THE OTTOMAN PRESS
(1908 – 1923)

Erol Baykal
Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
This thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge. It is 97,000 words in length, excluding the bibliography, and does not exceed the word limit. This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration, except as specified in the text and Acknowledgements.
This thesis examines the Ottoman press, in particular the Turkish language press in Istanbul, between the declaration of the second constitutional period in 1908 and the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. After contextualizing the Ottoman press by looking at its history leading up to the 1908 revolution, the socio-economic, linguistic, geographic and ideological dimensions of the post-revolution press are examined by analysing the 1908 press boom, a period of increased press activity. Subsequently, three mechanisms to control the press (law, censorship and finance) are discussed in detail. The new 1909 press law and its application indicate a liberal policy towards the press. However, changes made to the 1909 press law, starting in 1912, gradually established strict government control after 1913. Pre-print censorship is discussed and Allied censorship in occupied Istanbul between 1919 and 1922 is used to illustrate how censorship could be used to control the content of the press. The thesis also examines the role of capital as a method of control for both government and non-government actors in a press-industry where high competition and low profits made survival difficult. In conclusion, the thesis considers the social and political impact of the press and argues that it could play a decisive role in the course of political events.

Erol Baykal

Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies
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COMMONLY USED ABBREVIATIONS

**ATASE**: *Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı* (Centre for Military History and Strategic Studies).

**BA**: *Bundesarchiv* (German National Archives, Berlin).

**BCA**: *Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi* (Prime Ministerial Archives of the Turkish Republic).

**BOA**: *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi* (Prime Ministerial Archives of the Ottoman Empire).

**HTU**: Hakkı Tarık Us.

**MMZC**: *Meclis-i Mebusan Zabit Ceridesi* (Minutes of the Chamber of Deputies).

**NL-HaNA**: *Nationaal Archief* (Dutch National Archives, The Hague).

**TBMMZC**: *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Zabit Ceridesi* (Minutes of the Grand National Assembly).

**TNA**: *The National Archives* (British National Archives, London).
ON TRANSLITERATION AND CALENDARS

All Ottoman Turkish texts are transliterated into Modern Turkish orthography without diacritical marks. Arabic texts are transliterated without diacritical marks for elongated vowels or emphatic consonants. Ayn and hamza are transcribed as ` and ' respectively. When quoting from sources which included transliterations, the source system was used. Place names were rendered according to their current day English versions. If deemed necessary, the form in which they appear in sources was given in brackets, following the current day name.

Often sources would be recorded using several calendars, a combination of Hicri (Kameri), Rumi and Miladi. To improve legibility and overall uniformity, regardless of the order in which they were given by the source, the dates in the references to these sources were always ordered as Hicri Kameri first, then Rumi and finally Miladi. This, of course, was subject to whether or not a certain calendar was used by the source. In some instances, namely with newspapers and publications appearing in the 1860s, Hicri Şemsi dates were present alongside Hicri Kameri dates. These Hicri Şemsi dates were not taken into account due to rarity and Hicri in the text refers to Hicri Kameri.

For dates where months are given, the names of the months identify the calendar. When only a year is given, the years will have an H or an R, to mark them as Hicri or Rumi. A "1" was added in front of Rumi and Hicri years where it was omitted by the original authors due to convenience. For example, the Rumi year 1324, if it was recorded as 324 in a source, was still rendered in the text as 1324R. Years and months that were illegible were placed in square brackets.

In the case of archive documents, where there was a discrepancy between the archive catalogue entry date and the document that is referred to (this can often be the case for example with records containing correspondence over a period of time), the date that was found on the document referred to was given preference over the catalogue entry date. With Ottoman newspapers and periodicals, alongside issue numbers, all recorded dates were given, because these
publications were prone frequently to making mistakes by not updating the issue number, or misprinting dates in certain calendars. By giving the combination of all possible dates and issue numbers, possible confusion about which issue was referred to was reduced.

All Hicri and Rumi and Miladi dates where the months were given in Turkish have been converted to the Common Era calendar, which were rendered in the text in square brackets following the original dates. Sources where Miladi dates were used without Turkish months (for example numbers of the months or French or English names of months) were not converted. For date conversions Türk Tarih Kurumu’s online tool, "Tarih Çevirme Kılavuzu" ("Date Conversion Guide"), which was developed by A.M. Aytaç, was used.
INTRODUCTION

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In July 1908, an organization known as the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP, İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti), a secret organization of the Young Turks, who were dissatisfied with Sultan Abdülhamid II’s rule, successfully pressured the sultan into reinstating the Ottoman constitution. The Young Turks had found many followers among the ranks of young Ottoman army officers. Two such officers, Enver, who would later become the Minister of War and lead the Ottoman Empire into the First World War and Resneli Ahmed Niyazi, dubbed Champion of Freedom (Kahraman-ı Hürriyet) for his role played in the revolution, but mysteriously assassinated in 1913, triggered what would be known as the Young Turk Revolution, the Constitutional Revolution or the (July) 1908 Revolution (Ottoman: İnkılab-ı Kebir Osmaniye or İnkılab-ı Hürriyet, respectively Great Ottoman Revolution or Freedom Revolution). The revolution reached its aim and Abdülhamid II reintroduced the constitution, called for elections for the chamber of deputies (meclis-i mebusan) and reopened the senate (meclis-i ayan).

Disillusionment soon followed the revolution. In October 1908, Bulgaria declared its independence from the Ottoman empire and Austro-Hungarian annexed the Ottoman province of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Losing territory while the territorial integrity of the empire had been one of the main points in the agenda of the Young Turks so soon after the revolution was not good for the prestige of the CUP. Nevertheless, it obtained a landslide victory during the general elections of 1908 but despite the electoral victory opposition to the CUP was rising. The rising dislike towards the CUP culminated in the 31 March Incident (31 Mart Vakası), a counter-revolution that, despite its name, took place in April 1909 (but in March 1325 of the Rumi calendar). The incident involved religious scholars and students and soldiers stationed in Istanbul and was quickly extinguished by the Action Army (Hareket Ordusu) under the command of Mahmud Şevket Paşa,
but not before it had caused the resignation of the government in favour of a new cabinet.

After the counter-revolution was quelled, Abdülhamid II was abdicated on suspicion of being involved with the 31 March Incident in an attempt to restore his own power, thus ending his reign of over 30 years. He was followed by Mehmed V Reşad, who rose to the throne to become the penultimate sultan until he died in July 1918. Furthermore, martial law was declared in the Ottoman capital and would remain in force virtually uninterrupted until the end of the empire, blurring the lines between military and civil powers.

In September 1911, Italy, rejecting Ottoman proposals for a non-military solution, declared war on the Ottoman empire over the empire’s Tripolitanian (Trablusgarp) provinces (Libya). Libya was at this point a distant final remnant of Ottoman North African lands but the repercussion of this war in the capital was that the CUP was faced with a second revolt, this time by a group called the Saviour Officers (Halaskar Zabitan), military officers who forced the CUP-backed government to resign and paved the way for the Grand Cabinet, consisting of experienced statesmen.

Alongside the political turmoil in the capital, a larger storm was brewing in the Balkans. Not only had the Albanians been pushing for independence through revolts, but in October 1912, the Balkan League, consisting of Greece, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria and Montenegro, declared war and delivered a crushing defeat to the Ottomans who had just hastily signed a peace treaty with the Italians over the Tripoli war. This Balkan conflict, known as the First Balkan War, resulted in the almost complete loss of all European territories for the Ottoman empire.

The enormous loss of territory and the humiliating defeat under the Grand Cabinet presented Enver Paşa with the opportunity to execute the Bab-ı Ali coup in January 1913, resulting in the exile of Grand Vizier Kamil Paşa and Enver Paşa’s appointment as Minister of War. Enver entered the Second Balkan War and took parts of lands lost during the first leg of the Balkan Wars, which increased his prestige. At this time, following the assassination of Grand Vizier
Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the following crackdown on the opposition of the CUP, the triumvirate of Talat Paşa (Minister of the Interior) Enver Paşa (Minister of War) and Cemal Paşa, (Minister of the Navy) came into being with *de facto* control of the empire.

In October 1914, the Ottoman empire officially entered the First World War on the side of the Central Powers. Towards the end of the war, Mehmed VI Vahdettin, the last Ottoman sultan ascended the throne to replace the deceased Sultan Mehmed V. Shortly after that, in October 1918, the Ottoman empire signed the Mudros peace treaty, ending the conflict with the Allies as the losing party. Istanbul, the Ottoman capital, came under Allied occupation and Allied troops were allowed to land in other Ottoman territories. With the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920, the dismemberment of the Ottoman empire would have been complete.

However, the Nationalist Forces (*Kuva-ı Milliye*) under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Paşa, a distinguished general who was later to become the president of the newly founded Turkish Republic, started a resistance movement, based in Ankara. After successfully fighting off the British-backed Greek invasion of Anatolia, this movement successfully renegotiated with the Allies to reach the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which superseded the Treaty of Sèvres regarding the territorial integrity of the Anatolian Turkish heartlands. In October 1923 the Grand National Assembly (*Büyük Millet Meclisi*) declared the independence of the Turkish Republic under the presidency of Mustafa Kemal, thus ending the institution of the Ottoman Sultanate.

**METHODOLOGY**

The history of the Ottoman empire between 1908 and 1923, as concisely given above, is a tumultuous story. The switch to a constitutional monarchy, the continual loss of Ottoman territory and finally the creation of a republic from the ashes of the empire and other events all bear testimony to the scale of the things that unfolded in these very long fifteen years. As a result, much scholarly
attention has been devoted to the study of Ottoman and Turkish history of the period.

It is said that frustration is the mother of invention. For me, as I was working on my M.Phil dissertation, which was on Istanbul during the Balkan Wars in 1912-1913, the source of frustration was some of my primary sources, namely Ottoman newspapers and periodicals. This frustration did not stem from the lacking usability or poor information in the material. On the contrary, the material was very good and bursting with relevant and very exciting content. What was lacking, however, among the countless publications that scrutinize the period, were works that contextualized the Ottoman press. How was it that, for such a well-studied period of Ottoman history, a subject as important as the press, the media of the time, remained virtually untouched? The result of this frustration is this Ph.D. thesis.

While there have been publications of catalogues of Ottoman newspapers (such as Duman’s impressive work, Osmanlı-Türk Süreli Yayınları ve Gazeteleri, 1828-1928 and Odabaşıoğlu’s Trabzon Doğu Karadeniz Gazete ve Mecmuaları 1869–1928), or of selected articles from newspapers (such as Çulcu’s İkdam Gazetesi’nde Çanakkale Cephesi and Ilgar’s Mütarekede Yerli ve Yabancı Basın), these do not discuss the sources themselves or set the newspapers in context. Certain works focus in-depth on particular publications in order to shed light on a specific historical question. Ahmetoğlu’s Şehbal Mecmuası (1909-1914), for example (which also contains a detailed catalogue and index of all article titles, authors and subjects for every issue of Şehbal alongside modern Turkish renderings of a generous selection of articles) examines the bi-weekly Şehbal in an attempt to explain the aims of the Committee of Union and Progress after the 1908 revolution. Çakır’s Osmanlı Kadın Hareketi looks at the Ottoman feminist movement through the women’s magazine Kadınlar Dünyası. The focus of such works is not actually the press per se but rather the analysis of the content of Ottoman publications in order to gain a better understanding of various social or political issues in the Ottoman empire. This also applies to the works of Brummett, Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press,

On the other hand, various general histories of the press have been published, İnugur’s *Basın ve Yayın Tarihi* and Türk Basınında "İz" Birakanlar, Koloğlu's *Osmanlı'dan 21. Yüzyıla Basin Tarihi*, Oral's *Türk Basin Tarihi*, Şapolyo's *Türk Gazetecilik Tarihi ve Her Yönyüle Basin* and Topuz's *II. Mahmut'tan Holdinglere Türk Basin Tarihi*, for example. All these and similar works offer a history of the Turkish or Ottoman-Turkish press, usually starting from its inception until current day Turkey. It should be noted that many of these works are overlapping to the extent that they do not offer information that is substantially different from one and other. Furthermore, most of these works do not apparently use primary sources or, if they do, use them in a very limited way or without any reference to the source used, leaving many of their claims unsubstantiated and hard to verify. This is particularly visible in Topuz’s work, which, when compared to the others, has a relatively fleshed-out referencing system. His references show that he has used Koloğlu and Şapolyo’s works, among other secondary sources, and a limited set of primary sources in the form of articles from Ottoman publications. This limited usage of sources probably explains why most of these works tend to overlap in their content.

While the general histories of the press tend to be just that, general, there are various works written on specific aspects of the press which are much more useful. *Türkiye’de Matbuat İdareleri ve Politikaları*, written by İskit, the former head of the Turkish press regulation office (*matbuat idaresi*), gives an impressive overview of Ottoman and early Turkish policies towards the press. Koloğlu, in *1908 Basin Patlaması*, looks at the effects of the declaration of the constitution on the Ottoman press and discusses the press boom (albeit rather superficially), a period of heightened press activity, and Çakır, *Osmanlı Basınında Reklam*, examines advertising in Ottoman newspapers before the constitutional revolution. There has also been work done on censorship (such as Aslan’s "II. Meşrutiyet Dönemince Matbuat ve Neşriyat Yasakları" and Birinci’s "Osmanlı Devletinde Matbuat ve Neşriya Yasakları Tarihine Medhal"), and on aspects of the relationship between the press and government (Boyar, “The press and the

Despite such research on specific aspects of the press or the more general works on the history of press from its beginnings to today, there is still very little, if any, work on the press itself in the period between the constitutional revolution and the creation of the Turkish Republic. This thesis looks at various aspects of the Ottoman press between 1908 and 1923 and argues that the publications in the empire were influential and that this potential impact of the press was widely recognized.

The first chapter of the thesis, "The Ottoman Press until 1908", gives an overview of the history of the Ottoman press from its beginnings in the first half of the 19th century until 1908, and discusses the emergence of the private press, the creation and implementation of the first press laws and regulations to control the press. Although this chapter appears to be beyond the scope of the research and too lengthy for a historical background, the decision to include it in its current form as reached after considering the fact that the information is not only directly relevant to placing the rest of the thesis in a temporal framework, but also because it is not readily available in English.

The second chapter is a look at the social dimensions of the press as a medium and as an industry. In this chapter, the 1908 press boom, a period of heightened press activity following the constitutional revolution is analysed. By looking at the publishing permit applications in the Ottoman archives, it was possible not only to reconstruct the 1908 press boom, but also to understand that the press as an industry was the realm of the better-off all over the empire.

The third chapter, "Legislating the Press", looks at the legal dimension of publishing periodicals in the Ottoman Empire. An in-depth examination of the legislative process is used to argue that, as opposed to the commonly held idea that the 1909 press law was restrictive and designed by the CUP to silence the press, it was neither a product of CUP efforts nor restrictive. Using a case-study,
in which three dailies, Tanin, İkdam and Tanzimat are examined, it is argued that because of the liberal 1909 press law, martial law, declared in 1909, was unable to silence the press. However, starting in 1912 a series of changes first introduced with adaptations to the 1909 press law gradually made it more restrictive. These changes resulted in a more repressive law, which would govern the press until the end of the Ottoman Empire and which would be adopted by Ankara, to be replaced only in 1931.

The fourth chapter, entitled "Censorship", focuses on the politics behind pre-print censorship (which means that the content of publications could be suppressed before they ever appeared). The chapter looks at the abolition of pre-print press after the 1908 constitutional revolution and its reinstatement just before the First World War. Censorship in occupied Istanbul is measured for three dailies, Vakit, İkdam and Peyam-i Sabah, and the contents of Peyam-i Sabah are examined in detail, leading to the finding that, despite the fact that both Imperial and Allied censors were operating, it was the latter who dictated censorship policy. Furthermore, the chapter argues that Ankara, feeling that the Allied censorship was robbing it of its voice, implemented its own restrictions, banning Istanbul's press from Anatolia. In a further response to Allied censorship, Ankara also actively nourished the underdeveloped Anatolian press to help it grow into a platform for its own voice.

In the fifth chapter, "Financing the Press", the economy of the press as a market is analysed. By looking at the production costs of daily newspapers, circulations and sales, and industry-wide pricing policies, it is argued that the publishing industry was very competitive in the post-revolution era. As a result, publishers were hard-pressed to find money to keep their businesses running, leading to innovations being introduced in the formatting of newspapers. Under these harsh economic circumstances, the press was vulnerable to a form of financial control, where capital could be used to influence content. A case-study involving advertising revenue as a means of sponsoring newspapers with certain ideological leanings is presented, where the advertisements in Akşam, Alemdar, Peyam-i Sabah and Hakimiyet-i Milliye are compared and discussed.
Chapter six, the final chapter, looks at the impact of the press. The chapter argues that the Ottoman press had, or was perceived to have, significant power to impact society and politics by mobilising its readership into action. This social mobilisation is examined through a case-study, where the contents of one newspaper, Volkan, is compared to the events that took place during the 31 March Incident to show that a link existed between its publications and the actions of the mutineers.

After the concluding chapter, there are a series of appendices. Most of the appendices contain in-depth explanations of methodologies, sources and data. As the press laws are referred to frequently throughout the text, Appendix II, "Ottoman Press Laws" contains the full texts of the 1864 press law and the 1909 Press law, including changes made to it until October 1913. Appendix IV, "Evolution of the Front Page", offers visual evidence of how new formatting techniques were introduced after 1908, as a result of the competitive market.

**Sources**

The primary sources that were most extensively used in this research can be grouped as follows: the Ottoman press, official documents from archives in Turkey, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany, works of reference, namely the Ottoman codex (Düstur) and parliamentary minutes (Zabit Cerideleri) and finally memoires of those who witnessed the period.

Tütengil, who was a professor of sociology and a journalist who was assassinated in 1979, argued in his methodology for researching newspapers and periodicals, which was published by Istanbul University's Institute for Journalism, that studying the history of the Turkish press could not be limited to researching individuals or official documents and that looking at every issue of every newspaper or periodical, or at least "typical" examples for certain periods, was a must.¹ In accordance with Tütengil’s suggestion, this thesis relies very heavily on the Ottoman press itself as a primary source. Well over 600 Ottoman publications were consulted. While in some cases a limited number of issues of a

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periodical or newspaper were used, certain significant publications were worked on in depth.

For in-depth reading, 5 publications were picked due to their fame and popularity, namely İkdam, Tanin, Sabah, Peyam-i Sabah and Tercüman-i Hakikat. In addition, Takvim-i Vakayi, the official organ of the Ottoman government, was chosen due to its official nature. The advantage of these newspapers was that all of them published fairly consistently throughout the entire period with minor insignificant gaps. Therefore, as a source, they have an element of continuity, which sets them apart from the numerous short-lived publications of the same period.

A further 4 publications that did not appear throughout these 15 years were also selected, based on their importance for various reasons. These were namely Volkan, a short-lived daily which is considered to be connected to the 31 March Incident, a mutiny among soldiers in Istanbul, which was ended with the deposition Sultan Abdülhamid II; Alemdar, a fairly successful political daily which started to appear in 1911 and which played an important role as opposition to the National Forces during the Allied occupation of Istanbul; and İrade-i Milliye and Hakimiyet-i Milliye, the semi-official organs of the National Forces in Anatolia, which started to appear during the Turkish War for Independence.

All the aforementioned publications were obtained from the Turkish National Library and an approximate 20,000 pages from these were digitized from microfilm, specifically for this research, over a period of six months in 2009. To be able effectively to work with these digital images, most of them had to undergo image processing (microfilm are stored as negatives), and a custom built program, which enabled relatively easy cataloguing, was used in order to achieve a system for dealing with this large quantity of data and to allow quickly retrieving the desired issues or periods of publications. Unfortunately, part of the material obtained suffered from issues that hamper the legibility: scuffs, caused

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2 The digital images were donated to the microfilm department of the Turkish National Library, whose employees were kind enough to help me by providing me with their own digitized copies of Peyam-i Sabah, İrade-i Milliye and Hakimiyet-i Milliye free of charge.
by physical abrasion on the microfilms, and bad copy-photography techniques, resulting in out of focus or badly exposed images, were the foremost problems. These problems were mitigated as much as possible with digital image processing techniques, such as sharpening, increasing contrast and adjusting exposure. Still, a part of the digital collection is as illegible as the source microfilm images which they were copied from.

It should be noted that when the material was being digitized, this was almost exclusively limited to the front pages. This was done for practical reasons involving time constraints. Digitizing all pages would have increased the time required by about fourfold, and there was little justification for spending an estimated two years on this task alone. Part of the considerations taken into account when making the decision to limit the data collection to front pages had to do with the breadth of the material. It was imperative to cover the Ottoman press in longitude, that is, the 15 years that were at the focus of this research. But at the same time, because the focus of the thesis is the Ottoman press as a whole, it was deemed equally important to obtain as many publications as possible to achieve a latitudinal coverage of the source, in order to be able to compare publications at certain points in time. Therefore, instead of taking every page of 1 or 2 publications, the front pages of 4 times as many publications seemed a reasonable choice, considering the limitations of the thesis. As the Flemish saying goes: "to choose is to lose". Naturally, the choice to focus only on the front pages has the disadvantage of missing a large portion of the newspapers' contents. However, one should keep in mind that, arguably the most relevant information was concentrated on the front page of each publication. Although the second page could contain continuations of articles started on the first page or equally important letters from readers, the third page and fourth page were mostly official lists of wages, public transport schedules and advertisements.

The second most important archive used to obtain Ottoman publications, has been the Periodicals of the Hakki Tarik Us Collection (henceforth HTU), a digital repository. This, the product of a joint effort between Beyazıt State library in Istanbul (where the originals are located) and the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies reached completion (rather serendipitously) in February 2010 after 7
years of digitization and cataloguing efforts. An estimated 400,000 pages of
Ottoman periodicals were made available to the public over the internet. Despite
some technical shortcomings, this digital collection proved to be of great value
for this research as the available material covers far more than the 1908-1923
period and includes various sorts of publications, such as satirical magazines, or
publications aimed at specific audiences like women, children or niche
audiences, such as hobbyists or business professionals. The material from the
National Library could thus be supplemented with data from smaller
publications. This material has been used throughout the dissertation, and more
specifically for three purposes. Firstly, the available publications were used to
strengthen the analysis on the financial aspect of publications, as it was possible
to access the last pages, containing advertisements, which were key to the
financial viability of periodicals, and because a much more detailed picture could
be composed on pricing policies of Istanbul dailies because of the numerously
available publications. Secondly, once it was established that newly appearing
publications had the habit of explaining the purpose of their appearance, an
exhaustive search was conducted to collect as many as possible of these first
issues. Over 600 were found for the years between 1876 and 1930, over half of
which were from the 1908-1923 period, and their introductory articles provided
a wealth of information on social, financial and technical aspects of the press.
Finally, the HTU collection contains a large number of illustrated satirical
magazines. Several caricatures found in these magazines, which had a knack of
summarising complex issues in a simple way, are used as supportive evidence
for various arguments throughout the thesis.

Archival material was mostly obtained from Turkish archives. The archives that
were consulted were the Prime Ministerial Archives of the Ottoman Empire
(Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, henceforth BOA) in Istanbul, and in Ankara the
Prime Ministerial Archives of the Republic (Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi,
henceforth BCA), the archives of the Centre for Military History and Strategic

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3 For a detailed discussion about the advantages and the (technical) shortcomings of this archive,
see: Baykal E., “Periodicals of the Hakkı Tarık Us Collection” in Turkish Historical Review, 2/2
Studies (*Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı*, henceforth ATASE) and the archives of the Presidential Palace of Çankaya (*Cumhurbaşkanlık Arşivi*).

BOA material was used to cover the entire 1908-1923 period. The material from BOA comes mostly from the files of the Ministry of the Interior (*Dahiliye Nezareti*, DH.). Among these, the files of the Secretarial Office (*Mektubi Kalemi*, DH.MKT.) and the General Communications Office (*Muhaberat-ı Umumiye İdaresi*, DH.MUİ.) contain a variety of material related to the press. Documents that are specifically related to matters of censorship and propaganda were found in the Public Safety Office files (*Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdürlüğü*, DH.EUM.), the Confidential Secretarial Office (*Kalem-i Mahsus Müdürlüğü*, DH.KMS.) and the Cryptography Office (*Şifre Kalemi*, DH.ŞFR). From the ministry of the exterior files (*Hariciye Nezareti*, HR.), due to the focus of the thesis on the domestic Ottoman press, far less was material was consulted. Among the files of the Imperial Decrees (*İradeler*, İ) and those of the Cabinet (*Meclis-i Vükela*, MV.), material pertaining to legislation to regulate the press was used. However, as can be seen in the list of archival sources in the bibliography, material from other sections and sub-sections of BOA have also been consulted.

Other Turkish archives were used for more limited timeframes and, as a result, yielded a far smaller volume of useful documents. BCA material was used to cover material from 1920 until 1924. Here relevant material was found in the files of the Executive General Office (*Muamelat Genel Müdürlüğü*, 30.10.0.0) and of the Cabinet Decisions (*Bakanlar Kurulu Kararları*, 30.18.1.1). At the archive of the Presidential Palace, it was not permitted to do one's own search, but a small number of documents related to the press was made available upon prior request. At ATASE, due to time-constraints related to permission to work in the archives, only the files related to the Turkish War of Independence (*İstiklal Harbi*, İSH), between 1919 and 1922, were searched. The decision to limit the search to this specific section of the archive was reached because one of the research goals from the very beginning had been to look at the relations between Istanbul's and Ankara's press during this period and any auxiliary material was considered welcome.
Although in Ankara the headquarters of Anadolu Ajansı, the official Turkish news agency, founded in 1920, and in Istanbul the Press Museum (Basın Müzesi), founded by the Turkish Union of Journalists (Türkiye Gazeteciler Cemiyeti) were visited, both institutions claimed not to have any archives. Furthermore, attempts to access the library of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Kütüphanesi), which is said to have a very good collection of Ottoman periodicals, were unsuccessful, as, according to the employees, only members of parliament were allowed access.

Three archives were consulted outside Turkey. These were the British National Archives (henceforth, TNA) in London, the German Bundesarchiv (henceforth, BA) in Berlin, and the Dutch Nationaal Archief in The Hague (Henceforth, NL-HaNA). From the British archives, especially the Foreign Office (FO) material, and more specifically the Annual Reports on Turkey, usually containing a section for the Ottoman press were valuable. Furthermore, two press guides were found with British intelligence information on journalists and publications appearing in Istanbul. The Dutch material was mostly collected from the Dutch Ministry of the Exterior’s Embassy of Istanbul files (1872-1954) (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Gezantschap, Consulaat, Consulaat-generaal te Constantinopel/Istanbul (Turkije), (1817) 1872-1954 (1955), 2.05.94). Like the TNA files, the Dutch files, too, contain various press reports and, although these focus mostly on monitoring for pan-Islamic activities, the Dutch continued to create reports on the Ottoman press during the World War, something which they could do more efficiently than the British, whose embassies were closed due to the war. At the Bundesarchiv, which was an unfortunately short visit, the Sources on the History of Turkey and German-Turkish Relations (1855-1945) (Quellen zur Geschichte der Türkei und der Deutsch-Türkischen Beziehung 1855-1945, R901) were searched, and more specifically the files in the section on the Press in Turkey (Presse i/d Türkei, R901/34036) but these only continue until 1912, while other sub-sections of R901 probably had more relevant information, it was not possible to search those due to time constraints.

Three works of reference were extensively used. These were the minutes of the Ottoman Chamber of deputies (Meclis-i Mebusan Zabit Cerideleri) and the
minutes of the Grand National Assembly (*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Zabıt Cerideleri*), and the Ottoman legal codex (*Düstur*). All three of these were accessed in the library of the Turkish Institute for History (*Türk Tarih Kurumu*) in Ankara. The Ottoman legal codex, the collection of Ottoman laws, was searched for press-related laws and provided not only full texts of these laws, but also a good reference for dates during which these laws were created. The minutes of the Ottoman Chamber of deputies were then searched for these dates. The value of the parliamentary minutes lies in the fact that they contain the complete discussions held at the meetings. Thus, with the minutes of the Ottoman chamber of deputies, it was possible to gain a deeper understanding of the legislative process that created the 1909 Ottoman press law. The minutes of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, on the other hand, among other things, contain talks and discussions held by the various heads of the press regulation and intelligence Office (*matbuat ve istihbarat Müdür-i Umumisi*). The information contained in their remarks are very valuable as relatively little is known about the state of the Ottoman press in Anatolia at this time.

Memoires of the period and books written by journalists or in some cases about journalists, of the era, such as Ahmed İhsan, Ahmed Rasim, Ali Kemal, Falih Rifki Atay, Yakup Kadri Karaoşmanoğlu, Asım Us, Zekeriya Sertel, Yunus Nadi, Ahmed Emin Yalman, Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, Münir Süleyman Çapanoğlu, and Selim Nüzhet Gerçek, all of whom were involved in the press as journalists in the 1908-1923 period, were also consulted.
Newspapers appeared in the Ottoman Empire starting at the end of the 18th century, over two hundred years after the introduction of printing technology in the empire. Even then, the first newspapers in Ottoman territory cannot be classified as Ottoman per se, but rather as the efforts of foreign (French) actors. The Ottoman newspapers which appeared in the first half of the 19th century were official and semi-official publications. The emergence of the private press, and with it opinions that were not along official lines, provoked the state into creating a legal framework through which the press could be controlled. Under Abdülhamid II, a harsh censorship regime was combined with financial and other support to compliant publishers to create a press that was essentially Hamidian.

The press made its entry into the Ottoman Empire relatively late. In Europe printed newspapers with consistent publishing frequencies were common by the 17th century, with La Gazette in Paris, for example, which began publication in 1631, being cited as one of the earliest examples.\(^4\) Takvim-i Vakayi, which is regarded as the first Ottoman newspaper, appeared in 1831.\(^5\) This delay of two centuries forms an interesting question, especially because printing technology was well-established in the empire by then. Gutenberg is believed to have finished inventing his printing press in 1440. This technology was imported into the Ottoman Empire as early as 1493 by Jewish refugees from Europe who in the following century established printing presses in various Ottoman cities.\(^6\) In 1567 the first Armenian printing establishment was opened and in 1627 a Greek printer was set up. Under Sultan Ahmed III, whose reign was marked by the Tulip Era (Lale Devri) Yirmisekizçelebi Mehmed was dispatched to Paris as an ambassador to Louis XV in 1720. He was accompanied by his son Yirmisekizçelebi Mehmed Said, who took great interest in the printing press and visited printing establishments.\(^7\) After returning from Paris, in 1727, the father and son, with the help of Sadrazam Damad İbrahim Paşa, successfully petitioned the sultan for

\(^5\) Takvim-i Vakayi No. 1, 25 Cemazeyilevel 1247 [1 November 1831].
\(^6\) Şapolyo, Her Yönüyle Basın, p. 25.
\(^7\) Şapolyo, Her Yönüyle Basın, pp. 30-34.
permission to set up a printing house, arguing that the press would enable books to be copied cheaply and that this would benefit students and allow for the establishment of large libraries. Enlisting the help of İbrahim Müteferrika, a Hungarian convert who had experience in cartographic printing, this printing establishment successfully printed and sold its first book: *Sihah-i Cevheri*, an Arabic dictionary, also known as *Vankulu Lugatı*, named after its translator Vani Mehmed ibn-i Mustafa, who, according to legend, in the 10th century created an airplane and successfully flew it over Nishapur, but was less successful in landing his craft, resulting in his untimely death. After protests from the copiers in Istanbul, who manually duplicated manuscripts and feared that the end of their profession was approaching, an agreement was struck that Müteferrika would refrain from printing religious books, which the manual copiers had a monopoly on, allowing the first Ottoman Turkish printer to publish mainly a series of history books. This was followed by the establishment of other printers, including *matbaa-i amire* (imperial press). The answer as to why an Ottoman press did not emerge until a century after Ottoman printed books, can therefore not be answered through a lack of technology.

Much like the history of the Ottoman printing press, the history of the Ottoman newspaper was connected to France. The first newspapers that appeared in the empire were the French *Bulletin des Nouvelles* in 1795 and *La Gazette Française de Constantinople* in 1796. Both these newspapers were the result of a larger French policy to promote the French revolution, which had taken place some years earlier, in other countries. As no newspapers were being published in the Ottoman Empire yet, the French Ambassador Verninhac was charged with setting one up and he was sent the required material to do so. Verninhac, who published *Bulletin des Nouvelles*, was unable to print in Ottoman Turkish due to technical difficulties, and his newspaper only appeared sporadically. His successor, Ambassador Aubert-Dubayet, launched *La Gazette Française de

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8 Şapolyo, *Her Yönüyle Basın*, p. 41.
Constantinople but when the French invaded Egypt in 1798, the newspaper was closed along with the French embassy in Istanbul.\textsuperscript{10}

Starting in 1820, a series of privately owned French newspapers appeared in Izmir. \textit{Spectateur de l’Orient}\textsuperscript{11} or \textit{Le Spectateur Oriental},\textsuperscript{12} which appeared in the early 1820’s, is generally considered to be the first private newspaper in the Ottoman Empire. It had been founded earlier by Frenchman Charles Tricon, under the name \textit{Smyrnéen}, but it was soon sold to another Frenchman by the name of Roux. \textit{Smyrnéen} took it upon itself to defend Ottoman interests, and probably with that the interests of the French entrepreneurs and traders who lived in Izmir, which caused strained relations with the French embassy. Roux, unwilling to deal with this strain, was able to sell the newspaper to another Frenchman, Comte d’André, who renamed the newspaper \textit{Spectateur de l’Orient}. Despite changing the tone of the newspaper, pressure from the French embassy continued and finally \textit{Spectateur} was sold to Alexandre Blacque (Blak Bey in Turkish sources), yet another Frenchman. Blacque ignored the French embassy’s warnings and continued to publish material attacking French policies. As a result his newspaper was forcefully closed in December 1827, allegedly by the French.\textsuperscript{13} This, and continued pressure, caused him to change the title of the organ twice, first to \textit{Courrier de Smyrne} and later to \textit{Journal de Smyrne}.\textsuperscript{14}

In 1828, Blacque, who through his actions had attracted Sultan Mahmud II’s attention, was asked by the sultan to establish and run the first official Ottoman newspaper in Istanbul. Mahmud II, who had lost a war against the Russians and had lost control over Egypt to Muhammed Ali, deemed it necessary to inform the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} Topuz H., \textit{II. Mahmut’tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi} (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2003), p.34-36.
\item \textsuperscript{11} Djiiveleguian A., \textit{Regime de la presse en Turquie} (Paris: Émile Larose, 1912), pp. 16-17. According to Djiiveleguian the first political daily in Izmir was \textit{Spectateur de l’Orient}, published by "Alexandre Blacque bey", a Frenchman.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Koloğlu O., \textit{Osmanlı Basının Doğuşu ve Blak Bey Ailesi} (Istanbul: Müteferrika, 1998), p. 10. Koloğlu places the foundation of \textit{Le Spectateur Oriental} in March 1821.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Karal E.Z. et al. (eds.) \textit{Yeni Türkiye} (Istanbul: Nebioğlu Yayinevi, 1959), p. 174.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Djiiveleguian, \textit{Regime}, p.17. Djiiveleguian notes: "Son journal s’appela ensuite le \textit{Courrier de Smyrne}, puis le \textit{Journal de Smyrne}" yet offers no explanation as to why Blacque would feel compelled to change the title of the newspaper twice. Furthermore, he does not mention any pressure by the French embassy. This is most likely because Djiiveleguian published his book, which is very pro-French, in France where he also graduated from law school.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
public, both foreign and domestic, of the palace's opinions. Consequently, in 1831, *Le Moniteur Ottoman*, an official organ, started appearing in French and was later followed by *Takvim-i Vakayi*, the official organ of the Ottoman state, in Ottoman. *Takvim-i Vakayi*, which published both official and general news and translations from foreign newspapers, did not enjoy high demand at all, rendering it a loss sustaining enterprise. Steps were taken to overcome this, such as making it obligatory for government employees to take out a subscription.

Although privately owned newspapers were appearing in small numbers in Izmir, a privately owned Ottoman language newspaper was not published until 1840. However, this publication, due to its financial link to the palace, cannot be considered to have been fully independent. The story behind its creation is a remarkable one. Winston Churchill, a journalist for a British newspaper who lived in Istanbul, wounded a Turkish child during an illegal hunting trip. After being roughly handled by some locals, he was promptly arrested and thrown into prison. However, the British embassy turned the matter into a diplomatic issue and managed to get Churchill released. Subsequently, the sultan offered Churchill the opportunity to ask for a reconciliatory gift. He asked for permission to enter the edible oil business and permission to publish an Ottoman language newspaper. After selling his edible oil business, he used the money to start *Ceride-i Havadies*, the first privately owned Ottoman language newspaper. Unfortunately for Churchill, demand for his newspaper remained unsatisfactory and he struggled financially due to low sales. There simply was not enough of a readership, and much like the other Ottoman-language publication *Takvim-i Vakayi, Ceride-i Havadies*, too, suffered financial losses. Only during the Crimean War, in which Churchill assumed the role of a war correspondent, did reports on the war increase both the popularity of and the demand for *Ceride-i Havadies*. However, *Ceride-i Havadies* still relied on government subsidies to stay afloat. Because of this, it is considered a semi-official organ, an opinion reinforced by the fact that it refrained from criticising the government.

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15 Karal, E.Z. et al. (eds.) *Yeni Türkiye* (İstanbul: Nebioğlu Yaynevi, 1959), p. 175.
17 Ahmed Emin [Yalman], *The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press* (New York: Columbia University, 1914), p. 31.
The state press apparatus, the foundation of which was laid in 1831 with the creation of Takvim-i Vakayi and its multilingual sibling-publications and Ceride-i Havadis, for all intents and purposes a state funded organ, was slowly being joined by privately funded publications. Their financial independence and the fact that, in terms of legislation, nothing existed meant therefore, in theory, that no rules could be broken with publications. But of course, as the number of voices in the press increased, so did the state’s desire to keep them in check. As a result, parallel to the expansion of the Ottoman press, especially after the emergence of the Ottoman Turkish private press, there was an effort by the government to create laws that could be used to control newspapers and periodicals.

The first laws to control the press appear to have been made in 1858. Three articles (138, 139 and 213) were added to the penal code, which were translated from their French equivalents. The most significant addition stipulated that publishing attacks on the empire, its government or any people among the empire’s subjects, could lead to indefinite suspension of the publications and a fine. According to Topuz, this was an act of forward thinking by the state, as there were only three publications at that time, namely Takvim-i Vakayi, Ceride-i Havadis and Vaka-i Tibbiye, a medical journal, and they posed no threat at all. Topuz seems to have made a mistake based on the misconception that the first privately financed Ottoman newspaper was Agah Efendi’s Tercüman-i Ahval, set up in 1861, a notion entertained by most Turkish secondary sources. In reality, there seems to have been a flourishing press that was not subsidized by the state, but that these publications were not in Ottoman Turkish, but in other languages. According to Djiveleguian, five years prior to the additions regarding the press were made to the penal code, there were 13 publications in Istanbul alone, Takvim-i Vakayi and Ceride-i Havadis being the only Ottoman Turkish ones, while the rest were in French, Italian, Greek, Armenian and Bulgarian. Interestingly, he does not count the instances of Takvim-i Vakayi in different

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18 İnuğur, İz Burakanlar, p. 18.
19 Topuz, II. Mahmut’tan Holdinglere, p. 44.
20 Djiveleguian, Regime, pp. 18-19. According to Djiveleguian, in 1853 Istanbul had 2 Turkish, 4 French, 4 Italian, 1 Armenian, 1 Greek and 1 Bulgarian publication. He adds that there were only three in Izmir: 1 Armenian, 1 Greek and 1 in Hebrew.
languages. While little is known about these publications, it seems reasonable to assume that at least some of them were privately funded and did not have the strong connection to the palace that turned Ceride-i Havadis into a semi-official organ. Furthermore, according to İnuşur, in 1841 an irade was passed that required that permission be obtained before publishing and introduced pre-print examination for the duration of the Crimean War. An irade like this would only make sense if there had been publications that were not connected to the government financially, and thus politically. While some scholars recognize the existence of non-Turkish publications that were spreading separatist and nationalist ideas they argue that the government knew this but ignored it. However, the additions to the penal code were probably created precisely because of the existence of such publications.

The year 1861 marked the emergence of the private and independent Ottoman Turkish newspapers with the appearance of Tercüman-ı Ahval. Ottoman Turkish publications caught up and surpassed the number of foreign publications in the following decade. This not only triggered the first competition between these newspapers for readership but it also caused ideological clashes. More significantly, it prompted the government to take more elaborate steps to create a legal framework for the press to operate in.

The first independent Ottoman Turkish newspaper was Tercüman-ı Ahval, which, due to being first, was a pioneer in many aspects. Agah Efendi, who had worked at the embassy in Paris, with the help of Şinasi, who had also spent several years in Paris as a student, launched Tercüman-ı Ahval in 1861. This newspaper was fully funded by Agah Efendi. Tercüman-ı Ahval entered a business that was far from mature. For example, as distribution networks (paperboys) did not exist in its first days, Agah’s newspaper was only sold through a single outlet, a tobacco shop owned by a man named Hasan Ağa. According to İskit, Tercüman-ı Ahval

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21 İnüşur, İz Burakanlar, p. 4.
22 Karal, Yeni Türkiye, p. 117.
23 Topuz, II. Mahmut’tan Holdinglere, p. 19. Topuz gives 21 Ekim 1860 [21 October 1860], but this appears to be a typo. The first issue of Tercüman-ı Ahval was dated as 9 Teşrinievvel 1277R [21 October 1861].
24 Şapolyo, Her Yönüyle Basın, p. 115.
25 Topuz, II. Mahmut’tan Holdinglere, p. 20.
introduced opinion journalism, meaning that it did not limit itself to recounting news events but that it also offered opinions on them and on current affairs in its columns.\textsuperscript{26} It is also attributed with using innovative layouts through headlines, whereas \textit{Takvim-i Vakayi} and \textit{Ceride-i Havadis} appeared as unbroken, flowing walls of text.\textsuperscript{27} A less fortunate example of its pioneering spirit was that \textit{Tercüman-i Ahval} was the first ever Ottoman newspaper to be suspended by the government. It obtained this honour through its clashes with \textit{Ceride-i Havadis}, where at one point it ridiculed Nuri Efendi, a student at the military academy who had written a letter to \textit{Ceride-i Havadis}. Ridiculing a student of the military academy, and with him the curriculum at the academy, was enough grounds to receive the first ever suspension.\textsuperscript{28}

The clash between \textit{Ceride} and \textit{Tercüman} was caused, at least partially, by the competition between the two newspapers. With the appearance of \textit{Tercüman-i Ahval}, \textit{Ceride-i Havadis}, supported by the government yet profit-driven, found itself facing competition probably for the first time in 20 years. The most obvious indicator of this is the fact that \textit{Ceride-i Havadis}, which had not bothered to innovate in any way in its two decades of monopoly, changed its publishing frequency from weekly to near-daily and became \textit{Ruzname-i Ceride-i Havadis}.\textsuperscript{29} Soon, in 1862, after Şinasi left to create the second privately published Ottoman Turkish newspaper \textit{Tasvir-i Efkar}, \textit{Tercüman-i Ahval} also increased its publishing frequency.\textsuperscript{30}

The expansion of the Ottoman Turkish press to include financially and ideologically independent publications did not go unnoticed by the state. Whether it was to regulate the press in order to control its content through a better defined set of rules or whether it was to accommodate the inevitable further expansion of the press, in December 1864 the government enacted its

\textsuperscript{27} İskit, \textit{Agah Efendi}, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{28} Şapolyo, \textit{Her Yönüyle Basın}, p. 118.
\textsuperscript{29} İskit, \textit{Agah Efendi}, pp. 9-10.
\textsuperscript{30} Şapolyo, \textit{Her Yönüyle Basın}, p. 118.
first full press law, which would only be replaced in 1909, as a result of the constitutional revolution. Topuz argues that the 1864 press law was nothing but a "fancy" ("özenti") of the government because of the small number of newspapers appearing and their low circulations, which, according to Topuz, meant that no serious opposition was possible, rendering such laws unnecessary. However, both *Tercüman-ı Ahval* and *Tasvir-ı Efkar*, published articles which were critical of the government. Even if this criticism might not have amounted to much, these were newspapers that appeared with official permission. Therefore, criticism from these sanctioned publications, the likes of which probably had never existed before, must have been worrying. As for low circulations, this would indicate that an intellectual elite would be reading them, which would render dissenting opinions potentially dangerous. Furthermore, Topuz again seems to forget that non-Turkish publications existed and that they, in 1864, outnumbered the private Turkish press by far. It is almost certain that the 1864 press law was created, at least in part, due to these existing publications. The question that remains is whether the government was more concerned by Ottoman Turkish publications or whether in parallel non-Turkish publications, too, had fuelled their concerns.

The law, which was based on the French counterpart, created in 1852 under Napoleon III, consisted of 35 articles divided in two sections, namely *mevad-ı umumiye* (general) and *mevad-ı cezaïye* (penal). The law, in broad terms, appears to have been designed to curb excessive criticism of the government and to ensure domestic peace. For example, Article 1 of the law made it compulsory for all publications related to political and government subjects ("mevad-ı politikye ve mülkiye") to obtain a license. Under Article 3, this license could be denied if the applicant had been convicted of crimes in the penal code. Furthermore, Articles 15, 16 and 17 stipulated that inappropriate remarks ("elfaz ve tabirat-ı gayrı layıkâ") about the sultan, members of the imperial family, ministers of the

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31 *Düüstur*, tertip 1, cilt 2, 2 Şaban 1281/19 Kanunuevvel 1280 [31 December 1864], "Dersaadet’de ve Memalik-i Şahane’de tab ve neşrolunan her nev-i gazete ve evrak-i havadis-i mülkiye ve politikye tab ve neşri hakkında bu kere tanzim olunan nizamnamedir", pp. 220-227.
33 İnüşür, *İz Birakanlar*, pp. 5-6.
34 Topuz, *II. Mahmut’tan Holdinglere*, p. 45.
state or other high ranking governors and leaders of friendly states were punishable by imprisonment and under Article 27, the same crime could also cause suspension of the publication for a month. This would have made criticizing anybody within the government elite a slippery slope. Not only was the premise on which one could be charged vague, for the article did not define what inappropriate remarks were, but also, under Article 34, in these cases the judgment would lie with a special commission of 5 that would convene at the Porte, instead of in the regular courts. This procedure was unlikely to have changed the odds in favour of the newspapers. In contrast, under Articles 19, 20, and 22, libel against regular citizens and lower ranking government employees would lead only to prison or monetary penalties and, as opposed to "inappropriate remarks" ("tabirat-ı gayrı layıkə"), zem ve kadıh (libel) was clearly defined by the law, in Article 18.

A few years later, in 1867, the laws controlling the press were further tightened by what was supposed to be a temporary law (which lasted until 1908) called Kararname-i Ali, named after Sadrazam Ali Paşa who was responsible for its creation. According to this kararname (decree), any newspaper could be suspended without trial if suspension was found to be in the best interests of the state. This declaration of Kararname-i Ali was preceded by the suspension of Muhbir, a newspaper published by Ali Suavi who was a religious scholar turned revolutionary, and of Tasvir-i Efkar, Şinasi’s newspaper, now under the management of Namık Kemal, the famous intellectual and playwright. Both men had criticized the government’s foreign policy. This shows that, as far as the government was concerned, the press law was considered insufficient for silencing criticism and that in 1867, from the Porte’s perspective, there must have been sufficient dissenting opinions in the press to justify such a move.

Yet, it can be seen from the number of publications, which kept increasing, that it was not the aim of the government to curb the press. It merely wanted to control its content. Şapolyo offers a list of notable publications for the pre-Hamidian censorship Ottoman press, which includes Ayna-i Vatan (1866), Ruzname-i Ayna-

35 Topuz, II. Mahmut’tan Holdinglere, p. 45-46
36 İnuğur, İz Birakanlar, pp. 6-7.
First Chapter: The Ottoman Press Until 1908

i Vatan (1867), Muhip (1867), Utarit (1867), Mecmu'a-ı Maarif (1867), Terakki (1868), Mümeyyiz (1869), Kevkeb-i Şark (1869), Diyojen (1869), Vakayi-i Zaptiye (1869), Memalik-i Mahrusa (1870), Asır (1870), Hadika (1873), Hayal (1872), Siraç (1873), Latife (1873), Hülasat el-Efkar (1873), Şark (1874), Efkar (1874), Geveze (1875), İttihat (1875), Meddah (1875), Sadakat (1875), İstikbal (1875), Sabah (1875), Çaylak (1876), Arkadaş (1876), Müsavat (1876), Selamet (1876), Hakikat (1877), Tercüman-ı Şark (1878), Bahçe (1878). His list, limited to publications appearing in Ottoman territory, clearly shows that the press kept expanding, despite the fact that the state had mechanics for arbitrary suspension of publications in place.

The real aim of the law, of course, had been to silence the opposition movement against Sultan Abdülaziz. This movement called for a constitution and a parliamentary government and had organized itself under the banner of the Young Ottomans in 1865. Furthermore, this organization was made illegal in 1867, the same year that Kararname-i Ali was decreed, suggesting there was a link between the tightening of the control over the press and this illegal movement. The Young Ottomans found themselves being silenced and sought refuge, mostly in European cities. Among those who fled to Europe, as founders of the opposition movement, were prominent journalists like Agah Efendi, Şinasi, Namık Kemal and Ali Suavi. Ali Suavi’s Muhbir, which was shut down in Istanbul, reappeared in London in 1867 and is regarded as the first Turkish language newspaper to appear abroad. It promoted the creation of a parliament, which he called büyük meşveret meclisi (grand counselling assembly).

In the years following the suspension of the constitution by Abdülhamid II, the press was placed under censorship. However, this was, unlike the pre-print censorship that would be imposed some time later, limited to warnings and post-print punishments for those who broke the rules. Censorship was, however, not the only method Abdülhamid employed to control the press. Seven years after dissolving the parliament, he became actively involved in the press in a new way: instead of deciding what was or was not allowed to be published, he set out to

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37 Şapolyo, Her Yönlüle Basın, pp. 151-156.
38 Topuz, II. Mahmut’tan Holdinglere, pp. 40-41.
create a body of publications that would essentially model a press to his liking. A symbiosis was achieved between the press and the sultan, where, as long as it fulfilled its function of spreading propaganda for the palace, a newspaper could rely on financial support.39

From as early as 1885 until the second constitutional revolution in 1908, at the very least 70 new periodicals and newspapers were published.40 The remarkable thing about these new publications was that the vast majority of them opened with a statement of gratitude to Abdülhamid II. The first issue of publications traditionally contains a mukaddime, an introduction. In these introductions the publication explains its purpose. From an available total of 147 first issues that had appeared between 1861 and 1908, an analysis of the mukaddimes revealed a significant transformation in 1885. From 1885 until 1907, of 76 mukaddimes 44 explicitly mentioned Abdülhamid and expressed their gratitude to him. In contrast, in the 71 mukaddime’s found for the period between 1860 until 1884, 8 were found thanking the sultan, of which only 1, Çokcuklara Arkadas, was addressed to Abdülhamid and the rest to his predecessors. This means close to 60% after 1885 in comparison to 11% prior to this date, which is a dramatic increase for a similar sized sample (76 vs. 71) and a similar timeframe (22 years vs. 23 years).

These mukaddimes contained, for example, expressions such as: "our sultan, the benefactor of the press,"41 "the great padişah who has commanded the level of books and the press to perfection."42 Some devoted poems or even their entire front page to Abdülhamid II.43 Marifet, a literary and scientific weekly, celebrated its fifth anniversary in a way that was very revealing about Abdülhamid’s support not only of Marifet, but apparently of the entire Ottoman press:

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40 See Appendix I, "Data on the 1908 Press Boom", for more details.
41 Say No. 1, 10 Safer 1305, 15 Teşriniyevvel 1303 [27 October 1887], no title: Velinimet-i biminnet, ham-i matbuat, sevgil-i padişahumuz [...].
42 Marifet No. 1 (fifth year), 24 Şevval 1315, 5 Mart 1314 [17 March 1898], "Hüsni-i İbtida": [...] hakan-i mufahham ve padişah-i azam ve akdesimiz efendimiz hazretlerinin [...] mekatip ve matbuatı bir derece-i mükemmeliyete isal buyurduklar[...].
43 Hanımlara Mahsus Gazete No. 1, 19 Ağustos 1311 [31 August 1895].
The reason why our humble journal has achieved the great success [of entering its fifth year of publication] is because the progress and perfection of the Ottoman press has [come to be] and was ignited through the glorious rays [of light] of [the] royal support [by] his highness, our beloved padişah, the disseminator of [all that is] good, sultan, son of sultan, Gazi Abdülhamid the Second, who commands that all of his servants and those under his royal rule should bask in the glory of happiness.44

It is safe to assume that these newspapers and publications were receiving some form of financial support from the palace. In the British foreign office report for Turkey for 1906, Sabah and İkdam, two major dailies that continued their publications after the constitutional revolution and the deposition of Abdülhamid II, are reported to have received 600 lira subsidies per year, while the latter received 1,180 lira, according to the report, an increase from its initial 360 lira per year due to an article defending Islam in response to a foreign newspaper which was much liked by the sultan.45 Abdülhamid II did not invent newspaper subsidization. His predecessors used it too. Mahmud II gave Alexander Blacque, a Frenchman who had earlier published newspapers in Izmir, the money required to publish Moniteur Oriental and Takvim-i Vakayi in 1831, but these were official organs of the state. For example, Ceride-i Havadis, privately owned, could rely on support from the palace. However, Abdülhamid II took subsidizing further than anyone else, to achieve the creation of a press which would serve the purpose of the palace. According to Djiveleguian:

Newspapers always continued to be subsidized under the successive regimes; however while the Sultans Abdülmecid and Abdülaziz subsidized them to help their development, Abdülhamid, on the contrary, wanted to buy the journalists; thus we know of Turkish newspapers, which under his regime, each attained a yearly subsidy of 40,000 francs, on top of considerable gifts on the days of the anniversary of Abdülhamid II’s coronation or birthday. [...] The newspapers,

44 Musavver Terakki No. 1, 21 Şubat 1317, 26 Zilkağe 1319 [6 March 1902], "Tahdis-i Nimet ve Arz-i Sükran ile Tevzih-i Meslek": "Naçiz ceridemizin bu muvaflakiyet-i üzmaya mazhariyeti mücerred matbuat-i Osmaniyenin terakki ve tekmülü hususunda ibzal-i inayetle bicümle bendegen ve zir-i destan-i mulukanelerine mustağrik-i envar-i saadet buýuran sevgili padişah-i amimülhsan «essultan ibnüssultan, elgazi Abdülhamid han-i sani» efendimiz hazretlerinin aifat-i celular-i nasr-i hüsravanlerinden [istenmaz?]i hayat ve istinare-i muallayat etmiş bulunmasındandır". 
45 TNA FO 195/2363, 18 January 1907, "General report for Turkey for the year 1906", p. 40.
written under these circumstances were not able to achieve large circulations. Abdülhamid II, to compensate the losses of the journalists, suffering because of the censorship measures, subsidized almost all newspapers, published in every language; certain important newspapers, published in Turkish, attained up to 6,000 francs monthly each. But this subsidy was not paid regularly except to those newspapers that enjoyed good relations with the palace. As for the others, they were paid only four or five times per year, as was the case for all functionaries of Abdülhamid II’s government.\textsuperscript{46}

However, as had happened under Abdülaziz, there was an opposition forming against the sultan. Again dissidents found themselves fleeing to Europe. Numerous publications appeared, attacking Abdülhamid. Although outside his jurisdiction, the sultan tried to silence this opposition press in two ways. He would either bribe the journalists or alternatively try to get local governments to shut these newspapers down. Both strategies worked to a certain degree, yet silencing the opposition, as he had done in the empire, proved to be impossible. The reason why Abdülhamid placed such great importance on the foreign opposition press was because, despite all the preventive measures his censorship policy had put in place, illegal publications were being smuggled into the empire.\textsuperscript{47} These illegal publications found their ways into the hands of students and teachers and were probably influential in creating support for the constitutional movement, especially because they influenced the intellectual class.

