THE SCOPE OF IMAGINATION

by

Lorne E. Loxterkamp
of
Corpus Christi College

Dissertation submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the University of Cambridge
September 1975
PREFATORY NOTE

I am not aware of owing particular points and arguments in this dissertation to others, except for the references made in the text. No part of it has been carried out in collaboration with anyone.
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I</td>
<td>Ideas and Themes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II</td>
<td>The Image and its Description</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter III</td>
<td>A Phenomenologist's Account</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter IV</td>
<td>A Behaviourist's Account</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter V</td>
<td>Imagination and the Inner</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VI</td>
<td>Imagination and Creativity</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works Cited</td>
<td></td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We all know, we all agree, that the imagination, as a creative and expressive force, holds supreme importance. The problem is to say exactly what this importance consists in.

If we want an explication of the status of the imagination — how it makes a difference — we shall have to seek after its highest expression. And so we should not rest content with a characterization that covers all proper instances of the imagination fairly and equally. For it is plain that treating all the phenomena on a par impedes an investigation of what the imagination is capable of achieving. Rather the strategy here adopted is to focus on the most prominent exemplifications and let them suggest how the associated phenomena are to be organized and described. The stance is not the stance of one confronting an array of sorted phenomena in order to discern the meaning of the whole as constituted from the bits, but of one magnifying the bit that appears as the nucleus. After that is sketched, the view may be extended to include more by reducing the power of enlargement. That is to say, surveying the range of the imagination begins with the microscope.

But before this task can be started on, competing theories have to be cleared away. Two pictures of the imagination, the first lasting over two thousand years, the second for less than a hundred, have defined the thought of its nature. An attempt will be made to explain why the first endured so long and why the second arose. An adequate
account of the history of an idea, especially one so central to European philosophy as the idea of imagination, would of course involve a detailed study of all the leading contributions, showing the role the imagination has in each and how its conception changes and develops with time. But all that is necessary for my purposes is a rough description of the widely-held assumptions. Indeed such generalizing is possible because the views have remained so uniform.

It should be readily acknowledged, upon reflection, that the imagination, for one reason or another, strikes us as more perplexing than perception. It is as though the familiarity and unavoidability of perception makes us oblivious to its inexplicableness. (For instance, remember how quite recently Wittgenstein admonished the philosophically trained against surrendering to the natural tendency: 'We find certain things about seeing puzzling, because we do not find the whole business of seeing puzzling enough.') In fact to experience perception as a real problem requires extreme effort and concentration, while we naturally and easily find mental images strange, other-worldly. Images and dreams are normally felt as most curious phenomena, and we are not satisfied until we have come across some explanation, no matter, it seems frequently, how outlandish. This strong tendency of taking images as more problematic has been responsible for approaching the analysis of perception in a particular way, which is to derive the definition of perception from the definition of imagination. The methodological priority of the imagination is however not made explicit because the conclusion of many of the
various inquiries into the nature of experience, namely that internal images are not magical conveyors of unordinary truths, that their strangeness is only apparent, has perverted the exposition of the argument. One does not attribute the source of one's thinking to what one hopes to discredit.

Due to a philosophical refinement and agreement that precludes investigation, the actual motivation for accepting the traditional picture has been buried. But it can be exhumed by examining an ancient version. In the first century B.C. Lucretius, relating the doctrines of Epicurus, who propounded them two hundred years earlier, writes, when first considering the nature of experience, about mental images.

Now I will embark on an explanation of a highly relevant fact, the existence of what we call 'images' of things, a sort of outer skin perpetually peeled off the surface of objects and flying about this way and that through the air. It is these whose impact scares our minds, whether waking or sleeping, on those occasions when we catch a glimpse of strange shapes and phantoms of the dead. Often, when we are sunk in slumber, they startle us with the notion that spirits may get loose from Hades and ghosts hover about among the living, and that some part of us may survive after death when body and mind alike have been disintegrated and dissolved into their component atoms. (On the Nature of the Universe, p. 131)
The prose translation, needless to say, does not preserve the 'sweet honey of the Muses' but this passage does show that the starting-point of the inquiry is the imagination and that the immediate concern is to allay fears evoked by its more frightening products. Now an obvious technique for explaining away the bizarre is to show that the bizarre is at bottom a function of the commonplace. Accordingly, in this context, the imagination becomes, as it were, an inferior kind of perception. It must be inferior for, as Lucretius states, truth originates in the senses (p. 145). Once the imagination has been so defined, the argument about the nature of perception comes without trouble. Towards the end of the discussion the position is reviewed.

\[\ldots\] as a vision beheld by the mind closely resembles one beheld by the eye, the two must have been created in a similar fashion. Now, I have shown that I see a lion, for example, through the impact of films on the eyes. It follows that something similar accounts for the motion of the mind, which also, no less than the eyes, beholds a lion or whatever it may be by means of films. The only difference is that the objects of its vision are flimsier. (pp. 153-4)

It stands to reason that mental images have to be flimsier in order to penetrate the body and to activate the substance of the mind without stimulating the sense-organs. But notice how the progression of the argument has been reversed in the summing-up. What inspired the definition of perception was in fact, as we have seen, the characterization of images as very thin films; that characterization is the assumption that initiates the theory. In the course
of the poem the senses are presented as incomparably trustworthy, and all error is attributed to reason and the mind. This view therefore necessitates a correction. If it is claimed that perception is primary and the foundation of truth, the derivation of its definition from the definition of imagination would be an embarrassment. Thus the actual procedure of the inquiry is disavowed, and its contrary (i.e. the one advancing the thesis that the analysis of perception as the apprehension of films entails how mental images are to be explained) is declared.

Later, because this doctrine of experience as the apprehension of representations had become so deeply ingrained in the philosophical tradition, the dubious need for a pretence to conceal the actual procedure fell away. That there was a consensus among philosophers obviated making explicit the reasons for adopting certain assumptions. And we may suppose that the doctrine remained unquestioned because it was an extremely simple and comprehensive account of complex and very varied phenomena. 'Internal images are discrete, insubstantial items which come and go according to no canons of coherence. They must be engendered by perception, for whatever the image displays — the whole or each part — resembles sensory experience. Therefore perception itself must consist in the apprehension of fleeting representations, for no intimate relation can exist between essentially divergent things.' This doctrine was taken for granted despite the fact that, although images appear markedly to have the properties attributed to them, there is no experiential basis for analysing perception along similar lines. It is clear that perception could not possibly consist in the reception of discrete representations; the
merest attention to one's perceptual experience demonstrates this fact.

Hobbes, writing seventeen hundred years after Lucretius, corrects the classical materialist theory but leaves the core intact. He denies that sense or perception involves the reception of representations emanating from objects without, and argues that sense consists in representations produced by the action of external objects on the sense-organs, the stimulations of which are ultimately just the motions of matter. Sensations and images inhere not in external objects but are internal bodily effects; and so images are what survive after the objects of perception no longer impinge on sensibility.

For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it ... IMAGINATION therefore is nothing but decaying sense; and is found in men, and many other living Creatures, as well sleeping, as waking. (Leviathan, Pt. I, Ch. 2)

Hobbes quickly explains that the waning of the image is due not to its natural disintegration, for unimpeded motion is eternal, but to the successive overlaying of sensory impressions, which obscures past experiences.

As there is no point in explaining the currently obvious, Hobbes begins with the definition of sense without attempting more than a mere statement of it, and goes on to claim that the imagination is wholly dependent upon perception. What is experientially prior is
accorded, fittingly, methodological priority. This ordering has to be right since, if the properties of images flow from the properties of sense, then the former may be discerned only after the latter have been determined. However, contrary to what one might naively expect, the substance of images turns out to be identical with the substance of sense: both sensation and imagination are, as Hobbes states, 'Fancy'. The phrase 'decaying sense' purports to define the inferiority as well as the dependence of imagination. But, by Hobbes' implicit admission, there are no intrinsic features establishing the subordinate status of the imagination. The image is equal in all respects to the sensation. But in the waking man images disappear and diminish in force because obscured by more recent impressions and images; in sleep, they appear, without interference from sense, at full strength (the absurdity of dreams is caused by "the distemper of some of the inward parts of the body" (Pt. I, Ch. 2)).

Now Hobbes says both that images peter out through the continual imposition of present sensations, and that the images in dreams are indistinguishable from sensations. This ambiguity indicates that Hobbes intends to demonstrate the subordinate experiential (and so epistemological) status of the imagination but does not succeed in locating integral properties of images to prove their inferiority. He attacks, like Lucretius, the notion that images emanate from supersensible forces — he spends time discussing dreams and fantasy which can interfere with 'civill Obedience' — and maintains that knowledge begins with the action of external objects on the senses,
the remnants of which are images in the mind. If that is so, then it should be easy enough to separate the real source of knowledge from its vestiges by virtue of its primacy. But Hobbes finds it necessary to ad­duce the peripheral: we know the difference, he says, between Sense and Dreaming because, among other things, we observe the absurdities of dreaming while awake but never dream of waking Thoughts as absurdities.

Such considerations do not impress, for, in keeping with the status of sense, we look for an acknowledgement of the enveloping texture of perception and the stability and inexhaustible richness of experience that constantly challenge judgment and reason. Now to find an expla­nation why neither Hobbes nor many others took the facts of perception into consideration, let alone recognized them, we do not have to seek very far. It cannot escape notice that the theory of perception for Hobbes and for others, comes from an almost exclusive preoccupation with the phenomenal properties of mental images. The theory of perception is modelled on the theory of imagination. Perception, they contend, in­volves the apprehension of discrete, immaterial appearances just like imagination. This evidently implies that the relation between the self and the perception is exactly similar to the relation between the self and the image. But if perceiving is in part inferring from patches of colour, imagining can hardly be explained analogously. How could such errors about the nature of perception be made other than by exploit­ing uncritically the more plausible assumptions about the nature of imagination? For Hobbes mental images are the paradigms of experi­ence. And so his problem is not the problem of showing the exper­iential inferiority of images, as he might have thought, but rather the problem of establishing the superiority of the manifold of sense. If in his account perception turns out to be too like imagination, the fault
lies in the definition of perception. Of course it would be impossible for Hobbes to admit that that definition may be defective — an attitude to which the perfunctory discussion attests, the excuse of having pursued the matters at length elsewhere notwithstanding. But the predicament is more complicated. The definition of perception cannot be challenged for it acts as the basis of the theory of experience; to revise it would necessitate a radical reappraisal of the whole perspective. Yet, on the other hand, to weaken the status of images further and so create a more realistic separation of sense and imagination would have the not dissimilar effect of undermining the account of perception. As images are indeed the models for the analysis of perception, how they are conceived must hold firm or else that analysis would be in jeopardy. Hobbes struggles to separate sense from imagination, and the word 'decaying' is meant to carry the weight of his contention, a weight which proves to be too great for it. No sooner does he state that imagination is decaying sense than he takes it back, and the ambiguity makes its appearance.

This theme of the continuity of imagination and perception joins with and supports another in the tradition. If the matter of experience comes in isolated, independent, fleeting and insubstantial bits then the fact that we experience something more indicates, so the reasoning goes, that complex mental operations take place. The experience of the external world emerges as the sentient being judges on the basis of discrete, sensory data which survive as internal appearances. Indeed it was long believed that internal images were indispensable for thinking. St. Thomas Aquinas takes from Aristotle this view and the view that experience cannot be reduced to sensation and image, for appearances alone are dumb. More importantly, he was one of the first to
seriously pursue the idea that there must be mental processes which link the various items in order to deliver a coherent and unified experience of a material world. He argues that while images as such are devoid of import, they provide elements from which can be abstracted the meanings of the objects of appearance. As the mind requires something distinct in addressing itself to thought, all knowledge, and even awareness of the supersensible, depends upon reflection on images.

In its present condition the mind cannot actually understand anything except by reference to images. There are two indications of this state of affairs. First, the mind is a power which does not operate as part of a bodily organ, and so, were there no dependence on sense and imagination and faculties within bodily organs, its activity would be unimpaired by bodily lesion. Yet in understanding, either freshly or summoning knowledge already gained, the mind's activity must be accompanied by activity of imagination and of other sense-powers. When the imagination is warped, as in madness... a man is prevented from understanding even those things he previously knew. Secondly, each man experiences in himself that when he attempts to understand a subject he must picture it and use images as examples to hold his attention. (*Summa Theologica*, 1265-74, pp. 234-5).

To make possible the instant resuscitation of past experience and the acquisition of new knowledge, the imagination has to retain sensory impressions as a tourist collects picture postcards.

The proper external senses are appointed to receive sensible forms, and so also is a common internal sense, which is like a joint root and principle of the external senses. The
proper senses judge of their proper sensible objects, discerning one object from another within their proper field; for instance the sight distinguishes white from black or green. But to tell white from sweet cannot be done by the sight or taste, for to discern between two things implies knowing them both. This discrimination is the work of a common sense, to which are referred as in a joint-clearing house the perceptions of the other senses. This sense is also able to sense sensation itself, as when somebody sees that he is seeing. This cannot be done by the proper senses, which merely know the sensible forms that alter them.

Then to hold and keep these images, the phantasy of sense-imagination is appointed; it may be described as the storehouse of impressions . . . (pp. 228-9)

There is little point in quoting further, for it is plain enough now how he set up the problem of knowledge and experience which was to exercise the minds of some of the greatest philosophers.

This view of the imagination was strengthened and elaborated in the Enlightenment. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries clarity was considered a sure mark of truth, and clarity was thought best achieved by selecting and arranging one's ideas, which often meant furnishing the mind with concrete representations or images. Even Descartes, who valued clarity and distinctness so highly but who argued in the second Meditation (1641) that the imagination is dispensable because, as the imagination cannot cope with the infinity of aspects of material objects, the knowledge we have of nature comes through the understanding or the intuitions of mind alone, maintained that correct thinking consists in attending to representations. 'Of my thoughts some
are, so to speak, images of the things, and to these alone is the title "idea" properly applied; examples are my thought of a man or of a chimera, of heaven, of an angel, or of God' (p. 159). A more typical example of the combination of clarity with the imagination appears perhaps in a letter of Leibniz's addressed to Queen Charlotte of Prussia, 1702.

As therefore our soul compares (for example) the numbers and figures which are in colours with the numbers and figures which are found by touch, there must be an internal sense, in which the perceptions of these different external senses are found united. This is what is called the imagination, which comprises at once the notions of the particular senses, which are clear but confused, and the notions of the common sense, which are clear and distinct. (p. 357)

Subsequent theories are variations on the theme. For Hume the imagination, which contains all ideas, themselves copies of sensory impressions, unites them by the principles of association, custom and habit. As ideas as such are distinct existence, the workings of the imagination are responsible for producing the belief in the 'continu'd existence of body', a belief induced by the peculiar vivacity of the resemblance among ideas.

This resemblance is observ'd in a thousand instances, and naturally connects together our ideas of these interrupted perceptions by the strongest relation, and conveys the mind with an easy transition from one to another. An easy transition or passage of the imagination, along the ideas of these different and interrupted perceptions, is almost the same disposition of mind with that in which we consider one constant and uninterrupted perception. 'Tis therefore very natural for us to
Hume concludes that the belief in the independent existence of objects without the mind is finally unwarranted. How can we justifiably believe in a world of durable objects when all that we perceive is brief and discontinuous? He is driven to the skeptical position because he takes seriously, and faces the implications of, the definition of perception which derives from the definition of internal images. It is proof of the attraction of the (implicit) derivation that Hume, a philosopher having an exceptional capacity for skepticism, never for a moment entertains a doubt concerning the received doctrine of experience. And the fact that the definition of perception which originated in reflection on the imagination should lead to a theory which states that the imagination constitutes perception speaks for itself.

Hume's arguments had the effect of raising awareness of the difficulties of formulating a satisfactory account of perception of the external world, of objective experience. Clearly, one way of dealing with such difficulties is to make the account of the imagination and perception more complex. But complexity, as we see, is not always free of obscurity. The theory of imagination reaches a culmination of sorts in Kant, whose contribution is important not only for its attempt to answer Hume's problem but also for its application to aesthetic activity.

While Hume makes the understanding dependent upon the imagination ('the understanding, that is . . . the general and more establish'd properties of the imagination' (p. 267)), Kant describes the imagination as mediating between sensibility and the understanding. As experience involves the co-operation of heterogeneous elements, i.e.
sensation and concepts, there must be an interposing factor, possessing characteristics of both, to reconcile them.

Now, since every appearance contains a manifold, and since different perceptions therefore occur in the mind separately and singly, a combination of them, such as they cannot have in sense itself, is demanded. There must therefore exist in us an active faculty for the synthesis of this manifold. To this faculty I give the title, imagination. (First Critique, 1781 & 1787, A120)

Kant assigns to the faculty of imagination two main functions. One, the reproductive and empirical, is akin to that recognized by Hume. The imagination has the power to revive past impressions and to link them in the mind according to the principles of association. The other and more essential, the productive and transcendental, is that which, by the process of synthesis, provides sensible exemplifications of the categories of the understanding, exemplifications which are neither equatable with nor reducible to actual sensory impressions. This figurative synthesis of the manifold of sensible appearances, which grounds the categories in sensation, achieves the unity of experience in one consciousness by determining a priori the range of possible experiences of objects conformable to the categories (B 151-2, B 180-1). *

* For a discussion of Kant’s employment of the concept of imagination and its relation to Hume’s, see P. Strawson, ‘Imagination and Perception’. 
Furthermore the imagination, as Kant argues in the Third Critique, 1790, is active in both aesthetic appreciation and artistic creativity. In ordinary cognition the understanding brings concepts in the form of rules to bear upon the arrangements of sense supplied by the imagination. The experience of art allows a respite and release from the dictates of concepts by permitting the imagination the freedom to invent order in the manifold, a freedom that delights in not being bound by pre-existing conceptual rules. The talent of the artist is the talent of employing the imagination to create what Kant calls aesthetic ideas, or representations of the imagination for which no concept whatever could be adequate. Aesthetic ideas contrast with rational ideas for which no sensible intuition whatever could be adequate. The artist then attempts to embody aesthetic ideas in a sensible form.

