ST. AUGUSTINE'S

'NOTITIA SUI'

Related to Aristotle, the early neo-Platonists and Hegel

by

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This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration.

It is of approximately 85,000 words — permission having been obtained for an extension of the normal permitted length of 80,000 words.

Edward Booth
To the Right Reverend Thomas Holland,

Bishop of Salford,

who, amidst many and wider cares,

found the time to take a close interest

in the progress of this work.
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INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

This thesis is essentially a study of the fortunes of one of the most powerful ideas produced by philosophical reflection: the ὑόηος ὑόηος of Aristotle's Metaphysics.

To the a fortiori argument of the dialogue, 'The Sophist', that because they were the most noble and most real of all things the ideas themselves must live and think, Plato had pursued in the 'Charmides' a related and complementary idea: that there should be a knowledge which knew itself (ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμην), and which would therefore be the highest. He proposed it — only to reject it on the grounds that by definition it would be distinct from other kinds of knowledge, and its claim to oversee them would be nullified by its incompetence in their spheres. However, Aristotle's refurbishing of this conception in Metaphysics became one of the most respected metaphysical conceptions: thought thinking on thinking. Regardless of its being identified with 'the divine', it was a speculative attempt to describe thought at its highest, thought in itself. The description of intellectual knowledge in de Anima III was a speculative proposal for how thinking in itself, also still identified with the divine, is exercised in a man.

This thesis will substantiate an unusual view that this is in fact the background of Saint Augustine's conception of self-knowledge.
So the first chapter of the thesis will examine the two subjectivity structures of Metaphysics III and de Anima III, and note how their systematic interrelationship was not completely possible, to the embarrassment of Aristotle's followers and commentators. But their lack of reconciliation, and the lack of reconciliation with them of at least two other more empirical, sense-bound subjectivity structures, created a challenge for others to build the system which it was presumed would have been intended, and in the nature of things desirable, in which this unification would be achieved.

In this legacy of unrelated conceptions other formulations of the principles became attached. For example, it seemed necessary that if thought in itself was thinking on thinking, by its nature thought would try to coincide with itself, and that would be the stage in which truth was reached. Also, if thought in itself were considered to be distinct from thinking of something other that thinking must derive from self-thinking. These neo-Platonist developments of the Aristotelian theme throw light on Augustines assertion at the beginning of de Trinitate IX in particular: "if the knowledge by which the mind knows itself ceases to be, the mind will also cease to know at the same time."

The other chapters will therefore trace the probable way in which Aristotelian ideas came to Augustine, and will examine comparatively the self-knowledge systems of Augustine, his general epistemology and his triadic structures on the hypothesis that the appropriate hermeneutic is to
see the de Trinitate as an apologetic against neo-Platonism in which he reconstructs a system largely out of masterfully displaced elements of Plotinus and Porphyry. In a final excursus, this thesis looks at how the principle of οὐς φιλόσωσι occurs in Hegel who, conscious of the nature of this speculative content in Aristotle's thinking and of the neo-Platonists' development of it, though seemingly unaware of Augustine's thought, makes it the entelechy of all thinking: (der Entelechie des Denkens). Deploring the distinction between thinking and real objects made by the critical philosophy of Kant, Hegel proposed that Geist (that is, νοῦς) would, in thinking itself, recognise itself in material objects too: it would know them in their universality, as Aristotle had said, but in the same kind of knowing, it would know them (rather itself as virtually identified with them) as individual things too.

Interesting as is St. Augustine's call to innerness, for example in the Confessions and in the Sermons, it is not this kind of self-knowledge that is of principle interest in this thesis. To use a distinction of Hegel this is "the knowledge of men - the knowledge whose aim is to detect the peculiarities, passions and foibles of men, and lay bare what are called the recesses of the human heart." It is the speculative and metaphysical consideration that is of interest: that by which Augustine deliberately intended the de Trinitate to be in the line of metaphysical thinking of Plotinus and Porphyry, and therefore in the full tradition
of Graeco-Roman thought, as "the knowledge ... of man's genuine reality - of what is essentially and ultimately true and real - of mind as the true and essential being" 13. The realisation that the de Trinitate is a deliberate critique of neo-Platonism, a respectful critique which redeployes many of its own ideas, establishes its genre and purpose in a most convincing way. It renders quite unnecessary the heart searching of M. Schmaus that Augustine should have written so much philosophy into a matter which was primarily religious. 14 It is sadly moving to read this man, who published one of the best modern studies on the De Trinitate in 1927, 15 making a retraction of his previous metaphysical interpretation of the work and applying to it the insubstantial categories of modern secondary theological literature: "... in opposition to my own earlier publications ... (the genre of the de Trinitate) is primarily existential-historical, not philosophical-metaphysical (primar existentiell-geschichtlich, nicht philosophisch-metaphysisch)" 16. The association of the account of salvation - history (die heilsgeschichtliche Schau) with philosophical reflection can only be understood correctly, he writes, if it is related to the former as a material element, 17 and the explanation lies within the subjectivity of Augustine himself, and his personal struggle (Kampf) between these elements. Unfortunately such an arbitrary interpretation which uses not the content or the historically probable intended readership but only theological genres as measures of objectivity, cannot be accepted. The philosophical allusions to
neo-Platonism are not to be numbered in ones and twos: almost every page of the second part, as will be pointed out, can be read as if neo-Platonism is in view. Even the scriptural parts can be regarded as a riposte to neo-Platonist discrediting of the Bible, particularly by Porphyry. It is hoped that the parallelism which is traced here through many textual examples will carry conviction for the appropriateness of the speculative conclusion proposed. These parallels include many in the Vth and VIth Enneads which do not seem to have been noted before.

The circle for whom Augustine wrote the de Civitate Dei, reconstructed by Brown, could well fit the recipients for whom the de Trinitate was intended: the refugees come to North Africa after the Vandal capture of Rome in 410. "A new generation has come to demand a new approach: for the cultured pagan noblemen of Rome had begun to make their presence felt, as refugees, in the salons of Carthage". So many of the circumstances of the writing of the de Civitate Dei which Brown has worked out could be applied to the writing of the de Trinitate (to which, given its importance, he devotes unbelievably little attention). It would not destroy his case, but only add to it, that the de Trinitate was also written with the same neo-Platonist minded circle in view. There is the same "stereoscopic" technique of "juxtaposition" against the background suppositions of pagan literature, and against neo-Platonism that same personal blend of respect and incisiveness which appears in the de Civitate Dei.
Yet it would be wrong to limit either work to an immediate circle. By the fact of publication both works were committed to the stream of religious culture, for which Augustine clearly intended the de Trinitate to be, in the best eclectic sense, both apologetic and bridge-building: losing as little as possible from pagan insights but gaining so much from the Christian faith. Attention will be given to the background of philosophical eclecticism, but its continuance as far as Boethius can be noted here. The place of neo-Platonist writers in his thinking and his project of not only a commentary of their works but also a detailed reconciliation of the positions of Aristotle and Plato (existing in his mind but hardly begun to be written) both witness to the kind of eclecticism of which Augustine's de Trinitate is a hardly understood but clear example. 23 Both Augustine and Boethius here witness to the free, but not necessarily compromising, existence of the Graeco-Roman philosophical tradition in Christian hands. And it would make better sense to discover that far from St. Jerome's anti-philosophical, anti-Origenist condemnations 24 having succeeded in destroying indubitably well-intended as well as dubious Christian-neo-Platonist dialogue, there was before Boethius in the de Trinitate, a precedent near in time, near in both Christian and eclectic spirit, even geographically nearer to him than the politically less-troubled East.

Augustine was no less searchingly critical than he was eirenec. In sum, the main intention behind his critique of neo-Platonism in the de Trinitate was to make the individual
personality with his *mens* and *memoria* unequivocally independent, and so to deny any ambiguity about its being incorporated into a self-thinking single ψυχή and self-thinking single ψυχή, whose conceptions derive to neo-Platonism principally from the νοὴσυν νοὴσεως of Aristotle's Metaphysics. And so, in the Augustinian critique, in accord consciously or unconsciously with more empirical and individualistic Aristotelian subjectivity structures, the 'I' is no longer essentially thinking and self-thinking. There will be no possibility of identifying it with the divine thought in itself.

The 'I' remembers, thinks and loves through the memory, mind and will, and has to discover that it always knows itself. If then the de Trinitate contained such a searching critique of neo-Platonism it is not surprising that it came to have a theological and psychological significance far wider than for a small circle of Roman refugees by whose philosophical questionings it may have been occasioned. And for its later readers it seemed to carry a note of certainty and encouragement: that man need not fear that he should remain a mystery to himself, for there was always within him at his centre an ever present core of self-knowledge which he might discover. This conclusion was the consequence of Augustine's personal critical displacement and reconstruction of a psychology made out of neo-Platonic elements. The theme lasted right into modern times: identifiable in Descartes, in the idea probably derived from Augustine, that 'res cogitans' must always, by its nature, be thinking.
But to Hegel, the soul could not be a thing, with an 'abstract' simplicity and an equally abstract identity. It could not be known as, and could not therefore really be, anything other than its activity and its processes, even though those processes would lead to its coming to know itself, as νόησις νοησεως, to be equivalent to itself. Though Hegel has left almost no evidence of personal knowledge of Augustine's writings the significance of Aristotle for Hegel, his indirect relationship to Augustine through his absorption of certain neo-Platonic themes, their common participation in the tradition of νόησις νοησεως, their common identification of speculative philosophy with religious reflection: all of these factors point to the interest of making, in an excursus, a hypothetical Hegelian hermeneutic of Augustine. Even though Hegel himself never made it, it is not difficult to propose it in outline.

* * * *

I must express my gratitude to Professor Donald MacKinnon and Dr. Edward Hardy, of Cambridge University, for supervising me through my first two years of research, and particularly to Professor Klaus Hartmann of Tübingen University in my third year of research, for his suggestions (which I have followed out in my own way), his deep criticism and his reassurances.
FOOTNOTES to Introduction

1 Sophist 248 E - 249 A.

2 167 B ff.

3 The connection between Metaphysics \ref{footnote1} and the Charmides is infrequently given. An exception is K. Eibl, Augustin und die Patristik, 10/11 Geschichte der Philosophie in Einzeldarstellungen, ed. G. Kafka, Munich 1923, p.440, n.1260a.

4 Charmides 171 C. Aristotle's new beginning is sufficient justification for not starting the thesis with Plato. Besides which a satisfactory study would require special research into every dialogue. "Each work is a new birth of Platonism ... With Plato, man is in a violent state, in a perpetual state of self-generation" (J. Trouillard, 'L'Anthropologie et son Histoire', Revue des Sciences Religieuses, 28. 1954 pp.287, 288: a favourable exposé of B. Groethuysen, 'Anthropologie Philosophique', Paris 1953). cf E.G. Ballard, 'Socratic Ignorance, An Essay in Platonic Self-Knowledge', The Hague 1965, p.15: "The art and dramatic structure of the Platonic dialogue would seem to consist in nothing so much as an enquiry into oneself by the mediation of the study of another through dialectical interchange". But on the place of friendship in assisting self-knowledge there will be a need later to refer briefly to Plato's position (\ref{footnote5}, infra, p. 124a).

5 No passage could bring more light on the question of how Aristotle created a general metaphysics as opposed to a special metaphysics or theology. Yet in this matter P. Merlan refers neither to Metaphysics \ref{footnote2} nor to de Anima III 5 ("From Platonism to Neoplatonism", 3rd ed., The Hague 1968. cf pp.169 and 219), content to examine the question only in terms of being. These texts taken together would imply that thinking at its purest is equated with the divine. Without any doubt we have here the difficulty of relating mind and body; but not only is there this problematic (which will be taken up in chapter 1): there is also the union of divine and non-divine thinking. The situation is expressed by Hegel in the conception of a dialectical unity of both.

6 O. Hamelin saw the situation as being simply a distinction between the thinking of νοῦς θυμικός 'pure thought' outside us, and νοῦς πνεύματι πάντως "an effort to imitate it" within us ('La Morale d'Aristote, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 30, 1923, p.503), a solution whose simplicity is contradicted by Aristotle's evident difficulties.

7 'Self-knowledge' appears to be the best translation of 'notitia sui'.

\ref{footnote1} Sophist 248 E - 249 A.
\ref{footnote2} 167 B ff.
\ref{footnote5} Aristotle's new beginning is sufficient justification for not starting the thesis with Plato. Besides which a satisfactory study would require special research into every dialogue. "Each work is a new birth of Platonism ... With Plato, man is in a violent state, in a perpetual state of self-generation" (J. Trouillard, 'L'Anthropologie et son Histoire', Revue des Sciences Religieuses, 28. 1954 pp.287, 288: a favourable exposé of B. Groethuysen, 'Anthropologie Philosophique', Paris 1953). cf E.G. Ballard, 'Socratic Ignorance, An Essay in Platonic Self-Knowledge', The Hague 1965, p.15: "The art and dramatic structure of the Platonic dialogue would seem to consist in nothing so much as an enquiry into oneself by the mediation of the study of another through dialectical interchange". But on the place of friendship in assisting self-knowledge there will be a need later to refer briefly to Plato's position (\ref{footnote5}, infra, p. 124a).

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Footnotes to Introduction - continued

8 v. Plotinus, Ennead V 5 2: "veritable truth is not accordance with an external; it is self accordance". (Unless otherwise stated, translations of the first three Enneads will be taken from that of A.H. Armstrong in the Loeb Classical Library (London and Cambridge, Mass., 1967 ff.).) As the rest have yet to appear in this edition translations of the others will be taken from that of S. MacKenna and B.S. Page (new revised edition, London 1969). Sometimes the interpretation of the French translation by E. Bréhier has been used. (3rd edition, Paris 1960).

9 Following the translation of S. MacKenna, C.SS.R. (Series: 'Fathers of the Church', vol.45, Washington 1963). v. IX.4.6: "Item notitia qua se mens novit si esse desinat, simul et illa mosse (se) desinat". MacKenna rightly regards the inclusion of 'se' in the last phrase as incorrect. (Its omission is the minority MS reading, though an eleventh century MS which omits it is derivable from Prosper of Aquitaine (v. Prolegomena to Corpus Christianorum edition, Series Latina L (Tournhout, 1968), ed. W. J. Mountain and F. Glorie, pp.lxxii ff and xxvii; also p.298). But the reading is required by the text, as a parallel to the dependence on self-loving. Otherwise there is a pointless duplication. H. Achilles ("Der augustinische Gang zum Grund von Person, Zeitlichkeit und Wahrheit", Munich dissertation 1964-5) takes this reading for granted (op. cit. p.141).

10 cf. Augustine, Epistola 118.21 (PL 33.442): 'neo-Platonist philosophers (Platonicae gentis philosophos) may become Christian when a few things are changed which Christian order condemns (paucis mutatis quae christianae improbata disciplina)'. The opposition to Porphyry comes not so much in de Trinitate IV as in the second half of the work (contra G. Madec, 'Augustin Disciple et Adversaire de Porphyre', Revue des Études Augustiniennes 10, 1964, p.368). And whilst J. Burnaby saw this intention (though he carelessly introduced an unexplained vindictiveness into Augustine's intention: "It is the settlement of his account with Platonist anthropology and ethics as well as with Platonist theology"), he was incorrect in denying the de Trinitate to be "an attempt to illustrate the mystery of the Godhead by psychological analogies" (v. 'Amor Dei. A study in the Religion of St. Augustine,' London 1938, pp.143-4). The intentions ran side by side, and the attack on neo-Platonism was partly made through psychological images which were derived from it, but with their original significance deliberately altered.

* PL = Migne Patrologia Latina
Footnotes to Introduction - continued

10a v. System der Philosophie (i.e. Encyclopädie), III 552 Samtliche Werke (Jubiläumsausgabe, ed. H. Glockner, Stuttgart 1958 – edition normally quoted = SW) 10 p. 42 Translated as 'Hegel's Philosophy of Mind', by W. Wallace and A. V. Miller, Oxford 1971 p. 289: '(man's) truth and reality is the free mind itself, and it comes to existence in his self-consciousness. This absolute nucleus of man - mind intrinsically concrete - is just this - to have the form (to have thinking) itself for a content. To the height of the thinking consciousness of this principle Aristotle ascended in his notion of the entelechy of thought (which is νοησις τῆς νοησικῆς), thus surmounting the Platonic idea (the genus, or essential being).

11 This is the 'concrete universal' of Hegel.


13 ib.


16 op. cit. pp. 10-11.

17 ib. p. 19.

18 P. Henry's judgement ('Plotin et l'Occident', Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, Études et Documents, Louvain, 1934, p. 228) that 'Augustin is less interested in the last Ennead; perhaps he judged it too difficult' is best forgotten. Augustine's reading of Ennead VI has already been proposed by E. L. Fortin, 'Christianisme et Culture Philosophique au Cinquième Siècle', Études Augustiniennes, Paris 1959 p. 108 (Ennead VI 8 16) and A. Solignac, Introduction to 'Les Confessions I-VII', Œuvres de St. Augustin 13, Bruges 1962, p. 111 (Ennead VI 6 and VI 9).

19 In ch. 26, 'Magnum Opus et Arduum, Writing the 'City of God' of 'Augustine of Hippo', London 1967.

20 id. p. 300.

21 id. p. 306.

22 id. p. 307.
Footnotes to Introduction - continued


24 v. Courcelle, Lettres ... Part I chapter 2; p. 397.

25 cf. de Libero Arbitrio II 9 27: 'sed utrum sit communis (sapientia) una omnibus aut singuli sapientes suas habeant, sicut animas vel mentes suas, hoc nondum tenemus.'

26 cf. de Trinitate XV 22 42: 'Tria ... mea sunt, non sua nec sibi sed mihi agunt quod agunt, imo ego per illa.'

27 v. id. X 12 19: 'Mentem quippe ipsam ... quoniam semper se nosse ... comprehenderat ... quamvis non semper se cogitare discretam ab eis quae non sunt quod ipsa est. Ac per hoc difficile dinoamin memoria sui et intelligentia sui.' cf. also ib. XIV 6 9.

28 H. Heimsoeth, 'Die Sechs grossen Themen der abendländischen Metaphysik und der Ausgang des Mittelalters', Berlin 1922, p. 148: 'In fact, with his teaching of the self-certainty of consciousness, he laid the foundations for a thousand years' development.'

29 cf. Letter 262 of 19 January, 1642, written to P. Gibbieuf ("Oeuvres de Descartes", ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery, III Correspondence III, Paris 1899, p. 478): 'The reason why I believe that the soul is always thinking is the same as that which makes me believe that the light is always shining, even when no eyes are looking at it ... it would be easier for me to believe that the soul would cease to exist when it is said to cease to think, than not to have to conceive that it was without thought (que non pas de concevoir qu'elle fust sans pensée).'

Gibbieuf was a priest of the Oratory in which Descartes had encountered the thought of Augustine and augustinised neo-Platonism (v. E. Gilson, 'La Liberté chez Descartes et la Théologie,' Paris 1913, p. 265 ff.)
Footnotes to Introduction - continued

30 Given the importance of Augustine, as also the presumption of the presence of a Lutheran-Augustinian tradition at the Tübingen Stift, this is surprising. In a personal letter to the writer dated 1 June, 1973, the Director of the Hegel-Archiv at Bochum, Dr. H. Schneider, could add nothing to the few negligible references under the entry 'Augustin' in the index to the Glockner edition, SW 24. The recent and comprehensive book on Hegel's Tübingen theological training, H.S. Harris, 'Hegel's Development: Toward the Sunlight 1770-1801,' Oxford 1972, gives no indication of courses on Augustine as such, though we can infer that he was not unmentioned in the courses of Chancellor Lebret on Church History and Controversial questions 'de Medisi Gratiae'. (op. cit. pp. 89-90). Perhaps Hegel felt himself absolved from reading Augustine by the judgements on him by historians of philosophy. For J. Brucker '... quamvis se hominem fuisse, non in primo philosophorum ordine numero demonstravit, manebit tamen ingens ... in Ecclesia memoria' (Historia Critica Philosophiae III Leipzig 1743, p. 507). And D. Tiedemann considered him as a lesser Plotinus: 'Plotin und seiner Nachfolger ... Mit seiner Alexandriner setzt Augustinus als ausgemaacht voraus ...' (Geist der Spekulativen Philosophie III, Marburg 1793, pp. 462-3). Surprising though it may seem there may be in Hegel's theory of grace a trace of Augustine's thought. Although he gives a conventional view of grace in a way which crudely represents his thinking: 'something foreign to consciousness ... which man has to acquiesce in as something foreign to his own nature, and his relation to which is of a passive thought' (fremd ... die der Mensch als ein Fremdes sich gefallen lassen müsse und gegen die er sich passiv verhalte Religion II SW 16, p. 195; translation E.B. Spiers and J.B. Anderson, London 1895, II p. 332), it seems as if he attempted to formulate the Augustinian idea in a better way than this in which the element of 'foreignness' were removed, though the basis of the idea preserved. 'In this way the external divine existence, as something divorced from existence within the subjective spirit, is abrogated, and thus God is, as it were, called to mind within the sphere of subjectivity' (Dadurch also ist das Äusserliche göttliche Daseyn als ein Getrenntseyn vom Daseyn im subjectiven Geist aufgehoben und somit Gott in die Subjectivität hinein erinnert. ib. SW 16 p. 126; translation II p. 256). cf. 'it is possible also from the standpoint of consciousness to reach this subjectivity, this feeling that the object is not foreign to consciousness' (ib. p. 195; translation p. 332). The original formulae of Augustine did not envisage such an immediate opposition to be overcome, but rather a profound continuity between man's action and God's. In this way Hegel's formula is more Augustinian than its conventional representation.
Footnotes to Introduction - continued

30 cont'd:-

cf 'In (bonis) etiam (Deus) operetur et velle ... Subventum est igitur infinitati voluntatis humanae, ut divina gratia indeclinabiler et inseparabilegeretur' (de Correptione et Gratia XII 38, PL 40.939-40.)

Much more likely than Hegel knowing Augustine is the occurrence of comparable themes arising in both from a common source in St. Paul, as argued by E. de' Negri (L/elaborazione hegeliana di temi agostiniani, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 6, 1952 pp. 62-78).

e.g. 'Entlussung' may derive from the Lutheran translation of 'exinanivit' in Phil. 2.7: 'sondern Müsste sich selbst' (version of G.F. Seiter, Erlangen 1784) (op. cit. p.67). But de' Negri's suggestion that Hegel could have found the idea in Augustine's commentaries on St. Paul (ib. p. 68) is not so convincing.
CHAPTER 1
CHAPTER 1

Structures of Subjectivity in Aristotle

Intellectual and Sense Knowledge

Contrary to what some writers have been content to point out, Aristotle's intention in giving an account of the process of knowing was not just to assert a parallelism between intellectual knowledge and the more evident sensation. It is true that he does give some parallels. For example he writes in de Anima II 5:1 "The sentient subject, as we have said, is potentially such as the object of sense is actually. Thus during the process of being acted upon it is unlike, but at the end of the process it has become like that object, and shares its quality." (\( \nu \sigma \nu \sigma \nu \tau \alpha \kappa \alpha l \varepsilon \sigma \tau \iota \nu \delta \iota \nu \varepsilon \kappa \epsilon \iota \nu \)).

This account of sensation can be seen of the same form as the account of thinking at, for example, de Anima III 4:2 "For in the case of things without matter that which thinks and that which is thought are the same" (\( \tau \delta \ \alpha \upsilon \tau \delta \)).

The difference between \( \nu \sigma \nu \sigma \nu \tau \alpha \kappa \alpha l \) and \( \tau \delta \alpha \upsilon \tau \delta \) is an assurance that the analogy between sense and intellectual knowledge, which occurs between these statements 3 is not a complete account: "as the sensitive is to the sensible, so must mind be to the thinkable." That Aristotle should draw such analogies is not surprising, given his rehabilitation of the world of matter and sensation after Plato's disdain for it. In addition his language indicates his awareness of a cosmos internally ordered and inter-related. 4
Discontinuous with the physical world, yet understood from the imagination’s phantasms of it, was the intellectual world of νούς and νοητικός; but different texts can be found showing at one place that νοητικός were said to be created by the power of mind, at another that they seem to be eternal and primary, as Plato’s world of ideas.

Within the empiricism of Aristotle was a speculative content which emphasised the difference of the intellectual nature from the sensitive. An understanding of Aristotle is directly related to the degree of importance one accords to the speculative as contrasted with the empirical. 5 The empirical interpretation in the matter of epistemology arises from a concentration of the attention on the likenesses between sensation and thinking to the disregard of their differences. Yet those differences are there and demand attention – though the situation is not as simple as the interpretation of Hamelin, that Aristotle (despite himself) found himself returning to the Platonism he rejected. 6 There is no doubt that the activity of νούς is transcendently different from that of sensation, and the study of subjectivity cannot by-pass the problems posed in the divergence between them and take refuge in a conventional Aristotelianism.

For Aristotle the differences between thinking and sensation are evident even at an observable level. "... it lies in man’s power to use his mind whenever he chooses, but it is not in his power to experience sensation." 7 And "... the sense loses sensation under the stimulus of a too violent sensible object; ... but when mind thinks the
highly intelligible, it is not less able to think of slighter things, but even more able; for the faculty of sense is not apart from the body, whereas the mind is separable."

Within the de Anima a coherent doctrine is developed within the conception of knowledge being a movement from potentiality into actuality, and (notwithstanding the difference between identity and likeness) both intellectual and sense knowledge are analysed in that way. In sense knowledge, external objects become the activating principle of sensations. As the subject in intellectual knowledge is also in potency with regard to its object, it is necessary to establish whence comes the activation. Yet though there may be difficulties in explaining this and differences between the teaching of de Anima and Metaphysics, there is no doubt that Aristotle's teaching about the final state of activated intellectual knowledge is that mind and object are identified.

The specifically different character of intellectual knowledge, that one can exercise it when one wills, refers to knowledge already gained. The real problem, not only of interpretation of Aristotle but also the problem to which he brought no definitive explanation or solution, was how we first come by an intellectual object. And frankly we shall have to conclude that the best solution to the problem of interpretation is to accept an incompatibility between the view of the de Anima which makes intelligible realities the creation of νοῦς, and does not designate a place for will or desire in this creation nor have them exert an attractive
force over νοος before νοος makes them, and the view of Metaphysics 7 and 9 which makes intelligible realities initially attract νοος, thus putting the coming by intellectual knowledge from its beginning into a context of desire and will. Even though the account in Metaphysics is more designed to answer the ontological questions 'what is thought?', 'how does it fit into the cosmos?' and to find, in consequence, the presence of value in the goodness of its objects, than its more limited subjective account of the de Anima, the difference of intention will not completely explain the difference. For by making the potentiality of νοος actualisable by already existing νοητά rather than by νοητά created for it by itself, the Metaphysics account cannot be completely interrelated with the de Anima account, nor the place of desire and will which it raises be inserted into it.

There is no doubt that will does play an important rôle in the different accounts of knowing which Aristotle gives. And even in sensation (in man as in animals) the process is not purely passive; desire — whose human counterpart is will — comes into it. Perhaps the distinction between the primacy of the intellect and the primacy of the will — a mind or a will metaphysic — rests in a finer and more elusive distinction than is usually supposed.

Certainly the view of Metaphysics brings mind and will together at the final end of knowing and willing. A pure will will ultimately coincide with knowledge, because the ultimate desirable object is the ultimate intelligible. In his
conception of ὑπεξέχεις, Aristotle took over the Plato's notion of ἐπιθυμια, but with him it is not isolated in the sensitive faculties (which prevented Plato from having a place for will, and therefore having to make virtue equal knowledge). ὑπεξέχεις still is attracted to the apparent good, but in its intellectual extension it becomes rational desire: βουλήσις, which is superior to simple ὑπεξέχεις; and its object - τὸ ὑπεκτὸν is the real and not seeming good: τὸ ὁν καλὸν

It is through the interdependence of the faculties in the body-soul unity which he wished to maintain that Aristotle can give a place for will in intellection; and for the same reason of continuity he can (in the de Anima) give to the sense powers themselves a kind of judgement over their proper objects, and suppose the existence of a power for the co-ordination of diverse sense experiences.

Here one must notice in the de Anima III the existence of a theme not in keeping with the rest, of which it remains an open question whether we have the bringing together of chronologically diverse reflections, an indecisiveness on the part of Aristotle himself or manuscript modifications made with the presumptions of a later hermeneutic. It lies around the question of the systematic centralisation of experiences. In chapter I the power of co-ordination of diverse sensations is attributed to their working together.

"The senses perceive each other's proper objects incidentally, not in their own identity, but acting together
as one, (ἡ μία) when sensations occur simultaneously in the case of the same object". 16 In chapter II, on the grounds of avoiding an infinite regress he located self awareness in each sense power: "if there is a separate sense power perceiving sight, either the process will go on ad infinitum or a sense must perceive itself." 17 However, scattered throughout this chapter are a number of references to a principal of unity, which conflicts with the quasi-autonomy given to sense powers. Whereas chapter I will only give the co-ordinating functions to the senses acting together, chapter II will say "That which asserts the differences must be one; for sweet differs from white. It is the same faculty then that asserts this; hence as it asserts so it thinks and perceives. Evidently, therefore it is impossible to pass judgement on separate objects by separate faculties; and it is also obvious from the following considerations that they are not judged at separate times." 18 And the faculty which makes the judgement is both divided and undivided at the same time 19 "... as a point is ... both one and two" (i.e. capable of being used in a place of reference more than once) "in this sense divisible, so too in so far as the judging faculty is indivisible, it is one and simultaneous in action, but in so far as it is divisible, it uses the same symbol twice at the same time". 20 (The significance of simultaneity here will be taken up when the Parva Naturalia structures are examined.) The interpretation of 'so it thinks and perceives', taken at its fullest meaning, would give to νόησε a co-ordinating
function which the transcendent structure of chapters 4 and 5 would deny. The manuscript position is that two texts read ἀποκεί for νοεῖ 22, and ἀποκεί less precisely involves the activity of mind. But if νοεῖ were the correct reading it could be as in chapter 4 the cursive \dianoetic activity of embodied νοῦς 23. Yet even if in this way the difficulty over the fact of intellectual activity were resolved, there remains a further problem that the previous position that the senses need no special co-ordinating power does not coincide with what comes here.

That there is a co-ordinating power is, as we shall presently see, the characteristic of the subjectivity structures of the Parva Naturalia and the Nicomachean Ethics; in the de Anima it is an aberrant structure, 24 and which of the three explanations given above would be correct cannot be said. If it were not in fact an innocent revision by later systematisers, the presence of this idea would have been interpreted by them according to their own preconceptions without the consciousness of the problematic that characterised Aristotle himself.

One side of the problematic was Aristotle's insistence on the transcendent nature of thought; the other side was the bringing together of thinking with other living processes, and in consequence his speculation about a co-ordinating power of sense and mind was the place where his difficulty most appeared. R. Mondolfo has explained the reasons which lay behind this other side of his problematic: "this faculty of distinction located in the sense powers, constitutes for
Aristotle the motive and the means of passing over the division which Plato introduced between the spiritual activities when he distributed them between the different and separate parts of the soul. Thus Aristotle comes to affirm the continuity or reciprocal compensation of the faculties necessary to the unity of the subject.  

Aristotle's psychology should be seen as an investigation which proceeds not from the philosopher's study alone, but from the anatomical-biologist's work-room. It is related, as well to the study of νους, to Aristotle's interest in the way in which sensations are transmitted - whether by the blood or not - to and from the heart (which was for him the abode of the nutritive and sensitive soul). His proposal of a body-soul unity set up a problem which led to the discovery of nerves. The account of the search for a centre of unity in the personality which was also a centre of consciousness and self-consciousness will turn out to be a principle theme in this thesis. Once Aristotle had proposed the existence of a co-ordinating sense, the way opened for an analogous treatment of mind without reference to the bodily side of human nature. Except for Hegel, none of the writers covered by this thesis gave a place to the body comparable to that given by Aristotle: they felt themselves absolved from probing as deeply as he the question of its relationship to mind.
Thinking  a) How it comes about

Sensation cannot be ignored, but the principle concern in the study of subjectivity is with thinking. Besides the loci classici for Aristotle's accounts of thinking (de Anima III 4 and 5 Metaphysics 7 and 9-10) there are shorter but significant passages elsewhere. The account in the de Anima is not meant in the first place to give a complete account of every aspect of thinking together. de Anima III poses a single dilemma in two ways, and it is in terms of it that the account is given: firstly, if, as Anaxagoras said, the mind needs to dominate in order to know, how can there be a continuity between subject and object such that they may enter into unity with each other and thus the object be known; secondly, if, when an intelligible object is known the interaction of subject and object demands their being like, how does mind's special property operate. The second expression of the dilemma carries with it a suggestion that if community of nature is necessary, mind will belong to the object in some way, perhaps by being mixed with it. Expressed simply, the question behind both forms of the dilemma is whether in thinking subject and object are like or unlike.

Perhaps we can see here an allusion to a passage in Plato's Sophist. Not only would we find a relation of likeness between subject and object if intelligible objects themselves 'had mind and lived and thought' 29; the stranger's assertion that "to know is active, to be known must in turn be passive" 30 would imply that subject and object were of the
same kind. In the de Anima Aristotle's critique of the
dilemma, and through it of the position of Plato, is to
agree that with intelligible objects and mind there is
indeed a likeness of nature. But there is no passivity of
object to subject: the mind makes its intelligible object
by its own power and then is passive to it, unifying it to
itself completely.

The critique of Plato in these chapters of de Anima
goes wider and deeper still in the same direction. Aristotle
sees thinking not as a reminiscence of pre-existing intelli-
gible forms but a creative and active self-extension of mind.
The process is described as the realising of a capacity
instead of the reminiscence of what has always been known.
True, he is, like Plato, more interested in the knowledge of
a man who draws on what he already knows (though not through
anamnesis), as it is through what a man already knows that
thinking reaches its full significance in organised, related
scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) rather than in the
acquiring of isolated elements of information. The conception
that thinking is an activity demands that knowing be potential
to an object. And this is true of different degrees of
knowing: before something is learnt - like a sheet of paper
ready to receive some writing; when something is learnt,
identifying thinker and νοητόν for the first time; and when from his habit-like possession of knowledge he re-
calls it and uses it.

But if mind is characterised by the active production
of intelligible objects and their absorption to the degree of
identification is it able to know itself? For Plato the quest for self knowledge had spread itself through the limitless possibilities of inner and outer experience; knowledge of the nature of the soul might require knowledge of the nature of the whole man 32, but it seemed possible to arrive at. Aristotle turned against this conception of self-knowledge. Perhaps not without a reminiscence of the Phaedo, where the soul is described as "most like the divine and immortal and intellectual and uniform and indissoluble and ever unchanging" 33, he took a significantly different orientation from which so much future thinking was to derive, regardless of the difficulties, not always grasped by his followers, in which he found himself by regarding νοὸς as a single changeless essence. His difficulty arose from the fact that in human thinking νοὸς would have to be involved in mutability, and in numerous embodiments. Quite apart from the fact that νοὸς had lost the familiar self-evidence which it had for Plato the creativity of its active side made it a more difficult object to know in itself.

In the course of treating the dilemma of whether intellectual knowledge is through likeness or unlikeness he twice refers to the possibility of νοὸς knowing itself. The first of these passages 34 that "when mind has become the several groups of its objects ... the mind is then capable of thinking itself", is a notorious aporia. 35 The second is less difficult to understand: νοὸς can think itself as an object without thinking up any νοητὸν: its immateriality and openness to itself allows this direct
knowledge. 36 But this self-knowledge is only one case of intellectual knowledge, and the two allusions are no more than asides: for Aristotle's followers they provided tantalisingly difficult to interpret; for eclectic and neo-Platonist thinkers of the future, very pregnant suggestions.

Aristotle's resolution of the dilemma is in two parts. Firstly that there must be intellectual knowing a continuity and identity between thinker and object of thought, which alone makes thinking of an object possible. So νοῦς, in knowing its proper objects, transcends the distinguishability of itself from its object. It does this by itself making the intelligibility, creating the νοητόν. This intelligibility, this νοητόν, is then 'received' by a passive part of mind which then becomes the object through the unification which is made possible by their likeness; and so "speculative knowledge is the same as its object". 37 Secondly, in this process the dominating power of mind is also preserved: without the process of creating the νοητόν, the subsequent identification would not be possible. The dilemma is given a solution - though further dilemmas are created.

The key passage is in chapter V. Here the process of knowing is described in the languages of physics and craftsmanship. The receptivity of mind to likeness to the potentiality of matter to receive form, under the influence of a cause. In this case the creativity of the agent intellect is the cause (τὸ ἠτιον καὶ Ποιητικόν).
which is also described as an art (τέχνη) \(^{38}\). Here the account produced the problem which harassed future commentators, not less than Aristotle himself. He wished to develop his insight that created its intelligible objects. That and the use of physical analogy would mean that unless mind and knowledge were identical and self-causing, there would have to be a division in νοῦς itself. νοῦς then would be imperfectly united with the rest of the human personality. He goes on to opt for this separate existence \(^{39}\), and thereby creates a division in the personality.

Following the precedent of Plato, but with a much more scientific precision, he makes another physical analogy in terms of a composite image drawn from light. \(^{40}\) Careful physicist as he was Aristotle knew that light did not reveal objects in their true colours, but was really the condition of their being any colours in the object: no light, no colour. So with the power of mind: no intellectual creativity, no intelligibility. Whatever things are in themselves, they become intelligible and graspable only by a thinker. And as the colour lasts only as long as the light, so the intelligibility only whilst the activity of the mind is given to the objects (or to a remembered phantasm of them). The mind has to make its object first in order to become it; there is no question here about how the intelligible object begins the process of thinking. No sense-experience is said to prompt the creativity of νοῦς.

We turn to the teaching of Metaphysics \(^{\wedge}\) and particularly chapter 9. It should be noted that the well known early dating
of this work by W. Jaeger is no longer uncritically accepted; it is even dated as late and contemporary with the de Anima.

Some of the teaching of this book is parallel to that of the de Anima. In chapter 7 there is the same conception of the union of thinker and object in a passage which includes a section on self-thinking relatable to the first allusion of de Anima: "And thought thinks on itself through participation in the object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought by the act of apprehension and thinking, so that thought and the object of thought are the same". It goes on, in different language, to make the same distinction of de Anima between νοῦς as actualising and as potential: "that which is receptive of the objects of thought, i.e. essence, is thought (νοῦς). And it actually functions (ἐνεργεῖμαι) when it possesses this object. Hence it is actuality rather than potentiality that is held to be the divine possession of rational thought".

But Metaphysics sees the activity of thinking set in the context of a cosmos in which everything is moved by a desire for an eternal, first unmoved mover, and thought and human desire are no less subject to that condition. "The object of desire and the object of thought (τὸ ὄρεξτὼν καὶ τὸ νοητὼν) move without being moved .... thought (νοῦς) is moved by the intelligible (Ὕππὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ)". The de Anima account was not interested in the arousal of thinking by desire or any application of a power of willing - except perhaps when a knowledgeable man
chose to use the knowledge he already had. It is possible to read an aspect of willing into the conception of mind as dominant, but it would be sufficient to see this dominance as being an aspect of mind's transcendence.

The more ontological account of Metaphysics does not coincide with the subjective account of de Anima III in the area where they overlap: the inner motivation of thinking. The de Anima leaves the impression that thinking was a dynamic spontaneously creative process which creates the object of thought, like itself and thereby absorbable. Metaphysics makes it appear that the object of the mind is already made for it, and that it moves towards the intelligible object under its desire. Commentators are therefore faced with a task of locating the desirability of the within the de Anima analysis. A text in de Anima I which attributes the power of thought in itself to a separable and more divine mind, and 'thinking, loving and hating' to the 'individual which possesses the mind' does not help us, because the activity of love \( \varphi \lambda \epsilon \nu \) does not belong to the divine, creative mind \( 46 \). Perhaps - though it is not explicitly said - the supra-temporal and divine transcendence of \( \nu \omega \) is such that it can timelessly call the \( \nu \eta \tau \alpha \) into being and yet, being also immanent in man subject to time, allow it to appear that the \( \nu \eta \tau \nu \) attracts the \( \nu \omega \). But if we take the texts in the way in which they stand now the later dating of Metaphysics actually highlights the inconsistency.
b) the relationship of thinking to willing

We see then that the question of the priority of intellect or will arises in Aristotle himself: in different works, but in the same epistemological question and in writings which modern research has supposed to be quite contemporary. But this should not be regarded as historically the first emergence of a will metaphysic. Nor is it appropriate to the age or the spirit of Aristotle to press for a complete schematic and systematic reconciliation of the phenomena of thinking and desire. There is as much discrepancy in the two accounts as there is between the place of thinking and the more transcendent aspects of ἐρωτικός in Plato: indeed the similarity is very striking. The phenomenon of will was well-known even before the time of Plato and Aristotle. Mondolfo has written on the place of the will in ancient philosophy. He relates the ὁμοιότητα in Aristotle to ἐρωτικός in Plato; and he finds the element of will in the presence of judging, and (a common place of Greek thought known to go back to Xenephones) the need of a will to overcome difficulties in order to come by knowledge. Hamelin has also examined the place of the will in Aristotle in whose moral teaching he points out that to live virtuously means having a will to keep the mean. And he suggests that there is a radical difference with Aristotle from the position of Socrates (and Plato) that virtue was knowledge alone.

Commentators today who try to reconcile the de Anima III account with the Metaphysics account are the successors of
the early commentators who found the same problem. Theophrastus, Aristotle's successor, wrote that "to submit
the act of νοῦς to a different mover is absurd (ΣΤΟΤΟΤΟΥ"
..... unless the mover is another νοῦς " 50, and he
aligns himself with the position of the de Anima: "it is in
the soul (ψυχή) (that these movements have) their
source (ἀρχή), their activity and their end" 51.
From this it appears that the difficulty of reconciling the
positions was seen from the earliest times, and the tone of
the first quotation suggests that Theophrastus had assumed
the mantle of Aristotelian orthodoxy against Platonist
deviationism. Hamelin quotes Themisteus as making the will
prior to the intellect in the sense that, as Aristotle him-
self said, thought accompanies willing. 52

What lies behind the divergences of these two texts is
more than the relative priority of νοῦς or will in coming
by intellectual knowledge for the first time. Later systema-
tisers were concerned with this question of course but with
wider ones: how would will and knowledge be interrelated
together in any human action? would this take place
consecutively, or would they interpenetrate? Aristotle
gave attention to these matters but he did not draw the lines
with the sharpness which eclectics, neo-Platonists and even
Augustine and later Christian writers thought necessary.
For the boundaries they drew with firm, though not necessarily
rough, hands had little in common with those tentative but
penetrating perceptions of the elusive interplay of mind and
will in deliberation and choice in Nicomachean Ethics III 2 and 3. Neo-Platonists derived their teaching on the relations of will and νοῦς rather from the hypothesis that ultimately they would coincide than from what they found as the supposedly illusory world of sense experiences. Augustine found it necessary to bind together coincidently intellectus and amor or voluntas in the substance of the human mens, which neo-Platonism had bound together only in transcendent νοῦς. This was not only stylistically far from the view of Aristotle with his awareness of the problematic of their distinctness. But so great was his esteem for the sheer creative power of νοῦς, that it is difficult to be certain that it was against his spirit to pursue to the limit his insights on its nature and activity and its irradiation over everything else.

The Divisions used by Aristotle and their significance

It is impossible to describe the invisible νοῦς in words which are not primarily designed for material objects. The advantage of meaningful communication must override the disadvantage of limited application. Aristotle's position has been well expressed by Barbotin:

"At the bottom of all of these discussions the same fundamental difficulty is found: how to express with the help of terms borrowed from physics - passion, alteration, movement - realities of a quite different order: that of thought. Already the notions of natural science are so elaborate that they have to be severely corrected to be able to be transposed and correspond to the demands of their new objects. Of course,
some such necessity exists for whoever takes up the problem of knowledge: unless concepts are employed which belong to common experience, it is impossible to begin the metaphysics of mind (esprit). Aristotle's method reveals in a striking way the continuity of the real and at the same time the very strong feeling for the difference of thinking."

The break in style with Plato in its description of the soul could not be more striking. The use of terminology from Physics, and the rejection of the resources of myth was meant to shock the readers both by the unusualness of the notions and the pureness of the resulting conceptions. Later neo-Platonists took the point of the spiritualisation of these conceptions rather than their materialisation. The choice of a new way was in every sense deliberate.

Nuyens and Mondolfo have both examined the critique of Plato implicit in this choice and offered differing judgements on its success. So Nuyens writes:

"It has been seen that (Aristotle) had adopted on his own account the Platonic theory of the parts of the soul . . . . In the passage which concerns us he tries to combine this theory with the new conception of the soul—entelechy, even in the case of man".

But to Nuyens it was impossible to have the whole soul as \( \tau \rho \lambda \eta \lambda \varepsilon \xi \varepsilon \omega \nu \) and \( \nu \nu \zeta \) with a transcendent function.

"If the soul is in its entirety substantial form, even in man, what then is \( \nu \nu \zeta \) ? This question arises in many places in the de Anima. Related to the origin of man, it brings Aristotle to a dilemma without any way out."

Mondolfo sees the problem in a more sanguine way. The categories to which Aristotle turned enabled him to solve
problems which Plato could not solve:

"The critique of the tri-partite division of the soul made by Plato led Aristotle to substitute the concept of faculty for that of part, that is to say, to relate it to a unitary idea of the soul, by interpreting its different activities as degrees of a progressive development".

A faculty of judging, found in the more empirical structure, is a "rudimentary form of the mediation between sense and intelligence which provides a means of surmounting the difficulties which arose in Plato's psychology, whose rigid divisions did not explain how the soul could apply to sensations the categories of existence, identity, distinction".  

Mondolfo proposed to relate the sense-power involved in judgement with the interior sense of Augustine. As we shall see, Aristotle's account of this sense, subsequently known as the 'common sense', provided Porphyry in particular with a model for an integrated subjectivity structure at the level of the highest hypostases.

Some of the problems which go with these divisions have already been pointed out: in de Anima III 5, the receptivity of νόσσ is made analogous with matter, and its certainty compared with a technique. The Platonic notion of ἐρως has been transferred into the more sense-based ὑπεξ.  

Yet the distinction within νόσσ between what makes and is impassive and eternal, and what becomes its object and is mortal, does not stay as a purely formal division. As in the material world an efficient cause is distinct from that in
which it operates, it is hardened into a division which is perplexing; not how the two can yet be one, but how the one \( \nu\omega\) can yet be two. We have here the age-old problem of the transcendence or immanence of \( \nu\omega\); and to anticipate, it is both.

The divisions of Aristotle serve his opposition to Plato’s epistemology of reminiscence-innateness; he insists on the fact of learning anew and on the creativity of intelligence. The problems which have been discussed so far are principally concerned with the question ‘how is \( \nu\omega\) prompted to produce from sense experience the means of knowing things in the intelligible universality?’ While both of Aristotle’s theories concur in the fact that \( \nu\omega\) and \( \nu\eta\tau\nu\) are identical in act, the Plato-like perspective of Metaphysics gives a place to will through the place of the desire, while \( \nu\omega\) in de Anima III seems to move under its own creative spontaneity. Both fall in with the view that knowledge is to be created, not to be found in the soul, innate and ready made. But the distinctions between \( \nu\omega\) and \( \psi\upsilon\chi\hat{\iota}\), between \( \nu\omega\) that makes all things and \( \nu\omega\) that becomes all things, even between \( \nu\omega\) immanent and \( \nu\omega\) transcendent, are only impressionistically transcended in the interest of maintaining the unity of the human personality. So we are left with divisions and unity: not out of the desire to propose a paradoxical unity in diversity, but because of the insolubility of the questions posed.
Subjectivity a) how the mind knows itself

It is now necessary to look more closely at the two ways described in de Anima III. 4.62 in which mind may know itself.

The first refers to the possibility of self-thinking in the context of becoming learned: "But when the mind has become the several groups of its objects ..., the mind is then capable of knowing itself." 63

There is no reference here to the preceding scattered sentences to what A described as an aberrant structure: it refers purely to intellectual knowledge, to knowing in itself. As the passage identifies thinking with the divine activity it is certainly necessary to keep in mind its transcendence. Though the context is of the embodied \( \psi \delta \) which comes to know "the several groups of its objects", in this at least something like, perhaps something identical with, the divine state of full self-knowing arises. That intellectual activity is always of its nature self-conscious is not exactly stated, but is the presumption. The creation of intelligibilities is the condition of mind's awakening to itself, quite apart from the fact that there are inferior forms of self-awareness, which are not properly intellectual. The general principle is given in the context of the attainment of learned knowledge, as the achievement of a stable and coherent area of knowledge gives a man a sense of the extending of his own capacity and is the best experience for an understanding of the power which has made that extension possible. How far the "then" (\( \tau \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \epsilon \))
should be taken is not clear from the text: the flow of argument as it stands is that in exercising acquired, habitual knowledge, \( \nu\nu\sigma\) is able to think itself, because it has become its potential objects, and these have become mind itself. In thinking its \( \nu\nu\tau\alpha\) which it has created it is in fact thinking itself because of its identity with them. It is not knowledge of itself as the contemplation of an essence. \( \nu\nu\sigma\) is an intensely pure activity which becomes completely identified with the objects which it itself makes. But in reducing its nature to such a vanishing point, at which self-knowing and object-knowing are identified, paradoxically the spiritual transcendence of this existent is enhanced, not tainted.

The second case of self-thinking is when mind deliberately turns its attention on itself; here its timeless transcendence must to some extent be lost, because of the need of deliberation. It might be argued that the principle stated here could extend to the case of \( \nu\nu\sigma\) thinking of another \( \nu\nu\sigma\), which might be the divine \( \nu\nu\sigma\):

\[
(\nu\nu\sigma) \text{ is also itself thinkable, just like other objects of thought}. 
\]

Its objects are \( \nu\nu\tau\alpha\), and are known because they are made identifiable with itself. "For in the case of things without matter that which thinks and that which is thought are the same; for speculative knowledge \( \varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\iota\mu\nu\eta\ \Theta\e\iota\mu\rho\eta\iota\kappa\iota\) is the same as its object." 65

The mode of identity is described a little later in a way from which exact parallels with sense knowledge are a long way
away:

"The soul, then, acts like a hand; for the hand is an instrument which employs instruments, and in the same way the mind is a form which uses forms, and the sense is a form which employs the forms of sensible objects." (Literally, "... the form of forms ... the form of sensible objects" : ἐλάσσος ἐλάσσων...

There is a substantial identity of conception between the first of these passages in the de Anima with a passage in Metaphysics Α : "And thought (νοῦς) thinks itself through participation in the object of thought (αὐτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μεταληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ); for it becomes an object of thought by the act of apprehension and thinking, so that thought and the object of thought are the same, because that which is receptive of the object of thought, i.e. essence (ὁνομία), is thought (νοῦς)."

The first sentence states unequivocally what we had supposed in de Anima III 5: that object-thinking is at the same time self-thinking.

And the text continues with an expression which seems nearest to the de Anima account: "Hence it is actuality (ἐξεργεῖται) rather than potentiality (δεικτοῖ) that is held to be the divine possession of rational thought." Activity is the characteristic of thinking in itself, but the exteriority of its object (in the Metaphysics) introduces the place of desire and potentiality in what is not divine.

But to return with this parallel idea to the de Anima account. Self-knowledge, as an activity of νοῦς and supposedly a perception of its unity with itself, would fall foul
of the division between actualising and receptivity: though it does not create its own intelligibility anew, as it is already intelligible and open to itself, it has to be received 'just like other objects of thought'; and if so, as the neo-Platonists suggested, the unity would be lost, and the absolute unity of thought with itself in self-knowing would exist only on the divine side of a noetic divide. But let us accept the impressionistic surmounting of this divide and assume that thought and self-thinking can at least be the intermittent activities of their human embodiments. A man may think of himself in two ways: as the thinker whose consciousness of intelligible objects coincides with his own consciousness - because it is his consciousness which creates them and he knows his thinking in the same creative act; and in turning his thought upon himself, and here he knows his thinking directly because his mind is an immaterial object and present to itself in a way like the unity of \( \text{\textit{νοητον}} \) with \( \text{\textit{νοος}} \). The first may be said to be a normal feature of subjectivity; the second a more occasional one. The first discloses the basic quality of thought's own self-reflection, the second, by being more direct is fittingly more divine, but of its human embodiment Aristotle's analysis could not reach the simple unity he sought.

The aberrant subjectivity structure of de Anima III 2, 4 and 7 has qualities in it which are more fully detailed in three other texts, where they are not in conflict with other reflections on the nature of sensitive self-consciousness or, excepting the Nicomachean Ethics, of the
transcendent quality of thought in itself. Passages in the de Sensu et Sensibilibus 7 and de Somno et Vigilio 2 have a much more clearly drawn-up statement on the existence of a centre of sense self-consciousness which is also a co-ordinator of sensations than the scattered references in the de Anima. The first of these, like that in de Anima III 2 involves awareness of time, though as a concomitant of continuous sensation, not in the fact of simultaneity. The other text, in Nicomachean Ethics IX 9 brings thinking together with sensation on this centre of self-consciousness, inviting comparison again with the passage in de Anima II 71 which links thinking with sensation in the co-ordinating sense.

In the de Sensu et Sensibilibus 7 there is a continuous centre of self-consciousness, not focussed on to the simultaneous discernment of identity between diverse impressions at a point in time, but on the continuity of self-awareness through the passage of time. This text goes so far as to associate self-consciousness with time-consciousness that any objective criteria for time are for the moment forgotten. "For if, when a man perceives himself or anything else in continuous time, it is impossible for him to be unaware of his existence, and if again in continuous time there can be a time so short as to be quite imperceptible, it is clear that during that time he would be unaware of his existence, and of the fact of his seeing or perceiving" 72. So there is an inner sense which is together self-conscious, object-perceiving and pari passu time-conscious; and time is the medium, the element, without which any knowledge is
impossible. 73 The text then goes on to make this inner
sense responsible for the inter-relation of diverse simul-
taneous perceptions: "the general faculty of perception
is one and the same numerically but one in its being . . . .
So that simultaneous perceptions would be possible with a
part which is one and the same, but not the same in concept-
ional relation ( λόγος )" 74. The text is a degree
clearer and more satisfactory system-wise than the de Anima
texts, and it goes a considerable way towards drawing up a
total subjectivity structure of man in his sensitive powers.
Mondolfo makes this comment on it:

"Aristotle considers self-consciousness
or consciousness of one's own existence
always present and continuous in the sub-
ject; and it is in the constant and indefa-
tigable presence of self-consciousness,
which is quite unique and identical, that
he finds the solution to problems concerning
the possibility of cognitive relations be-
tween different impressions, without having
to fuse them into a unique sensation which
would make comparison and distinction im-
possible." 75

In the de Somno et Vigilio II Aristotle makes in
stronger terms the formal identity between the inner sense
which is self-conscious and the inner sense which correlates
different sensations. It should be noted that though this
work refers to de Anima (III) as to a work completed, its
assertion of the existence of a 'common' sensitive power
which has the further characteristic of self-consciousness
is at variances with the denial in de Anima III 2 of the
existence of a power distinct from the external senses in
which self-consciousness arises. "There is also a common
faculty associated with (all the senses) whereby one is conscious that one sees and hears (for it is not by sight that one is aware that one is aware that one sees; and one judges and is capable of judging that sweet is different from white not by the taste, nor by sight, nor by a combination of the two, but by some part which is common to all the sense organs; for there is one sense faculty and one paramount sense organ ...), and this is closely associated with the sense of touch. 76

One would like to say that a text in the Nicomachean Ethics IX 9 is the logical development of Aristotle's theory of the common sense anticipated in de Anima III 2, 4 and 7, as here he brings thinking specifically into a subjectivity structure much like that of the de Sensu et Sensibilibus 7 and de Somno et Vigilio 2 ... "and if one who sees is conscious that he sees, one who hears that he hears, one who walks that he walks, and similarly for all the other human activities there is a faculty that is conscious of their exercises, so that whenever we perceive, we are conscious that we perceive, and whenever we think we are conscious that we think, and to be conscious that we are perceiving or thinking is to be conscious that we exist (for existence, as we saw, is sense perception or thought (αἰσθανεσθαι ἡ νοεῖν) ... (then) ... is (a man's) friend's existence also desirable. ... Therefore a man ought also to share his friend's consciousness of his existence" 77.

