The deliberative speech known by us as *On Organization* (Περὶ συντάξεως) focuses on financial organization and political economy more than any other speech in the Demosthenic corpus. The assembly is to decide the fate of an unspecified sum of money (1). The speaker, who later identifies himself as Demosthenes (12), proposes that instead of distributing the money as theoric subsidies, all citizens can instead be satisfied by embarking upon a scheme of τοῦ συνταχθῆναι καὶ παρασκευασθῆναι τὰ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ‘organization and equipment for war’ (3). This scheme will distribute revenues amongst all as pay for useful service (1–5, 9). The speaker urges that this must be done if the city is once again to act as the arbiter of Greek affairs, and if the Athenian demos itself is to break the power of self-interested orators and resume its proper control of the polis (13–36).

The ancient commentators saw nothing amiss in all this. Our earliest, Didymus, in the first century B.C. (*Dem*. 13.14–15.10), treats the speech as authentic and attests to this opinion among earlier, unnamed writers by insisting that, contrary to some (ἔνιοι), the speech should not be classed as a Philippic (*Dem*. 13.17–30).¹ His contemporary, Dionysius of Halicarnassus does not mention the speech in either of his two letters to Ammaeus, but this may be because the difficulty of dating it meant the speech was not germane to his task of showing that Demosthenes’ speeches were too early to have been influenced by Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. Centuries later, Harpocrates (s.v. ὁ πισθόδομος *inter alia*) and Libanius (*Hyp*. [Dem.] 13) treat it as genuine.

Nevertheless, modern scholars have traditionally rejected ancient opinion and regarded the speech as spurious. It has been variously attributed to a later editor or compiler. Yet in more recent years the luck of 13 has changed. A majority of scholars now treat it as authentic thanks, in part, to the renewed case for authenticity made by Jeremy Trevett. For many, it

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would seem, the status of *On Organization* has at last been settled. It must be said that the good Demosthenic style and vocabulary of the speech is cause for confidence. Defenders of speech 13 have also made short work of several objections raised against the speech on grounds of content. I agree with Trevett (p.188) that the stylistic fidelity of speech 13 would be difficult to achieve from scratch – difficult, but not impossible keeping in mind the achievements of the Second Sophistic. My purpose is to point out that there are still serious problems with the substance of the speech, some of them hitherto overlooked, which must collectively dispel any notion of 13 as an original work of Demosthenes. The time has come to update the argument.

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4 See Trevett (n.3), 186–8 with literature cited; Usher (n.3), at 216. See D.F. McCabe, *The Prose-Rhythm of Demosthenes* (New York, 1981), 69–74 for stylistic analysis of Speech 13. The tribrach is avoided as much as possible, (‘Blass’ Law’), on which see Sealey (n.2, 1993), 230–32. Usher (n.3) at 215 notes, however, the exceptional number of words and expressions found in 13 that do not appear in any genuine speech.
for the prosecution, but also to consider if the rejection of *On Organization* as non-Demosthenic necessarily condemns it to exist without any precise historical context.

**THE CASE AGAINST**

The most striking feature of the speech is the large amount of material that appears in other speeches. Demosthenes did sometimes reuse sections of one speech in another (for example, cf. 23.207–9 and 3.25–6, 22.47–78 and 24.160–86), but rarely to this extent, and never from as many as five other speeches (Speeches 2, 3, 15, 19, 23). Only one of these other speeches (Dem. 23) is dated earlier than the likeliest date for 13, if we were to assume that the latter was

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5 28% of the lines in the OCT of *On Organization* are wholly or largely found elsewhere, bettered only by *On the Chersonese* (Dem.8, 31%) and the *Fourth Philippic* (Dem.10, 34%): 8.38–51 = 10.11–27, 8.52–67 = 10.55–70, 10.12–13 = 6.17–18. However, Dem.10 is generally, and I believe correctly, regarded as an unfinished version of the material eventually delivered as Dem.8, see G. Daitz, ‘The Relationship of the *de Chersoneso* and the *Philippica Quarta* of Demosthenes’, *CPh* 52.3 (1957), 145–62. The passages of 13 found elsewhere are as follows: 13.20 = 2.29; 13.21 = 23.196, 3.23; 13.22–4 = 23.198–200; 13.25 = 3.32; 13.26 = 3.24, 15.35; 13.27 = 3.28; 13.28–9 = 3.25–6, 23.207; 13.28 = 3.29; 13.30 = 3.29, 23.208, 19.275; 13.31 = 3.30–1. Some other passages bear a noticeable similarity: 13.3–5, 9 ≈ 3.34–36 (cf. 1.19–20); 13.19–20 ≈ 23.210. Moreover, the contrast between rich and poor regarding the fund (13.1–2) is reminiscent of the longer discussion in 10.35–46. The description of the treatment of the allies and the behaviour of Athenian generals (13.7) might owe something to Isocrates (8.42–6, 50, 115, 134 cf. 15.116–24 on Timotheus’ positive behaviour). See also Schaefer’s list of correspondences (n.2), at 92 n.2.
in fact a genuine speech (351/0–350/49). The sharing of so much material can be explained in two ways. Either Demosthenes re-used the content of 13 in an exceptional number of later speeches to the point where we must see the speech as the seminal work in the development of many of his arguments, or its content was gathered from the other speeches by a later writer in a rather excessive effort to appear Demosthenic. The latter is the simpler explanation. The writer has, however, tried to avoid the impression that he has just copied out all the passages verbatim by altering and rearranged them, and by splicing together material from multiple speeches at 13.26–30. Sometimes the debt to other speeches is less overt, as when arguments are adopted but expressed in different terms. The writer clearly exercised discrimination and care in terms of both material and style.

