COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION AND RURAL POLITICS IN
SOUTH-CENTRAL GHANA, 1919-1951

A Dissertation submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of Cambridge (Faculty of History)

by

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Gonville and Caius College,
Cambridge.

June 1974.
'The smaller the society the more complex the issues: the hostilities and alignments in a parliament of six hundred are easier to follow than in a parish council of twenty.'

V.S. Naipaul, *The Mimic Men*. 
'The smaller the society the more complex the issues: the hostilities and alignments in a parliament of six hundred are easier to follow than in a parish council of twenty.'

V.S. Naipaul, The Mimic Men.
While undertaking the research for this dissertation I was a Research Student of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. From August 1970 to June 1972 I was affiliated as a Research Student to the University College of Cape Coast (later the University of Cape Coast), Ghana: I also spent some time as the guest of Legon Hall in the University of Ghana, Legon. I received much assistance and advice from the Social Studies Project at Cape Coast (a project jointly organized by the University of Cape Coast and the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, Netherlands). While writing this dissertation, from October 1973 to June 1974, I was a Junior Research Fellow of St John's College, Oxford. To all these institutions, their members and staff, I owe a great debt of gratitude.

An equal debt is owed to the staff of the archives and libraries where I have worked, for their patience and helpfulness. In particular I should like to thank the staff of the Ghana National Archives at Cape Coast and Accra, of the Public Record Office in London and of Rhodes House Library, Oxford.

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To those from whom I have received hospitality and advice, I offer my
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who have been particularly helpful, should be mentioned. Drs. D.M.
Dunham, of the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, Netherlands,
who was working with the Social Studies Project in Cape Coast during
the period of my stay in Ghana, is a geographer who is making a study
of settlement and marketing patterns in the Central Region of Ghana.
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region. Mr. Patrick Yalley of the University of Cape Coast, a member of
an old Central Region family, was responsible for arranging most of my
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to him for the trouble he took in arranging and attending these interviews,
and for allowing me to share some of his extensive knowledge of the customs
and history of the traditional states of the Central Region.

The sources for this dissertation are discussed in chapter 1 and
listed in the bibliography.

I declare that, apart from the assistance and advice acknowledged in
this preface, this dissertation is entirely my own work and includes
nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration with others.

R. L. Stone
30 June 1974
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ABBREVIATIONS

Acc.No. Accession number
ADM Administrative series in Ghana National Archives, Accra.
Ag Acting
A.R.P.S. Gold Coast Aborigines Rights Protection Society
Asst Assistant
BF Book file
C.C.C. Chief Commissioner of the Colony
C.C.P. Provincial Commissioner Central Province
C.E.P. Provincial Commissioner Eastern Province
C.O. Colonial Office
Col.Sec. Colonial Secretary
Conf.Desp. Confidential Despatch
C.P.P. Convention People's Party
CSO MP Colonial Secretary's Office Minute Paper (Ghana National Archives, Accra)
DAO Papers transferred from the District Administrative Office, Cape Coast to the Ghana National Archives, Cape Coast.
D.C. District Commissioner
DCS Deputy Colonial Secretary's Office Minute Paper (Ghana National Archives, Accra)
FCB Papers of the Fabian Colonial Bureau (Rhodes House Library, Oxford)
GNA-Accra Ghana National Archives, Accra
GNA-CC Ghana National Archives, Cape Coast
Gov. Governor
H.M.S.O. His Majesty's Stationary Office
PRO, CO Public Record Office, London, Colonial Office Papers
RH Rhodes House Library, Oxford (Papers deposited by the Oxford University Colonial Records Project)
S.N.A. Secretary for Native Affairs
S. of S. Secretary of State
S.P. Sessional Paper
U.G.C.C. United Gold Coast Convention
GLOSSARY OF FANTE MILITARY AND POLITICAL TERMS

The political organization of the Fante states is outlined in chapter 2. This glossary is not meant to be an exhaustive list of Fante military and political terms, but merely a convenient guide to the terms most frequently used in this study.

The sources for the glossary are,


J.B. Christensen Double Descent among the Fanti (New Haven, Human Relations Area Files, 1954).

Methodist Book Depot, Cape Coast, Nkasafua Nkyerkyermase, Fante-English Dictionary (Cape Coast, Methodist Book Depot, Cape Coast, n.d., anonymous).


I have generally adopted the orthography of Christaller and the Methodist Book Depot (see section 1.4 for comments on orthography).

Following the practice of Christaller and the Methodist Book Depot, I have listed the words according to the first letter of their roots. For ease of reference the prefix is separated from the root by a hyphen.

ababio Literally, 'he has come again': an appellation given to a chief who has been re-elected to a stool from which he had previously abdicated or been destooled.

benkum The left hand; the left wing of an army.

benkumhen The commander of the left wing (a divisional chief).

a-berantse (Pl. mberantseg) A young man, youth; a commoner, a person who is not a stool-holder.

a-busua (Pl. mbusua) Family, kindred, relatives, especially the relatives on the mother's side; one of the original families of the Akan people (descent being matrilineal); race, lineage, clan.

a-déhye Free-born person; royal, member of a royal abusua.

a-démeyëfo The opposition, the 'malcontents'; the faction or party opposed to the ruling chief.

a-dontsen The main body or the centre of an army.

a-dontsenhen The commander of the dontsen (a divisional chief, usually the senior divisional chief of a state).

a-dzekuro (Pl. adakurofo) Chief or headman of a single town or village.
gyase Literally, 'under the fire; the place where the hearth stands; the kitchen', the household, especially of a chief; the bodyguard of a chief. For a fuller description of the structure and role of the gyase, see footnote 21 to chapter 2.

gyasehen The commander of the gyase; the commander of the chief's bodyguard, of that section of the army which includes the chief and his stool.

ɔ-hen (Pl. ahemfo) A chief (used for all ranks of chief above that of ɔdzekuro, especially for chiefs who are members of the state council).

an-kɔbea The personal bodyguard of a chief (a section of the gyase). For a fuller description of the role of the ankɔbea, see footnote 21 to chapter 2.

an-kɔbeahen The head of the ankɔbea.

ɔ-ɔnɔnyin (Pl. mɔnyin or mɔnyinifo) An old person, an adult; an elder, a member of a council (the plural mɔnyin is usually used to mean 'old people' and mɔnyinifo to mean 'elders' or 'councillors').

ɔ-ɔnɔman (Pl. aman or amanaman) The political community, the body politic; the state; the people or their representatives assembled for public transactions.

ɔ-ɔnɔmanhen (Pl. amanhemfo) The head of a state, the paramount chief; a king.

nana (Pl. nanaanɔnom) Literally, 'grandfather (or grandson), or one of the grandfather's (or grandson's) generation'; a title given to chiefs and stool-holders.

n-kyidɔm The rearguard or reserve of an army.

n-kyidɔmhen The commander of the nkyidɔm (a divisional chief).

nyimfa The right hand; the right wing of an army.

nyimfa hen The commander of the right wing (a divisional chief).

a-safo (From 'sa' = war, 'fo' = people) The military organization of a state, usually consisting of from two to eleven asafo companies, membership of which is patrilineal; one such military company; the people of a state; troop, gang, band, army, community.

a-safo hen (Pl. asafchemfo) One of the commanders of an asafo company, usually ranking immediately below the supi (not usually a stool-holder).

supi (Pl. supifo) The commander of an asafo company (not usually a stool-holder).
tufohen

(From 'tu' = to throw, e.g. arrows, spears (later used to define firearms, hence 'atuo' = gun); 'fo' = people; 'hen' = head, chief) The commander of the fighting men, the field commander of an army; the head of all the asafo companies (in some states the tufohen is a stool-holder and divisional chief, but in most states he is neither).

twafo

Literally, 'the cutters'; the vanguard, the advance guard of an army.

twafohen

The commander of the twafo (a divisional chief).

werempe

The bodyguard of a chief (a section of the gyase), especially those who are responsible for guarding the regalia. For a fuller description of the role of the werempe, see footnote 21 to chapter 2.

werempehen

The head of the werempe.
1.1 The argument

There are three major themes which recur throughout this study and which, it is argued, represented the main determinants of the development of rural politics in South-Central Ghana between 1919 and 1951.

The first theme is the attempt by the colonial Government from about 1927 onwards to introduce an increasingly interventionist system of indirect rule. Before the 1920s the Government interfered very little in the administration of the traditional states. It concentrated on administration and development at the colonial level and left the day-to-day government of the states to the chiefs and state councils. Officials usually intervened in local affairs only in matters concerned with the administration of justice and the prevention or settlement of disputes which were likely to lead to a breach of the peace. After about 1927, however, the Government took a much greater interest in local administration and development. It attempted to extend its influence into the local political arenas and to incorporate the chiefs to a much greater extent in the machinery of colonial administration - to make them the agents of the colonial Government in the rural areas. The chiefs were given direct responsibility for the implementation of central Government policies at the local level and for the initiation of local development schemes under official supervision. The main result of this new approach was to increase the amount of interference by officials in the day-to-day affairs of the traditional states.

The second major theme is the transformation of factions within the states into 'parties'. Before the mid-1920s, political conflicts within the states were generally concerned with purely local issues and were fought in purely local terms. After the mid-1920s, however, colonial issues were introduced into the local political arenas and became the subject of disputes between local factions. Conflicts over colonial issues reinforced existing conflicts over local issues and gradually transformed factions into pro-
anti-Government 'parties' within each state. These parties usually had a somewhat more stable membership and a stronger commitment to general normative principles than the more impermanent, transactional factions of the earlier period.

The third major theme is the role in these developments of the educated elite in Cape Coast. It is argued that a certain section of the educated elite, led by Kobina Sekyi and the rump of the Aborigines Rights Protection Society, resented the new role of the chiefs, and the reduction of the influence of the educated elite, under the system of interventionist indirect rule. They therefore attempted to undermine the machinery of indirect rule, not only by petitions and propaganda at the colonial level, but also by sabotaging the implementation of the policy at the local level, within the traditional states. This they did by encouraging the formation and activities of the anti-Government parties within the states. Such parties would probably have arisen without the assistance of the A.R.P.S., but the A.R.P.S. helped to strengthen and co-ordinate their activities by providing legal and political advice and by promoting widespread local propaganda against such instruments of interventionist indirect rule as the Provincial Councils and the stool treasury system.

These developments were, of course, closely inter-related. The more the Government interfered with the day-to-day affairs of the states, the greater was the opposition of the anti-Government parties. This opposition hampered the implementation of Government policies, and the Government reacted by seeking to give its officials yet more power to control the activities of the chiefs and state councils and to force them to co-operate with the Government.

The period between the mid-1920s and 1951 was therefore characterized by a continuous and self-reinforcing hardening of attitudes. The more interventionist the Government's policy became, the more stubborn the opposition to indirect rule; the more stubborn the opposition to indirect rule became, the more interventionist the Government's policy.
These themes will be more fully developed in the course of this study. We shall confine ourselves here to giving a brief outline of the argument. In chapter 2 the main characteristics of the political organization of the Fante states are described. In chapter 3 an attempt is made to analyse the transformation of factions into parties within the states, and to explain in general terms how this transformation was related to the introduction of interventionist indirect rule and to the activities of the Cape Coast educated elite in the second quarter of the twentieth century.

The rest of the study consists of an historical account of the development of indirect rule policy in the Gold Coast Colony, and its impact on rural politics in South-Central Ghana. In chapter 4, after a brief description of the different types of indirect rule, an account is given of indirect rule policy in the Colony before 1927, in which it is demonstrated that this policy was largely non-interventionist, involving as it did comparatively little interference by the colonial Government in the day-to-day administration of the traditional states. The effects of this type of colonial administration on the politics of the rural areas of South-Central Ghana are discussed. During the administration of Sir Gordon Guggisberg (1919-27) the colonial Government made some moves towards the introduction of a more interventionist system, and these are described at the end of the chapter.

Chapter 5 begins with an account of the formulation of a fully-fledged policy of interventionist indirect rule during the administration of Sir Ransford Slater (1927-32). We outline the reasons for the hostility of Kobina Sekyi and the A.R.P.S. to this policy and the methods by which they opposed it. A detailed account is then given of the development, partly under the auspices of the A.R.P.S., of local opposition to the colonial Government and to pro-Government chiefs in three crucial areas of native administration policy - the Provincial Councils, stool treasuries and native tribunals. The cocoa hold-ups of 1930-31 and 1937-38 and their implications are discussed.
Finally, an attempt is made to account for the failure of official propaganda in the Central Province in the 1930s.

From 1936 to 1940 an extensive debate on indirect rule was conducted in the Colonial Office and in Accra, during which the Government came to adopt an even more severe interventionist policy than Slater had established and to advocate the further extension of the powers of administrative officers. This debate is described at the beginning of chapter 6. The main developments during the war years are then discussed: the continuing failure of stool treasuries and the lack of confidence of officials in the native authorities' ability to administer local development programmes; the increasing sense of isolation of the chiefs, which eventually drove them to accept greater control by the Government in return for the Government's support; and the passing of the Native Authority and Native Courts Ordinances in 1944.

Finally in chapter 7 the events leading to the abolition of indirect rule by the Local Government Ordinance of 1951 are described. The main themes discussed in this chapter are the effects of low morale and inadequate communications in the colonial service in the 1940s, the failure of the Native Authority Ordinance of 1944 to bring about any real change in the practice of indirect rule, the significance of the 1948 Riots, the rise of mass nationalism after 1948 and the final abolition of the indirect rule system in the Local Government Ordinance of 1951. In the last section of chapter 7 we indicate briefly some of the general conclusions which can be drawn from our analysis.

1.2 The setting

At their greatest extent, during the 1930s, the boundaries of the Central Province of the Gold Coast Colony, which are shown in Map 1 on page 13, enclosed an area of some 4,000 square miles, the population of which was about 471,000 by the end of the period under review. Several changes were made to these

boundaries between 1921 and 1946. In 1921-22 the boundaries of Western Akim District were formally re-defined so as to include the whole of Akyem Kotoku and Akyem Busume traditional states; at the same time the name of the headquarters town of the district was changed from Nsuam to Oda. In 1926 the Twifo Sub-District of the Cape Coast District was created and an assistant district commissioner was posted at Twifo Wampong. In 1932 the Dunkwa Sub-District, which had formerly been part of the Ankobra District in the Western Province, but whose district commissioner had usually sent reports to the Commissioner Central Province (C.C.P.), was formally incorporated into the Cape Coast District: the whole of the Denkyira traditional state was thus brought under the jurisdiction of the District Commissioner (D.C.) Cape Coast.

At its greatest extent the Central Province therefore consisted of four districts and three sub-districts (including the area under the jurisdiction of the Assistant D.C. Agona Swedru, who was subordinate to the D.C. Winneba). The administrative officers in charge of these districts were responsible to the C.C.P. The C.C.P. was in turn responsible to the Governor through the Secretary for Native Affairs (S.N.A.) in all matters connected with 'native affairs' (a term which was vaguely but very broadly defined), and through the Colonial Secretary of the Gold Coast in all other matters.

In 1945-46 the whole administration of the Colony was reorganized. The office of S.N.A. was abolished and the Colony was placed under the authority of a Chief Commissioner, whose headquarters were to be at Cape Coast. The Colony was divided into two, instead of three, provinces, and the districts of the former Central Province were divided between the new Eastern and Western Provinces (most of Western Akim District went to the Eastern Province).

2. GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/1420, Native Affairs Department Annual Reports, 1921-23. For the boundaries of the traditional states, see Map 4 below.

3. GNA-CC, DAO 481, Handing Over Notes, Cape Coast District, entry for 11 March 1926.

4. Ibid., entry for 30 June 1932; Order in Council No.6 of 1932.
and Winneba, Saltpond and Cape Coast Districts to the Western Province). In 1948 the two remaining posts of Provincial Commissioner were abolished, and the officers in charge of each district corresponded directly with the Chief Commissioner of the Colony, or, in some cases, through the Senior D.C. Cape Coast.\(^5\)

It is because of these changes that we have had to adopt the somewhat clumsy and anachronistic term 'South-Central Ghana' when referring to the whole area outside the period 1932-46.

The region consists of a narrow strip of strand and mangrove along the sea coast, merging into a belt of coastal thicket 5 to 10 miles wide. To the north of this belt the whole region is covered with forest, most of which is moist semi-deciduous forest but which begins to merge into tropical rain-forest in the south-west corner of the region.\(^6\)

The main economic product of the region was cocoa, which was grown throughout the forest area, but which was mainly concentrated in the area covered by the traditional states of Breman Essikuma, Ajumako, Essiam, A beadzi Domenase, Agona, Assin Attandaso and Assin Apimenim.\(^7\) A substantial proportion of the cocoa exported from the Gold Coast was grown in this region. In 1932-33, for example, of a total of 200,511 tons exported from Gold Coast ports, 47,680 tons were exported from the ports of the Central Province.\(^8\) The other important crops of the forest area were limes, cola nuts and palm kernels.\(^9\)

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\(^7\) GNA-Accra, ADM 23/1/146, Commissioner of Swollen Shoot to D.C. Cape Coast, 17 April 1948. For the agricultural and mineral products of the area see Map 3 below. For the state boundaries see Map 4.

\(^8\) The Gold Coast Farmer, Vol. II, No.7, November 1933 (information supplied by Drs. D.W. Dunham). These figures compare with 115,914 tons exported from Accra and 32,361 tons from Takoradi. Virtually all the cocoa exported from Central Province ports would have been grown in the Province, and some of the cocoa exported from Takoradi would have been grown in the western part of the Central Province.

\(^9\) See Map 3 below. The main area for limes was Abura traditional state: limes from this area supplied the large Rose's lime juice factory at Abakrampa.
Diamonds were mined and collected in the north-eastern section of the region (mainly in Western Akim District), and gold in the north-western section (Dunkwa Sub-District). The gold production of this area was, however, comparatively small, since the main gold-bearing areas of the Gold Coast lay to the north of Dunkwa around Obuasi in Ashanti, and to the south around Tarkwa in the Western Province. Finally, foodstuffs for local marketing were grown throughout the forest area, and timber was exported from the western part of the forest.

Along the coast the main industry was fishing. Coconuts were grown all along the coastal strip, but they were mainly used for local consumption, in food, drink and copra; they did not become a major commercial crop during the period under review. A large proportion of the income of the coastal belt was derived from service industries connected with transportation, commerce and marketing, and government.

The highest densities of population occurred along the coast and along the border between the forest and the coastal belt. Most of the population was scattered in small villages; even the main towns of the region were very small, and their expansion was comparatively slow during the period under review. Table 1 below shows the population in 1921 and 1948 of the four largest towns in the Central Province (Cape Coast, Winneba, Agona Swedru and Saltpond) compared with that of three other towns in the Colony (Accra, Sekondi and Koforidua). It will be seen from the final column that the increase in the population of the Central Province towns during these years was much smaller than that of the towns in other areas.

10. Ibid.
11. Ibid. See also page 148 below.
### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Population 1921 (000s)</th>
<th>Population 1948 (000s)</th>
<th>Percentage increase 1921-48</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cape Coast</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>55.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winneba</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>115.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agona Swedru</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saltpond</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accra</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>133.2</td>
<td>224.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sekondi</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>177.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koforidua</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>227.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures for Agona Swedru in 1921 are not available.


### 1.3 Sources

In 1966 about 1,500 files were transferred from the Cape Coast District Administrative Office (DAO) to the Central Region branch of the Ghana National Archives at Cape Coast. These were the files of the Central Province and its districts during the colonial period, which became part of the repository of the Chief Commissioner of the Colony and then of the Central Regional Commissioner. The collection includes provincial and district confidential diaries and handing over notes, 'Native Affairs' files covering virtually every state in the region from the beginning of the twentieth century onwards, files on the various industries and products of the region, and a large number of special files concerned with such varied topics as riots and disturbances, fetishes, missionary activities and education.

This extensive collection is the single most important source for our study of rural politics in South-Central Ghana in the colonial period. It
has the disadvantage of all such collections of colonial administrative papers, that it reflects the interests and priorities of the colonial administrators rather than those of their subjects. In the case of these particular papers, however, this bias is less serious than in many other colonial collections, since the files contain an extraordinary number of petitions, minutes and letters from chiefs, faction leaders and members of the African educated elite, as well as verbatim reports of interviews between colonial officials and chiefs, asafo leaders and others.

A further insight into the activities and attitudes of the African subjects of the colonial regime is provided by a number of collections of private papers in the Cape Coast Archives, especially those of Kobina Sekyi, J.P. Allotey Hammond and W.S. Kwesi Johnston. The Archives also contain the papers of the Aborigines Rights Protection Society, the most important anti-colonial organization in the Central Province in the inter-war years, and those of the Central and Joint Provincial Councils, the most important pro-Government bodies during this period.

The Ghana National Archives at Accra contains much information on the Central Province not available at Cape Coast. It also contains a large number of papers relating to policy making at the colonial level. The most important papers in these respects are those of the Secretary for Native Affairs (the ADM 11 series) and the confidential Minute Papers from the Colonial Secretary's office (the CSO MP series). The bundle of papers classified as CSO MP 372/30 is particularly useful, since it consists of 59 sub-files containing extensive minutes and discussions on native administration policy from 1927 to 1940.

The other archives used for this study are the Public Record Office in London (PRO) and the papers deposited by the Oxford University Colonial Records Project in the Rhodes House Library, Oxford (RH). The former is used mainly for information on policy making in the Colonial Office and the relationship between the Colonial Office and the Gold Coast Government, and
the latter contains many interesting private papers of former colonial civil servants, as well as the papers of the Fabian Colonial Bureau (FCB).

During the course of my research I have interviewed a number of former colonial civil servants in Britain, and many chiefs and private individuals in Ghana. These interviews have been of incalculable value, not only in supplying information on details and motives which are not clear from the archival sources, but also in filling out and balancing the archival picture of the general characteristics and the rhythm of everyday life during the colonial period. The latter contribution, though necessarily vague and difficult to define, is perhaps of greater importance than the specific information which can be gleaned from the recollections of informants. The author's debt to those whom he has interviewed is therefore much greater than might be concluded from the number of references to interviews in the footnotes to this study.

The details of all these sources, as well as of the printed sources drawn upon for this study, are given in the bibliography.

1.4 Terminology, orthography, etc.

The political organization of the Fante states is outlined in chapter 2, and the Fante political terms used in this study are explained in the course of that chapter. For the convenience of the reader, the terms most frequently used are also listed and briefly defined in the glossary.13

There is, unfortunately, no standard orthography for the Fante language. I have generally adopted the orthography of Christaller's Dictionary and of the more recent Fante-English Dictionary published by the Methodist Book Depot in Cape Coast.14 Where these two disagree, I have usually preferred the spelling used by the latter, which tends to be more in accordance with modern usage in newspapers and other publications.


The spelling of place names in South-Central Ghana is even more variable than the spelling of ordinary Fante words. Where possible, I have preferred to adopt the spelling of the maps published by the Survey of Ghana. In some cases, however, these maps contradict each other: the capital of Lower Denkyira, for example, is spelt Jukwa in one map and Dwokwaa in another. In other cases there are inconsistencies in the same map: in one map, for example, two villages in Twifo traditional state are spelt Twifo Mampong and Twifo Praso. Finally, there are cases where the spelling in the Survey maps are markedly different from those used in the towns themselves and in modern publications: the town commonly known as Ayanmam or Anyan Maim, for example, is shown as Enyanmanmu in the Survey map.

In all such cases I have preferred the spelling used locally, on town sign-boards or shop and post-office signs. Where I have not visited a town, or where even local spellings vary, I have adopted the spelling used in the sources for this study, especially in 'Native Affairs' files.

During the colonial period 'the Gold Coast and its Dependencies' consisted of four distinct administrative regions - the Gold Coast Colony (often called the Protectorate before 1901), Ashanti, the Northern Territories and the part of Togoland under British Mandate. The term


16. Ibid., 1:250,000, North B 30/Q & Part of W and 1:62,500, Sheet 27. I have adopted the spelling 'Jukwa'.

17. Ibid., 1:62,500, Sheet 48. I have adopted the spelling 'Twifo'.


19. It would be possible to standardize the spelling of place names by adopting an orthography consistently related to the phonetic form. Not being a linguist nor fluent in the Fante language, however, I am not qualified to invent such a standardization, and have been forced to adopt the procedure indicated.

'Gold Coast' was sometimes used for the Gold Coast Colony proper, and sometimes for all four regions together. To avoid confusion I have used only 'the Gold Coast Colony' or 'the Colony' to refer to the Colony proper, and 'Ghana' for the whole country, except when it is perfectly clear from the context that 'the Gold Coast' refers to the whole country.

The titles of colonial officials are usually self-explanatory. It should be made clear, however, that in this study I have used the title Colonial Secretary (Col. Sec.) to refer only to the Colonial Secretary of the Gold Coast, the senior administrative officer in the territory who ranked next in precedence to the Governor. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Cabinet Minister at the head of the Colonial Office, who was responsible for the administration of the whole British Empire, is always referred to as the Secretary of State (S. of S.), never as the Colonial Secretary.

Lower-case letters have been used for titles in English and Fante, except when a particular officer or title-holder is referred to: thus 'district commissioners' in general but 'the District Commissioner Winnaba'; 'amanhemfo' in general but 'the Amanhen of Denkyira'.

The word 'native' has offensive connotations. I have naturally avoided it whenever possible, but there are certain technical phrases, such as 'native administration', 'native jurisdiction' and 'native affairs', in which the use of the word is unavoidable. These phrases were used in specific technical senses and they could be replaced only by clumsy and inexact circumlocutions. I have therefore decided to retain these phrases when there is no acceptable alternative, and I apologise if their use still causes offence to any reader.
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ASHANTI: TWIFO SUB-DISTRICT

WESTERN PROVINCE

EASTERN PROVINCE

MAP 1. Gold Coast Colony, Central Province, Administrative Boundaries, 1935.

Source: Gold Coast Survey Dept., Atlas of the Gold Coast, 1935

MAP 2. Central Province Road & Rail Routes, 1945.

Source: Gold Coast Survey Dept., Atlas of the Gold Coast, 1945
MAP 3. Gold Coast Colony, Central Province.

Main Agricultural Products & Mineral Deposits.

**KEY**
- Provincial Boundary
- Southern Limit of Cocoa
- Cola
- Oil Palms
- Coconuts
- Principal Alluvial Gold Deposits
- Gold Mines
- Limits of Main Diamondiferous Area

MAP 4. Traditional States in the Central Province, 1929.

Source: Gold Coast Survey Dept., General Map of the Gold Coast, Native States, 1929.
**KEY TO MAP 4 - NAMES OF STATES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List by numbers</th>
<th>Alphabetical list</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Hemang</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 &amp; 70</td>
<td>Denkyira</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>Komenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Egufo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Oguaa (Cape Coast)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Edina (Elmina)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Abura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Asebu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 &amp; 29</td>
<td>Nkusukum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Anomabu</td>
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<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Kwaman (Aye ldu)</td>
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<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Ayanmaim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Abeadzi (Domenasi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Aya n Denkyira</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>Ayan Abaasa</td>
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<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Ajumako</td>
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<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Ekunfi (Ebiram)</td>
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<td>Gomoa Assin</td>
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<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Effutu (Winneba)</td>
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<tr>
<td>51, 54, 55, 56</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Akyem Kotoku</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Abeadzi (Domenasi)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Oguaa (Cape Coast)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.B. The traditional state boundaries indicated on this map are meant to give only a general impression of the areas covered by the states. For the actual status of 'boundaries' see section 2.7 below.

Essiam was officially regarded as part of Ayan Denkyira state (No.33 on the map) until its independence was recognized in 1936.
CHAPTER 2. THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE FANTE STATES

2.1 Previous accounts

Any study of rural politics in South-Central Ghana in the twentieth century must begin with a description of the political structure of the nearly 30 traditional Fante states of the area. Unfortunately, none of the existing twentieth century accounts of these states gives by itself an adequate picture of this structure. The classical account is John Mensah Sarbah's *Fanti National Constitution*; but with his interest in judicial and broader constitutional matters, Sarbah tends to neglect the distinction between what I shall describe later as 'the military hierarchy' and 'the stool hierarchy'. On the other hand, J.B. Christensen's *Double Descent among the Fanti*, the only other major study of the area, concentrates almost exclusively on the stool hierarchy, to the detriment of the military and political hierarchy. It is this one-sidedness which leads Christensen to explain the existence of a patrilineal *asafo* system alongside the matrilineal *abusua* system as an example of 'double descent'. If we recognize the difference between the two hierarchies, then we do not need the cumbersome machinery of 'double descent' to explain the place of the matrilineal *abusua* within the stool hierarchy and that of the patrilineal *asafo* company within the military hierarchy.

Studies of the Akan peoples as a whole, such as those of Ellis, Danquah and Meyerowitz, describe mainly those characteristics which are common to Asante, Akyem, Assin and Fante, and therefore tend to neglect the

---


peculiarities of the Fante states. This is a greater problem still with regard to the work of Casely Hayford, who attempts to include non-Akan peoples in his account. Even Sarbah and Christensen, who deal only with the Fante, tend to gloss over the differences between individual states, and between the central core of 'true' Fante states and peripheral states.

Finally, there are a number of very valuable studies of individual states, such as Field's study of Akyem Kotoku, Wartemberg's of Elmina, and Owusu's of Agona. But, quite apart from the obvious disadvantages of generalizing from such specific studies, it is unfortunate for our purposes that the areas described in these studies, especially in Akyem and Agona, are peripheral areas whose ethnic and cultural composition was even more heterogeneous than that of the central core of 'true' Fante states. Their constitutions were therefore atypical.

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6. Examples of important deviations in these areas from the normal characteristics of Fante states are the designation of the abuwa as the asafo in Akyem Kotoku (Field, op. cit., pp. 18 f.), the central role of the asafo companies in the constitution of Elmina (Wartemberg, op. cit., passim) and the peculiar rivalry between Nsaba and Nyakrom for the paramountcy of Agona (Owusu, op. cit., pp. 24 ff.).
In the rest of this chapter, an attempt will be made to outline the main characteristics of the political organization of the Fante states in the twentieth century. Particular attention will be paid to those characteristics which were important in the development of rural politics during the period covered by this study.

2.2 Differences and similarities between states

Any description of the political structure of the states of South-Central Ghana must take account of the important differences between them. The main reason for these differences was that although the states can be called Fante in the sense that Fante was the predominant language spoken in virtually all of them, they varied greatly in their ethnic and cultural composition. The 'true' Fante were present throughout the region, and there was a group of states in the centre, such as Mankessim, Abura, the Gomoas etc., which were somewhat more homogeneous in their ethnic composition than the other states, and which were very similar to each other in their political structures. In the rest of the area, however, and even in some of the 'core' states, there existed many descendants of ethnic groups which were not Fante, which came into the area before or after the Fante, and whose traditions affected, and still affect, the customs and culture of the areas in which they settled. For example, in the North there were the Denkyira, the Assin and the Akyem peoples, in the East there were the Breman, the Agona, the Etsi and other Guan-speaking peoples, and in the South there were the Asebu and the descendants of various groups who called themselves Effutu, though according to Owusu, the word 'effutu' itself means 'the (tribally) mixed group'.

7. The sources for this account are: (1) the works cited in the footnotes to this chapter; (2) the 'Native Affairs' files of the Central Province of the Gold Coast Colony and other files kept in the Ghana National Archives at Cape Coast and Accra; and (3) interviews by the author with chiefs and members of Fante states between August 1970 and June 1972 (see Bibliography).

8. Owusu, Uses and Abuses, p.50 n.5. Some Fante and Effutu whom I interviewed believed that Owusu's etymology for effutu was mistaken, but they agreed that there were culturally different groups which were called 'Effutu'.
Apart from these long-established groups, there was a large number of comparatively recent immigrants - fishermen along the coast, cocoa farmers in the forest, and merchants, businessmen and moneylenders throughout the area. Some of these were from neighbouring areas - Asante, Kwahu, Ewe, etc. - some were from Nigeria and Northern Ghana, and some were from Syria, Lebanon and Europe. Each of the Ghanaian groups I have mentioned had its own influence on the political structures of the area; and the peculiar mixture of immigrants in each state lent its own peculiar set of usages and customs to the state.

These differences were intensified by differences in economic activity, in an area where, as I shall indicate later, political organization was closely linked with economic activities. For example, the fact that asafo companies were so much stronger in coastal towns and villages than in inland communities can be partly explained, though only partly, by the fact that fishing was generally organized on the basis of village or ward asafo organization, whereas land exploitation and trading were not. In fishing communities, therefore, there was a solid economic basis for asafo company activity which was generally absent from trading and farming communities.9

It would, however, be a mistake to exaggerate the differences between the Fante states. The diversifying tendencies which I have described were counteracted by a number of factors which gave a certain degree of uniformity to the states of South-Central Ghana. The first of these was the fact that most of the politically important groups I have mentioned were Akan, and Akan characteristics were dominant throughout the area: the abusua, matrilineal succession and inheritance, stools and swords were the basis of the organization of nearly all the states in the area.

9. This is something of an oversimplification of a very complex and baffling phenomenon. See the account of asafo economic activity in section 2.6 below.
The second important factor was the tendency of the states to borrow political institutions from other states. If a state found that it had no convenient way of arranging certain activities or of solving unprecedented procedural problems, it borrowed titles and functions from elsewhere. When Ajumako was faced with a dispute over the eligibility of candidates for the Paramount Stool in 1958, the post of Queen Mother was created, and the Queen Mother was given the task of deciding eligibility disputes, as the Queen Mothers did in other states.  

10. The mmerante (commoners) of Jukwa (in Denkyira) in 1937 and of Amosima (in Asebu) in 1969, lost confidence in their traditional asafo leaders. They therefore borrowed an Asante institution and elected an Nkwankwaahene to represent them in their dealings with the state council.  

11. The classic example of borrowing is, of course, the asafo organization itself, which appears to have spread from Elmina, Cape Coast and Anomabu, along the coast and then inland in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  

12. This kind of borrowing resulted in the spread all over South-Central Ghana of certain useful institutions such as the asafo.

10. GNA-CC, DAO 1306; and interview with K.A. Dadzie (Stool Secretary of Ajumako, 1929-69) and with Nana Nkran (Gbaatan of Ajumako) on 8 December 1971.

11. GNA-CC, DAO 625, Confidential Diary, Cape Coast District, entry for 28 September 1937; interviews with Nana Odeefuo Boa Amponsem III (Omanhen of Denkyira) and elders of Denkyira, 7 and 14 February 1972. Interview with Mr. Abraham Abedu, a Royal (Odehye) of Asebu, 6 October 1970. Cf. the institution of the Fante-style 'kyirim' company in Akyem Kotoku in the inter-war period, described in Field, Akim Kotoku, p.27.

For the position of the Nkwankwaahene as the representative of the commoners (mmerante) in Asante states, see K.A. Busia, The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti (London, Oxford University Press for International African Institute, 1951), pp.10f., 21.

The third factor contributing to uniformity was the existence of the core of what one might call 'true' Fante states - Mankessim, Nkusukum, Abura, Gomoa, and to some extent Anomabu and Ekunfi. These states had many characteristics and institutions in common, and were a major source of institutional borrowing by the other states. They also provide a starting point for the study of Fante political organization, the norm against which one can set the peculiarities of the peripheral states.

Fourthly, it is important to note that there was not only immigration into South-Central Ghana, but also considerable migration within the area - Fante as well as other groups moved from state to state in search of land or fishing. The first result of this was a tendency for cultural characteristics to travel with the migrants and thus become diffused throughout the area. The second result was that although each state contained a bewildering mixture of ethnic groups, most of them were dominated by Fante who have moved into the area over the past 300 years. Thus, for example, Agona Swedru consisted in 1960 of 19.8% Agona proper, 40.5% Fante, 4.1% Kwahu, 2.1% Asante and a mixture of others including Lebanese, Syrians and Europeans. The Fante therefore dominated Agona Swedru numerically, and according to Owusu, they, together with the Kwahu, were the dominant African group politically and economically.

Finally, the British, in governing through the traditional states, attempted to impose a certain degree of uniformity upon them. The Native Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1883 as amended in 1910, the Chiefs Ordinance of 1904, and above all the Native Administration Ordinance of 1927, specified certain rules governing the election and the functions of paramount and divisional chiefs, the composition and functions of state councils, rules of

14. Ibid. Mention might also be made here of Christensen's emphasis on the importance of chiefs who spent part of their lives with their fathers in a foreign state, being called back to their mother's state for enstoolment: 'Matrilineal inheritance coupled with patrilocal residence and inter-state or inter-tribal marriage, provides a medium which facilitates the spread of culture and cultural uniformity beyond the boundaries of any given state.' (Christensen, Double Descent, p.11).
procedure, etc. The states had to conform or appear to conform to these
rules if they wanted recognition from the Government. This attempt to
impose uniformity became a very important factor in rural politics after
1927, and had repercussions in all aspects of rural politics in the area, as
we shall see in later chapters.

So although no attempt to outline the pattern of traditional authority
in the Fante states can claim to be comprehensive or to have universal
application throughout South-Central Ghana, it is possible to make some
valid generalizations. I shall attempt in the rest of this chapter to build
a model of an idealized Fante state, which will not describe the structure
of any actual state, but which will, it is hoped, give some indication of the
kinds of characteristics common to most states, and provide a basis for the
discussion of rural politics in the area.

I shall begin by examining separately the two distinct hierarchies upon
which the organization of the Fante state was based - the stool and the
military hierarchy.

2.3 The stool hierarchy

The members of each Fante village were divided into seven or more
matrilineal mbusua (clans or lineage groups; singular, abusua), each
traditionally descended from a common ancestress.15 Most of the land and
property in a village belonged to one or other of the mbusua, and the right
to the use (or in some cases the ownership) of this land and property was
inherited from one's mother, as was one's membership of the abusua. The
abusua, which consisted of past, present and future members (i.e. dead
ancestors and descendants yet to be born as well as living members), was

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15. For a description of the abusua, and of the relationship of the abusua
(lineage group) to the larger abusuakwu (clan), see Christensen, Double
Descent, Chap. III. For a study of the kinship system within the
abusua, see George P. Hagan, 'An Analytical Study of Fanti Kinship',
Research Review (Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana,
symbolized by a stool (agbu). The \textit{panyin} (head of the abusua, stool holder; plural, \textit{panyin} or \textit{panyimfo})\textsuperscript{16} was responsible for the upkeep of abusua property and land, and for the welfare of its members. He was elected from among the brothers and nephews (sisters' sons) of his predecessor by the elders of the abusua.

In each village one of the stools was recognized as senior to all the others, usually because the ancestors of that abusua were held to be the original settlers who founded the village.\textsuperscript{17} The holder of this stool was the \textit{dzekuro} (Headman; plural \textit{adakurofo}) of the whole village. He was elected by the other \textit{panyimfo} from candidates nominated by the abusua of the \textit{dzekuro}'s stool from among the brothers and nephews (sisters' sons) of the previous occupant. His election was subject to the approval of the village as a whole. The village was governed by the \textit{dzekuro} together with a village council consisting of the other stool holders and some non-stool-holders appointed to the council by virtue of their special wisdom, experience or skills.

In a group of villages, one would be recognized as senior, again usually because it was supposed to be the first to have been settled in the area, and the \textit{dzekuro} of this village was \textit{phen} (Chief; plural, \textit{ahemfo}) of the whole group. He was elected by the \textit{panyimfo} of his own village and the \textit{adakurofo} of the subordinate villages, from candidates nominated by the ruling abusua.

\textsuperscript{16} The word \textit{panyin} could be used to designate elders or members of a council who were not stool holders as well as those who were. Where it was necessary to refer specifically to an \textit{panyin} who was the head of an abusua, the word \textit{abusua-panyin} might be used. \textit{panyin} was used as a plural for old men or elders in general, whereas \textit{panyimfo} was usually used only of those stool holders and other elders who sat on the council of a chief or headman.

\textsuperscript{17} The question of which family was the first to settle in a village or a district was often central to jurisdictional disputes. An excellent example of this was the case of Ankukrom in 1911-1914, where the point of issue was whether the \textit{dzekuro} of Ankukrom owed allegiance to Ayan Denkyira or to Anomabu. Eventually it was decided that Anku, the founder of the village, was an Anomabu man who had settled on land belonging to Ayan Denkyira; it was therefore concluded that his successors and their subjects owed political allegiance to Anomabu, but were subject to Ayan Denkyira in matters of land allocation and certain stool and ritual matters. This case also illustrates the division between the two hierarchies described in this chapter. The case is in GNA-CC, DAO 424.
from among the brothers and nephews (sisters' sons) of the previous occupant. Again, his election was subject to the approval of all his subjects.

A number of such groups owed a common allegiance to a divisional chief (also called \( \text{ohen} \)). The divisions owed allegiance to the \( \text{omanhen} \) (paramount chief; plural \( \text{amanhemfo} \)) of the whole state (\( \text{oman} \); plural \( \text{aman} \)). All these stools, like that of the \( \text{odzekuro} \), were inherited matrilineally. In each case a chief was elected by his subordinate chiefs together with \( \text{mpanyimfo} \) of his own village or town; in each case the election needed the approval of the subjects of the chief; in each case those who elected a chief could also destool (depose) him; and in each case the chief governed with the advice and consent of a council consisting of his subordinate chiefs and certain other \( \text{mpanyimfo} \). \(^{18}\)

Diagram 1 on page 26 illustrates these lines of stool seniority and allegiance. In some cases an \( \text{odzekuro} \) might be directly subordinate to a divisional chief, without the mediation of an \( \text{ohen} \), or an \( \text{ohen} \) or \( \text{odzekuro} \) might owe direct unmediated allegiance to an \( \text{omanhen} \); these exceptional cases are indicated in the diagram by broken lines.

The chiefs in this hierarchy were responsible for the welfare not only of their own \( \text{mbusua} \), but also of those \( \text{mbusua} \) whose stools served their own stools. In this capacity chiefs gave assistance and advice to all their subjects, and held courts to settle disputes between them. The chief also had certain responsibilities with regard to the allocation of land in the villages subject to his stool, though any attempt by a chief to exert any but a minimal control over land not directly belonging to his \( \text{abusua} \), usually encountered fierce resistance from the subordinate stools.

\(^{18}\). For a fuller description of the pyramid of the stool hierarchy see Sarbah, \textit{Fanti National Constitution}, pp. 3-9.
Diagram 1  The Stool hierarchy

- Omanhen
- Divisional Chief
- Chen
- Odzekuro
- Odzekuro
- Odzekuro
- Odzekuro
- Odzeu-a-panyen

----- = normal lines of subordination

----- = abnormal lines of subordination

Diagram 2  The battle formation

• Twafo

- Benkum
- Adentsen
- Nyimfa
- Nkyidom

- Gyase
- Omanhen
2.4 The military hierarchy

All adult members of a Fante state were members of the army, which was organized in wings according to the battle formation shown in Diagram 2 on page 26. At the head of each wing was a wing chief appointed by the state council: the adontsenhen commanded the adontsen (main body of the army), the nyimfahen commanded the nyimfa (the left wing), and so on. The omanhen was commander-in-chief of the whole army. Each of these chiefs would usually have a golden or silver sword as a symbol of his position in the army and the state.

This military hierarchy was the basis of the political organization of the state, and the wing chiefs played a central role in state politics. Some of their political functions were directly derived, historically or conceptually, from their military functions. For example, the adontsenhen, as the commander of the main body of the army, was the most important wing chief, and from this derived his function as the senior divisional chief and the omanhen's deputy in many states. The gyasehen (commander of the bodyguard) often stayed behind when the army went to war in order to guard the omanhen's palace and the state capital; from this he derived his political functions as the wing chief who resided in the omanhen's town and who was responsible for the affairs of the palace and of the town.

19. It should be noted that in the twentieth century no state has actually been mobilized to fight another state, or for any other purpose; nor has this been even a remote possibility, except during one severe crisis in 1920, when Gomoa was on the verge of mobilizing for an invasion of Ekunfi (GNA-CC, DAO 207); see page 40.

20. The adontsenhen was not always the senior divisional chief, but he was in most states. Most of the informants with whom I discussed the matter in interviews agreed that political functions were derived from military functions rather than vice-versa.

21. There was considerable variation between states in the structure and role of the gyase. The word 'gyase' (literally, 'under the fire') meant the place where the hearth stands, the kitchen. By extension, it meant the chief's household. This included the household servants, domestics and attendants of the chief, and often the Stool Family, as well as his bodyguard. In some states the gyase was divided into the ankobea, the werempe and the gyase proper. The ankobea, led by the ankobehen, was the bodyguard proper; the werempe, led by the werempehen, was that section of the bodyguard whose special duty was the custody of the stool and regalia; and the gyase proper, led by the gyasehen, consisted of the immediate entourage of the chief, and the Stool Family. The gyasehen usually took precedence over the ankobehen and the werempehen, who usually approached the omanhen through the gyasehen. Some people might be members of two or three of the divisions of the gyase.
More importantly, the council of war, consisting of the manhen and the wing chiefs, formed the nucleus of the state council which governed the state in peace time, and which was responsible for all major constitutional and political decisions within the state. The wing chiefs dominated the state council in nearly all states, and in some states the state council consisted exclusively of the manhen and the wing chiefs. Command of a wing therefore carried with it a substantial amount of political power within the state.

The army itself consisted of the mberantse (commoners, sometimes called 'youngmen', i.e. those who did not occupy a stool). They formed the asafo (military body, from 'sa' = war, 'fo' = people), which was divided into anything from two to seven asafo companies, membership of which was patrilineal. In most cases the companies were attached to particular wings on the battle-field, under the command of a wing chief. A member of an asafo company might thereby be brought into a relationship with a chief who was not his own stool chief, and it often happened that personal loyalty to wing chiefs cut across abusua and stool loyalties.

Each asafo company had its own elected officers (who in military terms corresponded to non-commissioned officers), the most important of whom were the supi at the head of the company and the asafohen commanding a section of the company. At the head of all the companies was the tufohen (literally 'chief of the soldiers'), corresponding in military terms to the Regimental Sergeant Major. Each company elected or deposed its own officers, and all

the companies together elected or deposed the tufohem.

Asafo office was generally patrilineal: that is, officers were elected from among the sons, brothers and brothers' sons of the previous occupant. This rule was not, however, universal. In many towns the office of asafo was open to anyone who had proved his powers of leadership or who had acquired great wealth, whether or not his fathers or uncles had been asafohemfo or descended from asafohemfo. In some areas, as in Ekunfi, the office of supi was matrilineally inherited: a supi elected in such areas would cut off his ties with his father's company and join the company to which he had been elected supi. In a few states, such as Denkyira, Anomabu and Abura, the tufohem was a stool holder: his office was inherited matrilineally and his position in the state was akin to that of a wing chief.