Such representations of the imagination may be termed ideas. This partly because they at least strain after something lying out beyond the confines of experience, and so seek to approximate to a presentation of rational concepts (i.e. intellectual ideas), thus giving to these concepts the semblance of an objective reality. But, on the other hand, there is this most important reason, that no concept can be wholly adequate to them as internal intuitions. The poet essays the task of interpreting to sense the rational ideas of invisible beings, the kingdom of the blessed, hell, eternity, creation, &c. Or, again, as to things of which examples occur in experience, e.g.
death, envy, and all vices, as also love, fame, and the like, transgressing the limits of experience he attempts with the aid of an imagination which emulates the display of reason in its attainment of a maximum, to body them forth to sense with a completeness of which nature affords no parallel; and it is in fact precisely in the poetic art that the faculty of aesthetic ideas can show itself to full advantage. (§ 49, pp. 176-7)

Thus the function of the imagination in art is to provide enjoyable and intriguing departures from the ordinary, to remind us, especially, that what we humanly are and what we experience are not ultimate realities: the aesthetic idea gestures toward, and gives a sense of, the absolute and unknowable.

Theories of the imagination after this inevitably fall short of the heights of Kantian metaphysics, but some fail not from not trying. Coleridge distinguishes between Fancy, which is roughly equivalent, it seems, to the reproductive imagination in Kant, and the Imagination proper:

The IMAGINATION then, I consider either as primary, or secondary. The primary IMAGINATION I hold to be the living Power and prime Agent of all human Perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM. The secondary Imagination I consider as an echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary in the kind of
its agency, and differing only in degree, and in the mode of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate; or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead. (Biographia Literaria, 1817, Ch. XIII, end)

One does not complain that Coleridge fails to sustain the profundity of the attribution beyond the paragraph, nor laments the unavailability of the suppressed '100 pages'. Rather one objects to the account of imagination, vague as it is, as it is employed in the discussion of art, for it hardly illuminates artistic creation, serving to imply, gratuitously, some fundamental connection between art and the great and all-important. The poet is said to achieve unity of thought and feeling by balancing and reconciling opposites, by harmonizing ideas and representations, and so on, but these processes so described seem remote from those involving mental images, let alone actual artistic creativity, that we may begin to think that the alleged connections are spurious. Yet even if we grant that the continuity obtains, that the imagination does participate in art as Coleridge contends, the theory of magical powers does not deliver what is intended, for, despite its truth, it does not make the least clear just what is going on in artistic creation and expression. The theory is loose and unhelpful. But perhaps it should be sympathetically regarded simply as an elevated conception of aesthetic inspiration, amounting to an apotheosis of art and artists.
If there is one conclusion to be drawn from Kant and Coleridge it is the conclusion that whatever explanatory value the faculty of imagination may have vis-à-vis the constitution of perception and the objectivity of experience, it comes to nothing when the imagination so conceived is applied to aesthetic matters. If there is plausibility in the idea that the imagination, apart from copying and retaining antecedent perceptions, distils sensation and extracts elements which define how experience must be, there is none in the suggestion that the poet works analogously, rather like a film editor following the principles of cinematic montage. The patent unacceptability of this highly abstract conception of artistic creativity demonstrates finally what has been recognized all along, namely, that that from which the conception emerges is itself totally unacceptable. We have already seen how the roots of the theory are rotten, and now we see how the decay infects the showy outcroppings. Perception is such-and-such, and the imagination or mental imagery is its remnant or replica: thus the obvious features of mental images, it is thought, confirm the definition of perception. But this confirmation cannot be, for, as we know, the definition of perception was formulated from certain assumptions about the nature of imagination. After Hobbes, interest in this theme of the relationship of sense and image, and of their exact constitution, virtually died away. It was supplanted by the problem of improving the account of perception by removing certain inadequacies. But the attempt at correction did not attack the source of the trouble, for such a correction would have entailed a wholesale revision. Instead the imagination was endowed
with a greater, even transcendental function. And so perception came to be regarded officially — as it had long been tacitly — as dependent on imagination. The circle completes itself.

The Kantian climb to such breathtaking vistas is bound to cause exhaustion and, just as significantly, to implant the conviction that the task remaining for lesser explorers, who are compelled to descend from the pinnacle, occupied so briefly, is that of forging a more accessible ascent, noting landmarks and obstacles once missed. It is plain that for one adopting the traditional perspective the only path, after Kant, points downward. How could an excursion after the master's journey be but anti-climactic? And how could the student venturer have enough energy in reserve to scale another peak, if indeed he could descry another not obscured by the one underfoot?

It took a century for philosophy to catch its breath, and to recuperate sufficiently to be able to survey afresh. Only then was it fully appreciated that the traditional procedure moved in the wrong direction. If perception is primary, then it is primary; it cannot be manufactured by the imagination. And thus it is perverse to draw conclusions about the nature of perception from reflection upon mental images. It is argued, surely correctly, by phenomenologists and behaviourists alike that images are dependent upon perception; and both go on to maintain, though in quite divergent ways, that if images are so dependent then their nature, and the nature of the imagination itself, can be inferred from prominent elements of perception, a
perception of material objects which is far from reducible to sensory impressions. But carelessly, without reservation, these reformers surrender to an old tendency: if imagination and perception are continuous, then points at both extremes should bear a significant resemblance and relation — having determined the scheme at one end makes it possible to work to the other. The mistake of believing that this derivation is a prerequisite for any inquiry into the nature and purpose of the imagination appears representatively in two writers, distinctive even within their incompatible schools, who are discussed below in separate chapters. That it is a mistake is shown by the narrowness and abstractness of the issuing accounts. In fact the absence of an adequate account of mental imagery does not inhibit the search for some satisfactory description of the scope and power of the imagination. Free of the restraints imposed by the assumption of a close relation with images and thus perception, the theory of imagination can now incorporate and be applied to less familiar aspects of the mind. Although, undeniably, images do play a part, a critical part, in the imaginative life, the assumption that the imagination must be an elaborate continuation of imagery, and the corresponding mechanical procedure of extracting its definition, are without merit.

Before the two representative ways of extracting the character of imagining from the character of perceiving are examined, a new problem, engendered by the inversion of the traditional procedure, to which both studies chiefly address their efforts, is investigated. If
the imagination is a subordinate, though still important but super-added faculty to perception, then the interpretation of imaginative experience becomes differently problematic. As imagination and perception are basically dissimilar, is it correct to employ the same vocabulary to describe each?

Moreover, both writers, as they repudiate the tradition, find the established conceptions of the self, which declare it to be either fixed in accordance with the laws of nature that apply to all living species or immutable because a non-natural substratum, sharing in the divine, uncongenial. Against the traditional views they argue that the self is thoroughly dynamic, being either a contentless force constantly striving for the unobtainable or an aggregation of the multifarious and changeable dispositions manifested by the human body. But this unceasing dynamism of change and the indiscriminate comprehensiveness, by implicitly ruling out the centrality of individual character, make self-discovery and the treatment of internal conflict which demands self-definition, impossibilities. As any account of the self then has to cope with these rather intractable requirements of the person, what is offered in the last two chapters is presented with extreme tentativeness.

Reflection on the manner of individual change and growth yields a major revision to the commonly considered structure of the imagination. Not all change in the self is brought about by judgment and manipulation, indeed some of the most fundamental changes occur as
a function of 'blind' growth. The imagination manifests itself not only in fabrication, as has always been agreed, but also, and perhaps superiorly, in generation. These two aspects, the generative and the fabricative, are related at crucial points and together outline the scope of imagination.
II

THE IMAGE AND ITS DESCRIPTION

The preoccupation with mental imagery as the expression par excellence of the imagination has diminished but little from Descartes to the present day. The peculiar fascination that mental images command makes that continuation not hard to understand. But if there has been no appreciable change in that general respect, there has been a development in what has sustained the interest.

In the preceding chapter we saw how the relevant issues that concerned the more prominent traditional theorists derived clearly from the view that mental imagery is a species of sense data. As imagery was thought to be of the stuff of sensations, in order to explain the difference between imagination and perception it became important to explain the distinctive mechanisms by which each was produced and thus how each datum was distinguished by the mind. But nowadays, when analysis prevails over synthesis, the idea that imagination and perception might have a common source strikes one as unthinkable. Perhaps, then, the popular abandonment of the sense data theory has removed one obstacle in the way of displaying the supposed autonomous nature of the imagination; but in so doing it has introduced a problem of its own — or we could say that it has carried the old problem to a new region.

The problem is this. If, in the main, experience consists in the same sensory material fashioned in various ways, then the
complementary mental processes of imaging and perceiving should not require divergent descriptions. Indeed, it might well have seemed to some that this alleged basic connection between them is borne out by the fact that the reports of imaging naturally employ the terms which are appropriate to reports of perceiving. But once any intimate connection of this sort is denied, and imagination and perception are presumed to separate completely, the uniformity of reports — which indicates a unity in essence — becomes a particularly troubling matter, either to be explained and justified or to be shown merely apparent and superficial. Doubtless it is because the contemporary mood encourages close study of many characterizations of mental life that there is greater sensitivity to the uniformity of reports (where the existing characterizations fail to supply straightforward description, should more accurate ones be sought?).

While it is usual to report an imaging experience by beginning with either 'I imagine ...' or, for one variety, 'I visualize...', it is not less usual to say, 'I see (hear, feel...)...' with the same purpose. Now someone might assert that in the interests of descriptive accuracy, the former are eminently preferable to the latter. For, surely, the use of perception verbs to record non-perceptual experiences must be on one reading false and on the other misleading (even if such qualifications as 'in the mind's eye' and 'in the imagination' are added). It is just perverse, so his argument might go, to persist in describing, or trying to describe, an experience in
perceptual terms when, say, neither the eyes nor presently visible objects participate. And besides, what could non-perceptual vision possibly consist in? Moreover — leaving these points aside but not out of sight — by retaining them we cater to the temptation of drawing out connections and resemblances where there are none to fit, and so we deliberately endorse imprecision and confusion.

First I want to offer three objections to the thesis just sketched, and later consider some larger issues that arise from this preliminary debate.

The first objection concerns our readiness to employ verbs of perception in reporting imaging experiences, and often using them when the alternatives do not quite measure up to the demands. For instance, the image of a former, half-forgotten acquaintance may arise so suddenly and so unexpectedly that only the expression 'I saw him.' is deemed to capture the vividness of the experience. For the verbs 'imagine' and 'visualize' seem to indicate a voluntary project to have such an experience, and one wishes to expressly convey the unwilled, passive and startling character of the image. Doesn't the use of 'see' in this manner achieve the expression of that rather neatly? But if this example is thought to represent only very rare occurrences, which are of no moment because they can be so easily submerged, it ought to be recognized that the verbs of perception bring a definiteness and descriptive strength to the reports of imaging experience, otherwise very difficult to attain. Furthermore, the fact that 'imagine' does not have exclusive application to imagery,
and that 'visualize' has no associates means that in using only them we would have to resign ourselves often to an undesirable vagueness — or silence. So as verbs of perception are banned from reports of imaging, an unwelcome weakness of expression is generally introduced into those reports. That loss of expressive power will, if the proposal is to be at all attractive, have to be compensated by advantages gained elsewhere.

The second concerns the promised gains. We are told — at least it is strongly implied — that confused and mistaken ideas about the nature of mental imagery are due to a (naive) appeal to the language employed in their communication. Accordingly, we are asked to believe that the adoption of a 'correct' language allows a clear view of the subject matter, necessary for sound theorizing. But this position assumes that error stems from a too hasty reflection on unsophisticated language, that the tendency to err derives mainly, if not solely, from what we say. Why, however, this is not wholly convincing is that it underestimates the influence of the experience itself. If it is the case that the imaging experience is one which naturally provokes comparison with perception, i.e. it alone is responsible for the inclination to use verbs of perception, then the actual use of verbs of perception is a symptom and not a cause. Now supposing that to be true — and it is very likely true — even if verbs of perception were to be replaced, the tendency to bring imaging and perceiving too close together will not have been eradicated. Hence, whether or not the reports of images are 'corrected' will be largely irrelevant: if the real source of the error resides in the experiences
themselves, then how we ordinarily report them should not affect what we are inclined to think their nature is. Or, to make a larger point, foreground adjustments to language will not aid philosophical reflection, nor dissolve philosophical problems. But there is another related warning. The uniformity of reports of imaging and perceiving invites confusion and error in a rather different way: someone could mistake a (past) image for a (past) perception, or vice versa, by forgetting how he meant a past utterance. While this possibility is no doubt real, the suggestion that errors of this kind always derive from a confusion over language begs the question whether such errors are not sometimes a consequence of factors outside the range of language. Even with a 'corrected' language errors could still be possible.

If — and this is the third objection — when included in reports of imaging verbs of perception are suspect, then, surely, their grammatical objects are equally suspect. If it is wrong to suggest that imaging is a kind of perception, it ought to be wrong to suggest that that which is imagined is of a piece with what is perceived. For to claim that material objects could be experienced through non-perceptual means would just be crass: this will apply as well when verbs of perception are not in evidence. No characterization of imaging (or, for that matter, of many other inner experiences) will, if it is to be descriptively sound, be permitted to include any term whose first or central application is to the external world and its apprehension. Thus, to uphold the dictates of the position outlined would serve to eliminate all or virtually all characterizations of one's
inner experiences, beyond the merely sensual. As this absurd and drastic curtailment of language and expression is a consequence of the position, that alone may be taken as sufficient to refute it. But I do not think that its outright rejection is warranted, at least not warranted from what has been said so far. Rejection would be too hasty because there is an element of plausibility which has not yet received attention. It has been neglected because the statement of the position has been unduly rough. After elaborating the position and extracting the plausible substance, we will find that as the issues become more complicated it will not be so easy to dismiss.

The elaboration necessitates some changes. The claim that the use of verbs of perception (and their grammatical objects) in reports of mental images results in confusion and error, and the demand to eschew all such terms from such reports, are to be dropped. In their place comes the warning that these terms are to be treated with the utmost care. The aim now, rather than advising the elimination of such terms, is to stress the special status that they assume when used in such reports. When the special status is correctly understood, it will be recognized that severe restrictions must be placed on their use and their interpretation. One important point, however, undergoes no alteration: when used to report mental images, verbs of perception (and their grammatical objects) are fundamentally illegitimate.
The argument adduced to establish the special status is not unfamiliar. Nor indeed are the conclusions. I say 'conclusions' because there seem to be two distinct, though sometimes assimilated, views that the argument can be taken to support.

Reflection on the development and the growth of his language yields this instructive story. As man progressed through greater degrees of socialization, as his instincts were increasingly checked by the group, his inclinations were subjected to more inhibitive pressure. Now when an impulse is arrested, the concomitant energy, which should direct it outwards, is released inside the body. And as this process increases in frequency and intensity, the individual inner life unfolds. Nietzsche says it best: 'All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward — this is what is called the internalization of man: thus it was that man first developed what was later called his "soul". The entire inner world, originally as thin as if it were stretched between two membranes, expanded and extended itself, acquired depth, breadth and height, in the same measure as outward discharge was inhibited' (On the Genealogy of Morals, II, § 16). Parallel to this process of internalization, it can be reasonably supposed, is a development in language. The language that once was used exclusively to describe the outer world comes, as the inner world is created, to be applied to that which remains when the outward expression of feeling is inhibited. Recently, Nietzsche's picture has been given a linguistic amplification by Stuart Hampshire: '... we normally describe mental
processes and conditions in terms which have been transferred from an original use in application to physical objects' (Ryle's The Concept of Mind*, pp. 88-9). And in another place he writes:

'... we must first have distinguished certain patterns of behaviour in certain standard circumstances, actual or notional; and then, on the basis of this kind of classification, we can distinguish the various inner sentiments as controlled inclinations to behave in these ways in these standard circumstances. We arrive at the distinctions between the different feelings and sentiments by abstracting from the manifesting behaviour. In our classifications we move, as it were, inwards from expressive behaviour to inner feeling* ('Feeling and Expression', p. 155). * Accordingly, the ability to explain and understand oneself and one's neighbours depends to a large degree on how much one can accurately determine of that which exists inside. It could well be then that the need to understand and explain the human psyche was a force in giving language a new dimension.

The immense appeal of this picture is attested to by the importance that both philosophers see in it. Nietzsche finds in it the origin of conscience; Hampshire finds in it a basis for a theory of mind between dualism and logical behaviourism. But the question I wish to consider is more modest: what changes are brought about, what happens to language, when its range is extended to the inner? An answer to that question will settle the issue of whether the reports of imaging experience have a special status, and if so, what it amounts to.

* See also his 'Disposition and Memory', especially pp. 163-4.
To continue to spell out the position. If anything changes it is certainly the meanings of the terms whose range is extended. For outer and inner experiences are so palpably different, even when somehow related, that the terms which are applied to both must have their meanings affected. But — and this is where a complication is introduced — two independent theories of what change takes place stand out. One is that the ordinary meanings of the terms are exploited; that is, the terms, and by the same token the reports that contain them, become metaphorical. The other is that the terms, when used in the extended way, acquire distinct meanings, which yet bear some association with the original meanings. That these two theories do not collapse into one is made clear in recognizing that the first holds that the original meanings are still active in the new area, while the second maintains that it is only an association that persists (the phenomena are so different that new meanings are essential for the terms to possess really distinctive descriptive power). But to say this is not to deny that both could be asserted, rather confusedly, together: it could be thought that the terms and reports are metaphorical and by virtue of this they carry unobvious non-ordinary meanings. However, this possible confusion should be kept separate from a related but coherent and not uncommon view: the terms and reports are metaphorical, and to replace them new terms having non-ordinary meanings are required.

So the thesis that the reports of imaging experience (and some other inner experiences), which incorporate perceptually-based terms, divides on the issues of how their status is to be conceived and of
how they are to be treated. If the reports are considered metaphorical
then, in order to provide straightforward descriptions and thereby
permit exact study of some aspects of the inner life, literal replace-
ments must be furnished. Alternatively, if the reports are believed
to acquire additional senses then those senses ought to be couched
in unambiguous terms so that they can be readily clarified.

