The Relationship between the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and the SCM Agreement: An Analysis of Hierarchy Rules in the WTO Legal System

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1 INTRODUCTION

The advent of the WTO in 1995 brought with it new disciplines on subsidies and, in particular, agricultural subsidies. However, this was done in an unclear way. In principle, agricultural subsidies might be regulated by the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), the Agreement on Agriculture (Agriculture Agreement), or, in some cases, both.1

The difference is material. The SCM Agreement prohibits WTO members from granting or maintaining import substitution subsidies and export subsidies,2 and from causing adverse effects to the interests of other WTO members through the 'use'3 of other subsidies.4 In addition, the SCM Agreement (together with the GATT 1994)5 allows importing WTO members to impose countervailing duties on subsidized imports that cause injury to their domestic producers. In contrast, the Agriculture Agreement merely sets upper limits on the amount of

1 Article XVI of the GATT 1994 imposes additional disciplines on export subsidies, but in practice an independent claim under this provision would be difficult to envisage: Richard H Steinberg and Timothy E Jodling, When the Peace Ends: The Vulnerability of EC and US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal Challenge 6 J. Intl. Econ. L. 369, 382–384 (2003).
2 Article 3 of the SCM Agreement. Article 27 of the SCM Agreement establishes certain exceptions for developing countries.
4 Article 5 of the SCM Agreement. Article 27 of the SCM Agreement establishes certain exceptions for developing countries.


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trade-distorting subsidies. This makes it important to determine when, for any given subsidy, the SCM Agreement or the Agriculture Agreement applies.

At least in relation to agricultural export subsidies, one might think that this question has now been resolved by the WTO Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition, which states that ‘[d]eveloped Members shall immediately eliminate their remaining scheduled export subsidy entitlements as of [19 December 2015].’ The reference in this Nairobi Decision to ‘scheduled export subsidy entitlements’ seems to imply that the prohibition on export subsidies under the SCM Agreement does not apply to scheduled agricultural export subsidies. In addition, this Decision expressly exempts a number of scheduled agricultural export subsidies from this obligation.

Nonetheless, the legal status and effects of this Nairobi Decision are far from clear. It does not purport to be an authoritative interpretation of the WTO agreements, a waiver of obligations in those agreements or an amendment to those agreements under Articles IX:2, IX:3 and X of the WTO Agreement respectively. Nor would this Decision seem capable of overriding in any other way primary WTO law applicable to agricultural export subsidies. At most, then, this Decision can provide context for the interpretation of WTO law, or, perhaps, preclude WTO members from making dispute settlement claims contrary to its terms.

Turning then to the primary law, the key provision concerning the relationship between the SCM Agreement and the Agriculture Agreement is Article 21.1 of the Agriculture Agreement, which states as follows:

The provisions of GATT 1994 and of other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement [including the SCM Agreement] shall apply subject to the provisions of this [i.e. Agriculture] Agreement.

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6 Article 3 and Parts IV and V of the Agriculture Agreement.
8 WTO Ministerial Conference, Decision on Export Competition, supra n. 7, footnotes 3 and 4 make an exception for certain subsidies for sugar, processed products, dairy products, and swine meat, and the Decision also makes certain exceptions for developing countries.
10 It could be a ‘subsequent agreement’ or ‘subsequent practice’ under Art. 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See infra at text to n. 47.
11 Ibid., para. 228; Peru – Agricultural Products, WT/DS457/AB/R, adopted 31 Jul. 2015, para. 5.25.
12 Article 21.1 of the Agriculture Agreement was formerly less important because of Art. 13 of the same agreement (the ‘peace clause’). Article 13 provided expressly that, until the end of 31 Dec. 2003, certain types of agricultural subsidies were exempt from challenges under the SCM Agreement and the GATT 1994. Article 13 is also referenced in Arts 5, 6 and 7 of the SCM Agreement.
Article 21.1 is a hierarchy rule, in the sense of a rule that determines which of two ‘primary’ rules applies to a given fact. The following makes some general comments about hierarchy rules in order to provide a conceptual framework for understanding Article 21.1 as well as the Appellate Body’s various approaches to this provision.

