
**Abstract**

Resilience has gained substantial traction in international politics of late. This scholarship has sparked debates concerning the meaning of resilience and how scholar should go about studying it. Scholars attuned to Michel Foucault’s governmentality thesis argue that resilience is a product of contemporary neoliberalism and constitutes a strategy permitting states to abdicate responsibility in times of crisis. The overarching objective of this article is to tell a different socio-political story of the connections between resilience and international politics. In mapping International Relations scholars working on resilience, the gist of the argument presented here is that although resilience may be in some instances a neoliberal device for governance, it has a wider range of meanings as well. By setting out a different narrative of resilience, this article opens the possibility of an analysis that sees the emergence of resilience in international politics has holding great promise for renewing and deepening current International Relations debates, including securitization, international interventions, vulnerability, resistance, and the political use of myth.

**Philippe Bourbeau**
Department of Politics and International Studies
University of Cambridge
Cambridge, UK
pb623@cam.ac.uk
www.philippebourbeau.net
Introduction

A great deal has been written in the scholarly literature about the role of resilience in our social world. Several disciplines and fields of research, including psychology, child development, political geography, criminology, mental health theory, socio-ecological systems, and social work, have studied, delimited, criticized, and exalted a resilience approach.

Different disciplines have proposed different definitions and understandings of resilience. In psychology, resilience usually refers to the capacity of an individual to adapt positively after a traumatic event. Criminologists and social workers have proposed to ‘de-individualise’ resilience and to move away from the psychological understanding of resilience as a set of dispositional qualities; they defined resilience as a ‘dynamic process’ of positive adaptation in the face of significant adversity. From a quite different angle, geographers have employed resilience to describe how an ecosystem can cope with a change of state, return to a previous state, or maintain its function in the face of disturbances.

The definitions and understanding of resilience introduced by these scholars have been influential in the initial import of the concept into the domain of International Relations (IR). Although political science and IR scholarship have been almost completely absent from this vibrant discussion for many years, things have started to change lately. Scholars have employed resilience to describe the actions employed by individuals and groups in the face of economic liberalization, labour market reforms, and change in public service reforms (Yan Kong 2006, Ross Schneider 2008). Others have highlighted the utterly positive influence of resilience on individuals caught up in violent conflicts (Davies 2012, Williams 2013), while still others have underscored the role of resilience in counter-terrorism strategies, focusing on multifaceted efforts to improve preparedness in terms of psychological preparation and management infrastructure responses (Schoon 2006, Coaffee and Murakami Wood 2006). Yet another branch of scholarship has sought to understand resilience through its relationship with neoliberalism. One way to tackle this relationship is proposed by Peter A. Hall and Michèle Lamont (2013b) in their excellent edited volume, Social Resilience in a Neoliberal Era. The book offers a sweeping assessment of the consequences of neoliberalism for social, economic, and political life, and explores how social resilience has been developed and strengthened as a response to the challenges provoked by neoliberalism (Hall 1999, Pierson 1996).

This scholarship has sparked several debates concerning the usefulness of resilience in world politics and how scholars should go about studying it. Several factors have contributed to these debates: the infancy of the resilience research program; the mistaken belief that some IR scholars have ‘invented’ a new concept; the relative scarcity of empirical research applied specifically to IR.

At the same time as these issues are being explored, new terms of dispute are drawing a dividing line among IR scholars working with or on the concept of resilience. Scholars attuned to Michel Foucault’s governmentality thesis argue that resilience is a product of contemporary neoliberalism and constitutes a strategy permitting states to abdicate
responsibility in times of crisis. For these scholars, beneath resilience lurks a dehumanizing political agenda, the continuity of a state’s dominance, and a strategy for creating unequal regimes of power. In contrast to this particular view, the overarching objective of the present article is to tell a different socio-political story of the connections between resilience and international politics. The gist of the argument presented here is that, although resilience may be in some instances a neoliberal device for governance, it has a wider range of meanings as well. Reducing resilience to a neoliberal product limits more than it reveals in the context of international politics.

This article maps International Relations scholars who have employed resilience by defining resilience as the process of patterned adjustments adopted by a society or an individual in the face of endogenous or exogenous shocks. Whereas this definition cannot overcome all the critiques directed at the concept of resilience, it nonetheless takes an important step away from notions of dispositional qualities and equilibrium. This definition indeed assumes that the sources of change may be internal or external, and that the outcome of change is not necessarily a return to a previous state of affairs or mind. Instead of seeing resilience has a quality, a paradigm, or a theory for the study of world politics, resilience is here understood as an inherently dynamic and complex process. This definition also clarifies the question of to what an individual or a society is resilient. It postulates that disturbances or shocks are interpretative moments; they do not objectively exist “out there,” waiting to exercise influence. Agents have to interpret an event as disturbing for the event to become a disturbance. An event or a series of events may be interpreted as a profound disturbance by one individual/society and not by another. Likewise, similar event(s) might be seen as a shock by a particular individual/society at a given point in time and not at another point in time. In addition, this definition fosters an interdisciplinary dialogue between psychologists, criminologists, political geographers, and IR scholars – for it is hard to think about concepts such as resilience in anything other than an interdisciplinary way.

From this perspective, the article is structured as follows. In the next section, I reflect on previous scholarly contributions that analyze resilience by contending that the current engagement of IR with resilience presents an incomplete picture of our social world, thus failing to offer a convincing framework for the study of the interconnections between resilience and international politics. This incompleteness manifests itself on multiple fronts, including the failure of such analyses to take into account the negative aspect of resilience, the multi-scalar dimension of resilience, and the various forms and types of resilience. In the second section, I seek to bolster research on resilience by suggesting three core propositions – namely, that resilience has a dark and a bright side, that knowledge about resilience is contingent, and that resilience is a socio-historically informed, dynamic, and varied process. In the third section, I seek to highlight the series of questions and debates that my definition and these premises of resilience provide. I outline a terrain of debate between resilience and current IR fields of research such as securitization, international interventions, vulnerability, resistance, and mnemonic politics.
The meaning of resilience

The ubiquity of resilience across the broad social sciences spectrum is undisputable. Psychologists, criminologists, social workers, engineers, political geographers, sociologists, and, more recently, political scientists are all participating in multifaceted debates about resilience; various arguments, factors, and rationales have been offered to better understand and explain this phenomenon.

