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Keywords    benchmarking, network security, incentive regulation, exceptional events

JEL Classification   L94, L51, L98

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Incentive Regulation and Utility Benchmarking

For Electricity Network Security

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Abstract

The incentive regulation of costs related to physical and cyber security in electricity networks is an important but relatively unexplored and ambiguous issue. These costs can be part of a cost efficiency benchmarking or alternatively dealt separately. This paper discusses the issues and proposes on the options for incorporating network security costs within incentive regulation in a benchmarking framework. The relevant concerns and limitations associated with network security costs accounting and classification, choice of cost drivers, data adequacy and quality and the relevant benchmarking methodologies are discussed. The discussion suggests that the present regulatory treatment of network security costs using benchmarking is rather limited to being an informative regulatory tool than being deterministic. We discuss how alternative approaches outside of the benchmarking framework such as the use of stochastic cost-benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis of network security investments can complement the results obtained from benchmarking.

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1. Introduction

The introduction of incentive-based regulation since liberalization has coincided with the gradual adoption of cost and efficiency benchmarking as a powerful instrument by many European energy regulators (Jamasb et al., 2004). For example, Norway introduced incentive regulation and efficiency benchmarking in 1997 while Germany followed suit only in 2009. Benchmarking can be broadly defined as comparison of some measure of actual efficiency and productivity performance against a reference or benchmark performance (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2000). The primary role of benchmarking under incentive regulation is to decouple the allowed revenues of a network utility from its own underlying costs by determining the regulated revenue cap based on the cost of efficient networks.

Benchmarking aids comparative regulation and makes use of available outside information beyond what is revealed by the regulated network company itself. Hence, benchmarking serves as a tool for regulators to eliminate or reduce the firm’s asymmetric information (moral hazard and adverse selection) advantage on its operational and capital costs (inputs) and demand. The use of available outside information in network regulation retrieved independently of the network companies themselves imply that benchmarking in effect aims to mimic the incentive mechanisms of a competitive market in a monopoly environment. This resembles a yardstick competition in its extreme form where the outcomes of perfect competition are replicated in a regulated natural monopoly context (Shleifer, 1985).

However, the European electricity supply industry (ESI) is undergoing fundamental technical changes in the drive towards sustainability and ensuring security of electricity supply. These changes are also sparking debate on how incentive regulation and the application of benchmarking within incentive regulation should evolve (Cambini et al., 2014). For example, it is estimated that the required costs of the transmission grid expansions in Europe will be in the region of 104 billion euros (ENTSOE, 2012). Similarly, the investment needs in Europe's distribution grid is estimated to be around 520 billion euros by 2035 in the transition towards a low-carbon economy (EURELECTRIC, 2012). The large-scale investment requirements can alter the cost structure and the use of inputs (operational and capital expenditures) by

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1 This is a typical information asymmetry problem arising in a principal-agent relationship where the regulated agent holds superior information on its own cost and demand structures than the principal (or the regulator in our case). See Laffont and Tirole (1993) for more details.
network companies. These investments are also 'lumpy' implying increased uncertainty in benchmarking analysis. This is because investments concern the future and are of irreversible nature while the future is uncertain (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Bruneekreft, 2013).

Addressing the concerns of inadequate supply security would also imply that incentive regulation is evolving from an input-oriented approach to an output-oriented approach. An output-based incentive regulation approach evaluates the monopoly’s performance in terms of quantity and quality of delivered outputs such as energy and connections services as well as service quality and provides incentives to improve quality (Vogelsang, 2006). However, the probable inclusion of additional output measures of performance such as network security is unexplored by regulators and scarcely discussed among academics and policymakers.

The main aim of the paper is to illustrate how output measures of supply security performance such as ‘network security’ can be utilised using benchmarking analysis within an incentive regulation framework. We conceptualize ‘network security’ as encompassing the conventional elements of supply security such as short-run operational reliability; commercial reliability and long-run resource adequacy (see Joskow, 2007) along with the security threats arising from natural, accidental and malicious (or exceptional) events facing the electricity network (see Nepal and Jamasb, 2013) in the remainder of the paper. The paper defines and designs a suitable output metrics of network security to be incorporated in an output-oriented incentive regulation framework. The paper also aims to stimulate policy discussion on the conceptual and technical aspects of incorporating network security in incentive regulation framework using a benchmarking analysis.