Mondolfo comments that not only does Aristotle assert here
"the identity between human existence (i.e. the fact of being alive) and the consciousness of sensing and thinking..... still more he identifies enjoyment and love of life with the enjoyment and love of knowledge, that is of feeling and thinking which are sensations of feeling and the intention of thinking, in other words of self-consciousness". 78

But in the absence of indications to the contrary we are not justified in saying any more than that the Ethics IX puts forward here a theory of human cognition unambiguously individual. One is not justified in presuming that here we have a final view of the relationship between thinking and consciousness any more than of the de Anima III 4 and 5 and the Metaphysics Α. The coincidence of the descriptions here with the subjectivity structures nucleating on the common sense merely emphasises the differences between the two series of opinions, for the question of the nature of thought does not arise at this point. It does so later and in a way which coincides with the teaching of the other series: "(the life of Θεωρία ) will be higher than the human level: not in virtue of his humanity will a man achieve it, but in virtue of something within him which is divine." 79 The texts of the de Anima and the Nicomachean Ethics in their existing state, the former seeing thinking primarily from its transcendent standpoint, the latter primarily from a human standpoint, both witness through the diverse subjectivity structures they contain, to the impossibility which Aristotle found in relating the distinct quality of mind to its embodiment.

Mondolfo sees the connections between this interior common sense in Aristotle and the "sensus interior" in
St. Augustine, and also the views of both on self-awareness. His proposal that there is a neo-Platonist mediation of Aristotelian ideas to Augustine's is the same as that which will be examined in detail in this thesis; and we shall find that Augustine did achieve a coherent structure of subjectivity which critically subdued Aristotelian transcendent ideas on νοός, rigorously developed regardless of his empirical views by neo-Platonists, to an unequivocally individual structure which included sense and intellectual knowledge.

b) The different structures of self-knowing in Aristotle

It is striking that we have here not one structure of subjectivity, but at least four. And the possibility of discovering others should not be ruled out.

i) From de Anima III (and Metaphysics Α) in which it is claimed that the thinking of intelligible objects is the condition of self-knowing in the sense that the self is thus opened up to itself. From the Metaphysics comes the clarification that all thinking is at the same time self-thinking. In the form in which it occurs in de Anima III it contributes to the answering of the dilemma: how can mind have at the same time dominance over and continuity with the object of thought? If we wished to find an element of will here we would have to look at the fact of mind's dominance, though that could be seen as no more than the speculative power of mind. This structure looks upon νοός as having the creative power of bringing intelligible reality into existence, and a passive power of absorbing this creation completely into itself. The distinct, divine nature of νοός and its 'return' to
the separated state of its existence on the
death of the person raises the problem of
the unity of personality (as well as personal
immortality).

ii) From de Anima III when \( \nu o\dot{\upsilon}\) chooses
deliberately to think itself. It needs no material
object as an intermediary - that is from which to
create its intelligibility, for this is itself an
act. A will element may be seen in the choice to
think of the self, perhaps even in complaisance in
this self-thinking. However, the will is not made
a part of a triadic or polyadic structure. This kind
of self-thinking is really an answer to a subsidiary
question in the de Anima: "how is self-thinking
possible?"

These analyses are not mutually exclusive, but they are not
identical, being different approaches to the same activity.

iii) The noetic structure of Metaphysics which can not be accommodated to them. It supposes
\( \nu o\dot{\upsilon}\) to be moved by desire and not by its own
creative spontaneity. In giving this formal place
to the will a loosely triadic structure of object -
will - understanding is proposed.

Together, these three structures refer only to \( \nu o\dot{\upsilon}\). They are to differing degrees triadic in so far as the will
plays a part in them.

iv) From the de Sensu et Sensibilibus 7 and
de Somno et Vigilio 2 comes the proposal of a con-
tinuous self-consciousness, arising together with
time-consciousness in the common sense. In the
Nicomachean Ethics IX 9 thinking is proposed as also
existing within this continuous self-consciousness;
and these positions seem to be the fulfilment of themes
in de Anima III 2, 4 and 7. The resulting structure
is complete at the cost of omitting to include the
the separated state of its existence on the
death of the person raises the problem of
the unity of personality (as well as personal
immortality).

ii) From de Anima III when \( \psi \) chooses
deliberately to think itself. It needs no material
object as an intermediary - that is from which to
create its intelligibility, for this is itself an
act. A will element may be seen in the choice to
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existing within this continuous self-consciousness;
and these positions seem to be the fulfilment of themes
in de Anima III 2, 4 and 7. The resulting structure
is complete at the cost of omitting to include the
activity of thought as it is in itself. An order of systematic development of these positions can be worked out, but not much confirmed from the point of view of chronological study.

So in addition to the irreconcilability of the structures of de Anima III and Metaphysics \( \wedge \), supposed by some commentators to be approximately contemporary, we have further irreconcilabilities between them and the Parva Naturalia and Nicomachean Ethics. It would be expecting too much of chronological research to distinguish finely between the Parva Naturalia treatises themselves; indeed the differences over the nature of common sense would normally be taken as the means of making out the chronological relationship between them. Quite possibly chronology does not enter into the question, but only the intractability of material being handled. On the present state of the evidence it does not seem possible to say with certainty whether Aristotle moved forwards or backwards between the positions of a separate self-consciousness for each sense and a central self-consciousness. That thinking was of its nature self-conscious and timelessly transcendent (as in de Anima III and Metaphysics \( \wedge \)), but that the human-embodied \( \Psi \circ \nu \) was only exercised intermittently and only intermittently engaged in self-contemplation, would prevent it from being the centre of a personal self-experiences consciousness, in which the common sense relates to each other \( \wedge \) in time of either temporally simultaneous or successive sensations and, in the structure of the Nicomachean Ethics, of thinking as well. Torn between the nature of thought in itself which Aristotle supposed to be timeless \( \Psi \) and the need of a
centre of consciousness, somehow coincident with man's essence, what suffered was the unity of mind and body. For how could timeless thought satisfactorily integrate the temporal succession of experience; how could it even necessitate—as only time could—the unity of different perceptions of the same object, which came with the different sense powers? For Aristotle saw time as the necessary medium of sense experience. True, the sight would see and the ear hear an exterior regularity by which time could be measured, and there would be no measuring—the act of ψυχή—not νοῦς—unless an interior sense supposed the temporal instantaneity of diverse sensations. But this subjectivism of time and the timeless nature of thought itself and its declared unlikeness to sensations made the desired structure elusive.

If we may look ahead we can find that the subjectivity structure of Augustine's de Trinitate had a counterpart to the in its timeless self-thinking of pure thought and continuity of intellectual self-consciousness (in the inner 'se nosse': always present, and having to be averted to, rather than arising when the creativity of mind awakes). Probably Augustine's conception came from a conflation of the division thinking-sensation with a division of inner and outer, in which continuous self-knowing, self-loving and self-remembering were thought of as being at the inner centre of intellectual life. The rest of sense experience was interrelated in the memoria, which took over the integrating functions of the common sense, and in which, perhaps untidily but convincingly, intellectual and sense elements co-existed.
Before and after Augustine Aristotelians have tried to bring these four possible subjectivity structures into a coherent whole. This is probably an impossible task. The pre-occupations of each are different. The co-presence of each gives a better, if not final, account of the human subject which, bafflingly, has some functions proper to mind itself and others which belong to body and soul together. Hylemorphism is primarily a philosophy of unities not dualities; of informed matter not of matter and form, and, in intention, of embodied soul, not body and soul. The incentive which led Aristotle with his theory of soul as \( \varepsilon \varepsilon \varepsilon \varepsilon \varepsilon \varepsilon \varepsilon \varepsilon \varepsilon \) to assert such a complete unity of soul and body was his failure to relate human noetic structures with all the others. It seemed to him that nothing but the most rigorous unity would save his analysis of the human subject from dividing into two unrelatable parts, but this only heightened the incongruity between the characteristic noetic activity of \( \nu \nu \nu \) and its presence in a human body. As Nuyens writes:

"In the final period, the soul is considered as the entelechiae of the body and is united in this capacity in the closest way possible to matter; thence the possible consideration of it as soul or as mind (esprit) is brought forcibly to the attention of the philosopher, who makes this the principle problem of his psychology. The soul is inseparably united to the body; it is born with it and perishes with it, or to be precise: it is not the soul, nor the body which is born and perishes, but the living being, whose form (or soul) and matter (or body) are the principle constituents of the substantial order. But the mind itself is immaterial and eternal, that is, unengendered and imperishable. Aristotle did not reach a satisfactory synthesis of the soul and the mind in the human personality. \( \nu \nu \nu \) for him is a "residual phenomenon" whose reality he always recognises; but which he will
not succeed in linking with the other principles of his psychology. He asked the question about "\textit{\&aute}..."; he did not answer it."

The confession of failure which Aristotle himself expressed in the \textit{De Generatione Animalium} make it impossible not to accept Nuyens' interpretation of the texts:

"That is why it is a very great puzzle to answer another question, concerning \textit{\&aute}. At what moment, and in what manner, do those creatures which have this principle of \textit{\&aute} acquire their share in it, and where does it come from? This is a very difficult problem which we must endeavour to solve, so far as it may be solved, to the best of our power."

Contrary to what is often taken for granted, Aristotle did not draw up a simple and all-embracing subjectivity structure, and in consequence not only is the self of self-knowledge a disunited subject: the ways to self-knowledge have to follow its unfortunate division.
FOOTNOTES to Chapter 1

1 418 a 3-6. (The Loeb translation is used for classical texts).

2 430 a 4-5.

3 de Anima III 4, 429 a 17-18.


5 How unlike the general impression of Aristotle is to the speculative thinker, analysing the nature of thought and striving to relate it to other human experience, and failing, as we shall see, to give a final account of their connection. Aristotle, elegantly though incautiously, described by David Knowles as possessing 'the philosophy of common sense' and producing 'dazzling glimpses of the obvious' found the answers to the speculative problems he put to his undoubted common sense far from obvious. (v. auct. cit., 'The Evolution of Medieval Thought', London 1962, p.15).

6 "When pressed, Peripateticism comes to be absorbed into Platonism .... The system of Aristotle is a hardly concealed idealism" pp. 88 and 89 of 'La Théorie de l'Intell... Aristote et ses commentateurs', Paris 1953.

7 de Anima II 5, 417 b 24-25.

8 ib. III 4, 429 a 31- b 5.

9 The interpretation of Nuyens must be set on one side, resting on an exaggerated concentration on the analogy between intellectual and sense knowledge, that "It is essential that knowledge develops under an influence coming from outside: it consists for (Aristotle) in a use of our power (puissance) of knowing, to which no limits are placed" (op.cit. p. 283). But then, forgetting the complete union of ἕν οὐκ in ὕπου according to the de Anima, he holds the curious view that according to Aristotle 'νοητά universal concepts or essences ... do not exist by (en) themselves, but only as substantial forms united to matter' (ib. p.296).
Footnotes to Ch. 1 - continued -

10 As Barbotin writes (op.cit. p.99, n.2), bringing together de Anima I 3 407 a 7-8 ἔναντι ἰδέας and Metaphysics A 9 1074 b 38-1075 a 5, noting particularly οὐχ ἕτερον οὖν ὄντος τούτον νοοῦντεν καὶ τοῦ νοῆσαι, ὀσα ηλικία ἔχει: 'unlike the senses, the intellect is completely identified with its object, for in this case it is a question of forms without matter'.

11 Metaphysics A 7. 1072 a 26-27. 'The object of desire and the object of thought move without being moved. The primary objects of desire and thought are the same.'

12 cf. J. Tricot's commentary ('Aristote, la Metaphysique', new edition, Paris 1964 II p.676, n.2): 'the immaterial substance is at the same time πρὸς τον νοητὸν and πρὸς τον ἀρέσκον'. This is no doubt the origin of the position of Plotinus that 'if the will attains this object it becomes thought' (Ennead VI 8 6, following Bréhier translation).

13 Based on Metaphysics A 7, 1072 a 27-28. In the de Anima, Aristotle is unwilling to divide the soul into different parts, and so βολή τοῦ εἴδους is desire in the calculative part (τολογίστικός): III 9, 432 b 6-7.

14 de Anima III 2, 426 b 8-12.

15 ib. 425 a 30 - b 1.
17 ib. 425 b 15-16.
18 ib. 426 b 20-24.
19 ib. 426 b 29, 427 a 2.
20 427 a 9-12.

21 v. infra. p. 39ff. especially note 73.

22 D. Ross, 'Aristotle's de Anima', Oxford 1961, note to 426 b 22 amplifying the Bekker tally of MSS.

23 v. de Anima III 4, 429 a 23: 'by mind I mean that part by which the soul thinks and forms judgements'.

A later passage, in de Anima III 7, also belongs to this aberrant structure, "now in the thinking soul (τῷ δὲ διανοητικῷ ψυχῇ) images take the place of direct perceptions; and when it asserts or denies that they are good or bad, it avoids or pursues them. Hence the soul never thinks without a mental image. The process is just like that in which air affects the eye in a particular way, and the eye again affects something else; and similarly
Footnotes to Ch. 1 – continued –

23 cont'd:

with hearing. The last thing to be affected is a single entity and a single mean, although it has more than one aspect (τὸ δὲ ἐσχατὸν ἐν, καὶ μία μεσότης. τὸ δὲ εἶναι αὐτῇ πλεῖον. (431 a 14-20)) Here the dia-
noetic activity is specified as non-transcendent. The principle at the end is not tied to the dianaetic or to sense activity. Its generality would lend it to system-
building, but with its original context in Aristotle its application to pure noetic as by Porphyry, would be questionable.

24 Editors of the text seem unaware of the problem. As the structure suggested in de Anima III 2 4 and 7 is an aberrant one, the transcendent one will be designated as that of 'de Anima 4 and 5'.


27 Principally in the second part of his Encyclopedia.

28 Ch. 4, 429 a 13ff.

29 Sophist 248E – 249A.


31 Though 'That which produces development from potential to actual in the matter of understanding and thought ought not to be called teaching, but needs some other name' (de Anima II V, 410 b 10-12). Perhaps this is because more than receptivity is involved: by his creative reception of knowledge from someone who actually knows, the learner is developing himself.

32 Phaedrus 270 C.

33 Phaedo 80 , B: Professor Armstrong has translated ἄει ἦν ζώον as 'always in the same relation to itself'. ('Studies in Traditional Anthropology I Plato', Downside Review 201, Vol. 65, July 1947, p. 238).

34 429 b 5-10.

Footnotes to Ch. 1 - continued -

36 430 a 2-4.
37 430 a 4-5.
38 430 a 12.
39 "When isolated it is its true self and nothing more, and this alone is immortal and everlasting," 430 a 22-23.
40 "Mind ... is a kind of positive state like light; for in a sense light makes potential into actual colours". 430 a 15-17.
42 Chronological considerations would no doubt assist the unravelment of textual differences. On the scholarly investigation of chronology the most recent accounts are two by R.A. Gauthier.

i) Chapter I of volume I of 'L'Ethique à Nicomaque, Introduction, Traduction et Commentaire' by E.A. Gauthier and J.Y. Jolif, Aristote: Traductions et Etudes, Louvain and Paris 2nd edition 1970. Note 90 (pp. 36-7) gives the position on the dating of the Metaphysics, and p. 37 gives a special bibliography on the dating of Book A 'the nerve point of the chronology of the Metaphysics.'

This is in some respects surpassed by

ii) the first chapter of the brief 'La Morale d'Aristote' (Paris 1973).

It would be a mistake to think that all of the discrepancies in Aristotle can be reduced to chronological considerations. Even if the texts are completely authentic there remains the possibility of a later modification of an earlier text.

I. Dühring cautiously remarks that he is no longer certain that a chronology can be worked out for the psychological writings: 'The deeper the psychological writings are gone into, the more clearly can traces of working over (Überarbeitung) be seen'. ('Aristoteles, Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens', Heidelberg 1965, p. 561). However he commits himself to the view that the de Anima in its present version is 'the latest and most mature'.

This text is a transcription of a page from a document with footnotes. The page contains references to various sources and quotes from Aristotle, discussing his works and the challenges in understanding them. The footnotes are numbered and provide additional context and clarifications for the main text. The main body of the text elaborates on the challenges of chronology and the nature of Aristotle's works, particularly focusing on the Metaphysics and ethical texts.
Footnotes to Ch. 1 - continued -

36 430 a 2-4.
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'La Morale ... p.499.'

His proposal that will is necessary so that \textit{vōs παθητικός} can conform to the pure thought of the \textit{vōs ποιητικός} (ib.) is very questionable.

Fragment VI in Barbotin, \textit{op.cit.} p.258. 'Absurde' is Barbotin's translation.


'La Théorie de l'Intellect d'après Aristote et ses Commentateurs', Paris 1953 p.41.

\textit{op.cit.} p.104.

\textit{op.cit.} p.214.

\textit{op.cit.} p.236

'L'Unité ...' p.359.

i.e. the aberrant structure of de Anima III discussed above, p. 18 ff. and the Parva Naturalia structures below, p. 39 ff.

'L'Unité ...' p.365.

These relationships are discussed below in chapter 4, pp. 186 ff.

Footnotes to Ch. 1 - continued -

43 17, 1072 b 20-21.
44 ib. 1072 b 21-24.
45 ib. 1072 a 26-27, 30.
46 408 b 18-30.
47 In the second chapter of his 'La Comprensions di Soggetto Umano nell'Antichità Classica', Florence 1958: 'The Will as a Condition of Consciousness and the Actual Conception of the Cognitive Processes'. It is abundantly clear from this book that it is quite out of the question that a will metaphysic begins with Augustine, as is sometimes supposed.
48 'La Morale ... p.499.'
49 ib. p.503. His proposal that will is necessary so that \( \psi \oslash \sigma \pi \alpha \delta \theta \eta \iota \kappa \omicron \sigma \) can conform to the pure thought of the \( \psi \oslash \sigma \pi \eta \iota \kappa \omicron \sigma \) (ib.) is very questionable.
50 Fragment VI in Barbotin, op. cit. p.258. 'Absurde' is Barbotin's translation.
51 Fragment XIII, ib. p.272.
52 'La Théorie de l'Intellect d'après Aristote et ses Commentateurs', Paris 1953 p.41.
53 op. cit. p.104.
54 op. cit. p.214.
55 op. cit. p.236
56 'L'Unité ...' p.359.
57 i.e. the aberrant structure of de Anima III discussed above, p. 18 ff. and the Parva Naturalia structures below, p. 39 ff.
58 'L'Unité ...' p.365.
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Footnotes to Ch. 1 - continued -

43 *7, 1072 b 20-21.

44 ib. 1072 b 21-24.

45 ib. 1072 a 26-27, 30.

46 408 b 18-30.

47 In the second chapter of his 'La Comprensions di Soggetto Umane nell'Antichità Classica', Florence 1958: 'The Will as a Condition of Consciousness and the Actual Conception of the Cognitive Processes'. It is abundantly clear from this book that it is quite out of the question that a will metaphysic begins with Augustine, as is sometimes supposed.

48 'La Morale ... p. 499.'

49 ib. p. 503. His proposal that will is necessary so that \( \nu \circ \nu s \, \pi a \, \theta \eta \iota \kappa o \, s \) can conform to the pure thought of the \( \nu \circ \nu s \, \pi o \, \nu t \iota \kappa o \, s \) (ib.) is very questionable.

50 Fragment VI in Barbotin, op. cit. p. 258. 'Absurde' is Barbotin's translation.

51 Fragment XIII, ib. p. 272.

52 'La Théorie de l'Intellect d'après Aristote et ses Commentateurs', Paris 1953 p. 41.

53 op. cit. p. 104.

54 op. cit. p. 214.

55 op. cit. p. 236

56 'L'Unité ...' p. 359.

57 i.e. the aberrant structure of de Anima III discussed above, p. 18 ff. and the Parva Naturalia structures below, p. 39 ff.

58 'L'Unité ... ' p. 365.

59 These relationships are discussed below in chapter 4, pp. 186 ff.

It should be possible to distinguish between \(\text{\(\upsilon\)\(\alpha\)\(\upsilon\)\(\sigma\)\(\omega\)\(\nu\)}\) in its human embodiments which needs to make all things, and \(\text{\(\upsilon\)\(\alpha\)\(\upsilon\)\(\sigma\)\(\omega\)\(\nu\)}\) in its separate existence where the need to create \(\text{\(\upsilon\)\(\alpha\)\(\nu\)\(\eta\)\(\tau\)\(\alpha\)}\) presumably does not exist. But the content of the separate divine \(\text{\(\upsilon\)\(\alpha\)\(\upsilon\)\(\sigma\)\(\omega\)\(\nu\)}\) is not clear: even in the Metaphysics account there is room for a divergence of views. The \(\text{\(\upsilon\)\(\alpha\)\(\nu\)\(\eta\)\(\tau\)\(\alpha\)}\) already exist and attract the desire of embodied \(\text{\(\upsilon\)\(\alpha\)\(\upsilon\)\(\sigma\)\(\omega\)\(\nu\)}\). Whilst the ultimate principle — \(\text{\(\upsilon\)\(\alpha\)\(\nu\)\(\theta\)\(\sigma\)\(\varepsilon\)\(\upsilon\)\(\upsilon\)\(\sigma\)\(\omega\)\(\nu\)}\) (1074 b 34-35) — is normally taken as a divine thinking, intent on nothing but itself, the identification of \(\text{\(\upsilon\)\(\alpha\)\(\nu\)\(\eta\)\(\tau\)\(\alpha\)}\) with \(\text{\(\upsilon\)\(\alpha\)\(\upsilon\)\(\sigma\)\(\omega\)\(\nu\)}\) (\(\upsilon\)\(\alpha\)\(\nu\)\(\sigma\)\(\iota\)\(\tau\)\(\iota\)\(\nu\)\(\rho\)\(\omega\)\(\nu\)\(\pi\)\(\alpha\)) 1075 a 4-5) could allow the complete incorporation of all intelligibles into the divine, which Albinus made. (Though it should be noted that Plotinus later made this incorporation as a critique of \(\text{\(\upsilon\)\(\alpha\)\(\upsilon\)\(\sigma\)\(\omega\)\(\nu\)}\)’s self-thinking. cf. Ennead V.1.9 where he proposed that Aristotle ought to have extended the noetic cosmos to embrace the lower movers and indeed everything; also ib. 5.2: the \(\text{\(\upsilon\)\(\alpha\)\(\nu\)\(\eta\)\(\tau\)\(\alpha\)}\) must not be sought for outside \(\text{\(\upsilon\)\(\alpha\)\(\upsilon\)\(\sigma\)\(\omega\)\(\nu\)}\).) The content of the divine \(\text{\(\upsilon\)\(\alpha\)\(\upsilon\)\(\sigma\)\(\omega\)\(\nu\)}\) in de Anima III is less easy to discern. As making all intelligibles, how would it not know them? Yet, "when isolated it is its true self and nothing more", without memory (430 a 22-24). Plotinus’s conception that in contemplating the One and itself, \(\text{\(\upsilon\)\(\alpha\)\(\upsilon\)\(\sigma\)\(\omega\)\(\nu\)}\) produced the \(\text{\(\upsilon\)\(\alpha\)\(\nu\)\(\eta\)\(\tau\)\(\alpha\)}\) by a kind of overflowing is a formula of reconciliation of self-thinking with the creation of intelligibles, yet the timeless union of \(\text{\(\upsilon\)\(\alpha\)\(\upsilon\)\(\sigma\)\(\omega\)\(\nu\)}\) with \(\text{\(\upsilon\)\(\alpha\)\(\nu\)\(\eta\)\(\tau\)\(\alpha\)}\) keeps the thought within Aristotelian orthodoxy. (cf. p. 154 n. 56).


64 cf. above p. 19.

65 430 a 2-5. Again Ross’s commentary has no reference to the question of self-knowledge.

66 III 8. 432 a 1-3.

67 1072 b 20-23. In his notes on lines 18-21 and 18 Ross regards this thinking as being ‘of the divine \(\text{\(\upsilon\)\(\alpha\)\(\upsilon\)\(\sigma\)\(\omega\)\(\nu\)}\) itself’ only: Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Oxford 1924 II p. 379.

68 1072 b. 23.
Footnotes to Ch. 1 - continued -

and n, 23.

69 cf. supra p. 19. The texts are here listed after the de Anima in such a way that if this arrangement were taken as chronological it would agree with the line of reasoning of I. Block in his 'Order of Aristotle's Psychological Writings' for the priority of the de Anima against Ross and Nuyens (American Journal of Philology, 1961, Vol. 82, p. 50 ff). And the text from the Ethics has been added as a culmination. (Though the aberrant structure in the de Anima adds complications which would have to be faced in a study of chronology based on the conception of the emergence of a teaching into clarity and into a systematic form.) He makes his case from a principle of supposed progressivity, and a common sense inspection of the texts. But that Aristotle did have a 'regression' in his thinking is often supposed: e.g. to his earlier Platonism (by Hamelin throughout 'La Théorie ...') and to an earlier scepticism about the immortality of the soul in his middle years (by Gauthier, 'Introduction ...' p. 49).


71 426 b. 23.

72 448 a 26-30.

73 Time in Aristotle is not purely 'the number of motion' (δρομὸς κίνησιν: de Coelo I 279 a 15), nor can it be completely accounted for by the fact that we explain time and uniform motion by each other. (Physics IV 220 b 22-24). According to A. J. Festugiére, the Physics makes a distinction between the before- and afterness of time and time itself, and makes the numberability of bodies moving in time depend on the existence of a numberer ('Le Temps de l'Âme selon Aristote', in Études de Philosophie Grecque, Paris 1971, p. 205. This formally appeared in the Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, 1934, Part I).

A text of Physics IV would justify him in thus making a distinction between physical and psychic time: 'if nothing can count except consciousness (ψυχή), and consciousness only as intellect (not as sensation merely), it is impossible that time should exist if consciousness did not' (223 a 25-27). According to Aristotle, all experience under the 'first heaven' must involve place, void and time (de Coelo I 279 a 11-12), and if that is related to the fact that the whole of nature so constituted moves with the desire of God and mind tries to relate itself to all nature in order to know it and also to number it, it is possible to see that time for Aristotle involved a 'distension of the soul'. The idea of Augustine, deriving from Plotinus's
Footnotes to Ch. 1 - continued -

73 cont'd:
conception of ψυχή's government of the material world, may, in turn go back to Aristotle. The duration of time is thus exposed as the element in which human activity must take place. J. M. Dubois ('Le Temps et l'Instant selon Aristote', Paris 1967) more lengthily expounds a thesis near to that of Festugière: '(Aristotle's idea) puts the concept of time between movement and the soul, the balance is delicate' (p.8). The effort of R. Jordan to convert Bertrand Russell's view that Augustine's conception of time was subjective and solipsistic would more profitably have drawn from Aristotle than opposed him. (v. 'Time and Contingency' in St. Augustine', in Review of Metaphysics, 8, 1955 p. 414).

74 449 a 16-20.
75 'L'Uniété ...' pp. 361-2.
76 455 a 15-20.
77 1170 a 29 - b 11.
80 'L'Uniété ...' pp. 365, 378. For the 'sensus interior' v. de Libero Arbitrio II 3.8: 'ad quem ab ipsis quinque notissimis cuncta referantur'. As a parallel for self-awareness Mondolfo gives de Civitate Dei XI 26: 'nam et sumus et nos esse novimus, et nostrum esse novimus, et nostrum esse ac nosse diligimus'. Better texts would have been 'se sentire sentiret' (de Libero Arbitrio II 4.10) for sense knowledge, and 'notitia qua se mens novit, si esse desinat, simul et illa nosse (aliorum) desinat' (de Trinitate IX. 4.6) for intellectual knowledge. It is in terms of this last statement concerning intellectual knowledge that the mediation of Aristotelian ideas via neo-Platonists to Augustine is most evident.

81 de Anima III 5 430 a 23.
82 Known to him as found in St. Paul as well as in Plotinus. but also see below pp. 188, 198 (Ch.4) on this psychology.
84 736 b 5-8; it is considered a late work.
CHAPTER 2
CHAPTER 2
From Aristotle to Saint Augustine

'Aristoteles Redivivus'

The fate of the manuscripts of the Aristotelian corpus is a cautionary story for anyone who presupposes that there is an inevitable development in philosophic reflection as it proceeds so to speak by contagion from mind to mind. A few remained in circulation - the published exoteric Aristotle - but with the possible exception of the Protrepticus these were dialogues which were Plato-like in style and content; they all taught the necessity of a philosophic contemplation in the Platonic sense. Perhaps notes taken privately at the lectures of the later more specialised non-Platonist teaching were also in circulation. At any rate there was sufficient information to compile lists of these works, but from secondary sources, not the manuscripts themselves. The manuscripts of these students' notes as well as authentic texts, which had been incorporated into the library of his successor Theophrastus, were hidden in a cave at Skepsis until the beginning of the first century B.C. Two motives seem to be behind this extraordinary deed. Firstly there was a genuine fear that the kings of Pergamon might seize them for their library. Secondly later Peripatetics seems to have ignored or even attacked Aristotle, and it was felt that "the difficult treatises of the Stagirite did not correspond with the new preoccupations". They were then bought up and rather
inexpertly repaired by Apellicon a wealthy bibliophil, to be sent after his death to Rome by Sulla as part of the booty of his Greek campaign in 84 B.C. There they were seen by the scholar Tyrannion (who was interested in proving that Latin was derived from a Greek dialect), and his friend Cicero — able in the last year or two of his life to devote himself to philosophy, but who seems to have derived little profit from his reading. Subsequently they were edited and published by Andronicus of Rhodes.

Besides Aristotelian ideas which came to him in Stoic sources Cicero had already encountered the exoteric Aristotle, and in his Hortensius had drawn on the ideas about God and the place of philosophic contemplation which he had found in the Protrepticus this was later to influence Augustine so much. When he first read the Hortensius Augustine was able to set on one side the sceptical parts of this dialogue — as also when he returned to it at the time of his conversion and again when he turned to it later in life. Probably he did not realise that the depth and simplicity of the conception of the life of the search for wisdom which moved him so deeply derived from Aristotle. Communication of insight is far more important than familiarity with the words of a text of an established author.

Cicero's identification of Peripatetics with Academics (which bears all the marks of hasty reading and incomplete understanding) may be the basis of Augustine's statements in de Civitate Dei VIII that Aristotle was a disciple of Plato, and that 'the most notable philosophers
of recent times have rejected the title of 'Peripatetics' or 'Academics', and have elected to be called 'Platonists'. Yet with Cicero's interest begins not only the introduction of Aristotle into the Roman world, but the re-introduction of Aristotle back into the Greek world from which it came.

The period of time of its disappearance from sight, and the development of philosophical reflection during this period into scepticism or systematisation must have presented the reading public with an immense task of familiarisation and assimilation. The rich subtlety of analysis of the wide ranging subject matter of Aristotle was far from the mentality of the later Peripatetics. And what happened then was what so often happens in movements of thought. In many cases perhaps not the immediate followers, but the generations after them, who are not in personal contact with the founder, see in his thought an inheritance, an achievement, of course, but also an object to reduce to its simplest forms and from which to remove anomalies and discrepancies. And so the immense task of commentary and analysis began. Whilst the richness of Aristotelian analysis was unavailable (through incomprehension, lack of interest and the hiding of the manuscripts), and the followers of Plato, concentrating their attention on the negative aspects of Socratic dialectic, drifted into scepticism, the Stoic philosophical school developed: more systematic and less stylistically adorned, and more practically orientated than the other schools. The Roman urge to codify had rechannelled Stoicism further in the direction of simplification, and so Roman Stoicism provided
a style according to which all philosophies were to be subjected. Romanitas put a special insistence on that reduction to simple principles which is the mark of an efficient teacher, and of which the doxographies which Festugière has noted in Cicero himself were the most polished examples, though they were not always very elucidating. 7

Developments of Aristotle’s philosophy through later commentators meant the selection of significant parts, their reduction to simple principles and the abolition of supposed anomalies. The passing of some of its conceptions into Stoicism involved their simplification and preparation for systematisation. In Roman hands the need to re-interpret Aristotle coincided with the appearance of an intention to set about a vast task of hermeneutical transposition of Greek philosophical writers, with the aim of ultimate independence and further development in Cicero, and of philological independence from Greece in Varro. 8

It must not be overlooked that all of his life Cicero had been familiar not only with Stoic and Epicurean writers but with Plato and his known translations of the dialogues span his whole life. 9 His brief acquaintance with the esoteric Aristotle needs to be understood with that background. He was convinced of the potential superiority of Roman speculation even in Philosophy: “not that philosophy could not be learnt from Greek writers and teachers, but that it has always been my conviction that our countrymen have shown more wisdom everywhere than the Greeks, either in making discoveries for themselves, or else in improving upon what they have
received from Greece". It would then be possible to give the Romans a philosophical literature which would take the place of the Greek philosophy: "For this reason I encourage all, who have the capacity, to wrest from the now failing grasp of Greece the renown won from this field of study and transfer it to this city. Once these studies are transferred to ourselves, we shall have no need even of Greek libraries, to which there is an endless number of books due to the crowd of writers; for the same things are said by many since the day they crammed the world with books".

It was not translation alone which was intended by the Romans but rather re-embodiment of the ideas of Greek philosophy which would take place through Roman scholars reducing systematically the Greek variety, subtlety and inconsistency to dependable concepts in a language which had taken the measure of its own potentialities. In the conscious intention of re-embodying the thought lay the unconscious presumption that the thought could be so re-embodied, and then developed. The hermeneutical significance of this intended seizure was not a completely conscious one because the Romans had not measured the values of their culture by an external standard. More sensitive modern criticism makes it clear that this enterprise was not one merely of vulgarisation and simplification, and the conclusions of R. Poncelet suggest how the simplifications imposed on the rich philosophical material in its translation into Latin "with the linguistic resources (moyens) which were equivalent to every human consciousness in its infancy" caused it to "exaggerate its own
defects" as it hoisted itself up to the demands of philosophy. The result was that the Latin language became, not unlike Greek, only the form of ideas, but a form within which was the possibility of a rich intellectual experience. "The originality of the Latin mould lies in the fact that it does not give the reader the content of the ideas, but provides him with an outline of the developments which will help him to reconstruct it (des mouvements utiles à la reconstruction de l'idée). The reader of a Latin text is never the passive link in a chain; he is forced into cooperating creatively with the author. The distinctions (discriminations) of Greek, on the other hand convey within themselves the meaning; it is a wonderful language for the passing on of a science, but does not necessarily communicate the spirit" (l'esprit). 13

After five centuries this process reached the term which Cicero and Varro had intended, but by no means in the way in which they had foreseen. The Latin speech and literature gradually prevailed against the predominant Greek. Augustine's lack of Greek is taken as significant of the decline of Greek letters in the West. 14 Not due to an absolute decline in culture before the barbarian invasions at least, its place was taken by Latin translations from Greek, the classical Roman literature and increasingly by Latin Christian writers. Despite the set-back of the invasions amidst which he died the achievement of Augustine of having established a vocabulary and system of ideas was the real beginning of a Latin theological-philosophical culture.
He, his near contemporary Saint Leo, the later Saint Gregory (who depended so much on him), to a lesser extent his own contemporary Saint Jerome - the four Latin Fathers - and a host of lesser writers gave the distinct character of Romanitas the importance which Cicero and Varro had tried to create for it: 15 a quality of mind expressed through a language, prepared for by commentators on Greek philosophy and polished by the rhetor-jurist mentality and a style of education. 16 Yet this lapidary quality, this profound terseness, aptly suited the function of passing the theological conceptions of Christian belief and thought to the west which by then equated 'Romanitas' with 'Catholica'.

Aristotle as known to the age of Augustine

The esoteric Aristotle passed on to the age of Augustine - or rather the Aristotle passed on with recognisable identity, not involved in eclectic combinations, would have been principally the author of the logical treatises, "Scarcely any mention is found of the other treatises or other parts of his teaching." 17 Whilst Plato remained in favour, Aristotle was held in disfavour in east and west for teachings which seemed impious (particularly his exclusion of providence from the sublunary world, for his disbelief in personal immortality, and for proposing a conception of ethics which was too worldly) 18, as also for being the author of excessively verbose dialectic, useless from the point of view of the Christian religion or at least suspect by reason of his use
by Arians. He would have been known through commentators, friendly and otherwise, who (in the west) translated him and interpreted him in terms of a coherent hermeneutical tradition. A rare reference to Aristotle in Augustine witnesses to this: "whoever thought ... that the obscure and recondite works of Aristotle should be explained by one who was his enemy?" Though Augustine was prepared to be critical of an intemperate valuation of dialectic, as a former rhetor he was only prepared to accept it even as a method in exegesis.

Are we in a position to say how much of Aristotle would have been known to Augustine? The best-known of the modern historical works are short, even laconic, about it. Marrou thinks only of the Categories, known through the translation and Commentary of Victorinus and possibly the (spurious) de Mundo, and Courcelle has substantially the same view. One could suppose that he had information at one remove through doxographies of Cicero and others including Varro's Liber de Philosophia, now unfortunately lost. While Hadot is prepared to consider that he may have seen a version of Porphyry's commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, the possibility that he knew Porphyry's commentary on Metaphysics does not seem to have been proposed.

The quality of the research of Marrou and Courcelle is not difficult to characterise. In its intention to avoid extravagant and fantastic interpretations it insists on establishing unquestionable connections: direct quotations, references to the author by name are the desiderata of this
The labour of this kind of scholarship is commendable, but is subject to certain defects.

a) The reconstruction of a relationship between two people by means of a meticulous study and the acceptance only of undoubted referential links is removed from the philosophical creative process in which the later writer, even in his conscious and semi-conscious dependence on another, probably only gives a bare minimum of references. Scholarly skill may itself harm the sympathy for its own subject matter.

b) The later thinker has almost certainly more insight into the earlier thinker than the limited range of the historical scholar can detect. Here good scholarship may set speculative thought at a discount in the cause of objectivity. But equally necessary to objectivity is a sense for continuity in the interior discipline of the subject matter, when that itself is in any sense intellectual, and with that sense must go an awareness of any transformations. In the subject matter of this thesis we have some Aristotelian ideas coming to Augustine linked with Cicero's and others as part of neo-Platonism. In both ways Aristotelian conceptions came to him not merely as elements of a doxography but as helpful analyses to a very perceptive mind of what thinking is in itself and how self-thinking is related to it.

c) In an understandable wish to make itself more interesting than its self-imposed canons would permit within the subject matter, literal scholarship may resort to oversimplifications of conclusions, and seek to finalise itself in exaggerated contrasts. Thus a philosophy is reduced not to its essential insight as understood by a sympathetic insight, but to an interplay of contrasts, so to be made comprehensible to simpler mentalities at
the expense of veracity.

d) An investigation such as this - to establish a link between Aristotle and Augustine, which is dismissed by established historical scholars in five or six lines and a footnote - ought to be an enormous one even on its own presumptive axioms. Once the initial resemblances have been made clear and a plausible linkage between them proposed the possible mediating authors between the two turn out to be so numerous that the conventional scholarly task of interrelating the texts has made only a beginning; and it would probably never be completed in the way in which the current work is orientated. There is no certainty that the seeming discovery of a 'source' of an idea will not later be preempted by its discovery in an earlier one.

In point of fact there have been other scholars reflecting on the relationship between Aristotle and Augustine. Their works do not appear in the bibliographies of the modern French historical scholars, not only because they are mainly German and from a previous generation but also because they are more speculative philosophers than historians of philosophy. The proposals they put forward may be unhistorical in the sense that they are made mostly regardless of the historical distance, but the absence of an historical point of fixation is a necessity for an awareness of the continuity or discontinuity in the speculative themes which are the most important of philosophical subjects.

Among these scholars there are those who insist on the wide divergence between Aristotle and Augustine, and those
who insist on a similarity if broken continuity, between them. Amongst these the former have been the better known and more widely accepted; the historical and religious difference between them seems so great and the negative conclusions of the historical literary approach seems to support them. But the other view, which has never been widely discussed, is worthy of serious examination. While it concedes the lack of certifiable references in the texts it does draw attention to the neo-Platonist themes in Augustine's thought, and is conscious of the Aristotelian element in neo-Platonism. The former stems from the conception of 'Aristotle, the empiricist', to whom Augustine was supposed to be, as the advocate of 'innerness', the opposite. The latter has more sympathy for a conception of 'Augustine, the eclectic' than the other, which wishes to look on him as a kind of innovator: 'Augustine, the first modern man!' Certainly, the latter view has more to commend it in that the thinkers whom he mentions with particular respect were all themselves eclectics - Antiochus of Ascalon, Cicero, Varro, Plotinus, Porphyry. Those for an Aristotelian link tend to look at certain details in common; those against it look at a supposed difference in outlook as exemplified in certain texts. But it is not impossible that Augustine could take an idea which occurs in Aristotle and give it a richness of content which was not in the original, or could call into question a development of an originally Aristotelian idea which had taken place after him? And is not such caution most necessary in the speculative questions about subjectivity where their
presence in Aristotle has been so forgotten on the assumption that he is above all an empiricist? In other words, literary scholarship cannot be allowed to canonise its own standards as the only ones, particularly when that form-like quality of Latin words is remembered, and how, in consequence a simple expression may be filled out by a sensitive writer with allusiveness, and passed on to a sensitive reader. 29 A complete objectivity is gained when the textual links are seen in terms of the hermeneutical changes to Aristotelian themes that undoubtedly occurred.

Augustine as the antitype to Aristotle: a bibliographical review

Probably the view of Augustine as the antitype to Aristotle has a long back history, which must include the conflict in the scholastic period between Thomist-Aristotelian realists and Augustinian illuminists, but it is convenient to look at modern work beginning with that of H. Siebeck. In his "Geschichte der Psychologie", he drew out some conclusions from Augustine's de Trinitate IX 33:

"As the mind itself, therefore, gathers the knowledge of corporeal things through the bodily senses, so it gains the knowledge of incorporeal things through itself." 30

He interprets this as meaning that

"the soul has a direct knowledge of itself because in the condition of self-knowledge it is the nearest object of knowledge to itself. Through this it is also possible to know what becomes an object to it through its own activity."
He thinks it was a mark of superior insight on Augustine's part to have understood that self-knowledge comes before the knowledge of objects. Basing himself on the passage from Nicomachean Ethics IX.9, on self-consciousness, which has been examined in chapter one, he finds Aristotle not so profound in so far as he makes the activity of self-thinking depend on object thinking, "remaining concealed under the activity of the active and passive intellect", and treats sense objects in the same way as intelligible ones. He made here the mistake of assuming that all the other accounts of subjectivity in Aristotle were in accord with this one, and he is conspicuously unaware that Aristotle's transcendent structures of subjectivity merge object-thinking into self-thinking. He did not realise that the priority of self-thinking in Augustine is the consequence of accepting, in addition to the structure of the Nicomachean Ethics, characteristic for men which derive from these transcendent structures.

In a later article Siebeck developed a full-scale opposition between Augustine as an example of 'spiritual reaction' and Aristotle as an example of 'naturalism'. Always making the case that Augustine turned his attention inwards, thus making a true psychology possible, he makes the following comparison:

"The inner world of soul comes to be recognised and valued (by Aristotle) only in so far as it is activated through intercourse with the outer world and to the extent to which it appears determined with relationship to this involvement. The complete and exclusive problem with Aristotle is the scientific grasp and organisation of the external world of nature and social life. Augustine has the diametrically opposed frame of mind and orientation. For him the outer world only has meaning and value to
the extent that it appears to reflect the inner world. The problem with him is not nature, the state, secular ethics, but those of the most inner needs of the mind and heart, of charity and faith, and of hope and conscience take predominance over all. Not the relationship between inner and outer but that of inner to innermost ... 

In so far as this judgement depends on the structure of Nicomachean Ethics IX. 9 it fails to take account of the other structures with their conception of pure thinking — whose innerness, as passed on by neo-Platonist writers, was to be of such significance to Augustine himself. It also is unaware of Aristotle's exoteric themes of philosophic contemplation, passed on to Augustine through Cicero. And in so far as it may allude to the structure of de Anima III.4 (that mind is able to think itself when it has thought up other intelligible objects) it would be a fundamental misunderstanding, because the thinking objects which are then the occasion of its own self-knowledge are not external and part of the sensible world, but intelligible and created by itself: of a status for which inner is a usual metaphor.

This article was lengthily quoted and given the highest approval by A. Harnack, thus ensuring that its conclusions achieved the widest possible circulation. He wrote of "the process which leads out of the naive objective to the subjective objective ... making the inner life the starting point of thinking about the world ... the opposite picture to Aristotle's", and that Augustine "did away with all that we take to belong to the ancient classical spirit, the classical life and way of looking at the world". It is true that Augustine the Christian was opposed to the way of life of the
pagan world, but as a thinker he undertook the task of deliberately assimilating all he could of the most tradition-conscious sect of classical philosophy: neo-Platonism. And if there is some truth in the statement that "Aristotle and Augustine are both rivals who contend with each other in the learning and mentality of the following centuries" 37, it was because their followers did not perceive what they had in common.

The supposed opposition between Augustine and Aristotle, expressed with the clarity of Siebeck and the power of Harnack, and their joint conclusion, will presently be seen to be historically unwarranted. Siebeck was a scholar, deeply read in Augustine and the scholastics. But like many others he had failed to grasp the wide range of Aristotle's interests; he gave them the conventional characterisation of empirical; he had neither been aware of the diversity of Aristotelian subjectivity structures nor attentive to the importance of his speculation on the problems of mind. Thus has the picture of the formerly esoteric, now exoteric, Aristotle of modern times become the exact opposite of the exoteric Aristotle of classical times, with his search for wisdom and beatitude! Harnack felt that Siebeck's findings could be trusted because they coincided with his own religious pre-conceptions. The heightening of a comparison could be described by the unwary as 'speculative'; 38 but it is almost entirely rhetoric.

The repercussions of the Siebeck article still go on. J.M. le Blond quotes the section above in support of a frankly empty statement about Augustine:
"for Physics he shows a certain disdain";

and he comments

"on this point Siebeck very justly opposes Aristotle to Augustine" (though Siebeck is not concerned here with natural sciences). Again referring to Siebeck's article J. Guittion stops short at the problem of why Aristotle uses the vocabulary of cosmology to describe the soul, and, oblivious of the activity of υούς (which is by Aristotle's own definition 'separate' from this world), he asserts that it shows that for him the soul was only a part of nature.

"Psychology, in the way that Aristotle established the model for centuries, is an impersonal psychology which studies the soul as a thing. Above everything else it likes to distinguish between parts and functions. Just like logic, it is based on its idea of a hierarchy and the interlocking of genera. In such a condition how can it have any inclination to describe the intimate life of souls? The soul is a part of nature as man is a part of the city; it is made to reflect the external reality just like a mirror. And that is why the psychology of Aristotle is at its best in the analyses of the two opposed states in which the soul coincides with nature and is absorbed in it: sensations and intellect. The whole area between where the intelligence is developed, where the will is produced and where we are really ourselves only has meaning in relation to these moments of purity. Thus understood psychology is an appendix to cosmology."

Exception could be taken to every idea in this extract as doing injustice to Aristotle's real thoughts. What is extraordinary is that the books quoted from both authors are studies on the relationship between Augustine and neo-Platonism. They ought to have seen that the innerness of
Aristotle's conception of thinking and self-knowledge, albeit hermeneutically transformed, became part of the neo-Platonist system which Augustine accepted in a modified way.

It is not difficult to demonstrate that Aristotle had made a far greater analysis of innerness than Siebeck's categorisations would allow for. There is a very probing inner reflection evident in his arrival at the positions taken up about self-knowing without an intermediary which can be described as the heart of his teaching on epistemology, as also in his subtle and sensitive awareness that self-consciousness accompanies every conscious act in general, and even every sensation in man and animals. But to spread one's attention wider in Aristotle's writings numerous examples can be found to show his analytical competence over inner processes of mind. Thus, there is the subjectivity felt difference between true possession of knowledge and a superficial grasp of it, with a description of how knowledge roots itself in a soul to make a man an expert.

From the Nicomachean Ethics there is the analysis of 'state of character', the nature of the human act, the variety of virtues, the qualities of different intellectual dispositions, the subjective assessment of pleasures and pains, his very deliberate decision not to break up the unity of desire across the different faculties, and in general his appreciation of human character as being formed by the successful or unsuccessful association of cognition and desire, together with the reasons for this success or lack of success.
There is also the innerness in the analysis of memory, and especially the process of reminiscence, in the de Memoria et Reminiscentia. There is certainly sufficient in quantity in Aristotle to make point by point examination of the topics of innerness as raised by Augustine: in fact the possibility exists for a comparison and interrelationship between the two both with or without the hermeneutic twist which had changed the look of Aristotle since his esoterica had left the cave at Skepsis. In the case of the latter we should find a contrast between the simplification and desire for comprehension - the Romanitas of Augustine - far removed from variety which came about from Aristotle's rejection of the position of Plato, in which all problems were supposedly soluble by the application of the distinction between the real world of ideas and the unreal world of sense, and his deliberate tolerance of the resolution of all problems back into the stage of problematic. Yet with the reworked Aristotle, hermeneutically transformed through Roman doxographers and Greek eclectics - especially neo-Platonists, the variety had been brought into one order, and one not too far removed from Augustine's own. Yet the position in Augustine seems to involve a rejection of this later neo-Platonist systematisation with an innerness that was in part transcendent and a return to a conception which did not over-develop what was also found in Aristotle: the structures of the Parva Naturalia, Nicomachean Ethics and de Anima/2, 4 and 7 in which the individual is unmistakably self-master and self-complete,
even though it retained the conception of mind's self-immediacy as found in the transcendent structures.

The current to which Siebeck and Harnack belonged is one which believed that the classical world was essentially concerned with objectivity, not with subjectivity. Mondolfo's long study, undertaken to refute this frequently encountered presumption, \(^5^1\) has proposed what is likely in most general terms, that the current arises with Hegel. But in this particular case Hegel's opinion is worth quoting, for he had a great insight into the speculative problems which Aristotle considered. Commenting on *de Anima* III. 4 he wrote with more discernment than Siebeck and those impressed by his rhetorical contrast: "the self-conscious understanding is not merely implicit, but essentially explicit, since it is within itself all things. That is an idealistic way of expressing it; and yet they say that Aristotle was an empiricist." \(^5^2\)

Augustine as the Continuator of Aristotle: a further bibliographical review

We turn now to the approach which is prepared to see a likeness between them based on a far wider, if indirect, knowledge of Aristotle by Augustine. N. Kaufman collected together some of the writings which explored this approach in the last century; \(^5^3\) they are mainly brief allusions in longer studies. In three cases the results are disappointing, but in the *fourth* (Willman) there is much matter for reflection. The interpretation is first
noted in J. P. Nourrisson, in a book published in Paris in 1865. \(^{54}\)

After giving a rather lengthy account of the place of Plato's thinking in Augustine's thought, he proposed a list of nine points where Augustine may have "borrowed, if not completely, at least in part". These were "his conceptions on the differences between things"; his "celebrated theory of form and matter"; his views on eternity and time - in addition to those of Plato; "his definition of the soul even though he combats Aristotle whom he thought, wrongly, to have defined the soul as a fifth essence"; his theory on the "évolutions" (sic) of the soul: seminal life, sensible life, intellectual life; "his theory of knowledge, the internal or sixth sense, proper and common sense objects, the memory, imagination and reminiscence"; "the idea of a wisdom, a light superior to the soul, and the necessary faculty which develops in it"; "some of the most lofty maxims on behaviour"; his teaching on the sociability of man and "a number of most apt expressions about the constitution of societies".

E. Commer used Nourrisson's book and referred readers to it for further guidance (which it hardly provided), and he declared, "(Augustine's) theory of knowledge is essentially Aristotelian". \(^{55}\) C. Baeumker has only two allusions to Augustine's views on matter, but was aware of Plotinus's syncretism of Plato and Aristotle. \(^{56}\)

But with O. Willman we get a much more knowledgeable proposal of the relationship. \(^{57}\) He found far wider Aristotelian elements, mediated principally through neo-Platonists and later Peripatetics. He saw points of contact
in Augustine's Trinitarian theory in which according to de Civitate Dei XI.25 (though not de Trinitate) the division of sciences into physica - logica - ethica, based on the triad of being - knowing - willing, corresponded to Aristotle's division. He saw the analogy between Aristotle's statement of the need of faith before coming by knowledge from a teacher and Augustine's of the need of faith to come by knowledge of God. He also saw points of contact in a relationship between mystical knowledge in Augustine and Aristotle's teaching on the active intellect, the relation of the body to the soul, and the making of happiness as the end of life. It was altogether a collection of most perceptive suggestions. Even when the propositions were hesitantly made it is clear that the writer had an intimate sense of the nature of the speculative question and was disposed to see signs of continuity through neo-Platonism to Augustine, in the way this dissertation takes.

The research into the connection between Aristotle and Augustine continued.

