ABSTRACT: This article investigates a twelfth-century realist view on universals, the *individuum*-theory. The *individuum*-theory is criticised by Peter Abelard and Joscelin of Soissons, and endorsed by *Quoniam de generali* as well as by the unpublished *Isagoge* commentary found in MS Paris, BnF, lat. 3237, which is taken into account for the first time. The *individuum*-theory blurs traditional distinctions between nominalism and realism by claiming that the universal is the individual thing itself. Its main strategies for such a claim are presented, namely: putting forward identity “by indifference,” distinguishing *status* and *attentiones*, and neutralising opposite predicates. It is argued that these strategies have parallels in Peter Abelard’s own views. The *individuum*-theory’s paradoxical realism seems to defend universal *res* after criticisms were advanced against more traditional material essence realism and it seems to have been using some of the nominalists’ tools (particularly Abelardian tools) in its endeavour.

KEYWORDS universals; realism; individual; Peter Abelard; Walter of Mortagne; Joscelin of Soissons; Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 3237; identity; *attentio*; *status*.

Much can be said about what the early twelfth-century debate on universals is *not*. For instance, it is *not* a discussion of which genera or species grasp the truth of things, or which genera or species a certain individual belongs to, or how one knows that this is so. Twelfth-century *magistri* would think that the genera and species for which nouns are found in ordinary language, such as Animal or Man, “cut the world at its joints.” They would consider it unproblematic both that Socrates belongs to the genus Animal and species Man, and that one knows that he does.¹ Similarly, the debate is not about properties of all sorts, or about things of all sorts. It focuses, rather, on substantial properties to the detriment of accidental ones and on natural things to the detriment of artefacts (these being regarded as mere accidental arrangements of natural things). Scholars have recognised a realist and a nominalist approach to the debate. Realists are addressing an ontological issue. They claim
that universality pertains not only to words (voces, sermones or nomina), but also to things (res) — in other words, that there are universal things. There is no difficult semantic issue to tackle on this account: universal words simply refer to universal things. Nominalists, by contrast, hold that all that exists is individual — no universal thing exists. The issue to tackle is not ontological but semantic. Some of our words, such as proper names, refer to individual things and thus, obviously, are meaningful (that is, able to signify something). But other words are universal, and they too are meaningful. How can universal words signify, given that there is no universal thing to which they refer? Both the metaphysical and the semantic perspectives are a form of exegesis. They originate from authoritative texts studied as part of the school curriculum (Porphyry’s Isagoge, Aristotle’s Categories and De interpretatione, as well as Boethius’s commentaries on each). Authority texts transmitted both an ontological way of dealing with genera and species, and a predicative one. According to the ontological approach, a universal is a common nature that is in many individuals. According to the logical or predicative approach, a universal is that which is predicated of many things.

Now that the major lines have been established, we shall analyse a theory of this debate that somehow blurs most of them, the “individuum-theory.” It is a realist view, the core claim of which, however, is the nominalist claim that “all that exists is individual.” In my interpretation, the individuum-theory is a mitigated form of realism that developed in the time of Peter Abelard following criticism of material essence realism. Material essence realism, in turn, is a traditional form of realism claiming the existence of universal common things as constituents of individual things. The individuum-theory rejects universal common things endorsed by material essence realism, and claims that all that exists are individual things. At the same time, it still holds that universals are things. Given that all that exists are individual things, the individuum-theory therefore claims that “the universal is the singular thing itself.” Research on this view is scanty. Analysis by Martin Tweedale and Peter King has focused
primarily on Abelard’s criticism of the view rather than on positive accounts. More recent contributions by Wojciech Wciórka and Roberto Pinzani both focus on one published tract (‘Quoniam de generali’) and only address particular aspects of the theory. In particular, scholars have failed to take into account the Isagoge commentary of MS Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 3237, which seemingly endorses the individuum-theory. My aim is thus to develop a more comprehensive understanding on the basis of both published and manuscript sources. Moreover, I put forward the claim that parallels can be found between the strategies of the individuum-theory and of Abelard, a point which has not been adequately highlighted so far. I therefore argue that, in the twelfth-century, a form of realism was developed that tried to accommodate realist and nominalist claims, and defended realism using Abelardian tools. The article is divided into three sections. First, I will be summarising the basic tenets of material essence realism. Second, I will present the sources and main claims of the individuum-theory. Finally, I will investigate the strategies used by the individuum-theory and draw parallels with Abelard’s views.

1. CRITICISING MATERIAL ESSENCE REALISM

Realism enjoyed a venerable tradition, stretching back to Eriugena, Anselm of Canterbury, and Odo of Cambrai, before it was endorsed by William of Champeaux in the early twelfth century. William’s realism is usually called “material essence realism.” Material essence realism is a theory that tries to explain both what is common to different individuals and what is peculiar to each of them, therefore taking neither of them as primitive. Two constituents are identified within a singular, individual thing, for example Socrates. One is the universal constituent, the species of that individual thing (Man); the other is an individual constituent, proper to that individual thing only i.e. the accidents of that individual thing (such as Socrates’s particular colour). The species, in turn, can be analysed in terms of two
constituents. Just as Socrates shares Man with all other individual men, so Man has a universal constituent, which it shares with all other species of the same sort, and this is its genus, Animal. It also has a constituent that is proper to that species only, the particular differences by which it is distinct from all other species of the genus Animal (rationality and mortality). The genus Animal, in turn, is a species of a higher genus, Corporeal Substance. Therefore, the same reasoning can be applied, identifying a general constituent and Animal’s own differences. In a nutshell, the universal is a constituent of its inferior things, be they its inferior species or its inferior individuals. Material essence realism highlights this by saying that the universal is the matter of its inferiors, to which forms (i.e. differences or accidents) are added to produce the inferior species or individuals.11

The universal constituent, it is claimed, is an entity, a thing that exists in the world. Of course, it does not exist in the way in which individual things exist. But it, too, exists, with the following special ontological characteristics. A universal is a common entity existing: (1) entirely12 and (2) simultaneously in each inferior thing it is in, and (3) in such a way as to constitute the substance of the inferior thing. Three comparisons found in Boethius are usually mentioned in order to make the point:13 (1) The universal is not common to a and b as a field is common to a and b when a owns a part of it and b another — the universal is entirely in each inferior thing. (2) It is not common as a horse is common to a and b because a first owned it entirely and subsequently b owned it entirely — a universal is common simultaneously to its inferiors. (3) Finally, it is not common in the way in which a theatre show is common to all those that see it, that is, entirely and at the same time but without constituting the substance of the things to which it is common — the universal is a component of its inferiors.

Consequently, there is an interdependence between universal and individual entities according to material essence realism.14 As is clear from what has been said in relation to
constituents, this view is a form of immanent realism: universals do not exist apart from inferior things but as their metaphysical constituents. A universal cannot exist without being instantiated in at least one individual. However, individual things also depend on the existence of universals for their own existence. Indeed, the universal common entity is the nature of its individuals — in other words, it supplies them with all they need in order to be what they are, while the individual contribution lies only in accidental features. This means that an individual cannot exist without instantiating a specific universal. Indeed, the interdependence seems to be in favour of the universal: a universal must be instantiated by at least one individual but the non-existence of any individual (provided that at least one exists) does not entail the non-existence of the universal; on the contrary, the non-existence of the universal always entails the non-existence of the individual.¹⁵

In the first decades of the twelfth century, arguments were raised against various aspects of material essence realism — for instance, against its use of accidents as the principle of individuation.¹⁶ Arguments were also directed against the special ontological characteristics of universals, and the most frequent are variations of two arguments. The first: if material essence realism is followed through, the universal thing will have to be the subject of contrary properties at the same time — for instance, the universal thing will be subject to opposite differences by which it produces different species, such as being rational and being irrational, or to opposite accidents that different individuals happen to have, such as being ill, proper to this individual, and being in good health, proper to that one.¹⁷ The second: if material essence realism is followed through, one and the same thing (the universal common thing) will have to be entirely and at the same time in two different, possibly distant, places where it is instantiated.¹⁸ It is a characteristic of the medieval debate that universal entities are attacked not simply for being an uneconomical option on a balance sheet (albeit with the possibility being granted that entities with such characteristics could exist). As these
arguments demonstrate, common universals are considered to be ontologically impossible, something that simply cannot exist in the world.\footnote{19}

2. The Individuum-Theory

Criticism of material essence realism is the starting-point for the individuum-theory. Before considering its basic tenets, however, we should present the sources for reconstructing this theory. The individuum-theory is described, critically, by three texts that probably date back to the 1120s: Abelard’s \textit{Logica `Ingredientibus`},\footnote{20} the Abelardian \textit{Logica `Nostrorum Petitioni Sociorum`} (both defending the view that universals are words)\footnote{21} and a treatise, \textit{De generibus et speciebus} (which claims that universals are collections of the material essences constituting individuals).\footnote{22} It is also endorsed positively by at least one treatise called, from its incipit, \textit{`Quoniam de generali`}.\footnote{23} An unpublished commentary on the \textit{Isagoge} found in MS Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 3237, also seems sympathetic.\footnote{24} Moreover, John of Salisbury mentions the view in \textit{Metalogicon} II, 17 (attributing it to master Walter of Mortagne) and, more briefly, in \textit{Policraticus} VII, 12.\footnote{25} \textit{`Quoniam de generali`} and \textit{P17} provide the most detailed account but all these sources are quite coherent in presenting the view, its terminology, and strategies.