In peace time the asafo companies performed many important functions. They played a central role in acclaiming the election, enstoolment and destoolment of chiefs, and were consulted on most major issues. They were a major agent of political socialization.23 They were important in the social life of towns and villages, acting as friendly societies, providing for poor members, and participating in members' funerals. They were also responsible for road clearing, cleaning their towns and villages and for certain police duties such as searching for people missing in the bush, or raising the hue and cry.

2.5 Sword and stool: wing chiefs and divisional chiefs

The military and the stool hierarchies were inextricably bound up with each other, for it was nearly always the case that a wing chief within the military hierarchy was also a divisional chief in the stool hierarchy, and

vice versa. It is important to note that a chief's authority for holding these two offices came from opposite directions: he was appointed as wing chief and given his sword from above by the state council, whereas he was elected and enstooled as ohen or divisional chief from below by the subjects of his stool. The state council, when appointing a wing chief, was usually obliged to choose a divisional chief or ohen, but which of those chiefs they appointed was a matter for their own discretion. Through usage and custom particular wings became attached to particular stools, and it was the usual practice for a man who was elected ohen to take automatic command of the wing commanded by his predecessor on the stool. But the state council was always free to break this connection: however long the occupants of a particular stool may have been recognized as the commanders of a particular wing, the state council could transfer the command of that wing to the occupant of another stool if they felt that political circumstances warranted the change.

In 1935, for example, the State Council of Ajumako transferred the command of the Adantaen from the stool of J.W. Brien, an Ajumako chief, to Kojo Baa, the ohen of Besease, mainly because Brien's stool had lost its

24. This was not always the case where Guan or Etsi influences were strong. In Winneba, for example, none of the wing chiefs apart from the Nkyidomhen and the Twfohen were served by stools outside Winneba itself - they drew all their support from the town (GNA-CC, DAO 280, E.O. Butler, D.C. Winneba to Commissioner Central Province, 12 January 1938). Winneba was an exceptional case, however, since wing chiefs were a comparatively recent innovation there, copied from the 'true' Fante states. There is no mention of wing chiefs in the description of the constitution given in the Winneba Protest against being placed under the Stool of Gomoa Assin Ogwan, Gold Coast Colony in 1907 (GNA-CC, Acc. No. 67/64); wing titles were probably not adopted until Winneba's successful attempts in the 1920s to gain recognition as an independent state (GNA-CC, DAO 280).

25. The distinction was made quite clearly in Fante terminology. The subjects of a stool enstool (si or sihene) and destool (tu) an ohen, whereas the omanhen and state council appoint (bo) or remove from office (gya) a wing chief. The placing on the stool and the giving of the sword symbolize the two separate types of authority. Hence the Fante proverb, 'The state has no stool', which is a precise reference to the distinction between the authority of the sword and that of the stool, and not merely a statement that the omanhen rules only with the consent of his people, as Christensen interprets it (Double Descent, p. 117).
political importance whereas the *Jhen* of Besase had become too rich and powerful to be refused a wing chieftaincy. In 1969 the *Jamanhen* and State Council of Denkyira removed the command of the Adontsen from the *Jhen* of Diaso and transferred it to the *Jhen* of Denkyira Obuasi (who was already Twofohene): the *Jhen* of Diaso had always been a very troublesome wing chief, an 'overmighty subject', because of his wealth and the size of his division, whereas the *Jhen* of Denkyira Obuasi has been one of the strongest supporters of the present *Jamanhen*. Kojo Kodia remains the *Jhen* of Diaso - the State Council cannot interfere in the relationship between a stool holder and his subjects (unless asked to do so as adjudicator) - but he is no longer Adontsenhen and has lost his place on the State Council.

2.6 Economic aspects of the state

Both Field and Owusu have given detailed accounts of the interdependence of political and economic organization in two individual states - Akyem Kotoku and Agona - which in this respect at least were typical of the states of South-Central Ghana. So it will be sufficient for our purposes merely to outline the main areas in which the economic organization of the states was tied to their political organization.

The most obvious area of influence was that of land. Land, as we have seen, belonged to the *mbusua*, and was the responsibility of the stool hierarchy. Anybody was entitled to cultivate the land of his *abusu* or his village, provided he sought the permission of his *abusua-panyin* or his chief. Strangers wishing to cultivate a plot of land had to ask the permission of the *abusua-panyin*, the chiefs and the *Jamanhen*, and paid a form of rent (usually calculated

26. GNA-CC, DAO 1306; and interview with K.A. Dadzie (Stool Secretary of Ajumako) and Nana Nkran (Obaatan of Ajumako) on 8 December 1971.


as a proportion of the yield from the land). The mbusua-mpanyimfo and the chiefs of the stool hierarchy therefore supervised the use of land, and it was they who arbitrated in land disputes and judged in land litigation.

Matters concerning land were entirely the responsibility of the stool hierarchy; they had nothing to do with the military-political hierarchy. A man owed a personal allegiance through his own abusua to his state, which was unaffected by who his landlord might be. A man from state Y farming land belonging to state Z would owe no political allegiance to the manhen of Z, though he would pay him rent and might owe him certain ritual obligations. 29

As Casely Hayford put it,

'Allegiance . . . is that personal relationship between the occupants of two stools whereby the inferior acknowledges the authority of the superior over him. . . . Such relationship has nothing to do with the lands of the vassal. It may happen that the superior lord is at the same time the licensor of the vassal in respect of his holding, but that will be merely accidental.' 30

The relationship might be modified, however, if after long residence in state Z, a family transferred its allegiance from state Y to state Z. 31

Fishing was similar in this respect to land exploitation: the right to fish from a certain stretch of beach was vested in a certain stool, and a stranger would have to seek permission to fish there and pay a fishing toll (amandzi) to the stool and/or the manhen. As we shall see, however, the ownership of a stretch of farming land, or more frequently, of fishing rights on a beach, might be vested in an asafo company rather than in a stool.

29. See footnote 17 above for an example of this.


31. There was one circumstance in which the manhen as head of the state played a direct part in land transactions. The manhen was entitled to an abusa, a one-third share of all extraordinary wealth arising out of the lands of his state (he would usually keep a third of this abusa and divide the rest among his divisional chiefs). He was, for example, entitled to a third of money arising out of mining and timber concessions. Into this category fell money gained from the outright sale of land (as opposed to its rent).
The main area of economic influence for the military-political hierarchy of the state was in the field of trade and commerce. The cocoa trade was by far the biggest source of income in South-Central Ghana by 1919, and the chiefs in the political hierarchy played a prominent part in it. The chiefs provided the leadership for the cocoa co-operative movement. It was through the chiefs that various schemes were launched to set up new marketing organizations for cocoa, independent of the big European cocoa-buying firms (the most notable of these schemes being those organized through the A.R.P.S. in the 1930s). And chiefs played a prominent part in the cocoa hold-ups of 1930-31 and 1937-38.

Markets were another important source of influence for the chiefs. The markets of a state were controlled by the ahemfo and the amanhen; it was they who decided on the siting of a market, and who were responsible for its upkeep and its safety. Political controversies sometimes arose out of controversies over markets; conversely, control of markets might be used as a political weapon. For example, the aman of Esiam was granted its independence from Ayan Denkyira in 1936, after a long struggle. The two states immediately became embroiled in a number of jurisdictional disputes, notably over control of the village of Nkwantanum, which lay on the border between the two states. As a tactic in this conflict, Ayan Denkyira set up its own market in 1943 to rival that of Esiam (even though the towns were only half a mile apart), and fixed it to operate on the same day as the Esiam market. The District Commissioner, Saltpond, had to advise the Amanhemfo of the two states 'to keep the peace and avoid interfering with the rights of buyers and sellers to go to either market'.
The states were also involved in the general organization of trade and economic life. State, divisional and village councils (under the supervision of district commissioners) controlled the building and upkeep of feeder roads and minor trade roads (known to the Public Works Department as 'chiefs' roads' or 'political roads'). It was through chiefs and their councils that agricultural extension schemes such as those for unit food farms, coconut plantations and banana plantations were organized.\(^{36}\) Almost every aspect of the economic life of the rural areas of South-Central Ghana was in some way the concern of chiefs, either as stool holders or as members of councils.

To complete this general picture of the economic aspects of chieftaincy, one should mention the economic role of the chiefs' tribunals. The Omanhene and the most important divisional chiefs held tribunals for the trial of civil and criminal cases (the limits of their jurisdiction being defined by Ordinance). Tribunal fees and fines were a major source of income for the chiefs, while the tribunals gave the chiefs an additional means of control over economic matters, through their judgement in land and other economic cases. The right to hold a tribunal therefore became a valuable economic asset, quite apart from the prestige it carried, and divisional chiefs were always manoeuvring for the right to hold a tribunal, or for the upgrading of their existing tribunal. One of the reasons for giving the Omanhene of Besease, in Ajumako state, the command of the Adontsen and the right to hold a tribunal in 1935 (see pages 30f above), was that he threatened that 'he will not recognise the Omanhene and will not attend any State Council meetings unless he is granted a Native Tribunal'.\(^{37}\) Similarly, the Chiefs of Upper and Lower Okyisu demanded the right to hold tribunals as a reward for ending their opposition to the Omanhene of Ajumako in 1925.\(^{38}\)

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36. GNA-CC, DAO 31, 32 and lll.
37. GNA-CC, DAO 1306, Handing Over Notes, Saltpond District, 7 September 1932.
38. Ibid, 13 October 1925.
Finally, we must consider the economic role of the asafo, which was most significant in relation to fishing. The exact role of the asafo in fishing is not at all clear, but the situation appears to have been as follows. It was rare for the ownership of boats and nets to be invested in the asafo companies or sections of them; this usually fell within the abusua organization. On the other hand, it was common for asafo companies or the village asafo to have control of the beaches and to organize the collection of fishing tolls (amandzi). In villages sharing a lagoon, the asafo of the villages organized the division of the lagoon between the villages. In some areas there were even stretches of farming land over which the asafo exercised a similar control, though this was much rarer. 39

2.7 Geographical aspects of the state 40

Being based on patterns of allegiance and subordination rather than on territorial authority, the Fante states did not form compact territorial units. 41 An omanhen, asked to describe his state, would not draw a linear boundary and say, 'My state lies within that boundary'; rather, he would say, 'Villages A, B and C owe allegiance to me; villages P, Q and R owe allegiance to A; villages X, Y and Z owe allegiance to B;' and so on. It might happen at any level that villages owing allegiance to one chief would be scattered among


40. Drs. David M. Dunham, of the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, Netherlands, is undertaking a study of settlement patterns and markets in South-Central Ghana. My understanding of the economic and geographical aspects of the state owes a lot to conversations with Drs. Dunham.

41. 'An oman is not a district or a tract of territory. It is a confederation of groups of people'. Field, Akim Kotoku, p.1.
villages owing allegiance to another. In Map 4 on page 15, it will be seen that the two areas owing allegiance to the manhen of Denkyira (who resided at Jukwa until 1942), were separated from each other by areas serving the Amanhimo of Hemang and Twifo Mampong; there were villages scattered throughout Akyem Kotoku which were subordinate to the manhen of Akyem Abuakwa; Saltpond was part of Nkusukum, whose manhen resided at Yamoransa, near Cape Coast, separated from Saltpond by villages belonging to Anomabu and Oguaa (see also Map 5 on page 37).

The same pattern was often repeated at the divisional level. In the map of Abura on page 37, for example, it will be seen that although the villages in the Nkyidom and Twifo divisions were contiguous, those in the Gyase and the Adontsen were not. It is interesting to note that there appears to have been a connection between the geographical distribution of the divisions of Abura and the economic geography of the area. The villages subordinate to the Twafohen all lay within the main cassava-growing area of the state; those subordinate to the Nkyidomhen lay in the area of cocoyam plantations; the main villages subordinate to the Adontsenhen lay within the area of the state which was richest in palm oil, and, by 1919, in cocoa (though cocoa was grown extensively elsewhere in the state), and they controlled the approaches to the traditional marketing centre of this area; while the villages serving the Gyasehen controlled the main trade routes into and through the state. Since these divisions had certainly been established by the beginning of the twentieth century, it is virtually impossible to discover how this correspondence came about - whether economic division preceded or succeeded military division. This problem, however, lies beyond the scope of this study; we shall merely note that the connection between the economic and the political

42. The economic geography of Abura was explained to me by Drs. Dunham.

43. GNA-CC, DAO 251. The exception is cocoa: since cocoa was not established in Abura until the turn of the twentieth century, it is obvious that this crop succeeded the establishment of military divisions.
Map 5. Sketch Map of the
Divisions of Abura State, 1924

KEY
- Roads and trade paths
- Towns and villages not in Abura State
- Villages subordinate to Adontsenhen
  - Gyamien
  - Nkyidomhen
  - Twomfohen
- Residence of Divisional (Wig) Chief
  - Omanhen

Scale, 1: 125,000

Source: Gold Coast Chiefs List, 1924
organization of the state had a geographical as well as a jurisdictional and commercial basis.44

Disputes over jurisdiction and boundaries were a common feature of inter-state relations in the twentieth century, as they had been in the nineteenth. Abura, for example, was intermittently involved throughout the period of this study in disputes with the neighbouring states of Asebu, Anomabu, Ayan Denkyira and Kwaman Ayedu. Its dispute with Asebu over control of the village of Ebu (which almost led to violence in 1931), dated back at least to 1874.45 In 1921, 1926-27 and 1938 the colonial Government contemplated a survey of state boundaries; each time it was thwarted by the complexities of jurisdiction and the plethora of unsettled disputes.46

2.8 Democracy, flexibility and conflict

It only remains to comment briefly on the three dominant general characteristics of the Fante states. The first of these was the democratic nature of their organization. We have already seen in section 2.3 how, though chiefs might originally be nominated and elected by limited councils, their final election and enstoolment, like their destoolment, was subject to the approval of all their subjects. As Sarbah eloquently argues,

"Wherever the stool claims jurisdiction over the people or persons, and asserts right to collect tribute, impose fines, and claim their services, there the right to veto exists. The customary law is cogent and clear on the point, that he who serves and is bound to obey must have a voice in the election of the person who is to command".47

44. For speculation on possible connections between the economy of South-Central Ghana and the early development of Fante political organization, see Kwame Arhin, 'Diffuse Authority among the Coastal Fante', Ghana Notes and Queries, No.9 (1966).

45. GNA-CC, DAO 151 and 251.

46. GNA-CC, DAO 1065, correspondence between S.N.A., C.C.P. and Central Province D.C.s, 1921; GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/1420, Native Affairs Annual Report, 1926-27; PRO, CC 96/752/51352/58, especially correspondence between the Colonial Office and Sir Arnold Hodson, Governor of the Gold Coast, August 1938.

47. Sarbah, Fanti National Constitution, p.22.
The mberantag, the commoners, also had their place in the process of decision making. All decisions of councils were subject to their approval, while important decisions would be made by the whole man assembled in meetings at which any member of the man had the right to speak. When the okyeame (the linguist, the chief's spokesman) announced a decision, it was held to be the unanimous decision of the whole man.

Partly as a result of these democratic principles, the actual constitutions of the states were very flexible. For one of the basic principles of Fante political organization was summed up in the proverb, 'Oman tsinasi', that is 'The man (the body politic, the people, the state) exists (or has existed) before anything else', a proverb which was interpreted as the equivalent of, to coin a tag, vox populi suprema lex. No man was absolutely bound by its constitution, for the people were entitled to change it if they so wished. Minor constitutional changes, such as those described on page 21, in connection with the borrowing of institutions, were frequent. Major changes were difficult, because of the strength of many traditions and the fact that the man was held to consist of past and future members as well as present ones. Such changes were possible, however, if there was sufficiently strong popular support for them. The state could, for example, transfer the line of succession of the manhen from one abusua to another, as Winneba did in the early twentieth century, Gomoa Assin did in 1925, and Asebu did in 1930.

It was the interpretation of the flexible constitution which was often the ostensible subject of the faction disputes described in the next chapter. Behind these disputes lay the third dominant characteristic of the Fante states, their propensity for inter-state and intra-state conflict. As Datta

48. GNA-CC, Acc. No. 355/64, Charles E. Sagoe, Oquaa Oman Secretary to the Editor of the Gold Coast Spectator, 25 December, 1933.

writes, 'In the Fante political system, competitive segmentation has traditionally been a built-in structural feature'.

Fante states were rarely free from conflict - between states, between divisions within states, between ahemfo and the omanhen, between villages, between asafo companies, and even between mbusua or sections of asafo companies. There were a host of potential sources of conflict: land or fishing disputes, succession or jurisdictional disputes, commercial competition, quarrels over asafo emblems and songs, even moral or religious matters.

Frequently such conflicts turned into protracted vendettas in which the original cause of the conflict became of secondary importance, or might even be forgotten. For example, there was a riot between the neighbouring villages of Tantum (in Ekunfi) and Legu (in Gomoa) in 1920, in which 30 people died. The riot was part of a vendetta between the two villages which had originally arisen from a dispute over fishing and land rights which had been settled in 1894. The riot in 1920 nearly led to armed conflict between the states of Gomoa and Ekunfi, while the tension between the two villages, continually fed by minor hostilities and provocations, lasted at least until 1944. Groups engaged in such conflicts and vendettas within a state would almost invariably join opposite factions in the state, and add the hostilities of their own conflicts to those already involved in the faction dispute.

51. GNA-CC, DAO 207 and 316.
CHAPTER 3 FACTIONS AND 'PARTIES'

3.1 The general nature and composition of factions

Faction fighting was a perennial feature of the Fante states in the colonial period. At almost any given time a state was likely to be divided into two hostile factions involved in a lengthy, hard fought and very complex dispute. The ostensible subject of such a dispute would usually be an apparently minor constitutional point connected with the election or destoolment of a chief. The constitutions of the states were, as we have said, very flexible; apart from a few basic principles, almost every aspect of the constitution was open to controversy. The stools and positions being contended for carried with them real power - judicial power in the tribunal, economic power over land, markets and roads, and even constitutional power in arbitrating future disputes. The Fante constitution was therefore an ideal battle-ground for faction fighting, presenting as it did an almost continuous series of controversies about interpretation, and a set of desirable prizes, the winning of which consolidated the power of the members of the victorious faction within the state as well as providing a token of victory.

Before the late 1920s the factions involved in these disputes were true factions fitting at every point Ralph W. Nicholas's fivefold definition of factions: 1

1. Ralph W. Nicholas, 'Factions: a Comparative Analysis', in M. Bainton (ed.) Political Systems and the Distribution of Power (A.S.A. Monograph No. 2; London, Tavistock Publications, 1969), pp. 27 ff. Throughout this study I shall be following Nicholas's definition of factions. In distinguishing between factions and 'parties', 'moral groups' or 'cores' I shall generally use the terminology of F.G. Bailey's Stratagems and Spoils. A Social Anthropology of Politics (Oxford, Blackwell, 1969). I shall thus, for example, use the words 'transaction' and 'transactional' in the rather narrow sense used by Bailey, specifically to exclude moral transactions (Bailey, op.cit., pp. 36-42). I shall not use it in the broader sense used by Fredrik Barth, who describes as 'transactions' all interactions involving prestations, whether those prestations are of an economic, a social or a moral character: see Fredrik Barth, Models of Social Organization (R.A.I. Occasional Paper No.29, London, 1966), Chapter I. It is because Nicholas and Bailey are especially interested in distinguishing between factions and other kinds of political groups, whereas Barth is not, that I have adopted their usage rather than his.
(1) They were conflict groups: they dissolved as soon as a conflict had been resolved and the spoils shared, and reformed, often with a different composition, as a new conflict emerged.

(2) They were political groups: the central issue in such conflicts was never an economic or religious one, but always a primarily political or constitutional one.  

(3) They were not corporate groups. The relationship between the members of a faction and its leader or leaders was usually a transactional rather than a moral one: each follower hoped to gain a particular material or political advantage from a victory of the faction. The factions were, in Bailey's terminology, contract teams rather than moral teams, followings rather than cores, having neither the enduring corporate identity of a lineage or a clan nor the institutionalized corporate identity of a political party.  

(4) Their members were recruited by a leader or group of leaders: 'Members can be connected to a faction only through the activity of a leader, since the unit has no corporate existence or clear single principle or recruitment.' Leadership was almost invariably provided by a powerful divisional chief or a clique of divisional chiefs.

2. For the problem of distinguishing the political from other spheres in this context see Nicholas, op.cit., p.59 n.4.

3. Bailey, Stratagems and Spoils, pp.28, 49f. A corporate group might, of course, join a faction as a unit. Such a group would, however, act as an individual within the faction, seeking the same kind of transactional advantages for the group as an individual would seek for himself: for example, an asafo company might join a faction in order to gain extra fishing rights, or a stool family might join to gain support against a rival family in the opposite faction.

Once again, I have followed Nicholas's narrow definition of 'corporate' rather than Barth's wider one. Barth describes as 'corporate' both the moral and the contract types of team, defining corporate groups as 'groups capable of concerted action under the direction of a leader or a number of co-ordinating leaders': F. Barth, Political Leadership among Swat Pathans (L.S.E. Monograph on Social Anthropology, No.19; London, Athlone Press, 1959), p.71. The distinction between corporate and non-corporate groups has some similarity with Duverger's distinction between Gemeinschaft (Community) and Gesellschaft (Association); see Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, translated by B. and R. North (London, Methuen, 1964), pp. 124-132.

Members were recruited on diverse principles. Each member or group within a faction would have a different motive or set of motives for joining. The most common transational motive was a furtherance of the individual's or the group's interests in disputes arising out of land titles, fishing rights, jurisdiction, asafo company emblems, or petty quarrels with members of the opposite faction. Members recruited on such a basis would, of course, remain in the faction only as long as the faction leaders could offer sufficient resources, or the prospect of sufficient resources, to further these interests. They rarely had a very strong commitment to the constitutional issue which was the ostensible subject of the conflict, or even to their faction leaders: it was not unusual for leaders to succeed in subverting members of opposite factions and seducing them to their own by various forms of bribery or threat.

On the other hand, there were also members who were recruited to factions mainly by ascriptive ties with the faction leaders, the most common being abusua ties, asafo ties and stool allegiance. These followers would naturally be much more reluctant to desert their faction leaders. Some members might be recruited by combinations of ascriptive ties, transactional ties, and other ties such as direct patron-client relationships or even religious affiliation.

It should be noted that the composition of factions within a state rarely corresponded to class or social divisions. There were cases in which one might find all members of a particular social category - such as educated men, asafo leaders, or chiefs - in the same faction, but these were very rare exceptions. In most cases each side in a conflict would contain a mixture of chiefs, asafo leaders, commoners, members of the educated elite and members of the 'sub-elite' of middle-school leavers, lorry drivers, etc.5

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3.2 Example: the Anomabu Stool Dispute of 1930-33

To illustrate the nature of the factions described above, I shall take an example which was typical of scores of disputes throughout the Central Province. In May 1930 there was a dispute in Anomabu as to whether Zacchaeus Acquah had or had not been constitutionally elected as Manhen. Despite various attempts at reconciliation, by the Provincial Council of Chiefs and by the Government, the dispute dragged on until April 1933, when J.B. Essel, a compromise candidate, was elected as Manhen Amonu VIII. The dispute was revived in July 1935 when Amonu VIII was destooled. The principal supporters of each side are listed in Diagram 3.

**Diagram 3. Anomabu Stool Dispute 1930-33**

**For Acquah**
- Zacchaeus Acquah (the alleged Manhen Amonu-Aferi II)
- The Stool Family
- The Abontsenhen
- The Wemphehen
- Majority of chiefs on the State Council (about three quarters)
- Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 7 Asafo Companies
- Kobina-Ansah (leading village of No. 1 Company)

**Against Acquah**
- Chief Kwame Esson (Regent in 1930)
- The Tufohen
- Chief Kesi Kaa
- Minority of chiefs on the State Council (about one quarter)
- Nos. 2 and 6 Asafo Companies
- Rest of No. 1 Company

The Abontsenhen and the Tufohen were the leaders of the two factions.

As the diagram shows, not only were the chiefs on the State Council and the Companies split among themselves, but one of the Companies was itself split in two. It is difficult to establish any exact explanation of the origins of the dispute. H.A. Bonavia, the District Commissioner Saltpond in 1932, thought that the division was between the town of Anomabu, supporting

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6. The details of this dispute are taken from GNA-CC, DAO 172 and DAO 1306, and from interviews with J.K. Essel, an Òdehye of Anomabu with Nana Okun, Òhen of Egya No. 1, on 24 May 1972.

7. By December 1932, No.7 Company had changed sides and joined the Tufohen's faction.
the Tufohen's faction, and the outlying villages, supporting the Adontsenhen's. 8

J.A. Prendergast, Acting D.C. in 1933, thought that the 'die-hard group' of
the Tufohen's faction were 'attempting to organise the "educated community"
to oppose the election'. 9 Neither of these explanations seems adequately to
fit the facts, however. It is true that No.6 Company, the largest and most
powerful in the state, together with No.2 Company, dominated the town of
Anomabu; nevertheless there were large contingents from the other Companies
living in Anomabu, and the two sides within the town had to be prevented by
the D.C. and the police from fighting each other in November 1930. Some of the
Adontsenhen's supporters were town chiefs, and the Adontsenhen himself
commanded a 'Quarter' of the town. So the dispute did not represent a simple
split between Anomabu and the outlying villages. Nor, on the other hand, is
it true to say that the educated community as a group supported the Tufohen;
a number of them did, but there were educated men on both sides. The
Adontsenhen was educated, and so was Zacchaeus Acquah, who (like the Tufohen
and J.B. Essel) was a former Government Clerk.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to explain the dispute in terms of
its origins or of any simple division within the state, since the original
objections to Acquah soon became submerged in the complex web of conflicts
between, and alliances within, the factions. The best way of approaching an
understanding of the dispute is by examining the motives which the members of
each faction had for taking part in the dispute and for joining a particular
faction.

Each individual or group seems to have joined a faction for a different
set of reasons. The Stool Family and the Werempe had originally nominated
Acquah: it was their customary right to nominate an /manhen and they were

8. GNA-CC, DAO 1306, Handing Over Notes, Saltpond District, 7 September 1932.
9. GNA-CC, DAO 172, J.A. Prendergast, Ag. D.C. Saltpond to C.C.P., 19 April
1933.
bound to uphold the claims of the candidate of their choice. The Adontsenhen, as the senior divisional chief in the state, must have been worried by the increasing rival power of the Tufohen, who had been steadily building up a strong following since his election in 1926. Then Kwame Esson, who was Regent when the trouble started, felt that he had not been properly consulted during the election and that the Stool Family were not giving sufficient deference to his position within the family. Many of the group of educated men who supported the Tufohen (i.e. Prendergast's 'die-hard group') were related to him, and some of them were involved in a land dispute with the Stool Family which went back to the reign of Jamanhen Amonu VII (in whose enforced abdication in 1929 they had played a prominent part). As for the Companies, they were split by a number of traditional rivalries, most of them relating to fishing. Fishing disputes were constantly threatening to break out into violence in Anomabu, and in fact did so in 1919 when there was a serious fight between No.6 Company and part of No.1 Company.\(^{10}\)

3.3 Changes after 1927-30

Most intra-state conflicts in the Central Province in the inter-war period began as faction disputes which were structurally similar to the one at Anomabu. They did not start as ideological or class conflicts but as conflicts between factions in the strict sense of the word - transactional, single-interest political associations - that is, groups of people who, for a variety of reasons, were bound together to achieve a particular political aim such as electing, destooling, or opposing the election or destoolment of, a particular chief, or supporting or opposing a particular change in the constitution.

\(^{10}\) GMA-CC, DAO 424. In Appendix A, I have described in detail another example of a faction conflict, that which took place in Abura between 1909 and 1915. This conflict provides another example of the points made above, and also illustrates very clearly the role of the educated elite in disputes before the late 1920s. The example has been made into an Appendix in order to avoid cluttering up the argument with excessive detail, but it will be referred to throughout this study for comparison between the earlier and the later types of political conflict within Fante states.
The focus of such conflicts was entirely parochial. The hostilities and disputes being fought out concerned purely intra-state matters; colonial or even provincial issues were hardly ever brought into the political arena. Insofar as the factions paid any attention to the colonial Government, they regarded it either as a mild nuisance which kept interfering in their disputes, or as a potential resource to be called in to help one faction or to arbitrate in an impasse. Thus in the Anomabu dispute of 1930-33 the District Commissioner, the Provincial Council and the Governor were all involved in attempts at arbitration, and both sides tried to win over the District Commissioner and the Provincial Council; but the burning colonial issues of the day, such as the cocoa hold-up and the questions of Provincial Councils and taxation, were ignored by all the participants in the dispute. Similarly in comparable case of the Abura dispute of 1909-15 the A.R.P.S. members involved were all, at the height of the dispute, involved in the opposition to the Forest legislation and in the reform of the A.R.P.S., yet none of them tried to bring these issues into the dispute or to use their role in the A.R.P.S. as a source of political capital in Abura. From the standpoint of the factions, the Government once again appeared only in the figure of the District Commissioner, attempting to arrange arbitration. The politics of Fante factions before the late 1920s has, in J.M. Lonsdale's paradoxical phrase, a very diffuse focus.

11. GNA-CC, DAO 172.
12. See Appendix A.
So most intra-state conflicts in the inter-war period began as faction fights; and before the late 1920s they remained faction fights. After 1927, however, there was an increasing tendency for these factions to become transformed into 'parties'. Political groups still began as factions, but in an increasing number of cases they took up provincial or colonial issues and began to express their differences in terms of such issues.

Originally the political language of support for the Government or of anti-colonialism might have been seen by faction leaders merely as a political resource: it was a useful rhetorical device, and might also carry more tangible benefits in encouraging the support either of Government officials or of anti-Government lawyers and businessmen. Gradually, however, faction leaders began to realize that this rhetoric had an immediate and concrete meaning for their followers: the issues which they were arguing about came to be felt as pressing problems within the states, and an increasing number of people adopted a genuine 'moral' commitment to specific pro- or anti-Government stands. The purely transactional nature of adherence to factions was modified by a moral element and former contract teams took on some of the characteristics of moral teams.

Factions thus took on some of the characteristics of parties: they became corporate groups, they ceased to depend entirely on their leaders for cohesion, and they even began to recruit members on a moral or ideological rather than on a contractual basis. They became much less fluid and more enduring. And the hostilities between them became less 'recreational' and

15. Longevity was not, however, a characteristic exclusively of parties; some factions lasted a very long time. An extreme example was the dispute between the Condua and Interkudzi factions in Elmina, which lasted, with only minor modifications, from the destoolment of Jamanhen Condua III in 1918 to the election of Interkudzi as Jamanhen Anowi II in 1939, and even beyond that (GNA-GG, DAO 40, 47, 151, 625 and 969; and Wartemberg, Sao Jorge D'el Mina, pp.90ff.). Nicholas writes, 'That factions are not corporate, that they are basically impermanent, does not mean that they may not persist for a long period of time....' (Nicholas, 'Factions: a Comparative Analysis', p.28). Frequently this persistence can be accounted for by a tendency observed by Bailey, who notes that a continued set of transactions between the same partners will in itself tend to engender a moral relationship, so that in the case of a leader and his following, 'The longer they hold together,... the longer they are likely to hold together.' (Bailey, Stratagems and Spoils, pp. 53f).
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more bitter. 16

There are two important qualifications to be made in this description of the process of transformation. Firstly, it was by no means a clear-cut and universal development. It happened at different times and at a different pace in each state: some states, like Denkyira, developed party divisions very early and very quickly, while others, like Elmina, did not develop them at all until after the Second World War. In some states the process of transformation was not completed, and colonial issues remained purely rhetorical devices bandied about between factions which did not develop into parties. In nearly all states parties retained many of the characteristics and continued to use the tactics of the factions out of which they had grown. 17

It is, in any case, a difficult task to distinguish between transactional (pragmatic) and moral (normative) elements in disputes in small-scale rural societies in which many of the contestants have face-to-face relations with each other: as Bailey points out, 'the transactional element is much nearer the normative surface of public life in peasant societies than in the larger encapsulating structures...'; one might add, and vice versa.

Secondly it would, of course, be a serious mistake to assume that people in the rural areas were not aware of colonial issues, or active in opposition.

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16. Bailey points out that there is a recreational quality in doladoli (faction fighting) in Bisipara (Bailey, Stratagems and Spoils, p.90). This quality seems to be a common characteristic of the type of rural faction fighting we are describing. The factions may have hurled abuse and even missiles at each other in state council meetings, but in everyday activities they exhibited no sign of enmity. For example, the District Commissioner, Cape Coast, attempting to settle the hard-fought Elmina faction dispute in 1931, commented 'It was amusing at the break up of the meeting to see the opposing leaders laughing and joking together'. (GNA-CC, DAO 151, Confidential Diary for Cape Coast District, entry for 28 March 1931).

17. I have not found any states in which parties grew ex nihilo; in all the cases of party conflict which I have examined the parties arose out of pre-existing factions.

to the colonial Government, before the late 1920s. The Lands Bill of 1894, the Native Jurisdiction Ordinances of 1883 and 1910, the Chiefs Ordinance of 1904 and many other measures did encounter opposition in the rural areas as well as in the towns. Such opposition, however, tended to be sporadic and very diffuse in focus in the rural areas. It was not until after the late 1920s that organized groups within the states consistently opposed Government measures and made such opposition an integral part of the politics of the local arenas. 19

The process of transformation described above accelerated rapidly in the late 1930s and during the War years, parallel to the acceleration of rural anti-colonialism, so that by the time of the 1948 Riots and the campaign of the Convention People's Party in the rural areas, there were well-developed political structures within each state which were already used to absorbing colonial issues into their local political activities. By the time the C.P.P. began its campaign for the support of the anti-colonial elements in the rural areas, those elements had already acquired a local focus (at the District or Provincial level) or even a central focus (at the Colonial level). 20 It is with the causes of this change in the nature of rural politics that we shall concern ourselves in the following chapters. Before summarizing those causes, however, we must give examples of the transformation of factions into parties.

19. There were protests even before 1900 which foreshadowed the developments described in this chapter: they are the subject of Francis Agbodeka, African Politics and British Policy in the Gold Coast, 1868-1900. A study in the forms and force of protest (London, Longmans, 1971). But the 'primary' resistance described by Agbodeka usually consisted either of protests by chiefs and state councils against British encroachment on their authority, or scattered cases of British involvement in local disputes leading to hostility by a section of the people concerned against the British Government. The combination of these two strands of protest, and their incorporation into the whole network of grievances against the British, was never as widespread and pervasive as it became in the 1930s and 1940s: it did not transform the whole nature of local arena politics until the later period. For a seminal discussion of the relationship between 'primary' resistance and mass nationalism, see T.O. Ranger, 'Connexions between "primary resistance" movements and modern mass nationalism in East and Central Africa', Journal of African History, Vol. IX, Nos. 3 and 4, (1968).

20. For the use of 'local' and 'central' in this context, see Lonsdale, loc. cit.
Examples: Denkyira, 1929-42

Nana Kojo Tsibu II was elected *manhen* of Denkyira in 1929. From 1924 to 1929 he was involved in disputes with a number of his sub-chiefs, who in 1929 combined to prefer destoolment charges against him. The conflict between Tsibu’s supporters and opponents lasted until December 1931, when Kobina Kuffuor, whom the opposition had installed as *manhen* Bua Amponsem II in January 1931, was shot dead. Tsibu and two of his followers were tried in Sekondi for the murder and were acquitted in March 1932. But many people in Denkyira still believed Tsibu to be guilty, or at least an accomplice to the murder, and feeling ran so high against him that all his followers except the Stool Family gradually deserted him. By the end of 1932 he had lost most of his support and his destoolment was confirmed by a properly constituted State Council in April 1933 (though the Governor did not recognize the destoolment until March 1934). The principal supporters of each side in 1930 are listed in Diagram 4.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>For Kojo Tsibu II</th>
<th>Against Kojo Tsibu II</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>MANHEN</em> Kojo Tsibu II</td>
<td>Kobina Kuffuor (Ex-Nkawhen of Kumasi, and a potential successor to Kojo Tsibu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denkyira Stool Family</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWAFOREN Kwame Konnin</td>
<td>ADJTSENHEN/TUFOREN Kojo Kodia II*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BENKUMHEN/KUKATSIREHN Yaw Darku*</td>
<td>GYASEHEN Kweisi Sawu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OGYAHEN Kobina Amakua</td>
<td>NKYIDOMHEN Kobina Fosu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KRONKRONHEN Kofi Bautasi</td>
<td>EBUAKWAHEN/NIFAHEN Kwame Enyimadu IV*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The asafo of Sefwi and Assuanso, and a small minority of the villages in Lower Denkyira.</td>
<td>The asafo of Jukwa (capital of Denkyira), and the majority of villages in Lower Denkyira.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These chiefs held two Wing titles simultaneously. In Denkyira the Tufohen was a wing chief and stool holder, not an asafo captain.

The leaders of the two factions were the *manhen* and Adontsenhen/Tufohen Kojo Kodia II.

21. The details of this dispute are taken from GNA-CC, DAO 197 and DAO 1021, and from interviews with the *Odofuo* Boa Amponsem III and his elders on 7 and 14 February 1972.
This dispute started as a faction dispute similar to those described in Anomabu and Abura: each member of a faction had a different reason for opposing or supporting Tsibu, and each faction was united only by the common hostility or friendship of its members to Tsibu or to Kojo Kodia II, the Adontsenhen/Tufonen. The latter, like his predecessors, regarded himself as 'kingmaker' and felt that Tsibu was becoming too independent of his influence. The Gyaasehen, Kwesi Sawu, had been quarrelling with Tsibu over land allocation since 1924. The Nkyidomhen, Kobina Posu, resented the Jmanhen's interference with the Royal Mausoleum, traditionally the responsibility of the Nkyidomhen; their disagreement had led to the purported 'destoolment' of Kobina Posu by the Jmanhen and State Council in 1926. The Ebuakwahen, Kobina Enyimadu IV - who, as Jen of Buabinso, was by far the most powerful chief in Upper Denkyira - was waging a constant battle against the interference of the Jmanhen in the judicial and fiscal affairs of Buabinso. Enyimadu had even declared the independence of Buabinso from Denkyira in 1929, though he withdrew from this declaration when he realized that his interests would be better served by an alliance with Kojo Kodia II. The four major Wing Chiefs who supported Tsibu were also from Upper Denkyira. Like Enyimadu, they had their quarrels with Tsibu over courts and taxation, but when Enyimadu, the most powerful chief in Upper Denkyira, allied with Kojo Kodia II, the most powerful chief in Lower Denkyira, they felt that the alliance represented a greater threat than Tsibu to the relative freedom from interference hitherto enjoyed by Upper Denkyira.

22. Relations between the Jmanhen and the Adontsenhen in Denkyira had been strained for generations, and remained so until 1969, when the Jmanhen and State Council removed the command of the Adontsen Wing from the Jen of Diaso and gave it to the Jen of Denkyira Obuasi, who is also the Twafohen of Denkyira. See page 31 above.
chiefs, and they therefore supported Tsibu. 23 The mberantse (commoners) of Jukwa were hostile to the Jmanhen partly because of the excessive fines levied in his Tribunal and partly out of loyalty to the Nkyidomhen and Gyasehen, who were both Jukwa chiefs. Other chiefs and villages supported or opposed Tsibu for a host of transactional reasons.

The opposition to Tsibu, then, was at first a purely pragmatic, transactional, single-interest alliance - a faction in the strict sense, with a wholly intra-state focus. By April 1930, however, the opponents of Tsibu had adopted a common stand on a colonial issue: they opposed the attendance of the Jmanhen at the Government-sponsored Provincial Council of Chiefs. This change becomes very obvious when one compares the destoolment charges served on the Jmanhen in August 1929 with the fresh set of charges served in March 1930. In 1929, 39 charges were served, and the question of the Provincial Council is given very little attention indeed: the charge of attending the Provincial Council without the support of the Jman is listed as charge No.28, above the charge of having no fifth toe on one of his feet, but below that of riding a bicycle and falling off it onto the grass. 24 In March 1930, however, only four charges are listed, and that relating to the Provincial Council is given first, above those of failing to give a proper account of Stool money, attempting to steal Stool paraphernalia and treasures, and desecrating the Royal Mausoleum. 25

23. It was not until Tsibu had lost most of his authority following the murder of Kobina Kuffuor, and therefore ceased to be able to protect the Upper Denkyira chiefs against the threats of the Adontsenhen, that the Upper Denkyira Chiefs came to an understanding with the Adontsenhen and joined his party in August 1932. It is interesting to note that it was the District Commissioners of Dunkwa and Cape Coast who arranged this reconciliation and guaranteed the Upper Denkyira chiefs against any trickery by the Adontsenhen: having failed to persuade Kojo Tsibu to abdicate, the D.C.s decided that the only way to peace in Denkyira was his proper legal destoolment. GNA-CC, DAO 197, E. Norton Jones, D.C. Cape Coast to C.C.P., 25 April 1932 and R.S. Cooper, Ag. D.C. Dunkwa to C.W.P. 10 August 1932.

24. GNA-CC, DAO 1021, Charges preferred against Jmanhen Kojo Tsibu II by Kojo Kodia II, Adontsenhen and Tufohen, et.al., 26 August 1929.

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The opposition to Tsibu, then, was at first a purely pragmatic, transactional, single-interest alliance - a faction in the strict sense, with a wholly intra-state focus. By April 1930, however, the opponents of Tsibu had adopted a common stand on a colonial issue: they opposed the attendance of the Jmanhen at the Government-sponsored Provincial Council of Chiefs. This change becomes very obvious when one compares the destoolment charges served on the Jmanhen in August 1929 with the fresh set of charges served in March 1930. In 1929, 39 charges were served, and the question of the Provincial Council is given very little attention indeed: the charge of attending the Provincial Council without the support of the Jman is listed as charge No.28, above the charge of having no fifth toe on one of his feet, but below that of riding a bicycle and falling off it onto the grass. In March 1930, however, only four charges are listed, and that relating to the Provincial Council is given first, above those of failing to give a proper account of Stool money, attempting to steal Stool paraphernalia and treasures, and desecrating the Royal Mausoleum.

23. It was not until Tsibu had lost most of his authority following the murder of Kobina Kuffuor, and therefore ceased to be able to protect the Upper Denkyira chiefs against the threats of the Adontsenhen, that the Upper Denkyira Chiefs came to an understanding with the Adontsenhen and joined his party in August 1932. It is interesting to note that it was the District Commissioners of Dunkwa and Cape Coast who arranged this reconciliation and guaranteed the Upper Denkyira chiefs against any trickery by the Adontsenhen; having failed to persuade Kojo Tsibu to abdicate, the D.C.s decided that the only way to peace in Denkyira was his proper legal destoolment. GNA-CC, DAO 197, E. Norton Jones, D.C. Cape Coast to C.P., 25 April 1932 and R.G. Cooper, Ag. D.C. Dunkwa to C.W.P. 10 August 1932.

24. GNA-CC, DAO 1021, Charges preferred against Jmanhen Kojo Tsibu II by Kojo Kodia II, Adontsenhen and Tufchen, et.al., 26 August 1929.

The opposition do not here come quite out into the open on their hostility to the Provincial Council: they accuse Tsibu only of misusing the Provincial Council and the Native Administration Ordinance, and of misrepresenting the purpose powers of the Provincial Council, thereby bringing it into disrepute and causing unrest and agitation against it. It is clear from their activities and propaganda, however, that at least some of the agitation against the Council is their own, and that they did oppose the Council in its existing form. Such opposition became their rallying cry, their shibboleth, and they came to be called the Adomye fo (the opposition, the rebels), as opposed to the Omanhen's supporters who were called the Kansilfo (literally 'Council people', i.e. the supporters of the Provincial Council). The question of Provincial Council attendance henceforth became one of the main issues in the dispute.

The advantages of uniting under this kind of 'moral' or ideological banner are obvious. Firstly, it provided a rallying cry, a ready means of identifying oneself with other members of a faction. Secondly, it provided cohesion to what was otherwise a very loose alliance: it reinforced the commitment of the Adontsenhen's following and created a 'core' committed to a 'moral' stand which transcended their purely personal interests. Thirdly, and very significantly, it gave the adomye fo a means of expressing their resentment of the support given to Kojo Tsibu by the Government (in the persons of the District and Provincial Commissioners), by directly opposing an important Government policy, in this case the encouragement and expansion of the Provincial Council system. Finally, the adomye fo, by taking an anti-Government stand, could draw upon the existing resentment of Government interference in local affairs, which, as we shall see, had increased rapidly after 1927.

Once it had been introduced into the political arena in Denkyira, the Provincial Council issue became an issue in its own right, independent of the

particular dispute in which it had originally been used as a rallying cry. Long after Kojo Tsibu's removal there was a group of adomyefo which remained implacably hostile to the Provincial Council, a group which resorted to violence in a riot in Jukwa in September 1967. 27

The same process took place in Denkyira between 1939 and 1942. This time the opposition was to Omanhen Nkwantabissa III, who was elected in 1933, recognised by Government in 1934, and who abdicated in 1942 as a result of a crisis somewhat similar to that of 1930-34. The issue taken up by the adomyefo in this case was whether or not the Denkyira State should establish a stool treasury and levy rates. Once again the opponents of the Denkyirahen took the anti-Government stand - they opposed the Treasury and the levy - and once again the issue survived the dispute to become an issue in its own right. It is significant that one of the major reasons for the commoners' hostility to Nkwantabissa III was his attendance at the Provincial Council: an issue which has been used as a stick with which to beat Kojo Tsibu II became a reason for beating Nkwantabissa III. 28

This process can be seen taking place again and again in South-Central Ghana in the late colonial period: that is (a) the introduction of a colonial political issue into the local arena as a moral (normative) theme uniting a transactional (pragmatic) faction; (b) the carrying over of the same normative theme into subsequent disputes; and (c) its elevation into an independent issue within the local political arena, over which people fought for its own sake rather than using it as a mere tool or resource. Either (a) and (c) or (b) and (c) might, of course, take place simultaneously.

