Introduction

In its current configuration, Security Studies tends to analyse the relationship between security, resilience, and non-security politics in cases where the issue of concern has been securitized, when some issue already has the status function and label of a security issue. While some of the early works on desecuritization, the dismantlement of security issues (Huysmans 2006), suggested that desecuritization could be pre-emptive by nature (Wæver 1989a, 1995, 2000), i.e. about keeping issues off security agendas, the vast majority of this literature has operated on the assumption that both desecuritization and resilience processes occur after — or in response to — securitization processes. Our contention in the present article is to provide more conceptual nuance for the triangular relationships between the statuses of security, resilience, and non-security politics, which aids the comprehension of how issues move along and remain within these political nexuses.

Our triangle of political moves and status function highlights situations and dynamics that have not received sufficient attention in previous debates in the field. This is certainly the case for situations where security as a status function is not yet established, but is being
internationally contested, or is domestically still brewing. More elaborate conceptualizations of these kinds of pre-security dynamics are timely because both studies of desecuritization and resilience have in recent years been two fast-growing areas of research within the field of security studies. Securitization dynamics have been one branch of this literature. Here, a number of conceptualizations of longer term securitization processes have been developed. Such studies have shown how securitization includes both exceptionalist security discourses and routinized practices (Bourbeau 2014), thereby describing securitization as a gradual and fluctuating process (Salter and Mutlu 2013: 818) with periods where the threats can have more or less urgency or likelihood (Vuori 2010: 270). Scholars have also pointed out that securitization processes should be understood in scalar terms that encompass the possibility of variation across and within cases across time (Bourbeau 2011). Security issues can be “institutionalized”, whereby the story of necessity and emergency need not be continuously repeated (Buzan et al. 1998: 28), and issues that have gone away from security agendas can be “re-securitized” (Åtland and Brusgaard 2009). Most recently, Amir Lupovici (2014) has posited the notion of “securitization climax”, where a previously securitized issue is made to regain a prominent security status after a period of having an institutionalized security status, after having been partly desecuritized, or as a gradual intensification of necessary measures.

On the side on desecuritization dynamics, the Copenhagen School (CoS) initially understood desecuritization as the process of taking an issue out of the security/emergency mode and returning it into the political sphere (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998, Wæver 1995). The first discussions about desecuritization were about how it could
be achieved (Huysmans 1995, Wæver 2000). In later development, the literature on desecuritization has focused on three sets of questions: what counts as desecuritization (identification of the phenomenon), why should there be desecuritization (ethics and normativity), and how can desecuritization be achieved (transformative practice) (Balzacq et al. 2015).

Overall, desecuritization has been viewed as the unmaking of securitization (Huysmans 2006) that comes about either as a fading away of the issue (Behnke 2006) or through initiation with active moves (de Wilde 2008, Donnelly 2015). While the normative push of the CoS approach has been towards desecuritization, the literature on it has been criticised for eschewing politics (Aradau 2004), and biasing desecuritization when it is not necessarily morally better than securitization (Floyd 2011). Some view desecuritization as akin to securitization: for Rita Floyd (2015), desecuritization is a set of actions that can be morally evaluated as a time-limited event, while Juha Vuori (2011a, 2014) has treated desecuritization as a counter-move to securitization in processes of contestation and resistance. Others have favoured a return to the initial political purposes of the concept, like Lene Hansen (2012) who has sought to recover the political status of desecuritization with an examination of the ontological and practical levels involved in empirical investigation of desecuritization processes. Here, Faye Donnelly (2015)

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1 For example, the securitization of former male soldiers and effective desecuritization of former female soldiers in Sierra Leone has reproduced gendered roles for the detriment of the females (MacKenzie 2009).

2 The literature on desecuritization has already become too broad to be thoroughly reviewed in a non-review article. For different views on desecuritization and empirical case studies, see Huysmans (1995, 1998), Roe (2004), Jutila (2006), Behnke (2006), Paltemaa and Vuori (2006), de Wilde (2008), Aras and
suggests that desecuritization moves can be conceptualized as both speech and other symbolic acts by examining how desecuritization moves can be accomplished after several decades of institutionalized securitization.

