JÜRGEN HABERMAS AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY

by Michael K. Power

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Given the vast range of Habermas's work over the past twenty years, the focus of this dissertation is relatively narrow. I am concerned to explicate his status as a transcendental thinker, a status which I believe has not been made fully clear, either by Habermas himself or by a number of commentaries and criticisms concerning him. This task may seem anachronistic given the "de-transcendentalisation" of Habermas's work recently, and the shift to a programme for a theory of communicative action. Yet, there is a more general and speculative intention behind it. Working through issues within Habermas's thought I attempt to bring to the surface a reading of transcendental strategies and a speculative vision of their potentialities which avoids the less flexible features of a model which has dominated appraisals of them. Such an interpretative task is much more than descriptive. There is a normative intention that underlies it, a call for a revaluation of transcendentalism. The dissertation is divided into four parts as follows:

PART I provides a general introduction to the two major "phases" of Habermas's work i.e. his theory of "cognitive interests" and his theory of communication. The transcendental perspective is introduced in the light of two problems that arise in these contexts.

PART II concerns the earlier theory of "Knowledge-Constitutive Interests" specifically. The "analytical" model of transcendental thinking is introduced and "played" into Habermas's claims. Against the limitations of this model, a more hermeneutic and dialectically conceived transcendentalism is offered, one that overcomes prima facie aporias in Habermas's conception of Nature and natural science.

PART III concerns his later theory of communication and, in particular the transcendental status of Habermas's notion of an Ideal Speech Situation. The "Ideality" of this construct has been misunderstood. Borrowing in part from Kant's concept of a "regulative idea" I try to make the ISS more plausible as a transcendental construct.

PART IV attempts to bring together some of the claims developed previously as a reply to Rorty's polemical challenge to epistemology.

I wish to underline certain deficiencies of this dissertation. I shall not raise detailed questions about social theory, about the viability of critical theory, or about substantive analyses of modern capitalism. Nor am I concerned to contest in depth Habermas's interpretations of particular thinkers. Rather, I wish to exhibit the general structure of Habermas's early thought from the relatively more philosophical perspective of transcendental approaches to experience and cognition.
For my Mother and Father
This dissertation could not have been completed without the inspirational guidance of two people. Firstly, I am indebted to Gerd Buchdahl in too many ways to mention. His seminars on Kant were profoundly exciting and gave rise to my interest in transcendental thinking. Not only did they enable me to experience the "truth" about Kant, but they rekindled a passion for philosophy in general which, at the time of coming to Cambridge in 1979, seemed lost forever. I am only too aware that my attempt to expand the sphere of discourse about transcendentalism beyond the Kantian context must be extensively flawed by comparison with the quality of scholarship that inspired it. Secondly, I would like to thank Mary Hesse whose comments and suggestions concerning both the form and substance of this enterprise were an invaluable source of stimulation. I owe much to her sympathetic patience, allowing me to develop my own ideas, while offering those which began life as desperately superficial or were veiled by my stylistic eccentricities, a more professional rigour. The errors and inconsistencies that remain are undoubtedly my own.

I am also indebted to the Fellows of Girton College who saw fit to grant me an extremely generous studentship for the 1982 - 83 academic year. I could not have completed the dissertation without this help. Furthermore the College has assisted me greatly in many other less tangible though equally important ways, and my four years in Cambridge have been comfortable and fulfilling as a result.

To the office staff of the Department of History and Philosophy of Science and the librarian of the Whipple library I am extremely grateful for numerous small favours which have accumulated over the years. An acknowledgement of this kind is small payment indeed.
Finally I would like to give special thanks to Claire Sinnott. Her patience and loyalty during the preparation of the final manuscript were much more than I deserve, and well beyond the normal duties of a typist.

Michael Power
Cambridge September 1983

N.B. As required by Section 20 of the Memorandum to Graduate Students: This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration.

Signed: M. K. Power

Date: 30 - 9 - 83
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following abbreviations for key concepts are used throughout the text:

- TA = Transcendental Argument
- TI = Technical Interest
- PI = Practical Interest
- EI = Emancipatory Interest
- ISS = Ideal Speech Situation
- CT = Critical Theory

A full list of abbreviations of titles of works by Habermas is given at the beginning of the footnotes. The most common to appear in the text is:

- KHI = Knowledge and Human Interests
Jürgen Habermas is a thinker on the grand scale. Over the past two decades the scope of his work has been astonishing. His abilities to work at both abstract and concrete levels and to engage in detailed scholarship within a broad field of vision, are rare gifts. I could not possibly do justice to the multifaceted character of his output. My concern in this dissertation is relatively narrow and more "purely" philosophical. However, one must be suspicious of any self-styled autonomy in this latter respect. This would be the very false-consciousness that Habermas and his colleagues attack.

I am concerned with Habermas's status as a transcendental thinker. This may seem surprising and somewhat anachronistic given Habermas's recent development in which he very clearly wants to distance himself from transcendentalist themes. However, I believe that Habermas's transcendental phase has not been fully appreciated, and in many cases has been crudely misunderstood. Habermas himself is not free from self-misunderstanding. He is to some extent a sleepwalker. Like any great thinker the richness of his work extends beyond his own self-understanding. In a sense, though this is underdeveloped in what follows, Habermas is a case study for the wider task of exposing a more plausible reading of transcendental strategies in general, free from the less flexible features of a model which reads them as a peculiar argument form. Such a task would continue where this dissertation ends.

Naturally, Knowledge and Human Interests (KHI hereafter) is a locus classicus. It is the interpretative "centre of gravity" for many of my claims. As the most explicit statement of Habermas's transcendentalism I believe its potential has not been exhausted despite his later reorientation.
In advance of this hermeneutical task I wish to underline the limited scope of the arguments that are to follow. Whether there are serious omissions or not the reader may decide for himself.

Firstly, I am not concerned to confront Habermas's particular interpretations of individual philosophers and social theorists. This would be an enormous undertaking and would deviate from the main argument which seeks to explicate the structure of KHI and the later work on the foundations of the theory of communication. As a general methodological apologia for this, I believe that the history of philosophy gives many examples of seemingly gross misinterpretations which have constituted points of departure for rich and creative ventures. Hegel's interpretation of Kant comes to mind. More recently, Rorty's polemical challenge to his own philosophical establishment incorporates a rather maverick history of philosophy. Yet the impact of his work within the sphere of analytic philosophy has been enormous.

Secondly, I shall make only very schematic references to Habermas's substantive analysis of Capitalism and his concept of an emergent "legitimation crisis" in modern society. Nor shall I discuss issues associated on the same level with his reconstruction of historical materialism. Such a disclaimer stresses the epistemological orientation of this work and is a tacit admission that I would not have very much new to say on these other issues. Furthermore, the reader may be irritated by a failure to confront the general viability of Critical Theory and the coherence of something called the "Critique of Ideology". I seem to assume that problems of detail aside, these projects make sense and, more particularly, make sense in Habermas's terms. I acknowledge that this is a weakness. Habermas's notion of "distorted communication" remains largely uncriticised as does the strength of the model of psychoanalysis apart from
some brief comments. I believe that a sympathetic reconstrual of the
transcendental status of many of Habermas's claims leaves intact a whole
series of methodological problems about the claim of the theory to
supply a basis for "emancipation". Indeed, it could be said that Habermas's
transcendentalism seems to have hindered the general reception of such a
programme.

This dissertation is divided into four parts. Part I is introductory
and Chapter 1 offers an exegesis of the major themes in Habermas's
work. The theory of knowledge-constitutive interests is explained and attention
is focussed upon the problem of their "quasi-transcendental" status. In
addition, an account of the main contours of Habermas's theory of
communication is provided which converges upon the transcendental status of
the ideal speech situation and problems thereof.

Parts II and III contain the main body of critical work. Part II is
focussed upon KHI. Chapter 2 provides a sketch of a model of
transcendental argument which is found in analytic philosophy and draws
some preliminary conclusions about the implications of this model and
its problems for our appraisal of Habermas. Chapter 3 confronts Habermas's
notion of "epistemology as social theory" and the status of nature in
Habermas's "materialistically transformed" concept of synthesis. The neo-
Kantian idea of object constitution is subsumed under the Hegelian form of
metacritique. Chapter 4 continues the discussion in relation to Habermas's
appropriation of Peirce and Dilthey. I conclude that a prevailing picture
of Habermas's strategy at this point needs reappraisal. In particular, the
transcendental status of cognitive interests must be situated within a
dialectical structure. In Chapter 5 I apply these conclusions to some
specific criticisms of Habermas's theory of cognitive interests. While
our assessment of transcendental strategies is altered to some extent, the
problem of the "overestimation of power of reflection" in Habermas's work persists. Part III concerns Habermas's theory of communication. Chapter 6 examines Habermas's claims for the paradigm of rational reconstructive science with a suspicion that the rejection of transcendentalism is only nominal. Chapter 7 examines the classical background to the regulative status of the ideal speech situation (ISS hereafter) and raises the basic issue of its transcendental status; that is the suspicion that it is a mere postulate. A backward glance at the metacritical reconstrual of transcendental arguments introduces the basic concern of the next two chapters. Chapter 8 is a sustained analysis of Habermas's theory of "communicative ethics". The neo-Rawlsian model of critical-reflective equilibrium is offered as relocation of the transcendental status of the ISS and its normative content. In Chapter 9 there is a complementary argument, via a critique of Habermas's critics, for a metaphysically less suspect reading of the status of ideal speech and its relation to the rest of Critical Theory. I conclude that Habermas's transcendentalism has the character of establishing the possibility of the practical-critical viewpoint.

Part IV of the dissertation offers some conclusions. In Chapter 10 this proceeds by way of a critique of Rorty's challenge to epistemology and a rehabilitation of Habermas's transcendentalism as an "epistemology without mirrors".

One last word of comment seems appropriate. This is a thoroughly hermeneutical exercise. I take seriously Schleiermacher's claim that we can know an author better than he knows himself. Yet I also deny any essentialist reading of Habermas's transcendentalism. The task it to reactivate a sensitivity to it which seems to have been submerged under the weight of a dominant mode of appraisal and its dogmatic cliches.
Chapter 1
the philosophers have only interpreted the world, but the point is to change it (MARX)

Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it..... It leaves everything as it is (WITTGENSTEIN)
Habermas: General Themes

I The heritage of the Frankfurt School

Habermas is a second generation member of the Frankfurt School. The membership of this group and the issues which united it, albeit loosely in some cases, have been thoroughly documented. It may be defined by the theoretical attempt to come to terms with the failure of a workers revolution in western Europe and the rise of fascism in Germany in the inter war period. A central feature of the framework within which these thinkers operate involves an analysis of the rise of instrumental reason. The urgency of this analysis is preserved even in the context of the economically more affluent post war period in the West. The critique of instrumental reason is an attempt to come to terms with some very fundamental questions: Why, given extraordinary feats of technological progress, is humanity entering a phase of "barbarism"? Why has the Enlightenment, whose pinnacle achievements in the natural sciences have issued in an unparalleled ability to control nature, also accompanied the rise of systems of domination of man by man? Why has such an initially liberating phase turned back upon itself? These are the questions which are inherent in such concepts as the "Dialectic of Enlightenment" and the "Eclipse of Reason". In the face of this experience different members of the Frankfurt School held different expectations. Some were more optimistic than others about the prospect of social progress. But there was a general loss of faith in the "proletariat" as the engine of change. In the face of material affluence, revolutionary potentials may be displaced into fringe groups such as students and intellectuals. This loss of attachment to the proletariat
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In the face of this experience different members of the Frankfurt School held different expectations. Some were more optimistic than others about the prospect of social progress. But there was a general loss of faith in the "proletariat" as the engine of change. In the face of material affluence, revolutionary potentials may be displaced into fringe groups such as students and intellectuals. This loss of attachment to the proletariat
and to social analysis in terms of class struggle alienated the members of the Frankfurt School from more "orthodox" schools of Marxism.

What is understood by the notion of "instrumental reason"? In a general and perhaps vague cultural sense it is related to the "cult of the useful". We might refer here to the Weberian notion of "Zweckrationalität" or purposive rationality. According to this conception rationality is entirely ordered towards determining the adequacy of means to pre-determined ends. It then seems to follow that a concept of rationality appropriate to the determination of ends themselves is obliterated. As the members of the Frankfurt School put it, reason is "eclipsed". The image of the eclipse is a suggestive one, since it also implies that this non-instrumental conception of reason may in the appropriate conditions come to light and show itself. Indeed, "eclipses" are transitory!

Thus, the critique of instrumental reason is concerned to revive the rationality of a form of questioning. Such questions as "Is an end good?", "Is this society just?" are regarded as paradigmatic of this revival.

Social, political and personal life in the modern era is increasingly epitomised by the form of instrumental reason. This is the form of man's enslavement of himself, the creation of institutions and forms of life which are essentially dehumanising in their disattention to more fundamental needs of man that can not be characterised in the instrumental mode (also characterised as the "having" mode). According to the Frankfurt School a form of instrumental "rationalisation" has become the organising principle of society, in particular of Capitalism and its bureaucratic institutions.

There is a strong hint of intellectual elitism in some of the writings of the members of the Frankfurt School. Adorno's critique of culture is an example. Furthermore, the analysis of instrumental reason proceeds at a variety of levels the connections between which are not always clear.
Again, Adorno is a particularly startling exponent of this. His style and content are fused in an uncompromising fashion. It is in relation to such stylistic fluidity that the Frankfurt School's extremely wide notion of "Positivism" operates, a notion I shall examine in greater detail in a later chapter.

I believe we must retain, in what follows, a sensitivity to the dialectical character of thought that characterised the approach of the Frankfurt School. This is dramatically embodied in the idea of the "dialectic of Enlightenment". The Enlightenment raises an ideal of rational determination and a corresponding freedom from superstition (e.g. Bacon's attack on 'idols'). Yet it is claimed that the pursuit of this ideal as an end in itself has eliminated "critical" thought itself. In dialectic we move from one moment or condition to its opposite. In the dialectic of Enlightenment, they claim that we move from mythology to enlightenment but return to mythology again.

It must be stressed that the programme for a 'critical' theory that emerges from the writings of the Frankfurt School is by no means a unified and homogeneous one. On the contrary, the group was affected by numerous internal disputes. The debate between Marcuse and Habermas over the epistemological status of science and technology with respect to its proposed transformation is a relatively recent example of such rifts, though this was a philosophical rather than a personal dispute. Thus, the attempts to come to terms with modernity, to reflect its antagonisms and to envisage solutions were diverse. Adorno and Habermas pursued these issues in fundamentally different ways. It seems fair to say that with Habermas we encounter a more systematic approach, which in KHI is pursued as the reconstruction of the "pre-history of positivism". This is also understood as an account of the loss of "reflection" - another key notion in the
critical theorists verbal armoury. Critical theory is a reflective type of theory. But what is meant by "reflection"? This notion is often defined in terms of its opposite i.e. theories which are "objectivistic" ("Traditional" Theory in Horkheimer's sense). To make the relation between these two conceptions clearer is a central task for the assessment of Habermas's status as a transcendental thinker.

II Knowledge and Human Interests

Habermas's "early" phase culminates in KHI where we encounter a systematic pursuit of the problems that "define" critical theory at the level of epistemology. Critical theory examines the deep affinities between positivism, instrumental reason and capitalism. While Habermas later regards KHI as too indirect, it represents for our purposes an attempt to mirror social ills at the level of a theory of knowledge.

In the Appendix to KHI, which was Habermas's inaugural lecture at Frankfurt in 1965, he introduces the project of a critique of positivism. This is conceived of as a "History of Philosophy" with systematic intent. In the Appendix he discusses this in relation to the greek notion of 'Theoria'. He claims that the ideal of theoria involves a "contemplative" model of the soul. The latter is detached from the world, a world which shows itself "as it really is". However, the concept of Theoria also contains a moment of moral elevation, a form of moral cartharsis. This moment has vanished from the modern conception of theory. In Theoria the cosmos is confronted in a spiritually elevating fashion and fact and value are unified. This is a unity that disappears in the face of a purely "factual" interest in nature. Habermas refers to Husserl in order to characterise this. According to Habermas, nature is in Husserl's sense "constituted" by us. It is "mathematised" in its essential form. Natural
According to Habermas this "constitution" of nature reveals the rootedness of natural science in a particular "interest" of the species. This is an interest that must be exposed and, in an as yet unspecified sense, "overcome". In KHI it is "overcome" via the elucidation of other interests which have a similar constitutive function, thereby with the intention of enriching the concept of knowledge.

KHI is an extraordinary book. It is a philosophical classic. Habermas proceeds via criticism and appropriation of a whole series of individuals to evolve his theory of "knowledge-constitutive interests". This theory appears in its most obvious form in the Appendix and may be summarised as follows: The forms of possible knowledge are constituted by three universal "species-interests". a) A TECHNICAL interest (TI) in the control of nature "constitutes" knowledge as successful prediction within the realm of the empirical-analytical sciences.

b) A PRACTICAL interest (PI) in communication between "free" persons "constitutes" knowledge as the interpretation of meanings within the realm of the hermeneutical-historical sciences.

c) An EMANCIPATORY interest (EI) in freedom from all forms of domination "constitutes" self-reflective knowledge.

Such a schema is inherently critical of a sense of positivism which claims exclusivity for natural science qua knowledge. It is also critical of attempts to model the historical and hermeneutical sciences on the mode of objectivity of the natural sciences. They have their own paradigm determined by a different cognitive interest. However, Habermas's claims are an advance on the debates concerning the Natur- and Geisteswissenschaffen. Habermas proposes a third, seemingly distinct form of social inquiry. The "self-reflective knowledge" in question underlies
the idea of "critical Theory" (CT). Naturally, a great deal of debate has arisen concerning the viability of this threefold distinction. We shall examine some of these criticisms in due course.

Corresponding to this differentiation in the forms of knowledge, Habermas talks of the "life-spheres" of WORK, LANGUAGE and POWER. It is in these spheres that cognitive interests have their basis. Cognitive Interests are

the specific viewpoints from which, with transcendental necessity, we apprehend reality and ground three categories of possible knowledge......

these viewpoints originate in the interest structure of a species that is linked to definite means of social organisation: work, language and power

Ignoring for the moment difficulties associated with regarding language as a "means of social organisation", we must ask about the status of an "interest structure of the species". Like Kant, Habermas believes that objectivity is explicated via a set of transcendental presuppositions. The idea of such presuppositions is a response to a classically Kantian question i.e. "How is knowledge and/or experience of a particular kind possible?". Kant offers his Categories of Understanding as a response. Habermas supplies three cognitive interests. However, for Habermas, unlike Kant

The achievements of the transcendental subject have their basis in the natural history of the human species

Thus knowledge-constitutive interests or cognitive interests are both empirical and transcendental. They are embedded in the natural history of species, yet they are also conditions of the possibility of knowledge. This has led to their characterisation as "quasi-transcendental".

According to Habermas, cognitive interests "constitute" a domain of objects. More accurately, the TI and PI do this. The EI has no distinctive
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objects. More accurately, the TI and PI do this. The EI has no distinctive
"domain" of its own and is in some sense derivative regarding object-constitution (though I shall claim it is central in other ways). A reality is "objectified" by cognitive interests. It is simultaneously disclosed and constituted.

What does this mean? What are the implications of Habermas's cryptic notion of "objectification" apart from signalling that objectivity is some form of transcendental accomplishment. In Part II I intend to bring this issue and others associated with the transcendental status of cognitive interests into the open. But first I wish to prepare the ground for this by introducing a dilemma which arises on the, albeit sketchy, account given above. This dilemma is a co-ordinate for much of the discussion that follows.

III The dilemma of quasi-transcendentalism

The dilemma may be stated quite boldly, in order to dramatise the issue. How can cognitive interests be conceived in their transcendental aspect as conditions of knowledge and experience of the world and at the same time have an empirical status by which they are comprehended "within" the world (i.e. as somehow consequent upon an empirical and evolutionary story)? Either cognitive interests as "transcendental" are PRIOR to the world or as empirical they are comprehensible WITHIN it.

Now, it might be argued that my formulation of the problem is somewhat of a "straw man" and to some extent this must be admitted. Rather I offer it as a demand for an account of what is involved in claiming that cognitive interests have transcendental status. This is a pertinent demand because there exists a model of transcendentalism which we may call neo-Kantian which does raise the dilemma. To illustrate this let us
consider the following claims by Wittgenstein

5.631 There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas

5.632 The subject does not belong to the world; rather it is a limit of the world

In the Tractatus the subject is located "outside" the "world". It is a condition or limit of the world and not prior to it. Apel's hermeneutics dissolves this stark distinction between the transcendental and the empirical, between being "outside" the world and belonging to it. This move gives rise to the quasi-transcendentality of cognitive interests.

According to Apel the transcendental subject must be reinterpreted as the notion of the "communication community" and relocated within a socio-historical context. Communication bursts the Tractarian frame of reference and embraces much more than stating "what is the case". Apel wants to preserve from the Tractarian model the notion of a "transcendental philosophical alternative to scientism" while avoiding reductive tendencies.

If the subject qua communication community is now empirically comprehensible is it not plausible to reduce it to an object of science? This reductive urge is one horn of our dilemma - a horn that Habermas wishes to avoid with his theory of cognitive interests. And yet avoiding this horn must not be achieved by a return to the framework of an "external" subject as the condition of the world. Habermas wants to naturalise the context of subject and object without obliterating the transcendental perspective.

What is required is a new philosophical idiom. Apel claims that this may be found in the tradition of "objective" idealism. In a sense the former Tractarian, neo-Kantian model is that of "subjective" idealism.

Against this, Apel directs us towards the heritage of Herder, Leibnitz, Fichte and Hegel.
the representatives of this tradition believe that the subject of cognition not only experiences what is other than himself — as a world that is describable and explicable externally — but also experiences himself in reflexive contemplation and in the other

This tradition centres upon the dialectical relationship between subject and object. According to Apel, "objective" idealism combines experience in the sense of a hermeneutic medium of understanding with transcendental reflection upon its deeper conditions of possibility. It is in the context of this "speculative" tradition that the dilemma stated above dissolves and that we may conceptualise an appropriate model of transcendentalism for KHI. In a sense Habermas glimpses this. I hope to make it more explicit. These remarks are only suggestions and anticipations of a response that I shall pursue in Part II. In particular, the Hegelian concept of "metacritique" is at the heart of this more appropriate conception.

IV The Theory of Communication

The Postscript to KHI marks an important point of transition in Habermas's thought. After KHI he stands accused of an instrumentalist conception of scientific theory, and an unclarified notion of objectivity appropriate to the hermeneutical sciences (where it is assumed there is nothing such as "predictive" success to give content to the idea of "correspondence" as a truth relation). Against this, Habermas develops a consensus theory of truth, borrowed in part from Peirce. In addition Habermas distinguishes between problems of objectivity and problems of truth. This distinction initiates his turn away from epistemology towards a theory of communication.

In his account Habermas borrows from the Austin-Strawson debate on truth. "Facts" are what statements when true, state. They are not
tangible items of the world. A "state of affairs" is the content of a proposition stated hypothetically, while a "fact" is what we would wish to assert after testing it and finding it to be true. The distinction between "facts" and "states of affairs" is far from clear. Habermas appropriates this distinction from its context in analytical philosophy and recasts it in his own terms.

The categorial meaning of an empirical statement is determined by the structure of the object domain to which it refers... This is different from the discursive verification of the meaning of a truth claim which we imply in all assertory statements.

Here we encounter the concept of DISCOURSE, introduced as distinct from the framework of ACTION. Discourse is purged from action and experience, and produces nothing but arguments. It does not compel participants to act.

The sphere of action or life-praxis on the other hand is that within which action-related experience is acquired and shared. It would seem that Habermas's realisation that the "objectivity" of experience is bound up with the idea of intersubjectivity establishes a link with a communicative dimension. Action is "communicative" action. The triadic structure of knowledge constitutive interests is dropped. Language is not just one sphere of life, it pervades everything. With this shift in emphasis the concept of cognitive interest is less important than that of a "communicative competence". This recasts the question of foundations for critical theory in communications-theoretic terms.

Today the problem of language has replaced the traditional problem of consciousness; the transcendental critique of language supersedes that of consciousness.

Habermas's concept of a communicative competence has its place in his programme for a "universal pragmatics".
Habermas intends to redress an imbalance in previous philosophy of language by providing a formal analysis of the pragmatic dimension. "Universal Pragmatics" (UP) involves the rational reconstruction of universal and basic competences in speech. Habermas takes as his point of departure the theory of speech acts as it has been developed by Austin and Searle. A "communicative competence" is only partly the ability to produce and understand grammatical structures. It is also the ability to understand those modes of communication and their connections with an external world.

The essential features of Habermas's thesis are given in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
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<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOMAINS OF REALITY TO WHICH EVERY SPEECH ACTION TAKES UP RELATION</td>
<td>BASIC ATTITUDES OF THE SPEAKER PREVAILING IN PARTICULAR MODES OF COMMUNICATION</td>
<td>THE VALIDITY CLAIMS UNDER WHICH THE RELATIONS TO REALITY ARE ESTABLISHED</td>
<td>THE GENERAL FUNCTIONS THAT GRAMMATICAL SENTENCES ASSUME IN THEIR RELATION TO REALITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The&quot; World of External Nature</td>
<td>Cognitive: Objectivating Attitude</td>
<td>Truth</td>
<td>Representation of Facts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Our&quot; World of Society</td>
<td>Interactive: Conformative Attitude</td>
<td>Rightness</td>
<td>Establishment of Legitimate Inter-personal Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;My&quot; World of Internal Nature</td>
<td>Expressive: Expressive Attitude</td>
<td>Truthfulness</td>
<td>Disclosure of Speaker's Subjectivity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Language</td>
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Habermas claims that four "validity claims" are necessarily raised in every speech act. In addition to the implicit claim that what one utters is
comprehensible i.e. a minimal requirement that one can master elementary grammar and syntax and vocabulary, a speaker also makes claims for the truth, the normative rightness and the truthfulness of his utterances. Each type of claim is related to a domain of reality within which appropriate research programmes may be developed.

According to Habermas, each communicative speech act has a "double structure". The "illocutionary force" relates to the establishment of the intended intersubjective relationship (column IV) whereby a speaker and hearer may come to an understanding. The "propositional content" gives both speaker and hearer a level of experience and "states of affairs" about which they wish to come to an understanding. The success of any speech act requires the intended intersubjective relation to come about.

The central feature of Habermas's theory is the idea that the acceptability of a speech act by a hearer need not depend upon merely contingent factors such as the power of suggestion, habit or just faith in the seriousness of the speaker. Rather, it has a rational basis in so far as each claim has a cognitive character and can be subjected to testing in a determinate and intersubjectively accessible fashion. According to Habermas, speech acts embody an obligation on the part of the speaker to submit the validity claims which are raised to testing in discourse. It is not just that if, as a matter of fact, a hearer requires such vindication of a validity claim then the speaker must give it, but that this obligation is "immanent" in the speech-acts and language as such. This obligation is a deep lying constitutive element of communication. I believe this obligation has a transcendental status. Habermas admits that this speech immanent obligation is very rarely fulfilled in practice and is more
appropriately construed as counterfactual. However, we may specify some aspects of it.

Habermas talks of the "redemption" of validity claims. This is effectively the vindication of such claims. Redemption may take place at the level of communicative interaction: appeal may be made to mutual experiential certainty, to an appropriate normative background, or to what is self-evident. If agreement cannot be reached at this level then the force of the validity claims in the case of truth and normative rightness may be suspended and subjected to testing at another level. Communicative interaction is broken off and claims are tested at the deeper level of discourse. Alternatively speakers may resort to "strategic" action; that is action orientated towards a specific goal which may be egoistic, deceitful and which does not reciprocally recognise the other as partner in dialogue. Loosely speaking, this is the communicative correlate of instrumental action. However Habermas wants to claim that action orientated towards understanding (Verständigungsorientierten Handelns) is primitive. This is a controversial issue that I discuss in Part III.

In Discourse, participants are motivated solely by the force of the "better" argument. Discussion is unlimited and there is a "symmetrical distribution of chances to select and employ speech acts". This characterises what Habermas has called an Ideal Speech Situation (ISS). It explicates that maximal sense of rational agreement which he is concerned to specify (Veständlichkeit). There is a sense of agreement simply in following particular syntactical and grammatical rules. This minimal sense is covered by the validity claim to "comprehensibility". Habermas wants to go beyond this to a sense of rational agreement in a more substantive sense,
that concerns the claims to truth and rightness. The claim to truthfulness as sincerity is vindicated not at the level of discourse since in the interaction it will be shown in time whether the other side is in truth or honestly participating or is only pretending to engage in communicative action

On the other hand an ISS specifies the conditions under which rational consensus about truth and rightness is forthcoming. However, Habermas claims that the ISS is essentially counterfactual. The conditions are rarely satisfied. The ISS is necessarily anticipated in every speech act. The concept of an ideal speech situation of discourse consists of those structural elements of communication that make reasoning possible

Here we encounter the transcendental idiom. The ISS is both "anticipated" and "constitutive" of the structure of communication in some sense.

Part III of this dissertation examines this claim in depth.

There are other features concerning universal pragmatics which are problematic e.g. the concept of "truthfulness" and the domain of the "inner world" are very undeveloped by Habermas. I shall be concerned centrally with the status of the ISS and its transcendental function. Bound up with this is Habermas's claim that communication is fundamentally orientated towards understanding. The ISS is a deeper specification of this idea, of the possibility of reinstating a consensual basis to interaction without resorting to "force" - except the force of "better argument". Not surprisingly the notion of ISS has invoked a great deal of criticism and I shall now specify the central problem.
A worry about Ideal Speech

The central problem about the ISS runs as follows. What is the status of an ideal that is never actualised but remains counterfactual? How is such an ideal derived? Rather than claim that it describes the deep structure of communication critics claim that it simply postulates, externally, a norm which seeks to reduce all forms of communication to a single model. As Ottman puts it,

As an interest in argumentative discussion it.... does not cover the case of love, of strife, of the disinterested perception of another person, of evasion, of practical imitation or primary socialisation

Winch claims that the outlines of the ideal discursive situation must be based on observation of the demeanour of the actual behaviour of participants in actual discussions. In a word they would not be transcendental considerations.

According to Winch, transcendental considerations involve the ascription to participants of motives, beliefs, interests etc. on a priori grounds in the face of all empirical evidence.

In Part III I supply an account of these and other similar criticisms of the ISS with the intention of answering them. These criticisms themselves depend upon presuppositions which we need not accept and I hope to sketch a more plausible account of the transcendental status of the ISS which, though not unproblematic, avoids this form of objection. In effect, this account offers a new paradigm of transcendental thinking which goes beyond Habermas's own self understanding. It is I believe a more hermeneutically sensitive reorientation of transcendentalism which avoids the grosser criticisms of Habermas's ISS as a timeless fiction.
people are tied down by a sense object when they cover it with unreal imaginations: likewise they are liberated from it when they see it as it really is

(Buddhist Teaching)
A schematic history of transcendental arguments

In what follows I have no doubt neglected important details and run the risk of caricature. But one could write a compelling history of philosophy in terms of the history of "straw men", and of pseudo-debate. Therefore I make no apology. The fruits of my account come less from an attempt at a faithful construal of the positions of various philosophers than from the sketch of a model of transcendental thinking which acts as a point of coordination for a larger debate. Of course, this cannot legitimise interpretational anarchy. Rather, it seeks to avoid the other extreme of interpretational essentialism. I have already alluded by way of self justification to the creative impact of apparent misinterpretations in the history of philosophy (page viii). Yet perhaps one would doubt the creative merit of an enterprise were its interpretations of other positions too gross. So residual worries about "straw men" remain and ought not to be eliminated. If the following model does oversimplify features of transcendental argument, hopefully it lies towards the non-anarchical end of the interpretational spectrum.

The, perhaps more traditional, account of transcendental arguments (TAs) that I shall first offer derives from the suspicion that it is an inadequate yardstick by which to measure Habermas. My intention is therefore dialectical. I wish to explicate a model of TAs which brings us to a point of departure for a reconstrual of transcendental thinking which is more appropriate to Habermas. It is a distinctively hermeneutic enterprise, which must now commence with some tentative definitions.

Let us in the first instance characterise TAs as fundamentally
anti-sceptical strategies. What is scepticism? Generally speaking, it involves an attack upon the status of cognitive claims and procedures with respect to some area of life as well as specialist epistemological problems. This would seem to cover Greek forms of scepticism, which arose rather from practical and moral doubts, and issued in withdrawal from public life. In a more modern sense, scepticism involves a demand for the justification of cognitive claims, particularly with regard to the external world. Rorty locates this form of scepticism within the epistemological paradigm of the "mirror of nature". By this, he means something like a Cartesian model of the mind or self. Such a mind can be acquainted "with itself", is self-transparent and knows itself better than those things it reflects. A special sceptical challenge arises from this. If all that the mind can know are its own ideas etc. then this raises a problem about how it can know anything beyond this. In particular how can it be sure that such ideas represent the world as it really is? Transcendental strategies and TAs are a response to this problem.

According to a, perhaps crude, interpretation, Kant claimed that Hume was only able to give a "subjective" justification of various beliefs that we have e.g. causal connection. This justification provides no guarantee that these beliefs are at all applicable to the world. Kant deploys his Copernican Revolution in the face of this,

Either I must assume that the concepts by means of which I obtain this determination, conform to the object, or else I assume that the objects, or what is the same thing that the experience in which alone, as given objects, they can be known, conform to the concepts

This cryptic passage is much less an argument in a formal sense than a statement of intent, a philosophical reorientation. This reorientation is expressed in a general form of question i.e. How is a science of metaphysics
really possible? More particularly, how are synthetic a priori propositions possible i.e. how is it possible to have a priori knowledge about the nature of experience which is not derived from experience? Kant's transcendental turn is a response to these questions and claims that reality, the experience of reality (which is the same thing for him in his "critical" phase) is conditioned by a set of presuppositions. Objects must conform to concepts. The Critique of Pure Reason spells out the details of this reorientation.

The modern concept of transcendental argument emerges as an interpretation of Kant, as a form of anti-sceptical strategy. A schematic account of this interpretation runs as follows. In the early 1960s there arose within mainstream analytical philosophy a relatively unselfconscious use of a peculiar form of argument. Examples of this occur in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, Shoemaker's Self Knowledge and Self-Identity and Strawson's Individuals. Later work, particularly by Bennett and Strawson turns to Kant, applying this argument form to his claims and appraising their strengths and weaknesses in terms of it. As a matter of interpretational accuracy then, TAs are a modern invention. What are TAs in detail? Strawson refers to them aphoristically,

It is only because the solution is possible that the problem exists. So with all transcendental arguments

By this is meant that TAs are a distinctive form of backward moving argument. One argues back from a given state of affairs to the conditions of its possibility. Thus as a general argument schema we have, i) P

ii) P only if Q

iii) therefore Q

TAs are offered as powerful anti-sceptical strategies. By making P as
indefeasible and as general as possible one commits the sceptic to accepting it. For example the sceptic must admit experience in a general sense. If it can be shown that experience is conditioned by something the sceptic denies e.g. that there is an external world of sense objects, then scepticism is defeated. The sceptic is forced to presuppose the very framework he doubts. Rorty characterises TAs as "realist" strategies. They legitimate realist claims about experience.\textsuperscript{14} Kant after all claimed that his "transcendental idealism" issued in an "empirical realism". It legitimates the "grammar" of "empirical-world-talk". (It should be added in this context that Rorty seems to regard TAs as establishing "metaphysically" realist conclusions. This is quite different, and non Kantian.\textsuperscript{15} The classical examples of TAs simply don't have metaphysically realist conclusions).

In general we may organise a more critical discussion of TAs under three problem areas: a) That which concerns the justification of the first premiss, P.

b) That which concerns whether it is possible to argue to necessary conditions of P at all.

c) That which concerns the relation between TAs and Verification. This problem arises because TAs do not seem to close the gap between "conditions of judgement" and how the world "really is" unless they presuppose a Verificationist principle.

\textbf{II Transcendental Arguments and the justification of the first premiss}

Strawson and Bennett concern themselves with analytic TAs. What does this mean? According to Kant the analytic method,
only means that you proceed from that which is sought taking it as given and ascend to the conditions under which it is exclusively possible.

Strawson wants to maintain this analytic structure of TAs without Kant's "darker side" i.e. Kant's idealism and his problems about things-in-themselves. In the next section we shall focus upon the problem of "exclusivity" of the conditions of what is given. Here, we shall focus on the status of what is given as a first premiss. It was noted above that, as anti-sceptical, a TA aims at a first premiss that is as uncontentious as possible. There have been worries about whether such a premiss must itself be logically true. It does seem that such claims cannot be simply contingent. For example, the claim that we "have experience" is not like "I see a red ball". The former seems more reflective and abstract. The latter presupposes the former.

In order to give some flesh to these ideas I have schematically reconstructed an argument from Strawson as a TA. This is intended as an illustration of a general principle.

\[ P = \text{one can ascribe states of consciousness to oneself.} \]
\[ P \text{ only if } Q = \text{one can ascribe states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe states of consciousness to others.} \]
\[ Q \text{ only if } R = \text{one can ascribe states of consciousness to others only if behaviour is a logically adequate criterion of ascription of mental predicates.} \]

As it stands this seems to be an extremely specific TA. A sceptic might well deny P, not to mention the other inferential steps. However, Strawson's TA here is part of a larger argument. P is itself deduced from a more general claim that we judge that there is a world. We are then capable of judgement only if we can distinguish states of the self from states of the world. Such a distinction is denied by the "no-ownership" theory of the self against which Strawson argues. Thus, we can see
illustrated here the urge to make the first premiss as general as possible.

From what has been said it might appear that TAs are a form of ad hominem argument. Rorty seems to think they are. The premiss P is reformulated to meet particular sceptical objections. However, this seems to be an impoverished conception of TAs. One could cite many instances of ad hominem arguments which one would not wish to call transcendental.

The extra force behind TAs involves general claims about the structure of the world and cognition. They contain an "entailment" relation between the conditioned (P) and its condition (Q). It is perhaps this entailment relation which is the most interesting and puzzling aspect of TAs. The worry about the status of the first premiss can be allayed by giving it a hypothetical status. Furthermore, if a form of philosophical scepticism is no longer the opposing view, then the demand for as general a first premiss as possible disappears. One may be concerned to reveal the structural conditions of an activity which is contingent and historically particular, an activity which we may regard as hypothetically given. As we shall see, this "softening" of our approach to TAs is important in assessing Habermas's claims.

First, we must probe the idea of TAs as "analytic" a little further. Strawson's model of TAs as analytic in Kant's sense does not go unchallenged. Baum's critique of Strawson involves a return to Kant, in which he takes seriously the notion of "synthesis". It must be admitted that this is a mysterious notion that haunts Kantian scholarship. Its status seems to range between crude psychological accounts, which are too "empirical", and more formal, logical accounts which are obscure. The details of Baum's account are complex and I do not fully understand them. But they seem to centre upon the idea of the faculty of the Understanding as a faculty of "combining" and as the source of the "synthetic unity of experience". The
locus classicus for such an idea is itself deeply problematic:

But the combination of a manifold in general can never come to us through the senses, and cannot therefore be already contained in the pure form of sensible intuition.

What kind of claim is this? Kant seems to offer no arguments. As an empirical claim it seems just false. It is much more like a fundamental reorientation of philosophical outlook, a determination to conduct the epistemological enterprise in a particular way i.e. a secularised critical philosophy rather than a dogmatic theological one. But what are the gains from such a reorientation if it is so rampantly metaphysical? This is perhaps the most pertinent question about transcendental philosophy. As far as Kant is concerned it is difficult to answer and this is not the place to pursue the issue. However, one might regard his "critical" turn very crudely as a forerunner of Verificationism and as an articulation of empiricist misgivings in the face of the claims of the metaphysics of his day. In defence of Baum, Bittner claims that we can understand the idea of synthesis as a "story". But he does not develop this claim. To talk of "stories" is to admit that synthesis cannot be taken seriously either as empirically or psychologically real but that it nevertheless has an illuminating metaphorical or allegorical character. However, the hard-nosed questions remain. What is the power of such stories? What is a good story? A cogent answer to this would reorientate our perspective upon transcendental thinking and would focus on its metaphorical rather than its argumentative status. I believe something like this is the case since as we shall see it is impossible to construct strictly deductive TAs.

Bennett regards the notion of synthesis as a "powerful philosophical tool" within what he regards as the "analytic" model of TAs. "Synthesis" refers to a complex conceptual range of abilities e.g. those criteria one
must be able to employ in order to identify empirical particulars. We have certain competences e.g. mastery of grammar and syntax, and certain other abilities must be presupposed by them. One can remain agnostic about the psychological reality or otherwise of such claimed abilities. (Habermas's conception of "communicative competence" seems to be modelled on this idea although it is highly normative). According to Bennett, such "synthesis" is involved in empirical consciousness only in the sense of requiring analysis to bring it to light. Yet Bittner claims that Bennett's supposed demystification of the notion of "synthesis" is no better off than Kant's account. In neither case is a biographical remark involved, yet both senses claim to discern the deep structure of cognition. According to Bittner, TAs do not produce arguments of "unmarried bachelors" type. Analytic TAs are not analytic in this sense. Bittner looks at four possible senses of "analytic": a) A TA is ANALYTIC if it does not refer to synthetic activities of the mind.

b) A TA is ANALYTIC if it determines what is involved in having a certain piece of knowledge.

c) A TA is ANALYTIC if its conclusions are drawn by "unmarried bachelor" type statements.

d) A TA is ANALYTIC if it argues from a given conclusion to the conditions/premisses that are necessary for it.

Baum's interpretation of Kant seems to employ (a). Bennett seems to employ (b). Strawson's characterisation of TAs is close to (d). Yet no TAs are of type (c). Bittner doubts that TAs are strictly analytic in this sense. These doubts suggest to him that foundational epistemology should be given up. Furthermore, Quine's attack on the notion of "analyticity" suggests that striving after an ideal such as (c) is a mistake. However, Bittner suggests that analytic TAs are more analytic than not, though he is unsure
what this could mean. He considers that other locutions such as
"conceptually required" which avoid the word "analytic" should nevertheless
be considered as metaphors extended from their usual field of strict
logical relationships. According to Bittner we may cease to pursue the
illusion of a truly "analytic" philosophy as a result of these reflections
and other criteria of argument assessment such as coherence may arise.
In that case,

referring to something which we have never come
across would not count decisively against a line of
argument.

But there seems to persist in Bittner's comments a worry that this new
conception may sanction highly non-rigorous forms of reasoning. This
suggests that Bittner regards the ideal of "analyticity" as some form of
regulative canon of TAs, something aspired to stylistically but in
principle unrealisable.

Bittner concludes tentatively that perhaps there are no analytic TAs
even in the sense (b), that is determining what is involved in having
certain pieces of empirical knowledge. In this case the notion of
philosophy as a non empirical discipline capable of yielding synthetic
knowledge is under threat. (These are objections which Rorty articulates
in a more determined fashion).

Bittner misses the point of some of his own remarks. A strictly
analytic TA in sense (c) would, if possible, be quite uninteresting if it
involved statements of the "unmarried bachelor" type. TAs are powerful
because they cannot satisfy this model of analyticity. But we need a new
way of talking about this power. We might assess TAs according to how
persuasive a story they offer i.e. according to notions of coherence,
simplicity, perspicuity and the conception of experience they produce.
This last point is utterly crucial and returns us to the main point of this
section. TAs produce a model of experience in the sense that a typical premiss "P" of a TA cannot be regarded simply as "given", hypothetically or otherwise, but is highly "interpreted". It is already hermeneutically mediated. Analytic conceptions of TAs neglect this, because typical "P"s are so general, e.g. the claim that "we have experience". However, once P is made more specific its character "as interpreted" is revealed. Furthermore, the whole point of a TA may shift. Its task may be just to reinterpret P in the light of the argument itself. The conditioned and the condition are dialectically related. The sharp distinction between "interpreting the deep structure of P and reinterpreting it, that is, between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics, between analysis and critique, now looks unsustainable.

These ideas receive their dramatic fulfillment in Habermas. The reorientation of transcendentalism away from the ideal of analyticity is an important, though essentially negative, propadeutic to the main task. This section has moved from an immanent critique of the image of analytic TAs towards the need for a new model. Habermas's claims for the transcendental status of the emancipatory interest in particular seem so far from the ideal of "analyticity", so "revisionary" and "redescriptive" that one suspects that something else is at stake.

III Transcendental Arguments and the quest for Necessary Conditions

Let us turn to the second move in the TA schema which concerns the establishment of necessary conditions of the possibility of a given premiss. Körner denies that we can find such conditions. We can only establish those to which no alternative can be imagined. This means that in TAs the pervasive "structure" of actual experience is made to seem essential. Of course we must distinguish two claims here:
i) A claim that the whole idea of talking of necessary conditions at ANY given time is suspect. We can always be mistaken about necessity.

ii) A claim that the only necessary conditions that we can ever establish are historically relative and therefore not strictly necessary.

Under (i) there might be necessary conditions but we could not know them or know that we know them. Under (ii) necessity is historically relativised. Korner seems more interested in the case of the latter concerning "categorial frameworks" and uses historical examples to explicate what has been taken to be necessary at various periods.

According to Korner; a valid TA in the traditional sense must demonstrate the logical "uniqueness" of its own conditions. But it cannot do this, because there is never any reason to believe that one has exhausted all possible competitors. This argument now suggests (i) above rather than (ii).

But is the demand for the logical "uniqueness" of transcendental conditions at all reasonable, or is it really a hangover from a deductive ideal of TA appraisal? (N.B. The logical "uniqueness" of conditions is not the same as the issue of their timelessness. We might still be concerned about whether we had obtained the unique, necessary conditions of a contingent, historically relativised conception of experience without worrying about whether they were timeless or not).

Bennett talks of the "pursuit of strength" with regard to TAs. Their compulsive character is not at the level of deductive logic. He admits that TAs cannot demonstrate the absolute categorical status of the conditions they seek to explicate. However, while acknowledging this "deductive gap" in TAs he retains what he describes as the "intuitive hope" that this gap in TAs may be bridged (He himself has a particular TA in mind). So Bennett implicitly cleaves to the model of deductive TAs as an ideal. Yet much of the substance of what he says is on the brink of
Körner's reply to Bennett gets to the heart of these worries about "deductive gaps" in "analytic" TAs. He gives three candidates for the notion of entailment which may be at stake in TAs: a) Entailment not in any logical sense but as form of inferability which is the "converse of a certain formal deducibility relation".

b) Entailment which is stronger than formal deducibility in that certain "entailments" are invalid where the corresponding formal deducibility statements are valid. Körner refers to Kant's claims at A789/B817 where he rejects "apagorical" transcendental proofs. While such proofs can indeed yield certainty they cannot enable us to comprehend truth in its connection with the grounds of its possibility.

c) Entailment as stronger still, belonging with notions like "coherence" to an informal logic that validates some formally invalid inferences.

Körner claims that Bennett has something like (c) in mind. While Bennett retains the hope that "deductive gaps" may be closed, Körner introduces his own "looser" notion of ONTOLOGICAL IMPLICATION. He lists the interpretational possibilities as follows. i) Ontological Implication as logical implication.

ii) Ontological Implication as an intuitive guarantee that a deductive proof, though not yet available will or can be given in principle.

iii) Ontological Implication as an absolute relation between premise and conclusion which, though different from logical implication, is no less binding on all "rational" beings. Naturally the concept of what is to count as rational carries the
normative weight of this claim. Körner refers to Kant's concept of a "rational being".

iv) Ontological Implication

as a thinker's "ontologically supreme" belief i.e. one which organises other beliefs in the sense that other beliefs which are recognised to be inconsistent with it are rejected as inadequate. Nevertheless the ontologically supreme belief is still itself susceptible to rational argumentation and possible replacement. Ontological Implication here is a relation of consistency in some sense between beliefs one of which is relatively "supreme" (I wish to claim that this is an illuminating way to picture Habermas's ultimate value orientation inherent in the Ideal Speech Situation. See the model of critical-reflective equilibrium developed in Chapter 8).

According to Körner (i), (ii) and (iii) all reinforce opposition to his key idea of "ontological change". The proponents of these positions exclude the possibility of their conclusions being abandoned for a different ontological belief. Körner regards this as an objection to analytic TAs. Bennett's position is close to (ii) though his general remarks are compatible with position (iv). Only the latter articulates the perspective of "ontological change". Körner advances the conception of TAs to the point of a break with the ideal of "analyticity". This whole notion is regarded as misplaced.

In following chapters I shall show that Habermas's conception of cognitive interests of a species that develops, pictures a form of "ontological fluidity" which satisfies Körner's demands. The triadic scheme of interests defines possibilities of cognitive and social development which represent "ontological change" in some sense. For example, Habermas regards the history of the Enlightenment as the immanent
development of an ontological and normative concept of "person" which may not be realised in practice though it is necessarily projected. His account of "ontological change" i.e. his reconstruction of historical materialism, is infused with this "ontologically supreme belief". It is this that underlies his TAs. Of course this is not quite what Körner intends by the notion. I have extended his suggestions into this practical context (in a Kantian sense of "practical"). Körner's notion of "ontological change" is reinterpreted in the light of the possibility of social transformation. For Critical Theorists the "social" and the "ontological" cannot be disentangled. They cannot be regarded as mutually distinct levels of reflection. Furthermore, CT attacks the whole idea of ontology as the hypostatization of a fundamental set of predicates. Such hypostatization reflects social organisation in some sense. Likewise epistemology and social theory are not distinct. Hence for Habermas, "ontological commitments" are highly normative. Positivism à la Mach commits itself to an ontology of "facts" according to Habermas. The triadic scheme of "interests" in KHI is an attempt to criticise positivism and to introduce a richer "ontology" in some loose sense. Of course it has been argued that an ontology of "persons" is compatible with manipulative science, just as a technically "objectivising" social science in Habermas's terms may be liberating. The inferences from ontological commitments to the normative implications of sciences which embody those commitments are not compelling. However, I believe that this talk of ontology with respect to Habermas and CT is slightly artificial. What is central in Habermas's account is a deeply normative concept of "person". It is this that infuses the concept of ontology with the german romantic obsession with BECOMING. It is this Hegelianism which is crucial to the interpretation of Habermas's transcendentalism. This will be made clear in the next two chapters.
It is only important at this stage to recognise that we have come to a point of departure from a particular model of TAs. The task now is to take this forward to relocate our standards of TA appraisal in the setting of Habermas's work.

IV Transcendental Arguments and Verificationism

A problem arises for TAs concerning what might loosely be called a "gap" between thought and reality. According to our general characterisation of TAs, they are regarded as legitimising "realist" claims about the world via an explication of the necessary conditions of thought, judgement and experience. The problem is that TAs strengthen the "thought" side of the dichotomy between thought and reality rather than demonstrating how "thought" is rooted in "reality". Far from bridging the gap TAs leave it intact. They supply conditions of what we must presuppose e.g. for intelligible discourse about other persons. But this does not give compelling conditions of how things "really" are.

We ought to supply a more concrete context for these reflections. Let us return to the schematic representation of Strawson's argument (page 22). He talks of behaviour as a "logically adequate" criterion of making a mental state ascription. This conception however seems only to explicate what we must think in order to make sense of ourselves, rather than guaranteeing the existence of other minds. In effect, this is Ayer's objection to Strawson. Ayer claims that we could accept Strawson's TA and its conclusion that behaviour is a "logically adequate" criterion of mental state ascription, yet still leave open a question of whether there are any other minds at all. He gives his own counterexample of a child who is raised by robots. Ayer claims that the child satisfies the conditions of Strawson's TA in its development and yet there are no "minds", no other
persons.

The counterobjections to Ayer may be called "Verificationist". It is only if Ayer is entitled to a meta-position, from which he can distinguish how people think things are from how things "really are," that his example is cogent. He must have some way of verifying that robots are not people. It is only our intuition that because robots have a non-human history they do not have minds. But if robots could exhibit the appropriate behaviour such that a child could evolve in the appropriate fashion then it is not clear this intuition is correct. So not only must Ayer have a position which can verify that humans are not robots, it is also not clear that establishing the existence of "robots" entitles us to refuse to ascribe mental states to them. This is of course currently a very live issue. 36

Stroud claims that TAs require such a verificationist defence. 37 He claims on the one hand that without verificationism they are too weak to achieve their realist aims, since the alleged argument to the condition does not go through. On the other hand they are redundant because no further argument for the condition is needed. Bennett rejects this claim and argues that one might concede the need for a verificationist principle but still regard it as problematic whether one had described the transcendental conditions adequately or completely. A powerful TA shows more than a verificationist principle, i.e. if successful it shows the applicability of particular "objectivity concepts" and some sense in which they are indispensable. Although Bennett is sceptical of various interpretations of this indispensibility, he denies that TAs may be merely reduced à la Rorty to a form of "bulwark against rival conceptualisations" 38.

How can we adjudicate this dispute? Stroud's position is not immediately clear. Verificationism seems to involve the negative demand that we ought not to postulate unnecessary entities. More strongly it ties
possible existence to meaningfulness, in turn tied to verifiability. The entailment relation seems to be as follows:

1) If X exists \(\rightarrow\) I could have experience of it i.e. verify it.

In the case of TAs it appears that the relation of entailment is reversed. Thus:

2) If I have experience \(\rightarrow\) certain conditions are objectively valid, i.e. "other persons", "objective world" exist.

Stroud's objections to the use of verificationism are against an extremely strong version of it, i.e.:

3) The best case of verification of X \(\rightarrow\) existence of X

This is an argument from the "paradigm" case. But in particular instances we can give values to X which show very clearly that this is not a TA. e.g.:

3') My best verification \(\rightarrow\) existence of "tomatoes".
    that there are "tomatoes"

No TA theorist is interested in making such a claim about particular entities. He might still be happy and consistent to conclude there were no tomatoes. The thrust of a TA is stronger. It is concerned with general concepts which are somehow not optional. Stroud forces the strong verification principle to carry the weight of a TA e.g.:

4) My best verification \(\rightarrow\) existence of "persons".
    that there are "persons"

This formulation of the verification principle is quite different from (1) above. What Stroud has done is to mould TAs into a highly contentious form of the principle of verification i.e. the paradigm case argument. But the paradigm case argument is question-begging in this context since scepticism calls into question the general procedures for thinking the best verification of X must instantiate X. Stroud thus obscures the differences between (2) and (4). In (2) the additional weight is supplied by the claim
that person-talk is somehow a necessary condition of experience (the self-ascription of mental states). One would not dare to make such claims for tomatoes.

We may at this stage make a distinction between two forms of scepticism about other minds: a) Solipsism. This is the claim that I may be the only person. The behaviour of others is not enough proof of the existence of other minds. This form of scepticism leaves open the possibility of global doubt about cognitive claims - in this case concerning other minds.

b) There is a less global form of scepticism: It is possible that other minds exist, but there remains a problem about determining this on the basis of behaviour in any particular case.