The display of so much literary skill in On Organization is at odds with the weakness of its argument. The pretext for the speech is curiously vague: περὶ μὲν τοῦ παρόντος ἀργυρίου καὶ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐκκλησίας ποιεῖσθ᾽ 'in dealing with the sum of money under discussion and the other matters referred to this assembly' (1). Only with time does the matter under debate become clear: whether this money should go to the Theoric Fund (ἑορτή 13.2, τοῖν δύο ἐν δ' ὀβολοῖν 13.10). The speaker then proceeds to advocate a comprehensive scheme of pay for service, before shifting at 12 to a general critique of the contemporary behaviour of the demos and its leaders. This runs for the rest of the speech. Even if such

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6 See below, pp.8–11.

7 Croiset (n.3), at 73 suggests that Demosthenes did write the speech but put it to one side, embellishing it with successful passages over time but never actually delivering it. One wonders if the speech without the borrowed passages was really worth saving and what the good of borrowing so much would have been.

8 Translations modified from the Loeb edition. The Greek is that of the OCT edition.
generalized admonishment was not uncommon, it is perhaps hard to imagine the assembly patiently enduring this dressing-down from someone who begs indulgence for his speech because he is not among the most prominent ὀητορείς (18). It is in this second, longer, critical part of the speech that all the mirrored passages appear, giving the impression that the rest of the speech is a setting designed for their display. Insufficient attention was paid to the trimming of 3.27, for the statement that Athenians ἐρημίας ἐπειλημμένοι ‘have a clear field’ at 13.27 lacks the clarification provided in the original: τῶν δ’ ἄλλων οὐδενός ὀντος ἀξιόχρεω περὶ τῶν πρωτείων ἡμῖν ἀντιτάξασθαι ‘no other city is fit to dispute the supremacy with us’. Without this explanation, the phrase ἐρημίας ἐπειλημμένοι is rendered obscure.10

9 See the comments of Schaefer (n.2), at 91 to this effect.

10 Trevett (n.3), 183–5 tries to show that the lack of detail at 13.27 is not problematic because ἐρημίας ἐπειλημμένοι there (and perhaps at 3.27 as well) does not mean ‘have a clear field’ as the Loeb has it, but ‘we who have reached such a state of destitution’. However, ἐρημίας at 3.27 can more easily be translated to carry some sense of ‘isolation’ in light of the explanation that Sparta and Thebes are preoccupied and no other state has the necessary power, see MacDowell (n.3), at 227 n.64. Moreover, to declare that Athens is ‘destitute’ rather pre-empts the answer to the question being posed at 13.27 of whether the city has successfully emulated its ancestors. The other arguments used against 13, which point to changes made in borrowed passages, should be abandoned. The argument of Schaefer (n.2), 93–4 that 13 is spurious because its historical details are inventions based on genuine references in other speeches, begs the question. I see no reason why Demosthenes could not have made the historically incorrect alteration of ‘citizenship’ to ‘immunity’ (13.24; cf. 23.200) or added Cimon as one of those great men who had a modest home (13.29; cf. 23.209), even though
writer seems to have been more attached to style and rhetorical ornamentation through choice passages than to argumentative clarity.

This assessment is strengthened by problems with the factual premises of the speech. The most plausible interpretation of 13.1 – that the assembly is debating the appropriate use of surplus money (which is presumed to be going to the theoric fund, cf. 2, 10)\textsuperscript{11} – is at odds with the likelihood that the direction of all surplus money into the theoric fund was the consequence of a νόμος, and consequently that changing the arrangement was not within the power of the assembly but of the νομοθέται.\textsuperscript{12} The writer seems reluctant to provide specifics where we would expect them: not only are the details of the meeting kept vague, but he also declines to explain how his scheme of organization will be achieved, saying that this has been done at a previous meeting (9–10). The scheme is, however, presented as new at 13.3, which leads the reader to suspect that further discussion was avoided because the writer, living after the 350s, had no idea how such a scheme could have been implemented in practice.