That discourse of the inner life employs many terms transferred
from disclosure of the outer is unchallengeable. But whether the
borrowings become either metaphorical or ambiguous is — although
perhaps thought to be equally unchallengeable — not immune to doubt.
Yet the only place I know of where the position is controverted (let
alone discussed) is in Richard Wollheim's 'The Mind and the Mind's
Image of Itself'. Wollheim presents objections to both the meta-
phorical and additional meaning alternatives. His arguments are
inconclusive, but there is something to be learned from that incon-
clusiveness, and something to be learned of why such arguments
were presumed to be needed in the first place.

As a preliminary to establishing that our ordinary conception
of the mind is spatial or at least tinged with spatiality, Wollheim
considers a possible objection to his manner of approaching the
analysis of the mind and its contents. He writes:

    We may speak of thoughts entering the mind or breaking
in upon the mind or just being in the mind, but when we do
so, the phrases that we use do not reflect what we actually
believe. They are mere turns of speech. Now whatever sympathy we may have with the general impulse of this argument ... the argument as it stands is tendentious. For it assumes that we have a clear distinctions between what is metaphorical and what is not; which we do not have. As a minimum someone who uses this argument must show that there is an alternative way of describing the facts in question — here it would be, of reporting the relevant mental states — which could make a good claim to be a literal description. And I do not see that in the present case this condition can be fulfilled. (pp. 35-6)

And after this Wollheim evidently concludes that there is no good reason for holding the view that such statements about the mind are metaphorical. I have already indicated that this conclusion is incorrect, that there is a persuasive reason for regarding them as metaphorical: and Wollheim overlooks it. The quoted passage contains two main points. The first, if I may rephrase it, is that the want of a definition of metaphor undermines the assertion that such statements are metaphorical (is not a definition of metaphor tantamount to an explication of the distinction between the metaphorical and the literal ?). But if that is the case then an adequate definition is equally a condition on the attribution of metaphor to any linguistic item whatsoever, and thus no present attribution can be justified or even seen to be correct. That extremely disagreeable state of affairs clearly follows from what Wollheim says, but it is not the worst of
the consequences. If a definition is an essential requirement for the recognition of metaphor then anyone who sets out to define the notion is caught in this predicament. As an a priori definition must be unacceptable, at the outset some items will have to be identified as exemplifying metaphor so that there will be some data to investigate and something by which to assess the adequacy of the definition. Otherwise there can be no starting point, and with no point of departure no result can be reached. Some initially undisputed instances of the phenomenon must be available in order that analysis have an object and a beginning. But it is implied that a definition, the outcome of analysis, is required to identify what will count as data. It is not hard to see that together these two conditions have a paralyzing effect. Therefore the demand for a definition to be at hand to justify the application of 'metaphor' is extravagant. Moreover the unavailability of a satisfactory definition does not discredit the term.

The second point is that metaphor invariably rests on, or suppresses, a corresponding literal description; thus the existence of metaphor is established by supplying the underlying literal description. Wollheim allows that strong evidence for the existence of metaphor would be the formulation of an alleged literal alternative. Why the literal alternative is, as is intimated, a necessary accompaniment to metaphor is not made clear. And on what basis should we presume that behind every metaphor is a literal description? It just may be that with regard to the reports of many inner experiences the transference of terms, and hence the metaphor, is irreplaceable and unavoidable simply because there are no literal alternatives: the
absence of appropriate non-metaphorical terms forced the introduction of metaphor. If that is true — we have not been given a good reason to think it isn't — then Wollheim's minimum demand is unreasonable because it cannot be met.

Behind both points, surely, lie these convictions; that a report of an event, whether internal or external, should be an unembellished representation of the facts; that reports therefore have to be strictly descriptive; that a description requires that each of its constituent terms be used in its most straightforward, i.e. literal descriptions. Now I am inclined to think that this view, if not wholly wrong, is as it stands too simple to be right. But of that more later.

Wollheim also presents an argument against the second version of the thesis that the standard reports of some mental states are illegitimate. It would, if true, similarly jeopardize the retention of the standard reports.

... when I report what I envisage by saying such things as that a friend is on the verge of tears, or that my father upbraids me, or that I hear my father upbraid me, I am using words in a further or secondary sense. There are a number of forms such an account might take, depending on which word or group of words in any such report is held to change its sense, and each form of the account could doubtless be met on its own terms. But there is also a comprehensive objection to the
account: and that is that it is vacuous to talk of a further or secondary sense of a word unless we can specify a further way in which this sense is learnt or taught. In the present case there is no such way, and moreover there could be no such way. For suppose we were trying to teach someone the alleged further sense of, say, the word 'father'; then the only assurance we could have for thinking that the moment was ripe to do so, would be when he had reported to us what he was envisaging and that it was his father: and to do this, he would ex hypothesi have to use the ordinary sense of the word, which must therefore be adequate to the task. (p. 38)

Because the learning of language and the apprehension of meaning depend upon a mutual recognition of publicly observable items by (potential) speakers, the mental image and other comparable inner experiences could not by their very nature enter into discourse at a rudimentary level. Their privacy serves to restrict them as subjects to rather sophisticated speakers. Now if the appearance of the ability to talk of one's images, say, more or less coincides with a linguistic sophistication such that the speaker has achieved a degree of linguistic independence where he no longer needs primary instruction to continue the learning process, then it would not be surprising that no situations where the supposed additional meanings are imparted come to mind. In this state of affairs the additional meanings are 'picked-up' very much like the meanings of many newly experienced words are. If the linguistic sophistication means that
the speaker is able to invent and appreciate stories, jokes and puns and has a capacity for comprehending metaphor and ambiguity, then we have good reason to believe that the ability to apprehend and operate with the additional meanings occurs naturally in the course of linguistic development. In fact these additional meanings would be quite easily assimilated since they bear such a close association with the original, standard meanings. It may well be that the additional meanings possessed by terms used in the expression of imaging experience are apprehended naturally, as a natural accompaniment to ordinary language learning, provided that a certain level of linguistic and intellectual maturity has been reached. And it might well be that the nature of the experiences themselves makes the additional meanings assimilable in just this way. Perhaps images and some other inner experiences constitute a special class. Now whether or not this account is correct I do not know, but the fact that it is strikingly credible suffices, I think, to cast doubt on Wollheim's comparatively simplistic characterization of language learning. Why should every significant term have an individual learning situation where its meaning or one of its meanings can be suitably conveyed? (A remnant of logical positivism?) But, unless we have the benefit of a satisfactory theory of language learning (and so of meaning), this matter cannot be finally settled. So any argument which assumes that it is settled will be in that respect unacceptable.

The stage we have now reached is this. On one side stands the view that our ordinary description of the inner in terms of the outer
infects the terms so transferred with either metaphor or ambiguity. And neither of these alternatives in conducive to giving accurate accounts of the inner life: a metaphor, almost by definition, cannot be descriptive, and the postulated additional senses seem rather mysterious and mysteriously unforthcoming. At any rate, can it be denied that the transference has some aberrant effect on the meanings of the terms in question? If it cannot, it is readily seen that that effect amounts to a major, and probably total, loss of descriptive power. Thus if we then wish to study the mental life with some degree of precision we must cast about for an appropriate vocabulary. On the other side, while it may be agreed that the terms are not strictly used in ordinary ways, it is objected that the changes are of no real moment. Indeed there are no good grounds for asserting that the terms become either metaphorical or ambiguous; there are no good reasons for construing the terms in any but their ordinary senses. Further, without even the prospect of finding appropriate replacements, we must be satisfied with, and make the best of, what we now have — either that or give up the attempt to describe and understand a crucial area of human experience.

The dispute presents a clear choice, and seemingly, a choice that has to be made. But the issue is perplexing. Neither of the positions appears to dominate; neither of their arguments is conclusive. Still, if we are to give an account of imaging and other inner experiences — and that of course demands a continual appraisal of the terms and the experiences — then it seems that we ought to
decide whether the terms selected are purely descriptive and adequate for the job or whether their use does not achieve what we think it achieves, by either being systematically metaphorical or obscurely ambiguous in pointing to that which has not yet been, nor is likely to be, spelled out. But after looking at what has been offered by both sides, how can we decide which view is correct? It should be clear that not enough has been offered by either to enable a choice (to which some confidence can be attached) to be made. And it is equally clear, I feel certain, that no advance can be made, granted that the present work on what bears so heavily on this dispute (i.e. the nature of meaning) is unhelpful and unpromising. Nevertheless, perhaps we have come to this point of stagnation because our articulation of the problem is somewhat misconceived. A different approach may yield a solution (though tentative) when we feared there could be none.

A reconciliation, a solution, might be secured if each side agrees to accept what the other states convincingly and to hold the tendentious inferences in abeyance. That is, the conception against which the dispute exists is subjected to review. So each will retain what is especially his and relinquish what is mutually theirs.

As for compromise. There is a tendency for one side to underestimate the alteration in character undergone by the transferred terms: despite the special circumstances, the terms themselves remain unaltered. But, as the transferred terms refer to experiences
which are intrinsically different from the ones they normally refer to — and this is not always admitted — they must incur some significant change in character. Complementary to this, there is the tendency to overestimate the effect of the change in character such that the terms are thought to be hopelessly inadequate to the task. Now, in the interests of reconciliation, we might urge that while indeed the transferred terms undergo some change in character, it is not enough to defeat the attempt to communicate and interpret the experiences with reasonable success. The change is not so radical as a transformation to metaphor or obscure ambiguity but it is enough to disallow automatic and unexamined inferences to be drawn from what is said. We must not forget that the inner experiences are not their true ground, and because of that we must always be careful to ensure, by constant checking and comparison, that what is meant is in harmony with what is talked about.

Admittedly this reconciliation (the proposal) is facile. Facile because superficial. In order to make it compelling the overriding conception will have to be examined.

If I am right, both of the opponents share the conviction that reports (expressed in declarative sentences) can fall into two distinct groups: those involving metaphor and those not. And to promote exactness, metaphor must be avoided everywhere. (The same goes for obscure additional senses. For convenience I ignore the 'two senses' alternative; its exclusion will not affect the argument.) Otherwise the reports become contaminated with an ineradicable vagueness.
As vagueness is a flaw anathema to any serious investigation, it is therefore necessary to locate and eliminate instances of metaphor wherever it occurs so that the articulation and analysis of the inner life can proceed with soundness and certainty. The common fear is that, given the fact of terms having been transferred to cover inner experiences, the usual reports of many inner experiences will prove to be metaphorical, and thus a large and important slice of mental life will not be amenable to study. For one of the disputants the fear is realized; the metaphor is a \textit{fait accompli}. And the next step is to invent or wait for the discovery of terms which can articulate the experiences literally. For the other the fear, while genuine, is in this case without foundation; the terms cannot be metaphorical because a definiteness and clarity can already be attained. Now if it can be shown that the fear is itself false, that to couch the worry in terms of the metaphorical versus the literal is somewhat artificial, then some advance might be made in resolving the dispute.

My argument for a resolution falls into two related parts. First, some remarks on the phenomenal quality of the experiences referred to, and second, some doubts about the metaphorical/literal division and a proposed correction.

A most salient feature of inner experiences (the kind we have been referring to) is inner containment or, in other words, a less than immediate connection with the external world. As such experiences are non-perceptual this must surely be true. However, the fact that they are non-perceptual seems to invite an even stronger claim, to wit,
that any felt connection with the external world is illusory: they cannot refer, directly or even indirectly, beyond themselves. And — following out this line of thought — it can be added that any interpretation of inner experience which includes perceptual or perceptually based terms will be gratuitous. If this sounds all too familiar, it should be evident that it returns us to the first rather crudely stated position at the beginning. It will thus not be inappropriate to remind ourselves of an objection, similarly crude, that was presented there.

If inner experiences as is claimed are essentially self-contained, how is the strong inclination to articulate them in terms of the outer to be explained? And if one specifically attends to mental imagery then the strong inclination clearly graduates to a peremptory demand. One is at a loss to see how one could possibly frame the image — especially the image — in words while arresting all allusion to the external world. Further, even if a 'suitable' vocabulary were found, it would not, it could not, make sense of what one feels the sense of the image must be. Now this deeply felt belief that a good deal (all that has value) would be forfeited if we were to follow the linguistic revisionist is doubtless correct, and does provide a difficult item for the revisionist to explain away. I presume that in the end the revisionist will find that belief intractable, intractable because he will be quite unable to reassure us that his recommendations are to our advantage. As a reply that is fine as far as it goes. But the defence of standard practice can be bolstered with arguments which should make the nature of this belief clearer and the view it supports more cogent.
A basic condition of intelligible communication of the outer is that there be some range of publicly observable phenomena to which incontestable reference can be made. And discourse of public phenomena, which aims at truth not reducible to subjective experiences, must operate in accordance with certain standards. That means — to express it very briefly — that discourse aspires to objectivity. Now surely that applies to discourse of all phenomena. Thus communication of inner states, as such essentially private depends upon discourse of the outer. And hence the expression of some inner experiences, I think it safe to say, requires some allusion to the outer — by employing terms and invoking principles of assessment appropriate to description of the outer. Those terms and principles serve to introduce a means of communication and a critical factor otherwise impossible to establish.

So terms and principles appropriate to the outer are required for communication of the inner. That is, I think, a very plausible thesis. And it could be assumed that it alone puts an end to the matter of justifying a linguistic practice. But there is this challenge. 'I accept', someone might argue, 'what you have said but not without reservation because I do not see how your argument supports the conclusion (which I have inferred) that we must be content with the status quo. Must innovation in our talk of the inner be precluded, as it might take us too far, linguistically, from the outer? Are we not permitted to invent a novel technical vocabulary to attain an exclusiveness and greater refinement in expression?' But while I do not deny that a rigidly conservative use of 'outer' terms might
have a constraining effect and that some expansion beyond them will be valuable, I do not think that a wholly 'inner' terminology will prove to be a progressive invention. And this brings me to a more speculative point. Communication of one's more complex inner feelings, as well as requiring the foundation of the discourse of perception, presupposes a knowledge and understanding (however slight) of one's mind. Now, unless we are to regard every inner state, having a measurable degree of depth and complexity, as anomalous, the knowledge and understanding of such states will consist in the recognition of the relevance of a certain pattern (or patterns). Realizing that an inner feeling more or less fits into an ordinary network of relationships helps to make that state comprehensible, because importantly a unity in, a simplicity of organization of, one's total mental life is discovered when it looked at first as if it contained a crucial but inscrutable element. The search for and discovery of a pattern is essential to the belief in the value and coherence of one's inner feelings, for their value and coherence in one's general mental life consists in their pointing beyond themselves. So, very roughly, self-understanding is achieved by assimilating the inner and outer worlds, assimilating them just enough to suggest an analogy.

Now if some inner experiences by their very nature force articulation specifically in 'outer' terms, do we not then have good reason for taking such expressions as capable of direct and unswerving description? For the fact that in some instances there is no choice of terms (it is hard to think of alternatives) should entitle
us to deem at least some expressions of some inner experiences having depth and complexity as correct and straightforward. But that view will not carry any weight unless we dissociate ourselves from a conception of meaning. So long as we think that to each significant term is attached a definite sense, we will be prone to think that when a term is in other than its normal domain either its sense remains unchanged or it acquires an additional one. Thus when used in a foreign domain and used to refer to new objects, the term will become either metaphorical or obscurely ambiguous. Of course this could be denied (as Wollheim has done) by arguing that the transference has neither of those effects. But given that the atomistic conception of meaning is adhered to, this denial remains quite unpersuasive. My proposal is that when a more appealing picture of meaning is presented, the impasse in the dispute can be overcome.

If we look upon words not as possessing discrete, definite senses which exist over and above language but rather as having meanings which are a function of both the phenomena they represent and the relationships in which they participate with other words, our view of metaphor and description may undergo a change. By abandoning the atomistic picture of meaning we at the same time rid ourselves of a rigid and fixed distinction between the metaphorical and the literal, as well as a rigid and fixed distinction between related senses. The terms which have been transferred, we can suppose, were transferred because there was some phenomenal qualities of the
experiences in the new domain that suggested analogies with the terms' original referents. And once the transfer is achieved the term ceases to exist in the same relationships: the old inferences cannot be drawn. The new set of relationships will not parallel the original set. As the idea that sense is a discrete and definite concomitant of language has been dropped, so the idea that unless a term carries its ordinary (primary) sense and maintains its original reference it becomes metaphorical or (obscurely) ambiguous can be easily abandoned. And when we stop thinking of meaning as obtaining in an all-or-nothing way, and regard it as admitting degrees, we might be disposed to regard metaphor and (some) ambiguities in the same light. The picture I want to put across is this. Transference does not by itself make a term metaphorical or ambiguous; so the verbal expression of inner life need not be either. The transferred/original distinction does not correspond to a metaphorical/literal or a new sense/old sense distinction, because there is no one metaphorical/literal distinction and because meanings vary according to the phenomena referred to and linguistic relationships between words. If meaning depends on factors that admit of degrees then it too admits of degrees. Further, in each domain of discourse there are terms whose use is uncontentious and basic. When these terms are used normally within the domain they can be considered literal; otherwise more or less metaphorical or ambiguous (depending on the case). So figurative and literal speech and ambiguity are as much a reality in discourse of the inner as they are in discourse of the outer.
Does adoption of this picture suggest a more convincing reconciliation? It permits the retention of the standard vocabulary and acknowledges definiteness and accuracy of description — that should please one of the disputants. Moreover, it allows that metaphor (or ambiguity) is a very real possibility, and not an unavoidable feature — that should please the other disputant. But even if this proposal achieves a reconciliation, it does not provide any immediate means for removing the persisting difficulties. For instance, problems which arise in an epistemological context on the general accuracy and certainty of the reports remain intact. Nonetheless, I am inclined to think that the picture puts us on the right path, or at least a better path.

I should stress that I do not claim that the correctness of the picture has been demonstrated. What I do claim is that it is more appealing than the others, more appealing because it is more in line with our intuitions about the nature of such reports: namely, that they can be both definite and vague.