It was through the controversy over stool treasuries that colonial issues were brought into the arena in Anomabu. By 1939 Zacchaeus Acquah was once again a candidate for the Jmanhen's Stool. The factions described in

27. GNA-CC, DAO 625, Confidential Diary, Cape Coast District, entry for 28 September 1937.

28. GNA-CC, DAO 197 and DAO 529.
section 3.2 had realigned by this time, but they retained the same basic structure. The Tufohen and other opponents of Acquah raised the question of stool treasuries: Acquah appeared to be in favour of the establishment of a treasury in Anomabu, and this became one of the issues in the dispute.29

Throughout the area, as in Denkyira and Anomabu, it was generally (though not always) the adomyefo, those who opposed the smanhen and his allies, who took up the anti-Government stand in these disputes. The smanhen and his supporters wanted to preserve the status quo, whereas the adomyefo wanted to introduce change either by destooling the smanhen or by changing the constitution to weaken his position. Such changes had to conform to the provisions of the Native Administration Ordinance of 1927, which governed destoolments and the interpretation of the state constitutions. The Native Administration Ordinance, however, was an extremely complex piece of legislation: District Commissioners found difficulty in understanding its provisions, and it is hardly surprising that the leaders of factions in the states, advised by badly educated Registrars, frequently misinterpreted it.30

This, combined with the fact that the Ordinance failed to take sufficient account of local variations in practice, meant that the destoolments and constitutional changes brought in by the adomyefo rarely conformed to the provisions of the Ordinance. In many such cases the D.C. recognised that a large majority in the state supported the adomyefo, but because the smanhen still had the law on his side, the D.C. was obliged to support him, whether he wanted to or not.

In Denkyira, for example, the D.C. and the Provincial Commissioner recognized that hardly anybody in the state except the Stool Family supported Tsibu by August 1932; but his destoolment was not according to the letter of the law and they were obliged, under the orders of the Secretary for Native

29. GNA-CC, DAO 240.

30. There are many examples of this in entries in the Confidential Diaries and 'Native Affairs' files in GNA-CC. See also GNA-Accra, AD 11/1/794, and Chapter 5 below.
Affairs, to uphold Tsibu's legal authority as Jmanhen against the Regent appointed by the adomyefo. They had to confine their efforts on behalf of the adomyefo to attempts to persuade Kojo Tsibu to abdicate and the adomyefo to get together and secure a legal destoolment. Even after the state was wholly united against Tsibu, the State Council had to meet several times before the destoolment of Tsibu and the election and installation of Nkwantabissa III were performed in a manner acceptable to the S.N.A. as conforming to the Native Administration Ordinance. It was for this reason that the destoolment was not recognized by the Governor until March 1934; meanwhile the D.C. had to recognize Tsibu as the reigning Jmanhen. In such circumstances the adomyefo, finding themselves in opposition to the D.C. as well as the Jmanhen, would naturally take an anti-Government stand in order to fight the D.C.'s influence, while the Jmanhen would take a pro-Government stand in order to court and encourage his support.

3.5 Colonial administration and rural politics in South-Central Ghana, 1919-51.

In the rest of this study we shall try to fit the phenomenon described above into the actual development of rural politics in South-Central Ghana. Before we begin, however, it would be as well to summarize the argument which will be presented in the following chapters.

The British colonial Government paid very little attention to the administration of the rural areas of the Gold Coast in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Although the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1883 as amended in 1910 gave substantial legal powers over the chiefs to the political officers, actual interference by these officers was infrequent and superficial in practice. Officials usually interfered only in supervising the chiefs' tribunals and in attempting to prevent or settle disputes which might lead to a breach of the peace. In other words, the practice in this

31. See footnote 23.
32. GNA-CC, DAO 197.
Affairs, to uphold Tsibu's legal authority as Jmanhen against the Regent appointed by the adomyefo. They had to confine their efforts on behalf of the adomyefo to attempts to persuade Kojo Tsibu to abdicate and the adomyefo to get together and secure a legal destoolment.\(^{31}\) Even after the state was wholly united against Tsibu, the State Council had to meet several times before the destoolment of Tsibu and the election and installation of Nkwantabissa III were performed in a manner acceptable to the S.N.A. as conforming to the Native Administration Ordinance. It was for this reason that the destoolment was not recognized by the Governor until March 1934; meanwhile the D.C. had to recognize Tsibu as the reigning Jmanhen.\(^{32}\) In such circumstances the adomyefo, finding themselves in opposition to the D.C. as well as the Jmanhen, would naturally take an anti-Government stand in order to fight the D.C.'s influence, while the Jmanhen would take a pro-Government stand in order to court and encourage his support.

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\(^{31}\) See footnote 23.

\(^{32}\) GNA-CC, DAO 197.
period followed a non-interventionist, more indirect model of indirect rule.

At the end of the 1920s, however, the Government began to adopt an interventionist policy of indirect rule, in an attempt to make the chiefs 'a living part of the machinery of Government'. The chiefs and their state councils were to be given greater responsibility for implementing central Government policies and they were to be encouraged to initiate local development 'under the close supervision of Political Officers'. As a result, there was increasing interference by officials in the affairs of the states, and an attempt to co-ordinate the activities of the chiefs by co-opting them into the machinery of consultation and decision making through the Provincial Councils and their membership of the Legislative Council.

This new policy had two important results. The first was an increasing hostility to the Government in the rural areas. The interference of Government officials in local affairs was resented and mistrusted by large sections of the rural population, and there was a persistent refusal to co-operate in Government schemes (though, as we shall see, there were other reasons for opposition to the Government besides hostility to its local administration policies). There was agitation against the new policies and criticism of those who helped in their implementation.

Because of this agitation and criticism, and because of their own desire to preserve their independence, many chiefs and state councils were reluctant to implement Government-sponsored schemes or to establish the treasuries or levy the rates which the Government thought essential for local development. The Government therefore introduced legislation to give administrative officers more and more powers over the chiefs, both to compel them to establish

33. Sir Ransford Slater, Native Administration in the Gold Coast and its Dependencies, Confidential Minute by His Excellency the Governor (Accra, Government Printing Office, 1930).

34. Ibid.
treasuries and levy rates, and to supervise their day-to-day administration. Thus began a continuous and self-reinforcing hardening of attitudes: the more stubborn the opposition to indirect rule became, the more interventionist the Government's policy; the more interventionist the Government's policy became, the more stubborn the opposition to indirect rule.

The second result of the new policy was to exclude many members of the educated elite at Cape Coast from the positions of power and influence which they had formerly held. The chiefs were now the officially recognized spokesmen of African opinion in the rural areas, and the Provincial Councils replaced the A.R.P.S. as the body to which the Government turned in seeking that opinion. The role of the educated elite was to be confined to their membership of the Municipal Corporation and the Legislative Council; while on the latter body their influence was more than counterbalanced by that of the representatives of the provincial Councils. A section of the educated elite at Cape Coast, led by Kobina Sekyi and the A.R.P.S. which he now dominated, therefore came to lay less stress on its attempts to influence the central Government directly in Accra and London, and turned its attention to the rural areas. Its main tactic was to sabotage the Provincial Councils and the whole machinery of Native Administration by attacking them at the grass roots level - at the level of the traditional states.

This they did by encouraging the anti-Government elements within the states. They spread anti-Government propaganda; they encouraged factions which were beginning to take an anti-Government stand; they gave advice on the law, on tactics and on propaganda to anti-Government factions; they may even have given them money and other material assistance. They acted, in other words, as a catalyst to the formation of anti-Government 'parties' in the states.

It was to the combination of these two factors - the increasing resentment of Government interference in the rural areas, and the willingness of Sekyi and his followers to co-ordinate the resulting opposition - that we can
attribute the transformation of factions into anti-Government 'parties' in the traditional states. Pro-Government parties emerged either because they had no option but to oppose the propaganda of the adomyere, or because of a genuine 'moral' commitment to the rural development schemes which the Government were encouraging.
CHAPTER 4 INDIRECT RULE IN THE GOLD COAST, 1874-1927

4.1 Types of indirect rule

Throughout British West Africa in the colonial period, one can distinguish three types or styles of indirect rule. They might more accurately be described as stages in the development of indirect rule, even though it is not always easy to separate them into distinct chronological periods, since there was considerable overlap between them.

1. In this study 'indirect rule' is used as a general term to denote the approach to local administration which relied on the use of traditional authorities for local government. 'Native administration' refers to the types of indirect rule established and practised in the Gold Coast under the Native Administration Ordinance (Colony), No. 18 of 1927 and the Native Authority (Colony) Ordinance, No. 21 of 1944. 'Native authority' refers to a body (usually chief and state council) whose powers and jurisdiction were regulated or established by these two Ordinances. 'Native authorities' were sometimes called 'native administrations' both before and after 1944; but this usage was exceptional, and has been avoided in this study in order to avoid confusion. Since most of the work which has previously been published on indirect rule in British West Africa is concerned with Nigeria, it is important to note that Nigerian usage was different from that of the Gold Coast: see A.H.M. Kirk-Greene (ed.) The Principles of Native Administration in Nigeria. Selected Documents 1900-1947 (London, Oxford University Press, 1965), p.30, n.1.

2. There is an extensive body of literature on indirect rule in British West Africa, and it is possible to list here only the most important works dealing directly with the subject. The most comprehensive technical study is Lord Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Territories (London, H.M.S.O., 1950-51), of which Part III (1951) deals with West Africa: no work before or since has surpassed Hailey's study in either the breadth or the depth of its coverage of the technical problems of legislation and policy implementation in indirect rule. For a historical survey of colonial administration in both British and French West Africa, see Michael Crowder, West Africa Under Colonial Rule (London, Hutchinson, 1968). For Nigeria see Sir F.D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (Edinburgh and London, Wm. Blackwood and Sons, 1922; 5th edition, with a new introduction by Margery Perham, London, Frank Cass, 1965); Margery Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria (London, Oxford University Press, 1937; reprinted 1962); A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, op.cit.; and I.F. Nicolson, The Administration of Nigeria, 1900 to 1960: Men, Methods, and Myths (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1970).

There is a surprising lack of specific studies of indirect rule in Ghana, Sierra Leone and Gambia: the subject is covered only in more general histories of these countries, and such coverage is necessarily rather sketchy.
The first stage was that of the protectorate, which was characterised by treaty relations between the British authorities and the indigenous rulers. The British left the government of the area under the protectorate almost entirely in the hands of those rulers, interfering only in very limited areas, such as the abolition of slave-trading or certain specified judicial matters. Examples of such protectorates were the Oil Rivers Protectorate in Nigeria from about 1885 to 1899, and the Sierra Leone hinterland from 1890 to 1901. Applied to Ghana the simple term 'protectorate' would be confusing in this context, since the actual declaration of the Protectorate over the Gold Coast in 1874 marked the beginning of the second stage of indirect rule, non-interventionist indirect rule. For Ghana, therefore, I shall borrow Agbodeka's term and refer to the first stage as 'informal protectorate'.

The second stage was that of non-interventionist indirect rule. During this stage the British made a definite commitment to govern the area - usually associated with the declaration of a Colony or a Protectorate - and took a more active interest in the area, both in developing its economic infrastructure and in controlling the indigenous rulers. With regard to the latter, however, they tended to confine their interest to two types of activity, namely, supporting and strengthening the authority of the chiefs against the stresses and pressures of social and economic change in the colonies, and regulating certain functions of the chiefs, especially their judicial functions.


5. The terms 'interventionist indirect rule' and 'non-interventionist indirect rule' are taken from Crowder, West Africa Under Colonial Rule; see especially pp. 168 f, 211-213, 219-221.
This stage was sometimes called 'direct rule' by its critics, because the Government took a much more direct and active interest in the development of the colony than in the first stage. The Government undertook directly the organization of major projects such as railways and major roads, harbours, hospitals, etc., while on the whole it left the chiefs to themselves in the day-to-day administration of their states. There were some spheres of action in which the chief governed independently of the district commissioner or district officer, others in which the chief's activities were regulated by Ordinance, and yet others in which the Government acted directly without reference to the chiefs. In other words, administration was conducted by the chief (with or without the sanction of Ordinance) in some spheres, while policy was implemented directly by the district commissioner or district officer in others - it was rare for the district commissioner or district officer to implement policy through the chief. It was this which distinguished non-interventionist from interventionist indirect rule.

Examples of non-interventionist indirect rule were the administration of Yorubaland between 1899 and 1912, and of Sierra Leone between 1901 and 1937. In the Gold Coast Colony the second stage lasted from about 1874 to 1927, though during Guggisberg's administration (1919-27) there was some movement towards interventionist indirect rule.

6. For example, Slater says of the non-interventionist system which he is trying to replace, '... our system is more nearly akin to "Direct Rule" than to "Indirect Rule".' Sir Ransford Slater, Governor of the Gold Coast, Confidential Minute on Native Administration in the Gold Coast and its Dependencies (Accra, Government Printing Office, 1930), paragraph 3. See section 5.1 below.

7. Hailey, Native Administration, Part III, Chapters VII and IX; Nicolson, Administration of Nigeria, pp. 46 ff; Fyfe, Sierra Leone, Chapter XXIII.
Interventionist indirect rule was the fully fledged system of indirect rule advocated by Lugard, Cameron and Slater. Under this system the primary aim of local administration policy was the economic and social development of the rural areas, and the traditional authorities were seen mainly as agents in this development. Instead of simply supporting the authority of chiefs as a cheap and convenient alternative to direct administration by British officials, or encouraging the adaptation of chieftaincy for survival against the pressures of the colonial situation, so that it could provide an element of stability in a situation of rapid change, the new policy sought to mould the traditional authorities into efficient instruments of local development.

In this stage, the emphasis changed from government by the chiefs to government by the British through the chiefs. District commissioners and departmental officers were expected to work in close co-operation with chiefs and their councils, encouraging them to implement central Government policies, to initiate their own schemes for development, and to modify the traditional organization of their states in order to make them more efficient agents of development. The most important modifications of the organization of the states were those concerning fiscal administration: the establishment of state treasuries, the levying of local rates, etc.

Although this system was formulated quite clearly and consistently in policy documents, it was very rarely that it could be fully implemented in the field: to be strictly accurate, one should describe the third stage in

8. Lord Lugard, Dual Mandate; Sir Donald Cameron, The Principles of Native Administration and their Application, 1934, reprinted in Kirk-Greene, Principles of Native Administration, pp.193-225; Slater, Native Administration.

Cameron's policy was more interventionist than Lugard's: he described his system as 'indirect administration' rather than 'indirect rule' (op. cit., p.193). Cameron's policy was, nevertheless, a continuation and re-interpretation of Lugard's rather than a new departure; both clearly belong within the same category of interventionist indirect rule. For a comparison of Lugard's and Cameron's policies see Kirk-Greene, Principles of Native Administration, pp.23-26 and Perham, Native Administration, Chapter XX. I refer here to the policy advocated by Lugard rather than what he practised: Nicolson, Administration of Nigeria, provides convincing evidence of the disparity between the two.

9. Nicolson characterises the second and third stages as those of government by the chiefs and government through the chiefs: Administration of Nigeria, p.65.
the development of indirect rule as that of usually unsuccessful, and sometimes disastrous, attempts by colonial Governments to set up an interventionist system of indirect rule. The policy appears, however, to have had some success in Northern Nigeria under Sir Charles Temple between 1911 and 1918 and under Sir Richmond Palmer between 1925 and 1930. In the Gold Coast the system was introduced as official policy by Sir Ransford Slater in 1930, and the Government continued to try to implement it until the passing of the Local Government Ordinance in 1951.

Each of the three stages of indirect rule involved a certain amount of interference by the colonial Government in the affairs of the traditional states, but this interference was both greater and of a different kind in the third stage than in the first two. Under informal protectorate and non-interventionist indirect rule, the British encroached upon and interfered with the authority of the chiefs: they interfered with the foreign policy of the states so as to control or avoid wars between them; they tried to curtail certain practices, such as slave trading or witchcraft, which were abhorrent to their moral code; they restricted and regulated the jurisdiction of chiefs; and they even made occasional efforts to encourage the chiefs to effect improvements in such matters as sanitation and house building. Except in the judicial sphere, however, this interference was superficial and sporadic in practice. The British administrations were mainly interested in the maintenance of peace and order in order to facilitate trade and commerce.

Interventionist indirect rule arose out of a different kind of commitment. The main aim of British policy in this stage was the development of the rural areas, and the traditional authorities were seen as the agents of this policy.


11. This applies, of course, only to the rural areas, not to large towns, administrative headquarters, or towns in mining and other areas with a comparatively large European population. In such towns the development of local government followed a very different pattern.
The organizational method which was needed for this developmental effort was different from that which was needed in the first two stages. In order to get the chiefs to undertake what were essentially alien projects, the British attempted to modify and modernize the institution of chieftaincy. Officials had to interfere in the day-to-day administration of the states, and to involve themselves in local political disputes, in order to remove the local political barriers to development and make the traditional states an integral part of the machinery of government and development.

From the point of view of the states themselves, one might say that the British had been essentially an external force, a foreign power, in the first two stages, but became a force within the states in the third. The district commissioner or the technical officer became one of the contestants in the local political arena, and involved himself in its administration and its disputes, in a way in which he had never done before. Consequently, a secondary resistance to the colonial Government as a Government, as part of the political system into which the states were now integrated, was added to the primary resistance to the territorial and jurisdictional expansion of British authority. Thus the interference in the third stage was different in kind and in degree from what it had been in the first two stages, and so was the reaction to it.

4.2 The establishment of non-interventionist indirect rule, 1874-1900

We shall now turn to the development of the policy, practice, and African politics.

12. The establishment and practice of indirect rule in the Gold Coast was complicated throughout the colonial period by an important legal controversy about the relationship between the chiefs and the British Crown. This controversy, and the way it affected indirect rule legislation, are described in Appendix B.

reaction to, indirect rule in the Gold Coast from about 1874 to 1927. With characteristic insight, Hailey wrote of this period,

'A study of the long period during which the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance was in force [1883-1927] leaves one in doubt whether the government felt any serious concern to secure a better agency of local administration, and its attention seems to have been focused on the failure of the Ordinance to provide a better system of native justice'.

This comment summarizes the policies which we shall be describing in the rest of this chapter.

In 1874 the British Government finally rejected the policy of gradual withdrawal from the West African Coast which had been recommended by the Parliamentary Select Committee in 1865. There were various reasons for this change of policy, among which the most important as far as the Gold Coast was concerned were, according to Agbodeka, the improved economic prospects of the Gold Coast, and the threat to British interests revealed directly by the Asante War of 1873-4 and indirectly by the formation of the Fante Confederacy between 1868 and 1871. After the declaration of the Protectorate in 1874 the main concern of the colonial Government was the establishment and expansion of British rule in the area.

In this connection, the Government had to decide what should be its attitude to the chiefs. After intensive discussion from about 1870 onwards, the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance was passed in 1878. This Ordinance established a non-interventionist indirect rule, in which the government of the rural areas, and the administration of justice in minor civil and criminal cases and all land tenure cases, was left as far as possible in the hands of

14. For the Select Committee see Metcalfe, Documents, Chapter 18.
the chiefs, with the Government playing a regulatory and supervisory role. 16

The implementation of the Ordinance was delayed until 1883, when it was repealed and re-enacted. There were two reasons for the delay. In the first place both C.C. Lees (Acting Governor from May 1878 to June 1879) and H.T. Ussher (Governor from June 1879 to November 1880) argued that there were not enough officials in the Gold Coast to implement the Ordinance properly. 17 In the second place it had been taken almost for granted that stipends would eventually be paid to chiefs, probably financed by some form of direct taxation; but Ussher opposed this on the grounds that indirect taxes were already heavy, that the Gold Coast already had a substantial surplus as a result, and that the collection of direct taxes would not, therefore, be 'worth the risk and trouble of attempting it ...'. 18

With regard to taxation Ussher won his point: the imposition of direct taxation was not attempted and stipends were not paid to chiefs. On the first issue, however, Ussher's point of view was the opposite of that held by the Colonial Office. Ussher believed that a proper system of government through the chiefs could not be introduced until British control over the Protectorate was firmly established, and he therefore proposed that the first step should be to appoint district commissioners in the interior, especially in Tarkwa, Mansu and the Volta. 19 The reply of Kimberley, the Secretary of State, revealed how much Colonial Office thinking differed from Ussher's and how non-interventionist its policy was. Kimberley recognized the importance of the appointment of Civil Commissioners at such places as Tarkwa and the Volta (for the supervision of mines, border affairs, the prevention of smuggling, etc.) but, he added,

18. Ussher to Hicks-Beach, 21 January 1880, loc.cit.
19. Ibid.
'I entertain doubts as to the expediency of creating such an office for the interior Fante district ...'

'The appointment of a Commissioner in this district must, as it appears to me, involve a considerable amount of that interference with the authority of the native chiefs, which I have explained to you ... to be contrary to the policy which her Majesty's Government are anxious to see carried out in the Protectorate; namely, that the local administration should, as far as practicable, be left in the hands of the native chiefs, and their authority supported within reasonable limits. If the Protectorate were to be divided into separate districts, each under the control of a European Commissioner, not only would the direct responsibility of the Government be largely increased, but progressive augmentation of expenditure would be certain to follow, both of which results would, in my opinion, be very undesirable'.

This was the clearest possible statement of the policy of non-interventionist indirect rule favoured by the Colonial Office. Ussher died in November 1880, and his successor, Sir Samuel Rowe, agreed with the Colonial Office on this question, as did Rowe's successors. For the next twenty years, therefore, the policy of the Gold Coast Government followed the principles laid down in Kimberley's despatch.

It is true that the Government made sporadic efforts to effect improvements in the Protectorate outside the headquarters towns, and that they attempted to administer some of these through the chiefs. There were, for example, Kennedy's largely unsuccessful efforts in 1870 to open up the roads, solve the problems of porterage, and to raise the standard of sanitation by forbidding intramural burial. There were rather more successful attempts


to improve the transport and communications system in the last decade of the
century, into which the chiefs were reluctantly drawn by the Trade Roads
Ordinance of 1894, the Compulsory Labour Ordinance of 1895 and the Telegraph
Ordinance of 1896.²³ And, of course, there was the abolition of slavery in
1874.²⁴ Except for the last, however (and it is uncertain how successful
even the abolition of slavery was in practice), these measures had a very
limited effect on rural life in the Protectorate.

Perhaps the best indication of the Government's lack of interest in the
day-to-day local administration of the Protectorate was the manner in which
the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance was implemented. It was applied initially
to only six Head Chiefs, and only one more was added before 1898.²⁵ Agbodeka
has shown, furthermore, that the Ordinance was applied in the nineteenth
century only to troublesome peripheral areas - Tarkwa, Akyem and Akwapem-Krepi -
and that its main function was to establish British supremacy in these rebell­
ious areas rather than actually to regulate local government.²⁶

Virtually the only sphere in which the Government showed any real
concern for the rural areas was in regulating the chiefs' courts; and even
here they acted mainly by setting up procedures for appeal and the revision
of sentences (under the Supreme Court Ordinance of 1876 and the Native
Jurisdiction Ordinance), rather than through attempts to improve the chiefs'
courts themselves.²⁷

Naturally the expansion and consolidation of British supremacy was
resisted by the people of the Gold Coast, and the chiefs and the educated

elite worked together to thwart British encroachments. The Fante Confederacy was established to provide an indigenous system of government on the assumption that, following the report of the Select Committee in 1865, the British would be gradually withdrawing from the Coast; the supporters of the Confederacy hoped that it would eventually replace the British in administering the Protectorate. The Aborigines Rights Protection Society was set up in 1897 mainly to resist the British attempt to vest 'Waste Lands, Forest Lands and Minerals in the Queen'.

Resistance was not offered only at the colonial level; it also arose within individual states, as a result either of the direct opposition of a whole state to the expansion of British authority, as in Wassa and Akwapem in the 1870s and 1880s, or of the reaction of a faction in a state to British support for their rivals, as in Akyem in 1887-89.

In none of these cases, however, was the actual political organization of the state transformed in the manner described in chapter 3 above. From inside the states the British were still regarded as a foreign power, an external force, which they resisted either by combining against it, as in the Fante Confederacy and the A.R.P.S., or by the scattered resistance of individual states, as in Wassa and Akwapem. Even where sections of states supported the British, as in Akyem, they did so because in a particular dispute their interests coincided directly with those of the British, whom


31. To say that the A.R.P.S. in the early years regarded the British as a 'foreign power' is not to say that they did not recognize the colonial status of the Gold Coast. To the A.R.P.S., however, colonial status did not mean loss of sovereignty. See, for example, J.E. Casely Hayford, Gold Coast Native Institutions (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1903; new impression, London, Frank Cass, 1970), pp. 165-167.
they therefore saw as useful allies, a powerful external resource. Atafuah, the King of Akyem Kotoku, allied with the British in 1887-88 in his dispute with Chief Kwabena Okyere of Wankyi over the ownership of the Oda ferry; but he opposed them in 1888-89 over the settlement of the Kokofu refugees. He and his supporters could not be said in any sense to have become a pro-British 'party' in 1887-88, or an anti-British one in 1888-89: their reaction to the British was a purely pragmatic, transactional one. The influence of the colonial Government in the rural areas was too diffuse and too superficial to have effected any real transformation in the organization of rural politics in the nineteenth century.

This is not to deny that there were important changes in rural society in the late nineteenth century, and ones in which the colonial presence played a vital part; such a denial would be patently absurd. What we are arguing is that although there may have been profound changes in social and political relationships in the rural areas, the essential change in the actual organization of political life, the transformation of factions into parties, did not take place to any significant extent until the late 1920s and the 1930s. The changes in rural society before the 1920s might be seen as a necessary condition for the later change in the organization of rural politics, which in turn might be seen as a necessary condition for the rise of mass politics in the post-war period.


33. This applies only to the rural areas; it does not apply to Cape Coast, a comparatively large town which had been the headquarters of the Gold Coast until 1877, and a provincial headquarters after that. British interference in Cape Coast affairs had always been much greater than in the rural areas of South-Central Ghana, and the resistance to it had been correspondingly more intense. From King Aggrey's time onwards Cape Coast affairs were dominated by the colonial presence. See, for example, Kimble, Political History, Chapter V and Agbodeka, African Politics, pp.17f, 123ff.

4.3 The expansion of Government activities, 1890-1919

The turn of the twentieth century saw a great increase in the level of Government activity in the Gold Coast Colony, in relation both to the development of the economic infrastructure and to the regulation of the activities of the chiefs.

The Gold Coast Government's interest in developing the economic infrastructure was partly a result of Chamberlain's new policy of developing the 'undeveloped estates', but mainly it was a response to the extraordinary expansion of the economy of the Gold Coast in the spheres of mining, timber and, most important of all, cocoa.\(^{35}\)

The main thrust of the Government's development policy was directed towards the improvement of the system of transport and communications. An Inspector of Trade Roads was appointed in 1890 and two Sub-Inspectors in 1892; a Roads Department was established in 1895 and it was absorbed into a re-organized Public Works Department in 1896.\(^{36}\) These reorganizations reflected the increasing interest of the Government in establishing a good road network. In the Central Province, a road from Cape Coast to Anomabu was built in 1892, the Cape Coast-Kumasi road was rebuilt between 1895 and 1900, and roads were built from Appam and Winneba to the palm oil centres of Abodom and Swedru by 1905;\(^{37}\) by 1920-21 the Central Province had 231 miles of P.W.D. roads and

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36. For a discussion of the error of the view that the colonial Government in Ghana pursued a laissez-faire economic policy, and of the limits to their policy of maximizing trade, see G.B. Kay (ed.), The political economy of colonialism in Ghana, a collection of documents and statistics, 1900-1960 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1972), Preface and Introduction.

443 miles of 'political' and other roads. 38

Other important work was also undertaken by the Government. A Mines Survey Department was created in 1900, and in 1907 it was made into an independent Survey Department (with F.G. Guggisberg, the future Governor, as its Director); a map of the Colony was produced in 1906, and a series of sheets on the scale 1/125,000 were produced in 1907-8. 39 Between 1900 and 1919 the number of Post Offices in Ghana was increased from 34 to 110, the number of telegraph offices from 27 to 60, and the miles of telegraph line from 688 to 2,762. 40

Finally, the Government tried to pass measures to regulate land usage in connection with the mining, timber and cocoa industries. The story of the Lands Bills of 1894 and 1897, and of the Forest Bills of 1907-12, show both the extent of the Government's interest in regulating land and mineral exploitation and the sensitivity of the chiefs and the A.R.P.S. on the issue (as well as the Government's ignorance of local laws and customs relating to land). 41 Despite the failure of these Bills, the Government was successful in taking some important measures for regulating land use. The Concessions

38. Kay, Political Economy, pp. 396f. At the end of the nineteenth century it had been proposed that a railway should be built northwards from Apam or Kormantie, linking the Central Province coast with the interior. These lines were never built, however, and the coastal areas of the Central Province were left out of the railway system: in this Province only the mining and timber areas around Dunkwa and Buabinso, and the cocoa-rich belt from Abobo to Oda were to be served by the railway. See Gould, Transportation Pattern, passim., and Kwanina B. Dickson, A Historical Geography of Ghana (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969), Chapter 10. The railway had an important indirect effect on the coastal areas: it directed a great amount of the traffic from the interior towards Takoradi and Accra, and away from Central Province ports like Cape Coast, Saltpond and Winneba, and led to the decline of such ports. By the end of the 1920s most of them had been closed or reduced to sufferance wharves. GNA-CC, DAO 1288.


40. Kay, Political Economy, pp. 400-402.

41. Kimble, Political History, Chapters IX and X.
Ordinance of 1900 and the Timber Protection Ordinance of 1907 provided a certain amount of protection against abuses, while the Forestry Department, created in 1909, began at least to accumulate the information on the basis of which a coherent forestry policy might be worked out, though its other activities were hampered by the failure of the Forest Bills.42

At the same time as the increase in the Government's activities in the field of development, there was also an increase in their interest in reforming the system of indirect rule. The pattern following the annexation of the Gold Coast Colony under the Order in Council of 1901 was similar to that following the declaration of the Protectorate in 1874: the annexation Order in Council represented a yet firmer commitment by the British Government to ruling the Gold Coast, and resulted in yet stronger measures to control the chiefs. So one more step was taken in the gradual development of non-interventionist into interventionist indirect rule.

There were many signs of this development, such as the creation of the Secretary for Native Affairs Department in 1902, or the application of the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance to over thirty new Head Chiefs between 1898 and 1909 (only seven had been brought under the Ordinance between 1883 and 1897).43 The clearest indication, however, was the spate of Bills and Ordinances introduced in the first two decades of the century in an attempt to block the innumerable loopholes in the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance. The Chiefs Ordinance of 1904 - which Hailey called 'the only measure of any importance bearing on native administration enacted during this period [1883-1927]...' - empowered the Governor to confirm the election and installation of a chief and made the Governor's decision final in a disputed election or destoolment, thus rendering the position of a confirmed chief unassailable in law (though it did not mean that a chief could not exercise legal powers unless he had

42. Ibid., pp. 355-357, 363.
43. Ibid., pp. 466, 462.
been formally recognized). The Stool Property Detention Ordinance of the same year enabled the Government to compel an ex-chief to hand over the regalia in a disputed election, once the Governor had made his decision.

The Native Jurisdiction Amendment Ordinance of 1910 was a milestone in indirect rule legislation: its two most important provisions were to bring all the Head Chiefs in the Colony under the Ordinance, and to separate the jurisdiction of chiefs' courts from that of the Supreme Court, so that instead of a concurrent jurisdiction, they had an exclusive jurisdiction within certain prescribed limits.

This movement towards reform was greatly accelerated under the Governorship of Sir Hugh Clifford (1912-19). Clifford was entirely convinced that 'The administration of this Colony ... can only be carried on by us through the agency of the native system of tribal government'. He was, on the other hand, aware of the stresses which that system was undergoing as a result of the economic and social revolution produced by the 'sudden and rapid development of the country's resources ...' He felt that the appropriate policy would be for the Government to give the chiefs 'a greater measure of support', in order to help them 'in adjusting the ancient machinery of


45. PRO, CO 96/614/38098/20, Minute by J.T. Furley, S.N.A., 18 February 1920, enclosure 3 in A.R. Slater, Ag. Gov., to S.of S., No.596 of 7 July 1920. There had been a previous attempt to effect similar reforms in a Native Jurisdiction Bill in 1907, but this had been thwarted both by the opposition of the A.R.P.S. and by disagreements between the Chief Justice, the Attorney General, and the Legislative Council special committee which was examining the Bill: GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/1138. The Chief Justice, W. Brandford Griffiths, also opposed the Native Jurisdiction Amendment Ordinance of 1910, and even went as far as to petition the Secretary of State against it: see Kimble, Political History, pp. 467f.

It is odd that Hailey (Native Administration, Part III, p.202) should have regarded the Chiefs Ordinance of 1904 as more important than this Ordinance: it may be that he regarded the later Ordinance as an extension of the principles implied in the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1883, whereas the Chiefs Ordinance was something of a departure in the powers it gave the Governor as the final authority in stool disputes.

46. PRO, CO 96/567/29227/16, Sir H. Clifford, Gov., to S.of S., Confidential Despatch of 26 May 1916.

47. Ibid.

tribal government to the changed conditions with which they are now beginning to be confronted. 49

Accordingly, after consultation with chiefs and officials throughout 1913, Clifford planned to set up a committee of three senior political officers in 1914 to draft a new Native Jurisdiction Ordinance. 50 Various transfers and re-arrangements necessitated by the War forced a postponement of these plans, but a new committee was set up in 1915, and after lengthy consultation with chiefs, officials and the Colonial Office, a new Native Jurisdiction Bill was given its first reading in Legislative Council on 19 February 1919. 51 The numerous amendments which the Government made to the Bill in an attempt to meet the objections of the African Members of Legislative Council and the eventual abandonment of the Bill in 1922, will be dealt with in the next section.

The important question is, how did the more dynamic policy reflected in the legislation and attempted legislation affect the actual administration of the rural areas? The judicial role of the chiefs was undoubtedly affected by the legislation, particularly by the Native Jurisdiction Amendment Ordinance of 1910 and the Native Prisons Ordinance of the same year. The position of the chiefs within the judicial system was more clearly defined, their jurisdiction was separated from that of the Supreme Court, and provincial and district commissioners were given greater powers of supervision over Native Prisons. 52

In matters of general administration, however, the new policy appears to have had much less effect. There were some moves in the direction of a more interventionist approach to indirect rule. The Ordinances of the 1890s

50. PRO, CO 96/543/13456/14.
51. PRO, CO 96/557/26204/15; CO 96/567/29227/16; CO 96/593/62729/18; CO 96/614/38098/20.
52. GWA-Accra, ADM 11/1/286, 287, 305 etc.
concerned with roads, telegraphs and compulsory labour required the chiefs undertake new tasks in carrying out central Government policy. Provisions had been made under the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1883 to enable the chiefs to make by-laws for village sanitation, town clearance, etc.; these provisions had been largely ignored until the end of the century, but now district commissioners did make some effort to get such by-laws passed.

These efforts had some impact in headquarters towns, where district commissioners were able to exercise the 'personal influence' and 'constant supervision' which were felt to be essential to their relationship with the chiefs in supervising development tasks. The district commissioners were, however, generally too preoccupied with headquarters affairs, judicial matters and stool disputes to pay much attention to administrative matters in the states outside their headquarters. To cite a typical case, the Omahen of Eguafo drew up by-laws in 1909 covering the cutting of timber, hunting, sanitary measures, public nuisances, etc. These were then submitted through the District Commissioner, Cape Coast to the Commissioner of the Central Province, who duly submitted them to the Secretary for Native Affairs for approval and Gazetting. The S.N.A. returned them to the C.C.P., pointing out that they were totally inadequate: their numbering was jumbled, their titling was confusing, and some of the by-laws were in direct conflict with the draft sanitary by-laws which the S.N.A. had recently sent to the C.C.P. for distribution among the chiefs of the Province. The C.C.P. had not commented on the Eguafo by-laws when he sent them to the S.N.A., and it is obvious that neither he nor the D.C. had read them properly. After the S.N.A. returned the by-laws the matter was shelved by the C.C.P.; no pressure seems to have been brought on the Omahen of Eguafo to re-write or amend the by-laws, and nothing further was heard of them.

53. PRO, CO 96/602/48217/19, Minute by A. Taylor on Duties of District Commissioners, 1 July 1919, enclosed in A.R. Slater, Ag. Gov., to S.of S., Confidential Despatch of 30 July 1919.
55. Ibid., F. Crowther, S.N.A., to C.C.P., 13 September 1909.
56. Ibid., Minutes on file, 1909-1911.
When Clifford took up office, he was only too aware of how superficial and haphazard the administration of the Colony was. He wrote in 1913.

'Only a very small beginning has been made in really administering the Colony... British rule in many parts of the Gold Coast has, so far, done little more than effect a change on the surface of things. 'Except in the towns in which Government headquarters of some kind or other have been established, the administration of the Colony is to a great extent theoretical rather than practical, and exists on paper rather than in fact'.

Clifford felt that the essential preliminary to a more dynamic administration was the reform of the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance, a matter which he regarded as being of the utmost urgency. But, as we have seen, he was frustrated by the War and by the opposition to the Bills put forward to reform the Ordinance.

So although the Government was committed in the first two decades of the twentieth century to an active policy of economic development, and although the chiefs were brought more fully into the judicial machinery, these remained two separate elements in the administration of the Colony. The two strands of development and indirect rule were not brought together, and in the sphere of administration, as opposed to that of justice, the style of indirect rule remained distinctly non-interventionist.

These developments were reflected in the development of African resistance to indirect rule. At the colonial level, the chiefs and the elite continued the kind of resistance we have already described, through persistent criticism in Legislative Council and through petitions to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The A.R.P.S., having been reformed and revitalized in 1907, fought the Forest Bills from 1907 to 1912 with virtually the same tactics as they


58. CO 96/597/8627/19.
had used against the Lands Bill in 1897-98. The chiefs and the educated elite of Accra opposed the Native Jurisdiction Amendment Bill in 1919 through a committee of 'scholars' presenting the petition of a conference of chiefs and scholars to the Secretary of State - A.R.P.S. tactics again.

In the rural areas of the Central Province, however, there were the first signs of a new style of resistance - an explicit resistance to indirect rule encouraged by members of the educated elite at Cape Coast. Resistance of this kind was still comparatively rare, and by no means as significant as it was later to become, but it was the first sign of things to come. The clearest example of it was the case of the Good Templars in Akyem between 1907 and 1919. The Order of Good Templars was a world wide Christian temperance society, and both the English and the American branches had established Lodges in the Central Province by the turn of the century. The American Lodge, which worked mainly in the coastal towns, remained a proper temperance society, but the English Lodge at Cape Coast, through its subsidiary, the 'Star of Hope' Lodge at Winneba, became involved in the politics of Akyem Kotoku and Akyem Abua. Youngmen (mberantse), many of them non-Christians, joined the Lodge in large numbers, and claimed that their membership of the Lodge freed them from their allegiance to their chiefs, whose courts they need no longer attend. W.Z. Coker, the Tufohen of Cape Coast, was Grand Master of the English Lodge, and many of the youngmen saw


60. PRO, CO 96/614/38098/20, Petition and correspondence from the Eastern Province Native Jurisdiction Bill Opposition Committee, enclosed in A.R. Slater, Ag. Gov., to S. of S., No. 596 of 7 July 1920. The Petition was signed on 30 December 1919 by 15 chiefs of the Eastern Province (mainly Accra), 8 barristers-at-law, 2 doctors, 9 'merchants, traders etc.', and one journalist (J.J. Akrong, Editor of the Gold Coast Independent). There were no chiefs on the Committee, which consisted of 34 commoners, nearly all members of the Accra educated elite.

61. The information for this case is drawn from GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/1388.
themselves as transferring their allegiance from their chiefs to Coker as head of this new organization: the D.C. Birim reported that 'from private information I elicited that the people are of the opinion that Mr. Coker's authority is far greater than that of the Chief or the Commissioner. When asked if they intended to pay their fines they said they must first consult Mr. Coker'. 62 The chiefs and Government had crushed this movement by 1910, but while it lasted the element of protest in it was obvious. Even the Secretary for Native Affairs recognized that

'... the rapid spread of the Society in Eastern and Western Akyem, where the people are uneducated and have little apparent interest in either Temperance or Religion seems to me to indicate that it is not a mere instance of groundless political discontent, but a natural attempt to counteract oppression & misgovernment on the part of the Head Chiefs of these Divisions'. 63

There were few other movements in which the element of political protest was as clear as that of the Akyem Good Templars; but the Templars incident, however exceptional, shows that resistance was beginning to build up against the increasing involvement of the chiefs with the colonial Government, and that there were people in Cape Coast who were willing and able to encourage and tap that resistance.

4.4 Guggisberg's administration, 1919-27

When Sir Gordon Guggisberg became Governor of the Gold Coast in 1919, he took over and accelerated Clifford's policies. Development, and support for chieftaincy, remained the two basic elements in local administration policy, as they had been under Clifford, and they remained separate, as they

62. Ibid., Extract from letter by J.J.K. Greensaway, D.C. Birrim, 3 February 1908, enclosed in F. Crowther, Ag. S.N.A., to Ag. C.C.P., 18 February 1908.

63. Ibid., W.C.F. Robertson, S.N.A., Minute to Governor, 16 May 1908.
had been under Clifford: 'Guggisberg simply added his own characteristic drive to the policy already initiated by Clifford ...'\(^{64}\)

In the sphere of development, Guggisberg's main interest lay in the major development programme at the colonial level under his Ten Year Development Plan of 1919 - such projects as the road and railway programme, Takoradi Harbour, Achimota School, Korle Bu Hospital, etc.\(^{65}\) But he was also interested in the promotion of local development - the provision of medical and sanitary services, the provision of educational facilities, and the encouragement of agricultural extension and co-operatives.

For the purposes of local development Guggisberg felt that the administration of the Colony should be decentralized in order to give local political and technical officers greater independence and further scope for initiative at the district level. A series of conferences of department heads and provincial and chief commissioners was held in 1920 to work out the best way of reorganizing the political and technical services to facilitate this decentralization.\(^{66}\)

It was clear from the beginning that, as far as Guggisberg and his officials were concerned,

'There can be no doubt that the great bulk of the work of developing this country falls on the Government Official. As the years pass we shall receive more and more help from the natives themselves, receive and welcome more and more natives into our ranks. But for the present, the heat of the day is borne by the official, and especially by the European'.\(^{67}\)

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\(^{64}\) Kimble, *Political History*, p.106. Kimble is referring here to the policy of Africanization; but, as Wraith points out (Guggisberg, p.90), Kimble's comment can be applied to most of Guggisberg's policies.


\(^{66}\) Meetings and conferences on Government Policy for the Reconstruction of the Gold Coast, 1920, recorded in GNA-GC, DAO 550.

\(^{67}\) Government Gazette (Extraordinary), No.86 of 1919, Speech of Sir Gordon Guggisberg, Governor, on taking the Oath of Office, 13 October 1919.
This was the attitude of officials throughout the discussions on de-
centralization and departmental organization. The central issue in the
discussion was the relationship between political and technical officers, and
between local officials and their department heads. The chiefs were
relegated to a secondary role: they were to be consulted and kept informed
about development programmes, and were even to be encouraged to help, but it
was never suggested that they should be seen as the main agents through which
officials were to promote local development. In a memorandum on the subject
circulated in October 1920, the Secretary for Native Affairs and the Chief
Commissioner, Ashanti wrote that in all matters concerning the development
of 'the Tribal Divisions',

'... we consider that there should be full consultation
with the Chiefs and their Councillors, they should be
taken into full confidence and a persistent endeavour
should be made to excite their interest and to enlist
their assistance. They should be given full opportunity
of discussing the proposals among themselves, of con-
sidering the advantages, and of having, or at least
appearing to have, a say in the matter'.

68. There was considerable controversy over the relationship between political
and technical officers. In his address to department heads in February
1920, Guggisberg had said that the provincial commissioner 'should be the
Governor of his own province' and that, similarly, 'The District Commis-
ioner is senior in his own district'. The technical departments re-
sented this attitude: they argued that the district agricultural officers
or the district public works department engineers were responsible to their
department heads, not to the district commissioner. Under pressure from
department heads, the position had been modified by October 1920. In
Harper and Furley's memorandum it was laid down that '... the Political
Officer is not the Head of Department ... in his Province or District'.
He was 'an extraneous authority' as far as the departments were concerned,
coming into relationship with them only as senior executive officer or as
the local head of 'native affairs'. But the term 'native affairs' was
given 'a wider connotation than it usually possesses': in fact it was
taken to include 'projects, works and all matters affecting the welfare and
progress of the native inhabitants'. So the supremacy of the political
service was preserved in a thinly disguised form, despite the complaints
of the technical officers.

See An Address on Decentralization by His Excellency the Governor to Heads
of Departments, 18 February 1920 (Accra, Government Press, 1920); and GNA-
CC, DAO 550, Functions of the Political Officer and his Relation to the
Heads of Department and Departmental Officers, Extracts from a Memorandum
Commissioner of Ashanti], prepared for the Conference of Chief Commissioners
and Provincial Commissioners at Accra, 22-29 October 1920; and other papers
in GNA-CC, DAO 550.

At the departmental level the reforms went ahead with great rapidity. The Political Service was reorganized and streamlined from 1921 onwards so that, despite the retrenchments of 1923, it could become a more effective instrument for implementing policy at the district level. 70 The Agriculture Department was reorganized in 1920-21 and again from 1927 onwards so as to rationalize the functions of the Department in the promotion of agricultural education and extension at the district level. 71 The Forestry Department was expanded in 1919 for similar purposes, as was the Survey Department. 72 The Agriculture and Forestry Departments, like the Political Service, were the subject of retrenchments in 1923, but these retrenchments were not thought to have impaired the efficiency of their local operations. 73

Officials made some attempts to interest the chiefs in local development, and to get them to pass by-laws under the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance. These efforts were largely unsuccessful, however, and were soon abandoned. In the case of the control of disease among cocoa plants, for example, attempts to persuade the chiefs to pass by-laws proved unsuccessful, and a Pests Ordinance had to be passed in 1923, bringing control of the disease under the aegis of district commissioners and Government inspectors of plants and produce. 74 Similarly, the Forests Ordinance of 1927 authorized the

70. Notes and Instructions on the new Political Organization, the Governor's circular letter of 12 March 1921 (Accra, Government Press, 1921); GNA-CC, DAO 550.

