Philippine *Indios* in the Service of Empire: Indigenous Soldiers and Contingent Loyalty, 1600–1700

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**Abstract.** Philippine *indios* served in the Spanish armies in the thousands in expeditions of conquest and defense across Spain's Pacific possessions, often significantly outnumbering their Spanish counterparts. Based on detailed archival evidence presented for the first time, this article extends the previously limited nature of our understanding of indigenous soldiers in the Spanish Pacific, focusing in particular on the problem of what motivated indigenous people to join the Spanish military. The existing historiography of reward structures among indigenous elites is here coupled with an analysis of the way in which military service intersected with other forms of coerced labor among nonelite Philippine *indios*. An understanding of pre-Hispanic cultures of warfare and debt servitude helps make the case that many indigenous soldiers were pushed into military service as a way of paying off debts or to avoid other forms of forced labor. Thus indigenous participation in the empire was always tenuous and on the brink of breaking down.

**Keywords.** indigenous soldiers, Philippines, Spanish Empire, military service

In August 1642 the Dutch consolidated their control over Formosa—modern-day Taiwan—ejec ting the small Spanish garrison from their fort at Jilong and effectively ending the fitful sixteen-year Spanish presence on the island. Curiously, the Dutch conquering party incorporated a number of Philippine *indios*, natives of the provinces of Pampanga and Cagayan in northern Luzon. They had come to Formosa as conscripted soldiers in the Spanish military and served as soldiers and laborers in the construction of Spanish fortifications. Fed up with the lack of supplies, a lack of payment for their labor, and the ongoing cruelty and exploitation of their Spanish
overseers, these indigenous soldiers deserted and joined the Dutch forces, stationed on the other side of the island. When the Dutch finally invaded the Spanish military outpost, these same indios fought alongside their Dutch counterparts against those who had previously been their comrades and allies, including natives from their own lands.¹

The presence of Philippine defectors in the Dutch conquering party on Formosa complicates our understanding of the role played by Philippine indios in the Spanish imperial project. During the seventeenth century Philippine indios served in the thousands in Spanish missions of conquest, pacification, and defense. Yet our understanding of their participation in support of empire — their choice to act as enablers of Spanish aims, as indigenous conquistadors — is limited. Furthermore, the reliance of the Spanish on indigenous soldiers upsets one of the most enduring images of Spanish imperialism, which pits conqueror against conquered in an indissoluble dichotomy. This article thus examines the presence of Philippine indios in Spanish armies in the seventeenth-century Pacific, raising in particular the question of what motivated different indigenous people to play this role. I argue that indigenous integration into Spanish colonial armies was facilitated by a Spanish engagement with pre-Hispanic traditions of warfare and servitude and a co-option of preexisting social structures in service of Spanish aims. While indigenous elites were drawn into a new colonial power structure, the majority of Philippine indios experienced military service as an extension of debt servitude and forced labor.

In recent years historians of Latin America have highlighted the importance of indigenous intermediaries and native allies in the process of Spanish colonization.² Their work has emphasized Spanish reliance not only on individual natives — who functioned as interpreters, navigators, and political or cultural negotiators — but also on pre-Hispanic social structures and systems of tribute and forced labor that became the blueprint for future Spanish systems. Across their divergent empire the Spanish sought to impose their authority where possible by transitioning already existing power relations. The role of indigenous elites is particularly important in this analysis. While the Spanish sought to co-opt local elites in an effort to impose new tribute and labor regimes, these same elites often used the logic of the new colonial order to solidify their social status.³

These analyses have furthermore helped explain the significant presence of indigenous soldiers in Spanish expeditions of conquest and pacification. The use of native soldiers in the conquest of other indigenous groups has a long history in the development of the Spanish Empire. The siege and conquest of Tenochtitlán by Hernán Cortés in 1520 relied on the support of large numbers of indigenous soldiers from the Tlaxcala region of Mexico.
Although it is rarely noted in accounts that trumpet the glory of Cortés and his small contingent of Spanish conquistadors, recent research has indicated that up to twenty-four thousand indigenous soldiers took part in these battles, outnumbering the Spaniards nearly fifty to one. Similar stories can be told of the indigenous allies present in missions of conquest and pacification in the sixteenth century in Guatemala and Central America, the Yucatán, Nueva Galicia, and Oaxaca, and in the wars with the Chichimecas in northern New Spain throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. Companies of indigenous soldiers were also found across most South American territories. Particularly in Central Mexico and the Andes, historians have looked toward preexisting anti-imperial struggles against the Aztec and Incan Empires to explain the willingness of indigenous groups to ally themselves so strongly with the Spanish conquering forces. Additionally, Spanish rewards for military service in the form of land grants and encomiendas are mentioned as motivating indigenous elites to participate in Spanish armies. By contrast, the participation of the vast majority of nonelite indios in the Spanish military is often understood as a form of slavery or forced servitude—an issue that has hitherto received much less attention than the question of elite participation.

The historiography of the colonial Philippines has been slow to take up these innovations in the larger historiography of the Spanish Empire, particularly with respect to the role of Philippine indios in Spanish armies. Unable to account for the integration of the colonized into the armies of the colonizers, some of the earliest and most influential historians of colonial Philippine history, such as John Leddy Phelan and John Larkin, de-emphasized or reduced the role that indigenous soldiers played in the consolidation of Spanish aims. While a newer generation of historians has resurrected the role of Philippine indios in the colonization of the Marianas, the Maluku Islands, and Taiwan, they have demonstrated uneasiness when it comes to the question of what motivated these soldiers to participate in Spanish armies. Where motivation has been mentioned, it has been reduced to an analysis of rewards given to indigenous elites, as well as notions of prestige. Nevertheless, the participation of indigenous peoples in the military far outweighed the number of medals, land grants, and official titles awarded in return for this service.

Thus we need to look deeper into the way the Spanish co-opted pre-existing social structures in the Philippines to assert their authority and mobilize native allies. Historians such as Danilo M. Gerona, Luis Alonso Álvarez, Patricio Hidalgo Nuchera, and Ana Maria Prieto Lucena have studied the integration of Philippine elites into the ruling power struc-
tures of local communities as gobernadorcillos, alcaldes who oversaw labor drafts, and sometimes even encomenderos. Similarly, William Henry Scott and Felice Noelle Rodriguez have provided much-needed analysis on the logic and status of warfare in the pre-Hispanic Philippines. The conclusions of these historians help explore the participation of indigenous elites in the military. Yet more fundamental to this story is the gradual transition of pre-Hispanic forms of debt servitude into new Spanish systems of forced labor. This transition—which mirrors similar processes that took place with the mita system in the Andes—has rarely been examined in detail by historians of the Philippines beyond a simplistic assumption that pre-Hispanic forms of debt servitude “predisposed” Philippine indios to Spanish forced labor regimes. Nonetheless, a deeper exploration of the way pre-Hispanic debt servitude helped the Spanish impose their authority—and the role that indigenous elites played in this process—helps explain the participation of most Philippine indios in Spanish colonial armies. This study of military service thus demonstrates how the Spanish sought to adopt and supplant existing social structures by elevating indigenous elites into the new colonial governing class, while continuing existing practices of localized labor exploitation as a means of supporting colonization.

