SWEETNESS AND LIGHT FROM SWIFT TO ARNOLD

BY THOMAS OWENS

A significant portion of Matthew Arnold’s cultural and intellectual thinking derived from a phrase by Jonathan Swift: *sweetness and light*. This merits critical and historical investigation because its usage marks a highpoint in Arnold’s engagement with two competing kinds of erudition throughout the 1860s, echoing Swift’s own commitments at the turn of the eighteenth century. In his discussion of Liberal politics, Francis Newman and Homeric poetry, and the parochialism of the English middle class, Arnold restaged the battle between urbanity and philology which Swift and the Tory wits fought in response to Richard Bentley. This essay juxtaposes and interweaves these debates to show that articulacy twice attempted to lay total claim to knowledge; on each occasion, the effort to protect literature and ambiguity spurred Swift and Arnold to discrete imaginative acts engendered by the same anxiety over minute scholarship. It is suggested this disquiet was especially acute because the techniques of satire and artistry made those forms appear less disinterested and more pedantic than they professed to be, whilst Bentley’s philological work was truly exemplary of the vital creativity Swift and Arnold espoused. At work was a double irony: Swift and Arnold encouraged a ranging and cursory approach whilst in fact employing the subtest stylistic manoeuvres to attenuate the rise of a discipline which was in reality concerned with the aesthetic as well as the historical.

I. The ‘man of culture’: ignoramus and pedant

Matthew Arnold delivered the opening chapter of *Culture and Anarchy* (1869) as his final lecture from the Poetry Chair at Oxford University in June 1867, first published the following month in the *Cornhill Magazine*.¹ Successive book editions retained the genial informality of tone and light handling of minutiae suited to the orators’ podium and Arnold’s programme for cultural reform, opposed equally to ‘fierceness’ and ‘abstract system’.² His rhetorical manner, easy with colloquialism and imprecision, exemplified the intellectual policy advanced in ‘The Function of Criticism at the Present Time’ (1864) to cultivate a ‘disinterested love of a free play of the mind on all subjects’, where freedom is imagined to reside in a critical syntax which privileges the spirit of speculation over the dispiriting detail of hard fact (III. 268).³ As an analytical faculty, ‘disinterestedness’ aspired to the forgiving energies of speech, safeguarding inaccuracy and untidiness from the oppressively singular or
purely ‘practical considerations’ (III. 270) of the world in pursuit of a grammar of intelligence able to countenance curiosities.

At the same time, however, Arnold’s writing is dense with information and circumstance, though it looks at it aslant, as T.S. Eliot once noted in a striking parenthesis: ‘he produced a kind of illusion of precision and clarity; that is, maintained these qualities as ideals of style’. Quotation was one way in which Arnold anchored his opinions in sobering evidence to give his thinking the responsible assuredness of truth, yet John Holloway recognized the technique as something he was ‘fonder of inflicting on his opponents than on his models’. This conjunction of the suasive exterior of Arnold’s statements with the corroborative material adduced in support of them created prose designed to resist close scrutiny. Fluency and off-handedness were means of keeping the particulars quiet, as the initial paragraph proper of Culture and Anarchy testifies:

In one of his speeches a short time ago, that fine speaker and famous Liberal, Mr. Bright, took occasion to have a fling at the friends and preachers of culture. “People who talk about what they call culture!” said he, contemptuously; “by which they mean a smattering of the two dead languages of Greek and Latin.”…And the other day a younger Liberal than Mr. Bright…Mr. Frederic Harrison, developed, in the systematic and stringent manner of his school, the thesis which Mr. Bright had propounded in only general terms. “Perhaps the very silliest cant of the day…is the cant about culture. Culture is a desirable quality in a critic of new books, and sits well on a professor of belles-lettres; but as applied to politics, it means simply a turn for small fault-finding, love of selfish ease, and indecision in action. The man of culture is in politics one of the poorest mortals alive. For simple pedantry and want of good sense no man is his equal” (V. 87)
When this passage appeared in the *Cornhill* printed ‘as it was delivered’, the introductory sentence read: ‘In one of his speeches last year, or the year before last’, which was slightly modified to ‘a year or two ago’ for book publication in 1869, before ‘a short time ago’ was selected for the second edition of 1875 (V. 498). R.H. Super’s scholarly text follows the 1883 American imprint, where Arnold’s disregard for specifics becomes fully apparent. By 1883, Bright’s address ‘some time ago’ and Harrison’s article ‘the other day’ on the expediency of the Elective Franchise Bill referred to a ‘fling’ which took place in 1866-67, stretching even the lax prerogatives of the disinterested essayist. The further the debate receded into the historical past, the greater its petition of renewed immediacy on the attention of Arnold’s readership. This was a clever tactic for impressing upon them the timeless value of ‘culture’, whose priority was to endorse ‘perfection as an inward condition of the mind and spirit’ (V. 95) and not as steadfastness to ‘direct political action’ (V. 88) or, indeed, historical dates.

Nor was Arnold quite fair to the original tenor of the dispute. Bright’s reasoning in the House of Commons for rejecting the ‘fancy franchises’ which proposed an examination to bolster democratic representation did not constitute an impetuous attack on learning outright, as Arnold implied by ascribing ‘contemptuously’ to Bright’s words, an adverb of his own invention. On the contrary, Bright believed he was protecting classical education by removing it from the political sphere where he assumed it served little purpose. *Culture and Anarchy* is a riposte that separatism would be salutary. Arnold’s predisposition towards the humane tradition of Cardinal Newman, for whom the principal virtue of university training lay in nurturing a set of versatile mental capacities to empower students ‘to see things as they are’, promoted ‘a philosophical habit’ calculated to facilitate ‘the exercise of political power’, amongst other attributes. By yoking together Bright’s and Harrison’s negative valuations of culture as typifying a political liberalism which insistently ‘wants to be doing business’ (V.
111) when Arnold thought it should be busy contemplating, he elided two distinct appraisals of the Franchise Bill which conceal different responses to the pedagogic nature of culture itself.

Bright’s apprehension over the Bill was that solely possessing ‘a smattering of two dead languages’ did not demonstrate sufficient or relevant knowledge upon which to grant some people a political right denied to ‘the great body of working men of this country’. Harrison, by contrast, was convinced that the ‘man of culture’ displayed a surfeit of irrelevant knowledge which made him forget that ‘the active exercise of politics requires common sense, sympathy, trust, resolution, and enthusiasm’. Both men were sceptical about the Bill’s capacity to improve the political system, but whilst Bright’s issue was that educated voters would still not be remotely discerning enough to comprehend the machinations of government, Harrison classified the same individuals as dangerously discriminative, compulsively picking out ‘the “blots” in the last Reform Bill’ instead of effecting tangible change. For him, the idea of personal representation was ‘the merest pedant’s paradise’ corrupting the shrewd imperatives of rule. Harrison’s estimation is therefore not an obvious expansion of Bright’s, as Arnold maintained, but rather a critique of the societal role of culture from the other side. The ‘man of culture’ stood accused of knowing too much and too little at the same time; he was ignorant, and he was a pedant.

This episode encapsulates the concerns of this essay, which explores how Arnold’s prolonged engagement with two competing kinds of exactitude and erudition, principally in the 1860s, restaged the central antagonism of a treatise war between textual scholarship and sweeping urbanity crowned in Jonathan Swift’s An Account of a Battel between the Ancient and Modern Books in St. James’s Library (1704). In a discussion of Shakespearean editorial practice in the eighteenth century, Simon Jarvis has shown how these contending claims for edification reflect divisions of intellectual labour, illustrating ‘the rhetoric of disinterested
universality and the rhetoric of minute specificity as torn halves of a public culture, to which, however, they could by no means add up’.10 ‘[D]isinterested universality’ epitomizes Arnold’s ideal of culture as an embodiment of ethical and aesthetic perfection: ‘a harmonious expansion of all the powers which make the beauty and worth of human nature and…not consistent with the over-development of any one power at the expense of the rest’ (V. 94).11 Swift explicitly provided the governing dynamic for Arnold’s investigative equilibrium ‘in which the characters of beauty and intelligence are both present’ in the metaphorical form of ‘the two noblest of things, sweetness and light’ (V. 99).12 This phrase, originally spoken by Aesop from the camp of the Ancients in the Battel, not only configured Arnold’s paradigm for the Hellenic temperament in Culture and Anarchy, but informed his basic pledge to preserve vitality amidst the necessary exigencies of academic pursuit at all levels, from the school child to the scholar.

