INSTRUCTIONS

You should use Adobe’s editing tools (please see the next page for instructions) to indicate your corrections on the proof. Please then send the marked up file to the Production Editor by email (aesthj@oup.com).

Changes should be corrections of typographical errors only. Changes that contradict journal style will not be made.

These proofs are for checking purposes only. They should not be considered as final publication format. The proof must not be used for any other purpose. In particular we request that you: do not post them on your personal/institutional web site, and do not print and distribute multiple copies (please use the attached offprint order form). Neither excerpts nor all of the article should be included in other publications written or edited by yourself until the final version has been published and the full citation details are available. You will be sent these when the article is published.

1. **Licence to Publish**: If you have not already done so, please complete the Licence to Publish form online (instructions can be found in the ‘Welcome to Oxford Journals’ email).

2. **Permissions**: Permission to reproduce any third party material in your paper should have been obtained prior to acceptance. If your paper contains figures or text that require permission to reproduce, please inform the Production Editor immediately by email.

3. **Author groups**: Please check that all names have been spelled correctly and appear in the correct order. Please also check that all initials are present. Please check that the author surnames (family name) have been correctly identified by a pink background. If this is incorrect, please identify the full surname of the relevant authors. Occasionally, the distinction between surnames and forenames can be ambiguous, and this is to ensure that the authors full surnames and forenames are tagged correctly, for accurate indexing online. Please also check all author affiliations.

4. **Figures**: Any Figures have been placed as close as possible to their first citation. Please check that they are complete and that the correct figure legend is present. Figures in the proof are low resolution versions that will be replaced with high resolution versions when the journal is printed.

5. **URLs**: Any Please check that all web addresses cited in the text, footnotes and reference list are up-to-date, and please provide a ‘last accessed’ date for each URL.
MAKING CORRECTIONS TO YOUR PROOF

These instructions show you how to mark changes or add notes to the document using the Adobe Acrobat Professional version 7 (or onwards) or Adobe Reader X (or onwards). To check what version you are using, go to Help then About. The latest version of Adobe Reader is available for free from get.adobe.com/reader.

Displaying the toolbars

Adobe Professional X, XI and Reader X, XI
Select Comment, Annotations and Drawing Markups. If this option is not available, please let me know so that I can enable it for you.

Acrobat Professional 7, 8 and 9
Select Tools, Commenting, Show Commenting Toolbar.

Using Text Edits

This is the quickest, simplest and easiest method both to make corrections, and for your corrections to be transferred and checked.

1. Click Text Edits
2. Select the text to be annotated or place your cursor at the insertion point.
3. Click the Text Edits drop down arrow and select the required action.

You can also right click on selected text for a range of commenting options.

Pop up Notes

With Text Edits and other markup, it is possible to add notes. In some cases (e.g., inserting or replacing text), a pop-up note is displayed automatically.

To display the pop-up note for other markup, right click on the annotation on the document and selecting Open Pop-Up Note.

To move a note, click and drag on the title area.

To resize of the note, click and drag on the bottom right corner.

To close the note, click on the cross in the top right hand corner.

To delete an edit, right click on it and select Delete. The edit and associated note will be removed.

SAVING COMMENTS

In order to save your comments and notes, you need to save the file (File, Save) when you close the document. A full list of the comments and edits you have made can be viewed by clicking on the Comments tab in the bottom-left-hand corner of the PDF.
AUTHOR QUERY FORM

Journal : AESTHJ

Article Doi : 10.1093/aesthj/ayv029

Article Title : Schiller on the Pleasure of Tragedy

First Author : Samuel Hughes

Corr. Author : Samuel Hughes

AUTHOR QUERIES - TO BE ANSWERED BY THE CORRESPONDING AUTHOR

The following queries have arisen during the typesetting of your manuscript. Please click on each query number and respond by indicating the change required within the text of the article. If no change is needed please add a note saying “No change.”

| AQ1 | Please confirm the page range for ‘Tragedy’ |
| AQ2 | Please give the page range for ‘The Paradox of Horror’ |
| AQ3 | Please give the page range for ‘Of Tragedy’ |
| AQ4 | Please give the page range for Schopenhauer on Tragedy and Value |
| AQ5 | Please confirm that these references to ‘On the Pathetic’ and ‘On the Sublime’ are taken from Walter Hinderer and Daniel Dahlstrom (eds), Friedrich Schiller: Essays. |
| AQ6 | Please provide a page range for ‘On Self-Mastery’ |
| AQ7 | Please provide a full page range if possible for this reference to The Destiny of Man |
| AQ8 | Please provide a full page range if possible for this reference to Tragedy is Not Enough |
In this paper I offer a reconstruction and defence of a neglected theory of the pleasure we take in tragedy, that of Friedrich Schiller. Schiller held that our pleasure in tragedy is an instance of our pleasure in the sublime, which in turn he characterized as a revelation of human freedom through suffering. I show how many of the pretheoretically important characteristics of tragedy can be understood as making tragedy sublime in this sense, and that, accordingly, it is plausible that we do indeed take Schiller’s pleasure in it. I go on to argue that this sensitivity to what is important about tragedy constitutes an important advantage of Schiller’s account vis-à-vis its more famous successors in the post-Kantian tradition, those of Schopenhauer and Hegel.

It has long been thought that there is something perplexing about why we take pleasure in tragedy and many philosophers have developed accounts of this pleasure in response. In this paper I shall present and defend one such account, that of Friedrich Schiller. Schiller is himself widely celebrated as a tragedian, but his philosophical work on tragedy has received very little attention in Anglophone aesthetics. It is the contention of this paper that this neglect is unjustified and that it is possible to reconstruct from Schiller’s essays a powerful and plausible account of our response to tragedy.