The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature on the theoretical and empirical linkages between incentive regulation and network security by focussing on the regulation of quality of service in the European context. Quality of service is an integral but not a complete component of network security (Nepal and Jamasb, 2013). Section 3 focuses on general approaches to benchmarking analysis of network security with different benchmarking options such as network security costs, network security cost drivers, data (or sample) size and quality and the mathematical techniques. Section 4 proposes an output metrics for network security critically reflects on the findings from the previous sections and offers policy recommendations. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Relevant Literature and Studies

Electricity networks exhibit natural monopoly characteristics such as economies of scale, economies of scope and economies of densities due to high sunk costs and low marginal network operating costs (Kahn, 1971). In the absence of regulatory interventions, electricity network companies face low incentives for internal efficiency and greater incentives for rent seeking leading to distortions in allocative efficiency. Hence, incentive-based regulation (such as price cap/revenue cap regimes) of network entry, access and charges has been implemented in many European countries since electricity sector liberalisation. Utility benchmarking under incentive regulation aims to promote economic efficiency (cost efficiency, allocative efficiency and dynamic efficiency) by reducing the regulated firm’s information advantage on its inputs and demand. It can thus be viewed as a second best solution to achieve competitive market outcomes (Newbery, 2002; Joskow, 2013).

Benchmarking can be a useful tool in assessing the efficiency and the performance of the regulated company in meeting the productivity objectives defined by the regulator ex-ante (Ajodhia et al., 2004). The results from statistical benchmarking methods help to determine the relative efficiency of individual company’s operating costs and service quality relative to their peers. This information can then be used as input to setting values for setting the initial price $P_0$ and the 'X' factors reflecting the cost reduction path of a given regulatory period in incentive-based regulation (Jamasb et al., 2004; Joskow, 2008). A robust benchmarking model can aid the regulator in determining the relative efficiency of different network companies and set their reasonable targets in term of cost efficiency (Coelli et al., 2008). Hence, benchmarking of electricity network companies can play a key role in sharing the benefits of efficiency improvements with consumers and ensuring that regulated network companies earn a fair return on their investments (Haney and Pollitt, 2013).

From a theory point of view, the optimum level of network security (and service quality) is attained when a profit maximising regulated company increases network security to the point where marginal benefit of additional network security to consumers equals the companies’ marginal cost of increasing security (see Sappington, 2005). Figure 1 presents a graphical representation of the optimum level of network security considering that the reliability level reflects the consumers' priorities. However, regulation of network security or other aspects of

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2 Electricity networks were nationalised (i.e. publicly-owned) and managed by the ministry prior to liberalisation in Europe.
security of electricity supply such as service quality regulation suffers from three major problems (Spence, 1975; Fraser, 1994): a) problem of measuring service quality, b) the lack of information on the actual consumer demand for service quality, and c) the lack of information on the efficient costs required to produce optimal service quality.

**Figure 1: Socio-economic optimization of network security**

In many European countries, service quality is treated separately under quality incentive schemes and involves a rewards and penalty scheme (RPS) (CEER, 2012; Fumagalli, 2012). For example, in 2000, Italy introduced RPS followed by Norway and Great Britain in 2001 and 2002 respectively while France only introduced RPS in 2009. Under the RPS, the regulated tariff (or the allowed revenue) of the network company is increased (rewarded) or decreased (penalised) in proportion to the distance between actual performance and target performance set by the regulator ex-ante and an incentive rate defined as a monetary value per unit change in service quality. The RPS incentive structure is in line with the theory of optimal incentive scheme when quality is verifiable (Laffont and Tirole, 1989). The RPS scheme also places much importance on precisely identifying the underlying production technology of the network company to promote efficient delivery of service and quality (Coelli et al., 2013).
An alternative approach is to include network security aspects such as service quality into the efficiency benchmarking. This approach would imply that the efficiency requirement also includes incentives for service quality (and hence network security) improvements. Moreover, the cost efficiency or cost saving objectives of incentive regulation can adversely affect service quality (and hence network security) if the regulated prices are not allowed to increase as the network company incurs greater costs to improve the service quality (Sappington, 2005). For example, empirical studies such as Ter-Martirosyan (2003) and Ter-Martirosyan and Kwoka (2010) have showed that, in the absence of appropriate quality controls within incentive regulation, incentive regulation lead to deteriorating levels of service quality in the US electricity networks.