Accepting criticism of material essence realism, the individuum-theory has an ontology to which a nominalist could subscribe.\footnote{26} Things, it claims, are discrete from one another not only in their forms (as for material essence realism) but also in their material essences. Things are therefore entirely discrete from one another.\footnote{27} And such discrete things are individuals. Indeed, the theory claims that (i) all that exists is individual: “Quicquid est, individuum”\footnote{28} and “nihil omnino est praeter individuum.”\footnote{29} However, it also wants to claim that (ii) universals are things, in accordance with realism. Given that, by (i), the only things that exist are individuals, it follows that (iii) universals are precisely those things that are
individual. Socrates, they say, is Socrates, but also Man, Animal, Body and Substance. He is therefore an individual, a species, a genus, the most general genus. The same is true for any other individual. Consequently, the same thing is particular and universal.

It is, as Wojciech Wciórka put it, an “audacious” theory. If anything, authorities are clear in opposing universality and singularity and in attributing them to distinct items. In Chapter 7 of *De interpretatione*, Aristotle defines a universal as that which is apt to be predicated of many, and an individual as that which is not. In the *Isagoge*, Porphyry states that, among items that are predicated, some (individuals) are said of one only while others (genera, species, differences, *propria* and common accidents) are predicated of many. Indeed, some inspiration for the *individuum*-theory could have been found in a passage of Boethius’s commentary that scholars call the “unique-subject theory.” In this passage, Boethius says that the subject of singularity and universality is one and the same, just as the same line is concave and convex with respect to different points of view. However, Boethius’s overall aim is to say that things exist as singular in the world, whereas they can be thought of as universal (through abstraction). He certainly did not mean that the singular thing also exists as a universal. Aristotelian immanentism could also have provided some sort of antecedent, because of its claim that universals are always instantiated. This means that, in act, only individuals exist. A universal exists even if it is instantiated only by one individual (as is true for the phoenix). However, although universals always exist in individuals or indeed in the individual, they are certainly not the individuals themselves on this account.

One might wonder, therefore, why a view claiming that the individual thing is a universal was defended. It certainly is an aspect of the twelfth-century debate that it tried to defend, as cleverly and ingeniously as possible, difficult and counterintuitive positions. The *individuum*-theory, however, has more to recommend itself and does not lack philosophical interest. It is an attempt at defending realism (and thus honour the thought that universal predications are
true in virtue of something extramental)\textsuperscript{39} without committing to universal common things existing at the same time in different individuals. The \textit{individuum}-theory is also relevant from a historical point of view, documenting a form of realism much more palatable to nominalists than material essence realism. Closeness to nominalism is evident in accepting criticism of material essence realism and in claiming that individuals only exist. As the next section will make clear, this view also uses strategies and terminology reminiscent of Abelard’s for a purpose (defending realism) which is the opposite of Abelard’s own purpose.

3. Strategies for the \textit{Individuum}-Theory

Three main strategies are used by the \textit{individuum}-theory for supporting its claims: introducing a new sort of identity, identity by indifference; identifying different states (\textit{status}) of the individual thing, each corresponding to a certain \textit{attentio} on the observer’s part; and finally, neutralising opposite predicates. My contention is that all these strategies have parallels in Abelard’s own works.\textsuperscript{40}

3.1. Identity by Indifference

According to material essence realism, individuals of the same species and species of the same genus share a common entity, essentially the same in each individual or species. We should therefore draw a distinction between (i) the identity of the species (or the genus) in its inferiors and (ii) the identity of individuals of the same species, and of species of the same genus among themselves. On the basis of the description of material essence realism in \textit{LNPS}, things that are identical according to the first kind of identity are “the same essentially” (\textit{idem essentialiter}), and things that are identical according to the second kind of identity are “the same in essence” (\textit{idem in essentia}).\textsuperscript{41} Essentially the same thing is found in each individual of the same species — such a thing is, precisely, the species. Essentially the
same thing is found in each species of the same genus — such a thing is, precisely, the genus. Consequently, individuals of the same species are the same in essence (or, following the text more closely, are not different in essence) because they have one and the same matter, the species. Similarly, species of the same genus are the same in essence because essentially the same thing (the genus) is in each of them. On the one hand, \(a\) and \(b\) are essentially the same when they are, in fact, the very same thing (\textit{thing} being a standard meaning for ‘\textit{essentia}’ in the twelfth century). On the other hand, \(a\) and \(b\) are the same in essence when they share the same \textit{essentia}, which in turn is taken as a universal thing, identical with neither \(a\) nor \(b\) (in this case the meaning of ‘\textit{essentia}’ as matter seems to prevail).\(^{42}\)

According to the description of material essence realism in \(P17\), however, things that are identical according to the first kind of identity are “the same in essence.”\(^{43}\) Similarly, Abelard seems to call this identity “in essence.” According to Abelard, two items \(a\) and \(b\) are the same in essence when they are, in fact, the very same thing. Tullius and Cicero, for instance, are the same in essence. This \textit{ensis} and this \textit{mucro} are also the same in essence (‘\textit{ensis}’ and ‘\textit{mucro}’ are two Latin synonyms meaning \textit{sword}, and they are additionally taken here to refer to one and the same sword). This white item and this hard item are also the same in essence under the assumption that ‘white’ and ‘hard’ refer to one and the same thing here.\(^{44}\) In other words, \(a\) and \(b\) are the same in essence when they are not two things but rather one. Stated differently, \(a\) and \(b\) are the same in essence when they have all their parts in common.\(^{45}\)

Abelard’s identity in essence corresponds to the first sort of identity for material essence realism. At first sight, it seems \textit{not} to correspond to the second kind of identity for material essence realism (identity among individuals of the same species and among species of the same genus). After all, individuals differ through their forms and species through their differences — they can hardly be said to be exactly the same thing. However, one should keep in mind that, according to material essence realism, the species is all that is substantial
to an individual, that is to say, all that makes an individual what it is. Accidents only are added to the species to produce individuals and there is evidence, at least in some accounts, that material essence realism tends to consider differences as accidents.\textsuperscript{46} Seen from this perspective, when individuals of the same species are said to be the same in essence, the first and more radical meaning of identity in essence can also be seen lurking in the background.\textsuperscript{47}

The \textit{individuum}-theory similarly maintains that individuals of the same species (and species of the same genus) are \textit{the same}. However, it needs a different meaning of ‘the same’ to the problematic one of material essence realism. It says that they are the same not essentially, but indifferently (\textit{non essentialiter, sed indifferenter}). Individuals of the same species (and species of the same genus) are the same because they \textit{do not differ in}, or, in positive terms, \textit{are similar in} being a certain something.\textsuperscript{48} Identity by indifference attempts at providing unity while maintaining distinction. As noted above, individual things are discrete from one another in both matter and forms according to the \textit{individuum}-theory. Consequently, there is a sense in which there are as many species as individuals, since each individual is a species and is essentially distinct from any other individual. However, all individuals of a certain species are the same indifferently. Inasmuch as they are the same indifferently, they should be counted as one.\textsuperscript{49}

Lists of various meanings of ‘the same’ (and corresponding meanings of ‘different’) are found in several twelfth-century texts from Abelard’s school. The Abelardian \textit{Logica ‘Nostrorum Petitioni Sociorum’} and \textit{Glossae secundum vocales} and Abelard’s own \textit{Theologia ‘Summi Boni’}, \textit{Theologia Christiana} and \textit{Theologia ‘Scholarium’} all include such a list, and two meanings of identity are also mentioned in the \textit{Sententiae secundum magistrum Petrum} of Abelard’s school.\textsuperscript{50} Abelard’s or Abelardian lists all mention “the same by likeness”.\textsuperscript{51} Still, the meaning of identity by indifference might have originated in the realist camp. Abelard’s \textit{Historia Calamitatum} tells us that, as a result of Abelard’s criticisms, William of
Champeaux abandoned material essence realism and adopted a new meaning of ‘the same’ — the same by indifference.\textsuperscript{52} A sentence attributed to William also puts forward the distinction between the same according to the identity of the same essence (\textit{secundum identitatem eiusdem prorsus essentiae}) and the same according to indifference (\textit{secundum indifferentiam}).\textsuperscript{53}

