, neither increases nor decreases.

"Therefore, it is asserted that

[5b] the distinctions are in the aggregates,

and not in the substances".

Everything of spetial distinction has forms attributed to it; and hence it does not fall within the domain of sensuous consciousness. Thus there are several criticisms (when one) desires to demonstrate that the atoms have different forms. For, the cognitions of the pot, cup, etc. do not take as objects the different real entities, just like the feelings of Sukha, pleasure and Dukha, displeasure. (It is made clear so far that) atoms (which are equal in size) do not cause to differentiate objects, Nor can this (gross) (form be proper nature of that true object (i.e., alambana of the visual and other consciousness).

Or "If the cognition differs on account of differen-
ces in the forms of the pot, etc"; when this sentence intends to show the proposition that the non-differentiated thing (i.e., atom) becomes no-object, it incurs a logical fallacy called Siddhasadhana, proving of what is already proved. The opponent (Vaiśeṣika) holds that atoms which constitute the objects are identical in their nature; nevertheless different cognitions arise on account of differences in the forms of objects. We also admit that atoms are indistinguishable, and hence this incurs the fallacy of Siddhasadhana. The sentence: “Because atoms are absolutely identical in their dimension” points out the fallacy of Asiddhi, non-acomplishing to the proposition that the differences in substances (Vastu) constitute differences in objects (Artha).

Or, it makes clear that the sensuous cognitions pertaining to the pot, etc, do not bear the images of atoms; hence they are not actual objects of their cognizations in as much as they are not objects of other cognitions. By “other cognitions” is meant either non-sensuous consciousness or one born of the senses; for, a cognition of some patch of blue having arison, the same cognition does not bear the image of some patch of yellow. In view of the fact that the selves of atoms are many, they cannot be differentiated one another in any way, but the sensuous cognitions, however are distinguishable one another in their forms; it becomes evident that the object of condition (ālambana pratyaya) is not in the nature of atomic form (unvākṛt).

Or, we may take the verse (5 a-b) to mean: An objection that atoms are distinguishable by themselves has been put forth and answered as before If the aggregates of atoms are regarded as having forms other
than the ones of atoms; then it is logically to be established that those forms of the aggregates are not real.

Now, in order that a more specific reasonig is likewise to be established: (the author says):

(5 cd) "If those atoms are removed one by one, etc.

When the atoms are removed the perception of the pot, etc. do not arise and hence unreal like *Sena*, *arany* and others; therefore they do not exist in substance. The following is another mode of reasoning: "What are other than the non-substantial things, those things are not deviated from the latter" (i.e. Atoms which are other than the pot, etc. are not deviated from the pot, etc.) This reasoning is contradictory to the real state of things. When, e.g. a sound-object is present, no cognition of a blue patch arises. Thus the (said) distinguished form is a form reversed (of what is really there), as it takes as object the aggregate like the pot, etc. It may be reasonably stated that the multiplicity (of atoms) is brought home (before our eyes) and some other thing (i.e. the pot, etc.) is thought of; nevertheless it is absolutely impossible to prove that the selves of atoms that are substantially existing have any distinction. II 5 II

(6) "(It is the object) which exists internally in the knowledge itself) as knowable aspect". This establishes what the actual object of consciousness is in our system. If, an object is denied in general then it would evolve *lokavirodha*, contradiction to the world, a defect in our proposition. For the scripture says: There are four conditions (for raising up consciousness).
The term "internally" is in order to show that there is no object-cause apart from the consciousness. The term *jneyarūpa*, "knowable aspect" shows that the cognizable form is the consciousness-product (*Viñṇa-parināma*) and a cognizable part of consciousness (*Grāhyāmsa*). Thus what exists in knowledge itself and is thought of as cognizable form is proved to be object. Now the contradiction with the worldly experience again persists; for, men of the world all accept the object as externally existing. Therefore the author says: "as if externally". The object, however, does not exist apart from consciousness. Its knowable aspect.

"Appears to us as if it exists externally".

The expression "I see the object externally" is based on wrong notion, but in fact caused by it (= wrong notion); the visual consciousness representing the form of the hair-like object, etc. in the sky is apt example here.