Only few empirical studies based on panel and cross-sectional data analysis have explicitly included service quality in benchmarking analysis in the European context while examining the effects of incentive regulation on the level of service quality delivered. Giannakis et al. (2005) used data envelopment analysis (DEA) frontier method to measure technical efficiency (TE) based on non-parametric input distance functions and total factor productivity (TFP) growth among the UK’s 14 distribution companies for the period 1991/92 to 1998/99. The results showed that cost-efficient firms did not necessarily exhibit high service quality although it’s desirable to integrate quality of service in a benchmarking analysis. Similarly, Yu et al. (2009) presented an empirical approach to measure and incorporate service quality into benchmarking analysis in the UK electricity distribution networks from 1990/91 to 2003/04 using the DEA technique extending the earlier research by Giannakis et al. (2005). The results showed that from a performance point of view, cost and quality are not separable and that there is potential trade-offs between costs and quality of service.

Coelli et al. (2008) estimated a benchmarking model incorporating a service quality parameter for EDF’s 92 French electricity distribution units for the period 2003-2005. Using both the SFA and DEA techniques in estimating the input distance functions the results showed that inclusion of service quality variables had no significant effect on the mean TE scores implying that including a quality indicator in efficiency benchmarking has no substantial effect. Growitsch et al. (2009) undertook efficiency analysis of distribution networks from seven European countries applying the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) method to multi-output translog input distance function models. The results showed
significant potential trade-offs between quality and efficiency scores especially for smaller network companies.

Some recent studies have examined the impact of service quality regulation on performance of network companies in terms of cost efficiency and quality provision using benchmarking analysis. Growitsch et al. (2010) explored the impact of incorporating customers' willingness-to-pay for service quality in benchmarking models on cost efficiency of distribution networks in Norway using the DEA technique. The results showed that the introduction of service quality regulation had no conflict and impact on firms' performance and cost efficiency. Norway is a notable exception in integrating the cost of quality (in the form of the value of energy not delivered) in the efficiency benchmarking exercise. In the UK electricity distribution, Jamasb et al. (2012), by specifying a new empirical model, showed that regulatory incentives to reduce service interruptions have not been sufficiently strong to achieve economically efficient levels of service quality. However, the economic incentives to encourage utilities to reduce network energy losses have led to performance improvements in this area.

Cambini et al. (2014) investigate the response of the largest Italian electricity distribution company to the input-based and output-base incentives using a comprehensive and balanced panel for 115 companies spanning from 2004 to 2009. A two-stage, semi-parametric DEA and bootstrapping techniques is applied for this purpose. The main finding of their analysis is that the presence of quality regulation did not significantly alter the behavior of the firms’ implying that cost efficiency incentives did not conflict (or trade-off) with quality-related incentives.

The empirical evidences suggest that the incorporation of network security in efficiency benchmarking analysis is rather a relatively new concept and remains unexplored both in academic literature and regulatory practices. A first step towards including network security under benchmarking analysis would be to establish a conceptual benchmarking framework for network security, which is currently absent in the existing benchmarking studies of the regulated network companies. This presents a major knowledge gap which our study aims to bridge to some extent.
3. Methodology

The incorporation of network security in benchmarking analysis typically involves identifying the network security related 'inputs' (such as capital and operating expenditures of network security) and a range of network security related 'outputs' (such as quality of service, e.g., duration and frequency of interruptions). A network company will then be regarded as being more efficient, in delivering network security in our case, if it is able to deliver more network security related outputs while using less input factors.

Table 1 presents several considerations that arise in connection with integrating network security in a benchmarking framework. A benchmarking framework for network security has to consider four major dimensions: a) network security related costs; b) network security related cost drivers, c) data sample, and d) benchmarking technique. The benchmarking framework should allow for identifying and describing the conceptual aspects involved in benchmarking along with the categorisation of different benchmarking techniques as discussed below.

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Table 1: Several considerations involved in benchmarking network security
3.1 Network security related costs

Network utilities incur both operational expenditures (Opex) and capital expenditures (Capex) related to network security. Opex generally includes operating and maintenance costs (both variable and fixed) that the network company incurs during a fiscal year. Capex expenditures generate long-term future benefits and are incurred when a network company invests in new fixed assets to replace the existing old assets or to expand the network. There are several ways in which these costs can be structured, aggregated and treated in a benchmarking exercise under an input-based incentive regulation.