3.2. \textit{Status} and \textit{Attentio}

The \textit{individuum}-theory claims that, in his forms and matter, Socrates is different from anything else in the world — he is the same essentially as nothing but himself. He is, however, the same indifferently as other things in being a certain something. For example, he is the same indifferently as every other man in that he is a man and the same indifferently as every other animal in that he is an animal. Insofar as an individual is a certain \(x\) (with \(x\) referring either to that very individual or to the species or genus to which that individual belongs), that individual is said to be \textit{in the status of} \(x\).\textsuperscript{54} Socrates, for instance, can be said to be in the \textit{status} of Socrates, of man, of animal, of body, \textit{etc}. Any individual thus has a number of \textit{status}, one for being that individual and one for every species and genus above that individual in Porphyry’s tree.\textsuperscript{55}

Every \textit{status} of a given thing corresponds to an \textit{attentio} of the subject who knows this thing. An \textit{attentio} is an act of the intellect, by which the thing is considered. According to the \textit{individuum}-theory, an act of \textit{attentio} does not belie the way things are; it may, however, consider only certain aspects of the thing and neglect others. If someone considers (\textit{attendat}) Socrates in the \textit{status} of Socrates (i.e. inasmuch as he is Socrates) he or she will find him different from all other things in the world. In the \textit{status} of Socrates, Socrates is an individual, correctly identified by the proper name ‘Socrates’ which marks him out as different from anything else. To consider Socrates in the \textit{status} of Socrates means to take into
account all of Socrates’ properties (i.e. his socratitas). Another attentio, however, might consider Socrates only insofar as he has certain properties — for instance, insofar as he is a rational mortal animal. Such attentio neglects properties that Socrates possesses as an individual but nonetheless it still considers him in a status he truly possesses. In the status of man, Socrates is a species and the same (indifferently) with all other individual men, but still essentially different from every other thing. ‘Quoniam de generali’ insists that nobody’s attentio can change the way things are.\textsuperscript{56} Moreover, Socrates in statu Socratis is an individual; in statu hominis, a species; and in statu animalis, a genus. It does not follow that the thing is, in itself, some kind of neutral entity, indifferent to singularity or universality. The status in which the thing is individual should be regarded as primary because the thing is considered with all its properties in that status.

Status and attentio are key notions in Abelard’s discussion of universals and of understandings in the Logica ‘Ingredientibus’ and De intellectibus. The purpose that they fulfil for Abelard, however, is quite different to their purpose within the individuum-theory. When referring to status Abelard’s purpose is to explain the nominatio of universal words, that is, approximately, their reference. Universal words (e.g. ‘man’) and proper nouns (e.g. ‘Socrates’) both name individual things (e.g. Socrates). Proper nouns name individual things according to their being discrete from all other things. Universal words, in contrast, name singular things in that they agree (with one another) in a certain status, for instance, the status hominis, being a man. Abelard insists that such a status, in which things agree and which is the cause of the imposition of universal names to singular things, is not itself a thing.\textsuperscript{57} Questions have been raised about Abelardian status, particularly on the matter of their relationship to dicta and divine ideas.\textsuperscript{58} Even if they are not things, status seem to be extramental. Scholars have wondered whether, while claiming that status are not things (and
having strict requirements for what counts as a thing), Abelard is committing himself to something that *would* count as a thing according to contemporary use of the word.\(^{59}\)

Two differences can be identified between Abelard and the *individuum*-theory in their accounts of *status*. (i) Abelard claims that *status* are not things,\(^{60}\) whereas *P17* calls *status* “either the things constituted from matter and forms, or the affections, that is, constitutions, that are in constituted things, or the parts that constitute the things themselves.”\(^{61}\) However, there is further evidence to suggest that the picture is more complex than this. In point of fact, ‘*Quoniam de generali*’ never claims that *status* are things. There is also no justification for saying (as is sometimes found in secondary literature) that, *being a form of realism*, the *individuum*-theory claims *status* to be things.\(^{62}\) The *individuum*-theory grounds its realism on individual things, not on *status*. From its claim that universals are things, we cannot infer that *status* are things, because the theory does not hold universals to be *status*; rather, it holds universals to be the individual things. On the other hand, Abelard also tells us that one can call *status* “the things themselves set up (*statutas*) in the nature of man, the common likeness of which the person who imposed the word conceived.”\(^{63}\) This is a controversial statement, based on Bernhard Geyer’s correction of the manuscript text and has prompted various interpretations.\(^{64}\) Most recently, John Marenbon suggested that “the things themselves” mentioned here might be particular differences.\(^{65}\) Still, Abelard seemingly accepts calling certain things *status* at this point. (ii) A second difference is that an Abelardian *status* is that in which various individuals come together; the *individuum*-theory, in contrast, identifies various *status* for each individual. There are *status* in which an individual is not different from other individuals, but also a *status* (marking that individual as individual) in which that individual is different from others. However here, too, there are similarities. The account of the *individuum*-theory in *LNPS*, for instance, speaks of *status* as that “in the participation of which many things come together” or “do not come together.”\(^{66}\)
Attention/attendere are mentioned in the Logica ‘Ingredientibus’ and in De intellectibus in conjunction with intellectus, ‘understanding.’ An understanding is an act of the soul that consists of considering (attendere) something, or paying attention (attentio) to something. An understanding is therefore not identical to the attentio (or, as we shall see, to the several attentiones) involved in it. Understandings ought to be distinguished further from the content/object of that act, as well as from sense, imagination, estimation, knowledge and reason. As highlighted by Chris Martin, any understanding involves two aspects. (i) On the one hand, it needs an object extrinsic to the act. When things are perceived by the senses, the attentio is directed to the things themselves. When things are not perceived by the senses (because what I am considering is sensible but not being perceived by my senses at that time, or because what I am considering is not a sensible thing at all) the attentio is directed to mental images. (ii) On the other hand, understandings have an “adverbial component,” that is to say, they consider the object in a particular way (modus). It is possible to consider the same thing in different ways through different attentiones. In each case a different understanding is produced. For instance, a piece of wood can be considered inasmuch as it is a piece of wood, inasmuch as it is a body or inasmuch as it is an oak tree or a fig tree. Different attentiones will result in different understandings (“diuersae attentiones uariant intellectus”).

The individuum-theory only considers attentio paid to individuals in their status of being individuals, or to individuals in other status that they possess. Abelard’s use of attentio is much wider. We can pay attention to things that do not exist. We have, for instance, an understanding of past time, future time and of imaginary entities such as chimeras. Understandings can be combined into composite understandings. In such cases, more than one attentio is involved, one for each element that has been joined and one for their joining. To give an example, the understanding of a laughing stone is a composite understanding. It
involves three *attentiones*: one for the stone, one for the property of laughing and one for their joining.\textsuperscript{76} (As these examples show, the understanding need not be sound: it can be an empty understanding whereby properties that are not joined in reality have been joined.)\textsuperscript{77} Moreover, understandings (acts involving *attentiones* towards an object) can be formed as the result of hearing words. For a word or a group of words to signify means precisely to produce an understanding in the hearer’s mind. *Attentio* towards something can be gained as the result of hearing a *vox significativa*, a meaningful word. But *attentio* can also be gained as the result of hearing a syncategorematic term with words with which it co-signifies,\textsuperscript{78} or simply by the conjoining of *voces significatvaes* according to grammatical rules, as in ‘laughing stone.’ All such *attentiones* contribute to the composite understanding produced by hearing that string of words.

3.3. Neutralizing Opposite Predicates, or How to Predicate Opposite Predicates of One and the Same Thing

Even if one grants that identity by indifference and *status/attentio* could work for the *individuum*-theory, many problems remain. According to Porphyry and Aristotle, opposite definitions apply to individuals and universals. The crucial element for their difference is “being predicated of many.” A universal is predicated of many: the individual is *not* (the individual is predicated of one only).\textsuperscript{79}

The *individuum*-theory, therefore, faces a double obstacle. The first obstacle is how the definition of genus or species, which is meant to differentiate a genus or a species from an individual, can be applied to an *individual* thing. The second obstacle is how this definition can be applied to an individual *thing*. Such definitions clearly stem from the predicative approach to universals. It is difficult to claim that a thing (let alone an individual thing) is predicated of many since things themselves are not “predicated.”\textsuperscript{80}
Realists, however, have a strategy for dealing with the latter obstacle. The predicate ‘predicated of many,’ they say, must undergo “ontological interpretation.”81 “Socrates (in statu x) is predicated of many” merely means, they say, that he is similar to many in being a certain x, or that he converges with many in being a certain x.82

The main obstacle, therefore, is the first one — applying the definition of universal (as that which is predicated of many) to an individual. Opposite properties would be predicated of that individual. Saying that Socrates is a universal means that Socrates is both predicated of many/agrees with many (as a universal) and is not predicated of many/does not agree with many (as an individual). How can opposite predicates be true of one and the same thing? Two main strategies can be envisioned for dealing with this. One is to find a way for truly predicating opposite predicates of one and the same thing. Another is to claim that what seem to be opposite predicates are not, in fact, opposite — that is, to neutralize their opposition. This latter strategy is endorsed by the individuum-theory using some Abelardian tools. And the first strategy was also tried by Abelard, as we shall see:

1. In brief, the strategy of the individuum-theory for dealing with opposite predicates predicated of one and the same thing is to introduce status into such predicates.83 We have seen that, according to this theory, it is true that “Socrates is a genus” and “Socrates is predicated of many.” However, one needs to be careful with such formulations. In order for them to be true, ‘Socrates’ must not refer to Socrates in statu Socratis, that is, Socrates inasmuch as he is an individual. If ‘is predicated of many’ is predicated of Socrates truly, then we must be considering Socrates in a species-related or genus-related state, for instance, in statu animalis. Predicates, in other words, are attributed to Socrates according to certain status he has, not others (and not any status). Thus, the proper status has to be identified in the subject when we predicate predicates such as ‘is predicated of many,’ in order to
determine whether the sentence is true (as in: Socrates according to animal-state is predicated of many) or false (as in: Socrates according to Socrates-state is predicated of many).

