Ethnicising Ulster’s Protestants

Tolerance, Peoplehood, and Class in Ulster-Scots Ethnopedagogy

Peter Robert Gardner

Jesus College, The University of Cambridge

This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
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Abbreviations and Short Forms

**AIA:** The Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1985

**CTG:** Cultural Traditions Group

**GFA:** The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, 1998

**DUP:** Democratic Unionist Party

**UUP:** Ulster Unionist Party

**Ulster:** Unionist synonym for Northern Ireland.

**Province of Ulster:** The historic nine-county region, made up of six counties which are now Northern Ireland and three within the Republic of Ireland

**The Agency:** The Ulster-Scots Agency

**CCEA or CEA:** Council for the Curriculum, Examinations and Assessment

**MAGUS:** Ministerial Advisory Group for Ulster-Scots

**Heritage Council:** The Ulster-Scots Heritage Council

**The Ulster Society:** Ulster Society for the Promotion of British Heritage and Culture
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Word Limit and Plagiarism Statement
This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as specified in the text.

It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. I further state that no substantial part of my dissertation has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University of similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text.

It does not exceed the prescribed word limit: the main body of the thesis is 80,000 words exactly, with footnotes at 2,659 and references 7663 words.

Signed,
Peter Robert Gardner.
Abstract

Toward the end of the Troubles, the notion of an Ulster-Scots ethnicity, culture, and language began to be pursued by certain unionists and loyalists more desirous of ‘something more racy of the soil’ (Dowling 2007:54). Peace-building in Northern Ireland had undergone something of a cultural turn: the armed struggle over constitutional and civil rights questions began in the eighties to be ‘ethnically framed’ (Brubaker 2004:166). With cultural identity politically potent, the conception of an Ulster-Scots ethnic group began to gain traction with a tiny but influential subsection of unionists and loyalists. Since the nineties, this movement has gained considerable ground.

This thesis represents an intersectional investigation of the inclusion of Ulster-Scots education into schools in Northern Ireland. I contend that Ulster-Scots studies represents an ethnicisation of the conception of a discrete Protestant politico-religious “community” within Northern Ireland, holding considerable potential for the deepening of senses of intercommunal differentiation. Rather than presenting the potential for the deconstruction of ideas of difference, such a pedagogy of reifies, perpetuates, (re)constructs and even deepens such ideas of difference by grounding notions of difference in ethno-cultural and genealogical bases.

Ulster-Scots is often described as a means of waging cultural war in post-conflict Northern Ireland (Mac Póilín 1999). Contrariwise, I contend that it represents neither the uncritical, sectarian, loyalist pedagogy of its critics nor the pragmatic and innocuous solution to a problem of durable collective identities of its protagonists. Rather, Ulster-Scots education is embedded in the politics of consociational peace. The logic of consociationalism explicitly entails the maintenance of stark boundaries of ethnic difference. This research does not merely critique of Ulster-Scots pedagogy, but calls into question the whole consociational logic in which it, and the Northern Irish peace process in general, has been embedded.
Chapter One
Introduction

“When I went into maintained primary schools I noticed how much of a sense of pride in their Irish identity – Irish national identity – there was. And one of the things I make sure of is whenever you walk through the doors of Ballylavert¹, you’re greeted in Ulster-Scots.” Nestled amongst the rolling hills of County Down, the main entrance to this countryside school declared “Fair Faa Ye” to its visitors and displayed prominently its Ulster-Scots Flagship School award. The walls of PS3’s² classroom contained a board displaying various words and phrases in trilingual English, Irish and Ulster-Scots, and a bookshelf stacked with shiny volumes of “Ulster-Scots folklore,” poetry of the Scottish Renaissance, and copies of new children’s plays written in Ulster-Scots. “We’re Ulster-Scots and proud of it,” he continued. “It’s our heritage. For the children to be aware of it, you know, that’s an aspect that should be to the front – it shouldn’t be hidden away.”

The rise of Ulster-Scots in Northern Ireland has been ‘remarkable by any standards’ (Cooper 2010a; Crowley 2006:27; Graham 2004; McAuley and Spencer 2011; Níc Craith 2000, 2001, 2003; Mac Póilín 1999; Stapleton and Wilson 2004). Almost entirely unheard-of prior to the nineteen-nineties, its inclusion into the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement (GFA herein) in 1998 and subsequent promotion by political elites thrust it to the fore as an alleged language, culture, and ethnic identification of “the Protestant community.” The establishment of a government-funded Ulster-Scots Agency in 1999, whose remit is the ‘promotion of greater awareness and use of Ullans³ and of Ulster-Scots cultural issues’ further developed its social platform (Ulster-Scots Agency n.d.). By the early 2000s, Stapleton and Wilson (2004:586–87) could conclude from their research that Ulster-Scots had become ‘a salient discursive resource, not only at the (macro)level of public rhetoric but also at the (micro)level of personal and group identity construction.’

For PS3, the introduction of Ulster-Scots into Northern Ireland’s schools represented a productive and “enriching” pedagogical shift. He saw it as entailing the rooting of the individual to place and community in a form divergent from the politically- and religiously-charged identifications of the Troubles. Illustrating metaphorically his separation of Ulster-

¹ Pseudonyms are used throughout in order to anonymise Primary schools.
² Teachers’ names are anonymised throughout. “PS3” represents the third interviewee from one of the participating Primary Schools.
³ “Ullans” is a synonym of the Ulster-Scots language.
Scots from sectarianism, he compared it to the apparent relational difference between flute and pipe bands. “Flute band parades are provocative and are very much one side of the community against the other. Pipe band contests are cultural. ... It is a great fabric of what society can be – an integrated society that enhances everyone’s interests and encourages others and it is not set aside as a religious divide.” In a reversal of the emphasis found within the “civic versus ethnic nationalism” literature, PS3 conceptualised civic identifications as divisive, regressive and insular in contrast with the progressiveness and inter-communal sociability of the ethnic and cultural. Having quoted the Bard, he concluded that “Robert Burns and his poetry was against religious bigotry, very much.”

Knockboal Primary is situated in a well-known loyalist urban area. As PS5 herself noted, “this is the Aontas Road, we’re within the sound of the Lambeg drum … it’s very much an Ulster-Scots community.” For her, Ulster-Scots education granted teachers, pupils and families permission to “celebrate” Protestant unionist-loyalist culture, something she saw as having wrongfully become socially taboo. She expressed her concern at unionists having been “pushed out of the way and … becoming too PC”: “I know that in the past I have run the risk – I remember coming up to the Jubilee worrying about celebrating the Jubilee and so many Union Jacks, and I suddenly thought, no, catch a grip of yourself, this is the country we live in – we do actually.” She perceived Ulster-Scots education to have offered a corrective to this alleged cultural imbalance. “We can celebrate other things, but we’ve got to remember to celebrate what’s important to the majority of our children within our settings.”

This research investigates the development and deployment of Ulster-Scots education into schools in the north of Ireland; its rationales, structure, content, and current and potential impacts. It documents a case study of Protestant ethnicisation in the context of a profoundly segregated (post-)conflict education system, both in terms of physical separation and the “segregation of the mind.” As the two vignettes above illustrate, those involved in the promotion and teaching of Ulster-Scots hold a broad range of views. For both PS3 and PS5, however, Ulster-Scots represents a mechanism for producing inter-communal peace and tolerance: a resetting of communal balance. Parity of esteem is a basic tenet of Northern Irish peacebuilding, enshrined within the Agreement in 1998. As the Troubles moved from the high-intensity of the seventies into low-intensity intractable conflict, interpretations of the conflict underwent something of a cultural turn. Concerns over equal rights for Catholics and the “constitutional question” over the state solution gradually gave way to its description as, primarily, an “ethnically framed conflict” (Brubaker 2004:166; Finlay 2010; Níc Craith 2003). This “two-community” model placed heavy emphasis on cultural identity: the solution to
intractable conflict between warring ethnic groups was, thus, to encourage their mutual recognition and respect what the GFA refers to as ‘identity, ethos, and aspirations of both communities’ (GFA 1998). It’s ideal is one of mutual respect for the “two traditions,” rather than the disruption of neat ethnicity binary delineations. One is to know one’s own culture whilst considering the “other” to be legitimate yet mutually exclusive. However, far from representing a productive step toward peace-building, as its protagonists contend, the deepening of communal differentiation that the Ulster-Scots essentialist ethnic project represents holds considerable potential for highly nefarious effects, staunchly countering attempts to deconstruct notions of innate or insurmountable differences between Catholics and Protestants in the region.

Northern Ireland’s Protestants have long been criticised for a certain comparative inarticulateness of “their” account of history, “their” constitutional rationale, “their” cultural idiosyncrasies. Irish self-conceptions have been much more elaborate: a Celtic ancient heritage, a detailed and well-recited history of British Imperialism and the Irish struggle for independence, a (partially) revived language, music, dance and traditional dress, national sports, and a globally known diaspora complete with national stereotype. The Protestant “deficiency” became increasingly palpable as it became clear that strength of cultural identity was to be a game changer in the conclusion of the Troubles. The (dis)semination of ideas of “own culture” into Protestant Ulster, through various non-linear and multiple processes, came to be viewed by unionists, loyalists and peacebuilders alike as a potentially productive and profitable endeavour.

Thus, in the early nineties, the idea of an Ulster-Scots ethno-linguo-cultural “revival” began to gain traction amongst certain unionists and loyalists more desirous of ‘something more racy of the soil’ to compete culturally with ‘culturally inflected nationalism and republicanism’ (Dowling 2007:54). Its proponents purported to rescue a language, heritage, genealogical history and cultural identity from the brink of its extinction. Suddenly Protestants could claim a discrete cultural heritage, an identity, a genealogy; a ‘story of peoplehood’ (Smith 2003). However, despite its growing salience, for much of its development the Ulster-Scots “revival” has failed to procure widespread traction outside of its base of support within ‘the cultural wing of loyalism or the ethnic branch of unionism’ (Dowling 2007; Mac Giolla Chríost 2012; Graham 2004; Ní Craith 2003:83).

Northern Ireland has been hailed as a successful example of liberal peacebuilding. For many, the “peace process” in the north of Ireland, culminating in the GFA in 1998, is exemplary: a model format to be applied to other “intractable” ethnic conflicts (MacGinty...
2009; McGarry and O’Leary 2006a, 2006b). Concomitantly, however, considerable structural violence, sectarianism, segregation and division persist. In fact, much evidence points to increased communal bifurcation since 1998 (see chapter two). One of the central criticisms of consociationalism relates to its influence on communal identities. McGarry and O’Leary, as advocates of what they have termed “liberal consociationalism”, refute accusations of consociationalism’s inherent primordialism, positing rather that they consider consociationalism to be a pragmatic response to the “reality” of ‘durable’ identities (Finlay 2010; McGarry and O’Leary 2006b). The predominant critique of consociation, as well as McGarry and O’Leary’s approach to it, has been that of “freezing” the very communal identity binaries – Protestant/Catholic, Unionist/Nationalist, British/Irish – which are so problematic in Northern Ireland. Through his genealogical critique of consociationalism, Finlay (2011:37) concludes that ‘the problem with consociation is less the fact that it valorises particular ethnonational traditions, but that it valorises ethnicity per se and makes it normative, such that other ways of being and other forms of politics is diminished.’ Following this line of critique, I suggest that consociationalism does not merely “freeze” identities; rather, conceptualisations of identities under consociationalism are dynamically reconstituted.

As with the political sphere, Northern Ireland’s highly segregated education system is often considered to aid in the reproduction and perpetuation of sectarianism and communal identification. Over ninety per cent of the region’s school-age children attend majority own-religion schools (Darby and Dunn 1987; Dunn, Darby, and Mullan 1989; Gallagher 2011; Hansson 2015; Moffat 1993; Richardson 2011). In 2015/16, 53.1 per cent of school-age children attended Catholic or other maintained primary, secondary, voluntary grammar or special school (at which an average of 86.1 per cent are Catholic and 8.8 per cent Protestant), whilst 40.1 per cent attended controlled primary, prep, secondary, grammar or special schools (averaging 7.8 per cent Catholic and 69.4 per cent Protestant) (figures adapted from Matthews 2016). A minority attend the religiously mixed “integrated” sector; however, the growth in this area has dwindled in recent years, and its current trajectory is decidedly mixed. The physical, social, ideological, cultural, and curricular education segregations which characterise the Northern Irish education system ‘[represent] an obvious mechanism for the continued social

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4 The proportion of pupils across all educational institutions, nursery to sixth form, within the integrated sector was 6.48 per cent for 2015/16 (figures adapted from Matthews 2016). At primary level, the number of pupils attending integrated schools rose by 13.4 per cent from 2010/11 to 9,529 in 2015/16. In the latter year, it represented 5.65 per cent of primary school attendees. While the proportion was higher at post-primary in 2015/16, at 8.43 per cent, this figure has fallen continually for years 8 to 12 since 2010/11.
divisions which provide the basis for prejudice and violence to flourish and be replicated across the generations’ (Osborne, Cormack, and Gallagher 1993:5).

Since the 2000s, Ulster-Scots promoters have been working toward the inclusion of Ulster-Scots language, culture, history and heritage into the Northern Irish education system. Part of the remit of the Ulster-Scots Agency, established in 1998, has been the promotion of Ulster-Scots within the field of education. Programmes have been trialled, an Ulster-Scots curriculum developed for promotion in primary and post-primary schools, and the creation of a GCSE and A-Level have been discussed. Perhaps the most concrete scheme implemented to date has been the primary schools’ Ulster-Scots Flagship Award, in which schools engage with Ulster-Scots language, history, music, dance and culture. Thus far, almost all schools within the Flagship scheme are from the controlled sector; not one Catholic school has been involved. Given the associations between Ulster-Scots and Britishness/unionism/Protestantism, the introduction of Ulster-Scots linguo-cultural identity into controlled schools may further exacerbate the Protestant-Catholic cleavage. Crucially, however, under consociationalism it is parity of esteem which is paramount; sharp boundaries between groups are not problematic so long as mutual respect is upheld. In fact, as consociationalism’s founding father, Arend Lijphart (1969:219, 1975), argues, ‘distinct lines of cleavage appear to be conducive to consociational democracy and political stability.’ Ulster-Scots education may dynamically alter, deepen or perpetuate senses of Protestant-Catholic communal differences; however, if so, it appears to do so in accordance with the principles of the Northern Irish peace process. Through this research I, call both into question.

1.1 Research Questions, Methods and Chapter Overview

This research is an investigation into the recent foray of Ulster-Scots into the education system; its rationales, content and implications. Specifically, the research questions are:

*What is the political significance of the rise of the Ulster-Scots movement?*
*To what extent does Ulster-Scots education legitimise, perpetuate, or deepen the consociational ideal of distinct, bifurcated ethnonational identities?*

Subsidiary research questions include: how has Ulster-Scots education developed into its current form?; to what extent is ideas of Ulster-Scots taught in schools a “Protestant” cultural identity?; what is included in the Ulster-Scots narrative identity and aspirations in schools?; is the Ulster-Scots project utilised in line with the consociational democratic principle of stark boundaries between Protestant and Catholic cultural identities?; how do Ulster-Scots
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educationalists position themselves politically?; why do these teachers care about it, and what are their reasons for desiring to teach it?; and, how is the Ulster-Scots movement, and its expansion into education, perceived and conceptualised in this nexus within the educational materials, by the teachers, by the curriculum designers and by politicians?

The methods used to investigate these questions include a documentary analysis, interviews and questionnaire data. The former involved a documentary analysis of the educational material produced for use in schools. Second, interviews were conducted with teachers within the Ulster-Scots Flagship scheme, peripatetic teachers who teach Ulster-Scots culture, heritage and language in schools, individuals within the Ulster-Scots Agency, the Ministerial Advisory Group on Ulster-Scots and the Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure, and politicians within the Belfast Assembly. The bulk of the interviews were with teachers, Ulster-Scots Agency workers, and political elites. Third, a survey of 146 children (aged ten to eleven) across eight schools was conducted.

My approach to analysing Ulster-Scots is fundamentally intersectional. In investigating the narratives and perspectives relating to Ulster-Scots education, I describe in detail the relations among ethnicity, race, class, economic ideology, political perspective, religious identification, and gender observable within the data. In doing so, I interrogate the operation of social power and hierarchies intrinsic to intersectional sensibilities (Crenshaw 1991).

This PhD dissertation is organised into eleven chapters. Chapter two provides a detailed account of the historical background to collective identification in Northern Ireland from the Troubles to present day bifurcation, paying particular attention to trajectories of Protestant trajectories. This chapter also provides the reader with an outline of the Ulster-Scots “revival.” In chapter three I discuss the literature on segregation in Northern Ireland both in general and within schools specifically and attempts to amend educational bifurcation and its effects. In chapter four I describe the research methods summarised above. Chapter five provides an account of the development of Ulster-Scots education, as understood by those working within it. In chapter six I discuss the presentation of “Ulster-Scots” within the educational texts, analysing the boundaries of inclusion/exclusion, its myths of origin and story of peoplehood. In the following chapter, I discuss in detail the economic narrative within the general story of peoplehood presented throughout the data, through which Ulster-Scots is understood to be

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5 I take “religious identification” to refer to a complex interplay of self-imaginings as within current and historical communities of belief. The extent to which this involves core and peripheral orthodoxies, scriptural interpretations, denominational affiliations, and faith practices diverge considerably. Oftentimes, such an identification involves identification through negation: Protestant as not-Catholic, Christian as not-atheist, Protestant as not-Irish-nationalist, and so on.
primarily a working-class identification, whilst reinterpreting free-market, libertarian political-economic ideology to be inherent characteristics of Ulster-Scots ethnicity. In chapter eight I move on to discuss the extent to which Ulster-Scots represents a Protestant, unionist/loyalist identification. In chapter nine I argue that Ulster-Scots education represents a search for collective dignity to be attached to association with aspects of Protestantism, unionism and loyalism. By presenting it as a sanitised loyalism of sorts, its promoters promote a sense of ethnic pride whilst attempting to separate it from nefarious dogmas and historical narratives which would leave it open to stigmatisation and critique. In chapter ten I discuss the theoretical and practical implications of this study for the development of education conducive to peace. I conclude in chapter eleven with a brief summary of the research findings, its limitations, and its contributions to several areas of study.

1.2 Tolerance, Peoplehood, Dignity

Parity of esteem is the pivotal concept in consociational democracy, and hence in Northern Ireland’s consociational peace. Rather than aiming to deconstruct the notion of a two-community binary, the practices of the peace process have tended to opt, often explicitly, for an identity-reifying approach. The notion of parity of esteem implies and assumes the existence of communal categories, contending for intercommunal tolerance (dual identity work) and intracommunal feelings of self-esteem (single-identity work) (Finlay 2010; Niens and Cairns 2005). The latter approach holds that if those within a particular designated “community” investigate, analyse, discuss and celebrate “their own” ethnic identity, this will increase their ‘collective self-esteem,’ and as a result will be less defensive and more confident in approaching those from the “other side.” Within the literature on the production of peaceable relations through the education system, such an approach has been advocated as necessary for the proper functioning of dual identity work and tolerance.

For Wendy Brown (2006:10), ‘discourses of tolerance inevitably articulate identity and difference, belonging and marginality, and civilisation and barbarism, and … they invariably do so on behalf of hegemonic social or political powers.’ Opposing common conceptions of tolerance as an unproblematically benevolent trait, she contends that it represents a politics of ‘managing the presence of the undesirable’ (2006:25). It invokes and (re)produces senses of collective difference in which that which is “not us” is to be viewed justifiably objectionable yet permitted. Tolerance, far from being an egalitarian or reconciliatory principal, maintains the notion of an “other” and structures interaction such that that other is kept at arm’s length.
Rosemary Harris’ (1972) seminal work, *Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster*, often viewed as the harbinger of participant observation research into the Northern Irish conflict (Whyte 1991), observed the class and religious divisions in a border town prior to the outbreak of the Troubles. In relation to Protestant-Catholic divisions, she describes social relations marked by both prejudice and tolerance; an intercommunal harmony of sorts in which own-group bias and discrimination against the other were mediated by certain socially accepted limitations and the maintenance of neighbourly relationships. Tolerance in Harris’ work entails the ambience of coexisting objections and permissions, distaste with longsuffering described by Brown. Harris (1972:200) observed that it was not only acceptable to socialise one’s children into being ‘loyal members of their own side,’ ensure they marry endogenously, and ‘observe the correct behaviour for their own group’ themselves, but ‘it was also accepted that, within limits, even religious ‘discrimination’ in commercial transactions was right and proper’:

This tolerance for prejudice even extended to those letting or especially selling land when they tried to see that that too went to co-religionists. ... This acceptance within limits of prejudiced behaviour was undoubtedly an important factor in inter-group relationships. Faced with the politico-religious cleavage in their midst the people, for the most part, sought to promote quite friendly ties across this division.

This ‘tolerance for prejudice’ acts through and mediates actions of tolerance, producing a matrix of permitted, permissible, and prohibited behaviours.

The hegemonic ideology of peace production in Northern Ireland entails a corrected form of this tolerance, in which notions of communal difference are “retained” and reified but ‘tolerance for prejudice’ is to be replaced by parity of esteem. The conceptualisation of tolerance as involving the celebration of the self and the celebration of the other has become a commonplace banality in Northern Irish peaceable-relations discourse. As a multiculturalist model, bright boundaries of difference are to be “celebrated” and that celebration is to be viewed as an extension of love beyond one’s ingroup identity. Sarah Ahmed (2014:135), discussing the affective politics of multicultural love, writes:

Love … sticks the nation together; it allows cohesion through the naming of the nation or ‘political community’ as a shared object of love. Love becomes crucial to the promise of cohesion within multiculturalism; it becomes the ‘shared characteristic’ required to keep the nation together. The emotion becomes the object of the emotion. … It is now ‘having’ the right emotion that allows one to pass into the community.

This ‘love for love’ has become pivotal in the functioning of multiculturalism: ‘To love the other requires that the nation is already secured as an object of love, a security that demands that incoming others meet ‘our’ conditions’ (2014:135). To describe the current Northern Irish
situation as one in which love has replaced history, culture or ethnicity as a hegemonic binding principle would be inaccurate. However, in the context of post-GFA Northern Ireland, parity of esteem has become a form of ‘love for love’ through which the security of the province is to be assured. The ‘tolerance for prejudice’ observed by Harris is to be replaced with an ethnicised tolerance for tolerance.

Ulster-Scots education is embedded in an essentialist discourse. It aims at the production of deep senses of cultural and ethnic peoplehood, in which a proportion of Ulster – and its Ulster-Scots diaspora – are to reimagine themselves as collectively holding particular innate traits and predisposed to certain ways of being in the world. For some of its promoters, Ulster-Scots shifts the conceptualisation identity politics in Northern Ireland from the two-community, Protestant-unionist/Catholic-nationalist model to a three-ethnic-community conception, constituted by the Ulster-Scots, Ulster-Irish and Ulster-English. For others, Ulster-Scots maps more neatly onto “the Protestant community.” This ethnicisation of Ulster’s Protestants both reifies and deepens senses of communal difference in post-GFA Northern Ireland, representing a nefarious and regressive ideological step away from deconstructivist approaches aiming at blurring and eroding senses of communal difference.

The literature on Ulster-Scots has tended to describe it either in terms of the Protestant side in a cultural war (Mac Póilín 1999), or a salient ethno-cultural identity which ought to be afforded the same considerations as any other (Stapleton and Wilson 2004). I harbour neither approach. Although some working in Ulster-Scots education expressed anxieties over alleged Gaelicisation and Protestant community culture, the overriding concern was not over fighting a “cultural war.” Nor does it merely represent banal cultural expression. Rather, I contend that the discourses utilised by the Ulster-Scots educators and promoters interviewed through this research are much more reflective of feelings of a loss of collective dignity than a fight for supremacy. In chapter nine I define collective dignity as entailing efforts to gain autonomy over the defining the identity of the group – its alleged characteristics, history, aspirations, and destiny – such that the collective can potentially be shielded from criticism and abuse. Ulster-Scots educationalists speak more of their critiques of “the Protestant community,” loyalty and loyalists, and hard-line unionism than Irishness or Irish nationalism. Protestant history in Ulster is reconceptualised in a positive light through reconceptualisations, erasures, and new introductions. In the post-GFA landscape in which communal identity has been rendered

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6 As described in detail in chapter nine, this definition is a development upon Hodson (1996) and Lamont’s (2000) contributions to the field.
Ethnicising Ulster’s Protestants

hegemonic (Finlay 2010), Ulster-Scots has come to be utilised as a conduit for the (re)installation of a sense of collective dignity in “the Protestant community.”

Through this research, I contend that Ulster-Scots education represents a pedagogy of consociational “tolerance.” It’s political representatives, producers, promoters, and practitioners tend to situate it within a multicultural peace in which the individual must learn to read, know, interpret and enact the communal self in order to construct a stable, peaceful society. Tolerance for tolerance, and the necessity of the implementation of Protestant single-identity work within it, were invoked by interviewees and discussed in the educational materials, in part as a defence of Ulster-Scots education from its critics. I contend that Ulster-Scots represents neither the uncritical, sectarian, loyalist pedagogy of its critics nor the pragmatic and innocuous solution to a problem of durable collective identities of its protagonists. Rather I argue that Ulster-Scots education is embedded in the politics of consociational peace, and hence holds considerable capacity to deepen and extend notions of ethnic differentiation. Hence, this research does not merely offer a critique of Ulster-Scots pedagogy but calls into question the whole consociational logic in which it, and the Northern Irish peace process in general, has been embedded.
Chapter Two
Protestantism, Unionism and Consociational Ideology

In a speech in 1980, Irish nationalist activist and politician, Austin Currie, stated of unionists: ‘their lack of security, their crisis of identity is the kernel of the Northern Ireland problem’ (Murray 1998:99). Although in understanding the Troubles to be, at its core, a conflict over identities he was very much a minority voice at the time, the cultural turn in the 1980s brought this interpretive framework into the mainstream, eventually becoming the hegemonic, common-sense interpretation. Similarly, many have also come to view the conflict as stemming from a Protestant identity crisis. In this view, the absence of an authentic, ethno-culturally grounded nationalist peoplehood narrative for Protestants in the north after the partition of Ireland produced a sense of existential insecurity. Allegedly, from this insecurity stemmed anti-Catholic discrimination, crackdowns, backlashes, and eventually war, as well as a refusal to accept any peace short of a victors’ peace.

While such interpretations point to certain realities of Ulster Protestant politics, they tend to be grounded in problematic assumptions over the normative necessity of national identity. The inescapability of peoplehood, especially from the 1980s on, limited the question to whether Northern Ireland’s protestants had not yet discovered their identity or merely suffered from a failure to articulate it. Rather, with Finlay (2000:40), I consider this “identity crisis” to be a product of ‘elements of the northern Protestant belief system’ which came to be ‘no longer adequate to the political and economic situation’ in which they found themselves. Hence, from the 1980s on, Protestant elites began in earnest to pursue the “discovery” and articulation protestant peoplehood.

The rise of single, dominant narratives and explanations of the conflict was also highly productive for the institutionalisation of the British state’s preferred solution: consociational democracy. Since the eruption of violence in at the end of the 1960s, a wealth of scholarship has been dedicated to finding solutions to the “Northern Ireland problem.” However, as Vaughan-Williams (2006) rightly states, the search for solutions often assumes the “problem” to be unambiguous. Seamus Dunn (1995:7) similarly states, ‘there is not so much a single Northern Ireland problem, easily characterised and classified, as a set of interlocked and confused problems.’ The dominant representation of the Troubles has been to simplify this complexity to a clash of “cultures,” of two discrete, unchanging, ‘zero-sum’ ethno-nationalisms at war (Brewer 2010; Connor 1994; McGarry and O’Leary 1995). Hence, solutions have tended
to propose mechanisms for the good management of these “communities,” concluding with the installation of consociational democracy under the Good Friday Agreement.

This chapter discusses peoplehood ideologies in Northern Ireland, paying especial attention to protestant peoplehoods. I use “peoplehood ideology” to mean the set of beliefs and doctrines on the notional state of affairs relating to local and/or universal collective identifications. The chapter entails three sections. First, I map the historical trajectory of identifications in the north of Ireland. Second, I discuss consociationalism. Third, I provide a detailed description of Ulster-Scots and place its “revival” in its ideological, political and economic context.

2.1 Shifting Peoplehoods

An obstacle to mapping the history of “Protestant identity” in (Northern) Ireland is the issue of who or what this refers to. Splitting the population by political-constitutional preferences would not, historically, neatly divide it by religious affiliation. Nor would religious affiliation always have polarised national identifications. Furthermore, these categories have not at all points been salient. In this section, I describe the broad trajectory of these identifications the reformation to consociation, focusing on the development of Protestant/unionist peoplehood. I contend that a clustering into a “Protestant community” occurred most potently through the conflict itself, moving from multiplicity toward Britishness in the 1970s, and from crisis during the cultural turn toward consociational symmetry with Irishness.

2.1.1 From British Rule to Unionist Rule

Through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Britishness began to be constructed as inseparable from Protestantism (Colley 2005). The reformation rendered Britain in certain ways dissimilar from much of the rest of Catholic Europe, and by the time of the Acts of Union between England and Scotland in 1707, under the religiosity uniting force Protestant King James I and VI. Britishness was also constructed partly in opposition to its “other”, against which it was perpetually at war: Catholic France. Domestically, although divisions existed between non-conformist Protestants and Anglicans, these ‘should not obscure … the most striking feature in the religious landscape, the gulf between Protestant and Catholic’ (Colley 2005:18–19). Anti-Catholic restrictions and laws enforced throughout Great Britain and Ireland disproportionately affected majority-Catholic Ireland under British rule. This leant purchase to an Irish nationalist sense of grievance, allowing for the production of an Irish
national history furnished with exemplifications of British domination. Ireland under British rule could be easily reinterpreted not merely as religious persecution, but Irish repression. This was supplemented by themes of British dominance and supremacy, including their classification of the Catholic Irish as racially inferior (Bonnett 1998; Ignatiev 2009).

With the rise of Irish nationalism in the latter half of the nineteenth century, nationalist elites began to articulate Irishness in oppositional terms to Britishness. Despite innumerable Protestant Irish nationalists, Irishness and Catholicism came to be deeply intertwined. Numerous factors reinforced this delineation, including the formation of the explicitly pro-union, anti-Catholic Orange Order at the end of the nineteenth-century, (predominantly northern) Protestant opposition to Home Rule, the explicit enshrining of Catholicism in the Irish Free State’s constitution and laws, the social and political dominance of the Catholic Church in Ireland post-independence, and the concurrent enshrining of Protestant supremacy within the newly formed “British” Ulster (Inglis 1998). While the Irish Free State set its sights upon a Catholic nation-building project, in Northern Ireland “a Protestant parliament for a Protestant people” was under construction.

The struggle for Irish Home Rule reached its apogee in the latter half of the 1910s, culminating in Irish War of Independence and the Government of Ireland Act in 1921. This act partitioning the island, retaining the industrial north-east, with its high spatial concentration of unionists. Northern Ireland was thus formed from the largest area within which a unionist majority could be ensured and a Protestant ruling class be upheld, while the predominantly agricultural remainder was set up as the Irish Free State. The subsequent Irish Civil War (1922-1923), in which anti-partition republicans fought the pro-treaty Free State forces, backed by the British government. With the victory of the latter over the former, the border was retained; however, republican discontent continued to simmer and existential anxiety festered among northern unionists and their fledgling government in Belfast.

Although the period from the partition of Ireland to the start of the Troubles was marked by unionist domination and triumphalism in the north of Ireland, a sense of political insecurity was equally palpable. Its unionist ruling elites were nervous of both Dublin and London (McKittrick and McVea 2002). Many within the Irish Free State, as well as northern nationalists, opposed the creation of the Northern Irish state, regarding the new border as an illegitimate expression of British oppression. Many unionists within Northern Ireland came to consider republicans in the rest of Ireland to be an existential threat and Irish nationalists within its borders to be the “enemy within.” This was utilised as a rationale both for heavy-handed Protestant-unionist domination and anti-Catholic discrimination.
Another key element in this regard were allegations of alignment between northern Catholics and radical leftist politics. In the wake of the Russian Revolution of 1917, many throughout the island of Ireland viewed independence from the British empire as an opportunity to follow suit, creating a 32-county socialist republic. Such hopes were to be quickly thwarted. In the Free State, a conservative government tightly aligned to an imperious Catholic church stepped into the power vacuum, adopting a staunch anti-communist line. However, some Republicans continued to hope for the completion of the revolution through the overthrow of British imperialism in Ulster\(^7\). In the north, the Unionist government feared just such a socialist uprising. Not only did this lead to a demonisation of those whom the government perceived to be Irish republicans, but also to concerns over points at which the working-class, irrespective of religiosity or nationality, combined to take collective action. Both the expulsion of the Catholic shipbuilders in Belfast in 1920 and the reactionary action of the government to the 1932 Outdoor Relief workers’ strike, in which Belfast’s working-class united under the banner of common class interests in order to appeal for increased unemployment benefits, were a result of these anxieties (Bew 1979). For the Unionist government, sectarian tensions proved amenable to governance insofar as it restrained the possibility of united working-class revolt (see, for example, Bew 1979; Farrell 1978; Patterson 1980). Thus, Bew (1979:263) concludes that over this period ‘the Unionist State was far from neutral with respect to the reproduction of sectarian divisions’ in Ulster.

The Special Powers Acts, enforced from 1922 to 1972, included wide-ranging restrictions on actions deemed “Republican.” These included the power to implement curfews, detention, internment without trial, the closing of passageways and roads, the banning of the display of the Irish tricolour (or any emblem ‘consisting of three vertical or horizontal stripes coloured respectively green, white and yellow’), public meetings, the prohibiting of 140 publications deemed to be subversive, and the construction of Republican monuments (Donohu 1998:1107). The ‘[failure] to distinguish between violent and non-violent challenges to the government’ meant that measures ‘targeted at a small slice of the minority population’ had the effect of alienating ‘the whole minority community, establishing a sense of injustice that exploded with the civil rights marches’ (Donohu 1998:1114). The Special Powers Acts silenced opposition to unionist domination, but, furthermore, they established new boundaries within which the “minority” – and the “majority” – could be conceptualised and understood. Through

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\(^7\) Following Marx (1954; 1978), many proponents of classical Marxism viewed, or came to view, national unity as a pre-requisite to Ireland’s progression to socialism.
these Acts, not only were Catholics reimagined as religiously, socially, economically and politically subversive, but the majority Protestant population were constructed comparatively as loyal, upright, trustworthy and vindicated.

The unionist state was far from politically homogeneous through this period. Although Northern Ireland was ruled by a single party – the Unionist Party – from partition to Direct Rule in 1972, there existed a divide between populists and anti-populists among unionist elites. While populists believed in the maintenance of a strong relationship between ‘the Protestant masses and the Unionist bourgeoisie to the visible exclusion of the Catholic population,’ anti-populists’ focus was more pan-British, opposing ‘Orange triumphalism’8 and explicitly sectarian policies (Bew 1979:257–58). In general, the former tended to hold more sway than the latter. However, especially prior to the Troubles, religious, political and national identifications far from perfectly correlated. Nor, where they were correlated, were they always evident or axial. Thus, characterisations of the Troubles as representing an inevitable consequence of deep ethnic hatreds is, at best, inaccurate. Indeed, it was not until the “cultural turn” in the 1980s that the notion of the identity became dominant, and the articulation of a cohesive and coherent “Protestant community” became a political necessity.

2.1.2 From Multiplicity toward Britishness

Although numerous authors have argued that the ‘vast majority of Protestants … emphatically considered themselves as British and not Irish’ prior to the Troubles proper (McKittrick and McVea 2002:2), this runs very much contrary to empirical evidence (see table 2.1). Post-partition, religious and political-constitutional preferences became intertwined in new modalities. Historical trajectories intertwining British statehood with Protestantism were codified and solidified in the Unionist state. With the institutionalisation of a staunchly Catholic conservative nationalism in the newly independent Irish Free State, reactionary elites in the North pushed a Protestant character for Ulster (Clayton 1996). Nevertheless, contrary to ethnicity-as-causation theories of the conflict, by the late 1960s, the dichotomy between Catholic-nationalist-Irish and Protestant-unionist-British had not yet been consolidated. For much of its modern history, ‘both Protestants and Catholics could consider themselves

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8 Orange triumphalism describes a sense of pride, an attitude of superiority, and public performativity of domination relating to Protestant-Unionist hegemony and victory over Catholicism, the Irish state, and those within the north of Ireland who with both or either of these. It was especially prevalent between the construction of Northern Ireland in the twenties until the seventies.
Irishmen, albeit Irishmen who disputed whether they should be ruled from Dublin or London’ (Rose 1971:91).

In 1968, Rose found a strong preference for Irish national identity among Catholics (fully 76 per cent), with a small minority opting for British (15 per cent); whereas for Protestants, national identity was considerably more ambiguous, split between British, Ulster and Irish. Ten years on, Moxon-Browne (1983) found considerably increased bifurcation in religious-national identification (see Table 2.1), the primary change being represented by a movement of Protestants toward identification as British to a similar level as Catholic identification as Irish. Moxon-Brown concluded that although between 1968 and 1978 sectarian segregation remained fundamentally unchanged, ‘what we seem to have is a crystallised society, crystallised into polarisation’ (1983:167). By the mid-eighties, this delineation appears to have remained fairly stable (see table 2.1). This is reflective of a general trend from the early 1970s onward: the ‘precipitous, and apparently irreversible, decline in the identification of Protestants with things Irish’ (Dowling 2007:56; Trew 1994).

Table 2.1: Religious and National Identities: 1968, 1978, and 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1968 (Rose)</th>
<th>1978 (Moxon-Browne)</th>
<th>1986 (Smith)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P (%)</td>
<td>RC (%)</td>
<td>P (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulster</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Irish*</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>British;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes Irish</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo-Irish**</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Answers*</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Included in 1986 survey only
** Not included in 1986 survey

The early years of the conflict saw Protestants move away from all things Irish toward Britishness; however, questions of “identity” remained at the fringes (Gilligan 2007).

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9 Data combined from Rose (1971:208), Moxon-Browne (1983:6), and the data collected by Smith and reported in Whyte (1991:69).

10 “P” connotes Protestant, and “RC” Roman Catholic.
Confusion and multiplicity over the causes of the conflict were rife. Many saw the Troubles as having erupted out of the Catholic civil rights movement. The peaceful demonstrations of 1968–69 calling for an end to police brutality, and a variety of other economic, political and social inequalities was met harsh resistance from reactionary loyalist civilians and the unionist state security apparatus (Auenger 1975; Rose 1971; Smith 2011; Whyte 1991). As military and paramilitary violence spiralled out of control from this point, many saw civil rights as the core component of the conflict. While many loyalists bemoaned the loss of unionist hegemony and the “Protestant state,” other more progressive protestants saw a peaceful solution in the creation of greater equality and the granting of civil rights to Catholics.

Concomitantly, the constitutional question came to be viewed as paramount. Where the IRA’s explicitly non-sectarian armed campaign of 1956–62 to reunify Ireland had failed to gain traction in the north, the end of the 1960s presented a somewhat more favourable moment for republicanism. Disillusionment with the regime among Catholics was widespread, and the abject failure of peaceful protest to reform the Northern Irish state led many to view a United Ireland as the only means of escaping domination (White 1989). Concomitantly, the rise of militant republicanism, as well as concerns over the possibility of Westminster yielding to the nationalists, facilitated the rise a militant loyalism dedicated to keeping Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom at any cost. However, these constitutional and civic rights questions were accompanied by a rise in societal bifurcation. Largescale population movements created far greater levels of geographical segregation by religious affiliation, and tit-for-tat paramilitary violence (the retribution killings of both combatants and civilians from the “other side”) created a situation in which “identity” became vitalised (Burton 1978; Darby 1986). While Protestantism/unionism began to converge, shifting toward British national identification, it remained gelatinous in its articulation. Importantly, this Protestant convergence was a product, not a cause, of the violence in the late-1960s and 1970s. Hence, the foregrounding of identity in the 1980s created a moment of crisis for unionists in Northern Ireland.

Gilligan (2007) outlines four phases of the use of ‘identity’ in Northern Ireland. The first decade of the Troubles, from the outbreak of violence in the late 1960s to the 1980s, were characterised by colloquial, everyday usages of ‘identity.’ Such terminology did not feature heavily in either explanations of, or proposed solutions to, the violence. During the 1970s in Northern Ireland, the metaconflict over what the conflict was about was far from settled or uniform amongst its actors or the public (Finlay 2010). While identity talk was ‘in the air’ in the 1970s, it was not until the “cultural turn” of the 1980s that it come to the fore (Gilligan 2007:602). This second phase of the early 1980s witnessed ‘the emergence and stabilisation of
‘identity talk’ in public political discourse and policy documents regarding the Irish Question’ (Gilligan 2007:600–601). A third phase was inaugurated with the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA herein) in 1985, after which the “two-communities” model became dominant. For Gilligan (2007:605), the AIA was ‘the policy document which securely established identity as a key concept in official political discourse.’ In the fourth phase, the peace process of the 1990s, identity politics became hegemonic as the cause and solution to a single, identity-centric “Northern Ireland problem” (Dunn 1995; Finlay 2010; Gilligan 2007). For Protestants, their “lack” of a story of peoplehood rendered the cultural turn a moment of crisis.

2.1.3 Defeatism and the Cultural Turn

After the melee of the early years of the Troubles began to settle into more predictable and consistent patterns after the reorganisation of the provisional IRA in 1977 (McKittrick et al. 1999; White 1983). The ground shifted further with the republican hunger strikes, which dominated the scene in 1980-81 (Gilligan 2007; Hancock 2008; Holland 1999). With the election of one of the hunger strikers, Bobby Sands, to Westminster whilst still imprisoned, Sinn Féin-IRA changed course, adopting the “Armalite to the ballot box” strategy. Meanwhile, the moderate nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) began to coordinate with the recently elected Fianna Fáil government in the south, aiming to outline their ideas for a new Ireland and establish ‘a quadripartite conference which would involve both communities and the British and Irish Governments’ (Gilligan 2007; Murray 1998:99).

With the conflict crystallised into a chronic, low-intensity war, the early 1980s saw attempts by political elites in Northern Ireland, London and Dublin to ‘regain some momentum’ (Gilligan 2007:602). It was only at this point that the Irish and British governments began to ‘recognise the extent of nationalist alienation and embark on a path to resolve it’ (Ruane and Todd 2007:452). While both Westminster and northern unionists did not share Fianna Fáil and the SDLP’s desire for Irish re-unification, they welcomed their revision of Irish peoplehood (Gilligan 2007). Diverging from the traditional nationalist claim that British Protestants in the north are Irish victims of false national consciousness, Fianna Fáil and the SDLP introduced a two-community model into their vision of a new, pluralist Ireland. However, as Ní Cráith (2003) rightly points out, this discursive shift took place in the context of the rise of identity talk globally. Concomitantly, ‘the term identity began to become an established feature of policy documents regarding Northern Ireland’ over this period, culminating in the AIA in 1985 (Gilligan 2007:603). In the wake of the AIA, the two-communities model became hegemonic as an explanation of Northern Ireland’s problems.
The central tenets of the AIA were subsequently consolidated by both British and Irish governmental policy and practice. It initiated a full-scale ‘state sponsorship of cultural discourse,’ grounded in the two-communities model of conflict explanation and peace-building (Crowley 2005:196). The Community Relations Unit was created in 1987, whose remit is to advise the Secretary of State on community relations. The following year saw the establishment of the Cultural Traditions Group (CTG), charged with allocating grant-based funding to cultural projects to the “two communities” (Crowley 2005; McCall 2002). The CTG’s emphasis of the two-community model, one ‘Catholic, nationalist tradition with its Gaelic culture and language, and the Protestant, unionist tradition with its (Ulster-) English culture and language,’ was ‘both simplistic and dangerous’: ‘simplistic in that it tended to assume a certain rigidity and insularity to the traditions; dangerous in that such an assumption could lead to the prolongation of precisely such characteristics’ (Crowley 2005:197–98). Indeed, the CTG, alongside other elite-led peace-building initiatives, provided a powerful endorsement of the two-communities model, an approach which would ultimately bloom into the GFA. Such an environment proved highly conducive to the creation of Ulster-Scots (McCall 2002; Níc Craith 2003).

A shift in Ulster Protestant attitude from triumphalism to defeatism through the Troubles has been well documented (see Anderson and Shuttleworth 1994; Finlay 2001a; McKay 2000; Nagle and Clancy 2010; Nelson 1984; Smithey 2011; Southern 2007)\(^\text{11}\). Utilising Northern Irish attitudinal surveys, Hughes and Donnelly (2003) contend that through the 1990s “the Protestant community” experienced a growing feeling of marginalisation, as the ‘Catholic community’ grew in political confidence. Since the GFA, Protestant victimhood has become a key theme of unionist political elite discourses (see Ganiel 2007); as Lawther (2014:52) writes, ‘the relationship between innocence, legitimacy and hierarchies of victimhood is integral to unionist’s sense of identity and collective memory.’

According to Anderson and Shuttleworth (1994:97), this sense of marginalisation is not grounded in ‘reality,’ but a ‘deflated superiority complex.’ Todd (1987) described Ulster Loyalist ideology as containing a binary of domination or defeat. Hence, despite the Troubles concluding with Northern Ireland’s position within the UK retained, concessions to Catholics/republicans/nationalists, the relinquishing of the British state’s guarantee of defence of the union, and the power-sharing solution have been viewed as defeat. In a situation in which

\(^{11}\) Portions of this section have been published (see Gardner 2015).
compromise is interpreted as cataclysmic, the dignity once attained through domination came
to be replaced by a sense of loss, a sense of degradation.

For Finlay (2001a:16), the rise of protestant defeatism is primarily ‘symptomatic of the
fact that northern protestants did not develop a strong collective identity and, perhaps, of
ongoing attempts to get one in a context where identity politics have themselves become
hegemonic.’ The connection between Protestant anxieties over collective identifications and
unionist political aspirations is well described by Nelson (1984:12), in her ethnographic
fieldwork of loyalists in Belfast between 1973 and 1976:

For most loyalists, expressions of feelings for Britain are not just cynical exercises. While some have gained a more realistic sense of modern British feelings towards them, others still believe Britons will one day recognise them as allies, and cling to a sentimental (some would say maudlin) attachment to Britain. Abandoning this belief often means losing a sense of self-worth which has been built on the idea that Ulster Protestants are vital to the mother country, her staunchest defenders through history. To consider that this may be untrue is to challenge the point of past sacrifices, to invite
the disturbing question: “Who am I then, and where do I belong?”

With the cultural turn, this question was pushed to the forefront of Northern Irish politics. As the ascension of identity politics corresponded to the collapse of unionist-loyalist senses of
dignity, I consider the resulting Protestant projects of identity articulation to represent not a
continuation war by other means (Gallaher 2007; Níc Craith 2000), but a means to produce a
sense of collective dignity in the context in which they find themselves. For many of the
individuals whom I interviewed as part of this research, the ‘disturbing question: “Who am I
then, and where do I belong?”’ remained unanswered until they discovered Ulster-Scots.

The elevation of ‘identity’ explanations, and hence solutions, is the mechanism of
power which inaugurated the current era of essentialist forms of tolerance. A central component
of consociation holds that the society in question is constituted of two or more ethno-communal
peoples, characterised by bright boundaries of difference and both symmetry and mutual
exclusivity in their articulation. Prior to the cultural turn, nationalists and unionists were
asymmetric and contained opposing claims, both in terms of peoplehood and legitimate self-
determination. Through the cultural turn, both nationalist and unionist discourses moved to a
two-community model, hence rendering Northern Ireland conducive to the implementation of
consociational democracy.
2.2 Consociationalism, Normativity, Power

Consociation has been implemented in order to prevent or solve a range of ethnicised conflict zones in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, including Northern Ireland, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burundi, Kenya, Lebanon, and Iraq (Nagle 2017). By the turn of the millennium, it had become a principal tool for liberal interventionists (Finlay 2010). Political science definitions of consociationalism tend to centre around the organisation of political elites in the state in question, centring on systems of democratic government organised around elite-level ethnonational representation. For liberal theorists such as Pippa Norris (2008:23), power-sharing refers to ‘those states which are characterised by formal institutional rules which give multiple political elites a stake in the decision-making process,’ using “multiple” in an ethnic-bloc sense. Usually, these include key institutional mechanisms, such as grand coalitions, mutual veto, and other checks and balances on the ethnic balance of power.

In terms of the population, consociationalism is considered to work best where, in the words of its founding father, Arend Lijphart (1969:219), ‘distinct lines of cleavage’ are understood to exist ‘among their subcultures.’

Predominant explanations and defences of consociationalism tend to fail to take into consideration structural explanations and the effect of power. A comprehensive explanation of the causal mechanisms which led to the implementation of the GFA is beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather, I focus on the social reality and effects of consociation. It suffices to say that I consider its installation to be a product of economic, political, and ideological power, rather than some notion of the Agreement’s objective effectiveness or rationality, a product of the exemplary actions of the “great men” of the late-nineties (Tony Blair, Bertie Ahern, Bill Clinton, David Trimble, John Hume, Ian Paisley, Gerry Adams), or the will of the people.

Likewise, I consider consociation to be not merely a democratic institutional arrangement, but a mechanism of power, an organising principle in late modern Northern Ireland. It incorporates and operates through economic, political, and ideological sources of power, legitimising and reinforcing its core principles as benevolent and normative. Nor has it been in effect, so to speak, in Northern Ireland only since the GFA. Consociationalist “solutions” have been a spectre hanging over the Northern Irish state since at least the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973. The ideological bases of consociationalism – ethnopolitics among the ruling elite, inter-communal tolerance, the distribution of power by ethnic proportion – have emerged as core themes in the trajectory of normativity through the conflict, and have been rendered hegemonic in the post-GFA period (Dixon 1997; Finlay 2010). However, it does not do so in isolation, but through its synergy with a variety of other dominant
ideologies, including capitalist democracy, neoliberalism, ethno-national self-determination, and ethnic identity as a pan-human psychological necessity. As such, I consider consociationalism to be not merely an institutional framework, but a mechanism of ideological, disciplinary power.

‘Ideological phenomena are meaningful symbolic phenomena in so far as they serve, in particular socio-historical circumstances, to establish and sustain relations of domination’ (Thompson 1990:56). The operation of ideology, for Thompson, includes the rendering of something, via a variety of processes, as rational, natural, normal, and absolute. Two opposing forces within Thomson’s conception of ideology are unification and fragmentation; the former establishing and sustaining relations of domination through a common ‘collective identity, irrespective of the differences and divisions that may separate them,’ the latter by ‘emphasising the distinctions, differences and divisions between individuals and groups, the characteristics which disunite them and prevent them from constituting an effective challenge’ to the relations of domination (Thompson 1990:64, 65). Consociation functions through a merging of these mechanisms, producing a shared history of differentiation: a form of unity through fragmentation, and fragmentation as unity. To return to a theme of chapter one, the new, post-GFA Northern Ireland is to find peace under the common banner of tolerance for tolerance.

The ideological power of consociationalism functions at a range of levels, from the political power of its ruling elites to the intimate, the infinitesimal. With regards to the latter, consociationalism disciplines bodies such that they are rendered docile and, hence, governable (Foucault 1979, 2003). In this vein, Finlay (2010:66) writes: consociationalism is ‘a form of liberal governmentality that normalises the ethnic or the ethno-national through a combination of discipline and programmes that aim to “produce national being,” ethno-national subjects or identities.’ Although this points to a conceptualisation of power as highly diffuse, a concomitant rejection of top-down power does not necessarily follow. As Terry Eagleton (1991:8) has contended: ‘It is perfectly possible to agree with … Foucault that power is everywhere, while wanting for certain practical purposes to distinguish between more and less central instances of it.’ In this vein, I contend that consociational ideology has become hegemonic in schemes of normality both through infinitesimal mechanisms of power and the more structural political and economic power of the dominant class.

The predominant political-sociological critique of consociationalism has been that it institutionalises, or “freezes” the very communal categories/ethnic identities which are conceived to have been the primary issue of the conflict (Dixon 1997; Farry 2009; Guelke 2012; Horowitz 2001; Lustick 1979; McVeigh and Rolston 2007; Muldoon et al. 2007; Norris
2008; Ruane and Todd 2001; Simonsen 2005; Taylor 2001, 2006; Wilson and Wilford 2003). The GFA, and the consociational peacekeeping approach more generally, has adopted the two communities “ethnic conflict” interpretation of the Troubles; that ‘in the “nature of things” the north of Ireland is deeply, indeed irrefutably, divided between two competing ethno-national communities’ (Taylor 2006:217). The nature of collective identities is fundamental to this critique. With the constructivist turn, such identificatory systems were no longer to be considered primordial but fluid; continuously altering, alterable, and situationally altered. Few critics of consociationalism in Northern Ireland have, however, gone as far as to suggest full fluidity; rather it is suggested that identities are “malleable.”

McGarry and O’Leary (2006b:271) rebutted the accusation that consociation inherently includes a primordialist interpretation, arguing that ‘there is a major difference between thinking that some identities are durable and maintaining that they are immutably primordial.’ Rather than insisting upon immutable, naturally occurring, pseudo-biological conceptions of communal identity, they maintain that these identities are enduring, deep, generationally passed down, and hence more resistant to circumstantial and institutional arrangements than consociationalism’s critics contend. In doing so, McGarry and O’Leary attempt to distance themselves from the more explicitly primordial conceptions of ethnicity and collective identity inherent in Lijphart’s early work on consociational democracy (Finlay 2010).

In answer to their critics, McGarry and O’Leary (2004, 2006b) distinguish between ‘liberal’ and ‘corporate’ consociationalism. Whereas the latter involves pre-determination of collective identity, usually involving separated electoral registers which only permit voting for one’s own ‘side’ (such as that of Bosnia), the former permits self-determination. In his forward to Kerr’s (2006:xxv) *Imposing Power-Sharing*, O’Leary writes: ‘the distinction is vital because it is untrue that consociation necessarily privileges, institutionalises and reinforces prior collective identities.’ In Mujkic’s (2007) critique of Bosnian consociationalism1, he argued that ‘the politics of Bosnia can be best described as a democracy of ethnic oligarchies rather than a democracy of citizens’; in this context, the very ‘notion of the individual citizen abstracted from his ethnic and religious kinship’ is regarded as ‘subversive’ (Mujkic 2007:113,119,120 his emphasis). For McGarry and O’Leary (2006b:271), such ethnic restrictiveness is lamentable, but insist that this critique holds for corporate consociationalism only, rather than consociationalism in general. They argue that its liberal version holds no such mandatory identifications:
Let us be clear about the Agreement. It does not, contrary to the assertion of a recent article in *Foreign Affairs*, ‘set aside seats for Catholics and Protestants’, or for unionists and nationalists for that matter. Citizens vote on a common roll; vote for any candidates or parties they prefer; can vote across blocs, and can express first- or lower-order voting preferences outside their blocs. So the election of Assembly members (MLAs) does not privilege particular identities. Ministers become ministers by an allocation algorithm that is ‘difference-blind’: it operates according to strength of representation won by parties in the Assembly, not their national identity.

Thus, they insist, liberal consociationalism in mere pragmatism in light of durable identities.

