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Chirac Said “Non” – Or Did He?
Revisiting U.S.-UN Diplomacy on the 2003 Iraq War

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Abstract:
This article challenges the conventional wisdom that French President Jacques Chirac’s public veto threat on 10 March 2003 made UN Security Council approval for the Iraq War unattainable. Chirac only threatened to veto the particular draft resolution then on the table, leaving open the possibility of a future French abstention on the use of force in case the UN inspectors determined that Iraq had clearly failed to cooperate. Building on this insight, I develop a counterfactual thought experiment using new evidence from declassified documents and interviews with senior American, British, and French officials. What emerges from this evidence is that the Bush administration would have stood a good chance of securing UN approval — if it had been willing to postpone the start of military operations by several weeks and endorse a set of demanding benchmarks for Iraqi compliance as proposed by other members of the Security Council. In short, there are strong indications that President Bush failed to secure UN approval primarily because he was unwilling to make even tactical concessions to his international partners.

The standoff between the United States and France leading up to the 2003 Iraq War probably “led to the most serious deterioration of transatlantic relations in recent memory.”¹ According to a prominent view first advanced by American and British officials and subsequently taken up by academic analysts, President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair made an all-out effort to secure United Nations approval before invading Iraq, but French President Jacques Chirac’s public veto threat on 10 March 2003 doomed that effort to failure.² Put differently,
France’s determination to use the UN Security Council [henceforth: SC] as an instrument for “soft balancing” American power made UN approval unattainable.³

This article challenges that conclusion. Chirac only threatened to veto the particular draft resolution then on the table, leaving open the possibility of a future French abstention on the use of force in case the UN weapons inspectors determined that Iraq had clearly failed to cooperate. Building on this insight, I develop a counterfactual thought experiment using new evidence from declassified documents and more than a dozen interviews that I conducted with senior American, British, and French officials. What emerges from this evidence is that the Bush administration would have stood a good chance of securing a French abstention and ultimate UN approval for the use of force—if it had been willing to postpone the start of military operations by up to six weeks and endorse a set of demanding (and, we know now, virtually impossible-to-achieve) benchmarks for Iraqi compliance, as proposed by Britain and several nonpermanent members of the SC. In short, there are strong indications that President Bush failed to secure UN approval primarily because he was unwilling to make even tactical concessions to his SC partners.

Counterfactual arguments are notoriously controversial, especially among historians.⁴ However, scholars in political science and international relations have increasingly come to recognize that carefully constructed counterfactuals can be valuable to “probe the causes and contingency of the world we know,” and “are an indispensible means of evaluating it, empirically and normatively.”⁵ For a counterfactual argument to be useful, it has to fulfill several requirements. First, it must be well-specified, clearly indicating in what ways, if the antecedent had been different, the outcome or consequent too might have been different. Second, it must be logically and theoretically plausible—that is, the connecting principles and enabling counterfactuals that sustain the conditional claim must be specified with reasonable precision and must be consistent with logic as well as with relevant theories. Finally, the argument must be
consistent with the available historical evidence—it must start with the real world as it was otherwise known before asserting the counterfactual and be compatible with the most up-to-date evidence as to what the circumstances allowed.⁶

The different outcome imagined here is quite clear: the adoption of a UNSC resolution in the spring of 2003 authorizing the use of military force against Iraq. The article’s primary aim is to demonstrate that the counterfactual is logically and theoretically plausible and consistent with the latest evidence as to what the other SC members, notably France and most of the nonpermanent members, were willing to support. It should be emphasized that the argument is merely probabilistic rather than deterministic: there can be no absolute certainty that a different approach based on a longer timeline and specific benchmarks against which to measure Iraq’s compliance would ultimately have yielded UN approval for the use of force.

UN Security Council approval uniquely demonstrates compliance with international norms of legitimate behavior and helps powerful countries like the United States signal benign intentions when they intervene militarily abroad.⁷ That can be expected to reduce international opposition and make it easier for foreign partner states to cooperate with the intervener by offering landing and basing rights or contributing troops and resources.⁸ Consequently, U.S. policymakers may seek UN approval to facilitate international coalition building, coalition cohesion, and burden sharing on both combat and post-combat stabilization.⁹ Furthermore, opinion polls indicate greater U.S. public support for multilateral than unilateral intervention, and policymakers may thus view UN approval as valuable to boost U.S. domestic support.¹⁰ However, obtaining UNSC approval for the use of force can be costly. Related negotiations are often time-consuming, substantial side-payments and logrolling may be required to mollify other Council members, and the process entails a loss of secrecy and thus typically eliminates any
element of surprise. Therefore, policymakers can be expected to make meaningful efforts to secure UN approval only when they anticipate that the payoffs will outweigh attendant costs.

After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, senior Bush administration officials insisted that Iraq’s presumed WMD proliferation constituted a serious threat to U.S. national security, requiring urgent military action. Congress and the American people largely accepted this line of reasoning. Furthermore, policymakers expected that toppling Saddam Hussein and stabilizing the country would be relatively easy. This pessimism about the threat, combined with optimism about the costs of war (and the reality of high U.S. domestic support for military action against Iraq), reduced incentives for American leaders to engage in lengthy diplomacy aimed at securing UN approval. Alexander Thompson has argued in a carefully crafted analysis of U.S. policy on Iraq that “the Bush administration chose to take action against Iraq without UNSC approval because it deemed the costs of working through the UN too high in the end.” Implicit in this conclusion is the counterfactual that the United States could plausibly have obtained a UNSC mandate authorizing the use of force, if President Bush had assigned a higher priority to the objective. This article makes that counterfactual explicit.

Had President Bush considered UN approval for the Iraq War a prime U.S. objective, then after deciding to forcibly remove Saddam Hussein from power, he should presumably have accepted that building multilateral consensus for such a radical policy might require a gradual approach at the SC involving several new resolutions over a number of months. Furthermore, he should have been willing to offer significant inducements to other SC members, involving logrolling and financial side-payments, rather than merely exerting diplomatic pressure. Finally, Bush and his senior advisers should have made the effort to personally travel to the capitals of reluctant Council members, offering at least verbal assurances that they took seriously the concerns of foreign leaders. Instead, as this article will demonstrate, the U.S. president and most
of his senior advisers were disinclined to compromise or reach out to international partners at the SC from the outset, becoming increasingly dismissive of the UN track by the end of 2002.

Part One of the article briefly discusses how the heightened threat perception after 9/11 and the expectation of a limited U.S. commitment in Iraq reduced incentives to multilateralize the use of force. Part Two examines the UN negotiations in the fall of 2002 that yielded Resolution 1441 and explains why, despite strong reservations, President Bush subsequently agreed to seek another resolution explicitly authorizing the use of force. Part Three reconstructs the effort in February and early March 2003 to politically isolate France by securing a nine-member SC majority in favor of military action. Part Four discusses Chirac’s veto threat. Part Five examines the last-minute benchmarks proposal, and Part Six explains why the benchmarks, with American support, could realistically have yielded UN approval for the use of force.