Mental images receive much attention because, in connection with the problem of describing the inner life, they appear as paradigm instances of inner states having a determinable content. If any inner state of some complexity has a definite, reportable sense, then doubtless the image qualifies. (Images occupy a comparable position here to that of pains in the problem of other minds.) Now the various treatments of the nature of mental imagery fall into several kinds. It is worthwhile to classify them.
As there are experiences on one side and their reports on the other, we can expect that the types of inquiry will be determined by attitudes to them: whether the experiences or their reports are emphasized, whether concentration on one or the other is thought to produce (the best) results. This division should coincide with a difference of bias: linguistic or phenomenological. In addition, inquiries can be divided on the basis of whether they assume that reports are systematically misleading or all right as they stand, whether they are, in a word, metaphorical or literal. Since these divisions are independent, there should yield four categories. They can be classified thus: (1) Reports of images are metaphorical, and the metaphor is to be removed by an investigation and revision of the reports alone. (2) The reports are metaphorical but only an investigation of the images themselves will remove the metaphor. (3) Reports of images are literal and that can be shown by an investigation of the relevant concepts. (4) The reports are literal and that fact is made evident by inspecting and analysing the experiences themselves. Because this classification deals with extremes it is crude. Still it does give a scheme by which any particular inquiry can be ordered and understood, both in isolation and amidst its rivals. Two prominent examples: Gilbert Ryle's work on the imagination comes under the first heading, and Jean-Paul Sartre's under the last. Ryle argues for linguistic replacements to the normal reports of acts of imaging, though of course the consequences reach further than simple adjustments to language. Sartre directs much of the attention away from the image as such (or 'analogue' as he calls it) so that (a) the content of
the imaging experience becomes external to it, i.e. through intentionality the imaging consciousness aims at that which exists over and against it — thus the contents of the reports are literal since non-private entities are referred to, while (b) the composition of the analogue is shown to display strong continuities with perception — thus the use of verbs of perception in the reports is vindicated. As Sartre's arguments are complex and peculiarly expansive, I shall devote more time to them than to those of others. Unfortunately his work on the subject, when neither ignored nor dismissed, has been insufficiently discussed. That is another reason for the imbalance.
The general attitude to the nature of mind in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries contained the view that there exist discrete, independent mental entities, whose composition, combination and manner of appearance determine the kind and quality of experience. These theories made little advance beyond quite arbitrary postulations of collections of mental processes and powers, that were invented to explain the complexities of thought and experience. The unquestioned confidence in this atomistic assumption and the belief, so strongly held, that a correct theory of mind could only be achieved if a coherent account of the behaviour of these entities could be found, certainly secured the doctrine's longevity. It is evident that near the beginning of this century work along that line stagnated — if only because the doctrine's most attractive embodiments proved unsuccessful. And that opened the way to a challenge to the heart of the matter. If the principle that all experience is essentially a construction of one basic building material were abandoned, and a principle formulated, which would be faithful to experience as it is, and not as it is assumed to be, then a theory so developed is bound to be accurate.

Such a line of thought, voiced by Edmund Husserl in several voluminous attempts to fulfil that promise, inaugurated a major
philosophical movement. His writings have been the source of inspiration for many, but most importantly for the present study, they were the prime influence on Jean-Paul Sartre's critique and theory of the imagination. I shall say only enough about Husserl to introduce Sartre's philosophical orientation; a more elaborate discussion, in any case, would lead too far afield. Besides, I am not concerned whether Sartre has correctly interpreted, at every point, Husserl's methodology and ideas; nor whether his disagreements with Husserl are well founded. It is one conclusion of this chapter that the method which Sartre alleges to have followed enters as a lame appendage.

Sartre's two volume study of the imagination remains the most extensive and impressive examination of the subject to date. In the first, L'Imagination, the leading atomistic theories undergo incisive criticism and are rejected in toto, while Husserl's main ideas are proclaimed as furnishing — though not without some modification — the foundation for any future inquiry. In the second, L'Imaginaire, the programme announced in the earlier book is most ambitiously pursued. (All references will be made to the accessible English translations. Unfortunately, in several places I have found it necessary to amend the anonymous and badly flawed translation of L'Imaginaire.)

To anyone who has read both, it will have been apparent that while the attack on previous theories is often brilliant and unanswerable, the suggestions derived from their destruction are nearly
philosophical movement. His writings have been the source of inspiration for many, but most importantly for the present study, they were the prime influence on Jean-Paul Sartre's critique and theory of the imagination. I shall say only enough about Husserl to introduce Sartre's philosophical orientation; a more elaborate discussion, in any case, would lead too far afield. Besides, I am not concerned whether Sartre has correctly interpreted, at every point, Husserl's methodology and ideas; nor whether his disagreements with Husserl are well founded. It is one conclusion of this chapter that the method which Sartre alleges to have followed enters as a lame appendage.

Sartre's two volume study of the imagination remains the most extensive and impressive examination of the subject to date. In the first, L'Imagination, the leading atomistic theories undergo incisive criticism and are rejected in toto, while Husserl's main ideas are proclaimed as furnishing — though not without some modification — the foundation for any future inquiry. In the second, L'Imaginaire, the programme announced in the earlier book is most ambitiously pursued. (All references will be made to the accessible English translations. Unfortunately, in several places I have found it necessary to amend the anonymous and badly flawed translation of L'Imaginaire.)

To anyone who has read both, it will have been apparent that while the attack on previous theories is often brilliant and unanswerable, the suggestions derived from their destruction are nearly
always doubtful; but worse, the theory that arises from them is an abysmal failure. Perhaps if Sartre were to have applied the same standards of criticism to his own constructive work, he might have produced something quite invaluable — or nothing at all. Nevertheless it is the only study that I know of which pushes the traditional issues and points of concern to their very limit. For that reason alone it warrants close inspection. But more importantly, to my mind his failure demonstrates the futility of pursuing a certain avenue of philosophical inquiry.

What Sartre has borrowed from Husserl can be grouped under three headings: the attack on psychologism, the phenomenological method and the principle of intentionality. Very briefly, in Logical Investigations, Husserl inveighed against psychologism, or the attempt to account for the necessity of logical truths in terms of psychic phenomena and psychological laws, by pointing out that whereas psychological laws are generalizations and admit exceptions, logical truths are universal and irrefutable. Thus logic cannot be founded on psychology. Subsequently, in Ideas, psychologism comes to mean any attempt to give a probabilist, subjectivist, or relativist account of the essential structures of experience. He insists that each type of experience must have an essence that is discoverable: otherwise how could the nature of experience ever be investigated with certainty? As a corrective to all empirical theories, Husserl proposes a method which, when put into practice, will reveal the essences of experience in intuition, unsullied by any empirical or metaphysical prejudice, and in fact, detached from
any prior conceptual framework. When all such impositions have been removed, when the 'reduction' has been performed the experience in question will present its essential structure. The first essential characteristic to be uncovered is that experience as a whole has the property of intentionality, the property of being conscious of something. This fact is most important; indeed 'consciousness is always a consciousness of something' becomes the guiding principle of phenomenology. Expressed simply, the principle means that consciousness is always directed upon objects, whether external objects or internal conscious acts, whose existence transcends ('overflows') consciousness; that is, no conscious act can assimilate an object that it apprehends. Placed in direct opposition to the reductivist principle, it is seen to provide the basis for the rejection of the following views: external objects are apprehended indirectly; experience consists of a passive registering of psychic items; an object of experience is nothing more than the synthesis of a set of psychic items; an exhaustive description of that which is immediately present to consciousness amounts to a complete account of experience; the behaviour of psychic items, and therefore experience, is governed by psychological laws of association.

The import of intentionality should be evident from that thumbnail sketch: consciousness does not contain static psychic items, rather it is a dynamic force directed upon things which it cannot absorb, upon things existing in their own right over and against
consciousness. This attribution of dynamism to consciousness is the Husserlian theme that seems to have impressed Sartre most. In a very short article publicising the principle of intentionality and Husserl's pre-eminence ('Une idée fondamentale de la phénoménologie de Husserl: l'intentionnalité'), Sartre writes: 'What is a table, a rock, a house? A certain assemblage of "contents of consciousness", a class of such contents. O digestive philosophy! Yet nothing seemed more obvious: is not the table the actual content of my perception? Is not my perception the present state of my consciousness? Nutrition, assimilation! Against this 'digestive philosophy', the principle of intentionality restores to consciousness its irreducible self, its assertive power. 'To know is to "burst forward", to tear oneself out of the moist gastric intimacy, veering out there beyond oneself, out there near the tree and yet beyond it, for the tree escapes me and repulses me, and I can no more lose myself in the tree than it can dissolve itself in me. I'm beyond it; it's beyond me.' But his excitement brings him to an extreme interpretation of intentionality, at least an interpretation that diverges significantly from Husserl's. He goes as far as to claim that consciousness is devoid of all content: 'All at once consciousness is purified, it is clear as a strong wind. There is nothing in it but a movement of fleeing itself, a sliding beyond itself ... for consciousness has no "inside". It is just this being beyond itself, this absolute flight, this refusal to be a substance which makes it a consciousness.' But, despite the strength of conviction displayed in this passage, we shall see that he is forced to modify this view and
allow the introduction of something 'inner'.

Sartre makes a great deal of Husserl's revolutionary ideas, presenting them as the foundation for definitive answers to the problems of philosophical psychology. One might find oneself susceptible to that enthusiasm; and if so one ought to be careful that the enthusiasm is not misplaced. Such enthusiasm should be seen to be generated by the rejection of traditional views, and not the promise of the ideas that are heralded as their successors.

When one attends to the manner in which the proposals have been created, the revolution seems not to be as revolutionary as all that. It is important to recognize that the main proposals are direct contraries of the views they are meant to replace. At least part of what motivated the introduction of intentionality can be expressed thus: the theory that perception is mediated by sensory items is unsatisfactory; therefore external objects are apprehended directly.

Another example comes in the passages quoted above; the movement of thought can be encapsulated in this way: it has been shown to be incorrect to consider consciousness a receptacle of psychic entities; hence consciousness must be empty of all content, it must be nothing. While there is nothing intrinsically wrong with such a procedure — looking for truth in the opposite of the unacceptable — to employ it in order to fashion a full-scale intellectual revolution is to overestimate its effectiveness. Surely a genuine intellectual revolution involves the overcoming of a certain general perspective, where certain ideas and their opposites are set aside in favour of a fundamentally different point of view. The extent of change likely produced
by the this-can't-be-so-ergo-its-opposite-must-be procedure cannot, I believe, begin to approach the complete break demanded by a revolution deserving the name. In particular, the fact that the main problem which Sartre sets for himself, arises in accordance with the procedure, does not inspire confidence in the soundness and value of his solution. What will emerge in the ensuing discussion, is that Sartre's revolutionary stance is blocked by an inability to break free of traditional attitudes. His standpoint is certainly a shift within the tradition, and not a total renunciation of it.

Rightly critical of psychological atomism, Sartre adopts the diametrically opposite view that the mind or consciousness is a thoroughly dynamic, freely spontaneous force. Now one immediate obstacle in the way of making this view convincing, is the apparent static and independent nature of mental imagery. If it can be shown that mental imagery is dynamic and no hindrance to the spontaneity of thought, then a most troublesome difficulty has been removed and the phenomenological method will be exhibited in the strongest light. And if, at the same time, it can clarify the nature of that least explored of 'psychic structures', the imagination, then the method has undoubtedly proved its validity.

In assessing how Sartre has fulfilled these objectives, I shall look at his criticisms of traditional theories and to what extent he has overcome traditional mistakes and assumptions, the phenomenological method and how it is utilised, his theory of imagery,
and finally the theory of imagination as it emerges from the account of mental imagery.

In L'Imagination, for the large part, Sartre deftly surveys the most prominent theories of imagination, marshalling many incisive and unanswerable criticisms against theories advanced by Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume as well as Ribot, Alain and Bergson. I shall canvass, however, only those criticisms which yield positive proposals.

Generally, the various theories are accused and found guilty of a "naive metaphysics of the image". That is to say, they have fallen victim to the temptation of supposing all modes of existence to be more or less akin to the existence of material objects. The temptation is succumbed to 'as soon as one shifts from pure contemplation of the image as such to thinking about images without forming them' and here 'one slides from essential identity of image and object to an alleged existential identity. Since the image, in this case, is the object, one draws the conclusion that the image exists in the same fashion as the object' (pp. 3-4). Any theory embodying this mistake of making the image into an inert mass with a quasi-physical existence is precluded from satisfying the two chief requirements of an adequate theory of the imagination. "It must account for the spontaneous discrimination made by the mind between its images and its perceptions. And it must explain the role that the images play in the operations of thought" (p. 117). Once the mental image assumes the status of a thing on a par with external objects of consciousness, and perception and imagination are taken to consist in the same basic ingredient,
then the incontrovertible fact that I know absolutely when I imagine and when I perceive cannot be accounted for. And once the processes of thought are said to be governed by inflexible laws of association, then the freedom, creativity and spontaneity of mental life have been denied. Any theory which presents the image as a quasi-physical entity is faced with this dilemma: either mental images are external to consciousness, in which case the latter is deprived of all its freedom, or they are introduced into consciousness and 'the whole universe follows after, solidifying consciousness at one stroke, like a supersaturated solution' (p. 118).

If image and perception are fundamentally identical, how can a clear distinction between them be maintained? No doubt is ever raised against the assumption that each experience must belong to one category or the other; the possibility of an indeterminate, composite experience is neither considered nor feared. It is remarkable, to Sartre's mind, that despite the importance of the assumption, the theories so far advanced are powerless to justify it.

Needless to say, Sartre accepts the assumption but, unlike his predecessors, he does not try to avoid the issues it raises. He claims that the categorical difference between imagination and perception is given immediately to consciousness. This is so, we presume, because the usual attempts to found the distinction on metaphysical bases are "conjuring tricks"; 'the data of inner experience are transformed into external relations between contents of consciousness and a world, and immediate differentiations among contents are
replaced by classifications of them in terms of something else* (p. 86). Sartre states that there are three possible solutions to the problem of formulating a distinction on this basis, and believes that by showing that all three are inadequate he has confirmed his conclusion.

The Humean criterion of intensity is praised for at least acknowledging the immediacy of the distinction; each impression displays its nature without comparison or further interpretation. But it must be rejected. Why, if the difference is just one of intensity, are we not always confusing images of the same minimum intensity? 'And why does not an image of an artillery shot seem to be an actual, small cracking sound?' (p. 87). Furthermore, if this criterion were the only ground for discrimination, then there ought to be intermediate experiences 'compounded of real sensations and images, halfway between waking life and dream' (p. 88). A difference in quantity does not add up to a difference in quality.

According to the second, the dominance of perception is explained by a continual struggle among sensations; the victor's reward is to be entitled 'perception'. And it is claimed that the properties of externality and localizability which characterize perception-sensations contradict the putative external and localized image-sensations. But, Sartre points out, sensations cannot contradict one another, only judgments can. He gives this counterexample: 'I hear the faint sounds made by the maid in the next apartment. At the same time I distinctly recall, in its rhythm, its timbre, its intonation, a statement I heard uttered the day before
yesterday. How can the faint creaks in the next apartment "reduce" the "coherent sensation" of the statement when they cannot even drown out the faint sound of voices from the street below? Would we not have to say that the creaking sounds distinguished between what had to be cut out and what should be given passage? Would not such creaking sensations already be *judgmental*? (p. 92).

Making perception and imagination the outcome of sub-mental processes violates the spontaneity and immediacy of mental discrimination. (Ironically, this counterexample, as we shall see, causes Sartre acute embarrassment with regard to his claim that imagination and perception are mutually exclusive.)

The third holds that percepts and images are essentially similar, but separated into two realms by judgment. Some are selected to construct an objective world, while the remainder are relegated to the imaginary. Presumably selection is made by comparison tests for reliability, coherence and richness. But such tests could never yield anything but probable hypotheses. 'No one would grant that to establish the difference between an image and a perception one must resort to an infinite reference system. Let everyone consult his own inner experience. I am seated, writing, and see the things around me. Suddenly I form an image of my friend Peter. All the theories in the world are helpless against the fact that I knew, the very instant of the appearance of the image that it was an image' (p. 96). Probable evidence cannot strictly support a judgment of absolute certainty.
The common fault is that all three take images and perceptions to be composed of the same sensory material: 'Start by asserting the essential identity of two things, and you have removed, by the very nature of such an affirmation, all possibility of distinguishing them later' (p.101). Moreover, to regard mental images as autonomous sensory entities serves to place them outside thought, as objects to be studied, compared, deciphered, measured, anticipated and banished. Thought, then, becomes reduced to the apprehension of these entities and their relationships. And as slave to these entities, as wholly determined by their law-governed appearance and interaction, thought loses its integrity and autonomy: nothing can issue from it originally. If these independent psychic entities are susceptible to being reborn, there are problems that arise concerning how and where they reside when not attended to by consciousness. And if they can interact 'behind the scenes', then that implies that there is a region of unconscious mental activity. If there is an unconscious, what real power does thought possess?

In characteristic either-or fashion, Sartre infers from these remarks some large-scale conclusions. Images and perceptions do not consist of the same basic matter, nor are they presented to consciousness in the same manner; they differ crucially in animating intention. Past mistakes can only be avoided if a new conception of mind is adopted: 'A choice must be made: either images remain inert elements, in which case the role of spontaneity must be limited to the apperception of relations between images which elicit each other according to the laws of association; or, consciousness is organiza-
tion, systemization, and the flow of psychic facts is guided by controlling themes, in which case the image can no longer be assimilated to an opaque, received content" (p. 113). In order to keep thought wholly spontaneous, no opaque, inert sensory content can be allowed to enter consciousness. It follows that consciousness, devoid of all impediments, is always transparent to itself, as well as uniquely self-determining. This amounts to the supreme ontological law of consciousness: 'for a consciousness the only way of existing is to be conscious that it exists' (p. 115). If consciousness must always be fully known to itself, then no inert entity with its manifold properties can traverse the boundaries of consciousness. And, since 'there are only two types of existence, as thing in the world and as consciousness' (p. 116), consciousness must be empty. Consequently, the image cannot be a sensory content; it must be a pure spontaneity.