In a modest dissertation written at Strasbourg in 1912, a Welsh non-conformist minister, J.H. Parry, supposed there to be a link between Aristotle and Augustine through Stoics and neo-Platonists which was evident in Augustine's treatment of the body-soul relationship and the existence of a 'common sense'. 58
M. Heidegger has revealed that he has attempted to bring Augustine's views on man into relationship with Aristotle's ontology, but he has not published the work to which he refers in a note to his "Sein und Zeit". He speaks of "his attempt to make an interpretation of Augustinian -- that is Graeco-Christian -- anthropology with relation to foundation principles which were reached in Aristotle's ontology". 59

The works of R. Schneider on the ontological similarities between Aristotle and Augustine have already been referred to. 60 The foreword to "Seele and Sein" reveals that he had seen two unpublished papers by Heidegger on the role of Aristotelian ontology for Augustine, 61 and presumably these embody the attempt to which he refers. But the positive qualities of this same modest, brief and unfortunately incomplete work make it of exceptional interest for this thesis. In a few short pages, uncluttered by references, Schneider lists and briefly comments on the sources of information about Aristotle which would have been available to Augustine: 62 contact with Stoic-Aristotelian popular philosophy while studying rhetoric at Carthage; contact with Stoic-Aristotelian popular philosophy through the Pelagians; 63 and the wider sources -- Cicero and neo-Platonism. Whereas previous writers had shown themselves hesitant in going further than identifying connections at a textual level, Schneider was aware of the way in which neo-Platonism had changed the Aristotelian conceptions which it had absorbed and mediated. But he does not say in the introductory section how it did this, only that
neo-Platonism was "dynamisch". And the book only completes the study of the ontology at the level of vegetative and sensitive life. One wishes that he had either started with or lived to complete the section of the intellect and so worked out in detail (what is intended in the first part of this thesis) the remarkable insight, that

"this consideration (of how much ontology Augustine had learnt from neo-Platonism) shows again how significantly Stoic-Aristotelian popular philosophy must have influenced Augustine. This impression made on him in his youth, so affected him that Augustine did not accept neo-Platonism without reservations but gave it from the beginning a modified form - basically because of the powerful philosophical influence he had had in his youth".

The theory has to be extended, for Augustine did not make at least his final criticisms of neo-Platonism from his store of memory, but from a deeper and more up to date knowledge of at least the Cicero texts, and perhaps others. More importantly, the scope of the book and its grasp of neo-Platonism do not seem to have taken in fully the scale of the hermeneutical twist which had already given Aristotle's conception of self-thinking a religious and total binding force to the whole neo-Platonic system. Nor does it take in the full significance of the philosophical eclecticism that both influenced Augustine through its exponents and was the model of the superior eclecticism in his lucid anti-neo-Platonist apologetic of the de Trinitate. But at least the
problem as grasped by Schneider is more in sympathy with the speculative content of the subject matter of Aristotle and Augustine than the scholarly literalism of Courcelle and Marrou.

Certainly the proposal that Augustine always remained a neo-Platonist tout court cannot stand when their writings are compared in detail, yet that Augustine may have contributed to this impression by using neo-Platonist idioms with an apologetic intent will be one of the themes of this thesis. But Augustine's subjectivity structure has features very much like the common-sense centred structure of Aristotle; his view of the memory has something in common with Aristotle's; the conception of time as a subjective medium of experience also has something in common. Through the examination of the subjectivity structure in Aristotle we can draw the two Aristotelian parts of Schneider's perceptive hypothesis into a closer relationship and justifiable contrast. It was in terms of the unequivocally individual-centred structure that Augustine criticised the transcendent structure of thought in itself. Whilst he himself had derived some valuable insights into the human mind from the legacy of νόησις νοησεως, without necessarily being aware of it he was applying himself to the reconciliation of the divided inheritance which Aristotle had bequeathed to philosophy. The issues involved and their consequences were greater than the busy bishop could have conceived, for in so far as such metaphors are meaningful, Aristotle, rather than Plato, was the real 'Father' of
idealism as well as of empiricism.

To demonstrate this paradoxical proposal — that the hermeneutically transformed Aristotelianism of the neo-Platonic synthesis was acceptable to Augustine only as modified in accordance with a position that has some similarities to the original Aristotle, we have to undertake two investigations: to examine the intervening period of philosophy; and to look even more closely at the hermeneutical transformation of the ideas.

Eclectic Philosophies between Aristotle and Augustine

The principal philosophies which were found in Greece in the third and second centuries B.C. were Academy-derived (early Platonist) scepticism, Stoicism (against which the scepticism was often directed) and Epicureanism. For the moment authentic Aristotelianism had disappeared. Particularly from the headship of the Academy of Antiochus of Ascalon (c. 132-20 — c. 68), who brought back a return to dogmatism of Plato, and who also thought that the consensus of men should produce the same philosophical wisdom, an eclectic development began which provided a further option, and in time the majority option. Neo-Platonism was a later eclecticism, but it was not the last.

The negative attitude to this eclecticism which E. Zeller took is now seen to be unjust. Firstly, because there was a conscientious attempt to reconcile the different teachings at the detailed level: not just an unsystematic
conflation of irreconcilables. The eclecticisms were selective with a reasoned justification of what was rejected, and the amount of intellectual effort involved in this must have been very considerable. Festugière constructs a link between scepticism and eclecticism which is not a consequence of intellectual exhaustion. According to him the process followed the course: doxographic reduction of philosophical themes forming a spiritual κοινή (who were not professional philosophers) — the reawakening of philosophical reflection in an "infinitely subtle critical approach which spared no doctrine" — the arising of an eclectic dogmatism. 

Secondly, and particularly in the later period, there emerged from eclecticism a source of communion in a self-conscious tradition of philosophy, and here H. Dorrie shows, in a very suggestive paper to which further reference will have to be made, a very explicit consciousness of this tradition in Porphyry.

Once the esoteric Aristotle was available it presented not an occasion of intellectual escapism but a difficult intellectual problem of how to bring it together with the newly redogmatised Platonism, with Stoicism, as also with the renewed Pythagoreanism which came forward in the same period.

To this Greek eclectic exchange should be added the Roman contribution to the debate from Cicero and Varro (who both had known Antiochus) and later that from Plutarch. Another stream which mingled with it came from Judaism through Philo. Then increasingly came the contribution from Christian thinkers: at first the Greek-speaking, but increasingly the Latins.
So the philosophical eclecticism did not prevent the continuance of very lively discussion; the search for a complete system of thought in fact stimulated it. Converst like Marius Victorinus and Augustine enthusiastically entered into the controversy, which went on to embrace philosophical and Christian writings — both orthodox and heretical, arguing against the position they had abandoned with their religious conversion and offering their re-interpretation of their former neo-Platonism as a stepping-stone to belief in a heavenly revelation.

The eclectic philosophies had significant features in common. Usually they professed a virtual monotheism, into which a pagan pantheism was, not altogether unaltered, loosely fitted. Sometimes they saw the ultimate principle or group of ultimate principles as hierarchically triadic. Thus the neo-Pythagorean Numenius of Apamea of the 2nd century A.D., possibly using the authority of a very obscure passage in Plato's second letter, argues that there are three Gods:

"a first God who is in and through himself Spirit; he is pure activity of thinking (νοῦς) and source of being (όνος ἀρχή) and King (βασιλεύς), free from all labour. . . .

The second God is good through his participation in the first; he contemplates the suprasensible forms, acts on matter to bring about the world, since he is the principle of becoming. The world, the product of the demiurge, is the third God."
Po Merlan notes that Plotinus was accused of plagiarising Numenius. Merlan himself brings forward a passage from Ps.-Archytas, also a neo-Pythagorean, which shows that the syncretism at which the eclectic movement aimed did not only deal at the transcendent and remote level, but also the detailed and immediate.

"First, Ps.-Archytas introduces as two opposite principles matter, which he also calls ousia, and form (morphé). He proceeds to state that there must be, then, a third principle which is self-moved and will bring the two together, so that we have three principles. This third principle must be not merely intelligence, but something superior to intelligence — and it is obvious that which is superior to intelligence is precisely what we call God.

It is difficult to imagine a syncretistic passage in so small a compass. The two principles of form and matter are Aristotelian; to call the latter ousia is Stoic; to teach that form and matter must be brought together by another principle is Aristotelian again; to call this principle self-moved is Platonic; it is also Aristotelian ."

Merlan also shows that although he was familiar with (Plato's) two-opposite-principles theory Plutararch also expressed himself in the same triadic conception: "He obviously prefers to interpret Plato in terms of the triad 'artificer-ideas-matter'." Not too distant is a triadic conception of Philo whose cosmology was of a transcendent God with intermediary powers between himself and the world.

These passages all have in common the solution of a problem: how it is possible to relate ontologically opposite, or at least the most disparate, factors. The same problem
will be found later on in Augustine's assertion of the need of the "intentio" of the will to apply the cognitive faculty to its object, and also in complaissance in the object through love. Like the neo-Pythagoreans he saw the triadic principle present both at the transcendent divine level and at the level of the human mind. 78

Whenever it was accepted that there should be a union of dissimilars there was often an instinctive search for an intermediary third factor which brought them together. This is true of knowledge as of physics. True, no third factor was necessary in the analysis of intellectual knowledge in de Anima III as the \( \nu\eta \tau \omicron \upsilon \) was produced by \( \nu\omicron \upsilon \omicron \upsilon \) and was of an identical nature. But this was a special case: the object did not pre-exist for it. However there are examples of this instinctive triad-making in Aristotle. Hence the search for a "medium" (\( \nu\epsilon\tau\omicron\xi\omicron \upsilon \) : in the midst), in the case of sensation 79; and the sense powers bring opposites together. 80 For the wider division between contradictories, for example to say of something that it is at the same time white and non-white, Aristotle postulates the power of mind. 81 In Metaphysics \( \land \) the intelligible objects exist before they are thought, and Aristotle posited the intermediate force of desire. This proclivity to triadicity can express itself in the epistemological union of similaris. Thus in his commentary on the Timaeas, Chalcidius, while thinking that light from the eye meets light from an object in an act of vision, has to suppose a third element in which the two may come together: the light of the sun. 82 It is not surprising to discover the triadic positions of Numenius and
Archytas arising in a neo-Pythagorean context, with its doctrine of the One and the infinite Dyad, the consciousness of the width of the distinction between the greatest opposites. But the implicit need to think triadically in order to bind opposites together goes back to Plato's teaching on the One and the Other in the Parmenides, and original Pythagoreanism wherein the conscious was made up of the limited within the unlimited. The presence of this sense of deep diversity postulated some kind of unifier. Eclecticism would not allow any doubts in its desire for comprehensiveness and order: in those contexts which demanded it, it instinctively searched for triadicity — in physics and in epistemology, as we shall have occasion to see.

Another theme of eclectical philosophy was the search for a way by which nous might know the highest object which was possible for it. Here the contemplation of the Good as understood by Plato was relatable to Aristotle's teaching in the Nicomachean Ethics that contemplation was the highest and most divine activity. And in the period when only the exoteric Aristotle was known, his closeness to Plato in his teaching on the goal of philosophic contemplation had long been a locus for the unity of their teaching. Metaphysics gave a deeply reflected account of the nature of thought, unambiguously seen as present in the divine nature. de Anima III may have been ambiguous about the transcendent nature of thought as it described the creativity of the intellect in making its own objects. It did however propose that in
thinking there was such a union between them that the intellect thereby became its object. And as Aristotle said that the νοῦς was divine, there was every persuasion to ignore the problematic that existed and to conclude that Aristotle thought it to be divine in itself. Given time for collective reflection and systematic development, not only did this lead to the commentators like Alexander of Aphrodisias deciding to interpret Aristotle's teaching without qualification in the sense of the mortality of the individual soul and the immortality of the unchangeable intelligence in itself, but to integrate it with the personal striving and living for ecstasy, acknowledged in diverse but relatable ways by Philo, Plutarch and the Hermetic literature. Stoic doctrine had extolled the state of immovability — ἀπαθεῖα, and it could be improved on by supposing this state of fixity to be one of inward union with the divine. The world-soul in Plato's Timaeus could be given a similar place, related to νοῦς given an ambivalent one-in-many-ness, and a place found in it for the λόγοι ὀπέρματικοί of the Stoics as the principles of development of the world of movement and change. These in outline are the principal elements brought together by Plotinus into the eclectic unity known as neo-Platonism.

Merlan's account of this development contains a vast amount of information about the thinkers and a great amount about recently scholarly disagreements. But his method is wrongly conceived. In an attempt to simplify the story he proposed to demonstrate the joint
Platonic-Aristotelian quality of neo-Platonism by trying to show that Aristotle was a neo-Platonist — 500 years ahead of his time. He does this by demonstrating in great detail that a distinction of theoretical philosophy into theology, mathematics and physics and "an equation soul = mathematical" in Iamblichus and Proclus was originally to be found in Aristotle and attributed to Plato, and, in addition, that the neo-Platonist doctrine of not-being can be found in Aristotle. There is a presumption here typical of the kind of historical scholarship of which Merlan was so expert — that through the period of eclecticism there was no modification or development between Aristotle and the neo-Platonists: no hermeneutical twist; a literary and literal inheritance in which the thought-content suffered no modification. That is not to say that existence of this hermeneutical twist would have been apparent at the time. Historicism of a highly critical and sensitive kind alone would have been aware of this change. In point of fact Augustine found the philosophers whom he knew of too historically orientated: "Nor have these philosophers, who are better than others in their understanding of those sublime and eternal exemplars, gazed upon them; otherwise they would not, like historians, be investigating whatever past events of this same kind that they could". This historicism was not critical enough; in its energetic ransacking of the past for the sake of the present it did not reflect on what it was making available again, and what it was changing in re-presenting. But historicism alone
cannot prevent such a hermeneutical change from taking place. Not only is the effort of literal-historical research unlike the original creative process and thus produces a distinct genre of writing, but the degree to which themes get reflected on and developed is proportional to their power, not to their place in the whole.

Having in mind the same end as this thesis - the reception by Augustine of classical Greek thought - M. Grabmann briefly summed up the change which took place between Plato and Plotinus, which must not be overlooked in treating the relationship between Aristotle and Plotinus. He took a minimalist view of the possibility of Augustine's having read even Latin translations of Plato. 89

"Augustine would only have learnt these neo-Platonic versions of Plato's teaching on ideas; he would not have seen the actual texts in which Plato developed his theory. So it is understandable that he was not aware of the difference between Plato's teaching on ideas and his own". 90

The Characteristics of the hermeneutical transformation of Aristotelianism in Neo-Platonism

But our concern is principally with Aristotle. It will be as well to describe the features of the hermeneutical twist in so far as Plotinus, not by himself alone but as the product of an eclectical tradition of three centuries, had modified the Aristotelian elements which were incorporated into his thinking.
i) In Aristotle the teaching on contemplation was a part, even if it were the sublimest part, of the assemblage of wide-ranging topics which he treated. In Plotinus it is also the sublimest activity, but it is absolutely central and dominates everything else. For men it is the only worth-while activity. In Metaphysics the divine self-contemplative thought is distinct and self-contained; in de Anima III thought is ambiguously divine and timeless in itself but temporarily and individually embodied. Plotinus united these positions together in an unambiguous sense: a man must strive to unite his own thought into divine self-thinking and be absorbed into it. It is appropriate that he should seek for this union in ecstasy. Thus he should make himself conform with what is noblest in him. The divergence in nature between thought in itself and human thinking was thus made the basis of a moral orientation which ignored, out of a desire for consistency, all other human concerns thought to be natural by Aristotle. And just as the providence of the God of Aristotle did not extend to the sublunar world, so, correspondingly, the contemplative gaze of Gods and men was to be fixed on the One, quite oblivious to lower concerns.

ii) In the Nicomachean Ethics, as in the Enneads, the moral virtues are seen as a precondition for the activity of contemplation; but whilst for Aristotle the other virtues still remain important because of the human involvement in non-contemplative activity, with Plotinus their importance fades away in relationship to contemplation which is the only worth-while end for man.

iii) Thus, Plotinus unites the transcendent-immanent teaching on contemplation of the Metaphysics and the de Anima together with the teaching on the
iii) continued -
moral virtues derivable from the Nicomachean Ethics (but not representative of it.) Contemplation - in fact all thought - remains immanent in so far as it is 'within' but it is really a turning to something that is higher and transcendent: to νοῦς, which in its changelessness and full knowledge, is the beauty of ψυχή, and is "ours when we use it".

iv) As such it is a simplification and systematisation of Aristotle. The bringing together of the contemplation of the Good and other ideas from Plato, and the conception of the ideas as the thoughts of God (anticipated by Albinus) together with an extension of the Stoic virtue of ἀγαθός θεία, gave to the Aristotelian philosophy alongside this structuring a quality of immobility which derives from the search for unity and immobility in ecstasy. The original Aristotelian conception was of a philosophy of the variety of life. Plotinus may have expressed satisfactorily in their Aristotelian re-formulation the original Platonist values, but Aristotle was nearer to Plato than he in expressing the necessary variety of interests.

v) Plotinus gave the self-knowledge of νοῦς in Aristotle a striking development. The ability of νοῦς to know itself, the fact that in knowing its objects it would also be knowing itself, the characterisation of the divine as self-thinking thought: all these ideas are in Aristotle. But with him they are not rigorously thought out as the
v) continued -
realities that necessarily both embrace and support everything else. Plotinus made Aristotle's epistemology into an all embracing cosmology. But νοῦς is intermediary between two other members of a triad of ultimate hypostases: the One, derived from Pythagoras and Plato, and ψυχή derived from Plato. The One is usually said to be 'above knowing' but is described in one passage as having self awareness of a kind. ψυχή also is characterised by self-knowing.

Whilst νοῦς never fails from knowing itself transcendentally in the One, in its individual embodiments ψυχή is capable of an independent and false self-knowledge: it should be knowing itself in its contemplation of νοῦς. Thus an interconnected self-knowing is at the centre of the Plotinian conception, and this self-knowing is clearly looked upon as the basic reality and the basis for any other reality. But qua self-knowing it approximates to Aristotle's intermittent self-knowing at the human level and detached self-knowing at a transcendent level, even if a contextual change has made necessary a hermeneutical alteration of the original meanings.

vi) The material world, with its time and space, is generated from the imperfect, pluralising contemplation by ψυχή of νοῦς, which has some analogies with νοῦς's purer pluralising contemplation — the production by νοῦς of its many-in-oneness — of the One. ψυχή in turn presides over the material world, the lowest grade of reality, beyond which is non-being. Attraction to the One is therefore the
vi) continued -

bond which holds everything together from a dispersion which from some points of view comes from an overflow of creative power, but more fundamentally from an increasing cosmic fault.

vii) The resultant system was more religious in character than Aristotle's. The appetite for inclusion made a place for the pagan deities, "for Philosophers should defend the Gods", 94 who were 'generated' by the contemplation by νοῦς of the One. 95 There is an occasional enmythologisation — for example equating Zeus or Chronus with νοῦς 96 and Ouranos with the One. 97

In all there was in Plotinus

a) a consistent critique of Aristotle. This included a rejection of his conception of potential knowledge of any kind (all cognition was active, and the effect of the material world on ψυχή was seen in terms of a 'shock'), as also of his conception of the soul as ἐνεργεία. On the positive side there was the extension of his conception of self-thinking into the fundamental principle of all reality.

b) through the drawing out of the contemplative element in Aristotle's thought by its association with authentic Platonism, the original Aristotelian element was knowingly or unknowingly transformed. Perhaps the same words remained in use, but in Aristotle they were in the context of a busy and universal investigation of every
b) continued -

field of study; in Plotinus they were charged with religious meaning, their content to be deeply savoured in religious meditation.

Eclecticism had considered the original teachings comparable and relatable: had not Aristotle been a Platonist? Was there not even in his own work the beginnings of this unification in so far as he had treated the same matters as Plato - and offered a critique of him as operating on the same phenomena? And were there not existing works - such as Porphyry's - which brought Aristotle and Plato together? 98 Were not Stoicism and Aristotelianism able to cross-fertilise each other from the beginning, particularly in their teaching on virtue? A greater strength was found in eclectic combination, but also a changed content - agreed to by analysis and deliberate aggregation, not by compromise and indifference. In the effort of simplification we can see the work of the Greek commentators to set in order what particularly Aristotle had left in problematic disorder, as also the effort of Romanitas to express Greek philosophy to itself not only in its own language but also in its own spirit. 99

The eclectic contemplative philosophies, with their triple ultimate beings, and their doctrines of salvation, were the background against which Christian Trinitarianism entered the classical world, which contributed in turn to evoke from neo-Platonism a new triadic, and anti-Christian response. That the second of these beings was a middle
link between the higher, first principle and the world, and that there was a need for salvation — purification of some kind to reach the goal of beatitude — was a conception which disposed a man to understand the Christian teachings on Christ as the Logos, Wisdom, the mind-element of the Trinity, and also the reconciler of this world with the principle from which it came. Arianism was a premature attempt to bring the two conceptions together, but it meant — against the Christian Trinitarian conception — a hierarchical subordinationism within the ultimate triad. Converts from neo-Platonism — like Marius Victorinus and Augustine himself — were exercised to show the logical coherence of Christian Trinitarianism in terms of the neo-Platonist thought-world. It is possible that Plotinus — the fellow student with Origen of Ammonius Saccas, himself a lapsed Christian, "the Socrates of neo-Platonism" — had intended to construct a system with a code of behaviour which offered a substitute for Christianity, and through it an attack on it. This was the explicit intention of Porphyry, who had very likely been a Christian for a while himself.

Hermeneutically transformed Aristotelianism and Augustine

The hermeneutically developed Aristotelian conception of self-thinking alongside the Aristotelian-Platonist notions of beatitude and contemplation and the Platonist conception of gradations of reality — the results of the mutations by style of commentary and the spirit of Romanitas — were the objects to which Augustine applied his mind particularly when
he wrote his de Trinitate. The reflections on this area of philosophy which lie scattered through his other works are concentrated in this work which cost him so much effort and took him so much time.

Particularly in its second part it needs to be read as a strong and deep, yet not unfriendly apologetic for the Christian conception of three hypostases, which were yet One 

not only against Arianist subordinationism (as which it is usually taken) but more against the neo-

Platonist triad of three hypostases which had provided the intellectual framework for the heresy. Even the place of scriptural quotations can be read as having in mind Porphyry, who had claimed that the Christian scriptures were a mass of contradictions: from them was deduced a philosophical system which showed up the inadequacies of neo-Platonism, even while it used its ideas. It needs to be seen as another example of the eclectic philosophical tradition of writing, working not only at the transcendent level but also analogously, at the level of the human mind. It makes a critical reconciliation of diverse positions in which may be seen Plotinian, Porphyrian, Platonist, Stoic, neo-Pythagorean, and probably Aristotelian in the authentic sense. Hermeneutically and contextually it is an example of Romanitas: the seeking of a pithy and adequately solid summary statement in a balanced cadence: style felicitously and instinctively joined to thought, as rhythm to melody. Greek contemplative thought had inspired Roman thought, and Romanised formulations of it — as the Protrepticus-inspired Hortensius — had
inspired Augustine and continued to inspire him. If Augustine the mere rhetor is spoken of it is as well to remember the full background; he did not think in terms of style alone. The philosophical culture of his classical background, with its religious transcendence, was through numerous intermediaries translated and transmuted into a vision relatable to Christianity without excessive difficulty. Augustine, the rhetor-doctor, embodied a great amount of Christian belief in terms of a Romanitas that after him was increasingly identified as 'Catholica'. The anti-neo-Platonist apologetic of the de Trinitate, with its persuasively established relationships within the tradition of philosophical eclecticism, was so stylistically like the rest of his writings that generations of readers have overlooked not only the difference in its contents and orientation but also the immediate significance of the distinction he frequently made in the work between faith and knowledge, and his implication that parts, at least, were written for non-believers.


3. v. Testimonia, as in edition of fragments by V. Rose (Leipzig 1886), translated by Ross (Oxford 1952).


5. Academica, Prius V 15 and Post. IV 17.

6. v. chapter 12.


11. Tusculanarum II II 5-6.

12. 'Cicéron, traducteur de Platon', Paris 1957, p. 369. Parts II and III of his conclusion are relevant here.

Footnotes to Ch. 2 - continued -


15 The difference can be seen if one sets side by side the delicate and profound insights in the individually composed treatments of the virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics (II 7, III 6- V 11) with the confident, cursory treatment of the 'cardinal virtues' as given by the Latin Fathers in the fifth century. v. brief summary by O. Lottin, ‘Aristote et la connexion des Vertus’ in: ‘Autour d’Aristote: Recueil d’études de philosophie ancienne et médiévale offert à Mgr. A. Mansion’, Louvain 1955, p. 344.

16 v. Marrou, op. cit., chapter 3.


\[ \text{Περὶ δυστάσεως Πλάτωνος καὶ 'Ἀριστοτέλους} \\
\text{(Bidez 31, Beutler 21) and 'Περὶ τοῦ μὲν εἰναὶ τῆς Πλάτωνος καὶ 'Ἀριστοτέλους αὐτῆς} \]

(Bidez 32, Beutler 20). v. list in J. Bidez, ‘Vie de Porphyre’, Ghent 1913, nos. 1-9, 31 and 32. v. also article with list in R. Beutler’s article ‘Porphyrios’ in: Paulys-Wissowa RE XXII.I col. 282ff. and his judgement: ‘The first neo-Platonic to show a deeper interest in Aristotle (excepting the Organon) is P. ... Since P. there has been true exegesis of Aristotle’s writings (and not only the previous pure criticism) setting Aristotle side by side with Plato in the philosophical schools of the west, and not regarding him as subordinate.’ Yet Augustine’s idea of Aristotle as a disciple of Plato at the time of writing the de Civitate Dei (v. VIII 12) showed that he was then either unaware of or unconvinced by this Porphyrian exegesis. cf. Courcelle, ‘Les Lettres’ p. 166. Hadot has proposed that Augustine may have seen the commentary on the Ethics (v. infra p. 214 n. 75).

Footnotes to Ch. 2 - continued -


20 de Utilitate Credendi 6 13. 'Fathers of the Church' translation by L. Meagher, O.S.B. P. Courcelle does scant justice to this text ('Les Lettres..." p. 156): he judges his theories to be obscure'. But 'reconditos et obscuros' need not be a pejorative judgement. The texts expresses the distance he felt between the Aristotle he knew and himself, and also his personal knowledge of friendly and hostile commentators.


22 op. cit. p. 34.

23 op. cit. p. 156.


25 The beginning of de Civitate Dei VIII makes one suppose that he drew on this superior kind of textbook for information on the Greek philosophers. v. G. Langenberg, 'M. Terenti Varronis Liber de Philosophia', Cologne dissertation 1959. Varro's calculation that there were two hundred and eighty-eight views on the highest good, which he then reduced to twelve schools and ultimately to three sects is an outstanding example of Romanitas at work in the field of philosophy - but bereft of that inner effort which Poncelet could not claim characterised every reception into Latin.

26 cf. supra p. 99 n.17 and infra p. 214 n.75.

27 This has been done in a brief but highly satisfactory way in the matter of the ontology of Aristotle and Augustine by R. Schneider.

a) 'Das Wandelbare Sein. Die Hauptthemen der Ontologie Augustins', Philosophischen Abhandlungen VIII, Frankfurt am Main 1938, which picks out numerous Aristotelian themes. (cf. p.15 n.3 (p.16) 'the Aristotelian element is the most weighty in Augustine's ontology'.)

Footnotes to Ch. 2 - continued -


29 As appreciated by R. Poncelet, op.cit. p.372: 'The understanding of Latin demands at the same time obedience to the letter and forgetfulness of the letter, unconditional submission to the detail and going beyond the detail.'

30 I II, Gotha 1880, p.383. The text occurs frequently in this thesis: 'Mens ergo ipsa sicut corporearum rerum notitias per sensus corporis colligit, sic incorporearum per semetipsum.' A better text would have been another also frequently quoted: 'item notitia qua se mens novit, si esse desinat, simul et illa nosse desinat' (ib. IX 4 6).

30a v. supra p. 41: 1170 a 29 - b 11.

31 op.cit. pp.334-5.

32 v. infra. p. 189.


34 '... the living inner object of experience as opposed to the Peripatetics' systematic ossification of psychology,' ib. p.176.


36 op.cit. p.104-106.

37 ib. p.106.

38 In the sense of 'conjectural', not in the sense of bearing on the theoretical knowledge of mind as used in this thesis.


41 de Anima III and Metaphysics ∧

42 de Somno ... 2.

43 Posterior Analytics I 2.

44 ib. II 19. cf. de Anima II 5.

45 ◀ές — habit, especially VI 12.
Footnotes to Ch. 2 - continued -

46 ib. III.
47 ib. Moral virtues IV and V; intellectual virtues VI.
48 ib. VI 9.
49 ib. VII 14.
50 de Anima III 9.
51 'La Comprensions .....'
52 Geschichte der Philosophie II SW 18 p. 386.
'Der von. denkt Alles, ist so bei sich, er ist bei sich Alles; das ist idealistisch gesprochen, doch soll Aristoteles Empiriker seyn.' English translation (Haldane), II p. 196.
53 'Éléments aristotéliciens dans la cosmologie et la psychologie de Saint Augustine', Revue néo-Scolastique de Louvain, 11, 1904, pp. 141 ff.
54 'La Philosophie de Saint Augustine.' For the following see II, pp. 126-7.
56 'Das Problem der Materie in der griechischen Philosophie', Münster 1890.
57 'Geschichte der Idealismus II. Der Idealismus der Kirchenväter und der Realismus der Scholastiker' Braunschweig 1896. Particularly 57: Aristotelische Element in altchristlichen Gedankbildung, in which all the allusions in the text are found.
58 'Augustine's Psychology during his first period of Literary Activity with special reference to his Platonism', Strasbourg dissertation 1912, pp. 9-12, 86-7. He had read Siebeck's 'Geschichte der Philosophie' (v. p. 75), but kept a creditably open mind on its contents.
60 v. p. 100 n. 27.
61 op. cit. p. 5.
63 That Augustine was in controversy with Stoic-minded Pelagians and neo-Platonist-minded Arians, as well as with pagan neo-Platonists, indicates how much of his life was taken up with philosophical matters.
Footnotes to Ch. 2 - continued -

64 Hermeneutical philosophy has performed the service of stimulating an awareness of the transformation in the way in which words are taken, as also of producing dissatisfaction with the historian-archivist approach of finding certifiable textual links.


66 cf. I. Döring, ("Von Aristoteles ...") p. 270. 'What is known to him of Aristotelian thought in addition (to the Categories) comes principally from Cicero, Apuleius and the Latin commentary on the Timaeus by Chalcidius.'

67 Expressed in its most unqualified form in: P. Alfaric, "L'évolution intellectuelle de Saint Augustin" Paris 1918 v. especially its final words "his first works have been interpreted according to the later and it has been falsely believed that his neo-Platonism was simply a cover to his Catholic faith" (p. 527). The proposal in a less extreme form has a long history.

67a 'Scepticism forms the bridge from the one-sided dogmatism of the Stoics and the Epicurean philosophy to Eclecticism', Die Philosophie der Griechen, III 1, 3rd edition, Leipzig 1880, p. 531. Also, 'Justifiable, however, as the renewal of scepticism appears in relation to the uncritical treatment of philosophy, it would no longer attain the importance which it had in the school of the new academy. The exhaustion of thought, which can be shown even in this late scepticism, made a positive conviction too necessary to allow many to return to pure doubt. If, therefore, the belief in the truth of the systems hitherto in vogue was shaken, and even if their eclectic combination could not entirely satisfy, whilst strength was wanting for the independent production of a new system, the general result was only that thought began to long more and more for a source of knowledge lying outside itself and science as hitherto existing, which was sought partly in the inner revelation of the Deity, partly in religious tradition. Thus the way was entered on which neo-Platonism in the next period more definitely pursued, and so opened the last epoch of Greek philosophy.'

(ib. p. 544-5. Translation by S.F. Alleyne, as in: 'A History of Eclecticism in Greek Philosophy', London 1883, pp. 5, 22-23.)

However he is more indulgent in his 'Grundriss der Griechischen Philosophie,' 11th edition, Leipzig 1914, p. 286, where he saw the need of the Greeks to adapt themselves to the practical needs and mentality of the Romans. This contact with a more practical mentality, a sense of the existence of humanity and of a consensus gentium were powerful conceptions in the clarification of a single philosophy. (cf. p. 246 in: L.R. Palmer's translation of the 13th edition. London 1931.)
Footnotes to Ch. 2 - continued -

68 "'La Révélation..." II, Paris 1949, Part 4, Ch. XII especially pp. 368-9. The movement to dogmatism is said to be evident in Cicero, the pseudo-Aristotelian de Mundo, Philo and Hermetism.

69 'Die Schültradition in Mittelplatonismus und Porphyryos', in: Fondation Hardt, Entretiens XII: 'Porphyre'.

70 It seems appropriate here to point out the eclectic background and probable inspiration of Augustine's cogito. No more than Descartes' cogito is Augustine's absolutely without precedent. (For the prehistory of Descartes', see R.H. Popkin, 'The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes' (Assen 1960), passim; also, B.M. Bonansea, 'Tommasio Campanella', (Washington 1969), especially pp. 63-70).

The following are the loci in Augustine.

de Civitate Dei XI 26: Si enim fallor, sum (PL 41.340).


E. Bickel has maintained that Augustine derived his version of the cogito from neo-Pythagorean literature (v. 'Inlocalitas. Zur neu-pythagoreischen Metaphysik' in: 'Immanuel Kant. Festschrift zur Zweiten Jahrhundertfeier seines Geburtstages', Leipzig 1924, v. p.21 (5), n.4). It is an indication of the breadth of eclectic tradition that M. Testard can argue from reported passages in Augustine's lost work, de Bono et Apto, that Cicero may have mediated pythagorean notions to Augustine ("Saint Augustin et Ciceron" I, Paris 1958, p.46).

But we are on more certain ground when we suppose Cicero to be the mediator of the views of Antiochus of Ascalon to Augustine, particularly of the version of the cogito which, as also in Descartes, was based on certainty of doubting: he had certainly read Cicero's Academica in which it occurs: 'Hoc igitur modo potius erat ab his postulandum ut hoc unum saltem, percipi nihil posse, perceptum esse dicercnt' (Academica II IX 29).

A similar argument of Antipater is also produced there: 'qui affirmaret nihil posse percipi unum tamen illud dicere percipi posse consentansum esse, ut alia non possent' (ib. II IX 28).

The 'Scio me scire me vivere' of de Trinitate XI (12.2) could also be based on a dictum found in the Academica:
Footnotes to Ch. 2 - continued -

70 cont'd -
'Scisc nihil scire' (said of Socrates, II 23 74). The Academica of Cicero presented great problems to Augustine. Its conclusions are sceptical, though they do not fully plumb the depths of the later Academy itself: all that the wise man may do is to reach an opinion, not certainty (II 48, 147), and what is probable is good enough (II 31 99). Augustine is prepared - after his great crisis of doubt to which the Academica may have led him - to think that Cicero is speaking ironically, as the Academics had the custom of concealing their real teaching (v. Contra Academicos III 20.43. (PL 32 857). cf. M. Testard, op. cit. I p. 233.)

71 Augustine speaks as if there were a large literature on the Trinity (v. de Trinitate III 11), but it seems that while including Christian treatises he would also have included non-Christian works which had a triad of first principles - as Plotinus's Enneads.

72 Epistle 2: 312 B.


74 v. article 'Greek Philosophy from Plato to Plotinus' in the 'Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy', ed. A.H. Armstrong, Cambridge 1967, ('Cambridge Philosophy') p. 96. The question is of first importance for the development of neo-Platonism within the eclectic tradition.

75 ib. pp. 84-5.

76 There is no need for hesitation. In a parallel passage in his commentary on Aristotle's Categories, Ps.-Archytas makes this principle plainly God:
οίσιν τοῦς φυσικοὺς ποιούν μὲν ὃς ἢ Θεός ...

77 Merlan, op. cit. pp. 60-1.

78 That he realised he could not draw the analogy too closely and attribute all knowing to the Son, all loving to the Holy Spirit, and all remembering to the Father, caused him to utter a cri de coeur of failure in de Trinitate XV 25.45.

79 de Anima II 7ff.

80 ib. II 11: '(the sense power) becomes an extreme to each of the extremes in turn ...', it is 'actually neither but potentially both' (424 a 6-9). The sight is also concerned with visible and invisible (ib.).
10 6

81 ib. III 6 430 b 1-6: "... for if a man calls white not-white, he has combined the notion not-white. It is equally possible to say that all these cases involve division ... . The principle which unifies is in every case mind. This proposition that mind allowed the most disparate to remain divided, yet united them together, was given the fullest exploitation by Hegel as the basic conception of the dialectical process. His free translation of the passage substitutes 'everything' for 'in every case' ('... was jedes zu einem macht, ist der \textit{vou}s' Geschichts der Philosophie II SW 18 p. 392). Stated thus it gives to an important conception of Hegel a support from Aristotle which is not warranted: 'Näher liegt dies darin, dass der \textit{vou}s Alles ist; dass an sich Totalität ist, das Wahrhaftes überhaupt ...' (ib. p. 391). The illegitimacy of this step is discussed in the Excursus: v. pp. 285 and 304, n. 88.


83 \textit{op. cit.} X 7.

84 41 D.

85 'From Platonism...'.


88 de Trinitate IV 16.21: 'Nec isti philosophi caeteris meliores in illis summis aeternisque rationibus intellectu talia contemplati sunt: alioquin non eiusdem generis praeterita quae poterunt historici inquirerent'.

89 A knowledge limited by Courcelle to a part of the Timaeus translated by Cicero, "Les Lettres ..." p.159.

90 Des heiligen Augustinus Quaestio de Ideis (de Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII Qu.46) in ihrer inhaltlichen Bedeutung und mittelalterlicher Weiterwirkung: in 'Mittelalterlicher Geistesleben, Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik' II, Munich 1936, p. 29.


92 Who did little more than juxtapose Aristotle's ideas of divine self-thinking and the absolute unity of \textit{vou}s and \textit{vou}T\textit{a}: v. infra p. 154, n. 56. cf. pp. 127 and 157 n. 105.

93 Ennead V 4 2.
Footnotes to Ch. 2 - continued -

94 Ennead IV 4 30.
95 ib. VI 9 9.
96 For Zeus as υούς, ib. III 5 8 - following Philebus 30 D.
   For Chronos as υούς, and Zeus as ψυχή v. ib. V 1 4, V 1 7.
97 ib. V 8 13 - with Chronos as υούς and Zeus as ψυχή.
98 cf. Augustine's testimony to this enterprise: 'non defuerunt acutissimi et solertissimi viri, qui docerent disputationibus suis Aristotelem ac Platonem ita sibi concinere, ut imperitus minusque attentis dissentire videantur; multis quidem saeulis multisque contentionibus, sed tamen aliquata est, ut opinor, una verissimae philosophiae disciplina' (Contra Academicos III 19.42. (PL 32. 956). For Porphyry's works, v. supra p. 99 n.17.
99 Despite Poncelet's appreciation of the spiritualisation of the concepts of Greek philosophy as they passed into Latin (v. supra p. 62), this was not necessarily always the case. Consider Varro's reduction to a syllogism of the purpose of contemplative philosophy. One feels that he was writing about something of which he had heard, not of something which he knew intimately himself. "quando quidem nulla est hominis causa philosophandi nisi ut beatus sit; quod autem beatum facit est finis boni; nulla est igitur causa philosophandi nisi finis boni" (fr. 4 as reconstructed by G. Langenberg, op.cit.).
100 v. article on Ammonias Saccas by E.R. Dodds in Oxford Classical Dictionary.
101 Brown dates the de Trinitate as covering the years 399-419 (v. op.cit. Chronological Table C). The hypothesis that Augustine changed his principle intention in the second part from an anti-Arian work to an anti-neo-Platonist apologetic after the arrival of Roman refugees in Africa in 410 is an obvious one. If the theory advanced here is correct it will mean jettisoning the view of I. Chevalier, O.P., that the sources of the second part are purely speculative on Augustine's part ('Le théologian fait ici oeuvre d' intelligence proprement dite, de Sagesse.' 'St. Augustin et la Pensée Grecque. Les Relations Trinitaires' Collectanea Friubrgensis, Fasc. 33 N.S. 24, Fribourg 1940, pp. 85-6), and that his judgement on the doctrinal question, that
Aristotelian influence (in the matter of relation) takes precedence over neo-Platonism (ib. p.168), could be placed in a far wider context. Without denying at all the inspiration of Augustine, this thesis proposes that he had, in the neo-Platonist texts, a more concrete object on which to work than the writer supposes. In his 'La théorie augustiniennne des relations Trinitaires; analyses explicatives des textes' (ib. fasc. 2 and 3, Divus Thomas 1940) Chevalier goes no further than Book VII and supposes no further relationship with neo-Platonism.

0. du Roy ('L'Intelligence de la Foi en la Trinité selon Saint Augustin, Genèse de sa théologie trinitaire jusqu'en 391', Paris 1966) can see the place of Plotinus and Porphyry in Augustine's earlier speculation but sees him always under the influence of neo-Platonist structures, particularly triadic-emission ones. Though he sees that he would have corrected the philosophical influence of neo-Platonism in a personalist sense (p.456), eliminating any sense of difference of level between the hypostases (p.454), his analysis of the de Trinitate (pp. 437ff.) presumes the presence in it of neo-Platonist structures. The possibility that an apologist should have to adopt some of the language of his adversaries does not occur to him, and so he can conclude that 'L'Intelligence d'Augustin n'est qu'a moitié evangelisée par la foi'.

As we shall see, there are numerous neo-Platonist allusions throughout the second part of the de Trinitate, but the mode of their utilisation indicates the intervention of a very searching critique. It is impossible to agree with the same writer's description of the work out of which the de Trinitate grew as Augustine's 'jaillissement original et dans sa genèse tétanmonte, riche de bien plus de virtualités que n'en développera l'avenir'.

Augustine's genius here lay not so much in the originality of what he wrote but rather in his grasp and masterly displacement of neo-Platonist and other ideas, in the convincing force of his eclectic solution, and in the interrelationship of this with the data of Scripture: eclectic-apologetic rather than original (contra eiusdem auct. 'L'experience de l'amour et l'intelligence de la foi trinitaire saint Augustin', Recherches Augustiniennes II 1962, p. 415ff.; though his book goes some way to undo this impression).

102 v. XV 27 48. He gives a long quotation from his tractate on St. John's gospel (In Jn.XCIII:8,9) and adds:

'Haec de illo sermone in hunc librum transtuli, sed fidelibus, non infidelibus loquens.'
CHAPTER 3

Neo-Platonist Self-Knowledge systems and Augustine

Neo-Platonism within the Philosophical tradition

E.L. Fortin has very felicitously expressed two of the characteristic teachings of neo-Platonism. Firstly, of its teaching that the soul was divine he wrote that although this idea went back to Plato it took in neo-Platonism, particularly in Plotinus,

"a philosophical power and significance which it had never had before and would never have again. It can be asserted without any exaggeration that at no other time in the history of ancient speculation was the divinity of the soul affirmed in a more absolute and more categorical way".

Secondly, he noted that the high spiritual ideal which it put forward in such purity seemed to make the Incarnation an impossibility.

"We find at the bottom of the debate between Christians and neo-Platonists not in the first place the impossibility of conceiving a way in which the union of the two natures in Christ would be brought about, still less the Manichaean idea of matter being evil in itself and liable to contaminate a being who was united with it, but the idea of a sovereignly perfect God who is able to enter into direct contact with man and become one with him without losing his transcendence (déchoir). It was just because such a notion
was given to God higher than ever before, that its incarnation seemed by comparison unbelievable."

In its most spiritual conceptions neo-Platonism differed from its philosophical sources, even though it founded itself on a commentary of Platonist, Aristotelian, Stoic and other texts; though probably its greater similarity to authentic Platonism justifies the use of the title it carries. Philo’s philosophical Judaism of the first century was a tribute to the early strength of the eclectic spiritual philosophy from which it sprang. The identification of the transcendent θεός with the Jewish God by Porphyry was a sign of its synthetic power at a later stage. What it could not absorb it attacked: what seemed to be peripheral subversive movements in Christianity and Gnosticism. It took upon itself the task of giving a place to the Graeco-Roman Pantheon, demythologising and enmythologising where appropriate, for its conviction of the transcendent existence of mind was unshakeable.

Whether he intended it or not, the teaching and writing of Plotinus offered an alternative to Christianity which was made to seem by comparison both less spiritual and an intruder into the corpus of Graeco-Roman philosophy, now in process of being organised into a coherent system. With Porphyry, who was more incisive and more tempestuous, neo-Platonist thinking was accompanied with an intellectual onslaught against the Christianity from which he may have apostatised. The evangelists, he said, were not witnesses of Christ but inventors: "criminal sophists", and the religious
possibilities of the system were incapable of leading to the desired ecstasy. His concern extended to other religions, either proposing their incorporation or attacking them: clearly he carried out the eclectic dialogue to the limits of its possibilities. In correspondence with an Egyptian priest he proposed a critical purification of the worship which would make it approximate to philosophical contemplation. He made an important commentary, known to Augustine but now lost, on the Chaldaean oracles — themselves, as far as appears from their fragmentary remains, a fusion of Chaldaean Mazdaism, Stoicism and middle-Platonist conceptions. He was more concessive than Plotinus towards religious practices, and accepted theurgy as a means of purification of body.

Porphyry died probably in the first decade of the fourth century, about sixty years before Augustine was born. The neo-Platonist movement, after Iamblichus more and more drifting into a predominantly theurgic rather than philosophic form, continued until after Augustine's death. Julian the Apostate had made theurgy fashionable. When he died and Christianity was restored, theurgy was carried on only secretly, handed down in certain families. 5

The neo-Platonism against which Augustine wrote comes out of the unsettled religious state of the fourth century Roman Empire. In his three years reign (360-3) the Emperor Julian had given personal encouragement to the old paganism, particularly among the upper classes, on the defensive against Christianity which they considered barbarian.
and often morally corrupt. The arguments of Porphyry were used again against Christianity. With the demise of Julian paganism was not completely repressed. Under the liberal régime of his successor pagans still remained in the highest office, and they were characterised by the development of a "more ardent, more mystical" piety, showing itself in the mystery cults and at least the secret practices of the former Roman religion. Intellectually alien to them were the neo-Platonist thinkers in the Plotinus–Porphyry tradition who yet considered themselves as the intellectual apologists of the Roman tradition: occasionally theurgist, but above mystagogic excesses. Dedication to Cybele and Attis by being drenched in the blood of a bull immolated above them would have been alien to their conceptions; occasionally they might come together in a meeting room. It was pointed out in the introduction that the arrival of neo-Platonist-minded refugees in North Africa after the Vandal capture of Rome in 410 could have been the occasion for the seeming change in orientation of de Trinitate VII–XV. The preoccupation with neo-Platonism of a large part of the de Civitate Dei is easily shown. The earliest books are concerned to counter the arguments that neglect of the old gods was responsible for the debacle of 410. A great deal of the second half is concerned with refuting pagan arguments taken from at least three works of Porphyry. Thus from popular practice to its most intellectual justification: the whole spectrum of paganism is covered. The de Trinitate was also composed over a long period; the publication is
dated by Brown in 414, with 419 as a late date. On Brown’s dating the sections of the de Civitate Dei referring to Porphyry (Book VII onwards) would have been gestating in Augustine’s mind at precisely the time in which the second part of the de Trinitate would have been written and published. In catering for his newly arrived disputants he would inevitably have found himself arguing against the contention that neo-Platonism was the most intellectual and perfect form of philosophy. The two concerns of the apologist are both present in Augustine: defence — against attack and the prevention of apostasy, and offence — the winning of converts; and Augustine made a critique of both Plotinus and the more incisive Porphyry with that in view. For the capacities of the latter he had a wary but profound respect. And as in the sphere of world history the City of God was shown to be that to which all previous epochs were leading as to the eschatological phase of humanity, in parallel way the de Trinitate may be regarded a statement of divine-human philosophy, a synthesis of Judaeo-Christian and pagan philosophic traditions, a statement of the pre-eschatological stage of humanity’s intimacy with God through likeness and cult, the ‘temple’ of the human soul analysed timelessly — whilst the de Civitate Dei viewed the epochs of history under the single unchanging providence of God. In both historical tradition and introspective analysis it was necessary to come to terms with neo-Platonism, to point out the vestigia Dei both in history and in the mind, to contravert it in its self and in its flaws where it seemed to propose itself presumptuously
against the Church or against the revealed data of the Godhead and its image in man.

H. Dörrie has written about what is in fact the other side of this picture: the tradition-consciousness of Graeco-Roman philosophy, with Porphyry as a kind of judge of this tradition. 13 Likening the situation to the discerning of a new Gospel kerygma, he supposes that there must have been a judgement at work to keep tradition and truth together and, in terms of them, to control the incorporation of a new element. And the basic nature for this was that philosophy of all schools had a sense of there being one \( \lambda \dot{o} \gamma \varsigma \) behind the different forms of thought, and therefore thinkers must try to discern this same single, ultimate truth. Therefore, "If the Logos is single then must philosophy also ... be one" 14. More than Plotinus, wrote Dörrie, was Porphyry concerned to ensure that nothing which might not be drawn legitimately out of Plato should be tolerated.

But it was in just this spirit that Augustine, with a belief in the single Veritas, made use of some and rejected other neo-Platonist ideas. He asserted constantly the greater potential coherence of the Christian position, 15 and its ability to fulfil the aspirations of those outside its tradition and to enfold them within it. The Christian sacramental, cultic, biblical and preached means of 'Seelsorge' were far superior to the use of corporeal theurgy and the search for intellectual ecstasy. That the Christian experience demanded faith was not in question. Rist has shown that \( \pi \iota \sigma \tau \iota \varsigma \) in Plotinus could mean a firm
conviction in the invisible but real noetic cosmos. Porphyry had found in the Chaldaean oracles a triad Faith-Truth-Love, and gave an explanation of it which "rests on a Platonic reinterpretation of a Chaldaean doctrine"; and a Platonic interpretation of πίστις with relation to the Gods would have commended it. Later Proklos made πίστις 'the highest degree of knowledge' superior even to γνώσις through πίστις, ἀλήθεια and ἔρως, everything is conjoined to this divine. Lewy comments "Thus, Platonism, in its ultimate stage, professes the superiority of illumined Faith over Knowledge, ending with the same doctrine with which Christian theology had started."

Triadic and Enneadic Structures in the Graeco-Roman Philosophical Tradition and the Christian Trinity

The philosophical world into which the Christian trinitarian conception came was disposed to receive it by virtue of the rich content of its own triadic thinking, and Christian apologists were ready to point out this triadicity as so much foreshadowing of revelation and so many vestigia Dei. Broadly speaking, this triadic thinking was in four areas:

a) triads in the divine nature;
b) cosmological triads in Platonism, especially the noetic hypostasis-structures of neo-Platonism;
c) creational or divine relational structures;
d) epistemic structures
a) The first type is conspicuously found in Aristotle's divinity of Metaphysics \(\Lambda\) 22: "Therefore νοῦς thinks itself, if it is that which is best; and its thinking is a thinking of thinking". He argues for this triadic structure systematically: there must be a subject thinking, an act of thought and an object.

According to the Chaldaean Oracles, there is a triad of faculties of mind and will and source in the Supreme Being: "The action of the transcendent God is thought, consequently the first entity that issues from Him is His Intellect, the Πατρικὸς νοῦς. His Will (Βουλή) acts in harmony with this entity; for His volition is thought, and his thought is action. Intellect, Will and Power constitute the immediate faculties of the 'Father': the 'Paternal Monad'" 23. Other Chaldaean triads include Hecate and the world-soul; and here Lewy's account passes on an impression of imprecision in which triadic schemas are almost submerged in imagery. 24 The same can be said for a subordinated triad in which the Ideas come from "the Father's Intellect, thinking with his vigorous will" 25.

b) A passage in Plato's second letter 26 is quoted by Plotinus as an authority for the three hypostases Supreme God - νοῦς - Ἡμώνα 27: "All things are around the King of all, and that is the cause of all good and beautiful things and all things belong to that, and the second things are around the Second and the third around the Third". But far more important is a subordinated triad that can be read into a number
of texts in the Philebus and Timaeus, which can be systematically related with texts from the Letters, to produce an ordered triad of which the elements are firstly the originating principle, secondly either θούσ or the demiurge, and thirdly ψυχή. To complete the neo-Platonist exegesis of Plato, it is necessary to see some further elements in the Parmenides: not only the paradoxical 'one and many' in which Plotinus makes a distinction between one-many and one-and-many, but also the same dialogue's reflection that if One is, it would be a composition of itself and being. This seemed to be in accord with the teaching of the Republic that the Good was "Beyond thought and beyond being". The composition of itself and being could not, according to Plotinus, belong to the One, though it might belong to θούσ, and even more so to ψυχή. A rigid triad of three subordinated hypostases of increasing multiplicity is thus formed. Then further, the one-many characteristics of the lower two were given an extension such as Aristotle had proposed for θοúς alone, that it was one in itself but embodied in individual men — together with a lesser one-in-manyness of ψυχή, in conformity with the Timaeus's description of a residue of lesser purity making up the soul of the universe.

c) Creational and divine relational structures can be found more frequently. They do not have the paradoxical unity of the divine triads nor the problem of interconnection by emanation and return of the neo-Platonic hypostases; they straddle the distance in kind and degree between creator and creation.
For example, St. Ambrose's Hexameron begins (I.i. 1-4) with a reduction to three factors of the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, and these are both triads of this kind. Plato has the triad, so St. Ambrose wrote, "Deum, exemplar et materia": (Deum) "tamquam artificem ad exemplar, hoc est, ideam intendentem, fecisse mundum de materia"; Aristotle has "materia, species et tertium ... operatorium". In a long and masterful analysis arising out of this small text and going through a vast number of related writings, J. Pepin comes to the conclusion that it bears traces of the largely lost dialogue de Philosophia of Aristotle and lost works of Origen and Porphyry. In the case of the Aristotelian triad, which seems in itself to refer to particular actions, Ambrose has put it in a setting of creation. We may think then that the same principles are seen at both a macrocosmic and an immediate and detailed level — as the triad of the ps.-Arhythian fragment noted in the previous chapter.

*d) The triadic structure within the Plotinian voûts (Being-life-thought) derives from a well-known passage in Plato's Sophist in a context more epistemological than noetic-cosmological.

Triadicity in human epistemic structures, seen already in general terms, will be found highly developed in Augustine.

In a way parallel to the Christian search for trinitarian Vestigia Dei in other triadic structures, Porphyry found parallels to the eclectic-derived neo-Platonic triadic conceptions in the Chaldæan oracles. "He was the first to identify Father-Power-Intellect with Being-Life-Intellect; above all he identified the Father of the Oracles, that is to
say the Supreme God, with existence and pure being, and also with the One of Plotinus. 40

Porphyry and later Proclus moved on to make enneadic structures in which the vertical triad of being-life-intelligence was linked horizontally to triads of Father-Power-Intellect. Triadic and enneadic structures were clearly regarded by neo-Platonists as the means of understanding the laws according to which the noetic cosmos was constituted. Here Augustine followed Porphyry and constructed his own ennead, but the discussion of this must be left until later. 41

Besides these there are other significant triads in Plotinus where willing is involved in the knowledge of an object 42, where a triad is described in the act of self-knowing of ὄσος 43 and the One 44, and the self-love of the One 45. Of their appearing in the thought of Augustine, transferred to the human mens, we shall be speaking later. 46

Neo-Platonism: the Maximal Expression of the Eclectic Spirit

A critical and systematic synthesis of inherited principally Greek philosophical traditions was the aim of neo-Platonist speculation; a personal search for a full discovery of the self and noetic reality at the same time was the aim of neo-Platonist life: so the structures of the system would come to life: would turn out to be, when correctly conceptualised, the structure of the noetic world itself. Apergus from the Platonic dialogues and thoughts
from Aristotle on the divine nature of mind and thinking were brought together in critical union with other ideas originating from a wider field and given a systematic development and rigorous coherence which in their sources they had not had.