In Finlay’s (2010:22) *Governing Ethnic Conflict* he refutes McGarry and O’Leary’s liberal-corporate distinction, suggesting rather that within the GFA ‘the room for self-determination or self-identification seems to be curtailed or threatened’. Finlay points out that, the language of identity in the Agreement appears at times fluid and open\(^\text{12}\) and yet somewhat contradictorily, restrictive and two-community centred\(^\text{13}\). Furthermore, as also pointed out by Wilson and Wilford (2003:15), the requirement that all political parties must be registered as “Nationalist,” “Unionist” or “Other,” and that ‘critical decisions’ require “parallel consent” through concurrent majorities in the ‘nationalist’ and ‘unionist’ blocks,’ seriously undermines McGarry and O’leary’s claim the GFA represents a “liberal” form of consociation. This intrinsic “corporatist” element political structure renders problematic their liberal-corporate distinction, especially given their insistence that Northern Ireland represents the archetype of liberal consociation. Clearly the GFA is less liberal and self-deterministic than McGarry and O’Leary contend.

For Finlay (2008, 2010), McGarry and O’Leary’s liberal consociational model remains built upon durable conceptions of collective identities. Interrogating its ethical and ontological rationales, he contends that the roots of consociationalism lie in Eriksonian conceptions of identity. Erikson (1968, 1980, 1995), an eminent psychologist writing through the middle of the twentieth century, was a leading inventor and proponent of the notion that identity is a psychological necessity. He contended that all humans are naturally endowed with a stable and unavoidable identity, and that ‘this inner sameness and continuity is something to be valued and nurtured’ (Finlay 2008:284). For Erikson, this identity was inextricably bound up in notions of culture. His theories on identity have become commonplace, both in academic work and in societal norms. Consociationalism’s theoretical approach to identity similarly views the

\(^{12}\) GFA item 1 part (vi) states that the writers ‘recognise the birth right of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British or both, as they may choose’.

\(^{13}\) GFA item 1 part (v): ‘all the people impartiality on behalf of all the people in the diversity of their identities and traditions and … of parity of esteem and just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos and aspirations of both communities’.
cultural identity of the individual as a psychologically imperative, and an inescapable and immutable social fact.

As such, Finlay (2010:37) concludes that ‘the problem with consociation is less the fact that it valorises particular ethno-national traditions, but that it valorises ethnicity per se and makes it normative, such that the space for other ways of being and other forms of politics is diminished.’ As “liberal” as the GFA may be claimed to be, its politics is essentially ethnopolitical. The valorisation of ethnic identity – not merely a set of possible ethnicities – renders communal identity paramount and individual identity abstract. Thus, consociationalism is not merely an acceptance of the durability of particular identities but rather establishes communal identity into the mainstream of “normal” politics.

Conceptions of collective identification in the north of Ireland are historically malleable and dialectically constituted. Taking the malleability and relationality of ethnic identity seriously, the ethnically normative context of consociationalism does not merely “freeze” identities, but it establishes limits within which ideas of ethnic identity are continuously and dynamically reimagined. Identity politics in Northern Ireland has been rendered inescapable: paramount yet common-sense. In a word, identity politics has become hegemonic, and so ‘camouflage[s] particular distributions of power’ (Finlay 2001a; Lustick 1993:122). The specific ontological format of identity politics pursued under consociationalism has been the two-communities interpretation, fully institutionalised under the GFA (Taylor 2006). As such, consociational normativity – not only at the level of political elites or constitutional arrangements, but societally – establish boundaries within which normal articulations of the self are restricted, and under which new forms of communal identifications arise. With the field of vision restrained, identities continue to be (re)imagined within ethnic blinkers.

In other words, I contend that consociational arrangements do not merely freeze identities; rather, ideas of collective identity are dynamic under consociation. The rise of Ulster-Scots is illustrative of just such a capacity: the evolution of a new formulation of collective identification very much within the boundaries of consociation’s peoplehood ideology. Ulster-Scots is not just a new unionist weapon in a cultural war (Mac Póilin 1999), it is an idea congruent with consociational ideological normativity. It is worth pointing out, however, that although consociationalism represents a regressive form of peace-building with problematic effects, it is not the case that peace would be found in alternative approaches which also continue to maintain the present social order (Luxemburg 1911). Peace which fails to call into question, or indeed bolsters, the global structures of domination – capitalism, patriarchy, racism, and other forms of structural violence – is a false peace.
2.3 Ulster-Scots

Ulster-Scots burst onto the Northern Irish political scene in the 1990s. It gained notoriety initially as an alleged language of the “Protestant community” to rival the Catholic association with the Irish language, promoted by a small but influential faction of unionist political and cultural elites known as the Ulster-Scots Heritage Council (see chapter five). Although promoters of Ulster-Scots regarded the project as primarily ethno-cultural from its beginnings, promotion in the 1990s and early 2000s pursued primarily linguistic legitimacy. As Information and Community Outreach Officer for the Heritage Council, Lee Reynolds, explained:

There have been many attempts to define cultural rights, but whenever they have done they’ve found the language aspect much easier to define than the cultural. So, what began as a process of cultural rights recognition ended up language rights recognition with some cultural rights attached. As they examined the issue and tried to define it, it got reversed in what was the original intention. So, we ended up with a model where to secure our cultural rights we had to go heavy on the language rights.

However, my interview data would also appear to indicate that it was also the case that exactly what was to be included in “Ulster-Scots culture” was far from clear, even for its most expressive promoters.

In many ways, the route taken by the Heritage Council has proven highly successful. In the space of only a few years, Ulster-Scots had been allocated a high degree of official linguistic recognition. Its inclusion in the linguistic section of the GFA paved the way for its institutionalisation, which subsequently provided both funding and a platform from which to promote notions of culture, ethnicity and heritage. However, its record for broad societal legitimacy has been considerably more limited, even amongst unionists and loyalists. The last decade of promotion has been focused on gaining traction for Ulster-Scots as a primarily ethno-cultural movement.

In this section, I describe Ulster-Scots and place the “revival” in its social and political context. Before doing so, I wish to address the literature on ethnicity and peoplehood, outlining the theoretical framework in this regard within which this thesis is located.

2.3.1 Ethnic Peoplehood

Ethnicity, race and nation are ‘relational, processual, dynamic, eventful, and disaggregated terms.’ They are political projects rather than de facto entities (Brubaker

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14 Portions of this section have been published in Gardner (2015).
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2004:11). With Nagel (1994:161,154), I consider ethnic identities to be ‘created, emphasised, chosen, or discarded’ through a ‘dialectical process involving internal and external opinions and processes, as well as the individual’s self-identification and outsiders’ ethnic designations.’ Rather than deep-seated and explanatory variables, I take conceptions of peoplehood to be historically malleable and dialectically constituted.

Ethnicity is often contrasted with race, the latter described as invoking a small set over-arching categories of mankind denoted by phenotypical features, the former as corresponding to local cultural patterns, beliefs and behaviours. Such rigid distinctions fail to consider articulations of ethnicity as phenotypical and a product of ancient bloodlines, as well as the inclusion of culture within raceology and racism. Nor are race or ethnicity stable, homogenously conceptualised concepts across space and time. Rather, ‘ethnicity is defined by shifting and woolly criteria that operate inconsistently across institutional domains and levels of the class structure, such that it does not produce a coordinated alignment of boundaries in symbolic, social and physical space’ (Wacquant 2016:1081).

In response, Loïc Wacquant (2016) collapses all forms of collective ethno-racial identifications and categorisations into “ethnicity.” While I consider his rejection of absolute definitions of race, ethnicity and nation to be productive, the use and conceptualisation of such terms by social actors ought to remain an object of sociological analysis (Brubaker 2004). Furthermore, in their most “civic” articulations, the boundaries between race, ethnicity and nation and other forms of identification can become blurred. Rogers Smith (2003) offers a productive terminological and schematic way forward. “Peoplehood” refers to the full array of collective identifications, ranging from small-scale organisations and local affiliations, through national and state identifications, to international and universal affiliations (Smith 2003).

Narratives of history and ideas of shared memories play a central role in the construction of collective identities (Anderson 1991; Gellner 2008; Gilroy 1990; Hobsbawm 1983, 1990; Lentin 2010): as Hodgkin and Radstone (2003:196) point out, ‘nationalist memory describes a geography of belonging, an identity forged in a specified landscape, inseparable from it.’ Since Halbwach’s (1992) seminal study of memory and society, there have been countless theorisations of what constitutes “collective memory,” how it functions, and how it interacts with “history”; however its conceptualisations are so numerous and varied in the academic literature that it has become something of a disorganised concept (Lentin 2010; Wertsch and Roediger 2008). Zerubavel’s (2003) work provides a useful framework for the interrelation between history and collective memory. He proposes that history ought to be understood not as a comprehensive recording of past events but as a means through which
particular stories are told: we are ‘socialised into different mnemonic traditions’ through ‘unmistakably social norms of remembrance’ (Zerubavel 2003:5). Furthermore, Zerubavel (2003:4) contends that ‘being social presupposes the ability to experience things that happened to the groups to which we belong long before we even joined them as if they were part of our own personal past’. Thus, the internalisation of particular histories produces ‘mnemonic communities’ (2003:4).

In his seminal text, *Stories of Peoplehood*, Rogers Smith (2003) theorises the relationship between collective stories and the (re)production of senses of peoplehood. He outlines a general theory of people-making, contending that stories are central to the construction of “a people.” For Smith, these narratives have always formed a basis on which collective identifications are formed and formulated, laying down bases for claims of collective idiosyncrasies, geographies, and political aspirations. His theory focuses primarily upon what such stories do: their productiveness in peoplehood-building and the effect of their content on the actions of individuals conceived of as within the group in question. The effect of the story upon the individual/group is of greater concern to Smith than whether the story is considered ancient or modern, factual-historic or mythic, well-versed or novel. The content of such peoplehood stories establishes the contours of the collectivity (its characteristics and ambitions), the boundaries of inclusion/exclusion, the perceived strength of allegiances, and the range of issues over which the identification is conceived of as holding legitimate jurisdiction. While I broadly agree with Jaffrelot (2005) that Smith overlooks the role of the Other in the construction of political identities, his call for greater attention to be paid to stories in the construction of peoplehoods is productive.

A further productive element in Smith’s (2003) concept of political peoplehoods is its inclusion of the broad scope of communal projects. Contrary to approaches which separate local, organisational, ethnic, racial, national and other forms of collective identification, Smith places them all within the umbrella of political peoplehoods. He provides a two-dimensional framework in this regard, with one axis equating to the range of issues the peoplehood covers (from narrow to wide), and the other its capacity to override other competing peoplehoods (from weak to strong). Such an approach is particularly conducive to the study of a peoplehood such as Ulster-Scots, which oscillates, expands and contracts through religious, ethnic, national, political, and organisational formulations.

Smith offers three subcategories of peoplehood story: economic, political power, and ethically constitutive. The former ‘promise that membership in the political community will enhance the power of the community, either as individuals, as a people, or most often both’
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(2003:62). Such stories which prioritise the personal security of its members, however, are considered to be more compelling than those which emphasise global ascendency or some untenable notion of greatness. The economic story relates to the material interests and economic ideology within the collectivity’s conception of peoplehood. These ‘offer worth in the very tangible and tempting form of increased wealth for all, individually and collectively’ (2003:60). Ethically constitutive stories differ from both the economic and political power stories insofar as they ‘present membership in a particular people as somehow intrinsic to who its members really are, because of traits that are imbued with ethical significance’ (2003:64). These lay claim to deeper, more intrinsic aspects of the individual:

Such stories proclaim that members’ culture, religion, language, race, ethnicity, ancestry, history, or other such factors are constitutive of their very identities as persons, in ways that both affirm their worth and delineate their obligations. These stories are almost always intergenerational, implying that the ethically constitutive identity espoused not only defines who a person is, but who her ancestors have been and who her children can be (Smith 2003:64–65).

Thus, ethically constitutive stories include those which pertain to the construction and/or perpetuation of ethnic, racial, national and state-based identifications. In chapter seven I question the dissociability of this tripartite separation, outlining where the Ulster-Scots peoplehood story conceives of economic ideological and material features as innate, ethnic traits.

Histories of language revival – the chronology of development, incorporations and influences by other languages, migrations and movements – are intimately linked to ideas of genealogy, biography, territory, class, “race,” and myths of origin. To describe a particular ethno-linguo-cultural movement as a “revival” is to couch it in a frame which valorises it, ascribing it a certain legitimacy. “Revival” is a loaded term which evokes a particular narrative; that of a heyday, a decline, almost disappearance, followed by a heroic struggle by a benevolent few, and a resurrection. It infers an unproblematic return of cultural difference almost wiped out by a homogenising modernity, as well as a re-establishment of the human right of cultural expression for a “people.” As such, the revival narrative is a particular “story of peoplehood”, constructed, as Rodgers Smith contends, not merely to ‘serve interests’, but furthermore to ‘help to constitute them’ (2003:45).

Oftentimes, revitalisations of ‘half-forgotten ancestral culture [turn] out to be something qualitatively new’ (Eriksen 2002:85). Likewise, the Ulster-Scots cultural revitalisation draws upon genealogical descent to justify the (re)construction of an Ulster-Scots
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culture drawn largely from the elements of eighteenth-century Scottishness which are themselves a ‘retrospective invention’ (Trevor-Roper 1983:15). This conceptualisation of the ethno-cultural “revival” entails arbitration over the inclusion/exclusion of histories and culture (or, rather, to ‘touch them up, to shorten them, or to complete them’) in order to construct stories of origin and communal identity (Halbwachs 1992:51; Zerubavel 2003).

2.3.2 Who are the Ulster-Scots?

‘The linguistic question “What is Ulster Scots?” was always a displacement of the political question “Who are the Ulster Scots?”’ (Dowling 2007:61). A fundamental question for the interpretation of Ulster-Scots is whether it represents an ethno-linguistic community in its own right or merely ethnic wallpaper on a unionist political wall. In other words, is Ulster-Scots anything other than Protestantism/Unionism/Loyalism by another name? This thesis goes some way to provide an answer to this question.

The Ulster-Scots movement has been developed, appropriated, utilised and defended by a plethora of different actors and groups in the north of Ireland for often greatly varying purposes, almost exclusively by those from across the spectrum of unionism and loyalism; as Graham (2004:496) states, ‘as with Unionism in general, it is difficult to generalise because the Ulster-Scots movement is itself fragmented’. Various political actors and parties have utilised and defended it. Orange Order members and lodges have adopted it, describing Orange traditions such as the Twelfth of July parades as a form of Ulster-Scots cultural expression. Some Protestant (especially Presbyterian) churches have become interested in what they consider to be “their” Ulster-Scots “heritage”. For many, it is a key cultural weapon of unionism; a means of cultivating a sense of Britishness through a historical, cultural, linguistic, and even ethnic-genealogical connection with Scotland, thus legitimising Northern Ireland’s institutional-legal position within the multinational state of the United Kingdom (McCall 2002; Níc Craith 2000, 2001, 2003; Mac Póilín 1991).

As the Ulster-Scots identity has been appropriated by various different individuals and groups, and its “revival” has taken numerous forms. These actors tend to stress the centrality or importance of one or more aspects: the linguistic, literary, genealogical, cultural, historical and/or political (although many “grassroots” Ulster-Scots vocalise a concern over its politicisation) (see McCall 2002). For some it is primarily a linguistic and literary endeavour; a fight for the protection and rejuvenation of a minority autochthonous language on the brink of extinction (Gardner 2015). Others, however, feel alienated by this movement, considering it to be the reserve of intellectuals, academics, and the middle-class unionists, abstracted from
‘local communities’ of working-class Ulster-Scots (McCall 2002:206). Indeed, such assertions are supported by census data for Ulster-Scots linguistic ability\(^{15}\). Areas with above-average levels of Ulster-Scots linguistic ability tend to be areas of below average unemployment levels and working-class occupations, and above average levels of high-grade professional and manual jobs. In terms of “culture,” however, the features which have come to be understood as culturally Ulster-Scots\(^{16}\) tend to correspond to activities of working-class loyalists, such as parades, flute bands, and Ulster-centrism (Todd 1987).

According to the 2011 Northern Irish census (NISRA 2013a), the first census to include a question on Ulster-Scots linguistic ability, 8.1 per cent of the population (around 140,000 people) claimed to have some ability in Ulster-Scots. At first glance this appears surprisingly high given the relative newness of the movement. The Irish language, with its considerable history, establishment within the education system, and legitimacy amassed only 10.7 per cent. However, closer analysis depicts a starker contrast between the two languages: 65.6 per cent of those who stated some form of ability in Ulster-Scots could understand but not read, write or speak it, and only 11.7 per cent (16,373 people)\(^{17}\) stated ability in all four of these areas; whereas these figures for the Irish language were 38.1 and 35.1 per cent respectively\(^{18}\).

Age, gender and religious profiles for the two languages also differ significantly (NISRA 2013b). Whereas the Irish language is most prevalent among the young and least among the oldest age grouping, it is the older groupings which most commonly have some ability in Ulster-Scots, with the youngest being the least likely. One in four Ulster-Scots speakers are over the age of fifty-five. For Irish, the school-age population has for some time been the largest group to have some ability in the language, mostly representing the impact of the language’s place within the education system (Mac Giolla Chriost 2005). In terms of

\(^{15}\) Descriptive data from the Northern Ireland census (NISRA 2013a), analysed by the author, indicate that areas with above average Ulster-Scots linguistic ability reported tend to be more economically prosperous than those with below-average levels of Ulster-Scots.

\(^{16}\) The demonym for Ulster-Scots most commonly used by interviewees was “Ulster-Scots,” rather than Ulster-Scotch or Ulster-Scottish.

\(^{17}\) A figure considerably lower than that posited by the Ulster-Scots Language Society. It is important to note, however, that by “Ulster” it is likely that the Language Society include Donegal; a county within the historic province of Ulster, but located within the Republic of Ireland across north-western border. This would produce a higher figure than that found in the Northern Irish census.

\(^{18}\) In comparing linguistic abilities in these languages it is important to note that Ulster-Scots is considerably easier to learn than Irish. Although educational materials and language classes in Ulster-Scots are much more scarce, it’s structure, grammar, and many of its words are similar, mutually intelligible, or identical to that of English. Contrariwise, the Irish language’s grammar, vocabulary and pronunciation are somewhat more difficult and counterintuitive for the English speaker to learn. It is also quite possible, given the controversy around Ulster-Scots language, that participants stated that they understood it inasmuch as they rejected the notion that it was a different language.
gender, males are more likely than females to have some ability in Ulster-Scots (53.1 and 46.9 per cent respectively), while the reverse is true for the Irish language for which 47.8 per cent are male and 52.2 female.

The religious divide in linguistic ability is stark. Of those with some ability in the Irish language, fully 90 per cent are Catholic and only 7.4 per cent Protestant (NISRA 2013b). For Ulster-Scots, meanwhile, 79 per cent with some ability are Protestant, while Catholics make up 17 per cent. For Irish, this is perhaps largely explainable through the fact that the language is taught from an early age throughout Northern Ireland’s Catholic schools. Where the divide in Irish is exacerbated by educational segregation and communally differentiated curriculums, Ulster-Scots has no such institutional causality. Rather, it is symptomatic of geographic segregation and the politics of identification alone. The recent appearance of Ulster-Scots in Protestant-majority may further exacerbate this situation.

Ulster-Scots linguistic ability and identification do not necessarily correspond, and ‘a knowledge of the language is neither necessary nor sufficient for a sense of Ulster-Scots identity’ (Stapleton and Wilson 2004:571). When the figures for Ulster-Scots linguistic ability are compared to that of espousing Ulster-Scots identity, the religious bifurcation becomes clearer. Comparing the figures for self-identification from a 2010 Omnibus survey (Carmichael 2010) to those for linguistic ability from the 2011 Census provides a rough insight into this divide. Whereas the figure for self-identification among Protestants was considerably higher than that of linguistic ability, for Catholics it appears likely that Ulster-Scots linguistic ability and self-identification are more closely aligned (see table 2.2). Thus, it is clear that Ulster-Scots as an identity obtains resonance mainly amongst Northern Ireland’s Protestants.

Table 2.2: Ulster-Scots Linguistic Ability and Self-Identification by Religious Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Identity</th>
<th>Some linguistic ability in Ulster-Scots (Per cent of total group)</th>
<th>Self-identification as an Ulster-Scot (Per cent of total group)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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19 Figures from the Northern Irish Census 2011 (NISRA n.d.).
20 Figures from 2010 Omnibus study (Carmichael 2010).
Geographically, Ulster-Scots linguistic ability is most prevalent in the north of County Antrim and around the Ards peninsula (see figure 2.1 above). It is most commonly found in areas with high proportions of Protestants, and higher percentages of those who self-identify with the British national identity. Although this area reveals similarity to Gregg’s (1985) linguistic map of Ulster’s ‘Scotch-Irish dialect boundaries,’ this “Ulster-Scots heartland” is also ‘congruent with what the Ulster Defence Association call the “retainable homeland,”’ the territory that they define as theirs’ (Níc Craith 2000:408). DCAL survey data found linguistic ability to be more common in rural than urban areas (18 and 13 per cent respectively) and much less prevalent in the most deprived areas (8 per cent) compared with the wealthiest areas (19 per cent) (Carmichael 2017). This concurs with McCall’s (2002) finding that many working-class Ulster-Scots feel alienated from the literary and linguistic aspects of the Ulster-Scots “revival.”

Despite the imagined separation between Ulster-Scots linguistic ability and cultural identity (Stapleton and Wilson 2004), this line is blurred in terms of perceived legitimacy. The history of nationalism produced an interlinking of linguistic legitimisation and the validity of particular (ethno)national identities; thus, ‘a language, as opposed to a dialect, is frequently conceived as tied to a particular type of valorised space’ (Anderson 1991; Crowley 2006; May 2000, 2011). The perceived illegitimacy of Ulster-Scots as a language is simultaneously

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21 Statistics taken from the 2011 census results (NISRA 2013a).
22 With the exclusion of Ulster-Scots in Donegal, as this county is in the Republic of Ireland, and so is not included in the Northern Irish census.
wrapped up with the opinion that it is also an illegitimate culture/identity. For many in the north of Ireland, Ulster-Scots is derisory; a mixture of Northern Irish colloquialisms, mispronunciations, and thick, rural accent; often accused of being merely “English with a Ballymena accent” or “a DIY language for Orangemen.” Tom Kelly, former vice chair of the SDLP, famously referred to it as ‘gibberish,’ writing that it ‘would be laughable, if it weren’t so serious’ (quoted in Hagan 2009:76). Indeed, although debate over whether it ought to be considered a language, a dialect, or accent/slang continue in public, political and academic circles (Crowley 2005, 2006; Dowling 2007; Mac Póilín 1999), many linguists have argued that it fails to satisfy the technical criteria to qualify as a language (Görlach 2000; Kallen 1999; Kirk 1998, 1999, Nic Craith 2001, 2003).

The controversy of Ulster-Scots is not merely its contested legitimacy as a language. Public backlash is not merely against the ‘folksiness of the prose,’ but that it represents ‘a risible attempt to promote a marginally used tongue as a political gambit’ (Radford 2001:51). Derision of the linguistic aspect of Ulster-Scots often acts as a proxy for opposition to loyalist ‘competitive victimhood’ and divisive, anti-Irish political ploys (Mac Póilín 1999:112). Public suspicion is further raised by the apparent new-found interest many loyalists and unionists had suddenly developed in the fields of linguistics, cultural heritage and literary history. This suspicion is further heightened by the considerable flow of public finances apportioned to translation and funding.

Promoters of the Ulster-Scots language have responded to its contested status in a variety of ways. Many go to lengths to “depoliticise” it (Gardner 2015), or taking pains ‘to avoid being seen as solely representing the Protestant community’ (Radford 2001: 52). Another means of attempting to combat its contested status has been through the acquisition of vertical affirmation; however, despite some legitimation on the vertical axis, ‘it’s status remains highly disputed’ horizontally (Níc Craith 2000:408). A further attempt to valorise its linguistic status has been through the phenomenon of ‘maximally differentiated Ulster-Scots’ (Mac Póilín 1999:118). In order to combat accusations of being “English with an accent,” some promoters began to employ and spell words and phrases such that it appears as ‘far removed as possible from standard English,’ employing a ‘disproportionate quota of obsolete words and … neologisms invented in Northern Ireland’ (Mac Póilín 1999:117). Not only does maximally differentiated Ulster-Scots alienate many native speakers who find that they can no longer understand or recognise it (McCall 2002; Mac Póilín 1999), but it has tended to perpetuate its absurdity for those who oppose it (Radford 2001).
2.3.3 “Revival”

Although peoplehood stories do ‘serve to justify the exercise of power by those who possess it and which serve to reconcile others to the fact that they do not’ (Thompson 1990:62), their agency in doing so is limited by structural factors. While it is the case that unionist and loyalist elites have wielded disproportionate power in the construction of Ulster-Scots peoplehood, their agency is restrained by a variety of interlocking ideological, economic and political forces.

First, the Ulster-Scots “revival” is a product of the ideological power of ethnic normativity. As described above, ideas of cultural identity and “community relations” became increasingly central in the Northern Irish peace process from the cultural turn on (McEvoy, McEvoy, and McConnachie 2006). As consociational peoplehood ideology became hegemonic, symmetric and mutually exclusive ethnicities became the order of the day, bolstered by the broader, global rise of ethnic identity in the second half of the twentieth century. Hence, Ulster-Scots was not a nebulous unionist-loyalist idea, a creation from free agency: it is a product of the ideological structure of late twentieth-century Northern Ireland.

Second, the Ulster-Scots “revival” was produced through political power. The politics of the 1980s had shifted the focus from a multiplicity of issues relating to civil rights, political aspirations, and competing statehoods to communal identity. Unionists began to shift rhetoric from king-and-country civic nationalism toward articulations of genealogy, culture, and ethnic identity. In response to this shift, many unionist and loyalist elites turned to developing ideas of Ulster-Britishness (Finlay 2001a, 2010; Nic Craith 2003). For example, in 1985 the Ulster Society for the Promotion of Ulster-British Heritage and Culture (“Ulster Society” herein) was established in order to develop and promote Ulster-British identity and to prevent what they perceived to be ‘the Gaelicisation of the region’, or, according to David Trimble23, the ‘de-Anglicisation of the Province’ (Dowling 2007:54; Nic Craith 2003:59). Furthermore, the Ulster Society aimed to revise unionist politics, transforming it from being a ‘culture without a culture’ to ‘something more racy of the soil,’ to render it ‘culturally competitive with—and distinct from—culturally inflected nationalism and republicanism’ (Dowling 2007:54). The Ulster-Scots movement came out of this same strand of unionist political thought24 (McCall 2002).

23 David Trimble was formerly the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, a central figure in the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement negotiations, and Northern Ireland First Minister from 1998 to 2002.
24 Máiréad Nic Craith (2003:81–82) argues that not only was the Ulster-Scots movement unconnected to the Ulster Society, but it is actually opposed the Ulster Society’s aims insofar as it would ‘endorse the notion of several varieties of Britishness in the region, which ultimately could compete with one another.’ To the contrary, there
The political attractiveness of “Ulster-Scots” to unionist political elites is in some ways rather straightforward: ‘Scotland … can offer a version of a British political identity which is not English, and therefore not associated with the sense of betrayal which many unionists feel towards Westminster’ (Mac Póilin 1999:115). That Protestants tend to feel a strong sense of connection and cultural similarity with the Scottish further aided political traction in this regard (Mac Póilin 1999). With the political establishment in Belfast already heavily invested in ethnopolitics, having clearer dimensions by which to claim ethnopolitical equality (such as parity of funding for language and cultural bodies or the defence of loyalist parades as “Ulster-Scots culture”) proved productive for courting grass-roots support. Crucially, concrete visions of unionist culture were coveted but scarce in the peace negotiations of the 1990s (see chapter five).

Third, the Ulster-Scots “revival” is a product of economic forces. In a general sense, bright ethnic boundaries of difference became a necessity for Northern Irish capitalism (Shirlow 1997; Shirlow and McGovern 1996). With alternative solutions to the two-community consociational approach excluded, ethnic symmetry had been rendered a prerequisite for peace, and peace increasingly marketed as the conduit for a return to capitalist development. In such capitalist peace approaches, new cultural traditions such as Ulster-Scots are also productive inasmuch as they provide new markets for cultural commodification and tourism. Concomitantly, Ulster-Scots arose in the context of a collapse of Protestant working class jobs and a solid reliance of the Northern Irish state on British governmental block grants. By 1993, public financing from Westminster represented 35.8 per cent of Northern Ireland’s GDP, and the lack employment opportunities were buttressed by an abnormally large public sector (Shirlow and McGovern 1996). With more than a century passed since the Gaelic Revival, nationalist elites had an overwhelming advantage in the new political landscape of post-AIA

was a considerable cross-over not only of goals but also personnel within both the Ulster Society and the Ulster-Scots movement (Dawson 2007; Smithey 2011). Indeed, the first chair appointed to the board of the Ulster-Scots Agency in 1999. That dissonance exists between these projects does not preclude their consecutive usage in political discourse.

The Northern Ireland Life and Times survey of 1998 asked, ‘Of all these groups, which one do you feel closest to?’ (NILT 1998). While 58 per cent of Protestants identified themselves as closest to the Scottish, this figure was only 8 per cent among Catholics. Closeness to the Republic of Ireland was reported by 62 per cent of Catholics, compared with 13 per cent for Protestants. Neither identified as closest to the English or Europeans in high numbers, with 6 and 5 per cent respectively among Catholics and 9 and 12 per cent for Protestants.

Between 1961 and 1991, ‘manufacturing employment fell by just over 70%, while jobs in private services increased by 54% and employment in the public sector increased by a staggering 158%’ (Shirlow and McGovern 1996:393). In the two decades prior to 1991, ‘the share of those resident in the Belfast Urban area whose livelihoods were dependent upon state-sponsored welfare rose from 31.1% to 58.1%’ (Shirlow and McGovern 1996:393).
funding to cultural and linguistic projects. Unionist elites required a tangible Protestant culture to patronise, through which it continue to financially garner the support of the alienated Protestant working class and indignant middle-class. With Irish cultural expression off limits, Scottish heritage was forces into the lime light.

But what are the alternatives to Ulster-Scots for Northern Irish Protestants in the current context? The hegemony of consociational peoplehood ideology has rendered alternatives to, and transgressions from, such ethno-communal duality deviant. One option for Protestants in the north of Ireland, and the option argued for in this thesis, involves just such a transgression from consociationalism. However, the nature of hegemony is such that the capacity for this outcome is restricted. For the interviewees participating in this research, the primary alternatives to Ulster-Scots involve embracing one of three primary alterative communal options. One option would be to re-embrace, even re-capture, Irishness as a Protestant thing. Indeed, just such a movement has been articulated in recent years, such as the rise of Belfast Protestants learning the Irish language (Pritchard 2004; Simpson 2014). However, the bifurcation of legitimate communal cultural expression, as well as decades of breaking ties between Protestantism and Irishness, restrains the potential for such a movement to gain widespread traction. A second option would be to return to the civic British nationalism of the first half of Northern Ireland’s history, with its centring not on national identity or culture, but the glory of the empire and their place within it as bastions of that empire: of progress, industrialism, civilisation (Passing friends). Although some Ulster-Scots promoters depict the Plantation as bringing many benefits to Ulster, returns to King-and-Country Britishness in its older form have thus far not returned to the Northern Irish political scene. A third alternative to Ulster-Scots is to embrace the “Protestant community,” as understood since the cultural turn in the 1980s (see chapter two). However, many of the participants interviewed for this research felt that this identity alone was somehow unstable, unsupported. They feared its lack of validity, lack of the sort of articulate defence which Irish nationalism had developed since the Gaelic Revival. Without Ulster-Scots, they felt an existential threat, a sense of defencelessness, a lack of tools to explain their place in the world. This absence of an ethno-cultural vocabulary through which they could articulate their perspective is, for many promoters of Ulster-Scots, palpable and unavoidable. Ulster-Scots holds the capacity for finding just such an ethnic vocabulary at a point in which alternatives have been narrowed.
2.4 Conclusion

The Ulster-Scots “revival” emerged out of a set of interlocking forces: globally, the rise of identity projects through the twentieth century; locally, it has been shaped by constellations of economic, political and ideological power, especially through Northern Ireland’s cultural turn in the 1980s and the hegemonisation and institutionalisation of consociational ideology. As Hobsbawm (1983:1) states, traditions are invented such that ‘continuity with a suitable historic past’ can be inculcated. In this thesis, I argue that Ulster-Scots represents a mechanism by which unionists attempt to counter their indignity of the end of the Troubles with a more suitable past.

The implementation of Ulster-Scots education takes place in a schooling situation in which school-age children are highly bifurcated by religious background. In the following chapter, I discuss the literature around social and education segregation in Northern Ireland and approaches taken to desegregate schooling and/or ameliorate its conflict-heightening features.
Chapter Three
Communal Segregation and Educational Peace-Building

Segregated schooling and ethnicised conflict are mutually reinforcing social realities. While varied levels of Catholic-Protestant segregation had become common by the 1950s-60s (Harris 1972), this state deteriorated considerably in the first decade of civil war (Darby 1986). Since the end of the conflict, these patterns of bifurcation have persisted. Communal segregation has historically been particularly stark in the education sector. The confessional schism in schooling which began under British rule in Ireland was reinforced through the post-partition decades of Protestant rule in the Unionist state, entrenched through the intensity of conflict, and has persisted under the consociational infrastructure. Despite a plethora of attempts to tackle educational segregation and a preference for desegregation among political elites across the spectrum, even among ethno-political hard-liners, it has persevered. In this chapter, I discuss the literature concerning communal segregation in post-GFA Northern Ireland in general, in schooling, and approaches to amend/ameliorate educational bifurcation and its effects.

3.1 The Current State of Segregation

Despite the considerable acclamation given to the Good Friday Agreement, intense level of religio-communal segregation and bifurcation has largely either increased or remained stable since its signing in 1998. Although widespread segregation is not by itself the cause of intergroup conflict, it ‘play[s] a major role in establishing and maintaining’ communal divisions (Hughes et al. 2007:101). Levels of bifurcation are not homogeneous across the north of Ireland; rather, the region is a patchwork of rates of separation. In this section, I briefly outline, in broad-brush strokes, various forms of segregation in the post-GFA period: spatial-geographical, political, identificatory, interactional, and linguistic. It would appear that communal segregation has remained to a considerable degree intact in post-ceasefire Northern Ireland.

Around 35 to 40 per cent of the population in Northern Ireland live in neighbourhoods separated on ethno-religious grounds (Hughes et al. 2007). Such segregation is more pronounced among working-class communities: for Housing Executive properties, this figure increases to 71 per cent Northern Ireland-wide and 98 per cent in Belfast. Although some level of spatial segregation based existed in Northern Ireland prior to the Troubles, this was considerably exacerbated by varying degrees of communal population migration which
Ethnicising Ulster’s Protestants

occurred across the region from 1968 onward (Darby 1986; Doherty and Poole 1997; Harris 1972). The period from 1971 to 1981 witnessed the starkest upsurge in ethnic segregation, with a smaller but nonetheless notable increase between 1981 and 1991, and a considerably smaller rise between 1991 and 2001 (Doherty and Poole 1997; Lloyd 2012; Shuttleworth and Lloyd 2009). From 2001 to 2007, levels of segregation have remained reasonably stable, yet analysis of the direction of internal migration illustrates that ‘community background remains an important factor in shaping the population geography’ of the region (Shuttleworth, Barr, and Gould 2013:84). Shuttleworth et al (2013:82) further remark that, fifteen years on from the GFA, ‘different migration opportunities and preferences by community background remain salient and a major influence on residential choice.’ Doherty and Poole’s (1997:532) explanation for communal segregation in Belfast is perhaps expedient here:

[N]ot only does a deep folk memory of [the major refugee movements] remain in the consciousness of the city’s people, but every family is acutely aware of how the geography both of violence and of ethnic territories creates an urban mosaic of safe and unsafe residential environments.

Political polarisation has risen, with voting behaviour shifting away from the previously dominant moderate parties (SDLP and the UUP) to the more radical parties (Sinn Féin and the DUP) since 1998 (Evans and Tonge 2007, 2013; Matthews 2012; McEvoy 2007; Tilley and Evans 2011). Although both Sinn Féin and the DUP, having moved into the power-sharing executive have adopted more moderate positions, they remain – and, crucially, are publicly perceived to be – more radical than the SDLP and UUP respectively (Garry 2014). Under the ‘consociational logic of ethnic outbidding,’ parties have ‘no particular incentives for straying beyond the confessional reservoir in eliciting political support’ and thus ‘act as ethnic tribunes, rallying supporters to their badge on the basis that only they can maximise the benefits for “their” community’ (McGlynn, Tonge, and McAuley 2014:286,283,275).

Tilley, Evans, and Mitchell (2008) have suggested that the main cleavage between unionist parties has been altered by the institutionalisation of consociation post-GFA. They state that whereas prior to the Agreement support within unionism hinged upon left-right economic issues, the main cleavage between the UUP and the DUP post-1998 has been over ethnonational issues. Similarly, Evans and Tonge (2013:371) conclude that despite a ‘significant number of Catholics comfortable with Northern Ireland’s place in the United Kingdom’, Irishness, Catholicism and Nationalism remain key determinants in relation to nationalist political allegiance. Electoral preferences remain highly polarised, with almost no
Ethnicising Ulster’s Protestants

communal cross-over (Catholics to unionist parties or Protestants to nationalist parties) (Coakley 2007).

National and political identifications remain similarly polarised. Muldoon et al’s (2007) qualitative investigation found that collective identification has retained a strategic function in post-GFA Northern Ireland: ‘national identities continue to be constructed as oppositional and negatively dependent.’ Citing Rose (1976) and Moxon-Browne (1983), they argue that through the Troubles there was a bifurcation of Northern Irish society into a more rigid dichotomy of Unionist-Protestant-British and Nationalist-Catholic-Irish; their research indicated that there are no signs of this identificatory dichotomy reducing or weakening post-GFA. Although neither Catholic nor Protestant “community” forms a unified monolith, with small minorities who opt for Protestant-Irish or Catholic-British identifications, the ‘Protestant-Unionist package’ appears to be more homogeneous in terms of identity than that of the “Catholic-Nationalist community” (Coakley 2007). Political and national identifications remain highly bifurcated with ‘virtually no cross-over on both sides’ and only small minorities refusing to define themselves in these terms. The main nationality alternative has been to opt for ‘Northern Irish’, which espouses sizeable minorities on each side; however, the meaning of, and rationale for, this self-categorisation vary considerably (Coakley 2007; Ewart and Schubotz 2004; Lowe and Muldoon 2010; McKeown 2013; Waddell and Cairns 1991). Among Protestants, those who consider themselves to be ‘unionist’ have always outnumbered those who considered themselves to be ‘neither’ (Coakley 2007). For Catholics, on the other hand, those who considered themselves to be ‘nationalist’ remained approximately equal to the ‘neither’ group until the GFA: as Coakley writes, ‘it was only in 1998 that the ‘nationalist’ group established a decisive lead over the ‘neither’ group, a lead it has since maintained’ (2007:587).

Longitudinal survey data indicates that the perceived proportions of particular social milieu inhabited by co-religionists, and preferences for mono-religious constitution in particular areas of interaction, have remained fairly stable in the post-1998 era (NILT 2014). As figure 3.1 illustrates, consistently high levels of mono-religiosity tend to be reported for each social milieu, with figures for each grouping remaining relatively similar between 2005 and 2012. For the majority, all or most of their relatives, friends and neighbours are coreligionists, with reported rates for familial homogeneity consistently over eighty per cent (see figure 3.1). This concurs with findings which suggest that rates of “intermarriage” represents only a small minority of cases, the rate of which, although showing signs of a slight increase, is estimated to be between two and ten per cent (Hughes et al. 2007; Leonard 2009). Preference for a mixed religious constitution in the workplace, neighbourhood and school for
children were high in 1998 and appeared to improve further through the 2000s; however, this dropped between from 2010 and 2014. Respondents tended to be more comfortable with mixed environments in the workplace than in their neighbourhood or the school for their children respectively (see figure 3.2). Although these figures are encouraging, a certain level of caution is required in taking inferences from preference-based questions of this type in survey research, as respondents are usually conscious that stating a preference for ‘mixed’ environments is considered to be the “correct” answer.

In terms of “autochthonous languages” spoken, there also appears to be some degree of spatial distribution. The 2011 Northern Ireland census data illustrates that areas in which high levels of Ulster-Scots linguistic ability are reported tending to have low levels of Irish, and areas characterised by high levels of Irish tend to also have low levels of Ulster-Scots ability (see figures 3.3 and 3.4). Figure 3.4 illustrates a weak negative correlation between the two variables. The densest clusters are found around where there is either a low level of both languages, or a moderately high level of Irish with a low level of Ulster-Scots. Areas with high levels of Ulster-Scots ability are characterised by low levels of Irish ability, and vice versa. Although in a small number of areas a moderately high level of both languages is found, none have very high levels of ability in both languages.

Figure 3.1: Per Cent Stating 'All' or 'Most' of Various Social Circles to be of Same Religion as Themselves, 2005-2012

27 Data obtained from NILT surveys (NILT n.d.). Figures for the percentage of relatives perceived to be of the same religion were not collected for 2012.
Research conducted since 1998 has also found a relatively stable pattern of ethno-religious bifurcation among children and young people (Ewart and Schubotz 2004; Gallagher and Cairns 2011; McAlister, Scraton, and Haydon 2014; McCaffery and Hansson 2011). To some extent high levels of communal identification and low levels of intercommunal trust among young people is unsurprising, given the level of segregation in Northern Irish society in general. Age has been repeatedly shown to be a stable indicator of voting preferences, with younger voters consistently opting for the more radical parties, Sinn Féin and DUP, over the more moderate UUP, SDLP or Alliance (Evans and Duffy 1997; Evans and Tonge 2007, 2009, 2013; Tilley and Evans 2011; Tilley et al. 2008). Similarly, Ewart and Schubotz (2004:55) found considerable unwillingness among young people to ‘compromise in what they believed the political status of Northern Ireland should be.’ Especially among the youth of economically disadvantaged communities, ‘discontent with the peace process’ is palpable (McAlister et al. 2014:13). This is unsurprising, as children from more deprived socioeconomic backgrounds are more likely to have witnessed sectarian violence, and first-hand experience of such politically-motivated crimes tends to increase communal identification and tendencies for intercommunal agitation (Merrilees et al. 2013; Muldoon and Trew 2000).

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28 Data obtained from NILT surveys, 1998-2013 (NILT n.d.).
Figure 3.3: Regional Linguistic Ability: Irish and Ulster-Scots

Data for figures 3.3 and 3.4 from the 2011 Northern Ireland census: the 582 Electoral Wards (NISRA 2013a).

Figure 3.4: Levels of Linguistic Ability in Ulster-Scots and Irish by Small Areas, 2011

Data for Northern Ireland’s 4,537 Small Areas, the smallest designation in the census data. The average of those with “some ability” in Irish and Ulster-Scots in the 2011 census was 10.65 and 8.08 per cent respectively (NISRA 2012). Above average ability in a language was designated as “high,” and below average as “low.”
Table 3.1: Youth National Identities, 2009-2010

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<th>Total (%)</th>
<th>Protestant (%)</th>
<th>Catholic (%)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Irish</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulster</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ulster-Scots</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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McCaffery and Hannson (2011) found that “community background” continues to be a strong indicator of youth political identities in Northern Ireland. This division remains articulated in religious terms, with Protestants continuing to identify as British and Catholics as Irish. Through large-scale surveys of young people at various schools of Post-Primary level, they analysed identifications according to religious and national affiliation (see table 3.1). Overall, youth political identities surveyed follow a similar to those found by the Northern Ireland Life and Times surveys in 2010 and 2012 (McCaffery and Hansson 2011). Comparatively, Catholic young people identified less as British and more as Irish than Catholics generally, and the Protestant youth tended to perceive themselves to be less “British” and more “Northern Irish” than the Protestant population. Pervasive educational segregation continues to be a pivotal factor in the production of ethno-communal consciousness among children and young people in Northern Ireland.

3.2 Segregated Education

Many forms of segregation exist in the current Northern Irish education system, alongside the religious division. Different school trajectories frequently occur for various immigrant and non-Christian religious groups, and differentiation by gender is commonplace. In this subsection, however, I focus on two dimensions of educational segregation which form the primary framework of bifurcation: horizontal segregation (Protestant-Catholic) and vertical segregation (class-based segregation through the alleged “meritocratic” system of academic selection).

Although education prior to the nineteenth century Ireland was primarily provided by religious institutions, the revocations and controversies emanating from the attempted construction of the National School System in 1831 which entrenched a system of segregation along religious fault lines (Akenson 2011; Murray 1985). By the end of the eighteenth century, concern over proselytisation within schools had proved a considerable bone of contention. The National School System was established in part as a corrective, attempting to construct an
education system which accommodated and included pupils of various faiths. In order to accommodate for this policy of religious mixing, interpretation was officially excluded from accompanying mandatory bible readings, and subjects categorised as “religious” were taught separately from those considered to be “secular” (Coolahan 1981; Murray 1985). These stipulations were ‘highly controversial,’ ‘widely denounced’, and prominently and aggressively condemned by the Protestant clergy (Akenson 2011:1; Murray 1985). Following a decade of considerable pressure, the government amended the law, granting concessions to the Protestant church in line with their demands. Considerable discontent erupted among the Catholic clergy. An announcement by Pope Gregory XVI in the early 1840s allocated power to local bishops to judge whether or not Catholic children ought to remain within the National School System (Biancalana 2009). Further amendments for those who remained within the system rendered it segregated religiously:

Towards the end of the century, so many concessions had been granted by the commissioners to both sides … that all National schools had become de facto denominational institutions and remained so until the establishment of the state of Northern Ireland in 1921 (Murray 1985:17).

The existence of faith schools does not axiomatically lead to ethnic, national or other non-religious senses of communal difference, let alone intercommunal conflict. However, the entrenchment of religious segregation in schools by this point was instrumental in the development of the divided school system which developed post-partition.

The new government in Belfast, desiring both to modernise and to draw the new statelet’s education system in line “mainland” Britain, legislated educational reforms in line with that of Westminster (Gallagher 2015). Lord Londonderry, Minister for Education in James Craig’s government, proposed in 1923 that school management be removed from churches and brought under the control of local authorities and the state (Gallagher 2015; Murray 1985). Amongst Protestant clergy, the Orange Order, and Protestant populists these restrictions proved highly controversial (Farren 1985). Not only did it remove Protestant religiosity from the syllabus, but anxieties were strongly vocalised that it would open up the potential for the appointment of teachers deemed undesirable, namely ‘Socialists and Roman Catholics’ (Farren 1985:229). Voices of dissent through the twenties became so ardent that in 1930 the Unionist government, despite retaining a preference for the original bill, amended education policy in line with populist demands.

In doing so, however, Catholic concerns over education under the Unionist regime were vindicated. The 1923 bill included a clause by which schools could opt-out of the new
Controlled School status at the cost of being largely self-funded “Voluntary” schools. The Catholic Church initially opposed this clause, contending that ‘Catholic schools are starved unless indeed they go under a control that is animated by the dominant spirit towards Catholics’ (Farren 1986:21). In part fuelled by mistrust of the government in Belfast, widely perceived as “a Protestant parliament for a Protestant people”31, and partly through a general desire for the retention of Roman Catholic religious education within the school, Catholic schools opted not to join the Controlled sector. Furthermore, there was widespread belief among the Catholic population that ‘the state could not survive’ and ‘the Boundary Commission … would recommend major modifications to its area so that predominantly Nationalist-Catholic communities would be transferred south of the divide’ (Farren 1986:20). With the concessions to the Protestant church in relation to both the membership of school management and content of curricula in the 1930s, Controlled schools became distinctly Protestant institutions (Gallagher 2015). Schools established by the state in post-War building projects became de facto Protestant schools, setting a precedent for later state-constructed schools. In this way, education division by religiosity, as well as statehood beliefs, national identification and politics, became entrenched within the Northern Irish state.

The 1968 amendment act, brought in by the moderate unionist Terence O’Neill, extended government grants to Voluntary schools which covered almost all expenditure and 100 per cent of maintenance (Murray 1985). In return, government representatives were to constitute a third of school boards of governors. The system was widely accepted, and, over the following decade, many schools transferred from Voluntary to Maintained status. Despite drawing Catholic education under state funding, the religious segregation within the education system continued.

As the Troubles lapsed from a high-intensity violent upheaval into a longstanding, intractable conflict, research into children and youths in Northern Ireland moved from the short-term focus of trauma and stress to more long-term foci; the formation of communal identities, the internalisation of symbolic preferences, prejudices, stereotypes, and sectarianism (Cairns and Toner 1993). This research thus turned to the main spaces of child socialisation, namely mass media, the family, social milieu, and the school (Barrett 2007; Barrett and Oppenheimer 2011). The latter came to be viewed as particularly instrumental, being both pivotal in socialisation and amenable to governance and adjustment. Three main correctives

31 Widely considered to be a quote by the first Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, James Craig. Although the exact phrase has been contested, it somewhat captures how Northern Ireland was viewed by unionist political elites, as well as throughout Northern Irish society through the first half of the twentieth century.
have been introduced since the beginning of the Troubles: curriculum interventions (such as Education for Mutual Understanding), inter-school contact, and mixed schooling (the integrated sector and, more recently, shared campuses) (Gallagher 2015). Despite these measures, intercommunal tensions have remained potent and educational segregation persists.

Education in Northern Ireland at present remains starkly segregated along religious lines (see figures 3.5 and 3.6). Currently, over 90 per cent of pupils attend schools which are religiously segregated: in 2015/16, 53.1 per cent of school-age children attended Catholic or other maintained primary, secondary, voluntary grammar or special school (at which an average of 86.1 per cent are Catholic and 8.8 per cent Protestant), whilst 40.1 per cent attended controlled primary, prep, secondary, grammar or special schools (averaging 7.8 per cent Catholic and 69.4 per cent Protestant) (figures adapted from Matthews 2016). Northern Ireland’s school system includes a considerable array of school management types, the three main types being Controlled, Maintained, and Integrated. There are currently twenty-nine gaelscoils32 and ten mainstream schools which have an associated Irish-medium unit. Fair Employment legislation, which aims to ensure the ‘equality of opportunity’ for employment in both public and private sectors allocation of jobs by monitoring religious ‘community background,’ explicitly excludes ‘clergymen and ministers of religion, teachers in schools, employment in a private household, and jobs where their essential nature requires them to be done by a person holding, or not holding, a particular religious belief or political opinion’ (Equality Commission for Northern Ireland 1998).

Figure 3.5: Religious Composition of Primary Education by School Management Type33

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32 Irish-medium schools, the religious composition of which is exclusively Catholic (majority) and “other”: Protestants are not represented (Torney 2012).
33 Both Figure 3.5 and 3.6 adapted from DENI (2015).
On average 68.3 per cent of pupils currently attending “controlled” primary schools are from Protestant homes whilst this figure is only 6.7 per cent for Catholics. Conversely, fully 96.6 per cent of Catholic maintained schools are from a Catholic background, with a mere 0.8 per cent Protestant pupil constitution. Glaring segregation is found at the post-primary level: controlled grammar and non-Catholic voluntary grammar and controlled secondary schools have sizeable Protestant majorities (76, 65 and 81 per cent respectively), while Catholic and “other” maintained secondary and voluntary grammar schools are predominantly attended by children of a Roman Catholic background (97, 93 and 97 per cent respectively). Although faith-based representation of children at integrated schools is considerably more evenly distributed (approximating 35.3 and 37.9 per cent from Protestant and Catholic homes respectively), these schools constitute only 5.7 per cent of all school-age children attend such institutions (DENI 2015). The vast majority (91 per cent) of five- to eleven-year-olds currently attend either a controlled or Catholic maintained primaries, the two most starkly religiously segregated school management types (see figures 3.5 and 3.6). Likewise, the vast majority of post-primary pupils are registered at the most segregated school types. With the integrated sector failing to gain ground at both primary and post-primary level, religiously segregated education has remained a central characteristic of the Northern Irish education system.

It is often stated that religious segregation in the education system is a result not of coercion or force, but perpetuated by ‘a combination of community pressure and parental
choice’ (Gallagher 2015:265). The only tangible barrier in place for educational mixing takes the form of restrictions on entry to particular Catholic schools, for which the potential pupil must present evidence of Roman Catholic faith such as baptism certificates. In relation to parental choice, large-scale survey data has consistently found higher levels of parental preference for mixed schooling over religious segregation, despite a recent decline in preference for mixed schools (see figure 3.7). In part, the disparity between preference and reality is a result of the intensity of mono-religious geographical and housing segregation, poor transport links between areas (such as east and west Belfast), and the lack of integrated schools in the western counties (McAleavy, Donegan, and O’Hagan 2009). However, such considerations fail to explain both the perpetuation of the current system and much of the continuation of parental choice in line with educational segregation. I contend the failure to make gains in educational de-segregation in post-GFA Northern Ireland is a product of the hegemony of consociational ideology and its articulation through civil society, rather than merely the residuum of intercommunal conflict.

In line with the “freedom of choice” view of segregated schooling, McGarry and O’Leary (2006:275), contend that communally separated education is in line with the fundamental principles of consociation. They argue that:

While education was not a negotiated part of the Agreement, Northern Ireland’s current education system can also be described as liberal consociational. It allows children to attend Catholic or state (in effect, Protestant) schools without requiring them to do so, and now funds each system equally. Parents may also opt to send their children to a third, funded integrated sector.

This perspective was echoed by several political elites interviewed as part of this research. Unionist MLA John McCallister stated:

You take education, we’ve about five main sectors and they all have their own political party: you know, the maintained sector is for nationalists, the controlled sector is for unionists, and the integrated sector is for the Alliance Party.

As discussed above, McGarry and O’Leary view liberal consociation as pragmatically engaging with communal identifications whilst permitting self-identification and choice. Where the majority can opt for their “own community,” centrists can opt out of the Protestant-Catholic binary through the integrated sector. In this sense, in their view, this liberal educational segregationism complements the consociational democratic system of governance.

However, McGarry and O’Leary, and their fellow liberal consociationalists, fail to recognise the construction of societal consent to hegemonic ideology. The dominance of the
two-communities explanation for the Troubles and the hegemony of identity politics through the institutions of civil society restricts, rather than opens up, choices on educational segregation. Not only does the continued existence and valorisation of the current system of separation restrict the scope of choice; it also normalises it for each successive generation attending such institutions. Thus, McGarry and O’Leary mistake a system which perpetuates, and even dynamically develops, ideas of communal differentiation for one which merely accommodates pre-existent and durable identities.

Figure 3.7: Parental Preference for Religious Composition of Child's School 1998-2015

In describing Northern Ireland’s education system as in line with consociational democratic principles, however, McGarry and O’Leary are entirely correct. A central feature of consociation is the drawing upward of intercommunal political dialogue upwards to the level of political elites and depoliticises the masses (Dixon 1997). Under liberal consociational education, the meta-conflict over the reality of communal identities is excluded from the “freedom of choice” provided as both the explanation and rationale for the current levels of educational segregation. Far from opposing the conception of communal blocs, consociationalism promotes intercommunal tolerance whilst leaving ethno-religious identities intact. Thus, the hegemony of this ideological framework, rather than a mere ‘combination of community pressure and parental choice’ (Gallagher 2015:265), has perpetuated educational segregation within the north of Ireland.
The realities of ethno-religious segregation within the education system have been exacerbated by the degree of class-based segregation produced under the grammar system. The two-tiered grammar and secondary system was brought in by the Education (Northern Ireland) act of 1947, which broadly mirrored the Butler Act of 1944 for England and Wales (Farren 1992). In the context of the post-war consensus in British politics, the Butler Act had extended free education to all within England and Wales. Attempting to produce a modern education system which would yield a productive work force, it set out a tripartite, technocratic system consisting of technical secondary, modern secondary and grammar schools. Although aspirations for this system were for each route to have social parity, the tripartite system soon collapsed into a hierarchical, binary system consisting of grammar and secondary schools. With this, the defence of the system shifted from technocracy to meritocracy, while its critics pointed to its capacity for the replication of class inequalities. In Britain, this criticism led to the Labour Party’s reform of the system in 1965. With no equivalent reform in Northern Ireland, the binary system has continued unabated throughout the province.