In the ‘Preface’ to Essays in Criticism (1865), Arnold considered his ‘vivacity…the last sparkle of flame before we are all in the dark, the last glimpse of colour before we all go into drab, – the drab of the earnest, prosaic, practical, austerely literal future’ (III. 287). It was the stylistic seal of an effervescent ‘curiosity’, elsewhere identified as the hallmark of ‘real criticism’ (III. 268), which needed to be protected from those people and institutions Arnold perceived painting the world in black and white. In the 1860s, Liberal MPs, Francis Newman, and the English middle class, were all cast as victims of incuriosity whose cheerlessly staid outlook on actuality quelled exuberance and ‘free play’ (III. 268). This group was united in Arnold’s mind by an ill-conceived, even self-satisfied, attitude towards certainty and understanding. Instead of trying to approach truth holistically, ‘on one side after another, not to strive or cry, nor persist in pressing forward, on any one side, with violence and self-will’, they seemed rather ‘to fight impetuously towards her’ (III. 286). For Arnold, this denoted an especially unthinking sort of methodological parochialism; a willingness to surrender ‘play’
for the unremitting ‘earnestness and intensity’ of endeavour which he later branded as central
tenets of Hebraism’s ‘strictness of conscience’ (V. 165). The mind could seize a unilateral
triumph over its materials but only at the price of procedural fidelity to the many-sidedness of
truthful undertaking. Imagination, Arnold feared, was the biggest loser of even the most
passionate partisan commitment.

‘[C]uriosity’, then, demarcated a special type of devotion which brought Arnold much
closer to features of Bright’s and Harrison’s position than he formerly admitted. To the view
that culture is ‘supposed to plume itself on a smattering of Greek and Latin’ Arnold initially
appeared unequivocally censorious in Culture and Anarchy: ‘No serious man would call this
culture, or attach any value to it, as culture, at all’ (V. 90). Yet, because he had strong
reservations about heavy-handedness, he acknowledged a few pages later in depicting
‘sweetness and light’ as ‘the essential character of human perfection’ that ‘No serious man’
could afford to be too rigorous or dictatorial either: ‘Mr. Bright’s misconception of culture, as
a smattering of Greek and Latin, comes itself, after all, from this wonderful significance of
the Greeks having affected the very machinery of our education, and is in itself a kind of
homage to it’ (V. 99). Whilst Bright presumed speculative thinking a problem for obligatory
decision-making, Arnold encouraged it in an effort to dispel dutifulness altogether. Despite
his reputed antipathy to the Liberals’ proactive stance, Arnold counselled that too much
learning could be incapacitating, just as Harrison had done.

‘Sweetness and light’ were terms which, by their recurrent generality alone, structured
Arnold’s concept of intelligence as a searching balance between feeling and thought,
appreciation and insight. By refusing to explain adequately his central expressions Arnold
created an archetype of intellectual freedom which he hoped would mitigate crude ventures to
instruct directly. To his enemies, ‘sweetness and light’ seemed impossibly effete and
indeterminate; to Arnold, it was exactly this indecisive aspect of his nomenclature which he
anticipated would redeem artistic virtuosity as an integral element of truth. Arnold the literary critic defended ‘play’ as a saving category of knowledge from those whom he perceived to erase equivocation and flair in the name of discovery. Convinced that the complexities of intellectual experience were profoundly sensuous, he tested the limits of stringency by pitching urbanity and philology against one another, much as Swift had done over a hundred and sixty years previously when he came to the aid of William Temple, first calling for ‘sweetness and light’ to take the strain against the scholarly predilections of Richard Bentley.\textsuperscript{14}

Resituating ‘sweetness and light’ in its historical context satisfies the rubric of a disinterested critical attempt ‘to follow, with flexible activity, the whole play of the universal order, to be apprehensive of missing any part of it’ (V. 165), even as it concedes Arnold’s anxiety that contextual information itself was capable of thwarting disinterested reflection when hunted relentlessly.\textsuperscript{15} ‘[O]ur inaptitude for seeing more than one side of a thing…our intense energetic absorption in the particular pursuit we happen to be following’ (V. 95) was not coordinate with the Hellenic deference required ‘to slip away from this or that intimation of it, however capital’ (V. 165). The supererogatory accrual of perspectives could distort the possibility of ‘seeing things as they are’ (V. 178), though without any vantage point they might be mistaken for something else entirely, necessitating ‘a balance and regulation of mind which is not often attained without fruitful effort’ (V. 91). The truly Arnoldian encounter should restore the genealogy of ‘sweetness and light’ without sacrificing its spirit.\textsuperscript{16}

II. Studied felicity: the Horatian heritage of ‘sweetness and light’

‘Sweetness and light’ marked Swift’s allegiance to a late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century intellectual ethos committed to the promotion of \textit{curiosa felicitas} (‘a studied felicity
of expression’) to curtail the rise of textual criticism. The spirit of sprezzatura venerated by Castiglione as an epitome of ‘uncontrived and effortless’ courtly grace in Renaissance Italy was revived by Tory gentlemen to counteract dispassionate forms of progressive and specialised scholarship typified by Bentley.\textsuperscript{17} Horace was the classical precursor for empathetic instruction in an age where his influence was habitually credited, in Dryden words, as ‘perpetually Moral’.\textsuperscript{18} ‘Horace must be read seriously or not at all’, reflected the ethically-minded Earl of Roscommon in the ‘Preface’ to his translation of Horace’s Art of Poetry (1680), though several years later he softened the imperative sufficiently to concede that solemnity need not in fact be paramount for those ‘who (beside their Learning) were Well-bred’. On this account, good breeding was requisite to cultivate an intelligence supple enough to appreciate that ‘Harmonious Horace flows, | With sweetness not to be exprest in Prose’, registering any bid to scrutinise too closely as misguided and indecorous.\textsuperscript{19} Horatian ‘sweetness’ derived from the stylistic doctrine inArs Poetica which unified formal perfection with affective content: ‘Non satis est pulchra esse poemata; dulcia sunto | et quocumque volent animum auditoris agunto’ (‘Not enough is it for poems to have beauty: they must have charm, and lead the hearer’s soul where they will’).\textsuperscript{20} In critical commentary on these lines in their respective editions of Horace, André Dacier elucidated the indispensable role of emotive communication in artistic invention whilst Bentley detailed a variant reading from a Worcestershire manuscript: ‘Non satis est PURA esse poemata’.\textsuperscript{21} The difference between these two approaches – one literary and descriptive, the other historical and linguistic – exemplified commitments to distinct poetic and philological priorities which informed the translations and editions of the period.

‘Sweetness’ or ‘charm’ was the enduringly popular touchstone by which artistic exuberance spurned professional skill, contending that rhetoric and flair knew things which facts did not. Pope’s depiction of Horace in the Essay on Criticism (1711) as one who ‘still
charms with graceful Negligence, | And without Method talks us into Sense’ refashioned the
Roman moraliser as a raconteur of cheery abandon, freeing creativity to be realised not in
despite of contingencies but because of them. According to this liberating philosophy it was
no bad thing if the unresolved occurrences of life steadily beset the best laid plans, trouncing
the imposition of scholarly certitude in a discipline once reserved for gentlemen. Pope’s
suggestion in that poem that ‘there’s a Happiness as well as Care’ was part of an attempt to
circumscribe the boundaries of literary criticism by devaluing effort alone, replacing it
instead with a purposefully nondescript type of inspiration which could not be systematically
absorbed.  