WASHINGTON’S LIMITED INTEREST IN UN SUPPORT

After the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the United States and its partners imposed stringent economic sanctions on Iraq through the UNSC and established a UN inspections regime aimed at identifying and destroying Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In subsequent years, U.S. officials grew increasingly frustrated at Iraq’s lack of wholehearted cooperation. They gradually became convinced that a normalization of diplomatic relations with Iraq would be impossible so long as Saddam Hussein remained in power.13 By the fall of 1998, President William J. Clinton formally endorsed the goal of regime change in Baghdad: under pressure from Congress, he adopted the Iraq Liberation Act, which elevated regime change into an official U.S. policy goal and authorized $97 million to provide military support to the Iraqi opposition.14 However, even though the Clinton administration undertook
significant bombing raids against Iraq, most notably in December 1998 (Operation Desert Fox), it never seriously considered a full military invasion, partially because of concerns about the cost.¹⁵

Soon after President George W. Bush took office in January 2001, some of his administration’s most hawkish officials—particularly Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Lewis “Scooter” Libby, the national security adviser to Vice President Richard Cheney—began to argue in the intramural debates that Saddam Hussein’s regime ought to be forcibly removed.¹⁶ Initially, those neoconservative hawks were unable to convince the administration that regime change in Iraq ought to be a U.S. priority, but after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, they found themselves suddenly empowered.¹⁷ The new sense of urgency after 9/11 regarding the need to confront Iraq’s putative WMD proliferation, combined with the expectation that regime change in Iraq could be implemented at little cost to the United States, reduced incentives for U.S. officials to seek multilateral backing for the use of force.

As Sarah Kreps has argued, two factors determine how much the United States values multilateral approval for military intervention. First, its time horizon, as determined by the overall sense of urgency, and second, the anticipated operational commitment, “which refers to the level of resources directed toward the particular intervention.”¹⁸ When time horizons are long, reflecting low urgency, and the United States anticipates a significant operational commitment, multilateralism will seem attractive “as a way to reassure other states [and] share… costly burdens.” Conversely, if time horizons are short, reflecting a strong sense of urgency (based on the perception that important American interests are threatened), and the United States “thinks it can win quickly or on the cheap,… there will be fewer incentives to aggregate resources” and a unilateral course of action is more likely.¹⁹
Disarmament Through Regime Change: Urgent And Easy

In a climate of deep uncertainty regarding Iraq’s illicit weapons programs (Saddam had ceased all cooperation with the UN inspectors after the Desert Fox airstrikes of 1998), U.S. officials widely believed that Iraq had resumed its WMD development. America’s heightened sense of vulnerability after 9/11 significantly lowered its threshold of tolerance for Iraq’s putative WMD proliferation. Vice-President Cheney, emphasizing the possibility of a “nexus” between Iraq’s WMD and radical Islamic terrorism, declared on 26 August 2002 that “containment is not possible when dictators obtain weapons of mass destruction, and are prepared to share them with terrorists.” The vice president, like several of the administration’s other hardliners, probably to some extent engaged in threat inflation to build up public support for the war. Richard Haass, who as the State Department’s head of policy planning had access to much of the intelligence on Iraq, writes that “the vice president’s speech [of August 26] badly overstated the Iraqi threat.” Yet in private conversations, too, Cheney and other hawkish officials seemed convinced that the threat stemming from Iraq’s presumed WMD proliferation was mortal and real.

The prevailing view among the administration’s chief advocates of military action, notably Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and several of their subordinates, was that eliminating the Iraqi threat at its roots would require a preventive war aimed at forcibly changing the country’s political regime. The problem needed to be dealt with sooner rather than later, which left little room for consensus building with international partners at the United Nations. The argument was fleshed out in August 2002 in a secret memo authored by Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith: in a world where hostile states might covertly use terrorist groups to deliver WMD “in an unattributable, and hence undeterrible, manner,” the United States should not have to wait until it is attacked before launching preventative military action in self-defense, nor should it feel constrained “by a requirement for
international approval of some kind (e.g., from the UN).” The 2002 National Security Strategy then elevated the possibility of unilateral “preemption” to the level of official U.S. government doctrine. 

Furthermore, the administration’s most committed Iraq hawks, particularly Wolfowitz and his collaborators, believed that toppling Saddam Hussein and stabilizing the country would be relatively easy—a “cakewalk,” in the words of the neoconservative political commentator Kenneth Adelman. The highly optimistic assumptions that came to inform U.S. policy on Iraq were that American troops would be welcomed as liberators, the country’s administrative and security apparatus would remain largely intact, and the limited postwar reconstruction that might be necessary could for the most part be financed through sales of Iraqi oil. The belief that a protracted stabilization mission would be unnecessary in Iraq further reduced any incentive to secure UN approval as a means of legitimating the war and facilitating sustained international burden sharing. As a former senior U.S. official who played a key role in international coalition management on Iraq explains, the war advocates “didn’t have an extended stabilization period in mind, so they didn’t make the argument, we need UN approval because that’s the only way to durably hold the allies.”

Finally, the administration’s relentless insistence after 9/11 that Iraq constituted a serious threat to American security prompted Congress to adopt a joint resolution providing the president with wide-ranging authority to use military force against Iraq already in October 2002 (when the UN negotiations had just begun). Consequently, U.S. policymakers felt little need to work hard to secure UN approval as a means of bolstering domestic support for the use of force. As Marc Grossman, at the time a senior State Department official, explains while discussing the Iraq War, “The United Nations is not a domestic political factor here.” Stephen Hadley, then the deputy U.S. national security adviser, confirms that the administration “didn’t [feel it needed to] seek
support from the UN instrumentally in order to deal with the domestic problem, because domestic support really was not a problem.”

Powell’s Call for UN Involvement

The Bush administration’s choice to nevertheless involve the UNSC over Iraq in the fall of 2002 was largely the result of Secretary of State Colin Powell’s personal insistence. Powell and his deputy, Richard Armitage, disagreed with those, like Cheney and Rumsfeld, who viewed the Iraqi regime as an imminent threat to U.S. national security requiring urgent military action. Furthermore, beginning in the spring of 2002, the State Department organized several policy workshops with regional experts and Iraqi exiles as part of its “Future of Iraq” project, which made the senior diplomats extremely concerned about the costs of postwar stabilization. Consequently, Armitage remembers, in the summer of 2002 the State Department recommended that the administration build up multilateral support through the UN in order to “get friends and allies on board should [the United States] have to go to war, to help with the burden.” Powell himself made a passionate plea to the president for seeking UN approval during a private conversation on 5 August: “I told the president that when we break this we’re going to own it, and when the government falls [in Iraq] we’re going to be the government, and you may not want to be the government of this country—so let’s try to get the UN resolution.”