As the above conceptualizations suggest, desecuritization tends to be viewed as a post hoc move or process in relation to security. In a similar vein, resilience – defined as the process of patterned adjustments adopted by a society or an individual in the face of endogenous or exogenous shocks – made its entry into security studies as a societal strategy to adjust to a situation that is already securitized. The objective is not to transform security or to take an issue out of the security realm (i.e. to desecuritize it) but rather to enhance practices that promote social and community resilience in the face of an increasingly securitized world. For instance, Paul D. Williams (2013) demonstrates with indisputable clarity that building resilient local communities is one of the best ways to reduce violence against civilians in contemporary war zones — where security dynamics are certainly already fully developed. Similarly, Diane Davis and her team have shown how enhancing the resilience of social institutions tangibly reduced urban violence in Medellin, Columbia, one of the most violent cities in the world (Davis 2012). Furthermore, resilience is identified as one of the four strategies (together with desecuritization, resistance, and emancipation) for contesting security in Thierry Balzacq’s (2015) edited volume with the very title. In the concluding chapter to that book, Lene Hansen (2015) points out that resilience shares with these other concepts a

commitment to an ontological engagement with security — that is, a critical engagement with security to contest the predominance of a particular security reading of an issue.

Despite the above important contributions and types of discussion in the conceptualization of securitization, desecuritization, and resilience dynamics, it remains the case that little space is left for considering the possibility that desecuritization and resilience discourses, as well as practices, precede the implementation of security dynamics. This is because the literature consistently frames desecuritization and resilience as processes that take place after an issue has been securitized.

The overarching objective of this article is to tell a different socio-political story of the connections between desecuritization, resilience, and securitization. In order to do this, we present a triangular model of dual relationships among security, resilience, and non-security politics (see Figure 1 below). By doing so, we propose a theorization of the relations among these concepts that takes into account not only instances in which desecuritization moves and resiliencization moves follow security, but also instances in which desecuritization and resilience arise before security – when securitization is still brewing.

The argument proceeds as follows. The first section presents our triangular model for studying the relationships among security, resilience, and non-security politics. The subsequent sections detail our theorization of each relationship pair. Section two focuses

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3 We propose the neologism ‘resiliencization’ move to designate attempts by a society or an individual to adopt patterned adjustments in the face of endogenous or exogenous shocks.
on the security–non-security politics nexus; section three analyses the interconnections between security and resilience; and, section four tackles the link between resilience and non-security politics. Empirical vignettes will be employed throughout our discussion to illustrate key points of our argument.

**Our triangular model: a sextet of relationships**

Students of security studies are still struggling with many difficult questions associated with the process of securitization (Buzan et al. 1998), such as the question of change and continuity in the securitization process and how societies/individuals navigate through, facilitate, or limit the securitization process (Bourbeau 2011, Vuori 2011b). It is no coincidence that resilience and desecuritization have emerged as distinct and dynamic fields of research in security studies; in their search for a better understanding and convincing explanation for the questions raised above, scholars have found it increasingly useful to expand the tool kit provided by key securitization models, theories, and schools (Buzan et al. 1998, Balzacq 2011, Bourbeau 2014, Vuori 2014, Stritzel 2014).

In the present article, we suggest a number of strategies for tackling the analytical stalemates that securitization research is currently facing; in doing so, we capitalize on a broader understanding of the relationships among securitization, desecuritization, and resilience than is currently prevalent in the literature. In particular, throughout the article, we will contend that there are areas of potential convergence and complementarity that the literature (as currently organized) insufficiently appreciates. Indeed, the current benchmark in securitization research – i.e. the CoS – puts forward a parsimonious set of arguments regarding the sequence in the securitization process. An issue moves from (a)
being politicized, to (b) being securitized, and finally and hopefully to (c) being desecuritized (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998, Wæver 1995). However, a general assumption of complementarity and simultaneity forces us to deconstruct this sequential view of contemporary social worlds by injecting more nuanced pre-security dynamics into the study of the relationship between politics, security, and patterns of adjustments. As our triangle of dynamics displays (Figure 1), desecuritization moves may be in play even when an issue is not yet within the realm of security, and similarly, practices of resilience may trigger a process of securitization, rather than emerging exclusively as a response to securitizing moves.