The emergence of the private Ottoman Turkish press forced the Ottoman government initially to try and control its content through legislation. When this failed, or was not a sufficient success, arbitrary suspensions were introduced with \textit{Kârâname-i Ali}. When governments employed these mechanisms, the silenced press sought to voice its opinion outside the borders of the empire. Abdülhamid II, however, did not stop at silencing the opposition, he also created a press that could be used as an amplifier for his own ideas. Therefore, on the eve of the constitutional revolution, the Ottoman press was in a bifurcated state. On

\textsuperscript{46} Djiveleguian, \textit{Regime}, pp. 20-21.
the one hand, there was the Hamidian press, which, whether it enjoyed it or not, followed the rules dictated by the palace and on the other hand, an opposition press that existed mostly in Europe, but which was kept at bay through strict censorship policies.
THE 1908 PRESS BOOM

The July 1908 constitutional revolution is considered a pivotal point in Ottoman history. It opened the second period of Ottoman constitutional rule. For the press, too, the revolution marked a milestone, as it would trigger a boom in the Ottoman press. This press boom, characterized by unusually high activity in the press, was the unintended and unforeseen consequence of the promulgation of the constitution in July 1908, which granted freedom to the press within the boundaries of the law. As a result of the strict policies Abdülhamid II had adopted towards the press and the sudden appearance of press freedom, the floodgates opened and all over the empire a barrage of new press publications appeared, produced by all the various constituent people of the empire. However, after peaking in its first few months, the boom was followed by a crash as many of the new publications were not destined to live long. Some of the publications which were the result of this press boom, however, would continue to play an important role, while the boom also produced a new batch of journalists who joined the ranks of those who already existed and became important contributors to the Ottoman press.

The press boom was an event of such a size that it could not go unnoticed, especially by those involved in the trade. Ahmed İhsan, owner and editor-in-chief of the famous literary periodical Servet-i Fünun, recalls the days following the revolution as follows:

Especially Bab-ı Ali Street⁴⁸ displayed very peculiar sights regarding journalism and writing. What were these? It was as if all those in the country who could hold a pen were becoming writers! Whoever had a few para to spare immediately set out to start a newspaper! Those without ready money sold their houses and possessions and started printing shops and newspapers. The

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⁴⁸ Bab-ı Ali Caddesi, in Sultanahmet, was Istanbul’s equivalent of London’s Fleet Street and housed many printing shops and publishers. Currently, printing shops can still be found in this area.
Second Chapter: The 1908 Press Boom

number of dailies being published was over 50. There was no counting the number of journals and newsletters.49

Ebüziyya Tevfik, a prominent journalist and owner of one of the more successful dailies, *Tasvir-i Efkar*, has a similar testimony:

After the revolution the press-scape, in which the literate ecstatically plunged themselves, had taken on the shape of a publishing *mahşer*.50 The day after I arrived in Istanbul from Konya, passing through Bab-i Ali Street, I felt as if I was walking through a book-fair in Leipzig. The sidewalks had been transformed into press-expositions.51

This heightened activity in the press is also mentioned in secondary sources, albeit in a limited way as the boom does not form the focus of the research. For example, in her book on the revolutionary Ottoman press, Brummett links the occurrence of the July 1908 revolution with the rise in Ottoman serial publications.52 Kavas’s work about the history of Turkish photo journalism, mentions the significantly increased activity of the press in Istanbul in this period, however he neglects to add a reference to the source of his claims.53 It is clear from the presented figures though that he more than likely used İskit’s

49 Ahmed İhsan [Tokgóz], *Matbuat Hatıralarım, 1888 - 1923. İkinci cilt. Meşrutiyet ilanından umumi muharebye kadar, 1908 - 1914* (1931, Istanbul: Ahmed İhsan matbaası Limited Şirketi), p. 35: “Hele Babalî caddesi gazetecilik ve maharrirlik [sic.] noktalarından çok tuhaftanalar göstériyordu. O ne idi? Sanki memeletin eli kalemların [sic.] hepsi muharrir oluyordu! Kimin beş on parası varsa, hemen bir gazete kurmağa kalkıyordu! hazir parası [sic.] olmayanlar evlerini mallarını satıp matbaa ve gazete açıyorlardı. İntişara başlayan günlük gazetelerin sayısı eliyle geçmişti; mecmuaların risalelerin hesabı yoktu”. On p. 5, the author explains how changing *Servet-i Fünun*, an influential literary magazine, from a weekly to a daily was one of the first things he did after the revolution, which shows that he himself was caught up in the publishing hype of the boom.

50 According to Islamic tradition, during *mahşer*, the day of judgement, all the dead will be raised back to life, and coloquially this expression is used to refer to large crowds.


important work on the press regimes. Koloğlu, who suggests that the press boom was so intense that it should be called a press craze instead, is the only scholar to have dedicated an entire publication, a small book, to the subject. Strangely, despite the title of his book, only a small chapter focuses on the press boom, which, at the same time, is largely limited to a single source (two issues of a periodical, *Revue de Monde Musulman*) and does not interpret the data he supplies.

The press boom allows a unique window into the nature of the post-revolution Ottoman press and deserves scrutiny, just for its sheer size and impact on the Ottoman press alone. A thorough analysis of the press boom, based on press permit applications, reveals the size, intensity and timespan of the boom, but also the geography and demography of the Ottoman press as a whole. It occurred immediately following the revolution and the end of the Hamidian censorship, when an unusually high number of press permit applications, which were legally required to start a publication, were submitted.

Purely in numbers, the boom era press dwarfed the preceding Hamidian era, and at its peak, the boom was also to be unmatched in the near future. According to İskit, *İstanbul Matbuat Cemiyeti* (Istanbul Press Society) listed 353 new publications by name for this period, and this was not an exhaustive list. While his sources are not clear, according to Süreyya, over 100 new newspapers and periodicals appeared in 1 week, following the revolution. Further, according to Oral, the real number of new publications would be impossible to establish, as

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56 Koloğlu O., *1908 Basın Patlaması* (İstanbul: BAS-HAŞ, 2005).
57 Koloğlu, *Basın Patlaması*, p. 20. Koloğlu argues that this is a trustworthy source because it was compiled by İsmail Hakki, who was employed in *matbuat Dairesi* (press regulation office), and therefore should have had access to detailed information on the press. The two issues are given as the January 1908 and May 1909 issues, but this should probably read January 1909 and May 1909 as the boom only started after July 1908.
58 For a detailed discussion about the data and sources presented in this chapter, please refer to Appendix I, “Data on the 1908 Press Boom”.
59 İskit, *Matbuat İdareleri*, p. 161. İskit has the number of new publications as 130 in 1910, 124 in 1911, (p. 174) 45 in 1912, 93 in 1913, (p. 178) 70 in 1914, 5 in 1915, 8 in 1916, 14 in 1914 71 in 1918 and 68 in the following years.
60 İskit, *Matbuat İdareleri*, p. 159.
the flood of new applications caused administrative problems for *matbuat müdürüyeti* (press regulation office). While this may be true, the BOA catalogues list permit applications for at least 821 new newspapers or periodicals, the majority of which was intended for Istanbul. At least 500 of these, but more likely virtually every single one, received a positive outcome, in the year following the revolution, from July 1908 until July 1909. Of course, it is safe to assume that not every obtained license resulted in a publication, but in the HTU Collection, at least 73 publications were identified as originating in this period, the vast majority in Istanbul. The real figure must have been much higher, as the 73 found in the HTU collection only include publications in the Turkish language (bar a few exceptions) and only those for which the very first issue was available in the archive. It should also be kept in mind that the HTU collection is far from complete. In one year, the number of publications in Istanbul had at least doubled in size. According to British Ambassador Sir George Barclay’s annual report on Turkey for 1906 "in an Empire of over one million square miles, the Turkish press [was] practically represented in the capital by some four daily papers", while he placed the estimated total number of publications (including fortnightlies and monthlies) in the capital at around 24. Koloğlu has the number of pre-revolution publications in Istanbul at around 50.

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63 For a full list, see Appendix I, "Data on the 1908 Press Boom".
64 TNA FO 195/2363, 18 February 1907, "General Report on Turkey for the year 1906", p. 38.
65 Koloğlu, *Basın Tarihi*, p. 87.
The press boom produced a high number of new publications, but the intensity of the boom was not uniform. There was a huge peak in July and August 1908 (Figure 1), after which the number of applications started to taper off. The boom, however, reverberated until March 1909. The fact that July was relatively the most intense month of the boom, with August being the most intense in terms of absolute numbers, shows that the initial rush to publish, as the revolution had unexpectedly erupted, was completely unplanned, impulsive and opportunistic. This is one of the main reasons why the boom era press was mostly unsuccessful. This does, however, allow the argument that the boom started immediately following the revolution. Tevfik Fikret, the famous poet, submitted his application for a new daily newspaper, Tanin, which would become one of the hallmark publications of the second constitutional era, on 25 July 1908, the day after the promulgation of the constitution. The drop in new applications after

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66 BOA DH.MKT 1273/28, 29 Cemazeyilahir 1326 [29 July 1908]. Tevfik Fikret's handwritten application is dated 12 Temmuz 1324 [25 July 1908]. Similarly, see BOA DH.MKT 1273/27, 29 Cemazeyilahir 1326 [29 July 1908]: Mehmed Muhlis, an employee of the treasury, submitted his application on 14 Temmuz 1324 [27 July 1908]. This shows the slight delay in application and classification dates. The permit applications list in Appendix I, "Data on the 1908 Press Boom",
July 1909, is the result of the enactment of a new press law, which removed the requirement to apply for press permissions. This means that interest in publishing did not disappear after July 1909. However, when compared to July 1908, it is no longer possible to speak of a boom. Altogether, the heightened interest in publishing seems to have lasted around seven months. February 1909 appears to mark the end of the boom period: the number of applications drops visibly without resurging in the following months.

The press boom was a large event, not only because of the sheer numbers and timeframe in which it occurred, but also because it was a truly Ottoman phenomenon which occurred throughout the entire empire (Figure 2) and with the participation of its major constituent ethno-linguistic groups (Figure 3). The press boom was not limited to Istanbul, although it was clearly at its most

contains more examples of early applications, where the classification date is similarly towards the end of July 1908.
intense in the capital, followed by other wealthy and populous cities. Roughly speaking, there were two major groups: the Western cluster, including Istanbul, Izmir, Thessaloniki, and the Eastern cluster, including Beirut (with Mount Lebanon), Damascus, Aleppo, and Jerusalem.

The distribution of the applications over geography shows that the intensity of the press boom was linked to two variables, namely wealth and population density. That mass media should rather thrive in urbanized spaces where there were masses (an audience), is not a surprise in itself. The four cities that formed the major centres of press activity, Istanbul, Izmir, Thessaloniki and Beirut (Figure 2) were all densely populated urban centres. But other cities and regions with similar populations, such as Sivas, Edirne and Konya, for example, do not appear to have shared the same levels of increased press activity. The lack of publishing permit applications in Anatolia seems not to stem from administrative inefficiency, but from an economic difference when compared to the major press centres. The four major press centres are all located in the wealthiest areas of the empire, with the highest average per capita income. This is because, as is discussed in the chapter on finance, starting a publication was not a cheap thing to do. Therefore, an urbanized area with high population density and a good economic climate must have been essential for a flourishing press. Although these are figures for the 1908 press boom, in 1921, the director of Ankara's press regulation office remarked during a meeting at the Grand National Assembly that, when compared to Istanbul, impoverished Ankara and Anatolia simply did not have a press, a reality which is reflected in the map in Figure 2.

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67 Shaw S. J., "The Ottoman Census System and Population, 1831-1914" in *International Journal of Middle East Studies, 9/3* (1978), pp. 325-338. Here p. 338. Izmir is not in the list, as it is classified under Aydın province, which it was a part of.
69 TBMMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 İçtima 159 Celse 1, 28/2/1337 [28 February 1921], p. 517.
Except for Kurdish, all major languages of the Ottoman Empire were well represented in the press boom, with Turkish being the most preferred language for publication (Figure 3). Turkish was the language of choice, in both monolingual publications as well as multilingual publications, where a single publication appeared in more than one language in the same pages. In the monolingual language distribution, the total of the Arabic and Turkish applications is close to three quarters of the whole. This is very much in line with the 1906 Ottoman census, which shows a 75% Muslim population.\(^70\) However, it would be fallacy to assume that only Muslims published in Turkish or Arabic, or that Muslims did not publish in other languages. Of the 840 applications made for which the religion of the applicants was established with reasonable certainty, based on their names and titles, only 532 (63%) were identified as Muslim and 308 (36%) as Christian. This makes traditionally Muslim languages, such as Turkish and Arabic, overrepresented, most likely because they were the local lingua franca.\(^71\) The dominance of Arabic and Turkish is geographically significantly divided, with the Arabic making up 80% of the publications in the Eastern cluster and Turkish 60% in the Western cluster with much more room for other languages, in monolingual publications. This difference becomes even more apparent in the multilingual publications, where in the Eastern cluster

\(^{70}\) Shaw, "Ottoman Census", p. 337.

\(^{71}\) See Appendix I, "Data on the 1908 Press Boom", for more information on the distribution of languages in applications.
almost every multilingual publication was in combination with Arabic. Eldem suggests that the population of Syria before the First World War was close to three quarters Arabian and only 7% Turkish.\(^{72}\) Indeed, when Falih Rıfkı Atay, a journalist who would become one of the fiercest defenders of the Turkish nationalist movement, went to the Arabic regions of the empire as a reporter, he found that Lebanon, Aleppo and Jerusalem were only Ottoman in name and that almost nobody spoke Turkish, forcing him and his companions to learn Arabic in order to communicate with hotel staff.\(^{73}\)

This distribution of languages in the applications contains clues to understanding why the boom might have occurred in the first place; it was a matter of disseminating ideological views that were once not possible under Abdülhamid II. The idea that the main motivator of the boom was the oppression which had been suffered under Abdülhamid II, was posited by journalists. Ebüziyya Tevfik in his description of the sights he witnessed in the press, following the revolution noted: "These poor people! From the moment they were freed from the claws of the merciless oppression that would even make them lose their sense of humanity, after having been paralyzed by strict laws year after year, they rushed like starving people from a famine to the press, which is the food for the intellectual mind,"\(^{74}\) an idea supported by the views of other journalists of the period such as Zekeriya Sertel\(^{75}\) and Hüseyin Cahid.\(^{76}\) Part of this suppression was related to political ideologies. According to Tunaya, the post-revolution press was fuelled by the politicization of the Ottomans, who published in every possible medium to get their opinions voiced.\(^{77}\) Furthermore, under the strict Hamidian regime, there had been many secret societies, which

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\(^{72}\) Eldem, *Harp ve Mü'tareke*, p. 4.

\(^{73}\) Falih Rıfkı [Atay], *Zeytindöşü* (İstanbul: Pozitif, 2004), pp. 42-44.


\(^{75}\) Mehmet Zekeriya [Sertel], *Hatırladıklarım (1905' - 1950)* (İstanbul: Yaylacak Matbaası, 1968), p. 10.

\(^{76}\) Hüseyin Cahid [Yalçın], *Edebiyat Anıları*, p. 187.

came out in the open once the constitution was declared, and were in need of mediums in which to voice their opinions. The boom era press was thus partially fuelled by these once forbidden ideologies seeking a medium of dissemination. For example, in regard to languages, especially in the Western cluster, where a certain level of fluency in Turkish is to be expected among the general population, regardless of ethnicity and religion, it would appear odd that so many publishers opted for a language other than Turkish, thereby limiting their audience and readership, and in consequence revenue from higher circulations. Therefore, it seems likely that for some publishers, motivation was not to be sought in financial gain, but in nationalist ideologies. Similarly in the Eastern cluster, the press boom was partially the result of nationalism. Of the publishing permit applications that were found for the boom-period in the Eastern cluster with Arabic as a the only or one of the languages, at least 12 match the list compiled by Tauber, of Arab nationalist newspapers published between 1908 and 1914 in Syria and Lebanon.

Similarly, the re-emergence of the satirical press during the press boom supports the idea that the boom was a reaction to the strictness of Abdülhamid’s press regime. The satirical press, made illegal under Abdülhamid II, came back with a vengeance after the revolution and over 95 satirical publications appeared between 1908 and 1918. During the press boom, at least 25 were published (albeit some as a single issue) and at least 14 others were applied for, 12 of which certainly received a printing permit. Among these were Kalem, whose popularity was remarked on in a British foreign office report, and Karagöz, arguably the most successful of its peers, as it survived into the early years of the republic.

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80 Ahmed Ihsan [Tokgöz], Matbuat Hatıralarım, p.37. The ban on satirical publications happened in 1878, according to Ahmed Ihsan, by a decision of the first meclis-i mebusan (chamber of Deputies), because the mebusan (Deputies) were not happy with being ridiculed.
81 Koloğlu, Basın Patlaması, p. 67: Koloğlu cites Çeviker’s work.
82 See Appendix I, “Data on the 1908 Press Boom”.
The boom-era press was revolutionary in character. It portrayed itself as an opponent of the Hamidian-era press and Abdülhamid II as an oppressor of the free press. This was because at the helm of the boom-era press were educated men of a certain intellectual and social standing. Over a quarter of the applicants, whose occupations were supplied, were civil servants, most holding government posts in various ministries (dahiliye, hariciye, harbiye, hazine-i hassa, posta ve telgraf), almost a fifth were either lawyers or law graduates, another fifth was involved in press and printing while 14% were working in education, mostly as teachers (Figure 4). According to Atay, the movement against Abdülhamid was mostly led by an intellectual elite. Indeed, the initial founders of the CUP themselves had been students of medicine, and most schools had been hotbeds of revolutionary ideas. It is possible that the CUP and the 1908 constitutional revolution enjoyed popular support from the labouring class, which was fed up with the sharply increased food prices due to the financial crisis in the years preceding the revolution, causing it to enter an alliance with the Young Turks to

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enable the revolution.\textsuperscript{85} However, if this were the case, the popular support for the CUP would not have been for ideological reasons, as much as it was for pragmatic ones. Therefore, when most of the boom-era applicants belonged to well-educated or better-off classes, one should expect to see their ideologies reflected.

A look at the titles submitted by the applicants is sufficient to understand this. For example \textit{Muhbir} appeared in August 1908. However, its name was a reference to the original \textit{Muhbir}, which was the publication of Ali Suavi, the revolutionary journalist who was killed in the first attempt to dethrone Abdülhamid. Many of these titles would have simply been impossible to use a year earlier: \textit{Vatan} (fatherland), one of the most famous words on Abdülhamid’s alleged black list, appears no less than 12 times on applications as the desired title for a publication and similarly titles in combination with \textit{Hürriyet} (freedom) appear to have been applied for at least 8 times.\textsuperscript{86} Other popular choices, which had an undeniable revolutionary tone to them, included \textit{İstiklal} (independence), \textit{Müsavat} (equality), \textit{İnkılap} (revolution), \textit{Kanun-ı Esasi} (constitution) and \textit{11 Temmuz} (11 July, the Rumi calendar date on which the revolution took place).

\textsuperscript{86} In the list presented in Appendix I, "Data on the 1908 Press Boom", there are 8 counts of \textit{Vatan} or \textit{al-Watan} and it is possible to find this word in other combinations, such as \textit{Vatan ve Millet}, \textit{Hürriyet} or \textit{al-Hurriyah} appear 5 times and other combinations, such as \textit{Nur al-Hurriyah}.
The mark of the revolution is also clearly present in the rhetoric used by the boom-era publications to explain why such a rush to the press was normal.\footnote{For more similar examples, see: \textit{Metin} No. 1, 28 Temmuz 1324 [10 August 1908], "Metin'in Kalbi"; \textit{Hakayik-i Tarihiye ve Siyasiye} No. 1, 30 Haziran 1325 [13 July 1909], "Mukaddime"; \textit{Ceride-i Rusumiye} No. 1, 2 Ramazan 1326/15 Eylül 1324 [28 September 1909], "Arz-i Maksat"; \textit{Amid-i Sevda} No. 1, 7 Şubat 1324 [20 February 1909], "Amid".} For example, in \textit{Musavver Devr-i Cedid} the opening article compares Hamidian rule to the current state of affairs:

The press, [which is embodied by] publications that [create] the progress which people make, was left buried under a black curtain. [...] For about thirty years [i.e. the length of Abdülhamid’s reign] we tumbled into such great tragedies, worries, pains. It was not possible to free the mother land of [its] suffering. [...] [But now], the press and education have obtained their freedom. Now the

\footnote{For more similar examples, see: \textit{Metin} No. 1, 28 Temmuz 1324 [10 August 1908], "Metin'in Kalbi"; \textit{Hakayik-i Tarihiye ve Siyasiye} No. 1, 30 Haziran 1325 [13 July 1909], "Mukaddime"; \textit{Ceride-i Rusumiye} No. 1, 2 Ramazan 1326/15 Eylül 1324 [28 September 1909], "Arz-i Maksat"; \textit{Amid-i Sevda} No. 1, 7 Şubat 1324 [20 February 1909], "Amid".}
Ottoman pens are free, the thoughts of the people are free and every form of patriotic action is free.\footnote{Musavver Devr-i Cedid No. 1, 27 Rabiuelvel 1327/4 Mayıs 1325 [17 May 1909], "Mesleğimiz": "Matbuat, nazime-i terakkiyat-i ümem olan neşriyat, bizde siyah bir perde-i istitar altında medfun bırakılmış idi. Kitaplar, münevver ül-eľkar eserler, müfüd risaleler... den nişane bulunmazdı. Zira ele geçenler yurtılı, yakhr, giderdi... Perişan, mahzun, daima sereneg... otuz sene kadar böyle büyük türlü haileler, gayileler, kahırlar içinde yuvarlandı... Mader vatan ızdıraptan kurtulamadı... Matbuat, maarif cereyan-i serbestisini aldı. Şimdi Osmani kalemleri hür, efkar-i millet hür, her guna-i teşebbúsunun vatanperverane serbesttir".}

For the aforementioned \textit{Muhbir} the press boom was an attempt to restore what the earlier regime had destroyed in the press:

In a short time, the masters of the pen have founded many respectable daily and weekly newspapers, to make up for and overcome the damage to the publication and dissemination of important knowledge, [which had been] inflicted by the oppressive treatment of the press by the tyrannical regime.\footnote{Muhbir No. 1 29 Şaban 1326/12 Eylül 1324 [26 September 1908], "İfade-i Mahsusa": "Devr-i istibdadın matbuat hakkında tabbık ettiği muayene-i usulu-i zalimanesinden dolay neşir ve tamim-i marifet-i kazıyye-i mutena biha'sının duçař olduğu zararları tazmin ve telakki maksadıyla az zamanda erbab-i kalem tarafından bir çok ceraid-i yevmiley ve usbuliyı mutebere tesis buyurulmuş".}

Such display of hostility towards the old regime was not limited to newcomers in the press. The established press, too, displayed similar attitudes. The satirical magazine \textit{Boşboğaz} on the front page of its first issue printed a caricature depicting the end of the Hamidian press (Figure 5). Most of the newspapers depicted in this cartoon (e.g. \textit{Sabah}, \textit{Mizan}, \textit{Tercüman}, \textit{Servet-i Funun} and \textit{Kadınlar Mahsus Gazete}) had, like \textit{Malumat}, existed under Abdülhamid and had very likely received financial support from the palace. That \textit{Malumat} is singled out is probably because of its impressive connection to the palace through its owner Mehmed (Baba) Tahir. These established publications were now attempting to clean their names of any link to Abdülhamid's rule. For example, mere days after the revolution, \textit{Servet-i Fünun}, in its new daily edition, announced that "[it had returned] the monthly subsidy, amounting to 2,453 kurş, allocated by the ministry of the interior back to its treasury starting on the [24th of July], when the right of the freedom of the press was obtained".\footnote{Servet-i Fünun No. 3, 15 Temmuz 1324 [28 July 1908], untitled.} A few days later \textit{İkdam}, too, announced that it would no longer be accepting...
government subsidies, which in its case amounted to 4,250 kuruş. These public statements, and the voluntary rejection of subsidies from the palace, show that it was important for the established press to attempt to distance themselves from Abdülhamid’s press regime and to appear devoted to the new, free press which was outside of the palace’s control. However, only a few days before their aforementioned public statements, both İkdam and Servet-i Fünun had praised the sultan for his kind and wise decision to give the gift of a constitution to the Ottomans. That they went from praising to distancing in a matter of days, suggests that they were influenced by the revolutionary character of the boom-era newcomers. Therefore, a very different press environment emerged out of the 1908 press boom.

The press boom was short-lived and, like most booms, it crashed under its own weight. The seemingly endless stream of aspiring publishers had overlooked two things: first of all, money was needed to keep a publication running and, secondly, with the unprecedented amount of alternatives to choose from, the post-boom press was the scene of fierce competition over readership and revenue. Failing to understand these basic financial aspects, many publications vanished almost as soon as they appeared, some only appearing for one issue and some never appearing, and remaining merely a name on a publishing permit.

An analysis of the 1908 press boom has revealed that the press was something in which virtually all Ottomans to some degree participated. While most applicants were educated people, they came from all ethno-linguistic and religious backgrounds and from most regions of the empire. The boom has shown that there was a distinct geo-linguistic separation, seemingly reflecting the demographic situation of the empire. A Western cluster, focused around the Aegean Sea, where Turkish was the dominant region and an Eastern cluster in the Levant region, with Arabic as the dominant language.

The boom-era press also had a distinct new character, which opposed or distanced itself from Hamidian control over the press, forcing established

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91 İkdam No. 5095, 4 Recep 1326/19 Temmuz 1324/1 Ağustos 1908 [1 August 1908], "Tahsisatin İadesi": "Hükümet tarafından gazetemiz namına olarak verilelgmekte olan dört bin iki yüz elli kuruştan ibaret tahsisatı merceine iade ve terk ettigimizi beyan ederiz".
publications to adopt a similar attitude. Thus, the 1908 press boom constituted a clear breaking point with the pre-revolution press environment.
With the promulgation of the constitution in July 1908, the Ottoman press, rather unexpectedly and suddenly, found itself operating under a new set of conditions, which could best be described as a period of absolute freedom. After the revolution, theoretically, the press was still governed by the Ottoman press law,92 which had been enacted in 1864 under Abdülaziz to regulate the emerging Turkish-language private press. In practice, however, there was confusion among Ottoman officials about whether the declaration of the constitution also meant that the press law should be applied. This situation stemmed from the fact that, as with the Ottoman constitution, the 1864 press law, or at least its Articles 3 and 4, related to obtaining publishing permits, appears to have been placed in a state of suspension by Abdülhamid II. The sultan preferred tight control over who received permission to publish. Articles 3 and 4, which stipulated a legally regulated process for obtaining such publishing permits through maarif nezareti (ministry of education) or its local branches in vilayets (provinces), were therefore undesirable. After the revolution in 1908, still dazed by the sudden re-declaration of the constitution by the sultan, the administrative apparatus was caught unprepared, not knowing how to handle the sudden stream of hundreds of press permit applications. The result of this confusion was that the 1864 press law was only nominally applied, used only to regulate the press permit application process. On the other hand, the punitive measures prescribed in the press law appeared to have lost their validity, leaving journalists with a freedom to write whatever they pleased. The government, in its confusion regarding the post-revolution situation, did not restore the punitive measures in this law. This absolute freedom soon resulted in an increasingly vicious cycle of polemics, ad hominem attacks, name-calling, and libel against even the highest echelons of the state. Arguably, it also paved the way for the 31 March Incident, by allowing Volkan, a newspaper linked with the mutiny, to publish its provocative articles. Before this occurred, however, the government had already set in motion a plan

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92 Because the press laws are referenced often in this chapter, and throughout the dissertation, a full, transliterated version of both the 1864 and 1909 press laws, including additions and changes, has been supplied in Appendix II, "Ottoman Press Laws".
to create a new law, through the bicameral, constitutional legislative process. This law was eventually enacted in July 1909 and, at that point, was very liberal. However, starting in March 1912, the 1909 press law was gradually changed to become more restrictive, reflecting the changing politics and the change in the government's attitude towards the press. The 1909 press law, together with its subsequent alterations, continued to be effective until the end of the Ottoman Empire, and was also adopted by the Ankara government, which only would replace it in 1931.

The constitutional revolution in 1908 presented the Ottoman press with an opportunity to enforce freedom of speech. Due to the revolution, government officials were caught completely off guard, unsure of what powers they had, or did not have, in this new climate, and they lost all sense of initiative. The press, on the other hand, sprang into action. Arguing that the Ottoman constitution guaranteed freedom to the press under Article 12, which stated that the press was free according to the law ("matbuat kanun dairesinde serbesttir"), it ignored censorship regulations and behaved as if laws governing the press did not exist. At this time, in fact, the press was still regulated by the 1864 press law, enacted during the reign of Abdülaeziz, which was to remain in force until it was replaced in July 1909. Even the old system of strict control of the press was still in full force up until the day of the revolution. One anonymous report to the Ottoman foreign ministry, dated 25 July 1908, the day after the revolution, warned the government about reports on the Young Turks' activities in the foreign press and advised that care should be taken to have these publications seized at the borders of the empire.

The confusion in official circles, regarding what to do with the press in a constitutional regime, ran through all levels of officedom, starting with the highest ranks. According to Oral, in the wake of the revolution Kemal Bey, the head of matbuat müdürüyeti (press regulation office), until then charged with overseeing the press and enforcing censorship, hurried to the residence of the

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93 Ahmad, Young Turks, p. 14.
94 Djiveleguian, Regime, p. 25.
95 BOA HR.SYS 219b/46, 12 Temmuz 1324 [25 July 1908].
dahiliye nazırı (minister of the interior), Memduh Paşa, to ask whether or not the practice of censorship and restricting the press would continue and, if so, how it would be applied. Memduh Paşa himself was not able to answer this question and is said to have sent a telegraph to Sadrazam Said Paşa, who, also not knowing what to do, in turn forwarded the question to the sultan. Abdülhamid allegedly replied by saying: “These are delicate times... The opinions and feelings of the people are at boiling point... There is a possibility that undesirable publications could drag the people down terrible roads. Despite this, the freedom of the press should be respected...”

In other words, even though the constitution granted the press freedom, high-ranking officials did not know whether it should be applied and relied instead on specific instructions from the sultan.

The result of this confusion, appears to have been a two-stage response. Initially, very early after the revolution, some new publications appeared without publishing permits. Here, the government instructed officials that this should not be allowed to happen. Put differently, it wanted to see the press law applied in order to prevent illegal publications. Several provinces were given instructions that: "Even though the press is free, as is stipulated in Article 12 of the constitution, this freedom has to be in accordance with the law. Therefore, the laws and regulations related to the press which are valid today should be applied [...] and no illegal behaviour or publications should be allowed.” However, these early instructions did not explain what to do with printing permit applications. In the meanwhile, the press boom was occurring and applicants were flooding the government with paperwork. In September 1908, the maarif müdürü (director of education) of Tripoli wrote to maarif nezareti, which was in charge of press regulation, with the following matter:

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96 Oral, pp.150-151: "Abdülhamid’in cevabı. ‘...Zaman, pek nazik... Halkın efkâr ve hissiyati son derece galeyanda... Çirkin neşriyatın halkı fena yollara sürüklemek ihtimali var. Böyle olmakla beraber, matbuatın hürriyetine riyayet etmek lazmıdır...’”.

97 BOA TFR.1.UM 26/2509, 14 Temmuz 1324 [27 July 1908].

98 BOA TFR.1.UM 26/2509, 12 Temmuz 1324 [25 July 1908]: "Vilayet maarif müdürüne, Matbuat serbest ise de Kanun-ı Esasi’nin 12. Maddesinde muharrer olduğu üzere bu serbesti kanun dairesinde olmakla meşruttur. Binaenaleh, elyevm bilcümle matbuat mutaallak olarak meri bulunan kavanın ve nizamat ahkamının tatbikine... ve muhalif-i kanunca bir gune-i muamelat ve neşriyata meydan verilmemesi [...]".
Since the day of the declaration of the constitution, [...] there have been requests for permission to publish newspapers, to set up printing establishments and to open schools. Because we have not received instructions from the ministry of education on how to treat such applicants, they are complaining about [our] hesitation in answering [their applications.] [The Applicants] say that in some imperial provinces, such as Izmir and Thessaloniki, several newspapers were founded and started publication and they even announced [this] in other newspapers, saying that "permission [to publish] was obtained".99

It is noteworthy that the author acknowledged the declaration of the constitution and the fact that newspapers in other areas were receiving permits, yet, much like his superiors in Istanbul, he chose not to act without specific orders, which he had not yet received regarding such applications. In a strikingly similar scenario, which suggests that these were not exceptions, Ahmed Midhat, maarif müdürü of Sivas, requested to know what his course of action should be when he received applications for publishing permits, saying that the "processing of the applications, in the context of earlier instructions, was a cause for hesitation".100

The response from Istanbul, by matbuat-ı dahiliye müdürü (director of the domestic press regulation office) Mahmud, was that "applications [were] to be processed according to Articles 3 and 4 of the press law".101 Although this was the response to Sivas, it was probably the instruction that all such requests received. Now, the official response was that the press law should be used to regulate the printing permit application process. After all, the reality was that permit applications were now being requested and granted by the dozens.

But, although Articles 3 and 4 of the 1864 press law were now being applied in order to regulate the publishing permit application process, the rest of the law

99 BOA MF.MKT 1077/20, 31 Ağustos 1324 [13 September 1908]: "Kanun-ı Esasinin neşr ve ilan edildiği günden itibaren [...] gazete neşri, matbaa tesiisi ve mekatin küsadı için imtiyaz ve ruhsat talep olunuyor. Bu bapta maarif idaresince kendilerine ne yolda muamele edileceği hakkında yeni bir talimatname almamadığı için ita-ı cevabda terddüt edilmesini şikâyet ediyorlar ve İzmir, Selanik gibi bazı vilayat-ı şahanede mutavassil gazeteler tesis edip neşir ve bunların 'imtiyazi alınmiştir' ibareleriyle diğer gazetelere de ilan edilmekte olmuş".

100 BOA DH.MKT 2615/17, 26 Ağustos 1324 [8 September 1908]: "Maarif nezaret-i celilesine, Vilayet dahilinde hususi gazete neşri için müracaat edenlere talimat-ı sabika dairesinde muamele icrasi mucib-i tereddüt...".

101 BOA DH.MKT 2615/17, 6 Eylül 1324 [19 September 1908]: "vilayetce gazete neşri istidasında bulunanlar [...] Matbuat Nizamnamesinin 3. ve 4. maddelerininahkan-ı evlalara [...] tevfiikan muamele icrasi lazım [...]."
Third Chapter: Legislating the Press

seems to have been ignored. The press law was relegated to merely regulating the publishing permit applications.\(^{102}\) This was the cause for a period of absolute freedom of the press, where virtually everything that was actually punishable under the 1864 press law, could be said without consequences. In September 1908, *Millet, Metin, Terüman-ı Hakikat* and *Boşboğaz* were accused of tarnishing the honour of the Ottoman army. Article 28 of the 1864 press law clearly protected the army and the navy from defamation. Although Kamil Paşa’s cabinet decided to look into the matter, there appears to be no evidence that any of these publications suffered any consequences.\(^{103}\) When in March 1909 it was observed that many newspapers were found publishing illegal extra editions or spreading fabricated news, the official reaction was to send a warning to publishers and printers that they were liable to be charged for breaking the press law, instead of taking direct action.\(^{104}\) Both were again punishable under Articles 1 and 26 of the 1864 press law, but no action was taken. Ali Cevad, *mabeyn başkatibi* (head secretary of the palace), mentions frequently in his memoirs that Abdülhamid was concerned about what the press was publishing about him, but he had to inform the ruler that the government was not capable of doing much about it in the current situation ("ahval-ı hazira").\(^{105}\) According to Djiveleguian, one newspaper even called Abdülhamid, while he was still a sultan, "a great assassin" ("un grand assassin") and usurper of his brother’s throne, but faced no consequence.\(^{106}\) Under Article 15 of the 1864 press law, such "improper expressions" ("tabirat-ı gayrî layîka") were punishable with up to three years in prison. A similar description is also found in the British embassy’s annual report, according to which “during the early part of 1909 the Turkish press enjoyed to the full the delights of its newly acquired freedom. It was no respecter of persons; it criticised where it chose, and slandered whom it wished; on one

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102 İskit, *Matbuat İdareleri*, p.144.
103 BOA MV 120/51, 11 Şaban 326/25 Ağustos 324 [8 September 1908]. *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* and *Millet* were not suspended, nor did their müdür-i mesul (responsible director) change due to possible imprisonment, in the two months following this decision. For *Metin* and *Boşboğaz* no issues were available for this period in the sources.
104 BOA ZB 395/96, 9 Mart 325 [22 March 1909]
occasion even it libelled the French Ambassador.”

This was punishable under Article 21 of the law.

The government was not incapable of enforcing punishment. In October 1908, the government acted against a satirical magazine, Kalem, which had published a caricature ridiculing Emperor Willhelm II of Germany by depicting him as a two-faced man regarding his policy towards the Ottomans. Upon request of the German embassy, Sadrazam Kamil Paşa personally ordered that Kalem should receive penalties. Under Articles 17 and 27 of the 1864 press law, insulting leaders of friendly states could lead to imprisonment from 3 weeks to 3 months and the offending publications could be suspended for up to a month. Indeed, according to German embassy files, the editor of Kalem was arrested, the publication was suspended and the offending issues were confiscated. However, in reality, it appears that Kalem was not suspended at all, as it appeared without interruption. Furthermore, although its owner Salah Cimcoz was imprisoned, this lasted for less than a day, despite the minimum penalty of 3 weeks. This further shows the confusion in official circles, where, when urged to act by a foreign embassy, some steps were taken to apply the law, only to be abandoned without applying it to the fullest extent.

One result of this new press freedom was the opening up of political debate, something suppressed in the previous years of Abdülhamid’s reign. Such an environment of open political expression resulted in an increase in political tensions. A Dutch embassy report on the state of the Turkish press immediately after the revolution, argued that the constitutional freedom of the press was going to revive the Turkish press but that "the further consequences of

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108 Kalem No. 6, 28 Eylül 1324/7 October 1908.
109 Kalem No. 8, 9 Teşrinievvel 1324/22 October 1908, "L'Incident Du Kalem – Une atteinte grave à la libertê de la presse – a qui la faute?"
110 BA R901 34036/79, 19 October 1908.
111 Necmeddin Sahir [Silan], ed. by Dervişoğlu İ., Il. Mesrutiyet ve Sonrası Hâtıralarım (İstanbul: Dün Bugün Yarın Yayınları, 2010), p. 53.
these unexpected developments [were] unpredictable."¹¹² Some time later, the embassy reported back with its observation of one of these consequences:

I have already had the honour to draw Your Excellency’s attention to the highly dubious shape that the polemics of dailies belonging to different [groups] is taking here and how the freedom of the press, granted by the constitution, is threatening to degenerate into complete unbridledness.¹¹³

This tension was partially caused by the fact that the Young Turk revolutionaries, who had once fled the Hamidian regime and lived in exile, were now returning to a free press where disagreements could openly be debated.¹¹⁴ One of those to return after the revolution, Ali Haydar Midhat, son of one of the creators of the original Ottoman constitutional text, Midhat Paşa, describes a "fearsome battle" ("müthiş mücadele") taking place between CUP partisans and its opponents gathered around Prince Sabahattin, a battle which was also waged in the press.¹¹⁵ Oral, criticising the CUP for calling the cabinet and the sultan to swear loyalty not only to the constitution, but also to the Committee itself, sees this as one of the reasons why the political polemics exploded: "When those returning from exile opened their mouths [to voice their opinions] too and started speaking and writing carelessly, [the atmosphere in] Istanbul had become so tense that it was almost impossible to breathe".¹¹⁶ Further, according to İnuğur, the political polemics were sometimes fuelled by petty sentiments, such as Mizancı Murat’s daily Mızan joining the opposition because he had been denied

¹¹² NL-HaNA, Consulaat-Generaal Constantinopel/Istanboel, 2.05.94, inv. nr 505, index 920-1908, 7 September 1908, "Toezicht op de inlandsche pers in Egypte en de naburige landen - Voorlopig rapport over het toezicht gedurende de maand Juli 1908, B.I. Turkije": "De opheffing van de censuur die er [= constitution] een onvermijdelijk gevolg van was, zal nieuw leven aan de Turksche pers geven en een uitbreiding van het toezicht van Uw rapporteur zal daardoor noodzakelijk zijn. De verdere gevolgen van deze door niemand verwachte gevolgen zijn onberekelijkbaar".

¹¹³ NL-HaNA, Consulaat-Generaal Constantinopel/Istanboel, 2.05.94, inv. nr 454, index 514-1909, 8 April 1909: "Ik had reeds de eer U.E. aandacht te vestigen op den hoogst bedenkelijken vorm die de polemiek der dagbladen van verschillende richtingen hier aaneemt en hoe de door de constitutie verleende persvrijheid in volkomen teugelloosheid dreigt te ontaarden".

¹¹⁴ See for example: Koloğlu, 1908 Basın Patlaması, p. 13.


¹¹⁶ Oral, Basin Tarihi, pp. 178-179: "Sürgünden dönelerini de ağzlarını açmaları, uluorta söylemeleri ve yazmaları üzerine İstanbul, havası teneffüs edilemeyecek kadar sıkı bir hale gelmişti".
membership in the CUP. Karaosmanoğlu points to the polarization, but also to the name-calling that took place in the press:

As soon as the chants of "Long live freedom, equality and justice; Long live brotherhood!", which echoed through the streets, died away, they were replaced by the hard and harsh voices of the politicians, who had immediately split into two camps. One camp was headed by Hüseyin Cahit, the other side by Ali Kemal. One an ardent Unionist, the other a convinced opposition [writer]. Between them these coarse and petty demagogue writers, who had grabbed a pen and found a medium to publish, were ceaselessly fanning the flames. One called the other "Traitor! Jurnalci!", the other [replied]: "Balkan terrorist!" and because of this the entire Turkish press was in uproar.

This situation of an unruly press operating in what amounted to an environment of total press freedom was not to last. With the enforcement of the 1864 press law seemingly impossible, the government began, towards the end of 1908, a process to create a new law. A draft was presented by the government to parliament, with a request to pass the law as quickly as possible. Libel against the army in two foreign-owned Ottoman newspapers, against which the 1864 press law was unable to do anything, was put forward as the reason why a new law should be created. However, it seems more likely that the government was attempting to impose the rule of law on the uncontrolled press freedom. The original draft, put forward by the government had rather strict regulations with many mechanisms to shut down or control the press, including very steep monetary penalties, which shows the government's desire to introduce tight control. This plan failed because once the draft was in the hands of parliament, especially the meclis-i mebusan (chamber of deputies), it was transformed into a

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117 İnuğur, İz Bıarkanlar, p. 45.
118 Jurnalci refers to the practice of lodging reports with Abdülhamid II, to inform the sultan of any opposition, a system which was abused for personal gain.
119 Yakup Kadri [Karaosmanoğlu], Gençlik ve Edebiyat Hatıraları, p. 42: "Sokakları çınlatan Yaşasın hürriyet, müsavat, adalet; Yaşasın uhuvet!" neraları henüz dinmişir ve bunu, derhal iki kampa ayrılan politikacılardan sert ve haşin sesleri takibetmeye başlamıştır. Bu kampın bir ucunu Hüseyin Cahit, öbür ucunu Ali Kemal tutuyor. Bir koyu bir İttihatçı, öteki kızıl bir muhalif. Bunların arasında eline bir kalem geçmiş bir yazı vaktası buluşmuş iri ufak demagog yazarlar ise havayı durmadan körüklemekte; o buna "Vatan haini, Curnalci!" bu ona "Balkan komitacısı!" diyerek maşkıda ve bu yüzden bütün Türk basınında bir kızılca kıyamettir kopup gitmekte".
120 MMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 Cilt 2, pp. 479-483.
rather liberal product, which was enacted as law in July 1909. Although criticised by its opponents as curbing the freedom of the press, the 1909 press law that emerged was a very positive one for the press, embodying significant official support for a much more liberal press regime than had existed before. While some restrictions were introduced, the law also recognised the legal right of publications to be critical and made starting a new publication a mere formality.

The original draft appears to have been created at the request of dahiliye naziri Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa’s ministry and approved and signed by Kamil Paşa’s cabinet. The creation of the 1909 press law involved a lengthy legislative process. The first draft was created by matbuat idaresi (press regulation office), presumably near the end of 1908, as the draft reached tanzimat dairesi (reforms office) on 9 January 1909 via dahiliye nezareti.121 Dahiliye nezareti’s revised version was only sent to şura-i devlet (council of state) three weeks later on 31 January 1909.122 Eventually, the sadrazam and meclis-i vükela (cabinet) approved it and sent it on to Parliament.123 A meclis-i mebusan matbuat encümeni (chamber of deputies press law committee) was formed, tasked with examining the draft and modifying it where they deemed necessary, which took nearly two months and was completed only on 3 April 1909.124 However, during this time the 31 March Incident took place, and the legislative process was interrupted. Finally, on 11 May 1909, meclis-i mebusan matbuat encümeni presented its work to meclis-i mebusan.125 During the next two weeks the mebusan (deputies) discussed the law in detail and voted article by article for changes and additions.126 This process was repeated once more on 16 and 17 June 1909.127 Thereafter, the law was sent to meclis-i ayan (the senate), where, too, a special committee was formed, meclis-i ayan matbuat encümeni (the senate’s press law committee), and a similar process was undertaken until the 26 July 1909. After a final revision for approval by parliament was considered on 26 and 27 July 1909 the law was sent to the sultan for imperial approval and to be enacted, on 29 July 1909.

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121 MMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 Cilt 3, p. 349: 16 Zilhicce sene 1326 [9 January 1909].
122 MMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 Cilt 3, p. 350: 10 Muharrem sene 1327 [1 February 1909].
124 MMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 Cilt 3, p. 365: 21 Mart sene 1325 [3 April 1909].
125 MMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 Cilt 3, p. 307.
Although the draft passed through various stages of changes and approvals, it was in parliament, especially in the meclis-i mebusan where there were lengthy and fierce debates, that the law was most influenced and moulded into its final form. In fact, the mebusan's version of the draft was so different from its predecessors, that it would be possible to speak of an entirely new draft. Figure 6
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shows a schematic representation of this process. In this graph, the cobweb of lines, which represent numerous structural changes introduced by *meclis-i mebusan matbuat encümeni* before they handed the draft to parliament, is particularly striking. But the *mebusan’s* changes involved far more than merely restructuring the order of the articles in the law. Articles were regrouped, merged and even deleted altogether so that almost every article was altered, some fundamentally, at this stage. With their penchant for the idea of a free press, unencumbered by censorship and limitations, yet aware of the fact that some form of control was necessary to prevent chaotic situations, the *mebusan* thus turned the 1909 press law into a very liberal one, which was very beneficial for the press. The 1909 press law made it easier to start a new publication, it supported free journalism by guaranteeing new rights to journalists and publishers, and, while it certainly did have an extensive penal section, it was overall less strict than its predecessor.

Changes introduced to the draft by both chambers were aimed at making it easier for interested parties to establish a publishing business in the Ottoman Empire. Not only were eligibility criteria changed, to accommodate far more Ottoman citizens, but a steep financial barrier to entry was also removed. The *mebusan* further made the process for applying for a publishing permit almost obsolete, a step that was later finalized by *meclis-i ayan*. Compared to its predecessor, therefore, the 1909 press law was a breakthrough and now, legally speaking, it had never been easier to start a new publication in the Ottoman Empire.

The new law widened eligibility for entry into publishing. Under the first Article of the 1909 press law, every newspaper was required to have a *müdür-i mesul* (responsible director), the go-to person in case of legal problems with the periodical or newspaper. Charged with running the newspaper for the owner, this person was subjected to criteria, stipulated in Article 2, which had to be met prior to receiving permission to publish. Because appointing and identifying the *müdür-i mesul* was part of the application process, not having a suitable *müdür-i mesul* meant not having a publication. This made Article 2 critical for it established who would or would not be allowed to run a newspaper or
periodical. As a result, this article was the cause of the lengthiest debates in the meclis-i mebusan, spanning the better part of two sessions. Major changes were made to this article in both chambers. For example, the original government draft excluded people who had been sentenced to one year in prison, arguing that they showed lack of character.\textsuperscript{128} In the meclis-i mebusan, this led to discussions on the grounds that not everybody who had served a one-year prison sentence could be considered lacking good morals. This was especially so because of all the political prisoners during Abdülhamid’s reign, who would be automatically excluded under this clause. Indubitably, the fact that Lütfi Fikri, a prominent member of meclis-i mebusan matbuat encümeni, himself had spent over a year in prison due to political activities against Abdülhamid’s regime, played a certain role in this.\textsuperscript{129} The mebusan further discussed adding a higher-education prerequisite. The general sentiment was that the press was mostly a vessel for ideas and therefore an educational tool to enlighten an entire nation. Some thus argued that people in charge of a newspaper should have had some form of (higher) education. The majority, however, believed that accessibility was more important and that the lack of a formal education should not prevent those who wished to from entering into journalism. Furthermore, the legal age for starting a publication was reduced from 30 to 21 and it was made easier for people in the provinces by removing the requirement to obtain the permission via Istanbul.

The new law also made the application process for obtaining a publishing permit significantly easier. This process was described in Article 3 of the 1909 press law. According to Article 4, illegal publications, i.e. those which had not been through the process explained in Article 3, or had done so in an incomplete or otherwise incorrect fashion, were subject to immediate suspension and other penalties. Article 3 was therefore as significant as Article 2, for the severity of its requirements could hamper applications or deter potential applicants. The original government draft article required that the address of the printer should be disclosed along with information on the amount and location of the caution money that would be used to pay for damages and penalties. Furthermore, the

\textsuperscript{128} MMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 Cilt 3, “Matbuat Kanunu Layıhası”, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{129} Tökin, Ansiklopedi, p.84: “Lütfi Fikri”.

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application, no matter where the applicant was located in the empire, would be processed in Istanbul by *matbuat-i dahiliye idaresi* (domestic press regulation office). This was further altered so that applications could be made locally to avoid unnecessarily burdening the applicant and to keep their expenses as low as possible. Furthermore, the requirement to register the printing establishment was removed. Again, the move was aimed at making life easier for the applicants: if they chose not to have their own printing establishment, they would not be locked into a single provider, but would be able to pick their printer based on their own needs and switch printers if they felt that it was necessary. While in this case some people did point out that the 31 March Incident could have been prevented if the printer had been known, the majority was not convinced by this argument. Finally, a further change introduced by the *meclis-i mebusan* obliged the government to respond to the application process within 21 days, a change aimed at preventing any use of the application process as a means of preventing or undermining an application. The *ayan* took this one step further and decided that an application for a permit was no longer necessary, and that instead aspiring publishers would merely

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130 MMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 Cilt 3, “Matbuat Kanunu Layihası”, p. 4.
132 MMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 Cilt 3, p. 327: “MUSTAFA ARIF BEY (Kırkkilise) – Bendeniz hangi matbaada neşredeceğini malumat vermek, bu bapta arzuhal vermenin matbaayı da tahsis etmenin bir faydasını anlamıyorum...! Bir gazeteci de imtiyaz alacağı sırada bir matbaa tahsis etmesi o matbaayı menfaaten geri bırakmaya tabi tutmaktan başka bir işe yaramaz. Nerede teminant, nerede menfaat görürseler orada tabettirebilir gazetesini...”.
133 MMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 Cilt 3 p. 328: “SAİT EFENDİ (Üsküb) – Efendim, bendenziz bu kaydın kalmasını talep ederim. Nitelikim, Volkan Gazetesiinin olduğu matbaa bilinseydii hiç olmazsa men edilirdi...”.
134 Strangely, although parliamentary discussions took place immediately following the 31 March Incident, it was only used in arguments to make the law less strict, and in Parliament discussions urged not to have a knee-jerk reaction. Only in the case of attacks on the constitution was the incident used to introduce stricter regulations (See MMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 Cilt 3, pp. 568-570).

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need to declare their intentions and register their details with the local government.

These liberating changes were further supplemented by dropping a draft article that stipulated that the sum of 500 lira should be deposited as caution money ("teminat akçesi") with a financial institution, which would provide the applicant with an official document stating that the monies would be released in the event of the newspaper or periodical having to pay damages or penalties. This official document was a prerequisite and had to be submitted along with the application for a printing license.\(^{136}\) Although the article was protested against in şura-i devlet on the grounds that it would be detrimental to the freedom of the press,\(^{137}\) it was accepted by a majority as a precautionary measure but with the sum reduced to 250 lira in Istanbul and 150 lira outside the capital. However, the meclis-i mebusan matbuat encümeni, arguing that there were already a number of prerequisites demanded from applicants (referring to Article 2 on eligibility requirements), considered the article not only useless, as breaking the law would still require the owner of the newspaper to pay damages and penalties, but also excessive, meaning that it was an unnecessary burden on those who wanted to start a publication, and removed it by a majority vote.\(^{138}\) Indeed, the sum of 500 lira, or even 150 lira, that had to be deposited in advance was a significant increase in the capital required to set up a publication. As explained in the fifth chapter, "Financing the Press", in the worst case, this could mean a doubling of the capital required to start a publication and, consequently, would mean that a certain number of aspiring journalists, without access to such sums, would be, purely for financial reasons, barred from pursuing their goals.