The line had notable antecedents in Davenant’s notion of ‘Witte’ in the ‘Preface’
to Gondibert (1650) and in Dryden’s ‘Preface’ to Sylvae (1685), the latter of which yoked the
spiritedness of Horace’s words with ‘a secret Happiness [that] attends his Choice, which in
Petronius is call’d Curiosa Felicitas, and which I suppose he had from the Feliciter aude of
Horace himself’.  

Horace was invoked both to order the passions and to promote the
 disorder necessary to preserve the virtues of accidence and the felicities of imagination from
diligence and reason. There was classical precedent for chancing it.

The honey bee was the natural symbol for a cultural directive privileging range over
specificity, abundance over concision, disinterestedness over partisanship, and transformative
potential over concrete actuality. The ‘wandring Bee’ (CS. 149) of Swift’s Battel embodied
the suasive and conciliating attitude of ancient unrestraint and had several important forbears:
as a rebuke to the artificiality of rhyme, Neander argued in Dryden’s Essay of Dramatick
Poesie (1668) that its seductive cadence was ‘drown’d in its own sweetness, as Bees are
sometimes bury’d in their Honey’, thus permitting focus on ‘other beauties of the matter’; the
conclusion to Edmund Waller’s poem prefacing Roscommon’s translation of Horace figured
‘wandring Bees’ working in harmony as an analogy for the conviction that in poetry ‘sound,
as well as sence, persuades’; in An Essay upon Poetry (1682), the Duke of Buckingham
exhorted comedic dramatists to ‘Exposé no single Fop’ in honing satiric jibes but rather ‘to Collect, like Bees from every flower, | Ingredients to compose that precious juice, | Which serves the world for pleasure and for use’; and William Temple likened the prescriptive venture of regulating ‘the Genius of Poetry’ as similar to the enterprise of trying to make ‘excellent Honey’ by clipping the wings of bees when they must ‘range through Fields, as well as Gardens’ with ‘Distinction and Choyce’.

In this struggle between invention and imitation the bee was emblem for poetry’s autonomous imagination, the gentlest agent of an aesthetic sublimity ostensibly free from design and duty. Boileau restored the prerogatives of awe and delight in 1674 with his translation of Pseudo-Longinus’ treatise *On the Sublime* and his own version of Horace’s *Ars Poetica*, the latter of which acknowledged the injunction to ‘Love Reason’ and ‘Borrow from her its Beauty, Force, and Light’ even whilst it entreated the sensual intelligence to combat modern rationalism. It was a contest which ramified acutely in contemporary editions of Homer. Anne Dacier considered ‘servile Translation’ unfaithful ‘through too scrupulous a Faithfulness; for it loses the Spirit, to preserve the letter’, whilst the individual ‘Criticism of Words’ risked effacing ‘that Sublimity, and Stupendiousness, which runs through every Part of Homer’. Similarly, Pope’s impression of Homer’s inventive capacity or ‘Poetical Fire’ inured his conviction that ‘transfusing the Spirit of the Original, and supporting the Poetical Style of the Translation’ was the first priority. Otherwise a translator might be duped into ‘a servile dull Adherence to the Letter’ or ‘a chimerical insolent Hope of raising and improving their Author’. The sublime appealed to a reading experience which purported to transcend logic and excavatory analysis. It was an aesthetic capable of accusing scholarship of servility and hubris at the same time, whereby an unquestioning attention to textual particulars was deemed a sign of ‘the Ostentation of Men who had more Reading than Taste’. According to Boileau, proper discrimination recognised that Homer’s ‘Verses without Rule a method find’,
which Pope’s image of *The Iliad* as ‘a wild Paradise’ and not ‘an order’d Garden’ confirmed. Both descriptions registered a compositional independence which required tactful curation as opposed to radical cultivation. Significantly, these judgements aligned the grandeur of Homeric sublimity with the ‘graceful Negligence’ of Horatian ‘sweetness’ which, as Pope identified in the *Essay on Criticism*, ‘without Method talks us into Sense’. It was an instance of the domestic bee gone wild in its roaming ‘through Fields, as well as Gardens’ to celebrate spirit over scholarship.

If spiritedness alone guaranteed ‘sweetness’ then Bentley’s edition of Horace (1711) should have secured his status as a gentleman. He purported to have completed the work in his ‘leisure Hours’ and encouraged readers not to ‘pay a blind Veneration to Dealers in Books alone; but dare to think for your self’. The Horatian injunction of *sapere aude* with which the Tory wits validated imaginative activity also served as a philological principle. Over half the seven hundred emendations Bentley made to the text contradicted the readings in all the manuscripts. Moreover, in many cases conjecture preceded the recourse to manuscripts, not *vice versa*. This was the kind of inventiveness which Swift and Pope might have admired were it not for Bentley’s concomitant desire to ‘overwhelm’ readers ‘with the weight of my reasons and the number of my examples, until at last I drag them by the neck into agreement with me’. Correction itself was not necessarily the issue. Indeed, Pope was often pleased with Bentley’s alterations in his edition of *Paradise Lost* (1732), writing “‘pulchre’, “*bene*”, “*recte*” opposite them in his copy’. Even annotation could be excused; Pope’s Homer was packed with notes. Rather, it was because Bentley felt compelled to justify his textual assertions with a mass of comparative linguistic detail that he was not esteemed a man of taste, even though his formidably recondite interpretations aimed at clarifying aesthetic issues, much like Pope’s. Although Pope professed his observations were strictly ‘upon *Homer* as a Poet’, Bentley understood his own contributions to Horace in exactly the same
Whilst each had a fundamentally different conception of the fields of inquiry legislated by poetry, their editions cast doubt on the ability to separate ‘sweetness’ from ‘light’ in an uncomplicated way.

III. The politics of ‘sweetness’ from Swift to Arnold

‘Sweetness’ was also an integral part of the iconography of a Royalist vision which connected the revival of a natively powerful English literature with the restitution of the monarchy in 1660. Waller was consistently adduced as the archetypal hero of this politico-literary model. His mellifluousness was espoused by Stuart loyalists in a way which could make those writers seem unashamedly and unusually modern: in Dryden’s Essay, Eugenius declared to rare and unanimous assent that no lyric poet had produced anything ‘so even, sweet and flowing as Mr. Waller’; Atterbury credited him as the ‘Parent of English verse, and the first that shew’d us our Tongue had Beauty and Numbers in it’; Pope twice praised his ‘Easie Vigor’ and ‘Sweetness, Variety, and Majesty of Sound’. These judgements conditioned Hume’s tribute to Waller’s eloquence nearly a century later. However, the same perception of rhythmic ‘sweetness’ also leant itself to explicit espousals of political ancienneté. Atterbury was caught in a perplexity of his own making: though he lauded Waller in his ‘Preface’ for polishing the ‘rough Diamond’ of English he proclaimed rhyme itself ‘but a Trifle’, aligning his position much closer to Crites’ ancient-backing approval of blank verse in Dryden’s Essay. Likewise, if Dryden broadly endorsed the arguments for modernity in the Essay, he also came to bewail the Moderns as ‘Dwarfs of Wit and Learning’ when compared with ‘the vigour of the first Ages’ in the anti-Whiggish ‘Epistle Dedicatory’ to Plutarch’s Lives (1683). This was the same note of elegy struck by Temple in his Essay upon the Ancient and Modern Learning (1690) and by Swift in A Proposal for Correcting, Improving and Ascertaining the English Tongue (1712), for both of whom English was not sweet enough. Swift’s idealisation of Latinate ‘Purity’, coupled with his sense that
contemporary genius was ‘sunk under the Censure and Obloquy of plodding, servile, imitating Pedants’, was part of a political programme to purge ‘the Corruptions in our Language’ evident from ‘the Civil War to this present Time’. Replotting the historical coordinates so as not to exclude even Waller from reproach, Swift strengthened his argument that only by reclaiming the virtues of a classical instruction which linked learning with good manners would Queen Anne’s reign be glorified as a period of linguistic stability and polite criticism. Far from being a synchronic concept to measure the prosperity of one historical moment, ‘sweetness’ retained the socio-cultural valency to approve Waller and the Stuarts even as it nostalgically summoned a classical golden age of Dryden’s ‘gygantick Heroes’. The connection between gentility and constitutional rule was long-lasting. In *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790), Edmund Burke eulogised chivalry’s function to assuage destructive action with ‘superadded ideas’ from the ‘moral imagination’. He conceived chivalry conducive to the affectionate respect which ‘made power gentle, and obedience liberal, which harmonized the different shades of life’. Decorum was the centre of an ethical and intellectual code to mitigate the urgency of revolution, promoting steadfastness and patience in place of change and praxis. In chivalry’s demise, Burke feared the collapse of order, envisioned as the end of emotional intelligence and social decency. ‘[T]he sentiments which beautify and soften private society’, he presaged, would be ‘dissolved by this new conquering empire of light and reason’. Burke pressed an aesthetic argument into the service of a political one to convey his suspicion of the new and to curb the power of the people. It was civil control in every sense, envisaged as regulation by the statutory authorities and the constraints of honourable behaviour to promote collective disinterest and sympathy. Burke considered personal rather than institutional leadership a prerequisite for fostering feelings of ‘love, veneration, admiration, or attachment’, and he quoted the crucial lines from *Ars*
Poetica in defence of ‘antient principles’ to highlight his reservations about a regime predicated upon ‘that sort of reason which banishes the affections’:

The precept given by a wise man, as well as a great critic, for the construction of poems, is equally true as to states. *Non satis est pulchra esse poemata, dulcia sunto.* There ought to be a system of manners in every nation which a well-formed mind would be disposed to relish.  

Arnold’s admiration for Burke as a writer who ‘saturates politics with thought’ was incited by exactly this kind of perception: that the emotional quality recommended by Horace for poetics was germane to social policy. Arnold was in Burkean mode when he characterised the ‘grand error’ of the French Revolution as ‘quitting the intellectual sphere and rushing furiously into the political sphere’ (III. 266). In 1790, Burke fought republicanism with ‘chivalry’; in 1867, Arnold replaced ‘chivalry’ with ‘culture’ as the humanising force to protect Burke’s ‘decent drapery of life’ with sentiment and right conduct, challenging as rationalistic and divisive the philosophical positivism of Frederic Harrison, the disestablishment predilections of Edward Miall, and Henry Sidgwick’s religious call for ‘fire and strength’. Swift, Burke and Arnold all turned to Horatian ‘sweetness’ as a bulwark against a ‘new conquering empire of light and reason’, variously believed to endanger the sensuous imagination in matters of scholarship and state.

IV. Arnold vs. Newman: the battle of the Homers

Arnold’s lectures *On Translating Homer* (1860-61) were the ultimate celebrations in academic ‘sweetness’. His key strategy for nourishing a ‘disinterested love’ for poetry was a brilliantly counter-intuitive ‘acquiescence’ in his own ‘lack of learning’ (I. 175):

I sometimes find myself wishing, when dealing with these matters of poetical criticism, that my ignorance were even greater than it is. To handle these matters
properly there is needed a poise so perfect that the least overweight in any direction tends to destroy the balance. Temper destroys it, a crotchet destroys it, even erudition may destroy it. To press to the sense of the thing itself with which one is dealing, not to go off on some collateral issue about the thing, is the hardest matter in the world. The “thing itself” with which one is here dealing, – the critical perception of poetic truth, – is of all things the most volatile, elusive, and evanescent; by even pressing too impetuously after it, one runs the risk of losing it. (I. 174)

In appraising this passage, Stefan Collini struck a pleasingly Winnie-the-Poohish note for Arnold’s cautiously reflective epistemology of mind and social practice: ‘He is pointing to the way that we have, in some sense, to let the experience come to us a little more, and then to enter and explore its dimensions in a meditative, noticing sort of way’. Criticism needed to exercise simple restraint to avoid smothering its material with philological ‘erudition’, which meant it should be happy-go-lucky when it came to facts which stifled the ruminative energies of poetic ambiguity. ‘[C]uriosity’ was a boon so long as it conciliated fanatical tone and prejudice, steering artistic focus by lightly smattering attention on multiple avenues of meaning simultaneously, but fatal if it led to a concerted and disproportionate effort in one direction, as it did for Francis Newman. When an urge to historicize confounded the object under consideration, Arnold worried an appreciably intelligent hesitancy – of the kind which understands enough to know it does not know it all – was lost to ‘terrible learning, which discovers so much!’ (I. 184) In cases of unbalanced handling, then, ‘curiosity’ killed the critic.

Arnold was following in an established eighteenth-century tradition of thwarting philological emendation in his Homer lectures. Much as Dacier and Pope lambasted practices which detracted from Homer’s ‘Poetical Fire’, Arnold accused Newman of overlooking the essence of the verse in his stolid allegiance to antique diction. Newman’s theory that “the
entire dialect of Homer being essentially archaic, that of a translator ought to be as much Saxo-Norman as possible, and owe as little as possible to the elements thrown into our language by classical learning”, struck Arnold as ‘quite alien to the simplicity of Homer’ (I. 100). And it was ‘simple lucidity of mind’ (I. 141) which Arnold held as a cynosure for the English translator of Greek epic; without it, ‘a man even of real ability and learning may go astray’ (I. 140). By Arnold’s reckoning, Newman was such a figure. His proclivity for retaining “every peculiarity of the original, to be faithful, exactly as is the case with the draughtsman of the Elgin marbles” (I. 118) was the result of a scrupulously misplaced dedication. Arnold deemed Newman’s failure the consequence of generic confusion; he chose ‘quite the wrong field for turning his ability and learning to account’ (I. 171). Newman’s loyalty was to Homer’s matter, not his manner; his intractable wish to be literal dispensed with the delicacies needed to be literary; his introduction of lexical obscurities such as ‘bragly’ and ‘bulkin’ (I. 124) came at the cost of intelligibility; his fixation on the remote etymology of ‘single words’ tarnished ‘the general effect of Homer’ (I. 118); his insistence that the ancient poet’s style was ‘quaint, garrulous, prosaic, low’ (I. 119), and his trusting desire to imitate it, disregarded Homer’s ‘nobleness’, his most flagrant oversight, and settled the issue for Arnold: ‘between Mr. Newman and Homer is interposed a cloud of more than Egyptian thickness’ (I. 103). 47

However egregious Newman’s work from a literary-critical angle, Arnold’s estimation was also partly legitimated by the title repeatedly prefixed to his name. Ostensibly a form of politeness, ‘Mr.’ flagged up false credentials, highlighting instead the purported discrepancy between the trivialities of Newman’s modern philological practice and the timeless universality of Homer’s poetic power. Whilst Chapman, Pope, and Cowper also neglected to educe the full abundance of Homer’s beauties, they were at least addressed throughout the lectures on the same footing; their flaws were comparatively venial.
Conversely, in light of Arnold’s assessment that ‘neither Mr. Wright’s translation nor Mr. Sotheby’s has…any proper reason for existing’, and that ‘Mr. Newman…has yet failed more conspicuously than any of them’ (I. 103), their errors were nominally signalled to comprise a graver infraction. Arnold himself should be judged the progenitor for this especially subtle derogation of the scholarship of minor poets and Classics professors. A portion of ‘the cloud of more than Egyptian thickness’ which sallied Newman was Arnold’s stylistic ingenuity.48

Newman’s inscrutable translation was bound to displease in any case. Since the ‘Preface’ to Poems (1853) Arnold lauded the Greeks for their ‘simple and…well subordinated’ (I. 5) expression, believing their ‘noble simplicity, and…calm pathos’ made them the purest models for poetic instruction by exhibiting an unparalleled ‘unity and profundness of moral impression’ (I. 12).49 Arnold compounded his perception of unassuming Grecian sublimity with a picture of Victorian society in ‘On the Modern Element in Literature’ (1857) which could not have disclosed a starker contrast. Ancient Greek writing was revered as ‘a mighty agent of intellectual deliverance’ from the present age, besieged by ‘the spectacle of a vast multitude of facts’ which ‘baffles our comprehension’. In a world where not all facts were created equal, Arnold conjured the Hellenic impulse – ‘that harmonious acquiescence of mind’ (I. 20) – to adjudicate which ‘merit our utmost attention in all their details’ and which ‘it is sufficient to comprehend in their general character’ (I. 21). What subsequently revealed Newman’s translation to be the labour of a markedly modern author, and to which Arnold conceived culture as a cleansing antidote, was his inability ‘to observe facts with a critical spirit; to search for their law, not to wander among them at random’ (I. 24).