We conceptualize the poles of the triangular relationships (Figure 1) in the vein of the Copenhagen approach to security and politics (Wæver 1995, Buzan et al. 1998). While security policies deal with “worst case scenarios” and dire threats, a non-conflictual relationship between actors tends to be more conducive for trade and diplomacy. This has lead Ole Wæver (1995) to emphasise that often a non-security reality would be normatively preferable to a security reality. He also reminds us that a-security or non-security should not be confused with insecurity: security is a situation where there is a threat with measures against it, whereas insecurity is a situation where there is a threat and no certain measures to counteract it. What is desirable is desecuritization, which leads back to a-security or non-security, a situation where there is no threat, and thus no need for restrictive measures. Indeed, for Wæver (1995), desecuritization is a process by which security issues lose their “securityness”, and are no longer restrictive by nature.

In the triangle (Figure 1), then, “non-security politics” refers to situations where issues are considered to be on the agenda of political units and to abide by political rationales
other than that of security. “Security” in the figure, signifies a situation where an issue has the status function of security with concomitant deontic rights and duties that such a status entails, and thereby abides with the rationale of security. Finally, “resilience” refers to situations where endogenous or exogenous shocks have been dealt with patterned adjustments to maintain the status quo, to implement marginal changes, or to renew a given policy. The arrows in the figure represent political moves that aim to transform an issue from one status to another, or to keep the current status and repel a status transformation.

[Figure 1: Triangular relationship of security, resilience, and non-security politics]
The first relation-arrow in the figure is the one between security and non-security politics from the viewpoint of security (1). This is the received reading of desecuritization where a security issue is dismantled, and desecuritization is viewed as a political move and process away from security. In terms of Hansen’s (2012) ideal models of desecuritization (see below), “replacement”, “rearticulation”, and “silencing” can be included here.

The second arrow or relation engages the same nexus, but from the viewpoint of non-security politics. This arrow represents the usual story of securitization (2a), i.e. the move from politics to the realm of security, but it also includes desecuritization as a political move that originates from a non-security situation (2b). This second aspect of the relation represents political moves that aim to keep issues away from security, which gives this aspect of the arrow a slightly different logic to the others; the first desecuritization arrow (1) represents what happens when security turns into a-security, whereas the second (2b) is about what desecuritization does in order to keep away from a security status for an issue. Moves here include Hansen’s (2012) ideal model of “change through stabilization”, and what we term “pre-emptive desecuritization as rebuttal”.

The third and fourth arrows represent the security-resilience nexus. From the viewpoint of security (3), resilience can be mobilized in order to respond, and adjust to a securitized situation. The move here is not to transform security, or to desecuritize the issue, but rather to enhance practices that build social and community resilience in the face of an increasingly securitized world. From the viewpoint of resilience (4), resilience can drive and induce security. Here, resilience speaks to the idea of protecting a society’s “way of life”, an objective that is made possible by the enactment of security policies and practices.
Finally, the fifth and sixth arrows represent the resilience-non-security politics nexus. From the resilience viewpoint (5), while resilience is sometimes about maintaining the status quo (in which capacity it can induce security as in arrow four), on other occasions, it can be about renewal. By inducing profound change of public policy, resilience can lead to desecuritization and a-security. From the viewpoint of non-security politics (6), once an issue is desecuritized, resilience practices can be deployed to keep the issue in the a-security realm. Here, resilience practices can help to “lock in” a desecuritized reading of an issue.

We will now examine these nexuses in more detail and provide some illustrative empirical vignettes for them.

**Securitization and Desecuritization**

The ceteris paribus normative push, and political recommendation of the securitization approach has been “less security, more politics”, and the development of “possible modalities” for the desecuritization of politics (Wæver 1989a: 52): it is generally (which can only be assessed in practice though) more conducive to treat identities as identities, religion as religion, the environment as the environment, and so on, and to engage their politics through the particular modalities and rationalities of those fields rather than those of security. In the received reading, whilst securitization raises issues into the realm of security policies and practices (Arrow 2a in Figure 1), desecuritization lowers issues back into the realm of “regular politics” or removes issues from the political agenda altogether (Arrow 1 in Figure 1).
Desecuritization can be achieved through a number of options: by simply not talking about issues in terms of security, by keeping responses to securitized issues in forms that do not create security dilemmas or other vicious spirals, and by moving security issues back into “normal politics” (Wæver 2000: 253). These options can follow objectivist, constructivist, or deconstructivist strategies in bringing about desecuritization (Huysmans 1995: 65-67). These differ in regard to how the process relates to the claimed threat: has the threat been dealt with, can the security drama be somehow handled from without, or can identities beyond security threats be produced from within the process.