Now it may well be that some form of verification principle (like (1) above) is necessary to counter the stronger, global scepticism of sense (a). The sceptic must make sense of his doubts. Under (b) it seems we need the more contentious version of verificationism that Stroud envisages. But this remains open to the objection that even a paradigm case does not entail existence.

It seems important to distinguish the two senses of verificationism (2) and (4). Sense (4) seems highly contentious and is not peculiar to TAs. Sense (2) seems plausible as a general anti-metaphysical realist strategy, though, according to Bennett it tells us less than a TA. In Chapter 10 I shall return to the theme that TAs show "more" than verification when we discuss Rorty's anti-epistemological strategy.

Why is any of this of interest when discussing Habermas's transcendentalism? His is not a "metaphysically realist" programme though one might claim that his concept of the technical interest supplies a modest and
pragmatic "realism". The general point is that a model of TA appraisal that involves the issues discussed above dominates, for example, Rorty's interpretation of Habermas. This is the challenge that a sympathetic explication of Habermas's transcendentalism must face.

V  Habermas and Transcendental Arguments

It is now time to draw together this account with some preliminary observations concerning its relevance for Habermas's status as a transcendental thinker. Prima facie it would seem that in KHI Habermas has three TAs which we may set out as follows, in the form given on page 20.

a) The Technical Interest
   i) We have EMPirical-analytic sciences
   ii) ...only if we have a TECHNICAL interest in prediction and control.

b) The Practical Interest
   i) We have HISTORICAL-hermeneutic sciences
   ii) ...only if we have a PRACTICAL interest in maintaining intersubjective communication.

c) The Emancipatory Interest
   i) We have CRITICAL-emancipatory sciences
   ii) ...only if we have an EMANCIPATORY interest.

This schema places all three TAs on the same level, to be assessed it seems in the same fashion. Let us now recapitulate the main observations of the preceding sections. 1) If a philosophical scepticism about, for example, the "external" world or "other minds" is no longer the philosophical opponent then certain demands and worries about the first premiss P of analytic TAs recede. We may regard the first premiss as hypothetically given in some sense e.g. by reflecting upon some on-going concerns such as natural science.
2) We saw that the whole notion of analyticity, as bound up with the idea of analytic TAs, is suspect. This seems to have two consequences. Firstly it undermines the associated ideal of deductivity which has been implicitly presupposed in the appraisal of TAs. Secondly, as a consequence of this, it opens up the idiom of a "revisionary" enterprise as more appropriate to TA assessment. This in turn opens many other possibilities, for example TAs as primarily "rhetorical" or "metaphorical" in their "power". In Habermas's case I believe it will highlight his "critical" intentions in their widest sense. In the Postscript to KHI Habermas distinguishes neo-Kantian "critique" as rational reconstruction from Hegelian metacritique which is in some sense the dissolution of false consciousness. If what I suggest above is correct, this distinction may not be as sharply sustainable as Habermas's critics have persuaded him to think it is. I have argued for this elsewhere in Part III.

3) Following Körner's departure from the analytic model of TAs, and the importance he attaches to the model of "ontological change", it would seem that we can retain a modest and more plausible sense of the transcendental enterprise. This takes the form of something like an investigation of "deep" structures of practices. I wish to argue that Habermas's claims in KHI and his theory of communication represent such an enterprise and that this avoids much of Rorty's deconstructive strategy concerning epistemology. (see Chapter 10).

Let us now return to the triadic TA schema above which places all cognitive interests on the same level, and make some critical observations. Consider the first premiss of each "TA". It would seem undeniable that we have such an on-going activity as the natural sciences. But this is less
obvious in the second two cases i.e. the claim that there are other
distinct forms of enterprise is questionable, particularly in the case of
the critical-emancipatory sciences, the paradigms for which are Marx and
Freud. Habermas is not "describing" here an on-going field of cognition
so much as attempting to forge a new one. Thus, even if we regard each
first premiss P as hypothetically given there are different degrees of
contestability attached to each. In the third, the creative or revisionary
aspect of the TA is very obvious. Habermas's argument for the ISS is
similar. It flows from a general premiss that communication is
fundamentally orientated towards understanding. Yet this is enormously
contestable. As we shall see in Part III, Habermas defends this premiss in
a particular way. But the intention is not "descriptive" in a simple sense,
it is normative and revisionary.

In the three TAs of KHI the defence of each first premiss is the
interest doctrine itself i.e. the justification for maintaining a
distinction in these types of science lies in the three-fold structure of
cognitive interests. This is important since it shows that the defence of
either of the more contestable first premisses i.e. we have "hermeneutic"
and "critical" sciences, lies in a reference to the WHOLE triadic scheme and
the intention of enriching the concept of knowledge. That is, I wish to
maintain that the three TAs cannot be maintained as discrete TAs, and
certainly not as discrete analytic TAs.

In what follows I am concerned to reconstruct the general structure of
Habermas's claims. Particular worries about the plausibility of these
claims will be dealt with in later chapters. The reason for this order of
treatment is quite important. I believe that Habermas attempts to retain
the "dialectical" structure despite succumbing to the force of some
localised criticisms about the status of the various sciences. Let us
approach this structure via reflection upon each TA individually.

Taking TA (1) on its own it appears that the analytic idiom is most appropriate. The argument for a technical interest of the species in prediction and control emerges in its starkest form from an explication of the positivist account of the structure of scientific explanation. In this structure prediction and explanation are formally equivalent. We shall consider some problems about this in Chapter 5. Most of these concern whether TA (1) is actually very compelling after all. Lessnoff seems to propose a different constitutive interest in "understanding", others have questioned the overtly positivist account of natural science that Habermas offers. Habermas "reflects" upon the life basis of natural science. This has a "constructive-critical" aspect revealed above i.e. the derivation of the TI. But it also has a "limitative-critical" aspect, i.e. it is concerned to differentiate cognitive realms. Patzig identifies a twofold aim in Kant's TAs: to determine the field of possible knowledge and to limit it against what he would call the field of "dogmatic speculation". In Habermas's case, he is concerned to "limit" and criticise scientism, i.e. understood as the hegemonic self-understanding of the TI.

Turning to TA (2) we may now ask whether this conforms to the analytic image. Certainly there is a "constructive-critical" aspect i.e. the derivation of a practical interest. But it seems to me that the main thrust of the argument is "limitative". It is limitative vis a vis the technical interest in respect of the claim of natural science to be the paradigm of knowledge (scientism). Here Habermas locates himself firmly in the Natur- and Geisteswissenschaften debates. But we must see that the main worries about TA (1) and TA (2) are of different kinds. With TA (1) we are worried about whether the explication of the interest basis of natural science is correct. With TA (2) the worry is about whether there is a
different mode of science constituted by a different cognitive interest. This problem about differentiation (the defining problem for the philosophy of the social sciences) emphasises the limitative-critical aspect of TA (2), an aspect which implies that TA (2) cannot be regarded discretely. The problem is not just about establishing the uniqueness of the practical interest as a transcendental presupposition but also arises because there exists a competing interest, that is, the technical interest.

These remarks are intended to introduce the idea that there is an asymmetry between TA (1) and TA (2). It is this asymmetry which expresses the "dialectical" structure of Habermas's thought. I wish to replace the idea of analytic TAs with a sensitivity to this structure. The dialectical character of Habermas's TAs means that they cannot be considered separately. The dialectical intention is the critique of the claim of natural science to cognitive hegemony via reflection upon its life basis; a life basis which contains alternative cognitive interests, constitutive of alternative cognitive activities.

What is to be said of TA (3) in the light of this? Here the image of analytic TAs seems most remote. Not only is it problematic that critical sciences are a distinct mode of cognition, it also seems highly contestable that an EI is a species-wide interest. While the "survival" value of something like a TI seems plausible, it is not at all clear that this could be said of either the PI or EI. A preliminary answer to the question of the status of the EI can be given in terms of its relation to the other two cognitive interests. In terms of being interests which "constitute" forms of science, the three seem to be on the same level. However, Habermas claims that the EI has no object-domain of its own. As a result of this its derivative character is stressed. Habermas seems to have TWO versions of
i) At times he talks as if an interest in emancipation underlies BOTH the TI and PI i.e. as an interest in freedom from nature and from forms of social domination e.g. the technical and practical cognitive interests can be comprehended unambiguously as knowledge constitutive interests only in connection with the emancipatory interest of rational reflection 44

ii) At times it seems that the EI is an extension of the PI and expresses the intention of freeing the communicative realm from its domination by the TI. Here the EI has as its "object-domain" the contingent "mix" between the TI and PI which has been realised in the social lifeworld, i.e.: the structure of ..... the behavioural system of purposive rational action not only predominates the institutional framework but gradually absorbs communicative action as such 45

The difference in emphasis between (i) and (ii) is the difference between an account in terms of the reflective forms of science and an account which is socially-theoretically orientated. In (ii) the dialectical intentions are more clear. In (i) they are less explicit, but one important feature must be noticed. Habermas does not deny the possibility of a social science which is constituted by the TI. Rather he offers another paradigm for social science as constituted by the practical interest. (N.B. Habermas denies conversely that we may have a science of nature constituted by the PI although we can take up such an "attitude" to nature. 46 We shall discuss this later in Chapter 5). I wish to stress the significance of Habermas's dialectical claims in KHI. He is supplying a critique of positivism in the form of a theory of knowledge. Yet this is also intended to mirror a critique of a lifeworld that has become dominated by instrumental modes of reason. In the social lifeworld the TI has "eclipsed" the PI. The EI is directed towards
bringing the PI to light. In his later work Habermas distinguishes between "system" and "lifeworld". The relation between these notions is similarly dialectical. The lifeworld has had its communicative basis dominated, "eclipsed" by systemic imperatives. This communicative basis must be restored to its role in various forms e.g. resurrection of the "public sphere".

As far as KHI and cognitive interests are concerned we can picture these dialectical relations in a diagram given on the next page. This is a model of "metacritique", a notion that we shall discuss in Chapter 3. However it seems clear that the TAs can no longer be taken separately but are "moments" of this structure. Part III of this dissertation is really an attempt to fill out its details. We may note some features of this diagram. The three life-spheres of WORK, INTERACTION and POWER are depicted in the form of a Venn Diagram. The sphere of work appears as a "subset" of that of interaction. However one needs a more "dynamic" language to model the interrelation between them accurately. The "eclipse" of the sphere of interaction by that of work, the rise of instrumental reason that is characteristic of this, is in some sense the problematic and defines and initiates CT. The sphere of power (Herrschaft) is not actually independent of the other two but is determined by their relation, a relation that Habermas describes at the level of methodology. Natural Science is constituted by the TI (thesis). Hermeneutic-historical sciences are constituted by the PI (antithesis). Critical-emancipatory sciences are constituted by the EI (synthesis). Of course, the localised criticisms of Habermas's account deny the coherence of this dialectical scheme e.g. the blurring of the distinctions between natural and social sciences and the denial that critical-emancipatory science is methodologically distinct. So there are reasons to doubt that thesis and antithesis issue
THE DIALECTICAL STRUCTURE OF COGNITIVE INTERESTS

THESIS TA (1)
1. We have Natural Science
2. ... only if we have a
   TECHNICAL INTEREST (WORK)

ANTITHESIS TA(2)
1. We have hermeneutic-historical science
2. ... only if we have a
   PRACTICAL INTEREST

INTERACTION

SYNTHESIS TA (3)
1. We have critical-emancipatory sciences
2. ... only if we have an
   EMANCIPATORY INTEREST (POWER)
in synthesis. However, Habermas's dialectical account at this level is an attempt to mirror a "social dialectic" which is non-Hegelian and essentially incomplete. Synthesis i.e. emancipation is projected and anticipated. Modern society is characterised by the thesis, instrumental rationality, at the expense of the antithesis, practical rationality. The dialectical intention of KHI is the "aufhebung" of the former. The TI is retained as "constitutive" but is subsumed under the latter. Habermas even says that the former is a "limit" case.

we can view as a limiting case reality objectified from the viewpoint of possible technical control and its correspondingly operationalised experience 48

As far as the discussion of TAs is concerned the diagram above dramatises the sense in which the "first premiss" of TA (2) refers to the whole of TA (1) in the sense that it is the claim that there is another distinct form of science. This expresses an asymmetry between the two TAs and between the TI and PI. Similarly the "first premiss" of TA (3), that we have critical-emancipatory science is even more contentious and less descriptive. TA (3) is unable to pass as an analytic TA. How are we then to assess it? Some of the TA theorists discussed above gave veiled utterances concerning the "practical" power of TAs, the demand for coherence, and so on. I wish to claim that Habermas's transcendentalism supplies a dramatisation of the critique of ideology at the level of a theory of knowledge. In later work Habermas admits that KHI was too "indirect" in this respect. However, we cannot simply write off the transcendental status of cognitive interests as a series of bad arguments which seems to be the reaction of some critics, since the whole notion of TA appraisal has become negotiable.

Admittedly, the concern of this section with the general dialectical
structure of Habermas's thought ignores problems of detail. Yet many "localised" criticisms of Habermas in turn ignore this structure. Habermas does not have three neo-Kantian TAs but an interlocking scheme of argument which owes more to Hegel. Neo-Kantian critique is subsumed within Hegelian metacritique. The analytic model of TAs cannot be sustained.
Chapter 3

Epistemology as Social Theory

1 Reflections upon materialism and idealism

Habermas's position in KHI has been described as a form of transcendentalism in a materialist context. He wants to retain the universalistic line of questioning of transcendental philosophy while at the same time detranscendentalising the mode of procedure and the conception of what is to be shown.

In effect, Habermas wants to dissociate transcendentalism from its idealist setting. However, such general terms as "idealism" and "materialism" are not immediately clear. We need a model of how they relate to each other. Suchting's Marxist orientated discussion of materialism is useful in this respect.

Suchting identifies two components of a materialist position:

1) A claim to the effect that the material world in some sense "pre-exists" that of ideas. (This is not particularly clear. There are several possible accounts of what is involved in pre-existence, e.g. strong reductive, determinist programmes).

2) The claim that "ideas" are somehow a vehicle of knowledge of the material world. (Again this is not very clear. Do ideas in this sense "mirror" the world in a metaphysically real sense?).

Despite the haziness of Suchting's formulation the central idea is that, HOWEVER one gives one's account of (1) and (2), they are in some sense dogmatic. They are not known empirically via the results of the science of the day. They are not empirical claims in the same way that Kant's claim that combination is not given to the senses is not empirical. In this sense materialism is not a set of assertions ABOUT the world, but
"a place, a position where one stands". Lenin calls materialism a "line", presumably in the sense of a political line.

Materialism is the policy of seeking solutions of theoretical and practical problems in the results of appropriate material practices unglossed by interpretations which would call into question the existence of the practice independent of the inquiry or the possibility of knowing it in detail without primary reference to non-material determinants.

Historical materialism is distinctive in this respect. It depends upon a general notion of "practice" as the transformation of a pre-existent situation via instruments which may be economic and political as well as technical. The centrality of the concept of "practice" stresses a medium within which we

mark off within a certain context what on the one hand counts as the object ....on the other hand what counts as a subject of inquiry.

Thus, from this "pragmatic" and (historically) materialist perspective subject and object are not pre-constituted. Rather, the medium of practice is prior to both. In the face of this perspective idealism shows itself as the abstracted standpoint of the primacy of the subject. Conversely, there is traditional materialism which resembles a form of "natural" naive realism. This position involves the abstracted standpoint of the primacy of the object. These two extreme idealist and natural materialist positions are mirror images of each other. Suchting brings out the sense in which these two outlooks, viewed from the perspective of historical materialism, are a matter of political choice.

(Natural) Materialism and Idealism as philosophies should be looked at in the Marxist perspective as lines in the sense of regulative principles .... they induce opposed effects cognitively and socially.

On this view, natural Materialism (which reappears under the more philosophically articulate notion of metaphysical realism?) and idealism
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On this view, natural Materialism (which reappears under the more philosophically articulate notion of metaphysical realism?) and idealism
are antagonistic. The history of philosophy is a history of this struggle between a spontaneous and, more reflectively, scientifically reductive materialism, and a spontaneous (animistic?) idealism which although refining itself, retains an anthropocentric orientation. The history of natural materialism is a history of the urge to de-anthropomorphise.

Suchting's characterisations of idealism and natural materialism are perilous and sketchy. We must regard them more as ideal "poles" of philosophical thought, rather than as concrete specifications. We may represent the historical materialist perspective as a dialectical mediation of these "ideal" poles:

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IDEALISM
Primacy of Subject

MATERIALISM
Primacy of Object

PRACTICE
 Historial Materialism
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Historical Materialism emphasises the dual-constitutive character of "practice". It synthesises the idealist/materialist poles. It is clear that no historical figure subscribed to either of these poles. We may regard them as defining a continuum upon which to locate various views. Marx's historical materialism regards these "locations" as politically significant.

Suchting's claims illuminate Habermas's position. In KHI, Habermas follows the Marxist stress on the primacy of practice. His quasi-transcendentalism stands here. The ambiguities associated with it arise from either an over-idealist, Kantian reading of cognitive interests or from a materialist, naturalistically reductive interpretation of them which obliterates their transcendental status. The emphasis upon the notion of "practice" avoids these extremes. Hence Apel's notion of "transcendental pragmatism". However, for Marx the concept of practice seems to be extremely broad, something like action-in-general. According to Habermas
we need to differentiate forms of practice, i.e. types of action. We shall discuss Habermas's action typology at a later stage. The general point is that BOTH subject and object are constituted in this general medium of "practice" which may be refined into various forms. Thus Habermas's position in KHI is implicitly committed to a historical materialist perspective, a perspective that he develops more fully elsewhere.

These preliminary reflections place us in a better position to assess claims that Habermas's work conceals idealist biases which have not been fully expunged. Suchting claims that "historical materialism" is a research programme. It seeks solutions to theoretical and practical problems which are "unglossed" or unaffected by "idealist" interpretations which have primary reference to non-material determinants. Critics of Habermas claim that such idealist interpretations underly his concept of an emancipatory interest (EI) and its communicative-theoretic equivalent, the ideal speech situation (ISS). They claim that Habermas overestimates the emancipatory potential of the power of reflection and that this overestimation simultaneously fails to conceptualise material obstacles to freedom adequately. This is a problem that runs throughout our discussion of Habermas's position. In Chapter 2 we examined the ideal of "deductivity" associated with TAs. This is one notion of "strength" associated with transcendentalism. The other is that of "idealist" strength. What is meant by this? It refers to the way in which material elements of experience are conceptualised. With Kant we have the idea of "matter of sensation". With Fichte we have the notion of the "non-ego". With Hegel we have the notion of the "other". Despite certain passages, KHI is undoubtedly materially "richer" than these positions. It articulates a concept of nature that precedes human history and "naturalises" the
transcendental subject as a species-subject. Thus Habermas's transcendentalism must be interpreted in such a way as to maintain these non-idealist factors. Failure to do so gives rise to the dilemma concerning the status of cognitive interests. To assert the priority of "practice" in some deep sense is to avoid the worst excesses of each horn though Habermas's position sustains a tension which is a product of this dilemma. This dissertation is an attempt to reconstruct Habermas's position as a transcendentalist and to identify and explicate these elements of tension which may be regarded as "interpretational pressure points".

II Metacritique

According to Kortian, the key to understanding KWI lies in the notion of "metacritique" which in turn relates to the notion of "speculative experience". The Frankfurt School and Critical Theory are in a sense defined by two co-ordinates: 1) The dissolution of German idealism which culminates in Marxism.

2) The notion of "speculative experience" as a radical level of questioning derived from Hegel's "Phenomenology".

Let us concentrate on (2) here. (We shall deal with (1) in the next section). What does "speculative" mean in this context? According to Kortian, speculative experience "transgresses the limit between the positive and its condition".12 This is not really very helpful. Is speculative experience any more than reflection upon the presuppositions of a positive condition? An answer to this may be found if we look at Kortian's analysis of the concept of "metacritique". This is differentiated from Kantian critique of knowledge. It claims to be more radical, by calling into question the initial presupposition which sustains critique itself i.e. by questioning our grasp of what "knowledge" is. This level of
inquiry is at the same time a critique of the subject that engages in the critique: hence the label meta-critique.

Imagine the following TA schema:

1) We have experience/thought/judgement
2) ..... only if conditions C obtain.

We may regard (1) as our conception of knowledge. This conception is regarded as given. Metacritique denies this. The very consciousness which regards (1), the conception of what knowledge is, as given, must itself be subject to critique. The conditions of regarding (1) as given, even hypothetically, must be sought. (N.B. Kantian critique seeks the conditions of (1). Metacritique seeks the conditions of regarding (1) as that whose condition must be sought). Thus a hypothetical reading of the first premiss of a TA does not absolve us from metacritique. According to Kortian,

the elucidation of these presuppositions can only be accomplished through an experience which relates the positive to the presupposition that was the condition of its definition

So we must relate premiss (1) to the "condition of its definition" as knowledge. Metacritique in this sense is a radicalisation of a TA. Let us apply this idea to Habermas. On Page 36 his argument for the TI is put in schematic form. Interpreting this as a TA, one might wish to regard the claim that we have natural science as hypothetical. So the claim runs "IF we have natural science .... then this is only possible on the condition of a TI in prediction and control". However, metacritique is more radical. In Habermas's case, the very idea of regarding natural science as paradigmatic of knowledge (something he attributes to Kant) is to be criticised and transcended. It is this radicalisation of Habermas's TAs that I attempted to represent diagrammatically on Page 43. TA (2) is
meta-critical of TA(1) (a critique of "scientism"). TA (3) is meta-critical of TA (2) and TA (1) when these two are taken together in some sense. One aspect of this is a critique of a false objectivism associated with both the empirical analytic sciences and the hermeneutic sciences i.e. with positivism and historicism. The EI is realised in a form of transcendental reflection upon the interest basis of both sciences. The other "metacritical" aspect is directed at the domination of the PI by the TI - the instrumentalisation of the communicative sphere. In the Appendix Habermas says more about the former aspect:

Guided by the objectivist attitude of theory as the image of facts the nomological and hermeneutical sciences reinforce each other with regard to their practical consequence

However, he hints here that the second, metacritical, attitude is a consequence of this critique of the "objectivist" attitude. Metacritique goes beyond this Kantian critique. Its imagery comes from Hegel who radicalises the approach of the critique of knowledge by subjecting its presuppositions to self-criticism. In doing so he destroys the secure foundation of transcendental consciousness from which the a priori demarcation between transcendental and empirical determinations, between genesis and validity, seemed certain. Phenomenological experience moves in a dimension within which transcendental determinations themselves take form

Habermas appropriates Hegel's critique of Kant. According to Habermas, Hegel gives a critique of three presuppositions of a Kantian approach:
a) A critique of the concept of knowledge, which claims that Kant prejudges a specific category of knowledge, natural science, to be in some sense privileged. Phenomenological reflection on the other hand reveals all knowledge as the phenomenal knowledge of a natural consciousness, and reconstructs the process of the genesis of these forms of knowledge.
b) A critique of the autonomy of consciousness which claims that Kant
assumed that the identity of the self is somehow given. Against "Kant" it is claimed that ego-identity is an acquisition, the result of processes of formation which phenomenological reflection describes. (Habermas "naturalises" this and relocates it within a more empirically orientated, though not unproblematic, developmental theory).

c) A critique of the distinction between theoretical and practical reason which claims that this is a product of the development of consciousness itself, and is not given absolutely.

However Habermas wants to shift these criticisms of Kant from their location in Hegel's phenomenology. According to Habermas, Hegel dissolves epistemology, since he sees it as constrained within the movement of an absolute mind which terminates in absolute knowledge. Habermas claims that this obscures the relation between science and philosophy since the former appears merely as a limitation of the latter. This has the consequence that philosophy can no longer take up an enlightened position in relation to science. It cannot dissolve via reflection the false "objectivism" inherent in the self-image of pure theory. Habermas recognises (following Peirce) the fact of scientific progress, a fact which he believes is at the heart of positivism. Thus, Hegel's radicalisation of critique is ambiguous for Habermas and must be continued in a new setting free from the idealist presuppositions of a philosophy of "Identity".

In "Metacritique" we break with the ideal of "descriptive" metaphysics that Strawson associates with TAs, since it is the very "description" of the first premiss of such arguments that metacritique challenges. This process of description has a history. Hence, the metacritical resituation of TAs illuminates Habermas's "revisionary" programme, a programme which is prospective and normative.
III The Materialist conception of synthesis

Marx's "metacritique" extends the transcendentalism of Hegel's phenomenology into the setting of a pragmatist and evolutionary anthroplogy. Like all Habermas's characters in KHI, Marx is also ambiguous, in containing paradigmatic hints both for an epistemology, in some sense instrumentalist, and for the dissolution of epistemology altogether. According to Kortian, Critical Theory is intended as the experience and expression of the failure of the Hegelian concept.

The appropriation of Marx is therefore very natural. According to Habermas Marx reasserts the priority of "nature" as opposed to its idealistically constrained appearance as "otherness". This leans towards the (natural) materialist pole discussed above. Habermas also regards Marx's concept of "labour" as epistemologically significant. It represents a system of action which has transcendental meaning, i.e. it is in some sense the condition of the possibility of objectivity. The concepts of "labour" and "action" are not entirely clear. Habermas wants to prevent the identification of the concept of labour with action in general. The latter seems also to embrace those theories of child development and learning which have interested thinkers such as Piaget. Presumably it also embraces Weber's complete range of action types. Habermas wants to maintain a distinction between "labour" and "interaction", because his concept of labour is very close to one of Weber's specifications of action i.e. the purposive-rational type. Thus the concept of "labour" is displaced from its Marxist context, and from its political reference to a socio-cultural group. Nor is "labour" specifically manual in any sense as romanticist strains in Marxism would have it. "Labour" seems to remain generalised as an action type, though distinct from interaction. We shall see that Habermas's articulation of the labour/interaction distinction has been questioned (Chapter 5, Section I). In addition Orthodox Marxists question his
interpretation of Marx in this respect. According to Habermas's interpretation of Marx, labour both "constitutes" the natural world and produces social life thereby. Labour is the "synthetic" activity of the human species,

it expresses a dimension which is both empirical and transcendental

Habermas claims that in Marx we may discern the Kantian idea of a transcendental framework which is the "perpetual natural necessity of human life". As with Kant we may distinguish between "form" and "matter". Under form we understand categories of action located not in transcendental consciousness but in the behavioural system of distinctively "instrumental" action. Matter on the other hand is that which is first "shaped" in the labour process, just as it is for Kant in the cognitive process. This brings us to the crux of the "materialist" reinterpretation of synthesis. According to Habermas, Marx differentiates three concepts of nature:

1) **Subjective nature.** This refers to the physical attributes of an organism dependent upon its environment. That aspect of social labour which constitutes this "adaptive" relationship with the environment creates not merely the factual, empirical conditions for the possibility of the reproduction of social life but also those transcendental conditions of the "possible objectivity of experience".

the objectivity of possible objects of experience is thus grounded in the identity of a natural substratum namely that of the bodily organisation of man which is orientated towards action...

2) **Objective nature.** This refers to objective environmental nature as it is "constituted" within labour processes for us by us. It is the result of "synthesis". Thus

Although we must presuppose nature as existing in itself we ourselves have access to nature only
within the historical dimension disclosed by labouring subjects

3) Nature-in-itself. This Kantian idiom specifies a concept of nature which has priority over the human, social world. It precedes human history and lies at the basis of labouring subjects qua their status as natural beings. Nature-in-itself has the character of Kant's thing-in-itself and is the locus for natural-historical evolutionary theories.

Kant's thing in itself reappears under the name of a nature preceeding human history

These three concepts require further interpretation. The dilemma associated with Habermas's quasi-transcendentalism appears as a tension between (1) and (3) on the one hand and (2) on the other. Habermas now claims that the Kantian idiom in KHI concerning nature-in-itself was ironic. But let us take it seriously for a moment. According to Kant the thing-in-itself was the unknowable in principle. This concept has been the knife-edge of commentary upon Kant in the past two centuries. According to an intricate, though hermeneutically faithful and rich, interpretation of Kant's position, the thing-in-itself is a counterfactual correlate of the sheer "facticity" or "otherness" of experience which is more accurately expressed as the concept of "transcendental matter". This solves the grosser problems about how Kant is entitled to talk of what is unknowable in principle. In a materialist setting all these locutions are interpreted in a looser perhaps more plausible fashion. It is in the idealist context that the dilemma arises, i.e. what entitles Habermas to talk of a nature preceeding human history when nature is only constituted via labour processes? The dilemma recedes when we take seriously the (pragmatist) materialist "turn". Nature-in-itself and nature as constituted are really only two aspects of the same "naturalised" conception. The latter aspect seeks to retain the epistemological perspective. The result is that we must
reinterpret the sense of "constitution" at stake. It is not the strong idealist position that there could be no "nature" apart from the constitutive, synthetic activity of labouring subjects, though this is sometimes the way Habermas talks. "Constitution" must be regarded in a looser fashion, in a way which I shall claim is compatible with Hübner's requirement for the possibility of ontological change. This is perhaps less apparent in KHI where the Kantian idiom and style is dominant. It is clearer in Habermas's later work, where he talks of possible "attitudes" to nature, which do not carry heavyweight, idealist connotations.28

In passing, it is interesting to see that the materialist transformation of the concept of synthesis "demystifies" it. We saw above (Page 23) that there are problems about interpreting Kant's notion of synthesis either as a psychological or as a purely logical concept. Situated within a framework of action the materialist concept of "synthesis" has none of these metaphysical difficulties associated with it. However, its coherence is questionable in other ways, for example what precisely are the modes of action that fall under it? (Habermas's appropriation of Peirce is one answer to this). According to the model of idealist and materialist philosophical poles given above, it might be thought that the "materialist" interpretation of synthesis locates Habermas near to materialism. However, as we saw above, it is more accurate to regard Habermas as stressing the medium of "praxis" within which both subject and object are constituted. According to Habermas, "labour" constitutes both the natural world and reproduces social life. The former concerns the Kantian aspect, the latter concerns non-Kantian themes. Habermas claims that

the identity of societal subjects alters with the scope of their power of technical control 29

Thus he claims that the knowledge generated by labour processes takes on
external existence as "productive forces" (a Marxist refrain). This level of the development of the forces of production reacts back upon and "constitutes" the subject in some sense. Habermas believes that Fichte's critique of Kant is a model for this process. I find both Fichte and Habermas's summary of him extremely obscure. The generalised point seems to be that

it is only by opposing itself to the objectified forms of social production, its non-Ego, and by understanding them as its own products that the subject of social labour can acquire knowledge, form itself and understand its own identity in its own activity.

According to Habermas, the transcendental framework of instrumental action does not change, but the identity of labouring subjects is dependent upon the historical stage of development of the forces of production. So for example, an African tribe whose "productive forces" in a technical sense may be very undeveloped, (though their ritual practices "cope" with the physical parameters e.g. by dancing for rain at the start of the rainy season) constitute themselves in relation to this stage of development. The framework of instrumental action is very underdeveloped, more to do with e.g. using fire to scare away dangerous animals than reflective scientific theory. However, in this example another mode of action does seem to be highly developed and more appropriately construed as the dimension within which subjects constitute themselves. This is the communicative dimension, to which Habermas refers under the heading "interaction", and which, in the case of primitive tribes, is filled out in terms of a whole host of traditionally transmitted tribal practices. Habermas claims that:

the identity of consciousness which Kant understood as the unity of transcendental consciousness is achieved through labour. It is not an immediate faculty of synthesis or pure apperception but an act of self-consciousness in Fichte's sense.
But he is also critical of the idea that the dimension of labour is the only one within which the identity of subjects is achieved. He is critical of what he regards as a reduction by Marx of the self-generative act of the species-subject to the context of labour. This interpretation of Marx has been contested. As we saw above it seems to view the Marxist concept of labour through Weberian spectacles as purposive-rational action, thereby releasing another mode of action, namely "interaction", for a separate, discrete analysis. Habermas's critique of Marx in this respect is the point of departure for his conception of "epistemology as social theory".

IV From epistemology to social theory

According to Kortian, Habermas sees the value of both Hegelian and Marxist "metacritiques" in the way they relate knowledge to its social context, and to processes of formation of the human subject. However, this "social turn" is not intended as a sociology of knowledge. Rather, Habermas wants to retain the epistemological basis for his claims. One might well ask what an "epistemology" is. For Habermas it involves a commitment to the explanation of the meaning of knowledge, which in KHI is specified in terms of the three universal cognitive interests. It also involves a critique of any other conception of epistemology which neglects the rootedness of knowledge in "life-processes". But to talk of such life-processes is already a highly interpreted affair. (Husserl's concept of the "lifeworld" (lebenswelt) professed a similar philosophical neutrality, yet this too is already "philosophically" interpreted in some sense). Habermas's differentiation of the life-spheres of "work", "interaction" and "power" reveals this. This differentiation has its origins in Hegel's Jena lectures on the philosophy of mind. Habermas discerns three "categories", the FAMILY, the TOOL and LANGUAGE. These are the three
spheres within which "spirit" objectifies itself i.e. constitutes three object realms. According to Habermas this early work of Hegel's has not yet been located in the phenomenological framework of the movement of Absolute spirit and thus leaves room for epistemological inquiry.

The central point of this "young Hegel" context is, in Habermas's view, to offset the reductive tendencies he perceives in Marx. Corresponding to the categories of the "tool" and the "family", Habermas locates the spheres of social labour and social interaction. According to Habermas, Marxist anthropology errs in absolutising the former.

Habermas argues for the irreducibility of the spheres of social labour (work) and interaction. He is primarily concerned with the reduction of the latter to the former though a mutual irreducibility thesis is most plausible. His claims are problematic and will be discussed in Chapter 5 Section 1. But we may note at this stage that it is prima facie impossible to give empirical examples of "work" which are not interactive in some sense and, conversely, interaction which contain no instrumentalist modes of action. In KHI Habermas expresses this irreducibility at the level of different cognitive interests underlying different sciences. But this only shifts the problem since the viability of a stark distinction between nomological and hermeneutic sciences has itself come into question. (It may come as no surprise that I believe the relation between the two modes of action is dialectical rather than strictly dualistic. See Chapter 5).

As Kortian puts it, Habermas

wants to combine the reflective movement of Hegel's phenomenological experience with an epistemological inquiry into the human sciences which is incorporated into Marx's social theory

According to Habermas, Marx is ambiguous. CT must turn back to Hegel in order to integrate
a double experience into the concept of critique: the experience of Hegelian phenomenological reflection and the experience of the epistemology of the human sciences which its founder Dilthey understood as a critique of historical reason which complements and extends the Kantian critique of pure reason.

It is the very coherence of this "double experience" which is at issue. In the Postscript to KHI, Habermas distinguishes two senses of reflection. 

a) Reflection in Kant's sense of the rational reconstruction of the universal presuppositions of cognition.

b) Reflection in the Hegelian sense of the dissolution of "false objectivism". This mode of reflection is at the heart of the critique of ideology, and is the means whereby subjects come to perceive their own "veiled" real interests.

However, in KHI it seems that these two senses are "moments" of metacritique. The Kantian critique is incorporated within the metacritical argumentative structure (see the diagram on Page 43). It is only by grasping the meaning of metacritique that we can conceptualise the asymmetrical treatment of the TI and PI. by Habermas. This in turn makes sense within the project of a critique of ideology. The dialectical and developmental relations between an objective set of relations of power and domination and the system of the forces of production is reconstructed within Critical Theory as a movement of reflection. This has recourse to a differentiation between two realms and epistemological paradigms, "work" and "interaction". The dialectical relations between these two realms reflects and mirrors that between the more orthodox Marxist conceptions of forces and relations of production. The dialectical intent of both is to restore a suppressed dimension of human life. For Habermas this is given paradigmatically by the human sciences.
If the specific realm of social interaction is to be restored to the logic that properly governs it then, Habermas argues, the concept of synthetic activity which Marx inherited from Kant but restricted to the single category of material production by labour must be re-examined and extended. This extension of the concept of synthesis requires for Habermas a "return to Kant" in some sense, since the radicalisation of critique in Hegel and Marx is dissipated in a crucial respect. For Habermas transcendental inquiry maintains a commitment to the explanation of the meaning of knowledge, a commitment that disappears in positivism where it is reduced to "methodological inquiry" i.e. an explication of the methods of the natural sciences. The concept of the cognitive subject and its constitutive role are lost. However, no external return to Kant is possible according to Habermas. He shifts his argument to the level of an immanent critique of the history of positivism (Comte and Mach) which renders the "self reflection" of the sciences possible. Peirce and Dilthey provide paradigmatic hints for this reflection upon the "interest-basis" of knowledge.

I have represented my exegesis of the structure of Habermas's claims in a diagram below. KHI is otherwise a bewildering appropriation and critique of various figures in the history of philosophy. The present section has itself been largely exegetical, and has postponed some critical issues. I feel this is justifiable in order to picture the whole correctly. But problems in the concepts of "reflection", "positivism", "interaction" etc. are unavoidable and must be addressed at some stage.

V Ontological variability and knowledge constitutive interests

In the concluding section of this chapter I wish to draw together some
A DYNAMIC REPRESENTATION OF EPISTEMOLOGY AS SOCIAL THEORY

Chapter 1, Hegel's critique of Kant. Radicalisation of epistemology

Chapter 2, The "Social Turn" in epistemology as Social Theory

No external return to Kant is possible

Chapter 3, Critique of Marx's reductionism

Chapter 4, Critique of history of positivism

"Self Reflection" of the sciences of work and interaction

KANT (Critique of Pure Reason)

HEGEL (The Phenomenology of Spirit)

HEGEL (Jena lectures)

FOUR YOUNG EMPIRICISTS: PEIRCE and DILTHEY

COMMITMENT TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE MEANING OF KNOWLEDGE

HEGEL: COMMITMENT TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE MEANING OF KNOWLEDGE

MARX: THE PARIS MANUSCRIPTS, CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
of the preceding observations in an attempt to grasp the "constitutive" character of "cognitive interests". Ottman reflects, in a Heideggerian fashion, upon the mediational character of cognitive interests. They are "Inter-esse", revealing the character of being-in-between. This etymological hint dramatises the sense in which cognitive interests mediate pre-scientific contexts of life and reflected forms of methodical science.

The TI and PI are taken to be necessary conditions of experience. They are "invariant" and "objective" i.e. unalterable by reflection and binding upon all subjects.

How could Habermas know this a priori? Körner's problems about TAs resurface. However, the two cognitive interests are not fixed to a "transcendental subject" but to the human species. They have their basis in the natural and contingent history of that species. Still, Habermas makes strong claims to the effect that they have been present throughout history.

The TI and PI seem to be constitutive both of experience in some general sense, and of the mode of science appropriate to this sphere of experience. The idea of "experience" needs investigation. Kant's conception of experience and cognition is very general. In the discussion of TAs we saw that necessary conditions of very general specifications of experience were sought. However, regarding only the TI and the PI for the moment, what are we to say of "experience"? Are there TWO modes of experience corresponding to them? If so, then they are individually not necessary conditions of experience, since each must recognise a notion of experience that is constituted by the other.

Let us say with Kant that there is only one general specification of experience. What do we now say of the two cognitive interests? We might say that they apply to different "spheres of experience". If this is so then the cognitive interests are PRE-DETERMINED in their application to such
spheres by those spheres themselves. Alternatively, they may range freely across these different spheres with different ontological implications accordingly. We can therefore distinguish two possibilities.

1) If the TI and PI are respectively applied to specific realms of objects e.g. "nature" and "man" then they lose their primitivity. The whole force of their "constitutive" character is lost. It is the objects which determine them. Habermas could not possibly mean this. This model of cognitive interests is incompatible with their transcendental status.

2) If the TI and PI are "free-ranging" in an as yet indeterminate sense we can conceptualise a number of features such as the positivist "eclipse" of practical at the expense of technical reason. Here the constitutive aspect of the TI dominates under historically specific conditions. The mix between them - their configuration - is historically determined. The TI and PI are no longer necessary conditions of experience as such. Rather, their relationship to one another determines in some sense the character of experience itself. Thus the constitutive role of cognitive interests is variable. We do not have two ontological categories such as "nature" and "spirit" to which they apply. Rather, in the modern capitalist phase, we experience, according to critical theorists, "spirit" become "like nature".

I believe (2) is a more accurate interpretation of the status of cognitive interests. Habermas often talks of cognitive interests as "viewpoints" and "perspectives". This indicates a break with the general Kantian programme. To have a viewpoint is already to envisage alternative viewpoints. The TI and PI are somehow fluid and optional with respect to each other in a way that Kantian categories are not. (However Kant's concept of a regulative idea does have such a character. See Chapter 7).

Some recantation is necessary at this point in order that the case is not overstated. The sense in which the TI is optional in Habermas's system
is not a capitulation to Marcuse's conception of natural science. In KHI Habermas wants to claim that the TI is a necessary condition of having natural science. In later work he conceptualises the possibility of different "attitudes" to nature, but claims that there is only one "theoretically fruitful" attitude. In this sense Habermas regards the Naturphilosophie tradition as apocryphal. 41

The main point in this interpretation is to break with the Kantian idiom that dominates it. This idiom, which is inherently idealist gives rise to the dilemma of quasi-transcendentalism. The TI and PI do not constitute objects in Kant's strong idealist sense, i.e. they do not constitute objects in the face of something like Kant's conception of a manifold as the "unprocessed" givenness of experience. Instead, with Habermas we move within a general naturalistically conceived ontology. The TI and PI are different "attitudes" to such a loosely conceived lifeworld. So the meaning of "constitution" for Habermas does not carry strong idealist implications. It is a weaker, looser notion though still with ontological import. It is only on this view that I think we can begin to understand Habermas's claim that, Dilthey, however, sees the immediate transcendental logical differentiation between the orientations of the natural and social sciences not in two different forms of objectivation but in the degree of objectivation 42

No one seems to have taken this seriously. Admittedly, Shapiro's translator's footnote which distinguishes between "objectification" and "objectivication", the former being a limiting case of the latter, complicates the matter needlessly. 43 Neither is the difference particularly clear in german i.e. the difference between "Objektivation" and "der Grade der Objektivierung". The solution to this puzzle lies in
Habermas's account of Dilthey at this point. The difference between the Natur- and Geisteswissenschaften cannot be "conceived of ontologically but only epistemologically". The difference "must therefore be reduced to the attitude with regard to its objects". If this is Kantian, as Habermas seems to believe, it resembles Kant's thought in the "Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic" and the Critique of Judgement more than that of the more famous "Transcendental Analytic" of the Critique of Pure Reason. The concept of "objectivation" must be loosened from its latter strong Kantian context. It involves a methodological attitude which may vary in degree. This is properly construed more as a form of neo-Kantianism along the lines of Rickert and Aimmel. The Neo Kantians denied the strong idealist concept of "constitution" which confronts an utterly unordered manifold. Rather, "constitution" is weakened in the sense of being what is required to make sense of experience and to engage in systematic inquiry. Kant's regulative approach, to be discussed in Chapter 7, is the locus classicus for this reinterpretation of the concept of "object-constitution". Habermas's doctrine of cognitive interests must be read in terms of this Neo Kantiangism which also underlies Weber's concept of "value-relevance".

Outhwaite makes an illuminating "analytical" distinction between two senses of "constitution" which he applies to various historical figures. The distinction can be tentatively expressed as follows although it must be realised that the two senses are interpenetrating:

1) **Epistemic** constitution as a *methodological* "attitude" by the practitioners of cognitive science. In this sense a domain of theoretical objects is constituted by scientific "interest".

2) **Ontological** constitution as a feature of historical subjects engaged in forms of praxis which produce conditions of life. This is a general sense
of constitution. It is something we all "do", rather than being the province of scientists or historians.

In K.A.I Habermas argues for a "continuity" between these two senses of constitution i.e. between "science" and "life". Cognitive interests mediate these contexts. However, he seems to want to claim that this continuity is greater for the cultural sciences than for the empirical-analytic sciences. The two senses of "constitution" are much more interpenetrating in the cultural sciences. The relation between theory and experience is very close. This seems to be the meaning of the quotation from Habermas above and his distinction between being subject to and moving at the level of transcendental rules. The cultural sciences have some form of priority because of this intimate relation with life-contexts. In Chapter 5 I shall discuss the implications of Habermas's distinction between action and discourse for these issues. At this stage it is only necessary to acknowledge Habermas's Neo-Kantian concept of "constitution". In the context of his appropriation of Dilthey it is suspended between the two "analytical" senses provided by Outhwaite above. As we shall see in the next chapter, the hermeneutic concept of "constitution" found in Dilthey oscillates between "method" and "ontology". Furthermore there is a concealed normative weight to the concept which expresses a romanticist anxiety for the human spirit and the notion of Bildung. According to Habermas, "objectivation" or constitution as a methodological attitude may vary in degree to the extent to which it excludes the "experience of the subject" and "the sphere of pre-scientific experiences in everyday life". This creeping "methodological distanciation" is regarded as a threat to individual autonomy and the "ontological" dimension in which subjects constitute themselves. In a sense the natural sciences must take up this attitude to be natural sciences at all. To some extent this "attitude" is
also a feature of the cultural sciences if an extreme "participatory"
methodological position is to be avoided. However, critical-theorists
perceive a threat to social life at this level of method. The system of
natural sciences is one element, a limit, of a "comprehensive life-context".
But the objectivating attitude may range freely beyond this limit. The
"eclipse" of a relatively participatory hermeneutic methodology
characterises positivistic social science. This in turn "threatens" the
ontological dimension within which subjects "constitute" themselves. As we
shall see in Habermas's appropriation of Dilthey these methodological,
onological and normative concerns are intertwined - exemplified in the
fluidity of the concept of "dialogue". This fluidity is also fairly
typical of the older members of the Frankfurt School. However, in
concluding this chapter I shall deliberately conflate "methodological" and
"ontological" senses of constitution in order to "picture" the structure
of KHI.

Let us return to Kürner's notion of ontological change. How can we
picture this? Suppose a TA of the form: premiss P \( \rightarrow \) conceptual scheme Q.
We can draw this.

\[ P \rightarrow Q \]

Suppose P is some cognitive field. It is "constituted" and "bounded" by the
framework Q, according to the TA. However the relation between P and Q is
not absolute in Kürner's view. We may have another TA of the form
P' \( \rightarrow \) R, which we may represent as follows

\[ P \cap P' \cap Q \]

\[ R \]
Thus there may be features of a cognitive realm $P$ which it shares with $P'$ and this is relative to another categorical framework $R$. The general principle of this ought to be clear, though it is extremely abstract in this form. The relation between $P'$ and $P$ may be historical. $P'$ may be a later stage of $P$. The categorical framework may alter.

We can apply this scheme to Habermas if we regard $R$ and $Q$ as the PI and TI. Consider the following diagrams as representations of different "mixes" between them.

1) Natural and Social World

Here the TI is "eclipsed" by the PI. This position corresponds to that of "animism".

2) Natural and Social World

This is the opposite of (1). The PI is "eclipsed" by the TI. This is necessary in the first stage of the "Enlightenment".

3) Natural World Social World

This represents the "experience" of the debates concerning the natur- and geisteswissenschaften which arise in the face of "positivism". The common shadded area represents both the "naturphilosophie" tradition on the one hand and the place of a positivistically conceived social science on the other. Theorists like Winch deny the possibility of the latter. Habermas denies that the former is a viable alternative to natural science constituted by the technical interest.
This is an attempt to represent Habermas's position in KHI. The problem that confronts CT is represented under (2). Habermas wants a position such as (4) but not one that reimplies the viability of "Naturphilosophie", or romanticist conceptions of nature. The TI is "aufgehoben" in some sense though this does not involve a return to animism but a progression to a higher level. The TI is not "eclipsed" but subsumed. What this means in detail is ambiguous. In what sense is natural science "aufgehoben"? The impact of hermeneutic and historical reflection upon the positivist conception of natural science would seem to break the idea of an absolute distinction between the natural and social worlds. Thus the limits of the inner circle in (4) may be blurred. It is not clear what Habermas's position on this is. He seems in later work to return to an absolute distinction between science and culture borrowed from Weber. i.e. he seems not to have absorbed the implications of Kuhn's and Feyerabend's challenge to the positivist conception of natural science. So we may regard (4) as representative of a position "in tension" and as yet to be fully interpreted. (I shall attempt this in Chapters 4 and 5). The significant feature of diagram (4) for the present is the priority of the communicative realm constituted by the practical interest. The important feature of all the diagrams is the idea that the TI and PI may "constitute" either the natural or social worlds or both together. We can incorporate these claims in a more general diagramatic representation below which shows a very schematic epistemological and historical development.

Whatever its flaws in detail, for example the obliteration of the distinction between senses of constitution developed above, I believe this
The diagram is a rich one-page representation of Habermas's argument. In the centre we have the species subject, alias the communication community. The former is a naturalised locution, the latter is not. Each locution emphasises an aspect of a unitary subject. We are both part of nature and yet not so. This is a basic dialectical tension for Habermas.

What raises us out of nature is the only thing whose nature we can know: language.

Stages (1) - (4)' and (4)" correspond to the Venn diagrams above. The transition from (1) to (2) corresponds to the enlightenment. Habermas talks of Holbach's enlightened positivism which liberates man from the domination of nature. However (1) to (2) also reveals the "dialectic" of enlightenment. The social world is "schematised" as a natural object subject to the canons of prediction and control. Hence in the classical work of Hobbes, Mill and Comte the TI "eclipses" the PI. Practical reason, in which the discussion of the rationality of ends may proceed, is submerged. This grip may be broken in at least two ways. Firstly, it may involve a regression to an anthropocentric world view. This is the experience of the explosion of revolutionary "counter-cultures" in the late 1960s. Secondly, with Habermas, we proceed at a level of reflection upon the differential interest basis of knowledge i.e. we move from (2) to (3) and from (3) to (4)'and (4)". Habermas's position moves beyond (3) in the sense that he does not, like Winch, regard the methods of the natural sciences as utterly inappropriate to the social world. But, as I have noted, we have yet to spell out the details at positions (4)' and (4)". He seems to shy away from (4)" which embodies post-positivist conceptions of the natural sciences. It is not clear where he stands except that he denies a move to something like (5), Marcuse's position, which claims that in a truly emancipated society even the nature of natural science and technology...
will change. Let us dramatise this further. Regard the diagram as a spiral. Then looking from above as we do, positions (1), (5), (4)', (4)" all overlap. Habermas's position is at a "higher" stage from (1) and (5). Indeed he regards (5) as a regression to (1).

Little has been said in all this about the emancipatory interest. In effect it follows the course of the outer circle. Initially in the stage (1) to (2) we may discern the emancipatory aspect of the rise of positivism. It is in this sense that the EI underlies the TI. In (2) to (3) it seems that the EI involves specifically "transcendental" reflection upon the interest bases of both sciences. This would be accurate if the culmination of the movement of reflection were in something like (3). But this stage is subsumed under a metacritical reflection which proceeds from (2) to (4)". This is the sense in which the EI underlies the task of releasing the PI from its subordination by the TI. This is Critical Theory.

Admittedly, the whole diagram is highly schematic. (1) to (2) corresponds to the whole sweep of history up to the modern capitalist period! (2) to (4)" represents the critical-theoretical "prospective" on this with Habermas's over optimistic "faith" in the power of reflection (his undigested Fichtean component according to Bühler.54) However, the diagram brings out the sense of "ontological variability" through the stages (1) to (4)" in which the TI and PI bear a changeable relation to each other. It also locates the sense in which the subject constitutes itself within these transcendental configurations. "Constitution" is a two way process. The EI liberates the "species-subject" from the "idols" of nature and then, in CT, from its own naturalised self-image in order to realise the (ideal) "communication" community. According to Ottman, this setting for Habermas's materialist transcendental philosophy finally dissolves the transcendental concept of
It would be better to say that the concept of "constitution" is reinterpreted. It is weaker relative to an "idealist" position. Thus, when we talk of ontology in this context this refers to a shifting medium of "praxis" within which social agents constitute themselves. For critical theorists like Habermas and Apel this is dialectically related to the inter-relation between "cognitive interests" which "constitute" two forms of science. However, "constitution" in an ontological sense is a two way process, by which the species subject determines itself. In Habermas's scheme,

the supreme constitution of the natura naturans is rivalled by the supreme constitution of the subject

One of these "moments" can only be a totality at the expense of the other. Critical Theory is an attempt to understand and "transcend" a specific historical configuration in which this has occurred i.e. technology as ideology in modern capitalism.

Very clearly, the historical schema in which I have located cognitive interests above is an epistemological reflection of Habermas's reconstruction of historical materialism. Hence the conflation of methodological and ontological senses of "constitution". Habermas's programme explicates the latter via the guiding categories of labour and interaction. He now regards KHI as too indirect a pursuit of these issues and as having a propaedeutic function for ideas he develops elsewhere. However, the sense in which KHI attempts to mirror a historical process at the level of epistemology is fundamental to our interpretation of Habermas's transcendentalism. In the following two chapters we must consider the details of this account.
A radical perspective

It is conventional and generally sound when critically appraising a thinker to locate ambiguities, analyse the concepts involved and to introduce distinctions. Within such an "analytic" approach an ideal of univocality is sought, if not achieved. Such an approach to Habermas in KHI would seem justified, particularly since the development of his later work may be regarded as a refinement and reorientation of some of his central conceptions. Yet there is an alternative "hermeneutic" approach. Conceptual "fluidity" may reflect a deliberate strategy in the form of an attempt to transcend the linguistic framework of an opponent. Therefore demands for clarity and refinement which issue from such enemy territory will not necessarily carry weight, though "horizons" may merge. I believe that this second interpretational outlook is important when assessing the critical-Marxist tradition within which Habermas stands. One need only refer to Adorno's distinctively uncompromising language and style as an example of this. For him, language itself is a medium of praxis. A strategically heightened form of rhetoric pervades his work. There are no analytically discrete arguments capable of assessment in a progressive order.

This second perspective must be handled carefully. While it is sensitive to the radical intentions "behind" a text, in an extreme form it might sanction too much. For example it is not clear what stepping beyond a grammatical framework would achieve. It would seem to be of more interest to the poetically orientated than to someone called a "philosopher". Yet it is precisely the distinction between such concerns that is open for
negotiation within the hermeneutic perspective. Admittedly my remarks here are knocking at open doors for many continental philosophers, but the point seems worth stressing in this context; particularly in the light of my reflections upon "analytic" TAs in Chapter 2. Is it not the "analytical" pre-judgement that Habermas is engaged in "epistemology" that directs us to the more conventional methods of appraisal? This question is raised provocatively. After all, Habermas says he is doing epistemology and so analytic philosophers feel that is something they can talk about.

