EXECUTIVE PAY: WHAT WORKED?

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CEO pay is a controversial issue in America but there was a time, often overlooked today, when chief executives were not paid nearly as much as they are now. From 1940 to the mid-1970s executive pay was modest by today’s standards even though U.S. business was generally thriving. What worked to keep executive pay in check? Economist Thomas Piketty and others credit high marginal income tax rates, leading to calls for a return to a similar tax regime. This paper casts doubt on the impact tax had and also shows that neither the configuration of boards nor shareholder activism played a significant role in constraining executive pay. It emphasizes instead the roles played by strong unions, a different and more circumscribed market for managerial talent, and social norms, explanations that do not easily lend themselves to generating modern policy prescriptions.

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The authors are grateful for feedback from Michael Dorff, Jesse Fried, Troy Paredes, Gregg Polsky, and David Walker as well as for research assistance from Brooke Chatterton, Samuel Moniz, and Jonathan Olson.
I. INTRODUCTION

There is a substantial consensus that something is seriously amiss with executive pay, as the compensation of top executives of U.S. public companies is widely perceived as scandalously generous. Critics of executive pay can be found even amongst stout defenders of free markets. For instance, Richard Posner, a law and economics pioneer before he became a federal appellate judge, said in 2010 that the proposition that executive pay was excessive was “accepted not only by many leading scholars but by almost the entire nation, including many chief executive officers.”

Critics of executive pay often draw upon history for support, noting that the CEOs of today are much better paid than their counterparts of a half-century ago. Being a chief executive may be challenging. Still, when the job is the basically the same one it was during the mid-20th century, how can it be that CEO pay has increased substantially quicker than gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, total shareholder returns, corporate earnings and the wages of ordinary employees?

The dramatic growth in executive pay has not occurred in a vacuum. Managerial compensation has generated substantial controversy and criticism for at least a quarter-century and various reforms have periodically been introduced in response, seemingly to little avail. As the Wall Street Journal observed in 2006, “critics tried to slow skyrocketing pay through regulations, legislation and shareholder pressure. Few of their tactics worked. Many backfired.” For those perplexed or frustrated that efforts at reform have failed to reverse dramatic increases in executive pay, history may provide valuable lessons. “The quarter-century ending in 1970 was a time of unparalleled

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1 Michael Skapinker, It is Time for a Brave CEO to ask for Lower, Simpler Pay, FIN. TIMES, May 21, 2015, 14.
2 Id.
4 See, e.g., Robert J. Samuelson, The CEO Backlash, WASH. POST, June 22, 2015 (putting into context a backlash against CEO pay by indicating that the ratio of CEO pay to the pay of rank and file workers was dramatically higher than it was in 1965); Top Executive Pay Deserves Greater Scrutiny, FIN. TIMES, August 8, 2015, 9 (ditto).
5 Top Executive Pay, supra note xx (total shareholder return); MICHAEL B. DORFF, INDISPENSABLE AND OTHER MYTHS: WHY THE CEO EXPERIMENT FAILED AND HOW TO FIX IT 19, 25, 147-48 (2014) (other variables). We provide additional data on executive pay trends in Part II of the paper.
6 Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. L. REV. 673, 702 (2005) (“Executive compensation is one of the most controversial topics in corporate governance”); Paul Taylor, When the Boss Feels Like a Million Dollars, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1991, 9 (indicating that what had been an interest in what top senior executives were paid was changing to a “fascination.”)
success for American business.” Nevertheless, during the middle decades of the 20th century, CEOs of U.S. public companies not only were paid less along various measures than their present-day counterparts, but executive compensation failed to keep up with inflation and executives lost ground as compared to rank-and-file employees. What “worked” to constrain executive pay? This is the topic we explore in this paper.

Others have identified the shift from (relatively) modest mid-20th century executive compensation to stratospheric CEO pay by the century’s closing stages as a topic worth investigating. Paul Krugman said nearly 15 years ago that “[t]his major shift provides an opportunity to probe the inner workings of CEO pay.” Research on point nevertheless is just beginning. Carola Frydman, who has analyzed empirically 20th century executive pay trends in considerable detail, observed in a 2010 survey of CEO pay “the causes of the apparent regime change in CEO compensation...remain largely unknown.”

Explaining the “regime change” that disrupted mid-20th century CEO pay has important present-day policy ramifications. Thomas Piketty, in his much publicized 2014 tome *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*, detailed historical changes in the concentration of income and wealth and offered policy prescriptions designed to reverse growing inequality on both fronts. In so doing he argued that imposing high individual marginal income tax rates may be “the only way to stem the observed increase in very high salaries.” He suggested that the optimal top marginal tax rate would be above 80 percent, a policy recommendation that became increasingly controversial as the popularity of his *Capital* book grew. Piketty bolstered his argument with historical
evidence, attributing a late 20th century surge in the income of top earners in the U.S., including CEOs, to substantial cuts to income tax rates that began in the 1970s and were pronounced in the 1980s. He argued that if the intention is to stop the “stratospheric pay of supermanagers”, then “only dissuasive taxation of the sort applied in the United States and Britain before 1980 can do the job.”

Piketty’s argument is certainly plausible. If, due to high marginal income tax rates, executives keep very little of what they earn, executives might well be prepared to leave substantial money “on the table” because they know that they will only be able to retain a small fraction of what they have earned. This should in turn dampen pressure public companies might otherwise feel to pay management generously. Still, is Piketty’s invocation of history appropriate?

We argue no. Tax did not “do the job” with executive pay during the middle decades of the 20th century in the way Piketty implies. Other factors instead were equally or more important. Powerful unions exerted downwards pressure on executive pay. Managerial bargaining power was muted by limited job mobility and a perception that the managerial function was bureaucratic in orientation and correspondingly undeserving of exceptional rewards. Perhaps most crucially there were norms militating against “moneygrubbing” by top executives that functioned as a potent check on executive pay.

What are the policy implications of our findings? We are not seeking to identify in the past some sort of ideal executive pay model. Instead, our study provides insights regarding tools that could be deployed to restructure executive compensation should the political will develop to limit CEO pay substantially. One might wonder, for instance, if it would be possible to revise perceptions of top management to accord with those prevalent in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s or resurrect norms within companies strongly biased against greedy, grasping executives. Simply turning back the clock, however, is impossible. For instance, to the extent that mid-20th century norms constrained executive pay, these were shaped by the economic chaos of the Depression and the challenges of World War II, neither of which we would like to experience again. Moreover, top executives are perceived of differently now than they were in the mid-20th century, in the sense that their contribution to corporate success is thought of as being more critical. That means mid-20th century remuneration packages where performance-related pay was largely an afterthought are unlikely to be acceptable today.. This in turn has important implications for the level of executive pay because a logical trade-off with a


17 Piketty, supra note xx, at 508-512.
18 Id., at 417, 512.
managerial compensation scheme where much of the pay is “at risk” is a highly lucrative upside if all goes well.

The paper is organized as follows. Part II provides an overview of the history of executive pay since the 1930s. It focuses primarily on a mid-20th century era of comparatively modest managerial compensation that began to unravel in the 1970s and was displaced fully in the 1980s in a way that set the scene for dramatic increases in executive pay occurring in the 1990s. Part III describes how efforts to respond to executive pay controversies arising over the past quarter century have failed to “work” in the sense that CEO compensation has remained high and criticism of executive pay remains vocal. The remainder of the paper deals primarily with the middle decades of the 20th century, with the objective being to explain what “did the job” during this era of executive pay moderation. Part IV considers the contribution that tax policy made to managerial compensation trends, focusing particularly on the question whether executive pay trends during the mid-20th century were chiefly a product of high marginal tax rates on income in place at that time. Part V analyzes other plausible explanations of what “worked” with executive pay. Some, such as board structure, shareholder intervention and federal wage controls had at best a minor role to play. Others, including union power, the market for managerial talent and corporate culture (“norms”) do help to account for the configuration of executive pay during the middle decades of the 20th century, with the latter two factors being of particular importance. Part VI concludes.

II. THE FACTS OF EXECUTIVE PAY: THE 1930S TO TODAY

To set the scene for analysis of what “worked” with executive pay during the middle decades of the 20th century we consider now the evolution of executive compensation since the 1930s, with particular reference to the period from 1940 to the 1990s. We focus primarily on identifying trends governing overall executive pay, though we also consider how pay was structured. Our summary is not exhaustive; it seeks merely to provide sufficient detail to put our subsequent analysis into proper context.

Railways aside, prior to the 20th century, corporations were almost always run either by men with large ownership stakes or by their representatives. After a merger wave at the turn of the 20th century started to disperse ownership in major industrial corporations, salaried executives lacking a meaningful ownership interest began taking up top managerial posts

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19 See Harwell Wells, No Man Can be Worth $1,000,000 a Year: The Fight Over Executive Compensation in 1930s America, 44 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 689, 695-702.

with great frequency. Executive pay became a public issue as the 1930s began due to revelations that cast a harsh light on compensation practices during difficult economic times. Lawsuits and Congressional hearings revealed that top executives at three major firms, Bethlehem Steel, American Tobacco, and National City Bank, had each been paid more than $1,000,000 a year in 1929 or 1930. These apparently were exceptional cases. Still, in the midst of the Great Depression the image of a greedy corporate president and his million-dollar pay package became fixed in the public mind, with many, if not most, Americans believing executives were paid “too much.”

Dissatisfaction with executive pay in the 1930s sparked a series of reform proposals, the most consequential of which required the disclosure of executive pay of publicly listed companies under newly enacted federal securities laws. Evidence compiled from disclosures made to the federal Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) suggests that from 1936 to 1940 executive pay increased appreciably even after inflation. This pattern, however, would soon change. During the 1940s executive compensation saw “the sharpest drop . . . in at least the past 70 years, and possibly even longer.” In a 2012 study of compensation at large public manufacturing firms during this decade, Carola Frydman and Raven Saks Malloy found that in real terms the average pre-tax compensation for a firm’s three highest-paid executives dropped by 8% and after-tax earnings fell 24%. Correspondingly, the median executive in Frydman and Molloy’s sample received in 1949 17 times the pay of the average worker, compared with 24 in 1940. This was one aspect of a “Great Compression” in wages in the United States at mid-century, characterized by a decreasing distance between the wages of lower and higher-paid workers.

22 See generally Wells, No Man, supra note xx.
23 JOHN CALHOUN BAKER, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND BONUS PLANS 261 (1938) (indicating that as of 1932 the median compensation for a president in a sample of 100 industrial companies was only $41,833, equivalent to $728,000 currently).
24 Big Salaries, FORTUNE, Apr. 1936, at 215 (citing polling data indicating that 54.5% of Americans felt this way).
25 On the fact that dissatisfaction with executive pay was the catalyst for introduction of disclosure regulation see Wells, No Man, supra note xx at 741-44; Murphy, Executive Compensation, supra note xx, 251; Sandra L. Suárez, Symbolic Politics and the Regulation of Executive Compensation: A Comparison of the Great Depression and the Great Recession, 42 POL. & SOC’Y 73, 89 (2014).
26 Frydman and Saks, supra note xx, at 2107 (Fig. 1).
27 Frydman and Malloy, Pay Cuts, supra note xx, 225.
28 Id. at 239. The authors report the composition of their sample “is similar to that of manufacturing firms traded on the New York Stock Exchange.” Id. at 229.
29 Id. at 227.
Executives did somewhat better in the 1950s and 1960s in that their compensation did not shrink in real terms. Still, executive pay barely budged even though this was an era when “U.S. business stood triumphant at home and abroad.” According to a 2010 study by Frydman and Saks which uniquely provides data on executive pay using a uniform methodology for the decades we focus on, between 1950 and 1975 executive compensation only grew, after inflation was taken into account, by an average of 0.8% annually. The mid-20th century wage “Great Compression” correspondingly continued, as illustrated by the fact that between 1959 and 1968 the pay of a chief executive of a company with sales of $400 million or more rose 14% as compared with 39% for manufacturing employees overall. Moreover, the $1 million executive was nowhere to be found. Industry’s first “Millionaire Club” only took form in 1977 when the total compensation of the five best paid CEOs in the U.S. exceeded $1 million a year.

While overall levels of executive pay barely budged in real terms from 1950 through to the 1970s, some changes were occurring with the composition of executives’ pay. During the 1940s, executive compensation was overwhelmingly composed of salary and bonuses based on annual targets. Due in large measure to tax changes occurring in 1950, over the next decade the fraction of executives holding stock options jumped from 10% to 60% and the grant-date value of stock options awarded rose from 10% to over 20% of total executive compensation. Nevertheless, stock options grants “remained too small to have much of an impact on median pay levels until the late 1970s.”