British Prime Minister Tony Blair also repeatedly urged President Bush to seek UN approval before invading Iraq. Blair and his advisers felt that they needed UN approval to satisfy a skeptical British Labour Party and domestic public opinion. Yet among the president’s top-level advisers in Washington, Powell’s was a lonely voice. Cheney and Rumsfeld strenuously objected to involving the United Nations, fearing that it would needlessly constrain the United States. “They fought us every inch, by every manner possible,” Armitage recalls. Nevertheless
the State Department, with Blair’s support, persuaded the president that he could not completely bypass the SC if he wanted to have at least the British and perhaps a few other allies on board. On 7 September, Bush decided that he would seek a UN resolution to bring the weapons inspectors back into Iraq and gain international support for an ultimatum threatening war.41

THE FRANCO-AMERICAN DISAGREEMENT ON “AUTOMATICITY”

President Bush heeded Powell’s advice to involve the United Nations in the summer of 2002, but he also seems to have agreed with Rumsfeld and Cheney that the UN process would be valuable only insofar as it could swiftly yield some support for military action at little cost to the United States.42 The SC negotiations on a new Iraq resolution began after Bush declared before the UN General Assembly on 12 September that he would “work with the UN Security Council for the necessary resolutions.”43 Britain’s permanent representative to the SC, an experienced multilateral negotiator, cautioned in a secret cable that Washington and London were “start[ing] from a point where the other 13 members of the Council will, at best, have serious doubts about the use of force”—which would make it difficult to garner “the necessary nine votes for an explicit pre-authorization of military action.”44 Nevertheless, the Bush administration decided to float a draft resolution on 26 September that presented Iraq with a set of stringent disarmament requirements and foresaw an automatic authorization of “all necessary means” in case of noncompliance. Predictably, the draft had only limited support at the SC, with France and Russia completely opposed and only five out of the Council’s fifteen members backing the proposal.45

By the end of September, it was clear that France would be the main obstacle to quick UN approval of military action. The view in Paris, shared by several of the Council’s nonpermanent members, was that the SC should adopt a tough resolution establishing a comprehensive new inspections regime aimed at disarming Iraq of whatever WMD it possessed, but the resolution
should not permit an “automatic” use of force in the event that Iraq failed to comply. In early October, President Chirac and Dominique de Villepin, his foreign minister, indicated in conversations with Bush and Powell that if after the adoption of such a first resolution, it came to a point where the UN inspectors reported that Iraq had blatantly failed to cooperate and a clear majority of the Council supported the use of force, France would not stand in the way of a second resolution authorizing military action. However, French authorities were adamant that the first resolution to be adopted by the Council should contain no automatic triggers. In case of a serious violation certified by the inspectors, the SC would have to meet again and decide on any further measures to be taken. The French called this a “two-step approach” (approche en deux temps). As a senior French diplomat who was involved in the negotiations recalls, “To us, it was a proliferation issue, and we did not exclude the use of force. But there was a sense that it should be used only if it was clearly shown that we had collectively tried the inspections route and it had failed.”

The Bush administration’s leading advocates of military action, irked by those difficulties, argued that Washington should force a vote on the 26 September draft and rapidly bring the UN process to a conclusion. Wolfowitz, in particular, insisted during a meeting of the National Security Council on 15 October that “there are worse things than having our… draft defeated or vetoed by France.” British authorities, however, worried that a defeated UN resolution would be politically disastrous and eventually made it clear that they, too, deemed the initial U.S. draft unacceptable. Hence after mid-October 2002, the United States moved away from its request of an automatic authorization of military action. The next draft circulated on 21 October merely contained a warning of “serious consequences” should Iraq fail to cooperate. Over the following two weeks, Washington, London, and Paris negotiated a compromise text, and with all
three of them finally pulling in the same direction, on 8 November the SC adopted Resolution 1441 by a unanimous vote of 15-0.\textsuperscript{52}

Resolution 1441 offered Iraq a “final opportunity” to comply with its disarmament obligations, established a new UN weapons inspections regime, and threatened “serious consequences” in case of Iraqi noncooperation. However, it did not explicitly authorize military action. As John Negroponte, the U.S. permanent representative to the SC, declared at the time, “this resolution contains no ‘hidden triggers’ and no ‘automaticity’ with respect to the use of force.”\textsuperscript{53} Michael Wood, the British Foreign Office’s legal adviser, similarly concluded in a confidential memo that Resolution 1441 “does not itself authorize the use of force, or revive the authorization of force given in SCR 678” [the 1990 Persian Gulf War resolution].\textsuperscript{54}

President Bush and his advisers nevertheless felt that with Resolution 1441 they had obtained what they needed in terms of legitimacy for military action. “We didn’t feel as though an additional resolution was necessary for a military operation,” explains a senior State Department official who was directly involved in negotiating 1441.\textsuperscript{55} The resolution’s text contained significant ambiguity. Paragraph four stated that any “failure by Iraq at any time to comply with” its disarmament obligations “will be reported to the Council for assessment,” and paragraph twelve further stated that upon receiving a report from the inspectors the SC would “convene immediately… in order to consider the situation.”\textsuperscript{56} However, there was no explicit mention that another vote by the SC would be necessary before taking military action.\textsuperscript{57} A former senior adviser to the British prime minister confirms that the Bush administration initially appeared to have “an absolute red line that there should be no second decision required by the UN Security Council”—the expectation in Washington was that 1441 would be sufficient “to broaden out the coalition, and to give… countries like the UK but also Australia and others the basis… to join any military action.”\textsuperscript{58}
However, the British government subsequently insisted on a second resolution explicitly authorizing the use of force. Prime Minister Blair had promised a skeptical British public that he would join the war only with UN approval, or in a situation “where there is an unreasonable veto put down.” Accordingly, when in mid-January 2003 the Americans made it clear to their allies that war had become inevitable, David Manning, Blair’s principal foreign policy adviser, told National Security Adviser Rice that the British needed, at a minimum, to make a serious effort to obtain a second UN resolution in order to be able to participate in military action. On 31 January, Blair then personally traveled to the White House to repeat that same point. Ultimately, Bush gave in to Blair’s request. But U.S. support for the effort to obtain another resolution was always limited. As Jeremy Greenstock, then the UK’s ambassador to the SC, explains, “the [British] prime minister persuaded the president that there should be at least American condonement of that attempt. We never got real American support in it.”

SEEKING A NINE-MEMBER MAJORITY

The UN weapons inspectors, headed by Swedish diplomat Hans Blix, reentered Iraq in late November 2002 and almost immediately began their work. Only weeks later, on 13 January 2003, Rice told her French counterpart, Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, that President Bush was unwilling to delay military action much longer. Thereupon French diplomats, including Gourdault-Montagne and Jean-David Levitte, the French ambassador to Washington, suggested that the United States refrain from coming back to the SC for a second resolution. They made it clear that Paris would then acquiesce in military action, whereas pushing for a second UN resolution risked triggering a diplomatic showdown. On 20 January, Foreign Minister de Villepin publicly hinted during a press conference that, absent clear evidence from the inspectors
that Iraq had violated its disarmament obligations, Paris might veto a second resolution authorizing the use of force.  