The structure of my discussion is simple enough. In Section 1, I examine what precisely the question is that Schiller, and other philosophers, were asking about tragic pleasure, and how potential answers to that question might be assessed. In Section 2, I outline Schiller’s account, and in Section 3 I argue for its plausibility. I conclude in Section 4 by discussing implications of this plausibility, and in particular whether the account’s plausibility is sufficient to justify its acceptance as the correct interpretation of our pleasure in tragedy.
It is perhaps appropriate to note before proceeding that Schiller’s views on tragedy were expounded in a number of essays written over a period of years and exhibit considerable development over that time. My purpose being principally philosophical, I shall not hesitate to discount minor inconsistencies in Schiller’s discussions or to select the strongest of a number of different positions between which he wavered. The development of Schiller’s views is of great historical significance and interest, but, as I hope to show, his ideas also have sufficient philosophical worth to merit a philosophically-oriented reconstruction.

I

Schiller’s claim is that our pleasure in tragedy is an instance of our pleasure in the sublime, which in turn he understands to be the revelation of human freedom through suffering. In the next section, I will explain this claim in detail, but it is worth considering first what the explanatory aim of Schiller’s, and similar, accounts is. I take this to be simple: Schiller seeks to give an explanation of our mysterious pleasure in tragedy by interpreting it as an instance of a kind of pleasure. Such explanations are really very common and mundane:

A: Why do you enjoy visiting churches so much, despite being a nonbeliever?
B: Oh, because I find them architecturally interesting.

If B’s response here is acceptable, then it has a very straightforward explanatory value: it constitutes the assimilation of a mysterious pleasure (‘B’s pleasure in visiting churches’) to a non-mysterious kind of pleasure (‘pleasure in interesting architecture’). But of course, it might be disputed:

A: Really? I hadn’t thought you were interested in architecture. And besides, you even like visiting dull churches. Are you sure it isn’t because they remind you of your childhood?

The account is disputed on the grounds that certain facts related to B’s actual pleasure are inconsistent with its being an instance of the kind of pleasure suggested—specifically, a fact about the subject of the pleasure (B’s lack of interest in architecture) and a fact about its object (that it includes architecturally undistinguished churches). The discussion might continue indefinitely, with further interpretations being offered, and their plausibility being determined against such criteria. Observations about the physiological symptoms of B’s pleasure, its phenomenology and so on might also be useful. Perhaps they will ultimately decide that B takes a number of different sorts of pleasure in visiting churches.

It will be apparent that much of the canonical discussion of tragedy can be understood on this template. We know that we have some sort of pleasure in tragedies, but we are not sure just what sort of pleasure this is. Catharsis, sublime renunciation, intellectual synthesis and so on are then offered as characterizations or interpretations of this peculiar experience. The usual run of criteria will be in use for deciding which account is the most attractive one. One may appeal to facts about the subject: someone might reject the claim made in Lucretius’s name that our pleasure is really the enjoyment of one’s relative

2 For an excellent discussion, see Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher, 238–262.
3 I take these remarks to be largely ecumenical between differing contemporary accounts of pleasure, none of which in particular do I mean to presuppose.
security in comparison to the protagonists’ plight on the hopeful grounds that ‘I’m not the sort of person who takes such vicious pleasures’.

Phenomenological or physiological data might be appealed to. Very often, appeal is made to facts about the object. For instance, one may object to the 18th century theories on which tragic pleasure is a kind of admiration of the heroes’ moral virtues on the ground that a number of paradigmatic tragedies feature very wicked heroes and accordingly cannot be the objects of this kind of pleasure.

It is important to distinguish this issue clearly from two neighbouring discussions with which it has sometimes been elided under headings like ‘the paradox of tragedy’. Firstly, it is distinct from the question of what our motivation is in reading and watching tragedies. Achieving a successful characterization of the pleasure taken in tragedy need not entail that pursuit thereof is our motive in watching tragedies; nor need the settlement of the motivation question entail anything about which interpretation of tragic pleasure is the correct one. The question of motivation, though perhaps related, is thus independent. Secondly, it is not an instance of the question of why we sometimes ‘enjoy negative emotions’. In fact, this might not even be relevant to an enquiry into tragic pleasure. It is possible that the pleasure taken in tragedy is in fact a ‘negative emotion’ that we somehow enjoy. If that were found to be the most plausible interpretation of tragic pleasure, then to fully understand that experience we should clearly have to establish how negative emotions can be enjoyable. But as we shall see, this was not Schiller’s interpretation of tragic pleasure; nor, to my knowledge, was it the view of any other canonical writer on tragedy. Rather, philosophers have tended to suppose the pleasure in tragedy to be in itself an uncontroversially positive experience which is, however, in some way related to more pained feelings: catharsis, moral admiration, presentiment of spiritual resolution and the dynamical sublime may all be adduced as examples. How we enjoy negative emotions is thus pertinent to an enquiry into tragic pleasure only if this highly idiosyncratic interpretation of that pleasure could be made plausible; in lieu of this, it is, for our purposes, moot.

Before turning to Schiller’s account, one assumption about tragic pleasure must be stated explicitly, namely that it exists. This has been doubted by at least one recent commentator, who has wondered if the experience may be devoid of pleasure of any kind and sought solely for something like its epistemic value.

I shall not contest this at length here, but it is worth saying a few things to motivate my assumption to the contrary. The first is a prima facie justification, namely that it has been universally accepted as obvious by canonical commentators.

4 The tradition of this ‘Lucretian’ view takes its inspiration from De Rerum Natura, 2. 1–6.

5 For such a view, see e.g. John Steedman, Laelius and Hortensia (Edinburgh: Balfour, 1782), 151–155.


7 Berys Gaut claims that ‘the paradox of tragedy’ is an instance of this more general problem, in his ‘The Paradox of Horror’, BJ 33 (1993), 344. This was also Hume’s question, although he ultimately denies that we actually do enjoy negative emotions per se. See his ‘Of Tragedy’ in his Selected Essays, ed. Stephen Copley (Oxford: OUP, 2008).