Beyond conceptualizing desecuritization as an option or a strategy, it has also been viewed from the viewpoint of political actors (de Wilde 2008: 597), and their political moves in games of contestation and resistance (Vuori 2011a, 2015). There can be desecuritizing actors who evade, circumvent, or directly oppose securitizing moves by, for example, emphasizing competing threats (de Wilde 2008: 597). Security policies aim at desecuritization (the solution to the threatening situation), but desecuritization can also happen independently from the actions of securitizing or desecuritizing actors: the original security problem may be solved, institutions may adapt through new reproductive structures, discourses may change (e.g. with the loss of interest or audiences), and the original referent object may be lost (de Wilde 2008).

A key issue of debate has been on whether desecuritization can be considered to be an active political process, or whether desecuritization can only happen as a fading away of the issue (Behnke 2006: 65): the question is whether the logic and possibility of securitization is necessarily retained in explicit discussions of whether an issue has retained the status of a security issue. As empirical studies of securitization and
desecuritization dynamics (e.g. Salter and Multu 2013, Lupovic 2014, Vuori 2015, Donnelly 2015) have shown, it is difficult to point to a definitive end-point for either securitization or desecuritization: political and social situations evolve. Whichever the philosophical stance on how and whether desecuritization can be achieved (Vuori 2011a), such empirical studies show that political actors do make active desecuritization moves.

Indeed, systematizing empirical studies of desecuritization, Hansen (2012: 529; 539-545) has identified four ideal type forms for the concept. In regard to its issues of concern, namely the status of enmity and the possibility of a public sphere, when a larger conflict is still within the realm of possibility, but when a particular issue is presented with terms other than security, we have an instance of (1) “change through stabilisation” (Arrow 2b in Figure 1); when another issue takes the place of a previously securitized issue, we have (2) “replacement”; when the originally phrased threat is resolved, we have (3) rearticulation; and finally, when potentially insecure subjects are marginalized through depoliticization, we have (4) “silencing” (types 2-3 are represented by arrow 1 in Figure 1).

The previous literature on both securitization (Arrow 2a in Figure 1) and desecuritization (Arrow 1 in Figure 1) have produced ample illustrations of both dynamics. As a brief example of how both dynamics can alter between the same political actors, we can use some of the vicissitudes of Sino-Soviet relations.

China entered the Cold War in the Soviet camp and relied on the Soviet Union as the guarantee of the international security of the new People’s Republic. Chinese views in the late 1940s clearly structured the world into two opposing camps, with China firmly in the
Soviet one (Mao 1949). In the 1950s, however, Sino-Soviet relations soured, and the following “Sino-Soviet split” (Lüthi 2008) has been used as an example of the capacity of “parochial” securitizations to become disaffected by or even be withdrawn from dominant “macrosecuritizations” (Buzan and Wæver 2009: 257).

Following the split, Sino-Soviet relations in the 1960s were characterized by intensive ideological conflict, and Mao Zedong securitized Soviet revisionism as a major threat for the Chinese Communist Party (Vuori 2011b). Indeed, newly available documents suggest that it was the Chinese side, in effect Mao Zedong, which was more active in the pursuit of ideological conflict (Lüthi 2008: 2). In his securitization of the Soviet Union, Mao linked the revisionism he identified there to that which he also securitized domestically (Vuori 2011b), and the issue of revisionism was presented as an issue of life and death for the party.