Just over one third of schools in the region were found to have substandard results\(^{34}\) in 2012, all of which were non-Grammar schools (Torney 2012a). All pupils aiming to attend grammar schools in Northern Ireland sit exams for admission eligibility, while both integrated and secondary schools are non-selective. Although the standardised test, known as the “Transfer Test,” was removed in 2008, grammar schools have mostly replaced it with their own entrance exams (Borooah and Knox 2013a). As a result, these different school exams are often colloquially referred to as Protestant and Catholic tests (Borooah and Knox 2013b). Educational outcomes between these school types differ considerably. In 2012/2013, 97 per cent of grammar school pupils received five or more GCSEs of grade C or above, while this figure was 58 per cent for secondary schools. When adjusted for the inclusion of English and Mathematics GCSEs, these figures fell to 94 per cent for grammar and only 35 per cent for secondary schools. Meanwhile, pupils from socioeconomically deprived backgrounds and those with special educational needs are ‘grossly under-represented in grammar schools’ (Borooah and Knox 2013a). With this form of educational segregation based upon ideas of “natural ability,” its fairness rests on claims of meritocracy. However, as Bourdieu (1974) points out, the use of testing such that school system is distributed along class lines essentially represents a test of assimilation to the cultural capital of the dominant class (see chapter ten).

\(^{34}\) Fewer than 35 per cent achieving five or more GCSEs of grade C or above (including mathematics and English).
As such, the conception of meritocracy as providing equality of opportunity merely organises consent around the current system of stratification.

Both through and since the Troubles, class has played a central role in ethno-national strife in Northern Ireland. Both republicans and loyalists tend to be working-class, and the ‘overwhelming majority of combatants on both sides of the conflict’ are from socioeconomically disadvantaged backgrounds (Gallaher 2007:57). Amongst young people in the region, those from economically disadvantaged communities feel the most disenfranchised by the peace process, as well as being those most likely to have witnessed communal violence first hand (McAlister et al. 2014:13; Merrilees et al. 2013; Muldoon and Trew 2000; Muldoon, Trew, and Kilpatrick 2000). Lanclos’ (2000:89) ethnographic research conducted in Belfast in the late nineties found that a conception of communal differentiation, mistrust and aversion was part of everyday life for children in Northern Ireland, especially for those from working-class families living in Belfast:

Not even well-intentioned adults can shield children from the necessity of being fluent in the language of difference. For children growing up in working-class regions of Belfast, it would be difficult indeed and in many cases physically dangerous for them to completely opt out of the Protestant-Catholic divide. Many interactions in their everyday lives continue to depend on their knowledge of and familiarity with those very definitions of difference.

This chimes with Doherty and Poole’s (1997) assessment that an awareness of the territorial communal mosaic remains vital for families in Northern Ireland. This aspect of everyday life is considerably more pronounced for children in working-class communities.

Especially amongst Protestants, conceptions of communal difference by national identification differ by school type (Bell, Hansson, and McCaffery 2010). As table 3.2 illustrates, Catholics attending grammar schools tend to identify slightly less as Irish and more as Northern Irish than those attending secondary schools, with figures for integrated schools between the two. British national identity remained consistently low (four per cent) across school types. Difference by school type was starker amongst Protestants. British national identity was by far most common within secondary schools (63 per cent), with considerably smaller figures for grammar and integrated schools (44 and 36 per cent respectively). Identification as Northern Irish was also unambiguously more common at grammar and integrated schools, and while Irishness was only marginally higher in Grammar than secondary schools, the rise in this figure for integrated schools was notable. Thus, we can conclude that
school type and identificatory bifurcation are interconnected, with differences of self-identification starker at secondary schools than grammar or integrated schools.

Table 3.2: Youth National Identities by School Type, 2009-2010 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Grammar</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Integrated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P 36</td>
<td>RC 78</td>
<td>P 2 RC 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>3 78</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>44 4</td>
<td>63 4</td>
<td>36 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Irish</td>
<td>52 18</td>
<td>26 12</td>
<td>55 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulster</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>8 -</td>
<td>- -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulster-Scots</td>
<td>1 -</td>
<td>1 -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100 100</td>
<td>100 100</td>
<td>100 101 37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The allegedly meritocratic grammar-school system in practice largely separates by class, and the perpetuation of class inequalities through the school system, in turn, exacerbates senses of intercommunal difference. In broad strokes, where the horizontal segregation along religious boundaries dissects into unionist and nationalist, vertical segregation tends to do so along class lines, cross-sectioning into unionist and loyalist, nationalist and republican. Proposed educational amendments have, in the main, failed to take into consideration the effect of class, and are therefore limited in their capacity to address the communities most effected by, and embroiled in, conflict.

Through this thesis, I contend that Ulster-Scots education, whilst not representing merely a unionist-loyalist tool in cultural war, engenders considerable capacity to deepen and extend the peoplehood ideology of communal difference in Northern Ireland. As table 3.2 illustrates, Ulster-Scots identification amongst Protestant Grammar and Secondary school attendees was found to be low, at only one per cent, and entirely absent from Catholic and Integrated schools. The surveys of primary school children carried out as part of this research illustrates a notably higher proportion of Ulster-Scots identification in schools with considerable engagement with Ulster-Scots education compared with those with no engagement (see table 3.3). Whereas only 2.1 per cent identified as such in the latter, 14.3 per cent did so in the former. Such a level of identification with Ulster-Scots is previously unheard of in school-based research. However, as table 3.3 also illustrates, the survey research also

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35 Table adapted from Bell, John, Ulf Hansson, and Nick McCaffery (2010:45). Participants were aged between twelve and nineteen.

36 “P” connotes Protestant, and “RC” Roman Catholic.

37 Actual figures sum to 100; the additional percentage point is a product of rounding up.
found much higher levels of definite rejection of Ulster-Scots alongside much fewer stating that they didn’t know compared with schools without Ulster-Scots education. Evidently, the introduction of Ulster-Scots education has increased its salience in the schools in which it is present.

Table 3.3: Ulster-Scots Identification by School Type, 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Type</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Controlled Primary School: No Ulster-Scots Education</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>72.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlled Primary Schools: Ulster-Scots Flagship School</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3 Education and Peace-Building

Education both affects, and is effected by, inter-group conflict. As Bush and Salterelli (2000) have coherently pointed out, the school can influence war-worn societies in both positive and negative ways. In terms of economic power, education can, via various means, reproduce, perpetuate, or worsen socioeconomic disparities (as discussed above). Given that class inequality as a causal mechanism of ethnic conflict, and that working-class communities tend to both bear the brunt of violent conflict, class- and communal-based forms of structural violence have a circular, mutually-reinforcing effect. Violent conflict often increases communal spatial segregation, and so educational segregation. However, segregated education is both a spatial reality and a socialising mechanism, tending to produce ethnic(ised) subjects. Hence, segregated education often begets further, and more ideologically and experientially rooted, communal segregation. Communally segregated education allows for a variety of problematic phenomena: differentially funded schools (or even the withholding of education to certain groups within the society), differently educated pupils (divergent school cultures, text-books, language(s) of instruction), and pupils differently educated in the notion of difference (such as intolerance, sectarianism and hatred of the “other”). With regard to the latter, this thesis investigates the potentiality for just such a ‘segregation of the mind’ to be produced by programmes of education based not upon inter-communal enmity, but the very notions of peace-building and intercommunal tolerance at the heart of the peace process.

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38 A total of 184 pupils took part, and four schools were included in each school type. The first school type included 97 pupils, and the second, 77. Participants were aged between ten and eleven.
Northern Ireland’s segregated education system has long been considered to be a pivotal factor in the socialisation of children into the norms, values, perceptions, aspirations and identification with one “side of the community” (McCaffery and Hansson 2011; Murray 1985; Osborne et al. 1993; Richardson and Gallagher 2011). However, remedies for educational segregation have tended to centre around formulations which nurture rather than deconstruct senses of intercommunal identity, and focus exclusively on the production of intercommunal interaction and tolerance. In the Northern Irish context, the hegemonic consociational peoplehood ideology has been continually (re)produced and infused through the institutions of civil society (Finlay 2001a; Gramsci 1982). In doing so, the very notions being reified as normative are those which produce consent to the current system of governance. Educational segregation in Northern Ireland is not merely a centuries old faith-school trajectory from which sectarianism is an unfortunate by-product, but a protean site of socialisation in which the ideologies of difference are continually reconstructed in line with dominant ideologies. With peace conceptualised as parity of esteem, the school in Northern Ireland functions as a mechanism of the consociational, neoliberal peace process. Ulster-Scots education, as an ethnic pedagogy of the historically dominant, holds considerable capacity to perpetuate and deepen conceptualisations of collective difference within Northern Ireland’s educational context.

Although the region’s educational separation is widely considered to be problematic, there has been little agreement over what is problematic about it and what solutions ought to follow. Gallagher (2015) relays three main diagnoses which he perceives in the literature. First, older studies focus on the question of Protestant-Catholic inequality in education, analysing funding, quality and educational outcome disparities. In relation to this factor, the literature has tended to be upon inter-religious difference such that other forms of inequality and class difference are ignored. Much has been made, for example, of the reality that the top five schools in the Northern Irish rankings in 2015 were all Catholic grammar schools (Fergus 2014). However, considerable inequality exists between grammar and non-grammar schools within both the controlled and maintained sectors. Reducing such figures to religious lines alone would miss the opportunity differential between grammar and non-grammar schools, irrespective of religion. Nevertheless, the group most likely to be educationally disadvantaged are working-class, Protestant boys attending controlled non-grammar schools (Borooah and Knox 2016; Gallagher 2015).

Second, many within the literature describe the production of parallel education through overt curriculum differences. Such research centres around divergences in textbooks, curricula,
activities, and sports (see, for example, Dunn et al. 1989). The main corrective proposed for this diagnosis has been the imposition of structural and curriculum-based homogenisation. A third approach pushes the second further, focusing upon normative differences: the “covert curriculum.” The extent and ways in which children are socialised into norms of behaviour and beliefs are thus examined, analysing how mono-religious schools, both consciously and unconsciously, propagate a sense of ‘cultural separateness with the accompanying baggage of overt or covert sectarianism’ (Richardson 2011:41,45). In Gramsci’s terms, such approaches investigate the “breathing in” of the school’s environments. Arguably the most important work in the development of this perspective was the anthropological work of Dominic Murray (1985:77), who contended that schools transmit social and cultural values through a “Protestant” or “Catholic” milieu, differing in character, culture, symbols and rituals. Thus, segregation is understood to represent a means through which cultural difference is (re)produced and reinforced, breeding mutual suspicion and a sense of opposition (Darby and Dunn 1987). In line with this approach, Moffatt (1993) has illustrated that the effects of normative differentiation, or integration in the case of integrated schools, affects not merely the pupils but the entire community.

Despite the latter two diagnoses, solutions to the issues of educational segregation have tended, especially in recent years, to focus on the management of good intercommunal relations rather than the deconstruction of notions of difference. Interventions in the school system which have attempted to ameliorate its problematic nature can be generally grouped into three approaches; curriculum interventions, contact, and mixed schooling (Gallagher 2015). The former two attempt to correct the issues perceived to be most problematic in segregated education without the need for an overhaul of school religious composition. Since the seventies, ideas of mutual understanding and diversity have been floated for inclusion into Northern Ireland’s education system, to some extent influenced by the movement toward “race relations” in the education systems of Britain and the US (Richardson 2011; Richardson and Gallagher 2011). Through the eighties, these ideas came to be more precisely defined and generally accepted, and early in the following decade, EMU (Education for Mutual Understanding) became ‘an official and mandatory education theme’ (Richardson and Gallagher 2011:17). Most recently, the 2007/2008 Revised Curriculum introduced two mandatory subjects: at the primary level, Personal Development and Mutual understanding, and for post-primary, Local and Global Citizenship. This has broadly taken the form of single-identity work: the ‘exploration of social identity and community relations within the community with the aim to strengthen collective self-esteem’ (Niens and Cairns 2005:340). Thus, Education for Mutual
Understanding takes a consociational approach to segregated education, assuming communal identities to be durable and intercommunal hatreds ameliorable through own-identity valorisation and inter-communal parity of esteem.

A second corrective has been the organisation of cross-community school interactions. Essentially this mirrored the cross-community approach which preceded single-identity work in Northern Ireland’s peace process (Finlay 2010). The rationale for inter-group contact was essentially Allportian in its conception of peace-building. Allport’s (1954) hypothesis held that intergroup inter-communal prejudice can be ameliorated through inter-group contact. More specifically, inter-group interaction reduces prejudice when the interaction includes equality of group status, common goals, inter-communal cooperation, and support from external forms of power. At best, the contact hypothesis aims, in practice, for the inculcation of inter-group tolerance rather than the breaking down of the conception of inter-group difference. Within Northern Irish schools, this has taken the form of organised events involving interactions between pupils from controlled and Catholic maintained schools. Although considerable numbers of schools have taken up these initiatives, actual pupil numbers have been low, and they have proven to be ineffectual, with pupils struggling to move beyond ‘polite exchange’ (Gallagher 2015; Kilpatrick and Leitch 2004:582; Smith and Robinson 1996). As with curriculum interventions, inter-school contact has essentially focused on improving relations whilst retaining senses of communal difference. In line with such approaches, Kilpatrick and Leitch (2004:582) argue that contact alone is unproductive unless paired with single-identity work in the interacting schools. They advocate the supplementation of interactions with single-identity work for both teachers and pupils, ‘explore their own identities, fears, and anxieties prior to exploring that of the other community.’ This approach was viewed by many interviewees for this research as a rationale for the productiveness of Ulster-Scots education for the production of a peaceful Northern Ireland. In this way, both Ulster-Scots education and inter-communal pre-contact identity work explicitly promote the reification, rather than the deconstruction, of ideas of ethnonational difference.

The most radical intervention in the segregated school system has been the construction of religiously mixed “integrated” schools. Their emergence in the eighties represented the first ‘breach of an almost totally bi-partisan system since the state was formed.’ Since the opening of the initial integrated school in 1981, the figure for attendees outside segregated education has remained low, and its post-Troubles growth has essentially stalled (Darby and Dunn 1987; Dunn et al. 1989; Gallagher 2011, 2015; Moffat 1993; Richardson 2011). The proportion of pupils across all educational institutions, from nursery to sixth form, within the integrated
sector was 6.48 per cent for 2015/16\textsuperscript{39}. The picture differs for primary and post-primary in regards to the direction over time. At primary level, the number of pupils attending integrated schools has risen by 13.4 per cent from 2010/11 to 9,529 in 2015/16, representing 5.6 per cent of primary school attendees. While the proportion at post-primary was higher than primary schools for 2015/16, at 8.4 per cent, this figure has fallen continually for years 8 to 12 since 2010/11 from 10,442 to 9,988.

Furthermore, in practice it appears that whilst inter-communal friendships are increased and sectarianism reduced through the integrated school system, research suggests that the capacity for the integrated sector to deconstruct ethnopolitical identities has been very limited (Hayes, McAllister, and Dowds 2007). With the utilisation of ethnic quotas in the integrated sector, the schools are shared in much the same way as medium to large sized workplaces in which equal employment regulations monitor communal constitution. In this sense at least, integrated education has maintained senses of difference in line with the consociational ideal.

With the stalling in the growth of integrated education, a more recent move has been toward shared education (McAleavy et al. 2009). Trialled in the year following the return to devolution in the wake of the 2006 St Andrews Agreement, the SEP’s (Shared Education Programme) remit is considerably less ‘expansive and radical’ than full integration (McDaid 2015:9). In SEP, the ‘intention, unlike previous community relations initiatives in schools, is \textit{not} to see joint activities as one-off extra-curricular events but rather to put cross-community working at the heart of the process via the joint delivery of elements of the curriculum’ (Borooah and Knox 2013b:927). Several writers have pointed to the potential savings schools can make through SEP, and the capacity to utilise fiscal austerity, education cuts, and economic rationalisation as both carrot and stick in their proliferation (Borooah and Knox 2013a; Hughes and Loader 2015). Recently, the production of shared campuses has replaced integrated schools as the educational vogue, with several such schools under construction. In shared campuses, pupils remain separate to varying degrees, usually involving shared playgrounds, activities, and particular classes whilst maintaining segregated classrooms (Loader and Hughes 2016; McAleavy et al. 2009). This was the case for one of the schools included in this study. Much of the literature on the SEP praises it for its capacity to ‘[nurture] distinct social identities, whilst simultaneously promoting intergroup reconciliation,’ (Blaylock and Hughes 2013:485; Borooah and Knox 2013a, 2013b; Hughes and Loader 2015; Loader and Hughes 2016; McAleavy et al. 2009). Much in the prevailing consociational vein, aims to deconstruct,

\textsuperscript{39}Figures adapted from Matthews (2016).
problematised or even to not reinforce conceptions of communal difference are entirely side-lined for the promotion of good intercommunal relations, own-group self-worth, and out-group trust and relationships. In fact, in much the same Kilpatrick and Leitch (2004) advocated identity work in relation to interschool contact, Loader and Hughes (2016) promote the inclusion of ‘formal mechanisms for introducing matters of difference within shared education’ within SEP. Thus, the most recent trends in Northern Irish education back away from more radical projects which aim to deconstruct conceptions of starkly demarcated communal blocs, rather endorsing McGarry and O’Leary-style “ethnic pragmatism” and intercommunal tolerance.

Ulster-Scots education interacts with the diagnoses and remedies described above. In terms of inequalities, I have thus far discussed only the holistic and normative reproduction of hegemonic political-economic ideology within Ulster-Scots education. However, its dissemination of free resources, teaching, and tuition in drama, music, poetry, and dance in practice acts as Protestant-Catholic inequality. Many of the interviewees, specifically teachers and Agency staff, referred to the cultural, financial, and material capital which Ulster-Scots education provides. With Ulster-Scots education taking place almost entirely within controlled schools, this has produced a funding inequality not mirrored by the promotion of Irish, which is exclusively language focused.

Ulster-Scots education combines two other diagnoses of Northern Ireland’s education system: curriculum and normative differences. It is clearly so in terms of the former, introducing new differences in linguistic education, historical narratives and interpretations, and other forms of information. Furthermore, it has extended the array of ethnicity-specific activities to be incorporated, such as the inclusion of highland dancing, Ulster-Scots music and instruments, and the performance of Ulster-Scots plays and poetry. In terms of normative differences, Ulster-Scots education essentially renders “Protestant culture” a tangible entity. However, it need not, and indeed tends to not, explicitly state that individuals within the classroom are to understand themselves to be Ulster-Scots. Rather, pupils are to “explore” whether or not the cultural, linguistic, and genealogical information ascribed to Ulster-Scots which they are confronted with connects with them. In this way, it interacts with and feeds into the covert curriculum. Equally, its presence within a school also has a normative effect. Interacting with Ulster-Scots education is also likely to impact the milieu of the school and its local area. Further research is required to analyse these normative impacts.

A central conclusion from this research in terms of Northern Ireland’s educational segregation is that Ulster-Scots education has the capacity to severely restrict, detract from, or
even preclude deconstructivist moments made available through desegregation and interaction. Kilpatrick and Leitch (2004) proposed that single-identity work represents a necessary complement to cross-community school interactions, considering that one’s own cultural identity ought to be explored, consolidated, and encouraged prior to such interactions. Ulster-Scots forms a concrete, ethnic version of this proposal. Indeed, as described above, this argument was employed by many of its proponents. Both approaches replicate the hegemonic consociational peoplehood ideology and the power structures underpinning it. Likewise, where combined with the more recent “shared education” approach, strong associations with Ulster-Scots could structure interactions such that “reconciliation” is reduced to socialisation of the sort of communal tolerance described by Brown (2006; see chapter one).

In terms of the de-segregation of schooling, the integrated sector remains to date the most progressive means of reform, despite its notable failings. Drawing upon her empirical research, McGlynn (2009) outlined five approaches adopted within integrated education: liberal (emphasising commonality), plural (the celebration of difference), critical (a pluralist approach concerned with inequality and injustice), liberal-plural (an amalgamation of these approaches), and liberal-critical (a focus on both commonality and forms of injustice). Ulster-Scots education is fundamentally plural in its approach and tends to be decidedly uncritical. A minority vocalised concerns over working-class protestants in Northern Ireland, and Northern Irish protestants in the UK; however, its peoplehood narrative occludes structures of power, evades historical inequalities, and produces consent to hegemonic ideologies. In terms of difference, its pluralism has the capacity to severely diminish the extent to which integrated schooling can create communal boundary blurring.

It would appear that the latest experiment in spatial desegregation, the shared campus, entails a more explicitly plural approach. The incorporation of Ulster-Scots into this new approach may be used to provide cultural rooting for the “Protestant side,” thus concretising senses of collective difference. PS10, an interviewee whose school was engaged in both Ulster-Scots education and the development toward becoming part of a shared campus, considered the two to be complementary insofar as Ulster-Scots education concretised the pupils’ sense of communal difference prior to their move into the shared campus.40 Ulster-Scots education, in remedying this alleged culture gap, is understood to provide a bedrock for the Protestant single-identity work perceived as necessary for the production and management of consociational peace.

40 See chapter eight, section 8.3.1.
Although McGlynn’s schema of integrated schools is productive, and a recognition of the variation in approaches taken within the integrated sector instructive, she fails to consider the difference between liberal and deconstructivist approaches. Where liberal approaches tend to stress diversity-blindness, deconstructivist approaches attempt to directly address and counter hegemonic peoplehood ideologies. As Donnelly (2004a, 2004b) has described, liberal integration often leads to assimilation toward the culture of the dominant group (McEvoy et al. 2006). Deconstructivist approaches, to the contrary, actively seek to dislocate binaries and call into question notions of singular, essential being (Haywood and Mac an Ghaill 1997). Such pedagogical slants aspire toward countering structural violence and challenge the power structures through which such identities are prescribed. Hence, a deconstructivist pedagogy of liberation in the north of Ireland involves a somewhat different format to the current programme of consociational tolerance and peoplehood ideology. Through this thesis, I contend that Ulster-Scots education represents a consociational multiculturalist tactic, in which the essentialist communal identity is taken as given and good relations, rather than critical deconstructionism, is sought. John Garvey (1996:30) contends that multicultural education represents little more than ‘a project of defeat.’ Having ‘abandoned hope in the utopian desire’ of universal humanity, it ‘substituted, for that desire, the social/political/educational equivalent of managed care’ in which ‘distinctions are left intact.’ The ‘multiculturalist vision has a limited social goal – people should learn to live and let live’ (Garvey 1996:31). I argue that Ulster-Scots education represents just such a ‘project of defeat,’ in which peaceable relations are sought through a deeply ethnicised formulation of single-identity work. The vision of a Northern Ireland free from collective division is forgone, replaced by the more limited goals of ethnic pragmatism41.

Korostelina (2013) described history education as containing the capacity to produce cultures of violence or cultures of peace. The identity narratives which she perceives to be constructive of the latter are those which are reflected, historic and depictive in description, inclusive, civic rather than ethnic, and aspiring toward a balanced axiology. Clearly, Ulster-Scots education represents a somewhat different project. According to Korostelina (2013:47–48),

The reflected form if identity … is associated with an advanced understanding of the history of the ingroup and its relationship to outgroups; an awareness of the current

41 Portions of this section have been published (Gardner 2016).
status and position of the ingroup; and recognition of its appreciation of its perspectives and future goals.

A critical approach of this sort applied to the historical intersections and meanings of Protestantism, unionism and loyalism in the north of Ireland would indeed be highly productive in the fostering of a culture of peace. However, it would appear that Korostelina’s schema could be developed further here such that the notion of the ingroup per se is called into question and interrogated. Ulster-Scots education aspires to the contrary, positing an overarching, more deep-rooted ethnic ingroup. In its place, a pedagogy of liberation in the north of Ireland would call into question the notion of fundamental Protestant-Catholic difference, interrogate the history of the construction of political, religious, ethnic, and racial identity, encourage the observation of, and action upon, multidimensional inequalities and their structural causes, and work toward providing the tools for resistance to hegemonic ideology.

3.4 Conclusion: De-segregating the Mind

In The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict, Bush and Saltarelli (2000:16) articulate the necessity for a ‘de-segregation of the mind’ in highly segregated societies. Following Frantz Fanon’s (2004) proposition in The Wretched of the Earth that the minds of colonised peoples require a process of decolonisation, Bush and Saltarelli (2000:16–17) argue that ‘[c]ommunities cannot desegregate until the idea of de-segregation has taken root – not necessarily in every member of a community, but in enough individuals to develop a sustainable critical mass of interest in fundamental change.’ They continue:

The case of Northern Ireland provides a useful point of reference for assessing the role and impact of de-segregated education on the dynamics of peace and conflict in ethnicised settings. In this case, we have seen education play a critical role in enabling members of the middle class to transcend sectarian divisions. … The gradual moves away from segregated education, the inclusion of Education for Mutual Understanding in the curriculum and other liberal trends within the school system reinforced – and were reinforced by – liberalising trends in the political and economic sphere in Northern Ireland, Ireland, and Europe more broadly. When a conjunction of such forces exists, a mutually reinforcing positive dynamic sets in (Bush and Saltarelli 2000:16–17).

Although there are productive aspects to this approach, there are two assumptions within it which are somewhat problematic. First, they appear to place their hopes in the liberal project, presenting the growth of the hegemony of political, economic, social and religious liberalism as a panacea. The notion that such a liberal project leads to the cultivation of general liberal peace is, however, somewhat questionable (see, for example, Chua 2004; Dillon and Reid
Second, it would appear that the ultimate goal of the de-segregation of the mind is somewhat limited. Rather than articulating the need for a movement away from the ideological schemes which lead to beliefs in the division of mankind into bounded ethnological categories, Bush and Saltarelli (2000:16) contend for a negative desegregation of sorts: merely the absence of physical separation between such categories, and an ‘ethnically tolerant climate.’ The ethnic pragmatism Garvey (1996) critiques is found both within Bush and Saltarelli’s de-segregation of the mind and Northern Ireland’s consociational peace accords. While I agree with Bush and Saltarelli’s contention that what is required in Northern Ireland, and specifically within its education system, is a progressive alteration of mindsets, a critical deconstructivist approach calls for a more positive desegregation of the mind; one which critically engages with and deconstructs the core segregating principle of ethnic essentialism.

Bush and Salterelli (2000:16) attribute their notion of the ‘de-segregation of the mind’ to the ‘decolonisation of the mind’ within the work of Fanon (2004). For Fanon, however, the hegemony of imperialism organised and restrained the culture of the colonised such that articulations of the culture of the colonised self are constricted (an approach utilised and expanded upon by Wa Thiongo 1994). The mechanisms of control enacted by the coloniser upon the colonised restrain the latter’s articulation of the self, and draw the colonised mind in line with the hegemonic ideology of the colonial ruling class (Fanon 1972, 2004). Hence, decolonising the mind involves not only the spread of social preference for autonomy but also the overthrow of the psycho-social mechanisms of structural violence enacted upon the colonised. A more critical ‘de-segregation of the mind’ in areas of highly segregated schooling would involve countering not only the societal acceptance of communal segregation, which Bush and Salterelli suggest. It must also counter the forms of structural violence, social inequality, and hegemonic frameworks which the ‘de-segregation of the mind’ which produce and nurture.

Northern Ireland’s bifurcated, “post”-conflict education system continues to produce segregated minds. This communal structure is highly problematic, holding considerable capacity for the socialisation of children into communally delineated identity matrices. However, we ought not to be content to contend for a ‘de-segregation of the mind’ which aims only for physical de-segregation as an end in itself. As Fanon (2004) warns, decolonisation does not automatically decolonise the mind. Similarly, educational de-segregation of Northern Ireland requires not just the creation of communal mixing, but a countering of the hegemonic ideology of essentialist communal differentiations which underpins it.
Chapter Four
Methodology

This research represents analyses Ulster-Scots pedagogy in “post-conflict” Northern Ireland. I investigate the content of, and rationales for, such a pedagogy, examining its myths and narratives of collective identification, conceptualisations of difference, otherness and inclusion/exclusion, and the interaction between such conceptions and other collective identifications in the north of Ireland. My aim has been to further understanding of the potential effects of these developments upon the problematic case of Northern Ireland and to discuss theoretical and pragmatic issues relating to ethnic reifications, ethnopedagogy and narratives of collectivities in general. This research relates to theories of nationality and ethnicity construction, contributing both in-depth empirical data and theoretical developments. In this chapter, I outline the methodology employed in conducting this research. I describe the research design and methods used, the approach taken in analysing the data collected, and several specific issues which emerged in conducting, interpreting and presenting this data.

4.1 Research Design and Methods

The data was collected using three primary methods: documentary analysis, interviews, and questionnaires. These methods were implemented chronologically, each informed by the data and experiences encountered in preceding inquiries. First, I analysed the educational materials produced for teaching Ulster-Scots in both primary and post-primary schools. Second, I conducted forty-two interviews with political elites, educational elites, teachers within Ulster-Scots Flagship schools, and others involved in Ulster-Scots education. The final component involved the completion of a qualitative questionnaire by ten- and eleven-year-olds within eight schools; four Flagship schools, and four similar schools in which Ulster-Scots is not currently being taught. This data is also augmented by unplanned experiences during the carrying out of the research method, such as attending conference for prominent Ulster-Scots promoters and educationalists which I was invited to during my interaction with DCAL\(^\text{42}\), and observing a practice for the annual Robbie Burns’ Assembly at the participating Flagship schools at the behest of a particularly passionate Ulster-Scots teacher. In this section, I describe the methods adopted in the process of data collection.

\(^\text{42}\) The Department for Culture, Arts and Leisure within the Northern Irish government.
4.1.1 Educational Materials

The textual analysis of school textbooks and other educational materials has for many years been recognised as a productive means of investigating educational content. The school is far from politically neutral in its socialisation (Bourdieu 1974; Foucault 1979; Freire 1996; McLaren 2003, see also chapter ten of this thesis). Educational materials represent an ‘important source for political socialisation’, moulding subjectivities, embodiments and conceptualisations of difference and sameness (Harber 1991:248). The producer(s) of such texts act as purveyors of expert knowledge, sanctioning certain interpretations, narratives and facts (Foucault 2003). Although the newness of such knowledge relating to Ulster-Scots has been concealed from the teachers and pupils who use the materials, an awareness of the lack of a pre-existing base of knowledge was reasonably prevalent among the producers of Ulster-Scots education. For Ulster-Scots educationalists, its current and future prospects necessitate the production of histories, the standardisation of language, the discernment of ethnic genealogies, and the articulation of cultural idiosyncrasies. However, this role was generally conceived as involving a connecting of dots, a process of (re)discovery of an antecedent yet partially-submerged knowledges, rather than a process of invention, construction and (re)interpretation. Contrary to such conceptualisations, in this research I consider the producer(s) of the educational materials to be active, subjective agents in the process of inclusion, omission, interpretation and invention of such “expert knowledges.”

In this initial part of the research I conducted a documentary analysis of three sets of teaching resources, produced by the Ulster-Scots Agency. The first, Ulster-Scots fur Weans, was constructed in collaboration with Stranmillis University College, the CCEA and the Northern Irish Department of Education for use in primary schools: key stages one and two (an age range of five to eleven). The second set of teaching resources to be analysed are those available on the Ulster-Scots Agency website, produced for post-primary education: key stages three and four (ages eleven to sixteen). The newest set of materials, launched in May 2016, form the third set of materials. As I conducted the documentary analysis through 2014, this latter collection of materials was supplementary and subsidiary; the bulk of this analysis involved the former two sets of resources. These materials are also considerably shorter, less detailed, and contain much fewer documents than the earlier sets of booklets. Hence, all

44 A teacher training college, and constituent college of Queen’s University Belfast.
45 The CCEA, or CEA, is the Northern Ireland Council for the Curriculum, Examinations and Assessment.
46 These are available at http://www.ulsterscotsagency.com/education/teaching-resources/, sourced 16/2/2015.
teaching resources available on the Ulster-Scots Agency’s website were included in the analysis. These resources have been available for use in schools since the end of November 2012, and several interviewees reported using them in classes, however the precise dispersal and intensity of their utilisation is unknown. The rationale for analysing these documents was twofold: first, to investigate the content of Ulster-Scots education to be transmitted to teachers and pupils (the reader(s)); and, second, to discern the perception of what Ulster-Scots education constitutes by those working to produce and teach such knowledge (the writer(s)). This analysis subsequently aided in my interaction with interviewees, permitting readier situating of ideas vocalised and informing questions asked.

4.1.2 Interviews

As stated above, I conducted forty-two in-depth interviews over a one-year period with political elites, educationalists and teachers within Ulster-Scots Flagship schools. The primary interviews analysed include twelve MLAs47, thirteen instigating teachers from twelve flagship schools, one member of the Ministerial Advisory Group for Ulster-Scots (MAGUS), and four participants from the Ulster-Scots Agency. Secondary interviews which provided contextual detail include: a focus group with two civil servants from the Office of DCAL; five other members of staff in the first Flagship school studied (the principle, and a focus group with other teachers); a peripatetic bagpipe tutor working for the Ulster-Scots Agency; two pervious chairs of the Ulster-Scots Agency; one individuals who worked in the Ulster-Scots Heritage Council in the nineties; and Ulster-Scots entertainer, educationalist, and television presenter Willie Drennan, an early promoter of Ulster-Scots education who worked with the Agency in teaching language, music, and folk stories. The interviews investigated three aspects of the overall research project: the perspectives and debates on Ulster-Scots education at various different levels (teachers, education planners and political elites), the rationales for its inclusion into schools, and to build upon the findings from the documentary analysis to produce a fuller picture of the content and practice of Ulster-Scots education.

All interviews were semi-structured, following similar general outlines within each group interviewed. The wording of questions, phrases used, and the direction of the interviews altered slightly over time as I became cognisant of certain questions which repeatedly elicited unintended or unprofitable responses. Interviews averaged forty-five minutes, with politicians this was often much more time-restricted, some lasting fifteen minutes. Two lasted much

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47 Members of the (Belfast) Legislative Assembly.
longer; both my discussion with PS3\textsuperscript{48} and Nelson McCausland\textsuperscript{49} continued for over ninety minutes. All interviews were recorded, and data processing ranged from selective to full transcription. Interviews were mostly\textsuperscript{50} conducted in the place of work: schools, Ulster-Scots Agency, MAGUS, Stormont, Constituency Office and Westminster.

In total, eighteen members of staff within Ulster-Scots schools were interviewed. In the initial research design, four Flagship schools chosen to be included, interviewing as many teachers and staff members as possible to gain a holistic picture of an Ulster-Scots school. These schools were contacted as they were the only four Northern Irish Ulster-Scots Flagship schools publicly ascertainable online. Given the focus on Northern Ireland, the three schools in the parts of Ulster within the Republic of Ireland were excluded. Within the first school, I interviewed the principal, the vice principal, a focus group of three teachers, and the school receptionist. It readily became apparent that the vice principal was the primary instigator and promoter of Ulster-Scots within the school, while the others were passively acquiescent toward the subject. My initial interactions with the other schools revealed the same to be the case there also. Although the additional interviews in the first school were productive contextually, I decided to alter the research design to include twelve schools and limit interviews only to the instigating teacher(s). Concurrently I had begun interviews with the Ulster-Scots Agency, during which I was provided with an official list of all schools within the Flagship award scheme. Thus, the remaining eleven schools were included by continuous random sample drawn from this list\textsuperscript{51}. The number of schools included was not pre-set; rather, this was the point at which some form of data saturation was perceived to have been achieved.

All MLAs in the Belfast Assembly\textsuperscript{52} were invited to interview by letter, twelve of whom responded positively and could be interviewed within the time frame. The Ministers for Education and for Culture, Arts and Leisure were contacted separately. While both declined to be interviewed, the latter set up an interview with two civil servants from her department to discuss her perspective on the matter. In terms of education elites, I interviewed the Secretary to the MAGUS and four members of the Ulster-Scots Agency including the chief executive, the Director of Education and Language, and both education officers. The Agency is a

\textsuperscript{48} “PSx” refers to Primary School interviewee “x.”
\textsuperscript{49} DUP MLA and former Minister for DCAL.
\textsuperscript{50} There were three exceptions: one MLA, the current chief executive of the Ulster-Scots Agency, the two former chairs of the Agency, and the former members of the Ulster-Scots Heritage Council were interviewed by phone. Willie Drennan was interviewed in a hotel in central Belfast.
\textsuperscript{51} The sample was “continuous” as schools which declined or not take part within the time-frame were replaced by random sample.
\textsuperscript{52} As it stood in 2015.
relatively small organisation, and so I was able to gain further access as I met and interviewed their staff. The MAGUS interview was procured through my interactions at the Ulster-Scots conference. Peripatetic Ulster-Scots teaching has for several years been provided to schools by the Agency, and so I also interviewed any individuals whose names came up during interviews with teachers. One of which was the bagpipe tutor, whose contact was provided by one of the participating teachers. The other was Willie Drennan, who I had been aware of both through previous research into Ulster-Scots and knowledge of Northern Irish popular culture. Several of the participating schools mentioned having Willie to conduct educational assemblies early on in their schools’ interaction with Ulster-Scots, and so I arranged to interview him also.

4.1.3 Primary School Survey

Finally, I conducted a survey of 146 primary school pupils. This data allowed me to investigate pupil’s self-perceptions and perspectives on collective identifications, and to compare these findings between schools where Ulster-Scots has been the most intensively taught to schools where it is not taught. Eight primary schools were included in the survey; four Ulster-Scots Flagship schools (totalling 77 pupils) and four non-Ulster-Scots teaching schools (69 pupils). The former schools were randomly sampled from the list of Flagship schools. In order to improve the comparability of the data, the latter were chosen by stratified random sample. Each were drawn from a list restricted to schools of the same governance type (in all four cases, controlled primary schools) and containing a similar percentage of children from Protestant families (five per cent either side of the figure for the school in question). Within the interviews with teachers in Flagship schools, I was informed that the majority of Ulster-Scots education is targeted toward Primary 7 pupils (aged ten to eleven). As such, the questionnaires were carried out by this cohort. In each case, the school principal acted as a gatekeeper, permitting access to the school. The questionnaires were completed during school hours under teacher supervision, informed that they ought to answer with their own opinion, that the questionnaires are completely anonymous, and that if they don’t know that this is permitted as an answer. The questions asked aimed to ascertain both perceptions and self-conceptualisations of collective identifications around Ulster-Scots, Britishness, Irishness and difference (see Appendix 4.1). Two of the eight questions were quantitative, checkbox

53 MAGUS and the Ulster-Scots Agency share a building in Belfast city centre. The conference I attended was held in this building.

54 Data for school compositions as presented in The Guardian (Torney 2012b).
questions, five were qualitative, permitting space to answer as preferred, and one contained both elements. All eight schools completed the questionnaires within the same month.

4.2 Analysis

My point of departure for data analysis is with the assertion that ‘qualitative research is methodologically hermeneutical’ (Rennie 2012:288). Every stage and component of the research process represent formations of interpretation, both conscious and unconscious. Although since the interpretive turn in social studies the positivist orthodoxy has been replaced by subjectivity and reflexivity, its application has been heterogeneously conceptualised, unevenly applied, and is frequently employed problematically (Mauthner and Doucet 2003; Pillow 2003). Within this research, I have sought to engage in what Pillow describes as ‘uncomfortable reflexivity – a reflexivity that seeks to know while at the same time situates this knowing as tenuous’ (Pillow 2003:188). Epistemologically, this entails a suspicion of methods of data analysis through which the researcher claims to overcome or transcend this tenuousness.

In her move toward ‘uncomfortable reflexivity,’ Pillow (2003:188) outlines four main ways in which reflexivity has commonly been (mis)used. First, it has been used as ‘recognition of self,’ often invoking a ‘Cartesian belief in a unified, essential self that is capable of being reflected on and is knowable’ (2003:181). Second, reflexivity has been employed in the ‘recognition of other,’ involving similar ontological assumptions to the ‘recognition of self’ (2003:181,184). Third, it has been used as ‘truth’: a form of authorisation and valorisation of research findings and reporting (2003:181). Fourth, it has been invoked as a form of transcendence, purportedly allowing the researcher to move beyond ‘her own subjectivity and own cultural context in a way that releases her/him from the weight of (mis)representations’ (2003:181,186). In light of this productive critique, I aimed to maintain reflexive throughout this research without utilising it in order to claim some form of catharsis or reformed objectivity.

My exegesis of the Ulster-Scots Agency’s educational materials involved a close textual analysis, driven and informed both by the research questions and a more general interest in its content. In line with Pillow’s (2003) epistemology of discomfort, in conducting this textual analysis I remained critical of hermeneutics which claim to permit access to some true meaning, entirely known to the writer or accessible to a reader capable of transcending her/his personal interpretation through method. Gradually my interactions with the documents produced forms, further sculpted through the writing process into interpretations which interact
with the research aims and questions. Initially, I spent some time with the documents, working through embryonic interpretations. This developed into more detailed cataloguing of currents which I perceived within the texts. Of central interest were those aspects of Ulster-Scots education which pertained to its conceptualisation as an identification: the implicit and explicit criteria for inclusion and exclusion, its constituent components, myths of origin and narratives of collective history, culture, language and peoplehood. Within this analysis I lay no claim to systematic exegesis or exhaustive thematic analysis; rather, this research represents an interactional hermeneutic, informed and steered by my research aims, as well as my own ontological and epistemological bases both conscious and unconscious.

My analysis of the interview interactions continued in the same vein to my approach to the educational materials; however, the two methods of inquiry differ in several important respects. First, whereas prior to the interview the researcher formulates a structure for the content of the interaction, the document writer(s) and commissioner(s) have control over overall content. Second, in the production of the data in the latter the writer(s) and other institutions involved in its production have control over its composition and editing, whereas in the former the interviewee composes the answer without the ability to reflectively edit. Furthermore, some degree of editing control occurs in the transcription process, including the act of restricting vocal-auditory and non-verbal performances of communication to linear print, and the various linguistic decisions this depiction involves. Third, the intended audience differs: the educational materials were produced for school pupils and teachers, while the intended audience in the interviews is less obvious. Although I was their immediate audience, participants clearly also considered a wider audience of their statements as presented in future research. For some their audience was society in general, teachers often referenced parents or the Ulster-Scots Agency, and MLAs indicated concern over their public persona. However, the “audience(s)” in the mind of both the document writer(s) and the interviewee may not be accessible either to the researcher or the producer her/himself. Neither method of research inherently includes fewer interpretive uncertainties or ambiguities.

Analysis occurs continuously throughout the research process: in the construction of interview guide questions, content and direction; in the interactions before and after the interviews; during the interview; through listening to the recordings; through transcriptions; and through the process of writing (Bondy 2012). Each stage involved interpretations, developing conclusions and hermeneutic circles, alterations, and arbitrations on inclusion and exclusion of ideas and content. The conclusions reached and described as a result of the
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interviews correspond to my interpretations which emerged out of my interaction with interviewees and with the broader interview process.

The Primary School survey entailed both qualitative and quantitative questions, all of which were interpreted using both qualitative and quantitative methods. Prior to receiving the data, I had no predetermined mechanism for the operationalisation of qualitative questions; however, similarities and regularities in answers to these questions lent the data to quantification. While rejecting the feigned objectivity inherent in claims that the categories for operationalisation merely “emerged,” many of the categories were easily designated. Taking the example of answers to the question in which participants were to describe what the description “British” means, 22.4 per cent of respondents used the words ‘Queen’ or ‘Royal Family’ and 14.4 per cent employed some variant of the word ‘posh.’ Such similarities were found across the qualitative questions and across schools. Further categorisation then entailed arbitration, deeming answers similar enough to be grouped (such as ‘talk proper’ and ‘well-mannered and you do things like clay pigeon shooting or going out for afternoon tea’ with ‘posh’). Occasionally sets of grouped answers were combined under a more general heading (for example the grouping ‘genealogy’ absorbed perceived parental, grandparental, and ancestral identities). As the participants were ten or eleven years of age, there was a diversity of ability in writing and communication. A small number of respondents’ answers were illegible or hard to read, ambiguous, or difficult to understand or codify. Peculiar, nonsensical or unclear answers were organised into either the grouping which they appeared to best fit, or were assigned as ‘don’t know/blank/unclear.’ The resulting data was analysed using cross-tabulations. Limiting the analysis of the surveys to quantitative alone, however, would have involved discounting the depth of information provided by many of the participants, much of which eluded codification. With regards to the qualitative analysis, the methods perused were in line with the question-led, interactive interpretations described above.

4.2.1 Euphemism, “Telling” and Reading Silences

Seamus Heaney (1992:53–54), in his poem Whatever You Say, Say Nothing, described a dearth of candidness in the north of Ireland:

“Religion’s never mentioned here”, of course.
“You know them by their eyes,” and hold your tongue. …

Smoke-signals are loud-mouthed compared with us
Manoeuvrings to find out name and school …
That Norman, Ken and Sidney signalled Prod,
And Seamus (call me Sean) was sure-fire Pape.
O land of password, handgrip, wink and nod,
Of open minds open as a trap.
Where tongues lie coiled, as under flames lie wicks,
Where half of us, as in a wooden horse
Were cabin’d and confined like wiley Greeks,
Besieged within the siege, whispering morse.

Finlay (1999) states that Heaney’s poem accurately depicts the phenomenon of “telling,” described in anthropological research into Northern Ireland (Burton 1979; Harris 1972). Burton coined the term “telling” to describe the economy of symbols, signals and signs read by individuals to attempt to ascertain their collective affiliation. This phenomenon is also performative, as individuals – consciously or unconsciously – depict or cover the others’ potential reading of their own affiliation. However, Heaney’s insights go beyond a mere description of “telling”: he situates it within an affective context. He locates “telling” in a complex emotional landscape of repression, anxiety, defensiveness, sieges within sieges. Such affect is productive in the delimiting of boundaries of self and other (Ahmed 2014). Within this context, Heaney accuses his “us” of communicative silence and reticence: ‘Smoke-signals are loud-mouthed compared with us.’ Rather than explicitly naming terms, meaning is exchanged through coded silences, through ‘whispering morse.’

This un-naming of terms of collective identification was prominent throughout the interviews. Participants preferred to use euphemism, vocal inclination and emphasis, pauses, symbols and other clues almost exclusively over terms such as Protestant/Catholic, unionist/nationalist or British/Irish. The latter were used negatively, in order to distance the speaker from sectarianism or (ethnic) politics. Metaphor and euphemism were ubiquitously adopted outside of this context: “the other community”, “we”, “as well as celebrating our Ulster-Scots culture to, then, to start bringing - bringing ___ other___ things”, “showing the local parents that we were celebrating the local culture”. The term “community” was particularly malleable, as the same speaker could use it, even within the same sentence, to mean numerous things: the school and its families, the local area, the Ulster-Scots community, “the Protestant community,” unionists or loyalists, Catholics, nationalists, and other collective identifications:

PS2: I just think that they should help serve community, you know, and all sides of community. I don’t see Ulster-Scots in that ___ extreme, extreme branch of ___ … – a more extreme side of___ our, what I call, our community, you know.
Sheila Allen (1998:52) describes how in Northern Ireland public discussion of communal affiliation ‘may provoke anger or embarrassment’. Indeed, interviewees often expressed concern or hostility in response to requests for greater clarity on euphemistic terms. One of the initial interviews I carried out was with a teacher who worked in an Ulster-Scots primary school but played no part in its delivery. My aim was to gain an understanding of her position on the project; the basis for her passive support. Turning the conversation onto political perspectives, I asked whether she considered herself to be a unionist. Although quietly answering that she did, her embarrassment was palpable.

Allen (1998:52), also drawing upon Whatever You Say, Say Nothing, described the requirement for social researchers to engage in ‘reading the silences.’ Although this is a productive contribution, it could be pushed further. Silence connotes not merely the absence of noise but also muteness, omissions, avoidance, concealment, and privacy. It can indicate both peace (a stillness, a quieted mind) and violence (to be silenced). Breaking silence can indicate the revealing of previously hidden truths or the disruption of tranquillity. Silence is not an objective fact but a learned interpretation of the communicative actions taken by the other with whom one is interacting. Thus, silence is far from devoid of meaning (Medina 2004). As Ahmed (2014) argues, concealments can aid in the accumulation of value to signs. The silences of “telling,” far from being voids, are intensely symbolic sites imbued with complex layers of meaning.

My approach to this phenomenon moved as the research continued. At the outset I had concerns over clarity both for avoiding misrepresentation of the interviewee and for the future reader of the research. My (re)quest for annunciation was thus connected to a desire for proof in the production of research. Initially, this took the form of an unarticulated belief that breaking (their) silence would reveal the underlying kernel of meaning which could then be recorded, interpreted and depicted. Through the research process I became cognisant of this approach and increasingly recognised it as fundamentally misguided (England 1994). On more than one occasion, when asked directly about the meaning of their use of a hint, the interviewee clarified the term by equating it to something clearly different to the meaning hinted at in the preceding discussion. This laid bare the need not for an interviewer adept at the breaking of silence but a hermeneutic of silence (Medina 2004). My concerns over the limits of such a hermeneutic revealed an underlying prioritisation of explicit, transcribable and linguistically accurate utterances. In a sense, such attempts to break silence can be understood as processes of silencing. The voices communicating through the usage of silences are silenced by the researcher’s. As Foucault writes,
Silence itself … is less the absolute limit of discourse, the other side from which it is separated by a strict boundary, than an element that functions alongside the things said, with them and in relation to them within over-all strategies. … There is not one but many silences, and they are an integral part of the strategies that underlie and permeate discourses.55

Although such an approach was not initially present, it became progressively more salient in the data collection-interpretation process.

4.2.2 Reflexivity, Stickiness and Power Dynamics

PRG: What do you mean by saying you “hate politics”?

PS12: What do I mean by “I hate politics”? … I guess I hate the way all the parties are tied up with the whole sort of _____ um _____ um _____ how do I put it? ____ [Long pause. PS12 looked anxious, observing me slightly side-ways with clenched teeth as if afraid of causing offence].

PRG: So you know, I’m completely neutral.

PS12: Okay. There’s so many bigoted views out there – so many bigoted views. And there’s so many parties – you don’t know what they support, but it’s kinda “come vote for me so that the other party doesn’t get in” is their kinda manifesto. So that the other side don’t get in.

Over several months of contacting various individuals, requesting permission to interview them or conduct research within their school or organisation, I became increasingly aware of particular readings of me as a researcher of Ulster-Scots. Most commonly I became cognisant of being read as a promoter of Ulster-Scots and ideologically associated with loyalism. At times interviews subtly implied that I would be a sympathetic ear to more hard-line views vocalised, or that little needed to be said for me to pick up the underlying meaning of a statement. At other times those who considered themselves to be moderate – or at least moderate unionist – appeared cautious to speak against hard-line views, as exemplified by PS12 in the above discussion. At one point, in scoping the field prior to field research proper, I contacted by email the principle of every secondary school in Northern Ireland to inquire into their level of engagement with Ulster-Scots. My questioning was frequently met with aggressive resistance, especially from catholic schools; as one such respondent answered: ‘unless you have some

55 Also quoted in Medina (2004:562).
profound explanation for it I feel it is a topic does not even merit validation.’ Several strongly encouraged me to abandon the study for the ‘more worthy’ topic of the Irish language.

Precisely as my position within Northern Ireland’s ethnopolitical spectrum was being read, so too was my view of Ulster-Scots. The latter was assumed to inform the former, and vice versa. Several anti-Ulster-Scots individuals searched for evidence I did not ‘take it seriously’ before agreeing to discuss the research further. Meanwhile, individuals within Ulster-Scots promoting institutions vocalised concern that I had no ulterior motive, aiming to “reveal” the projects as derisory or inauthentic.

Before conducting this research I was mindful of the literature on reflexivity in sociological methodology, as well as issues around “telling” particular to Northern Ireland (Burton 1978), and the need for an incorporation of both in social research in the region (Finlay 1999, 2001b). However, the literature in general suggests a relatively unproblematic correspondence between the semiotic economy of telling and binaries which apparently underlie them. Contrarily, my experience in conducting this research would suggest that telling involves the positioning of the other within multidimensional spectrums rather than binaries, including the strength of support for particular positions and the potential for sectarian or hard-line sentiments. Furthermore, in line with a “hermeneutic of silence” approach, I would suggest that a prejudice for precise linguistic articulations over more ambiguous, indicative communications is a problematic one.

In light of his experience of telling in conducting qualitative research in Northern Ireland, Finlay (1999) advocates what he terms ‘analytical reflexivity’; ‘reflexivity as a politics of location and as a practice of positioning.’ Adopting such an approach, I had been diligently reflexive about potential readings of my own communal identification. With almost all participants self-identifying as Protestant and/or unionist, much of my concern had been directed toward readings which would place me within a category of hostility, thus potentially limiting the disclosure of information. My reasoning being that, while I had been brought up within a majority moderate Protestant milieu in central County Down, I considered myself to be, if readable at all, potentially more associated with Irish nationalism. In terms of unreadability, my Kenyan mother and Northern Irish politically moderate father had always positioned themselves “outside of” Northern Ireland’s ethnopolitics. Since leaving County Down at nineteen, I had lived for five years in Dublin, and England for two. Personally identifying with critical, Marxist, radical feminist, and neo-abolitionist positions, I considered myself to be outside of the unionist-centrist-nationalist spectrum. In terms of non-unionist readings, my years in Dublin had left me with something of a “southern lilt”. I had married a
red-headed, Irish-speaking, convent-school Dubliner. I had taken Irish language classes, attended mass, voted in an Irish election, and received critical stares reading the Irish Times in my home-town. I had been fiercely critical of unionist conservativism, Northern Irish ethnopolitics, and Ulster Britishness. In other words, the very reading I had not expected to receive was one of being associated with hard-line Protestant loyalism.

Ulster-Scots, like most signs in the semiotic landscape of collective identifications in Northern Ireland, is always already imbued with various meanings and associations. Sara Ahmed (2014) writes that signs can become ‘sticky’ such that particular symbols, motifs and meanings can stick to it, and it can cohere to certain bodies. She writes:

The stickiness of that surface … tells us a history of the object that is not dependent on the endurance of the quality of stickiness: what sticks ‘shows us’ where the object has travelled through what it has gathered onto its surface (2014:91).

The history of Ulster-Scots in Northern Ireland since the early nineties has been one of contest and controversy. For many across the ethnopolitical spectrum it has been an object of disgust; an illegitimate, futile, sectarian attempt to compete with Irishness. Such affect has rendered it highly sticky, and over time it has gathered associated conceptions of being loyalist, anti-Irish onto its surface. As will become evident in the data, this stickiness is clearly a matter of concern for moderates who have come to support the Ulster-Scots project. In terms of my positionality as “researcher of Ulster-Scots,” I too experienced its stickiness and cohesion to interpretations of my self. Within the process of telling, any indicative ambiguities were outbidden by the stickiness of Ulster-Scots and the signs attached to it. Such an incorrect telling was unexpected, and not initially a consideration within my reflexive approach (Finlay 1999).