Another problem associated with the more radical interpretational perspective is a worry about how to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate "conceptual fluidity". When is a thinker attacking the very roots of an opponent's position and when is he just confused? Can we determine the areas of commensurability and hence of possible conflict between philosophical positions? These questions are fundamental. An adequate answer would involve an extended excursion into hermeneutic and literary theory, into metaphorical and other modes of expression. This would then need to be reapplied to concrete examples in the history of thought. Such a task cannot be undertaken here and is probably more than a lifetime's work. Rather, I introduce this radical perspective in a schematic and antidotal fashion. In what follows I shall attempt to "clarify" some of Habermas's key concepts in the derivation of two cognitive interests. Yet this must not be understood merely as a conventional "analytic" criticism of him. Rather, I wish to preserve the best features of both interpretational outlooks and to retain a sensitivity to Habermas's "radicalism" in KHI.

II Positivism and Objectivism

In KHI Habermas sets himself the task of reconstructing the pre-history
of positivism with the intention of bringing out its denial of "self-
reflection". This is the context for his derivation of the TI and PI
given paradigmatically in his interpretations of Peirce and Dilthey. The
debates that brought together critical theorists such as Adorno and
Habermas, and "positivists" such as Popper, induced an understandable
commentarial unease in Dahrendorf.² Popper after all claimed he was a
critical rationalist and not a positivist. In the face of this Critical
Theorists maintained a methodological holism, with the claim that the way
social facts appeared AS facts was itself socially determined. They
stressed the "dialectical" relation of part and whole, individual and
social, present and past, in order to stress the abstract superficiality
of Popper's notion of falsification. Against this Popper saw in the
invocation of totalities a metaphysically suspect point of reference.
Adjudicating over these particular debates is not my present task, though
it may be aided by what follows.

We may provisionally distinguish five senses of "Positivism". This
schema is borrowed largely from Keat.³
1) Scientism (S)
2) A positivist conception of the structure of natural science (PS)
3) A scientific approach to politics (SP)
4) A distinction between fact and value (VF)
5) A form of "objectivism" (O)
(5) is my own addition to Keat's list. Keat draws conclusions about the
lack of entailment relations between (1), (2), (3) and (4). I shall
explicate these positions in a little more detail. Prima facie let us note
that the demand for entailment between them (which Keat implicitly ascribes
to CT) is a strong, perhaps over-strong one.
1) **Scientism.** This is the claim, usually implicit, that the natural sciences are paradigmatic of knowledge or, even stronger, that they are the form of knowledge as such. In Habermas's terms this is the "monopolistic self understanding" of the natural sciences.

2) **A Positivist conception of natural science.** We may distinguish here roughly between "early" and "later" positivism. The former is a narrow sense associated with Mach, Carnap, Schlick and (ambiguously\(^4\)) with the early Wittgenstein. It is "constructivist" and "foundationalist" and regards such notions as "elements", "sense data" and protocol sentences as the basic building blocks of science. We may also locate in early positivism the deployment of a principle of verification as a critical device which determines the meaningfulness of a conception. Later positivism is more appropriately labelled falsificationism or hypothetico-deductivism. It effectively abandons earlier constructivist, ontological enterprises and sets itself the task of outlining the methodological structure of science. It is this that Habermas has in mind in the derivation of the TI. He refers directly to Popper's *Logic of Scientific Discovery* as a source.\(^5\)

The distinction between the early and later phases of positivism is important since it is the former that is attacked by both Popper and Habermas.

3) **The Scientisation of Politics.** This is the location of Habermas's substantive worries about the dehumanisation of the social world corresponding to its increasing "rationalisation" at the expense of "practical" reason. The conception of a scientifically determined politics and a wholly administered society has its classical roots in the work of Hobbes and Comte. They both break with an older conception of politics as somehow continuous with ethical life and as a dimension of self-expression and "Bildung".
4) The distinction between fact and value. In its starkest "Humean" form this tenet of positivist thinking claims that there are no deductive relations between questions of fact and questions of value. Facts are only relevant to values in a looser sense. 6

Closely related to this is the ideal of "value-freedom" which appears in Weber's methodological writings. While CT seems to claim that the ideal of a "value free social science" is a central positivist conception, Weber argued that it was not possible to justify normative claims by recourse to scientific argument alone. A scientifically conceived politics is a kind of methodological mistake for Weber. However, such a programme must be "value relevant" i.e. certain objects of inquiry are established as relevant by reference to normative standpoints, but it is then possible to proceed in social science solely with reference to value-free criteria of assessment. Thus, according to Weber, it would seem that the doctrine of value-freedom is not compatible with the scientisation of politics. Indeed the former denies the possibility of the latter.

Keat summarises the lack of entailment relations between these four positions:

1) a) $S \rightarrow PS$
   b) $PS \rightarrow S$

2) a) $S \rightarrow SP$
   b) $PS \rightarrow SP^7$

3) a) $VF \rightarrow S$
   b) $VF \rightarrow PS$

NB c) $PS \rightarrow VF'$ ($VF'$ = scientific criteria of validity are independent of normative commitments)
   d) $PS \rightarrow VF''$ ($VF''$ = Normative judgements are not scientifically establishable)

Thus, according to Keat, scientism does not entail any particular
account of the natural sciences (1a). Nor does a specifically positivist
theory of natural science entail scientism (1b). Indeed, Popper is highly
critical of scientism. While Popper distinguishes between science and non-
science he does not add to this the claim that the latter is either
inferior or meaningless. Scientism does not entail the scientisation of
politics (2a). One might regard the political sphere as non-cognitively
concerned with a framework of values. In addition the scientisation of
politics is not entailed by a positivist theory of science (2b). Again,
politics might be non-scientific. Keat claims that the doctrine of value-
freedom does not entail scientism (3a) which seems true. Nor does value-
freedom entail a specifically positivist theory of science (3b). Keat
wants to claim that a positivist theory of science does entail that element
of value-freedom which regards criteria of "validity" as independent of
normative commitments (3c). Finally, he wants to claim that a
positivist theory of science does not entail that element of the concept
of value-freedom which holds that normative judgements are not scientifically
establishable. Keat claims that one could have a positivist theory of
science and regard norms as scientifically establishable in another sense
of "science". However, it is not clear what he means here. If we allowed
another sense of science then surely PS $\rightarrow$ VF' which refutes (3c)
above. Keat is using the term science in a very loose way in this context.

Keat argues that these distinctions are lost in CT's notion of
positivism. It has also been claimed that CT, and Habermas in KHI, embrace
an obsolescent conception of natural science i.e. PS. This seems to be
true. But the centre of gravity seems to be the substantive issues
raised concerning the scientisation of public life. It is this "experience"
which inspires critical theory. Scientism mirrors on the level of
epistemology the experience of the eclipse of the public sphere and
various "communicative" dimensions of the lifeworld. CT is not concerned with the formal relations of non-entailment that Keat outlines. Rather it takes as a point of departure the perception of a historical state of affairs and analyses this at a number of levels, one of which is the level of epistemology and the rise of positivism. Although in KHI Habermas believes there is a deep affinity between "positivism" as PS and this scientisation of the lifeworld, the rebuttal of positivism at the former level might leave intact worries about the growing "rationalisation" of the lifeworld. This explains to some extent Habermas's subsequent break with the central themes of KHI. It was too "indirect" and the critique of positivism had been completed by others. However, a clarification of Habermas's notion of positivism can be found in a fifth, and what I believe to be a "deeper" sense of positivism with which critical theory is fundamentally concerned.

5) **Objectivism.** To introduce such a term may seem to compound rather than to resolve ambiguity. We may distinguish, at least, four senses of this term: a) **Objectivism** as an attitude which is peculiar to the natural sciences. Habermas often talks of the "objectivating" sciences meaning natural science.

b) **Objectivism** as "objectivication" which is wider than (a) and involves the specification of a domain of objects. This does not presuppose for example an ontological gulf between "nature" and "persons". Rather it means in Habermas's sense of "constitution" differential methodological attitudes according to different cognitive interests which already presupposes a loosely "naturalistic" ontology. This is the sense in which Habermas differs from Kant. (See Chapters 3 and 5 for an elaboration of this). This form of "objectivism" is appropriate to all forms of science as Habermas conceives of them.
c) Objectivism conceived perjoratively as the failure of the sciences, either natural or hermeneutic to "reflect" upon their basis in the life-history of the species, and their quasi-transcendental interest ground.

d) Objectivism also conceived perjoratively as false-consciousness in some sense. Objectivism is then a term of critical import. Fichte's critique of dogmatism, Hegel's critique of "natural consciousness" and Marx's attack on the fetishism of commodities all have their place here.

How do these senses of objectivism interrelate, and what is their relevance for the conceptions of positivism discussed above? It is in this context that we must locate Habermas's transcendentalism. Not only is Habermas critical of "positivism" within his schema, he is also critical of Husserl and Kant who were not "positivists". That is to say, the critique of positivism must be located within a deeper critique of objectivism in some sense. Let us turn to Habermas's critique of Popper. 10

Habermas appropriates and shares Popper's critique of a protocol-sentence basis for hypothesis formation. This culminates in the notion of the theory ladenness of observation statements for which Habermas has a classical precedent in Hegel's critique of sense-certainty. 11 Habermas develops this as the context of a provisional and unthematised consensus of the scientific community which (in Marxist idiom) is the dimension of the intersubjective context of working groups 12

In natural science the work process is a context of research bound to "empirical analytic" rules which cannot probe behind this life-reference which is presupposed hermeneutically. It is this guarantee of intersubjective consensus which veils the constitutive interest in technical control of the sphere of work and leads to the illusion of pure theory. The "analytical" theory of science, by which Habermas means a Popperian form of
H-Dism "liberates" the attitude of pure theory from this life context. Habermas maintains, however, that values are constituted dialectically between the already value-laden (i.e. value-relevant in Weber's sense) life basis of WORK and particular value judgements. In this essay Habermas does not pursue the issue of the natural sciences further, but is more concerned to demonstrate that a technical interest is more obviously and contentiously a value choice with respect to the social sciences.

Habermas is critical of Weber's mapping of the mean-end relation on to that between value-freedom and a "decisionism" about values. He refers to Hegel's dialectic between ends and means mediated at all times by a totality, by a life-context. According to Habermas the TI cannot satisfy the demands of value-neutrality. It is guided by a pre-understanding which proceeds from a distinctive frame of reference and which may be incomplete since it eliminates a great mass of all the conceivable constellations of means and ends as elements of the life-context. In this way the domination of the TI is hidden to itself in the sense of concealing veiled investments of the relatively dogmatic total understanding of the situation.

Habermas claims that reflection upon such deep seated interests impels recourse to dialectical thought i.e. the view that analysis is part of the societal process analysed, and that it must be welded to a critical self-awareness of this.

So Habermas is critical here of the hidden value orientation of a technically conceived social science. He is not claiming that such a
programme is impossible, only that it is not value-neutral. In this early paper and in KHI Habermas conjoins senses (c) and (d) of objectivism and hence the senses of reflection required to release us from this. Habermas stresses the concept of social totality and its reciprocal relation to individual particularity. This expresses less a metaphysically suspect holism than a "theoretical attitude" which recognises that social inquirers are also social objects. Reflection is the mode of understanding the life context as a totality which determines the process of theoretical research itself. Habermas's transcendental reflection must be situated within this dialectical thought and its metacritical perspective. There is a deeper problem about transcendental reflection. It is not enough, with Husserl, to regard reality as constituted in some sense. Habermas criticises Husserl because he fails to rejuvenate the classical concept of THEORIA. Husserl releases knowledge from interest, but without retaining the classical cosmological and contemplative "interest" that remains. According to Habermas, Husserl recreates the "purity" of theory.

He errs because he does not discern the connection of positivism which he justifiably criticises with the ontology from which he unconsciously borrows the concept of theory. 17

As one commentator has put it, for Habermas as for Adorno, positivism refers to what one might call a form of methodologism, understood as any neo-Kantian kind of pure logic which grants validity to an autonomous method and its objectifications, which is "positive" in the general sense of suppressing the social and historical preconditions of its own possibility. 18

Thus, Habermas attacks any attempt to dehistoricise both the subject and object of knowledge. This is his deeper object of criticism, what he calls the "illusion of pure theory". This is a failure of reflection which is also a form of false consciousness. In the Appendix to KHI senses (c) and (d) of "objectivism" come together. Failure to reflect upon the
transcendental basis of science is also false consciousness. The hermeneutic sciences may also be guilty of this.

the objectivist self-understanding of the hermeneutic sciences is of no lesser consequence. It defends sterilised knowledge against the reflective appropriation of active traditions and locks up history in a museum.

Thus it is not the TI as such which is the object of critique, since to talk of a TI is already to talk at a level of reflection. Rather it is the illusion of the purity of any type of theory using individuating terms which is the target and which positivism embodies. According to Habermas, objectivism is eliminated by demonstrating the connection of knowledge and interest.

What can we say of the non-perjorative senses of "objectivism" (a) and (b)? Of (a) we may say that Habermas clearly regards the learning process associated with the achievements of natural science as a positive achievement of the species and necessary for survival. It is somehow necessary that we "objectivate" the environment in some sense. (Although this is to read the TI very generally, not specifically as "constitutive" of natural science, which does not seem to be a condition of survival at all. Again, there is a confusion here between TI as constitutive in a methodological and in an ontological sense. See Page 67 above. Only the latter seems to be a condition of "survival"). Husserl talks in this respect of the "mathematisation of nature". This project is not really optional if we are to have natural science says Habermas, rather than a "romanticist" attitude to nature. Sense (b) is wider than (a) and refers to the general transcendental perspective that "objects" of any science are constituted. Objectivication is a label for this constitutive process in a "methodological" sense. Both (a) and (b) emphasise the positive aspect of TAs of which I talked above (Page 39). This is transcendentalism in its
CRITICAL-CONSTRUCTIVE moment. It is rather senses (c) and (d) which are relevant to the discussion of positivism. They are "Critical-limitative".

According to Habermas, scientism denies that form of reflection which enriches the concept of knowledge. This denial has two aspects. Firstly, it fails to reflect transcendentally upon the interest basis of natural science (Objectivism (c)). Secondly, connected with this, it fails to conceptualise alternative interest bases for other forms of science. Thus scientism gives rise to an implicit dominance of the TI over the PI though it is not recognised in these terms.

Habermas is less critical of the positivist conception of the natural sciences than of its scientistic self-image as an account of the structure of the social sciences. Thus reflection upon the interest basis of natural science is explicitly metacritical in so far as the TI is revealed as problematic for the social sciences. In his attack on Popper, Habermas reflects upon the hermeneutically presupposed basis of the scientific community. Yet he fails to develop this in the direction of a post-positivist account of the natural sciences as Kuhn and Feyerabend have done. Rather, the focus is upon the social sciences. Habermas claims that the facts of social science are not given but are socially and historically determined in the sense that the way they appear as facts is itself an object of investigation. But this does not feed back into the account of the natural sciences as a realisation of problems of theory-ladenness. In a sense his position is more radical and dialectical than the notions of "theory ladenness". It is not just that social "facts" are theory laden but that the theories relative to which they appear as facts are also historical products which may conceal material relations of power.

For critical theorists, this is the experience of social science as constituted by the TI. Thus, we encounter here the metacritical aspect of
Habermas's transcendentalism. Reflection upon general transcendental orientations reveals the potentially "ideological" character of a social science which is constituted by the TI. It is within this context that the seeming fusion of early and late positivist theses must be understood.

For example, Habermas says

>The certainty of knowledge demanded by positivism thus means simultaneously the empirical certainty of sensory evidence and the methodical certainty of an obligatory unitary procedure.

Habermas is critical of an "objectivism" such as that of Mach, in which "facts" are elevated to the status of essences via an attack upon the appearance/essence distinction. While it is not clear that Mach held a "scientistic" position, according to Habermas his obliteration of the ego as a "fact among facts" gives rise to a shallow materialism (that) blocks off epistemological inquiry into the subjective conditions of the objectivity of possible knowledge.

Yet it is Habermas's metacritical intention to expose the technical constitution of social facts that motivates this critique, rather than a real dissatisfaction with the H-D model of natural scientific explanation. The problem of the scientisation of politics is therefore central. Habermas does not claim that such scientisation is impossible. Its "objectivism" lies in a failure to reflect upon its transcendental basis and to see the TI as a value orientation which is optional and, more strongly, which obstructs a self-developmental sphere of public discourse in which the rationality of ends may be discussed. Hence the notion of value-freedom is "objectivist" in its perpetuation of the illusion of pure theory. Specific values are constituted in a dialectic between a life-basis and theoretical questions. In KHI the three cognitive interests represent basic value orientations in life, similar in function to Weber's
notion of value relevance. Value freedom is revealed as a value itself constituted within the framework of instrumental action.

In conclusion I wish to maintain that while Keat's account of the non-entailment relations among the four "positivist" themes holds in a formal sense, it misses the deeper attack upon "objectivism" as the false-consciousness of the sciences which is at the heart of Habermas's strategy. Again, it is worth recapitulating the meta-critical dimension of this.

Habermas's transcendental reflection is an explication of the general dimensions along which the species-subject develops historically. It is a reflection upon general life-interests that constitute cognitive activity. However, these dimensions are realised concretely in history (see my schematic diagram page 72 ) and it is this "realisation" that is the object of meta-critique. According to critical theorists, in the "modern capitalist" period this interest basis has become lost from view and one particular interest has implicitly "eclipsed" the others. At the level of epistemology this corresponds to the rise of positivism. Thus Habermas's transcendental reflection, which seems Kantian, and his dialectical reflection, which seems Hegelian-Marxist, are connected in the notion of meta-critique. Of course, this unity inherent in metacritique is denied by Habermas in the Postscript to KHI where he concedes two discrete senses of reflection. Before we can consider this we must pursue Habermas's concept of transcendental reflection in his derivation of the TI and the PI from the work of Peirce and Dilthey.

III Peirce and the Technical Interest

According to Habermas, Peirce takes the fact of scientific progress as given, and asks in a neo-Kantian idiom how such a directional learning process of the human species, which such progress reflects, is possible.
The answer takes the form of an explication of a "logic of inquiry".

Like a transcendental logic, the logic of inquiry extends to the structure of the constitution of knowledge. But as a process of inquiry this logical structure materialises under empirical conditions.

In this way, Peirce's position is both aligned with and differentiated from Kant's. It seems that the latter is a "triangulation point" in the history of philosophy. In general, the transcendental-logical attitude seeks an account of the possibility of objects of experience by specifying the sense in which they are "conditioned". According to Habermas these conditions in Peirce's case are given as three inferential processes: deduction, induction and abduction. These are "synthetic" modes of reasoning.

According to Habermas, Peirce argues that there is no "reality" in principle lying beyond human knowledge. Rather, reality is the sum of statements of facts about which we can have final opinions at the limit of scientific inquiry. This Peircean concept of the "limit" seems to relocate Kant's notion of the thing-in-itself, retaining its "realist function" without its metaphysically suspect status. Peirce acknowledges however that "facts" cannot be exhaustively reduced to interpretations. There is an input "into" what Peirce regards as the "semiotic" dimension (which seems to be a realm of discourse). Interpretation of the status of this "input" is crucial. According to Habermas, Peirce claims that reality cannot be ascribed to such "original stimuli" although all our statements are "grounded" in them. What does this mean? How are we to talk of such "stimuli" without again implicating talk of things-in-themselves? This is a large problem in Peircean scholarship. Habermas says that while Peirce talks of
The answer takes the form of an explication of a "logic of inquiry"

Like a transcendental logic, the logic of inquiry extends to the structure of the constitution of knowledge. But as a process of inquiry this logical structure materialises under empirical conditions.

In this way, Peirce's position is both aligned with and differentiated from Kant's. It seems that the latter is a "triangulation point" in the history of philosophy. In general, the transcendental-logical attitude seeks an account of the possibility of objects of experience by specifying the sense in which they are "conditioned". According to Habermas these conditions in Peirce's case are given as three inferential processes: deduction, induction and abduction. These are "synthetic" modes of reasoning.

According to Habermas, Peirce argues that there is no "reality" in principle lying beyond human knowledge. Rather, reality is the sum of statements of facts about which we can have final opinions at the limit of scientific inquiry. This Peircean concept of the "limit" seems to relocate Kant's notion of the thing-in-itself, retaining its "realist function" without its metaphysically suspect status. Peirce acknowledges however that "facts" cannot be exhaustively reduced to interpretations. There is an input "into" what Peirce regards as the "semiotic" dimension (which seems to be a realm of discourse). Interpretation of the status of this "input" is crucial. According to Habermas, Peirce claims that reality cannot be ascribed to such "original stimuli" although all our statements are "grounded" in them. What does this mean? How are we to talk of such "stimuli" without again implicating talk of things-in-themselves? This is a large problem in Peircean scholarship. Habermas says that while Peirce talks of...
an ideal "first" reality, truth is meanwhile public and intersubjective. The ideal "first" remains somewhat mysterious, though intended as the cutting-edge of a realist position.  

In a sense Peirce reconstructs Kant with a sensitivity to the linguistic dimension. (However as we shall see, Habermas claims that he is not sensitive enough). According to Habermas, Peirce's conception of reasoning implies more than just a narrow deductivism. The "non-intentional input" enters the linguistic medium via the three "rules of synthesis". Peirce regards abduction as the crucial engine of inquiry. It defines the process in which it is necessary to form a new idea, a new explanatory hypothesis. Habermas claims that these modes of inference are legitimised i.e. shown to be "objectively valid" simply in virtue of the belief in scientific progress. However

at the same time the modes of inference cannot be viewed simply as transcendentally necessary because they are not valid universally at all places and times .... the logical rules of the process of inquiry do not by any means ground the conditions of possible knowledge with transcendental necessity .... they do establish a procedure that increases intersubjectively recognised beliefs if it is carried out under empirical conditions .... these rules as the specification of a method have the function of transcendental conditions of possible objects of experience. But unlike them they cannot be derived from the constitution of consciousness per se. They remain contingent as a whole  

Habermas wields the notion of transcendental necessity in the image of timelessness. He shares the presuppositions of some TA theorists. However while it is not necessary that there be a human species or that it should evolve something like natural science, if there is natural science it is constituted in this way.  

Habermas's talk of the contingency of these modes of inference must not obscure the strength of his claims in another sense.
According to Habermas, Peirce stressed continuities between pre-
scientific modes of learning and theoretical inquiry. The connection of
the latter with a life-context is important. (We saw above on Page 68)
that Habermas in general is arguing for a continuity between the
methodological (i.e. theoretical) and the ontological (i.e. life-praxis)
concept of "constitution"). Whether this also amounts to a continuity
between human and animal behaviour is difficult to say. In the Appendix to
KHI he says,

the human interests that have emerged in man's
natural history, to which we have traced back three
knowledge-constitutive interests, derive both from
nature and FROM THE CULTURAL BREAK WITH NATURE

So presumably there is no "essentialist" answer to the speculation above.
One could specify dimensions of continuity and discontinuity with animal
learning. Habermas designates this life context as the "behavioural
system of purposive rational action". The results of the three inferential
processes of reasoning have a function only in this sphere. Habitual
behaviour is regulated by a feedback mechanism that corrects and learns
from previous mistakes. This seems to be a minimal and unobjectionable
empiricism at the level of behaviour, though it has led to accusations that
Habermas has an instrumentalist conception of scientific theories, which I
shall show in the next chapter to be false. For the present we may note
the tension inherent in a position which holds that theories are not
exhausted by their "use-value", but still maintains that the meaning of
their concepts is primarily related to the dimension of instrumental action.
In KHI Habermas claims that this dimension has a transcendental status.
The synthetic modes of inference are "constitutive" of scientific inquiry.
(This seems to me to be compatible with a realist position. Apel label's
Peirce's position "sense-critical realism".)
Scientific inquiry isolates this behavioural learning process from the life-process. According to Habermas, feedback controls are selected for testing. Experimentation guarantees precision and intersubjectivity. However, even experiment must be recognised as "constituted" within the transcendental sphere of instrumental action. The "positivist" reduction of abduction to a merely contingent feature of scientific inquiry is an example of the way positivism abstracts from the transcendental sphere. (Popper regards abduction as merely a psychological matter). But according to Habermas, abduction is crucially related to the sensory "first" element of experience at the behavioural, pre-scientific level. Habermas' account of Peirce resembles Kant's position in the "Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic" in the Critique of Pure Reason. We are required to attribute instrumental action to nature itself.

We must act as though observable events were creations of a subject that .... had habitualised all laws of nature as the rules of its (nature's) behaviour.

In Kant's case the subject is God as the idea of the "highest possible formal unity of empirical laws". According to Habermas, the "subject" is an equally mythical correlate of human instrumental action. Peirce calls this our "natural and anthropomorphic metaphysics". Without engaging in a discussion of Peirce's cosmology which seems to underly all this, we may observe that this projection of human action on to nature, like a Kantian regulative idea, leaves open options for other projections, other attitudes to nature. According to Habermas these would not be natural science. He regards the naturphilosophie tradition as apocryphal and rejects Marcuse's conception of an emancipated non-technically constituted natural science. Habermas refers directly to the dilemma of quasi-transcendentalism associated with the framework of instrumental action.
Just as little as it can be elevated to the transempirical plane of pure noumenal determinations however, can it also be conceived of as having originated under empirical conditions - at least not as long as its origins have to be conceived under the very categories that it itself first defines.

As we have seen, such a framework cannot be reduced to that of animal learning. According to Habermas, Herder understood culture as the compensatory outcome of deficiencies in organic equipment such as teeth and claws. But cognitive interests cannot be likened to such an instinctual basis since Habermas claims they encompass a wider notion of success than direct gratification. They cannot be classed with mechanisms that steer animal behaviour nor can they be severed from the context of life, which is quasi-natural. This brings us to the point of Habermas's departure from Peirce's framework. What raises us out of nature according to Habermas is the linguistic community in some sense. Peirce cannot conceptualise such a subject because he applies his pragmatic criterion of meaning too widely to both "mind" and "matter". Such a conception whereby ideas or beliefs come to have the same status as events that fulfill conditional predictions is scarcely different in its reductive implications from Mach's doctrine of elements. Despite Peirce's reference to notions of consensus, Habermas believes that the subject as a community of investigators and its methodological framework becomes obliterated. Their synthetic achievements become dissolved into a series of empirical events. As such, Habermas claims that Peirce succumbs to a "concealed" positivism. Against this Habermas says that,

communicative action is a system of action that cannot be reduced to the framework of instrumental action.

At this point we burst the framework of technical or instrumental action.
Yet what is the status of such "bursting"? We must turn to Habermas's account of Dilthey to answer this. However, we can raise a question to conclude this section. Habermas's appropriation of Peirce is intended to pursue a level of reflection which reveals the TI as constitutive of natural science. The TI constitutes the behavioural system of instrumental action and is a "natural" necessity of the human species. The TI is realised at all times in the medium of language. Yet the sphere of communication is not reducible to it. So what is the relation between them? The answer to this is really the key to interpreting Habermas.

IV Dilthey and the Practical Interest

According to Habermas, Peirce did not discern the transcendental significance of the communication community. For Dilthey however

the system of sciences is one element of a comprehensive life-context, and the latter is the object of the cultural sciences

But we might ask about the relation of the natural sciences to this wider life-context. The following passage is significant

In so far as the employment of symbols is constitutive for the behavioural system of instrumental action the use of language is monologic. But the communication of investigators requires the use of language that is not confined to the limits of technical control over objectified natural processes

Yet, the distinction between MONOLOGUE and DIALOGUE is not very clear. Habermas seems to say that natural science is monological. What does this mean? It surely does not relate to a literal reading of the notion of monologue such that science may be pursued in isolation in the sense of "talking to oneself". On one interpretation this is just trivial: of course scientists can and do work alone. On another interpretation "monologue" is not possible in any case since according to Wittgenstein there is no
"private language". However, Habermas talks in the passage above of the different USES of language i.e. he seems to be making a distinction within language itself. However the monologue/dialogue distinction is in substance a distinction between different theories of language i.e. empirical analytic theories and hermeneutically based theories. To clarify his position Habermas focuses upon the category of the "self". Habermas claims that Peirce only comprehends man's self-understanding and development in a "private" manner i.e. via the success or failure of instrumental actions. A child touches a stove and "confirms" the testimony of others that it would be hot. This awareness of initial ignorance requires a category of "self" as the subject of that awareness. According to Habermas, this demonstrates that Peirce believed that "self consciousness" emerged only as the "negation of what is publicly recognised as reality". This is the "mute subjection to public monologue". There is only static consensus and not dialogue. Against this, Habermas's model of dialogue goes beyond "subsumption" of the individual. Rather,

every dialogue develops on an entirely different basis namely that of the reciprocal recognition of subjects who identify one another under the category of selfhood ..... the concept of individual ego includes a dialectical relation between the universal and particular which cannot be conceived in the behavioural system of instrumental action 39

In a sense, monologue is subsumed under dialogue. The former is an abstracted model of self-development. Habermas is claiming that Peirce's model is myopic and is loaded by the example of the child and the stove. From Habermas's perspective Peirce locates self-development too close to animal learning. Habermas would seem to be claiming that the monological status of natural science pertains to its abstraction from this dialogical self-formative process. Thus we might picture the relation thus.
The natural sciences are located in the medium of dialogue, that of language or "sprachlichkeit", but do not thematise it as such. Once again we see Habermas's capitulation to a positivist conception of natural science. Post-positivist theorists such as Kuhn and Feyerabend deny the sharpness of the inner circle of the diagram and stress "dialogical" features of the natural sciences. However, I believe the concept of dialogue as Habermas deploys it is different from this. It is in a sense normatively loaded as we shall see. But the diagram above represents the asymmetry between Habermas's accounts of the natural and social sciences. The former are subsumed within a medium which the latter takes as its object-domain. This indicates that Habermas believes the continuities between "life" and "science" are greater in the case of the cultural sciences where we move at the "level" of transcendental rules. 40

We may make the following provisional clarificatory observation and distinguish among three senses of dialogue. a) DIALOGUE I. This merely stresses the medium of language as such. It is an advance on animal learning. Habermas means something like this sense of dialogue when he claims that natural science is "monological", i.e. scientists use language after all (!) although the intersubjective basis of the scientific community is not reflected upon as such.

b) DIALOGUE II. This stresses the medium of intersubjectivity. Here we may locate hermeneutical and historical critiques of the natural sciences. However Habermas regards intersubjectivity primarily as the object domain of the cultural sciences.
c) DIALOGUE III. This is stronger than (b) and specifies a dimension in which individuals confront each other as "partners" in dialogue with normative and dynamic implications.

Habermas (deliberately?) obscures the differences between these senses. In particular, in his account of Dilthey Dialogue II shades into Dialogue III. Within this schema it is interesting to see that Dialogue I is "monological" with respect to Dialogue II, and the latter is "monological" with respect to Dialogue III. It is the difference between I and II that is important when assessing the status of Habermas's account of the natural sciences. It is the difference between II and III that is important when assessing the status of the cultural and "critical" sciences. Habermas's use of the concept of dialogue is highly fluid with respect to these senses. We must now show this in his account of Dilthey.

Habermas appropriates Dilthey's later work in which the importance of language and the influence of Husserl's concept of the "lifeworld" are recognised. Habermas regards this as the most plausible and least "psychologistic" phase of Dilthey's work though he claims that the "empathetic" conception of understanding is never fully digested. According to Habermas,

> this psychology of understanding as substitute experience contains a monadological view of hermeneutics

It might seem confusing to link this Leibnizian idiom to the concept of monologue. However, as we saw above, Habermas regards Kant's "categorial consciousness" as sharing an "objectivist" error with positivism. These reflections also have ethical significance for Habermas, for whom Kant's concept of autonomous will is a peculiar abstraction from the moral
relationships of communicating individuals ...... The intersubjectivity of the recognition of moral laws accounted for a priori by practical reason permits the reduction of moral action to the monologic domain

It is important to see that this ethical aspect of the distinction between monologue and dialogue pervades Habermas's thought.

According to Habermas, empathy is non-communicative in some sense. The image of its "monadological" character dramatizes this in terms of a kind of metaphysical isolation. As we shall see in Part III Habermas's concept of communication is more than the sharing of meanings. It is interactive in some deeper sense (in the sense Verstehendlichkeit!). In KHI he refers this to a "life-basis" in which the grammatical forms of description and evaluation are united. Habermas appropriates Dilthey's notion of an "individual life history" and the paradigm of autobiography as a model for the hermeneutic sciences. Retrospective interpretation is the force which subjects all past events to the category of "significance".

The unity of a life history (ego identity in Habermas's terms) is constituted by an accumulation of retrospective interpretations. This occurs in the dimension of time as the synthesis of the of receding experiences

However, Habermas claims that this temporal ("vertical") dimension abstracts from the intersubjective and communicative aspects of self-formation. The social (horizontal) dimension is actually prior, and dialogue is its mode of synthesis:

In the dialogue relation a dialectical relation of the general and individual, without which ego identity cannot be conceived, is realised

Perhaps the terminology here is confusing. Habermas's notion of a dialectical relation is that of a dynamic field of force in which the individual is constituted between poles of the ineffably individual and of
the general and social. This is the sphere of "dialogue" where one both identifies with the "other" and differentiates one's own self in the face of the "other". This "dialogue which we are" is less a specification of various canons of hermeneutical method than an ontological characterisation in Gadamer's sense of the context of self-formation and understanding. This is clear from Habermas's critique of phenomenological programmes in social theory.

The monads spin linguistic intersubjectivity out of themselves (erst aus sich heraus). Language is not yet grasped as the web on whose threads the subjects hang and on which they first begin to make themselves into subjects. Within this dynamic medium of dialogue individuals exist and constitute themselves between two poles. They may reify themselves in the face of the "other" succumbing thereby to role identity. Alternatively they may reify the other in the face of themselves and engage in an extreme individualist-existentialist position. This may be a non-communicative solipsism. As Habermas says:

Dialogue in ordinary language moves halfway between monologue and the impossibility of linguistic communication at all.

Reification of oneself in the face of the other is monologic. Habermas calls this the "mute subjection to public monologue". It resembles Durkheim's concept of mechanical solidarity. Indeed there is a more general point to be made about social theory and the concept of dialogue outlined above. Outhwaite describes how the idea that the objects of social science were meaningful in some sense generated two branches of development. On the one hand, by analogy with theories of meaning which stress that semantics is generated by the intentional mechanics of agents (e.g. Grice), we have a development of social theory in the Cartesian tradition. Here we may locate the neo-Kantians, DILthey, the phenomenological tradition,
forms of behaviourism, and the early Weber. On the other hand, by analogy with theories of meaning which stress the social context (e.g. Wittgenstein and ordinary language philosophy) we have a development of social theory more in the Hegelian tradition. Here we may locate Marxism, Systems theory, functionalism, Winch's neo-Wittgensteinian idea of social science and the development of forms of structuralism.

In a sense the whole history of the Geisteswissenschaften is a dialectic between these two branches. For the former the concept of agency and subjective meaning is the centre of gravity. For the latter the concept of social structure as objective meaning is central. However, a more detailed study, like that of Outhwaite, reveals an exchange between the two camps. Husserl's concept of the lebenswelt and its influence upon Dilthey's later work, Weber's conception of an ideal type and many other examples, illustrate a recognition by such theorists of the social determination of agents. On the other hand, many criticisms have been raised against functionalism and structuralism in which they are regarded as too abstract and formal to be of any real explanatory value. To have content they must refer in some sense to human agency.

This is really a most schematic account - a general epistemological map of the issues. But we can orientate Habermas's remarks with respect to it. Reification of oneself in the face of the other occurs in the "structuralist"tradition. Reification of the other in the face of oneself is an extreme variant of the "individualist"tradition. According to Outhwaite this is a persistent and perhaps irresolvable tension in social theory, as is the tension between methodological/epistemic senses of constitution and ontological notions. Sartre's existential Marxism, Schutz's problem of the alter-ego are illustrations of this tension. There are many others. Habermas's own version is the problem of fitting together
his account of ego-development and his reconstruction of historical materialism. Perhaps it is misleading to introduce the notion of "reification" here, since it is itself a contentious term. However, I wish to stress the normative aspects of Habermas's claims and the fluidity between dialogues II and III. For Habermas, "ego identity" and its complementary concept "communication" are not assumed as given as they seem to be in Dilthey (and Fichte). Rather, communication can go wrong in various systematic ways. Dialogue is the medium within which this process takes place.

This "community of life unities" defined by the dialogue relation and reciprocal recognition, ego identity and the process of self-formation in life history is postulated by Dilthey as the objective framework of the cultural sciences.

Dialogue for Habermas seems less a method than a Gadamerian characterisation of the essential "linguality" of life. However, he does talk in a methodological fashion at times. For example he claims that hermeneutics as a mode of understanding is always required because of a discrepancy in principle between a life context and its linguistic objectification.

What is meant here is that understanding mediates the particular life context with its expression in linguistic categories which are ineffably general. We may illustrate this with respect to three classes of life-expression which Dilthey takes as the "objects" of hermeneutics, thus displaying the greater intimacy between theory and experience in the cultural sciences.

a) Linguistic Expressions. These may appear in contexts independent of communication i.e. abstracted from it and treated as objects of e.g. grammatical analysis. According to Habermas this undercuts a role for hermeneutics. In a stronger sense hermeneutics is a denial that such an
abstract and formalistic conception of language is viable. Hermeneutics closes the "gap" between an expression, treated formalistically within a "monological" theory of language where nothing is alien, and the context of life within which that expression appears and which is totally alien. Hermeneutics is also the stronger claim that this "gap" does not exist. So here we encounter an ambiguity in the conception of hermeneutics both as a method for overcoming relatively alien expressions and as an ontological claim that there are no extremes in the manner specified above.

b) Actions. In a similar fashion Habermas talks of a gap with respect to the manifestation of meaning in intentional actions, the subject cannot express itself any more directly in actions that obey general norms than it can in the general categories of mutual understanding in ordinary language. Presumably this refers to the gap between the individual and the social or institutional norms that his particular actions express e.g. paying in a cheque at a bank, being a "postman" etc. Habermas objects to the inflexibility of Parsonian role theory. The deep source of this worry lies in the autonomy of the subject. According to Habermas the art of rendering "indirect" communications understandable corresponds to the distance that the subject must maintain and yet at the same time express between itself as the identity of its structure in its life-history and its objectifications. The penalty of not doing so is being reified by those to whom the subject addresses itself. Reification is identification merely with a role; housewife, accountant or whatever. It is not being taken seriously as a person. Although one can think of actions that do not involve norms, like "going for a walk", Habermas's general point is that the dialectic of the individual and general is a struggle, a process whose success in the sense of the realisation of ego-identity is not assured. While the "community of life unities" is in a
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sense given for Dilthey, for Habermas it is not. It is a "not-yet" which is anticipated in ideal speech. This is the meaning of dialogue III.

c) **Experiential expressions.** These are non-verbal but psychologically expressive signals which are understood as "signs" of unstated intentions. They are located close to the spontaneous context of life i.e. are less enmeshed in the fully articulated public forms of language. They disclose latent meaning. These expressions are objects of what Habermas calls a "depth" hermeneutics. The metaphor of depth pertains to the loss of self-transparency of meaning to agents themselves. Experiential expressions attest to a privatisation of meaning which may be regarded within a psychoanalytic framework as a result of repression. They have been removed from the dimension of dialogue in a radical form. Such expressions indicate whether

the communicating subject is deceiving itself or others

This anticipates Habermas's appropriation of Freud. Dialogue III, which embodies an ideal of human autonomy, comes to the fore.

According to Habermas these three "life-expressions" are the objects of hermeneutics. The task of hermeneutics is the deciphering and removal of the appearance of irrationality and arbitrariness from their interpretation. There can be no demonstrative deductive certainty for this procedure. It moves in a logical circle.

Theoretical concepts and systems of reference are only concretisations of a strategically successful preunderstanding that is temporarily fixed for the purposes of analytic comparison

Why is this circle that encompasses both pre-understanding and theorisation a virtuous and fruitful one? For Habermas, the answer lies in the immanent connection between experience, language and practice in the cultural sciences. In the model of textual interpretation we see that the
interpretation of parts commences with a hypothetical pre-understanding of the whole. This pre-judgement may subsequently be corrected. This corrective mode is not merely a move to coherence and consistency in a formal sense, otherwise circularity would be problematic. Rather, such coherence relates directly to practice and to the necessity of individuals who must make themselves understood to each other. The example of foreign language interpretation comes to mind, where this interest in communication and interaction is most dramatically revealed. But the claim may be generalised. It is the life context of communicative action which anchors these interpretational activities, a context that is constituted by a PRACTICAL interest in maintaining the intersubjectivity of understanding. This is a "transcendental viewpoint" since it applies not merely in cases of overt misunderstanding which one wants to overcome, but also constitutes the sphere of intersubjectivity itself as the dimension within whose horizon reality can first appear as something. Thus the PI constitutes the realm of interaction and communication and expresses another dimension along which the human species develops. However, it also embodies the technical interest and the sphere of work which are in some sense necessarily social and communicative (see Chapter 5, Section II).

According to Habermas, Dilthey (like the positivists) does not recognise this new paradigm and fears for the "objectivity" of hermeneutics. He would like to free hermeneutic understanding from the interest structure in which it is embedded on the transcendental level and shift it to the contemplative dimension according to the ideal of pure description.

However, on the conception of hermeneutics that has been developed above, "mental life" does not emerge directly in expression but indirectly via a dialectical exchange between the individual life context and general categories of language and or social norms. Hermeneutic understanding is
thereby bound to a dialogical structure in which the individual constitutes itself. The role of any interpreter is essentially that of a partner in dialogue. However, Dilthey remains bound to an empathy model of understanding. Re-experiencing and interpretation remain tied to the ideal of "observation" which in turn embodies a conception of objectivity which demands purification of subjective influence. Following Gadamer, Habermas claims that the interpreter cannot radically transcend the "horizon" of his own life activity though it may "merge" with other such horizons. He grasps the meaning inherent in an object/person in a relation in which he reflects upon himself and the object. In contrast Habermas claims that Dilthey is bound to a model of "reproductive feeling" and to the methodological assumption of a possible simultaneity between interpreter and interpreted. This position requires the romanticist metaphysical backcloth of a vitalism which posits an "omnipresent stream of life". It allows the transfer of the natural scientific ideal of objectivity to the cultural sciences i.e. the metaphor of a stream allows a quasi-observational model to apply.

In his retrospective upon Kant and Fichte, Habermas summarises his differentiation of cognitive interests. He claims that the TI expresses a "restricted mode of experience".

... we can view as a limiting case the reality objectified from the viewpoint of possible technical control and its correspondingly operationalised experience

Habermas describes three features of this limitation:

a) Language is monologic in the sense of being divorced from its embeddedness in interactions.

b) Action is severed from communicative action and reduced to a solitary act of purposive-rational action. This is what Apel calls "methodological
c) Individuated experience is eliminated in favour of repeatable experimentation. The differences between dialogues II and III are obscured by (a), (b) and (c). Habermas wants to claim that the transcendental framework of instrumental action is an extreme variant of lifeworlds constituted through ordinary language. Thus,

it becomes clear that the pattern of communicative action does not play a transcendental role for the hermeneutic sciences in the same way that the framework of instrumental action does for the nomological sciences.

What Habermas means is that the object domain of the cultural sciences is confronted as something already constituted. We proceed here not subject to transcendental rules but at the level of transcendental rules. This means that the materialist concept of synthesis with regard to external nature gives way to a concept of synthesis which is bifocal and dynamic, an exchange between social agents themselves and not between a subject and an externally given manifold. According to Habermas the hermeneutic sciences do not disclose reality under a different transcendental framework, different from the technical sciences because both are grounded in a natural lifeworld.

Rather they are directed towards the transcendental structure of various actual life-forms, within each of which reality is interpreted according to a specific grammar of world apprehensions.

What does this mean? Hermeneutics is in danger of mirroring positivist intolerance and of having reductivist tendencies of its own. Gadamer's universal claims for the notion of "dialogue" neglect the "natural world" except in so far as this is regarded as mediated by language. However for Habermas, although he is not explicit, there is a residual empiricism,
something which makes our sentences true or false about the external world, though this is only conceptualised in language. Peirce talked of "inputs into the semiotical dimension". Obscure as this may be, we want to retain a notion which functions similarly and which grounds the ability of subjects to learn a language. Thus an everyday "natural" world must be part of the lifeworld concept. Hermeneutical thought tends to conceive of the latter wholly in terms of a social, interactive world. But it contains a natural dimension too. Thus when we attempt to come to terms with the "transcendental structure of various life forms" as Habermas says above, this also includes a relation to a natural world even for highly "ritualistic" and so-called primitive societies and belief systems.

While the TI is in some sense "aufgehoben" for Habermas, the everyday natural world is not. This world is contained in the concept of a lifeworld, the everyday world of both natural and social common sense.

What is the importance of this stress on the lifeworld and its relation to hermeneutics? Fundamentally it expresses the view that all scientific and philosophical thought is an interpretation of the lifeworld from "within". The Kantian idiom associated with cognitive interests leads us to believe that they have their centre of gravity in a subject which "knows itself best" and which proceeds to constitute a world from this neo-Cartesian perspective. (Rorty, for example, interprets Habermas thus). However, the role of cognitive interests for Habermas resembles much more the Heideggerian notion of an "existenziale". Cognitive interests explicate the structure of the life-world as hermeneutic and phenomenological constructs rather than as neo-Kantian categories.

Subject to the proviso made above concerning the natural world, the TI and PI are asymmetrical. This suggests that the latter corresponds to a deeper level of reflection. Remember the characterisation of metacritique
given above (Chapter 3, Section II). The assumption that we have natural science which is paradigmatic of knowledge is challenged by the whole argument for the PI. Habermas's argument proceeds dialectically. The seeds of hermeneutics are contained in reflection upon the life-basis of Popper's H-D account. In particular Habermas's transcendentalism must be understood as dialectical. This implicit dialectical procedure must now be brought into the open.

V The Dialectical Imagination

What is dialectic? Its meaning is far from being univocal. Perhaps at its deepest and most general level it is a denial of an atomistic world view either of nature or of society. Dialectic involves an ontological claim which stresses the dynamic and interrelated character of nature and of society. The concept of "contradiction" is central. This notion has been much misunderstood. Unsympathetic commentators have claimed that dialectics violates the law of identity, $A = A$, and thereby embraces nonsense. Others have defused this problem by reducing all talk of contradictions to talk of "opposition", "conflict" etc. Both these moves seem to miss the point. The dialectical meaning of contradiction is not formal contradiction and does not really deny the law of identity as a formal axiom. Rather, it concerns "concrete" contradiction. To reduce this to the idiom of opposition and conflict neglects the essential and "constitutive" character of such opposition.

This is the barest and most abstract sketch. According to Sayers dialectic is

a philosophy, a logic, a way of seeing the world

It is thereby less a theory within the world than a total world view. It is important to perceive the generality of this claim, since dialectics is
suspected of being an a priorist theory of natural and human development. This is an understandable worry given the Hegelian dialectic which is situated within an a priori philosophical framework given by the self-unfolding of Absolute Spirit. But while Hegel is a locus classicus for the concept of dialectic, the concept is not to be constrained within such an idealist setting. Dialectics demands detailed empirical investigation. Its a priori character often pertains to a transcendental level which makes claims for the "essential connectivity" and "contradiction" in the world. Kant did not claim that we could know particular causal sequences a priori, although like others he thought that Newton's Laws had a peculiar status. What we can know a priori is for example that the concept of causation is a necessary condition of "objective sequence" or time-ordering. This is a transcendental claim. I believe it is a failure to see such differences in level, between e.g. transcendental and empirical claims, which underlies Popper's argument that Habermas's and Adorno's concept of dialectic invokes suspect holistic entities. Rather, dialectic is more like a "methodological attitude" which refuses to acquiesce to the positivist image of "things as they are". It expresses the need for the fullest possible "practical" experience. It admits that the details of this do require empirical study.

However, problems still persist concerning this global conception of dialectic as an "ontological" outlook. Applied to the natural world "dialectics" involves the view that the world is essentially dynamic and that geometrical constructs, such as the super-rigid lever, are abstract. But a "positivist" need not deny this. Nor perhaps would he deny that the solar system was formed at a particular stage in the evolution of the universe and that the real motion of the planets is not eternal. In fact, as applied to nature, dialectics seems contingent upon the dynamics of the world as described by modern scientific theory. Its original context of
Denial of a mechanical world view is no longer of any more than historical interest. To talk of a "dialectics of nature" today seems either to turn back to the "Naturphilosophie" tradition or to place the weight of meaning of dialectic upon current disputes in the evolutionary and other sciences. These details are all important for an understanding of "dialectics of nature".

I raise these empiricist worries about dialectics because at the level of society the concept takes on a normative meaning which it does not have as regards nature (though perhaps ecologists would dispute this). Dialectic is not merely an ontological world view i.e. that things do not stay the same (at its most trivial!), but a practical outlook too, a demand to change the social world on the basis of its internal contradictory character. The tension between its normative and descriptive aspects is perhaps the perennial problem of dialectic. This tension surfaces in the work of Engels who felt the necessity of articulating dialectical "laws" of society in order to convince the working classes of the inevitability of their historical position. The exact details of this need not concern us, but the law schema is interesting: a) The law of the resolution of a synthesis from a thesis and an antithesis.  

b) The law of the change from quantity to quality. 

c) The law of the interpenetration of opposites.

When Habermas talks of the dialectic of the individual and the general as constitutive of ego-identity he means something like (c) though the details of ego-formation must be established empirically. But Dilthey's framework is too "idealistic" to incorporate this. Obstruction and distortions of the processes of ego formation can not be conceptualised by him.
When Habermas talks of the difference between the context of instrumental action, where we proceed subject to transcendental rules ("technical" methods), and the context of communication where we proceed at the level of transcendental rules (in the medium of dialogue as the "dialogue which we are" in Gadamer's sense), he implies a vision of dialectic which may be superficially likened to (b). For example, nomological technical science may fall under the category of "quantity" requiring the "mathematisation" of nature in a Husserlian sense. The cultural and communicative sciences whose life basis emerges from "reflection" upon the unacknowledged intersubjective dimension of technical science may be regarded under the category of "quality". i.e. they have a transcendental basis, qualitatively different from natural science, which subsumes the latter. Admittedly this is somewhat artificial and suggestive.

When Habermas talks of critical emancipatory sciences as attempting to determine when theoretical statements grasp invariant regularities of social action as such and when they express ideologically frozen relations of dependence that can in principle be transformed the image of law (a) suggests itself. Hermeneutic and empirical analytic sciences are synthesised. (Horkheimer always claimed that traditional theory is preserved and transcended (aufgehoben) in CT. The relation between the empirical and the hermeneutic is not disjunctive). In KHI Habermas exhibits these three "nuances" of dialectics that in Engels appear as "laws". This might seem unsatisfactory. Is there no dialectical paradigm? It would seem not. The status of dialectics wavers between the ontological characterisation mentioned at the beginning and a "methodological" sense to which I shall now turn.

Methodologically the concept of dialectics lays claim to being a "way of knowing". What is this? Is it a rejection of or a supplement to formal
logic? Salleh cites on the one hand Marcuse and on the other, Levi-Strauss. For Marcuse, each logical proposition disguises a dialectical proposition about "reality". For Levi-Strauss dialectics is subsumed under formal logic. It is analytic reason attempting to "transcend" itself (in the development from "savage" to "scientific" thought). Between the poles represented by Marcuse and Levi-Strauss is the image of dialectical reason as a hermeneutic directed at clarifying mutual implications in the meaning of concepts. It is here that we may locate "analytic" TAs (so-called). Moreover, dialectics may have the practical and normative character of rhetoric and of imaginative conjecture. Dialectics in this sense pertains to a whole literary style which has practical intent. I paid lip-service to this style in my remarks at the beginning of this chapter. To some extent the fluidity of Habermas's concept of "dialogue" itself attests to this dialectical style. But in general critical theorists have stressed a reciprocal relation between method and ontology. CT is part of its own object domain. This is a fundamental product of historical consciousness. According to Salleh,

The insistence of the so-called historicists, pragmatists, voluntarists and others ... that the historical process itself enters into the very structure of the conceptual model is, for Althusser, nothing short of a denial of the possibility of authentic theorising 69

CT contrasts with this development of Marxism as a "science" which culminates in Althusser's programme. Nevertheless with Habermas we do encounter the need for "authentic theorising". Habermas does not want theoretical perspectives compromised by the historicism of Gadamerian hermeneutics. Adorno's conception of "negative dialectics" on the other hand, is a stark and extreme denial of even a limited form of "distance" between theorist and object since all theory for him is inherently positivist.
For Adorno, dialectics is purely a hermeneutic, existential negative activity which finds its idiom in literary modes of expression. At the other extreme we encounter a scientific, law-like conception of dialectics. Habermas is somewhere in between these two poles, with aspects of both dialectical "genres" in his work. Dialectics as a general attitude would seem to encompass the continuum from one pole to the other.

To return to the ontological conception of dialectics we might ask where the crucial dialectical processes in society are located. For the young Marx of The German Ideology it was the dialectical relationship of man with his sensuous natural environment. It is here that Habermas's interpretation of the "materialist conception of synthesis" is to be found. Habermas attempts to shrug off the inherent romanticism of this position by relocating it in his interpretation of Peirce. He also wants to locate the self-constitution of man at another more significant level. The mature Marx shifts the dialectic to an institutional level and to the struggle of social classes. While not bound by a class analysis, Habermas's move is similar, i.e. to the level of the communication community understood normatively. The former dialectic of man with nature is subsumed under that of man with man. But what does "subsumption" mean? It is central to dialectical thought and yet very general. According to Hegel,

To sublate (Aufheben) has a twofold meaning in the language: on the one hand it means to preserve to maintain and equally it also means to put an end to.... Thus what is sublated is at the same time preserved.

While I have stressed this notion of "aufheben" previously, it is thoroughly abstract. One might well ask in what sense is the positivist conception of natural science "aufgehoben" for Habermas? I shall attempt to answer this in the next chapter. However, while I have been concerned to
introduce a dialectical sensitivity into the appraisal of KHI, this is not enough. Consider the following representation of a dialectical relationship between society and nature,

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\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{SOCIETY} \\
\hline
\text{NATURE}
\end{array}
\]
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This still has to be interpreted. At the level of Habermas's transcendentalism it is not clear that we have the means to do this. Hence his later conception of KHI as "indirect". In recent work Habermas attempts to spell out the details of this dialectic at two levels which are intended to be mutually illuminating i.e. those of social and of individual development.