"Though the external thing is denied" i.e. the external thing does not exist in reality, because it is not experienced as such. Nor is it found: that its real self-substance exists invariably in the external even if we earnestly search for it with an extremely subtle reasoning. Even though that thing may be assumed to be existing in substance and characterised as external, nevertheless it cannot act as object-cause of consciousness. For, consciousness does not exhibit its form. Nor is the atomic form reflected (in our cognition).

That (*grāhyāmsa*) which appears to us as though existent externally, serves as the actual object-condition.
because (that alone) possesses the form of that (i.e. object). (To prove the above the following syllogism is formulated:) Whatever thing possesses whatever form, that thing is identical with that form; for example, the causality is possessed of its own form, (i.e. the nature of being cause: that causality is not distinct from the nature of being cause).

Again the author shows some distinct character of the perceivable object (ālāmbanā) when he says:-

"Because consciousness is the essence of that (i.e. object) etc."

It is evident that the external thing is non-existent and hence the object is not obtainable. The form of an object follows only in conformity with what is imagined by our habitual reckoning (vāsanā or turka). What is imagined by our Vāsanā does not at all exist externally and apart from consciousness.

"The forms of the (experienced) objects do not, from the outset exist apart from consciousness."

Hence it is called "knowable aspect of consciousness. The term "internally" indicates that the knowable does not exist beyond consciousness. That (knowable) non-existent externally by its nature is regarded as internally existent.

"It also arises from that"

That part (i.e. अकाराखं अकारयता) is productive (of consciousness); from it (=that part) sometimes arises consciousness; because the seventh (consciousness)
\(=Kliṣṭam\ manas\) has a characteristic distinct from the (first) five (consciousness) object-things. Since its consciousness is not obtained in separation from its knowable aspect (Jñeya) that part (i.e. \(ākārabhāga=rūpa=\) artha) produces consciousness . . . . . . . . .

Because (the knowable aspect, grhyāmsa) is endowed with two qualities (i.e. image and casolity), the same will be very well the object-condition as it accords quite with logic and it is demonstrated as cause of consciousness (Śādhana). The knowable aspect alone which is characterized as having two constituents (of ālambana) becomes Śādhana, cause. What is characterized \(=Kliṣṭam\ manas\) that consciousness does not take the external thing as the perceivable object; this is experienced in the dream-stage. The set of two qualities (dharma) as stated above becomes a single cause (ekam Śādhanam). Consciousness (i.e. its knowable part) is endowed with the form of that (object) and also productive of consciousness; on account of these two functions it becomes a single source of knowledge (ekam pramānam).

Now, though what exists internally within consciousness is admitted (as object-condition):

it is evident that the external things are of unreal character as analysed above and that there can be no other real character thereof. The object-cause is experienced only in pursuance of our habitual imagination. But the image of the object is immanent in consciousness itself, and that alone will be logically correct. (The opponent asks)
How can a part of consciousness become condition to (the consciousness) arising simultaneously?

(The author replies:) The knowable aspect (grāhyāṃśa) does not exist in the absence of consciousness; hence its part (i.e. knowable aspect) gives rise to another consciousness. (The opponent continues:) Now, (you have) a logical fallacy called self-defacing (svātmavirodha), as it is again only a part of consciousness just like its part that cognizes. (How can a grāhakāṃśa produce a grāhakāṃśa? Then, in that case the nature of its being cause can never be achieved. Moreover, consciousness arises only being discoloured by the forms of external things. That image-part itself springs up simultaneously with consciousness. No two things simultaneously arising can act mutually as cause and effect, e.g. a pair of horns of the cow. Moreover it is not proper to say that an object which is in fact no other than consciousness itself is co-existent with it. For, the term "co-existence" denotes some connection between two distinct objects. But you do not admit that there is an object distinct from consciousness. How is it then termed co-existent?

(Dharmapala replies:) It is true. Nevertheless, by virtue of distinction in aspects (ākāra) two distinct parts are assumed in the Ālaya consciousness and described. Thus it follows that the consciousness is distinguished and differentiated into the perceiving and perceptible aspects.