At this time the official designation of the Political Service was changed: Guggisberg would have preferred to retain the terms 'Political Service' and 'Political Officer', but Winston Churchill, the Secretary of State, preferred 'Administrative Service' and 'Administrative Officer'. The latter terms were those eventually adopted, but both sets of terms continued to be used interchangeably in official correspondence. GNA-CC, DAO 550, copies of correspondence between Guggisberg and Churchill, April to November 1921.

71. PRO, CO 96/610/7503/20, Sir Gordon Guggisberg, Governor, to Secretary of State, Confidential Despatch of 24 January 1920; Report of the Committee on Agricultural Policy and Organization, 1927, S.P. XVII of 1927-28 (Accra, Government Printer, 1927); and GNA-CC DAO 111.

72. PRO, CO 343/26/54359/19, 23669/19, 26820/19, 55154/19.

73. PRO, CO 96/641/59991/23; CO 343/28/44029/22.

Government to establish forest reserves, following the failure of successive attempts to persuade the chiefs to pass by-laws; such attempts had foundered on the widespread mistrust of Government intentions in any matter related to land. 75 In attempting to promote the palm oil industry local officials were a little more successful in getting by-laws passed; but these by-laws proved to be of little use since district commissioners and district agricultural officers failed to persuade the chiefs to take any really effective action in promoting the palm oil industry. 76

Mair summed up the practice of local officers vis-a-vis the chiefs in matters of local development when she wrote of the British administration that

'Instead of the sympathetic co-operation which characterizes Nigeria, its influence seems to have taken the form of spasmodic pressure to obtain the enactment of urgent measures which, being passed unwillingly and without any appreciation of their necessity, were not then enforced'. 77

On the whole, district commissioners and technical officers, finding their attempts to interest the chiefs in their development schemes frustrated by mistrust or misunderstandings or local disputes, preferred to do their work directly, without the aid of the chiefs. 78

This did not mean that, outside the sphere of economic development, the Government and its officials were not interested in chiefs and traditional authorities. Quite the reverse was true: from the outset Guggisberg wanted


76. GNA-CC, DAO 1306, Handing Over Notes, Saltpond District, 1924-25; GNA-CC, DAO 797, correspondence on Palm Oil Industry; GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/1420, Native Affairs Department Annual Reports, 1923 et seq.


78. Examples of this for the Central Province will be found in GNA-CC, DAO 32 (Banana Industry), DAO 261 ('Native Foodstuffs'), DAO 587 (Feeder Roads) and DAO 797 (Palm Oil Industry).
to make it perfectly clear that our object is to strengthen the power of Chiefs and to strengthen the preservation of the native customs and institutions'.  

His reasons were basically the same as those of Clifford and his predecessors: firstly that traditional institutions were those most naturally suited for ruling the rural areas, and provided a ready-made network of local authorities; and secondly that in a period of rapid economic and social change, chieftaincy should be strengthened against the stresses of such change in order to provide an element of stability. Guggisberg summarized the basis of his whole indirect rule policy when he wrote of the Provincial Councils in 1927,

'I have never concealed my conviction that it is on the native institutions of this country - with the exception of the necessity of giving certain populous municipalities a voice - that the gradual development of the Constitution must be founded. It was at the preservation of native institutions that I aimed when devising ... the Provincial Councils. These Provincial Councils are really the breakwaters defending our native constitutions, institutions, and customs against the disintegrating waves of Western civilization'.  

As we shall see, in attempting to pursue this policy Guggisberg faced the same opposition as his predecessors: from the chiefs against increasing Government control, from the educated elite against the special position given to the chiefs in the constitution, and from the subjects of the traditional states against the increasing involvement of the chiefs in the colonial Government.

Guggisberg's first move was an attempt to steer Clifford's Native Jurisdiction Bill through Legislative Council. There were various delays


before the Bill was introduced, necessitated by amendments following the 
Eastern Province Petition of 1919 and discussions with Unofficial Members of 
Legislative Council, and by the pressures of preparing the Estimates and the 
absence of various officials concerned with the Bill through leave, tours or 
illness. The Bill was finally introduced in the Legislative Council in 
September 1922. Both the educated elite and the chiefs objected strongly to 
the Bill on various grounds, the most significant one being that in the Bill 
the Government took upon itself unwarranted powers over the chiefs in 
connection with control over the chiefs' jurisdiction. Specifically, the 
opponents of the Bill objected to the attempt to allow the chiefs only such 
jurisdiction as was explicitly provided for in the Bill, and to the fact that 
the Provincial Commissioner's decision was made final on appeal in land 
cases.

Guggisberg was surprised and disappointed by the opposition of the chiefs 
to the Bill, but he accepted the principle, first laid down by Clifford, that 
if the chiefs in Legislative Council strongly opposed a measure affecting 
indirect rule, then such a measure should not be pressed. The Bill was 
accordingly withdrawn, and a stop-gap Ordinance was passed in 1924 to amend 
what appeared to the Government to be some of the most obvious flaws in the 
Native Jurisdiction Ordinance: in particular it gave the Governor the power 
to enforce his decision in disputed destoolments by deporting a chief who 
had been destooled.

81. PRO, CO 96/614/38098/20, A.R. Slater, Ag. Governor, to Secretary of State, 
No. 596 of 7 July 1920.


83. PRO, CO 96/593/62729/19, Sir H. Clifford, Governor, to Secretary of State, 
No. 696 of 28 November 1918; CO 96/648/56823/24, J.C. Maxwell, Ag. 
Governor, to Secretary of State, Confidential Despatch of 17 July 1924; 
Kimble, Political History, p. 478.

84. Native Jurisdiction Amendment Ordinance, No. 10 of 1924; PRO,CO96/648/ 
56823/24.
Meanwhile, Guggisberg had initiated other projects for the support and preservation of 'native institutions'. The first requirement for this policy was the collection of information on the 'constitutions' of the traditional states. An Anthropological Department was set up in 1921 under R.S. Rattray, who immediately began work on investigating Asante customs. For the Colony, it was considered sufficient to ask all assistant district commissioners to write essays on local history and customs; the Native Affairs Department then began to collect these essays and to collate the information on the traditional states in an attempt to give an overall picture of the political organization and customs of the Colony.

It was not enough, however, to gather information about the chiefs: they had to be given a more secure place in the colonial constitution. This was done in 1925 with the creation of Provincial Councils of Chiefs under the new Constitution. The Head Chiefs of each Province were to meet in council to elect from among themselves members of the reconstructed Legislative Council (one member for the Western Province, two for the Central Province, and one from each of the three Sections of the Eastern Province). Although the Provincial Councils were 'the outstanding feature of the Constitution of 1925', they were not entirely without precedent. Chiefs had met together in council many times before, under the auspices first of the Fante Confederacy and then of the A.R.P.S. There had also been moves by the Government to encourage conferences in the past. In 1913 it was proposed

85. Kimble, Political History, pp. 486f.

86. The best example of this work is in the file on 'The Etsi People' compiled by J.C. de Graft Johnson, Asst. S.N.A., in December 1921, in GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/813. The essays by assistant district commissioners are collected in GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/824. See also Kimble, Political History, p. 486.

87. For an outline of the 1925 Constitution see M. Wight, The Gold Coast Legislative Council (London, Faber and Faber for Nuffield College, Oxford, 1947), Chapter II.

88. Ibid., p. 45.
that District Conferences of Head Chiefs should be encouraged.\(^9\)

The idea had to be abandoned because of the War, but in 1918 Clifford encouraged Head Chiefs to come together in conference, and early in 1918 the Eastern Province chiefs met to discuss agriculture and the cocoa industry, education, the relations between district commissioners and chiefs, and a host of other matters. They even proposed that the Conference should, on its own initiative, charter a ship to clear the cocoa stocks which had built up during the War.\(^9\)

Chiefs were also consulted, in conference or individually, on the Native Jurisdiction Bills from 1916 onwards.\(^9\)

What was new about the Provincial Councils under the 1925 Constitution was that instead of occasional conferences on the chiefs' own initiative, or rare meetings encouraged by the Government to discuss specific points, the chiefs were now to meet regularly in full Councils constituted by law as a recognized and essential part of the constitution of the Colony. At first their only official function was the election of Legislative Council members, but they were encouraged to discuss other matters, and they were soon given a formal consultative role in 1927.

Meanwhile, further moves were being made to pass a new Ordinance regulating indirect rule in the field. Guggisberg decided that since the chiefs had almost invariably opposed new legislation on this matter brought in by the Government, they should be encouraged to draw up a Bill of their own. The first hint of this possibility came in January 1924, when Nana Ofori Atta II, \(\text{Omanhen}\) of Akyem Abuakwa commented on the Native Jurisdiction Amendment Ordinance of 1924 (dealing with the deportation of a deposed chief),

'Perhaps I may be permitted to state that we look forward to seeing a Bill regulating satisfactorily the power of Chiefs during the time they are in office too. In [the] ordinary course of events

\(^9\) GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/1163.

\(^9\) GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/692; PRO, CO 343/26/12929/18, MGO/17663/18 and cross-referenced cases.

\(^9\) PRO, CO 96/593/62729/18, Sir H. Clifford, Gov., to S. of S., No. 696 of 28 November 1918.
that should take precedence to one dealing with events when such Chief is no longer in office. 92

Ofori Atta and the chiefs were accordingly invited to draw up such a Bill. A provisional Bill was drafted at a conference of chiefs (mainly from the Eastern Province) at Nsawam in May 1926, and circulated throughout the Colony. 93 After being discussed by Provincial Councils and individual chiefs, the draft Bill was considered and revised by a Government committee consisting of three officials, in consultation with a number of chiefs, and was finally 'completely revised and re-settled' by the Attorney General in consultation with H.S. Newlands, the Acting S.N.A., in accordance with the recommendations of the committee. 94 The Bill was introduced into Legislative Council by Ofori Atta in March 1927, the first Bill ever to be introduced by an Unofficial Member. 95

The A.R.P.S. were violently opposed to the Bill, on the grounds that it gave the chief's far more authority and power than was warranted by their customary position, while at the same time tying them too closely to the colonial Government. 96 The A.R.P.S. were at that time boycotting the Legislative Council, mainly because of what they regarded as the over-representation of chiefs on the Council (six Provincial Members, for which

92. PRO, CO 96/648/36823/24, Ofori Atta to D.C., Akyem Abuakwa, 16 January 1924, enclosure 3 in J.C. Maxwell, Ag. Gov., to S. of S., Confidential Despatch of 17 July 1924. Ofori Atta read this letter before Legislative Council on 7 March 1924.


95. Guggisberg, Review 1920-26, pp. 242f. All this was done without consulting the Colonial Office. They were not told of the new Bill at all until April 1927, when it had already been introduced into Legislative Council. They were 'astonished' that it had not been sent to them in its draft form with a covering despatch, but they were delighted by the Bill itself, especially since it had been 'virtually drafted by Native Chiefs' with the co-operation of European Government Officials. PRO, CO 96/673/4308/27, Minutes on file, April to July 1927.

positions only chiefs were eligible), and the under-representation of other Africans (three municipal seats, the same number as in 1916). They accordingly asked that their objections should be heard in Legislative Council through counsel, but the Governor refused, pointing out that since J.E. Casely Hayford and J. Glover-Addo had already refused invitations to attend Legislative Council as extraordinary Members, they had only themselves to blame if their views were not represented.

The Bill accordingly passed through Legislative Council, with only Kojo Thompson opposing it. The A.R.P.S. continued their opposition, and petitioned the Secretary of State to advise the King to disallow the Ordinance. But by this time official opinion in London and Accra had turned very bitterly against the Society and its constant criticism and opposition, and their petitions were refused. One official at the Colonial Office commented in a minute,

'It is no new thing ... for the Aborigines Rights Protection Society to put themselves completely, absolutely, and altogether in the wrong ... Very little attention need be paid to any views they express, it seems to me ... We ought to consider, at any rate in theory, protests against the Ordinance, and applications for leave to be heard in opposition to it, before deciding that it should be sanctioned'.

With such an attitude prevailing, it is hardly surprising that the objections were discounted, and that the King was advised not to disallow the Ordinance.

97. Ibid., p. 445.
98. PRO, CO 96/673/4308/27; Kimble, Political History, pp. 494f.
99. Kimble, Political History, p. 496.
100. CO 96/673/4308/27.
101. Ibid., Minute by S.M. Campbell, 11 July 1927.
The A.R.P.S. then presented a further petition against the Ordinance in 1928, which was also rejected. 103

The controversy over the Ordinance proved how wide the split between the chiefs and the educated commoners had become. The split had first revealed itself in 1920 when Ofori Atta and other chiefs spoke out against the elite-dominated National Congress of British West Africa, and widened throughout the 1920s during the controversies over the Constitution of 1925 and the Native Administration Ordinance. This split has already been adequately described by Kimble and Holmes; 104 so it would be superfluous to describe it here. In the next chapter we shall see how profoundly this split and subsequent divisions within the educated elite itself, was to affect rural politics in South-Central Ghana.

The Native Administration Ordinance introduced several important innovations. It gave the Provincial Councils a formal consultative role: they were no longer to act simply as electoral colleges for the Legislative Council, but were to advise the Government on legislation and policy, as well as on stool disputes and customary procedures, either at the request of the Governor or on their own initiative. The importance of the state councils in the traditional states was recognized in legislation for the first time: state councils were given the power to determine cases of a constitutional nature and to formulate binding statements on the existing customary law. Finally, the Ordinance prescribed a procedure for the election and destoolment of chiefs.

The Ordinance was, however, still primarily concerned with judicial matters - it was even called the Native Jurisdiction Bill until March 1927.

The most detailed sections of the Ordinance were those regularizing and

103. GNA-CC, Acc. No. 8/64; Kimble, Political History, pp. 497f.

enlarging the powers of the chiefs' tribunals, instituting regular Native Courts of Appeal, and empowering the Provincial Commissioner to issue writs transferring cases from chiefs' tribunals to courts under the Supreme Court.

The Ordinance soon proved itself to be totally inadequate for the Government's purposes. There were many specific faults: for example the provisions laying down procedures of enstoolment and destoolment were too rigid, not allowing for the many local variations in the organization of the states. The position of chiefs' tribunals, despite the detailed enactments, was still left very muddled. In general, the Ordinance was much too long and unwieldy: its original 129 labyrinthine sections were very complex and provided endless opportunities for misinterpretation and confusion.

The most serious weakness that was to emerge, as far as the colonial Government was concerned, was that the Ordinance was still firmly in the tradition of non-interventionist indirect rule. The sections of the Ordinance dealing with local administration confined themselves almost exclusively to matters connected with the preservation of the peace and the maintenance of 'order and good government': they made practically no provision for regulating or encouraging local development under the auspices of the native authorities. Most important of all, it did not allow for the creation and control of stool treasuries or for any form of proper local fiscal control; stool treasuries and fiscal control came to be seen as the cornerstone of the new interventionist policy of indirect rule introduced by Slater, who saw their omission as the greatest flaw in the Ordinance. These problems will be discussed in the next chapter.

In the 1920s the signs of the forthcoming struggle were already evident. The colonial Government was, to an increasing extent, committing itself to a more active role both in local development and in indirect rule, and was thus prepared for these two strands to be combined in Slater's interventionist indirect rule policy. The chiefs were already beginning to take up their stands on co-operation or non-co-operation with the British: in the Central
Province some, like the Amanhemfo of Abura, Mankessim and Essikuma were following Ofori Atta's example in taking up a consistently pro-Government stand, while others, like the Amanhemfo of Oguaa and Gomoa Assin, were beginning to emerge as the centres of opposition to the Government. 105 The sides in the Central Province were already beginning to show themselves by 1926, when 13 of the 27 Central Province chiefs signed the A.R.P.S. Petition against the 1925 Constitution. 106 The educated elite was also beginning to divide by 1928 on their attitude to indirect rule and to the colonial Government in general; the split between the Ratepayers Association and the A.R.P.S. in 1928-9 will be discussed in the next chapter.

Finally, within the states there was a growing opposition to the increased involvement of the chiefs with the Government, and to increased Government activity at the local level. This opposition was still comparatively scattered, however, and was still using the same kind of tactics as it had used in the first two decades of the century: obstruction, non-co-operation, sporadic violence, and above all the destoolment of chiefs. 107 That this opposition was growing in the 1920s is indicated by the fact that the average number of confirmed destoolments of head chiefs and chiefs rose from about 7 per annum in the period 1917-20 to about 13 per annum in 1921-27. 108 This growth was, however, comparatively small compared to the mushrooming of opposition which occurred in the 1930s and 1940s, and which changed the whole organization of rural politics during that period.

105. GNA-CC, DAO files, cases on these states and Handing Over Notes.
106. GNA-Accra, CSO MP 4835/26. This figure should be compared with the 4 out of 13 chiefs from the Western Province who signed the Petition, and the 1 out of 13 in the Eastern Province (the Ga Mantse, President of the Eastern Province section of the A.R.P.S.).
107. GNA-CC, DAO files, Native Affairs cases and Handing Over Notes.
108. GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/1420, Native Affairs Department Annual Reports, 1917-27.
CHAPTER 5. INTERVENTIONIST INDIRECT RULE, 1927-39

5.1 The emergence of an interventionist policy, 1927-31

During Guggisberg's administration, as we have seen, moves were made in the direction of a more interventionist indirect rule policy. It was under the administration of Sir Ransford Slater (1927-32), however, that a fully-fledged interventionist system of indirect rule came to be adopted by the Government as the policy to be pursued in the Gold Coast Colony.¹

Two major factors contributed to the emergence of this policy. The first was the increasing influence on colonial officials in the Gold Coast of Nigerian and Tanganyikan models of indirect rule. By the late 1920s, the work which had been done in Nigeria under Lord Lugard and in Tanganyika under Sir Donald Cameron was gaining widespread publicity throughout West Africa. Gold Coast officials were familiar with what Nigerian and Tanganyikan officials were actually doing in the field of native administration,² as well

1. It should be emphasised that we are dealing here exclusively with the Colony. There were considerable differences between the local administration policies pursued in the Colony, Ashanti, the Northern Territories and Togoland Under British Mandate. In Ashanti, for example, the policy was conditioned by the fact that the area had been annexed in 1901 after a military conquest, and administration there was therefore much more interventionist than in the Colony. The Ashanti Stool Treasuries Ordinance, No. 10 of 1927, anticipated the unsuccessful Colony Native Revenue Bill of 1931-32 and subsequent similar attempts, while the Ashanti Native Authority and Native Courts Ordinances, Nos. 1 and 2 of 1935, anticipated the Colony Ordinances of 1944 in making it clear that native authorities and courts were appointed by the Governor and derived their authority from the Crown.

2. The S.N.A. and the Colonial Secretary frequently asked to be sent copies of Nigerian and Tanganyikan legislation, administrative orders, memoranda, etc., relating to native administration, and such information was frequently circulated to provincial commissioners. For example, a copy of the Native Revenue Ordinance of Nigeria was sent to Accra in 1924 at the request of the S.N.A. (GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/394, H.O. Wright for Ag. Chief Secretary, Nigeria to Col. Sec., Accra, 24 July 1924). In 1929 copies of notes, circulars etc. relating to fiscal administration in the Northern Provinces of Nigeria were circulated to the Provincial Commissioners of the Colony and the Chief Commissioners of Ashanti and the Northern Territories (GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/928, circular by W.J.A. Jones for S.N.A., 27 November 1929).
as with the theoretical ideas and arguments of Lugard and Cameron on the subject of interventionist indirect rule. 3

The second major factor was a shift in the emphasis of the Government's development policy away from the provision of a major, Colony-wide infrastructure for economic development, towards the promotion of local social and economic development. This change of emphasis was a matter of necessity rather than choice; for the Gold Coast Government could no longer afford the kinds of major development which Guggisberg had promoted under his Ten Year Plan of 1919.

As early as September 1927 Slater recognised that the estimated revenue for 1927-28 was only just going to be sufficient to cover the projected expenditure for that year, and that unless the small surplus was 'considerably augmented' in 1927-28 (through an unexpected increase in the revenue), it would be exhausted in 1928-29. 4 Although some development expenditure had been undertaken in 1926-27 and projected for 1927-28 with the idea of a new loan being raised, both Slater and the Colonial Office were reluctant to place any further burden on the revenue by involving the Colony in heavy interest and capital repayments on such a loan. The alternative was to abandon the idea of a loan and cut down expenditure on the development programme: Gerald Creasy of the Colonial Office wrote in November that a new loan was inadvisable, and that 'in the absence of a further loan ... the Colony cannot

3. Lugard's Dual Mandate, which went through four editions between 1922 and 1929, was widely read throughout the colonial service, and was much quoted in official correspondence in the Gold Coast. As early as 1924 a copy of Lugard's Political Memoranda (the second edition, published in 1919) was sent to the Colonial Secretary of the Gold Coast by the Chief Secretary of Nigeria in response to a request for information 'relating to the revenue and expenditure of native States' (GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/394). Cameron's ideas were also well known in the Gold Coast by the late 1920s: T.S.W. Thomas, the Acting Governor, issued a pamphlet in 1928 containing extracts from reports on the system of native administration in Tanganyika, which was circulated to Political Officers (it is quoted in Slater's Confidential Minute on Native Administration in 1930). For details of these works see the Bibliography.

afford any great extension of its existing programme'. 5 Fiddian, Creasy's superior, expressed himself in rather stronger terms: 'The Gold Coast, like other Colonies, will have to cut its coat according to its cloth, and many of these works, however desirable, will just have to wait'. 6

Slater had believed in September 1927 that an augmentation of the surplus in 1927-28 was 'by no means improbable', and that development expenditure could therefore be resumed when the financial position was clearer. 7 The slump of 1928-31 made such a resumption impossible and forced the Government not only to abandon projected development, but also to retrench severely on existing programmes. 8

This did not mean, however, that the Gold Coast Government had to abandon the idea of promoting economic development; it merely meant that they had to lower their sights from major developments at a colonial level to the provision of amenities at a local level. As we have seen, the first moves had already been made under Guggisberg to rationalise the functions of the technical departments in order to make them more effective at the district level. Now, under the pressure of increasing demands for local development, 9 policy makers were turning their attention to the intensification of Government activities at the local level in order to promote agricultural education and extension and the provision of forest reserves,

5. Ibid., Minute by G. Creasy, 1 November 1927.
6. Ibid., Minute by A. Fiddian, 3 November 1927.
7. Ibid., Slater to S. of S., No. 749 of 27 September 1927.
9. These pressures, mainly from chiefs and African Members of the Legislative Council, are discussed in GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/928 and ADM 11/1/933 and in PRO, CO 96/693/6599/30.
medical and health facilities, education and sanitation. 10 Nigerian and Tanganyikan models of indirect rule seemed to provide an ideal method of promoting such development: by arranging for the financing of local development from local resources through the native authorities, the Government would be relieved of a great deal of the cost of development while satisfying the demand for improved amenities in the rural areas. 11

Attempts by the Paramount Chiefs of Manya Krobo and Akyem Abuakwa to pass by-laws setting up treasuries and a system of taxation in 1927 and 1928 soon revealed that the Native Administration Ordinance of 1927 was totally inadequate as a measure for regulating local administration, especially in fiscal matters. 12 Slater felt that what was needed was a clear and explicit formulation of the principles of indirect rule, on the basis of which more effective legislation could be introduced. He accordingly initiated a series of discussions with senior officials and the chiefs in the Provincial Councils, as a result of which he published his Confidential Minute on Native Administration in the Gold Coast and its Dependencies (Accra, Government Printer, 1930). In 1931, W.J.A. ("Kibbi") Jones, the S.N.A., published two memoranda, on native jurisdiction and taxation, which filled in the details of Slater's policy in these two crucial areas. 13 Since Slater's minute (with Jones's glosses) provided the basis for native administration policy until 1944, it is worth summarizing its main points here.

10. GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/928 and GNA-OC, DAO 111, DAO 1003, and DAO 1062.

11. GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/928, Notes of Political Service Conferences, August 1928 to September 1929.

12. GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/184 and ADM 11/1/928. These attempts will be discussed in detail in section 5.4 below.

Slater began by admitting that in the past the Gold Coast had suffered from 'the lack of a clearly defined policy in this all important matter of Native Administration', and that 'inasmuch as [the chiefs of the Colony and Ashanti] have very few executive powers or functions they cannot be looked upon as substantially other than the mouthpieces of the administrative officers', except in their judicial functions. 'In short our system is more nearly akin to "Direct rule" than to "Indirect rule"'. Slater was referring here to the lack of executive powers by the chiefs: we have seen in chapter 4 above how administrative and technical officers tended to administer local development policies directly, leaving the chiefs largely to their own devices in the day-to-day affairs of their states. A Governor whose main concern was with the administration of local economic and social development policies, would inevitably describe this non-interventionist system as 'direct rule', as opposed to a system in which local development policies (the ones which mattered to him) were administered by officials through the chiefs.

Slater affirmed that 'personally I range myself unhesitatingly on the side of those who believe in the principle of "Indirect" rather than "Direct" rule'. His conception of 'indirect rule' follows very closely the interventionist model advocated by Lugard and Cameron: in summing up the aims of the policy he quotes Cameron's statement that 'Our aim should be to make the Native Authority ... a living part of the machinery of Government'. This phrase, describing the chief as ideally 'a living part of the machinery of Government' - was used again and again in official correspondence in the 1930s and 1940s. It had significant implications for the relationship between the administrative officer and the native authority; for it implied a single

15. See section 4.1 above.
16. Slater, Native Administration, paragraph 4.
system of authority, one which inevitably became identified in the minds of officials with the administrative hierarchy, and which cast the administrative officer and the chief in the role of superior and subordinate authorities. The argument that the chief was supposed to be 'an integral part of the machinery of Government' was used every time it was proposed to increase the powers of administrative officers to regulate or control the activities of chiefs.

It is interesting to note the arguments which Slater presented in favour of indirect rule, which summarize the arguments used at successive stages in the development of indirect rule in the Gold Coast:

(i) Indirect rule ensures the political officer closer contact with 'the influential natives - i.e. Chiefs and their Councils', and with 'every class of the native population'.
(ii) 'It upholds the authority of the native rulers by giving them threefold powers:-
   1. Judicial
   2. Fiscal
   3. Executive.'
(iii) 'It creates a barrier against undue "Westernisation" of native institutions'.
and (iv) It provides a means of satisfying the demand for local development.17

Slater did not believe that full executive powers could in practice be entrusted to all Paramount Chiefs, and he recognised that conditions 'vary enormously' in different areas.18 He did not therefore propose any 'general delegation' of government functions, but intended to act by means of formal instruments in each area and the establishment of Native Administration Treasuries in individual States, reserving to the political officer the duty of 'guidance and advice' in the disposal of the annual revenue and in 'all its important acts'.19 With this proviso, he proposed to give executive

17. Ibid., paragraph 5
18. Ibid., paragraph 9.
19. Ibid., paragraph 7.
authority to those Native Authorities that 'can reasonably be trusted to exercise executive functions with justice and wisdom, ... that is to say they must be invested with authority to issue orders to their people and, above all, they must be provided with funds "with which to pay the salaries of their officials and to inaugurate schemes of development" ... Such funds can best be collected through the machinery of the Native Administration, in accordance with native custom and under the close supervision of the British officer'.

The funds would come from the commutation of local tribute and services and 'a multitude of minor levies and imposts'.

The minute was submitted by Slater to the Colonial Office in February 1930. It was very favourably received: J.E.W. Flood, advocating the adoption of the minute as official policy, noted the increasing demand for rural development in the Gold Coast territories, and pointed out that 'it is pretty clear that the time is coming when the central Government will not be able to find the money to carry out everything that is desired, and it will become more and more the duty of each community to find the means for carrying out its own works'. Most officials in the Colonial Office agreed with Flood that the policy outlined in Slater's minute could solve this problem, and could form the basis of a stable system of native administration throughout the territories of the Gold Coast. Dr. T.D. Shiels expressed doubts as to the difficulties of putting the policy into effect, but he appears to have been in a minority of one. The other Colonial Office officials were...

20. Ibid., paragraph 4.
21. Ibid., paragraph 11.
22. PRO, CO 96/693/6599/30. Sir Ransford Slater, Gov., to S. of S., Conf. Desp. of 18 February 1930.
23. Ibid., Minute by J.E.W. Flood, 26 March 1930, and subsequent minutes.
24. Ibid., Minute by Dr. T.D. Shiels, 27 March 1930.
strongly in favour of the principles advocated in the minute, as were officials in the Gold Coast, and the minute became the basis of native administration policy throughout the Gold Coast.

5.2 Kobina Sekyi and the A.R.P.S.

In the Central Province, this policy aroused the unrelenting opposition of Kobina Sekyi and the rump of the Aborigines Rights Protection Society.

Officials in Accra and London had always regarded the A.R.P.S. as something of a nuisance: as early as 1912 the Governor, J.J. Thorburn, had argued that the Society existed primarily to oppose Government measures, 'frequently stirring up prejudice by an absolutely distorted interpretation of the Government's intentions'. Nevertheless, until the 1920s the Colonial Office and the Gold Coast Government had taken the Society seriously as an important spokesman of African opinion, as its victories over the Lands Bill in 1897-98 and the Forest Bills in 1907-11 indicated. During the 1920s, however, the hostility of officials to the A.R.P.S. grew in proportion to the intransigence of the Society's opposition to the Native Jurisdiction Bills of 1919-22, the Municipal Corporations Ordinance of 1924, the Constitution of 1925 and the Native Administration Ordinance of 1927. By 1927 a Colonial Office official could command general agreement with his opinion that, with regard to the A.R.P.S. protests against the Native Administration Ordinance, 'Very little attention need be paid to any views they express'. Similarly in the Gold Coast, the hostility of officials to A.R.P.S. resolutions and protests had grown to such a pitch that Slater—


26. Ibid., Chapters IX and X. "... the last occasion on which the Society received official recognition was in 1923, when the Governor discussed the proposed constitutional reforms with its leaders". Martin Wight, The Gold Coast Legislative Council (London, Faber & Faber for Nuffield College, Oxford, 1947), p. 26.

27. CO 96/673/4308/27, Minute by S.M. Campbell, 11 July 1927.
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25. J.J. Thorburn, Gov., to S. of S., No. 398 of 12 June 1912, quoted in David
Kimble, A Political History of Ghana. The Rise of Gold Coast Nationalism,
p. 369.

26. Ibid., Chapters IX and X. ' ... the last occasion on which the Society
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The Gold Coast Legislative Council (London, Faber & Faber for Nuffield

27. CO 96/673/4308/27, Minute by S.M. Campbell, 11 July 1927.
no great admirer of the A.R.P.S. - was driven to comment that 'I think that there is rather too great a tendency among all the Provincial Commissioners to animadvert on the reported misrepresentations by the instigators of these resolutions and to ignore the actual text of the resolutions'. 28

The tendency of officials to discount the representations of the A.R.P.S. was reinforced by the formal establishment of the Provincial Councils in 1925 and the recognition of their consultative role in 1927. It was argued that the Provincial Councils were now the official spokesmen of African opinion, while the A.R.P.S. was merely a private body, with no claim to represent African opinion in general. In 1928, W.J.A. Jones, then the Commissioner Central Province, made this distinction very clearly when he wrote that the A.R.P.S. was

'a private society to which Government will accord the same deference and consideration that it will pay to any other society, religious or secular, but the Provincial Council is established by law as an integral part of the machinery of Government with definite legal and advisory powers. This distinction cannot in my opinion be over emphasised'. 29

This is the attitude which officials took in their dealings with the Society. The Government's position was formally and finally stated in 1932 in a letter from the new C.C.P., C.E. Skene, to the President of the A.R.P.S.:

'Government does not recognise your Society as the medium of communication between Government and the Chiefs and people, the Provincial Councils having been established for that purpose'.

The C.C.P. added,

'His Excellency declines the invitation of your Executive Committee to attend a meeting of the Society at Cape Coast

28. GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/921, Minute by Sir Ransford Slater, Gov., 13 February 1928.

or any other place and... Government Officials will be instructed not to accept similar invitations. 30

This official hostility led to a split in the leadership of the A.R.P.S. The majority of the educated elite, led by J.E. Casely Hayford and F.V. Nanka Bruce, abandoned the policy of total opposition to the new Constitution and adopted a policy of compromise. A minority, led by Kobina Sekyi and G.E. Moore in Cape Coast, refused any compromise, and continued to fight with unrelenting hostility against the 1925 Constitution and the Native Administration Ordinance. 31

The first clash between the two sides occurred in 1928 over the election of a Municipal Member of the Legislative Council for Cape Coast. 32

The moderates in Cape Coast, led by Casely Hayford, H. Van Hein, W. Ward Brew and W.Z. Coker, formed a Ratepayers Association and put forward K.A. Korsah as their candidate. Nana Mbra III, Omanhen of Oguaa (Cape Coast) and the majority of the Oguaa Oman Council supported Sekyi in rejecting the whole idea of an election under the existing Constitution, and they boycotted the election. Korsah was elected and the petition of Mbra III and the Oman Council against the election was refused. 33 This dispute led indirectly to a serious riot in Cape Coast in 1932, and embittered Cape Coast politics for many years. 34 In the Province as a whole the struggle for power and influence continued: on one side were the intransigent anti-Government


33. GNA-CC, Acc. No. 349/64. Election Petition Case.

34. GNA-CC, Acc. No. 355/64 and DAO 685.
chiefs and members of the educated elite in the A.R.P.S., and on the other the moderates in the Provincial Council and the Ratepayers Association, favouring compromise and co-operation with the colonial government.

William Essuman-Gwira Sekyi, known as Kobina Sekyi (1892-1956), did not become President of the A.R.P.S. until 1946, but from 1928 onwards he was the dominant force in the Society, the main influence in the formulation and execution of its policies. He was a member of one of the old Cape Coast elite families, descended from chiefs, lawyers and businessmen. A barrister by profession, he had also by 1918 taken a B.A. and an M.A. in philosophy at London University, as well as reading sociology and law at King's College, London. His extraordinary energy, intelligence, personal magnetism and charm made a lasting impression on everyone who met him.

K.A.B. Jones-Quartey's 'Fragment of Biography', published in 1967, epitomizes what many people have written about Sekyi's character:

'A man of adamantine will and strength [of] character; a man so uncompromising in his belief about what was right and proper, that practically to his last breath he put the leadership claims of the old Aborigines Rights Protection Society before those of any other "national" organisation, past or present; a man of such great intellect and crushing wit as to strike fear and apprehension in his opponents - Kobina Sekyi went through life knocking down other people's idols right and left and setting up his own'.


... [He] despised all "Europeanised Africans" - who himself could not dispense with Western philosophy, and poured out Plato, Justinian and Blackstone with frequency and often without cause. But the more European philosophy he read, the more African he became... If Britain cannot afford to miss her Bernard Shaws and Bertrand Russells, neither could Ghana have afforded to miss her Kobina Sekyi...

'He was, in short, in some things as deeply conservative as he was in others angrily radical. This kind of combination is common, of course; it is not what made Kobina Sekyi almost unique. What made him unique was the inimitable way he wore his contradictions, and the sheer exuberance of his intellectual arrogance, which, in his type of personality alone, became a thing not for spite but for boundless admiration'.

In politics, Sekyi has been described as a 'revolutionary conservative'. A thorough-going elitist, he believed that political leadership in the Gold Coast must be based on the old 'alliance between the Natural Rulers and the educated conservative class of lawyers and doctors ...', which had found its supreme expression in the Fante Confederacy and the early A.R.P.S. In Sekyi's eyes, those chiefs who co-operated with the Government by supporting the Provincial Councils and the interventionist system of indirect rule, were committing a triple betrayal. Firstly, they were betraying their old allies, the educated elite, who had no place, or only a minor place as 'attendants', in the Provincial Council system, and who were left out of the machinery of indirect rule. Secondly, by accepting new Government legislation which sought to strengthen the authority and the legal position of the native authorities, the chiefs were betraying the democratic principles of the traditional political system, and seeking to emulate the autocratic rulers of Northern Nigeria:

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38. Langley, 'Modernization and its Malcontents', p.16.
39. Ibid; for Sekyi's elitism, see Nikoi, Indirect Rule and the Government, pp. 255, 260ff, and Holmes, Economic and Political Organization, pp.471ff. This elitism was reinforced by a strong element of what Holmes has called 'Cape Coast chauvinism' (op.cit., pp. 470ff): after the split in the A.R.P.S. in 1927-8, power in the A.R.P.S. was monopolized in the hands of the small executive clique of the 'Cape Coast school' (Nikoi, op.cit., p.259), 'known popularly as SS & Co. because of the dominance of Sekyi, Sakyiama and their cohorts' (Holmes, op.cit., p.471).
'If Nigerian models are those we are required to look up to, .... Have we considered the social and political structure of the society on which the Nigerian system ... was based? Are our rulers Emirs, Sultans, absolute Monarchs, under our own system? ... We must be careful how we hanker after strange models, strange gods, a strange outlook ...' 40

Finally, the chiefs were betraying themselves; for in accepting the support of the colonial Government they were becoming increasingly dependent upon the British, losing their autonomy and freedom of action and becoming the tools of the colonial administration, mere subordinates in the official hierarchy.

In opposing these tendencies, and many other aspects of colonial rule, Sekyi and the A.R.P.S. used a variety of different methods. They continued to use the old tactic of petitioning the Government in London, as in 1934 and 1935 over the Sedition and Waterworks Ordinances. 41 They were involved in miscellaneous commercial activities through the Gold Coast Farmers Association, the Consolidated Africa Ltd. cocoa shipping scheme, and various other organisations: these activities had the combined aim of profit and political gain - the latter through establishing an independent Africa marketing organisation for cocoa. 42 They were deeply involved in the cocoa hold-ups of 1931-2 and 1937-8. 43

From our point of view, however, the most important aspect of the Society's activities was its involvement in rural politics. Its agitation at the colonial level was supplemented in the Central Province by persistent efforts


41. GNA-CC, Acc. Nos. 59 and 60/64; Rhodie, 'Gold Coast Aborigines Abroad'; Holmes, *op.cit.*, Chapter IX.


to undermine the whole machinery of indirect rule and the Provincial Councils at the local level, within the traditional states. This was done by aiding the growth of anti-Government 'parties' within the states, by encouraging the sort of development we have described in chapter 3 above.

Sometimes Sekyi worked directly, as in the Denkyira dispute of 1926-32, where he was first called in as lawyer to the Gyasehen and the Adjantsenhen (W. Ward Brew was Kojo Tsibu's lawyer), and where he was probably instrumental in promoting the Provincial Council issue as a major one in the dispute. Usually, however, Sekyi and his associates worked indirectly, through their influence over chiefs and 'scholars' who came to Cape Coast either as political refugees or in the course of commercial, educational or political business. Sekyi was constantly consulted by such people in his house, and, influenced by him, they returned to their states and spread opposition to Government policy, especially among already established factions and adomyffe.

For example, the Tufohen of Winneba, Kweku Siripi, and the Supifo of the two asafo companies, Kojo Edu and Kobina Donkoh, attempted to destool the Omanhen of Winneba in 1927. They were defeated, and in their turn deposed. They fled to Cape Coast, where they came under Sekyi's influence and became involved in the activities of the A.R.P.S. In April 1932 they represented Winneba at a meeting held by the A.R.P.S. as a challenge to the Joint Provincial Council meeting being held at the same time. These three subsequently returned to Winneba, where they renewed their attacks against the Omanhen, at the same time spreading propaganda against the Provincial Council and the establishment of stool treasuries. They found willing allies among the Owusu Stool Family, who were engaged in a dispute with the Omanhen, and they

44. See section 3.4 above.
45. GNA-CC, DAO 197 and DAO 1021.
46. Interviews with W. S. Kweisi Johnston (Nana Amoah IV) of Cape Coast, and members of Sekyi's family.
47. This case is taken from GNA-CC, DAO 280.
succeeded in uniting the opposition to the Omanhen. As a result of this opposition there were serious disturbances at the annual Deer Hunt festival in May 1932.

Such activities were not confined to the coastal States, the traditional trouble spots. In Ayan Abaasa, for example, E.O. Sampson, another asafo leader and scholar, was deposed as a result of disputes with the Omanhen, Akonu VIII. He fled to Cape Coast, where he came under Sekyi's influence. He returned to Ayan Abaasa in 1941, renewed his opposition to Akonu VIII and united Akonu's enemies in opposition to the establishment of a state treasury and the levying of a local rate. Sampson succeeded in causing Akonu sufficient trouble to make him abdicate in July 1943.48

This kind of political activity was supplemented by intensive propaganda, in the press, by leaflet and by word of mouth. Some of this propaganda took the form of straight-forward political tracts, such as the A.R.P.S. leaflets against the Native Administration Treasuries Ordinance of 1939.49 Some of it took the form of rumours, which tended to be rather more colourful than the legal and political arguments of press and leaflet propaganda. Two rumours which had widespread circulation in the early 1930s were (a) that if the amanhemfo were allowed to attend the Provincial Council they would pass a law that the Omanhen had the right to take away a man's wife for the first week of marriage, and (b) that the Government would take away the first-born child of any marriage.50 There was a surprising uniformity among the rumours which circulated throughout the Central Province, from Denkyira to Gomoa and from Ekunfi to Assin. This uniformity suggests that these rumours may have had a

48. GNA-CC, DAO 345, and interview with Nana Kobina Borafosi (formerly Nana Akonu VIII) and other elders at Abaasa, 30 January 1972.

49. GNA-CC, Acc. No. 77/64.

common source, and many of my informants believed that this source was at Cape Coast.51

Of course it was not (or was not only) Sekyi's charisma and personal influence which persuaded people to undertake the kinds of political activity and spread the kinds of propaganda which I have described. Sekyi's role was that of a catalyst. Once people were aware of the potential advantages of bringing colonial issues into their local disputes, they would do so of their own accord. Sekyi taught people what these advantages were, and how to use them with the most telling effect. He taught them that a faction united by common normative beliefs had a far greater chance of staying united, and acting together, than a purely transactional faction; and if a group could merely stay united and keep fighting for a number of years, it had a good chance of defeating its opponents, if only by giving them so much trouble that they eventually abdicated rather than continuing the fight. Sekyi may also have helped with some of the funds which were so necessary for effective political action - for legal fees, drinks, the paying off of the debts of one's allies, and so on - though the evidence of this is at the moment scanty and indirect.

We shall now turn to specific areas of policy in the Central Province in the 1930s, in order to show how the A.R.P.S. campaign and the rising tide of anti-Government feeling in the rural areas thwarted the Government's plans for the Province and established a new style of anti-colonial activity in the traditional states.

51. During a conversation with the author, Kobina Sekyi's son, Mr. Henry Sekyi, argued that his father, with his strict standards of honesty and propriety, would never himself have deliberately and consciously spread such rumours. This is undoubtedly true, but Sekyi definitely did say, forcefully and repeatedly, that the chiefs were trying to become oriental despots and tyrants. In Cape Coast, which was a hotbed of rumour, such statements would tend to reinforce the more scurrilous rumours I have quoted. So although Kobina Sekyi almost certainly did not start such rumours, and possibly disapproved of them, his propaganda and that of his associates indirectly helped them to grow.
The Provincial Council

The first target of the A.R.P.S. campaign against indirect rule was the Provincial Council system. From 1925 to 1928 the Society concentrated on opposing the Councils with well-tried constitutional methods - petitions, newspaper propaganda and attempts to persuade chiefs to boycott the Councils. The A.R.P.S. petitions were rejected out of hand, however, and by 1928 the Provincial Councils - now given a formal consultative role under the Native Administration Ordinance of 1927 - looked as if they might flourish under the encouragement of the colonial Government and powerful pro-Government chiefs such as Ofori Atta. Already it was becoming clear that the colonial Government and the pro-Government chiefs intended that the Provincial Councils should completely replace the A.R.P.S. as the officially recognised spokesmen of African opinion. Open, constitutional opposition was failing to prevent the acceptance of the Provincial Council system.

After the 1928 split in the A.R.P.S., the rump of the Society, led by Sekyi and the 'Cape Coast school' began to employ new tactics. They instigated a vigorous propaganda campaign in the rural areas, and began to encourage the adomyifo within the traditional states to take a stand against the Provincial Councils. In the Central Province the propaganda fell on fertile ground and the anti-Council campaign achieved remarkable success. The slump of 1928-31 had led to mounting discontent in the Province, culminating in the cocoa hold-up of 1931-2. Those chiefs who attended the Provincial Council became identified with the increasingly unpopular colonial regime, especially when they appeared to be supporting the Government's position on the cocoa hold-up.

52. Kimble, Political History, pp. 441 ff, 490 ff; Holmes, op.cit., Chapter IX; PRO, CO 96/673/4308/27.
53. See section 5.2 above.
55. See section 5.6 below.
56. Ibid.
Anti-Provincial Council factions had appeared in Oguaa, Abura, Effutu, Asebu and Ajumaku by 1929, and in Denkyira, Twifu and Assin Attandaso by 1930. By 1931-2 the campaign had taken fire and there were groups in most of the states of the Central Province opposed to the attendance of their chiefs at the Provincial Council.

The success of this popular opposition to the Provincial Council can be judged by the Council attendance figures given in Table 2 below and the accompanying histogram. The comparatively high attendances in 1928-9 (from the 9th to the 12th sessions) can be explained by two independent factors. Firstly, there was inevitably a gap between the failure of the original A.R.P.S. campaign and the new spread of opposition under the influence of the Society's second, 'subversive' campaign and of the economic depression. Secondly, the number of states eligible to attend the Council had been increased from 20 to 28 in 1926-7, when the Government recognised eight formerly subordinate ahemfo as independent Paramount Chiefs. These new ahemfo naturally felt well-disposed towards the Government, and seven of them became regular attenders at the Provincial Council; by 1930 (the 17th session), however, even these states had succumbed to anti-Council feeling, and only three of the eight were regular attenders.