Nevertheless, policymakers in Washington and London expected that if at least nine out of the Council’s fifteen members could be persuaded to vote in favor of such a resolution, then France (as well as Russia and China, who were aligned with Paris on this issue) would ultimately abstain, allowing the measure to be adopted. As a senior U.S. official who was involved in the UN negotiations remembers, “We thought the French did not have a strategic enough reason to veto. They might threaten to veto, but at the end of the day none of us really believed they would go that far.” Senior French diplomats in fact worried that casting a veto might irreparably harm France’s relationship with the United States, and declassified documents indicate that several of them strongly advised against such a move in private. Paris had not vetoed a SC resolution in opposition to either Washington or London since the late 1970s.

Out of the Council’s ten nonpermanent members, however, Washington and London could initially count only on Spain’s and Bulgaria’s support. Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar was firmly aligned with the United States, and Bulgaria was waiting to have its NATO accession ratified at the time, which gave Washington significant leverage over its foreign policy. Germany and Syria, by contrast, were firmly opposed. That put all the weight on the other six nonpermanent members, who remained uncommitted: Mexico, Chile, Pakistan, Angola, Cameroon, and Guinea. Those six countries were all skeptical of military action against Iraq, yet they were also concerned about alienating the United States.

Pressure Without Inducements

The United States, Britain, and Spain introduced a draft second resolution at the SC on 24 February 2003. The draft stated that Iraq had “failed to take the final opportunity afforded it in
Resolution 1441”—apparently following specific advice from the UK’s attorney general, who had earlier explained in a secret memo that such a phrase would be sufficient to authorize the use of force. Jean-Marc de La Sablière, France’s permanent representative to the SC at the time, confirms that the draft was interpreted by everyone on the Council as an attempt to authorize the “serious consequences” that had been threatened in Resolution 1441. The draft resolution’s sponsors were aiming for a vote on or around 7 March, which left them with roughly two weeks to generate the necessary nine-member majority.

In an effort to persuade the “undecided six” nonpermanent members to support the draft resolution authorizing military action, between the end of February and early March 2003, Washington and London applied significant last-minute diplomatic pressure. But the six remained uncommitted. Rice remembers that the Latin Americans, in particular, “were proving more difficult than we had expected.” Besides the highly controversial nature of the issue, that may have reflected the fact that Washington and London had engaged in only limited preparatory diplomacy and did not combine their pressure with significant positive inducements. “Contrast the way that the Bush administration handled the second UN resolution in 2003 with [Secretary of State] Jim Baker’s effort on the 1991 Gulf War,” Negroponte suggests, and it becomes clear that in 2003 the president and his principal advisers “didn’t really focus much on diplomacy with the other Security Council members leading up to the war.”

In 1990-91, the U.S. president had been deeply involved in a months-long diplomatic effort to secure UN approval, personally traveling to several foreign capitals, while Secretary Baker visited twelve countries on five continents, offering inducements amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars. By contrast, in early 2003, President Bush only called Vicente Fox and Ricardo Lagos, respectively his Mexican and Chilean counterparts, on the telephone, warning them that bilateral relations were at stake and reportedly threatening trade reprisals. President
Fox sought concessions from Washington to help him “sell” a possible compromise to his own domestic audience, and he thus linked Mexico’s cooperation on Iraq to progress on a new immigration agreement with the United States. Bush, however, rejected such a bargain. In his memoirs, Fox candidly remembers that although Washington was wooing Mexico’s vote, “the United States didn’t have much to offer in the way of carrots to Mexico.” Indeed, the Bush administration appears to have offered more substantial economic carrots to recruit its informal coalition of the willing after the invasion than it did to secure UN approval beforehand.

**Anglo-American Dissension**

On 7 March, in an attempt to break the impasse, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw floated an amended draft resolution with a final ten-day deadline for Iraq’s complete disarmament. The amended draft foresaw an automatic authorization of the use of force after expiration of the deadline, *unless* the Council concluded on or before that date that Iraq had “demonstrated full, unconditional, immediate and active cooperation.” Although the proposed resolution foresaw no immediate authorization of military action, it would have established a mechanism according to which only an affirmative SC vote certifying Iraq’s full cooperation could subsequently have prevented the use-of-force authorization from taking effect. The goal of this intricate mechanism seems to have been to take some pressure off the nonpermanent members, since it was possible to argue, disingenuously, that the Council would technically decide on the use of force only after expiration of the deadline. (The uncommitted six could simply have abstained on the final vote after the deadline, assuming there was even going to be one, thus making it impossible for a resolution certifying Iraq’s full cooperation to reach the necessary nine-member majority—without considering the possibility of a British or American veto).
The uncommitted six showed considerable interest in the amended draft and were willing to negotiate with Washington and London on that basis. According to American diplomats, initially as many as five out of the uncommitted six were leaning toward the U.S.-UK position.\textsuperscript{89} French diplomats, declassified cables indicate, seriously worried after the revised draft was circulated that the balance at the SC might irrevocably be shifting to their disadvantage.\textsuperscript{90} Fox and Lagos declared themselves ready to find a compromise based on the 7 March draft—provided that the final deadline was extended by a few weeks and the Council agreed on specific benchmarks against which Iraq’s compliance could more clearly be measured.\textsuperscript{91} The three African members of the SC—Angola, Cameroon, and Guinea—were reportedly even more supportive. Walter Kansteiner, who in early March met with the leaders of each of those countries as the assistant secretary of state for Africa, is confident that “if it had gone to a vote, we would have gotten all three.”\textsuperscript{92} On 9 March, French Foreign Minister de Villepin personally traveled to the three African countries to meet those same leaders, seeking to persuade them to resist Washington’s entreaties, but his trip only increased the perception in Paris that the Africans were now tilting toward the U.S.-UK position.\textsuperscript{93}

Senior U.S. officials, including Powell, were willing to take the amended draft resolution to a vote almost immediately after 7 March. British authorities, however, were more reluctant.\textsuperscript{94} London first wanted to obtain more concrete assurances that \textit{all} of the uncommitted six were on board. As Greenstock explains, “the whole concept of the use of force was quite unpopular in the domestic opinion of Pakistan, Chile, and Mexico. So we were going for ten, we wanted all six of the middle ground states to be with us.”\textsuperscript{95} The Bush administration did not feel that a second resolution was necessary, and perhaps as a consequence it was willing to take greater risks. Britain’s former foreign secretary Straw recalls that, during the effort to obtain a second UN resolution, “parts of the U.S. government weren’t bothered about securing a consensus in the
Security Council. If the other members of the Council supported it, fine; if they vetoed it, fine too.”

The window of opportunity to secure a nine-member majority supporting a second UN resolution with an explicit ultimatum closed again within a matter of two or three days, as the negotiations became bogged down around the issue of extending the final deadline. A senior U.S. diplomat who was involved in the negotiations believes that the chance had already evaporated by the time Chirac issued his veto threat on 10 March. “Frankly, by that moment we had already lost the momentum that we had.” Greenstock agrees: “The fact was that they [the uncommitted six] felt that the Americans were rushing it beyond the logic of the situation. So in the end, they started to march backwards and moved away from what they were being asked to do. The Africans, too, fell away. And that movement was accentuated when the French said they were going to veto.”