In recent decades, two disciplines have been particularly keen to engage with the world through the analytical lens of resilience. Psychologists were among the first scholars to seek to identify the dispositional qualities that allow an individual to recover from or adjust easily to misfortune, adversity, unease, conflict, failure, and/or change (Garmezy 1974, Rutter 1987, Seery, Holman et al. 2010). A large strand of this scholarship is aimed at uncovering the internal and external qualities of resilience that help certain people to positively adapt to profound adversity in a way that is substantially better than would have been expected given the circumstances (Bonanno 2004, Donnon and Hammond 2007). The works of British psychoanalyst John Bowlby (1969) and French psychiatrist Boris Cyrulnik (1999) have been instrumental in developing and popularizing the notion of resilience in psychology and beyond. The often-cited maxim of Friedrich Nietzsche (1888 [1998]) that “whatever does not kill me makes me stronger” aptly summarizes the conceptualisation of resilience currently prevailing in psychology literature.

Geographers have also been deeply involved in the study of resilience, albeit from a different angle. Researchers in this vein have focused their investigations on three points: (i) the question of persistence and change in natural ecosystems; (ii) the conditions specifying the maximum displacement a system can suffer while still being able to return to equilibrium once a disturbance has passed; (iii) the opportunities for re-organization and recombination that emerge from exposure to disturbances (Holling 1973, Berkes, Colding et al. 2003, Folke 2006, Pelling 2010).

The conceptualizations of resilience introduced by psychologists and political geographers have been influential in the initial import of the concept into the domain of world politics. Although IR is a latecomer to this field of research, in-depth engagement of IR with the concept of resilience has followed five paths.

First, scholars have connected resilience with global governance, highlighting resilience in the face of economic liberalization (Ross Schneider 2008, Pfister and Suter 1987), of globalization and labour market reforms (Yan Kong 2006), and of change in public service reforms (Clark 2002). References to resilience has been made in terms of erosion (or lack thereof) of sovereignty (Ansell and Weber 1999) and about NATO’s future in a post-Cold war era (Barany and Rauchhaus 2011), while others have employed the concept to describe Indonesia’s national security doctrine in the 1960s (Emmers 2009, Dewitt 1994, Acharya 1998). In the same lineage, resilience of authoritarian regimes to democratic pressures has been underscored (Nathan 2003, Gilley 2003, Slater 2003, Kamrava 1998, Case 2004, Byman and Lind 2010) and the resilience of nationalism in the face of regionalism has been studied.
(Dieckhoff and Jaffrelot 2004). Peter Hall (1999) has spoken about the resilience of social capital in Britain in light of the apparent erosion of social capital in the United States and Paul Pierson (1996) about the resilience of the welfare state (see also Lindbom and Rothstein 2006) in the face of challenges brought by neoliberalism. Resilience is here equated with the persistence and endurance of an institution, a social norm, or some similar phenomenon. While this scholarship has opened up a convincing space for underscoring the relevance of resilience in world politics, these studies have not sought to unpack or theorise the concept.

Second, resilience has made entries into IR through the sub-fields of international development, humanitarian aid and disaster reduction. Several scholars have underscored the positive impact of resilience on individuals and communities caught in the middle of wars, conflicts and chronic violence (Sendzimir, Reij et al. 2011, Goldstein 2011, Muggah and Savage 2012, Davies 2012). The United Nations, together with several international organizations and non-governmental organizations, has invoked resilience as a new organizing principle, the development of which is perceived as critical to preventing unacceptable levels of human suffering and reducing the costs of international emergency response. Some recent initiatives in which resilience has been a key factor include: the UN Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015; the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change special report (2012); the United Nations Development Programme on human resilience (2011); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development Platform for drought disaster resilience (2013); the Global Alliance for Resilience Partnership National Resilience template (2013); the UK Department of International Development programmatic paper ‘Defining Disaster Resilience’ (2011); the US AID Resilience Agenda and Global Alliance for Resilience (2011); the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation ‘Resilience Project’ (2011); the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency recent report (2012). However, this application of resilience to world politics ignores the fact that resilience is not always a desirable feature of social, political or economic life. Because the conceptualisation of resilience that these studies employ is based on notions of resilience developed in psychology, they display an a priori normative bias. These studies start with the premise that the disturbance (or shock) is inherently negative, and that resilience is about positive adaptation. Starting from this premise leads to an overarching acceptance that resilience is good and thus must be promoted. This bias has been transposed from psychology, a field in which resilience is often employed in discussions of an individual’s set of actions following instances of sexual abuse or severe psychological trauma. Being ‘resilient’ in these contexts is unequivocally a positive adaptation. Although this inclination makes sense in the field of psychology, it is important that our understanding of resilience in world politics remains normatively open and avoids any such analytical closure.

The third path through which resilience has gained substantial traction in IR of late is in studies on terrorism and counter-terrorism. Efforts to improve preparedness, especially at the community and local level, have intensified in the past decade, while emergency management infrastructure has become a top priority for several governments (Coaffee and Murakami Wood 2006, Vale and Campanella 2005, Kaufmann 2013, Aradau 2010). Government initiatives, White papers, and key security statements about resilience abound. In the UK, for example, resilience is a key component in the latest National Security Strategy (2010), where
it is argued that to make ‘a strong Britain in an age of uncertainty’ requires developing a ‘whole of government approach’; a central pillar of this approach is the development of domestic resilience in the face of terrorism. Very similar language, promoting ‘whole of government’ approaches and ‘domestic resilience’, is found in Canada as well. In June 2011, the Government of Canada announced the creation of the Kanishka Project – a five-year, $10M initiative that seeks to achieve a better understanding of effective policies and programs to counter terrorism and violent extremism. ‘Collective dynamics and resilience’ is one of the three themes at the centre of the project. The Government of Canada seeks to develop among its citizens the capacity to ‘react to inflammatory actions and events in ways that prevent further harm’ and, where possible, to emerge ‘better able to manage future similar stressors’. The UK and Canada are no exception: ‘resilience’ is now a part of key security statements for the United States (2010), France (2008, 2013), the Netherlands (2010), and Australia (2011). The main problem with this application of resilience is that it tends to interpret resilience as a static concept. Indeed, the incompleteness of this understanding reveals itself in the fact that it treats resilience as a binary notion. Resilience is seen as an all-or-nothing concept. A clear implication of this perspective is the absence of a multi-scalar conceptualisation of resilience. Such a perspective also eschews the question of types of resilience, thereby creating a disconnect between the complexity of the contemporary social world and the tools developed to make sense of that world.