Theopompus (\textit{FGrHist} 115 F89) tells us that Cimon was able to hold large dinners at home for his fellow citizens. The former change was necessary because the contrast in Dem. 23 between a grant of inviolability and the mere grant of citizenship would not make sense in 13 and so was replaced with the distinction between citizenship and mere immunity.

\textsuperscript{11} Trevett (n.3), 190–2. Our writer may have invented a pretext which will allow him to discuss the Theoric Fund in a deliberative context.

\textsuperscript{12} According to the plausible reconstruction of theoric funding by Hansen (n.3), 240–6, there was one νόμος for its annual allocation in the μερισμός, the repeal of which was punishable by death (Lib. \textit{Hyp}. Dem.1), and a νόμος directing the annual surplus to the fund in peacetime ([Dem.] 59.4).
The indications of date are also contradictory. On the one hand, a reference to decrees passed against ‘the accursed Megarians’ for using the sacred ὀργάς located on the border with Attica (13.32–3) is consistent with a date of composition in the late 350s.13 The date may be narrowed down to the time between late 352/early 351, and sometime in the archon year 350/49: one of the decrees mentioned may have survived (IG II² 204 = RO 58). The decree dates to Poseideon 352/1 and mentions an earlier decree (lines 54–5). Our writer complains that the decrees have not yet been acted upon, while fragments of Philochorus and Androtion state that action on the question of the ὀργάς was taken sometime in 350/49 (cf. Dem. 3.20).14

13 The overthrow of the Rhodian democracy, which probably occurred during the Social War S. Hornblower, Mausolus (Oxford, 1982), 127 is mentioned ([Dem.] 13.8 cf. 15.3–4, 19).
14 Didymus (Dem.) using Philochorus (FGrHist 328 F155 = Dem. 13.40–58) and Androtion (FGrHist 324 F30 = Dem. 14.35–49) dates 13 to after 349/8, overlooking the fact that Demosthenes complains of action having not yet been taken, meaning that the speech ought to date to 350/49 or before. The two Atthidographers show the resolutions of IG II² 204 being put into practice. For Rhodes and Osborne (n.2), 277–9, the lag between decision and action which Demosthenes criticizes at 13.32–3 (if a genuine chronological marker at all) is to be placed after the passage of IG II² 204 and may be attributed to extended deliberation by the commission or a subsequent decision to involve the Megarians. This produced a delay, albeit not a great one, which Demosthenes exaggerates. If we instead suppose, like R. Lane Fox, ‘Demosthenes, Dionysius, and the Dating of Six Early Speeches’, C&M 48 (1997), 167–203, at 191–5 that Demosthenes is referring to other, non-extant decrees, then our range of dates for the beginning of the Megarian dispute may go back to 353/2 (see previous note) or forward to 351/0. It is certainly difficult to see IG II² 204 as expressing ἀπέχθεια ‘hostility’ towards the Megarians, as Demosthenes characterizes the decrees he talks of, when it does not mention the
While we may suspect that a later writer is unlikely to have added obscure period references like that to Megara, we cannot rule out the possibility that he had good sources to hand or some otherwise lost Demosthenic material.

The presence of other chronological markers, meanwhile, does not suit a genuine composition of the late 350s. The speech refers to allied contributions, garrisons in allied territory, and to the extortion of wealth from the allies by Athenian generals and their mercenaries (13.4–6). These details seem more appropriate to the Social War (357–355) and the few years leading up to it, when Athens’ naval confederacy became increasingly oppressive. Nor would we expect the total absence of Philip II in a speech of the late 350s. Philip’s absence is significant, and we shall return to it shortly.  

Megarians at all. However, while hostile decrees may well have preceded or even succeeded IG II² 204, the absence of hostility in 204 may be a poor basis for thinking that it is not one of those decrees mentioned in Speech 13 if Demosthenes has misrepresented the tenor of recent legislation concerning Megara in order to back up his argument that the Athenians do not follow hostile declarations with military action. The decree does not decisively date the speech to 352/1 or after, but it makes it more likely. It is tempting to agree with J.M. Fossey, ‘A Demosthenic Doublet (XIII, 22–24 and XXIII, 198–200)’, LCM 11 (1986), 77–80, at 78 that the absence of καὶ λυσιτελούντως αὑτοῖς ἐδίδοσαν (23.199) from 13.23 is due to haplography on the part of the writer of 13 (here by skipping to the immediately succeeding κακί), and is therefore additional evidence that Speech 13 was written after Against Aristocrates was delivered in 352/1 (Dion. Hal. Ad Amm. 1.4).