The article begins by addressing the extent of indigenous military recruitment in the Philippines during the seventeenth century. Although some Philippine communities supported the Spanish militarily from the arrival of Miguel López de Legazpi in the archipelago in 1565, Spanish authorities came to rely in earnest on indigenous soldiers in the mid-seventeenth century, in response to the Spanish-Dutch War and intensifying Moro raids, as well as an overall shortage in Spanish defenses. With this background as context, the rest of the article considers how this reliance was possible, beginning with an overview of how Philippine elites were co-opted into the Spanish regime. Preexisting class structures internal to indigenous Philippine communities were adopted by Spanish authorities to assert control over local populations. The pre-Hispanic Philippine elite were mobilized to impose new forms of tribute and unfree labor, including military service. In return, they were offered rewards for their loyalty in the form of land grants, encomiendas, and titles of nobility.

Yet a continuation of a pre-Hispanic class-based society does not fully explain the integration of ordinary Philippine indios into the Spanish military. Communities did not simply follow the direction and authority of their leaders. Rather, the Spanish system of military recruitment also relied on the mobilization of pre-Hispanic methods of unfree labor, especially labor that arose from debt servitude. The final two sections of the article
thus address questions of motivation and loyalty among ordinary soldiers. In this context, Philippine indios were motivated to join the army from two perspectives: as involuntary conscripts, performing unfree labor to service debts owed to indigenous or Spanish officials, and as volunteers seeking to evade their obligations to perform labor tribute. While the first situation describes the vast majority of indigenous soldiers who joined the armies for extraordinary expeditions of conquest, defense, or pacification, the latter situation was far more the province of the Pampangans who formed a professional military grouping that garrisoned the presidios of the archipelago.

Indigenous Military Involvement in the Seventeenth-Century Philippines

Indigenous soldiers were mobilized in support of Spanish aims from the very beginning of the colonization process in the Philippines. The conquest of Manila in 1571 would have been impossible without the help of several hundred Visayan soldiers, who joined the Spanish cause to go to war against a mutual enemy, Rajah Sulayman. During the seventeenth century indigenous soldiers became a fixture of the Spanish military presence in the Philippines, serving in all major conflicts and in the standing armies of most presidios. José Eugenio Borao Mateo estimated that from 1575 to 1640 up to forty thousand Philippine indios were mobilized in support of Spanish aims. Indigenous soldiers sometimes outnumbered Spanish soldiers five to one. Although these estimates are compelling, Borao Mateo’s data are incomplete. In particular, his estimates do not take into account the extensive use of indigenous soldiers in the stationary garrisons in Manila, in the port of Cebu, and across many other presidios. The full extent of indigenous participation in the Spanish military is as yet unknown, but it is likely to considerably exceed Borao Mateo’s estimates.

Perhaps more important, however, the involvement of indigenous soldiers changed over time. Historians have assumed that the expansion of indigenous labor in the archipelago was a response primarily to the Spanish-Dutch conflict of 1611–48. The aggressive behavior of the Dutch during this period greatly increased the needs of the Spanish colony and resulted in greater labor demands in the fields and shipyards. The same conclusions have been applied to indigenous military involvement. Indigenous soldiers were certainly mobilized in the thousands to counter the Dutch in the region, including during major battles in Ternate in 1606 and Playa Honda in 1617 and in the Spanish settlement of Formosa in 1626.

Yet indigenous companies were expanded significantly under the gover-
norship of Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera (1635–44), who went to war against the Moro populations of Mindanao and Jolo while maintaining defensive capacity against the Dutch. Throughout the seventeenth century indigenous soldiers were as likely to be mobilized against other natives of the region as they were in defensive missions against the Dutch. In fact, many indigenous soldiers stationed in the Moluccas regularly deserted to join the Dutch forces.

Table 1 demonstrates the frequency with which indigenous companies were mobilized, as well as the large numbers of soldiers who participated in these expeditions. Most of these expeditions involved the mobilization of many thousands of indigenous soldiers, with the average number being approximately sixteen hundred. The types of expeditions indigenous people participated in included defensive missions against the Dutch or the Moro of Mindanao and Jolo; expeditions of conquest to Ternate (1606), Formosa (1626), and Zamboanga (1635); and expeditions of retribution against rebellious communities in Bohol (1622), Pampanga (1646), Samar (1649), and Oton (1663). Two of the largest contingents of indigenous soldiers raised during the seventeenth century helped support Manila against massive rebellions among the Sangleys in 1603 and 1639. While Pampangans were the most frequently mobilized, other ethnic groups also participated in the military, including indigenous groups from the Visayas and Cagayan as well as Lutos and Merdicas, who were Christianized indios from Mindanao and the Moluccas.

Additionally, indigenous soldiers served in the standing armies of the presidios of the Philippines. In contrast to those mobilized for extraordinary expeditions, these standing armies were made up of professional soldiers, serving for many years at a time and in some cases for an entire lifetime. They had their own separate companies with indigenous officers and were paid a salary, although at half the rate of Spanish soldiers. Ethnically they were almost always Pampangans, although some sources also mention soldiers from the Tagalog and Camarines regions of Luzon. The reasons behind this preference for Pampangan soldiers were multiple. Pampanga was one of the first provinces in the archipelago to be pacified by the Spanish, and the Pampangan principales readily adopted Christianity and integrated their subjects in the Spanish tribute and labor systems. Pampangans were also well known for their military skill and valor. Maestre de campo Don Pedro de Almonte Verastigui stated in 1655 that the Pampangans were “a bellicose people, hardworking and valorous,” who had contributed in large part to all of the successes against invading forces and internal rebellions. They were said to serve “with all obedience and reputation and are very prompt in whatever occasion and very professional,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Expedition</th>
<th>Indigenous soldiers</th>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1600</td>
<td>Mission against raiders from Mindanao</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Visayan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602</td>
<td>Mission to Jolo</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1603</td>
<td>Defense against Sangley uprising in Manila</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>Pampangan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1606</td>
<td>Conquest of Ternate</td>
<td>1,672</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1616</td>
<td>Expedition to Singapore</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1617</td>
<td>Battle of Playa Honda</td>
<td>1,593</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1622</td>
<td>Defense against indigenous rebellion in Bohol</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1626</td>
<td>Expedition to settle Formosa</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Pampangan and Cagayan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1627</td>
<td>Reinforcements for Formosa</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>Pampangan and Cagayan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1628</td>
<td>Mission to Jolo</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>Visayan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1630</td>
<td>Mission to Jolo</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1635</td>
<td>Establishment of presidio at Zamboanga</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Visayan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1636</td>
<td>Mission to Jolo</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1637</td>
<td>Mission against Mindanao</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1638</td>
<td>Mission against Jolo</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1639</td>
<td>Defense against Sangley uprising in Manila</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1644</td>
<td>Defense of Port of Abucay against Dutch</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1646</td>
<td>Defense against rebellion in Pampanga</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Pampangan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1649</td>
<td>Defense against Sumuroy rebellion in Samar</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>Lutao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1663</td>
<td>Defense against rebellion in Oton</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Pampangan and Merdica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1667</td>
<td>Mission against Zambales</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>Pampangan, Ilocan, and friendly Zambales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1681</td>
<td>Mission against Zambales</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Pampangan and Merdica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31,445</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

they are able to comply with the orders that they are given and they are
tireless in their work as much on the sea as on land.”