But what more is it? Due to the repudiation of previous theories and methods, how to even begin to answer that question is not at all obvious. Sartre urges that a new method is needed, a method that will be incapable of producing mistakes because it will be applied to the examination of experience in its raw state. However, here it should be noted that Sartre has already overtaken himself. In the first chapter of *L'Imagination*, the new method is exercised to establish some fundamental theses, which find a crucial place in the argument just summarized. So even that conclusion (the image is a pure
spontaneity) depends upon what is yet to be announced, and accordingly, what yet should be put into practice.

All previous inquiries into the nature of mental imagery, Sartre maintains, have taken off on the wrong foot. The reason for their failure is twofold: their theories stemmed from metaphysical presuppositions, fashioned independently of the data to which they apply; their various attempts to grasp the essence of psychic phenomena by adducing psychological facts were in vain. The first is responsible for rendering the image into a quasi-physical item, and the second for managing only probabilistic definitions of imagination and perception. Assuming this diagnosis to be correct, he claims that the only right strategy is obvious. Faithfulness to experience is to be guaranteed by scrutinising it as it is actually lived through, and allowing one's conclusions to arise naturally from the investigation. This direct and unprejudiced confrontation of experience should ensure — if anything will — that the essential structures of experience are made manifest. These conditions, as we have been prepared to expect, are the salient marks of Husserl's phenomenological method.

While no right thinking philosopher could object to the eschewal of intellectual prejudice, he might not so easily agree that mental processes are distinct, separable and possess essential structures. But, as Sartre forcefully contends, the failure to find universally acceptable definitions of mental phenomena has denied progress of
a really significant kind to psychology; and the task of producing definitions belongs to the philosopher.

According to Sartre, the natural sciences have advanced so rapidly because the phenomena of which they treat can be exactly classified, thus enabling a sure method to be followed and adequate laws to be formulated. In contrast, the development of psychology has been retarded by conflicting theories and experimental results. This lack of agreement is due to deeper disagreements over the nature of psychological phenomena. We notice, too, that backing up the investigation in the natural sciences of contingent facts are logical certainties of mathematics: laws of nature are characteristically expressed in mathematical terms. But embarrassingly — at least for anyone who wishes to model the science of the mind on the science of nature — psychology lacks an analogous foundation. The aim, then, of phenomenological psychology is to anchor the inductive investigation of empirical psychology to the intuitive knowledge of our experience. As Sartre writes in a monograph on emotion, which was published after the first but before the second book on the imagination: "If we want to found a psychology we must go beyond the psychic, beyond the situation of man in the world, even to the very source of man, of the world and of the psychic; to the transcendental and constitutive consciousness that we attain through a 'phenomenological reduction', or 'putting the world in brackets'. It is this consciousness that must be interrogated; and what gives value to its answers is that it is mine" (Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, p. 22). This remark shows that the intuitive
knowledge alluded to is far removed from what is normally referred to by these words — a very extraordinary sort of intuition as it turns out.

Sartre offers this explanation: "Phenomenology is a description of the structure of transcendental consciousness based on intuition of the essences of these structures. This description takes place, of course, on the level of reflection; but reflection must not be confused with introspection, which is a special mode of reflection aimed at grasping and establishing empirical facts. To transform the results of introspection into scientific laws there must ensue an inductive transition to generality. There is another type of reflection, utilised by the phenomenologist, which aims at the discovery of essences. That is to say, it begins by taking its stand from the outset on the terrain of the universal" (L’Imagination, p. 128). Thus it is claimed that the 'universal' is reached by the suspension of the natural attitude, which consists in all factual beliefs about the world. But just why this temporarily induced amnesia should transport one to a state of profound contact with raw experience — whatever that might be — is left unexplained. Unfortunately, Husserl, the inventor of the method, is of no greater help (Cf. Ideas § 31). If we wish to follow the method, we must be satisfied with what we have been given — nothing more is offered. Nevertheless, although the destination is uncertain and the means of transport undefined, the novice may still want to take the mystical journey and never mind the details. If he is unable to embark unassisted, perhaps he can be guided, perhaps he can learn the method through imitation.
A good illustration of the method in action appears in the opening paragraphs of L'Imagination. Sartre reflects on a particular, ordinary experience and reaches some staggering conclusions:

I look at this white sheet of paper lying on my desk. I perceive its shape, its color, its position. These various qualities have traits in common. To begin with, they present themselves as beings whose existence in no way depends on my whim, as beings of which I can only take note. They exist for me, but they are not myself. Nor are they some other self. In other words, there is no spontaneity upon which they are dependent, neither mine nor that of any other consciousness. They are at once present and inert. This inertness of the content of perception, which has often been remarked, is being-in-itself.

... This inert shape, which stands short of all spontaneities of consciousness, which must be observed and learned about bit by bit, is what we call a "thing". Never could my consciousness be a thing, because its way of being in itself is precisely to be for itself; for consciousness, to exist is to be conscious of its existence. It appears as a pure spontaneity, confronting a world of things which is sheer inertness. From the start, therefore, we may posit two types of existence. (pp. 1-2)
The breathtaking rapidity at which the ontology is constructed is not without parallel. I do not think it inappropriate to compare it with the opening pages of Hume's *Treatise*. Now the only differences in procedure that I am able to detect between them are that Hume states his conclusion immediately ('All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds...'), and that he claims to have arrived at it after inspecting a large number of various 'perceptions'. Evidently there is no significant difference in method. But this cannot be right, the phenomenologist will say. If Hume had actually employed the phenomenological method, there could be no disagreement over ontology. It is the phenomenologist's dictum that the reductive method yields universally valid results. But unless he can show how the 'terrain of the universal' is to be ascertained, that dictum is without support. Suppose our novice earnestly attempt to follow Sartre's example. He perceives the sheet of white paper lying in front of him. It is certainly not part of him. But what is he himself? He reflects deeply and carefully, and discovers nothing more than the qualities, dispositions and abilities of a complex physical organism. He concludes that there is only one kind of existence. So he contradicts his teacher; where lies his mistake? If his failure to reproduce the results of his teacher jeopardises his chances of becoming a phenomenologist — if he has made a mistake — then by what criteria is success to be decided? Presumably, the validity of the results is determined by a complete 'reduction' to and correct 'description' of 'transcendental consciousness'.
It is to Sartre's (and Husserl's) discredit that no appropriate criteria are offered. Unless the novice has a definite procedure to follow, he has no means of checking whether he has adequately 'stepped back' from the natural attitude and whether the description of what he encounters is wholly accurate. Is there anything in, or absent from, the account of our novice's investigation which suggests that he has erred somewhere along the line? And now this question can be asked: does Sartre's account of his own investigation demonstrate that he has been true to the method? Without a clear procedure, a necessary feature of a truly scientific method, Sartre has no grounds on which to criticise our novice's results, nor, for that matter, vice versa. If, in criticising our novice's claim, Sartre resorts to a plea of special privilege, that is, as a phenomenologist he has exclusive contact with the 'transcendent', but is unable to give support for his results other than adducing the fact that the novice's claim diverges from his own, then, certainly, he has fallen into dogmatism, a dogmatism to which the reductive method was alleged to be the final antidote. Sartre insists that 'the first step of a concrete psychology must be to get rid of metaphysical postulates' (p. 101), and yet the first few pages of *L'Imagination* are a quite straightforward violation of that guideline. The method allegedly employed to establish the ontology is meant to guard against prejudice and secure absoluteness. Clearly, it does not, and cannot, achieve these aims. And, as the method is so obscurely presented and even more obscurely employed, it surely must be regarded as a spurious basis for Sartre's philosophising. Furthermore, because the
method does not appear to carry any appreciable weight in the actual process of arriving at his results, it does not illuminate the invention and/or discovery of his ideas; and, by the same token, it does not distinguish his philosophising — how the ideas are generated — from any other philosopher's. So, for that reason, we can ignore the method, such as it is, with impunity, and assess his results by subjecting them to the standards of criticism generally applied. This needs saying, for while ignoring the method we must recognise that it is responsible for a certain unreasonal tendency in his thinking. The felt impressiveness of the appeal to 'intuition' and the use of 'description' prevent Sartre from questioning his results when they become obviously untenable. His frame of mind seems to be: if it is experience as such that I investigate, then any contradiction in my results must reflect a contradiction in nature.

I mentioned above that Sartre diverges from Husserl on some important issues. One of these concerns (the nature of) the subjective matter of consciousness. Sartre states that, according to Husserl, the object of consciousness is 'outside consciousness (except in the case of reflective consciousness), or is transcendent' (p. 131). Nonetheless, 'Husserl does not deny the existence of visual or tactile data which constitute a part of consciousness as immanent subjective elements. But these are not the object. Consciousness is not directed toward them; rather, through them it aims at the external thing. This visual impression which is currently part of my consciousness is not the red. The red is a quality of an object, a
transcendent quality. This subjective impression which is no
doubt an "analogue" of the red of the thing, is only a "quasi-red".
That is to say, it is the subjective matter, the "hyle", on which
operates an intention transcending itself and trying to snare the
red out there' (p. 132). Therefore, for Husserl, the image is neither
identical with the subjective matter nor with the object: 'the image
ceases to be a psychic content. It is not in consciousness in the
guise of a constitutive element. Rather, in the consciousness of a
thing in image Husserl distinguished, as in perception, an imaging
intention and a hyle enlivened by the intention. The hyle naturally
remains subjective, but by the same token the object of the image,
unattached to the pure "content" resides outside consciousness as
something radically different' (p. 133). The image is a certain
manner that consciousness has of apprehending an object. So too,
perception is a kind of apprehension, having its own 'intentional
structure'. Thus for Husserl the fundamental difference between
mental imagery and perception rests on their distinct 'intentional
structures'.

But Sartre disagrees. Intentionality alone, he argues, cannot
be adequate because, if the subjective matter is uniform for images
and perceptions, then the insoluble problem arises of how to explain
the seemingly arbitrary decision of consciousness to animate this
bit of subjective matter to act as an image and that bit to act as a
perception. Husserl tried to forestall that problem by attributing
motivation to consciousness, such that consciousness wills the
kinds of experience. But Sartre points out that if the subjective
matter is uniform then there could be no valid motive for choosing one
bit of subjective matter to function as an image or a perception. And if the motivational selection is arbitrary, the possibility of formulating a distinction between imagery and perception has been ruled out. The lesson that Sartre extracts from this should not be surprising. In order to completely differentiate imagination and perception, a distinction, he concludes, must be made on the level of subjective matter: the subjective matter of mental images must be itself a spontaneity (pp. 141-2). Below we shall see how he tries to define the subjective matter as a spontaneous creation of consciousness.

With the passages, quoted above, from Sartre's article on intentionality in mind, one might be quite puzzled by this introduction of what is plainly 'inner'. Here we have come up against a striking ambivalence in Sartre's thought. On the one hand, he claims without qualification that consciousness is empty; and on the other that it has — if only in imaging — a specifiable content. Although Sartre does not explicitly deal with the problem posed by these contrary views, I think it is possible to construe a reconciliation (of sorts). The exegesis will lead into some of his major doctrines.

At times Sartre is prone to make uncompromising declarations. There are no better examples for our purposes than those found in L'Être et le néant. 'Consciousness has nothing substantial . . . it is total emptiness' (p. lvi); 'We must renounce those neutral mental "givens" which, according to the system of reference chosen, find their place either "in the world" or "in the psyche"' (p. li).
The danger in admitting 'contents' into consciousness is that a problematic passivity is allowed in as well. There can not be laws of consciousness or motivations external to consciousness either: 'Otherwise . . . we should fall into that too common illusion which makes consciousness semi-conscious or a passivity' (p. lv). Therefore, 'The first procedure of a philosophy ought to be to expel things from consciousness and to reestablish its true connection with the world' (p. li). But while such a procedure might be attractively applied to the dominating psychic structure, perception, its unrestricted use would tend to banish from at least one other psychic structure what so obviously must be retained. And if it is waived in order to retain what ought to be retained, then some adjustment must be made, some explanation given.

The policy of eliminating all 'contents' from consciousness (or anti-immanentism) is most strongly advanced when Sartre has only perception in view. All consciousness is consciousness of transcendent objects, which exist apart from and independently of cognition, and whose properties far outnumber those that can be apprehended in any cognitive act. When I perceive, the objects of my perception are there before me; nothing comes between the book that I see and touch, and my apprehension of it; I experience it directly. The book is before me; I perceive it: that is all there is to say. He goes no further. Quite justifiably, one feels that very little has been advanced. Has he not disregarded every serious problem of the nature of perception? If he has disregarded them,
it is because he does not believe that they are of any importance. They are of no importance, it seems, because from Sartre's phenomenological point of view they do not arise. It is thus no exaggeration to say that for him perception is unproblematic. That is a most curious feature of his philosophy. But it is curious because he takes perception as unproblematic and not because he takes some aspect of the mind as unproblematic. Indeed, Sartre's philosophical approach to the analysis of the mind resembles the one that he reacts so strongly against insofar as both share an unquestioned appeal to an area of mental life, but differ in the area chosen.

To put it crudely, it was characteristic of the traditional approach to take mental images as data *par excellence* of the mind, and appeal to them — if only implicitly — so as to make sense of perception. Mental imagery was the unquestioned starting point, and the nature of perception the commanding problem. Complementary to this, Sartre takes perception as the psychic structure, or consciousness, *par excellence*, and makes it serve as the model by which to explain the nature of mental imagery. This comparison is a valuable aid to the assessment of Sartre's renunciation of previous theories of imagination.

According to Sartre, perception consists principally of a perceiver, or perceptual consciousness, and the transcendent object to which that consciousness is directed. Now do we find analogous elements in mental imaging? Immediately the investigation gives rise to this problem. There is an obvious (phenomenological) difference
between my thought of some object and my actual visualization of it. The latter contains something — in the loosest sense of 'thing' — lacking in the former. What is it in visualization that 'fills in' my consciousness? It cannot be the object, because that exists outside my consciousness. ('It is not a something but not a nothing either.') Sartre refers to it variously as 'impressional matter', 'representative element', 'analogue', or 'psychic factor'; and contends that it is a but not the sole constitutive element of the imaginative consciousness. Sometimes however, when considering both mental imagery and perception together, he attributes an 'impressional matter' to perception as well. But that 'impressional matter' is distinct from that which participates in the imaginative consciousness; 'In perception the actual representative element corresponds to a passivity of consciousness. In the image, this element, in so far as it is primary and incommunicable, is the product of a conscious activity, is shot through and through with a flow of creative will' (L'Imaginaire, p. 15). But if a 'representative element' functions in perception, then there ought to be problems about the nature of its participation, particularly how perception can be said to present its objects directly and what sense can be given to the claim that all consciousness is pure and non-passive. In any case, what should be noticed now is that the declaration of the emptiness of consciousness opposes the view that consciousness contains inert, autonomous entities, but not in Sartre's scheme of things — oddly enough — the view that consciousness can produce a malleable 'psychic matter' which is dependent in greater and less degrees, according to the
between my thought of some object and my actual visualization of it. The latter contains something — in the loosest sense of 'thing' — lacking in the former. What is it in visualization that 'fills in' my consciousness? It cannot be the object, because that exists outside my consciousness. ('It is not a something but not a nothing either.') Sartre refers to it variously as 'impressional matter', 'representative element', 'analogue', or 'psychic factor'; and contends that it is a but not the sole constitutive element of the imaginative consciousness. Sometimes however, when considering both mental imagery and perception together, he attributes an 'impressional matter' to perception as well. But that 'impressional matter' is distinct from that which participates in the imaginative consciousness; 'In perception the actual representative element corresponds to a passivity of consciousness. In the image, this element, in so far as it is primary and incommunicable, is the product of a conscious activity, is shot through and through with a flow of creative will' (L'Imaginaire, p. 15). But if a 'representative element' functions in perception, then there ought to be problems about the nature of its participation, particularly how perception can be said to present its objects directly and what sense can be given to the claim that all consciousness is pure and non-passive. In any case, what should be noticed now is that the declaration of the emptiness of consciousness opposes the view that consciousness contains inert, autonomous entities, but not in Sartre's scheme of things — oddly enough — the view that consciousness can produce a malleable 'psychic matter' which is dependent in greater and less degrees, according to the
type of consciousness in question, on the creative power of the mind. Indeed, it is this latter view that Sartre advances. In this respect, is his theory of mind so radically different from ones which introduce sense data? The main difference between them lies in Sartre's rejection of the idea that the 'subjective matter' is a material akin to physical matter, and that it has primary status in the analysis of the mind and experience. As I understand him, Sartre holds that the transcendent object and the animating intention of consciousness directed at that object are the chief determining factors of experience; 'subjective matter' in perception is irrelevant, but in the imaginative consciousness of some importance. And in both perception and imagination the 'subjective matter' does not interfere with the dynamism of consciousness, because it is subject to consciousness. So the reconciliation — for what it is worth — is achieved. His anti-immanentism undergoes some modification, and amounts to a rejection of the old variety of 'hard' psychic matter while introducing a more adaptable 'soft' variety. To "empty" must be added "of the unsuitable psychic material": that takes some of the wind out of the anti-immanentist's sails. Now whether Sartre can make better sense of his sophisticated version of the nature of the 'subjective matter' (particularly as it occurs in the imaginative consciousness) than the psychological atomist had, is a question whose answer will become evident later.

Sartre fails to consider some difficulties that arise from his theory of consciousness; but he does not neglect them all, for his handling of one produces a fundamental doctrine. In perception, as
distinct from the imagination, the transcendent object is present to consciousness. But clearly, there are cases where consciousness aims at an object that it takes to be present but there is no such object present, and cases where the object that is expected to be encountered is recognized to be absent or non-existent. Failures of the former sort (perceptual error) he inexcusably does not consider; it is the more interesting latter sort that absorbs his attention.