Similarly, while deferred compensation such as pensions and perquisites such as expense accounts became important parts of compensation in the 1950s, the value of such fringe benefits was not substantial enough to

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32 Frydman & Saks, supra note xx, at 2099-2100 (unique nature of Frydman and Saks’s data), 2107 (1950-75 data). The evidence cited related to pre-tax compensation, but they report broadly similar trends after-tax. Id. at 2110. Wilbur Lewellen found that between 1940 and 1963 average before-tax compensation for senior executives increased 80%. Wilbur Lewellen, Executive Compensation in Large Industrial Corporations 8 (1968). Frydman and Saks persuasively argue, however, that this greatly overstates growth due to the use of a peculiar (pre-Black-Scholes) method for valuing stock options as compensation. See Frydman & Saks, supra note xx, at 2108-09 & n.15.
34 Donald B. Thompson, Advent of 7-Figure CEO Prompts Questions, Chi. Trib., May 31, 1981, N1; Cf. Other Business; The Million Dollar Sure Thing, N.Y. Times, January 24, 1982, at A23 (indicating Henry Ford II became the first million dollar executive in 1978).
35 Frydman & Saks, supra note xx, at 2106-07.
36 See infra note xx and related discussion.
37 Murphy, supra note xx, at 51 [SSRN version].
38 Frydman & Jenter, supra note xx, at 81.
change the general conclusion that executive compensation grew anaemically during the 1950s and 1960s.\footnote{Frydman & Saks, supra note xx, at 2109.}

This stagnation continued into the early 1970s.\footnote{See infra section V.__.} A 1976 article in the \textit{Harvard Business Review}, citing data indicating executive pay fell 20\% as a multiple of hourly workers’ income between 1964 and 1974, referred to a “pinch on executive pay” that was resulting in a “devaluation of the American executive.”\footnote{David Kraus, \textit{The “Devaluation” of the American Executive}, \textit{Harv. Bus. Rev.}, May-June, 1976, 84, 85.} However, between 1973 and 1979 the median cash compensation for CEOs in the \textit{Forbes 800} did increase by 12.2\% each year when annual inflation was 8.5\%.\footnote{Murphy, supra note xx, at 56 (at 260 in published version).} Moreover, by the end of the 1970s executive pay seemingly had begun a “regime change” from stagnancy to rapid growth.\footnote{Frydman & Saks, supra note xx, at 2101.} It is impossible to pinpoint the exact moment that executive pay began to increase substantially.\footnote{On the difficulty of telling what was going on in the late 1970s, see Detlev Vagts, \textit{Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the Markets or the Courts?} 8 J. CORP. L. 231, 247 (1983).} Various observers, however, have pegged the second half of the 1970s as the beginning of the acceleration that characterized the rest of the century.\footnote{Frydman & Jenter, supra note xx, at 83; Dorff, supra note xx, 18, 24.} A 1977 \textit{McKinsey Quarterly} report substantiates this verdict, as it indicated executive compensation had risen dramatically in 1976 and quoted a \textit{New York Times} story that said “The restraints are coming off. It is a time to grab” to drive home the point.\footnote{McLaughlin, \textit{Surging Executive}, \textit{McKinsey Q.}, Autumn 1977, 46, 47 (citing \textit{When the Boss Gets a Raise}, N.Y. \textit{Times}, July 24, 1977, Magazine, 47).}

Regardless of precisely what happened when in the 1970s, in the 1980s executive compensation rose rapidly. \textit{Newsweek} reported in 1991 that “CEO pay rose dramatically all through the 1980s -- 212 percent... -- four times faster than pay for ordinary workers.”\footnote{The Pay Police, \textit{Newsweek}, June 17, 1991, 44.} The \textit{Economist} said in 1992 “Chief executives’ pay soared throughout the 1980s.”\footnote{Worthy of His Hire?, \textit{Economist}, Feb. 1, 1992, 19.} According to financial economists Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy all executives were doing up to this point was “catching up.”\footnote{Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy, \textit{CEO Incentives -- It’s Not How Much You Pay, but How}, \textit{Harv. Bus. Rev.}, May/June 1990, 138, 139.} In urging public companies to do more to link CEO pay with corporate performance they argued that, despite headlines to the contrary, top executives were not receiving record salaries and bonuses.\footnote{Id., 138.} To make their point Jensen and Murphy provided data indicating that in 1986 dollars CEOs of larger companies traded on the New York Stock Exchange...
were paid more in the mid-1930s (an average of $882,000) than they were from 1982 through 1988 ($843,000). Nevertheless, even if Jensen and Murphy were correct that 1980s executives were merely “catching up”, the fact that their CEO pay figure for 1982-88 was substantially higher than the equivalent figure for 1974 to 1981 ($642,000) indicated clearly how much things were changing.

Executive pay increases occurring in the 1980s served as a prelude to even more dramatic growth in the 1990s that would drive CEO pay up to unprecedented levels. Carola Frydman and Dirk Jenter found that median compensation for an S&P 500 CEO rose from $2.2m in 1992 to $7.2m in 2001. Lucian Bebchuk and Yaniv Grinstein, looking at a similar cohort but focusing instead on average (mean) CEO compensation found it “climbed from $3.7m in 1993 to $9.1m in 2003,” a 146% increase.

The dramatic growth in CEO pay was accompanied by other executive compensation trends. One was that, despite Jensen and Murphy’s argument that there was little reason to be concerned about how much executives were paid, sustained and widespread criticism of lucrative CEO pay emerged for the first time since the 1930s. The trend became evident in the 1980s, driven by a takeover boom that meant, at least according to the media, workers were being laid off while dismissed executives were being rewarded with lucrative “golden parachute” severance payments. It crescendoed in the early 1990s, with exposés of executive compensation appearing at the same time as articles comparing U.S. CEOs’ compensation to that of their lower-paid, yet ostensibly more successful, foreign counterparts.

A second important trend was greater emphasis on linking pay with performance. The case that Jensen and Murphy made in this regard helped to convert many to the idea that executive pay should be designed to ensure “agents” (i.e., senior executives) had their incentives aligned with those of their “principals” (i.e., shareholders). This reasoning, possibly combined with tax

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51 Id., 143.
52 Id., 144.
53 Frydman & Jenter, supra note xx, at 78 (Table 1).
55 See Murphy, supra note xx, at 63-69.
57 On the impact of this reasoning, see, for example, Simon Holberton, Why Performance Should be the Most Crucial Element, FIN. TIMES, June 16, 1990; Charles M. Yablon, Bonus Questions--Executive Compensation in the Era of Pay for Performance, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271, 279 (1999) (“Jensen and Murphy’s article was extremely influential”); Frank Dobbin and
reforms made in 1993 that created incentives for companies to use performance-oriented pay,\textsuperscript{58} helped to prompt a reorientation in pay in favor of stock options and later long-term incentive plans with targets related to corporate performance.\textsuperscript{59} Only 16\% of CEO compensation in S&P 500 companies was performance based in the 1970s, but the proportion grew to 26\% in the 1980s and 47\% in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{60}

The shift towards performance-oriented pay in the 1990s likely helps to explain the substantial increase in aggregate executive compensation.\textsuperscript{61} Executives have various reasons to dislike having their pay tied closely to stockholder-related measures of corporate performance such as share prices and total shareholder return. These include fears that pay will fluctuate dramatically in accordance with changing corporate fortunes, concerns about pay falling substantially due to factors beyond the control of the executives (e.g. general stock market trends) and investment-related apprehension about tying pay to the performance of the company in which they have already tied up virtually all of their human capital.\textsuperscript{62} For companies that want to link to pay with performance but also want to assuage managerial doubts, the obvious solution is to structure executive compensation to provide for a highly lucrative upside if all goes well.\textsuperscript{63} Empirical analysis indeed reveals that between 1980 and 2005 increases in the level of executive pay were driven in large measure by the growing use of performance-oriented managerial compensation.\textsuperscript{64} Managerial attitudes aside, the shift towards performance-oriented pay in the 1990s drove executive pay upwards because the stock market rose substantially in buoyant economic conditions. As \textit{Time} observed in 1997, “it is that bull market that has turned millions upon millions of stock options into pure CEO gold, in cartloads unforeseen by anyone.”\textsuperscript{65}

Due to the bursting of a “dot-com” fuelled stock market bubble and corporate governance scandals such as Enron and WorldCom share prices fell

Dirk Zorn \textit{Corporate Malfeasance and the Myth of Shareholder Value}. (2005) 17 Pol. Power \& Soc. Theory 179, 189. Jensen was a pioneering proponent of principal/agent theory in the context of the public company: Michael Jensen and William Meckling, \textit{Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure}, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Infra} notes xx to xx and related discussion.\textsuperscript{59} Murphy, \textit{supra} note xx, at 72-88. Murphy has a multi-causal explanation for the growing use of stock options in the 1990s, including favorable accounting rules and relatively lax disclosure regulation.\textsuperscript{60} Frydman \& Jenter, \textit{supra} note xx, at 80 (Table 2a).\textsuperscript{61} Frydman \& Saks, \textit{supra} note xx, at 2103.\textsuperscript{62} Dorff, \textit{supra} note xx, 85-86; Brian R. Cheffins, \textit{Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation} 686-87 (1997).\textsuperscript{63} Cheffins, \textit{supra} note xx, 687-88.\textsuperscript{64} Frydman and Saks, \textit{supra} note xx, at 2130 (reporting that the growth in the level of executive pay was explained partly if not fully by the strengthening of managerial incentives).\textsuperscript{65} Daniel Kadlec and Bernard Baumohl, \textit{Linking the Boss’s Check to the Firm’s Stock Price Seemed Reasonable the Market Went Wild}, \textit{Time}, April 28, 1997.
substantially in the early 2000s, which coincided with a modest drop in CEO pay.\textsuperscript{66} Chief executive compensation rallied in the mid-2000s before falling again in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.\textsuperscript{67} Median pay for an S&P 500 CEO was $9.1m in 2001, dropped to $8.1m in 2005, and then bounced around, rising to $9.1m again in 2006 but dropping to $7.4m in 2009 before recovering to $9m in 2011.\textsuperscript{68} Median CEO pay crossed the $10 million threshold for the first time in history in 2013\textsuperscript{69} and rose to a record $10.6 million in 2014.\textsuperscript{70}

Even though the dramatic pay increases of the 1990s have not been repeated since 2000 a yawning gap remains between a CEO’s pay and that of the average worker. The exact details may vary, but, as many Americans are aware, whereas CEOs used to make not even 20 times what an average worker in their industry made, they now earn roughly 300 times the average worker’s wage.\textsuperscript{71} The “compression” of executive pay that characterized U.S. public companies during the middle decades of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century correspondingly is no more than a dim memory.

III. EXECUTIVE PAY REFORM – MORE MISSES THAN HITS

The dramatic growth in executive compensation over the past three and a half decades has generated significant controversy.\textsuperscript{72} A variety of reforms adopted in response are summarized here. To anticipate, none have “worked” to moderate executive pay in the mid-20\textsuperscript{th} century manner. Instead, the dramatic increases occurring in the 1980s and 1990s have remained entrenched because periodic decreases in executive compensation associated with scandals and falling share prices have been more than cancelled out by increases in better times. As a 2015 newspaper editorial said, the effort to reform executive compensation


\textsuperscript{67} Martin J. Conyon, \textit{Executive Compensation and Board Governance in US Firms}, 124 ECON J. F60, F73 (2013).

\textsuperscript{68} Murphy, supra note xx, at 97. Frydman and Saks’s sample (supra note xx) ends in 2005 so cannot be referred to for this period.


\textsuperscript{70} \textit{This Exec is the Highest-Paid American CEO}, CBSNEWS.COM (May 26, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/this-exec-is-the-highest-paid-american-ceo/.


\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Supra} note xx and related discussion.
pay practices has been “one of the least successful movements of the past
decade.”

Executive pay critics have certainly not been satisfied. Instead, they
are “angry,” and “outraged,” with commentators over the past few years
describing CEO pay packages as “gluttonous,” “shameful,” and “without
honor.” Hillary Clinton chose to attack executive compensation early in her
current Presidential campaign in an apparent attempt to “strike a populist
note.”

Even the former President of the National Association of
Manufacturers suggested in 2015 that “at a time when our economy is sluggish
and millions of working Americans are struggling to make ends meet, it is
unseemly for the lucky few at the top of the corporate pyramid to be taking
conspicuous advantage of their power.”

The most ambitious and the most conspicuously unsuccessful efforts at
executive pay reform, assuming the objective was to address concerns
executives were paid too much, were launched in the early 1990s. Due to a
combination of rapidly increasing executive pay and recessionary economic
conditions, managerial remuneration became highly controversial and was an
issue in the 1992 election campaign. In this context, significant reforms were
introduced impacting the disclosure and taxation of executive pay.

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78 Kevin J. Murphy, The Politics of Pay: A Legislative History of Executive Compensation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EXECUTIVE PAY 11, 23 (Randall Thomas and Jennifer Hill, eds., 2012).
In October 1992 the SEC substantially revamped rules governing disclosure of executive pay. The most dramatic change was mandating that companies provide in proxy solicitation documentation circulated to shareholders a Summary Compensation Table setting out the major components of executive pay the CEO and other highly paid executives had received over the previous three years. The purpose was to provide investors with an easily understood overview of executive pay in a single location. Additional tables describing in much greater detail payment in the form of stock options were also required.

Tax law was also deployed. Compensation has to be “reasonable” to qualify for deduction under the income tax. Newly elected President Bill Clinton proposed in 1993 to define all compensation above $1 million as unreasonable, and therefore, non-deductible, before backing off so that the deduction would only be denied to pay above this level that was not performance related. As enacted in Section 162(m), amounts paid in excess of $1 million to the CEO and the four highest-paid executives of a public corporation were deemed non-deductible unless the pay was based on performance goals that were determined by a compensation committee comprised of independent directors and approved by a vote of shareholders.

Despite the reforms occurring in the early 1990s, executive compensation sky-rocketed for the remainder of the decade. Indeed, the regulatory initiatives may have had the unintended consequence of accelerating the process. For instance, various observers have hypothesized that the toughening of disclosure rules in 1992 helped to foster the dramatic upward spiral of executive pay in the 1990s. Why would this have happened? A 2006 New York Times story entitled “Disclosure Won’t Tame CEO Pay” captures the logic:

“History suggests that whenever (chief executives) discover a fellow CEO is getting something they don’t have, they make a grab for it. In other

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80 CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW, supra note xx, 677.
81 Murphy, supra note xx, at 15.
82 I.R.C. § 162(a)(1); Aaron S. J. Zelinsky, Comment, Taxing Unreasonable Compensation: § 162(a)(1) and Managerial Power, 119 YALE L. J. 637, 638 (2009).
84 I.R.C. § 162(m).
85 Supra note xx to xx and related discussion.
86 Lublin and Thurm, Behind Soaring, supra note xx; Nocera, Disclosure, supra note xx.
words, as laudable as more disclosure is, there is a real possibility it will make a bad situation worse” .

To elaborate, due to disclosure, both managers and board members who set executive pay can find out readily the “market rate” offered by competitors. Executives who become aware they are paid less than their peers at other companies seek adjustments and the directors who set their pay will tend to be sympathetic because of a belief the management team is not “below average” and might defect to rivals offering more generous terms.

The $1 million deductibility cap was similarly problematic. It, in effect, may have been treated as an implicit endorsement of CEO pay of at least $1 million annually, thereby prompting companies paying less to play catch up. Moreover, since performance-related pay will tend to correlate with higher executive pay, the 1993 tax change, by providing companies with a tax incentive to rely extensively on performance-based pay, may have helped drive the huge compensation numbers in the ensuing years. The fact that many bonus payments regarded as performance based for the purposes of Section 162(m) were only weakly tied to performance likely compounded the problem. Even if Section 162(m) was not a catalyst for the rapid growth of executive pay in the 1990s, it does not appear to have done anything to stem the tide.