Speech 13 also makes undatable references to the exile of the Phliasians (32), and a burglary of the Opisthodomos which occurred ‘a day or two ago’ (14, which I do not associate with the Opisthodomos arson referred to at Dem. 24.136).
Eubulus’ financial administration (13.28, 30), pre-dating the only example of comparable rhetoric in the Third Olynthiac in 349/8 (3.29–30), is at odds with Demosthenes’ general trajectory of increasing policy disagreement with Eubulus. Demosthenes began by advocating intervention (Dem.15) and then criticized Eubulus’ foreign policy outright (23.201, 4.1), just as he then made guarded criticisms of the theoric fund in the First Olynthiac (1.19–20) before delivering the full-throated denunciation of the Third Olynthiac. The force of the attack made in the Third Olynthiac (3.29–30 cf. 19.208–9) on Athens’ leaders using a comparison between public and private buildings, is now blunted by the insertion of a qualification (here underlined):

νῦν δ’, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, δημοσία μὲν ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν τὰς ὀδοὺς ἀγατὰ κατασκευάζουσα καὶ κρήνας καὶ κοινάματα καὶ λήψους (καὶ οὐ τοῖς εἰσηγησαμένοις ταῦτα ἐπιτιμῶ, πολλοὺς γε καὶ δέω, ἀλλὰ ὑμῖν, εἰ ταῦθ’ ἵκανα ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ὑπολαμβάνετ’ εἶναι), ἵδια δ’ οἱ τῶν κοινῶν ἐπί τῷ γεγενημένῳ οἱ μὲν τῶν δημοσίων οἰκοδομήμάτων σεμνότέρας τὰς ὕδατας ἀοίδας κατεσκευάσκασιν, οὐ μόνον τῶν πολλῶν ὑπερηφανωτέρας τούτων δὲ αἰτιῶν ἄπαντων, ότι τότε μὲν ὁ δῆμος δεσπότης ἦν καὶ κύριος ἄπαντων, καὶ ἀγαπητὸν ἦν παρ’ ἐκείνου τῶν άλλων ἐκάστῳ καὶ τιμῆς καὶ ἀρχῆς καὶ ἀγαθοῦ τινός μεταλαμβάνειν, νῦν δὲ τούναντίον κύριοι μὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν σύτοι. ([Dem.] 13.30–1)

But today, men of Athens, while our public works are confined to the provision of roads and fountains, whitewash and frippery (and I do not blame those who introduced these things, far from it, but you, if you imagine that these are all that is required of you), private individuals, who control any of the public funds, have some of them reared public houses not merely finer
than the majority, but more stately than our public edifices...The cause of all this change is that then the people controlled and dispensed everything, and the rest were well content to accept at their hand honour and authority and reward; but now, on the contrary, the φήτορες hold the purse-strings and manage everything.

The disclaimer seems to reflect a later opinion, at odds with Demosthenes’ rhetoric in the early 340s, that the building projects of Eubulus’ time were actually of great importance (cf. Din.1.96). Historical hindsight also seems to inform 13 at the point where ‘Demosthenes’ speaks of himself in the third person from the point of view of his critics:

ήδη δέ τις εἶπεν ὡς ἀνδρεξ Αθηναῖοι που λέγων...’τί δ’ ἦμιν ἀπὸ τῶν Δημοσθένους λόγων ἅγαθον γέγονεν; παρελθὼν ἡμῶν, ὀπόταν αὐτῷ δόξῃ, ἐνέπλησε τὰ ὡτα λόγων, καὶ διέσυρε τὰ παρόντα, καὶ τοὺς προγόνους ἐπίνεσεν, καὶ μετεωρίσας καὶ φυσήσας ἡμᾶς κατέβη. ([Dem.] 13.12)

It has been before now remarked, men of Athens, by some speaker... ‘What good have we ever got from the speeches of Demosthenes? He comes before us, whenever he thinks fit, he fills our ears with words, denounces the present state of things, lauds our ancestors, and then he sits back down after raising our hopes and inflating our pride.’

Demosthenes never characterizes his rhetoric so precisely and the description seems more suited to Demosthenes the later statesman (cf. 8.73) than Demosthenes the up-and-coming speaker. Moreover, it conflicts with his plea, noted above, that the audience not object to the mismatch between his status and the ambition of the speech (18).
Even more worrying than the confused evidence of date is the cluster of overlooked errors in the description of the comprehensive pay scheme (ἡ σύνταξις ἁπάντων) (13.3–5, 9). They suggest that the writer has condensed, and misunderstood, a passage in the Third Olynthiac (3.34–6). The following is the scheme as it appears in On Organization:

καὶ τὰ μὲν προσιόντα τῇ πόλει πάντα, καὶ ἃ νῦν ἐκ τῶν ἱδίων παραναλίσκετε εἰς οὐδὲν δέον καὶ ὅσ᾽ ἐκ τῶν συμμάχων ὑπάρχει, λαμβάνειν ὑμᾶς φημὶ χρῆναι τὸ ἴσον ἐκαστον, τοὺς μὲν ἐν ἠλικία στρατιωτικὸν, τοὺς δ᾽ ὑπὲρ τὸν κατάλογον ἔξεταστικὸν ἢ ὅπως ἄν τις ὀνομάσαι τούτο, στρατεύεσθαι δ᾽ αὐτοὺς καὶ μηδενὶ τούτου παραχωρεῖν… ([Dem.] 13.4)