At the centre of the system was the One of Plato's 'Parmenides', identified with the Good of the Republic, the source of reality and the object of desire and love from everything which it created. In Plotinus it was usually described, in conformity with statements in both dialogues, as "above being and above thought", though it is sometimes attributed with a superior kind of reflection for any act of knowledge implies that there is some ignorance which is being satisfied which would introduce the imperfection of duality (or triplicity) even into its self-knowing. Yet Porphyry rejected this paradoxical position and attributed to the One an unambivalent, if superior, kind of knowledge.

According to Plotinus, from the One comes the hypostasis of which has had the audacity to separate itself from the One. In the 'Parmenides', Plato made Parmenides himself derive the many from the One, of which it was a necessary condition. The movement of the dialogue depends on the introduction of the genus of 'other', for 'many' turns out to be the 'other' of One. Neo-Platonic interpretation proposed that the conception of pluralising in this part of the dialogue described the movement of itself, which was the source of everything manifold. The self-thinking of represents the
radical otherness which coincides with its own oneness. Its self-thinking was both the originating division into otherness and the means of bringing all otherness into unity. It was at one and the same time epistemological and ontological: creating the binding force for everything which had been smitten with the fact of division which derived from its own separation from the One. It was the highest expression of a principle from which the One alone can be excepted: that 'everything seeks itself'.

Though related to multiplicity οὐδείς always remains the same; but having fallen away from the unity of the One it is under a necessity of knowing itself to gather itself together. In οὐδείς's knowledge of intelligibles other than itself Plotinus fused together the Aristotelian notion of the unity of thought and thinker with his own conception of the triad being-life-intelligence, taken from the Sophist: if "perfect being" is not devoid of life and mind, every idea should therefore be the act of thinking. Any doubt in Plato about the existence of a distinction between the idea thought and the thinker is ended by the Aristotle-derived identity. This is the basis of Plotinus's notion that each idea is οὐδείς; for in thinking, οὐδείς is the intelligible itself. So οὐδείς is a "single simultaneous whole of multiple things". The paradoxes of the One and the Many in οὐδείς are best described thus by Plotinus: "every notion (ἐκατόν) is what it is itself in act, and potentially everything else ... particular minds are comprised in the universal mind and the universal mind in
the particulars" 60. The triad being-life-thought, in which the components are in one sense equal and the same and at the same time different, is the characteristic perfection of the noetic world, which, bound together in self-knowledge and in its contemplation of the One, was the most assimilable hypostasis to the Christian idea of the divine, in which the ideas were its thoughts, yet were identical with itself.

"In thinking the Good, $\psi\upsilon\sigma\varsigma$ also thinks itself by accident" 61. But also in thinking the Good, from the power which it receives and inevitably fragments in order to support it part by part, 62 everything else is created, but principally $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ which is its image and expressed word 63. $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ is the intermediary between $\psi\upsilon\sigma\varsigma$ which is unchangeable and the changing world. It too knows itself as separate from the One and from $\psi\upsilon\sigma\varsigma$, and in its higher part seeks to gather itself together in self-knowledge and knowledge of $\psi\upsilon\sigma\varsigma$ and the One 64. Its multiplicity is more fault-smitten than the audacity of $\psi\upsilon\sigma\varsigma$: "we may imagine that it cannot bear to be a single existence when it has the power to be all it is" 65. In its human embodiments it is drawn to the relative unreality of material things. With soul comes the existence of time, a looser multiplicity than that of the $\upsilon\eta\tau\alpha$ within $\psi\upsilon\sigma\varsigma$, 66 and below it again the manifold of bodies in space. Plotinus's judgement is part moral, part metaphysical: with the distance of the lesser realities from their principle imperfections are not surprising 67. $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ in its human embodiments is the principle of life and discursive thinking, 68 but it is not the $\epsilon\nu\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\chi\varepsilon\mu\alpha$ of the body 69. Part turned to
and part turned to bodies, its union with self-knowing prevents it from dissipating itself. Between the unchanging and the changeable cosmos it is not only the setting of the soul-drama of fall and return: it is through its relative imperfection the ultimate reason for the existence of motion and time in the cosmos over which it presides.

In this schema, a man, with his normal and usual place in the higher level of rationality, guided by his daimon (for good or for evil: the choice is our own), drawn by desire for the Good and love for his engenderer, must gather himself together and come to know himself. This means the control of the passions by the will and the development of the intellectual virtues — in which will and desire are both sublimated into the pure intelligence of (which 'is ours when we use it') 77. By this unity of himself with the universal he will discover that he is all things, and awake to his true self. So reduced to unity he sees himself to be not distinct from God his object, his centre coinciding with the universal centre, and 'alone with the alone' becomes, in ecstasy, an object seen — no longer a separate seer.

Without changing the basic principles which he learnt from Plotinus, Porphyry developed his theories, though very often viewing them from a more human standpoint. The means of purification were important to him, and so the philosopher became a "Soul doctor". Yet the noetic remained the same: its cosmos is single in itself, ubiquitous but not spatially so.
And he proposed a way in which the material world was present to it: "For the undivided and by nature unmultiplied, on the contrary, the divided and multiplied is undivided and unmultiplied, and thus is present to it; that is to say, it is present without division or multiplication or position, according to its own nature, to that which is divided and multiplied and in space". He repeats Plotinus's injunction to the individual, to discover in θοῦς that he is an all. Similarly ὑμῖν is one and potentially many, though not by division. His teaching on the virtues resumes and summarises that which Plotinus took from the Theaetetus, which equated virtue with becoming divine, and from the Republic, which gave a place for 'civil' virtues, which were learnt partly by instruction but primarily through contemplation of the Good.

Porphyry tersely divides the virtues into political and purgative degrees, and these latter, which belong to the contemplative life, further into three degrees: at a purification level, in which man is led by his ἑκάτην; at an intellectual level in which the man is subsumed into θοῦς; and at the level at which they exist as exemplars. For Porphyry these are the stages of progressive divinisation, for "he who acts according to the intellectual virtues is God, and he who acts according to the exemplar virtues is the father of the Gods". This four-degree characterisation of virtue was passed on in Latin form by Macrobius in his commentary on the "Somnium Scipionis", and become an important element in later scholastic systematisation. Yet he did differ from Plotinus in unambiguously attributing knowledge to God, regarding θοῦς as a second One and accepting the transmigration of soul from man to animal.
The Place of Self-Knowledge in Neo-Platonism

We must see briefly how the question of self-knowledge arises in Plato, who described in Alcibiades I the process by which a friend helped it to come about, and in the Charmides how it arose without assistance.

Pepin has summarised the passage in Alcibiades I. 95

"... a characteristic of this dialogue is to regard self-knowledge not as direct introspection but as a complex operation which passes through the knowledge of someone else: in the same way that the eye can only see itself if it is reflected in another eye, as in a mirror, to be precise in its pupil, so the soul, to know itself must look at another soul, and that means at its intellectual part".

And he points out the presence of the same idea in the questionably authentic Magna Moralia of Aristotle.

"The astonishing relationship of a page of this work to Alcibiades I must be pointed out, not only for its definition of man but for the idea that self-knowledge comes about through the mediation of the soul of another: incapable of seeing our own face by ourselves ... we do so by looking at it in a mirror; in the same way when we want to know ourselves, we must come to it by looking at our friend, since he is, as it is said, our 'other ego' ..". 96
It is significant that when Plotinus considers that men are capable of self-knowledge, he does not turn to the possibility of knowledge of oneself through a friend, but to knowledge of God:

"this conversion brings gain:

at the first stage, that of separation,
a man is aware of self; but retreating inwards, he becomes possessor of all". 97

The Plotinian mode of self-knowledge certainly lies behind Augustine's "noverim me, noverim te". 98 Perhaps also the individualism of Augustine's search for self-knowledge independent of friends also derives from Plotinus; it can also be found in Plato's Charmides.

In this dialogue Critias equates the Delphic Oracle's injunction to 'know thyself' with the practice of temperance. 99 Hesitantly the dialogue proceeds to investigate the possibility that this self-reflecting knowledge, analogous to the self-reflecting power of the senses, 100 will in fact turn out to be a superior knowledge — a knowledge of knowledge — 101 in which the subject being identical with its object, it would be true wisdom. Given the later utilisation of this idea by Aristotle and its significance particularly for Hegel, the resemblance to modern idealisms is not fortuitous.

The problem over what the content of this knowledge would be is left on one side in consideration of the greater one: how could this self-referential, self-knowledge, the knowledge of knowledge, be really absorbed by the self? Socrates cannot see how they can be identified:
"I do not dispute, I said, that when a man has that which knows itself he will know himself; but having that, how is he bound to know what he knows and what he does not know?"

"Because, Socrates, the two things are the same".

"I daresay, I said; but I am afraid I am still my old self: I still do not see how knowing what one knows and what one does not know is the same as (knowledge of the self)".

Attractive as the notion is, Socrates rejects it somewhat curiously on the grounds that it would not possibly have the omnipotence which, were it the highest wisdom, it ought to have: it ought not to be a separate kind of knowledge, but a knowledge which contained within itself the knowledge of the separate sciences over which it was presuming to judge. In fact, says Socrates, it may involve some kind of a habit, but it would not possess those insights and habitual familiarity with the subject matter which experts in the particular sciences should have. For far from being a kind of super-wisdom it would be unable to distinguish between a facade of knowledge and real knowledge: the kind of discernment which the professionally competent have in their dealings with others. And so Socrates concludes:

"... now, I went on, you see that nowhere can any such science be found".

"I see", he said.

Aristotle saw an intuition of enormous value in this discarded Platonic aperçu: for him it was in the nature of thought to be primarily self-thinking, and this in fact was
the divine. As we have seen, he was willing to accept an unbridgeable divide in human subjectivity between pure thinking and everything else in order to preserve intact the valuable insight of the Charmides. The parallelism is most striking — even to his facing up in *Metaphysics* to the same problem as Plato in the passage: what else would self-thinking know in knowing itself? Aristotle's reasoned answer is that there is nothing else which it need know, for it is completely absorbed by and completely satisfied in itself; there is therefore no dissatisfaction which would lead to the arising within it of further desire. It is worth pausing to reflect that perhaps in the characterisation of thought in itself as divine and self-thinking, and yet as temporarily embodied we have the coping stone or beginning (depending on whether the synthetic or analytic approach is used) of a projected complete system of knowledge, in which thought — self-thinking thought — is not only the unifying point of the system, but illuminates and holds the whole together. It might embrace the subjectivity structure of the *Parva Naturalia* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and relate the transcendent structure of the *de Anima III* to the aberrant structure found in scattered unrelated hints. But it would have been no more than a project, depending on the aperçu recovered from the Charmides, full of promise because of the splendour of thought in itself which Plato appeared to have missed, but frustrated by the very distinctness that it seemed necessary to give it.
The neo-Platonists proposed an answer to the problem of relating transcendent thinking to any other content and other activity which must have been abundantly clear to them according to the best eclectic traditions. Leaving aside any relevance to self-knowledge of friendship Plotinus rejected self-thinking thought as ultimate and proposed that the eternal self-thinking \( \psi \psi \), which thought itself as a consequence of its contemplation of the ultimate One, knew its objects - the intelligible ideas, with which it was identified - through identity with them in a paradoxical one-in-manyness. This eternal self-thinking \( \psi \psi \) may be attained by the human soul which then shares its contemplation of the Good, its self-thinking and its object-thinking. But if \( \psi \psi \) is transcendent in the sense that it is transpersonal, it is really immanent as it is attained in the interiority of individual souls: \( \psi \psi \) "is ours when we use it, not ours when we do not", and the act of intelligence always comes from above. In the transcendent knowledge of \( \psi \psi \) is the first presence of multiplicity and its explanation: that the simplicity of its contemplation becomes pluralised with the loss of intensity when it comes from its source. Without any question of temporal priority because its act is timeless, its consciousness of objects is within a consciousness of itself: "For knowledge knows itself in the intelligibles and every intelligible is the act of knowing itself". The reason behind Socrates' doubt in the Charmides is in this way given an answer in a coherent account of a self-knowing \( \psi \psi \) whose origin from Aristotle
is clear: the passivity of νοῦς in de Anima III is rejected but the identity of the intelligible object with νοῦς is accepted, and the virtual simultaneity of one to the other allows this to be set in νοῦς more like that of *Metaphysics* \( \wedge \) — though desire has been displaced from νοητά to the One itself. Against the simplicity of the self-thinking thought of *Metaphysics* \( \wedge \) the consequent multiplicity is in conformity with the One-Many paradox of the hypotheses of Plato's Parmenides; whilst the fact of multiplicity adds a positive need for containment through self-knowledge: since νοῦς has multiplicity it has a need to know itself: "'Know yourself' is a precept for those who, being manifold, have the task of appraising themselves." 110 νοῦς is unchangeable; it is so structured that it is made one through its contemplation of the One and through its own self-knowledge. The fact of multiplicity which its dependence and otherness from the One has brought into being makes it need to see itself\(^1\), to find the complete self-conformity which is a law of the cosmos of Plotinus. The One has no need to search for itself in any way, for the presence of knowledge in general, including self-knowledge, implies that there has been or is the weakness of ignorance which is having to be satisfied. Though the One's being above thought is sometimes qualified in terms of its having a higher kind of unified self-knowing, the usual teaching of Plotinus is that it has no need of self-knowledge\(^2\).

As the intermediary between the changeless νοῦς and the changing world, in which all change is a demonstration of
falling short and imperfection, ψυχή even more needs to know itself: to gather itself together from the greater multiplicity in which it is distended. As νοῦς knows itself in the One, so ψυχή knows itself in νοῦς: "it is because it is a word which seizes things from νοῦς and adapts them to traces of νοῦς which it has in itself that it knows itself by accident".  

So self-knowledge is present in the noetic cosmos of Plotinus, with the duality of νοῦς denying it the right to be the ultimate reality, but its unity of mind with its proper object as conceived in de Anima III, making up not only its structure but its substance. The self-knowledge of ψυχή as well as that of νοῦς is always linked to the dependence of each on a superior principle, which binds the emanation together in a joint knowledge of self and source, not only bringing about its existence but also making the way for it to return to itself from its multiplicity, and thus to bring as near as possible to a conclusion the divisions and flaws in the original unity.

"It would be already absurd enough to deny (self-knowledge) to the Soul ..., but the very height of absurdity to deny it to the nature of the Intellectual-Principle, presented thus as knowing the rest of things but not attaining to knowledge, or even awareness, of itself".  

Plotinus saw two polarities of thinking in ψυχή as humanly embodied. There was the discursive thinking (διάλογον) which was properly human, and "that which surpasses it (when)
one knows oneself as being conformed to \( \nuo\delta \); then one knows oneself no longer as a man but as a being quite different from man, raised on high, taking there only the superior part of the soul, which alone can go out to thought, to bring below the ideas one has experienced there\(^{116}\).

The problem of the Charmides is re-opened and given a solution wherein the self-thinking thought of Aristotle is epistemologically united with the ideas that it thinks in a paradoxical one-in-manyness. Man can make self-knowing knowledge coincide with the knowledge of everything else and absorb it as true self-knowledge — but he thereby ceases to be a man. A rigorous neo-Platonist development and integration of partial Aristotelian solutions on the lines of an abandoned Platonic aperçu!

Aristotle related object-consciousness to self-consciousness of \( \nuo\delta \) in de Anima III with reference to time. \( \nuo\delta \) may always be self-conscious and self-thinking in a stage of separation, but in its condition of non-separation from a human personality it needed to know other things in order to know itself, or to turn deliberately on itself.\(^{117}\) Only in a timeless condition would it 'always' know itself. In the material world it was in some ways dependent on its condition. And this fact connected with the textual question which puzzled the commentators: was it the object or the creative agent intellect which started off thinking? Plotinus made it one of his main criticisms of Aristotle that \( \nuo\delta \) was always active, never potential\(^{118}\), since its
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that \textit{vou	extdagger} was always active, never potential \textsuperscript{118}, since its
activity was essentially in the transcendent-immanent \textit{νοῦς}, which was always self-knowing, and always knowing all intelligibles. So this self-knowing presence became what it was neither in Plato nor in Aristotle: the necessary condition of consciousness of any thought-object; because self-knowledge is the binding principle of noetic structures and without it the unity of subject thinking and object thought would disintegrate, the pluralising of its activity into many \textit{νοητά} necessitating its unification in self-knowledge. This conception, at once simple and immensely powerful, became the normal subjectivity structure of neo-Platonism: continuing self-knowing as a condition of knowledge of anything else so far as it alone allowed the coming together of disparate elements — even knower and known in self-knowledge. The structures from de Anima III 4 and 5 and Metaphysics \textit{Α} certainly had their influence on shaping the thought of Plotinus, but to unite them together into a system as they stood was even more impossible to Plotinus than it was to Aristotle. However it was possible to take the structure from the Parva Naturalia: the continuing consciousness which makes possible the interrelationship of diverse sense data from the same object, strengthened with the presence of thinking as in the Nicomachean Ethics, and the scattered references to an aberrant structure in de Anima III. \textit{119} If the activity of \textit{νοῦς} could be shown to be essentially in a single timeless transcendence, and that all multiplicity, including the manifold in time, derived from it, the obstacle of its
intermittency in making it the centre of subjectivity would be removed. This provided the possibility of system-building for which the Commentators had long searched. Thus Plotinus wrote:

"Thought takes place when a multiplicity of elements is united together and when there is a consciousness of their being together: that is true of the thought of oneself", and "It is necessary that νοῦς should be linked to thought, that it should have unceasing knowledge of itself, that is should know that it is this thought, and that the two make up only one".

The explanation is troubled by the fact that νοῦς is already multiple, and that only the One is truly simple. However, the common sense, as analysed by Aristotle, provided an exemplar of epistemological system-making: "if one impression comes from the eye and another through the ear, there must be something single where these two impressions come together. How would we say that these impressions are different if they did not arrive together in the same reality? There must be this one reality, which is a kind of centre, and that sensations coming from everywhere end in it like rays from the circumference of a circle; such is the perceiving being, truly one". Hadot interprets fragment XIII of Porphyry's commentary on the Parmenides in this sense. The important passage is:

"What is this mind which affirms that the thinking differs from the thought"?

He links it to the passage in the de Anima about the
discriminatory power of the common sense, and he comments, "It is this indivisible act — this point, as Aristotle has said, — which is the basis of the possibility of perception". And continuing about the noetic of Porphyry: "The mind which cannot return into itself is also the indivisible act which is the basis of the possibility of movement by which mind, in its second state, grasps itself as both mind and an intelligible".  126

Even if self-knowing in neo-Platonism involved an extraneous knowing of the source of being at the same time, it was a most fruitful means of a wholesale systematisation: the condition became the nexus of knowledge of everything else. It was a workable relationship, even if it had as a system-builder to make do with the less elegant, even less perceptive, personality structures of Aristotle. It also provided — from the Aristotelian elements it brought over with it — a way out of the impasse of the Charmides and the hesitations of Socrates: the self need not hesitate to accept into itself the knowing of knowing as true self-knowledge, because all thinking stems from the united hypostasis of νοῦς, shareable by all men, and shared when they authentically think, a thinking held together by the self-thinking of νοῦς itself. But the aperçu of Plato and the fragmentary solutions of Aristotle have more value than the all-purpose solution of Plotinus, which entailed that when a man has become aware of this unification he has ceased to be a man. And it may not have been the intractability of the problem which discouraged Plato and Aristotle from proceeding to a complete systematisation. They were aware
that man was unity in diversity; that in accordance with his nature he needed to vary his activities, if not by much. Plotinus sought a unity in unity: and from both of their points of view it would have been a fault that transcendent thinking could become so completely dissociated from everything else. Further, the neo-Platonist subjectivity structure was little more than a hardly adorned statement from a number metaphysics: the passage from the One to the Dyad and further multiplicity. It proposed neither a definition nor a description of consciousness, but only a very bare and simple statement of a basic condition of consciousness.

The transposition of this teaching in Porphyry was partly in the direction of clearer systematisation, but it did have certain changes. A kind of knowledge was less ambiguously given to the One. 127 Very significantly, and giving a possibility for the development of a less rigorously transcendent system is the idea that "by adverting to love (φιλία ) of ourselves, we recover ourselves and are united to God". 128 Plotinus had seen the place of in uniting the soul to the One: it was the desire of the creature for its creating 'Father'; but self-love or friendship had not entered into his system. It may be indicative of the fact that though the noetic realm of Porphyry was essentially the same as Plotinus's and quite as transcendent, it did have a greater respect for human individuality. 129 Courcelle finds a thought in Porphyry which would take us straight into the equation of self-knowledge and the knowledge of everything else: "By the true knowledge of our
essence (the soul) attains to the knowledge of the real essence of things, and comes to the Good in which its well-being consists", but disappointingly his reference is defective. 130

The Bibliographical Position over the Relationship between Augustine and the neo-Platonists

Augustine's own statement of how he was influenced by the reading of certain Platonist books 131 - which were undoubtedly neo-Platonic 132 - was the starting point of several centuries of study of his relationship with Plotinus in particular. Scholars were able to work on this aspect particularly because the text of the Enneads were made available through the edition of Ficino, first published in 1492. Knowledge of Porphyry was almost entirely confined to his Life of Plotinus and his "Isagoge". 133 The impression was created that although Augustine was of some philosophical interest he was not a thinker of the first rank, but that he was overshadowed by Plotinus on whom he seemed to draw so heavily. Some nineteenth century Protestant criticism became increasingly unfriendly towards Augustine, as it thought it found him a considerable number of deviations from the truths of Christianity. It turned a displeased attention on what it thought was a man of predominantly neo-Platonic conceptions (who, for good measure, could also be accused of docetism, ebionitism and adoptionism). Later, other Protestant critics took the completely opposite view finding like Harnack, as we have seen, that Augustine was more the man
of a new personalist psychological outlook, concerned essentially with the religion of the heart. C. van Crombrugghe summarised these controversies in 1904.

The culmination of the original line of nineteenth century criticism was P. Alfaric's "L'Évolution intellectuelle de saint Augustin" of which a single volume appeared in Paris in 1918. Whilst admitting that Augustine had to make some considerable modifications to Plotinus's thinking, it concluded

"For Augustine, Christ is the Plato of the masses",\(^{135}\) "... for educated people he borrows the language of the Enneads. In him the Christian disappears behind the disciple of Plotinus ... it has been believed incorrectly that his neo-Platonism was a simple covering of his Catholic faith".\(^{136}\)

Partly as an answer to this, C. Boyer, S.J., insisted on Augustine's moral conversion being completely Christian, but proposed that later the neo-Platonist writings provided the assistance he needed, as a man become very materially-minded, in his search for a way of contemplation: "He had the faith; he lacked knowledge (science)".\(^{137}\) However Boyer limits his attention to the early writings.

In "Plotin et Occident", to which reference has already been made, P. Henry had to take into account a recently published work of very great importance by W. Theiler, "Porphyrios und Augustin":\(^{138}\) a densely compact essay which made Porphyry rather than Plotinus the source of Augustine's neo-Platonism. Henry showed the inadequacy of
the matching of passages from Augustine with those of Plotinus and Porphyry and arguing for an "influence" in these cases. It was discerning to criticise the principle of interpretation presupposed in this superficial inspection of evidence, and to the point to state that it was quite possible that Plotinian ideas had come to Augustine through Porphyry. He asked for a greater use of external criteria: quotation and undoubted allusion, to bring about some discipline into what was becoming a considerable debate. But he did not explore in depth the kind of use which Augustine could be supposed to have made of neo-Platonist thinking.

The clarification of the relationship between Plotinus and Augustine has continued more in the line of interest in the exact textual sources of Augustine's thinking than in the more vital question of an interpretation of the real significance to Augustine of neo-Platonist speculation. Courcelle has proposed that such a source was Ambrose's preaching at the time, in which he had meditated out the connections between Christianity and neo-Platonist thinking, but the general conclusion from his research is that in Augustine's conversion period there are many possible influences working together, and also that he could have read Plotinus and Porphyry at this period. J.J. O'Meara has provided an accessible survey of the work on the relation between neo-Platonism and Augustine which covers the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century.

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task is more difficult because so much of Porphyry's work exist now only in quoted fragments. Among other proposals, Theiler's article, recently re-published, proposes that de Trin. X I - 16 is in effect an interpretation of the injunction 'know thyself' of which Porphyry himself wrote a Treatise of which only a few fragments remain. This very valuable suggestion turns attention away from the Arian pre-occupation of the earlier books and the much studied triads of the later books to the middle and neglected part of this work where Augustine goes very deeply into the epistemological question. Theiler also finds in Porphyry a weight of evidence from a number of places which suggest that he was Augustine's source for much of his triadic conceptions. Impressive and perceptive as Theiler's discovery of parallels is his conclusions fall back on the convention of "influence": his whole life long Augustine was attached to Porphyrian neo-Platonism.

As the study of the texts of Porphyry progresses, so does the establishment of relationships between him and Augustine. Since Theiler's article a number of important studies have appeared and some dependable conclusions are beginning to emerge.

Two studies which most particularly provide an insight into this relationship which is relatively easy to see but difficult to reconstruct are a long review by Hadot of O'Meara's "Porphyry's Philosophy from Oracles", entitled "Citations de Porphyre chez Augustin" and a short note by G. Madec: "Augustin: Disciple et adversaire de Porphyre".
Hadot writes of Augustine's allusions to Porphyry in the de Civitate Dei. "Three stages can be distinguished in Augustine's use of Porphyry. Chapters 9 to 10 use the de Regressu. Chapters 11 to 22 are under the influence of the letter to Anebon. Chapters 23 to 32 return to the de Regressu but without completely forgetting the letter to Anebon". 149 In other words, the structure of a great part of the second half of one of Augustine's major works is built round the examination of certain books of Porphyry: sometimes to bring out inconsistencies, sometimes to incorporate his ideas, sometimes to oppose them. With Porphyry so much in his mind it would not be surprising that a great deal of the matter in the latter part of the de Trinitate should, with its related lines of thought, and which was being written at the same time, be related to him as well. 150 The seeming silence of the de Trinitate text in this respect is as much explained as it is in its relation to Plotinus by the style of anonymous allusion, and the disappearance of so much of Porphyry's writing makes more difficult than with Plotinus, the identification of references to his thought.

Against an article of L. Dörrie which seemed to look upon Augustine too easily as only the inheritor and passer-on of Porphyrian logic and practical theology, G. Madec emphasises the critical use which Augustine made of Porphyry: Augustine uses Porphyry's works "not only to put himself in his school but also to oppose his doctrine of salvation". 151 And to put the matter into theological perspective, he says
that Augustine "did not cease to set against the false mediations put forward by Porphyry the doctrine of the unique mediator, the incarnate Word, in Confessions VII, in the de Consensu Evangelistarum I. 35, 53, in the de Trinitate IV and above all in the de Civitate Dei X". 

It begins to be clear that Augustine is a critical user of the noetic themes of Porphyry as well as Plotinus. Judicious acceptance of an observation here or there does not mean acceptance of the whole. Besides which the philosophy of the neo-Platonists would have had a significance for Augustine and his contemporaries which is rather lost on us. Not only history but geography seemed to make the Graeco-Roman world the only significant part of humanity; the Indian yogis and black Africans of whom he had heard were remote and unimportant: their isolation and supposed fewness merited for them only the briefest mentions. Total truth was to be found imperfectly discovered in Graeco-Roman philosophy but totally in Christian doctrine — the noetic triads of the most important philosophers pointing clearly, if imperfectly, to the Christian triune Godhead.

In the de Trinitate, Augustine's most important philosophical work, it would be altogether appropriate to find that he had in mind at many points the neo-Platonist theories of Plotinus and Porphyry, that he showed a judicious handling of their ideas with complete familiarity and complete understanding of their value and limitations; and therefore that he had in mind, in the critical utilisation and rejection of their themes, an apologetic intention, and also a permanent
memorialisation in the Graeco-Roman-Christian tradition of Christian belief in a triune Godhead and man made in its image, supported from Sacred Scripture and expressed in relation to philosophical works which had reached a stage in which their own search for perfection of expression which was relatable to Christianity's own. In some respects the thought of the neo-Platonists was near to Christian thinking. But no more is the distance of Augustine's own thinking greater from them than in the place which he declines to give to self-knowing. But here the critique was not entirely his own. He would have had in mind the significance of self-knowledge in Cicero: \textsuperscript{153} not the binding force of transcendent hypostases, but primarily the moral need of the individual. And there he would have found the thought expressed not in the fugitive allusiveness of Greek thinking mediated through Latin translations, and therefore rendered doubly difficult to comprehend, but in the idiom of Romanitas which was nearer to his own spirit.

Augustine's Critique of Neo-Platonism

The critique which Augustine made of neo-Platonism, whether explicit or by implication, covers the following points.

i) He explicitly rejected the idea that the highest principle was beyond thought and beyond being. "Are we to think that the wisdom which God is, knows other things and does not know itself, or loves other things and does not love itself"? It was a cardinal principle of Augustine that in true being there could be no non-being, \textsuperscript{155} and
that in the divine essence there was no distinction between it and divine knowledge. 156

ii) He explicitly rejected Plotinus's view of the mode of dependence of all things on the One, and its perfect remoteness. According to this all things turn to their source, the intellectual beings by way of contemplation, to such a degree that there was no providence watching over the world, only the contemplative gaze of everything else turned towards the One. (This was in fidelity to some of Aristotle's texts, but others are not so decisive). 157 So Augustine wrote

"There has been no lack of such doctrine among philosophers, no dearth of men to assert that there is no God to create and rule all things, but numbers of Gods attending to their own affairs apart from the world and taking no heed of what passes below."

Perhaps he had in mind a passage from Plotinus:

"the law does not warrant ... that the gods should lay aside the divine life in order to direct (man's) daily concerns". 159

iii) Augustine found the subordination of the three hypostases impossible to accept, even with an inter-dependence given to the self-knowing of and through their being contained in the knowledge they had of their source.

With O. Perler goes as far as he can in proposing a similarity between the noetic world of ideas in Plotinus and ideas in the mind of God in Augustine, 160 but he has to admit that for Augustine, God, whom the Word is consubstantial, is the source of all truth and reality whilst being the highest essence and the fullness of being, but that in the of
Plotinus the 'being' - in the true sense - which exists there comes from the Not-being of the principle of being - the One. The unity of the Plotinian triad breaks down at this point.

J. Ritter approaches the question from the way in which νοῦς and νοητά are united, and notes that Plotinus's ontology makes the whole noetic world correspond with νοῦς - which he identifies with God. Augustine, without diminishing divine knowledge, keeps God and the external objects of his knowledge apart.

But the principle difference - which is the thesis of this part of the paper - is that for Augustine the divine self-knowledge of the Word of God is not a sign of inadequacy, of falling short, of having to return to itself in order to maintain itself in unity. Self-consciousness is not in Augustine - nor is it in Aristotle - a weakness, a means of compensating for or stopping a dissipation of energy. As with Aristotle, full self-knowledge is for an intellectual creature an expression of perfection. As ψυχή does not appear in the Augustinian noetic cosmos its self-knowledge finds no place. What remains of neo-Platonist self-knowing is in the more ethical imperative to look within and to return to oneself; it is dissociated from the articulate noetic world structure of Plotinus where it is not only knowledge but the containing structure. Whilst the expression of this imperative as in Soliloquium II, 'Noverim me, noverim te', can be matched with
statements from the Enneads, in so far as it is a speculative philosophical reflection it is linked more with the individual human need for self-knowledge as found in Plato and more empirical structures of Aristotle, as also with Cicero, for whom Augustine had such enormous respect.

iv) In Plotinus the falling short of νοῦς from the perfection of the One, and the further falling short of ψυχή from this relative imperfection are the beginnings of a gradation of being stretching out at its limit to material and to evil. Whilst a strong element remained in Augustine’s thinking that evil was a falling away from the fullness of being and corresponding goodness to (relative) not-being and badness, he emphasises the sharing in goodness of the created world, alluding to, expanding and correcting in Confessions X, a text from Ennead III. And in the question of time, which, as has already been seen, for Plotinus is a consequence of this cosmos falling short from the timelessness of the One and of νοῦς, whilst he will accept it as being, with some parallelism to ψυχή’s dominations over multiplicity, subjectively a distension of the soul, he will not accept it as having the same illusory nature. With Plotinus the self-consciousness of ψυχή is of a piece with its presiding over temporal succession, and the unconsciousness of the One follows from its eternity. With Augustine the self-consciousness of mens provides the condition of thinking anything else, and thinking of all kinds, including deliberate self-thinking, occurs in the time-bound memory.
v) Augustine points out the contradictions of neo-Platonism in proposing the re-incarnation of a soul worthy of and enjoying beatitude into the miseries of this world; of believing in the eternity of the world, and at the same time in an eternal escape into beatitude which meant each soul would be created anew, and that they would not have the eternal existence which other parts of neo-Platonist doctrine taught. In the de Trinitate Augustine speaks with great scorn of (neo-Platonist) philosophers who have such powerful minds and abundant leisure and are familiar with the most subtle teachings, who can come to such contradictory conclusions.

vi) It is more than as a mere dialectician that Augustine argues against Porphyry's denial of the possibility of the Incarnation that it is reasonable on neo-Platonist grounds — for if a man could become God, why could not God become man?

"You Platonists have, at any rate, so lofty a conception of the intellectual soul (which must be identified with the human soul) that you assert that it is capable of becoming consubstantial with the mind of the Father which is, on your admission, the Son of God. Why then is it incredible that one intellectual soul should have been assumed, for the salvation of many, in some unique and ineffable manner?"

And if Plotinus asserted at the same time that "we must flee to our beloved country ... by becoming like God" and
that there can be no direct contact between the purity of the divine and mortal uncleanness, that should necessitate - triad-wise - a Mediator between the two.

vii) The question of mediation of salvation was important to Plotinus and Porphyry as it was central to Augustine. All three accepted the place of 'faith' in an unseen. Augustine thought that the whole process of coming to self-knowledge and to ecstasy in neo-Platonism might involve an authentic experience, but it was the highest pride to try to achieve it. Salvation was only possible through faith in Christ which alone could make a man have that union with the divine, which was the true, but perverted, object of the search for ecstasy in neo-Platonism.

It will be seen that these points are central points to the structure of neo-Platonist thinking. All of them required substantial modification or partial rejection. Yet there were also for Augustine many points of contact: not surprisingly in the providential meeting of philosophic and judaeo-Christian traditions. Augustine could see a number of important problems in neo-Platonist terms: in the area of the One and the Many, particularly in connection with the divine in-dwelling of the One God in many souls - being 'all in all' ; in the pursuit of spiritual perfection; in the mind's sharing in the light of truth and the participation of all good things in the supreme good. He could accept some aspects of the neo-Platonist conception of
purification: the removing of what was alien, the progression in virtue, the departing from unlikeness to one's true self. All of these themes arise out of the neo-Platonist quest for self-knowledge, to find in one's innerness the transcendent God. The need to return to oneself and to find God there at the same time was a frequent theme in Augustine's Sermons as in the Confessions. The relationship of this moral search to the philosophical structure of neo-Platonism could not have been far from Augustine's mind in these works. In the de Trinitate he set up their precise philosophical counterpart.
FOOTNOTES to Chapter 3

1 'Christianisme et Culture Philosophique au Cinquième Siècle', Paris 1959, p. 94. Particularly the introduction of J. Pepin's 'Idées Grecques sur l'Homme et sur Dieu,' Paris 1971, has a rich study of the occurrence in classical and early Christian writings of the idea of the divinisation of man, with ample references to texts; it is deeper but contains nothing so epigrammatic.


4 The basic works on the corpus of Porphyry's writings are Bidez and Beutler. cf. supra p. 99 (n. 17).

5 'In the fifth century it was again openly taught and practised by the Athenian neo-Platonists: Proklos not only composed a Περί ἄγωνης and a further commentary on the Chaldaean oracles, but also enjoyed personal visions (αὐτοπρονένοις) of luminous Hecate phantasms and was, like the founder of the cult, great at rain making' E.R. Dodds, 'Theurgy and its Relation to neo-Platonism'. Journal of Roman Studies, XXXVII, 1947, p. 59.


7 de Labriolle, 'La Réaction ...' p. 341.


9 de Labriolle gives concrete examples, 'La Réaction ...' pp. 348ff.

10 Contrast Prudentius's description of baptism in bull's blood (de Labriolle, 'La Réaction ...' pp. 348 (and n. 5)-9 with the kind of worship meant for a supposed meeting house for neo-Platonists excavated at Ostia (R. Meiggs, 'Roman Ostia' Oxford 1960, p. 393).
Footnotes to Ch. 3 - continued -

11 v. supra p. 5 also pp. 97 and 113.


14 op. cit. p. 5.

15 cf. de Trinitate XV 27 49: 'Quantum vero attinet summam ... naturam, per intelligentiam utcumque cernendam, nusquam se melius, regente duntaxat fidei regula, acies humanae mentis exercet ...'


17 πίστις καὶ ἀλήθεια καὶ ἔρως.


20 Lewy, p. 145 n (h).

21 A locus classicus for triadicity is in Aristotle's de Coelo I 1: 'It is just as the Pythagoreans say, for the whole world and all things in it are summed up in the number three; for end, middle and beginning give the number of the whole, and their number is the triad. Hence it is that we have taken this number from nature, as it were one of her laws, and make use of it even for the worship of the Gods' (268 a 10-15).

For the whole background v. R. Mehrlein, article "Drei" in: 'Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum' IV, Stuttgart 1959.

22 Ch. 9 1074 b 34-35.

23 So Lewy, op. cit. pp. 79-80: there are two triads here - the first includes the source which the latter ignores, substituting 'power'. The likeness to Augustine's human triad of mens (or memoria) - intelligere - velle (which he finds he cannot project back into God) should not go by unnoticed.
Footnotes to Ch. 3 - continued -

24  ib. pp. 82ff.
27  v. Ennead I 8 2.
28  Philebus 26D, 28G 30G; Timaeus 41D.
30  Parmenides 156B. v. Ennead V 1 8: ἐν πολλῆ καὶ τοπαλή.
31  142 B ff.
32  Republic 509 B.
33  Timaeus loc. cit. cf. J. Trouillard, "L'Âme du Timée et l'Un du Parmenide dans la perspective néoplatonicienne", Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 92 1970. "When neo-Platonists read the Timaeus they find there the Parmenides ... They project a dialectical conflict on to the myth about the creation ... Beginning with Plotinus these neo-Platonists are the thinkers who expect to find the secret of Platonism in the Parmenides. Plotinus expresses the multiplication and distribution of souls, as that of the powers of the soul in different parts of its own body, by contradictory formulas which recall both the Timaeus and the third hypothesis ... . In gathering together the extremes, (soul) makes of our universe a single unity living in sympathy with itself (Ennead IV 4 32) ... That the highest harmony comes about from the connection of opposites is a frequent theme in the Enneads. Unity is the relationship which transcends conflict (IV 4 38, III 3 6) ... these extremes are interior to soul (III 4 3)."
34  I 1 1-4. PL 14 123.
35  'Théologie Cosmique et Théologie Chrétienne', Paris 1964, pp. 11, 392ff, 525ff. The book is a model of literary scholarship in discovering the situation of ideas in transmission from Plato and Aristotle through the mazes of eclecticism until the time of Augustine.
36  v. supra pp. 84, 105 n. 76. Pepin gives this triad in turn an Aristotelian origin: ib. pp. 61-3.
37  248 E - 249 A.
Footnotes to Ch. 3 - continued -

38 P. Hadot has traced the history of the idea in 'Être, Vie, Pensées chez Plotin et avant Plotin', in: Fondation Hardt, Entretiens V 'Les Sources de Plotin', Geneva 1960.

He proposed that Plotinus brought the Sophist text into relation with Aristotle's Metaphysics where the 'life of intelligence' is described as 'the best life' (τὸ ἀριστεύειν : 1072 b 28): 'when Plotinus was inspired by the Sophist, life appeared as the act of being. Now under the influence of Aristotle, it is identified with the act of intellection ...' (op. cit. pp. 112-3).

It should be remembered that here 'being' is precisely the intelligible being of the ideas, and that the stranger proposes that they have movement and life in order to explain how they can move an intellect in the act of knowing. With Plato the need for this absolute being, 'awful and holy', to have these qualities is not argued by means of a dissecting analysis; his argument is a fortiori: because they cause to know they must also know. But neo-Platonism's method was the induction of a necessary structural pattern into often fugitive philosophical reflections; and here, as so often, it is a triadic pattern. It is at such moments that the hermeneutical transformation which it worked stands out at its clearest. With Porphyry the schematised triad is interpreted as the three moments of νοὸς in the act of motionless self-knowing.

'But (νοὸς) is neither one nor simple with relationship to the distinction of being, life and thought. Thinking (τὸ νοοῦν) and the intelligible exist in identity. But when νοὸς goes from being to become thinking, in order to come back towards the intelligible and to see itself, thinking is then life.' (Commentary on the Parmenides fr. XIV lines 15-21; v. Hadot, 'Porphyre ...' II pp. 110-111).

Hadot proposes that whereas the relation between the elements of the triad in Plotinus is only noetic, in Porphyry it becomes 'théogonique': 'Being is the Father of life and thought' (ib. I pp. 277-8).

39 v. supra pp. 84-5 and infra. chapter 5.
40 ib. I p. 272.
42 Ennead III 8 6: 'For, again, when they reach what they want, the thing which they wished to exist, not so that they should not know it but so that they should know it and see it present in their soul ...'.
43 ib. V 3 5: 'Given its intellection identical with its intellectual object and the object identical with the principle itself, it cannot but have self-knowledge.' It is a reformulation of νοὴς ἡ νοησθεων νοήηες. It follows on a dyadic version of the idea.
44  ib. VI 7 41: '...since knower, knowing and known are identical, all merges into a unity.'

45  ib. VI 8 5: 'He is at the same time object loved, love and self-love' (following Bréhier).

46  v. infra p. 190ff and ch. 5.

47  ib. V 4 2; also VI 7 38 (translating with Bréhier, 'And nothing belongs to him, except a certain simple intuition relative to himself').

48  ib. VI 9 6.

49  v. fr. 12-14 of the commentary on the Parmenides (Hadot, 'Porphyre ....' II pp.103ff) which speaks of a second 'One' participating in the first, and two states of 'mind'. For Porphyry's syncretism with Chaldaean notions, which make 'paternal intellect' and 'being' as characteristics of the first hypostasis v. ib. I pp.266ff.

50  Ennead VI 9 5 - following Bréhier's translation. cf. III 7 15: 'it could not sustain the power poured upon it and therefore broke it up'.

51  'Same' and 'other' are included with the other supreme genera in Sophist 254 D ff. In the Parmenides 'other' is introduced at 143 B, when the being of the One is found to be other than the One. For K.H. Volkmann-Schluck, the Parmenides represents Plato's latest position ('Plotin als Interpret der Ontologie Platos', p.149).


53  Ennead VI 6 1.

54  Ennead VI 7 13.

55  ib. V 3 10.
No doubt prepared for by Albinus' s identification of the intelligibles as thoughts of God. But the material for this construction lay at hand in Aristotle: in the complete unity of νοησὶς and νοητὰ and the divine activity of νοησίς νοητῶν. And if the embodied mind thought itself in its νοητὰ (v. supra, pp.36-7), and the embodied mind and divine mind were one, why need divine thinking to be only of itself? cf. C.J. de Vogel, 'La Méthode en Métaphysique d'après Métaphysique A 1-2' in: 'Aristote et Les Problèmes de Méthode', Louvain-Paris 1961: 'But the divine spirit which appears to know in the highest way the form-essences of natural things must so to speak be near to them' (p.168).

57 ib. V 9 8.
58 ib. III 9 1.
59 ib. IV 4 1, following Bréhier's translation.
60 ib. VI 2 20, again following Bréhier.
61 ib. V 6 5, following Bréhier.
62 ib. VI 7 15.
63 ib. V 1 3.
64 ib. v. especially V 3 6 and VI 9 3.

Ennead VI 2 6 - following Bréhier translation.

66 of. J. Trouillard, 'The Logic of Attribution in Plotinus' International Philosophical Quarterly I 1961, pp.130-1: 'The act which gives birth to time is the act by which ... soul, abandoning its search for the necessary being in itself, projects itself outwards toward new things and new states. The act from which time arises is thus very much an ecstasy in the etymological sense of the word .... Time is a process of continual alteration through which the simultaneous totality of the Nous is decomposed into successive states.'


68 ib. VI 7 17.
69 ib. IV 2 1.
70 ib. IV 8 8.
71 ib. V 3 8.
72 ib. IV 8 4.
Footnotes to Ch. 3 - continued -

73 ib. I 17. There seems to be a polarising of interpretation about what constitutes the personality. At one end are those who regard the individual personality as unimportant compared with the One in which it is to be absorbed, so the individual is no more than a shadow. (v. G. P. J. O'Daly, "Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self", Shannon 1973, p.28.) At the other end is a reluctance to abandon the individual's importance. So, A. H. Armstrong wrote "if pushed to its logical extreme (this) would destroy all possibility of a cosmology, or any sort of philosophical thinking ... (union with the One) is a temporary unification" ("The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus", Cambridge 1940, p.110). Hadot ("Plotin, ou la Simplicité du Regard" (Paris 1963), pp.21ff) writes of 'levels of the self'. In all strictness the first position (of O'Daly) seems the correct one.


75 Ennead V 1 6.
76 ib. IV 4 44.
77 ib. V 3 3.

78 ib. IV 4 2. McKenna fights shy of this identification. Following Bréhier: "since he is in himself all things (\(\Pi \alpha \nu \tau \kappa \epsilon \lambda \nu \omicron \lambda \omicron\)), in thinking himself, he thinks at the same time all things".

79 ib. VI 7 15.
80 ib. VI 9 4.
81 ib. VI 9 10.
82 ib. VI 9 11.
83 ib. VI 9 10.

84 v. Beutler, 'Porphyrios'. col.301-2. Porphyry did not fundamentally alter the absolute principles of Plotinus, but the need to answer subjective questions led him to fill out gaps in his exposition. The view conflicts with W. Theiler: 'Porphyry has made this cosmos really anthropocentric ... the basic orientation of his metaphysics is human and ethical' ("Porphyrios und Augustin", in: 'Forschungen zum Neo-Platonismus', Berlin 1966. ('Quelle und Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie', editor P. Wilpert, vol.X) p.174. Originally published among 'Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft', Geisterwissenschaftliche Klasse 10, 1933.
Footnotes to Ch. 3 - continued -


86 ib. XLI '... having put away all limitation, you have become an all. Notwithstanding you were all even before ...'

87 ib. XXXIX.

88 Theaetetus 176A. Republic, particularly II and VII. Ennead I 2.

89 Sent. XXXIV.

90 Op. cit. I 8 5 - where it is attributed to Plotinus.


93 fr.12, ib. pp. 103-107.


95 132 D - 133 B. v. 'Idées ...' p.15. For Augustine's knowledge of this idea v. de Trinitate IX 3 3. v. infra pp.184-5.


97 Ennead V 8 11.

98 Soliloquia II 1 1 (PL 32 885): itself a hardly altered repetition of Ennead V I 1: '... to ignore at once themselves and (God)'. W. Thimme wrongly supposed that Augustine's brief response was 'widely distinct from following Plotinus and his phantastically abstract speculation on υόης and world-soul, etc.' ('Augustins erster Entwurf einer Metaphysischer Seelenlehre', Berlin Dissertation 1908).

99 164D cf. the etymological derivation of Porphyry of 'be temperate' (σωροδιεν) from 'conserve wisdom' (σωλε την φρόνησιν) in his treatise on the 'Know Thyself' (fr. 2, Book I. v. J. Stobaeus, Anthologium III, Berlin 1894, p.580).

100 Charmides 167 D - 168 A.
Footnotes to Ch. 3 - continued -

101 169 B. ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ. ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ.

102 169 E - 170 A. Not 'the demonstration of a vicious circle', as Courcelle supposes, but that over which all idealist and anti-idealist philosophy divides: how the knowledge of other things enters into the knowledge of the self. v. 'Le "connais-toi toi-même chez les néo-platoniciens grecs', in: 'Le Néoplatonisme ...' p. 153.

103 Charmides 172 A.

104 v. supra. Ch. 1.

105 v. Metaphysics 9. It could be argued that in knowing νομος, νοησις is not knowing something other than itself because of its unity with them. (v. supra pp. 106 n. 92 and 154 n. 56).

106 Ennead V 1 9 and 10; also V 6 6: 'that primal activity, then, is not an intellection, for there is nothing upon which it would exercise intellection since it is the first'.

107 ib. V 6 5.

108 ib. V 3 3: translation follows Bréhier. The use of the dual approach transcendence/immanence as a means of analysis is fraught with dangers. Plotinus's noetic world, and therefore its values, are found 'within', and so transcendence is by definition innerness. Yet it remains true that within this innerness are found realities which are greater than the personality of the looker-within.

109 Ennead IV 6 2 (following Bréhier).

110 cf. supra p. 117 and n. 33 v. Ennead VI 7 41.

111 Ennead V 3 10.

112 As in III 8 11; V 3 13; V 4 2; V 6 6; VI 7 41; VI 9 6. But a number of texts do attribute some kind of knowledge to the One; certainly V 4 2; and VI 8 is entitled 'On Free Will and the Will of the One'. v. particularly VI 8 15 on its self-love. Will and love cannot be without knowledge.

113 ib. V 3 6.

114 ib. V 3 1.


116 ib. V 3 4 (following Bréhier).
Footnotes to Ch. 3 - continued -

101 169 B ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμης

102 169 E - 170 A. Not 'the demonstration of a vicious circle', as Courcelle supposes, but that over which all idealist and anti-idealist philosophy divides: how the knowledge of other things enters into the knowledge of the self. v. "Le 'connais-toi toi-même chez les néo-platoniciens grecs', in: 'Le Néo-platonisme ...' p. 153.

103 Charmides 172 A.

104 v. supra. Ch. 1.

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109 Ennead IV 6 2 (following Bréhier).

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112 As in III 8 11; V 3 13; V 4 2; V 6 6; VI 7 41; VI 9 6. But a number of texts do attribute some kind of knowledge to the One: certainly V 4 2; and VI 8 is entitled 'On Free Will and the Will of the One'. v. particularly VI 8 15 on its self-love. Will and love cannot be without knowledge.

113 ib. V 3 6.

114 ib. V 3 1.


116 ib. V 3 4 (following Bréhier).
Footnotes to Ch. 3 - continued -

117 In which case it is knowing itself, for the \( \upsilon \upsilon \tau \xi \) have become \( \upsilon \upsilon \upsilon \upsilon \). v. supra pp. 23-24, 36-37 (the latter showing that what was implicit in the de Anima is explicit in Metaphysics \( \wedge \): 'thought thinks itself through participation in the object of thought').

118 v. Enneads II 5 1, II 9 1, IV 6 2 ('contrary to sensations (intellectual knowledge) springs out from within, whilst sense knowledge comes from without'), V 9 5, VI 6 6, VI 7 40 ('if thought is ... united to the essence and makes it exist, it cannot be the principle from which it comes'). Yet a hint of this arises in Metaphysics \( \wedge \) 9: 1074 b 19-20.

119 v. supra pp. 38-43. For occurrence of this idea in Hegel, v. infra pp. 279-80, 290, 300 n. 49.

120 v. supra pp. 45-46.

121 Ennead V 3 13 (following Bréhier).

122 ib. VI 7 41 (following Bréhier).


124 ib. 'Porphyre ...'. II p. 107.

125 ib. I p. 136 n. 4. References are to de Anima III 2 426 b 8- 427 a 14. Plotinus draws his notion of a centre from the idea of a point in 427 a 9-14:

'The fact is that just as what some thinkers describe as a point is, as being both one and two, in this sense divisible, so too in so far as the judging faculty is indivisible, it is one and instantaneous in action; but in so far as it is divisible, it uses the same symbol twice at the same time. In so far, then, as it treats the limit as two, it passes judgement on two distinct things, as being in itself in a sense distinct, but in so far as it judges of it as only one, it judges by one faculty and at one time.'


127 Plotinus's difficulty of there being a lack of simplicity in \( \upsilon \upsilon \upsilon \upsilon \) also appears in Porphyry. Sent. XV says that \( \upsilon \upsilon \upsilon \upsilon \) is not the source \( (\alpha \chi \chi \chi \) ) of all things, though Sent. XXXI says that \( \upsilon \upsilon \upsilon \upsilon \) is in God. Frs. XIII and XIV of the Commentary on the Parmenides say that the One is a \( \upsilon \upsilon \upsilon \upsilon \) which cannot return to itself, and fr. V (considering Plotinus's objection to
Footnotes to Ch. 3 - continued -

127 cont'd:

there being understanding in the One, that this would imply the satisfaction of ignorance) speaks of his having a kind of knowledge transcending knowledge and ignorance.

128 Sententia XLI. cf. 'amor sui' in Augustine's de Trinitate IX 2 2. The conception was embraceable in Christian terms: 'Si autem nondum nosti diligere te; timeo ne decipias proximum tuum sicut te' (Sermon 128 5 (PL 38 715)). cf. friendship (φιλία) and hatred as cosmic principles in Empedocles. Further, Porphyry would have known the Chaldaean oracle according to which 'all things are governed and subsist' through the triad faith - truth - love (cf. Lewy, op. cit. pp. 144-5); and here εὼς would be very much like the Empedoclean φιλία, and even more like the Platonic εὼς.

129 Sententia XV may be considered as a speculative attempt to unify a position on νοῦς which included, as in Aristotle, its human embodiment. It speaks of intellect being many, and relates the powers of perception, imagination and intellect.

130 'Le Connais - toi ...' p. 156 and n. 15. However this idea does occur in a life of Pythagoras sometime published with Porphyry's life where it is based on the relatively trivial ground that man is a microcosmos. It originates from Photius': 'Bibliotheca', codex 249 (sometimes wrongly numbered, through an early compositor's error, as 259). cf. Bekker edition (of Bibliotheca) 440 b.

131 Confessions VII 9 13.

132 v. P. Henry, 'Plotin en Occident', Louvain 1934, pp. 78ff. This account is now accepted as authoritative.

133 i.e. 'Introduction (Εισαγωγή ) to the Categories of Aristotle'.

133a v. supra p. 13 n. 30.