Fourthly, an increasing number of IR scholars seek to understand resilience through its relationship with neoliberalism. Many sets of arguments have been proposed in this vein. Peter A. Hall and Michèle Lamont’s (2013b) edited volume offers a sweeping assessment of the consequences of neoliberalism for social, economic, and political life, and explores how communities, social groups, and nations sustain their well-being in the face of the challenges provoked by neoliberalism. Starting from an understanding of neoliberalism as an open-ended syncretic process, the authors employ the concept of social resilience to refer to “the capacity of groups of people bound together in an organization, class, racial group, community, or nation to sustain and advance their well-being in the faces of challenges to it… we conceptualize social resilience broadly to encompass the capacities of societies to cope with many kinds of challenges” (Hall and Lamont 2013a: 2). Of central importance is the capacity of individuals or groups to secure favourable outcomes under new circumstances and, if need be, by new means. According to Hall and Lamont, although states do not automatically operate as agents of social resilience, they are nonetheless important sources of social resilience during the neoliberal era.

From a different angle of analysis, Mark Duffield (2012) contends that the recent disillusionment with liberalism is a central factor in the emergence of resilience. For Duffield, resilience is a postmodernist technology that internalizes emergency within society and focuses upon the adaptation of the individual. As such, resilience “signals a deepening malaise within the liberal project” (2012: 487). David Chandler (2012) raises the stakes in arguing that the emergence of the resilience paradigm in the field of international intervention
illustrates a post-liberal world in the making. ¹ Resilience, Chandler argues, is about prevention, empowerment, and responsible agency, whereas liberalism works upon the assertion of the right of external sovereign agency. As such, resilience should not be seen merely as a transformation of liberalism, but as a rejection of it.

Other critical theory-attuned scholars have presented a more radical position on the resilience-liberalism nexus. Brad Evans and Julian Reid (2013) contend that, because resilience emphasizes risk to and care for the self, it is a form of reasoning that is fully compatible with the neoliberal model of economy. These authors understand resilience as a strategy for creating “contemporary regimes of power which hallmark vast inequalities in all human classifications.” Beneath resilience lurks a dehumanizing political agenda, argue Evans and Reid, because resilience distinguishes between those who have the ability and the power to secure themselves from risk and those “who are asked to live up to their responsibilities by accepting the conditions of their own vulnerability and asking not of the social” (Evans and Reid 2013: 14).

In fact, there seems to be a cottage-industry-in-the-making that argues that resilience is a by-product of neoliberal mode of governance. Seen in this light, resilience is lamentable. Several leading critical theorists deplore resilience as representative of the continuity of a state’s rationality, interest, and dominance (Dillon and Reid 2009, Lentzos and Rose 2009, Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2011, O’Malley 2010, Zebrowski 2013). Jonathan Joseph (2013a) proposes that resilience should be understood as part of a ‘neoliberal rationality of governance’ that places the burden of responsibility on the individual rather than on social institutions. As such, the idea of resilience supports both the organizational structure of advanced liberal societies and the idea of an individuated neoliberal subject. Resilience contributes to neoliberal ideology through its stress on preparedness, self-awareness, active citizenship and responsibility. Because on the one hand, resilience encourages the idea of active citizenship, whereby people take responsibility for their own social and economic well-being rather than relying on the state and, on the other hand, current governmental policies of resilience constitute a strategy for states to abdicate responsibility in crises, Joseph argues that resilience is best understood in the context of “rolling-out neoliberal governmentality.” Predicting that resilience “may well disappear as the language and techniques of governance change,” Joseph hopes “that communities around the world […] will continue to show a lack of interest in the idea of being resilient. Better still, they might even show an interest in a much more inspiring French word – resistance” (Joseph 2013b: 11).

However, I argue that by contending that resilience is in essence a product of neoliberal doctrine at the service of states these approaches to resilience do not sufficiently distance themselves from the discourses and practices of liberal democracies. They appear to make the

¹ It should be noted here that the jury is still very much out as to whether or not resilience should be considered a “paradigm”. However, since this is one of Chandler’s key arguments, I have preserved his use of “paradigm” in my discussion of his position. I thank one reviewer for recommending that I clarify my position on this issue. In fact, I have argued elsewhere that resiliencism constitutes a conceptual framework for understanding how continuity and transformations take place under various circumstances (Bourbeau 2013). However, that argument is not the focus of the present article.
mistake of equating a particular government’s use of resilience with the concept of resilience. In doing so, these scholars run the risk of reproducing what they seek to criticize, i.e. the intention and capacity of states to dictate the terms of debate and to define how a concept should be understood and employed. In fact, none of these scholars have so far argued for a different conceptualization of resilience than the one proposed (mainly) by the UK. Prominent figures have instead called for the demise and rejection of the concept altogether, as Joseph’s aforementioned comments illustrate.

While the strategy of highlighting the dangers of a particular aspect of resilience and using this aspect to damn the entire resilience project makes powerful polemic, it is a risky strategy at best. Either it runs the risk of suggesting that the vast literature on resilience across several disciplines is in fact only a subheading within the broader spectrum of political studies on (neo)liberalism and governmentality, or it suggests the rather daunting task of demonstrating that the improvements they offer are theoretically, analytically, and empirically more cogent.

Take Joseph’s suggestion that communities should opt for resistance over resilience. Such a suggestion invites the obvious question of resistance to what? How exactly would a community ‘resist’ a catastrophic natural event such as a tsunami? Should communities opt for resistance to state counterterrorism programs? To terrorism? To neoliberal governance or youth radicalization? These issues aside, the wish for communities to abandon the idea of resilience sits awkwardly in relation to the large body of psychology, criminology, social work, political geography, urban studies, and peace-building literature that underscores the positive aspects of resilience.

The idealistic position of seeing resilience as purely positive is as limiting as the cynical argument that considers only states’ abuse of resilience. While I do not dispute the call to reject certain particular applications of resilience within our socio-political world, it seems premature and unwarranted to reject the concept of resilience on that basis. In the end, contesting the UK’s (or any state’s) use of resilience while continuing to pursue research on resilience seems to be a promising approach. In fact, a central figure of resilience studies as applied to urban studies is moving in precisely this direction. Jon Coaffee—no ‘mainstream’, positivist, or idealist scholar by any account—has recently argued for a compromise, or a middle-ground position, in this regard. He contends (2013: 10) that “community resilience cannot simply be left to communities themselves but requires steering, not rowing, from state level in some form of collaborative alliance to be successful.”