In my encounter with PS12, quoted at the beginning of this subsection, I had observed through the interview a certain reticence in her responses. It became gradually more evident to me that she had read me as pro-Ulster-Scots and hard-line unionist/loyalist. At the moment depicted above, this became unavoidable. My trite claim of being “completely neutral” eased her tongue, but its success in doing so confirmed my suspicion that I was being read in this way. My hastily stated neutrality interested and concerned me; I felt it rendered visible some previously unconscious aspect of the power relation which I had adopted as a researcher. Steinar Kvale (2006:481,480) describes the ‘qualitative progressivity myth’ frequently invoked in interview-based research, in which interviews are understood to be ‘warm, caring, and empowering dialogues.’ Rather, Kvale (2006:485) contends that: ‘a research interview is not an open and dominance-free dialogue between egalitarian partners, but a specific hierarchical
and instrumental form of conversation, where the interviewer sets the stage and scripts in accord with his or her research interests.’ Whilst rejecting notions of objectivity in social research, my concerns regarding interviewees’ readings of my position and my experience of (at times hostile) interactions with potential participants had led me to claim scientific neutrality as a short-hand for being non-judgemental of their perspectives. I aimed to “let them speak.” However, this performed “neutrality” veiled both my rejection of such notions and my general ontological, epistemological and theoretical framework. The interview interaction thus represents an asymmetric negotiation of readings and interpretations in which I, as interviewer, have power over the direction of the discussion: direction in terms of topics of discussion, but also the direction of dialogue (I ask, they reply), of holding a monopoly over interpretation, and of knowledge (Kvale 2006). My underlying positions were to be revealed/performed only insofar it served the obtaining of theirs.

4.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have outlined the methodological approach taken in conducting the research for this thesis, as well as the specific methods utilised. As discussed above, I consider analysis to occur before, during, and after the intermingling processes of data collection, data processing, theoretical framework development, writing, and editing. In the chapters which follow, I have drawn upon these various data-collecting interactions in order to approach the research questions established.
Chapter Five
The Development of Ulster-Scots Education

At the beginning of the nineties, Ulster-Scots was at best a fringe interest of a tiny minority of unionists, a concept with which almost all in Northern Ireland were entirely unfamiliar. Since then, it has bourgeoned through official recognition, wide-spread awareness, and organisational engagement in public and school-based education. This rise has been ‘remarkable by any standards’ (Crowley 2006:27); however, as yet this development of Ulster-Scots has been only alluded to in the literature. Utilising in-depth interviews with a variety of current and historical actors in the field, in this first findings chapter, I offer a concrete narrative of this development, focusing primarily upon the Ulster-Scots foray into the education system. I contend that this development entailed three phases: first, grass-roots educationalists operated independently, as unionist elites lobbied for recognition; second, official recognition and central organisation created increased interaction between various actors, while the Ulster-Scots Agency became established; and third, the Agency has become predominant in the field. I begin by discussing the theoretical framework employed in describing this development.

5.1 Processes of Peoplehood-Building

Ethnicity does not intumesce but is a product of peoplehood-building processes. With Smith (2003:32), I reject conceptualisations which posit that ‘senses of peoplehood emerge organically or evolve out of people’s particular economic, territorial, demographic, ancestral, religious, linguistic, or cultural identities in some fairly automatic process.’ Although this chapter does not engage with the larger question of the process of the Ulster-Scots identity-building in aggregate, it describes a pivotal aspect in such processes: the development of ethnocultural education within schools (Faas 2010). The trajectory of ethnic educational intersects with and draws out the more general narrative of ethnic production.

According to Smith (2003:32), peoplehoods are produced ‘via constrained, asymmetrical interactions between actual and would-be leaders of political communities and the potential constituents for whom they compete.’ Although both constituents and (potential) leaders possess meaningful agency, these interactions are asymmetrical as leaders and potential leaders have greater incentives and capabilities to institutionalise the collective identity they purport to (re)present. Concomitantly, elite narrative-creation is also constrained by the ‘great variety of senses of membership, identity, and affiliation, with entrenched economic interests, political and religious benefits, historical and cultural attachments, and animosities’ within the
population which they seek to describe (Smith 2003:34). This is certainly the case in relation to Ulster-Scots peoplehood-building in Northern Ireland, with its considerable and varied array of intersectional ‘senses of identity, interests, and ideals,’ conceptualised as conflicting or unalignable: unionist/loyalist, moderate/populist, unionist/nationalist, Orange Order members/anti-Orange unionists, pro/anti-GFA, urban/rural, class, religiosity, and so on (Smith 2003:34). Elite proponents of Ulster-Scots have tended to emphasise an ambiguous, amorphous relationship with Northern Ireland’s dense lattice of identifications, involving complex negotiations in relation to its constituency. Smith’s description of leaders and potential leaders in competition, vying for position in the process of peoplehood making, is evident in the development of Ulster-Scots education, where isolated, dispersed grass-roots educationalists came to be absorbed into, or even excluded from, a centralised, coordinated official body constructed, implemented, financed, and predominantly run by political elites.56

Another productive framework for discussing peoplehood-building is provided by Hacker-Cordon and Miley (2007), who outline four key mechanisms discussed in the constructivist literature around national consciousness: nation-building from below, from above, and two from the ‘middle’ (bureaucracy monopoly and education-indoctrination). The former two represent, respectively, conceptualising the production of a national consciousness as evolving out from “the people” in a bottom-up process, and, second, as being constructed by ruling elite in a top-down process. In the latter conception, national consciousness develops from the middle. Bureaucracy monopoly exists where certain forms of linguistic or cultural capital are rendered advantageous on the labour market, leading to the construction of a national consciousness. An alternative form of nation-building from the middle comes from education-indoctrination, through the establishment of a ‘monopoly of legitimate education’ (Gellner 2008:33; Hacker-Cordon and Miley 2007). It is the development of this latter mechanism which this chapter maps: the construction of the peoplehood-producing infrastructure via education. In the specific case of Ulster-Scots education, this mechanism developed out of a complex process of elite lobbying, and, in fact, has taken on a top-down structure.

In this chapter, I argue that the rise of Ulster-Scots education, and the advent of its entry into schools, has been a predominantly top-down process. Having been lobbied for and established by the unionist political elite, the Ulster-Scots Agency gained an organisational monopoly over the field of Ulster-Scots education. The circumstances and dynamics of the

56 Portions of this chapter have been published (see Gardner 2017).
political sphere at the moment of its creation resulted in it gaining effective control over the field. Although its development has been relatively slow-paced, the Agency has emerged in the 2010s as dominant in the setting of the ethnic narrative within the education system.

5.2 Three Phases of Development

Ulster-Scots education has been established through three phases of development. The initial phase involved the rise of disparate inclusions of folk-stories, music, poetry and literature by grass-roots educationalists starting perhaps as early as the latter years of the eighties. In parallel, unionist political elites had begun in this period to lobby for its official recognition and establishment at the governmental, legislative and programmatic level. A second phase, beginning with the GFA and the creation of the Ulster-Scots Agency in 1998-1999, involved the beginnings of interaction between grass-roots educationalist actions and centralised bureaucracy, of the provision of funding and educational materials, and its promotion by the Agency within schools previously outside of the purview of Ulster-Scots education. The end of the 2000s heralded a third phase, in which grass-roots activists have become the minority in, and even at times excluded from, the mainstream of Ulster-Scots education.

5.2.1 Phase One: Grass-Roots Education, Elite Lobbying

The idea of Ulster-Scots had begun to disseminate through certain unionist currents of thought in the late eighties and early nineties. The Ulster-Scots Language Society had been formed in 1992, producing the first publication explicitly about, and partly written in, Ulster-Scots the following year (Gardner 2015; Níc Craith 2003). In the period of the nineties prior to the GFA and the establishment of the Ulster-Scots Agency, there appeared a small number of grass-roots educators who began to work to bring Ulster-Scots into schools. Only two participating interviewees stated that they were active in the pre-Agency period: PS3 and Willie Drennan. For PS3, his interest in doing so began in the mid-eighties, and was centred around linguistic and literary interests:

I’ve been teaching in this school for over 30 years now, and … I’ve been doing Ulster-Scots lessons right from day one. So it’s been going on at this school for over 30 years. … The first thing I would’ve done with kids was *Me and me Da*, by W. F. Marshall … and the kids very, very readily took to it … they liked the way it was poetry that you didn’t have to be very precise with pronunciation, you could use the language that they used naturally in class … the next step was to introduce them to the bard of Scotland, Robbie Burns. So Robert Burns – when I was twelve years old I was introduced to Robert Burns, and I’ve always admired his culture, I’ve always admired his politics, his sociology, and I have great pleasure in introducing that and teaching it.
PS3 expressed ambiguity toward to appearance of the Agency; broadly supporting its aims, but concerned over its political associations. Willie Drennan, a prominent grass-roots Ulster-Scots promoter, similarly engaged with Ulster-Scots education over this period, evolving out of a burgeoning interest in County Antrim localism. Having developed his interest in teaching local traditional music and folk-stories in Canada through the nineties, he returned to Northern Ireland to continue this project:

In 1997 I came back and started working straight away, and was recognised as an Ulster-Scot … I got a whole bunch of musicians together and formed a group called Fowkgates, which was just a collective, right? And I started going into schools in 1998, just me on my own or just a couple of other musicians. And then we formed the Ulster Folk Orchestra Association for the sole purpose to bring young people into it and tour the schools.

Initially, Drennan secured temporary funding from the Arts Council needed for the Ulster Folk Orchestra project to provide Ulster-Scots education to schools. This constituted the first organised, funded educational project of its kind. According to Drennan, his funding was redirected after the establishment of the Ulster-Scots Agency, at the behest of prominent individuals within the DUP. At least from Drennan’s perspective, from the early 2000s, grass-roots Ulster-Scots education had begun to be taken captive by unionist political elites, and centralised in the hands of the Agency.

One of the central figures in the early establishment of the Ulster-Scots project at the political level was DUP MLA, Nelson McCausland. He had become involved with the Ulster-Scots movement in 1992, and was instrumental in the launching of the Ulster-Scots Heritage Council three years later, acting as its first chairman and, later, as its director. For McCauseland, the Heritage Council brought together ‘all the organisations which were in some way Ulster-Scots-related … under one umbrella,’ in part due to a sense of marginalisation. One of the aims of the Heritage Council, after its creation in 1995, was the inclusion of Ulster-Scots into education:

We had, then, funding applications to the Community Relations Council and got some money to get a plan together. … Then we started lobbying and went to see the Council for the Curriculum at that time … We went to see various Education Ministers who made promises, but nothing happened. Eventually, then, some money was provided by the Ulster-Scots Agency for Stranmillis College to do some work putting together educational materials. … Anything that was in schools up to [this point] was very much driven by the enthusiasm and the passion of a principal or a teacher.

57 Meaning “culture” in Ulster-Scots.
The Heritage Council was led by a small group ranging from those on the fringe to the centre of the unionist political elite. McCausland, who chaired the Council, had been elected in Northern Ireland’s 1989 local elections as an Independent Unionist, moving to the UUP in 1993. Colin Robinson, who served as Cultural Outreach Officer, was an activist for the Progressive Unionist Party, while Lee Reynolds, who became the Information and Community Outreach Officer, was at the time a member of the UUP, contesting James Molyneaux for the leadership of the party in 1995. In the nineties, Reynolds became active within unionism, contending for recognition of class inequalities, as well as for linguistic and cultural recognition of Ulster-Scots. In 2011, Reynolds replaced Ian Crozier to become one of the DUP councillors sitting on the Belfast City Council, while Crozier moved his current role of chief executive of the Ulster-Scots Agency. John Erskine and John McIntyre, known as the “twa Johns,” both founding members of the Ulster-Scots Language Society in 1992, were also central figures in the Heritage Council. So too were other Ulster-Scots intellectuals, such as Dr Philip Robinson, author of *Ulster-Scots: A Grammar of the Traditional Written and Spoken Language* (1997) amongst other books on Ulster-Scots language and history. Given its personnel, the council had the capacity to wield considerable leverage in the political sphere at the time. The timing of their participation was also instrumental, taking place in the four-year period between the 1994 ceasefires and the 1998 signing of the GFA. The “two-community” model and the rhetoric of parity of esteem as central components of the peace process at the time meant that a “Protestant” language/culture to correspond to Irish(ness) was politically expedient.

Subsequent to its creation in 1992, the Ulster-Scots Language Society began to produce its publication, *Ullans*, in which articles on Ulster-Scots heritage, culture and politics, linguistic and literary history, and new poetry, prose and translations from English were printed. A central function of this publication was essentially to engage in Ulster-Scots ethnolinguistic apologetics. For Ulster-Scots, the creation of *Ullans* in the early nineties ‘essentially … constituted the initiation of a new print community’ (Ní Cráith 2003:82).

Hence, by 1998 Ulster-Scots had gained enough traction amongst unionist elites that it was placed along-side Irish in the GFA. According to Lee Reynolds, the achievement of its place within the Agreement “was basically down to us. If we hadn’t been about four years previously, if we hadn’t been hammering on the doors, if we hadn’t been raising it, it would...
not have been there.” Although, much to the Heritage Council’s frustration, the wording of its inclusion extended the same rights and protections to it as Irish, but fell short of granting it official recognition as a language. It would take subsequent years of lobbying to achieve this status. However, the most fruitful outcome of the late nineties for Ulster-Scots promoters was the establishment of the Agency; as Reynolds stated: “In the end of that process we got the Ulster-Scots Agency. That was the ultimate outworking of it all.” However, Reynolds pointed to the dynamics underpinning the creation of the Agency as engendering undesirable intentions and results:

The funding bodies didn’t want to recognise us and didn’t want to include us. We ended up with our own Agency because they wanted to basically just shove us in there and get us away from them. But, you know, when somebody says you’re now going to get a million pounds spent on you, it’s a bit difficult to say, you know, what about all the other ones who aren’t spending tuppence on us. That has actually proven to be a longer-term problem where Ulster-Scots go to the Ulster-Scots Agency whereas Irish can go everywhere. We’ve been sort of pigeonholed in terms of recognition and funding.

Although Reynolds vocalised criticism of the concentration of funding allocations which it produced, this restriction – alongside Ulster-Scots’ comparative newness in the sphere of language and culture – has rendered it more organisationally concentrated than Irish. Hence, the elite-level lobbying and negotiations of the nineties resulted in the production of an Ulster-Scots Agency effectively allotted an organisational monopoly over Ulster-Scots activities, promotion, and education.

5.2.2 Phase Two: Centralisation and Outreach

After the establishment of the Agency, Ulster-Scots education began to be strived for at a centralised level. Sizeable funding packages have contributed considerably to the creation and spread of Ulster-Scots education. Since 1998, governmental funding for Ulster-Scots has continuously increased, most notably with the promise of £12 million over five years in the 2005 budget, and the further boost of three million over three years in the wake of the St Andrews Agreement in 2006 (DCAL 2014; Northern Ireland Executive 2008). The Ulster-Scots Project for Primary Schools was established at Stranmillis teacher training college by the Ulster-Scots Agency in 2002, and in 2003 this remit was expanded to include a Post-Primary Project (Stranmillis 2006). Through the mid-2000s the materials for an Ulster-Scots curriculum were collected and trialled. Schools (mainly Primary) instigated Ulster-Scots activities, invited activists, and utilised materials produced by the Ulster-Scots Agency and Stranmillis on a voluntary basis. These educational materials are those utilised in the documentary analysis.
within this thesis. Although funding, public engagement, and curriculum input increased awareness and school engagement, progress was slow-paced (A Kist o Wurds 2004).

Most of the central decision-making figures within the Ulster-Scots Agency have had some form of connection to the ruling elite, either through being elected representatives of unionist parties, senior civil servants or through more casual connections to political power. Its board are chosen by “political appointment,”60 drawn from among persons appearing to the North-South Ministerial Council to have an interest in, or experience of, matters relating to Ullans or Ulster-Scots Cultural issues’ (Ulster-Scots Agency 2014). Although several founding members of the Heritage Council worked in the Agency, frustration at the top-down choice of personnel – and exclusion of several Ulster-Scots speaking or identifying elites – was vocalised in the editorial to the 2004 edition of Ullans (2004):

Even among members of the Ulster-Scots elite at the turn of the twentieth century, the Agency was perceived as overly top-down in structure.

In 1999, John Laird made both a UUP life peer and the first chair of the Ulster-Scots Agency. Laird had been a member of the unionist elite since his election to parliament on a UUP ticket in 1970 and again in 1975, and was appointed to the position of chair by David Trimble, then leader of the UUP and Northern Ireland’s first First Minister. With Trimble, Laird had been ‘a member of the Ulster Society for a quite considerable length of time’; however, in my interview with him, he maintained that his Ulster Society and Ulster-Scots interests were entirely separate. It would appear that the early years of the Agency under Laird were primarily dedicated to fielding off opposition and increasing public awareness of Ulster-Scots throughout the island of Ireland. On the former, Laird described having expounded much effort challenging the Irish government’s opposition to the promotion of Ulster-Scots after the

60 State in the interview with Mark Thompson.
61 “Ulster-Scots Agency” written in Ulster-Scots.
creation of the North/South Language Body\textsuperscript{62}: ‘The first thing that I had to do was to confront the dislike of Ulster-Scots by the republicans … and the Dublin government.’ For Laird, high-profile public clashes and antagonism between the Ulster-Scots Agency and the Irish government aided in gaining traction amongst unionists in Northern Ireland:

The Protestant, unionist community did what it always does, and that is: when it thinks the Dublin government is against it, then it must be alright. OK? I’m putting it very crudely, but that is it. If we could show that the Irish government were totally against what we were doing, then we were on the road to success, and the road to getting a lot of people to support us, which is \textit{exactly what we did}. Much to their considerable annoyance. I mean, the amount of restrictions they – the amount of work that they did to try and stop us was unbelievable, but it was too late – too late, too late – the genie was out of the bottle!

Laird described the early 2000s public engagement of the Agency as a key turning-point for the salience and spread of Ulster-Scots throughout Ulster, with a rapid growth in identification and awareness of the concept. Toward the end of his time as chair, the Agency began to make elementary steps toward developing Ulster-Scots education and began to develop educational materials with Stranmillis for use within schools. Laird resigned from the post in 2004 over funding cuts to the Agency (BBC 2004), as well as in response to, in his words, the ‘considerable hammering from the Dublin government’ the Agency had received.

Following Lord Laird’s resignation, Mark Thompson was appointed to the position of chair. It would appear that this change in personnel was emblematic of something of a change in direction for the Agency. Whereas Laird had been an established figure in unionist politics, Thompson had not. Under Thompson, a more positive-slanted public relations strategy became the key focus of the Agency. A decade of media critiques in which Ulster-Scots was presented as being merely a mouthpiece for loyalist claim-making and an exploitation of the discourse of culture to express sectarian bigotry left the Agency wary of such connections. Indeed, the defensiveness and unease of participants from various spheres of Ulster-Scots promotion, both past and present, where any link to unionist-loyalist politics was raised during interviews is testament to the continuing legacy of these concerns. Despite not being within the unionist elite, Thompson trajectory into the Agency was through a connection with the political sphere: “In my background in graphic design I was doing some work with the Northern Ireland

\textsuperscript{62} A Post-GFA council which includes two agencies: Foras na Gaeilge (the agency responsible for the promotion of the Irish language throughout the island of Ireland) and the Ulster-Scots Agency.
Office, and one thing led to other, and Lord Laird resigned, and I stepped into his considerable shoes."

With public relations increasingly to the fore, the Agency engaged in various strategies of engagement. It disseminated information on a variety of platforms, including radio and TV, booklets and its webpage, showcase events, and it relocated its offices to create a “shop front” in Belfast. For children and young people, it began to fund and supply lessons in music and dance, materials and workers for schools to stage Ulster-Scots-themed plays, and ran annual summer schools and after-school clubs. By the mid-2000s, much of the early ground-work in official linguistic recognition and securing partnerships with Stranmillis College and Ulster University had been achieved. Through the latter 2000s, the Agency spent time ‘quality checking’ and promoting the use of the educational materials produced through Stranmillis. According to Thompson, their entry into schools was relatively smooth:

We simply concentrated our limited resources on the places where the teachers were already on side. … There are an enormous number of people who are favourably disposed, and who are very enthusiastic. … There is just not the same level of organisation and assertiveness. I think it’s a cultural characteristic of the Ulster-Scots community that they are quite relaxed, quite laid back, but they will very much value and treasure their heritage, and they will want to incorporate it where they can.

Contrariwise, several other interviewees from the Agency suggested that the schools whom they had engaged had initially met their endeavours with suspicion and resistance. These interviewees discussed the need for promotion events in order to gain the trust of teachers of parents, as well as the interest of pupils. For these interviewees, promotional events held within schools across the province of Ulster opened up possibilities for its introduction to a wider audience. For Gary Blair, a current education officer at the Agency, the Agency’s Fair Faa Ye Project in 2007 was particularly effective in doing so:

I think the mould was broke by a play called Fair Faa Ye ... it taul ye the story o’ Ulster-Scots from the earliest days tae modernity. And it was a 45-minute sketch, and it was really, really clever, and really, really effective, and it toured hundreds of schools in this country. And I think it opened the eyes o’ teachers I think every bit as much if not mair than the pupils. They were so taken by the content, and it made Ulster-Scots safe, and it made Ulster-Scots interesting, and it made it educationally inviting.

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63 The NIO is the department of the British government responsible for Northern Irish affairs.
64 Told.
65 More.
It was through this period of public relations that the Agency began to gain ground in terms of school-based engagement.

During this second phase in the development of Ulster-Scots education, various promoters of Ulster-Scots became more vocal in arguing for its inclusion into schools. For example, the 2001 edition of the Ulster-Scots Language Society’s journal, *Ullans*, included numerous entries in support of doing so, including an article by the Scottish academic and Scots language promoter, Davis Purves, who took up the argument that doing so was a psychologically necessary: “This repressive treatment of generations of children has probably introduced a schizoid element, an element of self-hatred, into the national psyche. Associated with this self-contempt, the well-known Scottish cringe (Purves 2001:78). Around the same time, Willie Drennan (2004) was advancing similar arguments in his tours with the Ulster-Scots Folk Orchestra:

> Whun Ah wus at schuil, they done thair bes til hammer it oot o us. Nouadays there’s actually a few teachers, a few principals, an a few o’er people within the education system who’re realisin that tha Ulster-Scots way o’ taakin is something that is precious an deserves to be preserved, an so things are changing aroun. Now that it’s almost extinct, people are trying to preserve it.

Through this period, Drennan travelled around schools, speaking and performing at assemblies, and running workshops. He also presented an educational programme for the BBC entitled *A Danner Wi Drennan* in 2008, which included documenting these his school visits. Meanwhile, the Agency began to establish communication with isolated grass-roots Ulster-Scots educationalists, offering support, materials, funding, and tuition.

The 2000s appear to have been a mixed period for the Agency. While gains were made in terms of their acceptance and visibility socially and within the education sector, it was also marked by various scandals, such as the arrest of the first chief executive, John Stan Mallon, in 2002 (The Herald 2002), Lord Laird’s alleged spending of hundreds of pounds on taxis between Belfast and Dublin (Gordon 2005), and the misuse of funding scandal (BBC NI 2009).

Further, although interviewees frequently contended that this period was characterised by oversubscription and social acceptance of their project, it is important to recognise their invested interest in overemphasising demand and underplaying opposition. In fact, the development of Ulster-Scots education through this period was relatively slow paced. With the

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66 When I was at School, they did their best to hammer it out of us.

67 Around.

68 John Stan Mallon was arrested and charged in relation to a child sex offence.
Ethnicising Ulster’s Protestants

creation and implementation of specific school-based programmes at the end of the 2000s, the Agency began to drive the school-based educational project forward in a centrally coordinated manner. Gradually, the organisational monopoly allocated to the Agency came to be actualised in terms of educational provision.

5.2.3 Phase Three: Agency Ascendancy

Toward the end of the 2000s, the Ulster-Scots Agency began to introduce more concrete schemes for educational provision. In 2008 the Ulster-Scots Agency began a Peripatetic Tutor Programme (PTP), providing lessons in Ulster-Scots traditional music and both Highland and Scottish Country dancing to schools (Campbell, Eydmann, and Gunn 2013). The provision of these tutorials is particularly intriguing, given that the idea of a distinct Ulster-Scottish style of traditional music is relatively novel, negotiated and undefined (Cooper 2010a). In 2013 the Agency launched the Ulster-Scots Flagship Schools Award, awarded to (Primary) schools who ‘demonstrate eighteen continuous months commitment to Ulster-Scots in school life’ (Ulster-Scots Agency n.d.). By the spring of 2014, a small number of primary schools had received the Flagship Schools Award, while a further forty-four were either working towards it or on the waiting list having applied (Campbell et al. 2013; NSMC 2013; Ulster-Scots Agency n.d.).

Through the 2000s and early 2010s, the inclusion of Ulster-Scots in the education system has been almost entirely Primary School based, primarily because Post-Primary education is more formally structured into subject-based classes. Beyond its inclusion as a topic in Local and Global Citizenship69, the introduction of Ulster-Scots into secondary schools would necessitate the construction of a full Ulster-Scots curriculum as a formalised subject. The Flagship scheme represents the most concrete and ambitious of the Agency’s educational developments to date, establishing routine and continuous Ulster-Scots education within a specified number of schools under their purview. Most recently, in May 2016, the Agency launched its most recent range of educational materials, produced in conjunction with CEA (CEA 2016). Although visually of a higher quality, the number of documents was considerably smaller than previous rounds of materials, and focused heavily on language.

The establishment and active promotion of funded programmes by the Agency necessarily involved the inclusion of schools for whom Ulster-Scots was a novel development. Hence, activist-led schools were joined by others who relied much more heavily on the Agency

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69 The subject, Local and Global Citizenship, was introduced as part of the 2007/08 Revised Curriculum (see Richardson and Gallagher 2011).
for teaching, materials, and information. Many of the teachers and school workers interviewed were in the latter category, oftentimes expressing no prior knowledge of Ulster-Scots before engaging with the Agency. As PS4 put it, “I’m still try- I’m crystalising all this as I go along … it’s still new with me, so it is.” As school engagement increased rapidly through the 2010s, the Agency began to expand its aims. Trina Somerville, the Agency’s Director of Education and Language, described the desire for a more assertive strategy:

We’re at the stage where we’re talking to the Department of Education, we’re going to be meeting CCEA, and we’re going to be looking then to say you need to get the message out to schools to say this has to happen, this is happening. Because, you know, it’s fine for us to look at courses and to look at subjects where it can be embedded, but we need the buy-in and the support from the department of education saying; yes, this is good, this has to be done.

Hence, this third phase in Ulster-Scots education’s development is characterised by the ascendancy of the Agency in the field. Its position as the sole centralised body for funding and provision produces a top-down structure, wielding power through its capacity for the production and dissemination of official knowledge and narratives.

Grass-roots educationalists interviewed as part of this research expressed feelings of alienation toward to Agency and concern over its orientation. PS3 contended that he had ‘very little faith in the Agency,’ critiquing its organisation, political alignment, and conceptualisation of Ulster-Scots:

Particularly, the Agency is not run very well, I don’t see the board as being the best promoters of Ulster-Scots, and I would have people who would say to you that I would be a better representer of the way forward for where Ulster-Scots should go. … the weakness in the Agency [is] that they want to politicise it and make it Protestant. … I really think it is a terrible shame that the Agency is going the way it’s going at the moment. … I think they’ve been fantastic in the past, but I think they’re becoming more remote. … we’ve been a little bit isolated from the Agency. But not actually from Ulster-Scots teaching. I feel the Agency isn’t helping, though its position is to help schools.

Willie Drennan expressed concern over what he perceived to be a disconnect between the “real” cultural history of the area and the official version of Ulster-Scots being promoted by the Agency:

PRG: You mentioned that you disagree with the Ulster-Scots Agency on certain things: what do you disagree with in relation to the Agency?

Willie Drennan: The fundamental thing I disagree with is that it is controlled from the top down. But more generally, … they’re the “experts”, and I’m just a boy on the
ground, you know. … One thing is just the general image. … It’s all sort of glossed over, all sort of plastic paddie. One was a thing about traditional dance. It’s fair enough that they would promote Scottish Country dance because there was a wee bit of that, I suppose – maybe a dozen people did it in the 1900s. … But the traditional dance that they should’ve been promoting was known as country dancing, or, it was quadreels and things like that there – ordinance surveys from away back in the 1800s record what people did. Every area from North Down and Antrim, the main social activity was these dances, in a big barn or a big front room of a house, or a local hall, that’s what people did, and it social dancing, that was their main activity, everywhere. … So I was pushing that this would be revived. … Cos that was real, you know, that was our cultural tradition. And yet, because it didn’t have “Scotland” to it, you know. I mean, this is the thing on the image – [for the Agency] it’s all about Scotland, but it’s about what we did here.

Similarly, he contended that the music being promoted by the Agency excluded grass-roots and historical elements “because it didn’t have “Scotland” to it.” Drennan also described his break with the Agency in 2009, which perceived as a deliberate move by the Agency and unionist political elite to remove him from being “the face of Ulster-Scots”: “I didn’t fit into their agenda, because it’s all politically controlled, basically. … I don’t align with any political party … and that didn’t fit into their ideal of what an Ulster-Scot should be doing.”

Ulster-Scots education in the 2010s has come to be centrally organised, with the Agency dominant in the field. With the subject being new to the majority of schools now engaging with Ulster-Scots under the guidance of the Agency, the latter have come to wield considerable influence over the direction, conceptualisation, and curriculum for Ulster-Scots education. Since its genesis, the Agency has had considerable connections to – and exchange of personnel with – the political elite. This continues to the present personnel; the current chief executive was an elected representative for the DUP prior to appointment, and Tom Scott, chair of the Agency since 2009, was formerly a senior civil servant. Hence, it would seem that Ulster-Scots peoplehood-building, the Agency represents a top-down process of elite-led identity development, leading to the construction of an organisational monopoly. Although it is perhaps too early to describe the Agency’s position within the education system as ‘education indoctrination,’ the goal of achieving a monopoly over education through full inclusion of Ulster-Scots education into the curriculum at both primary and post-primary levels is one of its central aims (Hacker-Cordon and Miley 2007:13). In 2012 the Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure announced plans to instigate the production of a GCSE and A-Level in ‘Ulster Scots language, heritage and culture’ (Meredith 2012). This aim has been expressed as early as the late nineties by the Ulster-Scots Heritage Council. If developed and implemented this would constitute the most radical educational project yet undertaken by the Ulster-Scots movement,
and would considerably influence youth identities and perceptions. However, as many working in the field readily admitted, attaining this remains a more distant prospect than official discourses might suggest.

5.3 Conclusion
Ulster-Scots education has emerged in the 2010s as an elite-led, centrally coordinated programme. The ‘constrained, asymmetrical’ interactions between grass-roots educationalists and political elites which evolved since the late-eighties have produced a situation in the 2010s in which the latter have attained dominance in the field (Smith 2003:32). The considerable emphasis upon the non-political status of the Agency aims not only to counter claims of Ulster-Scots being merely a platform for a cultural war with Irishness, but also to afford it legitimacy in the drive to achieve an educational monopoly (Hacker-Cordon and Miley 2007). In the following chapter, I discuss the specific peoplehood stories sanctioned by the Agency in the form of the educational materials made available to schools.
Chapter Six
Peoplehood

This chapter introduces the Ulster-Scots story of peoplehood in broad brushstrokes. Discussing the findings from the documentary analysis of educational materials, I outline the conceptualisation of the Ulster-Scots as an ethno-linguistic “people,” including its boundaries of inclusion and exclusion and notional ethnogenesis and ethnic history. In the first section, I analyse the categories of inclusion and exclusion, the ethnic, civic and religious dimensions of identification, and the conceptions of distinctiveness as depicted in these materials. In the second section I hone in on the myths of origin and historical narratives told, and how these are constituted. I contend that the Ulster-Scots story of peoplehood counter-poses the traditional depiction of Ulster Protestants as settler-colonial bastions of British rule in Ireland with one in which the Ulster-Scots are always outside of the field of colonial power, take action to oppose tyranny, and imagined as a working-class people historically proactive under domination.

Through this chapter, I discuss the story of peoplehood within Ulster-Scots education as I interpret it to be told in the educational materials and interviews. Utilising Smith’s theoretical approach, as elaborated in chapter two, I analyse aspects of the Ulster-Scots peoplehood narrative: its purported position in the world, aspirations, and constituency demarcation.

6.1 Boundaries of Inclusion: Who are the Ulster-Scots?

6.1.1 Inclusion/Exclusion

Throughout the educational texts, as well as through the interviews and survey research, a range of opinion was found in relation to its boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, from more open conceptions based on self-definition to more restrictive ones limiting inclusion to birth-place, genealogy, or familial migratory path. The breadth of opinion amongst Ulster-Scots promoters was neatly described by Jane Wallace, education officer for the Ulster-Scots Agency: “Through all your research I’d be surprised if any two people say the same thing.” Wallace provided the broadest conception of inclusion found through the research:

I think it’s a very personal definition. For me being Ulster-Scot is – well, it’s somebody who feels that they belong. It’s not up to me to say, “oh, you’ve got an Ulster-Scots surname,” … if you feel that you belong to it, you know, and then you’re active in it somehow, then – I have quite a broad definition of Ulster-Scots … some people believe
you will have to have come from Ulster, at a certain period – but Northern Ireland is such a small country that if you were to do, you know, go back in anybody’s family tree in Northern Ireland – if they don’t have an Ulster-Scot person in their family tree – an actual planter, somebody who came over during the plantation, which is easy enough for me to say, you know, yes my family came over with the plantation … for somebody who doesn’t know [their family history] for us to say “oh, well then you mustn’t be”! Because, really, in Northern Ireland if you don’t have Ulster-Scot in your blood, chances are you’d be so in-bred, you know, there’s bound to be – there’s just mixture in everybody. … there would be Irish Celt blood in me.

Although she initially contended for a completely open identity including all who “feel that [they] belong”, she adds several interesting caveats: some form of participation (“active in it somehow”) and genealogy without the requirement of evidence. On the latter, she did not reject the ethnic requirement; rather, she contends that within Northern Ireland having “Ulster-Scot in your blood” is almost ubiquitous. This illuminates the most commonly held belief in defining Ulster-Scots: the necessity of Scottish lineage.

Within the educational materials, the most common explanation denoting what constituted an Ulster-Scot: the narrative of Scottish settlers.

For centuries, people from Scotland have come to Ulster and made it their home. We say they have settled in Ulster. These people call themselves Ulster-Scots (Ulster-Scots Agency 2006a:3).

Most of these people were Ulster-Scots, that is people whose ancestors had moved to Ireland from Scotland during the years of the Plantation (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012n:2).

When the largest group of Scots came to Ulster in the 17th century, that was not the end of the story. Their story had begun back in the mists of time when the very first Scot had climbed into his boat and sailed across to Ulster. It continues to this day when Scots come over to live in Ulster (and people from Ulster move across to Scotland too) (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012aa:18).

This represents a sanitisation of the settler-colonial narrative. One means of circumnavigating the colonial aspect of seventeenth century Scottish settlement has been to locate this movement in the context of millennia of movement, including recent migrations. In this regard, Ulster-Scots identity is acquired performatively through movement on this particular migratory path, either personally or in the individual’s familial history. Once performed, there appears to be an Ulster-Scots “one-drop rule” of sorts, by which all descendants of that migrant can (potentially) be included within Ulster-Scots.

At least in relation to migration to the United States, this migratory-path allocation of identity is perceived to persist irrespective of length of time spent in Ulster:
A large number of Scots had arrived in Ulster in the 1690's and had taken up either 21 year or 31 year leases. ... When these original leases expired ... more than 5000 Ulstermen left for America. ... In the period 1714-1720 alone, some 55 ships full of immigrants sailed from Ireland to ports in New England and between 1717 and 1776, over 200,000 Ulster-Scots made the journey (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012:o:my emphasis).

Even with only small periods of the individual’s life spent in Ulster, performance of the Ulster-Scots migration path renders them eligible. They may have been born and brought up in Scotland, and have lived only several years in Ulster before subsequently re-migrating: yet it is the Ulster-Scots identity which is considered to be retained. Furthermore, it is this identity which is passed down genealogically, acquired by “Scots-Irish-Americans”. This logic is frequently employed in the (mostly retrospective) designation of Ulster-Scots identity to historical Ulster-Scots, including the ‘17 [U.S.] presidents with Ulster-Scots ancestors’ (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012r, 2012x:3, 2012y).

A fundamental ambiguity of these discussions revolves around the question of whether or not the Ulster-Scot ought to be originally “ethnically” Scottish. An exercise within one of the educational texts explicitly portrays Ulster-Scots as non-racial/non-ethnic; only familial engagement in the Scotland-to-Ulster migratory movement (see figure 6.1). Under the title ‘Meet some Ulster-Scots,’ this exercise contends that Ulster-Scots is merely an expression of having “links” to Scotland. The portraits of the children below this statement are clearly racialised. The inclusion of Tyler’s story appears to be an overt challenge to the assumption – found implicitly woven through the rest of the educational materials as well as the interview data – of Ulster-Scots as a “white” identity. The reader’s gaze is meant to be drawn toward a racial hermeneutic – to read the faces, bodies, pigmentation, features, and the stories inscribed and prescribed to them – and to conclude with counter-narrativistic “surprise” at Tyler’s inclusion. The moral of this finale is that Ulster-Scots is to be considered fluid, modern, inclusive, multicultural, post-national; far from the “white,” settler-colonial, loyalty which it’s critics have so mistakenly aligned it with. Raciologically speaking, this self-consciously civic delineation suggests that Ulster-Scots identity is produced through migratory path alone, rather than genetic, genealogical or racial descent: an ius soli franchise of sorts.

Much more common, however, are assertions of Ulster-Scots as ethnic Scots. This is perhaps clearest in the ideas of Ulster-Scots characteristics, which I return to in more detail in the following section. These ideas go beyond mere cultural attributes; these are described as natural dispositions and ethnic temperaments.
When we consider the characteristics of Scots, words spring to mind like hardy, canny, thrifty, opportunist; yet it would be unfair to dismiss the importance of entrepreneurial skills and social concern that the Ulster-Scot has contributed to the shaping of modern Ulster (Ulster-Scots Agency 2006d:8).

In these depictions, the Ulster-Scot is no longer an open, civic identity acquired by migratory-path alone. Rather, the Ulster-Scots are clearly understood to be ethnic Scots, perceived as displaying supposedly innately Scottish idiosyncrasies.

**Figure 6.1: Meet Some Ulster-Scots**

This more ethnic conceptualisation is similarly observable in the use of surnames as a tool of identity diagnosis. Names are utilised for this purpose throughout the teaching materials (CCEA 2016a, 2016b, Ulster-Scots Agency 2006c:4, 2012p:8,19, 2012aa:8). The *Meet the Ulster-Scots* booklet explains:
Sometimes this group of people [the Ulster-Scots] is [sic] easily recognised by their surnames—names such as McGregor or Stewart - but sometimes, because of marriage, their name might not reflect where their family originally came from (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012aa:2 my emphasis).

Hence, it is assumed that the original migrant to Ulster is to be in possession of a Scottish surname and, as such, identification as an Ulster-Scot in Northern Ireland is to be understood as usually identifiable via the surname. An individual without an Ulster-Scots surname may still be an Ulster-Scot if the “original” Scottish name of the migrant has been lost through marriage, yet it is Ulster-Scots which is considered the “true” identity to be retained. This individual is an Ulster-Scot with the “wrong” name. Names have historically been, and continue to be, of crucial importance in Northern Ireland. They play a key role in the process of ‘telling’: the means of both displaying and working out the other’s identity as Protestant/Catholic, unionist/nationalist (Burton 1978, 1979). This has been a cause of considerable anxiety in Northern Ireland, especially among those whose name is perceived to be at odds with their “true” identity70. The above quotation addresses this concern, arguing that the true Ulster-Scots identity of the individual may be masked, yet redeemable through genealogy.

An exercise to be completed in the booklet, Ulster-Scots Surnames, further illustrates the use of names in designating identity. In this exercise, the pupils are required to identify a list of ten names as either “Ulster-Scots” or “Other” (Ulster-Scots Agency 2006c). Among those rejected as non-Ulster-Scots are names commonly considered to be Italian, Polish, Chinese, English and Irish; the surnames to be accepted are those perceived to be of Scottish origin (such as McGregor and McCartney). Not only do the writers assume the validity and legitimacy of ethnic decoding in this way, but, furthermore, they ascribe to the conceptualisation of the Ulster-Scots being an identity of the Atlantic Archipelago71 which is genealogically and ethnically distinct from both Irish and English. This echoes the unionist rejection of an imperialist connection to England for an organic one with Scotland: ‘This is not just the sentimental ties of crown and flag; for many Unionists, their “British heritage” means a significant Scottish link, both historical and contemporary’ (Walker 1995:37). Similarly, this reasserts the unionist rejection of identification with Irishness, rather considering themselves a

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70 Many have changed their names in order to correct for this; for example, the Sinn Féin MEP and Lord Mayor of Belfast, Máirtín Ó Muilleoir, officially changed his original name into the Irish language from the stereotypically “protestant” name, Martin Miller (Rutherford 2013).

71 Following Pocock (2005:77), I use “Atlantic Archipelago” throughout this thesis in order to ‘attempt to get away from inappropriate pan-national language,’ as well as to create distance from the language of unionism, nationalism and consociational peacekeeping.
distinct entity within the island of Ireland (Dowling 2007). Importantly, it reiterates the proposition that Ulster-Scots is an ethnic identity, involving conceptions of genealogical descent and “original” homelands.

The depiction of the Ulster-Scots in the educational materials occasionally engenders an implicit racial dimension. Discussing the topic of Ulster-Scots migration to the US, one booklet discusses the story of the Belfast-born ‘Ulster-Scot’ Mary Jemison, who was captured by, and subsequently adopted into, a native Indian ‘tribe’ (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012p:22–24).

It concludes:

Mary Jemison is the most famous of all female captives taken by the Indians. She acted as an intermediary between the Seneca tribe and the whites and refused to return to the white community when given the opportunity to do so. She was greatly respected by the Seneca and today you can still find native Americans with the surname Jemison, Jimerson or Jamieson especially in the Seneca but also in other tribes of the Iroquois nation (2012p:24).

Whereas other (white) descendants of Ulster-Scots immigrants in the States, including the seventeen allegedly Ulster-Scots Presidents, are permitted/allocated full Ulster-Scots identity, the Senecan descendants of Mary Jamison remain ‘native Americans’. This is, furthermore, a radical departure from the apparent “one-drop rule” found elsewhere, in which the existence of the migratory path from Scotland to Ulster at any point in the genealogy of the individual renders them an Ulster-Scot. Here, the racial feature of whiteness becomes a qualifying feature for inclusion into Ulster-Scots identity; this directly contradicts the self-consciously non-racial delineation discussed above. What’s more, this discourse also intersects with the staunchly heteromasculine gender ideology inherent within Ulster-Scots.

Traditional gendered discourses often depict women as the bearers of the people, both physically and culturally transmitting the identity to the next generation (Yuval-Davis 1997). The perceived fit of an ethnically or racially “other” partner can result in the children’s identity in being either accepted or called into question. In the case of Ulster-Scots, surname politics has placed greater emphasis upon male-line ethno-reproduction; however, both male and female descendants are frequently appropriated as authentically ethnic Ulster-Scots despite intermarriages with various (white) “others.” This surprisingly sudden loss of Ulster-Scots ethnicity, despite insistences of its persistence in much less tangential cases, illustrates the constellations of outcome resulting from intersections of race, ethnicity and gender in Ulster-Scots discourses of identity.

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72 For a more in-depth discussion of this dimension of Ulster-Scots, see chapter nine, section 9.4.
That Ulster-Scots identity, in the educational materials, contain both civic and ethnic features is to be expected. Such fusions are not unusual within ethno-nationalist movements, and attempting to denote particular groups on one side or other of a civic/ethnic binary tends to be both inaccurate and misleading (Miley 2007; Yack 1996). However, there does appear to be considerable ambiguity in relation to what constitutes an Ulster-Scot. It would appear that the considerable space allocated to discussing this question, and the varied approaches taken, are perhaps indicative of a certain unsureness among the writers themselves as to what constitutes an Ulster-Scot.

6.1.2 Characteristics

The educational texts propose an array of features purported to be characteristics of the Ulster-Scots (see table 6.1). Specifically, these include: hardiness, obduracy and a studious work-ethic; commitment to liberty, freedom, democracy, education; and Protestant/Presbyterian religiosity. In a similar vein to ideas discussed in the previous section, the Ulster-Scots are described as distinct from the English and Irish, and intimately connected to, yet distinguishable from, the Scottish. Although an array of cultural features are discussed in the educational texts, including music, dance, and cuisine, to discuss these in detail would be beyond the scope of this chapter. In this subsection, I hone in on the individual characteristics understood to be engendered by the Ulster-Scot, as depicted within the educational materials.

One booklet calls on a quote by the US theologian J.H. Snowden to describe the alleged Ulster-Scots character:

The original Scotch Irishman may be described as a Scotchman who was rubbed through the sieve of Ireland. And therefore he combines in a degree the excellences of both races. He had the Scotch tenacity and obduracy tempered with Irish plasticity, buoyancy and brightness. He is a boulder of Scotch granite, overlaid and softened with the green verdure of Ireland. There is a granite in his bones, but his mind is witty and his heart tender (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012r:5).

Here the Ulster-Scot is conceptualised as embodying a fusion of Scotch and Irish characteristics. Outside of this quote, however, this “racial fusion” theme is not pursued; rather, separateness from Ireland and Irishness through a distinct “Ulster” identity is followed more rigorously.
Although tender-heartedness and wit feature occasionally, the more “Scottish” characteristics of obduracy and stubbornness are pursued more commonly, alongside an Ulster-Scots work ethic:

The Scots-Irish were regarded as hardworking but also hard to get along with. They were also seen as very set in their ways and one story or myth from 18th century [American] frontier life says that their prayer was:

“Lord, grant that I may always be right, for Thou knowest I am hard to turn.” (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012p:10).

Referencing this early American Ulster-Scots prayer situates these supposedly innate features within the context of religiosity and piety. These ideas incorporate both national stereotypical characteristics of the Scottish (thrifty, stubborn, hard-working, confrontational, and religiously pious) and the conceptualisation of the (Protestant) Ulsterman as naturally more industrious, focused and productive than the supposedly more jovial, haphazard, lackadaisical Irish. The latter has been frequently cited, historically, as the rationale behind Ulster’s economic and industrial successes through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, ahead of those of the South (Rowthorn 1981). The educational texts teach a form of colonial revisionism, celebrating the allegedly positive impacts of the Ulster-Scots upon the landscape of Ulster post-Plantation: the construction of unornamented yet hardy and well-constructed buildings, the organisation of successful industries such as the production of linen, ship-building and engineering (the backbone of Ulster’s nineteenth-century industrialisation and economic advances over the south), and structured, coordinated town-planning (Ulster-Scots Agency 2006d:10–14). Their supposed hardiness and obduracy is also provided as a rationale for their flourishing in the United States, as effective ‘frontiersmen’ (Ulster-Scots Agency 2006d:8). The writer suggests that these impacts mirror the particularities of the Ulster-Scots “character.” To some extent, this narrative is reminiscent of neoconservative revisionists who have attempted to recast British imperialism as a positive, modernising force (see, for example, Ferguson 2003).

Linguistically, Ulster-Scots has a word for being characteristically obdurate, stubborn, awkward and intractable: “thran.” This was commonly used to describe Ulster-Scots innate features, as Unionist MLA Basil McCrea exemplified:

I … see in me traits that I would consider to be Ulster Scots. ... I do not mind being the only one that thinks this - the rest of you are just wrong, you know, whereas other people around would go, “oh, well, actually, we'd better compromise.” And I take it as an Ulster Scots trait that we are absolutely happy to believe in ourselves and … we think that's good that they should agree with us, but if they don't it doesn't matter. …
There is a thraness … where we refuse to accept even whenever anybody with any sense would give in. … There’s nothing we do better than adversity.

This notion of a thran temperament was similarly present within the education materials.

The Ulster-Scots are presented as being particularly committed to certain intellectual and ideological concepts, namely liberty, rights, freedoms, democracy and education. Essentially these stem from the placing of the Ulster-Scots within the Scottish Enlightenment (Ulster-Scots Agency 2006d:9, 2012b, 2012e):

The radical ideas of the Enlightenment were embraced by many intellectual Ulster-Scots in the eighteenth century, including Presbyterian clergy. Notions of freedom and liberty expressed themselves as anti-British in the American and French Revolutions. These same ideas became important principles adopted by radical Presbyterian leaders in the 1798 Rebellion. What was perceived as unjust treatment by a suppressive Anglicised regime, caused many Ulster-Scot Presbyterians to be uncompromising and eventually, confrontational. This highlights an Ulster-Scots trait – a people prepared to agitate when faced with discrimination and unfairness.

As discussed below, this intellectual commitment is employed to explain particular points in history in which they took action against the central British state, such as in the Irish Rebellion of 1798 and the American Revolution. In line with the Ulster-Scots Enlightenment ideology, they are constructed as naturally more inclined towards rationalism and liberty (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012e, 2012r), to education and the establishing of schools (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012p:10), and committed to democracy (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012b:8, 2012e:3, 2012f:7, 2012h:5, 2012i:30).

Religiosity was a continuously recurring theme throughout the educational materials. Readings and quotes from the Bible were common (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012a:26,27, 2012c:3, 2012m:4,12), and Ulster-Scots are generally represented as bearers of Protestant religiosity (Ulster-Scots Agency 2006d:8, 2012a:37, 2012e:4, 2012l, 2012q:10,32, 2012aa:13). One booklet entitled *Tae Meetin-Hoose* (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012l) provides information on the history, institutions, church structure, and theology of Presbyterianism in some considerable detail, indicating its conceptualisation as a primary feature of Ulster-Scots by the curriculum designers. At times Protestantism/Presbyterianism are described as a defining characteristic of the Ulster-Scots, and the two are occasionally used interchangeably. The teacher booklet, *What Makes an Ulster-Scot*, includes ‘religion’ as one of the key cultural influences for Ulster-Scots, stating that when Presbyterianism was ‘brought to Ulster in 1642’ it ‘unified Ulster-Scots giving them a social identity as well as a religion’ (Ulster-Scots Agency
2006d:8). I discuss this relationship between Ulster-Scots and Protestantism in more detail in chapter eight.

Table 6.1: Overview of Alleged Ulster-Scots Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Alleged Ulster-Scots Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic basis of inclusion</td>
<td>From feeling of belonging and cultural performance to surname politics, genealogy, family migration path, and ethnic Scottishness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>From unproblematically Protestant to problematically Protestant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racialisation</td>
<td>From assumed white to counter-narrativistic “surprise” non-white inclusions</td>
</tr>
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<td>Gender and Sexuality</td>
<td>Consistent, assumed, heteromasculinity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Class base</td>
<td>Benevolent working-class</td>
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<tr>
<td>Characteristics</td>
<td>Hardiness, obduracy/“thranness”, work-ethic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Economic Ideology</td>
<td>Free market, laissez-faire policy, Homo Liberalismus(^*) (see chapter 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Characteristics</td>
<td>Innate/cultural preference for the ideas of the Scottish Enlightenment; namely, rationalism, liberty, basic rights, and democracy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, the educational materials present a strong idea of a discrete, identifiable Ulster-Scots character. Mostly, these emulate stereotypically Scottish characteristics, including obduracy, hardiness, diligence, and Protestant/Presbyterian religiosity, as well as a commitment to the ideals of the Scottish Enlightenment. The writers discuss linkages to Scotland and Scottishness and interactions with Ireland and Irishness, yet negotiate a culturally and ethnically differentiated Ulster-Scots identity. Mirroring the concerns of Gregory Campbell in his interview for this research, the writers permit a limited ‘area of cross-over’ with Irishness, yet take pains to ensure that it is not ‘subsumed into a relatively insignificant element’ of it. This sensibility is similarly observable in the negotiation of historical narratives traditionally within the Irish canon: the rebellion of the United Irishmen and the US diaspora. It is to this Ulster-Scots story of peoplehood as depicted within the texts that I now turn.

6.2 History

In this section, I outline the Ulster-Scots story of peoplehood within the educational material through an analysis of the historical information provided. The three most prominent historical foci in the educational texts include the myths of origin and development of an Ulster-Scots people, the United Irishmen rebellion at the end of the eighteenth century, and the Ulster-Scots diaspora in US history. The historical education of the materials is notable for only mentioning in passing key events in unionist and loyalist history, such as the siege of Derry and the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the battle of the Boyne (1690), and the Anglo-Irish Acts of Union (1801). To include these within Ulster-Scots history would perhaps be too blatant a reference to Ulster loyalism, an association which promoters of Ulster-Scots education were keen to shirk. Rather, the history of the Ulster-Scots included focuses heavily on revolts against the central British state through the Irish Rebellion of 1798 and the American Revolution, both of which tend to be prominent within Irish national(ist) historical canon (Kee 2000; Lentin 2001; McGarry and O’Leary 1995). Through these historical narratives, the idea of a discrete Ulster-Scots peoplehood within the island of Ireland is pursued and outlined.

6.2.1 Myths of Origin

Ulster-Scots stories of peoplehood tend to emphasise the antiquity of the interrelation between the north of Ireland and Scotland. The most common narrative of Scottish settlers to Ulster is that of the Plantation of the seventeenth century. In 1603, the Union of the Crowns rendered James VI of Scotland also James I of England and Ireland. With risings common in Ulster through the sixteenth century, bringing the “unruly province” under the control of the throne became an early aim of his rule (Canny 2001; English 2006). The Plantation involved the permanent relocation of individuals and families into Ulster, predominantly of Scottish origin but including some from Wales and England, and a vast reallocation of land and power into the hands of the settlers. It was an explicitly civilising mission, the ‘testing ground for Anglo-Norman colonisation techniques’ which would later be employed in British colonialism (Home 2013:19; McVeigh and Rolston 2009). Within Irish nationalist historiography, the Plantation is often a central explanatory event in the narrative of Ireland’s colonisation and domination by the British, as well as the origins of Protestant-Unionist hegemony in Ulster.

74 Although other historical periods and events are mentioned, these three are the only ones to be addressed in detail. The educational materials include two larger series of booklets on history: one, entitled American Connection, covers the involvement of the Ulster-Scots in the broad sweep of US history; the other, The Liberty Tree, covers the 1798 Irish Rebellion.
The illegitimacy of Unionist rule, of the partition of Ireland, and even of the continued residence of these “settlers” by some more ardent ethnic nationalists, have been contended by situating them within a settler colonialist narrative, oppressing the “native”, Celtic Irish.

Contiguity between Scotland and Ulster is a cornerstone of the Ulster-Scots myth of origin as depicted within the texts. The writers stress not only the proximity and ease of communication and travel between the two places, but also the idea of the land between Ulster and the south as the real barrier:

Strong links have existed between Scotland and Ulster since prehistoric times due to the narrowness of the North Channel, which has acted not so much as a barrier, more as a corridor of communication (Ulster-Scots Agency 2006a:41, also found in 2012i:30).

And again:

Ulster in the past considered itself closer to Scotland than Dublin. [A] relief map shows us that the Province is fairly isolated from the rest of Ireland by mountains, lakes and bog-land: the absence of efficient internal route ways meant it was easier and safer to travel by sea than land.

