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St John's College

The Political Debate Over War Strategy 1689-1712

Submitted for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
The dissertation covers 1689-1712 in English political history. It deals with the debate between the Whig and Tory parties, and their internal conflicts, over the strategy necessary to defeat France in the two wars of this period: the Nine Years' and Spanish Succession Wars. It describes the widespread hopes for a quick victory, centred on the 'descent', in the early years of William's reign; and how this optimism was exploited to secure support for the Continental war. It traces the development of an alternative 'Country' strategy in response to the failures to mount an invasion of France and the build up of English forces in Flanders. The consolidation of Whig support behind the Continental war in 1693-95; and the failure of the Country attempt to draw away mercantile support from the European war by exploiting the anger over privateering losses are analysed. The explosion of Country/Tory bitterness in 1697-98 which led to the precipitate disbanding of the army is discussed with reference to the strategic hopes and disappointments of the previous war. The approach of the Spanish Succession War in 1698-1702 is analysed against the background of the expectations of both Whigs and Tories that England would now fight as naval auxiliaries; and attention is drawn to the widespread interest in Caribbean warfare. The internal disputes within the Tory ministry in 1702-04 over war strategy are analysed, and the strategic ideas of the main political figures - Nottingham, Godolphin, Marlborough and Harley - are examined. The importance of the Spanish theatre to public and political opinion and the revival of interest in Caribbean warfare from 1706 on are both documented. Harley's changing attitude to the war in the years 1704-08 is discussed. The rise to dominance of the Junto war strategy 1708-10 is considered, and the Tory response. The war strategy of the Tory ministry of 1710 is examined, with particular reference to the hold of the Spanish war on Tory loyalties, and Harley's West Indian and St John's Canadian schemes. The fierce pamphlet debate between Whig and Tory in 1710-12 over the conduct of the Succession War is analysed.
The dissertation in its entirety is my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration.

Dates are given in the Old Style throughout, or in both Old and New Styles where confusion might arise. The year is taken to have begun on 1 January instead of 25 March.

Contemporary spelling has been silently modernised in quotations. Punctuation has been modernised only when it seriously impedes comprehension of contemporary sources.
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**Introduction**

1

**Part One: The Nine Years' War 1689-1697**

(i) Early Hopes for a Maritime War 1688-89 41
(ii) The Irish War and the Strategic Debate 1689-90 47
(iii) The Country War Strategy 1689-90 52
(iv) The Descent 1690-92 61
(v) The 1692-93 Session: The Turning Point 77
(vi) The Jacobites and War Strategy 83
(vii) Whig Support for the Continental War 1693-94 87
(viii) Naval Strategy 1693-94 95
(ix) The Last Years of the Continental War 1695-97 101

**Part Two: Interbellum 1697-1702**

(i) The Post War Reckoning 1697-98 113
(ii) The Spanish Succession and the Strategic Question 1698-1701 120
(iii) Colonial Strategy 1689-1702 134
(iv) The Approach of War 1701-02 146

**Part Three: The Spanish Succession War 1702-1712**

(i) Ministerial Disputes Over War Strategy 1702-04 152
(ii) Blenheim 179
(iii) The Spanish War 1705-1706 185
(iv) Harley and the War 1706-07 199
(v) The Revival of a Caribbean Strategy 1706-08 208
(vi) Junto War Strategy 1707-08 213
(vii) Tory Opposition to Flanders Warfare 1708-10 228

/contd. over/
Table of Contents (con'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(viii) The Tory Ministry and War Strategy 1710-12</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary and Conclusion</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table of Contents (con'd)

(viii) The Tory Ministry and War Strategy 1710-12 237

Summary and Conclusion 260

References 306

Bibliography 368
'It was indeed a strange alteration in the ordinary run of things for Athenians to be fighting a battle on land'.

Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War

'Yet, like an English Gen'ral will I die,

And all the Ocean make my sparious grave.

Women and Cowards on the Land may lie,

The Sea's a Tomb that's proper for the brave'.

John Dryden, Annus Mirabilis

'I wish, quoth my uncle Toby, you had seen what prodigious armies we had in Flanders'.

Laurence Sterne, The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy
INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is seen primarily as a contribution to the domestic political history of Britain in the years 1689-1712. The recent historiography of this period has been dominated by the rôle and importance of party. Macaulay, Trevelyan and Feiling, in their still seminal works, essentially interpreted the politics of this era in terms of party conflict. All three showed great sophistication in their awareness of those factors in the political scene which diverted, and sometimes subverted, the rôle of party; but their broad analysis gave pride of place to the Whig and Tory conflict. This interpretation was dominant until the revisionary work of Walcott, who in place of a two-party structure (of Anne's reign in particular) suggested a multi-party one. Walcott conceded that on the great political issues - the Church question, the Succession issue etc. - there was a clearly defined Whig and Tory standpoint; but argued that in the context of parliamentary politics this was of less significance than a shifting series of 'connexions', factions and personal groupings which shaped the diurnal texture of political life. Rubini attempted to establish much the same pattern for William's reign; giving emphasis to the concept of a Court-Country rather than Whig-Tory dichotomy in 1689-1702.

Walcott's and Rubini's analysis has been comprehensively rebutted by contemporary research. The Whig-Tory clash has been substantially re-established as the main, though not always the dominant, factor in the complex and fissiparous structure of parliamentary politics between 1689-1714. The political framework now established differs greatly from
that suggested by Walcott and Rubini, but resembles that advanced by Macaulay: William's reign witnessing a clear Whig-Tory conflict, albeit a conflict given added complexity by a still vibrant Court-Country antagonism, and Anne's reign even more overtly politically dominated by the Whig and Tory rivalry.

Emphasis on the structure of post-Revolution politics has diverted attention from its actual content (though it is always difficult to totally differentiate the two.) Walcott and Rubini were, in one sense, engaged in an attempt to devalue the rôle of ideology in the post-1688 political world. Although historians are generally convinced that the Whig-Tory dichotomy remains an essential cornerstone in the political history of 1688-1714, much of the actual content of that clash remains uninvestigated. The revisionist interpretation of Walcott and Rubini, although unsound generally, will have served some purpose if it forces us to examine the subtlety and variety of the interplay and political cross-currents between Whig and Tory in this period.

The purpose of this dissertation is to give detailed expression to the political character of one of the great issues of this period: the strategic debate. For twenty years between 1689-1712 Britain was at war with France. For most of these war years, sometimes fitfully but often violently, there was to be a dispute as to the best method of defeating France. The strategic issue became one more strand in the volatile structure of English politics. This dissertation attempts, for the first time, to delineate that debate in all its complexity, and to assess its contribution to the re-ordering of English political, above all party political, life after the accession of William III to the close of the Spanish Succession War. It does not see itself as a contribution to the military history of this period, though military factors have a
part to play. Nine years of bitter and expensive attrition warfare in
the years 1689-1697 culminated in an indecisive truce at Ryswick. The
Spanish Succession War of 1702-1712 seemed destined to follow the same
course in the early years, and despite Marlborough's victories in 1704-10
the war ended with military stalemate. The strategic problem retains
its validity in purely military terms therefore. Contemporaries argued
that instead of English military resources being used to confront France
in the heavily defended Spanish Netherlands and Flanders, which rendered
both wars expensive and overly prolonged, they would have been better
used at sea to attack the enemy's coasts, colonial possessions and marine
trade. In support of this continental strategy it was claimed that the
Anglo-Dutch forces committed to the Low Countries were England's first
line of defence against the permanent threat of a French invasion of the
British Isles, because English political and maritime security was ul-
timately bound up with the security of Flanders. And that given sufficient
commitment of Anglo-Dutch forces to the Flanders theatre it was possible
to strike at the heart of France and inflict crushing strategic defeat
on Louis XIV.

In order to put the politics of the strategic debate in perspective
it is necessary to establish in broad terms the full significance of the
Glorious Revolution of 1688 in terms of Britain's changed relationship
with Europe both in foreign and military policy. That the accession of
William III was revolutionary not only in its domestic impact but also in
changing the whole nature of Britain's external relations is now a common-
place of historical thought.4 William brought his new kingdom in from
the periphery of Europe to become the mainstay of an Anglo-Dutch, and
later European, alliance directed above everything to checking the ex-
pansionist policies pursued by France under Louis XIV. The English
declaration of war against France in April 1689 was the logical conclusion of William's life of resistance to French aggrandizement. As soon as his position in Britain was relatively secure William concentrated on the need to bring England into a military alliance against Louis XIV. The majority of William's new subjects saw his accession in parochial terms: as a bulwark against the Stuart absolutism that James had threatened and against Roman Catholicism. William's English supporters were bewildered at their new king's obsession with European issues, even when James's landing in Ireland in March 1689 seemed to threaten his position in the British Isles. Yet, as the thesis will illustrate, English opinion was not completely isolationist at this time. Some of William's new subjects immediately began to consider the problem of the best means to defeat France expeditiously and decisively in the coming conflict. Their writings, ignored since, immediately establish the strategic question as one of the main themes of the political life of the next twenty-five years.

William found his new kingdom in 1688-89 grievously unprepared in military terms for the European struggle now contemplated. In manpower and in many war materials France was stronger and more self-sufficient. And before 1694, at least, it hardly looks as if English resources were more easily mobilised for war. Although England had a large and powerful navy (but in 1688-89 its ships were often ill-fitted out, the dockyards short of supplies, and the naval officer corps racked with divisions and feuds), William was not contemplating, as many Englishmen were, a basically maritime war on England's part. For William saw the developing hostilities as a continuation of the attritional and largely defensive warfare he had maintained against France in 1672-78. The military power of France was essentially land-based and, as William saw it, was primarily directed at breaking Dutch resistance in Flanders and the Spanish Netherlands. William
was determined that the untapped military resources of England, both in manpower and wealth, should be exploited directly in defence of the Dutch Republic. To William Anglo-Dutch security was intertwined and mutually interdependent so far as to be virtually indistinguishable. Yet William saw foreign issues in 1688-89 not from an exclusively Dutch (as many of his new subjects came to believe) or English position but from a consciously European one. His ultimate concern was the maintenance of the peace, political balance and 'liberties' of Europe in the widest sense. William carried with him to England the concept, revolutionary to many Englishmen, that the British Isles was an integral segment of the European military and diplomatic structure and that she must play an essential role in the Continental state system.

William conceived of Anglo-Dutch strength and security as being established above all by the integrity of the Revolution Settlement of 1688-89: the defence of the national sovereignty, of the constitutional liberties and the protestant religion of his new kingdom. The removal of James II from the English throne was necessary because his policies had threatened all three; as even more clearly would his return under the military sponsorship of Louis. Hence the paramount importance to William of continuing the war until he gained recognition, even if only de facto, of his title as king of England by Louis. This was not achieved until 1697. French historians have drawn attention to the importance of the question of the recognition of James II as legitimate ruler in the war propaganda of Louis XIV. Both Louis and William sought a peace from 1692 on but peace talks continually floundered on this question. Hence the Jacobite claims that Louis had promised to continue the war until James reclaimed his lost kingdoms and that William's coup meant perpetual warfare. For England, the Nine Years' War was above all a war
for the Revolution Settlement and the Protestant Succession. A fact clearly, and early, understood by many Whigs. Yet by 1702 even a Tory House of Commons suggested an article in any treaties made by William 'that no peace shall be made with France, until His Majesty, and the nation, shall have reparation for the great indignity offered by the French king, in owning and declaring the pretended Prince of Wales King of England, Scotland and Ireland' after the death of James II.

William's revolutionary concept of the necessity for England to play a full part in European affairs had deep ramifications in the military sphere. Indeed, William's successful invasion of England had been made possible by a beneficial combination of military circumstances in Europe: in September 1688 Louis deprived himself of the means of assisting James by withdrawing the bulk of his fleet to the Mediterranean; and then launched an assault on the Rhineland in October, which committed his main army to a region far removed from the Dutch frontier. It became impossible to dissuade William from invading England by threatening the Low Countries, or to take advantage of his absence when the invasion was launched. Once William was established in England, the control of military policy (indeed, all foreign policy) lay clearly in the king's hands. William resolved military and diplomatic affairs with the advice of a select few Dutch favourites. Ministers often communicated to William their own, or parliament's, unease with the conduct of the war but in no sense was the strategy of the Nine Years' War seen by William as a subject for ministerial or parliamentary debate. The conflict, as it is sometimes called, was William's War. And after December 1690 most of the decisions about the conduct of the war were taken by William during his periods of absence abroad. During William's reign the king, his chief advisers and generals were to be assailed as foreigners and accused of exploiting England for
the benefit of the Dutch.

William's subjects, who had not experienced large-scale English commitment to European fighting since Elizabethan times, were strangely over-confident about the chances of defeating the French quickly and woefully underestimated the problems of fighting on land and sea, whilst also having to organize and finance an often shaky European alliance.

Lack of continental war experience throughout most of the seventeenth century had led to the development of what might be called the 'Country' strategic argument. It found its origin in the Elizabethan tradition of privateering and colonial raiding against Spain: the idea that maritime attacks on an enemy's colonies and trading routes were the best method of bringing a power such as Spain low, and that such attacks would make war a profitable or self-financing enterprise. (The naval victories in Spanish waters in 1702 in our period were specifically compared to Elizabeth's campaigns.) Such ideas surfaced again during the 1620s when it was thought that England might be committing itself to a continental conflict and the Commons wished to 'make war by the precedent of Queen Elizabeth'. By the early seventeenth century much opinion was fixed that 'war could hardly be determined upon the Low Country stage... Flanders being a province replenished with offensive and defensive armies and fortified with divers strong cities'. Instead, 'by the example of Drake', England should 'strike at the root' of Spain in the West Indies 'where he is weakest, and yet gathers his greatest strength'. In the 1621 parliament Pym invoked the precedent of Elizabethan warfare, as did members in 1624. In fact, as research has shown, Elizabeth had much the same set of strategic priorities as William a century later. Her central concern was the security of the Low Countries, Elizabeth believing that 'if the nation of Spain should make a conquest of those Low Countries...
in that danger ourself our countries and peoples might shortly be'.

Her first commitment was always to her Dutch allies and the need to prevent one power dominating Europe. In 1585 when war broke out with Spain the key area was the mouth of the Scheldt, because the Scheldt was the only harbour in which a Spanish invasion fleet could have been assembled and from which it could have been sailed with the probability of success. Philip of Spain knew this, for the Armada was to join with forces from the Scheldt for the actual invasion. So did Elizabeth and her council. English forces were sent over in August 1585 to Flanders expressly to occupy the forts controlling this potential invasion base. It was not until these forces had been dispatched that Drake was sent to the coast of Spain and attempts made to capture the treasure fleet from the West Indies. It would have been impossible for Elizabeth to bring Spain to terms even by concentrating exclusively on trade warfare, blockade or disruption of treasure fleets as the subsequent history of the war illustrated.

These points were ignored later on. The Dutch Wars of 1652-1674 were almost exclusively naval. Dutch power was essentially maritime and vulnerable to attacks on its commerce and colonies. And the Anglo-Dutch conflicts only reinforced earlier strategic prejudices. The Country suspicion of the threat a large 'standing army' might pose to constitutional liberties at home also gave extra edge to such ideas. Throughout the 1690s the parliamentary opposition opposed the increasing military contribution of England to the warfare in Flanders. As early as 1691 Flanders warfare was being condemned as futile and expensive. And by the start of the Spanish Succession War in 1702 many had fixed opinions that operations there were 'unprofitable'. In the 1690s many protested that England should refuse to become a principal in the
alliance but act as a naval auxiliary, and restrict its contribution to that allowed in the Anglo-Dutch defensive treaty of 1677. That treaty stipulated 10,000 English troops for European service; by 1692 William sought 65,000.

The bulk of parliamentary members were drawn from the middling gentry. They performed no real military function in society (apart from occasional militia service) unlike their European counterparts. They viewed William's expansion of the army after 1688 through memories of Cromwell's New Model and James II's army. Senior professional army officers were few in England and William had to employ large numbers of foreigners to officer his army. As early as 1689 it was objected that 'those of our own nation are thought to be as fit if not fitter to command the English, who would not have made such delays as others'.

The English gentry, apart from xenophobic objections, saw such officers as having a vested financial interest in a long war; unlike English officers with their fortunes based in the home country and faced with war taxation: 'Our officers are men of estates, to subdue the enemy and not make a trade of war' as one MP put it.

The army expansion of the 1690s added to the king's power by greatly increasing the amount of patronage available for political exploitation. Army officers and career diplomats often secured parliamentary seats. By 1693 William's ministers could note that such members were vital to continuing parliamentary support for the continental war. The 1690-95 parliament became known as the Officers' Parliament. Those engaged in supplying the vast needs of the army were suspected of having a vested mercenary interest in the long continuance of the Flanders war. By 1691 the army was already associated with 'false musters, treacherous victualling and sale of places'.

In 1694 William's Secretary at War, William
Blathwayt, was told 'It is discoursed by some men, very seriously, that you
occasion the carrying of money out of England in specie, to be distributed
to the Confederates whose agent you are'.

Alongside the 'Country' strategic tradition a rival one developed,
again stretching back to Elizabeth's reign, of Flanders as 'England's
outworks': an area of vital concern to English security, and one which
must be defended if necessary by English forces. The strategic ideas
that were debated in our period did not appear sui generis in 1689.
Both sides in the debate could appeal to precedent and draw on arguments
that had evolved over the previous century. William was helped con-
siderably in his task of establishing England as a partner in a European
military alliance by the fact that by 1689 there was a body of opinion
which accepted the necessity of helping to defend the Low Countries and
Flanders. William thus found it possible to extend and expand the limited
continental commitment envisaged in the treaty of 1677. Some Whigs
could see William's direction of English foreign policy towards continental
opposition to France as a return to an English tradition stretching back
to medieval times. The Tories, however, often argued that the Dutch
from motives of self-preservation were bound to defend Flanders and that
England need not concentrate on this.

William's ministers met such military isolationism by pointing out
that French successes on the continent were a real threat to English
security. English power was ultimately marine in nature and could not
be exerted effectively in Europe without partners. Yet by 1692 the
parliamentary opposition were fiercely denouncing the subsidies necessary
to sustain the allies. And the suspicion that England was being used
by the allies prompted suggestions in 1693 that William should ask for
cautions in the Spanish Netherlands in return for English efforts
on the allied behalf.\textsuperscript{25} In the same year William was told that 'it is
the opinion of your subjects that the situation of England and Ireland may
by a prudent management maintain a perpetual war against France and trade
as we please with little hazard, without the help of any confederates'.\textsuperscript{26}

But the allied armies met reverses at Steenkirk in 1692 and Neerwinden
in 1693. The French took Mons in 1691 and Namur 1692. The alliance
would have broken if English forces were reduced to the numbers sought
by the opposition. Many Dutch hoped for an early peace with France.
Savoy left the alliance in 1696 and made peace. An England left isolated
would have had to sue for peace under the most unfavourable terms, unlikely
to have included recognition by Louis of William's title. Such arguments
were carefully exploited by the Court in the crucial 1692-93 parliamentary
session and by the ministerial Whigs and their supporters after 1694.

What gave edge to such arguments, especially in William's reign,
was the vulnerability of England to French invasion; especially in the
years 1690, 1692 and 1696. Throughout William's reign the navy's first
priority had to be defending England from an invasion. The militia
would have been ineffective in opposition to a substantial body of French
troops. The French established themselves in Ireland in 1689-91, but
logistics made support for their army there difficult. But a French
invasion of England would have presented fewer such problems. English
security was therefore closely bound up with the security of the Belgian
coast, Zeeland and Antwerp. Tories were to argue towards the end of
William's reign that the over-commitment of English forces to Flanders
had left England without protection and meant that the English navy had
perforce to be used in a defensive rôle instead of attacking French trade
and colonies. In reality England's first line of defence against invasion
were the Anglo-Dutch troops in Flanders which confronted the mass of the
French army. Strategically, Scotland and Ireland were both an advantage and disadvantage to England. Access to their ports gave power and flexibility to the English navy. But their western coasts offered ample scope for concealment of enemy fleets as well as populations sympathetic to James II. The French port of Brest had easy connections to south-western Ireland, which were exploited in 1689-92. The French invasion of Scotland in 1708 was a more hazardous enterprise; for the French were sailing from Dunkirk to the Forth, an area with extensive trade links with Holland and little Jacobite fervour.

The expansion of the army convinced many that the navy was being starved of resources. But the navy also grew, especially in the 1690s which saw the largest and most rapid expansion since the first Dutch war. William spent £22 million on the army; but only £2 million less on the navy. William appreciated that the first priority of England was the maintenance of a powerful navy. England could only support a long continental war if it kept up a high level of overseas trade. English coastal shipping was just as vital to the nation's prosperity. From 1689 the French privateers caused considerable losses to English marine commerce. In 1693 a Levant convoy was taken by the French off Portugal losing £1 million cargo. There was bitter merchant criticism of the naval authorities. Mercantile discontent was often taken up in parliament by opposition groups. But many members, and not just those with a merchant background, had a vested interest in the defence of marine trade, especially the vital coastal traffic which was closely bound up with the prosperity of many an area far inland.

Effective convoy protection was only slowly realised, especially in 1689-97. There were often delays of a year or more before trade convoys could be organised. There was a shortage of the smaller-rated naval
ships which were the most effective defence against privateers. The English navy found it difficult to mount close blockades of the privateering bases: St Malo, Dunkirk, Calais. Naval bombardment of them also proved ineffective. By December, 1702 the Admiralty calculated that 110 out of 167 ships would be needed for trade defence in 1703. So much of the fleet was now committed to trade defence ('very much exceeding what was allotted the last war') that 'the Channel coasts of this kingdom will be greatly exposed to the insults of the enemy'.

It is only recently that the true seriousness of the French privateering war has been recognised. English foreign trade came perilously near disaster in both wars. The guerre de course was no makeshift policy but an aggressive strategic naval plan. Louis realised that privateers could not defeat England on their own. But he hoped to break the morale and resistance of the trading classes in England. (And privateering losses may have hastened the coming of peace in 1697. Conversely, the interference of English cruisers with French shipping did something in the wars of this period, if less than corn shortages, to sap the economic strength of France, according to the intendants of Brittany, Rouen and Amiens in these years.) As noted, the opposition groups in parliament took up merchant grievances with enthusiasm. They usually tried to widen out the merchant complaints into a broader attack on the whole strategy of war: arguing that England could not adequately defend its trade because its military resources were over-extended in a futile and costly land war. Early in 1696 the opposition, against a background of exceptional merchant distress over trade losses, attempted to set up a parliamentary sponsored committee of trade, which would have taken upon itself the whole matter of commerce defence.

It was not only the matter of trade protection which aroused anger
towards the navy in William's reign. The seeming inability of the main Anglo-Dutch battle fleet to achieve anything decisive puzzled many. The fleet secured what appeared strategic dominance in 1692 when it defeated the French at La Hougue. The failure to exploit this victory by immediately launching an invasion of France provoked indignation. And the opposition made little allowance for the unorthodox naval strategy adopted by the French after 1693, although there was a dawning awareness from that year that the French were not interested in a major fleet action. From then on, basically, Louis layed up the French main fleet and concentrated on destroying English commerce by privateering raids.

The Nine Years' War, in fact, led to a prolonged debate in France about the value to the country, as a land power, of the navy built up since the 1660s. The French navy was powerful by 1689, but rested on fragile economic foundations. After 1689 the maintenance of a large battle fleet as well as a large army proved economically impossible. By 1691, even after the French naval triumph at Beachy Head, the fleet was smaller than the Anglo-Dutch and was strategically on the defensive. After La Hougue the French navy set upon an ambitious building programme, but the financial crisis of 1693-94 meant a drastic reduction in naval spending. The privateering guerre de course came to be seen as the only realistic naval strategy available. But although their navy was smaller in numbers and they were reluctant to risk battle the French could still detach small but powerful squadrons as commerce raiders. Except for the attempted invasion in 1708, the only serious French naval move during the Succession War was the attempt to recover Gibraltar and the subsequent drawn naval engagement at Malaga in 1704. However, English marine losses to French privateers in the latter war owed more than ever to the co-operation of the French naval dockyards, which fitted out many large squadrons of corsairs.
Parliamentary action to encourage privateers in 1708 was a response to the very real anger in that session over merchant losses, as was the proposal to protect English sea-lanes with statutory cruisers and convoys. There was a general opinion in the Succession War, however, that naval protection of trade was 'much better ordered than in the late reign'. And losses from privateers do seem to have been less in that war.

To prevent invasion England had to maintain a large battle fleet. The new French naval base at Brest was well windward of established English naval dockyards. In 1693 William was told that 'now we fit out our fleets as formerly against Holland, from Chatham and Portsmouth' and that more use should be made of Irish ports. The English navy was incapable of mounting a close blockade of the Brittany coast. Reasonably effective command of the sea could not be established until new English bases were constructed. And the first and second rated ships which formed the main part of the fleet were not very useful in the rapid in-fighting of commerce raiding and protection.

It was the need to find an aggressive strategic use for the fleet which made William take the decision to winter the fleet in the Mediterranean in 1694–95, with Cadiz as the base. William hoped to support the Spanish and to contain French sea power in the Mediterranean. French war strategy after 1690 turned increasingly southwards. Louis decided to put more pressure on the weak members of the alliance: Spain and Savoy (forcing the latter into a peace in 1696). After 1692, in particular, Spain began to occupy a central place in French war strategy: operations in Catalonia were stepped up and there was renewed interest in the Spanish treasure fleet. To many the use of the English fleet in distant waters when trade at home was under attack was foolhardy. But from 1694 English sea power became an important factor in the politics of Southern Europe. William's
Mediterranean strategy had only limited effects in the short term, even in support of the Catalans and Piedmontese. But the precedent was taken up in the Succession War, when it achieved the conquest of Gibraltar and Minorca, as well as providing support for the Habsburg cause in Spain and Italy and allowing Britain to intervene with better effect in Mediterranean politics. Until the 'miscarriages' of merchant shipping led to a concentration of naval strength in home waters in 1708, Mediterranean operations occupied the navy more regularly in 1702-08 than previously.

William was not blind therefore to the importance of the right application of English naval strength. He was continually sympathetic to projects for coastal raids on France for instance. But essentially his strategy in the Nine Years' War was to be land-based. William's interest in the employment of the fleet in supporting coastal invasions of France and in the Mediterranean was secondary to his main concern of checking the French armies in the Low Countries; they were useful adjuncts to this end but were not seen by William as alternative strategies.

The 'descent', a direct coastal assault on France by naval and land forces, was the most popular alternative strategy advocated during William's war. It rested on certain assumptions: that the local population in many parts of France would assist or not actively resist an invasion; that the force, once landed, could subsist very largely off local resources; that a descent, or the threat of one, would force Louis to withdraw troops from Flanders. There was also the belief that a descent attempt would provoke the French into a naval battle. Until a descent force was securely established it is unlikely that many Frenchmen, even protestant Frenchmen, would actively support it, given the savage manner in which Louis traditionally put down local dissent. (It is true, however, that large numbers of French troops were used to hold down the Cevennois
protestants in 1702-04, and some thought them the 'cheapest allies the Queen has'). Armies in our period could 'live off the land' to some extent but a descent force, once landed, would still need large supplies of military equipment, munitions and stores, which would have presented logistical problems rarely considered. The further inland any invading army penetrated, and it would constitute no real threat unless it did push forward ('into the bowels of France' as Nottingham put it in 1703), the more these problems would have increased. The early capture of a large port would have been imperative. French manpower resources were such that it is difficult to imagine Louis's armies being so stretched that they could not have adequately covered any invading force and defended the northern frontiers. Louis did not divert troops from Flanders when invasion threatened in 1692; he merely mobilised his reserve militia, the arrière ban. The raids on France attempted in the Channel in 1708, or at the mouth of the Charente a little later, made no impression upon either the French economy or her troop dispositions.

William's accession, therefore, represented a truly revolutionary change in England's relationship with Europe. Unpleasant though it might be, Englishmen had to accept this change and their need for European allies. But many now saw William as the absentee leader of a European league who was prone to neglect or discount purely English interests. William only spent a few months in England each year, even after the peace of 1697. In the Act of Settlement of 1701 parliament insisted on the inclusion of a clause forbidding any monarch engaging England in a war without securing parliamentary consent. No foreigner, even naturalised, could hold office. And, directly aimed at William, the act prevented the monarch leaving England without parliamentary consent.

The enormous financial cost of the Nine Years' War meant that William
had to call parliament every year after 1688 to raise the necessary revenue for the conflict. Parliament thereby secured an opportunity, on the occasion of the presentation of the annual military estimates, to debate the conduct of the war. We are fortunate in possessing a detailed record of these debates for the critical early years of William's reign. They reveal the widespread optimism among many members that a swift coastal invasion of France would knock her out of the war. Other members displayed insularity and naivety by suggesting that England had only a limited interest in defending the Low Countries and in the European war in general. William's opening speeches to parliament reveal a growing willingness on his part to provide parliament with a reasonably frank summary of the progress in the Flanders campaigns. (In 1691, for instance, it was noted that William's 'sudden and open manner' of a request for 65,000 soldiers 'prevented the concerts of the opposition'.) And the Court, at parliament's prompting, eventually set out clearly the treaty basis of the war. Yet parliament still thought that William's absences abroad and his generally taciturn nature (he 'carries all things with that secrecy that few know his mind') left them relatively ignorant about the war. The King 'comes for nothing but money, and then he leaves us'. At the height of the Nine Years' War one member sarcastically voted that William's European travels meant that 'he might be as much unacquainted with the condition of our affairs here, as we are with what is done or doing abroad'. In the early part of William's reign some reportage of European news was available in the London Gazette, the only newspaper in 1689. But this was an official government organ. In 1693, for instance, it wrote up the French triumph at Landen of August as a pyrrhic victory. But with the lapsing of the Licensing Act in 1695 a plethora of newspapers appeared; and most of the events reported concerned foreign or military matters. There was also a
rapid growth in the number of pamphlets which discussed the war and its impact on economic life, as well as foreign relations generally. The pamphlets which appeared in 1700-01 on the Spanish Succession issue reveal a growing sophistication in English understanding of foreign matters.

But only from 1701 on did William really concede that parliament had a right to be informed about foreign developments. And this was against a general mood in England of withdrawal from European affairs after the Ryswick peace. Early in 1697 William's ministers advised him that parliament would not countenance the continuance of the war for another year. Yet William regarded the peace achieved at Ryswick as no more than an armed truce. William was amazed in 1697-98 at the lack of awareness in England of the international problems that lay ahead over the Spanish Succession when the infirm and childless ruler of Spain, Carlos II, died. William's standing in Europe was undermined by parliament's insistence on the immediate disbanding of most of the army. And Whigs as well as Tories, as this dissertation will show, saw any future conflict over the Spanish Empire as one that could be largely conducted in naval terms on England's part.

There was a particularly strong revival in 1700-02 of the old dream of a self-financing or profitable colonial war in the Caribbean. In truth, neither the English nor French governments had resources to spare for major operations in America during the Succession War so long as a military decision was sought in the Netherlands, Rhineland, Italy or Spain. Their naval forces were to be fully stretched in support of continental operations, by fears and plans of invasion, and by the defence of trade. Neither William or Louis saw colonial friction as primary in their dispute with each other. William did not press colonial matters at Ryswick or assign them much importance in his diplomacy before the outbreak of the Succession War.
William died before the outbreak of the war in April 1702. But Marlborough, Godolphin and the largely Tory ministry which Queen Anne appointed found they had no real option but to resume the late king's war strategy. Attempts by Rochester and Nottingham to champion an alternative maritime strategy were defeated. Indeed, by the end of 1702 Marlborough was suggesting that money voted for the fleet should be diverted towards augmenting the army in Flanders. The military situation in Europe meant that Anne's ministers were faced with the same pattern of strategic priorities as William had faced in 1689. In fact, by 1702 the military position was worse for the maritime powers. In 1689 William had defended the Spanish Netherlands but now, as a result of Philip of Spain's invitation to French troops to enter these territories in 1701, France defended the most heavily fortressed area in Europe. The Dutch garrisons previously authorised to stay there had been ordered out by Philip.

The Tory ministry also had no choice but to co-operate with the Dutch, although there was a fierce dislike of them among many Tories. The ministry, notably Godolphin and Marlborough (appointed commander of the Anglo-Dutch forces in 1702), feared that the Dutch, freed from the personal authority of William, would contemplate a separate peace. Marlborough wanted to force an early and decisive land battle with France. The Dutch were more cautious and often hindered Marlborough's plans. Though the Dutch army was still significantly larger than the English they were a declining military power in Europe, on land and sea. Dutch morale was brittle and would not risk a major military defeat. A continuance of the costly attrition warfare of 1689-97 was also a bleak prospect to them. These military realities were imperfectly understood by many Englishmen. As they saw it, the Dutch, by their excessive caution, were attempting to lengthen the war. There was widespread dissatisfaction amongst Whigs
and Tories with the Flanders war, which reached its height in the winter of 1703-04.

Given the military situation the maritime strategies championed by dissident ministers were not realistic. Rochester thought England should send to Flanders just the 10,000 troops stipulated in the treaty of 1678, and undertake a maritime war. This would have almost begged the Dutch to sign a peace, as a French offensive from Brabant would easily have overwhelmed the Dutch without allied backing. Nottingham appreciated that French occupation of the Spanish Netherlands meant that a large English force must support the Dutch. But he was against Marlborough launching offensive operations against France. The allies should rather take the initiative in the Mediterranean and in the colonies. This would make best use of the alliances made with Portugal and Savoy in 1703 and 1704.

Such views had widespread public support. One, often neglected, reason for their defeat was the attitude of Queen Anne. By reason of her sex, temperament and background, Anne was obviously a less potent figure in military matters than William. But the obvious favour shown to Marlborough by Anne in 1702 (at a time when there was a great deal of Whig as well as Tory hostility towards him) and her determination to endorse those who would wholeheartedly support the continental war were probably crucial. She regarded Tory attempts in 1704 to build up a rival maritime strategy around their hero Admiral Rooke as 'ridiculous'. Anne's accession in itself changed the whole nature of the foreign and war debate to many Tories. As one put it in 1702: 'We have now the first English sovereign that we have had these hundred years and an entire English interest'. In the Commons debates in November 1702, it was noted that in William's reign 'things had been conducted by strangers, and trusted to them, and that a vast treasure had been spent in unprofitable campaigns in Flanders'; but
there were now hopes that the army abroad would at least be furnished as far as possible with 'products of England'.

This dissertation will discuss in detail the strategic disputes within the ministry in 1702-04. To a limited extent the ministry played with the idea of pursuing a mixed strategy. A substantial force was sent to reconnoitre the Spanish coast and to rally support for Charles, the Habsburg claimant to the Spanish throne. The destruction of a returning Spanish treasure fleet in Vigo harbour 1702 encouraged hopes of a revival of maritime warfare. In 1704 English marines captured Gibraltar and the French fleet was forced to withdraw to Toulon after the battle of Malaga. Such successes lured Englishmen's eyes to the Mediterranean and colonial theatres. Marlborough had noted in 1701 the importance to public opinion in England of fears that the Mediterranean (and the West Indies) might fall completely into the hands of France. And the ministry evinced great fears in the early part of the war whenever it was thought that the French were planning a 'great armament' in the Mediterranean.

But the French were obviously intent upon making Northern Europe the main theatre of war. For the first two years of the Succession War the main fronts lay in the Netherlands, the area of the Lower Rhine, south Germany and north Italy. The first aim of the Anglo-Dutch army in the Netherlands was to capture the outlying posts on the Rhine and the Meuse which Joseph Clement, the ruler of Cologne, had earlier handed to the French. This was achieved in 1702-03. The conflict seemed to be taking on the nature of an old-fashioned siege war at which the French, with Vauban, and the Dutch, with Coehoorn, excelled. Closest partners of the French were the Spanish Netherlands. That country was put in a strong defensive position by the construction of the lines of Brabant, making use of a system of redoubts and rivers stretching from near Antwerp to Namur. A strong
body of troops could negotiate the lines, but until 1705 they prevented allied raids. Bavaria was also allied to France, and represented a strong French position within the German Empire, seriously threatening Austria: with French help an efficient army of 21,000 was created. The French were also strongly placed in Italy.

It is true that in the winter of 1701-02 a number of German states joined the alliance. But most of these territories were not allies in the full sense. Their troops were hired as auxiliaries and gave the maritime powers a large supply of manpower to draw on. Yet the assistance of Bavaria and Cologne gave vital help to the French cause, and Saxony was fully tied-up with the Northern War. When in September 1702 the Empire as a whole declared war the German contingents possessed limited fighting value. In the course of the war the Dutch Republic increased its army from 100,000 in 1702 to 137,000. And Britain to 75,000 from the force of 40,000 sent out in 1702. These large numbers were achieved by enlisting foreign auxiliaries, not half of either army consisted of nationals. An enormous Dutch effort was made in the land war. In the Spanish Netherlands they carried easily the heaviest burden. They were also responsible for the cost of the many sieges and the supply of heavy guns. The Imperial army, as large as the Dutch but less effective, carried the burden of the campaigns in Italy and Germany. The British commitment to the allied land forces, often thought disproportionate, should be seen in perspective therefore. Even so, from 1704 on obtaining sufficient soldiers (12,000 a year were needed) for service abroad was a continuing headache for English ministers. The activities of the recruiting agents caused great resentment amongst the Tory gentry and real social tension, as one country gentleman made clear to the ministry in 1705. By 1707 it was noted that the pressing of 'workmen, apprentices and servants' into the army was
causing much distress and bitterness. In the 1707-08 and 1708-09 parliamentary sessions many Tories were plainly setting out to disrupt effective army recruiting.54

The weakness of the Spanish monarchy denied it serious military significance. But France was solely equal to the entire alliance ranged against her. In 1705 she fielded an army of a quarter million. Her central position and relatively short lines of communication, with military control concentrated in the person of Louis XIV, gave her formidable advantages. To win the war France had only to maintain an effective defence. However, France was a declining power at sea. By 1704 she had lost effective command even in the Mediterranean. French and Spanish maritime trade was severely disrupted by the allies, and the Spanish coastline was vulnerable to allied attack. The allied fleet, once bases were captured, was able to extend the opportunities open to the allied armies in the Mediterranean; yet had sufficient naval preponderance to defend allied trade and the sea lanes to Northern Europe. The Dutch, however, found it increasingly difficult to meet their naval quotas and this caused fierce anger in England. And, as in the Nine Years' War, France was able to wage intensive war on enemy trade. And the fear of a French 'fleet in being' remained a factor in the wars of this period long after Louis had ceased to believe in its potential.

A word should also be said about contemporary naval tactics and strategy. In the hands of a competent commander a fleet in line, given no real numerical imbalance could stymie efforts of an aggressive opponent to force a decisive engagement. The wars of our period introduced an era of indecisive naval battles. It was the gradual increase of the English fleet after 1689 which assured marine supremacy, not battles. Seventeenth century fleets could not win and hold total control of the sea.
Beachy Head and La Hougue are clear evidence of this. The ships were cumbersome, gunnery inaccurate, signalling systems basic. The annihilation of an enemy fleet was almost impossible. European navies were distinctly subordinate to land forces in strategy. The allied naval dominance of the Mediterranean, for instance, had real limitations: it could not take Toulon or really assist the armies in central Spain. France had to be defeated on land. Criticism of the continental strategy, shallow though much of it was, reflected the problem of a maritime power facing a continental power able to sustain the fight despite apparent submission at sea.

It was difficult for Englishmen to gather intelligence of French military strength, dispositions or plans. French government was less open than in England; Louis had no need to explain his military intentions, however sketchily, to any elected parliament. Defoe, for one, pointed out the advantages an absolutist state had in fighting wars. This contrasted with the relative openness of allied military planning: Louis easily found out about the assault on Brest in 1694 and the Anglo-Dutch plans on Cadiz in 1702 for instance. Much of the military 'intelligence' from France came from Huguenot or Jacobite sources, who were unlikely to be realistic in their appraisal of French strength. In Anne's reign, in particular, much of the prompting for descents came from Huguenots. Over-reliance on French protestant reports bedevilled English military thinking in this period. What hard military information came from France was often misinterpreted. For instance, French naval activities in the Caribbean in 1698-1702, although essentially defensive, were seen as indicating that Louis intended to fight any war over the Spanish succession by pursuing a colonial strategy. Many Englishmen magnified their importance in arguing for a corresponding colonial strategy on England's part. William and Marlborough rightly divined in these years that the French intended to
to make their main effort in northern Europe but had great difficulty persuading others. Later, in 1706–07, 'intelligence from France'\textsuperscript{59} that Louis was contemplating operations in the West Indies helped to turn government attention to that area again. French ability to come back from a long series of continental defeats was attributed after 1706 to the supplies of silver received from the Spanish Empire. In the opening years of the war it was asserted that the mere cutting off of Spanish silver would force France to a peace.\textsuperscript{60} Yet French financial strength rested ultimately on the taille and gabelle not on Spanish silver. The seizure of part of the treasure fleet in 1708 did not break French resistance. Great hopes were often placed on the vital necessity of stopping all allied trade and commerce by letter with France. The Tory Commons in 1702–03 made it a condition of augmenting the English forces in Flanders that the Dutch should agree to such a prohibition. Nottingham believed that it would help break France. It was abandoned in 1704 when even the Tory economic writer Davenant pointed out its uselessness.\textsuperscript{61} The French economy was far less dependent on foreign trade than the English or Dutch. And the allied attempt to starve France into submission in 1709 by seizing all corn ships bound for France - 'to distress the enemy as much as possible' - came to nothing. Parliament was also continually over optimistic about the damage which could be inflicted on France by the prohibition of French imports.

Contemporaries may have seen France as an 'exorbitant' power, threatening the balance of Europe and the religious and civil liberties of individual states. But towards the latter part of his reign Louis' military objectives were, in many ways, limited and revolved around the security of France's northern and eastern frontiers. The Habsburg ring, forged by dynastic compacts of the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs, was still perceived as enclosing France. Many portes remained through which
which France could be attacked. After 1679 Louis tried to avoid large-scale military operations by means of diplomatic arbitration and many-sided treaties to resolve European problems. He favoured short campaigns or the diplomatic isolation of any opponent; often using money rather than arms to influence rulers and their ministers. The defensive nature of much of Louis' foreign policy revealed itself in various ways: by the erection of a barrière or frontière de fer of Vauban-designed forts around the whole of France, concentrated in the north and east; by the policy, from 1696 on, to withdraw from Italy (previously a cornerstone of Richelieu's and Mazarin's state systems) so as to allow a concentration of military resources on the northern frontiers; by the clauses in the second partition treaty of 1700: which handed the Spanish possessions in Italy to France, but with definite provisions and projects for 'exchanges' to strengthen the eastern frontier (the duchy of Milan was to be exchanged for Lorraine; Naples and Sicily exchanged for Savoy and Piedmont etc.)

A decisive victory over France, therefore, was always a difficult proposition. From 1676 on defensive warfare had particularly appealed to Louis. He came under the influence of Louvois and Chamlay who fought war as administrators. Louis liked limited war 'Journals' of detailed instructions, issued every campaign. Frequent reminders to avoid risks were conveyed to his generals. The great Luxembourg fought masterful evasive campaigns and Tallard and Vendôme regularly avoided battle. Frequent use of fortified lines supplemented regular fortresses; the campaigning season was short and sieges could take months; and contemporary armies were similar in equipment, weapons and tactical ideas. There was certainly more mobility of armies in the Succession War than in the Nine Years' War. As the campaigns which were to end at Blenheim and Turin prove the French were anxious to avoid the containment of the main fighting to the Spanish
Netherlands which had led them in the earlier war regularly to divert troops from the Rhineland. Yet the French generals were hampered by remote direction from Versailles, as much as Eugene (the ablest Habsburg general) by his services with the Austrian War Council and Marlborough by the obsession of his Dutch allies with defence.

Marlborough (apart from Charles XII of Sweden) was the most aggressive strategist as war commander in our period: judging a single victory in the field 'of far greater advantage to the common cause than the taking of twenty towns'. An ambitious strategy which terrified the Dutch. Yet even the genius of Marlborough found it impossible to break into France, even after such dramatic victories as Ramillies in 1706, in the short campaigning season. So much so that by 1709 onwards many Tories came to believe their own propaganda that Marlborough was deliberately trying to prolong the war by his conduct of operations.

Marlborough's ambitions to break the military stalemate were exemplified in 1704. Louis had been putting great pressure on the Empire and was threatening a large-scale attack along the Danube. Marlborough realised that attacks in the Spanish Netherlands or a diversionary offensive along the Moselle into eastern France could not assist the Empire. The loss of Vienna or a separate peace by the Emperor would have broken the alliance. Marlborough therefore moved his army over 500 miles to the Danube. This was a risky move and brought fierce criticism in England. He had seemingly left the Dutch open to invasion while taking his forces far from their secure supply lines. But Marlborough's victory at Blenheim in 1704 changed the whole nature of the war. Many in England were now enthusiastic for the continental war; although some Tories objected that 'It was true a great many men were killed or taken, but that to the French king was no more than to take a bucket of water out of a river'. The
strategic effects of Blenheim can indeed be over-estimated. The French armies were rebuilt for the 1705 campaign. During 1705, Marlborough, obstructed by the Dutch, achieved nothing of importance in the Spanish Netherlands. The war in south Germany may have been effectively ended and France deprived of its Bavarian support but Louis was no nearer ultimate defeat.

In terms both of the allied war effort, as well as the domestic political debate over war strategy, the treaties signed with Portugal in 1703 probably had greater long-term impact than Blenheim. Substantial forces were committed to a distant front and the whole purpose of the war was changed. The idea of dividing the Spanish monarchy was ditched in favour of the ambitious concept of 'No peace without Spain'. This prescription meant the war would now drag on well after the moderate ambitions of the original Grand Alliance treaty of 1701 had been met.

The Tories, and a wide spectrum of public opinion, took the Spanish war to heart and championed it as a rival, and more promising, strategy than the war in northern Europe. Keen as they were for Spain to be won for the allies the Whig leadership, the Junto, consistently opposed any suggestion that resources be diverted from Flanders to Spain. But Peterborough's victories in Spain in 1705 changed the whole strategic debate. Peterborough's expedition to the Mediterranean was an attempt to implement the maritime strategy favoured by many Tories. By taking Barcelona in September and Valencia and most of Catalonia soon after Peterborough became a popular hero. The Imperial claimant to the Spanish throne, Charles, established himself in Spain and even occupied Madrid in 1706. Originally the allies were fighting only for 'an equitable and reasonable satisfaction' for Charles. But he now sensed the possibility of becoming ruler of Spain.
The impact of the Spanish campaigns on the domestic strategic debate is discussed in detail later. But it is important to make a few general observations on the Spanish war. The dramatic rapidity of movement in the Spanish theatre captured attention and cast the slow progress of Flanders operations in an unfavourable light. Peterborough used all of his skills as a political publicist to suggest that a diversion of military resources from north to southern Europe would soon bring victory. But in significant part the war in Spain, as the best modern study makes plain, was a civil war. Allied intervention rested very heavily on provincial opposition to Castile and on the activities of the Catalan guerillas (the miqueletes). It was often possible for the allied armies to make considerable, and deluding, progress but in reality their position was insecure away from the littoral provinces of Spain. The more 'Charles III' depended on foreign troops to establish himself in Spain the more unlikely it was that Charles would ever find favour in Castile. Philip V's central, and secure, position in Castile was of immense military advantage to him. With Provence and Italy in mind the attack on Barcelona in 1705 was only intended to serve as a cover, but the allied armies became locked up in Catalonia. And the identification of Charles with the Catalan cause ruined his prospects in Castile. Andalucia would have offered better prospects for the allies, for Cadiz had better facilities as a harbour than Barcelona and was the base for the Spanish American trade. But plans to take Cadiz never came to fruition. By 1706 a few Englishmen appreciated that Spain was a 'kingdom entirely against us', but this was not widely recognised. The Spanish war also presented unique logistic and climatic difficulties which were not understood in England.

It was also relatively easy for the French to support their army in Spain. Coffee-house strategists in England often over-emphasised the
importance of Spain to the French war effort and saw Spain as where the French 'seemed resolved to make their greatest efforts'. In 1704-5 the allies were fighting a French army ill-supported by Spaniards, but by 1706 and thereafter they began to fight a Spanish army only supported by France. In March 1709 Stanhope estimated that France had 80 battalions of foot and 140 squadrons of horse in Spain. Large numbers of these were withdrawn in August 1709; but after 1709 the allied effort in Spain depended almost totally on the English army, notwithstanding the arrival of the Imperial general Starhemberg in April 1708 with some German troops. Looking back in 1711 one Tory could declare that 'we have had that kingdom twice in our hands'. But even on the two occasions that Madrid had been taken the allied position was still insecure. Writing from there in October 1710, Stanhope admitted that 'we are not masters in Castile of more ground than we encamp upon'. But many in England believed that England 'had a more particular interest in the preservation of Spain than any of the allies and found it difficult to accept military realities.

The suspicions rampant throughout the Succession War that the Spanish theatre had been neglected and mismanaged were given credence by the continual difficulty of establishing the exact state of the forces in Spain, for 'the methods of discipline there make it impossible to know the number of troops with the same exactness as is practised in other parts'. In 1707 Robert Harley, the Tory Secretary of State, noted the 'uncertainty of the true state of matters there'. In 1711 the Tory ministry found it difficult even after long enquiries to establish the numbers of men in Spain and Portugal. But what is certain is that after Marlborough and Godolphin lost faith in the Spanish war from 1707 money and troops voted for the war there were diverted to other theatres.
Italy was the sole theatre in 1705 where the military balance was still clearly in favour of the French. Both the defeat of Savoy and the expulsion of the Imperialists from Italy seemed imminent. Peterborough's expedition which eventually landed in Spain had been designed originally to relieve Savoy. But supporting English troops there would have been very difficult. In northern Italy, French advantages in the early part of 1706 threatened the conclusion of the war there. But Eugene's army was now reinforced by the Emperor. With the victory of Turin in September the allies had in effect won the war in Italy. It remained to be seen however whether what Vendôme had prophesied was true: 'The loss of Italy would involve the loss of everything'.

Early in 1706 Godolphin had thoughtfully noted that it might 'be almost as well for the allies to have the balance kept up in Italy' rather 'than drive the French quite out of it, which would enable the French to contract both their troops and their expense, and more expose us on this side to their force'.

The victory of Turin might well be argued to have had more strategic significance than Marlborough's victory at Ramillies in June 1706. Ramillies lost Louis the entire Spanish Netherlands in one campaign. Yet the victory removed the fear of France which had held the alliance together, and allied disputes were to prevent the conclusion of a satisfactory peace. The French drew on their awesome military reserves for the 1707 campaign. Louis concentrated an army of 100,000 in the Netherlands under Vendôme, but instructed him to avoid battle. Marlborough's forces were reduced and his freedom of action handicapped by the need to cover the towns of the Spanish Netherlands, Brussells in particular. The 1707 campaign achieved nothing for the allies.

The 1707 fighting was disastrous on all fronts for the allies. An assault on Toulon failed and a rash offensive by the allied armies in Spain
ended in defeat at Almanza. Philip was now in control of all Spain apart from separatist Catalonia. The failure of Toulon was especially important in the context of the domestic political debate over strategy for it seemed to finally mean the end of all hopes of bringing France down by attacks along her Mediterranean flanks. It was the turning point in the war for many Tories as this dissertation will make clear.

From 1706 on the largely Tory cabinet who had directed the early part of the hostilities were slowly replaced by Whigs. Godolphin and Marlborough still shared overall command but were now increasingly politically reliant on the Whig Junto. The Junto were in one sense a war party: they owed their dominance to their ability to organize disciplined political support for the war from among Whig ranks. The Junto had given unstinted support to William during the war of 1689-97. But William had rewarded them with little share in the shaping of foreign or military policy. The leading members of the Junto tended to concentrate their energies on domestic issues. Far less than the Tories were they given to setting out their views on war strategy in any coherent fashion. They remained fervent supporters however of the whole Spanish monarchy going to the Imperial claimant. They hoped to negotiate in return a commercial agreement giving English trade exclusive rights in Spain and her colonies. A secret treaty to this effect was made with Charles in 1707. They also hoped to extend a war which increasingly brought only political benefits to them at home. This basically political view of war strategy resulted in the celebrated resolution of December 1708, that no peace 'can be honourable or safe... if Spain and the Spanish West Indies be suffered to continue in the power of the House of Bourbon'. The Whigs hoped by this to prevent any possibility of a compromise peace with France based on the partition of the Spanish monarchy. The Junto Whigs remained convinced that only Marlborough could win Spain
for the allies by defeating France decisively in northern Europe. It is clear however that some of the Junto, Halifax and Somers in particular, were not blind to the attractions of colonial operations in the Caribbean. This was a concern shared with some of the Whig mercantile community as this dissertation will make clear.

Marlborough's campaign in 1707 persuaded him that he must not again compromise his freedom of manoeuvre by protecting the large towns of Brabant. He now intended to evacuate Brussells and establish Antwerp as the capital of the Spanish Netherlands. But the attempted invasion of Scotland disrupted his plans. And in Europe Vendôme captured Ghent and threatened the heart of the Spanish Netherlands. Marlborough checked the French advance at Oudenarde and contemplated advancing on Paris. But the Dutch insisted on taking Lille, which held out to December. In the Mediterranean the allies took Sardinia and Port Mahon. The French had scuttled part of their Mediterranean fleet during the Toulon campaign in 1707. The Mediterranean was now an English sea. With the ending of the Hungarian rebellion the Emperor was now able to send German troops to Spain. But neither German forces or the dominance of the English navy could turn the tide of war in Spain.

Peace negotiations collapsed in 1709 and the war now became one of national survival for France. Louis appointed Villars, the best French general, as commander on the northern frontier. He built up the formidable lines of La Basée. Marlborough hoped to march on Paris but was forced instead into siege warfare on the frontier. The battle of Malplaquet in that year destroyed the best of the Dutch army and the carnage horrified Englishmen at home. But the victories of Oudenarde and Malplaquet (and the latter was in many respects a defensive triumph for the French) led to exaggerated Whig hopes that France would now crack open and Marlborough's
forces were increased. But there was an increasing groundswell of opinion against the continental war. There was a remarkable inconsistency in the public attitude to the Flanders war throughout our period. On the one hand it was denounced as a place of 'eternal war' where no decisive military progress would ever be possible. Yet from 1709 Marlborough was to be bitterly attacked for not exploiting, deliberately it was suggested, the military possibilities that his victories opened up there. Both Whigs and Tories showed little awareness of Marlborough's difficulties of advancing rapidly in the most heavily fortressed area of Europe while being hampered by increasingly cautious Dutch allies.

Once again, Anne's rôle is important. By 1705 she had a real belief in the Succession War which had estranged her from her natural inclinations towards the Tories. She was hopeful that Ramillies would bring 'prospect of a peace' but was against a precipitate one. She became at this time a firm supporter of 'No Peace Without Spain'. But her personal aversion to the Junto Whigs remained steady, even after Marlborough and Godolphin had pointed out to her continuously (in itself an indication of her crucial importance to the war) after 1706 how necessary their support was to the continuance of the conflict. It is clear that Anne longed for peace after 1709; Harley noted 'her sex and Christian horror of bloodshed'. But she had to be convinced of the growing opposition to the continental war. The rapacity of the Junto with regard to the political gifts they demanded in return for supporting the war increasingly upset Anne. She grew frightened at the extent of Marlborough's personal and political ambition in 1708-09; in particular, his attempts to secure the Captain-Generalcy for life. By November 1709 the Junto perceived that Anne was obviously out of personal sympathy with the Whig cabinet regarding the continental war. By the summer of 1709 she was against reinforcing the
army in Flanders and in 1710 anxious that the forces in Spain be increased to follow up the victories there. She remained a potent symbol in the war debates. When she was persuaded to come to the Lords in January 1711 to lend her blessing to the new Tory ministry's attack on its predecessors' conduct of the war in Spain her presence helped to capture a number of undecided votes which ensured a Tory victory.

When the Tory administration entered office in 1710 a new offensive was under way in Spain. During the winter of 1709-10 some French forces had been withdrawn from Spain. But the failure of the allied offensive in 1710 ruled out the possibility of reviving the Mediterranean strategy earlier favoured by the Tories. A British force retreating after a short occupation of Madrid was forced to surrender at Brihuega in December. Marlborough's 1710 campaign was also indecisive. Villars refused battle and Marlborough, after expensive sieges, captured Douai, Béthune, St-Venant and Aire. In August 1710 Marlborough penetrated the famous Ne Plus Ultra lines and captured Bouchain; but the road to Paris was still blocked by fortresses.

Three days after Harley's appointment as Chancellor of the Exchequer it was being doubted that Marlborough would 'serve any longer than this campaign'. By the end of August however the Whigs were reassuring themselves that Marlborough would be kept on. The new Tory ministry had planned to offer the Elector of Hanover Marlborough's post if the latter resigned. But Marlborough refused to. In mid-December it was reported as 'talked afresh now that the Duke of Marlborough would command the army next year'. The disappointments in the Spanish campaign meant that the war in Flanders would have to be pushed for at least one more campaign while a peace was secured. As Godolphin noted, Marlborough was 'the great cement by which the whole Confederacy was held together'. Until
the eve of the conclusion of the peace the Tory ministry could not do other than maintain the utmost military pressure on France in the Flanders theatre.

The new Tory ministry toyed with the idea of reviving the colonial strategy, but probably more to draw support from the mercantile and financial groups than out of any deep belief in the efficacy of such a move. Public enthusiasm continued to remain strong however. But the colonial strategy hoped for by many Englishmen at the outbreak of the Succession War had one flaw: it was not feasible to combine a buccaneering strategy in the Spanish Indies with a policy of rallying the Spanish colonies to the Imperial claimant. And the idea of forcing the Imperial prince to grant England trading privileges would not improve his acceptability to the Spanish. Unless Charles was securely established in Madrid it is unlikely that the overseas territories would have declared for him. Colonial adventures in the Americas on England's part were also bound to cause suspicion and jealousy with the Dutch. Those experienced in colonial matters also doubted whether it was really in England's interest to conquer lands in Spanish America and then have the trouble and expense of protecting them. Better they argued to leave this task to the Spanish while England secured commercial concessions there from Spain. Also, professional naval opinion was well aware of the technical difficulties of warfare at such a distance and in adverse climatic conditions. Regiments mutinied rather than face service in the West Indies. After 1706 it was often Whig merchant groups who pushed for more military resources to be used in the colonial war. But the Whig leadership were usually aware that such arguments would be used to call for a diversion of resources and manpower from the Flanders theatre. The disastrous expedition to take Quebec in 1711 also illustrated the difficulty of undermining the French position in North America.
This was the essential form of the strategic debate 1689-1712. But this dissertation is concerned with the ramifications of the debate in terms of domestic politics. Broadly speaking it might be said that the respective strategic positions outlined above were taken up by the Whig and Tory parties in our period. Yet to present the strategic question in the often caricature terms of Whig internationalist versus Tory 'blue-water' isolationist, as is often the temptation, is seriously misleading. The strategic debate was, to many of the participants, one of emphasis rather than an absolute divide. Few politicians, save the most ante-diluvian Tories, shared Rochester's view that any English presence on the Continent was a waste of time. Few supporters of the European strategy were blind to the value of at least supporting operations in the West Indies or the Caribbean. There was a complex fusion of sentiment and realism in the strategic views of most politicians. It is the aim of this dissertation to explain the subtlety and complexity of the strategic debate in this period as it presented itself in domestic politics.

It will draw attention to the fact that, for instance, it is Whig writers who first develop the maritime strategy for defeating France in the early years of William's reign; that the Country parliamentary opposition, far from supporting the strategy of direct coastal assault on France, poured scorn on its usefulness as against the ardent championship of Court spokesmen; that both Whigs and Tories looked forward to a war of colonial raiding and commerce attacks in 1701-02; that it was a Tory Commons which committed England to large-scale continental involvement in 1702; that it was the traditionally isolationist Tory back-benchers who supported the extensive continental war commitment involved in the Spanish campaigns of 1705-1710; that it was some of the Junta, with the enthusiastic support of Whig merchants, who pressed for an aggressive colonial strategy.
from 1706 on against the implacable opposition of the Tory Marlborough.

The dissertation will also attempt to give a greater depth to the discussion of the strategic views of the major political figures than has been attempted before. The position of Robert Harley, for instance, in many ways the key political figure of the post-1688 political world, has never been examined in detail. All too often his views on foreign and military matters, before 1710 at least, have been relegated to minor importance in his political development. Yet Harley's ideas on what he saw as the deliberate mismanagement of William's war for party advantage undoubtedly played a crucial rôle in the development of his later attitude to the Succession War. Harley, as this dissertation will make clear, was no mere cypher as Secretary of State in 1704-1708. The evidence will show that he was consulted by Godolphin on matters of high strategy and diplomacy, and that his growing distaste for the war and the way it was being conducted played an important, perhaps decisive, rôle in his break with the ministry in 1708. A close examination of the correspondence between Godolphin and Marlborough during their management of the Succession War also enables us to analyse the full complexity of their strategic views and the quite serious differences which separated them on this question at times. The representative importance of certain second-tier ministerial figures - Davenant, Blathwayt, Stepney, Vernon etc. - is also examined in detail. Concentration on Davenant's economic views, for instance, has considerably neglected his importance in the development of a Tory conception of at least partial commitment, including military, to European affairs.

These are just a few of the topics that this dissertation examines with a view to giving for the first time a detailed review of the strategic debate as it manifested itself in the political life of Britain from 1688-
1712. The dissertation adopts a broadly narrative and chronological approach. The swiftly changing fortunes of the war and the necessity of connecting military and diplomatic events in various parts of the world to the debate at home largely dictate such a methodology. A concluding chapter summarises and draws out and develops some of the main themes.
Part One: The Nine Years' War 1689-97

(i) Early Hopes for a Maritime War 1688-89

England's declaration of war on France on 15 April 1689 was to William III the culmination of his life's work of opposing French aggrandizement in Europe. His intervention in English affairs owed much to his need to safeguard his wife's and his own claims to the throne. But once his position in Britain was relatively secure all his actions and statements testified to William's obsession with the need to bring England into a military alliance against Louis XIV. For most Englishmen the 'Glorious Revolution' was primarily a domestic event: securing the country against absolutism and Roman Catholicism. Many, like Halifax, were amazed at William's emphasis on European affairs, even after the news of James's landing in Ireland reached London in mid-March. However, the declaration of war produced much anti-French propaganda; mainly addressing itself to the question of how England's resources could best be employed to defeat France.

One contemporary noted that 'At the breaking out of this French war, the English, especially in London, were so sanguine that odds were laid in many hundred wagers, that King William would be at Paris before Christmas'. There was much optimism about the coming war. The Means to Free Europe from the French Usurpation (1689) was a sophisticated analysis of the impact of William's accession on Europe. Louis XIV, concluded the author:

Finds on the throne none but an irreconcilable enemy burning with zeal for the preservation of Europe... We have seen England, in changing masters, to make the face of European affairs change also.
William as English King was 'a bit clapped in the French King's mouth'.

Yet, the same writer saw any war with France in deceptively easy terms:

There needs but a descent on his coasts to give it him in good earnest... Five hundred leagues of coast confound him, not knowing where his enemies will land; there needs but some false alarm, and at the same time a real descent, to set all the troops he has along the coast in disorder. Join to that attack at the same time of his enemies by land, he must undoubtedly bow under these pressures.

The west coast of France was seen as naked and Louis's subjects there as discontented; so that 'if the Dutch and English fleets disembark several armies upon the coasts then Bretagne, Poictou and Gienne must be destroyed. The French were seen as dreading such descents in realization of their vulnerability.

The Anglo-Dutch fleet could easily drive the French navy back into Toulon; and 'need not strain very hard to fit out together 120 sail of ships, yet that number will be sufficient to overcome France by sea'. Once assembled:

This powerful fleet, which the King of England is to keep at sea continually, that in conjunction with that of the States General he may be master of the sea, and not only give an alarm on the coasts of France but make a descent also in two different parts ... then will that kingdom be in a combustion.

France was too strong in the Spanish Netherlands and along her eastern borders to allow a breakthrough there; and Spain was thought incapable of supplying troops for action in Spanish Flanders:

In this posture of affairs the confederates must never expect to do any great matter upon the French in these provinces unless they do very much outnumber them.