Newman’s incapacity to arbitrate to Arnold’s liking in deciding which traits of Homer’s language to emulate prompted his charge of pedantry, which ‘is of all things in the world the most un-Homeric’ (I. 101). The display of technical learning evident in Newman’s
admiration for phonology and historical linguistics offended Arnold’s taste as grossly excessive, leading him to castigate Newman for applying “the philological view” where it is not applicable, but where the “poetical view” alone was rightly applicable’ (I. 182). A sentence on the artificiality of Pope’s verse translation beginning ‘Wordsworth says somewhere’ (I. 111) was one way Arnold the rhetorician countered all varieties of polish, showing instead how liberating academic carelessness could be. On the other hand, if Newman’s version really was as enervating as Arnold asserted, he forfeited the responsibility for evaluating it since ‘scholars alone’ were worthy to review it and ‘all the poetical feeling in the world will not enable a man who is not a scholar to judge him truly’. The caveat was that Arnold’s ideal scholar is something of a self-portrait: highly intelligent, bursting with ‘poetical feeling’ (I. 117), and ‘not pedantic’ in the slightest, realizing ‘Homer is Homer by his general effect, and not by his single words’ (I. 118).

It may be objected that Arnold was not so proscriptive or self-adulating and that the scholars he had in mind ‘who both know Greek and can appreciate poetry’ were ‘the Provost of Eton, or Professor Thompson at Cambridge, or Professor Jowett here in Oxford’ (I. 99). The catch was, as the index pages to Super’s volume make apparent, Arnold had a notable capacity for summoning them all into being at once (I. 264-5; 270), wielding them more as a shadowy conglomerate of indisputable fact than as a host of complexly individual opinion. Newman no doubt genuinely felt that the academics Arnold invoked to lend credence to his arguments “would only lose credit if they sanctioned the use…made of their names” (I. 174), but surely it was a greater injustice for ‘Mr. Newman’, Latin professor at University College London, to be separated from his colleagues and professional acumen by title. This was part of Arnold’s ploy; he was deeply concerned about the ramifications of this edition, which he once divulged by backhandedly insisting upon Newman’s proficiency only to separate him from it:
But Mr. Newman is a writer of considerable and deserved reputation; he is also a Professor of the University of London, an institution which by its position and by its merits acquires every year greater importance. It would be a very grave thing if the authority of so eminent a Professor led his students to misconceive entirely the chief work of the Greek world. (I. 139-40)

‘[A]Iso’ in the opening sentence is not as innocently corroborative as it looks, but rather waggishly suggests that the clauses separated by the semi-colon are typically irreconcilable. Only at the very beginning of the first lecture was Arnold respectful enough of this ‘deserved reputation’ to elide status and institution, admitting that one of the two ‘fresh translations of the Iliad’ was published ‘by a man of great ability and learning, Professor Newman’ (I. 97). By demoting him for the remainder of the series, Arnold’s sleight-of-hand detracted prestige from Newman’s philological methods, turning the earnest scholar into an inexpert and whining pedant before he had said anything at all. The juxtaposition of ‘so eminent a Professor’ with ‘misconceive entirely’ dramatically raises the comic pitch of the passage. Meanwhile, ‘the accomplished Provost of Eton, Dr. Hawtrey’ was adduced as ‘one of the natural judges of a translation of Homer, along with Professor Thompson and Professor Jowett, whose connection with Greek literature is official’ (I. 149).50 ‘[O]fficial’ was a magnificent denigration of Newman’s talent and prerogative; he must have been keenly stung.

Another scholar to whom Arnold had recourse was the most distinguished of all: ‘I consider that when Bentley said of Pope’s translation, “It was a pretty poem, but must not be called Homer,” the work, in spite of all its power and attractiveness, was judged’ (I. 99; cf.109). Bentley’s expanded Dissertation upon the Epistles of Phalaris (1699), together with his editions of Horace (1711) and Manilius (1739), set new philological standards for textual and historical scholarship. Thus, citing him to support the disparaging claim on Pope’s verse
that ‘Homer’s thought has passed through a literary and rhetorical crucible and come out highly intellectualised’ (I. 109) was so mischievously ironic as to invert completely Bentley’s sentiment. Bentley and Arnold both concurred that Pope’s rendition was foreign enough to transform Homer into another poet, even though Pope would have furiously demurred. However, the essential difference was that the strictures of Augustan rhyme heightened Bentley’s impression that the translation, for all its culpabilities, was nonetheless “a pretty poem”, whereas Arnold’s sense was that it detracted from its status as Homeric poetry altogether, leaving the Iliad ‘highly intellectualised’. For Bentley, heroic couplets were a sign of simplicity; for Arnold, they showed a want of it. Whilst Bentley saw contemporary poetry as clear and uncomplicated, Arnold associated those same qualities with part of a lost Grecian inheritance which urgently needed to be reinstated. This disparity underlines the fundamental divergence between what philologists and literary critics made of Homer’s language. Bentley’s Homer (and Newman’s too) was immensely demanding, requiring specialist expertise to establish the validity of variously authoritative extant manuscripts and conjectural emendations in the service of an enlightened historical understanding of Greek linguistics. Arnold’s Homer was immeasurably more straightforward, calling above all for a deftness of touch to recollect ‘the plain naturalness’ (I. 110) and ‘simplicity with which Homer’s thought is evolved and expressed’ (I. 111) as sources of the immediate power of Greek poetry. Much like the ‘man of culture’, Homer was portrayed as surprisingly unsophisticated and inordinately pretentious.

This is a rare incident in which irony conspired against Arnold rather than for him. Bentley only superficially substantiated Arnold’s verdict on Pope whilst in fact illuminating incompatible allegiances. Indeed, Bentley would have been judiciously sympathetic to what Newman was trying to achieve. Arnold unwittingly recruited a professional to offer the opinion of an amateur. Even if Bentley could have accepted that ‘in the field of poetical
criticism learning has its disadvantages’ (I. 175), Arnold’s take on the relationship between poetry and knowledge was totally nonsensical to his textual practice. Bentley could not have extracted philology as a ‘theoretical object’ out of the ‘real content’ of poetry as though they were wholly discrete concepts in constructing editions or translations, whereas Arnold’s literary rubric required it: ‘Rather will the poetry of Homer make us forget his philology, than his philology make us forget his poetry’ (I. 183). Intellectual endeavour was internally divided; scholars like Bentley and Newman strived for tiny details to elucidate “Homer’s oddities”, whilst critics like Arnold questioned the very nature of precision: ‘– ah, but what is correctness in this case? This correctness of his is the very rock on which Mr. Newman has split’ (I. 184). Philologists and their opponents both aimed to be faithful to the original, but their ideals of authenticity were radically dissimilar. Arnold’s intuition for what he called the ‘true knowledge of Homer’ was purposefully exclusionary; he could not tolerate ‘knowledge of Homer’s “peculiarities, pleasant and unpleasant”’ (I. 184), which corrupted ‘the true principles on which translation of Homer should rest’ (I. 185). The ‘successful translator’, he thought, ‘will have (or he cannot succeed) that true sense for his subject, and that disinterested love of it’ (I. 215). Dictating the terms of ‘true’ engagement with the past to proscribe certain intellectual labours was another reason why it was hard to take seriously Arnold’s occasional protestations about the value of minute scholarship: ‘I unfeignedly admire Mr. Newman’s ability and learning’ (I. 171). Philology was a ‘false scent’ (I. 215) in almost every particular. 51