2 A TYPOLOGY OF HIERARCHY RULES

It is submitted that one can identify three main categories of hierarchy rules. First, there are hierarchy rules that state that a primary rule applies (or, more commonly, does not apply) to certain facts (usually, conduct). Thus, Article 1.5 of the TBT Agreement states that ‘[t]he provisions of this Agreement do not apply to sanitary and phytosanitary measures as defined in [the SPS Agreement]’. This category also covers exceptions stating that ‘nothing shall prevent’ certain conduct or ‘notwithstanding’ a given obligation certain conduct is permitted. Such provisions require a determination that a measure meets the given description; once that determination is made, the rule automatically disables the application of any contrary rule (typically, but not necessarily, an obligation). There is no need to determine, for example, whether a given fact is legal under one rule but illegal under another. Provided that the exceptions provision applies, the second rule will not be relevant.

Hierarchy rules in the second category operate by comparing the sets of facts described by the two competing primary rules. The classic example of such hierarchy rules is the *lex specialis* principle, which operates by displacing a ‘general’ rule that describes a set of facts in favour of any ‘special’ rule that describes a subset

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13 For the purpose of hierarchy rules, ‘facts’ can include both ‘brute facts’ such as things (e.g., fruit or a ‘measure’) or conduct (e.g., the eating of apples or the adoption of a measure) and, to use another concept, ‘institutional facts’ such as rules (e.g., a rule stating that eating apples is prohibited). See G.E.M. Anscombe, *On Brute Facts* (1958) 18 Analysis 69 and Neil McCormick, *Law as Institutional Fact*, 90 L. Q. Rev. 102 (1974). At a greater level of abstraction, one can conceive of ‘facts’ for these purposes as the minor term in any legal syllogism (or an ‘if-then’ propositional logical formula) in which the major term is the rule, and the conclusion is a legal outcome (typically a binary determination of validity or legality).


of those facts. It will be noted that, whereas the first category of hierarchy rule itself defines the relevant set of facts (albeit this can be contracted out to a primary rule), for the second category of hierarchy rule, the two sets of facts are necessarily defined by the two primary rules.

Both of these categories of hierarchy rules are to be distinguished from hierarchy rules that operate by comparing the legal consequences of applying the competing primary rules to the same fact. The primary examples of rules in this category are those based on a ‘conflict’ between different provisions. An example is the General Interpretive Note to Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement, which that ‘[i]n the event of conflict between a provision of the [GATT] 1994 and a provision of another agreement in Annex 1A . . . the provision of the other agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict’. However, strictly speaking, it cannot be said that provisions are ever in ‘conflict’ in the abstract. The ‘conflict’ is between the two legal consequences of applying each provision to the same fact.

But, what is a ‘conflict’ for these purposes? At a minimum, there will be a ‘conflict’ when one rule prohibits conduct that another rule requires. In this case, the two results are in a logical contradiction: conduct cannot be both prohibited and required at the same time. However, rules can also conflict in the absence of a logical conflict. This is the case, for example, when one rule prohibits conduct that another rule permits. It is logically possible to comply with both rules, namely by refraining from that conduct. But doing so, nullifies the right established by one of the rules. This is why it is wrong, as a general proposition of law, to limit legal conflicts to logical conflicts. But, it is particularly wrong to do so in the WTO


17 Elisabetta Montaguti & Maurits Lugard, The GATT 1994 and Other Annex 1A Agreements: Four Different Relationships? 3 J. Intl. Econ. L. 473, 476 (2000), say that the General Interpretive Note to Annex 1A expressly states that ‘whenever compliance with one provision of an Annex 1A Agreement would lead to a violation of GATT 1994 or vice versa – in other words, when the two provisions are “mutually exclusive” – the Annex 1A Agreement prevails’. However, the General Interpretive Note does not define ‘conflict’. See also Joost Pauwelyn, Cross-Agreement Complaints Before the Appellate Body: A Case Study of the EC–Asbestos Dispute 1 World Trade Rev. 63, 81 (2002).