His reconstructions of Historical Materialism and of ontogenetic development are intended to support one another. In his interpretation of Dilthey we see an anticipation of the latter programme. The dialectical process in which individuals constitute themselves in dialogue is relocated from its hermeneutic setting to that of a specification of a logic of ego development which draws upon a variety of sources. The reconstruction of historical materialism is an attempt to mirror this logic at the level of social development. I cannot discuss the details of these programmes here. While they give content to the notion of dialectic which now recurs as a "developmental logic", they are fraught with difficulty. Both specify a highly normative end-point of development. Both abstract from the dynamics and "pathologies" of ego development and social evolution. To the extent that Habermas explicates a logic of development, he seems to be tied to the sort of implicit Hegelianism to which many of his commentators have been unsympathetic. Yet this "dialectic" is also normative, thus deliberately abstracting from developmental dynamics. It is this normative aspect which I wish to press as we turn to the original assessment of Habermas's status as a transcendental thinker.
In Chapter 2 the meta-critical structure of KHI was discussed and used to deny that Habermas has three discrete TAs. They form an interconnected triad. This was premissed upon the breakdown of the image of "analyticity" of TAs in general. The loss of the ideal of "deductivity" raised a tentative speculation about the potentially rhetorical and "imaginative" character of TAs, and their dialectical character in KHI. Furthermore, it was claimed that Habermas's transcendentalism necessarily accommodates notions of "ontological change" in Kürner's sense though this is highly normative in a critical-theoretical setting. What more is to be said of these speculations in the light of the claims of the present chapter?

To talk of Habermas in relation to dialectics is not to say he does not have "arguments" for his position. This would be unfair both to the concept of dialectic and to Habermas. The notion of dialectic as a whole style, important though it is, must not be taken to extremes.

Habermas's reflection upon the H-D account of explanation resembles that of many post-positivist critiques of it, though his derivation of the TI is not as radical. The character of Habermas's arguments here seem no more or less dialectical than many from within the mainstream analytic tradition. So it would be misleading to introduce dialectic as a new form of argument here. But it is obviously stronger than the image of conceptual analysis to which some critics have sought to reduce it.

Habermas's derivation of the PI on the other hand is dialectical in a more explicit sense. It is here that we saw in the discussion of Dilthey a highly normative notion of communication and an easy transition between two senses of dialogue, one that concerned the intersubjective sphere as such and another concerned with certain normative commitments associated with this sphere. The following passage dramatises this,

What raises us out of nature is the only thing whose
nature we can know: language. Through its structure autonomy and responsibility are posited for us. Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and unconstrained consensus.

In his theory of communication this claim reappears as the derivation of an ideal speech situation (ISS) as a deep lying norm of communication. I shall analyse this claim in Part III, but by way of anticipation we may note how non-analytical the TA is, how remote from the ideal of deductivity and how it forces a new idiom for appraising such claims. While I shall argue there is an explicatory aspect of this TA, the emphasis resides in its PRACTICAL and normative intent and hence in its dialectical style which bears a "family resemblance" to the rhetorical mode of Adorno. This will seem a surprising line to take given Habermas's recent aims to situate his theory within mainstream authorities.

A further aspect of the merging of dialogue II and dialogue III is that it appears that the EI really has no other content than that of the realisation of the PI. As we shall see in Chapter 9, Ricoeur's critique of the Gadamer-Habermas debate concludes just this, and he articulates a dialectical relation between hermeneutics and an immanent, anticipatory emancipatory element within it. This explains the sense in which hermeneutics is "aufgehoben" according to Habermas. From this I shall argue for a dialectical style in Habermas's TAs in which they are conceived as practical arguments. Applied to KHI this is the view that the "argument" for the EI is fundamental to the others, because the EI is central to the concept of metacritique. There will be a great deal of resistance to a conception of TAs as rhetorical and "practical". But why not? Our sacred cows of description, analysis and deduction no longer apply.

Let us now turn to the ontological aspect of dialectics. In general
terms we claimed dialectic to be a view of the dynamic and changing character of the world. Engels attempted to describe laws associated with the social world. However, for critical theory the dialectical processes of social change are characterised by struggle and transformation. According to Kortian, CT is premissed upon the failure of the Hegelian concept. It is also premissed upon the failure of the Marxist revolution. In other words while CT explicates a dialectic which is a model of ontological change it only anticipates a "synthesis" i.e. an emancipated end state. Unlike Hegel the logic of thesis-antithesis-synthesis is not a guaranteed movement. Nor is there in the work of critical theorists any faith in a historical subject such as the proletariat who perceive the "historical inevitability" of their position and task as Engels says. Such is the definitive experience of the dialectic of Enlightenment. Initially, the rise of positivism and the disenchantment of the world are emancipatory. However these contain the seeds for their opposite, namely the reciprocal enslavement of man by institutions. This in turn contains emancipatory potential which CT is concerned to articulate. In many instances this emancipatory potential is described in terms more appropriate to a spiritual mysticism than collective social change. i.e. it is difficult to see how "ontological reflections" issue in changed forms of "social praxis". For example Marcuse talks of the "silent potentiality" of the concept, and of a disproportion between "object" and concept. Yet there seems to be little optimism for a Hegelian "revenge of fate". Rather, such potentiality may only be anticipated. Yet it must be anticipated "immanently". This is the problem for Habermas's concept of the ISS. The dialectical concept of "contradiction" stresses its concretely immanent character, e.g. people's perceptions of their "real" interests. However, the danger is that the characterisation of the latter becomes non-immanent and external. At the
extreme they become the imposed values of neurotic intellectuals. They lose their dialectical character. Thus the issue of dialectic as anticipated is crucial and highly problematic. The spectre of affluence and of the totally socialised society is one that shakes the very roots of the methodology of critical theory, placing a great burden upon the concept of anticipation. In Part III I shall attempt to overcome this problem via an integration of the reflections upon dialectic as style and method as pursued above. For CT these levels of method and ontology are not distinct. For Habermas in KHI they underly his transcendentalism. Under the latter we have lost some basic distinctions between the "transcendental" and "empirical", descriptive and revisionary metaphysics. Dialectics is precisely the denial of such distinctions, and the claim that they are abstractions. As Habermas says,

Fundamental methodological decisions, for example such basic distinctions as those between categorial and non-categorial being, between analytic and synthetic statements or between descriptive and emotive meaning, have the single character of being neither arbitrary nor compelling. They prove appropriate or inap-

In a similar vein the timelessness or otherwise of TAs is a non-issue. For example "cognitive interests" emerge from an ontologically conceived life-
basis or lifeworld. No historical overview is possible ontologically though we may still regard cognitive interests as "universal". What are the criteria of "being appropriate"? In a sense Habermas ultimately considers the TAs in KHI as inappropriate and too indirect in the face of the need for a theory of communication. They provide a model for the "critique of ideology". They are inherently normative. After KHI the weight of this normative claim is carried by the concept of an ISS. Here the issues about transcendentalism and dialectics come to a head, but we must postpone them until Part III.
CHAPTER 5
Towards Emancipation

Labour and Interaction: Dualism or Dialectic?

In this section I wish to illustrate some of the claims made above by applying them to particular criticisms of Habermas. Let us begin with Keat who argues against the theory of cognitive interests. Considering the TI and PI together he claims,

If these two object domains differ solely by virtue of their different constitutive interests (operating presumably on the same uncategorised homogenous externality) what grounds can there be for rejecting a hermeneutics of nature i.e. for not choosing to constitute it via the practical interest . . . . The only grounds for refusing this possibility would involve abandoning altogether the constitutive interest doctrine i.e. it would have to maintain that nature and humans are themselves ontologically distinct independently of our interest determined categorial framework so that the application of hermeneutical categories is objectively mistaken and inappropriate.

In Chapter 3, Section V we considered precisely this type of account of cognitive interests and rejected it in favour of one which allows an "ontological fluidity" and a more dialectical model of their interrelation. Keat gives a too rigid and too Kantian account of the relation between cognitive interests. The diagrammatic representation which he gives illustrates this clearly. Keat puts both interests at the same level qua Kantian categories. His model is utterly without a sensitivity to the dialectical claims I have made above. A "human subject", apparently autonomous, confronts an uncategorised external manifold and "constitutes" two object domains via technical and practical "categories". Keat asks why we cannot have a hermeneutics of nature? But Habermas never says that we cannot. He only claims that this is not science. We may have different
Labour → TECHNICAL INTEREST → Technical Categories

HUMAN SUBJECT → Interaction → PRACTICAL INTEREST → Practical Categories

External Manifold

objectification → Object domain of empirical sciences. NATURE

Object domain of hermeneutical sciences. SOCIAL REALITY
attitudes to nature, only one of which is "theoretically fruitful". Habermas's notion of the "theoretically fruitful" character of technically constituted science remains largely unexplicated. However, this is not incompatible with a plausible form of realism. In effect Habermas is claiming that a hermeneutics of nature is not "theoretically fruitful" not for strong transcendental idealist reasons as Keat imagines but because of the way nature is. It is by identifying Habermas's position with Kant's in the "Transcendental Analytic" that this problem arises. Conversely Keat might have asked why not have a technical science of the social? But again Habermas does not deny this. Indeed it is the "scientisation of the life-world", mirrored in technically constituted social science, which is perceived as the problem facing critical theorists. This historical experience cannot be conceptualised on Keat's model. The TI and PI have a transcendental status for Habermas but this is not as Kantian categories. Rather, cognitive interests are the dimensions along which the species develops.

In the discussion of the materialist concept of synthesis it was seen that the notion of synthesis cannot retain its Kantian meaning. Nor can the external manifold be regarded as an utterly unprocessed givenness, though aspects of Habermas's interpretation of Peirce suggest this. Yet even if this were the case it is certainly not true that the PI confronts a manifold in the same way. Remember Habermas's, albeit obscure, claim that we move at the "level" of transcendental rules here and not, as with the TI, subject to them. What is meant is that "constitution" and "synthesis" are always reciprocal between subjects who interpret themselves and form themselves as well as understand others. The process of synthesis is two way and dynamic. This is Outhwaite's ontological sense of constitution. There is a dialectical relation between the "human subject" and social
reality which Keat misses by locating the former in a seeming position of autonomy and the latter as its transcendental "product". For Habermas the PI is an interest at a more fundamental level of reflection. The TI is a limit case of the PI. His appropriation of Dilthey, through a Gadamerian filter, is a source for this view, therefore it runs the risk of reducing the concept of a natural external world to that of social reality, (hermeneutics' own brand of reductionism!). This must be avoided. The concepts of nature and society are dialectically interrelated. Habermas does NOT argue for an ontological distinction between them through the TI and PI respectively. The history of the species attests to differential ontological outlooks e.g. animism, positivism, romanticism etc. (See the diagram on Page 72). Keat's model fails to conceptualise the species subject adequately, for this itself is constituted dialectically between a naturalistic and a cultural-communicative basis.

Notice how Keat's model gives rise to the dilemma of quasi-transcendentalism which defines the scope of Part II of this work. What is the status of his conception of the "human subject"? It both "constitutes" the empirical sciences as transcendental subject and yet is also comprehended under the latter as a natural subject. But this problem only arises on this neo-Kantian idealist model. The species subject is both continuous with and distinct from nature and reproduces itself along the dimensions of cognitive interests. While it is empirically comprehensible within an evolutionary theory this does not subsume it under empirical analytic science. In Section III I shall return to this question of what Habermas calls a non-objectivating science of man and its application to the dilemma.

To summarise: Keat's model is too inherently idealist and too Kantian in a strong sense. Cognitive interests are much more like Kant's concept of regulative ideas than like categories. I shall discuss regulative ideas
in Chapter 7. However, while the model of the relation between cognitive interests has been made clearer, the details of some associated concepts have not; for example "labour" and "interaction". Thompson raises objections to Habermas's distinction between them as two action types. It is questionable whether these types ever appear in a pure form in the sense that they could be instantiated independently of one another. According to Thompson, Labour and Interaction involve "monological" and "dialogical" uses of language respectively. However, as we have seen, the senses of monologue and dialogue are not clear either. Thompson offers a putative example of labour. It is the action of the chemical engineer who operates with the following rule: 

\[(R) \times \text{cc of catalyst activates } Y \text{ litres of resin at } N^\circ \text{ Centigrade}\].

Thompson claims that despite the fact that this is a specialised language it is nevertheless still a language,

in so far as it is used to exchange information and ideas within a community of individuals it is in some sense dialogic 9

But in what sense? Not Dialogue III as I have defined it certainly i.e. containing a highly normative concept of person. It it much more like Dialogue II i.e. stressing the dimension of intersubjectivity. (Habermas says that all labour is social labour). Thompson's worries are an understandable product of the fluidity of the concept of "dialogue". Habermas would regard the example above as "monologic" relative to Dialogue III.

Turning to the concept of interaction Thompson also claims that this is infected with purposive rational elements. It is difficult to think of a form of interaction which is not in some sense strategic. This is a fair point. Having its derivation in Habermas's appropriation of Dilthey, "interaction" emerges as something like understanding for its own sake. 10 Yet this is clearly not the dominant mode of interaction in families for example. (Remember Habermas's appropriation of the young Hegel's category
of the "family" as somehow paradigmatic of interaction\textsuperscript{11}. Thompson is sceptical of the value of one of the rare empirical examples that Habermas offers,

Habermas suggests that when strategic action is placed within an institutional framework like the Hague convention then its purposive rational character is eclipsed by an implicit consensus which constitutes the action as communicative\textsuperscript{12}

Thompson proceeds to argue that war and peace negotiations are simply not like this, and the centrality of language to communication does not suffice to distinguish labour and interaction. In my terms this is to claim that Dialogue I and Dialogue II are inadequate to distinguish them. Indeed these conceptions of dialogue correspond to the position occupied by Wittgenstein and ordinary language philosophy in the teleological structure of Thompson's book. Critical Theory is an attack upon the implicit conservatism of this philosophy.

It is with Dialogue III that the labour/interaction distinction gets what force and plausibility it possesses. Habermas faces the problem of, the expansion of the rational form of science and technology ... to the proportions of a life form\textsuperscript{13}

It is in the context of this social and institutionally conceived problem that Habermas introduces his action typology. The social world is rationalised in a Weberian sense in the modern Capitalist period and, men lose consciousness of the dualism of work and interaction\textsuperscript{14}

Thompson claims that strictly speaking this dualism cannot be maintained. But perhaps Habermas would admit this. For instance he says, the structure of one of the two types of action, namely the behavioural system of purposive rational action not only predominates over the institutional framework but gradually absorbs communicative action as such\textsuperscript{15}

Thompson might now object that the very description and idiom of the
absorption of one action type by the other still presupposes the dualism in question. Admittedly this objection has force. However, I wish to suggest that the action typology may be plausible as a dialectically related notion. The distinction between labour and interaction is not a DESCRIPTION of existing modes of action. It is normative and "critical". What is important is not so much a distinction in types of action as a projection of changed human relations. The locus classicus for this is Hegel's slave/master dialectic, and it is important to see this conception underlying Habermas's developmental-logical programmes. According to Bubner, the dialectic between master and slave resolves the unequal distribution of roles evident between them via a process of reflective "debate" in which they mutually recognise one another as subjects. This reciprocal realisation relinquishes their existence as separate subjects. In a sense this "idealistically ensured" improvement of social relations reappears in Habermas's concept of an ideal speech situation as an anticipation of a better life. I shall deal with the ISS in Part III. However, we may regard Habermas's concept of interaction as bound up with an ideal of changed social relationships in which we confront the other as an equal partner in dialogue. Examples of dialogue in this sense will naturally be hard to find. This normative element of the meaning of interaction is important. It is expanded in Habermas's theory of communication and the action typology is refined in various ways. The details of these refinements are less important than the general point concerning the dialectic of the two general action types, which underlies Habermas's reconstruction of historical materialism.

II The Aufhebung of Natural Science

This dissertation has been concerned to rehabilitate sensitivity to
dialectics in Habermas's transcendental approach in KHI, but so far particular details have not been discussed. In what way does Habermas regard the TI and natural science as "aufgehoben" in Hegel's sense (see Page 114)? In what sense does emancipation transform and resituate the TI and natural science if at all? I believe there is a deep ambiguity in Habermas's position here.

According to Ottman, the TI reveals and thereby constitutes nature as a "purpose-for-us". Yet in its "refusal of boundless control" it also reveals a "purpose-for-itself". According to Ottman we must formulate the epistemological status of the TI so as to conceptualise a nature "beyond control" i.e. a nature-in-itself. In the language of analytic philosophy, we must conceptualise an external world that governs the truth and falsity of our sentences. But what are the details of this conceptualisation? We saw, via an interpretation of Peirce, that it seemed anaemic in constitution - merely a way of denoting the resistant character of reality. Habermas wants to deny a conceptualisation of this which implies an "object domain" for a non-technical science of nature. Habermas attributes such a programme to Marcuse. Habermas claims that the hope for an alternative technology is tantamount to the resurrection of a "fallen" nature and to the establishment of dialogic relations with nature. Habermas counters with an epistemological claim that a "non-objectivating technology" is unthinkable. While we may have different "attitudes" to nature, only one, that of the TI, is "theoretically fruitful". (This is the heart of Habermas's realism.). Habermas wants to claim that the epistemological framework of science remains constant and that the issues raised by Marcuse and ecologically orientated thinkers are properly ethical (i.e. practical) issues. Though such issues are important, Habermas claims that they do not affect the epistemological account of natural science.
A variety of objections have been raised against Habermas, particularly against the overtly positivistic character of his conception of scientific theory. Habermas seems to derive the TI via reflection upon the logical form of scientific theories and the structure of instrumental action. Lessnoff and Stockman among others object to this. Following a Bhaskarian strong realism, Stockman questions the empiricist assumption of "closure". That is to say, a distinction is made between "closed" and "open" systems. Bhaskar regards the former as the ontological assumption that there exist systems in which the constant conjunction of events obtain. However, he claims that this is really only appropriate to the "moment" of theory in which closed systems are artificially established in experimentation to enable access to the enduring and continually active causal mechanisms of the world. This is distinct from the "open-systemic" applications of theory in which the results of theory are used to explain, predict and diagnose the phenomena of the world. The plausibility of this distinction is vital to Bhaskar's realism. It is not possible to discuss it more fully here. It is necessary only to recognise the use Stockman makes of the distinction to criticise Habermas. According to Stockman,

If scientific theories can only be interpreted as empirical covariances, and hence scientific knowledge as possible predictive knowledge, in closed systems and if therefore there is a gap between theoretical knowledge and its open systemic applications, then the structure of experimental activity cannot be used to derive technical control as the interest guiding and constituting scientific knowledge.

Stockman's distinction between an attitude to theories whose truth claims need testing, and a "technical" attitude in which such suspension of truth is itself suspended, corresponds to Habermas's later crucial distinction between discourse and action. However it is not clear that Habermas's earlier KHI account is incompatible with a realist position. Remembering
the claims made above that Habermas's transcendentalism is more like Kant's regulative approach, then his claim that observable bodies are simultaneously instrumental bodies need not be taken as a non-realist ontological claim. However, Stockman is correct to note that while technology may be necessary for survival in some sense, it is by no means clear that articulate theory and experimentation are.

There is another strand in Stockman's critique. He wants to demonstrate the historical particularity of the TI. He historicises the relation between science and technology by claiming that the empirical theory of science is a product of a low level of technical development. Against this, a realist theory is appropriate when the material forces of inquiry are well developed. Stockman refers to *Paris Manuscripts* where Marx claims that estranged labour, within the alienated division of labour, enforces a "partial" relation to nature and prevents a universal one. Stockman interprets the concept of the TI as a universalisation of what is properly a partial and alienated form of technical action. It is in this sense that Habermas's appropriation of the positivist theory of science prevents the "real openness" of man's relation to nature and establishes only a partial relation. According to Stockman, a universal relationship with the environment must be built into technical action. The latter must be reflexive in some sense and must see itself as the co-creator of its own conditions. The *aufhebung* of natural science for Stockman issues in a technology which assumes the form of a "more comprehensive environmental planning". He claims that the distinction between Marcuse's demand for a fundamental transformation of science and Habermas's retention of the core of the TI is too vague. However, one senses a great deal of fast footwork in Stockman's arguments. They are generally difficult to assess. The following points stand out:
a) The "sociological" programme which relativises the accounts of the logic of inquiry to material conditions of inquiry does not fit easily with Stockman's "philosophical" endorsement of some form of realism.

b) What is Marx's notion of a "universal" relation to nature? Firstly, this seems to be an ethical notion concerned with human social relations. Marx regarded the slave/master dialectic as the "source and secret of" Hegel and he relocates it in his reconstruction of historical class conflicts.²⁷ It is not technology as such which is exploitative and alienating. Secondly Stockman confuses two senses of universal here. One distinction between the universal and particular is in terms of timeless and non-timeless states of affairs. The Marxist distinction is more like that between non-alienated and alienated states of affairs. Habermas may universalise the TI in the former sense as an interest of the species at the heart of its self-formation. However, he does not universalise it in the second. Indeed, he claims quite the reverse. The domination of the TI at the institutional level and its alienating effect upon social relations is the core experience of CT.

c) Having argued against what he perceives to be Habermas's derivation of a TI from a positivist conception of explanation, Stockman "derives" his notion of "comprehensive environmental planning" from a realist theory of science. But the latter claim is even more suspect than that of Habermas. When Stockman talks of the "real openness" of man's relation to nature this is much more as an ethical exhortation, than as something inherent in a realist theory of science.

d) Stockman and Lessnoff overlook the plausible core of the TI in Peirce's sense of the idea of a feedback control mechanism in science. A realist theory of science could not deny this minimal empiricism.

I believe the claim under (c) to be important, since although Habermas
has conceded certain objections to his position in KHI concerning his positivistic conception of natural science, he denies that the vision of an alternative natural science is viable. Before considering this in detail we must examine Habermas's "realism" and his reworking of the consensus theory of truth.

Habermas is accused of endorsing an instrumentalist conception of scientific theory in KHI. He responds by distinguishing between action and discourse. This distinction marks the break with the theory of knowledge constitutive interests, and the transition to the theory of communication. Action in general concerns the pre-reflective following of rules. Discourse involves argumentation orientated towards the establishment of truth. Meaning is conceived pragmatically i.e. via an essential relation to a transcendently constituted object domain. Truth is linked on the other hand to intersubjective consensus. Habermas's transcendentalism is anti-realistic in a naive sense of realism. The notion of "constitution" denies an antecedently given domain of objects to which somehow "true statements" refer directly. We have talked of a "semiotic input" in Peirce's sense, "transcendental matter" in Kant's, and of the possibility of conceptualising a nature beyond control. These formulations have been marked by an implicit metaphysical idealism. Hesse reinterprets these notions, following Habermas's Postscript to KHI, as the claim that there are no true statements independant of cognitive interests. The "constitution" of possible objects of experience is the result of a "systematic interplay of sense-reception, action and linguistic representation". Habermas's transcendentalism is a naturalised strategy. He distinguishes between two levels of experience: 1) SENSORY EXPERIENCE. An experience can only be expressed in statements. There is, according to Habermas, a smooth transition from the act of
observation to that of expression. 32

2) COMMUNICATIVE EXPERIENCE. Here we find a further distinction between

i) The establishment of interpersonal relations by "participants in
dialogue".

ii) An attitude which focuses upon the content of a proposition
expressed with regard to its validity.

This distinction is intended as a more systematic explication of issues
raised via the historical approach of KHI to Peirce and Dilthey. Under
"sensory experience" Habermas locates the methodological paradigm of
"observation". He believes that analysis reveals a transcendental link
between this level of experience and instrumental action. Similarly under
communicative experience he talks of the hermeneutical paradigm of
"narration" and believes this has a "transcendental link" to structures of
communicative action. Thus, while observable bodies are at the same time
instrumentally manipulable bodies, persons who are subjects of understanding
are simultaneously participants in linguistic tradition, though they may
also be objects of instrumental action. Thus,

We create two fundamental object domains by
rendering the same set of categories (or
cognitive schemata) in the realms of instrumental
or communicative action 33

Habermas regards cognitive interests as providing the connection between the
modes of action and experience specified above and theoretical knowledge
achieved in the realm of discourse. This is intended to rebut the charge
of instrumentalism and to show

the latent nexus between action and theoretical
knowledge. (Cognitive interests) are responsible
for the transformation of opinions into theorems
and for the retransformation of theorems
into knowledge orientated towards action 34

Nevertheless, the nature of this link between discourse and action is not
made convincing and the significance of cognitive interests diminishes in
Habermas's system at this point. It is interesting to see that sensory experience, though a form of "direct" contact with the natural world, is subsumed under communicative experience in the same way the TI is subsumed by the PI. This subsumption issues in a consensus theory of truth. However, Hesse detects in Habermas's work a residual "correspondence" element. For Habermas empirical language mediates between animal learning and discursive argumentation. Language raises us out of nature. However, the nature of the continuity with nature is not made clear. Questions of truth enter at the level of discourse only. While Habermas's strategy is overtly an anti-correspondence theory, Hesse asks how we can conceive of language learning without an appeal to correspondence? Locke's correspondence model of language learning via discrete ideas seems to make communication doubtful. On the other hand a model of language as essentially public renders learning problematic. We need a theory that adequately relates both. Using structuralist terminology, Habermas talks of a "pragmatic semiotics", but leaves problems about how language is learnt. He says of elementary empirical propositions such as "This Ball is red" that their verification is "grounded" in the experience of handling a red ball. But what does this mean? The level of sensory experience here cannot be radically separated from discursive verification. Rather, this example appears as a limiting case of it. The "grounding" of which Habermas speaks is most evident in this example but is present in all empirical language. It is a residual and ineliminable point of "reference" to the external world. Truth as intersubjective consensus is most plausible where this element of correspondence is weakest e.g. in complex statements of theoretical physics. In a sense the problem is one of the choice of paradigmatic examples. But as Hesse says,
There is no language or learning of language without truth claims that are both grounded in experience and linguistic habit and are the result of discursive argumentation.

I believe that Peirce intends as much when he talks of "semiotical input" into the linguistic realm. This is his linguistic reorientation of Kant.

There is something that makes our sentences true or false. But truth is determined by consensus. Putting these two claims together without reimplicating metaphysical realism defines the central problem of modern philosophy of science!

Hesse's claims go against the tendency of hermeneutics to reduce the natural to the social world. This reduction takes place if the subsumption of the TI by the PI is taken too strongly. Just as the TI is a limit of the PI in Habermas's terms, so too is the truth of statements like "This Ball is red" a limit of a consensus theory of truth. Similarly sensory experience is a "limit" of communicative experience. The imagery of "limits" is a dialectical image. A notion of aufgehoben and reinterpreted as a "limit" of the larger one that subsumes it. Debates on theories of truth are pointless without a sensitivity to this.

Hesse applies this interpretation of Habermas to current problems in the philosophy of science concerning "meaning variance" and "theory ladenness". I shall not discuss this. However, if a residual "correspondence" is a limit of a consensus theory of truth at one end of a spectrum, there is still another end to be considered. A consensus theory of truth subsumes the TI under the PI in a general sense. But whose consensus counts? That of the scientific community would seem most obvious. Yet the scientific community is part of a wider social community. The limits between them are blurred. Hesse pursues this idea in a particular way. Since scientific theories are underdetermined by empirical
evidence, other criteria of choice and appraisal come into play. Hesse claims that these criteria may arise from a communicative relationship between the scientist and society at large. Theoretical science is part of the human goal of reflective and intersubjective understanding, an understanding in which hermeneutics and "critical" sciences also play a role. As such it is constituted by norms and values as well as by empirical facts. Hesse claims that theories reflect a "contemplative interest" in the sense that Durkheim gives to symbolic representations. They unify man's understanding of himself and his interaction with his group in relation to both natural and social sciences. According to this conception theoretical science incorporates general views of the natural and social worlds (e.g. the "Naked" ape image) and relates not just to "residues" of "correspondence", but to a medium of human communication about nature and society. Relativism in an extreme sense is avoided by recognising the norm of "empirical commitment" which differentiates Newtonian theory from belief in witches, though this does not "relegate" the latter to nonsense relative to an overarching rationality. Alien belief systems may be regarded simply as not primitive proto-science. 39

Hesse's claims in one sense blur the borderline between the TI and PI. Though TI reflects the "core" of empirical commitment, natural science is not exclusively determined by this. On this account, natural science is not "aufgehoben", but the positivist account of it is. However, the subsumption of the TI under the PI is not conceived by Habermas in KHI as a move to a radical post-positivist philosophy of science. The communicative relations between scientific community and society are not really discussed. It is curious and rather disappointing that Habermas fails to take note of Hesse's claims and, in reply, uncritically invokes Weber's threefold conception of cultural modernity, 40 differentiated by the
independent spheres of value i.e. science, morality and art. But why should this be convincing at all? Hesse claims that we cannot make these radical distinctions sharply, although we need not be pushed to the extreme of assimilating the natural to the social sciences. Some explanation, though not justification, for Habermas's response is to be found in his general worry about a regression to a form of animism and re-enchantment of the natural world. That is, he defends "enlightened positivism". He seems to read such a re-enchantment into Hesse's position. This misunderstands the realism inherent in the latter position - itself derived from hints in Habermas's own programme!

We initiated these reflections with Ottman's misgivings about the status of "nature-in-itself" which for Habermas is a logical place-holder for realism, not the domain of an alternative non-objectivating science of nature. These reflections upon Habermas's conception of natural science indicate the sense in which the "quasi-transcendentalism" of cognitive interests is non-Kantian in the strong sense indicated in Section I above. We must now turn to the so-called dilemma of Habermas's transcendentalism in the light of these conclusions.

III A Dilemma Dissolved

In his reply to his critics Habermas acknowledges McCarthy's account of the paradoxes of his epistemological concept of nature. McCarthy claims that

Either subjective bodily nature is not a prior condition of the possibility of cognition or it is and we cannot know it. In either case the theory of interests is untenable

This is a blunt formulation of the dilemma of the quasi-transcendental status of cognitive interests. Again
Habermas acknowledges the dual role that his concept of nature is intended to play. It is both a basic concept supporting evolutionary materialism and an epistemological "limit" concept. How can these two aspects be put together? Habermas claims that his use of the Kantian locution of nature-in-itself was ironic. (Unfortunately this has led to extremely "idealistic" interpretations of his theory of cognitive interests e.g. Keat's). Rather, he claims that it denotes the resistant character of reality, and not a noumenal realm of objects. Indeed, this pragmatist orientation rejects the construct of a transcendental consciousness. Subjective bodily nature itself emerges from "nature-in-itself as the natural history of the species. This latter aspect of nature-in-itself is a POSTULATE of epistemological reflection and not the result of empirical research. What does Habermas mean by this?

This postulate establishes a perspective from which a reconstruction of natural history can be undertaken as a pre-history of the social cultural form of life.

It establishes a theoretical research programme. Now, nature as "constituted" is known subject to the conditions of instrumental action. On the other hand nature in the sense of the pre-history of social and cultural life is known in "reflection". Thus

the apparent circle is broken only by the power of reflection. Although we can't take up a position beneath or outside of the structures of thought and action we can grasp them reflectively from inside.

However, these claims are not immediately clear. What is the relation between empirical inquiry into human nature subject to the TI and these life-structures encountered in "reflection"? It is important to see that Habermas's claims here apply to a theory of SOCIAL evolution and not to a
Habermas claims that such a theory of evolution as this cannot be developed within the transcendental framework of "objectifying" sciences. But these remarks by Habermas are programmatic and do not resolve problems of the status of natural evolutionary theories which he does not address directly. The discussion might be aided at this point by Outhwaite's thematic distinction between "epistemic constitution" and "ontological constitution". The former concerns the constitutive activities of specialist inquirers (relatively "specialist" in the case of the hermeneutic sciences). The latter is the proper domain of a theory of social evolution, which ideally would give an account of how the epistemic constitutive aspects of the sciences are dialectically related to the ontologically constitutive activities of all (labouring) subjects. The important point here is that the two senses of constitution may be located at different levels. Therefore, while the status of a non-objectivating science of society remains unclear we need not demand that it be assimilated to either cognitive interest, or at least not to the technical interest. According to Habermas, Schelling's philosophy of nature (which must be understood in a general sense as a pre-cursor of Darwin) involves a privative access to natura naturans that is guided by a pre-understanding of the life-world that is specific to humans. Habermas hints that theories of evolution, biological or social, have a
general methodological feature. Any reconstruction of a developmental process involves a hermeneutical element in the sense that the reconstruction is constituted from the "horizon" of its end point. Furthermore such reconstructions and general theories may be highly under-determined by evidence in the way Hesse describes. The additional criteria which determine them may be a variety of norms and values. Indeed such theories may be ideological in the sense of legitimating as "natural" an existing structure of society. (Obviously Habermas's own reconstruction of historical materialism wants to avoid this). According to Habermas such enterprises are "interpretative" and "reflective". However, it is not clear that he wants to locate biological theories of evolution in this "reflective" category. They are "objectivating" theories in his sense. This is the general category which replaces the role of the TI. However, it is in precisely such theories as these that the distinction between objectivating and non-objectivating (rationally reconstructive) theories is blurred. Habermas's failure to perceive this reflects his overriding worry about regression to a re-enchantment of the world.

According to Habermas, a non-objectivating, hermeneutic account of natural history shifts the boundary of interpretative science lower on the scale of nature than the point at which the socio cultural form of life emerges. In this sense, and as we established above (see Chapter 3 Section V), the theory of cognitive interests does not define the boundaries between the human and the non-human. While Habermas accepts the possibility of such a hermeneutics of nature, he regards as problematic the extent to which such a perspective can "penetrate" nature. Unlike Keat's implication that Habermas claims to know this a priori, this question of the "theoretical fruits" of the Naturphilosophie tradition is answered by nature itself. Habermas reflects upon the history of science and concludes that this "tradition"
which treats nature as a subject is apocryphal i.e. it fails certain
pragmatic criteria of success. This may be a harsh reading of all Natur-
philosophen though probably justified in the case of Schelling. Furthermore,
that tradition appropriated the emerging biological sciences as paradigms
though in a developed form they fall under Habermas's category of
"objectivating" science and fulfill certain criteria of instrumental success.

According to Habermas, the ecologically based worries about the status
of "nature-in-itself" in his system are ultimately ethical and not
epistemological. We saw how Stockman's ethical demands simply do not
follow from his realist epistemology. Habermas claims that the notion of
nature-in-itself is a limit concept of a "discourse" ethic (the details of
which I shall discuss in Chapter 8). He claims that nature-in-itself
cannot become a theme within the perspective of an "ethical universalism"
in which subjects are restricted to interpersonal relations. However, we
cannot separate out anthropocentrically our moral dealings with nature.

Rather,

Compassion and solidarity do however, appear in a
discourse ethic that is consistently thought
through to the end at least as limit concepts

Such limit concepts suggest that a discourse ethic can be extended, though
only analogically, into the realm of nature. According to Habermas, this
is not an absurd idea but the egalitarian notion of reciprocity inherent
in communication (specified by the ISS) cannot be strictly transferred.
However, Habermas stumbles upon an utterly crucial problem for the discourse
ethic. Who are the "subjects" of such a conception? If we include future
generations, we imply a universalism which is unattainable in principle.

But according to Habermas

Those born later can compensate for the contradic-
tion contained in the idea itself only by
supplementing the abstract thought of universality
with the anamnetic power of a remembering that goes beyond concepts of morality itself

But this issue is fundamental and local. Who constitutes the relevant ethical community? Do we include actual or potential participants? Can we give an account of potentiality that differentiates between our attitudes to healthy babies, mentally deficient adults, dogs and cats, trees and so on. There are great problems. Do we reconstruct or preserve our moral intuitions about these things? Habermas's claim that compassion and solidarity may be limit concepts of a discourse ethic, ignores the sense in which such "limits" are ethically negotiable. They involve substantive not formal issues.

Ottman and Stockman might question Habermas's reduction of the ecologically orientated perspective to that of ethics. What counts as "theoretically fruitful" is a normative element of scientific theories. Stockman and Ottman do not seem to deny that openness to empirical testing, which feeds back into theory, is an important dimension of theory appraisal. However, if what Hesse says is true, then there may be other factors in such appraisal. The ecologists might wish to incorporate a notion of "conduciveness to long term survival". Habermas claims that we could not "survive" in some sense without the "unnatural idea of truth". If this is understood as "theoretical truth" it is not immediately clear what Habermas means. Primitive cultures have survived without highly developed natural science. Habermas seems only to "describe" the experience of the West. Moreover, the whole concept of "survival" is normative. The ecologist would add that the "unnatural idea of truth" may be detrimental to long run survival.

In a deep sense it is the very concept of epistemology which is at stake in these issues. We have already seen how Habermas fails to
radicalise his epistemology of science in a crucial way. His perception of these issues is blunted by the concern to prevent a "romantic" science of nature. To this extent I regard the debate with Marcuse, and the sense of confrontation that we can discern with a position such as Stockman's, as inconclusive. The communication community embraces the scientific community. The former is also the sphere of a discourse ethic. Yet the relation between such a discourse ethic and the epistemology of natural science is not explored by Habermas. To this extent it is he who regresses to a Kantian division between theoretical and practical reason.

In conclusion I wish to return to the so-called dilemma of quasi-transcendentalism. It should now be very clear that this dilemma only arises on an "idealist" model of transcendentalism. This is how the problem of the status of nature-in-itself has generated so much heat. However, Habermas's transcendentalism must also be understood in the light of his remarks about the "reflective" status of "non-objectivating" theories of social evolution.

The unavoidable (for the time being) circle in which we have to move as soon as we tackle problems that are equivalent to the traditional problem of ultimate foundations ... may be a sign that among other things the concepts "contingent-necessity" are no longer sharply separable at this level of argumentation. Presumably assertions about the contingency or necessity of the human race or the world as a whole are meaningless.

Thus, not only is Habermas's transcendentalism dislodged from the idealist pole (see Page 48 ), the very idea that one pole or other must have priority is dissolved. With this understanding the dilemma cannot be formulated. Only via the idiom of foundationalism does it make sense. In a footnote McCarthy draws back from this conclusion and suggests an ambiguity in Habermas's stance. He believes that the spectre of foundationalist philosophy haunts the theory of cognitive interests despite
pronouncements of the kind above. However, the "circle" mentioned in the quotation above is only problematic from the perspective of a foundationalist model. Such circularity may be an essential and virtuous feature of a new and deeply hermeneutic conception of transcendentalism. The dilemma is a product of the hasty generalisation of Kantian elements in Habermas's concept of the TI over the whole field of cognitive interests. But this generalisation is untenable and probably would not have occurred had the centre of interpretational gravity been Habermas's explication of the PI. Habermas's TAs are in a sense hermeneutically "circular". What is "given" is the point of departure for a deeper reflection upon its conditions, which in turn "reinterpret" the "givenness" of the "conditioned". Or in less abstract terms, Habermas's TAs are not analytic, they are practical. The aim is not to describe the world but to change it. This is the thrust of Hegelian metacritique as we saw in Chapter 2. Natural science is given. The TI as its condition is derived. This argument reinterprets the sense in which natural science is given and limits it relative to other forms of knowledge.

Despite Habermas's talk of the universality and necessitarian character of cognitive interests, I believe we must take seriously his denial of traditional notions of necessity/contingency etc. and thereby remove cognitive interests from the framework of traditional "foundationalist" philosophy. Since Rorty attacks the latter, it may then be possible to talk of a transcendental programme which is immune to his deconstructionism, and for which Habermas's KHI is a locus classicus. I shall suggest this in Chapter 10.

IV A reappraisal of Transcendental Anthropology

In order to illustrate the conclusions of the preceding section I wish
to apply them to Lendhardt's critique of Habermas. According to Lendhardt, KHI represents an anomaly in the development of Habermas's thought. Habermas's transition to a communications theory is described as coming "full circle" and returning to a position similar to his early rejection of a priorist anthropology (held in common with other members of the Frankfurt School). This is a rejection of the "ontological" and uncritical aspects of philosophical anthropology involving a definition of man's essence. Lendhardt claims that Habermas's position in KHI is extremely ambiguous. On the one hand Habermas claims that Marx was correct to relativise the concept of "man" in the Paris Manuscripts. On the other hand he claims that, while Marx did specify an invariant relationship between man and nature, it was not broad enough.

This position both absolves Marx from the charge of anthropological reductionism and reintroduces anthropology on a different plane. But Lendhardt's objections are not clear. Habermas's claims must be weaker than a definition of the essence of man. The triadic scheme of interests is somehow a critique of "essence", or rather a critique of the idea that rational man in the means-end, instrumental mould is the "essence" of man. Habermas is at great pains to distance himself from some of Marx's claims. In the diagram on Page 72, the dynamic and interrelated character of the cognitive interests is represented. This is no static definition of man. Rather, it attempts to explicate possibilities for man inherent in the emancipatory interest. Lendhardt claims that KHI is silent about the concrete configurations that such interests have realised in the world. This is true. KHI is probably a highly indirect way of reconstructing historical materialism. However, the metacritical import of the triadic scheme is surely not on the same level as the a priorist anthropology that is criticised by the Frankfurt School. The model of "ontological variability"
that I have offered ought to allay fears of such essentialism, although the very word "ontology" seems to produce a violent reaction in the likes of Adorno.

Lendhardt confesses his confusion over the status of cognitive interests. He notes that on the one hand we must "postulate" such interests in order to understand the current division of labour between the natural and cultural sciences. On the other hand, in an evolutionary sense these interests have given rise to two forms of science. Cognitive interests are both a priori and contingent. However, given that the PI and the EI are highly questionable as purely contingent claims, then the postulatory a priori aspect is important. Such "interests" purport to be more than a description of the history of the human species. Lendhardt drives too sharp a wedge between the a priori and empirical aspects of cognitive interests. But this is a distinction that we can no longer make absolutely. 54

Lendhardt acknowledges the derivative character of the EI, as a meta-interest in the interplay between the TI and PI since their concrete development is problematic. However, he is wrong to say that at a transcendental level one cognitive interest is as "rational" as the other and that the model of cognitive interests is thereby "liberal". Certainly there is an abstractness in the concept of metacritique that I have developed. There are substantive issues which Habermas's transcendentalism does not address. However, this does not have the "liberal" features that Lendhardt suggests. It is only a strong Kantian reading of the status of cognitive interests (like Keat's) which has this consequence. Lendhardt seems insensitive to the overall "critical" context of Habermas's transcendentalism. He suggests that conditions of affluence undermine the legitimacy of a primordial interest in the repression and conquest of
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nature. However, it is a critical "analysis" of this state of affluence that is basic for CT. Habermas's transcendentalism is revisionary. It is not concerned to re-redescribe the "affluent" social lifeworld (of the West) but to penetrate to the level of some fundamental structures, cognitive interests, which also disclose the potential for change. While this inventory of "transcendental abilities" cannot give weight to the alternatives, it initiates a framework within which such a question can be raised. Admittedly, Habermas's reorientation of his programme towards a theory of communication, concedes the force of Lendhardt's objection that his transcendentalism is too abstract.

Lendhardt's critique betrays certain very traditional "hang-ups" about transcendental thinking which I have attempted to dissolve. Such attitudes are usually triggered at the sight of words like "invariant" and "necessary". Since Körner's critique of TAs it seems that we are entitled to talk in this way only in a limited context. The "necessity" in question is a hypothetical "necessity". The idiom of "necessity" reveals not a programme for timeless truth, but may be retained as a(rhetorical?) provocation. Such a provocation is located, in Gadamer's deep ontological sense, within a "horizon" of understanding. From this horizon we attempt to gain access to and interpret a contemporary social problematic via a systematic reconstruction of social history up to this point and beyond it. (In Chapter 9 I expand on this and draw upon suggestions by Ricoeur which situate Habermas's transcendentalism relative to Gadamer's hermeneutics of tradition). Habermas's transcendentalism has a greater continuity with the general project of reconstructing historical materialism than is realised. This is realised when we are forced to displace our conception of transcendentalism from its "traditional" context.

I find it utterly bizarre that Lendhardt breathes a visible sigh of
relief when Habermas turns to the paradigm of rational reconstruction and away from transcendentalism. In the next chapter I wish to show that this is far from being unproblematic. Indeed there are strong continuities between the transcendental and rationally reconstructive paradigms that suggest that the title of Lendhardt's article - "The Rise and Fall of Transcendental Anthropology" is overdramatic. It is hermeneutically suspect to talk of KHI as an "anomalous" feature of Habermas's opus.

This section has postponed some fairly crucial methodological issues in favour of what might seem a defence of Habermas that is of marginal interest. For instance, the status of "reflective" and "non-objectivating" theories has not been made clear. Are they thoroughly hermeneutic? In a sense Habermas's claims for the theoretical perspectives inherent in rational reconstruction attempt to go beyond hermeneutics. This is the realm of Habermas's dispute with Gadamer. However, I feel that these issues are most fruitfully discussed in the context of Habermas's theory of communication. The latter dissolves the triadic scheme of interests and relocates the EI as a presupposition of communication. Some parting comments on the EI as it relates to KHI will close Part II of my argument.

V The Emancipatory Interest

Little has so far been said directly about the EI. I do not intend however to discuss Habermas's interpretation of Freud. This has been done elsewhere by others. Rather, Chapter 9 of KHI seems a more provocative source. According to Habermas,

The concept of "interest" is not meant to imply a naturalistic reduction of transcendental logical properties to empirical ones

Cognitive interests mediate the natural history of the human species with a logic, not yet specified in KHI, of its self-formation. Some commentators
have had difficulty over the concept of "interest". This is more than the psychological interests or biological needs that individuals have.

According to Habermas and Apel what goes on "in the heads of scientists" is somehow irrelevant to the status of cognitive interests. (In this sense Outhwaite's distinction between epistemic and ontological senses of constitution may be blurred. The former is not "intentional" action).

Lessnoff talks of the TI as "applied" by scientists who have the "intention" to use knowledge. He seems to miss the point but thereby raises a problem. There are many notions in the history of metaphysics and transcendental philosophy that we may only comprehend via analogy, metaphor or some form of semantic extension. The example which comes to mind is Kant's notion of "synthesis" and worries about whether it refers to some psychologically "real" process. It seems only comprehensible by analogy with such a process. Similarly, it may only be possible to comprehend Habermas's concept of a cognitive interest by an analogy with the idea of empirical "interests". Is this semantic dependence legitimate or even stable? At one extreme we may locate thinkers in the empiricist tradition who strictly demarcate the literal and the metaphorical. At the other extreme, there are those who regard analogical extension and metaphor as fundamental and general properties of language conceived dynamically. For them it is not just a matter of the relative autonomy of a concept after its extension from the original context of semantic significance. Rather, the "original" context is still present but no longer has priority. This seems to be the case with Habermas's concept of "cognitive interest". It is charged with meaning which goes beyond the literal context of "empirical" interest.

"Cognitive interest" is therefore a peculiar category which conforms as little to the distinction between the empirical and the transcendental, or factual and symbolic determinations, as that
Habermas also claims that it is the EI which is central to understanding the PI and TI. The EI expresses the "experience of reflection" at the heart of metacritique in which the subject "becomes transparent to itself in the history of its genesis". The EI underlies both the PI and TI as we saw (Page 72). It gives rise to a standpoint from which the identity of Reason and the Will to Reason freely arises.

This is a standpoint that critical social science shares with philosophy, says Habermas. There is an interest in freedom which is inherent in the faculty of Reason itself. In the TI and PI this is revealed as a striving to be free of the domination of nature and tradition respectively. Habermas turns to Fichte for paradigmatic hints of such an interest in freedom.

Kant had asked how pure reason could be "Practical". According to Kant, moral freedom must be independent of empirical motives. Properly moral action is determined by principles of Reason. The problem is how a Practical "interest" i.e. a "moral" interest, in the realisation of principles determined solely by Reason can be possible. Kant claims that moral feeling does attest to a factual interest in the realisation of the Moral Law. Yet this must be a "pure" interest, free from the senses. According to Kant, we cannot understand a priori how that which contains nothing sensual can produce a feeling of pleasure. Kant directs us to the experience of this fact which represents an interest inherent in Reason itself. He gives this fact a transcendental status though he admits we cannot "comprehend it a priori".

Kant's problem here depends to a large extent upon his metaphysics of various "faculties". However, he is wrestling with the plausible and perhaps perennial intuition that we do not regard ourselves as acting fully
morally (or immorally) unless we also regard such actions as freely undertaken. Habermas appropriates the extension of Kant's reflections in *The Critique of Practical Reason* in which the notion of a pure practical interest inherent in Reason is transferred to all faculties of the mind. Kant subordinates Theoretical reason to Practical reason, though Habermas claims that he equivocates over this. It is only with Fichte that the primacy of Practical reason emerges. According to Habermas, Fichte talks of the "practical" intention of a subject that posits itself. In this "original self reflection" the ego frees itself from "Dogmatism". The latter may be regarded as a form of false-consciousness tantamount to a belief in objects independent of the ego (naive realism).

According to Habermas, Fichte conjoins Reason and the "Will to Reason" thus going beyond Kant's framework and the problem that arises within it. In this reflective act of "self-positing" "Knowledge" and "Interest" are one. It is important to see the double role of reflection in Fichte's system. Transcendental reflection and the dissolution of false-consciousness are identical. Such reflection is somehow demanded of each one of us. This is rampantly idealist, and Habermas quotes a startling passage from Fichte in which the strains of an intellectual elitism are unmistakable.

The sort of philosophy one chooses thus depends upon what sort of person one is. For a philosophical system is... inspired by the soul of the man who possesses it. A character that is lax by nature or that has been prostrated and bent by mental servitude and learned luxury, will never elevate itself to idealism.

False consciousness is a form of intellectual laziness. Material obstacles are ignored.

Perhaps a point of terminological clarification concerning the concept of "Practical" is appropriate here. We may distinguish, very roughly, three senses of "Practice":

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a) **PRACTICE** as action-in-general or "praxis". This embraces Habermas's conception of the TI, PI and EI.

b) **PRACTICE** in Habermas's sense of a practical interest in maintaining forms of intersubjectivity.

c) **PRACTICE** in the Kantian and Fichtean sense of something ethical. This embraces Habermas's conception of **both** the PI and the EI.

Such a terminological fluidity may be deliberate. We may note that the distinction between (b) and (c) corresponds to that between dialogue II and dialogue III given above (Page 97-8). As we shall see the latter emerges as a "moment" of the former in the sense that the EI appears as a presupposition of communication. Ricoeur's account of this is particularly interesting (see Chapter 9).

These reflections upon Habermas's interpretation and use of Fichte are important, since it has been argued that Habermas does not fully digest idealism. The ISS is subject to criticism of this kind. According to Habermas, Hegel's path complements that of Fichte. However, in "phenomenological experience" dogmatism is surmounted in stages, not in a single vaulting act of intellectual intuition. According to Hegel, this is too abstract. Fichte ignores historical and social determinations which for Hegel is a symptom of a world, the Enlightenment, where "spirit" is alienated from itself.

As we saw in Chapter 3, Habermas wants to establish his own distance from Hegel, an intention which leads him to Marx and the "social turn". Thus he says,

> The concept of an interest of reason introduced by idealism, needs to be reinterpreted materialistically; the emancipatory interest itself is dependent upon interests in possible intersubjective action orientation and in possible technical control.
For Habermas, the EI has no other content than the concrete developmental configuration of the TI and PI. The EI constitutes the circular path indicated on the diagram of Page 72. Unlike Hegelian reflection however the success of metacritique is not assured and cannot be "idealistically" guaranteed.

The Fichtean influence upon Habermas's thought in KHI is important, since it unifies a sense of "reflection" which Habermas subsequently dissolves in the Postscript. Habermas distinguishes between reflection as Kantian "critique" i.e. reflection upon the conditions of knowledge and experience, and reflection as self-reflection upon false consciousness. The former is transformed into the paradigm of "rational reconstruction".

The latter Hegelian component is naturalised and removed from its epistemological context in the work of Freud. However, in KHI and the conception of "Metacritique" which runs through it, these two moments of reflection are one. As Kortian puts it,

In a prospective moment, this act (of reflection) is understood as normative and appears as motivated by an interest of reason in emancipation. In a retrospective and reconstructive moment this reflection is required to reveal the interested character of all theoretical knowledge hence presupposing the primacy of action

In KHI, Habermas's excursions into the German idealist tradition are wonderfully creative and rich. Yet there remains a host of problems associated with this involvement, problems which crystallise around the suspicion that untenable "idealist" elements persist in his later work. It is only within idealism that the unified conception of reflection makes sense. Once the critical dissolution of false-objectivity is equated with a strategically conscious political praxis for which freedom is "materially" located, then the appeal to "reflection" seems weak. Bühler criticises Habermas's confusion between a formal interest in freedom and an interest in
situationally engaged enlightenment. The conflation of senses of reflection seems to place all epistemic subjects as such under an obligation to practical-critical engagement. This is the Fichtean legacy! Bühler's criticism is directed less against Habermas's confusion of two senses of reflection than against the highly abstract and formal character of the EI. According to McCarthy it avoids the moment of "decision and partisanship". I wish to deny the claim that the business of transcendental philosophy can be described merely as "reconstructive" in universal and formal terms, but it must be admitted that its meta-critical and emancipatory content is highly abstract. McCarthy does not believe that Habermas bridges the gap between universal and situational reflection. In KHI the relation between them is too direct. Thus he regards Habermas's "materialistically transformed phenomenology" in KHI as an empty exercise in self-reflection, a critique whose only object is the excesses of its own philosophical tradition. This "overburdens" the concept of reflection in KHI. Kortian's formulation displays this overburdening. According to him, Habermas claims that it is possible to lead the subject to an awareness of its reflective operations by relying upon its interest in knowledge for the sake of knowledge and by presenting it with the opportunity to become transparent to itself through the reconstruction of the genesis of its own determination.

Kortian argues that despite the shift to a theory of communication Habermas does not free himself from the philosophy of identity. While emancipation is anticipated and projected rather than assumed, Habermas's discussion is informed by the speculative tradition from Hegel to philosophical hermeneutics. Emancipation remains tied to the reflective attempt to destroy the autonomy of the non-ego. However, it is in the material aspects of the non-ego, in the form of tanks and guns, that
reflection runs up against its real limits. These limits may be the "cold destiny" of man. However, they may also be sources of possibility. When we turn to Habermas's theory of communication and his concept of an ISS as a transcendental presupposition these problems persist. However, it is not clear to me that the ISS does overburden the concept of reflection. Does it really purport to give situational content to the idea of freedom? I do not think so. It articulates a hope which is at the same time non-utopian in so far as it is immanent in current practice. Its transcendental status is central to this conception. We must turn to Habermas's theory of communication in more detail in order to see this.
PART III

THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATION

Reason cannot flourish without hope, hope cannot speak without reason

(BLOCH)
PART III

THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATION

Reason cannot flourish without hope, hope cannot speak without reason

(BLOCH)
CHAPTER 6

Rational Reconstruction

1 Rational Reconstruction and Transcendental Philosophy

In the Postscript to KHI Habermas reorients his programme in the direction of a theory of communication. The main contours of this theory, entitled "Universal Pragmatics" by Habermas, have been sketched in Chapter 1, Sections IV and V. In this chapter I wish to assess Habermas's conception of the status of universal pragmatics and, in particular, his conception of the paradigm of "rational reconstruction". The latter is developed as an alternative to the transcendental approach of KHI. However, I believe that the "break" with transcendentalism is often overstated.