8 Alex Neill, ‘Schopenhauer on Tragedy and Value’, in José Luis Bermúdez and Sebastian Gardner (eds), Art and Morality (Oxford: Routledge, 2003), 208; Aaron Ridley expresses qualified support in his ‘Tragedy’, 419.
from Plato onwards, and not merely by those whose hedonic theories of motivation entail that it is needed to account for our interest in the dramas—Kant, Schiller and Schopenhauer, for instance, held it too. It would be quite odd, to say the least, for so many thoughtful people to have mistaken a completely un-pleasurable experience for an importantly pleasurable one. The second is a clutch of concessions. In particular, I should be clear that the existence of tragic pleasure does not entail that: (1) this pleasure is of a sensuous variety; (2) that our response does not also include a painful consciousness of the characters’ sufferings; (3) that this pleasure in tragedies is our only or principal motive in viewing them; or (4) that tragedies’ capacity to be the objects of pleasure is what is principally valuable about them. Schiller explicitly denied (1) and (2), and as will become clear, his view is also perfectly consistent with the rejection of (3) and (4). The intransigent denier of tragic pleasure may still not be convinced, but I hope the foregoing indicates at least that one need not to subscribe to some shallowly hedonistic view of tragedy to be interested in what follows.

II

We may now turn to consider Schiller’s interpretation of our pleasure. As noted above, Schiller understands our pleasure in tragedy as an experience of the sublime, which in turn he held to be an intense consciousness of our freedom. To fill out this claim, it is necessary to look at two areas of Schiller’s philosophy: his view of freedom, and his account of the sublime.

Schiller’s account of freedom is drawn substantially from Kant. Both held that freedom is manifested in the taking of an inclination or a moral precept as a reason for action:

---


11 Regarding (1) see e.g. Friedrich Schiller, ‘On the Pathetic’, in Walter Hinderer and Daniel Dahlstrom (eds), Friedrich Schiller: Essays (New York: Continuum, 1993), 48–49; for (2) see e.g. ibid., 45–46 or ‘On the Sublime’, 44.

12 Schiller’s views are developed in a series of essays written over the 1790s. ‘On the Tragic Art’ and ‘The Pleasure We Derive From Tragic Objects’ date from around 1791; his view matures in ‘Of the Sublime’, ‘On Grace and Dignity’, ‘On Dignity’, ‘On the Pathetic’ (all 1793) and ‘On the Sublime’ (probably between 1794 and 1796). These essays, except ‘Of the Sublime’, were translated rather loosely in Aesthetical and Philosophical Essays (2 vols), trans. Nicholas Dole (Boston: Francis A. Nichols & Co., 1902); Daniel Dahlstrom has more recently produced excellent scholarly translations of all except ‘The Pleasure We Derive From Tragic Objects’, ‘On Grace and Dignity’ and ‘On Dignity’, in Walter Hinderer and Daniel Dahlstrom (eds), Friedrich Schiller: Essays (New York: Continuum, 1993), which I use where possible. For the German originals, see Friedrich Schiller, Erzählungen und Theoretische Schriften, Vol. 5 of Friedrich Schiller: Sämtliche Werke, ed. Wolfgang Riedel (München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2004).

13 My reconstruction here especially involves some selection from Schiller’s writings, which actually seem to contain a number of views of freedom at different times. For a lucid discussion, see Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher, 216–237. My choice is principally motivated by philosophical considerations, but also seems to have been the conception that Schiller settled on in his later essays; see esp. ‘On the Pathetic’, 59–69 and implicitly ‘On the Sublime’, 78. My characterization of Kant’s views is indebted to Henry Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), esp. 11–70.
Freedom of the will is of a wholly unique nature in that an incentive can determine the will to an action only insofar as the individual has incorporated it into his maxim (he has made it into a general rule in accordance with which he will conduct himself). According to a favoured metaphor, this is the freedom of the will ‘as executive’—the capacity to choose which of a range of pre-existing ‘incentives’ to incorporate into its maxims as a reason for action. Hence if I decide to have a glass of water because I am thirsty, I freely act on an inclination taken up as a reason for that action. This is possible only for a rational creature: indeed, it constitutes a basic instantiation of practical rationality. Kant contrasted this with the choices of an animal, which, he supposed, would simply be determined by its thirst to seek water, without the mediation of an active choice. The same may be true for infants, the insane and perhaps sane adults under certain conditions: in such cases their acts, in lacking rationality, also lack this form of freedom. For reasons that we must pass over here, Kant supposed that such free choices of a rational adult cannot be understood in terms of the causal laws of the phenomenal world, and must be regarded as manifestations of the agent’s transcendental freedom.

It is very important to distinguish this freedom as executive from Kant’s famous proposal that the will is also free ‘as legislator’—that is, that it possesses the capacity to actually generate an incentive for itself, namely the moral law. Although one does not manifest one’s freedom as legislator in acting from an amoral incentive, one still manifests one’s freedom as executive. Schiller himself did not appreciate this point in his earlier writings on tragedy, which temporarily led him to the implausible conclusion that tragic heroes acting from motives other than the moral law are unfree and therefore aesthetically defective; in his mature work, however, it is freedom as executive that he places at the centre of his understanding of tragedy.

Schiller’s view of the sublime was also indebted to Kant’s philosophy, specifically to the idea of the ‘dynamical sublime’ that Kant develops in the third Critique. This idea shares with other 18th century conceptions of the sublime the notion that there is something terrible about sublime objects and painful in our response to them; it adds to this, however, that what we really take pleasure in is an awareness of our own super-sensible freedom, which stands above all such natural terrors. We enjoy imaginatively entertaining the idea of something against which we are helpless qua animal, on this view, only because this thought indirectly highlights the ‘capacity for resistance of quite another kind’ within us, that is, the freedom untouchable by any natural power. Schiller departs from Kant, however, in claiming that the most sublime objects of all are not merely those that prompt such awareness via this indirect route, but those in which the overcoming of suffering

---


15 For Kant on animals, see e.g. his *The Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 213–214; on the insane, see his *Lectures on Ethics*, trans. Louis Infield (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1963), 52; for infants, ibid. 57; for people in a state of intoxication, ibid. 62. Schiller remarks that certain behaviours are not under the governance of one’s freedom at ‘On the Pathetic’, 51–52.


