Peace Education and Peace Education Research: Toward a Concept of Post-Structural Violence and Second Order Reflexivity

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Abstract:
Peace and conflict studies (PACS) education has grown significantly in the last 30 years, mainly in Higher Education. This article critically analyses the ways in which this field might be subject to post-structural critique, and posits Bourdiesuan second order reflexivity as a means of responding to these critiques. We propose here that theory-building within PACS education is often limited by the dominance of Galtung and Freire, and that, whilst the foundational ideas of positive and negative peace, structural and cultural violence, conscientisation, reflexivity and critical pedagogy are still relevant today, they nevertheless need to be combined in new ways with each other, and with Bourdieu’s notions of habitus and field, to adequately respond to post-structural critique. Thus, we call here for greater field-based reflexivity in 21st Century peace and conflict studies.

Key Words:
Peace and conflict studies education; higher education; Galtung; Bourdieu; Freire

Introduction
Peace and conflict studies (PACS) education concerns both the study of peace, and the related areas of conflict resolution, educational philosophy and social critique (Harris & Morrison, 2003). While most readers may be familiar with the field of peace studies, the field of PACS education is perhaps less well known. It evolved out of a call from early peace scholars for greater integration of studies of violence and peace; reflexive practice and research; and the educational peacebuilding that might result from that (Bajaj, 2010). As PACS scholars ourselves, we are drawn to the field’s potential for conflict transformation, and for cross-disciplinary and cross-sector thinking, particularly at the level of higher education. Yet, we are aroused by what we see as a void in the conceptual toolkit of contemporary PACS education, sometimes referred to as an a-theoretical vacuum in peace education (Gur-Ze’ev, 2001; Zembylas & Bekerman,
Gur-Ze’ev (2001), for example, pointedly states, ‘most current peace education activities manifest good will but little theoretical coherence or philosophical elaboration’ (p. 315). He further claims, ‘the justifications that are common in current discussions of peace education not only serve various violences (which peace education fails to reflect upon and challenge); *peace education is itself a manifestation of those violences*’ (ibid, p. 315; parentheses and italics in the original). Thus in this essay we attempt to clarify and develop an applied philosophy that, for us, helps account for the role of higher education peace scholars in perpetuating violence. Hitherto, such a concept has only been implied in reference to the structural violence of the education system in general, or the specific violence(s) of individual philosophies and methods (cf. Webster, 2010). Two related questions present themselves at this moment in time, however. Firstly, in what ways can PACS education/educators within higher education avoid becoming complicit with structural and cultural violence (Galtung, 1989; Reardon & Snauwaert, 2015)? Secondly, to what extent does the concern of the early peace scholars for education as a remedy for social violence (for example inequality during the 1980s) still hold true? It is to these questions that the current article now turns.

**A Brief History of PACS Education**

PACS Higher Education first emerged after the Second World War (Burns & Aspelagh, 1996). Bajaj (2010) makes particular reference to the early influence of Johan Galtung’s notions of positive and negative peace (1973) and later William Eckhardt’s call for education as a remedy for social violence (1988). Several university-based peace programs were initiated in this time, including the program at Columbia University in which Bajaj used to teach. Other peace programs that were started at this time include those at Bradford, UK, George Mason in the USA, and Uppsala University in Sweden, as well as the United Nations (UN) Universities in Tokyo, Japan, and San Jose, Costa Rica (Lopez, 1985; Harris, Fisk & Rank, 1998; Woodhouse, 2010). The field then grew rapidly over the period 1980-2010, during which time there were also several influential and related UN Decades (e.g., UN Decade for Human Rights Education, 1995-2004; International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Nonviolence for the Children of the World, 2001-2010; UN Decade of Education for Sustainable Development, 2005-2014; cf. Reardon, 2001; Alger, 2014).
As already stated, PACS Education is a blend of peace studies and peace education. Peace studies grew out of teaching and learning about war and peace agreements; analysis of peace and security organizations; and the study of leaders of peace movements, such as Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King and Aung San Suu Kyi (cf. Lopez, 1985; King, 1999; Weber, 2004; Kester, 2010, 2016; Alger, 2014). This strand of academic inquiry is most often found in political science or international relations departments. Peace education, by contrast, focuses on the transformation of educational content, pedagogy and structures to address direct, structural and cultural forms of violence (cf. Reardon, 2001; Harris & Morrison, 2003; Bajaj, 2008). This source of academic practice is often grounded in a progressive and pragmatic philosophy of experiential and democratic education (Howlett, 2008; Page, 2008; Webster, 2010; Dewey, 1916; Montessori, 1949; Freire, 1970), and is usually situated within education faculties or language and literature departments. Foundational scholars in both peace studies and peace education include Johan Galtung, Paulo Freire, John Paul Lederach and Betty Reardon (cf. Harris & Morrison, 2003; Bajaj, 2008). PACS education might be co-located across university departments, or else present in interdisciplinary courses and modules.