Habermas offers a suggestive picture of the contrasts and similarities between transcendental approaches and the idea of a "reconstructive" linguistics. His question is also our question.

What is the relation of universal pragmatic reconstruction of general and unavoidable presuppositions of possible processes of understanding to the type of investigation that has, since Kant, been called transcendental analysis?

Habermas wants to distance universal pragmatics (UP hereafter) from transcendental analysis. He provides a schematic characterisation of a Kantian position as a co-ordinate for his argument. Habermas distinguishes between strong and weak forms of transcendental approach. The "strong" a priorism of Kant's transcendental deduction is replaced by the weaker, minimalist programme that Strawson pursues, which still recognises that every experience is organised within a categorial framework. Habermas's conception of strength is ambiguous between the senses of the idealist and the argumentative or deductive strength that I distinguished on Page 49.
Habermas's conception of transcendentalism is bound both by an ideal of deductivity, and an ideal of strong, timeless conditions sought by the Kantian approach. Against the backdrop of this model he claims that,

> From now on, transcendental investigation must rely on the competence of knowing subjects who judge which experiences may be called coherent experiences in order to analyse this material for general and necessary categorial presuppositions. Every reconstruction of a basic conceptual scheme has to be regarded as a hypothetical proposal that can be tested against new experiences. 2

This is congruent with the "social turn" of KHI where Habermas attempts to retain a Kantian perspective and commitment independent of its original idealist setting. Transcendental analysis may only be an "internalist" view of a conceptual framework, and, as Kürner demands, it may be revised in the face of new experiences. This reorientation raises new possibilities for Habermas:

i) The boundary conditions of possible experience become contingent.

ii) Basic conceptual structures may develop phylogenetically. They may arise anew in "every normal ontogenesis in a process that can be analysed empirically".

iii) Such a revitalised a priori of experience may be valid only for anthropologically deep seated behavioural systems that make possible specific strategies for "objectification".

Habermas aligns himself with Piaget's programme with this conception, though if Part II of this dissertation is at all compelling it will become clear that much of this is inherent already in KHI.

However, Habermas develops these remarks towards a renunciation of the terminology of transcendentalism. Indeed, it is more than a terminological issue for Habermas. Apel regards the investigation of general and unavoidable presuppositions of communication as in some sense transcendental. But for Habermas,
recourse to this model is understandable only if one has in view one of the weaker versions of transcendental philosophy. But why not? The "weaker" version is actually the MOST plausible. Yet Habermas supplies two reasons for dissociating UP from the model of transcendental philosophy: a) He refers to the suggestion that "situations of possible understanding" corresponds analogically to "objects of possible experience". However, this would seem to show that acquiring "experiences" in communicative interaction is secondary to the goal of achieving understanding. Against this Habermas claims that,

The general structures of speech must first be investigated from the perspective of understanding, not from that of experience.

Habermas clearly associates the whole concept of a transcendental approach with the issue of "object constitution" i.e. supplying conditions of experience. He restates the contrast he wants.

Experiences are, if we follow the basic Kantian idea, constituted, utterances are at the most generated.

In place of the model of transcendentalism, Habermas offers that of the deep/surface structure relation. However, his case for making this shift is peculiar. In KHI we saw that the materialist conception of synthesis and constitution gives way to that which occurs in the medium of dialogue. In a sense this medium pervades all experience. Experience in Kant's sense takes place within a communicative medium. It seems unobjectionable to call an analysis of the "deep" structures of such communicative experience transcendental. Furthermore, Habermas develops his case in terms of the distinction between "constitution" (of experience) and "generation" of utterances. But what is the telling difference? Habermas refers to "generative structures" as rules according to which a speaker brings forth an utterance. It would seem obvious that such rules, "communicative
competences" in Habermas's terms, do not cause the utterance. They are more like dispositions in a Rylean sense. We are not concerned with particular empirical causes of occasioning utterances. So the explication of the rules which make communication via utterances possible reveals presuppositions or "enabling conditions" but not causal structures. If this is correct then the contrast between "generation" and "constitution" is not that between "causal" and "presuppositional" structures. But now it is difficult to see what it does mean. The two terms seem very similar.

On a more speculative track it may be a hermeneutical irony that the model of deep/surface structure is a rather good analogy for Kant's transcendentalism. In a sense the latter requires a metaphor which avoids the implication of causal imagery, particularly regarding the so-called "doctrine of affection". The "deep/surface" idiom supplies this. Far from signalling a break with transcendental philosophy, Habermas's new model may express a revitalised analogical relation to it!

b) Habermas's second reason for abandoning what he understands by the transcendentalist model centres upon the need to make explicit the break with Kantian a priorism. However, this seems to ignore two things. If we had a well-articulated transformation of the transcendental approach, many hints for which Habermas himself supplies, then the need would be less urgent. Secondly, and more critically, Habermas's break with the terminology of transcendentalism in UP actually conceals an a priorism in his approach. As McCarthy notes, Habermas's programme seems much more philosophical and "pure" than "empirical". Indeed the empirical dimension of UP seems very underdeveloped. Habermas relies more upon the appropriation of other sources and "reflection". I shall return repeatedly to this point.

Habermas talks of a blurring of a priori and a posteriori features
inherent in the paradigm of rational reconstruction. However, this does nothing to distinguish it from the approach of KHI. According to Habermas, Kant sharply separated empirical and transcendental analysis. In UP this distinction is blurred:

the rule consciousness of competent speakers is for them an a priori knowledge .... the reconstruction of this knowledge calls for inquiries undertaken with empirical speakers

As we have remarked however, it is not clear how this "empirical" dimension operates. Habermas wants to locate rational reconstruction within the sphere of empirical sciences. Though it is "non-nomological" the procedures of rational reconstruction are said to be like the nomological sciences in many ways. Perhaps the similarity is more than Habermas himself imagines. Hesse has argued that he overdraws the distinction. On the other hand, Habermas suppresses the a priori character of his differentiation of domains of reality and their correspondingly differentiated modes of communication. Between these two blurred edges in the concept of rational reconstruction Habermas also wants to contrast it with empirical linguistics.

II Rational Reconstruction and Empirical Linguistics

Habermas wants to distinguish between FORMAL analysis appropriate to rational reconstruction and the EMPIRICAL-ANALYTIC procedures associated with his conception of empirical linguistics. Under the former Habermas locates the methodological attitude which seeks the explication of meanings and the elucidation of presuppositions and rules. He claims that while reconstructive procedures are important in empirical-analytic science they are not characteristic of the development of nomological hypotheses about "observable" events. In contrast he claims that
these procedures are characteristic of sciences that systematically reconstruct the intuitive knowledge of competent speakers

In support of this, Habermas stresses the different epistemic relations between observer and object, and interpreter and object. The ideas of an observable reality and a "symbolically prestructured" reality are correlated with the methodological ideals of Description and Explication. Habermas develops a similar distinction in the Postscript as we saw on Page 132.

Given Hesse's critique of Habermas, this distinction between methodological ideals can no longer be strictly maintained. The ideal of description cannot be maintained because theories are underdetermined by evidence. Other determinants of theory choice are significant. Moreover such determinants may arise from the hermeneutical, communicative sphere. We must charitably regard Habermas's distinction as a thematic one, though this is also to recognise that Habermas never satisfactorily resolves the methodological status of the reconstructive sciences.

Habermas believes that there are two levels of explication. That which deals with semantic content concerns merely the "surface" structure of language. Ordinary language philosophy has its place here. Habermas wants to go beyond this to a deeper, more general level, i.e. to "generative structures" which are reconstructions of the rules according to which utterances are brought forth. The metaphor of "depth" is presumably mutually defined with that of universality. This is important since it could be said that the "deeper" one pushes the level of analysis, the more normative the reconstruction becomes. The object domain is the "intuitive rule consciousness" that speakers have of their own language. Habermas illustrates this by reference to Ryle's distinction between KNOW HOW, as a practical mastery, and KNOW THAT as a discursive consciousness. The
former is analogous to the implicit rule consciousness which is the "object" of rational reconstruction. This model of deep and surface structure seems to avoid the problems of "privileged representation" that Rorty associates with a Cartesian model of the mind. Rather, this hermeneutically constituted object domain gives a methodological respectability to introspection, though not a priority. Thus rational reconstruction need not be metaphysically mysterious in that sense, though Habermas’s notion of a "communicative competence" may be contentious because of its normative power. Indeed we should press this point, since within Habermas’s theory of communication, "communicative competence" is not given. By developing analogies with Ryle, Habermas conceals the normative aspect of his rational reconstruction of communicative competence. It is because communicative action goes wrong and is distorted in various ways, that this analysis is evolved by Habermas. The reconstruction of "speaker immanent obligations" to validate claims to truth, rightness and sincerity automatically bears a normative relation to the surface structure of communicative action. As we shall see the specification of an ISS highlights this issue. But it is already implicit in Habermas’s remarks about rational reconstruction. The need to claim a place in the sphere of empirical science leads Habermas to underplay this feature of universal pragmatics. Perhaps any explication is normative and revisionary in so far as it makes essentialist claims for itself and excludes competitors. However, Habermas’s "depth hermeneutics" goes beyond this to a distinct value orientation which is regarded as inherent in the structure of communication.

We encountered similar problems to these when discussing Habermas’s TAs in KHI. They began to look less "analytic" and more "practical" and normative. The relation between "deep" and "surface" structure is
dialectical and revisionary, not static and descriptive. However, against all this Habermas stresses the strictly empirical methodology of rational reconstruction.

Since the rule consciousness to be reconstructed is categorial knowledge, the reconstruction first leads us to the operation of conceptual explication. Citing Carnap and Wunderlich, Habermas claims that in their notion of "conceptual explication" they have not been sufficiently attentive to the "evaluative accomplishment of rule consciousness". However, Habermas seems to conceal the profoundly normative aspect of his own theory, as if this were not "empirically respectable".

To the extent that universal validity claims underlie intuitive evaluations ... reconstructions relate to pretheoretical knowledge of a general sort, to universal capabilities and not to particular competences.... when the pretheoretical knowledge to be reconstructed expresses a universal capability ... then what begins as an explication of meaning aims at the reconstruction of SPECIES competences.

One might ask how one could know that one had found universal as distinct from particular competences. How does one distinguish institutionally bound from "institutionally unbound" speech acts? If we regard universal pragmatics as continuous with transcendentalism, Körner's critique of the possibility of deducing universal conditions which are necessary and unique must be borne in mind. However, Habermas goes in the other direction!

In scope and status these reconstructions can be compared with general theories. But to what extent are such general theories empirically refutable? As McCarthy has observed Habermas says little about the empirical inquiries involved. In a sense Habermas's debate with Gadamer concerns this blurred status of rational reconstruction. Gadamer seems to regard this as a transcendental programme in a strong sense, i.e. an attempt to explicate
universal and timeless categories of thought. However, Habermas wants to go beyond a dialogical conception of understanding i.e. Sinnverstehen, and to evolve a theoretically grounded analysis which draws upon systematically generalised empirical knowledge. Universal pragmatics seems to constitute a break with his earlier consciousness of the historical situatedness of critical theory. But

the strongly theoretical, universalist approach to social inquiry that Habermas wishes to defend does not rest on a rejection of de-transcendentalisation of philosophy since Kant

This suggests that Habermas is not resurrecting the image of an Archimedean point from which a critical theory may be evolved as Gadamer thinks. Or is he? The empirical dimension of rational reconstruction has not been made clear. Are Habermas and Gadamer arguing about different levels? This is crucial. I shall consider Ricoeur's reconciliation of this tension in Chapter 9. In a sense Habermas and Gadamer do miss each other's point, if we interpret the former as attempting an empirical theoretical programme and the latter as making the deep ontological claim about the historicity of understanding. These claims may after all be compatible. In another sense there is a real issue. Habermas thinks that hermeneutics compromises theoretical attitudes. Gadamer suspects theoretical attitudes of an ahistorical transcendentalism. Ricoeur effects a synthesis by describing Habermas's theory as a "depth hermeneutics".

For the present we can regard Habermas as understating the a priori character of his theory. The four validity claims have an air of finality and immunity about them. They define empirical research programmes rather than emerge unequivocally from empirical inquiry. I contend that the dual transcendental-empirical status that we observed in KHI and in the cognitive interests is carried over into Habermas's paradigm of rational reconstruction. Habermas's desire to jettison transcendentalism fails to recognise its
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persistence in a weaker form. Universal pragmatics delimits the domains and boundary conditions of forms of communicative interaction. To the extent that the "world" of external nature and the "world" of society are sharply delimited Habermas seems to regress to non-dialectical relations between them. According to McCarthy this differentiation of worlds drops the Hegelian notion of the dialectical mediation between the self and other spheres. While Habermas retains a dialectical relation between the self and society elsewhere in his work, he is non-dialectical concerning the relationship between the self and nature. McCarthy alludes particularly to theories of evolution. With such theories a strict subject-object differentiation is less adequate than a schema of interdependence.

Theories of biological evolution are also the self-knowledge of the species. Are these included under the objectivating attitude for Habermas? Do they also overlap into the interactive attitude? Habermas does not really answer these questions. As I noted in Chapter 5, Habermas overstates his arguments against a non-technical science and fails to recognise a theory of science in which theories of evolution may be more adequately understood.

Habermas distinguishes the data of empirical linguistics which consists of "measured variables of linguistic behaviour" from the data of a reconstructive programme which ascertains the "implicit rule consciousness" of speakers "maeutically". This is a hermeneutically situated method which engages in "suitable questioning" with the aid of "systematically ordered examples". Little is said of what seems to be an overtly dialogical method. Habermas appropriates the theory of speech acts from Austin and Searle in its place.

According to Habermas, a rational reconstructive theory explicates meanings on the same level as the natural language being explicated. Competent speakers themselves evaluate and preselect possible data.
Habermas rejects the image of a meta-linguistic level from which normative judgements can be made. Reconstructions cannot falsify everyday knowledge, they can only represent it "more or less adequately". Once again, Habermas understates the normative and critical power of his theory. He also pays lip service to hermeneutic method. Habermas claims that such reconstructions correspond to the rules that are operatively effective in an object domain. But what does "correspond" mean here? It seems to denote a descriptivism which universal pragmatics simply does not satisfy. Habermas says as much when he describes the concept of implicit validity claims in communication as "courts of appeal". Presumably he intends that these normative structures are accurate descriptions of an implicit rule consciousness in some sense. This is highly contestable.

Echoing worries about the universality of communicative competences, Habermas asks whether a reconstructive linguistics is debarred from arriving at a theory of linguistic competence and is therefore limited to a theory of the intuitive understanding that speakers have of their own language. He claims that such doubts confuse two different research paradigms. Linguistic utterances are not the object of reconstruction in some ontologically distinct sense. They are part of the data gathering. The concept of a metalanguage is an abstracted level of analysis appropriate to empirical linguistics. However, worries about the supposed universality of Habermas's claims persist, even if we accept that they are part of such a depth hermeneutic. Furthermore what Habermas seems to intend by talking of a confusion of research paradigms may be bound up with the ambiguity concerning the notion of "correspondence" raised above. Rorty explicates the motivations behind such a confusion. They express worries about the unity of science and the urge to reduce. There is a feeling that only a thorough neurophysiology is ultimately correct. Added to this is a
fear of Rylean "Ghosts" and the implied Cartesian notion of introspective privilege. Habermas believes that he overcomes the problem of the reductive urge, by differentiating a research paradigm where it is pertinent e.g. empirical linguistics, from a research paradigm where it is not, e.g. reconstructive linguistics. Under the latter, access to intuitive knowledge is at all times discursive. This is his role for maeutics which is a "well thought out" method of interrogation. What is important in this procedure is not argumentation in any strictly deductive sense. It is more "practical". There must be a suitable choice of example and counterexample, contrast and similarity, and general specification of relations. It is an essentially circular procedure by which one starts with clear cases upon which reactions converge and then proceeds via one's hypotheses to less clear cases.

Every research process moves in such a circle between theory formation and the precise specification of the object domain.

This sounds like pure Gadamer. How could a "debate" with Habermas have occurred on the basis of remarks like these? However, it is not at all clear that Habermas is faithful to these claims. Does Habermas really overcome hermeneutics?

III Rational Reconstruction and Hermeneutics

According to McCarthy, while Habermas wants to develop a programme that reduces the situational character of Sinnverstehen, the attitude of the hermeneutic interpreter is in some sense still necessary. He claims that the formal structures of universal pragmatics can be filled out in a variety of ways. Hermeneutic procedures are therefore required in order to give them content. An interpreter must take seriously, validity claims raised by the text and at the same time critically examine them. His position is not
McCarthy acknowledges that Habermas's concept of reconstruction seeks to overcome hermeneutics in a more radical sense than this, a sense which McCarthy thinks nevertheless cannot avoid the need for some hermeneutic procedures.

McCarthy's worries however seem to miss the point. Habermas admits that hermeneutics is necessary to mediate between the formal, universal structures of thought and action, and concrete situationally specific events. He admits in his later work that the ISS does not sketch concrete social conditions. It is highly formal. In a similar fashion he recognises that his developmental studies abstract from the dynamics of ego-formation. The hermeneutic challenge to his programme is at another level. It is a challenge to the derivation and establishment of the formal structures in the first place. Gadamerian hermeneutics rejects an account of the "universality" of such structures as somehow reaching behind history. Gadamer does not deny that a distinction between universal and particular structures can be made, only that Habermas's version of the status of this distinction is not tenable. This returns us to Habermas's rather cryptic reference to the notion of maeutic inquiry, which is intended to establish the structures of communicative competence. Let us take maeutic inquiry seriously for the moment.

What is an "appropriate" procedure of questioning? It seems explicitly dialogical. This is true in a literal and minimal sense of "talking to another", but we saw that Habermas has two senses of dialogue that are more heavy-weight than this. The subject of questioning in maeutics is not an equal partner in dialogue. Indeed he is "objectified" in some sense. But Habermas claims that competent speakers themselves evaluate and pre-select possible data. So we are returned to the idea of a
participant. However, such participants are empirical subjects. Is Habermas claiming that communicative competences could be derived maeutically from African tribesmen as much as from the utterances of a white, protestant businessman? This is empirically dubious. It is not even clear in the latter case. Indeed, once one takes this notion of maeutics seriously, it leads to fundamental problems in Habermas's account. To the extent that this empirical aspect of Habermas's theory is unclear, it remains haunted by the cliched image of a timeless transcendentalism. It is then open to objections from relativists. The paradigm of rational reconstruction hangs uneasily between empirical and transcendental poles. Habermas is unfaithful to the demands of the former, and misunderstands a plausible feature of the latter.

Apel's conceptions of "transcendental hermeneutics" or "depth hermeneutics" are more appropriate terminology for Habermas's position. We avoid images of timeless, unique transcendental conditions, as well as commitments to merely "sinnverstehende" accounts. I believe that the theory of cognitive-interests in KHI is also a "depth hermeneutics" in a similar sense. However, this notion embraces the two senses of reflection that Habermas wishes to distinguish in the Postscript. The paradigm of "rational reconstruction" is intended to avoid an ambiguity in the concept of reflection.

IV Rational Reconstruction and Self-reflection

In the Postscript to KHI, Habermas evolves the concept of rational reconstruction in connection with the Kantian search for a transcendental ground, though he later wishes to distinguish them, as we saw above. This sense of reflection upon potential abilities is distinct from that upon unconsciously produced constraints. The latter derives from the Hegelian
model which combines,

the self-critical delimitation of consciousness,
effected by a transcendental analysis of the
conditional nature of something we know naively and
intuitively with reflexion in another sense of the
term which denotes the critical dissolution of
subjectively constituted pseudo objectivity

As we saw in Part II, this is the essence of "Metacritique" and its
inherent overburdening of the concept of reflection. A break with the
germaine idealist tradition effectively necessitates a distinction in senses
of reflection. But it seems also to involve a regress to "contemplative"
theoretical perspectives in Habermas's universal pragmatics. Habermas
gives three distinguishing features of the two modes of reflection:

a) While "self-criticism" has "objectivistic illusion" as its object of
study (see sense d Page 83) reconstructions are based on "objective data"
like "sentences, actions and cognitive schemata". This is subject to
Habermas's claim that such "objective data" are not those of empirical
science, though he overdraws the distinction between the methodological
ideals of description and explication.

b) Habermas distinguishes between criticising particular egos and
explicating anonymous systems. However, the former seems to require a
more general theory of objectivistic illusion which in turn implies some
idealised standards of normality. As Nicholls claims with respect to
Habermas's interpretation of Freud,

a critical science like psychoanalysis must rely
upon a theoretical framework which exists
independently of its clinical technique and its
criteria of validation

There are some complex methodological issues here about the relations of
primacy or dependency between Freud's general theory and his clinical
technique which I cannot discuss. I only wish to raise doubts about
Habermas's distinction between criticising particular egos and explicating
anonymous systems. Maeutics and therapeutics seem at least to be etymologically connected. What more can be said? Maeutics undertakes inquiries with subjects who are relatively anonymous in the sense that general competences are sought. While there is an asymmetry between interpreter and interpreted here, it does not correspond to that of the analyst/patient.

c) According to Habermas, self-criticism is intended to change the determinants of false-consciousness while rational reconstruction merely explicates correct know how. I wish to question the starkness of this distinction, though I believe it is valid in some sense. Since maeutic inquiry involves some form of hermeneutic exchange between inquirer and competent speaker it is not impossible that processes of self-criticism might be initiated and that they might not be accidental. At the very least, it has not been shown that maeutic inquiry could not have this effect. Furthermore we may discern critical elements in Habermas's concept of rational reconstruction. Universal pragmatics extends beyond the descriptive tone of "explication" of communicative competences. It involves a highly normative reconstruction, assuming in the first instance that communication is fundamentally orientated towards understanding. This normative aspect is concealed in Habermas's distinction between forms of reflection. Elsewhere it is clear that a theory of normal speech is required as a basis for explaining deviant and distorted forms of communication. Such a theory is normative. For example, the psychoanalyst must have a prenotion or rough understanding of the structure of undistorted ordinary language communication in order to be able at all to trace systematic distortions of language .... then he needs to reconstruct the conditions making normal speech possible

Such a rational reconstruction will be guided by a pre-understanding about the nature of deviance and distortion. The latter is in turn clarified
by the theory of "normality". The two moments are parts of a hermeneutic circle of practical and theoretical reflection. In a sense, the perception of distortion, pre-theoretically grasped, has some methodological priority. Here we might refer to Habermas's conception of the life-sphere of "power". While this is not a domain that is ontologically distinct from those of work and language, it is constituted at a meta-level of reflection upon them. According to Habermas, we experience these spheres via forms of power. However, what is lacking at this level of abstraction is a distinction between distortive, ideological relations of power and the possibility of non-distortive relations. Furthermore, the notion that the perception of distortion has some methodological priority has led to the worry, in the case of psychoanalysis, that theory is dragged along in an ad hoc fashion by clinical practice. I shall discuss this issue in greater depth in Chapter 9.

I have questioned Habermas's stark distinction between modes of reflection. Rational reconstruction, as he understands it, is also critical and normative, an aspect he seems to conceal under a distinction between general quasi-transcendental reflection and particular self-critical reflection. But the distinction is not crucially one of generality and particularity. Criticism of particular "distortions" in an individual or group of individuals requires a generalised theory of normality if it is to rise beyond a pre-theoretical, perhaps intuitive and ad hoc status to that of science. This meta-critical aspect of rational reconstruction is important. Reconstruction of the conditions of the possibility of communication simultaneously shows how rare "true" communication is.

Habermas's paradigm of rational reconstruction is both "critical-constructive" and "critical-delimitative" (see Page 39). The two modes of reflection cannot be sharply separated from each other in "universal pragmatics". The real point of the distinction in senses of reflection is
to separate "theoretical" reflection from actual emancipatory praxis involving real social agents. Hegelian metacritique associates them too closely. But even if the distinction between senses of reflection is accepted, it is still arguable that Habermas places too great a weight upon the emancipatory potential of SELF-reflection. His interpretation of Freudian psychotherapy is too "cognitive" in this respect.

If rational reconstructions are normative where is the justification of such a value basis? This problem comes out most starkly in Habermas’s developmental studies. It underlies BOTH senses of reflection that Habermas distinguishes and is NOT resolved by that distinction. I do not wish to engage in the details of Habermas’s theories and the problems of linking individual ontogenetic development unambiguously to the evolution of normative structures at a societal level. Rather, I wish to reflect upon the general features of a "developmental logic" as conceived by Habermas. Such a conception is that of a sequential ordering of states of affairs determined as directed towards the optimal fulfillment of a specific criterion (e.g. ego identity, the "rational" society etc.). Such developmental logics are rational reconstructions. In the context of Habermas’s reconstruction of historical materialism, Schmid claims that they lack explanatory power. Rather,

The epistemic character of the rational reconstructions also attests to a non-empirical interpretation of the developmental logic. These reconstructions are not empirical theories but retrospective interpretations which treat a factual process of development as if it were the optimal fulfillment of a specific criterion. Any "as if" philosophy is obliged to define the limits of its proposed powers of explanation in the face of the all too "freely creative moment" of such fictions.

In my remarks on dialectic, the problem of empirical interpretations of dialectical and developmental schemas was raised. Schmid recommends that,
because of this, developmental-logical perspectives need to be dropped from theories of social evolution. While this might seem to be a regress to an arbitrary definition of organisation principles, he claims that a developmental logic is in effect just as badly off. It can only be a retrospective reconstruction.

A developmental logic of world views does not explain how moral and cognitive innovations arise; it describes their occurrence if they occur.

Schmid is arguing for a thorough "de-transcendentalisation" of theories of social evolution. We must avoid representing them as processes of optimisation since empirical theory becomes burdened with normative and descriptive ambiguities. Schmid cites Weber's claims against such a confusion in support of his own. However, if Hesse's remarks are correct then such theories, being underdetermined by the evidence, will be necessarily appraised by non-empirical, possibly evaluative criteria. Now, it is one thing to look back on the history of science (and social science) in order to identify the kinds of evaluations that determined theory choice. It seems to be another thing, explicitly to render current theories, of society or nature, evaluative (in particular via the use of developmental logic). For one thing it seems to clash with the criterion of "empirical commitment", or the pragmatic criterion as Hesse calls it.

Schmid directs his criticisms not at the basic underlying theory but at what he calls the dubious "factuality of the explanandum". He refers to the Kuhnian and Feyerabendian critique of positivist conceptions of the history of science. We cannot speak of an accumulation of natural scientific knowledge, towards a standard which is constitutive, optimisable and outside time. Such an accumulation is a result of the "reconstruction" itself. This locates Habermas among some live issues about relativism. However, having located the theoretically arbitrary character of Habermas's
rational reconstruction of social development, Schmid is visibly unnerved in conclusion by Habermas's acknowledgement and recognition of such counter-arguments. Habermas wants to separate issues of developmental dynamics from those of developmental logic. Schmid regards the latter as theoretically redundant. But Schmid claims that Habermas would like to see evolution theory "applied" in discourses where competing projections of identity are at issue, and where the possibility of an ensuing consensus might prove the existence of invariant structures of development. This sounds like an obscure hope. However, I discern in it a new perspective upon rational reconstruction and developmental logic. In Chapter 2, I raised the spectre of TAs as fundamentally "practical" arguments. They are not purely analytical and descriptive. Habermas's developmental studies and their rational reconstructive theories fall foul of Schmid's claims if they are considered purely theoretically, in the "contemplative" aspect that Habermas seems to present. However, they are not intended as "predictive" theories, though some form of empirical testing is important. They are much more hermeneutic, or more precisely "depth" hermeneutic. The "invariant" or "timeless" character of the structures they posit are always situated within a "historically-effective" perspective in Gadamer's sense. They have a practical moment which reveals that such theories are an attempt to understand the present cultural situation and to reconstruct possibilities on the basis of it. Danto had claimed that each historian is his own last historian. We must regard Habermas's developmental logic of social development similarly. It is the "practical" moment of such theories to which Schmid's, albeit legitimate, theoretical objections are insensitive. He claims that his critique of developmental logic leaves no hope for an unequivocal identification of "moral regressions". Rather, liberation must come from a "responsible commitment". Yet Habermas's
developmental logic is a form of "responsible commitment" though deeper than the decisionist idiom of the latter. Ultimately, Habermas's theory of universal pragmatics and historical materialism depends perhaps upon "unjustifiable value orientations". But Habermas provides a deeper analysis than his opponents.

Developmental logic and rational reconstruction are associated with the philosophy of the "as if" by Schmid. In the next chapter I shall examine this in more detail. Kant's account of "regulative ideas" is a rich paradigm for such an approach. I wish to appropriate it to build towards an assessment and defence of Habermas's conception of an ideal speech situation backed by a reorientated attitude to transcendentalism which is regarded as primarily practical in the classical sense. If TAs are practical and hermeneutic we can avoid worrying about the "timelessness" of posited structures. They are appropriate or inappropriate in more than a theoretical sense. Ricoeur glimpses this, as we shall see. I am also drawn to Whitebrook's general outlook.

The way in which one come's to terms with the transcendental standpoint ultimately bears a closer resemblance to aesthetic taste or Aristotelean phronesis than to emphatic philosophical proof.

Nor can the demonstration of this practical aspect of transcendentalism be conclusive. It too is a matter of taste. Schmid fails to see that Habermas's developmental logic is not an abandonment of theoretical inquiry, though it is theoretically contentious. Its urgency is practical, and its plausibility lies in a commitment that does not rest on vague pronouncements about human responsibility.

V Conclusions

In Chapter 5, I concluded that there remains throughout Habermas's work
an "overburdening" of the concept of reflection which has its roots in the
german idealist tradition. It must be admitted that this persists into
his communicative theory. In a sense, to demonstrate that Habermas's
concept of rational reconstruction is much more transcendental in a
transformed sense than he realises, is to resurrect this problem. My
interpretation of Habermas's transcendentalism may be incompatible with the
requirement that critical theory move away from its dependence upon the
notion of "reflection".

With this in mind I wish to draw together some of the conclusions of
this chapter in order to anticipate the concerns of those that follow:
1) Habermas's break with the transcendental approach of KHI is illusory.
Rational reconstruction as he understands it is much more transcendental
than he realises.
2) Habermas's conception of transcendentalism as the search for timeless
conditions of experience fails to follow through many of his own hints in
KHI for a different conception.
3) Rational reconstruction is not to be distinguished sharply from empirical-
analytic theory as Habermas imagines.
4) Habermas does not give an adequate account of the empirical dimension
of rational reconstruction. He pays lip service to the maeutic method to
which he does not adhere in practice.
5) Habermas distinguishes two senses of reflection, one of which is given
by the paradigm of rational reconstruction. However, the implicitly
normative character of the latter raises doubts about the viability of the
distinction in a stark form.
6) The continuities with KHI are greater than Habermas imagines. However,
there also persists a problem of the overestimation of the power of
reflection. This arises from certain methodological worries about
Habermas's use of developmental logical perspectives.

7) Underlying the rational reconstruction of universal pragmatics or Habermas's developmental theories is a philosophy of the "as if". Such a philosophical perspective is most viable as a practical (i.e. ethical) rather than a theoretical outlook. Kant's conception of a regulative idea is the locus classicus for this account. It is to this notion and its application to Habermas's conception of ideal speech that we must now turn.
I Kant's Regulative Approach

Kant's concept of a regulative idea may be understood in the most general sense by way of a contrast with the approach that characterises the first half of The Critique of Pure Reason. In short, regulative ideas are not "constitutive". To understand them as standing for objects is to hypostatise them and to suffer from "transcendental illusion". We reify that which could not be an object of experience. Kant claims that we have a natural tendency to transgress these limits of possible experience. However, a transcendental idea is a necessary concept of reason to which no corresponding object can be given in sense experience.

That is to say, while regulative ideas never allow of a constitutive use, Kant claims that they have an "excellent and indispensably necessary" regulative use. The "Transcendental Dialectic" is an analysis of how Reason makes mistakes by hypostatising ideas that are properly only regulative. In the "Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic" Kant talks as if such regulative use is exclusively concerned with systematisation of the objects of experience. However, this properly concerns only one of the three transcendental ideas which Kant interprets regulatively:

a) The regulative employment of the PSYCHOLOGICAL idea allows us to talk of a soul but, unlike the conclusions of rationalist psychology, not in any constitutive sense. Rather, the concept of the soul is a "mere idea" or "object in the idea" to assist reason in its representation of "the systematic unity of the appearances of inner sense". This seems to be normatively transformed by Habermas for whom the concept of ego identity is
a regulative idea. It represents a symbolic organisation of the ego that lays claim, on the one hand, to being a universal ideal.

b) The regulative employment of the COSMOLOGICAL idea, allows talk of a totality of a series of representations. Such a totality can, never be completely realised in the empirical employment of reason but which yet serves as a rule that prescribes how we ought to proceed in dealing with such series as if it were in itself, infinite, that is, as if it proceeded in indefinitum.

Thus, the concept of infinity serves as a methodological procedure.

c) The regulative employment of the THEOLOGICAL idea allows us to suppose a God as the cause of all cosmological series. However, we have no grounds to assume any absolute, constitutive concept of God but only as an "object in the idea". It assists reason by providing an analogue for the greatest possible "purposive unity" of the world. It effectively justifies teleology.

The general similarities among these three versions ought to be clear. Because the ideas cannot be given in sense-experience, they have regulative meaning and use. (Kant was no verificationist! A philosophy of the "als ob" is rampantly anti-verificationist.). It is the theological idea which is applied to the systematic investigation of nature by reason. In fact, Kant makes a stronger claim concerning the quest for such systematic unity, i.e.

The law of reason which requires us to seek for this unity is a necessary law since without it we should have no reason at all.

and

The idea of such unity is, therefore inseparably bound up with the very nature of our reason.

Kant seems to run together the concepts of "systematic" and of "purposive"
unity. This problem need not concern us, though Kant’s vindication of teleology as a method reveals other more general issues pertinent to the discussion of developmental logic.

Kant reflects upon current methodological maxims such as those which seek classifications according to genera and species and asks how it is possible that they are "objectively valid" i.e. that they apply to nature. In order to legitimise them Kant offers a TA which is only analogous to those offered in the "Transcendental Analytic". It is not an argument for certain conditions of the possibility of experience. Rather, only on the presupposition that systematic unity is inherent in the objects of experience is a system of nature possible. For Kant, this is the sense in which reason commands nature and does not beg. But it is unclear what this really means. It seems to hover between the image of categorial determination which is too strong and that of a merely subjective principle which is too weak. This obscurity is not resolved by the following statement.

It is indeed difficult to understand how there can be a logical principle by which reason prescribes a unity of rules, unless we also presuppose a transcendental principle whereby such systematic unity is a priori assumed to be necessarily inherent in objects.

We investigate nature according to various maxims which Kant seems to locate under the regulative idea of God as the highest formal and purposive unity of empirical laws. We must investigate nature "as if" it conformed to such an idea, yet the force of the claim is dubious. Kant wants to go beyond a merely subjective and conventionalist reading of such principles.

Despite the fact that reason prescribes to nature, nature can refuse to respond

For the worst that can happen would be that where we expected a teleological connection (nexus
finalis) we find only a mechanical or physical connection (nexus effectivus). In such cases we merely fail to find the additional unity; we do not destroy the unity upon which reason insists in the empirical employment. So it would seem that regulative ideas cannot be refuted. Perhaps, particular regulative maxims e.g. the ideals of pure earth, fire, water and air may be jettisoned under the pressure of experience, i.e. they no longer have heuristic value, but Kant claims some priority for the regulative idea of God as a condition of the possibility of the empirical functioning of Reason. Paradoxically, the idea can be "confirmed".

The more therefore we discover purposiveness in the world, the more fully is the legitimacy of our idea confirmed. The legitimacy of the regulative idea seems to be both open and not open to question. This is a general feature of a philosophy of the "as if" which regards empirical processes within the framework of some optimised end point, though in the case of Kant's regulative ideas this is in principle unattainable. How do we assess this rather mysterious status of regulative ideas? We may simply jettison the quaestio juris and regard Kant as offering an ingenious redescriptions of the methodological principles of his day. In particular he shows that mechanism and teleology are compatible. Much would seem to depend upon accepting the argumentative force of the analogy he offers, and that in turn upon accepting the general transcendental perspective which pragmatists such as Rorty do not.

II Regulative ideals and regulative ideas

A defence for the regulative approach may be forthcoming at another level. The "Ideal of Pure Reason" is a mysterious chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant recapitulates upon his general claims that
the categories of the understanding only have "empirical" employment. This contrasts with "ideas" which are,

even further removed from objective reality than are categories for no appearance can be found in which they can be represented in concreto.... in them reason aims only at a systematic unity, to which it seeks to approximate the unity that is empirically possible without ever completely reaching it

Kant further distinguishes such ideas from what he calls the "ideal" which he claims is even "further removed from objective reality".

By the ideal I understand not merely in concreto but in individuo, that is as an individual thing, determinable or even determined by the idea alone

I interpret this somewhat obscure passage as the claim that the ideal is an aspect of the idea, its individualisation. Kant offers an example. Plato's concept of the idea of the divine understanding is such an ideal.

This is the idea of

an individual object of its pure intuition, the most perfect of every kind of possible being and the archetype of all copies in the field of experience

Such were Plato's forms. Kant wants to use Plato's conception here without inheriting his metaphysics. This is a point in Kant's work where theoretical and practical reason merge. In Section I above, regulative ideas were introduced solely in the context of theoretical reason and its search for the greatest possible systematisation in experience. However, the regulative idea of God has a dual basis. It does not merely validate teleology in Kant's system but has a practical power as an ideal.

Without soaring so high, we are yet bound to confess that human reason contains not only ideas but ideals also, which although they do not have, like the Platonic ideas, creative power, yet have practical power (as regulative principles) and form the basis of the possible perfection of certain actions
According to Habermas, Kant's assertion of the primacy of practical reason is ambiguous. It is only Fichte who is unequivocal. However, the seeds for this "Practical" turn exist in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. For example, Kant refers to the stoical conception of the sage as a regulative ideal. It is just the "divine man within us" against which we compare ourselves critically even though "we can never attain to the perfection thereby prescribed". This admission of the counterfactuality of regulative ideals is crucial. It would seem to cast doubt upon their validity. Indeed as we shall see this is the central problem for Habermas's conception of an ISS. Kant denies that such ideals are merely "fictive". He claims,

> Although we cannot concede to these ideals objective reality (existence), they are not therefore to be regarded as figments of the brain; they supply reason with a standard which is indispensable to it, providing it, as they do with a concept of that which is entirely complete in its kind, and thereby enabling it to estimate and to measure the degree and defects of the incomplete.

While this is a wonderfully suggestive passage, it does not silence worries that recur in the context of Habermas's concept of the ISS. How is the ideal to be justified? What is its source? Are there competing ideals? Kant does not answer these issues directly, though he claims that there is something absurd in the attempt to realise an ideal in concreto in that,

> in such an attempt in as much as the natural limitations which are constantly doing violence to the completeness of the idea make the illusion that is aimed at altogether impossible, and so cast suspicion on the good itself - the good that has its source in the idea - by giving it the air of being a mere fiction.

In other words, any attempt to realise the ideal, which are bound to fail, are also harmful in that they misrecognise the regulative status of the ideal. An ideal of reason must always rest on determinate concepts and serve as a rule.
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rest on determinate concepts and serve as a rule.
According to Kant, this contrasts with the hazy and indeterminate character of products of the imagination, blurred sketches which are drawn from diverse experiences. These are the merely shadowy images of the creations of artists. Kant calls them ideals of sensibility. However, the plausibility of this contrast depends crucially upon Kant's differentiation of the various faculties. How can we be sure that an archetype of reason was not a product of the creative imagination and thereby contingent, idiosyncratic and ultimately relativist? In effect we require a metaphysical prop to answer such issues. Faith is perhaps the ultimate and irrefutable anti-relativist retort. Indeed Kant's legitimation of teleology as a method via the regulative interpretation of the idea of God is supported at another level. It is also a necessary "fiction" for practical reason. Vaihinger stresses the practical function of the multiplicity of "fictional constructs" that he describes. However, the meaning of "practical" is ambiguous for him. It is determined both by a distinctively germanic form of pragmatism with its roots in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche on the one hand, and by a Kantian, ethical rendering on the other. Vaihinger stresses the organic and instrumental function of all thought, but this lives uneasily with his endorsement of certain ethical fictions. The use of fictions he claims is not to be confused with hypotheses, though there may be an interplay between them. Hypotheses are directed towards reality and demand verification. Fictions on the other hand have only a heuristic value. Vaihinger cites Goethe's animal archetype which he claims paved the way for the Darwinian hypothesis. However, Vaihinger's account of the difference is far from clear. Fictions are justified by a vague notion of utility which does not seem so unlike verification after all. Indeed, this is a general problem. What counts AGAINST a fictional construct such as a
regulative idea? Vaihinger considers the dynamics of the triadic scheme of fiction/hypothesis/dogma and attempts to specify a law of "ideational shift" that connects them.20 Presumably, Kant's claim that we have a natural tendency to transgress the limits of possible experience involves the "shift" from "fictions" to "dogma". This is transcendental illusion.

The denial that fictions are hypotheses in a theoretical sense is perhaps most plausible in the practical-ethical context. Freedom is an impossible ideal but is nevertheless demanded by moral judgement of others. According to Kant, a man must conduct himself "as if" he were to be held accountable for his acts. Vaihinger observes that,

we include as fictions not merely indifferent theoretical operations but ideational constructs emanating from the noblest minds, to which the noblest part of mankind cling and of which they will not allow themselves to be deprived. Nor is it our object so to deprive them - for as practical fictions we leave them all intact; they perish only as theoretical truths

Ignoring for the moment the rampant intellectual elitism of this claim, we may observe the differentiation of the practical fiction from the theoretical. Confirmation of the former does not even make sense. Its status is quite otherwise. Vaihinger seems to give it a mystical, theological basis of justification. He cites Lange's notions of "imaginative creation" and the "standpoints of the ideal". They also seem to have an aesthetic basis in which there is a rhetorical function directed at awakening the "noblest feelings". He talks of "poetic" fictions. However, the theoretical justification in terms of "utility" is never fully expunged although there is a hint of another form of justification underlying this which (ironically) is not developed. For example, Vaihinger claims that fictional constructs have the practical outcome of making communication possible.22 This vaguely anticipates Habermas's PI.
Kant is the classical source of the "as if" method in philosophy according to Vaihinger. His moral system is explicitly based upon fictions. For example the ideal of the "Highest Good" is an ideal of an intelligible moral world, a "corpus mysticum of rational beings". While Vaihinger talks of the place of these thoughts in experience, the tone of elitism is explicit.

only an elite can continue to breathe at this altitude: the vast majority need a different less rarified atmosphere

And yet how is the arbitrariness of such constructs to be avoided? In Religion Within the Limits of Pure Reason the ultimate court of appeal is faith. Practical fictions mediate a "mystical" core and the "people". Man has a need for these fictions. However, it is not fear in Nietzsche's sense, but reason which "creates" God. The "arbitrariness" of practical ideas such as those of God, immortality and freedom, only appears so vis a vis theoretical justification. Yet they are "critical" in Kant's sense in the face of dogmatic interpretations. Nor do such fictions "contradict" each other as dogmas do.

However, it is not clear that justification can be left at so indeterminate a level. In Part I of the Metaphysics of Ethics Kant talks of the "pactum originarium" as a fictional construct. Such notions may be deployed in highly ideological and contestable ways. For example the fiction of the "state of nature" may legitimate social and legal arrangements of a particular kind. Here, the "fictional" status of such constructs is a crucial problem even if we dispense with images of quasi-theoretical justification. It is here I wish to introduce the notion of the "immanent" character of such practical fictions, as their justificatory basis. Though the concept of "immanence" has theological connotations, we may approach a secularised reading of it which aligns itself with the
project of "immanent critique" proposed by the Frankfurt School.

It is interesting to see how Kant's regulative approach is taken up by the "Naturphilosophie" tradition. Ironically, it generalises the regulative account and thereby reestablishes the speculative function of reason which Kant's whole approach is at pains to limit. At the heart of this creative reinterpretation is the explicit fusion of theoretical and practical reason. The "Naturphilosophen" read Kant as reinstating the divine aspect of human reason. Intellectual intuition is generalised and encompasses the possibility of theoretical intuition of "wholes". Contrast this with Kant's regulative approach to the cosmological idea!

Kant talks of two interests in theoretical reason, concerning "extent" and "content". The former locates the "speculative" attitude e.g. the subsumption of species under higher genera. The latter locates the "empirical" attitude e.g. a regard for the multiplicity of species. A "Naturphilosoph" like Schelling emphasised the speculative attitude at the expense of the empirical. Others like Oersted were equally committed to both. It is important to see the fusion of the theoretical and practical aspects of reason in the speculative reinterpretation of Kant's regulative approach. Many of the Naturphilosophen regarded the Critique of Judgement as their locus classicus. Kant talks of the feeling of pleasure, conceived aesthetically, associated with the concept of teleology. The fusion of the aesthetic and the divine idiom and its priority over the theoretical is a strong theme in Kant's successors.

I wish to draw upon the implications of these classical sources in german idealism in order to attempt a justification of the regulative character of Habermas's concept of an ideal speech situation (ISS). The emphasis upon its practical as against its theoretical character is important to this task. As we shall see, the problem of the counter-
factuality of the ISS has incurred much criticism. Habermas's modern style dispenses with the stark neo-Kantian distinctions between faculties e.g. Understanding, Reason, Imagination and Judgement. Because of this Kant's distinction between ideals of reason and of imagination (see above Page 185) does not hold strictly. As such we may be able to talk of an ideal of reason which has an "experiential" basis of some kind. Such an ideal will not merely describe that basis but is dialectically connected to it. It is normative and critical. What is "given" and "factual" in experience is highly negotiable. Hence the counter factuality of a notion such as the ISS is simultaneously engaged in this negotiation. Moral experience in Kant's system testifies to "immanent" ideals which, though going "beyond" sensory experience, necessarily, are not thereby merely "fictive". In a sense I wish to appropriate an acceptable aspect of the language of "immanence". The ISS must be regarded as "immanently" critical or normative. Regulative ideas and ideals are immanent to experience. Immanence is inherently hermeneutic i.e. expresses the sense in which such ideals are a moment of experience on the dynamic model of the "hermeneutic circle". The circle mediates between the "given" and the ideal. Habermas talks of communicative experience as somehow fundamental. This is not given unproblematically but may be systematically distorted. According to him, the recognition and specification of this distortion qua distortion implies an ideal of non-distortion which may thereby be highly counter-factual. However, such a specification of "normality" must be immanent. In the case of psychoanalysis it must take as its point of departure perceptions of suffering, and frustration which have a systematic basis. In a sense such a general theory of normality will provide a theoretical framework within which to locate in turn those perceptions of "pathological" distortion. I have already alluded to the hermeneutical aspects of this
and the worry that a general theory is "pulled along" by the clinical technique. This raises some interesting methodological issues. For Habermas, it is the sphere of "power" which is the basis for such a depth hermeneutic. He assumes that this is a phenomenological category in some primary sense.  

In what follows I shall labour the distinction between the "immanent" and the "fictive" status of the ISS. Vaihinger describes the philosophy of the "as if" as an "idealistic positivism" or a "Positivist idealism". What is intended by these locutions is the denial that fictional constructs are properly construed either as given "positivistically" or as merely externally postulated. Rather,

Where the logical function actively intervenes, it alters what is given and causes it to depart from reality.

This is an attempt to avoid the seeming arbitrary character of such constructs. For theoretical fictions this is supplied by a criterion of pragmatic utility. However for practical-moral fictions, the justificatory basis is more difficult. The fictive character of the ISS suggests that it is the external, postulated ideal of intellectual elitists. Against this challenge, it must defend its claim to "immanence". The latter is a problematic notion. What is the immanent and "experiential" basis of the ISS? I shall suggest a schematic answer to this question.

We may regard the concept of the ISS as "inspired" by the critique of ideology. The latter in turn finds its Marxist grounding in the evident material suffering of a particular group whose self-consciousness paradoxically serves the interests of another dominant group. Habermas's theory of communication recognises that the historical co-ordinates of this basis for "Ideologiekritik" have altered. However, it must still be possible to retain a "primitive" perception of suffering due to "systematic"
illusion, rooted in the derivative life-sphere of power or hegemony (Herrschaft) in KHI. This is a great problem. A sceptic (i.e. a political conservative) would deny this phenomenological basis and undercut the language of "immanence". In effect he denies the first premiss of TA (3), (see Page 43). For example, in conditions of affluence, suffering and systematic exploitation are less visible. Conflicts are displaced. This is the spectre of the totally socialised society which haunts critical theory. Its concepts cannot "grip" social reality immanently. Rather, there arises the suspicion that the counterfactuality of the ISS represents an externally postulated value of a small group of elitist intellectuals.

While these challenges and problems must be recognised, I believe we can rescue a sense of the immanence of the ISS which implies a form of transcendentalism akin to Kant's regulative approach and which underlies the general idea of "depth hermeneutics". Kant's discussion of regulative ideals is a context in which the "analytic" model of TAs is loosened further and a practical moment is emphasised. This changes the character of possible justifications of transcendental strategies. They are "practical heuristic myths". But what does this mean? We abandon theoretical fictions such as pure earth, fire, water and air because they lose their heuristic utility. But what would count against practical fictions? What is the basis for their justification?

III Habermas's concept of ideal speech

Habermas does not deny that the ISS is a regulative idea in Kant's sense. The context in which he claims this is an interesting example of a modernised interpretation of the german idealist tradition. Habermas says,

This supposition can but need not be counterfactual; but even if it is made counterfactually it is a fiction that is operatively effective in the
illusion, rooted in the derivative life-sphere of power or hegemony 
(Herrschaft) in KHI. This is a great problem. A sceptic (i.e. a political 
conservative) would deny this phenomenological basis and undercut the 
language of "immanence". In effect he denies the first premiss of TA (3), 
(see Page 43). For example, in conditions of affluence, suffering and 
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This supposition can but need not be counter-
factual; but even if it is made counterfactually it 
is a fiction that is operatively effective in the
process of communication. Therefore I prefer to speak of an anticipation of an ideal speech situation ..... The normative foundation of agreement in language is thus both anticipated and - as anticipated foundation - also effective..... To this extent the concept of an ideal speech situation is not merely a regulative principle in Kant's sense; with the first step towards agreement in language we must always in fact make this supposition. On the other hand, neither is it an existing concept in Hegel's sense; for no historical reality matches the form of life that we can in principle characterise by reference to the ideal speech situation. The ideal speech situation would best be compared with a transcendental illusion were it not for the fact that ..... (in contrast to) the application of the categories beyond experience this illusion is also the constitutive condition of rational speech. The anticipation of the Ideal Speech Situation has ..... the significance of a constitutive illusion which is at the same time the appearance of a form of life. Of course we cannot know a priori whether that appearance is a mere delusion (Vorspiegelung) - however unavoidable the supposition from which it springs - or whether the empirical conditions for the realisation (if only approximate) of the supposed form of life can be practically brought about. Viewed in this way, the fundamental norms of rational speech built into universal pragmatics contain a practical hypothesis.

This is a dense but rich and suggestive passage. It hints at many of the ideas raised above. One reason for Habermas's denial that the ISS is merely a regulative idea, is that he has too theoretical a conception of the latter. In stressing the practical character of the ISS, Habermas believes that he is distancing himself from Kant. It is interesting that while Habermas takes Kant as a coordinate for his reflections, he effectively conflates Kant's approach in the "Analytic" and his regulative approach. This is epitomised in his suggestion that the ISS is a "constitutive illusion", a locution that Kant would never have accepted. We see throughout this passage that Habermas is wrestling with the basic tension between "immanence" and "fictionality" that underlies his conception of the ISS. He says that it is a fiction which is "operatively effective" i.e.
immanent. It is not merely a regulative principle in Kant's sense because we must "in fact" always make this supposition. Since we cannot know (theoretically) whether it is an illusion or whether the empirical conditions for its realisability can be brought about, it has the status of a "practical hypothesis". This is less a clarification than an expression of the problem. The ISS does not "exist" in Hegel's sense but we must presuppose it "in fact".

In his later work, Habermas comes to realise the inherently formal character of the ISS. It does not sketch a concrete form of life and so the sense in which it may be regarded as a practical "hypothesis" recedes. However, it retains a "practical" moment and its formal character does not reduce it to a regulative idea conceived purely theoretically. Thus, when Habermas talks of the "anticipation" of a form of life inherent in the specification of the ISS, this is most appropriately interpreted as the anticipation of the form of a form of life. Its concrete character is indeterminate. The notion of "anticipation" is an interesting one and is at the heart of any philosophy of the "as if". This is clearly not "prediction" in any theoretical sense. Moreover, it captures the idiom of "immanence" since anticipation is a future-orientated "moment" of the present which has normative significance for the present. It is a hermeneutically situated "moment" as Ricoeur says (see Chapter 9).

One might question the practical and normative status of the anticipatory character of the ISS by asking WHO does the "anticipating". As with the concepts of synthesis and of cognitive interest, this is a notion displaced from its original context of signification. It has transcendentental meaning. This is the interpretative tight-rope that the ISS walks. If its anticipatory character is removed from the actual practice of competent speakers then it is highly contentious. If it is too concerned
to reproduce the facts of discourse it loses its general and critical force. Heidegger has shown the anticipatory character of all experience. The nature of experience is not an atomistic succession of discrete events but a shifting horizon of interpretation constituted by retrospective and prospective or anticipatory moments. This rehabilitates "anticipation" as an ontological structure of experience. Whether we can specify the character of that anticipation in a highly normative fashion as Habermas does is a further matter. We saw in the section on Dilthey that self understanding is somehow constituted by the category of "significance" which interprets the "receding manifold" of past experience. This now requires supplementation in a non-psychologistic fashion by an "anticipatory" categorisation of the "manifold". What one is, is constituted by one's perception of possibilities. At a psychological level such anticipation may be characterised by vague utopian hopes. The ISS on the other hand operates at a transcendental level and spells out "anticipation" as a procedural form of rationality. We must now consider this.

IV Rationality as a regulative idea

We may regard the ISS as characterised by three conditions under which rational consensus about truth and norms is possible.

1) Participants are motivated solely by the "force of argument".

2) There is "freedom from constraint" such that for all possible participants there is a symmetrical distribution of chances to select and to apply speech acts.

3) There is a formal freedom to move from level to level of discourse i.e. there can be progressive radicalisation of argumentation.

We can discern immediately Habermas's intention to link truth and justice in a deep theory of rationality. This is a feature that Habermas
shares with Rawls' *A Theory of Justice*. I shall consider the similarities between them in due course. Habermas's conception of the ISS represents an attempt to restore cognitivity to values in the face of "decisionism". The latter is Habermas's term for positivist non-cognitivist ethics (common to social theorists such as Weber and Parsons).