17 Ibid., Section 28.
by freedom is actually apparent to the observer in the object. The paradigm of a sublime object accordingly shifts dramatically, from Alpine storms or volcanic eruptions to individuals enduring through suffering. In one essay, Schiller explicitly distinguishes this as the ‘pathetically sublime’ (Pathetischerhabene):

6.10 Two main conditions must be met for the pathetically sublime: first, a vivid image of suffering, in order to awaken the emotion of compassion with the proper strength, and second, an image of the resistance to the suffering, in order to call into consciousness the mind’s inner freedom. Only by virtue of the first does the object become pathetic, only by virtue of the second condition does the pathetic become at the same time something sublime.18

6.15 Our response to the sublime is thus a ‘mixed feeling’: we feel pain on account of our sympathy for suffering, but also ‘gladness’ (Frohsein), rising even to ‘rapture’ (Entzücken), in the consciousness of our freedom occasioned by witnessing resistance to that suffering19

Suffering is thus not an object of pleasure per se, but only an instrument to this consciousness, which is what is actually pleasurable.20 Schiller’s key claim for our purposes is of course that tragedy is sublime in this sense:

6.20 From this basic principle flow the two fundamental laws of all tragic art. These are first: portrayal of the suffering nature; second, portrayal of moral independence in the suffering.21

6.25 There is an important point to be clarified before proceeding. Strictly, according to Kant, all actions of rational creatures manifest freedom to the same extent: there is no obvious sense in which the choice to continue acting from one’s principles in adversity is freer than the choice to betray them. It might be thought that this precludes Schiller’s claim that certain responses to suffering are distinctively sublime, and perhaps even entails that any action of a rational person is as sublime as any other. But this would be to mistake Schiller’s view. Schiller does not hold that sublime actions are those in which freedom is most manifested, but rather those with a distinctive capacity to prompt a consciousness of freedom in the observer.22 And this varies from action to action a great deal. To understand this point, consider Christine Korsgaard’s description of a person who, despite possessing Kantian freedom, uses that freedom simply to follow his or her strongest desire at any given time, thereby behaving exactly as if he or she did not possess this freedom at all.23 Although such a person manifests freedom as much as an ascetic who never acts on

18 Schiller, ‘Of the Sublime’, 44. This essay contains Schiller’s official taxonomy of the sublime; in others, he tends to use ‘sublime’ to refer to the pathetic sublime only. I shall do likewise hereafter. For its possessing greater intensity than other forms of the sublime, see ibid. 23–26 and 36–38. Note that ‘pathetisch’ is really closer to ‘emotive’ than to the English term ‘pathetic’.
19 Schiller, ‘Concerning the Sublime’, 74.
21 Schiller, ‘On the Sublime’, 44.
desires at all, it is clear enough that someone observing him or her would not be vividly impressed by this fact, because his or her actions were in no way outwardly different from the behaviours that he or she would have exhibited without freedom. Hence, Schiller suggests, following the moral law where it diverges from desire is a distinctively vivid revelation of freedom, not because of its moral rightness per se, but because of its independence from inclination: no animal would behave thus. Relatedly, some kinds of distinctively rational immorality may be sublime. One clear case of this would be a long-term project, requiring a conception of a future object of desire and the endurance of much present hardship in its attainment. In spite of being motivated in the last analysis by inclination, such behaviour nonetheless reveals executive freedom and possesses a bleaker sublimity of its own.

III

What sort of considerations can usefully be appealed to in determining how plausible Schiller’s account is? A number of intuitive attractions are immediately apparent. Sandra Shapshay has plausibly claimed that an account of our response to tragedy should capture the mixture of painfulness and pleasurableness involved, and also some sense of its being at once humbling and elevating for the viewer. Schiller’s theory clearly succeeds handsomely on these two scores: it ties the pleasure of the sublime to pain at the other’s suffering, and revealing our transcendental freedom through our physical vulnerability. Relatedly, it is prima facie plausible as an explanation of the widespread sense that we learn something ethically significant from tragedy, in that on Schiller’s view just what is pleasurable is an awareness of our transcendent nature: he goes so far as to claim that without the sublime, ‘we would lose sight of our permanent vocation and our true fatherland’. But these sorts of considerations do not, I suspect, get us very far, because they could also be claimed for many other possible pleasures. In any case, I shall not focus upon them here.

The considerations that I think distinguish Schiller’s theory are, rather, facts about the object of the pleasure, that is, about tragedies. Observations about the object of a pleasure can help us to determine the plausibility of a given characterization of that pleasure in a number of ways. Sometimes, they provide outright counter-examples: as remarked above, the claim that our pleasure in all tragedies is a pleasure in portrayals of morally

---

24 See e.g. Schiller, ‘On the Pathetic’, 62–63.
25 Ibid., 63–69.
27 Sandra Shapshay, ‘The Problem with the Problem with Tragedy: Schopenhauer’s Solution Revisited’, BJ 52 (2012), 17–32. Shapshay correctly attributes these advantages to Schopenhauer’s theory: I shall return to the relationship between Schiller’s and Schopenhauer’s views in Section 4.
29 Schiller, ‘Concerning the Sublime’, 84.
noble heroes is falsified if some tragedies do not portray morally noble heroes. More subtly, however, they can pick out features of the object and show how they make it a proper object of this kind of pleasure. If they can show sufficiently convincingly that this object is just the sort of thing we take this kind of pleasure in, they make it extremely plausible that this is indeed what we are doing. Such observations are especially persuasive if they identify characteristics that had already been considered pleasurable in rival accounts; if a plausible counter-interpretation can be offered of why these characteristics seem pleasurable, the explanatory power of the theory is all the greater. In this section I shall argue that considerations of this kind apply in the case of Schiller’s theory, strongly enough to make it very plausible. In particular, I shall suggest that many of the pre-theoretically important characteristics of tragedy render tragedy sublime in Schiller’s sense—that is, that they may constitute ways in which transcendent freedom is revealed. I begin with the most obvious example—courage—and then pass on to consider three characteristics of tragedy that have been thought by other commentators to be what makes it pleasurable: comings-to-knowledge, collisions of values and the hero’s hamartia. Most of my discussion reconstructs interpretations that Schiller makes in his essays, but of course only a selection may be made from such a rich source; in places, too, I shall go beyond Schiller, in order to draw out respects in which his theory can accommodate insights that other philosophers have had about the object of tragic pleasure.