It is as yet unclear when indigenous companies were first incorporated
into the standing armies of the presidios. We know that indigenous soldiers
were stationed in Manila as early as 1603, in the wake of the Sangley
uprising. Pampangan companies were also part of the regular dispatch of
soldiers to the Moluccas after the establishment of a Spanish garrison there
in 1606. According to Gary Bohigian, indigenous soldiers regularly made
up a third of the ordinary garrison of the Moluccas, averaging two hundred
soldiers. A report from 1632 identifies that by this time indigenous
companies were regularly stationed across many of the other major presi-
dios in the archipelago, including Oton, Cagayan, Cebu, and Caraga.

It appears, however, that the use of indigenous soldiers greatly expanded at
midcentury under the governorships of Hurtado de Corcuera and Diego
Fajardo (1645–54), in response to the aggressive actions of both the Dutch
and the Moros of Mindanao. For the decade that Fajardo was governor, the
average number of indigenous soldiers stationed in Manila increased to
457. Another source from this period indicates that there were 1,170
indigenous soldiers stationed across the Philippines in 1644 (table 2).

In the 1650s a proposal was raised to abolish all indigenous companies
in the standing armies on the basis that the soldiers were not as professional
as the Spanish forces. Governor Sabiniano Manrique de Lara organized a
council of war to consider this proposal, evoking an outpouring of praise
and admiration from the leading Spanish military officers for the service
provided by Pampangan soldiers. Indigenous companies not only were
cheaper and more readily available than Spanish soldiers but were essential
to many military operations. This was particularly the case in the remoter
presidios, which were also often under threat from hostile forces. For this
reason, the proposal to abolish their companies was rejected. In 1660 the
king formally ratified Manrique de Lara’s decision to retain a permanent
garrison of indigenous soldiers in Manila and Cavite. Figures from the
early 1670s indicate that indigenous companies continued to be stationed
across most of the major presidios, including Manila, Cavite, Cebu, Oton,
Cagayan, Caraga, and Calamianes (fig. 1). While the numbers never
reached the same proportions as under the administrations of Hurtado de
Corcuera and Fajardo, indigenous soldiers continued to supplement the
shortages experienced in the military for the rest of the seventeenth century.
By contrast, the number of Spanish soldiers serving in the Philippines
averaged between fifteen hundred and two thousand throughout the cen-
tury (table 3).
Indigenous Elites, Pre-Hispanic Warfare, and Military Service

Throughout the seventeenth century a stream of Philippine indios made their way to Madrid to present themselves before the Council of the Indies with petitions addressed to the king. Prostrating themselves before the king and his counselors, these loyal petitioners requested recognition and reward for their services to the crown as community leaders and military officers. One such petitioner was Juan Macapagal, a principal of the Pampanga region, who presented his petition in 1667. Macapagal came from a long line of distinguished military leaders, and in his petition he presented the service records of his father, grandfather, and great-grandfather alongside his own.

Table 2. Companies of indigenous soldiers serving in Manila under Governors Hurtado de Corcuera, Fajardo, and Manrique de Lara, 1636–1655

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Governor</th>
<th>Soldiers</th>
<th>Companies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1636</td>
<td>Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1637</td>
<td></td>
<td>276</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1638</td>
<td></td>
<td>419</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>1639</td>
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<td>183</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1640</td>
<td></td>
<td>242</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1641</td>
<td></td>
<td>158</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1642</td>
<td></td>
<td>158</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1643</td>
<td></td>
<td>169</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1644</td>
<td></td>
<td>231</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yearly average</td>
<td></td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1645</td>
<td></td>
<td>95</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1646</td>
<td></td>
<td>208</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1647</td>
<td></td>
<td>465</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1648</td>
<td></td>
<td>694</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1649</td>
<td></td>
<td>694</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1650</td>
<td>Diego Fajardo</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1651</td>
<td></td>
<td>467</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>1652</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1653</td>
<td></td>
<td>536</td>
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<tr>
<td>1654</td>
<td></td>
<td>478</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yearly average</td>
<td></td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1655</td>
<td>Sabiniano Manrique de Lara</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AGI, Filipinas, leg. 22, ramo 7, núm. 21.
Macapagal’s great-grandfather was Don Carlos Lacondola, who had been a *datu* from the town of Tondo in Bulacan at the time of the arrival of the Spanish. When Legazpi reached Luzon, Lacandola went to meet him and to offer up his obedience to the Spanish crown. He instructed his vassals to build a house and a garrison for Legazpi and his men, and he and his children were baptized and received communion. Later Lacandola raised a company of soldiers and helped the Spanish conquer the province of Pampanga and bring the Pampangans under the obedience of the crown. Lacandola’s son and grandson played similar roles in the pacification of
Cagayan, Calamianes, and Ituy and defended against raids by the Zambales in the mountain region of Pampanga. This military tradition was passed on to Macapagal himself, who in 1667 was principal of the town of Arayat in Pampanga and had served his entire life as a soldier, squadron leader, sergeant, captain of infantry, and maestre de campo of the Pampangan infantry. Macapagal was known for helping the Spanish suppress a rebellion among the Sangleys in Manila in 1639, as well as aiding the Spanish against indigenous uprisings in Cagayan in 1639 and Pampanga in 1641. His greatest contribution, however, was his role in subduing the indigenous uprisings in Pampanga and Pangasinan in 1660–61, when he used his family name and position of authority to help restore Spanish rule.

Table 3. Distribution of indigenous soldiers in Philippine presidios, 1670 and 1672

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Spanish officers</th>
<th>Spanish soldiers</th>
<th>Indigenous officers</th>
<th>Indigenous soldiers</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage indigenous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1670</td>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fort Santiago</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cavite</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Caraga</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Calamianes</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oton</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cagayan</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cebu</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Governors' guard</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>224</td>
<td>1,632</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>2,645</td>
<td>30</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Spanish officers</th>
<th>Spanish soldiers</th>
<th>Indigenous officers</th>
<th>Indigenous soldiers</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage indigenous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1672</td>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>655</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fort Santiago</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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Sources: AGI, Filipinas, leg. 10, ramo 1, núm. 6; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 32, núm. 30.
For his service, as well as that of his forefathers, Macapagal was granted an encomienda worth five hundred ducats a year.\textsuperscript{38}

When we consider questions of loyalty and motivation among indigenous soldiers, such petitions give us insights into the systems of recognition and reward available to loyal \textit{indios} such as Macapagal. The imposition of Spanish rule in the Philippines relied heavily on co-opting and motivating local leaders, who in return for their loyalty received land grants, \textit{encomiendas}, titles, and sometimes the right to take captives as slaves. While the provision of rewards for service cannot be extended to explain the participation of the majority of indigenous soldiers, it is nonetheless a vital factor in explaining not only the participation of indigenous elites but also ultimately the creation of a political economy that was the foundation for military service among Philippine \textit{indios}. This political economy relied on the integration of pre-Hispanic class relations and labor systems with new forms of Spanish tribute.