134 In the first part of his 'La Doctrine christologique et sotériologique de St. Augustin et ses rapports avec le néo-Platonisme' (Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique, V 1904, pp. 237ff). The point at issue was whether the soteriology of an exchange of natures - God became man so that man might become divine - was not really neo-Platonist, and not Christian. van Crombrugghe put forward a perspective very much like that elaborated by Dürrie about the significance of Porphyry in the classical tradition, and his summary of the Christian apologetic attitude coincides with the lines of this present thesis:

'Neo-Platonism could not only pass itself off as the heir of Hellenism, but could also assume the pretensions
Footnotes to Ch. 3 - continued -

134 continued -

of becoming the religious philosophy of the future ... at the same time as combating these pretensions, it was necessary to show the points of contact and agreement of the two rival conceptions, and in this way to make it easy for neo-Platonists to come to Christianity' (p.238).


136 ib. p. 527.


140 In: 'Augustinism and neo-Platonism' (Recherches Augustiniennes I, 1958, pp. 91ff; and indications of more recent writings can be found in his 'Plotinus and Augustine: Exegesis of Contra Academicos II 5' (Revue Internationale de Philosophie 24, 1970, pp. 321ff).

141 v. supra p. 155 n. 84.


146 Besides the review of Hadot and the note of Madec cited in the text, the following contribute to the discernment of traces of Porphyrian ideas in Augustine. Courcelle, 'Les Lettres ...' pp. 166-176 has a rich survey of the position as it remained after Theiler's article and Henry's critique of it. (v. supra pp.137-38). A. Solignac, S.J., 'Reminiscences plotiniennes et porphyriennes dans le début du de Ordine de saint Augustin', Archives de la Philosophie 20, 1957, pp. 446ff, draws parallels between the Sententiae and the de Ordine. J. J. O'Meara's 'Porphyry's Philosophy from Oracles in Augustine', Paris 1953, identifies Porphyry's 'De Philosophia ex Oraculis Haurienda' with his 'De Regressu Animae' (known only from Augustine's
de Civitate Dei X). This thesis was vigorously and lengthily attacked by Hadot in the article referred to in the text. Pepin considers Sermons 240-242 a 'digest of Porphyrian philosophy' ('Theologie cosmique ...' pp. 433ff). In the same work he considers it is Porphyry's objections against the resurrection as stated in the 'Contra Christianos' which provoked Augustine's counter-arguments in the de Civitate Dei X, not as in the De Regressu Animae, as is usually thought (ib. pp. 443ff). Based on H. Dörrie's 'Porphyrios' 'Symmikta Zetemata' (Zetemata 20, Munich 1959), which proposes parallels with Augustine's Soliloquium II and de Immortalitate Animae (v. pp. 153-4), Pepin proposes further traces in the de Quantitate Animae, Soliloquium I and de Civitate Dei XIX, also in de Trinitate IX ('Une Nouvelle Source de saint Augustin: le διάτηκτος de Porphyre sur l'Union de l'Âme et du corps', Revue des Études Anciennes 66, 1964, pp. 53-107: the last part (pp. 92ff) is a rewriting of 'Les Symmikta Zetemata' de Porphyre et le de Trinitate de saint Augustin' in 'Die Metaphysik in Mittelalter: Vorträge des II internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie Cologne 1961,' ed. P. Wilpert, Berlin 1963 pp. 249-254). The images for the union of mens, notitia sui and amor sui which Augustine rejects had also been rejected by Porphyry for the union of body and soul, but both accepted as an image the union of mind and intelligibles. His suggested parallels between Sententia XV (= Mommert edn. XLIII) and de Trinitate IX 3 3 does not really show Porphyry as prompting Augustine's teaching that the soul can know itself through its presence to itself: the Sententia text is too brief to permit a detailed comparison with his teaching of a 'conversion' in self-knowledge in his commentary on the Parmenides (cf. Hadot, 'Porphyre ...' I pp. 326-370; II pp 140-113).

B. Voss in 'Spuren von Porphyrios 'De Regressu Animae' bei Augustin 'De Vera Religione' ' (Museum Helveticum 20 1963, pp. 237-9) has noted a parallel conception of intellectual purification.


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149 op. cit. p. 224.

150 cf. supra p. 113.


152 Madec, op. cit., p. 368. This thesis insists that Augustine had not so much Book IV in mind in the later part of the de Trinitate.


154 de Trinitate XV 6 10: 'Aut vero putandum est, sapientiam quae Deus est, scire alia et nescire se ipsam, vel diligere alia nec diligere se ipsam?' cf. ib. VI 10 11: 'primus ac summus intellectus, cui non est aliud vivere et aliud intelligere, sed id quod est intelligere, hoc vivere, hoc esse est, unum omnia'. Also, ib. IX 11 16: 'quia nec tantum eum novimus, quantum ipse se.'
Footnotes to Ch. 3 - continued -

155 In: Joannem XXXVIII 10: 'non enim est ibi verum esse, ubi est et non esse' (as a commentary on Jn. 8 24, where Christ applies the divine name to himself).

156 ib. XL 5: 'simplici ... naturae veritatis esse et nosse non est aliquid atque aliud, sed hoc ipsum.'
ib. XCIX 4: 'per hoc non sic habet scientiam, ut aliud illi sit scientia qua scit, aliud essentia qua est, sed ut omneque universum.'
cf. de Trinitate VIII 1 2: 'in essentia veritatis, hoc est verum esse quod est esse.'

157 W. J. Verdenius has pointed out the existence of another unresolved problematic. 'In Aristotle's system ... there is no real synthesis of divine transcendence and divine providence': w. 'Traditional and Personal Elements in Aristotle's Religion', Phronesis V 1960, p.64. cf. L. Elders, S.V.D., 'Aristotle’s Cosmology. A Commentary on the de Coelo', Assen 1966, pp. 33ff.

158 Second commentary on Psalm 31 25: 'non defuit talis doctrinae philosophorum, non defuerunt qui different non esse Deum, qui gubernat omnia et condidit omnia, sed esse multos deos vacantes sibi praeter mundum, non curantes ista.'

159 Ennead III 2 9. cf. ib. VI 8 16: '(All things) stand before (the One) looking upon him, not he upon them.'

160 In particular comparing the teaching on ideas in Ennead V 9 5 with that in Augustine’s de Diversis Questionibus LXXXIII 46 2. (PL 40 29-31). In 'Der Nus bei Plotin und das Verbum bei Augustinus als vorbildliche Ursache der Welt', Freiburg and Paderbon 1931 (Studia Friburgensia).


163 Its equivalent, the 'anima mundi', to which he alluded very briefly in the de Immortalitate Animi and the de Musica, is the subject of a later retraction (Retractionum I 11 3, PL 32 602), but even this was not, in Augustine’s mind, the equivalent of in all its extensiveness and intellectual quality, but rather as a 'spiritalis, vitalis virtus'.

164 v. supra p.156 no 98.
Testard's view on the corrective which the reading of Cicero gave to Augustine's attempts at ecstasy are interesting: "Cicero, by the recognition of his limitations, recalled the truth of Christ to Augustine ... Plotinus, in the ignorance of his limitations proposed to the rhetor that he should pass Christ by, worse still, that he should replace him" (op.cit. p.169).


This theme has been the subject of a number of studies by E. Zum Brunn: "'Être' ou 'ne pas Être' d'après saint Augustin', Revue des Études Augustiniennes, 14, 1968, pp. 91ff; 'L'Expression Ontologique de la Vie et de la Mort de l'Âme, d'après saint Augustin', Augustinus 13, 1968, pp. 443ff; 'Le Dilemme de l'Être et du néant chez saint Augustin', Paris 1969; 'La Dialectique du 'Magis esse' et du 'minus esse' chez saint Augustin', in: 'Le Neoplatonisme ...', pp. 371ff.

v. Confessiones X 6 9ff and Ennead III 2 3: the parallelism is quite clear from the dialogue form (cf. Plotinus, 'Do but survey (the cosmos), and surely this is the pleading you will hear: ...'), as by the key expression - 'I am made by a God' in Plotinus, and 'ipse fecit nos' in Augustine. But in Plotinus the cosmos says of itself 'I suffice to myself', whereas in Augustine it acknowledges its total dependence on God. The same contrast shows in the difference of their two attitudes to time. As expressed by Guitton, time is for Plotinus 'this eternal disquiet' (ce trouble éternel) ('Le Temps ...' p.59), whereas for Augustine 'these delays, these checks, these slowings down, these distances, these desires and all this bitterness which has its occasion and matter in time, become for the interior man the condition of despoothing himself, by which his true nature returns to him' (pp. 388-9).

That Aristotle can be the ultimate source of the subjective aspects of time-consciousness in them both, v. supra. pp.55-6 n. 73 .

v. de Civitate Dei XII 21; de Trinitate XIII 9 12.

dC.

dC. IX 29 (translation by H. Bettenson).

db. IX 17.

db. IX 16.
Footnotes to Ch. 3 — continued —

174 cf. de Trinitate XIII 19 24: *Ille autem praecipui gentium philosophi, qui invisibilia Dei, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspicere potuerunt, tamen quia sine Mediatore, id est sine homine Christo, philosophati sunt ...'*

175 v. in particular de Trinitate XV 28 51: *Cum ergo perveniremus ad te, cessabunt 'multa' ista quae 'dicimus et non pervenimus'; et manebis unus omnia in omnibus (1 Cor. 15 28): et sine fine dicemus unum laudantes te in unum, et in to facti etiam nos unum. Domine Deus une, Deus trinitas. ' An apologetic which had neo-Platonism principally in mind would very appropriately use an expression of the ineffable one-in-many, carefully relating it to a text of scripture.*
Augustine and Self-Knowledge:

a) General principles of epistemology

Always prepared critically to accept or critically to reject what he found in neo-Platonism, Augustine seems to have discovered his bearings from the moment of his conversion. The arrival in North Africa of the devout neo-Platonist minded pagans presented a potentially greater problem than could be faced up to in earnest argument with them in the salons of Carthage. There was the possibility of a greater pagan reaction than under Julian: a widespread apostacy of the intellectual classes as they struggled to make sense of their experiences of invasion. The enthusiasm with which some had embraced the half-way position of Arianism was threatening. Serious consideration was necessary in order to establish a position at once orthodox and philosophically reputable, which would also include a critique of neo-Platonism in two respects.

Firstly it ought to be able to show that even with its demythologising of paganism the resultant philosophical structures still contained a mass of contradictions, and that therefore only a thorough renewal of philosophy through contact with Christian inspiration held out any promise of finding coherence; and secondly that it contained grave misconceptions about the constitution of the individual.
Augustine's problem was to prevent the possible concentration of all the remaining energies of Graeco-Roman philosophy into what would have been an oppositionless Averroism, seven hundred and fifty years before its time, with consequences from its conception of the individual as needing to be transcendentally absorbed, disastrous for religious and social life.

It is possible to read every page of the de Trinitate VIII onwards as if neo-Platonist thought were in his mind and as if he were deliberately and critically restructuring it to make it acceptable; and in particular to make its reflections on the self-knowing and self-loving of νοότρία and the One as the basic metaphysical structure of the individual human mind. A mass of probable textual allusions to Plotinus can be found to justify this theory. The disappearance of so much of Porphyry's writings has almost certainly deprived us of the possibility of confirming the presence of allusions to them. Augustine's critique seems to be in two lines. One was by an implicit attack on the transcendent hypostases through a restructuring of the human personality on a model not unlike those of Aristotle's Parva Naturalia and Nicomachean Ethics, with the unequivocal assertion of the independence of each individual mens, characterised by the integrating and delimiting function of the individual memoria. The other line of critique lay in the use of modified neo-Platonist triads. Whilst his principle for modifying the triads of Plotinus is clear, our ignorance of Porphyry is a great hindrance. In these next two chapters the position of Augustine will be described, firstly with regard to his
general teaching in epistemology, and then with regard to his triadic teaching.

Mens and Memoria in the Individual

The term 'mens' brought together into a human unity, concepts which in νοῦς and ψυχή of the Greek of neo-Platonism, had at best an ambivalent but essentially transcendent meaning; it not only unified the faculties but individualised their possessor. As well as its use by Cicero, its occurrence in Chalcidius's commentary on Plato's Timaeus would have commended itself to Augustine. Here it was used of God: "est igitur mens Dei intelligendi aeternus actus"; and yet without any merging or identification it could be found in man, equated with his intellect, and made the highest part of the soul: "animae pars altera sanctior diviniorque, quae mens atque intellectus est".

Augustine's discussion of the memory include some most delicately sensitive passages of subjective self-analysis, especially in the Confessions. They are far more nuanced and of wider scope than his possible sources to which some commentators have drawn attention in Latin rhetor literature. His training would have made him very memory-conscious, but his reflections later were metaphysical in range. Significant as was the rhetor's consciousness of memory, more significant are the parallels between Augustine's and Aristotle's teaching on it.

Firstly, for both the basic principle establishing the
existence of memory is substantially identical. Aristotle insists on the existence of memory because there must be an original implantation of a perception which persists, so that subsequent remembering can draw on it. If it did not persist in a memory, it could not be recalled. Augustine speaks of something ultimate and first which lies in the memory,

"where we also find those contents which we think of for the first time, and where the inner word is begotten... from the understanding which already existed in the memory, but was latent there, although even thought itself, unless it had a memory of its own, would not return to those things which it had left in the memory when it thought of other things".

Secondly, even though Aristotle's position that

"one does not remember in the present what one experiences in the present" seems to be contradicted, even conceivably deliberately contradicted, by Augustine's paradoxical assertion of the possibility of a memory of the present, and even though Aristotle a fortiori denies there to be a memory of the future whilst Augustine even more paradoxically asserts the rôle of memory with regard to the future, there was the possibility of taking the words of Aristotle — that one does not remember in the present what one experiences in the present — in a different sense from their evident one. If the present is to be just the moving point of an unextended 'now' which is the boundary between past and future according to Aristotle's Physics, the experience of time would have only the unselfconscious intensity of the dancer's of Plotinus's image. But if it were admitted that time as experienced was essentially not of a point but of brief
continuum through which the intention of the mind continues, \(^{15}\) in which one got one's bearings and in which self-consciousness was involved, and if it were conceded that the centre of attention was always temporally a little behind what it perceived, not only because it was engaged in linking up its actual experience with past experiences but also because time was involved in expressing to itself what it was experiencing, and if the explanation of this time-involvement lay in the memory which would become the sine qua non of coherent experience, then the Aristotelian principle, præster intentionem auctoris, could justify the giving to the memory of a central epistemic rôle and, of necessity, an involvement in experience of the present.

Thirdly, the teaching of the de Memoria et Reminiscentia II that memory is self-conscious is strikingly parallel to Augustine's teaching on memoria sui \(^{17}\). Fourthly, there is a surprising number of detailed textual similarities between Augustine's treatment on memory and the de Memoria et Reminiscentia. The comparison of perception by the sense powers to wax receiving a seal is one of the normal Stoic images, but it does occur in Aristotle's text \(^{18}\). The impossibility of water receiving an impression occurs in both \(^{19}\). Both agree that the process of recollection is not under the control of the will \(^{20}\); and both consider in connection with memory, states of madness and conditions of confusion between what is real and imaginary \(^{21}\). Finally, Augustine states that he arranged his material in a form which is consistent and consecutive and that it could easily be re-learnt if forgotten, and this is reminiscent of the desiderata for
recollection of Aristotle. 22

But despite these similarities, which cannot have been mediated to Augustine by neo-Platonism because its hermeneutic transformation of Aristotelian themes had relegated the memoria to \( \psi \nu \chi \eta \): part in its memory of \( \nu o \upsilon \), but partly in its attachment to what was unreal, there are undoubtedly differences from Aristotle's teaching. The most striking is that for Aristotle memory is not in \( \nu o \upsilon \). 23

Commentators have tried to characterise the nature of the Augustinian memoria over and above its Aristotelian counterpart.

For Schmans it is "near our conception of 'consciousness', 'the range of one's mind'" 24. For G. Söhngen, "in fact the memoria performs in the Confessiones what intellectus does in the Aristotelian system of Thomas" 25. For Guitton "in a general way, the memory is the faculty by which the soul is present to itself" 26. For L. Cilleruelo, it is the "organo de perduración, distensión, unificación y conservación" 27.

It is all of these things, and something more. If it does overlap with the place of intellect in the Thomist part of the Aristotelian tradition, it still has its pure memory aspect. It is that from which knowledge which is not under consideration is called to be present; and perhaps here in the least elegant part of the theory: its content includes together and other intellectual notions 28. For the memory always has its content, whether cogitating it or not, even if it is only memory of the self"... we betake ourselves to the inner memory of the mind by which it remembers itself, and to the inner understanding by which it understands itself.
and to the inner will by which it loves itself, where these three things are always together at the same time, and always have been together at the same time, from the moment when they began to be, whether one thought of them or whether one did not think of them". 29

The mind, being incorporeal, is already known to itself; as with Aristotle's transcendent mind its self-presence is complete. From the memory which contains it, it has to make this self-knowledge conscious. 30 However, that it should consciously know itself, it has with the deliberation of Aristotle's embodied mind to express itself to itself. 31 But the difference from Aristotle is very clear: for him the self-presence of νοῦς was in undistended timelesslessness, hardly relatable to a human embodiment. For Augustine, even though the mens was time-distended, it was still present to itself. But this distension imposed upon it the duty of tending, through ecstasy, to eternity conceived in Christian terms. 32

Taking over the function of νοῦς in Plotinus with its complete self-presence, the memoria also took over the function of ψυχή with its function of bringing together the multiplicity of experiences into a unity, not only as the common sense of Aristotle relating simultaneous but separate sensata but bringing together experience spread out through time. Gathering these together and self-gathering, it reproduced at the level of the individual mens the desire of ψυχή to emulate the timeless intense contemplation of νοῦς. 33 If Augustine swung unmistakably in the
Roman-Stoic tradition of individual men's away from the Greek-Aristotelian tradition of transcendent \( \nu\nu\sigma \), he consented to speak in a language acceptable to both. Eclectic tradition had faced here an impasse exactly parallel to Aristotle's own. Augustine's traversing of this impasse could go even a little further and find a place for one-in-many transcendence of the neo-Platonist type in an explanation of the inherence of men in the Christian Godhead. Plotinus made memory an indication of being earth-bound and weak \(^{34}\); Augustine found a weakness in memory which he wished to rectify — a weakness which arose out of its involvement in time; so forgetfulness was a regrettable part of human life: "For with us to be is not the same as to know. For we know many things which live in some manner through our memory, and also die in some manner through forgetfulness, and, therefore, they are no longer in our knowledge, yet we are; and when our knowledge has slipped from us and perished out of our mind, yet we live". \(^{35}\) It was at once a brilliant insight into the means of a wholesale unification of knowledge and an inversion of neo-Platonist speculation to give to the despised human memory the same function as the self-gathering and knowledge unification of their \( \psi\nu\chi\eta \) and providing the possibility of the presence to self of their \( \nu\nu\sigma \). As we shall see it was another brilliant and parallel insight to take from the neo-Platonist hypostases the conception of their being the ultimate centres of consciousness, and therefore to be the conditions of meaningfulness and intelligibility by linking together the disparate, and to apply this to the human mens. In making the memory in the
individual mens 36 play substantially the same role in knowing as the hypostases, with a deep often undisclosed self-consciousness as a condition of consciousness of anything else, Augustine in fact had reconstructed the elements of Aristotelian analysis in the De Anima III in such a way that it embraced the phenomena of the other Aristotelian subjectivity structures. For this comprehensiveness the price to be paid was the indistinction of sense contents from intellectual contents, and the assertion of illumination as the source of intelligibility - but with no stated limit on how far into sense experience it would penetrate.

Fundamentally important in Augustine's thinking, the memoria is displayed in two different ways which correspond with two qualitatively different approaches to the question of self-knowledge. In the Confessions particularly and the commentaries on the Psalms, memory is continually being related to the consciousness of the passage of time; the interest lies in coming to a kind of self-knowledge which is more empirical: a knowledge of one's own qualities, pursued under a moral compulsion. For this kind of knowledge there is no ending: "nece ipse capio totum quod sum" 37.

This personalism and this sensitivity to the passage of time and its bearing on self-consciousness is quite different from the philosophical quality of de Trinitate VIII - XV. Here another genre of writing is evident: metaphysical, non-empirical, non-anecdotal, and almost timeless. Far from speaking of the disproportion of subject to object it speaks
of their equality: "mens et amor et notitia eius ... cum perfecta sunt aequalia sunt." 38 The content and its continual allusiveness have in mind always the neo-Platonism which he wished to combat, to make certain that the superior insight of Christian philosophy would make it the legitimate heir of Graeco-Roman philosophical tradition.

The ultimate subject matter - the eternal Godhead - and the type of analysis impose an immobility on the content, just as they did with the neo-Platonists.

Augustine was certainly aware of the difference between the two approaches which, under the aspect of self-knowledge, is contained in the distinction between "totum" and "tota". This corresponds approximately to the difference in English between "all" and "whole"; one can give one's attention to the whole of an object without taking all of it in. So Augustine writes:

"... it is absurd to claim that the mind (= mens) does not know as a whole what it knows. I do not say that it knows all, but that what it knows it knows as a whole. When it, therefore, knows something of itself which it cannot know except as a whole, it knows itself as a whole. But it knows itself as knowing something, and it cannot know something except as a whole. Therefore, it knows itself as a whole". 39

Yet Augustine proposed a connection between all-ness and whole-ness, and it is possible to use this as a means of reconciling the self-knowledge of the de Trinitate (whole-ness) with that of the Confessiones (all-ness):

"when the mind knows itself as a whole, that is, knows itself perfectly, its knowledge extends through all of it". 40
That it should know itself as a whole makes it possible to know all of itself; the distinction into kinds of self-knowledge does not correspond to a distinction in the subject matter.

Augustinian Noetic

Similar to Aristotle's in many respects, Augustine's epistemology yet lacks a clear account of the nature and mode of formation of universals. This has been noted by Gilson and U. Alvarez. In general terms, the teaching on intellectual knowledge of Augustine would be related, one would suppose, to two of his characteristic teachings: his doctrine of illumination, and his teaching on the eternal reasons.

Augustine certainly accepted that there were intelligible entities, but he did not seem to say that the mind made them: in terms of the Aristotelian structures they would be relatable to that of Metaphysics (on which Porphyry had written a commentary) and his analogy with the mediation of light more like Plato's than that of de Anima III. "But we ought rather to believe that the nature of the intellectual mind is so formed as to see these things, which, according to the disposition of the Creator, are subjoined to intelligible things in the natural order, in a sort of incorporeal light of its own kind." Though he certainly believed in special illumination from divine wisdom in what properly belonged to divine revelations, he also certainly believed that an illumination from divine truth was
necessary in all human knowledge. The position which Augustine set out in the early dialogue, de Magistro, remained substantially unaltered:

"when it is a question of things which we behold with the mind, namely, with our intellect and reason, we give verbal expression to realities which we directly perceive as present in that inner light of truth by which the inner man, as he is called, is enlightened and made happy. But, here again, if the one who hears my words sees those things himself with that clear and inner eye of the soul, he knows the things whereof I speak by contemplating them himself, and not by my words. Therefore, even when I say what is true, and he sees what is true, it is not I who teach him. For he is being taught, not by my words, but by the realities themselves made known to him by the enlightening action of God from within."

Of the understanding of revealed Christian teaching he could write

"(Deus) docet scientiam insinuando cognitionem".

The place of divine illumination in other epistemological contexts was the discernment of unchanging intelligible realities and in the assistance for the judgement to assent to what was correct.

"It is the province of the superior reason to judge of these corporeal things according to incorporeal and eternal reasons which, if they were not above the human mind, would certainly not be unchangeable; and yet unless something of our own were subjoined to them, we should not be able to employ them as standards by which to judge of corporeal things. But we judge of corporeal things according to the standard of dimensions and figures, which as the mind knows, remain unchangeable."
The background to this lies in both the noetic of Plato and Old Testament Wisdom speculations, but the neatness of the conception bears the mark of the systematisation of the neo-Platonist conception of \( \nu \omega \upsilon \upsilon \sigma \) and \( \nu \omega \eta \tau \alpha \) . It would be misleading to separate religious inspiration entirely from the normal illumination of the mind, for the same God gives his light in both. Following Plato Aristotle made a speculative identification of the religious and philosophical conceptions of mind and its activity, identifying thinking with the "divine". Neo-Platonist demythologisation had the same intention. The ease with which Augustine passed in his early works between religious and philosophical categories indicates the continuity and unity in his knowledge. Again in the de Trinitate he speculatively identified philosophical with doctrinal religious positions.

Where Augustine's position had ground in common with philosophical speculation he systematically opposed the kind of transcendence given by neo-Platonism to the hypostases. In the matter of epistemology it meant in fact a return, whether consciously or not, to a position nearer to Aristotle's.

Aristotelian rather than neo-Platonist Epistemology

a) Because the being of man was not identical with knowing \( \text{in } 49 \), and the intelligence not already filled because identical with all intellectual knowledge upon which it was always actively intent, he in fact asserted against neo-Platonism the
Aristotelian position of a potentiality for knowledge⁴⁹a. Even the de Magistro, which speaks of knowledge existing before instruction,⁵⁰ also quite clearly speaks of a potentiality to be instructed by Christ, the only true teacher⁵¹. And man can be possessed by the desire to know sense objects and to learn a science of which he was hitherto ignorant⁵².

b) Augustine's explanation of the manner in which involvement with material things has made the soul is in fact a moralising embroidery of the basis of Aristotle's conception of sensation:

"because they are bodies which it has loved outside of itself through the senses of the body, and with which it has become entangled by a kind of daily familiarity, it cannot bring them into itself as though into a country of incorporeal nature, and, therefore, it fastens together their images, which it has made out of itself, and forces them into itself. For in forming them it gives them something of its own essence (Dat enim eis formandis quidam substantiae suae), but it also keeps something by which it may freely judge of the species of these images; this is what is called more precisely the mind, namely, the rational understanding which is kept in order to pass judgement. For we perceive that we have, in common with the beasts, those parts of the soul that are informed by the images of bodies" (quae corporum similitudinibus informantur)⁵³. There is a passage in de Anima III, of which this may be an extended interpretation; "sense is that which is receptive of the form of sensitive objects without the matter, just as the wax receives the impression of the signet ring without the iron in the gold ..." ⁵⁴ Thus he did not follow Plotinus's explicit rejection of sensation as passive reception of a form ⁵⁵, and his attempted explanation of it in terms of a shock of an external object ⁵⁶.
c) The similarities between Augustine's account of the memory and Aristotle's have already been drawn, and its absence from memory has been noted as a difference. Plotinus followed Aristotle's transcendent subjectivity structure faithfully in making its activity timeless and a memory for it unnecessary. Even though Augustine made the self-reflecting memory take over the rôle of self-knowing as the ultimate centre of subjectivity, and even though he followed the neo-Platonists in making free use of the basic principle of the common sense as Aristotle conceived it as a means of noetic systematisation, this extension of the latter and the dissimilarities of the former are insufficient to make Augustine's subjectivity structure far removed from Aristotle's empirical structures. In Augustine the memory embraces the activity of Aristotle's internal common sense — embracing as well in continuity what the common sense does in simultaneity. Aristotle left the sense powers with considerable independence, and only impressionistically related them to an overall principle. That the imagination functioned in conditions of unconsciousness (in dreams or when the sight was not functioning), and was capable of making mistakes, inclined him not to treat it as an indubitable internal sense power. The inaccuracies of the imagination (conceiving black swans and quadruped birds) were, for Augustine, an argument for the presence of the imagination within the memory on which it drew, as was its contribution to reminiscence. Doubly unlike Aristotle in its confident systematisation and its memory-centredness, Augustine's structure was yet more like it in his rejection of the rigidities of superhuman neo-Platonism and in its acceptance into human activity of a lively variability — accounted for not by the independence of the faculties but the adaptability of the containing memory itself.
d) Most like Aristotle is Augustine's discussion on what prompts cognitive activity into action. In sense knowledge, even if the power has to be directed to the object by the intention of will, there is no question but that the sense power receives the form of its knowledge from the object. That intelligible realities are apt to be received by the intellect dispenses with the need for an agent intellect. The acceptance of passivity in the cognitive powers sets him quite apart from Plotinus's view. He can be credibly supposed to be familiar with the difficulties of Aristotle's commentators in reconciling the accounts of knowledge in Metaphysics and de Anima III. That he was for the former can be inferred from two texts in the de Trinitate:

i) '... we must obviously hold fast to this principle that everything which we know begets the knowledge of itself within us at the same time. For knowledge is born from both, from the one who knows and the object that is known'.

ii) '... knowable things, whether they precede in time or begin to be at the same time, beget knowledge and are not begotten by it.'

The alternative positions in the second extract correspond with the positions in the long-standing debate among Aristotle's commentators over the seemingly opposed positions taken up in de Anima III and Metaphysics. His option for the position that intellectual objects are not created by the mind but themselves create the knowledge, in making it the fulfilment of a potentiality of mind, opposes him to the neo-Platonist denial of there being any potentiality in knowing. Awareness of this debate would demand a far deeper appreciation for the reconciliation of the two texts together than that provided by A. Stöckl: 'Without an object no knowledge. But the subject must be active in this knowledge.' The first extract has the same idea that the object actively produces knowledge, but
'congenerat' $^{67}$ does not mean that the mind is passive to the object's activity: that would make the object alone truly 'generate' the knowledge. In the activity of the subject (also present in sensation) might there not be an eclectic proposal for the inclusion of a residuum of activity from the $\textit{vou\acute{s}}$ of de Anima III, now shown of the transcendent divine nature which had harassed the commentators for so long?

The Aims of the de Trinitate

The principle purpose of this thesis is the elucidation of the significance of the de Trinitate in its teaching on self-knowledge. Before beginning this task it will be to the point to sum up the number of related aims which Augustine had from the moment when he evidently makes a new beginning at the opening of Book VIII:

"Let us turn our attention to these subjects which we shall analyse in a more interior manner than the way in which we have treated them before". $^{58}$

a) The work began as an anti-Arian writing, and that intention continued. Arians had brought together neo-Platonist subordinationist triads and scriptural texts which seemed to have a subordinationist meaning. By demonstrating a non-subordinated trinity on the human mind he could construct a case for the likelihood of a non-subordinated Trinity in the Godhead. An effective critique of neo-Platonism would deprive Arianism of its intellectual support.

b) Probably more important in the second part was the need to compose a statement of orthodox Christian belief in the Trinity in terms of the Graeco-Roman philosophical tradition which meant to say with
relationship to the strongly structured and comprehensive neo-Platonism of Plotinus and Porphyry, showing at the same time that this belief was the product of the Christian scriptures 69.

c) This meant in some respects a critical rejection of neo-Platonist themes and expressions, and in other respects a deliberate critical acceptance of its ideas into the system. The spirit was at once orthodoxly Christian and philosophically eclectic — that eclecticism which offered a model in its philosophical structuring of how religious and philosophical conceptions might be brought into a single construct, and at the same time provided Augustine through complete works, translations, commentaries and doxographies, with an encyclopaedic collection of philosophical ideas from the past. Particularly necessary was the replacement of the continuity between divine and human with the separation of individual minds and transcendent God, as in the conception of an 'exchange of natures', the Christian doctrine of grace, quite scripturally based, taught a less than substantial divinisation of man.

d) Consequently there had to be a quite fresh beginning in the accounting for the structure of personality. Consciousness and self-consciousness were to be made personal. Against Plotinus, though not Porphyry, they had to be insisted on as a characteristic of God. As for man, it had to be unequivocally maintained that his mind was an absolute principle of his own mental activity. Triadic activities attributed to both the One and νοῦς were unequivocally and deliberately asserted of the human mind in its own right and associated with the characteristics of ψυχή; and together they were posited in
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the mens of Stoicism and the memoria of composite origin. The conception of self-knowledge as a condition of knowledge of anything else, taken from the Aristotelian tradition, was: shorn of any transcendence in its source and neo-Platonist developments, and applied to a structure individually complete — as in the Parva Naturalia and Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. And in this autonomous structure, treated timelessly and unanecdotally, there is a comprehensive reference to cognition of every kind.

Of the time-bound, richly anecdotal view of the Confessions there is no space to treat in this thesis.

Subjectivity unassisted by friendship

As a consequence of the autonomy which he attributed to every individual, without undervaluing friendship Augustine dispensed with the place of a friend in coming to self-knowledge; only when one had come to true self-knowledge could one correctly value one's friend. A de Trinitate text probably alludes to the section in Plato's Alcibiades I which compares the friend's role with seeing oneself reflected in his eye-pupil. The idea is rejected on the grounds that the highest clarity must be the knowledge of the self to itself; as with the primacy of self-love, the primacy of self-knowledge was a metaphysical necessity. (Provided they were related to the love and knowledge of God there was not necessarily any pride about them; and the priority of self-love over love of neighbour could even claim divine warrant.)
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"The mind cannot love itself unless it also knows itself, for how can it love what it does not know? Or if anyone says that the mind by a general or special knowledge believes that it is such, as it experiences others, he is speaking in a very foolish manner. For whence does a mind know another mind if it does not know itself?

For not as the eye of the body sees other eyes without knowing itself, does the mind know other minds and does not know itself. For we see bodies through the eyes of the body, because we cannot refract the rays which shine through them and touch whatever we see, and reflect them back into the eyes themselves, except when we are looking into a mirror. But this is a subject that is discussed very subtly and very obscurely, until it can be clearly shown whether it is actually so, or whether it is not so.

But whatever may be the nature of the power by which we see through the eyes, we certainly do not see the power itself, whether it be rays or anything else, with the eyes, but we seek it in the mind; and if it is possible, we comprehend it in the mind. As the mind itself, therefore, gathers the knowledge of corporeal things through the bodily senses, so it gains the knowledge of incorporeal things through itself, since it is incorporeal."

It is hardly possible that a later passage does not allude to Alcibiades I. Here he sees a real danger that in being over-impressed by what one thinks one sees in other people, one may apply a quite unreal conception of oneself to oneself. And as to searching into the eyes of others it is only satisfactory to look into a mirror to obtain a good reflection of oneself; but the immediate way in which the mind knows itself has no analogy with this.

* Unde enim mens aliquam mentem novit, si se non novit?

** Mens ergo ipsa sicut incorporearum rerum notitias per sensus corporis colligit, sic incorporearum per semetipsam. Ergo et semetipsam per ipsam novit, quoniam est incorporea.
"Behold! the mind seeks to know itself and is inflamed with this desire. Therefore, it loves, but what does it love? Itself? But how, since it does not yet know itself, and no one can love what he does not know? Or has it become acquainted with its own beauty in the same way as we usually hear about people who are absent by means of a report? Perhaps, then, it does not love itself at all, but the image which it forms of itself, and which may be far different from itself. Or if the mind forms an image that is like itself, and, therefore, when it loves this fancied image it loves itself; then, perhaps, it knows other minds from which it forms an image of itself, and so it is already known to itself generically (genera ipso). But why then does it not know itself, since it knows other minds, if nothing can be more present to itself than itself? But if it were with the mind as with the eyes of the body, to which the eyes of others are better known than its own eyes to themselves, then let it not seek itself for it will never find itself. For eyes will never see themselves except in a mirror; nor are we to believe in any way that such means may be also used for the contemplation of incorporeal things, or that the mind should know itself as it were in a mirror."

Admittedly the parallelism is not complete: in Alcibiades I it was a question of seeking the reflection of oneself in the eye of a friend, not just searching the eyes of others. But the principle of Augustine undercuts its argument: the friend, the alter ego, cannot possibly be known to one as one is able to be known to oneself; and here he agrees with Plotinus that the mind can in no way look at itself from outside.

The place of friendship is not absent from Augustine's account of self-knowledge, but it does not have the sense of dependence on the other which Plato gave it. He is primarily concerned with how it is possible to recognise another soul as just, and therefore lovable.
"He therefore who loves men ought to love them, either because they are just or that they may be just. So ought he to love himself also, either because he is just or that he may be just, for in this way he loves his neighbour as himself without any danger".

For Augustine the man capable of friendship will make certain that he has something to contribute before making a friendship and that they will be united in the possession of the highest of ideals.

Augustine's Structure of Subjectivity

In the setting of an individual mens, human subjectivity is considered without either attention to the obscuring of knowledge through sin and evil or a place for the need of divine illumination. Eclectic systematising of subjectivity, especially the neo-Platonist transcendent hermeneutic of Aristotle, had already placed self-knowledge at the centre of all other knowing; Augustine's transposition of transcendent categories to the individual mens took this as proven.

As always insisting on the priority of self-knowledge consequent on the immediacy of self-presence, and with this self-knowledge as the only means of knowing other souls, Augustine begins his examination of self-knowledge in Book VIII.

'For what is so intimately known, and what knows itself to be itself (seque ipsum esse sentit), than that through which all other things are likewise known, that is, the soul (animus) itself. For we recognise the movements of bodies also from their resemblance to ourselves, and
from this fact we perceive that others live beside ourselves, since we also move our body in living as we observe these bodies to be moved. For even when a living body is moved ... we notice that something is present within that bulk (moles), such as is present in us, so that we are able to move our bulk in a similar way, and this is the life and the soul. Nor is this the property, so to speak, of human prudence and reason. For even beasts sense the fact that not only do they themselves live, but also that they live with others like them and with one another, and that we ourselves do so. Nor do they see our souls except through the movements of our bodies, and that at once and very easily by a sort of natural familiarity (quadam conspiratione naturali). Therefore, we know the soul of anyone at all from our own, and from our own we believe of him whom we do not know. For we are not only conscious of our soul, but we can also know what our soul is by studying our own, for we have a soul.  

Unaware of the variety of subjectivity structure in Aristotle's works, R. Schneider proposed that 'self-feeling' from an inner sense characterised Aristotle, Stoicism and Augustine together as 'the specific form of sensitive life'. However, the place he refers to in Aristotle ('De Anima 2 Anfang') explicitly denies the existence of any self-conscious sense besides the sense powers themselves, whilst the passage he refers to in Augustine, almost as if he had heard of this Aristotelian theory, explicitly denies the self-consciousness of each external sense and proposes that in man this function is performed by the reason. Against Aristotle's assertion that if self-consciousness is taken away from the individual senses there would be an infinite regress, Augustine asserts that the process terminates with the reason. This certainty, so unlike the divergence of Aristotle's structures with their perceptiveness and greater elegance,
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was prepared for by centuries of eclectic systematisation. Eclecticism and Romanitas in their hermeneutical transformation of Aristotelian variety and profundity were guided by two unquestioned epistemological criteria. First, the desire for a simple form in which all knowing could be comprehended; in sensation and in intellection that meant the control of activities conceived of as peripheral or outer by an inner centre of reference and self-consciousness. Secondly, there was the presumption that this form applied analogously to both. Therefore Porphyry saw no incongruity in applying the pattern of the common sense as embodying an epistemic principle of the most universal significance even to the level of the One itself. Conversely, Augustine felt himself free to apply neo-Platonic noetic and erotic principles attributed to the hypostases to the individual mens. But theoretical comprehensiveness was not enough: the range of the presiding reason could be made to include moral activity as well as thinking. Therefore when the judging activity of reason is described it is not just an epistemic judgement of separating and uniting, but a moral judgement of value as well.

"... in regard to those things which are below reason, that is of bodily things and the bodily senses and the inner sense, what else but reason (ratio) tells us how one is better than another, and how reason is nobler than any of them? This could not happen unless it judged them."

It is true that a precedent can be found for this in the aberrant structure of de Anima III, with which Augustine's utilitarian product has so much in common; but style and method are widely apart. The eclectic spirit was impatient of
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It is true that a precedent can be found for this in the aberrant structure of de Anima III, with which Augustine's utilitarian product has so much in common; but style and method are widely apart. The eclectic spirit was impatient of
anything but the final result of reflection, reduced to its simplest expression; and inner self-consciousness could be given with complete ease a place in this pattern.

In *De Trinitate* IX this pattern is developed into a generalised theory of the necessity of self-knowledge as a condition of knowledge of anything else. It was not Augustine's personal discovery but a transformation of neo-Platonic conceptions according to the status of an individual mind, perhaps intent on eternity, but involved in time. For Plotinus and Porphyry self-knowledge and other knowledge in *vou̞s* were essentially identical not only conditionally inseparable, with an ontological, though not temporal, priority of self-knowledge over knowledge of anything else. The movement of return upon oneself, was the condition of identity, integrity, completeness — though its self-knowledge was fundamentally a consequence of knowledge of the One and the sense of separation from it. The transposition of the characteristics of this hypostatic self-knowledge to the individual involved the need to develop the memory as the faculty of time-bound self-knowledge and consciousness to connect what was separate in time as well as diverse. As the essential identity of self-knowledge and object-consciousness is transformed into self-knowledge as a condition of object consciousness, the ontological priority of self-knowledge becomes a temporal priority; it exists in the child *85* and the unselfconscious before its presence is averted to. Partly as a consequence of characterising the function of ratio as a faculty of judging, the complete
identity of subject and object in the original structure of Aristotle is replaced by a dianoetic superiority, remaining undivided over what it has to judge. This presence may do no more than emphasise an element already in Aristotle, but judging between opposites did not arise in the cognitive activity of νοῦς. "Notitia sui" is an interior citadel whose existence is a condition of there being any knowledge of anything else, because it becomes identified with mens itself.

de Trinitate Book IX: Self-Loving and Self-Knowing

Book IX begins with a scripturally-based statement of the Christian conception of the search for God, affirming the coherence of belief based on authority with truth as sought by the understanding, after which an account of the Trinity ends with the statement from 1 John IV: "Deus charitas est."

Augustine's intention is to build bridges with neo-Platonist thinking, for the Evangelist's statement has its counterpart in Plotinus's description of the One: "... desire and substance are one and the same thing with him". Though the One is remote from man, Plotinus said (broaching the theme which is Augustine's own) "we can sometimes see in ourselves a nature like his". Therefore to go from the image to the supreme principle was to pursue a relationship sought by Plotinus himself:

"We are not yet speaking of heavenly things, not yet of God the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, but of this imperfect image (de hac impari imagine), which is an image nevertheless, that is, of man."
That Augustine should begin this book with an account of God in terms of love and speak of the divine image in man firstly in terms of love is probably a deliberate counterpart to the Platonic doctrine of ἐρως which reappears strongly in Plotinus as the way to God and ecstasy: ἐρως is born from the soul in its effort at the contemplation of the One; it is "a being worthy of the object it contemplates". 91 And "one arrives there if one is of a loving nature, and if from the beginning one has the disposition of a true philosopher". 92 Justified by the Plotinian text that we can sometimes see in ourselves a nature like that of the One he applies the triad of loving which is attributed to the One as 'Father of Reason' in Ennead VI 93, who is "at the same time object loved, love, and self love" to the human mens, slightly changing its order: "Ego et quod amo et ipse amor" 94. Initiating a type of analysis with concordent totalities of mens, notitia and amor (so unlike the empiricism of the Confessions with its self-mystery), Augustine asserts that in the case of self-love, as in self-willing, the love or will is equal to the mens.

"But what does to love oneself mean, other than to wish to be with oneself to enjoy oneself. And when anyone wishes himself to be just as he is, then the will is equal to the mind, and the love is equal to the lover". 95

And this love, which is equal to the self of the lover, is not extrinsic equality but a substantial identity. Augustine argues:

"And if love is a substance, it is certainly not body but spirit; the mind is not body but spirit. Yet love and mind are not two spirits, but one spirit; not two essences but one essence". 96
Only after this exercise, based on the primacy of love in the commandments of Scripture but concessive at once to the Platonic tradition of the primacy of \( \varepsilon \rho \omega \lambda \varsigma \) and to the spirit of Romanitas in style, does Augustine turn to the question of self-knowledge for "the mind cannot love itself unless it also knows itself, for how can it love what it does not know?" 97 The simplicity of the later expression does not quite lose its allusiveness to the rambling, unrelated Greek themes of daimonic \( \varepsilon \rho \omega \lambda \varsigma \) and the precept to "Know Thyself".

The mens knows itself through itself: 'ergo et semetipsam per se ipsam novit, quoniam est incorpoream'; 98 and this means there is an equality between itself and its self-knowledge. This is reminiscent of a passage in Plotinus which makes the self-knowledge of the One depend on the absence of otherness — i.e. that there is a perfect coincidence between itself and its self-knowledge: 'he who has no difference in himself is always present (to himself)' 99.

And so there is the same equality between the human mens and its self-knowledge as there was between itself and its self-love. In both cases there can be a dyad: 'But just as there are two things, the mind and love, when it loves itself, so there are two things, the mind and its knowledge, when it knows itself.' 100. And the two dyads can be conflated to form a triad, embracing together knowledge and love in a way that Greek thought never had done: 'Therefore, the mind itself, its love and its knowledge are a kind of trinity; these three are one, and when they are perfect they are equal.' 101
Thus two neo-Platonist conceptions of the self-love and the self-knowledge of the One are simplified in themselves and are interrelated and then applied to the human mens. Its self-knowing and self-loving are detached from divine self-knowing and self-loving. The possibility of attainment of this perfect equality in the human mens makes it clear that there is no need for a man to seek absorption of mind and soul into a transcendent whole; it became conceivable too that the mind could generate its norm of truthfulness in self-knowing, and a moral norm through its self-loving. So it set up a moral ideal as clearly as the neo-Platonist, but unmistakably human.

Important consequences follow from this conception of a mental triad-in-unity. If mind, its self-knowledge and self-love can be identified — mind completely present to itself in self-knowledge, and in self-love not two spirits but one — it follows that the knowledge by mens of other things and its love of other things besides itself are extensions of its self-knowledge and self-love. So consciousness presupposes self-consciousness: not as the binding structure of the entire noetic cosmos, not as an insight into the nature of thought, but as a consequence of the realisation that self-love and self-knowledge mean the complete presence of mens to itself. Derived from the more transcendent conceptions, the rejection of a transcendent and separated faculty alone made possible an integrated structure of subjectivity. Similarly there would be no loving of anything else unless there were first self-loving:
'the mind can also love something else beside itself by the same love by which it loves itself. Similarly, the mind does not know itself alone, but also many things. Therefore, love and knowledge are not in the mind as in a subject, but they are also there substantially as the mind itself is'.

And so,

'if the love by which the mind loves itself ceases to be, then the mind will also cease to love at the same time; likewise, if the knowledge by which the mind knows itself ceases to be, the mind will also cease to know at the same time'.

Thus self-love and self-knowledge search for that equality with themselves which Plotinus made out to be the law of knowing, and striving after knowing, and the measure of truth.

"When the mind, therefore, knows itself fully and nothing else with itself, then its knowledge is equal to it, because its knowledge is not from another nature when it knows itself. And when it perceives itself fully and nothing more, then its knowledge is neither less nor greater than itself".

When the mind knows itself, and takes complaisance in itself—loves itself, it has to express itself to itself in a verbum which is none-the-less, through its substantial presence to itself, identical and equal to itself:

"When the mind knows itself and approves what it knows, this same knowledge is in such way its word, that it is wholly and entirely on a par with it, is equal to, and identical with it, because it is not the knowledge of a lower essence, such as the body, nor of a higher essence such as God. And since knowledge has a likeness to that thing which it knows, namely that of which it is the knowledge, then in this case it has a perfect and equal likeness, because the mind itself, which knows, is known. And, therefore, knowledge is both its image and its word,
because it is an expression of that mind and is equalled to it by knowing, and because what is begotten is equal to its begetter."

In this way neo-Platonist concepts of knowing and loving can be satisfactorily employed for Christian conceptions. The model for human knowing is not the One with its purity of self-love, self-willing and self-knowing nor the transcendent all-knowing, self-knowing νοῦς, drawing men by love into an ecstasy of knowledge; the human mind has an independence and the measure of its knowing is equality with itself, as the measure of its morality is a love and a will which exactly corresponds with itself, in relationship to which all other knowing and all other willing should fall into their natural place.

de Trinitate X: "eine Interpretation des delphischen 

\[\textit{γνῶθι \ σεαυτόν}\]

Theiler has written that

"the greater part of Book X up to section 16 is without relationship to the Trinity; there is found an interpretation of the delphic oracle's 

\[\textit{γνῶθι \ σεαυτόν}\]

But Augustine had concerns in view far more contemporary than the Oracle: perhaps, though Theiler does not say so, Porphyry's own commentary on 'Know thyself' addressed to Iamblichus, of which only a few fragments remain.

Speculatively synthetic though it was, the rigour of the metaphysical reflection on self-knowing and self-loving in Book IX kept itself within neo-Platonist terms of reference.
Yet Plotinus's concern in self-knowledge extended to loss of oneself and re-discovery. These interests are also pursued in Book X, yet without the heart anguish of the Confessions or the moralising of the sermons: in fact with that combination of ethical with metaphysical outlook which was neo-Platonism's own.

The difficulty in self-knowing is due to the unnecessary obscurity which comes from looking for the self as for something unknown and strange:

"What does the mind love therefore, when it ardently seeks to know itself while it is unknown to itself?" ...

..."has it become acquainted with its own beauty in the same way as we usually hear of people by means of a report? Perhaps then, it does not love itself at all, but the image which it forms of itself, and which may be different from itself".

Augustine insisted that the self was not so remote nor was the process so difficult. If the mind is present to itself so completely, the search for true self-knowledge, even where it does not seem successful, is in fact self-knowing:

"this is indeed very remarkable, that it does not yet know itself, and it already knows how beautiful it is to know itself! ... But where does it know its own knowing if it does not know itself? ... For it knows itself as seeking and not knowing, while it seeks to know itself."

Reminiscently of a passage in Plotinus where he insists that a being which knew itself in part by another part could not know all (Τὸ ἑαυτὸν) of itself, Augustine continues that this line of argument would lead to a contradiction:
'What shall we, therefore, say? That the mind knows itself in part, and does not know itself in part?'

Here he makes the distinction between 'whole' and 'all' referred to above:

'When (the mind), therefore knows something of itself which it cannot know except as a whole (tota), it knows itself as a whole (totam)'.

The apparent difficulty in self-knowledge comes about through an inaccurate conceptualisation of what it entails. The metaphysical approach with its grasp on the principle which lies within every search for self-knowledge is the only means of giving meaning to the multiplicity of these searches and, in fact, of making clear the kind of knowledge which they look for but fail to find.

The possibility of being wholly self-concerned produces the best answer to the question 'why was (the mind) commanded to know itself? It was, I believe, that it might consider itself and live according to its nature, that is, that it might desire to be ruled according to nature, namely under Him to whom it must be brought into subjection, and above those to whom it must be preferred: under Him by whom it must be governed, above those whom it must govern. For it does many things through evil desires, as though it had forgotten itself'.

Perhaps not only neo-Platonist noetic was present in this reflection, but its bearing on it was immense: Augustine was in fact proposing again that complete change in focus which we are finding repeatedly in the thought of the de Trinitate. According to Plotinus and Porphyry self-equality, even in this life, was only possible in ecstatic union with the One; even voûs did not completely possess it. And in his embodied
condition, man had an illusory nature, incapable, because not independent, of finding complete coincidence with itself. In place of absorption into the divine, Augustine insisted on the status of subjection in which the human men remained the centre of its personal activity. That fall towards not-being which Plotinus described would not be a cosmic flaw, a diffusion into multiplicity of everything outside the One: there would indeed be a fall ('labitur in minus et minus quod putat amplius et amplius'), but it would specifically be a moral decline ('perdit securitatem'); for to live according to its nature meant to live in subjection to God, outside of whom there is no possibility of finding this self-equality ('nec ipsa sibi, nec ei quidquam sufficit recedenti ab illo qui solus sufficit') 116.

In place of an ascetic leading to an awareness of the self-knowing of θυγγ through the self-knowing of ψυχή, Augustine proposed the possibility of the mind's discerning a self-thinking which it has never not been without. The way to discern this self-thinking is deliberately to discard every sense- and bodily-related experience and the burden of imagery which accompany them, and so to become aware of oneself as within.

'Let the mind, therefore, know itself, and not seek itself as though it were absent: let it fix the attention of its will, by which it formerly wandered over many things, upon itself, and think of itself. So it will see that there never was a time when it did not love itself, and never a time when it did not know itself; but because it loved another thing with itself, it has confused itself with this other thing, and as it
were grown together with it. And so while it embraces diverse things as though they were one, it came to regard as one, things that were diverse'.

The mind can be certain that, when, without any imaginative construction (imaginale figmentum), it thinks that it lives, that it remembers, understands and loves itself, it is knowing itself; for then, as with the Husserlian ἐποχή, only itself is left:

'And if it adds nothing from these thoughts (of material things) to itself, so as to regard itself as something of the kind, then whatever still remains to it of itself, that alone is itself'.

From this reflection he takes self-memory, self-knowledge and self-love as related essentially. This is the first entry of memoria sui into the argument: it would be challenging to neo-Platonists to have the memory, despised except for its recollection of what was above it, fit only to be discarded, introduced as an image of a fully conscious and self-conscious deity. It takes the place of mens in the triad of Book IX: three mutually comprehensive activities were to be a better image of the Christian divine triad than a faculty and two equivalent powers.

Firstly he expresses their mutual embraces in terms of a complete account of all possible parings of their activities.

'For I remember that I have a memory, understanding and will; and I understand that I understand, will and remember; and I will that I will, remember and understand; and at the same time I remember my whole memory, understanding and will ... . Therefore when all are mutually comprehended by each one,
and are comprehended as wholes, then each one as a whole is equal to each other one as a whole, and each one as a whole is equal to all together as wholes; and all these three are one life, one mind and one essence'.

That this statement is in enneadic form is significant with relation to the thesis that Augustine had Porphyry's philosophy in mind. Whilst leaving to the next chapter a speculative appreciation of Augustine's ennead, these historical observations can be made here. Hadot has pointed out the likelihood that Porphyry constructed an ennead reducible to a grill whose horizontal elements of being — life — thought have the vertical elements of Father — Life — Intellect. Elsewhere he has also linked Augustine's ennead with one in Victorinus:

'Triplex igitur in singulis singularitas et unalitas in trinitate'.

The mutual containment of the three powers in Augustine's ennead and their embrace by the memory, commended itself as a model for the Christian triad-in-unity, whereas Porphyry could not reduce nine-foldness to a unity, and Victorinus could only assert it without justification by argument.

Secondly, he expresses their mutual embrace in terms of a coincident unity of all three together:

"We have found the mind in the memory, understanding and will of itself in that just as it was always understood to know and always to will itself, so at the same time it always remembers itself, always understands itself, and always loves itself".

This inner triad is the irreducible nucleus, the essential
self-knowing activity of the human mind. Presupposed in any cogitatio, awareness of it derives from it without altering it; but it always exists regardless of awareness of it: unvarying, always complete and continuous through time.

de Trinitate XIV: similarities to de Anima III 4 on Self-Knowledge

For Plotinus, if the body were thrown out of harmony, there might be an activity of reason or mind, but it could pass without there being awareness of the fact; for Augustine it was normal and human for there to be knowing in the mind which would not become conscious unless there were deliberate 'cogitatio'. This was the natural way of knowing; this division was not in itself the consequence of a flaw in man's powers. Even though the mind is immediately known to itself, it is in need of cogitatio in order consciously to think of itself:

'But so great is the power of thought (cogitationis) that not even the mind itself may place itself, so to speak, in its own sight, except when it thinks of itself. And consequently nothing is so in the sight of mind, except when one thinks of it (cogitatur), that not even mind itself, by which is thought whatever is thought, can be in its own sight in any other way than by thinking of itself'.