57. GNA-CC, DAO 151, DAO 197, DAO 215, DAO 251, DAO 685, DAO 1021, DAO 1306.
58. Ibid.; GNA-CC, DAO 1062, G.M. Bewes, D.C. Winneba to C.C.P., 29 September 1939.
59. GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/1420, Native Affairs Department Annual Reports; Gold Coast Chiefs Lists. Twifo Kwapong was given its independence from Hemang in 1927 following a Central Provincial Council enquiry in 1926; the three Ayan states were recognised as having the status of independent Ahemfo in 1927; the Ahemfo of Abedazi (Domenase) and Ayeldu (Kwamankessi) were recognised as Ahemfo in 1927, having had their independence from Abura recognised in 1917 (see Appendix A); the Ahemfo of Gomoa Ajumako was recognised as independent of Gomoa Assin in 1922, and as an Ahemfo in 1927; Effutu (Winneba) was finally recognised as an Ahemfo independent of Gomoa in 1927. The number of eligible states was increased to 29 in 1936, when Esiam's independence of Ayan Denkyira was recognised.
60. GNA-CC, Acc. Nos. 257/65 et seqq., Central Provincial Council Minutes, February 1928 et seqq. Ayeldu (Domenase) was the only one of the newly recognised states which was not attending the Provincial Council by the 9th session; Ayan Abasasa, Ayan Ama and Effutu were the only regular attenders among the new states by the 18th session.
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57. GNA-CC, DAO 151, DAO 197, DAO 215, DAO 251, DAO 685, DAO 1021, DAO 1306.
58. Ibid.; GNA-CC, DAO 1062, G.M. Bewes, D.C. Winneba to C.C.P., 29 September 1939.
59. GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/1420, Native Affairs Department Annual Reports; Gold Coast Chiefs Lists. Twifo Mampong was given its independence from Hemang in 1927 following a Central Provincial Council enquiry in 1926; the three Ayan states were recognised as having the status of independent Aman in 1927; the Ahemfo of Acheada (Domenase) and Ayedu (Kwamankessi) were recognised as Ahemfo in 1927, having had their independence from Abura recognised in 1917 (see Appendix A); the Ahemfo of Gomoa Ajumako was recognised as independent of Gomoa Assin in 1922, and as an Ahemfo in 1927; Effutu (Winneba) was finally recognised as an Ahemfo independent of Gomoa in 1927. The number of eligible states was increased to 29 in 1936, when Esiam's independence of Ayan Denkyira was recognised.
60. GNA-CC, Acc. Nos. 257/65 et. seqq., Central Provincial Council Minutes, February 1928 et. seqq. Ayedu (Domenase) was the only one of the newly recognised states which was not attending the Provincial Council by the 9th session; Ayan Abasa, Ayan Maim and Effutu were the only regular attenders among the new states by the 16th session.
Table 2 Provincial Council, Central Province - Attendance, 1925-46

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<th>Session</th>
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<td>55</td>
<td>Aug-Sep 1950</td>
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Notes: (1) The Minutes of the first 7 sessions, and of the 20th and 52nd sessions, are missing from the Cape Coast Archives.
(2) I can find no explanation for the slight discrepancy between the attendance figures quoted by Kimble and the actual number of chiefs listed as attending in the Provincial Council Minutes, where the latter are available.
(3) It was ruled after the 11th session that Regents should not be allowed to represent their states; but they continued to do so again after the 23rd session.
Popular hostility towards the Provincial Council, which had kept average attendances well below half the potential membership before 1936, was beginning to wane in the late 1930s, for a number of reasons. The main reason was that it was becoming increasingly obvious that the Provincial Councils were not going to attain the central position in the constitution for which their supporters had hoped and their opponents had feared, nor were they going to lead to any great increase in the power of the chiefs. The idea that they might become the focus of a grand alliance between chiefs and Government, excluding both the educated elite and the commoners from the decision making process, was beginning to look a little absurd. Colonial officials were showing an increasing impatience with the Councils, with the high cost and slow progress of their constitutional and judicial enquiries, the persistent embezzlement and falsification of their accounts, and the lengthy and trivial discussion at Provincial Council meetings, from which little or nothing of any importance seemed to emerge. A.F.E. Fieldgate, the Acting S.N.A., summed up the feelings of officials when he wrote of the Joint Provincial Council in 1937,

'At these meetings, as at those of the Provincial Councils, little of real importance is, at present, accomplished. In the main, time is just frittered away in discussions on matters of little importance and the minutes of the proceedings, at times, makes [sic] pathetic reading.'


62. GNA-Accra, CSO MP 204/33, Provincial Council Accounts, 1934. The accounts of the Central Provincial Council are missing from the file, but it is clear from the comments on the other sub-files that the situation in the Central Province was as 'disgraceful' as it was in the other two. See also GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/1659, Amanfi III, 3manhen of Asebu (President of the Central Provincial Council) to S.N.A., 31 October 1938, and PRO, CO 96/730/31228/36.

63. PRO, CO 96/730/31228/36, Notes of meeting of CO officials with G.E. London, Colonial Secretary of the Gold Coast, 28 October 1936.
'In my opinion little importance can be attached to the activities of these Councils. For the most part the Chiefs do not carry their people with them, and the latter will quickly make the former exceedingly apprehensive if they identify themselves with any measure which is considered by the people to be unnecessary or undesirable'.

In 1937 the Government gave a clear indication of the low regard in which it held the Provincial Councils when it abandoned the former practice of consulting them before introducing amendments to the Native Administration Ordinance and other legislation affecting the native authorities. In November 1938 the Joint Provincial Council petitioned against this lack of consultation, and against the important Native Administration Further Amendment (Colony) Ordinance, No. 25 of 1938, which made the decisions of Provincial Councils in all except land cases subject to appeal to the Governor, whose decision would be final. The petition was politely received, but nothing was altered: the Ordinance was given the royal assent unchanged, and Provincial Council opinion on new legislation was still largely discounted. Although the Councils' opinions were sounded on the Native Administration Treasuries (Colony) Ordinance, No. 16 of 1939, the objections to the Ordinance and the Regulations under the Ordinance did not lead the Government to make any major changes. As Kobina Sekyi gleefully pointed out, Ofori Atta and his supporters were beginning to see the less compliant, less agreeable side of their friends, the British.

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64. PRO, CO 96/742/3137/37, Note by A.F.E. Fieldgate, Ag. S.N.A., enclosed in G.E. London, Governor's Deputy, to S. of S., 10 December 1937. Joint meetings of the three Provincial Councils had begun in 1931. They were encouraged by the Government, though the Joint Provincial Council was not given statutory recognition until 1942.

65. GNA-Accra, CSO MP 372/30, Sub-files 51 ff.

66. GNA-Accra, Acc. No. 911/56, Petition of Provincial Councils to the King, 9 November 1938.

67. GNA-Accra, CSO MP 372/30, Sub-files 52 and 56.

68. GNA-Accra, CSO MP 372/30, Sub-file 51. See section 6.3 below.

The Provincial Councils were no longer politically dangerous. They were useful as 'talking shops' in which the chiefs could exchange views and information, and they were very useful in settling disputes between chiefs, and certain complex land cases, but they could no longer be seen as a major threat to the independence of the traditional states. There were still sporadic outbursts against the Councils, like the riot in Jukwa in 1937, and until the 1940s a few states, like Oguaa and Ajumaku, persistently refused to attend. But on the whole, popular feelings, and the A.R.P.S. campaign against indirect rule, were concentrating on other, more vital matters by the late 1930s. One of these matters, which had been the source of great friction since the idea was first introduced in the Central Province, was the question of stool treasuries.

5.4 Stool Treasuries

An essential element of Lugard's theories from 1919 onwards, and of Cameron's work in Tanganyika, was the promotion of treasuries and taxation in the native authorities, both to stabilise them as administrative units and to enable them to promote and administer local development. Lugard, by 1922, believed that

"the fundamental basis on which the policy [of indirect rule] rests, is the assignment to the native rulers of a definite revenue with which to pay the salaries of their officials and to inaugurate schemes of development." 71

Such revenue was, of course, to be paid into properly established treasuries under official supervision.

By the end of the 1920s most senior officials in the Gold Coast shared these views. The question had already been discussed at some length in 1911-13 and 1920-23, but it had been felt on both occasions that the time was not

70. GNA-CC, DAO 151; GNA-CC Acc. Nos. 258/65 et seqq., Central Provincial Council Minutes, 21st session et seqq.

71. Lugard, Dual Mandate, p. 230.
yet ripe for the Government to involve itself in such matters. By 1925 official opinion was becoming more interventionist, and the Native Affairs Department was beginning to advocate the establishment of stool treasuries and the regulation of the revenue of chiefs. H.S. Newlands, the Acting S.N.A., wrote in July 1925 that

'The institution of stool treasuries, whether by voluntary or compulsory means, which would moreover be subject to periodical inspection by Political Officers, would undoubtedly be of enormous benefit to tribal communities.'

C.W. Welman, the substantive S.N.A., expressed similar opinions in February 1926, and added,

'I regard it as of great importance for the dignity of native rule on the Gold Coast and the improvement of its standard that every Chief should have an assured revenue, not only for the maintenance of himself and his household, but for applying to a considerable programme of works in his Division.'

Any hopes, however, that the Native Administration Ordinance, passed in April 1927, might lead to advances in this area were shattered within a year of its passing. In December 1927, the State Council of Manya Krobo, in the Eastern Province, passed a set of by-laws establishing a state treasury and a land and fishing taxation scheme. The Attorney General's Department pointed out, however, that these by-laws imposed taxation, and created new offences by imposing fines for forestry offences, both of which were ultra vires under the Native Administration Ordinance. Native authorities, under

72. GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/394, correspondence on revenue of chiefs, October 1911 to January 1913 and March 1920 to October 1923.

73. GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/928, Sub-file 1, item 7, extract from letter by H.S. Newlands, Ag. S.N.A., 24 July 1925.


75. GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/928, [?] Commissioner Eastern Province to S.N.A., 18 April 1928.
Section 40 of the Ordinance, were given the general duty of 'providing for the good government and welfare of the natives' in their areas, but nowhere were specific legal powers conferred upon them to enable them to provide for such matters through fiscal legislation. The Government therefore wrote to the Konor of Manya Krobo expressing the Governor's appreciation of the action of the state in passing the by-laws, but regretfully stating that 'it is not proposed to approve these Bye-Laws in their present form'. The Government considered that 'it would be better that enabling legislation should be enacted for the whole Colony, and that model State Treasury Bye-Laws should be passed'. The Konor of Manya Krobo, like many others, had mistakenly thought that the Native Administration Ordinance constituted such enabling legislation.

The same mistake was made even by Nana Ofori Atta, the Jmanhen of Akyem Abuakwa, who had headed the committee of chiefs that had originally drawn up the Native Administration Bill, and who had introduced the Bill in the Legislative Council. In May 1928 Akyem Abuakwa state made by-laws providing for the imposition and raising of certain cocoa taxes on farms owned by 'strangers' in the state. Once again it was decided that these by-laws were ultra vires and that 'power to make Bye-Laws "providing for the good government and welfare of the natives" does not confer the power to impose payment of tribute by means of Bye Laws'. This decision was communicated to Ofori Atta, who raised 'a very strong protest', especially against the Government's interference with the traditional right to levy tribute from 'strangers'.

76. Ibid., Minutes on file, April to May 1928.
77. Ibid., J.C. de Boulay, Ag. Col. Sec., to Commissioner Eastern Province, 31 May 1928.
78. See section 4.4 above.
80. Ibid., Ofori Atta, Jmanhen of Akyem Abuakwa to D.C. Akyem Abuakwa, 12 September 1929.
The stop-gap Native Administration Amendment Ordinance, No. 23 of 1931, overcame this particular problem by empowering paramount chiefs and their councils to make by-laws establishing and regulating stool treasuries, but it was felt by the Government that something more substantial was needed. The Ashanti Stool Treasuries Ordinance, No. 10 of 1927, made much more detailed provision for the establishment and control of treasuries in Ashanti: in particular it empowered the Governor to regulate the establishment by Head Chiefs of stool treasuries at the request of the Chief Commissioner, instead of leaving such regulation entirely in the hands of the chiefs. By the end of 1928 the system appeared to be working with a fair degree of success in Ashanti, and the Government decided that it might overcome the inadequacies of the Colony Native Administration Ordinance by introducing a similar type of legislation into the Colony. 81

As a preliminary to this, copies of the Ashanti Ordinance and the Regulations made under the Ordinance were circulated to Colony provincial commissioners, to the Provincial Councils of Chiefs and to the Joint Committee of the Provincial Councils for discussion in 1928 and 1929. 82 The Provincial commissioners were strongly in favour of such legislation being passed for the Colony, but reactions in the Provincial Councils were mixed. The Omanhen of Akyem Abuakwa and the Konor of Manya Krobo, both of whom, as we have seen, were keen to establish treasuries, were the dominant chiefs in the Eastern Province. Under the persuasion of these two chiefs and their allies, the Eastern Provincial Council declared itself in favour of the scheme. The Central Provincial Council, on the other hand, expressed forceful opposition to any control by Government officials over the administration of native authority finance, and made it clear that they would prefer no treasuries to treasuries liable to Government interference. The Western

81. GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/1420.
82. GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/928.
Provincial Council took a half-way stand, declaring itself in favour of treasuries, and in principle of some Government control, but rejecting the amount of control which the Government had in Ashanti. 83

The Government was anxious to promote the establishment of proper treasuries and the levying of direct taxation, and it was therefore much more inclined to listen to Ofori Atta and the Eastern Province chiefs than to the chiefs of the Central and Western Provinces. Slater’s confidential minute of 1930 on native administration and Jones’s of 1931 on the introduction of direct taxation both took a strongly interventionist line on the question. 84

After the stop-gap Native Administration Amendment Ordinance of 1931, which we have already mentioned, the first step in the implementation of the new policy was the publication early in 1932 of a Native Administration Revenue Bill. Under this Bill, chiefs were to be authorised to establish treasuries, under the close supervision of administrative officers, and to levy direct taxation in the form of rates, half of which was to be paid into the treasuries, and the rest to go to the central Government. 85

An Income Tax Bill had already been published in August 1931 to provide revenue for the development of the urban areas. After protests against the Bill from both the A.R.P.S. and the Ratepayers Association, the Bill was withdrawn. The Government intended to re-introduce it at the same time as the Native Administration Revenue Bill, after a propaganda campaign explaining the purpose of the Bills. 86 Despite demonstrations against the Income Tax

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83. Ibid.
Bills in Accra, Cape Coast and Sekondi in October and November 1931, the Government went ahead with its plans.\textsuperscript{87} The credibility of the colonial Government had been badly damaged during the cocoa hold-ups of 1930-31;\textsuperscript{88} so when, despite the demonstrations, the Government still pressed on with the Income Tax Bill, introduced the Native Administration Revenue Bill, and attempted to spread propaganda in favour of these measures, it was not difficult for the A.R.P.S. to persuade people that the Government was trying to dupe them into paying ruinous taxation which would benefit nobody but the Government and the chiefs.\textsuperscript{89} There was widespread opposition throughout the Colony to both Bills, and chiefs who showed any inclination to favour the Bills were threatened with destoolment.\textsuperscript{90} From reports coming into Accra from district and provincial commissioners it was clear that this opposition was more than just a general opposition to new taxation; the control which the Government was to have over the treasuries, and the share it was going to take of the levy, were equally resented.\textsuperscript{91} Both Bills were withdrawn and the Government reconsidered its approach.\textsuperscript{92}

It was decided that the encouragement of stool treasuries in individual states could still go ahead while a more acceptable Bill was drawn up. Although native authorities could not impose new taxation under the Native Administration Ordinance, the Amendment Ordinance of 1931 allowed them to establish a form of stool treasury under the supervision of the district commissioner and to pay into it such customary tributes and payments as they were already receiving under customary law. District commissioners were

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., sub-file B; PRO, CO 96/704/7259/32; GNA-Accra, CSO MP 1403/31.

\textsuperscript{88} See section 5.6 below.

\textsuperscript{89} GNA-Accra, CSO MP 60/32, CSO MP 1403/31, ADM 11/1/928.

\textsuperscript{90} GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/928; GNA-CC, DAO 151, DAO 1306.

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{92} PRO CO 96/704/7260/32.
therefore ordered to undertake a propaganda campaign in the rural areas, encouraging chiefs to establish stool treasuries based on such customary payments or the commutation of traditional services, as Slater had outlined in his minute.93

In the Central Province, this proved to be virtually impossible. In the first place, it was soon discovered that there were no traditional payments, or services which might be commuted into payments, sufficient to provide an adequate revenue for stool treasuries. District commissioners had been investigating potential sources of income since early in 1931. In June 1931 the District Commissioner Cape Coast reported that

'In their present stage of development the subjects either don't owe or in any case would refuse to give, any services to the Head Chiefs' Stools. So far I have not found any Stool which can definitely point to a recognised service which each subject owes to it and which would be capable of commutation to a money payment however small'.

The Acting Commissioner Central Province added, 'I am informed that this is the case everywhere'.94 The only existing regular source of income for the chiefs was the revenue from stool lands and the payments received from strangers farming on village land; but this income was usually barely sufficient to maintain the upkeep of the chiefs and the cost of the constant litigation arising out of the lands. It was certainly not enough to provide an adequate revenue for a regular treasury.

In the second place, most chiefs were reluctant to establish treasuries supervised by district commissioners: since such treasuries would not noticeably add to their incomes, there was no encouragement for chiefs to allow interference by officials in their financial affairs. Neither did the subjects want to have district commissioners supervising their chiefs' income and

93. GNA-CC, DAO 273, DAO 252 and District Confidential Diaries.

94. GNA-CC, DAO 151, Confidential Diary, Cape Coast District, entry for 6 June 1931 and marginal note.
expenditure. The argument that this would reduce the possibility of corruption or misuse of funds by chiefs was not very convincing, since most people distrusted colonial officials even more than they distrusted chiefs, over whose activities they had some measure of control under customary law.95

As a result of chiefly indifference and popular hostility the attempt to establish stool treasuries in the Central Province was a total failure.96

The Government accordingly passed a new Native Administration Amendment Ordinance, No.25 of 1936, which empowered the Governor to take the initiative in making regulations establishing and governing stool treasuries. This time, however, it was the Colonial Office which frustrated the Gold Coast Government's intentions: they pointed out in July 1937 that the draft Regulations which the Governor proposed to introduce under the Ordinance were invalid, since, firstly, no express power had been given for the Governor to regulate the application and custody of a tax, as he proposed to do under the draft Regulations, and, secondly, it was doubtful if the Governor could delegate the power to make rules in a matter in which he was authorised to make regulations himself, as he had to do under the Regulations if he was not to go through the impossibly cumbersome procedure of passing separate regulations for each state.97

Without these powers, the task of establishing native administration taxation would be too complex to be practicable, and so the whole idea was dropped pending fresh discussion on indirect rule and the stool treasuries.98

Meanwhile, district commissioners were ordered to continue the thankless task of attempting to persuade chiefs to establish treasuries themselves. This attempt was no more successful after 1937 than it had been before.99

95. GNA-CC, DAO 151, DAO 1062, DAO 1306.
96. GNA-CC, DAO 1306, Handing Over Notes, Saltpond District, 24 July 1936; GNA-Accra, CSO MP 372/30, Sub-file 29; GNA-CC, DAO 111, G.F. Mackay, D.C. Cape Coast, to C.C.P., 3 March 1937.
97. GNA-Accra, CSO MP 372/30, Sub-file 37, Telegram, S. of S. to Gov., No. 188 of 17 July 1937 and subsequent correspondence.
98. GNA-Accra, CSO MP 372/30, Sub-file 37. The new discussion will be described in chapter 6 below.
99. Ibid.; PRO, CO 96/752/31352/38; CO 96/758/31228/39.
Native tribunals did not arouse the same sort of explosive hostility as Provincial Councils and stool treasuries, but they were nevertheless a constant source of hostility to both chiefs and officials.

The main cause for complaint was the very high rate of fees and fines levied in the tribunals. All such payments belonged to the chiefs who sat on the tribunals: without stool treasuries and taxation, they remained the main source of income for the chiefs, who were therefore tempted to maximise their fees and fines. A.F.E. Fieldgate, the C.C.P., pointed out in 1934 that tribunal fees were almost twice as high as those of the Supreme Court: where, for example, the Supreme Court would charge only 11/- for dealing with a claim for £10, the tribunal would charge 21/-, with possible adjournment and other fees amounting to an additional 10/-. As for fines, district commissioners were constantly reporting that the tribunals were levying excessively heavy fines. A typical comment was that of the Assistant D.C. Cape Coast in his Confidential Diary for July 1939:

19th July. To Elmina. Spent whole day in the Native Tribunal. Inspected record books and accounts. This inspection has on several occasions been unavoidably delayed. It was evidently badly required. The whole working of the tribunal would appear to be devoted to the extortion of money. Fines are continuously being reduced - presumably to the maximum the person can afford - as soon as judgement has been pronounced; the maximum sentence of imprisonment is imposed as a lever to ensure payment of the fine ...

Under these circumstances it is hardly surprising that many chiefs should have made themselves very unpopular through their tribunals, and that when charges

100. GNA-Accra, CSO MP 206/34, A.F.E. Fieldgate, C.C.P., to Col. Sec., 9 May 1934.

101. GNA-CC, DAO 625, Confidential Diary, Cape Coast District, entry for 19 May 1939.
were served against chiefs they almost invariably included accusations of overcharging or partiality in the tribunal.

As well as being expensive, the tribunals were also very inefficient. An important factor contributing to this inefficiency was the great complexity of the Native Administration Ordinance which the tribunals were meant to enforce. It had 129 complicated and detailed clauses when it was first passed in 1927, and after numerous amendments resulting from attempts to correct its many faults, the Ordinance had 136 clauses by 1936. The A.R.P.S. complained in 1934 that

'Apart from the fundamental objections to this Ordinance the interpretation and understanding of it with its numerous amending Ordinances, all of a referential character, involving close and painful noting and revision, must baffle and perplex Native Chiefs, Court Clerks, and all those whose duty it is to administer their provisions. They would puzzle even the Judges of the High Court of Justice in England'.

Officials were inclined to agree with this view, and even came to oppose new amendments simply on the grounds that they would complicate matters still further. As the Commissioner Western Province commented in 1936,

'Owing to the very large number of amendments and alterations to the Ordinance, Tribunals have already great difficulties in observing correctly its provisions, and any further additions are at present to be deprecated'.

This would not have been an insurmountable problem if it had not been for the very low standard of training and education of most tribunal registrars. Courses were instituted in the early 1930s for the training of registrars, but their success was very limited; most registrars lacked even the basic education which would have enabled them to benefit from the courses.

The D.C. Cape Coast commented at the end of one such course,

102. GNA-CC, Acc. No. 59/64, A.R.P.S. Petition to the King, 1934.

'Only two candidates showed any promise; the majority of the others were almost illiterate and have no hope of ever achieving the certificate stage; I pointed this out and stressed the necessity for a sound education as a preliminary to success at the course or the subsequent responsible work of a tribunal registrar'.

The basic problem was again a financial one: without adequate funds, native authorities could not afford to pay their registrars properly. Low salaries, and the fact that registrars had 'often to resort to the Court in order to obtain their wages', made it virtually impossible to recruit competent registrars. As the C.C.P. wrote in 1934,

'Until a regular and adequate salary is assured I am afraid there is no hope of getting the right type of man to take up the work of Tribunal Registrar. It is true that the courses held for Tribunal Registrars have resulted in increased efficiency in certain Tribunals but the standard as a whole is still low. The whole question is one of money. The right type of man is forthcoming if sufficient inducement is held out. With money the Native Authorities can run competent Tribunals; without it they cannot'.

The low standard of registrars resulted in frequent misinterpretation of the Native Administration Ordinance, mistrials, and badly kept records and accounts, all of which helped to bring the tribunals, and the chiefs who conducted them, into further disrepute.

It was not only the incompetence of registrars which caused problems. Registrars, whether competent at their jobs or not, frequently became

104. GNA-CC, DAO 151, Confidential Diary, Cape Coast District, entry for 21 August 1932.
105. GNA-CC, DAO 1306, Handing Over Notes, Saltpond District, 7 September, 1932.
107. That the standard of registrars had an important effect on the standard of tribunals is indicated by the fact that where there were competent registrars, the tribunals were usually well conducted by legal standards, as in Essikuma, Ajumaku and Ebirem (Ekonfi) in 1936 (GNA-CC, DAO 1306, Handing Over Notes, Saltpond District, 24 July 1936).
involved in the politics of the states whose tribunals they served. They became accepted by many amamnemfo as personal advisers, as a sort of attorney-general. In states divided by disputes, they inevitably became identified with the amanhen's party, and were therefore suspected of bias against the adomyefo, and of giving partial interpretations of the Native Administration Ordinance during trials. Alternatively, when the adomyefo gained power in a state, they often appointed their own registrar, who was accused of bias against the amanhen and his party.

The Government's constant efforts to reform the native tribunals merely aggravated the situation. In the first place, as we have seen, the numerous amendments to the Native Administration Ordinance succeeded only in confusing matters by making the Ordinance yet more difficult to interpret.

In the second place, attempts to tighten up the rules of tribunal procedure frequently aroused opposition in cases where the procedures laid down by the Ordinance were contrary to custom. For example, following decisions in the West African Court of Appeal in December 1934 and March 1936, it was decided to enforce the rule that 'councillors who take part in giving judgement should only be those who have been present throughout the hearing'.

The S.N.A. sent a circular to provincial commissioners in November 1936, laying it down that in appeal records the names and ranks of councillors present should be given, and not just 'Omanhene of ... his Divisional Chiefs, Chiefs, Headmen, Linguists and Councillors'. This rule was utterly alien to

108. This was the situation of Afful, registrar of Kwamankessi (Ayeldu) from 1935 until he was ousted in 1939. GNA-CC, DAO 1306, Handing Over Notes, Saltpond District, 1935-40.

109. The Regent of Abura, and leader of the anti-Government party, appointed Abbanoh and C.N. Hackman as registrars in 1939 and 1940. Both were dismissed on the insistence of the pro-Government party. GNA-CC, DAO 215,Abura Native Affairs, 1939-40.

110. GNA-Accra, GSO MP 372/30, Sub-file 41, Hugh Thomas, S.N.A., to Chief Commissioner Ashanti and Colony Provincial Commissioners, 14 November 1936.

111. Ibid.
customary procedure. In tribunal sittings, as in all state council meetings, it was customary for people to join and leave the meeting at will, for groups or cliques to withdraw from time to time to discuss tactics or arrange compromises, and for those who opposed a decision to withdraw while it was being announced, so that the decision could be deemed to be unanimous. 112 It was therefore impossible for state councils to conform with the law if they were to abide by customary procedures. Chiefs and defendants alike were puzzled and angered when decisions properly arrived at by customary standards were reversed on appeal because they were deemed to be procedurally improper.

In the third place, resentment was also aroused by the powers given to district commissioners to supervise and interfere with the judicial machinery of the states. In January 1934, district commissioners were ordered to make 'frequent surprise inspections' of state prisons 'with a view to striking off the Register any ill-conducted ones', and several prisons were closed as a result. 113 Under the Native Administration Amendment Ordinance No. 18 of 1935, district commissioners were given the power to review the proceedings of native tribunals in criminal cases, and their costs in civil cases, without prior appeal having been made by plaintiff or defendant in the case. Once again the Government was seen to be encroaching upon the independence of the states in their day-to-day affairs, and attempting to subordinate chiefs and state councils to the district commissioners and the administrative hierarchy.

Major reform of the tribunals was postponed after 1937, while discussions took place between Accra and London on the whole question of indirect rule. 114


113. GHAC-CC, DAO 1306, Handing Over Notes, Saltpond District, 9 January 1934 et seq.; DAO 158.

At the local level, however, district commissioners were expected to continue the work of supervising the tribunals. This task was becoming increasingly difficult. New tribunals were being established every year, and the task of supervision was becoming correspondingly more complex and time-consuming. In Saltpond District, for example, there were 15 tribunals in 1935; by 1940 there were 25, most of which needed 'careful watching and frequent inspection'.

Supervising the tribunals was, of course, made even more difficult by the complexities and contradictions of the Native Administration Ordinance. Duncan-Johnstone, the hard-pressed Commissioner for Stool Disputes, commented in 1942, 'The Native Administration Ordinance is like a leaking boat and as soon as it is patched up in one part it springs a fresh leak in another. What is wanted is a much simpler Native Authority Ordinance'. This was not achieved until 1944, when, following the report of the Blackall Committee in 1943, a new Native Courts Ordinance was passed, which greatly simplified procedures, but which also increased still further the powers of the colonial Government over the courts.

5.6 The cocoa hold-ups of 1930-31 and 1937-38.

It would be superfluous to attempt here a detailed description of the two most important cocoa hold-ups of the inter-war years, those of 1930-31 and 1937-38. In the first place, they have already been analysed elsewhere.
And in the second place, although the hold-ups affected chiefs, brokers, labourers, businessmen and Government officials, they were essentially an economic protest by the producers - the large and small cocoa farmers - against the low price of cocoa and against the Pool of European firms which was blamed for keeping the price low. Nevertheless, these economic protests had important repercussions on the political life of the Central Province, and it is those repercussions which we shall discuss here.

The chiefs learned two important lessons from the 1930-31 hold-up. The first was that they could not openly defy the colonial Government. The chiefs played a prominent part in organising the hold-up, and used their traditional powers to enforce it, by having gong-gong beaten to proclaim chiefs' oaths.119 The Government responded by forbidding the use of the gong-gong and the oath in restraint of trade, by prosecuting chiefs who continued to use them, and by reversing their orders and decisions in such cases.120 By December 1930, most of the chiefs in the Central Province had succumbed to this campaign, and the pro-Government chiefs in the Provincial Council even went as far as to pass a resolution condemning the practice of using the oath to enforce the hold-up, and 'wholeheartedly' supporting the Government's proposal for a conference between the contending parties.121

The chiefs were quickly taught their second lesson: that it was equally dangerous for them to come out in open support of the Government. By this time, the smaller cocoa farmers, who had originally been reluctant to join the hold-up, were beginning to ally with the larger farmers; by the beginning of 1931, 'all the farmers - wealthy and poor - acted together to defend their

119. Holmes, op.cit., Chap. IV.
120. Rhodie, op.cit., p.110.
121. GNA-CC, DAO 297, S.W. Saxton, Ag. C.C.P., to D.C. Cape Coast, 18 December 1930, forwarding resolution by the Central Provincial Council at an Emergency Meeting on 17 December 1930. The resolution was signed by, or on behalf of, the Amanhemfo of Mankessim, Ayan Mai, Nkusukum, Akyem Busumee, Assin Apimanim, Ayan Denkyira, Breman-Esikuma, Assin Attandaso and Winneba.
common interests as producers against the combined power of the paramount chiefs, barristers, large cocoa brokers, African merchants and the European firms'. The result was widespread hostility in the cocoa-growing areas to those chiefs who actively supported the Government line. Farmers joined with anti-emanhen factions, and many chiefs, such as those of Agona, Assin Apimanim and Akyem Kotoku, found themselves facing destoolment charges in connection with their opposition to (or lukewarm support for) the hold-up, and with their support for the anti-hold-up Provincial Council.

The effect of these lessons can be seen in the management of the 1937-38 hold-up. Nearly all the chiefs in the Central Province were wholeheartedly behind this hold-up, which received far more popular support in general than that of 1930-31. Yet the chiefs rarely took the risk of openly enforcing the hold-up: they relied instead on popularly elected farmers' chiefs (akwafohemfo), to whom they 'lent' their gong-gongs. Even in the later stages of the hold-up, when many farmers were beginning to weaken and stricter enforcement became necessary, the chiefs still avoided direct enforcement: they used persuasion, conducting propaganda campaigns in each other's states, and when that failed they continued to rely on akwafohemfo for actual enforcement. This kind of indirectness, or deviousness, had long been a characteristic of local politics in South-Central Ghana, as we have seen in chapter 3 above, but the cocoa hold-ups reinforced it significantly.

The hold-ups did little to encourage the people of the rural areas to trust the colonial Government. In the first hold-up, the Government remained neutral, but, as Rhodie points out,

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124. Ibid., Chapter V; GNA-CC, DAO 297 and DAO 496.
Despite all official protests of neutrality, justice and fairness, the colonial administration chiefly served the interests of the large European firms. Neutrality was an argument for maintaining the status quo; in the inequitable conditions of the Gold Coast, such a policy left the field open to the most powerful. Moreover, the colonial bureaucracy, through its various departments, daily supplied information on crop movements, prices, rents and cocoa cultivation to the merchant firms .... Such information was not available to the farmers or to Africans in general. When Africans protested or made requests, they were ignored or turned down.\textsuperscript{125}

In the second hold-up, the sympathies of local officials in the Central Province were undoubtedly on the side of the farmers.\textsuperscript{126} But in this hold-up, as in that of 1930-31, they had to uphold the law, and the law forbade the use of any kind of compulsion or violence to enforce the hold-up. District commissioners were ordered to make frequent propaganda tours, during which they were to explain that the drop in cocoa prices was the result of world commodity conditions and not of the Buying Agreement, and they were strongly to condemn the use of force against those who wanted to sell cocoa.\textsuperscript{127} Nor did Government action stop at propaganda; in the second hold-up as in the first, district commissioners were active in prosecuting chiefs and farmers who attempted to use the chief's oath or any other form of illegal compulsion to prevent the sale of cocoa or the purchase of European goods.\textsuperscript{128}

\textsuperscript{125} Rhodie, 'Cocoa Hold-up', p. 107.

\textsuperscript{126} GNA-CC, DAO 496, T.R.O. Mangin, Ag. C.C.P., to S.N.A. 3 December 1937 et seqq.

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.; GNA-CC, DAO 297, G.A.S. Northcote, Col. Sec., to C.C.P., 31 December 1930 et seqq.

\textsuperscript{128} GNA-CC, DAO 496, C.O. Butler, D.C. Winneba, to C.C.P., 13 April 1938, enclosing 'Reports of obstructing lawful acts by violence'. 
The result was that, despite protestations of neutrality by the Government, they were thought still to be on the side of the firms. A meeting of 25 Colony chiefs and chiefs' representatives (of whom 7 were from the Central Province) wrote to the S.N.A. in January 1938,

'The Government on their part have averred all along that they are neutral in this affair, that is, they support neither the farmers nor the Merchants. Nevertheless since November an intensive propaganda has, presumably on the instructions of His Excellency, been carried on by all Political Officers in the country in regard to the Government's view of the Chiefs' relative position, apart from numberless leaflets which both the Government and the Merchants have issued extensively throughout the entire country on the subject. Further, the Political Officers have made it their habit to concentrate the farmers in their own villages and at certain centres, and to constantly preach to them the futility of the decision to withhold the sale of their cocoa; and at most of the meetings the Paramount Chiefs have been criticised and even condemned...'

"...The Political Officers or at least some of them have so acted in certain ways that we cannot but believe that they are agents of the Pool Firms. Everything has been done to discourage the farmer, and every effort has been made to encourage the Pool Firms to break the hold-up'.

It is interesting to note that this mistrust was confined to the political officers (whose job was to enforce the law against violent obstruction); it did not extend to agricultural officers (whose job was merely to see that the held-up cocoa was properly stored). The same meeting of chiefs noted that

'The remarkable feature of this propaganda of the Political Officers in regard to the hold-up is that the Agricultural Officers who, in so far as cocoa is concerned, are or should be more in touch with the farmers, have been extremely cautious, and their advice to farmers has always been such as we would

expect; viz. the picking of the crop from the tree and the storage of cocoa, no attempt having been made by them to discourage the farmer to hold-up his cocoa provided of course that all necessary attention is paid to it. 130

The feeling against political officers can be described only as mistrust: it never extended to violence, or even open hostility, in the Central Province. Following the lessons of the 1930-31 hold-up, people did not openly defy officials; they merely refused to co-operate. They continued the hold-up in their own way, and tried to avoid discussing it or openly committing themselves in front of district commissioners. The D.C. Cape Coast, on a propaganda trek in January 1938 commented, 'They show no desire to discuss the cocoa situation. The subject is only referred to when directly brought up by me'. 131

Finally, the hold-ups, especially the later one, demonstrated the remarkable degree of solidarity and the high level of organisation which could be achieved in the rural areas of the Colony. 132 The Senior Inspector of Plants and Produce reported in November 1937 that

'... never have the farmers been so well organised and I found that even in the remote parts of the Western Province the Chiefs and prominent farmers were in direct communication with the organising bodies in the Province and Accra. They are kept au fait with every daily development of the situation and in this respect the power of the local daily press is growing tremendously. In both Provinces the hold-up is virtually complete and the boycott of all stores is gaining in intensity rather than diminishing. In some districts the Chiefs even refuse to allow market vendors to sell produce to the servants of Europeans'. 133

130. Ibid.

131. GNA-CC, DAO 625, Confidential Diary, Cape Coast District, entry for 20 January 1938.

132. Holmes, op. cit., Chap. V.

133. GNA-CC, DAO 496, L.J. Packham, Agricultural Officer-in-Charge, Central Division, to C.C.P., 22 December 1937, enclosing extracts from report of W.R. Hudson, Senior Inspector of Plants and Produce, for November 1937.
Even in the later stages of the hold-up, when many farmers wished to sell their cocoa, the organisation remained intact and the hold-up was successfully maintained. Although the full potential of this solidarity and organisation was not realised until the time of the C.P.P. campaigns in 1948-51, it had been successfully tested in 1937-38.

5.7 Government propaganda in the 1930s

A constant theme throughout this chapter has been the importance of propaganda in the rural politics of South-Central Ghana. We have seen how successful the propaganda of the A.R.P.S. and the organizers of the cocoa hold-ups was in consolidating and mobilising anti-Government and anti-European feelings. To complete the picture, it is necessary to give an account of the less successful official propaganda of the period, and of the difficulties experienced by district commissioners in presenting the Government's viewpoint.

It had long been an accepted principle of colonial administration that trekking, and the dissemination of information about Government policy, was one of the most important duties of political officers. The Government was, however, rarely satisfied with the propaganda work of district commissioners, and frequently exhorted them to renew and extend their travelling. In April 1933, the Acting C.C.P. sent a circular to Central Province district commissioners in which he laid down in the clearest terms the importance which the Government attached to trekking, and the Governor's dissatisfaction with the existing situation:

"His Excellency the Governor is much perturbed to find how little touch there is between the administrative officers and the people of the country and as a consequence how little the people know of government's policy. The remedy is constant travelling and the dissemination of full information concerning

134. Holmes, op.cit., Chap. V.

135. GNA-Accra, ADM 36/1/10, A.A.C. Finlay, Ag. Col. Sec., to Ag. C.C.P., 8 July 1921."
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government's aims and the means adopted (or proposed) to effect them ...

'It is realised that there are a multitude of important matters needing attention which tend to tie administrative officers to their headquarters but it should be of assistance to make the principle quite clear that no duty of the District Commissioner approaches in importance that of continual travelling and the maintenance of close touch with the people, giving them the clearest possible knowledge of government's work and rectifying misrepresentations of government's intentions'.

The Acting C.C.P. laid down six points to be borne in mind in connection with trekking:

'(1) Give the Head Chief early notice of your itinerary and instruct him to inform his chiefs and people of dates and times of your visits to the various villages in the State and see that your instructions are carried out. There are means available to make the chief obey such instructions and the chiefs can insist on their people attending.

'(2) Complaints received at Headquarters should be adjourned for investigation at the town or village where the parties reside.

'(3) Most civil cases can be taken on trek and much of the criminal work can be dealt with also on trek.

'(4) Correspondence with Chiefs should be reduced to a minimum. Practically every subject of such correspondence can be dealt with more satisfactorily at a meeting.

'(5) The population of this Province is not concentrated in a few big towns on motor roads; it is scattered in small villages off the main routes and it is to these villages that most attention should be directed.

'(6) Meetings should be held wherever possible in the open and not in the chiefs' houses'.

136. GNA-CC, DAO 550, V.J. Lynch, Ag. C.C.P., to D.C.s, Central Province, 10 April 1933.

137. Ibid.
When district commissioners managed to abandon the mounting pile of paper-work in district headquarters and go out on trek, they faced many obstacles to successful propaganda. The first of these was the amount of other work which they had to do while on trek. Court work, inspecting tribunal records and reviewing cases took up a great deal of time. While on trek through Foso and Twifo the D.C. Cape Coast complained in September 1932,

'I find that Court work at Foso and Twifo during my periodic visits occupies all my time and that I am obliged to pay little or no attention to native affairs and other important work on these visits'.

When district commissioners found sufficient time to call and address village and state meetings, they had many topics to cover apart from political questions and pro-Government propaganda. The Acting D.C. Oda went on trek in June 1933 in obedience to the Acting C.C.P.'s circular quoted above; but, in addition to disseminating information on the political situation, he had also to talk about self-help projects, the reform of native tribunals, stool treasuries, cocoa quality control, cocoa co-operatives, the growing of local food crops and the establishment of forest reserves.

To cover such a wide variety of urgent and sensitive topics in each village at a meeting lasting a few hours, would have been a difficult enough task in itself. But the district commissioner, having called a village or state meeting, usually found that he could not even begin to discuss such matters until he had listened to lengthy arguments concerning the current stool dispute in the village or state. Most of the district commissioner's time on trek was, in fact, taken up with attempting to understand and mediate in innumerable complex and bitter disputes.

138. GNA-CC, DAO 151, Confidential Diary, Cape Coast District, entry for 2 September 1939.

139. GNA-CC, DAO 550, Address by the Acting District Commissioner to the People of the Western Akim District, June 1933, and correspondence relating thereto.
In all this work, whether explaining Government policy, advocating local development or attempting to resolve stool disputes, the district commissioner faced a formidable barrier of mistrust and suspicion. When district commissioners began to advocate the idea of cocoa co-operatives in the late 1920s, the chiefs and farmers 'all appear[ed] to have it in the back of their minds that it is another scheme on the part of the Government to get at their land or cocoa'. When they tried to encourage the establishment of forest reserves they were faced with the same suspicion. An attempted census of fishing vessels in 1940-41 failed because chiefs and fishermen immediately (and wrongly) assumed that it was being conducted for taxation purposes, and refused to co-operate. When district commissioners attempted to arbitrate in stool disputes or to expound the provisions of the Native Administration Ordinance 'in opposition say to the action taken by a group of people it is interpreted as Government favouritism of the other side'. When they suggested that disputes should be referred to Provincial Council they were obstructed by the anti-Provincial Council factions within the states.

The very fact that an administrative officer concerned himself with a matter was enough to arouse suspicion and hostility. Interventionist indirect rule necessitated more and more interference by administrative officers in the affairs of the states, and this resulted in more and more suspicion and hostility, making the task of officials even harder.

140. GNA-CC, DAO 1062, R. Ramsay, Asst. D.C. Twifo to D.C. Cape Coast, 15 November 1927.
141. GNA-CC, Forest Reserves files.
142. GNA-CC, DAO 40.
143. GNA-CC, DAO 625, Report on inspection of Dunkwa Sub-District by G.F. Mackay, D.C. Cape Coast, 15-21 November 1939.
144. GNA-CC, DAO 215, I.LL. Philips for D.C. Cape Coast to C.C.P., 23 September 1935.
It was rare for administrative officers to face open or violent hostility on their treks: the usual tactic of anti-Government states or parties within states was obstruction and non-co-operation. Often the first difficulty was to get state or village council meetings called. The D.C. Saltpond, for instance, wrote in his handing-over notes in July 1936 that in Mankessim,

"The difficulty ... is to get the State Council to meet, ever since I came back from leave [in December 1935] I have been trying to get the Omanhene to assemble a State Council so that I could meet them and talk over State matters but to date he has not done so. I advise you to keep on at him and get a meeting as soon as possible, then if there is any trouble brewing you will get to know of it!".  

When the state council was finally called, and if and when discussion of stool disputes was concluded, the difficulty was to persuade the council to discuss Government policy or to voice their criticisms. In January 1940, G.F. Mackay, the D.C. Cape Coast, went on trek attempting to counteract the efficient A.R.P.S. propaganda against the Native Administration Treasuries Ordinance of 1939.  

At Foso, headquarters of Assin Attandaso state, he succeeded in calling a state council meeting (albeit a badly attended one), but could get virtually no response to his propaganda:

"The meeting altogether lasted 2½ hours and though they seemed to listen well to all I had to say, and I did most of the talking, they would not give me their confidence, they would not voice their criticisms if they had any".  

The next day Mackay addressed a meeting at Manso, headquarters of Assin Apiman state:

145. GHA-CC, DAO 1306, Handing Over Notes, Saltpond District, 24 July 1936.
146. GHA-CC, DAO 625, Confidential Diary, Cape Coast District, January 1940.
147. Ibid., entry for 11 January 1940. Cf. the reaction to Government propaganda during the 1937-38 cocoa hold-up, described in section 5.6 above.
'I understand that representatives of the Society have visited many towns and villages in the State, particularly those of the malcontents, but when I asked the Omanhene and Chiefs what they had done about it, they had nothing to say. I pointed out to them that I had not the time to visit all the towns and villages and that it was up to them to counteract the misleading propaganda of the Society by telling their people the truth'.  

Officials were forced to rely to a large extent on the pro-Government chiefs to spread their propaganda for them, but there were few chiefs who were willing to take the risk of actively advocating unpopular Government policies, even if they were in favour of them. When the D.C. Cape Coast discussed the organisation of an agricultural show at Fanti Yankumasi in October 1932, Nana Taibu Darku IX, Omanhene of Assin Attandaso, '... reminded me of something we are frequently apt to forget, that in matters of policy which he himself understands and realises the necessity for - he is frequently faced with the task of upholding and popularising that policy single handed in a State containing nearly 30,000 people'.

It is understandable that most amanhemfo were reluctant to undertake that task, especially when there were powerful groups of anti-Government adomyefo in the states who were only too ready to accuse the chiefs of being mere agents of the colonial Government.

Chiefs as compliant and powerful as Taibu Darku were exceptional. Usually district commissioners found the amanhemfo unwilling to antagonise their adomyefo; often they found the chiefs positively obstructive. The confidential diaries reveal the mixture of suspicion and friendliness which characterised the chiefs' attitude to the district commissioner, and the mixture of exasperation and (often patronising) affection with which the

148. Ibid., entry for 12 January 1940.

149. GNA-CC, DAO 625, Confidential Diary, Cape Coast District, entry for 27 October 1932.
district commissioner regarded the chiefs. To quote a revealing example, from the beginning of 1936 to the end of 1937, L.W. Judd, the D.C. Cape Coast, was intermittently involved in attempting to settle a dispute between Nana Kwame Nkyi, Omanhen of Assin Apimanim, and some of his sub-chiefs. On 9 May 1936 he tried to arrange a meeting:

'I had great difficulty in getting the Omanhene to fix a date. I don't think I've ever met anyone less fitted to be a chief. All through the proceedings he did his best to prevent a settlement and I believe that he, Efilla and Effikera the late Regent don't care two pence about the State or their people.

'The Omanhene came and had a beer with me in the evening'.

