Succession and Deviation: the Politic-ethical Root for Communitarian Corruptions in Contemporary China

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Abstract:

Although various studies are made from various perspectives on the contemporary Chinese corruptions’ structures, causes and counter-measures, no historical research has been done on how succession of empowered zhong and xiao and deviation from ren and yi and other traditional Chinese values impinge on communitarian corruptions. Based on Foucault’s conceptual formation approach, the author makes a historical survey of the conceptual and practical relationship between Chinese traditional ethics and CPC’s cadre moral requirements and finds that although CPC tries its best to substitute Marxism for feudalism, it fails to suffocate the morphologically mutant succession of the Trinity of Sanwang Zhuyi, patriarchal clan ideals and political Confucian ideas centering around zhong and xiao, which is highly possible for some officials’ loyalty to the Party to metamorphose into personal attachment to a super power or political oligarchies inducing bossism and solid networks for communitarian corruptions on a large scale.

Key Words: Succession, Deviation, Politic-ethical root, Loyalty, Personal attachment, Network, Communitarian corruptions
1 INTRODUCTION

Since China’s economic reform in the early 1980s, according to Yang (2014), more and more corrupt officials have been punished, on which scholars have never stopped their researches.

The first category of researches tends to have a comprehensive description of the scales, fields, types, characteristics and tendencies of corruption cases.

According to Yang (2014), one hundred and eighty-one provincial and ministerial level officials who used to settle into central and state institutions and local governments have been investigated and punished from 1986 to 2014. The state-level institutions include the National People’s Congress, Committee of Political Science and Law under the CPC Central Committee, the Supreme Court, Central Military Commission, National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Ministry of Railways, Ministry of Public Security, National Development and Reform Commission and state-owned banks, communication and oil companies. Local corruptions are mainly concentrated in those developed provinces such as Guangdong and those rich in natural resources such as Shanxi and Sichuan. The Blueprint of Combating Corruption and Building a Clean Government (2014) issued by China Social Academy lists a total number of 182,038 Party members with various punishment from the nation-wide inspective and supervisory institutions over discipline in 2013; from January to June, 2014, 83,000. (Li , 2014) These corrupt officials in legislative, judicial, administrative institutions and state enterprises in control of national veins swallow millions or billions of RMB by weaving various communitarian networks. (Yang, 2014) Based on an evaluation of latency period of corruption, number of newly occurring corruption cases and cumulative number of cases adopted by current empirical analysis of corruption, Guo (2008:349-364) presents new evidence on the characteristics and trends of corruption and the relation with China's economic transition.

The second type of literature tends to discover the relationship between corruptions and social transition, administrative reform, economic structural changes and chaos of values.

Wederman (2004:895-921) draws together data from the Party discipline inspection system, the state supervisory system and the judicial system to chart not only overall trends in malfeasance and corruption but also those in the number of major cases involving senior cadres, and the amounts of corrupt monies. He argues that intensified corruption raises important questions about the link between reform deepening and corruption intensification, and economic consequences. Ko & Weng (2012:718-740) evaluate how the recent changes including progress of market economy, advent of a merit-based civil service system, improvement of budgeting and auditing system, fiscal recentralization and better monitoring of local governments' activities and progress in anti-corruption regulation and enforcement have led to structural changes in Chinese corruption. Their empirical analyses reveal that administrative reform leading to a decrease in the number of corruption cases related to the internal administrative
process (embezzlement and misappropriation of public funds) but failing to stop bribery aggravation suggests a transition from an administrative issue to a private–public transactional problem.

Zhu(2011), based on theories of equity and public choices, argues for deepening reforms of equity, constructing rational market and regularizing governmental behaviors are essential measures to curb Chinese corruptions because latent defect of administration, excessive intervention and deficient restriction of power are the chief culprits. Fan(2012), despite of taking public choice theory as Zhu(2011) does, argues for a poor salary for those critical positions, as well as intensification of corruption culture and collapse of socio-political system, is one of the most important factors to corruptions since it is understandable for a man to pursue for maximizing his own interests. Li &Zhu(2009:40-44) argue that corruptions root in the conflicts between desire and resources, rapacity and reality and man itself. The strong will to possess more than physically needed is strengthened by monopoly and abusing public power. The more powerful a man is, the more likely for him to be corrupt.

According to Zhang(2007),relevant chaos of ideas and values as well as insufficient restriction of powers, and economic and social transitions are the roots for the corruptions in China, among which the first is an inner motivation while the other three are outer conditions. Similarly, Pan(2013) stresses the current deficiency of outlook of right and wrong and shortage of essential moral standards fail those officials to resist corruptions, but he does not discuss what leads to the shortages. Neither Zhang nor Pan has deepened his studies of what leads to the chaotic ideas insufficient restraints on power.

