Enclaves, borders, and everyday movements:
Palestinian marginal mobility in East Jerusalem

Abstract

Jerusalem might be considered an enclave city *par excellence*: Israeli settlements in the Palestinian east of the city enjoy higher levels of services and are connected through infrastructures that immobilise those in Palestinian neighbourhoods. At the same time, Palestinian neighbourhoods have become exclaves of the city since the construction of the Separation Barrier. Beyond the top-down view of ethnically-based residential segregation, however, attention to quotidian movements reveals the practices through which the borders of enclaves are undermined and reinforced. Palestinians move through and into exclusively Jewish spaces, strategically making use of their amenities, while utilising the spatial autonomy of marginalised Palestinian areas. As borders are reinforced from above and below in times of political tension, they also attempt to disrupt Israeli intrusions into their enclaves. By showing how the quotidian practices of marginalised residents continually undermine and re-make intra-urban borders, the mobility-based perspective adds valuable nuances to the understanding of Jerusalem as an enclave city.

Keywords: Jerusalem, enclaves, mobility, borders, marginality, exclusion

Introduction

In Jerusalem, where most neighbourhoods are divided along ethno-national lines, Palestinian neighbourhoods are underserved by the municipality, while Israeli settlements in their midst enjoy a much higher level of amenities. Segregated infrastructures fragment urban space and entrench socio-spatial divisions. From this perspective, the city appears to fit neatly into prevalent understandings of processes of exclusion in enclave cities, according to which dominant groups construct gated enclaves to shield themselves from the marginalised. This paper argues, however, that if urban segregation is examined through the lens of people’s movements rather than merely static residential patterns, new perspectives open up which permit the agency of marginalised residents to become visible and allow us to understand how enclaves are both undermined and reinforced through quotidian practices.
In this article I seek to answer the following questions in the context of Palestinian everyday mobility in Jerusalem: How does movement across segregated urban space affect the borders of enclaves, in the short and long term? When and how are enclave borders reinforced? And how does paying attention to mobility alter the picture presented by an analysis solely based on residential segregation? Jerusalem presents an excellent case study for examining these issues, as it constitutes an extreme example of urban segregation due to its clearly defined residential enclaves reinforced by a history of ethnic division and ongoing institutionalised exclusion. The Jerusalem light rail (JLR), which began operating in 2011, serves as a particularly salient case study as it is the first mode of public transportation to connect Israeli settlements and Palestinian neighbourhoods, thus de-segregating public transport in some areas. I focus here on the enclaves of Israeli-occupied East Jerusalem and its immediate hinterland, forgoing a discussion of enclaves within the west of the city (cf. Hasson, 2001).

A short description of the methods and theoretical approach used is followed by a review of the literature and an outline of the local manifestations of ‘enclave urbanism’. The argument of the empirical section consists of two main parts. In the first, I show how Palestinians cross Israeli-imposed boundaries to maintain severed urban linkages, how embodied practices can contribute to a sense of freedom of movement despite these restrictions, and how Palestinians move through (and into) Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem to gain access to resources denied to Palestinian neighbourhoods. In the second section, I argue that Palestinians make use of the relative autonomy afforded by exclusionary exclaes created by the Separation Barrier.1 I examine Palestinian reactions to what is perceived as Israeli infringement on Palestinian space by way of the light rail, reading their restriction of Israeli mobility as part of a broader struggle over the control of space. Finally, I show how borders are reinforced by both voluntary and enforced limitation of movement across enclaves in times of heightened tension. I conclude that enclaves are not static, but are consistently undermined and re-made through quotidian practices. The mobility-based perspective thus adds valuable nuances to the understanding of Jerusalem as an enclave city, and may help us rethink internal divisions in less conflict-prone cities as well.

1 As the Barrier takes the form of a concrete wall of up to nine meters in height in the urban areas discussed, I use the terms ‘Wall’ and ‘Barrier’ interchangeably here.
Methodological and theoretical approach

This article relies primarily on data collected in 146 semi-structured interviews and follow-up conversations, the majority of which were conducted between July and September 2013, and between June and September 2014 and 2015 -- periods during which the prevailing levels of tension in Jerusalem fluctuated strongly. Of the Palestinian respondents, residents of and commuters to East Jerusalem were the primary target group (31% of the total, 56% of them female); in interviewing them, I frequently employed a ‘go-along’ approach (Kusenbach, 2003). Other respondents included transport company managers and employees, including drivers (15%), NGO representatives and researchers (13%), community leaders and local officials (5%) as well as national government officials and planners (3%). Israeli respondents included NGO representatives and researchers (12%), municipal officials and planners (8%), officials and consultants of the Jerusalem Transportation Master Plan (JTMT) and light rail project (8%) as well as residents of West Jerusalem (3%). I carried out extensive on-site visits, participant observation on various forms of public transport and visual research in the form of photographing, filming and mapping sites and movements. Due to the sensitive nature of Palestinians’ status in East Jerusalem, I use pseudonyms for these respondents.