(The opponent again objects:) If it is so, what constitutes patyaya (causal condition) will be the cognizable

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aspect. Nothing of the assumed character would be regarded as possessing the self-substance. And such an object turns to be something other than pratyaya.

(Dharmapala replies:) This is not contradictory (to our experience.) It is an accepted fact that perceivable aspect becomes the causal condition, (like) varied objects experienced somewhere else. (Such as the flower in the sky, or objects in dream etc. which though unreal and only images conceived by their thoughts are accepted as forming causal-conditions.) For example, the disappearance (of the mind and mental states) in the immediately preceding moment (samanantaranirodha) is a causal condition:- the moment a consciousness of homogeneous character (Sabhāga) disappears, the same consciousness is reckoned as condition by way of four modes of condition.
FOOT NOTES


2. Lit. Part. bit, bhāga, pien-fen (91; 18-2)

2a This and the following paragraph criticise the theory of Māṇsapratyakṣa see Nyayabindu 1,

3. whole discussion below, cf. Pramāravēctīkavīti, II, 239-244


5. cp. Pramāṇasamuccaya I, 21, Sense-organs are inferred, but the mind as the sense-organ cannot be inferred.

5a A sautrāntika view, v, kośavy. p. 352, 8; my pañcavastūka, Intro XI.

6. cf. Nyāyavārtika, 521 where similar anumāna is referred to न विलालक्षित्का विषया: ग्रहपत्ववादू वेदनातिवलू। Tatparyatika, p. 656: अत विलालक्षित्कासः प्राणमालि-न विलितेत.

7. Ref. to the author’s exposition of this point in the vritti ad ver. 8 with Hsuan Tsang’s version’s, p. and Vinitadeva’s Tiṅka. p.

7a cp. Abhi. kośa: एकस: समप्राणां कारणभावालू। स्वा=एकस=प्रेक्ष, समप्राणां=समवितानां कारणभावालू I, ver. 20.

7b C.I—five objects. C. II five senses.

8. cf. Ślokavārtika, 285: उद्भादम शेषाधिकारतम । V. Pramāṇavārtika II. 224: तेहतत्तावते नान्या ग्रहता नाम कारण । Vp. 12 above Pr. var. 246: विषय: कारणात्मक। नाकारण विषयः I ibid, 257.

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9. Ref. Pramanavartika, II, 224: तव बुद्धियंदर्शकर वस्यास्तद्वारहजःमुच्ये
Vitti: प्रांहमुच्येवस्यसन्नवः।

9a This shows that the advocate of the atom-object does not deny the image of the object in consciousness. But this is rather incorrect. See Vinita. Tika. p. 8(Ms). Dharmapala seems to have the same idea, See below p.12. his Tika.

10. Here we have to omit the negative particle pu in Chinese to make the sense much clearer; for, it has been pointed out that in the two previous propositions there is no homogeneous example even though an appropriate reason, hetu, is stated in each case, see notes to the Sanskrit text, 14a and 15a.


12. According to C.I. C. II. has: Svātma-virodha-dosa,
Contradiction with its own (consciousness) self.

13. According to C. I.

14. These 2 hetus: Vijnana-junakatva and akaratva are stated by the Vaibhasika and the Sautrantika. v p. 13f. above


17. According to C II. see note 27 to Dharma. Tikā.

17a Cfr. Pramananayatattvaloka of Vadideva suri, last page.

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18. See Note 31 to Dh. Tika.
19. See Note 32 (Ibid) for interpretations of this para in C.I and C.II

19a Lit. (we) set forth other syllogism.
20. I-chun (123-7); (85-10) = “meaning - criterion.”
21. The interpretation according to C.II. See Note 35 to Dh. Tikā.
22. According to C. II
24. See vṛtti ad. ver. 2.
25. See Note 39. (Dh. Tikā) cp. Kosavyākhyā, I, p.46: सबे धर्मस्वमाियो धर्मात्तूः
26. More Lit. “in accordance with an object”.

26a According to Vinātadeva this is Śāstra. p. 151 below. The idea seems to be like this: The Agama=Śastra does not speak of the object image, Visayakara because the co-ordination theory is unknown to it. The reason probably is that according to some early Buddhists, the form of the object is a mental image. v. Bahyarthaśiddhi, ver. 36, note 61. (p. 39).