When the Spanish arrived in the Philippines in 1565, they were confronted by a society made up of small, hierarchically structured communities known as \textit{barangays}. Each of these communities was led by a ruling elite called the \textit{datus}. Datuhip was hereditary and crossed generations, and this fact led the Spanish to liken the \textit{datu} class to European nobility. \textit{Datus} ruled over two subservient classes, the \textit{maharlikas}, who were free vassals of the \textit{datus} and often warriors, and the \textit{alipins}, who were indentured and considered by the Spanish to be slaves.\textsuperscript{39} The majority of \textit{indios} fell into the \textit{alipin} class. Their indenture was a form of debt servitude, and they paid their debts through labor tribute to \textit{datus}, \textit{maharlikas}, or even to other \textit{alipins}. Some historians, following contemporary sources, split \textit{alipins} into two subclasses—those who contributed only a part of their labor to another, and those who were completely indentured—reflecting the degree to which an \textit{alipin} was enslaved.\textsuperscript{40} A gradual understanding of how these communities worked and the logic of warfare in the pre-Hispanic Philippines not only aided the initial Spanish conquest of the islands but was integral to the later integration of indigenous communities into Spanish armies.

The Spanish appointed the \textit{datus} to positions of local authority in the colonial regime, renaming them as \textit{alcaldes} or \textit{gobernadorcillos} and imbuing them with the power to help with the collection of tribute and oversee other processes in the community, such as the supply of labor for labor drafts. In practice this was merely the recognition by the Spanish of a class system that already existed; however, during the first century of Spanish rule in the Philippines the composition of this indigenous governing layer changed. Whereas pre-Hispanic datuhip was considered hereditary,
the Spanish sought to break the power and influence of the datu strata by making the positions of alcaldes and gobernadorcillos by appointment or election. Since occupying these positions was both a sign of power and a source of material wealth, the Spanish rewarded loyal indios with these positions. Additionally, indios who were born and had served and worked in one location were sent to rule in another, as a means of breaking networks of local authority. Spanish sources reflect this transition with the renaming of datus as principales, or leaders. Nevertheless, the new generation of principales was always drawn from either the datu or maharlika classes and never from the alipins, and thus continued to reflect existing class hierarchies. Principales were deployed by the Spanish in the collection of tribute as well as the provision of labor under the repartimiento system, which included mustering soldiers for military levies.

While historians have noted how datus were integrated into the new colonial order, they have rarely examined the way that pre-Hispanic methods of warfare were used by the Spanish to initially help gain the trust of the datus before integrating them into the project of Spanish conquest and domination of other indigenous communities. Warfare was integral to pre-Hispanic societies across the Philippines and played a role in established social structures in indigenous communities. As in other parts of Southeast Asia, warfare was largely organized around slave-raiding expeditions waged by one group of islanders against another, by land or by sea. Historians such as Anthony Reid have argued that the early modern economy of Southeast Asia reflected a situation of abundance in the midst of a labor shortage. Hence all conflicts between groups were waged based on the control of labor rather than territory, which explains the prevalence of slave raiding across the region.

While slave raiding in the Philippines frequently took place between land-based communities, sea raiding has received much more attention from modern historians as well as from contemporary sources. Sea raiding was the principal method of warfare used in the pre-Hispanic Visayas, and conflict took place between neighboring islands as well as with islands as far away as the Moluccas. The Spanish called Visayans “Pintados” (painted) for their adornment of tattoos worn as a result of achievements in war. Visayans also had an extensive vocabulary for warfare, which included words for specific types of ambush, looting, sacking, and seizing captives, among other things. Large fleets of indigenous galleys, known as caracoas, would arrive at coastal villages laden with thousands of warriors who would plunder and set fire to the village and pursue the inhabitants, taking all those they captured as slaves. Rodriguez has argued that these traditions of warfare and sea raiding helped justify the initial Spanish
conquest of the islands. The parties of conquering Spaniards were understood by local communities in the same vein as the regular raiding parties that came from other islands in the archipelago and around maritime Southeast Asia. Pre-Hispanic slave raiders used forms of deception, ambush, and plunder to capture their prisoners, mirroring methods of night raiding and the plunder of whole villages used by Spanish military leaders such as Juan de Salcedo in the 1570s. In short, Rodriguez argues that the conduct of the Spanish conquistadors fit firmly in indigenous traditions of warfare, meaning that when the Spanish won their battles, they were seen as legitimate conquerors, and therefore their demand for tribute was justified.\(^47\)

These findings are useful for our discussion of the systematic integration of indigenous elites into the Spanish military as the seventeenth century progressed. When joining the military, \textit{datus} were joining the side of a legitimate conqueror.\(^48\) Additionally, Scott notes that participation in warfare was a way to attain honor. Warriors who returned from successful raiding missions on other islands were celebrated, elevated to hero status, and sometimes even memorialized in legends or songs. More important, pre-Hispanic military service was a means by which individuals could change their class status. \textit{Alipins} who participated in successful missions could be rewarded through elevation to \textit{maharlika} status, while some \textit{maharlikas} earned the right to \textit{datu}ship by demonstrating their warrior prowess.\(^49\) The honor and prestige associated with military service are again reflected in Spanish sources relating to Pampangan participation in the Spanish military. For Pampangans, known as bellicose and intensely loyal to the Spanish cause, participation in the Spanish military was an inherently honorable act.\(^50\)

The Spanish used these notions of honor effectively by offering indigenous elites personal rewards in return for military service, often in the form of lucrative positions of authority such as the head of a labor gang or as \textit{encomenderos} in their own right.\(^51\) Participation in Spanish military expeditions was the chief way in which \textit{principales} could earn themselves the right to an \textit{encomienda}.\(^52\) In 1631 the Pampangan military leader Don Nicolás de los Ángeles was granted an \textit{encomienda} worth three hundred pesos a year in recognition of more than twenty years’ service as a soldier, squadron leader, and sergeant. He had served in the Moluccas, where he had participated in the fortification of Tidore and fought many times against the Dutch.\(^53\) In 1652 the Pampangan \textit{principal} Don Jerónimo de Lugay petitioned the king for a modest \textit{encomienda} worth just sixty tributes per year, which he was granted in 1654. Lugay had served in the Moluccas, was a member of Hurtado de Corcuera’s missions against the Moros of Mindanao and Jolo in 1637 and 1638, helped quell the Sangley uprising in Manila in 1639, and finally served as a part of the defense against the Dutch.
invasion of Abucay in 1647, where more than four hundred Pampangans died.54


der to indigenous elites in return for their service. Cushner and Larkin show that between 1585 and 1602 sixty-nine land grants were given to Pampangan principales who participated in the initial conquest of the Philippines.55 In 1636 the attorney Don Juan Grau y Monfalcón requested the right to grant honors and military offices to principales from the provinces of Pampanga, Camarines, and Bulacan in reward for their service in support of the crown as soldiers, military laborers, and oarsmen on galleys and in defensive armadas. He argued that recognizing their service was also part of rewarding them for not having rebelled against Spanish rule. The provision of military awards and offices to loyal indios such as these was intended as a means of incentivizing other indios to participate in the military alongside the Spanish.56 In 1623 the Pampangan principal Don Diego de Maracot was awarded the right to receive a lucrative military pension in recognition of more than twenty years of military service. He fought numerous times against the Dutch and helped extend Spanish control over the Moluccas.57 Hence military service could allow some indios to attain prestige by occupying high military ranks, being awarded medals of honor, and receiving military pensions. Some military leaders were additionally honored by being appointed to positions of local authority, which placed them in charge of tribute collection or labor levies.