While the role of infrastructures in enforcing the division of Jerusalem has been explored taking the top-down view of planning, the politics of Palestinian mobility within East Jerusalem have not been sufficiently examined from a bottom-up perspective. This approach may permit us to nuance the picture of urban enclave life. Accordingly, the ‘people-based’ approach (Kwan, 2009) taken here, insists on the political importance of the everyday in shaping urban space through routine activities, including tactics that subtly resist power by seizing opportunities (de Certeau, 1984). Rather than only through policy, cities are also shaped by the activities of their residents, even the most marginalised. Such reshaping, achieved through incremental changes to the usage of spaces, has been called the ‘quiet encroachment of the ordinary’ (Bayat, 2009). The need for attention to mobility across borders is grounded in the understanding that space is not static or frozen in time, but is made up of a multiplicity of trajectories (Massey, 2005), which are in themselves worth exploring. As much as by static enclaves, the lives and identities of city dwellers are shaped by circulations which enable encounters between different groups (Jensen, 2009). Following from Simmel’s notion that a border ‘is not a spatial fact with sociological consequences, but a sociological fact that forms itself spatially’ (1997: 143), I conceptualise intra-urban borders not as a given, but as products of ongoing processes of reinforcement and subversion through everyday
actions which co-constitute the physical reality of the border. In a contested space such as Jerusalem, both top-down interventions and everyday acts are often based on the attempt to create or maintain ethnically homogenous enclaves, what Sibley (1995) terms the ‘purification of space’. As conflict in Jerusalem (as well as its potential resolution) is often conceived of from a bird’s-eye view (Geneva Accord, 2009: 111), understanding socio-spatial dynamics through everyday interactions at street level is important for gaining an understanding of the lived city.

_Urban enclaves and the mobility gap underpinning them_

While ethnically-based segregation is by no means a new phenomenon in cities (Nightingale, 2012), the urban studies literature in recent decades has paid particular attention to class-based segregation in line with the worldwide neoliberal turn (Castells, 1996; Davis, 2007). As privatised service provision has replaced the integrated ‘modern infrastructural ideal’ of public urban amenities, homogenous and securitised quarters emerged at the expense of shared public spaces (Graham and Marvin, 2001). Enclaves are often subject to special governance regimes and access restrictions – their etymological root in the Latin word *clavis* (‘key’) points to the fact that their closed-off perimeter is a defining aspect. Thus, the emergence of affluent gated communities alongside marginal areas is understood to have created new forms of inclusion and exclusion in the postindustrial city (Douglass et al., 2012). Enclave urbanism is not merely an expression of inequality, but also reproduces it – for instance, when securitised gated communities cause a decrease in security for those living outside the enclaves (Kaker, 2014). The overarching narrative of this new form of ‘enclave urbanism’ is thus often ‘alarmist’ in that it links enclaves to the decline of both the public realm and the socially diverse yet coherent city (Wissink, 2013).

Despite the recent ‘mobilities turn’ (Urry, 2007; Sheller, 2004), the literature on urban segregation and enclaves has not paid sufficient attention to activities and mobilities, focusing its analysis mainly on residential patterns (Kwan, 2009, 2013). The role of mobility is mainly understood in the context of unequal access to infrastructures, which creates ‘premium networked spaces’ at the expense of those living in ‘spaces of immobility and fear’ outside the elite enclaves (Graham and Marvin, 2001). This analysis is in line with the wider mobilities literature, which has highlighted the importance of immobilisations (Adey, 2006): while the movement of ‘kinetic elites’ is facilitated (Cresswell, 2010), the mobility of less desirable subjects is curtailed (Shamir, 2005), resulting in a ‘mobility gap’ (Turner, 2007). Research on mobilities has examined the subversive and transgressive potential of embodied leisure practices in the city, such as walking (Pinder, 2011),
cycling (Spinney, 2010), and parkour (Saville, 2008; Mould, 2009), but has primarily done so in localities where conflicts over urban spaces do not have repercussions as severe as in a contested city such as Jerusalem.

According to Caldeira (1996), the spatial segregation produced by fortified urban enclaves limits everyday interactions with other groups and thereby magnifies perceptions of social difference; the interactions that do take place as borders are crossed are marked by ‘suspicion and danger’. The picture painted, then, is one of spatial isolation and inequality, both in terms of residential service provision – what has been termed ‘infrastructural violence’ (Rodgers and O’Neill, 2012) – and in the means of mobility. Physical proximity in the city is no longer seen as a key determinant of social interaction (Coutard, 2008) and since cross-enclave or chance encounters are limited, inequalities are exacerbated and the potential (physical and political) space for forging solidarities is undermined (Young, 2000; Sennett, 2007). An examination of the literature on enclaves and mobility in the Jerusalem context would, at first glance, seem to support these notions, even to an extreme degree.