19 Cf. Clyde Engineering Co Ltd v Cowburn (1926) 37 CLR 466, 478, per Knox CJ and Gavan Duffy J, stating that ‘[s]tatutes may do more than impose duties: they may, for instance, confer rights; and one statute is inconsistent with another when it takes away a right conferred by that other even though the right be one which might be waived or abandoned without disobeying’. For the opposite view, see WTO Panel Report, Indonesia – Automobiles, adopted 23 Jul. 1998, WT/DS54/R, para. 14.28 n 649 and WTO Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, WT/DS34/R, adopted 19 Nov. 1999, para. 9.92–9.95. For a critique, see Pauwelyn, ibid.
legal system, given that Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), prohibits findings, rulings and recommendations that ‘add to or diminish’ both the rights and the obligations set out in the covered agreements.

The difference between these categories can be illustrated by reference to the rather unusual hierarchy rule in Article 1.2 of the DSU, which states that ‘[t]o the extent that there is a difference between the rules and procedures of this Understanding and the special or additional rules and procedures set forth in Appendix 2, [the latter] shall prevail’. Textually, rules and procedures are ‘different’ when they describe different facts (i.e., conduct), and so Article 1.2 would ordinarily fall into the second category of hierarchy rules as a rule that compares the two sets of facts described in the respective primary rules (but without requiring that these facts comprise a set/subset dyad, as for the lex specialis rule). In Guatemala – Cement I, however, the Appellate Body said that ‘[a] special or additional provision should only be found to prevail over a provision of the DSU in a situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to a violation of the other provision, that is, in the case of a conflict between them’. In other words, it saw Article 1.2 of the DSU as a rule requiring a comparison of the legal consequences of applying a rule to one of those facts, and thereby falling into the second category of rules described above.

In summary, there are three main categories of hierarchy rule. One is based on a simple description of a fact, and states that when that fact exists a given rule applies (or does not apply). Exceptions fall into this category. A second is also based on facts, but operates by comparing the facts described by the two competing primary rules. This is where the lex specialis rule is to be found. And both of these categories must be distinguished from a third category of hierarchy rules, which operates by comparing the legal consequences of applying the two primary rules to the same fact. This is where conflicts rules are located.

3 ARTICLE 21.1 OF THE AGRICULTURE AGREEMENT

These different types of hierarchy rule having been set out, it is possible to address Article 21.1 of the Agriculture Agreement, and in particular what it means for the SCM Agreement to be ‘subject to’ the provisions of the Agriculture Agreement. As

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20 WTO Appellate Body Report, Guatemala – Cement I, WT/DS60/AB/R, adopted 25 Nov. 1998, para. 65. The Appellate Body was concerned to establish a unified dispute settlement system for all measures: ibid., para. 66. Note also that the reference to ‘adherence’ indicates that the Appellate Body might have understood the concept of legal conflict to include situations in which a right overrides an obligation: see Lorand Bartels, Treaty Conflicts in WTO Law – A Comment on William J. Davy’s Paper ‘The Quest for Consistency’ in At the Crossroads: The World Trading System and the Doha Round 138–142 (Stefan Griller ed., Springer 2008).
will be seen, the Appellate Body has adopted a variety of different approaches to this question, sometimes virtually simultaneously.