The third category, however, takes a further step to focus on the historical interpretation on the root for mushrooming corruptions in both ancient and contemporary China. Hu and Li(2006:A4) observe the fact that patriarchal clan values and socialized institutions, by means of weaving various networks based on kinship and officialdom, lay a solid foundation for the reoccurring corruptions both in the ancient times and at the contemporary age. Cao(2015) points out that the corruption in ancient China roots in the prosperity of Sanwang Zhuyi(Kingism, kingcraftism and monarchical legalism) which leaves no room for democratic ideas like the Three Principles of the People blooming in ancient Rome Empire. In the meantime, Xu (2015) argues that “filial piety” is the origin of corruptions, by which current anti-corruption campaign is doomed to a failure.

On the one hand, this category deepens the studies on corruptions roots; on the other, they still remain isolated from each other since none of them has have ever detected how the inner connection between Kingism, political Confucianism and patriarchal clans contributes to the corruptions to date.

By integrating all the perspectives in the third category, therefore, the author attempts to discover how the spectre of the Trinity of Sanwang Zhuyi, political Confucianism and their
externalized patriarchal clans as social institutions generates the politic-ethical root for communitarian corruptions in contemporary China.

2 METHODOLOGY

The methodology in this paper involves two parts—establishing a politic-ethical perspective and following Foucault’s conceptual formation approach.

2.1 A politic-ethical perspective

Human being is defined ethically “just on account of its ability to follow its own retrospection, which separates human beings’ behaviors from those sheer physical, biological or instinctive ones in the natural world. With self-control mechanism, a man is able to handle its instinct so as not to damage the relationship with others, by which all community members co-exist.” (Gan, 2013:24)

The self-control ethic mechanism frames a man’s behaviors with two lines: the bottom-line of not doing bad in terms of self-restraint or self-abnegation, for instance, Ten Commandments warning people of ten don’ts while the top-line of doing good encouraging people to practice virtues such as benevolence, uprightness, propriety, sincerity and by respecting each individual’s life, health, wealth, family, freedom, equality, individuality and other basic human rights.

An official is, first, a man of private morals in his private life. In public kingdom, the granted public power in hand is to amplify institutionally the integrity of his moralities and capabilities by enlarging his freedom, rights and duties. The higher an official’s position is, the greater an amplification effect will be, of course, in both good and bad senses. That’s why civil servants, besides more strict private ethics, must practice public ethics vigorously based on two principles—the utilitarian principle to maximize the public good and the liberal principle demanding “that the promotion of the public good should not endanger or violate the protection of the rights of the individual members of a society.” (Hellsten and Larbi,2006:135–145)

Without moral restraints, either private or public, an official is greatly likely to be driven by his greediness to abuse his power for greater personal gains. When necessary, various layers of officials may appeal to the superior to set up a solid network for communitarian corruptions.

Whatever form a corruption may take, the agent of corruption must be a person (a group of people) with public power; the aim of corruption is for immoral and illegal personal gains; and the violated object is the public’s legal rights and the trust from between public and governmental institutions.

In this sense, corruption is a politic-ethical matter.
2.2 Foucault’s conceptual formation approach

Any actions are driven or motivated by certain desires or ideas, either individual or institutional. According to Foucault (1972:62), ideas might have a long history in an institution and thus construct an institutional “deductive architecture” without necessarily obeying “rigorous conditions” since “their history is not the stone-by-stone construction of an edifice” which, however, should not “be left in its apparent disorder” but be “seen as a succession of conceptual systems, each possessing its own organization, and being articulated against the permanence of problems, the continuity of tradition, or the mechanism of its influences.” Actually, a scholar should find a law “that would account for the successive or simultaneous emergence of disparate concepts,” “and have to describe the organization of the field of statements where they appeared and circulated.” (Foucault, 1972:62)

Following Foucault, the author will focus on the succession process consisting of various ordering of enunciative series, various types of dependence of the statements and various rhetorical schemata (Foucault, 1972:63) co-existing in the configuration of the enunciative field (Foucault, 1972:64), whose “procedures of intervention” may be interpreted in “techniques of writing”, “modes of translating” and “approximation of statements.” (Foucault, 1972:65)

To be specific, the author will first make a historical-socio-discursive investigation on how the coexisting Chinese traditional political values, ethic values and social values have been enunciated, translated and approximated, and how they intermingle with each other and construct a solid Trinity of Sanwang Zhuyi, political Confucianism and patriarchal clan system in which there is no counter-balance to corrupt power execution. Second, he will disclose with empirical evidence how this thousands-of-yeared mode fixates its spectres haunting contemporary China.

3 STRUCTURING THE TRINITY OF SANWANG ZHUYI, POLITICAL CONFUCIANISM AND PATRIARCHAL CLANS IN ANCIENT CHINA

Structuring a trinity edifice concerns the combination of Sanwang Zhuyi (Three Principles of Kingism), political Confucianism and patriarchal clans in ancient China, in which Sanwang Zhuyi drives the cart of patriarchal clans lubricated by political Confucian values centering around zhong and xiao.