All the revenues of the polis, including those collected from you which are being wasted on unnecessary objects, and the contributions of your allies, must be shared by each citizen equally, as pay by those of military age and as inspectors’ fees, or whatever you like to call it, by those beyond the age-limit; and you must serve in person and not resign that duty to others…

There are three major differences between what appears in 13 and what appears in the Third Olynthiac. First, our writer states that all the revenue of the polis will be used (τὰ μὲν προσιόντα τῇ πόλει πάντα), which is obviously impossible. Second, he wrongly assumes that Athens had unilateral spending control over allied contributions as part of this revenue (καὶ ὅσ᾽ ἐκ τῶν συμμάχων ὑπάρχει). Third, he expresses the view that money should be

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16 The ἔξετασται were auditors or inspectors of troops, see Aeschin. 1.113, 2.177.
distributed equally (λαμβάνειν ύμας φημί χρῆναι τὸ ἴσον ἕκαστον cf. 19) instead of ‘equitably’ (cf. 2.31, 3.34). In this way, ‘abundance (εὐπορία) may be provided for all’ (9). It is at the very least unlikely that Demosthenes (or any ῥήτωρ) could have written, much less delivered, anything like this proposal. It is even more ambitious than that of Xenophon in Ways and Means and so completely unlike the cautious financial counsel Demosthenes gives in other speeches of the late 350s, Against Leptines (Dem. 20) and On the Symmories (Dem. 14).

Defenders of 13 have never fully explained why it contains so much material found elsewhere, and prefer to downplay the inadequacies in its argument. The other problems I have raised, in particular the distorted description of the pay scheme, make it even more difficult to believe that Demosthenes could have written several passages in 13 which he thought were good enough to reuse later on, while spending so little time on the fundamentals of argument and fact. The historical slips and self-characterization at 13.12, moreover, best suit a writer who lacked first-hand experience of Athens in the mid-fourth century but who was still familiar with Demosthenes’ speeches from the 340s. The speech has so many serious problems that it is almost impossible to believe Demosthenes was responsible for it.

EXPLAINING SPEECH 13

Having established what On Organization is not, can we say what it is? We can start by observing that our writer’s favourite rhetoric was the rhetoric of political economy, the possibilities of organization (ἡ σύνταξις), and popular power, all of which are major themes

17 It cannot, as such, be used as it is by Cawkwell (n.3, 1963), at 48 n.9 to provide a date by which the law directing surplus revenues into the Theoric Fund was in operation, based on the wider activities of the board being referenced at 13.30. Nor can the speech be treated as a genuine piece of fourth-century Athenian oratory written by someone other than Demosthenes.
in undoubtedly genuine speeches of Demosthenes. It is hardly surprising that the writer drew on the *Third Olynthiac* most of all. It is there that Demosthenes gives the clearest exhibition of his righteous indignation against the Athenians and their ὁρίτορες when it comes to the conduct of politics and finance. It seems our writer’s imagination was fired by the pay scheme that appears at the very end of that speech, and he decided to produce a speech in which that scheme is introduced for the first time. Unfortunately, his inability or lack of interest in describing exactly how the organization will be achieved meant that he had to posit a still earlier speech where the real nitty-gritty was dealt with.\(^{18}\)

The passages shared between the *Third Olynthiac* and *Against Aristocrates*, in turn, probably led our writer to use the latter speech as his second main influence. So much of the borrowed material comes from these two speeches that the writer probably had texts of these speeches to hand. By contrast, the tiny snippets we get from other speeches, and the fixation on ‘organization’, which is strongly reminiscent of Speech 14, *On the Symmories*, are more likely to have come from the writer’s memory before being double-checked in the manuscripts.

\(^{18}\) The idea of an earlier, non-extant speech may have come from the *First Olynthiac* (1.20), since Demosthenes summarizes his proposals in a way that suggests the audience is already familiar with their substance: ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι στρατιῶτας δεῖν κατασκευασθῆναι καὶ ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι στρατιωτικὰ καὶ μίαν σύνταξιν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν τοῦ τε λαμβάνειν καὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν τὰ δέοντα, ύμεῖς δ᾽ οὕτω πως ἀνευ πραγμάτων λαμβάνειν εἰς τὰς ἑορτὰς ‘only it is my opinion that we must provide soldiers and that there must be one uniform system of pay in return for service. Your opinion, however, is that you should, without any trouble, just appropriate the money for your festivals’.
Next, as noted already, the speech may not be utterly devoid of material written by Demosthenes. There is a contrast between our writer’s lack of attention to the feasibility of the comprehensive pay scheme he proposes and his obscure references to the dispute over the sacred orgas, the exile of the Phliasians, and the burglary of the Opisthodomos. The explanation may be that these references come not just from an Atthidographer or some other historical work, but from otherwise lost Demosthenic material from the 350s. Access to now lost material, along with the heavy use of material from extant speeches, would help to explain 13’s accomplished stylistic mimicry. A strict contrast between ‘authenticity’ and ‘spuriousness’, which features in many discussions of 13, would in a sense be a false choice.