There was little additional executive pay regulation reform throughout the remainder of the 1990s but various changes have been made since the early 2000s. None, however, has apparently had a substantial impact on the amount executives are paid or is likely to do so in the future. For instance, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 mandated the “clawback” of performance-based compensation that was paid based on financial information that ultimately

90 Supra notes xx to xx and accompanying text.
93 For studies failing to find much of a causal link see, Brian J. Hall and Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive Compensation, 14 TAX POL’Y AND THE ECON. 1, 3 (2000); Nancy L. Rose and Catherine D. Wolfram, Regulating Executive Pay: Using the Tax Code to Influence Chief Executive Officer Compensation, 20 J. LABOR ECON. S138, S166 (2002).
proved to be erroneous, while the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 required companies to implement and enforce policies for recouping such payments made to executives.\textsuperscript{94} Executive pay expert Kevin Murphy has said that the rules are “notable mostly for (their) ineffectiveness,”\textsuperscript{95} which is not surprising given that clawback schemes seemingly do little to align pay with performance or contain executive pay increases.\textsuperscript{96}

The expansion of the clawback rules was just one feature of Dodd-Frank dealing with executive pay.\textsuperscript{97} A much more heavily publicized change related to “say-on-pay.” As Part V.A.2 discusses, there have for many years been requirements that shareholders approve specified features of executive compensation. Under Dodd Frank, shareholders of public companies were given the right for the first time to vote on executive pay policy in its entirety.\textsuperscript{98} Corporations, however, were only required to offer a “say-on-pay” vote once every three years and the outcome of the votes was deemed to be merely advisory.\textsuperscript{99} These features may help to explain say-on-pay’s modest impact. In the five proxy seasons from 2011 through 2015, fewer than 3 percent of all shareholder say-on-pay votes at Russell 3000 corporations were negative.\textsuperscript{100} There is some evidence that the high approval rates have occurred partly due to boards modifying compensation plans to head off possible negative recommendations,\textsuperscript{101} but at least one study has found that such modifications were accompanied by offsetting changes that resulted in higher overall executive pay.\textsuperscript{102}

Board structure was another executive compensation topic Dodd Frank addressed. The Act stipulated that the SEC should require national stock exchanges to provide in their listing rules that public companies must establish compensation committees staffed by independent directors.\textsuperscript{103} This was hardly a radical change. As far back as 2000, nearly four out of five S&P 500 companies had a compensation committee comprised entirely of independent

\textsuperscript{95} Murphy, supra note xx, at 29.
\textsuperscript{97} Dodd-Frank, Title IX, subtitle E.
\textsuperscript{99} Dodd Frank § 951(c).
\textsuperscript{101} DORFF, supra note xx, at 245.
\textsuperscript{103} Dodd Frank § 952.
directors. Moreover, the New York Stock Exchange has required since 2003 that companies listed on the Exchange have a compensation committees staffed by independent directors.

Dodd-Frank also required expanded disclosure of executive compensation. Most controversially, the Act provided that the SEC should introduce rules requiring an issuer to disclose the ratio between its CEO’s total compensation and the median total compensation for all of the company’s other employees. With the SEC only having implemented the relevant rules in 2015 and with companies not needing to make the relevant disclosures until 2018, it is too early to gauge the impact of reform. Still, it seems unlikely pay ratio disclosure will substantially change existing practices. As one commentator opined,

“[t]he idea behind publishing the ratio of executive pay to worker pay seems to be that the disparity will embarrass corporate boards and anger investors into cutting back on executive pay. Sounds good. But I don’t see that happening. If there was anger and embarrassment over CEO salaries, those salaries already would be cut. As long as CEOs deliver, what is the incentive to cut their pay?”

The dramatic acceleration of executive pay that occurred in the 1990s may have ceased. Nevertheless, executive pay has, for the most part, continued to increase since the early 2000s. Correspondingly, it seems fair to say that reform efforts of the past 25 years have yielded many more misses than hits. And so the question this paper focuses on naturally arises: why, given the dramatic growth in executive pay as the 20th century drew to a close, was managerial compensation flat for a number of decades prior to that, decades in which American business was performing well? What, in other words,

106 Dodd Frank § 953(b). Section 953(a) also directed the SEC to enhance rules governing disclosure of the link between pay and performance. In 2015 the SEC issued proposed rules on point implementation seems unlikely to have a marked effect on executive pay. Steven A. Bank & George S. Georgiev, *Paying High for Low Performance*, 100 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES ___ (forthcoming).
109 Supra note xx and related discussion.
“worked” to compress executive pay? We begin our analysis by considering the role of tax, in large measure because of Thomas Piketty’s high-profile recommendation that high marginal tax rates be introduced to bring executive pay under control.\textsuperscript{110}

IV. TAXATION AND EXECUTIVE PAY

A. Higher Tax Rates as a Potential Cure for Executives Being Paid “Too Much”

While Piketty is perhaps the most prominent commentator to have suggested that a solution to unduly lucrative executive pay is to raise income tax rates, he is by no means the only one. As far back as 1993 former Harvard law professor and President Derek Bok made this argument.\textsuperscript{111} Richard Posner did likewise in a 2010 law review article on executive pay\textsuperscript{112} as have various academics\textsuperscript{113} and media commentators.\textsuperscript{114}

These calls to raise top income tax rates to rein in executive pay are implicitly based on the assumption that executives take into account the costs and benefits associated with negotiating lucrative compensation and tax will be a cost that will deter them from taking full advantage of leverage they otherwise have. Piketty refers to the logic involved as a “bargaining power hypothesis.”\textsuperscript{115} To elaborate, significantly higher marginal tax rates can diminish substantially the after-tax benefits of the additional dollars executives obtain from managerial compensation. As the net benefit decreases, the costs become more salient and executives theoretically will conclude that the pursuit of additional dollars is not worth whatever social capital has to be expended to obtain those dollars.\textsuperscript{116} Executive pay moderation will follow in due course. Developments occurring during the middle of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century provide an opportunity to test whether this theory holds up in practice.

\textsuperscript{110} Supra note xx and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{111} Bok, supra note xx, 275.
\textsuperscript{112} Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, supra note xx, 1046.
\textsuperscript{115} Piketty, supra note xx, at 510.
\textsuperscript{116} Id.; Atkinson, supra note xx, at 186.
B. Tax and Executive Pay Levels During the Middle of the 20th Century

Proving directly that executives respond to higher tax rates by leaving money on the table is not feasible because few are privy to the deliberations of directors or the negotiations with top management which serve to set executive pay. At least some of those who advocate using tax to solve the executive pay “problem” have correspondingly resorted to citing the historical record as evidence that tax reform would work. In particular, they point to a correlation from the 1940s through the 1970s between high income tax rates in place then and executive pay that was modest by present day standards. For instance, Piketty has cited developments in both the U.S., where the top marginal tax rate was 91 percent between 1951 and 1963, and Britain, where the figure was as high as 98 percent between the 1950s and 1970s. According to Piketty,

“It is always difficult for an executive to truly convince other parties involved in the firm . . . that a large pay raise – say of a million dollars – is truly justified. In the 1950s and 1960s, executives in British and US firms had little reason to fight for such raises, and other interested parties were less inclined to accept them, because 80-90 percent of the increase would in any case go directly to the government.”

At first glance, the chronology of the top marginal tax rate in the U.S. supports Piketty’s logic. As Figure 1 indicates, the top marginal tax rate was high from the late 1930s to the 1970s, fell dramatically in the 1980s and remained low by mid-20th century standards thereafter. Executive pay either fell or increased only modestly in real terms when the income taxes were high and only began to increase substantially when the top marginal tax rate fell.

Figure 1: Tax Rates and Median Total Compensation, 1936-2005

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118 PIKETTY, supra note xx, at 509-10. On the British case see also ATKINSON, supra note xx, at 186.
119 For tax rates, adjusted to reflect changes occurring annually see Tax Policy Center, Historical Individual Income Tax Parameters, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=543. The data on the “earned rate” reflects the fact that due to the Tax Reform Act of 1969 earned income, such as salary and bonuses, was taxed at a lower rate than income from other sources, such as interest and dividends, from 1971 to 1981. See text accompanying note xx infra. On median total executive compensation data, presented as averages over five year periods see Carola Frydman & Raven S. Molloy, Full Data Appendix to Does Tax Policy Affect Executive Compensation? Evidence from Postwar Tax Reforms, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 1425, 1426 (2011) (Tbl. A5), available at http://web.mit.edu/frydman/www/appendix1109.pdf.
But was this merely a coincidence? Or did high marginal income tax rates actually cause executives to leave enough money on the table to explain the relatively modest executive pay arrangements in place from the 1940s through to the 1970s?

C. How Much Did Tax Matter?

During the middle decades of the 20th century various observers argued that the high marginal tax rates in place put meaningful downward pressure on executive compensation. One practitioner remarked in 1956 that “the no longer new, but always awe-inspiring, high plateau of progressive individual incomes taxes upon the take-home pay of high priced key personnel” had made traditional compensation policies “obsole[te].”

David Roberts, in a 1959 study of executive compensation, said the income tax regime was

“widely credited with partial responsibility for the failure of executive earnings gains to keep pace with those in other occupations. The corporation is allegedly discouraged from making increases which add to its costs and confer little after taxes benefit upon the executive.”

J. Grant Macdonnell of Northrop Aircraft echoed this sentiment, concluding in 1960 that “[t]oo often, mere salary increases are meaningless to executives in the higher tax brackets. These executives may retain only 20 to

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120 Clarence E. Bonnett, Jr., Compensation Planning for the Executive, 9 TAX EXECUTIVE 26, 26 (1956).
121 DAVID R. ROBERTS, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 155 (1959).
30 cents (or even less) of each dollar of the increase.

Likewise, the Wall Street Journal reported in 1969 when General Motors shareholders were debating a proposal to cap the CEO’s pay that “a wife of one top GM executive commented to a friend, ‘They don’t seem to understand that we give 90% of earnings back to the government.”

While high income tax rates plausibly could explain why executive pay was modest in the mid-20th century by present day standards, the only statistically rigorous analysis of the interrelationship between income tax and executive pay over an extended period of time indicates that tax policy was not pivotal. In a 2011 empirical study, Carola Frydman and Raven Saks Molloy examined the salaries, stock options, and post-retirement bonuses paid to a sample of top executives in large corporations between 1946 and 2005 and found there was a correlation in the time-series evidence between tax policy and the level of executive pay. While this seemingly implies tax had a significant role, Frydman and Molloy failed to find any meaningful link between changes in tax rates and changes in pay levels over the short and long-term. It seems, then, that neither boards nor executives altered their approach to executive pay explicitly in response to the tax regime in place.

Even with Frydman and Molloy’s time series evidence, the correlation between tax policy and executive pay did not hold at all times. At the beginning of the 1970s the top rate of marginal income tax on earned income was reduced from 70% to 50% while income from other sources, such as interest and dividends, continued to be taxed at a top rate of 70% (Fig. 1). Paul Samuelson, a well-known economist, described the change as “the greatest thing that ever happened to executives.” CEO compensation nevertheless increased only modestly in real terms in the decade following, even if there are some indications an executive pay “regime change” began in the second half of the 1970s.

125 Id.
127 Executive Compensation: Getting Richer in ’73, BUS. WK., May 4, 1974, 58.
128 Frydman & Molloy, supra note xx, at 1427. This does not mean tax had no effect on compensation packages during this era. Instead, it may well have helped to change the mix of compensation, rather than the overall amount. See Anthony M. Vernava, “Cash Now” – The Attractions of Current Compensation after the Tax Reform Act, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 1055, 1059-60 (1971) as well as infra notes xx to xx and related discussion.
129 Supra note xx and related discussion.
Why didn’t tax affect executive pay as much as has been theorized? One possibility was that with top marginal tax rates only kicking in at very high levels of pay the tax “hit” was not substantial enough to mean senior executives were indifferent about their pre-tax pay. For instance, the highest tax bracket was only applicable to income over $200,000 between 1942 and 1947 and over $400,000 (for 1955 nearly $3.6 million in today’s money) between 1948 and 1964.131 A 1963 study by Leonard Burgess of the executive pay of the three highest-paid executives in each of the 25 largest manufacturing companies indicates that as of 1958 there executives were paid on average $268,000 annually.132 The top rate of income tax correspondingly apparently was irrelevant for many top executives. Roberts affirmed the point in his 1959 study, conceding that it was widely thought that tax had impacted upon levels of executive pay, but saying “except in periods of emergency the rate has not been that high.”133

Other data Burgess compiled confirms that the after-tax income of top executives was far from negligible during the middle decades of the 20th century. He estimated using his 1958 data the percentage of the total pay package of the three highest paid executives that would have been paid as tax if fully progressive rates applied to all forms of executive compensation. The potential tax “take” varied from just over 40% for the executives of International Harvester, where the pay of the top three executives taken together was $317,000 before taxes and $194,000 after, to just over 60% for the executives of Bethlehem Steel, with the equivalent figures for its top three executives being nearly $1.6 million and $655,000.134 Hence, even though a top marginal tax rate of 91% might have reduced the incentive to fight for the last dollar, executives could still benefit materially from lucrative aggregate pay.

There were other reasons why tax policy might not have led to marked reductions in pre-tax compensation. A Business Week columnist observed in 1956 after noting that in the magazine’s most recent annual survey of executive pay General Motors president Harlow Curtice had been paid the highest figure ever reported by the magazine ($776,000), “A figure like this prompts some people to raise the general question: Why do companies pay their top men so much; after all, they keep a relatively small amount of it after taxes.”135 One explanation the columnist offered was that pay increases for top executives made sense because what they were paid served as a benchmark for other executive salaries in the company and too much “compression” at the top

131 Tax Policy Center, Historical Individual, supra note xx.
132 LEONARD RANDOLPH BURGESS, TOP EXECUTIVE PAY PACKAGE 114 (1963).
133 ROBERTS, supra note xx, 155-56.
134 Id., 135, 159.
135 Ideas Shift on Executive Pay, BUS. WK., June 16, 1956, 85.
created problems with the setting the pay of less senior executives faced with a less onerous tax situation. Another was that levels of pre-tax pay mattered because of “an emotional reaction” -- a typical top executive had “the desire to be recognized for his ability or status in terms of pay figures.” Graef Crystal, writing in 1970 when he was a senior official at a firm specializing in providing executive compensation advice, concurred, saying “most executives place primary emphasis on their pretax compensation and not their after-tax yield. To them, their pretax compensation represents a form of recognition.”

Given this, even if the high income tax rates in place during the mid-20th century were prompting executives to leave some money on the table, their pride meant they were not about to leave all, or perhaps even most, of it.

Tax mitigation strategies may have also lessened the effects of high marginal tax rates. For instance, the Business Week columnist, in his 1956 analysis of why companies continued to pay senior management well despite “the big tax bite,” said “many companies (were) changing their ideas of how an executive might be paid.” The nature of the change was described by a practitioner in 1954:

“It is no longer enough merely to increase the salary or bonus or to write a share of the profits into the executive’s contract. High income tax rates leave him very little of any additional compensation. . . . These conditions result in a great deal of pressure being exerted on employers to work out new methods of compensating executives which will prove attractive tax-wise.”