As could perhaps be deduced from the fact that this field concerns itself so directly with issues of power, conflict and violence, PACS education is deeply politicized. This emanates from both a critique of state-based systems of security and education, and (more recently) from a critique of the field itself. Zembylas and Bekerman (2013) suggest that PACS education is often complicit in a putative ‘civilizing’ process that promotes a modernist agenda of individual Enlightenment, autonomy, democratic peace, Western progress and state-centrism. They emphasize the ineffectiveness of education for peace when such learning becomes normalized rhetoric, embedded within the march toward Western progress through ‘positivist traditions’\(^1\) of learning and assessment.\(^2\) Many scholars share Zembylas and Bekerman’s critique that peace studies might promote a colonizing agenda (cf. Freire, 1988; Dietrich & Sutzl, 1997; Pupavac, 2001;

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\(^1\) By ‘positivism’, the authors mean education that is isolated to the individual (not interactional), static and defined (not contextualized) and task-oriented toward measurable transmissions based on Western paradigms (Zembylas & Bekerman, 2013, p. 210).

\(^2\) Multiple studies have been conducted concerning the impact of peace education (cf. Churchill & Omari, 1981; Johnson & Johnson, 1996; Feuerverger, 2001; Maoz, 2001; Bickmore, 2002; Nevo & Brem, 2002; Danesh, 2008; Kester, 2013; Felice, Karako & Wisler, 2015). Based on varied positivist and/or critical epistemologies, these studies have produced mixed findings concerning the effectiveness of peace education programs.
Gur-Ze’ev, 2001; Epstein, 2006; Fontan, 2012; Wallace, 2013). Some of these scholars even claim that the very affiliation of PACS education with formal education is in itself structurally violent (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000; Harber, 2004; Zembylas & Bekerman, 2013; Cremin, 2003, 2015). As Reardon and Snauwaert (2015) ask, how can PACS education within the ‘modern university’ avoid taking on the values of the corporate culture and the global market, where, ‘knowledge has become a commodity, the currency of success in the market; critical analysis is an exercise in perfecting technique for increasing material value; and wisdom is relegated to history and philosophy, realms that do not enjoy high-value in a market-centred academy?’ (Reardon & Snauwaert, 2015, p. 168). As they point out, PACS education does not operate within an ideologically neutral higher education environment.

Accordingly, PACS educators often tread a difficult path of working within state-based higher education institutions, whilst attempting to unsettle dominant discourses of state-building. As Page (2008) points out, it is perhaps one of the limitations of the field that it has been unable to protect its proponents from the normalizing influence of the state and its agents in this regard. PACS educators tend to respond to this in one of two ways. They either remain strongly committed to the transformative potential of PACS education whilst acknowledging the destructive capacity of its uncritical application within structurally violent systems (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000; Davies, 2003; Shiva, Kester & Jani, 2007; Selman, Cremin & McCluskey, 2013; Bajaj & Hantzopoulos, 2016; Cremin & Guilherme, 2016) or else they maintain a primarily sceptical and deconstructive stance (Gur-Ze’ev, 2001, 2011; Pupuvac, 2001; Fontan, 2012; Zembylas & Bekerman, 2013). But what is the way forward beyond these (potentially entrenched) camps?

**Avoiding Complicity with Structural and Cultural Violence**

Many of those who maintain a belief in the transformative potential of PACS education see critical pedagogy and its affiliated ideas of critique and social change as crucial. They are many in number (cf. Hicks, 1988; O’Sullivan, 1999; Patomaki, 2001; Reardon, 2001; Reardon & Cabezudo, 2002; Diaz-Soto, 2005; Toh & Cawagas, 2010; Deck, 2010; Christopher & Taylor, 2011; Bajaj & Brantmeier, 2011; Duckworth, 2011; Jenkins, 2013; Bajaj, 2015; Bajaj & Hantzopoulos, 2016), and they have collectively come up with a range of related approaches.
There is for example the approach of *comprehensive and transformative peace education* emerging from the ‘Columbia School’ (Reardon, 1988; Snauwaert, 2008; Jenkins, 2013); the *cultures of peace education* approach coming out of UNESCO (Adams, 1989; Reardon, 2001; Cabezudo & Haavelsrud, 2013); and the recently re-emergent efforts for *critical peace education* (Wulf, 1973; Diaz-Soto, 2005; Bajaj & Brantmeier, 2011; Bajaj & Hantzopoulos, 2016). These are only a few of the collective approaches of the field; thus, there is no shortage of scholarly work and initiatives toward a critical peace agenda,³ and toward the development of theory-as-such.⁴