In Chapter 5 we discussed Habermas's consensus theory of truth, claiming that it could not eradicate a residual "correspondence" element. However, we did not discuss it explicitly from the perspective of the ISS and the conditions that characterise it. In the ISS participants are motivated solely by the "force of the better argument" (condition 1 above). This defines the difference between "rational" and "merely factual" consensus. Habermas talks as if this concept of the power of argument were primitive. Elsewhere it is regarded counterfactually. It signifies the exclusion of "contingent" constraints upon discourse. More positively he claims that the force of argument

- is not sought solely in the power of refuting deductive arguments ....
- The progress of knowledge must take place through substantial arguments

But what are these "substantive" arguments? Indeed, what is argument at all in the light of metaphors and models? Is it a mistake to demand a definition of argument? In Habermas's case if we can differentiate those "arguments" appropriate to theoretical reason and those appropriate to practical reason, then the "force of argument" as a concept loses its priority. Rather, the differences in categorial meaning in Habermas's system carry over into the specification of logics of inquiry. He believes that the scope of argument in the natural sciences is bounded categorically such that,

Theories can only be constituted under the conditions of argumentation and, at the same time,
within the limits of the prior objectification of experiential happenings. The theory languages which undergo a discontinuous development in the course of scientific progress can interpret and in a certain sense even reformulate the structures of the pre-scientific object domains; but so long as we are neither angels nor animals these languages cannot transform the structures into the conditions of another object domain.

Hesse applies Habermas's veiled remarks to modern issues in the philosophy of science. The everyday life-world of low level observation statements provides the transcendental boundary of theory changes and overcomes the most radical forms of the meaning-variance thesis. But even within "theoretical" discourse it is not clear that Habermas's concept of the "force of argument" is unequivocal. He does refer to Toulmin's account of argument in the natural sciences but does not develop this further. Hacking's suggestions for a relativism of "styles of reasoning" would seem to damage Habermas's claim. The power of argument is always relative to a group, an epoch and so on, though Hacking retreats from a strong relativist thesis. It is interesting that the seeds for this challenge exist in the specification of the ISS itself. If there can be progressive radicalisation of discourse, we may move to a level where what counts as an argument is itself negotiable.

Peirce's conception of truth as an ideal form of consensus at the limit of inquiry is also open to interpretation. Does it represent a realisable, historical end point? It seems strange that one day science might come to a halt. Could we know we had the ultimate theory even if we did? To some extent these questions can be allayed by regarding Peirce's theory of truth, and Habermas's appropriation of it, as regulative notions. The ISS as a consensus theory of truth represents not a realisable state of affairs, but a form of rational accountability inherent in the nature of inquiry. That is to say, what it means to claim that a statement or theory
is "true" is that one would, if pressed, submit it to rational testing. Truth claims bear an inherent reference to the dimension of discursive redemption, whether this is effected or not. Hesse compares the ISS with Popper's account of the ideal "true" scientific theory. Rational consensus is falsifiable but not verifiable. Furthermore, the idea of "anticipated consensus" does not necessarily imply images of the cumulative progress of science.

Although the striving for consensus now is necessarily dependent on the communicative tradition of the past sequence of theories, I do not think that the anticipated ideal consensus can be understood in terms of an actual sequence of theories in the future. It is rather an ideal that is equally relevant to all points of time and, what is more important, to all temporary conceptual frameworks.

Hesse compares this point with Habermas's discussion of Danto's view that historiography is necessarily incomplete. Every historian is his own last historian. Similarly, every serious and sincere theorisation is "the last". However, this activity presupposes the acceptance of accountability inherent in the ISS. This is the meaning of being motivated by the "power of argument" alone. However, despite this explicit regulative rendering of the ISS doubts remain about its implication for every culture. Accountability as "empirical commitment" seems to be relative to the enlightenment tradition in which Habermas operates. This is a problem which is even more acute for Habermas's account of cogntivity in ethics, to which we shall turn in the next chapter. How is the accountability that the ISS represents as a regulative ideal to be justified? We must move beyond the consensus theory of theoretical truth in order to answer this.
In conclusion, I wish to connect the observations made above with the general problematic of transcendental arguments introduced in Chapter 2. This will provide a point of departure for a discussion of Habermas's "communicative ethics". Thompson reconstructs Habermas's "argument" for the ISS in seven stages:

1) The process of communication implies that it is possible for at least two subjects to come to an agreement about a state of affairs.
2) To come to an agreement implies that it is possible to distinguish between a genuine and a deceptive agreement.
3) A genuine agreement is an agreement induced by the force of the better argument alone.
4) The force of the better argument prevails if and only if communication is not hindered through external and internal constraints.
5) Communication is not hindered through internal constraints if and only if for all potential participants there is a symmetrical distribution of chances to select and employ speech acts.
6) A situation in which there is a symmetrical distribution of chances to select and employ communicative, constative representative and regulative speech acts is an ISS.
7) Therefore the process of communication implies the possibility of an ISS.43

Thompson's objections to Habermas's claims are important. He questions the initial assumption that communication is fundamentally orientated towards understanding as a deep form of cognitive agreement. Why is this mode of communication central? There are many other, more empirically substantiated modes of communicative interaction which are more plausible. The "will to power" in Nietzsche's sense may be fundamental,
revealing itself in the ubiquity of "strategic" forms of action.

Thompson questions the primitivity of the "force of the better argument" as the mode of reaching agreement. Why not love, compassion, empathy or compromise? Habermas's conception of the ISS is too cognitive. It filters out other important and ultimately perhaps more central aspects of social interaction. Furthermore, the requirement of the symmetrical distribution of chances to select and employ speech acts is obscure. This fails to conceptualise material constraints on the "far side" of discourse such as access to wealth and weapons. Nor is it clear what this implies concerning the "intelligence" of individuals. Is this a given for discourse or is it negotiable and itself a possible source of constraint? If we regard it as given, the ISS lays itself open to the charge of "intellectual gangstbery". The power of the better argument is still a coercive force in some sense.

These are powerful objections. As a consensus theory of truth the ISS carries some plausibility. However, the specifications of its normative conditions raise other problems. We might represent Habermas's argument for the ISS in my shorter TA form as follows:

1) We have the possibility of communication because it is fundamentally orientated towards understanding

2) Communication is possible only if we presuppose an ISS

Very clearly (1) is a highly contestable first premiss. Indeed it looks less like a given assumption than the result of reflection and argument itself. A sceptic might simply deny it. In the classic examples of TAs it seems adequate to reverse the onus of proof and demand that a sceptic make himself intelligible. However, the denial of (1) is not unintelligible and some support for it must be given positively. Regarding it as hypothetical is inadequate, since the contestability of the argument at this point is crucial. Habermas shifts the level of justification to that
of a developmental logic. Forms of communication orientated towards understanding are not empirically instantiated but may be regarded as developmental end points. However, this merely shifts the locus of justification. Habermas's developmental-logical perspective is as fictional and as in need of justification as the ISS. Where is such justification to be found? Following the reflections above upon the philosophy of the "as if", I believe the practical and normative character of the ISS and its developmental correlates (e.g. the concepts of "ego identity" and the "free" society) must be stressed. This indicates that (1) cannot be regarded as a "given" premiss in the style of analytic TAs. It is a practical demand in Kant's sense. What makes such a demand convincing? How can it be non-decisionist? How can the ISS be an "immanent" normative ideal? We must turn to Habermas's ethical claims concerning the ISS in order to approach an answer to these issues.
I Practical Discourse

Habermas's concept of the ISS is intended to enrich the idea of rationality. We have already looked at its status as a consensus theory of truth. Habermas also wants to restore a form of cognitivity to questions of ethics and political legitimacy. The ISS is a consensus theory of normative truth. In discourse the established background of norms and evaluations is called into question and treated hypothetically. Participants are motivated solely by the force of the better argument, which characterises the co-operative search for the right solution. But what in this case is the "force" of the better argument? Habermas locates it in the "generalisability" of needs. Thus,

In taking up practical discourse we unavoidably presuppose an Ideal Speech Situation that on the strength of its formal properties allows consensus only through generalisable interests.

According to Habermas, theorists such as Weber, Luhman and Popper are "decisionists" in so far as their concept of rationality allows no place for the rational discussion of values. Their concept of argumentation is too narrowly deductive.

However, Habermas's concept of generalisability is far from clear. The ISS represents an argumentatively achieved consensus and this expresses a "common interest" that may be ascertained without deception. It seems that constraint-free consensus permits only what all can want:

A morality based on principles is thus a system that allows only general norms (That is, norms without exceptions, without privileges and without limitations on the domain of validity).

All this is highly abstract. One would like some examples of such common
generalisable needs. Food, air, space and companionship would seem to be examples, but these are morally rather uninteresting as objects of consensus. Habermas cannot mean just this.

According to Habermas, only generalisable interests are really intersubjective,

a consensus can arise only through appropriately generalisable interests, by which I mean needs that can be communicatively shared.

What sense of communication is this? It is a strong sense which implies deep agreement about norms. Naturally, I can make my egoistic and non-generalisable interests understood to others, but Habermas has a more maximal sense of understanding as agreement (Vestmäßlichkeit). These ideas may be clarified if we compare Habermas's position with those of other defenders of a "universalisability" principle as some form of formal rationality constraint in ethics.

Kant explicates a form of "categorialism" that underlies moral judgement. There are a variety of formulations of his categorial imperative. In its most general form it runs as follows: "Act so that the maxim of your will can hold good as a principle of universal legislation". According to Kant, the CI is binding upon all "rational" beings. It is the form of the moral law. However, the separation of formal and substantive principles in ethics is a source of philosophical dispute, particularly so when interpreting Kant's position. In a sense the logical form of morality is intended to yield substantive moral conclusions. However, Kant invokes an overriding concept of rationality at just those points when the universalisability inherent in the categorial imperative threatens to include rogue principles as moral. For example, Kant demands that one must imagine that a maxim had become a natural law in order to test its acceptability as a fully paid up moral principle. In the case of promise
breaking for example the test has some plausibility, because the universal
institutionalisation of promise breaking would be self destructive.
Therefore the maxim, "break promises" is unsuitable as part of the Moral
Law. However, Kant's other examples are less clear cut. There are
maxims that would pass the imaginative test and yet still be morally
unacceptable. Hare characterises this as the problem of "fanaticism".5 In
effect, Kant places the substantive moral force of the supposed formal
character of the CI upon a concept of "rationality" that remains
unexplicated. Attempts have been made to give the concept of universalis-
ability as more plausible basis. Lukes summarises three versions of the
universalisability thesis.6 Roughly speaking, they are as follows:
i) No references are to be made to proper names. Purely numerical
differences between agents are morally irrelevant. There must be no
"essential" occurrences of singular terms functioning referentially.
ii) One must in some sense "put oneself in the other person's place".
iii) One must seek maxims that are acceptable from all points of view.

Lukes claims that Habermas needs some principle such as (iii) yet this
is far too strong. What principle could pass this test except those general
requirements for food etc. given above? Hare's position has elements of
both (i) and (ii). However, it is no longer clear that they may be
marketed as logical principles. According to Hare, the principle of
universalisability states something like, "one ought not to make exceptions
in one's own favour". This is intended to flow from the inherent
universalisability of the "descriptive" meaning of moral predicates. The
idea that meaning involves "rule-governedness" is widespread. Someone who
describes this X as something "red" and yet refuses to call something that
is "similar in the relevant respects" the same would be guilty of
contradiction and hence unintelligibility. Hare wants to deploy this in-
sight in the context of moral predicates. However, whether such predicates
share features by virtue of their inherent "descriptive" content is questionable. The question of "similarity in relevant respects" is negotiable in a morally substantive sense. That is to say, it remains a problem on Hare's account what precisely are the "morally relevant categories" over which we are prepared to universalise. The fanatic does not commit a logical sin. He is not unintelligible but "merely" refuses to play a moral language game. Both Kant and Hare attempt to locate some form of substantive "equality of respect" moral principle as a logical feature of moral discourse. Where does Habermas's communicative ethics stand on these issues?

Habermas is critical of Hare for whom values are the unjustifiable input into the universalisability constraint. While Hare claims to have a cognitivist theory of ethics, it is so in too weak a sense for Habermas. Habermas borrows from Hegel's critique of Kant's concept of an "autonomous" will. The latter is a peculiar abstraction from the moral relationships of communicating individuals..... By presupposing autonomy - that means the will's property of being a law unto itself - ....... Kant expels moral action from the domain of moral action itself. Kant assumes the limiting case of a pre-established co-ordination of acting subjects.

That is to say, the "rationality" of maxims cannot be decided upon monologically by appeal to a pre-established principle of universalisation. Kant and Hare's principles of universalisability abstract from a process in which the substantive, morally relevant categories appropriate to universalisation are actually formed. For Kant and Hare,

Universality of moral law here not only means intersubjective obligation as such but the abstract form of universal validity which is bound a priori to general agreement.

According to Habermas, the principle of universalisability is generated in discourse. Kant develops a contrast between the rational will (Wille) and
various "pathological" interests such that the latter are excluded from the
sphere of morality. Habermas's discourse model rehabilitates these as
candidates within an argumentative process which seeks consensus.

McCarthy claims that in communicative ethics the emphasis shifts from:

- what each can will without contradiction to be a
- universal law to what all can will in agreement to
- be a universal norm

However, the concept of the "generalisability of needs" remains unclear.
Habermas seems to suggest that it is the communicative context which is
vital. Which interests are generalisable cannot be specified a priori and
in advance for this would be to regress to a monological principle of
universalisability. However, generalisability is now simply defined as that
which results from ideal consensus. The latter is a product of an
argumentative process which is determined by appeal to generalisability.
The whole scheme seems circular. We can go some way towards dissolving
this obscurity if we regard the model of practical discourse not so much as
an account of how value disputes may be resolved i.e. by appeal to some
notion of generalisability, but as an account of a context in which certain
fundamental norms have already been recognised. The ISS is a specification
of a normative context in which persons reciprocally recognise one another
as moral agents. It is the context of argumentation and not the
substantive result which has fundamental normative significance. As
Habermas says,

A cognitivist linguistic ethics .... is based only
on fundamental norms of rational speech that we
must always presuppose if we discourse at all

These are norms in a morally substantive sense though they are seemingly
formal. According to Lukes the "force of the better argument" in practical
discourse is thoroughly opaque. What is important, he claims, is that the
ISS expresses an ideal of mutual recognition. Yet is this ideal
transcendentally necessary as a presupposition of communication? As Hesse puts it,

The choice of the concept "person" becomes transcendentally necessary only after an option is taken for practical discursive rationality and individuality.

This is to claim that Habermas cannot avoid a "decisionist" arbitrariness of value that he initially ascribes to Kant and Hare. The ISS is the "imaginative" expression of a commitment to the "inheritance of European Liberalism and social democracy". Can this be justified? What would count as justification?

II Against Decisionism

Habermas claims that Lukes assumes a zero-sum relationship between the individual differentiation of needs and the generalisability of collective interests. He points to counter examples in which increased scope for individual options does not decrease chances for agreement, e.g. traffic rules. In many ways one can assess a philosopher in terms of the empirical examples he regards as paradigmatic. Habermas is primarily interested in the justification of social norms, but he is inevitably projected into the level of debate between moral philosophers. A review of the basic issues might be helpful.

Hare's characterisation of freedom and reason as the fundamental antinomical elements in moral thinking provides a useful, if schematic, epistemological map. At one extreme we encounter various forms of subjectivist theories of ethics in which the priority of ethical freedom is stressed. This is most characteristic of existentialist ethics. Another subjectivist variant which seems to flow from a positivist approach to meaning is "emotivism". This regards all moral utterances as, in Habermas's terms, "strategic" and "expressive". In its starkest form it is
the claim that moral and evaluative utterances essentially purport to express and evince emotions and attitudes. At the other extreme are strong cognitive theories of ethics. Here we locate some extreme versions of utilitarianism and naturalistically conceived ethics. For example, "descriptivism" is the claim that terms like "good" and "bad" describe properties in the same way as other predicates. An intuitionist ethics claims that we can just "read off" the ethical properties of events and actions.

Admittedly these positions are somewhat caricatured. Hare's "prescriptivism" may be read as a more plausible attempt to mediate the poles of freedom and reason, and to rehabilitate a form of cognitivism. On the other hand Williams wants to reaffirm a role for the concept of emotion in moral theory. Moral conflict is more like a conflict of desires than a conflict of beliefs. (The desire/belief distinction parallels that of freedom and reason). For example, the discovery of inconsistent beliefs has a different outcome from the discovery of inconsistent desires. On pain of irrationality an offending belief must be rejected, whereas a desire may survive in a significant way. Williams attacks the assimilation of "ought" conflicts to "belief" conflicts inherent in cognitivist theories of ethics. He draws upon Ross's notions of "prima facie" obligations which are not merely apparent obligations but are obligations which, if overridden in action, nevertheless exert a "residual influence". Hare's response to moral conflict is a logical one, i.e. we must revise the offending principle since we are insufficiently prepared to avoid contradiction. However, Williams claims that ex post facto regret is not just at being unprepared. It contains a practical "moment" which projects a desire for guidance about how to avoid future conflict.

How does all this bear upon Habermas's position? His theory is
"cognitivist" in some sense. According to Nagel, the elements of our moral thinking are disparate and fragmented. This contrasts with the unity of action. Habermas's discourse theory of ethics is not isolated from a context of action. The unity of action seems to require that discursive rationality rule out other considerations "without remainder". There can be no residual influence. But is not a consensus theory of ethics making the best of a bad job? That is, recognising a commitment to action does not necessarily give a consensus any cognitive status for ethics. It seems plausible as a model for the justification of social norms but does this imply any cognitivity? Moral philosophers might regard consensus as a pragmatic necessity for collective decision making (though they might equally well support forms of compromise) without regarding this as an epistemological feature of values and their cognitive status. And yet Habermas's challenge is directed at the very idea of an "epistemology" of values. Let us approach this indirectly.

In reply to Lukes, Habermas claims that the discourse ethical way of reading the universalisation principle does not rest even implicitly upon assumptions about the quantitative relation between general and particular interests. Habermas seems to imply that particular interests simply are those which cannot be generalised and thus require principles of compromise to connect them. Being "generalisable" seems not to be an intrinsic, logical feature of interests but lies in the fact of whether they are agreed upon by all. This is not something that one may pronounce upon a priori. Originally, the principle of universalisability is invoked in the face of demands about what the right course of action may be. According to Habermas, universalisability is a formal, normative condition of an ISS, specifying the context in which such discursive deliberation may take place and is not a pre-existing monological court of
appeal. Against Lukes, Habermas claims that

A unified society of abundance would be a necessary condition of the functioning of the universalisation principle only if we had to suppose that the needs (wishes, inclinations, values and so forth) which normative regulation is supposed to take into account, exclude a priori consensual regulation at a higher level of abstraction.

Lukes seems to say that it is only with universal abundance that all interests could be universalisable. Yet Habermas claims that this assumes they cannot be regulated at a higher level of abstraction. At this level the principle of universalisability is not a method but an inter-subjectively formal context of discourse which instantiates a principle of mutual recognition. Such a principle is operative if we take ourselves seriously as arguing about truth, either theoretical or normative. However, with the former there may be some form of empirical commitment at the heart of the "argumentative" process, whereas for the latter this is not the case. Habermas appeals to his consensus theory of truth when the consensus theory of norms seems weak. However he also shifts the justification of the ISS and its deep lying normative commitment to another level where he continues to fend off the decisionist. He talks of the "self-destructive" nature of long run withdrawal from contexts of action oriented towards understanding and, by implication, oriented to a communicative rationality which applies to norms.

In reply to Heller's worries about the "universalisation of the addressee" in Critical Theory (i.e. the loss of the proletariat as a subject) Habermas wants to defend a potentiality for reason that can no longer be reconstructed in terms of an expressivist model of self-realisation. He rejects a romantic conception of work (Heideggerian Marxism) that Heller claims is lost when characterised as instrumental action. Habermas asserts that it is only in the context of a theory of
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communication that an explanation and critique of alienated labour can be sustained. While Heller mistrusts the formalist character of communicative rationality, Habermas in turn mistrusts the abstract and negative character of existentialist perspectives. Heller claims that IF we decide at all, we cannot help but decide in favour of communicative rationality. According to Heller, Habermas's formal pragmatics misleads us into losing sight of this moment of existential "decision". Against this, Habermas claims that the opposition between "decision" and "communicative rationality" is abstract. This is because the process of the self-formation of individuals can only take place through the medium of action orientated towards understanding.

Communicative rationality according to Habermas,

is already embodied in existing forms of interaction and does not first have to be postulated as something that ought to be

Evoking the idea of a "causality of fate" inherent in Hegel and Marx, Habermas refers to the "avenging force of communicative reason". The justification of the ISS and its non-decisionist ethics is shifted to the level of a theory of individual development.

III Developmental logic and ethical scepticism

Habermas implies that Heller's existential claim, that a decision in favour of communicative rationality is somehow necessary, begs important questions. Why is it necessary? Are there "burdens" at an existential level associated with long run withdrawal from contexts of communicative rationality? Habermas locates an account of them within his theory of individual development. This is a normative theory of development, that makes freedom possible without demanding for it the price of unhappiness, of violation of inner nature

Ego identity is constituted between the classical poles of a nature like
determinism and a Kantian image of pure autonomy. Habermas reinterprets this dialectical concept of the ego via critical appropriation of modern traditions in developmental and analytical psychology. He wants to shake up traditional divisions between philosophy and psychology. He recognises that his claims are programmatic and conjectural, since the traditions to which he appeals are themselves far from being unproblematic. Habermas's theory flows from a general perspective from which Kant's unity of apperception, the "I think" that accompanies all consciousness, is too abstract. Rather, it specifies a logical space for a dynamic process. This Fichtean re-reading of Kant is transmitted by Habermas to his reading of Kohlberg and emphasises the complementary relation between,

> normative theory that a psychologist has to borrow from moral philosophy and the empirical theory in which he or she uses the former as input

To this end, Habermas wants to correlate moral consciousness with the more general qualifications for role behaviour. This correlation in development specifies in general a release from "egocentricity". However, Habermas's developmental-logical schema issues in a normative level of formal-operational thought as the ideal end point. It is a level at which,

> the youth has acquired the important distinction between norms on the one hand and principles according to which we generate norms on the other

Yet this is a level which is not normally satisfied by many adults. Habermas talks of levels of development as the child acquires general structures of communication in the process of socialisation. These levels are distinguished by degrees of the reflexivity of expectations of behaviour from others, of abstraction in the motives and orientations that guide action, and in the degree of the generalisation of norms. These three dimensions constitute the sense of "reciprocity" perceived by the child at stages of its development i.e. its perceptions of the normative
status of the "other" in interaction. This develops from regarding the "other" as a natural object, to a "person" whose actions constitute a constraint upon one's own, and finally to a "person" in a deeper normative sense of partner in dialogue.

According to Habermas, Kohlberg's stages of moral consciousness are incomplete. Habermas differentiates,

the monologically applicable principle of generalisability (from the) communally followed procedure of redeeming validity claims discursively

Thus, communicative ethics is located at the highest developmental phase. It provides the developmental-logical perspective from which other stages are ordered. While Habermas acknowledges the problems of the dynamics of this process e.g. the maturational crises such as the Oedipal phase and adolescence which threaten the process, he holds to the claim that,

the model of an unconstrained ego identity is richer and more ambitious than a model of autonomy developed exclusively from the perspectives of morality

And yet in what does such richness consist? We saw that Schmid doubted the viability of the developmental-logical programme even as a heuristic device. Habermas's account breaks off at the point where a specification of the "utility" of such fictions in Vaihinger's terms is needed. Habermas's distinctive contribution seems to reside in the claim that the meaning of the transition from ..., a formalistic ethics of duty to a universal ethics of speech can be found in the fact that need interpretations are no longer assumed as given, but are drawn into discursive formation of will

This is a fundamental break with the notion of the ISS as a dimension within which needs are tested via the force of the better argument. It is a context within which needs themselves are formed. Needs are not given. Inner nature is "communicatively fluid". According to Habermas, needs can
be brought to language, to articulation via "aesthetic" modes of expression. The ISS describes a dimension in which suppressed needs receive an adequate interpretation. This is a more radical claim than the discussion of practical discourse above suggested. It is highly problematic.

According to McCarthy these developmental studies are

the scientific counterparts to the transcendental and developmental logic perspectives of classical german philosophy

Yet, their scientific status is questionable. Furthermore "communicative ethics" raises doubts about the very identity of the agents to whom it is addressed. I shall approach this issue in the next section. In conclusion, I wish to refer to Habermas's defence of his theory of the development of moral consciousness. He asserts that an ethical claim

would for us be thrown into question if the facts of moral advance were inconsistent with its psychological implications

An empirical theory may serve as a coherence test for the normative validity of philosophically reconstructed intuitions of everyday judgement. This resembles Hare's claim that "ought" implies "can". However this notion remains problematic to the extent that the status of "empirical" psychological theories such as that of Kohlberg themselves remain in question.

Habermas concedes some of the issues raised against these proposals. For example, he recognises that there are problems in differentiating among different "post-conventional" stages of moral consciousness since these are made at a highly "reflective" level. Nevertheless he defends an intuition that the reflective debates of moral philosophers are not located here. Habermas claims that ethical scepticism represents a freedom from conventional modes of thought, whose false cognitive claims have been penetrated, without passing to the post-conventional stage. However, it is
surely the case that the ethical sceptic, as Habermas understands him, will simply deny such a stage and regard such developmental logic as illusory? Habermas's defence is important. Ethical scepticism does not put norms out of operation in everyday social life. He refers to Weber's scepticism which leaves untouched the existential character and importance of value judgements. Such a position accomplishes more than emotivist and naturalistic theories of ethics.

This brings us to a crucial question. What is the status of this extra dimension that Weber supplies? It seems to reflect Habermas's deep lying "transcendental pragmatism" i.e. a reflection upon the epistemological priority of life-contexts of action in which choices based upon values must be made. One cannot remain abstractly suspended in "discourse", itself removed from the immediate dictates of action. Decisionist theorists of ethics might regard the consensual regulation of norms as a convenient system for social regulation (though of course they might not). Habermas intends something much stronger. He differentiates contexts of action and discourse but insists on retaining an epistemologically significant link between them. In his reply to Heller he talks of the burdens associated with long run abstention from contexts of communication. We might interpret this more fully as follows. How long might an ethical sceptic act as such? Such a reflective position may be sustainable at an abstract contemplative level, but implies "burdens" if sustained at the level of everyday life. Professors of philosophy who may be ethical sceptics still live and work in an environment in which value choices are necessary. However, such an individual might reply that he was merely acting strategically and that the value options accepted or rejected are just so many strategic options. Until we have a more articulate theory of the connections between action and discourse, this attempt to
subordinate ethical scepticism within a developmental logical perspective remains indeterminate. The plausibility of such subordination rests on a fuller account of the psychological "burdens" associated with non-cognitive ethical positions. Habermas refers to the dangers in ego development reflected in a discrepancy between moral judgement and moral action. Ego mechanisms intervene to avoid the conscious resolution of conflict and to provide a defence against anxiety in the face of the need to "decide". But if this is to be more than a worry about moral sincerity, and if it is to provide a theory of pathology in some sense, much more must be said. Indeed this places the onus of justification of the developmental logical sequence upon empirical theory. It seems possible that the heuristic value of the former might be rejected by the investigations of the latter. Habermas wants to deny this.

Habermas's replies to criticism of his developmental theory of moral consciousness reveals a general feature of his approach that he shares with other members of the Frankfurt School. Debates at a meta-ethical level are regarded as an abstraction from a life basis to which they are dialectically connected. For example, Habermas claims that one must return to the life-context of these "philosophical" debates. They are debates which have been shaped by a cultural modernity which in turn abstracts the "value sphere" from that of "complex practice". One would like to hear more on this. It would seem to demand in some sense a sociology of academic life! Habermas gives only hints. We might talk of "spiritual" burdens of long run withdrawal from communicative rationality. The fundamental character of action orientated towards understanding and of a communicative ethics might have some such mystical basis. But this says very little without the empirical content that Habermas's theory promises yet withholds. Such an empirical theory is hardly likely to be non-normative. However, it will not
have the a priori character of Habermas's developmental-logic. This may have a heuristic value in determining a normative standpoint but it cannot determine the whole content of such a theory.

IV Communicative Ethics and Reflective Equilibrium

Habermas's communicative ethics reflects a commitment to the reactivation of the "public sphere" and the "conversation of the citizens". According to Habermas, democracy is not to be identified with any one particular institution but is a self-correcting learning process. Habermas's arguments for the ISS are an attempt to provide a rational basis for this which is immanent in language itself.

Lukes compares Habermas with Rawls, who also attempts to establish a determinate rational basis for social criticism which is not merely a rationalisation of existing institutions. Habermas is committed to the idea that people are the sole judges of their interests, interests which are formed and discovered through dialogue. However, this gives rise to a problem concerning the ISS. Habermas talks of the hypothetical ascription to agents of interests that would emerge from the practical discourse of those involved. He claims that there may be "empirical indicators" to justify such a hypothetical ascription. For example, there may be an observed discrepancy between legal norms and legal practice; between the claims made and the levels of politically permitted satisfaction, rules excluding groups systematically from the political agenda. This reflects a social "pathology" in some sense. In general, conflicts may accumulate in fringe groups who are an indication of the suppression of "generalisable interests" elsewhere. However, Lukes questions the intelligibility of the hypothetical ascription of interests that this presupposes. This objection formulates the problem of the counterfactuality of the ISS. As
with contractarian theories such as Rawls', there arises a problem of the identity of the agents in an ISS. Lukes gives three candidates:

1) We imagine ACTUAL agents in the ISS
2) We imagine TYPICAL agents in the ISS
3) We imagine THEORETICAL agents in the ISS

Lukes claims that under (1) we have no reason to assume consensus is forthcoming. Under (3) consensus is virtually logically guaranteed.

Habermas needs a position like (1) in order to ground "immanent" critique. This is a general problem about the "ideal" status of the ISS; I shall discuss it fully in Chapter 9. I believe many commentators ascribe a position such as (3) to Habermas. However, under (1) the very notion of an "actual" agent is negotiable. We may conceptualise here situations where agents may be deceived about their real interests. As a prelude to a more general defence of this point I wish to illuminate features of Habermas's derivation of the ISS via parallels with Rawls methodology.36

In a paper on Habermas, Ottman makes a veiled reference to Rawls' notion of "reflective equilibrium" as a model of how actual intuitions about justice may be mediated by an ideal theoretical framework. Reflective equilibrium is also a pertinent concept for the discussion of rational reconstruction in Chapter 7. In Rawls' system it embraces both "forward" and "backward" arguments. We may explicate these metaphors as follows: 1) Rawls' "forward" argumentation moves from the specification of what would be decided upon in a hypothetical original position embodying certain procedural notions of "justice as fairness", to two principles of justice.

2) Rawls' "backward" argumentation moves from an intuitive sketch of "the well-ordered society" back to a reconstruction of the principles of justice that underly it.
Both (1) and (2) are mediated in "reflective equilibrium" in which our intuitions about procedural justice interact with general theoretical principles to provide an acceptable compromise. There is no talk of ultimate foundations here. It is a thoroughly hermeneutical procedure.

A great deal of commentary upon Rawls has concerned itself with the arguments under (1) i.e. with the justification of the "original position", the "veil of ignorance" it draws over its participants and whether the two principles follow uniquely from it. I cannot discuss these criticisms of Rawls in detail. They mirror worries about the ideality and counter-factuality of the ISS. I am more concerned with the idiom of "reflective equilibrium". Dworkin claims that it gives a structure to the moral intuitions that we do have, supplying principles which both explain our feelings and provide a guide for action. It is this "practical" justification that I wish to emphasise. "Reflective equilibrium" is not unlike the notion of a "depth hermeneutics". The two locutions represent a denial of the imagery of ultimate foundations. They both deny a radical "methodological alienation" in Gadamer's sense. They both contribute to a diagnosis of the "present" (Gegenswartdiagnose). Rawls theory is a "construction" of Western liberal intuitions of justice.

One might ask why it is necessary to posit the "original position" if Rawls' two principles of justice achieve "reflective equilibrium" with intuitive conceptions directly. However, the original position plays an important role. Rawls admits that such a "pactum originarium" is expository. It is a schematic representation of a moral reasoning process analogous to a principle of universalisation. Its expository status implicitly recognises that actual intuitions are ill-formed. Equilibrium is a coherence between moral intuition and moral theory. In naturalistic ethical theory intuition is the means for the discovery of an objective
moral reality. Against this we may regard intuitions as a dissembled part of some construction. The point is that this is not an "objective" construction, but a construction for which men have a "responsibility". On the former account we persist with intuitions until, and in the hope that, rogue principles fall into place. On the latter account we demand a consistency which may even require a compromise of intuitions. While the former is more plausible for a personal, existential ethics, the latter is stronger as the basis of social policy. It is this latter conception that Dworkin calls Rawls' "constructive methodology". Given Habermas's concern for social norms this idiom seems applicable to him. I have attempted a diagrammatic sketch of Rawls' "methodology" below:

A Model of Reflective Equilibrium in Rawls' A Theory of Justice

I shall now make some observations concerning this structure which are pertinent to our philosophical picture of Habermas's ISS. "Reflective equilibrium" is an expression which suggests the "immanent" character of Rawls' two principles of justice. The latter are not to be regarded as simply postulated but are "reconstructions" of underlying intuitions. This constructive methodology cannot "leave everything as it is". It is
inevitably a normative project. According to Dworkin it is based upon a "deep" theory of human rights. This is far from being unproblematic. We can regard the "moments" of the hermeneutical structure XYZ in the diagram above as follows:

1) The derivation of the OP itself at X
2) The derivation of the two principles of justice from what would be decided upon in the OP at Y
3) The reflective mediation between hypothetically produced principles and intuitions of justice at Y

I regard it as a general error to ascribe methodological priority to any one of these moments over the others. However, there are many problems of detail in Rawls' position which this "picture" must acknowledge. For instance, it is argued that, as it stands, the OP does not generate the two principles uniquely. Furthermore, the specification of the OP is itself regarded as artificial and unjustifiable, and illegitimately smuggles in norms. I wish to dwell on these problems for a moment since there are parallels between the OP and the ISS which may be helpful.

Habermas himself actually acknowledges parallels between Rawls' project and his own. Both share a procedural conception of rationality and norm justification. Both are insistent upon a form of unanimity. The OP and the ISS share an antipathy to value pluralism. Both positions reject a trade off between values except when mediated by a higher value. For Habermas, compromise can only be acceptable under stringent conditions for a symmetry of power relations.

The conception of the OP is a product of a fundamental tension between the requirement of unanimity and the individuality of the participants. Lukes formulated this problem as we saw above. The "veil of ignorance" seems to have the function of ensuring that only generalisable interests in
Habermas's sense may be decided upon in the OP. In particular, Rawls' assumption of the "mutual disinterest" of the participants in the OP generates his doctrine of primary "goods". The latter are goods which are necessary for the successful practice of any possible rational life plans. The more one has of such goods the better. However, the concept of such goods is problematic. The actual diversity of life plans may be so great that no such "goods" may be determined, i.e. we could not find a set which is advantageous to all whatever their life plans. On the other hand, such a set can be found according to Keat if one makes normative demands about what are "desirable" human interests. Critics claim that the OP conceals such a value orientation. Similarly, it is claimed that the ISS embodies an unjustifiable norm analogous to Rawls's specification of primary goods.

Keat locates this in the descriptive-normative ambiguities of Habermas's strong concept of understanding given in German as "Verständigung".

Before discussing this issue directly we need to develop an analogue for "reflective equilibrium" in which to situate Habermas's conception of the ISS. Ottman suggests a very direct parallel.

Possibly what Rawls has termed "reflective equilibrium" is one way of describing a hermeneutical process of mediating traditions and critical ideals.

Reflective equilibrium, for Ottman, seems to represent Habermas's demand that we compare existing norms and institutions with those that would be agreed upon hypothetically in the ISS. However, this fails to emphasise the sense in which the derivation of the ISS is also part of this process. The problem raised above concerning the deeply normative character of the OP, remains for the ISS. Both are practical regulative ideas within a "constructive" methodology in some sense. Can we regard "reflective equilibrium" as a medium within which the ideal of strong agreement and mutual recognition that the ISS represents, can be justified? To answer
this it is necessary to reflect upon some fundamental differences between Rawls and Habermas. Rawls' liberal conception of justice contrasts with Habermas's search for a basis for Ideologiekritik. Rawls acknowledges that ethical intuitions may be jumbled and inchoate, hence the need for "construction". For Habermas, the level of intuitions is potentially the scene of "systematic" distortion due to constellations of power relationships between members and groups within society. The value-orientation implicit in the concept of the ISS cannot simply be regarded as a "construction" of the diversity of language games. Its normative claims are even more contentious than those of Rawls. Habermas effectively radicalises the liberal conception. We seem not to be any better off than the OP as far as justifying the underlying value is concerned. The ideal of maximal agreement and mutual recognition seems to be simply externally postulated. How can it be regarded as a presupposition of communication?

We can sketch a model of "reflective equilibrium" analogous to Rawls' which highlights Habermas's argument structure.

A model of Critical-Reflective Equilibrium in Habermas's theory of communication
The hermeneutic structure ABC is circular and interdependent. We have given up the search for ultimate foundations. What more can we hope for? Let us examine these three moments of the argument structure:

1) At A we locate the recognisable TA as a claim about what is involved if we take ourselves seriously as engaged in the cooperative search for the truth. However, the ISS as a regulative idea is only plausible on the prior assumption that communication is fundamentally orientated towards understanding. This may be satisfied at the level of scientific inquiry but its generalisability is questionable.

2) At B we may locate Ottman's narrower sense of reflective equilibrium and the crucial "critical" relation between the ISS and social reality. As we shall see in Chapter 9, Ricoeur describes a similar relation to overcome the antipathy between critique and hermeneutics. They are "moments" of one another. Therefore B constitutes a "depth hermeneutics" in some sense, the critique of ideology for Habermas. Yet here the problem of the justification of the "ideal" in the first place persists. If we have a critical ideal such as the ISS then certain normative conclusions follow. But many critics of Habermas question the truth of the conditional. No "transcendental" justification seems available for this in the traditional sense.

3) At C the circular structure is closed by what I regard as a crucial, though underdeveloped section of the argument. It involves Habermas's recognition that interpretations of needs are not given, and his claim that long run abstention from contexts of communicative action involve certain "burdens". It is in the justification of these claims that Habermas shifts his argument to another level. This level is constituted in the first instance by his developmental-logical programmes. However, we have emphasised the need for greater empirical work in this area. To this extent,
the model of critical-reflective equilibrium requires the development of this empirical dimension in order to be compelling. Does this hold a chance for justifying Habermas's claim that communicative rationality is fundamental? It seems likely that such empirical studies will inevitably be normative themselves. I shall discuss this in depth in the next chapter. What is important is that at C, Habermas has a level at which to continue the argument for the ISS, which Rawls does not have for the OP. This may not provide an ultimate justification of the value-orientation of the ISS, but it does offer a "deeper", "more satisfactory" basis for it. This is the most one can demand.

V Deep Decisionism

Let us now summarise the points made above and draw some conclusions. We began with reflections upon Habermas's concept of practical discourse and its relation to the field of moral philosophy. Ambiguities in the central concept of the "generalisability" of norms were raised. "Generalisability" involves a deep normative commitment to reciprocal recognition in the context of argument and is not really construable as a form of argument. Where then lies the justification of this norm? Habermas's theory of ego development shifts the locus of justification without really coming to grips with the issue. His theory of normative development requires greater empirical articulation. It is the locus of a research programme. While stressing the significance of this empirical dimension, I attempted to picture a context of justification of the ISS which has parallels with the notion of "reflective equilibrium" developed by Rawls. In Chapter 2, we converged upon the conception of TAs as "practical" arguments, given the dissolution of strong theoretical demands. This seems to have been confirmed by an assessment of the philosophy of the "as if". Rawls' concept of
"reflective equilibrium" is practical in a similar fashion. The concept of "construction" that underlies this argumentative process ought to attract Habermas. It resembles the aims and presuppositions of "depth hermeneutics".

Beginning with a seemingly specific context of "communicative ethics" we converged upon the fundamental normative significance of the ISS. I suggested that even if Habermas's articulation of the empirical dimension at C in the model of "critical-reflective equilibrium" is deepened, an ultimate justification for such a norm will not be forthcoming. Yet surely this cannot be a collapse into "decisionism"? The latter undercuts the rationality of values prior to any argumentation. They are simply given with respect to the argumentative process. Habermas complains that the opposition between "decision" and communicative rationality is "abstract". The justification of this claim has its basis in theories of normative development. The justification of communicative rationality seems to have its place here. The "decisionist" demand that either an ultimate justification for values can be given or they are irrational seems to be extreme. The model of critical-reflective equilibrium is hermeneutically sensitive. It denies both the ultimacy of transcendental foundations and the arbitrariness of decisionism. In KHI, Habermas's quasi-transcendentalism fused empirical and transcendental themes. I tried to show that this is less a fusion than a reinterpretation of transcendentalism as such. The model of critical reflective equilibrium offers a similar conclusion. The transcendental status of the ISS as a regulative idea cannot be severed from a level of empirical investigation. This connects Habermas's abstract level of argumentation with his more substantive analyses. Only by making good such a connection can Habermas maintain his claim that communicative rationality
is already embodied in existing forms of inter-
action and does not first have to be postulated as
something that ought to be

In the next chapter, I discuss a variety of criticisms of Habermas which
deny this before exploring the "empirical" dimension of critical reflective
equilibrium in more detail.
is already embodied in existing forms of interaction and does not first have to be postulated as something that ought to be.

In the next chapter, I discuss a variety of criticisms of Habermas which deny this before exploring the "empirical" dimension of critical reflective equilibrium in more detail.
CHAPTER 9

Transcendentalism and Immanence

I The central problem of Ideal Speech

In an exchange with Apel, Winch directs his critique of the concept of an ISS towards the difference between a "transcendental" basis for it and one that pays heed to the actual behaviour of the participants. By now it should be clear that it is this distinction which I am concerned to question. According to Winch the outlines of the ideal discursive situation must be,

based on the observation of the demeanour of the actual behaviour of participants in actual discussions. In a word they would not be transcendental considerations

Winch has an extreme conception of transcendentalism. It involves the ascription to "participants" in ideal speech of motives, beliefs and interests in the face of all empirical evidence to the contrary. Winch claims that once we take the empirical evidence into account then an implicit aim at universal consensus seems quite untenable. Winch's conception of the evidence refers to the plurality of "language games" and, in particular, to instances of close personal relationships and questions of ultimate value. He claims that what counts as having a position on these issues deviates immensely from an implicit aim at universal consensus. In Chapter 8, Section IV, I sketched a model of the ISS in which it did bear a reference to empirical evidence. Furthermore, Winch's conception of transcendentalism is something like a conception of timeless, trans-cultural and trans-historical categories. This is an unfair ascription to Habermas. Against Winch, Habermas and Apel regard his neo-Wittgensteinian mode of reflection as too "descriptive". It lacks a
critical dimension which is a projection of the possibility of "progress" yet has a basis in the actual behaviour of actual participants.

I have tried to suggest that it is precisely this "actuality" which is questionable. As it stands, this merely places the onus of proof upon theorists such as Winch to articulate their position more clearly. Winch seems to take the self-description of agents at face-value. It is the absolute status of the distinction between transcendental and empirical themes that Habermas and Apel contest.

We cannot and need not separate the transcendental status of the participants from their empirical status but may and must nevertheless make a distinction.

The transcendental status of agents in Apel's sense here does not refer to a timeless non-empirical, noumenal realm of faculties. He does not want to invoke the Kantian duality of transcendentalism and empiricism though his formulation must work from it. Rather, he offers an attempt to articulate an ideal which is "immanent" in agent's behaviour.

Thus in my account one has indeed to switch over from a Wittgensteinian to a Kantian or rather a Peircean way of thinking in order to make the transition from a descriptive analysis of ordinary communication to a methodologically relevant epistemology of hermeneutic understanding as a branch of scientific inquiry that includes the possibility of progress.

The language is suggestive but not perhaps convincing. Why are we compelled to switch over to a mode of inquiry that includes the possibility of progress? According to Apel the factual and practical impossibility of consensus does not necessarily exclude the possibility of assent at some level. He identifies a "dialectical tension" between the finitude of factual life-processes and the infinitude of regulative principles. In Chapter 7 we located versions of this tension in Kant and attempted to characterise the ISS in terms of it. In this chapter I wish to expand upon
that characterisation via replies to some criticisms of Habermas. There can be no compulsive deductive argumentation at this level. The persuasiveness of the ISS as an immanent ideal cannot be demonstrated. Yet as a practical transcendental strategy it is a methodological mistake to expect more.

II Transcendentalism and Contextualism

In a recent work on critical theory (CT), Geuss claims that "self-referentiality" is one of its defining features. By this he means that a Critical Theory is itself always a part of the object domain that it describes; critical theories are always in part about themselves. As a definition this would seem to reject the possibility of an overarching critical standpoint. However, this statement by Geuss is problematic, because of the way he develops the rest of his argument, and, in particular, his key contrast between "contextualist" and "transcendentalist" interpretations of the status of CT. By associating transcendentalism with the search for ahistorical foundation, and hence a denial of self-referentiality in his sense, Geuss obscures the sense in which a transcendentalist interpretation of CT is even possible. This is an internal difficulty for Geuss's account which demonstrates prima facie an unease and flatfootedness with the terminology. On his account, transcendentalist renderings of the status of CT destroy its status qua CT! Against this, I wish to claim that Geuss's conception of what a transcendentalist is committed to is completely wrong.

Geuss talks of the "Reflective cognitive structure" of CT as another locution for the idea of self-referentiality. CT gives an account of its own context of origin and its application. Geuss appropriates a suggestive passage from Habermas which is more programmatic than
From the circumstance that theories of the critical type themselves reflect upon their (structural) constitutive context and their (potential) context of application, results a changed relation to empirical practice.

Ct emerges from a structure which also projects potentialities for changed practice. (As we shall see, Ricoeur develops this conception in a new way). Geuss claims that there are two interpretations of the cognitive structure of CT. Firstly, the CONTEXTUALIST interpretation is exemplified by Adorno and his guiding methodological injunction of "negative" dialectic. Secondly, the TRANSCENDENTALIST interpretation is exemplified by Habermas, by his theory of knowledge-constitutive interests and by his conception of an ISS. The two interpretations are differentiated by their conceptions of "epistemic principles". What is an epistemic principle and what is its importance for the concept of CT? According to Geuss such principles express what it is for beliefs to be "reflectively unacceptable" which also means "ideologically false". Epistemic principles are second-order beliefs about the acceptability of beliefs. According to Geuss, they are the basis of "Ideologiekritik". In its most general form this is the idea that,

Legitimising beliefs are acceptable only if they could have been acquired by the agents in a free and uncoerced discussion in which all members of the society take part.

Geuss raises, quite rightly, a whole series of questions about such "epistemic principles" which determine the "legitimacy" of belief. Are they tacit? How do we know we describe them correctly? Is there a unique set of such principles? Are they historically invariant? Geuss directs us to the two "quite different" views about the status of these principles:

1) The contextualist interpretation of "epistemic principles" involves a generally historicist approach to the concept of reflection. According to
Geuss the contextualist claims that,

our standards of reflective acceptability and the social and cultural ideals in terms of which we criticise societies and ideologies are just part of our tradition and have no absolute foundation or transcendental warrant.

On this view, exemplified by Adorno, CT emerges as a "fragile historical entity". Its truth and effectiveness in overcoming the frustrations of human agents is historically and situationally specific. According to Geuss, the contextualist conceives of CT as necessarily directed at a particular group of human agents, concerned with THEIR self-knowledge and THEIR epistemic principles. Geuss’s emphatic use of personal pronouns is intended to drive this point home.

In general then a critical theory specifies for these agents how they would have to modify their belief to attain their ideal.

2) The transcendentalist interpretation is given by Habermas’s problems about how to give a positive content to the notion of "critique". According to Geuss, Habermas underwent a transformation in his thought in the mid-sixties when, frightened by the spectre of relativism, and presumably scientism, he "retreated" into a kind of transcendentalism. Geuss’s characterisation of this as a "retreat" resembles Lendhardt’s view that this was an anomaly in Habermas’s thought. Geuss interprets Habermas as giving a more radical account of "reflective unacceptability" of beliefs since he takes into account the possibility that agents' epistemic principles may themselves be ideologically distorted. Thus, says Geuss,

If the society in which they live is extraordinarily coercive and their forms of consciousness very "distorted", why should we assume that their beliefs about what count as conditions of coercion will remain immune from ideological distortion?

There are some serious internal flaws in Geuss’s account. Firstly, it
displays an ideal of transcendentalism akin to the TA model developed in Chapter 2. Since Habermas himself stands within the hermeneutic tradition, a tradition that historicises and contextualises reflection, there are prima facie doubts about ascribing such a strong transcendentalism to him in which reflection is ahistorical. Secondly, and most pertinent, if the weight of Geuss's distinction between "contextualism" and "transcendentalism" falls, as it seems to, upon a distinction between taking agents' epistemic principles at face value and regarding them as possibly subject to ideological distortion, then it must be wrong. Any "contextualist" worth his salt will want to conceptualise the possibility that agents' epistemic principles might themselves be distorted. The possibility of radical distortion is a feature common to both positions. Geuss claims that the contextualist would argue that if there is a problem as regards the ideological impregnation of epistemic principles, it is a problem with "life" rather than with CT. It is not clear what this means. Presumably it recalls the neo-Gadamerian denial of an absolute critical standpoint. However, one cannot simply write off the possibility of radical critique as an ineffable problem of the "ontological finitude" of the human standpoint. Indeed a confusion has crept into our terminology. The original distinction between contextualism and transcendentalism seemed to be made in terms of the different methodological outlooks of each. However, Geuss's ultimate endorsement of the contextualist position depends upon the distinction as a meta-philosophical one i.e. the terms are competing accounts of the status of critique. Geuss wants to claim that only "internal criticism" is ever possible.

According to Geuss, the notion of "internal criticism" specifies that properly valid critique is limited by what could in principle be part of the self-criticism of the agents to whom it is addressed. The task of
emancipation must discover in agents' own forms of consciousness and beliefs the means of emancipation and enlightenment. Such a programme for "immanent" critique must find those experiences of agents' suffering and frustration, otherwise the critique of ideology cannot begin. Geuss claims we may be revolted by their mode of life but we have no transcendental a priori guarantee that either they or we will ultimately turn out to be deluded. 14

This is the central problem facing all "Ideologiekritik". However, the appeal to what is "in principle" possible as self-criticism does not help much. Surely the contextualist, if he takes seriously the notion of critique, will push it to its limits i.e. he will wish to conceptualise radical forms of distortion to agents "epistemic principles"? The point is that Geuss ascribes a range of problems to the transcendentalist that exist as much for the contextualist. Geuss's conception of a transcendentalist position is one that involves a model of critique totally unconnected with agents actual epistemic principles i.e. non-immanent critique which is tantamount to intellectual elitism.

I have suggested in the model of "critical-reflective equilibrium" above that the status of Habermas's ISS is not that of an absolute foundation. Indeed it is much more like Geuss's conception of "contextualism". However, he ascribes to Habermas a TA in his theory of communication which is regarded as a set of views about language use and its preconditions. He claims that this is intended to give standards of "reflective acceptability" that ALL agents must agree upon. The ISS is a "transcendental criterion of truth, freedom and rationality". All human agents necessarily presuppose the ISS and assume it counterfactually. Against this, Geuss argues that one might well recognise and accept the
claim that certain "validity claims" were necessarily raised without Habermas's view about how they were to be tested and redeemed, i.e. via consensus theories of truth and "rightness". Geuss argues that Habermas's appeals to parallels with Chomsky are misguided. According to Chomsky, tacit knowledge is posited to explain our intuitions of grammaticality. We do have these intuitions. Against this model, Geuss contrasts the case of ancient Egyptians for whom it is not at all clear that their intuitions concerning the legitimacy of social institutions involve a deep notion of universal consensus. This shows that

Habermas seems to be engaged in a transcendental deduction of a series of non-facts

What he means by "non-facts" is presumably intuitions that no one may have. However, we saw above that Habermas claims that need-interpretations are not given i.e. the factuality of various intuitions is in question. For example, our "intuitions" about the legitimacy of social institutions may not be well formed (Rawls) or possibly distorted (Habermas). The appeal to intuitions about norms cannot be final. We discussed some of these issues in previous chapters but the point is worth repeating. Clearly it will seem that Habermas is engaged in an argument for a series of "non-facts". Remember TA (3) on Page 43. However, the arguments are not theoretical but practical in Kant's sense. Furthermore, Geuss's point is misleading in its reference to the normative intuitions of ancient Egyptians. This problem of the non-givenness of intuitions is quite local and one that a contextualist critical theorist must confront. To claim, as he does, that CT is fine without its "transcendental baggage" is somewhat naive.

Habermas's contextualist opponents are of course free to adopt practically the whole of his substantive analysis as long as they reject its transcendentalist underpinnings ..... To be sure our real interests are the ones we would form in conditions of complete freedom of discussion and
any beliefs we could have acquired only under conditions of coercion we will find unacceptable, but these are just facts about us and our form of consciousness, just complex results of our particular history and tradition and of no transcendental standing

Geuss markets contextualism as unproblematic relative to his conception of transcendentalism. However, the facts with which CT grapples are not "just facts about us". The rise of modern Capitalism and the experiences associated with it are thoroughly complex. The opposition between "our" standards and transcendental ones fails to see this. It remains a deep problem even for a contextualist "Ideologiekritik" how to specify "real interests". According to Geuss, both the contextualist and the transcendentalist can agree upon a model of when agents' epistemic beliefs count as ideological. Agents' epistemic principles will find beliefs, which are sources of legitimation, reflectively acceptable only if they could be acquired under conditions of free and uncoerced discussion. The contextualist will argue that this claim is an integral part of each CT and must be established for each group. The transcendentalist claims that we can know it a priori. But this distinction is too strong. Geuss has a model of transcendentalism derived from the strong TA programme discussed in Chapter 2 i.e. the search for ultimate foundations. I believe Habermas's transcendentalism is a form of "depth hermeneutics" which is explicitly contextualist. Geuss claims that agents are ultimately the final judges of whether they are being coerced or not. However, Geuss allows for what he calls the "reflective process of interpretation". By this he admits that agents' epistemic principles are not simply "out there" to be observed. Rather, CT must in some sense CONSTRUCT them. The parallel with Rawls' constructive methodology is obvious. Having accused Habermas of arguing for a series of non-facts, Geuss's claim
that we must construct such "facts" is a crucial admission. Thus he says,

When I describe the epistemic principles of the addressed agents from which the critical argument begins this description is itself proleptic; the epistemic principles are theirs in the sense that they can be brought to recognise these principles as a good rational reconstruction of the conceptions underlying their behaviour.