The theory, however, moves a step further. When we make an ontological translation of certain predicates, such as ‘predicated of many,’ the status according to which the subject is taken is, in fact, moved to the predicate. This is clear if the ontological translation of these predicates is considered. “Socrates (in statu animalis) is predicated of many” means that “many agree with Socrates in being animal;” “Socrates (in statu Socratis) is not predicated of many” means that “many do not agree with Socrates in being Socrates.” The predicate, ‘predicated of many/predicated of one only’, in other words, must be paraphrased differently according to the subject term. These predicates are to be regarded as incomplete. They contain an empty slot that needs to be filled in, identifying the status in which the subject is taken. Such predicates, in other words, act like the so-called Abelardian predicates, that is, predicates affected by their subjects. Once the status is included for consideration, predicates that seemed to be opposite are no longer opposite because they have been relativized to different status (‘predicated of many according to the animal-state’, ‘not predicated of many according to the Socrates-state’).

2. Interestingly, Abelard also tried the first strategy. The problem of predicing opposite predicates of the same subject arises for things that are essentially the same, but different in property. An example of such things is a statue and the stone from which it is made (another example is the physical aspect of a word, vox, and the word inasmuch as it signifies something, sermo). A statue and the stone that makes it are, Abelard says, the same in essence, with ‘essentia’ here meaning “thing.” A statue and its stone are, in other words, one and the same thing. They are not, however, the same in property, because they fail to be the same in all their properties. There are properties that can be truly predicated of the statue, but not of the stone, and vice versa. For instance, only the statue is made material
when it is crafted (passing from the mind of its artisan into a material state): the stone is not 
it was already material before the statue was crafted).

If two items, \(a\) and \(b\), are the same in essence but not in property, then in one sense we are 
authorized to say that “\(a\ is\ b\),” and in another sense we are not authorized to say this. It seems 
that we are authorized to say this because they are the same thing. However, we are not fully 
authorized to say this because, usually, “\(a\ is\ b\)” means that any property that is truly 
predicated of \(b\) is also truly predicated of \(a\) — and, as the examples show, this is not the case 
here. So should we or should we not say that \(a\ is\ b\)?

Abelard replies that when \(a\) and \(b\) are essentially the same, but different in property we 
should say that \(a\ is\ that\ which\ is\ b\), but not that \(a\ is\ b\).

Abelard’s solution has two aspects. First, he shows that in the proposition “\(a\ is\ b\)” there is, 
in fact, a double predication: an essential predication of \(b\) with respect to \(a\), and an adjacent 
predication of the properties of \(b\) with respect to \(a\). Essential predication means that (if the 
proposition is true) the thing denoted by \(a\) is identical to the thing denoted by \(b\). For instance, 
in the proposition “Socrates is white,” the essential predication says that “Socrates is 
(identical to) the white thing.” Adjacent predication, on the contrary, means that the property 
of \(b\) inheres in \(a\). In the proposition “Socrates is white,” the adjacent predication says that 
whiteness inheres in Socrates.91 In the cases of the statue and its stone, however, only the 
essential predication between \(a\) and \(b\) is true, whereas the adjacent predication of the 
properties of \(b\) with respect to \(a\) is not. Therefore (and this is his second step), Abelard 
suggests using an expression such as “\(a\ is\ that\ which\ is\ b\),” which, in his eyes, indicates only 
the essential predication between \(a\) and \(b\) and involves no adjacent predication of \(b\) with 
respect to \(a\).92

This is a powerful way of attributing different (even opposite) properties to two items, \(a\) 
and \(b\), while also saying that they are essentially the same. In other words, it could represent a
different way of tackling the problem of the \textit{individuum}-theory. Supporters of this view could say that “the individual is the universal” should rightly be understood as “the individual is that which is the universal.” Opposite properties could then be predicated of each of them: ‘predicated of many’ could be truly said of the universal, and ‘not predicated of many’ of the individual.\textsuperscript{93} But instead of attributing opposite predicates to two items that are (only) essentially the same, the opposite strategy is deployed, that is, to neutralize the predicates’ opposition. Both ‘predicated of many’ and ‘not predicated of many’ are truly said of Socrates/the individual/this thing with no contradiction, because what we are predicating is, in fact, ‘predicated of many according to animal-state’ and ‘not predicated of many according to Socrates-state,’ which are not opposite predicates. Applying the essential-only-predication strategy would mean that universals and individuals are two distinct entities somehow unified in one existing thing. The \textit{individuum}-theory takes the opposite direction. It wants to claim that universals and individuals are not distinct entities at all, and that the definition of a universal can truly be applied to the individual thing.

**Conclusion**

In the twelfth century, a form of realism was endorsed trying to incorporate elements palatable to nominalists. I have called such realism “\textit{individuum}-theory” and tried to list such elements. They include criticising material essence realism, endorsing that individuals only exist, introducing a new sort of identity, positing \textit{status} and \textit{attentiones}, and finding strategies for neutralising opposite predicates. Many elements characterising such realism are also found in Abelard to serve the opposite aim of developing a non-realist account of universals. Was the \textit{individuum}-theory a successful position? According to John of Salisbury the view was quickly abandoned.\textsuperscript{94} All in all, the position seems at best problematic, at worst paradoxical. If contemporary criteria of explanatory power and of parsimony are used to
assess it, the \textit{individuum}-theory does not seem to score well. \textit{Indifferentia} performs a job that, in other accounts, is done by common universals: explaining similarity among things. One could argue, however, that its explanatory power is little and the problem is simply pushed one step further. \textit{Status} raise doubts with respect to parsimony. One may wonder whether, by admitting \textit{status}, one is committing to other things in addition to individual things. Abelard, for instance, argues against the \textit{individuum}-theory that, if individual things come together in man and each man is either this or that man, individuals things come together in this or that individual man. But this cannot be true because any individual, as individual, is different from other things rather than agreeing with them.\textsuperscript{95} Such argument challenges \textit{status} by interpreting the coming together of things as coming together in some \textit{thing}. It also raises an additional point of criticism. It challenges the idea that opposite predicates really apply to one and the same thing, as is required by claiming that individuals are universals. Even if some predicates can be neutralised to different \textit{status}, problems remain with respect to other properties since individuals and universals ultimately have to do entirely different jobs (explaining the fact of being distinct and explaining the fact of being either similar or common).\textsuperscript{96} Twelfth-century arguments challenging the \textit{individuum}-theory do not usually share contemporary criteria for assessing positions. The theory is judged weak primarily because it struggles to explain authoritative texts in a plausible way.\textsuperscript{97} Still, the \textit{individuum}-theory remains interesting. Among other things, in the \textit{Logica \textquotesingle Ingredientibus\textquotesingle} commentary on \textit{Isagoge} Abelard goes back to criticising this view frequently;\textsuperscript{98} and similarities between the \textit{individuum}-theory and later views on universals have also been noted.\textsuperscript{99}

\* Caterina Tarlazzi is British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Cambridge and a Research Associate of St John’s College, Cambridge.

\textsuperscript{1} See Marenbon, \textit{The Philosophy}, 104, 117. I am grateful to John Marenbon, Wojciech Wciórka, and conference audiences in Cambridge, London and Warsaw for kindly commenting on early drafts, and to
anonymous referees for *JHP* for their helpful criticism. I also acknowledge Yukio Iwakuma for sharing his unpublished transcriptions of *P17*, and Peter King and Chris Martin for sharing their unpublished work towards critical editions of the *Logica ’Nostrum Petitioni Sociorum’* and *Glossae secundum vocales*.


3 See Erismann, “ Penser le commun.” The contrast *esse in multis vs dici de multis* might not have been regarded as unproblematically overlapping with the contrast *res vs voces* in this period — even Abelard accepts that, in principle, authorities might be talking about predicating *things*, and indeed the ancient sources do sometimes talk of predication in a way that is not simply linguistic.