As highlighted above, however, there is a second sceptical group, who maintain a more deconstructive stance. Scholars within this group argue that critical pedagogy and transformative thinking does not go far enough. There are several critiques that they make. The first is that there is often an assumption in PACS education that knowledge, rationality and an improved skill-set amongst individual learners will lead to broader social change (i.e., cultural, political, and/or economic peace) (cf. Brookfield, 2009; Haavelsrud, 1996). This creates a resulting over-reliance on critical pedagogy where the psychologized individual (or atomized unit of the system) is the locus for change, rather than the social structures (e.g., poverty, war systems, structural racism, capitalist consumerism) that create structural and cultural violence in the first place (Pupavac, 2001, 2004; Farmer, 2005; Davies, 2016). Pupavac (2004) elaborates that the ‘“people-centred” paradigm’ of some development and human rights discourses has been co-opted in order to promote the ‘psychosocial conditioning’ of young people and others. Here, the mind of the individual is considered the ‘cause of violent conflict’ (p. 383). She explains that ‘the international modernization paradigm’ of earlier periods ‘was incrementally supplanted by a psychosocial or “people-centred” paradigm’ (p. 383).

A second critique is that PACS educators and students are often blind to their own relative

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³ Others that we don’t detail here include *dynamical systems theory in peace and conflict studies* (Coleman & Deutsch, 2001; Vollacher, Coleman, Nowak & Bui-Wrzosinska, 2010), *elicitive peace* (Lederach, 1995), *protracted social conflict management* (Azar, 1990), and *post-liberal peace* (Richmond, 2011), among others. Though these traditions come from varied disciplines/fields there is typically a common blend of ethico-philosophic underpinning, pragmatic conflict analysis and pedagogic approach throughout each of them.

⁴ See Brantmeier’s (2013) proposition that ‘critical peace education for sustainability’ might be accessed through ‘a simple equation: situated power analysis + engaged change = vibrant, sustainable peace’ (p. 244).
privilege and cultural values. This makes them unwilling to offer a genuine challenge to the status quo, or to embrace complexity, diversity and contingency in ways that impact on their own lived experiences (Freire, 1988; Davies, 2003; Dietrich, 2012). For example, when PACS education seeks to promote universalisms: universal knowledge, universal values, and universal behaviours (cf. UNESCO, 1995; Gur-Ze’ev, 2001; Pupavac, 2001), the assumption is that peace can be cultivated through the removal of one set of universal values and knowledge constructs (i.e., the war culture) in favour of another (i.e., the peace culture). The replacement is often assumed to have intrinsic (non-political) universal value (Harding, 2004), where the result is ‘a concept of peace conditioned by abandonment of reflection and transcendence’ that ‘produces brave warriors to protect its fears and destroy its internal and external enemies’ (Gur-Ze’ev, 2011, p. 111). Gur-Ze’ev (ibid) further explains this as ‘a kind of universalism within which idealists, pragmatists, and even (very) “soft” postmodernists could share peace education’ (p. 110). He continues, ‘modern peace education is very much influenced by the ideas of the Enlightenment and its visions of a future perfect world’ (p. 112). What is cautioned against here is the assumed normalisation of peace education, which in assuming it as normal denies the critical questioning that is necessary for peace (and democratic) education to contribute to social justice. It is noteworthy that Paulo Freire (1988) himself raised this concern toward PACS education. Freire critically stated: ‘Peace is created and developed in the never-ending construction of social justice. This is why I do not believe in so-called peace education that, instead of bringing to light the world of injustice, obscures it and has the effect of oppressing its victims even more’ (p. 27). The assumptions of PACS theory and practice as benevolent and universal must be questioned.