That this self-thinking requires an 'interior verbum' we have already seen but it would be inaccurate to conceive this formation of a thought of the self as making a division in itself:
is it, as it were, doubled, so that it is both there and here, that is, both where it can see and where it can be seen ...? When the truth is consulted it does not give any of these answers ... .

But this is not the activity of the triad of mutual equivalences of mens, notitia sui and amor sui of Book IX, nor the ennead of mutual containment of the pairings of meminisse sui, se nosse and se velle of Book X. For therein lies the essence of Augustine's subjectivity structure: irrespective of its ever becoming conscious, the inner activity of mind is continuous through time from the moment of its coming into existence; and the outer and conscious activity of knowing and willing other objects besides the self is dependent on the inner and unceasing self-remembering, self-knowing and self-loving. To a remarkable degree the conscious, deliberate self-thinking corresponds to the kind of self-knowledge in Aristotle's de Anima III when the mind deliberately turns its attention to itself; the deep continuity of 'se nosse' is a counterpart to the timeless self-thinking of pure thought. And this is in accord with the comprehensiveness of Augustine's structure which attributes to mens a limited element of the divine nous of Aristotle and the neo-Platonists.

Consciously or unconsciously, Augustine followed Aristotle's thought in recognising simultaneous and continuous time-awareness as necessitating a faculty as the medium of coherent experience. But the conclusions went beyond Aristotle's in proposing the memory as the necessary container of all experience, the total co-ordinator of cognition.
So primary did it become in his thought that he felt obliged to ask whether memoria sui were in fact by itself the essential activity of the mind so that notitia sui and voluntas sui came after it even temporally as derivative cогitatio. 'For if this is so, then the mind does not have these three things, so that it remembered itself, understood itself, and loved itself; but it only remembered itself, and afterwards when it began to think of itself (cogitare se), then it understood and loved itself.'¹³⁷ And this would mean that the image of the Trinity could not be found in self-knowing and self-loving, but only in self-remembering¹³⁸.

He grants that actual thinking may draw on the resources of the memory:

'the gaze of the mind is formed in remembering from those things which are contained in the memory, and ... some such thing was in him when he remembered before he thought ... I am now referring to understanding as that whereby we understand when actually thinking, that is whereby our thought is formed after the finding of those things which had been present in our memory, but of which we were not thinking.'¹³⁹

In this case there is an object in the memory which, with the loving attention of the knower, produces knowledge in him: 'I am referring to will, love, or dilection as that which unites this child with its parent, and is in some way common to both.'¹⁴⁰ This is very like the deliberate self-thinking of de Anima III which required the interpretation of choice and will.

But in the case of inner self-knowing, and continuing in the same imagery, there is an exception to the principle 'cogniscibilia cognitionem gignunt, non cognitione gignunter': with complete self-presence this knowing is as
divisionless as that of Aristotle's divine vous. From this principle of self-knowledge of mind through its self-presence it is clear that the inner element in mind cannot be self-memory alone:

"For (mind) is not adventitious to itself, as if to the mind already existing, there were to come from somewhere else that same self not already existing; or as if it did not come from somewhere else, but in the mind already existing, there were born the mind itself not already existing, just as there arises in the mind which already existed, the faith which did not exist; or as if the mind sees itself, as it were set up in its own memory, after it had learned to know itself by recollection; just as if it were not there before it knew itself, since from the moment that it began to be, it has certainly never ceased to be to remember itself, never ceased to love itself".

It is ridiculous to suppose that self-knowing would have to come into existence at a later time within the memory of the self. Without any necessity to go above itself in order to discover itself and without any circular thinking of out-going and return upon itself (as the neo-Platonists supposed), this thinking, whether consciously or not, offered eirenically a modification to the two self-knowledge situations of Aristotle's de Anima III in order to create a subjectivity structure which was humanly complete. In its consummate eclecticism Augustine's structure could take in and interrelate other elements (in the nature of memory and will) which may be traced to an indirect, even conceivably direct, knowledge of Aristotelian texts. 'Human nature, therefore, has been so formed that never does it not remember itself, never does it not understand itself, never does it not know
Such a lapidary statement, though, breathes forth a non-Greek spirit: a 'claritas' and a 'Romanitas', which yet conveyed more authentically than Cicero and Varro the impression of that power and modesty of mind which goes with a connatural grasp, like Aristotle's himself, of those realities treated by him as 'meta-physical'.

Conclusion

Augustine's conception of self-knowing in the de Trinitate is in fact a resolution of the Aristotelian problematic whose transcendent side had come to him in the completely rigorous and all-inclusive form of neo-Platonism. Rejecting their transcendent conception of mind, he yet incorporated the characteristic of primary self-knowing into his conception of the individual mens which, though it had in part a Roman Stoic background, kept an Aristotelian role of judging: not only the value, whether good or bad, of its objects, but also separating and uniting the objects of experience.

In addition, from the material principally as presented to him by eclectic neo-Platonism (and with a degree of awareness of its ultimate sources for which we can only conjecture), he did in fact pursue the eclectic path further. He brought into an ordered arrangement the Aristotelian teaching of self-knowing and the Platonist teaching on ἔγνως, already linked together but only hesitantly interrelated by Plotinus. And he did this with a deliberate hermeneutical change;
scaling down their notions as re-thought out by the neo-Platonists to the level of the individual with his mens, his knowing integrated together over his time-bound experience through his memoria. The individual man in terms of whom Augustine reinterprets this philosophical data is not, like the neo-Platonist hypostases, timelessly thinking and self-thinking, nor, like the neo-Platonist initiates, finding that at the higher stages of his union with the Good, his will is transformed into pure thought. The true constitution of the self is that it exists and acts through these faculties:

'Ego memini per memoriam, intelligo per intelligentiam, amo per amorem... Ego per omnia illa tria memini, ego intelligo, ego diligo, qui nec memoria sum, nec intelligentia, nec dilectio sed haec habeo'.

At its centre the self is always and has always been self-remembering, self-thinking and self-loving, whether it has averted to the fact or not. Here its inner unvaryingness resembles the changelessness of the neo-Platonist conception; but it is not against its nature to embrace the variety of its other experience as it passes through time.
FOOTNOTES to Chapter 4

1 According to V. d'Augustino 'mens' can include the will and sometimes be equivalent to VOS ('Studi sul significato delle voci animus, anima e mens e sui loro reciproci rapporti') in: Atti della R. Accademia delle scienze di Torino, Classi di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche, 73 1937/8, p. 123.


3 ib. CCVII, p. 225.


5 Commentaries or Latin doxographic works could have provided the link.

6 de Memoria et Reminiscentia I 451 a 23ff.

7 de Trinitate XV 21 40: '... hoc etiam primum cum cogitaremus invenimus, et gignitur integrum verbum ... de intelligentia quae in memoria jam fuerit, sed latebat quamquam et ipsa cogitatio quamdam suam memoriam nisi haberet, non reverteretur ad ea quae in memoria reliquerat, cum alia cogitaret'.

8 op. cit. I 451 a 31. cf. ib. 449 b 13: 'nor is there memory of the present, but only perception'.

9 de Trinitate XIV 11 14: 'in re praesenti quod sibi est mens, memoria sine absurditate dicenda est'.

10 op. cit. 449 b 10-11: 'It is impossible to remember the future, which is an object of conjecture or speculation'.

11 Confessiones X 8 14: '... in aula ingenti memoriae meae ... ex eadem copia etiam similitudines rerum vel expertarum vel ex eis, quas expertus sum, creditarum alias atque alias et ipse contexo praeteritis atque ex his etiam futuras actiones et eventa et spes, et haec omnia rursus quasi praessentia meditor'.

12 v. n.8.

13 VIII 263 a 23-25.
FOOTNOTES to Chapter 4

1 According to V. d'Augustino 'mens' can include the will and sometimes be equivalent to \( \nu o s \) ('Studii sul significato delle voci \( \textit{anima} \), \( \textit{anima} \) e \( \textit{mens} \) e sui loro reciproci rapporti') in: Atti della R. Accademia delle scienze di Torino, Classi di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche, 73 1937/8, p.123.


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12 v. n. 8.

13 VIII 263 a 23-25.
Footnotes to Ch. 4 - continued -

14 cf. Ennead IV 4 8: '... if this chorus dances always (μετά), its dance is completed at each instant; there is thus no instant nor place in which it will not be complete; and thus there will be no desire and it will measure neither space nor time in its dance; in consequence, it will not remember it at all' (following Bréhier).

15 cf. Augustine on the evanescence of the present: 'id solum est, quod praesens dicatur; quod tamam ita raptim a futuro in prae-teritum transvolat, ut nulla morula extendatur ... praesens autem nullum habet spatium' (Confessiones XI 15 20). But 'Et tamam pardurat intentio' (ib. 28 37); and length of time is measured in its expectation or in the memory (ib.). For time as a 'distensio animae', v. Confessiones XI 26.33, 29.39. cf. also Commentary on Psalm XXXVIII 7-9.

16 452 b 26-28.

17 de Trinitate XIV 6 9: 'mentem semper sui meminisse.' As for Augustine self-knowing and self-loving were a condition of knowing or loving anything else, self-remembering would probably be a condition of remembering anything else. cf. infra p. 199, pp. 233ff.

18 de Trinitate XI 2 3; de Memoria et Reminiscencitia 1 450 a 32 (also in de Anima II 12, 424 a 19, and III 12, 435 a 9).

19 de Trinitate ib.; de Memoria ... 1 450 b 3.

20 de Trinitate XI 4 7; de Memoria ... 2 453 a 14ff.

21 de Trinitate ib.; de Memoria ... 1 450 b 31ff.

22 de Trinitate XV 3 4; de Memoria ... 2 452 a 2.

23 It is another case of the divide between mind and body which Aristotle could not bridge: v. de Memoria ... 1 450 a 9ff: υδέη cannot make itself dependent on phantasms or involve itself in time.

24 'Die psychologische Trinitätslehre ...' p. 324: 'kommt unserem Begriffe 'Bewusstsein', 'Gedankenkreis' nahe.'


26 op. cit., p. 244. Based on de Trinitate XIV 7 10: 'Si nos referamus ad interiorem mentis memoriam qua sui meminit'.
Footnotes to Ch. 4 - continued -


28 Confessiones X 9 16: 'quae de doctrinis liberalibus percepta nondum exciderunt'; ib. 12.19: 'continet memoria numerorum dimensionemque rationes et leges innumerables'.

29 de Trinitate XIV 7 10: (v. n.26) '... ubi haec tria simul semper sunt, et semper fuerunt ex quo esse coeperunt, sive cogitarentur, sive non cogitarentur'. cf. the child's self-knowledge: 'non ignorare se potest, sed cogitare se non potest' (ib. 5 7).

30 cf. ib. 6 9: 'Res quippe incorpore inter intellecta conspicitur et intelligendo cognoscitur ... ita sibi nota erat, quemadmodum notas sunt res quae memoria continentur, etiam si non cogitentur.'

31 ib. IX 11 16: '... cum se mens ipsa novit atque approbat, sic est eadem notitia verbum elus, ut ei sit par omnino atque sequale, atque identidem ...'.

32 References to ecstasy in Commentaries on Psalms XXX (II 12; II III 10), XXXIV (II 6); LXVII (36), CIII (III 2). For Augustine's search for timelessness, v. Commentary on Psalm XXXVIII 7: 'Est illud simplex quaero', and on Psalm CI (II 10): '... aeternitas, ipsa Dei substantia est ... quidquid ibi est non nisi est.' The reference to ecstasy clearly alludes to neo-Platonism. For parallels to 'est' v. Enneads III 7 3, V 1 4 (of voûti), V 5 13 (of the Good), VI 7 38 (as said of the Good is not as said of any other thing), VI 8 19 (of the One).

33 cf. previous note, n. 32.

34 v. Ennead IV 3 32: 'the good soul is the forgetful'.

35 de Trinitate XV 15 24: 'quia non hoc est nobis esse, quod est nosse. Multa quippe novimus quae per memoriam quodam modo vivunt, ita et oblivione quodam modo morientur: atque ideo cum illa jam non sint in notitia nostra, nos tamen sumus; et cum scientia nostra animo lapsa perierit a nobis, nos tamen vivimus'.

36 Some triadic structures are based on mens, others include memoria. Schmaus writes that memoria 'is a direction of the activity (eine Tätigkeitssrichtung) of mens' ('Die psychologische Trinitätslehre ...' p. 313).
Footnotes to Ch. 4 - continued -

37 Confessiones X 8 15. cf. le Blond of the orientation of the memory-teaching of the Confessiones: 'St. Augustin grasped before Bergson that the fundamental condition of all conscious activity is to continue in duration, and that it is conscious is due to this duration' ('Les Conversations ...' p.183). But the de Trinitate considers simultaneity as well as duration.

38 op.cit. IX 4 4. le Blond's unawareness of the divergence of genres of Augustine's works accounts for the mistake in his plausible judgement that 'Unlike Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus, Augustine could not draw on a deep knowledge of philosophers who had preceded him; so it was natural that he was led to draw much more on his own background, reflecting less on books than on things and on himself'. (op.cit. pp. 47-48). Whatever the de Trinitate is, it is certainly not a development only out of his own inner experience.

39 de Trinitate X 4 10: 'Sed absurdum est dicere, non eam totam scire quod scit. Non dico: totum scit; sed quod scit tota scit. Cum itaque aliquid de se scit, quod nisi tota non potest, totam se scit. Scit se aliquid scientem, nec potest quidquam scire nisi tota. Scit se igitur totam.'

40 ib. IX 4 7: 'mens vero cum totam novit, hoc est perfecte novit, per totum eius est notitia eius'.

41 'Introduction ... pp. 115ff'; 'El conocimiento racionel y la abstraccion en san Augustin', Ciudad de Dios, 77, 1961 pp. 241ff. Alvarez -- plausibly proposes that the place of universalising in Augustine was in the area where the memory relates its sense impressions to the eternal truths, the basis of all knowledge, and then conveyed the resultant formed intelligibles to the intellectual memory.

42 There are however no means of confirming that Augustine learned of the Aristotelian problematic in this way; the existence of the commentary is only known from a remark in Simplicius's sixth century commentary of the de Coelo ('In Aristotelis de Coelo Commentaria, edited L.L. Heiberg, Berlin 1893, p.503, line 34). cf. Beutler, op.cit. column 284.

43 de Trinitate XII 15 24: 'sed potius credendum est mentis intellectualis ita comitum esse naturam, ut rebus intelligibilibus naturali ordine, disponeunte Conditore subjuncta sic ista videat in quadem luce sui generis incorporea.'
Commentary on Psalm CXVIII 18 4: 'Deus itaque per seipsum quia lux est, illuminat pias mentes, ut ea quae divina dicuntur vel ostenduntur, intelligant'. This illumination could be quite personal: 'Domine Deus unum, Deus Trinitas, quaecumque dixi in his libros de tuo, agnoscent et tu: si qua de meo, et tu innoce, et tu. Amen' (de Trinitate XV 28 51). Those who are puzzled over what they ought to expect of this illumination will have to be satisfied with the answer of a deeper insight and a surer judgement - over a scripture-philosophy relationship.

cf. Commentary on Psalm CXVIII Sermon 23 1: 'Nulla quippe creatura, quamvis rationalis et intellectualis, a seipso illuminatur, sed participatione sempiternae veritatis accenditur'.

Op. cit. 12 40: 'Cum vero de his agitur, quae mente conspicimus, id est intellectu atque ratione, ea quidem loquimur, quae praesentia contemur in illa interiori luce veritatis, qua ipse qui dicitur homo interior, illustretur et fruatur; sed tum quoque noster auditor, si et ipse illa secreto ac simplici verbo videt, novit quod dico sua contemplatione, non verbis meis. Ergo ne hunc quidem doceo vera dicens vera intuentem; docetur enim non verbis meis, sed ipsis rebus deo intus pandente manifestis'.

Commentary on Psalm CXVIII Sermo 17 3. cf. ib: 'Deus, quando vult docere, prius dat intellectum, sine quo ea quae ad divinam doctrinam pertinent, homo non potest docere ... quando Deus ea docet, sic docet ... aperiendo veritatem.'

de Trinitate XII 2 2: 'Sed sublimioris rationis est judicare de istis corporalibus secundum rationes incorporales et sempiternas: quas nisi supra mentem humanam essent, incommutabiles profecto non essent, atque his nisi subjungaretur aliquid nostrum non secundum eas possemus judicare de corporalibus. Judicamus autem de corporalibus ex ratione dimensionum atque figurarum/incommutabiliter manere mens novit'.

id. XV 15 24: 'non hoc est nobis esse, quod est nosse.'

cf. Ennead IV 6 2: which accepts some potentiality in the senses but not in intellectual knowledge. It is possible to see a limited parallelism between Aristotle's and Augustine's ideas of the activity of knowing. In de Anima III the mind must make what it has to know; in Augustine the mind must cogitare (v. his etymology of cogitare in de Trinitate XI 3 6) and create from its inner memory an expressed 'verbum'.

Footnotes to Ch. 4 - continued -

50  op. cit. 12 40: '... qui posset, antequam loquerer, ea ipsa interrogatus exponere.'

51  id. 14 46: '... ille, quia tu adhuc non potesiscere'.

52  v. de Trinitate X I 1-2.

53  id. X 5 7.

54  op. cit. 12. 424 a 18-19.

55  Ennead III 6 3 (explicitly rejects the image of wax receiving a form); IV 6 1.

56  ib. I 8 14.

57  v. supra pp.169-70.

58  de Anima III 3.

59  de Trinitate XI 10 17, cf. ib. 3 6.

60  ib. 7 12 and 8 13.

61  ib. X 5 7; v. supra p.178.

62  ib. XII 15 24: '... ista videat in quadem luce sui generis incorporea...'

63  cf. supra p.175 and n. 42.

64  de Trinitate IX 12 18: '... liquido tenendum est quod omnis res quamcumque cognoscimus congenerat in nobis notitiam sui. Ab utroque enim notitia paritur, a cognoscente et cognito.'

65  ib. XIV 10 13: '... sive tempore praecedentia, sive simul esse incipientia, cognoscibilia cognitionem gignunt, non cognitione gignunter'.


67  'Congenerat ... ' is reminiscent of a passage in the Adversus Ar i um of Marius Victorinus: 'sed quoniam tunc cognoscibilia et habitur et dicitur, cum est cognoscentia: relativa sunt enim, et se invicem tenent et pariunt aut invicem interiunt' (IV 23. Text edited by P. Henry and P. Hadot, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, LXXXIII part I, Vienna 1971). Elsewhere Hadot has thrown doubt on whether Augustine had read this (v. "L'Image de la Trinité dans l'Âme chez Victorinus et chez Augustin", Studia Patristica VI = Texte und Untersuchungen Vol.81, Berlin 1962, p.433.) Additional evidence that Augustine may have read the
Adversus Arium comes from the way in which he rejects self-knowledge as a kind of twinning: 'An quasi geminatur, ut et illic sit et hic, id est, et ubi conspicere, et ubi conspici poscit; ut in se sit conspiciens, ante se conspicua' (de Trinitate XIV 6 8). The 'geminatur' could well have in mind the innocently expressed view of Victorinus, so intent in defending the equality of the Father and the Son, and using the language of noetic, which would have denied the unity of the Trinity by making the Son to be produced outside the Father, v. op. cit.: 'cum autem se videt, geminus existit et intelligitur videns et quod videtur' (III 2); '... (intelligentia) intellexit semet ipsam, hoc quodam modo gemina facta, velut intus et foris, filius est genus ab existentia Patris' (IV 31). More radically, Augustine's criticism bears on Plotinus's idea that the self-thinking of nous was inevitably a loss of simplicity. Hadot has drawn attention to parallel texts (e.g. Ennead VI 7 39) in his commentary on the Adversus Arium (Victorinus, 'Traites Theologiques sur la Trinite' II, Sources Chretiennes 69, Paris 1960, p.935). R. Markus agrees with Hadot's negative conclusions about Augustine's knowledge of Victorinus's text ('Marius Victorinus and Augustine', in Cambridge Philosophy, p.340). There he incisively characterises Augustine's trinitarian theology as being, by comparison with Victorinus's, 'at once more scriptural in its approach and less metaphysical in procedure'. But the metaphysical approach is of the highest importance, and the scriptural writer also had the same writer in mind as much of the metaphysics: Porphyry, the writer of 'Contra Christianos', for whom the gospels were a tissue of contradictions.

For example, the three scriptural extracts in de Trinitate XI 5 8 are most pertinently placed to relate the argument to orthodox Christian teaching in a way most likely to attract the attention of a neo-Platonist reader. They come not so much as conclusions but, as in music, the intervention of a repeated high transcendent note after the development of a lower and busily groping passage, which they answer: the first two as a reassuring echo, but the third as a sharp and criticising dominant.

'... 'Nolite conformari huic saeculo' ... 'quandoquidem Deus fecit omnia bona valde' ... 'Eritis sicut dii' ... With the first two neo-Platonists would be agreed; but the third was a criticism of neo-Platonist presumption: their search for ecstasy equated with original sin.
Footnotes to Ch. 4 - continued -

70 v. supra p.124a.

71 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself!'. Leviticus 19.18 and Matthew 22.39 (and parallels). cf. Sermo CXXVIII 3 5: 'Si autem nondum nosti diligere te, timeo ne decipias proximum tuum sicut te' (PL 38 715), and Commentary on Psalm CXXVIII 8 2: 'quomodo ergo diligit proximum tamquam seipsum, qui nescit et seipsum'. J. Burnaby considers the controversial aspect of the priority of self-love ('Amor Dei...' pp. 116ff).

72 de Trinitate IX 3 3. v. M. Chastaing, 'St. Augustin et le problème de la connaissance d'autrui': a study in three parts in a meditative style, written as from the first person, based on a wide range of texts. (Revue Philosophique, 151 1961, pp. 109ff; 152 1961, pp. 90ff; 153 1963, pp.223ff.)

73 de Trinitate X 3 5.

74 cf. Ennead V 8 11: 'vous ... can never stand away and with bodily eyes apprehend itself'.

75 de Trinitate VIII 6 9. Here there is a parallel in Aristotle who taught that 'friendship is a virtue, or involves virtue' (Nicomachean Ethics VIII 1155 a 4), and that the best kind of friendship is not just out of personal usefulness or common pleasure, but, more rarely, among those who love each other for the sake of the other (ib. ch.3). cf. also sharing a 'friend's consciousness of his existence' (ib. IX 1170 b 11-12. v. supra p. 41 ).

76 Hadot suggests of this and other similar de Trinitate texts that 'the philosophical source from which Augustine borrowed the conceptual material of the de Trinitate had some relationship with the Nicomachean Ethics', and he thinks in terms of Porphry's lost commentary ("L'Image ..." p.440. cf. supra p. 99 n.17 ).

77 Seele ...' p.167.

78 op. cit. VIII 6 9.

79 425 b 15-16.
Footnotes to Ch. 4 - continued -

30 de Libero Arbitrio II 3 9: 'non enim quo sens colorem vides, hoc eodem vides etiam ipsum videre ... Quidquid est aliud quo sentiri potest omne quod scimus, ministerium rationis est'.

31 425 b 16.

32 v. Commentary on the Parmenides, fr.XIII 23 to XIV 4, following Hadot's version ('Porphyre ... II' pp. 108 - 9): 'in the same way that the power of sight does not attain the audible (etc.) ... but there is a power which transcends them, which distinguishes their object, which knows their identity and their difference ... in the same way one can say that the power according to which the νοης that cannot return to itself sees is different, superior to the distinction between knowing and known and beyond these two by its majesty and power'.


34 v. ch.4: 'by mind I mean that part by which the soul thinks and forms judgements' (429 a 23); ch.7: 'when (the διανοητική ψυχή) asserts or denies that they are good or bad' (431 a 16-17).

35 de Trinitate XIV 5 7.

36 cf. de Anima III 7, 431 a 18-20: 'The last thing to be affected is a single entity and a single mean, although it has more than one aspect'.

37 loc. cit. 1 1. 'De credendis nulla infidelitate dubitemus, de intelligendis nulla temeritate affirmemus; in illis auctoritas tenenda est, in his veritas exquirenda.'

38 Ennead VI 8 15: "Ταύτα ἡ ἐφεσυ καὶ ἡ ὀυσία

Translation follows Bréhier.

39 Ennead VI 8 15 (following Bréhier).

40 de Trinitate IX 2 2.

41 Ennead III 5 3: all of Ennead III 5 is concerned with ἐφεσυ .

42 ib. V 9 2.
Footnotes to Ch. 4 - continued -

30 de Libero Arbitrio II 3 9: 'non enim quo sens colorem vides, hoc eodem vides etiam ipsum videre ... Quidquid est aliud quo sentiri potest omne quod scimus, ministerium rationis est'.

31 425 b 16.

32 v. Commentary on the Parmenides, fr.XIII 23 to XIV 4, following Hadot's version ('Porphyre ... II' pp. 108 - 9): 'in the same way that the power of sight does not attain the audible (etc.) ... but there is a power which transcends them, which distinguishes their object, which knows their identity and their difference ... in the same way one can say that the power according to which the ... that cannot return to itself sees is different, superior to the distinction between knowing and known and beyond these two by its majesty and power'.


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38 Ennead VI 8 15: 

\[ \text{Τούτῳ ἦ ἐφεσφ καὶ ἕ ὄνομα} \]

Translation follows Bréhier.

39 Ennead VI 8 15 (following Bréhier).

40 de Trinitate IX 2 2.

41 Ennead III 5 3: all of Ennead III 5 is concerned with ἐφεσφ.

42 ib. V 9 2.
Footnotes to Oho LJ: continued

93 op. cit. 8 15: The triad is repeated again in de Trinitate XV 6 10.

93a καὶ τριάδιον καὶ ἐρωτὶς καὶ ἀληθὲς καὶ αὐτὸς ἐρωτὴς (ib. trans. follows Bréhier).

94 de Trinitate IX 2 2.

95 id. 'Quid est autem amare se, nisi sibi præsto esse velle ad fruendum se? Et cum tantum se vult esse, quantum est, par menti voluntas est, et amanti amor aequalis.' To complete the parallelism of the account there is also a text in Plotinus which equates the One with his will: 'He is entirely will . . . His will is himself' (Ennead VI 8 21). By contrast the will of ὑμὴ is uncertain (ib. IV 4 17).

96 de Trinitate loc. cit.: 'Et si aliqua substantia est amor, non est utique corpus, sed spiritus: nec mens corpus, sed spiritus est. Neque tamen amor et mens duo spiritus, sed unus spiritus; nec essentiae duae sed una'. There is a partial parallel to this in Plotinus: 'That our good is there is shown by the very love inborn (οὐν κατοικοῦσα) with the soul' (Ennead VI 9 9).

97 de Trinitate IX 3 3: 'Mens enim amare se ipsam non potest, nisi etiam se novit: nam quomodo amat quod nescit?'

98 ib. 3 3.

99 Ennead VI 9 8. Sententia XV of Porphyry develops Plotinus's thought: — for this as a source of de Trinitate IX 3 3 cf. supra p. 161, n. 146. cf. also infra p. 246 and 263 n. 80 for Stoic associations.

100 de Trinitate IX 4 4: 'Sicut autem duo quaedam sunt, mens et amor eius, cum se amat; ita quaedam duo sunt, mens et notitia eius, cum se novit'.

101 ib. 'Igitur ipsa mens et amor et notitia eius tria quaedam sunt et haec tria unum sunt; et cum perfecta sunt aequalia sunt.' Love and knowledge are brought together by Plotinus, though not systematically, in the contemplation of the One by νοός : νοός ἐρωτὸν . . . ἐρωτὴς γίνεται (Ennead VI 7 35). A possible origin in Porphyry for the description of the unity of the triad is given by Pepin, 'Une Nouvelle Source ...' pp. 92-100. cf. supra p. 161 n. 146.

102 de Trinitate IX 4 5: 'Mens autem amore quo se amat, potest amare et alio praeter se. Item non se sola, cognoscit mens, sed et alia multa. Quamobrem non amor et cognitio tamquam in subjecto insunt menti; sed substantialiter etiam ista sunt sicut ipsa mens.'

103 ib. 5 6: 'Amor autem quo se mens amat, si esse desinat, simul et illa desinant esse amans. Item notitia qua se mens novit, si esse desinat, simul et illa nosse desinat.'
Footnotes to Ch. 4 - continued -

104 Ennead VI 6 1: "everything seeks not the alien but itself"; ib. V 5 2: 'essential truth is not accord with anything else, but accord with itself' (following Bréhier). The theme of mind in equality with itself and its Stoic origin are discussed in the next chapter.

105 de Trinitate IX 4 4: 'Mens vero cum se ipsam cognoscit, non se superat notitia sua; quia ipsa cognoscit, neque secum quidquid aliud, par illi est cognitio, cum se ipsam cognoscit. Et cum se totam nihil amplius percipit, nec minor nec major est.'

106 de Trinitate IX 11 16: 'Ex quo colligitur, quia cum mens ipsa novit atque approbat, sic est eadem notitia verbum eius, ut ei sit par omnino et aequale, atque identidem: quia neque inferioris essentiae notitia est, sicut corporis; neque superioris, sicut Dei. Et cum habeat notitia similitudinem ad eam rem quam novit, hoc est, cuius notitia est; haec habet perfectam et aequalem, qua mens ipsa, quae novit, est nota. Ideoque et imago et verbum est, quia de illa exprimitur, cum cognoscendo eadem coaequatur, et est gignenti aequale quod genitum est.'

107 op. cit. p. 220.

108 v. supra p. 160 n. 143.

109 de Trinitate X 3 5: 'Quid ergo amat mens, cum ardenter seipsam quaerit ut noverit, dum incognita sibi est? ... An ei fama praedicavit speciem suam, sicut de absentibus solemus audire? Forte ergo se non amat, sed quod de se fingit, hoc amat, longe fortasse aliud quam ipsa est ...'

110 ib. 'Et hoc quidem permirabile est, nondum se nosse et quem pulchrum sit se nosse, jam nosse! ... Ubi ergo nosse suum novit, si se non novit? ... Novit enim se quaerentem atque nasciuntem, dum se quaerit ut noverit.'

111 Ennead V 3 1.

112 de Trinitate X 4 6: 'Quid ergo dicemus? an quod ex parte se novit, ex parte non novit?'

113 ib. of. supra p. 174 and nn. 39 and 40.

114 ib. 5 7: 'Utquid ergo ei praecipitum est, ut se ipsam cognoscat? Crede, ut se ipsam cogit et secundum naturam suam vivat, id est, ut secundum naturam ordinari appetat, sub eo scilicet cui subdenda est, supra ea quibus praeponenda est; sub illo a quo regi debet, supra ea quae regere debet.'
Footnotes to Ch. 4 - continued -

115 Ennead VI 6 1.
116 de Trinitate X 5 7.

117 ib. 8 12. 'Cognoscat ergo semetipsam, nec quasi absentem se quaerat, sed intentionem voluntatis qua per alia vagabatur, statuat in semetipsam, et se cogitit. Ita videbit quod nunquam se non amaverit, nunquam nescierit: sed aliud secum amando cum eo se confudit et concretit quodam modo; atque ita dum sicut unum diversa complectitur, unum putavit esse quae diversa sunt.'

118 ib. 10 16: 'Ex quorum cogitationibus, si nihil sibi affingat, ut tale aliquid esse se putat, quidquid ei de se remanet, hoc solum ipse est'.

119 Ennead IV 4 4.
120 ib. IV 3 32.

121 de Trinitate X 11 18: 'Memini enim me habere memoriam, et intelligentiam, et voluntatem; et intelligo me intelligere, et velle, atque meminisse; et volo me velle, et meminisse, et intelligere, totanque mean memoriam, et intelligentiam, et voluntatem simul memini ... Quapropter quando invicem a singulis et tota omnia capiuntur, aequalia sunt tota singula totis singulis, et tota singula simul omnibus totis; et haec tria unum, una vita, una mens, una essentia.'

122 Noted by Hadot: "L'Image ...." p. 436. According to Lydus, in whom the fragment is conserved, Porphyry had written of a Chaldaean Oracle, 'Divine is the number of the ennead, being formed as three triads and constituting the summits of the theology of Chaldaean philosophy' (cf. Lewy, op. cit. p.105, n.163); Porphyry's enneadic arrangement of Plotinus's writings is significant here (Hadot, 'Porphyre ...') p.262 and n.1).

124 'Porphyre ...' I pp.262-7, especially 267.
126 Eibl (op. cit. p.324) considers the possibility of an ennead with a grill whose horizontal members are both identified with the vertical ones of esse - intelligere - amare and identified with Father, Son and Holy Spirit. He sees a resemblance with a possible ennead in Plato.
Footnotes to Ch. 4 - continued -

126 cont'd -

But it is not Augustine's authentic ennead, whose mutual embracement of memoria sui - notitia sui - voluntas sui gives it at the same time a simple unity.

127 de Trinitate X 12 19: 'Mentem quippe ipsam in memoria et intelligentia et voluntate suimetipsius talem reperiebamus, ut quoniam semper se nosse, semperque se ipsam velle comprehendebatur, simul etiam semper sui meminisse, semperque se ipsam intelligere et amare comprehenderetur...'.

128 Ennead I 4 10.

129 de Trinitate XIV 6 8: 'Tanta est tamen cogitationis vis, ut nec ipsa mens quodam modo se in conspectu suo ponat, nisi quando se cogitat, ac per hoc ita nihil in conspectu mentis est, nisi unde cogitatur, ut nec ipsa mens, qua cogitatur quidquid cogitatur, aliter possit esse in conspectu suo, nisi se ipsam cogitando'.

130 ib. IX 11 16 v. supra p. 194-5 and n. 106.

131 ib. XIV 6 8: '... an quasi geminatur, ut et illic sit et hic, id est, et ubi conspiciere, et ubi conspici possit ... Nihil horum nobis veritas consulta respondat'.

132 v. supra pp. 199-200 and infra p. 236.

133 cf. supra pp. 24, 36, 44, 430 a 2-4.

134 In 429 b 5-10 is an attempt to bridge the distance between divine, timeless pure (self-conscious) thinking and its human counterpart. It has been interpreted along with Metaphysics A 9 (1072 b 20-23) as asserting that object thinking is at the same time self-thinking (v. supra p. 37). And this self-thinking is at least something like, perhaps identical with, the divine state of full self-knowing (v. supra p. 35). v. also pp. 24 and 46.

135 de Anima III 2 426 b 28: de Sensu et Sensibilibus 7 447 b 11.

136 de Sensu et Sensibilibus 7 448 a 27.

137 de Trinitate XIV 6 9: 'Si enim hoc ita est, non habebat haec tria, ut sui meminisset, et se intelligeret, et amaret: sed meminerat tantum sui, et postea cum cogitare coepit, tunc se intellexit atque dilexit'.

Footnotes to Ch. 4 - continued -

138 ib. 7 10: 'videbatur quidem imago illius trinitatis et ad solam memoriam pertinere.'

139 ib. ib. ibi ex iis quae memoria continentur, recordantis acies informetur ... et (tale) ... in illo erat ubi ante cogitationem meminerat ... Hanc autem nunc dico intelligentiam, qua intelligimus cogitantes, id est, quando eis repertis quae memoriae praesto fuerant, sed non cogitabantur, cogitatio nostra formatur.

140 ib.: '... et eam voluntatem, sive amorem, vel dilectionem, quae istam problem parentemque conjungit, et quodam modo utrisque communis est'.

141 ib. 10 13: 'neque enim adventitia sibi (mens) est, quasi ad se ipsam quae jam erat, venerit aliunde eadem ipsa quae non erat; aut non aliunde venerit, sed in se ipsa quae jam erat, nata sit ea ipsa quae non erat; sicut in mente quae jam erat, oritur fides quae non erat: aut post cognitionem sui recordando se ipsam velut in memoria sua constitutam videt, quasi non ibi fuerit antequam se ipsam cognosceret: cum proiecto ex quo esse coepit, nunquam sui meminisse; nunquam se intelligere, nunquam se amore destiterit'.

142 v. infra pp. 242-245.

143 de Trinitate XIV 14 18: 'Sic itaque condita est mens humana, ut nunquam sui non meminerit, nunquam se non intelligat, nunquam se non diligat'.

144 ib. XV 22 42.
Self-Knowledge in Augustine:
b) Triadic Structures

The textual analysis in the last chapter has shown that it is quite possible to make an analysis of Augustine's epistemology that is dyadic. Whether in the mind, the memory or the senses, the knower may have been active in grasping the object, but the fact remains that it was the object, and not himself, which produced the knowledge. However Augustine's de Trinitate is characterised by a number of triadic structures of knowing, whose third element is that of will or desire; their separation from the dyadic ones is not entirely rigid as will appear. The source, the modification and the application of triadic and occasional enneadic structures is the subject of this chapter.

Augustine's method with the neo-Platonist legacy of triadic conceptions

The simple answer to the question, 'Why did Augustine make so much of a triadic analysis of human cognition in the de Trinitate?' is that he was looking for analogies of the Godhead in the inner personality: not just purely apologetics for a readership that had no preconceptions, but, as has been repeatedly said, as a work which both had in mind and belonged to the Graeco-Roman philosophical tradition as he found it. And here he was more eirenec than polemic: the
CHAPTER 5

Self-Knowledge in Augustine:

b) Triadic Structures

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literature of this tradition abounded in triads of different kinds. Whether noetic or creational the general principal which lay behind all of them was that for two extremes - two 'termini' - to be brought together, an intermediary was needed to bind them together in their state of difference.

However it may still be asked, in addition, philosophically why Augustine should cast around for triadic structures, when he had answered the questions 'what initiates knowledge?' and 'how is self-knowledge possible?' dyadically; for a dyadic structure is sufficient in itself. The presence of the dyadic and triadic as two alternative analyses makes the metaphysical character of the work stand out. A psychological investigation would be more tied to an examination of vital functions, potentialities, the activity of knowing which would all have to be fairly strictly delimited; a metaphysical analysis on the other hand is pursued not entirely regardless of the existence of these factors, but more freely and a degree more abstractly. It asks 'how shall we best describe knowing?', and 'what principles are involved in knowing?', and 'how is willing related to knowing?', not 'how does this particular faculty of knowing function?' nor 'has the soul different parts?'. It attempts to discern the principles which are presupposed in the psychological descriptions; for, if they did not have them the psychological investigation of mind could not exist. Augustine's deliberate use of the category of 'mens' particularly equips him for such an analysis. It embraces intellectual and sense activity, and keeps in mind their unification.
Aristotle's notion of abstraction was proposed as a consequence of his awareness of the distinction between sensation and thought; Augustine took for granted the distinctness of each and felt no need to dwell on the mode of formation of intelligible realities. His conception of memory also embraces the sense and intellectual memories as one, and it is impossible to make a distinction between what comes from sense and what comes from spirit in the nature of the interior word which the again undistinguished cogitatio demands. Similarly, Augustine's notion of will can arise, as in the de Quantitate Animae, in an embodied context - directly linked to the panoply of nerves and other powers:

"if what we call strength, therefore, is made up of an impulse from the soul, the mechanism of nerve sinews and the weight of the body, it is the will that supplies the impulse which is consider­ably stimulated by hope or courage, but retarded through fear and much more through desperation (for fear, provided there be some hope, usually increases strength)".

And it can arise as a principle seen quite apart from bodily powers, identifiable with love, in his cognitional triads. And in this more spiritual domain, the interpenetration of the memory, intellect and will in their continuous self-knowing and loving, and the decreasing mere aggregation of their cognitional acts which goes with their increasing intensity, involves a union of what psychological analysis normally separates.

Very apt is the comment of E. Benz, clearly intended as a criticism of at least the title of the earlier book by M. Schmaus.
"It is not the case that Augustine invented a 'psychological teaching on the Trinity'; rather, the basis of this psychology is a development of a metaphysical law, derived from the analysis of the process of thinking which two hundred years before, Plotinus had found to be a general universal law of the development of mind, i.e. a law which presides over the objectification of absolute mind within the process of self-knowledge, and likewise is thought of as bringing the human mind to be the image of pure mind."

He describes this law as found in Plotinus as follows:

"The self-thinking of absolute mind necessarily leads to a triadic expression in so far as the intellect as a hypostasis bears within it the trinity of the power of knowing (Erkennens) (as potency), understanding (Erkenntnis) (as act), and the known (Erkenntten) (as τόπος, form and pattern).

... The most important ideas are: the separation of absolute being for the production of a dialectical tension; the regarding of this separation as an alienation in which the (potential) intellect objectifies, forms and limits itself; the return of the objectified mind upon itself (as to its model), with ἐπιστροφή, εραξις, κοινοφθαλμία; the basing of ἐπιστροφή upon the dynamic being of mind that has a will directed to itself — ἔρως, πόθος, ὀρνηθική, θέλημα."

Here, Benz's usually reasonable interpretation lapses in a major detail and a minor detail. In the first part of the second quotation he does not note that Plotinus is describing in the first text, on which he bases his reflection, not a self-production of νοῦς, but the production of νοῦς out of the One, in accordance with the epistemic principle which Plotinus shares with Augustine, that knowledge begins with the object — even in intelligibles. So the Τόπος which
starts off the production of \( \nu\upsilon\varsigma \) here is the One itself; and this whole triadic process therefore is not contained within \( \nu\upsilon\varsigma \), but is partly external to it. And further, Benz has overlooked Plotinus's basic criticism of Aristotle's noetic, that intellectual knowledge cannot be a passage from potency to act \(^6\): \( \nu\upsilon\varsigma \) is unchanging and any variability, such as an arriving at knowledge, must be located in \( \psi\nu\chi\eta \).

Benz's contention that Augustine based himself on a law of thinking which was derived from Plotinus needs highly critical qualification. It must be agreed that Augustine would have been interested in triadically structured acts of self-knowing in the hypostases as sources of material for analogies with the Trinity, and as also providing material which would be common ground with neo-Platonism over the structuring of human mental processes (though any agreement would have been critically conceded agreement whose apologetic tenour may easily and inaccurately be taken for 'influence'). Benz had noted that Augustine had said of the love of external things "\( \text{id amare alienari est} \)" \(^7\). But this cannot be taken as a persistence of the plotinian concept of \( \pi\rho\delta\sigma\varsigma \): it concerns the love of external things. And in any case self-knowledge in Augustine is a complete exception to this law, for the self is immediately and always self-knowing. Again, whilst Augustine's position is that at all levels, including the knowledge of God, cognition remains triadic with a place for will, Plotinus considers
that with knowledge at its "highest and purest", that is in νοûς, "if will (βουλησις) attains (the Good) it becomes thought (νόησις); and thus a triad, whose elements are νοûς, an act of will, and itself as object within the Good, always becomes a dyad. Though νοûς would here be satisfied, another text speaks of its being turned to the good in desire, and in this the structure of its "loving intelligence" remains triadic. There is clearly a resemblance with Augustine in the presence of will or love in this triad, but the parallelism disappears if at the highest degree of union, will or love is absorbed into knowing.

Benz seems to have merged together what Hadot has pointed out Plotinus does not seem to have clearly distinguished and defined: the relation between the conversion of intelligence towards the One and its conversion towards itself. It should be remembered that the triadic movement of outgoing and return is both the structure of the noetic cosmos as well as epistemic. Porphyry took the movement further in the direction of systematisation by distinguishing between intellectual beings, which were capable of this return, and sense powers, bound to a body, which were not, and equating the movement with the triad being - thinking - life, the last element being constituted of the state of self-regarding. Proclus went further and constituted it into a law of the constitution of all reality.

The complete role of Porphyry's thought in Augustine's thinking is evidently large, though much remains unclear and
is likely to remain so. We have every justification, however, in presuming that there was a great deal of allusion in Augustine's Trinitarian teaching to Porphyrian triads, though the loss of so much of his work makes confirmation of this presumption impossible. Following Hadot, A. Ziegenscha 15 has proposed that Victorinus's trinitarian speculations came out of Porphyry's modifications to Plotinus's thought: by giving the second One its own inner dynamism, Porphyry's position differed from the unqualified subordination of Plotinus's hypostases making them more equal, approximating more to the Christian Trinity.

Porphyry's eclectic identification of the Plotinian triad, derived from Plato's Sophist, of Οναΐαδις - Ζωή - νοῦς
with the Chaldaean Oracles' triad of Πάτηρ - δύναμις - νοῦς 16 gave an incentive and a precedent to Augustine to make assimilations and appropriations from neo-Platonism's store of examples. That he knew of Porphyry's commentary on the Chaldaean Oracles is clear from the de Civitate Dei. 17 From Lewy's work on the Chaldaean Oracles it becomes clear that they contained a wealth of triadic structures, some more valuable (because more unitive) than others. Augustine had no need to propose the existence of a triadic Godhead: what was necessary was to make clear the superior nature of the Christian conception derivable from the Scriptures which Porphyry belittled, and capable of formulation in the profoundest and most subtly distinguished of neo-Platonist terms. What more likely than that Augustine would have heard of the theory that the third
person of the Trinity has been likened to a woman, through a knowledge of the Hecate-triads as they appeared in the Oracles? He objected vigorously to the crude assimilative of the divine powers to a human image of father, son and mother.

"I do not speak of this parallel which makes the Holy Spirit the Mother of the Son of God and the husband of the Father. Perhaps it will be sufficiently answered by saying that this has an offensiveness in its carnal allusion, through having to think about corporeal conceptions and births".

Augustine then has considerable discussion on the appropriateness of applying sexual imagery to the Trinity, which takes up about half of Book XII. That it should arise out of the original allusion to a known triad of which the third member was feminine indicates the importance which Augustine attached to it. It would be consonant with the respectful attention which he gave to Porphyry in the de Civitate Dei; and should the hypothesis of the presence of a refugee group of Roman neo-Platonists being the destined recipients of the treatise be correct, the style and matter would be appropriate for the rejection of an eclectic identification of a Porphyrian triad with the Trinity made in such a circle, which Augustine eirenically consented to examine at some length. Here is indirect evidence, in addition to the direct evidence of the de Civitate Dei XIX, that Augustine knew of the Chaldæan oracles, either through Porphyry's early commentary or as commented later again in his de Regressu Animae.
If he found the significance of this Hecate-triad so great, is it not likely that, had he found it in the commentary, he would have been interested in the Chaldean triad ὄμορφος - πατρικός νόμος - βουλή as providing a model for the triadic constitution of mens, notitia and voluntas, though not applicable as he saw to the Trinity? Possibly he was also thinking of the Oracles' erection of ἐπως into a binding cosmic form when he wrote that everything had its cause in three respects: 'qua sit, qua hoc sit, qua sibi amīca sit'. Augustine did not follow Porphyry in his use of the triad οὐσία - γών - νόμος in self-consciousness as a form of circular thinking of outgoing and return upon the self, in his commentary on the Parmenides. A text in the Confessiones may bring them together as three in one: 'quam sit inseparabilis vita et una vita et una mens et una essentia, quam denique inseparabilis distinctio et tamen distinctio'; in the de Trinitate the triad is attributed to the separate personality of the Son, and also made to correspond with the hierarchy of being - sentient life - intelligence.

Probable as is the importance of Porphyry's notions for understanding Augustine's apologetic, the disappearance of so much of his work, no doubt by burning according to the decree of the Emperor Theodosius II and Valentinian III of 448, prevents us from confirming that Augustine alluded to him. Yet there is sufficient evidence to show that Augustine was systematically making a comprehensive simplification of triadic and dyadic descriptions of self-loving and self-knowing.
which may be found in the Enneads. In de Trinitate IX he conflated a triad of self-love, which he reduced to a dyad, with a dyad of self-knowledge, and following the logical law that two things which are each equal to a third are equal to each other, he postulated the existence of a triad of mens (later self-remembering), self-knowledge and self-love. The reduction of triad to dyad is always possible provided the elements include only two terms. And if νοῦς and νοητόν are identical, the activity of νόησις can be included or disregarded according to context. Here we should be aware of a great difference between the triads of Plotinus and those of Augustine. Even though Augustine's cognitional triads become decreasingly aggregates to the degree to which they are more interior, the interior triads (and the divine triad) do not lose their three elements as Augustine postulates their increasingly complete overlapping unity. By contrast, the triads of Plotinus become increasingly unified the closer they are found to the One. In the One, νοῦς, νόησις, νοητόν come to absolute unity, effacing each other in each other. This same triad is said to exist also in νοῦς itself, where, whether in triadic form or dyadic reduction, this absolute unity cannot exist. In so far as it is turned to the One, there is a place for its virtual triplicity to show itself, for in this case the subject (νοῦς) is in but not identical with the Good, its object; and therefore the will (βουλησίς) of νοῦς is revealed as a third element in its constitution in the desire for the Good. This will for the One can also be described as 'love'; the near equivalence between willing and loving is in this way held by Plotinus, as it is by Augustine.
The third element, will, is so called 'because it is in conformity with the activity of \( \nu\omega\varsigma \)', attaining to the Good, and 'becomes thought'. Whatever we make of this highest activity of \( \nu\omega\varsigma \) in the contemplation of the One being both \( \nu\eta\varsigma\iota\varsigma \) and \( \beta\omega\mu\lambda\eta\varsigma\iota\varsigma \), and, \( \beta\omega\mu\lambda\eta\varsigma\iota\varsigma \) though timeless, becoming \( \nu\eta\varsigma\iota\varsigma \) we have to say that there is a step to unity and purely formal triadicity in going from the true triad of \( \nu\omega\varsigma \) to the One, whilst in \( \nu\omega\varsigma \) the occurrence of will is more triplicative than triune, and precisely because the original unity is lost this triplicity is aggregated. Below \( \nu\omega\varsigma \) aggregation and triplicity should increase more.

Augustine would have rejected a purely formal triadicity in the Godhead: his Trinity was truly triadic, as it was also in consequence enneadic; for the three Persons cannot be merged into a supreme single Godhead. The occurrence of will in self-knowing does not disappear in the union of knower and object; it is present in all the cognitional triads as the dispositive cause of the union of knower and object known. This form of triadic epistemology goes back at least to the place of love and desire for intelligibles, found in the thought of both Plato and Aristotle. But to give such a significant place to the will enabled Augustine to integrate into his structure of subjectivity the attentiveness ('intentio') which characterised Stoic epistemology: an integration which to some extent Plotinus had already made. Besides the need of the Stoic virtue of \( \alpha\pi\alpha\theta\varepsilon\omega \), he wrote of the need 'to turn our perceptions towards the interior of ourselves and fix our attention there' 36. The comprehension
together of ultimately Platonist doctrine of \( \wpw \) and an ultimately Aristotelian doctrine of self-knowledge through their re-working together in neo-Platonism with some Stoic conceptions \(^\text{37}\), the garnering of these ideas from scattered places and obscure formulations, the re-interpretation of them in a radically simple but embracive idea was not only a hermeneutical \textit{tour de force}: all the time it was as much speculative theology in its search for dependable analogies between human mens and Godhead. Here the assertion of triadicity, will or love \textit{joining} object to knower, through every level of human cognition as also in the divine, while it may derive in part from neo-Platonism, conflicts with its general conception. 

Augustine knew that a triad of equal elements which were united without merging was the basic form of all noetic: not a convergence towards an unselfconscious unity. Correct though neo-Platonism's search for the innocence of oneness was, its triadicity turns out to be differing degrees of triplicity above which was the pure unity of the One: but this was wrong not only of God but also of the human mens with its fundamental constitutive triad.

The basic, constitutive triad of mens: memoria sui – se nosse – se velle; its enneadic version

Although, according to Plotinus, with its self-knowing and self-love, the One was in a state of self-equality, \( \vdot\dot{s} \) constituted as self-knowing, was not: if it were, it would be independent of the One. Plotinus explained the unity of the
whole system of hypostases by an absence of self-equality in νοῦς (and ψυχή): their desire for union with the One from which they came, a return to their source in which they would find self-equality, was the reason why the whole noetic (and its dependent cosmos) held together. They emulated the self-equality which could only be found in the One. Against this view Augustine held that man had his god-like independence, and was so constituted that he could find his self-equality. For Plotinus the universe was held together by the self-equality within the One, which the whole cosmos sought by desire; self-equality to a man was an impossibility while he remained a man. For Augustine man found self-equality by inhering in God 38, but that self-equality was his own. As the human mens had a true independence, it was no longer in every respect troubled by a desire for its source. Personal (including original) sin, not a cosmic flaw, explained why the image of God had lost its self-equality and needed grace to regain it, but this need not intrude into a study of its constitution. The self-love and the self-knowledge of mens must be immediately present to it, potentially total, and interrelated. The human essence is thus made theoretically capable of total explanation; it is no longer a series of limited, if elegantly analysed, domains as in Aristotle, or an accidental union of relevance and irrelevance, reality and unreality as with Plato and the neo-Platonists. Especially when the further substitution of memoria for mens allows an explanation to be given of the continuity of self-knowledge and self-love, an appropriately
time-bound structure of great power is produced. The basic structure of the mens could be conceived of as a triad of self-memory, self-knowing and self-willing (or loving) always in a state of self-equality, though perhaps obscured and therefore incompletely realised; and knowledge of other things, of which it was the condition, might also be regarded as triadic: the less interior, the less triune. In its possible perfectibility, it was a model of the divine; in its possible defectibility unmistakably human.

Not only is this inner triad of de Trinitate IX a simplification and systematisation of Plotinian (and possibly Porphyrian) texts taking in Stoic teaching in its comprehensiveness, not only are the triadic elements necessarily articulated: Augustine thought they were discernible through an exercise partly resembling the phenomenological reduction or επιστροφή of Husserl, partly an ascetical labour. One must detach oneself from the corrupting influence of material things, a great source of mistaken imagination of what the self really was, and become aware that "there never was a time when it did not love itself and never a time when it did not know itself; but because it loved another thing with itself, it has confused itself with this thing, and has as it were grown together with it". 39

This deep self-remembering, self-knowing and self-loving is interior and continuous, whether one is aware of it or not, though discernment of it is not excluded:

"If we betake ourselves to the inner memory of the mind by which it remembers itself, and to the inner understanding by
which it understands itself, and to the inner will by which it loves itself, where these three things are always together at the same time and always have been together at the same time, from the moment when they began to be, whether one thought of them or whether one did not think of them ... 