In modern times, with sophisticated transport and communication infrastructures, we often fail to appreciate past difficulties associated with making a journey. We tend to travel more by land than sea, and in a sense, our ‘mental’ map has changed! Even today, it takes less time to sail across to Scotland than it does to travel to Dublin (Ulster-Scots Agency 2006d:2)

Ulster is conceptualised as culturally, linguistically, economically, politically and socially intermeshed with Scotland historically, while ties with the rest of the island of Ireland are understood to be essentially modern through being historically more tenuous. As such, Ulster (and Ulstermen) are to be considered organically interconnected with Scotland (and so “mainland” Britain), while ideas of Irish unity are understood as comparatively modern and artificial. In terms of the myth of origin, this narrative reconstructs the Ulster-Scots as autochthonous (or, at least, semi-autochthonous) inhabitants of Ulster, rather than mere settler colonists. Further, this narrative fits neatly with unionist dialogues which have, at least since the late seventies, claimed Ulster as culturally, ethnically and geographically distinct from the rest of Ireland (Aughey 1995; Heslinga 1979; McGarry and O’Leary 1995). Although the Ulster Plantation of the early seventeenth century is at times downplayed in the educational materials by placing it within the context of millennia of population movement between Ulster and Scotland (see, for example, CCEA 2016b; 2012a:41, 2012aa:13), it is as frequently referenced as the most significant movement of Scots to Ulster (see 2012e:4, 2012n:2).
Outside of Ulster-Scots education, the most prominent theory of Ulster-Scots ethnogenesis has been promulgated by the loyalist historian, Ian Adamson (1974, 1987, 1991), who posited that the modern Ulster-Scots descended from an ancient people-group called the “Cruithin” (Davis 1986; McCall 2002; Mac Póilín 1999). Through their interviews with self-designated Ulster-Scots, Stapleton and Wilson (2004) found the Cruithinic narrative to have ‘gained currency’ (2004:576). Adamson (1974:12) claimed to have traced the ‘Belgic races’ – pre-Celtic inhabitants of the ‘British Isles’ – from the earliest maps and recordings of the islands through to the present day. In doing so, he alleged that the Ulster-Scots were the original inhabitants of Ireland, pushed north or forced out by invading Celts, and so makes a more ancient, primordial claim to the land than that of Irish nationalism, redubbing the Plantation as ‘the Second Return of the Cruithin, the Great Return’ (Adamson 1974:65; Davis 1986; Níc Craith 2001). Although the Cruithinic narrative of ethnogenesis was absent from the peoplehood narrative within the data collected during this research, the educational materials did reference the related notion of the thalassocratic state of Dál Riata75. The actual historical and archaeological evidence of such a thalassocracy is sparse and debateable (Campbell 2001), however it is alleged that this thalassocratic state spanned the north coast of Ireland and the west of Scotland between 500 and 1000AD was an ethnically Ulster-Scottish kingdom (Adamson 1974; Cooper 2010b; Heslinga 1979). This is hinted at in the more nuanced description provided as an aid for primary school teachers:

The rapid economic and social transformation of Ulster caused by the Plantation must have created great linguistic diversity. There is no doubt that they brought with them cultural traditions and languages, Scots and Gaelic. From the time of Dalriada, there existed a common culture in Ulster and Scotland. … From as early as the 1650s, Presbyterians evangelised, preaching in Irish in Gaelic areas. … Presbyterian radicals in the spirit of the Enlightenment, especially the ‘intelligentsia’ were keen to promote all things Irish, especially in music and literature.

In contrast, the Orange Movement, … became by the end of the nineteenth century an organisation that unified Ulster-Scots on grounds of religion and politics in the same way that Presbyterianism had done in 1642. It differed though in that its membership drew from all sectors of Protestantism, conformist and non-conformist, Anglo-Irish and Ulster-Scot. It was used as an instrument to preserve the Act of Union and to oppose the Home Rule Movement (Ulster-Scots Agency 2006d:9).

The narrative of cultural development of the Ulster-Scots is told from this point, contrasting their initial interest in, and use of, Irishness and the Irish language, and mutual linguistic compatibility of those Scottish migrants who spoke Scots-Gaelic (a notion seldom referred to

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75 Also spelt Dalriata or Dalriada.
in the materials), to the unifying identity under the Orange Order. The writer(s) appear to suggest that widespread Ulster-Scots membership of the Orange Order which produced a turn away from similarity with Irishness. As such, it presents a movement from cultural multiplicity and interaction toward homogeneity and opposition. As with much of the Ulster-Scots promotion, the writers are very careful to promote Ulster-Scots as a non-sectarian and not anti-Irish idea (see Gardner 2015). However, the writer(s) above map the development of the Ulster-Scots away from cultural mixing toward unity under the banner of loyalism. It is also noteworthy that a prominent use of the Irish language by the Ulster-Scots stated here is for the purpose of Protestant proselytisation, reiterating the Protestantism of Ulster-Scots.

The educational materials negotiate a history of the Ulster-Scots in which they are alleged to be principle organisers and combatants in a struggle Irish independence from Britain as part of the United Irishmen rebellion of 1798 (see below), yet subsequently, through involvement with the Orange Order, striving to defend the Act of Union against Home Rule. In many ways, the Ulster-Scots identity is taught as a subsidiary of “the Protestant community.” However, their primary commitment to an imagined community of Ulstermen and conditional loyalty to the British state, rather than principally wedded to an imagined community of Greater Britain, aligns Ulster-Scots, in this sense, closer to loyalist than unionist positionality (Todd 1987).

In referring to the Ulster-Scots homeland, the writers mostly refer to “Ulster”: the term “Northern Ireland” is almost never used. One pupil booklet (2006a:11.6) in Ulster-Scots fur Weans clarifies that “Ulster” is a nine-county entity with only six of these constituting Northern Ireland; however, in other instances the writer(s) use Northern Ireland and Ulster interchangeably. In terms of identity, individuals are described as “Ulstermen” rather than Irish, Northern Irish or British, even when discussing history prior to the Irish partition. This emphasis reflects the notion of geographical and demographical differentiation with Ireland and Irishness pursued by the writers in their descriptions of the Ulster-Scots myth of origin.

6.2.2 The United Irishmen

The Irish rebellion at the end of the eighteenth century, led by the Society of United Irishmen, has been of considerable importance to Irish nationalists. It represents both the creation of the first Irish republicans, who swore an oath to the formation of an independent Irish republic and a moment in which northern Protestants supported –even initiated – that movement. The “Cave Hill Oath,” a declaration of intent for an Irish ‘republican government and separation from England,’ was taken in 1795 by Protestant leaders of the United Irishmen
in Belfast (Kee 2000:67). Within Irish nationalist narratives, this Rebellion has been employed to illustrate a point at which northern Protestants fought for a United Ireland, maintaining that such a conversion remains potentially actualisable (McGarry and O’Leary 1995).

For the writers of Ulster-Scots education, the Rebellion is depicted essentially as a struggle for fairness, equal rights, and democracy; a product of the Ulster-Scots character as ethically-motivated, impervious and obstinate. They stress the religious supremacy of Anglicanism in Ireland, producing the oppression of Catholics and dissenters\(^\text{76}\) alike under the harsh and discriminatory Penal Laws and an undemocratic, unrepresentative, Anglican-dominated Parliament in Dublin (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012b). It was under this banner that these Ulster-Scots had mobilised:

James Orr lived in Ulster where a large number of the population spoke, and still speak, a form of the Scots language called Ulster-Scots. Orr felt his community was being treated unfairly by the government and he joined a group of men who were prepared to fight to make life more fair for everybody in Ireland (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012i:3)\(^\text{77}\).

This was an attempt to establish a more democratic and just Ireland where Catholics and Presbyterians … would not be subject to discriminatory legal and taxation systems (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012i:30).

In 1791 a Society of United Irishmen was founded in Belfast. Here most of the members were Presbyterians from the middle-classes, but membership also included some Catholics. In their desire to achieve a more democratic society and to remove laws which disadvantaged Presbyterians and Roman Catholics they were influenced by the ideas of the Enlightenment then current in Scotland, from where their ancestors had migrated to Ulster (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012f:2).

Ulster-Scots involvement in the Rebellion is explained through their alleged innate and cultural characteristics and dispositions: ‘a people prepared to agitate when faced with discrimination and unfairness’ (Ulster-Scots Agency 2006d:9). Intellectually, their inspiration is explained through their proximity to the French Revolution, their intimate connections to the American Revolution (see below), and the influence of the philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment.

Certain ideas of the classic nationalist narrative do appear within the narrative provided, however these are given a revisionist slant. Although extensive discrimination against Catholics is emphasised and discussed in some detail, the underrepresentation of the co-victimhood of the Ulster-Scots dissenters is accentuated alongside these considerations (see 2012b, 2012e). The Cave Hill Oath and the idea of Irish Independence are mentioned on several

\(^{76}\) Non-Anglicans, mostly Presbyterians.

\(^{77}\) James Orr was a Protestant United Irishman and a poet from Ballycarry, now within Northern Ireland. He is considered to be a Rhyming Weaver poet, considered to be part of the Ulster-Scots literary tradition.
occasions (see 2012b:25, 2012e:6, 2012f:2,6,11); however, this idea remains underdeveloped, nor is the subject of subsequent aspirations for Irish unification broached. Rather, its moral corresponds to the need for equity, fairness, and democratic principles. When referencing ideas of Irish independence, the writers invariably refer to independence from England rather than Britain, despite these events occurring after both the Union of the Crowns (1603) and the Acts of Union between Scotland and England (1707). Hence, this represents a negotiation of the historical narrative such that neither the idea of Britishness nor the history of Ulster-Scotland interconnectivity are subverted or called into question.

The writers emphasise that not all Ulster-Scots supported the movement and that some who supported it refused to take part in the Rebellion. Under the title ‘Presbyterians,’ the students are asked to analyse a Biblical verse from First Book of Samuel, which reads, ‘For rebellion is as the sin of witchcraft, and stubbornness is as iniquity and idolatry’78. The students are asked: ‘Does this explain why many Ulster-Scots Presbyterians and their ministers believed it was wrong to support the United Irishmen, even if Presbyterians were being unfairly treated?’ (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012c:3). The answer is provided in the accompanying teacher booklet:

This verse would have deterred many devout Presbyterians from supporting rebellion. They may have felt that even if the government was treating them unfairly, God would disapprove of any attack on the civil and military authorities. Many believed only He had the right to overturn such authorities and would point to passages in the New Testament, such as Paul telling first century Christians to obey the government, as further proof (2012g:6).

Thus, these Presbyterians are depicted as being in possession of a heightened religiosity, as well as a belief in the authority of the bible which others (including Catholics) are assumed not to share. The counter-argument provided is to reference ideas of an Ulster-Scots disposition for justice, equality and democracy. However, it is also argued that ‘radical politics in North Down grew out of the area’s Presbyterian culture’ (2012g:2). Thus, there is a degree of ambiguity in relation to the impact of Presbyterianism on Ulster-Scots during the Rebellion.

Intriguingly, the texts are starkly negative in relation to several key events generally considered to be victories for unionists and loyalists. The students are encouraged to empathise with Ulster-Scots who supported the Rebellion through and after its defeat, referring to the 1801 Acts of Union under the title, ‘Further Blows for the United Irishmen’ (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012d:3). Furthermore, the Battle of the Boyne – the famed victory of the Protestant King William of Orange over Catholic James II religiously celebrated annually by loyalists at

78 King James Version bible translation.
the Twelfth of July parades (which are elsewhere referred to in the texts as a key aspect of Ulster-Scots cultural and musical heritage (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012j:2)) – is spoken of in a distinctly negative tone:

Passed in 1697, following the defeat of James II at the Battle of the Boyne, the Penal Laws excluded the Roman Catholic population from Parliament, the Civil Service, local government, the Law. They also prohibited education in Catholic schools and, significantly, greatly restricted Catholics in buying, leasing or inheriting land. … By 1775, only about 5% of land was in the hands of the majority population. Some laws seem petty, deliberately designed to humiliate. For example, Catholics were forbidden to own a horse worth more than £5.00 (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012e:2).

As stated above, the texts note that the Penal Laws placed limitations on both Catholics and dissenters alike, thus producing the conditions for the Rebellion (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012b). James II’s defeat at the Boyne is radically reinterpreted as a moment of crisis for Ulster-Scots, instigating a hundred years of oppression against them. Although not explicitly named, it is William of Orange – the darling of Ulster loyalism – who enacts this discriminatory legislation against the Ulster-Scots.

The 1798 Rebellion, as presented in the educational materials, is a radical departure from both the triumphalism of traditional loyalist histories and the extended narrative of freedom struggle of Irish nationalist historiography. Through their engagement with the rebellion as part of their history they construct a narrative in which they are part of Ireland, and yet a separate and discrete group. Doing so complicates the plausibility of depictions of Ulster-Scots education as retrograde, sectarian, or unproblematically loyalist in outlook. Conversely, the neo-nationalist perception of northern Protestants as potentially assimilable into the Republican cause is subverted by their insistence upon the importance of historical context (McGarry and O’Leary 1995). Far from being wedded to United Ireland independence from Britain, Ulster-Scots involvement is interpreted as a product of their own ethnic experience of discrimination, as well as allegedly innate preferences for equality and democratic values. Hence, rather than utilising protestant participation in the rebellion to deconstruct local differences, it is employed in such a way that the Ulster-Scots dissenters are differentiated from Irish-Catholic and English-Anglican groups within Ireland.

This perception firmly establishes the Ulster-Scots as outside of the bounds of colonial power in Ireland, rather than its custodians. In a reversal of the conception of Scottish Planters as the ruling class in Ulster, Ulster-Scots are rendered co-victims with Irish Catholics in the discriminatory practices of an English ruling class. The educational texts also describe division amongst Ulster-Scots in relation to the rebellion, along theological lines of interpretation
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(Ulster-Scots Agency 2012g:4), but also on class, with wealthy, landed families opposing the United Irishmen ‘when the situation in the country began to look dangerous’ (2012g:2). Through this narrative, the gaze for the students becomes that of a disenfranchised and indignant ethnic group, a socioeconomic substratum with the Irish beneath the English ruling class.

6.2.3 Ulster-Scots Americanism and the New World

The notion of an Ulster-Scots-American diaspora has become a prominent theme amongst promoters of Ulster-Scots (Griffin 2012; McCarthy 2011; Radford 2001; Stapleton and Wilson 2004; Webb 2009; Wiman 1999). This emphasis was equally prominent within the educational materials. In terms of content, it is the most commonly referred to country in the educational texts after “Ulster”, Scotland and Ireland. Connections between the Ulster-Scots and the US dwarf those with England (which receives scant references in occasional booklets) and Wales (which is barely referenced at all). Rather than a European, global, Irish, or British focus, the educational materials pursue an Atlantic diaspora narrative. In the texts, the United States is by far the most common place outside of Ulster where Ulster-Scots are to be found, embodied by the hyphenated racial-national identity of Scots-Irish-Americans. Although references are scattered throughout the texts, the booklet series entitled American Connection explores it in greatest detail.

In these educational texts, the Ulster-Scots are presented as pivotal to a proper understanding of the historical development of the US. The early settlement on the western seaboard (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012m, 2012o, 2012q), the War of Independence (2012r), Western Expansion (2012t), the Battle of the Alamo (2012v), the actions of various presidents (2012x, 2012z), and various other aspects of US history are envisioned as part of Ulster-Scots ethnic history. The Ulster-Scots are repeatedly described as ideal pioneers for the New World due to their alleged hardiness, obduracy, and work ethic, as well as their history as Scottish Reivers79 and settlers in Ulster. Through their alleged entrenchment within the “New World” from its early settlement, the trajectory of US history is understood to be deeply imbued with

79 The primary school teachers’ aid booklet What Makes an Ulster-Scot? Explains: ‘Many of the lowland Scots [who moved to Ulster] were border people known as Reivers, raiders who for generations found it difficult to live peacefully, often carrying out cattle stealing, kidnapping and blackmail. They defied both the Scottish and English governments. Through out [sic] this period, they became highly skilled and adaptable individuals, hence the term ‘frontiersmen’ which was applied to their later experiences as pioneers in America’ (Ulster-Scots Agency 2006d:8).
Ulster-Scots cultural, social and political values. Having been supposedly better educated\textsuperscript{80} and more focused on intellectual pursuits than other settlers, they are understood to have been the catalyst for the creation of schools and universities, claiming Princeton as an Ulster-Scots institution (see Ulster-Scots Agency 2012p, 2012q).

Such notions were also backed by educationalists and supporting political elites interviewed for this research. Popular Ulster-Scots performer and educationalist Willie Drennan was the only interviewee to critique this perspective. His fatigue with the rhetoric was palpable:

You know, having people at concerts, like visitors and stuff, and they’re shaking their heads at some of the things being put out there – as if we invented the world! And certainly invented America, that’s for sure!

Ulster-Scots Americanism represents a form of ethnic exceptionalism. Within the educational materials, it corresponds not merely to a case study of ethnic history; the pupils are explicitly to learn more about their own characteristics through the actions of past Ulster-Scots.

The educational materials go as far as to endorse a sort of revisionism of the American Revolution in which the Ulster-Scots become the main protagonists and agitators, fuelled by a natural, identity-based mistrust of the British colonial state.

Some American historians regard the War of American Independence almost as a dispute between the Scots-Irish emigrants on the one side who had moved from Ulster to gain freedom from English dominance and the English Crown and parliament on the other side. This is especially true in the Appalachian region which takes in North and South Carolina. In 1776 when the war broke out, about 1/3 of the population of this area was Ulster-Scots (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012r:7).

The first voice publicly raised in America to dissolve all connection with Great Britain came not from the Puritans of New England or the Dutch of New York, or the planters of Virginia, but the Scotch-Irish Presbyterians (2012r:5)\textsuperscript{81}.

Their main contributions to the development of America were their fighting spirit which helped to open up the land; their main religion - Presbyterianism which led to church planting; and their democratic spirit which put them in the vanguard of the American War of Independence (2012q:5).

In this narrative, the Ulster-Scots provided the capabilities and intellectual basis for revolt, fought in pivotal battles (2012r:26), and were founding fathers, with at least 8 of the signatories’ of the Declaration of Independence (2012r:16, 2012s:8). Even the printer of the

\textsuperscript{80} ‘The Ulster-Scots settlers did tend to be better educated than emigrants from other countries’ (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012p:10).

\textsuperscript{81} A quotation from the nineteenth-century historian, George Bancroft.
first copy of the Declaration of Independence, and the reader of its first public reading, are claimed to be of Ulster-Scots descent (2012r:16). The American Revolution is thus interpreted as a movement initiated, led, fought, won and inspired by Ulster-Scots against the English imperial government. As with the United Irishmen rebellion, they are described as inhabiting a substratum beneath the weight of the English colonial ruling class, agitating out of moral indigence and intrinsic combativeness.

Ulster-Scots are similarly constructed as key players in the US territorial expansion westward. Two pupil workbooks are dedicated to this subject: one teaches of the Lewis and Clarke expedition to map the new land following the 1803 Louisiana purchase (2012t, 2012u); the other, the Battle of the Alamo, a decisive moment in the war of Texan independence which led to the US annexation of Texas in 1845 (2012v, 2012w). According to the educational texts, not only are the Ulster-Scots some of the first and most significant ethnic groups to move and settle in west; several specific influential characters, including William Clark of the Lewis and Clarke expedition (2012t:5), Davy Crockett (2012v:1) and General Sam Houston (2012w:9), are declared to be ‘great Scots-Irish Americans’ (2012z). In general, the westward expansion is portrayed unproblematically as a series of events to be celebrated, and its settlers and leaders brave and heroic. The educational materials thus include Ulster-Scots settler-colonialism in the United States as a valid and positive feature of their historical narrative of peoplehood.

Despite their apparently central role in the history of the US, general recognition of their role has not been forthcoming historically. A rationale for this is provided:

The Scots-Irish were in many cases the first non-native Americans. Once they moved inland from the already-settled coastal towns into the Appalachian foothills they set up their own townlands and homes and established the lifestyle for this new land. “As the first Americans they were totally assimilated into the fabric of the nation and their principles and virtues are deeply embedded into the constitution of the United States”. For this reason it is much harder to trace Americans from Ulster-Scots backgrounds than the later Irish emigrants or those from other ethnic groups. The Scots-Irish were the Americans by the time these later arrivals came to this new land (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012p:2).

Thus, it is their very ubiquity and entrenchment within the United States which is to be considered the reason for their being often overlooked. The writers contend that, as earlier, more established migrants, the Ulster-Scots narrative is less well-versed or easily recognisable than “later”, more familiar migrants, specifically naming the Irish. There is something of an echo of an indigeneity counter-claim here. Whereas in Ireland the Irish claim to be autochthonous to the island while the Ulster-Scots are the (colonial) settlers, the United States
is conceptualised as a land where the Ulster-Scots are the ‘first non-native Americans,’ and the Irish the (later) settlers. In this way, the “New World” provides a platform on which the Ulster-Scots settler-colonial identity can be (re)negotiated and (re)imagined.

I posit that Ulster-Scots Americanism poses three main benefits to its promoters. First, it presents a situation in which it is comparatively simpler to discuss identities, geographies and histories without the contamination of the politics of “telling” (Burton 1978). Northern Irish, Irish and British histories are rife with meaning; a minefield of potentially deleterious connotations, especially for a group nervous of the accusation of harbouring unionist sentiments. References to identities, preferences and places in the Atlantic Archipelago are similarly fraught with these implications and subtexts to be potentially read. Thus, the US provides an appropriately abstracted context in which Ulster-Scots identity can be discussed relatively free from the hazards of Northern Irish identity politics.

Second, both the idea of multiple, hyphenated ethnonational identities in general, and the existence of a Scots-Irish-American identity specifically, are established concepts. As such, the US offers a space in which Ulster-Scots identity can be legitimately discussed and negotiated, outside the murkiness of the Northern Ireland where its authenticity is highly contested. Whereas domestically a conceptualisation of Ulster-Scots as ethnically, or ethno-nationally, differentiated is socially suspect and politically nefarious, the US context provides an arena for its valorisation.

Third, the US represents for the writers a settler-colonial state in which the presence of the settlers is conceptualised as unproblematically valid. Where the traditional Irish nationalist narrative has conceptualised the Scottish settlers of the Ulster Plantation as unwelcome and unfairly established colonialists, the US context permits unbridled celebration of Scotch-Irish settlement and westward expansion. Assumed by the writers to be an unproblematic settler state, the US provides an Ulster-Scots settler-colonialist dialogue in which their presence isn’t called into question. In something of a reversal of the Irish context, the Ulster-Scots are to be understood as semi-natives in contrast to the arrival of the new, obtruding Irish settlers on “their” land. The 2016 materials, when discussing Plantation, intermingle British settlement in Ulster with the settlement of the States:

1606: Hamilton and Montgomery
1607: Jamestown (Virginia)
1607: Flight of the Earls
1610: Plantation of Ulster (CCEA 2016b:5).

Again:
For Scottish settlers, Ulster was also easy to get to – just a three hour boat trip from Portpatrick in Scotland to Donaghadee. So if things didn’t work out, it was easy to get the boat back home again – a lot easier than sailing back from Virginia! (CCEA 2016b:6).

It would appear that, in describing the settlement of Ulster and the US concomitantly, the writers purport to normalise the former through the apparent legitimacy of the latter.

As with the interpretation of the United Irishmen rebellion, the Ulster-Scots in the US are conceptualised as valiant, proactive and moralistic actors opposing the domination of the English colonial ruling class. However, the economic status of the Ulster-Scot in the New World is unequivocal:

The Scots-Irish on the frontier generally lived on small farms. ... They had little actual money and so would barter some of their crops in order to buy other basics like tea or coffee and of course to be able to buy a gun to protect their family and their property. Their homes were simple log cabins usually with just one or two rooms. There were dirt floors and the windows were shuttered. There was little furniture and what there was was mostly home-made. ... This was a hard life. (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012p:10)

Thus, the Ulster-Scots are to be viewed as the industrious working poor as much as they are figures who changed the world. The great achievements of working-class Ulster-Scots was, for many interviewees, an intentional moral of Ulster-Scots education. As Gary Blair, education officer at the Ulster-Scots Agency, contended, it aims ‘to educate people and to let them know: you have a deep and great history. And eventually … you’ll hae people who are mair confident and mair knowledgeable about who and what they are.’

6.3 Conclusion

The educational materials depict the Ulster-Scots as a discrete and differentiable ethnic group, denoting its specific cultural characteristics, identity, language, geographical spread, and historical narrative. In general, they are depicted as Protestant (mainly Presbyterian), of Scottish ethnic descent, and bearers of Scottish culture and idiosyncrasies which evolved in the context of Ulster. Although a distinction between Ulster-Scots and the Irish and English is repeatedly reinforced, no real attempt is made to distinguish them from the Scottish. They are to be understood as an ethno-cultural subset of the Scots, an ethnic reflection of their linguistic status as a developmental offshoot. In terms of culture and ethnic characteristics, they are constructed as sharing features, traditions, concepts, and dispositions with the Scots, yet modified through the particularities of living in Ulster. A ‘boulder of Scotch granite, overlaid and softened with the green verdue of Ireland’ (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012r:5). In contradiction
to the occasional ostentatiously civic claim, the texts are imbued with assumptions and implications of racial whiteness as a requirement for full inclusion into the Ulster-Scots identity.

The question of settler legitimacy hangs over the Ulster-Scots story of peoplehood. Indeed, it is only with migratory movement that the Ulster-Scot comes into being, existing always as a settler rather than a statically autochthonous people. In both Ulster and the United States, their lack of indigenous status appears to be amended in part through the magnitude of their influence upon their historical development, the trajectories of both places a direct product of Ulster-Scots engagement, entrepreneurial spirit, and social, political and religious ideology. Within the historical narratives of the educational materials, they presented primarily as hard-working poor families, outside of the zones of power yet invariably capable of opposing the tyranny of the English colonial ruling class. Positioned outside of colonial rule, their role in history is depicted as agitators for democratic freedoms, bolstered by their allegedly innate morality, audaciousness and obduracy. The Ulster-Scot is to represent neither the traditional Irish nationalists’ illegitimate bastion of British colonial rule (McGarry and O’Leary 1995), nor a classical loyalist triumphalist narrative of domination (Todd 1987), but proactive members of the dominated class. In the following chapter, I discuss further the Ulster-Scots peoplehood story, analysing the intersectionality of class and economic ideology with ethnicity in the context of Northern Ireland’s neoliberal peace.
Chapter Seven

Propertisation and Class

The Ulster-Scots story of peoplehood invokes, espouses, and utilises specific notions of class and political-economic ideology. In an intersectional sense, the economic is not separable from the overall narrative, but intersects with both the other features of the peoplehood narrative and the situation of those engaging with it. In this chapter, I focus on this political-economic aspect of Ulster-Scots peoplehood. First, I discuss this economic narrative in detail, including the perception of Ulster-Scots as a working-class culture, its alleged efficacy for upward mobility, and the articulation of political-economic ideology as an inherent ethnic characteristic. In the second section, I discuss these findings in relation to the economic areas in which Ulster-Scots education is currently installed, and the socioeconomic self-positioning of children within schools as evidenced by survey data. I conclude the chapter with a discussion on how these findings can be interpreted.

7.1 Economic Stories

Smith (2003) differentiated between three component parts of peoplehood stories: political power, economic and ethically constitutive stories. As discussed in more detail in chapter six, Smith considers the ethically constitutive to differ from the economic and political power story inasmuch as the former makes claims about the characteristics of the individual within the group. However, where he maintains a segregated tripartite of peoplehood narratives, I contend in this chapter that such stories are not so dissociable. The economic and ethically constitutive stories within the Ulster-Scots educational narrative of peoplehood are clearly indissociable. Concurrently, while working-class identification is a prevalent feature of the Ulster-Scots narrative, the Protestant and middle-class privilege of the areas in which Ulster-Scots is predominantly taught is ignored.

For Erik Olin Wright (1985:27, 1997), class structure – the lattice of economic relations between individuals in the labour market and ownership/control over the means of production – limits the formation of ‘class formation, class consciousness and class struggle.’ Describing this relationship as limiting, rather than determining, Wright’s formulation of class avoided the sort of class essentialism so prevalent within classical Marxism (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Dealing with the failure for Marx’s prediction that capitalism would consolidate into two antagonistic classes, bourgeoisie and proletariat, to actualise in advanced capitalism, he outlined a typology of class which includes the full gamut of middle-class positions between capitalist and worker. Dividing the labour market along four dimensions, Wright differentiates
between owners and employees in their relation to the means of production, between different ‘owners’ by the number of employees (capitalists, small employers, and petty bourgeoisie), and different employee positions by their relation to both authority (manager, supervisor, and non-management positions) and to scarce skills (experts, skilled, and non-skilled).

I take class to involve both the economic structural and relational/self-conceptualisational senses, but, with Wright, I consider these to be separate, interacting, mutually limiting phenomena. Lamont (2000:97–148) conceptualised class as best understood empirically, by the relational conceptualisation of individuals in terms of ‘people above’ and ‘people below’. As her empirical work clearly includes differentiation based upon the individual’s position within the labour market, the equating of class simply to class consciousness, in fact, leaves it open to deterministic accounts of class in which the economic structure has a one-to-one relationship with class formation, consciousness, and struggle. This aside, Lamont’s conception of class can be productive empirically for the analysis of economic stories of peoplehood, given the latter’s focus on narrativised senses of collective consciousness. As a device for the production of peoplehood, however, I consider such stories include, (re)present, utilise, interact with, and are limited by class structure and consciousness in their efficacy, internalisation, and dissemination.

7.1.1 Class and Mobility

Several interviewees from the schools and the Ulster-Scots Agency expressed a belief in Ulster-Scots as yielding the possibility for (labour-market) competitiveness and upward mobility. Some reported that performing “traditional” culture had proved beneficial for self-esteem and confidence. Others described the inclusion of local linguistic features within the classroom as particularly productive for engaging pupils’ interest. Concurrently, most educationalists and promoters of Ulster-Scots conceptualised it as a working-class culture and identification.

PS4, the principal of an Ulster-Scots school in a working-class loyalist area of Belfast, perceived identification through ethnopedagogy to hold the potential for upward mobility. For this interviewee, Ulster-Scots education permitted mobility out of the parochial restrictions of the local area through traction with local culture and ethnic identity. By way of example of the former, he described a pupil from a ‘working-class background’ whose father played in the Orange Order marching band, altered from being educationally disengaged to academically exemplary through the incorporation of traditional loyalist instruments and music into the school. Further, PS4 articulated a belief that discovering ‘who they are’ and ‘taking more and
more of the Ulster-Scots culture in your life’ would lead to a greater communal, national and global vision:

[I]t gives them probably a greater vision … in other words, it’s about pride. … when they’re involved with projects like the Ulster-Scots they can identify, or they can see that they can make a positive contribution, then I think it opens up other areas, and it helps them look beyond … the end of the [local area].

Hence, Ulster-Scots education was understood to be conducive to upward mobility for children from disadvantaged Protestant areas.

Similarly, linguistic education in Ulster-Scots was considered a conduit for personal development and advancement, as well as an element of the explanatory narrative of “their” current low economic status. Whereas within other linguistic contexts the teaching of the local language can be met with resistance as linguistic competence in the more prominent language(s) is viewed as more beneficial in terms of labour market competitiveness, the reverse is perceived by some interviewees in relation to Ulster-Scots. Where its linguistic categorisation isn’t recognised, it is claimed, individuals are unaware in which societal spaces to use local language and colloquialisms and which to employ ‘correct English.’ Thus, teaching children to demarcate English from Ulster-Scots spaces was perceived as a necessity; as PS11 stated:

Language-wise I think, sometimes, it could be seen as they’re not talking properly when they’re using Ulster-Scots so I think it’s good for them to see: no, you are talking properly but you’re using some Ulster-Scots words, but yes, you need to know when to use standard English. If you’re going for a job interview you need to know the standard English words for that. … Certainly, when they’re out and about among their friends and or with their families they should be using those words and they should recognise there’s nothing wrong with using those words … I think probably older generations – that’s just the way it was. You knew if you were going to see your bank manager they maybe would use their standard English words and not what they would if they were at the Cattle market or down the street.

An absence of a discourse of Ulster-Scots is understood to risk leaving the pupils open both to linguistic faux-pas and societal misinterpretation as linguistically incompetent rather than bilingual. PS11 focuses explicitly not only upon entry into the labour market, but doing so at a particular level. It is assumed that the aim of future employment will be within the white-collar linguistic arena of the ‘bank manager’ rather than the blue-collar ‘Cattle market or down the street.’ The ideal student is to be fluent in both, and yet personally identify with the “blue-collar language.” Evidently, in Ulster-Scots peoplehood narratives, both class and economic (in)security are not separate from but ‘intrinsic to who its members really are’ (Smith 2003:64).
Contrary to Smith’s dislocation of the economic and the ethically constitutive, the ‘economic story’ of Ulster-Scots mobility and competitiveness is indissociable from its ethically constitutive story, ‘intrinsic to who its members really are’ and ‘constitutive of their very identities as persons, in ways that both affirm their worth and delineate their obligations’ (Smith 2003:64–65). Many participants described Ulster-Scots as a fundamentally working-class culture. PS3 was perhaps the most explicit in his description of its class position:

[W]hat Ulster-Scots is – it’s the working-class man, it’s the – and I don’t think that it’s the lower working-class, it’s not the elite aristocracy who are going to promote Ulster-Scots, it’s the average, hard-working people who are there and are the backbone of society. They’re the people who’d gone to the first world war and were basically wiped out – literally a generation of them were Ulster-Scots, and the memorials are all over the planet. That’s the kind of person.

I see Ulster-Scots as, like I said to you, belonging not to the aristocracy but to the common working man: it’s his culture.

With its class basis conceptualised as such, Ulster-Scots education represents a pedagogy of upward socio-economic mobility. Such a pedagogy is congruent with capitalist tropes about meritocracy (Bourdieu 1974), equality of opportunity, and a post-class Britain.

7.1.2 Ulster-Scots Americanism

As discussed earlier in this thesis, the story of peoplehood within Ulster-Scots education is strongly associated with the idea of a US diaspora. Ulster-Scots Americanism provided a channel through which notions of interaction between peoplehood and economic ideology could be articulated. Far from merely describing “their” history, this aspect of the Ulster-Scots peoplehood story locates it within particular ideological trajectories: namely, individualism, social and economic conservatism, free-market capitalism, and anti-big-government. Although Ulster-Scots Americanism was discussed by participants across the board, the economic implications of this focus were explored in more detail primarily by political elites and within the educational materials.

Several unionist political elites articulated the view that certain approaches to government and political economy within the US align with Ulster-Scots peoplehood. Such approaches, including a focus on the free-market, individualism, neoliberalism and preference for small government, were described as a symbolic geography through which Ulster-Scot ethno-ideological difference was delimited. Political conservatism as an Ulster-Scots ethnic
feature is a cornerstone of the narrative of Ulster-Scots Americanism, as NI21 politician, Basil McCrea, contended:

[T]he core, you know, what the Americans think of as being the American ideals, the American Declaration of Independence and all of these things are actually pretty close to Ulster Presbyterianism which is about the state won’t interfere, I’ll do my thing, my right to hold arms, my rights, you know. All of these things, whether right or wrong, where an encapsulation what the freedom-seeking Ulster Scots thought up as themselves.

Similarly, Mike Nesbitt, leader of the UUP, considered Ulster-Scots to correspond to ‘values – this idea that the individual is not going to be dictated to. That you cannot have a top-down government – the government must be of and by the people, and it is roots up.’

In the educational materials, the Ulster-Scot in the US is the pragmatic, hardy frontiersman, the valiant vanguard of the revolution, the settlers who civilised the West. As discussed in the previous chapter, the culture of the US is viewed essentially as a product of Ulster-Scots identity. Hence, notions of American values are considered a product of Ulster-Scots character, including liberty (2012e, 2012r), enterprise and the free market (2006b, 2012w, 2012z), enlightenment thought (2006d, 2012b, 2012e), and liberal democracy (2012b:8, 2012e:3, 2012f:7, 2012h:5, 2012i:30). Lipset (1997:19,144) described the ‘American Creed’ of US exceptionalism as including ‘liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism, and laissez-faire,’ firmly rooted in Enlightenment philosophy and ‘classical liberalism, which strongly distrusts the state and emphasise competitive meritocracy.’ In this sense, the Ulster-Scots Americanism in the educational materials represents an ethnicisation of the “American Creed.” Far from merely describing “their” history, this aspect of its peoplehood story locates the Ulster-Scot as characteristically and intrinsically within this ideological standpoint.

The position of the Ulster-Scot in the new world is described within the educational materials as modest, positioned politically, socially and economically beneath the English colonial ruling class. They represent the strata of hard-working settlers, outside of the sphere of landed classes yet too productive to be included within the lumpenproletariat. Their individualism, obduracy and work ethic renders them ideal subjects for liberalism, capable of thriving in the absence of external or governmental support. In this way, the Atlantic diaspora represents a continuation of the economic story of Ulster-Scots through which narrative of peoplehood is wedded to the values of individualism, economic conservativism, free-market capitalism, and opposition to government “imposition.”
7.1.3 Ulster-Scots as Homo Liberalismus

Esping-Andersen (1999), detailing his three-fold ideal type of welfare regimes, outlined three ideal individuals corresponding to each regime. To the liberal regime, the predominantly Anglophone model characterised by self-reliance, modest welfare provisions, and free-market-centrism, Esping-Andersen allocates *Homo Liberalismus*: an individual who ‘follows no loftier ideal than his own personal welfare calculus’:

The well-being of others is their affair, not his. A belief in noble self-reliance does not necessarily imply indifference to others. *Homo liberalismus* may be generous, even altruistic. But kindness towards others is a personal affair, not something dictated from above. His ethics tell him that a free lunch is amoral, that collectivism jeopardises freedom, that individual liberty is a fragile good, easily sabotaged by sinister socialists or paternalistic authoritarians (1999:171).

Esping-Andersen’s depiction of *homo liberalismus* is constructive insofar as it appears to correspond to the ideal individual within neoliberal(ised) education. Davies and Bansel (2007:247) argue that ‘discourses and practices of neoliberalism … at work on and in schools in capitalist societies since at least the eighties’ have established a ‘new moral order of schools and schooling … produc[ing] the new student/subject who is appropriate to (and appropriated by) the neoliberal economy.’ Within the context of Ulster-Scots education in the north of Ireland, the Ulster-Scots individual in many ways resembles Esping-Andersen’s *homo liberalismus*: the ideal accompaniment to its ‘neoliberal peace’ (Lipschutz 1998).

Ulster-Scots education has gradually amassed a canon of great historical figures, re-conceptualised as part of “their” story of peoplehood. Rather than a process of invention, this was perceived by the interviewees to represent an excavation; a re-connection to a history almost forgotten. For McCrea, the innate individualism of historical Ulster-Scots prevented the writing of “their” collective history before the recent “revival”: ‘there is a very distinct grouping called Ulster Scots that have been really successful in the world but because they do it as individuals its maybe not recognised as much.’ Another moderate unionist politician, John McCallister, concurred with this prognosis, putting the novelty of the Ulster-Scots canon down to “their” propensity to ‘[get] on with things’: ‘I suppose it’s that Scotch-Irish Presbyterians tended to be much more individualistic, and just went on and provided for their family.’ Within the educational texts and interviews, many of the most celebrated historical figures were (notably almost entirely male) inventors and businessmen. Alongside frontiersmen, explorers, American presidents, and other elites, entrepreneurs are central to “their” mythic hall of fame:
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PS3: I mean, a lot of really, really good stuff is being promoted – I mean, Ulster-Scots is our great inventors: John Dunlop – the pneumatic tyre: Ulster-Scot. Hans Sloane – chocolate.

PS8: Part of the history is a lot of the famous Ulster-Scots inventors, people who have left this area and gone to different parts of the world and become famous in their field. A lot of the American presidents et cetera – we’ve done some of that with the children.

Ian Crozier, (Ulster-Scots Agency CEO): What we’re trying to do is develop more content that’s around STEM82, for example in terms of Ulster-Scots innovators and inventors, and around different areas of the curriculum. … You know ginger ale, for example? Ginger ale was invented by an Ulster-Scot in Belfast. … and the Canada Dry company was founded by somebody of Ulster-Scot extraction in Canada. And Canada Dry was explicitly modelled on Belfast ginger ale. And the reason why they developed ginger ale in Belfast was because there was a very strong temperance movement in the city. So there your scientific invention comes out of a religious, kind of, observance.

The Ulster-Scots are to be understood as ‘hard-working people,’ an embodiment of industriousness and entrepreneurship. Interconnected with Protestant (often Presbyterian) religiosity, this frequently took the form of an ethnicised version of the Protestant ethic (Weber 2002). “Their” religiosity is to be considered conducive for the production of specific inventions (ginger ale out of temperance).

Importantly, however, the interpretation of the position of such individuals within the Ulster-Scots canon depicts their actions not just as exemplary, but as a product of innate ethnic characteristics. Within one recitation of the history of Ulster-Scots in Ulster the writer states:

When we consider the characteristics of Scots, words spring to mind like hardy, canny, thrifty, opportunist; yet it would be unfair to dismiss the importance of entrepreneurial skills and social concern that the Ulster-Scot has contributed to the shaping of modern Ulster (2006d:8).

The alleged ‘social concern’ of the Ulster-Scot is to be understood as a strictly individualistic one, articulated solely through the market and acts of personal charity. In Esping-Anderson’s (1999:171) terms, the Ulster-Scot is to be understood as ‘generous, even altruistic,’ yet averse to such concern being ‘dictated from above.’ Such ideas are in line with McCrea and Nesbitt’s perception of Ulster-Scottishness as opposed to big government and state-centrism. The entrepreneurial attribute is understood to have rendered them exceptional frontiersmen, as colonialists both in the north of Ireland and in North America. Crucially, the pedagogical focus on historical entrepreneurship was perceived by interviewees at various levels as conducive to upward mobility for children considered to be Ulster-Scots. The student, understood as situated

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82 STEM stands for Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics.
within this tradition, is to consider him/herself to be predisposed toward productivity and entrepreneurialism, able to thrive best within laissez-faire economic regimes.

Throughout the data, a ‘belief in noble self-reliance’ was palpable (Esping-Andersen 1999:171). Only McCrea pointed to the potential for a nefarious outcome of this purportedly innate characteristic:

What I do think we are able to do is, given any shape of level playing field – or even not a level playing field – Ulster-Scots people will come to the fore. Now, if you look at some of the negatives about it: if you have all of these attitudes about independence, and I should stand on my own two feet, and not take subsidies from people and things like that, if you are in certain areas that could be a negative for you because you won’t take help. So, you could argue that a fair amount of what they call “trailer trash” in the southern States in the US are people that have all of the attitudes of independence – of standing alone and all that – but not sufficient skills or ability to thrive in an environment like that, and that leads you to problems.

The downside of such supposedly innate individualism and ‘noble self-reliance,’ then, is the production of an underclass. The explanation for this condition is partly a belief in the amoralism of free lunches, in Esping-Andersen’s terms, and partly due to inadequate aptitude. Thus, rather than conceptualising such an outcome as a societal or market failure, it is the individual who is held responsible. Unlike US “trailer trash,” however, the Ulster-Scot is allegedly capable of success despite adversity: ‘even not a level playing field’.

Within Northern Ireland, working-class (loyalist) Protestant boys are those most likely to be lagging educationally (Gallagher 2015). Simultaneously, working-class Protestants are those considered most congruent with Ulster-Scots ethnicity and culture. Hence, the depiction of the Ulster-Scot as the ‘common working man’ (PS3) able to thrive best within a laissez-faire regime despite adversity would thus appear to be more aspirational than descriptive. Within this neoliberal ethnopedagogy the pupil simultaneously “breathes in” both ethnic normativity and capitalist rationality (Gramsci 1982). Not only is the pupil disciplined into the neoliberal order, but furthermore taught that capitalism itself is essentially synonymous with, and an outcome of, the actions of his/her ethnicity. The Ulster-Scot as homo liberalimus is understood to be the ideal competitive individual for a world of neoliberal hegemony. Inclusion within the ethnicity includes claims about expected innate features which aid in economic mobility, promise greater material and political welfare, and prescribe ideal political-economic governance structures under which the Ulster-Scot will thrive.
7.2 Class and Ulster-Scots Schools

In this section, I describe the socioeconomic factors of the areas in which Ulster-Scots is taught and the self-perception of class as described by pupils within Ulster-Scots schools. In the first subsection, I analyse the characteristics of the local areas in which the Ulster-Scots schools are located, comparing unemployment rates, sectoral employment and other social factors to the Northern Irish regional averages. In doing so I conclude that Ulster-Scots school neighbourhoods tend to be predominantly British, Protestant, and middle-class areas. In the second subsection, I outline the findings from the school surveys in relation to the pupils’ descriptions of national identifications. An understanding of their perceived social position becomes observable through the descriptions of Britishness and Irishness within the survey data.

7.2.1 Working-Class Culture, Middle-Class Education

Analysing the 2011 census data on the local geographical areas in which the Ulster-Scots Flagship schools are located and comparing the averages for such areas to the national averages provides useful insights into some of the features of the areas in which Ulster-Scots has been introduced. These school wards are characterised by high levels of those who identify as British (65.4 compared with 48.5 per cent nationally), low levels of those whose national identity is Irish (14.6 and 28.2 per cent respectively), while levels of Northern Irish national identification equal the national average (both around 30 per cent) (see figure 7.1). In terms of religiosity, these areas are similar to the national levels for “other” and “none”, yet differ considerably in for Catholic and Protestant. Whereas 44.9 per cent of those surveyed in the census described themselves as Catholic, only 24.1 per cent of those within Ulster-Scots school areas defined themselves as such. On the other hand, Protestant identification is notably higher than the Northern Irish figure of 48.5 per cent, at 68.4 per cent. As such, Ulster-Scots school areas tend to strongly represent British and Protestant identifications.

Unemployment levels were found to be lower than the national average. The country-wide rate of economically active yet unemployed was 5.0 per cent in 2011, while this figure for Ulster-Scots school neighbourhoods was 4.0 per cent. Similarly, the proportion of those who have never worked is notably lower for these areas than the Northern Irish average (3.4 and 4.9 per cent respectively). As figure 7.2 illustrates, Ulster-Scots school areas are notable for their high concentration of small-business entrepreneurs, relatively low levels of workers

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83 The data for wards was analysed. Only schools within Northern Ireland were analysed.
in semi-routine and routine occupations, and below-average representation within higher professional occupations. For males in these areas, there is notably high level of representation for small employers and own account workers at 19.5 per cent, compared with the Northern Irish average of 14.6 per cent. Females in these areas were strongly represented within lower managerial, administrative and professional, intermediate and small-scale entrepreneurial occupations, with percentages 1.5, 1.0 and 1.4 points higher than the country-wide averages. For larger employers and higher managerial and administrative occupations, these areas approximately equal the overall average for Northern Ireland; meanwhile, higher professional occupations marginally less common. At the other end of the scale, routine occupations are notably less common in these areas, especially among females, for whom employment in this sector was 1.7 per cent percentage points lower that of the female country-wide average. Semi-routine occupations were marginally more common among females, but less common for males in these areas than the Northern Irish averages by gender.

Overall, the data for Ulster-Scots school areas connotes a more middle-class environment in terms of labour market positions, characterised by low unemployment and high representation in middle-income and small entrepreneurial occupations. Within Wright’s (1985, 1997) typology of class, these areas are above average in terms of small employers and petty bourgeoisie: small-scale owners of the means of production (see figure 7.2). Although these figures describe economic class, and the descriptions of Ulster-Scots by educationalists as a working-class identity corresponds to social class, it would seem that the material reality of the areas in which Ulster-Scots education has initially entered diverges from the notion of class within the story of peoplehood it pursues. In short, Ulster-Scots education would appear to represents an appropriation of working-class Protestant culture within middle-class Protestant schools. PS3 articulated a belief that Ulster-Scots represents ‘the working-class man’ and ‘the average, hard-working people who are … the backbone of society,’ but neither the ‘lower working-class’ nor ‘the elite aristocracy.’ The narrative of an Ulster-Scots work-ethic, differentiated both from the underclass and poor through hard-work and non-reliance upon the state and from the non-meritocratic position of the upper-middle and aristocratic classes. Such a positioning reinforces the rejection of the Ulster-Scot as a settler-colonialist, unjustly inheriting wealth and position as part of a dominant ruling class, portraying them as lowly yet worthy workers. However, this portrayal also suggests a feeling of exclusion from the dominant class and its aristocratic culture. Michèle Lamont (2000:101) contends that such a positioning represents a ‘search for respect and alternative spheres of worth.’ Hence, this “dignity of
working men” narrative may be particularly attractive for Northern Irish lower-middle-class Protestants.

Figure 7.1: Difference Between Schools' Wards and National Averages: General Descriptive Factors

Figure 7.2: Difference Between Schools' Wards and National Average: Employment (Aged 16-74)

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84 Figure 7.1 and 7.2 were adapted from the 2011 Northern Irish census data (NISRA n.d.).
7.2.2. Socioeconomic Positioning and Identification Descriptions

The socioeconomic self-positioning of pupils was evidenced through their descriptions of Britishness and Irishness. Pupils (aged ten to eleven) from four primary schools involved in the Ulster-Scots Flagship Award scheme (referred to as Ulster-Scots schools herein) and four comparatively similar schools in which Ulster-Scots was not being taught (non-Ulster-Scots schools) were asked the following questions in the surveys: [Q5]: “What does it mean to be “British”? What characteristics might they have?”; and [Q6]: “What does it mean to be “Irish”? What characteristics might they have?” The responses were subsequently compared between question and between school type.

In general, non-Ulster-Scots school pupils focused much more on civic explanations of Britishness, such as British law, the royal family, and Northern Ireland being politically within the UK, with 47.4 per cent stating such reasons compared to 13.0 per cent for Ulster-Scots schools. The greatest dissimilarity, both within this category and overall, related to the emphasis upon the royal family as an aspect of Britishness. This was mentioned by 33.0 per cent of pupils in non-Ulster-Scots schools, but only 9.1 per cent in Ulster-Scots schools. Following the rule of law as an aspect of Britishness was mentioned in only one (non-Ulster-Scots) school, but many of its pupils did so. The link between Northern Ireland and the UK was emphasised by 10.3 per cent of non-Ulster-Scots school pupils, compared with only 2.6 per cent for Ulster-Scots schools.

Ulster-Scots school pupils discussed geographical, cultural, appearance-based and linguistic features more often in their descriptions of Britishness than their counterparts at non-Ulster-Scots schools. Although geographical explanations of Britishness were common in both school types, it was mentioned by 55.8 per cent in Ulster-Scots schools compared with 41.2 per cent in non-Ulster-Scots schools. Although pupils at all schools referenced cultural, linguistic and accent-based features of Britishness, these were more commonly found among Ulster-Scots school pupils.

U2P26: Someone who speaks english [sic] and a really strong London accent.
U3P13: Ulster accent.
USP14: Hair colour, Accent, The way they walk, clothes, Eye colour and likes and dislikes.
U3P15: You would have a British voice.
U4P10: A British accent and live in Britain.
N3P22: To be British they will be a Protosant [sic] and follow the queen, and you’ll have an accent.

Similarly, it was common across all school types for pupils to describe Britishness as upper class:

U2P3: They talk more posh
U2P19: British people would be posh, on sundays have roast beef and play golf or tennis
U2P21: I feel like British people are a bit posh
U2P35: Posh
U3P8: Their from England and dresses poshley
U4P4: To be very posh
U4P9: You come from England and they speak very posh. And they live in British land.
N1P11: To serve Queen Elizabeth II, A bowlerhat, They have an accent, Posh.
N4P14: I think someone who is British has a funny accent and talk quite posh.

This conflation of Britishness with class was notably more common within Ulster-Scots than non-Ulster-Scots schools, with 22.1 per cent of pupils at the former and 13.4 per cent at the latter doing so. Among those who self-identified as British, fewer than one in ten non-Ulster-Scots school pupils viewed Britishness as an upper-class identity, while this figure was almost one in five for British-identifying Ulster-Scots school pupils. This perception was higher among pupils who did not identify was British, stated by 22.6 per cent of non-Ulster-Scots and 25.8 per cent of Ulster-Scots school pupils. The comparative interpretation of Ulster-Scots was stated explicitly by one Ulster-Scots school pupil: ‘They do not speak as politely [sic] as British people’ (U2P6).

Pupils in all schools responded with less uniformity for Irishness than for Britishness. Concomitantly, 28.7 per cent of all pupils responded that they “don’t know” for Irishness, compared with just 10.9 per cent for Britishness. Although this rise was represented at both school types, this was starker at non-Ulster-Scots schools (at which it rose from 10.3 to 36.1 per cent, compared with 11.7 to 19.5 per cent at Ulster-Scots schools). In general, Irishness was conceived of most frequently in terms of appearance, accent and language, and less often in civic and cultural terms than for Britishness.

Both school types had similarly low figures for “civic” descriptions, such as living in the Republic of Ireland, having an Irish passport, or ‘loyalty to the government in the South of
Ethnicising Ulster’s Protestants

Ireland’ (N2P12). The difference in this conceptualisation of Irishness from Britishness was much starker for non-Ulster-Scots school pupils. Whereas 13 per cent of Ulster-Scots school pupils considered Britishness in civic terms and 6.5 per cent for Irishness, 47.4 per cent at non-Ulster-Scots schools did so for Britishness and only 4.1 per cent for Irishness. For the latter, Britishness was described more often in terms of civic qualities such as loyalty to state and government, than in descriptions of Irishness. Such a dramatic differentiation was not found within Ulster-Scots schools. Cultural characteristics, such as Gaelic sports, Irish dancing, and celebrating St. Patrick’s Day, were mentioned more frequently than civic features. Convergence on this factor was evident; despite a higher proportion of Ulster-Scots school pupils referencing this factor, the difference between school types was minor. Geographical explanations, such as ‘Irish is what someone is if they are from Ireland’ (U2P37), were slightly less commonly stated than for Britishness across all schools. Ulster-Scots schools stated this option more often, with 49.4 per cent of pupils doing so compared with 38.1 per cent for non-Ulster-Scots schools.

Several pupils from each school type described Irishness in comparatively negative terms compared with Britishness. This was equally common across the schools.

U2P20: [Q5] British people would be posh, on Sundays have roast beef and play golf or tennis. [Q6] Probably be drunk and swear, be loud and very strong like Conor McGregor.

U2P21: [Q5] I feel like British people are a bit posh. [Q6] To be very loud and it mostly ginger.


U4P7: [Q5]: When baking a cake to be precise. [Q6]: When baking a cake, bunging it all in and hoping for the best.

N1P6: [Q5] Someone who respects the Queen. [Q6] To live in Ireland and drink a lot.

N4P19: [Q5] They talk proper and they don’t like mess. [Q6] They would say Iye a lot and most talk like farmers.

In general, whilst Britishness was strongly associated with poshness and upper-class culture, Irishness was viewed in more working-class terms. Several students referenced alcohol consumption, coarseness, joviality and imprecision. Especially within one school in a rural western county, Irishness was frequently described in relation to agricultural work.

Although at first glance these responses may suggest a fit with findings from development psychological research into ingroup bias of national identity among children of this age group (Barrett 2007; Jahoda 1964; Piaget and Weil 1951). However, the national
identifications stated by such pupils do not permit such a conclusion, as the sample above illustrate in this regard:

- U2P20: British, Irish and Northern Irish.
- U2P21: British, Irish, Northern Irish and Ulster.
- U3P8: British, Irish, Northern Irish and Ulster.
- U4P7: British and Northern Irish.
- N1P6: Northern Irish.
- N4P19: Irish.

Similarly, many students who described Britishness in terms explicitly as different to themselves still self-identified as such. National identification in Northern Ireland is a complex, multifaceted field through which the individual learns to navigate, and within which she/he negotiates. Self-identifications and subsequent descriptions of identifications frequently “clashed,” suggestive of partial-identifications, interactional dynamics and contingency.