**Enclave urbanism in East Jerusalem from the top down**

In Jerusalem, which is routinely referred to as ‘divided’ (Klein, 2005), ‘segregated’ (Thawaba and Al-Rimmawi, 2013), ‘fragmented’ (Pullan, 2011), or even ‘many bordered’ (Dumper, 2014), enclaves have a long history. While communal borders in Jerusalem were defined by Mahallat neighbourhood units during Ottoman times (Tamari, 2009), the clear segmentation of the old city into four confessional quarters was only implemented during the British Mandate, when Jerusalem was rebuilt as a 'divided city' on the basis of the principle of the ‘unmixing of peoples’ (Roberts, 2013). However, despite the Mandate authorities’ insistence on ethnic segregation, there were significant zones of mixing, in particular in commercial areas (Abowd, 2014). Between 1948 and 1967, the West of the city became part of the newly established state of Israel, while East Jerusalem was under Jordanian control. The armistice line of 1949 running through Jerusalem, referred to as the ‘Green Line’, remains internationally recognised despite the fact that Israel has occupied East Jerusalem since 1967 (Lustick, 1997), effectively annexing it (Basic Law, 1980), without, however, granting citizenship rights to the city’s Palestinian residents, who have the status of ‘permanent residents’.
While Palestinians continue to conceive of the city as the capital of their future state, Israeli urban planning policy reflects the goal of avoiding any future partition of the city (Bollens, 1998). Since 1967, numerous Israeli settlements have been constructed. They house approximately 200,000 Jewish Israelis (UN OCHA, 2014) and range in size from large-scale neighbourhoods to individual securitised houses in the midst of the Palestinian communities (Dumper, 1997). Both forms are not merely isolated enclaves, but also perform a frontier-expanding function. The major settlements in East Jerusalem today are closely linked to the west of the city, annexing large swathes of Palestinian land and conceptually shifting the Green Line far into East Jerusalem and even past the municipal boundary (Shlay and Rosen, 2010; Allegra, 2013). Due to this strategic purpose, such localities have been described as part of a ‘civilian occupation’ (Segal and Weizman, 2003). Owing to their military origins, the settlement enclaves are built as ‘defensible spaces’ (Newman, 1972) in that they are clearly demarcated, internally cohesive, and ensure easy surveillance of anyone entering (Savitch, 2005). Their homogeneity and exclusivity is ensured by ethnically-based landownership laws and property markets (Yacobi, 2012a). Access to the larger settlement neighbourhoods in Jerusalem is not restricted by a highly security perimeter, but through ‘carefully selected’ connections and disconnections of the mobility infrastructures (Pullan, 2013a). It is often impossible to walk from a Palestinian area to a neighbouring settlement without being forced by the lack of pedestrian pavements to walk on the road or across open space, or even to cross major highways. Because cross-enclave movement is thus restricted but not impossible, we can think of the perimeters of these enclaves as ‘borders’ in the sense of Sennett (2011): they are semi-permeable membranes rather than boundaries or hard edges that undermine activity on either side.
The mobility infrastructures that separate these homogenous enclaves simultaneously enhance Israeli mobility and restrain Palestinian movement. Major thoroughfares connecting Israeli settlements cut through the urban fabric of Palestinian neighbourhoods without serving them, dividing them into isolated enclaves and stifling local urban life and social exchange across the east of the city. Like the roads connecting Israeli settlements in the West Bank, these ‘conflict infrastructures’ (Pullan, 2013b) turn Palestinian space into an archipelago of disconnected islands (Handel, 2013). The spatial inequality brought about by the mobility gap is exacerbated by the lack of investment in Palestinian areas of East Jerusalem. Due to decades of neglect, even middle-class Palestinian neighbourhoods lack basic amenities, including functional roads and pavements, connection to the sewage system, reliable garbage removal, community facilities, public parks and postal service (Cheshin et al., 1999; UN OCHA, 2009). Such policies based on unequal citizenship, effective ethnic segregation and resource allocation on the basis of ethnicity have been termed 'urban ethnocracy' (Yiftachel and Yacobi, 2002).

Over the last decade, the Israeli Separation Barrier, a more overt means of interrupting movement, has cut off at least 55,000 Jerusalem residents – a quarter of the city’s Palestinian population – from

Figure 1: Enclave urbanism in East Jerusalem (Conflict in Cities).
the centre of the city and the economic, educational, medical and social resources located there. Residents of Palestinian areas of Jerusalem now located on the West Bank side of the Wall, exclaves such as Kufr Aqab and Shuafat Refugee Camp, are considered residents of the city but do not benefit from most municipal services (UN OCHA, 2011). For much of 2014, for instance, residents of Shuafat camp and the surrounding neighbourhoods did not have a reliable water supply (Shuafat camp local representative). The liminal status of these exclusionary exclaves has also created a security vacuum, as neither Israeli nor Palestinian police enter the exclaves (Dumper, 2014), leading to a proliferation of crime and regular gun violence (Nidal and Amneh, Kufr Aqab). While it was built ostensibly as a security measure to ward off Palestinian suicide attacks in the centre of the city, the Barrier has increased insecurity for Palestinians, who also fear their permanent exclusion from the rest of the city as municipal officials have abrogated their responsibility for these areas (Hasson, 2010).

From this top-down view, it appears that Jerusalem fits neatly into the enclave urbanism paradigm, where the establishment of ‘spaces of mobility and flow for some’ is predicated on the ‘construction of barriers for others’ (Graham and Marvin, 2001: 11). Urban inequality is entrenched by enclavisation, with the securitisation of some urban areas causing the insecurity of others, service provision severely lacking in marginalised neighbourhoods, and a variety of legal regimes and access restrictions being applied to the enclaves and exclaves. As segregated mobility infrastructures in East Jerusalem appear to only further sever Israeli and Palestinian areas from one another, in this situation of ‘frontier urbanism’ (Pullan, 2011), it has been argued, residents of enclaves have a merely ‘spectatorial relationship’, lacking the direct personal interaction that might alleviate the conflict (Hercbergs and Noy, 2015).

**Palestinian everyday mobilities and the transgression of borders**

The restriction of Palestinian mobility by means of barriers, checkpoints, roadblocks and a complex permit system is one of the Israeli occupation’s main methods of spatio-social control (Weizman, 2007; Ophir *et al*., 2009). This mobility regime negatively impacts Palestinian everyday life by stifling movement (Hammami, 2004, 2010; Kelly, 2006; Handel, 2009; Harker, 2009), yet many Palestinians nonetheless insist on moving between their disconnected enclaves and into Israeli spaces. Beyond transgressing geographical borders, I argue, everyday mobility can also be transgressive in its assertion of presence in shared urban spaces.
‘Maintaining the connection’ in spite of the Separation Wall