The fifth path of IR engagement with resilience – which I call the golden mean path – proposes broader viewpoints on resilience and argues that any extensive evaluation of resilience and its relationship to contemporary world politics must look beyond the questionable instrumentalization of resilience by some governments to the complex and

---

2 As one reviewer points out, one might question whether these resilience programmes are really about counter-terrorism in the first place, and thus, resist these programmes on the basis that they are pretext for something different. I agree. But I think that, in this case, it is the instrumentalization of resilience by a particular government that is being (should be) resisted, rather than the concept of resilience itself.
The multifaceted application of resilience in world politics more broadly. I turn my attention to this fifth path in the next section.

The premises of resilience

Scholars have sought to elaborate on and explore three inter-related propositions about resilience and how to study it: (1) that resilience has a dark and a bright side, (2) that knowledge about resilience is contingent, and (3) that resilience is a socio-historically informed, dynamic, and varied process.

The first of these propositions postulates that resilience has both a dark and a bright side (Bourbeau 2013, Davies 2012). In contrast with some critical theorists who bracket (or politely neglect) the positive aspects of resilience, advocates of a resilience approach argue that a lack of *a priori* normative bias is key to understanding and explaining a wide range of international phenomena. This proposition is supported by several empirical studies. Indeed, vast swathes of literature suggest that, in many cases, resilient strategy has been a rather successful course of action. For instance, building resilient local communities has been identified as one of the best ways to reduce violence against civilians in contemporary war zones (Williams 2013). How the small nation of Québec has dealt with the challenges of neoliberalism suggests the image of a successful resilient society in economic, social, and cultural terms, and cases of positive resilience in Medellin, the second-largest city inolumbia, where the collective capacities of urban institutions were invigorated and urban violence tangibly reduced has been described (Bouchard 2013, Davies 2012). And examples of the resilience of individuals, communities and institutions abound in Carol Cohn’s (2012) most recent book, *Women and Wars*. At the same time, numerous studies have underscored the negative aspects of resilience. Cases of negative resilience in Johannesburg have been described where supposed security providers (both private and state-run) have become drivers of violence, and where violent entrepreneurs have gained effective control of the means of coercion. Similar conclusions are found in the case of Nairobi, Kenya (Muggah, Agevi et al. 2011, Davies 2012). Scholars have decried the policy of progressively putting the onus of prevention and preparation for disruptive shocks onto communities and individuals rather than the state, pointing out that this situation can lead to a state’s abdication of all responsibility for managing crises.

The second proposition asserts that knowledge about resilience is contingent. Scholars reject both the search for law-like generalizations and the possibility of gaining objective knowledge about the world on the basis that it is neither achievable nor desirable. Nevertheless, these scholars have not shied away from presenting contingent generalizations about aspects of resilience in world politics. That is, they present a set of arguments about resilience that they deem to be the best possible interpretation of the issue at hand. In fact, they yearn for confidence rather than absolute knowledge or certainty. For example, Ann Swidler (2013) contends that the provision of collective good by a local chief in the villages of Malawi illustrates the ways in which cultural meanings and repertoires contribute to a resilient institution. Similarly, others have highlighted the importance of local networks and systems of
knowledge in reducing violence against civilians in contemporary war zones, and the role of local religious leaders in forbidding sectarian attacks has been identified as a key factor for the development of resilience in a number of multi-ethnic neighbourhoods in Baghdad City (Carpenter 2012, 2014, Williams 2013). Yet, these authors do not argue that the expressions of resilience they have identified should be applied systematically across multiple cases, but they do stand firm on the contingent and limited generalizations they are making about resilience. Accepting the inherent limits imposed on our knowledge does render difficult – if not impossible – the development of a comprehensive theory of resilience, applicable across cases and times. However, for those inclined to fully embrace the complexity of the social world, this is precisely what makes resilience a particularly stimulating approach. A resilience approach also offers an alternative to atheoretical studies, which tend to define the object of research as the inescapable moment of interpretation and reject any possibility for limited, theoretically informed generalizations. By admitting that every claim is necessarily a partial interpretation of a complex world, we can foster an engagement with alternative explanations and interpretations, thereby cultivating a crucial vector of dialogue and debate.

The third proposition posits that resilience is a socio-historically informed, dynamic, and varied process. Scholars indeed argue that resilience does not take place in a vacuum, but draws on past experiences, collective memory and social history, as well as being depending upon the critical junctures\(^3\) at which agential powers decide to act (or not). This proposition suggests that how a society, a group, or an individual adjusts to a disturbance or a series of internal/external shocks is deeply influenced by past trajectories and decisions, that a particular understanding of an issue tends to get established at critical moments, and that, once set in motion, a chosen pathway is difficult to alter. This consensus notwithstanding, there are disagreements among scholars on how to label and problematize aspects of this proposition. Some scholars propose ‘cultural repertoire’ (Lamont, Welburn et al. 2013), ‘temporal regime of processuality’ (Juntunen and Hyvönen 2014), or ‘antecedent condition’ (Ancelovici 2013) while others embrace the general label ‘context’ (Bourbeau 2014b). This third proposition also advances that the meanings of the shocks and critical junctures in the face of which resilient strategies are elaborated are socially constructed. Endogenous and exogenous shocks are interpretative moments; agents must interpret these shocks as politically negative in order for them to become politically negative, and vice versa. Resilience, too, is constantly in flux. A society or a group may respond in a resilient manner to one type of shock but not to another, or may respond resiliently at one time in its history but not at another. Resilience is not a fixed attribute or an unchangeable characteristic of a society or an individual. Furthermore, resilience does not imply finality, as the process can never be fully completed; in fact, the process is inherently dynamic. The third proposition suggests that resilience does not express itself in a flat, stable, or variation-free way. Resilience is always a matter of degree; complete immunity to disturbances and shocks does not exist.