3.1 Sanwang Zhuyi demanding absolute obedience to the power in a state

By comparing Three Principles of the People in ancient Rome, Cao (2015) gives a insightful investigation of Sanwang Zhuyi (Three Principles of Kingism) which dominates ancient China from Xia, Shang and Zhou Dynasties to Ming and Qing Dynasties.
The first principle of Wangdao Zhuyi is that the power of kings are divine because it is granted by the Heaven. It first stems from Zhuanxu’s disconnecting Heaven from Earth (jüedì tiàntóng, 绝地天通), Emperor Yao and Emperor Shun’s concept that the power is given by heaven and should be followed by ordinary people, which lays a primitive foundation for the emperor’s legal administration. (Tian yu zhi, min shou zhi, 天与之，民受之) And it grows into a legal idea that the emperor has the reason and power to punish those guilty in the name of Heaven (Tainfa Youzui, daitian xingfa, 天罚有罪, 代天行罚) in the Xia Dynasty and penalty from the Heaven in Shang Dynasty, which ascend into a systemic ideology consisting of respecting the Heaven to save the people (jingtian baomin, 敬天保民), highlighting moralities and being prudent in penalties (mingde shenfa, 明德慎罚) from the Son of Heaven.

From Wangdao Zhuyi, the ideological source, stems the second Kingism (Wangquan Zhuyi) in the Qin and Han Dynasties, by which feudal kings and princes have the power to dominate both the enfeoffs and their attached people. Wangquan Zhuyi paves a political way for the third principle (Wangfa Zhuyi) that all the highest legislative, judicial and administrative power belongs to the king or emperor himself.

Although Sanwang zhuyi was born four thousand years ago, according to Cao (2015), it keeps ideologically and legally booming until late Qing Dynasty and still implicitly active in the contemporary society, by which the state head tightly grasp the strongest power with the remains divided by various levels of officials while lower-class is too powerless to guard themselves, let alone constraining the powerful persecutions and corruptions.

### 3.2 Patriarchal clan system demanding absolute obedience to the senior power

To solidify the political structure of Sanwang Zhuyi, a patriarchal clan system is established based on the key ethic relations between king and minister, father and son, husband and wife, in which the first is just an analogically magnified circle to those in a family. According to Hu and Li (2006), this family-state isomorphism, on the one hand, constructs the orders of ancient Chinese social and political life; on the other, it expedites the birth of privileges and nepotism which soils various corruptions. Ideologically, various levels of officials regard themselves as parents of the working people, which is discursively mirrored in “parent officials” (fu mu guan, 父母官) and “child people” (zi min, 子民) while serving their various superiors. Institutionally, various networks with different hierarchies are weaved based on how close or distant to “ME” in terms of kinships and geographic relations. Such an ideological and institutional combination creates a hotbed for corruptions.

Specifically, Hu and Li (2006) argue that many officials do their best to weave three types of networks. The first is a pure official network for patron, protection and promotion. The second is an infinite kinship-friendship network for mutual political or economic benefits. The third is a network of various social resources rotating around officials. These invisible nets not only
shelter corrupt officials from relevant punishments but legalize and aggravate more severe corruptions.

3.3 “Zhong” and “Xiao” justifying obedience to the power

While establishing the patriarchal clan system dominated by Kingism, times has an eye on breeding an ethical lubricants to ensure the legalized edifice’s smooth running. Consequently, Confucius’ moral teachings, later translated adroitly by his followers in different dynasties, just meet their needs.

Confucius’ idea of san da de (The Three Virtues, 三达德) includes ren (benevolence,仁), yi (righteousness,义) and consequently li (propriety, 礼). (The Doctrine of the Mean, in Legge, 1992:41) Anyone who wants to be a jun zi (superior man 君子) must practice xiao (filial piety, 孝) and ti (fraternity,悌) in the form of wen (beneignity,温), liang (uprightness,良), gong (courteousness,恭), jian (temperateness,俭) and rang (complaisantness,让). (Xue Er, The Confucian Analects, in Legge, 1992:67)

Succeeding the concept of xiao, the Xiao Jing (Classic of Filial Piety) formally highlights the doctrine that filial piety is the most important of all virtues except zhong.

It tries to elaborate the connotation and significance of filial piety by citing Confucius’ words whenever possible. (Deng, 2012) For example, the introductory principle that filial piety is the root of all virtues arises from You Zi’s argument in Xueer, The Analects of Confucius that it is impossible for a filial person to disobey his superiors.

While You Zi’s interpretation only stresses the effect of filial piety, according to Deng (2012), Xiao Jing formulates its mechanism which can be transcended from family to state, from filial piety to loyalty towards kings, from fraternity to obedience towards officials because xiao is man’s natural instinct by which children should be filial to their parents and ministers should be loyal to their kings. In short, filial piety is the way of Heaven, and the way of being a man.

Dong Zhongshu translates it into wu chang (The Five Constant Virtues, 五常) including ren (benevolence,仁), yi (righteousness,义), li (propriety,礼), zhi (wisdom,智) and xin (sincerity,信) within the frame of san gang (The Three Cardinals, 三纲) that ruler guides subject, father guides son and husband guides wife, which specifies Confucius’ xiao (filial piety) in a state or a family. (Dong Zhongshu, Chunqiu Fanlu). And it establishes the connotation “loyalty” by distinguishing the obedience between rulers and ministers and that between family members.