Through these negotiations of the self, a general interpretation of Britishness as “above” and Irishness “below” in class terms emerges. Within Ulster-Scots schools, the differentiation from a perceived upper-class culture of Britishness was more pronounced, while emphases on Irishness as engendering a lower status was less common. Concomitantly, pupils at Ulster-Scots schools less commonly self-identified as British than non-Ulster-Scots schools (59.7 and 68.0 per cent respectively) and more frequently as Irish (16.9 and 11.3 and per cent). Overall, through self-identification and descriptions of identifications, Ulster-Scots school pupils tended to consider themselves more similar to Irishness than those non-Ulster-Scots school, and less so with Britishness.

Pupils were also asked to describe Ulster-Scots: [Q2] “What is an Ulster-Scot?”; and [Q7] “What does it mean to be an “Ulster-Scot”? What characteristics might they have?” In general, pupils at Ulster-Scots schools stated that they did not know or left blank questions describing Ulster-Scots much less frequently than those at non-Ulster-Scots schools. Of those who provided answers, the former also tended to elaborate in more detail on their perceptions. Across the board, there was a strong focus on movement to Ulster from Scotland. Such descriptions involved differing emphases, including genealogy (U1P1: ‘If you are an Ulster-Scott you are related to someone who is Scottish but being in Ulster for five or more years’; N2P5: ‘That you could trace your ancestors back to scotland’), movement (N2P1: ‘A Scottish migrant who moved to northern ireland’), proximity (U2P41: ‘come from the part of Ireland or Scotland where they are both very close), and the Ulster Plantation (U4P5: ‘Plantation’; N1P2:
‘liven in Scotland then moved to Ulster 100s of years ago’). It was also common in descriptions of Ulster-Scots to reference Scottish clothing (U3P10: ‘I think Ulster-Scot people would wear kilts long socks’), music (N4P6: ‘I think an ulster scot is a person who plays the bagpipes, snare drums or tenar drums’) and sports (U1P2: ‘they do sports like highland dancing’). Traditions particular to Northern Ireland were also mentioned, such as ‘Ulster-Scots dancing, tin whistle, flute, drums,’ and the Lambeg drum.

Language, dialect and accent were also very commonly stated in describing Ulster-Scots. This description was especially common within Ulster-Scots schools. The accent perceived as characteristic to Ulster-Scots was described as ‘rough,’ ‘heavy,’ ‘mixed,’ ‘harsh,’ ‘broad,’ ‘a Scottish twang.’ At non-Ulster-Scots schools, this was most commonly perceived as a ‘Scottish accent.’ Several pupils referenced specific words understood to be particular to Ulster-Scots (U3P5: ‘They say words like aye, gulder and your doin my nut in’; U2P21: ‘oul, coul’; N4P13: ‘you call your ears lugs and cold coul’). Several pupils, seemingly inadvertently, described their understanding spoken Ulster-Scots in ways somewhat contrary to the sensibilities of its linguistic promoters:

U3P6: [Q2] An Ulster-Scot is someone who changes some word with a scotish accent.
U2P15: [Q7] You shorten your words and say them differently.
U2P30: [Q3a: Would you see yourself as an Ulster-Scot?] No. [Q3b] I don’t talk slang.

It’s depiction in such terms has been a matter of concern to the Ulster-Scots Agency, as well as other promoters of Ulster-Scots. A key aim of Ulster-Scots ethnic education is purported to be the encouragement and valorisation of linguistic localism. In practice, however, the ideal of Ulster-Scots as a legitimised, homogeneous, unified language appears to be a source of alienation rather than an affirmation of local dialectic idiosyncrasies. With Irishness, Ulster-Scots is viewed by the pupils surveyed as being characterised by connoting a lower class than Britishness:


In sum, the surveys illustrated a perception of Britishness as associated with upper class traits, while Ulster-Scots and Irishness were viewed as representing a lower status. While these differentials were observed across both school types, they were found to be more pronounced within Ulster-Scots schools. Although questions remain with regards to causation, it would
appear that the inclusion of Ulster-Scots education encourages greater conceptualisation of identities in terms of features relating to ethnicity, culture, and class.

7.3 Discussion: Propertisation and the Economic Narrative

Through this chapter, I have discussed how the story of peoplehood portrayed within Ulster-Scots education involves its depiction as a working-class ethnicity whilst invoking a narrative through which certain political-economic ideologies are viewed as ethically constitutive (Smith 2003). This political-economic schema includes a belief in the benevolence of free-market capitalism, opposition to government intervention, the potential for upward mobility, the “American Creed” and *Homo Liberalismus*. For its educationalists, the Ulster-Scots are to be considered an ethnic group associated with the working-class, but that class refers to the hard-working, the self-restrained, the entrepreneurial, the unreliant, rather than the undeserving poor. Meanwhile, analysis of the geographical areas in which Ulster-Scots education has thus far found traction have been predominantly middle-class and Protestant dominated. In this sense, Ulster-Scots education represents a middle-class appropriation of a vision of moral working-class culture.

Beverley Skeggs (2004, 2005) employed the term ‘propertisation’ in order to describe the appropriation of working-class culture by the middle-classes. She contends that certain groups can appropriate the culture of others such that value can be realised in ways unavailable to those socially inscribed as existing within the culture appropriated.

*The ability to propertise one’s self and one’s culture* (as an exchange-value) generates new forms of exploitation based on immateriality (alongside the existence of traditional exploitation from production). … [T]he use of culture enables the dissimulation of affect, which can be propertised onto selves, people and practices; but for those who can mobilise and convert culture, their exchange values – hence value – are consolidated even further. … the middle-classes can enhance their overall value capitals, extending their resources in volume, composition and across time. … The entitlement and access to the resources for making a self with value are central to how the middle-class is formed; they have access to others’ culture as a resource in their own self-making (2004:176–77).

According to Skeggs, whereas certain working-class bodies are constructed as morally questionable or nefarious, certain formulations of working-class culture understood to be productive for particular means can be appropriated by the middle-class. The value accredited inevitably correlates to an evaluation of morality: ‘How people are valued (by different symbolic systems of inscription; by those who study them; by systems of exchange) is always a moral categorisation, an assertion of worth that is not just economic’ (Skeggs 2004:14 my
emphasis). Ulster-Scots education, conceptualised as a working-class culture packaged for middle-class schools, appears to represent just such an adoption of “moral” working-class, Protestant culture; perhaps even a sanitised loyalism of sorts.

In *Black Skin White Masks*, Frantz Fanon (1972) describes how the language (as both discourse/articulation and particular language used) of the colonised interacts with status. In terms of the language spoken, the black colonised individual of the Antilles becomes ‘proportionately whiter – that is, he will come closer to being a real human being – in direct ratio to his mastery of the French language’ (1972:13). Creole was discouraged in order to enable the speaker to climb to social ladder toward whiteness. The child is taught that (s)he ought not to speak Creole at school or in the home, but rather to speak ‘the French of France, the Frenchman’s French, French French’ (1972:15). This is not merely a linguistic requirement: adoption of the cultural knowledge, diction, methods of articulation deemed preferable by the colonial “mother country” are also sought after. It involves not merely the choice of which language to employ (French or Creole) but also what language is used (pronunciation, diction, articulation). Taking the example of a Lyonnais in Paris, Fanon writes that while in the metropolis ‘he boasts of the quiet’ and ‘beauty’ of his city and the Rhône; however, on his return ‘he will never run out of its praises: Paris-city-of-light, the Seine, the little garden restaurants, know Paris and die …’ (1972:14). For Fanon, the colonised of the Antilles to the French metropolis is a subject of a particularly wide hierarchical distance. Without resorting to nebulous notions of distorted psychologies inherited from (internal) settler colonialism (such as those described by Clayton 1996, 2014; or Memmi 1990), I contended that the articulation of class difference by regional and national identifications have real effects on continued notions of class hierarchies within the UK. A form of Fanon’s periphery-metropolis phenomenon was articulated by Ulster-Scots educationalists and promoters85. For Gary Blair, of the Ulster-Scots Agency, the replacement of Ulster-Scots words for “received pronunciation” English was a class issue:

Its *forbye* you use in everyday speech: I would never think of saying “too” or “also.”
And if I’d’a said that in my granny’s house she woulda said: “what’re you on about?” – you know – “who do you think you are? [imitating a posh, southern English accent] “Also!” “Opposite!”

Similarly, as the surveys illustrated, children within protestant-majority controlled primary schools tend to view Britishness as socioeconomically “people above”, and Ulster-Scots and

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85 The difference in hierarchical distances experienced by the Northern Irish Protestants in the UK and colonised Martiniquais is not a trivial one, as Fanon himself pointed to (see 1972:21).
Irishness to be “people below” (Lamont 2000), a perspective more starkly visible within Flagship schools. This appears to reflect an internalisation of a class position which associates Britishness with superiority and the self as subaltern. In this sense, rather than ‘dissimulation’ (Skeggs 2004:177), the appropriation of Ulster-Scots as a working-class culture may, in fact, capture some real sense of self-conceptualisation inhabited by those constructing, promoting, and conducting Ulster-Scots education.

However, this appropriation remains productive for particular ends. That the Ulster-Scots are represented by their entrepreneurs, inventors, great leaders and pioneers, capable of their greatness by virtue of their ethnic exceptionalism and envisioned socioeconomically within the working-class, produces an aspirational moral for its ethnopedagogical subjects. Accompanied by its ethnicised political-economic ideology, the Ulster-Scots story of peoplehood protects certain projects and aspirations whilst precluding others. In this way it ‘establishes a relationship between property and personality’; between material reality, economic potential, political perspective and ethnic identification (Skeggs 2004:15). Simultaneously, as discussed in chapter six, the distancing of Ulster-Scots from spheres of the political domination and wealth of the historical figure of the settler-colonial, is productive insofar as it challenges narratives in which the Plantation settlers are viewed as illegitimate. However, the extent to which Ulster-Scots corresponds to Protestantism and unionism/loyalism ought to be investigated in detail rather than assumed. In the following chapter, I discuss the findings in relation to this question.
Chapter Eight
Protestant Ethno-Pedagogy or Ethnic Counter-Narrative

A question of paramount importance in analysing the creation of Ulster-Scots education, and a central one to this dissertation, relates to its conceptualised relationship to “the Protestant community.” In practice, this question is closely associated with the rationales different actors provided for the creation and implementation of Ulster-Scots education within schools. In this chapter I describe the extent to which it represents a form of “Protestant” cultural identity; an ethno-pedagogy which reinforces the consociational democratic principle of stark boundaries between “Protestant” and “Catholic” communities. In order to tease out this primary question, I analyse the rationales provided for Ulster-Scots education by educational and political elites, and the instigating teachers within Flagship schools. I contend that the extent to which Ulster-Scots is understood to equate to the “Protestant community” diverged considerably through the data. For some this relationship was found to be unproblematic and linear, while others challenged and opposed such representations in several consequential ways. For many interviewees, the intersectionality of Ulster-Scots with Protestant religiosity, Britishness, unionism, and loyalism produces a complex lattice of meanings and identifications.

This chapter consists of four sections. In the first, I provide some broad-brush descriptions of the Flagship schools, including the religious break-down of the schools, comparative survey-data and ethnographic details of the locales, and some descriptive detail about the teachers who instigated the introduction of Ulster-Scots into the school. In the second section, I provide a broad description of the various understandings of Ulster-Scots among interviewees and within the educational materials. The relationship between Ulster-Scots and the notion of “the Protestant community” discussed in this section is developed further in the third section. Here I outline the rationales provided for the introduction of Ulster-Scots education. In the third section, I analyse in detail the specific rationales for Ulster-Scots education put forward, from teachers on the ground to political elites. In doing so, I tease out in more detail the relationship between Ulster-Scots education and Protestantness, Britishness, and unionism/loyalism. The final section draws together conclusions from analysis, contending that despite close links between Ulster-Scots and Protestantism, unionism and Britishness,

86 Portions of this chapter have been published (see Gardner 2017).
most interviewees contended for an Ulster-Scots interpreted as outside of the normal run of unionist-loyalist politics.

8.1 Protestantism, Identification, and Ulster-Scots Schools

Of the thirty schools either to have achieved or engaged in working toward achieving the Ulster Scots Flagship Schools award by the time of research, the vast majority were in the Controlled (majority Protestant) sector. Three schools in the Republic of Ireland, yet still within nine counties of the province of Ulster, had also participated in the programme. Within Northern Ireland, there were only two exceptions: one integrated and one controlled integrated primary school. At the time of writing, no Catholic maintained school had done so. The rationale for this current state was outlined by the Director of Education and Language for the Ulster-Scots Agency, Trina Summerville:

Whilst the Catholic schools might not be our pure focus at the moment, they can apply for anything. They can apply for funding and so forth. Actively getting into the Catholic schools, I suppose, is something that, yeah, we’ll need to focus on, to see, right, how can we do this, but we need to have a strong programme first before we can get a wider audience.

Clearly Catholic schools are considered to be the “wider” rather than primary audience. Although, when prompted, establishing Ulster-Scots education in Catholic schools was stated as a goal of the Agency, Controlled schools were clearly considered to be the natural habitat in which Ulster-Scots education was to flourish.

Many of the schools had unionist or loyalist symbols within or around the building’s grounds. For most, but not all, of the schools, the driver upon entering the area would be left in little doubt as to the political affiliations intended to be portrayed. Loyalist and Union flags commonly adorned lamp posts on adjacent roads, intermingled with portraits of William of Orange and the Queen for several of the schools. For one school, Irish Tricolours and republican memorabilia surrounded the area of what was visually designated a small loyalist enclave. The sudden change in the colours of flags and kerbs, as well as their quantity and intensity, provided an unequivocal orienteering cue. For another, a chalk loyalist mural had been drawn on the road outside, and the playgrounds equipment in two of the schools had been produced in red, white and blue. One principal described his school as being in ‘very much a loyalist area’ (PS4). The British Union Flag flew in the grounds of almost every participating controlled school. The reason for this was provided by PS8:
It’s just we’ve never opted out of that. The board of governors would have to meet, Peter, and make the decision not to fly it. The way it works is, if you’re a controlled school, you put up the Union Flag, but your governors would have to meet and discuss *not* displaying it. I suppose they never have – that’s why it’s done.

Clearly such salient symbolic partisanism is problematic for the notion of the controlled sector as somehow politically neutral\textsuperscript{87}. Most of the participating schools were open about having either a tiny minority or no pupils from a Catholic background, with slightly larger minorities found only in the integrated and one larger, more modern controlled school. In line with the findings from the census data, described in chapter seven, the schools were predominantly located in more middle- than working-class areas, with only a small minority within working-class, loyalist neighbourhoods.

Within all twelve schools participating in this study, the decision to introduce Ulster-Scots into the school was due to the preference of one or two members of staff, as opposed to a communal aspiration. I refer to such individuals as *instigating teachers*. Only one instigating teacher (PS3) stated that he considered himself to be an Ulster-Scots activist, reporting that he had included it in his classroom for three decades: “I’ve been teaching in this school for over thirty years now, and in that course of time that I’ve been teaching here I’ve been doing Ulster-Scots lessons right from day one.” Many of the other teachers had little to no knowledge or experience of Ulster-Scots prior to their contact with the Ulster-Scots Agency. Furthermore, not all instigating teachers considered themselves unambiguously to be Ulster-Scots. Although most did consider themselves as such, several did not or “hadn’t really thought about it” (PS6). One such instigating teacher expressed a belief that Ulster-Scots was less of a specific identity than “just an experience really” (PS14). Despite expressing a desire to include Ulster-Scots so that the pupils learn about their “own culture,” another teacher stated: “I’m happy to promote it in school, but I wouldn’t classify myself as an Ulster-Scot” (PS12). One instigating teacher (PS10), when asked if she considered herself to identify as such replied:

No. Well, I’ve never really thought about that. I’m just, I’m from Northern Ireland, you know. I wouldn’t’ve grown up with it myself, really being particularly aware, but now when I hear some of the Ulster-Scots words were words that we would’ve heard at home that we didn’t necessarily known that they would’ve originated from that. I suppose I don’t know how I would define myself. … But closer to Ulster-Scots than to Irish. Definitely. Yeah, I would definitely say I’m from Northern Ireland and I identify

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\textsuperscript{87} Such an opinion was stated by the DUP’s Paul Frew in an interview for this research: “I refuse to call them Protestant schools because they’re state schools: we do have the Catholic maintained sector but we don’t have a Protestant maintained sector. It’s state, and it’s not right to call the state sector the Protestant sector”.

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with Ulster-Scots more so than Irish culture, because I wasn’t brought up in the Irish culture.

Such multiplicity and negotiation is not unusual within Northern Ireland’s matrices of identification. Todd et al (2006:329, 330) refer to such self-categorisations as ‘category hybridity,’ noting ‘the range of available identity categories, the variation of assigned meaning and the intuitive clarity of distinction between each.’ Although PS10 did not consider herself to be an Ulster-Scot, on her conceptualised continuum of culture in Northern Ireland she placed herself “closer to Ulster-Scots than to Irish.” Most instigating teachers interviewed indicated some form of category hybridity in their interaction with political, national, cultural and ethnic identifications. Irrespective of personal identification, a range of answers were provided over the question of what constitutes Ulster-Scots and the criteria for inclusion. It is to this question that I now turn.

8.2 Two Approaches

Almost all interviewees contended that Ulster-Scots ought to be permitted to celebrate and learn about “their” culture, heritage and identity; however, there was little agreement on precisely what constituted an Ulster-Scot and who is to be included. The boundaries of inclusion ranged from the more open, self-definitional conceptions to greater limiting by genealogical and migratory movement requirements. In relation to its linkages with Protestantism, I identified two differing approaches to Ulster-Scots within the data (see table 8.1): Ulster-Scots as representing a one-to-one correspondence to the notional Protestant-Unionist-Loyalist (PUL) bloc and Ulster-Scots as an ethnic group, separable from and not reducible to “the Protestant community” (Smithey 2011). For the former, which I call the Protestant-community approach, Ulster-Scots was unequivocally and unproblematically equated with the notional PUL bloc. Instigating teachers stating this position generally perceived Ulster-Scots education as providing the opportunity for an allegedly ignored, silenced or devalued “Protestant community” to express and celebrate its cultural particularities. Such teachers also tended to identify less firmly as Ulster-Scots than those who expressed the ethno-cultural approach. For the latter, although being Ulster-Scots was considered to most frequently overlap with other “Protestant” (religious, political, national) identifications, it was considered to be a separate, discrete ethnic group. That the majority of those who identify as Ulster-Scots are Protestant, unionist and/or British was incidental rather than formative within this approach. In terms of positions held, there was not a sharp dichotomy in personnel between the Protestant-community and ethno-cultural approaches. Several
interviewees vocalised aspects of both positions, and some instigating teachers who pursued the *ethno-cultural* approach articulated a belief in the liberating effect of Ulster-Scots education for “the Protestant community.”

Table 8.1: Summary of Ideal-Type Approaches to Ulster-Scots

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basis for categorisation as Ulster-Scots</th>
<th>Protestant-Community Approach</th>
<th>Ethno-Cultural Approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unionist/Loyalist community</strong></td>
<td>Protestant (often Presbyterian)</td>
<td>Those definable as ethnically Ulster-Scots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religiosity</strong></td>
<td>Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
<td>Open to inclusion of non-Protestants, including Catholics (however, Protestantism frequently assumed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constitutional preference</strong></td>
<td>Two-community model</td>
<td>Constitutional arrangements secondary to ethnic affiliations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conception of Northern Ireland</strong></td>
<td>Three-community model</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Amongst those who adopted a more *ethno-cultural* approach, a conceptualisation of Northern Ireland as containing three, rather than two, cultures were occasionally vocalised. Nelson McCausland, senior MLA within the DUP and former Minister for Culture, Arts and Leisure (2009-2011), explains:

I use an illustration … about going to Downpatrick and on the hill with three streets that meet at traffic lights: English street, Irish street, Scotch street. That’s what we are. Three traditions meet here, and that’s what makes Ulster different from the rest of the island: you don’t have that mix. … Back in the 70’s, when Stormont was abolished and we had direct rule, there was this push – into the 80’s as well – for the “two-traditions” model: you’re British, you’re Irish, you’re Protestant, you’re Catholic, you’re unionist, you’re nationalist. How can you tell the story of the United Irishmen on the two-traditions model? … It all makes sense when you have the three traditions.

This three-traditions hermeneutic is ethnic where the two-traditions model is politico-religious. Although it notionally splits “the Protestant community” in two, this is rendered relatively unproblematic due to the reality that, as Lord Laird described it, ‘there are very few Ulster-English that I have come across’ and ‘most unionists regard themselves as Ulster-Scots.’ Individual actions are to be interpreted within the framework of hyphenated nationality and its purported attendant ethnic characteristics and culture, rather than politico-religious culture. As
David Trimble put it, it is more ‘racy of the soil’ (Dowling 2007:54). Although this model was only expressed explicitly by a minority of interviewees, something of the non-equatability of Ulster-Scots with the PUL through the narrative of ethnicity is observable among other interviewees who vocalised an *ethno-cultural* approach. This three-community model is more explicitly pursued in the 2016 materials, visually and descriptively. Three different cartoon characters are used to represent the Irish, English and Scottish, coloured green, red, and blue respectively. Their continued separation post-Plantation is also emphasised:

The English and Scottish settlers tended to live in areas with their fellow countrymen. Most of the Scots lived on estates owned by Scottish undertakers and similarly most of the English lived on English-owned estates. The areas with the highest numbers of settlers were usually those closest to the ports. People were able to sail directly from England and Scotland to Londonderry and Coleraine (CCEA 2016b:12).

Differences in speech were also introduced as a result of the Plantation with the most important change being the spread of the English language. The Scottish settlers spoke Scots (also called Lallans) which continued to develop into what we now call Ulster-Scots. New words arrived in Ulster – like sheugh, oxter, scunner, thole and thran. New words developed too, through the close influence of the Irish language on the settlers. (CCEA 2016b:14).

Whereas this approach was common among political elites and workers at the Agency, it was uncommon amongst instigating teachers. This illustrates the capacity for the Agency’s monopoly over Ulster-Scots education to allow it to engage in ethnic narrative setting.

Crucially, under the three-traditions model, Ulster-Scots does not correspond precisely to “the Protestant community,” unionists, loyalists or the Northern Ireland British. The majority of Ulster-Scots can be Protestant, unionist/loyalist and British; however, Ulster-Scots *per se* cannot be described merely as such. Hence, Ulster-Scots (especially historically) can be Catholic or an Irish nationalist without threatening the integrity of the narrative. In fact, both the lack of corresponding to the PUL identifiers and being unperturbed by such potential fissures can be highly productive for its promoters as it places Ulster-Scots solidly outside of traditional sectarianism. It evades the accusation of being mere ethnicised or linguicised Protestantism as the two are not equated. Thus, the narrative of ethnic particularity through the three-traditions model is rendered politically potent and productive for its adherents.

Although conceptualisations of Ulster-Scots among its endorsing teachers, education planners and political elites was far from unequivocal, approaches expressed were locatable within the spectrum from the *Protestant-community* approach to the *ethno-cultural* approach. Although anxiety over Ulster-Scots’ alleged “politicisation” – or its perception as sectarian –
was commonly stated at all levels, political and educational elites articulated the *ethno-cultural* approach and registered concern with the *Protestant-community* approach much more commonly than instigating teachers. The ideological standpoint of the individual in this regard effected the rationale for the introduction of Ulster-Scots education, and subsequently the strategies and policies adopted by that individual within their institutional framework. The question of the rationale(s) provided for Ulster-Scots within the school is thus the focus of the following section.

The educational materials fluctuated between a *Protestant-community* approach and more overt challenges to it, pursuing rather an *ethno-cultural* approach. In the work booklet, *Meet the Ulster-Scots*, the students were asked to debate whether several facts are true or false, one of which was: ‘All Ulster-Scots speakers are Protestants’ (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012aa:5). This is a relatively weak revocation, however, applying solely to those with linguistic ability.

A more robust example of this counter-narrative is found in the discussion on the history of the United Irishmen, in which it states that ‘Most Presbyterians lived in Antrim or Down, though Ulster-Scots in the Glens of Antrim were usually Catholic’ (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012b:8). Outside of these more explicit references, however, “Ulster-Scots culture” tended to essentially correspond to “Protestant culture.” In the main, the Ulster-Scots were unproblematically assumed to be Protestant:

Presbyterianism was different from both the Roman Catholicism of the Irish and the Anglican (Church of Ireland) form of Protestantism of the English lords. … All these differences made these Ulster-Scots stand out as different. Over time it would make the north-east part of the island culturally very different from the rest of Ireland (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012ab:4)

Not only does this reinforce the idea of Ulster-Scots distinctiveness, distinguishable from both Irish and English; it also reproduces the unionist narrative of Northern Irish differentiation from the rest of the island of Ireland. Where the traditional nationalist position points to the unnaturalness of Ireland’s partition, the unionist rebuttal points to an organic development of a north-eastern distinctiveness which the border merely reflects (Heslinga 1979). In this sense, the educational materials reflect the unionist position, positing that an organic geographical differentiation was produced by the religious-cultural distinctiveness of the Ulster-Scots.

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88 Although, according to the 2011 census, 3 per cent of Catholics stated that they speak Ulster-Scots, it is also common for Ulster-Scots promoters to insist that many Catholics who oppose Ulster-Scots are in fact speakers of the language.
A poem included for study in the texts, entitled ‘A Heirskip Loast’\(^89\), lists various social phenomena allegedly being rejected by modern society, concluding that these things ought to be cherished as part of the Ulster-Scots tradition. It laments the loss of belief in the Bible, church attendance, pipe bands, the tartan kilt, the “old battles”, the “old songs” and Robert Burns, and ‘oor ain tunge’,\(^90\) concluding:

But a these things ir pairt o’ mae, A tae that boady sae.  
Frae tha mists o’ Scotlan’ thae wur brocht, in a noo lang distant deh:  
Sae let is cherish tha Guid Book, Rabbie Burns an’ a tha best,  
An’ tha Man abaib will surely tak’ care o’ a tha rest\(^91\) (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012a:37).\(^92\)

Here, Ulster-Scots is associated with various features of the Northern Irish “Protestant community.” Such associations are found occasionally elsewhere in the texts, such as marching bands as a form of Ulster-Scots traditional music: ‘Perhaps you only think of marching bands on the twelfth of July when you think of Ulster-Scots music but there is a lot more than that’ (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012j:2).

In many ways, Ulster-Scots education fluctuates between the perspectives of ‘the cultural wing of loyalism’ (Níc Craith 2001:22, 2003) and attempts to deflect from, and even sincerely challenge, this orientation. Articulating concern over perpetuating, or at least being seen to perpetuate, sectarianism and the politics of collective defamation, educationalists who promoted more Protestant Community approaches to Ulster-Scots tended to contend for its differentiation from loyalism’s antagonistic tendencies. Rather, as a form of single-identity work, Ulster-Scots education permitted an engagement with a “Protestant culture,” understood to be previously disallowed or disengaged from.

### 8.3 Rationales for Ulster-Scots Education

All interviewees were asked about their rationales for supporting, proposing and/or introducing Ulster-Scots into the schools. The rationales stated for doing so included the desire for the “Ulster-Scots” – usually some conceptualisation of “the Protestant community” – to be proud of “their” cultural and/or ethnic heritage, the production of peaceable intercommunal relations, the rights of the child, embedding education in the local community, and, especially

\(^89\) A Lost Heritage.  
\(^90\) Our own language (Ulster-Scots).  
\(^91\) But all these things are part of me, I to that person say. / From the mists of Scotland they were brought, in a new lang distant day: / So let us cherish the Good Book, Rabbie Burns and the rest / And the Man above (God) will surely take care of all the rest.  
\(^92\) Written by Charlie Reynolds.
in small and rural schools whose instigating teachers described tight or reduced school budgets, the lure of free resources and professional tuition. The former was the most commonly expressed rationale; oftentimes the latter four implied or were imbued with some idea of “fit” between Ulster-Scots education and Protestantness/unionism/loyalism/Britishness.

8.3.1 Education as Collective Dis-Alienation

Whether taking a Protestant-community or ethno-cultural approach, most educationalists contended that those within “their community” had suffered from a lack of recognition of, confidence in, and/or knowledge of “their” culture and identity: a pathology which Ulster-Scots education is to ameliorate. Many interviewees, discussing their rationale for introducing Ulster-Scots into the school, perceived a certain identity confusion amongst Protestants: that too many were unsure or unaware of “their culture” or “cultural identity”. As one instigating teacher, PS1, stated:

I think, especially if you’re from a Protestant origin, they struggle to find their identity whereas the Irish identity is very strong and very, you know – it’s an identified culture, you know what I mean? You’ve got your language, you’ve got your music, you’ve got your dance, you’ve got your tradition – it’s all there – whereas I think, I suppose maybe for an Ulster Protestant or Ulster Presbyterians or whatever else, it’s trying to find an identity. And in many ways they maybe see that within their Ulster-Scots heritage.

For these teachers, the central purpose of Ulster-Scots education is to amend this alleged cultural-identity imbalance: this deficit in collective autochthonous essence, culture and authenticity. “The Protestant community” have been alienated from a sense of their volksgeist, in Herderian terms (Barnard 1965). Ulster-Scots offers just such an authentic, grounded identification.

Gary Blair\(^\text{93}\) similarly considered Ulster-Scots education to be a means of alleviating a perceived sense of cultural anomie and dislocation:

I think that the community that I come frae needs educated. … I grew up in a situation where you learnt English history, European history, Asian history – I learned every history except Northern Ireland history. And we grew up a people who were bereft, through the education system, o any knowledge. … At the minute I think there’s a lot of people out there innae sure who they are – they innae know where they came frae … And unionism was very much a British thing. Scots are British, Welsh are British, English are British, but they were primarily Scots, Welsh and English. We were caught here in a situation where we were scared of an Irish ___ and innae feel really that we were British, so that made life hard and made life confusing for us. I think now we hae,

\(^{93}\) One of the two education officers within the Ulster-Scots Agency.
and … people are seizing to the identity of Ulster-Scots. They feel more comfortable, it describes them better, and it’s what they are, and they are realising that now. This is in line with the Eriksonian conceptualisation of the necessity of collective identity for individual well-being (Erikson 1968, 1995; Finlay 2010). Indeed, Blair went on to be more explicitly Eriksonian in his approach; ‘The understanding of a culture – of a culture and a language and a history – must be understood by the people who it effects primarily, and once they know who and what they are then it’ll be easier for them to go and tell others who they are.’ According to Blair, the invisibility of the self – of the locale – in his education was problematic insofar as it produced a community “bereft” of the intellectual tools for self-understanding. With the structure of identifications throughout the United Kingdom such that the overarching state identity, “British”, complemented by a specific national identity, Blair identified the lack of a discrete national identity for ‘the community that [he] come[s] frae’ as problematic. In negotiating ‘their’ authentic collective alternative, he states that they ‘dïnnae feel really … British’ but could not identify as Irish due to an undefined fear (‘scared of an Irish ___’). He made no mention of a “Northern Irish” or “Ulster” national identity. Rather, he describes an ethnic awakening of sorts, to the reality of “what they are” in Ulster-Scots. Interestingly, neither Blair nor any other participant interviewed considered Ulster-Scots to be a national identity, as Blair later stated; ‘I don’t think it’ll ever be a national identity, you know, I probably dinnae want it to be a national identity.’ Lord Laird similarly separated Ulster-Scots from nationalism:

The problem with nationalism – nationalism is the most corrupt thing in the world because … it creates the feeling among some people who are nationalist, that they are a kind of master race … It is for the Irish who are nationalist to be narrow-minded, but we weren’t going to be narrow-minded, we were open minded. We were the people of the world. … we’re not people who sit in behind a fence, a hen-run, and try and keep everybody else out. That’s nationalism. We were the people who saw the big picture, ran the big picture … we are internationalists.

Despite Laird’s description of Ulster-Scots engendering clear traits of ethnic exceptionalism (‘you fellas have only one President of the United States – we’ve seventeen!’), he viewed nationalism as problematically insular in comparison to the internationalism of Ulster-Scots.

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94 Ulster-Scots spellings were used in the transcription of this interview in order to accurately illustrate the differing uses of form by the speaker.

95 First chair of the Ulster-Scots Agency, on the board between 1999 and 2004.
Ethnicising Ulster’s Protestants

For several of the instigating teachers interviewed, “Protestant culture” was perceived to have been subject to gradual erosion, demonisation and exclusion. The introduction of Ulster-Scots into the school permitted an interaction with, and celebration of, Protestantness:

PS7: The reasons for [introducing Ulster-Scots into the school] was very much – being conscious … that this community would be very loyal in its view, and I mean loyal in a positive way, rather than loyalist _ and_ be very _ pro Protestantism. I felt that that was one aspect of culture, but the real cultural aspects weren’t being explored, and what our children are wasn’t being explored. And my personal belief is very much that there is a – rightly – … a very strong Gaelic culture, and that’s right and proper that that be recognised, but … I feel now it’s got to the time where we owe it to our children to give them that sense of what they are, where they’re from, to legitimate that and say “that’s right”, you know – there’s nothing wrong with that.

PS5: I think it’s very important that we do link on to our heritage, and I think to a certain extent it would’ve been pushed out of the way, and we were becoming too PC. And I know that in the past I have run the risk – I remember coming up to the Jubilee worrying about celebrating the Jubilee and so many Union Jacks, and I suddenly thought, no, catch a grip of yourself, this is the country we live in – we do actually. … So I do think we have, you know, run the risk. But I also think a lot of the teachers weren’t too sure when we brought the Ulster-Scots Agency in and we’re going to start to celebrate our Ulster-Scots culture.

Both interviewees directly addressed the alleged Protestant sense of cultural alienation and victimhood (Anderson and Shuttleworth 1994; Finlay 2001a; Southern 2007). Unionists have historically been accused of inarticulateness, failing to ‘convey to others in an intelligible, defensible and coherent manner what they believe’, and therefore permitting ‘opponents to fix upon unionism the label of an ideology of sectarian supremacism or to dismiss it as nothing but the flotsam and jetsam of Britain’s imperial past’ (Aughey 1995, 2013:17). The lack of a clear nationalism or authentic cultural imagined community tied to the land rendered unionist self-determination problematic and the defence of the union weak in light of twentieth-century de-colonisation. According to Finlay (2001a), the perceived lack of an articulated sense of cultural identity in the context of hegemonic identity politics form the eighties onward instigated both a palpable sense of defeatism and the search for just such an expression. Lord Laird, describing the Agency’s dissemination of the notion of Ulster-Scots in the early 2000s:

You think about, let’s say, a middle-class dinner somewhere in East Belfast, and they’re all having a dinner party and all of a sudden the nationalists at the table start getting on at the unionists, saying “And what is your culture? Tell me, what is your culture?” And the unionists get very red-faced because they know they have a culture but they can’t express it. We gave them a thing to say.
Hence, Ulster-Scots is understood to have provided just such a solution to this dilemma. Without it, middle-class unionists are understood to be condemned to ‘red-faced’ silence.

PS5 and PS7 adopted unequivocally Protestant-community approaches. Both perceived the PUL “community” to have been demonised, excluded, even expurgated from Northern Irish society, creating asymmetric senses cultural authenticity. This victimhood narrative portrays Protestants as restricted in “their” cultural “self”-expression due to various repressive forces (the alleged “political correctness” of Gaelic culture and comparative incorrectness of loyalist “culture” such as marching bands and the Orange Order). For PS5 and PS7, as well as other interviewees, Ulster-Scots education was viewed as a means of redressing this imbalance, “finally” permitting a sense of place and rootedness to the next generation (‘we owe it to our children to give them that sense of what they are, where they’re from, to legitimate that and say “that’s right”’). The accusatory rootlessness of settler-colonialism implied by PS7’s alleged aggressors (‘you people are only just here’) becomes, with the Ulster-Scots counter-narrative, part of their rootedness (‘yeah, we’ve been here for four hundred years’). As briefly outlined in chapter one, PS5 contended that Ulster-Scots has allowed her to ‘celebrate’ her own Britishness, admitting to have previously ‘run the risk’ of ‘becoming too PC’ over overt displays of British nationalism. Concurrently, a concern over sectarianism – or, at least, of appearing sectarian – is expressed: they are ‘loyal’ yet not ‘loyalist’; ‘pro Protestantism’ yet not anti-Catholicism. Their Gaelicisation anxiety entails an equally strong, permitted, Protestant equivalent, rather than an eradication of Irishness from Northern Ireland. With Ulster-Scots established as the notionally bona fide expression of unionist culture, the problem of Protestant alienation is perceived to be amendable.

Two of the thirty schools within the Flagship programme were within the integrated sector, one of which was included in the sample. For many years this school had been a controlled school, but had recently (less than a decade ago) become an integrated and subsequently increased the ratio of children from Catholic and other families to those of a Protestant background. According to PS5, the integration coordinator for the school, introducing “Ulster-Scots culture” was understood to be productive insofar as it could placate local Protestant families through the introduction of “Irish culture” to the school through its transition from the controlled to the controlled integrated sector:

We had to consider the local parents … and reassure them that nothing would change within the school. … We saw that there was a need that in bringing in – in reinforcing the integration part of the integrated school that it was good for our local parents to see. … So, by bringing the Ulster-Scots in … we were showing the local parents that we
were celebrating the local culture. And through doing that it has almost allowed us, then, as well as celebrating our Ulster-Scots culture to, then, to start bringing - bringing __ other__ things.

Here again, Ulster-Scots is relatively unproblematically equated with Protestantness. Within the literature on the development of peace through the education system in Northern Ireland, the integrated school is often cited as its most progressive and radical form. However, the content of education with respect to ideologies of collective identity effects its outcomes. A strong sense of ethnic difference taught within the school instils, deepens, sharpens senses of Protestant-Catholic difference. In short, the integrated school with such an Ulster-Scots ethnopedagogy no longer represents the “third option” in McGarry and O’Leary’s (2006b) interpretation of the Northern Irish education system as consociational.

A more recent development in Northern Irish educational practice has been the migration of support from integrated education to the shared campus. In the latter, pupils share meals, a common playground and campus, yet remain separate for the majority of lessons: in the words of PS10, whose school was at the time working toward a shared campus with the local Catholic maintained school, ‘that would be one building somewhere in [the village] where we would still keep our own identity and our own culture, and children would still have their own teachers really.’ PS10 introduced Ulster-Scots into the school in order to provide Protestant children with a cultural identity both to contribute to, and retain in, this imminent shared campus:

I sort of feel that while we’re doing that we want to promote our own culture, you know, because the other community in Northern Ireland very much have their GAA and their Irish music and dancing, and they’ve always had that. And we, sort of, the Protestant community can get a bit lost and not sure what their culture is. … I think we all need to belong, don’t we, and have a culture. And, definitely, the Protestant community doesn’t have very much, you know, apart from the Twelfth of July and, you know __. … I do feel it’s very important for our community as we move into … a shared campus. … Because if we don’t have something, and we’re in a shared campus, you know, when it comes to shared events and we can’t do anything – you know, if we can’t get up and dance___ [trailed off] … You know, our children can look at St Mary’s children doing their Irish dancing and think, oh, that’s brilliant, you know, and there’s no – they don’t ____ – and then we have ours and they think ours is good and they can dance together, you know.

Ulster-Scots education, thus, was introduced in order to prevent a feeling of culturelessness among Protestant pupils in preparation for the shared campus. Consequently, according to PS10, the Protestant children could match the cultural contribution of those from the Catholic school: to be able to, when required, literally perform their identity.
8.3.2 Intercommunal Peace

The production of peaceable intercommunal relations was cited by almost every interviewee as a secondary rationale for Ulster-Scots education. This mostly took a consociational, single-identity work based form in which ‘exploration of social identity and community relations within the community with the aim to strengthen collective self-esteem’ precedes and creates the possibility for peaceful, self-confident intercommunal interaction (Niens and Cairns 2005:340 my emphasis):

PS7: I think by having that sense of your own culture it gives you that identity to be comfortable … and then go and explore others.

Ian Crozier (Ulster-Scots Agency CEO): [I]n terms of Northern Ireland as a post-conflict – there’s almost a re-building process of Northern Ireland post-the Troubles, and we’re talking about concepts of shared space and good relations and so on, and there’s a sense in which if people don’t understand their identity, and who they are, it makes it much more difficult for them to relate to somebody else of a different identity and tradition.

Brian McTeggart (MAGUS): All this [Ulster-Scots education] fits very, very well, very closely, with the whole good relations strategy of the executive which is – together building a united community. And to do that, people must [have] knowledge, awareness, understanding of where we’ve come from, so that we can understand our present and create a shared and agreed future.

McTeggart called upon the three-traditions model to contend that such ethno-pedagogical projects are not only natural, but in line with consociational logic. Here again, a consciousness of one’s collective identity is conceived of as psychologically beneficial and able to assertively interact with out-group members. Antithetically, this hermeneutic also implies a certain deviance or nefariousness involved in the individual placing oneself outside of the communal category (Mujkic 2007).

Gary Blair, ‘a Presbyterian and proud to be,’96 compared the Ulster-Scots Agency’s need to spread the word of the psychological benefits of collective cultural identification, and its potential effects on Northern Irish sectarianism, to the Great Commission:

So, I think that in order for the kinra97 to move forrit98 as a whole I think that … it’s important to understand each other’s culture, but it’s important first of all to understand

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96 Full quote: ‘I am a Presbyterian and proud to be – and of course pride runs contrary to the bible – I’m glad to be, and happy and comfortable to be.’
97 Country.
98 Forwards.
your own. How are you going to promote that? How are you going to be comfortable with who you are if you don’t know who you are, or what you are? How are you going to explain to somebody who you are if you don’t know who you are yourself? So learn this. And, you know, make yourself aware of the fact that you have a vibrant, colourful, brilliant cultural background – if only you but knew it! … We know what we have learned, and we have shown it ourselves, and now, I suppose, like the apostles of the New Testament we are full of fervour, and we want to go out and tell others and show what we have learnt.

For Blair, as for many others interviewed, the ‘dour,’ ‘political’
sectarian, defensive, violent pathologies of “their community” were considered a result of this lack of knowledge of, and confidence in, one’s communal identity, genealogy and heritage. His response was pedagogical evangelicalism.

8.3.3 The Rights of the Child

A third rationale for Ulster-Scots education employed by interviewees involved invoking the human rights of the child and of ethnic communities. Although such ideas were only loosely inferred by a minority of teachers, it was referred to directly by several political and educational elites. The most intense articulation of this discourse was put forward by Lord Laird, who accused those ‘laughing at us because it sounds as if its slang or whatever’ of ‘becoming racist,’ warning that such individuals could find themselves ‘up for hate crime.’ Ian Crozier, current chief executive of the Agency, struck a less accusatory tone:

It’s fundamental. Because, first of all, I’m a law graduate by my own background, you know: there’s a rights issue. Children are entitled to be taught about the identity of the community that they come from. And a huge number of children in Northern Ireland come from a community which is Ulster-Scots, in origin and identity. And therefore they have the right to be taught about it which, at the moment, they aren’t being – or they largely aren’t being.

Nelson McCausland adopted a similar line, contending that the inclusion of Ulster-Scots into Northern Ireland’s schools is a human rights necessity: ‘The UN Convention on Rights for the Child states clearly that children have a right to learn about the culture of their own culture, the culture of the home – the culture of the community that they come from.’ Thus, Ulster-Scots education is to be understood as ‘right for the child, but … also the right of the child.’ It is useful to note the tone of this defence: the UN Convention on Rights for the Child frames cultural, religious and linguistic rights primarily in terms of migrant or autochthonous

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99 Interviewees referring to something as ‘political’ was invariably negative. Mostly this was used as a synonym for “sectarian”: see chapter eight, section 8.4.
minorities, rather than protection of the dominant majority. Thus, Ulster-Scots is perceived/presented as a historically and presently victimised minority culture, rather than the traditional discourse of the land- and power-seizing settler colonialists rendered a politically, economically and socially hegemonic majority post-partition.

As Ian Crozier, chief executive of the Ulster-Scots Agency, stated, ‘we’re all, in this space, minority cultures.’ Employing the three-traditions hermeneutic, he contended that, ‘Linguistically and culturally the predominant culture is English in Northern Ireland, and most Irish and Ulster-Scots are minority cultures looking for space and recognition in a place where the predominant popular culture is English going onto Anglo-American, effectively.’ Thus, Ulster-Scots education is to be understood as protected under the rights associated with minority cultures. Nevertheless, along with all other interviewees from the Ulster-Scots Agency, Crozier depicted Ulster-Scots as resilient and animate, rather than needy of protection:

It’s not, and nor should it be seen as this little shrinking violet that needs to have a big glass house built around it otherwise it’s going to die. … Certainly, we will take whatever protection we can get, … as are appropriate and commensurate with our cultural rights … But … this is not an enterprise that is undertaken from the standpoint of “we need protection or we’re going to disappear.”

8.3.4. Localism

A fourth rationale for the inclusion of Ulster-Scots into schools, articulated often by instigating teachers, is the desire to embed the pedagogical subject matter in localism: history, myths and stories, language, geography, monuments, buildings and people within the school’s immediate locality. PS13 and PS14, co-instigating teachers, articulated this perspective:

PS13: I think you go back just to the local sayings, it’s the environment that we’re in, you know, in a rural environment, and it’s just trying to capture something of that, and bring the past into the present. I think the children then build out from that. … There’s so much from our heritage that they’re learning about just in a lovely way, and talking to folks that are a bit older, you know, grandmas and grandas.

PS14: I think when we’re looking at it we’re very much looking at our own locality, where we live – bringing the outside in and the inside out … the grannies and grandas, and even mummies and daddies, have connections in all of this. … For us, it’s very much where you live and those local names – it’s just part of your locality.

Entrenchment in the locality, such as teaching ‘the local in history’, is in vogue within current primary pedagogical theory (Dixon and Hales 2013:11). Such approaches tend to encourage more open, dynamic interactions with varied and individual formulations of self-identification,
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interacting with and incorporating elements outside of official narratives. Indeed, rather than discussing Ulster-Scots in terms of collective identity binaries, PS13 described their desire to teach a “balanced view-point”, aiming to “balance that all out with other experiences the children have as well so as they have an all-round experience of what Northern Ireland and what Ireland is like”. Although Ulster-Scots and Irish are taught as different cultural phenomena, they are taught as various aspects of shared experience within the locality, rather than discrete and bounded ethnic communities.

Linguistic localism was cited as a rationale for the introduction of Ulster-Scots education for one school located within an Ulster-Scots speaking area. Acceptance of the linguistic particularity of its inhabitants and correct linguistic use between Ulster-Scots and standard English was considered a primary rationale behind the introduction of Ulster-Scots education. PS11 desired children growing up in the local area to respect and take pride in their linguistic idiosyncrasies, rather than to “see it as something which is inferior or wrong or makes you out to be of a lower intelligence or less educated”. Although the school was a Protestant-majority controlled primary in a staunchly unionist area, her focus was on preventing linguistic restrictions for social interactions and life opportunities (see chapter seven). For PS11, recognising both Ulster-Scots and pupils’ diglossia could potentially alleviate future linguistic dissonance.

It is important to note, however, that referring to the “local” was also often utilised as a euphemism for the “Protestant” or “unionist” community. As PS5 stated:

we had to consider the local parents … [the school catchment is] very much an __ Ulster-Scots __ em __ community. … by bringing the Ulster-Scots in … we were showing the local parents that we were celebrating the local culture.

As discussed in chapter three, euphemism was a frequently utilised tool among participants when discussing collective identifications. In this extract, PS5 was stating that the school becoming an integrated school meant the introduction of Irish sports and music (“__ other __ things”), which would be potentially disliked by the Protestant, unionist or loyalist (“local”) parents who made up the majority. That this was the intended meaning was reinforced by a later clarification: “I believe that its only through the local parents seeing us celebrate Ulster-Scots culture that when we introduced Gaelic games for the first, last year, they were happy for that to happen. It couldn’t’ve happened seven years ago.” Especially given the geographical bifurcation of Protestant and Catholic in Northern Ireland, and the characteristics of the local
areas in which Ulster-Scots Flagship schools are generally found, “local” can connote “the Protestant community”.

8.3.5. Economic Pragmatism

The economic rationale for the employment of the Ulster-Scots Agency’s services was expressed by three of the twelve schools. In light of primary school budget cuts (Taggart 2013), these smaller, more provincial schools articulated a pragmatic view that “anything that agencies are going to offer us at a reasonable charge or free of charge that’s worthwhile continue” (PS6). Gary Blair of the Agency explains the deal from their perspective:

Flagship starts where they enthèr intae an agreement. An’ they hae things tae do as well; they hae paperwork tae complete, they show an Ulster-Scots dedicated noticeboard, a space on their website tae say wha’s goin’ on, an’ in return we gae them forty-odd weeks free tuition on anythin’ o’ their choice.

In his words, the remit of the Ulster-Scots Agency is “to promote and make aware o’ the Ulster-Scots, the language and the attendant culture.” As such, the economic incentive is offered in return for the promotion of Ulster-Scots by the school.

Crucially, these instigating teachers also indicated a perception of Ulster-Scots education as culturally appropriate for their settings. As PS12 stated, Ulster-Scots presented a financial opportunity:

Being a small school we don’t have a lot of funding, so I suppose initially it was the fact that I could get some free – to be blatantly open and honest – it was the fact that I could get some people in to do work with the children which was free. Now having had it in the school for a wee while, it has definitely opened up the whole lines of communication. Children talk more about language. It’s opened up a whole dialogue about different instruments and about their history and their family, and be quite a __ traditional area here. Very much linked to the Orange Order and so on, so it has definitely all tied in beautifully with that, so with hind-sight it has fitted in here very well.

In this instance, the economic rationale acted as a gateway for the introduction of Ulster-Scots. The nature of such free services, however, is not irrelevant: it must “fit” within, and be accepted by, the school’s community. For PS12, the initial interest in Ulster-Scots was economic pragmatism in the context of restrictive funds, with the unionist/loyalist connection a secondary aspect; however, the Protestant cultural connection was far from irrelevant. As PS5’s experience illustrates (see above), it seems improbable that another agency offering free Irish

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100 See chapter seven, section 7.2.1.
cultural tuition would have been permitted entry. This said, for PS12 the perceived cultural fit succeeded the economic need.

For another small, rural school the instigating teacher (PS8) considered the provision of free services to be beneficial in terms of the potential for human capital development:

From a school perspective, it’s not so much the cultural identity as the way we can enhance their curriculum. And the Ulster-Scots has been a medium, because there are not so many, Peter, coming to my door and offering free drama. You know, free activities like that. And we look on it – yes, … it links to a lot of the children’s culture. I think [for] a lot of the children it’s not so much because of the cultural link they’re involved, it’s because of the activities you’re offering. You’re offering them new skills, new qualities that they can enhance within their own personalities.

As for PS12 and PS6, the offer of free provision of professional tuition was an appealing one in light of tight budgets. Interestingly, PS8 indicated a belief in differences of educational preferences between Protestant and Catholic families:

PRG: In terms of culture and cultural practices, music, would you see [it as

PS8: Yes, the parents] love that. We’ve had violin tuition here in the past and we’ve had tin whistle. They love that, and the children are learning a skill. But the Ulster-Scots language is a different one. … Whereas a lot of Catholic families will embrace the Irish language, but you don’t get that to the same extent – not with the Protestants. They’ve different aspirations for their children – they don’t include that Ulster-Scots language, they don’t see that as an essential, integral element of who their child is. So, there is a difference.

For PS8, pedagogy engaged in autochthonous culture and language is idiosyncratically Catholic, whereas a focus on developing human capital is more characteristic of Protestants. Interestingly, as discussed in chapter six, the educational materials included entrepreneurship and (free-)market orientation as ethnic characteristics of the Ulster-Scots. As with the other “Celtic-fringe” nationalisms of the Atlantic Archipelago both historically and presently, Irish nationalism has been predominantly leftist politically. In Northern Ireland’s electoral history, parties espousing large proportions of Catholics have tended to be socially liberal and economically socialist, while conservative and neoliberal approaches have dominated within the unionist parties (Farrell 1978; Nagle 2009). Thus, stereotypical communal political orientations are both ethnicised as an inherent feature of Ulster-Scots and used in explaining the greater interest in Irish among the Catholic population than Ulster-Scots among Protestants. Political conservativism as an Ulster-Scots ethnic feature is also perpetuated within the
narrative of Ulster-United States interconnectedness: as Basil McCrea (NI21\textsuperscript{101} MLA) contended; “the state won't interfere, I'll do my thing, my right to hold arms, my rights, you know, all of these things, whether right or wrong, were an encapsulation of what the freedom-seeking Ulster Scots thought up as themselves.” In something of a Weberian sense, the Ulster-Scots ethic is intertwined with the spirit of neoliberalism. Ironically, it is only in their ethnocultural “awakenings” that the apparent Protestant preference for pragmatism over the cultural is purported to be discovered ethnically explicable.

8.4 Protestant Ethno-Pedagogy or Ethnic Counter-narrative?

Thus far I have established the various rationales expressed for the introduction of Ulster-Scots education, and, through this, teased out some aspects of the nature of its interaction with Protestantness/Unionism/Loyalism; however, the precise nature of this relationship is yet to be delineated. In this section, I address this concept directly, questioning the extent to which Ulster-Scots education legitimises, perpetuates, or deepens the consociational ideal of distinct, bifurcated ethnonational identities; the extent to which it is, in practice, a ethno-pedagogy of “the Protestant community”.

As discussed above, several instigating teachers adopted a Protestant-community approach, essentially considering Ulster-Scots to constitute identification with “the” Protestant, British, unionist/loyalist bloc. The key rationale associated with this approach was that the introduction of Ulster-Scots would (finally) permit the cultural self-expression of the historically beleaguered “Protestant community.” For such individuals, Ulster-Scots is ‘the same as saying Protestant because unionist is ninety-nine per cent Protestant’ (PS10). Others, however, adopted a more ethno-cultural approach, perceiving Protestantness/Britishness/unionism to be characteristic but not formative of Ulster-Scots. Ian Crozier, chief executive of the Agency, stated:

Essentially what’s happened is, over a period of forty years or so of the Troubles, people were pushed into a very binary way of looking at things, so you were British or Irish, you were Catholic or Protestant. If you were Catholic you had to be Irish, if you were Protestant you had to be British. And people were kind of pushed into these pigeon holes. And because you have a kinda big overlap between, you know, Irish language, Irish culture, Irish nationalism kinda politics. If you imagine the old Venn diagram, there’s a much closer relationship between all those circles in relation to Irish than there is for – Ulster-Scots doesn’t fit as easily into that kind of way of looking at things.

\textsuperscript{101} NI21 stands for “Northern Ireland for the Twenty-first Century”. It is an anti-sectarian, moderately unionist political party which aims to appeal across the religious divide(s).
Crozier’s rejection of binary ethno-politics is not deconstructionist but revisionist, offering instead the purportedly more accurate ternary ethno-politics of the three-traditions model. However, he perceived this reinterpretation to be progressive, in line with the peace process, and distanced Ulster-Scots from traditional unionist/loyalist politics.

Similarly, PS3 considered conceptualisations of Ulster-Scots as ‘Protestant – and exclusively Protestant’ or ‘alien to the Irish’ to be ‘provocative,’ and voiced concern with those who ‘want to politicise it and make it Protestant,’ presenting it in ‘triumphalist, Protestant’ terms (PS3). Although himself an Anglican, he insisted that religiosity ‘doesn’t come up in Ulster-Scots,’ stating rather that the subject is broached considerably more in English history (Henry VIII, the Gunpowder Plot). In terms of nationalism, however, PS3 considered Ulster-Scots to be ‘part of our Britishness’:

Culture and pageantry are so much of what British heritage is, I mean we were in London and we were looking at the changing of the guard. And [the pupils asked], “why do they do that?” You know, pomp and ceremony is part of what British society is – you know, why have the changing of the guard, why don’t they go home and just let the next guy in? Why have flute bands and the royal soldiers walking up the – that is, you know. And they see that. Taking my children from P7 to London is also part of Ulster-Scots because it is a Britishness. It is a British identity, is what I’m there trying to say, “you are part of it” in London, in Westminster Abbey the unknown soldier is your soldier that’s there. The Crown Jewels are your Crown Jewels, they’re British Crown Jewels. And that’s embedded in my Ulster-Scots teaching – its London, its Britishness.