A third critique emerges from the Enlightenment legacy of mind/body dualities. The deconstructive stance claims that critical pedagogy is overly cognate in orientation (Ellsworth, 1989; Shirazi, 2011; Zembylas, 2015) and that this maintains the privilege of certain cultures and behaviours over others. Among those that are cited as advantaged are Western, analytic, masculine and direct cultures; and amongst those that are cited as disadvantaged are non-Western, feminine, and contemplative cultures. Cautious not to be essentialist, the point here is that critical pedagogy favours mind-centric epistemologies, wherever they may be from, and whomever they concern. Thus, deconstructive scholars detail the ways in which critical
pedagogic efforts undermine the effectiveness of PACS education.

Some of these critics call for greater attention to bodily, aesthetic and historicized dimensions of experience, and to the role of the arts, emotion and spirituality in helping PACS education to transcend the field’s rational limitations (Dietrich, 2012; Zembylas, 2015). For example, in a review of the philosophical lenses through which peace education can be viewed, Page (2008) identified aesthetic ethics as a promising set of ideas that begin to address more embodied, spiritual, feminized and affective dimensions of peace. These include Gandhi’s Satyagraha; Gur-Ze’ev’s (2011) hospitality, co-poiesis and improvisation; and Dietrich’s (2012) transrational peace. These value inner as well as outer peace, and integrate Eastern, Western and indigenous perspectives. They draw on relationality and the arts, and set themselves against colonising and territorialised ways of thinking about peace. For example, Gur-Ze’ev (2011) elaborates, ‘peace education that challenges the fruits of normalizing education should challenge both the quest of totalizing homogeneity and the dogmatic quest for difference…co-poiesis and enduring responsible improvisation might offer a counter-education’ (p. 114). Page (2008) further draws on Bernard Haring and Valentino Salvoldi; who have argued that education for peace is not so much a task to be implemented, as a process of educating the body to be in dialogue with the senses; and also on Sherry Shapiro, who sees peace education as encouraging a bodily-orientated passion for peace and justice. These ways of thinking about and working towards peace, despite notable exceptions,⁵ are largely under-developed in the field of PACS education, and this is a serious omission in a field that claims to value global harmony, understanding and justice.

To us, these critiques represent the post-structural and postmodern condition in the field where some peace scholars are actively complicit in violence production, thus we synthesize these three critiques as pertaining to the concept of ‘post-structural violence’. Such a concept is distinct from earlier concepts of cultural and structural violence in at least three ways. First, although the notion of ‘post’ might seem to suggest the dominance of structural analysis / violence has ended, we instead use the pre-fix to point toward the contemporary need to re-interpret and re-engage intimately with structural analysis alongside popular transformative approaches. We are

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⁵ See for example the University of Innsbruck’s MA in Peace, Development, Security and International Conflict Transformation, https://www.uibk.ac.at/peacestudies/ma-program/.
concerned, for example, that with the rise of the focus on agency and individual action in transformative approaches, structural inequities / analysis becomes glossed over. Second, we find the ‘post-structural violence’ concept useful as an analytic tool to describe the ways in which structural violence is constituted in a post-structural process when well-intentioned actors in the field find themselves complicit in furthering the very violence that they seek to mitigate. Reframing the deconstructive critiques as ‘post-structural violence’, a brief definition might be:6

Post-structural violence is a way of describing broader unjust social arrangements, worldviews and behaviours that have been interpreted and enacted by a person or organization, who aiming to mitigate these injustices through its actions instead has the effect of maintaining the dominant social order. This occurs even if that social order causes harm to the very entity maintaining it. The arrangements are post-structural because they are embodied and discursive, and undermine and target the entity taking the action. At the same time, violence is produced because the arrangements being addressed and the actions of the entity addressing those arrangements serve to perpetuate structural and cultural injustices. Whereas employment of structural, cultural and direct violence is used traditionally in oppositional duality with negative and positive peace, post-structural violence questions this assumption and invokes the need for agents to gaze back onto themselves and their field of practice to question their own role in perpetuating violence on the self and others through their peace work.

Third, the void inhabited in the absence of this analytic tool is in part constitutive of the dogmatism and evangelicalism of PACS critiqued by modernity, yet the critiques remain in the absence of a clear and systematic response to postmodern and post-structural criticisms. That is, the individual PACS scholar (and the relational communities to which she belongs) has in some cases become the vessel to promote the grand truths and panaceas (critiqued by postmodern thinkers) offered in PACS education. Such diffusion of responsibility and accountability renders cultural and structural violence insufficient in explaining contemporary forms of violence enacted by the peacemakers (cf. Farmer, 2005). In summary, post-structural violence is manifest through epistemological, procedural and personal changes not sufficiently answered by older forms of structural and cultural violence as examined through structuralist and modernist lenses. Hence, we call for more common intersecting and heterogeneous areas of concern in PACS

6 This definition is an evolution on earlier definitions of structural violence by Galtung (1969) and Paul Farmer (2005). Farmer’s definition is important as it integrates human agency as a crucial factor into Galtung’s concept. So too is the aspect of human agency integral to our definition of ‘post-structural violence’.
through contemporary postmodern, post-structural and transrational lenses (cf. Tikly, 1999; Dietrich, 2012).