In the North Song Dynasty, the principles evolved into ba duan (The Eight Virtues, 八端) — zhong (loyalty to the emperor), xin (sincerity), xiao (filial piety), ti (love and respect one’s elder brother), li (propriety), yi (righteousness), lian (a sense of honour, 廉), and chi (a sense of shame, 耻). (Chinese Encyclopedia Online) In the 1910s, Sun Yat-sen revised it into ba de (The Eight Virtues, 八德) — loyalty, filial piety, benevolence, love, faithfulness, justice, peace and harmony. (Sun, 1978:65)
In the seemingly rich moral teachings, however, *zhong* always takes the first position. Liu(2012) points out the Confucian antinomy that when conflicting with each other, *zhong* is always superior to *xiao*. Logically, *zhong* marginalizes or even crushes other values into null. That is, all the values such as *ren* (benevolence), *yi* (righteousness) specified as *wen* (benignity), *liang* (uprightness), *gong* (courteousness), *jian* (temperateness), *li* (propriety), *rang* (complaisantness), love, faithfulness, justice, peace and harmony are marginalized by *zhong* (loyalty), *xiao* (filial piety), *ti* (fraternity) condensed in *san gang* (The Three Cardinals); so are *xiao* and *ti* by *zhong*. Therefore, such an ethics creates an unbalanced ethical hierarchy. The Chinese ethic history, as Gong(2014) argues, constructs a complete powerful top-down politic-ethical paradigm ruining Mencius’ benevolence requirement on the rulers that “(T)he people are the most important element in a nation; the spirits of the land and grain are the next; the sovereign is the lightest.” (Mencius: *Jin Xin*, Part II. Legge,1992:541)

### 3.4 Constructing the Trinity

Along with various rhetorical schemata (appealing to the law of harmony between man and the Heaven), ancient Chinese elites have various ordering of enunciative series (The heaven dominates the Earth and Man so that the superior dominates the inferior), various types of dependence of the statements (*Sanwang Zhuyi*, ideals of patriarchal clans, and concepts of *zhong* and *xiao*) co-existing in the configuration of the declarative field, whose “procedures of intervention” are well interpreted in “techniques of writing” (analogy), “modes of translating” (*Homme de paille*, for example, translating a family into a state, filial piety into loyalty) and “approximation of statements.” (adroitly turning Confucius’ *Junjun Chenchen* (A king should behave as a king, so should a minister as a minister) into *Junwei Chengan* (monarch is the outline for his subjects)).

All these methods and efforts contribute to constructing the Trinity of *Sanwang Zhuyi*, patriarchal clan systems and politically-distorted Confucius ethics. That is, political Confucian ideals of *zhong* and *xiao*, together with other attached values establish the running mode of patriarchal clans in which the king/emperor’s power is the highest, that of officials, secondary, and that of the powerless, null.

This ideological-political-institutional-cultural process for thousands of years greatly depresses, weakens or disables other traditional moral values and leaves a larger and larger loophole for power abuse. Although this Trinity’s legitimate institutional flame has been extinguished since 1949, its schema still keeps active underneath everyday life ideologically, culturally and politically like spectres.

### 4 SPECTRES HAUNTING THE CPC’S CADRES CONSTRUCTION AND MUSHROOMING CORRUPTIONS
So long saturated in Chinese culture, CPC’s practices in selecting cadres fail to escape from being subject to some significant Chinese traditional politic-ethical values however communist or Marxist it might claim to be.

4.1 Spectres in the CPC’s selecting a cadre since 1949

With various degrees of succession, translation and deviation from Chinese traditional values, the history of CPC’s moral requirement on selected cadres since 1949 undergoes three phases —virtues-come-as-the-first- capabilities—second before the mid-1980s, capabilities-come-as-the-first-virtues-second from the mid-1980s to the early 21st Century, and traditional-virtues-returning phase since the year of 2006.(For details of the third phase, see Section 5) The first phase implicitly marginalizes Chinese traditional values such as li(propriety), yi(righteousness), lian(fairness and incorruptness) and chi(a sense of shame), etc. by only translating the concept of loyalty to emperor into that to the Party. To make it worse, the second phase almost deviates from any ethics.

Virtues-come-as-the-first- capabilities-second phase

This phase undergoes a conceptual variation in terms of liyi lianchi(Propriety, uprightness, sense of honor and sense of shame), youhong youzhuan (both red and expert) and decai jianbei(having both virtues and capabilities), during which traditional values except loyalty do not appear in written documents.

The only chance for Mao Zedong to connect Chinese traditional ethics with the CPC’s ruling of the state occurred soon after the founding of People’s Republic of China. Mao, in an informal talk with his fellow-villagers, cites Guan Zi’s words to comment on how the CPC should govern officials.