4 This label has no previous tradition, and the theory has been given a variety of names: ‘identity theory,’ ‘*status*-theory,’ ‘indifference theory,’ etc.


6 See Wciórka, “Is Socrates a Universal?,” focusing on the strategy for neutralising opposite predicates, and Pinzani, “Identità parziale,” on identity according to the *individua*-theory.

7 See especially Erismann, *L’Homme commun*.

8 *LI* 10.17–11.9 (Abelard’s description of material essence realism): “Quidam enim ita rem uniuersalem accipiunt, ut in rebus diuersis ab inuicem per formas eandem essentialiter substantiam collocent, quae singularium, in quibus est, materialis sit essentia et, in se ipsa una, tantum per formas inferiorum sit diuersa. Quas quidem formas si separari contingeret, nulla penitus differentia rerum esset, quae formarum tantum diuersitate ab inuicem distant, cum sit penitus eadem essentialiter materia. Verbi gratia in singulis hominibus numero differentibus eadem est hominis substantia, quae hic Plato per haec accidentia fit, ibi Socrates per illa. Quibus quidem Porphyrius assentire maxime uidetur, cum ait: ‘Participacione speciei plures homines unus, in particularibus autem unus et communis plures.’ Et rursus: ‘Indiuidua, inquit, dicuntur huiusmodi, quoniam unumquodque eorum consistit ex proprietatibus, quorum collectio non est in alio.’ Similiter et in singulis animalibus specie differentium unam et eadem essentialiter animalis substantiam ponunt, quam per diuersarum differentiarum susceptionem in diuersas species trahunt, ueluti si ex hac cera modo statuam hominis, modo bouis faciam diuersas eidem penitus essentiae manenti formas aptando. Hoc tamen refert quod eodem tempore cera eadem statuas non constituit, sicut in uniuersali conceditur, quod scilicet uniuersale ita commune Boethius dicit, ut eodem tempore idem totum sit in diuersis quorum substantiam materialiter constituat, et cum in se sit uniuersale, idem per aduenientes formas singulare sit, sine quibus naturaliter in se subsistit et absque eis.
nullatenus actualiter permanet, uniuersale quidem in natura, singulare uero actu et incorporeum quidem et insensibile in simplicitate uniuersalitatis suae intelligitur, corporeum uero atque sensibile idem per accidentia in actu subsistit et eadem teste Boethio et subsistunt singularia et intelliguntur uniuersalia." See also LI 63.31–65.11, 125.3–126.7; LNPS 515.14–31 (quoted below, n. 41); HC §6 (quoted below, n. 52); GS §33; QG §§2–3; P17, ff. 123va, 125va (quoted below, n. 43); Erismann, "Generalis essentia," 32–37; Brumberg, "Universaux," 429–439; Tarlazzi, "Iam corpus," 3–6. The label ‘material essence realism,’ based on LI 10.19, is introduced by Tweedale, Abailard on Universals.

9 See Galluzzo, Breve storia, 84–85.

10 See Gracia, Introduction, 198–204. Considering accidents as the principle of individuation of the substance possessing them is one of the tenets of the Standard Theory of Individuality of the high Middle Ages (125–129).

11 It is not doubtful whether an individual has one material component only (the last species) on this account, or one material component for each species and each genus located above that individual in Porphyry’s tree. The twelfth-century way of considering universal things as matter, moreover, is quite idiosyncratic (but cf. for sources Porphyrius, isag., 18.9–15, 23.15–16; Boethius, div., 14.5–7, 16.12–14). Matter is that which is common to different individuals of the same species, or to different species of the same genus.


13 Boethius, II Comm. In Isag., 162.15–163.3: “quodsi unum quiddam numero genus est, commune multorum esse non poterit. una enim res si communis est, aut partibus communis est et non iam tota communis, sed partes eius propriae singulorum, aut in usus habentium etiam per tempora transit, ut sit commune ut seruus communis uel equus, aut uno tempore omnibus commune fit, non tamen ut eorum quibus commune est, substantiam constituat, ut est theatrum uel spectaculum aliquod, quod spectantibus omnibus commune est. genus uero secundum nullum horum modum commune esse speciebus potest; nam ita commune esse debet, ut et totum sit in singulis et uno tempore et eorum quorum commune est, constituere ualeat et formare substantiam” (cf. LI 11.1–2, quoted above, n. 8).


18 See GS §34; QG §§9–10, 14.
19 I am grateful to John Marenbon for pointing this out to me. Abelard, for instance, says that universal entities are repugnant to the *physica* in *LI* 11.10–11.

20 *LI* 13.18–14.6, 14.18–31, 15.23–16.18, are the crucial passages (see also Lafleur–Carrier, “Édition” for a revised edition). Abelard also goes back to criticising the *individuum*-theory in *LI* 37.3–29, 46.24–47.15, 100.13–20.

21 *LNPS* 518.9–521.20. For reasons to consider *LNPS* Abelardian rather than Abelard’s, see Marenbon, *Abelard in Four Dimensions*, 33–38.

22 *GS* §§50–73 (description and criticism of the *individuum*-theory), §§87–89 (the treatise’s own position).


24 MS Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 3237, ff. 123ra–124va (first, incomplete version of the commentary) and 125ra–130rb (second, complete version) (= *P17*, as listed in the working catalogue of twelfth-century logical commentaries in Marenbon, “Medieval Latin Commentaries”). *P17* has an ambiguous position with regard to the *individuum*-theory. On the one hand, it introduces the theory as the view “of other people” (presumably, therefore, not the author himself: see below, n. 28). On the other hand, it goes on to put forward counter-objections against each objection to the *individuum*-theory.


26 Compare *LI* 13.18–33 (quoted below, n. 27) and *LI* 64.20–65.11.

27 *LI* 13.18–33: “Vnde alii aliter de uniueralitate sentientes magisque ad sententiam rei accedentes dicunt res singulas non solum formis ab inuicem esse diuersas, urerum personaliter in suis essentiis esse discretas nec ullo modo id quod in una est, esse in alia, siue illud materia sit siue forma, nec eas formis quoque remotis minus in essentiis suis discretas posse subsistere, quia earum discretio personalis, secundum quam scilicet haec non est illa, non per formas fit, sed est per ipsam essentiae diuersitatem, sicut et formae ipsae in se ipsae diuersae sunt inuicem, alioquin formarum diuersitas in infinitatem procederet, ut alias ad aliarum diuersitatem necesse esset supponi. Talem differentiam Porphyrius notauit inter generalissimum et specialissimum dicens: ‘Amplius neque species fieret unquam generalissimum neque genus specialissimum,’ ac si diceret: haec est earum differentia quod huius non est illius essentia. Sic et praedicamentorum discretio consistit non per formas aliquas, quae eam faciant, sed per propriae diuersificationem essentiae.” *LNPS* 518.21–24: “Dicunt enim singulas substantias ita in propriae suae essentiae discretione diuersas esse, ut nullo modo haec substantia sit eadem cum illa, etiamsi substantiae materia penitus formis careret.” See Gracia, *Introduction*, 210–215.
§26: "Est autem primum propositum sententiae nostrae: Quicquid est, individuum; quod ex ipso rerum effectu omnibus rei ueritatem intuentibus manifeste iudicatur."
P17, MS Paris, BnF, lat. 3237, ff.123vb, 125va: “Nunc ad sententiam aliorum accedamus, qui similiter ut praedicti genera et species in utrisque, id est in rebus et in uocibus, constituunt. Quorum sententiae positio est nullum uniuersale materiam esse diuersorum; sed sicut unum individuum nequit esse aliud, ita materiae eorum idem esse nequeunt. Itaque materiae et species et genera diuersorum sic essentialiter inter se discretae sunt sicut individua, ut uerum sit dicere tot genera esse in numero quot sunt individua. Nec aliquod uniuerse commune uel praedicabile de pluribus est ita quod essentialiter pluribus insit. Sed commune appellatur idcirco quod, cum ipsum uniuerse in uno sit individuo, aliud ei simillimum in materia et forma est in alio, ut uox dicit communis non quod eadem uox essentialiter ueniat ad diuersos, sed consimilis. Praedicabile autem de pluribus dicitur, non ideo quod conueniat essentialiter pluribus, sed quia ipsum est materia unius et suum indifferentens uel est uel esse potest materia alterius. Nec ideo eadem species diuersorum esse dicitur quod essentialiter sit eadem, sed quia sunt consimilares. Illas autem species diuersorum similis et indifferentes esse dico, quae cum discretae sint, tamen ex materiis et formis consimilis effectus exigentibus componuntur, ut homo Socratis et homo Platonis, cum essentialiter differant, tamen materiae et formae eorum consimilis effectus operantur. Asinus uero et lapis diuersae species et in essentia et secundum indifferentiam sunt, cum dissimilares status habeant et effectus dissimilares exigant. Status autem appello uel res ex materia et formis constitutas uel passiones, id est constitutiones quae in rebus sunt constitutis, uel partes quae ipsas res constituant. Affirmat quoque haec sententia genus et speciem et individuum sic esse idem prorsus, ut uerum possit dici ‘Socrates individuum est homo species et animal genus’ et e conuerso; et ‘singulare est uniuersale,’ et e conuerso, quod Boethius confirmat, ubi sic dicit uniuerse laudem et singularitatem esse in eodem fundamento, sicut cauitis et curuitas licet diuersa sint tamen in eadem sunt linea."