---

\(^3\) Commonly defined as “choice points that put countries (or other units) onto paths of development that track certain outcomes – as opposed to others – and that cannot be easily broken or reversed” (Mahoney 2001: 7), critical junctures are slowly making their way from comparative politics to IR scholarship (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, Capoccia and Keleman 2007, Collier and Collier 1991, Katzenelson 2003, Fioretos 2011, Bourbeau 2014a).
Opportunities and challenges of a resilience research agenda

Understanding resilience as a process of patterned adjustments adopted by a society, a group, or an individual in the face of endogenous or exogenous shocks and postulating the three premises aforementioned offer many kinds of added value and shed a new light on contemporary international politics. In what follows, I take few steps in suggesting ways of broadening and deepening research agendas around issues of security, international interventions, vulnerability, resistance, and mnemonic politics. These are but a few of the ways that could be explored further. The infancy of a resilience approach in IR only permits us to present a broad review of the existing works that have contributed to our understanding of these issues. Scholars have already started to make inroads into establishing the added value of a resilience approach to some of these issues, while considerable works remain to be done for other issues.

Securitization

As heated debates are unfolding concerning whether the process of securitization is inherently normatively positive (Browning and McDonald 2013, Floyd 2011, 2014, Hansen 2012), the agnostic position on analytical normativity advocated for in this article has particular utility for those studying the relationship between desecuritization, securitization, and resilience. In fact, resilience enters the IR fray in a much better ethical position in this regard than the Copenhagen School did (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998). Whereas the initial formulation presented by the Copenhagen School suggested that desecuritization is normatively better than securitization, the acceptance that resilience has a dark and a bright side encourages us to avoid adopting any hasty normative standpoint. By holding off on presenting a firm position until further research has been done, the dark-and-bright approach to resilience escapes the ethical problem identified by Browning and McDonald (2013) for critical security studies: the presentation of a precipitate set of normative preferences that turn out to be unsophisticated and ill-defined. Indeed, one wonders what the field of de-securitization research would look like today if the architects of the Copenhagen School had not inserted a footnote on desecuritization in their path-breaking 1998 book.

The premise that knowledge about resilience is contingent opens up other agendas in securitization research. One such agenda highlights that resilience, on some occasions, is a strategy used to contest a securitization that is deemed inappropriate and wrong (Balzacq 2014, Fjäder 2014). In this context, the securitization of an issue is the disturbance in the face of which a resilient strategy is deployed in order to challenge, counter, and debunk the dominant security-attuned reading of the issue at hand. The collective strategy is not to take the issue out of the security realm (i.e., to de-securitize it) but rather to build social and community resilience in the face of an increasingly securitized world. Cases of pandemic scares and disaster management have been investigated in an effort to better understand the role played by resilience in countering security practices (Aaltola 2014, Rogers 2014). None of these scholars are arguing that resilience is always employed to contest security, or that resilience only expresses itself when one is engaged in contestation. Nonetheless, by
emphasizing that resilience sometimes plays an important role in securitization dynamics, these scholars have introduced a hypothesis that should capture a great deal of attention for some years to come.

Yet, it is important that we also consider the role of resilience as a precursor to security – that is, as a process leading to and inducing security. Elsewhere I have developed the notion of resilience-as-maintenance to suggest one avenue by which resilience can induce security (Bourbeau 2013). Resilience-as-maintenance is characterized by an adaptation in which resources and energy are expended to maintain the status quo in the face of an exogenous shock. Re-affirmation of the value, benefit, and importance of the status quo will be made on several occasions. A society relying strongly on this type of resilience will deal with endogenous and exogenous shocks with rigidity and underscore the potentially negative transformative consequences that may be brought about by these events. Disturbances or shocks are not by definition problematic; they must be socially constructed as negative via dominant discourses. This inward-looking strategy, which aims at protecting the social cohesion of a society, gives agents the opportunity, if they are so inclined, to present a novel disturbance as a security threat that requires a strong and immediate response. Rhetoric and discursive powers will be deployed to portray the event as a problem, and practices will be implemented in response. Here, again, I do not make the case that resilience – or even resilience-as-maintenance – always induces securitization. My objective is not to propose a comprehensive theory of the link between resilience and securitization that is applicable across cases and times. Rather, I argue that resilience constitutes an excellent vector to be scrutinized in our quest for a better explanation for the fact that some issues become securitized and others do not.

The premise that resilience is a socio-historically informed process and resilience’s focus on critical junctures nicely complement current research on the issues of context, variation, and audiences in the securitization process. One of the leading sociological explanations of context-informed securitization focuses on distant and proximate contexts, an approach that highlights respectively the genre of interaction among participants and the macro-sociocultural inscriptions of securitizing practices (Balzacq 2011). Yet, scholars attuned to this approach have so far found it rather difficult to anchor their theoretical arguments within extensive empirical research. Moreover, this approach encounters a quandary when it seeks to explain change in contemporary security affairs. The approach makes a strong case for the enduring “security” characteristics of the social world, but less so for the sources of change and critical junctures. It has so far failed to produce guiding principles to make sense of key moments of change in the securitisation process, where actors step out of adopted boundaries and transcend the field of action in which they are normally engaged. By providing analytical axioms through which the “windows of opportunities” can be conceptually and empirically studied, resilience fruitfully connects the fuzzy and elusive notion of context with contemporary security policies. Focusing on critical junctures and path-dependence strengthens the ties between securitization research and the literature on self-reinforcing dynamics, the enduring consequences of history and legacy, and the importance of imprints left by social norms and culture. At the moment, arguments about these elements are scattered and dispersed throughout the literature on securitization. A resilience approach offers a
unifying analytical lens to better understand the nature and expressions of these elements in the securitization process.