What is "proleptic" description? How can agents be "brought to recognise" principles? Vaihinger's language of fictions haunts the OED definition of prolepsis. It is the "assumption that something is done or true before it is so". It involves the "anticipatory use of an epithet". This is not mere pedantry. If the practical character of the derivation of the ISS is to be compulsive such locutions must be emphasised. Proleptic description recognises that such description is informed by a pre-understanding which has practical intent. Agents can be brought to recognise such descriptions. This is the rhetorical "moment". I believe that only on something like my "critical reflective equilibrium" model can this prolepsis be fully understood and explicated. The ISS is a practical fiction. It cannot argue directly from a given to its "condition" as with theoretical TAs. Its practical character consists in the non-givenness of the first premiss and the need to "construct" it.

Geuss's attack upon the transcendentalist conception of epistemic principles seems to be motivated by a general worry about radical theories of freedom. This is a legitimate worry.

If I don't from the start agree that conditions C are conditions of freedom I may be unimpressed by the fact that ..., if I were to be in conditions C I would agree that they are conditions of freedom.

The whole concept of "immanent critique" and the counterfactuality of the ISS are problematic. It is a thin line that separates judging others by elitist, culturally relative and external standards, and seeking to
unearth and express modes of frustration and suffering which may be repressed. To this extent, Geuss's regard for CT as a "fragile historical entity" is correct. I wish to claim that the transcendental status of the ISS is similarly "fragile". Geuss talks freely of the need for an ideal to underly critique.

A Critical Theory . . . asserts of itself that it can be definitively confirmed or disconfirmed only by being freely accepted or rejected by agents in the Ideal Speech Situation. Thus, even a contextualist requires the concept of an ISS. The suspicion of concealed ultimate values is not less here than with Geuss's strong conception of transcendentalism. Because of the latter, Geuss never confronts the problems that face the contextualist position.

Habermas is a contextualist. More accurately, his transcendentalism is a denial of stark contrasts between contextualism and transcendentalism. It is not clear that it can eradicate a moment of unjustifiable value input. However, this does not reflect an attempt at timeless foundations.

III Postulation and Sophistry

Bubner reiterates many of the criticisms made by Geuss, Winch and others. He claims that Apel and Habermas go beyond the "descriptive" project of Wittgenstein to the specification of an ideal language game as the transcendental condition of the possibility of all language games. From dissatisfaction with simple recourse to actual understanding emerged the thesis of the ideal communication community which admittedly vacillates between the status of a postulate of reason and recourse to given facts. Neither Bubner nor Habermas adequately explicate this vacillatory character. What counts as "recourse to given facts" is negotiable. The supposed dichotomy that Bubner articulates is as yet indeterminate. He regards the ISS as primarily a philosophical postulate. This is to deny
the language of "immanence" that I am proposing. On Bubner's account, such a postulate seems to emerge in an external, decisionist fashion. It embodies a distinct value orientation. Habermas and Apel argue that this is embedded in the pragmatic aspect of language which,

extends beyond linguistic requirements to the standards of treatment of partner as partner 22

Bubner does not find this at all compelling. It is not evident that without presupposing an ISS, we could have no communication. The postulate at the heart of the ISS is one we need not accept. Bubner's remarks are suggestive:

The reference to Kant's "transcendental illusion" thus shows a double polarisation from a theoretical dialectic to a practical hypothesis and from the critique of knowledge to a postulate inspired by the critique of ideology 23

Unfortunately the metaphor of "polarisation" begs too many questions. What is it to regard the ISS as a postulate "inspired" by the critique of ideology? I would locate this within the sphere of "critical-reflective equilibrium" as a primary experiential basis i.e. that of the suffering of agents due to systematic domination. In KHI Habermas regards this as a fundamental experiential dimension. Secondly, Habermas himself has recently dropped the concept of the ISS as a "practical hypothesis". It is not a concrete sketch of the good life as Bubner seems to think. For instance, Bubner attacks the coherence of the ISS and its notion of discursive argument. Participants have no preconceptions, no differences in knowledge, no cheating, no rhetoric and unlimited time. Bubner claims that if these conditions are satisfied then there is no need to enter dialogue at all. The very conditions of the ISS seem to entail consensus. (see Page 217 where Lukes envisages the same problem). Against this Bubner claims that,
the task of dialogue consists precisely in the production of rationality under conditions which still fall short of rationality

Yet no one denies this, least of all Habermas. Bubner is insensitive to the counterfactuality of the ISS, a counterfactuality which is extremely plausible as a form of scientific accountability. We cannot know our current discourse is non-ideological just as we cannot know our current best theory is true. Bubner demands that a substantive concept of rationality emerge from a procedural one. He claims that we cannot extricate ourselves from the possibility of "sophistic illusion". This may be what Geuss means when he describes the problem of radical ideological distortion as a problem for "life". For a contextualist once we situate critique concretely, as we are forced to do, this is a problem.

Against Bubner, Habermas continually emphasises the formal character of communicative rationality. It cannot be burdened with the task of constructing the totality of a form of life. The ISS has a "utopian content" but "it does not sketch a utopia". Habermas acknowledges that practical reason must be situated. This he says is the blind spot of transcendentally orientated theories.

While we can permit no a priori conclusions about the orders of happiness, Habermas claims that we can conclude from the perspective of the ISS that, If the balance of happiness (which is difficult to weigh) shifts at all, it certainly does not do so in dependence upon rationalisation of the life world.

This returns us to Habermas's claim that there are "burdens" associated with long run abstention from contexts of communicative rationality by individuals, a claim which we acknowledged requires greater empirical support.

Habermas's response to Bubner is to reverse the onus of proof. He
asks how his model of procedural rationality could be as ominous as to warrant Maurer's claim that discourse is the "alibi of gangsters". Habermas demands that Bubner must show that in science there are truths whose validity is based in the final analysis upon something other than agreement brought about by argumentation. Habermas shifts the burden of justification of the ISS to its status as a consensus theory of truth — a fairly typical move. However, Bubner's worries about the postulation of an ideal and the problem of sophistry arise in the context of the normative content of the ISS.

Bubner questions the coherence of "reflective foundations" for CT. Borrowing from TA theorists such as Kürner, he claims that, to grasp principles as ultimate, means recognising the impossibility of further inquiry, and the consistency of the "deductive" steps. Habermas and Apel substitute reflection for deduction. Bubner claims that the task of providing foundations is incomplete if it is a merely contingent matter whether further steps would be senseless. He echoes the worries of TA theorists that we discussed in Chapter 2. Yet why should a contingent limit be a "merely" contingent one? Bubner is tied to the strong TA programme. However, reflection is not flawed deduction. We saw that there are always deductive "gaps" in TAs, enough to suggest that the ideal of deductivity is suspect. I believe that reflection in Apel's and Habermas's sense has a practical aspect, in Kant's sense, and may "appeal" to some experiential basis. It is the paradigm of critical reflective equilibrium, not that of deduction which is most appropriate. Bubner identifies two problems associated with the transcendental status of the ISS.

a) TAs argue from pre-given conceptions of knowledge and experience to their conditions of possibility. What corresponds to this for Habermas? Bubner offers some candidates e.g. linguistic articulation, critical
communication, language games in general, a norm for the reciprocal relation of rational beings with each other, and the intersubjective form of life as such. Yet this ad hoc list misses the crucial point we stressed before namely that Habermas's "TA" does not move from a given premiss. This is its meta-critical character (see Chapter 3). Communication orientated towards understanding cannot simply be regarded as given. It too is a "reflective" achievement in some sense. More accurately, I believe it results from a critical reflective equilibrium in which empirical theory does play a role.

b) Bubner questions the status of the concept of transcendental reflection. It must be self-referential in the sense that it recognises as transcendental that it cannot free itself from its object.  

It is not clear what Bubner means. Perhaps such reflection must itself be a part of the cognitive interest doctrine. However, it does not seem too artificial to locate it under the EI. Furthermore, the model of critical reflective equilibrium does not imply a radically autonomous mode of reflection. Thus Bubner's worries about the subject of reflection i.e. WHO reflects, are difficult to appreciate. He claims against the ISS that there is a non-identity between reflecter and reflected. Self-reflection is not achieved by the linguistic community but by philosophers. However, if the model of critical reflective equilibrium is coherent then the latter are not in a privileged meta-position. Moreover it is not really necessary for the communication community to reflect upon itself in order for talk of presuppositions of communication to make sense. Bubner is worried that Habermas continues to confuse two senses of reflection. But the ISS is much more modest than this. We may make a distinction between,  

1) An argument for the ISS which is a priori and shows what underlies speakers' utterances.
2) An "argument" showing speakers themselves what underlies their utterances.

Bubner is worried that reflection under (1) is radically distinct from that of (2). He is concerned that (1) simply postulates a norm inherent in the ISS. However, the model of critical reflective equilibrium suggests that (1) and (2) are not radically distinct, i.e. that the confirmation of agents themselves plays some role in the confirmation of the argument for the ISS. Such "confirmation" is no simple issue since Habermas claims repeatedly that need interpretations are not given. It is not so much that agents are shown what underlies their behaviour etc. but that they are brought to realise an interpretation as "true" of themselves. Of course such self-reflection does not remove material obstacles to freedom. It does show that the context of justification of the ISS is more complex than Bubner imagines (see Section V). A "deduction" of the ISS cannot be given in principle. It is always an anticipated foundation which is "immanent" in speakers' utterances. I have tried to explicate the notion of "immanence" above with the aid of parallels with Rawls' notion of reflective equilibrium. Ironically, Bubner contributes to this explication by referring to a form of reflection which occurs in the work of Benjamin and Adorno and which "vacillates between hope and despair". Adorno claims that in illusion there is the promise of freedom from illusion. 30

This is a provocative conception of art in which the authority of theory is shunned. Aesthetic experience has a "critical" moment. Perhaps the paradigm of aesthetic experience, derived from hints in Adorno is an appropriate medium within which to conceptualise Habermas's derivation of the ISS. The "hope" that art expresses is not postulated but is "immanent" in the aesthetic experience itself. Ricoeur articulates a similar conception in which the concept of the text is central, and in which the
immanence of the ISS is expressed.

IV Critical Hermeneutics

Ricoeur's creative discussion of the debate between Habermas and Gadamer sheds further light upon the transcendental status of the ISS. According to Ricoeur, Habermas develops the concept of "interest" from Lukacs' Marxist tradition. Habermas regards Marxism as an ambiguous phenomenon with a line of development from Kant and Fichte through to Hegel. Ricoeur summarises Habermas's thought in KHI.

To conceive of Marxism as a novel solution to the problems of the condition of the possibility of objectivity and the object, to say that in "Materialism" labour has the function of synthesis is to submit Marxism to a properly critical reading in the Kantian and post-Kantian sense

Ricoeur does not really contest the coherence of this project. Rather, he notes that in Marx Habermas recognises the most advanced stage of the transcendental subject and the simultaneous systematic loss of reflection.

As with Gadamer's concept of "Pre-judice", borrowed from philosophical romanticism, the notion of Interest denies the pretensions of any theoretical subject to stand outside the "sphere of desire" in Ricoeur's terms. Gadamer appeals to the human sciences which forbid such forms of "methodological alienation" while Habermas appeals to the critical social sciences which forbid institutional and psychic forms of reification. For Gadamer critique is a "moment" which is subordinated to the "consciousness of finitude", whereas for Habermas it is constituted by an interest in autonomy concealed by Heidegger's and Gadamer's "ontological" sensitivity. Ricoeur juxtaposes these basic differences between Gadamer and Habermas. For Gadamer it is misunderstanding which is problematic, whereas for Habermas it is the systematic distortions to communication which result
from power differentials and are "veiled" ideologically. The theory of ideology operates at a different level from that of the restoration of understanding. There exist systematic distortions of language and communication which entail going beyond the dimension of "Sprachlichkeit", the essential linguality of life, to the specific spheres of labour and power (KHI) or communicative action (post KHI). According to Ricoeur's interpretation of Habermas, distortions which "come to" language from the relations of labour and power constitute a peculiar form of mis-recognition, more appropriately described as illusion and not simply error. There occur "rationalisations" which involve the re-arrangement and suppression of motives, giving rise to pseudo-communication.

According to Ricoeur's account, the dissolution of ideology must employ procedures of explanation in addition to those of "Sinnverstehen", interpretative understanding. Ricoeur gives a distinctively psychoanalytic illustration of this, thereby begging questions about the viability of this paradigm for social analysis. He claims that a "total" understanding in such a fashion involves the reconstruction of a "primitive scene" in connection with its "symptomatic scene" and the "scene of transference". The scheme forms the basis for a depth hermeneutics. Ricoeur suggests it is a "detour" which reconstructs processes of de-symbolisation and resymbolisation. He calls this a LIMIT EXPERIENCE of hermeneutics. This means that the theoretical and topological psychoanalytic framework is vitally connected to a dialogical medium in which the patient is brought to self-reflection. By analogy Ricoeur interprets ideological distortion due to power and violence as a form of "desymbolisation". Thus the critique of ideology is also a limit concept of hermeneutics. The concept of a "limit" introduced by Ricoeur is important. Regulative ideas in Kant's sense are "limit" concepts. The idiom of "limits" denies a
radical gulf between hermeneutics in Gadamer's sense and CT. The ISS is a limit concept of actual language games yet is not external to the latter. Whether such imagery is at all compelling is another matter.

Habermas objects to Gadamer's "ontologising" of hermeneutics. According to Ricoeur, Habermas means by this the reification of the "pre-consensus" of linguistic life. Habermas claims that this is an experience that cannot be canonised. It is a "rare experience" which indicates that in our "most felicitous dialogues" we are preceded by an understanding that supports them. This cryptic reference to the rarity of the experience associated with communicative rationality squares with the ideas I have suggested, which centre upon Habermas's claim that "need interpretations" are not given. According to Ricoeur, Habermas relocates this "experience" as the basis of an anticipatory structure given by the ISS. The critique of ideology thinks in terms of anticipation while the hermeneutic tradition thinks in terms of assumed tradition. The former must posit as a regulative idea "in front of us" what hermeneutics locates at the origin of understanding. Ricoeur seems to imply that hermeneutics and CT interpret the same "rare experience" in different ways. For Habermas it is the locus of a critical, anticipatory moment, of an interest in autonomy. For Gadamer it reflects the unrecognised "enabling" character of tradition. How are we to adjudicate these interpretations? Neither makes a simple appeal to experience. Neither proceeds by deductive arguments. Must we decide upon one over the other? What could decide the issue?

I believe that these questions bring out the practical character of the "arguments" proffered by both Habermas and Gadamer. On the one hand we have awareness of the impossibility of "methodological alienation". On the other hand we have critical awareness of the power of tradition. However, there is a conflict at some level. According to Habermas, the EI and the
ISS are not founded upon a prior consensus. Rather, only pseudo communication is really prior. As such, Ricoeur claims that

the critique of ideology must be placed under the sign of a regulative idea.

Such a location, he argues, illuminates a Kantian emphasis concerned with what "ought to be" rather than with "what is". This is the practical character of "anticipation" which gives meaning to critique. Ricoeur talks of the different locations of hermeneutics and the critique of ideology. Yet they are not radically distinct.

the recognition of a critical instance is a vague desire constantly reiterated by, but constantly aborted with hermeneutics.

This echoes claims made in Chapter 3 that Habermas's appropriation of Dilthey explicates a concept of the PI which has a critical moment. Dialogue II and Dialogue III seem to be immanently related to one another. The EI seems to be a "moment" of the PI and not a radically distinct cognitive interest as the triadic scheme of KHI suggests. Ricoeur approaches this conclusion via a question which is basic to his reading of Husserl, Heidegger and Gadamer: Is a "return" from the level of the ontology of Being to that of epistemological and methodological issues in the human sciences possible? In answering this question the anticipatory structure of hermeneutics is fundamental. Ricoeur recognises that the image of the hermeneutic circle as an ontological ground "compromises" the raising of epistemological issues. According to Habermas, it "compromises" the theoretical perspective inherent in his concept of rational reconstruction. However, what is this talk of compromise? It is not that hermeneutics and CT contradict each other? This is too crude an opposition. They share many presuppositions (e.g. a critique of positivism and historicism). Yet they are perspectives which mutually "disattend" to one another. Ricoeur
claims that both Heidegger and Gadamer bring themselves to, but fail to
confront, the "critical" moment in hermeneutics. McCarthy, among others,
doubts that Habermas's rational reconstructive enterprises "overcome"
hermeneutics. Ricoeur wants to effect a reconciliation by supplying a
critical supplementation to a hermeneutics for which the primary
experience is the overcoming of "alienating distanciation". This is Ricoeur's
creative extension of the Habermas-Gadamer debate which recasts it in
terms of his own guiding concept of the TEXT.

According to Ricoeur, "writing" constitutes the moment of
distanciation of the text, a moment which is simultaneously a moment of
autonomy from the immediate cultural and personal conditions of its
creation. The "world" of the text "explodes" that of its author. The very
nature of inscription implies distanciation from the intentions and life-
world of the author. Ricoeur regards this as an immanent emancipatory
feature of textuality as such. This locates critique at the heart of
hermeneutics and overcomes the so-called dichotomy between explanation and
interpretation. Ricoeur has in mind semiological and structural forms of
explanation regarded as a "depth semantics". Understanding and interpreta-
tion bring to discourse that which is initially given as structure. Truth
and method are not disjunctive in Gadamer's sense but are poles of a
dialectical process in which "ontological pre-structure" of understanding
is brought to discourse. Such a bringing to language also yields
possibilities for redetermining it. Thus "tradition" may be a condition of
discourse which receives expression in discourse and is thereby
criticisable.

There may be a confusion of modalities in Ricoeur's account - a
philosophical mistake par excellence. While particular determinate
"structures" may be criticised within discourse, the idea of structure as
such, i.e. of pre-understanding-in-general, cannot. Gadamer seems to stress the latter i.e. the historical situatedness of all understanding, while Habermas objects that this legitimates a particular tradition. The use of the concept of "tradition" rather liberally may contribute to this confusion. Another objection, which I cannot pursue, is that such structure, "differance" in Derrida's sense, cannot in principle come to language explicitly.37

Ricoeur introduces the concept of the "reference" of text. This bears little resemblance to issues in the theory of reference which have occupied analytical philosophy of science. It is more concerned with the sign-functioning of language. However, as used by Ricoeur it seems very broad. The reference of a text is the "mode of being" which is unfolded in front of it. That is to say, the text does not "represent" a "given" reality but contains by virtue of this referential function "the subversive possibility of the critique of the real". The most paradigmatic instance of this general claim is poetry. In poetry the normal referential character of language is explicitly suspended. Ricoeur claims that this releases a second order reference to a "new world" which is "anticipated". According to Ricoeur, the poetic represents the mediation of fiction and re-description. It is fictional in so far as first order reference is suspended. It re-describes by virtue of its practical, subversive second order reference. The ISS may be compared to these ideas in an illuminating fashion. It is both fictional and has the practical character of re-describing, in this case a normative re-description at the heart of the critique of ideology. Heidegger talked of the projection of possibilities, of the "power-to-be" as an existential element of Dasein. Ricoeur's paradigm of the text and more particularly, of the poetic, restates this as the "subversive force of the imaginary". Adorno had claimed that in
illusion there is projected freedom from illusion. It is a "practical imagination" which seems to conduct a dialectic between "what is" and "what could be". Kant had recognised that regulative ideas were a "focus imaginarius". According to Ricoeur this is a focus immanent in textuality as such. A text is never simply given but also anticipates a state of affairs with subversive, critical content.

Ricoeur's remarks give some plausibility to the fictive but non-postulational character of the ISS. This interpretation of the status of the ISS as an imaginative product (the dialectical imagination?) is a far cry from the TA model discussed in Chapter 2. Certainly one might worry that Ricoeur's claims are indeterminate with respect to the details of the ISS. For example, one might accept much of what he says without filling this out in terms of the ISS. The merit of Ricoeur's approach is the way it breaks the crust of an old paradigm of "transcendential reflection" for us. The derivation of the ISS cannot be understood merely as an analytic TA. I have tried to emphasise its practical status. Ricoeur provides a way of discussing this, a location for it, which is analogous to the model of critical-reflective equilibrium discussed in Chapter 8. However, Ricoeur's claims move at a level of generality and abstraction which is not always easy to follow. For instance, Ricoeur claims that "reading" constitutes an unscrambling, an "unrealisation" of the subject. Subjectivity is deconstituted and held in suspense to be determined. Within this process Ricoeur locates the "imaginative variation of the ego" whereby the self and its illusions are disappropriated. Such "illusion" can only be recognised on the basis of a non-illusory ideal. The "imagination" projects these possibilities for "authentic" existence. Yet as an empirical description of "reading" this seems patently false. The "structuralist" programme that deconstructs various philosophical sacred
cows concerning the subject, meaning and the text results in a tense and a high altitude style that is difficult to appropriate. To talk of "reading" as implying a moment of possible authenticity stretches the metaphorical imagination. One turns to statements such as these for refreshment:

Most men have learned to read to serve a paltry convenience, as they have learned to cipher in order to keep accounts and not be cheated in trade; but of reading as a noble intellectual exercise they know little or nothing; yet this only is reading in a high sense, not that which lulls as a luxury and suffers the nobler faculties to sleep the while but what we have to stand on tip-top to read and devote our most alert and wakeful hours to

Ricoeur's concept of the "imaginative variation of ego" seems only appropriate to that rare "noble intellectual exercise". Yet he wants to claim a general transcendental status for it, as "immanent" within textuality as such. The faculty of the "imagination" does not create and project fantasies, myths and utopias which are radically/metaphysically external to social life. They have their proper location, their conditions of possibility, at the heart of it, within textuality as such and its projected "reference". By analogy, Ricoeur claims that critique is immanent in hermeneutics, and also has a basis in the "imaginative" faculty, a faculty which is directly practical in Kant's sense. These literary-theoretical excursions constitute a search for a new paradigm of transcendental thinking. 40 Habermas acknowledges the primacy that Kant ultimately gives to practical-moral reason, yet the paradigm of transcendentalism remains dominated by the "first Critique" i.e. the critique of pure theoretical reason. Kant's regulative approach supplies hints for an alternative. Despite the problems of generalising the model of the text across the domain of social action. Ricoeur's thought is rich in suggestions which point in a similar direction. The "imaginative" status of the ISS seems important, though to explicate this in full would be
Returning to the debate between Habermas and Gadamer, Ricoeur regards Habermas's disclosure of the interest basis of knowledge as a philosophical anthropology similar to Heidegger's analytic of Dasein. Cognitive interests are not observables or theoretical entities. They are more like "existenziales" in Heidegger's sense. This suggests that the universality of such interests is a hermeneutically situated universality not an argument for timeless foundations. Transcendental reflection is a form of hermeneutical reflection upon the closest yet most concealed structures of a species subject. Ricoeur claims that critique is not external to this reflection.

The critique of ideology raises its claim from a different place than hermeneutics, namely from the place where labour, power and language are interwined. But the two claims cross on common ground: the hermeneutics of finitude which secures a priori the correlation between the concept of pre-judice and that of ideology. This is a correlation supplied by the model of the text more clearly than the model of historical understanding which it supercedes. The EI is not radically different from the PI. Distortions relevant to the critique of ideology operate at the level of communicative action. The emancipatory interest has no other content than as an ideal of unconstrained communication. The ISS is thereby purely formal.

According to Ricoeur, the hermeneutics of tradition and the critique of ideology are "mutual reminders". We cannot anticipate emptily via a regulative idea unless such an idea is situated concretely. Habermas's conception of ideology pertains initially to the status of science and technology as a force of production which generates its own self sustaining systemic imperatives. It becomes a self regulating system and not a sub system. This rewrites the terms of Weber's concept of rationalisation of
the lifeworld in which modes of communicative action, given paradigmatically by traditional, tribal rituals and practices in primitive societies, are subordinated to a system which has become autonomous and hegemonic. Questions of ends, of the good life, become abolished in favour of functionalist dictates. Problems of praxis, in its fullest classical sense, are repressed. The EI must be embodied as the reawakening of communicative action which is supported by the "creative renewal of cultural heritage". This connects the reanimation of traditional sources of communicative action and the reactivation of political responsibility in the "public sphere". According to Ricoeur, the antithesis between hermeneutics and critique is lively but futile. Each has its own location. Furthermore, critique is itself a tradition. The antithesis between reminiscence and hope is illusory. Each must be realised concretely. If they become separated analytically they become ideologies themselves. The ISS has been regarded as ideological by many critics. Ricoeur claims that hermeneutics and critique are "dialectically" related and cannot collapse into each other. This mirrors the critical-reflective equilibrium model whose "moments" are not reducible to each other. We can "map" Ricoeur's claims on to it. The "text" projects an ideal which is immanent in it, which in turn reinterprets the text and reconstitutes the subject. This mirrors and expresses the dialectical relation between the ISS and the diversity of language games. Like the text, the latter cannot be regarded as given, as facts. They contain a "moment" of critique which the ISS conceptualises.

Ricoeur's ideas are highly suggestive. However, they seem to preserve the problem of the ISS discussed previously. To have established a general location for some critical-anticipatory conception is not yet to establish the ISS as the unique occupant of that location. Why not other ideals?
Ricoeur's "picture" is not yet determinate enough, it requires supplementation. In negating Habermas's critics who regard the ISS as an expression merely of an externally postulated ideal of enlightenment Ricoeur's ideas seem powerful. The ISS is a "practical fiction" which reorientates our conception of what a transcendental approach can be. Practical regulative ideas cannot be regarded as conditions of the possibility of experience in the general sense of Kant's "Analytic". They require a different form of evaluation. Whitebrook's claim resembles the spirit of Ricoeur's:

the way in which one come's to terms with the transcendental standpoint ultimately bears a closer resemblance to aesthetic taste or Aristotelian phronesis than to emphatic philosophical proof

Habermas cites this with approval. Yet his argument also proceeds at another, empirical and substantive level. In the next section I shall suggest that this is no less normative.

V Reflection and Emancipation

According to Apel the ISS represents an ultimate foundation of non-deductive but reflective kind

Yet the concept of reflection remains obscure. In the Postscript to KHI Habermas distinguishes two senses of reflection; transcendental reflection and self-critical reflection, which he suggests were confused in KHI. In Chapter 6 we tentatively questioned the starkness of such a distinction. In this section I wish to pursue the question in order to illuminate the transcendental status of the ISS, and also my references in Chapter 8 to an "empirical" dimension to critical reflective equilibrium. It is appropriate to examine Habermas's interpretation of psychoanalytic theory in this connection since it has been ignored until now.
Habermas analyses the structure of psychoanalytic theory and practice on three levels.  

1) At the level of **meta-psychology** the basic categories of psychoanalytic theory i.e. the ego-id-superego model, are established via reflection upon the form of communication in which the analyst and patient participate.  

2) The level of **general interpretations** resembles that of theorisation in empirical science. Theories must somehow prove themselves.  

3) At the level of the **reconstruction of individual life histories with a therapeutic intent**, the events of a patient's life history are pieced together with narratives or hypotheses. Put crudely, verification of such narratives consists in the "acceptance" by a patient of the reconstruction of his or her life history. This involves conscious self-critical reflection on the part of the patient. Clearly, this concept of verification appropriate to psychoanalytic theory has been hotly contested and I cannot discuss it in depth. It is not at all clear that the "acceptance" of a narrative thereby verifies the historical causes of the patient's life history. 

Keat attacks Habermas's claim that psychoanalysis has utterly different criteria of validity from hermeneutics and empirical theory. Habermas overdraws the distinction because of an over-simple conception of empirical theory testing. In developing the role of auxiliary hypotheses, and their centrality in psychoanalysis in terms of patient-resistance etc., Keat introduces a more sophisticated model of testing which can encompass psychoanalysis and the crucially precarious therapeutic concept of "transference" which represents an attempt to induce self-reflection in the patient.  

However, the concept of self-reflection remains thoroughly problematic. Patients may "accept" an interpretation which is false, and may reject an
interpretation which is true. An interpretation may be only partly true. How can one tell what it is that commands assent? The individuation of interpretations is problematic. In general,

the truth of psychoanalytic explanations of the formation of the neuroses is consistent with the failure of the therapeutic practices guided by psychoanalytic theory.

We may regard psychoanalytic theory as a holistic field in which the instances of verification and falsification filter through from therapeutic practice in a very loose fashion. In a diagrammatic form this "field" may be represented as follows.

1) General categorial framework
2) General theories
3) Particular life-history interpretations - therapeutic practice
4) Self-reflection of patients

This shows that the central, categorial framework is relatively immune from counter-instances at the interface between theory and practice (levels 3 and 4 respectively). Of course, if one believes that the categorial framework may be accepted or rejected independent of the processes of self-reflection at 4 then this model is problematic. I have merely tried to represent certain relations of inclusion that might hold among these levels, which are ultimately included in a dialogical medium of self-reflection at 4. This seems to be the meaning of "depth hermeneutics". However, this model also ignores a more central problem. "Success" in psychoanalytic therapy is itself a normative issue which cannot be insulated from wider ethical and political issues. Habermas's model of the confirmation of psychoanalytic theory is highly normative. Keat sets out Habermas's
interpretation of Freudian psychoanalytic theory as follows. 48

a) The Nature of the Goal = AUTONOMY

b) The Nature of the Technique = SELF REFLECTION

c) The relationship between Therapist and Patient = ENLIGHTENMENT

Against this, Keat offers other versions of this scheme. One extreme example replaces the goal of autonomy with the elimination of maladjusted anti-social behaviour, the technique of self-reflection is replaced by the control of environmental variables, and the relationship between therapist and patient is now characterised as a "power" relationship. Between these extremes there are other more subtle variants which bring into question sharp distinctions between the TI, the PI and the EI. The details of Keat's account are worth notice. In general, he wishes to claim that the typical normative vocabulary of CT is inadequate and that the "ontological" adequacy and the normative acceptability of theories are in many respects quite independent. A technically constituted science may be emancipatory. A science that recognises the category of "persons" may be manipulative.

We may note therefore that even processes of confirmation of psychoanalysis are value-laden. This has important consequences for the so called "empirical" dimension of critical reflective equilibrium. It is unlikely that such empirical investigation and theorising will be value-neutral. In dismissing the normative content and the explanatory paucity of developmental-logics Schmid fails to recognise the normative complexity of a theory with admittedly more empirical content. Indeed, within critical-reflective equilibrium the level of empirical investigation into processes of psychodynamics etc. may well reproduce and be determined by the value of "autonomy" and "mutual recognition" inherent in the ISS. This is an extremely important issue that I wish to pursue.

Held "maps" Habermas's three levels of psychoanalytic theory and
therapy on to a similar structure for critical social theory: 49

1) Habermas's transcendental theory of cognitive interests
2) The Theory of Social Evolution and the formulation of critical theories which can stand up to scientific discourse.
3) The particular critique of Capitalist society and the organisation of the processes of enlightenment.
4) The selection of appropriate strategies and tactics in the political struggle.

We may reproduce a similar holistic diagram as above for these four levels of CT. 50

What can be said about this structure? In a critique which is analogous to that of psychoanalytic theory, Keat attacks Fay's attempt to tie the "truth" of CT to the success of "actions" at level 4. 51 Fay wants to emphasise the sense in which the truth of CT is determined in part by people's concrete reactions. Yet his account is too strong. The epistemological "gaps" between psychoanalytic theory and the success or failure of therapy are reproduced at the level of social theory. One might have a CT which embodied pessimistic conclusions about the possibility of social change.

I am chiefly interested in 1, the transcendental level of this theoretical structure. It is the "hard core" of the theory in some sense. I wish to argue for the hermeneutic interdependence of the levels, which
reproduces another version of the model of critical-reflective equilibrium.

In Part II it was seen that Habermas's quasi-transcendentalism represented an abandonment of absolute distinctions between the a priori and the a posteriori, the transcendental and the empirical. The diagram represents this. The doctrine of cognitive interests and the priority of the EI as the foundation of metacritique occupy the central "core" position (1) in a "practical-theoretical framework". This is the location of Habermas's ultimate value. However, this "core" bears a relation to the other levels of inquiry and draws support from them. For example, Habermas talks of empirical indicators of the suppression of generalisable interests at (2). This is how "ideologiekritik" can begin to "grip" its object domain. Transcendental reflection at (1) is not radically distinct from the less abstract modes of inquiry. At (1) we may locate the derivative experiential realm of power (Herrschaft) which is the "object" domain of Ideologiekritik. This is an inevitably normative category. The experience of domination is somehow primitive for Habermas. The rest of his theoretical edifice constitutes a deeper understanding of this pre-scientific domain. Habermas's transcendentalism is "contextualist". The values of "autonomy" etc. pervade the whole holistic structure and cannot be regarded simply as externally postulated at (1).

Habermas's communicative "turn" locates the concept of the ISS as a regulative idea at (1). It expresses fundamental values that permeate the theoretical structure and are not without empirical support, though this itself is value-laden. Does this render the structure of CT unfalsifiable? I do not think so, not any more than other theories. That is to say, adjustments to the theoretical edifice are likely to be made at (3), and not at the value core. One might retain the latter yet remain pessimistic about the outcome of organisations of enlightenment.
However, it is of course true to say that Habermas has abandoned the KHI account of this "core".

This attempt to situate Habermas's transcendentalism within the overall CT programme is vital. The former does not represent a strong programme to evolve timeless conditions of rationality. It is part of a practical-theoretical framework, a "Gegenswartanalyse", and is hermeneutically connected to other levels of diagnosis and organisation of critical theorems. This is "depth hermeneutics". The problem of the overestimation of the power of reflection only arises if we confuse transcendental level (1) with self-reflective level (3) and all its problems. In other words we need to preserve a distinction between

a) Showing what underlies speakers' "language games". This is the location of transcendental reflection and Habermas's "nominal" procedure of MAEUTIC inquiry. (see Chapter 6).

b) Showing speakers what underlies their "language games" with a view to releasing them from false consciousness via modes of self-reflection. This is the level of the organisation of processes of enlightenment. We may talk here in general of THERAPEUTICS.

Hegelian "metacritique" effectively identifies and conflates these two levels, leading to the german idealist overestimation of the power of reflection (see the quote from Fichte on Page 150 ). Habermas's critics argue that he does not fully expunge this Hegelian notion. His interpretation of Freud seems to be mediated by a Hegelian filter. We see that this indicates "self-reflection" as a value in Habermas's system.

While (a) and (b) are distinct, they are not radically so. Transcendentalism at (a) is contextualist with respect to (b) and receives some loose support from level (b). Despite Keat's critique of a naive view of "acceptance" as confirmation of CT, something like this must play some
role in the overall coherence of the theory. Level (a) does not simply impose values externally a priori, though it is open that one might ultimately conclude this a posteriori. Transcendental reflection is not reserved for an elitist minority who may evolve timeless truths. Nor is it the case that all agents must engage in this form of reflection. Transcendental reflection, issuing in the normative concept of the ISS, is a moment of a "depth hermeneutics" which is a practical framework seeking to theorise about society and change it on this basis.

Vaihinger talked of the possibility of practical fictions to evince and appeal to the "noblest" elements of humanity. This gives such fictions a rhetorical status. However, the concept of rhetoric need not be regarded here as the purely strategic and manipulative use of discourse to achieve an end behind agents backs so to speak. Rather, it implies that agents may be brought to recognise/accept/appropriate interpretations of their condition in a practically enlightening way. For CT "need interpretations" are not given, they must be "constructed" in some sense. The ISS cannot be simply confirmed or refuted by appeal of agents' "intuitions" about their position as Geuss seems at times to say. It is part of a structure within which it is recognised that such an "intuitive" level is indeterminate. I claim that the ISS is "rhetorical" in so far as it is hermeneutically connected to the level of the organisation of processes of enlightenment, in which attempts will be made to induce self-reflection among social agents. Analogues of the psychoanalytic concept of "transference" will be in play. Resistance will be expected. As we saw with the model of critical-reflective equilibrium, appeal to the level of normative intuition, everyday language games, does not refute the practical regulative idea of the ISS.

Willmott and Knights develop these ideas from the perspective of the
work of Erich Fromm. According to them,

The fundamental problem of capitalist society, Fromm suggests is the contradiction between our heightened sense of self-consciousness on the one hand and .... limits upon the chances of developing a positive response to our feelings of insecurity on the other 52

In effect, this gives a psychological reading of an analytic distinction between positive and negative liberty. Willmott and Knights admit that the distinction is empirically dubious. It is not simply given in the observable behaviour of social agents. They regard the distinction as rhetorical. It is intended to heighten an awareness in agents of the contradiction between self-awareness and frustrated possibilities. The distinction is rhetorical,

not empirical and appeals ultimately to intuition and experience not to purely observable behaviour 53

While Willmott and Knights perhaps conflate (a) and (b) above, they bring out this rhetorical-practical "moment" of a seemingly analytic distinction. The practical-ethical status of the ISS is similar. The notion of rhetoric affirms the immanence of such a construct which inspires and gets indirect support from the level of the organisation of enlightenment. This is a deep rejection of the presuppositions of critics such as Winch, Geuss and Bubner.

When responding to those who dismiss critical theory on the grounds that it fails to provide objective validation for its ethical standpoint, critical theorists only succeed in contradicting themselves when they seek to beat rather than counter positivism at tis own game 54

This chapter has tried to make good this claim. However, the concept of "self-reflection" that Habermas depends upon is too cognitive. It is argued that Habermas neglects the centrality of non-cognitive and "affective" modes of emancipation. The role of suffering is underestimated
in his interpretation of psychoanalytic therapy. Emancipation may be a tragic concept. It is by no means obvious we all have the spiritual resources to rise up to this. In short, the Hegelian influence lives on in Habermas's work. The philosophy of identity is not yet fully expunged. This irritates those who claim that Habermas ignores material determinants of social life on the "far side" of discourse. They plead for a more thorough de-transcendentalisation of CT. Perhaps this is plausible. But we must at least be sure about what we are giving up. Habermas's transcendentalism is a practical-theoretical hard core of a research programme potentially rich in social consequences. It is not the tired attempt to erect timeless conditions of rationality, truth and goodness. It is an attempt to deepen our understanding of a contemporary social context in which a plurality of norms compete. Transcendentalism and immanence evoke diametrically opposed images in the first instance. In the analysis of Habermas's concept of the ISS I have sought to overcome this antinomy. The ISS both "goes beyond" experience and "dwells-in" it.
It is not that gum chewing undermines metaphysics but that it is metaphysics - this is what must be made clear

(HORKHEIMER)
CHAPTER 10

Habermas and the Conversation of the West

I Rorty's Challenge

By way of conclusion to the arguments concerning Habermas's status as a transcendental thinker, I wish to address Rorty's challenge to epistemology and the self-understanding of professional philosophy. This is a convenient focus which recapitulates many of the points made above. Rorty's book Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature has aroused considerable interest and controversy. It would not be possible to confront each aspect of it. Rather, I shall be selective with a view to questioning his dismissive remarks about Habermas and Apel. In very general terms we may identify two main components in Rorty's strategy. Firstly, the DECONSTRUCTIONIST component locates itself within some mainstream issues in analytical philosophy seeking to dissolve a certain range of problems found there. Rorty claims that they owe their existence to the "invention of the mind" which he questionably situates somewhere in the seventeenth century. Secondly, Rorty offers a vision of the future of philosophy, the DIDACTIC component, in which epistemology is replaced by hermeneutics.

Some preliminary comments about this strategy are worth making. It is not at all clear how the didactic claims follow from Rorty's deconstructionism. The former seem to concern some highly specific debates about realism and the philosophy of language. Rorty claims that the use of the arguments of Quine, Sellars, Putnam and Davidson are not essential to his argument, but this is not obvious. Secondly, the coherence of Rorty's didacticism is very questionable. It is not clear what the demand to be hermeneutical in our thinking really amounts to. Rorty deploys some key contrasts, e.g. between normal and abnormal discourse, in a highly confusing
fashion. He also irritates certain historical sensitivities. He runs many issues together under the "mirror of nature" metaphor which is intended to reflect a Cartesian-Kantian model of the mind (though how these can be regarded as similar is itself highly problematic). Thus Rorty conflates foundationalists, dualists, ocular metaphors etc. in an inflexible fashion. Such a maverick history of philosophy might be more acceptable if not for notable absences. In a sense the Hegelian tradition stands outside the Kantian tradition, outside the mirror of nature metaphor. Quine and Sellars may be regarded as modern proponents of Hegelianism in a new pragmatistically orientated setting. Another issue concerns the interpretation of Rorty's heroes, Dewey, Heidegger and the later Wittgenstein in whom a conception of philosophy as therapy from "bad problems" is developed. I wish to claim that Habermas shares a "deconstructionist" programme with Rorty, though it is rooted in the Lukacs-Marxist tradition and infused with hermeneutics. Surely the critique of ideology is therapy par excellence? Rorty's dismissal of Habermas seems to reside in a blanket reaction to the concept of "transcendentalism". Yet Heidegger was a rampant transcendentalist. The general point is that the selection of heroes and villains in the story of epistemology is highly artificial. It is this artificiality that my case for Habermas's transcendentalism confronts. Habermas cannot simply be palmed off as a "mirror of nature" philosopher. Some of the central themes of CT question the perspicuity of Cartesian self consciousness. Indeed Adorno's critique of Heidegger as engaging in an "ontologising of subjectivity" seems to turn Rorty's hero on his head.¹

It is with these difficulties in mind that I wish to turn to a more detailed assessment of Rorty's claims. Firstly I shall question his concept of transcendental philosophy. Secondly I shall question his didactic claims from the perspective of his critique of Habermas.
Rorty's challenge is an important one in so far as it is a good thing that philosophers question their activity. It does seem to be true that the quest for timeless foundations of knowledge, and a specialist self-image based upon it, are no longer viable. However, this critique has come from within analytic philosophy. It is not clear that the latter must now only concern itself with a historical approach to the mistakes of great men. After all, Rorty sustains a belief in the analytic style. And his antithesis between therapeutic/edificatory and systematic/constructive philosophy seems overdrawn. In an assessment of the *Philosophical Investigations* Apel asks how Wittgenstein's ad hoc approach can fill its therapeutic function without recourse to some theoretical insight. How, he asks,

> is it possible to reveal the nonsensicality of metaphysical questions without adopting in a disguised form, a metaphysical or for that matter, philosophical standpoint itself?  

One must ask a similar question about Rorty's didactic account.

II The Transcendental Argument to end all Transcendental Arguments

As an example of Rorty's general deconstructionist programme I wish to draw upon his attempts to block the idea of philosophy of language as a successor subject to a "mirror of nature" epistemology. Roughly speaking we may explicate the latter in terms of a Cartesian model of the mind which is somehow self-transparent. The problem of knowledge is that of how to bridge the "gap" between thought and reality to obtain accurate representations of the external world. We encountered this model in Chapter 2. Rorty wants to deny that this programme may be continued in the setting of the philosophy of language. In particular he wants to deny that a theory of meaning is or could be a way of showing and articulating a
relationship between "words" and the "world". Rather, it is a way of laying out the relations between parts of a social practice. Rorty's "social turn" is very underdeveloped. It is primarily a reaction against the classical idea of a quaestio juris i.e. that knowledge claims are justified by showing that an appropriate relation between such judgements and the world is satisfied. Rorty drives a strong wedge between causal accounts of how the human organism is affected by its environment and the essential social character of justification. This ignores the central empiricist insight that discerning appropriate causal links is part of justifying knowledge claims (e.g. worries about E.S.P.). In addition, Rorty's anaemic conception of the social is highly ideological from the perspective of the tradition in which Habermas stands. However, we must postpone this issue for a while. Rorty regards Davidson's philosophy of language as an example of a theory of meaning which purports to do no more than lay out the relations between the parts of a social practice. He calls this rather oddly a "pure" philosophy of language. This is to be distinguished from an "impure" philosophy which attempts to solve an old problem of the relation between words and the world. Such a "realist" programme crystalises as a demand for a theory of reference. This demand arises in the face of three issues that require defence and which Rorty ascribes to Putnam's early work: 3

a) There remain problems with an account of "truth" as "warranted assertability". A theory might satisfy all the operational criteria and yet still be false.

b) There is a need to explain the "facts" of convergence in scientific knowledge.

c) There is a need to block the meta-inductive possibility that since current theories have shown past theories to be false then it may one day
emerge that none of our theoretical terms refer.

Rorty attacks the need for a theory of how language hooks on to the
world, which these three problems seem to express. In his initial
skirmishes he talks rather irritatingly of parallels between the logic of
the use of "true" and "good". We simply do not feel obliged to write up
current theories of goodness, if there are any, as improvements upon the
past as we do in science. Nor indeed do we capitulate automatically to
the judgement of our "peers" about goodness and questions of value.
However there is the more worrying aspect concerning Whiggishness about
current theories. Rorty objects to the whole idea of a theory of reference.
He claims that

it is hard to see why we need do more to assuage
the sceptic than to be "Whiggish" in our
historiography. We can just write things up so as
to make even the most primitive animists talk
about, for example, the motion of molecules,
radium, genes or whatever. We do not thereby
assuage his fear that molecules may not exist but
then no discovery about how words relate to the
world will do that

This passage is typical of Rorty's style. Even if we felt a theory of
reference was a non-starter one would be inclined to wince at Rorty's
endorsement of Whiggish historiography. But one wants to retain the
perjorative sense of Rorty's expression for a very crude way of doing the
history of science. Rorty is deliberately provocative. How do we
adjudicate between competing historiographies? Rorty assumes a consensus.
He claims that checking new theories by old ones is not an option. We
must explain why our ancestors said the things they did. But this, he
says will not be via a discovery about how words relate to the world.

According to Rorty, the notion of a theory of reference is born of a
confusion between two claims:

1) "S refers to X" means S refers to whatever entity makes most of his
central beliefs true.

ii) Meaning determines reference. The more false beliefs we have the less in touch we are with reality.

That is to say the notion of reference contains both the idea of a "factual" relation between words and the world, and the common sense notion of "talking about". It is caught between a causal theory of the "refers" relation and an intensionally determined notion. Rorty claims that this tension dissolves when we realise that the causal account still itself depends upon where our inquiry leads us and the type of theories we develop.

According to Rorty, Davidsonian semantics avoids the confusions inherent in a theory of reference. He regards Davidson's assault on the scheme/content distinction as a parallel attack to his own upon the concept of epistemology. According to Rorty, Tarski's "convention T" embodies our "best intuition" about the concept of truth. This is questionable. He regards the notion of "correspondence" between sentences and the world as philosophically uncontroversial. This constitutes the point of departure for Davidson's attack upon the "very idea of a conceptual scheme". Rorty describes this cryptically as

the transcendental argument to end all transcendental arguments

Davidson is attacking a form of scepticism that arises from the idea of alternative conceptual schemes in the philosophically interesting sense that they could be "true but not translateable". There is a great deal of Davidson's semantics underlying his claims that I cannot pursue. Rather, a crude sketch of his argument, which itself is not easy to grasp, runs as follows: It is a necessary condition of counting people as having a language at all that it is "like ours" in sufficient respects. The principle of charity seems to be a transcendental condition of judgement and
not a methodological maxim. However, Davidson's claims seem to centre upon the case of "partial translation". We must translate most of "their" beliefs as true, or at least minimise inexplicable error.

I find Davidson's arguments obscure. The whole notion of a conceptual scheme seems obscure. Davidson's claims seem verificationist where his arguments are strongest i.e. at the level of translating behaviourally grounded beliefs. But surely the point about the indeterminacy of translation occurs at a deeper level, i.e. at the level of very general "ontological commitments" to particulars or particular-phases or other less obvious natural kinds? So Davidson's arguments seem to depend upon a version of verificationism. Yet Rorty wants to deny this. Those who claim this say that Davidson is

not using the Platonic notions of Truth and Goodness and Reality which "realists" need to make their realism dramatic and controversial (metaphysical rather than internal in Putnam's sense)

Rorty implies that verificationism dialectically implicates metaphysical realism. Again the analogy between "truth" and "goodness" begs issues which are specific to the problem of truth. Rorty moves from plausible claims against the idea of an "uninterpreted reality" to some problematic conclusions. It is not clear that Davidsonian semantics is a necessary outcome of Rorty's critique. Certainly Rorty regards his attacks as an attack upon any realist theories of truth. This seems to be too strong.

In what sense is Davidson's strategy a TA to end all TAs? What is Rorty's concept of transcendentalism in all this? Rorty has two criteria of a TA: 

a) It must be a "self-referential" argument

b) It must have "realist" conclusions

Davidson's argument is only a TA in the weak sense of (a), i.e. it seeks to show the self-defeating character of the starker forms of scepticism and
conceptual relativism. However, most ad hominem arguments have this structure and are not thereby transcendental. In Chapter 2 we saw that some constructive structural content must be provided by a TA. Davidson's argument seems to be the global argument of the kind suggested on Page 35. It is a TA in no stronger sense. If it is not verificationist it is at least as anaemic in its conclusions. TAs are richer arguments. Are they inherently "realist"? It is questionable whether the classic TAs e.g. of Kant's 1st critique, have metaphysically realist conclusions. Quite the reverse in fact.

Rorty's conception of transcendentalism is extremely narrow, tied to the quest for knowledge-legitimacy inherent in "mirror of nature" epistemology. He regards Davidsonian semantics as purified of these concerns. Yet the question of the social basis of justification raises interesting questions. Some sentences may be relatively more embedded in a holistic field of belief than others. Why cannot the scheme/content distinction be activated as an analysis of the relative embeddedness of sentences? As Schwartz says,

accepting Rorty's views on meaning truth and reference leaves interesting problems about understanding, communication metaphor, the forms and differences among symbol systems and a whole lot more unresolved.

One might add the critique of ideology. The most that Rorty shows is that a particular constructive philosophical programme fails when accompanied by certain unsound metaphysical assumptions. There is a tension between Rorty's anti-essentialism and deconstructionism and his own hidden essentialism about how philosophy can and cannot proceed. This brings us to a discussion of Rorty's didactic claims about the future of philosophy.

III Rorty and the Future of Philosophy

Rorty's general goal seems to be to reorientate the profession and to
liberate it from "bad problems". However, there is more to his claims than this. Not only must philosophy stop trying to solve bad problems but we must be "hermeneutical". What does he mean by this? Philosophy can no longer be "constructive". Dewey, Heidegger and Wittgenstein point the way to this conception. They were truly "reactive" and "edifying" philosophers who did not regard themselves, according to Rorty, as establishing a new tradition.

According to Rorty, epistemology gives way to hermeneutics. Yet it is not always clear what is meant by this. On the one hand hermeneutics is intrinsically reactive and dependent upon epistemology. On the other hand hermeneutics expresses the hope that the "cultural space left by the demise of epistemology will not be filled". Thus hermeneutics is both abnormal discourse only from the point of view of a "normal" epistemological discourse and also abnormal discourse "in-itself". These slides in Rorty's terminology are even more evident on closer inspection of his deployment of the normal/abnormal discourse which he picks up from Kuhn and generalises. Here are at least six senses which need unravelling.

1) Kuhn's distinction between normal science/abnormal science derived via historical reflection.

2) Normal science as a reference to the natural sciences as such. This use embraces (1) and is ahistorical.

3) Normal discourse in the sense of any context of inquiry incorporating and constituted by its own practices of justification.

4) Normal discourse in the sense of mainstream "mirror of nature" epistemology in Rorty's sense.

5) Abnormal discourse in the Rortian sense of hermeneutics given paradigmatically by the work of Dewey, Heidegger and Wittgenstein.

6) Abnormal discourse distinct from (5) referring to the work of those
liberate it from "bad problems". However, there is more to his claims than this. Not only must philosophy stop trying to solve bad problems but we must be "hermeneutical". What does he mean by this? Philosophy can no longer be "constructive". Dewey, Heidegger and Wittgenstein point the way to this conception. They were truly "reactive" and "edifying" philosophers who did not regard themselves, according to Rorty, as establishing a new tradition.

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5) Abnormal discourse in the Rortian sense of hermeneutics given paradigmatically by the work of Dewey, Heidegger and Wittgenstein.
6) Abnormal discourse distinct from (5) referring to the work of those
revolutionary mainstream philosophers who eventually renormalised philosophy i.e. established a tradition.

Rorty links epistemology as a form of normal discipline to the natural sciences. In this Rorty like Kuhn imagines that such normal discourses are generated spontaneously without conflict, scepticism or reflection. This is a failure to recognise that the classical epistemological questions were raised from WITHIN natural science itself (see Chapter 2, footnote 24 for an expansion of this point). From Habermas's perspective Rorty is guilty of "scientism". However, Rorty's programme blends into a variety of didactic claims at this point. There are hints for this when he says,

To think of Wittgenstein and Heidegger as having views about how things are is not to be wrong about how things are exactly, it is just poor taste.

This ironic reference to "taste" is expanded later in the book where Rorty uses epistemology and hermeneutics as ideal opposites. Epistemology unites its participants by UNIVERSITAS, by common interests i.e.

To construct an epistemology is to find the maximum amount of common ground with others.

Against this, hermeneutics unites its participants in SOCIETAS which is a form of union constituted by civic virtues (such as "taste") and a civic body. Rorty parallels this contrast with a cluster of others e.g. between knowledge as "accurate representation" and as understanding a practice; between following a demonstration and becoming acquainted with a fellow man; between foundationalism and conversation; between strangeness and familiarity.

We will be epistemological where we understand perfectly well what is happening but want to codify it in order to extend it or strengthen or teach or ground it. We must be hermeneutical where we do not understand what is happening but are honest enough to admit it.

This distinction between hermeneutics and epistemology as two forms of
activity with normative consequences is expanded as Rorty draws upon that
romantic strand of the concept of spirit which runs through the hermeneutic
tradition to Gadamer, that is, the concept of "Bildung", self-formation or
edification. This is the direction philosophy must now take.

Edification is the project of finding new, better,
or more fruitful ways of speaking .... without
being constructive at least if constructive means
the sort of co-operation in the accomplishment of
research programmes which takes place in normal
discourse... 14

A great deal is pushed into the category of "normality" here, leaving
abnormal discourse as inherently edificatory. Indeed the point is stressed
in educational terms,

one cannot count as educated - gebildet - if one
only knows the results of the Naturwissenschaft of
the day... 15

According to Rorty, the humanist tradition embodies the idea of the
relativity of descriptive vocabularies

Gadamer's attempt to fend off the demand for
objectivity in the Geisteswissenschaft is the
attempt to prevent education from being reduced to
instruction in the results of normal inquiry... 16

Edification is both normal knowledge and a meta-view that this is only one
option in a range of descriptive vocabularies. This liberal-humanism that
Rorty discerns in Gadamer's hermeneutics guides his conception that
philosophy must keep "the conversation of the West going". Edifying
philosophy

... it falls into self
deception when it tries to do more than send the
conversation off in new directions... 17

Rorty's concept of conversation is enigmatic. Seemingly idiomatic it is
actually more philosophically heavyweight. It negates that philosophical
tradition running from Aristotle to Descartes and Kant, (assuming that this
is a unitary thread). However, Rorty's concept of "conversation" seems to
leave philosophy with no content, just a voice or interlocutional role in mediating other discourse forms. What could a purely reactive discipline look like? Rorty's deconstruction of particular issues in the epistemological tradition is connected to very general, radical and highly rhetorical conclusions about the future of philosophy. At least one response to this challenge is to question the ideological character of his concept of conversation.