§50: “Nunc itaque illam quae de indifferentia est sententiam perquiramus cuius haec est positio: Nihil omnino est praeter individuum sed et illud aliter et aliter attentum species et genus et generalissimum est. Itaque Socrates in ea natura in qua subjectus est sensibus, scilicet secundum illam naturam quam signifcat de eo ‘Socrates,’ individuum est, ideo quia talis est proprietas eius numquam tota reperitur in alicui. Est enim alter homo sed Socratitatem nullus habet praeter Socratem. De eodem Socrate quandoque habetur intellectus non concipiens quicquid notat haec uox ‘Socrates,’ sed Socratitatis oblius id tantum perspicit de Socrate quod notat inde ‘homo,’ idest animal rationale mortale, et secundum hanc attentionem species est, est enim praedicabilis de pluribus in quid de eodem statu. Si intellectus postponat rationalitatem et mortalitatem et id tantum sibi subiciat quod notat haec uox ‘animal,’ in hoc statu genus est. Quod si relictis omnibus formis in hoc tantum
consideremus Socratem quod notat inde ‘substantia,’ generalissimum est. Idem de Platone dicas per omnia. Quod si quis dicat proprietatem Socratis in eo quod est homo non magis esse in pluribus quam eiusdem Socratis in quantum est Socrates, aequae enim homo qui est Socratis in nullo alio est nisi in Socrate, sicut ipse Socrates, uerum quidem concedunt, ita tamen determinandum putant: Socrates in quantum est Socrates nullum prorsus indifferens habet quod in alio inueniatur sed in quantum est homo plura habet indifferentia quae in Platone et aliis inueniuntur. Nam et Plato similiter homo est ut Socrates, quamuis non sit idem homo essentialiter qui est Socrates. Idem de animali et substantia.”

30 Wciórka, “Is Socrates a Universal?,” 60: “These things are to be considered as ‘ordinary’ individual objects acceptable to an antirealist (in contrast to ‘additional’ particulars such as Platonic Forms understood as autonomous paradigms or prototypes).”

31 QG §26 (immediately following the text quoted on n. 28): “Vnde si genera et species sint — sunt autem, quippe materia individuorum sunt — oportet quod individua sint. Sed et ipsa individua sunt et genera et species. Est igitur eadem essentia et genus et species [et added by the editor] individuum; ut Socrates est individuum et species specialissima et genus subalternum et genus generalissimum.”

32 LNPS 518.9–10 (quoted below, n. 48).

33 Wciórka, “Is Socrates a Universal?,” 57.

34 Aristoteles, int., 7, 17a39–b2: “dico autem uniuersale quod in pluribus natum est praedicari, singulare uero quod non, ut homo quidem uniuersale, Plato uero eorum quae sunt singularia.” For our purposes, the distinction between what is actually predicated of many and what can be predicated of many can be disregarded; see, however, Sirkel, “Alexander of Aphrodisias,” 298–300.

35 Porphyrius, isag., 2, 17–20: “Eorum enim quae praedicantur alia quidem de uno dicuntur solo, sicut individua sicut Socrates et hic et hoc, alia uero de pluribus, quemadmodum genera et species et differentiae et propria, et accidentia communiter sed non proprie alicui.”

36 Boethius, II Comm. In Isag., I, 11 (166.23–167.7): “neque enim intercluseum est ut duae res eodem in subiecto sint ratione diuersae, ut linea curua atque caua, quae res cum diuersis definitionibus terminentur diuersusque earum intellectus sit, semper tamen in eodem subiecto reperiuntur; eadem enim linea caua, eadem curua est. ita quoque generibus et speciebus, idest singularitati et uniuersalitati, unum quidem subiectum est, sed alio modo uniuersale est, cum cogitatur, alio singulare, cum sentitur in rebus his in quibus esse suum habet.” On the unique-subject theory, see de Libera, L’Art, 235–244.
Boethius’s passage also supports material essence realism in *LI*: see n. 8.


39 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for putting things in this manner.

40 By this I mean that similarities can be detected between Abelard’s views and the *individuum*-theory with regard to terminology and strategies, that is to say, that certain elements are present in both positions. This might or might not be the result of borrowing such elements from Abelard and the relationship may vary with respect to different elements. In general, however, my interpretation favours the hypothesis of a realist borrowing of at least some elements from Abelard.

41 *LNPS* 515.14–31: “Nonnulli enim ponunt decem res diuersas esse naturaliter secundum decem praedicamentorum uel generalissimorum distinctionem, cum uidelicet ita dicant res esse uniuersales, hoc est naturaliter communicabiles pluribus, quod *eandem rem essentialiter in pluribus ita ponunt ut eadem quae est in hac re, essentialiter sit in illa*, diuersis tamen formis affecta. Verbi gratia ut animal, natura scilicet substantia animata sensibilis, ita est in Socrate et Brunello et in alii, quod eadem quae est in Socrate et per aduenientes formas effecta est Socrates, et essentialiter tota est in Brunello ita quod *Socrates nullo modo a Brunello in essentia diuersus est* sed in formis, cum eadem essentia penitus materialiter aliiis formis in isto, aliiis formis in illo sit occupata. Quibus illud Porphyrii consentire uidetur, scilicet: ‘Participatione speciei plures homines unus, unus autem et communis plures.’ Et iuxta hane sententiam praedicari de pluribus tale est, ac si diceremus: idem essentialiter ita inesse aliqibus rebus, per formas oppositas diuersificatis, ut singulis essentialiter uel adiacenter conueniat” (my italics).

42 See Jolivet, “Lexicographie,” 538–543, on ‘*essentia*’ meaning *thing* and *matter*.

43 *P17*, ff. 123va, 125va: “Quorundam enim eorum est sententia eandem rem uniuersalem totam indiuisam in diuersis et oppositis individuis esse, ut uere dici possit *idem animal in essentia est materia Socratis et Brunelli*. Ponunt etiam genus et quodlibet uniuerse in simplici natura acceptum rei singulari oppositum esse, inferioribus uero formis uestitum idem esse cum singulari” (my italics).

44 *Ensis* and *mucro* in the abovementioned example are the same in essence and the same in definition. This white item and this hard item are the same in essence but not in definition. See *TSB* II, 83–84 (142.751–143.783), and below, n. 50.
45 See Marenbon, *Abelard in Four Dimensions*, 195. If it is characterised in this way, sameness in essence can be differentiated from sameness in number. According to Abelard the part of a thing is the same in number as the thing it belongs to, but not the same in essence: see *TSB* II, 83 (143.759–778). In later accounts Abelard says that the part is *not* the same in number as its whole *nor* different in number from it: see *TChr* III, 148–153 (250.1807–252.1874). Therefore, things that are the same in number are not always also the same in essence. On the other hand, things that are the same in essence are always the same in number. However, they can differ in definition (see above, n. 44) and in property (see below).


47 As acknowledged in criticism against material essence realism noting that, following this view, only ten things exist, one per category. See especially *LI* 12.27–41.

48 *LI* 13.33–14.6: “Cum autem omnes res ita diuersas ab inuicem esse uelint, ut nulla earum cum alia uel eandem essentialiter materiam uel eandem essentialiter formam participet, uniuersale tamen rerum adhuc retinentes idem non essentialiter quidem, sed indiffereenter ea quae discreta sunt, appellant, ueluti singulos homines in se ipsis discretos idem esse in homine dicunt, id est non differre in natura humanitatis, et eosdem quos singulares dicunt secundum secundum discretonem, uniuersalem dicunt secundum indifferentiam et similitudinis conuenientiam.” *LNPS* 518.9–13: “Sunt alii in rebus uniueritalatem assignantes, qui eandem rem uniuersalem et particularem esse astruunt. Hi namque eandem rem in diuersis indifferenter, non essentialiter inferioribus affirmant. Veluti cum dicunt idem esse in Socrate et Platone, ‘idem’ pro indifferenti, idest consimili, intelligent.” *QG* §30: “Et attende quod Socrates et unumquodque indiuiduum hominis, in eo quod unumquodque est animal rationale mortale, sunt unum et idem; *non dico idem essentialiter*,quia et secundum hunc statum et secundum quemlibet adeo opposita sunt in esse suo quod nullum eorum est aliquid aliorum nec etiam esse potest; *sed sunt idem, id est indifferentes*, secundum statum hominis. Ecce Socrates: secundum statum hominis est species specialissima, quia secundum hunc statum cum indiuiduo hominis tantum conuenit. Item, ipse Socrates secundum statum animalis est genus et species, quippe animal est genus hominis et species corporis. Item, Socrates secundum statum substantiae est genus generalissimum” (my italics).