It would be fatal for the allies to 'trifle away time in encamping their forces, and in taking two or three frontier towns in one campaign'. As important as any purely military thinking in making descents so attractive was the idea that France was on the edge of revolt, and 'not the tenth part of that great people have cause to be contented'. 'If
England had an army on foot and stood inclined to make use of it that way—\(\text{a descent}\) we should not be long without an invitation \(\text{from the French}\).\(^8\) Therefore it would not be 'a bloody war but an easy victory for the English and Hollanders... More especially while the French, thus lying under the smart of their provocations, are thus favourably disposed to assist the enterprizes of their avenger'.\(^9\) Even if no descents were made, 'There needs no more than to hover about and sail along the coasts with a powerful fleet', or 'for the Anglo-Dutch naval forces to interrupt French sea trade', to force France into early defeat. 'Thus the allies need only maintain the war for two years at the most to gain a victory'.\(^10\)

'The French King commonly makes himself the assailant, maintaining half his wars at his adversaries charge, by fighting in their countries'.\(^11\) If the French achieved this 'It must be a long and unlucky war, managed by France on the soil of other princes'.\(^12\) A quick descent would take the war to France, where 'by her arbitrary government and intolerable impositions she hath probably prepared combustible matter, wherewith at any time to consume herself'.

An invading army could live off French resources, with no need to export specie or supplies. There was little recognition of the strategic advantages that French interior lines would bring. Louis was surrounded, with his country open to invasion on all sides.\(^13\)

Such optimism implicitly reflected the success of the recent 'descent on England' by William: an operation (extremely hazardous in fact) which had succeeded with little fighting, against a king swiftly disowned by his subjects. Evelyn wondered:

\[
\text{If in all he had read, or heard of, he had ever met with anything which was like this expedition of the Prince of Orange with so small a force, to obtain three great kingdoms without any contest'}\]
The convulsions in England, it was thought, would find a sympathetic response in France. The links established by the exiled James with Louis made this plausible. 'The Revolution that has happened in England, throws France into new agonies'. Louis was warned that 'the late easy Revolution in England is so fresh and deep in your memory, that I need not represent the history to your majesty, least it should make you abdicate before your time'. The writer went on to compare James's and Louis's policies.

The over-estimate of Huguenot strength contributed to such ideas. Huguenot tracts appeared in 1688 and 1689; portraying a France soured by high taxes, starvation and religious persecution. In 1689 appeared the first of many projects to aid the Cevennois by sending money and officers, and by invading Mediterranean France. The social disturbances to which France was prone made a great impact in England; and contributed to the view of Louis's kingdom as unstable. The Bordeaux tax riots and disturbances in Brittany in 1675 created great interest. In August 1675 it had been reported that the French were fearful of a Dutch fleet 'pur­posing to land men and furnish ammunition to the mutineers in Brittany'.

Writers in 1689 documented the growth of French military power since the 1660s. There was recognition of the importance of the Low Countries to English security and trade. The need for England to contribute to the defence of Flanders was acknowledged, as was the need for a firm military alliance with the Dutch; but the maintenance of a large force there was not foreseen. Yet the wide recognition of England's interest in defending the Low Countries is an important development.

* It was denied that there was any fundamental antagonism between the two nations (The Happy Union of England and Holland, May 1689, p.5).
The idea that France was particularly vulnerable to coastal descents that would spark off widespread rebellions can be traced back to Buckingham's La Rochelle expedition in 1629. With growing French power in the 1670s such ideas developed afresh. In 1678 one writer saw France as dreading English naval power: 'In regard of our ability thereby to make sudden invasion and descents into the maritime counties of our enemies'. Such ideas became widespread. During the discussions between England and Holland regarding the defensive treaty in 1678, the States learned that England 'had 6 or 8,000 landsmen always ready to annoy the French coasts by some descent'. The Dutch encouraged such beliefs. One 'gentleman in Holland' advised a MP in 1677 that if 'the King of England enters into the war, it is to be supposed that he will employ his arms principally at sea'. He stressed the need for frequent descents and for privateering attacks: thus distracting the French from Flanders where the Prince of Orange would operate. He thought the French would revolt if descents were made, especially in Bordeaux and Flanders.

Such ideas proved attractive to the growing Francophobia of many Whigs before 1688. Most of the 1688/89 pamphlets on the European situation bear obvious marks of Whig authorship. Many came from the radical Whig publishers: Richard Baldwin, Randall Taylor, Richard Bentley etc. Some were dedicated to distinguished names in radical Whig circles, like Wildman. The sense of European protestant solidarity of the Country Whigs found expression in the belief that the Huguenots would lead a popular revolt if a descent was made. The tension in Whig ideology between their Francophobia and their distrust of large standing armies was resolved in a reliance on that traditional safeguard of English liberties: the navy. It was a tension which emerged clearly after 1697. The ideas which appeared in 1688-89 echoed such Country Whig classics as Slingsby Bethel's The Interest of the Princes
Bethel warned England of the growing power of France, and the threat to England's security posed by French designs on the Low Countries. But Bethel stressed that England's position meant that it could rely on the navy for defence and offence, without need of a standing army. Bethel saw any war with France in purely naval terms. 28

Whatever the pre-Revolution provenance of such ideas they were widespread in 1689; and contributed to the mood of optimism regarding an early French defeat. This mood did not dissipate completely until 1692, and strongly influenced the political developments of the early years of the war. Until 1692 the enthusiasm for descents was exploited by the Court to secure military supplies for the war. The maritime strategy was not simply a negative response to protracted warfare in Flanders; but the very basis on which many Englishmen saw the kingdom as entering the war.
(ii) The Irish War and the Strategic Debate 1689-90.

The declaration of war on France on 15 April met little opposition. A small group of Whigs protested about William 'running the nation into a war with France'; but in the Commons the Whig Hampden and Churchman Clarges spoke for war, and the motion was approved without opposition on 16 April. Louis's sponsorship of James and the Franco-Jacobite invasion of Ireland forced most Englishmen to consider the European implications of William's accession. Many now saw the threat from the Jacobites and from France as the same. One MP observed:

'It is more than an Irish war; I think it is a French war. The French King has carried James into Ireland; and there is no way possible to bear that great force but by securing Ireland.'

The increasing vulnerability of Ireland as French power grew in the 1670s was apparent to many. Ireland was thought vulnerable to an invasion as France was: with a discontented population likely to assist any invaders. During the international crisis of 1677 Sir Robert Southwell had written to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland:

'No place would sooner feel the blow than the kingdom which your Excellency governs; whose miserable nakedness and want of defence your Excellency did sufficiently expose when you were here.'

William's first message to the Convention advised hastening the constitutional settlement because of the dangerous condition of 'the protestant interest in Ireland'. The immediate fear was that James would organize a counter-revolt from Ireland and Scotland with French help. An invasion of Ireland was feared even at the end of 1688. In December William was pressed to solve the Irish problem by 'conquest rather than compact' and to send immediately military aid, especially by refugee protestants. They had a spokesman in Clarendon, but found William seemingly indifferent: 'It is certain the Prince has very little curiosity, or sets a small value on
When the Convention Parliament met on 22 January 1689, each member was presented with a pamphlet on Ireland, by Sir Richard Coxe, a Cork lawyer. It stressed the importance of maintaining the Anglo-Irish connection; the practicability of military intervention; and the prospect of making the operation self-financing by confiscating the estates of James's supporters. Coxe recommended the despatch of 20,000 troops in a three-pronged attack: 4,000 should go to Ulster, 6,000 to Munster, and 10,000 to 'the heart of Ireland'.

William's Convention address noted the peril of the Irish protestants 'requiring a large and speedy succour'. But no immediate steps were taken. There were reasons: the army and navy were thought unreliable and money was short. No help reached Ulster until well after James had landed in Ireland. The Jacobites thought William dilatory: had he sent troops immediately, he would have 'easily effected what afterwards cost him so much blood and treasure'. In March one of Harley's correspondents lamented that 'Ireland seems wholly gone and Scotland dubious'. By late May the Protestants in Ireland were reduced to a few strongholds in Ulster; after delays in sending English forces and then the miscarriages of the relief expedition to Londonderry, commanded by Richards and Cunningham. Nor did the inconclusive engagement of Bantry Bay in early May between a French flotilla and English relief squadron help matters.

The links between the Anglo-Irish magnates in Ireland and their English counterparts were numerous and intimate. Lord Massareene, an extensive land holder in Ireland, had as his cousin Sir Richard Newdigate, a member of the Convention Parliament. Both supported the Revolution; but their correspondence shows the increasing fear over Irish affairs that developed in 1688-89, and the suspicions of William that followed. Even before James landed in Ireland Massareene was pleading that:
If succour from England do not speedily come these outrages and the effusion of much blood most come upon us... The French King's promises of aid to the Irish, which they expect before any come from England; and 2,000 a month ago had done as much as 10,000 will do now.42

With James established in Ireland Massareene wrote:

Thus you see how we are scattered, and the Protestant interest of Ireland ruined, all but Londonderry City I fear... The present expectation is of an Irish army to invade Scotland and disturb England.43

Massareene was sure where the blame lay, speaking of:

The failure of aid expected by the Protestants upon many promises, and more particularly by the faithful assurances thereof, given in King William's and Queen Mary's declaration of 22 February 1689, which was the cause of my family's stay so long in Ireland... I am sorry to see so many delays in the aid for Ireland and such fears of troubles in Scotland and England.44

William found the French invasion of Ireland a useful means of consolidating hostility to Louis. As Halifax noted, 'He had a mind to propose a war against France upon the assistance given by that King to King James. This was well before the war was declared'.45 But his seeming neglect of Ireland caused much bitterness.* Many Whigs were disgusted by the mismanagement of the Irish war given that the Privy Council committee on Irish affairs was dominated by Tories associated with the policies of the past two reigns.** In the Commons debates on Irish affairs in June, when it was agreed that Richards' and Cunningham's conduct should be investigated, John Howe alleged that 'it would not be doubted' that their negligence 'had encouragement from greater persons than themselves'. This was a barely concealed reference to Halifax and Carmarthen.46

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taken up outside by disaffected Whigs. Edward Stephens's printed *Reflections* created a tremendous furore.* They indicated how far some Country Whigs were alienated from William by the mismanagement of the Irish war. The miscarriages were blamed on William, and the Council of Ireland appointed by the King containing papists and followers of James II. John Somers, Whig lawyer and placeman, defended the King. He indicated the danger to England if William had sent troops prematurely to Ireland while James's disbanded army was still a threat; and the difficulties faced by the navy in supporting Ireland in the winter of 1688-1689, while 'the fleet was as yet in hands he [William] was not assured of'. Somers argued that the delays in troops arriving in Ireland were not William's fault, and that William 'showed his earnestness to relieve Ireland, to that height, as to order ammunition and provisions to be sent to Londonderry even before he was proclaimed King'.

Stephens argued that the initial failure to defend Ireland properly had meant that the English war effort was committed almost totally in the first year of the war to its recovery. Such a diversion had blasted the hopes for a quick victory by preventing an early attack on France 'on the one side as they [The Dutch] did on the other'. Similar criticisms of delay in launching the expected invasion of France were made at the end of the 1689 campaign. One author noted the siege warfare that was developing on France's borders:

> The difficulties we meet with in reducing Ireland; our losses of ships; our great decay of trade; the fall of our rents; and the heavy taxes we lie under; all must be imputed to the sieges of Mainz and Bonn, and all might have been prevented by a powerful invasion of France.

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The early setbacks in Ireland assumed retrospective significance for the Country and Tory opposition in William's reign as long years of military stalemate unfolded. In 1692 William was reminded that proper use of the fleet in the spring of 1689 could have prevented James and the French establishing themselves in Ireland and the 'rest had been sufficient to have crushed all the first preparations of the French for a naval war'.

* The real explosion of Country Whig bitterness came after the end of William's war. In 1698 John Trenchard returned to William's early neglect of Ireland, which had entailed the raising of a large army to retrieve the island; 'Thus the war in Ireland was mired up'. When the King had eventually to ask the Commons for 20,000 men to conquer Ireland, 'This was a bitter pill to the parliament who thought they might have managed their share of the war by sea' (John Trenchard, A Short History of Standing Armies in England, 1698, pp.20-22). Well into Anne's reign the Tories would point an accusing finger at William's early neglect of Ireland; and it became part of the standard party line relating to the war that, in Robert Harley's words: 'Upon the Revolution there was a fixed purpose to make a long war. To this end Ireland was neglected; and after that was reduced, the war carried on to Flanders - that place of eternal war - and there protracted' (Loan 29/370, memo. in Harley's hand, 14 December 1709).
On 24 October 1689 one observer noted that parliament 'did vote today for giving the King a vigorous assistance, and a full one for reducing Ireland and opposing the French King; it did take very well, the House was calm and unanimous'. On the 2 November the Commons voted £200,000 in extraordinary supply for the war. But there was a different mood after the summer's reverses. One Shropshire gentleman confided to Harley:

Since the war entered upon seems likely to have a prospect of some considerable continuation there will be a necessity of raising large sums of money, more especially if the war proceed as hitherto. But how it will be done is the subject.

Harley's correspondent thought that people would pay - 'all save the accursed party' - but that they would want 'Good fruits thereof, and therefore they grieved at the heaviness of this summer's campaign and should be glad to hear the reasons thereof'. In embryo, this was the attitude that led to the formation of the committee of Public Accounts.

It was not surprising, therefore, that the conduct of the war came under further scrutiny in the Commons; particularly in Ireland, where Schomberg (commander of the relief force landed in August) made no progress, and logistic inefficiency brought death and disease to his army. In November 1689 the new feeling of caution as far as financing the war effort was concerned found reflection in the appointment of Sir John Guise to chair a committee to investigate government accounts; and another was appointed under Paul Foley to investigate miscarriages. Both Whigs, they represented the still widespread feeling among that party that the war was being sabotaged by the employment of Charles II's and James II's courtiers.* Yet, from the outset these enquiries attracted Tory support.

* To many Whigs the two issues were inseparable, and one praised: 'The unanimity and briskness of the House in the last session both for the vigorous prosecution of the war and the enquiring into the summer's miscarriages at land and sea, and into the promotions of the betrayers of the rights and liberties of the subjects and nation, and also into the bloody trials of those that suffered in the last unhappy times' (Loan 29/150, Ed. Littleton to Harley, 30 October 1689).
Clarges thought that 'In great probability Ireland might have been had in January last for the asking'; for 'If the English army had intercepted King James we might have had Dublin and Drogheda before they had it'. Foley observed that 'Ireland was not relieved in proper time', and that 'it had been neglected for six months'. True, when the Commons renewed consideration of the miscarriages in December 1689 there was partisan back-biting. Some Whigs blamed miscarriages on the employment of those who had served in former reigns, particularly Halifax, Nottingham and Godolphin; and advised that this would lose the régime much of its initial support. Clarges retorted 'that we have none to fear but sectaries and commonwealth-men'.

But it was already clear that there were members, of diverse political origins, who would not accept the prevailing optimism about the war; or exhibit any gratitude for Dutch assistance in James's removal. In February 1689 Clarges attacked William for his 'inadvertancy' in placing Holland before Ireland - 'which goes nearest to us' - in his opening speech. Anti-Dutch feelings were openly espoused by some MPs, notably Seymour; with much resentment at the delayed arrival of those Dutch ships expected at Bantry Bay, and at continued Dutch trade with France. In fact, the inchoate 'Country' opposition, coming together late in 1689, owed most to the war. The debates in November/December 1689 increasingly referred to the expense of the war and over-extension of English resources. Clarges, for instance, would be easy to patronise for his insularity and xenophobia; but his very suspicion of all government and all demands for money meant that Clarges - and like-minded members - were far more realistic about the war than many others. Such members were concerned over the exact nature of the English war commitment, and its likely long term consequences. In February 1689 Clarges questioned 'the condition of our alliance with the
Dutch: Perhaps we shall enlarge it. I would not be hood-winked.\textsuperscript{59}

Clearly articulating the Country fear that William or some of his ministers must be engaged in deception.

In March the Commons formally asked to know the mutual obligations of assistance between Holland and England. After Bantry Bay they asked what number of ships and seamen the Dutch were obliged to fit out for the summer. And when they voted to inspect the books relating to Ireland they instructed the committee to enquire why the Dutch had not sent out their fleet sooner to join the English.\textsuperscript{60} In the debates later in the year Clarges requested firm information on military commitments:

I profess I am much in the dark till I hear some proposition from the King on the state of the war for the next year, and till we know the obligations of alliances.\textsuperscript{61}

Seymour asserted that England had 'come in at the day as assistants, now are made principals'. But the radical Whig Wildman declared that 'Against King James we are principals... and have need of confederates against King James and France'. Treby pointed out: 'There is an absolute necessity of an army' to defend Flanders, which is 'your outworks'.\textsuperscript{62} But the Whig Garraway thought England 'could not support the war above a year longer'. He thought French power exaggerated, and that what really accounted for the coalition against Louis was the expected struggle for the Spanish throne; and thought 'it better to apply money to the fleet, and retrench the landsmen. England knows no need of them'. Clarges thought that because of the Irish campaign it was unreasonable for England to send to the continent even the troops stipulated by the 1678 treaty. The Court tried to counter such arguments by exploiting the widespread optimism about French weakness, proclaiming that 'if we consider the state of France, it is not so formidable as represented ... If you are masters of the Channel, and supported by the Confederates he will soon fall'.\textsuperscript{63}
The summer campaign at sea caused great anger. The presence of the fleet in the western approaches helped prevent French reinforcements reaching Ireland, but failed to prevent the Mediterranean squadron which left Toulon in June joining the Atlantic squadron in Brest. It had also failed to protect the in-bound trade in the Channel approaches. James II, Dartmouth and Pepys were aware of the dangers to trade a war with France would bring. This awareness was lost in the disruption of naval administration following the revolution. The war, it was suggested, would not endanger English trade. On the contrary, 'The Dutch and we have thereby so many advantages both to beat her out of sea and increase our own navigation and traffic'. But by the end of 1689 it was estimated that a hundred vessels had been taken by privateers between the Scillies and Plymouth alone; and the West Indies and Mediterranean trades were at a standstill.

The influential and articulate resentment of the merchant interest was aroused. The trade losses provided a weapon for such members as Clarges to attack the basis of England’s commitment to the war:

You have heard of want of convoys, though this of trade is the life of land. Yet we are over-stretched in treaties. The Dutch are a fifth less charge in men than we. The Dutch are our great competitors in trade and we join with them in war.

Other members supported him, claiming that if the Dutch 'bear no greater proportion in naval quotas, and we be still kept to 5/8, they will run away with all our trade'. The idea that maritime trade was at risk because England’s war effort was over-committed and misdirected was to be one of the most important opposition arguments. It was Clarges’s motion that 'The want of a guard, or convoys, for the merchants, for the last year, hath been an obstruction of trade, and an occasion of great losses to the nation' that was eventually agreed. The widespread discontent over merchant losses was proving eminently exploitable in parliamentary
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Some Englishmen were aware of the difficulties England faced in the naval war. Somers noting that:

As to our losses in trade, it is a thing could not have been avoided in a war with France, considering the wideness of the sea, the impossibility of having convoys in all places, the small number of French merchant ships, and the great number of ours; and that the English ever thought the privateer trade beneath them. ⁷⁰

Though the 'Country' opposition in the Commons was developing a maritime strategy, it was completely different to that of those who had responded enthusiastically to William's declaration of war against France. It was essentially defensive in character: England should concentrate on pursuing a naval war of strictly limited liability, protecting maritime commerce and attacking France at sea. Members like Clarges spoke up for the mercantile interest, denied the interdependence of English and Continental affairs, and exploited the common distrust of the Dutch.

Such ideas revived arguments used in the Commons debates on foreign affairs treaty years before; which revealed then little awareness of French military power. There was a growing realization that 'If Flanders be swallowed up there is nothing betwixt us and France'. ⁷¹ But there was a widespread idea that the Netherlands could be secured simply by a conjunction of the Anglo-Dutch fleets. ⁷² Some members thought that a close blockade of the French coast for two or three years could ruin France. ⁷³ And, although there was an increasing awareness of the threat posed by the growing French fleet, ⁷⁴ many members underestimated French naval power. Some claimed that England had nothing to fear from a French privateering war; ⁷⁵ or that the French navy was not really formidable because the French lacked sufficient seamen to man the ships; ⁷⁶ Clarges claiming that: 'The strength of England consists in our marine which - for want of men - France can never equal us; their trade will not breed them'. ⁷⁷ In the 1677-78 debates Churchmen and Whigs insisted on a purely maritime approach to the expected
war with France. One member was 'for giving money for ships ... but for ships only, and for no other purpose... We put no shock upon France by having our forces in Holland'. Clarges expressed the same suspicions as in 1689 that England was over-committing itself in comparison with Holland, asking 'whether we are to bear the whole burden of the war', and questioning the quotas. It was suggested that England's contribution to any war should be to raise a fleet of 90 ships, 50 of them to be employed exclusively on the defence of trade and 40 used in conjunction with the Dutch. Many members wanted to limit the expense of a war in case it should be a long one.

Late in 1689 William abandoned the idea of reducing Ireland by attacking France. William had always desired a descent on France. In June he claimed there was only one reason for making Milford Haven one of the rendezvous for the forces assembling to attack Ireland, 'And that was not to be told; viz. more convenient to go from thence into France'. Later he confessed that 'He had a great mind to land in France and that it was the best way to save Ireland'. Earlier in the year William hoped to end the Irish war by winter and then 'There was nothing to be done but making a descent in France to give a diversion, or else the Confederates would make peace, even Holland itself'. William saw the descent as complementary to the Flanders war;* but told Waldeck in January 1690 that he saw no alternative but to concentrate his own and his realm's resources in Ireland for the coming campaign.**

* Though William's biographer thinks that he was still obsessed with the idea of a French rising (Baxter, S.B., William III, p.289).

** According to the Imperial envoy William had contemplated taking personal command in Ireland at the beginning of December, when he promised the Commons to take vigorous action there (Klopp, Fall des Hauses Stuart, v, 64-5, 339; Lamberty, Mémoires, ii, 693).
In January 1690 Sir Robert Southwell urged on William the necessity of a speedy, even if expensive, reconquest of Ireland. He recommended the use of Irish protestants as the best troops. Southwell thought that no one army based on Ulster could conquer Ireland quickly; and recommended a landing in the South, preferably at Cork. Clarges, too, advised William that employing 'protestant natives of that Kingdom' represented the best and cheapest method of subduing Ireland.

The enthusiasm which had greeted the Revolution seemed remote at the beginning of 1690. Harley lamented the economic dislocation caused by the war:

The noise of taxes and the deadness of markets fills the country with complaints. Farmers in many places throw up their lands... The Papists talk openly of the return of the King and how little opposition he is like to meet with. The French are certainly landed in Ireland. The prospect of affairs is very sad.

Fears about William going to Ireland were widespread. Harley thought it 'more questioned than formerly. Some think the visible growth of the King James's party prevents it'. William told Portland that 'Tout le monde continue fort a desaprouve mon voyage pour l'Irlande par de divers principes'. Carmarthen was reminded that Schomberg's failure in Ireland had ruined his reputation; if the King went in person, and was not immediately successful, the same would happen to him. One MP thought the King would be forced to take many troops, leaving the kingdom defenceless; and was concerned at the difficulties of supporting the campaign from England:

Should the total reduction of Ireland be effected yet this debt would be so great that the parliament will certainly quarrel with the ill husbandry, and say it may be done for less, and the factions will take advantage of that argument. To cure all this there is but one way, which is, to reduce the charge, whatever the consequences be, to such a proportion that the war may be carried on and the government subsist'.

Yet the King left for Ireland on 4 June. William thought that unless he
went to Ireland himself 'nothing worthwhile would be done'.\textsuperscript{91}

In March and April the Commons voted an extraordinary supply of £1,200,000, beyond the monies voted so far, for the support of the war in 1690. This met opposition. Clarges noted that 'The fleet is employed in everyone's business but ours, no wonder that Ireland miscarry', and thought that '20,000 men, considering our alliance with Holland, is all we need'.\textsuperscript{92}

One observer in June thought England was laying the 'foundation for a civil war', with in particular 'murmuring at the 10,000 men in the States' service' and the complaints of the 'unequal quota of ships'; given that 'France had so well defended itself the first year of the war'.\textsuperscript{93}

The naval action of Beachy Head in June 1690 seemed to leave England open to invasion. Nottingham told William:

There are not wanting disaffected persons who say that England is at a yearly charge of 5 millions and has near 80,000 men in pay in defence of Ireland, Scotland and Flanders, yet is itself naked and destitute of means of preservation.

Nottingham understood that the militia 'cannot be much relied on'.\textsuperscript{94} There was talk of risings in Scotland and England, and Carmarthen urged William to return from Ireland with some troops, 'The fears here being very great, especially whilst the French fleet are about the Downs!'.\textsuperscript{95}

But William's victory at the Boyne in July seemed to presage the end of the war in Ireland. When William returned to London in September 1690 he could take comfort in the results of the summer's campaign, despite

* The Queen told William that: 'When it was first known you were intending to come back, it was then said, what leave Ireland unconquered, the work unfinished? Now upon your not coming, it is wondered whose council this is, and why leave us to ourselves in danger' (Dalrymple, Memoirs, ii, appendix part ii, 156). But Harley thought the invasion scare 'propagated more than likely to get money from the City' (Loan 29/164, to Elizabeth Harley, 24 June 1690).
Beachy Head and the allied army's setback at Fleurus in July. Just before parliament met came news of the surrender of Cork. When parliament opened on 2 October 1690, William asked for £1,800,000 for the fleet and a 69,000 man army. On the 11 October the naval estimates were approved with little dispute. The troop requests provoked opposition. Some members, notably Seymour and Clarges, argued for a sharp reduction in the army and pursuit of a naval strategy. But with the Irish campaign over there was a widespread belief that the long-expected descent on France could finally take place.
(iv) The Descent 1690–1692

It is not clear whether the Court specifically promised a descent in the 1690–91 session (as it did in 1691/92 and 1692/93) but, as one MP noted with respect to the war, 'There are a great many people that have no other rule than to be for those who speak to them first'. Lord Manchester observed that 'most of the speeches tended as if they expect 40,000 men to land in France' the coming year to bring the war to a speedy end. On 13 October 69,000 men were approved without dissent, and on 14 October £2,300,000 to pay for them.

During the 1690–91 session the parties seemed 'to vie with one another who shall give the most', and the ready voting of £4,600,000 was eased from the evidence of a memorandum drafted by Carmarthen - by the activities of a set of 'managers of the King's directions', assisted by some privy councillors. Almost certainly, given Manchester's observations, the members were promised a descent. But there were other factors. The fears of invasion after Beachy Head induced generosity, and William's success in Ireland convinced others that the optimistic hopes of 1689 would now be realised.

* Dalrymple thought William's turning to the Tories had considerably eased the passage of supplies: the 'Tories ran before the King's wishes to cement their new friendship' (Dalrymple, i, 151).

** There was still a great deal of optimism about descents outside as well as inside parliament. One writer thought that 20,000 men should be used 'to make a vigorous descent' on France. One of the French coastal ports could be taken and then fortified. The taking of Brest, it was suggested, 'would destroy at once their power at sea'. The troops could be taken from Flanders; and the garrisons on French soil would be able to maintain themselves. Yet these ideas reflected a growing appreciation of the strength of France: 'The frontier of Flanders is so fortified, and that of Germany so wasted; the French also have now so great a force in the field, and they manage their affairs with so much skill and conduct' (Edward Littleton, A Project of a Descent Upon France, 1691 (written 1690).

*** Evelyn reported England in 'extraordinary alarm' over this (Evelyn, v, 27-29).
Burnet observed early in October that he:

Was never more surprised to see the House of Commons in such a temper. They dare not go back into their country if they do not give money liberally. The French fleet by lying so long on our coast and the King's behaviour in Ireland has made so wonderful a change in all men's minds. 100

Gratitude to William for his success in Ireland - 'Never was such a kingdom won in so short an expedition' one Tory enthused 101 - a fearful realization of England's vulnerability to invasion, and optimism about the expected descent had improved the morale of the Commons.

Optimism was not universal. The Harleys were extremely despondent at the end of 1690. Robert observed:

It is greatly feared that the Confederacy is in so languishing a condition that nothing can keep it alive but English money... Our fleet is likely to continue in the same posture it was last summer. The loss of trade and want of money and great taxes fill persons on all sides with great dissatisfaction. 102

A few days later Robert's brother reported:

The state of public affairs present a very sad prospect. The state of the Confederacy such that there is little hopes of its continuance. The French preparations by sea and land are immense. 103

The Whig Hampden and Tory Musgrave agreed. 104 The basic political division in the Commons was now between the optimists and pessimists concerning the war. The formation of the Commission of Public Accounts in December 1690 offered a chance to the latter to control war expenditure. 105

William's Tory ministers, despite an easy session, were pessimistic. Carmarthen especially so. He thought a diversion through Savoy the best chance of progress in the coming campaign, and without some notable success he thought William's position desperate when parliament met. 106

* The Commons had begun enquiries into the government war accounts in the 1690-1691 session (C.J., x, 495-9, 515-9).
held an allied conference at The Hague early in 1691. Writing from there, Nottingham agreed that 'The chief if not the only advantage that can be hoped for against France this year is from Savoy, but how that shall be carried on I can yet give your Lordship no account'.

Carmarthen was worried about Ireland, and thought that 'If affairs there go backwards (or indeed but stand still) I appeal to your Lordship how much an English parliament will value a town or two taken elsewhere'.

Nottingham pressed the advantages of a descent, which William thought 'scarce practicable'; Nottingham hoping a quick reduction of Ireland would release troops for a descent. Nottingham believed that a descent would force the French into a naval battle. But if nothing of this sort is to be expected', he wrote, 'nor any other thing can be proposed for our fleet to do, we shall have made but very ill preparation for the meeting of parliament.

In April the French took Mons (much to the disgust of Harley). The French navy got a supply fleet to Ireland in May, before the Anglo-Dutch fleet was out. When the latter sailed the French skilfully avoided battle. 'Nothing done at sea, pretending that we cannot meet with the French', noted one Tory. Although William prevented the French exploiting their success at Mons, the CPA group were now confirmed in their pessimism:

The art of war is great when two such vast armies are in dread of each other a whole summer and cannot be forced to an engagement, which makes it plain that the war may be of longer continuance than we ignorant creatures could fancy.

Edward Harley thought England should now concentrate on a privateering war against French trade.

The forces in Ireland made better progress. The taking of Athlone and success at Aughrim in July led ministers to suggest a small-scale descent before the campaign season ended. 'A little thing', Nottingham agreed, but one that would 'please better than a very great one done in Flanders'.
Indeed, Carmarthen pleaded that without such an attempt the Commons would ask for a cut in the Flanders contingent, and suggested a descent in Bordeaux or Normandy. Even Musgrave hoped that 'Ireland were settled by treaty ... that so we might solely apply ourselves against France'. There were no troops available for the descent and final victory in Ireland was not achieved until October. The Irish, Godolphin noted in August:

Seem to resolve to hold out at Limerick till the last, and that being the case, there need be no difference of opinion as to whether 10,000 men designed to be drawn from Ireland, be sent to Flanders or France, for they can hardly be spared for Ireland till Limerick be surrendered, and besides as there seems no probability of an engagement between the fleets which may perhaps make it more necessary but less possible to land in France with any success.

'I hope', Godolphin wrote to William, that parliament 'will think themselves so concerned for the preservation of that country as to pay them there for one year more'.

William was exceptionally open in his speech to parliament in October 1691.* He noted the 'good success in Ireland', and asked for a fleet in 1692 equal to that of 1691. An army of 65,000 would 'Not only defend ourselves from any insult, but also annoy the common enemy where it may be most sensible to them'. Phraseology suggesting a descent in 1692 without committing himself. Harley noted that most 'gentlemen generally come up with no other apprehension but to give all that is asked'.

The early part of the session went well for the Court. Late in October a motion offered by Sir Richard Temple (a Tory placeman) asking for assistance for William 'to the utmost' in the war was approved without opposition. But the House was still 'very thin', and Harley hoped for better things when more members arrived.

The smooth start came to a rude end when the Commissioners of Accounts

* Drafted with the help of Godolphin (S.P. 8/8, f1).
entered the debate. The Commissioners, mostly Whigs, had the support of Tories and others who shared a common outlook on the war. As Burnet noted:

And then it appeared that a party was avowedly formed against the government. They dare not own that before, while the war in Ireland continued. But now, since that was at an end, they began to infuse into all people, that there was no need of keeping up a great land army, and that we ought only to assist our allies with some auxiliary troops, and increase our force at sea. 124

Another observer noted that some members would 'now alter the methods of war, and spend all our forces by sea'. 125 Linked by a common attitude to the war and, in many cases, by membership of the Public Accounts Commission, the 'New Country Party', headed by Whigs such as Foley, Harley and Sir John Thompson, and by Tories such as Clarges and Musgrave, now attempted to enforce on the Court the more efficient management of the war effort. 126

From the start of the year they conducted wide-ranging enquiries into irregularities in government war finance. Their activities led to reports 'of schemes to put all things in disorder when a parliament shall meet', and of a 'design' that 'the war both by sea and land, shall be managed by a committee of parliament'. 127 Any financial mismanagement would be exploited to change the whole nature of England's war effort.

Foley presented a report on financial irregularities in the military accounts at the end of October. Harley thought these disclosures had 'a little opened the eyes of some gentlemen that came out of the country'. 128

Unfortunately for the Commissioners, some of the more partisan Whigs - 'men of intrigue' to Harley 129 - exploited the anger over the fleet's ill success to undermine Carmarthen and Nottingham, the two ministers responsible for naval affairs. 130 William prevented this getting out of hand; 131 but in November Clarges retaliated by attacking the Whig Admiral Russell's conduct, using as evidence a log book supplied by the Tory naval commander Killigrew. 132 Amidst this partisan bickering the enquiries into naval miscarriages had
seemingly come to nothing.

Yet the Commissioners' disclosures had their effect. Early in November Edward Harley reported 'no disposition to meddle with the ministers of state', now that 'Whigs and Tories unite against the Court in endeavouring to be frugal by good management'. In the debates on supply during November the Commissioners presented a detailed and critical examination of Court demands.* Their first success was the referral of the naval estimates to a select committee. On 14 November Harley presented the committee's report recommending the paring of nearly £280,000 from the original request of £1,855,000. His report was accepted almost completely by the House.** For all their concern with the fleet and trade protection, the CPA group demonstrated that 'good management' could be just as ruthlessly turned on the fleet as the army.

An army of 65,000 men was approved in general on 19 November after fierce debates. 'There seems no great forwardness in the House for the supplies', wrote one observer. 'They would not consider of that for the army, till they have more satisfaction how the king intends to dispose of the forces'. On the 18 November the army estimates were presented.

Goodricke told the Commons that:

His majesty was resolved to draw all his foreign forces

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* By late 1691 it was reported that Clarges and Musgrave had gained 'the character of Commonwealthmen' (H.M.C. Portland, iii, 485).

** Clarges attacked the original naval estimates as a 'great charge... In 1677 we were in a war against France and Holland and had 90 men of war at sea, and then your charge was but £108,000 per mensem'. Foley saw 'no reason' to maintain so many ships in summer and winter. And Musgrave thought it 'fit we have an account how many ships in particular are designed for the next summer' (Luttrell Diary, pp.9-10). The only vote in these debates went against the Court by 174 to 147; this involved the £28,864 'taken out', which had been for the building of 4 new 4th rate ships.
out of all his three kingdoms. That he would keep no more forces in England and Ireland than was absolutely necessary for the defence of the same. That he intended to employ the rest beyond the sea, either by making a descent into France or otherwise to annoy the common enemy. 136

And on the 19th the Court revived the hopes of a descent in language strongly reminiscent of the optimism of 1689. France could best be attacked by:

Landing an army upon him; hereby he must either come out at sea to fight you or suffer his country to be wasted by a powerful army. Then his own subjects will be apt to rise against him, being overwhelmed with so many oppressions and taxes. 137

Foley, realizing that the promised descent was being used by the Court to pass supplies, declared 'that a lesser number may serve for a diversion. Suppose we land and take a French port, and then you engage for ever after to keep a footing in France'. 138 Clarges thought that 'the most natural way is to continue the war where France grows so great: by sea'; which to him was synonymous with managing 'this war with as much frugality as possible'. 139

The Court pointed out that if the number of men requested was not granted:

There is the Confederacy broke... The proportion now as to your fleet with the Dutch is you are to be 2/3 and the Dutch 1/3; and both of us joined together are now but strong enough for the French. But if the French should overrun Holland and force the Dutch to join their fleet with his, what would become of us then. 140

The Attorney General, Treby, thought England could not possibly fight the French and the Dutch on its own 'if the Dutch make peace and truckle under France'. 141 Seymour also intended to speak in favour of a troop reduction, but was restrained by West Country members, a region vulnerable to a French attack, who declared repeatedly that the question should be put without

* This was a line of argument which was always denied by the more insular members such as Clarges (H.M.C. 7th Report (Denbigh) iii, 208).
further debate and thought that 100,000 men would be better than 65,000. 142 Twenty-six thousand of the troops requested were to be stationed at home. 143 Some members evinced fears of a 'standing army' in the kingdom. 144 One thought the troops 'designed - as pretended - for a descent' were merely being used as a 'colour' for this purpose. 145

The next debate on 25 November proved lively once it emerged that officers were not included among the 65,000 voted. The House supported a CPA resolution that the 13,000 men intended for Irish service should include officers. 146 But when the Commons returned to this subject a few days later Goodricke stated:

That the King has taken notice of your votes. He pulled them out of his pocket in Council. And he has empowered us to say that he was resolved to make a descent into France, and wthal that if you did strike off the number as proposed (as is done in Ireland by including the officers) you would spoil all. 147

This appealed to the continuing optimism about the success of a direct assault on France. 148 Clarges complained of the use of William's name in this way. 149 Foley thought that 'To say if we do not comply we shall break the King's measures, this is wholly irregular'. 149 Even so, the Court only won by 25 votes. 150

Yet the Court was now seemingly committed to the use of a substantial number of the voted troops in a descent in 1692. As Seymour reminded the Commons: 'If no descent be intended you have given too many'. 151

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* There had been considerable disquiet over the behaviour of William's troops in Ireland in 1691; which gave a sharper edge to fears on this point (Loan 29/164, Robert Harley to Elizabeth Harley, 31 March 1691; Loan 29/185, f 222, Edward Harley to Robert Harley, 24 October 1691).

** And reminded the more timid members that it was traditionally not seen as their business to determine war strategy. In 1689, Sir William Williams had spoken for this ingrained conservatism when noting that 'war and peace we meddle not with, we are only to supply it' (Grey, x, 110).
the Brandenburg envoy, believed that if 80,000 troops had been asked after Goodricke's disclosure they would have been granted.*152 The opposition had managed to force a 10% reduction in the army and navy estimates. But the Court's promise of a descent effectively countered the CPA assault. The Commission struggled on for another year. Their report in early December, alleging all sorts of malpractices, was received with indifference by the House.**153 But the estimates were subjected to closer examination than previously. There was a growing suspicion, notwithstanding the optimism about a descent, that 'This is like to be a long war so that you must be as saving as you can'.***154

With the ending of the Irish war the opening of the 1692 campaign saw English military resources applied fully for the first time to the European conflict. But descent preparations were delayed because of the emergency mobilization measures ordered in April against a threatened French invasion.155 Sunderland explained to Portland the unfortunate impression that William's failure to leave sufficient troops in England had created.156 William, hard-pressed in Flanders, considered reinforcing his army with five cavalry regiments stationed in England for the descent.157 Only Nottingham's

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* There was little interest in the wider question of England's continental security in these debates; as one observer noted (H.M.C. 7th Report (Denbigh), iii, 207).

** The CPA group suffered a defeat in the Commons later over the question of reducing the military establishment in Ireland. As Harley noted with regard to the Commission in February 1692: 'Many are desirous to get a bridle out of their mouths, at least they do not love super­visors' (Loan 29/79/2, 2 February). On the Irish establishment see: Loan 29/79/2, 31 December 1691 and 2 January 1692.

*** Note Evelyn's dismay upon hearing from a recent visitor to France in the latter part of 1691 of 'the strength of the French King, and the difficulty of our forcing him to fight'. Evelyn recorded his own despondency about the difficulty of finding 'any way to make impression into France' (Evelyn, iv, 72, 14 October 1691).
protests, seconded by Carmarthen, finally decided William not to summon the cavalry. 158

The English naval victory at La Hougue in May seemed to promise a successful descent. But the euphoria of victory soon dissipated and was followed by bitter recriminations: 'The great joy conceived for the late success at sea seems now much to vanish... The news now vastly differs from the first reports'. 159 Nottingham was especially keen not to lose the chance offered by the naval success for an invasion of France. Before La Hougue both Russell and Nottingham had agreed that a descent would force the French navy to fight. This, argued Russell, 'is what the nation expects; and without a battle this summer the fault will be laid on me'. 160 Nottingham agreed that a success at sea was necessary to prevent trouble in parliament, 161 especially considering that a descent was promised in the last session. 162 Nottingham thought that if the French took Namur then they would not begin another siege; if they did William was strong enough to hold them even if a detachment was withdrawn for the descent:

For whether a town more or less be won or lost in Flanders certainly the advantage or disadvantage is not comparable to the destruction of their fleet, which leaves all France open to an invasion and will encourage the parliament to pursue it with utmost vigour and resolution. Nottingham dissociated himself from the point of view that would have taken all English troops from Flanders, and was certain 'that we cannot be safe if Holland be exposed to be ruined by France'. But he suggested an army of 20,000 men for the descent, which could take St Malo and Brest. William had originally set aside 20 battalions, 14,500 men, for the assault. Nottingham wanted to increase this to 28 battalions, totalling 18,200 men. 163 An irresponsible suggestion given the situation in Flanders. Nottingham painted a grim picture of the reaction in parliament if there was no descent. He told William that the cabinet 'don't think parliament will be able to come
up to last year's money for the war'; especially if the money was to maintain a large army in Flanders, together with the export of specie which this would entail. In late August Nottingham reported much talk that 'since Namur was taken in spite of 100,000 men it is plain we cannot oppose France this way and therefore it is a vain thing to attempt it to exhausting all our treasure and the dispeopling the kingdom'. He told Portland that the idea was being floated of excusing the Dutch their naval quota and placing the defence of Flanders entirely on their shoulders.

However, in the Cabinet Council discussions early in March after William's departure it became evident that Nottingham's hopes for the descent were not universal. Most of Mary's advisers, led by Godolphin, declined to proceed until further authorization from William. Some of the cabinet blanched at the expected cost of the assault, notably Rochester and Godolphin. Russell went to Portsmouth to discuss the descent with Portland, Sidney and Rochester; but 'Shrewsbury and his gang told everybody that Mr Russell had gained a great victory and that there was three lords gone to spoil it'. In late May Russell was still apparently enthusiastic about the descent. But when the troop transports were held up until late July, Russell decided not to proceed with any of the descent schemes. The French navy reformed its fleets at Brest; and, while regiments which William needed were held in England for the descent, the French took Namur in June. In August the allied armies were defeated at Steenkirk. In that month a last effort was made by the cabinet to salvage something from the campaign. Nottingham, Carmarthen and Rochester met both land and sea officers, but none of the naval commanders could be persuaded to provide fleet cover for an attack on St Malo.

Russell threw the blame for the aborted descent on the cabinet, Nottingham in particular. Nottingham wrote long justifications of his
conduct to Portland, intended ultimately for William's eyes; while Russell publicly attacked him. William supported Nottingham; being 'resolved', Blathwayt wrote, 'to support the committee and the reputation of their proceedings, though the preparations must be acknowledged to have been very late, which is plainly a consequence of our want of money and other disabilities at home'.

The abortive descent, failure in Flanders and bickering between Russell and Nottingham cast a shadow over the coming session. Rochester advised the King in mid-August that he would probably have to accept a reduction in his Flanders army. This view was supported by the cabinet, although with reservations. Rochester's war views resembled the CPAs': distrust of the Dutch; the need for England to concentrate on a sea war of strictly limited liability; and dismissal of descent attempts as costly and futile.* Carmarthen, Nottingham and Pembroke took care to dissociate themselves from Rochester's proposal to reduce the army and enlarge the fleet. Nottingham thought it a 'pernicious' and 'fatal' scheme; convinced that the navy simply did not have the men, without denuding the merchant service, or the ships. If the army was reduced, Nottingham saw the Confederacy broken; as well as severe social disturbances following rapid demobilization. But the three ministers thought the Commons could be persuaded to give the same in 1693 as in 1692 if a descent was promised. Carmarthen reminding William that many country gentlemen believed that 'sending an army into Flanders is not the way to put an end to the war. But that which is far more prevalent amongst the country gentlemen is that the war there exhausts the specie out of the kingdom'. Carmarthen thought much of the enthusiasm for descents was motivated by hopes of eventual savings: even if a descent

* Carmarthen thought Rochester had done his best to obstruct the 1692 descent (Browning, i, 500).
did not cause a revolution in France, the army might subsist off the land or be supplied from England. 176 Carmarthen thought the Commons would keep up the present number of troops and did not believe 'the difficulty would be so great as imagined were the country gentlemen left to their own thoughts'. 177 Nottingham shared his colleague's misgivings, but argued positively: 'To invade France next year with a powerful army' would reduce the loss of specie, and a 'considerable success there' would 'cause a revolution' against Louis and end the war; 10,000 men left in Flanders could hold the French. 178

There was a violent outpouring of anti-government propaganda in 1692, much of it taking war strategy as its theme. William's land campaigns were dismissed as 'futile' and leading to the 'exhausting of the wealth of the nation'. While England misdirected its military efforts the 'French remain in reality the masters of the sea'. England should concentrate on attacking French marine commerce:

To ruin him in his West India trade and cut off his seamen; to shut up his commerce northwards through our own seas, to spoil him in some of his chief harbours and sea-port towns; destroy the rest of his ships of force, and ruin his trading, even in the Mediterranean. Descent attempts were scorned: 'Which though but for the same reasons that made it last year unsuccessful, cannot be expected but to prove so this next, and is likely to prove more fatal to us'. 179 Such propaganda closely followed the war strategy advocated by the CPA group. A malcontent ultra-Whig nobleman, Delamere, took up the same arguments. Instead of making a land war, England should finance a fleet of 100 ships, supplemented by 100 privateers; the latter 'to have been wholly employed to destroy their fishing in Newfoundland, as their interest in America, to have crushed their privateers, and have burnt their ships of trade in all their harbours'. The Confederates 'ought to be assisted', but only by naval action; if they
insisted on land armies 'we should have paid the Confederates subsidies to raise men'.

The dependence of France upon marine trade was overestimated, and a naval war was presented as self-financing or profitable. Great hopes were placed on prevention of trade with the French, for 'unless we can put a stop to the commerce of France with our neighbours, and to the supply of ships, stores and other things which they receive from them, we can never hope to bring this war to an happy end'.

However, in November 1692, coinciding with the opening of parliament - it addressed itself to 'Those who are now assembled' - appeared a cogent defence of the King's war record. Its main theme was:

The fatal consequence it would be to us here, if the French King should be suffered to be master of the Spanish Netherlands... and if any considerations should make us lay open that bulwark by withdrawing our joint assistance, what is more visible than that not only Flanders would be immediately overrun, but Holland too would be reduced to the last extremity.

And then England would not be able 'either to act defensively or to manage the war separately', for she could never oppose the French at sea without Dutch help and the Dutch could not hold off France without English help. A descent on France would be useful only as a means to 'revive the spirits of this drooping country'; it might 'wound him in a limb' but not bring France down. Though there was still optimism in 1692 about the parlous internal condition of France and its nearness to revolt.

* Such arguments found expression in the defeatist insularity of An Honest Commoner's Speech (1692): as for the continent, 'What have we to do there? Our part is little more than defensive; scour the coast and you secure the island and trade'.

** For the more erudite, 1692 saw the appearance of Temple's diplomatic memoirs covering 1672-1679. The main theme was the importance of Flanders and Holland to England's maritime security and the necessity of maintaining a compact between the two nations against France, and the neglect of such principles by Charles II (Sir William Temple, Memoirs of What Past in Christendom 1672-1679, 1692).
The CPA members were hopeful over the coming session. Harley reported in July that 'the private discourse of all sorts was that new measures must be taken or the King and government are ruined'. Tollet, the Commission's secretary, reminded Harley that 'Parliament should not forget that a descent was said to be intended'. Musgrave thought there was 'no question but those who so confidently asserted a descent will endeavour to explain their meaning; it will be hard for Sir John Guise, because he was very particular in the manner of doing it'; 'but', he added pessimistically, 'our good natured people are easily satisfied'. The Court could surely no longer exploit enthusiasm for a descent to push through supplies. Gwyn thought the summer's events would 'make your fraternity [the CPA] think of saving us money the next winter, which I am sure there will be need enough of doing'. It was 'talked very publicly in the coffee houses that parliament is put off so long that nothing may be done but give money'.

Foley thought the maladministration of naval affairs, especially trade defence, the best means of uniting opposition to the Court and ensuring the shifting of England's resources to a naval war; although the ministry was using 'mighty endeavours to hinder it'. On the 23 September merchants petitioned the Admiralty over their losses, claiming 2,000 ships worth £4,000,000 had been lost since 1689. The Admiralty thought the losses exaggerated, and blamed the merchants for not going in convoys. In further discussions the merchants revised their figures to 1,000 ships worth £1,000,000. 'The main design of those that set it on foot', one official noted, 'being to raise a clamour'.

* Rumours were circulating among CPA members that the Dutch were engaging in peace talks (Loan 29/186, f 162, G. Tollet to Harley, 11 October 1692).

** Clarges was very sympathetic to the merchant case (Loan 29/186, f 131, to Harley, 27 September 1692).
The strategic debate as seen by the CPA group was set out in mid-September by Foley. He found three schools of thought:

1. To reduce the army only to defensive at home making our navy as strong as may be
2. To make our army strong enough by itself to make a descent upon France so as the command and officers may be such as are likely to pursue it to effect
3. The middle between these extremes to endeavour to keep off a general excise and let the Court otherwise get what they can of supply and manage all themselves at their peril as hitherto.

Foley realised that 'the first will depend upon the Confederacy standing or breaking'; the second 'upon the terms which may be consented to encourage it'; and that 'the third will be the effect of no agreement'.

* Baxter (William III, p.307) sees this letter as establishing that in 1692 the Tories developed a 'blue-water' strategy!
(v) The 1692-93 Session: The Turning Point

William opened the new session on 4 November. His speech was, thought Harley, 'quite other than his former ones'. William was pliant and forthcoming. He asked for 'assistance' and 'advice' on the war, and for both naval and land forces to be kept at the present level; but promised to listen to any suggestions regarding the 'inconvenience of sending out of the kingdom great sums of money'. William promised another descent attempt in 1693 with larger forces. He reminded his listeners that 'we have the same religion to defend', so 'you cannot be more concerned for the preservation of your liberties and properties than I am that you should always remain in full possession of them'. A reminder of how near the war had come to England in that year, and a point which the Court repeated in the coming debates. But the CPA group had prepared well and intended to exploit dissatisfaction over the last year's war effort to question the exact nature of England's alliances and the subsidies to the allies. Discontent was rife, as one foreign observer noted; and Harley thought William's speech offered 'a very good handle to lay hold upon for the good of the public'.

When the session reopened, Clarges asked William to present 'the leagues and alliances he has with any foreign princes', and in particular the 'alliances made with Holland in April and August 1689'; and this was resolved on by the House, without Court opposition. Clarges reminded the House that 'You gave the last sessions a great deal of money for a descent upon France but it ended in a descent at Ostend'. On the 15 November the Commons agreed, at the urging of 'the Country Party', to put consideration of the accounts, alliances and advice before supply, despite Court pleas that 'the Exchequer was never barer than now'.

This gave Harley 'hopes, which before were low, that God hath mercy
for us'. He was happy at the events of 21 November: with nearly 400 members present the Commons took up the report of a select committee on merchant shipping losses.\textsuperscript{199} The committee basically accepted the figures for losses presented by the London merchants. The Admiralty Commission, a Whig dominated body, was accused of being 'very careless in appointing cruisers'. For the first time the speeches on the war mainly centred on the desirability of maintaining large forces in Flanders, with the members taking up positions resembling those presented in the pamphlet debate about the war before the session. The opposition members linked the over-extension of English resources in a mistaken continental war to mercantile losses and the growing danger from French privateers. Clarges thought France 'irresistible' in Flanders:\textsuperscript{200}

\begin{quote}
We ought to have applied ourselves to sea and attacked them there; to have burned his ships if possible so to have weakened him there, whereby we should have done ourselves the best service.\textsuperscript{201}
\end{quote}

One member recommended an address to William 'To take care of the sea and let your Confederates take care of the land'.\textsuperscript{202} Harley complained that 'You had a great victory at sea this summer but your enemies reap the benefit thereof by their trade, of which you may soon be masters if you will make yourselves entire masters at sea';\textsuperscript{203} and that 'the pretence of a descent into France has been a topic used to get money from you'.\textsuperscript{204}

As always when trade defence was discussed even Court supporters were critical of the sea management. One thought it possible to 'impoverish France by inducing the two northern crowns to prohibit a trade with France', and 'letting 'privateers go abroad and give them prizes they take to encourage them'.\textsuperscript{205} The Court argued that there were not sufficient

\* One member complained of 'the want of cruisers at the mouth of your Channel to guard your merchants'. Falkland replied that the Commons had contributed to the shortage of lower rated ships by removing the building of four new 4th rate ships from the 1692 naval estimates (Luttrell Diary, p.245).
ships for the battle fleet and the protection of trade: 'You must have
more ships and that cannot be without money'.206 One of the Admiralty
Commissioners blamed the merchants for causing losses by not sailing in
convoys.207 After a debate of five hours, the question, formed by Harley
and his friends, that the Admiralty be entrusted 'to such persons as have
known experience in marine affairs and that all orders to the fleet may
pass through the said commissioners', was passed without division.208
Seymour and Lowther justified Nottingham's dispatch of orders to the fleet
as established practice; and the ministerial Whigs defended their Admiralty
friends. However, those against the motion were not confident about
dividing against it. The 'universal complaint' against 'the managers
of the government' over 'these embarrassments upon trade' proved eminently
exploitable by the CPA group.209

These early opposition successes proved no indicator of the mood of
the Commons on the wider question of war and supplies. In a series of
debates between 22 November and 10 December the Commons proved incredibly
generous with assistance for the continental war. By the 3 December a
total of 54,000 men had been approved, and expenditure of £4,000,000 agreed
to, only £200,000 less than requested. Harley reflected that he and the
CPA group of 'seven or eight' had 'done the part of honest men and lovers
of our countries against all placemen'.210 The series of debates which
accompanied these Court triumphs were a significant turning point in the
history of the war and in the attitudes of parliament.

On the 22 November the Court presented abstracts of nine treaties
between William and the allies. Clarges thought the treaties established
that 'Holland and the Empire were the principals in the war, and that
Spain was drawn in by the Emperor and we were by the Dutch'; and that
England was making an unfair contribution in respect of the 5/8 and 3/8
division of the Anglo-Dutch fleet, and the subsidy payments to Savoy. This was not followed up by other CPA supporters, who were silenced by the Court's willingness to set out clearly the treaty basis of the war. 211 At the end of November the naval estimates were debated. The Court requested nearly £500,000; 'a prodigious sum' Clarges thought. 212 Foley complained that the 'navy is a growing charge. It still increases on you every year, but I see no reason for it to increase now when you beat your enemy the last year'; all that was needed was 'as good a fleet as you had last year'. 213 There were attacks on Dutch failures to meet their naval quotas. Goodricke tried to placate the Commons with promises of rich pickings in the West Indies and a 'squadron on the Irish coast' to protect trade. Even so, Clarges tried to get the building of eight new 4th rates struck off the estimates for 1693. Falkland reminded the House of the want of these smaller rated ships for trade protection and on a division the Court won 104 to 80. 214

On 21 November Harley condemned the unfulfilled promise of a descent in the previous session as a ruse to get money. 215 But the discussion on 30 November of a report on the descent was turned to partisan ends, with the Whigs blaming Nottingham for its failure and the Tories shifting responsibility on to Russell. 216 Harley was disgusted at the party bickering, 'for other ends than the public good'. 217 Thus conducted, the debates of 30 November prevented any general discussion on the conduct of the war; although, as one member noted, the descent attempt had 'lost you near £400,000 and was made the great discourse of last sessions to draw you in and pick your pockets'. 218

* Minutes of the discussion (S.P. 8, King William's Chest, f 146) reveal growing cynicism about descent attempts. Seymour admitted that 'the business of the descent was neither prudently undertaken, nor well managed, nor well carried on'.
During the seven-hour debate on the land forces on 3 December the Court broke the opposition to the maintenance of large forces in Flanders. The Court exploited the fears of a French invasion by claiming that Flanders was England's first line of defence:

Some gentlemen are pleased to call this a defensive war, but I am sure if you help not to support it it will prove an offensive one upon you. The seat of war is now in another kingdom, but if you break the alliance you may chance to bring it into your own... Let gentlemen consider that if we withdrew our forces from Flanders whether the Confederates will be able to carry on without us... They will withdraw their assistance by sea and then consider whether you can stand alone.

Temple thought it 'better we should fight for Flanders than for England'. Lord Colchester, seconded by Court supporters, warned that if 'you come not up' to the requested number of land forces 'all Flanders will be lost the next year'.

Ranelagh had informed the Commons that 20,000 of the 54,000 asked for were to be kept in Britain for home defence. A significant concession to public opinion.* Sunderland had pressed on William for two years the need to assure 'the generality of mankind' that sufficient care to secure the kingdom was being taken. The opposition tried to force through a separate vote merely on the 20,000 forces for home defence, and then attack the 34,000 troops for overseas service in detail; for, Foley argued, they could 'see no likelihood of an end' to the war, and were themselves 'for managing it so that we may be able to hold it on'.

* In November one observer had noted that: 'People think the government can't last. Now the first step to persuade the world it may last, must be to let England always be in a posture of defence, not to be conquered in a month, which can only be by bringing over with the King and keeping constantly here, such a body of men as may hinder attempts of that kind... People are possessed of a dangerous opinion that England is not taken care of' (Japikse, i, part ii, 37, memo. by Henry Guy, November 1692).
ourselves first', one member recommended,'and then you may consider of your allies'. But on the 23 December the Commons was told of the 'vast preparations at sea' being made by the French; and there was much talk of a possible French invasion. Sensing the mood of the House, Wharton resolved that 'the first question of 20,000 men may be put, and then I doubt not but gentlemen will see the necessity of coming up to the remainder of the forces'; which duly they did. The 34,000 were carried 'with so great a majority that the opposite side did not think fit to divide for it'. Musgrave argued that the Court was pushing through the troop estimates on the basis that 'a descent is intended'. But if the troops voted for overseas service were 'designed to make a conquest in France', he argued, 'they are too few, and if you could get a province or two therein what would it signify when you will not be long able to keep it'. In fact, only one Court spokesman used the ploy of another descent attempt in 1693 to push through the army estimates. Court spokesmen laid stress on the need to secure Flanders in order to defend England; and it was certainly in this spirit that the army numbers were voted.

The CPA group managed to take the lead in devising financial expedients to raise money for the war, attempting to stave off a possible general excise. But these were pyrrhic victories in a session in which the Commons had been brought to appreciate the concrete realities of England's strategic position. The frightening events of 1692 turned the rather abstract conception of Flanders as 'England's outpost' into a perceived reality. The fears of Jacobite activity and of James returning 'on a French horse', and the danger of the Dutch deserting the alliance and leaving England to fight alone, forced parliament to contemplate seriously for the first time the maintenance on a long-standing basis of a large English army in Europe.
(vi) The Jacobites and War Strategy

The Court informed the Commons that if 'we withdraw our forces from Flanders, to seriously consider with themselves if it is not better to bear some small inconvenience now than to have King James come back with a French power - whether the hardships now are comparable to the mischiefs that will then follow'. Musgrave contended that 'If you keep a good fleet at sea you need not fear King James's return'. The Court's skilful exploitation of 'the amazing horror conceived from the threatenings of a powerful invasion', and then linking it with the scares over Jacobite activity contributed greatly to the eventual ease of passage of the army votes on 3 December.

Early in 1692, before the invasion scare, the Commons heard of letters from Jacobites in England 'pressing the landing of the French, and that there were 30,000 ready to join them'. One observer noted that all Jacobite 'hopes depend on a foreign force'. Early in 1693 one pamphleteer answered the increasing Jacobite propaganda by noting that the return of James 'would make us slaves both to King James and the French King'.

In the summer of 1692 Jacobites were reported as refusing to pay taxes in anticipation of the imminent return of James.

Numerous Jacobite pamphlets survive from the early 1690s, and the topics that their authors, often disguised as soured Williamites, chose to exploit are interesting. Rather than theoretical discussion of the

* Throughout 1692 parliament had had the Jacobite threat as a running motif to their deliberations: whether it was the consideration in the Lords of the legality of the Privy Council's committal of the previous spring of Marlborough, Huntingdon and Scarsdale on suspicion of such sympathies, or the widespread dispersal of Jacobite pamphlets (H.M.C. House of Lords 1692-1693, pp.86-91; Foxcroft, ii, 158-9; Luttrell Diary, pp. 274-5, 277).
legitimacy of William's kingship most of the Jacobite writers concentrated on the war strategy adopted and the damage it was causing to England's mercantile interests. In 1690 the Jacobites were attacking William's neglect of Ireland; the expense of sending men to Holland; and noting merchant losses to French privateers while 'the Dutch run away with our trade'. 'The English interest is governed by Dutch councils', wrote one; declaring that 'to put down France is the Emperor's work'.

Many of the pamphlets were designed to appeal to the merchant community, and resurrected mercantile suspicions of the Dutch, who 'have always been our rivals and are now our masters'. 'Our trade is lost at sea', bewailed one patriot, 'and we are harassed by taxes by land, to maintain an army upon a foreign continent, and a fleet at sea, who neither fight'.

The descent was 'a design so shamelessly managed as the only thing to buoy us up to sponge 5 or 6 millions more out of our purses'; and the author was contemptuous of the chances of success for any new attempt. England should 'recall our forces, break off the Confederacy and to stand upon our own legs, maintain a good army here at home, pay them well and augment our navy'.

Such sentiments were similar to those heard often enough in the Commons.

* A copy of this pamphlet came into Shrewsbury's hands; who fulminated about 'The daily impertinences of some disaffected persons' and their 'scurrilous reflections upon the government which they obtrude on all kinds of persons' (C.S.P.D. 1690, p.445, 4 February 1690).

** By early 1693 one Jacobite could claim: 'The revolution in England was the contrivance of the Confederacy in general and insisted upon by those singular advantages they proposed to themselves by it. They have drained our wealth and occasioned our blood to be spilt most profusely... Instead of carrying on a vigorous war against France and humbling her they have stood merely upon the defensive, which is only to suffer the evils of war'. (William Anderton, Remarks Upon the Present Confederacy, 1693).
from Clarges or Foley.* It was alleged that 'abundance of those that seemed fierce republicarians are in reality fierce Jacobites'. In the summer of 1692 Carmarthen had written of 'some Jacobites promising themselves a winter assistance from France, but most depending upon an ill humour in the parliament - in which they have the concurrence of the republican party - and thereby a kind of certainty of not finding the necessary supplies for another year'. A doctrine that was assiduously spread by the Court before the session.

In the highly-charged atmosphere of 1692 Jacobite and CPA arguments seemed dangerously close. Throughout the year a concerted pamphlet campaign against the 'Whiggish Jacobites' gained momentum. The Jacobite technique of 'extolling the flourishing of trade under James II' was drawn attention to. And any who claimed that taxes were too high were accused of making compact with those wishing 'to make people disaffected to the present government'. James II's printed 'Declaration' of April 1692, distributed widely, was a litany of Country complaints about the loss of ships, specie going abroad to support a futile continental

* The Jacobite pamphlets quoted parliamentary speeches which supported their position, such as those on the trade losses of 1689: A Choice Collection of Papers (ed. by E. Stephens), 1703, The Englishman's Complaint, 1689/1690, p.224 (misnumbered p.204). For a list of pamphlets in Harley's collection, which included many Jacobite titles, see: Loan 29/17, bundle 8.

** A Dialogue Betwixt Whig and Tory (1693), by one of Sunderland's writers, Ben Overton, accused all Tories of being Jacobites; and attacked Harley and Foley for running with the Tory party.