CHIRAC’S VETO THREAT

On 10 March 2003 President Chirac declared in an interview broadcast live on French national television that France would veto the latest draft UN resolution containing an explicit ultimatum “whatever the circumstances” (quelles que soient les circonstances). From Chirac’s previous statements in the interview it is clear that the circumstances he had in mind were the precise number of nonpermanent members that might vote for the specific draft then on the table. In other words, he threatened to veto the latest draft resolution, regardless of how many other SC members supported it. The relevant sentences from Chirac’s interview read as follows:

France will oppose that resolution. Now what does that mean? … The first scenario, which is today, this evening, the most probable, is that this resolution won’t get a majority of nine members…Then, the second scenario: what I believe this evening to be the views of a number of people change. If this happens, there may indeed be a majority of nine votes or more in favor of the new resolution, the one authorizing war,
to put things simply. If that happens, France will vote “no.” … My position is that, regardless of the circumstances, France will vote “no.”

However, Chirac left open the possibility that France might support, or at least abstain on, a different SC resolution authorizing military action down the road. In his interview, the French president explained that should a situation arise where the UN inspectors informed the SC that “the progress isn’t sufficient… [and] we won’t be able to guarantee Iraq’s disarmament… in that case, of course, regrettably, the war would become inevitable.” British and American officials understood that Chirac meant he would veto the draft resolution on the table but was not necessarily closed to the idea of abstaining on, or even supporting, a different resolution without an ultimatum, based on specific benchmarks and a longer timeframe for Iraq’s compliance.

Indeed, shortly after Chirac’s interview, French Foreign Minister de Villepin telephoned Straw, his counterpart in London, to clarify that France remained open to supporting such an alternative resolution with a longer timeframe of at least three weeks.

For Chirac, the veto threat was partially a matter of principle. The SC, a symbol of France’s continuing relevance on the world political stage, should not rubberstamp what he believed would be an illegitimate war dictated by a “Manichean logic.” Furthermore, Chirac viewed the veto threat as politically expedient. The war was deeply unpopular with European publics and French Muslims in particular, and the veto threat might conceivably improve France’s standing in the global South—especially the Arab world. Finally, there was a tactical dimension involved. Chirac and his advisers had concluded that by making the veto threat explicit, they could take some pressure off the Council’s nonpermanent members, thereby making it less likely that Washington and London could achieve a nine-member majority. La Sablière, then France’s ambassador to the SC, recalls that at the end of February his Chilean and Mexican counterparts had told him, “the Americans are saying that you will abstain.” When he
sought to reassure them that France would veto the draft resolution under discussion, they asked, “well, could you make it public?” Chirac confirms in his memoir that he felt he “needed to reaffirm our position publicly in order to reassure the Chilean and Mexican presidents.”

After 10 March, the adoption of a second resolution with an ultimatum foreseeing an automatic authorization of force in case of Iraqi noncompliance was probably no longer feasible. The uncommitted six, with political cover from France, could now more openly resist the pressure from Washington and London to vote in favor of such a resolution. In this sense, Chirac’s veto threat indeed “changed the game.” However, even after Chirac’s veto threat, an alternative approach involving what became known as the “benchmarks proposal” would have stood a good chance of breaking the impasse at the SC. A two-step process would have been necessary for this approach to ultimately yield UN approval of the use of force. First, the SC would have had to adopt a second resolution containing a list of benchmarks as well as a deadline for Iraq’s compliance. Second, after the deadline expired and the weapons inspectors issued their final report, the SC would have had to adopt a further resolution, acknowledging Iraq’s failure to comply with the benchmarks and thereby authorizing the use of force.

THE LAST-MINUTE BENCHMARKS PROPOSAL

In the days between 8 March (thus starting before Chirac’s interview) and 16 March (when Bush informed Blair that the UN process should be abandoned), Greenstock launched a final effort to find a compromise agreement with the Council’s uncommitted six. Together with Blix and Juan Gabriel Valdés, Chile’s UN ambassador who informally represented the six, Greenstock worked out a list of five demanding benchmarks that Iraq would have to meet and which he proposed for inclusion in the second UN resolution. The list, circulated to the entire SC on 12 March, included: (1) allow thirty Iraqi scientists identified by the UN inspectors to travel abroad
for interviews, together with their families; (2) hand over all unaccounted stores of anthrax, nerve gas, and mustard gas, or provide evidence of their destruction; (3) destroy all remaining “Al Samoud” ballistic missiles; (4) surrender all mobile production laboratories for biological and chemical weapons; (5) account for all unmanned aerial vehicles and remotely piloted vehicles.\textsuperscript{110}

The Bush administration, however, showed little interest in the benchmarks proposal. “By then, our minds were on other things,” explains Negroponte.\textsuperscript{111} Blair recalls in his memoirs that “it was indeed a hard sell to George [Bush]. His system was completely against it.”\textsuperscript{112} Ultimately, the Bush administration reluctantly allowed the British to move ahead with the proposal. But the administration made it clear that the benchmarks resolution needed to be adopted within the next few days, and Iraq should be given no more than a single week to demonstrate its compliance — hence the final deadline had to be 21 March, or 24 March at the very latest.\textsuperscript{113} Furthermore, U.S. authorities were opposed to any resolution without an ultimatum that would have automatically authorized the use of force, after the deadline expired, unless the SC concluded by then that Iraq was fully cooperating.\textsuperscript{114} In short, Bush consented to add some benchmarks to the 7 March draft and extend the deadline by a few days, but he was unwilling to go further. The benchmarks proposal circulated by Greenstock on 12 March reflected those American requests, and thus still included an ultimatum authorizing the use of force in case of Iraqi noncompliance.\textsuperscript{115}

The uncommitted six, for their part, were sympathetic to the benchmarks proposal but insisted on a longer timeline of thirty to forty-five days. “The biggest point of diversion was the timetable imposed upon Iraq for compliance,” remembers Lagos, the former Chilean president.\textsuperscript{116} Furthermore, the six requested that the benchmarks resolution entail no ultimatum or “automaticity.” After expiration of the deadline, the SC should assess Iraq’s implementation of the benchmarks, based on a report from the inspectors, and only in case of certified noncompliance it would then authorize military action.\textsuperscript{117}
On Friday, 14 March Chile circulated a revised proposal, containing almost exactly the same benchmarks as Greenstock’s original list, including the requirements that thirty Iraqi scientists be allowed to travel abroad for interviews and that all alleged stores of anthrax and mustard gas be fully accounted for. But unlike the earlier British proposal, this revised text foresaw no automatic authorization of military action. Chile suggested that the timeline for Iraq’s compliance should be extended from seven to thirty days. Canada, which without being a member of the SC at the time was actively involved in trying to broker a compromise, had earlier suggested a deadline of 15 April, which came down to roughly the same. Others among the undecided six requested a somewhat longer timeline of forty-five days. Although the six still disagreed about the exact timeframe, however, the 14 March draft, with the ultimate deadline left blank, was presented as a joint initiative of all the hitherto undecided countries. Former Chilean President Lagos confirms that he “had six votes—the entire swing vote of the SC.”