Palestinians who refuse to accept the restriction of their mobility regularly cross the checkpoints separating them from the urban core, despite the fact that these journeys entail heavy traffic, long periods of waiting, humiliating treatment by soldiers and a higher risk of encountering clashes between Palestinians and the Israeli army (Braverman, 2011; Kotef and Amir, 2011; Tawil-Souri, 2011; Amir, 2013). Several respondents who crossed checkpoints regularly conceptualised their insistence on movement, in spite of hardships, as ‘maintaining the connection’ the Israeli occupation was attempting to sever (Reema, Bab al-Zahra). Thus, for them a daily commute constituted an act imbued with political significance, or even religious duty, as in the case of Aya from Kufr Aqab, who travelled to the old city of Jerusalem several times per week to pray at the Haram al-Sharif (Temple Mount). Several commuters living on the West Bank side of the Wall repeatedly noted they had ‘the right’ to go anywhere in Jerusalem. Residents of the exclaves cut off by the Barrier insisted that their Jerusalem ID cards conferred the right to enter Jerusalem, despite the fact that checkpoints were occasionally closed to them. Bilal, a Ramallah resident without a permit to enter Jerusalem, refused to accept the Israeli mobility regime: ‘It is my capital, so I will go just to see my friends, to drink tea with them. There doesn’t need to be an emergency. I should be allowed to go anytime.’ While intended as a hard boundary, the Separation Wall is in fact quite a porous border. Not only is it open to Israeli settlers, who do not require permits to cross, but in addition to approximately 90,000 workers from the West Bank who are permitted to work in Israel (PCBS, 2015), some 14,000 Palestinian labourers also cross from the West Bank into Israel and Jerusalem without a permit every day (UN OCHA, 2013).

Both those respondents who crossed ‘illegally’ and those with Israeli permission employed various tactics to minimise the strain of the journey and thus make the crossing less disruptive to their lives. In circumventing checkpoints, or knowing which routes to use at which time, they display an intimate knowledge of the surveillance and control regime (Zureik et al., 2010). In addition, many commuters made use of social media to obtain updates on the traffic and security situation at checkpoints surrounding Jerusalem. Evading militarised mobility regimes by circumventing constraints and making use of the available resources might then be considered part of the Palestinian ‘art of presence’ (Bayat, 2009). While most saw walking as the least preferable way of crossing urban borders, as it leaves the walker exposed, pedestrian movement also allows Palestinians to evade Israeli controls, for instance by using small alleyways and back routes on foot.
(Ahmad, Beit Hanina), thus opening up possibilities of movement beyond the predetermined routes set by state power (Handel, 2009).

Despite insisting on their irrevocable right to access the city, most respondents cut off from Jerusalem in fact only entered the city without a permit when it was urgently necessary – for a visa appointment at a consulate or to visit a friend or family member in hospital. According to Dina, a Bethlehem resident, ‘It’s not worth the risk just to go for fun.’ Others found the difficulty associated with crossing discouraged them from entering the city at all. Salma, a resident of the suburb of Abu Dis, who had at one point crossed the Barrier without a permit while in labour in order to give birth in Jerusalem, now said she found it ‘easier to pretend Jerusalem doesn’t exist.’ She had not visited in several years, even though she had the opportunity to obtain a permit to enter the city during Ramadan, because she found her disconnection from Jerusalem so painful. Amneh from Kufr Aqab, who had various health problems, had not gone to see her doctor on the Jerusalem side of the Barrier for several weeks because she anticipated the journey across the checkpoint would be too strenuous.

*Embodied practices*

Mobility related to leisure, rather than to quotidian journeys, can also serve to undermine boundaries and Israeli control in Jerusalem’s urban space. Activities such as walking, running, cycling or parkour resonate with notions of freedom of movement on both an affective and a political level. Dina, who goes on regular extended runs in areas surrounding Jerusalem, found this allowed her to experience the ‘Palestinian landscape’ in new ways. While running gave her the sense of being ‘like a bird set free’, she also made the conscious decision to run on roads usually reserved for settlers, and thus to overstep the enclave borders prescribed by the occupation. Similarly linking embodied experience with collective political visions of space, walks through the Palestinian landscape have been discussed as a means of personally connecting to the land and its history, but also of resisting the increasing fragmentation of Palestinian space (Shehadeh, 2008). However, those engaging in outdoor sports such as mountain biking near settlements noted their circumspection because encounters in seam zones could be dangerous (Bilal). Others found that engaging in such activities caused potentially dangerous confusion about their identity; one East Jerusalem commuter who cycled to work, for instance, was regularly mistaken for an Israeli or foreigner because this was seen as unusual behaviour for a Palestinian. Palestinian youth who practice parkour or BMX stunts in Jerusalem’s old city test the boundaries of accepted behaviour by
using space in unexpected manners. Their disruption of the routines of shared and highly securitised spaces, such as the stairs leading to Damascus Gate, makes light of a tense situation. Acting in a spatially expansive manner by acting rowdy or blocking the way of passers-by, they subtly provoke soldiers on patrol (Figure 2) and thereby exert a certain light-hearted dominance over the space.

Figure 2: A parkour practitioner from Silwan performs a flip as he passes Israeli border police on Khan az-Zeit Street in the old city (film stills: Nina Renaux).

Transgressions into settlement enclaves

The inequitable distribution of resources, which becomes especially apparent at the seam zones where Israeli and Palestinian neighbourhoods interface, causes Palestinians to regularly transgress the borders of neighbouring settlements in order to make use of services not provided in their residential areas. Thus, next to parks (Hasson, 2013) and playgrounds (Yacobi and Pullan, 2014), Palestinians make use of the settlements’ shopping opportunities (Hanan, Beit Hanina), including malls carrying Israeli brands, stores selling alcohol and petrol stations with better prices (Ibrahim, Beit Hanina). Many Palestinian respondents, however, noted ambivalence about venturing into the enclaves of the other, including discomfort based on language barriers (Hamdi, Shuafat), fear of discrimination (Aya) or their own political disapproval of buying from Israeli establishments (Reema). Nonetheless, the establishment of the Jerusalem light rail in 2011 has increased such quotidian transgressions. The shopping mall in Pisgat Zeev, for instance, has become much more accessible to Palestinians, leading to the perception among locals of a significantly increased Arab presence in the settlement (David, Pisgat Zeev).