*** A similar manifesto of King James distributed a year later was 'so written as many thought to be very reasonable' (Evelyn, v, 141, 25 May 1693. Cf. James II, Life, ed. Clarke, ii, 502-5; Luttrell Relation, iii, 104).
The last point was taken up by the CPA group on 9 December, when the Commons discussed subsidy payments to Savoy and Hanover. Clarges thought that the English contributing 2/3, to the Dutch 1/3, towards the Savoy alliance was all wrong. But as the Court pointed out, the Commons had good reason to encourage the Duke of Savoy, he 'having done you great service and it is the only way you can attack France'. The necessary subsidies were eventually voted. Nor did a group in the Lords who moved 'that His Majesty should be humbly advised to demand both of the Hollanders and Spaniards cautious towns as Ostend, Newport, Sluyce etc', have any more success. After long debate the motion was defeated (Luttrell Diary, p.305; Add MSS 34096, ff 233, 256; Browning, i, 503; Ranke, vi, 202-05).
Whig Support for the Continental War 1693-94

The question of another descent played a minor part in the 1692-93 session. Early in 1693, however, preparations were renewed; despite a shortage of funds and over Godolphin's strong protests. One observer noted that 'They begin to talk here of the descent as a thing that is intended in good earnest'. Others were sceptical. 'A most formidable descent is as much talked of now as it was this twelve month', wrote one cynic, 'and it is not doubted that it will be as successful as the last'. To Musgrave the descent was something 'I cannot fathom; the charge will be great nor ever be the success'.

The Commissioners for Transport met great difficulty in securing money; and informed Blathwayt that they were 'told at Whitehall that we were doing miracles to make a descent without money'. When they asked the Treasury for funds, Seymour was particularly hostile and 'did not care to hear of it'. The Committee of Lords treated them 'in a better manner'. Godolphin was asked to estimate the charges for the descent, and told William that 'some of the lords were inclined to think our report was not very fair, and that we had endeavoured in every particular, to aggravate and increase the expense, rather than give a true and impartial state of it'. Some ministers (including the still enthusiastic Nottingham) received Godolphin's estimates with scepticism and preparations continued. Godolphin admitted he did not have 'enough faith in the thing itself to give easily in to any expense which the preparations require'; and thought there would be enough difficulty in raising the money for the normal expense of the forces:

* In May there was talk 'of bringing out forces from Flanders under colour of a descent to be a standing army for other purposes' (Evelyn, v, 140, 14 May 1693).
And if there is no probability either of making this descent or of success, supposing it could be made, which way can one hope that the diverting of so much money will be forgiven. 255

The descent was now a political liability rather than an asset. It never took place; a matter which passed without comment in the next session. Interest in descents declined outside parliament. 256

The 1693 campaigns on both sea and land were calamitous. The out-manned allied army was defeated at Landen in July.** The surrender of Huy convinced Harley that 'No one believed that the Dutch will cause their army to fight to preserve any towns but their own'. 257 At sea the Turkey fleet was left unguarded and took heavy losses from French privateers. Even before this disaster Sunderland wrote to Portland reporting 'the discontent, or rather rage, people are in concerning the fleets, the Admiral and the ministers'. He found much talk of 'taking the government into their own hands', and the widespread opinion that the money given for the fleet 'had better have been thrown into the sea'. 258 A Whig Admiralty official, asked in the summer of 1693 for his observations on naval mismanagement, informed Trenchard:

> It is the opinion of several of the King's subjects that the situation of England and Ireland may by a prudent management maintain a perpetual war against France and trade as we please with little hazard without the help of any of the Confederates. 259

The danger was that naval miscarriages would so alienate the mercantile

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* And the arguments in favour of descents became increasingly cranky. One writer advocated the creation of a series of fortifications along the French coast which could be lightly garrisoned and reinforced by marines. These would be self-sustaining as they might collect tribute money from the surrounding area whilst giving aid to larger invasion forces from England. ([Edward Littleton], The Descent Upon France Considered in a Letter to a Member of Parliament, 1693).

** Musgrave, like many others, was appalled at the loss of life at Landen (Loan 29/312, to Harley, 31 July 1693).
and monied community that the financing of the European war effort would be undermined. Or that the CPA group would exploit the mercantile discontent by repeating calls for a purely naval war on England's part.

Musgrave was convinced that 'our great security depends upon our fleet, and that must abate the greatness of France'. The fate of the Turkey fleet dismayed the CPA group. Harley reported in mid-June that 'The Cabinet and Secretary wash their hands from this management and load the experienced land admirals and wise and honest sea admirals'. Harley thought 'The folly of sending' the Turkey Company 'thus is not to be paralleled'. Musgrave wondering 'Why our fleet should leave them till they were well assured of the station of the French fleet'. When the main fleet was forced back into Torbay in early July to revictual, Harley was disgusted: 'What the meaning of the fleet's return I know not', he lamented, 'want of beer is pretended'. By the time the fleet was victualled, Musgrave wrote, 'the next consideration will be concerning the time for laying up the great ships. And then there is an end of our summer's fleet expedition'. Even Musgrave did not think the Tory admirals 'wholly excusable in this matter'. The naval mismanagement confirmed CPA opinion that the war was being fought at the expense of English trade; and 'If the sea be not better regarded for the security of trade we shall quickly be poor and miserable'.

Edward Harley reported 'many citizens resolved not to encourage any loans' until trade was better protected. The ministry deflected much mercantile discontent on Nottingham, and the three fleet admirals.

* Godolphin advised William that the navy must devote more resources to protecting commerce, for 'When all is done, the war cannot be supported, unless trade is protected' (C.S.P.D. 1693, p.274, 18 August 1693).

** Two of them, Killigrew and Delaval, were widely acknowledged as hot Tories.
Whig merchant would 'never forgive our ministers for this ignorance, malice or carelessness'. Over 1,500 merchants presented a petition calling for an inquiry into naval miscarriages. Somers was asked to address the Whig-controlled Common Council of London in August in an attempt to consolidate financial support. After a rousing review of William's war conduct the Whig financiers and merchants rallied to his defence. 'The Whig party in the City', it was noted, 'by lending and addressing so seasonably, have restored matters here'.

There were rumours in early November that the parliamentary session would see an attempt to place the fleet under direct Commons control. William's Tory ministers were pessimistic about steering the war supplies through the House. Sunderland assured the King that the Whigs could be rallied to support of the continental war if William made a clear move to the Whigs in ministerial changes. The King now saw Nottingham and the Tory admirals as a liability. Early in November Nottingham was dismissed as Secretary. On the same day Russell took command of the fleet.

William was not certain that these changes would ease the ministry's problems. In his opening speech on 7 November William requested

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* The Cabinet Council had been expanded to include him and the Whig Secretary Trenchard earlier in the year.

** In August 1693, Sunderland advised Portland that he 'believed men will be ready to give and venture as much as ever if they can have a prospect of good management, but they have none and think they never shall' (N.U.L., Portland MSS, 14 August). Burnet claims that the Tory ministers suggested a peace to William in 1693, which meant that he had to turn to the Whigs (Burnet, iv, 216). Godolphin certainly had. He had also argued that William should retain the present parliament, for 'these are the same men that engaged your majesty in the war, and are obliged by their votes to support it'; the King had managed to build up a party of placemen in the Commons who had been 'hearty for your government in relation to the foreign dispute' and 'in the grand affair of carrying on the war' (Dalrymple, ii, appendix part ii, pp.6, 99-100). Burnet noted that the war became a much more partisan issue in the 1693-94 session (Burnet, iv, 219).
increases in both the army and navy. He blamed misfortune in Flanders 'solely' on the enemy's greater numbers.\textsuperscript{275} Significantly, it was common talk among Whigs before parliament opened that the allied reverses were due to this.\textsuperscript{276} William frankly acknowledged the miscarriages at sea, and advised that 'It will well deserve your consideration whether we are not defective both in the number of our shipping and in proper ports to the westward'.\textsuperscript{277}

The debate on William's speech began on the 13 November. Clarges raised the question of merchant losses: 'I always told you that our safety is in the sea... The trade of the nation is gone and land will be worth nothing if trade be not supported'.\textsuperscript{278} An inquiry was ordered into the naval failures of the summer. Clarges advocated 'the ancient way of parliament' that 'grievances may be redressed before we give aid', but the Commons at Russell's urging moved ahead simultaneously with supply.\textsuperscript{279}

'Our most undoubted kings', Clarges then told the Commons:

Have heretofore been forced to comply with their parliaments in the manner of making their wars, and shall we now be afraid to refuse such vast sums as are asked of us for a war which in the manner of it, is carried on not only against the sense of this House, but even against common sense... I desire mankind to give us any tolerable reason why we ought to hope for better success in Flanders next year than we have had the last. I am sure it will be very easy to give many good ones why we ought to fear that this next campaign will be more fatal to us than any of the former.

Clarges's speech created an impact in official circles.\textsuperscript{**} It was now clear after the 1692-93 parliamentary session, and the King's opening speech to

\textsuperscript{*} Richard Gibson, a Whig naval official consulted by the ministry, recommended building a dry dock at Falmouth and a general re-deployment of naval strength to the west (Add MSS 11602, passim).

\textsuperscript{**} This portion of Clarges's speech does not appear in Grey; but can be found in Add MSS 28878, f 139, headed 'Sir Thomas Clarges's Speech, 13 November 1693'. These are the papers of Under Secretary Ellis.
this one, that England's major military commitment was to be to Flanders. It was now certain that only by withholding supplies could the Commons hope to radically alter William's war strategy. Clarges's speech was a clear statement of the belief that he who paid the piper should call the strategic tune.*

In late November the naval estimates were debated. Clarges attempted to link naval misfortunes with the over-extension of English resources in Flanders: 'Had we attended the sea the French could have done little in Flanders', he suggested. 'The army is for the defence of the kingdom' he claimed; England having 'no obligation to have an army in Flanders'. But this came to nothing. The Commons accepted most of the naval estimates. But the ministry sought an additional 30,000 troops. These figures were formally presented on 5 December. Musgrave complained of Dutch counsel: 'Or else we should never be put to contribute at this rate, to ruin England to preserve Flanders'. Harley warned that so large an army would require a general excise.

Indeed, Harley was increasingly concerned at the drain on resources that the European war entailed. In December 1693 he prepared abstracts of the English troop commitment and its cost since 1693. To accompany them he made some rough notes. Harley noted 'that we have spent vast sums of money wastefully and fruitlessly'; and he warned that 'more

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* One pamphlet, dating from this period, attempted to establish from parliamentary precedent that taxes could only be used for 'defence at home' and 'safeguarding of the seas', and not for 'maintenance of wars in foreign parts' ('Some Remarks Upon, and Instances of the usages of Former Parliaments, in relation to taxes', in Edward Stephen, A Choice Collection of Papers Relating to State Affairs, 1703, pp.185-93).

** Almost certainly for his speech of 11 December, when he attacked the numbers of troops in Flanders and questioned England's ability to support them (Grey, x, 360).
money without other counsels will be but a swift undoing'. For 'men talk loudly of the King’s service and yet have done none but their own; speak highly of the King’s power but have made it a miserable power'. Harley thought the war's misfortunes were being deliberately managed and exploited by the Court: 'First they bring things to an extremity, then they make that extremity of their own making the reason of their next action seven times worse than the former'. He concluded: 'Let us advise the King that his affairs may prosper better than they have done in their hands'. The idea that a lingering war was being set up and then exploited for factional advantage is an interesting development in Harley's thought.*

Indeed, the opposition case this session centred on the cost of supporting the Flanders war and its dire consequences for the economy. A significant reaction by the opposition groups to the seeming acceptance of a continental role for the English forces in the previous session. Repeatedly the CPA group drew attention to the 'vast sums' that were 'gone thither', and that 'The Hollanders rather get than lose by this war'.**

In the Commons, faced with the prospect of an increase in the armed forces, the CPA group concentrated their attack on England's treaty commitments and the over-extension of English resources. Harley advised

* Outside parliament a fierce debate took place on the effect long years of continental warfare was having on the economy, and the financial strain necessary 'to maintain an hitherto successless war in Flanders' (Evelyn, v, 169, 22 March 1694; H.M.C. 7th Report, p.217, 5/15 December 1693).

** Parliament was contributing 'to ruin England to preserve Flanders' (Grey, x, 346, Musgrave, 29 November 1693). 'If this vast number ruin England we must not support Holland' (ibid., p.340, 29 November, Sir Francis Winlington). 'I have heard the current cash of Holland is twelve millions, and ours but eight millions' (ibid., p.350, 11 December, Clarges). As Oldmixon noted: 'The sending money to Flanders was ever in the mouths of the disaffected who meant nothing by it but the sending of soldiers to Flanders' (Oldmixon, p.79).
the Commons 'to be careful that what we give this year we may be able to
give the next'. Yet several members who had a history of opposition
now proved surprisingly moderate; one declaring that 'in one year I have
seen more done than in four years since'. Many members approved an
addition to the English forces, especially as the Court claimed that
England's allies would augment their own troops by 30,000. Court spokesmen
declared that Louis could not pay his men last year, and that England was
'at the last push in the war'. General Tollemache, reviewing the
campaign, supported the army augmentation, noting the danger of the French
taking Nieuport and Ostend, and of a precipitate peace 'upon such terms
as that before the present debts are paid, you may be engaged in another
war'.

The King requested 93,500 men. Opposition members asked that this
number be voted on by the Commons in total; hoping such a large number
would be refused. But the forces were voted piecemeal. The Tory
opposition had hoped to resist the increase in the army and even force a
reduction. The debate was conducted with exceptional partisan bitterness.

On the 14 December the size of the army augmentation was debated, and
20,000 men agreed without a vote. Unheard of sums were voted to supply
the war, despite the unsuccessful summer's campaigns. Trenchard told a
fellow Whig in December: 'I assure you that the country gentlemen of the
Whig party have adhered to the King's interest beyond what could be imagined'.

Many Whigs had envisaged a maritime war very different from the continental
grind that England was now committed to. But Whig support for William's
war, even if waged in Flanders, could be organised, as the 1693-4 par-
liamentary session showed.
The defeat of the opposition on the question of increased support for the continental war was galling after they at last had significant success on the matter of trade protection. In January 1694 an amendment (proposed by Clarges) was attached to the land tax bill securing the use of 43 naval ships exclusively for commerce protection. The naval authorities were to have no say in their deployment, but the Court secured Admiralty control in emergency. 296

In August 1692 Sir Edward Harley was convinced that 'securing the sea' necessitated the establishment of 'a committee of trade, empowered for all the naval concerns relating thereto'. 297 After the Turkey fleet débâcle in 1693 there was talk in Court circles of setting up such a body. 298 Rumours abounded late in 1693 that a committee of trade with merchant members was being set up by the government. Trenchard ordered a draft commission prepared, and the London merchants were told of a committee for the defence of trade being authorised. 299

William did not pursue the matter. But six weeks before Clarges's proposal was adopted Harley suggested such a commission to the House. When Clarges revived the plan in January he co-operated with Foley over the numbers, rates and location of the ships to be used. When the proposal came up for its final reading on 22 January, Harley and his comrades defended the proposal, thinking it more useful in protecting trade than anything the naval authorities had managed. 300 The opposition group had

* The ministry, concerned over merchant losses, had approached Richard Gibson, a Whig naval official, in the summer of 1693. He made detailed proposals for the distribution of warships for commerce protection, paying particular regard to Western and Irish waters; and recommended the placing of merchants on the Admiralty Board, as merchants were 'fitter to commissions of the Admiralty than country gentlemen in ordering convoys'. (Add MSS 11602, passim).
at last succeeded in exploiting merchant discontent in parliamentary terms; but their hopes of linking this to a wider criticism of the strategy of the war had failed.

In September 1694 Huy was recaptured, and the allies recovered much of the ground lost to the French. The year had witnessed the failure of the Brest assault, the last of the descent projects. Before the expedition had taken place, in June, Russell had written:

> Since the men are embarked, all things necessary provided, and the world full of expectations, they ought certainly not to return without attempting something that may be of benefit to the nation; and this number of men cannot be of that consequence to the King in Flanders as they may prove to be this summer in annoying the enemy on their marine ports'.

In fact, there was a muted public response to the Brest disaster. The attitude of the Tories, long since sceptical of such operations, was resignation rather than anger. The issue of the operation itself became obscured by arguments over possible treachery and tactical responsibility for the failure. One contemporary noted that 'The occasion of the ill success was doubtless treachery at home... Another prejudice was the straightness of the commission, which was positively to land in that bay, as the enemy well knew'; and he was not surprised that no further descent attempt was intended.

The year saw the English fleet operating in the Mediterranean for the first time. 'The Mediterranean had been William's objective for the allied navies from the time he invaded England,' believes one writer. From 1689 to June 1692 little opportunity offered for any effective action there. A small quadron was sent to the Straits in March 1690 (much to Harley's

* William certainly pressed the operation strongly on the Lords Justices (S.P. 42/3, f 113, Minutes of the Committee of Council, 14 May 1694). Though the sending of the fleet into the Mediterranean was uppermost in his mind (S.P. 42/3, f 109, 9 May 1694).
William was not alone in his recognition of the strategic importance of an English naval presence in the Mediterranean; although to many other Englishmen it represented 'simply an unavoidable commitment from time to time to protect one of the most powerful and lucrative of national trades'.

Nottingham did not demur from the importance given to the Mediterranean in William's earliest naval dispositions. Indeed, when recommending to William that Killigrew and his squadron remain longer in those waters (in June 1690) he reminded him that 'The Spanish ambassador is very earnest that your fleet should appear upon these coasts of France, and thinks it of infinite consequence to the common interest'. Merchants engaged in the Turkey trade, anxious for English naval activity in the Mediterranean, were not blind to the strategic benefits of such operations. As one noted:

I am sorry the French are so powerful in the Mediterranean; we and our friends have most of the best ports; we and the allies must spare a sufficient fleet to be absolute masters here, which would be of a greater mortification to the French and frustrate more of his designs in trade than at first appears; if this had been done the last year, those places in Piedmont had never been lost, nor those which for want hereof may fall.

William revived the plan for a substantial Mediterranean squadron in the summer of 1692. The year had gone badly in Flanders and, after initial...

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* Nottingham was keen in 1690 on a Savoy alliance as a means of attacking France in the Mediterranean region (H.M.C. Finch, ii, pp.250, 259, 299).

** According to Burnet, it was in 1692 that Trumbull himself informed William that: 'If, instead of sending embassies, he would send a powerful fleet into the Mediterranean, to destroy the French trade, and stop the commerce with Turkey, he would quickly bring court to other measures, or raise such tumults among them as would set that Empire, and even Constantinople itself, all in a flame' (Burnet, iv, 174).
success, at sea; there seemed little hope, William noted, of invading France with any chance of success in the north; and he was considering a negotiated peace. When William suggested sending a squadron 'immediately' to the Mediterranean in June 1692, Nottingham confessed he did 'not see of what use it would be, as we have no fleet of merchant ships there... A little squadron would be exposed to the French and a great one would put some inconvenience upon our affairs' (i.e. the descent preparations). The navy was desperately overstretched against the privateers at home; and all interest in England was centred on the descent. William's insistence on the 'immediate' sending of a squadron to the Mediterranean can only be attributed to his distance from political and military realities in England.

The Mediterranean squadron sent in 1693, ostensibly to accompany the Turkey fleet, William also hoped would encourage Savoy to invade France. In the summer of 1694 William revived the Mediterranean scheme, and proposed to keep the fleet there throughout the winter. There was opposition to the move, especially from Russell, which William skilfully overcame. Somers and Shrewsbury were enthusiastic, and they secured cabinet support. However, fears were often expressed of French attacks on England in the winter and early spring, at a time when the navy was not fully operational. Somers told Portland that it would 'be necessary to do everything which may not only make the kingdom safe in the absence of so great a part of the fleet but may make them see that they are safe'. William should press the Dutch to meet their full naval quotas, and to ensure the English fleet was ready earlier than normal.* Somers thought that such preparations

* In May 1695, Somers warned William that the Mediterranean fleet might the following year be 'too weak and disproportioned to the enemy's strength' unless he took good care that the Dutch 'have at least their full quota of ships in those seas'. (Add MSS 40771, f 21; C.S.P.D. 1694-1695, p.476).
'would more contribute to the facilitating of parliamentary business next winter'.

The Mediterranean venture produced bewilderment at first. Musgrave told Harley that 'the keeping our fleet this winter in the Mediterranean is too great a moment for me to give a judgment of'. Notwithstanding the Convoys and Cruisers Act of 1694, the summer and autumn of that year saw severe merchant losses in home waters; which produced great anger in merchant communities. Early in 1694 there was confidence that the new trade protection provisions would prevent this. But Musgrave was soon 'sorry to see in the newsletters so many laden colliers sank and taken, when an act of parliament makes such a provision for securing trade'. Given this situation, the movement of a substantial part of the navy to the Mediterranean produced disquiet and hostility. But even Musgrave, after digesting the news, confessed 'We are in great hopes of great things to be done by our fleet in the Mediterranean'; an optimism shared by Foley and Gwyn. Godolphin was anxious for Russell to stay in the Mediterranean, foreseeing serious political trouble:

If he should now come directly home as he seems to intend, and leave Barcelona to be certainly taken by the French before winter, after so much expense and so great hazard of the fleet to no manner of purpose, what can there be said to justify so unsuccessful and so indigested an expedition as it will appear to have been.

And there was a concerted propaganda exercise to drive home the benefits of a Mediterranean fleet.

* 'We should rejoice to hear some good effects of our fleet being in the Mediterranean, a great way from home and the enemy strength' (Loan 29/299, Ed. Littleton to Harley, 24 September 1694).

** It had succeeded in forcing a French withdrawl from Catalonia when it appeared before Barcelona (Ehrman, pp. 490-550, 511-526).
If reaction to the fleet's Mediterranean venture was mixed the same cannot be said of the response to the policy of bombarding French ports pursued in 1694. Shrewsbury told William that these attacks appeared 'so frivolous that it is not very pleasant writing upon them'. The government justified these endeavours with a vigorous pamphlet campaign; but this was one 'blue-water' policy which produced nothing but anger and sarcasm.

* 'What becomes of the ships ordered for cruisers? In vain is the thunderings and noises on the French coast while our own are neglected' (Loan 29/299, Ed. Littleton to Harley, 22 August 1694). Henry Boyle made sarcastic comments to Harley at 'so expensive a service as that upon the coast of France' (Loan 29/187, f 290, 8 September 1694). The Jacobites were quick to exploit such feelings: one noting the lack of protection for English trade, 'whilst our fleet was fooling away a campaign, and squandering the treasure of the nation upon the impracticable expeditions of bombing Brest and Calais, and blowing up Dunkirk by your machine vessels' (Robert Ferguson, A Letter to Mr Secretary Trenchard, 1694). The Harleys hoped for 'a Committee of Trade impowered by all the naval concerns relating thereto... It may boldly be affirmed that the care for the sea will, more than the distribution of a million of money, prevail to keep the integrity of the Confederacy' (Loan 29/142, Sir Ed. Harley to Robert, 2 and 6 November 1694).
Sunderland and the Whig ministers were optimistic about the coming session. The war had taken a turn for the better, and Whig loyalty was rewarded with place and favour. When Sunderland came to London in the autumn of 1694, he noticed that 'all the art possible is used by some people to engage others in their ill humour'. Particular objects of attack were the Bank of England, 'Dutch Counsels', the drain of specie to Flanders, and the poor allied performance.* Yet Sunderland expected that 'it will be much easier this year than it was last'; and his optimism was echoed by Trenchard.  

The combination of real success in the war and its skilful exploitation by the new ministers produced a buoyant mood. Christopher Hatton noted:

> All the discourse is how gloriously the campaign in Flanders is ended by the taking of the strong and important place Huy and the Confederates are possessed of Dixmude... After the fatigues of the campaign certainly the parliament in the next sessions cannot do less than double their supplies and give ten millions considering how much is gained by the last five millions given.  

By early December the estimates for 1695 were agreed. William, in his opening speech, noted the 'better posture' of military affairs.  

And there was widespread anger at the offers of peace which France had made that year** - 'We are to get nothing but be owned' one MP commented bitterly.*

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* Doubts about the latter were answered effectively by the Court. Shrewsbury told Blathwayt that he had 'heard discoursed lately by some members of parliament, well wishers to his majesty and his government, upon the occasion of subsidies in general, and the charge the nation had been at to support the alliance abroad. They say they were now satisfied that expense would now be lessened, having been promised by those who managed for his majesty in the House of Commons this last session that we should for the future pay no more than equal share with the States General, and not two thirds as before' (H.M.C. Buccleuch, ii, part i, 78, 8 June 1694).

** Beginning in 1693 French peace proposals were being made through their ambassador at Stockholm.
and determination to fight on for a secure peace.*

There was a government-directed propaganda campaign in 1694 setting out the need to press France firmly, and the dangers of an insecure peace. Reflections upon the Conditions of Peace, for instance, is certainly the work of Edward D'Auvergne, the quasi-official historian of William's campaigns. This pamphlet asserted that the French could not be trusted in peace negotiations and would easily renew the war unless they were firmly checked. An insecure peace would necessitate England remaining armed, and continuing high taxation. The English should fight on for a strong defensive barrier in Flanders and on the Rhine. The danger to the security of England, and the balance of power in Europe, if the French conquered the Low Countries was plainly set out. Defoe agreed, claiming it a known maxim that the preservation of Flanders is more for the interest of England, than of Spain. If Flanders be an accession to France, Holland must soon follow, and England next. They are like nine pins, the throwing down one carries the next.**

* L'Hermitage reported that rumours of peace had been silenced by the return of the King, and that several of the Commons leading members were thinking that to reduce France it would be necessary to continue the war until a firm and durable peace was made. (Add MSS 17677, 00, 13/23 November; Ranke, ix, 35).

** A Brief Display of French Counsels (1694) drove home such beliefs: 'France has begun a war which she will not quit of when she pleases herself... The English alone are able to harass France more than any of the Confederates... We must believe that France would fain have a peace while she thinks she has some advantage'. Other writers set out clearly the history of French aggression since 1661 as evidence of Louis's desire to attain 'universal monarchy'. None of them minimized the strength of France as in the early part of the war. But D'Auvergne offered in his 1694 campaign history the cautious optimism that 'This present war now is drawing near to an end. Now that the allies have been sensible of the necessity of augmenting their forces we find the scale turn' (A Brief Display of French Counsels, 1694, pp. 49, 70, 73. Cf. The Bounds Set to France by the Pyrennean Treaty and the Interest of the Confederates Not to Accept the Offers of Peace, 1694; Edward D'Auvergne, The History of the Campagne, 1694, p.101.)
Harley and Foley realised it was pointless questioning the wider conduct of the war this session and concentrated their energies on financial matters. In November 1694, in preparation for the new parliament, Harley drew up a series of issues to be exploited. He attacked the Bank of England, claiming that it would 'monopolize' all money, and possibly trade; and called for Foley's assistance against the exorbitant excises and funds which will quickly destroy all the landed men in England. In pursuit of these objectives Harley and Foley were prepared to co-operate with the ministry. In August Shrewsbury and Godolphin opened conversations with them for 'preventing miscarriages in parliament especially relating to excises'. Harley and Foley, younger politicians of a distinctly post-Revolution outlook, were moving from the position of intransigent insularity and opposition they had adopted when serving their 'Country' apprenticeship under Clarges and Musgrave. In June 1694 Foley was even looking forward to success in the Flanders war. The cracks in the opposition opened on the 1 December, when Foley suggested a lump sum of £2,500,000 for the army, instead of a detailed review of the original Court estimate of £2,700,000. Wharton, for the ministry, quickly accepted. The House agreed to this arrangement three days later, much to Clarges's disgust. On the 30 November the opposition only achieved a small reduction in the naval estimates.

The Whigs viewed the opening of William's 1695 campaign with enthusiasm, expecting William to force his way into France. William recaptured

* The only serious attack on war policy in this session came in the Lords early in 1695, when Nottingham launched an attack on the 25 January on the Brest débâcle and the diversion of the fleet from its prime task of guarding against invasion by sending it into the Mediterranean. He was supported by Rochester, Halifax and Torrington; but the attack came to nothing (Browning, i, 515-7; Horwitz, Revolution Politicks, pp. 151-152).
Namur in the August of 1695; which even Musgrave considered a 'great success'. This victory received full publicity, and led to expectations of a favourable peace. Belief that William would decide whether to have a new election on the basis of Namur proved correct. William exploited his new popularity in a series of pre-election tours designed to encourage support for those candidates unreservedly speaking out for full support of the war.

The year saw more reverses at sea. The policy of bombarding coastal areas of France was again attempted, with little success. Such a strategy was thought a completely inadequate response to the French privateering threat. Evelyn thought the protection of coastal trade 'of infinite more to the public than spending their time in bombing and ruining two or three paltry towns... without any benefit or weakening our enemies'. And the ministry were conscious of the public hostility such attempts provoked.

The Convoys and Cruisers Act of 1694 seemed to have achieved little. In May 1695 the Commons received news of the loss of many merchant ships in the Harwich Road:

And after sharp debates at last the reason was agreed to be that of the money given so much was expended to support the Confederates in a greater proportion than our proper quota came to, that there was less care to provide sufficient convoys; and some of them lashed out severely upon the sending our fleets to secure Spain's and thereby had less regard to ourselves.

Musgrave, citing information from the subsidy treaties for hiring foreign troops, secured approval for an address to William that, in future, England's share of such subsidies should be no larger than those of her principal allies. The opposition had succeeded in linking merchant losses with a mistaken and costly European war strategy. But it was a victory won in a thin House at the end of the session.
Later in 1695 it was reported that 'there is no talk of anything with us but of coin, trade, and how to raise six or seven millions for the next year'. A rapid deterioration of the silver coinage aggravated the already difficult task of paying the army. One of the experts consulted by the government was Charles Davenant. Davenant had made himself unofficial spokesman for the 'landed interest', and of their troubles in a time of war and high taxation. Two manuscripts which Davenant composed in 1695 and early 1696 on problems of coinage and trade specifically linked these problems with an overall critique of war strategy, and anticipate the arguments Davenant employed as the most influential Tory pamphleteer in 1697-1702. Davenant interpreted the recoinage and monetary crisis of 1695 as a problem in war finance and war strategy. He did not think conditions could improve unless some way was found to check direct remittance of specie to the forces in Europe.

Davenant thought the war could be profitable to England, for 'Riches always follow power, and the iron does draw to it the gold and silver'; but the expense of maintaining armies abroad was ruining trade and money. 'The first spring of our trade not lying in money but in the exportation of our native product; if, by a right application of our naval strength we can carry that out, and bring home the returns with more safety, the over balance will not be so heavy upon us.'

He wanted a legislative body 'to establish some coercive power over merchants' to ensure better protection of trade; and recommended 'a universal care of traffic, paying the army as much in kind as possible, or changing the manner of the war and turning the land troops into a greater naval strength'. Davenant appreciated the conflict between the Admiralty's desire for 'a fleet of war' and of the mercantile interest in the maximum naval strength being devoted to trade protection; but
thought that 'The ends of the war and of trade might both perhaps be answered by the right application of such a naval strength'.

A Memorial Concerning Credit launched an attack on both the 'monied men' who were profiting from the war and on the allies for not fulfilling their quotas. France was still in a strong condition; and Holland could enlarge its contribution to the war, for as the war was being fought now the Dutch had 'all along increased in riches'.

Davenant took a pessimistic view of England's prospects; which 'must still go on in a declining condition unless either our trade flourish more or our yearly expenses be diminished, or the state of the war be altered or the Confederacy enlarged'. The war could not be sustained 'beyond the year 1698 upon the foot it stands at present'. The French could only be weakened 'by bearing hard with our naval force upon some of their most important trades'.

William opening speech to parliament in November 1695 recommended consideration of 'such laws as may be proper for the advancement of trade', especially 'that of the East Indies, least it should be lost to the nation'. The East India company had lost £1,000,000 of effects to privateers in 1695, and had petitioned the King. Even Blathwayt, Secretary at War, noted that it was 'a great scandal that while we are so much superior at sea we should not in the first place and above all things take care to protect our trade'. The issue was exploited by the Jacobites in 1695. One thought 'The vast expense we have been in to equip and set out double the quota that the Dutch have towards the constituting the Confederate fleet was plainly to disable ourselves from having that number of cruisers and convoys as is necessary to be kept at sea during the present war'. But even loyal mercantile spokesmen claimed that 'If foreign trade were promoted and secured as it might be, we might easily find money to carry on
a lasting war with France'. 368 One lamented 'our negligence of trade';
for 'As the parliament gives money to carry on the war against the French,
another party hath suffered our ships to be taken to help the French'.
He thought 'We might easily support and secure our trade with such success
that we should not find this war to be burdensome'. 369

Yet the fundamental loyalty of the merchant class to William's régime
and war was not shaken. In the summer of 1695 Harley had been corres-
ponding with the West Country merchants, whose letters were full of complaints
about the activities of privateers in the Irish Sea and around Bristol.*
Sir John Knight, the Tory/Jacobite MP for Bristol, continually attempted
to exploit the dissatisfaction over merchant losses to instil hostility
to the allies and the European war. When Harley informed the merchants
late in July 1695 of the good progress in the Flanders war,** Sir John
retorted:

I don't believe a word of it, nor do those that write it,
being bound to the government that employs them. And
what signifies besieging a town, if it is to sacrifice
the English and the Scots, and spare the Dutch... And
what's the burning a town or two on the coast, and let
the French privateers take over our merchant ships'.

But as one merchant admitted to Harley, 'All this rhetoric makes but few
proselytes here'. 370

Yet merchant discontent caused serious worries in the ministry before
the 1695-96 session. The establishment of a government-sponsored committee

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* Harley was also informed from Kinsale in Ireland that: 'All trade
in these parts is at a perfect stand, for a boat cannot pass within
a league of us, but she is either taken or drove in again by the
privateers, and for ought I find the coasts are not better guarded
in other parts for the like complaints are made everywhere' (Loan
29/146/6, 21 June 1695).

** An interesting indication that Harley was now prepared to consider
the continental war in a different light.
responsible for trade protection was again considered.371 The Privy Council blamed marine losses on merchants for not sailing in convoy, a ploy which had seriously disrupted proper investigation into trade protection in the past.372

As in 1693, William and his ministers failed to produce any definite proposals to parliament on trade defence. But on the 25 November the Commons was informed (probably by Harley) that 'a council of trade' was 'absolutely necessary'.373 On the 2 December the Commons resolved to consider the state of trade, and Rochester pressed the Court strongly on trade defence in the Lords.374 But only when the Commons again considered a parliamentary board of trade on 12 December did the Court suddenly declare that William was setting up a royal commission.375 This pacified the Commons and gave time for William to authorise such a body.376 And whatever the House's misgivings over trade protection they proved prompt and generous with the 1696 military estimates. A group of Tories attempted to reduce the army from 90,000 to 60,000; but when they forced a division on 13 December they were easily defeated.377

The House proved obstinate over the board of trade matter. The long debate of the 2 January revealed much opposition to William's conception of the duties of such a body; it 'being only for speculations about the improvement of trade in time of peace'.378 The opposition achieved notable victories. Some of the Court's most determined opponents - including Foley (who became Speaker in March) and Harley - were elected to the Commission of Public Accounts.379 And a land bank scheme - intended as a rival to the Bank of England - was pushed through; 'chiefly managed by Foley, Harley and the Tories'.380 These opposition victories came when there was a growing crisis in war supply because of the state of the coin. But the discovery of a Jacobite plot against William's life
early in 1696 was skilfully exploited by the Junto to rally support to the government. And 'one of the benefits the plot has produced' was the disappearance of all interest in a parliamentary-controlled council of trade. 381

Nevertheless, even Court supporters were losing faith in the continental war: 'There is nothing but marching and counter-marching like a game of chess... 400,000 fighting men and not one bloody nose'. 382 Even the partisan Whig Oldmixon admitted the widespread war-weariness by 1696 and the increasingly effective exploitation of it by the Tories. The poverty of France had, admitted Oldmixon, been exaggerated. 383 William began the 1696 campaign with hopes of forcing France into realistic peace negotiations. Inadequately financed because of the coinage crisis he achieved little. Significantly, the economic dislocation which the continental war was producing revived interest in the question of a descent as a means of saving money. 384 William, too, was thinking along these lines. His correspondence in 1696 documents his renewed interest in amphibious assaults on the French coasts.*385

Nor was 1696 successful for the fleet. Rooke brought the Mediterranean squadron back home in the spring. But the ministry failed to find worthwhile employment for this 'great useless fleet'. 386 Coastal bombardments of France met hostility as before: 'These bombardments were not generally approved, as not answering their expense and being of no

* In June 1696, when Admiral Berkeley suggested an attack upon Camaret Bay, William advised the cabinet to turn this into a full-scale assault on Brest. William was very unhappy when the Admiralty reported the attack not feasible. William began to consider the logistic and tactical problems involved in such assaults with real seriousness; and in August 1696 instructed the cabinet to prepare a descent attempt for the next year (Add MSS 37992, ff 145, 164, 166, 169-70, 176-7; P.R.O. Admiralty 1/4083, f 1166).
benefit to the English'. 387

Military stalemate and economic dislocation produced a serious situation in the spring and summer of 1696. The economic crisis provoked disturbances and riots, at a time when the ministry was having difficulty paying and feeding the garrison forces in England. There seemed a real possibility of a Jacobite-led rising against the régime. 388 Shrewsbury was alarmed at the prospects for William's rule if the war were not soon ended. 389

When parliament was called in October William obtained expeditious Commons support for the 1697 military estimates. 390 But this was largely secured by William's insistence on the need to discuss peace 'with our swords in our hands', and William found all 'reasonable men' supported him in this.* 391 A group of Tories opposed the estimates, but with little success; an attempt to reduce the army to 90,000 being defeated by the Court 223 votes to 67. Foley and Harley again gave support to the Court's requests for military aid. 392 Opposition attempts at the end of 1696 to exploit naval inactivity came to nothing. 393

One Whig had greeted the opening of the 1696 Flanders campaign with optimism; but by the autumn hoped for an 'honourable and secure peace':

For it will puzzle a more politic noodle than mine to find out ways to carry on the war... and when all is said and done if we have not a peace we are ruined to all intents and purposes, as far as the French King and King James can ruin us, if we do not still prosecute the war. 394

Parliament's readiness to vote supplies for another campaign reflected belief that 'France will certainly give more or less in the treaty as the

* 'If the expectation of a peace were wholly taken away our parliament would be less ready to supply the necessities of the war' (Jersey MSS, to R. Hill, 30 October 1696 n.s., The Hague). In December Jersey thought that 'Nothing I believe will intimidate France so much as our resolutions in parliament' (Jersey MSS, to R. Hill, 10 December 1696 n.s., The Hague).
people of England will proportionately give towards carrying on the war'. Vernon noted that 'We have exceeded what many among us ever thought could be done; and I don't think any parliament hereafter will have it in their power to give so much'. In the summer it seemed scarcely possible to maintain the army on the continent in view of the financial situation. William's army paymaster recommended 'any peace in the circumstances we are'; as did Shrewsbury, who found England 'in the saddest condition that ever people were in: an army abroad, a fleet and an army at home to maintain and neither money, friends nor credit to do it with'. It was hoped that 'the peace might be signed this winter, supposing our parliament does put his majesty in a way to make another campaign'. Harley and Foley were so distressed at the prospect of the Flanders army being 'reduced to extremity' that they promised to arrange a loan from Land Bank supporters; but this proved impossible, for 'several of their people were dissatisfied with the campaign'.

Disenchantment with the continental war, and the economic dislocation it entailed, caused increasing suspicion of England's allies, especially the Empire. 'The Emperor', Prior thought, 'is so much concerned for Hungary and the dominions of the Austrian family on that side that he utterly neglects the Rhine and the safety of the Empire on this'. The Emperor was managing any peace talks to his own exclusive advantage, with an eye to the expected death of Carlos II of Spain. 'We have bore a great deal of the war and shall be scarce mentioned in the peace' it was feared. 'All the advantages of the peace are so entirely for the good of Spain and the Empire' it was reported; and this was seen as a good

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* This was from Richard Hill, the deputy army paymaster. He 'was a Tory, but often attacked them for their false notions of foreign affairs' (Burnet, iv, 310).

** See Evelyn's comment in October 1697: 'None got by this peace so much as Spain who contributed least to it' (Evelyn, v, 269).
argument for William to sign a quick peace and secure all possible advantages to the maritime powers. The desertion of Savoy in the summer of 1696 seemed ominous. There were rumours of a growing peace party in Holland.

William found himself in a much stronger military position in 1697 while negotiating at Ryswick than he could have expected in 1696. Shrewsbury noted that if William failed to secure recognition of his title in the peace talks then England must fight on, being 'now in a better condition to do so than we were the last year'. But reports of the signing of the peace treaty in September were greeted with relief. On the 8th one observer noted that if William 'comes home without it the people in the country will all hang down with despair, so great will their disappointment be'.

Certainly, Shrewsbury's confidence about England's ability to continue fighting a continental war beyond 1697 was not widespread. In June 1697 one moderate Tory reported the country:

Filled with very melancholy stories in reference to our present circumstances... and that King William is deserted by all the Confederates and left to shift for himself, it being certainly agreed by them to make a peace without him. The French are strong enough to possess themselves of all Flanders and Catalonia; and that we are to be sacrificed to prevent it'.

A Whig MP and placemen noted:

I find necessities nowhere fit to be thought for, but supplying an army, and filling the pockets of insatiable men, till a resumption be to help all. I find a very great loss of the hearts of most of our friends by the heavy taxes and the decay of trade, and want of money, and increases of beggars, so these taxes cannot be continued. God send peace.

Vernon warned William in September 1697:

The people are now in much better humour and relish the peace more than they will do a year hence when they shall find taxes in a good measure continued, and troops lying heavier upon them as being in great numbers dispersed about the country.
(i) The Post War Reckoning 1697-98

Ryswick was no guarantee of peace abroad or tranquility at home. The 'haughty demeanour' of France during the Ryswick negotiations left William with deep forebodings. The most pressing international problem was the expected death of Carlos II, the childless ruler of Spain. There was little awareness of the scope of this problem and the possible scale of English involvement. The experienced Tory diplomatist George Villiers was opposed to parliament's precipitate disbanding of the army after Ryswick and realised the fragility of the European peace. 'We must do what we can to part friends with our allies', he thought, 'for we must never expect to be real friends with France'. However, he thought the Spanish Succession problem an opportunity for a partial English disengagement from European affairs.¹ 'At the Court of Vienna', he reported:

They think that the King of Spain cannot live above a year and would be glad to have all Europe in arms to fight their cause. Whenever that happens it is but reasonable that we should act as good allies, but not as principals in the war, as we have done hitherto.

Montagu noted in August 1698:

If the taxes have been so heavy in a war against France and Popery, they will be very uneasy when the danger is thought farther off, with the expense that is necessary for an ordinary security; and if the King of Spain dies, who, I think nobody hopes can live, Lord have mercy upon us.²

Many in England thought a dispute over the Spanish Succession opened up the possibility of a different war from the last: 'If France has designs on the Spanish monarchy our part in that war will be best managed by sea'.³ William noted early in 1698 a widespread feeling that England had only a
limited interest in any conflict over the Spanish Empire, which could be fulfilled in purely marine terms:

People here begin to be more and more apprehensive of the death of the King of Spain believing that it would certainly plunge us into war; in which I very clearly see that, if the case should happen, they would indeed resolve upon it, but would desire to contribute only to a naval war, and take very little part in a war by land, which you know is impossible without losing everything. 4

William's Whig ministers, too, did not think that parliament would support a large land army in any new conflict. 5

The pressure of war realigned political groupings in the period 1689-97. Whig Francophobia and enthusiasm for English involvement in European affairs, and their realisation of the importance of the Low Countries to England's security, led many of them to support the eventual maintenance of a large army on the Continent. However, many Whigs, whilst anxious for English involvement in European affairs in 1689, had envisaged a largely naval war on England's part.

The standing army debate which broke out after Ryswick was really between the two wings of the Whig party. To present it as a conflict between European commitment and isolationism is facile. Much of the language used by anti-army Whigs in 1697-98 resembled that used by Whigs in 1689. They drew attention to 'the growth and progress of French power'; the enthusiasm of the Whigs in 1689 for a European alliance against Louis was recalled; and William portrayed as a 'Prince whose life is so necessary to the preservation of Europe, that both Protestant and Popish princes have forgot their ancient maxims, and laid aside their inate animosities', who defended 'not only our safety but the liberties of all Europe, and the Protestant religion through the world'. William's war was therefore 'just and necessary'. 6

These writers no more ignored the European context of William's reign
than had their Whig forebears. The Country Whigs had lost none of their enthusiasm for European protestant unity, or for the use of English resources to check French aggression. Their disappointments lay in the military sphere: in William's refusal to fight the war as recommended in 1689. They objected to 'the misapplication of our naval force - which is our known strength - for these last eight years'; and the 'losing so many opportunities of destroying the French fleet'. They objected to 'the misapplication of our naval force - which is our known strength - for these last eight years'; and the 'losing so many opportunities of destroying the French fleet'.

Fifteen or twenty thousand men, one Country Whig asserted, 'might have landed in their country, their sensible part, which we have so gently touched'; such a force 'would have been sufficient to ravage 10 or 20 miles round in their country', and could have carried out continuous raiding warfare on the French coasts. Trenchard attacked William for neglecting Ireland; this had blasted hopes for a quick assault on France and meant a long war. After the Irish campaign the army had been built up to over 87,000 men, 'upon pretence of invading France'. England should have fulfilled its military commitments in a purely naval manner as contemplated in 1689.

The debate was conducted in retrospective terms: pro-army writers defending England's continental military commitment under William rather than drawing attention to the present serious international situation. Defoe argued that under William England had taken an irreversible step towards military involvement in European affairs. England was now the cornerstone of a continental league formed to defend the balance of power in Europe. That balance would only be maintained if the English army was committed 'to preserve Flanders, to garrison the frontier towns, and be in the field in conjunction with the Confederate armies'. Already in 1697, it is true, there was some concern at the dangerous posture of Spanish affairs, and the threat to trade if France took Spanish Flanders. But most commentators concentrated on the continuing military strength of France, Louis's reluctance
to fulfil the obligations of the Ryswick treaty, and the danger of a Jacobite invasion with French support. 12

A major theme of the debate was England's vulnerability to French invasion, not the wider question of England's position in any struggle over the Spanish Empire. Defoe could argue that England's first line of defence was an English army in Flanders. 13 But this necessitated a permanent standing force for service in Flanders so long as France constituted a military threat. It was easy for the anti-army writers to appeal to traditional 'Country' sentiments, e.g. that the navy alone was capable of defending England, 14 or that a revamped militia could beat off an attacking army. 15

Attempts at militia reform came to nothing. Nor did parliament prove generous in its treatment of the navy. Blathwayt hoped late in December 1697 that 'Parliament are fallen into a better humour and think to make amends for disbanding our army by providing a considerable fleet'. 16 But by the middle of December the fleet strength had been settled for 1698 at 10,000 men and 3,000 marines. 17 The Commons was stingy with money for the repair and augmentation of ships. In January 1698 the Admiralty prepared a repair programme and in March arrived at a figure of £150,000 for the work. 18 Government spokesmen attempted to get a separate provision for this purpose, 19 but only £20,000 was allowed. 20

During debates on the naval estimates in February 1699 some members thought 10,000 seamen sufficient; 'but Sir George Rooke gave his opinion that, since they have made themselves so weak at land, they could not have less than 15,000, which the House inclined to'. The 15,000 were voted. 21 Tallard thought that 'The nation persists in resolving to make its safety depend on the fleet'. 22 In fact, by insisting that the 15,000 voted be all seamen with no marines, the Commons left the King with a naval force
larger than he wanted.\(^{23}\)

Parliament showed little interest in the fleet beyond providing for basic defence needs. Even this proved too much at times. In December 1699 Sir George Rooke requested 10,000 men for the fleet, but Harley proposed a mere 7,000 seamen for the next thirteen months; 10,000 in summer, and half that number in the winter. This proposal was carried without a division.\(^ {24}\) Then on 12 January 1700, Harley 'maintained almost himself' a long debate over the size of the 'ordinary' of the navy, and in the end a sharp cutback was made in official requests.\(^ {25}\) These reductions caused consternation in official circles. The Admiralty complained of 'the small strength that will remain for the defence of the kingdom'. William considered conveying their fears to the Commons.\(^ {26}\)

The Commons were no more generous towards the marine regiments. Pamphleteers poured scorn on their use for amphibious assaults. 'In the last war', one recalled, 'sea and land soldiers were never sent any long voyage together, but their differences have always defeated the enterprize they were sent about for'.\(^ {27}\) Attempts in the early part of 1698 to secure an increase in the number of marines failed. They were attacked as indirect increases in the army. Some members argued for their usefulness; but only 2 regiments were voted.\(^ {28}\) A year later the Court requested 15,000 as the total naval establishment, which occasioned little dispute until one member enquired whether any were to be marines. He was followed by Musgrave, who would have limited the 15,000 men to seamen. Upon a division this restriction was rejected 130 to 124.\(^ {29}\) But on 18 February the Commons finally insisted that all 15,000 men must be sailors.\(^ {30}\) Early in 1701, the Commons 'to make some show of zeal for the public safety', voted 30,000 men for the fleet; 'but they would allow no marines, though they were told that a fleet without these was only a good security for our
own defence, but could have no influence on the affairs of Europe, either to frighten or to encourage those abroad'.

William's speech to parliament on 3 December 1697 urged the necessity for a 'land force' and a strong fleet. But on the 10th Harley moved that all troops raised since 1680 be disbanded. This would restrict William to 8,000 men in England. Harley was seconded by Howe, who recommended 'depending on our fleet as our only security'. The Court stressed the dangerous European situation, but 'it was said on the other side that that would always continue as an argument during the life of the King of France, of King James and the Prince of Wales'. There was a deliberate attempt to prevent discussion of foreign affairs, and when the issue of national security was finally raised by Court spokesmen 'they were answered that this might be done by keeping a good fleet and making the militia more useful'.

As reports of Carlos II's failing health arrived, MP's zeal for disbanding diminished. But William, convinced that the Commons would only agree to naval campaigns if war broke out, thought it prudent to avert a new conflict by reaching agreement with France, in conjunction with the Dutch. These discussions led to the first Partition Treaty. Somers concurred, noting:

A deadness and want of spirit in the nation universally, so as not at all to be disposed to the thought of entering into a new war and that they seem to be tired out with taxes to a degree, beyond what is discerned, till it appeared upon the occasion of the late elections.

Carlos's health proved less fragile than anticipated. His survival removed the main justification to many for William's maintenance of more than the 10,000 soldiers authorised. While the terms of the Partition Treaty were under consideration in August, Vernon observed to Shrewsbury that 'the number of troops kept up' would 'be excused or aggravated according
to what shall happen to the King of Spain'. Vernon thought it 'pretty plain that a parliament would look upon their concerns as satisfied if a way were found to keep Spain and the Indies from falling under France'.

With Carlos near death early in 1698 authors such as Defoe attempted to establish that the succession of Spain ultimately affected England's security and her trading interests, in particular in Flanders, the West Indies and the Mediterranean. But in August 1698 Vernon observed:

Our people are either so unable to bear great taxes, or wearied with them, that they cannot be brought to grant the supplies necessary for such a war. Those who are against managing it as the last was, by maintaining a great army in Flanders, would in all likelihood be the prevailing party, and carry the resolutions for being no otherwise concerned than by sea, whereby Flanders and Holland would be fatally exposed. If ever a parliament should come to understand that Spain, Flanders and the Indies might be kept out of the French hands without a war, as it is probable they would not fail to insinuate, there would be still greater difficulties to engage the nation in the support of a war that was not unavoidable; that we should not think it worth while to hazard all we have, only that the Spanish monarchy may be kept entire.

In November 1698, Trenchard argued that when Carlos died England need not send men into Spain 'as some argue', for 'we may hire men from Germany for half the price we can raise them here'. England's contribution would be the sending of a strong fleet to the Mediterranean and transporting the Emperor's forces to Spain.

* In March 1698, Jersey noted that, although the allies would 'reasonably expect' it, there was no possibility in its present mood that the country would 'enter into a new war to make a King of Spain' (Jersey MSS, Jersey to Hill, 29 March, London).
(ii) The Spanish Succession and the Strategic Question 1698-1701

The first Partition Treaty gave the bulk of the Spanish Empire to the Electoral Prince of Bavaria, except for the Italian possessions which would go to the French (apart from Milan which was to go to the Archduke Charles, second son of the Emperor), who in return were to renounce the pretended right to the succession of Spain. When informed of the treaty William's Whig ministers were cautious. Somers thought the treaty necessary but worried over England's military inability to enforce it, and the acquisition of Sicily by France and its possible consequences for England's Mediterranean trade. He thought that if England could have been 'in some ways gainer by this transaction', perhaps by the Elector conceding England trading privileges in Spanish America, 'or in any other manner, it would wonderfully endear your majesty to your English subjects'. Vernon advised Portland:

> It is generally said here that we can't be in any tolerable condition for a new war these 3 or 4 years. If by what your lordship mentions of the necessity for keeping up troops to oblige France to stand to their agreements, it be meant that a great force is requisite to put the Prince of Bavaria in possession of Spain, and to keep him there, that will be pretty hard of digestion if we should come to a rupture with France in direct opposition to the interests of the Emperor. After an accommodation made, people will rather except that the forces should be reduced still lower than either be increased or continued as they are. I remember Sir Edward Seymour's argument: "Why make a treaty if you do not trust to it".

The Treaty signed in September 1698 was nullified by the death of the Electoral Prince in January 1699. The Second Partition Treaty was signed in February 1700. The bulk of the Spanish monarchy was to go to the Imperial claimant, while France was to receive Naples and Sicily. The Treaty was unofficially published in July 1700. It provoked protests, especially from those who feared French encroachment upon England's Mediterranean trade. But when Carlos II died in October 1700, his will aimed at preventing partition by leaving his entire realm to one of Louis's grand-
sons on condition that he accepted it all; if not, his territories were to be offered on the same terms to the Habsburgs. Louis accepted the will rather than attempt to implement the second Partition Treaty.

Many, as Vernon predicted, jumped at the opportunity of keeping the Spanish Empire, particularly the West Indies, out of direct French control. They thought the danger to England posed by the incorporation of Naples and Sicily into the French monarchy greater than any that might follow from the Duke of Anjou's succession to the entire Spanish monarchy, since once Louis's grandson went to Spain and was surrounded with Spanish advisers he would soon act as a Spaniard and not as a Frenchman.*

William's ministry was largely Tory, and William stated his position on 26 December to the two Secretaries, Vernon and Hedges, as well as Jersey, Godolphin and Rochester. William believed that those who thought that 'Spain would have separate interests from France' were 'mistaken'. The recent orders from Madrid to the governors of the Spanish territories 'to obey the King of France in whatever related to their affairs' confirmed this. Immediately threatened were the Dutch garrisons in the barrier fortresses of the Spanish Netherlands. Faced with this danger, William could 'not see how we could think ourselves in any state of safety'. He thought Anglo-Dutch security could only be preserved by the maintenance of existing ties and negotiation of new alliances, in particular with the Emperor. But William thought the Empire unlikely to make alliances without an Anglo-Dutch promise of military assistance in pursuit of Imperial claims upon the Spanish Empire. William believed the Empire desired 'no less than the whole succession of Spain'. This was not 'practicable', and

* The Whig Liverpool merchant Thomas Johnson inclined to this view, and did not think that 'The death of the King of Spain makes any alteration of trade... Most are of opinion that all will be well, and pleased with the Duke of Anjou' (Norris Papers, p.49, to Richard Norris, 14 November 1700). For Harley's similar response see: H.M.C. Portland, iii, 634.
William thought it pointless negotiating new treaties with the Empire until he could see 'how they would be made good' by any new parliament. 45

Rochester and Godolphin urged William to recognise Anjou as King of Spain. They did not think a new parliament could be brought into 'a war against Spain or if the dismembering any part of that monarchy were made the grounds for it'. All they conceded was 'that alliances will be very necessary and what the people would come into if they were made only with regard to the common security'. If war was coming William's best strategy would be a 'temporizing one', for 'the more time should be gained the nation would be in a better posture to defend itself'. 46

The debate was taken up nationally as the election campaign began in late December 1700. * One Dutch observer believed foreign policy the main

* The pamphlet war saw three main lines of argument. Some Tories continued to argue for recognition of the will, and there was no danger of the Spaniards ever accepting a 'French' King. The Partition Treaties had simply made France stronger by land and sea; and much was made of the disruption of English trade to Old Spain if England chose to contest the will of Carlos militarily (An Argument Against War, 1701). They denied that Anjou's succession to the Spanish throne was a threat to our trade, for 'It is the interest of Spain to keep up its ancient alliance and trade with England' (Remarks Upon the Two Great Questions, part ii, 1701). Some of the Tory merchant community agreed. One wrote in December 1701: 'Under pretence to carry on their party they [the Whigs] cry up a war with Spain and France... pretending that France and Spain being joined in one family we shall lose all our trade with Spain and the Straits... Not considering that the same day we make war we lose for the time of war in hopes of the future, which to me is madness; for by war the French will gain the trade and bring them to wear their commodities' (Add MSS 22851, ff 131-32, Henry Whistler to Gov. Thomas Pitt, 20 December, 1701).

Some accepted the danger of the international situation and the probability of war, but thought 'our main strength ought to be exerted at sea'; for 'although we cannot be without more land troops than are upon the present establishment... the war was not to be on the same foot as before; that our part and the Dutch will be chiefly to act at sea, and so our money kept home'. (The Succession of Spain Discussed, 1701). Naval power would permit England easily to transport troops to Spain (An Account of Spain to which is added a large preface concerning the establishment of the Spanish Crown on the Duke of Anjou, 1700).

Many Whig pamphlets defended the treaty of partition and attempted to show the danger of the will. They stressed the danger of Flanders falling into the hands of France; and refuted arguments that we could rely on the fleet alone and act purely defensively (A Letter to a member of parliament in the Country concerning the present posture of affairs in Christendom, December 1700; The Two Great Questions Further Considered with some reply to the Remarks, 1700). The Partition Treaties (cont'd p.123
issue: 'No longer do they invoke the names of Whigs and Tories, rather the distinction in some places is reported to be peace or war'. In William's opinion the division was still partisan: the Whigs supported a war if necessary, while the Tories favoured peace if possible. William found, with 'great surprise', that 'they begin to talk here of the necessity of a war in a more decided manner than I could ever have imagined'.

The French envoy Tallard returned to London in December 1700. He found general opinion for a peace; with Rochester strongly in favour of accepting the will. Some Whigs favoured war as the only way of keeping their party in office; but Tallard thought that even they had such a distrust of William that they would not permit a large army.

News of orders sent by the Spanish Regency to give Louis conduct of the Spanish government, and the threat this posed to the Spanish Netherlands, aroused traditional Whig fears for the security of the Low Countries, and there was increasing talk of war. Between November 1700 and February 1701, Louis reserved the right of succession of Philip V of Spain to the French throne, and occupied Flanders and ordered the Dutch barrier forces out. Rumours circulated that the French were to have exclusive trading rights in the Spanish colonies, as well as the Asiento.

The most important Tory spokesman in the debate about England's rôle in any future war was Davenant. Early in 1698 he attacked the Junto and their 'management' of the Nine Years' War in his Discourses on the Public Revenues and on the Trade of England. Davenant claimed England had been committed to a large army in Flanders by disadvantageous treaties and the

* (cont'd from p.122): were invoked by some Whigs as operating on the basis of the old concept of the balance of power in Europe. For this reason some of them specifically pointed to the dangers of all Spain going to the Germans (The Partition Examined and its Rejection by the French King fully stated, 1701).
ill-performance of our allies. The need to over-extend military resources to defend Flanders left England naked; and the fleet had to be used to defend the country from invasion, instead of trade protection:

Now to have so numerous a land army, and at the same time to pay such a fleet as would give trade a full protection was an expense which must have brought us very low... Besides to increase our forces abroad, so many troops were drawn from hence as left the kingdom at every turn unguarded; so that we must have been liable to frequent assaults upon our coast, and invasions, if our whole naval strength had not been kept together, in one gross, and in a body what is inconsistent with the care of trade.51

If England had not been drained of troops the navy could have fought in small commerce-protecting squadrons. The troops left in England could resist any invasion:

And when our merchant fleets were taken we blamed the management of the Admiralty; whereas, to argue the matter calmly, and without prejudice, neither our circumstances, nor our manner of making war, nor the nature of the alliance, could perhaps admit of better conduct.52

If trade had been protected, England need not have feared a long war, for War, in itself, is not inconsistent with the care and protection of trade... A trading people can maintain a war when their strength is so disposed, that their naval force may have no other care and business but to attend and guard their traffic; but this cannot be done with safety, unless their land armies are kept at home, to defend the country against invasions.53

Davenant conceded England's interest in making some contribution to the defence of Flanders; an important development in Tory thinking. If a new Anglo-Dutch treaty was made then 20,000 English should serve in Flanders if needed. But England should reduce the Dutch naval quotas, 'That they may augment their forces at land, and very well defend themselves and Flanders with a small addition of charge, and by 20,000 of our troops'. Equipped with a larger fleet, England could defend its trade as well as attack French commerce and ports.54 A naval war would also keep money at home; and its expense be more easily regulated by parliament.55
Shortly before parliament opened in February 1701 Davenant produced another pamphlet.\(^5\) It was certainly the duty of England to maintain 'the balance of Europe' and defend the integrity of the Low Countries as had been done since Elizabeth's time. France was still strong, and there was a danger of the French attaining 'universal monarchy' if there were a full union of the French and the Spanish crowns. Davenant again stressed the Junto's mismanagement of the public finances during William's war and their acquiescence in the Second Partition Treaty. Davenant argued that the treaty would have increased French power; in particular, by damaging English trading interests in the Mediterranean. The treaty had offended Carlos and led directly to the will. After Ryswick, 'vigorous application' should have been made to the Court of Spain from England; the aversion of the Spanish to the French would have produced a declaration in favour of the Archduke.* With its trading channels open England could sustain a long war; but now 'upon a declaration of war an immediate and full stop must be put to the greater part of our foreign traffic', for France would close the Spanish, Mediterranean and the West Indies trades to us. If war came the danger would be that it 'will bring again into play the very set of men whose ruinous conduct for eight years was a greater weight upon this kingdom than all our other burdens'; and the war 'will be fought as formerly' by 'a numerous land army and a small fleet'. With a powerful fleet England could confront France with 'the terror of an invasive war'.

On 11 February 1701 William requested parliament's 'mature' resolutions on the great 'alteration in the affairs abroad' since Carlos's death. He

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\* Harley assisted Davenant in his researches (Loan 29/190, f 17, Davenant to Harley, 19 September 1700). One foreign observer noted that Davenant's essays were 'conserte avec ceux de son party' (Add MSS 17677, WW, f 203).
referred the keeping up of a strong fleet. The response to the King's speech revealed sharp differences between Whig and Tory over the extent of any English commitment to European affairs. At William's prompting the Dutch presented a memorial defending their recognition of Anjou as Philip V of Spain as an attempt to gain the release of the Dutch garrisons in Flanders, and requesting England to prepare to send the 10,000 men and 20 ships promised under the 1678 Treaty. Though the leading Tories advised English recognition of Philip, the Whigs gave full backing to the memorial and drew general support for a resolution to make good the 1678 treaty terms if necessary. The Commons advised William 'to enter into such negotiations, in concert with the States General and other potentates, as may most effectually conduce to the mutual safety of these kingdoms, and the States General, and the preservation of the peace of Europe'. This delighted William.

In March 1701 the Lords considered the Second Partition Treaty. The Tory lords were critical of its terms. The Lords proposed to address the King on this matter, and a committee was formed under Nottingham to agree terms. On the 18 March Wharton suggested that the Lords add to their address a condemnation of Louis for violating the Partition Treaty by accepting Carlos's will, and an advice that in future dealings with France William should 'proceed with such caution as may carry along with a real security'. Wharton's addition was approved, which some Tories 'objected against as declaring war with France and not treating but on the terms of a new King of Spain'. But Shaftesbury noted: 'It was so accepted on our side, and explained it his sense for sending back the young gentleman to Versailles, and bringing the Archduke into his room, and that which was his just right'. 'No peace without Spain' was a Whig policy in 1701.

Shaftesbury, a radical Whig who opposed William's attempt to keep a
standing army after Ryswick, was a firm believer in the whole of the Spanish Empire going to Charles, 'esteeming all partition treaties to be fatal'. He thought it better to leave the whole Spanish Empire in Philip's hands, 'and wait for what providence may work for us by a division of the Courts and interest of France', than agree to a partition. And the Whig Stepney thought 'a war ought not to be undertaken with any less prospect' than 'the dispossessing the Duke of Anjou of the whole Spanish monarchy; or at least of Spain, the West Indies and Flanders and placing the Archduke Charles in his room'.