An in-house lawyer at E. I. DuPont de Nemours and Co. echoed this sentiment, observing that “[t]ax planners have devoted much time to devising a plan for compensating executives which will alleviate the effect of the high individual surtax.” Companies indeed increasingly paid their executives using tax-favored deferred compensation schemes, tax advantaged “restricted” stock option plans provided for under the Revenue Act of 1950,The 1950 Act reversed an adverse decision of the Supreme Court from 1945 and created a class of “restricted stock options” that one contemporary compensation consultant claimed “[gave] the stock option a new lease on life as an executive incentive.” Arch Patton, *Incentive Compensation for Executives*, 29 Harv. Bus. Rev. 35, 43 (1951). On the impact of the
and fringe benefits not subject to tax in the same way as income, such as life and health insurance, dining and country club memberships, recreational facility fees, interest-free loans, and the free use of personal residences, cars, and planes.\footnote{143}{William H. Hoffman, Jr., Tax Influences in Shaping the Executive Pay Package, 40 TAXES 386, 390 (1962); Henry W. Trimble, Jr., Executive Compensation Corporate Considerations, 6 PRAC. LAW. 45, 47 (1960); Leslie Mills, Recent Developments in the Taxation of Executive Compensation, 34 TAXES 882, 883 (1956)\footnote{144}{Robert B. Mautz and Gerald W. Rock, The Wages of Management, 11 U. FLA. L. REV. 474, 482 (1958).\footnote{145}{BURGESS, supra note xx, 160.\footnote{146}{Supra note xx and related discussion.}}}

Some observers suggested that deployment of tax planning strategies largely cancelled out the effect of high marginal rates. According to a 1958 law review article on executive pay, “The argument that the current high rate of individual tax in the upper income brackets provides a built-in safeguard against managerial desire for increased compensation has little factual basis…[T]axation does not limit total compensation; it merely changes the techniques of reward.”\footnote{144}{Robert B. Mautz and Gerald W. Rock, The Wages of Management, 11 U. FLA. L. REV. 474, 482 (1958).} Tax planning, however, does not explain fully why tax failed to constrain executive pay to the extent that might have been anticipated. This is because most of the pay top executives received was in fact fully taxable.

Burgess, in his study of executive pay in the 25 largest companies in the U.S. as of 1958, reported on the tax-oriented executive pay “savings” for each of the 25 companies, this being the difference between the tax their three most highly paid executives would have paid if their compensation was taxed fully at the rates applicable to income and actual tax paid, adjusted for favorable tax treatment afforded to other types of compensation. Ford had the greatest savings with a differential of 26% between 35% of pre-tax aggregate compensation actually paid as tax and a possible tax “hit” of 61%.\footnote{145}{BURGESS, supra note xx, 160.} With most of the 25 companies, however, the tax savings were 10% or less. This indicates that not only did top executives fail, as the wife of the senior GM executive suggested in 1969,\footnote{146}{Supra note xx and related discussion.} to hand over most of their compensation to the government but that tax mitigation strategies played only a supporting role in protecting them from a damaging tax “hit.” None of this is to claim that high marginal tax rates had no role in suppressing mid-century executive compensation or that it is impossible in theory for tax to put substantial change, see Frydman & Saks, supra note xx, at 2099, 2107 (finding that more than 40 percent of the companies they studied adopted a restricted stock option plan within five years of the passage of the Revenue Act of 1950). "Restricted" stock options” were replaced with “qualified stock options” in the Revenue Act of 1964, which, among other things, required that to qualify for favorable tax treatment the options had to be awarded “at the money”: Revenue Act of 1964, § 221, 78 Stat. 63 (1964). Observers felt, however, that the few additional requirements would “not impair its usefulness as a device to avoid income taxes.” Charles L. B. Lowndes, The Revenue Act of 1964: A Critical Appraisal, 4 DUKE L.J. 667, 684-85 (1964).}
downward pressure on executive pay.\textsuperscript{147} Nevertheless, mid-20\textsuperscript{th} century income tax rates were not the “smoking gun” explanation for modest executive pay claimed by modern proponents of a tax-based solution. 

So we are left with a puzzle. If high tax rates do relatively little, on their own, to explain the stagnation of executive pay in the U.S. during the middle decades of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century in the U.S., then what does? We consider various possibilities next.

V. \textbf{IF NOT TAX, THEN WHAT “WORKED”?}

Having identified the middle decades of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century as an era when executive pay was modest in comparison with the decades to follow and set aside tax as the key explanatory variable, we consider whether other factors “worked” to compress executive pay. We will begin with variables that can be thought of as “internal”, in the sense they were intrinsic features of the public companies that were paying the executives. We then turn to potential “external” determinants of managerial remuneration.\textsuperscript{148}

\textbf{A. Internal Variables}

1. Boards of Directors

State corporate statutes vest the board of directors with the authority to manage the corporation and it has long been understood that the setting of executive pay falls within the ambit of this grant of managerial power.\textsuperscript{149} Hence, historically boards of public companies have been formally responsible for fixing the compensation of the officers.\textsuperscript{150} A correct but ultimately uninformative answer can correspondingly be provided to the question why executive pay was “compressed” during the middle decades of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century:

\textsuperscript{147} It is possible, for instance, that this occurred in Britain with respect to cash salaries and bonuses. \textit{See, e.g.}, Cheffins, supra note xx, 704. During the late 1960s, the top marginal rate of 91\% kicked in when gross income reached £19,000 (then approximately $46,000), meaning it was virtually impossible for an executive of a U.K. public company to earn much more than £10,000 in salary after tax. \textit{See} Brian R. Cheffins and Steven A. Bank, \textit{Corporate Ownership and Control in the U.K.: The Tax Dimension}, 70 Modern L. Rev. 778, 796 (2007).


boards of directors fixed managerial compensation that way. That begs the more challenging but more interesting question: Why? Were boards structured in a manner that tilted them towards moderation in a manner that boards have not been more recently? As we will see now, the answer is no, which indicates that the manner in which boards were organized does not explain the executive pay moderation of the mid-20th century.

Given that boards of public companies are formally responsible for setting managerial compensation, critics of executive pay have not surprisingly identified the board as a prime culprit when diagnosing what has gone “wrong.” Those espousing what has been referred to as the “managerial power” approach to executive pay assert that executive pay reached unjustified levels in recent decades largely because powerful executives benefitted from favors weak boards bestowed.151 Critics who blame the board acknowledge that even before Dodd Frank required U.S. public companies to set up a compensation committee comprised of “independent” directors most public companies had such committees in place.152 The critics have argued, however, that due to CEOs exercising significant influence over the director nomination process and to board dynamics that mean independent directors are supportive of the management team absent a crisis (“support or fire”) compensation committees are counter-productively management friendly.153

Following the logic of those who blame boards for executive pay reaching unsatisfactory levels in recent decades, it would seem that boardroom procedures must have been more robust during the middle decades of the 20th century than they were in ensuing decades. As various critics of managerial power theory have argued, the situation in fact was quite different.154 Boards, even if they did not function optimally as the 20th century drew to a close, nevertheless were structured to operate more effectively as detached scrutineers of managerial behavior than had been the case previously. Of particular relevance in the present context, independent directors, who might have been expected to enhance the objectivity of the process by which executive pay was set, moved to the forefront just as managerial compensation began to escalate

151 Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, Managerial, supra note xx, 754; BEBCUK & FRIED, supra note xx, at 2. See also Randall Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture or Market Driven, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1174 (2004) (summarizing “board capture theory”); cf. DORFF, supra note xx, 116 (“the existing evidence is a far cry from persuasive proof that managerial power is the primary cause of the inefficiencies Bebchuk and Fried catalog so aptly”).

152 Supra note xx and related discussion; Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, Managerial, supra note xx, 765.


154 See, e.g., Thomas, Explaining, supra note xx, 1175; Kaplan, CEO, supra note xx, 15; Marianne Bertrand, CEOs, 1 ANN. REV. ECON. 121, 134 (2009).
rapidly. Hence, “if managerial power is the principal explanatory variable for escalating pay, the timing is odd.”

A 2007 study by Jeffrey Gordon of the growing prominence of independent directors over time is instructive on trends concerning board structure. He says that as of 1950 the consensus was “that boards should consist of the firm’s senior officers, some outsiders with deep connections with the firm…and a few directors who were nominally independent but handpicked by the CEO.” Hence, according to Gordon, only 15% of directors in large public companies were executives of the same firm as 2005, compared with approximately half in industrial companies both in the mid-1930s and at the start of the 1950s.

The proportion of directors who were executives of the same company was considerably smaller with railways and utility companies at mid-century than was the case in industrial companies. Even, however, with companies where executives were outnumbered on the board, boards seemingly were not well-positioned to engage in arm’s-length negotiations over executive pay. A 1945 study of business leadership in large corporations indicated that boards of the time were “passive” and said that outside directors “function[ed], if at all, primarily as financial and business advisers.” According to a 1958 law review article on executive pay, boards were “frequently either inactive and mere formalities or they [were] officer dominated.” A 1964 text on management organization suggested similarly that “most boards don’t review the executives’ stewardship very critically. Outside directors are only part-time men and are sometimes beholden to the president (chief executive officer) and hold their jobs at his sufferance.”

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157 Id., 1565.
158 Kenneth M. Lehn, Sukesh Patro and Mengxin Zhao, Determinants of the Size and Composition of US Boards: 1935-2000, 38 FIN. MGMT. 747, 758 (2009), cited by Gordon, Rise, supra note xx, 156. On the mid-1930s, see also Robert A. Gordon, Business Leadership in the Large Corporation 122 (1945) (with 25 selected large industrial corporations 191 of the 372 directors were officers).
159 Gordon, Business, supra note xx, 123 (with 10 large utilities and railways as of 1935 officers held 35 of 154 directorships); Mabel Newcomer, The Big Business Executive: The Factors That Made Him 1900-1950 27 (1955) (indicating that as of 1952 executives were in the minority on the boards of all railway companies and nearly 90% of utilities).
160 Gordon, Business, supra note xx, 144, 145.
161 Mautz and Rock, supra note xx, 490.
162 Moore, Management, supra note xx, 61.
There was awareness during the mid-20th century that the manner in which boards were structured and functioned was problematic from an executive pay perspective. The 1958 law review article on executive pay that characterized boards as inactive or officer dominated spelt out the implications: “Who controls the wages of management? It is accurate to say that it is usually management. There is the possibility of danger in such a situation…” An executive compensation expert noted similarly in a 1943 Harvard Business Review article “In most companies executives have control over their own compensation; herein lie both temptation and opportunity to profit personally from compensation policies.” The authors of a 1975 study that found little relation between executive pay and standard measures of corporate performance thought it was relevant that “Friendly boards, usually chosen by the chief executives…make the compensation process a congenial give-and-take affair.”

During the decades immediately following World War II, delegation to board committees was emerging as a response to the potential conflict of interest that existed in the executive pay realm due to managerial influence in the boardroom. A 1955 empirical investigation of “big business” executives indicated that when boards established committees to deal with managerial salaries it was customary for the committee to be staffed exclusively by outside directors. By 1967, nearly three out of five larger public companies had established a compensation committee. Due to the fact that it was “indelicate and improper for inside officer-directors to sit in judgment on their own salaries and incentive compensation” such committees “increasingly [were]…made up exclusively of outside directors who may make final decisions in this important area.” Doubts existed, however, about the objectivity of these committees, in part because the recipients of the compensation usually had considerable influence over the composition of the committees. Also, the compensation committees typically did not get “to upset established patterns. Big changes…[were] full board actions.”

163 Mautz and Rock, supra note xx, 500.
166 NEWCOMER, supra note xx, 127.
170 MOORE, MANAGEMENT, supra note xx, 592.
With most large public companies having a compensation committee staffed by independent directors by 2000, the procedure public companies were using to set executive pay therefore apparently was more objective and robust as the 20th century drew to a close than it was during the middle decades of the 20th century. Executive pay thus seemingly grew dramatically in tandem with better corporate governance. Correspondingly, the manner in which boards were structured does not explain the executive pay arrangements in place during the middle decades of the 20th century.

2. Shareholders

Policymakers have recently shown considerable faith in shareholders as a check on runaway executive pay, as evidenced by the introduction of “say-on-pay” votes in Dodd-Frank. It is open to question whether shareholders are ever likely to use powers available to them to reform executive pay in the way critics who argue that executives are paid “too much” hope or expect. Regardless, shareholders were pretty much entirely peripheral to the moderation in executive compensation occurring between the 1940s and the 1970s. While shareholders had (and have) a variety of tools at their disposal that could be used to influence compensation decisions, shareholder challenges to executive pay were uncommon and usually unsuccessful.

Though a “say-on-pay” vote was decades in the future, shareholders acting collectively theoretically could have substantially influenced the setting of executive pay during the middle of the 20th century. The powers available to them, however, turned out to be of little practical importance. One way that shareholders potentially could have dictated the approach companies took to executive pay was by selecting directors who would implement desired policies when exercising control over the setting of managerial compensation. During the middle decades of the 20th century, however, boards themselves controlled the director nomination process and usually put forward a slate listing as many individuals as there were open seats on the board, whom shareholders would then duly elect. The only time shareholders were given a real choice with director selection was during a proxy fight, which frequently involved an attempted takeover of the corporation. Proxy contests for board control in public companies were not particularly common, however, with the number

171 Supra note xx and related discussion.
172 Supra note xx and related discussion.
173 See Bank & Georgiev, supra note xx, at 3.
attracting press coverage averaging just over 13 per year between 1945 and 1965.  

Board elections aside, shareholders were given in some instances a veto over particular aspects of executive pay. Though it was thought to be good practice for companies to seek shareholder approval when they introduced new executive compensation bonus and stock option plans, particularly if there was a shadow of self-dealing, this was never required in any general way. On the other hand, some states, including New York, mandated shareholder approval in circumstances where a corporation was establishing a plan involving the issuance of stock to employees, including executive stock option plans. Shareholder approval would also typically become necessary under state corporate law if implementing a stock option plan required a corporation to increase its share capital or if existing shareholders were vested with preemptive rights. The New York Stock Exchange additionally required all listed companies to seek shareholder approval of issuances of stock options to senior executives. Despite all this, it was virtually unknown for shareholders to use their powers to block proposed changes to managerial compensation.