His attempt to understand the phenomenon of seeing that such-and-such is absent results in the hypostatization of non-being. In order for non-being to have a place in perception it must meet two conditions: first, it must be existent and transcendent, and second, it must be a real object of consciousness and as such have a real presence. He writes that 'not to be "there" means still to be' (L'Être et le néant, p. xlix), and 'To say that consciousness is consciousness of something is to say that it must produce itself as a revealed-revelation of a being which is not it and which gives itself as already existing when consciousness reveals it' (p. lxii), and 'The necessary condition for our saying not is that non-being be a perceptual presence in us and outside us' (p. 11). Since, he seems to argue, perceptual consciousness demands real, present existence as its object, the perceptual consciousness of absence or non-existence must as well demand real, present existence. And, taking imagination as parallel to perception, he claims that imagination too involves presence. He says in L'Imagination that mental images are 'only procedures for rendering objects present in a certain way' (p. 64). As we shall see there is a similarity between perception
of non-being on the one hand and imagining on the other. In imagination, for Sartre, the analogue (which includes, in common terminology, the mental image) functions as the manifestation of presence. Though, despite the similarity, it is doubtful whether removal of the paradox of a perceived present absence will effect a dissolution of the corresponding paradox of an imagined present absence.

Sartre analyses the consciousness of imagery into three components: the animating intention, the analogue, and the intended transcendent object. As he tends to treat them separately so shall I.

If L’Imagination ends with an appeal to an unduly technical, esoteric method, L’Imaginaire opens on a remarkably conciliatory note. Sartre understates: 'The method is simple: we shall produce images, reflect upon them, describe them; that is, attempt to determine and to classify their distinctive characteristics' (p. 2). The images that he discusses form a group both broad and narrow: broad because it includes images other than mental images, but narrow because the images (with one minor exception — listening to a symphony — which, in any case, comes outside the main argument) are all exclusively visual. That restriction is significant.

The reflection on some mental images yields four distinctive characteristics of the imaginative consciousness; namely, (1) the image as a consciousness, (2) the phenomenon of quasi-observation, (3) the image involving a nothingness, and (4) spontaneity.
of non-being on the one hand and imagining on the other. In
imagination, for Sartre, the analogue (which includes, in common
terminology, the mental image) functions as the manifestation of
presence. Though, despite the similarity, it is doubtful whether
removal of the paradox of a perceived present absence will effect
a dissolution of the corresponding paradox of an imagined present
absence.

Sartre analyses the consciousness of imagery into three
components: the animating intention, the analogue, and the intended,
transcendent object. As he tends to treat them separately so shall I.

If *L'Imagination* ends with an appeal to an unduly technical,
esoteric method, *L'imaginaire* opens on a remarkably conciliatory
note. Sartre understates: 'The method is simple: we shall produce
images, reflect upon them, describe them; that is, attempt to
determine and to classify their distinctive characteristics' (p. 2).
The images that he discusses form a group both broad and narrow:
broad because it includes images other than mental images, but
narrow because the images (with one minor exception — listening
to a symphony — which, in any case, comes outside the main argu-
ment) are all exclusively visual. That restriction is significant.

The reflection on some mental images yields four distinc-
tive characteristics of the imaginative consciousness; namely, (1) the
image as a consciousness, (2) the phenomenon of quasi-observation,
(3) the image involving a nothingness, and (4) spontaneity.
Against the long-standing tendency to conceive mental images as akin to physical objects, Sartre offers a knock-down argument, which shows just how ridiculous that assumption is. If the proponents of the traditional view are to be taken at their word, then their claim amounts to an assertion that the object is in the image and that the image is in the mind. He locates an expression of this incoherent view in Hume's *Treatise*: 'But to form the idea of an object, and to form an idea simply is the same thing; the reference of the idea to an object being an extraneous denomination, of which in itself it bears no mark or character. Now as 'tis impossible to form an idea of an object, that is possest of quantity and quality, and yet is possest of no precise degree of either; it follows, that there is an equal impossibility of forming an idea, that is not limited and confin'd in both these particulars' (p. 20). To this remark he might well have added: 'Now since all ideas are deriv'd from impressions, and are nothing but copies and representations of them, whatever is true of the one must be acknowledged concerning the other ... An idea is a weaker impression; and as a strong impression must necessarily have a determinate quantity and quality, the case must be the same with its copy of representative' (p. 19).

If Sartre objects, the idea of an object bears only an extraneous relation to the object, and the idea must possess all the qualitative determinations of the real object, then what can this mean except that in having an idea of an object, the object is exactly reproduced in the mind.
The refutation of immanentism is straightforward and embarrassingly simple: 'When I perceive a chair it would be absurd to say that the chair is in my perception. According to the terminology we have adopted, my perception is a certain consciousness and the chair is the object of the consciousness. Now I shut my eyes and I produce an image of the chair I have just perceived. The chair, now occurring as an image, can no more enter into consciousness than it could do so as an object. An image of a chair is not, and cannot be a chair. In fact, whether I perceive or imagine that chair of straw on which I am seated, it always remains outside consciousness' (p. 4). Thus if we wish to preserve an unmitigated distinction between consciousness and objects in the world, we cannot allow that the mind could be populated by such objects or copies of such objects. So it is perverse to even suggest that in visualizing a chair a peculiar copy of a chair is present to the mind, and equally perverse to maintain that the mental image itself behaves in accordance with mechanical laws, for only an object in the world can be really subject to such laws.

Now it should be clear that by talking of the imagined object and the mental image separately, we have described two aspects of immanentism. Immanentism is, Sartre says, a 'double error': 'We believed, without giving the matter any thought, that the image was in consciousness and that the object of the image was in the image' (p. 2). With regard to the latter, Sartre urges that the only proper objects of consciousness are transcendent objects (i.e., objects which can be described without referring to any apprehension of them). A mental
image, then, is 'nothing other than a relationship' between consciousness and the transcendent object' (p. 5), it refers to 'a certain manner in which the object makes its appearance to consciousness, or, if one prefers, a certain way in which consciousness presents an object to itself'. The image does not harbour the object and the image is not self-contained. Like perceptual consciousness, the imaginative consciousness is directed on transcendent objects.

That is the first characteristic of the imaginative consciousness, which introduces the new, dynamic model of the mental image, and begins to demolish the old, static one. The remaining three characteristics continue the process.

We have been told that the only proper objects of consciousness are 'outside' it, or the non-reflective consciousness is never directed upon itself. Yet in considering some mental images where there are no definite external objects of which they are clearly images, it is naturally tempting to refer to the object given in the image (or, for Sartre, in the analogue) as the object of the image. I visualize a chair stretching, shrinking and finally disintegrating. Certainly I have no particular chair in mind; it is entirely my own creation. And I have destroyed it. Granted the chair is an imaginary object, why cannot imaginary objects be genuine objects of consciousness? If all mental images were as a matter of fact images of objects currently existing (as in the case of visualizing the chair upon which one is seated), then Sartre's view of the image as a relationship would be highly attractive. But as it is with the variety of images, it would seem that we are at times drawn to give a real, external object as
the object of the image and at other times to give a privately created, imaginary object. So to forestall that sort of criticism of his theory, Sartre argues that objects given in the image cannot by any means satisfy the requirements of a genuine object of consciousness. When consciousness is unable to secure the presence of the real object, it fashions a substitute. Yet, even when that substitute has been produced, consciousness never ceases to aim at the transcendent objects. But if the intended transcendent object is known to be non-existent or to be fictional, then what sort of relationship obtains between imaginative consciousness and its objects? Rather bizarrely, Sartre seems to maintain — he says nothing to the contrary — that the 'relationships' obtaining between fictional objects, non-existent objects, absent objects, etc. and consciousness are identical.

An object of perceptual consciousness possesses an indefinitely large number of determinate properties, whereas an object given in the mental image exhibits only those properties that are immediately apprehended. Indeed the latter is determined wholly by the consciousness of it: 'the object of perception overflows consciousness constantly; the object of the image is never more than the consciousness one has of it; it is limited by that consciousness; nothing can be learned from an image that is not already known' (p. 8). It is already known definitively because it is just that knowledge which reacts with impressional matter to produce the object in the image. It is the apprehension of the results that creates the (illusory) impression that the object in the image is observed, and since observed, a genuine object of consciousness. The object in the image cannot be a
genuine object of consciousness because 'the image teaches nothing, never produces an impression of novelty, and never reveals ny aspect of the object... No risk, no anticipation: only a certainty. My perception can deceive me, but not my image. Our attitude towards the object of the image could be called "quasi-observation"... If I produce an image of a page of a book, I am assuming the attitude of a reader, I look at the printed pages. But I am not reading. And, actually, I am not even looking, since I already know what is written there' (p. 9). Perception involves the acquisition of knowledge—an ongoing learning process. The mental image, on the other hand, is merely a manifestation of already assimilated knowledge and experience. As wholly a product of consciousness, the image is consciousness, and therefore it or the object in the image cannot be an object of consciousness. The attitude of quasi-observation allows only quasi-objects. So, as the object in the image is not an object of consciousness but can be treated as if it were some such object, we might speak of the phrase 'object in the image' as a façon de parler, which refers to the synthesis of the 'representative element and the element of knowledge'. The object in the image inasmuch as it can be talked about and described is something, but because it is not a transcendent object it is nothing.

Although much of the discussion suggests a distinction between the object of the image and the object in the image as I have tried to indicate, some remarks show that Sartre either does not wish to make the distinction (consistently) or is confused about it. Besides
frequently referring to the object in the image (l'objet dans l'image) as the object of the image (l'objet de l'image), he complicates matters by introducing the expression 'l'objet en image'. While it apparently acts as a synonym of 'the object in the image', more likely it means both kinds of object in union. If so, the expression serves to limit the objects of imaginative consciousness. But that limitation causes problems:

To construct a certain consciousness of a table as an image is at the same time to construct the table as the object of an imaginative consciousness. The object in the image (en image) is therefore contemporaneous with the consciousness I have of it, and it is determined exactly by that consciousness: it includes nothing in itself but what I am conscious of; but, inversely, everything that constitutes my consciousness has its counterpart in the object, a knowledge concerning the object. In the act of consciousness the representative element and the element of knowledge are united in a synthetic act. The correlative object of that act becomes at one and the same time a concrete, sensible object, and an object of knowledge. This gives rise to the paradoxical result that the object is present to us externally and internally at the same time. Externally, for we observe it; internally, for it is in the object that we perceive what it is. (pp. 9-10)
Whether Sartre is deliberately running both kinds of object together, or simply does not have a firm grasp of the distinction, or both, it is not easy to say. But what is certain is that, by having exercised more care with regard to this matter, he could have spared himself some strong criticisms, and, by the same token, some unfortunate mistakes. For instance—apart from the obvious objections to the quoted passage—there is a very serious criticism that can be levelled against the presentation of the all-important third characteristic of the imaginative consciousness, namely, that it posits its object as nothingness.

The third characteristic of the image describes a crucial contrast with perception: 'Every consciousness posits its object, but each does so in its own way. Perception, for example, posits its object as existing. The image also includes an act of belief, or a positing act' (p. 11). The positing act of imaginative consciousness, can take several forms: 'No doubt there are some perceptual judgments which involve a neutralized act of positing. This is what happens when I see a man coming towards me and I remark "this may be Peter". But this suspended belief refers only to the man who is coming. I doubt only whether he is Peter, not that it is a man. In a word, my doubt necessarily implies a positing of a type of existence: a man is coming towards me. On the other hand, to say "I have an image of Peter" is equivalent to saying not only "I do not see Peter" but also "I see nothing at all". The characteristic of the intentional object of the imaginative consciousness is that it does not exist and is posited as not existing, or that it is not posited at all' (pp. 12-13).
We are reminded that all consciousness is consciousness of something, and that each consciousness (or psychic structure) distinguishes itself by a unique act of positing the object to which it is directed. In perception, the object is posited as existent and present (only later, in *L'Être et le néant*, does Sartre allow a perception of absence), while in imagination, the object is, generally, posited as absent. The contrast, as described in *L'Imaginaire*, is sharp: the positing of the object as absent 'can manifest itself only in an imaginative act' (p. 217). But now which object is posited as absent? Surely the object of the image need not be absent. Consider this: I stop reading, close my eyes, and visualize the book I hold in my hands. I visualize it in that location. There is no doubt that my imaginative consciousness is aimed at the book in my hands; and therefore I am quite unable to posit it as absent. (I can entertain the possibility of its absence, but that is another matter.) And suppose I visualize myself? Surely it is nonsensical to maintain that I posit myself as absent; absent from what? It may be pointless to visualize what is present and can be seen adequately, but that is another matter; the matter at hand is the nature of mental imagery. (Perhaps Sartre, since he does stress that imagination attempts to get what perception fails to, has confused the 'aim' of consciousness, directedness, with the 'aim' of consciousness, motivation.) Nevertheless, since one normally shuts one's eyes when visualizing, a qualification to the effect that the object is absent from sight could be introduced. But that possibility is not entertained by Sartre, and anyway, if it were introduced, it would violate the all-or-nothing
spirit of nothingness as well as the principle that perception and imagination are mutually exclusive attitudes of consciousness. Is the object in the image, then, posited as absent? We might agree that it meets the general condition of being a certain nothing: it is not an object of consciousness. But what could it mean to say that that object can be posited, more specifically, as 'non-existent, or as absent, or as existing elsewhere'? It seems very odd to contend that in one case the object in the image is posited as non-existent, and in another, as existing elsewhere. Clearly no sense can be made of that.

I suspect that the reason Sartre has failed to give a coherent account is that he has extended the characteristic of nothingness too far. He extends its coverage from the object in the image — where it readily fits — to object of the image. And that leads to the interpretation of nothingness as absence, etc. It may be that in the great majority of cases, the object of the image is absent, or non-existent, or etc., but that fact does not amount to a necessary feature of mental imagery.

The final characteristic, spontaneity, emphasizes the non-passivity of the imaginative consciousness. As the image (or the created object) is a spontaneous construction of consciousness, the awareness of the image is immediate and complete. The imaginative consciousness is nothing substantial and never fixed. Thus the old metaphor makes way for the new: 'the consciousness of the image is not at all like a piece of wood floating on the sea, but like a
wave among waves' (p. 14). (If consciousness contains nothing solid, it must be all fluid.)

Next, Sartre examines phenomena which are commonly called images, with the intention of demonstrating important similarities and dissimilarities among mental imagery, photographs, portraits, reflections, mimicry, schematic drawings, hypnagogic imagery, and so on. But the primary objective is to pave the way for the speculative inquiry (The Probable) into the nature of the mental analogue. If we doubt that the mental image incorporates a material (of a rather special sort) we need only compare 'my initial empty intention with my mental image of Peter. At first I wanted to produce Peter out of the void, and then something loomed up which filled in my intention' (p. 18). The nature of the material in the mental image is to be clarified by clarifying the material of other forms of imagery. This procedure is sound, argues Sartre, because as all the forms share an identical function (to wit, to represent what is not present to perception) they are species of the same genus; and therefore their respective analogues are closely related in composition. Photographs, portraits and schematic drawings require some perceived material for the imaginative consciousness to animate. Differences among them, according to Sartre, are due to the degrees to which the various materials make demands on the imaginative consciousness to produce a satisfactory analogue. The upshot of the investigation is that as the material becomes more impoverished in representational detail and perceptual 'stability', the more the imaginative
consciousness must contribute to establish and sustain the image.

The discussion moves from a consideration of photographs and portraits whose material is richest in observational detail and representational quality, to pantomime, sketches and schematic drawings where an increasingly greater participation of the imager is required to effect a successful and full image. What form does the participation take? Deficiencies in the material are compensated by an imposed organization. The organization is achieved through the activity of knowledge-directed eye movements. It cannot be denied that knowledge (and past experience) and the focusing and refocusing of (as well as movements of) the eyes are significant factors in the creation and recognition of images based in perception. Moreover, it is not implausible to suggest that the inferior representational quality of an ink blot (compared to a photograph, say) necessitates more effort and greater concentration on the part of the imager. To be sure, ready-made images such as photographs and portraits depend less for their existence on the imager than the accidental images in blots and wallpaper. Now, taking into account the immense number and variety of perceptually-based images, it might reasonably be supposed that their differences will prove to be a function of a complementary relationship between the richness of the perceived material and the contribution of knowledge. If such things could be calibrated, then it might even be expected that the differences between neighbouring cases will be slight, and that the overall effect will be that of a continuous change from photographs on one
extreme to blots on the other. Indeed it is just such a fictional model of distribution that Sartre finds so attractive, and which he tacitly appeals to when arguing that there exists a mere difference of degree between photographic images and mental images.

Extrapolation must be sound: the gap between images in blots, which depend upon present perception, and images in the mind, which preclude present perception, has to be filled. Hypnagogic images, those images that emerge from the retinal 'light-display' during the period just prior to sleep, occupy that crucial intermediate stage. They resemble images in blots insofar as 'the material is plastic: in the one arabesques, faint forms, in the other lights without contours' (p. 55). Often they both arise in similar circumstances: when one is tired and trying to sleep, the images that emerge from patterns in (say) wallpaper become an amusing if sometimes distracting preliminary to slumber. But with hypnagogic imagery, consciousness is less free; it is at once enchained and fascinated, because hypnagogic phenomena belong to consciousness and are not contemplated by it. 'In falling asleep the motor basis of attention is weak. From it there results a different type of presence for the object. It is there, but without externality; we cannot observe it, that is, cannot make hypotheses and control them. What is lacking is precisely a contemplative power of consciousness, a certain way of keeping oneself at a distance from one's images, from one's own thoughts, thus permitting them their own logical development, instead of depositing upon them all of one's own weight, of throwing oneself
into the balance, of being judge and accused, of using one's own power of synthesis to make a synthesis of whatever sort and no matter what' (pp. 49-50). The lack of contemplative power is an inherent feature, because, as Sartre says, the material (i.e., the phosphenes) is in the eyes, and therefore not external (p. 51). But if this is so, then, keeping in mind the dichotomy of being-in-itself and being-for-itself, the material is 'wholly consciousness' — or else, if he wishes to confer a hybrid status on the phosphenes, partly internal and partly external, he has violated that dichotomy. Now if the material of hypnagogic imagery is wholly internal, how can there be a mere difference in degree between images in blots and hypnagogic images? Furthermore, if the material of hypnagogic images is wholly internal, what distinguishes them from mental images?