Not only can they never not be lost; they were also present through the unconsciousness of childhood (even if children lack the power of cogitation and the understanding of words: cogitation which is necessary even for the self consciously to know itself, and the spoken word, depending on the interior word which adds nothing however to what is thought up from the memory). This supposition may sound a prioristic to a later age: it was in itself a necessary corollary to apportioning to each person the attribute of self-knowing in the recognisable form neo-Platonists had inherited the conception from Aristotle. If this were to be not timeless but present through time, it would necessarily involve, together with self-memory, continuous existence from the creation of men. Further, continual self-complaisance, the aim and consequence of self-knowledge in the time-bounded self-memory, demonstrates the presence of self-love:

"nobody loves that which he does not remember, and that of which he is completely ignorant ... . Human nature, therefore, has been so formed that never does it not remember itself, never does it not understand itself, never does it not love itself".

The Aristotelian insight that mind's knowing was essentially would self-knowing necessitate in a timebound setting the concomitants of self-memory and self-love which, as timeless, it would not have. Aristotle risked the dissolution of the personality
by insisting on the absolute transcendence of thought; Augustine risked an unclarity in mind's connection with transcendence by making the structure of subjectivity independent and complete.

Normally the study of Augustine's metaphysical psychology is carried out triadically; it ought to be carried out enneadically. This is an inevitable consequence of substituting the active power of memory for the entity of mens.

When self-knowledge and self-love are made equivalent to mens, the total interpenetration is the comprehension of each in the two others, or of the two others in each: it is a complexity which is easy to manage. But when self-memory, with its characteristic activity, takes the place of mens the basic pattern becomes enneadic: the self-reflection (through reduplication) of the three faculties and the two-way linkage of each of the other three pairs.

"For not only is each one comprehended by each one, but all are also comprehended by each one. For I remember that I have a memory, understanding and will; and I understand that I understand, will and remember; and I will that I will, remember and understand; and at the same time I remember my whole memory, understanding and will."

With a modicum of re-arrangement the enneadic structure becomes clear, together with its total containment in the unity of memory.
Not only are the powers represented vertically, bound together by their activity, represented horizontally: Augustine relates to this ennead the knowledge of other intelligibles. Significantly he treats this knowledge as an extension of self-knowledge, firstly in so far as this also requires the presence of memory and will besides the intelligence as the inseparable constituents of mind:

'Quidquid itaque intelligibilium memini et volo, consequenter intelligo'; secondly, by handling the concept of 'intelligibilium' as if it were equivalent to 'intelligentia'. The richly subtle argument is not halted at all for an explanation of the origin and nature of the former. That he should regard the knowledge of intelligibles to be the identity of object with knower is a further indication that he knew the content of Aristotle's noetic, perhaps
through Porphyry's commentary on Metaphysics, which may have contained allusions to the position in the de Anima.

Cognitional triads and the place of the will

The internal triad with its enneadic expansion introduces a more subtle basis to the processes of cognition. In the first place it explains why although knowledge of other things may be regarded as an extension of self-knowledge, it should not be seen only as a dyadic union of subject and object; for together with the activity of intelligence there is also that of will and memory. Self-memory keeps the knowledge of itself present to itself through time; with the knowledge of other intelligibles the memory is necessary to sustain them in continuity of perception. Whilst it may also be the source from which past knowledge is brought to consciousness, it is necessarily involved in present reflection; it provides links with past knowledge, and contains the process of knowing through the delay in time in which the mind expresses its knowledge to itself. Self-willing, which may be regarded as the equivalent to self-loving, is the condition of loving and willing other things. An act of knowing, rooted in self-knowing, must in consequence entail an act of willing — at least of willed attention, rooted in self-loving. With an act which draws on the memory there will be a triad, resembling the inner one, of memory, understanding and will; but in the case of direct knowing, though the memory is indirectly involved, the third element of the triad, that which begets the knowledge, will be the intelligible object itself. An analogy
may further be drawn between direct sensation and intellectual knowledge triadically conceived. In this way a triadic pattern of cognition can be deduced from the inner constitutive triad of mens as well as observed in external circumstances: the speculative and empirical approach are bonded together.

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Between books XI and XIV of the de Trinitate Augustine examines a wide range of cognitional acts on the plan of union of knower and object through a willed attention, ranging from seeing (as a representative of sensation) to thinking of God. The series is arranged in an ascending order ('quodam modo gradatim') of spiritualisation and interiority, which
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corresponds to an increasing degree of unity within the triad. Some relations are made between the different triads, but not completely systematically. Thus memory triads are seen to depend on sensation triads; the memory of the expressions of faith triad is related to the triad of the understanding of faith; the triad of self-knowing will lead to a triadically conceived union with God. However, the overall movement in its classification and arrangement to a greater interiority is important. Initially they promise a great variety of observations; but then it turns out that they are without exception based on the same pattern: the object produces the knowledge of itself in the knower; but the will, sometimes transformed into love, has to intervene to fix the attention of the person knowing on the object. The more external the object, the less spiritual the knowing, and the more merely aggregated the application of the will (though its deliberate intervention is more necessary). The more interior the object, the knowing and the will producing the attention, the greater their unity. The greatest unity is when object, subject and will are united in conscious self-knowing. With faith, connatural pleasure in virtue and self-knowledge the will becomes more and more complaisance, more and more love. Hence the mens becomes more Godlike, without becoming divine; and Augustine's problem will be to determine their mode of continuity between God and his image in man.

Against those who imagine that Augustine initiated a will metaphysic, Benz's judgement, that Augustine is rather the thinker who interrelated mind and will, is the correct one:
"There is nothing in this metaphysics to give the will primacy over the intellect, or intellect over the will, in the way the question is usually put; but will and intellect are found undivided within a single intellectual substance".

Augustine put the Platonic-Plotinian primacy of desire and love over thought together with the Aristotelian usual primacy of thought over desire. Yet equal though self-knowledge and self-willing may be in themselves, the relation between exterior knowing and willing may be uneven. The desire to know something unknown has to be stirred by a foretaste of it (breviter impressam notitiam): as with a man who sees it is a good thing to know a foreign language from an experience of hearing it before he understands it; and he

"represents it in his mind by an imaginary picture by which he will be aroused to love. But whence does he picture it except from those things which he already knows?"

A small hint does not necessarily produce a small desire: it may produce an enormous desire; it may cause the person to apply immense will-power to reach that of which he has only a passing glimpse. In this way the power of the will can be given an immensely important place without denying in principle the primacy of the intellect. And the whole human process of fulfilment can be expressed in terms of the will for beatitude — a state of knowledge as much as a state of love: 'rectarum voluntatum connexio iter est quoddam ascendentium ad beatitudinem'.

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Circle or Substance Thinking

That Augustine's structure of thinking is triadic has led L. Scheglmann to suppose that with him self-reflection is in a tradition of circular thinking that goes back through the neo-Platonists to Plato. "I here designate this structure as a 'Subjectivity circle' ('Subjektzirkel'). It is intrinsically dynamic throughout, as only through the permanent reflecting self-movement does the unmoving (identical) centre cohere and the whole is en-souled." We have already seen that in Plotinus the return of νοῦς and ὑπόκτησις upon themselves are necessary to offset the multiplicity which their outgoing has caused. We have also seen in Porphyry's commentary on the Parmenides that the outgoing and return are conceived as moments of the triad being - knowing - living, and how Victorinus incautiously followed Porphyry and saw the production of the Son as an outgoing from the Father in an act of self-knowing. This movement of outgoing and return becomes the circular movement of rest, procession, conversion which was found increasingly among the later neo-Platonists as a systematic structure.

Scheglmann notes how Aristotle set himself against the circle thinking structure of Plato in de Anima I 3. He had no doubts that the process of outgoing and return was a part of the Augustinian theory of self-knowledge, derived from neo-Platonism and Porphyry in particular. (It is true that the system of Plotinus is a hierarchy of alienation, either held in check by the drawing power of the One, so that the material world does not become absolute non-being, or, by
conversion, on the way of return to its principle.  
The whole cosmos, both noetic and material, in its multiplicity and its subjection to time, is really something that ideally speaking ought not to have been. And he supposed that for Augustine the movement of thought in self-thinking was both a return from alienation and a circular movement of which the elements were esse - velle - nosse, into which however he did inject an authentic Augustinian conception of alienation: the moral failing of a man over-absorbed in this world.

"Now it can be asked (in addition to what came from neoplatonists) what psychological discoveries (Augustine) derives from Christian ideas. Above all there is the turning inwards, the transforming of the soul from out of its alienation in the world, in which it had wandered by itself. This turning to itself implies a circle .... nosse and esse are indivisibly united .... There exists in relation to the self the tendency to self-preservation, the will."

J. Mader thinks likewise. Commenting on a sentence in de Trinitate X 4, 6 - "Sed quando mens veniat in mentem, quasi possit mens in mente non esse" - he says

"in reflections on the self a circle is revealed. The human mind must be thought of as both remaining with itself and being other, so that it returns to itself (dass er zu sich selbst zurück kommend), i.e. so that it can yet be thought of in its own being as a unity." He continues

"The human mind is called back in its outgoing; in a certain way through going away to another self of its own (zu einem anderen seiner selbst) it comes back to itself", which is precisely what it does not do! As the product of
the object, self-knowledge in Augustine is precisely like any other kind of knowledge. But it is different from any other kind of knowledge, in that mens has no need to go 'out' to its object when it is already present to itself. Whilst it may be the function of the will to apply the attention of mens to itself - or to any other object - to begin for the process of 'cogitation', willing is not a stage of the cognitive process as such as Scheglmann's schema makes it. It should be noted that in the triad of Mader there is no provision for the will at all.

Benz has well understood the way in which Plotinus's assertion derived from Stoic thinking, of the need to turn within contributed to Augustine's explanation of the disposing of the mind to know itself through the fixing of the attention of the will.

"The precondition of willing is an act of will turning from all external objects and concentrating within, i.e. the transforming of \( \delta \rho \varepsilon \xi \varsigma \) into \( \beta \omega \eta \lambda \gamma \varsigma \varsigma \). In this is already a pointer to Augustin's teaching on the will." 75

He sees quite clearly that there is no alienation or loss of force in the process of self-knowing as Augustine understood it: he

"had grasped well Plotinus's ideas of hypostatising as an alienation of mind," 76 but had not agreed with it." 77

"... (it is) an inner movement of the mind which takes place in the divine transcendent being. This inner development led to neither alienation nor loss of power, without its unity or existence being affected in any way".

Likewise the human mens would have retained its unity.
Triadic accounts of epistemology in Augustine are not circular. In external cognition the object, object-produced knowledge and the 'intentio' of the will are an aggregation of factors. Only in internal cognition, when they begin to be united in such a way that the will can communicate with its object as known at the same level of spiritualisation, is there a possibility of 'circular' thinking. Yet here, through its more flexible enneadic structure and therefore not tied to its more rigidly conceived triadic processes, mind can at some prompting, however slight, apply the will to search the memory for what it wants to know. In self-thinking there is the greatest degree of self-equality and full interpenetration of knower and object known; and this self-equality, not circular thinking, is the true doctrine of Augustine. Otherwise the triad of self-knowledge - 'memoria sui - notitia sui - voluntas sui' - would not be what it is, a triad of equivalences of all in each and each in all 78; and its enneadic formulation would be quite out of the question.

Mens in equality with itself

The principle of interpretation so far in this thesis has been to discern Augustine's authentic meaning through observing his re-interpretation of neo-Platonist teaching. Fully in keeping with the eclectic spirit and the search for a statement of truth that was Christian and made greater claim to reasonableness at the same time, Augustine gave his
attention to Stoic teachings, and can be shown to have made a critique of neo-Platonist teachings in Stoic as well as a more authentically Aristotelian sense.

In the notion of self-equality with which de Trinitate IX begins can be seen the presence of a Stoic theme, which had been brought together with a comparable Aristotelian teaching before Augustine. According to Hadot

"There was a fusion of the Stoic notions of being in accord with oneself (\textit{oikei\sigma\iota\sups{w}}) and the Aristotelian notions of natural affinity (\textit{oikeio}\ups{tita}). The notion of self-conservation is thus related to the notion of being happy, as is found in the Nicomachean Ethics ... . This being in accord with one's self, desire, and joy in existence, are identified."

M. Zepf has written of a special study of this "\textit{oikeiosislehre}" of Augustine. Very precise on its sources (Cicero and Antiochus of Ascalon via Varro; as also Aristotle's \textit{\ups{v}o\ups{h}o\ups{t}i\ups{v} \ups{v}o\ups{h}o\ups{t}e\ups{w}s} via neo-Platonism) he insists on the novelty of his teaching, and with Husserl in mind he asserts that in Augustine

"It is not a case of the being of the self asserting its substance against objective being ... now the radiance of being is bound up with the subjective being of mind."

"Augustine comes between the periods, linked to antiquity, but already pointing to the new age ... . Tradition neither binds him nor constrains him, but stimulates his own creative power."

Augustine is more related to tradition than Zepf allows; his creativity was exercised on elements within a self-conscious eclectic tradition with the intention of establishing Christian triadic thinking on the divine within the tradition.
as its culminating expression. Nevertheless there is something original in Augustine's de Trinitate even if it was a work occasioned by circumstances not too difficult to reconstruct. As Zepf says Augustine leaves the question in the way in which Husserl picks it up: self-knowledge presupposes a turning away from the world, in \( \text{ἐπὶ οὐ} \); 84 but it does not lie in that alone. It is in the deliberate transposition to the human mens of neo-Platonist concepts of the identity of substance, self-love and self-knowledge from the One and from \( \text{ήμερον} \), the substitution of memoria for mens, and the establishing of the equivalence and coincidence of memoria sui, notitia sui and amor sui, and their constitution as fundamental to all cognition. A complete account of the intrinsic nature of mind is thus made theoretically possible. But has this equivalence any more than a tautologous meaning?

M. F. Sciacca has considered this speculatively in a short contribution to a conference. 85 He finds a number of suggestive epithets to describe the unity of the triad: "la circoncession et la consubstantialité des termes semblent évidents. Compénétration, synthèse, intrinsécisme . . ." 86. He envisages an order in which the acts of self-remembering, self-knowing and self-loving arise out of the deep continuing memory of the self; that is, when the mind consciously adverts to inner self-knowing and loving and their unity.

"When the mind (l'esprit) has self-memory and knows how to recall itself, this "scire se" is an act of intelligence, and precisely the first act which specifies it as "auto-consciousness", as "autovolition" is the first act of the will." 87
Love, as a desire for self-knowledge, is, in the mind (l'esprit), before the generation of autoconscience (so it can not be an engendered love); after its generation there is self-love, that is conscious self-love. 88

Sciacco's most valuable comments concern the arising of values of truth and morality when the mens has established a norm in finding equality with itself. "As the generation of self-knowledge is the essential act within the mind" 89, human thinking measures itself with relation to this act: "the reality (l'actualité) of thought receives its specification in the act of 'autoconscience' 90". This being so, self-knowing becomes the measure of its own truthfulness: "of itself the mind engenders the truth of its autoconnaissance, the object connatural to it." Here, like Stumpf, Sciacco has to suppose the presence the superior illuminating truth. "That is the first contact of the mind with the illumination by the truth which also constitutes it as mind" 91. The consideration of this value-generation in itself is not to be excluded by the fact that the supreme measure of truth is God himself. By transferring perfect, divine characteristics to the human mind Augustine gave a source of value to it, relatable to mind's own independence and immediate self-presence. Mind itself is what mind knows best: better than God, better than material things. If its self-certainty is disturbed by the giving of too much attention to material things, it is going against the nature of its own constitution and running the danger of confusing itself with an unreal image. 92

Correspondingly, if self-certainty by which all other certainties fall into place is reduced, it will mean that the
certainty of everything else will be disturbed. For human beings, self-consciousness is pure consciousness: it is not opposed to objects which are not itself; but they could not be known without it, nor would they have any clear truthful value without it. As Sciacco says,

"Thought by the fact of being thought is self-thought; so the mind knows itself in its essence. Self-knowledge is essentially intrinsic to thought".

This is a practical consequence of the principle of νόησις νοήσεως drawn out only by Augustine in a coherent subjectivity structure for an individual, embodied human existence.

That Augustine could construct a similar measure for loving in self-loving, interrelate them, and root them in the essence of the soul made possible a meaningful study at the religious level of dogmatic teaching and Christian morality, and at a philosophical level the interrelationship of metaphysics and ethics; as also the interrelation of revealed religious data and philosophy. It was a systematisation in order and penetration, superior to the neo-Platonist. Hitherto knowing and willing, epistemology and affectivity had remained distinguished in analysis and consequently kept apart in their treatment. With the transposition of the conceptions of perfect self-knowing and perfect self-loving from the One and νοῦς to the individual human being, and with the interrelating of these with self-remembering in the memory as the centre of consciousness and the locus in which all experience was relatable together and over time, it was possible to conceive of a total systematisation of the mind: with self-consciousness as pure consciousness, and self-love as
pure love, with both equal to the subject, mens, and to self-memory, mutually caused and mutually contained by each other.

The Divine Prototype

By virtue of the primary intention of his de Trinitate Augustine was obliged to relate his analysis of the human mens to the Godhead which it imaged. He needed to do so in order to complete his apologetic task: in neo-Platonism the transcendent triad was also itself the means by which the individual came to know it, for he had to become aware that his knowing and self-knowing were derived from this triad and were identical with knowing and self-knowing in the hypostases themselves. If all thinking were 'divine', all thought which leads to the divine would already be divine. Not so with Augustine, for whom the distinction between God and everything else was complete. The constitutive and cognitive human triads had shown that three powers and three acts could co-exist in the mens without becoming confused. But the act in which God was the object of knowledge found the Godhead only in its unity; direct continuity between the power of mens and the Persons of the prototype was impossible. God might be remembered in the memory, known in the mind and loved in the will, but the triadicity was in the human mens alone; for the three powers in the human mind belonged to one person, whilst in the Godhead there were three persons. Augustine had to point out that in the Godhead it is impossible to attribute all remembering to the Father, all knowing to the Son and all
loving to the Holy Spirit for all three powers must belong to each. 94 Even if the presence of these three powers together in the human mind disposes a thinker to accept the possibility of a triune Godhead they do not in fact image it. Perhaps forgetting the success which he had with the ennead and its promises of further development for the trinity of three persons each with three powers, 95 he expresses a sense of failure: "in ipso intellectu conatum me senserim magis habuisse quam effectum", 96 for he feels he has found an analogy which would distribute the three powers discernible in a single human person among those divine persons, apart from which the three powers in man are variable and changeable, unlike the timeless changelessness of God 97. Because of the Christian discontinuity between Creator and creature, the timeless and the time-bound, the completeness of the neo-Platonist account cannot be attained. What Augustine gives is a kind of progression from the most external knowledge to a noetic link between man and God: not by neo-Platonist identity, but by gradual assimilation — in which faith and the practice of virtue have their part — which suggests the non-impossibility of a triune God, who leaves in the triadic nature of the cosmos, and particularly the noetic cosmos, vestiges of his own nature. Desire and will, aroused by what seem disproportionately small hints lead to a limited understanding of the invisible Godhead which calls all men to share in its own beatitude; but desire and will are not absorbed into knowing. Yet there cannot be a link between each of the three powers of the soul and what had seemed to be their equivalents in the divine persons, for the divine
essence would need expressing enneadically; and an
elevation to God of an enneadically conceived human mens
to an enneadically conceived divinity would have presented
a task at which Augustine must have despaired; and he ad-
mits he had trouble enough with the triadic approach 98.

Yet, accepting the appropriate obscurity of the divine
object, worship could be thought of as providing a means of
union between the mens and its prototype: "Let (the mind),
then, remember its God, to whose image it has been made, and
understand him and love him. Or to express this more brief-
ly, let it worship the God who was not made, but by whom it
was made so that it is capable of him and can be a partaker
of him." 99 * "Qui ergo se diligere novit, Deum diligat;"
and love of one's fellows is nothing but a further consistency
with this love. 100 Unlike other texts of Augustine, in the
de Trinitate charity is not developed into a mode of divine
union: rather it is identified with God 101.

Yet Augustine does relate the divine Trinity directly to
the human triad of remembering, knowing and loving, and implies
that despite their discontinuity any commercium is not
one-way from the human mens: "Meminerim tui,
intelligam te, diligam te. Auge in me ista, donec

Insert p.252 at *

Whereas Porphyry wished to demythologise cult and reduce
it to philosophical contemplation which he considered it
essentially was, Augustine, through his conversion from a
philosophical position, had learned to discover its significance
and value. Again, union with the Godhead might be found through
coincidence. Paralleling the neo-Platonist self-knowing, which
was at the same time a knowledge of the source from which one
comes, Augustine proposed that a right kind of self-love would
coincide with a love of God:
essence would need expressing enneadically; and an
elevation to God of an enneadically conceived human mens
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one-way — from the human mens: "Meminerim tui,
intelligam te, diligam te. Auge in me ista, donee
me reformes ad integrum" 102. When it comes to the divine
object it is so vast that the acts by which the Godhead is
grasped are separated out and expressed like three tremendous
resolutions; but the remembering, knowing and loving which
are embodied in them and reach through every level of the
human mens in all its powers — memory, understanding and will —
have an effect of bringing the servant of God into the unity he desires: "donee me reformes ad integrum".

2 'Marius Victorinus und die Entwicklung der abendlandischen Willenmetaphysik', Stuttgart 1932, p. 358.

3 'Die psychologische Trinitätslehre ...'

4 op. cit. pp. 223-5.

5 Ennead V 4.2.

6 v. ib. V 9.5: 'if one takes the word 'mind' in its true sense, what must be understood by it is not a mind in potentiality which passes from a state of non-understanding to a state of understanding ... but mind in act and eternally existent.'

7 de Trinitate IX 5.9. cf. op. cit. p. 369: 'Augustine has grasped well the plotinian idea of alienation of mind, and certainly of an alienation of his own being; however he would not allow the conception to be applied to the divine being.'

8 Ennead VI 8.6:

9 ib. VI 7.35: '... carried out of itself and inebriated with nectar, (νούς) becomes a loving intelligence in simplifying itself to reach this state of happy fulness.'

10 cf. Hadot, 'Porphyre ...' I p. 320. ἑπιστρέφειν can mean in fact a return of νούς to itself or to its source. Ennead VI 7.37 brings the two movements together: 'it looks for itself and its author, it turns itself to contemplate and it knows' (ζητεῖν ... καὶ αὐτὸ ἑπιστρέφειν ἐν ἰδίῳ καὶ γνωρίζειν) following Bréhier.


12 v. fr. XIV of Commentary on the Parmenides (Hadot, ib. II p. 111) lines 16-21. But notice lines 15-16 give the order being - life - thought. cf. Lewy, op. cit. p. 455: 'Plotinus ... frequently designated ζωή as coordinate with θύμος and νοῦς; with (tacit) reference to this teaching Porphyry introduced the noetic
Footnotes to Ch. 5 - continued -

12 cont'd:

triad ὅν - ὅν in his commentary on the Timaeus. Lewy refers (op. cit. p. 456, n. 57) to a text in Proclus's commentary on the Timaeus (ed. E. Diehl, III p. 64 l. 8 to p. 65 l. 7, Leipzig 1906) quoting Porphyry (and Theodorus (of Asine)) as explaining the apparent difference of speed in the movement of the stars (= Star-gods) by the variations of Οὐρά - οὐρά - ὅν in their constitutions and between themselves and their end (meditations) (cf. Proclus, Commentaire sur le Timée, translated and annotated by A.J. Festugière, O.P., IV pp. 88-9, Paris 1968).

13 v. 'The Elements of Theology', proposition 35 (translation, Introduction and Commentary, by E.R. Dodds, 2nd edition Oxford 1963, p. 39): 'Every effect remains in its cause, proceeds from it and reverts upon it'. But by propositions 39 and 45, this is restricted to what is 'self-constituted' (i.e. what necessarily exists).

14 Pepin's suggestion that the mode of union of the triad mens - notitia sui - amor sui is described in a form which comes from Porphyry is the single solid suggestion to date. "Une Nouvelle source ..." v. supra p. 161 n. 141.

15 'Die trinitarische Ausprägung der göttlichen Seinsfälle nach Marius Victorinus', Munich 1972, pp. 91, 93.


17 Explicitly mentioned in XIX 23: for other places v. O'Meara, 'Porphyry's Philosophy ...' p. 63ff.

18 de Trinitate XII 5 5: "Omitto enim quale sit Spiritum Sanctum matrem Filii Dei putare et conjugem Patris: fortassis quippe respondatur haec in carnalibus habere offensionem, dum corporis conceptus partusque cogitatur." cf. Lewy, op. cit. p. 5ff for a triad in a hymn of Porphyry which derives from the Chaldaean Oracles: 'Father of the Gods' - feminine principle - intellectual creator of the world. 'The feminine principle "suckles" the world-forming intellect by means of the "eternally flowing rays" ... the forms which spring from her' (op. cit. p. 13). On Hegate-Psyche, the cosmic soul in the Oracles, v. ib. pp. 83 33.

19 For the relation of the two works to the Oracles see Hadot 'Citations ...' especially pp. 205-7, as complementary to Lewy, op. cit., pp. 449ff. Lewy opines that Augustine would have known a Latin translation, ib. p. 451 and n. 10.

20 v. Lewy, pp. 78ff.
Footnotes to Ch. 5 - continued -

21 de Trinitate XV 25 45: 'tria unius personae, non sicut humana poscit intentio, tribus illis personis convenire potuerunt'.

22 de Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII 18 (PL 40.15). The theme of self-coincidence here very much resembles Porphyry's Sententia XII on self-knowledge where it is expressed in terms of ἐναυ.<ref>

23 As proposed by Scheglmann and Mader, v. infra, pp. 242 - 4.

24 op. cit. XIII 11 12: the condition is that 'mens' is equivalent to 'intelligere'.

25 op. cit. VI 10 11.

26 ib. X 13-16.

27 Codex Justiniani I 1 3: 'We wish that all his writings, which provoke the wrath of God and are offensive to souls, should not come to the hearing of men.' The writings of Nestorius were condemned in the same decree.

28 v. infra, n. 33. - - - - -

29 That this unity is more paradoxical and the resultant triads are not dialectical in the Hegelian sense is explained in the exoursus.

30 v. Ennead VI 7 41.

31 v. ib. V 3 5. In its triadic form, said by A. Dahl ('Augustin und Plotin, Philosophische Untersuchungen zum Trinitätsproblem und zur Nuslehre', Lund 1945, pp. 70-71) to have an 'unmistakable resemblance' to Augustin's triads. This thesis demonstrates how limited that resemblance is.

32 Ennead VI 8 6: 'for the will tends to the Good; but νοος is truly in the Good; it thus possesses the object towards which the will tends'.

33 cf. ib. VI 7 35. Knowing and willing are more obscurely brought together in the One in VI 8 16: 'As for him, transporting himself into himself, he loves himself, he loves his pure clarity (αὐγὴ τὸ ἀροὰν), since that which he loves in himself is a motionless act and a kind of intelligence (οἶνος νοος) ... he is as he wishes to be (ἐξεχελ). Two remarks of Hadot reach nearest to the heart of the subject-matter:
Footnotes to Ch. 5 - continued -

33 cont'd:

1) 'the schemas of the neo-Platonist schools which can be discerned through the Augustinian trinities undergo a kind of metamorphosis' ("L'Image ..." p. 440). But disconcertingly he goes on to ask 'are there psychological, historical or mystical reasons which explain why renouncing ontological dogmatism, Augustine only admits the evidence of interior experience to possess certitude ...?' (ib. pp. 441-2).

ii) 'It is desirable to have) a study of the genesis of the Augustinian schemas, those complexes of thought in which memories of Plotinus and Porphyry, scriptural quotations and theological reflection make up a block which it is almost impossible to break down' ('Citations ...' p. 244).

As for the first, it is the proposal of this thesis that Augustine retained some of the certainties and analyses made by neo-Platonist dogmatism, and did not limit himself to personal 'experience' (presumably of a non-metaphysical kind, which he used to construct a different subjectivity structure.) As for the second, this thesis undertakes an initial 'decomposition' of Augustine's schemas.

34 cf. de Trinitate XI 2 5: Et si (voluntas) tam violenta est, ut possit vocari amor, aut cupiditas, aut libido ...

35 Ennead VI 6. ΩΠΕΡ η βουλησις Θελει και ου τυχουσα ταυτην νοησις γινεται.

36 ib. V 1 12 (following Bréhier): και θα αντιλαμβανομενον εις το ευω επιστρεψειν, κακες πολευν την προσχυν εχειν.

The Stoic occurrences of προσοχη (= attention) noted in the dictionaries of H. Stephanus and Liddell and Scott are significant. It is not surprising to find a considerably developed Roman use of this conception in Cicero's employment of 'intendere', and at the same time its association with a teaching on 'acies mentis' (= point of attention). 'Intendere' and 'acies' are brought together by Cicero (Academia (Priores) II 25 80) and also Quintilian (Institutio Oratoria XI 2 10: the context is of memory). This is undoubtedly the background to Augustine's own conceptions.

37 v. in particular infra: pp. 246 and nn. 79 and 80.

38 On 'inherence' and related notions in the de Trinitate, v. XII 3 3: 'subhaeremus intelligibili atque incemmutabili veritati'; ib. 7 12: 'mens aeternis rationibus conspiciendis vel consulendis adhaerescit'; XIV 14 20: 'ei cuius imago est valeat inhaerere'.
Footnotes to Ch. 5 - continued -

39 ib. X 8 11: 'videbit quod numquam se non amaverit, numquam nescierit: sed alius secum amando cum eo se confudit et concrevit quodam modo.' cf. ib. X 10 16: '... quadem interiore non simulata, sed vera praesentia (non enim quidquam illi est se ipsa praesentius) sicut cogitat vivere se et meminisse, et intelligere, et velle se. Novit enim haec in se, nec imaginatur quasi extra se illa sensu tetigerit, sicut corporalia quaeque tanguntur'.

40 ib. XIV 7 10: 'Nam si nos referamus ad interiorem mentis memoriam qua sui meminit, et interiorem intelligentiam qua se intelligit, et interiorem voluntatem qua se diligit, ubi haec tria simul semper sunt, et semper simul fuerunt ex quo esse coeperunt, sive cogitaretur, sive non cogitarentur...' cf. ib. XIV 6 9.

41 ib. XIV 14 19: 'Non tamen in his tantis infirmitatis et erroris malis amittere potuit naturalem memoriam, intellectum, et amorem sui'.

42 ib. XIV 5 7: '(Infans) se nosse ... non ignorare se potest, sed cogitare se non potest?' The question is answered affirmatively.

43 ib.

44 ib. 6 8.

45 ib. 7 10.

46 cf. Schmaus, 'Die psychologische ...' p. 238: 'Mind wishes to attain to happiness. It must thereby be conscious that it is itself that strives for this end. It is recognisable as the bearer of a desire for happiness.' However, this may not be apparent before introspective analysis. The lack of immediate awareness of self-love may be due to the fact that it does not show itself because it is satisfied: cf. 'voluntas in ipsa notitia conquiescit, quod fit in amore spiritualium' (de Trinitate IX 9 14).

47 ib. 14 18: nemo diligit cuius non meminit, et quod penitus nescit ... Sic itaque condita est mens humana, ut numquam sui non meminerit, numquam se non intelligat, numquam se non diligit.
48 de Trinitate IX 5 8: 'Singula in binis ...' Ac per hoc et bina in singulis, quia mens quae se
novit et amat, cum sua notitia est in amore, et cum
amore in notitiae...

49 ib. X 11 18: 'Neque enim tantum a singulis singula,
verum etiam a singulis omnia capiuntur. Memini enim
me habere memoriam, et intelligentiam, et voluntatem;
et intelligo me intelligere, et velle, atque meminisse;
et volo me velle, et meminisse, et intelligere, totamque
seam memoriam, et intelligentiam, et voluntatem simul
memini'.

50 ib. This passage makes the much-quoted passage in
IX 4 6 on self-knowledge as a condition of other
knowledge appear in a much more Aristotelian light.

51 Triplicity ('Dreifaltigkeit') is therefore 'a
necessity of thought, a metaphysical law ...' Benz,
op. cit., p. 367.

52 v. supra, p. 169.

53 op. cit., XV 2 3.

54 The cognitional triads are listed below. In Augustine's
text they are not always given with completeness. In
every case will or love keeps the attention of the
percipient on the object, at the same time affixing a
moral value or disvalue to the act.
(cf. Schmaus, 'Die psychologische ...' p.218:
'its moral worth or lack of worth depends on the third
element in the triad, the will').

i) triads of external objects, with sight as an example:
ipsa res - visio - animi intentio (XI 2 2). Repeated
in XI 2 5: species corporis - impressa elius imago
sensui - voluntas animi quae rei sensibili sensum
admovet in eoque ipsam visionem tenet.

ii) triads of the memory: memoria - interna visio -
quae utrumque copulat voluntas (XI 3 6).

iii) triads of sensation and cogitation, with 'voluntas ...
copulatrix quasi parentis et prolis' (XI 9 16) —
partly summary, though cogitation is new.

iv) At the margin of the 'inner man' and exterior sensa-
tion is a development of thought out of memory: 'intus
corporum similitudines ... impressas memoriae, ex
quibus cogitatio formatur, tertia voluntate utrumque
jungente' (XII 15 25).

v) with faith (with which the consideration of inner
knowledge begins - v. XIII 20.26) are

a) triads of the sounds of the words in which it
is embodied: 'memoria ... verborum soni, ...
Footnotes to Ch. 5 - continued -

54 cont'd:

a) cont'd -

inde formatur aecies recordationis eius, ... et voluntas recordantis atque cogitantis utrumque (conjungens)' (XIII 20 26).

b) a triad of understanding the expressions of faith: 'voluntas ... quae ibi conjungit ea quae memoriae tenebantur, et ea quae inde in acie cogitationis impressa sunt' (ib.) Yet, to be perfect, the will must be turned into love (ib.).

vi) Next he considers the cognitional triad by which the mens needs to express itself to itself (XIV 6 8). After repeating that the mens has no need to place itself before itself (because all the time it is knowing itself), he likens the act of self-knowledge to a well-read man bringing to consciousness knowledge lying in his memory. The situation of self-knowing is like Aristotle's learned man of de Anima III 429 b 5-10 (cf. supra, pp. 35-6). Augustine is emphatic that the interposition of cogitatio does not destroy mind's self-immediacy. He gives here two formulations of the triad.

a) 'illud unde formatur cogitantis obtutus, in memoria poneremus; ipsam vero conformationem, tanguam imaginem quae inde imprimitur; et illud quo utrumque conjungitur, amorem seu voluntatem'.

b) 'Haec autem duo, gignens et genitum, dilectione tertia copulantur, quae nihil est aliud quam voluntas fruendum aliiquid appetens vel tenens'.

vii) a wide range of triads of knowing and remembering are given in XIV 8 11: 'Quae omnia, et quando discunter, quamdam faciant trinitatem, specie sua quae noscibilis fuit etiam antiquam noscere tur, elque adjuncta cognitione dissentis quae tunc esse incipit quando discitur, ac tertia voluntate quae utrumque conjungit'.

viii) Contrast with the changeless bliss of the next world is the complaisance in good deeds, whether recognised here and now ('cum ea praebentia tenemus, aspicimus, amamus'), or remembered from this life in the next ('cum illud quaecumque vestigium et memoriter retinebatur, et agnoscitur veraciter, et hoc utrumque tertia voluntate jungetur') (XIV 9 12).
Footnotes to Ch. 5 - continued -

55 In a posthumous article, L. Scheglmann proposed a relationship between the triads: amans - quod amat - amor (IX 2 2), mens - amor - notitia sui (IX 3 5) and memoria = intelligentia - voluntas (X 11 17). ('Der Subjektzirkel in der Psychologie Augustins', in Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 22, 1968, pp. 327ff.) From the first triad (which amounts to self-love in the sense of feeling (Selbstgefühl)) comes the second (because self-love needs knowledge). And the third is a reflected deepening of the second. 'In this way the basic quality of feeling of the mind's being (Sein des Geistes) becomes reflected. From reflected knowledge comes intelligence; from reflected love comes will.' 'Die reflektierte Kenntnis (notitia) ergibt die Er-kennnis (intelligentia), die reflektierte Liebe (amor) ergibt den Willen (voluntas)' (p. 334).

From the first two triads he makes out a 'first circle' of self-feeling (Selbst - gefühl) which is raised into self-knowing (Sichwissen). 'I' is thus self-knowing. Knowing is now consciousness: self-knowing is self-consciousness: 'i'" (ib.) The interrelationship is ingenious, and the development from an unreflected notitia sui to intelligentia could be the heart of a systematisation. But it would not be Augustine's! The three triads which Scheglmann produced, of which the second is given inaccurately (in place of 'amor sui' should be 'amor sui') are in fact all different formulations of the same fundamental triad of mens (or memoria sui) - notitia sui - voluntas sui: the triad by which mens remains always known to itself. Even in the act of turning to know itself (the second triad of Scheglmann) it already knows itself (cf. 'Deinde cum se quaerit ut noverit, quaerentem se jam novit. Jam se ergo novit ... Si autem se nescientem nescit, non se quaerit ut sciat' (X 3 5)). The 'amans' of the first triad derives directly from the erotic of Plato and Plotinus: feeling does not enter into it; the second triad (when complete) refers to the continuous inner self-knowledge; the third triad, according to the context, looks at separate faculties as passing into act. Scheglmann did not respect the basic distinction in Augustine's structure between 'se nosse' and 'cogitatio de se'. Beneath the pattern of triads and their components is the ground-swell of a normal Augustinian elevation, whose elements are strongly linked to the rising theme rather than rigidly linked to each other.

56 op. cit. p. 302.
57 cf. Phaedrus 250 D (admittedly based on reminiscence) and Ennead III 5 1.
58 de Trinitate X 1 2.
Footnotes to Ch. 5 — continued —

59 ib. 2 4. cf. Aristotle: 'But I presume that there is no reason why a man should not in one sense know, and in another not know, that which he is learning'
(Posterior Analytics I 1 (71 b 5-7).

60 de Trinitate XI 6 10: cf. Nicomachean Ethics, I 9, especially 1099 b 19-20: happiness is won by study, care and effort. cf. also 1111 b 26: \( \text{bou} \text{ny s-} \) is for an end; repeated at 1113 a 15.

61 cf. de Trinitate IX 4 5: "... non amor et cognitio tanquam in subjecto insunt menta; sed substantialiter etiam ista sunt, sicut ipsa mens.'

62 op. cit. The circle schema is represented thus (p.331):

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{esse} \\
\text{velle} \\
\text{Ego} \\
\text{hors} \\
\end{array}
\]

63 ib. p.329.

64 supra. p.120-2 .

65 supra. p.226 .


68 v. Timaeus 35 A ff, especially 36 D and E.

69 v. 407 a 15-33.

70 cf. Benz, op. cit. p.265: This return of universal soul (Seele) is included in the overall reintegration of the hypostatised and alienated spirit (Geist) into its own transcendent being (An-sich-sein).

71 e.g. in the frequent injunction to 'return to oneself': 'redire ad se'.


73 'Die logische Struktur des personalen Denkens aus der Methode der Gotteserkennnis bei Aurelius Augustinus', Vienna 1965, p.153. Perhaps the author was misled by the translation of 'veniat in' by 'zurückkehren': how else can we explain his total misunderstanding of the text — which specifically denies that there is any need of mens to go outside itself and return to itself in order to know itself, as it is already totally present to itself!
Footnotes to Ch. 5 — continued —

74 ib. p. 155.
75 op. cit. p. 308.
76 ib. p. 369.
77 ib. p. 370.

78 cf. de Trinitate X 11 18: 'aequalia sunt tota singula totis singulis, et tota singula simul omnibus totis'.

79 G. Verbeke has shown how Augustine largely set on one side the neo-Platonist teaching on pneuma (according to Porphyry a kind of psychic envelope to the body) in favour of the earlier Aristotelian (more metaphysical) and Stoic (more physiological) teaching that it was a necessary intermediary between soul and body, on whose organs the soul could not act directly. "L'Evolution de la Doctrine du Pneuma du Stoicisme à saint Augustin", Paris—Louvain 1945, chapter I passim, pp. 334ff, and especially 504ff.

80 'Porphyre ...' ib. pp. 289–90. A.C. Lloyd points out a related Stoic teaching in de Trinitate X 5 7: 'The mind, he said, must know itself so as to live secundum naturam suam, that is by controlling what it ought to control and being controlled by what ought to control it. This at least was orthodox Stoicism.' v. 'Nosce Teipsum and Conscientia', Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 46, 1964 p. 195.


82 ib. p. 130.

83 ib. pp. 131–2.

84 'Damit stehen wir dort, wo Husserl die augustinische Problematik aufgriff: die Weltverlorenheit wird die Voraussetzung für das Selbstbewusstsein', ib. p. 131.


86 ib. p. 527.

87 ib. p. 523. 'Autoconscience' does not exist in the most recent French dictionaries: presumably it translates 'autocoscienza' — more the awareness the spirit has of its own acts than deliberate introspection, though it is used in the latter sense (v. passage referred to in n. 90).

88 ib. p. 531.
Footnotes to Ch. 5 - continued -

89 ib. p. 530.
90 ib. p. 524.
91 ib. p. 529.

92 cf. de Trinitate X 5 7: '... ut secundum naturum suam ordinari appetat', and 6 8: '... Errat autem mens, cum se istis imaginibus amore conjungit, ut etiam se esse aliquid huiusmodi existimet.'

93 op. cit. p. 523.

94 de Trinitate XV 7 12: 'Ergo tria illa, id est, memoria, intelligentia, dilectio sive voluntas in illa summa et immutabili essentia quod est Deus, non Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt, sed Pater solus ... Filius ... est et ipse memoria, sua intelligentia, sua dilectio .... Spiritus sanctus ... habet haec tria, et ea sic habet, ut haec ipsa ipse sunt.' cf. ib. 17 27 and 22 42.

95 cf. supra, p. 237. The horizontal or vertical lines of the diagram would have to be regarded as unités for application to the Trinity.

96 de Trinitate XV 25 45.

97 '... in una quidam persona quod est homo ... et in re mutabili tria illa ... sed tria unius personae, non sicut humana poscit intentio, tribus illis personis convenire potuerunt ...' (ib.).

98 cf. Epistola CXX 3 13, written about 410. (PL 33. 458-9).

99 de Trinitate XIV 12 15: 'Inmemerit itaque Dei sui, ad cuius imaginem facta est, eunque intelligat atque diligat. Quod ut brevius dicam, colat Deum non factum, cuius ab eo capax est facta, et cuius particeps esse potest'.

100 ib. XIV 14 18.

101 ib. IX 1 1, XV 17 28.

102 ib. 28 51: cf. ib. 20 39: 'Ad quam summam Trinitatem reminiscendam, videndam, diligendam, ut eam recordetur, eam contempletur, ea delectetur, totum debet referre quod vivit.'
EXCURSUS
Hegel's Conception of Self-Knowledge seen in conjunction with Augustine's

Hegel was explicitly aware of the fragmentary, unsystematised nature of the Aristotelian corpus - the point from which this thesis began. "A general view of his philosophy does not give the impression of its being in construction a self-systematised whole, of which the order and connection pertain likewise to the notion (dem Begriffe); for the parts are empirically selected and placed together in such a way that each part is independently recognised as a determinate conception (Begriff), without being taken into the connected movement of the science". Nevertheless it is perfectly clear that that element of Aristotle's teaching on thinking and self-thinking, which had been so systematically developed by neo-Platonist thinking, was also developed further by Hegel, and while his interpretation might seem idiosyncratic he would have justified it as being the logical completion of what Aristotle and Plotinus had left incomplete.

Passages selected from the Metaphysics and the de Anima, as translated and commented in the section on Aristotle in his History of Philosophy reveal many themes which are recognisable as central to Hegel's thinking: the Notion (Begriff) as "principium cognoscendi ... and also principium essendi"; "the direction of thought on all kinds of objects thus transforming them into thoughts"; that "it is only in thought that there is present a true harmony between
objective and subjective; that constitutes me" 4; that "the universal is, to a certain extent, in the soul itself as substance" 5; that sense perception is simultaneously a separation as well as a union 6; a tendentious explanation of the passive \( \nu\ointas \) of de Anima III 4, that "the ideas are at first only quiescent forms 7 (in the soul), not activities, and so Aristotle is not a realist"; but, above all, his development of the idea of absolute Geist from the conception of thought thinking on thinking: "Absolute thinking (he calls this the divine \( \nu\ointas \)), Geist in its absoluteness, this thinking is a thinking of what is best, what is the ultimate end, this is precisely the self-thinking \( \nu\ointas \)." 8 Through paraphrases, which were really new interpretations and commentary, Hegel gave a coherence to the epistemology of Metaphysics \( \Lambda \) and de Anima III on the basis of the complete and pre-existing identity of thought and thinker because they were divine.

The \( \nu\ointas \) of Metaphysics \( \Lambda \), "became for Hegel simply (or, if you wish, mediated infinitely in a dialectic way) and in general 'the entelechy of thinking'" 9 and it appears as such, particularly in a number of places in the Encyclopædia: (of the idea as being its own object, and the union of the two being absolute idea; of "free mind (Geist) ... which sunders itself ... into a limitless knowing, and on the other hand into the object that is identical with that knowing", 10 of thinking which becomes what "it was only supposed to be", "self-knowing truth" 11. But it was no longer the remote \( \nu\ointas \) of Aristotle; either actually or potentially it was prepared to embrace every content, in its individuality and universality together." 12
For Hegel the original conception of Aristotle had revived in Kant's unity of apperception, which had the quality of self-thinking without the capacity to penetrate to the reality of things: "On the other side and independent stands a self-apprehending thought, the principle of freedom, which Kant has in common with ordinary and bygone metaphysics, but emptied of all that it held, and without being able to give it anything new". 14

Plotinus had given self-thinking \( \psi \sigma \upsilon \varsigma \) the simultaneous content of the transcendent One and the \( \psi \left( \upsilon \chi \right) \); individual things were grasped only by \( \psi \left( \upsilon \chi \right) \), the emanation from \( \psi \sigma \upsilon \xi \). For Hegel the soul was immaterial, but "the sleep of mind – the passive \( \psi \sigma \upsilon \varsigma \) of Aristotle" 15. This ingenious, but inauthentic, interpretation of Aristotle, by reducing the noetic of neo-Platonism to one principle with the contents of two, allowed its development into two spheres where Plotinus was not concerned. Firstly in the relationship of Geist with the external material world in which it recognised itself, so that its cognition of material things was also a realisation of its self-consciousness. Secondly, in its historical manifestations, so that not only the formally historically related works (Geschichte der Philosophie, Philosophie der Religion, and Philosophie der Geschichte), but also the more loosely historically related works (Phänomenologie des Geistes and Philosophie des Recht), and even the non-historically related works (Wissenschaft der Logik and System der Philosophie (Enzyklopädie)) are centred on the process of Geist coming to know itself. Even though self-thinking was developed for Hegel in other directions, neo-Platonism was of
great significance for him. In Plotinus "The distinction between thought and an external God is thus doubtless at an end" 16; and had he known of Porphyry's proposals to transmute religion into what he thought it essentially was—philosophical contemplation, he would have been even more impressed; 17 but little of Porphyry's writing was available to him.

W. Beierwaltes has recently considered the relation of Hegel to neo-Platonism 18. He proposes that Hegel can be related to Plotinus in the following ways 19. Firstly, that Hegel rationalised Plotinus's conception of ecstasy; there was to be an ascent into self-thinking-being: not an ecstasy into non-thinking (non-) being in the One. Secondly, although there is some similarity with Hegel's conception in the way in which Plotinus's νοῦς unites diversity (thinking objects) and sameness (thinking itself), the unification of diverse objects into self-thinking Geist is by the ever extending process of negation and synthesis. Thirdly, that both systems are in a way speculative syntheses of the Aristotelian conception of the divine substance (thinking on thinking) and Parmenides' identity of thought and being. In Hegel the Absolute becomes wholly united with itself though by a dialectical process. In Plotinus the unification of thinking and being through νοῦς is not complete: it needs the activity of Soul as well; but Geist in Hegel is to bring everything into an absolute unity. Beierwaltes even goes so far as to say that Hegel "recognised the logical-speculative meaning of neo-Platonic philosophy, and founded his own thinking on it" 20. However, for Hegel the past
great significance for him. In Plotinus "The distinction between thought and an external God is thus doubtless at an end" 16; and had he known of Porphyry's proposals to transmute religion into what he thought it essentially was philosophical contemplation, he would have been even more impressed; 17 but little of Porphyry's writing was available to him.

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pointed to the present, but did not determine it; the contemporary stage of philosophy posed the important questions, which were quite unthought of in earlier times. So Plotinus had his place in the history of philosophy — as did the more important Proklos — but the importance of his thought has been superseded.

Since Hegel like Augustine re-interpreted the thought of Plotinus the question arises whether he and Augustine, as characteristic philosophers of Western innerness and yet as belonging to seemingly widely different traditions within it, might be speculatively related to each other on the ground of their both being interpreters of Plotinus. The absence of evidence of direct knowledge of Augustine by Hegel was pointed out in the introduction 21. If he had read and understood the Augustinian critique of Plotinus in the way in which it unequivocally asserted the independence of the individual it might have sharpened his awareness of the ambivalence (necessary in the dialectic of the individual and the universal) of the Aristotelian-Plotinian \( \chi \nu \sigma \nu \) as one and yet many, which was taken over into his conception of Geist. Given the historical axiom of the processive self-disclosure of Geist it is likely that he would have re-interpreted the thinking of Augustine as containing so many elements pointing toward a philosophical position of which he himself held the key. Plotinus's transcendent thinking identified human Geist and absolute Geist; but there were other nearer sources of this kind of totality-thinking who were far more important (Spinoza in particular 22) which did not, as Plotinus, find
reality graduated from the noetic as most real to the material as least real. Hegel's conception of the end of thought and the end of history was a complete refusion of mind and matter which spurned such gradations. Hence his insistence that Geist and the world were not strangers to each other, and his philosophising on objective forms taken by Geist (rights and property, family, civil society and State) are quite foreign to Plotinus's conception of what was important.

Concentration on their common ground would run the risk of neglecting the material interests of Hegel, to which Augustine's practical concerns are nearer than Plotinus's desire to escape from the body. Whilst noting that both Augustine and Hegel re-interpreted some Plotinian themes, it seems better to undertake a direct comparison between them.

And the most convenient way of carrying this out is to propose the interpretation of Augustine's position on self-knowledge which Hegel himself would have made. The Hegelian reflections on self-knowledge, in its richness and subtlety, can find a place for the Augustinian statement.

There is no enormous difficulty in outlining the hermeneutic of Augustine which Hegel would have made. It would have judged that his conception of thinking, self-thinking and thinking of God as something which later speculative thinking had surpassed, but whose true elements it would be willing to incorporate. It would doubtlessly have the generosity to indicate the elements in his thought which might have become related to each other and developed into a 'modern' system
of thinking. Incompletion through an inappropriate search for a transcendent principle and an unnatural turning away from the world into a self-enclosed innerness, the soul in Augustinian thought was bound to the frustration of not coming to its union with the truth for which it was by its inner nature destined. And this would explain the sense of failure of Augustine which he felt over his inability to define a continuity between the image of God in the soul and its creator. The frustration of the Notion because it had been unable to fulfil the law of its universal nature! No doubt Hegel would insist that the experience of thought in Augustine was limited to a past and circumscribed view, whilst it was axiomatic that 'modern' thinking could explain and absorb all that was significant in him.

A Hegelian hermeneutic of Augustine

a) General Considerations

The foremost question here is the historical context of Augustine's thinking. He belonged to a period when epistemological problems were problems about the objective world particularly about the status of universal ideas, whereas in modern times this problem had been supplanted by other problems which seemed more important, if far more difficult, which follow on from the previously not deeply analysed presence of the subjectivity of the knower.

Hegel's position on this matter can be seen in the first part of the Enzyklopädie on Logic where he gives a critique of three former attitudes on the question of objectivity and subjectivity, after which he proposes his own solution.
The first attitude was the pre-Kantian "old metaphysical system", characterised by 'finitude' and 'abstraction', in which the object was considered the only important thing and with which thought must identify itself in order to be true. The second attitude, exemplified by Kant, was perilously to separate subject from object: it was to be found in scepticism and, its seeming opposite, transcendental idealism. The third, of Hegel's romantic contemporaries, was to look inside oneself to discover there the truth directly present, thereby safe from the possible deceptions to which Kant had drawn attention. Then follows a fourth possibility: Hegel's development of suggestions put forward by Fichte and Schelling: that the total truth of a material object was that given to it by mind because the ratio essendi and the ratio cognoscendi of the thing were the same. 26 "The Idea is truth in itself and for itself — the absolute unity of the notion and objectivity". 27 And not only is the certainty, but also the condition of the certainty rooted in self-knowledge: "Truth is contained in the certainty of spiritual true self-consciousness", and is inseparably identical with it. 28 "It is manifest that behind the so-called curtain, which is to hide the inner world, there is nothing to be seen unless we ourselves go behind there, as much in order that we may thereby see, as that there may be something behind there which can be seen" 29. As every consciousness is self-consciousness 30 self-consciousness "will take into itself" the determinations belonging to the object of consciousness 31 and go on until it "had produced those elements out of itself and thereby reinstated them once more as objects of consciousness" 32.

Because "consciousness distinguishes itself from something to which at the same time it relates itself", 33 two things are involved in the thinking process of
which pre-Kantian metaphysics did not conceive. Firstly, there is an awareness that knowledge, as well as making for a union between subject and object, also establishes a discontinuity between them, so that knowledge no longer has about it the innocence of immediacy. Secondly, the mind has to go deeper into its "inner core ... (of) self-conscious consciousness" 34 to discover that the real truth of the object is the notion, which it has grasped at first obscurely, and at the same time to realise that when the notion is grasped it is "a moment of a connected whole" 35. And this connected whole is not an abstract identity: opposition and contradiction as well as any kind of difference can only exist because Geist, having created these differences, now holds them together in order to resolve them. "Mind endures contradiction because it knows that it contains no determination that it has not posited itself, and consequently that it cannot in turn get rid of". 36 "It is the essential nature of subjectivity to unite opposite principles within itself ... that they are set free", 37 for it is in the nature of mind both to create opposition and to reconcile it at depth. 38 So there is a correspondence between the degree of externalisation and degree of difference of the objects united and the degree of interiorisation in which the unity comes about 39.

This interiorisation is a particular characteristic of the modern spirit: "the grandeur of the modern world ... (is) the going down of the subject into itself whereby the finite (das Endliche) knows itself to be infinite" 40 (unendlichenes). But this process of subjectivisation also creates its problems. The principal one is that it has to find a properly subjective content for its objective data, and here the old
epistemology cannot help it.
"... (philosophy formerly) created an experience permeated through and through by universals. In modern times, however, an individual finds the abstract form ready made ... the production of the universal is abridged ... . Nowadays the task before us is ... the very opposite: it consists in actualising the universal and giving it spiritual vitality by the power of breaking down and superseding fixed and determinate thoughts" 41.