The Commons also took up the 'ill consequences' of the Second Partition Treaty, and Seymour presented a draft address. This claimed that the 'dangers which now threaten both this kingdom and the peace of Europe' resulted from the treaty. By April 1701 Tallard thought war certain, though he doubted it would be declared in 1701. He thought the principal difference between Whig and Tory was which party would be in power when war was declared. A fresh royal message on 31 March told of France's refusal to offer anything more than a continuance of the Ryswick Treaty in response to the maritime powers' request for 'security'. William also presented a second (unprompted) memorial from the Dutch requesting mobilization of the English aid promised by the 1678 treaty. Tories such as Brydges, who had previously attacked the Junto mercilessly, called for national unity; though Brydges drew attention to the debts left by William's Whig ministers and England's military unpreparedness. Seymour 'was not for declaring against war nor being too forward in it, but for supporting the Dutch

Some Whig writers perceived the dangers to the balance of Europe if the whole of the Spanish Empire went to the Germans, and defended the Partition Treaties as the best means to preserve that balance (The Partition Examined, and its Rejection by the French King fully Stated, 1701, pp. 10, 29, 33).
according to the treaty - to be seconds not principals'. This distinction between 'seconds' and 'principals' was crucial to many Tories, and reflected a distinction between a largely land or largely naval war on England's part.  

The Tories proposed an address to William assuring him that the Commons 'would effectually enable him to support' the 1678 treaty, but advising continued negotiations with France. In April the Tories were claiming that England was not obliged to send the 10,000 treaty troops until the Dutch were attacked, and not at all if they were the aggressors. The Whig general Cutts wanted an addition to Finch's motion to state that the Commons would not regard a renewal of Ryswick by the French as 'a sufficient security'. But the Tories thought this tantamount to declaring war. Hedges asked the Commons to drop the Whig amendment in an attempt to preserve unanimity on European affairs. Cutts withdrew his extension of Finch's motion, which was passed without opposition. The House then approved the sending of 10,000 men and 20 ships to support the Dutch. William assured the Dutch there was now no question of England abandoning them.

Partisan divisions again erupted in April, when an investigation was conducted into the Vernon-Portland correspondence relating to the First Partition Treaty. Shower, a Tory, denounced its terms as worse than the second. The Whig leaders Orford, Somers and Halifax were eventually impeached for their alleged complicity in its negotiation. And William suffered a further blow in early May when news reached England that he had, without informing parliament, recognized Anjou as King of Spain in mid-April.

The Commons considered on the 9 May the latest Dutch request for military aid, accompanied by a strong supporting message from William. The Tory Howe thought 'The liberties of Europe were in danger from France', and that 'now there was occasion we should show the world that we were mis-
represented' outside parliament. But Howe added the rider that 'We would manage things so that we would not be principals and yet not neglect anything that was necessary for our safety'. Many Whigs were amused at this sudden Tory bellicosity, but the House overwhelmingly adopted a resolution that promised 'to support his allies in maintaining the liberties of Europe'.

The Commons asked William for an estimated charge for the 10,000 men to be sent abroad. And when the Lords considered the Dutch request the Tory Normanby suggested an even stronger address to William recommending renewal of the Anglo-Imperial alliance. Parliament's deliberations were passed on to the Dutch with satisfaction by William, who believed he could now proceed to negotiate with the Empire.

Yet the Commons still appeared isolated from public opinion. On the 15 May the merchants and citizens of the London Common Council rejected by one vote a petition in support of immediate war. And on the 8 May the Kentish Address was presented to the Commons, advising tougher measures against France. By June it was apparent that the public clamour for war had not been silenced by either the Commons committal of the Kentish petitioners, or their address of the 14 May against those who 'endeavoured to raise tumults and seditions'. The latter was a response to the placing in the Commons of the bellicose 'Legion' memorial, which questioned the patriotism of the Commons and criticised their dilatoriness in response to the French threat.

Over one hundred Commoners received petitions from constituencies urging tougher measures against France. Godolphin noted that 'people are generally unsatisfied with the proceedings of parliament'. On the 12 June the Tories, led by Seymour and Shower, pointedly noted William's approval of their proceedings so far, and 'unanimously assured' him of their support for such alliances concluded 'in conjunction with the Emperor and the States General, for the preservation of the liberties of Europe, the
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The Whigs thought the resolution a 'sham', designed to secure the Tories public favour; but accepted that such 'artifices' were 'blinding' the public.76

In the latter part of 1701 the Whigs attempted to persuade William of the popular enthusiasm for the war and consequent hostility to the present parliament, and that it would be to his advantage to call fresh elections. In defence of the Tory conduct of foreign policy Harley's A Justification of the Honourable House of Commons in the Last Sessions of Parliament appeared in September.77 The Commons, Harley stated, had been right not to plunge England into war early in the year. The English and Dutch were militarily unprepared; and the merchants had 'millions of effects abroad'. England was in debt from the last war; and the Commons 'could not but take notice of the forwardness of those gentlemen to enter into a new war who had got most by the management of the last'. Like Davenant, Harley was obsessively concerned with the internal political repercussions of war, and was appealing to widespread Tory suspicions. One Tory, in July 1701, observed that 'If we must have a war we shall keep it out of the hands of the late managers'.78 (In a further pamphlet in September, Harley asked 'whether the nation has suffered more, or the late ministers got more, by the management of the last war').79

Harley saw England's role in any Spanish Succession war as limited, for 'The Emperor was the principal party concerned, and the Dutch in more immediate danger'. The Commons apparent tardiness was justified, so that 'The Emperor and the Dutch might apply to England and not England to them for assistance'. For the Commons were 'not willing that England should be made a principal in the war, and bear the greatest burden, as they did in the last'. Harley recommended entering any new war on the 1678 treaty
basis only, 'and then we should come in as assistants'. Harley's pamphlet also justified the conduct of the Commons to those Tories critical of parliament's apparent unawareness of the growing dangers in Europe. Evelyn was upset in the spring of 1701 that parliament 'neglect the affairs abroad most unseasonably, whilst the French secure themselves of Flanders'. He berated parliament for 'running into parties than much minding the danger of Europe by the preparation of the French'.

Harley's leadership of the Tories on foreign and war issues cemented his links with that party: 'Whatever matter was offered in the last session of the Commons that seemed to have the least tendency to war', one Whig observed, 'was violently opposed by the Speaker, Musgrave, Seymour, Shower, Finch, Howe, Harcourt, and all those who were entirely in the interest of that party'.

For the Whigs, Somers attacked the Tory concept of a limited naval war:

> It was a very fond opinion to imagine that we, who in conjunction with Holland were the last war insulted upon our coasts by the fleet of France; and another time had probably been ruined by them, had not the heavens been favourable to us, should be able, after the loss both of our own trade, and the assistance of the Dutch, to maintain a fleet big enough to secure us from a power so exorbitant as that of France.\(^8\)

The Whig Stepney, ambassador to the Imperial Court, had been for launching a naval attack on French marine trade as early as March 1701. And in August he reminded Godolphin of the sad consequences of the delays in con-

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* Evelyn noted the inadequacy of a purely naval response to the French threat: 'We had only a good and chargeable fleet at sea whilst the French neglected our preparation, whilst saving that expense, he was wholly intent on securing Milan, Flanders and threatening Holland' (Evelyn, v, 462, 1 June 1701). In February the moderate Tory Sir Edward Coke thought 'The war is already determined. France acting with as an absolute power in the Spanish Dominions as in her own country is the necessary consequences of the Duke of Anjou being King of Spain'; and he was fearful of Flanders coming under French control (H.M.C. Cowper, ii, 418, to Thomas Coke, 3 February 1701).
templating war: the loss of Portugal to the French alliance;* giving the French a chance to establish their interest in Spain; the English fleet not appearing in the Mediterranean early enough to assist in the capture of Naples and Sicily.84 In justification, Godolphin stressed 'the uncertainty of the proceedings in England last spring, and the apparent unwillingness of Holland to come into a war without an absolute necessity'; though he admitted the loss of Portugal had been a consequence of this delay:

On the other side could it reasonably be expected that England and Holland should go head first into a war not to end till the Archduke were King of Spain? England and Holland have all along been of opinion, and very firm in it, to procure a reasonable satisfaction for the Emperor, as well as a competent security for themselves, and enter into alliances first for these ends and afterwards into a war if fair means will not attain them, but I incline to think that Holland will scarce consent to begin that war till they are fully convinced those fair means are become desperate.85

An indication of Godolphin's sensitivity to Dutch opinion; and of his reluctance to accept, in 1701, a war not to end until all Spain was in Charles's hands. In reply, Stepney stressed the damage done to allied interests by English vacillation, and concluded: 'With these disadvantages we are at last forced into a war, and still in doubt how far the parliament will support his majesty'.86

Initially, Louis's acceptance of Carlos's will brought him advantages: the expulsion of garrisons from the Dutch barrier fortresses in Flanders; Anglo-Dutch recognition of Philip; and the signing in June of a Franco-Portuguese alliance. But the Imperialist war in Italy was vigorously implemented by Eugene, and his successes were followed by the conclusion at The Hague in August of a renewed Grand Alliance. Marlborough bore the

* In June 1702 Pedro of Portugal had signed treaties with France and Spain whereby he undertook to bar the use of Portuguese ports to the enemies of both (F.G. Davenport, European Treaties, 1934, iii, 29).
burden of the negotiations, and his preoccupations show the influence of
the now influential Tory belief that England's contribution to the coming
war would be largely naval. Although the Dutch agreed to furnish the same
proportion at sea as in the last war - three ships to the English five -
and were planning to augment their land forces, Marlborough considered
offering for England's share half the soldiers supplied in the previous war.
Marlborough said he had made use 'of the argument that is very natural
for England, which is that their expense at sea must be great'.

It was agreed that the alliance would attempt to reclaim a sizeable portion of the
Spanish Empire for Charles, and secure the Dutch a barrier against France -
though Marlborough thought that 'some may object that England ought to have
no barrier but the sea' - to guarantee the English Mediterranean trade,
and allow the maritime powers to take what they could of the Spanish West
Indies. The last point was important to many in England, for the possibility
of military action in the West Indies opened up a whole new dimension to
the strategic debate.
(iii) Colonial Strategy 1689-1702

The merchant interest welcomed war in 1689 as 'a golden opportunity' for the French to be 'rooted out' of the Caribbean. But it was the vulnerability of the English plantations which increasingly aroused the fears of the authorities as war approached. In April 1689 the Lords of Trade submitted to William a memorandum which expressed only apprehension for the security of England's settlements in the West Indies, where the French were 'more numerous and in better condition of defence than the English. Men, arms and ammunition should be sent to succour them and to save our sugar trade'. They recommended despatch of a squadron to defend the islands against French privateers, 'for the party superior at sea in those parts will probably prevail on land'.

Caribbean warfare never became the political issue it became in Anne's reign. The classic doctrines of Caribbean warfare had been formulated in Elizabeth's reign in response to a Spanish enemy. The occasional writer recommended an assault on the French West Indies; they being, it was alleged, the basis of French economic and maritime power. Such ideas were very occasionally taken up in parliament. And some colonists in the West Indies pressed vigorously the advantages of destroying the French in that area.

However, the only systematic plan for Caribbean warfare came from within the ministry. In 1691 William Blathwayt, Secretary at War, produced his own 'Proposal for Destroying the French Plantations in America'. Planning did not commence until 1692; when there was, for the first time, strong ministerial and public interest in the colonial war. In April, Blathwayt pressed Nottingham on the Caribbean expedition, and hoped to persuade William to take more interest. In June Russell was asked for his observations on naval operations there. And he was told to send a
squadron to Newfoundland to 'ruin the French fishery and trade and navigation to those parts'. By July, Nottingham was predicting the destruction of the French plantations in the West Indies. And he warned Blathwayt that 'it would be of very ill consequence to the King's affairs if after the little success of our designs at home we should attempt nothing abroad in the Indies where our advantage must be so great and so probable'. But it was already too late in the year for the planned expedition to leave. Wheler's expedition to the West Indies in 1693, the most ambitious of the war, ended dismally.

Not until the end of William's war did interest revive in the West Indies. England was now on the defensive there, and it was the French threat to the plantations, to Jamaica in 1694 for instance, which aroused public concern. It was never a common criticism of William, as it was to be of Marlborough and the Whigs in Anne's reign, that colonial operations had been neglected. But towards the end of William's war merchants were becoming concerned at the lack of military success in the Caribbean, and in April 1696 one told the ministry to pay more attention to the colonies, 'lest in defending other people's countries we lose our own'. The merchant reported French moves there, and in the winter of 1696 news was definitely received that a French squadron was being sent, with financial backing from French West Indies merchants, to capture the treasure fleet and if possible destroy the Spanish West Indies trade. English merchants

*A descent on the West Indies was offered as a sweetener to the naval estimates during November 1692. Parliament was promised that there was 'Now setting out a great fleet in the West Indies to protect your own trade in those parts, which is very great. You cannot expect the Dutch will preserve it, who have but a small share there and have almost rooted out the French from most of the islands but Martinique, of which you will also have a good account in some short time' (Luttrell Diary, p. 268, 29 November 1692, Sir Henry Goodricke).*
had substantial trading interests in the Spanish flota, and it was decided in England to concentrate the main naval effort in the spring of 1697 on preventing this. Providing for the safety of the Spanish flota seemed an intolerable burden to Secretary Shrewsbury; but operations in American waters now seemed to occupy the centre of the strategic stage because of the fears that 'that great treasure' should fall into French hands.

Gradually the West Indies area was drawn into the situation opened up by the impending death of Carlos II, and the possible disintegration of the Spanish Empire. Late in 1696 colonial and merchant groups reported that if the French captured Jamaica they could then engross the whole of the Spanish West Indies and then become masters of the mines of Mexico and Peru.

Earlier Blathwayt had noted the importance of Jamaica as a source of 'under-hand' trade with the Spanish colonies, and as a possible base for a French assault on Cuba and the Spanish American mainland.

During the Ryswick negotiations the French suggested a neutrality covering the Caribbean area in the event of fresh hostilities. William rejected the idea as 'not convenient for us'. William feared French designs there in the event of a new war; and early in 1698 told Portland 'We must also have some ports in the West Indies'. William saw increasing public concern for the West Indies as a means of drawing England from its pacific posture after Ryswick. He told Heinsius in March 1698:

There seems too great an aversion to war at the moment... So that, in case of a war is to be the upshot of the business, I must take my measures so as to involve this nation insensibly in it. What I can do at present is to augment the squadron I had destined for the Mediterranean, and hasten its departure. I am also resolved, besides the ships I had destined for the West Indies, to cause those that are there to remain till further orders... I have thought of sending 4 or 5 regiments to Jamaica, under pretence of defending our possessions in those parts... If these men are there you will easily feel that, in case of necessity, they may make themselves masters of the Spanish possessions in the West Indies.
William's fears were confirmed in April and May of 1698 when Portland wrote of possible French designs on the Caribbean and of the need for fortresses there to safeguard Dutch and English interests. In the summer of 1698 Prior reported a French expedition to the coasts of Chile and Peru to seize ports there: 'They are assured of some Spaniards who had rather be under French government than under that of their own countrymen'. And Prior thought France was planning an immediate expedition to Spanish America when Carlos died.

Benbow's expedition to the Caribbean in 1698 found clear pro-French sympathies on the part of the Spanish officials. Scottish attempts to found a colony at Darien angered the Spaniards, who were incited by the French to turn their indignation against England. Benbow discovered no attempts by French commanders to interfere with the Spanish treasure fleet; but thought that in the event, or even possibility, of war the French would make their first objective the West Indies. He noted that the prevention of such a scheme depended entirely upon English naval mastery over strategic keypoints in the Caribbean itself.

Spanish antagonism to the Darien adventure led William to disown it. As Jersey told Prior, the King was 'not privy to the design and is resolved not to protect it'. Jersey himself hoped that 'the Spaniards will beat the Scots out of Darien'. But Prior thought that 'the moment the Scotch are driven out of Darien, the French will get in; and laugh at us'. Some defended the Darien scheme as a sure means of preventing the union of the French and Spanish crowns. On the eve of war Davenant noted that 'There is one point I could hardly get over among the country gentlemen; which was, our behaviour to the Scots at Darien. They told me this colony would have secured a footing in the Spanish West Indies in case of the King of Spain's death'.

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By the summer of 1699 Prior was confidently reporting to Jersey that 'You know very well that the French design lies chiefly that way in case of any change by the King of Spain's death'. And thought the French were taking an increasing interest in the English position there. Benbow's reports confirmed this, and Vernon told William of the 'unexpected inclination the Spaniards in those parts show towards the French. Which is like to secure them Peru, and they may have Mexico too if they desire'. When they received Benbow's report the Lords Justices thought that a squadron should be stationed permanently there.

As a war with France over the Spanish Empire appeared ever more likely, interest in the Caribbean increased. Naval intelligence received from France seemed to confirm that in the event of war the French would make this an area of vital importance. In February 1701, Vernon reported to the Admiralty that French naval activity was centred on the West Indies: 'This is a plain sign that we are going to enter into a great war'. In May it was reported that the French 'fear especially for America, upon which they do not doubt but some great design is forming. They are afraid they shall not be in a condition strong enough to make any successful opposition thereto'.

Many Tories now anticipated a classic Elizabethan 'blue-water' war. Early in 1701 one argued that 'The only way to pinch and stress' France would 'be by the united naval strength of England and Holland to make a desultory war on the Spanish coast, and to seize the Spanish mines in the West Indies'. Some Whigs were strongly against the English making war there. Shaftesbury thought the West Indies best joined to a weak power such as Spain. If England tried to take further territory there it would cause disputes between the English and Dutch. War in the West Indies would be a useless 'diversion' from the European theatre. Shaftesbury's concern
at the English obsession with the West Indies was directed as much against his own party as towards the Tories. Many Whig pamphlets in 1700/71 arguing for war were attracted by the idea of a largely maritime conflict. One Whig suggested that 'It would seem to fall naturally to our share to act most of our part at sea'; and recommended 'attacking the French or the Spaniards in the West Indies, for they must now be reckoned one and the same'. The importance of the Spanish Netherlands to English security was acknowledged, but he recommended keeping on the defensive there, 'for should we attack there, we must be obliged to dispute every foot of ground'.

Another Whig invoked the Elizabethan tradition of warfare after pointing out the danger of Carlos II's will to English interests: if war came when England should support Holland as in Elizabeth's time with native troops or hired mercenaries. But the English navy could quickly end any war if we sent 'such squadrons abroad as may secure the treasure of the West Indies for the use of the League. By this means we possess ourselves of the most valuable part of the Spanish monarchy... We cut off the sinews of war from the common enemy'. He concluded that 'a naval war is the likeliest method to quell' France.

Some Whigs made a distinction between the French and Spanish interest in America. Stepney's *The Present Interest of England* (1701) saw the Empire and Holland supplying the bulk of the troops for the fighting in Europe. England should send only 12,000 men for continental service, or the equivalent in money; and Stepney recommended 'increasing our naval force and taking upon us the greater share of the war by sea than was done in the last war'. Stepney recommended substantial English fleets in the West Indies and the Mediterranean; the former 'will go a long way towards saving the charge of the whole war'. But England should arrange a neutrality with the Spanish in the West Indies, and concentrate on attacking the French there.
The Whig author of *The Succession of Spain Discussed* (1701) thought that 'The treasures of Spain will compensate us for any loss' in a new war. And the prospect of Caribbean silver reconciled many Tories to war. One thought England should avoid entering any war too quickly, and prevaricate 'until our fleets are got ready and everything provided to seize upon the wealth of Havana, and bring the treasures of Mexico and Peru'. One Tory argued that war was now acceptable because it opened up the possibility of war in the West Indies:

> In this therefore the acceptance of the will is more favourable to us than the Treaty of Partition... In the present case, the West Indies now in the possession of an enemy present us with an inviting prospect of ample recompense... Now what we give towards the support of a war seems to be but a kind of venture to sea.

Whig writers argued that it would be 'impossible' for Louis 'to spin out his wars without an annual return from the West Indies', and that it would be easy for the English navy to cut off this 'exhaustless store of silver and gold'. William Paterson, father of the Bank of England and part-author of the Darien scheme, with close links with Whig financial and mercantile circles, attempted to persuade William late in 1701 of the advantages of making extensive conquests in Spanish America. Several ambitious schemes for American warfare were circulated. And Whig authors took the lead in calling for more determined English efforts in the privateering war.

* The Observator newspaper in the years 1702-1704 provides an interesting glimpse of the independent Whig view of war strategy. Emphasis was laid upon the war at sea, which would secure England's 'advantage'; descents on France and Spain; privateering attacks on French trade; and the securing of places in the West Indies. Defoe captured the public mood in his *Reasons against a war with France*, published late in 1701. Better to ignore recognition of the Pretender and to concentrate on a colonial war against Spain rather than on a war against France. He championed a maritime war; with English efforts concentrated on helping the Imperial cause in Spain.
against French trade in any new conflict.*

The 6th article of the Grand Alliance allowed England and Holland to keep any conquests made in the West Indies in the coming war; and thus implied they should stay with Philip of Anjou. But as Stepney noted in August 1701:

The Emperor's pretended right to the whole of the Spanish Indies is in a manner acknowledged in the 6th article, otherwise it is a weakness in us to ask leave to conquer what we may possess without the precarious title.

Stepney thought the article might lead to Anglo-Dutch jealousy, when the latter 'acquire more settlement than the poor ones they have now in the West Indies'. The Tory ministry of 1701 strongly supported the 6th article, much to the disgust of Blathwayt:

Our West Indies article it seems was very much insisted on in England by those as certainly know very little of those parts, but as I have always been a Spaniard to the death of the late King for our interests in American, so now I am an Imperialist, and desire nothing more than that all the dominions belonging to Spain be declared to be vested in the House of Austria under the protection of England and Holland. Blathwayt entered a formal protest to William about the article. Blathwayt thought the only safeguard for English trade in the West Indies was establishing Charles on the Spanish throne, long before England was formally

* There was particular enthusiasm for a privateering war. The Whig John Dennis published in 1703 A Proposal for putting a Speedy End to the War, which recommended the formation of an Anglo-Dutch privateering fleet of 400 ships. Sir Francis Brewster's New Essay on Trade (1702) thought the war could be used to 'defeat the French in their growing navigation and trade'; as did the author of England's State Distempers Traced (1704). The Whig Observator of 29 April 1702, stressed the importance of England taking the offensive in the privateering war against French trade, which had been neglected under William III. A 'Privateers Encouragement Bill' was sent up to the Lords in May 1702, but was lost in a dispute with the Commons (H.M.C. House of Lords 1702-1704, pp. iv-v, 42). A 'West Indies Privateering Bill' passed through the Lords in February 1703, but was lost in the Commons (Ibid, pp. 208-209).
committed to this in 1703. In August 1701, Blathwayt told Stepney that he was 'for proclaiming the Archduke in the West Indies whenever we can make good his title'.

Benbow had noted in May 1702 that the Spanish West Indies would never be brought over to the Habsburgs unless there was 'set up one of the Austrian family in Old Spain'.

Godolphin asked Marlborough in July 1701 to remind William that if war came 'it will be of the last consequence that his majesty may be able to give his orders very precise in that matter when our West India squadron shall be ready to sail'. Marlborough realised the public concern for the West Indies, and told Godolphin that William was anxious that he and Rochester 'and whom else you think should consult for drawing up of instructions for a West India squadron'.

Vernon told William and Marlborough of the general enthusiasm for Caribbean warfare:

I don't see that we can make the Spaniards feel our weight unless it be in the West Indies, and there we might make the best advantages both against France and Spain and perhaps work soonest upon the Portuguese... If we are to have a war the operations at sea in all probability will be carried into those parts and the advantages or dis-advantages there will have great influence here.

He saw the West Indies as where 'We can most perplex France'.

By August 1701 Blathwayt was advising Marlborough against the 6th article:

Where the Emperor is too liberal in my opinion for our interests... For I would rather see the Spanish West Indies under the House of Austria with a freedom of trade than in our hands.

Blathwayt and Stepney persuaded Vernon to change his mind. In March of 1702 Blathwayt told Stepney:

In your last you tell me that Mr Secretary Vernon is come over to my notion of the West Indies, which I take to be no great honour, because by the way of working upon it none is like to accrue to the nation... We shall I fear rather
spoil our American affairs rather than mend them, if they continue to be mismanaged as they have been, which must needs be while they are misunderstood... Nor would I take one foot of ground from them [the Spanish], neither an island nor continent. 142

Vernon now told Stepney that the Empire wanted to interpret the 6th article as simply giving the English and the Dutch the right to use force to compel the Spanish in America to accept Imperial rule, in return for freedom of trade. Vernon thought this 'much more advantageous to us than anything got by rapine or buccaneering'; but reminded Stepney:

Many here seem more impressed with that article than any of the rest, and are like therefore to take great exceptions at the laying it aside, till they can be convinced that the nation will reap a greater benefit another way. 143

In reply, Stepney told Vernon it was pointless making conquests in Spanish South America; which were 'scarcely to be achieved and as hard to be maintained, without the exposing England and our other kingdoms to the same desolation with Spain suffers at this day by having to supply the Indies' although he thought it in England's interest 'to take as many of their islands as we can'. Hispaniola and Cuba should be taken, which could help to secure for England 'the whole navigation in the Gulf of Mexico'. 'The main question', he thought, 'is how the Indians themselves stand affected. For their inclinations must be the rule of our actions'. 144

But West Indies merchants continued to press for immediate action. In July 1701 they requested effective naval measures to protect their interests in the Caribbean (and Old Spain) and to stop the flota from falling into French hands. 145 Vernon told William that some were 'for venturing everything to lay hold on the flota'. 146 Colonial interests in the Caribbean also recommended vigorous action. In June 1701 Codrington wrote to the Lords of Trade about the French threat there, illustrated by the appearance of a French naval squadron. He thought English interests could 'only be secured by a fleet'. 147
The French appeared to be concentrating a superior naval force in the West Indies, which, by the end of 1700, amounted to 20 vessels with 1,300 guns. The merchants feared the French would make initial strikes against Jamaica, and then use it as a base to attack the Spanish Indies. In May 1701 they suggested an expedition to the West Indies immediately. In June the Admiralty Lords, acting on intelligence from France and the West Indies, advised William to send a squadron to the Caribbean, 'answerable to the force it is said the French have in those parts'. There was considerable fear of the Spanish flota falling into French hands. In August the cabinet decided to concentrate all naval action upon the movements of the flota.

The first instructions to Benbow (commander of the squadron to the Caribbean) in September 1701 seemed to suggest a West Indian guerre à outrance. Benbow, as well as protecting the flota from French designs, was to attack both the French and Spanish in the West Indies as occasion permitted. Rochester was delighted: 'Everybody is extremely pleased here with the hope they have got by these last letters from England that Benbow is designed for the plantations... Everybody begins to have more concern for them than they used to have formerly'. At a cabinet meeting in February 1702, some ministers thought Benbow should be reinforced, and suggested a full-scale expedition to the West Indies with land forces; although Pembroke, Lord High Admiral, pointed out the possible over-extension of naval resources.

But the new instructions to Benbow of February reveal a significant change in policy. The Spaniards were not now to be attacked in the West Indies, but encouraged to throw off French influence. Spanish jealousy and distrust' of the French there seemed established; they refused to send
home the plate fleet under French protection.* But if it was found that 'the generality of people' in the West Indies 'adhered to the French interest' then Benbow was to pursue his less discriminating orders of September. But, as Benbow pointed out in May 1702, the Spanish West Indies would never be brought over to the Habsburgs unless Charles was established in Madrid. **

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* The refusal made a great impact in England. One of Harley's naval contacts in the West Indies wrote: 'The news here is that the Spanish merchants will not trust their money under the French convoy, and that there is a strong party of the Spaniards stands up for the House of Austria as far as they durst'; but that this change of heart would last only so long as the English did the Spanish there no 'damage' (Loan 29/299, Capt. Richard Long to Harley, 5 February 1702, Port Royal). The news of the refusal led one English newspaper to crow that the French were 'Quite discouraged and perceive plainly that they must be at the expense of maintaining the King of Spain on the throne' (The Flying Post, 26 February 1702).
(iv) The Approach of War 1701-02

Many Englishmen saw the West Indies concessions in the Grand Alliance as just reward for engaging in a war widely seen as primarily of Imperial interest. In January 1701, one Tory noted that 'We are already divided into factions about war or peace... The Emperor has sent an embassy who offers no great matters if we enter into this quarrel'.158 After the Commons votes of June 1701 to support such alliances as William made, Stepney rushed to hinder Vienna 'from growing too presumptious upon the assistance which they expect from England... In my discourses with these ministers I have decided them to reflect seriously upon the word reasonable'.159 It was the reluctance of many Englishmen to enter too far into 'his quarrel' that led William to engage England only to a 'reasonable satisfaction' for the Emperor in the coming war. The Tory Hedges recorded his relief that the Empire would 'not insist upon the whole Spanish Succession, but would be satisfied if Naples, Sicily, Milan and Flanders came to the Emperor's share'.160

Vernon still hoped:

There will be no exceptions to the Treaty as engaging us too far or too soon with the Emperor's quarrel. If we will have him be concerned for our security we must not be indifferent to his satisfaction.161

* Early in June 1701 Stepney wrote of the Imperial fears at the neglect in the treaty talks of the Emperor's ambitions for Italian territories; and the fact that the Emperor 'disobliged the honest part of Spain by consenting that the monarchy should be divided'. But Stepney thought that if the Emperor got Naples and Sicily he would be satisfied. In August 1701 Stepney recorded the Emperor's dissatisfaction with the 'Project of Alliance', which he found 'liable to objections' in many parts: it made no mention of his desire to claim Milan for the Empire, and the Spanish Netherlands were merely mentioned as providing a Barrier for the Dutch without noting the Emperor's rights to the territories. As Stepney remarked, 'The Indies are the only parts of the world to which we seem to own the Emperor's rights and those we take to ourselves' (S.P. 105/62, ¶ 118, Stepney to Hedges, 4/15 June 1701; S.P. 105/63, ¶ 241, 'Remarks on the Project of Alliance', n.d. but August 1701).
Vernon told Marlborough that he 'never had any other notion but that if he would engage the Emperor to be concerned for our security we must not abandon him in his pretensions'. To placate English opinion Vernon thought the West Indies article should be exploited quickly, and that 'more ships and men than are ordered at present' should be sent to the Caribbean. But the Imperial Court sought an English naval presence in the Mediterranean rather than the West Indies. Imperialist hopes centred on Naples and Sicily,* and they desperately wanted to see an English naval squadron off the Italian coast early in 1701. Throughout 1701 Stepney continued to report the Imperial obsession with Naples and Sicily, and their relative unconcern with Old Spain and Spanish America.

Stepney shared the Emperor's concern for the Mediterranean; a fleet there would ensure the support of Portugal, and:

The Prince of Darmstadt maintains his principle that with 4/5,000 men on board he could make himself master of the island of Minorca, and as we find any disposition in the Catalans (whom he assures are ripe for revolt) he might be there at hand to second an attempt.

He was critical of the fact that naval attention was being concentrated on the Caribbean. In August he noted that if a fleet was not sent into the Mediterranean because of the lateness of the season, 'to a refusal will be imputed all the misfortune that can happen in Italy'.

* The Emperor's demands for Naples and Sicily were recognized in the final Grand Alliance, with the promise also of an English naval squadron at Naples to aid in their conquest (O. Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, ix, 280-289). The Naples expedition was pressed strongly by the Imperial envoy in London. But the hostility of the English naval authorities to this idea encouraged William to reject the Naples plan and take up instead a design put forward by the Landgrave George of Hesse-Darmstadt for an attack on Cadiz. The news of the absence of Philip from Spain in the spring of 1702 encouraged belief that a landing would provoke the Spanish to revolt in favour of Charles (S.P. 105/65, Stepney to Vernon, 28 April, Stepney to Vernon 6, 9, 10, 15 May 1702). Cadiz had the added attraction of being the European end of the Spanish American trade.
shared Stepney's desire for a Mediterranean squadron. But noted in August 1701 that 'Our going into the Mediterranean and attempting Minorca are fine schemes, but for the next year. Our first decision must come from Italy'. Hedges told Blathwayt in September 1701 that the fleet could not be sent into the Mediterranean because of the lack of secure port facilities, 'which is a most material alteration of the case from what it was in the last war', as well as the season being too far advanced. Stepney suggested using one of the Adriatic ports. And Blathwayt agreed.

The French showed no signs during the summer and autumn of 1701 of moderating the aggressive stance adopted after their acceptance of Carlos's will. In July 1701 Louis formed a company to exploit the Spanish American trade. In September he was considering a bill to bar most English goods from France. When James II died on the 5 September Louis immediately proclaimed his son 'James III' of England. This was especially provocative and on the 26 September the London merchants petitioned William advising immediate war. Sunderland, certain of a Whig victory, urged on William the advantages of fresh elections. He warned William that if the Tories were forced to contemplate a new war, 'It will be with a design of raising money which shall be both insufficient, and laid so as to be the most uneasy to the people that is possible'. William was convinced. New elections were ordered at the end of 1701; with the Tories seemingly handicapped by the weight of Court disfavour and Whig generated war hysteria.

The Tories made the main electoral issue the conduct and aims of the forthcoming war. Davenant and Harley collaborated on The True Picture of a Modern Whig. Claiming that Whigs desired 'a war to justify the Emperor

* Davenant and Harley were now co-operating closely in the production of pro-Tory propaganda (Loan 29/190, f 131, Davenant to Harley, 26 December 1701).
in his pretensions to the whole succession of Spain, though all sober men will think that not very reasonable'; and that the Junto wanted a war 'quite to dethrone the Duke of Anjou'. If The Whigs got control they would build up war aims to prolong the conflict and ensure their own dominance; for that 'party can reap no advantage but by a long, bloody and expensive war'. Davenant claimed the Partition Treaty had caused Carlos's will; and that the Whigs want a war 'to have justified the Partition Treaty'. For 'that was a matter few in parliament but men of our stamp [Junto Whigs] would have engaged in'. 'The reasonable war aims' that the Commons had agreed to were those of the present ministry and:

The intentions of those that govern at present are to make a war with the French unless they remove their troops out of all the Spanish Dominions whatsoever, and give the Dutch a sufficient and safe barrier, and unless they give the Emperor reasonable satisfaction, and such a part of the Spanish Succession as may make the House of Austria more a balance to the French power. If that be the scheme the country gentlemen will unanimously come into it.

Davenant's pamphlet went through six editions in four months.175

Both Harley and Davenant stressed the importance of England not entering any war as a 'principal', i.e. for a war fought mainly at sea and with a limited European commitment. By the end of 1701 one Tory believed the State of the question - peace or war - to be very much altered since last sessions. We have now very potent alliances formed abroad, we had then none, the Treaty of Partition having broke those we had. We had then very great effects at sea in Spain... The Dutch are now in so good a posture of defence that the French can't hurt them with their force... It is so notoriously known that the subsistence of Holland out of the French power is absolutely necessary to the preservation of this kingdom... For then we must have been principals, had we declared first without alliances... And the seat of it being so remote as Italy and the West Indies, that will be but in ships and money.*176

* Seymour took the same line in his election speech. Surprisingly, perhaps, he seems to have envisaged a war quite 'to reduce Spain to the obedience of her rightful sovereign'. But he stressed the importance of economy in war financing, for 'It is visible that very great estates having been gained during the last war, which (cont'd p. 150)
Nottingham, soon to take office, noted in September 1701 his

Hope that since we are entering a war of which the success under the best conduct is much to be feared, we shall not have it managed as the last was, and be twice in danger of ruin by the same methods. Good gamesters will change their cards at least if they can't their fortune, especially when they are master.177

By September Davenant and Harley were preparing a more accommodating position in anticipation of war and Tory hopes for continuing office. Davenant told Marlborough that he was preparing a pamphlet calling on 'our friends to lay aside, for this time at least, their resentments, in order to unite with more vigour against France the common enemy'. He would show the dangers of the French and Spanish crowns uniting, and 'with all the force I can recommend to the House of Commons espousing the House of Austria'; and would press for speedy and effectual supplies to be voted to support William's alliances.178

It was Seymour who moved an address on 12 January to ask William to include in any new treaties an article binding the allies not to agree to a peace until England received 'reparation' for Louis's recognition of 'James III'. William happily assented, believing it ensured English entry into the conflict as a principal. Seymour did attempt to persuade the Commons that the 40,000 troops voted included the 7,000 serving garrison duty in England. But moderate Tories such as Harley dissociated themselves, and the proposal was lost.179 The voting of the English troops was eased by

* (cont'd from p.149): could not fairly be attained in so short a time'. He thought that 'We must either raise men and money to be sent to the Emperor or else must raise money and thereby enable the Emperor to pay for troops'. Seymour stressed the difficulty of disbanding any troops we might raise, 'And if an army be kept upon us in time of peace we are from that instant in French shoes'. He recommended that money should be sent to the Emperor to raise his own men, 'because he can raise men cheaper than we, and because the expense we must be at for transporting them over the sea will be saved to him'; though Seymour admits this will mean loss of specie from England ('Minutes taken from the speech of Sir Edward Seymour upon his election. Published December 1701', in An Account of the Growth of Deism in England, 1709, pp. 155-157).
Vernon's proposal that a body of 10,000 men be raised to serve on board the
fleet in the summer following. This was resolved on 'without much oppo-
sition'.

It being represented to them how useful it would be to
send a good body of forces out with the fleet, to alarm
all the enemy's coasts, and to make a descent in France,
Spain or Italy as opportunity may offer.

And the Court, especially Marlborough, showed great concern that the number
of troops settled on be debated fully in parliament, and the agreement of
the majority of the Commons secured at each step.
Part Three: The Spanish Succession War 1702-1712

(i) Ministerial Disputes Over War Strategy 1702-04

The Tory party did better than expected in the second election of 1701. Many Tories now believed that in the coming war England would be fighting as naval auxiliaries. When the declaration of war was debated by the cabinet in May 1702, Rochester, with the support of Normanby and Jersey—all three immediately drew accusations of being Jacobites—argued that it would be in England's interest to act only as seconds in the coming struggle. Rochester, in his preface to Clarendon's *History of the Rebellion* (April 1702) attacked the conduct of the Nine Years' War. England should fight its wars only by naval means. As for France: 'With a little more than ordinary application we might hope to restrain his exorbitant power, by our naval expeditions'; and Rochester stressed the 'futility' of Flanders warfare, 'where, by the strength of his numerous garrisons, he must be, for many years, at least, invulnerable'. He wished England to contribute only the troops set out in the 1678 treaty, and apart from that confine itself to a purely naval war, with descents on France, Spain and the West Indies. However, Nottingham, Seymour and Harley sided with Marlborough in opposing such a limited commitment; and the cabinet sanctioned full-scale English intervention. Most of the cabinet supported the naval measures which Rochester proposed, but argued that, of their own, they could not end the war. The ministry was already effectively dividing itself from a significant section of the Tory party.*

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* Many Tories still held to the earlier suspicions (which Harley and Davenant had assiduously cultivated) over the renewal of the war and the commitment of English land forces to the continent; although by October one Tory could talk of Harley 'converting the country' (Loan 29/160/10, Salwey Winnington to Robert Harley, 3 October 1702).
The growing disquiet about England's exact commitment to the war among the allies helped to consolidate ministerial opinion behind a vigorous pushing of the war by land and sea. Alexander Stanhope, envoy at The Hague, told the ministry in April of Dutch belief that the English 'intend to act only as auxiliaries and by that means secure our trade to their prejudice'. Such suspicions were understandable given the attitude of many Englishmen to foreign commitments since 1697. Simultaneously Stepney informed the ministry that the Imperial Court was suspicious that England intended not to over-extend itself in the coming war, and still entertained a bias towards the old Partition Treaty. In particular, that English hopes were concentrated on Spain (and the projected Cadiz expedition) and not the achievement of Imperial aims in Italy, 'As thinking that plan more conformable to the interests of England and Holland than what has been stipulated for the Emperor's share of the Spanish monarchy in the Grand Alliance'. But Vernon assured Stepney that 'the effects will show that we shall exert ourselves to the utmost against France'.

The defeat of Rochester did not end cabinet disputes about war strategy. The Dutch wished England to concentrate their forces in Flanders; and Marlborough increasingly favoured this. Nottingham thought it pointless: 'Considering that a good issue of this war does not depend on any conquests in the Spanish Netherlands nor are the States likely to make any. Then surely the troops should be there employed where they may most annoy France'. Nottingham championed a project (initiated by Wratislaw) of sending 10,000 troops from Flanders to winter in Germany, to prepare to support the Imperial

* The Dutch were concerned over the delays in sending over the English troops 'they depend on' (S.P. 84/224, f 32, Stepney to Vernon, 28 April/2 May, 1702). And the Imperialists were criticising the lack of English naval activity in the Mediterranean (S.P. 105/65, Stepney to Vernon, 26 April 1702).
army there. Nottingham enlisted Godolphin's support for this idea, which eventually aborted through delay. Marlborough was not, ostensibly, opposed; but passed on the fierce Dutch resistance to such a plan.  

Shortly before his death William told Marlborough that the French would attack in Flanders, and that unless a vigorous approach was made to the war there Dutch resistance would crumple. Marlborough sympathised with such views - reinforced by his increasing concern at the build-up of French forces in Flanders - and conflict between Marlborough and Nottingham became inevitable.*

The maritime powers, Nottingham told the Dutch, would find that 'no war can be of great damage to France but that which is prosecuted by a fleet, and an army accompanying it... And the last war is an unhappy instance of the truth of it'. But as 1702 progressed the Dutch pressed for an augmentation of English forces in Flanders. A figure of 25,000 men being mentioned; the Pensionary being 'certainly informed that the French will have a hundred thousand men more in all parts next year than they did the last'. Nottingham and Rochester tried to prevent the matter coming before parliament.

Nottingham was also anxious that the Imperial troops in Italy under Eugene be reinforced quickly. He thought Italy 'much neglected even by the Imperial Court', and that the Dutch did not give it 'that regard it deserves'. Nottingham believed that 'should Prince Eugene be driven out of Italy we should quickly be convinced that the weight of the war on this side would be almost insupportable'. Nottingham, at Wratislaw's prompting, pressed Marlborough to ask the Dutch to join England in giving subsidies to

* In November 1702 Marlborough was arguing for a diminution of England's sea forces to provide an augmentation of its Flanders contingent; a policy which Godolphin was obviously unhappy with (Marlborough - Godolphin Corr., i, 145, 21 November 1702).
Bavaria and Savoy. Godolphin also wanted an alliance with Bavaria, but thought it useless unless it led to a direct increase in allied strength in Italy, and that on no account should the Duke of Bavaria be allowed to command troops in person there. Nottingham was optimistic about the eventual outcome of the Imperial talks with Bavaria; but hopes of Bavarian support were shattered in September when the Elector joined the French side. Savoy also showed little interest in joining the allies at this time.

With neither Bavaria or Savoy interested in aiding the allies in Italy the Imperialists were pressed to reinforce Eugene with their own troops. In return Nottingham suggested to Wratislaw, in September 1702, the sending of a large English naval force to the Mediterranean. The Austrians had pressed this throughout the summer. Nottingham shared their enthusiasm, for an Anglo-Dutch naval presence in the Mediterranean would help in the 'securing our trade', as well as 'prevailing with Algiers to break with France, securing provisions to Prince Eugene's army, encouraging a revolution in Naples and Sicily' and destroying French 'magazines of provisions for their army in Italy'. William's recognition of the impact that English naval power might make in the Mediterranean was now commonplace. (Even Seymour suggested an English naval squadron before Naples). To the Imperialists the English concentration on Cadiz indicated that England would 'have little or no time for Italy', and might still fall into 'the old scheme of Partition'. As Stepney wrote: 'I suppose we keep to the history of Queen Elizabeth and have our aim on Cadiz, whereas Naples is the only point on which these people have their views'. The use of the English navy in the Mediterranean was thus partly a response to increasing Imperial fears over the nature of England's war commitment.

When Wratislaw informed Nottingham in December that the Emperor would strengthen his forces in Italy, the project for a Mediterranean squadron to
be sent in February 1703 secured cabinet approval. The squadron was to be in Naples by May, and stop there till the middle of July.\textsuperscript{26} The Dutch agreed to co-operate but then prevaricated.\textsuperscript{27} Nottingham warned Marlborough of the 'clamour' in England if the Dutch refused to take part.\textsuperscript{28} Hedges advised Marlborough to press the Dutch strongly:

\begin{quote}
Besides that we have such melancholy accounts of the posture of affairs at Vienna, and there is so little likelihood of their being able to act offensively in Italy, that they are strong arguments against sending that squadron to the Mediterranean. This matter, with consideration of the hazard of its return, was before the cabinet on Friday night but no resolution was taken.\textsuperscript{29}
\end{quote}

Not until May did the Dutch squadron join Shovell, and by the time the allied fleet reached the Mediterranean it was too late for a rendezvous with the Cevennois.\textsuperscript{30} Though it probably did something to convince Savoy to join the allies.\textsuperscript{31} There was general ministerial enthusiasm for operations from Savoy against France;\textsuperscript{**} but to Nottingham such operations were the sole hope for defeating France. Operations based on Savoy:

\begin{quote}
Would most sensibly affect France, by bringing the war into France itself... Whereas we had found by experience, both in the last and this war, that, the seat of it being out of the French dominions, the King of France, by the
\end{quote}

\* The sending of a fleet to the Mediterranean was linked with the revival of ideas for facilitating rebellions in France. This time by the sending of arms and money to the rebels in the Cevennes. Hopes which were never fulfilled. There was widespread support for such efforts among Whigs and Tories. One Whig thought it 'An opportunity presented of offending France more sensibly than can be done in any other part', and that a fleet in the Mediterranean would encourage the Cevennois, but that they should also be sent arms, supplies and ammunition, as they at present 'coop up a Marshall of France'. Stanhope told of an insurrection at Bordeaux: 'Where they absolutely refuse to pay the capitation; and that the whole province is ready to join them upon the same account if the Camissards and they once meet together, with a little of our assistance' (C.S.P.D. 1702-1703, pp. 705-6; S.P.84/224, f 399, Stanhope to Hedges, 16/17 April 1703, 20 April/1 May 1703).

\** Davenant thought Savoy coming into the alliance 'a greater good to England than the Portugal Treaty' (Add MSS 4291, f 20, 10 June 1703).
supplies of money which his own country could afford him would be able to continue it long, and with a fair prospect of a good issue.32

Nottingham was angry at Dutch naval failings, and combined this with criticism of England's present war strategy. The English naval strength in 1704 depended on the condition of Shovell's and Graydon's squadrons on their return; and if England was unable to meet its full quota then the Dutch, 'after their own failure this year, should rather exceed their proportion, if it be necessary for their defence, since we have no army to defend us, and they have all ours in their service'.33

Equally vital to Nottingham, and Marlborough, was obtaining a Spanish base to protect English naval security in the Mediterranean.34 This plan had originated with William.35 This may account for the opposition to the scheme in Tory and Country Whig circles. Granville, Seymour and Howe were noted by Godolphin as having 'all taken an impression that the expedition of our fleet to Cadiz was ridiculous and impossible to succeed. How they came by it I can't tell certainly, but I doubt I can give a shrewd guess'.36 This means Rooke, who had been critical of the expedition he was to command. In July 1701, he suggested it was 'exposing a considerable part of the strength of the nation to an enemy, and in the enemy's port, without the prospect of doing any service'.37 Burnet notes that 'Rooke spoke so coldly of the design he went upon, before he sailed, that those who conversed with him were apt to infer, that he intended to do the enemy as little harm as possible'.38 An indication that some Tories still saw the navy's rôle as essentially defensive. Rooke thought the expedition would leave home waters unprotected. The Tories seemed to be up to their old

* Vernon sent Rooke's letters to William; remarking he was 'sorry to find we are so unprovided at sea; I think it is pretty plain that the fleet must be enlarged if any use is expected' (Add MSS 40775, f 41, 29 July 1701).
ploy of appealing to merchant opinion on such topics.*

In September 1702, Nottingham told Hedges that he much doubted any success for the Cadiz expedition, but that 'possibly an ill success at Cadiz may have this consequence to our advantage, that, as Portugal is thereby become the more necessary to the gaining of Spain, so the Emperor will be more inclined to gratify Portugal'. In August 1702, Nottingham tried to persuade Wratislaw to agree to the Empire subsisting English troops at Cadiz if the town was captured; or the expense of such an operation would create trouble in parliament. Wratislaw objected and claimed that the English holding Cadiz would be of benefit to their trade; although, as Nottingham pointed out, England would have no trade with Old Spain while the war continued.

The Cadiz expedition ended in failure. But through the efforts of John Methuen a treaty with Portugal was concluded in May 1703, which gave England a friendly naval base for Mediterranean operations. Nottingham was enthusiastic for such an alliance 'It being notorious that no minister can take a thing more to heart and labour it more industriously than my Lord Nottingham has done the treaty with Portugal'. Nottingham thought that 'if once Portugal be possessed of the places mentioned by Mr Methuen, and we have success, as I hope, in the Indies, Spain must revolt from the Duke of Anjou'. The Whigs had been critical of the Tory delay in coming into

* Pembroke, the Lord High Admiral, composed a memorial to the Queen in May 1702 setting out his fears that the proposed expedition would 'leave the trade and coasts within the Channel to eminent danger' if steps were not taken by the English and the Dutch to protect it. He thought the situation was quite different from the Mediterranean expedition of the last war, 'at which time the greatest naval strength of France were at Toulon, and the English and the Dutch between England and them'; but now the fleet would 'leave the greatest part of the naval strength of France on this side of them' (S.P. 42/5, f 82a, to the Queen, 20 May 1702).

** Whig attacks on the Cadiz failure rallied Tories in support of the expedition, and began to consolidate High Tory support behind the Spanish war (Vernon corr., iii, 229, 6 November 1702).
the war as being responsible for the loss of Portugal to the French side. In order to rectify matters the ministry were prepared to buy Portuguese assistance at a very steep price indeed. Godolphin wanted the English commitment kept within strict bounds: 'If there be a necessity of land forces to be furnished by us', he told Nottingham, 'they should be only foot or at most dragoons'; noting that parliament, like himself, would prefer simply to pay foreign troops to serve there.

But the destruction of the Spanish treasure fleet at Vigo led to optimism about the war there at this time. Alexander Stanhope thought it 'so great a blow to the naval power of France as they will not be able in many years to recover, so we may do whatever we please in the Spanish Indies'; and thought it would certainly 'secure Portugal firmly to us'. The success at Vigo - combining as it did a naval victory (under Tory command) with the capture of American treasure - and the victories in Italy produced general euphoria about the war at the end of 1702. Successes especially significant given the disappointments of the last years of the Nine Years' War. The occasional Tory could still harangue Harley about the 'short and unprofitable campaigns in Flanders'; but most eyes were turned elsewhere. One Tory believed the war would 'be very short; for it is said if we baffle the French this summer he must comply to very reasonable

* Methuen faced much opposition. Many still believed that the use of Portuguese ports could be obtained without Portugal abandoning her neutrality. But Methuen insisted that Anglo-Dutch forces would have to fight in Spain (Add MSS 29590 f 154, Methuen to Nottingham, 12 November 1702).

** There was very little treasure in the fleets at Vigo (Francis, Peninsular War, pp. 52-55). But Ormonde and Rooke were built up as High Tory heroes (C.S.P.D. 1702, pp. 297-303, 320-3; Add MSS 28946, f 281; Stanhope MSS, James to Alexander Stanhope, 4 September, 1702).
The High Tory leader Bromley was happy about Marlborough's opening campaign in Flanders in the autumn of 1702. Seymour, after first attempting to stymie supplies for the land forces, moderated his behaviour after being spoken to by Nottingham.

Concerning the Portuguese treaty, Methuen reassured the ministry in terms remarkably sanguine given Portugal's later performance. But Nottingham was so taken with the Portuguese alliance that he was easily convinced. Nottingham thought 'no kingdom or state in Europe is more concerned in interest to hinder the Duke of Anjou being established King of Spain than Portugal'. Methuen assured Nottingham that Portugal 'will act with very great vigour' in the war, 'for they esteem themselves in a very different condition from England and Holland who may have some security by a peace upon other conditions, whereas after they have broke with France and Spain nothing can secure them if Spain remain under the present government'. Portuguese troops could 'be raised and maintained so much cheaper than other nations', and would be of 'the same religion, language and nation with the Spaniards'. He agreed with Nottingham that the subsidies should 'cease or diminish when the King of Portugal is in possession of the places granted to him'. Nottingham was fearful of Portugal being lost to the allies. Yet in January 1703 he did not think it possible to accept the Portuguese

* The success of both our land forces with the Confederates, our taking of so many towns and territories which the French had usurped in Flanders... the Duke of Ormonde taking, sinking and destroying a great part of the Spanish fleet at Vigo... Such a concurrence of blessings and hope of God's future favour has not been known in 100 years. The forces also in Italy and on the Rhine prosperous beyond expectation. Add to these the rich and numerous return of our ships from the East Indies and other places'. (Evelyn, v, 519, 9 November 1702).

** Yet Evelyn lamented the 'excess of honours' conferred on Marlborough 'for the successes of but one campaign'; and noted the Duke's 'suddenly rising was taken notice of and displeased those who had him till now in great esteem'. (Evelyn, v, pp. 524-5; cf. Norris Papers, pp. 102-103, 105-107; H.M.C. Portland, iv, 53).
Hedges' reaction towards the proposed treaty was that 'the conditions are very hard, and so high it is scarce possible for Her Majesty to comply with them, but considering the great importance of gaining Portugal at this juncture she will do what she can'.

One article of the Portuguese treaty stipulated that peace should not be made until Philip V was removed from the Spanish throne. Nottingham had no qualms: he was always a firm supporter of the policy 'No peace without Spain'.

But given the doubts expressed by some Tories before the outbreak of war it is surprising that the ministry accepted such an extension of the original war aims. There was the need to reassure the Imperialists that the maritime powers had abandoned William's partition plans. The expedition against Cadiz had been so interpreted by the Imperial Court.

In October 1702 Mansfeld told Stepney that he thought it 'sufficient that we have brought the King of Portugal to a neutrality, where it is better to keep him, than to engage in alliances'. Stepney was told by the Imperialists that 'If Spain be designed for the Duke of Anjou it will be for the Emperor's interest to concur in dismembering that kingdom, i.e. by giving territories to Portugal, but if it be intended for the Archduke it will not be worth his acceptance when any part thereof be alienated'. Stepney reported much 'table talk' in Vienna that Spain should be partitioned among the allies; 'providing the Archduke were put in the possession of Naples and Sicily'. But the Emperor's concerns were more basic: he feared that England, looking to the Partition Treaty, would conquer as much of Spain 'as may suit with our convenience' then fail to assist the Imperialists in Italy.

* In July 1702 Hedges noted that while 'there is no right pretended for the Archduke to succeed to the Kingdom of Spain, yet we hope it is a point which will never be disputed' (Francis, 'Portugal and the Grand Alliance', B.I.H.R., XXXVIII, 1965, p. 83, Hedges to Stepney, July 1702).
The ministry believed Spain ripe for revolt. Considering the optimism over descents on France leading to revolution there that was still widespread, and given that Louis's grandson was now on the throne, the idea that Spain was ready for rebellion was an easy extension of such arguments. In June 1702 Stepney was passing on reports that many of the Spanish - 'even in Castile' - were ready to declare for the allies. And George of Hesse-Darmstadt was pressing on everyone early in 1702 his ideas on the taking of Minorca, 'From hence he would undertake to attack Catalonia, where he thinks he has interest enough still to occasion some revolution'. Philip's departure from Spain to Italy in 1702 suggested to Stepney that he had 'abandoned Spain'.

The Portuguese would not declare war without the presence of the Archduke. But Hedges reported optimistically:

If the Emperor sends the Archduke the Almirante [of Castile] is of the opinion he may march to Madrid without one stroke being struck. But if Portugal should declare war without his appearing the natural animosity and jealousy which the Spaniards bear towards Portugal would make it a work of great difficulty. They say further that the very appearance of the Archduke will be of more weight than 20,000 men.

Alexander Stanhope agreed and thought the Archduke's 'appearance at the head of an army' would make 'general a defection among the Spaniards of all degrees and qualities that the gaining the kingdom will hardly last a battle'. Even Davenant, who in 1701 had argued against making war to dethrone Philip, now had 'good hopes, and those not ill-grounded, that there will be an entire revolution in the Spanish dominions' in favour of Charles. But he added that 'if there be not then God help England for our case will be very desperate. For we play at a higher game and our all is more at stake than ever it was'. Davenant was conscious of the hold Spain had taken on the popular imagination: 'Nothing will more tend to restore peace at home than for her majesty's arms to be successful in Spain'. Harley
agreed, thinking the Portuguese war 'so popular in England that they will spare men from any service for it'.

Under the terms of the Portuguese treaty the maritime powers and the Empire were to supply 12,000 troops. The fulfilment of this obligation caused serious ministerial conflict. Marlborough was torn between his enthusiasm for the Portugal treaty and his concern for Flanders and the Dutch. As for taking men from Flanders for Portugal, he advised Godolphin that if the Dutch 'will be contented we should act defensively then we may spare them; but if they think it more for the public good that we should act offensively, we have not for that affair too many troops'. Some way or other troops must be had' Nottingham told Marlborough. The Dutch, over-extended at home, were proving recalcitrant about supplying their own proportion for Portugal. They showed no enthusiasm for Nottingham's idea of using the forces intended for Portugal in coastal assaults on France on the way out, since this would mean the Anglo-Dutch force leaving Flanders even sooner. The cabinet decided that an initial assault should be made on Dieppe or Bordeaux with 1,500 troops on their way from Flanders to Lisbon. Troops from Flanders could then garrison the town. Nottingham told Heinsius:

If proper fortifications may be made before the French can disturb us, we may defend the place all winter, and next spring we may prosecute this with such numbers of troops or rather such an army, as may be formidable to France and of infinite more damage than in any other place where the troops of the allies are employed.

Subsequently Nottingham asked Marlborough for an additional 1,000 men for the initial attack. The project was abandoned after Marlborough told Nottingham on 20 July that the troops could not be found. Nottingham comforted himself with the reflection that 'things of this kind will be better settled in the winter when your Grace is here'. Marlborough was most dismissive of the project to Godolphin: 'If the design should be
to keep that place, I should think it would be very difficult'. 73 But Marlborough did try to whip up enthusiasm amongst the Dutch, by informing them that Nottingham 'seems to open a very great scene by this undertaking, no less than the carrying the war next year into the bowels of France'. 74 Nottingham's insistence on a descent on Dieppe antagonized Godolphin, who could not agree that a descent there would 'be equally considerable as in any other part of France, because in this country there are few, or no protestants'. Godolphin preferred descents in southern France, because 'it would require three months march at least' before the French could respond. 75

Marlborough was disturbed at the French build-up in Flanders, 76 and reminded Nottingham that 'as the French are stronger than was expected in this country, the Dutch would be very unwilling to give their consent to have them drawn out of this army'. But Marlborough conceded that the greater part of the men must come from Flanders, and was content to act defensively there so as to supply the Portuguese troops, for 'if they can be with the Archduke Charles by the beginning of September I take the consequence to be so great'. 77 But Marlborough's obsession with Flanders warfare led Hedges to write a blunt letter to him in May after a war cabinet meeting. Marlborough was to remind the States that:

The Queen was ready on her part to concur with them for employing the troops under your grace's command by detaching part of them for Germany, or making diversions to annoy France.

Hedges told Marlborough that the cabinet thought:

The French may be effectually attacked in some other place than in Flanders and in fortified towns, that gave occasion for giving your Grace this hint and that it should likewise again put your Grace in mind of considering how some troops may be spared for Portugal so as to act there in the beginning of September next'. 78

As the date, 1 September, for the dispatch of the allied contingent to
Lisbon neared Nottingham became agitated. Writing of the Dutch refusal to promise any more than twelve ships for this expedition, Nottingham told Hill:

The Pensioner's answer to you will be much more useful than it is satisfactory; for it will be remembered in settling the quota next year, and will teach us how to fix the agreement. 79

Hill, from The Hague, reported Dutch indifference to the Portuguese expedition because:

1. The Dutch were not used to war at a distance.
2. They were fearful of being weak in Flanders.
3. 'Because they do not look upon the Portugal expedition as their own design, being drawn into it as they say sometimes in a great measure of complaisance to the Queen'. 80

The Empire was also refusing to supply their share of 4,000 men and subsidies promised to Portugal. Nottingham thought England would have to supply half of the Imperial deficiency but should do no more, for this would only encourage the Dutch to renege further on their commitments:

I will in confidence tell it you, and it is that the Queen should not pay the other half of the Emperor's quota. The consequence of her majesty yielding will be very great in the course of the war, for the States, and others too, will see that they need only be obstinate and anything may be obtained. And should the treaty miscarry the consequence would be more fatal to the House of Austria and to the States than us. 81

(Nottingham was eventually overruled by Godolphin). Jersey was particularly disgusted by the English capitulation to the Emperor; and saw Wratislaw as part of a conspiracy with the Whigs (Wratislaw did see them as the 'war party') 'to exert subsidies which I fear this nation cannot bear'. 82 Evidence that some Tories were unhappy with the Methuen treaties and would have pre-

* The affair provided ammunition for the Tories. Buckingham was 'sorry to hear their delays of shipping, for this important affair to that sad account which will be strictly taken this next session of parliament concerning all their several failures this year; and which will make it almost as difficult to deal with such friends, as with our common enemy'. (Stanhope MSS 82/85, to Alex.Stanhope, 17 September 1703, calendared in Marlborough - Godolphin Corr., i, 194, footnote 5).
ferred a greater Imperial effort in that theatre or even a neutral Portugal.*

Marlborough told Heinsius that he was sensitive to Dutch fears of being weakened in Flanders, but pressed them to come into their share of the Imperial quota for Portugal and to organise the despatch of their own troops there expeditiously. Otherwise, an 'ill use' would be made of any Dutch defaulting in parliament. Marlborough arranged that only a half of the English soldiers for Portugal should be drawn from his forces. But Nottingham's answer to the Dutch refusal to supply the German quota was to tell Marlborough that 2,000 more troops would be taken for this purpose from the English forces in Flanders, and that ships were at sea to transport them. Nottingham secured cabinet agreement, but had not consulted the Dutch. Marlborough gave way, but supported Dutch protests.

Nottingham was unsympathetic. He warned Heinsius that further reduction of the English contingent in Flanders would be considered when told that the Dutch did not think the Imperial quota an Anglo-Dutch responsibility. He was distressed to find the Dutch 'still of opinion that our great effort must still be there, where we so fruitlessly spent our blood and treasure in the last war; and where this method must, in our present circumstances, be still more useless and ruinous than it was even in the last war'. The allied contingent sailed for Lisbon in the early months of 1704, but the

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* For a trenchant Tory criticism of Methuen and the Portuguese treaties see the views expressed by John Milner, the Tory Consul-General at Lisbon: England should have allowed Portugal to hold to its alliance with France at the beginning of the war; for 'France neither could nor would have protected them'. Portugal would have then have been forced into the allied camp 'upon your own terms'. Portugal had a vested interest in a long war which would ruin Spain; and would like to see Spain divided. Milner made known these views to Hedges at the start of the war, and lost no opportunity later to bring them to the notice of the ministry; continually criticising the Portuguese conduct of the war (S.P. 8/20, ff 270-271; S.P. 89/19 passim).
effort had nearly split the ministry.

The Caribbean theatre also caused friction. Since February 1702 there had been consideration of an Anglo-Dutch expedition to the West Indies. In May a force of 8,000 foot and 40 sail had been approved in cabinet for this purpose. Detailed plans were entrusted to a secret sub-committee of the cabinet. A detachment from the flotilla under Rooke destined for Spain was to be sent to the Caribbean once Cadiz had been captured, supported by forces from England under Peterborough. The expedition was to be directed against French and Spanish possessions. Late in June 1702 Nottingham asked Marlborough to secure Dutch co-operation, on a basis. Nottingham thought 'Nothing can be more for our interest and to the prejudice of France than to prevent France from the fruits he expects from the West Indies'. Marlborough realised the attraction of such schemes in England, and advised Heinsius that 'Your ready compliance in this matter will be of great advantage towards a good understanding when the parliament shall meet this winter'. But fears expressed before the war of possible distrust between the allies over Caribbean schemes proved correct. In August representatives were sent to The Hague to arrange the expedition details. But the Dutch proved unco-operative.