Why was 13 written? It is beyond doubt that we are not dealing with a mere rhetorical exercise. The style and content of the speech, especially the obscure chronological signpost of the ὀργάς dispute, are not what we (or for that matter, successive ancient scholars) associate with that sort of work. Nor is it what we would expect of an exercise by Demosthenes himself that was posthumously circulated by an editor. It is also hard to imagine that an exercise would have been disseminated widely enough to survive, let alone become part of the standard corpus of Demosthenes. The speech is the work of a rhetorical expert. His motives may have been pious. Finding some fragmentary writings of Demosthenes, he decided to ‘restore’ the speech from which they came. This scenario has the advantage of explaining what would otherwise be an unusual choice of chronological setting and subject matter. On the other hand, a subversive interpretation might be preferred: in light of the way that the unflattering rhetorical characterization of Demosthenes at 13.12 is borne out by the rest of the speech, could 13 instead be a learned and hostile parody of his rhetoric?

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19 See n.15.
The first scenario does not seem quite right, and the second simply wrong, when we consider that feature of 13 which writers in antiquity stressed: the absence of Philip. His absence cannot be explained by the ‘dramatic’ date of 352/1–350/49: Athenian troops had been sent to block Philip at Thermopylae in the summer of 352, and in 352/1 Demosthenes probably delivered the First Philippic after Philip had interfered in Euboea and made a raid on Marathon (4.34). In Against Aristocrates (352/1) he is ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μᾶλιστα δοκῶν νῦν ἡμῖν ἐχθρὸς εἶναι ‘now accounted our very worst enemy’ (23.121). The alternate possibility, raised by the scholiast (13.1), is that Philip is absent because the speech dates from 353/2 and so is closer in date to On the Symmories (354/3) than the First Philippic. However a date of 354/3 or 353/2 looks too early in light of our evidence associating the dispute over the Megarian ὀργάς with the years 352/1–350/1. Moreover, even if Philip was not yet generally considered a strategic threat in 354/3–353/2, we might have expected the writer to at least make mention of him since he had been Athens’ enemy since 357. The speech actually suggests that Athens faces no great strategic threat (underlined):

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21 Dem. 19.84; Diod. Sic. 16.38.2; Just. Epit. 8.2.8–12.

22 On the date of the First Philippic, see the comprehensive treatment of Karvounis (n.2), 223–32. The traditional date of early summer 351 seems the likeliest.

23 Thus, Cawkwell (n.3), at 48 n.9. It would seem that in these early years, Demosthenes did not fully appreciate the threat of Philip, see T.T.B. Ryder, ‘Demosthenes and Philip II’, in I. Worthington (ed.), Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator (London, 2000), 58–72, at 45–9.

24 See pp.8–9.
If you are convinced that now is the opportunity for these reforms, all things will be ready when the need of them arrives, but if you pass over the opportunity as unsuitable, then, just when you want to use them, you will be compelled to begin your preparations.

I submit that the absence of Philip is a case of deliberate avoidance. Even the most indirect reference to him (underlined) has been left out of the speech at 26, which is otherwise copied verbatim from the Third Olynthiac (3.24):

They accumulated more than ten thousand talents on the acropolis, the then king of Macedonia was their subject, just as a barbarian ought to be subject to Greeks, and they set up many honourable trophies for victory on land and sea…

It appears our writer has eschewed Philip in favour of Demosthenes’ earlier rhetoric, despite including material which dates the speech to the time of Philip’s emergence on Demosthenes’ radar (352/1–350/1) and despite using material from a speech like the Third Olynthiac which
is focused on the threat of Philip. This choice makes it unlikely that speech 13 is a ‘restoration’
or a parody. In both cases we would expect some mention of Philip but especially in the latter,
because Demosthenes’ celebrated anti-Philip rhetoric would be the obvious target of any
parody.

Philip’s absence is key to explaining On Organization. First, by leaving him out, our
writer creates a vaticinium ex eventu. Demosthenes is made to appear prescient, like a latter-
day Themistocles (Thuc. 1.138.3) or Pericles (Thuc. 2.65.6–7, 13), of the kind of threat that
Athens would face and the kind of action which was required, before that threat had
materialized in the shape of Macedon. The question posed by the imagined critic in 13, ‘What
good have we ever got from the speeches of Demosthenes?’ (12) and the speaker’s subsequent
warning that ‘beware lest you end by acknowledging that what you now consider a proper
practice was a grievous error’ (2) appears, like other hints of hindsight discussed earlier, a little too knowing. Second, the speech overcomes the basic problem that revisiting
Demosthenes’ rhetoric often means recollecting failure: the avoidance of Philip is also an
avoidance of the memory of Athens’ defeat.