Temporary movement into settlements in East Jerusalem to make use of local resources can also initiate more permanent changes to residential patterns. Israeli settlements were conceived as exclusively Jewish, and the majority of East Jerusalemites cannot purchase or lease land there (Ir Amim and BIMKOM, 2010), yet an estimated 4,500 Palestinians have moved into settlements. While most are middle class citizens of Israel (Yacobi, 2012b), East Jerusalemites are increasingly moving into settlements as well, mainly due to the better services (Maha, Beit Hanina), more
affordable prices (Ahmad), a ‘Western’ lifestyle and a lower degree of social control compared to Palestinian areas (Razan, Palestinian former resident of French Hill). French Hill appears to be especially popular, not only because it is among the oldest settlements, but also because it is familiar to Palestinians like Razan who attended the adjacent Hebrew University. As they visit on a regular basis during their studies, the ‘politics of presence’ (Bayat, 2009) entails a gradual expansion of positions which has the potential to permanently reshape the makeup of these exclusive enclaves. The quotidian use of Israeli space renders it familiar, thus making a permanent move into such enclaves more viable for Palestinians. This familiarity also produces a less polarised understanding of the enclave space and its residents. Thus, Maha found French Hill was ‘not really a settlement’ due to the strong presence of students and foreigners. A similar sentiment was echoed by other Palestinians who had experienced the residents of a particular settlement as ‘normal civilians’ not necessarily motivated by an exclusivist ideology. Such flexible conceptions of political boundaries show that the meanings of spaces in the city are constantly re-inscribed as exclusive spaces are used in new ways.

Due to the worry that an increased Palestinian presence will eventually change the character of the enclave (Yacobi and Pullan, 2014), many landlords refuse to lease flats to Palestinians, yet those who are willing to pay a ‘premium for being Arab’ can usually gain access (Razan). Contrary to enclave urbanism in other Israeli cities, where global neoliberal processes appear to go hand in hand with urban segregation along ethnic lines (Monterescu, 2009), then, in some of Jerusalem’s enclaves the ‘free market’ contributes to the undermining of ethnically-based segregation.

**Upholding and reinforcing enclave borders**

*Marginalised exclaves as zones of autonomy*

While Palestinians regularly enter secular Israeli areas for business or pleasure, Palestinian neighbourhoods are rarely visited by Jewish Israelis, in particular since the second Intifada (Garb and Savitch, 2005; Greenberg-Ranaan and Shuval, 2013). Palestinians capitalise on the lack of Israeli movement into their neighbourhoods – in particular in the exclaves outside the Barrier. The socio-spatial exclusion of these areas has numerous drawbacks, yet residents also utilise the fact that housing beyond the Wall is more affordable and not subject to the same level of stringent regulation that makes legal construction close to impossible in East Jerusalem. Because of this, the
exclaves have seen a veritable building boom in recent years, and thousands of new residents have moved in (Kufr Aqab village council; see also Dajani et al., 2013; Charney and Rosen, 2014). According to a member of the local committee of Shuafat refugee camp, many residents here refuse to pay the municipality or companies associated with it: ‘In Shuafat, everything is free. People do not pay for a building permit, we refuse to pay municipal taxes or bills for water or electricity.’ When residents of the camp refused to grant access to tax inspectors, this caused politicians to worry that Israeli sovereignty over parts of Jerusalem was being called into question (Selig, 2010; Pitrikovsky, 2014).

Due to the lack of municipal enforcement, Jerusalemites living in the exclaves can cohabitate with partners who hold West Bank identification without risking forfeiting their Jerusalem residency for having left the municipality. Mariam, a West Bank ID holder who is married to a Jerusalemite stated: ‘Although it’s not very good area, I’m glad that there is a place like Kufr Aqab where I can live together with my husband. This is the only place for us.’ There are thought to be several thousand couples in a similar situation utilising this interstitial legal ‘grey space’ (Yiftachel, 2009) created by the exclusionary exclaves to their advantage in order to circumvent the mobility regime imposed by the Israeli occupation (legal counsel for Kufr Aqab residents). As they move to the margins of the city in order to be able to remain part of it, their socio-spatial exclusion, paradoxically, grants them a certain degree of autonomy and freedom from Israeli from interference of the Israeli mobility regime.
Figure 3: Students pass through the checkpoint into Shuafat refugee camp after attending school on the Jerusalem side of the Separation Barrier. The tall buildings behind the Wall indicate the lack of enforcement of building regulations in the exclave (Hanna Baumann).

The Jerusalem light rail: disrupting the advancing frontier

By linking Israeli and Palestinian enclaves that were previously served only by separate public transportation, the Jerusalem light rail has not only increased Palestinian movement into the connected settlements. On their way into the western part of the city, residents of the settlements of Pisgat Zeev and Neve Yacov inevitably pass through Palestinian Shuafat. Despite Palestinian calls to boycott the light rail on the basis of its annexation of Palestinian land (Barghouti, 2009), the JLR was seen as a success in its first years of operation. The security situation was stable, with only occasional scuffles between passengers, and Palestinians used the tram in higher than expected numbers (JLR security consultant). According to the CEO of the light rail operator at the time, integration worked ‘like heaven’ and there was ‘harmonised life between all groups’. From a Palestinian perspective, this accommodation was due to a sense of resignation: ‘The people were already paying for the train and couldn’t stop its construction, so they made use of it’ (Ahmad). Yet, Palestinian attitudes to the train remained ambivalent, with some residents supporting a full boycott.
and others expressing concern with regard to personal safety (Noor, Shuafat), or unwillingness to pay for tickets: ‘I see the train as a settler project, so of course I don’t want to support it financially’ (Rania, Ramallah resident working in Jerusalem). Indeed, the number of riders who do not pay for their ticket is higher at the stops in Palestinian areas, according to JTMT statistics, suggesting that skipping the fare may be used as a form of silent protest against the Israeli municipality, a type of ‘everyday resistance’ (Scott, 1985).