Blair pleaded with President Bush to extend the deadline, and Greenstock declared at the time that if he got “traction” on his benchmarks proposal, Britain might consider dropping the operative paragraph that foresaw an automatic authorization of force in case of Iraqi noncompliance. But Washington was unwilling to compromise either on automaticity or on the one-week deadline. “What we weren’t seeing,” recalls a former senior British diplomat, “was serious American engagement in the negotiation in trying to find a formula that would work.” White House Spokesman Ari Fleischer dismissed proposals to push back the deadline by thirty days as “a non-starter.” Greenstock himself explains the ultimate failure of the benchmarks proposal as follows:

The middle ground six, the Africans, the Pakistanis, and the Latin Americans, went along tentatively with the idea of setting benchmarks. But they wanted to stipulate a much greater length of time for Saddam to meet those benchmarks than the Americans were prepared to concede. They [the six] stipulated forty-five days to me, and we couldn’t bridge the gap between one week and forty-five days.
Had the United States supported a benchmarks resolution along the lines of the 14 March Chilean draft, it would most likely have been adopted by the SC. France, while skeptical, would almost certainly have gone along with the proposal. La Sablière, then France’s ambassador to the SC, explains that he “didn’t like the benchmarks approach,” because he understood that the benchmarks would have been difficult to meet and could have generated new momentum in favor of UN approval for the use of force—consequently, when he “found out that Greenstock’s negotiations with the six had failed, [he] was relieved.” If Washington had endorsed the Chilean benchmarks proposal, it would have enjoyed a 10-member majority at the Council, making a French veto extremely unlikely. Indeed, on 13 March, French authorities publicly declared that while they couldn’t support Greenstock’s 12 March proposal, a compromise might be reached on benchmarks, by introducing a longer timeline and removing any reference to automaticity—which is precisely what the Chilean proposal of 14 March attempted to do. As a senior French diplomat who was involved in the negotiations explains, “whether we were going to accept it [the Chilean proposal] sincerely or because we had no other choice, that’s another question. But I think we would have accepted it.”

Russia, which had earlier teamed up with the French in opposing previous draft resolutions intended to authorize the use of force, was also very unlikely to veto the 14 March benchmarks proposal, given that the Russians had been the first to suggest a benchmarks approach to Blix back in February. Therefore, had the Bush administration accepted the Chilean proposal of 14 March (Blair was reportedly supportive), the resolution could in all likelihood have been adopted either on that same day, or by the following Monday, 17 March.
THE PROBABILITY OF A FRENCH ABSTENTION ON THE USE OF FORCE

A benchmarks resolution along the lines of the Chilean proposal would have entailed no ultimatum—consequently, it would not in itself have authorized the use of force in case of Iraqi noncompliance. For the use of force to be authorized at the end of the thirty- or forty-five day period, the following conditions would have had to be met. First, after expiration of the deadline, the UN inspectors would have had to report to the SC that Iraq had failed to meet several of the benchmarks. Second, the previously uncommitted nonpermanent members would have had to support a third resolution acknowledging Iraq’s noncompliance, which (similarly to what Britain had aimed for in its 24 February draft) would have authorized the “serious consequences” threatened in Resolution 1441. Finally, the Council’s other veto-wielding permanent members, including France, would have had to support that resolution or at least abstain.

With hindsight, it would have been next to impossible for Iraq to meet several of the benchmarks. Baghdad could hardly have accounted for its outstanding anthrax and mustard gas stores, given that the relevant documentation had probably been destroyed years earlier, and even following the invasion no usable WMDs were found inside Iraq. Furthermore, Iraqi scientists interviewed abroad could have told indicting stories of Saddam’s attempts to deceive the international community about his WMD programs, which might have convinced the inspectors that Iraq was not fully cooperating as required. Former chief UN inspector Blix, reflecting on the benchmarks, declared in 2010 that “they didn’t have the anthrax… So I doubt very much they would have [been able to] fulfill that condition…. The other one was the mobile biology laboratories. They didn’t exist… They didn’t have them, so how could they have complied with that?” Already during the negotiations in the spring of 2003, Blix, who supported the benchmarks approach, had serious doubts about Iraq’s ability to comply, and his views were certainly known to the United States, Britain, and the other permanent members of the SC.
It appears likely that a report by the UN inspectors in mid- to late April concluding that Iraq had failed to meet several of the benchmarks would finally have tilted the balance at the SC in favor of military action. For further insights regarding the odds of such an outcome, it is worth taking a closer look at the available evidence as to what the “undecided six” were in fact willing to support. The 14 March Chilean draft resolution, supported by all the six, listed the benchmarks and then foresaw that “upon expiry of the period [that is, either thirty or forty-five days], the inspectors will present a factual and detailed report… The Council will then assess the situation and decide the continuation of the inspections process… or apply the appropriate relevant paragraph of 1441.” Hence the six were in fact willing to accept a process which, in case the inspectors certified Iraq’s failure to comply with the benchmarks, all but committed them to authorizing the “serious consequences” threatened in Resolution 1441.

In short, the benchmarks approach, if supported by Washington, could have moved the Council’s nonpermanent members out of France’s orbit, thereby isolating France and increasing the political cost to Chirac of continued opposition. Asked about the chances of a use-of-force resolution being adopted on the basis of the benchmarks approach, Matthew Rycroft, then the private secretary for foreign affairs to the British prime minister, told the UK Iraq Inquiry: “As we were going into what turned out to be the end game in terms of strategy to secure the Mexican and Chilean votes, I remember… We did have four in the bag, but we had at that point a reasonable chance of securing a further six if we did all of this… clusters [that is, benchmarks] stuff with Mexico and Chile.”

In the face of a nine- or ten-member majority at the Security Council supporting a resolution acknowledging Iraq’s failure to comply with the benchmarks, a French abstention would have been the most probable outcome. Javier Solana, who as the EU’s high representative for foreign and security policy at the time was engaged in an ongoing dialogue with heads of state
on both sides of the Atlantic, is convinced of that: “The French were willing to get out of the mess, there’s no doubt about that. But the impression was that the Americans were very decided.” Declassified French documents confirm that by early 2003 Chirac’s leading diplomatic advisers, including Foreign Minister de Villepin, were insisting that in case of Iraqi noncompliance certified by the inspectors, Paris should not oppose the use of force.

It is worth emphasizing that the counterfactual presented here is compatible with the evidence that France opposed a second SC resolution (including a benchmarks resolution), with an explicit ultimatum automatically authorizing the use of force in case of Iraqi noncompliance. Blair subsequently declared before the UK Iraq Inquiry that France “would agree to a [benchmarks] resolution that didn’t have an ultimatum in it because that would then mean a further resolution afterwards.” What Blair, who has consistently defended his own policy choices at the time, fails to acknowledge is that the adoption of a benchmarks resolution along the lines of the 14 March Chilean proposal would have changed the dynamics at the SC in a way that would have been clearly unfavorable to those who opposed the use of force. French authorities were acutely aware of this risk – the benchmarks approach, writes La Sablière, “could have engendered a real debate at the Council, putting [France] in difficulty.”