Sino-Soviet relations began to mend in the 1980s with the removal of a number of political obstacles and with the intensification of the conflict between the US and the Soviet Union (Wishnick 2001). Yet, it is only with the fall of the Soviet Union that we can see an overall desecuritization in the form of rearticulation (Hansen 2012: 542-544) taking place in Sino-Russian relations. In the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, China’s line was not to take the lead in international affairs. China worked towards “world multipolarization”, which was exemplified with China and Russia forming a “strategic partnership” in 1996. China and Russia even shared the same “threat package” of “terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism” (the “three evils”) within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Jackson 2006: 310). These are strong indicators of how the two states have managed to reform their identities away from the Sino-Soviet
antagonism. In the overall state relations then, we can see a rearticulative desecuritization
tactic at play on both sides: ever since the early 1980s, China’s policy towards the Soviet
Union (and later Russia) shifted from antagonism to one of collaboration and negotiation
rather than securitization.

Desecuritization can be conceptualised in the above manner as a negative ontological
corollary to securitization. Yet, it is also prudent to investigate securitization and
desecuritization as political moves in order to potentially understand the logic of when
and how they are wielded in practical politics. It is proposed here that in addition to
instances where a securitized situation is dismantled (Arrow 1 in Figure 1),
desecuritization can also be viewed as a political move that can be deployed before
“securitization plays” in a game of securitization (Arrow 2a in Figure 1). In other words,
desecuritization moves – both in terms of discourse and practice – can be used in a pre-
emptive manner before the threshold of securitization is reached (Arrow 2b in Figure 1).
For Wæver (2000: 254), silencing can be a strategy to “pre-empt or forestall
securitization”. We argue here that beyond silencing, active desecuritization efforts can
be made to block the escalation of a contention. Thereby, in addition to change through
stabilization (Hansen 2012) and the silencing of an issue (Wæver 2000), there can be
explicit rebuttals of security frames and claims before they are solidified into policy. This
tactic can be termed pre-emptive desecuritization through rebuttal.

The kind of posture and dynamic captured by the notion of pre-emptive desecuritization
is evident from the foreign policy maxims of the People’s Republic of China since the
late 1970s, and particularly after the end of the Cold War. These maxims represent a
strategy of avoiding conflict, that is, of avoiding other actors’ securitization threshold.
Such an overall stance has been deployed to create a peaceful or non-threatening reputation for China; indeed, a threat reputation would be damaging for an aspiring great power (Deng 2008: 102-103). As Hansen (2012: 536) notes, a key concern for political moves that form desecuritization has been to avoid security responses by authorities. The same applies to states too: states can aim to alleviate security responses through their reputation for example (Deng 2008).

China’s overall stance is very close to how desecuritization was imagined by Wæver (1989b: 314) before the concept itself was launched: “More and more trans-national activities should become purely ‘economic’, ‘social’ and ‘political’”, rather than issues of security where states claim the right to use any means necessary to hinder a development which goes against its interests. The Chinese goal of a peaceful international environment has been implemented in a variety of ways, of which pre-emptive desecuritization seems to be one. The paradigm example here is the maxim of “peaceful rise” (Zheng 2005, Glaser and Medeiros 2007), which can be seen as a rebuttal of the US China threat discourse, which China has countered with a desecuritization discourse (see e.g., Yee and Zhu 2000). The official maxim can be read as a pre-emptive move to avoid the domestic China threat discourse becoming official US policy. Indeed, Chinese observers have been attuned to both non-state and state discourse (Deng 2008: 113), and the pre-emptive stance aims to limit such views to the non-state level. The principle of “peaceful rise”

\[\text{\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{4}} For attempts at such avoidance in view of domestic authorities, see Paltemaa and Vuori (2006) and Vuori (2014).}}\]
pre-emptively argues that China is not a threat to other states’ security even as China’s “comprehensive national strength” and capacities to project it are on the increase.

While “peaceful rise” and its subsequent rearticulation as “peaceful development” are directed against the concerns of major powers (Zheng 2005, Glaser and Medeiros 2007), a pre-emptive stance has also been discerned from China’s behavior in regard to the issue of transboundary rivers (Biba 2013). The maxim of “building good-neighbourly relationships and partnerships with our neighbors” works to alleviate the security concerns of regional and small states. Beyond such political slogans, China has consistently promoted a cooperative stance, even when China’s dam-projects have been framed in security terms; such a cooperative stance indicates a desire “to block and deflect potential securitization” of the dams (Biba 2013: 15-16).