Schiller’s theory applies most straightforwardly, then, to the courage of the tragic hero. Walter Kaufmann noted that courage is the only characteristic that all tragic heroes share, be they noble or wicked, innocent or wise. It plays an important role as a condition for our pleasure in tragedy in a number of canonical accounts. And indeed, the idea of a tragic hero terrified, broken and abased really is, I submit, an extremely strange one: if Antigone were to plead for her life and scream with animal fear as she was taken away to die, how different would be our response to the play! Schiller’s claim must of course be that the significance of courage for our response is that courage constitutes a revelation of freedom. In fact, he discusses two ways in which what we would call courage may be understood this way, both, to my mind, very plausible. The first is what we might call ‘having strong nerves’—the ability to continue operating as a rational agent rather than to be driven, so to speak, wild with fear. Schiller calls this ‘sublime composure’ or ‘dignity’; he supposes it to be the most important form of sublimity in the plastic arts and still very significant in poetry, as in the response of Milton’s Lucifer to Hell. The second would be choosing to continue to pursue one’s distinctively rational ends, despite one’s fear of the costs to one—be those ends moral or prudential, as per the discussion in Section 2. Schiller terms this ‘sublimity of action’, and holds it to be the central form of the sublime in tragedy, evinced by heroes throughout the canon.

---

30 Kaufmann, *Tragedy and Philosophy*, 145.
32 Schiller, ‘On the Pathetic’, 59–60 and also ‘On Grace and Dignity’ and ‘On Dignity’.
33 Schiller, ‘On the Pathetic’, 60–61 and ‘Concerning the Sublime’.
Schiller may offer plausible interpretations of many of the other properties of tragedy that commentators have held to be important to us, however. Consider first the significance in tragedy of a movement of the hero towards a veridical understanding of his situation: for instance, Oedipus learning of his origins, Heracles of the crimes of his madness, Lear of his culpability. Again, this movement towards understanding has often been thought to be an important element of what it is about tragedy that gives pleasure. Schiller seems to me capable of accounting for the significance of such comings-to-knowledge in several ways. On the simplest level, the discovery is often an occasion for fortitude. When Oedipus, Ajax or Othello learns of the horrible actions he has uncomprehendingly perpetrated, the strength and integrity with which he responds to news that many would refuse to accept or disintegrate before is clearly apt to appear sublime in Schiller’s sense. Such discoveries clearly bring suffering of peculiar depth and intensity; nor do they obscure the hero’s self-expression in the way that some physical torments do. A second point worth making in this connection is that ignorance of the reality of the situation around him is likely to cause the hero to act in self-defeating and futile ways (e.g. Oedipus’ inadvertently cursing himself). Although of course the hero is not strictly less free in such a case, the spectator’s imaginative sense of his liberty is hardly likely to be augmented by the fact that its exercise so frequently has unintended and disastrous effects—and, as per the discussion in Section 2, the viewer’s imaginative sense is what matters. The coming-to-knowledge finally allows the hero to exercise his freedom effectively, and thereby gives the audience a much clearer apprehension of that freedom than whilst its use was ironically thwarted.

Schiller also offers, however, a much deeper interpretation of comings-to-knowledge. This rests on the fact that most such discoveries in tragedy have a strongly ethical dimension: they involve the clarification of the hero’s moral relation to his environment. Consider for instance the discoveries of Oedipus, Heracles, Ajax and Othello. In fact, in many cases the ‘discovery’ is purely ethical—it is an acceptance of culpability or of hitherto-denied obligations. We may number Lear, Don Carlos, Coriolanus and Titus and Bérénice in this class. In these cases the hero accepts terrible burdens as the corollary of acknowledging the moral realities of his situation—sometimes of actual sacrifice, as with Titus and Bérénice or Don Carlos, but more fundamentally of guilt and penitence. Such cases are thus an especially acute instance of Schiller’s sublimity: the free person not merely endures through suffering, but brings it upon himself as the cost of his integrity, that is, his acceptance of the difficult truths that his reason lays down for him.

Consider next Hegel’s celebrated claim that tragedy contains a collision of opposed moral or spiritual principles. Hegel’s most famous illustration is of course Antigone, with Antigone taken to represent loyalty to the family and Creon loyalty to the state, but Hegel


35 Schiller himself had portrayed such revelations in _Die Räuber_ and _Fiesco_.

36 I follow and expand slightly upon Schiller’s discussions at ‘On the Pathetic’, 60–61 and ‘On the Pleasure We Derive from Tragic Objects’, 95–96.

37 Hegel, _Lectures_, II: 1192–1237.
also offered remarkable interpretations of many other tragedies as involving such spiritual oppositions, including *Seven Against Thebes*, *Iphigenia in Aulis* and *Electra*, as well as, in modified forms, *Oedipus Tyrannus*, *Hamlet* and Goethe’s *Faust*. We shall look at how Hegel understood the significance of these oppositions to us in Section 4; for the time being it need only be remarked that though many commentators doubt that Hegel’s account really applies to all canonical tragedies, it has been very widely held that it highlights something profoundly important in many works.  

Again, Schiller has the resources to explain the importance of this feature to our response. Devotion to, and sacrifice for, some principle greater than oneself is for Schiller one of the most vivid expressions of freedom possible. Hence, on the simplest level, the opposition of characters loyal to opposed principles creates a natural setting for the exhibition of that freedom in adversity: the very ardour with which one pursues his ideal creates circumstances for the other to do the same. Antigone would exercise a great deal less courage and zeal if Creon caved in easily and vice versa. In some tragedies, however, the opposing principles are contained within a given character rather than personified in opposing ones. Here I think the Schillerian explanation will be similar to that in the case of coming-to-knowledge. A character who acknowledges a value that he must override in order to honour some value he takes to be higher incurs upon himself a burden of sorrow and agent regret. That one accepts such pain as the cost of one’s continuing commitment to something that one must betray reveals how serious that commitment is. More than this, it also reveals the strength of one’s loyalty to that upon which one did act. Were Brutus to betray Caesar single-mindedly and without moral anxiety we should not, of course, have any sense of his love and loyalty to Caesar, but we should also have a diminished sense of how serious is his dedication to the Republic, for we would not know how dearly he holds the values that he is prepared to override for its sake.