Although the evidence is not conclusive, then, it appears that what prevented UN support for the benchmarks and ultimately for the use of force was not so much principled opposition from France or any of the nonpermanent members, but rather the Bush administration’s unwillingness to compromise on automaticity and consider a longer timeframe for Iraq’s compliance. Greenstock essentially told the UK Iraq Inquiry as much: “the benchmarks [could have offered some] sort of escape route from what Chirac had said,… [however] the Americans were closed to compromise.” With Greenstock unable to offer meaningful concessions to the uncommitted six, the benchmarks negotiations had collapsed by the end of Friday, 14 March.
Five days later, Bush gave the order to execute Operation Iraqi Freedom, and soon thereafter the first U.S. special operations teams crossed into Iraq.145

Paradoxically, as former UK officials now acknowledge, the French veto threat of 10 March may have had its greatest impact in London, by helping the British government overcome its domestic political difficulties. “The Chirac statement fell into our laps,” acknowledges Matthew Rycroft, then the private secretary for foreign affairs to the British prime minister.146 In particular, it allowed Blair to claim that he was living up to his pledge not to go to war without UN approval, unless an “unreasonable veto” made that impossible.147 Greenstock wrote in a diplomatic cable at the time that he had agreed “with Negroponte… that we will tell the press… that we have concluded that there is no prospect of putting our resolution to the vote, casting heavy blame on the French.”148 On 18 March, during a crucial House of Commons debate on Britain’s participation in the war, Blair insisted that “what is surely unreasonable is for a country… to say that it will veto such a resolution in all circumstances.” A majority of British MPs apparently agreed, repeatedly referencing the French veto threat in their remarks and ultimately endorsing Britain’s participation in the Iraq War by a 412 to 149 majority.149

CONCLUSION: WHY BUSH WAS UNWILLING TO WAIT

The available evidence indicates that even after Chirac’s veto threat, the Bush administration would have stood a good chance of securing UN approval for the Iraq War within a matter of weeks and without fundamentally changing its policy, had it been willing to postpone the start of military operations, endorse specific benchmarks for Iraq’s compliance, and abandon its insistence that the second resolution ought to preauthorize military action. The American president, however, was unwilling to make even tactical concessions to his SC partners and deviate from a timetable for war set months in advance.150
It appears that the decision to start the war in March 2003, as opposed to postponing the commencement of hostilities by six weeks or so to accommodate other Council members, was based on a fairly straightforward cost-benefit analysis in Washington. By early March, a full 55 percent of Americans supported a U.S. invasion of Iraq, even if it was in defiance of a vote of the SC.\textsuperscript{151} With strong domestic support for military action and most senior administration officials expecting that toppling Saddam and stabilizing Iraq would be easy, President Bush saw little reason to engage in further taxing UN negotiations – especially since there could be no certainty about the final outcome. (Indeed, the outcome must have appeared all the more uncertain because, back then, Bush could not know that Iraq would most likely have failed to meet several of the benchmarks). Furthermore, by waiting much longer, the president risked appearing indecisive vis-à-vis an opponent that he and his administration had increasingly portrayed as a vital, imminent threat to the United States. “We were so leaning forward,” Armitage explains, before adding, “The momentum that had built in the administration didn’t favor waiting at all.”\textsuperscript{152}

Some analysts have suggested that the American military pushed the Bush administration to go to war by March 2003, because U.S. forces would have been incapable of fighting in the Iraqi summer heat.\textsuperscript{153} However, General John Abizaid, who by early 2003 was deputy commander of CENTCOM, the U.S. command responsible for military operations in Iraq, rejects this interpretation. He and other senior military officers, he insists, made it clear to their political superiors that U.S. forces could avoid the summer heat by fighting at night. “It would have been a problem, but it was not an insurmountable problem,” Abizaid explains. “I believe it was not a military decision, it was a political decision, and then some of the political leadership came up with this idea that it couldn’t be done later. Of course it could be done. It could be done anytime. I didn’t feel any great pressure from our military commanders on the ground.”\textsuperscript{154} British policymakers received similar advice from their Chiefs of Staff: coalition troops could stay
deployed for another several months if needed before launching military operations, and fighting in the summer would be a manageable problem.\textsuperscript{155}

Assuming that the Bush administration had behaved differently, I have argued, it would have stood a good chance of securing UN approval for the Iraq War. Some may view the assumption as unrealistic, since it might have required a different president with less hawkish advisers. However, the counterfactual developed here is based primarily on what would have been possible in light of the available evidence about the negotiating stances of the other SC members, notably France and the uncommitted six. At stake is ultimately the war’s legitimacy. Contemporary international legitimacy norms require that “in situations other than self-defense, decisions to use force must be made multilaterally” – either through the UN Security Council or through regional multilateral bodies like NATO.\textsuperscript{156} Those who argue that Chirac’s grandstanding and his veto threat were the primary, and perhaps only, reason why Washington and London failed to secure UN approval at least implicitly seek to weaken criticisms of the Iraq War as illegitimate.

Perhaps a better strategic assessment on the part of U.S. leaders, resulting in a fuller appreciation of the war’s likely costs and the damage to America’s standing from an invasion widely perceived as a unilateral act of aggression, would have been sufficient to persuade the Bush administration of the value of a more determined effort to secure UN approval. As former U.S. intelligence officer Paul Pillar has written, “Assume that the Bush administration and the American people anticipated the costly mess that would follow a toppling of Saddam… Under those assumptions, it is highly unlikely that the administration would have proceeded with its plan for war and inconceivable that Congress and the American people would have gone along if it had.”\textsuperscript{157} At the very least, Congress and the American people would have viewed UN support
and broader international backing as all but essential before embarking on such a high-stakes mission.

After the 2003 invasion, faced with a rapidly deteriorating security situation and looming humanitarian disaster, the SC went back to cooperating on Iraq in a newfound spirit of pragmatism. Resolution 1511, adopted on 16 October 2003, authorized a “multinational force under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability,” and “urge[d] Member States to contribute assistance, including military forces, to the multinational force.” However, since the U.S. invasion, launched without UN approval, continued to be viewed as illegitimate by large portions of the world’s population, foreign leaders, even those closely aligned with the United States on other issues, were reluctant to meaningfully share in the burden of postwar stabilization. Many countries that did contribute troops to the initial stabilization phase withdrew them again by late 2004, under strong domestic political pressure. Although full UN-backing for the war might have done little to prevent the subsequent complete breakdown of public order in Iraq, it would probably have allowed the United States to form a more substantial international coalition that could have helped it share the longer-term burden as well as the blame for what went wrong.*

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3 See “France to blame for failure of UN, says Straw,” Daily Mail (London), March 18, 2003; and “Dealing with the foot-draggers: blame, aim, fire,” The Economist, 1 May 2003.
6 Tetlock and Belkin, Counterfactual Thought Experiments, 19-24; Levy, “Counterfactuals and Case Studies,” 627-644; and Lebow, Forbidden Fruit, 44-58.
12 Thompson, Channels of Power, 168, emphasis added.