We may not be surprised that here Sartre uncovers another paradox. He argues, it seems, that, despite the differences in material, there is no discontinuity between images in blots and hypnagogic images because the latter too involves perception: 'in the hypnagogic consciousness the object is posited neither as in the process of appearing nor as already having appeared; one is suddenly aware of seeing a face' (p. 45). This conclusion does not tally with my own reflection on similar experiences, not because I hold the opposite, but because it is not clear how I could have been using my sight in total darkness with my eyes closed. Sartre implies that the phenomena of seeing a face in perception and of seeing a
face in hypnagogic images are essentially alike. But this similarity of verbal expression does not demonstrate a fundamental identity of the phenomena concerned, rather it presents a problem: what leads us to describe such obviously different phenomena with the same terms? It is therefore necessary to ask Sartre: What kind of awareness? Vision? In what way? He tries to explain: 'I do not see the teeth of the saw (I only see phosphenes), but I know that what I see is a figure of the teeth of a saw' (p. 52). And further on with yet another example: 'The image is not posited as an object, but as a representation. One sees if not a cat at least a representation of one; or, to be more exact, one is about to see a non-existent cat... it is because consciousness feels itself but slightly en-chained that it posits its object as object as non-existent. It posits itself as seeing a cat; but since it is aware, in spite of all, of the origin of the vision, it does not posit that this correlative exists. Whence this paradox: I really do see something, but what I see is nothing' (pp. 55-6). Doubtless — since Sartre leaves the matter at that — we are asked to believe that the 'vision' in hypnagogic imagery is like ordinary vision in every respect except that no object is seen! Faced with such a clear absurdity, which is paraded as a significant discovery, the attempt to make the view in question intelligible cannot proceed. Besides, the incoherence is too obvious to warrant comment. Yet something remains to be said on how Sartre is driven to adopt it.

Pressure mounts on two sides. On one: Hypnagogic images differ from images in blots primarily in that the former depend on no
external material. That fact alone would seem to be sufficient to open a wide gap between them and leave hypnagogic images very close to mental images. On the other: Assuming that only one kind of imagery (namely, mental imagery) can be completely internal, hypnagogic imagery must exhibit some aspect of externality. It can bear some externality only if it does not possess the characteristic of quasi-observation. So real perception must be involved. Now no wonder the opposing sides cannot be reconciled: their aims are plainly contradictory. Of course Sartre realizes this; but, since the paradox is a result of phenomenological reflection, it must be accepted.

Perception, then, according to Sartre, connects hypnagogic imagery with imagery involving perceived material, and so keeps it separate from mental imagery. What makes this separation only partial is the (relative) dependence of the material. As Sartre puts it: 'in the hypnagogic consciousness the material is practically inseparable from the consciousness we have of it, since it is radically transformed as consciousness seizes hold of it, and this not only in its functions, but in its very structure' (p. 56). It should be recognized however that examination of the material present in hypnagogic imagery is not beset with the problem — inherent in the attempt to examine the material present in mental imagery — of identifying it. In fact there are no possible means of locating and inspecting the material present in mental imagery. While subtraction of the imaginative consciousness from the apprehension of a portrait leaves the canvas, no such comparable residual entity remains when
the consciousness of the mental image ceases: 'This is due to the fact that when the imaginative consciousness is destroyed its transcendent content is destroyed with it; no describable residue remains, we are confronted by another synthetic consciousness which has nothing in common with the first' (p. 61). Since the mental image is inseparable from its material, and the annihilation of the imaginative consciousness makes the material itself irretrievable, there is nothing for phenomenological reflection to apprehend. In order to determine the nature of this material we must 'leave the sure ground of phenomenological description and turn to experimental psychology. That is, as in the experimental sciences, we form hypotheses and seek confirmation in observation and experiment' (p. 62). Although true phenomenological reflection fails us at so crucial a point, it has, fortunately, provided enough equipment, by way of general facts applicable to all forms of imagery, to allow 'The Probable' to achieve a certainty of its own. The shortcoming of the method does not, Sartre insists, spell disaster.

From the treatment of various members of the image family, Sartre concludes that the differences among them derive solely from the interaction, between the material and knowledge, which produces the analogue; intentionality undergoes no transformation. In all, consciousness is directed upon a transcendent object by means of an analogue; and since it is possible to ' intend' the same object by employing distinct analogues (e.g., a photograph of J.-P. S. and a caricature of J.-P. S.), the differences among imagery must rest on variations in the composition of the analogues. But not just any
material will be susceptible to the animating intention and knowledge of imaginative consciousness. The material must be such as to allow knowledge to upgrade the impoverished material to the level of representation. The transformation is effected by the 'penetration of knowledge': 'Knowledge is not substituted in its ideational form for the weak material. As knowledge it cannot fill in the gaps of intuition. It must undergo a debasement . . . It becomes intuitive in the form of pantomime; it flows in the movements. A new phenomenon appears: the symbolic movement, which, by its very nature as movement, belongs to intuition, and, by its meaning, belongs to pure thought. But it can happen that knowledge becomes directly incorporated with other sensible qualities, as in the case of hypnagogic images. We shall see that this degradation of knowledge is not exclusively an imaginative phenomenon and that it also is to be found in simple perception' (p. 59). (If the transformation occurs in perception, then it cannot be as bizarre as it might seem.) Now if the analogue of the imaginative consciousness is essentially a manifestation of knowledge, then any theory that supposes the mental image to be a sensory item must therefore be incorrect. But while this conclusion is attractive, the strength of the argument depends on his project of defining the nature of the analogue. And, as we shall see, the proposal that emerges from that project is not a persuasive, let alone intelligible, alternative.

Knowledge is inextricably bound up with the intention of the image, for the intention always directs consciousness at something
specified, however vaguely. Nevertheless, knowledge itself can exist in a 'free state'. My knowledge that Peter is tall and blond, for instance, remains inactive and 'pure' until it undergoes a 'radical transformation' when I actively employ it in the formation of a mental image of him. Somehow, in the formation of the image, my pure knowledge that Peter is tall and blond becomes an imaginative knowledge that aims at the 'realization' of that fact. Sartre writes: 'Things present themselves as presences. If we begin with knowledge, the image will arise as a result of thought trying to make contact with the presences. This birth of the image coincides with a debasement of the knowledge which no longer aims at the relationships as such but as substantial qualities of things' (p. 75). If knowledge inaugurates the creation of the image by aiming to represent what it contains in a pure state, what is it that supplies the ingredients of the representation in the form of an analogue?

There are two components, affectivity and movement, either of which may exist alone in determining the analogue — but their union gives the best result: 'The complete image includes an affective analogue which presents the object in its basic nature and a kinaesthetic analogue that externalizes it and gives it a sort of visual reality' (p. 93). So Sartre hopes to explain the (quasi-) apprehension of sensations and feelings that are produced by the real object of the image, and how visualization corresponds to visual perception insofar as the image represents objects as they are actually (or can be) experienced in perception.
As all consciousness is consciousness of something, feeling too is intentional — but 'in its own way'. Sartre stresses that feeling is not a subjective state which is only accidentally related to neutral objects: rather objects themselves carry affective qualities. Otherwise one could feel hatred without hating or finding anything worthy of hate. Thus: 'To become conscious of Paul as hateful, annoying, sympathetic, disturbing, winning, repulsive, etc. is to confer upon him a new quality, to construct him along a new dimension...[these] qualities constitute the sense of the object...they are its affective structure; they permeate the entire object...the feeling presents itself therefore as a species of knowledge (connaissance). If I love the long, white and delicate hands of that woman, this love, which is directed on these hands, can be considered to be one of the ways they have appeared to my consciousness. It is a feeling which is directed towards their delicacy, their whiteness, the animation of their movement: what could a love mean if it were not a love of these qualities?...love does not intend the delicacy of the fingers which is a representative quality: it projects a certain tonality on the object which may be called the affective sense of that delicacy, of that whiteness...these subdued affective structures...constitute the deepest reality...The representative retains a sort of primacy. The animated, white and delicate hands appear first as a purely representative complex and then bring about an affective consciousness which confers upon them a new meaning' (pp. 77-8). But now what happens when the object is absent, when the object is visualized? In order to answer that question, we must
first determine what pure feeling contributes to consciousness. Without knowledge and sensible representation, 'I become aware of [the hands] as an undifferentiated mass which defies all description. And this affective mass has a character which lacks clear and complete knowledge: the mass is present. What this means is that the feeling is present and that the affective structure of objects constitutes itself in correlation with a determined affective consciousness. A feeling is thus not an empty consciousness: it is already a possession. Those hands give themselves to me under their affective form' (p. 79). Suppose then that I produce an imaginative consciousness of those hands, which is a synthesis of knowledge and affectivity. 'I know that the object which is there, transcendent [? ], confronting my consciousness, stands for two white and delicate hands; at the same time I feel that whiteness and that delicacy, and particularly the nature of hands always so intimate, so personal. But, at the same time, I am aware that these hands have not as yet come into existence. What is before me is a substitute for these hands, concrete, full, but unable to exist by itself. When that substitute is present it delivers the hands to be completely . . . Let us recall the essential characteristic of the mental image: it is a certain way an object has of being absent within its very presence' (p. 81). (With that possibility of imaginative presence, of what value is perception?)

When the image is complete, the object is not, strictly speaking, present, for its real presence obtains only in perception; rather, what Sartre wishes us to say is that, its presence is present. I believe
that Sartre is led to this desperate-sounding thesis because, in not wanting to discredit the genuineness of the feelings concerned, he finds himself forced to claim that the object of the image, although absent, must in some sense be present. The pattern of his thinking seems to be this: Isn't my visualization responsible for the feelings that I now have? Aren't the feelings genuine? And don't real feelings require real, 'positive' objects? Therefore the cause of these feelings must be something that truly exists, something there before me. Even though the object is absent, I am affected as if it were there. So it must in some way be present to me — if all its qualities are present, and particularly those that constitute its 'deepest reality', then surely the object is as good as present.

But if we are puzzled about how this presence of an object obtains, about how whiteness and delicacy, say, can enter into the mental image, about how such qualities can be detached from their owner, we are given no illumination. Sartre states, it seems, that the qualities are indeed present because the feelings are experienced, and, conversely, that the feelings are experienced because that which gives rise to them is present (is a presence). And there is no apparent exit from this circular argument. Moreover, there is a further problem about the perplexing notion of presence. What, we might ask, is the difference in consciousness between the presence of an object when the object is present, and the presence of an object when it is absent? If Sartre replies that the difference rests in the positional acts of consciousness, then we might ask as well whether the positing act is arbitrary or depends on the nature
of the presence itself. If the former, then we seem to have reverted to the problem of how to define the dichotomy between perception and imagination when the phenomenal ingredients are identical. If the latter, then we must find the difference between kinds of presence. Later on, Sartre refers to the feelings in the imaginative consciousness as imaginary feelings, which require 'non-being in order to exist' (p. 167). So, presumably, he might be prepared to call the corresponding presences, imaginary presences. But the introduction of the adjective does not remove unclarities.

The problem of explaining how movement can function as the analogue, unlike the problem of explaining how affectivity can, does not involve the question of transformation: '... when a movement is given by sense other than sight, the consciousness that apprehends it is already imaginative and not perceptual ... since the structure of the consciousness of movement is imaginative, it undergoes no modification when the image is richer' (p. 91). (The reader will immediately object that by ruling out tactile perception of movement, the first claim is clearly false. Sartre's carelessness invites such off-target objections.) Sartre contends that movement is not a transcendent object of consciousness, but a synthetic unity of discrete impressions. Following Husserl, he ascribes to the consciousness of movement two specific intentions, namely, retention, which directs consciousness back to the impressions that have been destroyed, and protention, which allows consciousness to anticipate impressions. Both together constitute the meaning of the visual impression of movement and the meaning of form produced
by movement. Important too are the kinaesthetic sensations (produced by movements of the eyes) which sustain these intentions after the visual sensations have disappeared. This fact explains how it is possible to be conscious of a visual figure, described by movement, when the eyes are shut. The illustration given is: trace a figure eight in the air with the finger, and then shut the eyes and repeat. Now Sartre attributes to the imaginative consciousness or imaginative knowledge of movement both retention and protention, which react with kinaesthetic sensations to produce the analogue: '... when we form an image of an object, the kinaesthetic impressions which will accompany certain contractions, certain voluntary displacements of organs, will always serve as substitutes for a visual form' (p. 92). Actual movements of the eyes, because they produce the appropriate kinaesthetic sensations, are therefore necessary for the formation of the image.

But phenomenological reflection reveals that this is quite untrue. I am able — and I suspect the reader is as well — to visualize a figure eight without moving my eyes in the slightest. I do not deny though that eye movements can facilitate the formation of the image: that is evident in the attempt to visualize an object in motion. Sartre confesses that the impossibility he felt in trying to visualize a moving swing while keeping the eyes stationary demonstrated that eye movements are essential. While one might agree that it is very difficult to satisfactorily visualize motion while keeping the eyes stationary, one is not thereby forced to accept — and it does not follow — that it is equally difficult to visualize a static object.
while keeping the eyes stationary, nor that eye movements are necessary for the production of the analogue of the imaginative consciousness. Rather tellingly, Sartre neglects to mention and discuss the eye movements and kinaesthetic sensations that accompany sound heard in the mind's ear.

If, as Sartre contends, the analogue of the imaginative consciousness is constituted by knowledge, affectivity and movement which together are inextricably bound up with intentionality, there arises the problem of showing how it is possible to intend an object as it exists now via an analogue that represents it as it was in the past. If intentionality is bound up with the analogue, it would seem that it cannot go beyond that analogue. Sartre acknowledges the paradox but remains unbothered by his inability to resolve it. In fact, he goes as far as to claim that it is irresolvable because the phenomenon itself is paradoxical: He states flatly that the mental image is a contradictory synthesis, just because it is possible to direct one's consciousness at the object as it now exists via an analogue of how it was in the past. The image involves a 'fusion of intentionalities' (p. 104). The intentionality of knowledge involves a 'belief' in finding oneself before the object as it is now, and the intentionality of the analogue gives the presence of the object. And he says — but not in so many words — that it is the first intentionality that determines what is to count as the
object of the image.* Why that intention should dominate is not made clear. Moreover, if it always dominates, it would seem to be incorrect to speak of a fusion or synthesis of intentionalities. And if there is no complete synthesis, then the 'inherent contradiction in the image' will divide the imaginative consciousness. And thus the view that consciousness is unitary and wholly spontaneous is undermined. Once we allow that an imaginative consciousness could involve a mixture of visual, auditory and tactile analogues, consciousness becomes even more fragmentary. Consequently, Sartre is faced with this dilemma: if he wishes to preserve his theory of consciousness, he must reject the account of the mental image; if he decides not to reject that account, he must revise the theory.

Sartre assumes that perception is accompanied by an affective reaction (p. 30), and that perception (at least vision) requires certain eye movements (p. 36). Now from the fact that both factors are incorporated in the composition of the analogue in visualization, we might be inclined to conclude that, for Sartre, imagination and perception are closely related. Unless knowledge, affectivity and

* By admitting a plurality — at least a duality — of intentions in the composition of the imaginative consciousness, Sartre gives the earlier thesis that 'the image is defined by its intention' an ambiguity. At any rate, Sartre suggests a distinction made more clearly by Bernard Williams in 'Imagination and the Self'. Williams distinguishes between what is visualized and what is imagined. To apply this distinction to Sartre's example (see below): what is visualized is Peter as he was in Paris while what is imagined is Peter as he is now in Berlin.
movement are derived from the relevant perceptual experiences, it would not seem possible to produce a certain mental image. But, disconcertingly, Sartre contradicts that inference. At the end of the inquiry into the nature of the analogue, Sartre declares: 'the image represents a certain type of consciousness which is absolutely independent of the perceptual type' (p. 107). The claim that perception and imagination are absolutely independent is, to say the least, a palpable overstatement: a distinction does not entail absolute independence. The overstatement leads into a gross error when he proclaims that imagination and perception 'represent the two main irreducible attitudes of consciousness' and therefore 'they exclude each other' (p. 138). While, as he would certainly point out, it is true that there is an irresolvable competition between trying to concentrate on the book that is seen in front of one and trying to visualize the book at the same time, it is quite another matter to maintain that — to revert to an earlier example — a similar conflict exists when trying to visualize the book while attending to the feel of it in one's hands.

The volte-face should be apparent. Sartre seeks to remove the mystery of the nature of mental imagery by showing how it is continuous with other forms of imagery, in particular, how the analogue in the mental image is fashioned out of elements that are present in imagery having a perceptual base (p. 20). Yet he comes to argue that because visualization does not require an accompanying perception, no imagery at all involves such perception: dichotomy replaces continuity. After having arrived at the destination, he renounces the route taken.
Sartre treats the mental image as the paradigm of the imaginative consciousness, and takes the unreality of the object in the image to be the crucial feature. Accordingly, that feature becomes the key factor from which he develops — with great speed — a theory of imagination.

The object in the image is essentially impoverished; it lacks real spatial and temporal determinations. Qualities of time and space as they appear in the image are qualities of the object as such: they are intrinsic and non-relative. That is: 'In perception I can never know whether an object is large or small unless I have the means of comparing it with other objects or myself. But the object in the image carries its smallness within itself' (p. 145). For that reason the object in the image is unreal or a nothing: 'the type of existence of the imagined object as long as it is imagined differs in nature from the type of existence of the object grasped as real. And, certainly, if I now form an image of Peter, my imaginative consciousness includes a certain positing of the existence of Peter in so far as he is, at this very moment, in Berlin or London. But while he appears to me in the image, this Peter, who is now in London, appears to me as absent. This absence in principle, this essential nothingness of the imagined object, is enough to distinguish it from objects of perception. What then must consciousness be in order to be able to successively posit real objects and imagined objects?' (p. 209). The short answer is that in order to imagine, consciousness must be able to posit unreal objects, or to posit nothingness in relation to the whole of reality (p. 212).
The unreality of the object in the image is extended to cover the objects in all forms of imagery. Appreciating the force of this extension, and thereby flouting common sense, Sartre contends that when one apprehends the character depicted in a portrait, one ceases to apprehend the portrait as part of reality.* He argues that the light on the cheek depicted in the portrait is irrevocably specified by the painter — all that the exhibitor can do is to illuminate the canvas, and that if the portrait should be destroyed by fire, only the canvas will be burnt — not the unreal object. From this he concludes that the unreal object or the character depicted 'appears immediately to be beyond the reach of reality' (p. 213). And this distinction between real and unreal objects establishes, he implies, an absolute dichotomy between imagination and perception. In pursuing this larger claim, he abandons the belief of a varied dependency between imagination and perception, a dependency which he has already exploited. In order to apprehend the portrayed character, 'consciousness', he writes, 'must be able to deny the reality of the picture, and it can deny that reality only by retreating from reality grasped as a whole. To posit an image is to construct an object on the fringe of the whole of reality, which means therefore to hold the real at a distance, to free oneself from it, in a word, to deny it' (p. 213).