Several interviewees from both approaches contended for an interpretation of Ulster-Scots as British (‘I view it to be part of my British identity,’ Roy Beggs, UUP), many of whom considered it to be less tightly interwoven than PS3 (‘in terms of national identity I’m British, but in terms of cultural identity I’m an Ulster-Scot,’ Ian Crozier).

The 2014 Scottish independence referendum provided interesting insight into the strength and nature of belief in the union.

PRG: I suppose there are also those who consider it to be kind of a unionist identity – what are your thoughts on that?

PS3: Yes, and I think that came to the fore at the time of the debate as regards Scotland’s independence. It was the last thing that Ulster people wanted because it would have isolated the Ulster-Scot in Northern Ireland, with its identity being in the United Kingdom with Scotland. My comment on it was if Scotland goes independent we’ll have to go and join Scotland.

For PS3, the union is expedient only insofar as it retains Northern Ireland’s link to Scotland, and is dispensable where this linkage no longer applies. This is a far cry from traditional
unionism, accused of being tied to Westminster by weak civic and economic bonds alone. Both Ian Crozier and Jane Wallace of the Ulster-Scots Agency argued that it’s nature as a ‘cultural’ rather than ‘political’ identity rendered ‘the constitutional settlement’ irrelevant; rather, ‘it’s kinda transcendent.’ In light of the surge in nationalist secessionism in Scotland Crozier pointed out the irony that, despite three decades of Irish nationalist struggle, ‘there’s more likelihood of Scotland not being part of the UK than there is of Northern Ireland not being part of the UK.’ Taking an ethno-cultural approach to Ulster-Scots (see table 8.1), both Crozier and Wallace argued that the Scottish Referendum is illustrative of the problems of ‘[going] down the line of Ulster-Scots equals British equals kinda Loyalist.’ According to Wallace, Ulster-Scots’ rootedness to Scotland and their sizeable support for Scottish independence renders it more ‘republican in ideology’ than loyalist (‘there’s that notion out there that everybody would say Ulster-Scots, DUP, unionist, when that’s not true’). Wallace even suggested that ‘a lot of people in Ulster-Scots would think that Northern Ireland should be independent’, thus abandoning the central tenet in unionism. Rather than being contingent and state-based, it is to be considered rooted, enduring and genealogical (‘Ulster-Scots is about Scotland, not British’). Similarly, Crozier stated:

[B]earing in mind that all of these Ulster-Scots things came about over centuries and predate current constitutional arrangements by centuries, and whether or not current constitutional arrangements change, Ulster-Scots will still be there. … [Y]ou don’t do family relationship based on who you vote for. You know what I mean? You’re related - you’re related no matter what your political views are, it’s the understanding of the relationship.

Ulster-Scots is thus presented as deeper, more durable and transcendent than national or state identities and borders. Indeed, several interviewees who self-identified as Ulster-Scots expressed nonchalance over the prospect of a future United Ireland. Thus, unlike the constitutional question of the Troubles, Ulster-Scots represents for some an identification unperturbed by constitutional politics and state sovereignties. In this sense, it represents a significant break with both unionist and loyalist ideology.

It was common across the board for interviewees to express anxiety over the ‘politicisation’ of Ulster-Scots. The meaning of the term, as used by participants, requires teasing out. To some degree, ‘politics’ was used as a synonym for sectarianism or interethnic hatred, used euphemistically in a similar manner to terms relating to communal identification. It was common for a participant, when referring to her/his sense of communal solidarity, to add a caveat that her/his identification is apolitical to differentiate it from hard-line ideology.
Conversely, if the interviewee wanted to distance her/himself from a particular approach, (s)he could describe it as having 'political overtones’ (PS1).

PS10: It’s not getting into political, you know, we’re not talking about politics really … It’s certainly not about that.

PS3: In Northern Ireland there’s a tendency to try and politicise it – that Ulster-Scots is of a Protestant background and Irish is of a Roman Catholic background … Ulster-Scots is part of our Britishness – but I don’t see it as being political.

PS7: I prefer the term “Scots Irish” because the word “Ulster” has a resonance of the political with it: like, so-and-so’s a loyalist or so-and-so’s a Protestant, and I don’t associate myself with the Orange, perhaps, or the Black, because I find the its not intended to be such. I find the anti-Catholicism, even though it’s pro-Protestant in essence, an element of that offensive to me and my core values: does that make sense?

To some extent, calling something ‘political’ associated it with trench ethno-politics; the hard-line majority within the consociational politics of Stormont, but also other societal forms of unbridled own-community-centric behaviour. The frequency with which interviewees referred to “politics” or “politicisation” in a derogatory manner led me to question PS12 directly on her use of the term:

PS12: I think it’s good for [the pupils] to be aware of [their cultural background], of where the language has come from, and, so and I’m not saying I’m, you know: I just hate politics personally, and that is political but nah, I’d be kinda middle ground when it comes to things like that.

PRG: Sure. What do you mean by saying you “hate politics”?

PS12: What do I mean by “I hate politics”? I guess I hate the way all the parties are tied up with the whole sort of … how do I put it? … There’s so many bigoted views out there – so many bigoted views. And there’s so many parties – you don’t know what they support, but it’s kinda “come vote for me so that the other party doesn’t get in” is their kinda manifesto. So that the other side don’t get in. I just think that they should help serve community, you know, and all sides of community. I don’t see Ulster-Scots in that ___ extreme extreme branch of ___ … what I call, our community, you know [her emphasis].

PS12’ initial use of ‘political’ suggested that the focus of Ulster-Scots education is to be cultural rather than sectarian. In her clarification, however, she referred to ‘bigoted views’ as well as a perception of Stormont party politics as divisive and communally insular. Under consociationalism, “politics” is transferred upward from the masses to political elites (Dixon 1997): perhaps this provides some explanation for the synonymisation with the political and party politics with hard-line communal ideology in general.
In sum, despite linkages between Ulster-Scots and Protestantism, unionism and Britishness it became clear that most interviewees considered Ulster-Scots to be outside of the normal run of unionist “politics”. Ulster-Scots was unproblematically equitable to “the Protestant community” for several of the teachers interviewed, while others perceived it to be a more negotiated relationship. The latter attempted to disassociate Ulster-Scots from its associations with hard-line unionist politics by positioning themselves outside of the Northern Irish ethnopolitical spectrum. All were, however, keen to differentiate it from sectarianism or community parochialism; as ‘loyal … rather than loyalist’ (PS7). Interviewees varied greatly in the extent to which they considered it to be associated with Protestantism, Britishness, Ireland and unionism; however, almost all perceived it to be aligned with the construction of peaceable intercommunal relations. According to Ian Crozier; ‘Ulster-Scots don’t waste their time running about rubbing Irish people, or any other cultural group – Ulster-Scots are concerned with trying to make the most of the rich culture we’ve got and not kind of pooh-poohing other people.’ Invoking ethnicity, promoters of Ulster-Scots education appeal to a historiography which transcends borders, pre-dates the Troubles, the partition, and the United Irishmen’s declaration of Irish independence, and produces an identification deeper and less contingent than nationalism, constitutional aspiration, or religiosity. In this sense, Ulster-Scots both challenges mainstream unionism in important ways and represents a form of Lijphartian consociational communalism par excellence: a bright yet non-confrontational ethnic boundary.

8.5 Conclusion

Through this chapter, I have contended that Ulster-Scots studies represents an ethnicisation of the conception of a discrete “protestant” politico-religious “community” within Northern Ireland. Its adoption almost exclusively within majority-protestant controlled schools is thus problematic for attempts to senses of deep intercommunal differentiation. Rather than presenting the potential for the deconstruction of ideas of difference, such a pedagogy of ethnic identification reifies, perpetuates, (re)constructs and even deepens such ideas of difference. The incorporation of Ulster-Scots into the integrated schools, as well as its future incorporation into the new shared campus sector, holds considerable potential to diminish the extent to which such mixed schooling sectors can create communal boundary blurring, rendering it more concretely plural in approach (McGlynn 2009).

Whether adopting a more Protestant-community or ethno-cultural approach, Ulster-Scots tended to be described such that it remains closely aligned with “the Protestant community.” However, this alignment involves complex negotiations with unionist
Identification. Importantly, it appears that Ulster-Scots education is far from an unproblematic ethnic extension of traditional ideals of Protestant/unionist/loyalist communal identification. Rather, it deviates from, challenges, and opposes such representations and conceptualisations in several consequential ways. In practice, however, it corresponds a form of Protestant ethno-pedagogy. Essentially, its proponents present it as a re-negotiation of “the Protestant community’s” position from a once-dominant, parochial, cultureless, alienated, defensive, colonial remnant to an equality-focused, progressive, globally-focused, culture-imbued, peaceable ethnic group. However, the extent to which Ulster-Scots education represents an attempt to deal in earnest with “their” history of sectarianism, settler-colonialism, and unionist domination or if it merely represents an evasion of collective guilt remains an object of debate. It is to this question that I turn in the following chapter.
For those who identify to some degree with unionism and loyalism, “their” history has been a site of contention. The confiscation of land and the seizing of power through the Plantation, the history of close association and identification with British imperialism, the domination of unionists post-Partition, twentieth-century sectarian inequalities, and the enmities of the Troubles have left them open to critique and stigmatisation. Lee Smithey (2009:86, 2011) contends that he has perceived ‘a growing shift among loyalists’ who have in recent years ‘attempt[ed] to enhance their political cachet by modifying public expressions of collective identity.’ Grounding my discussion in the concept of collective dignity, I argue in this chapter that Ulster-Scots education similarly represents an attempt to remodel their image so as to produce a palatable, defensible cultural identity.

I begin by defining the concept of collective dignity in relation to my usage of it in this chapter. In the second section, I compare identification with Ulster-Scots to that of white racial identity in whiteness studies. Here I contend that both Ulster-Scots and whiteness studies contain dialogues of being allegedly disallowed, a “we-weren’t-good-enough-to-have-our-own-culture” mentality which gives rise to me-too-ist and green-light claims. Following on from this, I discuss the negotiation between the need expressed for collective differentiation and the rejection of exclusivity where it would leave Ulster-Scots open to critique. In the fourth section, I argue that Ulster-Scots invokes traditional masculinity as an aspect of its promoters’ pursuit of collective dignity. Reinforcing such ideals of masculinity and gender can be utilised in attempts to establish senses of collective dignity, appealing to notions of strength, bravery, and honour (Lamont 2000). The final section explores Ulster-Scots education as a form of sanitised loyalism through the conceptualisation of the production of Ulster-Scots in the language of journeys. In doing so, its promoters aim to reintroduce sense of collective dignity into the association with aspects of Protestantism, unionism and loyalism in Northern Ireland, whilst evading its historical excesses.

9.1 Dignity

According to Rosen (2012), dignity is a fuzzy and gelatinous concept in use, its breadth of meaning producing inconsistencies and inaccuracies in its application. Attempting to tie down the various meanings of the term, he outlines its four meanings is usage. First, it is used to mean ‘rank or status’: either the high position of those positioned in the higher echelons of
social hierarchy or, as in nineteenth-century Catholic thought, the subordination of the self to the position within society in which one finds oneself (Rosen 2012:114). Second, it is used within the human rights tradition to describe the intrinsic value of human beings, in which all by virtue of being human to have inherent dignity which is to be upheld. Third, dignity can be used performatively, to act in a dignified manner. Fourth, dignity is understood in an interactional sense: ‘To treat someone with dignity is … to respect their dignity’ (Rosen 2012:58). Rosen separates out these four uses of dignity, arguing that ‘the failure to differentiate these separate strands’ has had nefarious consequences for its application in (human rights) law. However, the extent to which these four usages are entirely mutually exclusive is questionable. Where Rosen contends for greater accuracy of usage, its multidimensionality of use in discourse may, in fact, indicate a depth and complexity to the term which Rosenian “accuracy” would prohibit.

Michèle Lamont (2000), in her seminal work The Dignity of Working Men described the ways in which working-class men invoked a sense of morality in describing their position in the world. Through contrasting themselves with ‘people above’ and ‘people below,’ she contends that these men allocate dignity to their position in society, the family, and the labour market in moral terms. Lamont describes her conception of dignity as having been adopted from Randy Hodson’s (1996:722) work, in which he defines it as ‘contingent not only on protecting oneself from abuse, but also on having personal space for one’s individual identity.’ Discussing dignity in the work-place, Hodson related it to notions of autonomy, collective solidarity, and self-realisation. Hence, in relation to self-identification, Lamont (2000:170) links these sensibilities in Hodson’s work such that dignity involves not merely the construction of space in which one’s identity is permitted, but also ‘autonomy for defining’ the contours of that identity.

Connecting dignity theory to Smith’s (2003) stories-of-peoplehood approach, I contend that the two elements of the Hodson-Lamont conception of dignity are interlinked. Especially for Lamont, it would appear that dignity though identity is conceived of as involving the freedom to articulate and define oneself through the narratives used to describe the individual’s current position. Extending this from individual to collective identification, the writing of peoplehood narratives provides just such a space for a sense of autonomy of identity. Through self-described peoplehood narratives, the intrinsic characteristics and chronology of the collectivity can be portrayed such that potential allegations of historical or current transgressions, misconduct, dominations, inconsistencies and inauthenticity can be transcended.
or evaded. Hence, dignity through autonomy of collective identification can be employed as a form of protecting the (collective) self from abuse.

However, it is important to note that the capacity to define the story of peoplehood is not shared equally, but unevenly distributed. Political, cultural and educational elites have greater ability to express and describe the ethnic narrative than the majority of those they purport to describe. In terms of Ulster-Scots education, the Ulster-Scots Agency have much greater access to the “dignity” to define the terms of the collective narrative than teachers or, moreover, the pupils. In Rosen’s terms, the interactional definition (permitting or requesting to be treated with dignity) is itself both hierarchical (limited by position within the system) and performative (the individual acts with dignity through her/his autonomy over peoplehood narrative description).

Extending the Hodson-Lamont conception, I take the search for collective dignity to involve the search for the autonomy to define the peoplehood narrative to which the individual belongs, such that the individual can ‘[protect] oneself from abuse’ (Hodson 1996:722; Lamont 2000:170). In this chapter, I describe the presentation of Ulster-Scots and its stories of peoplehood as a search for dignity. Rather than either absconding or transcending Protestant/unionist/loyalist history in post-Plantation settler-colonialism, post-Partition domination, and the legacies of “their” part in the Troubles, I contend that Ulster-Scots education represents a search for collective dignity through re-narrativisation in the context of such unpalatable alternatives applied to “them”. In terms of the consociational peoplehood ideology, collective dignity functions as the single-identity work counterpoint to the doctrine of symmetric collective tolerance.

9.2 Green Light: Whiteness Studies and Ulster-Scots Pride

By the late nineties, a growing trend had emerged among US educationalists for multicultural ‘preparation foundation courses,’ aiming to combat the ‘race dilemma’ through racial and whiteness studies (Sheets 2000:15). Teachers conscious and unconscious prejudices were to be combatted with multicultural pedagogies and replaced with ‘white racial’ consciousness. Rosa Hernández Sheets (2000), among others, criticises such ‘guilt-ridden white introspection’ as in practice a form of “white” empowerment (Gillborn 2005:488). She contends:

While one can agree that effective educators “know self,” this knowledge in and of itself, without cultural knowledge of other groups from their own perspective, relevant curricular content, and effective instructional strategies, might encourage narcissistic

According to Sheets, white-consciousness multicultural courses adopt a single-identity work conception of inter-communal peace production, aiming to teach the individual about her/himself with a view to such creating “Other”-inclusiveness through “self”-consciousness. Her critique of such an approach, however, is not for its stark, unproblematised boundaries, but for its “mono-racial” focus. Others, such as Marx and Pennington (2003:92–93), similarly retain an unproblematised belief in a bounded “white racial identity” whilst expressing locating their approach in critical race theory, contending for ‘the benefits of a healthy, positive White identity … neither characterised by racial superiority nor mired in guilt for the deeds of the White dominant group.’ The task of such “white racial” pedagogies has not been to eliminate race or whiteness, as proposed in more critical frameworks, but merely to limit or eradicate its excesses (Ignatiev and Garvey 1996; Leonardo 2002; Nayak 2007; Ware and Back 2002).

Ulster-Scots pedagogy shares similar anxieties. As discussed in the previous chapter, Ulster-Scots educationalists illustrate considerable apprehensions over sectarianism and identification. This mirrors to some extent the anxieties within whiteness studies over “dealing” with the problem of racism and the distancing of the inculcation of a “white” racial identity from white nationalists, supremacists and racists. In both discourses, there exists a spectrum of extent to which the boundary of the identity ought to be blurred; however, a dialogue of negotiating between and discerning “good” and “bad” identifiers and conceptions of identification. Within Ulster-Scots studies, interviewees were keen to describe identification with Ulster-Scots as non-political\(^\text{102}\), separate from the divisive, anti-Irish or anti-Catholic sentiments of hard-line loyalism; as ‘loyal … rather than loyalist’:

PRG: Do you see it teaching them about their identity?

PS10: I do, yes, I think so, yes. It’s not getting into political, you know, we’re not talking about politics really, at any time, or trying to indoctrinate children. It’s certainly not about that. But, I think we all need to belong, don’t we, and have a culture. And definitely the Protestant community doesn’t have very much, you know, apart from the Twelfth of July and, you know__. The flute that we’re starting now, we’ve only just got a bit of funding for that from the Ulster-Scots Agency and the local band would be hoping there would be some recruits from that, you know, because they struggle with numbers. And it brings it out into the community as well, you know, because whenever they perform the community comes in to see that.

\(^{102}\) See chapter eight for the discussion on the use of “political” euphemistically, corresponding roughly to “sectarianism.”
Ethnicising Ulster’s Protestants

PS10’s statement has an element of the historical critique of “the Protestant community” as inarticulate and cultureless, bound together only through their shared loyalty to the British state and a post-partition domination. Adopting a somewhat Eriksonian conceptualisation \(^{103}\) of cultural identity, she outlined her preference for promoting an engagement in an Ulster-Scots pedagogy which avoids the “political”: the sectarian. Mirroring “white studies,” then, Ulster-Scots studies aim is to “know self” whilst attempting to separate it from sectarianism and the worst excesses of hard-line unionist politics (Sheets 2000; Ware and Back 2002).

Many of the interviewees described processes through which they, their colleagues, friends and acquaintances developed their views from initial concern over what engaging with Ulster-Scots entailed to (sometimes) gradual acceptance. Two of the teachers interviewed mentioned concern amongst school staff members toward the introduction of Ulster-Scots: ‘I also think a lot of the teachers weren’t too sure when we brought the Ulster-Scots Agency in and we’re going to start to celebrate our Ulster-Scots culture’ (PS5). For Ulster-Scots Agency education officer, Jane Wallace, widespread ‘misconceptions’ about Ulster-Scots result in her experience of prejudice:

Wallace: There was a drama … that went round the schools … and it went Maintained, Controlled, Integrated, and it even went down as far as Dublin, introducing educationalists to Ulster-Scots as well to say we only have one head, we’re not bigoted – trying to get rid of that, you know, misconception that people have that this is what Ulster-Scots is. It’s just an ordinary wee kid’s drama. And that opened a lot of doors for us.

PRG: What are some of those misconceptions?

Wallace: Well, people just think Ulster-Scots means a certain religion and a certain mind-set – a very narrow mind-set. And then they meet us and were like, “well no, it’s nothing to do with religion. Ulster-Scots does not mean you’re a certain – you know – religion!” But that’s got a long way to go. … Even, then, socially – if I go out and somebody says “where do you work?” and you’re thinking, I’m going to say this and you’re just going to automatically assume that I am a ___ DUPite. I’m thinking, “no, no, definitely not.” But ___ [shrugs].

Combatting societal ‘misconceptions’ about Ulster-Scots – its association with hard-line loyalism, close-mindedness, and sectarianism – is both part of the Ulster-Scots Agency’s remit and a personal, social burden for Wallace, who considered her political views to be moderate, expressed a disinterest in the union, and did not ‘associate with the word British.’ Thus, mirroring certain currents within “white studies,” promoters of Ulster-Scots studies aim to

\(^{103}\) As described above, Erik Erikson considered collective identity to be a psychological necessity for individual well-being.
“know self” (Sheets 2000) whilst – and through – attempting to navigate a severing of its associations with sectarianism and the excesses of loyalism (Ware and Back 2002).

The argumentation for sanctioning Ulster-Scots identification in many ways mirrors that of white racial identity in (non-critical) whiteness studies. The affective politics of “indignity” expressed by certain individuals who feel socially restrained from identifying as part of the racial/ethnic group to which they consider themselves to belong is common to both Ulster-Scots and whiteness (Ahmed 2014). The attempt to appropriate autonomy over what gets included in the peoplehood narrative – and, more importantly, which (dishonourable) aspects are to be excluded – represents an attempt to regain dignity in/for the identification under question. The efforts of Ulster-Scots educationalists to recover it from loyalist and hardline representation epitomises such a redemptive attempt.

Dyer (1997:10) outlines several of the pitfalls of whiteness studies, and its potential to represent ‘a new assertiveness … amounting to a statement of “white ethnicity”, the acceptable face of white nationalism.’104 Two related issues in this regard which he describes are particularly helpful in the analysis of Ulster-Scots education: the ‘green light problem’ and ‘me-too-ism.’ The former represents the concern that whiteness studies can ‘[give] white people the go-ahead to write and talk about what in any case we have always talked about: ourselves.’105 At least since partition, the Northern Irish state has been Protestant- and unionist-centric, with education divided between the state sanctioned “controlled” and a Catholic “maintained” sector extraneous to the state. Controlled schools have often been critiqued for being Protestant-friendly arenas, exuding a British unionist ambience. Many Ulster-Scots educationalists and unionist MLAs referenced the focus on Britain within Northern Irish controlled schools as problematic, citing a lack of Ulster Protestant or Ulster-Scots community focus rather than a unionist bias. Gary Blair presented just such a deficit, arguing that his generation ‘grew up a people who were bereft, through the education system, o any knowledge’: Ulster-Scots education amends this imbalance by ‘allow[ing] our children tae taste and see what they are and the community they come frae.’ PS7 similarly contended:

I spent my childhood in school going through the battles and the Kings and Queens of England, and there was nothing that resonated because it wasn’t relevant, and again I think that was part of the we-weren’t-good-enough-to-have-our-own-culture sense, so

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104 Quoted from Phillips (1993:30).

105 Although an astute critique, is important to note Dyer’s continued insistence upon an identifiable bounded white race: “ourselves.” As such, his critique of white studies retains, and to some extent reinforces, “race” as a category.
we’d learn everything about English history, and Catholic schools would learn about Irish history, and never the twain shall meet.

This British-centrism, along with Protestant-centrism, has commonly been utilised by Irish nationalists as a rationale for the continuation of the separate Catholic school sector. Here it is reinterpreted as a form of (self?)-victimisation, understood as a result of a “we-weren’t-good-enough-to-have-our-own-culture” mentality. Mirroring whiteness studies, there is a sense of ‘green light’ irony here in which “Ulster Protestants” are to be permitted the go-ahead to focus explicitly upon what “they” ‘have always talked about,’ albeit often only implicitly (Dyer 1997:10).

Interrelated to the ‘green light’ issue, ‘me-too-ism’ involves espousing ‘a feeling that, amid all this (all this?) attention being given to non-white subjects, white people are being left out’ (Dyer 1997:10). At its worst, me-too-ism takes the form of white supremacist victimology, conceptualising “whites” as ‘the only major segment of the population that is not encouraged to take pride in its heritage and in the achievements of its ancestors,’ or the repetition of tropes about modernity’s multicultural climate leaving working, heterosexual, white males as the group with the least rights (Berbrier 2000; Hughey 2009)\(^\text{106}\). Many of the interviewees expressed a belief that, while Irish cultural nationalism has been permitted social legitimacy and prominence, it has become taboo to express an equivalent interest in, or enjoyment of, Protestant/Ulster-Scots culture\(^\text{107}\). Doing so was perceived to be considered “politically incorrect” in Northern Irish society, whereas the same is not considered to be true of the celebration Irish culture, history and traditions. Hence, the claim is made that, despite being the historically dominant majority, Northern Irish Protestants have become the only ones for whom pride in “their” ethnic and cultural identity is called into question and considered nefarious. As described in the previous chapter, many interviewees described Ulster-Scots as an opportunity to amend this alleged imbalance.

Ulster-Scots education, in this sense, is proposed as an antidote to the alleged “we-weren’t-good-enough-to-have-our-own-culture” mentality. Independent unionist MLA, Claire Sugden, contended:

I don’t think there’s anything wrong with [self-identifying with certain aspects of Ulster-Scots] – I don’t think there’s anything I should apologise for. In Northern Ireland


\(^{107}\) See chapter nine, section 9.2.
sometimes we feel like we have to because of history and where we are up to now. … You know, “culture” itself in Northern Ireland has nearly become a dirty word.

Like the reclamation of a purportedly redeemed white racial identification by some, Ulster-Scots ought no longer to be apologised for, but reconsidered and rendered permissible (Hughey 2009; Ware and Back 2002). For Sugden, the reason for apologetic Protestants is, rather vaguely, ‘because of history and where we are up to now.’ PS7 elaborated further on this issue:

[M]y personal belief is very much that there is a – rightly – a very strong Catholic culture – eh, that’s not the right word – a very strong Gaelic culture, and that’s right and proper that that be recognised, but that certainly, as I was growing up in east Belfast, my sense of who I was and sense of belonging was always, kind of, shunned – it wasn’t recognised, it wasn’t legitimised, it was as though it was, there was something a bit shady about it, as in “you people are only just here”, “yeah, we’ve been here for four hundred years”, you know.

PS7 understands the illegitimacy of her ‘sense of belonging’ to be a product of the perceived recentness of the Ulster Plantation of the early 1600s, rendering them non-autochthonous settler colonialists. Against a ‘Gaelic culture’ permitted for its authenticity and rootedness, the illegitimacy apportioned to the settler-colonialist is to be at last overturned, its four-century-old rootedness finally deemed adequate. As PS3 put it; ‘I think that those from Ulster-Scots culture got fed up being told that there was only one culture in Northern Ireland, and that was Gaelic culture, and that was the only place with history, and heritage and language.’ For these and other interviewees, “Protestant community” identity alone lacks a vocabulary for defending their “way of life” against such alleged imbalances. The remit of Ulster-Scots education was understood by many to involve correcting this imbalance, and providing such a vocabulary. Thus, a me-too-ist mentality is palpable: whilst celebrating one’s culture has been permissible for the others (“Other”) in Northern Ireland, the Ulster-Scots must now contend for celebration of “their” own culture.

With white racial identity, defences of self-identification as Ulster-Scots are often accompanied by the perception that it has become socially excluded, disallowed, and is thus alleged to be needy of defence and re-authorisation. These heinous re-authorisations often include an allegedly pacified form of white pride, in which the past successes and contributions of “the white race” are to be affirmed. Such approaches are claimed to be merely symmetrical with “other racial groups”; a phenomenon described as ‘the acceptable face of white nationalism’ (Dyer 1997:10). As I discuss in the following section, just such a comparative technique is employed by Ulster-Scots educationalists and its promoters. However, an irony of the re-authorisation of Protestant identification through Ulster-Scots is the concern that the
latter will be seen as being “too Protestant.” In this sense it represents only a partial argument for (re)acceptance of so-called “Protestant culture.” I contend that this feature of Ulster-Scots discourse represents an attempt to detach from the potential for abuse from being read as sectarian, loyalist, regressive or Gaelophobic. It is a search for the capacity to redefine “their” communal identification; for collective dignity.

9.3 Differentiation and Exclusivity

In the search for collective dignity, interviewees sought to negotiate a balance between two competing elements: differentiation and exclusivity. On the former, interviewees contended for ‘space for one’s … identity’ (Hodson 1996:722), as dissociable from all other collective identifications across the Atlantic Archipelago. This dignity through difference included argumentation against the potential for Ulster-Scots to become, as Gregory Campbell put it, ‘subsumed into a relatively insignificant element of Irishness.’ However, there was a concomitant tenancy to oppose claims of exclusivity where doing so could be understood to potentially align Ulster-Scots with regressive or hard-line unionist politics. In this section, I elaborate upon this tension within Ulster-Scots education.

9.3.1 ‘The Same Skin, But Listen to the Difference’

A technique utilised by both proponents of Ulster-Scots cultural education in Northern Ireland was to normalise it through a comparative reference to some “foreign” culture perceived to be unquestionably-legitimate:

PS9: In terms of Ulster-Scots education I think history and heritage as much as any other language … but there are people, you know, who are brought up in the Chinese culture, or other ethnicities and nationalities and, you know, if they want to explore their heritage and their history then, you know, [Ulster-Scots] should be part of [the education system].

Jane Wallace (Ulster-Scots Agency): Someone could come in and tell me about, you know ___ Indian culture, and I don’t find that offensive – so why would someone find it offensive for someone to come and talk about Ulster-Scots culture?

In other words, Ulster-Scots is just another ethnicity among all others globally: if Chinese ethnicity is permitted, ought Ulster-Scots not also be afforded the same status? Again, such statements have a certain me-too-ist ring, contending that ‘amid all this (all this?)’ permission provided to all “other” national, racial or ethnic groups, exclusion of “the Ulster-Scots” is unjust, perhaps even racist (Dyer 1997:10).
This technique was employed by PS5 in discussing drumming lessons taking place in the school. As an integrated school, this school included higher proportions of children from non-Protestant backgrounds. Pupils were taught not only the Lambeg (the drum most famously played in the pipe band parades of the Orange Order and of the Twelfth of July) and the bodhran (the drum of Irish “trad”), but also the drums of other ethnic groups:

Jim, who brings the drumming, not only does he teach the children the Lambeg, he teaches them about the similarities and differences: here’s the bodhran, here’s the Lambeg – they’re both made out of the same skin, but listen to the difference. You know, here’s an African drum, you know, here’s a Turkish drum, so they’re learning about lots of other things as well.

The pupils were thus taught national-racial difference through the medium of these musical objects: their sound, appearance and the techniques used by the ethnically demarcated producers and musicians. While PS5 did not use the phrase allegorically, ‘they’re both made out of the same skin, but listen to the difference’ opens up some of the interesting fissures and connections between race and ethnicity in collective conceptualisations of Ulster-Scots and Irish more generally. Although Ulster-Scots and Irish were frequently considered to be ethnically separate/separable, engendering different/differentiable genealogies, blood-lines, cultures, traditions, characteristics, inherited personality traits and so on – some tracing this back to Celt/non-Celt ancient origins – they were simultaneously assumed to be racially congruent. As discussed in chapter six, the children of mixed Irish-Ulster-Scots parentage were still considered Ulster-Scots, while this dropped out for those of a notionally inter-“racial” “exogamy.” Furthermore, the conception of the Ulster-Scots as corresponding to the “working (class) man”, as discussed in chapter seven, is a designation which is always already racialised, as well as relating to class and gender (Lamont 2000; Roediger 2007). The intersection of race and ethnicity in the conception of Ulster-Scots reveals an assumption that ethnicity relates to primordial essences of culture, genealogy, separateness, with race reduced unselfconsciously to a biological (perhaps even micro-biological), self-evident fact.

Ulster-Scots, then, is not only comparable to whiteness studies, but is itself an ethnic subcategory of whiteness. It is an identity of “post”-colonial whiteness, but one in which the “post” in postcolonial represents not the situation following the conclusion of colonialism but, closer to the “post” in poststructuralism, a departure through critique from many of the central tenets of the colonial. Both through its historical narrative within Ulster and its alignment with US imperialism and white exceptionalism, Ulster-Scots is articulated racially as a hyphenated ethnic identification within postcolonial whiteness.
Through Ulster-Scots education, pupils are taught to be readers of cultural difference (Hall 1996). Irish and Ulster-Scots “culture” might be ‘made out of the same skin,’ but distinctions must be listened out for. Gary Blair of the Ulster-Scots Agency describes this differentiation:

A fiddle’s a fiddle, but the tunes are different you hear each tune is a Scottish tune, and they are identifiably different, and we’ll all try to stamp our feet and prove points – it’s just how it works. And there are the same instruments but they’re played in different ways and of course, you can play The Sash108 on a harp109 if ye wanted to, the same way you could play, you know, The Soldier’s Song110 on a flute111 if ye had to – it’s not the instruments themselves that have a religious dimension, it’s the tunes you play on them, they’re all different.

Ulster-Scots and Irish ethnic differentiation is conceived of as performatively maintained through the delineation and interpretation of ethnic signifiers. Considerable effort and consideration was given to the delineation and maintenance of boundaries of differentiation between Ulster-Scots(ness) and Irish(ness).

For some this rendered Ulster-Scots at certain points assimilatable, whilst at other points conceived of as tied to the biological-genealogical. The boundaries of inclusion into Ulster-Scots was at times permeable or semi-permeable, and at others impermeable. This tended to alter in line with what would be most advantageous, or the least disadvantageous, in terms of a public view of Ulster-Scots identity. One discussion with PS3 typified this sort of pragmatic alteration:

PRG: On the “politicisation of Ulster-Scots” – what are the main parts of that which jar with you?

PS3: That it’s provocative. … that its Protestant – and exclusively Protestant. That it is alien to the Irish. That its__ everything that I’ve said to you – and I’ve said it with passion, and I mean it with passion – can be eroded away by a political person representing it in a dour, exclusive and provocative manner.

While Irish and Ulster-Scots were to be considered strictly differentiable for most of this interview, the boundary became more blurred where the potentiality of Ulster-Scots being

108 The Sash is a ballad most famously played by the Orange Order in their band parades. It commemorates the victory of Protestant King William of Orange over Catholic King James II and is generally considered offensive due to its perception as a celebration of the killing of Catholics.
109 Traditionally associated with Irish traditional music, as well as being an emblem of Irish nationhood.
110 The Irish national anthem.
111 Meaning the flute used in Protestant marching bands.
considered as socially problematic was discussed. Hence, shifting permeability was a technique employed in attempting to avoid potential contempt.

9.3.2 Grey Amalgam and Ice Cream Swirls

Protecting Ulster-Scots from potential abuse through shifting permeability led several interviewees to contend that Ulster-Scots ought to be understood as a fluid, post-modern, post-(or pre-) national identification. Such descriptions were rife with internal contradictions: for example, PS7 simultaneously considered the ‘Scots-Irish’ to be a separate, identifiable ethno-cultural group and yet the population of Northern Ireland to be ‘all mongrels.’ DUP MLA Peter Weir, and Minister for Education since May 2016, similarly held these contradictory viewpoints, contending for differentiated identifications yet arguing that ‘we have a mongrel quality because we have a blend of identities.’ The anxiety expressed over such a conception of Northern Ireland is the production of a homogenous or homogenising discourse, as Weir explained:

[A]t times we try and turn everybody into sort of some sort of grey amalgam. And it’s important, therefore, that the people are given, if you like, a degree of freedom and manoeuvre to express their culture and then, indeed, it’s not frowned upon that someone who is celebrating their culture in, I suppose, quite a mono-cultural type way, that there is that there isn’t that pressure on people on it.

It is interesting to note that within the Northern Irish ethnoscape the conception of national homogeneity is considered nefarious and threatening, as opposed to the assumed or desirous state found in “normal” nationalist discourses. Such national homogeneity is perceived as encroaching upon the liberty of communal self-expression. In general, considerable energies were expounded by interviewees across the board to navigate between the culturally authentic and the ‘plastic paddy’\textsuperscript{112}, between the “real” and the “forced” performances of communal expressions of culture. As a result, participants were highly conscious of – and conscientious about – the maintenance of cultural credibility. Weir’s ‘grey amalgam’ dystopia is one in which such ‘freedom’ of cultural authenticity is restricted, and only an “inauthentic,” bland, featureless composite remains.

What was for Weir a potential dystopia was for Independent unionist MLA John McCallister a present reality:

\textsuperscript{112} This phrase was used by Willie Drennan during my interview with him.
[T]he answer from the Alliancy types\textsuperscript{113} or Integrated types\textsuperscript{114} is we’ll either do a bit of both and we’ll do exactly the same, so we’ll do Ulster-Scots for two hours a week and we’ll do Irish for two hours a week, as an example. Or else we’ll merge everybody into the paint bucket and all come out this beige colour; and whatever you do, here, don’t mention culture, don’t mention parading, don’t mention that you’re in a pipe band, don’t mention that you play GAA. … But that’s just the state that Northern Ireland’s in. We want everybody to go beige. But it’s like that old one, the Basil Fawlty thing – don’t mention the war. You know. We’re not allowed to mention anything – it’s just easier if everybody’s the same. You know, don’t have a lively conversation about politics, don’t mention your religion, or don’t mention that your wee girl goes down to Irish dancing in case I’m offended, or in case that I work out that you must be Catholic, or you must be this – making assumptions. But to me that’s not what a shared society should look like. We should be embracing those differences.

For McCallister, the alternative to ‘embracing’ communal differentiation was a form of denial. Not displaying the “fact” of ethno-cultural difference is hence to be considered a form of evasion (“don’t mention the war”). With notable features silenced, McCallister conceives of a Northern Ireland rendered ‘beige’ through deculturation. As with Weir, McCallister implicitly links cultural “freedom” with cultural authenticity; the bland, featureless social landscape allegedly desired by the ‘Alliancy’ and ‘Integrated types’ is achieved through a repression of individuals’ “natural” cultural expression. Unlike the multiculturalism-sensitive Ulster-Scots education, so the story goes, such utopic attempts at peaceable relations are as unrealistic as they are unpalatable.

The antithesis of this freedom-authenticity conception of “communal culture” discussed by the interviewees was the notion of cultural force. Repeatedly, participants used remarkably similar phrases to describe this process:

Peter Weir (DUP): It’s important that nobody’s culture is thrust down anybody’s throat.

Gary Blair (Ulster-Scots Agency): I’m not gonna ram Ulster-Scots down throats of people who see themselves as Gaelic.

PS8: As an educationalist you have to be careful that you don’t force anything down anybody’s throats. It’s better for them to opt in.

PS4: I don’t think it – just like Irish – [Ulster-Scots] can’t be pushed down people’s throats.

“Ramming culture down people’s throats” is a violent depiction. It was used by interviewees to describe the forcing of Irishness, Ulster-Scots, or national commonality – the ‘grey

\textsuperscript{113} Referring to the centre-ground, moderate Alliance Party and its supporters.

\textsuperscript{114} Referring to those who support or are aligned with support for Integrated education.
amalgam’ – upon others against their will. Such cultural violence was perceived to contravene the more authentic, “natural” state of ethnic difference. Furthermore, this typically adopted the function of a parable for Irishness; a demonstration of “correct” multicultural behaviour. Many interviewees vocalised anxiety over unfettered Gaelicisation; in this sense, Ulster-Scots exemplifies the model ethno-citizen under the rules of consociationalism: the multicultural subject *par excellence*. Gaelicisation, in these conversations, was always the semi-submerged subject as initial transgressor of this principle.

For PS3, however, it was precisely the notion of ethno-national admixture which renders Ulster-Scots identifiable and differentiable:

To me, if you want to imagine what makes an Ulster-Scot, if you take several ice creams, and you mix those ice creams up, that’s what Ulster-Scots is. You’ve got a little bit of Ireland in it, you’ve got a little bit of Scotland in it, you’ve got a little bit of Presbyterianism in it, you’ve got a little bit of Church of Ireland in it, you’ve got a little bit of Catholicism in it, you’ve got an awful lot of aspects that are mixed up that create this enriched – it’s like comparing a granite to a basalt. Two stones: granite is far more interesting cos it’s got far more minerals and aspects to it. Basalt, even though it’s basically made of the same stuff, is dead boring, you know. So what I’m saying is Ulster-Scots is a much more enriched – to me it’s an enrichment of your life, an enrichment of your interests, an enrichment of your culture, it’s an enrichment of your national identity in that often people in Northern Ireland – now I don’t want to go too deeply down this political side - but Sinn Féin say that they’ve got the Irish culture. I mean, my answer to that is, our Ulster-Scots culture is *every bit* as strong as theirs.

Despite Ulster-Scots being, for PS3, an amalgamation of various features across Scotland and the island of Ireland, he concluded by reiterating his belief in a bright boundary between Ulster-Scotsness and Irishness. Other interviewees similarly reinterpreted the unionist trope the existence of an Ulster admixture.

In general, although the boundary of Ulster-Scots is at times blurred, at others bright, and engenders internal contradictions, the boundary itself remained essentially intact. The Ulster-Scots are to be understood as identifiable: a differentiated people and a culture. Fears over a looming ‘grey amalgam’ render deconstructionist or abolitionist approaches to identity untenable. Rather, it is claimed that peaceable inter-communal relations and the transcending of Northern Ireland’s troubled, sectarian past necessitate a “recognition” of collective differences. Thus, it is claimed, Ulster-Scots education transcends sectarianism through the explicit recognition and encouragement of senses of communal difference. The defence of

115 The idea that the addition of Scottishness, purportedly less prominent elsewhere, makes Northern Ireland a distinctive entity on the island of Ireland. Such rationales have been utilised by unionists since the late seventies to legitimate the partition of Ireland (Heslinga 1979).
ethnic differentiation, conceptualised as morally defensible and even preferable, creates the space for Ulster-Scots promoters (especially its elites) to construct and define their own peoplehood narrative. The defence of Ulster-Scots as a dignified identity requires such a conclusion in the meta-conflict between deconstructivist and bifurcationist ideals. The idea of the existence of a discrete Ulster-Scots identity was defended such that its identifiers could be protected from the critique of being segregationist qua sectarian.

9.4 Heteromasculinity

The image of the Ulster-Scot, and the search for Ulster-Scots collective dignity, was unequivocally gendered and heterosexualised. Its alleged ethnic characteristics include individualism, obduracy, hardiness, (primarily Protestant) religiosity tempered by a logical nature, inclinations toward liberty, liberal freedom, democracy, education, (Scottish) enlightenment thought, entrepreneurialism, and civilising progress. The central figures of their story of peoplehood are settlers, explorers, brave frontiersmen, anti-imperial revolutionaries, industrial businessmen and inventors. Thus, not only were almost all characters discussed male, but Ulster-Scots traits tended to correspond to those associated with the notion of ‘normative heteromasculinity’; ‘willpower, honour, courage, discipline, competitiveness, quiet strength, stoicism, sang-froid, persistence, adventurousness, independence, sexual virility tempered with restraint, and dignity, and which reflected masculine ideals as liberty, equality, and fraternity’ (Lamont 2000; Mosse 1996; Nagel 1998:245). According to Lamont, reinforcing such ideals of traditional heteromasculinity and gender roles often accompany attempts to establish senses of group dignity, appealing to notions of strength, bravery, and honour. The Ulster-Scots narrative contains just such appeals.

The Ulster-Scots settler embodies a particularly muscular form of masculinity. They are described as ‘highly skilled and adaptable … “frontiersmen”,’ thriving in wildernesses, bartered in the new world ‘to be able to buy a gun to protect their family and their property,’ and were always prepared to take up arms as the vanguard against imperial oppression (Ulster-Scots Agency 2006d:8, 2012p:10). A song included in one of the pupil booklets reflects the assumed masculinity within the Ulster-Scots story of peoplehood (2012p:26–28):

Daniel Boon’s wilderness road
Was carved out by woodsmen with axes
Opening the way for the Scots-Irish settlers
Who’d eventually push through to Texas
Through the Cumberland Gap
They hunted and trapped
Traded with the Indian tribes
Over the years they developed a friendship
Some made the Indians their wives …

They were weavers and they were farmers
Men of many trades
They were determined hard working they were brave

Here the Ulster-Scots actor is clearly assumed to be white, heterosexual, and male: exploring, taking new ground, hunting, trading, ‘[making] the Indians their wives.’ With PS3, Scotch-Irish culture is affirmed as the possession of ‘the common working man: it’s his culture.’ This heteromasculinity allocates agency almost exclusively to male actors, with Ulster-Scots females, where rendered visible at all, taking passive or supportive roles.

This dynamic is similarly found throughout discussions about Ulster-Scots in various wars. Remembrance Day, the Battle of the Somme and the two World Wars have become known “Protestant” symbols in Northern Ireland, firmly within the unionist mythic inventory, often considered symbols of ‘traditional orange masculinity’ (Hayes and Nagle 2015; Racioppi and O’Sullivan See 2000:21). The Somme features heavily in Orange Order memorabilia in the unequivocally heteromasculine zones of pipe band parades and the Twelfth of July, and ‘has become central to the imaginative narratives of memory underpinning working-class loyalist self-identification’ (Graham and Shirlow 2002:888; Racioppi and O’Sullivan See 2000). At one school, a project on the Battle of the Somme and the First World War was described as the central aspect of their Ulster-Scots education programme thus far. For PS5, this allowed her pupils to learn ‘all about World War One through the Ulster perspective, and our local people who took part in that’:

We have so many boys from [pause] you know [pause] … they have a film about a little boy, and he’s a Ballymena boy, and he joined up at the age of fourteen or fifteen, and they have filmed his story and they played that to the children … so really that would make it much more real to them.

Adopting the Protestant-community approach, PS5 clearly envisioned Ulster-Scots, “the Protestant community” and unionist-loyalist culture to be congruent. This memorialisation of local Protestant boys of the Somme aligns with the general narrative in Ulster-Scots history, in which males are active agents and females are invisible or passive.

Two exemptions to the all-male historical actors discussed in the educational materials include Amy Carmichael (Protestant colonial missionary to India) and Mary Ann McCracken (late eighteenth-early nineteenth century Irish feminist and social activist). The ethnic characteristics so prevalent as explanations for male actions are not found in the accounts of
both women’s lives; their actions are depicted as benevolent yet submissive and supporting. Nor are innate ethnic characteristics deduced from their narratives. Amy Carmichael is depicted primarily as a “hero of faith.” Before exploring her life, the pupils study a biblical passage in which the achievements of various biblical characters are described as a product of their faith (2012k:1–6). Outside of one brief affirmation of her status as an Ulster-Scot (‘Both her parents were from families who had emigrated to Ulster from Scotland a few centuries earlier’), her actions are explained through her religiosity and submission to God’s will, rather than through her Ulster-Scots ethnicity (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012k:7–8). Mary Ann McCracken is discussed in the context of the United Irishmen, as the brother of Henry McCracken. Although the reader is informed that she ‘is remembered in Belfast as an independent, intelligent woman and a philanthropist’ and ‘In a recent essay she is called a “revolutionary and pioneer of feminism”,’ her actions are mostly described as playing a supporting role to males (Ulster-Scots Agency 2012f:5):

Politics: Mary Ann supported Henry’s radicalism. Some authorities allege that she belonged to a Society of United Irishwomen. She certainly had read and admired Mary Wollstonecraft’s Vindicating of the Rights of Women. She demonstrated her independence when, in partnership with her sister and aged only twenty, she started her own muslin business in order to have a small income to use as she pleased. …

Active Supporter: Mary Ann supplied clothes, food and money to Henry when he was in hiding on Slemish. She certainly braved the rough terrain of the south Antrim hills to find him there with Jemmy Hope and others after the final defeat of the United Irishmen at Ballynahinch. …

Trial and Execution: Mary Ann continued to visit her brother in prison during the period of his trial. She also nursed back to health one of his workmen who refused to testify against him and was punished with 200 lashes. …

She accompanied Henry right to the gallows in Cornmarket at which point he kissed her and begged her to leave. In order to spare him further distress she obeyed. She was afterwards informed of how courageously he met his death, still refusing to betray his comrades in exchange for his life.

Hence, McCracken is presented as a helper and attendant to the male revolutionaries. She provided clothes and food for the men, nursed one back to health, and as her brother ‘courageously’ met his death, she is praised for having dutifully obeyed his instruction. Touting her independence through entrepreneurialism and her capacity to “brave” the Antrim hills, where the male revolutionaries could apparently remain indefinitely, is particularly demeaning. Such a celebration of weak, limited feminism, in fact, functions as an affirmation of patriarchal hierarchy.
In her work on working-class males, Lamont (2000:129) contends that:

The Protestant emphasis on the work ethic, the republican and liberal social contract, and the culture of masculinity are cultural factors that contribute to making morality particularly central to workers. … by stressing morality over socioeconomic success, workers affirm their own value and dignity.

The same could be said of Ulster-Scots. In the case of its education programme, the goal of “educating” is particularly apposite. In a more recent publication, Lamont, with Nissim Mizrachi argued that members of groups who consider themselves to be stigmatised ‘obtain recognition and maintain dignity by changing the negative meanings associated with their group through “educating” the ignorant and managing the self so as to not confirm stereotypes and to protect oneself’ (Lamont and Mizrachi 2012:377). I contend that a similar dynamic is identifiable in relation to Ulster-Scots peoplehood, in which traditional morality, including heteromasculinity, is employed in order to attempt to transcend the indignity and stigmatisation attached to their self-identification.

9.5 Journeys for Domination: Sanitised Loyalism?

Ulster-Scots represents not an unequivocal green light for loyalist politics, but a means whereby associating with aspects of Protestantism, unionism and loyalism can be proposed as permissible without the social disgrace of doing so. Žižek (2002:37,10) has described the process of ‘desubstantialisation’ – the production of ‘products deprived of their malignant properties’ – as a feature of modernity. As we have already seen, Ulster-Scots education incorporates a form of loyalism without the “ism”; a unionism in which the union itself at times described as superfluous; a hardworking, morally upright working-class culture taught primarily within middle-class settings. The semantic technique of rooting Ulster-Scots identification in journeys permitted a sanitisation of unionist-loyalist history by dislodging it from its institutional, colonial or political structures of power. The desubstantialisation of Ulster-Scots was considered a politically productive approach in the search for collective dignity, opening up the space for autonomy over “self”-definition and protection from critique.

Recent currents within theories of landscape and urban geographies have intimately linked “race” with space and place. Mapping these conceptualisations onto her concept of journeys, Caroline Knowles (2014:9) contends that, given that ‘people, dwellings and places are co-produced,’ ‘journeys are key mechanisms in the social construction of places.’ Journeys – from daily commutes to migrations – actively co-produce both people and place: in other words ‘people are where they go’ (2014:9). The production of Ulster-Scots as a migratory-path
identity in many ways reflects such ideas. For many interviewees their Ulster-Scots identification was grounded not only in the initial migratory path, but also continued Scottish-Ulster journeys. Family connections and holidays in Scotland were regularly referred to in relation to their self-identification as Ulster-Scots.

Jane Wallace: And I just always grew up … it was wee subtle things … Even if we were going on holiday just when we were wee, and it was never seen as a big deal, we just always, if we didn’t do a big holiday “away away”, then we went to Scotland, and that’s just what we done.

Ian Crozier: I’d come from north Belfast which is not what people typically assume to be an Ulster-Scots area but … I, myself, my mother was born in Paisley in Scotland – I’m actually a, I’m a first generation Ulster-Scot, as it were, on my mother’s side. So … I mean all of my aunts grew up in Scotland but now live here, but all my aunts … have all got sorta mad Scottish accents and stuff. I grew up very much with Scotland being a – a key part of kinda the family, cos … obviously my mother was born there, and my grandfather was from there, so they were going back and forward to Scotland over time and stuff so it was all very, kinda, natural for me to be interested in this Ulster-Scots thing.

The intermingling of journey, identification and place even permitted the expression affiliation with Gaelic language and culture in a working-class, loyalist setting:

PS4: [O]n New Year’s night we’d watch Scottish TV, and we found there was a Gaelic channel which – and it was just because they were playing music and we thought it was enjoyable. And we tuned into it so we did, flicked it on, and that – I think it was that Alba TV … and although we couldn’t we didn’t know _ some of the songs were in Gaelic – Scots Gaelic – and some of them were in English, but … it was up in the Highlands somewhere. And we could identify with it cos we’d actually been there on holiday so we had, and I kinda had that affinity as well.

The production of the self through journey and place thus permitted new forms of affinity and relaxed rigid ethnic boundaries. Stark exclusivity between Ulster-Scot and Gael could thus be mediated by journeys and place, co-written into and onto the landscape.

Such an identification-through-journey approach is also observable in the insistence by many Ulster-Scots educationalists of its conceptualisation as a post-national, post-constitutional, post-border, post-union identity. Journeys, both ancient and current, were described as providing the sense of interconnection which rendered national identity less permanent, less stable, less deep-rooted and authentic than Ulster-Scots as an ethno-genealogical and cultural identity. Brian Graham (2004:497), writing on the development of post-GFA loyalism, described the apparent rootlessness of the Ulster-Scots movement as being problematically incoherent for its proponents:
for something that can be so traditionally ethno-nationalist, there is a curiously postmodern fragmentation of place in Ulster-Scots: where is Ulster-Scot Land? In this case, Thirdspace is ‘nospace’, neither Irish, nor British, nor Scottish but merely an unhappy amalgamation of all three.

To the contrary, the formulation of Ulster-Scots ethnonationalism is very much based within notions of intermixture and journey, interacting with, critiquing, and partially including and rejecting the national identities with which it interacts. In this sense, Ulster-Scots is much more interconnected with recent loyalist claims of subalternality, which Graham (2004:488) himself describes. The constitutional question at the heart of unionism was described by several interviewees as unnecessary, even if predominantly preferred. For several interviewees, this, in fact, permitted some degree of incorporation of Ireland, Irish and Irishness. As PS3 stated, ‘I see Ulster-Scots of course as being Irish, in the sense that I’m Irish – I’m also British as I live in Northern Ireland.’ Similarly, PS7 argued for the use of “Scots-Irish” rather than “Ulster-Scots”: ‘the term Scots-Irish, to me, is much more inclusive, and is much more recognising that we are all mongrels, rather than Ulster-Scots which is so affiliated with one political side.’

While the degree to which Ulster-Scots represented a post-national or post-constitutional discourse differed considerably, it was widely accepted as post-border. The Ulster-Scots Agency considers its remit to be explicitly cross-border; all Agency interviewees emphasised this feature. Trina Summerville, the Agency’s Director of Education and Language, described the development of Ulster-Scots education in the Republic of Ireland and one of the Agency’s priorities for the future: ‘We have a lot of schools in border counties, with some in Donegal, Monaghan, not quite Cavan yet, and not necessarily as much as we want, but that is something to develop over the next few years.’ As a genealogy of journeys, Ulster-Scots permits new cartographies of the self: ‘Journeys, in other words, draw people’s maps and in so doing provide a way of thinking about them’ (Knowles 2014:9). In this sense, Ulster-Scots represents a post-unionist ideology of sorts, without going as far as to risk the “grey amalgam”116 of a ‘one-community Northern Irishness’ evoked by the so-called ‘radical centre’ (Evans and Tonge 2003:33). Ulster-Scots education’s reinterpretation of geographies of belonging reinterprets the borders of Northern Ireland and the Acts of Union as comparatively recent, ephemeral and alterable. In contrast, Ulster-Scots itself is understood to be grounded in a folkish, localist historiography of journeys of old. Hence, Ulster-Scots post-unionism demotes political unionism to a view held by many of “their” kin over the centuries: nothing more than a (nonetheless integral) part of the journey. Such a realignment is, however, also

116 Peter Weir, DUP
potentially in line with Smithey’s (2008, 2009, 2011) depiction of modern loyalism as reorienting away from the hard political expression of it’s past.