To govern a state, in nature, is to govern the officials. Propriety, uprightness, sense of honor and sense of shame are the four pillars to establish a state, without which a state is doomed to collapse. If all the ministers were in lack of the four dimensions, they would embezzle or do whatever they wish, which is certain to bring about great chaos. Kuomintang has had such a fate of collapse, so would the CPC. (cited in Jia,2014)

Later on, Mao Zedong (Gong, 2014) formally puts forward the policy of “appointing cadres in terms of virtues and capabilities”, in which virtues mainly means political attitudes, ideology and daily ethics and work style.

A new term youhong youzhuan is put forth by Mao (1977) in 1957 to demand that all cadres should keep red as the color of the national flag rather than white, grey or pink in both ideology and political stands, and be a member of the Left rather than the Middle and the Right. In 1960, Hu Qili(2011) explains that “to be red ” means clinging to the belief of communism and

In August, 1980, Deng (1994:326) presents a new standard of decai jianbei that officials should have, first, political integrity and second, capability. “By political integrity, first and foremost, an official should stick to socialism and CPC’s leadership. Under this precondition, cadres should be younger, better-educated and more professionally competent.” In December, 1980, Deng (1994:361) terms “political integrity” into ge ming hua (being revolutionary), which induces establishing si hua as the cardinal of selecting a cadre in the revised Party Constitution at the 12th National Congress of CPC. Ge ming hua, according to the new constitution, requires a cadre to adhere to the Four Cardinal Principles, advocate the Party’s basic lines, keep the same space with the Central Committee, not to abuse power for personal gains but serve the people whole-heartedly and be honest and upright in daily life, in which loyalty to the Party ranks the first while honesty and uprightness rank the sixth. (Deng, 1994:361)

In short, the evolution of CPC cadre ethical values from the 1950s to the early 1980s were more plutonomic than ethic, in which highlighting loyalty to the Party implicitly marginalizes other Chinese traditional moralities such as benevolence, uprightness, propriety, cleanness, sincerity and a sense of shame.

**Capabilities-come- as-the-first-virtues-second Phase**

If the requirement of de (political integrity) could somewhat restrain and regularize cadres’ behaviors before the age of reform, the fatal turning of capability-comes-the-first in selecting officials completely marginalizes ethical requirements so that more and more officials get to abuse their power for personal illegal benefits.

Highlighting capability as the first regardless of their moral standards used to be popular in the Warring Period (480 BCE to 221 BCE) and Three Kingdoms Period (220AD-280AD), when ancient China in chaos called for more war talents. In the 1980s-1990s, this ghost haunts China having just narrowly escaped from the Great Cultural Revolution. At that time, the state under dramatic economic reform is so thirsty for knowledge and talents that it takes an extreme step.

In the mid 1980s, People’s Daily launches a landmark discussion on the new ideals of talents. An editorial entitled “Be brave to select and employ those who dare to be innovative” (Page 1, 1984/09/14) establishes the epochal standards for new type of talents: 1) Adhering to Marx-Leninism; 2) Being young with new knowledge, new technology, new ideas and new experience; 3) Being intensely ambitious, responsible and far-sighted; 4) Being able to follow the true and good. At the end of this editorial, interestingly, the author does not forget mentioning that people should be tolerant of those talents’ various defects.

In contrast with that Si Hua Standard, the new standard has a drastic change:
1. “Adhering to Marx-Leninism” is replaced by “adhering to the Four Cardinal Principles, advocating the Party’s basic lines, keeping the same space with the Central Committee.”

2. The new standard lays a great stress on the would-be cadre’s youth, energy, expertise, experience, responsibility, ambition and far-sightedness.

3. “Being able to follow the true and good” is rather ambiguous since what is true and good may involve various parameters, which invites different interpretations.

From February to May, 1985, a series of essays are published to further the details of that editorial in the People’s Daily. They are Don’t be too “demanding” on prodigies (Page 8, Feb.7), Too perfect to be true (Page 8, Feb.13), Select both young and old talents (Page 8, Feb.13), No set form for selecting a talent (Page 3, Feb.13), Invigorate the way of selecting the talents (Page 1, Feb.16), An essay of spring (Page 4, Feb.22), Say goodbye to the past and welcome the new year (Page 8, Mar.17), Be bold to employ talents with errors (Page 8, Mar.19), Unnecessary to select a cadre on better votes (Page 8, Mar.21), Times changes (Page 8, Mar.25), Reform and open policy calling for rapid growth of talents (Page 8, April 9), and Fearless of gossips in selecting a talent. (Page 3, May 19)

Not surprisingly, another editorial titled Don’t be obstructed in selecting a cadre (Page 2, July 9, 1985) in the People’s Daily makes a subtle but historic tuning, in which “being in one’s prime of life” ranks the first, followed by “being somewhat knowledgeable”, “having moral integrity” and “being innovative.”

These imperative essays steer the whole Party to a new but wrong direction. They criticize the old principles’ laying too much demand on a cadre’s personal integrity and too little on his reform capability. At the same time, they pray for new standards of hiring a capable person even though he is morally sullied.