Desecuritization may then not only be about the termination of an institutional fact as has been suggested in previous literature (Vuori 2011a), but a move directed at the prevention of the construction, or solidification of an institutional fact. In the case of transboundary rivers, China has used a variety of means to prevent the escalation of the dam-projects into the realm of security. Assuaging rhetoric has been combined with increased transparency to produce intermittent cooperation in order to accommodate its neighbors concerns and worries (Biba 2013). Indeed, while the “peaceful rise” is directed at the US, other forms of pre-emptive desecuritization are at play with bordering states.
Securitization and Resiliencisation

While desecuritization is a concept that has developed primarily within security studies, the ubiquity of resilience across the broad spectrum of the social sciences is indisputable. Several sets of arguments, factors, rationales and explicantia have recently been offered to better understand and explain resilience, now that psychologists, criminologists, social workers, biologists/ecologists, sociologists, and political scientists are all participating in debates about resilience.⁵ Although International Relations and Security Studies are latecomers to this field of research (Bourbeau 2015b, Juntunen and Hyvonen 2014, Chandler 2015, Corry 2014), in-depth engagement of security studies with the concept of resilience has primarily favoured one particular angle of the relationship between security and resilience, that is, where a resilient course of actions expresses itself once an issue has been successfully securitized (Arrow 3 in Figure 1).

For instance, the United Nations (2011), together with several international organizations and non-governmental organizations, has invoked resilience as a new organizing principle, the development of which is perceived as critical to preventing unacceptable levels of human suffering and reducing the costs of international emergency responses. Resilience is understood as a particularly meaningful way to respond, or to adjust to a given securitized situation. This is also reflected in studies on terrorism and counter-terrorism. Efforts to improve preparedness, especially at the community and local level, have intensified in the past decade, while emergency management infrastructure has become a top priority for several governments. Government initiatives, White papers, and

⁵ See Bourbeau 2013.
key security statements arguing that resilience is a uniquely useful way to respond to these threats abound. In the UK, for example, resilience is a key component in the latest National Security Strategy (2010), where it is argued that to make “a strong Britain in an age of uncertainty” requires developing a “whole of government approach”; a central pillar of this approach is the development of domestic resilience in the face of terrorism. The UK is no exception: “resilience” is now a part of key security statements for the United States (2010), France (2013, 2008), the Netherlands (2010), and Australia (2011).

Several scholars have also underscored the positive impact of resilience on individuals and communities caught in the middle of wars, conflicts, and chronic violence — that is, situations in which security dynamics are already full-blown (Davis 2012, Goldstein 2011, Muggah and Savage 2012). Because resilient strategies give greater agency and voice to vulnerable people and local communities, resilience is also seen by some as a promising avenue to achieve sustainable poverty reduction and to circumscribe the power of police forces that have become exploiters of citizens’ vulnerabilities (Davis 2012). In short, security studies literature operates on the assumption that resilience processes occur after – or in response to – security (Balzacq 2015, Bourbeau 2015a).

However, it is important that we also consider the role of resilience as a precursor to security – that is, as a process leading to and inducing security (Arrow 4 in Figure 1). Bourbeau’s (2013) notion of resilience as maintenance suggests one avenue by which resilience can induce security. Resilience as maintenance is characterized by an adaptation in which resources and energy are expended to maintain the status quo in the face of an exogenous shock. Re-affirmation of the value, benefit, and importance of the status quo will be made on several occasions. A society relying strongly on this type of
resilience will deal with endogenous and exogenous shocks with rigidity and underscore the potentially negative transformative consequences that may be brought about by these events. Disturbances or shocks are not by definition problematic; they must be socially constructed as negative via dominant discourses. This inward-looking strategy, which aims at protecting the social cohesion of a society, gives agents the opportunity, if they are so inclined, to present a novel disturbance as a security threat. Rhetoric and discursive powers will be deployed to portray the event as a problem and practices will be implemented in response. In other words, resilience as maintenance speaks to the idea of protecting a society’s “way of life” and this objective is made possible by the enactment of security policies.