Similar considerations may be adduced to explain the significance of the hero’s *hamartia*. Aristotle’s suggestion that the hero of tragedy play a role in his own downfall in virtue of a *hamartia*, variously translated as ‘flaw’, ‘error of judgement’ or ‘mistake’ is perhaps the most famous of all claims about the characteristics of tragedy. We may pass over the question of which rendering is to be preferred, as well as whether Aristotle’s claim does indeed apply to all tragedies: I suggest only that Schiller may offer interpretations of why the hero’s having some active part in his downfall may play a role in making tragedy pleasurable. Firstly, Schiller might claim that although it is not impossible for a passive tragic hero to express his freedom in solely fortitude or defiance, it is generally less easy to apprehend the dignity of a character that has no part at all in shaping his own destiny, compared

---


with that of a Coriolanus or an Antigone.\footnote{This is hinted at in Schiller’s discussion of the distinction between sublime composure and sublime action; see ‘On the Pathetic’, 59–61. Other commentators have understood the significance of \textit{hamartia} in ways closely related to this: see Hegel, \textit{Lectures}, II: 1214–1215 and Miller, ‘Tragedy and the Common Man’.
} Such a character may tend to seem insipid or inert, on account of one of the most vivid ways of expressing freedom—causally-efficacious action—being precluded. Another way in which Schiller might accommodate the strengths of the Aristotelian account is by appeal to the claim noted above that guilt or agent regret are amongst the most vivid ways of revealing a rational nature. Since one must usually actively transgress in order to occasion these conditions, this important form of the sublime is only available to tragic heroes who are active in shaping their situation.\footnote{‘On the Pleasure’, 95–96, 98.}

This could be contrasted with the relative passivity of the heroes of melodramas, which Schiller might suggest is related to their being pathetically innocent.\footnote{For another account of how freedom could be manifested especially by a hero with a \textit{hamartia}, see Schelling, \textit{Philosophy of Art}, 251–255.
}

It is worth finishing this section by noting some more mundane points about the presentation of the hero in tragedy that are very much in keeping with the spirit of Schiller’s account.\footnote{Schiller’s discussion of dignity (in the sense of dignity of comportment) in ‘On Dignity’ and ‘On Grace and Dignity’ is of special relevance here.}

In particular, the portrayal of heroes tends to de-emphasize their natures as animals and as functionaries in social systems. Tragic heroes are almost never shown eating or sleeping onstage, they virtually never perform quotidian tasks (washing, dressing, etc.) and they are rarely seen in a state of physical exertion. Schiller notes that in successful tragedies, a strong sense is always conveyed of the heroes as individuals irreducible to their social roles: though they are often rulers, we never think of them as ‘the King’ or ‘the General’, but always as Lear or Coriolanus.\footnote{Schiller, ‘On the Pathetic’, 46–47. We might also observe in this connection that tragedies are usually named for their heroes, unlike, say, comedies or social realist dramas.
}

The sense in which I think that all this coheres with Schiller’s account is that inasmuch as the viewer’s imaginative sense of the tragic hero is of a creature of physical needs and appetites, or one reducible to a social role, it precludes apprehending his freedom as a rational person.\footnote{Readers might adduce Phèdre as a conspicuous counter-example. To be sure, she is strongly afflicted with a passion of the flesh. Yet surely there are few more vivid exhibitions of rational personality in literature than the guilt and self-disgust with which she \textit{responds} to this desire!
}

By de-emphasizing such things in their portrayal of the hero, tragedians focus our attention on his personality—he is shown to us as a creature which has only serious thoughts and occupations. Though not strictly a form of the sublime in Schiller’s sense, since no overcoming of suffering is involved, these kinds of characteristics will result in an unmixed and therefore also more muted form of the same kind of pleasure—the apprehension of freedom. We find this also in the speech of tragic heroes: virtually without exception they are highly articulate, use a fairly formal register, and of course speak in verse.\footnote{The ‘elevating’ effect of verse on our perception of the tragic hero was attributed great significance by George Steiner; see his \textit{The Death of Tragedy} (Oxford: OUP, 1980 [1961]).
} This is of course significant in many ways, but for our purposes it may suffice to say that it precludes the errors, obscurities...
and tics which ordinarily inhibit speakers from expressing themselves: the language of the tragic hero tends to be more completely at their command than that of speakers either in other genres, or in reality, and their rational personality more transparently revealed in it. Once again, then, this coheres closely with Schiller’s theory: their portrayal reveals their moral personality un-obscured by exiguous frailties. There are occasional apparent exceptions to this—Lear and Philoctetes, for instance—but it is significant that their degradation is always temporary and succeeded by a dignity of portrayal that is the more vivid for what has preceded it.

If the above observations and interpretations are accurate, it is clear that Schiller’s theory is at least plausible. In particular, it looks to perform well against the interpretative desiderata discussed above. First, it is at least plausible that it has no outright counter-examples. The object of Schiller’s pleasure—the revelation of human freedom—is multiply instantiable, and accordingly only some of the above characteristics need to be present in any given tragedy in order for it to be the proper object of the pleasure Schiller describes. Thus, although it is certainly true that many successful tragedies do not have all of the characteristics discussed above, this is far from sufficient to constitute a counter-example to Schiller’s thesis. I cannot myself find any tragedy that constitutes a clear counter-example, by lacking enough of these qualities, in sufficient measure, for it to be implausible that we take Schiller’s pleasure in it. But of course this cannot be shown exhaustively here, and I must invite readers to consider it for themselves.