Besides offering indigenous elites a way of integrating themselves into a new colonial governing class, joining the Spanish side allowed them to continue to pursue preexisting conflicts. Pre-Hispanic rivalries did not disappear under Spanish rule and could easily be appealed to by the Spanish in a time of need. Thus we see Lutaos from Mindanao mobilized against Visayans, Visayans participating in armadas against Mindanao, Pampan- gans eagerly embarking on reprisal missions against Zambales, and the coastal communities of Cagayan fighting against raiding parties from the cordillera region of Luzon (see table 1). Rodriguez has argued, moreover, that the presence of indigenous soldiers in Spanish colonial armies may have been one of the most important factors in legitimizing the conquest for the communities that these armies were invading.58 Nevertheless, Spanish occupation did change the balance of power between many of these groups. The Spanish disapproved of slave raiding and convinced the datus to cease the practice. Slave-raiding missions thus came to a halt in the territories controlled by the Spanish, with two consequences. First, Philippine communities became easy targets for groups that fell outside Spanish domination and continued to practice slave raiding, and attacks by these groups continued throughout the seventeenth century.59 Second, the process of
Spanish colonization required the Spanish to convince indigenous communities that they were their legitimate protectors, and so a considerable effort had to be put into defending indigenous communities from slave raids. Both factors motivated the buildup of the Spanish military forces through the recruitment of indigenous soldiers, and in addition to the social prestige attached to the military, indigenous soldiers were likely motivated by the natural defense of their communities against familiar coastal enemies.

Finally, perhaps in recognition of customary slave raiding rights that Philippine indios had to give up under Spanish rule, a more controversial reward for military service was the possibility of granting principales the right to take captives as slaves. While the laws governing the Indies forbade Spaniards from taking Philippine indios as slaves, the same did not apply to indios enslaving other indios. In 1605 the attorney Hernando de los Ríos Coronel argued in favor of enslaving the rebel Zambales and Negrillos of northern Luzon and the Moros of Mindanao, Jolo, and Borneo on the basis that this was an indigenous customary right. Ríos Coronel believed that, particularly in the case of the Moros, their Muslim faith made them enemies of Christianity, and therefore, any war against them was a just war. Although it was lawful to murder them in a just war, it would be of greater benefit to the empire if they were enslaved. Another attorney, Rodrigo Díaz Guiral, supported Ríos Coronel’s arguments, particularly in relation to the Zambales, who were known enemies of the Pampangans. As late as 1654 Governor Manrique de Lara continued to use Ríos Coronel’s original arguments to justify making slaves of captives from Borneo and the Camucones. Nonetheless, not all Spaniards supported the continuation of slavery among Philippine indios, and the issue was contentious throughout the seventeenth century. Still, the controversial nature of this reward for military service did not diminish its real value in the eyes of principales.

Historians have often applied these same motivations to all indigenous soldiers participating in the Spanish military. Nevertheless, the indigenous soldiers who received rewards for their service were far fewer than the many thousands who fought in Spanish wars. The idea that ordinary indios simply followed their principales into military service is an unsatisfactory answer as to why so many indios fought alongside the Spanish, particularly in wars against other indigenous communities. Here I offer two explanations. First, military service formed part of a continuation of a debt-servitude economy that was integrated with other forms of forced labor in the service of the empire. Second, many indigenous soldiers joined the military as a way of escaping forced labor. Thus, where indigenous elites
found the means to preserve their status and continue practices of authority through debt servitude in the colonial order, the majority of ordinary Philippine *indios* experienced Spanish colonization as a continuation of already existing forms of labor exploitation and indenture.

### Military Service and Debt Servitude

Outside Manila and the provinces immediately surrounding the city, the consolidation of Spanish control met with pockets of fierce resistance throughout the seventeenth century. One such region was the province of Cagayan in northern Luzon. Cagayan sat on the border of a vast, uncontrolled mountainous territory inhabited by indigenous groups that refused to be brought under Spanish control. In the late seventeenth century the Spanish established a series of small defensive forts throughout the lowland towns of Cagayan to protect the missionary population and to assert Spanish authority over the region. Both forts and towns alike were subject to raids by the mountain rebels, who raided fields, attacked and murdered *indios* seen to be loyal to the Spanish cause, and sometimes plundered whole villages, taking prisoners as slaves back to their maroon communities. In response, the Spanish organized retaliatory military expeditions into the mountains, involving many thousands of *indios*, who marched for weeks through the rugged terrain of the cordillera. As a cumbersome and slow army tramping through thick jungle and treacherous mountains in pursuit of speedy rebel gangs familiar with the paths through the forests, the Spanish forces rarely had success. To ward off counterattacks, the Spanish armies marched through the night, and many of the indigenous soldiers perished by falling off cliff faces or stumbling over sharp rocks. Others were said to be impaled on concealed sticks implanted in the road as part of the rebels’ defenses. Food supplies were never sufficient, and although the armies attempted to replenish their stocks through hunting and gathering, the rebels nonetheless found ways to cut off their supply lines to encourage them to leave their lands. Many starved. When they finally returned to their towns after weeks or months away, the *indios* found their crops destroyed after having been left unattended for so long.

This description of regular military expeditions that relied on the mobilization of thousands of indigenous soldiers comes from a petition written by a group of Cagayan *principales* in 1691. This source is extraordinary not merely for the rich detail it provides about conditions experienced by *indios* during a military expedition, but also because of the explicit link the *principales* make between forced military service and an economy of debt servitude. Indigenous participation in the military was
often involuntary and military service was part of a larger debt economy whereby the labor of *indios* could be mobilized by indigenous *principales*, Spanish officials, military leaders, or religious orders. Military service was in fact only one part of a broader economy of unfree labor. While these systems operated under the guise of official Spanish labor policies known as the *repartimiento* and the *bandala*, they were also continuations of a pre-Hispanic economy of debt servitude.

The *repartimiento* and *bandala* systems were types of paid labor tribute that Philippine *indios* were required to provide in addition to paying actual tribute in specie. In the seventeenth-century Philippines the *bandala* entailed the compulsory sale of goods—usually rice—to the government, with each province fulfilling a specified quota. The *repartimiento* was used principally to provide the labor needs of defense against the Dutch, primarily in woodcutting and work in the shipyards that supported the construction of new galleons. The largest mobilizations of labor under the *repartimiento* system occurred in the woodcutting expeditions necessary to supply local shipbuilding activities. Gangs of many thousands of men were drafted to leave their homes and hike into the mountains in search of timber. At a local level, the religious orders and other officials, including *principales*, could requisition labor for personal services under the auspices of the *repartimiento* system—although the legality of this was questioned throughout the century. Although rarely acknowledged by other historians of the *repartimiento*, large levies for military expeditions like the one described above clearly fell within the auspices of this system. Both the *bandala* and the *repartimiento* were forms of compulsory labor, but individuals were meant to be paid by the government for labor and goods supplied under these systems. Nonetheless, chronic financial shortages experienced by the treasury in Manila meant that these debts were rarely ever paid, and both systems therefore came to be viewed by Philippine *indios* as another form of servitude or indenture.