V. Style vs. scholarship: Swift’s Battel and Bentley’s ‘sweetness’

Much as Arnold’s idealistic appeal to ‘letting a free play of thought live and flow round all our activity’ (V. 187) was not as beguilingly laissez-faire as it appeared, Swiftian ‘sweetness and light’ hardly constituted an impartial contribution towards sustaining critical freedom,
though it masqueraded as charmingly inoffensive in the shape of the ‘wandring Bee’. In both scenarios, the criteria of ‘free play’ were strictly controlled in response to systematic thinking. Arnold feared Newman’s ‘explosion of pedantry’ was indicative of widespread Philistine narrow-mindedness incapable of distinguishing crudity from creativity. Similarly, in *An Essay upon the Ancient and Modern Learning*, Temple reproved ‘the scorn of Pedantry’ which operated like ‘an infection’ in ‘the Common-wealth of Learning’ as a measure of the imminent risk he felt empirically-minded modern scholarship posed to public participation in the cultural sphere. In fact, this ‘Contagion’ plagued the validity of Temple’s own wayward urbanity, which indiscriminately praised Phalaris’ *Epistles* as the ‘most ancient’ apotheosis of ‘Race…Spirit…Force of Wit and Genius…ever seen’, thus provoking Bentley to the best philological scholarship of the day.

Bentley’s enlarged *Dissertation upon the Epistles of Phalaris* (1699) ignored ‘the Common-wealth of Learning’ envisaged in the persuasive rhetoric of Temple’s *studia humanitatis*. To Charles Boyle, the Christ Church Wits, and Swift, it represented the hostile incursion of gratuitously technical knowledge which threatened to turn ‘the Common-wealth’ into a dictatorship where intellectual exploits were limited to a select group of highly-qualified individuals. Although Bentley abused his critical freedom by refuting Temple’s historico-aesthetic judgement about the age and quality of Phalaris’ *Epistles*, the real issue was that he had done so in an intellectual arena which priced out those who could not ‘play’. It was impossible to repudiate Bentley on his own terms, so philology was cast as a form of bad-mannered pedantry. Bentley was a pedant, averred Charles Boyle – who haplessly produced an edition of the *Epistles* in 1695 on the basis of Temple’s eulogy – because his scholarship flaunted ‘the receiv’d Rules of Civility, and Common Decency’, exposing his ‘Illbreeding’. Swift concurred. In the *Battel*, Scaliger humiliates Bentley in an ironic condemnation of his ‘Humanity’ which unites classical scholarship with rudeness: ‘Thy
Learning makes thee more Barbarous, thy Study of Humanity, more Inhuman...polite

Conversation has finish’d thee a Pedant’ (CS. 161). Pedantry was the charge levelled against Bentley for improperly parading his academic learning when the ‘sweetness’ of Temple’s ‘Nicety of...Taste’, which ‘set the world a Pattern of mixing Wit with Reason’, was supposed desirable. Yet, since it was a conviction made in the name of discourteousness, it was also the insult Bentley pitched back on Temple, Boyle, and the Christ Church Wits in the Dissertation for affecting to intelligence (‘light’) they had not earned, and for excessive reverence built on nothing more than conceitedness. Once again, the ‘man of culture’ was ignorant and learned; a pedant because he knew too much, and because he claimed to know anything at all.

In an attempt to protect the esoterica of modern scholarship from Temple’s vilification, William Wotton mounted a justification in Reflections Upon Ancient and Modern Learning (1694) which tactfully proposed to expand the creative bounds of ‘the Commonwealth’:

Though Philological and Critical Learning has been generally accused of Pedantry, because it has sometimes been pursued by Men who seemed to value themselves upon Abundance of Quotations of Greek and Latin, and a vain Ostentation of diffused Reading, without any Thing else in their Writings to recommend them; yet the Difficulty that there is, to do any Thing considerable in it, joined with the great Advantages which thereby have accrued to the Commonwealth of Learning, have made this no mean Head whereon to commend the great Sagacity, as well as Industry of these later Ages.

His entreaty went unheeded; the civil war in ‘the Commonwealth of Learning’ ramified as an intellectual division in Johnson’s Dictionary (1755), where a ‘Critick’ was ‘A man skilled in the art of judging of literature’ and ‘a man apt to find fault’. Wotton’s ‘Commonwealth’
was democratic enough to categorize excellence in all its forms irrespective of whether or not ‘Difficulty’ posed an obstacle to accessibility. The same could not be said for Temple or Swift, whose several incarnations of the ‘Commonwealth of Wit and Learning’ in *A Tale of A Tub* (1704) transformed the value Wotton recognized in ‘Willingness to drudge’ as a topic for derision. Moreover, it was mockery concealing an insecurity that philology might indeed ‘denominate…a great Genius, or one who was able to do great Things of himself’. Temple and Swift invoked the ‘Commonwealth’ to insist upon the liberality of their own rhetorical practice which they characterized as under assault from pedantic scholarship when, in actuality, they themselves were the oligarchs who renounced textual criticism as tasteless. This brought them remarkably close to a Philistine embodiment of Arnoldian ‘bathos’ which refused to accept ‘that excellence dwells among high and steep rocks, and can only be reached by those who sweat blood to reach her’ (V. 151).

Bentley’s admission in the *Dissertation* that he ‘design[ed] nothing but a search after Truth’ forced a generic shift in the debate, as John Tinkler detected, from ‘a judicial respect for the authenticated book or document’ to ‘a humanist commitment to the creative activity of writing’. In reply, Boyle and Swift played to their strengths in ‘Burlesque and Ridicule and Banter’ which Bentley, albeit unwisely, considered ‘no part of the Dispute’. His firm belief that satire was pure evasion denied respect to a mode of critical vitality which bluntly pictured him as ‘Rudely and Dully in the right’ even though this was not the whole story. Swift took up the cudgels with vigour, turning Bentley into a proudly self-reliant spider to secure sophistication and gentility from fastidiously plain discovery. Whilst Boyle denounced Bentley for placing the ‘*Matters of Fact*’ which composed ‘the Grounds of his peevish Quarrel’ into ‘an odd corner of his Book, as it were out of Sight; and plac’d ’em in the Rear of all his learned Arguments’, the bee similarly censures the spider’s ‘*Method and Skill*’: ‘if the materials be nothing but Dirt, spun out of your own Entrails (the Guts of Modern Brains)
the Edifice will conclude at last in a Cobweb: The Duration of which, like that of other
Spiders Webs, may be imputed to their being forgotten, or neglected, or hid in a Corner’ (CS. 
152).

Philological work which conducted its exegesis and emendation of ancient fragments in scholia, marginalia, appendices, and footnotes was depicted as hopelessly recondite and peripheral. It was also unwieldy, making Bentley ‘the most deformed of all the Moderns’.

Physical clumsiness became an index of indiscriminative intellect; Bentley’s ‘Armour was patch’d up of a thousand incoherent Pieces’ (CS. 160) to imply he could not profitably reconcile the range of his philological techniques. The spider was equally insatiable and disorderly, boasting of the ‘Destruction of infinite Numbers of Flies, whose Spoils lay scattered before the Gates of his Palace, like human Bones before the Cave of Some Giant’.

Like Bentley’s research, the spider relied on new devices for superiority: ‘The Avenues to his Castle were guarded with Turn-pikes, and Palissadoes, all after the Modern way of Fortification’ (CS. 149). For Swift, such belligerent supremacy cloaked the hubris of scholarship which pretended to be logically self-sufficient. ‘[W]hatever Spoil thou takest, shall certainly be thy own’ (CS. 161), Scaliger placated Bentley, in language which aligned philology with the spider’s petty anxieties over ownership and invention: ‘This large Castle (to shew my Improvements in the Mathematicks) is all built with my own Hands, and the Materials extracted altogether out of my own Person’ (CS. 150).