My hope, however, is that the observations in this section do not merely fail to falsify Schiller’s account, but that they suggest it is quite attractive. Many of the most prominent and oft-remarked characteristics of tragedy are plausibly just such as to make it the proper object of the pleasure Schiller suggests. Furthermore, as noted, these are often the very characteristics in virtue of which commentators have thought tragedy to be pleasurable: Schiller’s theory can offer a unified account of why all these commentators were right, though not for the reasons they supposed.

IV

If the considerations advanced in the preceding section are correct, then Schiller’s is at least a plausible interpretation of our pleasure in tragedy. Notoriously, however, it has a great many competitors, many of which have furthermore been often found to be plausible in their own right. The question arises, accordingly, of whether the attractiveness of Schiller’s account really distinguishes it very much, or whether a similarly sympathetic reconstruction could make any serious theory of tragedy sound plausible in the same way. I cannot, of course, discuss every account of tragic pleasure ever offered here. Instead, I will compare Schiller’s account with two of its much more famous successors in the post-Kantian tradition, namely the theories of Schopenhauer and Hegel. These two theories, I will argue, each have an important limitation in comparison with Schiller’s view.

Consider firstly Schopenhauer.\(^{48}\) Schopenhauer claims that the vision of the empirical world that we see in tragedies so horrifies us that we are impelled to renounce our

---

\(^{48}\) Schopenhauer’s discussion may be found in *The World as Will and Representation*, I: 252–255 and esp. II: 433–437.

My presentation is indebted to Shapshay, ‘The Problem with the Problem of Tragedy’.
entanglement in it. In this renunciation, we become aware of something within us that transcends this suffering reality, and it is this awareness that is pleasurable:

In the tragedy the terrible side of life is presented to us, the wailing and lamentation of mankind, the dominion of chance and error, the fall of the righteous, the triumph of the wicked; and so that aspect of life is brought before our eyes which directly opposes our will. At this sight we feel ourselves urged to turn our will away from life, to give up willing and loving life. But precisely in this way we become aware that there is still left in us something different that we cannot possibly know positively, but only negatively, as that which does not will life... What gives to everything tragic... the characteristic tendency to the sublime, is the dawning of the knowledge that the world can afford us no true satisfaction, and are therefore not worth our attachment to them.49

It will be readily apparent that Schopenhauer's account shares a number of attractive features with Schiller's. It too characterizes our response as ambivalent: there is something painful and shocking in the experience of tragedy, but also something pleasurable and consoling.50 More than this, the two accounts of these pains and pleasures are similar: in both cases, an initial horror at empirical suffering leads to a pleasurable consciousness of that in us which transcends the world of experience, something that cannot be perceived directly but only as an implication of the distinctive way in which a rational creature responds to empirical suffering.

The most significant difference between Schiller and Schopenhauer, for our purposes, is that Schopenhauer sees the mere presentation of the horrors of the empirical world as sufficient for tragic pleasure. Although our pleasure is constituted by an awareness of human transcendence to suffering, the human in question is the viewer and all that the tragic hero need do to afford the viewer this recognition is to suffer.51 By contrast, Schiller, as we have seen, takes it to be a necessary condition for our pleasure in tragedy that we also see the hero's resistance to suffering: the portrayal of mere suffering, as noted above, is merely distressing for the viewer. It seems to me that Schiller's view is much the more attractive here. To see why, consider the alternative version of Antigone mentioned in Section 3, in which Antigone is led away broken, pleading and screaming with animal fear. Such a play would, I take it, present the horror of suffering, the 'fall of the righteous' and the 'wailings and lamentations of mankind' no less vividly than the actual tragedy—more so, perhaps—yet I submit that a large part of our pleasure in Antigone would be thereby destroyed, to be replaced with horror and disorientation. This suggests, I think, that by locating the transcendence of suffering, so to speak, in the viewer rather than in the work, Schopenhauer has misconstrued as unnecessary to our pleasure much of what really matters in tragedy and underspecified what an object must be like in order to render us tragic pleasure.

Now this is not quite fair to Schopenhauer, for he goes on to claim that the best tragedies are those in which the tragic hero not only occasions the renunciation of the world...
in the viewer, but actually does so himself at the conclusion of the work. This is rather uncommon in the tragic canon—indeed, Schopenhauer apparently held that none of the tragedies of antiquity include it fully—but it is found in certain modern works, notably *Die Jungfrau von Orleans*, *Norma*, the Gretchen episode of *Faust*, *Die Braut von Messina* and *Hamlet*. This addition to Schopenhauer’s account does not, however, help much with our difficulty. The alternative version of *Antigone* remains at least as pleasurable as the actual one, since in neither does Antigone renounce the world in Schopenhauer’s sense, even if it is surpassed by Schopenhauer’s rather eccentric list of favourites. And because only a minority of tragedies portray transcendence as Schopenhauer understands it, Schopenhauer could not rule out the pleasurableness of the alternative *Antigone* by claiming that we only take tragic pleasure in works which actually portray this transcendence, because of course this would also imply that we do not take this pleasure in most tragedies.

This is not to imply that the pleasure Schopenhauer describes has never existed, nor even that it has never been occasioned by a tragedy. It seems to me plausible enough that certain people have, on certain occasions, been prompted to this profound world-renunciation by tragedies and that they would be prompted to the same thing by the alternative *Antigone*. Perhaps Schopenhauer himself was one such. But this is something quite different, and requiring the subject to be in a vastly more unusual condition, to the normal kind of pleasure that one takes when one seriously contemplates a tragic drama. What is implausible is that the normal pleasure that one takes in a reading of *Antigone* would not be seriously marred in the alternative version; it is not implausible that both works could occasionally prompt a second, highly unusual pleasure in certain people already on the brink of this total disillusionment. So Schopenhauer’s account could indeed describe a pleasure in tragedy, but only quite a marginal and special one. For our ordinary aesthetic experiences, Schiller’s account is far more promising.