From then on, this poisonous thirst quenching sees a sheer economic-political metamorphosis in which requirement on capability of making money totally replaces the priority of adhering to the Four Cardinals both in media propaganda and in the state administration.

These two historical conceptual metamorphoses, consequently, lead the CPC farther and father away from other Chinese traditional values except the translated loyalty, which creates new personal attachment to power.

4.2 Formation of personal attachment to power and relevant corruptions

Theoretically, it is understandable for CPC to make some requirements on cadres’ political integrity to be hong(red) or ge ming hua (revolutionary) characterized by adhering to the Four Cardinal Principles(socialist road, (proletarian )people ’ s democratic dictatorship, the
leadership of CPC, and Marxism and Mao Zedong Thoughts), keeping the same space with the Central Committee, not abusing power for personal gains but serving the people whole-heartedly and being honest and upright in daily life.

However, five parameters to these requirements call forth attention:

a. If a cadre fulfills all the requirements as to be loyal to both the Party and the people, he is regarded as a qualified Party member and might be highly praised;

b. If a cadre can only be loyal to the Party instead of the people, no clear regularities are listed to restrain his misconduct;

c. If a cadre can only be loyal to the people instead of the Party, it would be highly possible for him to be expelled;

d. If a cadre can be loyal to neither the Party nor the people, he would be punished first in terms of the Party’s disciplines, and might be punished legally;

e. If some cadres distort the loyalty to the Party into that to a particular powerful person, the damages to the Party, the state and the people are inevitable. Historically, the consequences are characterized by corruptions, power conflicts and social disorders since the establishment of CPC, for which the Party has failed finding a remedy.

Practically, the mechanism of CPC’s selecting a cadre, in which the individual power rather than democracy has the last word, gives birth to personal attachment to individual power. When selecting officials, for example, those CPC County Committee Secretaries lay the greatest emphasis on loyalty to the Party and to the superior Party organization. In daily practice, the former is concretized into the loyalty to the key superior leaders. (Zhou, 2015)

The first typical example is an extreme polarized loyalty to the mighty individual, Mao Zedong, at whose age virtues of benevolence, uprightness, propriety, sincerity and a sense of shame are deeply buried and large scale of political corruptions committed by the Gang Four who violated thousands upon thousands of victims’ human rights. The second is the loyalty to newly arising political oligarchies in various circles, where both traditional virtues and CPC’s moral standards are so ignored that numerous officials try to appear upright in words while abusing power for personal gain including higher positions, more wealth and extramarital sex in action. (Liu, 2013) These loyalties, despite of different ages, share the same nature—officials’ personal attachment to power.

**Blind worship of Mao**

The personal blind worship to Mao involves many factors such as Mao’s personal need since 1958, some officials’ evil employment and survivals of feudalism, as Deng Xiaoping criticized. (Dong, 2011) In the author’s eyes, distorting loyalty to the CPC should be one of the most important.
Despite of Marxist opposition to extreme individualism in the history, a firm loyalty to the Party turns into blind worshiping Mao Zedong, the almighty head of CPC. It walks so far that even if the Great Cultural Revolution has come to its end and Mao has been dead for two years, the Central Committee still urges all the Chinese to follow the Principle of “Two Whatevers,” that is, “whatever decisions Chairman Mao has made, we must advocate; whatever instructions Chairman Mao has fixed, we must follow.” (People’s Daily, Feb. 7, 1977)

The Age of Mao sees both numerous cases of individual power abuse\(^1\) at different phases and above all, communitarian political corruptions.

First, worshippers of higher officials enjoyed special provisions with daily usages as well as personal secretaries, bodyguards, drivers, housemaids, cooks, doctors and houses, which symbolized the commencement of a special class with various privileges. (Huang, 2012) A sharp contrast could be seen between the starvation of the peasants and the special provisions to higher officials and senior intellectuals. (Zheng, 2011: 20)

Second, the “Gang of Four” (Si ren bang, 四 人 帮) — Jiang Qing (Mao Zedong’s wife), Zhang Chunqiao (the Shanghai Propaganda Department official), Yao Wenyuan (literary critic) and Wang Hongwen (the Shanghai security guard) rose to power during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and committed severe political corruptions. Under the flag of loyalty to Chairman Mao, they, openly or secretly, took every means to persecute national leaders, CPC’s leaders and those of democratic parties, to suppress and persecute a large scale of cadres, intellectuals and other citizens at various levels and to have menaced the victims’ basic human rights. In a word, their ten-yeared power abuse had great havoc with Chinese people’s democratic dictatorship, social orders, national economy and other causes, which brought a calamity to the new China. (Supreme Court, 1981)

\(^1\) Soon after the foundation of New China, officials’ grafting scattered here and there. According to Gao Gang(1951: 203-205), Secretary of Northeastern Bureau, “in the second half of the year of 1949, the number of grafting amounted to 5.3% of all criminal cases; in 1950, 5.7%; in the first quarter of 1951, 13.2%.” Similarly, according to Xi Zhongxun(1952: 1-2), Secretary of Northwestern Bureau, “In Tianshui Special Zone, more than 30 percent of officials committed corruptions.”