On 18 May the reconciliation meeting took place:

'To Manso. To witness the swearing of the oath of allegiance ... Never have I met such a crowd of contentious elders. There was a dispute about each smallest detail and the oaths were not taken until the evening after a day spent in argument. This does not augur well for the future peace of the State. Eventually the Twafuhene, Akroponghe, Odikro of Ochisu and a sub-Chief from Anyabram took the oath and I came away reaching Cape Coast about 6.45 p.m.

'There will have to be another meeting to go into a dispute about the Apagyahene to whom the Omanhene refused to swear and who left the meeting in a rage'.

On 15 September 1937 Judd was back in Manso, still trying to settle the dispute:

'In the evening the Omanhene came to see me again and stayed until 10. As he arrived at 7 I did not get dinner until somewhat late. He said that the next time I was here to tell the P.C. there was a lot of work here and

150. Ibid., entry for 8-9 May 1936.

151. Ibid., entry for 18 May 1936.
stay for a week and he would take me hunting. There are bongo about and if possible I should like to try and shoot one in February which is, I believe, the best time of year. 152

Sometimes the difficulties officials had in communicating with chiefs and understanding local disputes led to tragic miscalculations. In November 1936, L.W. Judd was Acting C.C.P. while the substantive C.C.P. was on leave. He had to deal with a stool dispute in Abura in which the questions of stool treasuries and Provincial Councils played as important a part as local issues. Judd had been dealing with this problem for some time as D.C. Cape Coast, and on 12 November 1936 he wrote:

'... the only suggestion I can put forward is that further petitions from the malcontents should be ignored until they become reasonable in their attitude.
'There is no doubt that the Omanhene's supporters are gaining ground steadily and that the young men following the malcontents are heartily tired of the dispute. In my opinion the dispute will die a natural death unless the hopes of the malcontents are revived by further inquiries into their alleged grievances'. 153

A week later there was a riot at Abura Dunkwa in which five people were killed and six seriously injured. 154

152. Ibid., entry for 15 September 1937
154. Ibid., G.F. Mackay, D.C. Cape Coast, to C.C.P., 19 November 1936.
CHAPTER 6  THE WAR YEARS, 1939-45

6.1 The debate on indirect rule, 1936-40

By the end of the 1930s officials in the Gold Coast and in London were losing their faith in the existing system of indirect rule in the Colony and were advocating a much more rigorous interventionist policy. The signs of this hardening attitude were already clear by the mid-1930s. We described in the last chapter how officials in Accra and London were becoming disillusioned with the Provincial Councils. We also noted that in 1934, during the Governorship of Sir Shenton Thomas, a new Native Authority Bill was drafted for the Colony. This Bill had much in common with the Ashanti Native Authority Ordinance which was passed in 1935, and it was similar to the Colony Native Authority Ordinance of 1944: it gave the Governor the power to appoint and dismiss native authorities, and it gave officials much more control over native authorities than they had hitherto exercised.\(^1\) This Bill was never submitted to the Colonial Office for approval, and it was dropped soon after it was drafted, for reasons which are not clear,\(^2\) but it was the first sign of the desire of Gold Coast officials to sweep away the laxity and uncertainties of the existing system.

From the beginning of 1936 to the middle of 1940 a vigorous debate was conducted in London and in the Gold Coast on the subject of indirect rule.

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1. The Bill was enclosed in the Conf. Desp. of 31st August 1936, Sir Arnold Hodson, Gov., to S. of S. (PRO, CO 96/730/31228/36). This was the first time the Colonial Office had seen the Bill.

2. PRO, CO 96/730/31228/36, Note of a meeting in the C.O. between G.E. London, Col. Sec. of the Gold Coast, and C.O. officials, 28th October 1936, London said at that meeting that 'It had not been possible to discover locally what were the reasons for dropping the Native Authority Ordinance...' Hodson thought that it had been dropped because Sir Shenton Thomas had 'grave doubts whether native administration... would be really suitable for the Colony', considered that it would be impossible to 'impose a system which the people did not accept', and wanted to prepare the ground by propaganda (PRO, CO 96/730/31228/36, Hodson to S. of S., Conf. Desp. of 31st August 1936).
rule. Since this debate gives a useful insight into official thinking on the subject, and since it was to determine official policy for the remaining years of indirect rule, it is worth recording it here.

The immediate occasion for the debate was a letter from H.M. Grace, the Principal of Achimota College to Dr. Meyer Fortes, a young anthropologist and a Fellow of the International African Institute in London, describing the 'precarious position' of political life in the Gold Coast and asking Fortes to come out and investigate the state of the traditional political systems.\(^3\) Fortes forwarded the letter to the Secretary-General of the International African Institute, who forwarded it to the Colonial Office in January 1936.\(^4\) Gerald Creasy (later Sir Gerald Creasy, Governor of the Gold Coast, 1948-49) agreed that

'...affairs in the Colony have continued to drift, and I fear that no attempt is being made to examine the question of native administration as a whole and to think out a policy for the future.'\(^5\)

An investigation was clearly needed, but Creasy, and his superiors, felt that this investigation should be conducted by officials under Government authority, not by a private individual under the auspices of Achimota College.\(^6\)

At first it was argued that the investigation should be conducted by an officer from outside the Gold Coast, since 'Sir Arnold Hodson was not primarily interested in Native Administration, and would not readily

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3. PRO, CO 96/730/31228/36, H.M. Grace to Dr. M. Fortes, 9th November 1935.

4. Ibid., Minute by H. Vischer, Secretary-General of the I.A.I., 9th January 1936.

5. Ibid., Memo. by G. Creasy, 20th January 1936.

move in these matters..."7 Hodson (Governor of the Gold Coast, 1934-41) strongly opposed the idea of an outside commission, however, on the grounds that there were plenty of experienced and capable officers in the Gold Coast if such a commission were necessary, and that a general debate would in any case be more useful than a commission.8 This discussion in itself aroused a new interest in the problem among Gold Coast officials, and in view of Hodson's opposition, the idea of a commission was therefore dropped,9 and the general debate went ahead, by means of despatches, discussions in London with Gold Coast officials on leave, and meetings of officials in Accra and London.10

The debate was a long and complex one, and we must confine ourselves here to outlining only the main themes and conclusions which were relevant to the formulation of indirect rule policy. The first point, on which everyone was agreed, was that indirect rule in the Colony was in a most unsatisfactory state from the Government's point of view. Creasy summed up the general feeling when he wrote, 'The policy of the Government is that of indirect rule through the Chiefs, but I am beginning to believe that it is now rather a question of no rule.'11 I.M.R. Maclellan, another Colonial Office official, was more explicit:

9. PRO, CO 96/730/31228/36, Note of meeting between Lord Hailey and C.O. officials, 14th December 1936; PRO, CO 96/739/31228/37, Note of meeting in S. of S.'s office, 19th January 1938, and subsequent minutes.
10. The debate is recorded mainly in PRO, CO 96/730/31228/36 ('Political Administration of the Colony'), and subsequent 31228 files.
... at present nobody is doing anything, and, among those political people who do try to see into the future, there seems to be no confidence that anyone is trying to frame a policy, and a general attitude of discouragement is the result. And there is nothing in the present system to afford the slightest hope that a policy of drift can end in anything but complete chaos. As long as Government has no control of the N.A. revenue, and as long as a chief cannot be destooled except by his own people I don’t see what can be done. ...

... It seems to me that the great needs of the Colony are just the things which the A.R.P.S. people reject so violently: (1) control of stool funds; (2) control of the occupants of the stool. Of the corruption among the N.A.’s there can be no doubt. ...

This opinion was shared by Colonial Service officials in the field. A.F.E. Fieldgate, the Commissioner Central Province, summed up the opinions which his district commissioners and technical officers had been expressing for years, when he wrote in 1939,

'The system of Government has been described as "a mixture of direct and indirect rule, with a steady bias towards the latter" but as Lord Hailey remarks in his book "An African Survey", this bias towards the methods of indirect rule is more evident in the Northern Territories Protectorate than in the Gold Coast Colony. It can, I think, be said that indirect rule does not exist in any part of this Province. Apart from well defined judicial powers the chief and his councillors play little part in the ruling of the country, a state of affairs due in the main to the complete absence of a native treasury system and any form of direct taxation. These faults in the existing system have been recognised for some considerable time but it is no easy task to introduce corrective measures ...

For these local officials the inadequacies of indirect rule and the

12. Ibid., I.M.R. Maclellan, Accra, to G. Creasy, 8th January 1936.

drawbacks of government through the chiefs were amply demonstrated by
the fate of the various agricultural development schemes which they were
attempting to promote through the agency of the native authorities. For
example, it had been recognised since the mid-1920s that there was great
potential for the establishment of a coconut industry in Saltpond District.
From 1934 onwards the district commissioner and the district agricultural
officer had been conducting an intensive campaign to persuade the chiefs
to encourage the formation of coconut co-operatives. Yet by July 1936
only seven co-operative societies had been formed, with a total membership
of 82, a total paid up capital of £15. 2s. Od., and a total sales of 2.7
tons. Even the 2.7 tons had been sold entirely by one society (Ebiram-
Akra), the other six societies having sold no coconuts at all. This despite
the fact that the estimated potential production of the area was 'in the
neighbourhood of 300 tons per annum'.14 The development of banana co-
operatives was equally slow: after several years of work the whole of the
Central Province by February 1938 contained only eight banana co-operatives,
with a total membership of 125 and a total paid up capital of £122. 4s. 10d.15

There were many other such setbacks, which discouraged officials
from believing that they could achieve anything by working through the
chiefs under the existing system: the failure of the District Agricultural
Committees established in the early 1930s, the failure of the experimental
Unit Food Farms established in 1939, the lack of enthusiasm for cocoa co-
operatives.16 There were, of course, many other reasons for the lack of
success of these schemes, but officials believed that the difficulties of

14. GNA-CC, DAO 1070, Coconut Cultivation Industry; GNA-CC, DAO 1306,
Handing Over Notes, Saltpond District, 31st December 1935 and 24th
July 1936.

15. GNA-CC, DAO 32, Report on Development of a Banana Industry in Central
Province, 5th February 1938.

16. GNA-CC, DAO 1003, DAO 111 and DAO 1062.
working through the native authorities were a central factor. When it was suggested in 1936 that native authorities might appoint their own agricultural inspectors, the district commissioners of the Central Province were unanimous in opposing the scheme, on the grounds that native authorities would not be able to pay such inspectors, and would in any case probably be reluctant to organize their appointment. Clearly the district commissioners were as disillusioned with the existing system of indirect rule as were officials in Accra and London.

The first question to be decided was whether indirect rule, even if it were reformed, was the best way of governing the Colony: should the attempt to establish indirect rule be abandoned, and local councils set up instead of native authorities? It would have to be considered whether the system of Native Administration as it was generally known was suitable to the Gold Coast.

At first there were many officers in the Colonial Office and in the Gold Coast who believed that it would be impossible to establish an efficient system of local administration through the chiefs. It was even held by some officials that the very democratic nature of the Colony chiefdoms made indirect rule impossible:

'It was this "democratic" feature of native society in the Gold Coast which had led Sir Donald Cameron to express the opinion ... that indirect rule was probably not possible in the Gold Coast where authority came from below and not from above as (generally speaking) in Nigeria.'

Hodson shared these doubts:

'If you have proper chiefs who are real rulers and have a large territory under them indirect rule is a good thing but when

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17. GNA-CC, DAO 111.
18. PRO, CO 96/730/31228/36, Memorandum of discussion in Lord Plymouth's room, 14th February 1936. The suggestion quoted was that of Sir Cecil Bottomley.
19. Ibid., Memo. by H. Downie, 27th March 1936. Lord Plymouth, however, disagreed with this view: see discussion cited in fn. 18.
you have dozens and dozens of small and insignificant Chiefs ruling tiny districts it is quite another matter, and, in my opinion, a form of direct rule is necessary. The position is almost comic in the Gold Coast because if a chief tries to rule at all, or to do anything which the people do not like, he is at once destooled!  

Hodson even suggested a programme of radical reform which would include the establishment of statutory rural councils in areas where 'it has clearly been demonstrated that progress under a native authority is impossible...'

By this time, however, the ideology of indirect rule was far too well established to be seriously shaken. As Lord Hailey said in 1936 of 'the debate into the comparative merits of direct and indirect rule...',

'It is a misfortune that the partisans of either system are apt to support their preferences with a confidence that is almost theological in its fervour. The principle of indirect rule has, in particular, passed through the stages, first, of a useful administrative device, then that of a political doctrine, and finally that of a religious dogma.'

In any case, it was generally felt that the political atmosphere in the Colony was so hostile to official control that the radical reorganization of local government would be impossible. In January 1937, the Secretary of State informed Hodson that:-

'It may be well if I make it clear at the outset that I can see no practicable alternative to the development in the Colony

20. Ibid., Hodson to Sir Cecil Bottomley, 5th June 1936.

21. Ibid., Hodson to S. of S., Conf. Desp. of 31st August 1936. Hodson also suggested special Town Boards for 'cosmopolitan' areas containing a mixture of ethnic groups - towns such as Obuasi and Agona Swedru. Since only limited changes were made in this sphere, and since there were very few such areas in the Central Province, this discussion is omitted here.

22. RH, MSS Brit. Emp. s.338, f.12, Lord Hailey, 'Some Problems dealt with in "African Survey"', address delivered at Chatham House. 18th December 1936. Lord Hailey was engaged in writing his African Survey during the years of this debate, and was frequently asked to attend the discussions at the Colonial Office.
of a system of indirect rule, based on the existing chiefs. Hodson eventually conceded this point, and further consideration was duly given to the reform of the existing system.

A number of comparatively minor matters were considered, including the regulation of stool dispute enquiries, the ascertaining of proper boundaries, the education of chiefs, and the bringing of educated Africans into the state councils. But the two main areas in which reform was sought were in the control exercised by officials over the native authorities and in the regulation of the authorities' finances.

From the very beginning it was agreed by all the officials participating in the debate that Administrative Officers under the Native Administration Ordinance had inadequate powers for controlling the activity of supplementing the inactivity of native authorities... The first priority of any scheme of reform should be to give such powers to officials. In particular the Governor should be given the power to appoint and disband native authorities, and his administrative officers should be empowered to create and regulate stool treasuries, to compel native authorities to implement Government policies, to adjudicate in stool disputes, to supervise and control native courts, and to take over the judicial functions of the Provincial Councils.

In this connection it would be necessary explicitly to repudiate the old argument, based on the Bond of 1844, that the chiefs possessed inherent judicial and administrative authority which did not derive from


24. PRO, CO 96/739/31228/37, Hodson to S. of S., Conf. Desp. of 13th November 1937.

25. PRO, CO 96/730/31228/36, Note by H. Downie of discussion with A.C. Duncan Johnstone (C.W.F.), 3rd April 1936.

26. Ibid., Sir Arnold Hodson, Gov., to S. of S., Conf. Desp. of 31st August 1936
the Crown, and with which the Government could not interfere. 27 It was 'useless to think of improvement in the native judicial and administrative system unless the Government was prepared to repudiate once and for all the unfounded claim to "inherent" jurisdiction and executive power on the part of the chiefs in the Gold Coast. The Government had never accepted the contention of the chiefs in this respect, but for various reasons the issue had been shirked in face of opposition on two occasions in recent years. 28

This did not mean that the Governor should resume the power to depose or suspend chiefs, which had been abandoned in the Native Administration Ordinance of 1927. The Secretary of State suggested that it might be desirable to restore such powers, 29 but Hodson argued that this would be ineffective, 'in view of the democratic nature of native institutions': a chief removed by the Governor could still be recognized as chief by his people, in which case no successor would be elected. 30

In any case, such a provision would not be necessary, since, after the reforms being contemplated, the Governor would be able to assume control of local justice and administration by virtue of his power to appoint and disband native courts and native authorities: the Governor need not appoint a chief to a native court or native authority if he did not think him fit. 31

The second main area of reform was in the finances of the native authorities. It was agreed that these were in a deplorable state, and

27. For the question of inherent jurisdiction and the legal status of the Bond of 1844, see Appendix B below.

28. PRO, CO 96/730/31228/36, Note by H. Downie of discussion with Mr. Howard, 27th March 1936.

29. Ibid., S. of S. to Hodson, Conf. Desp. (2) of 15th May 1936.


31. Ibid., and PRO, CO 96/739/31228/37, Hodson to S. of S., Conf. Desp. of 13th November 1937.
that powers ought to be given to the Governor to compel native authorities
to establish proper treasuries, and to arrange for the supervision and
control of such treasuries by provincial and district commissioners.32

The final question to be decided was the pace at which these
reforms should proceed. At first the Colonial Office officials felt that
drastic action was urgently needed and that the reforms should go forward
as soon as possible.33 Sir Arnold Hodson, on the other hand, argued that
the reforms would encounter strong opposition, and that there should be
a period of 'sympathetic propaganda' to prepare public opinion for them.34
He believed that reform of the courts could go ahead straight away, while
the ground was being prepared for further reform. Officials in the
Colonial Office thought, however, that it would be a mistake to separate
the question of courts from all the other problems of native administration,
and that reform on all fronts should proceed together without delay.

The Secretary of State wrote in January 1937 that

'Bearing in mind ... that propaganda in favour of reform on
the lines now under discussion has been proceeding for six
years or more, I cannot avoid the conclusion that the time
has come frankly to face such opposition and to make it
clear that the Government intends to initiate without further
delay a comprehensive programme for the rehabilitation of
native administrations in their executive and financial,
as well as in their judicial, aspects.'35

The cocoa hold-ups of 1937-38, however, transformed the situation.

As Hodson put it in March 1938,

32. Ibid.
33. PRO, CO 96/730/31228/36, Discussions in C.O., 14th February 1936
et segg.
34. Ibid., Hodson to S. of S., Conf. Desp. of 31st August 1936.
35. Ibid., S. of S. to Hodson, Conf. Desp. (3) of 30th January 1937.
'The cocoa dispute could not have happened at a more unfortunate time, for things were beginning to move slowly but steadily in the right direction. Now however we have not only been brought to a standstill, but we have lost the ground we had gained. Nothing is more certain than that there will have to be a breathing space before any important steps in native policy can be taken for I can say without any hesitation that the introduction in the near future of the proposals under consideration would lead to very grave trouble indeed.' 36

The Colonial Office had already come to the same conclusion, 37 and so it was decided to allow Hodson to move at his own pace, even though it was felt that things might be changed a little faster than Hodson was proposing. 38 Hodson would normally be due to leave the Gold Coast by 1940 or 1941, and if his successor was in favour of 'taking a firmer line with the chiefs', then the pace could be quickened. 39

The initiative once again lay with the officials in the Gold Coast. A conference of Colony Provincial Commissioners was held in the S.N.A.'s office in Accra on 24th March 1939, at which a 'Five Years Plan of Development' for native administration was proposed. 40 This plan envisaged three stages in the advancement of indirect rule: firstly treasuries would be established in the states, without local taxation being imposed; secondly direct taxation would gradually be introduced in the rural areas; and finally native jurisdiction would be comprehensively

36. PRO, CO 96/749/31228/38, Hodson to Sir Cecil Bottomley, 11th March 1938.

37. PRO, CO 96/759/31228/37, Bottomley to Hodson, 27th January 1938.

38. PRO, CO 96/749/31228/38, Minutes by O.G.R. Williams, 2nd August 1938, and A.J.D. Dawe, 18th August 1938.

39. Ibid.

40. GNA.-Accra, CSO MP 372/30, Sub-file 54, and CSO MP 1997/30.
As the first stage in this development the Native Administration Treasuries Ordinance, No. 16 of 1939, was passed. This Ordinance empowered the Governor to establish a treasury in any state which did not itself establish one, and to make regulations for such treasuries. It also gave substantial powers to provincial and district commissioners to control and supervise these treasuries. The London officials felt that local officials had taken rather too literally the decision that they should proceed at their own pace: the Colonial Office had not been informed of the Bill until it had already been discussed with chiefs and members of the Legislative Council, and was ready for publication. Nevertheless Colonial Office officials strongly approved of the Ordinance, and provincial and district commissioners went ahead with the task of encouraging the establishment of treasuries. The difficulties which they encountered will be discussed in the next section.

The other stages of the reform had to be postponed because of the financial restraints imposed by the War. But Hodson's successor, Sir Alan Burns (Governor from 1941 to 1947) believed in a much faster pace of change than Hodson had envisaged, and the proposals we have described above were all incorporated in the Colony Native Courts and Native

41. Ibid.
42. For the origins and passing of this Ordinance, see GNA-Accra, CSO MP 372/30, Sub-file 51.
43. PRO, CO 96/752/31352/38, Minutes by G. Jones and O.G.R. Williams, 9th August 1938 et seqq.
44. PRO, CO 96/767/31228/40, Hodson to S. of S., Telegram No. 291 of 18th May 1940. For accounts of Gold Coast government and politics during the war years, see P.M. Bourret, Ghana - The Road to Independence (London, Oxford University Press, 1960), Chap. IX; and A.B. Holmes IV, Economic and Political Organizations in the Gold Coast, 1920-45 (Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Political Science Department, University of Chicago, 1972), Chap. XVI.
Authority Ordinances of 1944. These Ordinances will be discussed in section 6.4 below.

6.2 Stool treasuries and rural politics in the Central Province, 1939-44

Although the Native Administration Treasuries Ordinance had given the Governor the power to compel a state to establish a treasury and to make regulations for such a treasury, these powers were never exercised in the Central Province. It was realized that a treasury established under such circumstances could not possibly function, since the jamanhen and state council would refuse to co-operate, and it would therefore be a full time job for a district commissioner to set up and supervise the treasury of a single state. 45

As far as the Central Province was concerned, the importance of the Ordinance was that it gave much greater powers to the provincial and district commissioners to supervise the regulations and functioning even of treasuries which had voluntarily been established by state councils. Administrative officers therefore felt much more confidence in the potential benefits of state treasuries, and the campaign to persuade states to set them up was pursued with renewed vigour. The results, however, were disappointing. In a few states with strong pro-Government jamanhemfo proper treasuries were established: by August 1940 treasuries had been established and finance boards appointed under the Ordinance in Kommenda, Assin Apimanim, Assin Attandaso and Winneba. 46 Some states even managed to collect a reasonable revenue for their treasuries. In Mankessim a treasury was established in 1943, with revenues for the large and prosperous market as its main source of income. By December 1943 this treasury had a surplus of £125, and by April 1944 the surplus

45. GNA-Accra, CSO MP 372/30, Sub-file 55.

46. Ibid., A.F.E. Fieldgate, C.C.P., to S.N.A., 23rd August 1940.
These states, however, were exceptional, and the establishment of treasuries in the Central Province as a whole proceeded at a much slower pace than in the Eastern and Western Provinces.\textsuperscript{48} The reason is not hard to discover: once again the A.R.P.S. was conducting a vigorous propaganda campaign, and once again their propaganda was falling on fertile ground.

At a Conference of the Society held at Cape Coast in December 1938, it was resolved,

'...that seeing that stool or state treasuries have been in existence for time immemorial there is no necessity for any institution resembling stool or state Treasuries ... to be introduced by Government by legislation or otherwise; that, therefore, this Conference is very strongly opposed to the Native Treasuries Bill in its present form ...\textsuperscript{49}

As usual, the A.R.P.S. conducted its campaign both at the colonial level, through the press, pamphlets and appeals to the Government, and at the state level, through intensive local propaganda and 'spoiling' tactics.

At the colonial level, a telegram was sent to the Governor opposing the Treasuries Bill,\textsuperscript{50} while Kobina Sekyi prepared and published a pamphlet on The Native Treasuries Bill. An Analysis of the Bill with

\begin{footnotes}
\item[47] GNA-CC, DAO 1306, Handing Over Notes, Saltpond District, 4th December 1943 and 14th April 1944.
\item[48] GNA-Accra, CSO MF 372/30, Sub-file 55. Only four treasuries of any kind had been established in the Central Province by August 1940, whereas by this time the Eastern Province had 5 state treasuries, 3 divisional treasuries and 6 town treasuries. By December 1940 there were 15 state and 4 divisional treasuries in the Western Province.
\item[49] GNA-CC, Acc. No. 77/64, J.P. Allotey Hammond, Secretary, A.R.P.S., to Regent of Abeamdi, 3rd May 1939.
\item[50] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
For the most part, this pamphlet consisted of technical and legal arguments against the Bill, in a detailed, clause by clause analysis. But it also contained much of the political rhetoric of opposition to interventionist indirect rule which the Society had been using since 1925:

'There is no need for us to give the Native Treasuries Bill... a trial before we can say whether it will be beneficial or not. There can be no doubt that its clauses, if permitted to stand, will do immense harm to the prospects of development by ourselves or our national ideals and, that is, of our real progress as a free people with constitutional native rulers....

'If Nigerian models are those we are required to look up to, ....Have we considered the social and political structure of the society on which the Nigerian system, now established in the Northern Territories was based? Are our rulers Emirs, Sultans, absolute Monarchs? Is our land tenure based on the feudal system? We must be careful how we hanker after strange models, strange gods, a strange outlook ....

'Obviously the Governor wants more power of controlling the chiefs over and above the innumerable and enormous powers he holds by clauses in various Ordinances. How long are we to sit still and allow such progressive degradation to go on as to our rights as a free people under our own constitutional rulers? Why does the Governor want more power to control the Chiefs? Let us watch the various commissioners and their reports ... Let us watch the Commissioners, real and spurious, proper and improper, and watch our land.'

51. Published by W.E. Pietersen & Co., Cape Coast (a firm owned by Sekyi) in 1939. Copy in GNA-CC, Acc. No. 397/64.

52. Sekyi, The Native Treasuries Bill, pp. 3, 7 and 18. Original emphasis. The 'spurious' Commissioners referred to were those of the Leverhulme Trust Cocoa Commission.
It was realized that this long technical pamphlet would have little immediate impact in the rural areas, where the treasuries were actually to be established. So a series of four short leaflets was prepared in November 1939, in which the offending clauses in the Ordinance and regulations under the Ordinance were described. It was explained that the A.R.P.S. opposed the Ordinance and its regulations on the grounds that it gave excessive powers to the Governor and his administrative officers. It was also explained that the paramount chiefs were failing in their duty to support the Society in this opposition.

Three hundred copies of these leaflets were printed, and they achieved widespread circulation in the Central Province and beyond. Nana Amanfi III, Omanhen of Asebu and President of the Central Provincial Council, complained on 8th January 1940 that

'There can be no doubt that the leaflets have been distributed in a most secret manner to nearly all the States. They are taken to the Chiefs who in the opinion of the Society are at variance with the Paramount Chiefs and unless the activities of the Society are checked immediately the country will be thrown into helpless confusion before long.'

The leaflet campaign was evidently being reinforced by the traditional A.R.P.S. 'spoiling' tactics: emissaries of the Society circulated the leaflets among the adomyɛfo and anti-Government parties in the states and encouraged them to renew their struggle against pro-Government chiefs. As Amanfi III said on 23rd January 1940,

'The Aborigines Society is now up to cause trouble by accusing the chiefs that they are selling the people to the Government.

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53. GNA-CC, Acc. No. 77/64.
54. Ibid. The leaflets were printed by the Roman Catholic Press.
55. Ibid., Nana Amanfi III [?] to C.C.P., 8th January 1940.
... we heard that they held meetings in Cape Coast and took certain decisions by one of which emissaries are to be despatched to the States in the Central Province to misrepresent things to the people and as a result this is causing trouble in certain States. They first touch States in which they know discontent exists or where relations between the chief and a section of his people are strained. In my State they sent for one or two disaffected people from Moree to Cape Coast, where they instructed them what to do. I have held a meeting at Moree where I explained the situation to them but still the trouble is spreading to other States. The Omanhene of Ajumaku told me some of the propaganda leaflets have been circulated in his State.56

It is difficult to establish the exact extent of the distribution of the leaflets, since district commissioners on trek encountered a barrier of silence when they attempted to discuss the matter.57 It is clear, however, that the A.R.P.S. campaign was well timed and well conducted: anti-Government parties took up the opposition to stool treasuries throughout the Central Province, where there was a spate of disturbances on destoolment attempts from 1939 to 1943. There were disturbances against the Native Administration Treasuries Ordinance in Akyem Kotoku in 1939.58 The adomyefo of Denkyira opposed the Omanhen, Nkwantabissa III, from 1939 onwards on the grounds that he was in favour of establishing a treasury and levying a rate: Nkwantabissa was eventually forced to abdicate in 1942.59 The Tufohen of Anomabu and his faction

56. GNA-Accra, CSO MP 372/30, Sub-file 55, Notes of interview with the Secretary for Native Affairs by the Standing Committee of the Joint Provincial Councils, 23rd January 1940.

57. GNA-CC, DAO 625, Confidential Diary, Cape Coast District, January 1940. See section 5.7 above.


59. GNA-CC, DAO 197 and DAO 529.
opposed Zaccheus Acquah's candidacy for the Paramount Stool in 1939-40 in the belief that Acquah was in favour of establishing a treasury.\textsuperscript{60}

E.O. Sampson, an Ayan Abaasa asafo leader who had been deposed because of his opposition to the \textit{Jmanhen} Akonu VIII returned to Ayan Abaasa in 1941 from his exile in Cape Coast and succeeded in uniting Akonu's enemies in opposition to the \textit{Jmanhen}'s scheme for establishing a treasury. Akonu abdicated in July 1943.\textsuperscript{61} Attempts were made to destool the \textit{Jmanhen} of Ajumako in November 1943 because he favoured a treasury.\textsuperscript{62}

Even in states where comparatively strong amanhemfo succeeded in establishing treasuries, there were anti-Government parties which gave the amanhemfo considerable trouble. The states of Assin Apimanim, Assin Attandaso, Essikuma, Abura and Asebu all reported strong opposition to the establishment of treasuries.\textsuperscript{63}

The Government conducted a campaign of counter-propaganda. One thousand copies in Fante of an address by the S.N.A. explaining the Treasuries Ordinance was sent to the Central Province in March 1940, and district commissioners were ordered to go out on trek to counteract the A.R.P.S. propaganda.\textsuperscript{64} But for the reasons explained above,\textsuperscript{65} this official propaganda was not well received, and the rate of establishment

\ \textsuperscript{60} GNA-CC, DAO 240.

\textsuperscript{61} GNA-CC, DAO 345 and interview with Nana Borafoasi (formerly Nana Akonu VIII) and other elders at Abasa, 30th January 1972.

\textsuperscript{62} GNA-CC, DAO 1306, Handing Over Notes, Saltpond District, 4th December 1943.

\textsuperscript{63} GNA-CC, DAO 625, Confidential Diary, Cape Coast District, February 1940; DAO 1306, Handing Over Notes, Saltpond District, 17th July 1942; Acc. No. 77/64, Minutes of Aburu State Council Meeting, 16th January 1940; and Acc. No. 77/64, Amanfi III, \textit{Jmanhen} of Asebu [\textit{? to C.C.P.} ] , 8th January 1940.

\textsuperscript{64} GNA-Accra, CSO MF 372/30, Sub-file 59, H.W. Thomas, S.N.A., to Colony Provincial Commissioners, 27th March 1940.

\textsuperscript{65} See section 5.7 above.
of treasuries remained very slow. The pace speeded up in 1943 only because the news circulated that the Blackall Committee had recommended that no tribunal should be allowed to continue functioning unless a treasury was established in its state or division: the D.C. Saltpond reported in July 1943 that,

'The principle enunciated in the Report of the Native Tribunals Committee of Enquiry ... to the effect that no tribunal should be permitted in future to function unless there is a Treasury in the State or Division in which it operates, is creating quite an impression and many States hitherto uninterested in such measures of progress are now rushing forward with requests for a Treasury, since they no doubt consider that the inauguration of a Treasury will "save their bacon"...'

It was not only against stool treasuries that the adɛmyɛfo were active: almost any sign that an ɔmanhen was willing to co-operate with the Government was liable to be seized upon by his opponents as a sign that he was 'selling out' to the colonial power. In Winneba, for example, the 'systematic and organized obstructionism' of the ɔmanhen's opponents (which eventually resulted in riots in Winneba in August 1941), included opposition to the ɔmanhen taking his seat on the Legislative Council, to his assistance in recruiting for the war, and to his support for the Compulsory Services Bill and for air raid precautions. Even the old bugbear, the Provincial Council issue, was still causing trouble in many states.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the pessimism of local officials with regard to the possibility of achieving any real advance

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66. GNA-CC, DAO 1306, Handing Over Notes, Saltpond District, 16th July 1943.

67. GNA-CC, DAO 538, Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the disturbances which occurred in Winneba (Effutu) State on the 19th and 20th August 1941.
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by working through the chiefs, should have deepened during the war years. This pessimism is revealed in the comments of district commissioners and Provincial Commissioner (A.F.E. Fieldgate) on the various development plans which were considered before and during the war.

In February 1939 copies of a rural development scheme which had been proposed for the Colony of Cyprus, were circulated to officials, with the request that they should comment on the applicability of the scheme for their own areas. All the officials in the Central Province were sceptical about the possibility of working the scheme in the Province. Most of them gave as one of their reasons the probable difficulty of persuading the chiefs and farmers to co-operate, and the difficulty of finding funds even if they were willing. The same reactions were elicited by the suggestion in April 1939 that a scheme for the development of export crops might be included in the proposed Five Year Plan for the Development of the Gold Coast.

The construction of a Five Year Plan had to be abandoned with the outbreak of the war, but by December 1942 the victories of the Allies in North Africa seemed likely to result in this Colony ceasing to be an important link in the chain of Allied communications with a consequent reduction in the strength of service personnel and of military demands for food supplies and labour. Though there would still be a shortage of European personnel and difficulties in obtaining materials, there would probably be a surplus of African labour. It was therefore considered

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68. GNA-CC, DAO 997.

69. Ibid.

70. GNA-CC, DAO 627.

prudent to plan for this 'Distant War Stage', and also for the later 'Peace Stage', when more materials and European supervisory staff might be called upon. Officials were asked to suggest and comment on plans for the development of their districts and provinces, which would absorb African labour and lead to the improvement of economic and social conditions. 72

Yet by this time official confidence in the possibility of cooperating with chiefs in the planning and implementation of development had sunk so low that the native authorities were almost entirely excluded from these plans. When provincial and district commissioners were asked in May 1943 to assess whether native authorities would be willing and able to guarantee a minimum revenue for a proposed rural electrification scheme under the 'Peace Stage' plans, they were explicitly instructed not to discuss the question with the native authorities themselves: 'the Native Authorities are not to be consulted. Your own opinion is required ...'. 73 The findings of Central Province officials were predictable:

'I do not think any useful purpose would be served by calling upon any Native Administration in this Province to give guarantees in connection with these schemes. All are without substantial funds with which to implement any promises made by them.' 74

The financial instability of the native authorities was not the sole reason for this pessimism. It was felt that such financial problems were merely a part of the general inadequacy of native authorities; development would have to go ahead without the native authorities, if

72. Ibid.
73. Ibid., Circular by Ag. Col. Sec., 18th May 1943.
74. Ibid., A.F.E. Fieldgate, C.C.P., to Col. Sec., 2nd July 1943.
it was to go ahead at all. In June 1943 the D.C. Saltpond, commenting on native authority guarantees for the electrification scheme, pointed out that,

'There are ... only two Native Administration Treasuries in this District, one just started and the other in process of starting, whilst the remaining 10 States pursue the hand to mouth system re finance, so the degree of financial security or stability necessary for such a guarantee would in most cases be vague, unknown and therefore unreliable. This raises the old question therefore as to whether the material advancement of the area should wait on its political or constitutional progress to equip it therefor, and in the circumstances I am of the opinion that it should not, otherwise judging from past experience it would seem that material advancement would be delayed indefinitely.'

There was virtually no mention of native authorities in the General Plan for Development in the Gold Coast of July 1944, which brought together the various local and departmental development schemes.

Even when District and Provincial Social Welfare Committees were established in 1943-44, they were established entirely by administrative and technical officers, without reference to the native authority structure.

By 1944 the Government was evidently unwilling to seek the assistance of the chiefs of the Central Province in either the planning or the implementation of local development. This was despite the chronic shortage of staff, which might have made it willing to seek any allies.

75. Ibid., W.H.A. Hanschell, D.C. Saltpond, to C.C.P., 16th June 1943.

76. General Plan for Development in the Gold Coast, Governor's Despatch No. 222 of 26th July 1944, S.P. II of 1944 (Accra, Government Printing Dept., 1944.).

77. Ibid.
it could find in the development process. Yet it was considered impossible to ease the situation by relying on the chiefs to shoulder some of the burden of development administration.

The situation was altered by the Native Authority (Colony) Ordinance of 1944. Many officials believed that the reformed native authorities under this Ordinance would be able to undertake much more of the work of development, and the chiefs were therefore brought back into the Government's confidence. But, as we shall see in the next chapter, this experiment was to be short-lived and, as far and the chiefs and the Government were concerned, ill-fated.

6.3 The chiefs under pressure.

By the late 1930s the chiefs were beginning to feel isolated. They could no longer rely on their own people, on the Government or on the educated elite for support.

Within their own states the amanhemfo obviously had their supporters, or they could not have continued to reign. They still exercised great powers, and it was still not easy to depose a ruling amanhen, since by virtue of his office he exercised considerable control over the machinery of state councils and tribunals. Nevertheless, as we have seen, most amanhemfo were rarely free from troublesome opposition.

The adomyefo in most states were very strong, and getting stronger, and the chiefs were less certain of their own security than they had been.

78. Ibid., and GNA-CC, DAO 654.

even in the 1920s.

On the other hand, they felt that the Government, which had hitherto been firm allies for pro-Government chiefs, were gradually deserting them. They were very concerned about the Government's loss of confidence in the native authorities and the Provincial Councils, and its unwillingness to consult them on questions of local administration. In November 1938 the members of the Joint Provincial Council petitioned the King that they

'have observed with increasing anxiety disregard to the ascertainment of their views in regard to measures which directly affect native interests and we feel that such policy of non-cooperation is not only materially prejudicial, but also not beneficial, to the Country as a whole.'

Officials' mistrust of the chiefs extended even to Nana Ofori Atta, 3manhen of Akyem Abuakwa, who had been one of the staunchest supporters of the Government among the chiefs, and who had introduced in 1927 Native Administration Ordinance into the Legislative Council. The petition quoted above was in part against the Native Administration Further Amendment (Colony) Ordinance, No. 25 of 1938, which made the decision of Provincial Councils in all except land cases subject to appeal to the Governor, who was to have absolute discretion and whose decision was to be final. H.W. Thomas, the S.N.A., firmly believed that the Provincial Councils' opposition to the Ordinance was stirred up entirely by Ofori Atta, who was involved in a number of jurisdiction disputes and who wanted to take his cases through the courts to the West African Court of Appeal, and was therefore opposed to giving the

80. GNA-Accra, Acc. No. 911/56, Petition of Provincial Councils to the King, 9th November 1938.
Governor the sole right of appeal. Thomas several times accused Ofori Atta of partiality, and discounted his opinion on that account.

During the war years, the situation deteriorated even further, with the Government virtually freezing the chiefs out of the development planning process. But it was not merely the Government's manifest lack of confidence in the chiefs and their opinions which worried the chiefs, it was also its attempts to assume more and more control over their activities. The petition against the Native Administration Further Amendment Ordinance was the first sign of this concern. When the Native Treasuries Bill was introduced in 1938, even the pro-Government chiefs were suspicious, and many of them were unwilling to accept the Bill. At its 37th session the Central Provincial Council declared itself in favour of the Bill with a very narrow majority: 8 states in favour of the Bill and 7 against, with one abstention.

When the draft Regulations under the Ordinance were published in April 1939, the chiefs felt that their suspicions were confirmed. The Regulations gave wide powers to the Governor and to provincial and district commissioners to control and supervise the treasuries and their finance boards. Estimates had to be sent to the provincial commissioner for the approval of the Governor, all payments outside the estimates had to be approved by the district commissioner, all cheques had to be countersigned by the district commissioner, who also


83. See section 6.1 above.

84. GNA-Accra, Acc. No. 259/65, Minutes of 37th Session of the Provincial Council of Chiefs, Central Province, 23rd February to 7th March 1939.
had to approve the appointment of all treasury personnel, including
the treasurer and the members of the finance board. 85

The Provincial Councils protested against the draft Regulations,
and nine months of negotiations followed, during which the Government
refused to make any significant concessions. On 23rd January 1940 the
Standing Committee of the Joint Provincial Council met the S.N.A. for
a final discussion. 86 Ofori Atta, on behalf of the chiefs, made repeated
objections against the amount of control to be exercised by the
Government:

'... when you have to submit everything for the approval
of the Governor it weakens the power of the native authority.
We would like to have the assurance that the native authority
will be so free. We may make mistakes but we can learn
thereby. The regulation as it stands make us feel that the
whole thing will be Government-controlled business and the
native authorities just mere puppets to Government ...

'... Certainly, we wish to learn by ourselves. To be
candid, we want to have the power in our own hands, for
if the State Council decides to carry out a certain work
and the District Commissioner wants another work done
instead it is likely that the District Commissioner will
use the Governor's powers to enforce his will upon the
people. We want a free operation. We want State Councils
to be given full measure of responsibility and their

85. GNA-Accra, CSO MP 372/30, Sub-file 55, Draft Regulations for
Native Administration Treasuries under the Native Administration
Treasuries Ordinance, 1939.

86. GNA-Accra, CSO MP 372/30, Sub-file 55, Notes of interview with
the Secretary for Native Affairs by the Standing Committee of
the Joint Provincial Councils, 23rd January 1940. Ofori Atta
was Chairman of the Standing Committee. The Central Province
members were the Amanhemfo of Asebu, Assin Attandaso, Agona
and Winneba.
authority to be valid but when you use words like "control" and "approval" in that way the State Councils become puppets in the hand of the Government.

'... We are prepared to carry on with your help and guidance but no control. We shall avail ourselves of the services of the District Commissioners to our utmost ability but the "control" should be removed.'

The S.N.A., however, was adamant, and insisted on the Government retaining control:

'How can you learn when you will not be taught your lesson? You want to learn by yourselves without the teacher. We are trying to prevent further mistakes. Government has no desire to control you unnecessarily ...'

'You must not think the Chief is a separate entity from the Government. You form part of the Administration of this country. You must not disassociate yourselves from the Government. The money that goes into the native treasuries is not personal money, it is public money, it belongs to the people and it is the duty of the Government to see that the money is spent in the interest of the masses.'

'The Secretary for Native Affairs informed the Chiefs that ....so far as he was concerned he could never recommend that a Treasury should be permitted to function under the Ordinance unless supervised by the District Commissioner.

'....We insist on the policy of control owing to experience we have already had in this Colony. We are trying to

87. Ibid.
help you but you do not seem to realise it. It is the intention of the Government to protect the Chiefs and the State Councils nothing more or less.\(^{88}\)

The S.N.A. refused to abandon any of the control established under the draft Regulations, and they were duly passed with only minor amendments and with Government control intact. Many chiefs in the Colony were anxious to establish treasuries, in order to stabilize their finances; so they were forced to accept the Regulations and to override their suspicion of the Government's control. As we have seen, however, there was great popular hostility to the treasuries in the Central Province, and comparatively few chiefs in that Province were prepared to face such hostility in order to establish treasuries under Regulations which they themselves mistrusted.

The Government's attempts to increase its powers of intervention did not stop with stool treasuries. The number and complexity of stool disputes seemed to be increasing in the early 1940s, and in 1942 the Government decided to intervene.\(^{89}\) A.C. Duncan-Johnstone, then the Commissioner Eastern Province, was appointed Special Commissioner for Stool Disputes to investigate a number of disputes in the Central Province and elsewhere,\(^{90}\) while the possibility was considered of giving the Governor the right to make a final decision in disputed elections or destoolments instead of merely recognizing the successful candidate if and when the dispute was settled.\(^{91}\)

Once again the chiefs made a strong protest against such official encroachment on their powers. The Central Provincial Council

\(^{88}\) Ibid.

\(^{89}\) Gold Coast Independent, 26th September 1942 et seqq.

\(^{90}\) GNA-Accra, BF 0362, Sub-file 1.

\(^{91}\) GNA-CC, DAO 1145, H.W. Thomas, S.N.A., to C.C.P., 28th May 1942.
passed a resolution on 9th September 1942, signed by 22 amanhemfo or their representatives, which pointed out that the Governor already had the power under the Native Administration Ordinance to refer stool disputes to the Provincial Councils for investigation, and that this power was sufficient. The Governor ought not to usurp the rightful role of the chiefs themselves in Provincial Council in settling stool disputes. 92 Eventually the Government postponed its intention to undertake new powers in this sphere, since the whole situation would be altered by the proposed new Native Authority Ordinance. 93 But the intention to increase the Government's powers had been made public, and the chiefs once again felt threatened.

Ofori Atta revealed the anxiety and bitterness of the chiefs at these developments when he said to the S.N.A. in January 1940,

'I want to make it quite clear that we have been told enough of what is being done in Nigeria. In this country we do feel that we have advanced enough to know all about these things now. We feel, however, that we should not adopt the system which prevails in the Northern Territories and Nigeria. ... We are prepared to carry on with your help and guidance but no control. We shall avail ourselves of the services of the District Commissioners to our utmost ability but the "control" should be removed. We have heard enough of the system in the Northern Territories and Nigeria and we say definitely that we do not need to be brought under that system. 94


93. GNA-CC, DAO 1145; GNA-Accra, BF 0582.

94. GNA-Accra, CSO MP 372/30, Sub-file 55, Notes of interview with the Secretary for Native Affairs ..., 23rd January 1940.
The problem was not that as the law stood the Government had much real power over the chiefs. There was very little a district commissioner could actually do to compel a chief to comply with the Government's wishes. He did have the power to grant, suspend or close tribunals, to review certain of their proceedings, and to inspect and close native prisons. But these powers were usually used only in connection with tribunal and prison matters: a tribunal might be closed if it was seen to be redundant or excessively corrupt, but it would hardly ever be closed simply because the chief and his council were recalcitrant or unwilling to accept a recommended policy.

The district commissioner's potential sanctions against hostile chiefs were in fact very limited. He could refuse to grant gunpowder permits, or to allow the celebration of festivals, he could delay the countersigning of warrants issued by native tribunals, or use a number of other minor irritants like these, but on the whole he had to rely mainly on personal influence and persuasion to secure co-operation. These had a limited influence even at the best of times.

Nevertheless, the chiefs felt that they needed the good will and support of administrative officers. Where the adawmyi were insufficiently strong to destool an omahen, but strong enough to cause him trouble, the omahen relied on the Government to uphold his authority, by recognizing him as the sole spokesman of the state, by setting up independent enquiries and arbitrations, and by sending in police to suppress violent demonstrations. The state councils needed the district commissioners' advice and co-operation in passing by-laws.