As discussed in previous chapters, Ulster-Scots history utilised the notion of the journey to reconfigure the colonial history of Northern Ireland. The focus on the migration of (poor) families to the region, and co-victimhood with the Irish against British colonial rule, evades the realities of the Plantation and its hierarchies. Congruent with this approach, all forms of Protestant supremacy in the region’s history are absent from Ulster-Scots education. Rather, it centres around narratives of family, movement, traditions and culture. In doing so, it evades potential questions of historical guilt, presenting itself firmly outside the mechanisms of political and economic power.

9.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that Ulster-Scots education represents a search for collective dignity: a search for the autonomy to define the peoplehood narrative to which one belongs such that the self and community can be shielded from potential critque. Through this process, Ulster-Scots promoters and educationalists have constructed a form of sanitised loyalism. With the currents within whiteness studies which argue for the perpetuation of white racial identification, it aims to retain boundaries of differentiation while limiting or erasing its historical excesses. In the consociational context in which communal identity has become hegemonic, a socially decontaminated ethnic identification, associated with “the Protestant community” yet ‘safe’ from the critique from unionism and loyalism’s excesses, has indeed considerable potential for traction. Doing so, however, represents both a reification of communal difference and an evasion of the various historical issues relating to unionism, loyalism, and Protestant domination.
Chapter Ten
Critical Pedagogies, Consociational Hegemonies

Having reported the findings from this research in the previous five chapters, this chapter departs from findings to discuss some of its key theoretical and pragmatic contributions in relation to post-conflict education and peace-building. The chapter contains four sections: in the first I discuss Ulster-Scots education in light of hegemonic neoliberal and peoplehood ideology; second, I note the role of power in theoretical approaches to education; in the third section I deliberate further upon dignity, and the sort of dignity which Ulster-Scots provides; and in the fourth, I assess some of the progressive kernels of Ulster-Scots which, if reformed in several fundamental ways, could be potentially valuable.

In conceptualising the relationship between the school and society, theories of power are pivotal. Engagement with critical pedagogical approaches has been almost entirely absent in the literature on post-conflict education in Northern Ireland: a literature which has tended to aim somewhat narrowly upon the reduction of sectarianism, ethnic hatred, and intercommunal violence with only minimal concern over the (re)production of communal identification itself. Although critical pedagogy has been allocated differing meanings and foci depending upon context, it generally represents ‘a way of thinking about, negotiating, and transforming the relationship among classroom teaching, the production of knowledge, the institutional structures of the school, and the social and material relations of … society’ (McLaren 2003:160). Taking into consideration the broader context of the school as an institution within civil society, it illuminates the structures of ideology, power and domination inherent within the school, and offers a holistic approach to interpreting ethnopedagogy. Taking a critical pedagogical approach, this chapter represents a discussion of pedagogical theory in light of the findings presented in this thesis.

10.1 Consociation and Hegemony

Consociationalism is not merely a governance structure, but a normative peoplehood ideology. As I state in chapter two, I use “peoplehood ideology” to mean the set of beliefs and doctrines on the notional state of affairs relating to local and/or universal collective identifications. While the peoplehood ideology of Protestant-Catholic differentiation clearly has older historical roots, these have morphed and shifted in meaning, salience, and associations over time (McEvoy et al. 2006). Through the Troubles, the notion of difference was altered and expanded in meaning, heightened communally and relationally, and
consolidated. The consociational peoplehood ideology holds not only that the resulting communal-identity formula is natural (Lijphart 1969) or durable (McGarry and O’Leary 2006b), but – furthermore – is productive for the construction of a peaceable society. Its doctrine of inter-“community” tolerance, in the form of parity of esteem, assumes the communal interpretation of the north of Ireland to be accurate. Hence, the peace process has played a key role in the (re)production and dissemination of the current peoplehood ideology, rendering ethnicity hegemonic and normative (Finlay 2010). Concurrently, the peace process has been rooted in a particular political-economic framework, bolstering and perpetuating capitalist hegemony. In this section, I explore the interaction between these dual hegemonies and Ulster-Scots ethnopedagogy.

For Gramsci (1982:12), institutions within society act as conduits for hegemonic ideology. Society is to be understood as consisting of two ‘superstructural “levels”’; civil society (the ‘ensemble of organisms commonly called “private”’), and political society (essentially state institutions). Far from being neutral or apolitical zones, the institutions of civil society act as buffers against revolution by organising and perpetuating consent to domination (Burawoy 2012). The control of the ruling class is deeper than mere tyranny; its ideologies percolate through every organ of society, constructing consent to the ruling order. In Gramsci’s schema, the school, as a primary method of childhood socialisation, functions as a key institution of civil society within which consent is cultivated and internalised: ‘the school is the State institution par excellence that prepares children and youth for their appropriate economic and political niches within the prevailing order’, and so functions as one of the ‘primary sites for achieving mass consent for social rule’ (Aronowitz 2002:113). In the school, the pupil “breathes in” the dominant order of normality (Gramsci 1982:31).

In the Northern Irish context, this means socialisation not only into the contemporary form of capitalism, but also into the consociational peoplehood ideology. The school tends to instil the prevailing formula of identificatory differences; conflictual (in the form of sectarianism) and peace-building (consociational tolerance). The maintenance of these two hegemonic ideological orders is not distinct but interconnected. Lipschutz (1998:7) described the consociational peace-process as representing ‘neoliberal peace’: ‘one that is characterised by formal democratic procedures and market economies, but which fails to address the deeper causes and consequences of communitarian violence.’ He contended that the production of a peace which entailed the creation of a more holistically equal society would be a more productive, equitable, and lasting solution. Similarly, Crighton (1998:78) described liberal peace-building’s primary goal in Northern Ireland as involving the achievement of ‘a
minimalist definition of peace (the absence of armed conflict) and to move as quickly as possible to promote a transition to democratic governance and a market economy.’ Capitalist peace theorists have also contended for neoliberal approaches to peace-building, citing its capacity to build ‘possessive individualism,’ as Nagle (2010:227,228) explains:

The pacific benefit of entrepreneurialism is not only that it is seen to correlate with greater prosperity, but that it also teaches actors the merits of how to be individuals rather than mere components of a communal culture. Indeed, seeing that the role of the state in free-market societies is to provide a supportive context for entrepreneurialism to flourish, powerful interest groups, such as ethnonational groups, have to be minimised since they will distort state interventions for their own benefit. For these reasons, indigenous entrepreneurialism is often actively encouraged as part of peacebuilding projects.

As Nagle points out, possessive individualism can lead to anomie, increased fracturing of society, and even ethnic violence. Citing Harvey (2005), he describes capitalism’s need for the ‘centripetal’ force of national identity, contending that such identities are frequently sources of division rather than solidarity in areas which have experienced protracted conflict (Nagle 2010:228). In the Northern Irish context, however, it would appear that the hegemony of binary identity politics has restricted the atomisational capacity of the market.

Ulster-Scots education bridges the gulf between possessive individualism and communal identification. As described in chapter seven, the Ulster-Scot is to be understood as ethnically libertarian. Within both the documentary analysis and within interviews, the alleged atomisation of ethnic Ulster-Scots was repeatedly provided as a primary rationale for the historical lack of salience of their communal identity. Furthermore, they are conceptualised as being naturally predisposed toward free market competition. In this sense, Ulster-Scots education exemplifies an archetypical liberal consociational identity, providing something of a reconciliation in the tensions inherent within neoliberal consociational peace-building. Thus, in terms of the functioning of hegemony through civil society, the teaching of Ulster-Scots within schools socialises in line with the dominant economic and communal peoplehood ideologies.

The Ulster-Scots story of peoplehood also provides considerable support for the notion of meritocracy, in the form of an alleged preference for, and specific capacity to thrive with, freedom for individual action unimpeded by communalism. The notion of educational meritocracy holds considerable capacity to replicate societal inequalities. Bourdieu (1974) considered the school to be a conservative force, serving, in practice, to perpetuate the prevailing order. Assertions of school-based education’s meritocratic nature tend to fail to take
into account both that educational achievement equates to the level of particular types of cultural capital acquired, and that this cultural capital correlates to the culture of dominant elites. Bourdieu (1974:39) writes;

The culture of the elite is so near to that of the school that children from the lower middle class … can only acquire with great effort something which is given to the children of the cultivated classes – style, taste, wit – in short, those attitudes and aptitudes which seem so natural in members of the cultivated classes and naturally expected of them precisely because … they are the culture of that class.

This system serves to reconstruct and perpetuate class inequality, reproducing and demanding ‘an aristocratic culture and, above all, an aristocratic relationship with it’ (Bourdieu 1974:39). The myth of educational meritocracy, and so socio-economic mobility, allows for the continuation of the class hierarchy under the guise of self-efficacy and the rewarding of what is alleged to be natural ability. In short, the pupils are instilled with a sense that ‘they themselves have chosen the fate that was already reserved for them’ (Bourdieu 1974:43). Meritocracy has become a normative argument in support of maintaining Northern Ireland’s educational separations, specifically through the division between the grammar and non-grammar sectors. With Ulster-Scots education, meritocracy is buttressed as an ethnic preference. However, rather than entailing a Bourdieusian notion of assimilation to bourgeois society, Ulster-Scots involves the notion of conceptualising the self as being within an apparently benevolent, hard-working, working-class culture.

While Bourdieu’s argument reflects societal outcomes, the Ulster-Scots hypothesis of ethnic exceptionalism is notional and based upon myth. Given the newness of Ulster-Scots education, it is too early to tell what success such propertisation will have. However, the existence of this notion within the Ulster-Scots peoplehood story is, in itself, conceptually informative. Emphasising a non-aristocratic peoplehood story in a region historically characterised by colonial control, Protestant supremacy, religious disparities117, and class-based inequality represents a claim of absolution from systemic inequalities. Concurrently, it

117 While current levels of Protestant-Catholic inequality are only very rarely discussed, evidence from the 2011 census suggests that this is ongoing. Taking the most detailed area data, I found a weak positive correlation between levels of Roman Catholic identification and unemployment, C2 (skilled manual) and DE (semi-skilled and unskilled manual, unemployed and lowest grade) labour market outcomes in the areas (correlation coefficients of 0.29, 0.10 and 0.18 respectively), and weak negative correlation with the AB (higher and intermediate managerial, administrative, professional) and C1 (supervisory, clerical & junior managerial, administrative, professional) occupations (-0.10 and -0.30 respectively). Conversely, Protestant identification involved almost no correlation with AB and C2 occupations (0.07 and 0.03), weak positive correlation with C1 jobs (0.24), and weak negative correlation with both unemployment and DE (-0.34 and -0.20 respectively) (data utilised taken from NISRA 2011).
reconceptualises the alleged descendants of Scottish settler-colonists as enterprising underdogs. Hence, as a discourse to be embedded within an education system saturated in notions of meritocracy, Ulster-Scots education contains considerable capacity for reinforcing dominant dialogues, and so perpetuating structural inequalities.

The conceptualisation of Ulster-Scots as both a natural, ethnic identity and a productive means of constructing peace through communal tolerance evidences the strength of the consociational peoplehood ideology in post-GFA Northern Ireland. It evidences my theoretical approach to consociation as being a social structure which not merely “freezes” collective difference, but one in which limits are constructed within which ideas of ethnic identity are continuously and dynamically reimagined. With Ulster-Scots education, the mapping of particular economic ideologies onto essentialist notions of ethnic character, as described in chapter seven, can render consent to the neoliberal peace even more concrete. Hence, this research demonstrates the workings of hegemony within this ethnopedagogical case study. Before discussing further specific issues relating to the education system in the north of Ireland, in the section that follows I discuss sociological approaches to power in education.

10.2 Power and Pedagogy

The operation of power within the education system is implicit throughout the preceding section. In this section, I wish to assess the workings of power more directly. The workings of structures of power is a central component to critical pedagogical theory; a theme which is pervasive in the work of the field’s founding father, Paulo Freire. Henry Giroux, in his introduction to Freire’s work The Politics of Education, states that in his schema;

> Power works both on and through people. … Power … is not exhausted in those public and private spheres where governments, ruling classes, and other dominant groups operate. It is more ubiquitous and is expressed in a range of oppositional public spaces and spheres that traditionally have been characterised by the absence of power and thus any form of resistance (Freire 1985:xix).

Despite being diffuse, power in Freire’s model remains understood to be exercised over the oppressed by the oppressor, in both the singular/individual and plural/collective senses. Similar to Gramsci, Freire viewed the school as a structure of civil society in which individuals are socialised into the culture of the ruling class, entailing both a Gramsci’s “breathing in” of hegemonic ideology and Bourdieu’s notion of cultural capital as “aristocratic culture.” However, Freire’s focus was more concretely upon remedy, arguing that liberating education must come from below. In Pedagogy of the Oppressed, he contended for the need for a radical
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rejection of conventional hegemonic education for one which liberated both the oppressor and the oppressed. For Freire, oppressors mount a ‘cultural invasion’ on the oppressed in which the ‘invaders mould’ and ‘those they invade are moulded,’ whether consciously or unknowingly (Freire 1996:133). This, in Freire’s view, is a key aspect of oppressive pedagogy:

One of the basic elements of the relationship between oppressor and oppressed in prescription. Every prescription represents the imposition of one individual’s choice upon another, transforming the consciousness of the person prescribed to into one that conforms with the prescriber’s consciousness. Thus, the behaviour of the oppressed is a prescribed behaviour, following as it does the guidelines of the oppressor. The oppressed … [internalise] the image of the oppressor and [adopt] his guidelines (1996:28–29).

Hence, power functions within education systems such that individuals can be remade in the image of the ruling ideology.

Gramsci, diverging from the Marxist-Leninist model of the state, saw capitalism’s resilience not (merely) being the result of coercion or the ‘fooling’ of the ‘common people’ (Lenin 2011:40), but of the active acquisition of the consent of the masses to the domination of the ruling class (Burawoy 2003, 2012). Within such a society the ideology of the ruling class is rendered hegemonic; their maxims, articulated by their “traditional intellectuals”, are imbued in society and are made normative (Gramsci 1982). The power of the oppressor over the oppressed is oftentimes more silent and insidious, internalised by, and for the most part invisible to, the former and the latter alike. Michael Burawoy (2003:214–15) explains:

Force never disappears but recedes in visibility as the arena of consent expands. Force moves offstage to be mobilised against individual deviants and in anticipation of moments of crisis. If sociologists contrast social order sustained by “value consensus” with a social order sustained by fear of coercion, Gramsci’s hegemony explicitly connects the two. Thus, consent is not to be understood as the sociologist’s “spontaneous consensus” that holds society together but rather as something that is organised through specific institutions and always (and necessarily) backed up by the potential application of force.

The power to acquire consent to domination through hegemonic ideology is a more potent force than coercion for the production of acquiescing masses.

For Foucault (1979:139), the school developed within the framework of the ‘new micro-physics’ of power which arose from the seventeenth century. Out of the early modern period’s array of educational institutions, the school emerged as the ‘chief socialising mechanism intermediate between the family and the world of work’ (Deacon 2006:179; Foucault 1979). Foucault (1998:140, 2003) similarly contended that biopower – the ‘numerous and diverse
techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations’ – was considerably more potent and effectual than mere physical coercion. The “micro-physics of power” involved the disciplining of bodies for the control, development, health and fecundity of the population (Foucault 1979, 1998). Individuals within institutions – the soldier, the madman, the patient, the pupil – are disciplined in order to produce ‘docile bodies’; ones which ‘may be subjected, used, transformed and improved’ (Foucault 1971, 1979:138,136). Within the school, disciplinary techniques such as the timetable (to ‘establish rhythms, impose particular occupations, regulate the cycles of repetition’) and the examination (which ‘combines the techniques of an observing hierarchy and those of a normalising judgement’) came to be employed in order to mould, reshape and improve the pupil (Foucault 1979:149,184). ‘[T]he more or less simple transfer of knowledge from one person to another cannot be disentangled from those authoritative processes which seek to instil discipline into the moral fibres of its inmates and thus differentiate between them, their nature, potentialities, levels and values’ (Deacon 2006:181–82). For Foucault, the school is a disciplinary institution: a technology of control over a population.

Where power is diffuse for Freire, in the work of Foucault it is infinitesimal. Beyond the power to coerce or conscribe is the power to describe, define and designate the limits of normality, of accurate epistemology, of truth and knowledge (Foucault 1980, 2003, 2009). For Foucault, large-scale constellations of power are assembled from below out of the ‘infinitesimal mechanisms of power’ (Foucault 1980:99). He writes:

Power comes from below; that is, there is no binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations and serving as a general matrix – no such duality extending from the top down and reacting on more and more limited groups to the very depths of the social body. … [T]he manifold relationships of force that take shape and come into play in the machinery of production, in families, limited groups, and institutions, are the basis for wide-ranging effects of cleavage that run through the social body as a whole. These then form a general line of force that traverses the local oppositions and links them together; to be sure, they also bring about redistributions, realignments, homogenisations, serial arrangements, and convergences of the force relations. Major dominations are the hegemonic effects that are sustained by all these confrontations (1998:94).

According to Foucault, minutil forces occurring within the institutions of civil society build upward, by which hegemonic ideologies are both produced and perpetuated. Within this nexus, education goes beyond the domination of one group over another through an oppressive pedagogy; the nature of reality and normativity has come to be restrained not by a nefarious elite, but through an aggregation of essentially untraceable and unconscious forces.
Gramsci saw hegemonic ideology as emanating from the ruling class, Foucault viewed the existence of domination as emanating from hegemonic ideology which bubbles up from below. This postulation in poststructuralist thought has been critiqued for its deconstruction of the basis for the observation of exploitation and capitalist hegemony. For McLaren (2003:161), such theorists ‘privilege structures of deference over structures of exploitation, and relations of exchange over relations of production’ and ‘replace the idea that power is class-specific and historically bound with the idea that power is everywhere and nowhere.’ In doing so, ‘they end up advancing a philosophical commission that propagates hegemonic class rule and establishing the rule of the capitalist class.’ In this register, Foucault’s work has been criticised not only for deterministically restricting agency, but also restricting it in terms of revolutionary action. While I broadly agree with this critique of Foucault, insofar as his work could occlude and therefore perpetuate the domination of the ruling class, I consider the critique to encompass something of a misinterpretation of Foucault’s work. As Butler (1993) has pointed out, his work ought to be read as admonition and a call to action, rather than mere fatalism. Despite his conceptualisation of power as infinitesimal, he calls for a countering of the dominations which he describes. However, while Foucault sheds light on the micro-functioning of power, I consider the absence of concrete societal power hierarchies in his work to be problematic.

Critical pedagogy points to the school as an institution of civil society within which hegemonic ideology functions to produce particular subjects. In the context of education in the north of Ireland, it calls attention to the functioning of power and ideology within schools, including the hermeneutics of conflict, the hegemony of identity politics, and the production of neoliberal peace. All institutions of civil society in the region have come to be infused with, and embedded in, the language of communal identification, from police and parliament to businesses and schools. As I have discussed in this section, the latter socialises children into particular constellations of normality, imbuing them with particular modalities of being. In Northern Ireland’s schools, even where unconscious, unremarked upon, or even actively excluded, conceptions of ethno-religious identification pervade. Concomitantly, as described in the former section, consociational peoplehood ideology is accompanied by the hegemony of neoliberalism and capitalist peace. Any attempt to construct a “pedagogy of liberation” in the north of Ireland must critically engage with the relationship between the school and hegemonic ideology. In the previous chapter, I described Ulster-Scots as an attempt to reinstate a sense of collective dignity for Protestants in the north of Ireland. In the following section, I readdress the question of the sort of dignity Ulster-Scots provides, and contrast it with more progressive approaches to accessing dignity.
10.3 Dignity, Culture, Power

Through this thesis, I have argued that Ulster-Scots represents an attempt to reinstate a sense of collective dignity in an ideological sphere in which symmetric, mutually exclusive expressions of communal difference have been rendered hegemonic. Building upon Hodson (1996) and Lamont’s (2000) work, I contended that collective dignity entails the capacity to gain autonomy over articulating the identity of the group – its characteristics, history, aspirations, and destiny – such that the collective may (potentially) be shielded from abuse. However, such stories of peoplehood involve power asymmetries (Smith 2003). Communal narratives ‘serve to justify the exercise of power by those who possess it and which serve to reconcile others to the face that they do not’ (Thompson 1990:61–62). In this sense, collective dignity is not an ethic for the masses, but an elite aspiration. It is a discourse which maximises the dignity of the dominant, and not primarily for the general polity. I would argue that alternative approaches to dignity would serve better those to be included within the elite discourse of Ulster-Scots, and offer a more productive peace-building pedagogy.

A criticism of the cultural turn of the 1980s, and the institutional changes established in the wake of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, was that it involved a whitewashing of local expressions and cultures into two homogenised communities. This included overwriting the history and reality of many Protestants who engaged for decades, both self-consciously and un-self-consciously, in what was considered “Irish culture” (Crowley 2005; Dowling 2007). This consociational peoplehood ideology was then consolidated in the form of the GFA. The Ulster-Scots movement engages simultaneously in separations from manifestations of Irishness, limited permissions of liminality, and some redefinitions of local practice which may otherwise have been classified as Irish. In this sense, Ulster-Scots is a sedimentation of the consociational ideal.

For promoters of Ulster-Scots, the threat of not developing it as a discrete ethnic identity is their absorption into Irishness. As Gregory Campbell put it,

There are significant elements of cross-over [between Ulster-Scots and Irishness]. I think, by and large, that is a good thing, as long as it doesn’t … bastardise either tradition, outlook or culture. To take the Ulster-Scots culture, that it doesn’t become subsumed into a relatively insignificant element of Irishness. … Some of the cross-over is designed to show that this is all aspects of Irishness, and that Ulster-Scots is a particular aspect of Irishness which can be accommodated within the Irish diaspora – it can’t. I think that’s the danger area that quite a few people have recognised. It a distinct, cultural entity in its own right. It doesn’t sit at logger-heads with Irishness, but it does sit as a separate entity. It quite easily overlaps … but that overlap shouldn’t
be confused with a view that eventually this will all become some huge mass of indistinguishable Irish cultural identities.

For many of the participants interviewed for this research, without Ulster-Scots as a bright boundary of differentiation, they would be at risk of absorption into Irishness. However, outside of its political, cultural and educational elites, the scope for autonomy over self-definition is considerably limited. Despite Ulster-Scots claims over giving dignity to local voices, rather than an elite-led cultural defence of unionism, it fails to take into consideration its capacity to overlay the multiplicity of local experiences and culture with a solid “Ulster tartan.”

There a conspicuous absence of concern over the culture of, say, Ballymena being subsumed into a relatively insignificant element of Ulster-Scots.

Hence, my point is not that Ulster-Scots promoters ought to give in and embrace some submerged truth of their Irishness, correcting a false consciousness of separation from the Irish nation. Rather, it is to recognise that both Ulster-Scottishness and Irishness represent competing elite projects which funnel local experience into larger narratives for specific political ends. Ulster-Scots, in countering the Irish nationalist project, does not correct it with a more authentic and local expression of culture, but replaces it with an alternative, equally problematic, form of peoplehood.

So what alternative dignity-enhancing projects are available to potential Ulster-Scots? Perhaps the most obvious alternative to collective dignity is the liberal vision of individual dignity. Liberalism has historically offered a strong discourse on dignity, and has enjoyed a renaissance of sorts in recent years (see Dworkin 2011; Kateb 2011; Rosen 2012; Wallach 2013). Liberal visions of human rights stress each individual’s personal, inalienable dignity as a member of universal humanhood. Such ‘liberal dignity,’ however, tends to be a somewhat limited project, aiming to ‘dispel degradation without promoting transformation’ (Wallach 2013). Such a limited project produces ideal citizens for capitalist exploitation, their consent acquired through the guaranteeing of minimal freedoms and protections. Importantly, however, too stark a boundary can be drawn between liberalism and ethnic groupist approaches. Liberal governmental practice has entailed both individualist and communal projects. As peace-building in Northern Ireland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq and elsewhere have illustrated, communalism is not ‘the antithesis of liberal “good governance”’ but as one of its foremost techniques’ (Finlay 2015:224).

118 See Ullans magazine (Dickson 1995).
Rather than liberal models of dignity, both communal and individualistic, perhaps the dignity sought through Ulster-Scots is best attained through a democratisation of narrative autonomy and an opening out of societal capacity for pursuing the subversion of forms of domination, alienation, and exploitation. Such a restoration of dignity must involve a reflexivity as to the group’s historical position; in the case of Ulster Unionists, a recognition of their historic position of domination. For Paulo Freire, situations of oppression involve the dehumanisation of both oppressed and oppressor, the latter dehumanised by their oppression of the former. The dignity for the oppressor is restored through the leadership of the oppressed, the primary role of the former is to listen and act in solidarity with the latter:

The oppressor is solidary with the oppressed only when he stops regarding the oppressed as an abstract category and sees them as persons who have been unjustly dealt with, deprived of their voice, cheated in the sale of their labor – when he stops making pious, sentimental, and individualistic gestures and risks an act of love. True solidarity is found only in the plenitude of this act of love in its existentiality, in its praxis.

Adopting Freire’s approach, a key to the restoration of the dignity of Protestants in the north of Ireland would be found in listening to, and solidarity with, Catholics. The (once) dominant must be led to re-humanisation by those dominated by the many dimensions of the intersectional matrix of domination. Nevertheless, as Sara Ahmed (2014) has pointed out, we must remain critical of the sorts of politics carried out in the name of love, rather than assuming discourses of love to render it de facto productive. Indeed, Unionist ‘love for difference’ discourses toward Catholics and Irishness, amounting to pious, sentimental, and individualistic gestures of intercommunal tolerance, are found within Ulster-Scots discourses.

In opposition to a Freirean restoration of humanity, Ulster-Scots attempts to regain dignity by overwriting domination with folksy tales of dance, fiddle and kilt, of potato-bread and tartan, of families carrying culture and language across the short North Channel of the Irish sea. (Settler-)colonial rule, Orange populism, and bourgeois sectarianism are all rebranded as products of English domination. All domineering Protestant actions are the product of an unavoidable “thran” ethnic spirit, for which the Ulster-Scots of old cannot be blamed. As I argue in chapter 9, the dignity of Ulster-Scots is comparable to white pride; a regressive, me-too-ist dignity aiming to articulate an ‘acceptable face of white nationalism’ (Dyer 1997:10). In its place, there is a need for a de-ethnicised dignity founded on countering the various outcomes of the history of Protestant/unionist domination in the north of Ireland. To return to Freire (1996:36), a more progressive form of pedagogy, which could more fully provide the
dignity sought through Ulster-Scots, would involve the unveiling of the world of oppression and its transformation by the oppressed and, subsequently, once ‘the reality of oppression has already been transformed, this pedagogy ceases to belong to the oppressed and becomes a pedagogy of all people in the process of permanent liberation.’ Whereas such liberation requires a healing admission of guilt from the dominant group, Ulster-Scots aims for mutual victimhood with the Irish and a sanitisation of the history of domination in the North of Ireland.

10.4 Ulster-Scots’ Progressive Kernels

Overall, Ulster-Scots represents a damaging and regressive addition to Northern Ireland’s educational landscape. This said, in this section I wish to draw out several of its features which, if applied holistically and developed in a more progressive direction could be potentially beneficial. I contend that Ulster-Scots education contains four kernels of a progressive deconstructivist approach to collective identity, language, and place: a reorientation away from stories of hard indigeneity toward journey narratives; an opening for inclusion of migrating languages; a rejection, or vigorous critique, of nationalism; and an inclusion of the local.

First, the notion of territorial belonging which Ulster-Scots education pursues places the history of journeys at its core. This has the capacity to be highly productive in allowing for breaking down the dichotomy between autochthonous and non-autochthonous, and radically incorporating traveller and immigrant populations. It includes a recognition of movement as a meaningful, routine, and legitimate element of human society, and contends for a conceptualisation of that movement which considers both the place left and arrived at to be important in the production of the identity of the individual. If extended beyond its narrow ethnic reading, this could lead to greater incorporation of migrant and traveller groups, as well as breaking down boundaries of difference in this respect. In its current form, however, the dissolution of the category of “native” often entails either moving the line such that it includes Ulster-Scots, or simply counters Irish nationalist autochthonity claims. With regards to the latter, this is a productive critique of Irish nationalism, but only where not accompanied by a tacit defence of unionism.

In relation to the deconstructivist potential of the “journeys” narrative, several theoretical developments would render the approach taken within Ulster-Scots education more progressive. Most obviously, there is a need at the educational and political level to explicitly extend this dialogue to incorporate more than Ulster-Scots (and occasionally Ulster-English). Likewise, there is a need to develop further the limited rejection of nations and national
boundaries, such that the range of diversity of/through journeys extends beyond the nationally-specific. Doing so would avoid merely recreating the notions of bordered difference which the binary “Ulster”-“Scots” entails. A further progressive potential development would involve the incorporation of discursive forms of identification which entail numerous personal and genealogical journeys. Similarly, where Ulster-Scots tends to situate self within an overarching ethnic story, it would be more fruitful for the production of a pedagogy of liberation to entail specific familial stories, and to allow investigation into how these fit within overarching power structures. Furthermore, I contend that there needs to be a recognition that senses of identity do not inevitably coalesce to journey or place, and any notion that familial history of movement has any de facto automatic bearing on the identity of the individual ought to be rejected outright. To do so, as Ulster-Scots predominantly does, is to construct the individual as a foregone conclusion of historical forces.

Second, an acceptance of linguistic relocation and change opens up the capacity for subverting linguistic hierarchies. Discussions around the languages found within particular states tend to differentiate between indigenous and immigrant languages. For many migrants and migrant communities, the first language is neither English nor an “autochthonous” language. Polish is the most common “immigrant” language spoken in each jurisdiction of the Atlantic Archipelago. Reportage in the media on the numbers of Polish speakers in the censuses have often pitted it against autochthonous (and thus, it is often implied, more legitimate and desirable) languages: in 2011 there were only marginally more speakers of Welsh than Polish in England and Wales, and in Ireland there were more speakers of Polish than Irish (Booth 2013; Poulter and Chorley 2013; RTÉ 2012). Within the UK there are a small number of areas with high concentrations of particular languages. For example, three-quarters of all Yiddish speakers live in Hackney, just less than half of all Pakistani Pahari are located in Birmingham, and a quarter of all Hebrew language speakers live in Barnet (ONS 2013). In stark contrast to the Gaeltacht, the Y Fro Gymraeg, and the Gàidhealtacht, the diminishing populations of which are a source of national anxiety, the existence or growth of “immigrant” linguistic enclaves are more often raised as a cause for concern rather than something to be encouraged or protected. This immigrant-native binary in linguistic categorisation represents a mechanism of the racial state, positioning certain languages – even the “ancient immigrant” languages of Anglo-Saxon, Norse, and Celtic – as within national/state accommodated homogeneity (Goldberg 2002). In

119 Dual English-Bengali and English-Chinese road-signs around Brick Lane and Chinatown respectively within London represent obvious cases to the contrary; however, a discussion of this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this thesis.
relation to traveller languages, exclusion from discussions on the category of “indigeneity” is particularly stark and misleading, given the historical development of Angloromani, Shelta and Scottish Cant within the Atlantic Archipelago. Thus, it represents the ‘power to exclude (and include) in racially ordered terms, to categorise hierarchically, and to set aside’ (Lentin 2007:612).

It is worth noting that, linguistically speaking, Ulster-Scots permits historical migration and change, but is static in relation to current linguistic assemblages. As with the potential for the progressive capacity of the focus on journeys, the deconstruction of notions of difference and the acceptance of a plethora of forms of difference is limited in practice within Ulster-Scots education. Rather, this deconstructivist conception tends to be restricted in practice to where is politically and socially expedient, and is readily converted into an ethnic framework in which boundaries are stark.

Third, and perhaps more concretely observable within the Ulster-Scots discourse, is the caution toward, and critique of, national identity. Graham (2004:497) described the Ulster-Scots movement as ‘inherently anti-British and often can be profoundly anti-Irish,’ and characteristic of the ‘increasingly jaundiced attitudes held by many Loyalists towards the union.’ Although this is to some extent accurate, I contend that the rationale provided for Ulster-Scots ambivalence toward nationalism extends beyond reactionary opposition. The nation and its borders and institutions were perceived by participants to be comparatively novel and changeable in contrast to the alleged depth of ethnic history. Hence, the interconnected concepts of the nation and the state were called into question, conceived of at most as alterable realities of current political opinion. To be sure, at times this took the form of ambivalence toward the union, or disregard for British or Irish nationalism. However, such views tended to be derivative rather than umbilical.

Especially in the north of Ireland, where nationalist aspirations – whether for maintaining British union, constructing Irish unification or federalism, or Northern Irish independence – have been the cause of considerable conflict, ambivalence toward questions of nation and state has the potential to be beneficial. Such a dialogue would also call into question the problematic “Northern Irish” identity, most commonly celebrated as a liberal, inclusive alternative by moderate unionists who fail to recognise as problematic to inclusivity its implicit legitimisation of the partition of Ireland. In a general sense, recognition of the modernity and constructedness of national consciousness within school curricula represents a powerful tool for pedagogies of liberation, going some way to restrain the prescriptive power of nationalist consciousness (Freire 1996; Roth 2006; VanSledright 2008). This said, caution must be
exercised with regards to the Ulster-Scots educational project in this respect. As mentioned above, in the context of Ulster loyalist ideology this approach can be utilised in order to rubbish or obscure the capacity for articulations of Irish nationalist aspirations, and forms of Irishness in the north of Ireland beyond the cultural and ethnic structures within which Ulster-Scots positions itself. As necessary as deconstructivist critiques of Irish nationalist narratives are, this is problematic where it corresponds to a tacit unionist argument. Furthermore, it must be noted that Ulster-Scots critiques of various forms of nationalism are particularly expedient as a rhetorical device, aimed at separating the movement from the unionist political sphere. It is also crucial to recognise that the Ulster-Scots narrative does not solely deconstruct ethnic nationalist peoplehood, but promotes its replacement by an ethnic community peoplehood as the most fundamental and meaningful sense of self. Hence, its liberating potential is restrained.

Fourth, in counterpoint to the previous point, Ulster-Scots incorporates a focus on the local. Local education can prevent overarching nationalist dialogues, restrict the overemphasis of the history, politics, and culture of historically dominant areas (such as London and the Home Counties or Île de France), and have a democratising effect on the scope of legitimate educational knowledge (VanSledright 2008). Doing so can restructure the educational conversation toward the area in which the student is embedded, and challenge power dynamics in Deweyan and Freirean directions (Canagarajah 2002; Smith 1994). In actual discussions of “the local” I observed several meanings and applications of the term. Oftentimes, “local” referred to people and things from Northern Ireland. For example, a broad canon of individuals from throughout the north of Ireland were considered to be ‘local innovators … people in our area’ (PS13). Similarly, as discussed in chapter three, “the local” frequently referred simply to the “Protestant community.” Least commonly, the local referred to individuals, history, and knowledge located within the immediate vicinity of the school. It is this latter understanding of the local which actually contains the progressive element of localism. In its other forms it continues the very prioritisation of overarching peoplehoods and affinities which it purports to counter. In practice, in this regard, Ulster-Scots localism tends to function as an Ulster Protestant “nationalism” of sorts. However, an expansion of the presently limited extent of tangibly local knowledges within schools has the potential to be educationally and socially productive.

In sum, Ulster-Scots education contains some minimal progressive kernels which, if amended and affirmed in certain fundamental ways, could be conducive to a counter-hegemonic pedagogy. Ulster-Scots educationalists tended to view it in its ethnic form as a counter-hegemonic space, overthrowing the dominance of “mainland British” educational
knowledges, and countering the power of the colonial metropolis. Its “organic intellectuals” consist of a loose affiliation of teachers and academics who contend for a rise in Ulster-Scots ethnic consciousness. However, to view Ulster-Scots education as counter-hegemonic in its current form would be fundamentally misguided.

10.5 Conclusion

Through this thesis, I have contended that Ulster-Scots studies represents an ethnicisation of the conception of a discrete Protestant politico-religious “community” within Northern Ireland. I have argued that it holds considerable potential for the deepening of senses of intercommunal differentiation. Rather than presenting the potential for the deconstruction of ideas of difference, such a pedagogy reifies, perpetuates, (re)constructs and even deepens such ideas of difference by grounding notions of difference in ethno-cultural and genealogical bases. In this chapter I have discussed the consequences of this research for the literature on, and approaches to, the production of peace-building education in Northern Ireland. Taking a critical pedagogical approach, I have argued that Ulster-Scots represents a highly problematic addition to Northern Ireland’s system. Its incorporation and reinforcement of consociational hegemony contains a considerable capacity to exacerbate senses of difference produced through the region’s segregated schooling. In its place, I have posited that deconstructivist approaches to history, language, culture, and cultural identity, which illuminate rather than occlude the workings of hegemony, would be more conducive for working toward the construction of positive peace.
Chapter Eleven
Conclusion

Ulster-Scots education is a pedagogy of consociational tolerance. It involves three dimensions of tolerance: for one’s (communal, ethnic) “self,” for the Other, and a tolerance for tolerance itself. With Wendy Brown (2006), I consider tolerance to be a politics of differentiation through which boundary of self and Other is maintained, and that Other kept to some extent at arm’s length. Within the framework of Northern Irish peace, Ulster-Scots education serves as a more fully ethnicised form of single-identity work, reproducing yet transforming senses of Protestant-Catholic cleavage. Although the extent to which Ulster-Scots was understood to be congruent with the notional “Protestant community” was not homogenous, the notion of Ulster-Scots as a discrete, differentiable entity was pervasive. Hence its introduction into the education system was defended on the grounds of consociational logic: the production of peace through the permission of all within the society to freely express their ethnic identification, and ingroup respect as a basic necessity for good inter-communal relations.

As I argued in chapter two, consociational institutions do not merely “freeze” ethnic identities, but establishes social boundaries within which normal articulations of the self are restricted and under which new forms of identifications can be produced within ethnic blinkers. Hence, Ulster-Scots education indeed fits with the consociational ideal of communal difference, but also illustrates how new forms of identification can be produced within the consociational logic without merely reconstructing or perpetuating the precise bifurcation of Protestant-unionist and Catholic-nationalist. Not only does this dynamic legitimise, perpetuate, and deepen the notion of distinct, bifurcated ethnonational identities; the legitimacy of identity politics provides the basis for its development and advocacy as an ethical necessity. The attempts by Ulster-Scots educationalists to distance it – and themselves – from the worst excesses of unionism, loyalism, Orangeism, and Protestant domination represents an attempt to render public expressions of association with, and celebration of, “Protestant community” culture socially defensible: a search for an acceptable face for Ulster Protestantism.

For many of its teachers, Ulster-Scots education permitted an engagement with “Protestant community” themes within the classroom. Its reformulated narrative of peoplehood, decoupling from “politics” and aligning with theories of single-identity work, allowed for its introduction to be considered morally defensible, even preferable. A minority of teachers viewed Ulster-Scots education primarily as opening up the space for engagement
with local history and dialect. For others, free professional tuition from the Ulster-Scots Agency was a pragmatic solution to recessionary cuts to education budgets. Interspersed with social and political perspectives, almost all who engaged in Ulster-Scots education shared some level of interest in the history and/or linguistic features of the region. Far from being grounded in reactionary, anti-Irish or sectarian politics, it was considered by its proponents, instigators and practitioners to be a means of producing stable (consociational) peace, encouraging communal parity of esteem.

Ulster-Scots was conceptualised within this framework primarily as an ethno-cultural, more than linguistic, identity. Its boundaries of inclusion were not static, ranging from the white, Protestant, unionist/loyalist descendants of firmly Scottish settlers to more open formulations through acculturation or its grounding solely in journeys. I contended that this altering permeability was instrumental, utilised where doing so would be productive in presenting Ulster-Scots as open, modern, non-sectarian, non-racist, and non-exclusionary. A tension existed between this latter ideal and the maintenance of differentiability: avoiding being ‘subsumed into a relatively insignificant element of Irishness’ or a ‘grey amalgam’ of pan-Northern-Irishness. In explaining the contradictions and ambiguities of Ulster-Scots, I argued that it represents a search for collective dignity; the search for the autonomy to set out the peoplehood narrative to which the individual belongs through which the purported group can potentially be shielded from abuse. However, Ulster-Scots education in its current form represents no attempt at a vergangenheitsbewältigung: it was positioned outside of unionist and loyalist politics and separate from colonial rule (considered, rather, to be the preserve of the British ruling class). Where the Ulster-Scots were understood to have taken negative action, these were often excused as inescapable products of the allegedly innate ethnic characteristic of thranness.

Ulster-Scots was, in the main, considered a working-class culture. Concurrently, the cohort of schools at the time of research was primarily situated in more middle-class areas. This allowed for a discourse of being hard-working and moral yet not wealthy or dominant; a ‘propertisation’ (Skeggs 2004) of the ‘dignity of working men’ (Lamont 2000). However, doing so also holds the capacity to appropriate the acceptance of one’s position within the socioeconomic hierarchy which such discourses can provide. In terms of economic ideology, the Ulster-Scots story of peoplehood provides an ethnicised defence of free-market, laissez-

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120 Vergangenheitsbewältigung means “overcoming the past,” and is commonly used in reference to efforts of the German state to deal with its problematic twentieth-century history.
faire political-economic ideology. Furthermore, free-market liberal democracy was reimagined as a contribution which emerged, especially within the US, out of the ethnic characteristics of the Ulster-Scots settlers. Hence, an aspect of the political significance of the Ulster-Scots story of peoplehood is its considerable capability to produce consent to the current political-economic system, as well as the positioning of those associated with it as naturally inclined to desire further development toward right-wing economic policy.

11.1 Contributions

This research contributes to several bodies of literature. In this section, I discuss its contributions to several fields, some of its implications, and potential future research directions which result from it.

11.1.1 Consociational Civil Society and Intercommunal Conflict

Consociationalism has continued to enjoy precedence as a solution to conflicts interpreted as grounded in intercommunal difference, especially among liberal interventionists. Although several theorists have pointed to the normative effect of consociationalism upon conceptions of ethnic blocs (Dixon 2012; Finlay 2010), this research contributes to the field an empirical illustration of the effect of that normativity upon the production of peoplehood ideologies and narratives. Taking a Gramscian approach, I have contended that consociational ideology has become hegemonic in the north of Ireland. Hence, identities are not merely frozen but dynamically (re)produced within its normative framework. Ulster-Scots education represents a development in line with this normative framework, rooted in notions of collective tolerance, parity of esteem, and bright communal boundaries as necessary for peaceable relations. McGarry and O’Leary’s (2006b, 2007:671) defence of ‘liberal consociationalism’ is based upon a belief in the durability of ethnic identities: ‘While integrationists mostly believe that identities are malleable, transformable, soft, or fluid, consociationalists think that — in certain contexts — they may be resilient, durable, and hard.’ This research illustrates the malleability of identities even within consociationalism’s normative constraints. Liberal consociationalists’ belief in the “pragmatic” politics of communal accommodation overestimates the durability of identities and underestimates the normative effects of consociational ideological hegemony being imbued through the institutions of civil society. Further research in the area is needed, however, to illustrate these dynamics both within Northern Ireland, and within other societies in which consociational peace has been trialled, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Iraq, Benin, Burundi, and others.
McGarry and O’Leary (2007:670) delimit the apparent binary of democratic options for ‘managing national and religious diversity’: integrationism or accommodation, the latter equated with consociationalism. On the former they write:

Integrationist states seek to construct a single overarching public identity. … Integrationists back executive systems that favour candidates who rise above religious, linguistic, and ethnic factions. They favour a unitary centralised state, or a federation that is constructed on nonethnic criteria (2007:670).

Although I do indeed contend for political projects and institutions which do not rest upon, reify and perpetuate (bright) boundaries of collective identification, I do not consider the production of a ‘single overarching public identity’ to be its only alternative. My critique of consociationalism is not to contend for such homogeneity, such as a call for an overarching Northern Irish identity. Rather, I hope for conceptions of difference and place whereby identity is restricted neither to collective or biographical homogeneity. The emphasis on journeys rather than primordial claims to ownership of land within Ulster-Scots education, if a critical position on boundaries of identification was adopted and it was extended to include all migrants both recent and historical, holds the potential to be highly productive, radical narrative of humanhood, moving beyond restrictions by ethnic identity, “race,” nationality, and state boundaries. Unfortunately, Ulster-Scots education tends to restrain the breadth of this reinterpretation to the journey from Scotland to Ulster, whilst maintaining rather than deconstructing ethnic boundaries.

11.1.2 Stories of Peoplehood

Smith (2003), in his seminal work Stories of Peoplehood, trichotomised peoplehood stories into economic, political power, and ethically constitutive subcategories. Whilst the former two are to be understood as relatively ‘intuitively clear,’ ethically constitutive stories differ from both the economic and political power stories insofar as they ‘present membership in a particular people as somehow intrinsic to who its members really are, because of traits that are imbued with ethical significance’ (2003:64). In doing so, Smith (2003:133) severs collective identity from material and ideological context, and restricts action upon domination and exploitation to a mere plea for stories to permit ‘basic economic liberties.’ Smith’s break with Gramsci was instrumental in this regard. Whereas Gramsci’s notion of consent to particular narratives of normativity implicates acquiescence to domination through the hegemony of political-economic ideology, Smith valorises consent to peoplehoods insofar as he perceives their durability to be psychologically benevolent.
In chapter seven I demonstrated how the economic narratives within Ulster-Scots ethnopedagogy are not as dissociable from ethically constitutive stories as Smith contends. Indeed, economic stories, both in terms of the historical and current socioeconomic position of the ethnic group and the ideologies allegedly espoused by it, are evident in the descriptions of Ulster-Scots traits. Since the nineties, neoliberalism has dominated Northern Ireland’s political-economic landscape. Despite the failure of the much-promised “peace dividend” to fully materialise through the ‘neoliberal peace,’ even for the working-class communities to whom it was most fervently promulgated, belief in market-based redemption remains strong both in terms of peacetime economic prosperity and the potential for individualist consumerism to replace interests in the maintenance of intercommunal hatreds (Coulter 2014; Lipschutz 1998; Nagle 2009). Inequality and class divisions have, in fact, been exacerbated in the “post-conflict” period, and, within the UK, the province has experienced a disproportionately sharper downturn and slower recovery since 2009 (Shaheen and Lupton 2015). Recognition of the indissociability of the economic, political power and ethically constitutive within stories of peoplehood illuminates the extent to which conceptualisations of class mobility, Ulster-Scots-Americanism and *homo liberalismus* within the peoplehood stories of Ulster-Scots ethnopedagogy can align with and reinforce neoliberal hegemony in Northern Ireland.

Although Ulster-Scots provides a productive counter-example to Smith’s trichotomy of peoplehood stories, further research is required in order to provide a more robust rebuttal. Investigations into this dynamic within other peoplehood stories is required in order to establish the various mechanisms through which this dynamic occurs in other contexts and to investigate potential effects of ethically constitutive economic ideology. Doing so not just for ethnic, racial, national, and state-level identifications, but also for other formulations of “political peoplehood” would deepen insight into the functioning of hegemonic ideology through civil society. However, through this research I developed Smith’s theoretical approach, replacing his conceptual demarcation and separation of different sorts of stories, wherein various aspects of a narrative are summated, with an intersectional approach in which such aspects are interwoven within the peoplehood narrative to produce intersectional realities.

11.1.3 The Literature on Ulster-Scots

The literature on Ulster-Scots has mostly included two approaches: those who uncritically accept it as authentic or defend at as a legitimate linguistic-cultural movement (see Hagan 2007; Stapleton and Wilson 2004), and those who dismiss it as nothing more than reactionary, neo-sectarian, anti-Irish politics. Among the latter, it is viewed as constituted by
'the cultural wing of loyalism or the ethnic branch of unionism’ (Dowling 2007; Mac Giolla Chríost 2012; Graham 2004; Níc Craith 2003:83). For Mac Póilin (1999:109,112) it is the ‘Unionist answer to Irish’; a discourse of ‘competitive victimhood’ invoked by unionists and loyalists as a counter to Irish language and culture. Although through this research I have taken a critical stance on Ulster-Scots, considering it to be indeed a late-twentieth-century (re)invention, I do not conclude that it merely represents reactionary politics, ‘competitive victimhood’ or unionist-loyalist cultural combat. I have contended that Ulster-Scots does indeed have associations with PUL ideas and identifications, but the conceptualisations of how closely these align varies considerably. Further, its promoters tended to consider Ulster-Scots education to be part of a progressive movement toward the production of a more tolerant, peaceable society. Far from engaging in a cultural war, this research illustrates its alignment with current hegemonic ideological framework in Northern Ireland: ethnic boundaries, single-identity work, and consociationalism. Hence, rather than a search for ethnic retaliation, I have contended that Ulster-Scots education represents a search for collective dignity at a point where such dignity is perceived as under threat.

This research represents the first investigation into Ulster-Scots education, and the most intensive study of its ethnic narratives to date. This research has been carried out at a relatively early stage in its development. The staff of the Agency expressed grand aspirations for the future of Ulster-Scots education and, with continued funding and support from Stormont and increased traction both socially and within schools, it would appear likely to continue to rise. Data collected at this early stage will be productive for future research in the area. Future research will be required to analyse it as it increases in formal structure.

This research further develops the field by adopting an intersectional approach to the analysis of Ulster-Scots, describing the interaction between ethnicity, race, political perspectives, religion, class, and gender and sexuality. I detailed the intersections of Ulster-Scots with political and religious identifications and perspectives, developing further the understanding of the phenomenon beyond the current scope of the literature. I also described in detail the relationship between Ulster-Scots, class, and political-economic ideology, a consideration essentially absent from the literature. Further research is required in the area, especially in order investigate its relationship to race and racial ideology, and to gender, sexuality, and sex.
11.1.4 Ethnic Education

Through this thesis I have contended that Ulster-Scots studies represents an ethnicisation of the conception of a discrete Protestant politico-religious “community” within Northern Ireland. As such, it holds considerable potential for the deepening of senses of intercommunal differentiation. Rather than presenting the potential for the deconstruction of ideas of difference, such a pedagogy reifies, perpetuates, (re)constructs and even deepens ideas of difference by grounding notions of difference in ethno-cultural and genealogical bases. I contend that the incorporation of Ulster-Scots into integrated and shared campus schools has the potential to severely diminish the extent to which such institutions can create communal boundary blurring. Furthermore, its economic story has the capacity to ethnicise consent to the economic status-quo. In the context of Northern Ireland’s neoliberal peace, the positioning of working-class culture as ethnically predisposed to free-market entrepreneurialism restrains dissent from neoliberal hegemony.

Ulster-Scots education is far from a pedagogy of the oppressed (Freire 1996). Much of the literature on minority ethnic, cultural and linguistic pedagogical projects consider its development to be productive insofar as it provides representation for groups suffering discrimination, underrepresentation, and other forms of domination. The literature on single-identity work education programmes has tended to focus on the defence, maintenance and inequalities relating to specific collective identifications under threat, such as minority ethnic, religious, cultural, national and/or linguistic identities. Investigations of the development of ethnic group consciousness affiliated with the historically dominant, rather than dominated, is relatively uncommon, and hence is a productive addition to the literature. Furthermore, it raises the following questions for the analysis of ethnopedagogies for peace-building and multicultural approaches to education: to what extent does the educational programme reify, avoid or deconstruct the notion of bounded categories?; and does it address the system of historical and present systems of power? This study calls into question the efficacy ethnopedagogies which reify or deepen senses of collective difference as a mechanism of peace-building in post-conflict societies.

11.2 Stagnant Marshes in Moonlight

Galtung (1969:168) described structural violence as being ‘present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realisations are below their

121 Portions of this chapter have been published (see Gardner 2017).
potential realisation.’ Perhaps most clearly, such structural violence can involve the enactment of forms of oppression upon individuals read by their oppressor (and perhaps also themselves) as being within a defined group. However, structural violence can take numerous forms, and is intersectional in both construction and effect. For example, material and life-chance inequalities have distinct somatic and mental effects on the individual, and are effected by the intersections of various collective identifications (see, for example, Therborn 2013). The presence of segregation on the basis of collective identity of any sort within a society – be it segregation of the mind alone or in addition to physical separation – is a form of structural violence. As described in chapter ten, power over normativity is more potent than mere physical coercion. Such is the case for Northern Ireland’s hegemony of ethnic peoples and collective tolerance. In areas of ‘ethnically framed conflict’ (Brubaker 2004:166), the construction of peace through ethnic hegemony is particularly malignant in this sense.

Hence, Galtung (1969) distinguished between a situation of positive peace (the absence of physical and structural violence) from that of negative peace (the absence of physical violence only). In a similar vein, Câmara (1971:59,33) contended that ‘there can be instances of false peace, with the same deceptive beauty as stagnant marshes in moonlight’:

If there is some corner of the world which has remained peaceful, but with a peace based on injustices – the peace of a swamp with rotten matter fermenting in its depths – we may be sure that the peace is false.

Especially in light of the normative effects of consociationalism’s peoplehood ideology, McGarry and O’Leary’s (2006b) notion that the Northern Irish case represents a benevolent ‘liberal’ consociationalism appears even more spurious. Rather, the hegemonic ideology of neo-liberal consociationalism has produced the ‘peace of a swamp,’ (re)producing and perpetuating various forms of structural violence. Northern Ireland has fallen victim to every one of Câmara’s ‘seven capital sins of the modern world: racialism, colonialism, war, paternalism, pharisaism, alienation and fear’ (1971:76). If positive peace is to be achieved, structural violence and injustices must be addressed and amended. Câmara was something of an optimist, viewing injustices as visible, progressive change almost inevitable, and power structures increasingly evident. I view the situation less favourably, with consociational ethnic normativity hegemonic, the GFA impressively resilient to dissent, and neoliberalism even more-so. Worse still, consociational peace may yet fail on its own terms, with ethnic(ised) tensions bubbling beneath the surface, ethnic difference legitimised and consolidated, and
material inequalities exacerbated. The development toward a positive peace, based on an intersectional interrogation of the mechanisms of structural violence, is an imminent necessity.

Ethnopedagogy has tended to form part of a politics of resistance: a means of countering domination and ethnic or racial exclusion. Ulster-Scots education represents no such pedagogy, but an attempt for those identifying with a previously dominant group to come to terms with a new culture-centric reality. In the context of Northern Ireland, with its rising racism, islamophobia and xenophobia, rampant discrimination relating to gender, sex and sexuality, increasing material inequalities, austerity economics, and considerable inequalities produced through various identificatory intersections, there is indeed much to be fought for in regards to forms of collective exploitation. It is my hope to see a truly radical pedagogy enter schooling in the north of Ireland, rather than the education of consent to the stagnant marshes of ethnic difference.
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Appendices

Appendix 4.1: Primary Schools Questionnaire

Q1. How much would you say that you know about Ulster-Scots?
   □ I know a lot about Ulster-Scots.
   □ I have heard of Ulster-Scots, and I know a little about it.
   □ I have heard of Ulster-Scots, but I don’t know anything about it.
   □ I have never heard of Ulster Scots.

Q2. What is an Ulster-Scot?

Q3. Would you see yourself as an Ulster-Scot?
   □ Yes.
   □ No.
   □ I don’t know.

Why? Or Why not?

Q4. Which of the following do you see yourself as? (Tick as many boxes as you feel describe you)
   □ British
   □ Irish
   □ Northern Irish
   □ Ulster
   □ Something else: .................................................................
Don’t know

Q5. What does it mean to be “British”? What characteristics might they have?
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Q6. What does it mean to be “Irish”? What characteristics might they have?
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Q7. What does it mean to be an “Ulster-Scot”? What characteristics might they have?
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Q8. Can somebody be both Irish and an Ulster-Scot? Why/why not?
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