A large French squadron was at that time in the West Indies. The English were not only able to recommend an attack on the West Indies as stopping supplies of silver to France, but also to note:

It is plain also by the measures the French have taken, who, to secure themselves the Spanish West Indies and the products thereof, have exposed the best part of their fleet, and almost ruined it for the accomplishing of this design. Such language failed to move the Dutch. Nottingham thought that although 'we shall not have a ship or man from the Dutch' this would permit the English expedition to set sail as soon as possible. A few days later
the Dutch agreed to take part. Godolphin was still keen, believing that Peterborough should not wait for the Dutch contingent before sailing 'because their designs are all public'. Godolphin thought it important that England moved quickly in the Caribbean, as we were now 'masters of the sea' there, and could act before the French reinforced their squadron.

Godolphin still saw England taking advantage of the 6th article of the Grand Alliance, and keeping any territories it conquered in the Americas. But Nottingham did not contemplate any permanent conquests. Nottingham suggested that at the end of the war the allies would surrender to Austria all rights of conquest in the Indies, in return for free trade:

I give notice to the Spaniards at Hispaniola with offers of all good correspondence with them on our part, and assistance if they will join with us in rescuing their country from the French. For as we are not likely this war to attempt any conquest of the Spanish Indies, this, if accepted will secure our own plantations and be very advantageous to our trade.*

The Dutch sought reimbursement from the Emperor for any Caribbean expedition. Godolphin thought this would weaken England's right to keep any territories conquered there, or would encourage the Emperor to question that article. Godolphin told Nottingham that the Dutch:

Would do all that was possible for them to join with us in that expedition, both from a desire of having their share of the booty, and a jealousy of our getting any new acquisitions in those parts without them.

* Nottingham's attempts to prohibit all trade between the English and the Spanish plantations in America brought him into direct conflict with merchants and colonial interests in that area. Heathcote pressed the Council of Trade and Plantations 'about the conniving at a trade betwixt our people at Jamaica and the Spaniards' as a means of supplying gold and silver to England. 'This might also help to cultivate a good understanding in order to promote Her Majesty's glorious design of rending the Spanish monarchy out of the hands of the House of Bourbon, without which we are undone'. Nottingham was finally forced to relent (C.S.P. Col. 1702-03, Gilbert Heathcote to the Board of Trade, 28 August 1703; C.S.P. Col. 1704-1705, pp.49-50, W. Popple to Richard Warre, 18 February 1704).
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Rochester, too, was agitated at the delay of the West Indies project, 'which is already been too much postponed. The whole expedition lies as it were quite asleep'.

But by the end of 1702, when the military demands of the Methuen treaties were becoming clear, Godolphin reflected:

> The war in the West Indies will not be so chargeable next year as it has been this, and what will be saved there may be applied towards this next expense of Portugal.

Some cutback in English efforts was obviously desirable; and as Alexander Stanhope reminded Hedges in January 1703, the Portugal treaty 'may prove more fatal to our enemies than any hurt we can do them in the Indies, which will be in our power at any time'.

Godolphin's financial rectitude triumphed over his enthusiasm for West Indies operations. In March 1703 he told Harley that England now had 'too many irons in the fire. We can't be in the Mediterranean, in Portugal, upon the coast of France, and in the West Indies all at once.'

By the time the Dutch contingent arrived in January 1703 it was too late for any ambitious Caribbean venture, as both Marlborough and Heinsius recognised. A smaller force was sent in March without success. The naval establishment was hostile to Caribbean ventures, aware of the operational difficulties they posed. Burchett's *Justification of His Naval Memoirs* (1704) condemned attacks on the West Indies as a waste of precious naval resources. England should rely on a purely defensive posture in those parts.

With the resignation of Rochester in 1703, and Nottingham in 1704, much of the ministerial impetus behind West Indies warfare was lost, though Godolphin continued to show interest. And the French themselves showed far less concern for the area after Chateau-Renault's squadron left in July 1702.

The Dutch also proved reluctant to prohibit commerce by mail with the
French enemy. Nottingham believed that this facilitated the French financing of her war effort, particularly in Italy. Late in 1702 he suggested withholding the annual renewal of the Anglo-Dutch treaties until the Dutch reconsidered the matter. When the Dutch asked for increases in the English troops in Flanders in November, Nottingham and Rochester recommended that unless the Dutch agreed to a prohibition of all trade with France the request should not be taken before parliament. Godolphin agreed at first, thinking it 'very difficult to obtain any more troops for the next year'; though Marlborough argued that 'the whole success of this war depends upon our having a superiority this next campaign', and that 'it would certainly be good husbandry, since it would bring us to a quick end of the war'. Marlborough suggested that the money for the 5,000 soldiers to serve with the fleet be used to augment the forces in Flanders.

Nottingham sought the co-operation of his Commons supporters to agree to the additional 10,000 troops but to demand that the Dutch prohibited trading with France in response. Parliamentary support for such an agreement was secured in January 1703. A group of Tories proposed this arrangement, and they had the full support of the ministry, except for Godolphin and Marlborough. Many Whigs shared their misgivings, believing the proposal designed more to embarrass the States, to hinder the war effort or force a compromise peace, than to damage France. The Dutch, with much bitterness, eventually agreed.

* And he wished 'it had never been proposed' (H.M.C. Portland, iv, 57, Godolphin to Harley, 23 January 1703).

** Some moderate Tories were well disposed towards the original Dutch request for more English forces: 'I believe we shall have another memorial from Holland for us to pay more money or more men; for it cuts them hard to maintain such an army and I believe we must grant it'. (Add MSS 22851, f 31, Mr Whistler to Thomas Pitt, 9 September 1702).
The ministerial disputes over the Portugal treaty troops, Dutch trading with France, and the augmentation of the Flanders army revealed radically different attitudes to war strategy. Marlborough was sensitive to repeated Dutch failures to meet naval commitments: 'I can't say a word for the excusing the Dutch the backwardness of their sea preparations' he told the Duchess. But he was determined to prevent such disagreements from producing 'coldness between England and Holland' for 'France would then gain their point'.

Godolphin shared his extreme sensitivity to Dutch opinion. Marlborough was determined to make the Flanders theatre paramount and to take the offensive there. In October 1703, when Nottingham told him to release the 2,000 extra troops for his command for Portugal, without prior consultation with the Dutch, Marlborough told Godolphin:

I cannot but say that the Dutch argue very justly. If the Queen can without their consent take these men she may by the same reason recall the rest; and by the same reasoning they are at liberty to reduce as many as they please of their army.

Marlborough's campaign in Flanders in 1703 was unproductive. Nottingham's view of such warfare as costly and ineffective was shared by many in the Tory and Whig parties. Rochester's resignation in February 1703 meant that he was now free to exploit the dissatisfaction over developments.

In April Marlborough noted:

The conversation that was between Lord Rochester and the Speaker is no doubt the language he entertains the whole party with; and if they can once be strong enough to declare which way the war shall be managed they will ruin England and Holland at their pleasure. And I am afraid may do it in such a manner as may not at first be unpopular; so that the people may be undone before they can see it.

Craggs told Godolphin of:

Great advantage taken and reflections spread abroad, of nothing being done this campaign where the allies have so great a superiority, which they make use of to show the war is carried on in a very wrong method.
Marlborough was attacked for the taking of Limburg, 'so poor and mean a place for the sake of a consideration in contributions'. In the summer of 1703 it was being claimed that Marlborough desired to prolong the war in Flanders.

Harley told Godolphin in September 1703 that 'the hot people of both sides' were complaining of the mismanagement of the fleet, the uselessness of an offensive war in Flanders. Even in July Marlborough told Sunderland:

By what I hear some people are as angry as ever. I am told that the great part of their discourse is in the counties where they have been that the manner of making the war must be changed, by which they think to mortify me, and frighten Holland to a peace... And I am afraid if Holland should be frightened into its own undoing, England would not continue long unhappy.

Marlborough warned Heinsius that if the Dutch generals proved reluctant to bring the French to battle:

The disaffected people in England will take occasion to make use of the arguments given by your generals, to convince our parliament men that the war ought to be made in other places and not in this country.

Godolphin confessed that the Dutch conduct 'would give but too just a handle for clamour against our great expense of carrying on this war in their country'. Marlborough noted 'the heads of both parties are resolved that an offensive war must not be made in this country'.

Much Whig criticism of Marlborough at this time was purely factious.*

* Many Whigs were not reconciled to a European war under a Tory ministry and general in 1703. In May Davenant reported 'all but the Whigs have aching hearts' over the setbacks in Northern Europe (Add MSS 4291, f 11, to Henry Davenant, 21 May 1703). Somerset informed Marlborough of the dissatisfaction of the Whigs with the 1703 campaign. They were blaming Marlborough for the timid policies of the joint-staff; and joining the Tories in demanding another theatre of war, and talked of replacing Marlborough with a more aggressive strategist (Boston Public Library Quarterly, vol. v, April 1953, Ruth Emery, 'Letters by the Duke of Marlborough in the Somerset Papers... in Boston Public Library', p.73).
But many Whigs were plainly disturbed by Marlborough's emphasis on Flanders. Stepney had been pressing Marlborough since early 1703 to use his forces on the Moselle, on 'which diversion the safety of the Empire to a great measure depended'. Stepney noted:

The advantages we might have expected from this, which was touching the French King in his mortal part, by taking something - Metz and Thionville - from him that really belongs to him. Whereas any violent attempts either on Namur or Antwerp is spending our forces on places which must of course be given up one day by the dash of a pen, since it is not to be thought he ever proposed the keeping any part of the Spanish Netherlands to himself.

What most saddened Marlborough was Godolphin's sympathy with such views. 'I do assure you', he told Godolphin:

That some expressions in yours of the 14th /October/ from Newmarket has given me a good deal of thought. For since you can be of opinion that the people here ought to be easy, though they should be obliged to make a defensive war, there will be many more of that opinion.

He reminded him of England's responsibility towards the Dutch:

I think I know these people, that whenever this opinion is put in practice great numbers of them will be thinking of a peace. Were I not to see you very soon I should now trouble you with my thoughts on this subject, but I think all we have depends upon it.

Godolphin's strategic outlook was not so Flanders dominated as Marlborough's. Even Marlborough at moments of intense frustration with Dutch inactivity in the Low Countries momentarily lost faith. In the summer of 1703 he looked to the Portuguese and Savoy operations 'as likely to do much more hurt to France than anything we can do in this country'. He was to express similar sentiments in the following years. But, in essence,

* At the end of 1703 Godolphin could see hope only in Spain: 'Matters grow worse and worse in Germany; and what Sir Edward Seymour told us long ago begins now to be true, viz: that we had nothing to trust to, but our Portugal expedition' (H.M.C. Portland, iv, 77, 25 December 1703).
Marlborough never despaired of his ability to break through into Northern France.

The indecisive campaign in Flanders in 1703 negated much of the optimism generated in 1702. Many of the Whigs were angry at the Dutch, and Somerset believed that Dutch conduct 'this campaign will prolong this war some years'. Even so, Cardonnel thought 'our parliament is like to go very well, the estimates for the land forces were delivered today and I hope will meet with little or no opposition. Seymour and his gang are the only people that are like to make a bustle. The Duke of Marlborough and he are quite out'. The parliamentary session of 1703-04 was stormy.* But Harley rallied the moderate Tories in support of the continental war, with the help of Davenant, whose Peace at Home and War Abroad argued this line in 1704. The Commons eventually agreed an increase in English forces. The realignment of the Tories was eased by the forcing out of Nottingham and Seymour from the ministry early in 1704. They were ousted not directly on questions of military policy but because of their refusal to put partisan political considerations aside during the war.138

The introduction of Harley into the Secretaryship of the Northern Province resolved, temporarily, the growing ministerial conflicts over strategy. Harley took the post with reluctance; he was not experienced in foreign matters. But he did not have the rigid views of Nottingham.

* In February 1704 Rochester led an investigation into Graydon's expedition to the West Indies and Shovell's to the Mediterranean in 1703. The latter was condemned as having 'nothing in the nature of it that could be answerable to the expense and danger thereof'; and as being responsible for leaving the coast and trade at home 'so naked' (L.J., xviii, 537). The attack had the support of some Whig Lords anxious to discredit the largely Tory naval administration. However, between May 1702 and August 1703 nearly 200 ships and over 2,000 men had been captured by French privateers (H.M.C. House of Lords 1702-1704, p.534), and this led to fears that the home waters were unprotected.
or Rochester on the war.* In particular, he was not against an offensive war in Flanders, so long as it was fought in an aggressive manner. Harley shared the fears of Godolphin and Marlborough that the Dutch, if neglected, might arrange a separate peace. His intelligence system in Holland was well-developed, and he was sensitive to the vagaries of Dutch opinion. After Blenheim he told Marlborough that he had 'written to all my acquaintances there in the best manner I can... I hope your Grace's success will encourage them to hold on'. Harley realised how hard-pressed the Dutch were, and of 'their poverty and the factions in their government'; this made them especially vulnerable to the 'designs of the French... who seem intent upon drawing them one way or other to a separate peace, or an inactive war'. Regarding an 'inactive war', Alexander Stanhope had given his opinion to Harley that it was what the Dutch 'most certainly design'; and went on to observe that the Dutch 'wills are very good; but they cannot endure to part with more money, or sooner than they think it absolutely necessary'. Harley was 'sensible of their poverty, but they should consider that an inactive war next summer is the dangerousest counsel'.

In the summer of 1705 Harley complained of the Dutch subverting Marlborough's desire for a pitched battle with the French. With the refusal later of the field deputies to allow Marlborough's superior force to attack the French army, Harley noted that 'the root it springs from

* Harley needed to reconcile the back bench Tories to the European struggle, and to embrace the war with enthusiasm. In February 1704 appeared the first number of Defoe's Review which did much to whip up popular support for the continental war. The paper owed much to Harley's enthusiasm (Add MSS 28055 f 3, Harley to Godolphin, 9 August 1702). Signs of war-weariness were apparent in the spring of 1704; and the Review emphasised the strength of France and the seriousness of the threat that Louis XIV posed.
I fear will produce worse fruit'. Harley's main concern was to ensure that the Dutch would come up to their military quotas, and not hinder Marlborough in his attempts to push forward aggressively in Flanders and Central Europe. 'A lingering war' must be avoided, as much for domestic as external reasons.

Harley conveyed his moderation towards the Dutch to the domestic scene. 'We are studying all we can here to preserve their reputation with our country', he told Stanhope early in 1705. He felt particular frustration at the Dutch inability to meet their naval quotas in the Channel and the Mediterranean; always a sore point with Tories. 'We do already bear a great deal of clamour for their remissness in their marine affairs this current year', he wrote. But Harley would compromise on the issue of the Dutch trading with France. He hoped, at the end of 1704, that the 10,000 augmentation troops would 'not be bogged down with the old condition of prohibiting commerce and letters'; but that the Dutch would cease negotiating bills with France.

Harley's responsibility for the Northern Province included the Empire. His first letters as Secretary pressed the Imperialists to end the disturbances in Hungary, and apply the troops tied down there to Italy. The Italian campaign, and Mediterranean operations generally, had a great

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* When it was decided to send Pembroke to the Dutch to protest, Harley drew up, in strong language, a draft memorial (H.M.C. Portland, iv, 237). Marlborough scotched the mission (Marlborough - Godolphin Corr., i, 482); much to the chagrin of Harley (S.P. 104/72, to Alexander Stanhope, 11 September 1705).

** The Dutch were more interested in sending their ships into the North Sea and Baltic than 'our Channel' or the Mediterranean. The Dutch had suffered very heavily in their Baltic trade in 1703, and Stanhope warned Hedges in 1704 that they would be tardy in supplying their naval quota for the Mediterranean in that year. (S.P. 84/227, ff 147-8, to Harley, 8/19 December 1703; S.P. 84/226, f 265, Stanhope to Hedges, 28 February/4 March 1704).
importance for Harley. He asked Stepney to remind the Emperor of the
importance of his aiding Savoy, and 'How much Spain is concerned in keeping
up the war in Italy'. For this reason Harley fully supported Marlborough's
push into Germany in the summer of 1704. Bavaria, he believed, 'could
now be knocked out of the war'. After Blenheim, Harley was extremely
anxious that the victory be followed up, and advised Marlborough to 'improve
this success to the utmost advantage for the common cause, and particularly
in Savoy'. Harley responded favourably to a Savoyard request - 'a
very earnest and well penned memorial' - for further supplies; and hoped
that 'immediate and sufficient supplies' would enable Savoy 'to act offen-
sively. This will have wondrous effects everywhere, and particularly
help us to mightily apply our sea force'. Harley wanted an effective
English naval presence in the Mediterranean throughout the year, believing
'that the Queen would have very little effect from her naval strength if
they were only to make a show in the summer and the apparition vanish in
the winter'.

Harley's protégé, Henry St John, now Secretary at War, was also pur-
suing a moderate line.* He shared the Tory preference for a naval war,
and was enthusiastic about the attempted assault on Cadiz in 1702. Like
Harley, the Italian campaign was always much in his mind. But he supported
Marlborough's conduct of the war in Flanders. Like Harley, he blamed
Dutch timidity for Marlborough's failures to make progress in 1702 and 1703.

* In November 1701 St John had written: 'The Dutch, who found they
had a strong party here to close with them, were resoled not to enter
into a war but upon the foot of the last, and in short to push us
foremost as a blind to cover them' (H.M.C. Downshire, i, part i, 811,
to Sir William Trumbull, 12 November 1701); and had seen England on
'the very brink of destruction'. But by March 1702 he was overjoyed
to see that the Dutch were not showing 'any slackness or consternation
in preparation for the war', and that 'they rather seem to redouble
their vigour' (Ibid., p.811, to same, 16 March 1702).
He had a fanatical belief in Marlborough's ability to break into France eventually. 157
The campaign of 1704 began under an unfavourable aspect. Davenant noted growing disquiet even among moderate Tories concerning the war. In June he lamented: 'Our hearts are very low to see things go no better. We are in apprehensions for Savoy. Affairs have not an over good prospect in Portugal. All our hopes rest now in Germany'. For it cannot be but a melancholy prospect to all thinking men', thought Davenant:

To see so big a war upon our hands and at the same time to have so large a branch of our trade lopped off by the war with Spain. I perceive in my own office* that though out importations still are considerable, which hold up the Queen's customs, yet our exportations are sunk to almost to nothing; and it is from the return of these exportations only that we can hope to carry on a foreign war.

Davenant thought 'Marlborough is now our sheet anchor'. Since early April Marlborough had been planning a march to the Danube to relieve the Emperor. When the general's plans became public, some Tories, led by Rochester and Seymour, protested against such a strategy and threatened impeachment. In June it was reported that there was 'a greater party forming against my Lord Treasurer and my Lord Marlborough than ever was against King William's ministers'. Seymour would run him down 'as hounds do a hare' it was claimed. The Nottinghamites condemned the march into Germany. Marlborough feared 'if we do not have success I shall be found fault with, by those here that think themselves exposed for want of troops I shall have in Germany'. A view not confined to Holland. Some of the Tory fears about an English army being so far from 'home', seemingly to answer the deficiencies of the Imperial war effort, found expression in the advice Hedges gave Marlborough early in July: he should march out of Germany unless the Emperor sent troops to Italy to aid

* Davenant was Inspector General of Imports and Exports.
Savoy. The march into Germany was principally for the Emperor's advantage:

Her Majesty's fleet in the Mediterranean at vast expense for the support of the Confederates, and the Portuguese expedition was undertaken for setting of the Emperor's son on a throne of Spain. And at the same time Her Majesty has neither ships nor land forces in or near her dominions or can have them upon any emergency. 164

French spies reported:

The moderate party had decided to frame articles accusing Marlborough of having arbitrarily changed the seat and measures of the war: of having withdrawn forces capable of defending the country at a perilous moment. 165

But amongst moderate Tories hopes were high. Thomas Coke wrote to Marlborough in June that the country gentlemen were 'more cheerful about the war' and happier over the burden of the land tax since his great march. 166

The High Tories disparaged Marlborough's action at the Schellenberg, which upset him considerably. 167 But the Whig newspapers reported the fighting favourably, 168 as they were to do Blenheim.*  

Even before Blenheim many Whigs were coming over to the support of the government because of its war policy. Rowland Gwynne praised Harley and the Tory ministry for their 'moderation', supported their policy in Spain and Portugal, lauded Marlborough and saw the war ending in the Empire in 'a very short time'. 169

At the news of Blenheim the moderate Tories began to say 'there is something for their money... and raised our English general above all detracting tongues'. 170 Davenant summed up the difference to the political situation that Blenheim made:

It is visible enough what would have been the effects of a fruitless campaign. They who malign the government, that is to say the High Tories of both sides, would have

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* Just prior to Blenheim the attacks on Marlborough in the Whig Observator were causing him annoyance (Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., i, 344, 19/30 July 1704). A section of the Whig party was plainly upset by Marlborough's victory (H.M.C. Cowper /Coke/, iii, 41, 19 August 1704).
been augmented... The ministers would certainly have been attacked... Without this victory there are those who have malice enough perhaps to have accused the Duke of Marlborough for his march to the Danube. The victory was so complete that there is no room left for envy or malice. 171

Blenheim had, he thought, 'fixed his Grace and my Lord Treasurer'.*

As autumn wore on criticism of Marlborough again developed. There was disparagement of Marlborough's failure to follow up Blenheim and engaging in costly siege warfare. 172 Even Godolphin was critical: 'such operations at this time of year may draw into length, and delay the Duke's coming over': it would 'expose him to new hazards'. 'All these', Godolphin added, 'have been better prevented, and the Empire might have been contented with seeing the French gone back over the Rhine'. 173 Much of the criticism was directed against the Germans. 174 But, as one foreign observer noted, the prestige conferred on Marlborough and the continental war by Blenheim enabled the ministry to defy all opponents, and to reach out blatantly for Whig support:

The Whigs triumph, and assume the merit of a policy which the events of the war have approved, while the Ministerialist Tories, who are not pleased about home affairs, agree to take full advantage of the situation for the benefit of the nation and the balance of Europe. 175

Foiled in their attempt to discredit Marlborough and the continental war strategy, the High Tories attempted to build up the Tory Admiral Rooke as a rival to Marlborough. His victory at Malaga was 'at that time looked upon by the Whigs as well as the Tories to have been, under circumstances he found himself, a very complete victory, and did no discredit' to Marlborough's. 176 But in the Commons, in November 1704, 'the Tories run out in commendation of Sir George Rooke and talk of my Lord Marlborough's victory

* Some Tories continued to disparage the victory (Coxe, 1, 341); and Marlborough was aware that his victory had driven an even deeper wedge between him and the High Tories (Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., 1, 384; c.f. B.L. Lansdowne MSS 825, ff 120-121).
as a small matter'.*177 'The victory at sea', wrote Defoe, the High Tories 'look upon as their victory over the moderate party'. But Tory attempts 'to set up the sea victory against the land victory', and hopes that 'the High Church Party will revive under his patronage'178 met opposition. As St John noted: 'Sir George Rooke has done an action which all the world ought to admire, and which the generality blame'.179 One moderate Tory noted that the Admiral had 'gained a great deal of reputation', but that 'no man in England is more pushed at by his numerous enemies than he. Several detracting expressions are thrown out against him by particulars'.**180 Even amongst the Tories there was a widespread feeling that 'Rooke had not done enough';181 and that 'both sides have been well banged, neither having much to brag of a victory'.182

Under a more charismatic naval leader the Tories might have organised a 'maritime party', perhaps with the support of Tory naval officers,*** and made strong play for more resources to be devoted to the sea war.**** But Rooke was past his prime. He was sick in body and cautious in mind, seeing

* The Tory Commons in their address of 25 October joined thanks for Marlborough's victories with extravagant praise for Rooke's engagement at Malaga (C.J., xiv, 392).

** Even in 1703 Rooke was being maligned for his 'lucky hit' at Vigo, and with accusations that he took French money (A Dialogue Between A Member of Parliament, a Divine, a Lawyer, a Freeholder, a Shopkeeper, and a Country Farmer, 1703, p.24). For the fury of the party debate over Rooke's conduct see: A Review of the Late Management at Sea, 1704; A Review of the Late Engagement at Sea, 1704; Observator, vol.iii, no.36; A Narrative of Sir George Rooke's Late Voyage to the Mediterranean, 1704.

*** On the interesting question of political affiliations among the navy captains see: Loan 29/40/8, where a printed 'General List of the Captains of Her Majesty's Fleet, 22 August 1711' has been marked (by Harley?) to show the political leanings of each officer.

**** In August 1703 Marlborough noted that Rooke was 'not so warm as I could wish'. But Marlborough was concerned lest he be replaced by George Churchill. The latter would be much more energetic in organizing a Tory naval party (Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., i, 240, 29 August 1703).
naval strategy mainly in terms of the defence of home waters, the inter-
ception of Caribbean treasure fleets if possible, and perhaps the sending
of a portion of the main fleet, with some land soldiers, 'to attempt
something in Spain or Portugal' during a summer cruise. The episode
illustrated the tendency for strategic conflicts to take on a personal
basis.

Marlborough's victory considerably eased the session of 1704-05.*
Only in the Lords was a serious attack launched on the continental strategy
by Haversham.** Haversham made annual assaults on the ministry; which
were then printed. These echoed the attacks made on William's war strategy
in the Commons during the 1690s — when as Sir John Thompson he had sat as a
member — by the Tories and Country Whigs: England was over-extended by its
war treaties; the allies were blatantly defaulting on their military obliga-
tions;*** English mercantile trade was being sacrificed to the Dutch by
the ill-protection of commerce; and calls for naval warfare against French
trade and coasts and their colonial possessions.**** The attacks by Haver-
sham always drew support from Tory peers, and enjoyed public notoriety.****

* The ministry was forced into an increasing intimacy with those Whigs
who fully supported the continental war (Trevelyan, ii, 4-6; Boyer,
Queen Anne, 1735 edn. p.177 note a; H.M.C. Lonsdale, p.118; Vernon
Corr., iii, 267-270).

** The Whig Lords responded with an enquiry into naval miscarriages.
Designed to diminish Rooke's glory and discredit the Tory Admiralty
Board, led by George Churchill (H.M.C. House of Lords 1704-1706,

*** In December 1704 Harley found many 'honest gentlemen' were 'very
uneasy possessed with a notion that we perform our parts, and the
States suffer the common cause to languish and our efforts to be
fruitless for want of supplying their proportions last year at sea'
(Stanhope MSS, to Stanhope, 5 December).

**** For Marlborough's reaction to Haversham's speech see: Marlborough-
had close links with Tutchin of the Observer.
They greatly angered the Dutch. But he was not a major political figure.

* In December 1705 Buys was reported as 'raving about' Haversham's comments (Loan 29/45X, Drummond to Harley, 18 December 1705, Amsterdam).
Marlborough's victories in Central Europe in 1704 were especially welcome because the lack of progress in Portugal seemed to threaten the whole Iberian strategy. From early 1704 the Portugal treaties and the war there (as well as Methuen personally) were under attack in England. The expected gains from this war had not emerged; indeed, the enemy invaded Portugal early in 1704. In the spring of 1704 the ministry still believed the Spaniards ready to revolt, and 'the army wants only to march to take possession'; and were considering landing men in Catalonia. But by June it was clear that Schomberg would have to be replaced as commander of the Anglo-Portuguese force, and Galway was sent as replacement. He agreed to go after obtaining substantial reinforcements; and England was drawn into an even deeper commitment.

Even so, the autumn campaign in Portugal was a failure. By October Methuen was informing Harley that the Portuguese had 'been grossly guilty of the greatest faults'. He blamed a strong French faction at the Portuguese Court, as well as corruption; and insisted that 'wherein I was deceived it was where the King of Portugal was himself deceived by his ministers'. Methuen admitted to Hedges:

The design of entering Spain this year past was first formed when there was no French troops or at least very few in Spain and upon the assurance as was believed of some revolution in Spain in favour of the House of Austria.

But, given the ease with which the French could reinforce Spain, Methuen now thought it 'not reasonable to expect any revolution in our favour till this French army can be beaten or, at least, be opposed by a superior

* His appointment delighted the Junta (The Letter Books of John Hervey, First Earl of Bristol, 1894, i, 207). Marlborough strongly supported him against the claims of the Tory Ormonde (Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., i, 330, 351).
Rooke had made an abortive attempt to take Barcelona in May 1704. He carried no land forces, but informed the ministry he had 'no good opinion of affairs in Portugal but says if the King of Spain had been landed with English and Dutch troops at Barcelona he does not doubt but we had been in Madrid before this time'. This was more to the ministry's liking; and with the raising of 5,000 men to serve with the fleet in November, Harley could speak of this 'as one effectual means to establish Charles II as King of Spain'.

It was clear that the Portuguese or Imperialists would not supply troops for campaigns in Spain and, Harley thought, 'The terror your fleet carries either in Italy or Spain is in proportion to the number of Redcoats which they supposed to be with them'. (The use of troops in such descent attempts was always a form of warfare which aroused Harley's enthusiasm). The success at Gibraltar and Malaga fixed public, mercantile and ministerial interest on Spain; and encouraged the latter to cut its losses in Portugal and concentrate on Spain. But it was still thinking primarily of an amphibious, littoral war which would set Spain in revolt.

1705 was a year, mainly, of military disappointments. Marlborough's

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* When Rooke was sent into the Mediterranean in 1704 his orders gave priority to plans to take Toulon or aid the Imperialists in Italy (S.P. 42/46 ff 56-8). Descents on Barcelona or Cadiz were at first considered as secondary objectives, but in June he had been told to concentrate on the former (Francis, Peninsular War, p.108; H.M.C. House of Lords, v, 159-162).

** For Whig enthusiasm for the Spanish war see the Observator, 12 August 1704.

*** The taking of Gibraltar had delighted merchant groups: 'The City of London is very well pleased with the news as thinking this place when garrisoned will be some security for our trade'. Hedges was enthusiastic about the capture of Gibraltar, which he saw as 'a footing for the King of Spain in the strongest fort belonging to that country, and of greater use to us for securing our trade and the interrupting of the enemy's' (Marlborough MSS M/26, Hedges to Marlborough, 15 August 1704; Add MSS 7058, f 360).
ambitious plan to fight the summer campaign on the Moselle was prevented by the lack of German support. Harley asked Stepney to remind Vienna 'of the ill conduct which has obliged the Duke of Marlborough to quit his designs upon the Moselle'; and that parliament would not vote supplies 'for carrying on the war to support those who will not (though they can) help themselves'. There was a campaign gathering force in England promoting a compromise peace. In July, Harley commented:

The French emissaries are very busy in spreading their pamphlets and propagating discourses how convenient a treaty of partition would be. But they little consult the interest or humour of England, who believe that we can be easy while they have the command of our trade in the Mediterranean.

The Dutch were unhappy about the clause in the Portugal treaties which committed the allies to a war to remove Philip from the throne of Spain. The ministry was now effectively committed to a policy of 'No peace without Spain'. By August 1705 both Godolphin and Marlborough had reconciled themselves to such a position. Harley made his position plain by the end of the year:

I hear the ill-intentioned in those parts [Holland] give a very wrong turn to that part of the Queen's speech which relates to the monarchy of Spain, as if that was to eternize the war; when there cannot be a clearer proposition than that it is the only way to secure peace. And if the honest people of Holland will not give way they may have it quickly, instead of a rotten whimsical barrier. And they ought to know that England has a way of being secure, without

* 'The tickers and all their friends are glad of the disappointments I meet with, saying that if I had success this year like the last, the constitution of England would be ruined' (Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., i, 448, 13/24 June 1705). And the feeling that if the High Tory leaders (whose activities were closely monitored by Marlborough and Godolphin) made difficulties in the next session this would give the Dutch 'a handle to make an argument for the pressing the Queen to such a peace as might agree with the circumstances' was obsessing Marlborough (Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., i, 453, 481, 502, 25 June/6 July, 20/31 August, 3/14 October).
Harley's belief that the Spanish war was now 'the only way to secure peace' reflects his frustration with the Dutch obstruction of Marlborough's war plans in 1705. Peterborough's taking of Barcelona in October 1705 revolutionised English war strategy. If Peterborough had failed before Barcelona the ministry would have reconsidered the whole nature of their Spanish hopes and the inflated war aims that England was now pursuing. But the letters which Peterborough sent back to the ministry from Spain helped reconcile them to the new commitments. 'I am persuaded', Peterborough told Harley, 'that if I had fifteen hundred good horse and a hundred thousand pounds that the Duke of Anjou would not be six weeks in Madrid'. Harley found reassurance in Peterborough's view that the Spanish war 'may be carried on at the expense of their [Spanish] men after the first supply this spring. Under a right management it would not exhaust us of ready money'. Catalonia itself, Peterborough thought, could supply 20,000 men. Peterborough carefully played on the lack of success in the war in Northern Europe, and the difficulties Marlborough had had with the Dutch in the 1705 campaign: 'Another advantage which I think appears sufficiently at this time, by the cruel disappointments Her Majesty's glorious endeavours meet elsewhere, is that the Queen, her ministers and her generals may be masters of the war'. Implicit was the idea that a shift in resources from Flanders to Spain would be a profitable military policy; and that the war there could be directed by England, the allies following our lead. Harley was soon assuring Marlborough that making a push in Spain was 'The likeliest way to end the war'; although he appreciated the Dutch would not be happy about supporting the war there. * Some Whigs were seduced by such ideas. Alexander Stanhope thought 'reinforcing Spain' the 'most ready way to give a safe and speedy end to the war' (S.P. 84/227, f 338, to Harley, 4/15 December 1705).
that 'nothing less will satisfy' England 'than the restoring of Spain to the House of Austria'.

He observed:

Great talk in many places of augmentations of troops for next year and several princes have spoke to the Duke of Marlborough upon it. But if that should take effect it will be necessary to apply them to support the happy beginnings in Spain.

The Queen's speech of October set out the commitment to the policy of conquering Spain. The Whig and ministerial press urged the necessity after the capture of Barcelona of obtaining Spain for Charles, and foresaw in the consequent trade with Spanish America means of recouping the cost of the war. Whigs such as Shaftesbury welcomed the successes in Spain as tying the ministry to the full war aims and consolidating public opinion against a compromise peace.

There was a more disturbing side to the public reaction to Peterborough's expedition. Even before the capture of Barcelona, The Post Man - of 1 September - published a letter, purporting to come from Peterborough's fleet, informing its readers that the Earl was not anxious to land in Catalonia 'because it is so very distant, and affords no harbour for our fleet... It is so near a neighbour to France, that the enemy has all the advantages possible', but that letters from Turin and Genoa had arrived saying that the Catalans were ready to rise in favour of Charles III.* Peterborough, it was claimed, had great hopes for success, but needed funding of at least £200,000 to enable him to march on Madrid and fully exploit the promising situation. Others complained of Peterborough being sent to Spain 'meanly equipped and wretchedly provided for such an enter-

* Peterborough's original instructions in May 1705 had given priority to aiding Savoy. Only failing that was he to take Cadiz or Barcelona. He had two sets of instructions; those for Savoy were secret (H.M.C. House of Lords 1706-1708, pp. 361-364, 500-6). Peterborough would have preferred to go to Italy (Francis, Peninsular War, pp. 171-189).
prise'; and suggested that the ministry was essentially hostile to the expedition. 'But it is not to be doubted', it was thought, 'but the parliament will send such timely and effectual supplies' to Spain as would 'give a happy turn to the affairs of the Confederates in the only place where it can be reasonably expected'. After a review of the disappointing Flanders campaign of 1705, one author concluded:

For as to any other seat of war there seems no probability of doing anything more at present than keeping our enemies at a stand... If the Dutch and we together would happen to take a town in Flanders it is no more than a grain out of a handful of corn, and serves only to afford us the prospect of a never ending war. 211

The writer was a Country Whig, an interesting indication of how some Whigs found it difficult to reconcile themselves to Marlborough and the Flanders war.* The pamphlet caused consternation within the ministry. 212 The Spanish campaign was already seen as an alternative to an offensive in Flanders.

Peterborough was also causing the ministry embarrassment in November. It had been planned to read his victory despatches to parliament, but the Cabinet decided that several of his reflections should be omitted, as they were merely put in 'by way of valuing his success', and 'might possibly give occasion of discourse to the parliament'. In particular, Peterborough was insinuating that it was his idea originally to take Barcelona. 213

Reporting from Winchester in August 1705, Hedges noted 'The country complain of a scarcity of money but there are very few who are not willing to contribute to the carrying on the war with vigour, though there is a

* For the hostility of many Country Whigs to Marlborough at this time, and 'their arraigning his conduct last campaign on the Moselle and in Flanders' see: Add MSS 4291, f 40, Charles to Henry Davenant, 18 January 1706. Tory newspapers made much of Whig hostility to Marlborough well into 1706 (The Rehearsal no.87, 23 February 1706; no.110, 5 June 1706, no.111, 8 June 1706).
general murmuring at the deputies'. The ministry certainly had some rough moments in the Commons in the session 1705-06; but it was in the Lords that the fiercest attacks on the war were made. Haversham moved an enquiry into obstruction of Marlborough during the summer campaign. Haversham claimed the Dutch were gaining wealth from the war, and noted their concern for 'the balance of trade', which England might do well to emulate. A clear suggestion that England should throw up the European war and seek advantage in the Indies and at sea.

After the ill-performance of the Dutch and the Imperialists in the past summer, open attacks on the allies caused much fear to those committed wholeheartedly to the continental war. As Somers noted:

It is plainly the most dangerous argument for making an end to the war, because it is the only one they [the High Tories] dare make use of: that all our efforts are in vain; if we join with the Germans they will not be in a condition to act, if we unite with the Dutch they will not let their troops fight.

Haversham's motion was rejected, although supported by Nottingham and Rochester. Even the Junto Whigs were angry at the Dutch failure to act energetically in 1705. But their basic attitude of conciliation was exemplified by Wharton's motion 'to preserve good correspondence with the allies', which was voted by both Houses. Cowper 'apprehended' the Tory attacks as being designed 'only to make breaches in the Confederacy and to renew resentments which were well over'.

The successes in Spain at the end of the year were provident. The

* Godolphin and Harley both thought Marlborough's presence vital to secure parliamentary co-operation (Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., i, 492; Marlborough MSS, Harley's letters to Marlborough late in 1705).
military situation looked grim in the winter of 1705. In particular, by the end it was desperate. Savoy's plight was, Marlborough admitted, 'that which troubles me most', as it did Harley and Godolphin. A large loan was agreed in the winter of 1705 to support the war in Italy; but Godolphin was prepared to go much further. Late in 1705 he wrote a remarkable letter to Harley. 'All that we can hope for from Holland', he observed, 'is a promise to go upon the foot of last year, so that they will not keep I doubt either at land or sea'. Godolphin continued:

At the same time it seems plain that the Emperor will be forced to withdraw his army from Italy unless the maritime powers send 10,000 men to reinforce Mr Eugene, as well as twice the 300,000 crowns which we have made them expect. Unless some way or other it be done or something very like it we must be undone on that side of the world.

Godolphin confessed he would rather 'consent to send the troops of the augmentation to Italy' than see Savoy knocked out of the war; 'and be satisfied with being upon the defensive upon the Meuse and the Rhine'.

Godolphin thought this could not be mentioned until Marlborough returned, and that the Duke's greatest objection to such a plan:

Would be that it would not be easy to himself to make only a defensive campaign, and unless he be upon the place, one can't depend but Holland will be treating with every accident that happens for peace; for I

* The expense was met out of the extraordinaries voted by parliament in the 1705-1706 session (Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., i, 464). It was decided that the troops of the Duke of Wurtemburg should be sent from the Rhine army to Italy. In September 1705 Godolphin was anxious they be sent as soon as possible to present parliament and the Dutch with a fait accompli, 'and deliver them from the apprehensions which otherwise they will naturally have, that it is only so much money thrown away' (Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., i, 494-5). A loan of 300,000 crowns was raised by subscription in England early in 1706. A convention with the Emperor of May 1706 provided for continuing the 7,000 German troops in Italy, and an additional quota of 3,000, for which England should pay 2/3 and the Dutch 1/3 (Lamberty, iv, 60-2).
cannot be persuaded but that the continuing the war in Italy is of much more consequence to us than any advantages we can reasonably hope either on the Rhine or the Meuse. 223

Godolphin's strategic vision was often wider than Marlborough's.*

Godolphin, for instance, never lost interest in colonial operations. Late in 1702 he pressed on Marlborough the importance of Anglo-Dutch naval cooperation to cut off supplies of treasure from the Spanish Indies to Europe. 224

In the summer of 1704 he was again thinking of Caribbean operations, in order to stop French 'returns' from those parts, without which it would 'not be possible for them to continue their present expense another year'. 225

In the autumn of 1704 he sent West Indian projects to Marlborough, who responded unenthusiastically; 226 as he was to do throughout the war. In July 1706, when it seemed Spain might be won, Godolphin pressed for 10 or 12 ships to be sent from the Mediterranean to the West Indies 'to hinder the galleons from coming into France'. 227

Godolphin was much more interested in descent projects than Marlborough; the latter fearing his own forces would be denuded for such attempts. Godolphin was especially keen on landings in Southern France to aid the Cevennois. Early in 1705 he suggested that 'if one could carry 5 or 6,000 men with a wish to the South parts of France they might make foul work', and give the French 'work at home'. 228 Marlborough was unenthusiastic.

* Although by the summer of 1705 even Marlborough thought some of his troops might be better used to take Toulon (Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., i, 449, 456, 18/29 June, 2/3 July). In December 1705 Marlborough was 'entirely' at one with Godolphin in 'your opinion that our first thought must be for the supporting King Charles in Catalonia and Prince Eugene in Italy' (Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., i, 515, 18/29 December 1705). And by early 1706 Marlborough had determined to march to Italy in the spring. See the Queen's instructions of 14 April, authorizing Marlborough to prepare an expedition to Italy. The plan was kept secret from the rest of Cabinet, even after it was given up (Churchill, iii, 79-80).
Marlborough proposed instead that 8,000 Prussians go to Savoy which could then aid the Cevennois. This was the plan agreed.

As in Italy, the campaign in Portugal in 1705 had gone badly. Harley warned Methuen that 'the Queen cannot expect to prevail with the parliament next year to continue so great expense in Portugal which hath upon two years trial proved so fruitless, without some sudden change in their proceedings'. Methuen agreed that the Portuguese Court should be pressed to 'change the manner of the war here and carry it into Spain to possess ourselves of Andalucia and take Cadiz':

A war in Portugal and on the frontiers could in no way be to the advantage of the allies, but will be a vast expense without fruit and at the same time an inconsiderable charge to France since there will be no French troops in Spain than are necessary to keep themselves masters of it.

The frustration over Portuguese affairs was mounting. Hedges noted: 'Nothing could be of greater advantage or contribute more to the further successes of the King of Spain then having some troops in motion on the Portuguese side'. In April Davenant was still optimistic about Spain, but thought that 'if we fail... I shall give Spain for gone and expect a very calamitous conclusion of this war'. He noted the hold the Spanish campaign had taken on the popular imagination:

Many begin to suspect the King of Portugal's ministers are all corrupted, which, if true, Spain is certainly

* Miremont's project to aid the Cevennois, Marlborough thought, would 'end in costing money, and making a great deal of noise to no purpose' (Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., i, 359, 17/28 August 1704).

** A treaty was concluded on 13/24 November 1704 (C.J., xiv, 501-2). Prussia was to send 8,000 troops to aid Savoy, and the maritime powers were to pay 150,000 crowns p.a. in subsistence (Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., i, 402, 403).

*** Godolphin continued to be far more optimistic about the war there than Marlborough (Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., i, 436, 24 May/4 June).
lost to the House of Austria; and if the recovery of Spain comes once to be thought impossible, the people of England will never be persuaded to carry on the war, nor indeed will they be able to do it.\footnote{236}

An interesting echo of the views Davenant, and Harley, had expressed in 1701. Harley was using the word 'corrupted' about the Portuguese Court in June 1706; and thought they 'would prolong that war by which they get so much'.\footnote{237}

The successful resistance of Barcelona to the French and the allied entry into Madrid encouraged belief that 'there must be a revolution in Spain against Philip of Anjou'.\footnote{238} Such a revolution did not occur; and Harley was having doubts that it ever would. One of Harley's contacts in Amsterdam sent him a letter from an English merchant based in Spain. According to the writer, those Spanish in Castile 'who have given obedience to the Arch duke have done it by force, and not of free will; and they will gladly return to their obedience' when the French returned. 'These Catalans and Valencians', he added, 'are indeed malcontents and rebels, but all the rest are quite the contrary'. Harley pointedly noted: 'This intelligence agrees with private letters I have seen from Lord Galway's camp'.\footnote{239} Though he still had hopes in the summer of 1706 of the Spanish declaring for Charles doubts were growing.\footnote{240}

The occasional writer now suggested that England should pull out of the Spanish war. Robert Crosfield, a High Tory, caused much disturbance within the ministry in 1706\footnote{241} when he suggested that the Spanish war was a futile undertaking: 'For it is plain our prosecuting the war against France in Spain is at least five times more charge to us, than it is to the French'. The men employed there could have been better used on descents on the French coast. In Spain 'we see the enemy in a manner impenetrable'. Such arguments could become a source of public debate and Harley had Crosfield admonished.\footnote{242} But a more general Tory attitude
was certainly that of Edward Southwell - Tory MP for Rye in 1707 - who thought Spain now required 'new life and new supplies to put that affair into a finishing way'.

But the response of the Whig Sunderland (who replaced Hedges as Southern Secretary in December 1706) was different. He now had few hopes for the Spanish theatre after the summer's setbacks. He told Marlborough that 'We are not to expect very much success from any quarter but where you are. For the affairs of Spain seem to be put to great hazard by the management of the Lord Peterborough'. And this reflected a general Junto Whig disenchantment with the war there.

Yet so much public enthusiasm rested in the Spanish campaign, Whig and Tory, that the ministry found it impossible to cut its commitment to Spain. As Marlborough admitted late in 1706, the Spanish war 'is now the affair in which the public is most nearly concerned'. He told Heinsius of the remarkable 'disposition I find here for carrying on the war in Spain', and 'our chief aim ought to be to satisfy the people, and make them easy under the present administration'.

The ministry feared Peterborough making public the discontent he felt over the support he had received during his time in Spain. Peterborough was a volatile and eccentric character; but he had undoubted personal and public charisma. Through his chaplain, Dr Freind, he had links with the High Tories - though his political pedigree before 1706 had been Whig - and the ability to manipulate public opinion by his contacts with writers. Peterborough's first reports at the end of 1705 set the tone. 'If we had not wanted money', he lamented, 'we should have played the game so fast' that Charles and his followers 'would not have had time to spoil it'.

Throughout the early part of 1706 he reiterated this point. For, as he wrote to Hedges:
I think in no place the attempts against France can be more fatal... I hope the necessary support will not be wanting. I have been very modest in my desires. 249

When reinforcements did arrive he complained of their poor quality. 250

Peterborough told Marlborough:

With a handful of men I have raised the siege, taken a town and strong castle from the enemy and saved the capital... My Lord, it is a hard shift I am put to sustain a war against French generals and French troops with Spanish horse the best that can be found anywhere; without troops, without money... We must languish so long without relief or support. 251

His conflicts with Galway also carried political overtones for Galway was seen as a Whig protégé.

By the end of October Peterborough had a 'long justification of himself sent to Dr Chamberlain', 252 complaining of how 'my Lord Galway with his French politics, or what else to call it, has ruined the effects of my endeavours', and requesting Chamberlain to do 'justice to truth'. 253 By the winter of 1706 a justification of Peterborough's conduct in Spain was circulating. Harley's secretary was told to begin enquiries to establish who had printed 'Lord Peterborough's Memoirs' but then received instructions 'to let that matter take its course'; for Godolphin and Hedges were 'both of the opinion that the book when published can never do so much mischief now as it would if endeavours were used to suppress it'. 254 Godolphin warned Marlborough that Peterborough was 'preparing materials of all sorts to perplex and embroil all the public affairs this winter', and:

To that end, he has lodged copies of these papers in the hands of his agents here, to be distributed to such people as he thinks he will be glad to lay hold of things of that nature, and I think, one may be sure Nottingham will be fully possessed of that whole affair. 255

Godolphin began collecting documentary evidence 'to prevent any ill effects

* For Peterborough's hostility to Harley at this time see: Cunningham, A., The History of Great Britain, 1787, i, 466-67.
of all this'; fearing that Peterborough could undermine the whole war effort, unless they could establish that Peterborough himself had 'been the occasion of the greatest part of the ill measures taken in that country'.

Godolphin was more sympathetic to the claims the Spanish war made on English resources than Marlborough; and generally more optimistic over the war there until 1707. In April 1706 Godolphin believed 'if we save Barcelona we must get Spain'. He suggested an immediate diversion of the forces assembled for a descent on France to Spain. He pressed this on Marlborough after Ramillies, with news that Philip had returned to Madrid, where 'his presence may be able to hinder a general revolution'. Marlborough prevaricated, and on the 14 June Godolphin wrote:

I wish my Lord Rivers's expedition may have the success you seem to hope for from it. But if it should not succeed, and the King of Spain should come to want an additional force, it will make a good deal of noise, that we neglect to send more troops to follow our success in Spain for which expense the parliament had provided, and instead of that send them to be baffled in France.

Eventually Marlborough agreed.

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* If the allies were successful in Spain Godolphin thought that it 'would be almost as well for the allies to have the balance kept up in Italy as to drive the French quite out of it, which would enable the French to contract both their troops and their expense' (Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., i, 523, 28 April 1706).
(iv) Harley and the War 1706-07

In May 1706 Defoe could see no prospect of progress anywhere but in Spain; and Marlborough planned to march on Italy. But when the French army moved forward later that month it was decisively defeated by Marlborough, and the victory seemed to presage France's surrender. Sunderland thought Ramillies 'if possible more considerable than Blenheim' considering the campaigning time Marlborough had left to exploit the victory. Halifax saw Ramillies as making 'a most fortunate end to this war... And your Grace may push your conquest as far as the situation of the war will give you leave'. He thought Marlborough could 'finish the war this campaign', and that 'France will be obliged to make peace on what terms the Queen pleases'.

The very decisiveness of Marlborough's victory opened up fissures within the ministry. Harley grasped at the possibility of peace.* 'Now we have raised our hopes to the height and look for still greater things', was his response on hearing of the victory. Just before Ramillies he expressed fears of an inactive campaign 'eternizing the war'. Harley noted the first signs of war-weariness in the nation.** Davenant expressed hopes in March for an early peace, for 'so much is our trade lessened during this tedious war, out of which I wish we could get at last with honour and safety, for none of the Confederates act their parts to the utmost stretch

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* St John, too, was of opinion that 'a peace may be made' (H.M.C. 10th Report (Bagot) p.340, 16 July 1706).

** 'Beyond sea affords nothing new', Harley wrote on 15 June, 'We have victories, and have improved them, and that is grown so old a story, as I wrote our general word, that I am of the opinion that he will need another victory, not to save himself, but to rescue the Modern Whigs from their own mismanagement' (H.M.C. Portland, ii, 193, to Newcastle). Harley's use of the term 'Modern Whigs' is interesting; it had come into the political vocabulary through the agency of Davenant in the foreign policy debates of 1701 (see p.125 above).
but ourselves'\textsuperscript{269} In October Shrewsbury thought 'the war was being felt in the country more than ever it has yet been, and money is so scarce that unless a trade be opened with the Spanish West Indies and that we can have bullion, we shall be reduced to barter'.\textsuperscript{270} Merchants reported that 'trade in England is quite dead in consequence of war, which we cannot long support'.\textsuperscript{271}

However, Shrewsbury was against any peace which left Spain and the Indies in French hands.\textsuperscript{272} This was still, in essence, Harley's position. But the language he used in August 1706, in joint reply with Godolphin to Buys on the French peace proposals is interesting.\textsuperscript{273} Comparison of Harley's original notes and the final reply reveals illuminating discrepancies.\textsuperscript{274} Harley believed 'England finds itself so much oppressed by the war that a solid peace would be readily embraced'. Godolphin permitted no such defeatist reflections in the reply though much of Godolphin's letter was taken almost verbatim from Harley's notes.\textsuperscript{**}

Godolphin stressed the dangers of rushing into a peace; and Harley had noted that 'the preoccupation which hath been showed to obtain any peace hath made France backward to offer what is reasonable'. Harley was clear that 'No peace can be lasting without the continuance of a league between the maritime powers for the preserving of that'; for 'should the impetuosity of any faction draw on an insecure peace it would ruin those that complied with it'. This was a dominant theme of Godolphin's letter to Buys.

\* See Burnet, v, 242, on the effect by 1706 on the economy caused by the loss of money from the Spanish and West Indies trades; and the loss of specie to support the war, especially in Spain. Early in 1707 Shrewsbury reported growing difficulties over the recruitment of soldiers, and rising antagonism towards the Dutch and the Empire (Add MSS 40776, f 49, to Vernon, 22 March 1707).

\** For instance, Godolphin's remarks that 'increasing the Duke of Savoy's power will be a most effectual method to balance the power of France' follows Harley's minute almost word for word.
An insecure peace, Harley observed, would lead to a swift revival of French aggression: 'Note how quickly France recovered after the Pyrrenean Treaty'; and Harley was thinking of Ryswick as well.* Godolphin's final letter stressed that a successful campaign could force France into such a condition that it 'will find itself under a necessity of making better offers at the end of the campaign, than they do now'. But Harley was against vindictive demands being made, and determined to ask nothing but what is reasonable', which was 'not a worse argument now we have success than it was when it was urged not to try for those successes'. England should 'ask nothing but what tends to our security: Dunkirk, Newfoundland, Hudson's Bay'.

Harley appreciated the importance of Spain to the public and thought the allies should insist that 'Spain with all its territories - except the States' Barrier - be restored to the House of Austria'; because 'it can never be justified in England not to insist upon this as far as is reasonable'. Harley thought that Louis would 'not let that break a treaty of peace he has so much need of'. But the word 'reasonable' is significant, given Harley's intransigent language a year before. Godolphin allowed no such moderation in his final reply to Buys; 'No good Englishman, nor servant to the Queen', he affirmed, 'can advise the dismembering of the

* Note the views of the High Tory Sir Robert Davers in July 1705: 'I hope the Duke of Marlborough go on with success and break the French into an honourable peace, not such a one as the last war made, for it was a worthless one' (Loan 29/133/5, to Harley, 19 July 1705).
Spanish monarchy'.*

After Ramillies Harley 'advised the Queen to command the Duke of Marlborough to march into France, where there was no army to oppose him, or else, to hearken to the overtures of peace that were then made by France', and warned her against 'the carrying on of a lingering war'.275 Boyer claimed that 'upon the overtures of peace made by the Elector of Bavaria after the battle of Ramiles', Godolphin and Marlborough

Found the Queen strongly inclined to enter upon a negotiation... they resolved to remove him /Harley/ whom they justly suspected to have suggested pacific counsels...
And it was undoubtedly with an eye upon him that they made her say in her last speech to parliament, that she must think herself obliged to look upon all those who were willing and desirous to support her in this war.'276

And in 1706 Defoe began urging a speedy peace in his Review. The war had been contemplated only to reduce 'the exorbitant power of France', not to destroy France itself.277 Harley was certainly using Defoe as his mouth-piece.**

* Harley clashed with his colleagues over the Dutch barrier. To prevent their responding to French peace proposals Marlborough opened talks with the Dutch, promising them a more generous barrier than Louis would ever offer. He chose Halifax of the Junto to conduct the talks. Halifax shared the Whig tradition of obsessive concern with the security of the Spanish Netherlands: 'Their barrier should be as good as we can get for them; and if they insist upon too much, it will be the greater tie to them, not to make peace till it is proposed for them' (Geikie and Montgomery, p.46, note 2). But in November 1705 Harley revealed a much less ambitious attitude: 'If the honest people of Holland will not give way they may have it /peace/ quickly, instead of a rotten whimsical barrier' (Coxe, i, 490, Harley to Marlborough, 4 December 1705). Harley opposed the Dutch request for the inclusion of Ostend and Dendermonde in the barrier (S.P. 104/73 f 67, Harley to Stepney, 24 December 1706). In fact, the negotiations broke down on this point (Geikie and Montgomery, chapter 2, esp. pp. 87-9).

** Godolphin told Marlborough late in 1706 that Harley and the Tories 'were underhand endeavouring to bring all the difficulties they could think of upon the public business in the next sessions' (Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., ii, 715, 8 October 1706. See H.M.C. Bath, i, 109-111, for Harley's denial of this).
Marlborough's campaign after Ramillies culminated in a series of successful, but inconclusive sieges. Most of the Spanish Netherlands was taken but there was still no decisive breakthrough. Marlborough thought that 'For the good of Europe I think this war must continue another year'; and that any compromise with the more intransigent Tories was impossible, for 'the Queen had no choice but that of employing those that will carry on the war and support Godolphin'.

In December 1706 the war supplies were passed rapidly in the Commons, with ineffective High Tory opposition. The Queen's speech and the debates of that session showed little impatience for peace. But there were still widespread hopes that Spain could be conquered; with the Lords voting for the restoration of the whole monarchy to Charles.

The popular enthusiasm for Spanish operations forced the ministry into a reckless attitude. The earlier belief that the mere presence of Charles with some troops would cause the Spanish to revolt in his favour had proved illusory. Increasingly the opinion was that the Spanish had 'neither the resolution nor spirit to assert their liberty', and that 'a superior force must carry that affair and must maintain it till a peace'.

The new Secretary, Sunderland, now effectively first Secretary, told James Stanhope in February 1707:

It has always been the opinion here that the dividing of the army would be the loss of all, and that the only way of putting King Charles in possession of the monarchy in Spain is by marching straight to Madrid.

St John urged on Erle the advantages of an offensive war in Spain:

This scheme, which had so fatal an event this year, will progress better in your hands and indeed to me it appears the only way of ending a war advantageously which is of so prodigious consequence to us and at present so great a burden.

Erle was to 'restore a game that has been made dubious and which we must win or in consequence become very miserable'. Though he gave Erle a
sad account of the conditions in Spain, with 'all the Spaniards either animated against you, or at best distrusting your strength and afraid to declare for you'. St John looked 'upon this year as that which is in effect to end the war, and provided you can in Spain make a good game, we have no great concern upon us'. He urged a direct attack on Madrid; and noted the 'concern' he had 'to see this lost game retrieved'.

St John saw the victory at Turin in September 1706 as ensuring the end of the war in Spain, and that Erle would now be going merely to 'pin the basket'.

Early in 1707 pursuing an offensive policy (which had been fitfully resisted by Peterborough) Galway led the allied armies to defeat at Almanza.*

Sunderland's immediate reaction is interesting. He told Marlborough:

A great deal will be wanting to retrieve our misfortune in Spain which I fear is hardly retrievable in that country... if our misfortunes there be as great as the French represent it. I own, I can't but be of opinion it would be best not to fling away any more troops in Spain. But rather draw off what remains and carry them where they may be of more use to the common cause, for if we can't reduce Spain by a superiority there we must do it by pressing of France itself.

This was the position of the Junto Whigs from now on. Even Harley told Marlborough that the setback could 'not be retrieved but by your Grace's superior genius giving the French a checkmate in another place'. The best he could look forward to in Spain was ensuring that 'our footing there may not be lost'. St John believed only Marlborough could avenge the misfortune in Spain; and recommended an addition to the Duke's strength in Flanders as the only way to make progress, as 'no army under German conduct can be of any use'. Only after 'much consideration' was a cabinet decision made to send reinforcements to Spain. But Harley

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* Godolphin was shattered by the defeat (Loan 29/64/2 to Harley, n.d., 'Saturday night at 11').
thought the Empire should take a larger share of the Spanish campaign, 'as the less expensive way of maintaining the war.' As did St John, who thought only a small English reinforcement could be sent to Spain, 'as all we can in our present circumstances do, where only Britain exerts itself'.

Harley was desperate, and thought the capture of Toulon 'the most effectual way to put a good end to this long war'. Anticipating success, he was considering the provision of a strong naval squadron in the Mediterranean in the winter of 1707. To Dayrolle, Harley wrote:

The good prospect we have of success in Toulon makes it requisite to think in time of what is to be done after, and should we be so fortunate as to have that place not only the Duke of Savoy's land army will winter in France, but there will be a very good station for a squadron of ships of her majesty and the States, which will be of great service in transporting succours from the kingdom of Naples to the assistance of King Charles in Spain. Besides it will make the port of Lisbon less necessary for carrying on the war in Spain.

There is much evidence of the public expectation vested in the Toulon enterprise. It was seen as the last chance of opening up France on the Mediterranean side. Marlborough thought the expedition 'the only means left to redress our affairs in Spain'. Craggs thought 'The great hopes of Toulon lulls everybody until the event is over'. Till the battle was decided, Craggs noted, 'our wise men are very cautious in speaking their minds'. St John thought 'the success of the Duke of Savoy and the consequences of that success must be in great measure to determine the fate of this campaign'.

Godolphin's 'great hope was in the Duke of

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* And the only way effectually to support Charles, all 'other matters being only imaginary and chimerical' (S.P. 104/74, f 31, Harley to Cadogan, 23 January/3 February 1708).

** Marlborough, Godolphin, the two Secretaries and Maffei and Briancon had worked out plans for the Toulon expedition in December 1706 (Owen, War at Sea, pp. 158-92).
Savoy's expedition', and he told Marlborough how 'enraged all people here
are at the Imperial Court persisting in their design against Naples' in
May. In July he noted that the Toulon expedition was 'uppermost with
all people here'; and the increasing opposition of many Tories to the
war.

Given these expectations the failure at Toulon was a body-blow.
Harley lamented: 'The hopes which the generality of people had swallowed
down concerning it makes the disappointments at present more grievous'.
The ministers deflected much blame on to the Emperor and Savoy. But
Addison noted that news of the raising of the siege had 'given a great
deal of spirit to our malcontents', and that the High Tories 'now pretend
that it was one of the most chimerical and unpracticable projects that
could have been concerted'. St John was devastated by the failure:
'Against the next year', he noted, 'we must take new measures, and in a
manner begin the war anew'. Addison foresaw a dangerous session ahead.
For, as well as the 'miscarriage before Toulon', he noted that Peterborough
gives intimation among his friends to be very active in the next parlia-
ment'. Addison could only hope that Marlborough 'will come to our relief
and set things right again as he has done formerly when affairs were in a
more desperate posture'. Even Tory military men, at the end of 1707,
were complaining of the expense and inactivity of the Flanders campaign
and the Toulon failure.

In his official capacity Harley put a brave face on affairs. But he
now talked of the need for England and Holland to 'exert themselves to do
somewhat for the preserving of what is got and for procuring the security
and safety of Europe'. It is clear, however, that Toulon was the
turning point in the war for Harley as for many Tories.* In September 1707 he noted the failure to take advantage of the French peace offers of 1706:

It is now fit to consider what temptations the French will make: Savoy has no other expectations; the Emperor is uneasy to chastise the Hungarians; Holland weary of the war;** therefore if France forces Portugal to a peace without your concurrence or being there very strong, Savoy and the Emperor have very good grounds to fall off. Now is the worst time to have a peace but it will be. 310

Harley thought France in a much stronger financial position to support the war than in 1706:

I hear from France that the billets de monnaye are much improved in their value of late; and there appears too good a reason for it: the armies upon the Rhine and in France being maintained upon the spot, and no remittance being made to Italy keeps vast sums in the country which last year were carried out by those services. 311

Despairing of continental warfare, Harley’s mind was turning to the Caribbean as perhaps the last chance to force France into a reasonable peace. In September Harley compiled a memorandum setting out the need to shift attention to the West Indies.312 Harley’s renewed interest in this theatre reflected a growing concern amongst many sections of opinion from 1706 on.

* Early in July Marlborough was anxious concerning the 'too much conversation' between Harley and the Queen (Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., ii, 842, 7/18 July 1707). On the same day he wrote to the Queen advising that only the Whigs could be trusted, for the Tories 'would not carry this war with vigour' (Ibid., ii, 843, 7/18 July, 1707). In September Godolphin wrote to Harley reminding him of the necessity of their agreeing 'upon the measures of which she is to be served, both at home and abroad' and that he never had any 'thought of your being out of the Queen's service' (H.M.C. Bath, i, 183).