95. Cf. Government's role in upholding the authority of Ayirebi Acquah III, Omahen of Winneba, from 1941 to 1944 (GNA-CC, DAO 29), and of Nkwantabissa III, Omahen of Denkyira, from 1939 to 1942 (GNA-CC, DAO 197 and DAO 529).
concerning fishing and farming, and, where they were wanted, in establishing stool treasuries. Financial support from the Government was essential if the Provincial Councils were to continue to function. In all sorts of other ways the chiefs relied on the Government to support their authority, by legislation and financial assistance. It was therefore a serious blow to the chiefs when they realized that the Government was losing its confidence in them and seeking to increase its powers over them.

On the other hand, the chiefs could no long rely on the support of their old allies, the educated elite. Dennis Austin has noted that by 1946 'there was little sense of permanent hostility between any section of what constituted ... a triple ruling elite - the officials, chiefs, and intelligentsia.' Nevertheless, during the war years there were many signs of a weakening of the alliance between the chiefs and the educated elite as serious as that between the chiefs and the Government.

In the Central Province, of course, Sekyi and the A.R.P.S. continued their unrelenting battle against interventionist indirect rule, and renewed their condemnation of the Provincial Councils. They also carried the battle into wider areas. G. Ashie-Nikoi, the A.R.P.S. representative at the Pan-African Congress in Manchester in October 1945, was instructed to emphasise at the Congress that the extension of interventionist indirect rule to the Colony was an attempt to introduce 'medieval autocracies as substitutes for Democratic Gold Coast

96. GNA-CC, DAO 40, DAO 45 and DAO 1306.

Institutions.' Ashie-Nikoi condemned the Provincial Councils as 'nothing short of Government Departments controlled by political officers.'

Hostility to the role of chiefs in government seemed to be spreading, however, to sections of the intelligentsia outside the 'Cape Coast School', and even to the chiefs' former allies against the A.R.P.S. In 1936, A.W. Kojo Thompson replaced the complaint Dr. F.V. Nanka-Bruce as Municipal Member for Accra, and from then until 1944 Kojo Thompson was an unrelenting critic of the chiefs. In 1944 A. Sawyer, Kojo Thompson's successor, maintained a similar attitude, coming out strongly against the Native Administration Ordinance, as did K.A. Korsah, who until the death of Ofori Atta in 1944 had been a close political associate of Ofori Atta and the pro-Government chiefs.

Even Dr. J.B. Danquah, a royal (Obon) of Akyem Abuakwa, Ofori Atta's relative and closest associate from the 1920s until the war years, became increasingly disillusioned with the political position of the chiefs, and with their reluctance to give the educated elite what he regarded as their proper share of influence in the states and in the Colony as a whole. Danquah campaigned against the Native Administration Ordinance of 1944.

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101. Ibid., pp. 74, 182f.

102. Ibid., pp. 182f.
members of the committee of 'middle class nationalists' which met in Accra in December 1945 to discuss the revival of the National Congress of British West Africa. 103 The N.C.B.W.A. had been controlled almost exclusively by the educated elite, and had been destroyed mainly by the hostility of Ofori Atta and the chiefs. 104 If Danquah was prepared to sit with his old political enemy, Kobina Sekyi, on a committee to discuss the revival of such an organisation, then his disillusionment with the chiefs must have been very great indeed.

The relationship between the chiefs and their former allies among the intelligentsia reached its lowest point in July 1946, when the Joint Provincial Council allocated seven of its seats on the Legislative Council to chiefs, and only two to non-chiefs (Danquah and Rev. C. Baeta). Despite the fact that Danquah was one of the two, the intelligentsia was very disappointed:

'... the educated leaders had expected a much more generous, and, in their eyes, more enlightened, attitude. Hence their disappointment in 1946, amounting almost to a sense of betrayal, when the Colony chiefs showed they were still unwilling to relinquish their place in national politics.' 105

The chiefs felt that they were being deserted by the Government, by their own people, and by the educated elite. If they were to survive the uncertainties and instability of the 1940s, they had to seek allies from at least one of these groups: they tried each of them in turn. First the chiefs reluctantly threw in their lot with the colonial Government, by consenting to the passing of the Native Courts and Native

103. Langley, Pan-Africanism and Nationalism, p. 356.
104. Ibid., pp. 165ff.; Kimble, Political History, pp. 389ff.
105. Austin, Politics in Ghana, pp. 5lf.
Authority Ordinances in 1944. They hoped that by conceding to the
Government a large measure of control over native administration, they
would at least be able to rely on the Government's support in upholding
their authority. The failure of native administration in the post-war
years, the rising tide of anti-colonialism, and the popular resentment
of the chiefs' connection with an increasingly unpopular Government,
rendered this policy unworkable, since the Government was no longer in
a position to give them the support which they needed.

The chiefs therefore turned to their own people, attempting to
assume the leadership of the anti-colonial protest movement by promoting
and organizing the 1948 boycott and cocoa hold-up. After the 1948 Riots,
however, the mass nationalist movement was clearly beyond the power of
the chiefs to control. They were frightened that their own authority
was being threatened by the very movement which they had originally
encouraged. They turned once again to the intelligentsia in the U.G.C.,
attempting to form a common front to oppose the campaign which Nkrumah
and the C.P.P. were waging against indirect rule and the whole machinery
of colonial administration. It is with these developments that we shall
concern ourselves in the following pages.

6.4 The Native Courts and Native Authority Ordinances, 1944

By 1943 the breach between the chiefs and the educated elite had
not yet reached the stage of open hostility, though there were already
many signs of disagreement. When the Blackall Committee was set up
in 1942-43, to review the native tribunal system, J.B. Danquah and Ofori
Atta sat together on the Committee, and both signed the Committee's
Report. But Danquah refused to support Ofori Atta's efforts to

106. Report of the Native Tribunals Committee of Enquiry [Blackall
restrict the powers of administrative officers over the native courts. Ofori Atta, for example, wanted to give the power of review of native court proceedings to district magistrates instead of to administrative officers, but Danquah sided with the majority of the Committee in recommending the extension of the existing powers of review of administrative officers. 107

The Committee, consisting of 2 European and 5 African members, recommended a thorough reform of native jurisdiction. 106 They rejected the suggestion that the whole system of native tribunals should be abolished:

'We are ... satisfied that while there is strong feeling that there is urgent need of reform, there is no great demand for the abolition of a system which is indigenous to the country and familiar to the people. Native customary law is fundamentally sound and it can best be administered by Tribunals whose members are familiar with it from boyhood. Such abuses as exist are excrescences which can be removed and we are confident that if the reforms we recommend are adopted, the Colony will have a system of jurisprudence well suited to the circumstances of the vast majority of people and capable of adjusting itself to the growing changes in the habits and ideas of African society.' 109

They agreed, however, that if the system was to be retained, it would need wholesale reform. Sir Alan Burns summarized the main recommendations as:

107. Ibid., p. 10. The idea of granting the power of review to district magistrates had been proposed by the Central Province Bar Association in its evidence to the Committee.

108. Ibid. The European members were H.W.B. Blackall (Chairman), the Attorney General, and T.R.O. Mangin, the Ag. S.N.A.; the African members were Ofori Atta, Danquah, J.C. de Graft Johnson (the former Assistant S.N.A.) and Nene Azzu Mate Kole, Konor of Manya Krobo.

'the grading of the Native Courts and the limitation of the powers of the Courts of each grade; the relieving of Paramount Chiefs of their judicial function as members of the Courts; the reduction in the number of judges sitting in each Court; the payment of all fines and fees of the Court into the Native Administration treasuries; and the appointment of a Judicial Adviser as a "guide, philosopher and friend" to the Native Courts. The Committee also recommended the setting up of a Land Court separate from the Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{110}

To these heads should be added, the extension of the administrative officers' powers of review to include all proceedings in native courts; the abolition of the judicial powers of the Provincial Councils; and the recommendation that the appointment and dismissal of court registrars should be subject to the approval of provincial commissioners.\textsuperscript{111}

Most of these recommendations were incorporated in the Native Courts (Colonial) Ordinance, No. 22 of 1944.\textsuperscript{112} This Ordinance, together with the recommendations of the Havers Commission of 1945 regarding the costs of litigation in native courts,\textsuperscript{113} provided a clear and comprehensive programme of reform, a programme which was accepted as necessary by almost every section of the community. The reform of the courts therefore went ahead with some success, as we shall see in the next chapter.

The same cannot be said of the reform of native administration.

The Government decided that new legislation reforming the native authorities should be passed at the same time as that governing the native

\textsuperscript{110} Burns, Colonial Civil Servant, pp. 200f.

\textsuperscript{111} Blackall Committee Report, 1943.

\textsuperscript{112} Extracts from the Ordinance are printed in Metcalfe, Documents, pp. 673f.

A Native Authority Ordinance (No. 21 of 1944) was therefore drafted, and introduced at the same time as the Native Courts Ordinance. The Native Authority Ordinance established the thorough-going interventionist indirect rule system which most officials had favoured by the end of the debate on indirect rule in 1940. Rural local administration was to be vested in native authorities appointed by the Governor, over which the Governor and his administrative officers were to exercise a large measure of control.

The chiefs had by this time decided to throw in their lot with the colonial Government and they supported the Ordinance: they hoped that in return for their co-operation in conceding more control to the Government, they would be able to rely on the support of the Government in upholding their authority. The educated elite, on the other hand, could not accept this alliance between chiefs and Government, and they strongly opposed the new Ordinance. They were not strong enough, however, to resist the combined weight of the Government and the chiefs, and the Ordinance duly became law.

Most officials believed that with the Native Authority Ordinance they had achieved a 'comprehensive measure of reform', that the Ordinance was a real step forward in making the native authorities 'a living part of the machinery of government'. It is true that the Ordinance

114. Hailey, Native Administration, Part III, pp. 204f.; T.R.O. Mangin, C.C.C., Confidential Circular on Native Administration, 1st August 1946 (Private source, copy in author's possession).

115. See section 6.1 above.


117. Hailey, Native Administration, Part III, P. 204; Burns, Colonial Civil Servant, pp. 203ff.; and interview with G.M. Levack (a D.C. in the Colony, 1940-58), 11th July 1970.
transformed the legal structure of local administration. Local government was placed in the hands of native authorities appointed by the Governor. Officials were to be granted much greater supervisory powers over these authorities than they had hitherto had; treasuries became compulsory for all native authorities; many of the loopholes and obscurities of the 1927 Native Administration Ordinance were removed, and the laws regulating all aspects of native administration were simplified. The chiefs also gained greater powers to restrict the activities of their opponents. Under the Native Administration Ordinance the chiefs’ only real sanction against rebellious subjects had been the clause which forbade divisional chiefs to withdraw their allegiance from paramount chiefs, and sub-chiefs from divisional chiefs. The new Ordinance introduced heavy sanctions against 'any person who commits an act with intent to undermine the lawful power and authority of a Native Authority or any member thereof.' The asafo leaders and other commoners who had given so much trouble to chiefs were thus brought under the Ordinance, as well as divisional chiefs and sub-chiefs.

Yet in reality the reforms introduced by the Native Authority Ordinance were not nearly as radical as its supporters (or its opponents) claimed. Most of the new elements in the Ordinance represented, at most, changes in legal principle which did not materially effect the actual practice of native administration.

118. Native Authority (Colony) Ordinance, No. 21 of 1944, Section 14 (1).

119. Cf. the recommendation of the Fuad Commission in 1941 that supifo and asafohemfo as well as chiefs should be forbidden from withdrawing their allegiance (GNA-CC, DAO 536, Report of the Commission to enquire into the disturbances which occurred in Winneba (Effutu) State on the 19th and 20th August 1941, p. 36).
The best example of the spurious nature of the reforms was the very change which most of the supporters of the Ordinance regarded as the most fundamental one: the introduction of native authorities directly appointed by the Governor to replace chiefs and state councils as the organs of local government. In principle this did represent a change, for now a chief would no longer automatically be a member of a native authority by virtue of his chieftaincy, but only by virtue of his appointment by the Governor. In practice, however, this made little difference. There was never any doubt that the Governor would still appoint the chief and state council as the native authority in all but exceptional cases. In fact, the Preamble to the Ordinance explicitly stated,

'... Whereas the provision made aforesaid by the Native Administration Ordinance No. 18 of 1927 has now become inadequate to secure such Chiefs their due place in the administration of the said Colony:

'And whereas it is expedient that other provisions be now made whereby such Chiefs may be enabled to take an effective part in the administration of the said Colony:

'Now therefore be it enacted,' etc. (My emphases).

It is true that under Section 3 of the Ordinance the Governor was empowered to 'appoint as Native Authority such person or persons as he deems fit' if he was 'satisfied that... it is inexpedient to appoint a Chief and Native Council or a group of Native Councils as Native Authority '. But the period of such appointments was limited to one year (although they might renewed), and in any case 'the primary object' of the Section was only 'to make provision for cases where
the succession to a Chiefdom was in dispute or a State Council was disrupted by quarrels. It was not an attempt to replace chiefs and state councils in general as native authorities, nor was it intended or used as a measure to enable the Governor to by-pass unco-operative chiefs and state councils. In practice the chiefs and state council was almost invariably recognized by the Governor as the native authority. So the situation had hardly changed at all in practice: chiefs and state councils still formed the vast majority of native authorities, and administrative officers still found them just as difficult to control.

Nor did the emphasis given by the Ordinance to the desirability of appointing commoners to native authorities represent any real departure from former policies. Renewed efforts were made to encourage the appointment of educated commoners to the state councils, and by 1946 commoners constituted some 30 per cent of the membership of state councils in the Colony. But this had been official policy long before the Native Authority Ordinance, and in any case a 30 per cent commoner membership was considered inadequate, especially in view of its uneven distribution - 10 of the 47 states and confederacies in the Colony having no commoners on their councils at all.

The conservatism of the Native Authority Ordinance was not confined to composition and personnel; there was little in the specification of their functions to encourage the imaginative use of native authorities. Apart from the general obligation 'to maintain peace,

120. Hailey, Native Administration, Part III, p.205.
121. Ibid., pp. 206ff. Cf. the 45 per cent commoner membership of native courts which had been established by 1951 (Report of the Commission on Native Courts (Accra, Government Printing Department, 1951), para. 65).
order and good government within the area of its authority, the native authorities were given only 18 specific functions, nearly all of which were purely regulative, such as making regulations concerned with hunting and fishing, infectious and contagious diseases, etc. Even those functions roughly related to development matters were phrased in negative terms, such as 'prohibiting, restricting and regulating the construction of buildings'. 122 The timidness of these measures becomes clear when we compare them to the 82 local government functions assigned to local authorities under the Local Government Ordinance of 1951, many of them specifically concerned with the promotion of local development. 123

Treasuries were made compulsory for native authorities under the Ordinance, and this did have the effect of ensuring that within a few years all native authorities had properly established treasuries. As we shall see in the next chapter, however, the fact that a native authority possessed a treasury did not mean that it was necessarily putting its financial resources to the best possible use, and in practice the local development programme run by native authorities continued to be just as limited in scope as they had been before 1944. Perhaps the best indication of the Government's lack of interest in using the 'reformed' native authorities for material development was the fact that no provision was made in the Native Authority Ordinance for the authorities to undertake loans. They were 'required to finance capital development from accumulated savings.' Inevitably this 'to a large extent restricted capital works by local authorities', and

122. Native Administration (Colony) Ordinance, No. 21 of 1944, Sections 7 and 11.

123. Local Government Ordinance, No. 29 of 1951, Section 58.
prevented them from realizing any potential they may have had as agents of local development.\textsuperscript{124} The problems of indirect rule in the Colony were not very different after 1944 from what they had been before.

The limited nature of the 1944 reforms should not be considered to be surprising. Senior officials in the Gold Coast were, on the whole, as conservative as those in any other British colony in Africa. Sir Ransford Slater summed up the attitude of most senior officials, and nearly all Governors, when he wrote in 1930 that "The inevitability of gradualness" is not a bad motto for Gold Coast Native Administration.\textsuperscript{125} Sir Arnold Hodson constantly stressed that "It would be fatal ... to rush the reforms we propose. They must be done over a period of time ..."\textsuperscript{126} Even Sir Alan Burns, the reforming Governor, urged that in any measure of reform, "We must carry the people with us, and it is no good trying to hurry the Africans."\textsuperscript{127}

There were officials like J.G. Stewart, the Director of the Department of Animal Health, who railed against

"the half baked idea that the African must go slowly, "must learn to walk before he can run", a favourite cliche of Governors, which means that they must have bullock ploughs and instruments which are slightly better than the hand-hoe; this is accepted as a law of the Medes and Persians by officialdom but the African jumped straight from head to head."

\textsuperscript{124} Report by the Select Committee on Local Government (Colony), 1950 [Loveridge Committee] (Accra, Government Printing Department, 1951), para. 157.


\textsuperscript{126} PRO, CO 96/730/31228/36, Sir A. Hodson, Gov., to Sir C. Bottomley, 27 August 1936.

\textsuperscript{127} Address to Empire Parliamentary Association, 24 October 1946, quoted in Austin, Politics in Ghana, p.11.
loading goods to the motor lorry ... 128

On the whole, however, most senior officials agreed with T.R.O. Mangin, the Chief Commissioner of the Colony, that

'Such untold damage can be done by enthusiastic officers trying to obtain quick results in native administration. Satisfactory results will only be achieved long after we have disappeared. We must adopt the principle of guided evolution - prodding where we can prod with safety and restraining our enthusiasm when prodding would be misunderstood, and above all by patient education of the people in the paths we want them to follow.' 129

This attitude dominated the thinking of officials in the Gold Coast until the policy of gradualness was swept away, along with many other things, in the aftermath of the 1948 Riots.

128. RH, MSS Brit. Emp. s.365, FCB Box 80, File 1, f.45, J.G. Stewart, Director of Department of Animal Health, Pong-Tamale, to Dr. Rita Hinden, Secretary of Fabian Colonial Bureau, 21st November 1945.

129. T.R.O. Mangin, C.C.C., Confidential Circular on Native Administration, 1st August 1946 (Private source, copy in author's possession).
CHAPTER 7  THE END OF INDIRECT RULE, 1945-51

7.1 The administrative service in the 1940s

Before describing the development of indirect rule under the 1944 Native Authority and Native Courts Ordinances, it is necessary to consider the state of the colonial service, and in particular the administrative service, in the 1940s. For there are indications that the morale of junior administrative officers, and the level of effective communications between junior and senior officers were very low in the 1940s, low enough materially to affect the formulation and implementation of indirect rule policy.¹

The most obvious source of discontent was low pay and bad conditions of service. This was not a new problem: Guggisberg had had to deal with a 'deplorable state of affairs' regarding the level of European officers' salaries in 1919-20 and in 1923, and Slater had had to face discontent over salaries in 1930.² By the end of the second world war, however, the situation was far worse than it had been in the 1920s or the 1930s. The scarcity of commodities and the rapid inflation of the last years of the war made the officers' already inadequate salaries even more inadequate in real value. The building of new offices and bungalows was held up during the war, so that living and working conditions deteriorated. At the same time, the growing volume of paperwork necessitated by the war and the formation of plans for post-war development led to an increasing pressure on the time of men who were already overworked.

¹ 'Junior administrative officers' in this context means officers in Classes III and IV of the Colonial Administrative Service (i.e. D.C.s, Assistant D.C.s and Assistant Colonial Secretaries). 'Senior administrative officers' were Class II, Class I and Superscale officers (i.e. from Deputy Provincial Commissioners to the Colonial Secretary).

² PRO, CO 96/610/10333/20, Sir Gordon Cuggisberg, Gov., to S. of S., Conf. Desp. of 30 January 1919; other cases in CO 96/610; CO 96/602/48217/19; GNA-Accra, CSO MP 1490/30.
By 1945, Sir Alan Burns (Governor, 1941-47) was aware that 'overwork and overstraining, and a belief that their financial and other difficulties were not receiving sympathetic consideration, led to much discontent among the European members of the Civil Service'.

He encouraged the Colonial Office to set up a Commission on the Civil Service in West Africa, with Sir Walter Harragin, the Chief Justice of the Gold Coast, as Commissioner.

Harragin found that 'The service generally is in an unhappy state. Officers believe themselves to have been unjustly treated. '...

The majority of those volunteering information, other than those invited, were suffering from strain brought about by overwork, long tours and ill health, all of which are directly due to war conditions, and the fact that many of them are very pressed for money and have genuine grievances with regard to their terms of service'.

Harragin recommended new salary scales, improved housing conditions, the setting up of Whitley Councils, and many other improvements. The acceptance of many of Harragin's recommendations, together with the introduction of a new salary structure on the basis of the Colonial Office White Paper of 1946, led to a distinct improvement of the situation in the late 1940s.

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4. Ibid.


7. The Whitley Council, however, was a failure. It was established in the Gold Coast in 1948-49, the first full meeting being held on 16 January 1949. By September 1949 the experiment had collapsed because of the persistent refusal of the Unofficial Members of the Legislative Council to ratify the agreed decisions of the Whitley Council (RH, MSS Brit. Emp. s.105, Papers of the Colonial Civil Servants Association, File No.6, correspondence between G. Higginson, A.N. Strong and the C.C.S.A. Executive Council, 1948-49).
Salaries, however, were by no means the only problem. There were persistent complaints from junior officers throughout the 1940s concerning understaffing, the turnover of district commissioners in their districts, communications between junior and senior officers, and the whole structure of the colonial administration.

A conference of Colony provincial commissioners in Accra in March 1939 noted that there had been a significant decrease in the number of administrative officers in the Colony during the past twenty years. There were 49 district commissioners and assistant district commissioners in the Colony in 1915, 53 in 1920, but only 32 by 1939. The decrease in the number of officers, combined with 'a great increase in the volume of routine work', meant that, 'It can truthfully be said that in most districts the Administrative Officer is hard pressed to keep pace with the continuous volume of work'. The conference recommended a radical restructuring of the administration of the Colony, and proposed certain measures for the reduction of routine work. The implementation of these recommendations had, however, to be postponed because of the war.

Meanwhile the situation continued to deteriorate. The increase of work during the war added to the difficulties which district commissioners already had in keeping up with the supervision and administration of the numerous states in their understaffed districts. W.H.A. Hanschell, the Acting D.C. Saltpond, pointed out in June 1943 that in his district there were 12 states, so that

'...Government's liaison [sic] with these units (States) in the person of the District Commissioner has...to be subdivided into 12 different channels, necessitating thereby an equivalent multiplication on the part of this liaison [sic] i.e. latter has to make 12 contacts on each occasion of

8. GNA-Accra, CSO MP 372/30, Sub-file 54, and CSO MP 1997/30, Notes of the Political Conference of Provincial Commissioners (Colony) held on 24 March 1939.

9. Ibid.
Government, has 12 independent units to overlook and advise (administer), with 12 different State Councils etc., the keeping up to date of which re personnel changes is in itself almost a whole time job, quite apart from the question of Tribunals', Prisons' and Treasuries' inspections (which are far from mere routine work) and the potential source of friction amongst the States themselves, not to mention the internal affairs of each individual State.

'This state of affairs therefore tends to make the administration of government in an area such as this (Saltpond District) an unwieldy and cumbersome procedure, ill-fitted for the many, speedy and somewhat technical and complicated calls made upon it these days...

These difficulties were exacerbated by a shortage of clerical staff, which further increased the district commissioners' burden of routine work.

Related to the problem of understaffing was that of the rapid turnover of district commissioners within districts. With no officers to spare to act as full-time relieving officers, district commissioners and assistant district commissioners were constantly moving from district to district to replace officers who were ill or on leave. The result was that hardly any officer spent a long enough period in his district to familiarize himself with it or to become known by its people.

In October 1942 the village of Narkwa (in Ekuffi State, Saltpond District) completed the building of its asafo company post - a magnificent thirty feet high, solid concrete model of H.M.S. Renown. The post had taken three years to build. Since the building of company posts without permission was illegal, the Governor naturally wished to know why no officer had noticed

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during the past three years that it was being built. The Acting C.C.P. pointed out that between November 1939 and November 1942, no less than eight different officers had acted as District Commissioner Saltpond: none of them had served in the district for more than seven months continuously (the average tour of duty being less than three months), while most of the officers acting as D.C. Saltpond had been acting as D.C. Cape Coast at the same time.

These officials had hardly had time to visit Saltpond and complete the routine work of administration, let alone to go on trek and familiarize themselves with the district. None of them appears to have visited Manka or the neighbouring villages.

Similarly, following the disturbances in Winneba in August 1941, the Fuad Commission noted that 'owing to the exigencies of the Service and the shortage of staff', three successive district commissioners had served at Winneba during the two months preceding the disturbances. None of them was there long enough to gain a complete understanding of the situation, while the last officer took over only three days before the disturbances, and was therefore in no position to take decisive action to prevent them.

The staffing situation improved after the war, but district commissioners continued to be overworked. The number and complexity of their duties increased rather than diminished during the post-war years. Each new piece of legislation, whether it concerned economic and social development or routine administrative matters, seemed to add a new set of tasks to be dealt with by district commissioners. In 1951 Sir Sydney Phillipson, in a list which did

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13. Ibid., P.W. Rutherford, Ag. C.C.P., to S.N.A., 9 November 1942.
14. Ibid.
15. GNA-CC, DAO 538, Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the Disturbances which occurred in the Winneba (Effutu) State on the 19th and 20th August 1941 [Fuad Commission].
'not claim to be exhaustive', specified over 100 different duties discharged by district commissioners, under 21 main headings, from Chairman-ship of the Local Development Committee through Supervision of Local Taxation to the Preparation of Itineraries for Mobile Cinema Vans.16

When these thinly spread, overworked district commissioners managed to take stock of the situation in their districts, and to make recommendations concerning particular or general improvements in administration, they came up against another major problem - the lack of effective communication between junior and senior administrative officers. While the Harragin Commission was being set up, W.H.A. Hanschell and a number of other junior administrative officers were organizing a petition to the Governor, which was eventually submitted in January 1945.17 It was supported by 38 of the 90 or so junior administrative officers serving in the Gold Coast - a very large number for such an unprecedented step (the organizers had hoped for 20 signatures).18

The petitioners asked that a delegation be given an interview with the Governor, and suggested seven topics for discussion. Most of these topics were concerned with salaries, transfers and recruitment, all of which were dealt with by the Harragin Commission. The first two topics mentioned, however, concerned quite different matters, and suggest that there were serious barriers to effective communications within the administrative service in the Gold Coast at this time:

16. Regional Administration. Report by the Commissioner (Sir Sydney Phillipson, Kt., C.M.G.) (Accra, Government Printing Department, 1951), Appendix L.

17. For the text of the petition, and an account of its origins and back-ground, see R.L. Stone, 'The Junior Administrative Officers' Petition of 1946', Ghana Notes and Queries, No. 12 (June 1972).

(a) The lack of adequate and easily accessible up-to-date information regarding Government's policy, which frequently results in a sense of frustration amongst Junior Administrative Officers and tends to give the impression that they are not trusted by Government, especially in the case of Officers in the outlying stations.

(b) The lack of adequate consideration by Government for an officer's temperament and aptitudes, his wishes regarding postings etc. and lack of sufficient contact on the part of senior officers with their juniors...

Junior Officers felt that the generation gap between themselves and senior officers in Accra led to a gap in understanding which was impairing the efficiency of the administrative service and preventing the Government from appreciating the problems faced by district commissioners in the field.

The Governor's reaction to the petition can hardly have done very much to alter these feelings. He wrote a minute about the petition, parts of which were read out to the petitioners; no copy of the minute is at present available, since the petitioners were not allowed actually to see it, but to judge by their reactions, the minute was extremely hostile. Hanschell called it a 'tick off', while Peter de C. du Sautoy, a Kumasi organizer of the petition, wrote,


20. The existence of a generation gap is confirmed by the list of supporters of the petition. Not one of them had been recruited before 1939, and only R.F. Riberio Ayeh (aged 39) was over 35 years of age: their mean age was 28.8 years on 31 December 1945. During interviews with the author, both G.M. Levack (a signatory of the petition) and J.D.E. Barnard agreed that junior officers were conscious of a generation gap. Levack became an Assistant D.C. in 1940 at the age of 22: when showed a list of the supporters of the petition, he said, 'Ah yes, that's very much my generation'. He also referred constantly to 'The Old Guard'. See Stone, 'Junior Administrative Officers' Petition', pp.29f.
'We are entitled to a copy of those remarks in order to protest to the S. of S. or our M.P.! ... He has put himself in the wrong by his attitude - in fact he took an official matter as a personal insult....Everyone agrees that the tone of the Governor's reply was uncalled for'.

Henry Bruton wrote from leave in England,

'I was amused to hear about H.E.'s reaction to the request for an interview. How disgraceful of his blue eyed Administrative boys to behave in such a way! When will he realise that such a state of affairs has been boiling up for some time past, if only the gentlemen at the top had the sense and sympathy to see it?'

That this failure of communication continued into the late 1940s and seriously affected Government policy making was affirmed by the Coussey Committee, whose Local Government Sub-Committee

'were impressed during their tours by the active thinking going on among District Commissioners throughout the country on the problems of local government, as carried on at present through the Native Authorities. They are alive to the defects we have mentioned and some of them had made suggestions for their solution, which are in many respects similar to the conclusions we ourselves had reached independently'.

Yet, the Committee suggested,

'It would appear that many of these useful ideas had failed to reach the level where policy is formed, owing to over-centralisation of control. There is evidence of a sense of frustration among some of these officers'.

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22. Ibid., f. 36, Bruton to Hanschell, 24 February 1946. Original emphasis.

23. Report to His Excellency the Governor by the Committee on Constitutional Reform, 1949 [Coussey Report], Colonial No. 248 (London, H.M.S.O., 1949), para. 76.

24. Ibid.
The Watson Commission was even harder in its strictures on the conservativism of senior officers. Among some of 'those who by long residence may claim an understanding denied to those of less experience', the Commission 'were oppressed by the feeling that time had stood still. In a world where time was the keynote there appeared to be a disposition to let the world go by and to resent the intrusion of new ideas'. The Commission did add that 'It would be wrong, however, to suppose that this is a true reflection of the Administration as a whole'. Nevertheless, it was evidently a serious enough problem to represent an important weakness in the machinery of government.

Finally, there were more fundamental flaws in the structure of the administrative service per se, which made it an inefficient organization for governing the Colony. The conference of Colony provincial commissioners in March 1939 had recommended a complete reorganization of the administration of the Colony. This reorganization, like many other reforms, had had to be postponed because of the war, but in 1945-46, on the basis of the conference recommendations, the organization of the Colony was restructured. The office of Secretary for Native Affairs was abolished, and replaced by that of a Chief Commissioner for the Colony, with his headquarters at Cape Coast. The Colony was divided into two, instead of three, Provinces, the former Central Province being absorbed into the new Eastern and Western Provinces (most of Western Akim (Oda) District went to the Eastern Province, and Cape


26. Ibid.

27. GNA-Accra, CSO MP 372/30, Sub-file 54 and CSO MP 1997/30, Notes of the Political Conference of Provincial Commissioners (Colony) held on 24 March 1939.

Coast, Saltpond and Winneba to the Western). A Senior District Commissioner at Cape Coast was to take charge of the affairs of the former Cape Coast and Saltpond Districts and the Dunkwa Sub-District.

It is very doubtful, however, whether before 1948 these changes made a significant difference to the planning or implementation of policy, especially to that of development policy. In 1948 the Watson Commission still found that 'there has, in the past, been a lack of co-ordination in the planning of Gold Coast development. ... In this connection we feel that the administrative machine was weak for the purposes of modern economic planning'.

There were many other problems which exacerbated the inadequacies of the administrative machine - the lack of technical skills possessed by most administrative officers and the lack of opportunity for acquiring those skills, the problems of inter-departmental co-operation, the derisory number of Africans in senior grades. These problems need not be examined in detail in this context, however; despite the undoubtedly high level of personal integrity and intelligence among individual members of the colonial service, the administrative machinery of the Colony was plainly in a poor state to cope with the upheavals of the 1940s.

7.2 Indirect rule and development under the Native Authority Ordinance

During the four years after the passing of the Native Authority Ordinance in 1944, the Government was successful in promoting the establishment of native authority treasuries and the collection by native authorities of an annual rate. Since treasuries were compulsory for native authorities under the Ordinance, and since the Governor, Sir Alan Burns, adopted a policy of closing native courts in areas where there were no properly established

30. GNA-CU, DAO 149.
treasuries, the prevention of their establishment by anti-Government parties was no longer realistic. If the chief and state council were no longer recognized by the Government as the native authority, and if the state's courts were no longer in operation, then there was little point in anyone capturing control of the political machinery of the state, since its effective power would have been virtually neutralized. So, rather than destroy the prizes being contended for, the admyefo reluctantly allowed treasuries to be established and annual rates to be collected. By 1948 all the states in the Colony had established treasuries under the Ordinance.

In 1946 the Governor appointed a political officer to be 'concerned solely with the improvement of the Native Authority Treasuries in the Colony', who was to work directly under the orders of the Chief Commissioner of the Colony. Partly as a consequence of this officer's work, there was a distinct improvement in the organization and accounting of the treasuries, and in the efficiency of the collection of the annual rate.

These reforms resulted in 'a striking increase in the revenues brought to account in the Native Authority Treasuries'. By 1947-48 the annual rate was contributing the largest item of the revenue of native authorities in the Colony - £132,104 out of a total of £478,489.

32. Burns, Colonial Civil Servant, p. 201.
33. Hailey, Native Administration, Part III, p. 208.
35. Ibid.
37. Ibid., p. 209.
The fact that native authorities had a regular income and rendered accounts of expenditure in properly established treasuries did not, however, mean that the expenditure itself was effectively managed. In fact, there are many signs that the efficacy of the native authorities in administering local government and development in the Colony was far below the level expected by the Government.

The Government laid particular emphasis on the authorities' local development functions - the provision of water supplies, health and education services, etc. It maintained that 'it is partly upon their efficiency in performing those functions that their claim to recognition as local government units rests'. By 1946 the Government believed that the native authorities were beginning to perform these functions well:

'The tendency to spend a greater proportion of available resources on social services, and a less percentage on administrative charges had also begun to be felt'. 39

In its progress reports on the Ten-Year Plan in the late 1940s it was claimed that 'substantial progress' was being made in these areas through the efficient work of the native authorities. 40

An examination of the actual distribution of expenditure by the native authorities in the Colony, however, fails to substantiate this claim. In Table 3 below it will be seen that of the total estimate of expenditure by the Colony native authorities in 1947-48 (£474,754), only 0.8% (£3,761) was allocated to Agriculture and 0.076% (£359) to Forestry in this predominantly agricultural area, whereas 18.6% (£88,285) was allocated to Administration, 7.7% (£36,444) to running the Treasuries, and 8.6% (£41,035) to Native Courts.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Head of Expenditure</th>
<th>Actual 1945-6 £</th>
<th>Approx. %age of total</th>
<th>Actual 1946-7 £</th>
<th>Approx. %age of total</th>
<th>Estimates 1946-9 £</th>
<th>Approx. %age of total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
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<td>70,320</td>
<td>19.2</td>
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<td>359</td>
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<td>13.0</td>
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<td>Post Office</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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<td><strong>99.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>366,375</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.03</strong></td>
<td><strong>474,754</strong></td>
<td><strong>99.976</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Including expenditure in respect of Animal Health Department.

Source: **Annual Report on the Gold Coast for the Year 1947**
(London, H.M.S.O., 1948), Appendix IX.
The record for Education (19.5%, £92,568 allocated) was better, as was that for Medical Services and Health (8.3%, £39,097 allocated); and some of the 15.5% (£73,731) allocated to Extraordinary Expenditure was spent on the Animal Health Department. But half the expenditure on education and a considerable proportion of the other development expenses came from the £63,340 Government Grant-in-Aid allocated specifically for these developments.41 These figures were only a marginal improvement over previous years, as the Table shows.

By the end of the 1940s most observers not directly concerned with the administration of indirect rule would have agreed with Lord Hailey that

'On the whole, it is fair to say that as compared with some other territories, including many with less resources, the Native Authorities in the Gold Coast Colony make as yet little direct contribution to the provision of local services, and their general tendency is still to look on the Central Government to provide services of this type. Nor have they, with rare exceptions, shown any active interest in co-operating with the work of the Government Departments such as those of Agriculture or Forestry, and except in regard to Education their chief concern appears to have been in those activities, such as markets, lorry parks and the like, whence they can draw fees for the increase of their own revenues'.42

Even the Government's expressed confidence in the local development work done by native authorities is difficult to reconcile with the establishment in 1949 of separate Local Development Committees, chaired by district commissioners, which took over local development administration from the native authorities in each district.43

42. Ibid., p.211.
43. GNA-CC, DAO 398 and DAO 555.
In the late 1940s there were some improvements in native administration which were more effective than the partial successes of the treasury system. For many years before the war the Government had been attempting without success to persuade the states to come together in confederacies, in order to reduce the number of administrative units. The disputes and mistrust between states had always prevented such amalgamations. With the increased leverage and control given to the Government by the Native Authority Ordinance, officials were able to organize the formation of several confederacies. In the Central Province three confederacies were established in 1945: the Ayan-na-Breman Confederacy (containing the three Ayan states and Breman Esiam), the Fante Confederacy (containing Abeadzi, Anomabu, Kwaman Ayeldu, Mankessim and Nkusukum states), and the Denkyira Confederacy (containing Denkyira, Twifo and Hemang). 44

The establishment of treasuries enabled the pay of registrars to be raised and stabilized, and this, combined with new regulations in 1945 governing the appointment and work of registrars, led to a raising of their standard of efficiency. 45 And although it was still generally agreed that the native courts were still in need of major reform, there had nevertheless been great improvements as a result of the Native Courts Ordinance of 1944. 46

These improvements, however, were not nearly enough to compensate for the continuing shortcomings of native administration, and they did little to stem the tide of popular hostility to indirect rule, which was to sweep away the whole system in the aftermath of the 1948 Riots.

44. The Native Authority (Declaration of Native Authorities) (Nos. 3, 4 and 5) Orders, Orders No. 14, 18 and 35 of 1945.
45. Hailey, Native Administration, Part III, pp. 211ff.
7.3 The 1948 Riots

In January 1948, Nii Kwabena Bonne III founded an Anti-Inflation Committee, and with the assistance of this Committee and the Joint Provincial Council of Chiefs he organized a boycott of European goods and a hold-up of cocoa, with the aim of forcing the European firms to reduce the prices of imported goods.\(^{47}\) The firms eventually agreed to reduce their gross profit margins from 75 per cent to 50 per cent from Saturday 28 February 1948, and the boycott was to be lifted from that day.\(^{48}\)

On that day, however, a rally of ex-servicemen was held in Accra to present a petition to the Governor specifying their numerous grievances. This rally of about 2,000 marchers diverged from the route which had been authorized by the police and marched towards the Governor's residence. The small detachment of police which tried to stop the marchers faced a tumultuous crowd, which began to throw stones at them. Shots were fired by the police, and two people were killed and several injured. Serious riots followed, with European stores set on fire and looted. In the next few days the riots spread to Kumasi, Cape Coast, Koforidua and elsewhere, and a state of emergency was declared throughout the country.\(^{49}\)

A Commission of Enquiry (the Watson Commission) was sent out to the Gold Coast to investigate the disturbances. It reported that the Gold Coast was in a state of seething discontent, and recommended immediate and far-reaching reforms. A Committee of 40 Africans (the Coussey Committee) was set up to recommend changes in the Constitution, and its report in 1949 began the rapid reforms which culminated in the elections of 1951.\(^{50}\)

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The 'proximate underlying causes' of the disturbances were listed by the Watson Commission as high prices (it was popularly believed that the agreement between Bonne and the European firms would result in a reduction of 50 per cent in the actual price of goods - when the stores were opened on the morning of 28 February 1948 and this proved not to be the case, there was bitter disappointment);\(^5^1\) the inadequate provision for the welfare of returning ex-servicemen; 'a feeling of political frustration among educated Africans'; the slow pace of Africanization; 'Increasing resentment at the growing concentration of certain trades in the hands of foreigners', particularly 'Syrian merchants'; the Government's campaign for cutting out cocoa trees affected by swollen shoot disease; and 'A general suspicion of Government measures and intentions reinforced by a hostile Press and heightened by the general failure of the Administration in the field of Public Relations'.\(^5^2\)

It would be superfluous to discuss these problems in detail, since they are already adequately dealt with in the Watson Report and in Austin's study. For our purposes, we need discuss only one of the 'proximate underlying causes' of the disturbances described by the Report, namely, 'A failure of the Government to realise that, with the spread of liberal ideas, increasing literacy and a closer contact with political developments in other parts of the world, the star of rule through the Chiefs was on the wane'.\(^5^3\)

The findings of the Watson Commission, and the developments after the 1948 Riots,\(^5^4\) indicate that the popular hostility to indirect rule which we have described in this study had not diminished after the second world war but remained as strong as ever, and was reinforced by the numerous post-war grievances against colonialism and the colonial Government.

\(^5^1\) Austin, Politics in Ghana, p.77. According to Bonne, Autobiography, p.75, the firms agreed to reduce their profit margins from 75 per cent to 50 per cent, not to reduce them by 50 per cent.

\(^5^2\) Watson Report, pp. 7ff.

\(^5^3\) Ibid., p.7.

\(^5^4\) See section 7.4 below.
The Government, however, refused to recognize that indirect rule had been repudiated, and continued to believe that, with a little more reform, it could still be retained as the most suitable way to organize local administration. The Government's continuing faith in indirect rule forms a remarkable contrast with the pessimism of its junior officers, and demonstrates the effects of the breakdown in communications which we have already described.

In its Statement on the Watson Report, His Majesty's Government completely rejected the Commission's assessment of the state of native administration and the resulting conclusion that in the sphere of government 'for ourselves we are unable to envisage the growth of commercialisation in the Gold Coast with the retention of Native institutions, save in a form which is a pale historical reflection of the past'.\(^{55}\) The Government chose to point out that

'In the very short time available to them in the Gold Coast the Commission were not able to travel extensively in the rural areas and they can therefore have had less opportunities of hearing evidence from the representatives of rural communities which form the great bulk of the population of the Gold Coast'.\(^{56}\)

The Government believed that the Commission's comments on the chiefs therefore did 'substantially less than justice to the strength of tradition and custom which a large part of the country still regards as essential to an ordered society'.\(^{57}\) Accordingly it was reaffirmed that 'it is the settled policy of the Gold Coast Government that Native Authorities should be developed into efficient organs of local government and should be made fully representative of the people in the area'.\(^{58}\) So, whereas the Watson Commission

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57. Ibid., p.3.
58. Ibid., p.7. My emphasis.
believed that a completely new local authority system was necessary although 'until experience has found a better system Native Administration presents the obvious base on which to build', the Government reversed the emphasis completely by stating that

"His Majesty's Government agrees with the Commission's view that local government bodies in the rural areas must be built up from the existing Native Authorities".

This insistence on the value of native administration, amounting to a prejudice, was as true of many high ranking official observers as it was of the high ranking man on the spot. Lord Hailey, as we have seen, was aware of the shortcomings of native authorities, and even acknowledged that

'It is not...unreasonable that there should be many to whom it seems debateable whether the present system of local administration should be maintained or whether it should be radically revised, for example by the substitution of a system of local or District Councils designed to contain a considerable proportion or even a majority of elected members'.

Yet he, like most other high officials and members of the Colonial Office dealing with the Gold Coast, felt that

'It would be inadvisable to force this issue to a decision until a serious effort has been made to adjust the existing system of Native Authorities to the requirements created by modern developments in the Gold Coast'.

This was written in 1948, the year of the Riots, and published in 1951, the year of the Local Government Ordinance.

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62. Ibid.
63. Internal evidence, especially the reports, estimates and legislation cited by Hailey, suggest that Chapter VIII, on the Gold Coast, was written late in 1948. Neither the Watson Report nor the Coussey Commission were discussed in this Chapter, however.
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From their opposite points of view, both the Watson Commission and the Government, by treating the terms 'native administration' and 'chieftaincy' as interchangeable, appear to have made misleadingly simplistic assumptions about the nature of the opposition to indirect rule. The Coussey Committee was rather more sophisticated in its approach. For the Committee recognized the crucial distinction between chieftaincy and native administration - between chieftaincy as a socio-political institution which remained central to the whole organization of social life in rural Ghana, and native administration as the attempt by the colonial Government to transform this institution into a bureaucratic instrument, 'an integral part of the machinery of [colonial] Government'.

The Coussey Committee fully acknowledged the weaknesses of native administration, yet at the same time it asserted that chieftaincy itself was still strong, and refused to accept 'the status which the Watson Report would assign' to the chiefs. In discussing indirect rule, the Committee recognized that

'The Native Authorities, through which local government is at present carried on, are virtually the old state councils vested with modern administrative powers. Their deficiencies include the restricted basis of their membership, their old-fashioned procedure, and their inadequate finance and staff. These deficiencies, despite the gallant efforts which have been made by the Native Authorities, efforts which have resulted in definite progress and solid achievement, have in general hampered their effectiveness as agencies of local administration, have made them unequal to the demands being placed upon them, and have prevented them from achieving the standard of efficiency required of modern local authorities'.

Since the native administration system had encountered such strong opposition, and had 'proved unable to meet the requirements of an efficient

65. Ibid.
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Since the native administration system had encountered such strong opposition, and had 'proved unable to meet the requirements of an efficient

65. Ibid.
and democratic administration* of local government, the Committee recommended that native authorities should be abolished and replaced by 'more efficient organs of local government'. These should be local authorities on the English model, with a two-thirds elected membership and one third appointed by state councils. Yet at the same time the Committee argued that

'The whole institution of Chieftaincy is so closely bound up with the life of our communities that its disappearance would spell disaster. Chiefs and what they symbolise in our society are so vital that the subject of their future must be approached with the greatest caution. No African of the Gold Coast is without some admiration for the best aspects of chieftaincy, and all would be loath to do violence to it any more than to the social values embodied in the institution itself'.

We shall postpone discussion of the Committee's conservativism until later; for our present purpose the important point is that it was quite clear to the Committee that an attack on indirect rule, on the imposition of a bureaucratic role on the chiefs, was not incompatible with a continued attachment to chieftaincy as a focal point for local social, economic and religious life. One of the purposes of abolishing indirect rule, as far as the Committee was concerned, was that it would disentangle the chiefs from the machinery of central government, free them from the conflicting demands of central government policy and local interests, and enable them to return to their rightful role as purely local leaders and figureheads. We shall take this argument up again in the following pages when we discuss the implications of the C.P.P. campaign against indirect rule.