\(^{136}\) MMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 Cilt 3, "Matbuat Kanunu Layihası", p. 4.
\(^{137}\) MMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 Cilt 3, "Matbuat Kanunu Layihası", p. 4: "Ceraid ve resaili yevmiye ve muvakkate için kefaleti nakdiye alınmasına dair olan dördüncü madde mevzuu bahis ve münazaraya konuldukta, bunların neşri için eshabından nakden teminat ve kefalet alınması serbestti matbuat mugaýır olmakla...".
\(^{138}\) MMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 Cilt 3, "Matbuat ve Matbaalar Kanunu Layiha ve Encümenin Mazbatası", p. 19: "Gazete veya risalei mevkute sahibinden layihanın talep eyelediği kefaleti nakdiye hususuna gelince, bunu Encümeniniz exseriyetle ret eylemiştir. Çünkü bir az evvel denildiği üzere, bir kimsenin bir gazete veya risalei mevkute çıkarmak hususundaki hakkı sarhini menafi içtimiayı noktai nazardin kendisinde birtakım evsafi mahsusara aramak ve fazla olarak bir de yine bir takım kuyud ile takýt etmek matlup olan maksadi temine kafidir. Kefaleti nakdiye şartı, kavaidi hukukiye noktai nazardin fazla bir şiıdet olacağ...".
The draft of the press law was also changed by the mebusan in order to safeguard rights of journalists when criticising the government and officials by better defining what constituted libel. Much like the 1909 press law, where zem ve kadıh (Libel) had its own subsection, the 1864 press law dealt a great deal with matters of insults and libel. Of the 35 articles in the original 1864 law, a total of 10 were related to these matters. However, while both press laws gave the same weight on the issue, they emphasised different aspects. Whereas the 1864 law gave only vague descriptions for what constituted an insult, the newer press law attempted to provide more precisely defined guidelines for zem ve kadıh. While the 1864 law placed importance on social hierarchy, the 1909 law tried to level the field. The 1864 press law made it very difficult to express any negative opinion about the upper echelons of the state by protecting them against “improper expression” (“tabirat-ı gayrı layık”), a phrase which was both ambiguous and undefined and use of which brought some of the heaviest penalties in the law. Three articles in the 1864 law (Articles 15, 16 and 17) protected the sultan, the sultanate or the imperial government from such improper expressions, with fines up to 150 lira or three years in prison for contravention of these articles. On the other hand, laws against zem ve kadıh, much better defined concepts than “improper expressions”, were also present (Articles 19 to 25) in the 1864 law but these were reserved for lower government officials, foreign officials living in the Ottoman Empire and common people, and the penalties were reduced according how low down one was on the ladder of official hierarchy. In the 1909 press law, the vagueness concerning the aforementioned articles was completely removed, and all matters regarding the leaders of the state were governed by the zem ve kadıh guidelines. For example, although in its drafting process the law did contain an article\textsuperscript{139} that used the same "improper expressions ", it was removed on grounds of its ambiguity and potential for abuse, which several mebusan argued was reminiscent of the pre-constitutional oppression. One mebus (deputy) argued:

\textsuperscript{139} MMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 Cilt 3, "Matbuat ve Matbaalar Kanun Layihaları ve Encümenin Mazbatası", p.23: The Parliamentary press law Commission believed that libel was not sufficient to cover the person of the sultan, who was after all also the caliph. Hence it decided to change the article with "tabirat-ı gayrı layık". The 6 month minimum prison sentence, however, was seen as too steep and was lowered to 3 months.
Third Chapter: Legislating the Press

[...] let me just add this. If the phrase "tabirat-ı gayrı layıka" is going to be included, it will in any case require an explanation, for if we cannot interpret something here [in Parliament], the courts will [certainly] be unable to interpret it. But if something is open to many possible [interpretations] and it is left thus, it will have many possibilities [of interpretation], the courts will seize on these possibilities and interpret [the article] accordingly. What does improper mean? This must, at the very least, be explained using simple definitions and interpretations in the memorandum setting out the reasons of requirement ("esbab-ı mucibə layıhası") [for the article]. This cannot be any other way. Otherwise, in the future, when somebody writes something insignificant in one of the newspapers, he will have to be convicted just as under the former regime, saying: "Ah ha, you have been found to be saying unpleasant words! And this is not acceptable."

As a result, the 1909 press law still contained Article 26 in order to give the sultan some form of protection from the press, but as with Articles 27 and 28, which cover foreign leaders and Ottoman and foreign officials, everything was set within the definitions of _zem ve kadıh_. In theory, this meant that journalists had guidelines which, if they kept to them, would allow them to criticise even the sultan, while it also reduced the gap between the punishments for libel directed against the upper echelon, the common people or anybody in between. Furthermore, Article 34 of the 1864 press law stipulated that in cases of libel or insult against the sultan or high officials, a special committee of five members was to convene at the Bab-ı Ali (Porte) to decide over the matter, instead of a regular court. This regulation, which clearly was not in favour of journalists, was no longer present in the 1909 press law, and all matters were now to be handled by regular courts.

Journalists were further safeguarded from potential abuse by ambiguous laws. The _meclisi mebusan matbuat encümeni_ changed a draft article regarding the

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140 MMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 Cilt 3, p. 569: "YUSUF KEMAL BEY (Kastamonu): ... yalnız şurayı ikmal edeyim. İlave edilecek olursa, "tabiratı gayrı layıka" sözü de her halde teşfīre muhtaçtır. Çünkü bizim burada teşfī edemediğimiz bir şeyi mahkeme teşfī edemez. Ancak bir şey ihimalatı muhtelif yazı, müteaddideye mütehammil olur da böylece terk edilmesi, mahkeme onu ihtimalere alır, teşfī eder. Gayrı layıka ne demek? Bunu, hiç olmazsa esbabı mucıbe layıhasında umumi tabirlerle, tarifelerle olsun ızah etmeli. Başka türlü olmaz. Yoksa yarım gazetelerden birine biri ufaç bir şey yazdıgı ve devri sabıka olduğu gibi "vay, sen tefevvühatta bulundun" diye mahkum etmek lazım gelir ki olmaz."
punishment for publishing the mebusan’s proceedings which appeared in such a way as to unintentionally create a wrong impression,\textsuperscript{141} so that only intentional alteration would be punished.\textsuperscript{142} Subsequently, this entire article was scrapped in the meclis-i mebusan on the grounds that it would damage the functioning of the press. Again references were made to Hamidian censorship:\textsuperscript{143}

The old [Hamidian] regime too had this much censorship. If [journalists] misspelled something they would be sent to exile. They were supposed to write "Cülûsu Hümâyün Leylei Mesûdesi" [sic.] ("joyful night") but wrote "Leylei Mesûde" ("dark night"). That newspaper suffered enormously... So its [meaning was changed on purpose]? How are you going to prove this? Is it a misspelling or not?\textsuperscript{144}

Furthermore, the 1909 press law safeguarded the continued publication and reduced government control of their contents. The original government draft imposed a three-strike law. This meant that any publication that broke the law three times in the span of two years incurring the imposition of a prison sentence, would be either suspended for an undefined time or would be forced to shut down altogether.\textsuperscript{145} Opponents of the article in the sura-i devlet claimed that it was detrimental to the freedom of the press and that it therefore should be removed entirely from the draft.\textsuperscript{146} Their objections were overruled by the

\textsuperscript{141} MMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 Cilt 3, "Matbuat Kanunu Layhaları", p. 11: "Heyet-i mebusan mübahasat ve müzakerat ve mukarreratini aynen ya hulasen nesrinde hüküm ve manasını tagyr edecek surette tahrifat vukubulursa meclisi mebusan Riyaseti Valasından tanzim ve Adliye nezaretine tevdi olunacak müzekkere üzerinde mahkemece tahrifat-i vakanın derece-i cemiyetine gore müdî-i mesel 10 altından 100 alta kadar ceza-i nakdi itasına ve 1 aydan 6 aya kadar hapse mahkum edilir".

\textsuperscript{142} MMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 Cilt 3, "Matbuat ve Matbaalar Kanun Layhaları ve Encümenin Mazbatası", p. 23: The word "kasten" ("on purpose") was added.

\textsuperscript{143} Here, the mebus was referring to the story of how İkdam was suspended under Abdülhamid for a simple typo. For this and other stories, see for example: Hüseyin Cahid, Edebiyat Anıları, pp. 115-116.

\textsuperscript{144} MMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 Cilt 4, p. 392: "İdarei Sâbıkada da bu kadar sansür var idi. Bir yanlış şey yazacak olsalar gider, sürürlürdü. Cülûsu Hümâyün leylei mesûdesi [sic.] yazılacakmış. Leyleri mesude düşmüştür. Gazete, çekmediği şey kalmadı... İşte kasden manası tahrif olunacak surette değişmiştir. Nasıl bunu ıspat edersiniz? Bu yanıştır, bu değilidir".

\textsuperscript{145} MMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 Cilt 3, "Matbuat Kanunu Layhaları", p. 12: "Bu nizamname mucibince hapis cezasını müstelzem nesriyati iki sene zarında 3 defa tekrerrür eden ceride yahut risale hükümetçe muvakkat ve tatili veya ilga olunur".

\textsuperscript{146} MMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 Cilt 3, "Matbuat Kanunu Layhaları", p. 6: "[..] muhalî-i nizam harekette bulunanlar kanunen duçar múcazat olacaklarına göre, iki sene içinde üç defa hapsi müstelzem nesriyatta bulunan ceradin, velev muvakkat olsun, tatil ve ilgisi hakkında olan otuzüçüncü madde, serbestii matbuata irsai halel edecîne maddei mezkerinin tayyi lazım geçeçegi [...]".
majority, who believed that any newspaper that was breaking the law with such frequency should be treated with suspicion and therefore be shut down. The *meclis-i mebusan matbuat encümeni* explained that it would obviously not partake in such methods that it considered to be clearly unconstitutional. For the *meclis-i mebusan matbuat encümeni*, the article was not only open to abuse because it could be arbitrarily executed but it was also reminiscent of the treatment of the press under Abdülhamid’s regime:

> Although the draft had given the government the right temporarily to suspend or [completely shut down] a newspaper or periodical that, within a period of two years, would publish three times things that could lead to prison sentences, our Committee has refrained from giving such power to the government because it would result in a subjective [situation], reminiscent of the treatment of the press under Abdülhamid's regime: 

Government control over newspaper content was brought to an absolute minimum. Draft Article 14 obliged newspapers and periodicals to publish official announcements issued by the government or *matbuat idaresi* (press regulation office) and stipulated that these were to be published in the issue immediately following their receipt.148 Again in the *sura-i devlet* protesters insisted that the newspaper was the property of its owner and that the government had no right to force it to publish its announcements. That, they argued, was what the official state organ *Takvim-i Vakayi* was for,149 but such protests failed to gain a majority

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149 MMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 Cilt 3, "Matbuat Kanunu Layihası", p. 5: "Ceridelerde vaki olacak tebligatin mecburiyeti neşriyesini mutazamının ondördüncü maddedede tilaf olunarak ..."
vote to remove the article. The meclis-i mebusan matbuat encümeni, however, considered the article incompatible with constitutional rule and regarded it as impinging on the personal freedoms of people and in consequence removed it.\textsuperscript{150}

While the legislative process relaxed the strict draft of the 1909 press law, the law was not void of penalties. However, when the final version of the 1909 press law is compared to the 1864 press law, it is clear that in almost all instances it set lighter punishments for the same offences. All the penalties for libel were less severe in the 1909 law. Although the maximum sentences remained the same for libel against the sultan the minimum of one year was significantly reduced to three months, the minimum sentence for libel against leaders of friendly states went from a minimum of six months to one month, and the sentences for zem against high-ranking officials, including the mebusan and ayan, underwent a similar transformation in the new law. Publishing an illegal newspaper, in other words an unregistered or unlicensed publication, under Article 10 of the 1864 law, would be fined at 10 lira per issue and the offending newspaper would be suspended. Furthermore, the 1864 law did not offer a maximum limit on this penalty, thus theoretically left the maximum possible fine open. Although suspension remained part of the penalty under Article 4 of the 1909 law, the fine was dropped to 5 lira per issue, with a maximum fine of 50 lira. But repeat offenders would be charged 10 lira per issue with a 100 lira maximum limit. However, the 1864 law, as stated in Article 33, could double the penalties in case of recidivism, too, thus still rendering the 1909 law less strict. Both the 1864 and the 1909 law, respectively in Articles 11 and 8, required publishers to send in copies of every issue to local officials. This was to make sure that the law was not being broken and also to have copies in the case of legal action. The 1909 law displayed much greater leniency, by only charging half a lira for every issue that was not submitted, which is much less than the 10 lira imposed on the publisher for similar negligence under the 1864 law. In similar vein, the penalty for publishing immoral texts or images was reduced from a fine of 10 to 50 lira to

\textsuperscript{150} MMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 Cilt 3, "Matbuat ve Matbaalar Kanun Layıhaları ve Encümenin Mazbatası", p. 21: "Böyle bir mecburiyeti, hürriyeti şahsiye ve Meşrutiyeti İdare ile kabili telif görülmemiştir".
to 10 lira. Finally, refusing to publish government announcements could lead to a fine of up to 25 lira under Article 12 of the 1864 law, while the practice of forcing newspapers to publish government statements was completely abandoned in 1909. Furthermore, even in cases where the 1909 press law had the same penalty as the 1864 press law, real and nominal wages had increased between 1864 and 1909, thereby technically making the same penalty less strict.\footnote{Özmucur S. & Pamuk Ş., "Real Wages and Standards of Living in the Ottoman Empire, 1489-1914" in \textit{The Journal of Economic History}, 62/2 (2002), pp. 293-321. Here p. 301.}

In three cases the 1909 press law prescribed heavier penalties than the 1864 law. However, in these instances, the aim was clearly not to limit the press, but to prevent malpractice in journalism. Article 26 of the 1864 law and Article 19 of the 1909 law forbade the intentional dissemination of fabricated news. The 1909 version doubled the maximum penalty, but, on the other hand, halved the minimum penalty. Furthermore, the new version added that publishing of fabricated news could only be punishable if it actually resulted in public disturbance, thereby again preventing potential abuse of the article. Article 12 of the 1864 law and Article 19 of the 1909 law provided the "right of reply". This meant that if a publication mentioned a person, that person had the right to have their reply published. In the 1909 law, the maximum penalty for denying the right of reply was double that of its predecessor. Finally, under Article 14 of the 1864 law and Article 16 of the 1909 law, insulting religions which were officially recognized, was made punishable. In this case both the minimum and the maximum penalties were significantly higher in the 1909 version. In two of the abovementioned articles, the aim seems to have been to improve the profession of journalism, by stopping intentional sensationalism and by placing greater importance on any individual’s right to defend themselves against claims made in the media. The last article, however, must be seen in light of the realities of the post-1908 era, as one of the motivations of the revolutionaries had been to grant all minorities the same rights in order to stop secession movements and as a result, having newspapers raising inter-sectarian tensions was not considered best-practice. Despite this, the 1909 law still allowed more room for genuine discussions of religions than its 1864 counterpart, as it stipulated that scientific and philosophical discussions could not be considered insulting. In the same
spirit of improving the quality of journalism, Article 18 of the 1909 press law was introduced at the chamber of deputies. This article stipulated that "extorting money, receiving any form of benefit or preventing benefit [to others] from somebody by threatening to publish something that could blemish their honour or damage their reputation" would be punishable by law and thereby made it illegal to use the press as a vehicle for blackmail.

However, it should be noted that the meclis-i mebusan matbuat encümeni introduced one of the strictest articles in the new law. Article 35 of the 1909 press law gave the cabinet and the government the power to ban a single issue of a publication from being brought into the Ottoman Empire. The meclis-i mebusan matbuat encümeni considered it as the government's right to ban foreign publications if this were thought to be in the best interests of the empire. It argued that France had a similar article in its press law, 152 an argument likely to appeal to the mebusan for whom Europe was the yardstick to follow in matters of freedom of the press. In this context it is interesting to note that the Dutch, only a few years previously, had passed a similar law in their colonies to prevent undesirable Ottoman newspapers from being imported. 153 The ayan also introduced an article, suggested by the government, which gave the office of the sadrazam, in times of war or when there was the threat of war, the power to forbid newspapers to publicise information about the actions of the Ottoman army and navy or the defences of the state. 154 Arguably, the heaviest penalty in the 1909 law is Article 17, which, in the case of attacks on the constitution could lead to life-long exile. This is one of the very few instances 155 in which legislators

152 MMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 Cilt 3, "Matbuat ve Matbaalar Kanun Layihaları ve Encümenin Mazbatası", p. 25.
153 Baykal E., “The Ottoman press and the Dutch East Indies at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century” in Turkish Historical Review, 2/1 (2011), pp. 1-17. Here pp. 15-16. Towards the end of 1900, the Dutch government enacted a law in their colonies in the Dutch East Indies that made it illegal to bring into the country, to distribute, own or read newspapers that had been declared dangerous to the wellbeing of the colonial society. This was an attempt by the Dutch government to prevent certain Ottoman pan-Islamist publications from reaching the Muslims in their colonies.
155 The only other occurrence where the final version of an article had a more severe penalty than the government draft was Article 13, regarding the publication of official meetings and courts
chose a more severe penalty than what was in the government draft. But this should be seen in light of the 31 March Incident, as this is the only instance in which the 31 March Incident was used to increase penalties or restrictions, arguing that, had this article existed, Volkan could have been stopped before the military uprising took place.

The final version of the 1909 press law, which was enacted in July 1909, was undeniably a far more positive piece of legislation for the press than both its 1864 predecessor and the original government draft. It was supportive of the freedom of the press and guaranteed the rights of journalists to an extent that had not previously been the case. According to Djiveleguian, an Ottoman lawyer who taught law at a university in Paris and as a result also knew the French press law, the new law did away with all forms of “preventive measures”. He wrote in his book on the 1909 press law:

Under a purely preventive and prohibitive regime, one cannot exercise a right, except when one is authorised by [officials], who have the discretionary [power] to grant or revoke authorisation. This constitutes a police regime. Preventive prohibition measures have all disappeared from the new Turkish [press law of 1909]. These are:

(a) Preventive censorship. Preventive censorship is the most terrible of all preventive measures. We see with its abolition that all agents of the press regulation office [i.e. censorship apparatus] have disappeared.

(b) Preliminary authorisation. The preliminary [requirement to obtain] authorisation [to publish] is replaced by the declaration [of intent to publish], in Article 3 of the 1909 law.
Despite being thus a very liberal law, the 1909 press law was condemned by some journalists at the time and has often been regarded by modern scholars as restrictive, serving the interests of the CUP by silencing the opposition press. However, the idea that the 1909 press law was intentionally constructed by the CUP to silence the opposition appears rather unlikely in light of the legislative process. The law had been the initiative of Kamil Paşa’s cabinet in a period when the cabinet was void of CUP partisans. Although Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, who is considered to have been sympathetic to the Unionists, is said to have been involved with the drafting of the bill, it was approved, and therefore supported, by Kamil Paşa’s cabinet. Even if one were to argue that the CUP, which nominally held a majority in Parliament, had been responsible for changing the draft there, the result was a more liberal, not a more repressive, law, and thus does not support the claim that the CUP produced a restrictive press law aimed at controlling its opponents.

While it is clear that the government was not imposing authority over the press in what İskit describes as the “anarchy” of the post-revolution period, it is also evident that the government eventually actively adopted measures designed to support the press and its expansion. For example, printing equipment was exempted from import tax. This sort of equipment, purchased by many new publications, was not readily available in the empire and had to be imported from abroad at great cost and was one of the most costly aspects of starting a new publication. Removing taxes was probably a welcome financial support for new publishers. Furthermore, the press was given special, reduced tariffs for distributing their issues to their readers, in order to cut down on the costs of mailing issues to subscribers outside Istanbul.

suitables: (a) La censure préventive. La censure Préventive, est de toutes la mesures préventives la plus redoutable. Nous voyons avec son abolition, disparaître tous les agents du Bureau de la Presse. (b) L’autorisation préalable. L’autorisation préalable est remplacée par la déclaration, dans l’article 3 de la loi de 1909.


160 İskit, Matbuat İdareleri, p. 192.

161 TNA FO 195/2280 No. 291, 5 September 1908.

162 BOA İDÜİT 94/41, 29 Rabiulahir 1328/26 Nisan 1326 [9 May 1910]
The argument about the restrictive nature of the 1909 press law is presumably influenced by the attitudes of certain dailies of the time, such as Volkan and Ikdam, which attacked the new legislation as an assault on press freedom. On 2 April 1909, writing in Ikdam, Ali Kemal warned that the freedom of the press was being limited by the 1909 press law, asking its readers what was wrong with the 1864 press law and arguing that, if a new law was to be created, it should be based on the French or British examples.163 Interestingly Ali Kemal himself had complained earlier, in August 1908, about the laxity of the law over ad hominem attacks after having been labelled a jurnalci by Tanin. Such attacks, he noted, did not happen in France or Britain because these countries had laws to prevent them.164 But, the 1909 press law was indeed based on the French press law, and in terms of its penalties, the two laws were almost identical.165 Therefore, the complaints in the press directed at the new law need to be considered in the context of the period and should be interpreted not as reflecting any repressive nature of the new legislation but as a reaction to the curbing of the absolute and unregulated freedom which the press had enjoyed in the chaotic period immediately following the 1908 revolution and the declaration of the constitution. In this context any attempt to regulate the press, however liberal, was not automatically likely to be welcomed by all. However, as will soon become clear, the 1909 press law, although scorned and criticised by some, was actually to play an important role in keeping the press more or less free under martial law.

One reason for this misconception might be the coincidence of the enactment of the 1909 press law and the declaration of martial law after the 31 March Incident. Like the creation of the 1909 press law, the declaration of martial law, too, is often incorrectly regarded as an opportunity for the CUP to silence the opposition press, because of the trials held against newspapers. However, regardless of any arguments about the nature of the 1909 press law, the imposition of martial law following the 31 March Incident ensured that the
environment in which the press was to function was not a normal one, a situation which would continue virtually uninterrupted until the end of the empire. In a way almost reflective of the conflict between the constitution and the 1864 press law in the immediate post-revolution period, martial law and the 1909 press law produced conflicting rulings, for while martial law gave the military courts the right to shut down publications, the 1909 press law presented them with a loophole to circumvent such closures.

When the 31 March Incident occurred, the second and third armies formed the Hareket Ordusu (Action Army) which, under the command of Mahmud Şevket Paşa, moved into Istanbul to restore order. Hareket Ordusu successfully took control of Istanbul after skirmishes with resisting mutineers and proceeded to install courts-martial to try those suspected of having involved in the mutiny. The press was also subjected to these courts. The court martial issued a declaration which openly put the blame for the mutiny, at least partially, on the press:

The unfortunate influence that newspapers had in poisoning the minds [of the populace] and in corrupting the harmonious friendship among the people, by abusing the absolute freedom of the press is well known among all. [The fact is that] the trials have shown that the questionable content of the newspapers was reduced to slandering and dishonouring the government and vilifying the commanders of the army and that some members of the press, without anybody to stop them, continued their false publications of great influence, seeking to create a [source of] financial power, which could be tapped into when needed, through the opportunistic aim of capturing [the minds] of the people by using their religious feelings and that, by using the power granted to them through the ad-hominem attacks of newspapers, which gave them a control and advantage, to force their personal influence on the decisions of the government and that the government was unable to take any other position than powerlessness and surrender towards the clamorous torrent of transgression and slander emanating from the press.166

166Quoted from Oral, Basın Tarihi, p. 196: “Tesmimi ezhanda ihlâli ahengi vikafi anasırda evrak havadisın hadsiz hudutsuz hürriyeti matbuatı suiistimal etmek suretiyle icra ettiği tesirati meş’ume malumu havassı avamdır. Esnayı muhakematta [...] zemini sual teşkil eden münderecati
Among those tried was Derviş Vahdeti, owner and editor-in-chief of *Volkan*. He was found guilty of treason and hanged and *Volkan* ceased to exist. Other journalists, too, were interrogated. According to Ahmed İhsan, newspapers were subjected to an examination of all of their issues that had appeared prior to and during the mutiny.  

This action against newspapers, that included prominent newspapers with an anti-CUP bias, has led to the claim that this was a deliberate action by the army to suppress political opposition (including the press) to the CUP, whose bidding was done by the military. However, the evidence at hand suggests that such claims should be nuanced. In the case of *İkdam*, which in the 1909 annual report of the British embassy is described as “important as being the organ of Kiamil Pasha and the Ahrars” (i.e. the opposition to the CUP), the allegation brought against the owner and the editor-in-chief was that the newspaper was guilty of publishing material that led to the occurrence of the mutiny. A survey of *İkdam*’s contents in the weeks before the mutiny hardly reveals any overly inciting articles, such as those published in *Volkan* during the same period. However, *Volkan* clearly aligns itself with both *İkdam* and *Serbesti* on more than one occasion, either by copying articles from these newspapers or by speaking...
about them in friendly or supportive terms (something that was unthinkable with Tanin, which was frequently portrayed as the archenemy along with Şura-i Ümmet, both strong supporters of CUP). Although in these cases İkdam involuntarily found itself associated with Volkan, which no reasonable court would deem damning evidence, what could have initiated the case against Ali Kemal and Ahmed Cevdet might be the attitude their newspapers displayed in the wake of the mutiny. There are three interesting points by which İkdam’s position regarding the revolt can be gauged: the description of the uprising and the motivations behind it, the coverage of the deaths that occurred and the position that the newspaper took vis-à-vis the religious leaders who were involved.

When reporting the death of officers killed during the mutiny, İkdam took a very apologetic tone, where it shifted the blame onto the officers and justified the acts of the mutineers. In a piece entitled “How many were killed?”, published on 14 April 1909, the author explains that four officers had been killed the day before but that these men had tried to stop the military uprising and had shown signs of aggression or transgression (“tecavüze kalkışmış”), a choice of words which deliberately puts the blame on to the officers.

Further reading in the same issue reveals a similar reflection of the events, when the paper goes into detail about the murder of one of the officers:

In the morning, as said officer had climbed on top of a car on the bridge and started to deliver a speech against the soldiers, two soldiers affiliated with the sniper battalion listened to his statements, after which they said to him: ‘Sir, Officer! What you are saying is wrong. Our aim is only to see the application of sharia law within a constitutional framework’, upon which the officer pulled out his revolver and fired on the soldiers. The fired bullets hit a soldier in the hand

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172 See for example: Volkan No. 72, 21 Safer 1327, 28 Şubat 132[5], 13 Mart 1909 [13 March 1909], “Doktor Nazım Beyin Konferansları’: Taken from İkdam, Volkan No. 74, 23 Safer 1327, 2 Mart 132[5], 15 Mart 1909 [15 March 1909], “Biz De Görüyoruz Ki İş Fena Gidiyor”: Taken from İkdam, Volkan No. 97, 17 Rabıulevvel 1327, 25 Mart 1325, 7 Nisan 1909 [7 April 1909], “Davetname”: Taken from Serbesti; Volkan No. 99, 8 Rabıulevvel 1327, 27 Mart 1325, 9 Nisan 1909 [9 April 1909], “Miting”: Taken from Serbesti.

173 İkdam No. 5347, 23 Rabıulevvel 1327, 1 Nisan 1325, 14 Nisan 1909 1[4 April 1909], ”Kaç kişi telef olmuş?": ‘Dünki hadise-i askeriyyede saat altıya kadar dört kişi telef olmuştur. Bunlar da bir müzakim, bir kolağası, bir katip, bir binbaşıdır. Zabıtanın telef olanlar, askerin bu hareketine münanaat etmek istemiş ve tecavüze kalkışmış omlarından dolayı telef edilmişdir”.
and one porter, who happened to be there, in the knee. It is upon this that the very agitated soldiers wounded and killed the officer by shooting him in the chest and by [using] a knife on his head.\textsuperscript{174}

In both instances the report suggests that it had been the officers who had been showing aggression, and that, in contrast, the soldiers' decapitating an officer after shooting him was not an offensive act.

Similar language is used when reporting the deaths of adliye nazırı (minister of justice) Nazım Paşa and the Emir of Latakia (Lazkiye): “When adliye nazırı Nazım Paşa was passing in front of the meclis-i mebusan yesterday, he was mistaken for Ahmed Rıza Bey and killed. The soldiers have been extremely saddened by the accidental killing of the minister.”\textsuperscript{175} The newspaper did not care to explain how the murder could have been justified had the correct man been killed. The following day the story of the minister's death was reported in more detail.

According to an account which has been verified the adliye nazırı (minister of justice) Nazım Paşa and bahriye nazırı (minister of the navy) Rıza Paşa had boarded an automobile to go from the Sublime Porte to the Imperial Palace to present their resignations and as they were moving towards Sirkeci they were turned around and led in front of the parliament. According to some accounts the bahriye nazırı Rıza Paşa there took out his revolver and fired on the soldiers, who returned fire. They mistook the late adliye nazırı Nazım Paşa for Ahmed Rıza Bey and wounded him. Two bullets hit the justice minister and the former bahriye nazırı was injured in the foot.\textsuperscript{176}

\textsuperscript{174} Ikdam No. 5347, 23 Rabıulvelvel 1327, 1 Nisan 1325, 14 Nisan 1909 1[4 April 1909], “Kaç kişi Telef olmuş?": "Sabahleyin mumaileyh köprü başında araba üzerine çıkarak askere karşı nutuk irad etmekteryken avcı taburuna mensup iki asker mumaileyhin beyanatını dinlemişler, badehu mumaileyh zabita hitaben: 'Zabit efendi! Siz yanlış söylüyorunuz. Bizim maksadımız kanun-ı esasi dairesinde şeriat tatbikidir.' demeleri üzerine zabit belinden revolverini çıkarp askere ateş etmiş, çıkan mermi askerin eline ve orada bulunan bir hamalın dizine isabet etmiştir. Bunun üzerine neferat son derece hiddete gelerek zabıtı mermiyele göğüsünden ve kasaturayla başından cerh ve itlaf etmişlerdir”.

\textsuperscript{175} Ikdam No. 5347, 23 Rabıulvelvel 1327, 1 Nisan 1325, 14 Nisan 1909 1[4 April 1909], “Adliye Nazırı”: "Adliye nazırı Nazım Paşa dün meclis-i mebusan önünden geçtiği sıradı Ahmed Rıza bey'e benzetlerek telef edilmiştir. Asker, adliye nazırı Paşanın böyle bir yanlışlıkla itlaf edilmiş olduğuna fevkalade müteessir olmuştur”.

\textsuperscript{176} Ikdam No. 5348, 24 Rabıulvelvel 1327, 2 Nisan 1325, 15 Nisan 1909 1[5 April 1909], “Adliye ve Bahriye Nazırları”: “Ilyice tahlik el-mübün bir rivayete göre istifalarını arzuçu’nun Bab-i All’den Mabeyn-i Hümayun’a gitmek üzere bir arabaya binmiş olan adliye nazırı Nazım ve bahriye nazırı Rıza paşalar Sirkeci’ye doğru indikleri sıradı çevrilip meclis-i mebusan dairesi önüne
Here, too, the report justified the action of the soldiers by ascribing the initial act of violence to the victims. It is, of course, possible that this account of events is in fact correct. However, it seems unlikely that a minister, presumably an educated man, would think it wise to open fire with a revolver (containing a limited number of rounds) on a group of soldiers who not only outnumbered him, but also had superior fire power. Added to this is the fact that the account, while repeating the earlier report on the mistaken killing of the adliye nazırı, still does not explain why the soldiers would have been justified in their action in the first place. İkdam's attitude in this respect is further demonstrated by its reporting of the killing of Mehmed Arslan, the Emir of Latakia, who was reported as "having passed away" ("vefatı vukubulmuştur") while the man had in fact been the victim of violence and clearly did not die of natural causes.177

Not only did İkdam absolve the soldiers from any blame over the violence committed, but it also heaped praise on them for their "historical" achievement, noting that "the events that this country has seen in the past two days can really teach us all a lesson. It is important for the army because the good nature, the pureness of being, the obedience to the laws of humanity of our soldiers and the importance they place on the Ottoman honour was not only seen by us but also by [the rest of the world]".178 The next day, the newspaper claimed that the soldiers in mutiny had been fighting against "tyranny" ("istibdad"), a word that was associated with Hamidian oppression. "The night of April 1st [Rumi calendar]", the newspaper explained "is an important page in the history of the Ottoman [constitutional] revolution... the soldiers were excitedly awaiting the appointment of the new sadrazam and bahriye nazırı in an attempt to end the
tyranny of the secret society and to bring true justice within the Islamic sharia.” The shots fired into the air by the mutineers were, according to the article, simply the soldiers’ expression of joy for the great service rendered to the entire nation and were not something anybody needed to worry about.

Ikdam’s support for the mutiny (after it had happened) can further be seen in the fact that it published many articles supporting the application of the sharia. But perhaps the most telling sign was that it published a statement by Seyid-i Kürdi telling the soldiers that, now that their job was finished, they should return to listening to the commands of their officers. Seyid-i Kürdi was not only a prolific author in Volkan but also a member of Derviş Vahdeti’s Mohammedan Union Party. Allowing the newspaper to act as a platform for spreading this message explains a great deal about Ikdam’s position immediately after the revolution.

Once it became clear that the Action Army, poised to suppress the mutiny, was gathering forces in Thessaloniki, and this news reached Istanbul, there was a change of tone. It was only on the 17 April 1909, several days after the events, that Ali Kemal first published (or at least signed) an article to be published in Ikdam. In his first article he criticised the attacks on the Tanin and Şura-ı Ümmet offices, but strangely chose to call it “an act of vengeance”, thus still agreeing that somehow one could understand why these attacks occurred. By 21 April it had

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182 Ikdam No. 5350, 26 Rabıulevel 1327, 4 Nisan 1325, 17 Nisan 1909 [17 April 1909], “En Büyük Tehlike Nedir?”: “Matbuatımız da bu vakayiden hisse-i intibahi aldi, rufekamızdan bazılarına reva gören muamele-i gayr-i layyka ibtidai emirde bazı dilhun etti. Ancak asker kardeşlerimizin de o itısaflariddet tekibh ettirdileri görüşe biz de o hasaraton maddi, yani kabili-tazmin olduğuna anlayarak teselli bulundu. O tazmin ise adeta yine milleltimizin borcudur. Ghanda her ne suretle olursa olsun, intikam, adavet bir zillettir, fakat bir vatannın evladi
become abundantly clear, as the army had issued an ultimatum which was circulated in newspapers, that the Action Army would enter Istanbul and that resistance would be met with great force. In a questionable display of journalistic integrity, Ali Kemal published a lengthy article explaining his actions during the days following the revolt: he had not been supportive of the mutiny at all, the soldiers who had done so were an unruly and undisciplined bunch of criminals and Derviş Vahdeti was declared a *serseri* (good-for-nothing, bum). In the following days, the Action Army was welcomed by *İkdam*, as coming to save them from the tyranny of the “reactionary forces” who wished to return to the old Hamidian tyranny.

When all of these examples are considered, an image emerges of *İkdam* as a newspaper in limbo, not certain of where to place its allegiance. However, the Action Army’s approach seems to have been convincing enough for Ali Kemal and the newspaper to start to attack the mutineers with full force. This did not stop Ali Kemal from feeling unsafe and fleeing, together with the paper’s owner, Ahmed Cevdet. In their absence they were tried by court martial, but they were found not guilty of the charges regarding the content of the newspaper. However, Ali Kemal was found guilty of having been a secret agent of Abdülhamid in the past and was exiled. He would return to Istanbul in 1912 and continue to write for *İkdam*. Although its owner and editor-in-chief had fled the country out of fear of being prosecuted, *İkdam* reappeared shortly after Ahmed Cevdet was absolved. Had the army wished to crush the opposition to the CUP, the post 31 March situation would have provided it with ample opportunity to do so and to penalise any newspapers severely. *İkdam*, however, despite statements such as those given above, received no penalty. Religious publications began to reappear, taking care, however, to emphasize that the...
constitution was compatible with the sharia. It is clear that the claims that the Action Army was trying to silence CUP opposition in the press should be reconsidered. These findings are in agreement with Shaw’s claim that the Action Army was not a CUP army, and that the 31 March Incident was not immediately followed by a CUP dominated period.

Legally speaking, with the introduction of martial law, the Ottoman press again entered a period of ambiguity for while martial law, as noted above, placed restrictions on the press, the 1909 press law was more liberal. Under the circumstances in which the revolution had taken place, and the occurrence of the 31 March Incident a situation existed where the military recognized the civilians’ legal right to power, by restoring the constitution, while the civilians consented to the establishment of martial law, which placed the military above the civilian administration, resulting in an ambiguity where two authorities enjoyed undefined powers. In one instance, dahiliye nezareti referred to to Article 35 of what it called, "the martial press law" ("matbuat kanun-ı harbi"), something which did not exist. However, the introduction of martial law meant that the press law could be bypassed. Article 6 of the martial law decree of 1877 stipulated that it was within the authority of the courts immediately to suspend any newspaper which they deemed to be engaging in "tehdiş-i ezhan" (obfuscating minds). Under the 1909 press law, however, suspension was only imposed if the publication had failed to be registered with local authorities, i.e. had failed to declare its intentions to publish to officials, as required under Article 4, or under Article 23, if it had incited its readers to commit serious crimes as described in the second part of the Ottoman penal code. While the press law set out very specific and exceptional circumstances in which the suspension of a publication could be invoked, martial law relied on a loose term like "tehdiş-i ezhan". Because this term was open to interpretation, it could be used to circumvent the press law with its better defined terms.

185 NL-HaNA, Consulaat-Generaal Constantinopel/Istanboel, 2.05.94, inv. nr 505, index 1152-1909, 3 Augustus 1909, "[...] persverslag van Mr. Van Ophuijzen over de maand Juli".
187 Ahmad, Young Turks, p. 55.
188 BOA DH.EUM.THR 92/46 29 Teşrinievel 1325[?] [11 November 1909].
189 Djiveleguian, Regime, pp. 80-81.
In this period, both martial law and the press law were apparently being applied. Immediately after the declaration of martial law, in mid May 1909, the Porte informed the zabtiye nezareti (ministry of the Police) that Hareket Ordusu and the third army corps command had ordered that the matbuat nizamnamesi (press law) should be applied to Musavver Papağan, due to it publishing articles and images that could incite agitation.\textsuperscript{190} The issue of Papağan immediately preceding this order contained a two-page colour caricature of the ex-Sultan Abdülhamid II being dragged away in a cage as dogs barked at him, which could clearly be considered a highly disrespectful way of depicting a sultan, even if he was deposed.\textsuperscript{191} The next issue of this illustrated satirical journal, which appeared nominally weekly or occasionally every two weeks, only appeared three weeks later.\textsuperscript{192} If it had not been able to publish, as had happened due to technical reasons a few weeks earlier, it would have published an apology to its readers.\textsuperscript{193} The fact that it did not supports the supposition that it was in fact suspended for a week. That martial law could override the press law is clear from the suspension, in October 1911, of a daily newspaper, which was charged with libelling ministers of the cabinet.\textsuperscript{194} Under Article 28 of the 1909 press law, libel against members of the royal family (excluding the sultan) and high-ranking officials could not result in the suspension of the publication, yet the newspaper was suspended. Such suspensions happened frequently under martial law, and across the political range of newspapers from CUP supporting to CUP opposing dailies. But, because of the 1909 press law, these suspensions were easily circumvented by merely republishing under a different name. With the 1909 press law, the application process for permission to publish had been greatly simplified. It was sufficient merely to submit a statement of intent to publish to the local government, a proceeding which remained unaffected by martial law which made no ruling on it in the martial law decree.

\textsuperscript{190} BOA DH.MKT 2810/66, 22 Rabiulahir 1327/30 Nisan 1325 [13 May 1909].
\textsuperscript{191} Musavver Papağan No. 32, 20 Rabiulahir 1327, 27 Nisan 1325, 10 Mayıs 1909 [10 May 1909].
\textsuperscript{192} Musavver Papağan No. 33, 1 Cemazeyilevel 1327, 18 Mayıs 1325, 31 Mayıs 1909 [31 May 1909].
\textsuperscript{193} Musavver Papağan No. 31, 7 Rabiulahir 1327, 14 Nisan 1325, 27 Nisan 1909 [27 April 1909], “İtizar”.
\textsuperscript{194} Islahat No. 84, 20 Şevvel 1329, 29 Eylül 1327, 12 Teşrinievvel 1911 [12 October 1911], “Tanzimat Gazetesi Müdürülüğünü”: Heyet-i Vükela aleyhinde kadhi havi neşirde bulunmuş […].
The ineffectiveness of suspension is nicely demonstrated in the case of *Tanin*, a daily newspaper considered close to the CUP, which was suspended in December
1909. This again shows that the claim that martial law was supposed to support the Unionists, should be reconsidered. On 22 December 1909 the paper appeared as Tanin with an issue number of 469.195 A few days later it appeared as Yeni Tanin with its issue number reset to start from 1.196 While it is not clear why Tanin received a suspension at this point, it remained Yeni Tanin for over two months before reappearing as Tanin from 10 February 1910 onwards.197 It is interesting to note that when Tanin did reappear it did so from issue number 517, while it had been suspended at 469 thus appearing as if it had not been suspended at all. This shows quite clearly that, to all intents and purposes, suspensions of newspapers at this point were a mere formality. Both Tanin and Yeni Tanin were under the control of the same müdür-i mesul, Hüseyin Cahid, as was clearly printed in the header and the additional Yeni in the title was printed inconspicuously, in much smaller characters, giving the daily the appearance of having the title Tanin instead of Yeni Tanin (Figure 7).

Again in 1911, Tanin was hit by a series of suspensions, which were, according to Ahmed İhsan, the result of Kamil Paşa’s cabinet being in power and being hostile to the CUP.198 In May 1911, the martial court suspended Tanin indefinitely for “publishing ad hominem attacks and sensationalist news”, but the newspaper reappeared the next day as Canin.199 Less than a week later, Canin was suspended for the same reason, but reappeared as Senin, only to be suspended again in June and to reappear as Renin.200 More than two months after its initial

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197 Tanin No. 517, 29 Muharrem 1328, 28 Kanunuevvel 1325, 10 Şubat 1909 [10 February 1910].
198 Ahmed İhsan, Matbuat Hatıralarım, p. 130.
199 Senin No. 1-974, 20 Cemzaeyilevel 1329/6 Mayis 1327/19 Mayis 1911 [19 May 1911], “Tanin Gazetesi Müdürüyetine”: "Gazetenizle divan-ı harb-ı örfiye eden ahiren vakıf olan ihtilali resmiyye hilafla olarak yine şahsiyata mutaallak ve hayecan amiz makalar neşredildiğinden idare-i örfiye kararnamesinin altını maddesine tevifkan bila müddet tatlın muttefiken karar verildiği divan-ı harb-ı örfiyenin sadır olup harbiye nezaret-ı celiyesinden batezkere tevdi olunan mazbatada beyan ki neşretilmekte ber mucip-i karar Tanin gazetesinin bu günden itibenin bilamüddet tatl kalındığı teblig olunur. 5 Mayis 1327, Matbuat-i dahiliye müdürüyeti". Tanin No. 973, 19 Cemzayilevel 1329/5 Mayis 1327/18 Mayis 1911 [18 May 1911] appeared, which means that the publication did not miss a single day.
200 Senin No. 1-977, 23 Cemzayilevel 1329, 9 Mayis 1327, 23 Mayis 1911 [23 May 1911], “Cenin Gazetesi Müdürüyetine”, Renin No. 15-1030, 17 Recep 1329, 1 Temmuz 1327, 14 Temmuz 1911 [14 July 1911]. The first issue of Renin is missing but as it was at issue 15, this would mean that Renin first appeared at the end of June.
suspension, *Tanin* was allowed to reappear as its suspension was considered to have "lasted long enough." In September 1912, the whole spiel was re-enacted once again: *Tanin* appeared as *Tanin, Canin, Senin* and *Hak*, before finally reappearing as *Tanin*.202

*Ikdam*, traditionally considered to be closer to the Liberals, underwent suspensions too, although to a lesser degree. In mid-March 1910 *Ikdam* was suspended and reappeared as *Yeni Ikdam*.203 While it refrained from using its old issue numbering as an alternative, it kept Ahmed Cevdet as the *müdür-i mesul* and *sahib-i imtiyaz* (concession owner). In late February 1912, it appeared as *İktiham*,204 but the *müdür-i mesul* was now Ahmed Mecit. It reappeared again as *Ikdam* only in August 1912, with Ahmed Cevdet again at its head, explaining its reappearance as being due to the fact that martial law had been suspended.205

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201 *Tanin* No. 1043, 1 Şaban 1329/15 Temmuz 1327/28 Temmuz 1911 [28 July 1911], "Tanin Gazetesi Müdürüyetine": Matbuat-ı dahiliye mdbürüyetinden: divan-ı harb-i ûrfice mukaddema bilămüddet tatil edilmiş olan 'Tanin' gazetesinin müddet-i tatiliyesi kafi görülerek tekrar intişarına müsade itasına karar verildiği divan-ı mezkurda sadir olyup harbiye nezaret-i cellilesinden batezkere gönderilen mazbatada ışar olunmaka gazetenizi tekrar neşre mezun bulunduğunuz beyan olunur efendim. Fi 14 Temmuz 1327".

202 *Tanin* No. 1431, 21 Ramazan 1330, 21 Ağustos 1328, 3 Eylül 1912 [3 September 1912]; *Cenin* No. 1-1432, 22 Ramazan 1330, 22 Ağustos 1328, 4 Eylül 1912 [4 September 1912]; *Senin* No. 40-1433, 23 Ramazan 1330, 23 Ağustos 1328, 5 Eylül 1912 [5 September 1912]; *Hak* No. 149-1441, 1 Şevval 1330, 31 Ağustos 1328, 13 Eylül 1912 [13 September 1912]; *Tanin* No. 1442, 1 Şevval 1330, 31 Ağustos 1328, 13 Eylül 1912 [13 September 1912].

203 *Yeni Ikdam* No. 1, 2 Rabiülevvel 1328, 1 Mart 1326, 14 Mart 1910 [14 March 1910].

204 *İktiham* No. 18, 24 Rabiülevvel 1330, 1 Mart 1328, 14 Mart 1912 [14 March 1912]: While the first issue is missing, it should have appeared at the end of February 1912.

205 *İkdam* No. 5558, 27 Şaban 1330, 29 Temmuz 1328, 11 Ağustos 1912 [11 August 1912], "İkdam’ın intişarı".
That these suspensions did not amount to more than a formality was not a secret. A caricature in the satirical magazine *Cem* (Figure 8) shows a man reading *Canin* while the French caption refers to "*Le Tanine dit..."* and the Ottoman caption starts with "Bakalm Cahit Bey [the owner of *Tanin*] ne demis..." (In *Cem* No. 37, 25 Ağustos 1328/7 September 1912, p.8)

![Figure 8: A caricature of a man reading Canin. The newspaper header clearly reads Canin but the French caption says "Le Tanine dit..." and the Ottoman caption starts with "Bakalm Cahit Bey [the owner of *Tanin*] ne demis..." (In *Cem* No. 37, 25 Ağustos 1328/7 September 1912, p.8)](image-url)

Figure 8: A caricature of a man reading *Canin*. The newspaper header clearly reads *Canin* but the French caption says "*Le Tanine dit..."* and the Ottoman caption starts with "Bakalm Cahit Bey [the owner of *Tanin*] ne demis..." (In *Cem* No. 37, 25 Ağustos 1328/7 September 1912, p.8)
simply reappear the next day under a different name. Furthermore, the paşa added that Tanin was not a government newspaper, but an independent one over which the state had no control. Rifat Paşa, however, did reassure Lowther that Jeune Turc had been warned about not publishing an upcoming series of articles attacking Britain.206

Perhaps the most striking example of the absurdity of press suspensions in this period is that of the daily Tanzimat, founded by Lütfi Fikri, a member of the Ottoman Chamber, who, as a member of the chamber of deputies' press law Committee, had had an influential role in the creation in the 1909 press law. Lütfi Fikri gave an account of his own experience of suspension in an article in Tanzimat published in September 1912, when martial law was suspended for a short time.

I remember very well; at that time [under martial law] we had in our office about 15 newspaper publishing declarations [i.e. statements submitted to the government declaring the intention to publish], and as many clichés with the names, that were written on these declarations, engraved on them. This was our biggest weapon against the Unionist government, our ammunition. When an order for suspension was received from the press regulation office, we regarded it as of such little consequence that, for example, if I was busy with something at that point, I would not see the need to interrupt [this activity] and with a nearly habitual motion of my hand would seek out one of these declarations from the document container on my desk, and hand it to the person [bearing the order of suspension]. And, I, satisfied with only warning [the workers] not to make any errors with the issue numbering and the headers on the pages, would once again return to my work.207

206 TNA FO 424/226, October 1911, "Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Asiatic turkey and Arabia, Part I", No. 108, 14 February 1911, p. 96.
Lütfi Fikri’s account does not appear to have been in any way exaggerated. *Tanzimat* first appeared in 1911 and received what appears to be its first suspension in October 1911. This was the start of a very long series of suspensions in a very short timespan. In the next four months, in which most changes took place in the first month, *Tanzimat* appeared as *Islahat, Maşrek, Tanzimat* (illegally), *Merih, Matbuat, Zühre, Tenbihat, Nevrah, Tesisat, Takdirat, Teşkilat* and *Teminat* with a new müdür-i mesul every time, but with Lütfi Fikri as the editor-in-chief throughout. What sets Lütfi Fikri’s daily apart was its blatant defiance of the martial law courts. When *Islahat* was suspended for an article in which it criticised Germany, *Maşrek* published a stinging attack on the Article 6 of the martial law decree. The article noted:

This time it has become completely apparent that the court martial interprets "tehyic-i efkar" and "tedhiş-i ezhan" completely incorrectly. Because an article about Germany - even if it is very critical - will not cause "tehyic-i efkar" in Ottoman lands [...] The Courts Martial should end this situation. We are informing [the court] and warning it one last time: if it continues in its practices, it will leave us no choice but to act (within the law) in a different manner and it will create difficulties for itself and for us.
Despite its tone, this threatening and defiant statement produced no reaction. Less than two weeks later, in what could be considered another act of provocation, Tanzimat reappeared without permission and with a letter on its front page addressed to the army expressing strong criticism of the on-going martial law.210 This rebellious act did actually elicit a reaction. The next day it appeared as Merih and expressed its disgust at the fact that its offices had been raided by the police and that the copies of Tanzimat had been confiscated, thus forcing the newspaper to appear as Merih. It commented scathingly that:

While there is an option for the court martial not to meddle with things that are outside its duty, its leaving that [option aside] and attempting to forbid the publication and distribution of a newspaper in this way and, as a legal reason for this, coming up with oddities that could be filed under the funniest things in the world and that could not even mislead a fresh law student, is cause for great sadness and the words "woe, what type of [men] have control over the government", involuntarily spring to one's lips.211

An inevitable suspension followed. There was again an attempt to illegally continue publishing the suspended Merih, but when this failed Matbuat appeared. The next day Matbuat was suspended and Zühre appeared in its place, announcing its defiance of the Court Martial, despite what it described as the illegal actions taken against the paper.212 In the next week Tenbihat and Nevrah followed each other in quick succession as a result of further suspensions. Lütfi Fikri continued this game, where he deliberately provoked action against his newspaper and then republished under a different name three more months,
until February 1912, right before the first steps were taken prevent such circumventions of martial law.

After the revolution, the period of legal confusion was followed by the codification of liberties for the press. This shows that, despite martial law, official policy remained supportive of the press. For example, printing equipment was exempted from import tax.\textsuperscript{213} This sort of equipment, purchased by many new publications, was not readily available in the empire and had to be imported from abroad at great cost and was one of the most costly aspects of starting a new publication. Removing taxes was probably a welcome financial support for new publishers. Furthermore, the press was given special, reduced tariffs for distributing their issues to their readers, in order to cut down on the costs of mailing issues to subscribers outside Istanbul.\textsuperscript{214}

However, in 1912, the supportive policy changed, where support was sacrificed for control. The first move towards tightening control over the press was taken in March 1912 when Article 2 of the press law was altered. A deposit of 500 lira caution money was now required when lodging a declaration of intent to publish, an alteration presumably related to an attempt to prevent suspended newspapers from immediately springing up again under a new name. This move, however, was probably ineffective because, apparently, newspapers already owned a number of licenses under different names and the change to the article exempted existing license holders, meaning that newspapers could use their stock of licenses.\textsuperscript{215} The changes applied to the press law in 1913 were more numerous and thorough. Article 2 was changed again. Those publications with permission to publish but which had not yet done so, publications which had ceased publishing voluntarily and publications which had been suspended by the government were now obliged to pay the 500 lira caution money before they could reappear.\textsuperscript{216} The bill, as it was presented to the parliament, justified the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item\textsuperscript{213} TNA FO 195/2280 No. 291, 5 September 1908.
\item\textsuperscript{214} BOA İ._DLÜT 94/41, 29 Rabıulahir 1328/26 Nisan 1326 [9 May 1910]
\item\textsuperscript{215} \textit{Düştür} tertip II, cilt 4, No. 132,” Matbuat Kanunu’nun ikinci madde-i muaddelesi” pp. 365-366. See Appendix II, ”The Ottoman Press Laws”, for the 1909 press law, including changes made to the law.
\item\textsuperscript{216} \textit{Düştür} tertip II, cilt 5, No. 117, ”Matbuat Kanunu’nun bazı maddelerini muaddil kanun-i muvakkat” pp. 181-185.
\end{itemize}
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change as "preventing the procedure where a new publication appears in the place of a publication that was suspended by the civil or military government, and which has an undesirable impact on the purpose of the suspension and the benefits and image of the government." Furthermore, Article 23 was changed to state specifically that suspended newspapers were not permitted to use the caution money from their suspended publication towards a new license. In October 1913, Article 23 was further changed, giving the meclis-i vükela (cabinet) the right to suspend temporarily (but without defining a maximum period) any publications which it deemed dangerous to the domestic and foreign security of the state.

These measures must have been particularly effective. The changed Article 23 gave the government the right to suspend any newspaper on the premise that it found it to be "dangerous". Once suspended, a publisher could only start a new publication once he had paid the 500 lira caution-money, and was unable to reuse his original deposit for caution-money to pay for the new publication. Furthermore, 500 lira was a very large sum and with repeated suspensions, would have multiplied rapidly. For example, had this law existed during Tanzimat’s aforementioned rebellious month, the daily would have had to pay a sum close to 5,000 lira, in order to keep publishing. To put this in perspective: Turkish language dailies were sold at ten para per issue and in order to raise 500 lira in revenue alone, one would have needed to sell over 200,000 copies in a period when the average daily circulation figures for higher end dailies was probably only around 10,000. When real profits rather than revenue are considered, the real figure, due to the minimal profit margins, would probably have been around 2,000,000 copies to pay for a single suspension or almost a year’s worth of sales for a popular daily. In comparison, the penalty for libel against the imperial family or the upper echelons of the state was a maximum

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218 Düstur Tertip II, cilt 6, #12, p. 49, "11 Recep 1327 tarihi Matbuat Kanunu’nun 23. maddesini muaddel kanun-i muvakkat".
fine of 100 lira, under Article 28 of the 1909 press law. It was now in the
government’s power to subject publishers to such penalties on a whim.

The 1909 press law underwent other changes in the following years. However,
one of these were of any significance, when compared to the system which was
set in place in 1913. In September 1914, on the eve of entering the First World
War, in what appears to have been a precautionary move, the government
changed Article 33, which explicitly forbade publishing about military activities
during wartime or when threat of war was present. The penalties for this law
were more than doubled, with the maximum fine reaching 500 lira and legally
obliging the owner or editor-in-chief to disclose their sources.219 In 1916, it was
decided that publishers who published in languages other than Turkish were
required to be fluent in one of the officially recognized languages of the
empire.220 In 1920, an article was introduced that explicitly made it illegal to
publish any official document that could cause problems for domestic peace and
foreign relations.221 Finally, in 1921, it became illegal to print religious texts from
the Quran or the Hadith.222 Although these were further restrictions on the
freedoms of the publishers, they were of relative insignificance to the easy-
suspensions and high-fees system finalized in October 1913, when the 1909
press law took on its definite character.