It seems that underneath a scholarly commitment to stylistic fidelity there lurks a
political desire to present Demosthenes favourably, and perhaps the wish to reflect a changed
set of relations with the Macedonians. The obvious context for a speech that seeks to define
Demosthenes’ career positively is 280/79. This was the year the Athenians passed a decree
rehabilitating Demosthenes and bestowing on him the city’s highest honours. The move

25 See pp.9–11.
26 Plut. Dem. 30.5; [Plut.] Mor. 847d; Paus. 1.8.2. [Plut.] Mor. 850f–51c preserves the text of the decree (technically the petition, αἰτήσεως, but apparently passed as proposed). In addition
became possible once Athens won back its freedom and democracy from Demetrius Poliorcetes in 286/5. The commemoration was orchestrated by Demosthenes’ nephew and political heir Demochares of Leuconoë. Through the honours posthumously awarded to Demosthenes and the inscription of the decree which bestowed them, Demochares not only elevated his status (as Demosthenes closest living relative he inherited the honours), but won public affirmation of his claim to control and define Demosthenes’ posthumous reputation. By assimilating himself to a Demosthenes who was partially of his own making, Demochares channelled the moral authority of a patriot and martyr in the pursuit of his own political goals. To this end, he also wrote a highly polemic 21-book account of recent Athenian history (FGrHist 75 F1–2).27

Demochares’ claim to Demosthenes’ legacy no doubt extended to his papers and Demochares has long been the favourite candidate for the initial formation of the Demosthenic corpus. Based on stichometric notations in the manuscripts, J.A. Goldstein shows that 13 belonged to an early collection of public speeches (including the spurious 7 and 11) assembled in all likelihood before the mid-third century B.C.28 Unlike Demosthenes’ old partisans, to the inscription of the decree, Demosthenes received the highest honours of a statue in the agora, σίτησις, and προεδρία. 

27 Cicero described Demochares writing it non tam historico quam oratorio genere (Ad Brut.286), see R.A. Billows, Antigonus the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State (Berkeley, 1990), 336–9; C. Cooper, ‘(Re)making Demosthenes: Demochares and Demetrius of Phalerum on Demosthenes’, in P. Wheatley and R. Hannah (edd.), Alexander and His Successors: Essays from the Antipodes (Claremont, CA, 2009), 310–22, at 318–21.

28 J.A. Goldstein, The Letters of Demosthenes (New York, 1968), 6–25, 82–3. Speeches 1–11, 13, 18–24, the exordia, and letters 1–5 all share the same indicators used by scribes to count the number of lines in their manuscript: marginal stoichometrics marking off each hundredth
kinsmen like Demochares would have the greatest personal and political interest in using such a collection of Demosthenes’ public addresses to defend him from posthumous attack and to champion his reputation as ‘hero, patriot, and moral example’. Speech 13 was not the work of a crude propagandist, but of a scholar steeped in Demosthenes’ work. I wonder if Demochares’ concerns influenced not just the publication of *On Organization* but its creation as well.

Even within a collection of speeches assembled to present Demosthenes in the best possible light, *On Organization* stands out as an encapsulation of some of Demosthenes’ most memorable rhetoric which could, as such, be celebrated and drawn upon. There were obvious parallels between the state of Athens in the 350s and in the 280s. After 286 Athens was threatened by critical shortages of food and money, not helped by the Antigonid garrisons which still held the Piraeus and other forts in Attica. Alleviating shortages and retaking the Piraeus were accordingly the chief political priorities of Demochares in the 280s. His own line with the letters alpha to omega, and then a total in acrophonic numerals at the end. Further, they all share a fifteen-syllable στοῖχος. Goldstein suggests, at 21–2, that the speeches in this collection were chosen because they fulfilled at least one of three functions: to attest to Demosthenes’ great struggle against Macedon and his advocacy of sound domestic policies and high moral standards, to provide evidence of his services, to offer material for defence against later attacks. It is for the second reason that 13 was included with the Philippics over the more similar 14–16.

29 Goldstein (n.27), at 24.

30 It appears that foreign embassies were meant not only to keep Athens supplied, but to prepare for the retaking of the Piraeus and the retaliatory siege of Athens that would inevitably follow (cf. Philippides Decree *IG* II² 657.33–6). See Shear (n.26), at 26–9 and C. Habicht, *Athens from*
posthumous honorary decree declares that as soon as Demochares returned from exile he συστείλαντι τὴν διοίκησιν πρώτῳ καὶ φεισαμένῳ τῶν ύπαρχόντων ‘first reduced the expenses of the administration and was sparing of public resources’ ([Plut.] Mor. 852e).