It is not surprising that shareholders, acting together, failed to curb executive pay during the middle decades of the 20th century. The retail investors who collectively owned most of the shares in public companies during this era lacked both the appetite and aptitude to intervene in corporate affairs. The fact institutional investors, which held at this time only a small

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175 Derived from data generated for John Armour and Brian Cheffins, Stock Market Prices and the Market for Corporate Control, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming, 2016), working paper version available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2646778, 29 (Figure 3).

176 See 1 GEORGE THOMAS WASHINGTON & V. HENRY ROTHCHILD 2D, COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 27 (1962) (hereafter “WASHINGTON 1962”) (“[M]anagement will, as a matter of good practice today, and even though not required by law or regulation, submit a plan for its own compensation to stockholders for their approval”), 228 (“Not only may submission to stockholders help clear up questions of the directors’ power; it may also be helpful in resolving doubts as to the manner of the exercise of that power”).

177 Id. at 251-54 & n. 223 (citing NY Stock Corp. Law § 14 (1951). The Model Business Corporation Act had an optional provision requiring shareholder approval. Id.


179 2 WASHINGTON 1962, supra note __, at 824.

180 See 1 WASHINGTON 1962, supra note __, at 223-28, 252-54 (in a multi-page discussion of shareholder voting on compensation plans in the standard work on executive compensation, no case was discussed where shareholders voted to reject a stock option plan); Note, Shareholder Attack Against Stock Options For Corporate Executives, 62 YALE L.J. 84, 90 (1952) (saying in the context of potential shareholder opposition to stock options “ratification is often an empty formality”). For an instance where shareholders did defeat a management-sponsored stock option plan see Robert Metz, Criticism Voiced on Stock Options, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1963, 147 (discussing General Baking Co.).

percentage of corporate equities despite an emerging trend in favor of institutional ownership,\textsuperscript{182} would not actively oppose proposals management put forward at shareholder meetings helped to give companies full freedom in setting executive compensation.\textsuperscript{183} The upshot, as the AFL-CIO said in a 1959 report critical of stock options, was that “management is in the driver’s seat. With its control over proxies it is able to do pretty much as it pleases.”\textsuperscript{184}

Given that it was unlikely that shareholders would exercise power collectively to influence executive pay, shareholder influence was restricted to individual investors prepared either to agitate publicly for change or to litigate to challenge particular features of managerial compensation. During the middle decades of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, shareholder agitation was the province of the “gadflies,” self-appointed spokespersons for stockholders who lobbied for shareholder rights, with the most visible being Lewis and John Gilbert and Wilma Soss.\textsuperscript{185} Executive compensation was one of the gadflies’ perennial targets. Lewis Gilbert, for example, used shareholder proposals, speeches and media interviews to denounce executive salaries (he thought many too high) and to call for reform of stock option plans (he wanted longer holding periods for exercised options) and pension schemes (he wanted annual pensions capped at $25,000).\textsuperscript{186}

The media found something appealing in the gadflies’ quest to force managers to listen to shareholders,\textsuperscript{187} which meant that the gadflies could garner some beneficial publicity. However, because few shareholders were prepared to offer active support the gadflies did not wield real power.\textsuperscript{188} This was as much the case with executive pay as with other issues. Graef Crystal, writing in 1970, said that while “some companies rationalize their failure to pay meaningful incentive awards by citing the specter of adverse stockholder

\textsuperscript{182} In 1950 mutual funds and private and public retirement funds held 4\% of corporate equities; in 1970, less than 15\%. See JAMES P. HAWLEY AND ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY CAPITALISM 53 (2000).

\textsuperscript{183} J.A. Livingston, Investors Could Curb Executive Excesses, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1958, C24.

\textsuperscript{184} Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO Research Section, The Stock Option Scandal, unpublished, Aug. 1959.


\textsuperscript{186} See LIVINGSTON, supra note __, at 88-89; see also LEWIS D. AND JOHN J. GILBERT, NINETEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF STOCKHOLDER ACTIVITIES AT CORPORATE MEETINGS DURING 1958 122 (1959).


\textsuperscript{188} See, though, John E. Balkcom, Executive Compensation: A History of Imbalance in Public Controls, Shareholder Interests and Executive Rewards, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Spring 1977, 4, 7 (suggesting that a 1938 Gilbert proposal that the highly paid CEO of Bethlehem Steel be demoted to a less lucrative post that was roundly rejected may nevertheless have prompted the company to pay that CEO less).
reaction,” most shareholders “were unlikely to begrudge a company $5 million in bonus funds, if the funds are paid only when they receive $25 million in additional earnings.”189 Given such attitudes, the gadflies’ shareholder proposals relating to executive pay not only never passed, but were usually overwhelmingly rejected in shareholder votes.190

On the litigation front, lawsuits have been launched with some regularity over time by shareholders who believe executives have been overpaid.191 The trend was the same during the middle decades of the 20th century, but it is unlikely that litigation was any more effective as a check on executive pay than was agitation. In the early 1930s, in Rogers v Hill,192 a shareholder successfully challenged “excessive” compensation paid through a bonus plan at American Tobacco, briefly igniting hope that courts would seriously scrutinize executive pay packages and strike down those that were “excessive.” Over the rest of the decade, though, such hopes dwindled as courts admitted themselves incompetent to judge what was a “fair” amount of compensation and consistently rejected shareholder suits challenging big pay packages as a “waste” of corporate assets.193 After 1945, shareholder suits solely challenging the amount of compensation public companies paid to executives were, absent evidence of procedural irregularities or self-dealing, almost always thrown out of court.194

A fresh avenue for shareholder suits opened up with the growing popularity of stock options.195 Following changes in 1950 to tax law that were favorable to stock options,196 a wave of lawsuits challenged the stock option schemes companies had begun adopting, with many resting on claims that executives gave inadequate consideration in exchange for the options.197 Litigants had some success in the early 1950s in Delaware’s normally pro-

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189 CRystAL, supra note xx, 32.
190 Metz, Criticism, supra note xx (saying in an article on executive pay that Lewis Gilbert’s “resolutions are usually roundly defeated”); Bosses’ Pay: Executive Salary Lags in Economic Race, but ‘Fringes’ Ease Pain, WALL ST. J. Feb. 24 1955, 1 (“[T]he failure of most Gilbert pay-curbing efforts suggest their views are not widely shared by stockholders”). An exception was in 1969 when 19% of shareholder votes were cast in favor of a Gilbert proposal that would put a $350,000 ceiling on the pay of any GM executive: About 19%, supra note xx.
192 289 U.S. 582 (1933)
193 See Wells, No Man can be Worth $1,000,000 a Year, supra note __, at 711-16, 732-37.
194 See Thomas & Wells, supra note __, at 868-873. Some challenges were successful when it was argued a bonus had been swollen by improper accounting that overstated earnings, but adoption of standardized accounting measures ended this line of attack: 2 Washington 1962, supra note __, at 920.
195 See Vagts, supra note xx, 262-64.
196 See sources cited supra note xx.
197 2 Washington 1962, supra note __, at 573-74 & n.21 (setting out the major companies involved in litigation over their options plans).
business courts. However, subsequent shareholder lawsuits targeting stock option grants almost always failed. The consideration question was easily solved by advance planning, and courts turned out to be no more willing to police stock option grants on the basis of unreasonableness than they were willing to second-guess other compensation decisions. Delaware also amended its corporate legislation in 1953 to make a board’s determination as to consideration offered for stock options conclusive “absent fraud.” Litigation over other forms of compensation was fairly rare during the rest of the 1950s. There was an uptick in shareholder litigation involving executive pay in public companies as the 1960s began, but most such lawsuits again failed.

As we will see in section B, norms relevant to public companies likely had a meaningful role in compressing executive pay during the middle decades of the 20th century. It is possible that, despite a lack of tangible evidence that shareholders had a marked impact on executive pay, concern about shareholder agitation helped to reinforce these norms and thereby dissuaded firms from adopting outsize compensation schemes. For instance, Washington and Rothschild, in the 1951 edition of a manual on executive pay, acknowledged shareholder lawsuits and the attendant publicity could have some effect: “Litigation or the possibility of litigation...have probably brought down compensation levels, or at least kept compensation levels lower than they might otherwise have been.” Overall, though, it would appear that shareholder intervention did relatively little to slow the growth of executive compensation during the middle decades of the 20th century.

B. External Variables

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198 Gottlieb v Heyden Chemical Corp., 90 A.2d 660 (Del. 1952); Kerbs v. California Eastern Airlines Inc., 90 A.2d 652 (Del. 1952)
199 See Vagts, supra note __, at 263 (“These cases had no particular impact on the generosity with which boards of directors awarded their employees”).
200 On how this could be done see Note, Shareholder Attack Against Stock Options for Corporate Executives, 64 YALE L.J. 87-88 (1952).
201 2 WASHINGTON 1962, supra note __, at 572-74, 906-09.
202 Id. at 578-79.
203 See id. at 915. There was at least one high profile compensation suit in the late 1950s, Nadler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 154 A2d 146 (Del.Ch. 1959) (dealing with a special bonus plan linked to corporate dividends); discussed in Bethlehem Steel Stock Option, Change in Pay for Executives Voted, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 1957, at 32.
204 See Companies in Court: Stockholders File More Suits, Sparking Debate Among Lawyers, WALL ST. J. April 27, 1961, at 1. Cf. Daniel J. Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 74, 77-78 (1967) (indicating that with a random sample of recent derivative suits there were “many instances” where excessive salaries were challenged but it is likely most of these lawsuits involved closely held companies).
205 2 WASHINGTON 1962, supra note __, at 921-22. They also cautioned that “so many forces are at work—such as varying corporate profits or varying stock market prices—that it is unsafe to generalize.” Id.
We have just seen that during the middle decades of the 20th century the manner in which boards were structured prompted concerns that the setting of executive pay was "a congenial give-and-take affair" and that shareholders were at best bit players with managerial compensation. Nevertheless, the data set out in part II shows there was no wanton executive pay free-for-all. This was known at the time. As economist John Kenneth Galbraith acknowledged in 1971, "Management does not go out ruthlessly to reward itself – a sound management is expected to exercise restraint." Correspondingly, he said "There are few corporations in which it would be suggested that executive salaries are at a maximum."

Why did management not ruthlessly reward itself during the mid-20th century? Our analysis in Part IV indicated that tax played at best a subsidiary role. We will consider now various additional “external” variables that may have operated as constraints and correspondingly explain executive pay during this era. We will begin with direct regulation of pay and then consider disclosure regulation, union power, the market for managerial talent and corporate “culture” in the form of “norms.” We will see that while each played a role the final three do the most to account for executive pay being modest by present day standards during the mid-20th century.

1. Direct Regulation

Statutory measures that give government officials scope to stipulate how much companies can pay executives – “direct regulation” – theoretically can address the configuration of managerial compensation in a more forthright manner than any other variable. On the other hand, this sort of intervention has been characterized as “the last available cure for excessive paychecks” because “the government [c]ould be quickly drawn into an intricate process generating intense political pressure and threatening to produce arbitrary, rigid results.” In 1942, President Franklin Roosevelt relied on a broadly phrased wartime mandate for price stabilization to impose an upper limit of $25,000 annually on executives’ after-tax salaries, but Congress quickly overrode the measure. Otherwise, to the extent that direct regulation has shaped executive pay in the U.S., this has occurred through regulatory schemes affecting the economy generally. Laws of this sort would have had an impact on
managerial compensation at particular points in time. Direct regulation, however, does relatively little to explain why executive pay was suppressed in general terms from the 1940s to the 1970s.

Economy-wide regulation impacting on executive pay was initially implemented during World War II as part of sweeping controls aimed at holding down wartime inflation. There was a salary freeze applicable to all companies from 1942 until late 1946 overseen by a complex bureaucracy evaluating requests for salary adjustments. The regulations froze not only salaries but also bonuses and, in some cases, stock option plans, but they did not cover deferred compensation, pension plans, and health and life insurance, each apparently exempted as unlikely immediately to fuel inflation. Frydman and Malloy, in a careful econometric study, reported that the controls may have held down executive compensation during the years they were in place while affording average workers’ wages some scope to grow. Frydman and Malloy also found, however, that the effects of the salary controls were short-lived, meaning they did not explain a decline in executive pay that occurred during the remainder of the 1940s.

During the Korean War, limits were again placed on executive salaries as part of a regulatory regime targeting wartime inflation. This time a separate Salary Stabilization Board was established in recognition of the “peculiar nature of many forms of compensation paid to the executive, administrative, and professional employees.” This episode of direct regulation had little impact on levels of executive pay because the Board did not get to work until late 1951 and was within a year largely moribund because the inflationary conditions that had been expected did not materialize.

The final period in which the Federal government significantly regulated executive pay on an economy-wide level was during the early 1970s. From 1971 to 1974 wage and price controls were imposed to attempt to contain inflation. Under this regime, following an initial 90-day freeze on regulators sought to impose limits on executive pay by refusing to grant rate increases when companies had made managerial compensation payments thought to be “excessive” or by “excluding excessive salaries from the rate base”: 2 WASHINGTON 1962, supra note __, at 791. WASHINGTON 1951, supra note __, at 300-05. Id. at 305-07.

Frydman and Malloy, supra note __, at 232 (table showing decline in average and median executive pay from 1942 to 1946, and decrease in ratio of executive to average worker pay). See id. at 225-30.

Rudolf Sobernheim, Salary Stabilization under Defense Mobilization, __ FED. BAR J. 117, 134 (1951). See Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where we are, supra note __, at 54-55.

The discussion in this paragraph is drawn from Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where we are, supra note __, at __-__; see also ALLAN MATUSOW, NIXON’S ECONOMY: BOOMS, BUSTS, DOLLARS, AND VOTES 62-67, 109-116, 228-234 (1998).
compensation increases, the Federal government’s Wage Board limited increases in executive pay to 5.5% annually. It is doubtful whether the controls had a marked impact on top management pay, given that 1972 and 1973 surveys of executive compensation by Business Week indicated CEO pay, on average, increased by more than the 5.5% limit. One reason may be that the restrictions were initially imposed on a corporation’s executives as a group, thereby leaving scope for companies to increase CEO pay while curtailing that of lower-ranking executives. Also, the wage and price control scheme may have done more to alter the composition of pay than reduce pay overall. The adoption of new incentive plans was permitted so long as they were “directly related to increased productivity” and, not surprisingly, “scores of companies introduced performance-based bonus plans linked to accounting data or revenues.”

2. Disclosure Regulation

Mandatory disclosure of executive pay constitutes a less intrusive form of government intervention than direct regulation because whatever impact the law might have does not arise from the fact of disclosure itself. Instead, the catalyst is the reactions disclosure elicits—the shareholders it angers, the politicians it pushes to impose new laws and the journalists who disseminate the data to a receptive public. Disclosure thus might facilitate the curbing of managerial compensation, but it is not sufficient to achieve this objective.