** John Drummond had written to Harley from Amsterdam in May 1707 informing him that 'we are under the greatest necessities of a peace; our commerce is very low, our finances stretched to the greatest extremity, and our treasury exhausted'. Drummond thought Amsterdam was 'fully resolved to have a good peace, but the other princes were very much less steady' (Loan 29/45 X).
(v) The Revival of a Caribbean Strategy 1706-08

Even before Almanza, Halifax, who had close links with Whig mercantile interests, confessed he had:

Always thought that Methuen was the ruin of our affairs in Spain, he was truly the minister of Portugal, and not of England. He diverted the war from being made in the West Indies which would have enriched us, and touched Spain most sensibly, to carry it into a place from whence we had no assistance, but they had our money and France the silver of the Indies. 313

Confirmation of the fact that many Whigs anticipated rich pickings in the Caribbean at the outbreak of the Succession War. It was Halifax, 'with the advice and assistance of most of the Admirals and chief citizens of London', who pushed through the bill for encouraging privateers in the West Indies. 314 The bill was introduced in the Commons on 19 December 1707 by Whig naval officers and merchants. It contained a clause that any places that adventurers 'make themselves masters of shall remain in their hands after a treaty of peace'. 315 By July 1708, merchant groups associated with the bill were pressing the ministry to furnish them with three regiments of foot and six warships to make their 'intended acquisitions'. Boyle reported that the cabinet:

Upon reading this proposal have desired it should be further explained as to what places and purposes this force intended. To which it is answered that till it be known whether the government can spare such a strength it is not proper or necessary to open the scheme. 316

The matter stood still, but the anxiety of the merchants to pay more atten-

* Rivers's reply confirmed Halifax's fears: 'The truth of the matter is that the Portuguese are to ruin Spain beyond recovery; and if they could, pull it to pieces, that they may never be under any further apprehensions, and let the war last, so far as my Lord Galway conforms to them in these points he can influence them, but no other ways' (H.M.C. Bath, i, 163).
tion to the Caribbean was clear.

It became a favourite ploy of the ministry's opponents to argue that a larger share of the war effort be devoted to West Indian campaigns. This suggestion always caused disquiet to the Junto Whigs. As Addison admitted:

This I must confess carries so promising an appearance that I would by no means discourage the attempt. But at the same time I think it should be a collateral project, rather than our principal design.\textsuperscript{317}

Addison was aware that public, including Whig, enthusiasm for Caribbean operations might lead to a cut back in the continental war. One of the most clearly expressed war pamphlets of Anne's reign, published in 1707, launched a reasoned but firm attack on the war policies pursued so far.\textsuperscript{318} The author was of the Country Whig persuasion.\textsuperscript{319} Primarily he castigated the neglect of the war in the West Indies. The writer regretted the 'omission' at the beginning of the war of having 'ten or twelve' warships 'constantly cruising in the latitude of Martinique and Guadeloupe, which would have cut off their communications of supplies from France, and soon have obliged those islands to surrender to us'.\textsuperscript{320} France could only be defeated by 'destroying his naval force'; and he thought it 'a surprise to every thinking man that we have not been able hitherto to prevent the French King's being master of the treasures of the West Indies'.\textsuperscript{321} The author was 'not of capacity to judge' whether, in order to carry on the war in the West Indies and Spain, the forces in Flanders should be reduced. But he suggested that if the Emperor could make peace with the Hungarians then the French could be held by the Dutch and Germans, and 'leave us and the Dutch to manage the war in the West Indies'.\textsuperscript{322}

\* The author claimed to be an MP. He took a classic radical Whig position on many matters: the decline of the navy under Charles II; 'tarpaulin' commanders preferable to gentleman captains; abuses in the administration of the navy. He attacked religious tests and 'High Flyers'.

In 1707 Harley feared a French naval attack on the West Indies, as 'the only place where they can direct their sea power with prospect of success'. He requested Dutch naval co-operation to secure the flota. And Tory merchants continued to look towards the Caribbean as a source of profit, and as recompense for 'the want of money and slow trade' in England. Attempts should be made upon the Spanish West Indies 'from whence golden mountains would be expected and the thoughts of men buoyed up with the prospect of having qualities of bullion coined'. Nottingham told Dartmouth after Ramillies:

In the midst of our triumphs perhaps it will be counted a fault to lament one misfortune in the West Indies. I would much rejoice to hear that some care had been taken to stop the progress of the French there. Without which all our islands will be lost.

There are many plans in Harley's papers relating to expeditions to the Caribbean, dating from as early as 1701. According to one near contemporary account Harley was often approached in office with such schemes:

Which Mr Harley at that time seemed to neglect as an idle dream. But perhaps he might take some hints from it, for when he was out of employment, he was observed often to find fault with the management of the war, and it was the usual topic of his friends, when they talked of public affairs, that the only way to bring the war to a right issue, and to weaken the power of France and Spain, would be by sending a strong armament to make conquests in the West Indies; that being the main source from whence the French King drew his supplies.

The most systematic plan in Harley's papers is dated December 1704, and was composed by Christian Lilly, a Whig army engineer of high rank and long service in the West Indies. It obviously had great influence on Harley's thinking when he began to consider the West Indies situation late in 1707. Harley was dismissive of any design on the French West Indies:

* He expressed similar fears to Marlborough (Marlborough MSS M/20. 25 April/6 May 1707).
The project on Guadeloupe and Martinique ridiculous. You have already more land there than you can people, and the French will easily repossess it or have others. Tobago, St Vincent, St Lucia go a begging now.

But he was keen to take land from the Spanish and suggested 'Havana, Porto Bello, Vera Cruz, St Augustin, St Cruz [St Croix, near Puerto Rico]'. Harley thought Havana 'a key to the Panama Channel and consequently to the outlet of the West Indies'. These ideas resemble Lilly's.

Late in 1707 Harley heard from the West Indies that:

All the silver that comes from Lima, Vera Cruz and other places of the Spanish West Indies comes into the hands of the French King, and is looked upon by all men there as the true support of this war, without which the sinews thereof have been very languid some years ago;

which led Harley to comment that the Spanish 'silver trade was now managed by France'. The idea was growing up that France had survived in Europe because of the supplies of silver from America.* Indeed, for that reason 'they grow more formidable under their defeats'. Ever since the battle of Almanza', it was claimed:

The least discerning eye might perceive the Castilians were not to be reduced but by force, and their whole dependency being on the Spanish West Indies trade I ever thought it the best way to reduce them and enrich our trade. 332

One writer proposed the establishment of a South Sea Company, for settlements there would be a 'fatal blow' to France. He added that:

At this time any grant may be had from Charles III. Whereas, should he become in quiet possession of Spain, it may be found very difficult to be obtained. 333

* Harley was informed from France in October 1706 that 'We do not fear to re-establish our affairs before the next campaign, that is if the galleons come safely home with money we shall have 100,000 men' (H.M.C. Portland, iv, 337, John Gassion, alias Ogilvie, to Harley, 9/20 October 1706).

** In fact, Charles's dependence on England enabled Stanhope to force out of him a commercial treaty (29 June/10 July 1707) which gave England special trading rights in Spain and the West Indies; and provided (in a secret article) for an Anglo-Spanish company to be formed after the war, which improved on these privileges to the exclusion of the Dutch and French. The Dutch were very angry when they heard of the treaty (Williams, Stanhope, pp. 60-61; Geikie and Montgomery, pp. 147-8).
Defoe, previously uninterested in Caribbean operations and formerly a convinced supporter of the European war, wrote in October 1707 of the prime importance of stopping the Spanish treasure fleet: 'The loss of such a sum to the French would be a blow superior to Hochstadt or Ramillies'. 334 A theme he pressed with mounting enthusiasm in the *Review* during 1708. 335

From the spring of 1706, cabinet minutes reveal, the ministry devoted considerable attention to the West Indies. Godolphin was keen to attempt something there: in July, in response to his promptings, the cabinet held 'a very long debate' on the West Indies. Throughout the winter of 1706–1707 the cabinet kept the Caribbean situation in mind; showing considerable fears of possible French action there. In October 1707, the cabinet requested the Admiralty Council 'to reconsider and propose methods to intercept the galleons coming home'. 336
(vi) **Junto War Strategy 1707-08**

It is unlikely that Harley's military views now carried weight. For Godolphin and Marlborough were increasingly committing themselves to an alliance with the Whigs in order to obtain parliamentary support for the war supplies. This confirmed Harley's pre-war fears of the Junto taking control of a war without hopes of an early end, and whose aims and strategy he increasingly questioned. Only Sunderland of the Junto was in ministerial office; but Godolphin turned to Cowper, the moderate Whig Lord Chancellor, to review the military and diplomatic situation in early September. In the face of waning enthusiasm for the war Godolphin and Cowper showed great sensitivity to public opinion. There was little intelligent thinking about the war aims and strategy, but a desperate attempt to formulate a military policy which would be acceptable to parliament and the country at large.

Cowper's views on war strategy differed from the Junto. He proposed that the allies concentrate on Spain in 1708 and go on the defensive everywhere else.* Spain was 'really most essential to Britain', and 'the expectation of the people'. Eugene was to lead the offensive there. To reinforce Spain the two ministers suggested a diminution of the Flanders army. Additional troops would be requested from the allied armies on the Rhine and in Italy. Cowper thought that allowing Marlborough to retain his present strength in Flanders in 1708 would enable the Tories to censure the administration for favouring the Duke; for Marlborough 'having done nothing this year in Flanders has convinced the people nothing there is to be done'. But Marlborough was pessimistic about the chances of success in Spain; and this was a view increasingly shared by Junto Whigs.

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* Shrewsbury was another Whig who supported such views (Marlborough MSS M/30, Shrewsbury to Marlborough, 30 August, 1707).
Late in 1707 Marlborough reportedly told the Imperial Court that he did not intend to send any of his troops into Spain next year.*340

Godolphin and Cowper hoped for a descent on France in 1708; and Cowper thought that the Spanish coast should also be considered for such operations. A landing in western France was favoured, which would join up with French rebels in the south. A descent had been planned in 1706 but the forces had been diverted to Spain. Another descent was projected in 1707. A French Huguenot, Guiscard, revived the idea of a landing near Bordeaux. Godolphin responded with enthusiasm.**341 But Marlborough was sceptical, and passed on Dutch indifference.342 He finally agreed to release 3/4 battalions from Flanders for the operation, though objecting that the season was too advanced.343 After the Toulon failure the descent was scrapped. Marlborough unenthusiastically agreed to a fresh attempt in 1708. In December he told Heinsius:

A descent would be of the greatest consequence, and we are not without thoughts of it, if the ill success we have hitherto had in those expeditions do not give too great a discouragement.344

Cowper and Godolphin thought Portugal was simply to be kept 'safe', with minimum force.*** But Godolphin had not lost faith in Savoyard oper-

* A final complication in the Spanish war was the lack of a suitable port for the fleet to winter in. The expedition had had this as one of its purposes. Cowper insisted that 'The fleet must be in the Mediterranean'. The taking of Port Mahon next summer solved this dilemma.

** Given Godolphin's fears about the coming session, and the likely protests against the war (Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., ii, 860, 25 July 1707) he saw a descent attempt as likely to smooth the government's path in parliament.

*** Methuen told Marlborough in May that Portugal would never mount more than a frontier war, and that it would be difficult to support the war in Spain based on Catalonia from England (Marlborough MSS A2-29, 30 May/10 June). Similar advice came to Godolphin (Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., ii, 802,847).
ations, even after Toulon. Savoy was to be pressed to take the offensive again in 1708. The ministers recognized public interest in the Caribbean, and Cowper proposed to take the offensive there: which 'many wise and thinking men have long judged the only way, but being new will keep up hopes'. The supply of bullion to Spain and France was to be intercepted, and England to make conquests in Spanish America. 'The Spanish [West Indies]', thought Cowper, were 'not to be spared longer; a right notion unquestionably'. Admiral Jennings's reports from there early in 1707 revealed the bankruptcy of the policy of drawing over the Spanish colonies to Charles simply by propaganda. The colonists and merchants were to be placated with a stronger naval presence there.

Without the presence of Marlborough or the Junto these discussions signified little. In a letter to Godolphin of 1/12 September Marlborough expressed fears (correctly) that the French would attempt to overrun Flanders in 1708, and requested an augmentation of his army. This was reluctantly accepted by Godolphin and Cowper in their final conference on 8 September.

The latter part of 1707 saw serious strategic disagreements between Godolphin and Marlborough. In his plans for the 1707 descent Godolphin revealed growing distaste for the war in Flanders. He proposed the concentration of 10,000 troops 'which may be applied either to Spain or for a descent' to the cabinet in May, and suggested that 8,000 English troops be taken from Flanders for that purpose, and replacing them with Saxon troops. But Marlborough believed the Empire and Holland had 'no other care of the war in Spain but putting the whole expense upon England', and warned Godolphin against 'running too fast to that expense'; thinking the 'good or bad success of this war will depend upon what we shall do in this army'.

The lack of progress in Flanders in 1707 confirmed Godolphin's prejudices. Early in September Godolphin suggested that Eugene be sent to Spain, a move popular in England and which would facilitate the passing of supplies in the Commons. He recommended remaining on the defensive in Flanders in 1708, 'since it is plain that the greatest and the best armies can be of no use in that country, till both sides agree to fight'. He asked Marlborough to consider what 'an opportunity we have lost' by not having 10,000 troops less in Flanders in 1707 and applying them to 'the coast of France where there were no troops within 500 miles of them'. He advised having merely a covering force in the Low Countries, strong enough 'to hinder the French to make any siege, or to put Holland into a panic fear'; which:

Is more for the advantage of the common cause than to have so great an army there as disables us to have troops for a descent, upon a view of acting offensively, which is always in the power of the enemy to avoid it.

But Marlborough thought his army should be strengthened for 1708:

Being of the opinion that the war will be decided in this country by a battle early in the next campaign, for they [the French] see that no success in any other part of the world can get them peace.

Marlborough thought a descent not feasible until July 1708 and 'before that time we shall have decided the business here'. Godolphin was 'sorry' to find Marlborough holding such views; believing an increase in the Flanders army unrealistic, as it would 'prove no small difficulty here to keep it upon the foot it now stands, considering how little fruit the States have suffered it to yield us this summer'. Godolphin noted that the idea of having a greater force in Flanders was 'in some prejudice' in England. He was aware that such a policy would further split the ministry, and alienate the government from even moderate Tories. Marlborough appreciated this, but still asked Heinsius to give him 'a handle to press it' even harder on his colleagues at home. Godolphin's final
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capitulation on this question meant that a move towards complete co-operation with the Junta was inevitable.

If there were doubts that Godolphin and Marlborough would now have to surrender politically to the Junta they were dispelled by the parliamentary session of 1707-08. Godolphin was fearful even in July that the summer's failures would be exploited to 'give the greatest handle imaginable against the war'. The Tories pressed more strongly than ever the moving of the principal theatre of war from Flanders to Spain. Dissatisfaction with the Spanish war was rife: Rivers was 'publicly' attacking Galway's conduct, and Peterborough had been organizing his friends for the next parliamentary session from August, 1707. In June Peterborough told Marlborough that the Almanza defeat 'will oblige us to enquire more exactly into the affairs and conduct of that war'. Swift noted it a 'perfect jest' that Peterborough - 'reputed as great a Whig as any in England' - was now 'abhorred by his own party and caressed by the Tories'. Peterborough 'declares open war with the Court' Davenant noted; and Marlborough expressed fears of Peterborough going in to print to justify his conduct. Harley thought that Peterborough should be required to 'give an account in writing of his proceedings' in Spain; and if he was found to have acted wrongly then to have him committed.*

Dr Freind's account of Peterborough's campaigns was published in 1707, setting out the rightness of the latter's conduct in Spain, and the way he had been denied proper support. Freind had connections with the High Tories, through his friendship with Francis Atterbury, which were now exploited. Peterborough argued that Spain was still recoverable, and

* For Harley's hostility to Peterborough at this time see: Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., i, 891, Godolphin to Marlborough, 25 August 1707. For Peterborough's answers to the charges levelled against him see: Ibid., ii, 877, 9/20 August 1707; H.M.C. House of Lords, vii, 398, 400-4.
that English troops should be employed as German troops were useless.

Nottingham and Rochester proposed that 20,000 men should transfer from Flanders to Spain. Nottingham stressed:

The absolute necessity of supporting King Charles, and the little likelihood of doing anything against France in Flanders, since we were not able to do anything last summer when the enemy fled before us, not even when they had weakened their forces by a detachment of 1,500 for Toulon. 367

Marlborough said that if the bulk of the English army were removed from the Netherlands the French would advance and recover much lost territory; and that the French held their fortresses with large numbers of troops, but moving allied strength from Flanders would release them. 368 Rather than a diminution he needed an augmentation. 369

Marlborough, under pressure, revealed ministerial plans to send an army of 10,000 Imperialists to Spain under Eugene. But Rochester claimed that German troops would rather be decimated than sent to Spain. 370 Marlborough admitted the slowness of the Empire, and mentioned the 7,000 Germans which the Emperor had promised for Savoy: if these 'had arrived in time, the enterprise against Toulon would, probably, have been attended with success'. But Marlborough claimed that an additional 20,000 German troops were to assist Savoy to enter France next campaign. 'All the Duke of Savoy got this war was to be allowed him at the peace to secure him a sufficient barrier against the enemy' and further encourage him. 371 Faced with continuing public enthusiasm for Spain the ministry could not abandon it, nor could they suggest any realistic way of reviving the war. For the Germans totally refused to comply with the English plans over Spain.*

The Junta Whigs dare not speak out openly against the Spanish project.

* Only after protracted negotiations in 1708 was it arranged that 7,000 Palatine troops in the pay of the maritime powers (serving then in Savoy) should be sent to Spain.
But Somers concluded by stating plainly the Whig policy which had been outlined even before the war: 'That no peace can be honourable or safe for her majesty and her allies if Spain and the Spanish West Indies be suffered to continue in the power of the House of Bourbon'. The Tories did not object for most merely wanted England to make her main effort outside Flanders, and to break the prestige and power of Marlborough. (Only one independent Whig, Scarborough, suggested the possibility of a partition of the Spanish monarch). By late 1707 Marlborough had given up hope of ever conquering Spain. But noting the still continuing concern for the Spanish war in England Godolphin thought that the sending of Eugene with some troops to Spain:

> Would be so popular in England, that I have no doubt that parliament will be very ready to allow subsidies for the support of those troops from the first January next, especially if they be sent so timely as that we may hope to defend Catalonia this winter.

In November 1707 Anne wrote to the Emperor recommending the plan; and on 2 January 1708 the Commons approved the policy. The idea was popular with all sections of political opinion. Some Whigs even hoped that Marlborough would 'crown his glory by reducing Spain'. And Marlborough pacified much of the clamour against him by keeping up the pretence that he had great hopes of retrieving Spain by reinforcing that theatre, and that he was considering acting in that campaign himself.

The Junta payed lip service therefore to the continuing importance of the Spanish campaign; indeed Wharton 'spoke with much zeal for supporting

* Once the 'No Peace without Spain' motion was carried the Lords began an examination of Peterborough's conduct; with Rochester and Nottingham attempting throughout January to secure Peterborough's commendation (Vernon Corr., ii, 303, 307; Duke of Manchester, Court and Society, ii, 269, Original Letters, pp. 189-91).

** In November 1707 Harley noted that Eugene must command in Spain, 'without which neither the parliament nor the people will be satisfied in the methods of carrying on the war there' (Add MSS 15866, f 67, Harley to Dayrolle, 28 November 1707).
the war there'. But the true reaction of the Junta to the suggestion that England now concentrate her efforts in Spain can be seen in Maynwaring's comments on 'the vile attempt that was made last winter to draw the forces out of Flanders'. He condemned Nottingham and Rochester as 'fools':

Who were sure to be caught with anything that looked like carrying on the Spanish war; as if there were no way of getting that monarchy but by sending armies thither. The contrary of which is so true that I think it is now more surely ours than when we were in possession of Madrid... if one can wound an enemy at the heart* it is ridiculous to think of cutting off his finger.

But Maynwaring thought Marlborough could 'never forgive those men that would be lessening his army'; and he reassured the Duchess he would 'certainly be as good a Whig as your Grace next winter'. By July the Duke was informing his wife 'You may depend upon my joining with the Whigs in opposition to the Tories in everything'.**

At the end of January 1708 there was a series of Commons debates on the condition of the army at Almanza. A wide discrepancy had been noticed between the numbers of men voted and paid for and the numbers actually present at the battle. It was suspected at the time that St John's original production of these figures to parliament in a potentially explosive

* He was writing just after the battle of Oudenarde.

** For the place the Lords debates on Spain in the 1707-1708 session held in Junto political mythology see Francis Hare's letter of December 1710 to the Duchess of Marlborough (Private Corr., ii, 11-12): 'I can't forget how clamourous they were in the Lords House, what faults they found with the scheme of the war, which they wanted to have pushed in Spain, in the same nonsensical cant the Tories now talk in. And what was this for? Not because they thought what they said, but to force the ministry into their measures, which they did, and then they were quiet. Which, when Mr Harley perceived, he brought about the Almanza business in the Commons, in order to bring the ministry off from the new engagements they were gone into. He miscarried in this attempt, was removed, and the Whigs triumphed.'
way was an underhand attack on his colleagues, inspired by Harley. The affair is complex but there is some evidence to support the last suggestion. Shortly before Almanza Harley had been 'assured that my Lord Galway has above 27,000 effective men, besides what King Charles of Spain can join with him'. Yet after Almanza Harley commented bitterly:

Never such a handful of men did more, considering all circumstances, or sold themselves so dear. And I am not willing to make any other reflections upon what has happened.

In July and August 1707 St John complained to Marlborough of the 'miserable, confused state of the troops upon the Spanish establishment'; and the lack of information about the number of troops there. But it is possible that Marlborough and Godolphin felt that St John could have handled the disclosures of the missing troops in a less dangerous way, and that Harley had not exerted himself fully enough on the government's behalf in the debates of 29 January and 3 February, when the Commons passed a motion hostile to the ministers. Harley's letters to Raby, with their reference to 'a handful of men' and his belief before Almanza that Galway was adequately manned, indicate that the two Tory ministers were unhappy at what they found there, and no longer cared if the blame was placed on Godolphin and Marlborough.

A Tory backbencher, Hanmer, widened the debate with a far-ranging attack on the conduct of the war, the neglect of Spain, and the money wasted in Portugal; and stated that a favourable peace could have been obtained after Ramillies. This was a proposition that Harley and St John sympathised with and they hardly defended the ministry. It seems the Tory ministers did not reply to the attack on the conditions in Spain.

* H.M.C. House of Lords 1710-1712, p.25, for Galway's letter of 4/15 January, 1707; read before the cabinet early in 1707.
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After his dismissal in February (along with St John) Harley certainly voted with the Tories in an unsuccessful motion that the lack of men at Almanza had been caused by the failure to send effectual and timely reinforcement from England. This debate, on the 24 February, had seen furious Tory attempts to make 'further reflexions upon the war in Spain', but the Whigs had successfully resisted this by pushing through an address of thanks to the Queen 'for her care of that service'. Boyer noted that it was 'remarkable' how several members had commended Galway's conduct since the battle, 'but, at the same time, reflected on him for venturing it upon so great an inequality of forces'.

In these debates on the Spanish war, Swift noted how 'oddly people are subdivided', and that 'it seems to have been no party question'. 'You sometimes', observed Swift, 'see the extremes of Whig and Tory driving on the same thing'. These enquiries at first attracted a great deal of support from the Country Whigs, Peter King in particular. Their concern over the rumours that funds for the Spanish war had been mismanaged illustrates how many Whigs still had hopes for the war there; and of their concern, in one Whig's words, that the Queen should 'take care of the effectual conduct of the war in Spain'. For Spain was 'the part of the war that most have at heart, and there is really a dread on most lest it should be lost'. But few Country Whigs let concern for Spain carry them in full support of the Almanza enquiries right up until the end of February. The government's explanations of the troop discrepancy, which did in fact appear largely justified, convinced some; the others quickly realised that the Tories were determined to change the whole nature of the war and discredit the ministry, rather than showing altruistic

* Harley noted the hold of Spain in public opinion in early 1708 (S.P. 104/39, to Sir Philip Meadowes, 2/13 January 1708).
concern for good management. The Junto Whigs looked upon this affair 'as one of the most dangerous to the common cause had it not ended so well'.

The vote on the 24 February Addison saw as the 'most important day of this session'.

Marlborough's hopes for an augmentation of his forces in Flanders in 1708 were disappointed, yet he managed to defeat the French again, at Oudenarde. Halifax of the Junto wrote to Marlborough shortly after the victory; a letter almost proprietorial in tone:

It is the universal opinion of people here that if you amuse yourself with any long sieges the French will recover themselves again. And therefore they do expect... you would form such a body of men as you judge sufficient and march into France. We here can never apprehend the difficulty of subsisting in such a country as France... nor can we apprehend that the French can now draw together any force able to engage such an army as might march with you.

He suggested that the troops assembled in England for a descent on Spain could be used to capture 'Boulougne or some other place'. This port could then supply Marlborough's forces as they marched into France:

This is the only right use that can be made of the fleet, and those troops; all other attempts will only carry the ships out of the way; and after all, we shall never now get Spain unless your Grace conquers it by way of Flanders... I am sure if your Grace was in the territories

* At the conference at The Hague in April 1708 it was decided that Marlborough should take the offensive in Flanders, and Eugene on the Moselle. There were also plans for a descent. The Spanish War was to be kept on the defensive, though commanders there could take small scale offensive action as initiative indicated (Murray, iii, 698-9, 2/13 April).

** A descent had been planned in 1708 with several thousand troops under the command of Erle. It was intended as a diversionary move to attract French troops from Flanders (Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., ii, 1001). As late as July Godolphin informed Byng that he might have to transport them to the Iberian theatre (Byng Papers, N.R.S., p.206, 9 July); but in the same month Marlborough hoped they would not have to be sent there. He planned to use them for a landing near Abbeville, but they were eventually landed near Ostend to protect his supply lines (Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., iii, 1308).
of France with the sea coast open at your back to supply you with men and provisions you would be master of the terms of peace'.

Marlborough told Halifax that 'entering France agrees very well with my own inclinations... but we have a great many among us who are more afraid of wanting provisions than of the enemy'.

By the spring of 1708 Tory peace propaganda was troubling the ministry. There was fierce criticism of the failure to follow up Oudenarde, and why Marlborough was 'not before Paris'. Yet St John, at least, still possessed a remarkable belief in Marlborough's ability. He expressed 'hopes that Lille and Tournai will both be taken this year'; and that 'these conquests will open so wide a gap in the French frontier' that the French would 'give us this winter those terms which according to the natural course of things we may expect to extort from them in another campaign'. In the summer of 1709 St John confessed to 'a faith, which comes near to superstition' in Marlborough:

Let my Lord Galway lose battles as fast as he pleases in Spain my Lord Marlborough will scourge his country-men to absolute submission in Picardy before the campaign is over.

June brought news of Wager's action against the Spanish treasure galleons from Porto Bello. Sunderland thought it 'a fatal blow to France'. Godolphin believed it 'must quite complete the ruin of their

* For similar views from Lord Manchester see: Marlborough MSS M50, to Marlborough, 19 May 1708.

** In December 1708 Edward Harley wrote: 'I am very sorry to find so little of the great news that we rejoiced so much about proves true. People began to suspect the Oudernarde business. They must have a care for the people will not now be so easily caught with their shams, the trick has been too often put upon them' (H.M.C. Portland, iv, 3 December 1708).

*** For Defoe's enthusiasm over the victory see: The Review, v, 245-7.
credit', and incline Spain towards 'the settlement of King Charles'.

Godolphin saw Wager's victory as a 'great temptation and encouragement' to send an expedition to the Caribbean. But doubted whether a general could be found either capable or willing to lead it. Godolphin noticed intense public enthusiasm - 'a ferment' - for such a venture. Godolphin thought of using 4 or 5 regiments from Erle's force for this purpose.

Not all the clamour for West Indies operations was coming from Tories; for, as Marlborough admitted, both Halifax and Somers 'by the judgement of merchants are made very fond of such expeditions'; but he himself remained hostile to all such projects, not remembering 'any that has hitherto ever served for anything but a pretext to plunder'.

Marlborough's failure to break into France in 1708 was a turning point in public dissatisfaction with the Flanders war. One of Harley's correspondents noted in October that:

This ill blast blows this good, that I dare go without fear of being insulted, into public places which I could not have done for some months since... You would be surprised to hear men say publicly we have spent so many millions to find out this great secret, that our general does not understand the metier de la guerre, that he had indeed twice or thrice thrown a lucky main, but never knew how to play his game.

Talk of an augmentation of Marlborough's forces was circulating in Tory military circles late in 1707, one Tory officer thinking:

We can never hope to obtain any success on this side and

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* As was William Paterson, see Marlborough MSS, CI 47b, 12 December 1709.

** In May 1709 the West Indies merchants were in contact with the Cabinet over the progress of the French interest in the Caribbean (Marlborough MSS CI 16, 30 May 1709, 20 July 1709, Cabinet minutes).

*** See Raby's comments in May 1707 doubting that Marlborough could ever break through French lines in Flanders (Add MSS 22196, f 75, Raby to Cadogan, 31 May 1707).
in this country that can force France to yield to so
great demands as we make, unless we could bring an army
of at least 25,000 or 30,000 men to the field superior
to what they have.\textsuperscript{412}

Marlborough's victory at Oudenarde created a deceiving confidence among
the Whigs about the chance of decisive victory in Flanders, and gave good
prospect that a Whig-dominated Commons would vote an augmentation.\textsuperscript{413}

For Junta Whig hopes for the war were now centred almost exclusively on
overpowering the French in Flanders; for, as Addison claimed: 'The only
means therefore for bringing France to our conditions is to throw in
multitudes upon them, and overpower them with numbers'. And Addison
thought that the bulk of the troops for any augmentation would have to be
'raised in our country'.\textsuperscript{414}

Addison's printed reflections on the war, as an Under-Secretary in
the new Whig ministry, set out clearly Junta war policy.\textsuperscript{415} His views
could have little effect on Tory, even moderate Tory, opinion at this
stage. His manifesto was aimed at rallying the Whigs. The undoubted
attraction that Caribbean and Spanish warfare held for many Whigs was firmly
placed in context by Addison: who wrote that West Indies campaigns and the
war in Spain all had a part to play in bringing eventual victory, but only
a supporting role to the war in Flanders. He attacked any idea of a
partition of the Spanish monarchy, and confirmed that the Junto wished
to fight until both the West Indies and Old Spain were taken from Philip.
Even if the West Indies were taken, Addison argued, French resources would
enable her to fight on in Europe.

To the Junto every success won by Marlborough in Flanders, even
bitterly contested siege actions, tied the war-weary Dutch ever more closely
to their ambitious war aims. In December 1708 Halifax wrote to Marl-
borough in language which looked forward to the Barrier Treaty of 1709:
The taking of Lille* will make the affair of the Dutch Barrier most easy to be adjusted. The French would have never given that up, but since that has been so bravely forced from them, they can make no difficulties of any others that are necessary for the security of the Dutch frontier from Thionville to the sea.

The French, Halifax thought, would be forced to destroy Dunkirk, and the Dutch would then be unreasonable 'to insist upon Ostend, or if they are still pertinacious in that point, why not this expedient be proposed: to lay the whole sea-coast open, and demolish Ostend, as well as Dunkirk'. But Godolphin noted that all siege warfare 'delights Buys and Harley'; and in October 1708 the general Tory discourse was on the 'uselessness' of taking Lille.

In a Junta-dominated Commons Addison's doctrines were easily accepted, and the vote for an augmentation met little opposition. There was an attempt to add a clause to the effect that the Dutch came up to England in the same proportion, but this was easily 'thrown off'. But an address was passed that the Queen should persuade her allies to provide their share for a general augmentation of troops in 1709. It runs in general to the allies', Godolphin observed, 'but it is particularly intended to the States'. The Tories were disgusted: 'We yesterday voted £220,000 for 7,000 foot and 3,000 horse as an augmentation without so much as being told that any of our allies would augment their forces'. Addison was jubilant at the Whig success.

* Which Marlborough had captured in September when his plan of marching into France was prevented by Eugene's caution.
Out of office Harley began to articulate the widespread Tory anger at 'the family' - Godolphin, Marlborough and the Junto - and their deliberate mismanagement of the war for reasons of avarice and party advantage. Late in 1708 Harley's essay 'Plain English' developed the essential anti-Marlborough platform; and was made public in September. Marlborough was presented as managing the war in Flanders simply to prolong it. 'The mines are worked out', Harley thought, 'we have out of necessity created a long war, and that is now to be made an argument for most extravagant burdens'. These were similar to the ideas that Harley had developed regarding the Nine Years' War from 1693 on.

In the Lords during the 1708-1709 session Haversham suggested that the Duumvirs and the Junto had left Britain inadequately defended and thus encouraged the Franco-Jacobite invasion of Scotland in March 1708. Marlborough came under fierce attack in the Commons: where 'people who love to exaggerate things pretend to say the Duke of Marlborough for a hundred days this campaign received each day two thousand pounds'. The Tories now argued not so much that Flanders was barren of possibilities for decisive victory, as that Marlborough was deliberately failing to exploit the real chances of success there by his method of conducting operations.

The Tories concentrated their attacks, however, on the Spanish war: led by Harley, who was 'very reflecting upon the management of the war in Spain, and the great neglect of supporting it! Harley pressed for

In September Godolphin reminded Marlborough that 'provision was made in the last sessions of parliament for twenty seven regiments to serve in Spain and Portugal, and not one has been sent to either since the raising of parliament'. (Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., ii, 1094, 3 September 1708). Godolphin warned Marlborough in January 1709 that the 'application of the money in Spain and Portugal' was likely to provoke trouble in both Houses (Ibid., p.1201).
(vii) Tory Opposition to Flanders Warfare 1708-10

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The Tories concentrated their attacks, however, on the Spanish war: led by Harley, who was 'very reflecting upon the management of the war in Spain, and the great neglect of supporting it'.

* In September Godolphin reminded Marlborough that 'provision was made in the last sessions of parliament for twenty seven regiments to serve in Spain and Portugal, and not one has been sent to either since the raising of parliament'. (Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., ii, 1094, 3 September 1708). Godolphin warned Marlborough in January 1709 that the 'application of the money in Spain and Portugal' was likely to provoke trouble in both Houses (Ibid., p.1201).
details of the expenditure there in the last campaign (as a former minister he was aware of how complicated and disordered were the Spanish accounts) and noted the expense to the English gentry of attempting to take Spain for the Germans. Stanhope's generalship was attacked; his Whig connections ensuring Tory hostility.*

The expense of the Spanish campaign was the main theme of these debates. Harley attempted to wean the Tories away from their enthusiasm for the war there. For the Tory party was now split on this question. Nottingham and Rochester, with Peterborough's encouragement, were urging greater Spanish efforts. To Nottingham, the setbacks in Spain were due to 'shameful neglect'. St John, by the end of 1708, was convinced of the futility of further efforts there and wanted England to withdraw from Spain. Some Tories sympathised with such views: 'Our Court yet talks of nothing less than forcing the Spaniards to accept King Charles', remarked one Tory late in 1707, 'of which I have as little hopes as of gaining the Holy Land from the Turks'. Whether Harley thought there was any point in further Spanish campaigns, under whatever financial management or generalship, is debatable. Certainly just before the session began he had written of Spain as 'lost', and 'our successes there managed away'. Harley and St John may have lost faith in the policy of 'No Peace Without Spain'. But many Tories still desired increased military efforts in Spain, being convinced that 'if France keeps Spain and the West

* Tory attacks on the management of the Spanish war caused the ministry great embarrassment (Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., iii, 1213, 30th January 1709); and generated much fear that, even in this most Whig of parliaments, many members were still not disposed to leave the Spanish war mainly in German hands.

** In January 1708, shortly before his resignation, Harley was particularly dismissive of Imperial plans to reinforce the allied armies in Spain, which included the transfer of troops from Flanders and the raising of new German levies with English money (Add MSS 15866, f83, Harley to Meadows, 2 January, 1708).
Indies we have done nothing in this war. Tory frustration spilled over in a series of unprecedently savage assaults on the Imperial war effort in Defoe's Review in October 1708:

And yet at the same time the armies of the Empire are pushing in Naples to the establishment of new conquests, and enlarging the skirts of the Spanish monarchy, the substance and centre of it being in great danger of being entirely lost.

The Imperial envoy Gallas complained to the Attorney-General.

Marlborough told Godolphin that sending further English troops to Spain was a waste of time; only from Italy could Spain be supported.

Marlborough urged the use of the seven regiments voted for Spain in 1707-1708 (which had been placed under Erle for a descent attempt on France, and then put into Ostend in September 1708) in the Flanders theatre.

Godolphin disagreed; but consented to the regiments staying in Flanders while new recruits were absorbed, 'So you may count upon the service of those regiments in the beginning of the campaign'. But warned Marlborough of the domestic consequences of another fruitless year in Flanders:

As affairs now stand the besieging and taking any of their great towns would not be thought of so much use to us at the endeavouring to press them nearer the heart of their own country.

By June Godolphin was informing Marlborough that the seven regiments would have to be taken for an expedition against Cadiz, for which even the Whig parliament was enthusiastic. He told Marlborough:

I am afraid you will think our troops going to Spain are not like to make much service there. While we had hopes of getting it by treaty there was no thoughts of doing it. But I don't see how it can be avoided, since the French lay so much stress upon keeping of Spain, and the parliament has given the money for those regiments in order to reduce it.

Boyle noted the 'disgust' with the Empire over the failure to reinforce Spain from Italy (Marlborough MSS M/21, to Marlborough, 30 November 1708).

Although Marlborough was not (Marlborough-Godolphin Corr, ii, 1002, 14 June 1708). The project originated with Galway in 1708.
The breakdown of the peace negotiations forced the ministry to revive the war in Spain. The proposed expedition to Canada was aborted, and the troops diverted to Cadiz; 'Which everybody here thinks of the last consequence' as Sunderland noted. Stanhope advised that a strong English force 'would be needed to beat the Castilians into a complaisance'; and thought there was a favourable disposition amongst the population of Cadiz to declare for Charles.

The possibility of Marlborough breaking into France, and the urgent necessity of so doing, was now the major topic of concern. Marlborough's increasing involvement in the siege of Tournai produced frustration among his Whig supporters. Halifax telling him: 'People expect you would have marched over the belly of Marshall Villars'. There was strong public expectation (with which Godolphin sympathised) of a descent on northern France which Marlborough could link up with: it was 'every man's thought and talk' noted Godolphin. One Tory noted that all the 'coffee house talk' was of the futility of further siege warfare, for Marlborough ought to 'march directly to Paris'; if this was not possible then he should take his army from Flanders to Picardy to link up with a force landed from England:

If they are told it is too late to provide for such provision, then they rail upon the incredulity of those that gave so much into the faith of the French King's sincerity to a peace.

* The Cadiz expedition arrived in Spain too late for an attack on the town; and was diverted to Barcelona. The forces formed a part of Stanhope's army in 1710 which achieved victories at Almenara and Saragossa (Luttrell Relation, vi, 467, 491, 522; C.T. Atkinson, 'The Peninsular Front in the Spanish Succession War', The Journal for Army Historical Research, xxii, 1943-4, p.231). Louis did make some troop withdrawals from Spain in 1709, but kept the bulk of the French infantry there; and in July he had increased them to 25 battalions (Studies in Diplomatic History, ed. by Hatton and Anderson, p.111).
St John reported to Brydges the widespread desire for peace, but had not completely lost his faith in Marlborough's ability to break into France: for 'The glorious successes and the hopes of a last campaign are sovereign cordials. They elevate the few spirits we have left'.

Harley mounted a forceful propaganda campaign, alleging that Marlborough and Godolphin were 'absolutely against peace and resolved not to admit of it on any terms, which he would insinuate was very demonstrable 2 or 3 years since'. Harley derided the idea that Marlborough would make any progress in Flanders that summer, for Marlborough had been in a position to break the deadlock in Flanders long since, but was as 'fond of war as possible'. This introduced quite openly personal distrust of Marlborough as a factor in the debate over strategy. The Tories were reluctant to question the general's military abilities; but asserted that he was not extending himself fully, in order to perpetuate his power and ensure the dominance of his Whig friends at home. Harley argued for an immediate peace being forced on the ministry by the withholding of supplies, because these matters could never be investigated while 'war was in being'.

Some of Harley's associates were openly talking of a partition treaty.*

Harley was in despair by the winter of 1709:

It is plain that Savoy is useless; Portugal makes new demands and cannot subsist its own subjects; the Duke of Anjou will be able to lend his grandfather troops; and the Catalans, instead of taking sides are afraid of an invasion from thence, and nothing but scarcity defends them, the country cannot support the natives and our forces there. If the Elector of Bavaria should pierce into Germany then the French need only be on the defensive in Flanders, though they will certainly have better or more numerous troops there than last year.

* Maynwaring reported to the Duchess in April 1709 that Simon Harcourt, a Harleian Tory, 'lately foretold to some of his friends that we shall have this year a successful campaign, if any; after that a treaty of partition, and the next year an impeachment'. (Marlborough MSS E26, 19 April).
Harley was also afraid of the Northern War becoming involved with the Succession conflict.\footnote{457}

Relief swept England at the drawing up of a preliminary treaty of peace which gave Charles the Spanish monarchy entire.\footnote{**} 'England was generally satisfied with the preliminary treaty', Godolphin noted, but:

> Perhaps they would not have liked it so well, if the consequences of that treaty had been Spain would not have submitted, but the war must have been continued there; and though the French had withdrawn their troops, France would still have assisted Spain underhand. At the same time the whole burden of the war for the recovery of Spain must be upon England alone.'\footnote{458}

But Marlborough thought that 'if proper measures be taken that war could not last six months'.\footnote{459} Godolphin was pessimistic about the support in England for a new war to take Spain, and, as he noted, 'Holland begins to shrink at the very first thought of any new expense'. But merchant opinion, as represented by Gilbert Heathcote, would never consent to any peace 'under which they do not think themselves safe, or that leaves them to an aftergame for the recovery of Spain'.\footnote{460}

Marlborough's costly victory at Malplaquet in August became a test point whether the French could finally be forced to a peace in Flanders.

\* Godolphin informed Marlborough that 'whatever you may hear from hence of censuring the conduct of the army this summer, those stories come all from Harley and his emissaries, and from nobody else' (Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., iii, 31 July 1709).

\** Negotiations had taken place with France in early 1709. Forty 'Preliminary Articles' were drawn up in May. In essence the whole Spanish monarchy was to go to Charles, and Louis was to give up certain cautionary towns in Netherlands on the signing of the articles. But the 37th article, which Louis refused to agree to, insisted that if the whole of the Spanish monarchy was not in the hands of the allies in two months then they would renew war against France from the bases of Strasburg, Tournai and the other frontier fortresses that would be already surrendered to them under the peace treaty.

\*** For similar doubts in the Whig camp over this aspect of the preliminaries, see British Diplomatic Instructions 1689-1789: ii, France 1689-1721, ed. L.C. Wickham Legg, Camden Society, xxxv, 1925, p.16, Boyle to Townshend, 3 June 1709. Note Francis Hare's comments in August: 'A Spanish war may prove very troublesome as well as expensive upon England, when the other allies have got all they want' (H.M.C. Hare, p.228).
Brydges told Marlborough that many were 'calling your last victory in question'. Walpole noted 'the malice and ill-nature of some people here', who were trying 'to lessen the advantages of the late glorious victory and to magnify the loss on our side'. But to Townshend, Malplaquet was 'the greatest action that has been done this war'. The victory certainly improved the government's financial position: 'Upon the news of your victory I spoke yesterday to the bank', Godolphin told Marlborough. But they were now tied even closer to the Whig conception of a good peace. Sir Gilbert Heathcote told Godolphin that it would be 'a rotten peace unless we have Spain, for without it we can have no safety. And now we have them down, let us keep them so, till we get out of the war'. Godolphin told Heathcote that he and Marlborough would be attacked for not making peace. 'They are a company of rotten rogues that tell you so', replied Heathcote, 'I warrant you, we'll stand by you'.

Godolphin could still talk of 'so successful a campaign', and that 'the allies had nothing to do' but boast openly of the fact, and then France 'will soon come again to talk of peace'. But if this failed all that Godolphin could recommend was making 'our plan next year to be upon the defensive in all other parts of the world, and press them yet more effectually than ever on this side [Flanders]'). Prisoner of the Whig peace,* Godolphin was now prisoner of Whig war strategy.

The Whigs in Marlborough's camp were still confident in early 1710 that:

Such is the condition of France that we must have a peace on our own terms before the end of the campaign, or we shall pierce into Champagne and Picardy, which is an extremity the King of France will hardly wait for.

* In the Barrier Treaty of 1709 the Whigs purchased the support of the Dutch for a war not to end until all of Spain had been wrested from the Bourbons by granting the Dutch an extensive barrier in the Spanish Netherlands and equal trading privileges with Britain in the Spanish Empire (thus annulling Stanhope's Spanish treaty of 1707); and Minorca was to remain the property of an Austrian King of Spain (Trevelyan, iii, 27-31, Geikie and Montgomery, pp. 155-164).
In April the allies penetrated the French lines at three points and forced the French back into Cambrai. But there was still no breakthrough into France. Marlborough and Godolphin were feeling increasingly insecure in their control of the war strategy because of the growing hostility at home to the régime. An expedition had been planned against Canada, which Marlborough had 'no opinion of'. Godolphin suggested that the troops could be used instead for a descent on France. Godolphin believed that 'both Calais and Boulogne with the whole country was so oppressed and in such misery... the inhabitants so disposed to put themselves under Her Majesty's protection'. Marlborough was, in fact, formulating a project to take Abbeville whilst linking up with an expedition from England to the French coast. Marlborough agreed that the Canadian troops would be usefully employed this way, but did

Beg there may be no thoughts of sending them hither, for I had much rather venture my life with too few troops, than to have villains insinuate that any other service is neglected in order to strengthen this army. 'Nor is anybody here so fond' of the Canadian expedition, Godolphin noted, that they would not let the troops go to support Marlborough instead.

Godolphin, increasingly insecure at home, recommended that Marlborough:

Communicate his /Abbeville/ project as soon as you can, for at least it would bring a great difficulty upon Shrewsbury and Harley whether not to concur in it or not to follow it when once it is agreed.

Marlborough became fearful of attempting anything 'but that I am almost sure

* Only Sunderland of the Whig ministers displayed much enthusiasm for the expedition. The destination was given publicly as the West Indies (Marlborough MSS CI-16).
Godolphin was sorry when the Abbeville project was aborted, believing that 'no undertaking would have been more popular' or done more 'to have raised the drooping spirit of the Whigs'. He thought that the Tories, realising how popular such descent plans were, would have had their bluff called as to their declarations that 'the war shall be as well supported as ever' if they were in power. 'The noise of an undertaking would bring all the difficulties imaginable upon those who would be glad to destroy parliament', Godolphin thought. Even after his dismissal from office Godolphin continued to press Marlborough to take Calais before parliament met, to help the 'public service'. In June Somers was still confident that Marlborough could break through in Flanders, though he saw the increasing difficulty of keeping the Dutch up to a vigorous war, and did not see 'what language we shall be able to use for their encouragement or our own'. The final breakdown of the Geertruidenberg negotiations, on 9 July, gave Godolphin hopes that the fight would be now pushed with vigour, 'the war being thus renewed again'.

* A sign of the ministry's desperation was that both Godolphin and Marlborough began to look to the war in Spain for some success (Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., ii, 1529, 1540, 15 June, 3 July). Reinforcements under Norris were sent to Spain from Italy in July 1710. They enabled the allies to take the offensive there, and the minor victory of Almenara resulted on 16/27 July. By the end of August there was pressure to send the descent regiments to Spain, to support Stanhope's summer successes (Ibid., pp. 1592-3, 7 August).
Godolphin was dismissed office on 8 August. Harley was appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer on the same day, and appointed to the cabinet on 13 August. The Dutch agent in London reassured the States General that in spite of the Tory election victory every effort would be made 'to vigorously pursue the war'. Harley's 'Plan of Administration', drawn up on 30 October, made no specific mention of the war strategy to be followed; merely the 'pressing roundly' of 'all the allies to keep exactly to what they have agreed to do in their treaties'; for 'their exact performing is the likeliest way to obtain peace'. Indeed, the new ministry was in a quandary about how the war would be continued until a secure and reasonable peace could be arranged. The war in Flanders was now anathema to most Tories. In answer to the Dutch memorial to the Queen protesting at her change from Whig to Tory ministers, the ministry noted that although the war had:

Hitherto been prosecuted with wonderful successes, yet it could not be denied that some parts of it, particularly in Spain and the West Indies, had been notoriously neglected; either with a design to spin out the war, or, at least, to give the whole honour and profit to the favourite general; and therefore it was necessary to put the treasury in the hands of such persons, as would impartially give attention to all the branches of the war.

Many Tories expected renewed efforts in Spain and the West Indies. St John's Letter to the Examiner still spoke of the 'restoring the Spanish Empire to the House of Austria' and the establishment of a secure barrier in Flanders for the Dutch as 'the wise and generous motives which engaged Britain in the present war'. Though St John had, it is true, attacked the Whigs for making Flanders the main theatre of war. Davenant complained in 1710 of the neglect of the Spanish (and the West Indian) war, as compared to the futile years spent attacking in Flanders. The Whigs had opposed Peterborough because he looked likely to end the war too soon, and
Davenant concluded:

The House of Austria must some time since have been in the entire possession of the Spanish monarchy if reasonable proportion of our expense, of our fleet, and of our expense of our fleet, and of our troops had been applied to the reduction of Spain.484

But this line of attack was not typical of Tory propaganda at the time of the election, as can be seen by the violence of the Whig reaction to St John's statements about the war.485

The latent enthusiasm of many Tories for the Spanish war was revealed by the reaction to Stanhope's unexpected victories there in the summer and autumn of 1710. Harley's confidant Stratford noted the advantages, external and domestic, that military success in Spain might bring:

If the victories in Spain prove as great as the first report of it is, it must bring with it at once all we can wish for. There is an end to the difficulties we feared, either at home or for our allies, about the command in Flanders, there will be no occasion for any general... This victory will not only give us peace I hope abroad, but at home too.486

Tory enthusiasm was testified to by Davenant, who told Harley of his Pleasure to hear of the late glorious success in Spain... To gain a victory at a time so critical, in the country where it was most needful, least hoped for, and which had been most neglected, is such auspicious omen to a new ministry... All reasonable men must certainly rejoice at a conquest which does not lead us into a mindless protraction of the war... Sir Thomas Double told me yesterday that this advantage in Spain would in effects prove as fatal a blow to the modern Whigs as to the King of France.487

Even Harley responded warmly to a victory which seemed to let the ministry off of so many of its hooks.* 'I look upon that country as conquered once more', wrote Harley, 'and if we do not take pains to manage it away it will bring in a peace'.488 When Peterborough told Harley that Stanhope's

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* 'Money is sent to supply Mr Stanhope amply' Harley told Newcastle in September; and the Queen made a purposeful reference to the Spanish war in her speech of 27 November (Loan 29/238, f 373, 14 September; C.J. xvi, 403).
successes would come to nothing, Harley 'argued the contrary'. It has
been stated that the Tory ministry had been inclined when it took office
to abandon Spain. Perhaps; but the ministry now took a different line,
as is shown by the minutes of the cabinet meeting of 31 October when Spain
was discussed. The sending of a relief expedition to Spain to exploit
the successes there was enthusiastically endorsed.

Even Boyle told Marlborough: 'The case regarding Flanders is now very
much altered by our late victory in Spain'. Marlborough was informed
that:

The five regiments in the Isle of Wight have hitherto been kept there with a view to your grace's design upon the sea coast. But some of the Lords of the Council have been very pressing that they may be immediately to Spain... And there is very great zeal in everybody here to enable our generals in Spain to follow their blow.

Marlborough, too, was misled by these twilight successes in Spain. Late in August he wrote to Boyle hoping that the regiments in the Isle of Wight would be sent there:

And a reinforcement of troops in Spain will not be less necessary to improve the advantage lately gained than it was thought before to maintain our ground there.

St John remained sceptical. He noted that 'no revolution follows our successes'; and 'there seems to be little reason to expect anything but opposition from the Spaniards... We must give up the game or send enough troops to take the whole of so large a continent'.

Of course, the question of supporting the Spanish war could be used to attack the

* There was 'not any matter of rejoicing by authority' at the good news from Spain (Add MSS 33273 f 80, James Taylor to Henry Watkins, 19 September 1710). Presumably because of Stanhope's Whig connections. Even before Brihuega the extreme hostility to Stanhope amongst the Tories was noted (Ibid., f 84, 17 October 1710, same to same).

** Boyle told Townshend that it did not matter if England had to reduce its forces in Flanders to reinforce Spain, for the French would have to send more troops to Spain as well (Marlborough MSS M/23, 5 September 1710).
allies for their lack of effort in the war. He criticized Dutch deficiencies in the Spanish establishment; and the slowness of the Emperor in agreeing that 2,000 horse in Italy should go to Spain. 497

Stanhope was cautious, and admitted he had been 'hoping that after such a defeat the Castilians would desert the Duke of Anjou', but could report no sign of this at all. 'The war in Spain is not ended', he wrote to Dartmouth, 'but will require large supplies'. 498 But even before news of the defeat at Brihuega St John was thinking merely in terms of 'holding our post in Castile', and using the winter to decide the next move. 499 At the news of Stanhope's defeat St John admitted that:

Since Spain cannot be gained by revolution - of which error, imposed by the Imperialists, and by that run of success which we once had in Catalonia and Valencia, upon us we are at last undeceived - there is no reasonable, sober man who entertains a thought of conquering and retaining the wide continent.

But told Drummond that 'a good face is to put on, and the war there must be kept alive, and France must be pushed with the greatest vigour in the most sensible part [Flanders]'. Drummond was to tell the Pensionary that these thoughts on the Spanish war were St John's 'private sense', but he could 'let him know that it is the Queen's too'. 500 St John dissented, therefore, from the attention which the ministry were disposed to give to Spain, but stifled his private doubts.

Not so the Whigs. At the news of successes in Spain rumours were rife in England and Holland that Flanders was to be stripped of troops to support the Spanish war. 501 Stanhope's victories in Spain had been greeted with enthusiasm by some Junto Whigs. Maynwaring argued that although these victories 'at first view... might have appeared favourable to the new ministry, and likely to fix them better' such was not the true case: 'If one considers it fully, it is more probable they will be weakened by it, by losing the best handle they had for clamour', i.e. that the war in
Spain had been neglected by the previous ministry. Maynwaring noted the widespread enthusiasm for the Spanish war, and how easily that concern had been politically manipulated. Francis Hare expressed similar views in October. But by December Hare's earlier hopes of 'pushing the war with more success on that side' had been replaced with fears over the 'nonsensical cant' the Tories were now talking about the war in Spain.

Such fears led the Whig writer Hare to compile a defence of the Whig military strategy and management of the war, and Marlborough's part in it. He finished the first part in November 1710. Hare claimed that he would answer four Tory criticisms:

1. That a good peace might have been had at the end of the Ramillies campaign.
2. That the war in Spain had been shamefully neglected.
3. That pushing the war in Flanders was making war in the wrong place.
4. That the Duke of Marlborough was prolonging the war for his own benefit.

Hare linked the first two by claiming that the Emperor's suspicions that some in England wanted to accept the partitioning of the Spanish Empire offered in the French peace terms of 1706 led him to conclude the treaty with the French for evacuating the Milanese. This enabled the French to reinforce Spain and defeat Galway at Almanza. This jealousy also led the Emperor to secure Naples in 1707 and ruin the Toulon expedition.

Hare agreed that the Tory claim that the Spanish war had been neglected was 'the most plausible of their arguments'; but, Hare argued, 'It will concern those whom this complaint comes from, to show they had no part in the management they now complain of'. Showing an insight into the attitudes of some of the Tory leaders, Hare thought that those who attacked the neglect of the Spanish war had 'long been convinced that the best thing for England is to draw the war on that side into the least compass we conveniently can, and keep on the defensive only'. Hare argued that it
was too expensive in men and money for England to support an offensive war in Spain; whereas for France 'It is a manner the same thing in all respects to send men to Spain as it is to Flanders'. 'All things conspire', Hare concluded, 'to make Spain the least desirable of all places to push the war in'. The Junto Whigs now stated publicly a policy which had long been their private belief.

Hare admitted that the Spanish war 'was begun with the most promising appearances in favour of it'. The Spanish were thought near revolt; and agreed that the prospect in Flanders at the beginning of the war was unpromising (confirmation of Whig doubts about an offensive war there in 1703). 'The appearance there was of losing all in Italy, and of getting nothing in Flanders, made it very reasonable for us to try the inclinations of the Spaniards'. After Barcelona was taken, it was a useful acquisition to hold on to: we could keep the French pinned down there; and the Duke of Anjou was increasingly forced to depend on France for support, which held the prospect of alienating the native population. It was a useful base from which to alarm the southern parts of France. Hare thought it advantageous to keep the war in Spain within 'moderate bounds'; but the only way to win Spain was to defeat the French in Flanders. 506

As a post scriptum to the first part of his history Hare added that the news of Brihuega confirmed his point of view; but that we should stay in Spain and act only in a 'defensive' manner. 507 This was the line that the Whig financial interest took. For, as Addison noted,

> The speculators as you may see by our stocks are not much mortified by the defeat in Spain, because they think it will make us push the war in Flanders under our present general. 508

Even before Brihuega, when news came of the evacuation of Madrid, Harley admitted the futility of further efforts in Spain. The ministry suggested as much to the French representatives in the informal peace talks even
before news of Brihuega when they had suggested a compromise over the Spanish Empire. 509 Even so, Harley's bitterness was such that he told Stanhope 'that he might assure himself he should never forget either him or Brihuega'. 510 Swift noted the extreme 'mortification within the ministry at the news of the battle'. 511 After Brihuega Godolphin wrote to the Queen. He advised reinforcing Spain from Italy, England and Holland, not with the intention to overrun Spain by taking the offensive, 'this misfortune having shown that this is not to be done', but to keep a footing in Spain as a bargaining counter, while pressing the French ever more strongly in Flanders, 'as to be obliged to give up Spain by treaty'. This would establish that the ministry were 'hearty and sincere in their intentions to support the alliance for the recovering of Spain, and lose all the distrust which is grown very much upon them by the changes of ministry'. 512

The blasting of allied hopes in Spain convinced even some die-hard Tories that the game was up. 513 Yet in the Commons debates early in 1711, in response to the Queen's message concerning Brihuega, some continued to call for further efforts 'for retrieving the late losses'. One Whig recommended hiring foreign troops and sending them from Italy if Spain must have reinforcements; but Robert Walpole reported talk outside parliament that the troops to go to Spain would come from Marlborough's command. Harley attempted to reassure the Commons that this would not happen. But Lieutenant General Webb delivered 'a speech which disconcerted all that had been said before', by insisting that 'everybody was sensible that in all this war the war in Spain had been starved, and that in Flanders very sufficiently provided for'. England should send 20 battalions, 10,000 men, from Flanders to Spain. 514 Many Tories saw such suggestions as nothing other than a means to discomfort Marlborough; but some continued to press
for an active policy in Spain well into 1711, and thought that country 'still conquerable if the war there was properly supported'.

The death of the Emperor in April 1711 made the conquest of Spain diplomatically unwise, even if militarily possible. Yet on 7 December 1711 the Whig and Tory parties divided almost cleanly on the question of 'No Peace Without Spain'. Swift saw it as 'a resolution of breaking the treaty of peace without any possible scheme for continuing the war'; and St John shared his disgust: he thought that many Whigs realised that 'the end which they pretend to aim at is chimerical'. This may have been true of some of the Whig leaders, but their scepticism was not shared by their followers.

The ministry played a double game. Late in January 1711 Dartmouth's secretary was predicting that 'the war in Spain would be just kept alive, and peace must come very soon'; yet there was already talk that Argyle was going to command in Spain, and that he 'would not go without he had assurance of being well supported'. Argyle was persuaded that the ministry did not intend that 'Spain should be lost by degrees' and that he would be reinforced. Though he was told that 'several of your friends think this too desperate an undertaking considering how affairs stand in that country'. By June, however, Argyle reported himself 'entirely abandoned'.

* Even after Brihuega, and well into 1711, Peterborough continued to argue that Spain could be conquered under right management and made such views publicly known (Add MSS 22205, St John to Peterborough, 22 May 1711; Swift, Journal to Stella, i, 151, 10 January 1711).

** See Add MSS 35584, ff 141-42, 31 December 1711, for the attitude of one Whig, Philip Yorke. John Toland, the intransigent Country Whig, whose writings had done much to destroy William's land army after Ryswick, wrote to Harley early in December 1711 strongly insisting that no peace should be made which would give Spain and the Indies to the Bourbons (Loan 29/198, 7 December 1711).

*** The problem of revealing that there was to be peace without Spain had to be handled carefully. Defoe's Review continued to pretend that Spain would never be handed to the Bourbons. (Vol. viii, 279).
Ironically, it was in the same session that the ministry launched a full-scale debate on the Spanish war in the Lords. The debate concentrated on events before Almanza; any reflections on Stanhope's victories and Brihuega might have been embarrassing to the Tories. The debate aroused intense public interest. Peterborough said the decision to take the offensive in Spain late in 1706 had ruined the grand plan which he had concocted with the Duke of Savoy, by which means the forces besieging Toulon could have been reinforced and the town taken. Since October 1706 Peterborough's contacts with Savoy had aroused the suspicion of Godolphin and Marlborough, and they then collected all the information they could on the general's contacts with the Savoyard Court. Marlborough easily exposed Peterborough's bogus claims to a special intimacy with Savoy.

Marlborough attacked Peterborough's idea that separating the armies in Spain early in 1707 could have assisted the siege of Toulon. Marlborough argued that an offensive war in Spain then was the best way of assisting the Toulon expedition, for it would prevent French troops from that theatre reinforcing Southern France. He denied that French troops had left Spain after Almanza for Toulon. Marlborough claimed that Peterborough was misleading when he said he had advised against any offensive in Spain at the end of 1706, for Peterborough's suggestions at the councils of war at that time - that the Spanish forces be divided and that one part march to Madrid - broadly supported an offensive strategy.

Devonshire recalled 'that the Lords themselves that now spoke against an offensive war in Spain, were for it some years before'; specifically mentioning Nottingham. Sunderland observed that in the winter of 1706-1707 'it was the general opinion and desire of the nation that the Earl of Galway should march against Madrid'; and even more damaging, as it reflected directly on Harley and St John, he observed 'that all the ministry
then were unanimous in their opinions for an offensive war'. A point which even Tories conceded. Peterborough drew attention to the lack of support he had received whilst commanding in Spain. He claimed he had not obtained adequate supplies 'till 3 or 4 days before the French raised the siege of Barcelona', and little money in 1705-06; and that the war in Spain 'when under the conduct of other generals, was supported by great numbers of men, and vast sums of money'. Galway was slighted by Peterborough for the poor generalship even though he had been favoured. Tactically, the debate was a series of defeats for the Tory case on Spain. But Tory and ministerial supporters in the Lords carried the motion that the offensive policy pursued early in 1707 had led directly to Almanza and the subsequent failure at Toulon.

In the Commons Harley had to persuade the Tories that in the interests of a good peace it was necessary to keep the armed forces at the present level, even in Flanders. The gravity of the financial situation, and Harley's promise of a revived Commission of Accounts to investigate misapplication of war funds, especially in the Spanish theatre, ensured that the Tories were brought to their senses for a few days. In the interest of maintaining Tory enthusiasm for the war that there was revived talk of sending an expedition to the West Indies, though Boyle believed 'that proposal will come to nothing'. Tory triumph had stimulated interest in the Caribbean. Peterborough being made general of marines encouraged speculation that the forces assembled under Shannon, designed for Canada, would go to the West Indies; 'and they find the project he proposed at the

* The Lords debates on Spain in January 1711 were seen by some as indicating a renewed offensive in Flanders to force Louis to compel his grandson to give up the Spanish throne, and by others as de facto acceptance of a Bourbon Spain (S.P. 94/78, 'Reply to Count Gallas' Memorial', 10 February 1711; Dartmouth MSS, Cabinet minutes, 10 February 1711).
beginning of this reign or latter end of the last now feasible'. Harley encouraged such speculation. In his papers are numerous schemes for West Indies operations dating from this period. Some arrived unsolicited, encouraged by the change of government; but Harley also consulted a wide range of opinion on any new American venture. Naval, colonial and mercantile spokesmen were all invited to submit recommendations. Harley took special care in the autumn of 1710 to draw in representatives of the mercantile and financial community. William Paterson informed Harley that he was glad to hear him 'mention the affair of the Indies', thinking that, 'notwithstanding all the opportunities lost, we have yet a fair occasion to secure our reasonable interest in that matter'. Paterson recommended taking cautionary towns in South America, 'until the repayment of at least some of the vast expense we have been at for the recovery of that monarchy to the House of Austria'. Harley took advantage of Halifax's concern for this area of the war to draw him into preliminary discussions. Halifax asked Harley for Any further commands about the expedition to America; for till I am fuller informed what number of ships and men can be had in a month's time it is impossible to form any design.