indifferentiam decem tantum, quot enim indiuidua substantiae tot etiam sunt generalissimae substantiae. Omnia tamen illa generalissima generalissimum unum dicuntur quia indifferentia sunt. Socrates enim in eo quod est substantia indifferentes est cum qualibet substantia in eo statu quod substantia est” (my italics). LI 14.22–27: “Qui tot species quot indiuidua quantum ad rerum numerum ponunt et totidem genera, quantum uero ad similitudinem naturarum pauciorem numerum universalium quam singularium assignant. Quippe omnes homines et in se multi sunt per personalem discretionem et unum per humanitatis similitudinem et iidem a se ipsis diversi quantum ad discretionem et ad similitudinem iudicantur.” PI7, ff. 123vb, 125va–b: “Praedictae sententiae oppositae sic. Dicit Aristoteles decem esse generalissima, indiuidua uero infinita esse; sed cum superius positum sit tot esse genera quot sunt indiuidua, tunc necesse erit similiter esse generalissima infinita. Solutio. Non dixit Aristoteles omnia generalissima esse decem tantum in essentia, sed manerias eorum, id est collectiones, decem appellatu. Vel omnia generalissima substantiae secundum similitudinem et uisum hominum unum esse reputauit, sicut plura nomina multiuoca pro eadem significacione solent unum appellari. Vel sic intellext: decem sunt, id est apta sunt in suprema natura decem scilicet intellectibus concipi, cum indiuidua discrete concipi nequeant nisi innumeris intellectibus. Vel illud de uocibus generalissimis dictum fuit.” As we have seen above (n. 11) it is customary to say that the species is the matter of the individual. Thus the indiuiduam-theory claims that the individual Plato, inasmuch as he is the species Man, is the matter of himself essentially, and of each other individual man indifferently: see QG §§31, 37; PI7, ff. 124ra–b, 126ra.

50 LNPS 558.11–560.15, GSV 178–179 and TSB II, 82–102 (142.745–150.959) mention the same six meanings of ‘the same’ (and corresponding meanings of ‘different’): the same in essence, in number, by definition, by likeness, unchanging, and by effect. In TChr III, 138–162 (247.1677–255.1975), the same in property is added, and the list now amounts to five: the same in essence or in number, in property, by definition, by likeness, and unchanging. Finally, in TSch II, 95–100 (454.1411–456.1487) three meanings of ‘the same’ are mentioned (by likeness, in essence or number, and by definition or property) and three of ‘different’ (in essence, in number, by definition or property). SP 115–117, distinguishes between identitas personae (additionally said to be personaliter et quasi discrete) and identitas naturae (indifferenter ac simpliciter); see Jolivet, “Trois variations,” 138–139. Boethius also distinguishes three meanings of ‘the same’ – numerically the same, the same in specie, and the same in genus: II Comm. In Isag., 191.21–192.19, 240.14–243.27; trin., 167.46–168.63. See Jolivet, Arts du langage, 285–93; Gracia, Introduction, 227–232; Marenbon, The Philosophy, 150–158; Wilks, “Peter Abelard,” 370–373; King, “Metaphysics,” 85–92; J. Brower, “Trinity;” Arlig, Mereology, 165–197; Marenbon, “Changing Thoughts;” Id., Abelard in Four Dimensions, 183–184, 195–198.

52 HC §6: “Tum ego ad eum reuersus ut ab ipso rethoricam audirem, inter cetera disputationum nostrarum conamina antiquam eius de uniuersalibus sententiam patentissimis argumentorum rationibus ipsum commutare, immo destruere compuli. Erat autem in ea sententia de community uniuersalium, ut eamdem essentialiter rem totam simul singulis suis inesse astrueret indiuiduis, quorum quidem nulla esset in essentia diuersitas sed sola multitudine accidentium uarietas. Sic autem istam tunc suam correxit sententiam, ut deinceps rem eamdem non essentialiter sed indifferenter dicere” (my italics).

53 Sententia 236 of the Liber Pancrisis (in Lottin, Psychologie et morale. V, 190–195), especially 192.112–193.127: “Et ut omne ambiguities genus excludamus, uides has duas uoces ‘unum’ scilicet et ‘idem’ duobus accipi modis, secundum indifferentiam et secundum identitatem eiusdem prorsus essentie. Secundum indifferentiam, ut Petrum et Paulum idem dicimus esse in hoc quod sunt homines, quantum enim ad humanitatem pertinet, sicut iste est rationalis et ille; et sicut iste est mortalis et ille. Sed si ueritatem confiteri uolumus, non est eadem utriusque humanitas, sed similis, cum sint duo homines. Sed hic modus unius ad naturam diuinitatis non est referendus ne, quod fidei contrarium est, hac acceptione tres Deos uel tres substantias cogamur confiteri. Secundum identitatem uero, prorsus unum et idem dicimus Petrum et Simonem, Paulum et Saulum, Iacob et Israël qui, cum singuli singulas habeant substantias, singuli non plus quam singulas habent personas. Et nos quidem Patrem et Filium hoc modo dicimus idem prorsus in substantia, sed differt quod due sunt persone” (my italics). On the Liber Pancrisis, see Giraud - Mews, “Liber” and Giraud, Per verba magistri, 193–211.

54 On status in the individuum-theory see LNPS 518.13–27: “Et cum dicunt idem de pluribus praedicari uel inesse aliquibus, tale est, ac si aperte diceretur: quaedam in aliqua conuenire natura, idest similia esse ut in eo quod corpora sunt uel animalia. Et iuxta hanc, ut diximus, sententiam eandem rem uniuersalem et particularem esse concedunt, diuersis tamen respectibus; uniuersalem quidem in eo quod cum pluribus communitatem habet, particularem secundum hoc quod a ceteris rebus diuersa est. Dicunt enim singulas substantias ita in propriae suae essentiae discretione diuersas esse, ut nullo modo haec substantia sit eadem cum illa, etiamsi substantiae
materiae penitus formis careret, quod tale secundum illos praedicari de pluribus, ac si dicatur: aliquis status est, participatione cuius multae sunt conuenientes, praedicari de uno solo, ac si dicatur, aliquis status est, participatione cuius multae sunt non conuenientes.” *P17*, MS Paris, BnF, lat. 3237, ff.123vb, 125va quoted above, especially: “Status autem appello uel res ex materia et formis constitutas uel passiones, id est constitutiones quae in rebus sunt constitutis, uel partes quae ipsas res constituant.” See also Wciórka, “Is Socrates a Universal?,” 63–68.

55 Consequently, any *status* seems to be the extramental and extralinguistic correlate of a proper or common noun or of a verb phrase made up of the verb ‘to be’ followed by a proper or common noun. Because of that, *status* do not correspond to contemporary “states of affairs” meant as objective counterparts of propositional attitudes. A “state of affair” would rather correspond to Abelard’s *dictum*, that is, what is said by a proposition. See Cesalli, “States of Affairs,” and Tweedale, *Abailard on Universals*, 282–304.

56 See *QG* §§27, 29: “Quod qualiter sit, per diversas attentiones discernitur. Nullam uim tamen faciunt in rerum essentia attentiones hominum. Nullius enim attentio confert ipsis rebus uel esse quod non sunt, uel non esse quod sunt. Si quis ergo Socratem attendat tamquam Socratem, idest in omni proprietate Socratis, inueniet eum cum nullo conuenientem, potius ab omnibus differentem per socratitatem quae in illo solo reperitur et in alius esse non potest, uel eadem uel consimilis, cum nihil sit consimile Socrati secundum statum Socratis; et sic Socrates, secundum hunc differentem statum, est indiviuidum. Vnde conuenienter datur sibi hoc uocabulum quod est ‘Socrates,’ quod significat eum secundum talem statum. […] Sed si simpliciter attendatur Socrates non ut Socrates, idest non in omni proprietate Socratis, sed in quadam, scilicet in eo quod est animal rationale mortale, iam secundum hunc statum est differens et indifferens; differens a qualibet alia re existente, hoc modo quo ipse Socrates nec secundum statum hominis nec secundum aliquem alium est essentialiter aliquod aliorum. Item, indifferens est, idest consimilis cum quibusdam, scilicet cum Platone et cum aliis individuis hominis, in eo quod in uno quoque eorum est animal rationale mortale.” See also *GS* §50, quoted above, n. 29.

57 See *LI* 19.21–20.14, esp. 20.7–14: “Statum autem hominis ipsum esse hominem, quod non est res, uocamus, quod etiam diximus communem causam impositionis nominis ad singulos, secundum quod ipsi ad inuicem conueniunt. Saepe autem causae nomine ea quoque quae res aliqua non sunt appellamus, ut cum dicitur: Verberatus est, quia non uult ad forum. Non uult ad forum, quod ut causa ponitur, nulla est essentia. Statum quoque hominis res ipsas in [in is Geyer's emendation for the MS non] natura hominis statutas possumus appellare, quorum communem similitudinem ille concepit, qui uocabulum imposuit.” On the very last sentence, see below.