Both critics and advocates of Israeli settlement expansion in East Jerusalem observed that the light rail helped to ‘strengthen Jewish presence’ in Palestinian Shuafat, which was previously off-limits to most Israelis, suggesting that temporary Israeli uses of the space might result in permanent settlements (Arieh King in Wishart, 2015). The tram stops and the associated infrastructure look like those in West Jerusalem: clean platforms are lined by newly-planted trees and lit by modern street lights, there are large advertisements in Hebrew and armed private security contractors are always present. By demarcating the space along the JLR route as Israeli, the light rail made Shuafat ‘legible’ (Scott, 1998), creating a safe familiarity for Israelis, who had previously avoided the area. At first, the new Israeli movements into the neighbourhood were of a benign nature mirroring the pragmatic Palestinian uses of settlements and included using the main road as a short cut or a free-of-charge parking space. Later transgressions became more violent, with settlers destroying property and threatening locals (Hamdi). When a Palestinian teenager was kidnapped from the Shuafat main road and murdered in July 2014, this caused several days of protests and confrontations, with residents’ anger directed in particular at the light rail. Although the transgressions had been carried out by individuals, the opening up of Shuafat to Jewish Israelis can be seen a ‘strategy’ in the sense of de Certeau, in that it originates from a place of power and is backed up by institutions, unlike the individualised Palestinian tactics of enclave transgression outlined above. This became particularly clear when, following protests, unmanned aerial vehicles were introduced to identify individuals attacking the tram in Shuafat, a symbolic militarisation of civilian infrastructure. As the means of opening up hitherto inaccessible spaces, the light rail itself had become the advancing frontier of Jewish settlement expanding into Palestinian Jerusalem, a fortified ‘space of “flow”’ (Weizman, 2006) in its own right.

To residents, the train represented not only the municipality, and thus the Israeli occupation, but also the physical means by which Israeli settlers accessed the neighbourhood. Although the boy’s killers had not used the tram, it became the target of their anger following the murder (Noor). Over the course of several days of protests and clashes with Israeli security forces, protesters
systematically dismantled all infrastructure associated with the light rail at the Shuafat stations: security cameras, station shelters, signage, ticket machines, tracks, signals, traffic lights and underground wiring, as well as electricity pylons (Figure 4). The thoroughness of the destruction reflected their view that Israeli infrastructures, mobility infrastructure in particular, are deeply implicated in the structural violence of the Israeli occupation in that they serve to expand its reach into new areas – in this case, through settlers’ quotidian movements.

By interrupting the train service, the destruction forced those living in settlements at the northern end of the JLR line to take alternative routes, circumventing Palestinian areas. Despite not having taken part in the protests, one Shuafat resident expressed his support for the destructive acts: ‘If [having to transfer to a bus] means even a small inconvenience to the settlers, if they will avoid Shuafat in the future, then the protests have achieved something.’ Even after the light rail began operating again, attacks with rocks and paint continued, damaging a large portion of the rolling stock (JTMT Engineer). More than mindless destruction, then, we might then think of the disruption of the light rail as a form of ‘tactical vandalism’ (Ward, 1973), an attempt to maintain the existing enclave borders by limiting Israeli transgressions. This shows that marginalised urban residents are not only victims of exclusion from ‘spaces of flow’ (Castells, 1996), but that they also have the capacity to disrupt the routines of those living in premium networked spaces, and thereby ‘decompress’ their time-space (Sopranzetti, 2014). The Palestinian ability to stop unwanted Israeli movement through their enclaves resulted in the reclamation of a level of territorial control that also reverberated inside the nearby settlements, if only temporarily. In addition, in the manner in which they disrupted Israeli habitual movements, Palestinians had appropriated one of the key methods of Israeli control over Palestinian space – making unpredictable the time and risk involved in travel and thus disturbing the rhythms of everyday life.
The image of the train initially promoted, as a symbol of the city growing together as a ‘cosmopolitan metropolis’ (Nolte and Yacobi, 2015), was destroyed by the attacks, and suddenly the light rail became an emblem of Jerusalem’s ongoing conflict (cf. Miller, 2014). Expressing the origins of Palestinian ambivalence to the light rail, Ahmad, who had lived in Shuafat for much of his life, stated: ‘People tried to convince themselves that this train is a civilised thing. But this happy picture is just based on racism, it’s fake. We don’t want this kind of civilisation.’ After close to five decades of Israeli occupation and neglect, Palestinians are ‘tired’, as Hamdi put it, and want to live decent lives, therefore taking ‘what [they] can get’ in terms of services from the municipality. At the same time, the light rail is seen as a symbol of normalisation that glosses over the underlying situation of unequal citizenship and urban rights. Therefore, it was rejected in a highly symbolic manner, even if this meant that residents deprived themselves of one of the few services the municipality provides for them.