The bottom up approach involves treating different types of costs (i.e. opex and capex) to different benchmarking analysis. The opex can be an aggregate measure or could be split according to the type of network security related activity (such as wages and salaries, repair costs etc.). Each cost type enters a separate benchmarking model with different cost drivers. However, such activity-specific treatment of network security opex in benchmarking gives rise to implementation issues such as data-quality and data comparability. Effective opex benchmarking requires harmonised rules for cost classifications and allocation that are consistently applied across the network companies. On the other hand, capex benchmarking can pose difficulties due to significant heterogeneity between network companies in terms of the age of assets, geography, lumpiness of investments and other considerations (Joskow, 2008). The differences in the costs nature imply that benchmarking approach to opex may not be suitable for capex.

The bottom up approach to network security benchmarking may be suitable if the regulation framework of the network is based on the 'building-blocks' approach where the constituent components of total costs such as opex and capex are subject to scrutiny. However, the building block approach suffers from the 'double jeopardy' problem characterised by the allocative and accounting trade-offs between capex and opex (Ajodhia et al., 2006). A partial cost benchmarking under the bottom-up approach can lead to an overall estimate of costs, which can be infeasible, and unreasonable basis for setting targets as the regulator combines the most efficient (or the lowest) costs for each subset from different network companies (Shuttleworth, 2005).

The top down approach will use a comparison of total network security costs among network companies. The approach can involve controlling for the effects of contextual factors such as economies of scale, scope and densities, and network topography. Benchmarking total
Expenditures (totex) creates a more equal treatment of capital and operational expenditures in efficiency analysis and is an alternative approach to overcoming the problems associated with accounting treatment of capital expenditures. Moreover, an effective totex benchmarking requires long datasets to minimise the aggregation problem as the transmission and distribution companies tend to invest on network security assets with long service life. This is important, as network security totex can constitute lumpy, indivisible, volatile and cyclical investments, which lead to wide short term fluctuations in the annual value for totex.

An alternative approach to totex benchmarking is the total cost benchmarking. Total cost includes the sum of opex plus depreciation of capital and an allowed return on capital. Hence, total cost benchmarking, to some extent, addresses the challenges associated with capex benchmarking when investments are characterised by lumpiness and annual variability. For example, the total cost approach to benchmarking has been adopted by the Dutch and the Norwegian regulators in their regulation of electricity transmission and distribution networks (Ajodhia et al., 2006). A total cost benchmarking creates incentives to improve security performance in both the short and long run. However, determining a suitable basis for depreciation of asset values (accounting, regulatory or economic) such as book values versus replacement costs and calculating the return on capital can be problematic (Diewert, 2005).

Overall, costs benchmarking requires standardised definitions and classifications of Opex and Capex considering the differences in accounting classifications of costs across countries (Cohen, 2005).

From a social-welfare perspective, a regulator can also consider to incorporate the costs of inadequate network security in the total costs estimates and undertake benchmarking analysis based on a measure of the social costs of network security. The Finish and Norwegian regulators have included estimated socio-economic cost of outages (i.e., the value of energy not served due to outages) as part of the total cost for efficiency benchmarking (Kuosmanen, 2012). Outage costs are also used as an instrument to evaluate the social cost of service including service quality. However, there is no consistency in estimating outage costs among the EU regulators. Assessing the costs of inadequate network security failure can be contentious and the informational requirement is high considering the multi-faceted and infrequent nature of the problem and limitations on data availability and quality.
3.2. Network security related cost drivers

In economic and benchmarking modelling terms cost drivers are explanatory factors that
drive the costs of network companies. Hence, it is desirable the incentive regulation and
benchmarking model can also reflect the network security. The incorporation of network
security variables directly within a benchmarking model as 'outputs' can provide incentives to
deliver these outputs at different cost levels. This is especially relevant as, in countries such
as the UK and Italy, where incentive regulation is changing from an input-based to an output
based approach and given the regulatory concerns on investment inadequacy, innovation and
sustainability (Cambini et al., 2013). An output-oriented approach combines the efficiency
mechanisms in a revenue cap framework with output-based incentives including those
concerning network security.

The primary cost drivers in network benchmarking can include demand and supply side
variables such as the number of connections (a proxy to reflect fixed costs), load served (a
proxy for network capacity), volume of energy delivered (a proxy to reflect the cost of
energy), network security variables, network energy losses and network length. The selection
of cost drivers should ideally be independent of data availability considerations. For example,
Turvey (2006) criticises the practice of choosing the number of cost drivers to suit the data.
The use of available data on electricity distributed (MWh) as proxy for maximum demand
and on network length per customer as customer density variable to explain maximum
demand can be questioned. This is because the relevance of these measures depends on
networks having similar customer and load factors. On the other hand, the inclusion of
network length as an output variable can introduce perverse incentives by encouraging
network expansion solely to improve relative performance (CEPA, 2003).