Swift’s wit emphasized Bentley’s aggressive haughtiness to misrepresent his Dissertation as a monomaniacal bid to eviscerate critical freedom. It was actually the product of a very busy bee who ‘by an universal Range, with long Search, much Study, true Judgment, and Distinction of Things, brings home Honey and Wax’ (CS. 151). Bentley was no spider, but rather driven by fidelity to the same virtue as the prototypically Arnoldian bee, ‘to whose Curiosity a broken Pane in the Glass had discovered it self’ (CS. 149). The breadth
of his learning was unbounded and the deployment of his sources disinterested, like the bee’s flight: ‘I visit, indeed, all the Flowers and Blossoms of the Field and the Garden, but whatever I collect from thence, enriches my self, without the least Injury to their Beauty, their smell, or their Taste’ (CS. 150).°° Bentley’s ‘search after Truth’ was certainly unremitting, but ‘Injury’ was Swift’s speciality. What made Bentley’s simple pronouncement worthy of parody was the possibility that such relentless ‘Curiosity’ did not stymie his investigation of the ancient world, as Arnold assumed it had Newman’s, but that it invigorated it ‘by infinite Labor, and search, and ranging thro’ every Corner of Nature’ (CS. 152). Crucial to Swift’s contention that Bentley lacked imagination was the original framework of the debate which pitted virtuosity and precision against one another: all philology and no ‘play’ made Bentley a dull boy, but elegance without accuracy was a shallow and undemanding chaos. Satire was the apparatus to create a world so fantastic that minute criticism seemed unforgivably dour by comparison. Still, it was hysteria engineered to trump the terrifying prospect that the quiet circumspection of fact was perfectly capable of ‘furnishing Mankind with the two Noblest of Things, which are Sweetness and Light’ (CS. 152).

By rejecting Phalaris’ Epistles as ‘a fardle of Common Places’ and declaring Cicero’s Letters a real example of the liveliness and pathos that Temple extolled in the Phalaris forger – merely ‘some dreaming Pedant’ – Bentley redeemed philology as an exhaustively innovative enquiry able to locate eloquence through diligence.°° Temple and Boyle never courted historical correctness, like Arnold, but Swift’s contemporaries were also mistaken in their own urbanity because they bought into the ‘emptiness and deadness’ of false beauty. Bentley’s knowledge enabled him to show that Temple’s valuation of the Epistles was an aesthetic illusion: ‘All that takes or affects you, is a stiffness and stateliness and operoseness of Stile’.°° Swift tried to rescue superficiality from Bentley’s confederacy of beauty and intelligence, but Temple and Boyle remained convicted of pedantry by Temple’s own
definition for ‘pretending to more than they had’. Luckily for them, satire sells; the connoisseurs were resoundingly cheered for fooling the scholars, even though Bentley subverted Swift’s specious caricature of him as a spider. Perhaps, if panicked pedants left ‘true Judgment’ too late, a roasting was the punishment Bentley endured for being a know-it-all. He was the queen bee.

Bentley did not completely overcome the Empedoclean dilemma which Arnold envisaged as an insoluble struggle between life and life of the mind. The qualificatory impulse of Bentley’s intellect was not ‘dead to every natural joy’ like Empedocles’ but, in his philological quest to ‘feel the All’, he lost his balance by underestimating the broad appeal of a retaliatory genre which pragmatically found its material in ‘the delightful commerce of the world’. Swift’s parody metamorphosed Bentley into a spider irrespective of whether or not that was apposite. Although Bentley’s academic mind could legislate amongst innumerable contingencies, his blunder was not honouring sprezzatura and wit as styles of sharp intelligence which could dupe the truth. This was still not quite the experience of having it both ways, then, but of consistently having to appease one side of the intellect at the expense of the other: the scholar could not comprehend the success of the satirist, whilst philology seemed too much like hard work for amusing amateurs to bother. Through closer cross-examination, Bentley and Swift might have aspired to the more permissively circumambient tone of ‘prose of the centre’ (III. 246) which, as Arnold delineated in ‘The Literary Influence of Academies’ (1864), ‘always aims at a spiritual and intellectual effect, and not excluding the use of banter, never disjoins banter itself from politeness, from felicity’ (III. 249).

VI. The ‘man of culture’: gentleman and scholar

‘Sweetness and light’ was consistently reformulated to address discrete intellectual and political pressures, testifying both to the self-serving flexibility with which the phrase was
employed in the protective vanguard of cultural politeness to detract from the potency of Humanist scholarship or the prospect of non-monarchical rule, and to the energies of internal contradiction latent within the quarrel itself. Rather than simply structuring a debate which unmistakably pitched poetry against philology, the Horatian idiom dramatized the complex kinds of self-adjustments made as individuals embodied opposing sets of values. It was precisely because of this concealed ideological parity that the myth arose of a strictly bipartisan encounter in which neither side respected the other. This was easier to sustain than interrogating the true workings of a dispute in which the same person frequently held conflicting views regarding the nature of creativity and the appropriate methods of investigative practice.

Arnold generated a wicked accuracy all his own to keep facts in check. He appreciated that he was most coercive when insouciant, and least convincing when strident. In *Culture and Anarchy*, Arnold postured as ‘a notoriously unsystematic and unpretending writer’ (V. 143; cf. 88-9; 137; 192) whose style imitated Hellenism’s ‘*spontaneity of consciousness*’ (V. 165). In reality, he was a superb grammatical tactician faced with the challenge of voicing obedience to his rule whilst at all times doing the opposite. The opening lines to the first three paragraphs of the conclusion show Arnold at his most seductive:

And so we bring to an end what we had to say in praise of culture… (V. 222)

For we have seen how much of our disorders and perplexities is due to the disbelief…in right reason, in a paramount best self… (V. 222)

And this opinion of the intolerableness of anarchy we can never forsake, however our Liberal friends may think a little rioting…useful sometimes to their own interests…still we say no… (V. 223)
‘We’ governs two mutually exclusive groups: the top example secures an informal idiom in which Arnold’s entire periodical readership is addressed, whereas the bottom one is partitive, distinguishing the cultured from the collective. The middle sentence ambiguously shuttles between the conventional and the subjective. This is a decisive incision. The shift is from the voice of public witness to personal outcry. In the last case, Arnold unobtrusively smuggled in his urgent opinion under the guise of communal approbation to recruit strength in numbers to his cause; the commissarial tone is concealed by the adjacent paragraphs’ colloquially incorporative ease. Throughout *Culture and Anarchy* this was something Arnold contrived. The plural pronoun frequently determined someone already attuned to culture’s perfectibility so that, as the essay proceeds, the reader is almost unconsciously transformed from identifying as one amongst many – ‘we Philistines of the middle class’ (V. 218) – to being converted and welcomed on Arnold’s side: ‘we poor disparaged followers of culture’ (V. 222). By blending his personality with the suasive architecture of popular assent, Arnold ventriloquized his private reforms through a beneficent cultural force which impartially and indirectly spoke for everyone. This was the kind of tactful urbanity which could beat the facts and it operated at a very different frequency from the hype of satiric commotion, nevertheless victorious in its own right.

Although Swift and Arnold policed their patch of the ‘Commonwealth of Learning’ with shared socio-rhetorical rather than philological tools, their schemes for conserving the playful vitality of knowledge with ‘*sweetness and light*’ were distinct. Swift had the hardest foe and exploited the retributive agency of satire to temper the corrective zeal of Bentley’s scholarship and validate the classical imagination. Satire, though, looks squint at all its creations, not just the Moderns. The wide irreverence of Swift’s method also preserves the artistry of the minutely discriminative mind, extinguishing the fantasy that by releasing antiquity from the cloying proximity of its source materials the intellect might negotiate a
balance between the scrupulously noted and the sumptuously free, each instinct with the other’s virtues. Indeed, it was in the depths of exceptional accuracy that Bentley-the-bee found the most arresting splendour, whilst in the responsive shallows of articulacy Swift and Arnold discovered their flair for common truth. Given this, perhaps the laughter induced then is neither intent on scoffing at all it encounters, nor self-mockingly despairing of ever being academically highbrow. Instead, chastened by the recognition that no approach to reality is total, it is rescued from the anarchic by an investment in the disinterested imaginative life, which Bentley’s *Dissertation* shinningly illustrated, too. It might therefore be merriment nervously meeting the arduous effort of reverencing the beauty of intelligence as well as more readily approving the intelligence of beauty. The pedantry of the ‘man of culture’ was, after all, another cultured man’s earnest profession.