**Access restrictions and the self-limitation of movement**

While the state has access to formal means of enforcing borders, the JLR incident shows that the interruption of mobility from the bottom up can also serve to reinforce enclaves. In times of
heightened violence or political tension, Israeli security services increase access control across Jerusalem by operating temporary checkpoints at the entrance to Jewish settlements or by cordonning off access roads to Palestinian areas with concrete blocks to restrict the movement of entire communities (Eisenbud, 2014; Hasson, 2015). In the sense of Foucault, such closures (familiar from the West Bank) are a way of ‘partitioning’ space in order to gain greater control and ‘break up collective dispositions’ (1979: 143). Yet, the regulation of access to enclaves is not only a top-down strategy, and boundaries are also reinforced by people’s self-limitation in terms of movement. In times of heightened inter-ethnic violence in Jerusalem, young men in Palestinian neighbourhoods easily accessible to Israelis such as Wadi al-Joz erected vigilante checkpoints. Some perceived areas behind the Barrier to be safer than areas of East Jerusalem more accessible to Israelis. Sameer, a father of two school-age children, explained: ‘In Beit Hanina we can’t let our children go outside to play – so we sent them to their grandmother in Kufr Aqab, there they can play outside, no settlers will enter there.’ In this way, the abjection of the marginalised exclaves outside the Wall, also creates a protective buffer from outside intrusions.

As the threat of violence in shared areas increases, residents restrict their movements to the most necessary and retreat into ‘purified’ spaces; they avoid military installations such as checkpoints where there are unpredictable and ‘different rules, based on the political situation’ (Aya) and mixed areas, particularly crowded ones such as markets (Hanan). Some women noted they ‘avoided leaving the home at all’ and worried extensively about relatives who did. Due to the decrease in passengers during the July-August 2014 war in Gaza, the East Jerusalem bus consortium made significant losses. The JLR also saw a significant drop in daily passenger trips in July 2014 (JTMT, 2014), in line with survey data according to which 60% of Palestinians who had previously used the JLR no longer did so following the events of that month (IPCC, 2014). The head of the Ramallah-Jerusalem Bus Company explained the decrease in public transport usage saying simply: ‘When there is war, the people don’t move.’ This also proved true during other periods of tension, such as during the increase in stabbings and shootings in autumn 2015. Residents of seam zones, such as Musrara, located on the Green Line, noted the absence of any street activity as people remained in their houses out of fear. In particular in such times, Mahmoud said, ‘we feel these invisible boundaries’ when traversing the city. Others relayed feelings of relief when stepping back into their ‘home’ enclave, the invisible line often symbolised by a familiar landmark, such as Damascus Gate, coming into sight (Ahmad, Reema).

Geographies of fear in urban settings, often discussed in relation to crime and terrorism, are closely
linked to fear of Otherness (cf. Bannister and Fife, 2001). The personal fears respondents in Jerusalem expressed were marked by worries of being violently attacked on the grounds of their own identity or the visibility thereof. This guided their decisions on which spaces to frequent and when, how to get there and how to conduct themselves. Those who had no choice but to continue frequenting mixed spaces in times of tension because they worked in Israeli areas stated that they were afraid despite their familiarity with the areas. They attempted to minimise their difference and avoided disclosing their Arab identity by avoiding interactions with Israelis (Musa, Beit Hanina; Hamdi, Ahmad). Following several attacks on veiled women on the JLR, a number of Palestinian women temporarily adopted the typical dress of orthodox Jewish women to continue covering themselves while concealing their identity (Maha). On the one hand, this reflects how boundaries are inscribed on the body and move through the city with it, discernible in details such as clothing, hairstyle, body language or accent. On the other hand, the capacity to adopt the dress of the other convincingly also shows proximity and familiarity with other groups’ customs across ethnic divides. Such instances of hybridity reflect the double consciousness of the colonised, who have better insight into the world of the coloniser than vice versa, echoing the imbalance in Palestinians’ access to Israeli spaces. Such an instance of ‘colonial ambivalence’ (Bhabha, 1994), then, perhaps illustrates the limitations of enclave urbanism in a dense urban setting: while borders may be clearly delineated, movement within and exchange across them are never fully suppressed. At the street level, people interact – whether in a civil or hostile manner.

**Reconsidering enclave urbanism in light of everyday mobility**

Enclavisation and the restriction of Palestinian movement is a key spatial strategy of the Israeli occupation across the territories occupied in 1967 (Falah, 2005). These mechanisms of control are reflected at a more local scale in Jerusalem – yet they function differently in dense urban fabric, where daily movements cannot be controlled and curtailed in the same manner. As I have shown, not only states or economic elites have the capacity to mobilise and immobilise – subaltern mobilities and disruptions of movement can also undermine or reinforce urban enclaves.

Examining everyday movements across enclaves has allowed contradictions and ambiguities to emerge that would have been lost when focusing solely on residential patterns. This approach has shown that Palestinians living in marginalised areas of East Jerusalem routinely transgress both explicit boundaries and less visible residential borders to make use of amenities in Jewish enclaves (albeit often with ambivalent attitudes), forging ‘activity spaces’ (Kwan, 2009) far beyond their
residential areas. Unwilling to accept the Israeli-imposed boundaries within and around the city, Palestinians in Jerusalem thus move across enclaves, undermining the meaning and efficacy of the border through everyday practice. While the Israeli mobility regime has severed many connections, Palestinians insist on their right to access all parts of Jerusalem, reflecting the sense that ‘resisting immobility’ has become a key form of spatial opposition to the Israeli occupation (Hammami, 2004).

Occasionally, their ‘quiet encroachment’ on settlements can alter the character of the enclave permanently. While enclave urbanism is often portrayed as a global phenomenon, attention to local histories often reveals that different typologies of enclaves are not a new development. Israeli settlement enclaves in East Jerusalem are not merely neoliberal gated communities of economic privilege, but are rooted in older ethnic segregations, in the division of the city between 1948 and 1967, as well as the military purpose of frontier settlements (cf. Rosen and Razin, 2008). In fact, the recent market-driven turn seems to partially undermine ethnic boundaries by allowing some Palestinians to buy their way into what were once enclaves of ethnic exclusivity.