Relatedly, scholars have argued that an important flaw in securitization research is that it does not take into account the scale or variation of securitization. By and large, scholars have studied whether an issue is securitised or not. The question of level, intensity, or variation of security is, by contrast, rather underdeveloped and under-theorised in the literature. Scholars distinguish between un-securitised and securitised issues, but once an issue enters the security realm, no further distinction is made. In other words, security is largely seen as a one-size-fits-all concept. Yet, it certainly seems important to consider whether, for example, security practices that relate to migration are more or less prevalent in one country vs. another, and in one time period vs. another. It also seems relevant to be able to determine whether migration is securitised to the same extent as, say, nuclear weapons. And if a given issue is “more” securitised than another issue, it also seems rather pertinent to be able to pinpoint the knowledge mechanisms through which we have arrived at this conclusion. Accepting a scalar understanding of resilience suggests that securitization, too, should be thought of in gradient terms. Indeed, the present view of resilience provides guidance for the development of hypotheses pursuing deeper insights into the question of variation in securitization. If we accept that the securitization process is first and foremost about the mutual constitution of security performances and social structures, then surely hypotheses put forward to make sense of variation must take into account societies’ processes of adjustment. The central question concerning the scale of securitization is not whether variation exists or not (clearly it does) nor whether this variation is objectively true or not. Rather, the question is how societies’ processes of adjustment to shocks and to particular security performances differ across time and across societies. Research on resilience has already started to make inroads into that question. David Chandler’s (2012) notion of a “continuum of resilience” provides guiding tools to help us better understand the contour of variation in levels of securitization. By breaking away from a binary understanding of resilience, this continuum-based approach forces securitization scholars to analyse in a scalar fashion how security performances are received, evaluated, and approved by audiences. Distinguishing, as I do, among three types of resilience – resilience as maintenance, as marginality, and as renewal – offers another avenue of research to better explain variation in securitization (Bourbeau 2011, 2013). In the context of international migration, my study suggests the following hypothesis: when dominant forces in a society manage to implement a resilience-as-maintenance approach, the outcome is a strong securitization of international migration; by contrast, if resilience-as-marginality is the preferred option, the outcome is a weak securitization.

Finally, juxtaposing securitization research with research on resilience provides a point of entry into the thorny issue of audiences in the securitization process. The question of the place, role, and nature of audiences in the securitization process has captured a significant amount of attention in the recent literature. Seminal contributions have proposed to conceptualize audiences as a vague unit of analysis that decides whether a securitization is successful (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998), that provides moral and formal support (Balzacq 2011) or that can be best understood with insights from Kingdon’s “three streams” model (Leonard and Kaunert 2011). These studies have considerably improved our understanding of
the significance of audiences in the securitization process. Yet, a consensus remains in the literature that the question of audiences is left under-theorized and/or under-specified in most models (or approaches) to securitization and that the documented empirical analysis of ‘audiences’ remains murky at best. A focus on resilience opens up new areas of research in this regard. Since resilience is a matter of degree, inasmuch as societies can be more or less resilient both diachronically and synchronically, a resilience approach seems well suited to further develop and understand some aspects of the question of audiences. A focus on resilience offers an analytical framework that (i) permits us to move away from an understanding of audiences as entities that ‘accept’ a given security speech act, (ii) traces the impact of both security performances and audiences’ adjustments on the development of a given policy response and on the contemporary social world, and (iii) permits investigation into the emergence of dominant patterns of representing (and adapting to) issues within a society. In other words, resilience broadens our understanding of the multi-directional relationship between agents’ security performances, societies’ processes of adaptation, and endogenous/exogenous shocks.

International interventions

Accepting that knowledge about resilience is contingent renders one of the most controversial arguments about resilience a tough sell. In a series of articles, David Chandler argues that the emergence of resilience in the field of state-building intervention should be seen as a rejection of liberalism rather than a mere transformation of it. The liberal internationalist paradigm puts the emphasis upon the agency of external interveners and away from the (local) societal level whereas the resilience paradigm puts “the agency of those most in need of assistance at the centre, stressing a programme of empowerment and capacity-building” (Chandler 2012: 216, 2014). This field is thus witnessing a shift away from the liberal internationalist paradigm and towards a resilience paradigm focusing on preventive intervention and empowerment of (local) agency.

However, replacing an often decried and encompassing paradigm (liberalism or neoliberalism) with another one (resilience) is highly problematic on multiples fronts. On the one hand, scholars will have to answer the series of challenges issued by Roland Paris (2010) if they want to position resilience as a solid contender to liberal peacebuilding. One of Paris’ (2010: 356) points is that scholars calling for the end of the liberal intervention paradigm should clearly explain “what kinds of peacebuilding they would find more acceptable or effective. […] Some responsibility therefore rests on individual authors to clarify their views on what, if anything, would constitute a better approach to peacebuilding.” Paris is careful not to present his set of challenges as a disguised attempt to squeeze critiques of the liberal interventionist framework within the confines of a single and dominant model of theory construction. In fact, he recognizes both the limits of the liberal interventionist model and the added value of critical theory-informed approaches in shedding new light on long-held assumptions and orthodoxies. “The peacebuilding literature need not, and should not,” argues Paris (2010: 362), “be limited to narrowly policy-oriented or ‘problem solving’ analyses.” If anything, these precautions only strengthen Paris’ point that scholars who want to present
alternative approaches have to move beyond their critique of the liberal interventionist model to apply their own perspective.

On the other hand, governmentality-attuned scholars have already criticized Chandler’s arguments, claiming that, although he is right to identify a paradigm shift away from a classical liberal framework, this shift is adequately described as neoliberalism and “to call it something else is to unintentionally reinforce neoliberal ideology by not calling things as they are” (Joseph 2013a: 44). If Joseph is right that a resilience approach to peacebuilding still embraces and promotes liberal values – albeit neoliberal ones – then Chandler’s claim that resilience is a new paradigm needs to be further substantiated.

In broader terms, we might question whether resilience is the new paradigm for all international interventions and for all involved coalition members. Were Turkey’s and Bulgaria’s involvements in the multi-state Libyan intervention coalition in 2011 made under the ‘paradigm’ of resilience? Is the ongoing intervention in Iraq (2014) about working “at the societal level, focusing on addressing the transformation of societal processes and understanding the ‘root causes’ of problems,” as resilience supposedly should be (Chandler 2013: 4)? There are reasons to believe that accepting the contingency of knowledge about resilience – rather than understanding resilience as a new and encompassing paradigm – offers some answers to these questions, and, incidentally, provides some leverage concerning the role and limit of resilience in that field of research.

Jennifer Milliken (2013) in her report of a 2012-workshop of the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform speaks to these issues. While she is careful not to overplay the added value of resilience, she argues that there are at least four reasons why resilience provides a worthwhile research agenda for the peacebuilding community. First, resilience is a fundamental reminder that successful conflict prevention is not an externally engineered process but must include local communities. Second, resilience put at the forefront of the political agenda the notion of prevention. Third, resilience highlights local actors’ strengths rather than their weaknesses. Fourth, resilience provides practitioners and decision policy-makers some guiding principles in their evaluation of a community’s responses to crises and disturbances. Overall, regardless of the capacity of scholars to mount a powerful competing paradigm to liberal interventionism, the fact remains that the triangular debate between governmentalists, resilience-attuned scholars, and liberals is likely to capture a great deal of attention in the next few years in this dynamic field of research.