The first Appellate Body report to consider Article 21.1 was EC – Bananas III (1997). The question was whether the prohibition on quantitative restrictions on goods in Article XIII GATT 1994 was ‘subject to’ Article 4.1 of the Agriculture Agreement. The Appellate Body said:

[T]he provisions of the GATT 1994 . . . apply to market access commitments concerning agricultural products, except to the extent that the Agreement on Agriculture contains specific provisions dealing specifically with the same matter.21

The Appellate Body continued:

[W]e do not see anything in Article 4.1 to suggest that market access concessions and commitments made as a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations on agriculture can be inconsistent with the provisions of Article XIII of the GATT 1994. There is nothing in Articles 4.1 or 4.2, or in any other article of the Agreement on Agriculture, that deals specifically with the allocation of tariff quotas on agricultural products. If the negotiators had intended to permit Members to act inconsistently with Article XIII of the GATT 1994, they would have said so explicitly.22

The Appellate Body here seemed to adopt several different hierarchy rules. In the first of these quoted paragraphs, and in the second sentence of the second, it seemed to adopt a hierarchy rule falling in the second category identified above. That is to say, it saw Article 21.1 as a lex specialis test involving ‘institutional facts’, namely rules governing tariff quotas on agricultural products,23 the implication being that if those rules are more detailed in the Agriculture Agreement than equivalent rules in the GATT 1994, they will be considered more ‘specific’ and will prevail over those other rules. (The reason for saying ‘seemed’ is that it is also possible that such rules would conflict with each other, which would involve hierarchy rule in the third category identified above. It was unnecessary to consider this possibility.)

In contrast, the first and third sentences of the second quoted paragraph indicate a conception of Article 21.1 of the Agriculture Agreement as a hierarchy rule falling in the first category identified above. It stated that Article 21.1 requires an indication in the Agriculture Agreement that a prohibition in another agreement would be disabled for a certain type of measure, in other words, an exception. The Appellate Body elaborated with two examples.


22 Ibid., para. 157.

23 On this type of ‘institutional fact’, see supra n. 13.
The first of these examples was Article 5 of the Agriculture Agreement. The Appellate Body said that:

Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture allows Members to impose special safeguards measures that would otherwise be inconsistent with Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and with the Agreement on Safeguards.  

The second example was Article 13 of the Agriculture Agreement, which, disables dispute settlement actions based on Article XVI of the GATT 1994 or Part III of the SCM Agreement (but not Article XIII of the GATT 1994) in respect of certain measures during the implementation period.

In sum, in EC – Bananas III the Appellate Body seems to have identified Article 21.1 of the Agriculture Agreement in terms of two different types of hierarchy rule. First, Article 21.1 could be seen as a lex specialis rule triggered by more ‘specific’ (i.e., detailed) rules on the allocation of agricultural quotas in the Agriculture Agreement. Second, Article 21.1 could be seen as reinforcing any provision in the Agriculture Agreement that disables rules in another agreement in respect of certain measures.

In Chile – Price Band System (2002), the Appellate Body adopted another type of hierarchy rule. The question in this case was whether, for the purposes of determining the order of analysis, the first sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 was ‘subject to’ Article 4.2 of the Agriculture Agreement. The Appellate Body said:

Article 4.2 prevents WTO Members from circumventing their commitments on ‘ordinary customs duties’ by prohibiting them from ‘maintaining, reverting to, or resorting to’ measures other than ‘ordinary customs duties’. The first sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 also deals with ‘ordinary customs duties’, by requiring Members not to impose ‘ordinary customs duties’ in excess of those recorded in their Schedules. Thus, the obligations in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture and those in the first sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT both deal with ‘ordinary customs duties’ and market access for imported products. As we see it, the difference between the two provisions is that Article

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24 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, supra n. 21, at para. 157. In fact, Art. 5 of the Agriculture Agreement does not say anything about measures that would be inconsistent with Art. XIX of the GATT 1994 or the Safeguards Agreement. Art. 5.8 is the only part of Art. 5 that refers to Art. XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Safeguards Agreement, and this paragraph does not say whether a special safeguard measure would be inconsistent with Art. XIX of the GATT 1994 or the Safeguards Agreement. It states, rather, that in respect of certain special safeguard measures WTO members will not exercise their rights to suspend concessions in response. The Appellate Body’s description better suits Art. 5.1, which states that special safeguard measures may be taken ‘notwithstanding’ the obligation in Art. II:1(b) of GATT 1994 (but not the other provisions cited by the Appellate Body).