Palestinians’ regular transgression of enclave borders and their utilisation of the relative advantages of exclusionary enclaves complicate the classical narrative of socio-spatial exclusion. The marginalised here simultaneously make use of the services in the areas of the dominant group and utilise the autonomy provided by their own enclaves, which can thus be seen as functioning like a ‘sociospatial shield’ (Wacquant, 2010). As Palestinians are able to live with partners with a different residency status and because construction is not as prohibitively difficult as on the Jerusalem side of the Wall, these deregulated enclaves are not unlike the South African ‘grey areas’ under Apartheid rule, where racial mixing was quietly tolerated (Elder, 1990). In both, deregulation created a situation of insecurity, but also allowed autonomy and breathing space away from state control.

In disrupting the Jerusalem Light Rail, residents of Shuafat appeared to counter-intuitively entrench their own marginalisation by depriving themselves of access to a public service – yet I have argued that this immobilisation of the train constituted a defence of Palestinian enclave borders. As in other (post)colonial cities which have always had splintered service provision (Kooym and Bakker, 2008; Zérath, 2008), the ‘modern infrastructural ideal’ mourned by much of the literature on enclave urbanism was never present in Jerusalem. The highly symbolic acts of destruction by which Palestinians expressed their rejection of the light rail dismantle the notion that marginalised groups
necessarily seek, or benefit from, inclusion in premium services. In disrupting Israeli mobility, Palestinians adopted tactics familiar from the Israeli mobility regime. If continuous circulation (based on the metaphor of the healthy human body) epitomises the functioning city (Swyngedouw, 2006), and since the light rail served as ‘the symbol of connecting different parts of Jerusalem’ (Tamir Nir, Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem in charge of Transportation), we might read this interruption of flows through attacks on infrastructure as a refusal to be part of the Israeli municipality and the body politic it represents.

As I have argued that the light rail can be understood as a frontier expanding exclusive enclaves at the expense of marginalised residents, we should consider that ‘infrastructural violence’ is not only at work when excluded groups lack access to public services. In a situation of territorial conflict like the one in Jerusalem, incorporation into infrastructural circuits can also constitute a form of violence. In more ‘ordinary’ cities too, then, urban infrastructures should not only be seen as the markers or borders of exclusion in enclave urbanism, but potentially as a potential means of expanding premium enclaves. While Palestinians view the JLR as a vehicle of colonial expansion, elsewhere, improved access to mobility infrastructures can act as a harbinger of gentrification (Lin, 2002; Kaufmann et al., 2007; Grube-Cavers and Patterson, 2013). It may therefore be worth examining the role of everyday mobility in processes of displacement involved in gentrification or the ‘upgrading’ of informal settlements.

Because traversing the city is necessarily an embodied experience, I have attempted to highlight the importance of affect in the perception of intra-urban borders, in their transgression and in encounters with the other. In the ‘alarmist’ narrative of enclave urbanism such encounters are generally marked by conflict and fear, whereas I have shown a fluctuation between civil quotidian interactions (which can alter conceptions of enclaves previously considered hostile) and encounters marked by fear in periods of heightened inter-ethnic violence. The notion that more contact in shared spaces would necessarily foster urban cohesion, implied by much of the literature on urban enclaves, was not confirmed by the light rail in Jerusalem or the new spaces of interaction it opened up. While an uneasy civility prevailed on the train during its initial years of operation, quotidian contact between different groups on the newly shared mode of transport appears to have done little to overcome underlying differences (cf. Amin, 2002; Valentine, 2008). Like other new spaces of normalisation, such as the Israeli malls increasingly frequented by Palestinians, the light rail might initially have given the appearance of an ‘already binational city’ (Shtern, 2015). However, because this limited interaction took place in the context of ongoing occupation, ethnocratic rule and urban
inequality, the light rail did not become a site of positive encounter. Rather, it expanded the potential zone of friction, as evidenced by increasingly violent incidents along the route of the light rail, including stabbings and vehicular attacks (Heller, 2014). In that it limits expansive movement beyond one’s own enclave, we might think of such ethnically-based violence in shared spaces or towards outsiders as a (particularly insidious) type of ‘border enforcement’. Ultimately, this kind of re-enforcement of enclave borders in times of tension serves to maintain homogeneity within enclaves and minimise spaces of ambiguity, usually located in liminal areas – a ‘purification of space’ which, as we see here, is not only carried out by the dominant group. Critiques of enclave urbanism have focused on the segregation of mobility infrastructures as it allows (kinetic) elites to avoid encountering marginalised Others. Yet a bottom-up reading of quotidian mobilities in Jerusalem suggests that structural inequalities cannot be overcome merely by everyday interaction. While urban enclaves exacerbate social distance in spite of physical proximity, temporarily jointly inhabited spaces, such as the light rail, alone are unlikely forge solidarity across these divides.

This examination of Jerusalem’s enclaves through the lens of Palestinian everyday mobility has, then, altered the narrative of the top-down approach focused on residential segregation. It has shown both how tactical mobility can undermine residential segregation by eroding homogeneity and how marginalised residents can stop incursions, thus reinforcing urban divisions in order to preserve their own ethno-national space. If we understand space as relational rather than static and accept that intra-urban boundaries, like all space, are socially produced and underpinned by people’s actions, we cannot ignore the role of mobility, or lack thereof, when attempting to make sense of the enclave city.

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