IV Conversation and Ideology

In this section I wish to reply to Rorty's claims for the future of philosophy developed above, via a defence of Habermas. It is interesting to compare the histories of philosophy that Habermas and Rorty utilise. According to Habermas, epistemology originally embraces the claim that science did not coincide with knowledge. Prior to its post-Kantian dissolution,

> The critique of knowledge was still conceived in reference to a system of cognitive faculties that included practical reason and reflective judgement

From Habermas's perspective, the rise of positivism can be traced via Hegel's critique of Kant and Marx's critique of Hegel. This is the story of the dissolution of epistemology as the self-reflection of reason.

> Since Kant, science has no longer been seriously comprehended by philosophy. Science can only be comprehended epistemologically which means as one category of knowledge

In contrast, Rorty claims that epistemology has contributed to the view of science as the paradigmatic category of knowledge. Rorty's conception of epistemology is antithetical to Habermas's which sees it as the locus of "reflective" potential. It is worth remarking that Habermas would probably not dispute Rorty's main deconstructionist claims and the anti-metaphysical
realist programme. (Indeed Adorno's concept of "negative dialectic" might be regarded as a germanic variant of Rorty's concept of "conversation". Both concepts share "deconstructionist" connotations). However, for Habermas epistemology represents a potential for the critique of scientism, whereas for Rorty it must be abandoned all together. Rorty's characterisation of the "enemy" is very broad:

The primal error of systematic philosophy has always been that .... questions are answered by some new (metaphysical or transcendental) descriptive or explanatory discourse.  

Rorty effectively equates transcendentalism with systematic, mirror of nature epistemology. Kant's greatness, says Rorty, lay in perceiving the metaphysical form of scholastic philosophy. But

unfortunately Kant put his diagnosis of science in terms of the discovery of "inevitable subjective conditions" to be revealed by reflection upon scientific inquiry  

This is insensitive to other levels of Kant's thought to say the least. Rorty's concept of transcendentalism is bound up with his view above. Thus Habermas's quasi-transcendentalism is criticised under this general strategy. Cognitive interests according to Rorty are, just facts about a given society and what it takes to be grounds for assertions  

This sounds much like Geuss's criticism of the transcendental status of the ISS. However cognitive interests are not grounds i.e. reasons for assertions. Habermas's post KHI distinction between action and discourse makes this clearer. Rorty's general point is that such notions are historically situated, and can acquire "timeless" transcendental status. Yet I have tried to show that this issue of timelessness is really a non-starter even for mainstream TA theorists. What we have is a penetrating depth analysis of contemporary on-going activities i.e. the forms of
science, which establishes a "practical" framework for CT.

Rorty criticises those philosophers who would like to be both systematic and edifying and, seeing them as incompatible aims, have gone on to suggest that the reflective capacities of men might themselves be turned into a philosophical subject matter. He has Habermas and Apel in mind. They are trying to do something like Kant did but without falling into either scientism or historicism.

Yet how like or unlike Kant's programme it is remains unexplained. Rorty claims that Habermas and Apel hope for a successor subject to epistemology which will do for reflection what the tradition did for objectivising knowledge.

Rorty ignores the role of Hegel and meta-critique in this story. This is interesting since Rorty displays the analytical tradition as somehow struggling to catch up with Hegel. He refers to the "Hegelian" implications of Quine's behaviourism and holism and to Sellar's self description of his book as "incipient Meditations Hegeliennes". Yet the strand of Hegelian thought that runs through Feuerbach to Marx is omitted in this background acknowledgement of Hegel. It is a strand which runs through to Habermas's doctrine of cognitive interests. KHI "rewrites" the Phenomenology of Mind. Rorty's position is further complicated by his categorisation of thinkers as "systematic" or "edificatory". In the former he locates those members of the Descartes-Kant tradition including presumably Habermas and Apel. In the latter he locates the likes of Marx and Freud (Habermas's heroes!) together with his own "gang of three". Are Marx and Freud "philosophers" in a recognisable sense? This is debatable. However, how can one regard them as NON-systematic except in a very specialist use of the term. Rather, it is precisely thinkers such as these
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that straddle the "systematic" and "edificatory" categories. One is reminded of Apel's comments above (Page 266). Furthermore, surely the edificatory impact of Freud's work i.e. dissolving our confidence in self-consciousness, a project initiated by Hegel (and continued by Nietzsche) is to some extent dependent upon a systematic though non-mirror of nature framework? Habermas and Apel are villains because of their transcendentalism. Yet it is the main claim of this dissertation that the nature of the transcendental approach has not been understood. It has been caricatured and crudely linked to the attempt to find timeless, a priori conditions of experience.

Rorty quotes from the Postscript to KHI concerning the dual empirical and transcendental status of cognitive interests. He responds by claiming that the "cultural anthropological standpoint is all we need". Thus,

There is no point in trying to find a general synoptic way of analysing the functions that knowledge has in universal contexts of practical life

Firstly, the cultural anthropological standpoint alone is insufficient for Habermas in KHI. It lacks the anti-scientistic import that the triadic quasi-transcendental scheme offers. The latter preserves that reflective commitment to the explanation of the meaning of knowledge, that Habermas defends, which in turn is pressed into the service of the articulation of the critique of ideology. Now, it is true that Habermas abandoned the transcendentalism of KHI as "too indirect". Furthermore it is possible that the "detranscendentalisation" of Habermas's thought in his latest programme for a theory of communicative action might return him to Rorty's edificatory category. But this is not the point. Habermas's earlier transcendentalism bursts the framework of Rorty's whole analysis. More generally, it is a lever in the critique of ideology, a form of discourse, "depth hermeneutics", to which Rorty is utterly insensitive. Rorty
deconstructs the idea that there may be eternal standards of rationality etc. and reduces it to the claim that all critique must be piecemeal. But the opposition is a false one and the latter claim reinvokes the Habermas-Gadamer debate (and Ricoeur's synthesis). Rorty's concept of conversation with its implicit values of civility, taste, etc. is a quasi-aesthetic notion. It is also ideological, a "convervatism overlain with radical rhetoric". Quite apart from the irony of regarding Heidegger as a hero of something sounding as mundane as "conversation", Rorty's analysis of the context of cognitive-justification, his "social turn", is lacking in depth. This is exemplified by his throwaway statement that

the dangers to abnormal discourse do not come from science or naturalistic philosophy. They come from the scarcity of food and the secret police

Rorty's didactic claims promote a liberal ideal of

free and leisured conversation (which) generates abnormal discourse as the sparks fly upwards

Yet for Habermas it is the very notion of "free" conversation that is problematic. Rorty has a vague hope for consensus. Habermas articulates this hope more thoroughly without standing within "mirror of nature" epistemology. The hope is a hope for normalcy, post revolutionary normalcy perhaps, a normalcy founded upon freedom. Habermas's concept of Discourse and his conceptual and institutional expansions of it flesh out the idea of the conversation of the West, a "Gegenswartdiagnose" and not a search for timeless, cross-cultural canons of rationality. His procedural ideals of rationality and democracy are not concerned with how the conversation goes but that it goes i.e. a formal conception. Rorty does not conceptualise the possibility of systematic barriers to abnormal discourse such as differential power relations between participants.

One might accept the demand for a more penetrating analysis such as a critique of ideology without endorsing Habermas's version of this task.
However, one cannot affirm with Geuss that CT can get along nicely without its transcendental baggage. Firstly, CT may be problematic for many other methodological/epistemological reasons. Secondly, transcendentalism is not necessarily baggage but an aspect of the depth hermeneutical analysis that CT represents. As such, it is not, as Rorty claims, that our sense of ourselves as choosers of alternative vocabularies is turned into a philosophical subject and that this is to see "freedom as nature". Rorty's terms of reference are too crude. Freedom has become "nature-like". That is the problem facing CT. Transcendental reflection is liberation of a minimal kind from scientism etc. This in turn inspires strategies at other levels of inquiry, though it also draws support from them. Rorty cannot conceptualise the "non-foundational transcendentalism" that is expressed by the idea of critical-reflective equilibrium (Chapter 8, Section V) and the holistic model of CT (Chapter 9, Section V). I located the worthwhile nature of these projects in a "practical richness" expressing a normative ideal not disimilar to Rorty's use of the notion of Bildung. As Schwartz says, Rorty's demand to be hermeneutical is nihilist in the sense that it does not even demand such richness of practical insight but demands that these constructive projects not be begun.

In his most recent collection of essays Rorty affirms again the Gadamerian historicist insight that it is impossible for us to step outside our traditions within which we do our thinking and self criticism. However this issues in drastic conclusions for what Williams calls Rorty's post-Philosophy philosophy. All we can do is make comparisons from within the sphere of "textuality". The categories that we use are a function of our time. However, what counts as "our time" or "tradition" remains as underdeveloped as in Gadamer's case. (We saw that Ricoeur's
synthesis of Habermas and Gadamer reconciles the transcendentalism of regulative ideas to this historicist image. Rorty's conception of philosophy coalesces around "reflective awareness" as a distinctive attitude. As Williams rather ironically puts it,

the owl of Minerva robbed by later skepticism of Hegel's flight plan to the transcendental standpoint notoriously finds itself flying in ever decreasing circles 34

Yet, Rorty is not perhaps as quick in his reflexes as Derrida, though his conclusions to Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature manage to patch together an anti-essentialist reading for his didactic claims. For example,

It may be that mirror imagery and mainstream systematic philosophy will be revitalised by some revolutionary genius 35

But it is not clear how seriously we should take this. One of Rorty's more defensible projects involves overcoming the divide between so called "analytic" and so called "continental" philosophy (a project in which Habermas seems engaged from the other direction). Both have been, in Williams' summary of Rorty, "public relations agencies" of science and literature respectively. Rorty wants to effect a rapprochement between their different rhetorics. However, there remain on the "analytic" side empiricist misgivings about Rorty's lack of philosophical interest in science, a lack which as Williams says (echoing some remarks in Section II above), ignores the fact that many of the descriptions that Rorty dislikes i.e. notions of "accurate representation" come from science itself! This issues in some self-reflexive problems for Rortian pragmatism.

There does seem to be a deep affinity between the analytic style and the scientific project. Rorty claims that this cannot devalue the imaginative potential of more literary styles. Yet he offers little positive vision of how philosophy can proceed as a form of the latter. Ricoeur described the ISS as a basis for the critique of ideology and as a
"focus imaginarius". Habermas's transcendentalism is imaginative in this non-analytic sense. We cannot hold it up to the worn model of analytic TAs. Rorty talks of "conversational constraints" with lip service to Habermas yet he remains unexcited by Foucault's vision of discourse as a network of power relations.

"Power" and "culture" are equipolent indicators of the social forces which make us more than animals and which when the bad guys take over, can turn us into something worse and more miserable than animals.

Williams satirises the shallowness of Rorty's claims here. Certainly Foucault's concept of "power" ranges so widely as to be unhelpful from the point of view of social critique. Rorty's position reproduces this problem.

Williams acknowledges that Rorty's questioning has force in the field of moral philosophy where first order ethical issues are now discussed. This activity needs to deepen its understanding of the relations between theory and practice and of theorists to society. Habermas's programme is at least an attempt to do this. The various levels of his thinking indicate that the importance of philosophy is not overestimated as in Rorty's case. The necessity of organising processes of enlightenment and choosing political strategies bursts the enclosed "world of books" that Rorty's conception of the future of philosophy seems to become.

The criteria by which I judge Habermas's transcendentalism obviously have some affinity to the imaginative potential that Rorty discerns in Europe. Broken from its association with ahistoricist programmes transcendentalism should now be something whose potentials can be assessed in a new light. Rorty cannot make this transition, hence his critique of Habermas.
V Epistemology without Mirrors

According to Habermas the interests of the Frankfurt School shifted away from Marx's political economy and its concomitant theory of the laws of motion of society. With the failure of the latter, philosophy reassumed a position of cognitive privilege. Horkheimer and Adorno abandoned the historical faith in immanent critique and critical theory in its classical form dissolved. Part II above showed that the Hegelian influence still dominates KHI and our conception of Habermas's quasi-transcendentalism. We converged upon the idea that Habermas does not fully expunge that overestimation of the power of reflection so characteristic of the German idealist tradition. Thus while the analytic model of transcendental argumentation is displaced by a "metacritical" model, which exhibits the fluidity of the triadic scheme of cognitive interests, this problem of reflection persists.

Habermas regards himself as explicating a concept of Reason which falls neither to historicism nor to the sociology of knowledge, nor is abstractly standing over history and the complex of social life. I have attempted to explicate the ISS as a regulative idea capable of satisfying these desiderata, and avoiding some standard reflex responses to the issue of transcendentalism. The model of critical-reflective equilibrium offers a more satisfying account of Habermas's concept of an ISS. The holistic model of CT which is derived from this (Chapter 9, Section V) alleviates the suspicion that Habermas continues to overestimate the power of reflection without granting the theorist an abstract position of cognitive privilege. (Though self-reflection as a norm of therapeutic practice persists in Habermas's interpretation of psychoanalysis). This reconciles Gadamer's hermeneutics with Habermas's general theoretical programme. The former does not deny that the latter is possible; it provides a meta-view about its historicist cognitive status.
In KHI Habermas claims that he sought to renew the foundations of CT in an experience of thought gained from Kant through Hegel to Marx and from Marx to Peirce, Dilthey, Freud, Weber and Mead. Only in this way, he says, can the Kantian meaning of critique gain a "position of honour" in the Hegelian-Marxist tradition. Habermas defers to McCarthy's account of the difficulties in sustaining this position of honour and I have argued that "metacritique" fundamentally transforms Kantian critique. Habermas claims that KHI was too indirect and turns towards a theory of communication. He argues that the notion of language as a "fact of reason" intends an analogy between rational reconstruction and Kantian critique. In Chapter 6 I suggested that this relation was perhaps stronger than analogical. Habermas claims that a weaker a priorism gives rational reconstructions the status of hypotheses open to testing.

if it makes sense to reconstruct the philosophical concept of reason in the light of the role that these validity claims play in processes of reaching understanding .... then the telos of understanding inherent in language can, in analogy to Kantian usage, be called a "fact of reason"

However, the factuality of this fact, the ISS, has been a source of great dispute. Part III attempted to unravel the central problem and offer a model of the derivation and status of the ISS which avoids the grosser objections. However, even Kant regarded the "fact" of reason as an insurmountable problem for the question of how pure reason can be practical.

It is interesting in the light of this to refer briefly to an analysis of Kant's second critique from the perspective of the problem of TAs. Benton explicates a TA which establishes the "practical cognitive viewpoint". His project mirrors some of the intentions of my own though in a purely Kantian context.
I suspect that before we can make any really enlightening comparisons between Kant's Transcendental Arguments and more recent attempts at such arguments we need to understand Kant's arguments much more thoroughly. Our examination of the Second Critique has already shown that certain of the features most commonly attributed to transcendental arguments need to be reformulated. For example we now know that experience is not the only cognitive framework that can ground such an argument, since in the Second Critique the argument is grounded by the practical viewpoint.

According to Benton, TAs establish frameworks or REALMS in Kant's sense. He alludes to the lack of consensus about what a TA is, its formal as distinct from its substantive features, and points to the domination of Kant's First Critique as a model for TAs as an inflexibility in TA appraisal. In Chapter 2, I assumed some degree of consensus about TAs perhaps aritificially, though with the aim of drawing similar conclusions to Benton's about the internal difficulties with this model, i.e. the necessity of "deductive-gaps". In Chapters 8 and 9 I suggested that Habermas's "arguments" for the ISS seek to establish a practical viewpoint or framework in some sense. We might call it the critical-theoretical realm. The suspicion of decisionism persists unless the mutually supporting character of the levels of inquiry that constitute this realm are recognised. To say that TAs are "practical" is to situate them within such a depth-hermeneutical structure. This will not satisfy the decisionist, but then nothing will.

Habermas's relation to and appropriation of transcendentalism is complex. It is intended to support the multi-levelled inquiry that constitutes CT, a diagnosis of the ills of the West. It is part of an analysis to provide theoretical sign posts for analysing the tensions and tendencies of the modern era in which descriptive and normative contents and concepts are intertwined.
Habermas's transcendentalism supplies a "moment" or point of departure for his reconstruction of historical materialism. Habermas claims that we can preserve the leading intention behind this theory if we ascertain the rational content of anthropological deep seated structures of a transcendental-ly orientated analysis which is initially unhistorical.

Habermas's transcendentalism is only INITIALLY unhistorical. In effect, this dissertation has been an attempt to understand this claim in terms which extend beyond Habermas's own sensitivity to the issues, which more recently is concerned with substantive analyses of crisis tendencies in Western capitalism, and with evolving a theory of communicative action in the face of functionalism.

Rorty's challenge to epistemology and transcendentalism as he understands it is in the first instance quite specific and in the second, because of this, indeterminate in its claims about how philosophy must proceed. Transcendental approaches properly understood may provide a deeper picture of various theoretical and normative frameworks. Reflection upon the presuppositions of thought, action or communication need not be limited to a historicist reflexivity which is ultimately autodestructive. This preserves something that one might still wish to call epistemology, and which goes deeper than Rorty's concern for "when the bad guys take over".

In conclusion it might be worth reflecting upon a gulf between the so called "analytic" and "germanic" philosophical traditions. In a classic commentary on the work of Thomas Mann, Erich Heller brings to view the germanic obsession with "becoming". This is reflected for example in Nietzsche's concept of "destiny". Even Marx had claimed that

German philosophy is the ideal extension into the future of German history.
Naturally, the work of Hegel is the focal point for the concept of "becoming" (though some seeds for this are to be found in Kant's "regulative" account). The "analytic" tradition's appropriation of Hegelian historicist themes does not really import this deeper concept of "becoming". This separates Habermas's and Rorty's interpretations of Hegel. Habermas's thinking is still infused with that deep Germanic value attached to the notion of becoming, a notion that lies in the very structure of German language. Heller discerns the restlessness and commotion implicit in the concepts of "Wirklichkeit" (reality) and "wirkung" (effect).

I have referred at various junctures above to the concept of a "Gegenwartsdiaognose" in relation to Habermas and CT. According to Heller, "Gegenwart" cannot be identified with the English word "present". It is expressive of opposition and expectation.45

Thus, when one comes to measure Habermas's transcendentalism against "analytic" TAs, it is language itself, a "fidgety respect" for "becoming" and a mistrust of the stability of the present, that separate the two streams of thought. Naturally Rorty's concept of "conversation" will seem flatfooted from Habermas's point of view. Similarly, Habermas's concept of an "emancipatory interest" which lies in the structure of language, threatens empiricist sensibilities. Perhaps there are distinctive cultural and historical experiences associated with these deep differences. This would be an interesting point of departure for further research. Against Rorty's "world of books", the experiences that inform Habermas's concerns may derive from the situation of Mann's hero Tonio Krüger who, stands in melancholy bewilderment between his tradition and his emancipated consciousness, between a world without knowledge and a knowledge without world.46
FOOTNOTES
ABBREVIATIONS OF WORKS BY HABERMAS WHICH HAVE BEEN TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH


KHI  Knowledge and Human Interests (London: Heinemann 1972) translated J.J.Shapiro


TP  Theory and Practice (London: Heinemann 1974) translated J. Viertel

LC  Legitimation Crisis (London: Heinemann 1976) translated T.McCarthy

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PREFACE

1 See especially *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp 1981)


3 F. Schleiermacher *Hermeneutik* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter 1959) ed H. Kimmerle p 56

CHAPTER 1


2 M. Horkheimer and T. Adorno *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (New York: Herder & Herder 1972)

3 M. Horkheimer *Eclipse of Reason* (New York: Seabury Press 1974)

4 See D. Held Chapter 2

5 See J. Habermas *TRS* p 109

6 See E. Fromm *To Have or to Be?* (Jonathon Cape 1978)

Here instrumental reason is equated with "egoism" as such. The wide ranging character of some of the central concepts of Critical Theory has irritated many commentators.

7 See M. Horkheimer and T. Adorno "The Culture Industry: Enlightenment or Mass Deception" in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* pp 120-167

8 For example see T. Adorno *The Jargon of Authenticity* (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1973) translated K. Tarnowski and F. Will

The conflation of "levels" is most apparent here in Adorno's critique of Heidegger, against whom he claims that, "ontology" is the willingness to endorse a "heteronomous social order" exempted from the need for rational legitimation.

9 See J. Habermas *TRS* Chapter 6


11 J. Habermas *Postscript to KHI* p 352

12 J. Habermas Appendix to KHI pp 304-8

This is an instance of the wide notion of "positivism" understood by Habermas and the members of the Frankfurt School. Husserl, a critic of
naive realism par excellence, succumbs to a form of "objectivism" i.e. retains a "traditional" concept of theory.

13 J. Habermas Appendix to KHI p 313
14 J. Habermas Appendix to KHI p 312
Habermas reads Kant through "Husserlian" spectacles. Kant's "unity of apperception" cannot be regarded as a "transcendental subject" in a psychologically real sense.
15 J. Habermas TP p9
18 K.O. Apel p100
19 See G. Pitcher (ed) Truth (Englewood Cliff 1964)
20 J. Habermas Postscript to KHI p 361
21 J. Habermas Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaft (Frankfurt:Suhrkanp 1970) p 220 (Translated and reproduced in T. McCarthy op cit p 273)
22 J. Habermas "What is Universal Pragmatics?" in CES pp 1-68
23 J. Habermas "What is Universal Pragmatics?" p 68
24 J. Habermas TP p 18
25 Habermas does not make it clear that discourse by its very nature is presumed to be ideal. If it turns out that such conditions are not in fact realised we have only pseudo-consensus. Critics claim that not only could we never know that such ideal conditions were satisfied, but that even if they were not e.g. one participant is motivated by interest in a "theory" being accepted, it is not clear that such a theory could not be "true" though the ensuing consensus, in Habermas's terms, was not rational. Scientists very often are motivated by personal interest.
26 J. Habermas Postscript to KHI pp 362-3
28 P. Winch "Apel's "Transcendental Pragmatics"" in S.C. Brown Philosophical Disputes in the Social Sciences (Harvester 1979) p 65
CHAPTER 2

1 This is the real message of Gadamerian hermeneutics. It is not the case that anything goes; critical interpretations of texts and events are legitimate. However such "close reading" cannot aspire to an essentialist view.

"the only thing that characterises the arbitrariness of inappropriate foreknowledge is that it comes to nothing in the working out"

(Truth and Method (Sheed and Ward 1975) p 237)

2 R. Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Blackwell 1980)

3 At the end of the Second Meditation Descartes concludes:

"I thus clearly recognise that nothing is more easily or manifestly perceptible to me than my own mind"

4 There are of course other available strategies e.g. reductive behaviourist and phenomenalist arguments as well as the naturalisation of epistemology. Habermas's "socialisation" of epistemology resembles the latter in some respects.

5 This interpretation of Kant is rather artificial although it helps to locate transcendentalism. The Critique of Pure Reason is more plausibly read as a response to many of Leibnitz's claims which had themselves inspired the young Kant. See G. Buchdahl Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science (Blackwell 1969) Chapter VIII Section 1.

6 I. Kant Critique of Pure Reason (MacMillan 1958) Translated N. Kemp-Smith B xvii

7 Kant does not consider that synthetic a priori propositions may not be possible. One can contrive a dispute between Kant and Hume on this basis.

8 Once again, it is easy to overlook Kant's own pre-critical Leibnitzian phase where "God" functions as the "external" transcendental ground of the world. This function is relocated in Kant's"critical" phase where the significance of experience and human "sensibility" are developed.

9 Of course, there are many discernable "arguments". But I wish to stress the deep sense in which Kant's critical turn is prior to them.

10 Perhaps this is controversial. It is not at all clear that Wittgenstein's "private language argument" can be regarded as a TA. Rather, it denies the intelligibility of a distinction between "sensation words" and the mental entities such as ideas to which they "refer". Most crucially it denies that they derive their meaning by virtue of this reference. Meaning is socially determined. While there may be "inner goings-on", it is not these that are important in determining meaning. In Rorty's sense, Wittgenstein deconstructs the problem within which TAs are meaningful.

11 See J. Bennett Kant's Analytic (Cambridge University Press 1966) and P. Strawson The Bounds of Sense (London: Methuen 1966)
Perhaps it is significant that Kant never uses the phrase "transcendental argument" but talks of "explanation". 

P. Strawson Individuals (London: Methuen 1959) p 40


This implies that Kant wanted to legitimate talk of things-in-themselves, his idiom for metaphysical realism. We may conceive of them counterfactually as potential objects of the intellect, but Kant's programme is "empirically realist" (See G. Buchdahl "Reduction-Realisation: A Key to the Structure of Kant's Thought" Philosophical Topics Vol 12 No 2 pp 39-98)

I. Kant Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics Translated P.G. Lucas (Manchester University Press 1953) p 31 n (Ak IV 276 n)

See R. Walker Kant (Routledge and Kegan Paul 1978) Chapter II


R. Rorty "Transcendental Arguments Self-Reference and Pragmatism" p 82

M. Baum "Trascendental Proofs in the Critique of Pure Reason" in Bieri et al (eds) pp 3-25

However, this seems to be the most faithful reading of Kant's intentions. Buchdahl's interpretation dispels much obscurity in this respect.

I. Kant Critique of Pure Reason B129/130

R. Bittner "Transcendental Arguments, Synthetic and Analytic: Comment on Baum" in Bieri et al (eds) p 30

In Kant's case we might offer the following account: The transcendental orientation or perspective is to ask HOW X (the world/experience of the world) is possible. Now, this question only gets teeth if one already sets up the "epistemological language-game" as Rorty calls it. For instance, combination is interpreted as NOT coming through the "senses". The tough pragmatist claims that this is a "fix" (see R. Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature pp 152-3). The "actuality" of the world/experience is not in doubt unless interpreted in a philosophically specialist sense so why set up a requirement for an account of its possibility? What could be gained from such an enterprise? We do not even accept the question "How is X possible" unless we also accept much more concerning the structure of Faculties, the distinction between "concepts" and "intuitions" etc.. The whole project is self-defining.

An answer to these doubts may be possible. What Rorty fails to grasp is that the question of possibility is raised WITHIN the history of scientific practice. The most notable example of this kind was the issue of interpreting the phenomenon of "action-at-a-distance". Such interpretations had corresponding implications for the concepts of "matter", "space", "time", "force", "causation" and so on. Rather than being philosophical contrivances such questions arose within "normal" science itself. The general claims of
the Critique of Pure Reason are inspired by this level of questioning. Hesse regards these as "local reflections on the knowledge-industries of the time" and not necessarily identifiable with the search for perennial foundations (see "Epistemology without Foundations" (forthcoming)). Rorty's dismissal of epistemology fails to discern this reflective hermeneutic aspect of Kant's enterprise. The appeal to "normal discourse" will not help because, like Kuhn, Rorty imagines that such discourses are generated spontaneously without conflict, scepticism or reflection.

Thus Kant's general orientation may be regarded as part of the working out of specific issues in the science of the day. Buchdahl lays great stress upon the "levels" of Kant's thought. The most cogent reply to Rorty may come via an elucidation of Kant's claims in the "Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic" (A642/B670 ff) and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (Translated J. Ellington Boobs-Merrill Co. 1970).

See G. Buchdahl "Reduction-Realisation: A Key to the Structure of Kant's Thought" Appendix pp80ff.

In the context of Habermas's claims in KHI the raising of the question of "possibility" of various cognitive practices takes place in the face of analogous internal doubts about the "actuality" of social phenomena. This question is given a normative twist in the face of the hidden value-ladenness of positivist conceptions of social science. The pursuit of the critique of ideology at the level of epistemology is inspired by the veiled "interests" of such a practice. Habermas's programme is NOT descriptive. When he asks "How are the critical-emancipatory sciences possible?" the very givenness of such a form of science is in doubt. Apel and Habermas analyse "the normal discourse of Enlightenment rationalism - a discourse within which Rorty also situates himself" (Hesse op cit). But the "normality" of this discourse is extremely questionable. The critique of ideology and Habermas's transcendentalism go hand in hand.

25 J. Bennett "Analytic Transcendental Arguments" in Bieri et al (eds) pp 45-64
26 W.V.O. Quine "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" in From a Logical Point of View (New York: Harper Torchbooks 1963) pp 20-46
27 R. Bittner p 34
28 R. Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Blackwell 1980)
30 J. Bennett "Analytic Transcendental Arguments" pp 55-8
31 Bennett reconstructs Kant's "Refutation of Idealism" (B274-9) as the claim that anyone who has beliefs about his own past "inner states" must also apply "objectivity concepts".
32 I. Kant A789/B817
34 For example see R. Keat The Politics of Social Theory (Oxford, Blackwell

35 A.J. Ayer "The Concept of a Person" in The Concept of a Person and Other Essays (MacMillan 1963) pp 82-128

36 For example see D. Dennett, Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology (Harvester 1978)

37 B. Stroud "Transcendental Arguments" J. Phil 65 (1968) pp 241-56

38 J. Bennett "Analytic Transcendental Arguments" pp 61-2

39 This speculative remark is developed in later chapters. It is raised here in order to indicate a "distance" from the ideal of "analyticity" in TA appraisal. It has the consequence that the "practical" character of TAs, in Kant's sense of "practical", may come to the fore. (See Part III).

40 See J. Habermas Appendix to KHI pp 308-9 which draws explicitly upon Popper's account.

41 See M. Lessnoff "Technique, Critique and Social Science" in S.C. Brown (ed) Philosophical Disputes in the Social Sciences (Harvester 1979) pp 89-116


43 G. Patzig "Comment on Bennett" in Bieri et al (eds) p 73

44 J. Habermas KHI p 198

45 J. Habermas TRS p 106

46 J. Habermas "A Reply to My Critics" in J.B. Thompson and D. Held (eds) pp 219-283


48 J. Habermas KHI p 193

CHAPTER 3


2 W. Suchting "On Materialism" Radical Philosophy 31 pp 1-9

3 W. Suchting p 3

4 See V. Lenin Materialism and Empirico-Criticism Vol 14 of Collected Works (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House 1962)

5 W. Suchting p 3
For example, even Fichte's extreme form of Idealism conceptualises the "non-ego". From a materialist perspective this is thoroughly anaemic, though it is a necessary concession in order to avoid a phenomenologically suspect "generative idealism".

It is also interesting to note that Kant describes Berkeley's position as a form of "material idealism". This odd formulation is intended to set his own "transcendental" idealism apart. (B274). Kant regards Berkeley's position as inadequate because he fails to conceptualise that aspect of "being" which does not consist in "being perceived". Kant's notion of "transcendental matter", one formulation of his multivalent notion of the thing-in-itself, conceptualises the sheer "facticity" of experience. It might be argued that Berkeley secures this function for God's perception, though for Kant in his "critical" phase this is not a viable philosophical option. (see G. Buchdahl "Reduction-Realisation: a Key to the Structure of Kant's Thought" Philosophical Topics Vol 12 No 2 pp 39-98).

The general point of these reflections is to indicate a "material" sensitivity within idealist philosophy, a sensitivity motivated by the "descriptive" metaphysical need to preserve the phenomenology of experience.

See K.O. Apel Towards a Transformation of Philosophy Translated G. Adey and D. Frisby (Routledge and Kegan Paul 1980). In connection with this, I once heard Habermas described as a "Deweyian who can't forget he is german"! This implied distrust of all things transcendental is most dramatically expressed in Rorty's work - where Dewey is a hero.

For example, see J.B. Thompson Critical Hermeneutics (Cambridge University Press 1981) p 203


J. Habermas Appendix to KHI p 316

This is not an accurate interpretation of Kant. Kant's concept of the "synthetic unity of apperception", modelled on the "I think" that accompanies all representations in a consciousness, is not a pale conception of the empirical self. It operates at an entirely different level from the
latter. It articulates a (transcendental) logical unity. Problems of ego-identity in Habermas's sense are empirical concerns. See again G. Buchdahl op cit.

18 See J. Habermas "Moral Development and Ego Identity" in CES pp 69-94
19 J. Habermas Appendix to KHI pp 301-8
20 G. Kortian pp 85-6
21 G. Kortian p 32
22 G. Kortian p 89
23 J. Habermas KHI pp 35-6
24 J. Habermas TP p 114
25 G. Kortian p 89
26 J. Habermas "A Reply to My Critics" p 242
27 See G. Buchdahl esp pp 60-71
28 J. Habermas "A Reply to My Critics" pp 242-50
29 J. Habermas KHI p 36
30 J. Habermas KHI pp 37-42
31 G. Kortian p 92
32 J. Habermas KHI p 40
33 J. Habermas TP Chapter 4 esp. p 152

34 The romanticist edge to the conceptions of the "tool" and the "family" are noticeable and carry over into Habermas's claims. For example, the normative weight behind the category of "interaction" refers back to the notion of the "family". The latter is characterised less by consensus orientated action than by an ethical principle of reciprocal recognition. Thus while Habermas is highly resistant to romantic Marxism and the elevation of non-alienating relations with nature, romantic elements do underly his concepts of interaction and dialogue i.e. the "communicative" relationship between men.

35 G. Kortian p 99
36 G. Kortian p 98
37 G. Kortian p 99
At least, it is in the "Transcendental Analytic" of the Critique of Pure Reason. However, it must also be regarded as a philosophically specialist concept of experience. Rorty's remarks in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford Blackwell 1980) pp 149-50 are pertinent in this respect.

There is an excellent discussion of this "weakening" of the concept of constitution in W. Outhwaite Concept Formation in Social Science (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1983) pp 75-91.

However, following Bhaskar Outhwaite wants to defend a form of realism in social science despite the intimacy of this relation. It is a "realism" which depends upon Bhaskar's distinction between "transitive", theoretically constituted, and "intransitive", brutally real, objects. Objects of social science may be intransitive in a weaker sense than natural objects, since they are concept-dependent in a crucial sense of being "ontologically" constituted by the practices of social agents themselves. See Outhwaite pp 116-17.

The logic of Winch's arguments in The Idea of A Social Science (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1958) seem to force him in this extreme direction though he does not wish to embrace it.

See P. Winch op cit.


"Language" in this context is a general dimension of social interaction for Habermas. It is the sphere of symbolic and ritual practices. Thus, "Sprache" embodies praxiological, action orientated connotations.


H. Ottman p 91

H. Ottman p 91
CHAPTER 4

1 For example, Heidegger has been a source of dispute in this respect. See G. Steiner Heidegger (Fontana Modern Masters 1978) pp 11-12


4 For example, see Janik and S. Toulmin Wittgenstein's Vienna (Simon and Schuster 1973) which attacks the idea that the Tractatus is an unambiguously positivist treatise. He is interpreted as deeply intent upon preserving the sanctity of ethics. Far from being consigned to a realm of meaninglessness ethics is mystically elevated.

5 J. Habermas Appendix to KHI p 308

6 For example, see R.M. Hare Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Clarendon 1963) Chapter 3.

7 B. Fay in Social Theory and Political Practice (Allen & Unwin 1975) argues in a similar fashion.

8 R. Keat p 21

9 J. Habermas Postscript to KHI pp 353-4

10 J. Habermas "The Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics" in Adorno et al. pp 131-162


12 J. Habermas "The Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics" p 154

13 J. Habermas "The Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics" p 160

14 See Chapter 8 for a discussion of Habermas's critique of "decisionism".

15 J. Habermas "The Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics" p 162

16 This may be expressed as follows:
   "Built into dialectics is the theme of a continuous self-critique of philosophy in so far as it tends always to construct for itself a pure theoretical standpoint in abstraction from its own social..."
precondition and its subject matter"
(Radical Philosophy 14 - Introduction)
Adorno's "negative" dialectic takes this conception to an extreme, abandoning Hegel's notion of "determinate" negation.

17 J. Habermas Appendix to KHI p 305
18 G. Rose Hegel Contra Sociology (Athlone Press 1981) p 32
19 J. Habermas Appendix to KHI p 316
20 J. Habermas KHI p 75
21 J. Habermas KHI p 85
22 J. Habermas KHI p 94

23 Kant's classic statement of this runs as follows:
"Not every kind of knowledge a priori should be called transcendental but only that by which we know that - and how - certain representations (intuitions or concepts) can be employed or are possible purely a priori. The term "transcendental" that is to say signifies such knowledge as concerns the a priori possibility of knowledge or its a priori employment ..., what alone can be entitled transcendental is the knowledge that representations are not of empirical origin and the possibility that they can yet relate a priori to objects of experience"
(Critique of Pure Reason A56/B80)

Of course Habermas's "NeoKantianism" is a "weaker" version of this idealist position as we saw in Chapter 3.

24 J. Habermas KHI p 95

25 Peirce's formulation of this problem and his attempt to conceptualise the "ideal first", a posteriori, element of experience without implicating a discourse about things as they are in themselves anticipates a recent reconstruction of Kant's own position. In "Reduction-Realisation: A Key to the Structure of Kant's Thought" (Philosophical Topics Vol 12 no 2 pp 39-98) Buchdahl explores the multivalent character of Kant's conception of the thing-in-itself. Under one interpretation it is merely a counterfactual notion i.e. if we had intellectual intuition we could have cognitive access to "things as they are in themselves". However, since we are creatures of sensibility we can only know things qua "appearances". Nevertheless, this critical turn in Kant's thought cannot eradicate the need to characterise the "foreign" element of experience. In its most general (= reduced) sense this is given by the concept of "transcendental matter". This retains the positive function of the concept of the thing-in-itself not as some mysterious entity behind the scenes which affects us, but as a characterisation of the ultimate "bruteness" of experience. This is really a minimal "realist" claim. There is something that makes our sentences true and false, though we cannot isolate this, as the metaphysical realist demands, from our shifting conceptual frameworks.
Though it is open that particular canons of scientific method may be historically contingent.

However, Habermas is primarily interested in social evolution which begins with the advent of hominids. See "Towards a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism" in CES pp 130-138.

Habermas's distinction between action and discourse attempts to avoid the instrumentalist conception of theory that his position seems to imply.

Indeed Kant's regulative approach allows a solution to the antinomy between mechanist and teleologically orientated methodology. See G. Buchdahl Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science (Oxford: Blackwell 1969) Chapter VIII Section 4.


J. Habermas, *KHI* p 158

J. Habermas, *KHI* p 164

cf. Habermas's critique of the "abstractive fallacy" (Apel) in "What is Universal Pragmatics?" in *CES* p 5.

J. Habermas, *KHI* pp 165-6

J. Habermas, *CES* p 82

J. Habermas, *KHI* p 166

J. Habermas, *KHI* p 167

J. Habermas, *KHI* p 171

J. Habermas, *KHI* p 176 - a very Gadamerian formulation by Habermas.

J. Habermas, *KHI* p 179

J. Habermas, *KHI* p 193


J. Habermas, *KHI* p 193

J. Habermas, *KHI* p 195


S. Sayers, p 10

See Kant's "Second Analogy of Experience" (A189/B233 - A211/B256)

See Sayers p 11 and the example drawn from Wittgenstein's *Lectures and Conversations*


J. Habermas, Appendix to *KHI* p 310

K. Salleh, p 60

CHAPTER 5

2 R. Keat p 79
3 R. Keat p 82
4 See P. Osborne's review of Keat in Radical Philosophy no. 32 pp 29-31
5 J. Habermas KHI p 142

As I have already indicated, this is representative of the intentions of Habermas's reconstruction of historical materialism. See CES Chapter 4.

9 J.B. Thompson p 131
10 This is articulated as Habermas's notion of communication orientated towards understanding (Verstöndigungsorientierte Sprechhandlungen). It is impossible to ignore an aesthetic dimension to this notion, which may flow from Habermas's appropriation of Dilthey's neo-Kantianism. See W. Outhwaite Understanding Social Life (Allen and Unwin 1975) Chapter 3.
11 J. Habermas TP Chapter 4
12 J.B. Thompson p 132
13 J. Habermas TRS p 90
14 J. Habermas TRS p 105
15 J. Habermas TRS p 106
The use of the word "purpose" may be confusing here. Habermas objects to an interpretation of Nature qua subject. However, he does not object to certain forms of teleological and functional explanation which constitute in part the biological sciences. The latter are "objectivating" sciences of nature in Habermas's sense. Ottman's formulation implies a distinction between "mechanistic" and "teleological" methodological attitudes to nature. But Habermas's problem is not that of solving the antinomy between them. Purpose-for-itself is problematic for Habermas only when interpreted as ascribing subjectivity to nature.

20 J. Habermas TRS Chapter 6
21 J. Habermas Appendix to KHI p 308
22 M. Lessnoff "Technique, Critique and Social Science" in S.C. Brown (ed) Philosophical Disputes in the Social Sciences (Harvester 1979) pp 89-116
25 R. Bhaskar p 13
26 N. Stockman p 25
27 R. Bubner p 50
28 N. Lobknowicz "Interest and Objectivity" Phil. Soc. Sci. 2 (1972) pp 193-210
29 M.B. Hesse "Science and Objectivity" in Thompson and Held (eds) pp 101-6
30 J. Habermas and N. Luhmann Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie - Was leistet die Systemsforschung? (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1973) p 206
31 J. Habermas Postscript to KHI pp 367-9
32 J. Habermas Postscript to KHI p 367
33 J. Habermas Postscript to KHI p 369
34 J. Habermas Postscript to KHI p 370
35 However, the so called "smoothness" of the transition from "observation" to "expression" must not eliminate the function of an external natural world.
36 M.B. Hesse p 101
37 See KHI p 331 footnote 13
38 M.B. Hesse pp 101-6

39 In this sense truth as theoretical truth is not a necessary condition of survival. See M.B. Hesse pp 104-5.

40 J. Habermas "A Reply to my Critics" in Thompson and Held (eds) p 276

41 T. McCarthy The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas (Hutchison 1978) p 119

42 T. McCarthy p 121

43 J. Habermas "A Reply to My Critics" p 242

44 T. McCarthy pp 119-120

45 J. Habermas KHI p 286

46 J. Habermas "A Reply to My Critics" p 243

47 See especially M.B. Hesse pp 109-15

48 J. Habermas "A Reply to My Critics" p 246

49 J. Habermas "A Reply to My Critics" p 247

50 J. Habermas TP p 285

51 T. McCarthy p 403

52 C. Lenhardt "The Rise and Fall of Transcendental Anthropology" in Phil. Soc. Sci. 2 (1972) pp 231-46

53 C. Lenhardt p 238

54 A similar position to Lenhardt's in this respect is to be found in T. Overend "The Socialisation of Philosophy: Two Monistic Fallacies in Habermas's Critique of Knowledge" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (1977) pp 119-24

55 J. Habermas KHI p 196

56 M. Lessnoff p 93

57 See C. Buchdahl Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science (Oxford: Blackwell 1969) Chapters I and II.


59 J. Habermas KHI p 197

60 J. Habermas KHI p 197

61 I. Kant Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten translated H.J. Paton
The Moral Law (Hutchison 1948) Chapter 3

62 Quoted by Habermas in KHI pp 208-9
63 J. Habermas KHI p 211
64 G. Kortian Metacritique: The Philosophical Argument of Jürgen Habermas translated J. Raffan (Cambridge University Press 1980) p 76
66 T. McCarthy pp 97 ff
67 See T. McCarthy pp 91-110
68 G. Kortian p 70

CHAPTER 6

1 J. Habermas "What is Universal Pragmatics?" in CES p 21
2 J. Habermas "What is Universal Pragmatics?" p 21
3 J. Habermas "What is Universal Pragmatics?" p 23
4 J. Habermas "What is Universal Pragmatics?" p 24
5 J. Habermas "What is Universal Pragmatics?" p 24
6 G. Buchdahl supplies an interpretation of Kant which avoids implicating things-in-themselves as "entities" which "cause" appearances. See "Reduction-Realisation: A Key to the Structure of Kant's Thought" Philosophical Topics Vol 12 pp 39-98.
7 J. Habermas "What is Universal Pragmatics?" p 24-5
8 M.B. Hesse "Science and Objectivity" in J.B. Thompson and D. Held (eds) Habermas: Critical Debates pp 98-115
9 See G. Buchdahl pp 80-4 where the conceptual-explorative aspect of nomological science is one component of scientific theory within a Kantian interpretation.
10 J. Habermas "What is Universal Pragmatics?" p 9
12 See Chapter 2 where I claim that Bennett attempts to demystify "synthesis"
in a similar fashion.

13 However, Chomsky's reconstructive linguistics is also normative vis a vis our intuitions about grammaticality. Habermas's theory is normative in a stronger sense than this though implying a value orientated concept of "person".

14 J. Habermas "What is Universal Pragmatics?" p 13
15 J. Habermas "What is Universal Pragmatics?" p 14
16 J. Habermas "What is Universal Pragmatics?" p 14
17 See T. McCarthy "Rationality and Relativism: Habermas's overcoming of hermeneutics" in Thompson and Held (eds) pp 57-78
18 T. McCarthy p 58
19 See Chapter 9
20 R. Rorty Chapter V
21 J. Habermas "What is Universal Pragmatics?" p 19
22 T. McCarthy The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas (Hutchison 1978) p 357
23 Although not as a "patient" specifically but as a bearer of general competences.
25 J. Habermas KHI p 377
26 C. Nicholls "Habermas and Freud" Phil. Soc. Sci. 2 (1972) pp 261-270
28 See Chapters 8 and 9 for a fuller consideration of this assumption.
29 J. Habermas "On Systematically Distorted Communication" Inquiry Vol 13 1970 pp 205-18
30 J. Habermas Postscript to KHI p 379
32 M. Schmid p 175
33 A similar criticism is made of Popper and Lakatos's position in their "History of Science and its Rational Reconstructions" in Buck and Cohen (eds) Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol 8 (Reidel,


CHAPTER 7

2 I. Kant A682/B710
3 J. Habermas "Moral Development and Ego Identity" in CES p 70
4 I. Kant A685/B713
5 I. Kant A651/B679
6 I. Kant A695/B723
7 I. Kant A650/B678
8 More accurately, while Kant accepts that particular methodological maxims are conventionalist in some sense i.e. their heuristic value may be exhausted revealing them as optional choices; the regulative principle of the highest possible systematic unity, given by the idea of God, is not.
9 I. Kant A687-8/B715-6
10 I. Kant A699/B727
11 I. Kant A568/B596
12 I. Kant A568/B596
13 I. Kant A568/B596
14 I. Kant A569/B597
15 I. Kant A570/B598
16 I. Kant A570/B598
17 I. Kant A570/B598
18 H. Vaihinger The Philosophy of the "as if": A System of the Theoretical, Practical and Religious Fictions of Mankind (Kegan Paul 1935) translated c. K. Ogden
19 H. Vaihinger pp 85-90
20 H. Vaihinger p 125 ff
21 H. Vaihinger pp 48-9
22 H. Vaihinger p 176
23 I. Kant A804/B832 ff
24 H. Vaihinger p 293
26 I. Kant A654/B682 ff
27 L. Pearce Williams pp 8-9
28 J. Habermas Appendix to KHI p 313
29 H. Vaihinger p xli
30 H. Vaihinger p 159
32 Though the Naturphilosophen certainly could have done.
36 J. Habermas LC p 107
37 J. Habermas Postscript to KHI p 366
38 M.B. Hesse "Science and Objectivity" in J.B. Thompson and D. Held (eds) pp 98-115
40 However, this is in a deep sense still a commitment to discourse.
41 M.B. Hesse "Habermas's Consensus Theory of Truth" in Revolutions and Reconstructions (Harvester 1980) p 217
42 M.B. Hesse "Habermas's Consensus Theory of Truth" p 218
20 H. Vaihinger p 125 ff
21 H. Vaihinger pp 48-9
22 H. Vaihinger p 176
23 I. Kant A804/B832 ff
24 H. Vaihinger p 293
26 I. Kant A654/8682 ff
27 L. Pearce Williams pp 8-9
28 J. Habermas Appendix to KHI p 313
29 H. Vaihinger p xli
30 H. Vaihinger p 159
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36 J. Habermas LC p 107
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40 However, this is in a deep sense still a commitment to discourse.
41 M.B. Hesse "Habermas's Consensus Theory of Truth" in Revolutions and Reconstructions (Harvester 1980) p 217
42 M.B. Hesse "Habermas's Consensus Theory of Truth" p 218
CHAPTER 8

1 J. Habermas LC p 110
2 J. Habermas LC p 88
3 J. Habermas LC p 108
4 I. Kant Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten translated H.J. Paton The Moral Law (Hutchison 1948) Chapter 1
5 R.M. Hare Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Clarendon 1963) Chapter 9
7 J. Habermas TP p 150
8 J. Habermas TP p 150
9 T. McCarthy The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas (Hutchison 1978) p 326
10 J. Habermas LC p 110
11 M.B. Hesse "Habermas's Consensus Theory of Truth" in Revolutions and Reconstructions (Harvester 1980 ) p 225
12 J. Habermas "A Reply to My Critics" in Thompson and Held (eds) p 257
13 e.g. see M. Warnock Existentialist Ethics (MacMillan 1967)
14 J.O. Urmson The Emotive Theory of Ethics (Hutchison 1968)
15 e.g. see J.C.C. Smart in B.A.O. Williams and J.C.C. Smart Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge University Press 1973)
16 R.M. Hare Chapter 2
17 B. Williams "Ethical Consistency" in Problems of the Self (Cambridge University Press 1973) pp 166-86
19 J. Habermas "A Reply to My Critics" p 258
See the diagram given in McCarthy pp 344-5 which is a composite of Habermas's in "Moral Development and Ego Identity" pp 81, 83 and 89

27 J. Habermas "Moral Development and Ego Identity" p 85
28 J. Habermas "Moral Development and Ego Identity" p 90
29 J. Habermas "Moral Development and Ego Identity" p 93
30 J. Habermas "Moral Development and Ego Identity" p 93
31 T. McCarthy p 353
33 J. Habermas "A Reply to My Critics" p 261
34 S. Lukes p 138
35 J. Habermas TRS p 109
38 R. Dworkin "The Original Position" in N. Daniels (ed) pp 16-53
39 H. Ottman "Cognitive Interests and Self Reflection" in Thompson and Held (eds) p97
40 J. Habermas "A Reply to My Critics"

CHAPTER 9

1 P. Winch "Apel's Transcendental Pragmatics" in S.C. Brown (ed)
Philosophical Disputes in the Social Sciences (Harvester 1979) pp 51-73

2 P. Winch p 65

3 K-O Apel "Reply to Peter Winch" in S.C. Brown (ed) pp 74-86

4 A more radical and perhaps paradoxical formulation of this dialectical issue is suggested by the Derridean notion of "sous rature" or "under erasure". See Of Grammatology translated G.C. Spirak (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press 1976), translator's introduction for a "discussion".

5 K-O Apel p 78

6 Kant recognised this feature of philosophical proof. See Critique of Pure Reason A735/B764.


8 J. Habermas TP p 10

9 R. Geuss p 62

10 R. Geuss p 63

11 R. Geuss p 63


13 R. Geuss p 64

14 R. Geuss p 65

15 R. Geuss p 67

16 R. Geuss p 67

17 R. Geuss p 94

18 R. Geuss pp 78-9

19 R. Geuss p 85

20 See R. Bubner Modern German Philosophy translated E. Matthews (Cambridge University Press 1981)

21 R. Bubner p 73

22 R. Bubner p 77

23 R. Bubner pp 80-1

24 R. Bubner p 82
(313)


26 J. Habermas "A Reply to My Critics" p 253

27 J. Habermas "A Reply to My Critics" p 228

28 J. Habermas "A Reply to My Critics" p 238

29 R. Bubner p 86

30 T. Adorno Negative Dialektik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1966) p 397


32 P. Ricoeur p 79


34 I. Kant Critique of Pure Reason translated N. Kemp-Smith (MacMillan 1958) A701/B729 ff

35 P. Ricoeur p 87

36 P. Ricoeur p 88

37 For example, see the translator's introduction to J. Derrida Of Grammatology

38 I. Kant A644/B672


41 P. Ricoeur p 96


43 J. Whitebrook "The Problem of Nature in Habermas" Telos 40 (1979) p 51

44 K-O Apel quoted in R. Bubner p 84

45 J. Habermas KHI Chapter 11

46 R. Keat Chapter 4

47 R. Keat p 150
Habermas insists that level 4 is distinct from level 3.

For example see A. Giddens "Labour and Interaction" in Thompson and Held (eds) pp 149-161

CHAPTER 10


4 R. Rorty p 287


7 R. Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature p 311

8 R. Rorty "Transcendental Arguments, Self-Reference and Pragmatism" pp78-9

9 R. Schwartz "Richard Rorty: Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature" J. Phil. Vol XXX no. 1 p 65

10 In his review of Rorty's Consequences of Pragmatism, Williams traces the links between the style of analytic philosophy and scientific ideals of truth and rational accountability.

11 R. Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature p 372
(315)

12 R. Rorty p 316
13 R. Rorty p 321
14 R. Rorty p 360
15 R. Rorty p 362
16 R. Rorty p 363
17 R. Rorty p 378
18 J. Habermas KHI p 3
19 J. Habermas KHI p 4
20 R. Rorty p 383
21 R. Rorty p 381
22 See G. Buchdahl "Reduction-Realisation: A Key To the Structure of Kant's Thought" Philosophical Topics Vol 12 No. 2 pp 39-98
23 R. Rorty p 385
24 R. Rorty p 379
25 R. Rorty p 380
26 See J. McCarney "Edifying Discourses" in Radical Philosophy 32 p 4-7
27 R. Rorty p 381
28 J. McCarney p 7
29 R. Rorty p 389
30 R. Rorty p 389
31 R. Schwartz pp 64 ff
32 R. Rorty Consequences of Pragmatism (Essays 1972-80) (Harvester 1980)
33 B.A.O. Williams "Auto da Fe" N.Y. Review of books Vol XXX No. 7 (April 28 1983)
34 B.A.O. Williams p 34
35 R. Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature p 393
36 R. Rorty Consequences of Pragmatism p 208
These reflections upon the concept of "becoming" are at an extremely abstract level. For example, one might link Marxism and various forms of mystical and theological existentialism to it. While this is so broad as to be not very useful it raises the following question: Could it be said that at least some members of the Frankfurt School were profoundly disturbed by a spiritual malaise in modern capitalist society, yet were compelled to pursue this in the context of a "critique of ideology"? If so, it would create a tension that runs throughout their work - a tension between a regard for fairly evident material suffering and for less "visible" problems of the "spirit". This tension seems to exist in the work of Marcuse. I also believe it underlies Habermas's concept of ideal speech, as the problems discussed in Chapter 9 may indicate.
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