Parallel to these developments, the broad field of conflict analysis continues to offer a high-yielding source of resilience studies. Descriptions of instances of resilience at both the individual and the societal level abound in specialized journals and beyond (Cudworth 2013, Davies 2012, Ryan 2012). Ami Carpenter, for example, has recently studied with great insights the patterns of adjustments of individuals and communities with conflict escalation in 10 Baghdad’s neighbourhoods. She founds that “short-term prevention of immediate violence and long-term efforts to reduce underlying issues that produce large-scale conflicts” are situated conceptually within the confines of resilience (Carpenter 2014: 5, 2012). Maria Buchanan and her colleagues (2007, 2013) analyzed how Columbian child soldiers who were exposed to and have experienced armed combat but that did not exhibit trauma-related
symptoms dealt with the effects of war. These children did not identify as soldier or combatant any longer; a univocal step in the resolution of conflicts. Buchanan et al. identify these children’s patterns of adjustment as expression of resilience just as Jacqueline McAdam (2013) regards the pattern of survival of children from zones of conflict in Africa as resilience and as Christian Karner and David Parker (2011) have documented that resilience is a critical factor in the peaceful relationship among ethnic communities in the Alum Rock area of Birmingham, UK. These scholars do not offer law-like generalizations about the role of resilience. On the contrary, they go to great lengths to circumscribe their arguments to contexts such as a few neighbourhoods in Bagdad, some Columbian child soldiers, and one inner-city suburb of a single UK city. These detailed cases-studies are crucial for the development of the resilience research agenda. Yet, deeper theorization of resilience can help these narratives organize their findings and observations into a cogent analytical framework. It would also fence this research off from criticisms that the lack of an analytical framework for resilience studies means that little cumulative knowledge about the mechanisms or the implications of resilience is gained. The approach offered in this article provides useful guiding principles that are flexible enough to welcome ethnographic and cases-oriented studies about expressions of resilience in world politics and analytical enough to permit contingent generalization and dialogue with alternative explanations.

**Inter-conceptual dialogue**

Taken together, the aforementioned core propositions offer the foundation for fruitful inter-conceptual dialogue and debate. Three notions spring to mind: vulnerability, resistance, and memory/myths.

Understanding resilience as a varied process offers a promising point of entry into a better understanding of the concept of vulnerability. The link between resilience and vulnerability is no doubt complex and defies simple delineation. For feminist philosopher Robin May Schott (2013: 211), the concept of resilience contributes to “marginalisation” and to the “complete displacement” of the concept of the victim, as resilience “provides a framework of understanding in which vulnerable subjects must train to be adaptable.” She argues that the new security paradigm that constitutes resilience thinks in terms of “vulnerable subjects who need to overcome their own obstacles.” A fundamental limit of the concept of resilience, according to May Schott (2013: 212), is that it asserts that “vulnerability must be overcome in order to become a resilient subject.” In the same lineage, Evans and Reid (2013: 14) decry the fact that the underlying ontology of resilience is vulnerability. They claim that this is a neoliberal regulation technique that distinguishes unfairly between “those who have the ability to secure themselves from risk and those who are asked to live up to their responsibilities by accepting the conditions of their own vulnerability and asking not of the social.” Other scholars in this same vein argue that the shift from vulnerability studies to resilience is a shift of interests that leaves the poor and vulnerable behind (Cannon and Müller-Mahn 2010). In sharp contrast to these viewpoints, a second group of scholars argue that resilience is actually a solution to vulnerability itself, one of the major obstacles to social and economic development. Because resilient strategies give greater agency and voice to
vulnerable people and local communities, resilience is seen as a promising avenue to achieve sustainable poverty reduction, to circumscribe the power of police forces when they have become exploiters of citizen vulnerabilities, and to reduce violence against civilians in war zones (Williams 2013, Davies 2012). Others contend that the added value of resilience is not that it tries to reduce vulnerability but rather that it embraces, recognizes, and appreciates vulnerability, thereby accepting not only that vulnerability cannot be overcome but also that it is a reality of human existence. Resilience only makes sense if we acknowledge and accept that we are (potentially) vulnerable. A third group of scholars have resisted viewing the relationship between resilience and vulnerability in these dichotomised black-and-white ways. For these scholars, the danger is not that, in building resilience, vulnerability gets ignored, as May Schott and others contend; rather, the danger is that a focus on resilience comes at the expense of an analysis of the causes of inequality, injustice, power discrepancies, and vulnerability in the first place, factors that are particularly important while the number of people facing poverty, violence, and protracted conflicts keeps increasing. Building resilience does not negate our concern with vulnerability, nor does it force a complete displacement (or a virtual disappearance) of the concept of vulnerability, as long as the development of the capacity of individuals/groups to adjust to shocks is not the only strategy (Hillier and Castillo 2013, Warner 2013, Ahrens and Rudolph 2006, Walklate 2011). In short, resilience is neither a one-size-fit-all solution to vulnerability nor a buzzword wiping vulnerability off of our social map. Yet, the jury is still very much out on whether resilience negates or reduces vulnerability. In the end, this is exactly the sort of friendly disagreement that will enliven further resilience research.

Accepting that resilience has a wider meaning than a mere product of neoliberal governance strategy opens up new research directions for studies of resistance. One way to understand the relationship between resilience and resistance is to frame each of them within the rubric of security and hypothesises them as strategies for contesting a securitization that is deemed inappropriate (Balzacq 2014). The assumption here is that resistance and resilience can be brought together in a study about how security is politically debunk and contested since they are not inherently competing concepts, for it is not clear that the two are mutually exclusive. In broader terms, I think it is worth asking whether both resilience and resistance can be useful tools to gain a better understanding of some features of world politics. After all, a society might seek to respond with resilience to a particular type of event (e.g. natural disasters) and with resistance to another (e.g. globalization) at the same time, without perceiving the two processes as leading to competition or collision. Yet, other scholars utterly disagree and see little added value of juxtaposing resilience with resistance. Tackling the interconnection between resilience and resistance from the premise that they are competing concepts, some have argued that resilience is being encapsulated in a neoliberal strategy of domination, and not resistance (Joseph 2013b). Because resilience is best understood in the context of “rolling-out neoliberal governmentality”, it is to be hoped, argues Joseph, that societies will not be tempted by resilience and adopt, instead, a position of resistance. Yet, this begs the questions of why oppose resilience with resistance, and why understand these two concepts as opposing and competing view? In sharp contrast with this “competing” premise, I contend that resilience is a condition of resistance. Indeed, chances are that one
might need to display a considerable level of resilience when engaged in resistance, as resistance is an extremely high-demanding course of actions. Not only resistance will often necessitate several months, years, or even decades of struggle, but resistance also comes with multiple setbacks, small and not-so-small gains, and minor hurdles and more significant obstacles. Resistance is a path paved with disturbances and shocks. In short, to resist – and especially to resist one of the most powerful political organizations in the history of humankind (i.e. the state) – is not an easy course of action, and it is one that is calling for resilience to ensure its continuity. Instead of being simply annoying noise in the ears of resistance, resilience might in fact be a crucial vector for explaining why some resistance movements manage to persevere despite heavy hurdles and setbacks, while others do not.