The case of how French dominant discourses adjusted to the surge in worldwide refugee numbers (from nine million in 1984 to eighteen million in 1992), and the associated mass-migration phenomena in post-Cold War France nicely illustrate our point that resilience can lead to security. Rising numbers of migrants fed alarmist tendencies, reinforcing the notion that France was being – or had already been – flooded with migrants. The metaphor of an invasion quickly became the dominant discourse through which the surge in worldwide refugee movement was to be interpreted. The exogenous shock of massive refugee and migrant pressure was portrayed as a considerable threat precisely so that security discourses and security practices would be called into play (Bourbeau 2011, 2014).

The construction of international migration as a security issue was carried out most notably at two levels. First, migration was institutionally securitized — that is, new laws or articles modifying an existing law were passed, providing the government with tools to
deal with the “security problem” that was international migration (Freedman 2004, Van Munster 2009). Second, several security practices were put into place to deal with the threat of international migration including detention centres for migrants (in which the procedures, codes of conduct, and apparatus of operation are strikingly similar to those of incarceration facilities) and interdiction measures such as restrictive visa policies (Rodier 2006, Fassin 2005, Welsh and Schuster 2005). In short, the surge in worldwide refugee numbers and associated “mass” migration was instrumentalized and the necessity of adopting a particular pattern of adjustments to uphold the status quo against changes provoked by these migratory events was underscored by dominant discourses in France. The social construction of refugee movements and mass migration as a significant disturbance necessitating a resilient strategy has led, ultimately, to the securitization of migration.

Desecuritization and Resiliencization

While the goal of resilience is sometimes to maintain the status quo (in which capacity it can induce security), on other occasions, its goal is renewal. Resilience-as-renewal is characterized by responses that transform security policy assumptions, remodel social structures and security practices, and, thus, lead to non-security politics (Arrow 5 in Figure 1). This type of resilience implies introducing novel vectors of response that will (in an implicit or explicit way) fundamentally change existing policies and set new directions for governance. Although the remodelling of policy assumptions does not take place in a social vacuum but draws on past experiences, collective memory, and the
windows of opportunity upon which agential powers decide to act, the option of renewal is, on some occasions, seen as inescapable. In this context, resilience-as-renewal supplements Hansen’s (2012) “rearticulation ideal” by suggesting the mechanism through which such rearticulation takes place.

Some of the discussion about the link between resilience, security, and liberalism exemplifies this line of thought. For instance, the emergence of the resilience paradigm in the field of state-building intervention, claims David Chandler (2012, 2015), should be seen not as a mere transformation of liberalism, but as a rejection of it. This field is witnessing a fundamental transformation from the liberal internationalist framework in particular securitization dynamics and towards a growing focus on resilience (which includes preventive intervention and empowerment of local agency); bringing, ultimately, the issue outside of the security realm.

Parallel to this debate, the broad field of conflict analysis offers a high-yielding source of example of resilience leading to non-security politics. Ami Carpenter, for example, has recently studied with great insights the patterns of adjustments of individuals and communities with conflict escalation in 10 of Baghdad’s neighbourhoods. She found that “short-term prevention of immediate violence and long-term efforts to reduce underlying issues that produce large-scale conflicts” are situated conceptually within the confines of resilience (2014: 5). Maria Buchanan and her colleagues (2013, 2007) analysed how Columbian child soldiers who were exposed to, and have experienced armed combat, but that did not exhibit trauma-related symptoms, dealt with the effects of war. These children did not identify with soldiers or combatants anymore, which was a univocal step towards the resolution of conflict. Buchanan et al. (2007, 2013) identify such patterns of
adjustment as an expression of resilience, which is similar to how Jacqueline McAdam (2013) regards the pattern of children’s survival in African zones of conflict as resilience too.

While this particular understanding of the resilience–non-security politics vector (Arrow 5 in Figure 1) is both insightful and controversial, it is also important to theorize the non-security politics–resilience arrow (Arrow 6 in Figure 1). Here, a focus on resilience can enlighten us on the endurance of desecuritization. As we have seen in our discussion of the security–non-security politics relationship (Arrow 1 in Figure 1), most literature on desecuritization has focused on the mechanisms that remove issue away from the security realm. However, the necessary follow-up question to this analysis remains neglected and under-theorized in the literature: once the desecuritization of an issue is achieved, how does the issue manage to stay within the desecuritization realm? To be sure, the issue of such continuity in security studies is still vigorously debated, with many questions raised but few entirely resolved (e.g. Behnke 2006, de Wilde 2008, Donnelly 2015), but the resilience–non-security politics nexus may provide some headway here.