Mandatory disclosure of executive pay at public companies has been in place in the U.S. since federal securities law was introduced in the mid-1930s. Though investor protection is typically cited as the rationale underlying the enactment of federal securities law, the primary motive underlying the introduction of executive pay disclosure requirements in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was to respond to inflammatory revelations concerning managerial compensation and more broadly to “shame” executives discredited by the Depression into limiting their compensation. The 1934 Act was the more consequential, requiring corporations traded on national stock exchanges to reveal annually, in registration documents to be filed with the SEC and made available to the public, remuneration paid to directors and officers, including “bonus and profit-sharing arrangements.” Form 10-K, issued to implement this requirement, required corporations to

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220 Murphy, Executive Compensation, supra note __, at 260.
221 Id.; this loophole was tightened in 1973.
222 Id.
223 See sources cited supra note xx.
224 Exchange Act 12(b).
report the compensation received by the three highest-paid “officers, directors, [or] employees” of the firm.\textsuperscript{225}

Disclosure regulation would become more demanding over time. We have already seen that major reforms were carried out in 1992,\textsuperscript{226} but this was preceded by various other changes that made the disclosure requirements more rigorous. For instance, mindful that it was advisable (though not mandatory) for companies to seek shareholder approval for executive bonus schemes and stock option plans,\textsuperscript{227} the SEC required in 1938 that proxy statements corporations sent to shareholders disclose full details of any compensation plan for which shareholder approval was sought.\textsuperscript{228} Four years later, the SEC further amended the proxy rules to require that compensation arrangements that were reported in proxy solicitation documentation sent to shareholders be set out in a tabular form for each director and each officer paid more than $20,000 a year.\textsuperscript{229}

In 1952 the SEC amended the proxy reporting rules to oblige companies to divulge, again in tabular form, compensation for each director as well the “top 3” executives receiving more than $25,000 annually and to respond to a widening of the range of the types of compensation companies were awarding by stipulating that executive pay taking the form of deferred remuneration, including pension and retirement plans, had to be divulged separately.\textsuperscript{230} Also, shareholders who were asked to approve a bonus, profit sharing, or stock option plan had to be furnished with data about both the plan and the benefits to be awarded to each director or “top 3” officer.\textsuperscript{231} In 1978 companies were required to factor in payoffs from long-term incentive schemes in a way that had not occurred previously because disclosures formerly made in nearly incomprehensible tables at the back of corporate proxy statements had to be dealt with in a clearer fashion near the front of the disclosure documentation.\textsuperscript{232}

\textsuperscript{225} See BAKER, supra note xx, at 258 (reprinting original Form 10-K).
\textsuperscript{226} Supra note xx and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{227} Supra note xx and related discussion.
\textsuperscript{228} Securities Exchange Act Rel. 34-1823 (Aug 11, 1938).
\textsuperscript{229} Securities Exchange Act Rel. 34-3375 (December 18, 1942).
\textsuperscript{230} Id.
\textsuperscript{231} Amendment of Proxy Rules, Securities Exchange Act Rel. 34-4775 (December 11, 1952).
\textsuperscript{232} Kevin J. Murphy, \textit{Top Executives are Worth Every Nickel They Get}, HARV. BUS. REV., March/Apr. 1986, 125, 129, 131. Information on options was included in the proxy statements but consisted primarily of details from which the reader had to carry out a computational process to determine what an executive had earned: BURGESS, supra note xx, 198. In 1983 the SEC moved to a more narrative (and less informative) approach to executive compensation disclosure, but returned to the requirements for formatted tables and more detail in 1992: Securities Act Rel. No. 33-8865, supra note xx, notes 40 & 41 and accompanying text.
There are no empirical studies that have isolated the impact of disclosure on the level of executive pay.\textsuperscript{233} Even documenting its effects anecdotally is difficult.\textsuperscript{234} One potential stumbling block is that, as Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried have observed, companies can seek to avoid public criticism of executive pay through a process of “camouflage” where much of the compensation awarded to executives is channelled into forms where disclosure can be obscured or avoided altogether.\textsuperscript{235} The camouflage pattern was evident almost as soon as disclosure of executive pay was required. In the late 1930s, firms that awarded executive compensation in the form of deferred compensation plans, pensions, stock bonuses, and stock options would often refrain from taking such compensation into account in tabular data and justify only providing background information in a footnote on the basis that such compensation could not be reliably valued.\textsuperscript{236} Boards also began to “look for supplemental methods of compensating their corporate executives” that would not be subject to compulsory disclosure.\textsuperscript{237}

A 1986 article by executive pay expert Kevin Murphy indicates how gaps in disclosure requirements can make it difficult to ascertain accurately the impact of disclosure on executive pay.\textsuperscript{238} Murphy relied on executive pay data compiled by Forbes to illustrate key compensation trends and reported substantial increases in CEO compensation totals in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The executive pay regime in place in public companies from 1940 through to the 1970s likely was ending during this period.\textsuperscript{239} Murphy, however, said the trend he found could be explained in large measure on the basis that the 1978 changes to SEC rules meant that stock options and other forms of long-term incentive-oriented compensation were being factored in in a way that had not been the case previously.\textsuperscript{240}

Another problem that complicates assessment of the impact of mandatory disclosure on executive pay levels that is particularly relevant for present purposes is that disclosure’s effects may vary over time. As we have already seen, it is widely thought that the bolstering of disclosure requirements by the SEC in 1992 amid concerns over rising levels of executive pay had the unintended consequence of fostering higher executive pay.\textsuperscript{241} Executive pay expert Graef Crystal, who was a consultant to the SEC chairman at the time

\textsuperscript{233} Suárez, Symbolic, supra note xx, 90.
\textsuperscript{234} Jensen and Murphy, CEO, supra note xx, 145; George T. Washington, The Corporation Executive’s Living Wage, HARV. L. REV. 735, 766 (1941).
\textsuperscript{235} BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note __, at 67-70.
\textsuperscript{236} GEORGE T. WASHINGTON, CORPORATE EXECUTIVES’ COMPENSATION 233-234 & n.35 (1942).
\textsuperscript{237} I WASHINGTON 1962, supra note __, at 9.
\textsuperscript{238} Murphy, Top, supra note xx.
\textsuperscript{239} Supra note xx and related discussion.
\textsuperscript{240} Murphy, Top, supra note xx, 129, 131.
\textsuperscript{241} Supra note xx and related discussion.
reform occurred, observed ruefully in the mid-2000s “I absolutely thought it would cause comp to go down because the disclosures would be so embarrassing. But it turned out when somebody is hauling in $200 million, he’s not embarrassed.” Crystal’s assumption, though erroneous, was understandable. This is because disclosure’s impact on executive pay levels may well have been different in the early 1990s than it would have in earlier decades. In particular, while disclosure reform may have caused executive pay to increase in the early 1990s, during the middle decades of the 20th century disclosure may have put downward pressure on executive pay because corporate boards, mindful of possible negative publicity, refrained from awarding executives compensation likely to attract attention and criticism.

There is anecdotal evidence indicating that disclosure did serve as a moderating influence on executive pay during the middle decades of the 20th century. George Thomas Washington, a law professor who co-authored a leading executive pay manual, said in 1941 of the mandatory disclosure regime introduced in the mid-1930s “the publicity given to compensation in recent years had largely removed the unhealthy atmosphere of the boom days.” After World War II, he indicated in his executive pay manual that the disclosure requirements administered by the SEC “expose[] management’s proposals to public view and criticism and, like other disclosure requirements. . . serve[] as a restraint.” Jensen and Murphy, in their 1990 Harvard Business Review article advocating supercharging executive pay with performance-oriented compensation, explained why companies had been paying executives like “bureaucrats” partly on the basis that compensation committees mindful of executive pay disclosure had been seeking to forestall criticism of “what the boss makes” by capping what their CEOs earned.

Particularly telling is the complete absence of pay packages exceeding $1 million a year—the kind of pay packages that triggered outcries in the 1930s—from the 1940s to the late 1970s. For many years “the one million dollar line . . . seemed . . . to serve as a psychological barrier to advances.” For instance, Business Week observed in its 1974 survey of executive salaries “More executives edged closer to the magic $1 million mark in 1973,” including Paul Hofmann of Johnson & Johnson, who earned $978,000. Still, while inflation averaged over 8% annually between 1974 and 1976, no

242 Quoted in Nocera, Disclosure, supra note xx.
243 2 WASHINGTON 1962, supra note __, 766.
244 1 WASHINGTON 1962, supra note __, at 27.
245 Jensen and Murphy, CEO, supra note xx, 144-45.
246 On $1 million per year executives, see supra note xx and related discussion.
247 Vagts, supra note xx, 232.
248 Executive Compensation: Getting, supra note xx.
executive joined the $1 million club until 1977, likely because of concerns about negative publicity fostered by disclosures made to the SEC.

While disclosure regulation may have put downward pressure on executive pay during the middle decades of the 20th century, why would the impact of disclosure vary over time? The most likely answer is that mentioned above: disclosure does not work by itself. Its impact instead depends on who is using the information divulged and how. Jensen and Murphy said of the effect that disclosure had on managerial labor contracts in their 1990 article “[t]hird parties play an important role in the contracting process, and strong political forces operate inside and outside companies to shape executive pay.” As we will see in the following sub-sections, during the middle decades of the 20th century unions were influential and social norms militated against extremely high pay. In this environment, disclosure likely put downward pressure on managerial compensation because union officials could find out readily what top executives were paid and because those setting managerial compensation knew that the results of their decisions would be in the public domain. When union power faded and social norms evolved, disclosure’s effects changed, and changed in a way that meant regulation could prompt increases in executive pay. We consider next in more detail the impact of unions on managerial compensation.

3. Unions

There has been speculation in the academic literature that downward pressure unions put on executive pay helps to explain the flatness of executive pay during the mid-20th century. Given the weakness of unions in the private sector presently -- union membership in the United States among non-agricultural workers in the private sector is approximately 12% -- this conjecture seems scarcely plausible. During the middle decades of the 20th century, however, matters were much different.

250 Supra note xx and related discussion.

251 See, however, Suárez, Symbolic, supra note xx, 90 (arguing that disclosure regulation has always drove pay upwards, saying in so doing executive pay rose from the early 1950 to the 1970s, when the increases began to accelerate rapidly). While it is true that executive pay did increase in nominal terms from the 1950s through the 1970s, the fact that it was outpaced by inflation and wage increases awarded to rank-and-file employees (supra notes xx to xx and related discussion) meant there was restraint of a sort that disappeared completely by the 1980s. The evidence presented here indicates that disclosure regulation contributed to that outcome.

252 Jensen and Murphy, CEO, supra note xx, 144.


Between the mid-1930s and the mid-1940s union power grew substantially, bolstered by the enactment of federal legislation that enabled workers to organize. Union membership among non-agricultural workers had risen to 35% in 1954 and strikes were considerably more frequent than they would be as the 20th century drew to a close. Correspondingly, mid-20th century executives had to be mindful of maintaining the goodwill of organized labor in a way their counterparts in later decades did not. This was potentially relevant for executive pay. Companies entering labor negotiations probably would have preferred to avoid giving unions a significant bargaining chip by increasing executive compensation substantially. Union officials also likely would have been opposed as a matter of ideological principle to senior executives getting rich due to the hard work of modestly paid union members.

There is anecdotal evidence indicating that during the middle decades of the 20th century union power influenced the setting of executive pay. Washington and Rothschild drew attention in the 1951 edition of their executive pay manual to the fact that it could be seen as “provocative of labor problems” for a chief executive to be paid $500,000 a year when the workers at the same company received $2000 per annum and said “The board of directors of today, before approving (executive pay), may well consider the effect upon the company’s next collective bargaining negotiation.” A study of the impact of taxation on business behavior published the same year suggested “[t]he probable effect on labor relations and union demands is undoubtedly a factor in any consideration of executive compensation” and quoted a senior executive as saying “[i]t is important not to let the executives get so much that they steam up the labor boys.” Similarly, a specialist in executive compensation suggested in 1970 “that cutting executive pay” could “be a good tactic if a company is preparing for union negotiations.”

A 2012 study by Frydman and Malloy of executive pay in the 1940s substantiates the theory that union power influenced executive pay patterns during middle decades of the 20th century. They found a statistically significant negative correlation between executive compensation and

257 Bok, supra note xx, 105 (“Lavish executive earnings have already complicated union negotiations in more than one corporation.”)
258 This was not always the case. See e.g., Thomas C. Hayes, The “Front-End” Bonus Lure, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1980, D1, quoting an AFL-CIO spokesman as saying “We don’t give a hoot about executive pay levels as long as workers get their fair share.”
259 Washington 1951, supra note xx, at 9, 16.
262 Frydman and Malloy, Pay Cuts, supra note xx, 241-42, 244-45, 247.
unionization that meant that while managerial pay was slightly higher in unionized firms at the beginning of the 1940s it was markedly lower in such firms by the end of the decade and remained so at least up to 1955. A study focusing on data from the 1970s involving larger employers similarly found a negative association between unionization and CEO pay.\textsuperscript{263}

Just as the rise of union power likely was a constraint on executive pay during the middle decades of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the subsequent marginalization of unions may well have contributed to the subsequent trend in favor of higher managerial compensation. Executive pay, as Part II described, began to increase in earnest in the second half of the 1970s before gaining additional momentum in the 1980s. Similarly, union influence began to decline markedly in the 1970s due to companies deploying robust union avoidance strategies and the process accelerated in the Reagan era as federally prompted deregulation of labor law weakened unions.\textsuperscript{264} By 1985, the percentage of employees who were union members was merely half of the 1954 figure (Fig. 2). Hence, while union officials denounced the substantial increases in executive pay occurring in the 1980s,\textsuperscript{265} their views seemingly were doing little to impose checks on those setting managerial compensation.

Figure 2: Union Membership -- Non-agricultural Workers


Although union pressure may have helped to flatten executive pay during the middle decades of the 20th century, it is doubtful organized labor played the decisive role. Only once, in 1945, did union membership among private sector workers exceed the 35% level achieved in 1954. The fact that even at the peak of labor power only a minority of the workforce was unionized inevitably would have diluted whatever impact unions had on executive pay. The preferences of organized labor can have a spill-over effect to non-unionized workplaces because the threat of unionization can prompt non-unionized employers to grant pre-emptive concessions to staff and because unions publicly espouse social solidarity and advocate redistributive governmental policies. It is impossible to gauge the magnitude of this spill-over effect. Still, with union density peaking at 35%, even if unions discouraged increases in executive pay during the mid-20th century they would only have been one of a variety of factors doing so.