Finally, ‘post-structural violence’ reminds us that such individuated, culturally normative and mind-centric approaches can further deepen inequality and structural violence through peace work. What makes ‘post-structural violence’ different from symbolic violence is that the educational actors are explicitly working toward peacebuilding through education, whereas symbolic violence involves more diffuse agents.

This resonates with Zembylas and Bekerman’s (2013) claim that, ‘peace education may often become part of the problem it is trying to solve’ (p. 198), as well as Gur-Ze’ev’s (2001) argument that, ‘the field is part and parcel of the reality it pretends to change’ (p. 315) and Victoria Fontan’s (2012) contention that peace practitioners are helpless in the face of the injustices they co-create through their peace work. We agree that post-structural violence in the field is thus manifest through the universal narratives, psychologized approaches and domination of cognate privilege explained by the deconstructive stance (Galtung, 1990; Zembylas & Bekerman, 2013). Whether or not we nevertheless hold onto the transformative potential of PACS education within higher education will be elucidated later in this article.

At the level of the field, it could be argued that post-structural violence is enabled by the isolation of educators in their own institutions, distant from the collective effects of the field (Nixon, 2013). To amend for an individual PACS educator’s role in structural and cultural violence, practitioner reflexivity is usually prescribed (i.e., first order reflexivity) (cf. Reardon, 2001; Toh, 2004; Bajaj & Brantmeier, 2011; Brantmeier & Bajaj, 2013). We contend however that post-structural violence continues in part because of a reliance on first order reflexivity in the field. First order reflexivity once again locates the problem / solution at the level of the individual educator, rather than the field (Daley, 2010; Davies et al., 2004). It is thus insufficient to address the broader post-structural violence that exists. Hence, we advocate for second order reflexivity in addition to first order reflexivity, and for empirical research in addition to theoretical and conceptual in order to further develop these ideas. Yet as far as we are aware, empirical investigation of the ways in which the PACS field collectively reproduces and
perpetuates violence has not been conducted. It is our hope then that second order reflexivity (i.e., collective reflection on the field as operationalized through empirical and theoretical investigation) might help reclaim PACS education from its complicity in promoting the forms of violence detailed herein. We now turn to detailing how we arrived at this juncture.

**Reclaiming PACS Education through Second Order Reflexivity**

In the search for concepts that help to explain the causes of violence and peace many scholars are led to literature that details Galtung’s theory of structural violence, Freire’s critical pedagogy and (to a lesser extent) Bourdieu’s symbolic violence (Brantmeier, 2011; Carr & Porfilio, 2012; Cabezudo & Haavelsrud, 2013; Bajaj & Hantzopoulos, 2016). Johan Galtung is among the most widely cited peace scholars. His concepts of negative and positive peace and direct, cultural and structural violence, as well as peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding, are ubiquitous.

Second only to Galtung in terms of citation is Freire. His critical pedagogy introduces education and reflexivity into peace studies (Webster, 2010; Fook, 2010; Brookfield, 2009); and his humanistic approach questions the neutral, a-political and objective nature of education and scientific research. A third philosopher, who brings the notion of symbolic violence to the discussion, is the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. His concepts of field, cultural capital and habitus are central to post-structural education theory, and have much to contribute to an understanding of the ways in which PACS education might itself symbolically reproduce violence (Bourdieu, 1977; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1986, 1998; McKnight & Chandler, 2009).

It is our contention here that it is in the combination of the contributions of all three scholars that the field of PACS education is able to move from Galtungian scientific analysis and Freirian first order reflexivity to second order (and embodied) reflexivity that draws on Bourdieu. It is only through second order reflexivity that structural and symbolic violence within, through and by scholars in the field becomes fully visible. Whilst reflexivity has traditionally concerned individual practitioners and wider socio-cultural contexts, little attention has been given to the capacity of the field itself to collectively reproduce symbolic violence through the aggregative actions of those who inhabit it (Sripakrak & Mukhopadhyay, 2015; Sandri, 2009; Harding, 2004). Thus the field, made up of the habitus of individual PACS educators, in Bourdieusian

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7 A Google Scholar search on 22 January, 2017, revealed that Galtung’s 1969 article had been cited 4,112 times.
terms, may well contain subtle and insidious forms of structural and symbolic violence. PACS scholars find themselves simultaneously constrained by and reproductive of these structures (cf. Farmer, 2005).