In 1920, the Grand National Assembly in Ankara adopted the 1909 press law. It
is not clear whether this included the changes and additions made after 1912.
Most of the changes to the 1909 press law were introduced in the absence of a
parliament and qualified as temporary ("kanun-ı muvakkat"). Once parliament
reconvened, they would supposedly be turned into regular laws.223 What
Ankara’s policy was towards these temporary laws, and the laws created by the
occupied government, is not fully clear. In one case, during a discussion in the

maddesiine muaddil kanun-ı muvakkat”.
220 BOA DHKMS 36/46, 29 Ramazan 1334/17 Temmuz 1332 [30 July 1916]. This law was not
found in Düstur Tertip II.
221 BOA İ.DUİT 94/45, 19 Zilkade 1338/5 Ağustos 1336 [5 August 1920]. This law was not found
in Düstur Tertip II.
222 BOA İ.DUİT 99/4, 17 Safer 1340/19 Teşrinisani 1337 [19 October 1921]. This law was not
found in Düstur Tertip II.
223 See for example: BOA MV 231/10, [11 Rabıulahir 1331] [20 March 1913]; BOA MV 230/98, 20
Zilhicce 1331/20 Teşrinisani 1329 [20 October 1913].
Grand National Assembly, it is suggested that mebusan should be barred from being müdür-i mesul.\(^{224}\) However, Article 3 of the 1909 press law had already been altered in March 1913 to prevent mebusan and ayan from holding that position.\(^{225}\) On the other hand, during a later discussion it is suggested that the requirement for caution money, which was introduced in March 1912, should be dropped to help the industry grow.\(^{226}\) However, until it was replaced in 1931,\(^{227}\) the 1909 press law remained effective in Turkey, where, according to Mazıcı, it was used to impose strict control over the press, in order to secure the position of the new state against the counter-revolutionary press.\(^{228}\)

Following the 1908 constitutional revolution, there was a period of confusion in the government regarding the application of the 1864 press law. As a result of this confusion, this law was relegated to regulating the permit application process. Under these circumstances, there was an uncontrolled freedom of the press, which led to fierce attacks between political camps, name-calling and libel. Although the government issued tax exemptions and advantageous mail tariffs to support the press as an industry, it still wished to restore strict control over the press with the creation of a new press law. However, parliament transformed the strict government draft into a very liberal law, by allowing more Ottoman citizens to publish and by making the process easier and by granting liberties and guarantees to journalists. The 1909 press law protected publishers from suspensions under martial law, which targeted publications regardless of their political inclinations. Therefore, neither the 1909 press law nor martial law can said to be products of CUP efforts designed to silence the opposition press. However, starting in 1912, a series of changes were introduced to the 1909 press law, which gradually lost its liberal nature and eventually enabled the government easily and effectively to silence publications. This restrictive law was used until the end of the Ottoman Empire and was also adopted by the government in Ankara.

\(^{224}\) TBMMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 İçtima 110 Celse 1, 7/12/1446 [7 December 1919], p. 255.
\(^{226}\) TBMMZC Devre 1 Sene 2 İçtima 43 Celse 1, 27/6/1337 [27 June 1920], p. 60.
\(^{227}\) Resmi Gazete No. 1867, 8 August 1931, “Matbuat Kanunu”.
\(^{228}\) The 1909 press law, with its changes, was adopted by Ankara. It was only replaced with a new law in 1931. Mazıcı N., “1930'a Kadar Basının Durumu”, p. 139.
CENSORSHIP

While censorship, in the form of suspensions and banning of newspapers or, more obliquely, violence against journalists had been in use from the early beginnings of the Ottoman press and was certainly applied in the post-1908 era, a more effective form of censorship, pre-print censorship, which prevented ‘undesirable’ material appearing in the press rather than reacting to it after publication, was introduced for the first time since 1908 at the beginning of the First World War. After the armistice, this form of censorship, one particularly easy to analyse due to its physical appearance in the press in the form of blank spaces where text had been removed, continued, though now with a variety of censoring parties, Ottoman, Allied, Greek and Turkish Nationalists. An analysis of censorship applied to Istanbul’s press during the occupation period shows that, the combined Imperial and Allied censorship apparatus robbed the Nationalist Movement of a platform from which to voice its own opinion and to conduct its own propaganda in the face of propaganda directed against it. As a result of this, the Ankara government reacted by following a policy of constructing its own press infrastructure in order to spread its own message. In this context one could thus argue that the censorship imposed on Istanbul’s press in this period had a beneficial effect on the Anatolian press.

The constitutional revolution brought with it the end of Hamidian censorship. Pre-print censorship had been an inextricable part of Abdülhamid II’s strict press-regime. In the confusion that followed the declaration of the constitution, the press not only found itself working in a state of near lawlessness, it also unilaterally abolished pre-print censorship. For İkdam and Sabah, this decision was allegedly taken during an improvised meeting at a pub ("birahane") and the next day, when censorship officers came around, they were simply told to go away.229

This action had not been sanctioned by officials. Rather, the government was presented with a \textit{fait accompli} and although censorship in practice was no longer

\footnote{229 Kabacalı A., \textit{Başangaçtan Günümüze Türkiye'de Basın Sansürü} (İstanbul: Gazeteciler Cemiyeti Yayınları, 1990), p. 81.}
being applied, no official instructions had been given to this effect. One week after the declaration of the constitution, censorship officers in some post offices had “abandoned their duties” (“terk-i vazifė”), which indicates that they had not received such orders. The censorship officers in Galata, who remained at their desk and who were awaiting instructions, were informed that their services were no longer required.230 Similarly to what had happened regarding the application of the 1864 press law, provincial authorities, were apparently officially informed only some time later about the new situation. For example, Thessaloniki’s maarif müdürű (director of education), upon asking how to proceed with publishing permit applications,231 was informed that: “as dictated by the constitution, the press is free according to the law and can therefore not be subjected to pre-print censorship. Naturally, the application of censorship has therefore come to an end.”232 This response from Istanbul was sent on 4 August 1908, ten days after the declaration of the constitution and the decision of Istanbul’s press to refuse censorship. At this point censorship was over. Newspapers could no longer be held for inspection at post-offices (which functioned as censoring offices) and books (which had also been subjected to censorship), held for inspection, were to be returned to their rightful owners.233 The German embassy informed its government that with the introduction of the freedom of the press, censorship had become superfluous and had disappeared and that an inspection at the customs of printed material was solely done to estimate its monetary value, and no longer for the purpose of its content.234 Yet, even though censorship controls were in practice (and now also officially) abolished, there seems to have been an expectation that this would merely be

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230 BOA DH.MKT 1273/87 1 Recep 1326H/17 Temmuz 1324 [30 July 1908].
231 BOA MF.MKT 1068/70, 19 Temmuz 1324 [1 August 1908].
232 BOA MF.MKT 1068/70, 22 Temmuz 1324 [4 August 1908]: "Kanun-ı 1 Esasi mucibince matbuat kanun dairesinde serbest olup kablettab hükümetin muayenesine arzolunamayacağından sansür muamelesi bittab hitam buluştur".
233 BOA MF.MKT 1068/70, 5 Recep 1326/21 Temmuz 1324 [3 August 1908].
234 BA R901 34036/75, 13 August 1908: "Nachdem mit der Einführung der Pressfreiheit die Censur als überflüssig in Wegfall gekommen ist, sind die den einzelnen Zollämtern bis dahin überwiesenen Zensurbemänten nunmehr ihrer Posten enthoben worden. Eine Prüfung der Bücher, Zeitschriften und dergleichen findet nur noch insoweit statt, als dies zur Feststellung ihres Werts zum Zwecke der Zollzahlung erforderlich ist. Alle, aus politischen oder religiösen Rücksichten früher erlassenen Einfuhrverbote für Drucksachen, Grammaphonplatten, Tabaksdosen usw. sind damit ohne weiteres als aufgehoben zu betrachten".
temporary. Ahmed İhsan obtained a copy of a memo from posta ve telgraf nezareti (postal and telegraph ministry) which informed the post offices that "the movement of newspapers and similar [materials] should temporarily not be hindered", which indicates that censoring was expected to return shortly. In response to protests about this situation, dahiliye nezareti (ministry of the interior) replied assuring the worried parties that this memo had been sent out by mistake. Such a claim however, appears dubious. In accordance with the constitution, the press was free, something seized upon by the press itself. This, however, cannot be perceived as considered policy for a government which for years had imposed censorship. That the government should regard this abnormal situation of no censorship as temporary and should wish to return to a system of press control is thus highly likely.

Despite any such government views, however, the abolition of censorship seemed set to remain in place. The press had justified its action through the constitutional guarantee that the press was "free within the law" ("matbuat kanun dairesinde serbesttir"), under Article 12 of the Ottoman constitution. In April 1909, this article was altered to make pre-print censorship explicitly unconstitutional. The new wording was unequivocal: "[the press] may under no circumstances be subjected to pre-print control or examination" ("hiçbir veçhile kablettab teftiş ve muayene tabi tutulamaz"). Officially, thus, pre-print censorship was no longer tolerated.

However, official circles soon displayed an aversion to all forms censorship, although there seems to have been confusion again, this time regarding what constituted and what did not constitute censorship. In February 1909, the Third Army Corps requested that the newspapers in Thessaloniki be warned not to publish details about their logistic and other activities in the area, in order not to give away militarily sensitive information. The vali of Thessaloniki declined this request:

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235 Ahmed İhsan [Tokgöz], Matbuat Hâtralarım, pp. 24-25: "Bir müddetî muvakkate üçin gazete ve sairelerin imrârına mûmanat olunmaması".

236 İskit, Matbuat İdareleri, p.156: İskit gives the date as 4 Nisan 1908, but this is a mistake as it is several months before the declaration of the constitution and there would certainly have been no commission tasked with updating the constitution at this point.
"[Telling the press] that they may not publish such things is not considered to be in the spirit of this [constitutional] era of freedom and progress. The journalists of the [offending] Turkish newspapers were invited over and the necessary information was given to them in a fitting language [which addressed] their patriotic convictions. And, as happens in civilised countries with freedom of the press, if such [information] on military operations is kept strictly secret by the military [itself] without allowing any opportunity [for it] to leak outside, newspapers will naturally [have to remain quiet]. 237

At this time, the 1864 press law was still in force. Even if it had been fully applied, this law did not contain any articles to prevent militarily sensitive information from appearing in the press. Therefore, demanding illegally that journalists should refrain from printing such things could be considered a form of censorship, which was rejected by the vali. In similar fashion, when in August 1909 editors and owners of two newspapers in Basra, *Izhar al-Haqq* and *al-Iqaz*, complained that İsmail Efendi, the director of Basra's official newspaper, enforced pre-print censorship by only allowing approved and signed drafts to be printed,238 and that their newspapers were therefore being treated illegally, *dahiliye nezareti* warned the *vilayet* of Basra that they were to act in accordance with the Ottoman constitution and the 1909 press law.239 However, earlier, in June 1909, an episode between *dahiliye nezareti* and *rüsumat emaneti* (customs office) highlights the confusion regarding censorship. *Dahiliye nezareti* asked *rüsumat emaneti* to keep *Tuhfat al-`Arab*, published in Paris, from coming through the Ottoman borders. *Rüsumat emaneti* showed an unwillingness to cooperate, remarking that "because methods of censorship [were] abolished under the constitutional regime in accordance with the constitution, such activities

237 BOA DH.MKT 2760/14, 7 Safer 1327, 14 Şubat 1324 [27 February 1909]: "[...] o misüllü nesriyyatta bulunamaları hususunu tehim etmek bu devr-i hürriyet ve terakkinin icabatına muvafik görulmediğine, yalnız mezkur Türkçe gazetelerle muharırları [...] davet olunarak lisan-i münasibe ve hamiyet-i vatandan verilen mektubun memalik-i mütededinede cari olduğu veçhile bu gibi tedarik-i askeriye, devair-i askeriye tarafından fevkalade mektubun tutularak harice terşihini katyıyen imkan bırakmadığı takdirde evrak-i havadis bittib istilikatta bulunacağını [...]".

238 BOA DH.MUİ 5-1/4 17 Ağustos 1325 [30 August 1909].

239 BOA DH.MUİ 14-1/85 10 Eylül 1325 [23 September 1909].
were not going to take place at the customs.” Dahiliye nezareti tried to justify its request by arguing that Tuhfat al-'Arab was attacking the Ottoman constitution (which had ended censorship) but it also drew attention to a technical detail by noting that "because the content of the newspaper [would] not be censored and [only] its entry [into the country would] be directly forbidden, there [was] no need nor place for censorship”. Dahiliye nezareti apparently submitted further such requests to ban foreign publications, because in July 1909, maliye nezareti (ministry of finance) intervened on behalf of rüşumat, by also pointing out a technical detail: identifying banned publications at customs could only be done through examining their contents, which was "a procedure that could not be interpreted otherwise than as censorship". In its response, dahiliye nezareti insisted that such bans were not a form of censorship and that such bans were being used only to stop publications that attacked the constitution. This back and forth argument about the definition of censorship shows clearly the confusion in official circles, which is further emphasized by dahiliye’s display of two different attitudes in the examples given above. It also underlines the aversion in official circles towards censorship as maliye nezareti was unwilling to apply, what it considered, censorship and dahiliye nezareti adamantly rejected allegations of censorship.

However, pre-print censorship of the Ottoman press would return. It was reintroduced in 1914, following the series of changes made to the 1909 press law in 1912 and 1913, which turned the liberal law into a very strict one. It might have been part of a general move in the direction of tightening control over the press, but on the outside it had every appearance as having been introduced because of the First World War. On the eve of the war, a sansür talimatnamesi (censorship guideline), in the form of a booklet detailing how military censorship

240 BOA DH.MKT 2854/63 26 Cemazeyilevvel 1327, 2 Haziran 1325 [15 June 1909]: [...] üsul-i meşrutiyet ve kanun-i esasi ahkamınca sansür üsulünün müilha olmasından naşi bu gibi şeyle tevaggulun gumrüklere tertip etmeyecoğ mülahazasına binaen [...].

241 BOA DH.MKT 2854/63 4 Cemazeyilevvel 1327, 10 Haziran 1325 [23 June 1909]: [...] gazetenin münderecatı sansür edileyip doğrudan doğruya ithali menellediceğeb sansür istihdamına lüzum ve mahal olmayacağın emanet-i müşarunileyhe tebligi [...].

242 BOA DH.MKT 2893/53 4 Recep 1327, 8 Temmuz 1325 [21 July 1909]: [...] evrak ve resail-i mezkurenin muayene ve taharrüsü icabederek şu muamele sansür muamelesinden başka surette olunamayacağından [...].

243 BOA DH.MKT 2893/53 15 Recep 1327, 20 Temmuz 1325 [2 August 1909].
was to be applied, was distributed throughout the empire.\textsuperscript{244} This contained guidelines for censorship for post, telegrams, valuable goods, books, theatre plays and the press. Article 54 of the \textit{sansür talimatnamesi} said that all press drafts needed to be submitted to the \textit{sansür müfettişliği} (censorship supervisor), in order to receive an approval stating that it was "in accordance with the guidelines" ("talimata mutabiktur") and a signature. Only then could the newspaper go to print and after print, another copy had to be submitted to the censors for control. Article 55 stated that printing unverified material, or material marked for removal could lead to the publication being shut down. Article 50 of the guideline warned that acting in violation of the guidelines would lead to immediate shutting down or temporary suspension.

In June 1919, \textit{Alemdar}, looking back on the censorship during the First World War, recounts that even when enemy bomber planes were flying near Istanbul, the people were not aware of any danger, as the military censorship forced the press to explain the presence of the airplanes as an act of desperation on the part of the Allies. \textsuperscript{245} Strangely, although pre-print censorship was certainly introduced by the \textit{sansür talimatnamesi}, and acknowledged to have existed, it has not been possible to find direct evidence of its application in the form of blanked out sections in newspapers. According to the Dutch embassy, by 1915, "a strict censorship resulted in that, aside from the daily reports on the war, very few things of any importance [could appear in the Ottoman press]."\textsuperscript{246} Furthermore, after the war, in October 1918, when reports were being read on the misconduct of wartime officials, one of the accusations against the Said Halim and Talat cabinets was the "needless and illegal introduction of military and civil censorship and impeding the freedom of the press [...]."\textsuperscript{247} Official

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\item \textsuperscript{244} BOA DH.EUM.5.ŞB 44/59, 1330 [1914], "Sansür Talimatnamesi".
\item \textsuperscript{245} \textit{Alemdar} No. 173-1483, 19 Ramazan 1337/15 Haziran 1335-1919 [15 June 1919], "Hükümet ve Matbuat".
\item \textsuperscript{246} NL-HaNA, Consulaat-Generaal Constantinopel/Istanboel, 2.05.94, inv. nr 505, index 1211-1915, 8 December 1915, "Persverslag tot 1 Dec. 1915": "Een strenge censuur heeft tengevolge, dat buiten de dagelijkse oorlogsberichten zeer weinig van belang kan worden gepubliceerd".
\item \textsuperscript{247} Necmeddin Sahir [Silan], \textit{Hatıralarım}, pp. 70-72: "Hiçbir lüzum ve kanuna müstenit olmayarak siyasi ve askeri sansürler ihdasi ile hürriyet-i matbuat ve muhaberati ihlal eylemesi ve Avrupa matbuatını memlekete ithal etmemesi".
\end{itemize}
correspondence proves that military censorship was being applied. Furthermore, journalists mention this pre-print censorship in their memoirs. Karaosmanoğlu, who worked at İkdam, a major Istanbul daily, during the war recounts the situation:

My exhaustion while working at İkdam was not only physical, but also mental. A two-edged, Military and civilian censorship found even in the simplest news reports qualities that were "perturbing public opinion" and because of this I was constantly called to the press regulation office or the Police. The head of the press regulation office was at that time Nazım Hikmet’s father, Hikmet Bey. Despite being my neighbour and friend, he subjected me to threats. The head of police would interrogate me standing for hours.

Despite all this evidence of its existence, the signature signs of pre-print censorship, blanks in a body of text, could not be found in a survey of major Istanbul dailies, İkdam, Tanin and Sabah, for the First World War period. This however, clearly does not mean that pre-print censorship was not being applied, given the evidence to the contrary, but indicates that it was being applied in such a way as to avoid the blank signs of censorship.

Towards the end of the war, in June 1918, the Ottoman government decided to lift the political (i.e. civil) censorship that had been in place throughout the war. Military censorship, however, would remain in place until İzzet Paşa’s cabinet came to power in November 1918 at which point newspapers simply stopped sending in drafts to (in this case) the military censors, who, not having received an official order to stop their work, continued with only censoring letters and telegraphs. This is reminiscent of what had happened immediately after the

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248 See for example: BOA DH.EUM.5.ŞB (Military censorship officers discovered that pro-French propaganda was being conducted through the press in Beirut); BOA DH.ŞFR 441/93 (From Izmir, regarding pre-print military censorship).
249 See for example: Ahmed Ihsan [Tokgöz], Hâtralarım, p. 169 and Ahmed Rasim, Muharrir, p. 175.
251 ATASE İSH kutu no. 83, gömlek no. 11, belge no. 1, 1/2/35 [1 February 1919].
constitutional revolution in 1908. Then, too, before any orders to dismantle the censorship apparatus had been sent out by the government, the press, in its own act of revolt, had refused censors their drafts, turning the freedom of the press into a fait accompli. As this had been possible in 1908 due to the chaos caused by the revolution, in 1918 these actions were probably made possible by the signing of the armistice and general uncertainty about what was going to happen next.

However, in terms of the press, what happened next was the exact opposite of what had happened after the constitutional revolution: instead of unprecedented freedom, an Allied censorship was enforced, which employed pre-print examination of publication drafts. The Allied forces entered Istanbul on the 13th of November 1918. In the beginning of December 1918, an Allied military administration was installed and, asked to do so by the Allied high commissioners and unwilling to cause issues by refusing demands, Tevfik Paşa's cabinet reinstated a new press censorship, under the control of matbuat müdüriyeti, but with military representatives, while military censorship was limited to controlling letters and telegraphs once more. This was done despite opposition in the chamber and the senate as this was considered against the spirit of the constitution. In February 1919, a matbuat kararnamesi (press decree) was issued, Article 1 of which stipulated that the last paragraph of the amended Article 2 of the 1909 press law, and Articles 3 and 4 were indefinitely suspended. In practice this meant that suspended newspapers could no longer reappear without government permission and that starting a new publication was wholly dependent on the government’s will. Istanbul’s press would be subjected to censorship until October 1923, when, immediately following the end of the occupation, press censorship and martial law were lifted, as they were deemed no longer necessary.

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253 Ali Haydar [Midhat], *Hatıralarım 1872–1946* (İstanbul: Mithat Akçit, 1946), p. 327: Tevfik Paşa is described as not wishing to create justification for unnecessary actions by the Allied forces by complying with all of their wishes.
254 ATASE İŞH kutu no. 83, gömlek no. 11, belge no. 1, 1/2/35 [1 February 1919].
256 BOA MV 250/25, 3 Çemazeyilevel 1337/4 Şubat 1335 [4 February 1919].
258 BCA 30.18.1.1/7.35.19, 7 Teşrinievel 1339 [7 October 1923].
During this period, censorship appears to have been rather under the control of the Allies, than of the Imperial government. Talat Paşa describes this period as one with an "Allied press", which served only the purpose of spreading the propaganda and ideas of the occupiers.\textsuperscript{259} For the Allied forces, the apparent aim was to suppress articles that were "acrimonious, revolutionary or diplomatically indiscreet".\textsuperscript{260} To ensure that this aim was reached, an Allied censorship commission was set up in the British embassy, with Ottoman, British, French and Italian military representatives. Newspapers were examined and complaints were reported to matbuat müdür yeti\textsuperscript{261}. However, in mid-December 1918, both the British and French representatives of the Allied censorship commission argued for the introduction of pre-print censorship, as they felt that the current method was not effective.\textsuperscript{262} As a result, still in December 1918, pre-print censorship was once again introduced and this time, in contrast to the World War, Ottoman dailies started to appear with lines, paragraphs or entire articles removed. Furthermore, while initially the role of the allied representatives had been to give guidance to the censorship commission, starting on the 20th of January 1919, they took on full roles as censors.\textsuperscript{263}

\textsuperscript{259} Bolayır E., \textit{Talât Paşa’nın Hatıraları} (Güven Yayınevi: İstanbul, 1946) p. 38.
\textsuperscript{260} TNA FO 371/4141, No. 49194, 8 March 1919, Part IV.
\textsuperscript{261} ATASE İŞH kutu no. 83, gömlek no. 11, belge no. 1-2, 1/2/35 [1 February 1919].
\textsuperscript{262} ATASE İŞH kutu no. 83, gömlek no. 11, belge no. 2, 1/2/35 [1 February 1919].
\textsuperscript{263} TNA FO 371/4141, No. 49194, 8 March 1919, Part IV.
As can be seen in the chart in Figure 9, Allied participation in the Ottoman censorship had a significant impact on the amount of censorship applied. Although censorship was applied starting in November 1918, a steady increase is seen in the level as soon as Allied involvement occurred at the end of January 1919. Furthermore, following the termination of Allied involvement in censorship in November 1922, there was a decline in the amount of censorship and although censorship continued for another year, it appears to have been virtually non-existent after this point. This suggests that, when censorship was applied during this period, the Allied representatives in the censorship commission were responsible for a significant part of it. The chart, although showing significant fluctuations, reveals a constant presence of censorship. This indicates that there remained a certain level of defiance against the censors by certain journalists. This was, without doubt, partially caused by the vagueness of the censorship guidelines. The orders of the 2 December 1918 stated that it was forbidden to (1) write about military movements of the Allied forces, (2) publish exciting ("heyecan verici") material and material that could cause unrest among different ethnicities, (3) publish material disrespectful of the

Figure 9: Chart of pre-print censorship in Istanbul (November 1918-June 1923). The censorship is shown in function of its frequency and volume. A higher number means a higher level of censorship. This chart is based on data supplied in Appendix III, "Quantifying Censorship".

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264 Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivi A III-10-B, D 45, F 171, 171-1, 19/11/338 [18 November 1922].
sultan, government officials and allied officials, (4) publish material inciting action against the Powers, (5) publish *ad hominem* attacks and (6) write about changes in the form of government. The guidelines lacked any further details, and in the end the decision to cut or not cut something was in the hands of the censors. But Istanbul’s press at times deliberately took a defiant attitude. Reports from the censorship commission show that in early February 1919, newspapers went ahead and published text that was marked for removal by the censors. Both *Sabah* and *Vakit* defied such orders for several consecutive days. No reports of newspapers defying censors’ orders were found dated after February 1919, which suggests that the earlier mentioned *matbuat kararnamesi* regarding the closure of newspapers, whether it was for that purpose or not, did strike enough fear to the hearts of the newspaper publishers to make them comply with the censors. Failure to follow the censorship guidelines was a serious offence. Sertel, who was a journalist in the early days of the occupation, but later went to study journalism at Columbia University only to return to Ankara in 1923 to become the head of *matbuat müdüriyeti* and who was one of the founders of the daily *Cumhuriyet*, recounts such an act of defiance in his memoires:

Nebizade Hamdi and I were publishing a daily by the name *Yeni Ses* in those days. We were young, excited, sad and in a state of revolt. We were unable to cope with the pressure of the [Allied] censorship. Finally, one day we went mad and decided to publish our newspaper without showing [the proofs] to the censors. We prepared vehement writings and statements, resembling manifestos, calling the people to rise in revolt and we filled the newspaper with these and sent it to print. [The two of us] hid in a friend’s house, where the British would be unable to find us. The next morning the newspaper was distributed all over Istanbul and created great commotion. The Occupation Forces took immediate action. [They] had the copies they found confiscated, stormed and sealed our [offices], they searched for us but could not find us. Nothing good could come out of this action of ours. We were aware of this. But

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266 See three such reports: ATASE İSH kutu no. 83, gömlek no. 17, belge 1-3, 6/2/35 [6 February 1919], 7/2/35 [7 February 1919], 8/2/35 [8 February 1919].
being unable to express the defiance we felt had choked us. This was a drawing of breath. Nothing more, nothing less.267

Asım Us explains that censorship was not only limited to removing information, but also forcing a certain type of information to be published in the form of teblig-i resmi (official notices), which were handed out to publishers by special officers accompanied by armed soldiers, who explained that severe punishments would be meted out to those who refused to publish them. One day, Asım Us was invited to matbuat müdüriyeti, where he was informed that the government was not pleased with Vakit’s publications. Asım Us, who replied that his newspaper followed all the rules, published the government issued teblig-i resmis and never criticized them, adding that his newspaper underwent censorship in accordance with regulations, was told that he was expected not only not to criticize Istanbul’s government, but also to write positive things about it. In other words, he was being warned not to abstain from writing, but rather to write positively about the government, which he, in an act of defiance, refused to do. A few weeks later he was called in to martial court.268

The literary magazine Küçük Mecmua also adopted a defiant stance in the face of censorship. Initially so careful to avoid raising the censors’ suspicions that its contents was dull in the extreme, to the extent, according to Sertel, that readers might imagine the authors to be “completely uninterested in the hellish life in Istanbul and the whole country in those days” and "might believe that the intellectuals were living in a fantasy world”, erupted in massive protest following the occupation of Izmir by the Greeks. Sertel commented that although most articles were censored, the magazine had every appearance of being in an act of


268 Asım Us, Gördüklerim, Duydüklerim ve Duygularım – Meşrutiyet ve Cumhuriyet Devirlerine ait Hatıralar ve Tetkikler (İstanbul: Vakit, 1964), pp. 24-25.
revolt, probably referring to the large gaps in the articles where the censors had been at work. Wholesale removal of chunks of text was, after all, a highly visible sign that a publication was doing something that the censors did not like and these blanks in the print were signals of non-compliance.

The chart in Figure 9 further reveals the strong Allied influence on the censorship of the press through the varying levels of harshness with which different newspapers were hit. These differences show that, while the censorship apparatus seems to have worked indiscriminately amongst different dailies, some of these newspapers bore the brunt of the censorship, while others were treated in a milder manner. Vakit appears to have encountered more censorship than İkdam, while Peyam-i Sabah, for the issues available during the research, almost always had significantly less text removed by the censors. This difference coincides with how the British perceived these dailies.

In Peyam-i Sabah, under the direction of Ali Kemal, the British had found a powerful ally in Istanbul’s media. A well known opposition journalist, who had briefly served as minister of the interior, and supporter of the sultan, Ali Kemal believed that the salvation for the empire lay in gaining the favour of the Allies. His animosity towards the National Forces, whom he, much like the British, considered a reincarnation of the CUP, further facilitated his relations with the British, who regarded him favourably. A report on the Ottoman press composed for the Allied commissioner in December 1918, described Ali Kemal, who would become the editor of Peyam-i Sabah in 1920, as a furious opponent of the earlier regime and an archenemy of Talat, Enver and other CUP leaders. In March 1919, a similar report nominated Ali Kemal "one of the best journalists of Constantinople", although adding that his honesty was sometimes the prey of his expensive tastes. Furthermore, one and a half years later, the British foreign office’s guide to the Turkish press in 1921 described Peyam-i Sabah as "foremost

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269 Mehmet Zekeriya [Sertel], *Hatırladıklarım*, pp. 74-75: "Yazarlar, ilk zamanlarda öyle konularla uğraşıyor ve öyle şeyler yazıyorlardı ki, sanki İstanbul’un ve memleketin günü cehennem hayatı onları hiç ilgilendirmiyordu. Dergiyi okuyanlar, o vakitki Türk aydınlarının sanki bir hayal aleminde yaşadıklarına hükümetebilirlerdi".

270 TNA FO 471/3421, No. 209964, 21 December 1918, "La Presse Turque", p. 2

271 TNA FO 371/4141, No. 49194, 8 March 1919, "Part IV. Influence of the Committee in the Turkish Press".
among Opposition organs; hostile to the Committee of Union and Progress, Ali Kémal (who is a Philippic), at present directing his antagonism against the Forces Nationales, which he looks upon as the revival of the Party."\textsuperscript{272} It should also be noted that, as described in the chapter on finance, \textit{Peyam-i Sabah} enjoyed a disproportionate amount of advertisement from foreign companies and the Allied administration, suggesting that the political link was further cemented by financial support. \textit{Vakit}, on the other hand, represented the opposite viewpoint. Its owner, Yale graduate Ahmed Emin Yalman, was among the people who had been exiled to Malta, in order to be tried for having connections to the CUP. Asım Us, one of the journalists for \textit{Vakit}, was harassed for his publications for apparently illegitimate reasons, simply for not being supportive enough of the occupied government.\textsuperscript{273} Initially, in 1918, the British described \textit{Vakit} as a natural ally of the Young Turk movement, yet moderate,\textsuperscript{274} but it was regarded in the 1921 guide as a "fervent propagandist of Wilsonian ideas in Turkey, and under cover of acting in the name of the American principle which accords to every people the right of self-government, the paper strives hard to revive the Unionist system in Turkish political circles"\textsuperscript{275} and as "one of the most cynical and chauvinistic organs of Turkish irredentism."\textsuperscript{276} Finally, \textit{İkdam} is described as not having any pronounced political tendencies in December 1918,\textsuperscript{277} and similarly as lacking political colour in domestic affairs but having made occasional immoderate comments about the Allies in the 1921 guide.\textsuperscript{278}

As far as the British were concerned, the main difference between \textit{Vakit} and \textit{Peyam-i Sabah} was their respective support and opposition to the CUP, whom they considered the enemy and of which they considered that the Anatolian Nationalist Movement was a resurrection. Naturally, Mustafa Kemal's organizing the national resistance in Anatolia were considered to be against Allied

\textsuperscript{273}Asım Us, \textit{Gördüklerim}, pp. 24-28.
\textsuperscript{274}TNA FO 471/3421, No. 209964, 21 December 1918, "La Presse Turque", p. 1
\textsuperscript{275}TNA FO 141/504, "A Guide to the Press of Egypt and the Soudan and Constantinople", April 1921, p. 36
\textsuperscript{276}TNA FO 141/504, "A Guide to the Press of Egypt and the Soudan and Constantinople", April 1921, p. 34.
\textsuperscript{277}TNA FO 471/3421, No. 209964, 21 December 1918, "La Presse Turque", p. 2
\textsuperscript{278}TNA FO 141/504, "A Guide to the Press of Egypt and the Soudan and Constantinople", April 1921, p. 35.
Fourth Chapter: Censorship

interests. The opposition to the Nationalists formed a key characteristic of the Allied censorship until mid-1921, after which it took a more neutral form. Yunus Nadi, a journalist who was arrested during the occupation for publishing "illegal material", a charge which the court was unable to prove with specific examples, wrote that Ali Kemal’s Peyam, which argued in its publications that the country should remain under British occupation because the Ottomans were incapable of governing themselves, received British and French backing, while adding that the occupied press showed strong signs of palace influence and published along the lines of presenting the sultan-caliph as the only possible salvation.

According to Asım Us, who was a journalist with Vakit during the armistice, it had become impossible for pro-nationalist papers to mention the nationalist forces openly. This is further supported when the fact is considered that Izmir, the second largest press centre of the Ottoman Empire, was subjected to pre-print censorship, starting in December 1918 and at British request. Yet, in several other cities, either specific newspapers or the entire press were censored only after August 1919, i.e. when the Nationalist movement was making itself public through Amasya Tamimi and Erzurum Kongresi.

Indeed, when the nationalist movement declared its intentions to open the Grand National Assembly in April 1920, neither Vakit nor İkdam mentioned a word about it nor did they have any articles directly related to the nationalist movement, but both Vakit and İkdam had their main articles removed by censorship.

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281 Asım Us, Gördüklerim p. 24.
282 BOA DHŞFR 608/76, 21/12/1334 [21 December 1918]: The vali (governor) of İzmir, İbrahim, informed dahilîye nezareti (ministry of the interior) that the British commander in İzmir requested this at the end of December 1918, on the grounds that some newspapers were causing inter-communal strife. BOA DH ŞFR 609/26, 2/1/35 [2 January 1919]: This request was repeated a few days later. BOA DH ŞFR 610/92, 15/1/35 [15 January 1919]: although it is not clear when it started, two weeks later the vali informed the minister of the interior that censorship would continue for some time to come.
283 BOA DH KMS 54-2/78, 20 Ağustos 1335 [20 August 1919]: Censorship applied to İtidal and İmdad in Eskişehir. DH KMS 54-2/78, 10 Ağustos 1335 [10 August 1919]: All newspapers in Havza (Samsun) must undergo censorship due to "tahdiş-i ezhan" (inciting) content in publications. BOA DH ŞFR 641/54, 11 Teşrinievel 1919 [11 October 1919]: Orders that İkaz in Karahisar must be suspended or censored.
284 Vakit No. 882, 5 Şaban 1338, 24 Nisan 1336-1920 [25 April 1920]: Main article removed by censorship.
censors on the 24th of April, the day following the opening of the Grand National Assembly. While it could be a coincidence, it appears far more likely that the total removal of the main articles was an act designed to prevent the opinions of pro-nationalist and neutral newspapers and coverage of the opening of the Grand National Assembly from reaching the public. In contrast, Peyam-i Sabah, in the days leading up to the opening of the Grand National Assembly published an article by Ali Kemal, under the headline "The Best Course of Action":

Charlatanism, shamelessness, and backstabbing are arts. We should meet with approval and laughter the clownish behaviour of these tyrants, whose skills in these arts we cannot deny, in forming governments, establishing Extraordinary National Parliaments, [...] appointing that parrot Halide Edip, of whom we all know what she is capable of, minister of education and then sending fabricated telegrams to Europe [claiming] while no woman minister exists in a developed country, in Mustafa Kemal’s government a woman had attained such a position. It is as they stoop like this that the scandals of that CUP-nest will become apparent.286

Apart from being ridiculed, and in rather sharp contrast to it, Ali Kemal suggested that they should all be punished by being hanged by invoking images of executions.

While Vakit and İkdam, probably forced to do so by censors, refrained from talking about the Nationalist Movement, Ali Kemal’s Peyam-i Sabah very regularly covered the movement negatively. It ignored the defeat of Anzavur at the hands of Çerkes Edhem, who was at that point acting for the Nationalist Forces, claiming that operations were still under way and were very

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285 İkdam No. 8331, 5 Şaban 1338, 24 Nisan 1336-1920 [25 April 1920]: Main article removed by censorship.
286 Peyam-i Sabah (Sabah No. 10932, Peyam No. 502), 29 Recep 1338, 20 Nisan 1336-1920 [20 April 1920]. "En Doğru Yol": "Şarlatanlık, bihayalık, kahapelik fendir bütün bu fenlerde meharetlerini inkar edemeyeceğiz o zorbaların hükümetler, medis-i Milli-i Fevkaladeleler teşkil eylemek, [...] ne işler gördüğünü hepimiz bildiğimiz Halide Edip hanım tutusunu maarif nazari tayin edmek, sonra henzü hiç bir müterakki memlekte taife-i nişadan nazır yok ıken Mustafa Kemal hükümünde bir Türk kadını bu mertebeye ihraz eyledi diye Avrupa’ya musanna telgraflar göndermek gibi maskaralıkları hoş görmeli ve bahkahalarla karşılıkmayız. Böyle suikut ettikcedir ki İttihad ve Terakki ocağının rezaletleri bısbüttün tezahür eyler".
successful,\textsuperscript{287} while in reality Anzavur had been routed one week earlier and was on his way to Istanbul. Ali Kemal accused Mustafa Kemal, Kazım Karabekir and Ali Fuad Cebesoy of being brigands ("haydut"), gang leaders ("çete reisi") and despicable cowards ("namerd"), while predicting a swift and harsh punishment for them.\textsuperscript{288} \textit{Peyam-i Sabah} continued its attacks, publishing articles peppered with derogatory terms, until 1921,\textsuperscript{289} writing in early January 1921, in the days leading up to the First Battle of İnönü, that Sadrazam Damad Ferid had sent Mustafa Kemal to Anatolia, but that the latter had revolted:

The former Sadrazam wanted to defend our rights abroad by first securing order domestically. With this concern he dispatched Mustafa Kemal and his friends to Anatolia. But those [overly ambitious men], because they care more about their lives and themselves than for their country, revolted at the first opportunity and pushed the state as a whole into a weak position. Concretely, domestically they razed and destroyed Anatolia, perpetrated every possible malice against even the white collar workers, the traders and shopkeepers of Istanbul and abroad they destroyed our relations with the Allies, they caused the terms of our peace agreements to be even heavier for us, and as if that was not enough, they caused another couple of our provinces to be occupied by the Greeks.\textsuperscript{290}

Furthermore, \textit{Peyam-i Sabah} clearly argued that military conflict against the Greeks was causing more harm than good and that the only solution for the

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Peyam-Sabah} (Sabah No. 10933, Peyam No. 503), 30 Recep 1338, 21 Nisan 1336-1920 [21 April 1920], "Anzavur Paşa'nun Harekatı".
\item \textit{Peyam-i Sabah} (Sabah No. 10937, Peyam No. 507), 6 Şaban 1338, 25 Nisan 1336-1920 [25 April 1920], "İdam! İdam!".
\item \textit{Peyam-i Sabah} (Sabah No. 11186, Peyam No. 756), 1 Cemazeyilevel 1339, 11 Kanunusani 1337-1921 [11 January 1921]: "Niçin?": While not specifically naming Mustafa Kemal or the Nationalist movement, Ali Kemal uses "zorbalar" ("bullies") and "başbozuk" ("crazies", referring to bashi-bazouk troops) for the people who have been causing unrest during the First World War and since the armistice, i.e. the Nationalist Forces.
\item \textit{Peyam-i Sabah} (Sabah No. 11181, Peyam No. 751), 26 Rabiulahir 1339H, 6 Kanunusani 1337-1921 [6 January 1921], "İbret ve Nefret": "Sadr-i asbak ki [...] dahilde aşayiş teşvik ettiğim moneta hariçte metin bir siyasetle hukuk-i mensubemiz müdaf etmek istedik, bu endişеye Mustafa Kemalleri Anadolu'ya o memur etti. O [muhtarlar] da memleketten ziyade o canların, şahslarının düşündükleri için, ilk firsatta ayaklandular, devleti büsbütün zafa düşürdüllер. Filvakia dahilen Anadolu'yu kazılar, kuvvurlar, memurlarınndan tacirlerine, esnaflına kadar İstanbul halkın da her fenaliği ettiler, haricen İtilaf devletleriyle aramızı bozdular, şerait-i sulhîyemizin bir mertebe daha ağırlaşmasına sebep oldular, onunla da kalmadilar bir iki vilayetimizi daha Yunanistan'ın istila etmesine salk-i [illegible] oldular...".
\end{itemize}
Turks was maintaining good relations with the Allies.\textsuperscript{291} During this time, both \textit{Vakit} and \textit{İkdam} again refrained from giving their opinions on the conflict and reporting the battles mainly from Greek sources, while devoting their editorial columns to subjects like "The first Sufis in Turkish literature"\textsuperscript{292} and "How to get the villager to love his village".\textsuperscript{293}

The Allied control of censorship and its effect on \textit{Peyam-ı Sabah} is clearly visible due to a British shift in policy in mid-1921. This resulted in a temporary yet very abrupt change in \textit{Peyam-ı Sabah}'s tone. Towards the end of March 1921, the Second Battle of İnönü took place, which, in terms of Istanbul's censorship, was a tipping point. In the days leading up to the battle, \textit{Peyam-ı Sabah} was expressing the same opinions as it always had: it accused the National Forces of being solely responsible for the further Greek occupation of Anatolia,\textsuperscript{294} while predicting that Mustafa Kemal's belligerence would bring even greater damage to the country than the First World War.\textsuperscript{295} However, almost overnight, without the outcome of the second battle yet known, \textit{Peyam-ı Sabah} changed its opinion dramatically regarding who the transgressors were and who was to blame for the violence:

As we have said, because our inefficient governments, with their inefficient policies, were unable to reduce the ill-feelings of the Allies towards us, the Greeks have plunderously trodden over these places and they wish to continue to do so. These places [...] [where] six hundred years ago a Turkish khan arrived and created the foundations of this sultanate. How can the Ottoman Turks not defend the sanctity of such a khan with all their blood and their lives? How can they not forget all their other concerns in the face of such a great attack? How can they not work with great resolve as an iron mass forming a unity to fend off such treachery? A good nation, when charged with such a patriotic duty, will not

\textsuperscript{291} For example, see: \textit{Peyam-ı Sabah} (Sabah No. 11188, \textit{Peyam} No. 758), 3 Cemazeyilevel 1339, 13 Kanunusani 1337-1921 [13 January 1921]: "Yok! Yok! Yok!" and \textit{Peyam-ı Sabah} (Sabah No. 11188, \textit{Peyam} No. 758), 4 Cemazeyilevel 1339, 14 Kanunusani 1337-1921 [14 January 1921]: "19 Kanunusani" and \textit{Peyam-ı Sabah} (Sabah No. 11179, \textit{Peyam} No. 749), 24 Rabıulahir 1339, 4 Kanunusani 1337-1921 [4 January 1921], "İtidal ile".

\textsuperscript{292} \textit{İkdam} No. 8563, 3 Cemazeyilevel 1339, 13 Kanunusani 1337-1921 [13 January 1921], "Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi - Türk Edebiyatında İlk Mutasavvıflar".

\textsuperscript{293} \textit{İkdam} No. 8565, 5 Cemazeyilevel 1339, 15 Kanunusani 1337-1921 [15 January 1921], "Köylüye Köyünü Sevdirmek"

\textsuperscript{294} \textit{Peyam-ı Sabah} (Sabah No. 11257, \textit{Peyam} No. 827), 14 Recep 1339H, 23 Mart 1337-1921 [23 March 1921], "Haza Min Fazlı Rabbi".

\textsuperscript{295} \textit{Peyam-ı Sabah} (Sabah No. 11258, \textit{Peyam} No. 828), 15 Recep 1339H, 24 Mart 1337-1921 [24 March 1921], "Barut Kokuları".

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have time to think about the inefficiency and mistakes of its government, but reach for its crescent moon and weapons and plunge into battle. [...] Regardless of the difficulties and hurdles of our duty, the enemy transgression must be brought to a halt and, once it has been stopped, we must have this matter brought before the courts of justice of the nations. As we have always said, our cause cannot be won by force alone. It requires politics. The government in Ankara that is still chasing adventures in Batumi, the Caucasus, Iraq and other places cannot conduct or follow such politics [...]. That duty can be performed by the Sublime Porte, which is a true representative of the caliphate and the sultanate, and knows the world, in other words Europe and the Powers, better than [the Ankara government].

Not only was the blame for the conflict shifted from the Nationalist Forces to the Greeks overnight, but suddenly the leaders of the Nationalist Forces, branded traitors, brigands and gang leaders just two months earlier, were showered with compliments. "It is possible" the paper noted in March 1921, "that the majority of those who have created Ankara and the National Forces, especially the vigorous, determined and devout military leaders, are people who love their country and their people with great conviction. Indubitably, they are so. For, it is especially because they are like this [that they understand that] the military is one thing and that politics are another." The newspaper went on to say that the leaders in Ankara could not be blamed for their lack of experience in

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297 Peyam-i Sabah (Sabah No. 11262, Peyam No. 832), 19 Recep 1339H, 28 Mart 1337-1921 [28 March 1921], "Böyle Olmayacaktı": "Ankara'ya, Kuva-i Milliyye-i ekseriyetle vücuda getirenler, bilhassa o dinc, azmen, imanen dinc erkan-i askeriye memleketlerini, milleketlerini canlandır iman ile seven insanlar olabilirler, ve hiç şüphе yok öyledirler, memafılı bilhassa böyle oldukları için - askerlik başka, siyaset başkadar".
international politics, for they were soldiers and that nobody held this against them. Not only were the Nationalist leaders now praised, they were also now accorded titles. Until this point, it had been illegal to use military rank titles for Mustafa Kemal, Kazim Karabekir and the rest of the leaders in Ankara, as they had been stripped of their ranks by the Istanbul government. Even the use of the title bey could prove problematic. In July 1920, Vakit journalist Asim Us had been summied to a court martial for printing Mustafa Kemal Bey, which the court argued was an official rank. Asim Us reminded the court that the porter at their office was also called Ali Bey, which did not mean that the man had a rank.298 This can also be seen during the first battle in January where Vakit mentions İsmet Bey. Even on the 24th of March in 1921, Peyam-ı Sabah still referred to Mustafa Kemal without giving him a title.299 However, three days later, Peyam-ı Sabah contained a headline saying "Mustafa Kemal Paşa is at the Front" and bestowed the same title on Kazım Karabekir.300 In April, it also acknowledged the fact that Mustafa Kemal was given the rank of Müşir (Marshall) by the Grand National Assembly.301 Similarly, it dedicated a poem to the soldiers of the National Forces, calling them "our warriors" and speaking of the fallen soldiers as "our martyrs" and of the victory as "our victory".302 Finally, there was a noticeable shift from Greek sources (which had also been the main source

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298 Asım Us, Gördüklerim, p. 28.
299 See for example: Peyam-ı Sabah (Sabah No. 11258, Peyam No. 828), 15 Recep 1339, 24 Mart 1337-1921 [24 March 1921]; "Barut Kokuları".
300 Peyam-ı Sabah (Sabah No. 11261, Peyam No. 831), 18 Recep 1339, 27 Mart 1337-1921 [27 March 1921]:"Mustafa Kemal Paşa Cephede".
301 Peyam-ı Sabah (Sabah No. 11262, Peyam No. 832), 19 Recep 1339, 28 Mart 1337-1921 [28 March 1921]:"Andolu'da Umumi Seferberlik: [...] Kazım Karabekir Paşa'nın Kuvvetinden Bir Kısım Eskişehir'e Geldi".
302 Peyam-ı Sabah (Sabah No. 11273, Peyam No. 843), 1 Şaban 1339, 8 Nisan 1337-1921 [8 April 1921]:"Mustafa Kemal Paşa Müşir Oldu - Metris Tepe'de Şühegamız İçin bir Abide İnşasını Takarrür Etti".
303 Peyam-ı Sabah (Sabah No. 11273, Peyam No. 843), 1 Şaban 1339, 8 Nisan 1337-1921 [8 April 1921], "Cephelerde Kahraman Mücahitlerimize".
304 Peyam-ı Sabah (Sabah No. 11273, Peyam No. 843), 1 Şaban 1339, 8 Nisan 1337-1921 [8 April 1921]:"Mustafa Kemal Paşa Müşir Oldu - Metris Tepe'de Şühegamız İçin bir Abide İnşasını takarrur etti".
305 Peyam-ı Sabah (Sabah No. 11273 Peyam No. 843), 1 Şaban 1339H, 8 Nisan 1337-1921 [8 April 1921], "Nabi Bey Muzafferiyetimizi İzah Ediyor".
during the First Battle of İnönü for all three newspapers), to Anatolian news sources, including Ankara's official news agency Anadolu Ajansı.  

*Peyam-ı Sabah*’s sudden shift in attitude can be explained through a change in Allied policy. The British had been disappointed by Venizelos losing the elections in Greece and started to realize that pursuing the agreements of the Sèvres Treaty appeared to be unrealistic because the nationalists were achieving unexpected successes and could no longer be left out of the equation. This prompted the Allies to adopt a more cautious attitude, which led to Britain declaring its neutrality in the Turkish-Greek war. A day before Ali Kemal’s great change of heart, his newspaper carried a headline stating that the British had under no circumstances encouraged the Greek attack. British neutrality and lack of support for the Greeks was repeated over the next few days and at the same time a headline reported that the Porte had lodged a protest with the powers regarding Greek aggressions, thereby revealing either a supportive or at least a neutral position from these parties towards the nationalists. All such statements had been forbidden under censorship rules and had even been punishable a few months earlier.

This turning point reveals unmistakably that, although both Ottoman and Allied censorship officers were used, it were the latter who pulled the strings. For, while censorship was still being applied, *Vakit* and *İkdam* were from then on allowed to celebrate Ankara’s victories, which had not been possible earlier. On the other hand, *Peyam-ı Sabah*’s change of heart was only temporary, and it soon

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306 *Peyam-ı Sabah* (Sabah No. 11263, Peyam No. 833), 20 Recep 1339, 29 Mart 1337-1921 [29 March 1921], "Anadolu’nun İlk Tebligleri", "Anadolu Haberleri". Greek sources remained, but less prominently so. See: "Yunan Tebligleri Ne diyor?".

307 *Peyam-ı Sabah* (Sabah No. 11260, Peyam No. 830), 17 Recep 1339, 26 Mart 1337-1921 [26 March 1921], "İngilizler ve Anadolu Harekatı": “Büyük Britanya hükümeti Yunanları Katiyyen Tesci Etmemiştir”.

308 *Peyam-ı Sabah* (Sabah No. 11261, Peyam No. 831), 18 Recep 1339, 27 Mart 1337-1921 [27 March 1921], "İngiltere’nin Bitaraflığı".

309 *Peyam-ı Sabah* (Sabah No. 11262, Peyam No. 832), 19 Recep 1339, 28 Mart 1337-1921 [28 March 1921], "Andolu’da Umumi Seferberlik": General Harrington was ordered by the British government to step down as commander of Greek troops in İzmit.

310 *Peyam-ı Sabah* (Sabah No. 11261, Peyam No. 831), 18 Recep 1339, 27 Mart 1337-1921 [27 March 1921]: "Bab-ı Ali’nin Protestosu".
resumed its attacks on the nationalists. This suggests that not Peyam-ı Sabah’s policy, which was arguably the palace’s viewpoint, but British policy dictated the rules of censorship. So, in September 1921, Peyam-ı Sabah wrote:

[censored] ideas cannot be changed by force. Whatever happens, the truth cannot be suppressed. Right now it is an obvious truth that, as had happened during the World War, this time [censored], exactly as with the Committee of Union of Progress, the path chosen by the Nationalist Forces too has dragged this country and people into catastrophes all over again. Every [person] with a [clean] consciousness admits this now.

It is noteworthy, as can be seen in the chart in Figure 9, that the only occurrence of Peyam-ı Sabah being subjected to more censorship than either Vakit or İşadam occurred in September and October 1921. September 1921 was when the Sakarya battle ended in a Turkish victory and a Greek defeat, and which arguably constituted a breaking point for British foreign policy as even The Times started to suggest that a new direction should be pursued in British Near East policy.

Although there were shifts in the Allied policy towards Ankara, Peyam-ı Sabah continued its attacks on the nationalists unabatedly. In August 1922, as the Dumlupınar battle, which would end in the expulsion of the Greek army from Anatolia in September 1922, had just started, Peyam-ı Sabah questioned Ankara’s integrity because of its participation in the London conferences:

If Ankara had been sincere in its warmongering efforts from the beginning, would it then act as [it does now]? What was that pickle? And what is this diet? [i.e. why this change in attitude]. How then can [Ankara] join peace talks with

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311 See for example: Peyam-ı Sabah (Sabah No. [11415], Peyam No. 984), 28 Zilhicce 1339, 2 Eylül 1337-1921 [2 September 1921], "Hakiki Müdafaa-i Milliye": Accusing Ankara of being a miniature version of Moscow; Peyam-ı Sabah (Sabah No. 11457, Peyam No. 1027), 12 Safer 1340, 14 Teşrinievvel 1337-1921 [14/90/1921], "Tavassut Sözleri": Ankara is accused of having chosen a military solution for a problem that cannot be solved by conflict, thereby wasting millions of the people’s money and causing the needless deaths of thousands of young men.

312 Peyam-ı Sabah (Sabah No. [11415], Peyam No. 984), 27 Zilhicce 1339, 1 Eylül 1337-1921 [1 September 1921], "Beklediklerimiz": [censored] fikre karşı kuvvet para etmez, ne olursa olsun, hakka, hakikate galbe çalınamaz. Bu dem pek bariz bir hakikattır ki Harb-i Umumi esnasında [censored], tpki Ittihad ve Terakki gibi Kuvva-i Milliye’nin tuttuğu yol da bu devlet ve milleti yeniden yeniye badirlerle sürükledi, bunu şimdi her sahib-i insaf teslim eyler“.

the Greeks today? [...] The Sublime Porte never opted for armed conflict or
defence against the Greek transgression because it realized how we had
emerged from the World War and to what degree we were restricted by [the
Sèvres] Treaty. It could only trust [Allied] politics and that, eventually, from
these politics would emerge a change for the better. It hoped that we could
receive the support from the [Allies] once we overcame the excesses and
demands from our government and sovereignty which were unacceptable to
Europe. How dare Ankara, when it acted in complete opposition to these efforts,
change its direction? If they really are abandoning their drive to solve this issue
with cannons and rifles, then, for the sake of this country and its people, the very
first duty of the men of the National Forces, as we have always said, is to move
aside and leave our fate in the hands of a Sublime Porte which represents the
caliphate and the sultanate.314

However, once the National Forces achieved decisive victory, by expelling the
Greek army from Anatolia, and this was known as a certainty, Ali Kemal, in an
article titled "Our Goals Were One and Are One", cautiously admitted that he
might have been wrong by not having confidence in the abilities of the National
Forces, but that he was happy to see the outcome.315 Shortly after this, Sabah
announced that it would no longer be cooperating with Peyam, and that it fully
supported the national cause, thereby ending the joint Peyam-i Sabah
publication, which had started in 1919.