There is also the reverse problem of "translating subjective purpose into objectivity" 42, for mere inwardness or mere self-consciousness is insufficient and one-sided, as among other reflections, a number of figures of the Phenomenology shows. And "a personality (which is) ... inherently infinite and universal (in sich unendlich und allgemein)" just cannot stand over against the world: it must "claim that external world as its own" 43.

But the perfection of self-consciousness is not obtained just by the fact of adjusting this one-sidedness and recognising itself in the external world: self-consciousness has to take possession of itself. "This taking possession (Besitznehmen) of oneself ... is the translation into actuality of what one is according to one's concept ... . In that translation one's self-consciousness for the first time becomes established as one's own, as one's object also and distinct from self-consciousness pure and simple" 44.

Self-consciousness discovers its identity with reason (Vernunft) 45, and that "when consciously certain of itself, it is all reality" 46. A parallel principle is given in terms of "die reine Personlichkeit": "The highest and sharpest point is simple personality,
which, by virtue alone of the absolute dialectic which is its nature, equally holds and comprehends everything within itself because it perfectly liberates itself — becomes simplicity which is first immediacy and universality. 47.

It is then able to exercise its universality and fulfill itself in accordance with its notion of making explicit the cognitional union of itself with everything else. "Self-consciousness then purifies its object, content and aim and raises them to universality" 48; it communicates its own universality to its object 49. This universality is more than the Aristotelian conception of universality, a rigid quality created by the understanding (Verstand): something that is merely held in common 50, abstract and contentless 51, a common characteristic 52, something merely descriptive, a means of classification 53. As the universal is known in the particular 54, a complete knowledge of the universal must bring the individual and the universal together — in the "concrete universal" 55. For example, every self-consciousness is both universal (in Hegel's sense) and particular 56.

The end of the process of knowledge, the arriving at the truth in the notion, is the recreation of an immediacy deeper than that which the process of self-conscious cognition broke up; self-consciousness has incorporated all otherness into itself and it can now go on to express this unseparated content in an objective form. Absolute knowledge is the perfect union of subjectivity and the objectivity which self-consciousness, with deliberation, has created from itself. In the religious sphere Absolute religion is described as "infinitely substantial subjectivity which makes itself both
object and content" 57.

Augustine's de Trinitate is, by Hegel's criteria, a metaphysical treatment of self-knowledge like his own: not an empirical treatment 58. And yet, for all the comparable interest in self-knowledge in human knowing and in the Godhead, Augustine's analysis would have to be located in the initial stages of Hegel's dialectical approach. For in Augustine, the divine and the human remain distinguishable, the human not being absorbed into unity with the divine, and the human mind remaining at the stage of ingenuous immediacy: unaware that its object is in fact thought, and therefore, for all its self-knowing, really un-self-conscious. The dialectical process which could go on to produce absolute knowledge has not made the first detachment of itself from its object: attention - "intentio" - is not so much aware of making this break as setting on one side at the "acies mentis" the clamouring other demands on itself.

Therefore, according to Hegel's point of view, self-consciousness in Augustine would not really have begun to possess itself. So, Augustine, the most interior and subjective of the fathers of the Christian Church, would not have come near the end of the evolution of self-consciousness which Hegel thought possible and desirable!

Hegel himself was very conscious of the change of attention from objectivity to subjectivity and of its significance for religion and theology. "The object of theology as generally understood is to get to know the merely objective God, who is absolutely separated from the subjective consciousness, and is
thus an outward object just as the sun, the sky, etcetera, are objects of consciousness, and here the object is perfectly characterised as an other, as something external. In contrast to this the notion of the absolute religion can be so presented as to suggest that what we have got to do is not anything of this external sort, but religion itself, i.e. the unity of the idea which we call God with the conscious subject (die Einheit dieser Vorstellung, die wir Gott heissen, mit dem Subject).... We cannot know God as object or get a real knowledge of him, and the main thing, what we are really concerned about, is merely the subjective manner of knowing him and our subjective religious condition. We may recognise this standpoint as described in what has just been said. It is the standpoint of the age, but at the same time it represents a most important advance by which an infinite moment has had its due value recognised, for it involves the recognition of the consciousness of the subject as constituting an absolute moment. The same content is seen to exist in both sides, and it is this potential or true Being of the two sides which is religion. The great advance which marks our time consists in the recognition of subjectivity as an absolute moment, and this is therefore essentially determination or characterisation (Bestimmung). The whole question, however, turns on how subjectivity is determined or characterised" 59.

By Hegel's standards Augustine's looking for images of the Trinity in the soul in terms of thinking and willing would be a subjective investigation much like his own. But by the same standard Augustine would lack the
subjective awareness of what he was doing, and it would therefore not be surprising that he should be discontented with his incomplete interrelationship between the mind and God. In common with pre-Kantian thinkers Augustine did not notice that the God whom he described as being "sine indigentia creatorem" was already in that statement reconstructed in his mind with a relationship to creation which was not put out of sight, perhaps never put out of sight. The Hegelian critique would go on to point out that already God and creation, the two opposites, had been noetically united; and recognition of the fact of this already unitive thinking would have provided the means of interrelationships between God and man: rather, would have been a discovery of the existence in mind of this interrelationship. Even in the matter of worship, which both Augustine and Hegel see as the practical way in which this union is attained, whereas Augustine's speculation halts before the incomprehensible, Hegel's speculation sees a union in Geist. That this facility would have been obtained at a cost which Augustine would not have been willing to pay, and at a place which happens to be the vulnerable point of Hegelian dialectic, we shall see.

b) Particular Questions

i) The 'Cogito' and 'Mens et notitia sui'

The presence of the cogito in Augustine's thinking would no doubt have put Hegel in mind of its appearance in Descartes, from whom he dated the beginning of the 'new' period of philosophy. But to use it merely to provide an assurance against the temptation to complete scepticism and not as a principle which established the transcendent certainty of thinking would have been to have failed to pursue the principle to its completeness.
Augustine's assertion of the identity in equality of mind, self-knowledge and self-love would have provided the chance of regarding mind and self-knowledge as equivalents. This should have made possible the defining of mens in its self-conformity (through self-knowledge) as universal and infinite. Augustine's line of argument which leads on to the statement that consciousness presupposes self-consciousness might then be regarded as an insight into the universal nature of the mens and the relationship of all knowledge to its infinite capacity. But the reasoning of Augustine would have seemed hesitant: more intuitive than thoroughly analysed.

So there would appear to be two principles capable of providing the foundation of a system of subjectivity, but which remained as disconnected fragments. Still, if this development was not made both principles themselves could be seen as pointing out the path that Geist was taking, fully within the central stream of its tradition.

ii) The necessity of a centre of consciousness and the place of memory

Even though Hegel's commentary on de Anima III 2 in the Geschichte der Philosophie about sense perceptions coming together as at a point does not extend the principle to intellectual knowledge we have seen that he does so elsewhere. The need of a centre of reference to relate different objects, even opposites together, not absent from Aristotle, more greatly preoccupied Hegel who gave this matter a thoroughly systematic dialectical development. But while Hegel respected the distinctness of sensation from thought, his comprehensive treatment did not show hesitation at their division; the union of knowledge of singulars with knowledge of universals was made to be a more penetrative type of intellectual knowledge. Sense perception is raised into the higher degrees of cognition. But Geist itself "is not an abstractly simple entity, but a system of processes," and in the last resort it is Geist itself, embracing all differences
and contradictions and all experience, yet processual and not unmoved, which is the place where all knowing becomes interrelated until it is total in depth and extension. Geist is the locus of meaningful knowledge because it is the place of the unification of all experience. But, according to Hegel, total experience meant not only unity but negation and distinction in Geist, which must not be thought of as apart from its own processes. A system of centralisation of knowledge as in the common sense or the memory of Augustine dealt more with how experience ought to come together, in a hastily conceived otherness; it did not bear the mark of the distinguishing and contrasting which characterised the real processes of thought, and it was necessary to go beyond it. The way in which experience should be interrelated was not (in the Hegelian sense) 'abstract' and in terms of an imagined centre, but processual.

Yet, even if it is processual the process needs to be internalised. And here Hegel's remarks on memory - 'Erinnerung' - do have some remarkable likeness to Augustine's on memoria. This is found in the sections on Erinnerung, Einbildungskraft and Gedächtnis in the third part of the Encyclopedia 68: particularly in the former. In the treatment of Gedächtnis he is more concerned to consider the relationship of remembered words to their thought content; and this will be considered later.

As with Augustine's memoria, the process of Erinnerung is not just the process of recollection. It is concerned with the incorporation of an external object within the knower so that it can be considered "in a space and time of (the subject's) own"; not in "the particularity of space and time to which, in its immediacy it is tied and on which I, too, am dependent in feeling and intuition" 69. So, as in Augustine, reception of an object into the memory is not distinguished from the initial cognition, and is made the beginning of knowledge. Though memory is not the overall centre of cognition with Hegel, it has to be remembered that its functions continue in its sublation into Geist. And
further, while accepting the existence of an external measure of time, Hegel has some interesting remarks on subjective time relatable to Plotinus's conception, as also to Augustine's, of time as a "distensio animae". Thus, "all that happens possesses duration for us only when it is taken up by intelligence (vorstellende Intelligenz), whereas whatever happenings are deemed unworthy of being so taken up become things wholly of the past .... In intuition (Anschauung) time becomes short for us when we have plenty to perceive, but long when the lack of given content drives us to the contemplation of empty subjectivity ... conversely, in mental representation (Vorstellung), those things, these times in which we were occupied in various different ways appear long to us, whereas those times in which we were not very busy seem to be short" 70. In much the same way as in the thought of Plotinus and Augustine, lack of concentration and dissipation of attention are linked with a wearisome passage of time. Hegel expresses the same pattern in a more general way, and adds to it the human observation that experience does not seem to be like this from outside.

In his examination of the laws of association in the imagination 71 he gives more than the formal account in Aristotle and Augustine 72 : the fundamental fact of the identity of self-consciousness with all reality gives the possibility of making an explanation of why there should be any association at all.

iii) Self-Knowing as a Basis of Consciousness

It will be recalled that in Augustine, self-knowledge was stated to be the condition of any knowledge, and this was because of the identification of mens and notitia sui 73, Augustine's humanistic location of self-knowing vous.

The interrelation of consciousness and self-consciousness is of cardinal importance for Hegel, and is a constant theme. The essence of the position in the "Phänomenologie des Geistes" is as follows. From the infinitude of its capacity for knowing there comes about in mind a virtual unification of
itself with its object — of which the distinction which consciousness makes between itself and its object is a contradiction in the self-consciousness which knows itself to be all things. Yet in fact it needs this otherness of being all things: "Then for self-consciousness the distinction (of itself from the world of sense and perception) does not have the shape of being, it is not self-consciousness. For self-consciousness, then, otherness is a fact, it does exist as a distinct moment; but the unity of itself with this difference is also a fact for self-consciousness, and is a second distinct moment. With the first moment, self-consciousness occupies the position of consciousness and the whole expanse of the world of sense is conserved as its object, but at the same time only as related to the second moment, the unity of self-consciousness with itself." And he is able to produce his own foundation, substantially in accord with that of Augustine, and, like his, deriving from the Aristotelian legacy of νόησις νοηστοῦ.

"... not merely is consciousness of a thing only possible for a self-consciousness, but ... this self-consciousness alone is the truth of those attitudes. But it is only for us (who trace this process) that this truth is actually present; it is not yet so for the consciousness immersed in the experience." 76

The process is described in greater clarity in the Encyclopédie:

"I have in the one and same consciousness myself and the world ... in the world I find myself again, ... and conversely, in my consciousness I have what is, what possesses objectivity". 77 Upon this realisation, the first reaction is to suppose that self-consciousness is something distinct from the outer world, and is confined to self-knowing: "abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness". 78 From this realisation arise two processes: the abstract self-consciousness which has detached itself from the outer world must give itself content and objectivity, and it must shed any sensuous aspects (Sinnlichkeit) from its knowing in order to identify the object with itself. "The two processes are one and the same, the identification of consciousness and self-consciousness" 79; and so "self-consciousness thus reaches the stage where it does not have
consciousness alongside it, is not externally connected with it, but truly pervades it and contains it dissolved within it." 80

The Augustinian self-consciousness was never self-consciously aware that its object as thought was always noetically related to and absorbed by itself. So it remained a condition of the knowledge of other things, not the substance of that knowledge. Certainly it did not find itself in the material world. The self-consciousness of the triads of self-knowing, both the deep, underlying one of self-remembering, self-knowing and self-loving, as well the knowing of itself as object in act, reach no further, in Hegelian terms, than abstract self-consciousness. Even when self-consciousness realises that 'it has never not known itself', the other-than-self is not a factor in its discovery which is purely inward-turning; and therefore this self-consciousness is steadfastly orientated by Hegelian standards to a position of incompleteness.

The position of Hegel that self-consciousness knows itself implicitly in the object of its consciousness has two developments that are of interest in a comparison with Augustine.

Firstly, Hegel's conception that self-consciousness finds itself in its object gives a place for a function of the will, with a possible extension to include love. 81 Both 'Begierde' and 'Trieb' have the function of correcting the "one-sidedness" of subjectivity when self-consciousness has discovered its underlying unity with its object. Thus through 'Begierde' the 'seeming independence' of the object is nullified because it "is, in fact, a being which neither merits nor is capable of an existence of its own, but must succumb to the real power of the subject." 82 And 'Trieb', assured that the mind's "contents are at once potentially existent and are the mind's own", brings it about both that the content of knowledge is objective and in the knower, and what it conceives shall come about objectively. 83 So here are a number of subtle variants of a triadic epistemic pattern, somewhat
more psychologically conceived than Augustines. More will be said below of Augustine's triads as proto-dialectical structures in Hegel's sense. But it is worth pausing to consider the implications of Hegel's teaching on Begierde and Trieb. If absolute Geist were to become present in the world in the totality of its self-conscious consciousness, there would be no limits to its universal power of knowing and loving, and it would unite itself to whatever it wished. Universality of knowing and universality of satisfied desire in consequence would entail complete unification in the same absolute thought-being, together with everything else. Augustine clearly rejected a similar unification in the thought-being of Plotinus, but, to Hegel the pointers to this development would already exist in Augustine. The identity of mens with its notitia sui established its infinitude, with which its amor sui would be commensurate.

Secondly, it shows an interest in an area where philosophically Augustine reveals none, though he treats the same reality in the setting of charity and the nature of the Church. That is to say, that the universality of the identification of self-knowledge with every other object has to include other self-consciousness. Thus 'self-conscious recognition' ('das anerkennende Selbstbewusstsein') is taken as a basis for social life, such that the mutual recognition of self-consciousness goes, pari passu, with the development of individual self-consciousness.

"In the state of universal freedom, in being reflected into myself, I am immediately reflected into the other person, and conversely, in relating myself into the other person I am immediately self-related".  

iv) The knowledge triads as proto-dialectical structures

On the grounds that it does not take into account "the activity of the Notion - an activity which it is implicitly but not consciously" (nur an sich ist, aber nicht für sich) 85, Hegel sets himself against an
Aristotelian principle "nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerat in sensu" which he restates as "nihil in sensu quod non fuerat in intellectu" 86. He explains in Geschichte der Philosophie II 87 that the opposite dictum misrepresents Aristotle's true position, and is but one example how well-known examples and dicta supposedly drawn from Aristotle do not contain the whole truth.

His translation of de Anima III 5 —

"Now it has already been said that passivity is so determined that understanding is in potenti-ality all that thought is exercised on: but at the same time it is in actuality nothing before the exercise of thought," — allows him to make the interpretation, "thought is implicitly the content of the object of what is thought, and in coming into existence it only coincides with itself". 88 If the Hegel translation could be allowed, his dialectical interpretation of knowing would be little more than the meaning of Aristotle: the difference between subject and object is sublimated into the pre-existing, implicit unity in thought. The basis of the dialectical relationship between subject and object — "I relate myself to an object ... but consciousness is at the same time the relation of these two independent things to each other, a relation in which they appear as one" 88a — is the discovery by the subject that it is already in the object: "There is something in its object concealed from consciousness if the object is for consciousness something 'other', or something alien, and if consciousness does not know the object as itself". 89

Although the process of cognition can be expressed in terms which do not involve the will, it can be more fully expressed in this way: in an act of deliberate identification of subject with object, which implies as well a recognition of their separation. 89a... the separation of subject and object
makes its first appearance as will" (im Willen). Hegel wrote a particularly sensitive description of the nature of attention ('Aufmerksamkeit'), the equivalent of Augustine's 'intention' — though the comparable situation to Augustine's (where there is a need to fix the attention on something else as one's own, with the implication that it is other) merits the description of attention as "a mental, i.e. an abstract, externality ... that is still quite formal, without content". But having broken up the immediacy of knowledge by its assertion of a separation between subject and object, the will "annuls the contradiction between subjectivity and objectivity"; and at a later stage, through its collective realization in society and the state, translates subjectivity into objectivity.

The Augustinian cognitive triad depends on the distinct existence of the will as well as the distinct existence of subject and object, in a unity which, especially in external cognition, was admittedly imperfect, an aggregation of factors. The interrelation of will and mind by Hegel was more nuanced. According to him, they are separate from each other in ordinary thinking. But, unlike ordinary consciousness, the higher philosophical consciousness sees their identity in what is the reverse of the sublation of will into mind by Plotinus: "thought determines itself into will and remains the substance of the latter". It does not matter for the Hegelian process that will should be distinct from the mind at the level of ordinary consciousness and united with it at a higher level, and that the clearcutness of the distinction between object and subject should be both posited and then sublated. But it is necessary for the Augustinian process that subject, will and object should be distinct if they are to make up an image of the divine Trinity. This pattern demands that they should remain a paradoxical unity in division; and its resemblance to a dialectical unity, because it is also triadic, is only superficial: the basis of the dialectical unity in the Hegelian sense is absent — the self-conscious consciousness of mind into which, a pre-existing unity, subject and object resolve.
The turning point in Augustine's de Trinitate from triads of outward cognition (with internal triad of memory) to inner cognition is the group of triads of faith. It is only after them that Augustine turns to triads of purely speculative thinking, and ultimately (still in a speculative and not fideistic way) to cognitional triads which have God as object. Even so the speculative triads are not divorced from the phenomena of faith. The cognitional triads, which become more unitary relative to their degree of interiorisation, have the religious aspect of bringing out increasingly in the knower the image of God. The genre of the de Trinitate is the same as Hegel's: a speculative reflection into the divine object of Christian faith and the divine elements which arise in human nature. Though they seem arranged according to a simple schema of increasing unification, and interiorisation, there is no evidence in the text to warrant an interpretation of the triads of the de Trinitate by which they would be connected dialectically with each other; there is nothing more to interrelate them than the course of a typical Augustinian 'elevation'. That the faith triads have the place they do, and that they are followed by the triad of self-knowledge, does not mean that subjectivity arises in a dialectical way out of an abstractly objective conception of God. Rather they affirm, at the appropriate place in this elevation, that all that follows about the inner man should be seen in the context of belief, and that an interiority without real belief is an incomplete interiority.

That the first two triads of faith distinguish between 'the memory of the sound of words' in which it is embodied and 'the understanding of the meaning of those words' constitutes a parallel to Hegel. It is sometimes assumed by writers on both Augustine and Hegel alike that the word is sufficient in itself, as a vehicle of meaning and thought. Yet in Augustine's thinking the nature of the verbum cordis, precursor of the verbum oris, is such that it need not be a complex of words. It is often said of Hegel that for him there is no thinking outside of the medium of written, spoken or thought words. It is as well to know that Hegel explicitly
considers the case when words are used but a thought-content does not automatically become present:

"Just as the true thought is the very thing itself, so too is the word when it is employed by genuine thinking. Intelligence, therefore, in filling itself with the word receives into itself the nature of the thing. But this reception has, at the same time, the meaning that intelligence thereby takes on the nature of a thing and to such a degree that subjectivity, in its distinctness from the thing, becomes quite empty, a mindless confusion of words, that is, a mechanical memory".

So in the passage into inwardness it is true that Augustine does show a passing interest in what is in fact a problem of subjectivity. But the contrast between the inner triads that follow and the subjectivity structure of Hegel could not be greater. For Hegel, subjectivity is one-sided until it has re-created an objective content for itself; in Augustine subjectivity turns its back on the world — on objectivity. However Augustine's inner triads do find a different kind of objectivity: the more developed of the faith triads find their object of knowledge and love in the God, whose being 'beyond' knowledge Hegel rejects; but the purely speculative approach falters, and Augustine confesses his sense of failure — at his inability, speculatively, to cross the divide which faith has already crossed.

Augustine's triad of self-knowledge in de Trinitate XIV VI 8 does have some approximation to a dialectical form in so far as an existing self-knowledge is presupposed; it is the nearest he comes in his triads to the sense of separated things being united together by the power of mind, an explanation offered in order to exhibit the essential simplicity of the self, even in the act of self-knowledge, against the neo-Platonist duality. But its significance in the Hegelian scale is limited: its product is only abstract self-consciousness. By deliberate intention it has as its content itself as separate from the external world. But according to Hegel this deliberate self-restriction would prevent it
from experiencing its own universality to the full. This kind of self-knowledge is not mind taking possession of itself in self-consciousness. It is merely "self-certainty". 98

"In it self-consciousness has arrived at a consciousness of its own substance. At the same time, as we find self-consciousness here, it is a consciousness of its substance which has risen, and hence is immediate; and this is the specific way in which we find spirit at the present stage: it has not reached its truly real substance". 99

That is, it has not realised its presence in everything; in particular, it has not realised the nature of its presence to other self-consciousnesses in the giving and receiving of recognition. That Augustine expects the individual to suppose that others are like himself rather than allow their recognition of him in society to contribute to his own development would be taken by Hegel as an indication of faulty orientation 100.

In the highest and most god-like triad — in which man looks not at himself but at God — Augustine's analysis reverts to the triad of acts of memory, intelligence and willing which he found first in the triad of inner self-knowledge. 101 Augustine seemed to be developing his thought under the impetus of a desire to establish the continuity of human activity with the divine counterparts with which it corresponded, until he realised that this would lead him into a heretical position, appropriating the three activities to separate Persons and thus making their Personality incomplete. 102 Hegel reflected on precisely this problem, and it was an integral part of his system that Geist was in fact relating and thus uniting the human and divine in a continuity which would be quite clear to a truly self-conscious consciousness; he rejected the existence of a supra-sensible 'beyond' as 'the error of a one-sided, empty ratiocination', 103 a characteristically limited and abstract creation of the understanding 104.
For him, it was necessary to understand that God and man are opposites who are to be related to each other through Geist. For "(Geist) is not something having a single existence, but is (Geist) only in being objective to itself and beholding itself in its 'Other' as itself" 105. "It relates itself as within itself to itself, and it relates itself to things, which things are for it universal independence" 106. But (Geist) and its other have to be brought together.

"In so far as I know certainly that God is, knowledge is a connection between myself and this content; as certainly as I exist so certainly does God exist. My being and the being of God are thus connected together in one, and the relation is Being; this Being is simple, and at the same time double or two-fold".

It is true that there are many texts in Hegel in which this being is described as simple, without its simultaneous duality, thus "(Geist) is accordingly the living process by which the implicit unity of divine and human natures becomes actual and comes to have definite existence" 108. But the edge of pantheistic accusation is blunted when it is seen that the dialectical relationship involves a difference as well as an identity: "God is self-consciousness, He knows himself in a consciousness which is distinct from him .... Finite consciousness knows God only to the extent to which God knows himself in it" 109. The dialectical unity in duality is ambiguous by the standards of older metaphysics, but yet it is an insistence on the necessary diversity of objects within subjectivity, correlative to their unity at a point in consciousness which is the structure we have followed from Aristotle through neo-Platonism: for Hegel the opposition between objects in knowledge is as essential as the point which unites them. Refusing to accept 'abstract' entities outside the processes of mind, it follows that infinite Geist 'needs' its opposite, finitude, in order to be what it is, and must have this opposite within itself 110. Quite aware of the paradox, Hegel's intention was in itself unambiguous:
it was to propose a way in which mind binds differences together, and therefore to make possible an understanding of what would otherwise be independent and therefore meaningless and unintelligible.

v) Speculative theories about the Trinity

In his speculative account of the Trinity, Augustine used familiar conceptions firstly, for reasons of instruction, to draw analogies with quite basic and well known aspects of the human mind, and secondly, for reasons of orthodoxy, because the fixity of these conceptions — memory, understanding, will — were appropriate for expressing in an image the distinctness of the Persons. Even so, the paradoxical quasi-dialectical unity in diversity achieved was greater than in the neo-Platonist subordinationism. Hegel's principle account of the Trinity \(^1\) begins with a statement on the limitations of the understanding (Verstand) and its rigid categories: "the absolute independence of the unit or this idea of absolute separation and rupture" \(^2\). The hermeneutic divide between Augustine and Hegel prevents any certain parallels being drawn between the two Trinitarian systems. The distinction between the dead, classifying activity of the Verstand and the creativity of the Vernunft was quite unknown to Augustine, and in place of a dialectical unity which was the product of Geist revealing the unity in division which it already contained, an activity perfectly in conformity with its nature, Augustine's triads were, from the point of view of their unity, mere paradoxes. If anything, Augustine's terminology would tend to the rigidity which Hegel thought that Geist at its highest would transcend; and this rigidity matched the need of his system to regard the divine persons as separable. For example, when Augustine spoke of a person he meant a distinct thinking being; but when Hegel spoke of a person he emphasised the qualities which were the opposite of this: "it is the nature or character of what we mean by person or subject to abolish its isolation, its separateness" \(^3\).
This is understandable only in a system of thinking, in which the individual is conceived of as universal self-consciousness, communicating his own universality to everything he knows. Particularly it presupposes what Augustine never for a moment entertained, that there is an absolute Geist which will ultimately contain all determinations within itself: which poses all divisions, but at the same time has the power of reuniting them within itself. For Augustine the presupposition is that there are so many sensible and supra sensible objects which happen to be known in thought. They are all created, but they have an existence in themselves, and though they may give rise to thinking by a particular individual, they remain detached from it. Thus, the trinitarian theory of Hegel proposes realities and categories which went beyond the subject matter of Augustine and mental experiences of which he had never conceived. Although the hermeneutical divide between them prevents a meaningful complete comparison being made there is one respect in which their reflections have some equivalence, though in Augustine this occurs in the first part of the de Trinitate, before that which has been looked at in detail. It is the notion of the Holy Spirit as Love uniting the other two Persons.

The conception of the Son as Verbum Patris was very much developed by Augustine: not surprisingly, for it was a deeply Biblical theme: the Father as mind, the Son as the thought of Himself. In this conception, now become quite commonplace in the tradition of Christian theology Hegel saw the characteristic of Geist: that it knew itself in its other, which in this case was still itself (and therefore could still be different from the other "other" of creation). 114 If Geist always knows itself in its other the basis of a unity in diversity is there. In this distinguishing between itself and its other, which was yet no distinguishing, the love of the Spirit comes, as it does in Augustine, to link the distinguished, yet undistinguished elements together. 115 So, "the difference is actually shown to be no difference, and thus the One is at home with itself in its Other. The fact that this is so is just what
is meant by (Geist), or expressed in terms of feeling, by eternal love. The Holy Spirit is eternal love ....
For loves implies a distinguishing between two, and yet these two are, as a matter of fact, not distinguished from one another. Love, this sense of being outside of myself, is the feeling and consciousness of this identity. My self-consciousness is not in myself, but in another; but this Other in whom alone I find satisfaction and am at peace with myself ... just because it is outside of me, has his self-consciousness in me" 116.

The Hegelian conception of the Trinity goes much further than this, but even here it will be seen that he conceives of self-knowledge in a different way from Augustine. This difference stems from different ways of explaining how self-thinking takes place. Augustine insists on the existence of the unity in the same self between subject known and object known; Hegel insists on the need of the thinking subject to have an other, with which it is already united. In the first case there is an exact equivalence through identity; in the second there is dialectical division and unity.

vi) The Divine-human relationship

In contrast with the Augustinian divide between the perfection of the divine transcendent mind and everything else (including the human mind) which is related to it — in Platonist terms — as participation, Hegel's system is a development of the Aristotelian conception of the divine ăvôψ , elevating everything known to a universal mode of existence like its own, within which activity the free mind, as self-conscious reason, progressively discovers that it is identical with everything else: not the remoteness of Aristotle's divine original thought thinking on thinking, but a content which embraces everything. It bears the contradictions which it has originally created between one and many, self and other, universal and individual, in order to bring
them back into unity. Its work is towards the creation of a totality: not the single substance-totality of Spinoza, but a process-totality in which contradictions are resolved by a deepening internalisation in which nothing is destroyed but everything is incorporated into and raised to the universal self-consciousness in which it finds its place and fulfilment.

From this conception of theoretical self-knowledge arises a conception of ethical life: altogether a system of thought with an application to problems which Augustine never considered, and in categories of which he never conceived. By the Hegelian measure Augustine's thought hardly ever strayed out of an uncritical immediacy and the barely even proto-dialectical contemplation of the paradoxes of certain rigid conceptions in unity: nor could it, because the basic postulates of subjectivity in self-consciousness, as an interpretation of \( \text{νήσσυ} \text{ νήσεως} \) with the ultimate incorporation of every reality into self-conscious consciousness, was unknown to him. The \( \text{νήσσυ} \text{ νήσεως} \) which he knew was that of neo-Platonised Aristotelianism: not supposed to draw everything into its own immanence as Hegel's Geist, but to draw everything into the highest intellectual transcendence ever conceived.

Fragile by comparison does Augustine's speculation on self-consciousness seem: able to be swallowed up by a greater whole, to which some of its elements could be interpreted as seeming pointers.

Yet the de Trinitate, such a comparatively ingenuous work though so analogous in its speculative treatment of Christian dogma to Hegel's, has not so much a hermeneutical critique which it can make in return as a point which it makes through its ingenuously simple witness. Augustine did not show an awareness that his data were known to him only as incorporated into thought, and therein subject to development by the laws of thought. Even with the resolution of his pre-conversion absolute scepticism in the 'cogito' he did not have the kind of philosophical self-consciousness which Hegel
appropriates to the period after Kant. But particularly in the area of speculation, the idealism of Hegel with its development of objects through their sublimation into thinking depends on the presence of sources, such as Augustine, which have the ingenuousness not to question whether they are dealing with things independent in themselves or as reconstructed in the mind’s own way and re-placed in the mind’s own relationships. Unless such sources exist, though there might be a logic there could not have been any Hegelian theology or even speculation on mind. Whilst tangible things may be accepted within the mind from its contact with what is outside itself, the number of philosophical reflections which may be derived from within the mind itself is, in fact, very few.
1 Vorlesungen Über die Geschichte der Philosophie II
   SW 18 p. 298. Translation (Haldane and Simpson)
   II p. 118.

2 SW 18 p. 330; translation p. 147: Hegel's comment
   on Metaphysics / 7 (1072 a 30 – b 8.) He makes out
   that Aristotle identifies the Notion with God:
   'er spricht es als Gott aus', plausible if all
   thinking is 'divine'. But behind this lies his idea
   that νοός is already νοητον: 'Hier im
   Denken ist so diese Identität vorhanden; das,
   welches bewegt wird, und welches bewegt, is
   dasselbe' (SW 18 p. 329; translation p. 146):
   an identification which might render Aristotle
   consistent — but at the loss of authenticity.

3 SW 18 p. 332; translation p. 149: 'Alles denkend
   zu betrachten, in Gedanken zu verwandeln'
   (Hegel's characterisation of Aristotle's speculative
   philosophy).

4 SW 18 p. 333; translation p. 150: 'Nur im Denken
   ist wahrhafte Übereinstimmung des Objektiven und
   Subjektiven vorhanden; das bin Ich' (interpreting
   Aristotle: truth is measured by the Begriff).

5 SW 18 p. 377; translation p. 187: Hegel's translation
   of de Anima II 5 (on sensation): '... die empfindene
   Thatigkeit auf das Einzelne geht, das Wissen
   dagegen auf's Allgemeine; diess aber ist
   gewissermassen in der Seele selbst als Substanz.'
   That intellectual knowledge should pre-exist in the soul
   would only be possible if the soul were the divine,
   timeless νοός. This position is reached at
   the cost of jettisoning the characteristic teaching of
   de Anima III that νοός creates intelligibles.

6 SW 18 p. 384; translation p. 194: a comment on
   de Anima III 2 427 a 9 – 14. 'Separation' in that
   each sense receives only its proper sensations;
   'union' in that the common sense unites them.

7 SW 18 p. 389; translation p. 199. A commentary on
   ll. 429a 27–29: the soul as being potentially
   (δυνάμει) the ideas. Hegel's interpre-
   tation of 'potentially' disregarded completely the
   place of the active νοός in creating the νοητά,
   which are then passively received: 'd.h. die Ideen
   nur erst ruhende Formen, nicht als Thätigkeiten. 
   Aristoteles ist so nicht Realist.'

8 SW 18 390. (The translation circa p. 200 does not
   correspond as it is based on a later edition.)
Footnotes to Excursus - continued -


10 System der Philosophie (Enzyklopädie) I Die Logik, 236 and z: SW 8 p. 446; translation (Wallace) p. 373-4.

11 System ... III Die Philosophie des Geistes 440 z. SW 10 p. 295; translation (Wallace and Miller) p. 179.

12 ib. 467 z. and 440 z.


14 System I 60. SW 8 p. 161; translation p. 118.

15 System III 389. SW 10 p. 53: 'nur der Schlaf des Geistes - der passive νοῦς des Aristoteles, welcher der Möglichkeit nach Alles ist.' Translation p. 29.

16 Geschichte III. SW 19 p. 56. Translation II p. 421.


19 op. cit. p. 146ff.

20 Plotinus was accessible especially through the Ficino editions of the Enneads, printed in the sixteenth century and later. But there was an undoubted revival of interest in Hegel's time. He was a friend of Creuzer, the editor of Plotinus's text. Plotinus's relationship to Goethe and Schelling has been studied by Hadot in "L'apport du néoplatonisme à la philosophie de la nature en occident", Eranos Jahrbuch 37, 1968; and X. Tilliette's study 'Schelling: une Philosophie en Devenir', Paris 1970, gives references to the contemporary knowledge of Plotinus (v. esp.I pp.306-7, n.3).
Footnotes to Excursus - continued -

21 v. supra p. 8 and n. 30.

22 A sterile debate can be found in eighteenth century histories of philosophy over whether Plotinus was a Spinozist.

The controversy may be pursued from the references in Bibliotheca Graeca of J.A. Fabricius, edited by G.C. Harless, V Hamburg 1746, pp. 693-4.

23 cf. Phänomenologie des Geistes, SW 2 p. 336; translation (Baillie) p. 458: 'Geist') is the self of the actual consciousness, to which (geist) stands opposed, or rather which appears over against itself, as an objective world that has lost, however, all sense of strangeness for the self (für das Selbst alle Bedeutung eines Fremden), just as the self has lost all sense of having a dependent or independent existence by itself, cut off and separated from that world'.

24 de Trinitate XV 26 45: '... in ipso intellectu conatum me senserim magis habuisse quam effectum ... tria unius personae non sicut humana possit intentio, tribus illis personis convenire potuerunt.'

25 System I, Vorbegriff, A, B, and C; translation chapters II, III, IV and V.


27 System I 213. SW 8 p. 423; translation p. 352.


29 Phänomenologie SW 2 p. 138; translation p. 212.


32 ib. SW 2 p. 612: 'sie aus sich erzeugt und damit für das Bewusstseyn zugleich wieder hergestellt hat'; translation p. 800.
Footnotes to Excursus - continued -

33 ib. SW 2 p. 75; translation p. 139.

34 ib. SW 2 p. 271; 'derem Inneres und Wesen es selbst ist (Selbstbewusstseyn)'. Baillie's translation (p. 374) is probably justified.

35 Religion II SW 16 p. 159; 'als Moment eines Zusammenhanges fassen'; translation II p. 291.

36 System III 382 z. SW 10 p. 32: 'Der Widerspruch wird aber vom Geist extragen, weil dieser kei ne Bestimmung in sich hat, die er nicht als eine von ihm gesetzte und folglich als eine solche wüsste, die er auch wieder aufheben kann'; translation p. 16.

37 Religion II SW 15, p. 438-9: '... in sich zu vereinen ... diesen Widerspruch zu extragen und in sich aufzulösen ... dass sie losgelassen'; translation II pp. 86-7.


(The development of a systematised conception of knowing based on the Aristotelian analysis of the common sense will be recognised behind the second quotation though not behind the first.)

For 'depth' (Tiefe) of opposition v. ib. p. 270; (translation III p. 59) and p. 277 (translation III p. 66). Geist also becomes mediation between the extremes in the triadic tradition (ib. p. 315; translation III p. 107).


40 Religion III SW 16 p. 212; translation II p. 351.

41 Phänomenologie SW 2 p. 35: '... durch das Aufheben der festen bestimmten Gedanken das Allgemeine zu verwirklichen und zu begeistern'; translation p. 94.

42 Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts 8 SW 7 p. 61; translation (Knox) p. 24.

43 ib. 8 39: SW 7, p. 61; translation p. 38. (For an explanation of the self as universal v. System I 24 z.; and as infinite (by virtue of being self-related) ib. 95 and 96 z.)

Abstract self-consciousness which 'isolates itself from itself' ... 'an inward trembling' (nur ein Zittern in sich ist), ib. II SW 16 p. 151; translation II p. 283. With this compare ib. III SW 16 p. 267, translation III p. 56; also 'self-consciousness in the sense of a bare empty unit of the person ... empty universality' ('... als das reine leere Eins der Person ... leere Allgemeinheit') Phänomenologie SW 2 p. 369; translation p. 503.

Compare also the various more or less deliberate withdrawals from the world: 'it is ... the very nature of (Geist) to develop itself, to differentiate itself until it reaches the worldly sphere' (bis zur Weltlichkeit) (Religion III SW 16 p. 342; translation III p. 137); 'I can withdraw into myself ... in chains I can be free' (Recht ø 48 comment: SW 7 p. 102; translation pp. 43-44); Stoicism and scepticism as forms of self-consciousness (Phänomenologie SW 2 pp. 158ff; translation pp. 242ff); the unhappy consciousness of unreconciled religious attitude (ib. pp. 166ff; translation pp. 251ff); the 'beautiful soul' which flees all contact with reality: 'its light dims and dies within it, and it vanishes as a shapeless vapour dissolving into thin air' (ib. p. 504; translation p. 667).

45 Phänomenologie SW 2 p. 183; translation p. 272.
48 Recht ø 21 comment: SW 7 p. 73; translation p. 30.
49 Religion I SW 15 p. 31: 'Den Gedanken, Vorstellungen, die ich mir zu eigen mache, denen gebe ich die Bestimmung, die ich selber bin' (that is, as universal: 'Ich, als einfach allgemein...') (loc. cit.). The sequel is undoubtedly an allusion to the Aristotelian subjectivity structure of de Anima III 2 427 a 9-14: 'Ich bin dieser einfache Punkt und das, was für mich ist, will ich in dieser Einheit erkennen'. Translation p. 13.
50 System I 163 z. 1: SW 8 p. 358; translation p. 292.
Footnotes to Excursus - continued -

51 Religion I p. 205; translation I p. 195.
The context is of God, but the principle applies to any universal which is known.

52 Recht φ 24 comment: SW 7 p. 75: 'die Gemeinschaftlichkeit oder die Allheit'; translation p. 31.

53 Phänomenologie SW 2 p. 193; translation pp. 244-5.


55 cf. Phänomenologie SW 2 p. 229: '... jene wahre Allgemeinheit auf die Seite der Einzelheit, die dadurch eine lebendige ist'; translation p. 324: 'True universality (is) ... organic concreteness'.

Recht 7 comment SW 7 p. 57; translation p. 23.

57 Religion III SW 16 p. 197; translation II p. 334.

58 System III 377 and z. : SW 10 pp. 9ff; translation pp. 1-2: 'the knowledge ... of man's genuine reality - of what is essentially and ultimately true and real - of mind as the true and essential being ... (and not the knowledge of) the peculiarities, passions and foibles of other men'.


60 de Trinitate v I 2.


Footnotes to Excursus - continued -


64 v. supra n.6.

65 v. supra n.49.

66 Religion II SW 16 p. 118: '... als aufgehobenes ... Der Gedanke soll für die Anschauung seyn was geoffenbart wird, ist einerseits die sinnliche Weise, und dasjenige, was wahrgenommen wird, ist zugleich der Gedanke, das Allgemeine'; translation II p. 248. cf. Phänomenologie SW 2 p. 337: 'Alle bisherigen Gestalten des Bewusstseyns sind Abstractionen desselben (Geist) ... Der Geist ist also Bewusstseyn überhaupt, was sinnliche Gewissheit Wahrnehmen und den Verstand in sich begreift'; translation p. 459.


68 System III 452ff: SW 452ff: SW 10 330ff; translation p. 203ff.

69 ib. 452 z. ; translation p. 203.


71 ib. § 455: p.335ff; translation p. 206ff.

72 v. de Memoria et Reminiscentia 2; de Trinitate XI 4 7 and XII 14 23.

73 de Trinitate IX 4 5: '... non amor et cognitio tamquam in subjecto insunt menti, sed substantialiter etiam ista sunt sicut ipsa mens.'

74 Phänomenologie SW 2 p. 136-7: 'es ist Unterscheiden des Ununterschiedenen, oder Selbstbewusstseyn'; translation p. 211.

75 Phänomenologie SW 2 p. 141; translation pp. 219-220.

76 ib. p.137. Baillie's translation (pp. 214-2) which makes "für uns", a normal expression in Hegel, stand for the philosophic investigator is unnecessarily restrictive. '... nicht allein das Bewusstseyn vom Dinge nur für ein Selbstbewusstseyn möglich ist, sondern dass diess allein die Wahrheit jener Gestalten ist. Aber für uns nur ist deisse Wahrheit
Footnotes to Excursus - continued -

76 cont'd:

vorhanden, noch nicht für das Bewusstseyn'.

77 System III 424 z: SW 10 p. 273; translation p. 165.

78 ib. 425: p. 273; translation ib.

79 ib. p. 274; translation p. 166.

80 ib. z.

81 Hegel's conceptions of desire, will and any other conception which can be related to Augustine's idea of love are distinguished by the degree of self-conscious consciousness involved. Thus 'Begierde' (appetitive or instinctive desire) is related to consciousness (System III 426ff: SW 10 p. 276ff; translation p. 107ff), whilst 'Trieb' (impulse) is denied to consciousness, but is in fact attributed to mind - both theoretical (in its craving to know) and practical (= will (Wille)), as it objectifies its subjective determinations (ib. 443 z, p. 302ff; translation p. 185). With love Hegel's thought is primarily union with another (cf. 'seine sich empfindende Einheit, die Liebe': Recht 158, SW 77 p. 237; translation p. 110); with Augustine self-love is the condition of love of another.


83 ib. 443 and z: ib. pp. 302-3; translation pp. 164-5.


85 System I 226 z: SW 8 p. 436; translation p. 364.

86 ib. 8: p. 52; translation p. 15.

Footnotes to Excursus - continued -


Kern has studied Hegel's translation of de Anima III 4-5 and included a transcription of a handwritten translation found among Hegel's papers in his doctorate dissertation, 'Hegels Aristoteles-Vorlesungen' (Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, Rome 1955). The same writer has drawn attention to the significant alteration which Hegel made to Aristotle's thought by his omission of 'δόξα' - 'in some way'. 'The nous is all noes', says Hegel in 1819. But does not Aristotle say the same: ή γνώσις ὁντα ἀλήθεια πάντα

Just this "'δόξα'" which calls for a modification has been omitted by Hegel. And also the νοέσκοτος θετικός is essentially related to the material world, which conditions its receptivity (a sign of which is its changeableness). Again it is not said that the νοέσκοτος which is universally able to receive all things is identical with the raising into universality of what is potential into the activity of Geist" (Die Aristotelesdeutung ... p. 254).

88a Religion I SW 15 p. 120; translation I p. 107.
89 Phänomenologie SW 2 p. 577; translation p. 759.
91 System III 448 z: SW 10 p. 322; translation p. 198.
94 System III 468 z: SW 10 p. 364; translation p. 228.
95 ib. cf. Recht Ø 5.
96 System III 462 z: SW 10 p. 355-6; translation p. 221.
97 'Nec ita sane gignit istam notitiam suam mens, quando cogitando intellectus se conspicit, tamquam sibi ante incognita fuerit.'
99 ib. p. 315; translation p. 431.
Footnotes to Excursus - continued -

100 v. supra p. 184: 'unde enim mens aliquam mentem novit si se non novit' (de Trinitate IX 3 3).

101 cf. supra pp. 190ff, 199ff, 233ff. The triad is found in de Trinitate XIV 12 15 and XV 20 39.

102 ib. XV 26 45.

103 Recht (Vorrede): SW 7 p. 32-33; translation p. 10.

104 Phänomenologie SW 2 p. 518; translation p. 686.

105 Religion, Einleitung: SW 15 p. 82; translation I p. 66.

106 ib. II SW 15 p. 359; translation II p. 5. Things attain independence by existing in a self-consciousness in a universal way and therefore freely.

107 ib. I pp. 172-3; translation p. 161: '... diess Seyn ist ein einfaches und zugleich ein zweifaches'. The whole of the Hegelian ambiguity rests in this sentence: not some recondite thought, but an expression of the dialectical principle of his system. From texts like those quoted below the charge of 'pantheism' has arisen, which, in an oriental sense, would be wide of the mark, and also the charge of 'panpsychism', which is nearer. But to give Hegel the justice of a complete presentation it is necessary to point out that unity of and division between God and man exist together. A. Chapelle, S.J., has collected the texts in which Hegel makes a distinction between God and man - reassuring for orthodox believers, but not giving Hegel the justice of a complete account (v. 'Hegel et la Religion' III Paris 1971, pp. 131-135 and Notes, especially Note 74).


110 Phänomenologie SW 2 p. 53; translation p. 115.

111 Religion III SW 16, especially pp. 236ff; translation p. 21ff.

Footnotes to Excursus - continued -

112 Religion III SW 16 p. 238; translation III p. 23.

113 ib. p. 239; translation p. 24.

114 v. supra p. 290 and n. 106.

115 v. de Trinitate VI 5 7.

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

This thesis has established a speculative and probably historical relationship between Aristotle and Augustine and a speculative relationship between Augustine and Hegel within the philosophical tradition of thought being in itself self-thinking: νοησίας νοητικός.

Aristotle's explanation of the union between this thinking in itself and its human embodiment led to a division within the mind where there should have been none: between νοούς as θεοτικός and νοούς as πολιτικός, and a division between νοούς and the ensouled body. The neo-Platonist conception attempted to bridge the gap between them with a hierarchy of hypostases and grades of being, all drawn into unity by desire for their source. Augustine's somewhat untidy resolution of the problem, a unity not in the highest activity of thinking, but in the wide and ample pell-mell of the memory, established a unity of personality with a simple and complete conception of subjectivity where Aristotle's pure thinking had created a division. Yet, Augustine was prepared to go along with self-thinking thought (mens et notitia sui), as also with self-loving love (mens et amor sui), on the understanding that these were to be considered as individually embodied. Thereby he put himself in the tradition of the past, and thereby he defined the Christian (though not the Aristotle-derived Islamic) tradition of metaphysical psychology for a
thousand years.

Hegel's much later reconciliation between thinking and material things lay in his view that, contrary to the division made by critical philosophy, all material things were to be transferred into and superseded by thought.

"It is a procedure which links up categories so as to let them result in a system that satisfies reason". 1

And reason is self-consciousness: when it finds satisfaction with itself it will have known itself and everything else in a unity. All knowledge is to be absorbed into self-knowing Geist, in its individuality as well as in its universality.

Thus both Augustine and Hegel may be considered as providing solutions to the problem left by the unrelated subjectivity structures of Aristotle, where the divine self-thinking \( \zeta \), thought in itself, could not be satisfactorily related to a particular human personality. Hegel's answer was to propose that every non-mental reality should be absorbed into Geist which was unsatisfied until it had communicated its own complete universality to everything else; Augustine's answer was to ensure the independence of self-knowing mind, to make individual self-knowing the condition of all other knowing, and to see the memory as the

centre of consciousness and the place of the interrelationship of all experience.

As it did with neo-Platonism, an Augustinian critique of Hegel would probably have attempted to dismantle the ultimate absorption of the individual knower into transcendent Geist; but it could not so easily have been claimed that Hegel had neglected entirely to safeguard the individual as such.¹

¹ cf. Recht § 185; comment.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

For all parts of the thesis a search was made in the following regularly published bibliographies, principally to discover relevant secondary material:

Répertoire Bibliographique de la Philosophie, Louvain 1949ff.


Some use was made of the Bibliographie de la Philosophie, New Series, Paris 1954ff.

The catalogues of the university libraries of Cambridge and Tübingen and of the Wurttembergische Landesbibliothek, Stuttgart, have also been freely used.

The bibliography is divided into two parts:

A. the classical and patristic period: the content of chapters 1-5.

B. Hegel and historically related figures: the content of the Exкурsus and Conclusion.

In each case there are three parts: specialised bibliographies; primary sources; secondary sources. In A all of the secondary sources referred to in the thesis are included in a single list, and a second list is given of other works read or consulted. In B, besides a list of the relatively few quoted secondary sources, there are two other bibliographies of
works read or consulted, and of works which compare Hegel and Augustine. Where more than one work by a single author is given the entries are listed in order of publication.

A

i) Special bibliography

Besides the general bibliographical aids listed above and the bibliographies which occur in the longer studies, the following special bibliographies have been used to survey the secondary literature -

a) Aristotle:

b) Augustine:

Augustine Bibliography - Fichier Augustiniennes (Institut des Études Augustiniennes, Paris) Boston 1972. (So far there have appeared two volumes of Author catalogue - complete; two volumes of Subject catalogue - incomplete).

ii) Primary sources

Most classical texts have been quoted from the Loeb classical library, whose translation has also been used (published in London and Cambridge, Mass.).

\( \text{Ἀλβῖνος} \) (Albinus) \( \text{Επίτομα} \) (Epitome).
Edited, with Greek text and translation, by P. Louis, Paris 1945 (Bude collection).

\( \text{Ἀριστοτέλης} \) (Aristotle).
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ii) Primary sources - cont'd:

Texts and translations

Posterior Analytics, with an English translation by E. Tredennick (with Topics translated by E. S. Forster), 1960 (reprinted 1966).


Nicomachean Ethics, with an English translation by H. Rackham, new and revised edition 1934 (reprinted 1968).

All quotations from and references to Aristotle's writings have been collated with authentic Beugler text, references to which are given in the notes.

Aurelius Augustinus

Texts and translations

For preference the Corpus Christianorum edition has been used, with consonantal "u's" changed to "v":

Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina, XXIX - LA (incomplete), Turnhout, 1953ff (= CC).

Otherwise the Migne text has been used:


For convenience' sake, the Latin text of the Confessiones and the de Trinitate have been normally taken from the Bibliothèque Augustinienne edition (Paris and Bruges, 1941ff);
Bibliography - continued -

ii) Primary sources - cont'd:

Texts and translations

Confessiones: Oeuvres de Saint Augustin 13-14, Series II, text edited by M. Skutella, both volumes 1962.


English translations occasionally slightly adapted:


de Civitate Dei, translated as 'City of God' by H. Bettenson, Harmondsworth 1972.

C(h)alcidius

Text


The Chaldaean Oracles

Texts and translations

W. Kroll, De Oraculis Chaldaeis. In Breslauer Philologische Abhandlungen 7,1, Breslau 1894. (Greek text with a Latin commentary).

W. Lewy (op.cit.) has English translations in his text and Greek texts in his footnotes. Unfortunately the work is unindexed. This dissertation gives some references to relevant oracles as they occur in his book.
Bibliography—continued—

ii) Primary sources—cont'd:

Texts and translations

Marcus Tullius Cicero

Texts and translations

Loeb Classical Library. Academica (together with de Natura Deorum), with an English translation by H. Rackham, 1933 (reprinted 1967).

Tusculan Disputations (Tusculanarum) with an English translation by J. E. King, revised 1945 (reprinted 1966).

Flavius Petrus Sabbatius Justinianus (Justinian).

Text


(Plato)

Text and translations


Theaetetus, Sophist, with an English translation by H. N. Fowler, 1921 (reprinted 1967).


ii) Primary sources – cont'd;

Texts and translations

\(\text{Πλωτίνος (Plotinus)}\)
Texts and translations of the Enneads


Armstrong's translation has been used for Enneads I, II and III, but most of the references are to Enneads IV, V and VI. An English rendering of Bréhier's clear translation of these has been preferred to the awkward, unsympathetic work of MacKenna and Page.

\(\text{Πορφύριος (Porphyry)}\)
Texts and translations of his works

The works of Bidez and Beutler (v. infra) describe the present state of knowledge of the corpus of Porphyry, and where quoted fragments and allusions to otherwise lost works may be found.

To their hesitant reference to a commentary on the Parmenides must be added the text of fragments published (from transcriptions of a Turin palimpsest made before the original was destroyed by fire in 1904) by Hadot in 1968.

Here it is necessary only to refer to the following:

\(\text{Περὶ τοῦ γνῶθι σαῦτον ἄ} \) (treatise on 'Know Thyself’, addressed to Iamblichos): text in J. Stobæus, Anthologiae III, Berlin 1894, pp. 579-583.

ii) Primary sources - cont'd:

Πορφύριος (Porphyry) continued -

Texts and translations of his works - continued -


English translation by T. Davidson in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, III, St. Louis, 1869 pp. 46-73.

The Latin version of De Regressu Animae, known only from Augustine's De Civitate Dei X, is reconstructed by Bidez, op.cit. pp. 27*-44*.

The fragments of Τῶν Χαλκάλων τὰ λόγα have been published in Greek with Latin notes by G. Wolff: 'Porphyrii de philosophia ex oraculis haurienda librorum reliquiae', Berlin 1856, pp. 109-186.

English translations can be found scattered through Lewy's book (v. infra), unfortunately unindexed. The thesis gives references to some passages which are relevant.

Fragments of Πορφύριον εἴς τὸν Πλάτωνος Παρμηνίδαν (Porphyre: 'Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon'), together with a French translation, are in Hadot, 'Porphyre' ... II pp. 64-120.

The existence of the commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics is known from a remark in Simplicius's commentary on Aristotle's de Coelo. v. supra, p. 210 and n. 42, and bibliography ii) below under Simplicius.

Cf. also Bidez p. 66* and Beutler col. 280.

Πρόκλος (Proclus)

Texts and translations

In Platonis Timeum commentaria (Procli Diadochi III), edited E. Diels, Leipzig 1906.


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ii) Primary sources - cont'd:

Texts and translations

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Loeb Classical library. Institutio Oratoria XI, with an English translation by H.E. Butler (Quintilian IV), 1922 (reprinted 1968).

Gaius Terentius Varro

Text


Gaius Marius Victorinus

Texts and translation of Adversus Arium:


iii) Secondary sources

a) works referred to in the footnotes to the Introduction and Chapters 1-5.

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