66. Ibid., p.14
67. Ibid., pp. 9, 14.
68. Ibid., pp. 8f.
69. See section 7.4 below.
The revolutionary changes in Ghanaian political life which took place in the three years after the 1948 Riots have already been discussed at length elsewhere. We shall therefore confine ourselves here to the developments during those years which were related to the abolition of indirect rule in 1951.

By the end of 1947 the chiefs in the Colony had decided that it was no longer in their interest to play the role of active supporters of the colonial Government, whose indirect rule policy had failed to bring them the security which they sought. They attempted instead to resume their role as the leaders of popular resistance to colonialism and to the dominance of the European firms over the economic life of the Colony.

Soon after he had formed his Anti-Inflation Committee in October 1947, Nii Kwabena Bonne III approached the Joint Provincial Council of Chiefs, asking for its support for a boycott of European goods and a hold-up of cocoa. The Council promised Bonne its support, and at Dodowa on 20 December 1947, it approved Bonne's plan to 'tour the various States of the Colony with a view to seeking the active co-operation of the State Councils'.

Soon after the boycott had begun on 26 January 1948, Bonne went to Kumasi and then returned to the Colony, where he travelled 'to almost all the States in the Colony', spreading propaganda in favour of the boycott.


72. Ibid., p. 65.

73. Ibid., pp. 68ff.
The chiefs and the state councils responded immediately to the call for a boycott and hold-up, and played a prominent part in its organization, while, to remove any doubts about the attitude of the chiefs, the Standing Committee of the Joint Provincial Council at Cape Coast issued a statement on 3 February 1948 re-affirming the chiefs' support for the campaign and for 'the adoption of constitutional methods in this struggle'.

Meanwhile the educated elite were also laying claim to the leadership of anti-colonial protest. J.B. Danquah and a number of other professional and business men launched the United Gold Coast Convention (U.G.C.C.) on 4 August 1947. On 29 December 1947 the U.G.C.C. pledged itself 'to ensure that by all legitimate and constitutional means the control and direction of Government shall within the shortest time possible pass into the hands of the people and their Chiefs'.

It was clear from the start that the gentlemen of the U.G.C.C. were resolved that it should be they and their colleagues who would assume such 'control and direction', while the chiefs should be firmly relegated to their place in the provinces, as figureheads in their own states. Their role in national politics was to be a very restricted one. On 20 September 1947 the Working Committee of the U.G.C.C. resolved

'(a) that the Convention is of the opinion that the contact of chiefs and government is unconstitutional, and

'(b) that in consequence their position on the Legislative Council is anomalous'.

In the eyes of the U.G.C.C. the proper people to sit on Legislative Council and become the successors of the British in assuming the 'control and direction' of Gold Coast affairs, were clearly commoner lawyers, teachers and businessmen like the members of the Working Committee.

74. Ibid., p.75.
75. Austin, Politics in Ghana, p.52.
77. Austin, op.cit., p.53.
To organize their activities in taking the leadership of the movement for self-government into the rural areas, the Working Committee felt that they needed a vigorous and efficient full-time secretary. Accordingly, at the Committee's invitation, Kwame Nkrumah left London for the Gold Coast on 14 November 1947, to take up the general secretariatship of the U.G.C.C. 78

At first all went well. Nkrumah took up his task with enthusiasm, and co-operated closely with the Working Committee. Nkrumah and Danquah travelled through the Colony and Ashanti together in January and February 1948, spreading the idea of self-government. 79 The number of branches of the U.G.C.C. increased from 13 in February 1948 to 209 by August 1948 (according to the U.G.C.C. Minute Book). 80

But there were soon signs of a growing breach between Nkrumah and his employers, a breach which was eventually to drive the intelligentsia back into an alliance with the chiefs. By July 1948 it was becoming evident that Nkrumah was seeking a far wider, more popular basis of support than the U.G.C.C. had envisaged and, more importantly, was advocating a more fundamental and rapid decolonization than the U.G.C.C. leaders wanted. 81 In August 1948 Nkrumah encouraged the formation of a 'Committee on Youth Organisation' in Accra under the leadership of K.A. Gbedemah and Kojo Botsio. 82 In December 1948 Nkrumah summoned a secret session of the Ghana Youth Congress in Kumasi, which demanded 'FULL SELF-GOVERNMENT NOW'. 83 And in June 1949 the final split took place when Nkrumah announced the formation of the Convention People's Party (C.P.P.), with himself as Chairman, Botsio as Secretary and Gbedemah as Vice-Chairman. 84

78. Nkrumah, op.cit., p.63
79. Austin, op.cit., p.73.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid., pp.61ff.; Nkrumah, op.cit., Chap. 8.
82. Ibid.
83. Austin, op.cit., p.82.
84. Ibid., p.85; Nkrumah, op.cit., Chap. 9.
Meanwhile, the chiefs were becoming increasingly frightened by the new nationalist movement. The Riots of 1948 were the first shock. Mii Kwabena Bonne III, who had instituted the boycott, was profoundly disturbed by this turn of events, and condemned the riots and looting as pointless and irresponsible.\textsuperscript{85} The Standing Committee of the Joint Provincial Council sent messages of loyalty to the King and welcomed the measures taken by the Government to restore order.\textsuperscript{86}

The Riots, and the activities of the new mass nationalist movement being organized by Nkrumah in the year following the Riots, looked dangerously like the kind of agitation which the \textit{ad\textsuperscript{2}mye\textsuperscript{3}fo} had been directing against the chiefs for the past thirty years. The chiefs feared that the ready response of the rural people to Nkrumah's anti-colonial and anti-indirect rule campaigns would leave them entirely isolated.

At first the educated elite had little sympathy for the chiefs' fears and the U.G.C.C. opposed strongly to the Joint Provincial Council's support for the Government after the Riots.\textsuperscript{87} But gradually, as the movement led by Nkrumah got beyond the possibility of control by the educated elite, they allied with the chiefs once again to form a front of 'moderates' against the excesses of Nkrumah and his followers. Even Kobina Sekyi and the A.R.P.S. eventually decided to throw in their lot with the chiefs. On the initiative of the Church leaders in Cape Coast, a reconciliation meeting between the A.R.P.S. and the Joint Provincial Council was held in Cape Coast on 17 August 1948.\textsuperscript{88} Kobina Sekyi 'expressed the hope that all would smooth the path and forget the past', and that the chiefs and the A.R.P.S. could once again work together for the benefit of the country.\textsuperscript{89}

\textsuperscript{85} Bonne, \textit{Autobiography}, p.74.
\textsuperscript{86} Austin, op.cit., p.78.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid.
By the time the Coussey Committee was formed in January 1949 this alliance of chiefs and intelligentsia had been firmly established. The Committee cemented the alliance. It consisted of 40 members, 16 of whom had been Members of the Legislative Council; 9 of the Committee members were prominent chiefs, and the other 31 were leading members of the educated elite. The Committee included Kobina Sekyi, G.E. Moore (Sekyi's oldest political ally and associate), and J.P. Allotey Hammond (Secretary of the A.R.P.S.); J.B. Danquah and George A. Grant (both founder members of the U.G.C.C.); and Sekyi's former political enemies, Amanfi III, Jamanhen of Asebu, Tsibu Darku IX, Jamanhen of Assin Attandaso, Sam Wood and Dr. F.V. Nanka Bruce.90

The Report of the Committee recommended major changes, but changes which would introduce a gradual devolution of power from the colonial Government to the new Legislative Assembly.91 Its recommendations were far more in line with the U.G.C.C.'s moderate demands for 'the design of a self-governing constitution...at the earliest possible time' than with the demands of Nkrumah's followers for 'nothing less than FULL SELF-GOVERNMENT NOW'.92

One of the recommendations of the Committee was the abolition of native authorities and the creation of a new local government structure based on the English model. Local government was to be placed in the hands of Local Authorities, two thirds of whose members were to be elected by popular ballot, and one third to be nominated by the traditional authorities. It was hoped that under this system the Local Authorities would be able to 'retain the valuable and responsible experience of the chiefs', who would still have a say in local government but could no longer be seen in the role of actual rulers or agents of the central government, as they had been under indirect rule.93

91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.; Austin, op.cit., p.82.
93. Coussey Report, 1949, Section II.
To save their position within the states the chiefs had at last come to accept the role which Sekyi had long been advocating for them, that of purely local leaders and figureheads. In an editorial on the reconciliation of the A.R.P.S. and the Joint Provincial Council, the *West African Monitor* had commented,

'Plato's dream of the Philosopher as king has never been realised. And nobody expects its realisation. Kings now reign. They are not expected to rule.

'...Any individual or body who will sincerely wish us to keep to our indigenous institutions should help us to retain our rulers and pay them homage. Our honour and dignity as a people find expression in our Rulers.

'Honour them, and you honour us. Despise them, and you despise us. Belittle them and you belittle us. We are so jealous of them that we wish to have the monopoly of conferring honour on them...We suspect foreign honours; we think they are conferred with ulterior motives. We have had experience of what foreign honours conferred on our Chiefs mean. We know by experience what harm they can do. We are jealous, very touchy of our Rulers. Let them be left to us. Let them remain our Grandfathers as we call them, instead of rulers, task masters, or legislators'.

Under the pressure of the rising tide of popular hostility to indirect rule, the chiefs had no alternative but to accept this more limited role.

After the publication of the Coussey Report in August 1949, events moved very rapidly. Nkrumah at once condemned this 'bogus and fraudulent' Report and began to advocate a Positive Action campaign to force the calling of a Constituent Assembly in a General Election. Having tried and proved its power in the Positive Action campaign from December 1949 to January 1950, the C.P.P. threw itself with unrelenting vigour into the General Election in

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95. Austin, *op.cit.*, pp. 87f.
February 1951 and won a sweeping victory. They soundly defeated the
U.G.C.C. and the associated elitist parties and gained full control over the
new Legislative Assembly. The story of their victory is told in full by
Austin.96

We should emphasise two important points about the C.P.P. campaign for
the 1951 election. The first is that a central plank on their platform was
their attack on the whole system of indirect rule. By allowing themselves to
be integrated into the machinery of colonial administration, the chiefs had
abandoned their obligations to their people and become the puppets of the
colonial Government: 'chiefs no longer sit on Stools but on Gazettes'.97

The chiefs should be removed from their place in central government and
restored to their people as purely local rulers. It should be stressed, once
again, that when the C.P.P. conducted their campaign against the power of
the chiefs, they were attacking precisely that, the power of the chiefs, not
chieftaincy itself. It was argued that by the abolition of indirect rule
and the introduction of local government on the English model, the chiefs
would be removed from the sphere of politics and restored to their 'proper'
role as a social institution. The policy of the C.P.P., therefore, had much
in common with the programme advocated by the Coussey Committee; but in
this as in many other spheres of policy the C.P.P. used more violent and
revolutionary language, and advocated much more rapid and drastic reform,
than the chiefs or the intelligentsia could have countenanced.

Before discussing this reform, there is a second point to be emphasised
in connection with the elections of 1951 - the nature of the mass following
of the C.P.P. The analysis of the structure and composition of this
following by Austin and Apter reveals that in the rural areas it was
dominated by precisely the kind of people who had been leading the opposition

96. Ibid., Chap. III.

to indirect rule within the states since 1925: the 'sub-elite' of
'Standard VII Boys', primary school teachers, clerks, lorry and taxi
drivers, market women, etc., those who had formed the backbone of the rural
adomyefo. 98 It was on such people as these that Nkrumah relied to organize
the activities of the C.P.P. at the local level, just as Sekyi and the
A.R.P.S. had relied on them to carry the fight against indirect rule into
the states. 99

The essential difference between Sekyi and Nkrumah was that after 1948
the latter was willing and able to combine all these elements into a mass
nationalist party, whereas Sekyi, the thorough-going elitist, the 'radical
conservative', could never, before or after 1948, countenance such a mass
movement, an organized nationalist political party. After the 1951
election Sekyi (or one of his close associates in the A.R.P.S.) drafted a
Memorial to the Governor in which the party system was denounced:

'the sudden introduction of the Party System, without
any proper or sufficient preparation or tuition, has
shifted the loyalty of members of such parties from
the country and its vital interests to their respective
parties: and it is obvious that any evils that may be
inherent in the Party System must tend to become more
pronounced if that system becomes lop-sided'. 100

One of the first pieces of major legislation by the new C.P.P. Govern-
ment in 1951 was the Local Government Ordinance, No. 29 of 1951, in which
native authorities were entirely abolished and a new local government
structure was established, the guiding principles of which were similar to
those recommended by the Coussey Committee. 101 The Committee had not, however,

98. Ibid., passim; Apter, Ghana in Transition, passim.
99. For the following of the C.P.P. in one town in South-Central Ghana,
Agona Swedru, see Owusu, Uses and Abuses, passim.
100. The text of this revealing Memorial is reproduced in Appendix C below.
101. Local Government Ordinance, No. 29 of 1951; see also Report by the
Select Committee on Local Government (Colony), 1950 (Accra, Government
Printing Department, 1951).
envisaged quite such a sudden and total reform. The chiefs and the educated elite, in this as in many of the C.P.P.'s programmes, viewed 'with grave apprehension the rate of advance'. The rate of advance was, indeed, very fast. A contemporary memorandum in the files of the Fabian Colonial Bureau noted that

'the timetable for reform, for political reasons, has been so rapid as to be almost unreal. Advance copies of the Phillipson Report, the last of the "control" documents to be prepared as a result of the Statement by Her [sic] Majesty's Government on the Report of the Committee on Constitutional Reform, reached the Gold Coast only in August 1951. Between that time and 1st April, 1952, when the first local government elections were held, it was necessary to determine the policy of Government, to translate this policy into legislation and to conduct detailed enquiries in order to apply the provisions of the new Local Government Ordinance to particular localities'.

There was nothing the chiefs or the educated elite could do to slow down the pace of advance, and with the setting up of the new local authorities in the early 1950s the last battle against indirect rule had been fought and won, and replaced by new battles.

7.5 Conclusion

It is to be hoped that in the course of this study we have demonstrated that the reaction to indirect rule in South-Central Ghana in the second quarter of the twentieth century should be given an interpretation somewhat different from that suggested by Apter and the 'modernization' school.

102. Draft Memorial of the Gold Coast Aborigines Rights Protection Society to the Governor-in-Council: see Appendix C below.


104. Apter, Politics in Ghana.
Apter's original analysis of politics in Ghana was a very early example of a 'modernization' approach which has been considerably modified since the 1950s. Nevertheless, his particular conclusions about rural politics in the Gold Coast have never been seriously challenged, except, perhaps, in Owusu's study, and they continue to be the framework within which the 'decline of chieftaincy' is discussed. It is therefore necessary to outline here the alterations in Apter's analysis which are suggested by this study.

One of Apter's basic hypotheses is confirmed by the events we have described. In his discussion of the 'doctrine' of indirect rule, he argued that

'One of the first effects of this doctrine was to shift the focus of authority and responsibility away from the legitimate properties of chieftaincy to those of British power. An immediate consequence was to identify the chiefs as agents of British rule'.

The chiefs, who traditionally derived their authority from the people, were seen to be turning increasingly to the colonial Government as the source of their authority, thus 'transmuting traditional legitimacy into legitimacy derived from Great Britain'. The result was that 'conflicting sources of authority, so different in nature as to be directly contradictory, were procedurally integrated into one system, indirect rule'.

With this hypothesis it is difficult to disagree. It is, however, impossible to accept Apter's analysis of the results of this conflict of


107. Ibid., p.123.

108. Ibid., p.120.
legitimacy; for he argues that the result was social dislocation and disorientation.

'In such circumstances the individual may forego many of the customs and beliefs most crucial to his traditional way of life. Once this occurs he wanders in a no-man's land for a time, stumbling and halting until he regains his footing on the side of secularity.

'The great danger in this process lies in the possibility of prolonged lack of integration. One possible result is the withdrawal of segments of the population from effective participation in secular social life - a state of apathy.

... Another possibility lies in the breakdown of order - a state of anarchy'.

If my reading is correct, Apter believed that the danger of apathy on the one hand and anarchy on the other resulted from the fact that the undermining of traditional authority structures and orientations, and the partial failure of Western values to replace them, left an orientational gap which was later to be filled by the C.P.P. and Nkrumah's charismatic leadership.

I do not believe this to have been the case; for what happened in the Central Province from 1925 to 1951 was the result of neither apathy nor anarchy, but of an active, forceful and relatively integrated opposition to the colonial Government and to indirect rule. The fact that this opposition was often expressed in non-co-operation does not make it 'apathy' - indeed, Positive Action depended on precisely this kind of non-co-operation and Positive Action was not apathy. I do not believe that people were in Apter's sense disorientated or socially dislocated, or that anomie was a significant factor in Ghana before independence; even if it existed in the urban areas, it does not appear to have been important in the rural areas. On the contrary, I would suggest that attachment to chieftaincy and to traditional

109. Ibid., p.17.
political norms remained as strong as ever in the rural areas and that it was partly from the viewpoint of these democratic traditional norms that indirect rule was being attacked in the Fante states. People were aware of what indirect rule meant and what it was doing to chieftaincy, they were consciously hostile to indirect rule, and consciously opposed it.

Hailey summarized the aspect of interventionist indirect rule against which people were reacting when he wrote in 1938 that

'As the policy has been developed in practice emphasis has shifted from the preservation of native institutions to their development for new functions, and it is beginning to be recognised that these institutions, if they are to play their part in the modern world, must undergo changes which may eventually make them unrecognisable'.

The subjects of the traditional states did not want their institutions to be rendered unrecognisable, at least not in the form which the British were trying to impose. To resist these changes they did not abandon their attachment to traditional norms. The adomyefo never sought the abolition of chieftaincy; to have done so would have been self-defeating, since chieftaincy was still capable of providing the most important prizes in the rural political arenas. They advocated only the abolition of interventionist indirect rule, of the attempt by the British to make chiefs an integral part of the machinery of Government. It was this standpoint which the C.P.P. came to adopt in its campaigns after 1948.

In resisting the colonial domination implied in interventionist indirect rule, the adomyefo employed traditional political methods, modified to suit the new conditions. Factions were transformed into parties within the states and these parties resisted the introduction of indirect rule by the traditional methods of Fante politics - destoolments, violent demonstrations and 'spoiling' tactics. 112 These developments represented a peculiar


112. See, in particular, chapter 3 above.
combination of the 'formal traditionalism' and the 'traditionalism of resistance' described by Balandier.

'Formal traditionalism...' is defined by the maintenance of institutions and of social or cultural structures, the content of which is modified; only certain means are preserved from the past - the functions and aims have changed'.

At the same time,

'During the period of colonial domination, the traditionalism of resistance served as a protective screen or camouflage to conceal reactions of refusal; the essentially different character of the dominated culture gave it, in the eyes of the colonizers, a strange, incomprehensible quality; traditions, either modified or revived, served as a defence for expressions of opposition and for attempts to break the ties of dependence'.

It would be difficult to fit this process, which is one of the main themes of this study, into the framework of modernization theory, with its excessively rigid distinction between tradition and modernity. We have instead had to turn to the insights given by recent work in the field of political anthropology. For

'Recent research has questioned the characteristics usually attributed to traditional systems and traditionalism. Most of this research is in the field of political anthropology and is based on a refusal to identify tradition with 'fixism' and an attempt to uncover the 'dynamic aspects' of the traditional society. Although processes may hinder change and innovation can only be introduced on the basis of existing forms and established values, this society is not condemned to being a mere prisoner of its past'.


114. Ibid. Original emphasis.

115. Ibid., p.172.
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114. Ibid. Original emphasis.

115. Ibid., p.172.
It is hoped that by applying to the Ghanaian situation the conclusions drawn by Nicolson and Bailey from their anthropological work on local arena politics in India, we have helped to clarify the nature of the resistance to colonial rule within the traditional states of South-Central Ghana. As Balandier argues,

'Apter...regards colonialism as "a modernizing force", as "a model by which modernization has been universalized". The correctness of this statement becomes apparent if one considers the breaks, the effects of destructuralization, the new modes of organization that have resulted from colonial enterprise and constraint. However, this general statement must be replaced by a deeper analysis of the immediate political consequences of the colonial situation."

In examining these consequences in South-Central Ghana we have seen that one of the main causes of rural anti-colonialism in this area was the nature of the colonial administration and its attempts to extend its control into the local political arenas. My intention has been to show that for a full understanding of the rise of rural mass nationalism in Ghana, analysis of this 'administrative colonialism' is at least as important as analysis of economic colonialism or of the social and cultural implications of the colonial situation. Thus we return to a restatement, and perhaps a more complete understanding, of Austin's insight:

'The particular grievances of the post-war years, therefore - though clearly important in bringing the unrest to the point of riots - only added fuel to a fire already smouldering and ready to burst into flame. The Ghana nationalist movement had its roots in the villages, among the commoners of the native authorities, many years before it found expression in a national People's Party, and the officials were taken by surprise because they underestimated the speed with which nationalist demands would spread once they became latched on to local discontents'.

116. See Chapter 3 above.
118. Austin, op.cit., p.27.
APPENDIX A THE ABURA STOOL DISPUTE OF 1909-15

S.D. Gardiner (also known as Gyandoh) was destooled as Omanhen Otu V of Abura in 1904. Kwame Tawiah was elected Omanhen Otu Bondzi VI in that year and was destooled in 1909. Gardiner was then re-elected and enstooled as Otu Ababio II in September 1909. A large section of the state, led by Twafohan J.E. Biney, opposed Gardiner's election and contested its validity. The dispute continued until September 1915, when it was settled by the arbitration of the Cape Coast Wesleyan Church Leaders under the chairmanship of 'Father' J.P. Brown (not to be confused with Lawyer E.J.P. Brown). Gardiner's election and installation were recognized by all concerned, and he remained Omanhen of Abura until he died in 1927.

The leading supporters and opponents of Gardiner are listed in Diagram 5. As usual with this type of faction dispute, each individual or group had a different set of reasons for joining a faction:

(1) The two branches of the Nsona Stool Family both claimed the exclusive right to nominate an Omanhen: each branch was almost bound to oppose the candidate chosen by the other branch. Since J.E. Biney, who was already hostile to Gardiner (see (3) below), had lent money to the Abakrampa branch in return for a pledge on Stool property held by that branch, it was likely that the Abakrampa branch would oppose and the Coast branch support Gardiner's candidacy, especially in view of the relationship between the 'scholar' members of the Coast branch and Gardiner (see (7) below).

(2) The Gyase wing were the most powerful in the State, and claimed a dominant role in electing an Omanhen. They were always at loggerheads with the other Oman Chiefs.

1. Unless otherwise indicated, the information in this Appendix is drawn from GNA-CC, DAO 251, and from an interview with Nana Nkum, Omankyiame (Linguist) of Abura on 21 May 1972.

2. Ababio (literally 'he has come again') was an appellation commonly given in Fante states to chiefs who have been re-elected after having resigned or been destooled.
Diagram 5. Abura Stool Dispute, 1909-15

For Gardiner

S.D. Gardiner, the alleged Otu Ababio II.

Coast branch of the Nsona Stool Family.

GYASEHEN Kojo Amuyaa.
All Gyase sub-chiefs.

ADONTSHENHEN Kweku Akonu, Jhen of Obohen.*
Some Adontsen sub-chiefs.

Egyir Sam, Jhen of Obokur.
Some Nkyidom sub-chiefs.

Rev. J.O. Hammond.
Rev. R.M. Acquah.
T.F.E. Jones.
J.E. Ellis.
Lawyer E.J.P. Brown.

Against Gardiner

Abakrampa branch of Nsona Stool Family.

TWAFOHEN J.E. Biney
All Twafo sub-chiefs

ADONTSHENHEN Kwame Odon, Jhen of Mpeseduase.*
Some Adontsen sub-chiefs.

NKYIDOMHEN Kwame Abaka, Jhen of Kwaman and Ayeldu.
TUFOHEN Kwa Yeboa, Jhen of Donase.†
Some Nkyidom sub-chiefs.

Awusu Tainase, Jhen of Dominase.

W.Z. Coker.

* There were, at this time, two Adontsenhemfo of Abura, sharing the command of the Adontsen wing.
† The Tufohen of Abura was a wing chief and stool holder, not a company captain.
(3) From 1904 to 1906 there was a protracted and involved intra-state conflict, during which Tawiah lost and Gardiner gained the support of the faction which attached itself to the Coast branch of the Stool Family.

During this conflict J.E. Biney and Kwa Yeboa were deprived by that faction of their wing positions as Twafohen and Tufohen respectively. They contested their deposition and opposed the faction and therefore Gardiner, though they and their faction were equally hostile to Tawiah: they said that they would accept anyone but Gardiner or Tawiah as Jmanhen. They were both reinstated to their former positions after the reconciliation in 1915.

(4) The command of the Adontsen wing was held by two chiefs, the Ahemfo of Obohen and Nyepeseduase. Each, with the support of his sub-chiefs, was manoeuvring for exclusive command of the wing. Gardiner supported the claims of the Jhen of Obohen, who, after Gardiner's victory, gradually gained recognition as the sole Adontsenhen becoming the only Adontsenhen listed for Abura in the Gold Coast Chiefs List by the 1920s.

(5) The Jhen of Kwaman and Ayeldu (Nkyidomhen of Abura) and the Jhen of Dominase were both claiming their independence from Abura: their claims had been quashed by the Government in 1908. Gardiner and his faction at first opposed these claims. It is possible that by 1915 some kind of deal had been made whereby Kwame Abaka and Awusu Tsinae agreed to withdraw from their opposition to Gardiner in return for their independence: a Commission of Enquiry in 1917 by C.H. Harper, Secretary for Native Affairs, found both Kwaman-Ayeldu and Dominase to be independent of Abura, though the Ahemfo were not allowed the title of Jmanhen by the Government until 1927.

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3. GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/1138, Minute by W.F. Robertson, S.N.A. to Governor, 12 May 1908.

4. GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/1420, Native Affairs Department Annual Reports for 1917 et seq.; and Native Administration Ordinance, 1927; Schedules. Cf. GNA-CC, DAO 251, Report of Settlement of the Abura Dispute, enclosed in Otu Ababio II, Jmanhen of Abura to C.C.P., 21 September 1915, in which Gardiner is reported as saying, 'The matter of Dominasi and Kwaaman or Ayedsu have been completed...' (sic).
(6) Egyir Sam, Jhen of Obokur and his subordinate chiefs were attempting to free themselves from the control of the Jhen of Kwaman and Ayeldu. They hoped that in view of the hostility between Kwame Abaka and Gardiner, the position of Nkyidémhen would be transferred to Egyir Sam. When Kwaman-Ayeldu gained its independence from Abura, Obokur and its subordinate villages remained within Abura and the Jhen of Obokur was duly made Nkyidémhen. Although Donase was in the Obokur section of the Nkyidém, Kwa Yebua, Jhen of Donase, had his own reasons for supporting the Jhen of Kwaman and Ayeldu against Gardiner (see (3) above).

(7) The 'scholars', Hammond, Acquah, Jones, Ellis and E.J.P. Brown, were all members of the Coast branch of the Nsiona Stool Family and close relatives of Gardiner.

(8) W.Z. Coker was a close friend and political ally of Biney. He was not a Royal of Abura, but he seems to have helped Biney in various ways during the dispute by running errands, etc., and he accompanied Biney, apparently as a kind of second, to the arbitration meetings in September 1915.

It is interesting to note that each of the participants gave a different account of the origins of the dispute and the issues at stake: most of them saw their own grievances or claims as the core of the dispute. Thus the Abakrampa branch of the Family blamed the whole dispute on the withholding of Stool properties by 'some of the members of the inferior Coast branch of my said family and some of the members of the Aborigines Rights Protection Society...' (i.e. Hammond, Jones, etc.); J.E. Biney and Kwa Yebua said that the dispute centred around their deposition as Twafohen and Tufohen; and Kwame Abaka and Avasu Tsainase saw the independence of Kwaman-Ayeldu and Dominase as the main issue in question.

5. GNA-CC, DAO 251, Affidavit sworn by Kwesi Abedu, Head of Abakrampa branch of Nsiona Stool Family, at Cape Coast, 22 August 1911.
The role of those members of the educated elite in Cape Coast who were involved in the dispute was particularly significant in view of the later role of the Cape Coast elite in Fante politics as described in this study. By 'members of the educated elite in Cape Coast', I mean those with at least primary, and usually secondary, education who worked in Cape Coast either as lawyers, like E.J.P. Brown, or as ministers of religion, like Revs. Hammond and Acquah (both Wesleyan), or as businessmen, like Biney, Coker, Jones, Ellis and S.D. Gardiner.

Except for Coker, who was drawn in by his friendship with Biney, all the educated men were involved in this dispute purely because of their positions in Abura State as chiefs or Royals (members of the Stool Family). None of them had any ulterior motives for his political activities in Abura. The dispute did not reflect any conflict between these 'scholars' in their outside political activities: they were all prominent members of the Aborigines Rights Protection Society, in which there was no split at this time; in fact they worked together on the opposition to the Forest Bill in 1911-12, while T.F.E. Jones and J.E. Biney were elected President and Vice-President respectively of the A.R.P.S. in 1914. Nor did the dispute represent a commercial conflict: J.E. Biney, J.E. Ellis and J.P. Brown (chairman of the arbitration committee) had been and continued to be closely involved together in joint ventures such as the lease of the Obuasi concession to Ashanti Goldfields Corporation first negotiated in 1895. Nor did any of the participants in the dispute try to make political capital in Abura out of his involvement in the A.R.P.S. or to get either faction to represent itself as taking a stand against the Forest Bill or for co-operation with the colonial Government: it would have been futile and pointless to have done so at this stage of the political history of the Central Province.


7. See, for example, ibid. pp. 23f.
APPENDIX B THE CHIEFS AND THE CROWN: THE QUESTION OF INHERENT POWERS

The establishment and practice of indirect rule in the Gold Coast Colony was influenced by an important controversy about the relationship between the chiefs and the British Crown, a controversy which began in 1844 and was never fully settled within the colonial period. It centred on the question of whether the chiefs derived the authority to rule their states from their people or from the Crown, or from a combination of the two. Did the chiefs have inherent powers as sovereign rulers, or were their powers conferred upon them (explicitly or by sufferance) by the Crown?

Under the Bond of 1844 certain chiefs in the Gold Coast acknowledged the 'power and jurisdiction' of the Queen, agreed that 'Human sacrifices and other barbarous customs, such as panyarring, are abominations and contrary to law' and that 'Murders, robberies and other crimes and offences will be tried and inquired of before the Queen's judicial officers and the chiefs of the district, moulding the customs of the country to the general principles of British law'.

Many chiefs and African legal writers maintained that since the Bond was a treaty freely made by the sovereign chiefs of the Gold Coast, and since the Gold Coast (unlike Ashanti) had never been conquered by the British, then the Crown could not acquire any further judicial rights (or any other rights at all) in the Gold Coast except by the consent of the chiefs and people. No treaty giving such rights was signed after 1844, and therefore the declaration of the Protectorate in 1874 and the annexation of 1901 were ultra vires, and

---

so was much of the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1883. The Crown could regulate certain very limited judicial matters under the Bond, but it could not claim sovereignty over the chiefs, and it certainly could not appoint or dismiss them. This argument was advanced against virtually every measure of the British to regulate chieftaincy throughout the colonial period.

In the nineteenth century the British Government recognised that there was some uncertainty on the question. In discussions on 'native jurisdiction' it was generally assumed (rather than argued) by officials that the Crown did have the right to declare itself the sovereign power in the Gold Coast, and to act as if it was the sovereign power; but they also realized that they should tread carefully in the matter. In the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1883, for example, the sovereignty of the Crown over the chiefs was implicit throughout (though it was not explicitly declared), particularly in section 29, which gave the Governor in Council the power to suspend or dismiss chiefs. Yet the Secretary of State felt that this might be somewhat more than was justified by existing relations with the Protected Territories; and therefore he laid down the proviso that such power should never be exercised without prior reference to London. In practice the colonial Government acted as if it were de facto sovereign and tried to avoid any discussion as to whether there was any de jure justification for this.

2. The Letters Patent of 24 July 1874; the Gold Coast Order in Council of 6 August 1874; the Gold Coast Order in Council of 26 September 1901; the Gold Coast Native Jurisdiction Ordinance, No. 5 of 1883. The last three are printed in Metcalfe, Documents, pp. 368f, 524f and 390ff. The first is printed in J.E. Casely Hayford, Gold Coast Native Institutions (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1903; new impression, London, Frank Cass, 1970), pp. 369ff.


In the twentieth century, however, it was argued by British officials that 'any claim to the existence of inherent rights became legally untenable after the annexation Order of 1901.'6 The 1901 Order in Council annexed the whole Gold Coast Colony to 'His Majesty's dominions', and the Crown was henceforward to exercise complete sovereignty over the Colony through the Governor in Council.7 That this included sovereignty over the chiefs was confirmed in a judgement in 1907 by the Chief Justice, Sir William Brandford Griffith, who held that chiefs exercised their jurisdiction in native courts only with the consent of the Crown.8 The upholders of the sovereignty of the chiefs maintained that the Order in Council was itself ultra vires, for the reasons outlined above, but officials whose whole authority derived from the Order could hardly be expected to accept this argument.

Even as far as officials were concerned, however, the subject was by no means closed by the Order in Council and they continued to be bothered by the problem until 1944. In a memorandum on the subject written in 1931, for example, W.J.A. Jones, the Secretary for Native Affairs, argued very strongly in favour of the official position, but he nevertheless recognized the possibility of adopting one of two intermediate positions. The first sought to

'... draw a distinction between the executive authority of the Chiefs, which should be an accepted consequence of popular election, and their judicial functions, which can be exercised only with the permission and the will of the Crown.'9

7. Gold Coast Order in Council of 26 September 1901, paragraphs 3 and 4, in Metcalfe, Documents, p. 524.
The second position had been proposed in 1904 by Willoughby Osborne, then the Attorney General: Osborne had argued that the whole authority of the chiefs derived both from the people and from the Crown. Jones quotes Osborne's argument that

'Briefly, the present position of a Chief appears to be that he holds office by the wish of the people, but at the will of the Crown.

'If the support of either the people or the Crown is withdrawn a Chief's powers and jurisdiction cease.'

Ultimately, Jones came down on the side of a strong assertion of the authority of the Crown, arguing that

'The Native Authorities cannot be an integral part of the machinery of government, which it is our desire and intention that they should be, until they appreciate and acknowledge that Government is the only source of power in the Colony.'

Nevertheless, the position was far from clear as far as most officials were concerned, and sometimes they even contradicted the official line and implied that the authority of the chiefs did derive from their people. In December 1930, for example, H.W. Thomas, then the Acting Secretary for Native Affairs, took the official line in a document intended for publication, in which he wrote that the chiefs were 'in reality agents of Government in carrying out the administration of this country ...' Yet in May 1931 he wrote in a similar document,

10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/1420, Account of Departmental activity for inclusion in Governor's Annual Address, enclosed in H.W. Thomas, Ag. S.N.A. to Governor's Private Secretary, 31 December 1930.
In the Colony... the legal machinery is not one conferring power but rather one defining, preserving and regulating the tribal authority of the Chiefs, so far as it can be adopted to suit modern methods. This authority which is inherent in the people, in so far as the Colony is concerned, is recognised and affirmed by an agreement known as the Bond of 1844, which gives the British a constitutional position in the Gold Coast...

The real source of the authority of the Chiefs has always remained with their own people...14

This uncertainty affected the legislation on indirect rule right up to 1944. Because the legislation avoided any explicit commitment to the absolute sovereignty of the Crown, it was always weaker than the Government wanted it to be, and never gave an adequate definition of the relationship between chiefs and Government officials. District commissioners were never certain just what they could or could not do, or what they could make chiefs do. This ambiguity is reflected in the titles of Ordinances and Bills relating to native jurisdiction and native administration. For example, the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1883 was entitled,

'An Ordinance to facilitate and regulate the exercise in the Protected Territories of certain powers and jurisdiction by Native Authorities.'15

The Native Jurisdiction Bills of 1919 and 1922 were entitled,

'A BILL intitled: An Ordinance to make better provision for the regulation and exercise of certain powers and jurisdiction by Native Authorities and for purposes connected therewith.'16

14. GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/1544, Statement on Native Administration policy in the Gold Coast for insertion in the Annual Affairse Report, enclosed in H.W. Thomas, Ag. S.N.A. to Colonial Secretary, 7 May 1931.

15. Native Jurisdiction Ordinance No.8 of 1878, No.5 of 1883, in Metcalfe, Documents, p. 390. My emphasis.

16. CO 96/593/62729/18. My emphasis.
And the Native Administration Ordinance of 1927 was entitled,

'An Ordinance to define and to regulate the exercise of certain powers and jurisdictions by Native Authorities, and to assign certain functions to the Provincial Councils, and for purposes connected therewith.'

The problem ceased to be troublesome to the Government with the passing of the Native Authority Ordinance of 1944, in which a formula was found for controlling local administration without claiming any authority over chiefs qua chiefs. For under this Ordinance the agents of local administration were to be Native Authorities appointed by the Governor: the Governor could appoint anyone he wished as a Native Authority, and that person exercised his functions as a Native Authority entirely and solely under the authority of the Ordinance. The Governor could, and almost invariably did, appoint a chief and state council as the Native Authority; such a chief and council, however, acted as a local authority not by virtue of their traditional office, but by virtue of their appointment by the Governor. Thus it was no longer relevant, as far as local government was concerned, whether or not the chiefs derived their authority qua chiefs from the Governor, since they clearly and explicitly did derive their authority qua Native Authorities from him: they could exercise no local government functions under the Ordinance without the Governor's authority. The same applied to the provision for courts in the Native Courts Ordinance of 1944.

17. Native Administration Ordinance (Colony), No. 18 of 1927. My emphasis.

18. Native Authority (Colony) Ordinance, No. 21 of 1944; Native Courts (Colony) Ordinance, No. 22 of 1944. The title of the former was 'An Ordinance more effectively to secure the Native Authorities their due place in the administration of the Colony, and to prescribe their powers and duties, and to assign certain functions to Provincial Councils, and for purposes connected therewith.'
APPENDIX C
THE DRAFT MEMORIAL OF THE A.R.P.S. TO THE GOVERNOR, 1951/52

[The text of the draft Memorial is taken from a copy in the private papers of W.S. Kwesi Johnston (Nana Amoah IV of Cape Coast), who informed me that it had been drafted by Kobina Sekyi. It was probably written late in 1951 or early in 1952.]

DRAFT
THE MEMORIAL OF THE Gold Coast Aborigines Rights Protection Society to the Governor-In-Council Humbly Sheweth

1. THAT your Memorialists are the Natural Rulers of this country in Conference with such of the enlightened sons of the soil as have joined the Society, formed by the predecessors of them the said Natural Rulers, and have pledged themselves to aid and advise them the said Natural Rulers.

2. THAT your Memorialists are anxious to see their country and the people thereof advance in all directions; but they view with grave apprehension the rate of advance, because of certain unmistakeable maldevelopments of the body politic which have manifested themselves.

3. THAT your Memorialists have observed, in particular, that the sudden introduction of the Party System, without any proper or sufficient preparation or tuition, has shifted the loyalty of members of such parties from the country and its vital interests to their respective parties; and it is obvious that any evils that may be inherent in the Party System must tend to become more pronounced if that system becomes lop-sided.

4. THAT your Memorialists are aware that one Party succeeded in becoming the leading Party at the first general election held under the 1949 Constitution, and is now in a position to carry every motion, no matter how complete and reasonable the opposition of members of the other parties may be.
5. THAT, in consequence, measures deemed to be likely to be of great benefit to the country in general, if initiated by any person outside the predominant party, are usually lost, and measures initiated by the latter party, no matter how vehemently and seriously, or honestly, the opposition members oppose it, are usually passed.

6. THAT your Memorialists would humbly and respectfully point out that, as recorded in paragraph 2 of Part I of the Report of the Committee on Constitutional Reform,

"As a result of the analysis which we have made, we are satisfied that the basis of British rule in the Gold Coast can, in general, and without going into the niceties of legal interpretation, be said to be derived ultimately from the fact that Britain found herself in a position in which she could exert her influence in a region ruled by weaker states. It has never been admitted, nor can it be proved beyond all doubt, that the peoples of these territories have lost their right to determine their ultimate destiny, though they have enjoyed benefits from the British connection. Indeed, the appointment of the present Committee proves the contrary view."

7. THAT your Memorialists are painfully aware that there is much dissatisfaction, among vast numbers of the peoples of the various States in which they, your Memorialists, are Rulers, with the present state of affairs, as far as measures now being passed in the House of Assembly go.

8. THAT, in particular, your Memorialists are greatly disturbed by the provisions of sections 71 to 77 of the Local Government Ordinance, 1951, and your Memorialists, therefore, most humbly pray that you may be pleased

(1) to cause such amendments to be made in the Constitution as to provide for government by a coalition consisting of members of
all the parties, until such time as the Party System could be generally deemed capable of being worked fairly;

(2) to cause to be defined the present position of the States of this country vis-a-vis the Government; and

(3) to suspend the operation of such Ordinances as have been passed, or may be passed prior to the amendment of the Constitution above prayed for, which have been opposed by all the parties other than the predominating party.

AND YOUR MEMORIALISTS etc. etc.
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GNQ  Ghana Notes and Queries
JAH  Journal of African History
HR  Research Review (University of Ghana Institute of African Studies, Legon).
THSG  Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana.

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      (i) Colonial Office publications - series
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397/64 The Native Treasuries Bill. An Analysis of the Bill, with comments thereon, by Kobina Sekyi, 1939

551/64 List of Causes which bring riots to Asafo Companies (n.d.)

3. Ghana National Archives, Accra

(i) Papers from the Secretary for Native Affairs' Office (the ADM11 series)

These papers are cited in the footnotes to this study as GNA-Accra, ADM 11/1/... Dates given are the opening dates of the files.

153 Bye-Laws made by the Omanhene of Eguaro, 1908

184 Cocoa Farming - Bye-Laws as to Tribute payable by farmers to Chiefs, 1908

286 Native Jurisdiction Ordinance - enquiries respecting operation of, 1910

287 Native Jurisdiction Ordinance - enforcement of judgements, 1910

305 Native Jurisdiction Ordinance - interpretation of, 1911

349 Chiefs, Revenue of, 1912

692 Meeting of Paramount Chiefs of Eastern Province, 1918

813 The Etsi People, 1921

824 Essays by Assistant District Commissioners on Tribal History, 1923
921 Provincial Council of Chiefs, 1925
928 Stool Treasuries, 1925
933 Visit of Under-Secretary of State - subjects for discussion, 1925
974 Native Administration Ordinance, 1927
1138 Native Jurisdiction Bill - Criticisms of by Native Chiefs and Press, 1907
1163 Conferences of Head Chiefs, 1913
1388 Temperance Society interference in Native Affairs, 1907
1420 Native Affairs Department Annual Reports, 1919-37
1544 Native Administration and Policy, 1931
1659 Miscellaneous Confidential Papers of H.W. Thomas, 1932

(ii) Papers from the Colonial Secretary's Office (CSO) - Minute Papers (MP) and Book Files (BF)

Dates given are the opening dates of the files.

CSO MP 372/30 Native Administration Ordinance - Amendments, 1927 (59 Sub-files covering native administration legislation and policy from 1927 to 1940)
CSO MP 1997/30 Political Conferences, 1930
CSO MP 1403/31 Income Tax Bill - demonstrations against, 1931
CSO MP 60/32 Proposed Native Administration Revenue Ordinance, 1930
CSO MP 204/33 Provincial Council Accounts, 1933
CSO MP 206/34 Native Tribunals, 1934
BF 0382 Stool Disputes, 1940
BF 0382, Sub-File 1, Stool Disputes - Appointment of Special Commissioner to investigate, 1941

(iii) Miscellaneous

ADM 36/1/10 Government Policy, Oda D.C.'s Office file, 1921-38
Acc.No. 911/56 Petition to King on Section 4 of the Native Administration Further Amendment Ordinance, 1938
4. Public Record Office, London (PRO)

(i) CO 96 - Gold Coast Original Correspondence

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* Addendum: 696/6830/31 Financial Position
Political Administration of the Colony

(ii) CO 343 - Gold Coast Registers of Correspondence

CO 343/26 Gold Coast Register of Correspondence, 1918-1919
CO 343/28 Gold Coast Register of Correspondence, 1922-23

5. Rhodes House Library, Oxford (RH) - Papers deposited by the Oxford University Colonial Records Project.

MSS Afr. s.578 Papers of W.H.A. Hanschell: Gold Coast. The Powers of the Crown, diaries of treks; report on Native Tribunals; inter-state cooperation; notes on disturbances and records of the commission of Enquiry, 1948

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MSS Brit.Emp. s.100-121 Colonial Civil Servants Association: Constitution, Minutes of Conferences, circulars, bulletins and correspondence, 1947-61

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MSS Brit.Emp. s.338 Lord Hailey (Malcolm, 1st baron): Typescript of addresses delivered 1912-1938

MSS Brit.Emp. s.365 Papers of the Fabian Colonial Bureau (128 Boxes; Box 60 covers the Gold Coast/Ghana, 1937-59)

6. Interviews

Those cited in this study are:

Abraham ABEDUN (Royal) of Asabu. Interviewed 6 October 1970

Elders of AJUMAKU (including Nana Mkrans, Obaaato of Kwana Stool Family, and Mr. K.A. Dadzie, State Secretary of Ajumaku, 1929-69). Interviewed 8 December 1971


J.D.E. BARNARD Gold Coast Regiment, 1940-45; Administrative Service (mainly in Accra and Northern Territories), 1946-54. Interviewed 15 July 1970.

Nana Odeefuo BOA AMONSEM III, Omanhen of Denkyira, and Elders of Denkyira. Interviewed several times, February - March 1972.
J.K. ESSEL  Stipendiary Magistrate, Cape Coast; an Oddeye (Royal of Anomabu, and candidate for the Paramount Stool. Interviewed 24 May 1972.

W.S. Kweisi JOHNSTON (Nana Amos IV of Cape Coast) A central figure in Cape Coast politics since 1914. A leading opponent of Mbra III and Kobina Sekyi in the 1930s. Interviewed several times, April 1971 - January 1972.


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