Defining resilience as the process of pattern adjustments adopted by a society, a group, or an individual in the face of endogenous or exogenous shocks and accepting that resilience draws on past experience and collective memory provides fertile grounds to complement the literature on the socio-political use of memory and myths. The literature on mnemonic politics is vast and complex – see Duncan Bell’s (2009) excellent article – with numerous strands and focal points. But resilience studies can speak to at least two of these strands: traumatic memory studies and myths. To be sure, resilience studies and traumatic memory studies share many premises. Traumatic memory studies emphasise, as resilience studies do, a turning point, a critical juncture, a before-and-after sequence (Cohen, Meek et al. 2010). Both literature sees aspects of a traumatic event as being socially constructed, i.e., the event’s components (or the event itself), the positive/negative consequences of the events, and the meaning and significance of the event are interpretative moments (Alexander 2004). Furthermore, trauma scholars have shown, just as resilience scholars have, that governments are on some occasions impressively quick to seize the opportunity “offered” by an event to impose a particular narrative of the origins, meanings, and implications of the traumatic event, thereby instrumentalizing both the event and its social/collective meaning (Edkins 2003). Yet, students of traumatic memory studies are still struggling with many difficult questions associated with the memory-violence nexus, including, first, the reasons why some disturbances have a kindling effect while others do not, and second, why some patterns of adjustment to trauma induce conflicts and others act as a damper on violence. Understanding resilience in processual and scalar terms and distinguishing among three types of resilience – resilience as maintenance, as marginality, and as renewal – opens up new vectors of inquiry into these questions (Bourbeau 2013). Resilience as maintenance, in particular, suggests one avenue to better understand the social mechanisms by which the political use of traumatic memory induces violence. Resilience as maintenance is characterized by an adjustments in which resources and energy are expended to maintain the status quo in the face of an exogenous shock. Re-affirmation of the value and merit of the status quo is made repeatedly. A society relying on this type of resilience deals with endogenous/exogenous shocks with rigidity and anxiety. A resilience-as-maintenance strategy, which aims at protecting the social

---

4 This is not to argue that traumatic events are not a “real” or that they have been “imagined”. Rather, the argument is that the importance and the consequences of a social trauma such as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, are processual and often politically charged.
cohesion of a society, underscores the negative transformative consequences that are brought about by shocks. This inward-looking strategy gives agents the opportunity, if they are so inclined, to present a novel disturbance as a threat that requires moving into conflicts. As such, scholars of traumatic memory studies might find it useful to expand the tool kit provided by their literature when examining how societies/individuals navigate, facilitate, or limit the impacts (and especially the violent impacts) of traumatic events or disturbances.

Accepting not only the profound influence of past experience on a society’s pattern of adjustment to shocks, but also the difficulty in altering a chosen pathway once set in motion, provides an interesting lens to improve our understanding of the role of myths in global politics. Seen in this lineage, a focus on resilience offers a unique complement to symbolic politic theory in the study of ethnic civil wars. Postulating that a myth-symbol complex is what primarily defined a group, the symbolic-politic theory contends that people respond to the most emotionally potent symbol evoked. Political agents motivate fellow citizens to respond in a particular way by using these symbols to evoke a broad range of emotions (Kaufman 2011, 2001). A resilience approach can shed new light on why particular sets of actions based on a myth-symbol complex are reproduced over time and become enduring patterns of adjustment. The central hypothesis in the field is currently that myths and collective imaginaries often stand in a mutually reinforcing relationship with policies promoting resilience (Bouchard 2013, Lamont, Welburn et al. 2013). Whereas myths and symbols are the anchoring devices by which agents convince other citizens of the validity of their own interpretation of a particular event, resilience may be the key vector to explain how a particular understanding can gain an enduring logic of its own, thereby contributing to a better understanding of the seeming endlessness and intractability of a conflict.

**Conclusion**

In this article, I have discussed and explored the potential of a resilience approach to international politics. I first demonstrated that current studies of resilience fail to offer a convincing framework for the study of resilience in world politics. This failure led me to develop, in the second section, a particular definition of resilience, and to identify three core propositions. I then argued that the emergence of resilience in world politics holds great promise for renewing current IR research agendas, for opening up exciting new avenues of research, and for spurring inter-conceptual conversations.

This is an opportune moment to better theorize the relationship between resilience and world politics. What was an exclusive expertise of psychology and political geography two decades ago has now made its way into other disciplines, including IR. Right from the start, resilience studies in IR have shown theoretical diversity, thereby demonstrating a sign of the intellectual health of this new field of research. This article has reflected on the challenges and enticing opportunities of applying resilience to IR questions, and has offered several suggestions for unpacking the relationship between resilience and other key concepts.

If the emergence of resilience in the social sciences is hard to miss these days, so too are the polarizing remarks that the prominence of resilience has provoked. I have sought to cut
through these conflicting viewpoints to offer a balanced set of arguments about resilience and its promises for future scholarship. In proposing a particular theorization of resilience, I have endeavored to engage with the perspectives of many different scholars. To those who see resilience as a panacea for all the challenges that world politics brings, I have exhorted them not to ignore the dark side of resilience. To those who find in resilience a concept that encapsulates the realities of people ‘on the ground’, I have encouraged them to further theorize resilience. To those who see resilience as merely a trendy (and empty) concept that soon will fade away, I have urged them to appreciate that disciplines other than political science and IR have been working with this concept for more than five decades. Finally, to those who condemn resilience as solely an illustration of the extent to which the neoliberal doctrine has contaminated every aspect of our social life, I have invited them to adopt a wider understanding of resilience.