25 The rights to bring actions based on these provisions are contained in Art. XXIII GATT 1994 and the DSU. The Appellate Body was technically inaccurate when it said that Art. 13 provides that Members may not bring dispute settlement actions under either Article XVI of the GATT 1994 or Part III of the [SCM Agreement] (emphasis added).

4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture deals more specifically with preventing the circumvention of tariff commitments on agricultural products than does the first sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994. 27

Here the Appellate Body decided that Article 4.2 was more specific than the equivalent GATT 1994 provisions 28 because it concerns agricultural products, whereas the GATT concerns all products, including agricultural products. This is a very simple version of the lex specialis principle in which the ‘brute facts’ in the Agriculture Agreement are a subset of the ‘brute facts’ in the SCM Agreement. 29 It would follow that, on this basis, the Agriculture Agreement will always be more ‘specific’ than the other WTO agreements.

Probably for this reason, this approach has not been followed in subsequent Appellate Body jurisprudence. In US – Upland Cotton, the Appellate Body endorsed the Panel’s statement that Article 21.1 would apply in the following three situations:

[W]here...an explicit carve-out or exemption from the disciplines in Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement existed in the text of the Agreement on Agriculture. . . . [W]here it would be impossible for a Member to comply with its domestic support obligations under the Agreement on Agriculture and the Article 3.1(b) prohibition simultaneously. . . . [W]here there is an explicit authorization in the text of the Agreement on Agriculture that would authorize a measure that, in the absence of such an express authorization, would be prohibited by Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement. 30

The first and third of these situations are the same as one of the situations mentioned in EC – Bananas III, namely where a provision in the Agriculture authorizes a measure that would be prohibited in another agreement (i.e., an exception). The second involves hierarchy rules of the third category based on logical contradiction and legal conflict (i.e., respecting rights as well as obligations).

But then, interestingly, the Appellate Body added that ‘[t]here could be . . . situations other than those identified by the Panel where Article 21.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture may be applicable’. 31 It elaborated as follows:

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28 In fact, Art. 4.2 of the Agriculture Agreement does not concern ordinary customs duties but rather other measures that, by definition, are precisely not ordinary customs duties, because they are required by this provision to be converted into ordinary customs duties. The equivalent rules in the GATT 1994 would probably be the second sentence of Art. II:1(b), which governs ‘all other duties and charges’, Art. XI:1, which governs quantitative restrictions, and Art. III, which establishes an obligation not to discriminate against imported products.
29 See supra n. 13.
It may well be that a measure that is an import substitution subsidy could fall within the second sentence of paragraph 7 [of Annex 3 of the Agriculture Agreement] as ‘[m]easures directed at agricultural processors [that] shall be included [in the AMS calculation] […]’. There is nothing, however, in the text of paragraph 7 that suggests that such measures, when they are import substitution subsidies, are exempt from the prohibition in Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.32

How is one to interpret this passage? On the one hand, the Appellate Body might simply have been describing the types of hierarchy rules that have already been discussed, and this explains the Appellate Body’s approach to Article 6.3 of the Agriculture Agreement.33 However, another intriguing possibility emerges from its treatment of United States’ argument concerning paragraph 7 of Annex 3 of the Agriculture Agreement. The United States had argued that this provision would have no meaning if it did not establish a right to adopt import substitution subsidies.34 The Appellate Body disagreed that this was the case, but in doing so, it appeared to agree with the assumption that Article 21.1 would be triggered by a provision in the Agriculture Agreement that would otherwise have no meaning.35 Such a rule would fall into the third category of hierarchy rules mentioned above but, importantly, without requiring a determination that a given fact is expressly permitted under one of the primary rules: it is sufficient if it is not prohibited.