'Without an equivalent in those parts', thought Halifax, 'what Indies we have lavished away'. Though Halifax thought any expedition to the Indies would be an Anglo-Dutch affair. Halifax's co-operation would be useful in securing financial and mercantile support for the new government.

Several schemes submitted to Harley mentioned the disappointment increasingly felt at the failure to follow up the expected West Indies campaigns discussed in 1701-1703; or to exploit the 6th article of the Grand Alliance. One writer criticised those responsible for laying aside Peterborough's expedition to the Caribbean in 1703; and thought we had Even neglected the pursuit of those advantageous
conditions on which we entered into the Grand Alliance, viz. that we should remain the masters of the conquests we should make in the West Indies. 534

A True Account of the Designs and Advantages of the South Sea Trade (1711) saw the renewed interest in the Caribbean as a direct revival of the hopes for Peterborough's intended expedition in 1703. 535 The earlier expectation of rich pickings in the West Indies was now to be reinvigorated in support of the ministry. In 1711 Defoe's Review began extolling the virtues of the West Indies campaigns, the importance of keeping the French out of the South Sea Trade, and lamenting the lost opportunities 'seven years ago' to attack in that area. A concerted Caribbean effort after 1706, Defoe thought, would soon have forced France to a peace after the defeat at Ramillies; but further attacks in Flanders were useless, 'although we were to win a town or a Ramillies from them every year'. 536 On 2 May 1711, Harley outlined the South Sea scheme to the Commons, and then emphasised the need to vote the remaining war supplies for the coming session so that Britain might bargain from a position of strength and obtain a secure and advantageous peace. There was almost no opposition. 537 The West Indies scheme sugared the pill for the Tories; and helped draw in sections of the financial and mercantile community in support of the ministry.

Harley's patient approach to Caribbean schemes, his attempt to draw in as wide a range of interests as possible, say a great deal about his methods as a politician. St John, too, had been anxious to launch colonial attacks as:

A compensation for all the poverty and distress which the war has brought or can bring upon this nation.
I wish the same notions had prevailed more amongst another people of my acquaintance. 538

His headstrong approach to war strategy was revealed in his sponsorship of a revived expedition to French Canada. This was a simple exercise in factional politics: a blow aimed at Marlborough's military prestige, and
a cynical ploy to seduce the High Tories. Unlike Harley he made no attempt to draw in a wide range of support for the project, although this should have been possible given that his plans were a revival of earlier, mostly Whig, schemes. For, as he wrote, 'That whole design was formed by me', and he had 'a sort of paternal concern for it'.\(^\text{539}\) He was to note proudly that 'These preparations by land and sea were kept private and went almost singly through my hands'.\(^\text{540}\) It was a direct challenge to Harley and his cautious approach to war strategy. St John hoped to win support from the trading interest for the expedition; but its disastrous failure merely alienated mercantile and colonial interests. Their spokesmen blamed the Tory ministry for the mismanagement of a well-conceived Whig plan, and suggested that the episode proved that Toryism and concern for trading interests were incompatible.\(^\text{541}\)

St John's letters on the Quebec expedition early in 1711 reveal desperate attempt so persuade Harley of the advantages of the operation. 'The squadron and troops which are to follow we have in our power. If we keep our secret, we shall succeed', wrote St John.\(^\text{542}\) 'Pray do me the favour' he begged Harley, 'to believe I am not light or whimsical in this project. It will certainly succeed if the secret is preserved'. And success would do 'more service to Britain in half a year than the ministers who went before you did in all their administration'.\(^\text{543}\) St John then spoke of the need to 'break Lord Marlborough's faction' in the army, and for the Queen to 'exert herself' in this matter, or 'the army will be none of hers'. Five battalions were to be withdrawn from Flanders for the expedition. The Canadian project was seen by St John as a direct challenge to Marlborough and the Whigs, and a demonstration that the rich field of army patronage was no longer to be their exclusive right. St John appointed as commander of the land forces Jack Hill, Mrs Masham's brother; an attempt
to ingratiate himself at Court. The naval commander was Hovenden Walker, an officer of extreme Tory leanings.

Harley refused to attend meetings at which the project was discussed. He 'avoided coming', and told 'Lord Rochester his reasons, and after he desired his lordship to be a means to the queen, to hinder that expedition, but it happened to be too late'. Harley believed, correctly, that St John was using the scheme to misappropriate public funds. He refused to authorise funds for the expedition until ordered to by the Queen, and stated that 'the public was cheated of above £20,000'. Harley's attempts to thwart the expedition were prevented by Guiscard's attempt on his life.

According to Harley's brother:

The expedition was fitting out, he apprehended might be of very ill consequence to the Queen's affairs at that time, and directed me to desire the Lord Paulet to acquaint the Lord Rochester, then president of the Council, that it was his dying wish that he would advise the Queen that it might be laid aside.

Rochester, too, was having doubts; and asked Harley 'whether in this very conjuncture [the death of the Emperor] the expedition under Walker should not be stopped is worth considering'. Rochester carried Harley's objections to the Cabinet and St John confessed that:

My Lord President surprised me very much in the cabinet, when he spoke of stopping Mr Hill, as what might be expedient upon the alteration in public affairs occasioned by the Emperor's death. The worse the conditions we are in the worse the peace we are likely to obtain, the more reason there is in my humble opinion that the intended expedition should be pushed.

St John's rashness in matters of strategy was shown after the failure of the Quebec expedition, when he immediately suggested to Harley launching an attack on the West Indies. Expedience meant that it was necessary for Harley to flatter the South Sea Company that a Caribbean expedition would eventually be sent, and he kept the promises coming well into 1712.

In the middle of 1711 he was genuinely optimistic about establishing British
trading posts, perhaps even colonial plantations, in South and Central America. He asked Defoe's advice on possible locations. But rumours of British action in the Caribbean aroused Dutch suspicions; and Harley was always very sensitive about preserving Anglo-Dutch understanding.

The French proved no less opposed to English ambitions in that area. In June 1711, Harley enquired of the French their reactions to the English desire for free trade to the Spanish colonies and the securing of certain territories there. The French were implacably hostile, and Harley backed down. But St John was enthusiastic about launching an American expedition: 'If the war continues many of the preparations for expeditions to America must be directed without loss of time'. He suggested a three-pronged attack on the Caribbean: launched from North America, the English West Indies and a squadron from Britain. The expedition would drive the French from their islands, capture Porto Bello and places on the coast of Peru. St John thought securing Spanish American territories by force a safer course than merely putting pressure on the Spanish to open up a free trade. 'Besides', he added, 'the projects of opening a new trade with the Spaniards and of attacking their countries at the same time seem a little repugnant'.

Marlborough's campaign in Flanders in 1711 was inconclusive, but he had taken the fortress of Bouchain. There were soon Tory complaints that the Whigs were 'making much of the taking of Bouchain'. Brydges told Marlborough that Bouchain would contribute to the 'increase of your fame and the support of your interest'. Sunderland hoped Bouchain would 'go a great way towards securing us against an ill peace'. The Tories responded by mentioning Marlborough's failure to bring the French army to battle after passing the lines as an example of his desire to prolong the war, and his taking of Bouchain was slighted as 'only removing his army
from a plentiful, to a starving camp'. One Tory told Harley that:

At the same time as the ousted family are applauded above measure, and bloated on the success of Bouchain, I find they double their malice against your Lordship... The taking of Bouchain now animates them afresh. It is a mighty glorious thing for them to be as long in taking a little town as our ancestors have been in reducing France.

The war debate now revolved on the question whether Marlborough had any chance of making a final breakthrough into France. The Whig writer Hare took this up in 1711, even before Bouchain. France, he declared, was now near final defeat because of Marlborough's successes in Flanders: 'Not above a fifth part of the work is now left, of what the allies had upon their hands three years ago'. Nothing but Arras was between the allies and the heart of France. The Tory case against making Flanders the main theatre had become intimately connected with the idea that the war there was part of a plot by Marlborough to prolong the war. But Hare argued that the French were most fearful of allied efforts there for they continually tried to weaken the allies in Flanders by pretending to concentrate on Spain or the Empire. England's allies wanted the main English effort to be in the Low Countries. Hare admitted that at the beginning of the war Flanders was a bad place to attack Louis in; but Marlborough appreciated this and had taken the war into Bavaria in 1704. 'Thus you see for five campaigns of this war the Duke of Marlborough did not act in Flanders, or did it out of necessity, and much against his will'. The cautious defensive war that the Tories would have fought in Flanders would have prolonged the war: 'They would have him make no sieges of towns that are well fortified... fight no battle but when you are sure of victory'.

* See H.M.C. Portland, v, 656, for Harley's opinion on Marlborough's campaign in Flanders in 1711; 'At the head of a greater army than had been during the whole war... which ended only in the taking of Bouchain, a small town'.
Hare concluded that 'The very possibility of acting with vigour in Flanders is owing to the man who is now accused of a design to prolong the war'. 566

The arguments as to the advisability of England concentrating its military power in Flanders which had dominated the first two years of the war were now revived; with the added factor of intense animosity towards Marlborough. The taking of Bouchain became a test case for the possibility of further success in Flanders, and the Duke's conduct of the war; as Marlborough himself realised. 567

Tory newspapers gave credit to the passing of the French lines to other generals, and dismissed the taking of Bouchain as costly and futile. 568 And a furious pamphlet battle ensued. 569 Whig writers stressed the military importance of Bouchain. They claimed that no one could now tell 'where the Duke of Marlborough will stop'. Marlborough's latest success was evidence that 'all further endeavours towards a good peace would be to little purpose'. 'A good while ago there was some tampering underhand towards a peace. This conquest will spoil it'. Bouchain was widened out into an attack on the idea of a peace without Spain. 570 The Tories realised how the Whigs were using Bouchain to undermine talk of peace, and argued that a separate peace was 'better than no peace at all'. 571

'Swhat is it to us that Bouchain is taken', asked Swift in his Conduct of the Allies; and Swift's pamphlet concludes with a clear exposition of the futility of further war in Flanders: 'The army that acts offensively there is at much greater expense of men and money'. There was no point in taking any more towns there 'for the States'. In the Nine Years' War 'we lost battles and towns as well as we gained them of late... Yet we bore up then, as the French do now'. The French were now sensible enough to avoid battle; and Swift could 'see nothing else in the modern way of making war, but that the side which can hold out longest will end it with most advantage'. 574 Swift's pamphlet is the most celebrated in the partisan
debates over war strategy. There is not an original argument in it. There has been much debate over the exact contribution of Harley and St John to the work.\textsuperscript{575} On the whole it carries the imprint of Harley's concerns and attitudes. It was surprisingly kind to Marlborough. Swift had been conscious in the summer and autumn of 1710 of the power Marlborough's military charisma still held over some Tories. His military successes were openly acknowledged.\textsuperscript{576} The now common argument that he was deliberately trying to prolong the war was not employed.

In examining English entry into the war Swift resurrected the arguments employed by Davenant and Harley in 1701. The Dutch had been in immediate danger in 1702; and although England had an interest in preventing the Low Countries falling under French dominion, this should have been done only on the basis of the 1678 treaties.\textsuperscript{577} He revived the fears of England fighting directly to remove Philip from the Spanish throne. Those who had argued for peace, he recalled, had noted that 'to assist King Charles by English or Dutch forces would render him odious to his new subjects'. For 'If we should engage in a war for dethroning the Duke of Anjou we should certainly effect what, by the progress and operations of it, we endeavoured to prevent'.\textsuperscript{578}

The war in Spain had been a mistake, which could only be 'imputed to the credulity of our ministers' who were 'persuaded by the Imperial Court that the Spaniards were so violently affected to the House of Austria, as upon the first appearance there, with a few troops under the Archduke, the whole kingdom would immediately revolt'. Swift drew attention to the 'corrupt management' of the Spanish war; and claimed that Peterborough was the only general who could have succeeded there. Peterborough's victories there should have been properly supported:

Or at least when we had found or made that design imprac-
ticable we should not have gone on in so expensive a management of it; but have kept our troops on the defensive there.* 579

Swift predictably attacked the neglect of the war in the West Indies, and directly accused Marlborough of preventing resources being diverted to sea warfare in general and the West Indies in particular. 580 Swift lamented the 'neglect' of the 6th article in the Grand Alliance treaty; 581 and dealt with the jealousy that English expeditions to the West Indies would have aroused in the allies in summary fashion: England had a right to pursue her own advantages 'while we are rushing ourselves to conquer provinces and kingdoms for them'. 582 In private Swift spoke differently. In December 1710, when Swift thought that St John's Quebec venture was destined for the West Indies, he told St John he had 'no good opinion of these expeditions, which hitherto never succeed with us'. 583 Possibly he was also reflecting Harley's doubts on this matter.

Swift was exceptionally critical of the Portuguese alliance, and the burdens it had eventually placed on Anglo-Dutch resources. 584 This was widened into a general attack on the performance of the allies. Since 1702 the States had been shifting the load of the war on to English shoulders. 585 They had used their troops 'towards garrisoning every town as fast as it is taken'; and had been particularly remiss in the supplying of their naval quotas. 586 The Emperor's failure to make peace with the Hungarian rebels, and his failure to back the Toulon expedition were trotted out. This was stale stuff. But Swift astutely highlighted allied failures to properly support the war which had taken place since the change of ministry: the Dutch obstruction of Marlborough's 'winter plan', and the

* Ironically, sentiments close to Hare's. As they were to St John's, who stated in December 1710 that: 'Either there should have been no war in Spain or another' (Bolingbroke Corr., i, 26, 20 December).
Imperial obstruction of plans to push the war in Savoy in a more aggressive manner. 588

In October 1710, commenting on the fall of Godolphin and the Whigs, Swift observed:

Besides the many personal causes, that of breaking the measures settled for a peace four years ago had a great weight, when the French had complied with all terms.

This was information 'which I have had from persons able enough to inform me'. 589 Almost certainly Harley. Swift laid emphasis on the failure to make peace after Ramillies, and specifically linked it to the Whigs entry into the ministry, when they:

Were forced to take in a set of men to screen them from the consequence of that miscarriage and accordingly upon the first succeeding opportunity.... the chief leaders of that party were brought into several great employments. 590

The French had been anxious for peace after Ramillies, but the 'exorbitant demands' of the allies had prevented peace. And supplies of silver from the West Indies, undisturbed by the English navy, enabled Louis to keep on fighting. 591 The moderate war aims of 1702 had been attained in 1706. And Swift attacked the idea that we should now fight on for Spain and the West Indies. Once the Whigs were in power (as Harley and Davenant had feared in 1701) they had steadily extended the war aims, e.g. in the Dutch Barrier Treaty. 592 Swift ended by repeating Harley's fears at the end of 1709: if the war was not stopped soon it might become embroiled in the Northern War. 593

The futility of further efforts in Flanders had to be established by the ministry to prepare the nation for the news that they had, for some time, been engaged in underhand peace negotiations with the French. St John sensed the uneasiness of many in the Commons, Tory and Whig, at rumours of this in December 1711. 594 The 'prodigious' success of Swift's book in December of 1711 and early 1712 nerved the ministry to issue 'restraining
orders' to Ormonde, which called a final halt to further British efforts in the Flanders war. The Whigs were dismayed but their attempt in May to persuade the Queen to countermand these instructions was swept aside with a Tory majority of 130 votes. When the matter was raised in the Lords on 28 May, Harley (now ennobled) admitted that Ormonde had been forbidden to fight a battle but claimed that his orders still allowed siege operations. Halifax's motion that Ormonde should be instructed to act in conjunction with the allies was defeated by 28 votes. However unhappy Harley may have been in private about the necessity for such orders he was determined to avoid the loss of any more British lives in Flanders.

Tory opinion was now prepared to ditch the allies after a series of debates in February 1712 designed to publicly castigate Britain's war partners for their consistent defaulting in the war effort. The Dutch were denounced for failing to meet naval quotas, or to properly support English efforts in Flanders and Spain; the commercial clauses of the Barrier Treaty were condemned; and a committee appointed under Hanmer to investigate both Imperial and Dutch deficiencies in the war effort since 1702.

There was now a section of the Tory party, represented most militantly in the October Club, which wished Britain to wash its hands of all continental concerns. But Tory leaders such as Harley and St John had moved

* And since April he had been planning drastic reductions in the army. As many as 32 regiments were to be broken in the first disbandment (Loan 29/45E 'Regiments to be Reduced', memo. in Harley's hand, 16 April 1712).

** A crucial point to the ministry. See the detailed investigations into the Dutch naval performance in the war ordered by the ministry from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty in January 1712 (Add MSS 22265, ff 22-23).

*** For the October Club's views on foreign entanglements, as reported by Marlborough, see Klopp Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, xiv, p.673, Roberthon's letter of 21 March 1711.
far beyond such parochialism. St John often expressed concern in 1711 and 1712 that Britain should secure the aggrandizement of Savoy in order to defend the maritime interests of Britain in the Mediterranean; for she might then 'depend on making hereafter as great a figure in those seas, as she ever did in her own Channel'; and would then have:

The prospect of changing the scene of future wars and removing them... to a part of the world where we cannot intervene unless by our fleets, instead of running into the extravagant ruinous schemes of maintaining armies on the Continent.

Hence the concern of St John that Savoy should obtain Sicily in any peace settlement, and that Britain should keep Gibraltar and Minorca. But St John was simply continuing a line of thought developed long ago by Harley. In August 1706 Harley thought that the 'obliging the Duke of Savoy and adding to his power is one of the finest ways of balancing the power of France'. In June 1711 Harley noted the necessity of Britain keeping Port Mahon and Gibraltar at the end of the war. When he gave instructions to Prior for the peace talks he stressed that:

For making a balance of power on the side of Italy the Duke of Savoy to be effectually secured in his own country and such places to be added to his possessions in Italy as shall be agreed upon as necessary for securing the quiet of Italy.

The notes which Harley made in 1714 for the Queen's speech at the opening of parliament laid stress on the need for Britain 'to hold a balance between the contending powers of Europe'; for this would 'make us really formidable abroad' and secure British trading interests. If war was necessary in pursuit of these objectives then England should 'carry it on by sea'. Such ideas 'foreshadow the principles of Walpolean Whiggery in the 1730's'. But also look back to the principles set out by Charles Davenant in 1701, which had obviously done much to form Harley's position on foreign affairs. Anne grasped the opportunity in 1714, at Harley's
bidding, to rejoice at the nation's deliverance 'from a consuming land war' and assuring them that Britain could remain powerful in future 'by the right application of our naval force'.
Summary and Conclusion

At the outbreak of war in 1689 there was much optimism in England that France would soon be defeated; centred on the idea of a landing on the French coast: the 'descent'. France was thought particularly vulnerable to such warfare; and it was expected that many French (especially protestants) would assist the English invader. Whig writers responded with enthusiasm to William's declaration of war, and did much to spread such views; showing little appreciation of the military and financial effort needed to defeat France, and seeing the war as largely a naval venture on the English part. There were intimate links, therefore, between the 'Country' view of the European situation, especially that in France, at the outbreak of the war and their championship of a naval war concentrating upon descents and coastal raids. Most writers in 1689/1690 were thinking primarily of offensive action against France and of bringing the war to an expeditious end. There was a gross under-estimation of the defensive commitment involved in England's new European obligations. There was widespread recognition by 1689 of the importance to England of the security of the Low Countries, although little awareness of the military commitment this might entail. Indeed, in the early years of the war William's commitment of the bulk of the English forces to Flanders was seen as leaving the country defenceless, given the apprehensions of a French invasion.

Many Whigs saw the revolution in England as the trigger to a whole series of European convulsions. The ease of William's 'descent' on England - an extremely hazardous operation - encouraged hopes that a similar assault on France would succeed as well; and gave a sharper edge to the fears of
French invasion early in the war. The sense of European protestant solidarity of the Country Whigs found expression in the belief that the Huguenots would lead a popular revolt against Louis if a descent was made. The tension in Whig ideology between their desire to reduce French power and their fear of a large standing army was resolved in the stress on a form of warfare which relied on the navy. A tension which emerged in particularly sharp form after 1697.

Until 1692 optimism over the descent was widespread in Parliament, and the Court secured agreement to unprecedented levels of expenditure and manpower mainly on the basis that an invasion of France would take place. Though the early English setbacks in Ireland (and the lamentable fleet performance in 1689 and 1690) seemed to have undermined the chances for a quick blow against France. These early events in Ireland proved important. The idea grew up that the Irish war had been used by the Court to mask the nature of England's European military commitment in the early years; when the decision to engage on the continent as principals was being established in an almost irrevocable form.

Domestic disputes over the setbacks in Ireland and at sea delayed the advent of realism over the war and the military commitments it would entail. Seymour's assertion late in 1689 that England had 'come in at the day as assistants, but now are made principals' was echoed many times in the years 1689-1712 by those who opposed large-scale military involvement on the Continent.

A small group of MPs, of diverse political origins, did not share the prevailing spirit of optimism over the war. Forming themselves into a cohesive and vocal opposition group through the Parliamentary Commission of Accounts they attempted to hold military expenditure in check and to champion a strictly limited English war strategy: one which denied the
inter-dependence of English and Continental (especially Dutch) interests; poured scorn on the idea of a victorious descent, which they saw as a cynical ploy by the Court to mask the nature of England's continental commitment; and argued for an almost exclusively naval war, concentrating on the defence of English and the destruction of French naval commerce. The war strategy of the CPA group was merely an external reflection of the policy of financial stringency and rectitude they attempted to force on the Court at home. Through their work on the CPA the 'New Country Party' suggested that the expensive continental strategy was bound to produce waste, and financial and political corruption at home. (These ideas drew on a similar 'Country' programme of the 1670s, when Churchmen and Country Whigs argued for a purely maritime strategy as against the Court attempt to commit English forces to a war against the French. The events of the 1670s, in particular 1678 when the Country had reacted bitterly against what later transpired to have been a bogus or simulated war policy, left a legacy of distrust for all Court initiatives on foreign and military policy). The CPA exploited widespread dissatisfaction over the French privateers' depredations on English trade to build up the case for a change of strategy. The CPA never managed to break the fundamental loyalty of the merchant groups to the Williamite régime and to the war. However, the CPA were to show little favour to the naval estimates and subjected them to the same ruthless examination as the army estimates; paring over £1 million from the fleet estimates in November 1691 for instance. Even at the height of William's war the CPA were obsessed with keeping 'the navy expenses within its old economy';\(^2\) and in 1709 Harley claimed that the fleet 'was made so unwieldy and expensive in order to make an army necessary'.\(^3\) With the abortive descent attempt in 1692, and the failure to follow up the naval victory at La Hougue, it seemed as though a major change in English war strategy might
be forced on the Court.

This year saw the most violent anti-government propaganda; much of it taking the strategy of the war against France as its main theme. But the possibility of a French invasion, and the growing fears of the Jacobite threat at home — points continually hammered home by Court spokesmen — allowed the Court to pass through the troop estimates in the 1692–93 session on the clear basis, openly espoused and debated in the Commons for the first time, that England had a vital national interest in establishing the military security of the Low Countries as the best means of defending the British Isles, and that this could only be done by the placing of substantial numbers of English troops on the continent. William had been much more diplomatic in his opening speeches to parliament in 1692: asking not only for 'assistance' but also 'advice' with regard to the war. And the Court had been very open in presenting war treaties and alliances to the Commons for examination.

CPA propaganda against the continental strategy lost force because it so clearly resembled the ideas and prejudices disseminated by the Jacobites. Jacobite writers often put on the mask of disgruntled Williamites, and used the war issue as the main plank in their propaganda campaign from 1689 on; and openly quoted parliamentary speeches which echoed their views. Jacobite propaganda was aimed at all sections of society: both the landed gentry whose taxes supported the war, and the merchants whose losses were a direct consequence of it. The Jacobites suggested that the war would continue endlessly so long as William sat on James's throne, and that it would involve increasing expense and neglect of English commerce. The open Jacobite propaganda against the continental war strategy helped to turn the whole issue into one of loyalty to the new King and régime.

After 1692 interest in descent attempts declined within and outside Parliament. There was much cynicism that promises of a descent were simply
a Court ploy to pass through large military estimates; and increasingly realistic appraisal of the difficulties in organizing them. The failure to invade France after La Hougue led to a political inquest which did much to expose the impracticability of a descent, and seemed to indicate that the army would now be concentrated in Flanders. William was now increasingly committing England openly to a full-scale continental war; and from 1693 turned more and more blatantly to the Whigs for support. Many Whigs were prepared to swallow their distaste for the sort of war now being fought in return for office, favours and Whiggish domestic measures. But the greater enthusiasm of the Whigs, especially the Junto Whigs, for involvement in European affairs was an important factor too; and from 1693, as contemporaries noted, support for the continental war became a much more partisan issue dividing Whig and Tory. Tory placemen tried to convince William that he could rely on the present parliament for continued support in the continental war effort. But the services rendered by the Whig financiers at the end of 1693, at a time when merchant marine losses were causing disquiet, helped convince William that an effective war ministry could be built around the Whigs.

The Country/Tory opposition now emphasised the alleged damage being done to England's economy and trade by supporting such a large army in Flanders. Only by withholding supplies, as Clarges recommended to the Commons in 1693, could parliament now change the direction of England's war effort. The years 1693-1695 also seemed to promise a decisive victory in the Continental campaigns; and success there was skilfully exploited by the new Whig managers to consolidate support for a land-based war strategy. (Harley, in particular, became concerned from 1693 on that the war was being deliberately mismanaged for partisan advantage; an idea which foreshadows his views on the Spanish Succession War from 1706 on). There was widespread
anger in 1694, in Whig circles in particular, at French peace offers, which were seen as offering no real security against any future French aggression. A government-directed propaganda campaign from 1694 on set out the need to press France firmly, and the dangers of an insecure peace. The CPA group also lost much of their earlier aggression and cohesion: with Harley and Foley, in particular, showing a willingness to co-operate with the Court over the war supplies, and moving away from the intransigent isolationism of other Country members. Harley was noted as taking an increasingly close interest in foreign affairs. 4

Parliament found it difficult to obtain reliable and regular news on foreign and military matters. The Flanders war, which necessitated long absences by the King, seemed to compound these difficulties. As Seymour bitterly noted in November 1694:

His Majesty by returning into England the day before the parliament sit and going out of it the day after they rise might be as much unacquainted with the condition of our affairs here, as we are with what is done or doing abroad. 5

Lack of information left the Commons especially volatile in opinion on the war and European affairs: the members easily jumped from ungrounded optimism to unreasonable fear, and were an easy prey to rumour and talk of disastrous defeats abroad for instance. 6 This put good management at a premium; for, as one Country Whig noted in 1690, there were a 'great many people that have no other rule than to be for those who speak to them first'. 7 Harley observed how easily support for specific issues could be whipped up or fall away in the Commons; and the CPA group mustered few vocal spokesmen. Parliament could be led with regard to the war and supply, if not by the nose. The King's speech on the war and European situation could help to set the tone for the session; and followed up by good Court management, as shown from 1694 on, could facilitate the voting of supplies for the continen-
tal war.

But by 1696 high hopes for the war had come to nothing; and the economic dislocation – merchant marine losses in particular – and high taxation were producing an increasing distaste for the continental war amongst Whigs and Tories. This was illustrated by the eagerness with which the Junto exploited the Assassination Plot and the Fenwick issue, when support for the war had been obviously falling. Even Oldmixon had to admit that by 1696 England was 'undoubtedly weary of the war, which was likely to be determined by the longest purse, and not by the longest sword'; and he noticed the increasingly effective Tory propaganda against taxes and loss of trade in this year. The creation of a parliamentary board of trade in response to merchant marine losses loomed over the Court in 1695-1696. Although impracticable as an effective counter to the French privateering threat, it raised the possibility of the Commons at last securing an effective lever in questions of war strategy. The widespread mercantile support for such a body made it even more dangerous for the Court.

The European strategy adopted since 1692 seemed proved finally bankrupt given the indecisive peace of Ryswick; and there was increasing suspicion of England's allies in the last year of the war, especially the Empire. The war weariness and disillusion of 1696-1697 explain the Country campaigns of 1697-1702 against the army, the Partition Treaties and the allies. Many Whigs who joined with the Tories after 1697 to reduce the English army looked back sadly to the hopes entertained in 1689 of an England playing its rôle in any European conflict primarily through naval means; and they berated William for his neglect of marine warfare and invasive descents. The main contribution on the Tory side to the war debate was made by Charles Davenant. The Whig Oldmixon realised the importance of Davenant's opposition to the government on the war issue from 1695 on; and by 1701 could refer to
him as 'the teacher of the faction'. In pamphlets published in 1698-1702 he offered a detailed critique of Williamite and Junto war strategy. Davenant's views showed that some moderate Tories had moved from the intransigent and unrealistic isolationism of earlier years. Davenant conceded that England had a vital interest in securing the 'balance of Europe' and ensuring the integrity of the Low Countries. And was willing to see at least 20,000 English troops stationed in Europe to perform the latter task. But he argued that in the Nine Years' War England had over-stretched itself on land, and had neglected marine warfare. With so many English troops abroad the navy had perforce to be used as a shield against invasion instead of protecting commerce and attacking French maritime trade.

His views had a great influence on Harley. His ideas clarified and confirmed the suspicions that Harley was developing with regard to the war from 1693 on. The very close co-operation between Davenant and Harley in the years 1700-1701 is well documented; and they kept in regular personal contact well into Anne's reign. Harley made use of Davenant's literary talents and his expertise in foreign and trade matters in this period on several occasions.

The increasing international tension from 1700 on found the Whigs in more bellicose mood than their Tory opponents; but amongst all sections of political opinion there was widespread optimism that England's rôle in any new conflict with France over the division of the Spanish Empire would consist of providing naval support to the Habsburg Emperor and a troop contribution to the defence of the Dutch Republic, together with the launching of naval raids upon the Spanish West Indies and Spanish America. (There had been minimal interest in Caribbean warfare in William's reign). Tory propagandists in 1700-1702 made much of the fear that the Whigs in power would seek to extend and develop these limited war aims and war strategy
for their own partisan advantage; making the case that was to prove so persuasive in 1710-1713. In particular Tories claimed that the Whigs would wish to wrest the whole of Spain out of Bourbon hands and place a Habsburg claimant on the throne. Some Whigs, in fact, proclaimed such intransigent views in 1701, and accepted a 'No Peace Without Spain' policy even before the outbreak of hostilities. And not all Whigs looked with disfavour on Flanders warfare. Many now argued that 'the carrying the war into Flanders, that is our great interest; the barrier of strong towns there is our best security against France in the world'. Such language looked forward to the Barrier Treaty of 1709. And several leading Whigs were strongly against taking possessions from Spain in the Caribbean; favouring a West Indies completely under Habsburg control with freedom of trade granted to England. Arguing that Caribbean adventures could only cause Anglo-Dutch friction.

But the Tory party too was seriously divided over war strategy. Many rank and file Tories believed that by resisting the Whig push towards immediate war in 1701 they had ensured that England would act only as seconds to the Dutch against the French, i.e. as naval auxiliaries. Tories such as Nottingham, though deeply committed to the European struggle, hoped that England's strength would be exerted by sea rather than on the continent. But ministerial Tories (notably Marlborough, Godolphin and Harley) were willing to commit England's resources to the continental struggle. Harley skilfully organized a propaganda campaign to push this line to those Tories who had envisaged a limited English commitment: e.g. by the use of Defoe's Review and pamphlets by Davenant. Marlborough continually pressed on his colleagues the importance of the Flanders theatre and the need to exert the greatest Anglo-Dutch pressure in Northern Europe. Rochester dissociated himself entirely from such views, as did Normanby and Jersey; and Godolphin
remained unhappy in the early years of the war that England was not using sufficient resources to mount coastal assaults on France, to attack in the Americas, or to support the war in Southern Europe, and occasionally grew restive at Marlborough's emphasis on the Low Countries. Many Whigs were also unhappy at this time about undue emphasis being given to the war in Northern Europe. The appointment of Marlborough in 1701 as commander of the Anglo-Dutch forces in Flanders was seen in itself as over-committing England to the continental war. The English general's lack of success in 1702-03 convinced many, Whig and Tory, that the war would be fought in the same indecisive way as the Nine Years' War. As early as July 1703 it was being claimed that Marlborough wanted to 'prolong the war'. The reaction against the Flanders War (and against Marlborough himself) at the end of the 1703 campaign severely rattled the ministry, and is a significant pointer to developments later in the war. Some, including Godolphin, were prepared to see England and Holland go on the defensive in Flanders and the main effort concentrated elsewhere.

The adhesion of Portugal to the allied cause in 1703 offered a handle to those holding such views. Even at this stage, however, some Tories grew suspicious that Portuguese entry into the war was becoming an excessively Whig dominated affair. Some Tories argued that merely securing Portuguese neutrality was the best policy. Wratislaw, Imperial Ambassador in London, associated closely with the Whigs, regarding them as the 'war party', which led some Tories to see him as part of a conspiracy with the Whigs to over-commit English resources in the Iberian theatre. The Methuens also aroused Tory suspicions; although Methuen was not on good terms with several of the leading Whigs, whilst he enjoyed the firm support of Godolphin. The Portuguese military performance fell far short of Methuen's expectations. The full force of the Tory anger with the Portuguese found bitter expression
in Swift's *Conduct of the Allies* in 1711. He was exceptionally critical of the Portuguese treaties and alliance, and the burdens it had placed on Anglo-Dutch resources.

But there was now optimism that the Spanish would throw off Philip, providing the allied powers gave military support. (The belief in the possibility of a Spanish revolt against Philip has interesting links with the earlier idea that the French population was ready to throw off Louis XIV if a coastal assault was launched in support). Tories such as Godolphin and Harley, previously sceptical about forcing the Bourbons out of Spain, were now prepared to consider such a step. Marlborough's victory at Blenheim in 1704 drew many moderate Tories and uncommitted Whigs to support of the continental war; but his lack of progress in Flanders in 1705 (mainly due to Dutch timidity) convinced the High Tories and others that the English were being used as dupes by the States General.

The High Tory attempt to build up Rooke as a rival naval hero to Marlborough illustrated the personal nature that much of the strategic disputes were to take. The Tories found a more convincing hero in Peterborough, commander of the allied forces in Spain. Peterborough's victories in the autumn of 1705 mark a watershed in the strategic debate. The Earl exploited his political connections in England (Whig as well as Tory) to argue that his success in the Iberian theatre offered a much better opportunity to English arms than Flanders, and to claim that he was being starved of support from home. Many Tories moved away from their earlier blue-water ideas to enthusiastic support for the Spanish land campaign; an important development in Tory thinking on European and military matters. Increasingly, public interest in the war centred on Spain, and its dramatic rapidity of movement; and the ministry evinced great fear of the damage that Peterborough's propaganda campaign could inflict on the war effort. The Junto
Whigs (and Marlborough) became increasingly concerned that the Spanish war would divert resources from Flanders (and even in Halifax's opinion from the war in the Caribbean); and moderate ministerial Tories such as Harley and Davenant grew concerned in 1706 over the commitments England had taken on with regard to Spain. The degree of public enthusiasm for the Spanish war, notwithstanding political divisions, is crucial to an understanding of the strategic debate in Anne's reign. Late in 1705 Harley noted how willingly parliament voted money for the Spanish war. And like many he looked forward in 1706 to the 'reducing of Spain and consequently the end of the war'. Public enthusiasm obliged the ministry, in the winter of 1706, to push a plan to wrest Spain from Philip by pursuing an offensive policy. The aggressive policy met complete disaster at Almanza, early in 1707. The Junto Whigs now wished England to mount purely a holding operation in Spain and Portugal, and to concentrate on the war in Northern Europe. However, the High Tories, led by Rochester and Nottingham, tried in the 1707-1708 session to move the main seat of war to Spain, and to denude Flanders of English troops to do so. Nothing horrified the Junto Whigs more in the strategic disputes over the Spanish Succession War than this attempt, and the whole episode enjoyed an important rôle in Junto political mythology. But it is clear that, early in 1708, many Country Whigs still had great hopes for the Iberian theatre, and were seriously concerned at charges that the ministry had neglected to support the war there.

Towards the end of the Spanish debates, in February 1708, the ministry broke with the moderate Tories, and Harley and St John were forced out of office. Harley had been Secretary for the Northern Province since 1704; and had obviously been involved closely in the formulation of foreign and strategic policy at the highest level. Harley shared the traditional Tory enthusiasm for descents and naval warfare (he was especially keen to see the English navy powerful in Mediterranean waters); but was prepared to give
the offensive war in Flanders a chance, so long as it was fought in an
gressive manner, having no time for the 'tedious methods of an expensive,
inactive war'. His great fear, which owed much to his 'Country' appren-
ticeship in William's reign, was of a 'lingering war' managed and manipulated
for political advantage at home. As early as 1706 he began to doubt that
the Spanish population would ever rebel against Philip, and thought that
England should assist in the recovery of Spain for the Habsburgs only as
far as was 'reasonable'. After Ramillies Harley jumped at the chance
that this offered of peace, and by the autumn of 1706 was obviously in dis­
agreement with Godolphin over the terms that should be offered to France and
the way negotiations should be conducted. (Harley had small conception of
the difficulties involved in negotiating a compromise peace in 1706).
Harley's disenchantment with the foreign and war policy of the ministry
played a more important rôle in his break with the government than historians
have generally accepted. But the turning point in the war for Harley, as
with other moderate Tories, came with the defeat of the expedition against
Toulon. Coming in a year of setbacks in Flanders it destroyed all hopes
of a decisive strategic breakthrough in Southern Europe. Harley now regretted
the missed opportunity of a compromise peace in 1706. From now on war
strategy for Harley was aimed at ensuring a peace, rather than total victory.

The Toulon failure produced great bitterness against the Empire, which
had jeopardized the expedition by its concentration upon taking Naples.
Over-emphasis on Anglo-Dutch differences has obscured the problem of England's
troubled military relationship with the Empire.

In the early part of the war (and in the late stages) dissatisfaction
with the allies tended to be concentrated on the Dutch: whether it be for
trading with the French; failure to meet naval quotas; or the lack of
military aggression in Flanders. In the middle years of the war, from 1705
on, the Empire often took the sharper edge of English hostility. In 1705 Harley thought the Empire's military priorities were, in order: Hungary, Italy, France, Spain. Throughout 1705 he was much more conciliatory towards the Dutch than the Germans. Tory antagonism to the Dutch during the war was generalized and almost traditional; but the Empire by its selfish behaviour was thought to have continuously undermined the chances for success against the French in those peripheral theatres which aroused blue-water enthusiasm. Moderate Tories such as Harley would deny any fundamental hostility between the English and Dutch; and accepted the necessity of a continuing Anglo-Dutch military alliance after the war to help 'keep peace after the peace'. Distrust of and contempt for the Dutch was largely a High Tory phenomenon; but anger with the Empire could cut across all party boundaries. Even the moderate Shrewsbury noted in March 1707 that 'The Court of Vienna furnish few men and little money in this war, and make us and the Dutch do what they please'. And, as Harley noted, it was 'difficult' for the ministry 'to answer the objections that are made against the Empire'. A parliamentary address of December 1707 'censured the Emperor and the Empire' in plain terms, much to the annoyance of Godolphin and Marlborough. Distrust of the Empire had been incipient during William's war: in 1695 Blathwayt thought the Empire would obstruct any peace initiatives 'if they could have their will to lay all the burden of the war with France upon his majesty and the states', and 'to advance their conquests at our expense in Hungary'. Anger with the Empire was rampant in 1696/1697 with regard to the peace negotiations. The coming war in 1701/1702 was often seen as basically 'the Emperor's quarrel', with England simply playing the part of naval auxiliary and transport organizer to the Imperial efforts. Stepney warned the ministry from 1700 on of the Imperial obsession with Italy and its disregard for Spain and the Indies.
Each of the Empire's failings in the war increasingly soured Anglo-Habsburg relations: the diversion of troops to Hungary; the failure to support the war in Spain and Savoy; the treaty of neutrality with France in Italy in 1707; the obsession with Naples at the expense of the expedition to Toulon; the failure to send Eugene to Spain in 1708. Throughout 1708 Harley and Defoe directed the major part of anti-allied feeling towards the Empire by means of the Review. In 1711 Swift devoted as much space to castigating the Empire as the Dutch in his Conduct.

The end of 1707 also saw the most serious disagreements yet between Godolphin and Marlborough over strategy. Marlborough wished to stake all on further offensive action in Flanders, and requested an augmentation of the English forces there; and had lost interest by the summer of 1707 in the Spanish war. Godolphin was unhappy over this demand, given the indecisive nature of the 1707 campaign in that theatre. In the Lord Treasurer's conversations with the moderate Whig Cowper in September it was agreed that the war should remain on the defensive in Northern Europe in 1708, and that the war in Spain should be given priority, for the latter theatre was still paramount in the minds of most concerned Englishmen. As Godolphin told Marlborough in June 1707: 'There is nothing thought so essential here as to preserve Catalonia this winter if it be any way possible'.

Godolphin, apart from his personal misgivings, was pessimistic that public and parliamentary opinion would now accept any addition to Marlborough's forces. Increasingly, Godolphin saw questions of war strategy from the perspective of domestic politics.

As well as increased efforts in Spain, Godolphin and Cowper agreed that more attention should be paid to Caribbean warfare. This was a significant concession to the increasing public concern that the war there had been neglected. Between the years 1702, when Peterborough's projected
Anglo-Dutch expedition had been aborted, and 1706 there had been little concern for the progress of the war in the Caribbean. Ministerial policy had been to encourage the Spanish colonists there to revolt in favour of the Archduke Charles by mounting a propaganda campaign; and, in essence, to win Spanish America on the plains of Castile. But by 1706 it was becoming fashionable, and politically expedient, to argue that France could never be defeated decisively in Europe while Louis was sustaining the French war effort with the silver of the Spanish Indies. From the spring of 1706 Harley's cabinet minutes reveal increasing ministerial concern for the war in the West Indies. Harley had shown little interest in the West Indian schemes submitted to him before 1706 but now began to espouse the cause of Caribbean warfare, and at cabinet level. (Some Junto Whigs, Halifax and Somers in particular, were sympathetic to merchant demands for military action in the Caribbean. Although they saw such campaigns as supportive to the war in Europe and not as an alternative maritime strategy). Prior to 1706 these plans were formulated by those with specialist knowledge of Caribbean affairs - either military or trading - and with no particular political axe to grind; and little discernible public interest was shown in such schemes in the period 1702-1706. Interestingly enough, the revival of such ideas in the context of political debate after 1706 was mainly associated with Country Whigs or with Whig financial and trading circles. The West Indies Privateering Act of 1708 was chiefly the work of a group of parliamentary Whig merchants, with strong support in the Lords from Halifax. Later in that year a group of Whig West Indian merchants requested that a substantial naval and military force be sent to the Caribbean. In 1709 and 1710 Godolphin tried to persuade Marlborough that more attention be paid to the war in the West Indies; without any success, however, for Marlborough always remained hostile to such plans. Besides, English naval forces were
over-stretched by the demands of trade protection and the war in the Medi-
iterranean; and the Admiralty were well aware of the technical difficulties
of marine warfare at such a distance, and in such difficult climatic con-
ditions.

The growing disenchantment of many Tories with the war from 1705 on
found little effective outlet before Harley's resignation. But from 1708
on Harley organized a propaganda campaign drawing in many respects on the
Country programme of the 1690s; and similar to the views that Harley himself
began formulating about the Nine Years' War from 1693 on. Indeed, Harley
stressed this continuity: claiming that 'upon the Revolution there was a
fixed purpose to make a long war, and drawing attention to the 'vast estates
which have been raised from nothing within the last twenty years' as a
consequence of protracted warfare. These attacks centred on Godolphin and
Marlborough: 'Victories obtained are employed for their private advantage
and profit... to aggrandize themselves and to prolong that war by which they
get such vast wealth'. (Significantly, Harley enlisted the help of
Haversham, the prime exponent of Country views, after 1708). Harley
attempted to build up a common front of Tories and disenchanted Whigs against
the war ministry. To this end he adopted an indirect approach to the war,
and did not directly raise, except by implication, the matter of strategy;
undoubtedly realising that this would tend to open up rifts between Tory
and Whig over larger European questions. (Right up until 1711, in fact,
Harley attempted to head off the extreme Tories on the question of war
strategy. He was unhappy at the intransigent line adopted on this issue
by the Letter to the Examiner and the Examiner itself in the latter part of
1710. Harley was essentially a moderate on the war and European issues;
and from a tactical point of view appreciated the danger of a premature
explosion of Tory prejudices on the war which would alienate moderate whigs,
the financial interest and also complicate the making of a peace). However,
the personal nature of the attacks on Marlborough is interesting. Marlborough was now associated with a discredited continental strategy, and personified the Flanders war to many Englishmen.

Most of the Junto Whigs continued to place their faith in Marlborough's ability to breakthrough into France through Flanders. His success at Oudenarde in 1708 convinced them that this was a real possibility still. Junto Whig propagandists, such as Addison, were careful not to disparage all military effort in the Spanish and West Indies theatres; obviously realising the hold that the war in those parts still had on much Whig and moderate opinion. But Addison argued that the war, including the retention of the whole of the Spanish Empire for the Habsburgs, could only be won in Flanders; and that final success there could only be achieved with an augmentation of Marlborough's forces. The election of 1708 had given the Junto Whigs a decisive say in parliament, and an augmentation was agreed in the 1708-1709 session. Such a decision alienated even moderate Tory opinion from Marlborough and the continental war. But the Whigs saw advantages even in the siege warfare that developed in Flanders late in 1708, in that the Dutch would now be tied even firmer to England by their hopes of achieving a powerful barrier of fortresses against the French.

In the 1708-1709 session the Tories, led by Harley, concentrated their attacks on the lack of progress in Spain. Harley pursued a double line: criticising the mismanagement of the Spanish war, while bitterly noting the cost to the English tax-payer of winning Spain for the Imperial cause. It is clear that by the end of 1708 Harley was becoming doubtful of winning Spain by force of arms, and there is evidence that he now regarded Spain as 'lost'. St John was less circumspect, and openly avowed to Harley his opinion that England should withdraw completely from the Spanish war. Indeed, his loss of faith in Spanish operations went back
to the summer of 1707, when he realised that the battle for the 'affections' of the Spanish had been lost and saw the strengthening of Marlborough's armies in Flanders as the only way to win the war. Yet Tory leaders such as Nottingham and Rochester continued to champion the Spanish war, undoubtedly with the enthusiastic support of the Tory rank and file. And the Whigs always saw the Tory insistence that Spain was being neglected as one of the most powerful propaganda weapons in the latter's armoury. As one Junta Whig commented: 'Spain being the thing we fought for, it was easy to persuade the vulgar that the most necessary part of the service was too much neglected'. Both Whig and Tory parties became prisoners of their Spanish dreams. The Whigs could not renounce their vision of the whole Spanish Empire going to the Habsburgs and were forced to place all their hopes on Marlborough achieving this in Northern Europe. Most of the Tories had no less committed themselves to the Spanish war, against all military reason from 1706 on.

The carnage at Malplaquet in 1709 convinced the Tories that decisive progress in the Flanders was impossible. Yet the Junto Whigs by signing the Barrier Treaty of 1709 had, in effect, committed England to a guerre à outrance in Northern Europe. Godolphin, so critical of Marlborough's over-emphasis on the Flanders theatre in the early years, could now only desperately hope that one last push by Marlborough in the Low Countries in 1710 would ensure a breakthrough into France and the end of the war. All strategic flexibility seemed lost. The lack of progress in Flanders in 1709-1710, linked with the growing public distaste for the war in England, did much to undermine the ministry; and Godolphin and Marlborough began to consider descent attempts on France in a desperate attempt to gain support at home. War strategy was now being related by Godolphin to the question of a parliamentary dissolution just as it had been earlier in the war to the need
for Whig support. There was now widespread war-wearyness. But, as in
the Nine Years' War, the Junta managed to discipline their supporters very
effectively. 'I do not doubt, but the generality of the nation long for
peace', Shrewsbury noted in November 1709, 'but how they may change their
minds when they come to London and submit to their leaders'.

The Tory triumph in the summer of 1710 presaged peace, but the war
obviously had to be kept active until a satisfactory one could be arranged,
and this would best be served by keeping Marlborough in command in Flanders
and supporting the war there to put maximum pressure on the French. But
many Tories still expected Marlborough's forces in Flanders to be reduced
and the war in Spain better supported. Stanhope's summer successes in
Spain were greeted with enthusiasm on all sides. Godolphin hoped they
would bolster the ministry at home. Many Junto Whigs thought that the
victories would refute the Tory arguments that the war in Spain had been
sadly neglected, and deprive them of a stick with which to beat the last
ministry. Indeed, in June 1710 Stanhope had confessed that we 'never had
so good an army in Spain'. To the Tories the victories seem to fix
the ministry and to provide an opportunity to undermine the personal charisma
and military power of Marlborough; whilst ensuring that a compromise peace
which took into account the problem of Spain could be arranged. Even
Harley and his fellow Tory ministers were deluded into thinking that Spain
could at last be won by force of arms and that the greatest problem relating
to the peace settlement could be resolved. Urgent preparations were made
to reinforce the Spanish theatre. Junto Whigs were stung into action by
rumours that Marlborough's army would be stripped of men for use in Spain.
Francis Hare began late in 1710, before Brihuega, to pour scorn on the Tory
emphasis on the Spanish war; arguing that Marlborough was now near success
in Flanders, and refuting in detail Tory claims that Marlborough, Godolphin
and the Junto had allied to prolong the war and ensure their own political
dominance. The evacuation of Madrid and Stanhope's defeat at Brihuega
destroyed most Tory hopes for the Spanish theatre; though extremists in
the Commons continued to argue well into 1711 for a diminution of Marl-
borough's Flanders force and for reinforcements to be sent to Spain.

Flanders was now obviously the main theatre of war until peace could
be made. Harley sugared this pill by reviving hopes of an expedition to
the Caribbean, and drew in Halifax who had connections with Whig trading
groups, as well as a host of other interested parties. As much as a sop
to traditional Tory 'blue-water' thinking, therefore, Harley's revival of
American warfare was an attempt to widen the base of the ministry's support.
St John's championship of the Quebec expedition in 1711, on the other hand,
was a partisan attempt to play up to the High Tories and undermine Marl-
borough's personal prestige and military power. St John made little attempt
to draw in mercantile or Whig support, though the scheme for a Canadian
expedition had originally been floated by the Whig ministry in 1709. The
failure of the 1711 expedition only served to alienate mercantile interests
from the Tories.

Marlborough's taking of Bouchain late in 1711 convinced the Whigs that
a breakthrough into France was imminent; although the victory had come too
late in the year to be decisively exploited. They used Marlborough's
victory to attack any idea of a compromise peace. A fierce pamphlet
battle broke out between the Whigs and the Tories as to the military imp-
ortance of Bouchain. The episode was extremely important in coalescing
party attitudes on the war. It is against this background that the appearance
of Swift's Conduct of the Allies in December 1711 must be seen. Swift's
pamphlet contained no original arguments but marshalled the traditional
Tory interpretation of the war with great skill. The concluding emphasis
of the pamphlet was the futility of further military effort in Flanders.

The peace achieved, Bolingbroke's diplomatic initiatives seemed designed to ensure that in any future conflict England's military role would be exercised primarily by naval means. Harley, too, made much of the need to limit England's continental commitment in any further war to preserve the 'balance of Europe'. But the Tory leaders, if not the rank and file, were now willing to concede the need for England to take an active interest in preserving that balance.

For Britain, ultimately, the wars of our period were primarily political and ideological in character. Other factors, mercantile and colonial, played a part but were distinctly secondary in importance. William's attitude to economic and commercial matters was essentially political. In 1690, in the aftermath of Beachy Head, merchants in parliament were told by the Court that 'the interest of commerce was of far less consequence than the safety of the Kingdom'. William would not sacrifice political interests to commercial considerations, but this was a point of view lost on many: in 1701 William observed that 'the riches that this country sees in a trade with Spain' had 'blinded Englishmen' to larger political considerations. William recognised the importance of trade but would not sacrifice political security to defend or extend commerce. William was primarily an aristocratic prince. He had learned to place little faith in the political acumen of monied or commercial men after his bitter disputes with the pacific-minded burghers of Amsterdam before 1688. William had also come to learn what a hindrance a powerful mercantile group could be in opposition. William clearly understood less of English than Dutch trading interests, as he admitted. Yet in England William drew much political support from mercantile elements (whose interests often conflicted with their Dutch trading rivals it should be noted). Political
expediency, as well as the vital importance of overseas trade to the health of the English war economy, meant that William had to accord some protection to trade interests; and agree to the use of squadrons of the battle fleet to defend maritime trade for example. But the attack on French trade which William initiated in 1689 was designed more to damage France itself than to further allied commerce. William certainly did all he could to prevent the neutrals trading with France but, on the other hand, his attitude towards the allied privateers was curiously ambivalent: he showed extreme anger when they failed to operate within his intended guidelines, and at one time seriously contemplated curbing the activities of the Dutch privateers. 32

The sensibility and influence of mercantile opinion was best shown after the Smyrna convoy disaster in 1693 when admirals were summoned before the Commons to explain their conduct. There were desperate attempts, detailed in the dissertation, by those opposed to the continental strategy to exploit mercantile anger over trade losses to argue for a maritime strategy giving, it was claimed, higher priority to the defence of trade. And it is one of the ironies of this topic that the Tories were often, superficially at least, advocates of a strategy which was designed to yield direct dividends in the shape of colonial acquisitions, new sources of overseas wealth, and the security of trade routes. Hence the Tory enthusiasm for Spanish campaigns. 33 It was the Tories, for instance, who most strongly attacked the first partition treaty on the grounds of the alleged damage its provisions entailed for England's Mediterranean trade. The Tories were not, of course, exclusively a party of landed men. A not insignificant number of merchants and bankers had Tory sympathies. 34 And Tory propagandists in Anne's reign always drew a sharp distinction between the pure merchant, whose interests they sincerely had at heart, and the
parasitic stock-jobbers and war suppliers. The main part of the merchant groups almost certainly leant towards the Whig camp in political matters. The political importance of merchant groups can be over-emphasised. In the last resort it was financial not economic capacity which determined the length and intensity of these wars. And the financial class in England always remained fundamentally loyal to wars which had in fact been their raison d'être. Certainly the interests of the merchants and monied men were not always identical: witness the hostility of the latter group towards the South Seas project in 1711; a scheme with wide mercantile support.

Attempts by merchant groups to influence the conduct of military operations were neither systematic nor frequent. In 1701 the merchants were pressing the authorities to use the navy to stop the flota, on which they had effects worth £1 million, from falling into the hands of France. In 1708 and afterwards, as noted, a group of West India merchants based in England did attempt to persuade the administration to launch military expeditions in the Caribbean; an enthusiasm which Harley exploited in 1710-11 when launching his South Seas scheme. But these were less attempts to influence the overall conduct of war strategy than a concern by a particular segment of the merchant class to defend and extend their sectional interests. The general concern of merchant groups was basically to ensure adequate naval defence of commerce. This was a concern pursued without heed, for the most part, of the political complexion of the ruling party; merchants 'never being satisfied with convoys or thinking they have enough'. There was, very occasionally, a political dimension to merchant anger. Some of the Whig merchants blamed the poor performance of the fleet in defending trade in the early years of William's reign on the dominance of untrustworthy Tories in the naval administration. And
the merchant revolt of 1707-08 over trade losses undoubtedly took on an extra dimension because of what was widely regarded as the poor performance of a Tory-dominated Admiralty. The Admiralty maintained, however, and with good reason, that the losses to French privateers were significantly less in the Succession War than in the previous conflict. Defoe noted the very real success in the early years of Anne's reign, at least, in containing the privateering threat. And the general impression is that mercantile discontent was a far less potent factor in the war debate in 1702-1712 than in 1689-97. Although the pressure of the French privateering in the years 1710-1712 plainly gave an extra edge to the Tory desire for an early peace. But merchants generally seem to have been moderate politically, except on the matter of trade defence, and were prepared to support a secure administration. The power of the merchant members in parliament to direct debates was small and there was no common trading organization linking the often widely divergent interests of the various branches of trade. As a group, merchants seem neither to have been particularly bellicose or pacific. Although there is a discernible mood of war-weariness among trading groups in the latter years of both conflicts, especially the Nine Years' War. Merchants usually blamed corruption, cowardice and treachery for their losses, not mistaken war strategy.

By our period English maritime trade was so large and geographically dispersed that from the point of view of naval protection it was probably incapable of systematic defence. Neither the Convoys and Cruisers Act of 1694 or the trade defence legislation of 1708 could do much to change this situation. Yet the war potential of the English and Dutch depended very much more than did that of the French on the maintenance of overseas trade. And the merchants plainly regarded commerce protection as a service for which they paid in subsidies, taxes and customs duties. Those opposed
to the continental strategy, like Clarges in 1693, plainly saw the issue of mercantile losses as bound up with their own prosperity: 'Land will be worth nothing if trade be not supported... By trade London makes up your rents'. Yet, significantly, the Country concern for commerce defence, as exemplified in the 1693 legislation, plainly gave emphasis to the protection of coastal trade rather than the defence of oceanic commerce.

As noted, colonial friction was not seen as primary by the major powers in their disputes with each other. Neither France nor Britain really had the military resources to spare for ambitious colonial operations, for which the military establishment in England always remained unenthusiastic. William only fitfully took an interest in colonial issues, and did not emphasise such matters during the Ryswick negotiations as one instance of his relative indifference. However, in the English economy the re-export of colonial produce played an important part and overseas planters and merchants often had important connections with political groupings at home. The relevant state papers in our period show almost continuous pressure from colonial merchants, administrators and their representatives in England, calling for greater efforts to be devoted to the colonial war. Yet such pressure only became significant in the public debate over war strategy when taken up for political reasons: between 1700-02 for instance, or in 1706-08 (significantly coinciding with a brief period of Country Whig revival) or after 1710. And the main concern of the West Indies groups and their domestic spokesmen was nearly always a primarily defensive one. They were generally more concerned with the vulnerability of the English colonies to enemy depredations than in arguing for any extensive Caribbean strategy to root out the French and Spanish. Colonial experts such as Blathwayt realised that England had a much greater vested interest in the West Indies trade than France and feared that the loss of ports there 'would
be of greater prejudice to our trade than all the French conquests in Europe'. It is significant that the idea of a colonial strategy only really took hold at the end of William's reign when it seemed that England would be fighting its traditional Elizabethan enemy, Spain. The concept of weakening France by attacking her sugar colonies had not really arisen in our period.

During the last quarter of the 17th century England had done everything possible to promote her Spanish American commerce. But her position in the Caribbean was increasingly threatened by France. This threat meant that England had had to place two regiments in Jamaica during the Nine Years' War. 'The situation of the island', noted Blathwayt, 'is such that, if it be lost to France, all that profitable trade we now enjoy, though underhand, with the Spanish colonies, as well as the negro traffic, will be cut off'. France then began concerted efforts to promote her commerce with Spanish America by legal means. Gilbert Heathcote observed in October 1699 that French ships were now carrying official letters from Louis XIV to all the Spanish ports. When the Spanish assigned the assiento (the monopoly rights of providing slaves to their colonies) to the French Guinea Company in 1701, the grant excluded the right to trade in goods other than negroes. But the powers the Guinea Company received were so wide that such a trade could easily be developed. By May 1702, it was reported from Jamaica that the French 'have now advanced their commerce considerably in the Indies, and have barred all others'. It was also unlikely that the Guinea Company would continue to use Jamaica as their chief source of slaves, as the previous assientists had done. And the combined naval resources of France and Spain might well exclude all English ships from the Spanish colonies. At the beginning of the Succession War English merchants were instructed not to trade with the enemy, and this included
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the colonial subjects of Philip of Spain. The Dutch continued to trade with the Spanish dominions, however; and English merchants began to fear that Curaçao would capture the Spanish trade. Heathcote urged the reopening of trade between Jamaica and the Spanish colonies. It was the strength of the French position in the Caribbean, then, which largely determined the English response in defence of her established trade; and the systematic attempts from 1702-07 to persuade the Spanish colonies to accept Charles. Governor Handasyd forbade any buccaneering based from Jamaica against the Spanish colonies; and tried to persuade the Spaniards that it was the French who were planning an open conquest of their colonies. It was only when this policy proved fruitless that, at Handasyd's prompting, naval squadrons were sent to Jamaica, and then on to the Spanish coasts carrying messages in favour of the Habsburg claimant and offering protection. But early in 1707 came reports that there 'has been a great alteration made in the Spanish governments, those governors who were supposed to be in the interest of King Charles are turned out, and their places supplied by others in the French interest'. Allied military failure in Old Spain had obviously completely undermined the Habsburg position in the Spanish Empire.

At first English privateers in the Caribbean had attacked Spanish and French vessels. Although the Dutch extended immunity to friendly Spanish ships. But when the Spanish colonists traded with France and in French goods, the ships so employed, even if Spanish, were considered legitimate targets for English attacks. By 1707, when the Jamaica trade had obviously declined, the slump was attributed to the plundering of Spanish vessels. As a result, parliament, in 1708, regulated the Caribbean privateering war. A zone was created along the Spanish American coast and extending well out to sea in which English privateers were not to attack Spanish ships, even
when transporting war material. Although the government refused to curtail
attacks against Spanish ships plainly sailing under Bourbon mandate. 52

When the West India merchants called for naval assistance in the
Caribbean it was motivated above all by the need to defend the Jamaica
trading fleet from French attack while it was bringing home the returns
from the Spanish colonies. 53 Britain was forced, therefore, to keep a
naval squadron based at Jamaica to convoy the merchants' sloops. During
the years 1708-11, for instance, Britain spent nearly £2 million on warships
assigned to the colonies, chiefly Jamaica. 54

In 1689-1712, therefore, the English position in the West Indies was
the essentially defensive one of preserving as far as possible its Spanish
trade. The war there simply did not offer the opportunity for decisive
military victory and vast profits that the theorists of maritime strategy
argued. Britain had to confront the rivalry of French merchants holding
the assiento and enjoying superior access to Spanish American ports. It had
to deploy military resources to meet the attacks of French privateers and
warships well placed to drive England out of the American trade. And its
own privateers had to be denied the right of unrestricted warfare given
the complex and delicate trading nexus in the Caribbean.

The strategic debate in the years 1689-1714 can never be considered
in purely military or economic terms, but always reflected deep-seated
political prejudices and domestic concerns. Any discussion of the strategic
debate in our period which fails to take seriously those broader political
issues which largely determined its course is seriously deficient. The
wars of 1689-1712 were to the Whigs ideological wars, fought ultimately
for the defence of those principles and issues enshrined in the Revolution
Settlement of 1689. Many independent Whigs may have failed to see the
danger involved in cutting down the army in 1698 to a derisory 8,000 men.
Even Whig ministers, aware of public opinion after a long and expensive war, were unenthusiastic about the first Partition Treaty when William deigned to inform them of its contents. The Junto leaders were sensitive to the traditional Whig fear of a large standing army: at the height of the Succession War Somers 'hoped never to see anything like a standing army in England'. But the Whigs recognised the interdependence of Britain and Europe far more easily than their opponents. (Indeed, one of the main attractions of the maritime strategy to the Tories was that it could be pursued independently by England with little need for allied co-operation.)

And as the cornerstone of that interdependence stood the Whig concern for the Anglo-Dutch alliance which underpinned the continental strategy employed by Britain in 1689-1712. This contrasted sharply with the Tory dislike for William and the Dutch, and of European wars fought, as they saw it, primarily for Dutch advantage. 'If you would discover a concealed Tory', noted one Whig, 'speak but of the Dutch and you will find him out by his passionate railing'. In 1701 the apparent Tory reluctance to commit England wholeheartedly to support for the Dutch led one Whig to comment that 'Our present parliament pleases no party that I can hear of but the French king'. In the following election the Whigs emphasised Tory disloyalty. The Tories recognised that such claims had damaged their election prospects. In 1701-02 Godolphin and Marlborough (and Harley) built up a Tory administration that they hoped would assure 'that the business of abroad shall be carried on with vigour'. But it became apparent from 1702 on that a strong group of Tories, centred around Rochester, Buckingham, Seymour, Bromley and Wright (and Nottingham after 1704), would do all they could to exploit Anglo-Dutch differences, denigrate Marlborough as a Dutch dupe, and undermine effective support for the Flanders war.

By the 1704-05 session Godolphin was forced into some sort of accommodation
with the Whigs. In the session of 1705-06, before Ramillies and Turin, Tory anger with the Dutch about the unequal burden which England was carrying was bitter and universal. Yet the typical Whig reaction at this time was 'to curse those who now do all they can to blow the coals between England and Holland'. Marlborough became convinced that 'there is no relying upon the Tories', and that there was 'no choice but that employing those that will carry on the war and support Godolphin'.