Matters stand quite differently with Hegel’s account. Hegel takes as his starting point the observation discussed in Section 3 above, namely that tragedies frequently involve the opposition of two spiritual principles, colliding in the action of the drama. In the paradigm case, each principal is championed by a hero who adheres to his or her respective principle absolutely and one-sidedly. At the climax of the tragedy, these representatives perish, but in their perishing the audience is enabled to see what they do not, namely the way in which the truth is shared between their principles. It is this apprehension in the spectator that constitutes our pleasure in tragedy:

In tragedy the eternal substance of things emerges victorious in a reconciling way, because it strips away from conflicting individuals only their false one-sidedness, while the positive elements in what they willed it displays as what is to be retained, without discord but affirmatively harmonized.

---

53 On this eccentricity, see Young, *The Philosophy of Tragedy*, 167–168.
54 Hegel’s main treatment of tragedy is to be found at Lectures, II: 1192–1238. I present Hegel’s account without its original metaphysical garb, interested as I am in seeing how plausible Hegel’s theory of tragedy is intrinsically independent of the support lent to it by Hegel’s wider system.
55 Hegel, Lectures, II: 1199.
Now, in order for a character to be the adequate representative of some great spiritual principle, he or she must clearly have great depth of conviction, and the ability to withstand fear and transitory temptations. Nor should the expression of a character’s deep conviction be obscured by inarticulacy or physical weakness. Hence Hegel’s shares much of Schiller’s attractive picture of the tragic hero, and his tragic pleasure is, like Schiller’s, a kind of awareness of a higher spiritual reality glimpsed through the characters’ travails.

The difficulty with Hegel’s account is in a sense the opposite of that with Schopenhauer’s: it is that the opposition of two partially valid principles, the characteristic of tragedy in virtue of which Hegel holds that we take pleasure in it, simply does not seem to be present in quite a large number of canonical tragedies. This point has been made many times by others and need only be briefly rehearsed here. Almost no tragedies conform perfectly to Hegel’s schema, with two main characters representing equally valid views and both being ruined at the conclusion — Richard II and Antony and Cleopatra suggest themselves, but then Bolingbroke and Octavius survive apparently triumphant, rather than ruined like Creon. The account may be extended, weakening the requirement that the protagonists must perish and that the principles be equally valid and including cases in which the conflict takes place within the characters: this certainly makes the theory’s reach somewhat wider. But even so, there remain many tragic heroes who seem to stand against no opposing principle at all, but only baseness and violence (the Trojan women, Iphigenia, Heracles, the Duchess of Malfi, Britannicus); in other tragedies it is not clear whether anyone at all represents a spiritual principle (what are we to make of Marlowe’s wicked heroes, for instance, of Macbeth or of Schiller’s Wallenstein?). It appears, therefore, that the pleasure that we manifestly take in such works cannot be that which Hegel is describing.

Once again, this does not imply that Hegel’s pleasure does not exist at all, but only that it seems to play a more marginal role in our response to tragedy than that which Schiller describes. Although my own sense is that much of the pleasure we take in Hegel’s spiritual collisions is actually a pleasure in the moral depth of the heroes revealed thereby (as discussed in Section 3), it may also include a pleasurable sense of intellectual resolution. Schiller’s pleasure, however, is surely much more central.

56 See for instance ibid., 1198, 1207; Hegel, Lectures, I: 236–244.
57 This is claimed both by writers unsympathetic to Hegel, e.g. Frank Lawrence Lucas, Tragedy (London: Hogarth Press, 1928), 40–43, and by many who, like myself, believe that there is much of interest and value in Hegel’s discussion, e.g. Anthony Cecil Bradley, ‘Hegel’s Theory of Tragedy’ in his Oxford Lectures on Poetry (New York: Macmillan, 1965 [1909], esp. 85–92; Young, The Philosophy of Tragedy, esp. 135–138; Kaufmann, Tragedy and Philosophy, 324–328 and 326–336 and Gardner, ‘Tragedy, Morality and Metaphysics’, 244–245. Kaufmann suggests that we should not see Hegel as offering a general theory of tragedy at all, but rather a series of rich interpretations of particular groups of tragedies. There is much to be said for this, but it only reinforces the claim that we find in Schiller a more general account of our response to tragedy than we do in Hegel.
58 See Hegel’s discussion of modern ‘romantic’ tragedy at Lectures, II: 1206–1208 and of dramas in which the reconciliation occurs in the drama rather than solely in the audience at ibid. 1203–1205 and 1219–1220; Kaufmann, Tragedy and Philosophy, 326–328.
My suggestion, then, is that the neglect in which Schiller’s account has languished is unjustified and that it constitutes a powerful and attractive characterization of our response to tragedy. Much of what is taken to be important about tragedies, either pre-theoretically or on other canonical theories, can be understood as making them apt for the pleasure that Schiller describes. There are also good reasons to suppose that some of the better-known Idealist theories of tragedy could not play so central a role in explaining our response to tragedy as Schiller’s can. My own view is that this is also true of many of the other canonical theories of tragedy, but this cannot be shown here.

One further consideration should be mentioned before concluding. This is that Schiller’s theory is not necessarily available in isolation from other commitments: in particular, it seems to presuppose some kind of Kantian distinction between rational and sensible nature and a Kantian account of free will. Even if it is possible to disentangle these distinctions from the transcendental idealism in which they were originally embedded, they would clearly remain substantive and contentious philosophical claims. If they are rejected, then Schiller’s intrinsically plausible account of tragedy is imperilled. This opens up some very intriguing questions about the contribution that art may make to philosophy; if we needed a Kantian view of philosophical anthropology and free will to understand our experience of tragedy—an experience that many have taken to be profoundly significant—would this constitute a mark in their favour vis-à-vis their rivals? But such matters are beyond the scope of the present enquiry and must be left for the future.  

Samuel Hughes
Selwyn College, University of Cambridge

---

59 I should like to express my gratitude to Roger Scruton, Andrew Huddleston, Stefan Riedener, Ralph Weir, James Tabbush, an anonymous reviewer at the BJ/A and the late Grahame Lock for their advice and assistance in the composition of this paper.