The last case to consider Article 21.1 of the Agriculture Agreement is EC – Sugar Subsidies (2005), decided a month after US – Upland Cotton (2005). The Appellate Body said:

Members explicitly recognized that there may be conflicts between the Agreement on Agriculture and the GATT 1994, and explicitly provided, through Article 21, that the Agreement on Agriculture would prevail to the extent of such conflicts. Similarly, the General interpretative note to Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement states that ‘[i]n the event of conflict between a provision of the [GATT 1994] and a provision of another agreement in Annex 1A ..., the provision of the other agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict.’ The Agreement on Agriculture is contained in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement.36

The analogy offered here with the conflicts rule in the General Interpretive Note indicates that Article 21.1 of the Agriculture Agreement requires a determination of the legality of a subsidy under the Agriculture Agreement and under the GATT 1994 respectively, and it is only when these outcomes are in

32 Ibid., para. 541.
33 Ibid., paras 543–545.
34 Ibid., para. 542.
35 Ibid.
‘conflict’ that Article 21.1 will apply in favour of the relevant provision of the Agriculture Agreement.

SUMMARY

The Appellate Body has offered several different interpretations of Article 21.1 of the Agriculture Agreement. It has seen Article 21.1 as a rule in the first category of hierarchy rules mentioned above, and it has done so in two ways. The Appellate Body has said that Article 21.1 is a rule triggered by a provision in the Agriculture Agreement that expressly disables a contrary provision in one of the competing agreements, such as Articles 5 and 13 of the Agriculture Agreement (EC – Bananas III; US – Upland Cotton); but, significantly, it has also seen Article 21.1 as triggered by a provision in the Agriculture Agreement that would otherwise be rendered inutile by a rule in a competing agreement (US – Upland Cotton).

The Appellate Body has also seen Article 21.1 as a hierarchy rule falling in the second category, which is to say one that requires a comparison between the facts described in the competing primary rules. It has also done this in two main ways, depending on the ‘facts’ that it has considered relevant. In this context, it will be recalled that ‘facts’ for this purpose can be of any type; the only condition is that they are described by a primary rule.

Thus, the Appellate Body has seen Article 21.1 as a lex specialis rule favouring the Agriculture Agreement because this agreement contains rules concerning agricultural products, whereas the GATT 1994 contains rules concerning all products (Chile – Price Band System). On the other hand, the Appellate Body has seen Article 21.1 as a lex specialis rule favouring the Agriculture Agreement because the rules in that agreement covering agricultural products are more ‘specific’ than the equivalent rules in the GATT 1994 covering the same products (EC – Bananas III). There are problems with both of these approaches. The problem with the first is that the Agriculture Agreement would always have priority over the GATT 1994, which does not seem to have been a popular conclusion. The problem with the second is that, in practice, not many rules in the Agriculture Agreement are obviously more ‘specific’ than an equivalent rule in the GATT 1994. Article 13 of the Agriculture Agreement is a rare example of a rule that could be seen this way.

Finally, the Appellate Body has seen Article 21.1 as a hierarchy rule of the third kind, which is to say one that is triggered by a conflict between the

37 But, as noted supra n. 24, this would be Art. 5.1 of the Agriculture Agreement, not Art. 5.8, to which (by implication) the Appellate Body was referring.

38 Again, the Appellate Body’s own example was not convincing, as discussed supra n. 24.
Agriculture Agreement and another relevant agreement (US – Upland Cotton; EC – Sugar Subsidies). In principle, this is unproblematic, but for the practical difficulty that the Agriculture Agreement does not contain many express rights that conflict with the other agreements, once one discounts exceptions, which are more properly seen as rules falling into the first category of hierarchy rules.