PACS education risks being structurally violent not only because it is part of the formal schooling system (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000; Harber, 2004; Bajaj & Hantzopoulos, 2016), but also because of many of its underlying premises about how to achieve peace (Freire, 1988; Pupavac, 2001, 2004; Gur-Ze’ev, 2001; Zembylas & Bekerman, 2013). Whilst it is important to critique the wider education system (and the higher education system in particular) in which PACS education is situated, this must not obfuscate the crucial analysis that needs to be done of PACS education’s role in violence production. Nor should this lead to extreme system blaming in lieu of addressing any individual responsibility (Fook, 2010; Dirkx, Mezirow & Cranton, 2006). Second order reflexivity transcends efforts of individual lecturers alone, and through linking the personal and social offers potential insights into the unintended collective impact of PACS group work (Daley, 2010; Harding, 2004). What we are advocating then is a collective, critical and empirical reflection on the field to counterbalance the ‘excessive individualism of liberal political philosophy’ (Harding, 2004, p. 35).

Second order reflexivity is thus helpful in providing an adequate response to the post-structural violence of hyper-individualism, where scholars reflect themselves on the violence perpetuated through individual and collective peace work (Daley, 2010; Davies et al., 2004; Denzin, 1997). The table below (Figure 1) illustrates an integrated theory of peace and violence in education drawing on Galtung, Freire and Bourdieu. The first three columns show the traditional ways that Galtung and Freire’s theories are applied to PACS education, and the fourth column shows how we suggest the concept of symbolic violence, added to Galtung’s structural violence, can deepen this analysis in order to introduce second order reflexivity into PACS education. We are not claiming that the combination of structural and symbolic violence is new, indeed we are drawing here in particular on the work of Gur-Ze’ev, Zembylas, Bekerman and Fontan, but we are making claim to the novelty of Bourdieusian second order reflexivity as a means of investigating the ways in which the field reproduces the very conditions it attempts to mitigate, even in spite of individual lecturer’s efforts toward peace-building and social transformation.
**Figure 1. An Integrated Theory of Peace and Violence in Education**
drawing on Galtung, Freire and Bourdieu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Direct violence (To address this type of violence, <em>peacekeeping</em> is typically utilized)</th>
<th>Cultural violence (To address this type of violence, <em>peacebuilding</em> or <em>peacemaking</em> and/or Freirian reflexivity is typically utilized)</th>
<th>Structural violence (To address this type of violence, <em>peacemaking</em> or <em>peacebuilding</em> and/or Freirian reflexivity is typically utilized)</th>
<th>Post-structural violence (To address this type of violence, Bourdieusian and Freirian <em>reflexivity</em> is utilized)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negative peace</strong></td>
<td>Absence of physical harm to self and others.</td>
<td>Absence of attitudinal and cultural normative injustices, such as ethnocentrism, patriarchy or heteronormativity. E.g., reduced levels of intolerance.</td>
<td>Absence of discrimination in social, economic and political institutions. E.g., non-discrimination clauses within schools, corporations and legal policy.</td>
<td>Absence of second order reflexivity on academic practices that perpetuate structural and cultural violence, despite Freirian first order reflexivity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positive peace</strong></td>
<td>Presence of values, behaviours and institutions that prevent physical harm. E.g., reverence for life; peaceful security forces; and conflict resolution education</td>
<td>Presence of Freirian conscientisation, critical pedagogy, and respect of other cultures and ways of being. E.g., Respecting, embracing, and including diverse perspectives and practices to enrich communities of experience.</td>
<td>Presence of Freirian conscientisation, critical pedagogy, and institutional policies and law that promote diversity, inclusion and reconciliation. E.g., restorative justice mechanisms, community activism, etc.</td>
<td>Presence of second order (i.e., discipline-based) reflexivity in order to moderate the equilibrium between peace theory and practice.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The primary point we are making is highlighted in the grey box in Figure 1. It is here that second order reflexivity is realized. For example, in the negative peace row, the absence of social ill seems to run throughout, with Freirian first order reflexivity becoming more likely toward the post-structural violence column as individual lecturers begin to question their assumptions about their own role within violence production. In other words, the presence of Freirian reflexivity in the negative peace/post-structural violence box indicates the role of practitioner reflexivity in mitigating personal practices of direct, structural and cultural violence him/herself. This does not, however, preclude field-based violence. A historic example might be John Dewey’s support for nation-state war despite his promotion of peace education in schools (Howlett, 2008). Dewey was personally conscious of his educational performance as promoting peace on the local level,
but at the same time supportive of broader systems of violence. In this respect, Stephen Brookfield (2009) critiques ‘critical’ reflection (a core component of PACS education) if it lacks wider social ideology critique. Brookfield writes: “Without this element of ideology critique the process of clarifying and questioning assumptions [in PACS education] is reflective, but it is not necessarily critical” (ibid, p. 299; brackets ours).