As Harley saw it with respect to the Dutch: 'The world is wide enough for us both to trade'. But few Tories were so understanding; and in 1707 Shrewsbury noted that 'there is a notion that we are such rivals in trade that the next war will be with them'. The Whigs understood that the Dutch 'Commonwealth had begun and prospered by trade, even with their professed enemies'. Dutch reluctance to prohibit all trade with the French infuriated the Tories. The French thus found it easy to exploit Anglo-Dutch commercial rivalry and, for instance, astutely broadcast the secret trading articles signed by Charles with the Whigs in 1708.

Anglo-Dutch military co-operation was the ultimate guarantee to the Whigs of the Revolution Settlement. This underlay their basic acceptance of a substantial English commitment in Flanders. In the Barrier Treaty debates of February 1712 the Whigs claimed that only the assistance of Dutch forces could secure the succession for Hanover. This infuriated the Tories. Later in the same session the Tory Commons bitterly attacked Dutch deficiencies in their naval quotas, which were seen as having undermined any chance of a successful naval strategy:

Hence your majesty has been obliged to supply those deficiencies with additional reinforcements of your own ships... This has straitened the convoys for trade, the coasts have been exposed for want of cruisers, and you have been disabled from annoying the enemy in their most beneficial commerce with the West Indies, whence they received those vast supplies of treasure without which they could not have supported the expenses of the war.
And the ministry fuelled this anger with detailed investigations into the Dutch naval performance in the war. The Admiralty Commissioners produced the following figures for ships contributed to the Anglo-Dutch battle fleets:

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Dutch Quota</th>
<th>Dutch Actual</th>
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<td>1702</td>
<td>74</td>
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<td>1703</td>
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<td>1711</td>
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'And not so much as one ship allotted by the States General to act in concert with those of Her Majesty against the enemy's ships at Dunkirk and the Channel'. In 1712 the Tory administration also prepared an estimate of 'The sums expended over and above the expense of furnishing quotas as answered those of the allies' which amounted to over £20 million. Accurate or not, these figures reflected the average Tory view that England had been blatantly fleeced by its allies, particularly the Dutch, in the Succession War.

William had no faith in the Whigs on foreign and military matters in 1689. The Whigs in 1677-85 had wilfully ignored warnings on the growing danger from France. The early Whigs had been ready cynically to use French assistance in order to ruin their political rivals and achieve their immediate domestic objectives. But the new generation of Whigs who came into office after 1689 soon accepted and championed William's new European rôle for England. They had no choice if they wished to preserve the Whig principles encoded in the Revolution Settlement. For in 1689-97 especially the Settlement itself was a major issue. As Halifax noted in 1706: 'In the last war the owning the King's title was a great ground of the war'.
In office or not the Whigs remained consistent in assuming that parliament had both a duty and a right to offer advice to the monarch on military and foreign matters. In defending the peace talks in December 1711 some Tories argued that the monarch had unlimited power to conduct such matters and that the role of parliament was only to give advice when asked. But there was no possibility that the royal prerogative in foreign and military matters would seriously become an issue dividing Whig and Tory, especially after 1702. It was their conduct which set Whig against Tory (and divided the parties internally) not the largely moribund issue of the theoretical royal monopoly of external and military policy.

The rise and conflict of political parties before 1688 did not greatly affect the course of Stuart foreign policy. Yet the war and foreign policy were easily the most important factors in realigning political groupings from 1689. The Tories indeed came to see Whiggery itself as an extraneous political parasite feeding off long continental warfare and high taxation. As Harley put it: 'Those who are the smaller part of the nation have made themselves formidable and terrible to the greater'. The Nine Years' and Succession Wars were an unhappy period for the small and middling farmers who made up the numerical strength of the Tory party and whose wealth derived almost totally from their rents. 'The whole burden' of war, argued St John, 'has lain upon the landed interest'. For such small landholders not even the Spanish war, which the Tory leaders had often championed, offered much: 'Since we must never give over the war till we have conquered Spain', bewailed one Tory squire in January 1711, 'it is high time for poor country gentlemen with small estates to conclude that all they have may not be enough to effect that which even Don Quixote himself would have thought impossible'.

That there was a real degree of social tension between the landed and
moneyed interest in our period is now fairly well established. That is, between those who lived on their rental income and those involved in the machinery of government credit created after the Revolution to finance prolonged war: particularly the Bank of England formed in 1694. Financiers, given their importance in sustaining government credit, had a political influence in and out of parliament disproportionate to their numbers. The Tories increasingly saw the government as being in an unholy alliance with the financiers to ruin the landed interest. In 1694 Harley complained of the 'exorbitant excises and funds which will quickly destroy all the landed men of England.' The Tories thought that direct taxation of estates to pay for the war was crippling the landed men, while those who lent money were making vast profits and thus had a mercenary interest in the continuance of the war. The principal source of government revenue was the land tax, calculated as two shillings in the pound in peace but doubled in time of war. Late in 1707, St John ominously warned Marlborough that the landed interest was 'bowed under the burden of taxes'. As one Tory put it in 1709: 'If a gentleman speaks against the continuance of the war to prevent the beggary of the nation, to prevent the monied and military men becoming lords of us who have the lands, then he is to be no object of Her Majesty's favour and encouragement'.

There was obviously more profit to be made from investing in the machinery of government borrowing than in land (or, indeed, in trade) in these years. Harley noted this in 1709 as well as the 'vast estates which have been raised from nothing' since 1689. The clash of interests between the two groups reached its height in that year. The landed gentry were reduced to distraction as a harrowing winter was followed by a pitiful harvest. But the Whigs were in power in 1708-10 and the bank dividends continued to show a handsome return. In 1709 the Commons, with a number of
monied members, increased the rate of interest on loans advanced in anticipation of the land tax. When the burden of war tax was at its worse the landed men had to watch as the return was made more profitable to those who lent on it. It was in 1708-09 that claims that the ministry were prolonging the war for mercenary and political advantage became widespread. As Nottingham noted of the war in December 1708: 'While it lasts it is plain some persons get immensely'.

The failure to make peace with a clearly desperate France in 1709-10 encouraged the notion that the monied interest desired to perpetuate the war. Certainly some financiers were not prepared to accept a peace which left the Bourbon candidate on the Spanish throne and communicated this to Godolphin in no uncertain terms. In June 1710 one observer bitterly noted that the Gertrudenberg peace proposals would 'be very acceptable to the country however they are received in town'. An added cause of friction was the large involvement of foreigners in the new financial institutions. In 1710 Harley was reminded of the 'great sums the French refugees and the Dutch have in the funds'. All in all, one Tory backbencher could declare in 1712 that 'the greatest and best part of her majesty's subjects eyes are open and know that they have been bubbles and made a property of to enrich others'. Continental warfare was not only bloody and expensive, but warping the country's social and economic structure.

The Whigs also seemed, in the Succession War particularly, to be the main beneficiaries from military patronage. In Anne's reign the disposal of such patronage played a vital rôle in the management of the war by Marlborough and Godolphin. Marlborough was a Tory of a sort and there was a group of Tory senior officers but the Whigs carried off the main military commands. There is no evidence that political divisions in the officer corps ever seriously influenced the conduct of military operations.
Yet the army was not immune to the rifts caused by political factors. Note the dissention in the officer corps over the refusal of French peace terms in 1709 and the chances of forcing a victory in Flanders. By late 1710 it was clearly noted that 'faction is crept into the camps'. And it was in this year that the fierce antagonism between Argyle and Marlborough became public.

The navy was less obviously Whig dominated. Indeed, in the early years of William's reign many naval officers were thought to have Jacobite sympathies. The poor performance of the fleet at this time was often attributed to this. But the degree of Jacobite sympathy in the navy seems to have been seriously overestimated by Louis. The political divisions in the naval officer corps, in part a legacy of the old 'tarpaulin' versus 'gentleman sailor' division, occasionally surfaced in our period as a factor in operations. But any attempt to pit Tory navy against Whig army would be seriously misleading. Tory attempts to build up a maritime party round Admiral Rooke in 1704 were stillborn; with the Whig lords prominent in defeating it. Tory mismanagement of the naval administration from 1702-08, exercised through George Churchill and Prince George of Denmark, was widely seen as 'scandalous'. And they do seem to have discriminated against naval officers with Whig leanings. Significantly, Harley thought it worthwhile to cultivate George Churchill's friendship and influence at the end of 1708. The Whig Junto already had close connections with the navy through one of their key members Russell (later Orford). And it is clear that Orford's friends in the naval administration and his clients in the officer corps were among the Junto's staunchest friends. The Whigs were sincerely upset by the failure of the new Lord High Admiral, Pembroke, to achieve any noticeable improvement in naval administration during 1709. When Orford took over he was determined to
get rid of all naval personnel he thought inefficient. But he obviously did not attempt to restructure the naval officer corps on partisan Whig lines. The Tory administration of 1710-14 eventually conducted a detailed analysis of the political sympathies of all serving naval captains, and found the corps almost evenly divided between Whig and Tory. 96

A large number of military officers, especially army officers, secured parliamentary seats. Few things distressed the country gentry more in William's and Anne's reign than the growing political influence exercised by military men. 97 Most of the small group of army officers who were Marlborough's favourites were clear Whigs. The campaigning season in the Spanish Netherlands and Germany normally corresponded to the parliamentary recess; and many of the country gentry thought that army officers seemed to prefer parliamentary service to their military duties. There is no evidence that the army officers in parliament formed a cohesive and articulate pressure group but it must be presumed that their very presence had some effect in broadening members' knowledge of military and international affairs. Certainly some officers' dissatisfaction with the conduct of the Dutch in the early years of the Succession War, for instance, was communicated to politicians and public at home. 98 But there is little evidence that they seriously attempted to sway public opinion on military questions on a consistent basis. They were feared more as a group who had a growing vested interest in the continuance of protracted continental war. In 1708, when Harley was trying to organize an effective campaign against the continental war, and attempting to draw the Country Whigs into an all-party opposition to its continuance, he made much of the abuses and corruption now widely associated with the army. 'Mean submissions are the road to advancement' in the armed forces suggested Harley. Where 'factions are fermented and discipline neglected' and 'everything sold from
an ensign to a colonelcy'. The government was 'setting up officers and furnishing them with money to oppose country gentlemen'.

Regiments and generals who have never seen an enemy in war...
And for general officers you have more than will serve treble the number of army you have... To what purpose is this but to make an interest to secure them from disbanding...
For the same purpose the black prince elector prefers such men to be members of parliament.

Significantly, the Tories came to see the threat from the military and monied interest in much the same terms, and to link them together in their propaganda.

To the Tories, a naval war seemed, by definition, limited and peripheral. As such it could be fought with limited resources, financial and material, and could be subjected to much closer parliamentary scrutiny than, it was thought, the swollen administration that a large army entailed. Not only would a naval war keep money at home (and the navy remained the largest employer of labour and consumer materials in the domestic economy) but naval expenses could be more easily controlled by parliament. The Tories, even in time of war, were always keen on the idea that naval expenses were kept 'within its old economy'. 100 As Davenant saw it:

It is a matter the House of Commons are well versed in, and used to; the charges of it are fully known, and easily stated, where there is no inserting dark and deceitful articles. A fleet admits of that economy which a vitiate Court abhors'. 101

The Tory backbenchers in 1710/11 were anxious, as one explained to Harley, to investigate 'the manner the army was paid since the beginning of this war, and also what abuses have been introduced by the insatiable avarice of some men'. 102 And there was a clear determination in 1710 that the money voted for the navy should not be diverted as had happened before for the use of the army. 103

As noted, neither the Spanish or Caribbean strategies held realistic
hopes of inflicting decisive defeat on France. In the early part of the Succession War great hopes were placed on the idea of getting at France through Italy. But the Savoyard alliance produced little of the military benefits envisaged in 1703, and by 1704 Victor Amadeus was clinging to a small area around Turin while the Imperial army was nearly forced back into the Trentino. Only Eugene's desperate diversionary manoeuvring in 1705 enabled Victor Amadeus to hold on. It was clear by 1705 that the Imperial war effort in Italy was emasculated by lack of money, and that this could only come from England. Marlborough played the main part in organizing effective financial support from the Maritime Powers for the Imperial army in Italy in the winter of 1705, and told Wratislaw in October: 'It seems to me high time to think seriously about this war in Italy, a war which employs so great a number of enemy troops, who would fall upon our backs elsewhere if we were driven out of it'. Supported with English money Eugene went on to victory at Turin in 1706, and by the beginning of 1707 the Imperial army was in an impregnable position in northern Italy. But the allied victories there merely encouraged Louis to withdraw from Italy and concentrate his forces on the northern frontier of France and on supporting Philip in Spain. Nor could the allies effectively exploit their Italian victories to enter France. The idea of capturing Toulon was unsound. Marlborough believed that 'the whole future of the campaign and even of the war depended on' the 'Italian plan'. But with only one poor coastal road to Italy the allies would have needed continuous naval support to supply their armies in Toulon, for they never contemplated occupying Provence itself. Louis was forced to divert troops to the south, but Marlborough could not exploit this in Flanders. It became clear after Toulon, especially to Eugene, that France could never be decisively defeated from the south-east. The allies could neither field nor supply a large
army from Germany or north Italy, nor could they threaten Paris from these fronts. Indeed, it was Eugene who suggested to Marlborough in 1707 that the allies should remain on the defensive in Savoy and Spain in 1708 and that a fresh army should be assembled on the Moselle under the Prince's command and a northern strategy pursued against France.

Ironically, Eugene played a large part in obstructing an offensive strategy in northern Europe in 1708-1710, when there seemed a real possibility of breaking into France. Delays in assembling Eugene's Moselle army in 1708 allowed the French to take the offensive, outmanoeuvre Marlborough and dominate the whole coast south of Antwerp and the canal system of western Flanders. Marlborough regained the allied initiative after Oudenarde; but his desire to march on Paris was prevented by Eugene's and the field-deputies' insistence on taking Lille. Although an aggressive field commander in the Turkish and Italian wars, Eugene succumbed to the prevailing atmosphere of defensive caution in Flanders and became obsessed with sieges and logistic security. Although Eugene had persuaded the Dutch commanders to give Marlborough more freedom of action in 1708 he soon supported their military conservatism.

In 1709 Eugene and the Dutch were preoccupied with the problem of supplying their forces if they decided to bypass Villar's army and advance on Paris. They rejected Marlborough's plan to maintain the allied forces through Abbeville. No real attempt was made to manoeuvre the French out of their defensive lines, and the allies settled down to besieging Tournai. There was an increasing belief in the allied camp that Louis was already beaten, and that only steady pressure was required for France to collapse: 'The account of the misery and disturbances in France are such that if it continues they must be ruined' Marlborough told Heinsius. But it seems Marlborough was becoming increasingly cautious and bereft of ideas. Marl-
borough had proved a brilliant strategist when, in 1704–06, he was largely anticipating and reacting to French moves. But now that the strategic initiative was plainly in allied hands Marlborough was less forceful, and offered little resistance to Eugene's defensive policies.

Such caution suited Louis, who increasingly imposed a strict defensive strategy on Villars, from which the French commander was only reluctantly released just before Malplaquet. In 1710 Louis once again ordered a defensive stance by Villars; and the allies continued with their conservative strategy by besieging Douai. Marlborough hoped that the 1710 campaign would end the war, but soon succumbed to depressive caution. Marlborough's hopes now began to centre on his belief, as explained to Godolphin in late June and early July, that France would eventually be ground down after two or three years by the pressure on her resources of having to support two large armies in her northern provinces. When Marlborough considered outflanking the French by a coastal march on Calais, he again allowed himself to be dissuaded by Eugene who was preoccupied with the problem of feeding the allied army in a famine-stricken area. Louis remained quite confident about maintaining his defensive strategy in 1711, for as he advised Villars in April of that year: 'The present conjuncture does not require any considerable action'.

Militarily, the policy of slowly wearing France down with sieges and weight of numbers may have had much to recommend it: French resources were not bottomless. But politically such a strategy was increasingly unacceptable in England in 1708–11. The idea that the war in Flanders was being deliberately prolonged by Marlborough after 1708 seemed plausible. To some extent Marlborough's ambitions for an aggressive forward strategy were hamstrung by allied caution; but from 1708 there was an increasing indecisiveness about his generalship. The Junto's oft-expressed belief
in these years, as Sunderland wrote in June 1709, that 'The French troops as well as the country are in such a miserable condition that either the King of France must comply with what the allies shall think necessary to demand of him, or there seems nothing can hinder our army from marching to Paris' was reminiscent of the Whig optimism about the parlous condition of France and the possibility of a decisive victory with little fighting expressed in 1689; and encouraged Tory belief that Marlborough and the Junto were engaged in the same sort of military and political duplicity. The idea that France was on the brink of total collapse mixed uneasily with the doctrine that sustained pressure was required to bring her to her knees, and helped create the atmosphere of military and political frustration which exploded in 1710-11; as a similar combination of disappointment over promised descents and the failure of the Junto dream of achieving decisive results through the Continental strategy had led to the bitterness of 1697-98. The sense of military frustration at the end of both wars was compounded by the unrealised hopes for a largely maritime strategy on England's part which had been widespread in 1689-92 and 1700-03. Country and Tory politicians foresaw a parasitic bureaucracy and a parliament filled with military officers, placemen and bankers supporting an army engaged in endless and inconclusive European warfare. To the Tories much of the attraction of naval campaigns together with supporting operations in Spain, the Caribbean and the coasts of France was because they were seen as making war on the cheap. They hoped to turn the French flank without the need to employ large numbers of men and vast amounts of money. They sought theatres of operations where the vast masses of the French army could not oppose them, but ignored the fact that in those theatres they would not be able to inflict decisive strategic defeat on the French. The Tories were the inheritors of the 'Country' and 'Elizabethan' tradition of warfare.
Nurtured in such a tradition, the military events of 1689-1712 only confirmed their prejudices. They viewed strategy in terms of an economy of effort, best realised by a careful distribution of military strength between a number of targets. British military power, conjoined amphibiously with the fleet, could thus produce results (and commercial benefits) out of all proportion to the small army that would be necessary. Given the failure of even Marlborough's military genius to breakthrough in Northern Europe in the limited campaigning season available, even after such victories as Ramillies and Blenheim, it might be argued that English military resources were too heavily committed to the continental war. Yet, given the crude way the military stalemate was often exploited for political ends, it must be remembered that the indirect, 'blue-water' approach was completely dependent, ultimately, on the hard grind of heavy battle against the enemy's main forces in Northern France and Flanders. Outflanking operations on the French coast, in Spain and Portugal, or in the Caribbean and Mediterranean, stood no chance at all if the main bulk of the French were not contained in the Northern European theatre of operations. 'Blue-water' ideas, then, were very rarely comprehensively thought out in our period. In many ways they were simply a negative and isolationist reaction to England's changing European role.

In many respects the Tory maritime strategy was merely an external reflection of their domestic obsessions with low taxation, abhorrence of placemen and government bureaucrats, and for rectitude in government finance which had made up the old 'Country' ethos, and which was increasingly taken over by the Tories after 1688 as the 'old' or 'true' Whigs such as Harley and Foley found common allegiance with Musgrave and Clarges, and a distinctly post-Revolution Tory ideology began to emerge. In their attempts to limit the extent of the corruption and financial peculation
which they saw as an inevitable consequence of an expensive land war the Tories relied above all on the Commission of Public Accounts. Its political importance in William's reign as a forcing ground for the developing Country/Tory opposition and as a platform for fierce criticism of the continental strategy has been detailed in the dissertation. Significantly, it only flourished in Anne's reign when the Tories held power with large majorities.

The essentially old-fashioned nature of much of the argument for a maritime strategy in our period is seen in its resemblance to ideas and prejudices dating back almost a century. A comparison of the parliamentary debates on the military situation in 1621, 1624 and 1625 with the ideas current in William's and Anne's reign reveals a remarkable continuity of thought: whether it was the objections in 1625 to Mansfeld ('a stranger') being chosen to lead the English army; the idea that the primary task of the navy was the defence of commerce at the expense of any strategically aggressive use: 'Shall we send a fleet abroad and be infested at home', as one member asked in 1625; the tendency to employ genuine mercantile fears over trade losses in coastal waters as an argument against continental military commitment; the condemnation of European campaigns as a waste of 'many thousands of treasure... expended without any success of honour or profit'. Above all, the desire for a war fought 'in such a manner as may yield a hope and commodity reciprocal to the charge' that Pym expressed in 1621. This hope was centred on the West Indies throughout the century. Campaigns there would be both profitable and the most efficacious way of fighting a continental power. In the 1621 parliament Pym spoke of his 'hope of profit, which how easily by the benefit of our shipping might be made upon the dispersed coasts' of the Spanish Empire. In 1624 Sir Edward Coke could claim that 'War with Spain is England's best
Prosperity'; and Sir John Eliot that 'The war with Spain is our Indies, that there we shall fetch wealth and happiness'. At the same time Francis Bacon noted:

For money, no doubt, it is the principal part of the greatness of Spain... Their greatness consisteth in their treasure; their treasure in their Indies; and their Indies... are indeed but an accession to such as are masters by sea... For whereas wars are generally causes of poverty or consumption... the special nature of this war with Spain (if it be made by sea) is like to be a lucrative and restorative war.

Such ideas, as we have noted, were revived in almost the same language in 1700-02 as a war over the Spanish Empire approached. As France survived defeat after defeat on the continent in 1704-08 such ideas were resurrected and manipulated by opponents of the Flanders strategy to argue that France and Spain could not fight without the treasures of the Indies to pay their armies - 'If you get but the Spanish plate fleet you recover Spain in two years... the money is the victory, and without you do nothing' - and that Britain had forsaken opportunities of vast profits in colonial campaigns to mistakenly concentrate on European fighting. Even among those Englishmen prepared to contemplate continental warfare there was still a widespread belief that, as Cromwell told parliament in 1656: 'Truly your great enemy is the Spaniard: he is a natural enemy'. Hence the astonishing popularity of the Spanish campaigns in Anne's reign; and the belief that a Spanish war held out hopes of profit and a possibility of unique advantages and benefits accruing to England. 'We would have the greatest effort made where the greatest earnings may be had; and this we are taught by our very enemies to be in Spain' was one typical Tory view of war strategy in our period which drew on this argument. Spain was the issue in which England had 'so particular an interest' as Harley put it. A view of warfare which saw military operations in the simplistic, balance-sheet arith-
metic of profit and loss, and which totally ignored the larger questions of political, dynastic, religious and commercial security which confronted the nation in 1689-1712.

The accession of George I and the passing of the Septennial Act in 1716 was to destroy the Tory party as an effective political force for nearly a century. But the strategic disputes of the years 1689-1712 have continued to erupt whenever Britain was compelled to exert itself militarily against a European power right down to the present century. The student of the First World War, for instance, will easily find many parallels in the fierce arguments between 'Easterners' and Westerners' in that conflict with the strategic debate in 1689-1712. For all the partisan heat which the strategic question generated in our period it possessed a rationale, given Britain's geographical position and special trading interests which, ultimately, did not owe everything to political loyalties. But even today, perhaps, the matter cannot be discussed without some reference to party divisions: when one contemporary High Tory can still talk of:

The Whiggish surrender of Great Britain's insular sovereignty to a continental alignment, political and ultimately military, towards which the Tory instinct at the end of the 20th century remains as over as it was at the beginning of the 18th. 112
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302. H.M.C. Buccleuch, ii, part i, 71.

303. H.M.C. Portland, iii, 551, F. Gwyn to Harley, 25 June and 7 July


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323. Loan 29/135 bundle 7, to Harley, 22 June 1694.

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325. An Exact Journal of the Victorious Expedition of the Confederate Fleet, the last year, under the Command of Admiral Russell, 1695; Edward D'Auvergne, The History of the Campagne in the Spanish Netherlands, 1694, p.102; Reflexions upon the Conditions of Peace Offered by France, 1694, p.29.

326. C.S.P.D. 1694-1695, pp.217-18, 10 July 1694.

327. A True and Full Account of the Burning and Destroying Five and Thirty Ships in Conquest Road, near Brest, on 9 May, 1694; An Account of the Burning of Havre de Grace by Lord Berkeley, 1694.


(ix) The Last Years of the Continental War 1695-97


330. Hatton Papers

331. C.J., xi, 271.

332. H.M.C. Ancaster, p.436, Peregrine Bertie to Earl of Lindsey, 10 November.

333. Archives, iii, part i, 366.

334. D'Auvergne had sketched out very similar arguments to those used in the Reflexions in his The History of the Campagne in Spanish Netherlands, 1694, pp.102-103; and the Reflexions is published by D'Auvergne's usual publisher. For D'Auvergne in general see the Dictionary of National Biography.


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337. Loan 29/187, f 344, Harley to Foley, 20 November 1694.

338. Ibid., f 284, Harley to Sir Edward Harley, 28 August; cf. Loan 29/135 Foley to Harley, 23 October; H.M.C. Bath, i, 50-51.


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347. Evelyn, v, 218, 15 September 1695.

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35. Journal of Sir George Rooke, 1700-1702, ed. O. Browning, 1897, pp.144-45; Tindal, xv, 253.

36. H.M.C. Portland, iv, 46, 11 September 1702.


39. Finch Hatton MSS 275, f 132.

40. Ibid., 276, f 175, to Godolphin, 10 October 1702.

41. S.P. 100/10, notes in Nottingham's hand of a conference with Wratislaw, 6 August 1702.

42. B.L. Lansdowne MSS 773, f 7, Charles to Henry Davenant, 4 May 1703.

43. Finch Hatton MSS 275, f 175, Nottingham to Godolphin, 10 October 1702.
44. Add MSS 29588 f 324, to Nottingham, 11 October 1702.
45. Ibid., f 325, to Nottingham 11 October 1702.
46. S.P. 84/224, f 191, Stanhope to Hedges, 3/14 November 1702.
47. Add MSS 28889, Col. Kendall to J. Ellis, 30 October 1702; cf. H.M.C. Cowper, iii, 18, William Inge to Thomas Coke, 8 November.
49. Add MSS 22852, f 12, Sir Stephen Evance to Thomas Pitt, 6 December; ibid., f 126, Thomas Lucas to Thomas Pitt, 10 March 1703; ibid., f 128, John Styleman to Thomas Pitt, 15 February 1703.
51. H.M.C. Portland, iv, 50, 55, 4 November and 24 December 1702.
52. Add MSS 29590 ff 153-54, to Nottingham, 1/12 November, Lisbon.
53. S.P. 100/10, draft, Nottingham to Wratislaw, 16 January 1703.
54. Ibid., draft, 4 January 1703.
56. Horwitz, Revolution Politicks, pp.211-212.
57. S.P. 80/19 f 241, Stepney to Hedges, 18 October 1702, Vienna.
58. Ibid., f 274, to Hedges, 25 October 1702.
59. Ibid., f 337, to Hedges, 18 November 1702.
60. S.P. 80/18 f 306, to Vernon, 20 May 1702.
61. Marlborough MSS M/25, Hedges to Marlborough, 8 May 1703.
62. S.P. 84/224, f 380, to Hedges, 17 April 1703.
63. B.L. Lansdowne MSS 777, f 20, to Henry Davenant, 14 March 1704; ibid., f 46, to same, 27 June 1704.
64. Ibid., f 22, to same, 24 March 1704.
65. Loan 29/9 bundle 5, memo. by Harley, 11 July 1704.
67. Finch Hatton MSS 277, f 13, 24 May 1703.
68. Murray, Letters and Despatches, i, 73-74; Finch Hatton MSS 277, ff 1, 2, 8-9, 37-38, 42-43; Add MSS 29595, ff 230-31, Nottingham to Heinsius, 24 May 1703.
69. Finch Hatton MSS 277, ff 1, 50, Nottingham to Heinsius, 30 April and 23 July; cf. Murray, Letters and Despatches, i, 101, 156, 168; S.P. 84/225, ff 59, 60, 75, Heinsius to Nottingham, 1/12 May, 25 May/15 June, 3/14 August.

70. Finch Hatton MSS 276 f 50, Nottingham to Heinsius, 23 July.

71. Finch Hatton MSS 276 f 59, 6 August 1703.

72. Finch Hatton MSS 276 f 60, to Marlborough, 10 August 1703.

73. Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., i, 201, 10 June 1703.

74. Marlborough-Heinsius Corr., p.87, 11 August 1703.

75. Add MSS 29589A ff 55-56, Godolphin to Nottingham, 23 July 1703.

76. S.P. 87/2, f 39, Marlborough to Nottingham, 26 March 1703.

77. S.P. 87/8, f 47, Marlborough to Nottingham, 3 June 1703; cf. Murray, i, 117.

78. Marlborough MSS M/25, 11 May 1703.

79. Hill Corr., i, 16.

80. S.P. 84/223.

81. Finch Hatton MSS 276, ff 1-2, Nottingham to Hedges, 3 September 1703; Coombs, Conduct of the Dutch, pp. 58-59.

82. Add MSS 29589A f 121, 31 August 1703; ibid., ff 143-44, 6 September 1703.


84. Ibid., Letters 119, 144.


86. Finch Hatton MSS 277, ff 113-14, Nottingham to Marlborough, 8 October 1703.

87. Murray, i, 203.

88. Hill Corr., i, 45-46.

89. Add MSS 40775 f 367, 18 February 1701/1702, Cabinet minutes.

90. Add MSS 29591 passim, for the minutes of this 'secret committee'.


92. Add MSS 29587, ff 101-06, instructions to Sir David Mitchell, 29 September 1702.
93. Finch Hatton MSS 275, ff 33-34.
94. Ibid., 275 ff, 33-34.
96. S.P. 84/225, ff 27, 33, 36, 45, 48, 49, Sir David Mitchell, to Nottingham, 18, 23, 28 July, 14, 25, 28 August.
97. Ibid., f 27, Mitchell to Heinsius, 18 July 1702.
98. Finch Hatton MSS 275, ff 104-5.
99. S.P. 84/225, Mitchell to Nottingham, 8 September 1702.
100. Add MSS 29588, f 318, to Nottingham, 8 October 1702.
101. Ibid., ff 304-05, to Nottingham, 5 October 1702.
102. Ibid., f 233, to Nottingham, 15 September 1702.
103. Finch Hatton MSS 275, ff 33-34, to Marlborough 26 June 1702; ibid., f 115, Nottingham to Warre, 16 September 1702.
104. Finch Hatton MSS 277, f 111, Nottingham to Hedges, 10 September 1703.
105. Add MSS 29588, f 233, Godolphin to Nottingham, 15 September 1703.
106. Ibid., f 253, Rochester to Nottingham, 21 September 1702.
107. Ibid., f 325, Godolphin to Nottingham, 11 October 1702.
108. S.P. 84/244, f 306, to Hedges, 26 January/6 February 1703.
112. Burchett, J., Justification of his Naval Memoirs, 1704, pp.149-66; cf. the same author's Memoirs of Transactions at Sea, 1703, p.175.
114. Add MSS 29588 ff 193, 240 Hedges to Nottingham, 9 and 18 September 1702.
115. Nicolson MSS Diary, 9 January 1703.
117. H.M.C. Portland, iv, 55-6; Klopp, x, 227.
118. Hill Corr., i, 248, 263.
119. Coxe, i, 204-05.
120. Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., i, 255, 19 October 1703.
122. Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., i, 10 June 1703; Coxe, i, 134, Marlborough to Duchess, 10 June 1703.
123. Morrison Catalogue, first series, 1883, i, 254, to Godolphin, 10 September 1703.
125. Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., i, 221, to Godolphin, 10 July 1703.
126. Marlborough MSS M/17, Harley to Godolphin, 20 September 1703.
127. Marlborough MSS C/1/1, to Sunderland, 8 July 1703.
129. H.M.C. Portland, iv, 68-69, 26 September 1703.
130. Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., i, 250, to Godolphin, 30 September 1703.
131. Marlborough MSS M/37 Stepney to Marlborough, 30 May 1703, Vienna.
132. Ibid., Stepney to Hedges (copy), 30 May 1703, Vienna.
133. Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., i, 256-257, 22 October 1703.
134. Ibid., i, 226, 26 July 1703.
135. Marlborough MSS M/30, Somerset to Marlborough, 9 September 1703.
136. Trevelyan, i, 337, 354.
137. Charles Davenant, Peace at Home and War Abroad, 1704.
139. Marlborough MSS M/18.
140. Marlborough MSS M/18, 8/19 December 1704.
141. Ibid., Harley to Marlborough, 1/12 December 1704; cf. S.P. 104/72 f 37, Harley to Stanhope, 1/12 December.
142. S.P. 84/227 ff 147-48, 8/19 December 1704.
143. Ibid., ff 149-50.
144. Ibid., f 172, Harley to Alex. Stanhope, 24 July 1705.

145. Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., i, Marlborough to Godolphin, 19 August n.s.

146. Coxe, i, 442, 18 August 1705.

147. S.P. 104/72, f 51, 16/24 February 1705.

148. Marlborough MSS M/18, to Marlborough, 8/19 December 1704.

149. Ibid., to Marlborough, 8/19 December 1704.

150. Add MSS 7059, f 3, 2 June 1704; Loan 29/164, bundle 84, draft letters to Stepney, 23 June/4 July, 30 May/10 June 1704.

151. Add MSS 7059, f 31, to Stepney, 5 September 1704; ibid., f 33, to Stepney, 1 September 1704.

152. Loan 29/164/84, to Stepney, 4/15 July 1704.

153. Marlborough M/18, Harley to Marlborough, 15/26 August 1704; ibid., Harley to Marlborough, 18/29 August 1704.

154. Loan 29/376, Harley to Hill, 5 September 1704; cf. Hill Corr., i, 156.

155. Loan 29/376, Harley to Methuen, 25 July/5 August 1705.

156. Berkshire R.O. Downshire Papers, Trumbull MSS 133, letters 3, 6, 13 and 25, to Trumbull, 20 June, 7 August, 13 October, 1702 and 11 October 1703.

157. Ibid., Letter 13, 13 October 1702.

(ii) Blenheim

158. B.L. Lansdowne MSS 773 f 39, to Henry Davenant, 2 June 1704.

159. Ibid., f 46, to Henry Davenant, 27 June 1704.


161. Trevelyan, i, 337, 354.


164. Marlborough MSS M/26, to Marlborough, 7 July 1704.

165. Churchill, Marlborough, i, 780.
166. H.M.C. Downshire, i, part ii, 831; Burnet, v, 150 and note; H.M.C. Coke, pp. 37-38; H.M.C. Cowper, iii, 20 June 1704.


169. Loan 29/137/6, Rowland Gwynne to Harley, 11 July 1704.


172. e.g. A Copy of a Letter Concerning the Siege of Landau, November 1704.

173. H.M.C. Bath, i, 61, Godolphin to Harley, 1 September 1704.

174. H.M.C. Cowper, iii, 49, St John to T. Coke, 10 October, 1704; ibid., p. 50, W. Stratford to T. Coke, 17 October 1704.


176. Remarks Upon the Account of the Conduct of a Certain Duchess, 1742, p. 47.

177. H.M.C. Bath, ii, 178; Add MSS 22267, f. 123.

178. H.M.C. Portland, iv, 137, Defoe to Harley 28 September 1704.

179. H.M.C. Cowper, iii, 49, to T. Coke.

180. Ibid., p. 46, Robert Jenkins to T. Coke, 21 September 1704.

181. Ibid., p. 38, J. Brydges to T. Coke, 8 July 1704.

182. Ibid., p. 46.


184. Memoirs of the Late Right Honourable John, Lord Haversham, from the Year 1640-1710, 1711, pp. 6-11, Haversham's speech of 23 November 1704.

(iii) The Spanish War 1705-06.

185. Add MSS 28056 f 53, Methuen to Godolphin, 22 April 1704.

186. Francis, Peninsular War.

187. Marlborough MSS M/26, Hedges to Marlborough, 16 May 1704; Ibid., to Marlborough, 30 May 1704.
188. Marlborough MSS M/18, Harley to Marlborough, 20 June/1 July 1704; ibid., Harley to Marlborough, 27 June/8 July 1704.
189. Marlborough MSS M/26, Hedges to Marlborough, 7 July 1704.
190. Francis, Peninsular War.
192. S.P. 89/18 f 167, Methuen to Hedges, 1/12 November 1704.
193. Francis, Peninsular War.
194. Marlborough MSS M/26, Hedges to Marlborough, 3 October 1704.
196. S.P. 104/72, f 40, Harley to Stepney, 29 December 1704/9 January 1705.
197. Add MSS 34677, Harley to Robinson, 17 November 1704.
198. Loan 29/164/84, Harley to Stepney, 19/30 June 1705.
199. Add MSS 7059, Harley to Stepney, 4 August 1705.
201. Ibid., same to same, 31 July/11 August 1705; cf. S.P. 104/72 Harley to Stanhope, 31 July/11 August 1705.
204. Loan 29/151, 11 November 1705.
205. Marlborough MSS M/19, Harley to Marlborough, 30 November/11 December 1705.
206. Marlborough MSS M/19, to Marlborough, 27 November/8 December 1705.
207. S.". 104/72, f 112, Harley to Stanhope, 20 November/1 December 1705.
208. P.H. vi, 451-454.
209. Review, no.116, December 1705; Flying Post, 20 March 1705/1706; Rehearsal, No.28.
213. Cowper Diary, p.20, 26 November 1705.
215. Ibid., same to same, 26 October 1705.
216. Marlborough MSS M/19, to Marlborough, 21 December/1 January 1705/1706.
217. The Lord Haversham's Vindication of His speech in Parliament, 15 November 1705, 1705; Memoirs of the Late Right Honourable John, Lord Haversham from the year 1640-1710, 1711.
218. Add MSS 34515, f 206, Somers to Portland, 28 August 1705.
219. Burnet, v, 238-239; Add MSS 17677 AA ff 521-24, 529-33, 536-37, 551-52, 571-74; Nicolson MSS Diary, 22 November.
220. Cowper Diary, p.17, 22 November 1705.
221. Add MSS 28056 ff 62-64, R. Hill to Godolphin, 16/27 May, 1704, Turin.
222. Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., i, 515, 18 December 1705.
223. Loan 29/64 bundle 17, Godolphin to Harley, n.d. but winter 1705.
228. Hill Corr., i, 185, Godolphin to Hill, 2 March 1705.
231. Ibid., i, 402; C.J. xiv, 501-02.
232. Loan 29/376, Harley to Methuen, 25 July/5 August 1705.
233. Add MSS 28056 f 343, Methuen to Godolphin, 13 October 1705 n.s.
234. S.P. 84/223.
235. Add MSS 4291 f 80, to H. Davenant, 30 April 1706.
236. Ibid., f 64, to H. Davenant, 15 March 1706.
237. S.P. 104/73 f 14, Harley to Buys, 31 May/11 June 1706; Ibid., f 20, same to same, 18/29 June 1706.
238. Add MSS 4291, f 84, to H. Davenant, 17 May 1706.

240. S.P. 104/73, f 22, 18/29 July.

241. The Umpire, or, England the Balance of Europe, 1706.

242. Loan 29/132/6, various letters from Crosfield to Harley.

243. Add MSS 29589A f 449, Edward Southwell to Nottingham, 30 May 1706.

244. Marlborough MSS M/24, Sunderland to Marlborough, 27 August 1706.


246. Murray, iii, 223, to Peterborough, 22 November 1706.

247. Ibid., iii, 240, 29 November 1706, London.

248. Loan 29/151, to Harley, 19 November 1705.


250. Ibid., same to same, 17 June 1706.

251. Marlborough MSS M/27, Peterborough to Marlborough, 8 February 1706; ibid., same to same, 13 May 1706.


253. Add MSS 29589A f 449, Edward Southwell to Nottingham, 1 October 1706.


256. Ibid., ii, 710.

257. Ibid., ii, 657, Marlborough to Godolphin, 23 August/3 September 1706.

258. Ibid., i, 529-30, 26 April 1706.

259. Ibid., i, 538, 6 May 1706.

260. Ibid., i, 576-7, 5 June 1706.

261. Ibid., i, 585, 14 June 1706.

262. Ibid., ii, 708, Marlborough to Godolphin, 10/21 October 1706.

(iv) Harley and the War 1706-07.

263. Review, 18 May 1706
264. Marlborough MSS M/24, to Marlborough, 17 May 1706.
265. Ibid., M/50, 1 June 1706.
266. Ibid., M/50, 2 June 1706; cf. S.P. 84/225 f 132, Halifax to ?, 8 May 1706.
267. S.P. 104/73, f 11, Harley to Alexander Stanhope, 21 May/1 June 1706.
268. Ibid., f 1, Harley to Buys, 19 April/30 April 1706.
269. Add MSS 4291 f 64, Charles to Henry Davenant, 15 March 1706.
270. Add MSS 40776, f 11, to Vernon, 28 October 1706.
271. H.M.C. Fortescue, i, 17, R. Pitt to T. Pitt, 3 January 1706.
272. Ibid., f 11, to Vernon, 28 October 1706.
274. Harley's notes in Loan 29/7/37, 31 August 1706; cf. Loan 29/7/36 and 38.
275. H.M.C. Portland, v, 647.
277. Review, iii, 244, 278.
278. H.M.C. Bath, i, 105, to Harley, 7 October 1706.
280. Add MSS 4291 f 119, to Henry Davenant, 28 January 1707.
281 S.P. 89/19 f 256, 28 August 1706, John Milner (Consul General at Lisbon) to Hedges.
282. H.M.C. Downshire, i, part ii, 848.
284. Ibid., to Erle, 25 August 1706.
285. Ibid., to Erle, 24 December 1706.
286. Ibid., to Erle, 20 January 1707.
287. Ibid., to Erle, 28 January 1707.
288. Ibid., to Erle, 17/28 September 1706.
289. Marlborough MSS M/24, Sunderland to Marlborough, 6 May 1707.

290. Ibid., M/20, Harley to Marlborough, 6/17 May 1707.


293. Ibid., f 109 to Stepney, 6/17 May 1707; cf. Marlborough MSS M/20, to Marlborough, 22 July/2 August 1707.

294. 'St John - Erle Correspondence', to Erle 6/17 January 1708.

295. Loan 29/376, Harley to Chetwynd, 27 May 1707.

296. Marlborough MSS M/20, 29 August/9 September

297. Add MSS 15866 f 41, Harley to Dayrolle, 29 July 1707.

298. S.P. 87/2 f 589, Marlborough to Harley, 10 May 1707.

299. Marlborough MSS M/30, J. Craggs to Marlborough, 8 August 1707.

300. 'St John - Erle Correspondence', to Erle 11/22 July 1707.


302. Ibid., ii, 859, 25 July 1707.

303. Marlborough MSS M/20, to Marlborough, 29 August/9 September 1707.


305. Addison Letters, p.75, to Charles Montagu, 29 August 1707.

306. 'St John - Erle Correspondence', to Erle, 31 August 1707.


309. Loan 29/133 bundle 7, to Dayrolle, 26 August 1707.


312. Loan 29/9 bundle 48, 'Heads. Windsor, 13 September 1707'.

(v) Caribbean Strategy 1706-08

313. H.M.C. Bath, i, 155.
315. Ibid., p.93.
316. Marlborough MSS M/21, Boyle to Marlborough, 16 July 1708.
318. An Inquiry into the Causes of our Naval Miscarriages, 1707.
319. Ibid., iv, pp.4-5.
320. Ibid., v.
321. Ibid., pp.21-22.
322. Ibid., p.25; cf. A Letter to a Member of Parliament Concerning Trade, and Particularly the Trade of the Spanish West Indies, 1707 and Le Wright, J., Two Proposals Concerning England at this Juncture to Undertake: One for Securing a Colony in the West Indies, 1706.
323. S.P. 104/73, f 80, to Stepney, 21 January/1 February 1707; cf. Marlborough MSS M/20, Harley to Marlborough, 25 April/6 May 1707.
324. H.M.C. Cowper, iii, 52, Ed. Repington to T. Coke, 1 December 1704.
325. H.M.C. Dartmouth, p.294, to Dartmouth, 17 August 1706.
326. Gibbon, Memoirs of Queen Anne, 1729, pp.115-16.
328. Loan 29/288.
331. Loan 29/40 bundle 8, memo. on West Indies expedition and Spanish trade, n.d. but c. 1707.
332. Loan 29/288, 'Sentiments of the W. India expedition'.
333. Loan 29/370, 'Proposals to establish a South Sea Company', by Edward Morgan, 20 November 1707.
336. Loan 29/9/30, 29 April, 7 July 1706; 29/9/33, 7 July; 29/9/34, 14 July; 29/9/36, 18 August 1706; 29/9/38, 10 November 1706; 29/9/41, 12 January 1707; 29/9/48, 26 October 1707.

(vi) Junto War Strategy 1707-08


339. Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., ii, to Godolphin, 1/12 September 1707.


342. Ibid., ii, 880.


344. Ibid., p.357.

345. Noorden, iii, 181.


347. Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., ii, 1/12 September 1707.

348. Loan 29/9/44, 'Minutes, Cockpit, 9 May 1707'.


350. Ibid., ii, 898, 1 September 1707.

351. Ibid., ii, 898.

352. Ibid., ii, 898.

353. Ibid., ii, 900, 1/12 September.

354. Ibid., ii, 906, 8/19 September.

355. Ibid., ii, 909, 9 September.

356. Ibid., ii, 22 September.

357. Murray, iii, 563, 650, to Heinsius, 17 September and 5 December 1707.


359. Addison Letters, p.75, 22 August 1707.

360. Marlborough MSS M/53, 2 June 1707.

361. Swift Corr., i, 67, 73.

362. Add MSS 4291 f 129, to H. Davenant, 12 September 1707; cf. Stanhope MSS, H. Walpole to Stanhope, 9 September 1707.


365. An Account of the Earl of Peterborough's Conduct in Spain, 1707.


370. H.M.C. Egmont, p.221; Boyer, p.315.


372. Swift Corr., i, 67, 73; Coxe, ii, 220-21; P.H., vi, 605-08; H.M.C. Egmont, ii, 220-21; Churchill, ii, 303-05.

373. Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., ii, 847, 900, 13 July and 1/12 September 1707.

374. Ibid., ii, 898, 1 September 1707.

375. Stanhope MSS, 12 August 1707; Francis, Peninsular War, 264.

376. Stanhope MSS, to P. Meadows, 16 January 1708; Francis, pp.261-64; Churchill, ii, 341-44.

377. H.M.C. Egmont, p.221.


381. S.P. 104/51, Harley to Raby, 6/17 April 1707.


384. Add MSS 9100 f 100, 25 July 1707.


386. Vernon Corr., iii, 326-30; Addison Letters, to Manchester 3 February 1707/08; Court and Society, ii, 372; Burnet, v, 348.
389. Add MSS 42176, f 225, Cardonnel to Watkins, 24 February 1708.
390. Boyer, 323.
391. Swift Corr., i, 74 and 76, 5 and 12 February 1708.
392. Luttrell Relation, vi, 262; Vernon Corr., iii, 283-4, 286, 293; Court and Society, ii, 272, 3 February 1708.
395. Addison Letters, pp.93-94, Peter King was one of the few observed to do so.
397. Addison Letters, p.94.
398. Ibid., p.88.
399. Ibid., p.94.
401. Ibid., to Halifax, 26 July, copy; Murray, iv, 129.
402. Add MSS 32686 ff 8-11, Newcastle to ?, 6 August 1708; Loan 29/171, Harley to Stratford, 4 August 1708; Burnet (Foxcroft Supplement), p.418.
403. Private Corr., ii, 277, 6 July 1708.
405. Ibid., p.160, 26 June 1709.
408. Ibid., ii, 1079.
409. Ibid., ii, 1093-94, 1 and 3 September 1708.
410. Ibid., iii, 27 August/7 September.
411. H.M.C. Portland, iv, 507, E. Lewis to Harley, 7 October 1708.
412. Ibid., iv, 442, Cranston to R. Cunningham, 10 September 1707.
413. Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., ii, 1164, 30 November 1708.

414. The Present State of the War and the Necessity of an Augmentation Considered, 1708


417. Ibid., iii, 1356, 29 August 1709.

418. H.M.C. Portland, iv, 508-09.


420. C.J., xvi, p.50, 18 December.


422. Finch MSS G.S. bundle 23, Sir Roger Mynst to Nottingham 16 December 1708.


(vii) Tory Opposition 1708-10

424. H.M.C. Portland, iv, 505, E. Lewis to Harley, 18 September 1708.

425. Loan 29/10/1.

426. An Account of a Dream at Harwich, 1708.

427. H.M.C. Bath, i, 192, to Sir Simon Harcourt, 16 October 1708.

428. An Account of the Late Scotch Invasion, as it was opened by Lord Haversham on Friday the 25th February 1708-09, 1709.

429. Wentworth Papers, pp.69, 74.


431. Add MSS 17677 DDD f 31v.

432. C.U.L., C (H), MSS 6, Walpole to Marlborough, 14, 21 January and 8 April 1709.

433. Cunningham, ii, 205.


435. Finch MSS G.S. bundle 23, to Bromley, 15 November 1708.

436. H.M.C. Bath, i, 191-4, 6 November 1708.

438. Loan 29/10/1, 24 August 1708.

439. Add MSS 22196 f 66, Raby to Cadogan, 9 April 1707.

440. The Review, No.87, 16 October, No.88, 19 October.

441. P.R.O. S.P. 100/10, Dallas to the Attorney General, 14 November 1708.

442. Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., iii, 1209, 27 January/7 February 1709.

443. Ibid., iii, 1215, 31 January 1709.

444. Ibid., iii, 1223, 8 February 1709.

445. Ibid., iii, 1271, 1 June 1709.

446. Ibid., iii, 1275, 5 June 1709.

447. Ibid., iii, 1285, 14 June 1709; Marlborough MSS C.I. 16, cabinet minutes 4 June 1709.

448. Marlborough MSS M/24, Sunderland to James Stanhope, 7 June 1709; ibid., Sunderland to Marlborough, 7 June 1709.

449. Ibid., M/52, Stanhope to Marlborough, 30 January 1709, Stanhope to Galway, 28 June 1709, Stanhope to General Wade, 28 June 1709 n.s.

450. Marlborough MSS/M50, 8/19 July 1709.


452. Add MSS 31433 f 386, 10 June 1709.


454. Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., iii, 1324, 26 July 1709; Loan 29/171 Harley to Stratford, 7 June and 3 September 1709.

455. Marlborough MSS E/26, Maynwarin to Duchess, 9 April 1709.

456. Loan 29/171, Harley to Stratford, 19 December 1709.

457. Ibid., same to same, 2 December 1709.

458. Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., iii, 1304, 6 July 1709.

459. Ibid., iii, 1330, 1343, 1/12 August and 15/26 August 1709.

460. Ibid., iii, 1362, 1371, 1 and 9 September 1709.

461. Marlborough MSS M/31, to Marlborough, 14 October 1709.

462. C.U.L., C(H) MSS 6, Walpole to Cardonell, 13 September.
463. N.U.L. Portland (Bentinck) MSS PwA 1404.
464. Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., iii, 9 September 1709.
465. Ibid., iii, 1399, 14 October 1709.
467. Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., iii, 1471, 1481, 1489.
468. Marlborough MSS CI-16.
470. Ibid., iii, 1499, 18/29 May 1710.
471. Ibid., iii, 1503, 22 May; cf. ibid., iii, 1564.
472. Ibid., iii, 1564, 9 July 1710.
473. Ibid., iii, 1575, 22 July/2 August 1710.
474. Ibid., iii, 1583, 29 July 1710.
475. Ibid., iii, 1585, 31 July 1710.
476. Ibid., iii, 1583, 29 July 1710.
477. Ibid., iii, 1508, 1619, 1626, 18 and 31 August, 5 September.
478. Add MSS 9109 ff 71-72, 6/17 June 1710.

(viii) The Tory Ministry 1710-12.
480. Add MSS 17677 DDD, 17/28 October 1710.
482. Boyer, pp.473-75.
483. Letter to the Examiner, 1710, pp.6-10, 15-16.
484. Sir Thomas Double at Court, 1710.
486. H.M.C. Portland, vii, 15, to Edward Harley, 29 August 1710.
487. Ibid., iv, 577, 27 August 1710, cf. ibid., iv, 578, J. Drummond to Harley, 29 August 1710, Amsterdam.
488. Loan 29/171, to Stratford, 16 September 1710; cf. Loan 29/238, f 373, Harley to Newcastle, 14 September; C.J., xvi, 403.
489. Swift, *Journal to Stella*, i, 140.

490. Trevelyan, iii, 87.


493. Ibid., M/23, 19 September 1710.


495. Marlborough MSS M/29, St John to Marlborough, 24 October 1710.

496. Ibid., M/29, to Townshend (copy) 24 October.

497. Ibid., M/29, to Townshend (copy), 10 October.

498. Marlborough MSS, M/52, Stanhope to Dartmouth, 4 October 1710.


500. Ibid., i, 33-35, to Drummond, 26 December 1710.


503. Ibid., i, 404, 30 October 1710.

504. Ibid., ii, 11-12.


506. Ibid., pp.8-13, 19, 21, 26, 28, 30-32, 34, 37.

507. Ibid., p.39.

508. Addison Letters, p.252, 30 December 1710.

509. E.H.R., xlv, 1934, p.103, Gaultier to Torcy, 12/23 December 1710.

510. Cunningham, ii, 334.

511. Swift, *Journal to Stella*, i, 139.


513. Add MSS 31136 ff 135-36; cf. Add MSS 29568, 6 January 1711; Bolingbroke Corr., i, 54-5.

515. An Examination of the Management of the War, in a Letter to My Lord***, 1711, pp.32-33.


517. Swift Corr., i, 310; Bolingbroke Corr., ii, 73.

518. Burnet, vi, 19, 82, Dartmouth's additions; Cowper Diary, p.41, note.

519. Add MSS 31144, ff 6, 10, 23 and 26 January 1711.

520. Add MSS 22221, ff 48, 58, 21 February and 9 June 1711.

521. Add MSS 31144, f 1, Wentworth to Strafford, 9 January 1711.


523. P.H. vi, 276-77; Churchill, ii, 788-90.

524. P.H. vi, 978.

525. Add MSS 31144, f 4, Wentworth to Strafford, 9 January 1711.

526. P.H., vi, 948.

527. P.H., vi, 981.


529. Marlborough MSS M/23.

530. Add MSS 31443, f 626, Wetworth to Strafford, n.d. but late 1710.

531. Loan 29/288 'In obedience to your Lordship's command... my sentiments of the West India Expedition', Mitford Crowe (ex-Governor of Barbados), 11 June 1711; Loan 29/288 'Some propositions relating to the fitting ships for the South Sea', George Byng, 20 July 1711; Loan 29/288 Plan to attack and seize Buenos Aires, anon., n.d. but 1711; Loan 29/40/7 'Some thoughts about an Expedition', anon., 21 August 1711; Loan 29/45C 'An Essay on the Nature and Methods of Carrying on a trade to the South Sea', anon., n.d. but 1710/11; Loan 29/45C 'Explanatory Observations on the South Sea Trade and Company', anon., n.d. but 1710/11; Loan 29/45C 'An Account of the Places and Ports which are most proper to make a settlement, and also which are not, in the South Seas', Lionel Wafer n.d., but 1710/11; Loan 29/45C Paper on making settlements on the River Plate, anon., n.d. but 1710/11; Loan 29/45C 'Explanatory Observations on the South Sea Trade and Company', William Paterson, n.d. but 1710/11; Loan 29/45C Recommendations on Slave Trade to Spanish America, John Chidley, n.d. but 1710/1711; Loan 29/370 'Proposals to establish a South Sea Company', Edward Morgan, 20 December 1710.

532. H.M.C. Portland, iv, 583, to Harley, 4 September 1710.

533. Ibid., iv, 596, Halifax to Harley, 19 September 1710.
534. Loan 29/45C 'Explanatory Observations to the South Sea Trade and Company'.


536. The Review, viii, 177, 80, 181-84, 345-48, 5 and 7 July, 10 October 1711.

537. Add MSS 17677 EEE f 193, 4/15 May 1711.

538. Bolingbroke Corr., i, 7, 12, 27 October and 14 November 1711.

539. Loan 29/266, St John to Drummond, 26 June 1711.


541. Letter to a Friend in the Country on the Late Expedition to Canada, 1712.

542. Loan 29/197, ff 7-8, St John to Harley, 8 January 1711.

543. Ibid., ff 23-24, St John to Harley, 17 January 1711.

544. P.H. vi, 967.

545. H.M.C. Portland, iv, 655.

546. Ibid., v, 655.

547. Loan 29/197, ff 105-06, Rochester to Harley, 18 and 19 April 1711.

548. Ibid., f 107, St John to Harley, 19 April 1711.


551. H.M.C. Portland, v, 124, 128.

552. Loan 29/10/17.


554. Loan 29/288, 'Some thoughts concerning attempts on the West Indies', n.d. but shortly after Quebec expedition had ended.

555. Loan 29/198, Francis Hoffman to Harley, September 1711.

556. Marlborough MSS M/31, Brydges to Marlborough, 14 September 1711.


558. Add MSS 34518, f 84, Marlborough to St John 20 August 1711.


561. The Management of the War in a Second Letter to a Tory Member, 1711.

562. Ibid., pp. 12, 19.

563. Ibid., p.10.


565. Ibid., pp.28-29.

566. Ibid., p.39.


568. Post Boy and Supplement issues for September 1711.

569. Bouchain: in a Dialogue between the late Medley and Examiner, 1711, /either by Maynwaring or Hare/; A Modest Attempt to Prove Dr H/are/ not the Author of the Bouchain Dialogue, 1711; The Duke of Marlborough's Vindication, in answer to a pamphlet falsely so called, 1711; The Charge of God to Joshua, 1711, /Francis Hare/; A Learned Comment Upon Dr. Hare's Excellent Sermon, 1711, /Mary Manley/; cf. H.L.Q., Vol. 12, 1949, G. Needham, 'Mary de la Riviere Manley, Tory Defender', pp.275-278.


571. A Modest Attempt to Prove etc., 1711.

572. The Duke of Marlborough's Vindication etc., 1711, p.16.

573. Conduct of the Allies, p.90.

574. Ibid., pp.90-91.


576. Conduct of the Allies, p.5.

577. Ibid., pp.14-16, 22.

578. Ibid., p.18.

579. Ibid., p.29.

580. Ibid., pp.31-32.

581. Ibid., p.33.

582. Ibid., p.32.

583. Swift Corr., i, 266, 30 December 1710.

585. Ibid., p.37.

586. Ibid., pp.43, 44-45.

587. Ibid., pp.47-49.

588. Ibid., pp.44-45, 50.

589. Swift Corr., i, 208, 10 October 1710.

590. Conduct of the Allies, pp.63-64.

591. Ibid., pp.88-89.

592. Ibid., p.67.

593. Ibid., pp.92-94.

594. Pittis, Second Session, p.11.

595. C.J., xvii, 246; Boyer, p.577.

596. Add MSS 17677 f 220, 30 May 1712.


598. C.J., xvii, 69-70, 92, 119-23; Add MSS 17677 FF ff 54-5, 91; Swift, Journal to Stella, ii, 20 February 1712.


600. Loan 29/9/37, 31 August 1710.

601. Loan 29/10/17.

602. Loan 29/10/17, 16 June 1711.

603. Loan 29/7/6, 19 February 1714.


605. C.J., xvii, 474, 2 March 1714.
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1. Grey, x, 393.
2. Loan 29/187, Paul Foley to Robert Harley, 10 July 1694.
3. Loan 29/10, 24 August 1709.
5. Add MSS 46527, f 22, Vernon to Lexington, 13 November 1694, reporting a Commons debate.
6. Add MSS 28878, f 125, Mr Tucker to John Ellis, 9 September 1693.
12. S.P. 104/72, ff 113-14, to Stanhope, 30 November/11 December 1705.
17. Add MSS 40776, f 53, Shrewsbury to Vernon, 31 March 1707.
20. Add MSS 46528A, f 37, Blathwayt to Lexington, 19 March 1695.
22. Loan 29/370, memo. dated 14 September 1709.
23. Loan 29/10/1, September 1708.
26. H.M.C. Bath, i, 197, to Harley, 3 November 1709.
27. Francis, p.311.
29. Ranke, vi, 155; Klopp, ix, 95.
32. Add MSS 34504, ff 139-40, to Heinsius, 16/26 February 1694.
33. Loan 29/370, Patriarchus Hodge to Harley, n.d. but c.1709.
36. Gibson, A Supplement to the History of Queen Anne, 1729, p.115.
41. Japiske, ii, 401; Grimblot, i, 462; ii, 23.
42. C.S.P. Col. passim for this period.
43. Add MSS 37992, ff 61-3, 167-68.
44. C.S.P. Col. 1693-94, pp.341-2, to Trenchard, 2 September 1694.
45. C.O. 137/5, no.8, to Board of Trade, 8 October 1699.
46. C.O. 137/45, no.5, Beckford to B. of T., 15 May 1702.
47. C.O. 137/45, no.51, 28 August 1703.
48. C.O. 324/30, pp. 15, 77, 85, 89, 90, 93, 106, 121; C.O. 137/45, no.75.
49. C.S.P. Col. 1706-08, p.96; C.O. 137/45, no.76.
50. C.O. 324/30, pp.6, 121; C.O. 137/45, no.79; C.O. 137/7, nos. 37, 62.
51. C.O. 137/7, nos. 31, 37, 42.
52. 6 Anne, C.37.
53. C.O. 389/20, pp. 12-16, Board of Trade to House of Commons, 4 December 1707.
54. C.O. 390/5, no.46.
55. P.R.O. 40/24/21/148/2, 7 February 1708.
56. P.R.O. 30/24/22/2, Shaftesbury to van Tweede, 17 January 1706.
57. H.M.C. Various, Clements MSS, p.224, R. Molesworth to his wife, 12 May 1701.
61. Trevelyan, i, 18; Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., i, 392.
62. Stanhope MSS, Harley to Stanhope, 5 December 1704; Add MSS 4291, f 64.
63. Original Letters, Shaftesbury to Furley, 4 September 1705; Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., ii, 659, 699.
64. Loan 29/164/Misc.84, 24 December/4 January 1706/07.
65. Add MSS 40776, f 49, to Vernon, 22 March 1707.
66. S.P. 84/228, f 164, Alex. Stanhope to Harley, 3/14 July 1705.
67. Wentworth Papers, p.269; Add MSS 17677 FFF, f 54; Burnet, vi, 111.
68. Add MSS 22265, ff 22-3, 21 January 1712.
69. Loan 29/45 F
70. Marlborough MSS M50, to Marlborough, 3 July 1706.
73. Bodl. MSS, Eng. Misc. e 180, ff 4-5, St John to Harley, 8 February 1708.
74. Add MSS 29568, f 268, 6 January 1711.
75. Holmes, British Politics, chap.5; W.A. Speck, 'Conflict in Society', in Britain After the Glorious Revolution, ed. Holmes, pp.135-54.

76. Loan 29/187, f 344, to Paul Foley, 20 November 1694.

77. Add MSS 9100, f 223, 12/23 October 1707.


79. Loan 29/370, 14 December 1709.

80. Finch MSS, vi, 23, f 77, 20 December 1708.

81. Add MSS 28893, f 388, ? to Ellis, 21 June 1710.

82. Loan 29/127, Abel Boyer to Harley, 15 August 1710.

83. Add MSS 31336, ff 135-36, Sir H. Johnston to Strafford, 1 January 1711/12.

84. Hervey Letters, i, 207.

85. H.M.C. Portland, iv, 497; H.M.C. Frankland-Russell-Astley, p.199.

86. Add MSS 33273, f 53, Taylor to Watkins, 1 August 1710.


89. Symcox, op.cit., p.122.

90. Francis, p.13.

91. B.L. Lansdowne MSS 1236, f 247.


93. Marlborough-Godolphin Corr., ii, 1073, Marlborough to Duchess, 12/23 August 1708; ibid., p.1083, Marlborough to George Churchill, 23 August/3 September 1708.

94. Private Corr., i, 194.

95. Swift Corr., i, 125, 127.

96. Loan 29/40/8.

97. P.H., vi, 889.

99. Loan 29/10/1; Burnet, vi, 40.

100. Loan 29/187, f 255, P. Foley to R. Harley, 10 July 1694.


102. Loan 29/45 F, G. Murray to Harley, 8 June 1711.

103. Add MSS 17677 DDD f 685; Marlborough MSS E27, Arthur Maynwaring to Duchess of Marlborough.

104. Gardiner, Debates in the House of Commons in 1625, pp.31, 43, 57, 114, 117.

105. Notestein, Commons Debates 1621, iv, 443.


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