While these systems have their counterparts throughout Spanish America, the *repartimiento* and the *bandala* in the Philippines operated far more as continuations of the Philippine pre-Hispanic debt economy than previously acknowledged. Prior to the arrival of the Spanish, the vast majority of *indios* occupied the *alipin* class, existing in one form of debt servitude or another. While indenture crossed generations and *alipins* could be bought and sold, historians such as Scott and Phelan have rejected the analogy to European-style chattel slavery. Both historians agree that the system of pre-Hispanic slavery had more in common with debt peonage or sharecropping. Scott notes that most *alipins* were enslaved for minor infractions of community laws or small loans that could not be repaid.
Additionally, individuals could even choose to sell themselves into slavery—for example, to pay for a marriage. At the same time, indenture did not have the same connotations as chattel slavery. The amount of labor time an *alipin* was obliged to provide to his master varied from a few hours per week to permanent servitude, depending on the nature of his debts. These facts indicate that pre-Hispanic communities relied on debt servitude as both a labor system and an economy in its own right. Most labor was agricultural or domestic, but *alipins* were also known to serve in the military, often as oarsmen during slave raids.\(^77\)

The imposition of the *repartimiento* and *bandala* systems continued the pre-Hispanic debt economy in an informal sense, since both systems operated on massive exploitation, corruption, and the manipulation of indigenous communities by indigenous *principales* and Spanish officials alike.\(^78\) Although royal decrees ordered an end to local exploitation and corruption and for all indigenous laborers to be paid what they were owed, the crown could not control the exploitation of the *principales*.\(^79\) In 1620 the Franciscan Fray Pedro de San Pablo issued a damning report on the exploitative nature of the *repartimiento* and *bandala* systems, alleging that royal officials and *alcaldes mayores* rarely paid for the goods supplied by indigenous communities or for the labor rendered under the *repartimiento* system. He implied that these officials were interested only in making themselves fat and rich off the exploitation of indigenous labor.\(^80\) Such exploitation took two forms: the manufacture of debts among communities that led Philippine *indios* into an obliged form of debt servitude, and the overuse of the *repartimiento* system, wherein communities were convinced to participate based on customary practices of providing indefinite unfree labor. Both factors underlie the mobilization of indigenous soldiers for extraordinary expeditions.

*Indios* rarely received payment for either labor or goods supplied under the two systems, and the natural consequence was a shortage of specie in indigenous communities, which meant that most *indios* could not pay tribute or engage in any other form of monetary exchange. This resulted in a chronic economy of debt in indigenous communities. The *principales* of Cagayan described this situation explicitly, saying that a shortage of currency throughout the province meant that most *indios* were unable to pay the tribute asked of them by the *encomenderos*. Tribute collections in Cagayan were regularly accompanied by whippings and beatings, and many *indios* were taken prisoner and placed in the forts. The *principales* lamented that “even though they murder us and tear us to pieces, it is impossible for most of us to pay [the tribute], because no one can give what they do not have.”\(^81\) Reports from other provinces indicate that
when individuals were unable to pay tribute to the local *encomendero* or to provide their quota of goods for the *bandala*, they could be fined or jailed.\(^82\) In practice, the issuing of fines and punishment for not participating in the *bandala* system was a continuation of the pre-Hispanic debt economy. In fact, some reports indicated that individuals sold themselves into slavery to pay these debts.\(^83\)

This situation of indebtedness was consciously orchestrated by *principales* and Spanish officials, since an indebted *alipin* class could be forced into service. In Cagayan, the brutality of tribute collection prompted many Cagayanes to flee from the Spanish towns and join a large and thriving maroon community in the mountains. Those who stayed, however, were forced into personal service to pay off the debts that they had accrued.\(^84\) *Principales* who were responsible for receiving payment for labor or goods given to the crown by their community members were known to keep this money for themselves instead of distributing it among those who performed the labor.\(^85\) Particularly in remote locations, *alcaldes mayores* were known to exploit communities by forcing them to sell more than what was needed for the *bandala* and at lower prices. Frequently, this was imposed through brute force and humiliation and with the complicity of religious and secular Spanish officials, who also benefited from a supply of free labor and agricultural goods. Additionally, the requisition of goods was a form of profiteering by the *alcaldes mayores*, who were able to resell the goods at vastly inflated prices.\(^86\) The *alcaldes mayores* who were profiteering from the *bandala* also continued the pre-Hispanic social norms in which the *alipin* class contributed unfree labor to support community leaders.\(^87\)

The major consequence of this debt economy was how it legitimized exploitation of *alipins* through the *repartimiento* system. *Indios* could be forced to perform personal services for *principales*, Spanish officials, missionaries, or military leaders under the guise of the *repartimiento* system. Personal services often took the form of domestic labor, where an *indio* temporarily served in the house of a Spaniard or *alcalde mayor*, sometimes for up to a year at a time. Families and fields were abandoned, leaving the provinces starved of agricultural labor and wives and children forced into further debt. Moreover, the terms of indenture were often extended indefinitely. In Cagayan the *principales* reported that “although the *indio* completes his year of service, if he wants to leave the house, the Spaniards won’t let him. . . . Some threaten to murder them with lashes if they even mention to say they want to leave the house, and sometimes these threats pass into actions.”\(^88\) These same *principales* also revealed that the Spanish military leaders forced the *indios* into servicing the forts in the province by harvesting their fields, hunting for meat, and carting water and wood,
among other things. At the same time, the alcaldes mayores of the towns and the military leaders were all embroiled in an illegal trade with the rebel maroon communities stationed in the mountains. The forts were turned into illegal trade houses, and the indios were employed as carters and haulers, traveling between towns along the waterways or through the forests in the service of this trade. Rowing goods along the river was particularly backbreaking labor that took some men away from their crops for many weeks at a time. Most of those who were employed in this work had been laboring for years and were never paid, meaning that their debt at tribute time was compounded again and again.89

It is in this context that the large levies of indigenous soldiers occurred in Cagayan. In their report, the principales are clear that service in the military expeditions was neither paid nor voluntary, and it therefore fit firmly in the broad exploitation occurring under the guise of the repartimiento. A combination of debt servitude and exploitation of unfree labor thus underpinned the mobilization of indigenous soldiers, especially for specific expeditions such as those that occurred in Cagayan in the 1690s. A description of indigenous soldiers in the vastly different context of Formosa in the 1630s supports these conclusions. In 1633 the Dominican Fray Jacinto Esquivel described indigenous military service in Formosa as akin to slavery, since most indios were taken against their will and forced to serve without hope of return. Many had been told that they would be gone from their families only for a short time, but during the years of their absence their families in turn were forced to sell themselves into slavery to survive. Fray Esquivel wrote that the Cagayanes in Formosa “live in despair and anger because they are neither relieved from their posts nor sent back to their hometowns. Some of them were deceived into thinking that they would be there only for two months.”90 Nonetheless, the involuntary nature of their service limited their loyalty to the Spanish cause. The conditions experienced in Formosa were so bad that many of the Cagayanes deserted and joined the Dutch or fled into the interior of the island to live with the indigenous Formosans.91 In 1632 one deserter joined a group of indigenous Formosans hostile to the Spanish and known to engage in headhunting.92