In the entirety of the positive peace row, by contrast, Freirian conscientisation and critical pedagogy are presented (and crescendo toward the final post-structural violence box) as part of addressing cultural and structural violence in lecturers’ (and increasingly field-based) practices. As we have argued, individual reflexivity is not sufficient to prevent the production of violence in the field; hence, we present the grey box to argue that a second order sociological engagement with field-based reflexivity is crucial in contemporary PACS education if it is to retain its promise of transformation as early scholars wished. The criticality of the field (not just individual practices) is what, for us, begins to move PACS education toward second order reflexivity. Sriprakash and Mukhopadhyay (2015) explain:

A second order engagement with reflexivity encourages us to trace the ways in which knowledge about [PACS education] is assembled: how particular ‘truths’ about [PACS education] are produced through empirical studies, how these ‘truths’ circulate, and how they gain an apparent stability and durability…. Reflexivity, then, is not only concerned with individual researchers’ engagement with their subjects under study, but it is also about tracing the politics of knowledge with respect to their field of study and beyond. (p. 232).

As suggested here, the conditions under which the practitioner is legitimated to define what peace is, and how one goes about practicing it, are not adequately addressed. Sriprakash and Mukhopadhyay critically explain how primary reflexivity can be used to make ‘truth claims’ – or perhaps ‘peace claims’. This happens by situating the PACS practitioner’s desire for peace as central. They continue: ‘On an almost benign level, reflexivity appears in research [and we would add PACS practice] as indulgent narcissism, but in a much more problematic way, it is used as a means of obscuring the inequities of power in the production of “knowledge” about the other’ (Sriprakash & Mukhopadhyay, 2015, p. 233). PACS education, as a disciplinary realm, becomes post-structurally violent when it operates at a distance from its objects of concern (i.e.,
peace, community, inclusion) (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

Here, second order reflexivity offers reflexivity on reflexivity itself. In other words, where first order reflexivity concerns individual lecturers’ actions, second order reflexivity offers reflection on the limits of an individualistic approach to ethical peacebuilding. Hence, there is a responsibility for practitioners and the field to scrutinize taken-for-granted assumptions of the field, such as liberal, state-centric and capitalistic peacebuilding approaches that are popular today (Richmond, 2011). Thus, first order reflexivity is propositional of 'P' (i.e., a particular issue, such as the practice of human rights, development or peacekeeping), and second order reflexivity is critical of reflexivity itself. In the first order, PACS education is imagined and developed by scholar-practitioners in response to the limits of 20th and 21st century modernist and liberal ideals of education. In the second order, these scholars are reflexive of the theoretical premises that drive PACS education’s responses to the earlier limitations.

Meadowcroft (2007) explains second order reflexivity further: ‘Critically important in this regard is the collective character of this reflection’ (p. 160). Cunliffe (2003) has argued similarly that, ‘From a radically reflexive, second order perspective, reflexivity becomes an ontological issue because it unsettles any notions of the objectification of reality and knowledge’ (p. 989). If this is the case, first order reflexivity is insufficient to counter the dominant tropes of universal peace, rationality, and psychosocial peacebuilding, i.e., the epistemologies, within the field. There are at least two points why. First, the heterogeneity of PACS education and PACS lecturers challenges the limits of this monolithic position. Second, reontologizing (i.e., externalizing) what has been epistemologized (i.e., internalized) helps to trouble the presumptions that peace, like violence, is simply in the rational minds of individual scholars and students (Bekerman & Zembylas, 2017).