4 AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES UNDER THE AGRICULTURE AGREEMENT AND THE SCM AGREEMENT

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The range of interpretations given to Article 21.1 of the Agriculture Agreement makes it somewhat difficult, in theory, to determine when that agreement will prevail over the SCM Agreement. Nonetheless, it is possible to draw some conclusions, based on these different interpretations.

4.2 IMPORT SUBSTITUTION SUBSIDIES

In US – Upland Cotton, the Appellate Body decided that the Agriculture Agreement does not override the prohibition in the SCM Agreement on import substitution subsidies: the Agriculture Agreement contained no provision establishing a right to adopt such measures or that would have been rendered inutile by the SCM Agreement.39

4.3 EXPORT SUBSIDIES

In relation to export subsidies, the key provision is Article 8 of the Agriculture Agreement, which states that WTO members agree ‘not to provide export subsidies otherwise than in conformity with [the Agriculture Agreement]’.40 Some authors have said that this amounts to an ‘explicit authorization’ of conforming agricultural export subsidies41 or that ‘it is patent that the URAA allows Members to use export subsidies under precisely defined conditions’.42 This goes too far. There is nothing explicit or patent about Article 8. However, there are reasons why

39 See infra at text to nn. 35–35.
40 Article 3.3 of the Agriculture Agreement also prohibits unscheduled agricultural export subsidies.
Article 8 might nonetheless prevail over the prohibition on export subsidies in the SCM Agreement.

It could namely be argued that Article 8 would be rendered inutile if it did not authorize subsidies that are in conformity with the Agriculture Agreement. Unlike the situation in relation to import substitution subsidies, the SCM Agreement prohibits export subsidies regardless of whether they conform to the Agriculture Agreement. As a result, it can be said that Article 8 would have no meaning if it did not immunize export subsidies from this prohibition. If so, then on the interpretation of Article 21.1 of the Agriculture Agreement implicitly adopted by the Appellate Body in US – Upland Cotton, export subsidies that conform to the Agriculture Agreement must be permitted.

Such a reading is also supported by the 2015 Nairobi WTO Ministerial Decision, which, by requiring the elimination of some agricultural export subsidies and expressly permitting the continuation of certain others, implies that such subsidies are not already prohibited. Moreover, while, as noted above, this Decision does not fall within the usual framework of WTO decision-making, it may still have a bearing on the interpretation of Article 8 of the Agriculture Agreement as a ‘subsequent agreement’ or ‘subsequent practice’ concerning that provision within the meaning of Article 31(3)(a) and (b) respectively of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

Concerning the first option, the Appellate Body has previously considered a Decision of a WTO Ministerial Conference and a Decision of the TBT Committee to qualify as a ‘subsequent agreement’ regarding the interpretation of WTO law. However, in the same context Appellate Body also stated that such an agreement must ‘bear[…] specifically’ on the provision being interpreted; a vague reference to whether a type of measure is permitted or not sufficient. Given the absence of any reference in this Decision on Export Competition to Article 8 of the Agriculture Agreement, it might be difficult to consider it a ‘subsequent agreement’ bearing specifically on the interpretation of that provision.

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43 Steinberg & Josling, supra n. 1, 377.
44 Supra at text to nn. 35–35.
45 Supra n. 7.
46 Supra text to nn. 9–9.
This leads one to consider the second option, namely, whether the Decision could constitute ‘subsequent practice’ regarding the interpretation of a treaty provision. While the interpretive effects of ‘subsequent agreements’ and ‘subsequent practice’ are essentially the same, it would appear that they differ formally insofar as the subsequent practice does not require the express reference to the provision being interpreted. In *US – Gambling*, the Appellate Body said that ‘(i) there must be a common, consistent, discernible pattern of acts or pronouncements; and (ii) those acts or pronouncements must imply agreement on the interpretation of the relevant provision.’\(^{49}\) Subsequent practice may also constitute an understanding that a certain provision does not relate to certain facts. For example, in its advisory opinion on *Nuclear Weapons* the International Court of Justice said that the parties to relevant international instruments had, in their practice, shown their understanding that the term ‘poison or poisoned weapons’ did not include nuclear weapons.\(^{50}\) It is therefore possible to consider the Nairobi Decision on Export Competition, along with the series of previous instruments on the issue,\(^{51}\) as subsequent practice evincing the common assumption – and therefore interpretation – of all WTO Members that Article 8 of the Agriculture Agreement permits for the time being scheduled agricultural export subsidies (at the same time, of course, as this Decision purports to require the elimination of at least some of these subsidies). Consequently, as a result of Article 21.1 of the Agriculture Agreement, Article 8 prevails over the prohibition on such subsidies in Article 3 of the SCM Agreement.