**Military Service as Exemption from the Repartimiento System**

The above conclusions cannot be applied to all indigenous soldiers, especially not to those who enlisted semipermanently to serve in the garrisons stationed in the presidios around the archipelago. Conversely, military service for these indios could be a way to avoid the repartimiento and
bandala systems altogether. For the duration of their service in the presidios, indigenous soldiers were not required to participate in any other form of service to the crown.\textsuperscript{93} Furthermore, some indios sought to be permanently exempted from tribute payments and the repartimiento and bandala systems because of their military records. For example, in 1653 the principal Don Jerónimo de Lugay petitioned for the right to be exempted from paying tribute and performing any other labor that was not military service on the basis that he had already served in the military for more than a decade.\textsuperscript{94} In 1691 the principal and maestre de campo Don Simón Jerónimo Cantín petitioned for the right for himself, his brothers, his wife, and his children to be exempted from paying tribute on account of Cantín’s personal military record spanning more than forty-six years. Cantín also claimed the military records of his father and grandfather.\textsuperscript{95} While most petitions of this nature were from principales, some records indicate that ordinary soldiers attempted to claim the same exemptions. In 1635 a native Pampangan called Pedro Taguan petitioned the king to be relieved from the repartimiento and bandala systems for military service provided by himself and his father in Ternate.\textsuperscript{96}

That exemption from these systems was a key motivation for ordinary indigenous soldiers to enlist in the military is understandable. Both systems were inherently exploitative, as numerous reports from secular and religious officials confirm. For example, in 1691 the principales of Cagayan described the difficult labor of woodcutting: because the timber in the province was so poor, one tree trunk provided just one plank. In addition, the indios were required to cart the plank to the main town of Lallo, where they would be paid just one and a half or two reales for work that was really worth six or eight pesos.\textsuperscript{97} In 1618 Governor Fajardo de Tenza noted that the use of indigenous labor in shipbuilding had devastating consequences for local communities, as indios were often pulled away from their fields at harvesttime, and many died from overwork and abusive treatment at the hands of their supervisors. Fajardo de Tenza considered this an overall cost to the king, since it resulted in the loss of so many lives.\textsuperscript{98} In 1694 Fray Antonio de Santo Domingo reported that the indios recruited for the repartimiento were paid one month’s salary; however, the work typically took forty days to complete, and the laborers also were not paid for the time it took to travel in and out of the forests.\textsuperscript{99} The superintendents of the labor draft also regularly detained workers many weeks beyond the month that they were paid to serve, and this in itself provided an incentive for indios to try to find ways of exempting themselves from the labor draft.\textsuperscript{100} Labor performed under the repartimiento was so onerous that sometimes draftees looked for a substitute to take their place or indeed sought to sell themselves...
into slavery to pay for this substitute. Corrupt local indigenous leaders often accepted payment in exchange for exemption from the draft.\textsuperscript{101}

*Indios* looking for ways to exempt themselves from the *repartimiento* and *bandala* systems might also enlist on galleons bound for New Spain or simply abandon Spanish towns.\textsuperscript{102} In 1679 the attorney Don Diego de Villatoro wrote that the exploitation of the indigenous population under these systems had caused large numbers of *indios* to flee into the mountains, abandoning the Catholic religion. To Villatoro, the only solution was to implement the numerous royal decrees issued since 1649, and he proposed that *indios* be exempted from performing personal services or providing goods and supplies free of charge to the secular and religious officials in the provinces.\textsuperscript{103} A petition written in 1680 by a group of Pampangan *principales* suggested that the province had been depopulated from eight thousand tributes to three thousand in just fifteen years, most of the population having fled the province to avoid the *repartimiento* and *bandala* systems. They argued that the Pampangans were forced to work virtually until they dropped dead and that the only ones paid for their labor were the overseers.\textsuperscript{104}

Hence exempting some *indios* from both systems was a vital means for the Spanish to retain control over their most loyal subjects. In 1694 Fray Antonio de Santo Domingo suggested that if the woodcutting could not be shifted from Pampanga to provinces elsewhere in the archipelago, then Pampangans should be exempted from the requirement to supply rice to Manila under the *bandala* system.\textsuperscript{105} Nonetheless, given the reliance of the crown on *indio* labor, not all *indios* could be granted exemptions. Spanish officials recommended exempting only those who provided the most exceptional service to the crown—primarily *indios* who had served in the military.\textsuperscript{106} For example, in 1636 Governor Hurtado de Corcuera recommended that *indios* recruited into the military defense of the islands against the raiding missions regularly conducted by the Moros of Mindanao and Jolo be exempted from paying tribute and from participating in the *repartimiento* and *bandala* systems.\textsuperscript{107} In 1679 the attorney Diego de Villatoro made a similar recommendation in relation to the *indios* of the province of Camarines because of their vital service in defending the archipelago from raids by the Camucones.\textsuperscript{108}

Exemptions from the *repartimiento* and *bandala* systems in exchange for military service was a recognition of the crucial and pivotal role of indigenous military labor to the crown in the Philippines. Thus the possibility of being relieved from other forced and largely unpaid forms of service could provide a motivation for *indios* to consider a career as a soldier. Nevertheless, it should be noted that these privileges were usually extended
only to *indios* who were already considered loyal to the Spanish cause, which primarily meant Pampangans.\textsuperscript{109} More than any other group, the Pampangans benefited from exemptions, while at the same time they were also overrepresented among the professional indigenous companies that garrisoned the presidios.

Military service can thus be understood as just one of a number of intertwining ways that indigenous people were expected to participate in the imperial project. It is also clear that the Spanish system of governing created winners and losers among indigenous communities. Where *principales* received positions of status and privilege in return for their service to the crown, ordinary Philippine *indios* were expected to endure an endless stream of exploitation and abuse. While the *alipin* class of *indios* comprised the bulk of ordinary indigenous soldiers serving in the thousands in armies of conquest and defense, we cannot say with any certainty that their motivation to serve was due to loyalty to the empire or the colonial administration. Rather, many *alipins* existed in a network of interlinking debts—to their *principales*, to Spanish *encomenderos*, to officers of the crown—which meant that their choice to labor in the service of empire was not always free. Yet this factor is what makes their support for the empire so contingent. While abuses, exploitation, and debt servitude could push individuals into military service as a way to pay their debts or escape labor drafts, the same factors could push whole communities to rebellion or desertion from Spanish control.