26b Contrast the opinion of the Vaibhāsikas referred to in the Kośavva. (B.B. 89. 20. the Kośa (Tib. Text) I. P. 83, 1. 15.;— न च परामाः प्रवो नेव सत्यां: यथा वैभासिकाः कहाँचिन् See Dh. Tikā, note 44 b. for Dignaga’s reverse opinion.

26c Cp. N. Sutra. iv, 2,13: केवल समुद्र निमिरिको पलतिवतंतुपलितः: with N. Vartika P. 508.

26d See to C.I. This is pūrva paksa. v Note 48 (Dh. Tikā)
27 See Note 49 (Dh. Tikā)
28. See Pramāṇavārttika, II, 294: and II. 256 with vṛtti: मानसं तथपीये (==कणाद्य:) अविभ्यक्ता थ प्रविषेत तत्सविनि: जनयाः । तत्त्ववाच्यतं न तु प्रविष्टं न किसम्। वियोगृपाल्पति: —
See also ver II. 502-504 & 507-12

29. See Prakaranapāñjikā, p 38, verses 58-60; Ślokav. Nirāl. 54 with Pārtha Sārathi's comment, Pramāṇavārt. II, 505-12

30. Ibid. II 570.

30a cp. सहिततत्त्वसि : परमाणुवयस्य कायाः:। in the Kośavyā. ad. ver 30. p. 47, 18 (B.B.)

31. Lit. to beseech and advance.

32. The author says from the standpoint of the opponent.

33. Superior and = integrated form Sañcitākāra, inferior = atomic form, pārimandalya. - C II

34. According to C. II

35. It is explained: Sañcitākāra of blue colour is superior, and atomic form of the earth-element inferior. Hence seeing only the blue colour, one knows it as earth-element. - C. II, 207 b2.

36. The interpretation is according to C. II; See Note 63 (Dh.Tīkā)

36a Consult note. 67 (Dh.Tīkā)

37. i.e. the visible, Sancita, is of atomic self-form, pāramāṇusvarūpa.

38. Lit parts = pien-fen.

39. After all the blue patch never produces the cognition of the yellow patch. Now if the many atoms of the result and objective, the pot, etc. just remain
many atoms, they will not separately produce
different cognitions of the pot, etc. C.II. 208b,1.
(Dh.Tika)

40. This is according to C.I. 195, 62. But C. II
(208, 62) interprets that consciousness has —

41. The objective differences are not in atoms. There­
fore the Hinayanists say in vain that atoms have
differences - C II, 209, al.

42. According to C.I, the pot, etc.

43. (Atoms) in aggregates can be definitely removed
one by one. When they are not done so, the pot,
etc. are only perceived and not atoms. After remo­
ving the atoms, the form of the pot is not there.
Then the pot is not real. Atoms, however, are not
actual objects. Therefore that multiplicity - C.II,
209,b1.

44. That ākārabhāga is only consciousness-product
(Viññāna-puṇīṇāma)

45. Chin. literally reads: “Because consciousness posses
the form of the object”.

45a The expression ‘na pañcama’, etc. is left untranslated,
as its meaning is not clear.

46. Lit. if the consciousness, etc.

47. That is to say: things experienced in dream-thought
are not external, but they prove to internal, C.I.
198,b2.

48. Added from C.II of 210.a2.
49. According to C.II. we must supply here Diśnāga's reply: *pratyaya' vyabhicāritvāt*........

50. Or "then it follows", Sui-Chiang (162-9, 41-9).

51. See PārthaSārathiMiśra, Slokaśārtikavyākhyā, p.309: कारणलेष्येत्वं भवतां गृह्यत्वस्।

52. Added from C.II, 210,b1.

53. Explained in C.II. Thus : Mind and mental states (*cittacaitta*) that disappeared in the immediately preceding movement, e.g. while a consciousness of homogeneous character disappears, the previously disappeared mind though not different, becomes *Samanantarapratyaya* of the following one. Ibid.

54. Four modes of conditions are: *hetu, ālambana Samanantara* and *adhipati*.