Demochares sent embassies to secure much-needed food and funds. It is perhaps no accident that the honorary decree he proposed for Demosthenes lauds his personal financial contributions to the polis at greater length than his other achievements. Demochares knew, as most of his fellow citizens must also have known, that it was only a matter of time before a confrontation with Antigonus Gonatas would be necessary, and that attacking the Piraeus was the quickest way to bring this on. Moreover, the absence of Philip from the speech has the added convenience of recognizing that two of Philip’s successors, Lysimachus and Ptolemy, had provided invaluable assistance to Athens in the 280s in response to Demochares’ embassies.31 The single Macedonian autocrat who had consumed Demosthenes’ energy had now been replaced by the rival διάδοχοι. Where once Macedon had only represented danger, some Macedonian kings were now proving crucial to Athens’ continued independence and survival.

The message of 13 to spend limited money wisely and to sacrifice comfort for the good of the polis, while avoiding hostile pronouncements against all Macedonian kings, cannot have been very different to Demochares’ own rhetoric in the assembly. If copies of On Organization began to circulate in around 280/79, it would have reinforced Demochares’ message by

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Alexander to Antony (Cambridge, 1997), 124–9, 135–41 who sees the decision to honour Demosthenes as ‘tantamount to a declaration of war against Macedonia’ at 139.

evoking a pivotal moment in Athenian history. Not only were the threats Athens faced after 286 comparable to those faced in the late 350s, but failure to take action would again lead to disaster. Demochares’ close association with his uncle would, meanwhile, inoculate him from the bitter attacks the speech makes on Athens’ political leadership, leaving only the Athenian *demos* itself in need of correction. We may hypothesize that 13 was written at the behest of Demochares by a rhetorician steeped in Demosthenes’ speeches, and who may have utilized a few unpublished scraps from his papers.

We may imagine two concurrent routes for the ‘release’ of 13. The text of the speech, along with the rest of Demochares’ hypothesized collection, could have been disseminated by booksellers eager to offer texts by a famous author (Dion. Hal. *Isocr.* 18). Of oral delivery was, however, the most effective means of general dissemination. Did Demochares quote from it in his own speeches, in preference to the Philippics, just as earlier orators were known to quote from recreated historical documents (Dem. 19.303; Lycurg. *Leoc.* 81)? For both readers with

32 Most if not all of Demosthenes’ extant speeches are likely to have been in circulation already during his lifetime. J. Trevett, ‘Did Demosthenes Publish his Deliberative Speeches?’, *Hermes* 124 (1996), 425–44, at 433–6 is right to point out that publication was a poor way to influence popular opinion, but Demosthenes was probably more interested in his standing among his fellow ῥήτορες and the wider elite. Making copies of his speeches available to these readers was probably a novel strategy, chiefly used in the early part of his career, to promote his rhetorical and political gifts: see H. Yunis, *Taming Democracy* (Ithaca, NY, 1996), 242–3. *On Organization* would therefore not have been overshadowed by a general release of Demosthenes’ speeches after his death.

33 The speech may then form part of the phenomenon attested in the fourth and third centuries of ‘recreating’ or ‘editing’ earlier historical documents to serve as παράδειγμα for the
rhetorical interests and Demochares with his political agenda, the great attraction of 13 would be the way it conveniently condensed Demosthenes’ finest rhetoric on the topical subject of optimal financial and military organization into one relatively short but polished text. In *On Organization*, Demochares would have had a document which expanded upon the justification supplied in the honorary decree. Both decree and speech would effect the apotheosis of Demosthenes and trumpet Demochares’ personal connection to the great man.

The case for the ‘authenticity’ of Demosthenes 13 is far less straightforward than it has been made to seem of late. Its stylistic strength is not enough to mask the serious and, to my mind, insurmountable obstacles that stand in the way of acceptance. The burden of proof when it comes to this speech should still rest with those who wish to treat it as a ‘genuine’ work. *On Organization* is a strange beast with its combination of fine style, historical mistakes, and awkward silence. It is clear that any satisfactory explanation must abandon rigid oppositions between authentic and inauthentic, scholarship and propaganda. With this in mind, I have suggested an explanation that fits the conflicting indications of identity which exist in the speech and the available historical evidence. The speech is not good evidence for Demosthenes and Athens in the 350s, but it does shed light on the reception of both by later generations of Athenians.

The most famous examples are the oath of Plataea (Lycurg. *Leoc.* 81; Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F153–4) and the Troizen Decree of Themistocles (Dem. 19.303). There is also some evidence for a parallel scholarly interest century of writing historical speeches concerned with Demosthenes as early as the third century (C. Kremmydas, ‘P. Berl. 9781 and the Early Reception of Demosthenes 20’, *BICS* 50 (2007), 19–48). Speech 13 would not, then, lack interested readers.