Finally, these critiques raise the question of how one might link the reflexive critique of the field and practice to future action (Fook, 2010; Mezirow, 1991). To this, we would suggest three tentative responses: an epistemological re-turn to group consciousness; critical workshops; and empirical reflexive studies. An epistemological re-turn to group awareness would not entirely break from the agency of dominant liberal individualist discourses in the social sciences, but it would serve as a reminder of the flaws of such an approach (Harding, 2004). In PACS education
in particular, the scrutiny of collective action within the field would reverberate coherently with the ethical reflexivity that underscores vital social peacebuilding. Critical workshops and conferences are another example of second order reflexivity in action (cf. Davies et al., 2004). They operate as organic living-learning communities where agendas are set in-group and motions taken to respond to challenges to influence the wider field (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 1998). Thus, our first two proposals include re-engagement with collective epistemologies and critical seminars / workshops that affirm the value of peace education through seeking to strengthen it with reflexive ideology critique.

Third, we propose that empirical studies that investigate scholars’ rationales, motivations and pedagogic actions across the field could also provide insights into the collective production (of peace or structural violence) within the discipline. For example, Kester (2017) recently conducted a second order reflexive study with 25 PACS academics at one UN university. The findings of his study offer critical reflections on the theoretical premises, power and pedagogy of the peace field as practiced within one university by scholars converging from institutions around the world. The reflections are the summative result of individual ruminations by lecturers and Kester’s observations of teaching, which were coupled with student interviews and document analysis. As cognitive reflections alone would have not been sufficient (and indeed would have been contradictory) to critique the modernist limitations of PACS, the study sought to better understand embodiment and practice as well through habitus investigation. Thus, in this piece too, we argue that second order reflexivity should involve aesthetic and emotive engagement with practices in the field. Like other PACS scholars we call for emotive (Zembylas, 2015; Denzin, 1997) and transrational (Dietrich, 2012; Toh, 2004) avenues of investigation in addition to cognitive, and we call for this at the level of the field.

Lastly, in line with our post-structuralist stance we acknowledge there is no prescription for how academics and departments might go about practicing second order reflexivity; however, we do cautiously suggest that an epistemological shift from first order reflexivity of the self-in-the-field to second order positioning of self-in-relation-to-the-field and the self-constituted-by-and-constitutive-of the field offers an initial starting point. Second order reflexivity is a zooming out, not merely to gaze back on the self, but to look onto the self as it is in relation with others and to
observe how these constructed collectives then serve to constitute and govern the fields they create.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, we have argued that the concern of early peace scholars for education as a remedy for structural and cultural violence still holds true, provided that: the premises of the field are robustly examined; reflexivity is extended empirically/practically to the level of the field; and aesthetic/spiritual/affective elements of PACS education are given greater prominence through an applied philosophy of education. We draw this conclusion whilst cautioning against any exaggerated sense of agency/determinism that may be read into our call for second order reflexivity. At present, there are several limitations of much PACS education work – which is archeologically implicated in the modernist agenda of mind-centred Enlightenment, atomistic individualism, nation-state-centrism, naïve development discourse, and notions of interventionist social engineering. This much has already been established in the field, as we have accepted throughout this paper (cf. Dietrich & Sutzl, 1997; Gur-Ze’ev, 2001; Fontan, 2012; Zembylas & Bekerman, 2013), but there is now a need to develop concepts such as post-structural violence and second order reflexivity in order to critically and compassionately address the limitations of the foundational concepts of structural and cultural violence in a field that sets itself against all forms of social malady, and that aims to integrate empathy and humility with analysis and critique (Cremin & Guilherme, 2016; Zembylas, 2007).

As such, the philosophic concept of post-structural violence problematizes the notion that it is straightforwardly possible through PACS education to create a more socially just global society, if that education does not account for the ways that the educators might be complicit in structural and cultural violence. Given that the field is itself deeply embedded within and reproductive of powerful global hegemonies, it is clear to us that individual reflexivity, though necessary and important, is in itself insufficient in challenging the wider structural impediments that inhibit educational peace-building. The combination of personal and field reflexivity offers, we hope, a more comprehensive, albeit still ambivalent (Davies et al., 2004), response to the contemporary challenges of structural violence in the field of educational peacebuilding. In the end, it is our hope that post-structural violence and second order reflexivity in PACS education might support
conceptual and empirical investigations into Zembylas and Bekerman’s (2013) claim that ‘peace education may often become part of the problem it is trying to solve’ (p. 198). As PACS educators ourselves, with many years of empirical work and experience in the field, we are hopeful that these concepts might hold the promise of new ways of operating in a field that we hold dear.

8,383 with references and footnotes; 6,081 without

References


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