4. The Market for Managerial Talent

If companies are competing intensely in the market for managerial talent to retain or recruit senior executives this should bolster the bargaining power of these executives and drive up managerial compensation.


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Although union pressure may have helped to flatten executive pay during the middle decades of the 20th century, it is doubtful organized labor played the decisive role. Only once, in 1945, did union membership among private sector workers exceed the 35% level achieved in 1954. The fact that even at the peak of labor power only a minority of the workforce was unionized inevitably would have diluted whatever impact unions had on executive pay. The preferences of organized labor can have a spill-over effect to non-unionized workplaces because the threat of unionization can prompt non-unionized employers to grant pre-emptive concessions to staff and because unions publicly espouse social solidarity and advocate redistributive governmental policies. It is impossible to gauge the magnitude of this spill-over effect. Still, with union density peaking at 35%, even if unions discouraged increases in executive pay during the mid-20th century they would only have been one of a variety of factors doing so.

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4. The Market for Managerial Talent

If companies are competing intensely in the market for managerial talent to retain or recruit senior executives this should bolster the bargaining power of these executives and drive up managerial compensation.
Correspondingly, developments affecting this market potentially explain why executive pay was flat during the middle decades of the 20th century. While the term “market for managerial talent” has been in use at least since the 1950s, this market apparently operated at a significantly lower level of intensity during the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s than it did at the end of the 20th century. This in turn likely helps to explain historical trends concerning managerial compensation.

Systematic empirical analysis of the market for managerial talent was lacking up to the end of the 1970s. Nevertheless, the available evidence indicates that the market was listless, at least compared to more recent times. During the middle decades of the 20th century, companies would search quite intensely for managerial talent at entry level. At the very top of the managerial hierarchy, in contrast, “the average company [had] but scant recourse to the outside market for top officials.” Most top executives in large corporations were “company men” who joined their corporate employers during their 20s and then continued to work with the firm for at least a couple of decades before taking up their senior managerial posts.

Recruiting executives from other companies was by no means unknown in the mid-20th century. However, “mobile manager” bosses were usually only hired from a company operating in the same industry and were brought in because a company was in serious trouble or because a vacuum at the top had arisen due to a failure to grapple successfully with executive succession issues. Hence, a 1996 study of the American corporation as an employer during the 1950s and 1960s maintained “Managers… were generally treated by corporations as fixed assets who would enjoy long-term security and careers as long as they conformed to the expectations of the prevailing corporate culture that respected hierarchy and conformity.....” Likewise, a 2006 analysis of governance of the modern corporation said of large firms during the mid-20th

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269 See, for example, Herrymon Maurer, Great Enterprise: Growth and Behavior of the Big Corporation 100 (1955).
272 Roberts, Executive, supra note xx, 148.
273 Maurer, Great, supra note xx, 96-97; Burgess, Top, supra note xx, 180-81; From the Bottom Up, FORBES, Nov. 15, 1957, 35, 35.
274 Newcomer, supra note xx, 133; Burgess, Top, supra note xx, 181; When the Boss is a "Foreigner", BUS. WK., Nov. 8, 1958, 107; The Mobile Managers, FORBES, Nov. 15, 1957, 49.
century “[t]op jobs, including that of CEO, were usually awarded to those from within the company, often as a result of orderly succession planning.”

The 1970s was something of a transitional decade for the market for managerial talent in the same way it was for executive pay. It has been said that “[f]rom the 1950s through the 1970s American executives looked a lot alike,” and that in the 1970s, “CEOs were usually ‘company men’ promoted from within” with “the vast majority of CEO openings [being] filled by incumbents rather than outside hires.” Nevertheless, at the CEO level the market for managerial talent was evolving in various ways that were potentially significant for executive pay. For instance, companies began looking for new chief executives more often, with turnover doubling between 1960 and 1980. Moreover, forced exits became more prevalent. The annual firing rate for CEOs doubled from 5% to 10% per annum between 1976 and 1981, prompting the New York Times to publish a story entitled “Why Big Business is Firing the Boss.”

Companies also became increasingly willing in the 1970s to shop externally for top managerial talent, particularly as the decade was drawing to a close. According to a 1986 book on “headhunters” (executive search firms) “The greatest growth of the business occurred in the 1970s” due partly to the fact that the “Corporate appetite for outside management rose as the traditional promotion-from-within notion of advancement grew dusty and executives viewed ship-jumping mobility as a career strategy.” The 1981 New York Times article that discussed accelerating CEO turnover said top management

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277 Cappelli and Hamori, New, supra note xx, 25.


279 Murphy, Executive, supra note xx, 267. See also Patricia Bonfield, U.S. Business Leaders: A Study of Opinions and Characteristics 28-29, 31 (1980) (discussing data from a 1978 questionnaire sent to the CEOs of large companies indicating that in terms of age, length of time working for the company and number of companies worked for the profile of chief executives indeed was little different in the 1970s than it had been in the 1950s or 1960s.

280 Cappelli and Hamori, New, supra note xx, 25 (“There were hints throughout the 1970s that things were changing.”)


283 John Byrne, The Headhunters 21 (1986). See also Todd Fandell, Recruiting Executives is Big Business, Chi. Trib., Oct. 14, 1979, Q3 (indicating that the number of executives hired each year with the assistance of executive search firms had increased from 4,000 in the late 1960s to 16,000).
had “come to accept this rising transience in executive life.”\textsuperscript{284} A Chicago Tribune article from the same year indicated that companies were explaining and defending the rapid growth of the club of executives being paid more than $1 million per year on the basis they had to pay the going rate to attract and keep competent executives.\textsuperscript{285}

The most prominent illustration of changing attitudes was Chrysler’s 1978 recruitment of Lee Iacocca. Reportedly “[t]he Chrysler board was desperate to get someone as experienced as Iacocca, and agreed to whatever he demanded.”\textsuperscript{286} Iacocca was paid a then-largely unprecedented “front-end bonus” of $1.5 million before turning up for work, a practice that Revlon began in 1974 when it paid the same amount to recruit as CEO an International Telephone & Telegraph executive.\textsuperscript{287}

The trend in favor of a more robust interaction between supply and demand in the market for managerial talent that began in the 1970s continued in the 1980s. The Wall Street Journal, in a 1988 article that sought to explain why CEOs were “the richest hired hands in history” despite a stock market crash in 1987, cited the views of a “market forces camp” that contended “People at the chief-executive level are in short supply….,” and indicated “Many companies say they must pay their chief executives handsomely lest others lure them away.”\textsuperscript{288} Chief executive turnover also continued to accelerate. As of the mid-1990s, a CEO appointed after 1985 was three times more likely to be fired for a similar level of performance than one appointed before that date.\textsuperscript{289} Moreover, U.S. public companies were casting the net wider to find an executive who was the right fit. A CEO appointed in 1990 was 50% more likely to have been hired from outside the company than in 1970.\textsuperscript{290}

The 1980s market for managerial talent was not a model of theoretical perfection. In 1985 Michael Jensen was arguing that senior executives of public companies were underpaid, thereby causing a brain drain at some major companies as talented individuals opted for fields such as investment banking, real estate and high-tech startups.\textsuperscript{291} He and Kevin Murphy asserted in the 1990 Harvard Business Review article where they urged public companies to stop

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{284}Bauer, Why, supra note xx.
\item \textsuperscript{285}Thompson, Advent of 7-Figure, supra note xx.
\item \textsuperscript{286}SMITH AND WALTER, supra note xx, 105.
\item \textsuperscript{287}Hayes, Front-End, supra note xx. Iacocca received $1 million in 1979 and $500,000 in 1980: Stocks Sweeten Pay at the Top, BUS. WK., May 12, 1980, 56.
\item \textsuperscript{288}Amanda Bennett, Top Dollar, WALL ST. J., March 28, 1988, 1.
\item \textsuperscript{289}Thank You and Goodbye, ECONOMIST, Oct. 30, 1999, 91 (citing a study by Rakesh Khurana examining 1300 instances where CEOs of Fortune 500 companies left their jobs).
\item \textsuperscript{290}Are CEOs Worth Their Salaries?, WASH. POST, Oct 2, 2002, E1 (citing data compiled by economists Robert Frank and Philip Cook).
\item \textsuperscript{291}William J. Powell, Could it be That Corporate Leaders are Underpaid?, BUS. WK., May 6, 1985, 87.
\end{itemize}
paying chief executives like bureaucrats “The CEO position is not a very risky job” and law professor Carl Bogus contended in 1993 “The CEO labor market is highly restricted….Most CEOs are promoted from below, and it surely is not necessary to offer a vice president a gargantuan sum to persuade him to accept the top job.” Nevertheless, it does seem that the market for managerial talent was operating with greater intensity during the 1980s and thus might help to explain why executive pay increased substantially during that decade.

While changes to the market for managerial talent in the 1970s and 1980s seemingly help to explain the executive pay “regime change” occurring then, this leaves open an important question: Why did the market for managerial talent intensify? The most likely explanation is that perceptions of the contribution top executives could make to corporate success evolved. In particular, those responsible for appointing senior management and setting executive compensation increasingly believed that managerial talent was a scarce commodity for which paying premium prices in the form of higher executive pay was necessary and worthwhile.

In the 1950s and 1960s there was a general consensus that while executive talent was important corporate success was not contingent upon a corporation having a dynamic leader at the helm. In the mid-1950s, reputedly chief executives “of many companies…like[d] to remark jocularly that they are the most expendable men in their organizations.” A 1969 study of corporate executives said that top management usually “gets the job done…by mastering the ‘science of muddling through’” and attributed “[t]he relative indifference of the stock market” to the death or replacement of chief executives to shrewd investors deducing “changes at the top have little if any effect on the prospective earnings and growth of the company.” These conjectures were substantiated by a “ground breaking” 1972 empirical study of 167 major public companies which indicated that once the strength of the economy, the industry in which a corporation was operating and various company-specific features were taken into account, executive “leadership” did very little to explain corporate performance.

Things seemed to be different in the 1980s. Rakesh Khurana, in a 2002 study of “charismatic CEOs” who had come to replace “the professional

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292 Jensen and Murphy, CEO, supra note xx, 142.
294 MAURER, GREAT, supra note xx, 81.
Organization Man who toiled in anonymity,” said “the advent of this new breed of corporate leader” could be traced back to Iacocca’s 1978 appointment.\textsuperscript{298} The \textit{New York Times} picked up on the trend in a 1985 article entitled “A New Breed of CEO,” saying that while “until fairly recently the most obvious trait of the CEO was his relentless dullness” Iacocca and other leading chief executives eschewed “the old ways of managing and have brought new excitement to rusty companies.”\textsuperscript{299} Boards, in turn, apparently re-evaluated assumptions about the impact top executives could have on corporate performance and became prepared to adjust pay upwards to get and keep the right person in charge.\textsuperscript{300} The stock market also was becoming sensitive to circumstances surrounding departures from office by CEOs, with share prices typically rising when a CEO left due to poor performance.\textsuperscript{301}

So long as perceptions of the contribution executives were making to corporate success were changing, even if managers did not “matter” more in reality, the shift in attitudes should have sufficed to jump start the market for managerial talent in a way that would have driven executive pay upward.\textsuperscript{302} Nevertheless, there is empirical support for the proposition that chief executives were having a greater impact on corporate performance in the 1980s and 1990s than they were in the 1950s and 1960s. Timothy Quigley and Donald Hambrick, following in the footsteps of the “seminal” 1972 study of the “CEO effect”, provide a unique historical perspective in a 2015 study where they filter out the strength of the economy, the nature of the industry corporations operated in and specific features of the firms in question to isolate the impact of CEOs between 1950 and 2009.\textsuperscript{303} They report that the CEO effect, which accounted for just under 10% of corporate performance in the 1950s and 1960s, hovered in the 10% to 12% range from 1970 until the mid-1980s before increasing to the 15% to 17% range as the 1990s drew to a close.\textsuperscript{304}

Taken together, then, there is quite strong evidence in favor of the proposition that the operation of the market for managerial talent accounted at

\begin{footnotes}
\item[298] KHURANA, SEARCHING, supra note xx, 71.
\item[300] David Leonhardt, \textit{For the Boss, Happy Days Are Still Here}, N.Y. TIMES, April 1, 2001 (“Running a large company is simply more difficult than it once was…companies can quickly steal market share from one another….Boards have responded by paying lavishly – and firing them more often than in the past”).
\item[302] DORFF, supra note xx, 81 (drawing attention to the possibility the beliefs of directors setting executive pay could have prompted an increase in executive pay even if the market for managerial talent did not change dramatically in fact).
\item[303] Timothy J. Quigley and Donald C. Hambrick, \textit{Has the “CEO Effect” Increased in Recent Decades? A New Explanation for the Great Rise in America’s Attention to Corporate Leaders}, 36 STRAT. MGMT. J. 821, 822 (2015) (“there has been no consideration of the possibility that CEO effects can change systemically over time in a given country”).
\item[304] Id., 826-27.
\end{footnotes}
least partly for the flatness of executive pay between 1940 and the mid-1970s and fostered the subsequent dramatic increases in managerial compensation. One point we have left open is why top management might have mattered more over time. For present purposes it suffices to say that there were various reasons why those who set executive pay might have plausibly believed that the executive function had become more important, and more important in a way that justified higher compensation. John Kotter, a Harvard Business School academic, offered in 1990 a helpful summary of factors that likely played a role:

“[A]fter twenty-five to thirty years of relatively easy growth…the business world became more competitive, more volatile and tougher. A combination of faster technological change, greater international competition, market deregulation, overcapacity in capital-intensive industries, an unstable oil cartel, raiders with junk bonds, and a demographically changing workforce all contributed to this shift.”305

In sum, changing perceptions of the importance of corporate executives likely helped to foster from the late 1970s onwards a more robust market for managerial talent that in turn contributed to the dramatic rise in executive pay that began then. One additional explanatory variable, however, needs to be taken into account to round out our survey of explanations for what “worked” during the middle decades of the 20th century, namely evolving norms within public companies relevant to the setting of executive pay. We consider norms next.