İkdam and Vakit had been able to show support for the Nationalist movement
after mid-1921. However, the Allied censors only tolerated this as long as it was
not against their interests. As can be seen in the chart in Figure 9, both dailies

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314 Peyam-i Sabah (Sabah No. 11769, Peyam No. 1339), 4 Muharrem 1341, 28 Ağustos 1338-1922
[28 August 1922], "Siyasette Mantık": "Ankara ichtidadan ictihad-i cenkcuyanesinde samimi
olsaydı, şimdi böyle m, hareket ederdi? O turşu neydii? Bu perhiz nedir? Nasıl Yunan ile bugün bir
sulh masasının başına geçebilir? [...] bir Bab-ı Ali hükümeti ki Yunan'ın bu tecavüzü karşı hiç
bir zaman silahla mukavemet, müdafaa ihtiyar etmedi. Çünkü Harb-ı Umumi'den nasıl çıktığımızı,
bu mutarekename ile ne derece mukayyet olduğumuzu biliyordu, ancak devletlerin siyasetlerine,
siyasetlerinden er geç bir imtiyazın husuluna itimat edebiliyordu. Biz hükümet ve hakimiyetimizi
Avrupa’ların kabul edemeyeceği efratlardan, ihtiraslardan tenziye edince, aynı devletlerin bu
yolda muzaheretlerine nih olabileceği umuyordu. Ankara böyle bir ictihadin büsbütün
zddna gittiği iken ne yüze şimdi sağıldan geri edebiliriz? Filhakika toplu, tufekle bu davayı
fasletmek iddaasını birakayollarsa bu devlet ve milletin selametini için Kuva-i Milliye ricaline tertip
eden en birinci vazife mukadderatımız, daime dediğimiz gibi, hıfazat ve saltanati temsil eden bir
Bab-i Ali’ye tefriz ederek çekilmektir".

315 Peyam-i Sabah (Sabah No. 11782, Peyam No. 1352), 17 Muharrem 1341, 10 Eylül 1338-1922
[10 September 1922], "Gayeler Birdi ve Birdir".
continued to be censored frequently until the Allied censorship was lifted in November 1922. For example, the peak which is apparent for both dailies in October 1922 can be attributed to the fact that the front pages during this month were dominated by the Mudanya peace talks between Ankara and the British, which ended in Eastern Thrace being evacuated and handed to the Turks. It is highly likely that Vakit and İkdam portrayed this as a major Turkish victory over the British, thus causing the Allied censors to intervene to prevent statements that could be damaging to British prestige.

With Istanbul and Izmir, the major press centres of Anatolia, under Allied and Greek occupation and censorship, the nationalist movement in Ankara found itself, from the very beginning, without a platform to voice its own position. Furthermore, the press in these cities was not merely unable to support the movement, but it was also openly hostile to the nationalist cause. However, the nationalists were very much aware of the power of propaganda, as conducted through the press. In response to this, on the one hand, steps were taken to prevent hostile propaganda from entering the territory under the control of the Grand National Assembly and, on the other hand, a nationalist press infrastructure was created with the purpose of disseminating propaganda both domestically and internationally.

The Ankara government regarded the Istanbul press, because of the Allied censorship, as being in opposition to the interests of the Nationalists. On the 28 September 1921, Hakimiyet-i Milliye, the semi-official mouthpiece of the National Forces and the Grand National Assembly, explained what it believed was the problem with the “foreign censorship” in Istanbul:

What is it that the Istanbul censorship does not allow to be written? These [topics] tally up to an innumerably large, meaningless, illogical, and merciless total. [...] However, there is one thing that we cannot but mention. That is that the censorship in Istanbul does not allow our Turkish colleagues to write about Greek atrocities. We understand, from very reliable letters, and we see, by following Istanbul’s newspapers, that the censorship in Istanbul tries to keep the press from writing even a paragraph about the atrocities of the uncivilised [Greeks] who are burning down and destroying Anatolia. Why? Why should the
atrocities [committed by] these monsters, who maim children and women in Anatolia indiscriminately, be kept from surfacing? [...] It would be difficult to show a better example that reveals what a great lie Istanbul's neutrality is.\textsuperscript{316}

The article further noted that the Greeks could say whatever they wished about the Turks in the Greek press in Istanbul, but that the Turkish press in Istanbul was not allowed to mention Greek atrocities.

Furthermore, in response to the negative press they received from Istanbul, Ankara established a news agency called \textit{Anadolu Ajansı}, which still exists today. In its founding statement, the occupation of Istanbul and the requirement for disseminating (what the nationalists considered) correct information to the public, are given as important reasons to establish the agency:

Because of the importance of the need to enlighten the people with correct domestic and foreign news during the national and holy war, in which Rumeli and Anatolia partake as a whole because the Ottoman capital is under enemy occupation and the entire country and nation is exposed to the gravest danger, an institution by the name Anadolu Ajansı, was formed here, consisting of a committee of the most trustworthy people. As the news and information spread by Anadolu Ajansı through the fastest means will actually be the real and reliable source [of information] from our Heyet-i Temsiliye (the proto-government in Ankara), its bulletins will be disseminated.\textsuperscript{317}

\textsuperscript{316} Hakimiyet-i Milliye No. 306, 26 Muharrem 1340, 28 Eylül 1337-1921 [28 September 1921], "İstanbul Sansürü": "İstanbul sansörü neleri yazdırmıyor? Bu sayılıp dökülemecek kadar çok, manasız, mantıksız, insafsız bir yekün tutar. [...] Fakat kemal-i lisanla söylemekten vazgeçemediğimiz bir şey var. O da İstanbul sansürünün Türkçe rufekamızda Yunan mezalimini yazdırmamamıdır. Algığışız gayet mevsuk mektuplardan anıyoruz ve İstanbul gazetelerini takip ile de görüyoruz ki İstanbul sansörü Anadolu’yu yakıp yakan vahşilerin zulmünden, matbuata bir satır bile çizmemece çalşıyor. Niçin? Anadolu içinde kadın, çocuk, dalle demeden kesen, yakın canavarların zulüm niçin meydana çıkmam? [...] İstanbul bitaraflığının ne büyük yalan olduğuunu bu sansür misali kadar güzel numune göstermek cidden müzeldir”.

In launching its own information outlet, Ankara was not only concerned with having its own voice heard, but also in countering what it regarded as "foreign propaganda". One month after the founding of Anadolu Ajansı, Mustafa Kemal sent a note to all vilayets, stressing the importance of Anadolu Ajansı, but this time specifically mentioning it as a countering move to enemy propaganda, arguing that "the reason for creating Anadolu Ajansı was to provide true and correct information to every individual regarding domestic and foreign events and [in doing so] to safeguard them from the negative influence of foreign propaganda." Anadolu Ajansı soon became active and its bulletins, printed twice daily, were distributed to even the smallest villages by means of gendarmes and tax-collectors. A message from Mustafa Kemal informed post and telegraph offices in Erzurum, Trabzon, Van, Diyarbekir, Sivas, Konya, Kastamonu, Hüdavendigar and Edirne that Anadolu Ajansı bulletins should be distributed without delay and that in all cities where newspapers were published, editors should receive a copy of the bulletins. The 14th Corps in Bursa was ordered to print special bulletins for Istanbul and distribute them to important agencies in the capital.

In the eyes of the governments in Ankara and Istanbul and the Allies the press could be an effective vessel for (harmful) propaganda. The Grand National Assembly, in May 1920, mere weeks after its opening under the jeering remarks of Peyam-i Sabah, passed a decision to the effect that not only official correspondence from Istanbul, but also any newspaper printed in Istanbul was to be barred from entering Anatolia. Anybody who received such material was to immediately return it to the sender, or, otherwise, be charged with treason.

Two weeks later, on 20 May 1920, a sansür talimatı (censorship directive) was

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318 ATASE İSH kutu no. 575. gömlek no. 163, belge no. 163-1, 4/5/36 [4 May 1920]: "Anadolu Ajansı’nın tesisinden maksat her Ferd-i Ahalinin hadisat-ı dahiliye ve hariciye hakkında sahih ve hakkı malumat istihlalı ile harici propaganda lerin tesirat-ı muzrasından vareteş kalmalarını temin edilmişine göre her gün muntazaman verilen ajansların mahalli matbuat ve ilaveler neşri suretiyle büyük şehir ve kasablarda ve köylerde her türlü vesaite müracaatla tamım ve nécessaire fevaid azimeyi mucip olacağandan bu bapta lazımı ihlimam buyurulmuş elzem ve vakit ve zamanyyla gelemeney ajanslar hakkında posta ve telgraf merakizinde tahkikat icrasıyla maksadın her suretle temini sarf-ı himmet buyurulması rica olunur".

319 ATASE İSH kutu no. 273, gömlek no. 91, belge no. 91-1, 12/4/36 [12 April 1920].

320 ATASE İSH kutu no. 273, gömlek no. 120, belge no. 120-9, 14/4/36 [14 April 1920].

321 ATASE İSH kutu no. 273, gömlek no. 205, belge no. 205-1, 21/4/26 [21 April 1920].

322 BCA 30.18.1.1/1.1.2, 6 May 1920.
published in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, which instructed post offices on how censorship would be conducted, and here, too, it was made clear that allowing Istanbul newspapers into Anatolia would be considered treason. The ban on newspapers was not unilateral, as Istanbul, too, took measures to prevent Ankara’s press from being distributed. In late April 1921 copies of *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* were seized by the police, as ordered by the British forces. Early in June of the same year, the head of Istanbul’s police Hasan Tahsin, who according to *Yeni Gün* editor Yunus Nadi was a driving force in having the latter sent to prison while he was in Istanbul, declared it illegal to sell or carry *Yeni Gün* and *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, both pro-nationalist papers, in Istanbul on punishment of immediate arrest and confiscation of the newspapers. This happened on 25 April 1920, or two days after the opening of the Grand National Assembly and one day after *Vakit* and *İkdam* appeared without their main articles, which were probably on the subject of the opening of the Grand National Assembly. The *posta ve telgraf ve telefon müdürü-i umumisi* (general director of the postal, telephony and telegraphy office) Refik Halit, who himself was a journalist opposing the Nationalist Forces, which he saw as an extension of the CUP, informed *dahiliye nezareti* that publications of the National forces, printed in Ankara and sold openly or secretly in Istanbul, had all been collected and destroyed.

As long as Istanbul’s press was under Allied censor control, Ankara rejected it. It would be more than a year later, around the tipping-point for nationalist victories, that exceptions were made for publications based in Istanbul on the grounds that they were found to be suitable from the point of view of Ankara. For example, in June 1921 the Grand National Assembly decided that the satirical magazine *Karagöz*, which had been supportive of the nationalists, was to be allowed into Anatolia. In September and October of the same year, *Tevhid-i

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323 *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* No. 31, 20 Mayis 1336 [20 May 1920], "Sansür Talimatı".
324 ATASE İŞH kutu no. 1480, gömlek no. 63, belge no. 63-1, 27 Nisan 37 [27 April 1921].
325 Although in his Memoires Yunus Nadi mentions the chief of police, he admits to not recalling his name properly but says that it must have been Hüsnü, which is almost identical to Hasan and could therefore be easily mixed up.
326 ATASE İŞH kutu no. 1474, gömlek no. 25, belge no. 1-2, 2/6/37 [2 June 1921].
327 BOA DH.İ.UM 16-3/1-18, dd. 6 Şaban 1338H, 25 Nisan 1336 [25 April 1920].
328 BCA 30.18.1.1/3.24.4, 5 Haziran 1337 [5 June 1921].
Efkar\textsuperscript{329} and Tercüman-ı Hakikat\textsuperscript{330} received the same permission. Although a search in the archives did not produce a document with a similar permission for Vakit, it is likely that at a certain point, it, too, given its views, received such permission. However, it was not until after the end of the Allied censorship in October 1922, that Ankara decided to lift the general ban on Istanbul newspapers. It argued that because the Allied censorship commission was disbanded and control of the censorship was handed to Rafet Paşa, Istanbul’s newspapers would no longer be publishing material that was adverse to the aspirations of the Ankara government.\textsuperscript{331} This ban appears to have been extended to other parts of the occupied territories. Ferda, an anti-nationalist publication, which would change its tone to be more moderate after Adana came under control of the Nationalist Forces, was also restricted.\textsuperscript{332}

With this move, the nationalists attempted to cut off the stream of information from the Ottoman capital. However, attempts were made to smuggle copies of Peyam-ı Sabah illegally into Anatolia by wrapping copies around commercial goods, giving them the appearance of mere wrapping paper.\textsuperscript{333} It is likely that these smugglings were supported by the imperial government, as it was already investing in propaganda in Anatolia as can be seen by its financial support of Yeni Gazete in Sivas before Ankara’s ban on Istanbul’s press occurred.\textsuperscript{334} It is not difficult to imagine that such a ban was not fully waterproof and that some illegal copies made it to both Anatolia and Istanbul from opposing sides.

However, one of the consequences of cutting off Anatolia from Istanbul’s press was that Anatolia was left with very small local newspapers. According to Öztoprak, the most popular publication in North Western Anatolia, Açiksoz,
reached only 1,500 daily circulation at its height\textsuperscript{335} and Muhiddin, *matbuat müdür-i umumisi* (director of the press regulation office) in Ankara, said during a discussion at the Grand National Assembly that Anatolian newspapers were unable to reach circulations more than 700 per day and, due to the paper shortage, circulation figures could be as low as 150.\textsuperscript{336} These figures are dwarfed by the major Istanbul dailies who could reach an average of 10,000 and catered for a smaller region. Together with the paper shortage, Anatolia is also said to have suffered from occasional ink shortages, causing printers to improvise with a mixture of soot and linseed.\textsuperscript{337} In other words, the Anatolian press was underdeveloped and, according to Muhiddin, while Istanbul had a well-established press, ”press [did virtually not] exist in Ankara and Anatolia”\textsuperscript{338} and that the region was so poor that ”no printing press worthy of the name [existed]”.\textsuperscript{339}

Consequently, the government in Ankara felt the need to support this press, which was done through Ankara’s creation of *matbuat ve istihbarat müdüriyeti* (press regulation and intelligence office). Although its name was reminiscent of its counterpart in Istanbul, its purpose was different. In Istanbul, such institutions had existed prior to the constitutional revolution and had served as a means to apply censorship. After the revolution, not only had the 1909 press law removed references to this institution, thereby removing its influence over the press and relegating it to the function of permit dispensary, but also the whole concept disappeared until 1912, when it reappeared alongside changes to the law that allowed tighter control and after 1913 effectively resumed its function as a censorship coordination office.\textsuperscript{340} In Ankara, *matbuat müdüriyeti*, according to Muhiddin, was not interested in controlling the nearly non-existent press, but


\textsuperscript{336}TBMMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 İçtima 159 Cele 1, 28/2/1337 [28/2/1921], p. 520.


\textsuperscript{338}TBMMZC Devre 1 Sene1 İçtima 159 Celse 1, 28/2/1337 [28/2/1921], p.517: ”Matbuat Müdüri Umumisi Muhittin B.: [...] Ankara’da ve Anadolu’da matbuat yükürt".

\textsuperscript{339}TBMMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 İçtima 159 Cele 1, 28/2/1337 [28/2/1921], p. 519: ”Matbuat Müdüri Umumisi Muhittin B.: [...] Anadolu memleketi çok zavallı bir memlektettir. Anadolu memleketinde matbaa denebilecek bir matbaa yoktur efendim”.

\textsuperscript{340}İskin, *Matbuat İdareleri*, pp. 197-198.
its purpose was to conduct propaganda. That this was an unmistakable fact was supported by Tunali Hilmi, a mebus from Bolu, who claimed that "saying press regulation office is the same as saying propaganda office". Domestically, Ankara's press regulation office sought to fulfil this function by giving financial and material aid (paper, which had become very expensive during the war due to shortages) to local newspapers that supported the nationalist ideals, without which, the director of the matbuat ve istihbarat müdüriyeti claimed, Anatolian newspapers could not exist. With high paper prices and low circulation figures, nowhere near that of the major dailies of Istanbul, it was probably not easy for these publications to sustain themselves, even under less competitive circumstances than in Istanbul. Discussions in the Grand National Assembly regarding budget allocation for the press regulation and intelligence Office for the financial year 1337R resulted in great cuts due to financial problems, however, both the amount allotted for the monies to support the local press ("Anadolu matbuatına muavenet") and for obtaining paper ("kağıt tedariki") to help Anatolian newspapers, were raised. Showing the continued dedication for this support, in the budget review for following financial year (1338R), the money for supporting the local press was substantially increased, to 40,000 lira, which equalled what was set aside for (foreign) propaganda purposes, with again the rationale being that supporting the struggling local press was part of domestic propaganda efforts aimed at informing the public about the on-going national struggle. Thus publications such as Küçük Mecmua, İleri, Babalık and Hakimiyet-i Milliye all received financial support. Furthermore, while 40,000 lira annually may not appear much, especially considering the inflation during the war, it should be kept in mind that the number of newspapers being published, and thus required financial aid, was much lower when compared to Istanbul.

341 TBMMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 İçtima 159 Celse 1, 28/2/1337 [28 February 1921], p. 518.
342 TBMMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 İçtima 159 Celse 2, 28/2/1337 [28 February 1921], p. 527; Tunali Hilmi B. (Bolu): Matbuat Müdiriyeti demek; Propaganda Müdiriyeti demektir.
343 TBMMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 İçtima 159 Celse 1, 28/2/1337 [28 February 1921], pp. 519-520.
344 TBMMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 İçtima 159 Celse e, 28/2/1337 [28 February 1921], p. 532.
345 TBMMZC Devre 1 Sene 3 İçtima 99 Celse 2, 9/9/1338 [9 September 1922], p. 579. Although the 1337R [1921] budget apparently has that the money set aside for subsidizing local newspapers was to be 4,957 lira, the 1338R [1922] budget shows over triple that amount. It is possible that more money was made available for this purpose over the year.
346 Propaganda ve telifat received 20,000 and Masarif-i muhabere ve istihbariye also received 20,000 lira.
347 TBMMZC Devre 1 Sene 3 İçtima 99 Celse 2, 9/9/1338 [9 September 1922], p. 573.
Subsidizing was only one part of Ankara's policy to keep Anatolia's press alive. Tax exemptions were given to newspapers. The proposal that import tax for printing equipment should be removed, put forward by the press regulation and intelligence office in December 1920, was accepted and the law to this effect was enacted in April 1921. In January 1921, a law was proposed to allow telegraphs for the press to be sent at quarter the regular price to facilitate the communication of newspapers. In June 1921, a proposal to remove the requirement for caution money was accepted by the Grand National Assembly, as being in the best interests of the development of the press, and forwarded to the ministry of the interior. It is not immediately clear whether the latter two proposals, which were accepted for discussion, were enacted as laws, but what can clearly be seen here is an attempt by the new Ankara government to support the growth of the press, similar to the official Ottoman policy after the 1908 revolution.

While some forms of censorship were used, legally and illegally, the Ottoman press was spared from preventive censorship until the empire entered the World War in August 1914. Pre-print examinations were at that point reintroduced for the first time since the 1908 revolution. After the armistice and the occupation of Istanbul, a new round of preventive censorship started, this time through the insistence of the Allied Forces. The Allies' negative attitude towards the Nationalist Movement, and their influence on censorship, had ensured that newspapers in Istanbul and Izmir, the two largest press centres of the Ottoman Empire, were unable openly to support the nationalist cause, while opponents of Ankara were given all liberty to conduct propaganda against Mustafa Kemal and the Grand National Assembly. However, aware of the importance of propaganda, Ankara resorted to a policy of supporting the Anatolian press by supplying it with financial and material aid, and it established Anadolu Ajansı, its own news agency, through which it tried to make itself heard in Anatolia, Istanbul and the West.

348 See for example: BCA 30.18.1.1/2.39.10, 30 Mart 1337 [30 March 1921], BCA 30.18.1.1-3.29.4, 3 Temmuz 1337 [3 July 1921], BCA 30.18.1.1-7.22.3, 21/6/1339 [21 June 1923], BCA 30.18.1.1-10.28.18, 8/6/1340 [8 June 1924].
349 BCA 30.18.1.1/2.27.9, 15 Kanunusani 1327 [15 January 1921].
350 TBMMZC Devre 1 Sene 2 İctima 43 Celse 1, 27/6/1337 [27/06/1920], p. 60.
FINANCING THE PRESS

While some scholars have sought to re-examine the workings of the Ottoman press and in doing so have touched on various financial aspects, no in-depth studies have to date been made of the economic and financial dimensions of the press in the Ottoman Empire. It is, however, important to examine the economy of the press, if one is to gain any effective understanding of the press in the late Ottoman and early republican period. This chapter examines the financial aspects of the Ottoman press, by focusing on the Turkish language dailies in Istanbul.

In contrast to the previous era, when newspapers were effectively tied to the state, in the aftermath of the 1908 revolution, entering the newspaper business, from a legal perspective, was a mere formality. Paradoxically, after the revolution, it had also become more difficult for newspapers to survive, not because of political but because of economic pressure. The post-Hamidian press was one of tough competition, low-prices and the emergence of the battle for readership market shares. At the same time, the toughness of the industry created the circumstances which allowed for newspapers to be influenced by financial sponsors.

Ahmed İhsan, distinguished journalist, and owner and editor-in-chief of the successful Servet-i Fünun, in discussing the rise and fall of newspapers in the post-revolution era noted that:

Of the innumerable newspapers that had mushroomed in Bab-ı Ali Street [where most newspaper offices were located] in the first days of the constitutional regime, most had gone bankrupt. A few had tried to survive and struggle by merging [with others publications], but that too had proven to be impossible [to make work]. This was because the passionate rush on all things printed [initially displayed by] our people, who did not read the censored newspapers under

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Abdülhamid, had long gone. The numbers of those who bought newspapers had dwindled. Those who had tried journalism ended up in loss. But the desires remained never-ending. Still new newspapers were published, and as I have written earlier, those who did not receive support from an official or private source could not possibly stay afloat. Their rising and sinking happened simultaneously, like with cormorants.\textsuperscript{352}

As Ahmed İhsan's account makes clear, Ottoman newspapers in this period were expensive to run and difficult to make profitable. Publishing newspapers was, in the words of Asım Us, himself a journalist and publisher, "not only a matter of journalism; foremost it [was] a matter of capital".\textsuperscript{353} The authors of the twice-weekly humoristic \textit{Cingöz} were also very much aware of the financial necessities of running a publication:

What we aim to do by publishing this [magazine], under the protection of freedom [i.e. the constitution], is both to serve to the best of our ability and to make a profit. Better put, to work and, in return for our effort and hard work, to earn a few kurş. Yes, a few kurş... Because men of good conscience realize what level of sacrifice is required to publish a newspaper, given the scarcity of printing presses, machines and typesetters today and the extremely high prices on the paper market. If they consider the cheap price we have chosen [for our publications], given the good quality print of \textit{Cingöz}, they will also understand that we do not expect much of a profit from \textit{Cingöz}.\textsuperscript{354}

\textsuperscript{352}Ahmed İhsan [Tokgöz], \textit{Hatırlarım}, p. 63: "Meşrutiyetin ilk günlerinde mantar gibi Babalı caddesinde çıkan sayısı gazetelerin çoğu batmış, birkaç tanesi birleşip yaşamğa ve tutunmağa çabalamıştı, o da mümkün olmamıştı. Çünkü Abdülhamit zamanında sansürlü? gazete okumyan halkın 23 Temmuzdan sonra matbu kağıda, ne olursa olun, gösterdiği hücum ateşi çoktan sönmüş, gazete alanlar azalmış, gazeteciliğe kalkanka zararla oturmuşlardı. Fakat heveslilerin arkaşı azalmıyordu, gene yeniden gazeteler kuruluyor, evvelce yazdığım gibi bir resmi ve [=veya?] hususi membadan kuvvet alamayanlar mümkün değil tutunamıyordu. Hepsinin karabatak gibi çıkmaları ile batmaları bir oluyordu".

\textsuperscript{353}Asım Us, \textit{Gördüklerim}, p.8: Fakat bir gazete çıkarmak yalnız yazıcılık meselesi değildir; daha evvel bir sermaye meselesidir.

\textsuperscript{354}\textit{Cingöz} No. 1, 26 Ağustos 1324 [08 September 1908], "Ifade-i Mahsus": "Bizim de şu gazeteyi neşretmekten maksadımız, saye-i hüriyette hem elimizden geldiği kadar hizmet etmek hem de temin-i menfaat eylemekdir. Daha doğrusu çalışmak ve bu say ve gayrettimiz mukabili beş on kurşunas kazanmaktır. Evet, beş on kurş... Çünkü erbab-i insaf, bugün matbaa, makina, mürettep kahtından, hatta kağıt piyasasındaki az çok tereffiu fıyattan dolayı gazete neşretmek için ne mertebe fedakarlık ihtiyar edildiğini takdir ederler. Biz de (Cingöz)ün nefaset-i tabına göre küzi bir fiyat vazettiğimizi nazır-i dikkate alırlarsa (Cingöz)den pek büyük menfaat beklemedigimizi takdir ederler".
The clarity of mind possessed by the editors of this particular publication regarding the financial challenges of running a publication appears not to have been shared by many of the would-be publishers during the press-boom. From the hundreds that appeared, only a handful managed to appear longer than a few years. At the core of these failures lay the difficulty of making a publication profitable.

If starting a new publication were considered a process involving multiple stages, the first step towards materializing the idea would be securing initial capital. Establishing a newspaper required an amount of money that was not immediately available to most people. In May 1909, during discussions regarding the 1909 press law in the chamber, one mebus, pointing out the importance of capital for starting a newspaper, placed the estimated required amount at 2,000 lira. In the same session, Rıza Paşa, the Karahisar-Sahip deputy, who had experience in the press, said: "You are all aware that journalism requires capital. A gentleman who has finished higher education, at no point has the capital to just establish a newspaper with a lump sum payment of 500 lira, 1,000 lira or 2,000 lira." While these figures should be approached with scepticism, as they were presented as arguments in a discussion during a vote on an article of the press law that would have required the müdür-i mesul (responsible director) to have received higher education, the man who proposed the article in the first place, Hüseyin Cahid, a journalist himself and co-founder of the successful daily Tanin, never dismissed these numbers in his counter arguments as being exaggerated. Incidentally, Tanin, one week after these discussions in the chamber, estimated its own value as a business at 20,000 lira. Therefore, taking the middle figure, rather than the highest, the sum of 1,000 lira can carefully be used as what one would approximately need to get started. What is more important here is that Rıza Paşa argued that, even for the lowest estimate, even men who had enjoyed

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higher education, and therefore arguably relatively better off financially than other people, did not have immediate access to the required capital. To put these figures into perspective, at an average of three lira per month wage for unskilled labour around this time,\(^{358}\) as, for example, newspaper distributors working for Takvim-i Vakayi received in 1908,\(^{359}\) it would take well over 30 years worth of wages to save 1,000 lira for common workers, given that the wage earner would have to live as well and not merely save to set up a newspaper. Although other aspects, such as education and literacy levels, most probably played an important role, the financial dimension of starting a publication explains why most of the applicants during the press boom were from relatively better-off positions.

This capital investment was required to cover two types of expenses: the initial set-up and the operating costs. The initial set-up involved printing related equipment and presses. For the official government organ, Takvim-i Vakayi, the price of printing equipment alone was estimated at 600 to 700 lira in 1908 by Ebüziyya Tevfik, an experienced journalist who operated newspapers both under Abdülhamid II and under the constitutional regime.\(^{360}\) When these prices are compared to the estimates for the required capital, they appear high but according to Ahmed İhsan, at one point in 1909 he was offered 4,500 lira for his printing press\(^{361}\) and, in 1915, when a printing establishment was to be installed in the parliament building (to print minutes and drafts) a budget of 2,380 lira was allocated.\(^{362}\) Even for Ahmed İhsan, whose prominent literary magazine Servet-i Fünun had been subsidized by Abdülhamid II and who was probably better-off than most aspiring publishers, paying for this sort of equipment was a substantial financial outlay. Following the constitutional revolution, Ahmed İhsan had decided to invest in new equipment. However, probably due to being more experienced in the trade than many of the aspiring new journalists during the press boom, he soon realized that the financial burden of the new rotary


\(^{359}\) BOA İ.DÜİT 136/50, 10 Eylül 1324 [23 September 1908]: "[…] ve iki nefer-i muvezzi maaşı olan altı yüz kuruş […]".

\(^{360}\) MMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 Cild 1, 9 Şubat 1324R [22 February 1909], p. 785.

\(^{361}\) Ahmed İhsan [Tokgöz], *Hatralarım*, p. 82.

\(^{362}\) BOA İ.DÜİT 77/8, 4 Safer 1334, 29 Teşrinisani 1331 [12 December 1915].
printing press and expert staff, collectively on their way from Paris, was too much, as the new daily edition of Servet-i Fünun was unable to cover its own operating costs. As a result, he sold the machine to the then newly founded Şura-i Ümmet, a Committee organ.\footnote{Ahmed İhsan [Tokgöz], Hâturalarm, p. 64.}

One of the reasons why the machinery was so expensive in the first years after the revolution was probably, just as in Ahmed İhsan's case, that the equipment needed to be imported from Europe because it was not readily available in the Ottoman Empire. The sole cause for this unavailability, according to revolutionary journalists, was Abdülhamid II’s oppressive regime.\footnote{See for example: Resimli Kitap No. 1, Eylül 1324 [September 1908], “İlk Söz”.} In İttihat ve Terakki, a political daily, a small note on the front page expressed the following complaint: “Because the most afflicted, subjugated and devastated thing during the period of despotism was the press and the equipment and means that served it [...] we are unable to publish our first few issues more than three times per week”.\footnote{İttihat ve Terakki No. 1, 9 Recep 1326, 24 Temmuz 1324 [6 August 1908], “İtizar”: Devr-i istibdadan en ziyade duçar, kahr ve tahrrib olan şey matbuat ve ona hadim olan alat ve vesait olduğu cihette gazetemiz istedişimiz kita ve nekasette olarak şimdiden her gün neşredebilmek için bir haftadan beri vakiolan mesayimize rağmen meeteessüf ilk birkaç nüshamızı bu hacimdem fazla ve haftada üç defadan ziyade neşretmek mümkün olmayacağından ve memâli yakında arzumuz veçhile bir matbaa tesisi esbabına tevessül edilmiş olduğundan ona intizaren karilerimizin kısa bir zaman için bizi mazur görmelerini rica ederiz”.} That a newspaper named after the CUP should blame the previous regime for the unavailability of printing equipment seems hardly surprising. However, the fact remained that even the official organ Takvim-i Vakayi, over a month after it was restarted in September 1908, had to rely on existing private printing establishments and the presses of matbaa-i amire (the imperial press of which Takvim-i Vakayi was to become a part), as it had not managed to obtain its own printing equipment.\footnote{BOA DH.MKT 2644/2, 19 Teşrinievvel 1324 [1 November 1908].} The equipment ordered for Takvim-i Vakayi was presumably on its way to Istanbul from Europe, as was the case for other newspapers. Around the same time when Takvim-i Vakayi was forced to find alternatives until its own machines arrived, Fazilet had the same problem and was "eagerly awaiting the arrival of [the] printing equipment that [they] had ordered from Europe last week."\footnote{Fazilet No. 1, 8 Ramazan 1326 [3 October 1908], "İki söz": "Geçen hafta Avrupa’dan sipariş ettiğimiz levazım-ı temsiliyênin vürudunu bey-sabrane intizar ediyoruz".} Half a year later, when the press boom had
mostly subsided, equipment was still being hauled in from abroad, a situation which affected Hilal, as it explained to its readers:

Although Hilal was being prepared for daily publication since the beginning of the revolution, because the equipment which we ordered from Europe was damaged on its way to our city, it became necessary for our printing establishment to return [the equipment] and because of the unnecessarily high increase in the publication of dailies since then and because of other difficulties, it was afterwards decided that it would be published as an illustrated and useful periodical, once every fifteen days.368

As can be seen from the examples above, during the press-boom, even those who had access to machinery sometimes thought it necessary to invest in better hardware. According to Djiveleguian, the customs were flooded with printing equipment.369 This allows for a glimpse inside the psyche of the press-boom: the intensity of the craze was such that some were willing to invest beyond the bare necessities in order to get prints of a higher standard and therefore paid more. New machines, after all, did not serve only to increase production, as was intended by İttihad ve Terakki and Hilal, but they could create better quality output.370 Resimli Kitap was clearly out to improve the quality of its product by using Europe equipment. It noted in September 1908 that:

[...] we shall not give up our struggle to bring our periodical to the level of the European illustrated magazines. Although of course it is impossible to show this [sort of] perfection all at once before the equipment we have ordered has arrived, trusting in the demand and interest that our readers will graciously

368 Hilal No. 1, 8 Ramazan 1326, 7 Nisan 1325 [20 April 1909], "İzah-ı Maksat": "Hilal" bidayet-i inkulapta yevni olarak intișar etmek üzere hazırlanma ta iken Avrupa'ya sipariş edilen makinesinin şehrîmize esna-ı naklinde sakatlanarak matbaaca iadesine mecburiyet hasıl olunmasından, o surada ceraid-i yevmiyenin lüzum ve hadden efzun bir derece tekessür etmesinden ve mevani-i saireden dolayı bilahere on beş günde bir çıkarılacak bir mecmua-i musavvere ve nafia halinde intișara karar vermiş idi”.

369 Djiveleguian, Regime, p. 225.

370 For example see: Kibar No. 1, 23 Teşrinisani 1326 [6 December1910], "İltizar". Although apparently Kibar had not ordered new machinery, but rather what appear to be typesets (takmlar) from within the Ottoman Empire and not from Europe, they explain they did so to improve the quality of their publication.
bestow [upon us], we have many miraculous things and imaginative ideas which we will display in our journal.371

Renting presses during the press boom, was probably not particularly cheap, as the number of printing establishments operating in Istanbul were unlikely to have been sufficient to keep up with the demand created by the press boom. Furthermore, involving a third-party printer would have increased the operating costs of the publications, which, as will be explained below, was not desirable.

The importing and buying of new machinery appears to have been largely limited to 1908 and 1909. The failure of many of the new publications to survive must inevitably have had an impact on the availability of equipment which presumably came onto the market at a cheaper price, and thus on the amount of set up capital required. In October 1917, Asım Us and Ahmed Emin Yalman founded Vakit, one of the handful of Ottoman dailies that was a success, with a 700 lira capital, which was, considering the hike in prices during the First World War, relatively cheap. This low figure reflects the fact that they were able to rent an unused printing establishment for their own use. Obtaining new printing equipment was still expensive. In 1919, Osman Nuri, owner of the newspaper İkbal, which appeared in Trabzon, requested 5,000 lira from the government to set up a new printing establishment,372 after his print shop was destroyed by Russian troops during the World War373 and, around the same time, the press regulation office (matbuat müdiriyeti) had spent between 6,000 to 7,000 lira to set up its own printer.374 Similarly, when Cumhuriyet, which is still being printed today, was established in 1924, its initial capital was 30,000 lira, a figure which soon had to be increased to 60,000 and even higher as it was insufficient to run the newspaper.375 However, it should be kept in mind that at that point, because

371 Resimli Kitap No. 1, Eylül 1324 [September 1908], “İtizar”: “…mecmuamızı Avrupa’nın resimli gazeteleri derecesine getirme için sarf-ı mesai den geri dönecek değiliz. Sipariş ettğimiz makinelerimiz gelinceye kadar tabi bu tekmülüü birden bir göstermek mümkün olmayıp her iki ve kariyerimizin lütfen ibraz edecekleri ragebet ve tevecühe istinaden daha mecmuamızda göstereceğimiz ne harikalarımız, ne tasavvurlarımız var”.
372 BOA DH.IUM.EK 52/43, 7 Mayıs 1335 [7 May 1919].
373 BOA DH.IUM.EK 52/43, 20 Mayıs 1335 [20 May 1919].
374 TBMMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 İçtica 159 Celse 1, p.515.
375 Mehmed Zekeriya [Sertel], Hattırladıklarım, pp. 120-124.
of the war, there had been a substantial inflation increasing prices approximately 10 times.

Apart from the initial set-up costs, the new newspaper proprietor was faced with operating costs. As Zekeriya Sertel, a journalist who would become one of the co-founders of the daily Cumhuriyet in 1924, noted, financing set-up expenses was not enough:

My friend Hamdi (Nebizade) convinced his older brother and got him to give us a small amount of [financial] help. However, this money was not sufficient, we needed to add to it because, with that money we could only establish a typesetting atelier and buy a printing press. But we needed operating capital. How else were we going to cover the wages of our employees, the cost of paper and daily expenses?376

These operating expenses could be very high and although the price of equipment probably diminished over time, operating costs of newspapers increased significantly during the First World War, partially because of rising paper prices. If the initially required 600 to 700 lira for Takvim-i Vakayi's printing presses are considered, the monthly 100 lira for operating expenses budget it received in 1908 shows that operating costs for one year could be double that. Half of this budget went towards covering employee wages. This included 3,000 kurus for the director, 2,000 kurus for the editor and typesetter, 700 kurus for his assistants, 600 kurus for a clerk, and 300 kurus for distributors.377 Although Takvim-i Vakayi is an exceptional publication, due to being funded by the state, private sector wages appear to have been on similar levels. In August 1908, the unskilled workforce, probably at the bottom of the pay scale, at Levant Herald, Stamboul, Turquie and Moniteur Oriental, received an average wage of 400 kurus monthly, but chose (apparently unsuccessfully) to go on a strike for an average increase of 100 kurus.378 These wages probably went

377 BOA İDÜLT 136/50, 10 Eylül 1324 [23 September 1908], p. 2.
378 TNA FO 195/2280, 266-270, 18 August 1908, p. 269.
up during the First World War, when according to Eldem, the lack of able-bodied men increased labourers’ pay. There were also those who were employed to deliver publishable content. Ahmed Rasim claims that after the constitutional revolution he received 2,500 kurşun monthly as başmuharrir (editor-in-chief) at Sabah, a well-established newspaper founded in 1875, while earlier in his career this was between 800 and 2,000 depending on the employer. Ahmed Rasim was a prominent journalist and newcomers to the trade were probably never paid as much as he was. Nevertheless, his account shows what higher end positions in the Ottoman press were likely to be paid after the constitutional revolution. Furthermore, Hüseyin Cahid recounts how, in the post-revolutionary era he poached talented writers from competing publishers, which probably involved higher pay-rates for the journalists. If this practice was common among other publishers, it might have led to significant increases in skilled journalists’ wages. İkdam allegedly employed 10 to 15 reporters to focus on news and events from Istanbul alone. It seems unlikely that this number of reporters for Istanbul alone would all have received over 2,000 kurşun, as veteran journalist Ahmed Rasim did. What is more likely is that these reporters were freelancers, who were paid per report or scoop, and not with a monthly salary, but they still required to be paid. After the Balkan Wars, when printing photographs on the front pages of political dailies had became common, İbrahim Ferik allegedly was paid 10 lira (or 1,000 kurşun) monthly by one employer, while he also sold photographs as a freelancer to other publishers at 25 to 50 kurşun per piece. This means that publishers who wanted to stay up-to-date with trends in publishing had to incur extra costs.

Apart from wages, operating costs also needed to cover materials, such as paper and ink. The cost of printing, when compared to the prices at which dailies were sold, was so high that profit margins for sales must have been very slim. In the 100 lira monthly budget for Takvim-i Vakayi 4,800 kurşun were allocated

379 Ahmed Rasim, Muharrir, p. 395.
380 Hüseyin Cahid [Yalçın], Edebiyat Anıları, pp. 189-190.
381 Münir Süleyman [Çapanoğlu], Basın Tarihine Dair Bilgiler ve Hatıralar (İstanbul, Hür Türkiye, 1962), p. 27.
382 Münir Süleyman [Çapanoğlu], Basın Tarihine Dair, p. 22.
specifically to paper and printing expenses. This figure would be better understood in the light of circulation numbers. However, exact circulation numbers for newspapers for this period are not readily available. Available sources give significantly different figures. A British foreign office report on Turkey for 1906 estimated a circulation of 9,000 for İkdam, 6,500 for Sabah and 1,000 each for Saadet and Tercüman-i Hakikat, what it called "noteworthy newspapers". Djiveleguian, an Ottoman lawyer with expertise on the press laws, estimated the pre-revolution circulation for large Turkish-language newspapers higher, at around 12,000 to 15,000, while, according to him, Armenian and Greek-language dailies had a 3,000 to 5,000 daily circulation. İskit, who had served as the matbuat müdür-i umumisi in the early Turkish Republic, gives a much lower estimate for the pre-revolutionary figures at around 2,000 per day and claims that after the revolution circulations reached 15,000. Again in 1919, British foreign office reports indicated that newspapers that did well had a daily circulation of between 6,000 to 9,000, only exceptionally exceeding the 10,000 barrier. The British foreign office’s "Guide to the Press of Egypt and the Soudan and Constantinople", published in 1921, estimated Peyam-i Sabah, which it called "the largest opposition newspaper", at 8,000 to 10,000 and placed Alemdar in second place with a daily circulation of 3,000 to 4,000. Sertel, a journalist and one of the founders of the prominent daily Cumhuriyet, claims for Cumhuriyet a daily circulation between 5,000 to 10,000 around 1924. In Anatolia, the figures must have been substantially lower. Tökin gives the circulation of İrade-i Milliye, the Ankara-based semi-official organ of the nationalist movement, as 5,000 daily in 1919. Around the same period, according to Öztoprak, Açıksöz, which he describes as the most popular

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383 BOA İDUİT 136/50, 10 Eylül 1324 [23 September 1908], p. 2.
385 Djiveleguian, Regime, pp. 64-65.
386 İskit, Matbuat İdareleri, p. 148.
387 TNA FO 371/4141, No. 49194, 8 March 1919, Part IV: Tasvir-i Efkar was apparently one such exception at a circulation of 22,000.
389 Mehmed Zekeriya [Sertel], Hatırladıklarım, p. 122.
390 Tökin, Basın Ansiklopedisi, “İrade-i Milliye Gazetesi”, p. 75.
publications of North West Anatolia, had a circulation of 1,500 per day.\(^{391}\) The estimates of Ankara's press regulation office, however, put the figures much lower at 600 or even 150 a day.\(^{392}\) Unfortunately, none of these sources explains how they arrived at these figures, which is why they are referred to as estimates and claims. If they were not estimates, they might have been based on figures provided by the publishers, who no doubt kept records of their printing volumes. However, as Boyar points out, even in this case, the numbers might have been purposefully inflated in order to appear more influential.\(^{393}\)


\(^{392}\) TBMMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 İçtima 159 Celse 1, p. 520.

In the end, while sales for popular dailies probably could reach peaks over 15,000 occasionally (see Figure 10), for example during the first days of the press boom, it seems safe to assume from these numbers that sustaining an average daily circulation of 10,000 in Istanbul was certainly at the higher end
and probably not easily achieved, and that even for popular dailies daily circulation could be as low as a few thousand. This gives a clear idea of just how low the numbers must have been for the dailies which were not even considered worth mentioning by these sources. Takvim-i Vakayi, for example, was not one of the popular dailies and indeed was not intended to be one. As a result, it could never have reached the 10,000 daily circulation of the larger dailies. In its earliest days, in the 19th century, Takvim-i Vakayi had contained odd bits of news and trivia, simply because it was the only available Ottoman newspaper; in its post-revolution form the official state organ contained five sections, which were all limited to official information.\textsuperscript{394} The first part was reserved for new legislation, imperial \textit{irades} and other news from official sources, together with telegrams from foreign correspondents and financial news, such as the situation on the stock markets. The second to fourth parts were dedicated to proceedings, decisions and correspondence of the \textit{meclis ayan} and the \textit{meclis mebusan}. It thus contained very little in terms of news, opinions, and much less of sensational or entertaining content such as serial stories one might find in a regular daily. Furthermore, popular dailies generally devoted some portion of their publication to the most interesting events in parliament, therefore rendering the purchase of Takvim-i Vakayi only desirable to a select audience composed of people such as government officials in provinces who wanted to stay up to date on proceedings in the capital.

On the basis of calculation one can suggest a probable average circulation figure for Takvim-i Vakayi in 1908 of less than 1,200. A budget report of \textit{matbaa-i amire} for the fiscal years 1325–1335R [1908–1918], containing the details for Takvim-i Vakayi’s expenses and revenues for the fiscal year 1335R (1919) shows a total sales figure for both subscriptions and individual sales as 337,992 \textit{kuruş} for that year.\textsuperscript{395} As Takvim-i Vakayi was sold at 1 \textit{kuruş} per issue in that year\textsuperscript{396} and appeared about 312 days per year, this would mean 1,083 issues per day on

\textsuperscript{394} MMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 Cild 1, 9 Şubat 1324 [22 February 1909], p. 786.
\textsuperscript{395} BCA 30.10.0.0/83.545.14, 26 March 1923, “Matbaa-yi Amire’de basılan Takvim-i Vakayi’nin 11 Yıllık Bilançosu”, p. 30.
\textsuperscript{396} See for example: Takvim-i Vakayi No. 3491, 6 Cemzayilahir, 9 Mart 1335 [9 March 1919], Takvim-i Vakayi No. 3523, 14 Recep 1327, 15 Nisan 1335 [15 April 1919], Takvim-i Vakayi No. 3586, 29 Ramazan 1327, 28 Haziran 1335 [28 June 1919].
Considering *Takvim-i Vakayi*'s audience this is a reasonable figure in relation to the popular dailies. Assuming that *Takvim-i Vakayi*'s circulation remained roughly the same for that decade, its 1908 monthly printing budget of 4,800 kurus, would mean that every copy was produced for 6.8 para when disregarding all costs except printing costs and materials. In 1908 *Takvim-i Vakayi* was sold at 10 para, suggesting that nearly 70% of sales revenue per unit would go towards covering printing expenses and paper. Although 70% might seem excessive, it should be noted that in 1919, for which the exact figures are available, the production cost of a single copy was 116 para, which is almost 300% of the sale price of 40 para per unit in that year. The sharp hike in costs had to do with prices increasing during the First World War, where, according to Eldem’s figures, which are based on the duyun-i umumiye (public debt administration) indexes, in 1919 prices were on average 14.5 higher than prior to the war and according to Toprak the cost of living in Istanbul had seen an 18 fold rise between 1914 and 1918. Incidentally, the 1919 annual paper and printing expenses (982,175 kurus) are seventeen fold the 1908 annual budget for the same expenses (57,600 kurus) or a close match to Toprak and Eldem’s figures, suggesting some level of accuracy.

The 70% production cost suggest has, however, to remain speculative, for many variables in the equation remain unknown. The most important caveat is that, while the 1919 figures show the actual expenses, the 1908 are budget figures, and therefore expense estimates which, in reality, could have been higher or lower. Secondly, it is based on the assumption that circulation figures for *Takvim-i Vakayi* for the two years were similar, a point that can be argued based on the nature of the readership, but is not proven. The 70% figure is at best a

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397 Although the sales in the report reflected revenue for both individual sales and subscriptions, subscribing to a newspaper did not change the price much. Major dailies would sell subscriptions at 340 times the price of a single issue, which also included postage fee. See for example: *Sabah* No. 10497, 4 Cemazyelevvel 1337, 5 Şubat 1335 [5 February 1919], *İkdam* No. 7992, 9 Şaban 1337, 10 Mayıs 1335 [10 May 1919], *Alemdar* No. 2665, 23 Rabılevvel 1338, 16 Kanunuvelvel 1335 [16 December 1919]. However, as the aforementioned budgetary report for *Takvim-i Vakayi* itemizes postage expenses separately from paper and printing expenses, this should not have an impact on the calculations.

398 Monthly 4,800 kurus equals annually 57,600 kurus. This divided by 337,992, the number of issues sold in 1919, equals 0.170 kurus or 6.817 para.

399 Eldem, *Harp ve Mütareke*, p. 49.

guideline to understand what the order of expenses could have been. It is not, however, necessarily a low estimate. In 1911 *Takvim-i Vakayi*, which was given to distributors at 7 *para*, was acknowledged to be selling at a loss*401* and given that for 1919 it is certain that production costs were 300% of sale price per unit, 70% does not seem an overestimate.

Therefore, it can be argued that in the year following the revolution, a substantial portion of the sales price of a daily newspaper went towards covering the printing expenses alone, excluding employee wages, office rent and other expenses such as heating. While one could argue that this cost might be lower than the 70% estimate for popular dailies because higher circulation numbers would introduce economies of scale, rendering production costs per unit cheaper, it should also be noted that first of all, there were only a handful of popular dailies that could reach and sustain these high sales figures and secondly, *Takvim-i Vakayi* was physically about half the size of private dailies, which meant half the paper and half the ink was spent for each unit. This is especially important, because, despite the difference in size, privately operated dailies, from 1908 until 1914, were sold at the same price as *Takvim-i Vakayi*, 10 *para* per issue. The high costs of printing are probably part of the reason why dailies invested in their own printing presses as a long-term measure to cut costs, as relying on third-party printers, who naturally had to make their own profits, would inevitably further increase costs.

Costs associated with printing did not remain stable, but increased considerably with the start of the First World War. This increase was generally speaking connected to the increase in market prices in Istanbul, which eventually affected newspapers too. Specifically, the most important factor that impacted the expenses of newspaper publishers was the widespread shortage of paper which led to an increase in the prices of newspapers and books. The war caused paper to become scarce, due to disrupted trade routes, and therefore more expensive in many countries. In the United States, following disruptions in trade with Germany, imports of raw materials and paper were cut off within a few months.

*BOA MF.MKT 1176/54 28 Teşrinievvel 1327 [10 November 1911].*
of the start of the war. The resulting scarcity and high prices in the paper market became a threat to the existence of small newspapers and a burden on the larger newspapers, forcing them to change tariffs in advertising and prices. Similar situations occurred in other countries: the paper shortage in Paris is said to have caused the price of printing paper to increase fivefold over pre-war prices and resulted in fewer books being published in countries like Britain, France, Germany, Italy and the US. In Britain, during wartime, the British propaganda institution Wellington House had to reduce its literary output significantly while, according to The New York Times, in 1918 a combination of lack of paper and advertisers forced London dailies to reduce the number of pages per issue.

The Ottoman Empire, like the United States, was an importer of German paper. When the connection between the two allies was severed, the Ottoman economy was cut off from its source of imports, which further exacerbated the rising prices in the open market. The Ottoman paper business was one of the first industries to be hit by the war, because it relied heavily on imports. As early as 1916 available stocks were running out. Paper industry employee numbers dropped from 1,897 in 1914 to 1,267 in 1915. As a result, paper scarcity became an issue for the Ottoman press, both in terms of increased cost and because of not having a medium to print on. This situation lasted at least until 1924, when publishers still complained about the difficulty of obtaining paper. There is also a likelihood that the further increase in the price of dailies in the

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407 Eldem, pp. 75-76.
408 See for example: Hür Çocuk No. 1, 5 Şaban 1336, 16 Mayıs 1334 [16 May 1918], "Gazetemize ve Mesleğimize Dair", Hizmet-i Umumiye No. 1, 1 Teşrinievel 1336R [1 October 1920], "Hizmet-i Umumiye'den İlk Söz", Mahfil No. 1, Zilkade 1338 [July 1920], "Badelbesmele Velhamdele Vessulule [=Vessalavat?], Haftalık Resimli Gazetemiz No. 1, 13 Teşrinisani 1340 [13 November 1924], "Ana ve Babalara ve Bütün Muallim Arkadaşlara".
early Turkish Republic might have been related to paper scarcity. 409 Furthermore, during the First World War, according to the British foreign office press guide, the scarcity of paper in the Ottoman Empire allowed Germany to advantage Vakit, a daily which was pro-German, by supplying it with "plant and material free of charge", presumably here also meaning paper.410 The lack of paper, which started during the First World War and was still resonating in the early years of the republic, was therefore substantial enough to add to the general increase of market prices and further increase the production costs of press material.

While these expenses discussed above, namely obtaining or renting printing presses, paying employees and the costs of printing and of paper combined are already high, the final figure for operating costs must also include rent, maintenance and repair costs of equipment, and heating. However, these latter expenses are harder to estimate correctly as sources tend to ignore them, focusing instead on wages, equipment and printing costs. It is known, however, that Tahir Bey, an important figure in the Hamidian press, received over 100 lira from the sultan's own treasury to cover his heating expenses.411 Although the document regarding this does not specify what time period the gas bill covered, given that a monthly expenditure of 100 lira for heating seems excessive, it would seem logical that it was for a year, in which case the monthly expenses for heating would have been 8.5 lira. Although clearly this figure cannot be used as an across the board figure for all publishers, it does give some indication of monthly expenses for heating, and of the possible significance of such an expenses in annual budgets of newspapers.

With all of these costs, publishers had to create revenue to cover their expenses and keep their business viable. Sales, driven by demand, were an important source of money, especially after the constitutional revolution when Hamidian subsidization was no longer available. Abdülhamid II, intending to create a Hamidian press as a vehicle to spread the palace's propaganda, financially

409 See the data in Appendix V, "Pricing Policies", for prices from 1923 until 1928.
411 BOA MTV 235/94, 17 Recep 1320, 6 Teşrinievel 1318 [21 October 1902].
supported newspapers and journalists who were successful in disseminating the sultan's ideas both at home and abroad. Dailies that were unable to make enough profits to sustain themselves could rely on these subsidies. However, after the revolution, this safety net was effectively removed and, as a result, both well-established publications and newcomers to the industry had to make sure their operations were viable, by creating enough profits.

Therefore, rağbet ("demand"), a concept of less significance for the survival of the press under Abdülhamid II's press policy, became a central pillar for supporting a publication. Demand was not a wholly alien concept in the Hamidian press, where a few newly established publications justified their appearance as a response to existing or increasing demand from the readership. Demand changed from being an excuse or justification for existence, to being the means to exist. For example, Hiyaban, a scientific and literary periodical which appeared every two weeks, stated in its the introduction in its very first issue: "Of course, to be able to continue with this service of ours [i.e. publishing], we need to able to cover our costs through the sale of our periodical. ... We will put in the effort, let our countrymen show demand and let God lead us to success." Those who enjoyed demand for one of their publications, found the courage (and probably the financial means) to start new ones.

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413 See for example: Gülistan No. 1, Haziran 1326 [June 1910], "Mukaddime Yerine", Yeni Avrupa No. 1, 12 Zilhicce 1329, 21 Teşrinisani 1327 [4 December 1911], Gençlik No. 1, 11 Mayıs 1327 [24 Mayis 1911], "Ifade", "Mukaddime", Cici No. 1, 12 Mayıs 1327 [25 May 1911], no title; Mütalaa (1911, No. 1), "İfade-i Mahsusa"; Türk Duygusu (1913, No. 1), "İhtar"; Kadınlik (1914, No. 1), "Mesleğimiz"; Karikatür (1914, No. 1), "Maksat"; Hizmet-i Umumiye (1920, No. 1), "Makale-i Mahsusa, Hizmet-i Umumiye'den İlk Söz".

414 Hiyaban (1914, No. 1), "Bir iki Söz": "Şu hizmetimizde devamımız için tabii, masarifimizi mecmuuanın satışıyla temin edebilmemiz lazımdır. [...] Gayret bizden, rağbet vatandaşlardan, tevfik Allahtan...".