Coelli (2012) suggests that one possible approach to choosing the relevant cost drivers is to
explore the implications of an engineering-based reference or norm model of network
companies. For example, Burns et al. (2005) described a method previously used in Austria
for selecting cost drivers based primarily on an engineering-based simulation model of a
Performance Assessment Model (NPAM) previously used by the energy regulator in Sweden,
Spain, Peru and Chile. However, network security is unexplored in benchmarking analysis
implying that the existence of a network security defining output indicator as a cost driver in
benchmarking analysis is largely unknown.
The quality of service indicators that commonly enter the benchmarking models as explanatory variables are the continuity of supply indices such as the System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) and the System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI). However, these indicators are generally inadequate for mimicking the interruptions impacts arising from exceptional events because exceptional events lead to long unplanned interruptions. Hence, an alternative approach would be to construct a new SAIDI indicator that only accounts for unplanned interruptions of longer than 5 minutes (Jamalsb and Nepal, 2014). Long unplanned interruption of at least 5 minutes (which are relatively more frequent than major exceptional events) can mimic the impacts of interruptions engendered by exceptional events. Also, while there is limited data on exceptional events, more data is available on long unplanned interruptions. Furthermore, it might be advisable to use an average measure over several years instead of annual values as exceptional events less frequent than short and planned interruptions. This would increase the stability of the network security indicator.

For the transmission system reliability, other output indicators such as 'unsupplied energy' or average interruption time (AIT) can be used. For example, Ofgem has developed incentive mechanisms for different aspects of distribution network service quality in 2004. For example, a new incentive mechanism was introduced in 2005 that focused on transmission system reliability as measured by the value of energy not supplied (Ofgem, 2004). However, consistent cross-sectional and time-series data measuring different aspects of network security such as interruption statistics are generally not available, as network companies do not systematically report them. Improving data quality is possible when regulators are resourceful and invest the required time and effort.

### 3.3 Data samples

Data availability and quality are important factors for performing benchmarking analysis for regulation of network security. Accessing larger datasets and improving data quality also increases the robustness of the benchmarking results (Lowry et al., 2005). Panel data is generally preferable to using cross-sectional data in benchmarking analysis, as the results obtained from cross-sectional data do not reflect the longer-term network security performance of the network. The benchmarking results from cross-sectional data may be influenced by exceptional company-specific events such as one-off major network security
related capital expenditure. Such results can be misleading in capturing the network security efficiency of network companies over time. Burns and Weyman-Jones (1996) found that panel data could address certain shortcomings of cross-sectional data, as some variables that are particularly important for cross-sectional comparison may not be required for a panel-data analysis.

However, the use of panel data in network security benchmarking poses certain problems. The availability of appropriate price deflators is a concern as the economic value for some network security inputs needs to be deflated to derive the equivalent constant cost measures. Also, panel data may be inconsistent over time due to changes in definitions, accounting standards, or data providers. These can limit data comparability over time and across the network companies. Furthermore, using benchmarks based on historic costs to determine future revenue allowances can be less reliable than has been in the past, when the European electricity industry was in more of a steady state (Frontier Economics, 2010). This is especially relevant for network security as the additional costs involved in network security are uncertain in terms of magnitude and timing. For example, network companies can incur different costs at different times to achieve the security objectives. Hence, benchmarking historic network security costs under increasing uncertainty will not provide reliable and informative results.

An alternative to historic cost benchmarking is to undertake the benchmarking based on future or forecasted network security costs. Assessment of planned total network security costs against explanatory factors and future increases in the outputs of the networks make benchmarking more oriented towards improving consumer welfare (Frontier Economics, 2010). The threat of disallowance of security enhancing costs and regulatory risks of network security assets stranding as a result of ex-post benchmarking is avoided under this approach. Instead, companies are required to meet a set security targets at an efficient price. However, future cost benchmarking suffers from the risk of benchmarking inflated costs by the companies (Jenkins, 2011). For example, the Information Quality Incentive (IQI) mechanism introduced by Ofgem addresses the incentive to inflate future costs even though it is unlikely to completely eliminate such incentives in practice among the companies. Hence, in the absence of long panel data on outputs, analysis of historic costs in benchmarking can provide an additional means of assessment of future expenditure plans.
International benchmarking offers another option to increase the sample size and dataset by including network companies operating in other countries. This technique of data enrichment can be especially useful in the benchmarking of transmission network companies given their limited number in a single country. This implies that the scope of benchmarking with the country-specific transmission companies is low given their small numbers. For example, the UK has only 3 electricity transmission operators and 1 gas transmission operator. Studies by Agrell and Bogetoft (2009) and Jamasb and Pollitt (2003) on electricity and Jamasb et al. (2008) on gas transmission networks provides an application of international benchmarking on efficiency analysis and regulation of the transmission companies. However, international benchmarking involves issues such as the availability and consistency of data, exchange rates and technical matters for addressing country differences in input price such as labour, cost of capital, regulatory issues such as timing of rate reviews and environmental factors (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2003; Haney and Pollitt, 2013). The trade-off between increasing the sample size and maintaining its homogeneity (or adjusting for heterogeneity) of the sample is another issue associated in international benchmarking.