Indeed, a focus on resilience can show that, on some occasions, what seems to be an idiosyncratic course of actions is in fact a culturally embedded pattern of adjustment to endogenous or exogenous shocks. While most rationalist explanations for continuity emphasize the maximization of benefit and the obtained Pareto-optimal equilibrium, a focus on resilience as a tool of explanation provides an informative alternative approach. Because a resilience-based analysis taps into sociological institutionalist explanations that focus on institutional practices, cultural frameworks, and path-dependencies, it holds great promise in explaining how a particular desecuritized understanding of an issue gets
“locked in” (Bourbeau 2015b, Hall and Taylor 1996, Mahoney and Thelen 2010). This suggests that how a society, a group, or an individual adjusts to a disturbance is deeply influenced by past trajectories and decisions, that a particular understanding of an issue tends to get established at critical moments, and that, once set in motion, a chosen pathway is difficult to alter. Acting as a self-reinforcing dynamic process, the focus on resilience underscores that on some occasions it is the securitizing move that comes to be seen as the disturbance or the shock to which a resilience strategy is deployed in order to maintain the desecuritized status quo.

Several scholars working on genocide have highlighted the usefulness of a resilience focus in explaining the factors that impede mass atrocities (Ingelaere, Parmentier et al. 2013). In their comparative analysis of Rwanda and Botswana, Deborah Mayersen and Stephen Mcloughlin (2011) suggests that a focus on resilience is a central element in understanding the pathways that led to genocide and mass atrocities in the former country, and not in the latter. Drawing from a multifaceted conception of resilience, they point out that the socio-historical construction and interpretation of ethnicity, as well as Botswana’s indigenous dispute resolution capacity, have had a lasting impact on that country’s enduring ability to keep ethnic relationships within the desecuritized realm and to prevent ethnic differences from escalating into ethnic conflict. Similarly, Witold Mucha (2013), in a comparison of escalation dynamics in Peru (1980-1995) and Bolivia (2000-2008), contends that a focus on resilience best explains why civil war broke out in the former country but not the latter, despite a similar structural conflict propensity in both nations. According to Mucha, the Bolivian state was able to activate resilient mechanisms that have ensured a constant de-escalation of the conflict and thereby
prevented a crossing of the threshold towards civil war. These mechanisms have “locked
in” a desecuritized reading of the issue.

Conclusion

In the present article, we have introduced new avenues of conversation for security
studies in several research clusters. We examined the conceptual space of security,
resilience, and non-security politics as political status functions and the political moves
that induce status transformations between them. In this, we highlighted the related
political moves and processes of securitization, desecuritization, and resiliencization,
both in situations where security as a status function and rationale is already established,
and where it is still in the making. This provides more nuance for the investigation of
political dynamics in regard to security, resilience, and non-security politics. Beyond the
vast literature on securitization and desecuritization processes, our exploration of such
interrelations provides some headway into studying how issues remain “desecuritized”,
or move from resilient strategies towards security, for example.

Our examination of this conceptual space is in tune with a renewed interest in the
concepts of, and conceptual approaches towards World Politics (Berenskoetter 2016).
Indeed, while our conceptual triangle engages with the dynamics among three growing
literatures of securitization, desecuritization, and resilience studies, there still remain
other transformations of rationales, modalities, and status functions to explore, for
example the relation of our triangle towards risk and “riskification” (Corry 2012).
Relatedly, we have engaged with the growing interest in security studies to seek
commonalities rather than differences (Fierke 2007, Sylvester 2007) in order to avoid
some of the pitfalls of oppositional thinking (Williams 2012). In this modest attempt to embed a conceptualization of before-security dynamics into a triangle of political statuses, we have sought to demonstrate the benefit of opening up debates on the sequence of securitization processes and of zooming in on similarities, rather than the differences, among the various facets of such processes. We hope that the conceptual approach we have presented in the present article allows for the detection of further political dynamics that have remained understudied.

References