Walter Slocombe (Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, 1994-2001), interview by author, 11 March 2010. Even Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, perhaps the Clinton administration’s leading hawk on Iraq, concedes that “no serious consideration was given to actually invading Iraq.” Madeleine Albright, *Madam Secretary* (New York: Miramax, 2003), 277.


Ibid., 35 and 33.


Kori Schake (Director for Defense Strategy and Requirements on the NSC staff, 2001-2005), interview by author, 21 January 2011. For a similar conclusion, see Kreps, *Coalitions of Convenience*, 130-133.


33 Stephen J. Hadley (Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 2001-2005), interview by author, 24 January 2011.


36 Armitage, interview. See also Haass, *War of Necessity, War of Choice*, 225; DeYoung, *Soldier*, 399-402.


42 Thompson, *Channels of Power*, 139-140.


47 La Sablière, *Dans les coulisses du monde*, 198, 201.


Paragraph eleven, introduced upon France’s request, indicated that only the UN inspectors, rather than individual member states, would be able to determine “any failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations,” which they would “report immediately to the Council.” See La Sablière, Dans les coulisses du monde, 204; Bozo, Histoire secrète de la crise irakienne, 166.

On this point, see Gordon and Shapiro, Allies at War, 111; La Sablière, Dans les coulisses du monde, 205.


Rice, No Higher Honor, 201.

Bush, Decision Points, 244; Woodward, Plan of Attack, 296-297; Gordon and Shapiro, Allies at War, 146-147


Chirac, My Life in Politics, 273. See also Nouzille, Secret Des Présidents, 395; Gordon and Shapiro, Allies at War, 119-120; Bozo, Histoire secrète de la crise irakienne, 215-219.

Author interview with French diplomat involved in the negotiations, 22 January 2011. See also Gordon and Shapiro, Allies at War, 148; Nouzille, Secret Des Présidents, 405; Bozo, Histoire secrète de la crise irakienne, 275-276.


Armitage, interview. See also Bush, Decision Points, 246.

Senior State Department official, interview by author, 1 June 2011.

Bozo, Histoire secrète de la crise irakienne, 159-160, 271-272. See also Chirac, My Life in Politics, 270; La Sablière, Dans les coulisses du monde, 225.


Jean-Marc de La Sablière, interview by author, 18 May 2011. See also Chirac, My Life in Politics, 279.

78 Colum Lynch, “U.S. Pushed Allies on Iraq,” Washington Post, 23 March 2008; Kampfner, Blair’s Wars, 275-276. For revealing accounts by, respectively, the Mexican and Chilean presidents at the time, see Vicente Fox, with Rob Allyn, La Revolución de la Esperanza: La vida, los anhelos, y los sueños de un presidente (Mexico City: Aguilar, 2008), 381-387; and Ricardo Lagos, The Southern Tiger: Chile’s Fight for a Democratic and Prosperous Future (New York: Palgrave, 2012), 200-241.

79 Rice, No Higher Honor, 202.


82 Lagos Southern Tiger, 219. See also Lynch, “U.S. Pushed Allies on Iraq.”


84 Fox, Revolución de la Esperanza, 382.


88 For a useful discussion of the 7 March draft, see Marc Weller, Iraq and the Use of Force in International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 178.

89 Senior State Department officials involved in the negotiations, interviews by author, 3 June and 12 June 2011.

90 Bozo, Histoire secrète de la crise irakienne, 287-289.

91 Lagos, Southern Tiger, 223-226; Bozo, Histoire secrète de la crise irakienne, 288. See also Gordon and Shapiro, Allies at War, 145-152; DeYoung, Soldier, 455.

92 Walter Kansteiner, interview by author, 18 January 2011.

93 Bozo, Histoire secrète de la crise irakienne, 289. See also La Sablière, Dans les coulisses du monde, 219; Chirac, My Life in Politics, 280.

94 Senior State Department officials involved in the negotiations, interviews by author, 1 June and 12 June 2011.

95 Jeremy Greenstock (Permanent Representative of the UK to the UNSC, 1998–2003), interview by author, 30 March 2011.

96 Straw, Last Man Standing, 378.

97 Senior State Department official, interview by author, 1 June 2011.

98 Greenstock, interview. See also Greenstock, Testimony before the UK Iraq Inquiry, 32.


100 Ibid.

101 Ibid.

102 Greenstock, Testimony before the UK Iraq Inquiry, 35.


104 Chirac, My Life in Politics, 274.

La Sablière, interview.


When Greenstock was asked during the UK Iraq Inquiry whether Chirac’s statement “changed the game,” he nodded affirmatively. Greenstock, Testimony before the UK Iraq Inquiry, 33-34.

On the specific dates, see Gordon and Shapiro, *Allies at War*, 151-154; La Sablière, *Dans les coulisses du monde*, 218-222.


Negroponte, interview.


Senior State Department official, interview by author, 1 June 2011. See also Lagos, *Southern Tiger*, 217.


For the full text of Chile’s 14 March proposal, see U.S. Mission to the UN, “UN/Iraq: Undecided Six Initiative Dead,” diplomatic cable, 14 March 2003, accessed at: https://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/03/03USUNNEWYORK707.html.

Lagos, *Southern Tiger*, 225. See also La Sablière, *Dans les coulisses du monde*, 222.

USUN, “Iraq/UNSC: Canada still working–at the highest levels–to ‘bridge the divide’,” diplomatic cable, 12 March 2003, accessed at: https://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/03/03OTTAWA692.html.


See USUN, “UN/Iraq: Undecided Six Initiative Dead.”


Quoted in MacAskill, Norton-Taylor, and Borger, “US may go it alone.”

Greenstock, interview.

La Sablière, interview.


Senior French diplomat involved in the negotiations, interview by author, 22 January 2011. See also La Sablière, *Dans les coulisses du monde*, 218, 228.
132 Blix, *Disarming Iraq*, 181.
137 Quoted in USUN, “UN/Iraq: Undecided Six Initiative Dead.”
138 Rycroft, Testimony before the UK Iraq Inquiry, 69, emphasis added. For a similar conclusion see also Manning, Testimony before the UK Iraq Inquiry, 86.
139 Javier Solana, interview by author, 24 March 2011. For a similar conclusion, see also Davidson, *America’s Allies and War*, 230, note 137.
140 See Bozo, *Histoire secrète de la crise irakienne*, 203-204.
141 Blair, Testimony before the UK Iraq Inquiry, 104.
142 La Sablière, *Dans les coulisses du monde*, 228.
143 Greenstock, Testimony before the UK Iraq Inquiry, 35.
144 USUN, “UN/Iraq: Undecided Six Initiative Dead.” See also Blix, *Disarming Iraq*, 248.
146 Rycroft, Testimony before the UK Iraq Inquiry, 76.
147 Straw, *Last Man Standing*, 389; Greenstock, Testimony before the UK Iraq Inquiry, 36-37, emphasis added.
151 Armitage, interview.
154 Straw, Testimony before the UK Iraq Inquiry, 75.
156 Pillar, *Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 78.