415 Musavver Muhit (1908, No. 1), "Küçük Bir Mukaddime": "Resimli Kitap"'ımız nail olduğunu rağbet-i teveccühten cesaret alarak... Daha ziyade tefsil-i kelama lüzüm görmeyerek "Musavver Muhit"'imizin "Resimli Kitap"'in nasip olduğu rağbete muzahhar olacağından umidvar olduğumuz..."
In other words, where once owners of publications appealed to the sultan for financial help, it seems that now new and struggling publications turned to the public for support. Under these circumstances, the readership had become so important, that some placed it on an equal footing with divine blessing. "Min Allah al-Tawfiq" ("Success comes from God") was a formulaic prayer linking the success of a newspaper or periodical to God that can be found in the opening statement of new publications in the Ottoman press from the 1860's to the 1920's. However, after the press boom, altered versions of this prayer started to appear. Hür Çocuk, a weekly illustrated publication aimed at children, declared in its first issue in May 1918 that: "with the help of God and the demand, attention and thirst for knowledge of our beloved people, our newspaper will appear regularly." Consequently, journalists made appeals to the public explaining that it was in the power of the readership to help grow a publication. For example, Kainat explained that its ability to increase its publishing frequency depended on the demand from its readership, and explained that "Kainat will [appear] temporarily twice weekly on Mondays and Thursdays and, with the support of the continuous demand we expect and hope to see from our beloved brothers [i.e. readership], it will be published daily in the future." One magazine, Spor Alemi, which covered sports, went as far as to beg:

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416 For examples of this prayer in various forms see: Mirat (1862, No. 1), "Mukaddime"; Hülâsat el-İfkâr (1873, No. 1), "Mukaddime"; Vakit (1875, No. 1), "Vakit"; Nîlûfer (1886, No. 1), "İnfitah"; Ümran (1887, No. 1), "İfade"; Ceride-i Baytariye (1899, No. 1); Balkan (1906, No. 1), "İfade-i Meram"; Zevzek (1908, No. 1), "İfade-i Mahsusa"; Gramofon (1909, No. 1), "İfade-i Meram"; Pervin (1910, No. 1), "Fatiha-i Kelam"; Guvaze (1911, No. 1), "Mesleğimiz"; Ahali (1912, No. 1), "Mesleğimiz"; Ayntab Haberleri (1918, No. 1), "Maksat ve Gayemiz"; Genç Kadın (1918, No. 1), "Mesleğimiz"; Genç Kalemler (1919, No. 1), "Mecmuanın Meslek, Gaye ve Vazifesi"; Genç Andolu (1921, No. 1), "Genç Anadolu nihîn çıkyor?"; Milli Mefkure (1922, No. 1), "Adana'nın Muhterem Halkına".

417 See for example: Musavver Mecmua (1909, No. 1), "Mukaddime"; Cici (1911, No. 1), "Mukaddime"; Musavver Malumat-i Nafia (1914, No. 1), "İfade"; Genç Kadın (1918, No. 1), "Mesleğimiz"; Halka Doğru Mecmua (1919, No. 1), "Maksat ve Meslek"; Doğu (1921, No. 1), "Gayemiz".

418 Hür Çocuk (1918, No. 1), "Gazetemiz ve Mesleğimize Dair Bir Kaç Söz": "Binaenaleyh, gazetemiz Allahın inayeti ve muhterem ahalimizin rağbet ve teveccühatıyla, maarifperverliğiyyle muntazaman neşrolunacak".

419 Tonguç (1909, No. 1), "Başlangıç"; Doğu (1922, No. 1), "Maksat ve Meslek".

420 Kainat (1909, No. 1), "İfade-i Mahsusa": "Kainat" şimdilik haftada pazartesi ve perşembe günlerine mahsus olmak üzere iki defa ve umit ve tehmini [illegible]inde muhterem kardeșlerinden göreceği rağbat-i mütevaliyeden bilistifade istikbalen her gün neşredilecektir".

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"[Why don’t] you, your friends, everybody buy [this magazine], so that we can keep alive this one little sportsman.”

Figure 11: Chronological comparison of the evolution of the front page of Ottoman dailies. *Ruzname-i Ceride-i Havadis* (1864), *Tercüman-i Hakikat* (1894), *Sabah* (1908), *İkdam* (1918).

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421 *Spor Alemi* (1919, No. 1): "İfade-i Meram": “Kendiniz, arkadaşlarınız, hepiniz alınız ki şu çıkardığımız bir tanecik idmançıyı da yaşatalım".
The desire to increase demand seems also to have triggered a drive for innovation in the press. In itself, innovation can be an indicator of competition. In the case of Ottoman newspapers, the innovations introduced into the front page of the dailies, reflects the competitive nature of the post-revolution market. In the fifteen years following the revolution, the face of the Ottoman newspapers (i.e. the *mise-en-page*) changed very noticeably (see Figure 11). This happened much more quickly than in any other period. In the almost eight decades that had passed since the inception of the Ottoman press, the only noticeable change in the composition of the front page of dailies had been the introduction of subtitles. However, as can be seen in Appendix IV, in just under ten years, a series of changes were introduced and adapted by the press. These changes included the introduction of articles that spanned multiple columns, the use of illustrations and photographs by political dailies and the first appearance of headlines, using larger type. This evolution caught the eye of the Dutch who noted in their report on the Turkish press for 1917: "In appearance there is a desire to mimic the large dailies in Europe, however content-wise, there is still a long way to go".\footnote{422 NL-HaNA, Consulaat-Generaal Constantinopel/Istanboel, 2.05.94, inv. nr 505, index 2125-1918, 19 Juli 1918, "Verslag over de Turksche pers van 1 Januari tot 1 Juli 1917": "Uiterlijk zoekt men het groote dagbladwezen in Europa na te bootsen, maar innerlijk is men nog lang zoo ver niet".} Although the report suggests a mimickery of European-style dailies, it falls short of explaining why this should be taking place at this particular point. The technology had been available, as is evident from the existence of illustrated publications, but had simply not been used by the dailies. According to Yalman, these innovations would have been considered sacrilege earlier, but that increased competition forced publications to adopt these methods.\footnote{423 Ahmed Emin [Yalman], Development, p. 123.} It seems reasonable in the post 1908 climate to argue that the drive for innovation was fuelled by desire either to differentiate one’s product from the throngs of new competitors, or to keep up with competitors who were applying such innovative techniques, all in order to retain existing readers by preventing them from choosing a more trendy competitor or to draw in a new readership, attracted by the attractive new formats and technological changes exhibited by the newspaper in question. On the other hand, breaking with tradition in an act of
"sacrilege" again shows the greater importance the readership started to play. Perhaps, if innovation did lead to higher sales, it should also be interpreted as a change in what the public demanded or expected from the press, as most changes that were introduced were aimed at showing more important information at a glance, instead of a monotonous wall of text.

The importance of demand underlines the competitive nature of the post-revolution press market. It was not only the fact that palace's subsidies were no longer available, but the also great number of competitors that flooded the scene with the press-boom and afterwards, that made demand important. For dailies in Istanbul, this meant having to sell their newspapers at very low prices, dictated by the industry as a whole, with very small, or perhaps even non-existent profit margins.

The constitutional revolution had done away with what had been a tremendous barrier to entering the press-industry: in contrast to the strict Hamidian press policy, whereby receiving a publishing concession was a privilege, it was now within everybody's reach to receive permission to establish their own publication. As a result, a press boom occurred and new newspapers and periodicals mushroomed, creating many alternatives to what used to be essentially an oligopoly of a select subsidized club. For new entrants into the industry, there was little choice but to follow the prices set by large circulation incumbent dailies that used to benefit from imperial subsidies, because, given the established existence of strong brands like Sabah and İkdam and the high number of competitors, raising the price of a daily would push readers to the many alternatives and create a loss in readership, which would not bode well for the survival of the publication in question. Consequently, the status quo of the press in July 1908, as defined by Hamidian sponsorship, set the standard for size and price for an industry which could no longer rely on financial support from Abdülhamid II. This forced prices for dailies to remain constant at a historic low-point and virtually inflexible in the first decade following the revolution, thereby minimizing profits from sales. From the press boom until the end of 1917, dailies in Istanbul were forced to set their prices at 10 para. Setting a higher price was impossible, as the availability of many alternatives at the common 10 para price
would potentially drive readers to the competing publications. Lowering the price was also not an option, considering the high costs involved in running a newspaper and the costs associated with it.

![Graph showing annual overview of daily newspaper prices in Istanbul (1861–1923). This chart is based on data provided in Appendix V, "Pricing Policies".]

![Graph showing annual averages of the price per column for Istanbul dailies (1861–1923). This chart is based on data provided in the Appendix V, "Pricing Policies".]

The competitive nature of the newspaper industry after the press-boom can be seen in Figure 12 and Figure 13. In Figure 12, it is clear that there was a clear-cut...
difference between how nominal prices of dailies in Istanbul behaved before and after 1908. Price variations, such as the ones in the mid 1870s and the late 1880s, which were likely triggered by economic crises that occurred in those periods, and in the latter case also probably be related to Abdülhamid II’s project to create his own press through carrot and stick methods, which caused a non-competitive situation to emerge, were more common in the pre-1908 era. After the revolution, appealing to the readership required offering the lowest possible price, which kept the whole industry of private dailies at the same price, even when prices eventually inevitably increased. While by looking at the nominal prices in Figure 12, it appears as if in the 1880’s, until the impact of the Hamidian press became visible in the pricing, there was a situation similar to that after the press-boom, with stable prices, a comparison with Figure 13 shows a different picture. Figure 13, which shows the approximate real value of newspapers, expressed in the amount of para paid per column in the newspaper, reveals that the 1880’s, while maintaining stable nominal prices, fluctuated in real prices.

A similar comparison between the period after the press-boom in Figure 12 and Figure 13, reveals a stability both in nominal and real values. This would suggest that dailies were forced, by competition over readership, to offer the same amount of reading material for the same price. Furthermore, since 1861, or around the birth of the Ottoman private press with Agah Efendi’s Tercüman-i Ahval and Şinasi’s Tasvir-i Efkar, when real value is considered, daily newspapers became cheaper over time, either because they lowered their prices, or offered more value, that is more columns to read, for the same price. Children’s publications underwent a similar process of price reduction in the two decades before the constitutional revolution, which suggests that not only newspapers, but all forms of periodicals gradually became cheaper. By 1908, when the constitutional revolution occurred, this historical trend had reached an absolute low. This essentially locked an industry with high operating costs into low profit

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425 Fortna B.C., Learning to Read in the Late Ottoman Empire and the Early Turkish Republic (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 171-172.
margins. When *Takvim-i Vakayi* reported in 1911 that it was selling at a loss, its rational was that the 10 *para* price had been set in the past and it had simply been kept at that point.\(^{426}\) In other words, for the dailies in Istanbul, increasing the price would drive readers away and lowering the price was not feasible. Although these findings are for dailies, according to Brummett, some satirical journals which appeared after the revolution had to lower their initial prices as a result of the market not being receptive of their initial prices, which were higher than that of the dailies.\(^{427}\)

The severity of this price lock can be seen in Figure 14. Even in the face of rising prices in the free-market, caused by the First World War, the price of 10 *para* per issue was stubbornly upheld by Istanbul’s dailies, thus further pushing down the profits. By mid-1917, prices in Istanbul had increased on average by over eight times, yet dailies were still selling at pre-war prices. However, although nobody dared change the 10 *para* price, the industry reacted to the increasingly higher costs by decreasing the size of its publications. This initially increased the real

\(^{426}\) BOA MF.MKT 1176/54, 28 Teşrinievel 1327 [10 November 1911].

value of newspapers to be generally on par with the rising market. But, there is a limit to how small a newspaper can be: a single sheet with two faces and this limit was reached about one year into the war. Rising prices in the market, however, did not have a limit and continued to climb unabated. From mid-1916 until 1919, newspapers were effectively selling well below what they should have. According to one British report, around this time, a single sheet of paper cost 27 para. After the war, the paper cost for a single issue of the Ankara government’s semi-official organ, Hakimiyet-i Milliye, and of other publications of the same (small) format, was estimated at 30 to 40 para,428 which was probably higher for large format dailies. Yet, prices were kept at 10 para until 1917, when a series of increases in the price brought the real value of the newspapers to a level resembling the free-market in the second half of 1918. Remarkably, the changes in price occurred simultaneously throughout the industry,429 as the result of concerted efforts by publishers.

These increasing prices were the result of the costs becoming finally unbearable. In 1917, with the first increase, Tanin placed the problem squarely on the lack of paper, caused by the war time situation:

Of course our readers know the scarcity caused by the war in all aspects [of life] also affects paper. Because [the paper] that is used in our country is obtained from abroad and in order not to leave our readership without newspapers, publishers have since the beginning of the war had to reduce the volume of the dailies to half or even a third of what [they used to be]. Only so have [they] been able to ensure the continued publication with the paper at hand. This problem, which our country had to cope with earlier [than other countries], was soon afterwards also felt in countries that produce paper and in all of the warring countries. Sooner in some [countries], later in others, first the volume of the newspapers was reduced and eventually the necessity to increase prices was felt. We are again the last to increase our prices. Along with the current difficulty

428 TBMMZC Devre 1 Sene 2 İçtima 72 celse 1, p.163.
429 See for example these dates: Increase from 10 to 20 para: Tanin No. 3149, 29 Zilkade 1335, 17 Eylül 1333-1917 [17 September 1917], İkdam No. 7399, 28 Zilkade 1335, 16 Eylül 1333-1917 [16 September 1917]. Increase from 20 to 40 para: Tanin No. 3327, 2 Cemazeyilahir 1336, 16 Mart 1334-1918 [16 March 1918], İkdam No. 7578, 2 Cemazeyilahir 1336, 16 Mart 1334-1918 [16 March 1918]. Increase from 40 to 80 para: İkdam No. 7894, 29 Rabiulahir 1337, 1 Şubat 1335-1920 [1 February 1920], Alemdar No. 49, 29 Rabiulahir 1327, 1 Şubat 1335-1920M [1 February 1920].
of obtaining it, there was also an extraordinary increase in paper prices. Adding to this the costliness of other printing material, it becomes clear that it will not be possible to publish without [incurring] loss. It is because of this that some newspapers, in order not to incur too much loss, had significantly reduced their printing output. This is why, at a meeting between publishers, [they had] decided, in order to guarantee the continuation of publications, to increase the prices to 20 *para* starting on 16 September. [...] In accordance with this decision *Tanin*, like other Turkish and French language newspapers in the capital [...] will be sold for 20 *para*.430

*Tanin* emphasized the fact it was not alone in taking this action, but that all of its competitors were doing the same, a fact that was also underlined during the second price increase in 1918, when again paper shortages were shown as the main reason for price increases.431 Even in 1920 *İkdam* justified the increase in its prices by blaming the increasing paper prices:

> With the newspapers appearing in various languages in our city having already increased their prices to 100 *para*, we sold it at 2 *kuruş* [=80 *para*] while coping with great sacrifices [to be able to do so]. But certain expenses, [connected] with the extraordinary increase of paper prices, make it impossible to sell newspapers at 2 *kuruş* in the future. Therefore, we are announcing we are now

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431 *Tanin* No. 3326, 2 Cemazeyilihahar 1336, 15 Mart 1334-1917 [15 March 1918], "Tanin Kırk Paraya".
forced to sell at 100 para in order not to rob our nation the press, which it needs a lot these days.\footnote{Ikdam, No. 8327, 1 Şaban 1338, 20 Nisan 1336-1920 [20 April 1920], "Muhterem Karilerimize": "Şehrimizde elsine-i sairede münteşir gazetelerin bir seneden beri fiyatları yüz paraya çıkarmasına mukabil gazetelerimizi bir çok fedakarlıklar ıltiham ederek iki kurşu fiyatla satyorduk. Lakin kağıt fiyatının tereffü-i fevkaladesine [illegible] eden zaruri bazı masarifat fımabad gazetelerin iki kuruşa satılması imkanını salb ediyor. Binaenaleyle memleketin pek ziyade muhtaç olduğu bu zamanda matbuattan mahrum etmek için gazete fiyatlarını bu günden itibaren yüz paraya iblağa mecbur kaldığımız [...] beyan ederiz".}

The price of paper had a great impact on the industry. Köroğlu claims that the number of publications in Istanbul had dropped from hundreds to a mere 14 in 1918, which he explains through strict censorship applied by the CUP.\footnote{Köroğlu E., Ottoman Propaganda and Turkish Identity, Literature in Turkey During World War I; (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007), p. 12.} It is clear from Figure 14, that the years between the third quarter of 1916 and the third quarter of 1918 must have been financially devastating for dailies and the situation cannot have been much better for weeklies or bi-weeklies, as the rising paper prices affected the industry as a whole. Therefore, the dwindling numbers of publications during the First World War should rather be seen in the light of financial or technical hardship which was a more likely cause than any other for the demise of especially smaller publications. For example, from March until May 1916 Sabah had to cease its publication because it had simply run out of paper.\footnote{NL-HaNA, Consulaat-Generaal Constantinopel/Istanboel, 20.05.94, inv. nr 505, index 485-1916, 10 Juni 1916, "Persverslag over de maanden April en Mei 1916".} Sertel, who had started publishing a daily during the World War explains why he was forced to cease publication as follows: "Our newspaper faced hardships, increasing day by day. We were at war and we had difficulty finding paper. We had not been able to stock up on enough paper because we did not have the money. This is why [...] we were forced to shut down our newspaper."\footnote{Sertel, Hattıladıklarım, p. 63: "Gazetede hergün artan zorluklarla karşılaşıyorduk. Savaş içindeydik. Kağıt bulmakta zorluk çekiyorduk. Yeter paramız olmadığı için, vaktinde yeter derecede kağıt depo edememiştik. Bu yüzden nişanlandiktan birkaç ay sonra gazeteyi kapamak zorunda kaldık".} Censorship does not have to mean the destruction of the press, but control of its content. Even under Abdülhamid II’s strict regime of press censorship, many new publications appeared with support from the sultan himself.
With sales apparently barely enough to break even, an important source of revenue for the dailies had to be advertising income. As early the 1830s, *Takvim-i Vakayi* contained advertisements for books printed in *Takvimhane* and fez headgear produced in the state owned *Fezhane*, seemingly limiting advertisements to state owned products. However, for the private press, born in 1861, advertisements seem to have been a more prominent source of income and in 1880, the foreign company Nestlé started advertising in *Vakit, Tercüman-i Efkar, Levant Herald* and *Neologos*. As can be seen in Figure 15, as the size of newspapers grew over time, the amount of advertisement increased proportionally. After 1887, when the Hamidian press was created, a break occurred from this tradition when some richly illustrated dailies appeared containing no advertising at all, because they were subsidized by the palace.

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This correlation of total size and the amount of columns that were dedicated to advertising appears to return after the constitutional revolution. This would suggest that, without funding from the palace, advertising was important for the growth of dailies, as the increased costs of having a larger publication appear to have been carried by advertising.

Unfortunately, it is difficult to estimate what the revenue from these advertisements was. Although prior to the press-boom, it was common for dailies to explain their advertisement pricing policies in their header, later this changed, probably a result of the increased competitiveness of the market. Now advertisement pricing was kept secret in most cases, only to be obtained by contacting the headquarters of the newspaper. The exceptional pricing schemes that were found, on the other hand, seem to suggest that, while newspaper prices remained inflexible across the industry, advertising costs could vary greatly between dailies, which was probably based on circulation and one of the reasons why circulation figures could have been inflated. İttihad ve Terakki initially charged between 1.5 and 10 kurus per line, depending on the placement of the

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438 İttihad ve Terakki No. 14, 10 Şaban 1326, 24 Ağustos 1324, 6 Eylül 1908 [6 September 1908], header.
ad, but later dropped its minimum price to 0.75 kuruş per line,\textsuperscript{439} suggesting that the initial minimum price had been too high. \textit{Tasvir-i Efkar}, on the other hand, charged between 3 and 6 kuruş per line, depending on the nature of the advertisement, with the high price reserved for commercial companies.\textsuperscript{440} While later editions of \textit{İttihad ve Terakki} could not be obtained for this research, \textit{Tasvir-i Efkar} quickly stopped publishing the cost of its advertising space.

Because advertising played a significant role in the financing of dailies, this made the advertisers themselves important contributors to the survival of these publications and shows that capital could be used to control or influence the press. Indeed, it seems that sometimes entities would specifically use a daily for their advertising in what appears to be an attempt to supply them with funding. In the case of \textit{Peyam-ı Sabah}, a daily that came into existence through the merger of \textit{Peyam} and \textit{Sabah} after the First World War, a clear British bias is discernable. \textit{Peyam-ı Sabah} was under the editorship of Ali Kemal, a man described by Yunus Nadi, another journalist of the time, as being supported by the British and French occupying forces because of his publishing of articles suggesting that the Ottoman Empire should remain under British occupation because the Ottomans were incapable of governing themselves.\textsuperscript{441} The British foreign office's guide to the press describes him as "at present [in 1921] directing his antagonism against the Forces Nationales,"\textsuperscript{442} yet does not mention any type of support. However, a survey of the advertisements in the first half of 1921 reveals a different image: significant portions of the total of advertisements are devoted to public auctions held by Mr Tuplis and Mr Harding, who were charged by the British military authorities with handling the auctions. These advertisements by Mr Tuplis and Mr Harding would sometimes cover over one sixth of the available advertising space in \textit{Peyam-ı Sabah}\textsuperscript{443} and would appear with high frequency. Furthermore, there is an instance where a large announcement of the sale of surplus British

\textsuperscript{439} İttihad ve Terakki No. 61, 9 Zilkade 1326, 20 Teşrinisani 1324, 3 Kanunuevvel 1908 [3 December1908], header.
\textsuperscript{440} Tasvir-i Efkar No. 557, 5 Rabiulahir 1329, 23 Mart 1327, 5 Nisan 1911 [5 April 1911], header.
\textsuperscript{441} Yunus Nadi [Abaloğlu], \textit{Kurtuluş Savaşı}, pp. 9-10.
\textsuperscript{442} TNA FO 141/504, "A Guide to the Press of Egypt and the Soudan and Constantinople", April 1921, p. 35.
\textsuperscript{443} Peyam-ı Sabah (Sabah No. 11183, Peyam No. 753), 28 Rabıuelvevvel 1339, 8 Kanunusani 1337-1921 [8 January 1921].
army items can be found. Conversely, neither in Vakit nor Akşam, described in the same foreign office guide respectively as moderately or very supportive of the nationalist movement, can these advertisements be found. If the aim had merely been a matter of making an announcement in large circulation papers Akşam should have received the same advertisement because the same British press guide described Akşam as “amongst those most read by the Turks”. However, it further added that "beyond all other Turkish papers of the capital, [Akşam] is the most ultra-patriotic Unionist organ." Therefore, it would appear that the decisions were not based on best practice in terms of commerce and marketing, but rather on British foreign policy, which was hostile toward Ankara and the nationalists. Ferda, an anti-nationalist publication in Adana, also enjoyed French, American and British advertising.

Furthermore, while Peyam-i Sabah enjoyed great attention from foreign advertisers, such as Banco Di Roma, the American Foreign Trade Corporation (which sold Ford cars), Guarantee Trust Company of New York and Edwards and Sons (Near East) Ltd., this calibre of companies appeared less keen to advertise in Vakit and even less so in Akşam. Edwards and Sons, a company that sold Vaseline, chocolate and tea amongst other things, appears to have been the most indiscriminate in choosing a medium for its marketing but even so gave far more of its advertising to Peyam-i Sabah than to Vakit or Akşam. Therefore, Vakit and especially Akşam have a distinctly different feel in their advertisement pages, with Vakit’s foreign advertising mostly shaped by Edwards and Sons and J. Roussel, a French clothing company, together with various smaller companies and Akşam, which received around two Edward and Sons advertisements monthly, devoting more space to local and personal advertisements.

Hakimiyet-i Milliye, the official organ of the nationalist movement, had no foreign advertisers at all in 1921 and relied wholly on local advertisers. Although one

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444 Peyam-i Sabah (Sabah No. 11281, Peyam No. 851), 9 Şaban 1339, 16 Nisan 1337-1921 [16 April 1921], "İngiliz Hükümetine Ait Fazla Malzememin Füruhtü".
could argue this was because *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* was Ankara based, unlike the others that appeared in the capital, it should appear as no coincidence that after the Turkish victories against the Greeks in September 1922 and the liberation of Izmir, foreign advertising started to trickle into *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*. The first occurrence of foreign advertisement is on 18 September 1922, placed by Swiss watchmaker Zenith, who had already been advertising in the Ottoman Empire before the outbreak of the war. One week later, Zenith was joined by two large department stores located in Istanbul, namely Galata Tiring and Selanik Bonmarché. But, more interestingly, a French company, producers of the medicine Tricalcine also started to advertise in the official organ of the nationalist movement. Before the year was over, German car manufacturer Benz also started taking out advertising space. While Tricalcine, Zenith, Benz and the Istanbul department stores were advertising both in Istanbul dailies and in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, the conspicuous lack of British and American companies, who were prominent advertisers in Istanbul, raises questions. However, this first wave of foreign advertisements was a short-lived one and ended abruptly at the end of 1922. The reason for this is presumably related to the negotiations over Lausanne and the pressure applied by the British, together with the desire of the business community to wait and see which way things would go.

Only several months after the declaration of the Turkish Republic, there was a return of foreign advertisers to what had now become the organ, not of the resistance movement, but of the government. Tricalcine, Zenith and Benz returned as advertisers, and this time for longer. In fact, Benz, the first foreign company to advertise in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* after the declaration of the republic, continued as Mercedes Benz later on and several German companies like Deutz, Rheinmetall, Biox, and Bayer, would follow it, giving advertisement in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*.

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447 *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* No. 611, 25 Muharrem 1341, 18 Eylül 1338-1922 [18 September 1922].
448 *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* No. 618, 3 Safer 1341, 25 Eylül 1338-1922 [25 September 1922].
449 *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* No. 615, 29 Muharrem 1341, 22 Eylül 1338-1922 [22 September 1922].
450 *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* No. 663, 27 Rabiulévvel 1341, 17 Teşrinisani 1338-1922 [17 November 1922]
i Milliye a distinct German bias in 1924.\textsuperscript{452} French companies that also advertised in this period were J. Roussel, Franco-Roman Air Transport, and Memalik-i Şarkiye Fransız Bankası, with the latter appearing only once.\textsuperscript{453} Italian car manufacturer Fiat was, although low in frequency, present all through 1924.\textsuperscript{454} Interestingly, the only British company to advertise was Sentinel Cammel, a producer of train wagons, which ran a short lived campaign from mid-December 1923 until early February 1924.\textsuperscript{455} In this context, the absence of British companies needs explanation, as both former allies Italy and France were advertising in the organ of the new republic. Italian and French businesses had sought to establish economic ties with Ankara starting in 1922, when it became clear that Ankara would be victorious in the Turkish-Greek war. British companies, however, had initially been hampered by British foreign policy and then subsequently suffered from the hostile stance taken by the Ankara government towards British capital.\textsuperscript{456} Furthermore, in 1919 dahiliye nezareti came to an agreement with Yeni Gazete in Sivas to the effect that, in return for propaganda for the government, Evkaf-ı Hümayun would systematically buy advertisement space in Yeni Gazete.

This is further evidence of how presence or absence of advertising in newspapers with certain political affiliations was a reflection of support or opposition to those leanings.

It is clear that money was changing hands with the aim of influencing the press in various ways. That this is the case and that such payments were widespread


\textsuperscript{454} Hakimiyet-i Milliye No. 1032, 21 Cemazeyilahar 1342, 29 Kanunusani 1340-1924/ [29 January 1923].

\textsuperscript{455} Hakimiyet-i Milliye No. 999, 12 Cemazeyilevvel 1342, 21 Kanunuevvel 1339-1923 [21 December1923].

and important is supported by an article published in December 1910 in the Ottoman daily *Azad*.

The unbiased complaints, criticism and objections of the press have increasingly diminished. Those who were amazed by this change in the situation were not small in number. [...] A honourable friend of mine said that this silence [in the press] was related to 'hidden payments'. I was surprised and said:

— It was only in the era of [Hamidian] oppression that newspapers accepted money to keep quiet. That [practice] was cut off after [the revolution].

— It was cut off, but an event that occurred recently [would suggest that] some newspapers still keep quiet because of hidden payments...

— No sir, you are wrong. How could it be that the *Nigehban-i Meşrutiyet, Tercüman-i Millet* would sell their conscience?! Impossible! [These are fictitious newspaper titles, alluding to existing ones, such as *Meşrutiyet, Tercüman-i Hakikat* and *Sada-i Millet*]

— I agree. What is more, the other day I was passing by one of the official offices and one of our hard working journalists was there too [...] I asked him: 'You are here, Sir?' He said: 'Yes, I am waiting for the payment for my newspaper...' I did not believe him and you had better not believe him either!457

Such government support, however, probably happened in a clandestine way. As was argued by Muhiddin, the *matbuat ve istihbarat müdürü* of the Ankara government, financial support given to newspapers was not to be discussed in

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- Vakıan kat edildi ama ahiren ceryan eden bir vaka hala bazı gazetelerin tahsisat-ı mesturdan teşkin-i etəş-i zaruret etmekle sürdürmə. [...] Yık efendim, su-i tefehüm buyurdunuz. Hiç öyle yeni devrin nigejian-ı meşrutiyet, tercümən-ı millet gazeteleri vicianlarnını satarlar mı?! Haşal...
- Ben de öyle diyorum. Hatta geçen gün devair-i resmiyedendirin önünden geçiyordum. Hamiyetperver gazetecilerimizden biri de oralarda [...] Kendilerine sordum: Buralardınızın efendim, dedim. - Evet, gazetinin tahsisatını bekliyorum da... - Ben inanmadım ya siz de inanmayın!"
public, unless a public perception should arise that recipients of subsidies were merely official organs of the state.458

Money could be used directly to bribe or fund journalists or newspapers. The idea of accepting payment in return for silence was not an alien one. For example, soon after the constitutional revolution, the CUP organized a gala-dinner for members of the press, where, probably after having enjoyed an expensive meal, they were informed that they should refrain from printing articles on the annexation of Bosnia by Austria-Hungary.459 Although Hüseyin Cahid claims to have sold Tanin after the Balkan Wars due to being tired and disillusioned by the outcome of events,460 according to Atay, the CUP bought Tanin for several thousand liras, shortly after it had taken a critical position towards the Committee's minister of education. Hüseyin Cahid, Atay adds, was given a high-paid position in the duyun-i umumiye. The once fierce journalist passed his time during the World War spending his money in yacht clubs. Muhiddin Birgen, the man who took over from Hüseyin Cahid at Tanin, described journalism to Atay as "Writing a lot, but not really saying anything!" ("Bir çok şey yazarak hiç şey söylememek").461

Abdülhamid, who had a pre-revolution history of playing a cat and mouse game with blackmailing journalists who accepted "hush money", was clearly of the opinion that journalists could, and should, be bought. Ali Cevad, his personal secretary, recounted how Abdülhamid complained to him about the press, saying:

Whether in Europe or here, journalists are blackmailers. [...] Our enemies are making progress. Yet we do nothing. They give these newspapers money. [Speaking to Ali Cevad:] You are an honourable man. Let me give you a few hundred lira and you keep it on you. Whenever these journalists come to you,
give them a fitting sum of money so that they act with good manners. Try and get these men to shut up.\textsuperscript{462}

Ali Cevad claims to have replied that money could not silence the press in its current chaotic state adding that it could also lead to rumours about the sultan trying to buy the press. Abdülhamid, probably, insisted that this should be done anyway. Ali Cevad adds that some money was still given to journalists and that this had led to “incorrect accusations”, by which he probably means the allegations regarding \textit{Volkan} and the 31 March Incident being linked to the palace. That \textit{Volkan}, a daily newspaper with barely any advertisements could be distributed for free leads one inevitably to the conclusion that it was receiving substantial outside financial support, and that, despite Ali Cevad’s claim that he personally turned Derviş Vahdeti away when he came seeking financial support for \textit{Volkan}, this support in all probability came from the Palace. Such support for newspapers was not limited to the palace. British intelligence reported that, during the First World War, the ministry of interior allegedly had a secret fund for newspapers, from which pro-CUP newspapers received 20 to 50 \textit{lira} per month while adding that the entire press was probably subsidized, as there was no other explanation to how issues could be sold for a mere 40 \textit{para} when the price of paper was 27 \textit{para} for a single sheet.\textsuperscript{463} The Grand National Assembly in Ankara financially and materially supported newspapers that it considered aligned with its own interests.\textsuperscript{464}

It was not merely internal actors who could, by the judicious use of money, influence what was published in the press and push their own agendas. Foreign actors also adopted the same approach. Even before the constitutional revolution, the British Embassy in Istanbul suggested that either Turkish newspapers should be subsidised or that a new Turkish newspaper should be published in order to prevent loss of British prestige in the Ottoman Empire


\textsuperscript{463} TNA FO 371/4141, No. 49194, 8 March 1919, Part IV.
\textsuperscript{464} TBMMZC Devre 1 Sene 1 İçtima 159 celse 1, p.516.
because of articles appearing in the press which were critical of British policy in India. Shortly after the constitutional revolution, the German ministry of the exterior and Deutsche Bank, with the financial aid of German businessmen, such as Eccius, the president of Krupp, published the bi-lingual *Osmanischer Lloyd-Lloyd Ottoman* soon after the constitutional revolution. Zionist funding was made available to newspapers which sought to convince Ottoman Jews of Zionist ideals and *Jeune Turc*, according to the British foreign office annual report on Turkey for the year 1910, was funded by the Anglo-Palestine Trading Company, registered in England and an offshoot of the Judaic Colonisation Association, which frequently published articles on why a wholesale Jewish immigration to Mesopotamia would be beneficial for the Ottoman Empire. Further, according to a 1919 British intelligence report, prior to the Armistice the majority of Turkish papers (Including *Sabah* and *İkdam*) appear to have been subsidised by the Austro-Germans at rates varying between 1,000 to 3,000 *lira* per month. Tauber claims that it was highly likely that the French supported pro-French newspapers in Syria. In 1919, in occupied Istanbul, anti-Turkish newspapers, originating in Greece, were sold at cheaper prices than those of domestic papers, thereby making them a popular choice and a vessel for Greek propaganda. In this last case, although no direct financial support was given, the domestic market was, presumably deliberately, undercut.

The quest for money could also have been bi-directional. The British foreign office annual report for Turkey for the year 1909 describes the Turkish press, with the exception of *Tanin*, as corrupt, since they would seek monetary support from financial institutions and gives the example of *Yeni Gazete*, that had sought the support of the Lynch Company and upon failing to secure it, had resorted to

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468 TNA FO 195/2363, "Turkey, Annual Report, 1910", 14 February 1911, p. 66.

469 TNA FO 371/4141, No. 49194, 8 March 1919, Part IV


471 TNA FO 608/92, 17 April 1919, p. 95; 29 May 1919, pp. 98-99.
attacking it in its publications.\textsuperscript{472} Given that one of the articles that was introduced in the 1909 press law to combat malpractice was Article 18, which dealt with blackmail, this was probably not an exceptional case.

The financial sources of a newspaper were also considered important by the government. Even though under martial law newspapers could reappear with a slightly different name after being shut down, when \textit{Sada-i Millet} was hit with such a closure and was going to reappear as \textit{Cidal}, those thought to be the source of finance for this newspaper were secretly observed by the police.\textsuperscript{473}

Publishing periodicals, especially dailies, was an expensive business. It required a lot of capital up front, which is why most of the permit applications during the press boom were submitted by people who were arguably better off. The initial capital investment was necessary to obtain printing equipment, which in the first few years after the constitutional revolution had to be imported from Europe, which added to the cost. After the boom, when there was a surplus of equipment, the cost of acquiring printing equipment most likely went down. However, operating costs, to cover consumables, such as paper and ink, but also to pay the wages of the employees, increased during the First World War, due to the wartime economy, which affected the markets in general. Paper was exceptionally expensive because it became scarce almost as soon as the war started, and remained so even after the declaration of the Turkish Republic. In addition to the high costs, the press boom had caused the prices of daily newspapers to be locked in at the lowest levels for the entire industry and ignited competition over readership, which resulted in very slim and potentially negative profit margins. Under these circumstances, sustaining a profitable publication was very difficult. In contrast to what is often suggested, it is very likely that these economic realities had more to do with the decrease in the number of publications during the First World War than with censorship.

This harsh climate left publishers vulnerable and any financial support was likely to be welcome, regardless of any conditions that might be attached to it.

\textsuperscript{472} TNA FO 195/2363, “Turkey, Annual Reoprt, 1909”, dd. 31/01/1910, p.63
\textsuperscript{473} BOA DH.EUM.THR 93/10, dd. 23 Teşrinisani 1325 [6/12/1909].
However, it is very difficult to quantify or obtain the precise details about such financial support since it was, of necessity, usually a clandestine arrangement. Even with advertising, there appears to have been a form of censorship, with preference given to publications that aligned with the sponsor’s interest.
In any examination of the Ottoman press, or indeed of any press, one question inevitably arises: what was the impact of the press on society, on politics and on public opinion in general? In a period in which the literacy rate has been estimated at around 10% of the population, it was the case that circulation figures were usually low or very low, to what extent can one argue that the Ottoman press was important?

As Hanna has noted, the question of what constitutes literacy needs to be nuanced. In a ‘cafe society’, such as the Ottoman one, the number of those who could read did not, thus, need to be high in order for the population at large to be informed of, and influenced by, what was in the newspapers, and however scathing Ahmed Rasim might have been about the ability of people, whether “children, young graduates or men with beards”, to understand what newspapers were talking about, the fact remained that they had access to press coverage whether they were literate or not. It has even been argued by some scholars that literacy rates increased as a result of the existence of the press, Ortaylı claiming that the Ottoman population did not learn to read from books but from newspapers and Berkes arguing that the palace-controlled press under Abdülhamid resulted in an increase in the number of newspaper readers (and listeners) even among the lower classes.

That the Ottoman press did indeed have an impact and was influential in shaping public opinion is evident from the strenuous efforts applied by all Ottoman governments in this period to control it. The 1864 press law was introduced to

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474 Fortna B.C., Learning to Read, pp. 20-21.
bring a measure of control over this new medium. Abdülhamid employed censorship and money to ensure a compliant press and nurtured a series of publications that were close to the palace.\textsuperscript{479} The introduction of the 1909 press law, although remarkably tolerant, was nevertheless brought in in an attempt to curb the excessive freedom of the press which followed the 1908 revolution, while martial law and the various legal changes introduced in 1912 and 1913 aimed at tightening press controls. The government also sought to ban the entry into Ottoman territory of Ottoman newspapers published abroad, including \textit{Meşrutiyet}, \textit{Yeni Yol} and \textit{Serbesti},\textsuperscript{480} over whose content it had no control. While Article 35 of the 1909 press law allowed the banning of a single issue of a paper from entry, upon the agreement of the cabinet (\textit{meclis-i vükelə}) and by order from \textit{dahiliye}, it is clear that this article was used to ban entire publications, not merely single issues.\textsuperscript{481} This was probably possible because of martial law, declared in May 1909, which to an extent blurred the lines between civil and military law, since the request in October 1909 to ban \textit{Meşrutiyet}, a French language newspaper published in Paris, was achieved though invoking Article 35 of what \textit{dahiliye nezareti} (ministry of the interior) called the “martial press law” (matbuat Kanun-i Harbi),\textsuperscript{482} something which did not in fact exist.

Not just the Ottoman government but foreign governments too, clearly persuaded of the power of the Ottoman press, compiled reports on the various newspapers produced in the empire. While the British subsidised certain Ottoman newspapers in order to prevent a loss of British prestige,\textsuperscript{483} the Dutch took measures to prevent the entry of Ottoman newspapers into their East Indian colonies, fearing the spread of pan-Islamic propaganda.\textsuperscript{484}


\textsuperscript{480} BOA DH.EUM.THR 13/63 16 Teşrinisani 1325 [29 November 1909].

\textsuperscript{481} See for example: BOA DH.EUM.KADL 18/38 9 Cemazeyilevel 1329, 26 Nisan 1327 [9 May 1911]; BOA DH.EUM.KADL 18/38 2 Cemazeyilevel 1329, 18 Nisan 1327 [2 May 1911]. Only the titles of the publications and their country of origin are given, with no indication that a specific issue should be stopped at the borders.

\textsuperscript{482} BOA DH.EUM.THR 92/46 29 Teşrinievvel 1325[?] [11 November 1909].


The violence, either physical or verbal, to which journalists could be subjected, further demonstrates that the press had, or was perceived to have, considerable influence. According to Karaosmanoğlu, when Refik Halit, a journalist who gained fame through his work in satirical publications, criticised the CUP in the satirical magazine *Cem*, the pro-CUP press attempted to depict his father and brother as almost single-handedly responsible for the existence of Abdülhamid’s tyranny in an attempt to discredit him.\(^{485}\) Mizancı Murat, a fierce opposition journalist, was subjected to smear campaigns in the CUP press, which questioned his loyalty to the Ottoman Empire because of his Caucasian origins.\(^{486}\) He was also threatened at gunpoint and was subsequently taken into custody, allegedly for his own protection.\(^{487}\) As will be discussed later in this chapter, another prominent journalist, Derviş Vahdeti, claimed to have received anonymous threats against him, while at the same time claiming that similar threats of violence against other journalists, originating with the Muhammedan Unionists, were untrue.

On occasion journalists were not merely threatened but killed. Hasan Fehmi, a journalist for *Serbesti*, was shot on the Galata Bridge in March 1909, an assassination was which never solved but which was widely thought to have been the work of the CUP. Ahmed Samim, a journalist who worked for *Sada-i Millet* and who was strongly critical of the CUP, was killed in May 1910\(^{488}\) and Alemdar’s Zeki Bey was shot and killed in July 1911.\(^{489}\) The scale of violence against journalists, such as these assassinations or the killing of a man mistaken for Hüseyin Cahid, and the attacks on newspaper offices which occurred during the 31 March Incident, declined after the period 1909-1911, but there were still sporadic incidents. Hasan Tahsin was killed by Greek forces in Izmir in 1919 and Ali Kemal was allegedly lynched by a mob in 1922.

\(^{485}\) Yakup Kadri [Karaosmanoğlu], *Hatıraları*, pp. 72-73.
\(^{488}\) Ahmed İhsan [Tokgöz], *Hatıralarım*, pp. 97-100.
\(^{489}\) Ahmed Emin [Yalman], *Development*, p. 104.
While governments certainly perceived newspapers as potentially dangerous, the newspapers themselves were also clearly aware of their own potential impact. In December 1908 *Kalem*, a popular satirical magazine, came out with a caricature (Figure 17) depicting a child swatting at the portrait of an unidentified Ottoman minister with a newspaper. The caption read “My father said yesterday that, now, with the constitutional regime, a single newspaper can bring down a minister. Let us see whether he will fall.” (Babam dün dedi ki şimdi idare-i meşrutiyette bir gazete ile bir nazır düşürülebilir. Bakayım düşecek mi?). (In *Kalem* No. 16, 4 Kanunuevvel 1324/17 December 1908).

Figure 17: Caricature of a child swatting at the portrait of an Ottoman minister with a newspaper. The caption says: "My father said yesterday that, now, with the constitutional regime, a single newspaper can bring down a minister. Let us see whether he will fall." (Babam dün dedi ki şimdi idare-i meşrutiyette bir gazete ile bir nazır düşürülebilir. Bakayım düşecek mi?). (In *Kalem* No. 16, 4 Kanunuevvel 1324/17 December 1908).

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other words, the post-Hamidian press was not a mere cocoon of self-contained ideas and messages, read only by an elite as an intellectual pastime.

That this was indeed the case and that the press could, and did, have a significant impact is indicated by Ahmed İhsan’s description of the press, in the period following the constitutional revolution, coercing the government, which consisted of men of the old mind-set, to play by the rules of the constitution.490 Pressured by complaints in the press, Kamil Paşa’s newly appointed cabinet decided to look into complaints made about government officials in various newspapers,491 while Tanin is said to have caused the downfall of Ferid Paşa.492

![Caricature of a man using the press to become elected. Hüseyin Cahit, owner and editor of the political daily Tanin can be seen using his newspapers to propel himself towards the chamber of deputies (meclis-i mebusan). (In Kalem No. 2, 28 August 1324/10 September 1908, p. 3).](image)

Because of this, the press was an important factor in electioneering. A cartoon published in the political daily *Tanin* in September 1908, during the first

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491 BOA MV 120/2, 18 Recep 1326H, 3 Ağustos 1324R [16 August 1908].
elections for the chamber after the revolution, showed Hüseyin Cahid, owner and editor of Tanin, using his newspapers to propel himself towards meclis-i mebusan (chamber of deputies), which he did successfully, becoming a mebus (deputy) for Istanbul (Figure 18). The use of the press in electioneering increased in intensity for the 1912 elections.\footnote{Kayalı H., “Elections and the Electoral Process in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1919” in IJMES, vol. 27, No. 3 (Aug., 1995), pp. 265–286, here p. 271 and p. 273.}

The press was also influential in mobilising popular support for political action. The call of various newspapers for a boycott of Austrian goods after the annexation by Austria-Hungary of Bosnia Herzegovina in October 1908\footnote{See for example: Tanin No. 70, 13 Ramazan 1326H, 26 Eylül 1324R [9 October 1908], “Siyasiyat - Avusturya Emtiasını Almayınız!”; Sabah No. 6841, 14 Ramazan, 27 Eylül 1324R [10 October 1908], ”Bayram Geliyor. Bulgar ve Avsturya Malı Almayalım“.”} appears to have been a considerable success. Ahmed Rasim describes in his memoirs how it caused everyone “to throw away their fez”\footnote{Ahmed Rasim, Eşkal-i Zaman (Istanbul: Devlet Kitapları, 1969), p.23: "Bosna ve Hersek'in ülkelerine katılması üzerine, bize Avusturya mallarına karşı bir boykotaj yaptırmışlardı, hatırladınız mı? Yaman süratli bir propaganda hemen hepimize fesleri attırmıştı".} and, according to Falih Rifki Atay, “because the fez was produced in Austria, for a while, due to the boycott, we did not know what to wear on our heads".\footnote{Falih Rifki [Atay], Batış' Yılları, p. 30: "Fez Avusturya mâl olduğu için boykot yüzünden bağımsız eyleme gitmek bilemiyorduk".} Similarly, in 1912, with the first Balkan War looming, the press played a significant part in mobilizing the population of Istanbul to attend war rallies\footnote{See for example the headlines in Tercüman-i Hakikat No. 1311, 13 Şevval 1330, 20 Eylül 1328, 3 Teşrinievel 1912 [3 October 1912], "Yaşasın Harp Kahrolsun Düşmanlar"; "Artık Yeter; Ya Namus ve İstiklal, Ya Ölüm!". Some dailies printed poems which were specially composed for the occasion, calling for war, see for example: İkdam No. 5612, 24 Şevval 1330, 23 Eylül 1328, 6 Teşrinievel 1912 [6 October 1912], "Destan-i Harp"; İkdam No. 5621, 4 Zilkade 1330, 3 Teşrinievel 1328, 15 Teşrinievel 1912 [15 October 1912], “Neşide-i Harp".} and in creating an aggressive public opinion\footnote{See for example the headlines in Tercüman-i Hakikat No. 1311, 13 Şevval 1330, 20 Eylül 1328, 3 Teşrinievel 1912 [3 October 1912], "Yaşasın Harp Kahrolsun Düşmanlar"; "Artık Yeter; Ya Namus ve İstiklal, Ya Ölüm!". Some dailies printed poems which were specially composed for the occasion, calling for war, see for example: İkdam No. 5612, 24 Şevval 1330, 23 Eylül 1328, 6 Teşrinievel 1912 [6 October 1912], "Destan-i Harp"; İkdam No. 5621, 4 Zilkade 1330, 3 Teşrinievel 1328, 15 Teşrinievel 1912 [15 October 1912], “Neşide-i Harp".} which eventually forced Gazi Ahmed Muhtar's Great Cabinet (so dubbed due to the number of elder statesmen in it) to abandon seeking a diplomatic solution and instead to respond militarily to the ultimatums
presented by its Balkan neighbours. The press was also considered to have played an important part in encouraging the population of Anatolia to join the Turkish struggle for independence. In the Arab provinces, too, the power of the press was evident in the leading role played by the newspapers *al-Mufid* and *al-Ittihad al-‘Uthmani* in gaining public support for the reform movement which began in Beirut at the beginning of 1913. Their lead was soon followed by most of the Syrian press.

One of the most telling examples of the power of the press is the role played by *Volkan* in the 31 March Incident, a mutiny among Ottoman soldiers stationed in Istanbul who, incited by Derviş Vahdeti’s Mohammedan Union Party, revolted against their officers and poured out into the streets of the capital, demanding the (re-)application of the sharia law. The members of the cabinet, unable to act swiftly and fearing for their safety, chose to resign. This mutiny resulted in the collapse of Hilmi Paşa’s cabinet and prompted the army to react by sending in troops from Thessaloniki to restore order in the city. Both modern historians and contemporary sources see the counter-revolution as an attempt (according to many by Abdülhamid himself) to negate the effects of the 1908 revolution or, at least, as an attempt to overthrow Hilmi Paşa’s cabinet, which was considered close to the CUP.

The question about what motivated the counter-revolution and whether a conspiracy was set in place by the palace to initiate the incident, is, here, less important than the question of whether or not the daily *Volkan* had any influence in the affair. In his memoires, Atay describes a scene from the 31 March Incident where a mob of men wearing turbans were hanging on the fences around the ministry of War and hurling in copies of *Volkan*. For him, as for many of his contemporaries, the link between *Volkan* and the mutiny was clear. Indeed, evidence strongly suggests that *Volkan* was, at least partially, but probably significantly, an influential factor that shaped the counter revolution. This is

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499 Public opinion was strong enough, according to the German and Austrian ambassadors, to coerce the government into a war which they were trying to avoid. See for example: TNA FO 424/234 No. 450, 9 October 1912 and No. 502, 12 October 1912.
500 TBMMZC Devre 1 Sene 3 İçtima 18 Celse 1, 1/4/1338 [1 April 1922], pp. 441-443.
502 Falih Rifki [Atay], *Batış Yılları*, p. 34.
particularly clear from the way the events unfolded and the content of the newspaper.

On the morning of 13 April 1909, the troops of the fourth avcı (sniper) batallion, stationed in Istanbul, imprisoned their officers and moved out into the square in front of the Sultan Ahmed mosque. They were joined by more troops from other barracks and religious students and clergymen and the number of protesters swelled rapidly as more and more soldiers and students joined them. This sight was described by the second dragoman of the Dutch embassy, who was an eye-witness:

Early this morning a very large group of religious scholars gathered at the square in front of Ayasofya, very close by to the offices of the ministry of justice and the chamber of deputies, who, as their number grew took a more and more aggressive attitude. Shortly, soldiers (but not officers) were seen joining them, [and] among the regular blue uniforms the white uniforms of the Albanian troops, the old palace guards, could be seen... From this large mass of people chants [were] rising: We want the Religious Law! Out with the Committee [of Union and Progress]! Long live our Sultan Abdülhamid! And such [other chants]...".504

There is an undeniable resemblance between this, arguably rather impartial, eye-witness report and the opinions expressed and positions taken by Volkan. Like the mutineers, Volkan argued explicitly and strongly for the establishment of the sharia law.505 More ambiguous was its stance on the constitution, for, in many cases, Volkan, the official organ of the Mohammedan Union Party, argued

503 This event happened on 13 April 1909, which coincides with 31 March 1325 on the Rumi calendar.
504 Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Gezantschap, Consulaat, Consulaat-generaal te Constantinopel/İstanbul (Turkije), (1817) 1872-1954 (1955), nummer toegang 2.05.94, inventarisnummer 454, index 540-1909, 13 April 1909: "Heden morgen vroeg verzamelde zich op het plein van Aya Sofía, vlak bij het ministerie van justitie en het gebouw der kamer der afgevaardigden, een zeer grote menigte hoja’s die met het aangroeien van hun getal tevens een meer en meer dreigende houding begonnen aan te nemen! Spoedig zag men zich ook soldaten (echter geen officiers) bij hen voegen, waaronder naast de gewone blauwe uniformen ook de witte kleding van de Albanese troepen van’t vroegere paleisgarnizoen opvle... Uit de thans zeer grote menschen massa stijgen de kreten op: Wij willen de Godsdiestige Wet! Weg met het Comité! Leve onze Sultan Abdul Hamid! En dergelijke".
505 See for example: Volkan No. 91, 11 Rabıulevelvėl 1327, 20 Mart 1325R, 2 Nisan 1909M [2 April 1909], "Dayak Mi Vahşettir, Yoksa Zindan Mi?", where the author is arguing for corporal punishments, as part of sharia law.
that they were supportive of the constitution and sought sharia only within that framework. For example, in Volkan No. 48 the nizamname (constitution) of the Mohammedan Union Party was published in full. The first article of the party's constitution boldly stated that the leader of the party was the prophet Muhammed himself. The aims of the party were explained in the third article as:

"The purpose of this party is to work and strive to guarantee the continued application, until Judgement Day, of the Glorious Quran and the Holy Sharia, the sole path to moral improvement and social progress of the various Muslim people living in the lands of the Caliph or other countries and to increase and unite the political and social efforts of all Muslims and to protect the system of consultation, which is supported by the Honourable Sharia and the Great Constitution. As laws in the Ottoman Empire are encompassed within Mecelle-i Ahkam-i Adliye (Ottoman civil code) [we will strive] to present to the meclis mebusan, in the future, laws, created through the interpretation of fikih (religious law) books and also the criminal code and other necessary laws, and work to bring about their acceptance and [we will strive] to determine all our actions and stances through the Honourable Sharia and in this way try to have sharia laws in force in the regular courts in the future and to protect the entire Islamic world, which is under the Mohammedan banner, from attacks.

Here the stress is placed on sharia within a constitutional framework, or rather, that the new legislative apparatus should be controlled to make sure that the laws it produced were in compliance with the sharia. However, a mere three

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506 For example, Volkan No. 87, 6 Rabıulevel 1327, 15 Mart 1325, 28 Mart 1909 [28 March 1909], "Nida-ı Mazlumane": "Fakat biz meşrutiyeti keyf için, zevk için, Frenk adetlerini memleketimize sokmak için kabul etmişlerden değiliz. Dinimize nakise vermek isteyenlerden değiliz. Biz meşrutiyetle beraber, meclis-i mebusanında yapılacak kanunların şeriserife muvafık olmasına gayret edeceğiz."

days before the 31 March Incident took place, Volkan claimed that the new law on societies, which was being drafted, was of no effect on the Mohammedan Union Party, for it would only recognize the sharia, claiming that "[the Mohammedan Union Party] is not a new organization to be subjected to worldly laws. For it is governed only by divine law" and that "societies, new societies, can all be subjected to a certain law, however the holy Mohammedan Union Party is exempt from such requirements. How can an eternal society, like the Mohammedan Union Party, which seeks to subject Ottoman laws to the religious laws that it follows itself and proclaims its wish to act within these lines, be limited [by non-religious laws]?"\(^{508}\) In both cases, in the former declaring the prophet Muhammed to be the leader of the party and in the second claiming impunity from worldly laws due to the holy nature of the party, religious zeal and a desire to see laws in compliance with the sharia are clearly present.