See Marenbon, “Universals,” 46–47.

See above, n. 57.

Quoted above, n. 54. One possible source is Boethius, *top. diff.*, IV, 7 (79.1–82.17); Stump’s translation, 83–87.


Quoted above, n. 57; translated in Marenbon, “Universals,” 46.


See *LNPS* 518.24–26, quoted above, n. 54.


69 See *IL* 20.28–36.


72 See *IL* 21.18–26 and *IL Per.*, I, 25–35 (30.133–33.196).

73 *IL Per.*, I, 110 (58.785-794): “Et saepe in eadem imagine diuersae attentiones uariant intellectus, ueluti si eam simpliciter ad naturam qualitatis excogitandum instituam uel ad naturam etiam albedinis. Videns enim lignum diuersa de eo per rationem attendo, quia modo ipsum in eo quod lignum est excogito, modo in eo simpliciter quod corpus, modo in eo quod quercus est uel ficus. Similiter eadem imagine ante mentis oculos constituta ipsam et qualitatis et albedinis naturam considero et licet sit eadem imago, plures sunt de ea concipiendi modi, modo in eo quod qualitas est, modo in eo quoque quod est album.”

74 In Abelard’s terminology, these understandings are all “sound,” *sani*, and “simple,” *simplices* (however, when I consider *rational mortal animal* rather than *man*, my understanding is not simple but composite). On sound vs empty understandings, see *IL Per.*, I, 73–76 (44.447–45.475), 97 (54.676–683); *int.* §§56–59; on simple vs composite understandings, *IL Per.*, I, 94 (52.621–53.643); *int.* §§31–45.

75 See *int.* §5: “Intellectus uero, hoc est ipsa animi excogitatio, nec corporei exercitio indiget instrumenti quo uidelicet ad excogitandum utatur, nec etiam uirtute aliquae existentis quam excogitetur, cum aeque scilicet et existentem et non existentem rem, siue corporalem siue incorporalem, animus sibi per intellectum conficiat, uel preteritorum scilicet reminiscendo uel futura prouidendo, uel ea etiam nonnumquam configando que nunquam esse contingit, utpote centaurum, chimeram, hircoceruum, sirenes, et alia multa.” Such examples are repeated in *int.* §94 and *IL Per.*, I, 20 (29.101–102, quoted above n. 68).

76 Abelard’s example is, in fact, *homo rudibilis* (“man who can bray”), but he also mentions *lapis risibilis* in *IL Per.*, I, 20 (29.102) and *lapis rationalis* in *int.* §49. In all these examples, a certain species has been joined with the *differentia* or *proprium* pertaining to another species; see *IL Per.*, I, 117 (60.827–834): “Volumus insuper in ‘homo rudibilis’ quandam intellectus partem ex coniunctione constructionis nasci, qua uidelicet, cum et hominem et rudibilitatem attendimus, insuper ea in unam substantiam coniungimus, quae coniunctio cassat intellectum. Tres itaque sunt attentiones, duae ad percipienda uera quae ad actiones pertinent, tertia ad
coniungenda illa duo in unum, quod adiectui et substantiui iunctura facit. Ex iunctura itaque totius orationis una est attentio quae est tertia pars intellectus.”

Sound and empty understandings are not the same as true and false understandings: LI Per. I, 98 (54.684–687); int. §§56–60. On attentio with respect to truth and falsity see LI Per. I, 107–108 (57.750–58.777).

See LI Per. I, 118 (60.834–842), with the example of the conjunction ‘if,’ and Rosier-Catach, “Discussions,” 23–24.

Cf. above.

However, cf. n. 3 above; Wciórka, “Is Socrates a Universal?,” 62.


“Alii uero sunt qui non solum collectos homines species dicunt, uerum etiam singulos in eo quod homines sunt, et cum dicunt rem illam quae Socrates est, praedicari de pluribus, figuratiue accipiunt, ac si dicerent: plura cum eo idem esse, idest conuenire, uel ipsum cum pluribus.” LNPS 518.13–27, quoted above, n. 54.

See Wciórka, “Is Socrates a Universal?,” on this strategy.

Other examples are: [is] ‘predicated of one only’, [is] ‘an individual/species/genus/universal.’

QG §§42–43: “Item opponitur. Cum Socrates secundum statum animalis sit genus, praedicatur de pluribus, quod est omnis generis; et item, cum Socrates secundum statum Socratis sit indiuiduum, praedicatur de uno solo, auctoritate Porphyrii, et ita non praedicatur de multis. Quodsi Socrates praedicatur de multis et non praedicatur de multis, uerum etiam singulos in eo quod homines sunt, et cum dicunt rem illam quae Socrates est, praedicari de pluribus, figuratiue accipiunt, ac si dicerent: plura cum eo idem esse, idest conuenire, uel ipsum cum pluribus.” LNPS 518.13–27, quoted above, n. 54.

87 On all this, see especially Wilks, “Peter Abelard.” See also King, “Metaphysics,” 89–92; Brower, “Trinity,” 226–250; Arlig, A Study, 180–194; Marenbon, “Changing Thoughts.”

88 Difference in definition is said to be the same as difference in property in TSch II, 97 (455.1440–1444). However, the two are listed separately in TChr III, 154–158 (252.1875–254.1926) and what follows only concerns difference in property.

89 See especially TChr III, 140–141 (248.1707–1739). It should be noted that the statue/stone example (also framed as comparisons with a bronze statue and a waxen image) is simply an example that Abelard uses for addressing semantic, Trinitarian and ethical problems (such as the identity of vox and sermo; the identity of the Persons of the Trinity; the fact that a punishment is an evil and a good thing at the same time), rather than something in which he is directly interested as such.

90 See above.


92 See, for instance, TChr IV, 90 (308.1385–309.1394): “Et quemadmodum ibi quod est materia est id quod est materiatum ex ea, utpote cera ipsa est cerea imago, uel e conuerso, nec tamen ideo ipsa materia est materiata ex se, uel ipsum materiatum est materia sui, ita et hic id quod Pater est id quod est Filius et e conuerso; nec tamen Pater est Filius, uel e conuerso. Ibi quippe substantiae praedicatio fit, cum uidelicet dicitur: est id quod est materiatum, uel quod est Filius; hic uero proprietatis, cum dicitur: est materiata, uel est Filius. Substantia uero eadem est, proprietates uero impermixtae sunt” and Wilks, “Peter Abelard,” 369–384. As shown by Wilks (ibi, 372, n. 25), Abelard employs at least three kinds of “essential-predication locutions,” that is, locutions that involve essential but not adjacent predication or, as Wilks states, locution that “relate the thing corresponding to the subject term with the thing, not the property, corresponding to the predicated term” (ibi, 378): (i) the id quod-phrase (“est id quod est bonus”), (ii) the res-phrase (“est bona res”), and (iii) the neuter inflection (“est bonum”).

93 Moreover, it cannot be inferred from “the individual is that which is universal” (which is true) that “the individual is predicated of many” (which is false).

94 See texts on n. 25.

95 See LI 16.2–18; cf. also LI 15.36–16.2.
As an anonymous referee put it, the *individuum*-theory seems to be caught between a rock and a hard place with respect to contemporary criteria of parsimony and explanatory power. On the one hand, it looks like the individual thing is asked to do too much explanatory work — unless the *status* of things become more and more thing-like in order to serve as adequate truth-makers. But then, on the other hand, these quasi-thing-like *status* appear to violate the consideration of parsimony that led the *individuum*-theorist toward grounding universality on individuals in the first place.

See arguments against the *individuum*-theory in *LI* 15.23–16.18; *LNPS* 518.28–521.20; *GS* §§ 51–73; *QG* §§ 36–51; *P17* ff. 123vb–124rb, 125va–126ra.

See above, n. 20.

Spade, *Five texts*, xiv compares the *individuum*-theory to the view of Henry of Harclay over universals, as criticised by Ockham.

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND ABBREVIATIONS

Primary Sources


Logica 'Nostrorum Petitioni Sociorum.' In Peter Abaelards Philosophische Schriften. Edited by Bernhard Geyer. Münster: Aschendorff, 1933. [LNPS]


—. Logica 'Ingredientibus.' In Peter Abaelards Philosophische Schriften. Edited by Bernhard Geyer. Münster: Aschendorff, 1919–1927. [LI]


Secondary Sources


—. “Penser le commun. Le problème de l’universalité métaphysique aux XIe et XIIe siècles.” In Arts du langage, 373–392. [“Penser le commun”]


—. “Metaphysics.” In The Cambridge Companion to Abelard, 65–125. [“Metaphysics”]


—. “Logic at the Turn of the Twelfth Century: a synthesis.” In Arts du langage, 181–217. [“Synthesis”]