3.4. Benchmarking techniques

There are different potential approaches to benchmarking of network security. The choice of the appropriate method is crucial in benchmarking as it influences the results. Coelli (2012) describes in detail five common benchmarking methods after reviewing the energy regulatory practices in 15 OECD countries. These benchmarking methods include Partial Performance Indicator (PPI) method, Index-number-based Total Factor Productivity (TFP) analysis, Econometric method (EM), Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).

PPI methods involve the use of trend or ratio analysis on part of the network companies’ inputs or outputs and make comparisons on the efficiency performance with other network companies or an industry average (Stone, 2002). This method calculates a single explanatory variable. The indicators produced through PPI are generally easy to compute. The data requirements are not high and the results are simple to interpret and therefore require less data while the results obtained only suggest significant cost differences exist between network companies. However, as a partial indicator is not able to simultaneously account for multiple inputs.
TFP is a ratio of a measure of total output to a measure of total input use that reflects the overall productivity change (Turvey, 2006). The TFP method is best used to measure productivity performance of a single or a group of network companies over time. There are alternative methods for measuring TFP growth including non-parametric approaches such as index numbers and DEA, and parametric approaches such as Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and econometric cost-function models. Index-number-based TFP is commonly used for measuring productivity growth when there are a limited number of observations available (Fisher, 1922; Diewert, 1992). However, the index-number-based TFP method is demanding in terms of information requirement as it requires price and quantity information on the inputs and outputs for two or more network companies over long time periods. Austria and Germany have used the TFP method to assess the performance of the electricity distribution companies in measuring the general productivity trend.

The econometric methods (EMs) involve the use of a cost function, which show the output-cost relationship for cost minimising, or profit maximising network companies. A minimum-cost function provides the periodic costs incurred by an efficient network company to deliver the network services by modelling the technology in place, the output quantities, the input prices, and the operating conditions of the company (Coelli et al., 2005). Least-squares-type estimations such as ordinary least squares (OLS), corrected ordinary least squares (COLS) or modified ordinary least squares (MOLS) are used to estimate the parameters of the cost function for comparable companies under this approach (Richmond, 1974). The results are then used to derive the expenditures required by individual companies if they are minimising costs (i.e. the ‘benchmark cost’) and needs to be compared with their observed costs for benchmarking purposes. The difference in the observed cost from the benchmark cost is attributable largely to management or controllable inefficiency. Hence, the EMs method do not allow for a separate random error term from the inefficiency terms in the modelling while it also requires the specification of the correct functional form. UK and Ireland have used the econometric methods in electricity distribution in additional and supporting analysis.

SFA is an extended parametric econometric method that can be used in cost benchmarking analysis. SFA enables the estimation of a cost frontier, from which actual costs incurred by the network companies can be compared. However, it differs from traditional econometric approaches in two important ways (Schmidt, 1976). SFA focuses on estimating the cost frontier representing the minimum costs rather than estimating the cost function representing the ‘average’ network company. SFA also aims to separate the presence of random statistical
noise from the estimation of inefficiency by separating the composite residuals into two components consisting a random error term and a term capturing ‘other departures from the frontier’. The terms capturing ‘other departures from the frontier’ are assumed to be management-controllable inefficiencies. SFA has been used in Germany, Finland and Sweden.

On the other hand, DEA is a non-parametric technique that can compare the efficiency and productivity of companies that produce similar outputs using similar inputs. Unlike parametric techniques, DEA does not require ex-ante assumptions about the shape of the underlying production function or cost function (Coelli et al., 2005). Information about the shape of the real-world production technology is inferred from observations of the input-output combinations used by the businesses. However, being a deterministic method, DEA results are sensitive to outlying observations. DEA has been applied by energy regulators in Finland, Norway, the Netherlands, Germany and Austria.