4.4 **ACTIONABLE SUBSIDIES**

As mentioned, the SCM Agreement prohibits WTO members from granting subsidies that cause ‘adverse effects’ to the interests of WTO members, and (together with Article VI of the GATT 1994) permits WTO members to impose countervailing duties on subsidies that cause ‘injury’ to their domestic industries. The Agriculture Agreement does not contain any explicit right to adopt subsidies


\(^{51}\) *WTO Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, adopted 20 Nov. 2001, para. 13; WTO General Council, *Framework for Establishing Modalities in Agriculture, WT/L/579, adopted 1 Aug. 2004, Annex A, para. 17; the WTO Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(05)/DEC, adopted 18 Dec. 2005, para. 6; and the WTO Bali Ministerial Declaration on Export Competition, WT/MIN(13)/40, adopted 7 Dec. 2013, para. 2, (albeit para. 13 states that ‘the terms of this declaration do not affect the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements nor shall they be used to interpret those rights and obligations’).*
causing such ‘adverse effects’ or ‘injury’, but does it contain any provisions concerning such subsidies that would be rendered inutile by the SCM Agreement? Again, the most likely candidate is Article 8 of the Agriculture Agreement. The question then is whether all of the subsidies described in this provision will necessarily cause adverse ‘effects’ to the interests of other WTO members or ‘injury’ to their domestic producers. That cannot be said with certainty; as a result, Article 21.1 will not operate to give priority to Article 8 over these competing provisions in the SCM Agreement.52

5 CONCLUSION

Article 21.1 of the Agriculture Agreement, which has governed the relationship between the Agriculture Agreement and the SCM Agreement since the expiry of the ‘peace clause’ at the end of 2003, has been given numerous different meanings by the Appellate Body.

Some of these meanings appear to have melted away, at least for the Appellate Body: for example, the idea, suggested in Chile – Price Band System, that the Agriculture Agreement is more ‘specific’ than the GATT 1994 because it covers agricultural products rather than all products. In contrast, Article 21.1 can be understood to apply when the Agriculture Agreement explicitly displaces a contrary rule in a competing agreement, or establishes an express right to adopt a measure. Beyond this, significantly, US – Upland Cotton indicates that Article 21.1 also applies when otherwise a provision of the Agriculture Agreement would be rendered ‘inutile’ by a contrary provision of a relevant WTO Agreement. This reading is also confirmed by subsequent practice, notably, the 2015 Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition, even as this Decision purports to require the elimination of at least some agricultural export subsidies.

On this reading, one can arrive at the conclusion that agricultural export subsidies that, in accordance with Article 8 of the Agriculture Agreement, conform to the commitments of WTO members in the Agriculture Agreement remain exempt from the prohibition set out in Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement. In contrast, as already decided, agricultural import substitution subsidies remain prohibited under Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement. Beyond this, agricultural subsidies causing adverse effects to the interests of WTO members remain actionable under Article 5 of the SCM Agreement, and agricultural subsidies causing injury to the domestic industries of WTO members may be subject to the imposition of countervailing duties by those members under Part V of that Agreement, in conjunction with Article VI of the GATT 1994.

52 For the same result, see Steinberg & Josling, supra n. 1, 385 and Coppens, supra n. 41, 329.