5. Norms

Norms -- social rules not dependent upon on the government for promulgation or enforcement306 -- constitute a popular explanation for why executive pay held steady during the mid-20th century.307 For instance, noted economist Paul Krugman wrote in his 2002 New York Times essay on equality that some economists believed the New Deal “imposed norms of equality of pay that persisted for more than 30 years…[that] began to unravel in the 1970s and have done so at an accelerating pace” and cited executive compensation as “Exhibit A for this view.”308 Frydman and Malloy have acknowledged in their

306 This definition is derived from Richard Posner and Eric Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, With Special Reference to Sanctions, 19 Int’l. Rev. L. & Econ. 369, 369 (1999).
307 Suárez, Symbolic, supra note xx, 74.
308 Krugman, supra note xx.
empirical research on the historical development of executive pay that evolving norms impacting managerial compensation may explain why they found that changes to income tax only explained in a limited way managerial compensation trends from the 1940s onwards. Economists Xavier Gabaix and Augustin Landier, who in a widely cited 2008 article attributed a six-fold inflation adjusted increase in executive pay between 1980 and 2003 to a similarly sized increase in the market capitalization of the companies executives were running, said that social norms might well explain why the same pattern did not hold when executive pay was “flat” from the mid-1930s to the 1970s while firms were growing substantially. Piketty, having suggested in a co-authored 2006 article that norms may well have helped to keep “executive pay below market” during the mid-20th century, said in Capital in the Twenty-First Century that his tax analysis provided “the best explanation of the observed facts” but acknowledged that “social norms concerning executive pay directly influence the levels of compensation.”

While various observers have invoked norms to explain historical executive pay trends, the norms that were relevant during the middle of the 20th century have gone largely unspecified. Krugman’s 2002 essay provides, however, a helpful departure point:

“[I]t’s a matter of corporate culture. For a generation after World War II, fear of outrage kept executive salaries in check. Now the outrage is gone….a relaxation of social strictures….By the end of the 1990s, the executive motto might as well have been ‘If it feels good, do it.’”

“Outrage” is a term Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, well-known critics of current executive pay arrangements in U.S. public companies, have used to make the point that the ability of executives to use their power to extract “rents” by way of overly generous managerial compensation is “not unlimited.” Instead, “the need for board approval, and social sanctions…do place some constraints on compensation arrangements.” Bebchuk and Fried, writing in 2004, acknowledged that norms could help to predict the evolution of compensation but stressed that managerial power explained more effectively

309 Frydman and Saks, Executive, supra note xx, 2131-32; Frydman and Malloy, Does, supra note xx, 1435-36.
310 Gabaix and Landier, Why, supra note xx, 76. This concession did not preclude critiques of their research citing the chronology issue. See, e.g., Bertrand, CEOs, supra note xx, 137; Frydman and Saks, Executive, supra note xx, 2129-30.
311 Piketty and Saez, Evolution, supra note xx, 204.
312 Piketty, supra note xx, 512.
313 Krugman, supra note xx.
314 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note xx, 64.
315 Id.
“executive-friendly compensation practices that [had] developed and quickly spread during the last decade or two.”

Bebchuk and Fried’s reasoning implies that managerial power was greater in the 1980s and 1990s than it was beforehand – if it was not the “executive-friendly compensation practices” presumably would not have grown in importance. Given that the proportion of independent directors on boards was higher during these decades than it was previously, it is unclear why there would have been any such trend. Perhaps, instead, changes affecting norms in the boardroom, and corporate culture more broadly, opened the way for the more lucrative executive pay arrangements of which Bebchuk and Fried are critical. There is evidence suggesting that might well have been the case.

A perusal of contemporary sources indicates that norms in U.S. public companies, which in turn likely were shaped by society-wide values, probably did constrain executive pay during the middle of the 20th century. Washington and Rothschild, in the 1951 edition of their manual on executive compensation, said “The executive will damage his own cause if he insists on being given the ultimate dollar to which he believes himself entitled.” A 1955 study of 50 leading U.S. corporations indicated “Moneygrubbing of substantial proportions is no longer possible for corporate managers…” and suggested that “maximizing the emoluments…of money-minded managers” would put a company “in danger of outraging the public, including its own employees and customers…”” Business Week observed in 1960 that executives of public companies were eager not to be “pilloried as greedy, grasping, and domineering” and wanted to be “the man everyone likes.”

As the 1960s drew to a close a new generation of managerial talent was moving to the forefront that was less patient with “the rituals of the system” than the executives who had inculcated a “team first” ethos during the crisis conditions of the Depression and World War II. Specifically, with managerial compensation there were “some stirrings of unrest” among key businessmen who felt their pay should be increased at a faster pace. The basic norm structure, however, did not change materially. As we have seen, economist John Kenneth Galbraith said in 1971 that executives were not paid as much as they might have been because of management’s self-restraint.

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316 Id., 76.
317 Supra note xx and related discussion.
318 Washington 1951, supra note xx, 17.
319 Maurer, Great, supra note xx, 14, 91.
320 Broadside at U.S. Management, BUS. WK., Feb. 20,1960, 129, 129 (citing views expressed by Cameron Hawley, an author of best-selling business novels, but saying there was considerable agreement with what he was saying).
321 Arch Patton, Motivating Tomorrow’s Executives, MCKINSEY Q. March 1968, 20, 21.
323 Supra notes xx to xx and related discussion.
Crystal said similarly in 1970 that “[c]ompensation practices in the U.S. bear an uncomfortable resemblance to those of Eastern Europe. At these companies everyone “gets a little something”.”

By the mid-1980s matters had changed considerably. “Superstars” who could dominate the activities in which they engaged and cash in accordingly were growing in importance throughout the economy, and attitudes in public companies were adjusting accordingly. Edward Herman, a business school professor, was quoted in a 1984 newspaper article on executive pay as saying that while “huge salaries” were thought to be “slightly dubious,” “they’re obviously not dubious enough so they are not done,” with at least part of the explanation being “the free market is back….This is the age of laissez-faire.” James Tobin, a distinguished economist, likewise cited in a 1984 interview a political shift rightwards to explain why “The undiluted pursuit of personal gain is more accelerated in our society” in a way that affected how businessmen thought about what they were doing. A New York Times article published the same year entitled “The Age of ‘Me-First’ Management” that focused on concerns that top executives were “losing sight of moral standards in the new frenzy to get rich” cited upheaval for executives caused by an unprecedented wave of hostile takeovers as a key reason “why some of the traditional constraints on corporate behavior appear to be unravelling.” The impact norms have on CEO pay depend on their substantive content rather than their mere existence. Correspondingly, it seems likely that changing views concerning the propriety of getting rich help to explain the executive pay “regime change” occurring as the 20th century drew to a close.

Evolving norms may well have fostered the growth of executive pay in another way. Given that executives, for various reasons, will prefer not to have their pay linked closely to the performance of the companies they manage, if those setting managerial compensation begin to prioritize a pay/performance link this will tend to drive upward aggregate executive pay. In the middle of the 20th century, there certainly was awareness that with executives rarely owning more than a tiny number of shares in the companies they managed a failure to tie pay to performance could result in them being primarily “devoted

324 Crystal, supra note xx, 33.
328 Id.
329 Dorff, supra note xx, 55.
330 Supra note xx and related discussion.
to conserving present assets and ‘living out their terms.’” Nevertheless, tying pay to performance was not a top priority. According to a 1955 study of top management in 50 large U.S. corporations, pride in the corporation and a job well done, not incentive-based pay, were the strongest motivating forces for senior executives. Crystal said in 1970 it would only be “the gutty company” that would de-emphasize executive salaries in favor of increased bonus opportunities even though top management would have the potential to receive higher total compensation. Reputedly as of 1975, for the “average CEO,” “the best way to get ahead was ‘grow the company’ through diversifying acquisitions. Most of the money came in the form of salary, and the bigger your company, the bigger your salary.”

Matters were changing at least to some degree in the 1980s as a small but growing number of companies adopted compensation plans that incorporated performance measures assumed to be much more closely allied to the creation of shareholder value than the standard measure of earnings per share. By the early 1990s, the idea that executive pay should be tied closely to shareholder outcomes was quickly becoming received wisdom in public companies. Jensen and Murphy’s 1990 Harvard Business Review article and the research underpinning it were influential in this process. As pay-for-performance became a key governance objective in public companies the early 1990s, higher levels of executive compensation would have logically followed, given managerial antipathy toward a riskier stream of income.

The public company norms relevant to the setting of executive pay were clearly different in the 1980s and the 1990s than they were in the 1950s and 1960s, but it cannot be taken for granted that the changes explain the end of the era of remuneration moderation prevailing during the mid-20th century. As we have seen, the trend in favor of higher executive pay likely can be traced back to the mid-1970s. To the extent that this is accurate, if norms relevant to executive pay only changed in public companies in the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s then other factors must account for the pivot away from executive

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331 Wentz, supra note xx, 442.
332 Newcomer, supra note xx, 129.
333 Crystal, Financial, supra note xx, 79.
334 Dobbin and Zorn, supra note xx, 183.
335 Rewarding Executives for Taking the Long View, BUS. WEEK, April 2, 1984, 99.
336 Supra note xx and related discussion; Behind Soaring, supra note xx; Bebchuk and Fried, supra note xx, 72.
338 Supra note xx and accompanying text.
339 Supra note xx and related discussion; Frydman & Jenter, CEO Compensation, supra note xx, 84-87.
340 Frydman and Saks, supra note xx, at 2130 (reporting that the growth in the level of executive pay was explained partly if not fully by the strengthening of managerial incentives).
pay moderation. It is even conceivable that causation worked in reverse, with the move toward higher executive pay helping to set the scene for prevailing norms to change.

While it is possible that changes affecting executive pay may have reconfigured social norms rather than vice versa, there is some evidence that norms had begun to change in the mid- to late-1970s in a way that fostered the trend in favor of higher executive pay that prevailed thereafter. Arch Patton, the executive pay expert, suggested in 1976 that “executive self-interest has replaced company loyalty to a substantial degree” and said this had helped “to raise the pay expectations of executives above any level sustainable without rampant inflation.”

Derek Bok, in his 1993 study of executive and professional pay, acknowledged that the “Reagan revolution” of the 1980s lifted to the status of an “official ideology” a belief in individualism and admiration of successful entrepreneurs, but indicated that surveys of college students showed that making money was moving up the priority list as early as the start of the 1970s.

Correspondingly, changing norms coincided with and likely contributed to the late 1970s shift away from the executive pay model that prevailed during the mid-20th century.

Caution should be used in drawing upon norms as an explanatory variable with respect to corporate governance. This is because the term can potentially be defined so broadly that the behavior in question can be explained much more adequately by reference to incentives traditional economic analysis addresses. Nevertheless, it appears that a corporate culture underpinned by norms that discouraged “money grubbing” by top executives helps to explain why between the 1940s and the 1970s they were not paid as generously as their counterparts in later decades.

VI. CONCLUSION

Executive pay has been a highly controversial issue for the past quarter-century. Various reforms have been introduced as a response, seemingly to little avail. Ironically, not long before the controversy began an executive compensation regime was in place in U.S. public companies during the mid-20th century that likely would have appealed to many of today’s critics of executive pay. How was it that executive pay was modest by present-day standards prior to the introduction of reforms designed to address concerns that would subsequently arise? We have addressed that question in this paper. By

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342 Bok, COST, supra note xx, 249, 253-54.
identifying “what worked” we are able to offer insights for those advocating executive pay reform today, albeit of a rather pessimistic nature.

Tax provides at first glance the most obvious explanation for executive pay arrangements in place during the middle of the 20th century. The top marginal tax rates on income were eye-wateringly high compared with present levels, which might have been expected to keep executive pay down. Thomas Piketty has indeed argued that restoring the tax regime in place in the U.S. during the mid-20th century would do much to address concerns which currently exist about executive pay. As we have shown, however, tax likely only had a modest impact on executive pay levels during the middle of the 20th century. The tax “hit”, though substantial by present-day standards, was not robust enough to result in top executives leaving substantial sums “on the table.”

Unions likely exerted some downward pressure on executive pay during the mid-20th century, with unionized companies refraining from increasing managerial compensation substantially so as to reduce friction in labor negotiations with unions that had considerably more clout than they do presently. Unions, however, never represented a majority of the workforce at any point in time, which would have diluted the impact they had on executive pay economy-wide.

The market for managerial talent and norms within public companies do more to explain the mid-20th century executive pay compression. While by the end of the 20th century CEOs were widely thought of as being genuine “difference makers” who would be worth paying generously and even poaching if they were the right person for the job, from the 1940s through the 1970s top executives were perceived of as mere bureaucrats with largely fungible talents and were paid accordingly. Also, a “team first” ethos and a fear of being pilloried as greedy stemming from the crisis conditions of the Depression and World War II fostered the development of strong norms within companies against the awarding of highly lucrative executive pay.

Could such historical conditions return so as to create a new era of executive pay moderation? It is doubtful. Pleas that have been made to today’s CEOs to leave money on the table voluntarily have fallen on deaf ears, 344 so it seems improbable they will do much to lead by example. Humility reputedly is “the flavor du jour” among senior executives right now. 345 Still, it seems unlikely that CEOs will be thought of anytime soon as mere “organization men” meriting merely bureaucratic pay. There is also little chance that a “team first” ethos will become sufficiently prevalent and potent in public companies

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344 See Skapinker, It is Time, supra note xx; Michael Skapinker, CEOs Need to Join the 20 Times Club Now, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2011 (a 2015 plea by a journalist for executive self-restraint followed on from a futile 2011 plea to the same effect).
to drive executive pay downwards towards mid-20th century levels. While there is nostalgia for the industrial giants that dominated the U.S. (and world) economy during the middle decades of the 20th century, Americans came to view such firms as bastions of soul-destroying conformism and ultimately preferred a more individualistic arrangement.\footnote{Christopher Caldwell, \textit{In Lament to America’s Lost Bargain}, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2010, 14.} There probably is little appetite for a return to the orderly but demoralizing uniformity of mid-20th century corporate life, which likely precludes norm-driven reform of executive pay.

Perhaps Americans would be amenable to a return to the bureaucratic corporate ethos of the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s if what can be referred to as “America’s Midcentury Moment”, characterized by substantial faith in government and widespread acceptance of a highly egalitarian income distribution, was to return.\footnote{Michael Barone, \textit{The Surprising Roots of Liberal Nostalgia}, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2011.} The Midcentury Moment, however, may well have been unique in U.S. history, following on from the deprivations of the Depression and the collective effort associated with World War II. This likely is not a bad thing, given that these were traumatic events few, if any, would want to see repeated. To draw matters together, in this paper we have identified what “worked” with executive pay in the sense that we have explained why managerial compensation remained relatively flat during the middle decades of the 20th century in a way that regulation introduced since the early 1990s has not been able to replicate. Putting into practice, however, the insights we have offered in a way that will satisfy today’s critics of executive pay may well be impossible.