Figure 2 shows the data and information requirements for different benchmarking technique reflecting differences in the comprehensiveness and accuracy of methods along the spectrum of simplicity to complexity. PPI has limited data requirements and is also less complicated while TFP is information-intensive, as it requires both price and quantity information on inputs and outputs, which makes the technique more, complicated. The other three methods (EMs, SFA and DEA) are more effective with larger samples and lie between the two extremes of the spectrum.

Table 2 shows the general properties of the different benchmarking techniques. SFA seems to be the most complete approach being relatively strong on both theoretical and statistical grounds and hence the most suitable candidate technique for benchmarking of network security costs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complexity</th>
<th>Information Intensive</th>
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</table>

PPI → EM → SFA → DEA → TFP

Fig 2: Data requirements and complexity of different benchmarking techniques
### Properties of Benchmarking Techniques

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Properties \ Techniques</th>
<th>PPI</th>
<th>TFP</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>SFA</th>
<th>DEA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type</strong></td>
<td>Non-parametric</td>
<td>Non-parametric</td>
<td>Parametric</td>
<td>Parametric</td>
<td>Non-parametric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presence of random error</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (one composite error term)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presence of inefficiency</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (one composite error term)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presence of optimal behaviour</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (cost function)</td>
<td>Yes (cost frontier)</td>
<td>Yes (frontier firms)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of inputs</strong></td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of outputs</strong></td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data requirements</strong></td>
<td>Cross sectional or time series</td>
<td>Cross sectional or time series or panel</td>
<td>Cross sectional or time series or panel</td>
<td>Cross sectional or panel</td>
<td>Cross sectional or panel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: General properties of benchmarking techniques
Source: Adapted from Coelli (2012)

### 4. Results and Discussions

The review of different approaches to benchmarking networks suggest that undertaking robust benchmarking of network security can pose challenges to energy regulators. The main challenge stems from the confusions surrounding the treatment, accounting and classification of different types of security costs, the choice of appropriate variables to include as cost drivers and most importantly the lack of comprehensive and quality data related to network security. Nonetheless, network security output indicators can be defined and designed considering the existing data limitations and incorporate these in an incentive regulation framework. Our proposal to incorporate network security in incentive regulation by designing a network security output indicator is as follows.
A network security metrics can be designed by including long unplanned interruptions of at least 5 minutes (which are more frequent than exceptional events). Long unplanned interruptions can mimic the impacts of interruptions engendered by exceptional events since interruptions from such events are often long and affect many customers. Including long unplanned interruptions also increases data availability for benchmarking analysis to derive the metrics. Hence, the allowed revenue or price path ($P_t$) of the regulated network company can be directly linked to the network security indicator in an incentive regulation framework where RPI is the retail price index, X is the efficiency gain (or the efficiency factor). $Q^*$ is the network security adjustment parameter (or the network security output indicator) and defined as an output measure of continuity of supply (or service quality) for long unplanned interruptions of at least 5 minutes. The annual values of $Q^*$ are calculated from benchmarking, ex-post on the basis of the companies’ performances and can take a negative or a positive sign. A positive value of $Q^*$ implies that network security has improved more than required at the national level and vice versa.

$$P_t = P_{t-1} (1 + RPI − X + Q^*)$$

However, the adoption of statistical methods to account for exceptional events will require harmonisation of network security indicators and data collection procedures. This can be problematic in Europe because the understanding and definition of 'exceptional events' varies between the EU member countries where some countries adopt a more statistical approach while other countries qualitatively define exceptional events in terms of their causes (CEER, 2012). Not all EU countries publicly share the interruption statistics arising from exceptional events in their interruption database such as Germany, Denmark and the UK. From a benchmarking perspective, it is desirable that the interruptions statistics from exceptional events are recorded and publicly shared among the member countries. These factors also complicate undertaking international benchmarking of network security in Europe.

The results from benchmarking, if undertaken, may be inaccurate in the absence of good quality adequate data pertaining to network security. The results may be informative and not deterministic from a regulatory perspective. Most importantly, undertaking network security benchmarking with limited data leads to inaccurate results while the costs of doing it wrong are high considering the distortions in large-scale future investments pertaining network security. Hence, the need to design alternative approaches to treat large-scale network
security costs arise within incentive regulation. This is because incentive regulation is a paradigm while benchmarking is a tool which incentive regulation may embrace.