Moreover, corruptions frequently occurred concerning educated urban youth who worked and settled in the countryside in the 1960’s and 1970’s. On the one hand, many higher officials tried their best to send them to the army to keep their own children from working and settling in rough countryside; (Huang, 2012) on the other, sexual corruptions were often seen in those officials with the power to authorize the fate of those educated urban youth who worked and settled in the countryside in the 1960’s and 1970’s. According to Ding(2006), more than 3,400 seducing and raping cases happened in Liaoning Province from 1968 to 1973, and 3,296 in Sichuan Province. More detailed data can be found in Xin(2014).
Although the “Gang of Four” has been smashed, the historical climate in which an official takes advantage of various levels of power paves the way for officials’ breeding new worship of newly arising oligarchies and weave various solid guan xi (network) at the age of reform.

**Fluctuating worship of newly arising oligarchies**

In contrast with the dogmatic worship of Mao which is not easy to be converted, the worship of newly arising oligarchies is quite fluctuating because what a corrupt official really pursues is not the oligarchy’s personal charisma but his added value, namely, the potential benefit that the worshipper might get. Three factors, in the author’s eyes, contribute to the worship of power and guan xi centering round newly arising oligarchies:

In the 1980s, more and more Chinese from grass roots to higher officials begin to reexamine the blind worship for Mao who launches the Great Cultural Revolution in which hundreds and thousands of cadres, intellectuals lose their freedom or lives. With the collapse of worship to Mao, new personal political idol remains vacant for 30 years while loyalty to the power is still there.

Secondly, there is little room for western values to be spread in the 1980s. On the one hand, Deng Xiaoping stresses the significance of distinguishing Mao Zedong Thoughts from Mao’s own blunders in his late years so as to delete the blind worship for Mao; (China.Org.cn, 1980) on the other, Deng keeps highly alert on fighting against bourgeois liberalization and the academic spreading of Western thoughts did dwindle since the 1990s.

Thirdly, the fatal turning from ethics-comes-first to capability-comes-first aggravates new worships at the age when no strict moral, political, legal punishments come to the stage.

**4.4 Oligarchy worship and communitarian corruptions**

The shift from worship of Mao’s almightiness to that of power at various levels rockets to the sky in the early 21st Century. With no ethical top line (virtues) to pursue, no bottom line (basic moral standards) to stick to, no strict disciplines and laws to fear but superior power to obey, corrupt officials are strongly motivated by seeking for wealth and sex.

Consequently, officials concerned appeal to various guan xi, to borrow Hellsten and Larbi’s words, (2006:135-145) in order to weave “communitarian solidarity-networks for the common good of their particular social collectives rather than the national public good.” Since the 1990s, such underground communitarian solidarity-networks mushroom in the circles of family members or kinships, officials and businessmen.

The first type is circles of clans. According to Yang(2014), more than 60 percent of corruptions involve officials’ family members such as the Zous(Yongkang), the Xus(Caihou), the Sus (Rong) and the Lings(Jihua). (Lin, 2014 )
The second is weaved by officials and businessmen. On the one hand, half of the investigated higher officials are corrupted by real estate businessmen, among whom 30 provincial-level officials have been punished since the 18th National Congress of CPC. (Liu, 2014) On the other hand, some businessmen bribe for political capital and get intermingled with governmental officials. For example, Liu Han and Liu Wei in Sichuan Province leading 36 gangsters and officials committed 15 criminal cases, in which three judicial officials (two section-level police-officers and one section-level prosecutor) offered them political protections as well as bullets and arms. To accumulate more wealth, Liu Han bribed some high officials to take three sessions of member of Sichuan Provincial Committee of CPPCC, member of the Standing Committee of Sichuan Provincial Committee of CPPCC. (Zhang J.,2014)

The third type of circles involves a gang of corrupted officials who center round an oligarchy at various levels. According to Yang(2014), 15 bureau-level cadres, 19 section-level and 13 office-level cadres are engaged in Luo Yunguang(former vice Minister of Railways) Bribery Case in 1990; over 30 per cent of provincial-level corrupt officials investigated since 18th CPC National Congress of CPC erect political allies and economic conglomerations. For instance, the Sichuan Corruption Case involves Li Chuncheng(former Vice Secretary of Sichuan Provincial Party Committee ),Guo Yongxiang(former Vice Chairman of the Literary Federation of Sichuan), Li Chongxi(former Chairman of Political Consultative Conference in Sichuan ), Ji Wenlin(former Vice Governor of Hainan ), Tan Li(former Vice Governor of Hainan), all of whom are connected with Zhou Yongkang to some degree. And the Shanxi Corruption Case centering round Ling Jihua enlists Jin Daoming(former Deputy Director, Shanxi People's Congress Standing Committee), Du Shanxue(former Vice Governor), Ling Zhengce(former Vice Chairman of Political Consultative Conference), Nie Chunyu(former Secretary General , Shanxi Provincial Party Committee), Chen Chuanping(former Member of Standing Committee of Shanxi CPC, Secretary of Taiyuan ), Ren Runhou(former Vice Governor), Bai Yun(former Member of Standing Committee of Shanxi CPC, Director of United Front Work Department of Shanxi Province)and Shen Weichen(former Secretary of Party Committee of China Association for Science and Technology).