Unlike the bulk of the boom-period press, which showed revolutionary tendencies, Volkan and the mutineers were supporters of the sultan-caliph. The abovementioned Mohammedan Union’s manifesto, as published in Volkan, displayed reverence for the caliph, or at least the caliphate, in article two, by describing itself as having been founded in Darülhilafet, one of Istanbul’s names literally meaning “the abode of the Caliphate” and, no doubt chosen on purpose over the common Dersaadet ("Gate of Bliss"). While the caliphate as an institution, for obvious religious reasons, lent itself rather well to support from a pro-sharia group, Abdülhamid could count on support from the daily in his function as sultan, too. Like its contemporaries, Volkan, too, spoke of the previous regime as istibdad (tyranny), condemned it, and celebrated its abolition.\(^{509}\) However, in doing so, it refrained from linking that oppression to the rule of the sultan himself, in some instances presenting an apologetic defence

\(^{508}\) Volkan No. 99, 18 Rabıulevvel 1327, 27 Mart 1325, 9 Nisan 1909 [9 April 1909], "İttihad-i Muhammedi Cemiyetinin Tesiratı"; "İttihad-i Muhammedi Cemiyeti, cemiyet-i mukaddes değilirdir ki kanun-i beşeriyyeye tabi olsun. Onun kanunu, Kanun-i İlahidir. [...] Cemiyetlerin, cemiyet-i muhdeselerin her biri bir kanuna tabi olabilirler, lakin İttihad-i Muhammedi Cemiyet-i mukaddesesi bu gibi kuyuttadan varstedir. İttihad-i Muhammedi Cemiyeti, yapılacak kavanin-i Osmanlıye’nin bile kendirin tabi olduğu kavanin-i şeriyeye tabiyetini aramakta ve o hudut dahilinde hareket edilmesini takip edeceği emelini ızhar etmekte iken, hiç ezel, ebedi olan bir cemiyet başka bir suretle tahdid mi edilir".

\(^{509}\) For example see: Volkan No. 94, 13 Rabıulevvel 1327, 22 Mart 1324, 4 Nisan 1909 [4 April 1909], "Menkibe-i Celile-i Cenab-i Peygamberimiz".
of the ruler. In one piece, *Volkan* accused the CUP, which it regularly antagonized, of being responsible for the assassination of Serbesti journalist Hasan Fehmi and argued that the sultan himself had never resorted to such violence, suggesting that the sultan was less oppressive than the Committee:

If His Majesty Sultan Abdülhamid had wanted men assassinated, he could have the president of Şeref Sokağı (referring to Ahmed Riza, the head of the Ottoman chamber of deputies) and his supporters killed in their apartments in Paris or in Egypt, in the Khedival accommodations [...] and there is no doubt that the aforementioned sultan had the necessary power to do so. Our newspaper has already published that, in those days, [the sultan] personally said — my predecessors had put thousands to the sword over politics, yet today I find exile sufficient. What we are trying to say is that, while under the previous regime countless forms of abuse was suffered at the hands of ministers and the like, the murders and scandals of today were unheard of.511

Thus, *Volkan* was putting the blame for the oppression not on the sultan but on corrupt men in the government. Similarly, the tensions between *mektepli* (academy schooled) officers, who had worked their way through years of education and the *alaylı* (experienced) officers, who had received their ranks through active duty, the result of the latter more easily reaching higher and better positions, was explained in the same fashion: "The blame fell not on the *mektepli*, nor on the *alaylı* [officers]. But do not think the caliph was to be

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510 See for example: Volkan No. 88, 7 Rabıulevvel 1327, 16 Mart 1325, 29 Mart 1909M [29 March 1909], "Hükümet İçinde Hükümet" or Volkan No. 99, 18 Rabıulevvel 1327, 27 Mart 1325, 9 Nisan 1909 [9 April 1909], "İktihad-i Muhammedi Cemiyetinin Tesiratı". In the latter example, *Volkan* calls the members of the Mohammedan Union Committee to support the government, but qualifies that by saying "as long as the government is not in the hands of a single party", meaning the CUP. ("Daima hükümete zahir olunuz. Çünkü bizim hükümetten bir beklediğimiz yoktur. [...] O halde biz hükümetin muhabbetini müsabesindeyiz. Lakin, hükümet de bir fırkaya mensup olmadiğini isbat ederse").

511 *Volkan* No. 102, 21 Rabıulevvel 1327, 30 Mart 1325, 12 Nisan 1909M [12 April 1909], "Teskin-i Helecan Emr-i Mehal": (After claiming that Hasan Fehmi was assassinated by order of the CUP) Sultan Abdülhamid Han Hazretleri, eğer adam öldürmek isterseydii, şeref sokağının reisini de, avnesini de, Paris apartmanlarında, Mısır’da, Hidiv imarethanelerinde, öldürtebilirdi [...] Ve hiç şüpheye yohtur ki: Hakan-i müşarun ileyh Hazretleri bu kuvvet ve kudrete balağan mablag malik idi. Ve o zamanlar bizzat – Ceddim siyaseten yüz bin kişiyle kılıçtan geçirmiş iken, ben bugün nefıyle ıktıfa ediyorum – dediği de yine bizim ceridelemizde görülmemiştir. Demek istiyoruz ki: derv-i sabıkta nüzzar ve saire tarafından bin türlü mezali batbit olunduğu halde, bu günki cinayetlerin, rezaletlerin hiç birisi görılmemişti".
blamed. No! He too was being deceived. He was told that the schooled officers would not be loyal to him. In short, games were being played."

Volkan's influence on the counter-revolution goes beyond striking similarities between the daily's ideologies and the counter-revolutionaries. The executive force in the counter-revolution were mutinous soldiers, stationed in Istanbul, who killed or disabled their officers. British embassy reports state that Volkan was distributed for free among these soldiers. If this was true, it would suggest a very deliberate propaganda effort on part of the publishers, for, as explained in the chapter "Financing the Press", publishing a daily was expensive and distributing copies for free would require a decision at the highest level, as it would carry very high costs. Furthermore, Volkan, in the weeks preceding the mutiny, on various occasions, had presented itself as the protector of the interests of the common soldier, showering them with praise and regularly printing readers' letters from soldiers who would return these compliments and sometimes complain about their officers. Although Volkan never openly called on the soldiers to mutiny, it was rather suggestive:

A soldier should be a soldier in every sense. He should live for the army, he should die for the army. However, if [a man] is a soldier for four westernised drunks, who [have only just] returned from Europe, and believes them when they say that they are patriots, then woe to this people. Soldiers! The people expect a service from you this instant. [You must] think and believe! [You must] act!

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513 TNA FO 195/2363, 31 January 1910, "Annual Report, 1909", p. 62: "In especial the inflammatory articles of the semi-religious 'Volcan' must have had great influence on the soldiery, among whom it was distributed gratis".

514 See for example: Volkan No. 80, 29 Safer 1327, Mart 1325, 21 Mart 1909 [21 March 1909], "Volkan Sahib-i İmtiyazi Derviş Valdeti Kıl", Volkan No. 87, 6 Rabievelvel 1327, 15 Mart 1325, 28 Mart 1909 [28 March 1909], "Nida-i Mazlumane": "Allah bizi şeriatà, kanuna karşı gelen askerden eylemesin! Amirize itat boyunuza borç olduğunu, hamdolsun biliriz. Lakin ruhumuzun skıntı verecek çevrü cefaya da yer yoktur".

515 Volkan No. 81, 39 Safer 1327, 9 Mart 1325, 22 Mart 1909 [22 March 1909], "İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti": "Askerler bütün manasyla asker olmalı. Askerlik için yaşamalı, askerlik için ölmetalı. Yoksa Avrupa'da frenkleşerek avdet etmiş dört tane sarhoş için askerlik ediyorsa, ve onların
The casualties of the counter-revolution came mostly from among the officers, who resisted or opposed the mutiny and who were killed by regular soldiers. Obedience to officers was, strangely, brought up regularly in Volkan’s opinion pieces. It is peculiar that the official organ of a political party should occupy itself with matters of obedience in the military to the point that it should, on several occasions, state the most obvious fact (i.e. "in the army, orders from superiors are to be followed"), as if soldiers were unaware of this fact. However, while apparently Volkan urged soldiers to be obedient to their officers, it subtly introduced conditions to that obedience: "[...] what I am saying here is that obedience is required to those superiors who do not stray from the law and just action. But what are we to do? If we were to call all of them bad, where are we to find good ones?" What constituted a "just" officer was left blank in this case. In another example Volkan filled in these blanks by suggesting that abuse at the hands of officers, should it go unpunished, could be resolved through the "people", the civilian population:

However, you are not required to perform private services such as cook for an officer or clean their baby. You cannot be put to work in slave labour. You cannot be beaten based on the personal opinion of an officer. [...] One of the things that the people are indebted to you for is that, if you cannot have your superior officers listen to your complains about illegal treatment, then the people could seek justice for you."

Such expressions would suggest that there were, as far as Volkan was concerned "good" and "bad" officers. The distinction, as is clear from a general reading through the daily, would be made on the basis of religion and piety. In one case,
mektepli officers, who through their education were often more exposed to Western culture and influence, were addressed as follows: "Officers, if you do not understand your own value, you will come to regret it! Try to raise the philosophy that you have learned in school or through research to a higher level. I beg you to learn about matters of the spirit and to learn better what martyrdom means."\footnote{Volkan No. 82, 30 Sefer 1327, 10 Mart 1325, 22 Mart 1909M [22 March 1909], "Alaylı - Mektepli Zabıtanla Askerler": "Kadruniz bitmeyeniz pişman olursunuz zabtan! Mektepte gördügünüz yahut mutalaa ile öğrenmiş olduğunuz felsefenizi ali bir dereceye ivsale çalışınız. Rica ederim biraz ruhun ahvalinden haberdar olunuz ve şehitlik ne olduğunu daha ziyade öğreniniz!."
}\footnote{Volkan No. 97, 17 Rabiulevvel 1327, 25 Mart 1325, 7 Nisan 1909M [7 April 1909], "Pusudakiler Başlarını Kaldırmasınlar": "[...] yine bazı ruşefaka-ı matbuata İttihat-ı Muhammedi azasından diyte tehditnameler ve bazı guna-ı münasebetsiz varakalar gönderilmekte olduğu meeteessül görülmüştür".} Furthermore, Derviş Vahdeti, owner and editor-in-chief of Volkan, complained in one issue that some newspapers were receiving anonymous threats signed as coming from the Mohammedan Unionists, and that their party had nothing to do with these forged letters.\footnote{Volkan No. 98, 1[8] Rabiulevvel 1327, 26 Mart 1325, 8 Nisan 1909M [8 April 1909], "İttihat-ı Muhammedi Cemiyeti - LaTurquie Gazetesi ve Bir Zabıt Tehditnamesi".} However, the very next day Volkan did not restrain itself when it allegedly received a very threatening letter from an anonymous officer, warning Derviş Vahdeti that his attempts at causing a religious division in society would end terribly.\footnote{Volkan No. 102, 21 Rabiulevvel 1327, 30 Mart 1325, 12 Nisan 1909M [12 April 1909], "Teskin-ı Helecan Emr-ı Mahal": "Bu mülkte evvel ve ahir hükümran olan şeriat kuvvetidir. O halde ahkam-ı şeriye büyükah olanları sokak ortalarında öldürmeli, memleketimizi Avrupa’nın bazı aksama dönemergi mi emrediyor?"} Similarly, in the days preceding the counter-revolution, Volkan claimed that certain officers had commanded their soldiers that if need be, they should not hesitate to kill the turbaned hocas, if ordered to do so.\footnote{Volkan No. 82, 30 Sefer 1327, 10 Mart 1325, 22 Mart 1909M [22 March 1909], "Alaylı - Mektepli Zabıtanla Askerler": "Kadruniz bitmeyeniz pişman olursunuz zabtan! Mektepte gördügünüz yahut mutalaa ile öğrenmiş olduğunuz felsefenizi ali bir dereceye ivsale çalışınız. Rica ederim biraz ruhun ahvalinden haberdar olunuz ve şehitlik ne olduğunu daha ziyade öğreniniz!."} Although it is not clear whether Volkan fabricated these threats, for it was silent about its sources, it used them to garner sympathy and to make a clear distinction between officers:

A few days earlier, an officer at a barrack, allegedly when he was giving soldiers instructions on obedience, [said] – Soldiers! Those turbaned hocas in the streets? When you are ordered to do so, you need to spear them to your bayonets! – Does such advice exist in the military? If it does, it is a fallacy, a tremendous mistake. Because the soldiers of this people fight only to be martyrs or gazi. A soldier, rather than fighting for territory, dies to exalt the Word of God. [...] Officers who occupy themselves with giving advice, nay, not advice, [but rather] things that
generate disgust from soldiers [towards the officers], [like] "Do you see those hocas in the streets? If it should be necessary, you will need to cut them" or "Who do you love more? The people or the sultan?" know neither God nor sharia. The only thing that I can do for such officers is to pity them.\(^{522}\)

Volkan's targets were not only westernised officers, but also CUP politicians. Two of the victims of the counter-revolution were prominent political figures, *adliye nazırı* (minister of justice) Nazım Paşa and the *Emir* of Latakia (Lazkiye) Arslan Bey. Silan, parliamentary secretary when the incident occurred, recounts in his memoirs:

"Seeing in front of my own eyes on Sultanahmet Square how, *adliye nazırı* Nazım Paşa, [who was mistaken for] the then *meclis-i mebusan reisi* (president of the chamber of deputies), Ahmed Riza, and Arslan Bey, the *Emir* of Latakia, [who was mistaken for] Istanbul Deputy Hüseyin Cahid, were killed with bayonets as they were approaching the building of the chamber of deputies [one of them] in a roofless and [the other in] a roofed car, was an unfortunate [sight] for unspoilt minds [like mine]."\(^{523}\)

In the case of Arslan Bey, the mob had believed him to be Hüseyin Cahid, prominent journalist and editor with the semi-official CUP newspaper *Tanin*, and Nazım Paşa was mistaken for Ahmed Riza, *meclis-i mebusan reis*. Both Hüseyin Cahid and Ahmed Riza were high-profile targets of Volkan. About a month before the mutiny, Hüseyin Cahid had published an article (mockingly) titled "We Want Sharia!", in which he strongly criticised the voices demanding a return to the application of the Muslim religious law. In his article, Hüseyin Cahid warned


\(^{523}\) Necmeddin Sahir [Silan], *Hatırlarım*, p. 19: "[...] Sultanahmet Meydani'nda, o zamanın Meclisi-i Mebusan Reisi Ahmed Riza Bey'in yerine Adliye nazırı Nazım Paşa'nın, İstanbul Mebusu Hüseyin Cahid Bey yerine Lazkiye Emiri Arslan Bey'in kapalı ve açık arabalar içinde Meclis-i Mebusan binasına gelişleri sırasında gözlerimin önünde süngü ile şehit edildiklerini görmek [...] masum dimağlar için aşı bir talihszlik oldu".
about the occurrence of reactionary events ("silisile-i irticai") which aimed at tyranny, anarchy and abusing people’s religious feelings to achieve this goal:

There are hidden hands that try to provoke the religious sentiments of the Muslims. As a bunch of mysterious voices, who indubitably have not the slightest interest in religion or the afterlife, keep chanting “We want sharia”, these words echo in the hearts of many pious believers, and the sentence “We want sharia” rises like a thunderstorm. Because we consider this provocation very damaging to our nation and because we fear that this time the traitors can mislead many good willed and kind people under the guise of sharia, we want to discuss this topic and open it up to the public”.

Hüseyin Cahid continued by stating that the demand for sharia was ridiculous because, he argued, it was already being applied as people were allowed to practice their religion as they wished and that there were many religious scholars among the mebusan. The result of this publication was that attacking Hüseyin Cahid became a recurring theme in Volkan, either for this particular article or for others. The aforementioned article was attacked in several issues of Volkan, being called a scandalous article ("rezalet alud"), incompliant with the sharia ("mugayır-ı şer-i şerif"), while Hüseyin Cahid was accused of wanting to “strike another blow at the sharia and open another wound among...
the supporters of the sharia,” and (intentionally) abusing the freedom of the press to create hubbub in the press.529

The attack on Arslan Bey, who was mistaken for Hüseyin Cahid, thus raises the question of whether the hatred for this particular journalist could not be traced back to the publications in Volkan. The other victim was mistaken for Ahmed Rıza, who was targeted more often in the days preceding the counter-revolution. In an example that was mentioned earlier, it was pointed out that he could have easily been assassinated in the past.530 But he was also accused of "plotting intricacies to dethrone the caliph" and "crushing the Muslim people".531 Furthermore, the opinion piece published on the day of the counter-revolution, claiming that Ahmed Rıza was trying to establish a new form of tyranny, threatened the members of parliament and displayed a remarkable level of accuracy about the events to come: "Rest assured: your joys of today will not last tomorrow. Not you, nor your leader (Ahmed Rıza) will reach your goals."532 Indeed, that same day Nazım Paşa suffered the fate that was meant for Ahmed Rıza.

During the counter-revolution, the offices of two newspapers, *Tanin* and *Şura-ı Ümmet* were ransacked. Again, there is a clear link here between *Volkan* and these acts of violence. Ahmed İhsan, who, during the mutiny, was in the office of

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528 Volkan No. 70, 19 Safer 1327, 26 Şubat 1324, 10 Mart 1909 [10 March 1909]. "Fikri": “Tanin gazetesinin ikiyüzon numeralı nüshasında şeriat’a bir darbe daha vurmak, ehl-i şeriatı bir yara daha açmak maksadıyla [...]”.
529 Volkan No. 76, 25 Safer 1327, 4 Mart 1325, 17 Mart 1909 [17 March 1909], “Aynen”: “... Hüseyin Cahid pişdar olup ‘Matbuat serbest’ diyerek ortalığı haftalarca yaygaralarla doldurmasından [...] ortalığı velveleye vermesi [...]”.
530 Volkan No. 102, 21 Rabiulevvel 1327, 30 Mart 1325, 12 Nisan 1909 [12 April 1909], "Teskin-i Helecan Emr-i Mehal".
531 Volkan No. 98, 17 Rabiulevvel 1327, 26 Mart 1325, 8 Nisan 1909 [8 April 1909], "İttihad-ı Muhammedi Cemiyeti - La Turquie Gazetesi ve Bir Zabit Tehditnamesi": "O mebusan reisi, halifeye hülüli ederek, entrikalar çevirmesine meydan vermeyeceğini, Paris’te geçirdiği hayatı seflinin intikam-ı gayr-i meşruunu almaya çıkıncı, vaktiyle halifeye karşı etmediği tecavüz, yapmadığı rezalet kalmamış iken, bugün halife [illegible] o halifeye nevazisher ibrazıyla, millet-i İslamiyeyi ezdirmeyeceğini derpiş ediniz!"
his own newspaper Servet-i Fünun, explains that this was a deliberate attack on unionist organs, which saved his newspaper from being destroyed:

A large mob, led by the people belonging to the lowest class in the city, was moving towards Bab-ı Ali after having destroyed the print shop of Şura-ı Ümmet. And I was looking out of the window of my print shop. Voices could be heard... they were shouting: This is a print shop too! Is it Unionist? No! It is neither Unionist nor Liberal! It only opposes tyranny!... We do not want full tyranny, let's not harm this place!

From this testimony, it appears that the ransacking was not the result of random and wanton vandalism, but of deliberate targeting. It should be added that both Tanin and Şura-ı Ümmet, had been antagonized often in Volkan. For example, Tanin was dubbed Tanin-i Bedanin ("the ruckus of the wicked") and described as "a dangerous microbe destroying the press-scape by spreading the intolerant smell of animosity and hypocrisy with its every sentence and its every word." The article concluded by comparing Tanin and Şura-ı Ümmet to two drunks randomly attacking whomever they saw. In one instance Şura-ı Ümmet was accused of not obeying fundamental Islamic rules, when it reprinted an article by a Christian journalist, who had praised a recently deceased professor by calling him "one of God's rare children". "Could a small explanation not be added [saying] "the Lord does not beget, nor was he begotten"?

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533 Ahmed İhsan [Tokgöz]: Hatıralarım, p. 71: "Kalabalık bir güruh, önde şehrin en eğilimli tabakasına mensup ayaktakıları olduğu halde 'Şûrayi ümmet' matbaasını dağıtktan sonra Babalıyı doğru gizler ve televvün saçarak, sahne Ili intisharlı matbuatı, muzır bir mikrop gibi telviseden 'Tanin' dün yine bir hücum-i müfterisaneyle rastgeldiğine saldırmaktadır".

534 For example see: Volkan No. 69, 18 Safer 1327, 25 Şubat 1324, 5 Mart 1909 [5 March 1909], "İttihad-i Muhammedi Cemiyeti Hakikatı", Volkan No. 70, 19 Safer 1327, 26 Şubat 1324, 6 Mart 1909M [6 March 1909], "Seriat İsteriz Ünvanı Altında İstemeyiz Fikri", Volkan No. 79, 28 Safer 1327, 7 Mart 1325, 20 Mart 1909 [20 March 1909], "Tanin".

535 Volkan No. 68, 17 Safer 1327, 24 Şubat 1324, 8 Mart 1909 [8 March 1909], "Aynen".

536 Volkan No. 68, 17 Safer 1327, 24 Şubat 1324, 8 Mart 1909 [8 March 1909], "Koca Taninci": "Her bir satır ve kelimesiyle, tahammülüz bir bu-i garez ve televisün saçarak, sahne-i intişar-i matbuatu, muzır bir mikrop gibi telviseden 'Tanin' dün yine bir hücum-i müfterisaneyle rastgeldiğine saldırmaktadır".

537 Volkan No. 68, 17 Safer 1327, 24 Şubat 1324, 8 Mart 1909 [8 March 1909], "Koca Taninci": "Ah! Şu sen ile Şura-ı Ümmet, kol kola iki sarhoş gibi etrafa saldıra saldıra, huramengiz ne tuhafdar... koca Tanincı!!!..".

538 Quran, chapter İhlas, verse 3. A cornerstone verse in Islamic theology, which is considered basic knowledge to all Muslims and which rejects the idea of the Christian trinity.
Muslim may not publish that description in his newspaper. He could [publish it], however, only to criticize it, [but] otherwise..."539

Any single one of these aforementioned links between the counter-revolution and Volkan can easily be brushed aside as being purely coincidental. For example, it would not be difficult to find harsh criticism of Hüseyin Cahid or Ahmed Rıza in other dailies. However, when the links are considered as a whole, it becomes difficult to assume that such a string of seemingly related events could be the result of unrelated coincidences and it would be difficult to find another publication that so closely matches the "fingerprint" of the counter-revolution. Therefore, it seems plausible to argue that Volkan was indeed an influential factor in the 31 March Incident. How far Volkan's responsibility reached regarding the creation of the circumstances is a question that remains unanswered. If hypothetically one were to assume that Volkan, or a similar publication, never existed, the counter-revolution might still have occurred. However, the evidence suggests that the daily newspaper, even if it had no part in creating, for example, the tensions between the officers and the soldiers, certainly acted as a catalyst and helped escalate matters. Volkan, by acting like a forum for certain groups which expressed dissatisfaction (the soldiers and the religious scholars), broke what would have been otherwise perhaps a more insular situation, where interactions between the dissatisfied parties and individuals would have been more difficult. Arguably, the sense of mutual support created by this forum, would have given extra motivation, in the form of courage and religious justification, to the mutineers. At the least, without Volkan, it might have taken longer for these ideas to solidify among the mutineers and to turn into actions.

In conclusion, the impact of the press on late Ottoman society was considerable. Not only was it influential among intellectual and educated circles and in promoting new ideas, such as feminism,540 nationalism and language reform,541

539 Volkan No. 80, 29 Safer 1327, 8 Mart 1325, 21 Mart 1909 [21 March 1909], "Volkan"."Cenab-i Hakkin "Lam yalid wa lam yulad" olduguna dair bir mutaalarlck olsun beyan edilemez miydi? [...] Bize kalsa bir Ulah merhumuistedigi gibi tevsif edebilir. Lakin, bir muslim o vasiflari gazetesine dercedemez. Eder; lakin muahheze ve tenkid etmek için yoksa...”
but it also had a direct impact in daily politics and among all strata of society. Inciting mass protest, provoking popular pressure and, in the case of *Volkan* and the 31 March Incident, playing a leading role in the course of political events, the Ottoman press became a powerful manipulative tool, one which, in consequence, all politicians were anxious to harness to their own needs, to censor or to control.

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CONCLUSION

When a few months after the Young Turk revolution, in December 1908, the satirical magazine *Kalem* published a caricature of a young child swatting at the portrait of an Ottoman minister with a newspaper in an attempt to make him fall (see Figure 17), it was spot on in its identification of the Ottoman press as a powerful political weapon. Journalists, as insignificant as this child, so small that they actually needed a stool to stand on to even reach the level of the portrait, were now capable of causing ruckus in Ottoman politics.

The true power of the Ottoman press after 1908 reveals itself in two separate layers. First of all, it was clearly capable of having far reaching real-world impacts. Obvious examples of these include the boycotts on foreign goods, in response to, for example, the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and the Italian push for the Tripoli war, which were both met with chauvinistic calls from the press to respectively stop buying Austrian made fez headgear and Italian products. Even more visible were calls for political rallies and mass gatherings, which, in the case of the war rallies before the Balkan Wars, placed enough pressure on the government to choose a military solution over its initial, more diplomatic approach. With the introduction of elections, following the Young Turk revolution, the press also played a role as a disseminator of political propaganda and, thus, it paved the way to parliament and office for some men, including *Tanin's* Hüseyin Cahit. On the other hand, Turkish scholars have published on the influence of the press on society, in topics ranging from nationalism, language reform to feminism.

The second, more subtle yardstick by which the power of the Ottoman press in this period can be gauged is the desire that existed to control it. Between 1908 and 1923, the Ottoman press was perceived as a powerful tool both domestically as abroad. This is why many attempts were made by authorities, social and political actors and individuals to exert control over the contents of the press. The introduction of press laws, which became more and more strict, the eventual reintroduction of preventive censorship, and the information war waged
between Istanbul and Ankara, with both parties attempting to make their opinions public and to silence the other's, are examples of how authorities fought to gain control over the press. Assassinations and attacks on journalists, briberies and hush monies, on the other hand, showcased a similar desire by others who perhaps did not have legislative or government authority, but were willing to invest money and effort nevertheless. In its own way, the 1908 press boom, the period of heightened press activity following the Young Turk revolution, was also an indication of the perceived power of the press, as the boom was partially the result of men lured with the prospect of great wealth, which would be the outcome of political influence.

Arguably, by itself the 1908 press boom also played an important role in defining the status of the new press by enabling it to assert itself and redefine itself as powerful enough to force the hand of the government instead of the traditional other way around. In this thesis, the boom, which has hereto been referred to in primary and secondary literature without solid evidence, is proven to have taken place through the analysis of publishing permit applications. The analysis revealed that, like a shockwave with its epicentre in Istanbul, an explosion of press activity took place all over the Ottoman empire and among virtually all of its constituent peoples and their languages. The opening of the floodgates of the press swamped the Ottoman administration, which was caught off guard and did not know how to handle the situation, resulting in the acceptance of the self declared freedom of the press as a fact. This freedom was further cemented by the abolition of press censorship, again unilaterally decided by journalists, and by the fact that, under these circumstances, the existing press law was only applied nominally, having been relegated to regulating the administrative registration of new publications.

As such the years between the 1908 revolution and early 1913 were a special time for the Ottoman press, for it enjoyed great to moderate freedoms. Especially in the first year after the revolution, publishers were left virtually unchecked and could print whatever they wished, under the banner of the freedom of the press. However, as the power of the free press became manifest it also became clear
that an absolute freedom of the press could have detrimental effects for authority. The free, post-revolution press did not promote unity, but rather created a polarizing political atmosphere with CUP supporters in one camp and opponents in the other and both sides engaging in fierce polemics, rife with *ad hominem* attacks. This spiral of violence in the printed pages eventually transgressed into the real world with attacks and assassinations on journalists and the 31 March Incident, causing decrying about the situation as an abuse of freedoms.

In a first government attempt to establish some control over the powerful press, which at that point enjoyed a virtually unlimited and absolute freedom, a new press law was created, which was enacted in 1909. This law has often been regarded as a product of the CUP, which, it is said, intended to silence opposition newspapers with it. Yet, a closer look at the legislative process and its application, has revealed the opposite. An initial draft was created by the Kamil Paşa government. It was in the *Meclis-i Mebusan*, where the CUP at that point held a nominal majority, that the draft law, containing very strict regulations and penalties, was transformed into a very liberal law. Consequently, not only was the 1909 press law incapable of silencing opposition, but it also offered the required legal loopholes for journalists to circumvent the closure of their publications through martial law, which had been enacted following the 31 March Incident. The 1909 press law, gave a plausible excuse to start reapplying some regulations on the press, but at the same time, it was preserving and guaranteeing the freedoms of the journalists.

However, subsequent new additions to the 1909 press law resulted in it becoming more and more strict. Of great importance were the additions made in March 1913, almost coinciding with Enver’s coup d’état, resulting in the installation of the Enver, Talat, Cemal triumvirate which was to last until the end of the First World War. From this point, the press law had lost its liberal nature and it became possible for the Ottoman government to *de facto* shut down publications.
The press received another blow with the re-introduction of pre-print censorship at the eve of the First World War. During the period of Allied occupation of Istanbul, the Ottoman press was subjected to censorship to, on the one hand government censorship, which was for all intents and purposes under Allied control, and on the other hand censorship from the Ankara based nationalist movement. Through its systematic censorship of positive news about the nationalist movement, the Allied occupational government displayed clearly its desires to keep a check on public opinion.

Ironically, Istanbul's censorship had a beneficial effect on the Anatolian press. Although the 1908 press boom had been an empire-wide phenomenon, both geographically and linguistically, in the period after the First World War, printed media in Anatolia was in an emaciated state and not at all capable of meaningfully sustaining itself. After all, it was unable to reach the circulation numbers of the dailies in Istanbul and in other large Ottoman cities. However, as Allied censorship left the nationalists without a voice of their own and because the nationalist movement understood the power that the media could have over public opinion and in an effort to step up its counter-propaganda, Ankara introduced a series of incentive programs, including subsidies, material support and tax exemptions to local publishers. Furthermore, it ran its own newspaper, *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, and established *Anadolu Ajans*, currently still the official Turkish news agency, with a headquarter based in Ankara.

The idea of subsidies was not alien at all in the post-1908 Ottoman press. Under Abdülhamid II there had existed a carrot-and-stick system, which allowed the palace to keep alive large dailies, even when they were unprofitable. The constitutional revolution, however, caused this system to collapse like a house of cards. The Hamidian system of subsidies was halted. Faced with the revolutionary sentiments of the post-revolution boom-era press, large incumbent dailies, that had enjoyed these subsidies, felt the need to publicly denounce such practices and to even return some of that money to the palace. The disappearance of Abdülhamid’s financial net, which meant that a select few publishers could exist without fear of bankruptcy, was exacerbated with the
1908 press boom. What had once been a closed market that was very difficult to enter, was being overrun with new publications and was subjected to strong competition.

The battle for the hearts (and wallets) of the readership had positive outcomes for the readers. In this new market, where survival was somewhat linked to demand, readers started to play a very central role in the lives of publishers and the old formulaic prayer to God for success found itself replaced with pleas to the public. Under these circumstances, known as a buyers’ market where customers have the advantage over suppliers, a passive price war was fought out and for almost ten years after the 1908 revolution, dailies in Istanbul were sold at a historically low price of 10 para per issue. Furthermore, publishers felt obliged to innovate to appear modern and draw more readers and the face of Ottoman dailies evolved from its decades-old, unimaginative walls of text into the more recognizable modern format, including photographs, illustrations, headlines, usage of different typefaces and sizes and a generally more appealing and better structured mise en page.

Conversely, the market was not kind to the publishers and making a large enough profit to sustain operations was not easy at all. The highly competitive, but barely profitable market contained the perfect mixture of circumstances to eliminate the majority of new publications and this most likely accounted for more newspapers disappearing than censorship or legal closure.

Being part of the Ottoman publishing industry could be lucrative, as had been demonstrated by the Hamidian press barons, who, through their connection to the palace, obtained financial wealth and prestige. But for the great majority of the post-revolution entrepreneurs, starting a new publication was an experiment that ended in financial failure. To begin with, becoming a newspaper or periodical owner was very expensive. It required a substantial capital investment in the order of a lifetime worth of wages of a regular labourer. This money was needed in order to pay for printing equipment, consumables, such as ink and paper, office rent and employee wages for both the manual labour force
and the editors and journalists. As a result of this, those who applied for a publishing permit during the press boom, were mostly from relatively better-off backgrounds who could muster the required lump sums.

Once set up, the new journal or newspaper would have to compete with numerous other publications in order to generate a return on the initial investment, and, ideally, to create a profit for its owners. The price war to obtain or maintain a share of the general readership, which obviously benefited the customers, forced publishers to sell with very low profit margins or even at a loss. As inflation flared up due to the First World War, and prices in the free-market skyrocketed, publishers still resisted raising their prices. But the war had also increased wages for print-workers, as able bodied men became scarce and global shortages, caused by the conflict, created additional spikes in the price of paper. It was not until mid-1917, when the first of a series of industry-wide price changes took place, that prices per issue were gradually increased to reflect the real cost of printing and production. Furthermore, low circulation numbers further exacerbated the low profit margins. Although it is not possible to establish with great accuracy the circulation numbers for most dailies, what is known is that, even for the most successful dailies, it was very hard to reach and maintain the 10,000 per day mark and that smaller publications had but a fraction of that.

In other words, it was impossible to rely on sales alone to keep a publication running and, as a result of these circumstances, publishers were left financially vulnerable, and thus resorting to practices like blackmail but also accepting bribery and hush money, like they had under Abdülhamid. Although Abdülhamid’s system of subsidies had disappeared, those in power continued to support publications of certain political persuasion. This happened in a clandestine fashion to avoid losing credibility with the public. On the other hand, renting out advertising space was, next to profit from sales, the only source of revenue that was directly related to the core business of publishers, too, opened the way for financial influence by third parties. After all, advertising money was something that could be leveraged as a method to support a publisher, as was
demonstrated during the occupation of Istanbul, when pro-Allied publications, such as *Peyam-i Sabah*, were given an obvious preference over their colleagues who had similar circulation numbers but were less supportive of the occupation government.

Adaptation meant survival. Publications that were run as profit-driven businesses, such as *Sabah* and *İkdam*, enjoyed longevity, while ideologically driven publications, like *Volkan* or *Tanin*, disappeared together with the political powers that they relied on. As a result, the most successful publications of this era were those which easily adjusted to the current political climate. *İkdam* and *Sabah*, for example, did not only thrive under Abdülhamid, but they successfully made the transition from being mouthpieces of the palace to becoming defenders of the new constitutional regime. Politically, they were either moderate or showed chameleon-like traits, with, for example, *Sabah* entering a joint venture with Ali Kemal’s *Peyam* to form *Peyam-i Sabah*, which enjoyed British patronage through advertising, because of its political stance. Reminiscent of how *İkdam* had ditched Ali Kemal, its former editor in chief after the 31 March Incident, *Sabah* was quick to denounce this co-operation when it became clear that Ali Kemal, ardent opponent of the CUP and briefly Ottoman Minister of the Interior under Allied occupation, was soon to become a *persona non grata* in government circles as the nationalists achieved a major victory with the Turkish liberation of İzmir.

In contrast to this, publications that were too radical or unwilling to change could only remain short-lived because they lacked subsidies from a government that shared their views, were relentless in the mission of spreading their message and therefore not to be bribed, and therefore did not have the money to continue their operations or did not feel the need to continue the substantial investments that were required once their payload had been delivered.

But in both types of publications, either driven by profit or ideology, the Ottoman press could act as a successful platform to disseminate information and, more importantly, opinions, which could then have political influence. It was not an
ivory tower nor a self-serving cocoon of intellectuals. It reached the public and was therefore capable of forming the Ottoman public opinion that in turn could influence the course of politics. It is because of this that such a desire existed to exert influence or control over the Ottoman press by both government and non-government actors, because controlling the press was a way to controlling public opinion.
APPENDIX I: DATA ON THE 1908 PRESS BOOM

The most important source for the press boom data comes from Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, but, unconventionally, not from its documents but rather from its catalogues. While it is neither common practice nor indeed desirable in principle to rely on catalogue entries, the reason that I have done so here is a logistic one.

Over a thousand archive documents were identified during the search for applications for publishing permits. Given the limited number of documents researchers are allowed to retrieve from the archives per day, the longer waiting times that sometimes occur when the number of requests is high, and the inevitable unavailability of certain documents, an attempt to retrieve all of these documents would have taken much more time than was justifiable for the amount of information retrieved. This is especially the case, since a random sampling has shown that all of these documents are rather formulaic and contain little else of interest aside from what their entries in the catalogues show.

The catalogue search was aimed specifically to find application records. Applicants, as per the press law of 1864, were required to submit their names, the desired title, publication location, frequency and language. However, the data compiled in the list at the end of this appendix, clearly has gaps in these fields for many of the entries. This is because the catalogue records sometimes omit one or more of these details. A sampling of documents, where a calculator was used to randomly decide which documents to retrieve from the archives, revealed that

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542 The retrieved documents are: BOA DH.MKT 2619/73, 5 Ramazan 1326 [1 October 1908], DH.MKT 2616/93, 1 Ramazan 1326 [27 September 1908], DH.MKT 2651/22, 14 Şevval 1326 [9 November 1908], DH.MKT 2637/28, 26 Ramazan 1326 [22 October 1908], ZB 328/88, 17 Teşrinisani 1324 [30 November 908], DH.MKT 2636/35, 25 Ramazan 1326 [21 October 1908], DH.MKT 2636/25, 25 Ramazan 1326 [21 October 1908], DH.MKT 2635/36, 24 Ramazan 1326 [20 October 1908], DH.MKT 2629/66, 16 Ramazan 1326 [12 October 1908], DH.MKT 1292/80, 13 Şaban 1326 [10 September 1908], ZB 25/41, 27 Ağustos 1324 [9 September 1908], DH.MKT 1290/68, 7 Şaban 1326 [04 September 1908], DH.MKT 1281/65, 21 Recep 1326 [19 August 08], DH.MKT 1278/59, 12 Recep 1326 [10 August 1908], DH.MKT 1278/22, 11 Recep 1326 [9 August 1908], DH.MKT 1274/6, 2 Recep 1326 [31 July 1908], DH.MKT 1273/27, 29 Cemazeyılahır 1326 [29 July 1908], DH.MKT 2778/28, 6 Rabıbiylevel 1327 [28 March 1909], DH.MKT 2783/21, 10 Rabıbiylevel 1327 [1 April 1909], DH.MKT 2824/53, 7 Cemazeyılevel 1327 [27 May 1909], DH.MKT 2908/86, 7 Şaban 1327 [24 August 1909], DH.MKT 2655/2, 16 Şevval 1326 [11 November 1908], DH.MKT 2666/45, 28 Şevval 1326 [23 November 1908], DH.MKT 2701/11, 14
the omission of these was not always the result of an omission in cataloguing but that these details were sometimes left out of the paperwork done by the administration. For example, in one Muhammed Medani’s application for a weekly Arabic publication in Damascus, the catalogue entry does not mention the publishing frequency, while this is clearly present in the documents themselves. However, at the same time, the documents neglect to mention the type of the publication. This is because, in the samples, the original application submitted by the applicant was not included and, probably for their own reasons, the administration chose not to mention certain details from the application in their internal communication. Yet even when the original application was present, it was possible for details to be omitted during cataloguing. More importantly, the random sampling has shown that whatever was taken into the catalogues, even if it was incomplete, was accurate: not even a single discrepancy was found between the catalogue entries and the retrieved documents. Furthermore, it is clear that any omission of details happened with two levels of randomness (administration or cataloguing), thereby ruling out bias. These findings are strong indicators that the data retrieved from the catalogues can be considered trustworthy.

The greatest shortfall of the collected data is its incompleteness, however it still remains a more comprehensive list than earlier compilations. Although applications for over 850 newspapers were retrieved from the approximately 1,200 catalogue entries, it is apparent from comparing the data from the permit applications with a similar list, which can be found in Takvim-i Vakayi, in Resimli Ay and one that was compiled by the Press Society in Istanbul, that actually none of these lists are complete. Of these, Takvim-i Vakayi is the most complete in terms of the details it supplies. Because of its nature as official organ of the state Takvim-i Vakayi had access to administration information, and as a result it was

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Zilhicce 1326 [7 January 1909], DH.MKT 2711/30, 25 Zilhicce 1326 [18 January 1909], ZB 328/147, 30 Teşrinisani 1324 [13 December 1908].

543 BOA DH.MKT 2651/22, 14 Şevval 1326 [9 November 1908] and ZB 328/48, 9 Teşrinisani 1324 [22 November 1908].

544 Only the following documents in the sample included the original application (arzuhal): BOA DH.MKT 2619/73, 5 Ramazan 1326 [1 October 1908], DH.MKT 1292/80, 13 Şaban 1326 [10 September 1908], DH.MKT 1274/6, 2 Recep 1326 [31 July 1908], DH.MKT 1273/27, 29 Cemazeyilahir 1326 [29 July 1908].
able to publish lists of publications that received a printing permit, including their titles, publishing locations, frequencies, types and the names of the permit owners. However, this was discontinued after some time and unlike the permits used to compile the list in this appendix, which have their own issues when it comes to dating them precisely, as will be discussed further down, the Takvim-i Vakayi list does not offer details on the application dates at all. Furthermore, it is also certain that the lists in Takvim-i Vakayi are also incomplete, for they lack certain permits which can be found in the archive catalogues. The other lists merely limit themselves to listing titles and dates.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine just how many of the total applications and permit grants are covered by the data in the list. Yet, the true richness of the data is not in its size for simply producing numbers without explanation as to how such numbers are reached, as some scholars have done, sheds very little light on the press boom or the on Ottoman press in general. The point here, therefore, is not an even higher number to add to the list of existing figures. Rather, if the size of the list has any importance, it is only in combination with the details that are found in the application permits, of which a substantial amount are filled in.

The list contains the details which it was compulsory to supply with the permit application (title, location, frequency, applicant name) but is expanded with several other fields: the applicant’s occupation and religion, and the application outcome. Although it was not compulsory to provide information on occupation, it was taken into account where the applicant had done so. Among the applicants who had supplied this information, it is striking that not a single one had a lower class occupation, such as porter, barber or even shopkeeper. Although there is the possibility that those who did not disclose their occupation belonged to the lower class and were less willing to (or saw little benefit) in sharing this on their application, it seems more likely there simply were not any people from less fortunate socio-economic backgrounds because, as is discussed in detail in the chapter "Financing the Press", it was expensive to publish. Furthermore, it would be reasonable to assume that someone wishing to sell their own publication would probably have a certain level of education and interest in literature and
current affairs, which was more likely to be found among educated professionals. Therefore, it seems highly that those who did not disclose their occupation came from the lower class.

On the other hand, the religion of the applicants is derived from their names and titles. For example, Muhammed ibn-i Alizade is classified as Muslim and Yorgi veled-i Mikail is classified as non-Muslim. For names where no clear distinction could be made, the religion is left undefined. The outcome of the application is again based on catalogue entries that specifically mention this.

However, the outcome of the applications field is augmented with information from other sources, mainly from the Hakkı Tarık Us collection, where positively identified publications mean that a permit was granted. Where possible, when such publications were identified, the information obtained by accessing copies of the publications was used to complete other fields. For example, the archive entry might not mention in which city a newspaper was published, but this information was always printed in the headers of newspapers under the address of the office or printer. Similarly, languages could be further filled in by reading the newspaper and seeing in which languages it appeared. Where other sources were used to augment the list, this extra source is also indicated along with the Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi classification codes.

Monthly applications for publications permits

The Monthly applications chart is based on the "date" field of the list at the end of this appendix. Application dates are originally based on cataloguing dates, with dates in the Hicri or Rumi calendar. While a delay of a few days is present between the applications and the cataloguing, the overall impact is negligible. The Rumi and Hicri dates were converted into Miladi and grouped per month. By grouping applications per month, differences in the cataloguing period are reduced. This makes the monthly overview arguably closer to reality than a weekly or daily overview.
Appendix I: Data on the 1908 Press Boom

**Geographic representation of the boom**

To visualise the boom, applications were grouped per location to create the following list:

![Chart of cities with the most press permit applications during the 1908 press boom.](image)

**Figure 19:** Chart of cities with the most press permit applications during the 1908 press boom.

For each location in this list, the occurrences were counted. A cut-off of a minimum 5 applications was used to keep the list manageable and meaningful. However, all locations, regardless of the cut-off were eventually marked on the map.

**Application languages**

For application languages, all occurrences of a monolingual language were counted for the major languages (those with more than 10 occurrences). For multilingual, because combinations with more than two languages commonly occur, each occurrence of a language within a combination was counted towards that language's total.
Appendix I: Data on the 1908 Press Boom

The position of Turkish as the most preferred secondary language in bilingual publications can be seen in the following table, where a horizontal reading of the chart shows the most prevalent combination for that language. Almost in every instance, except Hebrew and Judeo-Spanish, Turkish is the most commonly chosen secondary language.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 20: Table of occurrences of language combinations for major press-languages.

The division between the Eastern and Western cluster was seen when languages were distributed per region. For this chart, the languages were counted in the same method as for all of the applications, except that they were grouped according to cluster, with the Western cluster existing of Istanbul, Izmir and Thessaloniki and the Eastern cluster of Aleppo, Damascus, Beirut and Jerusalem.

Figure 21: Chart of relative language distributions over the Western and Eastern Clusters.
A similar approach was used for the distribution per religion, where languages were counted as per the described method, but grouped per religion.

![Figure 22: Chart of relative distribution of languages between Muslim and non-Muslim applicants.](image)

**HAKİ TARİK US COLLECTION**

In the HTU collection, a survey was conducted to find every publication for which the very first issue was available, in order to read their *mukaddimes* (introductions), which contain a wealth of information on the motivations and goals of the publishers, but sometimes also of the hardships they faces in order to get started with publishing. Furthermore, first issues are also a useful way to discover the date when a publication first appeared.

For the pre-revolution period, these were:

**1840s:** *Ceride-i Havadis; 1850s:* *Ceride-i Ticariye; 1860s:* *Mecmua-i İbretnuma, Tasvir-i Efkar, Miraat, Terakki, Türkistan, Mecmua-i Funun, Utarit, Hürriyet, Terakki, Zavra, Memalik-i Mahruse; 1870s:* *Hadika, Terakki, Haqaq-ı al-Waqi’a, İbret, İbretnümâ-i Dünya, Yemen, Cüzdan, Sirac, Çingiraklı Tatar, Hülasat el-Efkar, Hayal, Ceride-i Muhakeme, Mecmua-i Maarif, Latife, Kassa, Meddah, Müteferrika, Dolap, Tiyatro, Kahkaha, Letaif-i Asar, Vakit, Kara Sinan, Geveze, Vakit yahut Mürebbe-i Muhadderat, Ayna, Sabah, Muharrir, al-Nahla, Yadigar, İstikbal; 1880s:*
Appendix I: Data on the 1908 Press Boom


For the press boom period, a similar list was compiled. However, these publications were also categorized per type of publications, which is indicated by their colour in this list.
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<thead>
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<th>Kartal</th>
<th>Mudde-i Umumi</th>
<th>Millet</th>
<th>Saika</th>
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<td>Musavver Papağan</td>
<td>Servet-i Fünun</td>
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<td>Mühtit</td>
<td>Musavver Seyf ve Kalem</td>
<td>Tanın</td>
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<td>Nabi</td>
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<td>Nasreddin Hoca</td>
<td>Umman</td>
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<td>Nekregu ile Pişkar</td>
<td>Volkan</td>
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<td>Makarım al-Akhiça</td>
<td>Musavver Edeb</td>
<td>Neşter</td>
<td>Zaman</td>
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<tr>
<td>Metin</td>
<td>Musavver Emel</td>
<td>Nevsal-i Ragib</td>
<td>Zevzek</td>
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<td>Musavver Mecmua</td>
<td>Ramazan</td>
<td>Zıpır</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Musavver Meşher</td>
<td>Rehber-i Saadet</td>
<td>Zuhuri</td>
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<td>Mirat-i Maarif</td>
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<td>Resimli Kitap</td>
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<td>Muallim</td>
<td>Musavver Necat-ı</td>
<td>Sabah</td>
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</table>
## PUBLISHING PERMIT APPLICATIONS

What follows is a tabular presentation of the data used for the calculations in the second chapter, "The 1908 Press Boom", and in this appendix.

### references
- BOA DH.MKT
- BOA ZB
- Hakkı Tank Us Online

### publication language
- Albanian (l)
- Armenian (m)
- Arabic (a)
- Bulgarian (b)
- English (e)
- French (f)
- German (d)
- Greek (g)
- Hebrew (h)
- Italian (i)
- Judeo-Spanish (s)
- Kurdish (k)
- Persian (p)
- Russian (r)
- Serbo-Croat (c)
- Turkish (t)
- Vlach (v)

### frequency of appearance
- Daily (D)
- Weekly or twice weekly (W)
- Monthly or twice monthly (M)

### application outcome
- Granted
- Unknown
- Denied

### religion of applicant
- Muslim
- Unknown
- Non-Muslim

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<tr>
<th>Application</th>
<th>Language</th>
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<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Applicant</th>
<th>Publication</th>
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Appendix I: Data on the 1908 Press Boom
Appendix I: Data on the 1908 Press Boom

Halil t İstanbul Kethüdazade Mehmed Salihuddin Bey 01/04/09 M.2783/21
Hama a Şam (Hama) Şeyh Ahmed Sabuni 25/02/09 M.2751/13
Hammatul-uş-Sam a Sadat+k`adiyye Beşyulanizade es-Seyyid Vafdi 01/03/09 M.2754/11
Hande Adana Arslanlıan Artin a M.2788/86
Hanım a,e Çebeli-Lübnan İbrahim Name Halef 06/08/09 M.2882/82
Harzan m D KırkçaTarçın q 11/08/09 M.2779/06
Harış g Trabzon Saraş Dilimi 03/09/09 M.2756/91
Harun g D Alexander ikenderici 31/07/08 M.2747/12
Hacı e Kelam İstanbul Hayri 02/09/09 M.2712/68
Hatib t Sivanik [unknown] 20/08/09 M.2782/14
Hatıf t İmzalı W Kıbrıslı Ahmed Efendi c 27/09/09 M.2777/33
Hatıf Bil-Harç a Surişe Abdi İkbal 02/06/09 M.2826/14
Havva p İstanbul Hayri c 25/08/08 M.2858/50
Havva t İstanbul Ahmed p 31/09/08 M.2746/37
Hayı Jogovart m D Hrant Nazaryan 29/09/08 M.2618/85
Hayı-Aşk m D Yatafık Arman 01/03/09 M.2754/36
Hayal ve Hakikat t Yomu Nâdi M.2733/95
Hayat t İstanbul D Amvazade Sulyman p 26/10/08 M.2840/03, ZB128/37
Hefesbendos g Kâlif-i-Soltaniye Kaleşi Negri 04/09/07 M.2865/02, M.2829/10
Hermes Osman i Hürjîd 03/09/09 M.2700/40
Hicaz Hattı t,р Lâ W İbrahim b. Davud Nabilusi 10/02/09 M.2735/10
Hidal Adana W İhsan Filki 10/08/08 M.2728/78
Hifet t İstanbul D Mustafa Asım (Hokuk mezuusu) 29/08/08 M.2729/36, Z.24/35, H.2549
Hikkaßab 1,g,m, t İstanbul Artın Tanayân 18/08/08 M.2767/7, Z.24/49
Höner Maris İstanbul Ahmed ıjsûrî a 20/02/09 M.2745/87
Hubb ul Vatan t Hâpek Zihnezade Seyyid İbrahim Hakkı 12/02/09 M.2737/87
Hüzüm t İstanbul Ali İkender Efendi 16/03/09 M.2768/88
Hükük t İstanbul Mehmed Behram w 21/08/08 M.2728/48
Hükük ve Adalet t İstanbul D Sule Koleli M.2732/91
Hükük-i-Osmâniye t İstanbul D Abdükhâder 12/10/09 M.2641/36
Hükük-i-Osmâniye 1 Konya (Karpınar) D Necib Nâdir G 07/09/08 M.2828/88, Z.25/28
Hükük-i-Sultaniye 1 Konya Multüzade Mehmed Tevfik 05/02/09 M.2763/79
Hüsnâ t İstanbul Hâdi Mehmend Ali 26/08/08 M.2790/25
Hüsnâ-i-Efkar t İstanbul Ali İkender Bey c 10/03/09 M.2763/3
Hümüs a İstanbul D Hümûs Matarîni Alayîçî 11/03/09 M.2764/28
Hümûz İstanbul Simon Çomeksîyan 18/08/08 M.2767/3
Hürriyet 1,Mz, t İzmir Alfred e 14/08/08 M.2826/66
Hürriyet İstanbul Selim Amin & Davud 09/11/08 M.2652/65
Hürriyêt t İstanbul Mehmet 30/01/08 M.2760/15, M.2826/65
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İmara g Yânıko İstorolarâ 09/08/08 M.2787/17
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İnlâkal-i-Osmanî 1 Aydın (Nauki) Hâşim Enver 26/09/08 M.2837/12
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İntikâm 1,4,g, m,F t Trabzon D Tatırazade Aklî 04/03/09 M.2758/16
İntezâm t İstanbul Esa Mihlis c 02/09/08 M.2582/37, ZB25/10
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Mecmuası Fütun-i Malıye 1 İstanbul W Muzaffer-i Fütun-i Malıye Cemiyeti | 14/10/08 M.1260/90
Mecmuası Uulum 1 İstanbul W Mehmed Emin e | 14/08/08 M.1280/41
Med Cezir 1 Süleyman Feyzi w | 03/04/09 M.2783/70
Medeniyet 1 İstanbul Hasan Taşhin c | 24/08/08 M.1283/45, B24/29, H1224
Medrese W Tokadi Mustafa Sabri e | 09/08/08 M.1278/26
Medresesi Osmaniye 1 Necati w | 09/09/08 M.1292/21, B25/29
Mehasin 1 İstanbul M Asaf | 10/08/08 M.1277/64, H1304
Melki-i Sanayi 1 Aydın D Celebişade Mehmed Easa | 22/01/09 M.2735/35
Mekerple 1 Kürban Bey w | M.2722/67
Mevlânâ 1 Hamid Naci | 24/09/08 M.1292/18
Memur ve İşçi 1 İstari Fütüyadi g | 25/10/08 M.2699/60, B328/41
Menar ul-Adl a Beyrut Enezade Mehmed Selim | 08/02/09 M.2734/63
Mehmed ul-İrfan a Mehmed Nureddin e | 31/01/09 M.2725/78
Menderes 1 Aydın Hasan Efendi g | 29/09/08 M.2825/76
Mekam 1 İstanbul D Mehmed Refat t | M.360/71
Merium m Ümrin W Milgârd Esendan | 22/05/09 M.2821/19
Mesârık Ramîvâya Lg D Apostolîcava İova w | 01/12/08 B328/93
Meyserret İstanbul D Rojas | 06/09/08 M.1292/12, B25/218
Meyhât el-İsmâliî 1 İstanbul Ahmed Sübit c | 23/09/08 M.1300/59
Meyhât el-İsmâliî a Beyrut (Trabûssan) Abdullahîman izzeddîn & Muhammedî Mehî | 19/12/08 M.2678/74, M.2678/81, M.2692/62
Mevlûviyet-i İdare 1 Ümrin Bostancıoğlu İbali w | 23/12/08 M.2690/21
Mezîret 1 Trabzon Sahîhadî Hasan Naci | 22/09/08 M.1299/65
Mevlânâ el-İkmân a Şâbâr W Abdülkarîm Bedran | 11/09/08 M.1292/18
Mevvîm 1 İstanbul W Mehmed Refat n | 18/07/08 M.1277/61
Mezîyet 1 İstanbul D Mehmed Ali p | 06/09/08 B25/21, H1569
Midilîn g Ümrîn [Midiili] Dargin Efendi | 21/10/08 M.2636/35
Mihrâbîyya Aya İstanbul D Dimitraki Topmaydaci (Hâmidîye ticaret mezunu) | 16/08/08 M.1280/54, B24/25, M.2661/52
Millet 1 İstanbul D İbrahim Hınış b | 28/07/08 M.1273/10, H085
Millet-i Osmaniye 1 İstanbul Haydar p | 31/07/08 M.1273/88
Mimimi 1 Ümrin Nahîzade İhsâeddîn Şükru | 15/09/08 M.1294/87
Mina 1 İstanbul D Hoşru w | 24/12/08 M.2695/85, B329/79
Minaît-kcâk 1 İstanbul D Hüsnü w | 04/08/08 M.1275/32
Minâît-kâfî 1 İstanbul D Mustafâ Remzi p | 19/12/08 B328/148
Minâît-ü Kelmâ 1 D Haydarîzade İbrahim | 11/09/08 M.1293/74
Mişbah 1 Mehmed Habib | 09/08/09 M.2893/43
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Mûallim İstanbul W Mehmed Süreyya r | 07/09/08 M.1289/90, Z.25/30
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Mûçafaa 1 Bursa İsmail Hakk t | 20/12/08 M.2678/95, Z.328/116, M.2678/59
Mûçafaa-i Hukûk-i Vatan 1 İstanbul (Mahmutpasa) Şükru Efendi | 07/10/08 M.2684/100, M.2666/50
Muhâbir g İstanbul Ahmed Saki w | 21/08/08 M.1282/58, M.24/87
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Mühtesib İstanbul Ahmet Muhtar Bey c | 11/03/09 M.2764/55
Mühît 1 İstanbul W Hüseyin Hayreddin (Tophane'de mucun) | 14/08/08 M.1280/39, B24/49, H1201
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Mukaddes-i Mûnâkât 1 İstanbul D Hüseyin Hayreddin (Tophane'de mucun) | 25/08/08 M.2686/51
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Mükâtarsî Selâmî İsmail Hakk t | 27/08/08 M.1275/63
Mükâtarsî Barwa Epilepti muhasebe kebetebî | 03/04/09 M.2783/70
Mülûhakât Lg Ayshin (Naizli) W Ömer Beyzade Ahmed Refik | 08/11/08 M.2650/68
Münekkîd 1 W Abdûlkerim Nadîrî c | 03/11/08 M.2645/2
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Müsavat 1 D Pandâlak Közîmdî | 02/09/08 M.1274/59
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Müslûkman Gazetesi 1 Ertuşyalı Şakir g | 22/10/08 M.2637/72, B328/88
Mustakîl D Mehmed Nureddin (Sultani mezunu) | 04/05/09 M.2800/86
Muzaffer 1 İstanbul D As Muzaffer | 24/08/08 M.1283/41, B24/349
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Appendix I: Data on the 1908 Press Boom
Appendix I: Data on the 1908 Press Boom

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APPENDIX II: OTTOMAN PRESS LAWS

Because both the 1864 and 1909 Ottoman press laws are referenced extensively, especially in the chapter "Legislating the Press", the full laws have been provided here in transcription. However, the 1909 law is not given in the original form in which it is found in Düstur, but rather as a compilation which includes additions and changes to the law that are found in Düstur. In such cases the amendments are marked in a different colour background and contain references to their exact source and their publication dates. Law texts founds in other official sources, such as in the documents of legislators or the government, were not used, as they did not guarantee a correct rendering of the text.