**Notes**

7. Oudijk and Restall, “Mesoamerican Conquistadors in the Sixteenth Century,” 54–56; Matthew, “Whose Conquest?”, 112–13. In a different context, Ben Vinson III makes a similar point that freedmen could redefine and elevate their status in the colonial order by participating in the colonial armies of New Spain (*Bearing Arms for His Majesty*, 3–5).
13 Scott, *Slavery in the Spanish Philippines*; Rodriguez, “Juan de Salcedo.”
18 A more recent essay by Borao Mateo acknowledges the service of Filipinos in the presidios but does not make any estimates about their numbers (“Contextualising the Pampangos,” 591).
20 Borao Mateo, “Filipinos in the Spanish Colonial Army.”
21 Archivo General de Indias (AGI), Audiencia de Filipinas (Filipinas), leg. 7, ramo 1, núm. 23; Borao Mateo, “Filipinos in the Spanish Colonial Army,” 75.
22 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 22, ramo 7, núm. 21.
24 Comparative numbers of Spanish soldiers have not been included in this table, since the data on Spanish soldiers serving in each of these expeditions are patchy and individual comparisons are difficult to make. The average number of Spanish soldiers serving across all of Spain’s Pacific presidios during the seventeenth century was two thousand. See Mawson, “Convicts or Conquistadores?”
25 Sangley refers to people of Chinese ethnicity who lived in the Philippines at the time.
26 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 28, núm. 128; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 41, núm. 20; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 340, libro 4, fols. 57r–57v; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 340, libro 5, fols. 175r–176v. See also Henson, *Province of Pampanga*, 30–32.
27 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 22, ramo 7, núm. 21.
28 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 19, ramo 6, núm. 84; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 8, ramo 1, núm. 5.
29 Bohigian, “Life on the Rim of Spain’s Pacific-American Empire,” 90. This figure is also verified in reports from 1618 and 1628: AGI, Filipinas, leg. 20, ramo 12, núm. 81.
30 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 22, ramo 1, núm. 1, fols. 11r–14v.
31 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 22, ramo 7, núm. 21.
32 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 22, ramo 1, núm. 1, fols. 408r–428v.
33 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 22, ramo 7, núm. 21.
34 Ibid.
35 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 330, libro 5, fols. 224r–225v.
37 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 1, núm. 86; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 1, núm. 200; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 1, núm. 248; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 2, núm. 249; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 4, núm. 15; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 4, núm. 32; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 4, núm. 36; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 4, núm. 39; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 5, núm. 50; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 5, núm. 454; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 39, núm. 20; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 43, núm. 27.
38 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 43, núm. 27; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 2, núm. 249; Scott, Discovery of the Igorots, 11–12.
39 I am using the Tagalog nomenclature for pre-Hispanic classes. Some other historians have adopted terminology derived from other languages, such as Visayan. Hence maharlika is interchangeable with timawa, and alipin with oripun. See Scott, “Oripun and Alipin.” See also Junker, Raiding, Trading, and Feasting, 120–43; Álvarez, “Los señores del Barangay,” 367; and Prieto Lucena, El contacto hispano-indígena en Filipinas, 334–38.
40 Chirino, Relación de las Islas Filipinas, 363–64; Scott, Slavery in the Spanish Philippines, 11–14; Scott, “Oripun and Alipin”; Phelan, Hispanicization of the Philippines, 15, 20–22; Cortes, Pangasinan, 30; Cushner, Spain in the Philippines, 70–71; Cortes, Puyal Boncan, and Trota José, Filipino Saga, 39–40; De la Costa, Readings in Philippine History, 4–5.
43 Reid, “Introduction,” 8. See also Scott, Slavery in the Spanish Philippines, 11.
44 Chirino, Relación de las Islas Filipinas, 261–62; Fray Juan Francisco de San Antonio, Crónicas de la provincia de San Gregorio Magno, 131–32; Newson, Conquest and Pestilence, 171–72.
46 Scott, Barangay, 147–57; Junker, Raiding, Trading, and Feasting, 336–69.
47 Rodriguez, “Juan de Salcedo,” 151–64.
48 Ibid., 143–64.
49 Scott, Slavery in the Spanish Philippines, 51–52.
50 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 22, ramo 7, núm. 21; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 8, ramo 3, núm. 45; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 31, núm. 43; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 19, ramo 6, núm. 84; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 28, núm. 128; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 193, núm. 22; Borao Mateo, “Filipinos in the Spanish Colonial Army,” 84.
51 Santiago, “Filipino Indio Encomenderos.”
52 Camara Dery, Pestilence in the Philippines, 31–33.
53 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 1, núm. 248. See also Santiago, “Filipino Indio Encomenderos,” 170–71.
54 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 4, núm. 32; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 4, núm. 36; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 4, núm. 39. See also Santiago, “Filipino Indio Encomenderos,” 171–73.


56 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 41, núm. 20. The king granted this request. See AGI, Filipinas, leg. 340, libro 4, fols. 57r–57v; and AGI, Filipinas, leg. 340, libro 5, fols. 175r–176v.

57 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 1, núm. 200; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 4, núm. 15; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 5, núm. 305; Bohigian, “Life on the Rim of Spain’s Pacific-American Empire,” 110–11.

58 Rodriguez, “Juan de Salcedo,” 163.

59 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 74, núm. 47; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 27, núm. 63; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 7, ramo 6, núm. 85; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 30, núm. 12; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 8, ramo 1, núm. 9; De la Costa, Jesuits in the Philippines, 282–85, 311–12, 322–23; Majul, Muslims in the Philippines.

60 Scott, Slavery in the Spanish Philippines, 52–54.

61 Larkin, Pampangans, 37–38; Borao Mateo, “Filipinos in the Spanish Colonial Army,” 78.


63 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 27, núm. 52; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 27, núm. 51.

64 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 27, núm. 63.

65 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 19, ramo 7, núm. 100.

66 AGI, Filipinas, libro. 285, núm. 1, fols. 30r–41v.


69 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 83, núm. 52; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 75, núm. 18; Scott, Discovery of the Igorots, 14.

70 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 83, núm. 52; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 75, núm. 18.

71 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 83, núm. 52.


74 Cushner, Landed Estates in the Colonial Philippines, 51.


76 Scott, Slavery in the Spanish Philippines, 11–12; Phelan, “Free versus Compulsory Labor,” 197.

77 Scott, Slavery in the Spanish Philippines, 11–15.

78 Cummins and Cushner, “Labor in the Colonial Philippines,” 120.

79 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 28, núm. 104; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 341, libro 7, fols. 243r–255v; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 8, ramo 1, núm. 4.
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89 Ibid.; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 75, núm. 18.
90 “Record of Affairs concerning Isla Hermosa, according to the Dominican Priest Fr. Jacinto Esquivel,” in Borao Mateo, Spaniards in Taiwan, 1:171–72.
92 “Record of Affairs concerning Isla Hermosa,” 169–70.
93 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 22, ramo 7, núm. 21; Cruz, “Tagalog Society under Colonial Rule,” 47.
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96 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 5, núm. 454.
97 One peso was worth eight reales, so in this instance the value of the labor was about thirty times greater than what the laborers were paid. AGI, Filipinas, leg. 83, núm. 52.
98 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 7, ramo 5, núm. 53.
99 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 83, núm. 48.
100 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 332, libro 11, fols. 59v–67r.
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108 AGI, Filipinas, leg. 28, núm. 128.
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