These circles, as Xi(2014:764)criticizes, practice bossism by personal attachment and erect a hierarchy according to their official positions. Consequently, the loyalty to the Party is replaced by that to the most powerful guru like the relation between ministers and the emperor, sons and the father in the ancient feudalist China. Moreover,

(T)hese circles have the power as their cores, business gurus and cahoots as their radii, in which “big brothers” instead of “comrades” are frequent remarks of their relationships. Those involved in such circles have no common beliefs, no principles of CPC, no laws and regularities only to construct cliques based on how powerful a person is. Various powers unite together for special allied interests so as to desalinate the tenet of serving the people, which
excavates tunnels for transporting special interests and sows the seeds for corruption. (Huang Y., 2014)

In summary, the polarization of loyalty leads to personal attachment to stronger power brings forth values subject to the superior’s personal will and lays a basis for power abuse, on account of which more and more people come to believe in power for personal benefit rather than other traditional virtues considerate of other’s interests. In addition, the historic inverting the order of ethics and capabilities aggravates power abuse to an extreme degree.

5 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS

Based on Foucault’s conceptual formation approach, the author makes a historical survey of the conceptual and practical relationship between Chinese traditional ethics and CPC’s cadre moral requirements and finds that although CPC tries its best to substitute Marxism for feudalism, it fails to suffocate the morphologically mutant succession of the Trinity of Sanwang Zhuyi, patriarchal clan ideals and political Confucian ideas centering around zhong and xiao, which is highly possible for some officials’ loyalty to the Party to metamorphose into personal attachment to a super power or political oligarchies inducing bossism and solid networks for communitarian corruptions on a large scale.

Facing more and more severe communitarian corruptions, both Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping attempt to reestablish official moralities as the priority over capability by transforming Chinese traditional ethics into the socialist. Hu(2006) puts forward “barong bachi” (eight honors and eight shames) as the socialist outlook of honor and disgrace, according to which it is a great virtue to love the motherland (zhong), serve the people (gong and ren), uphold science, work hard (lian), work in unity and cooperation (wen, rang and he), obey the law and make a plain living (jian) while it is a sheer shame (chi) to do the opposite. And the new government led by Xi, along with tougher tactical measures to deter corrupt officials by intense tiger-flies-hunting, (Lin,2014 ) resolves to renew official ethics strategically by translating traditional values in contemporary words. A qualified cadre, according to Xi(Gong, 2014) , should be “firm in political belief (zhong), willing to serve the people (ren and gong), devoted (gong) and practical (cheng), brave for responsibility (gong), and clean and clear in his position (lian),” “strict in self-cultivation (xiushen) and using power, self-restriction (xiushen), be practical (cheng) in planning, starting a business and honest as a man.”

Hu’s and Xi’s transformation are theoretically developed by earnest calls for the returning of Chinese traditional ethics. Lin (2014) argues that most punished officials have ethic deficiency in their public and private moralities, in which the former means that a Party member should be loyal to the Party and serve the people whole-heartedly; the latter refers to the official’s self-cultivation, which constructs a very good interface between public and private moralities by turning a family into a state, in which a family is the miniature of a state and a state is the
enlarged family. And Chen (2015:7) argues more concretely that Chinese traditional values, compared with Western ethics, stress more on responsibilities than freedom, duties than rights, collectivity than individuality, and harmony than conflict. The interests of families, clans, states are much more important than that of an individual person. In short, contemporary China should adopt Chinese traditional ethics characterized by loyalty and obedience as the top priority rather than the Western highlighted by freedom, rights and individuality.

However promising these efforts might be, in the eyes of the author, new oligarchy worship would frequently steps onto the 21st C stage if the national leaders failed to notice or refused to acknowledge the following two aspects.

Firstly, Chinese traditional ethics centering around loyalty and filial piety leaves a large loophole for a community head to violate an individual’s rights at his own will in the name of justice, particularly, in that of protecting the interests of families, clans, communities and states, which has been witnessed so frequently. An insular appeal to Confucian ethics to govern the state, clearly, is doomed to a failure.

Secondly, moralities appear so weak as to be parasitic on the charming, nutritious, protective, sometimes, destructive power. Therefore, what must be done to guarantee the role of ethics in state-governing is to convert the channel by which the power is granted to a person. To be more specific, the cadre generation mechanism must be converted from relying on a particular powerful person to depending on the powerful public, both theoretically and practically. Only the power is really of the people, by the people and for the people, may both private and public ethics maximize their contribution to the benign growth of Chinese nationality so that most officials not only dare not but will not commit corruptions. Elected or selected, that is a question.

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