THE 1864 PRESS LAW

Source: Düstur, tertip I, cilt 2, pp. 220 - 227, "Dersaadet’de ve Memalik-i Şahane’de tab ve neşrolunan her nev-i gazete ve evrak-ı havadis-i mülinkye ve politikiyetab ve neşri hakkında bu kere tanzim olunan nizammamededir."

Birinci fasıl – Mevadd-ı umumiye


3. madde: Gazete ihdas edecek adam tebea-ı devlet-i aliye’den olur ise la-akall otuz yaşını teknil etmiş ve ceza kanunnname-i hümayanın tayin ettiği cinayet ve cenahlardan dolayı aleyhine hüküm tertip etmemiş olduğu ve kaaffe-i hukuk şahsiyesine tamamen ve bilfıl mutasarrıf bulunduğu halde ruhsata ruhsata nail olacak ve tebea-ı ecnebiyeden bulunur ise işbu nizammame akhamından vazaif ve tekifata tebea-ı devlet-i aliye misalli tabi olmak ve matbuatca bir gune-i kabahat
ve cünhası vukuunda hakkında gerek hükümete ve gerek mahkemece icra olunacak muamele Saltanat-ı Seniye tebası hakkında cari olan usula tatbikan icra olunmak şartıyla kezalik nail-i ruhsat olacaktır.

4. madde: 1. madde’de beyan olunduğu vehile ruhsat istihsal ziminde ita olunacak istedanameler ile beraber gazetenin ne isim ile ve kaç günde bir kere çıkarılması ve hangi matbaada basılacağı mubin ve gazetenin mesuliyetini deruhde eden sahibi veya ahsap ruhsat müzezzi veya memhr olarak bir kuta-i sened takdim olunacaktır. Ve gazete sahibi veya müdürü tab ettiği gazetenin her defasında bir nüshasını kalemiyle vaz-ı imza ettiğten sonra o nüshayı matbuat müdürüğü canibine ırsal edip bade sair nüshalarını zirinde imzası beraber olarak tab ile öylece yaşan ve taşralarda dahi vali imzalı nüshayi vali-i memlekete takdim olunacaktır.


7. madde: Bir gazeteye ahar bir zat tarafından olmak üzere derc olunan bendin zirinde o zatin imzası bulunduğuna halde böyle yazılan bendenden tertip edecek mesuliyet o nüshayı imza eden gazeteciye ait olacak ve bend-i mezkur imzalı olsa bile hilaf-i nizam ve kanun olduğu surette gazeteci dahi müstferiken mesul tutulacaktır.


İkinci fasıl – Mevadd-1 cezaiyye

10. madde: Her kim Devlet-ı Aliye’nin olmaksızın yılı laf-ı nizam gazete veya bir veraka-ı mürettebe ihdâs ve neşredersese etmiş olduğu nûsha veya cüzlerin here biri için 10 aded yüzlük altın ceza-ı nakdi ahzolunacak ve bu surette neşrolunan gazete tatil ettirilecektir.

11. madde: Nizamnamenin 4. maddesi ahkamına mugayır olarak her kim gazetesinin imzali bir nûhasını murceine ırslâ etmez ve imzasız gazete neşrederse kezalık 10 adet yüzlük altın ceza-ı nakdi alınacaktır.


13. madde: Ceza kanunname-i hümâyunun ikinci faslında beyan olduğun vechile Devlet- Aliye’nin emniyet-i dahiliyesini ve Memalik-i Mahruse’nin asayışını ilhal edecek cinayet veya cümlelerden birinin ıçrasına her kim bir gazete vasitasıyla bazı eşhası tehrîk ve âğverderse müşterek cinayet addolunarak eşhas-ı merkumenin derece-i cânûh Ü cinayetlerine göre haklarında tertip edecek mecazata o kimse ve gazeteci beraber müstehak olacaktır. Ve o gazete dahi hükümet marifetiyle muvakkaten veya katiyen tatil ettirilecektir.

14. madde: Her hangi gazeteci adab-ı umumiye ve mehasin-i ahlak-ı milliye’ye mugayır bir şey yazar veya eyan ve mezâhîb-i cariyeden birini gazete vasitasıyla hakaret eder ise 1 yüzlük altından yirmi beş yüzlük altında kadar ceza-ı nakdi alınır ve yahut bir haftadan üç maha kadar habsonunur.


16. madde: Vükela saltanat-ı senniye’ye veya herhangi memalik-i mumtaze reislerine dokunacak sözler yazan olur ise 1 aydan 1 seneye kadar hapis veya yahut 5 altından 50 altına kadar ceza-ı nakdi ahzolunur.

17. madde: Devlet-ı Aliye’nin dost ve mütefîği bulunan hükümdaran’a dokunur ilfaz ve tabirat istimal olunur ise 3 mahdan 3 seneye kadar hapis veya 15 altından 10 altına kadar ceza-ı nakdi ahzolunur.

18. madde: Bir zat veya bir heyetin efal-ı mahsusa beyanıyla heng(?)-i namusunu veya kesr-i itibarını mucib olarak açvîyata zem Ü efal-ı mahsusa beyan olunmayarak yalnız tahkîk ü tezyif ve şetm yolunda izad olunan tabirata kadîh-ı itlak olunur.
19. **madde**: Bir meclis ve mahkeme veya devletçe teşkil olunmuş olan sair bir heyet hakkında zem veya kadıh vukuunda mütecasiri 15 günden 1 seneye kadar hapsolunur veyahahut 2 yüzden 5 gün halinde 50 kuruşdan 15 alına kadar ceza-ı nakdi alınırmır.

20. **madde**: Memurun ve hediem-i Devlet-i Aleyi aleyhinde zem vukuunda 10 günden 10 aya kadar hapis ile veyahut bir altında 30 sene kadar ceza-ı nakdi ahzile hükmolunur.

21. **madde**: Düvel-i ecnebiyenin nezd-i saltanat-i senniye'de mukim büyükeliçi ve murahhası ve ortaelçi ve sosyalatıcılu sair memurları aleyhinde gazeteler vasıtasıyla zem vuku bulduğu takdirde mütecasiri 8 günden 8 mahā kadar hapis veyahut 1 altında 30 sene kadar ceza-ı nakdi ahzile hükmolunur.

22. **madde**: Efrad-ı ahali hakkında gazeteler vasıtasıyla zem vuku bulduğu halde 50 kuruşdan 5 aya kadar ceza-ı nakdi ahz ile 5 aya kadar hapis cezası icra olunur.


25. **§25** Efrad-ı nas hakkında kadıh vukuubulur ise mütecasiri 2 günden 2 aya kadar hapis veyahut 30 kuruşdan 5 aylaka kadar ceza-ı nakdi ahzolunur.

26. **§26** Bir gazeteci taammüden ve bir su-i niyete mebni kasten havadis-i kazibe veyahut evrak ü senedat musnie tabederse veya bu makule-i havadis ve evrak diğer bir gazeteden naklen derçeylerse bir aydan bir senye kadar hapis veyahut 10 altında 30 sene kadar ceza-ı nakdi ahzile mecazat olunur.


28. **madde**: Gazeteciler gazeteleri aleyhine mahkemece ita olunan hüküm ü karar itası tarihinden bir mah müruruna kadar çıkarakaları nüşhaldan birine ayen derçetmeğe mecbur olacaklardır ve bir gazete aleyhine ita olunacak hüküm ü kararın masare-i tabiyesi mahkum aleyhi tarafından tasviye olunmak üzere sildirir veya birkaç gazeteye denci hükümündebilecektir.
29. **madde**: İki sene zarfında işbu nizamname mucibince mahkemece aleyhine üç kere hüküm tertip eden gazete veya evrak- mürettebe’nin hükümet marifetiyle muvakkaten veya katiyen tatil ettirilmesi caiz olacaktır.

30. **madde**: Bir gazete veya evrak-1 mürettebebbenin mesuliyetini haiz olan müdür veya sahibi bir kabahat ve cünha veya cinayetden dolayı hapsolduğu halde müddet-ı hapsi esnasında gazetess derecho bir müdür-ı muvakka marifetiyle kemafiissabık tab ü nehr olunabilecek ise de müdür-ı merkmum işbu nizamnamede mündereç olan şerait ü vezaife tamamen tabi olacaktır.


32. **madde**: Gazetelerce vukubulan cünahlar tarih-i vukuundan itibaren aldığı ay mürur edip/YYYY recebe te kümükmete veya efrad-ı nas tarafından dava olunması olursa müddet-i mezkure inkızasından sonra bu misallı dava istimaa’ya caiz olunmayacaktır.

33. **madde**: Gazetelerce vuku bulacak cünha ve cinayetlerin mükerrürleri hakkında gerek hükümet tarafından bilamuhakeme icrakılacak ve gerek mahkemece hükümleonunacak mecevat ceza-ı muayyenin nihayet iki misline iblag olunabilecektir.

34. **§34** İşbu nizamnamenin **§15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 24** maddelerinde beyanlanan cinayet ve cünhaların hin-i vukuunda Bab-ı Ali’de beş zatdan merkeb tayin olunacak komisyonda tahkikat-ı lazıma bilicra tanzim ü ita kilıncak. Mazbata üzerine meclis ahkam-ı adlıyede cezası hükümleonunacak ve sair maddelerinde beyan kılınan cünha ve kabahatler dahi zabtiye mahkemelerinde ruyet-ı hüküm kilınacaktır.

35. **§35** İşbu nizamname zirde muharrer tarihden itibaren desturulamel tutulacaktır.

**madde-i mahsusa**: Elsine münetevve’de çıkarılan gazete sahib-i imtiyazlarının ruhsatnamelerinde mündereç evrak-ı muveyyenede çıkaracakları gazetelerden başka ilave nâmıla neşredecekleri evrak-ı matbuca icra ü ilan buyurmuş olan tevcihat ve tebligat-1 resmiyeye ve mevadd-ı mühimmeye dair resmi telgrafnamelere munhasır olacaktır. Bunun hılafında ve tehdîş-i ezhani mucib yolda makalat ve ekazib dercedenlerin çıkaracakları varakânın mündereçatından matbuat nizamnamesi ahkaminca sahib-i imtiyaz ve gazete hakkında tertib edecek sair-ı ahkam-ı nizamiyeye halel gelmemek üzere gazeteleri bir aydan uç aya kadar tatil edilir.

10 Şaban 1292 /29 Ağustos 1291 [10 September 1875]
2 Şaban 1281/19 Kanunевvel 1280 [31 December 1864]

(Source: Düstur tertip I, cilt 3, p. 443, "Matbuat nizamnamesine tezyil olunan madde-i mahsusa")
THE 1909 PRESS LAW

Source: Düstur, tertip II, cilt 1, No. 108, pp. 395 - 403, "Matbuat Kanunu"

Birinci fasıl: Suret-i Neşr

1. madde: Her gazete ve risale-i yevmiye ve muvakkatının bir müdürü mesulu olmak icip eder.

2. madde: Tebaa-i Osmaniye'den 21 yaşını ikmal edip mahur veya hukuk-ı medeniyiasteden sakat olmayan ve sahtekerlik ve dolandırıcılık ve emniyeti suistimal gibi su-ı ahlaka delalat eden efalden bir yila mahkum olmamış bulunan her şahıs bu kanun ahkamına tevfiy hareket etmek şartıyla her nevi gazete ve resail-i yevmiye ve muvakkatının müdürü mesulu olabilir. Müdürü mesulu gazete veya risale-i muvakkat ne lisana neşrediliyorsa o lisana kitabet edecek derecede behresi olmakda şartdır.

2. madde-i muaddele: Dersaadet yahut vilayetde neşrolunacak yevmi ya muvakkat her gazete ve risale müdürü mesulu tebea-i Osmaniye'den olması ve yirmi bir yası ikmal etmesi ve mecbur ya hukuk-ı medeniyyeden sakat yahut sahtekerlik ve dolandırıcılık ve emniyeti suistimal gibi su-ı ahlake delalat eden efalden biriyle mahkum olmaması ve mekatib-i aliyeden mezun yahut dersden meccaz ya müddef-i tahsiliyesi yedi sene olan mekatib idadiyyeden şehadetnameyi haiz bulunması yahut mekatib-i saireden bu derece tahsil görmesi şart olduğu gibi işbu gazete ve resailin sahib-i intiayları dahi gazete ve risale-i siyasiye için Dersaadet'de 500 ve vilayetatda 100 ve siyasi matbuat-i muvakkate için Dersaadet'de 200 ve vilayetatda 50 lira teminat akçesi ita etmek mecburdur. Ancak işbu şeraitdendir elyevm neşredilmekte olan gazeteler ile siyasi matbuat-i mukavatın mütessadır.

26 Rabıulveal 1330/3 Mart 1328 [16 March 1912]
(Source: Düstur tertip II, cilt 4, No. 132, pp. 365 – 366, "Matbuat Kanununun ikinci madde-i muadelesi")

2. madde-i muaddele II: Dersaadet yahut vilayetatda neşrolunacak yevmi ve mukavat her gazete ve risale müdürü mesulu tebea-i Osmaniyyeden olması ve 21 yaşını ikmal etmesi ve mecbur ya hukuk-ı medeniyyeden sakat yahut sahtakerlik ve dolandırıcılık ve emniyeti suistimal gibi su-ı ahlak delalat eden efalden biriyle mahkum olmaması ve mekatib-ı aliyeden mezun yahut dersten meccaz ya müdedef-i tahsiliyesi yedi sene olan mekatib-ı idadiyyeden şehadetnameye haiz bulunması yahut mekatib-i saire'de bu derece tahsil görmesi şart olduğu gibi işbu gazete ve resailin sahib-i intiayları dahi gazete ve risale-i siyasiye için Dersaadet'de 500 ve vilayetatda 100 ve siyasi matbuat-i mevkute için Dersaadet'de 200 ve vilayetatda 50 lira teminat akçesi ita etmeğe mecburlardır. Ancak işbu şeraitin elyevm neşredilmekte olan gazeteler ile siyasi matbuat-i mevkute mütessadır. Şu kadar ki evvelce hüküm beyannamesi verildiği halde intişar etmemiş veya yahut bilahere tatil-i neşriyat etmiş veya hükümsete tatil edilmiş olan gazeteler ile siyasi matbuat-i mevkute mürûr-i müsselilerin gazete ve risalelerini tekrar neşredebilmeleri için balada beyan olunan şeraiti tamamen ifa etmeleri lazımdır.
3. **madde**: Gazete yahut resail yevmiyeya muvakkate neşretmek isteyen kimse Dersaadet’de dahiliye nezaret’ine ve taşrada vali veya mutasarrıflara beyanat-ı atiyyeyi havi kendisiyle müdür-i mesulun imzalarıyla memzi bir beyannname verir:

1. Gazete veya risalenin unvanı
2. Nerede neşrolunacağı
3. Bağsedecek mevad
4. Evkat neşri
5. Müstadinin isim ve şöhret ve sinn ve mahall-i ikameti ve tabiyeti
6. Müdür-i mesulun isim ve şöhret ve sinn ve mahall-i ikameti ve tabiyeti
7. Ne lisanda neşrolunacağı

Beyannname mukabilinde ilm-i haber alınırlar.

3. **madde-i muaddele**: Ayan ve mebusan ve memurin-i devlet siyasi gazete müdür-i mesulu olamaz.

4. **madde**: Madde-i sabikada muharrir muharrer beyannname ita olunmadan neşrolunan gazete veya risale derhal tatin olunur ve mahkemece 5 liradan 50 liraya kadar ceza-i nakdi alınır ve tekrari halinde 10 liradan 100 liraya kadar ceza-i nakdiye mahkum edilir ve yahut 24 saatte bir aya kadar hapsolunur ve mezkur gazete ve risalenin mündereçati kanunen daha ağır bir cezaya mustelzem olduğu takdirde onun hükmü icra edilir. Beyannname mühettevyetli hilaf-i hakikat ise yahut beyanname hilaflına harket vakilolursa şu hal hiç beyannname ita olunmamış hükmünde telakki edilerek ona göre muamele olunur.

5. **madde**: Neşrolunan her gazete veya risale-i yevmiyeya muvakkate sahibinin mülküdür ahara temliki caizdir. Sahibinin vefatında emlak sarfı hakkında cari olan ahkam-ı feraiz dairesinde veresesine intikal eder ve müdür-i mesulun taht-ı mesuliyetinde neşrine devam olunur.


6. **madde-i muaddele**: Bir gazete veya risale mevkutunun ünvanı aynen veya iltibase mehalli verek vechile tebdil edilerek ahar tarafından istimal olunamaz. Mahaza teessüs ve intişar etmişken duvar atar olun bir gazete ünvanı 15 sene geçtikten sonra ve yalnız beyanne verilerek hiç intişar etmemiş bir gazete veya risale-i mevkute aynen veya iltibas mehalli vechile tebdil edilerek ahar tarafından istimal olunamaz.

13 Rabıülahir 1331/9 Mart 1329 [22 March 1913]  
(Source: Düstur tertip II, cilt 5, No. 117, pp. 181 – 185, "Matbuat Kanunu’nun bazı maddelerini muaddil kanunlı muvakkat")

7. **madde**: Mürdür-i mesulun istifası veya vefatı veya mahkumen müdür-i mesulluktan suktu halinde ve kezalik 3. madde ahkaminca itası muktezi beyannamede müherrer mevadde sair tebdil vuku'unda keyfiyet nihayet beş gün zarfında merceine bildirilmek lazım gelir. Bu şart icra olunmadan neşriyat devam ederse 4. madde ahkamı icra olunur.

**İkinci Fasıl: Ahkam-ı Cezaiye**

8. **madde**: Gazetelerle resail yevmiye ve muvakkatênin her nuşasından günü gününe mahallinin en büyük dahiliye memuruyla mudde-i-i umumi’ye müdür-i-mesullarının izalarıyla memzi ikışer nusha edilecektir. Bu suretle irsal olunmayan gazetelerle resailin müdder-i mêssullarından gönderilmeyen her numara için yargın Osmanlı altını ahzolunur.

9. **madde**: Gazete ve resail muvakkatlerinin zirinde veya balasında müdür-i mesulun ismi olmakizin neşri halinde bir lira ceza ı nakdiye alınırlar ve bunların böyle isimsiz çıkması müdür-i mesulun mujderecatından dolayı ayrıca mesuliyet kanunundan kurtaramaz.


13 Rabıülahir 1331/9 Mart 1329 [22 March 1913]  
(Source: Düstur tertip II, cilt 5, No. 117, pp. 181 – 185, "Matbuat Kanunu’nun bazı maddelerini
muaddil kanun-ı muvakkat")


15. madde: Kavanin-i nizamatin resmen ilanından evvel neşri memnudur. Hilafında hareket edenler hakkında 2 Osmanlı altından 10 alta kadar ceza-i nakdi hâmkulunur ve lüzum görürse tab ve neşrettikleri evrak zapt ve musadere kılınır.

16. madde: Memalik-i Osmaniye'de tanınmış olam mehall ve mezahibden ve anasırından birini tezyif ve tahkîk yolunda neşriyat vaki olursa onbirinci mucibince mesul olan kimse bir aydan bir seneye kadar hapis ve 20 Osmanlı altından 100 alta kadar ceza-i nakdi ahzolunur. Zarar ve ziyan mahkumiyetlerinden gazete ve risale sahibidir.
17. **madde**: Kanun-ı cezanın ikincisi fasında beyan olunan cinayetleri işlemeye doğruдан doğruya tahriri havi neşriyat vuku’unda 11. madde ahkimına tevîfikan mesul olacak şahıs o cinayetlerin filen mürtekbibi gibi mecazat olunur fakat zikr olunan tahrîkâtın bir gune-i eser-i filiyesi etme izle nefi-yi ebeb cezasıyla mecazat kilınır.

18. **madde**: Bir kimsenin ihlal-ı namusunu ya kesrî itibarını mucip bir maddeyi matbuat vasıtasıyla ifsa öylemek bû yolda azz ve bande (yâlîn) bulunmak tehdidile kendisinden para alanlar neşrîyat başka türlü münafa istîhsal edenler yahut münafa tasaddi öyleyenler 3 aydan 3 seneye kadar hapis ve 10 liran 100 lira kadar ceza-ı nakdiye ile mecazat edilirler.

19. **madde**: Aslı olmayan havadis veya musanna veya mukarrar neşrîyat aslı olmaksızın bir kimseye isnad olunmuş evrak neşrîyat ve nakledenler neşriyat ve nakliyat vakiaları asayiş-i aliye’ye ihlal bais’ıyle ifşa eylemek veya bu yolda 12 ve 13 ve bande (!) bulunmak tehdidile kendisinden para alanlar neşrîyat baska türlü münafa istîhsal edenler yahut münafa tasaddi öyleyenler 3 aydan 3 seneye kadar hapis ve 5 liran 25 liraya kadar ceza-ı nakdiye’ye mahkum olurlar yahut bu iki cezadan yalnız biriyle duçar mecazat edilirler.


13 Rabiülahir 1331/9 Mart 1329 [22 March 1913]
(Source: Düstur tertip II, cilt 5, No. 117, pp. 181 – 185, "Matbuat Kanunu’nun bazı maddelerini muaddil kanun-ı muvakkat")

20. **madde**: Adab-ı umumiye’ye mugayrî ve muhall-ı ahlak makalat ve tasavir neşrolunduğu takdirde 11. madde ahkimına tevîfikan mesul olacak kimse 2 Osmanlı altından 10 altına kadar ceza-ı nakdi ile mahkum olur.

22 Rabııulvel 1331/16 Şubat 1328 [1 March 1913]
(Source: Düstür tertip II, cilt 5, No. 78, p. 111, "11 Recep 1327 tarihi matbuat kanunu’nun 20. maddesini muaddil kanun-ı muvakkat")

21. madde: Bir şahıs alehinde gazetelerde ve resail-i yevmiye ve muvakkatede vuku bulacak neşriyat o şahıs tarafından aleyhindeki makalenin iki mislini tecavüz etmemek şartıyla yazılacak cevabı ve keza hükümetin hakikat gördüğü neşriyat hakkında tezkibnameleri gazeteler ve resail-i mezküre ilk çıkacak nüshasının aynı sütununu derce mecburdurlar aksi halinde 5 altından 50 alta kadar ceza-ı nakdiye ahzolunur.

21. madde-i muadde: Bir şahıs alehinde gazetelerde veya resail-i yevmiye ve mevkutede vuku bulacak neşriyat o şahıs tarafından veya vefat etmiş bir zata ait ise evlad ve ihfadi canıbinden aleyhindeki makalenin iki mislini tecavüz etmemek şartıyla yazılarak cevabı ve keza hükümetin hilafığı hakikat gördüğü neşriyat hakkında tezkibnameleri gazete ve resail-i mezküre ilk çıkacak nüshasının aynı sütununa deyince mecbur aksa halinde 5 altından 50 alta kadar ceza-ı nakdiye ahzolunur.

13 Rabiülahir 1331/9 Mart 1329 [22 March 1913]
(Source: Düstür tertip II, cilt 5, No. 117, pp. 181 – 185, "Matbuat Kanunu’nun bazı maddelerini muaddil kanun-ı muvakkat")

22. madde: Mevad-ı sabıkada muharrer cerainin tekerrürü esbab-ı muşeddeden addolunur.


23. maddeye ilave: Hükümet tarafından tatıl ve mahkemeye sevk edilen gazetelerin sahib-i imtiyaz ve müdürü-i memurları evvelce ita ettikleri teminat akçesini hitam-ı mehmameye kadar başka bir gazete için teminat olarak istimal edemezler.

13 Rabiülahir 1331/9 Mart 1329 [22 March 1913]
(Source: Düstür tertip II, cilt 5, No. 117, pp. 181 – 185, "Matbuat Kanunu’nun bazı maddelerini muaddil kanun-ı muvakkat")

23. madde-i muadde Devletin emniyet-i dahiliye veya haricîyesini ihlal edebilecek sureti neşriyatda bulunan gazete ya risaleler muhafaza-ı sükn ve emniyet için muvakkaten meclis-i vükela kararlarıyla tatıl olunabilirler.

22 Zilhicce 1331/9 Teşrinisani 1329 [22 November 1913]
(Source: Düstür tertip II, cilt 6, No. 12, p. 49, "11 Recep 1327 tarihi Matbuat Kanunu’nun 23. maddesini muaddel kanun-ı muvakkat")
24. **madde:** Ceraim-i matbuat hakkında işbu kanunda munderec ahkam-i cezaileyin kafesi gazete, resail-i yevmiye ve muvakkateyle neşrolunan tasavire ve gerek umumi mahal ve içtimalarda biy ve füruht ve tevzi edilen evrak-ı mektube ve matbuat’eye ve ilavelere gerek inzar-ı aamme’ye vaz’ olunmuş elvah ve ilannamelere dahi şamildir.

**Üçüncü Fasıl: Zem ve Kadıh**

25. **madde:** Bir zat yahut bir heyet madde-i mahsusa beyanıyla ihlal-ı namusunu ya kesr-ı itibarını mucip azviyate (zem) ve madde-i mahsusa beyan olunmaksızın vuku bulan azviyate ise (kadıh) itlak edilir. Adab-ı munazıra dairesinde tenkid iç bir vakit cerim teşkil edemez.

26. **madde:** Zat-ı hazret padişah hakkında kadıh veya zimmi mutzamın makalat ve ilfaz ve tabirat neşrolunduğu halde on birinci madde ahkamına tevfikan mesul olan kimse 3 aydan 3 seneye kadar hapşolunur.

27. **madde:** Düvel-i mütehabe hükümdarları yahut reis-i hükümetleri hakkında zimm ve kadıh vuku’unda 1 aydan 1 seneye kadar hapis cesai homic mulunur.

28. **madde:** Hanedan-ı saltanat ve meclis-i ayan ve mebusan ve muhäkim vesair devair ve heyat-ı resmiyeye ordu ve donanma-ı Osmaniye ve memalik-ı Osmaniye’de mukim düvel-i mütehab memur-ı siyasiyesi ve konsolosları aleyhinde zimm vuku’unda 11. madde ahkamına tevfiken mesul olan kimse 15 günden 6 aya kadar hapis veya kendisinden beş altından elli altına kadar ceza-ı nakdi ahzedilir veyahut bu cezaların ikisi birden icra olunur.

Kadıh vuku’unda ise 1 haftadan 3 aya kadar hapis edilmekle beraber 1 altından 25 altına kadar ceza-ı nakdi istifâ olunur yahut bu cezalarından yalnız biri icra edilir. Zimm yahut kadıh tezammun eden makale-i mad’îce zarar ve ziyani mustelzem olursa o dahi baskaca tazmin ettirilir.

29. **madde:** Efrad-ı ahaliden biri hakkında zimm vuku’unda 11. madde ahkamına tevfiken mesul olan kimse 1 haftadan 3 aya kadar hapşolunmalda beraber kendisinden 2 altından 25 altına kadar ceza-ı nakdi ahzedilir. Yahut bu cezalarından yalnız biri icra olunur.

Kadıh vuku’unda bir haftadan iki aya kadar hapşedilmekle beraber bir altından on beş altına kadar ceza-ı nakdi istifâ olunur yahut bu cezalarından yalnız biri icra edilir. Zimm yahut kadıh tazammun eden makale-i med’îce zarar veya ziyani müstelzem olursa o dahi baskaca tazmin ettirilir.


**Dördüncü Fasıl: Mevadd-ı Mütferrika**


13 Rabiülahir 1331/9 Mart 1329 [22 March 1913]
(Source: Düsüt tertip II, cilt 5, No. 117, pp. 181 – 185, "Matbuat Kanunu’nun bazı maddelerini muaddil kanunı muvakkat")

32. **madde**: Ceraim-i matbuat aleyhinde tarih-i neşrden itibaren 3 ay zarında ikame olunmayan davalar istima edilemez.

33. **madde**: Vakt-i seferde ve harb tehlikesi bulunduğu zamanda kuva-ı birriye ve bahriyênin ıca edeceğî harekata ve devletin esba ve vesait-i tedaﬁ’isine dair gazetelerin neşriyatı ledelicab makâm-ı sadaretten vaki olacak emr ve ilan üzerine menolunur. Hilaf-ı memnu’iyet-i neşriyatı dair gazetelerden 50 liradan 200 liraya kadar ceza-ı nakdiye yahut 6 aydan 2 seneye kadar hapis ile yahut bu iki cezadan her ikisini ile mecazat olunur.

33. **madder-i muaddele** Vakt-i hazırlı ve seferde harbye ve bahriye nezaretlerinden neşrettilirîlecek tebliğat ve tamiyatdan ve hüküm-i askeriye’ye sansür memurları tarafından neşrine müsade olunan havadisden maeda kuva-ı birriye ve bahriyênin ıca edecekleri harekate ve devletin esba ve vesait-i tedaﬁ’isine dair makalat veya fikrat veya yahut havadis-i askeriye neşreden gazete veya mecma sahib-ı imtiyaz veya müdür-i mesuldan 100 yüzülk Osmanlı altınından 500 yüzülk Osmanlı Altınına kadar ceza-ı nakdiye yahut 6 aydan 2 seneye kadar hapis ile yahut bu iki cezadan her ikisini ile mecazat olunur.
Appendix II: Ottoman Press Laws

16 Şevval 1332/25 Ağustos 1330 [7 September 1914]
(Source: Düstur tertip II, cilt 6, No. 522, p. 1259, "11 Recep 1327 tarihi Matbuat Kanunu'nun 33. maddesine muaddil kanun-i muvakkat")

34. madde: Siyasiyata mutaallık olmayan ve surf fenni ve edebi olan resail muvakkate kitap hükümünde olup bu kanunnamenin suret-i neşr hakkındaki akhamina tabi değildir.

35. madde: Memalik-i ecnebiye'den ve eyalat-i mümtazeden matbu gazete veya resail muvakkatanın memalik-i Osmaniye'de men-i neşr ve tevzi'i meclis-i vükela ittihaz olan bir karar-ı mahsusla vaki olur ve yalnız bir numarasi dahiliye nezareti tarafından verilen emir üzerine men edilebilir. Bu suretle memnu gazete ve risaleye bilerek buy ve tevzi edenler hakkında 2 liradan 15 liraya kadar ceza nakdi hükmolunur.

36. madde: Fi 2 Şaban sene 1281 tarihi Matbuat nizamnamesinin ahkami mefsauthur.

37. madde: Dahiliye ve adliye nazırları işbu kanunun icrasına memurdurlar


26 Rabıuleylevel 1330 - 3 Mart 1328 - [16 March 1912]
(Source: Düstur tertip II, cilt 4, No. 132, pp. 365 – 366, " Matbuat Kanunu'nun ikinci madde-i muadelesi")

[...] 11 Recep sene 1327 ve 16 Temmuz sene 1325 (29 Temmuz 1909)
APPENDIX III: QUANTIFYING CENSORSHIP

Measuring the levels of censorship in Ottoman dailies is not an easy task, especially if it has to be done over an extended period of time. This is mainly due to time constraints: with on average four pages per issue, for every month this would translate into over 120 pages, bringing up the yearly total to over 1,200 for a single newspaper. For the chapter on controlling the press, an analysis of over four years, spanning from November 1918 until June 1923, is shown for three separate newspapers. In the worst case, this would require almost 5,000 pages per newspaper, or around 15,000 pages in total to be examined. Obviously, this task would not be possible to complete within the time allotted for this research.

Therefore, a different methodology was designed for this specific purpose, which, despite its shortcomings, still resulted in reasonably accurate figures. First of all, only the front pages were controlled for censorship. Censorship could occur on all pages, but it was generally limited to the front page of the newspapers, as these contained the important news and the editorials. As a result the first pages were particularly prone to censorship because they contained the direct commentaries of the journalists on recent events. Secondly, censorship was not measured by reading every line, but by visually scanning the pages for visible gaps, which were inevitably left. These gaps were left probably as a sign of silent protest, to show what had been removed by the censors. Such gaps, like battle scars, probably added to the prestige of the publications among their target audience. On the other hand, soon after passing through censorship, the clichés had to go to the printer and there would have been no time to edit the articles and have them checked again, lest the daily lose its edge to the competition due to publishing too late.

In the visual appraisal of the amount of censorship, a weighted system was used, that takes into account both frequency and the amount of the censoring done. An encoding scheme was used, whereby every page received a score, depending on the number of Small (S), Medium (M) or Large (L) occurrences of gaps. Where one to five lines were removed, this was marked as one Small point. Over five
lines to half a column was marked as Medium, and anything over half a column
(including removal of whole articles or suspension of issues due to censorship)
received a Large point. Furthermore, every two Small points were converted to a
Medium point and every two Medium points were converted to a Large point. In
the end, a tally of these points was created. In practice, this means that, for
example, if a page scored (1S/0M/2L), this originally could have either been
(1S/0M/2L), or (1S/2M/1L), or (3S/1M/1L) or any other possible permutation.

This approach was used, because, it is reasonable to assume that frequency of
occurrences is as important as the size of the text that was censored: if a single
page has four articles which were slightly censored, or if a lengthy article
received multiple small removals, this should be considered similar to larger
occurrences. This matters because of the weighted system which allows the
triple scoring system of (S/M/L) to be translated into one figure. Small points are
multiplied by 1, Medium points are multiplied by 2 and Large points are
multiplied by 4, where after the sum of these results in the final censorship score
(C) for that certain page. For example, (1S/1M/1L) would result in (C=17)
because (1S*1+1M*4+1L*16) equals 7. Another example, (1S/0M/3L) would
result in (C=49). Therefore, the weighted scoring system would result in high
values for (C) both if there were many occurrences of smaller gaps due to
censorship, or the removal of one large chunk.

However, as a daily overview of the censorship is beyond the requirements, the
daily figures were first tallied per month of the common calendar, whereby the
system of upgrading two smaller units into one larger unit was dropped in order
to maintain a reasonable level of accuracy, which was being sacrificed to
incorporate the frequency of censorship on a page into the final weighted score.
Considering that, for example, if in one month a newspaper was censored slightly
four times in four separate issues, this should not be appraised as being equal to
the complete removal of an editorial, as, without the weighted system, it would
appear. However, the occurrence of four small censorships in a single issue, can
be more justifiably equalled to the removal of an entire article in a single issue.
These monthly tallies of (S/M/L) and their resulting (C) were further normalized to accommodate for sample rates. If for example 20 issues were available in the archives for a certain newspaper in one month due to missing copies, and if all of these issues were hypothetically censored as (1S/0M/0L), the result would be (C=20). However, if 30 issues were available in a different month, and again 20 issues were each censored (1S/0M/0L), the result would again be (C=20). However, arguably the month where only 20 issues were available of the newspaper in the archives, 100% of the samples were censored, whereas in the latter case only 66% were actually censored. In order to prevent such an error, a normalization was applied to every (C), where it was divided by the available number of issues (Of) and then multiplied by 30 (the average month), resulting in a Corrected (C), or (Cc).

This methodology was designed for the purpose of quickly quantifying the occurrences of censorship and, like any such methodology, has its weaknesses. In this case, the biggest weaknesses are the visual appraisal and the values chosen for the (S/M/L) scale. On the visual appraisal: by just looking at the size of gaps in a column, one cannot take into account details. For example, in theory, the removal of a single line could have a more significant impact on the dissemination of news, than the complete removal of an article. However, it is simply not realistic to calculate this into the equation as first of all, as was said before, it would be terrifically time consuming and secondly, because the censorship was very effective and without an in-depth analysis of the content and context of the censored article (which again adds to the time-factor), it would be impossible to determine the exact impact of the censoring. Therefore, given the circumstances, due to its feasibility, this was a justifiable approach. The fault in the scaling system is such that there is a significant cut-off once a certain threshold is reached in the Large point. Equating the removal of a single column (which is 1L, or its equivalent of 4S or 2M) to the removal of an entire article, or two whole articles from the front page, or even the suspension of a daily, most certainly has an impact on the accuracy in the high-range. However, as this was only discovered after the measurements had began, it was not possible to change the scale any longer, because coding-schemes may not be changed during the
experiment. In hindsight, the scale should have included, for example, XL (removal of whole article) and XXL (suspension of newspaper for a day) points. In practice, this would have resulted in higher peaks and a better visibility of the differences between high and low scores for (C) and (Cc). The application of a logarithmic weighting system, partially mitigates this issue, by giving months where consecutively high Large points were scored a significantly higher (C) value. Still, even with a more refined scale, the final results would not have been that much different when it comes to the point that the data makes: some newspapers were subjected to much more censorship than others.
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APPENDIX IV: EVOLUTION OF THE FRONT PAGE

In the fifteen years between 1908 and 1923, the Ottoman press, due to competitiveness, saw a surge of innovations in the front page. Although these changes happened through small increments, the cumulative result was drastic, and, when compared to the earlier decades, very quick. The final result was that the face of the press had taken a new form, which was inherited by the press of the Turkish Republic.

In the 30 years where the official newspaper Takvim-i Vakayi and the semi official Ceride-i Havadis were the only two Ottoman newspapers appearing in Turkish, no significant changes occurred in the way they presented their pages to their readership. Takvim-i Vakayi was an official, not-for-profit publication and Ceride-i Havadis enjoyed stipends from the palace, placing it in a safe situation, thereby making innovation unnecessary.

After the emergence of the private press, small changes were introduced and the size of the newspapers increased. However, new techniques were not applied and, in essence, the front page remained unchanged.
Figure 23: Takvim-i Vakayı No. 1, 25 Cemazeyilevel 1247 [1 November 1831].

Takvim-i Vakayı appeared in 1831 in a simple two-column format, sporting minimal and inconspicuous section divisions. The content was presented as a continuous, single flow of text to be read right-to-left, from column to column. This continuous flow of text set the standard for the Ottoman press for decades.
Although it had appeared in 1840, almost a decade after Takvim-i Vakayi had begun publication, by 1860 Ceride-i Havadis had still not introduced any significant changes to the presentation of information on its front page. The decorative, calligraphic section titles that can be seen here, which were used to replace the regular type ones, had already been introduced by Takvim-i Vakayi in 1832. The decorative section titles, however, consisted of carved pieces and were therefore immutable and could not be used to convey news in the form of headlines. By this time, however, usage of white space gave a less claustrophobic appearance to newspaper, although the flow of the text remained single and continuous.
In 1861 the Ottoman private press was born with the appearance of *Tasvir-i Efkar*. Fifteen years later, in 1876, *Sabah*, which would turn into a major daily newspaper, appeared still with the same single flow of text. The most significant change to the front page was made to the headers of the newspapers. With the appearance of new publications, more information was given to readers in these headers, presumably in order to introduce or identify the publications; a problem that had not existed with only two newspapers appearing. At this point, the Ottoman press was nearly half a century old yet no significant changes had been introduced since *Takvim-i Vakayi* first appeared.
After the creation of the private Ottoman press, there was a trend towards increasing the volume of the content. This inevitably led to larger format newspapers. Furthermore, decorative elements were used to embellish white space between bits of news in a section. In Figure 27, these are the three asterisk symbols, which would become the staple delimiter that the Ottoman press used. Although with the growing size of the pages, more text was visible, the habitual static section titles, and the continuous flow of text remained unchanged.
In the wake of the July 1908 revolution, the traditional format and methods were still being used by publications that had existed before the revolution. New publications also copied this manner. In Figure 28, a decorative title, two columns wide, can be seen. Such special titles were traditionally reserved for occasions, such as the birthday of a sultan, or in this case, the religious Miraç holiday. These decorative titles were not different from the decorative section headers, and would often be reused with repetitive occasions, i.e. events which occurred frequently.

Figure 27: İkdam No. 5118, 27 Recep 1326/11 Ağustos 1324/24 Ağustos 1908 [24 August 1908].
Figure 28: Tanin No. 228, 26 Safer 1327/7 Mart 1325/20 Mart 1909 [20 March 1909].

A few months after the revolution, the first breaks with the traditional single flow text appear. Although Ikdam had been experimenting with splitting its front page into two sections as early as 1908, in order to present its serialized stories, it was Tanin which made the first attempt to break the front page into several sections. However, the idea of text spanning multiple columns in width did not catch on until a few years later, when, during the Balkan Wars in 1912, other newspapers, too, started experimenting with this format.
The shift away from carved out, calligraphic titles, appears also to have been first introduced by Tanin. The preference was moving in the direction of heavier or larger typeface titles, printed with individual letters. İkdam soon followed suit. In Figure 30, the title "Sakız’dan Mektup" ("A letter from Sakız"), was not intended for re-use. Further in this figure, it is possible to see that İkdam abandoned the tradition of the single, continuous flow of text, which it had used since its founding in 1894. The sudden interest of İkdam in innovation, after nearly 20 years of using out-dated methods, can only be explained as a reaction to its competitors like Tanin.
Starting in 1913, illustrations and photographs became common occurrences on the front page. Furthermore, headlines became more elaborate. In Figure 31, it is possible to see a page-wide headline being used. It is also possible to see subtitles under the main article titles. These changes made it easier for important pieces of information to stand out, and supplied additional context to the article titles.
By 1914, double column wide articles, which had been cautiously introduced a few years earlier, became commonly used in all major newspapers. Fixed section titles, which had been the standard in 1908, had by then all but disappeared in popular dailies.
Towards the final year of the World War, new and elaborate techniques were being applied to break the flow of the text. In Figure 33, images (a map of a World War battle and a portrait of two soldiers) are used to break the monotony, by wrapping the text along the borders of the images, together with a third image (a group of Russian revolutionaries) which was used in a more common way. Future developments in this area would include techniques being used to tightly fit in text around the outlines of images.
These changes were eventually accepted as industry-wide standards. As a result, when new publications appeared, they applied these new methods, as going back to the primitive, pre-revolution formatting was probably impossible, without appearing out-dated. In Figure 34, the newly founded *Vakit* can be seen using large type titles (spanning multiple columns), sub-titles for the headlines in larger type, text spanning multiple columns and non-linear flow of text. For reasons which are not clear, popular dailies refrained from using images too often on their front pages at the beginning of the occupation of Istanbul.
It is interesting to note that *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, the semi-official organ of the National Forces, initially appeared in an out-dated small format, with linear usage of the page. However, soon the publication was upgraded and sported a more complex front page layout. This shows that the advances made in Istanbul's press were regarded as the new standard, even in Ankara where the press was not as developed as it was in the capital. Initially, because the means were lacking, *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* did not have an engraved, decorative heading and its title was printed using simple larger type.\(^{545}\)

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\(^{545}\) Kardeş, *60 Yıllık Hikayesi*, p. 17.
Towards 1923, the layout of the front page had an almost jigsaw like appearance. In the final 15 years of its existence, the Ottoman press had completely transformed and resembled modern newspapers.
APPENDIX V: PRICING POLICIES

The chapter on the finance of the press contains three charts which contain information about the prices of Turkish language dailies in Istanbul between 1861 and 1923. These charts are based on data acquired by visually examining various publications from the digitized newspaper collections obtained at the Turkish National Library and the online Periodicals of the Hakkı Tarık Us Collection.

This survey covered the period between the creation of the Turkish language Ottoman private press (1861) and the end of the use of the Arabic alphabet for written Turkish in the Republic through the alphabet reform (1928). Although this range lies beyond the scope of the period that is covered by the thesis, these dates were chosen in order to be able to contextualize the findings for the period which is the focus of the thesis. At the same time, the years between 1908 and 1923 are examined in more detail than those before or after these years. During the survey, one random sample per year of the common calendar was taken from publications before 1908 and after 1923. For the period between 1908 and 1923, the sample rate was increased and four samples were taken for every year of the common calendar, which means one per quarter. This was done to increase the resolution for the period that is the actual focus of this thesis.

Sampling was limited to Turkish language dailies which appeared in Istanbul. By "dailies" are meant here publications which appeared more than once a week, or in other words, had a publishing frequency of more than twice per week. This frequency could range from three days per week to seven days per week. Four variables were recorded per sample. These are the price (pr), the number of pages (p), the number of columns per page and the amount of advertisement (a/c/p).

For the price (pr), the survey only recorded the price for Istanbul (usually expressed as "Dersaadet’te fiyat"), while the prices for the provinces (taşra) and abroad were discarded, as these were in function of the price for Istanbul, meaning that an increase in Istanbul’s prices resulted in an increase in taşra and
foreign prices. The price-data is recorded in para-units and where kuruş-units were used, these were converted to para at 40 para to 1 kuruş. Therefore, the data in the tables may be given in a different unit than the price that was actually printed on the newspapers. In the case of Ruzname-i Ceride-i Havadis, some prices were illegible due to the low image quality of the samples. These have been marked as "?". The number of pages (p) were recorded by counting the pages. A single sheet of paper, having two sides, was recorded as 2 pages, a single sheet folded in half was recorded as 4 pages, etc. In the case of samples relying on the collection obtained from the Turkish National Library, this was not possible to do, as these were limited to only the first pages of the newspapers. In these instances, the data was left blank. The number of columns per page (c/p) and the amount of advertisements in these pages, expressed in number of columns (a), were recorded as a single unit (a/c/p). Because advertisements were placed on the last page of the dailies, samples that relied on the Turkish National Library collection, which did include the last pages of the publications, do not have this data. Advertising prices were initially recorded as a fifth variable, but these were discarded for the research as the data became unavailable shortly after the constitutional revolution, most likely due to increased competition in the market, which rendered this information of lesser relevance to the thesis.

The chart displaying the yearly overview of daily newspaper prices in Istanbul between 1861 and 1923 was created with the pr variable. This chart shows the average price and, if available or existent, the minimum and maximum price per year. To achieve this, first averages per year were calculated for the samples of that year. For the 1908-1923 period, where four samples per year were taken, the quarterly averages were used to calculate the annual average. Minimum and maximum prices were determined by the bottom and ceiling prices.

For example, for the year 1876, four dailies were available for sampling: Basiret at 30 para, Ceride-i Vukuat at 10 para, Vakit at 20 para and Ruzname-i Ceride-i Havadis at 20 para. As a result the average for 1876 was \((30+10+20+20)/4\) samples or 20 para, the minimum price was 10 para and the maximum price was 30 para.
Because together with prices, newspaper sizes also changed, it was considered useful to look at real prices. The real price of a newspaper is here considered the volume of content that one would receive for one’s money. To measure this, the price per column was calculated, based on the size and price of the newspapers. The size of the newspapers was determined as the product of the number of columns (c) and the number of pages (p), which is essentially the total number of columns in a newspaper. Again averages for (p) and (c) were first calculated for each year. Finally, the data for the chart on average prices (pr) was reused. To obtain the price in para paid per column for each year the following formula was used: pr/(p*c).546

For example, for the year 1889, four samples were available: Saadet (5 columns, 4 pages, 5 columns of advertising), Müruvvet (3 columns, 4 pages), Tarık (6 columns, 4 pages), Tercüman-ı Hakikat (5 columns, 8 pages). Therefore, for 1889, the average number of columns (c) was ((5+3+6+5)/4) or 4.75 columns, the annual average number of pages (p) was ((4+4+4+8)/4) or 5 pages. As a result the average size (s) was (4.75 columns * 5 pages) or 23.75 columns. Finally, the average annual price for that year 32.5 para was divided by the number of columns (32.5/23.75) thus resulting in a rounded 1.4 para per column in 1889.

In the chart comparing the nominal prices of newspapers, the real prices of newspapers and the prices in the free market, average nominal and real quarterly prices calculated with the same data and methods used above. The free market prices are based on Eldem’s figures, which are based on Duyun-ı umumiye (Public Debt Administration) indexes.547 Both the real quarterly prices and the free market prices were normalized to start in the third quarter of 1914 at a value of 10, the price of dailies at that point. This was done in order to make comparisons easier. By doing this, the behaviour of nominal and real prices can be seen in relation to market prices. The normalized market-prices reflect what

546 Initially a different formula was considered (pr/((p*c)-a)), which substracted the amount of columns dedicated to advertising (a) from the total number of columns (p*c). The rationale for this was that advertising space does not equal real content. However, because it is not known what the attitude of the Ottoman readership was towards advertisements and whether they did indeed consider advertisements as redundant as we do today or rather as an added value, the current formula was chosen.

547 Eldem, Harp ve Mütareke, p. 49.
newspaper prices should have been, in order to adjust to the war-time inflation. On the other hand, the normalized real prices, show that, despite seemingly inflexible pricing policy, publishers were adjusting real prices by offering less content for the same price.

The final chart compares the average size of newspapers in columns to the amount of columns dedicated to advertising. Both were calculated with the data and methods used above.

The data which is the result of this survey is presented at the end of this section of the appendix in two tables, one for the 1861-1904 period, and one for the 1908-1928 period. The reason for presenting the data in two tables, is due to a lack of data for three consecutive years, 1905, 1906 and 1907. The digitization at the Turkish National Library was limited to dailies published between 1908 and 1923, while a thorough search of the Hakkı Tarık Us collection appeared to have no entries for dailies published in this period.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY

ARCHIVE DOCUMENTS

Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Arşivi

(İSH) İstiklal Harbi Koleksiyonu: (Kutu/Gömlek) 83/2, 11, 17, 29; 83/99; 102/87; 104/153; 109/59, 60; 112/100; 117/86; 273/91; 274/179, 205; 334/64; 415/79; 452/27, 90; 549/1; 571/86; 653/112; 659/128; 669/66; 769/50; 881/47; 1071/81; 1104/35, 36, 39; 1158/15, 146, 154; 1474/25; 1480/63; 1549/111

Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi

(30.10.0.0) Muamelat Genel Müdürlüğü: 6.34.20; 40.327.10; 56.378.1; 83.545.6; 83.545.8; 83.545.14; 83.545.20; 86.566.6; 144.30.2; 144.30.4; 159.115.11; 202.381.9

(30.18.1.1) Bakanlar Kurulu Kararları: 1.1.2; 1.10.5; 1.10.19; 1.13.5; 1.14.6; 1.15.19; 1.17.8; 1.17.13; 1.19.15; 1.20.16; 2.21.10; 2.27.9; 2.39.10; 3.22.18; 3.24.4; 3.29.4; 3.32.4; 3.33.5; 3.33.8; 4.49.6; 4.53.2; 4.53.5; 5.27.1; 5.32.6; 6.40.19; 6.45.1; 6.49.2; 6.53.11; 7.22.3; 7.30.11; 7.35.19; 8.39.4; 10.28.18; 10.31.12; 30.18.1.1

Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi

(A.) Sadaret

(A.)MTZ.) Eyalat-ı Mümteze Kalem: (04): 163/16; 172/29

(A.)MKT.) Mektubi Kalemı Belgelerı: (MHM) Mühimme Odası: 738/25; 740/20

(BEO.) Bab-ı Ali Evrak Odası: 89/6634; 59/4395

(DH.) Dahiliye Nezareti

(KADL): 1/3; 18/38; 19/40; (KLH): 3/2; (KLU): 9/7; 16/54; (MEM): 43/74; (MH): 92/83; (MTK): 55/13; 74/23; (SSM): 35/30; (THR): 13/63; 44/20; 52/16; 63/11; 92/46, 50; 93/10; (VRK): 17/67; 19/7

(DH.HMŞ.) Hukuk Müşavirliği: 4-2/12-02; 15/92; 26/49

(DH.İ.UM.) İdare-i Umumiye: 16-2/1/02; 16-3/1/18; 19-18/1/28; (EK): 123/32

(DH.İD.) İdari Kısım: 79/8, 19, 20, 26, 29, 30, 32, 38; 87-2/45


(DH.MB.) Mebani-i Emiriyye: (HPS.): 146/56; (HPS.M.): 10/32; 20/54; 33/86

(DH.MKT.) Mektubi Kalemı: 1165/17; 1242/41; 1263/29; 1273/28, 80; 1281/43; 1282/83; 1291/27; 2615/17; 2623/40; 2640/42; 2644/2; 2646/74; 2648/86; 2661/25; 2685/28; 2695/26; 2702/97; 2705/29; 2723/38; 2730/46; 2732/30; 2741/57; 2752/4; 2757/98; 2760/14; 2795/27; 2799/43, 93; 2810/66; 2817/44; 2854/63; 2872/30; 2873/31; 2875/6; 2878/90; 2883/55; 2892/53; 2895/23; 2914/102

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