From Swift to Arnold, ‘*sweetness and light*’ shows how one set of skills, erudite after another tradition, twice tried to make the philologists’ facts subordinate to its own claims for comprehensiveness. Such a task, for which the critics’ resources of wit, irony and eloquence are substituted for the scholars’ material world, in turn concedes an anxiety not just to seem clever without knowing or having read everything, but actually to be clever under those conditions. The truth content of tone is thus recommended as a type of propositional truth which rightly emboldens literary critics to wear their learning lightly, even when it arises in response to the real threat posed by the rarefied wonders of routine scholarship. Even if literary critics, for all their style and refinement, really know nothing at all.

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1 Matthew Arnold, ‘Culture and Its Enemies’, *Cornhill Magazine*, 16 (1867), 36-53.

Quotation from Arnold’s prose is from this edition, cited parenthetically in the text by volume and page number.


8 Bright, ‘Speech on the Franchise Bill’, col. 1518.


15 ‘Flexibility’ served Arnold’s experiential pragmatism and ethical idealism; see William Robbins, *The Arnoldian Principle of Flexibility* (Victoria, BC, 1979), 76.


17 Baldesar Castiglione, *The Book of the Courtier*, tr. George Bull, 2nd edn (Harmondsworth, 1976), 67. It is of special interest, in the context of this essay, that Castiglione’s discussion of ‘nonchalance’ draws a parallel between the imitative techniques of the courtier and the bee’s flight: ‘Just as in the summer fields the bees wing their way among the plants from one flower to the next, so the courtier must acquire this grace from those who appear to possess it and take from each one the quality that seems most commendable’ (67-8).


26 The Iliad of Homer, with notes. To which are prefix’d, a large preface, and The Life of Homer, by Madam Dacier. Done from the French by Mr. Ozell, vol. 1 (London, 1712), xxxiv, xxxix. Dacier’s French translation appeared in 1711.


28 Ibid., 82.

29 The Art of Poetry…by the Sieur de Boileau, 46; The Iliad of Homer Books I-IX, ed. Mack, 3.

30 The Odes, Epodes, and Carmen Seculare of Horace, in Latin and English; With a Translation of Dr Ben-ley’s Notes. To which are added Notes upon Notes. In 24 Parts complete. By several Hands, 2 vols. (London, 1713), i. 7, 13. This edition parodies Bentley’s notes in the first edition of 1711.

31 Glenn W. Most, ‘Classical scholarship and literary criticism’, in Nisbet and Rawson (eds), 749.


For competing Tory and Whig chronologies of the seventeenth-century efflorescence in English literature see the introduction to David Womersley (ed.), Augustan Critical Writing (London, 1997).

Prose 1668-1691, ed. Monk and Maurer, 14; Francis Atterbury, ‘Preface’ to The Second Part of Mr. Waller’s Poems (London, 1690), 1; An Essay on Criticism, ed. Audra and Williams, 280, ll. 360-1; The Iliad of Homer Books I-IX, ed. Mack, 11.


Prose 1668-1691, ed. Monk and Maurer, 227.


Ibid., 127; Carl Dawson and John Pfordersher (eds), Matthew Arnold: Prose Writings; The Critical Heritage (London, 1979), 215. For the full responses of Miall, Sidgwick and Harrison to ‘sweetness and light’ see 204-37.

Stefan Collini, Matthew Arnold: A Critical Portrait, 2nd edn (Oxford, 2008), 52. ‘Present participle or adjective + sort of way’ is a classic A.A. Milne formulation. For Pooh in Arnoldian mode see Milne, The House at Pooh Corner (London, 1928), 146-7: ‘Poetry and Hums aren’t things which you get, they’re things which get you. And all you can do is to go where they can find you’.
In the conclusion to *Literature and Dogma* (1871-73), Arnold once again rallied culture to protect speculative thinking, though the tone was decidedly different; he was gleeful and gloating where a decade before he had been genuine and disinterested (VI. 410-11).


Arnold had a keen sense for how the juxtaposition of names alone could instigate critical ridicule and save him from explicit defamation. The only instance Arnold addressed the Bishop of Natal as ‘Dr. Colenso’ (III. 48) was to highlight his doctrinal qualification at the very moment he considered it most deficient. In *Culture and Anarchy*, ‘Newman Weeks, and Elderess Polly’ were set alongside ‘Plato and St. Paul’ (V. 149). In *Friendship’s Garland* (1866-70), Bottles’ education under the systematizing Archimedes Silverpump, Ph.D. (V. 70-1) was as suspect as Cecilia Jupe’s under the ‘eminently practical’ Thomas Gradgrind; see Charles Dickens, *Hard Times*, ed. George Ford and Sylvère Monod, 2nd edn (London and New York, 1990), 14.


Arnold elevated and humbled people as the occasion suited. ‘[T]he somewhat pale stream of Mr. Jowett’s speculation’ (III. 54; cf. 53, 75) fared less well next to Spinoza.

In his lectures *On the Study of Celtic Literature* (1864), Arnold conceded philology was a ‘reconciling power’ (III. 330). However, despite leading ‘towards ideas of affinity of race which are new to us’ it was ‘no very potent affair’ (III. 335). In *Schools and Universities on the Continent* (1865-67), he gave a more positive though delimited appraisal pertinent only to someone of Bentley’s stature: ‘Some minds have such a special aptitude for philology, or for pure mathematics, that their access to vital knowledge and their genuine intellectual life lies in and through those studies; but for one whose natural access to vital knowledge is by these paths, there will be ten whose natural access to it is through literature, philosophy, history, or through some one or more of the natural sciences’ (IV. 295).


Ibid., 72, 60-1.
Charles Boyle [Francis Atterbury, George Smalridge, Robert Freind, John Freind, and Anthony Alsop], Dr. Bentley’s Dissertations on the Epistles of Phalaris, and the Fables of Æsop, Examin’d (London, 1698), 93.


Samuel Johnson, A dictionary of the English Language, 2 vols (London, 1755), vol. 1, ‘Critick’. The ‘Detailed Explanation of the System of Human Knowledge’ prefaced to volume one of Diderot’s Encyclopedia (1751) divided the practice of writing poetry into the faculties of ‘Reason’ and ‘Imagination’, reifying the distinction between art proper and craft explored in this essay. The former – which also contained philology and criticism – was responsible for prosody, grammar and syntax, and the latter reserved for creative content; see Jean Le Rond D’Alembert, Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia of Diderot, tr. Richard N. Schwab (Chicago and London, 1995), 144-5. For a critique challenging the deletion of prosody from cognition, and vice versa, as one which falsely insists that ‘Beauty must not only lack all knowing; equally knowing must lack all beauty’, see Jarvis, ‘Prosody as Cognition’, Critical Quarterly, 40 (1998), 8. This might provide a context in which to question the idea that the Enlightenment can be split into distinct narratological and epistemological parts; see Dan Edelstein, The Enlightenment: A Genealogy (Chicago and London, 2010).

CS., 40; cf. 61, 95, 116.

Wotton, Reflections, 317.


Bentley, Dissertation, cxi-ii.

Boyle, Bentley’s Dissertations...Examin’d, [iv].

Ibid., 1-2.


Arnoldian, requiring ‘a mind as various as its matter, nimble, flexible, empty of prepossessions and alert for every hint’; see Marcus Manilius, *Astronomicon*, ed. Housman, 5 vols (Cambridge, 1903-30), vol. 1, liv.