*Network security costs capitalisation* and *network security cost-pass through* are two input-based approaches to treat network security costs within incentive regulation but not subject to benchmarking. Capitalisation implies that network security costs are treated as capital expenditures (i.e. cost capitalisation) and are included in the regulatory asset base (RAB) and depreciated in line with other assets. Network companies can earn a rate-of return (or possibly extra rate of return) on network security related capital expenditures irrespective of security and efficiency improvements achieved.

Cost pass through involves treating the costs related to network security such that they are passed to final consumers assuming that the regulator accepts network security costs in the regulatory asset base (RAB). Hence, the network security costs will be treated as operational expenditures (Opex) of the network companies and will be subject to direct pass-through under following this approach. However, the regulator should cap or ex ante approve the security costs to be capitalised or pass-through to mitigate gold-plating of network security costs.

The risks associated with large-scale and irreversible network security investments suggest that these investments can undergo the initial regulatory scrutiny and receive ex-ante approval or denial. For example, the RIIO (Revenue=Incentives+ Innovation + Outputs) model to be adopted in the UK requires that budget allowances undergo ex-ante regulatory approval. There are two regulatory tests determining the 'usefulness' and 'efficiency' of investments (Joskow, 2008; Brunekreeft, 2013). These ex-ante tests allow the regulator to detect whether a particular security investment is useful and whether investment is realised at efficient cost.

From a welfare economic perspective, the 'usefulness' test can be conducted by using a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) as a systematic approach for calculating and comparing the benefits and costs of security investments in determining whether investments are justified and feasible. It involves comparing the total expected cost of each investment option to network security against the total benefits. Hence, an investment is useful if the benefits outweigh the costs (i.e. net benefit is positive). A social cost benefit analysis (SCBA) can also be carried out although pricing the externalities arising from network security investments becomes a critical issue.
The CBA framework on network security should account for the high-impact-low-frequency nature of exceptional events. By definition, exceptional events are central to the concept of network security. Policy conclusions without comprehensively accounting for exceptional events in a CBA of network security are incomplete. One possible approach to consider the exceptional events such as the network security of CBA is by conducting a probabilistic or stochastic CBA (Azar and Lindgren, 2003). This approach assigns probabilities for the occurrence of exceptional events to estimate the expected benefits and costs. However, estimating realistic probabilities for exceptional security events and estimating the benefits of the correct or required level of investments will be a major challenge and will test the suitability of SCBA to its limit.

An alternative approach to assessing the usefulness and efficiency of network security investments would be to undertake cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) of the required investments. A CEA analysis of security investments identifies the most economic or efficient way to undertake a given network security investment. CEA provides an ex ante evaluation to support decision-making relating to network security and guides the choices to be made by decision makers. However, both CBA and CEA analysis of network security investments will need to be accompanied with sensitivity analysis in order to validate and increase the robustness of results.

5. Conclusions

The novelty of the present paper is to discuss and propose the possible incorporation of network security in a benchmarking analysis within an incentive regulation framework. The need for large investments to meet the European energy policy goals of sustainability, economic efficiency and security of supply places emphasis on adapting and developing benchmarking as a useful tool for incentive regulation. The paper discusses the different considerations when benchmarking network security costs. We underscore the issues and options associated with different benchmarking approaches in terms of costs, cost drivers, data and techniques pertaining to network security.

We discuss that that network security cost benchmarking requires a clear understanding of the cost structure of networks. The need to understand the key security outputs provided by benchmarked companies along the network inputs used (and their price) and other associated
exogenous variables such as the key environmental factors remains crucial. The effectiveness of the use of more sophisticated techniques to network security costs benchmarking tends to be greater with the availability of relevant data. The use of panel data techniques to deal with unobserved heterogeneity among the networks and the validity of the relevant comparator group in security benchmarking will also depend on data availability.

We also highlights the accounting and classification issues of network security costs, choice of cost drivers, data adequacy and quality and the choice of benchmarking techniques. Assembling and sharing of international datasets can mitigate data availability if compatible international data are available together with a proper understanding of the practical issues involved when using international data to benchmark domestic network companies.

The future use of network security costs benchmarking can be initially helpful as an informative tool rather than being a deterministic tool in the incentive regulation of network security. However, network security costs can also be dealt outside of a benchmarking but within an incentive regulation framework through costs capitalisation and costs-pass through. Stochastic CBA and CEA can be helpful to the regulator in assessing the usefulness and efficiency of network security investments. These approaches complement each other and provide valuable information to the regulator with regards to the treatment of network security costs in an incentive-based regulatory framework.
References