* For a similar thesis that in viewing a painting the spectator cannot attend simultaneously to the painted canvas and the scene depicted, see E. Gombrich, *Art and Illusion*, p. 237. It is convincingly criticised by R. Wollheim, 'Reflections on *Art and Illusion*', pp. 279-80. For a criticism of Sartre see H. Ishiguro, 'Imagination', 1966, pp. 176-7.
If, in order to apprehend the character depicted in a portrait, the reality of the painted canvas must be denied, and because that denial can be accomplished only with a concomitant denial of reality as a whole, then, since the real is an exclusive property of perception, it follows that the apprehension of the character depicted in all its rich detail cannot be a process involving the co-operation of an interaction between imagination and perception. It would seem that, if the painted canvas is to be a factor in the production of the imagined object, it can act only as a catalyst by arousing the appropriate imaginative consciousness, but not itself entering into or sustaining that consciousness. And thus, as elicitor and not sustainer, the painted canvas is precluded from serving as the material for the analogue. Evidently the most effective, if not the only, procedure for excluding the perception of a painted canvas is to close the eyes; and so, from Sartre's claims, the ludicrous consequence is that the best way to apprehend the character depicted in a portrait is not to look. Moreover, since in every imaginative consciousness reality as a whole is denied, no perceived matter could function in the formation of the analogue (at least in the continued formation of the analogue) — and that makes all forms of imagery on a par with mental imagery. Since, when imagining is complete and at its fullest, every feature of reality, without distinction, is denied, the painted canvas ought to bear the same relation to the image that it supposedly elicits as one's perceptual vicinity bears to the visualization of an absent friend. So Sartre's attempt to finally divide imagination and perception ends in advancing the quite untenable thesis that there is no
difference of real consequence between visualization and the apprehension of a portrait. And this thesis contradicts the claims that were made regarding the differences among portraits, caricatures, drawings and so on.

After that virtual recasting of the data (the prying away of all imagery from the world), Sartre proceeds to make even more of the fashioning of the unreal and the accompanying denial of the real. It is, he states, this surpassing of the real which constitutes man's freedom: unless man is able to transcend the world, he will be determined by what the real offers. 'We can affirm fearlessly that if consciousness is a succession of determined psychical facts it is entirely impossible for it ever to produce anything but the real. For consciousness to be able to imagine, it must be able to escape from the world by its very nature; it must be able by its own efforts to withdraw from the world. In a word it must be free' (p. 213). And the creation of the unreal involves 'a two-fold nothingness: nothingness of itself in relation to the world, nothingness of the world in relation to itself' (p. 216). Nevertheless Sartre recognizes — at least implicitly — the dangers in the categorical separation of the real and the imaginary; and so he admits an influence of the real on the imaginary. He tones down the emphasis placed on withdrawal by saying that the denial of reality accompanies the ordinary positing of the world as real; but even more than that 'to posit the world as a world and to "negate" it are one and the same thing' (p. 214). And still he tries to draw the two realms together — or, rather, to prevent them from moving too far apart — by attempting to establish
a connection between 'situations' (the different immediate ways of apprehending the real as a world) and the production of the unreal object. The exercise of the imagination must be a response to how the world is; otherwise it is arbitrary and unintegrated with its counterpart. Thus the production of the unreal object is always the 'negation' of the world from a particular point of view; e.g., the visualization of an absent friend requires the 'situation' where the friend is recognized not to be present. But, then, the apprehension of the world is essential to imagination, and so the denial of the world can never be (fully) realized. We encounter yet another paradox: in order to imagine consciousness must deny and surpass that which it requires to establish itself. Sartre wants it both ways: that imagination is completely detached from perception and the real, and that the imaginary is in some way dependent on the real. How can consciousness both 'be free from all specific reality' and at the same time require a 'situation' to define itself? (pp. 215-6). The only answer forthcoming — the only answer that I am able to discern — is that that is simply the way it is. But this resignation of sorts should not distract us from this inherent self-defeat in the realization of the imaginative consciousness.

The extravagant opinions to which the uncritical acceptance of a paradox can lead is exemplified in the final section of L'Imaginaire. Here Sartre contends that 'the work of art is an unreality' and so is to be contemplated only in the imaginative attitude. And as aesthetic appreciation can occur only in the imaginative attitude, beauty must be exclusive to it: '... the real is never beautiful. Beauty is a value applicable only to the imaginary' (p. 225).
But what of ugliness? If, as is suggested, all aesthetic qualities are exclusive to the imaginary, then ugliness too ought to be. But, unpredictably, Sartre denies that the real is aesthetically neutral, and attributes what must amount to ugliness to the world: there is a 'nauseating disgust that characterizes the consciousness of reality'. That must mean either that ugliness is not an aesthetic quality, as it derives from the real, or that some aesthetic qualities — all negative ones — are not products of the imagination, in which case the apprehension of bad works of art would be strictly perceptual. Whichever, Sartre cannot consistently maintain that the world is disgusting and that the aesthetic is wholly unreal.

Now the imagination offers the only means of escape from the intolerable world. Unfortunately, just how satisfying the escape can be is not adequately discussed. Anyway, Sartre himself seems to have no definite opinion on that point: he vacillates between asserting that the imaginary possesses an uncommon richness and that the image suffers from an essential poverty (pp. 168-9). But such withdrawal from and rejection of life cannot prevent or assuage pain, for the imaginary needs to be supported at every point by wretched reality. That fact is hardly consoling. (After all, Madame Bovary's imaginings — does Flaubert's novel bear more than an accidental relation to L'Imaginaire? — did not compensate her circumstances nor prevent her destruction.) Indeed, if escape is always fleeting then we must despair. And it does not diminish our despair to learn in the last few lines that the 'great beauty in a woman kills the desire for her' since 'we cannot simultaneously place ourselves
on the plane of the aesthetic and on the plane of physical possession' (pp. 225-6). We are advised that in order to desire her 'we must forget that she is beautiful, because desire is a plunge into the heart of existence, into what is most contingent and most absurd'. Consequently Sartre is unable to stop the dichotomy from dividing consciousness into warring factions: the admiration of a woman's beauty and the desire thereby excited are not only mutually exclusive but mutually combative.

Thus we arrive at this general conclusion. If spontaneity, wholeness and transparency signify health and freedom of consciousness then — contrary to the initial, basic intentions — Sartre's philosophy as it incorporates a theory of the imagination culminates in the attribution of essential sickness and impotence to man. That above all is why his work disappoints.

By deriving the features of mental imagery as a whole from visualization alone, Sartre, as I have suggested above, has placed more weight on visualization than it is capable of bearing. Even if all that he advances on the nature of visualization were correct, to extend those findings to auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactile imagery would be a highly dubious manoeuvre. Suppose it is true that the analogue and the unreal object are constituted by knowledge, affectivity and movement, and that those terms can be satisfactorily explained along the lines drawn. What, then, in the sound heard in the mind's ear, corresponds to the unreal object? What movements are involved in the make-up of the analogue? These questions and
others like them make it plain that, for whatever is said about visualization as Sartre conceives it, the kinds of mental imagery are different enough to preclude an adequate theory of one from being adequate for all. The preoccupation with visualization is bound to lead astray.

In the last chapter he spends some time discussing the experience of listening to a symphony, but that effects no modification; the portrait example would have done just as well. Apart from that minor exception he is silent on non-visual kinds of imagination. Worse still, within the field of visual imagination he restricts his attention — for obvious reasons — to examples where either the specifications of the image are given to immediate perception in greater and less degrees, or the specifications are due to past experience. Nowhere is it even hinted that the imagination has the power to traverse the bounds set by past and present experience. The analogue, whether the mental image or the portrait, is an essential ingredient of imaginative consciousness; and the analogue is constituted by knowledge, affectivity and movement, all of which are determined by experience already assimilated through perceptual consciousness. Hence the imagination itself contributes nothing; it is thoroughly parasitic on perception. That being so, the promise to introduce a dynamic factor, or to make the imagination completely dynamic, by way of the principle of intentionality, has not altogether been fulfilled. The production of the image (or analogue) may well be dynamic and spontaneous; but, more importantly, the imagination as limited to that which is already possessed
and represented in the analogue is static. What is imagined is defined by what can only be realized in the analogue, i.e. the unreal object. So, in this respect at least, despite the revolutionary claims, Sartre's theory resembles his predecessors' insistence that the imagination mirrors, and cannot go beyond that which has been acquired through, perception.

To what extent has Sartre made advances? The traditional view that the mind contains independent ready-made 'contents' and that experience consists in the conscious registering of them, is replaced by the view that consciousness is always directed beyond itself, and that each psychic structure consists in a particular and irreducible synthesis of forces. Sartre maintains that no psychic structure, with special emphasis on the imaginative consciousness, can be reduced to a collection of discrete parts (cf. p. 106); but there is a discrepancy between this conception of his work and the work itself. Granted, his analysis of the image is not as crude as (say) Hume's, but the gain in sophistication does not divorce him from the atomistic approach. Discrete psychic items make way for amorphous psychic structures, but still the attitude to the analysis of the mind has not changed: to clarify the nature of the mind or indeed the nature of the imagination, first distil the components. Evidently, for both, the model to be applied to philosophical investigation is the scientific analysis of the composition of a substance, and as science becomes more sophisticated so too the model.
In another respect, however, it can be argued that Sartre has, as it were, opened up the imagination. He extends the coverage of the term beyond mental imagery to images of various (external) kinds, i.e. photographs, caricatures, etc. And that surely is a significant enlargement over the traditional restrictions. Nevertheless what he gives with the right hand, it seems he takes back with the left. As I tried to show above, external images lose their physical attachment and are assumed into the imaginary realm to occupy a place beside mental images. That which is stretched quickly shrinks to something like its former, but now somewhat altered, shape.

In connection with the question of the range of imagination, we might be inclined to feel that the few rather pedestrian examples that Sartre uses fail to meet the description of the imagination as (so Sartre puts it) 'one of the four or five great mental functions' — but of course he is not alone in choosing unimpressive illustrations. Rich and provocative examples, described in sufficient detail, are perhaps what is needed to keep faith with the importance of the imagination. With this topic in the philosophy of mind in particular, the kind of examples determine what can be accomplished, because to find the most striking examples is to partly discover what one is trying to say. In talking of detail, I am conscious of the kind of detailed scrutiny that Sartre brings to bear on the nature of the imagination: it is that peculiar examination which establishes a link between Sartre and the empiricists. The fact that he fails to present
a satisfactory account indicates, I think, that any like-focused scrutiny will fail. The problem, as I see it, is to find what things will support detail (aspiring to richness and depth) and support it in such a way as to convey a real grasp and illumination of the matter at hand.

Finally, insofar as Sartre's theory of the imagination fails, the account of the reports of imaging experience fails too. While the actual content of the imaginative consciousness is located outside it, as object of the intention, thereby showing the description to be unproblematic, the shift of focus does not serve to alter the centrality of the image (or analogue) itself. The image has a life of its own, it can be described. And it can be described in perceptual terms because it is composed of elements (knowledge, affectivity and movement) germane to perception but which are activated so as to create the (real) presence of the object intended. But since this notion of presence and the explanation of the composition of the analogue remain incoherent, the use of perceptual terms in the description of the analogue has not been vindicated. Sartre begins by denying the existence of the inner and ends with the unresolved difficulty of determining its true description.
IV

A BEHAVIOURIST'S ACCOUNT

That what is seen as the content and power of the imagination is a function of one's general view of the nature of the inner life escapes, I think, the grasp of particular argument. Thus the aim of this chapter will be to show that the thesis gains confirmation in the context of examining an all-embracing theory of mind. Certainly what Sartre ascribes to the faculty of imagination is governed by the sole inner force, the centre and essence of consciousness, intentionality: as the intentional structure virtually exhausts the content of any mental act, the imagination is restricted to fixing on absent objects. So too, Gilbert Ryle's account of the imagination is best understood by first approaching his view of the mental world as a whole. Now it goes without saying that Ryle's philosophical perspective and motivations are radically distinct from Sartre's; although, as has been pointed out, they do share an (implicit) objective in trying to cope with the descriptions of the inner life, in particular when the topics are mental imagery and imagination. And there is some agreement — though superficial but which tends to be exaggerated — which connects with the refutation of the outstanding traditional theories of mind. Otherwise there is no common ground: each point of congruence is surrounded by large contrasting areas.
A fitting subtitle to The Concept of Mind (to be supplied in aid of coming to grips with the whole work) might be 'the disparagement of the inner'. Indeed this phrase suggests the salient theme in the discussion of the following: Ryle's overall programme, its motivation and direction; his attitude to the inner life, the views on sensations, feelings and self-knowledge; and how the programme and the attitude lead to an uneasy ambivalence in the treatment of imagery and imagination.

A useful preface to his magnum opus is the much earlier statement on philosophical methodology in 'Systematically Misleading Expressions'. There, principles and opinions are enunciated which, although much of the accompanying detail has evidently been abandoned, survive in the later writing. Ryle argues that

There are many expressions which occur in non-philosophical discourse which, though they are perfectly clearly understood by those who use them and those who hear or read them, are nevertheless couched in grammatical or syntactical forms which are in a demonstrable way improper to the states of affairs which they record (or the alleged states of affairs which they profess to record). Such expressions can be reformulated and for philosophy but not for non-philosophical discourse must be reformulated into expressions of which the syntactical form is proper to the facts recorded (or the alleged facts recorded). (pp. 41-2)
As such expressions can be grouped into a small number of types which are apt to mislead in certain ways and which are similar insofar as they are 'all temptations to "multiply entities"', he calls them systematically misleading. The proposed criterion for determining whether a candidate expression misleads systematically is logical. The following passage presents the criterion and conveys the temper of much of his argumentation.

We meet with and understand and even believe a certain expression such as 'Mr Pickwick is a fictitious person' and 'the Equator encircles the globe'. And we know that if these expressions are saying what they seem to be saying, certain other propositions will follow. But it turns out that the naturally consequential propositions 'Mr Pickwick was born in such and such a year' and 'the Equator is of such and such a thickness' are not merely false but, on analysis, in contradiction with something in that from which they seemed to be logical consequences. The only solution is to see that being a fictitious person is not to be a person of a certain sort, and that the sense in which the Equator girdles the earth is not that of being any sort of a ring or ribbon enveloping the earth. And this is to see that the original propositions were not saying what they seemed on first analysis to be saying. Paralogisms and antinomies are the evidence that an expression is systematically misleading. (p. 60)
Now Ryle appears to assume that all errors of a philosophical kind are engendered by naive reflection on such expressions. So for him the philosopher's task becomes the replacement of misleading expressions by those which have no tendency whatsoever to mislead. For the analyst must search for syntactic forms which will 'exhibit the forms of the facts into which philosophy is the enquiry'.

Apart from the oddity of allowing that the contradictory propositions could ever seem to be 'naturally consequential', and therefore apart from the doubt that arises over the inherent misleadingness of such expressions, there is not a little obscurity associated with the ideas of a form of a fact and a properly mirroring linguistic form. His self-acknowledged inability to adequately elucidate these ideas, however, does not undermine his confidence in either the belief that a certain relationship obtains between language and the world or the belief that philosophy ought to consist in the analysis of language so as to uncover the real, non-superficial linguistic forms which reveal the nature of reality. We do encounter both in The Concept of Mind, though they are present in new garb—or perhaps it is more correct to say that we meet their descendants. Ryle undertakes to refute Cartesianism or the theory that postulates a separate and independent realm of the mental, as it is surely guilty of 'multiplying entities'. And the technique is to expose the error by showing how it confuses categories, how it attributes the set of mental phenomena to the same logical type as the physical, and in so doing absurdly creating a spiritual realm, analogous to but over and against the physical.
My destructive purpose is to show that a family of radical category-mistakes is the source of the double-life theory. The representation of a person as a ghost mysteriously ensconced in a machine derives from this argument. Because, as is true, a person's thinking, feeling and purposive doing cannot be described solely in the idioms of physics, chemistry and physiology, therefore they must be described in counterpart idioms. As the human body is a complex organized unit, so the human mind must be another complex organized unit, though one made of a different sort of stuff or structure. (pp. 19-20)

But Ryle's procedure — commendable though some of its aims are — manages not only to exorcise the ghost from the machine but also to deliver man from an inner life, at least an inner life meriting some interest and having some content. And as the inner life is extinguished so the imagination becomes debilitated.

Ryle's worries are plain, if not plainly expressed; there is more than enough to suggest them. If a person is essentially a Cartesian ego, a despairing consequence follows. Each man is fundamentally incomprehensible to all others, while yet thoroughly transparent to himself. And thus it is immediately evident that a firm belief in the duality of man as a spiritual and physical composite corrupts the ordinary confidence displayed in the day-to-day dealings with others. If dualism were correct and we truly believed
it, then every exchange of greetings, every instance of co-operative activity, every act of affection would be beset by a destructive suspicion, a suspicion not provoked by discernible features but by a theoretical conviction that makes it basic and pervasive. As the real person, the other's soul, is inaccessible to me, beyond the reach of my observational powers, so I cannot ever know, ever be in the least certain that what I observe corresponds to what is the case. Every facet of my relationships and activities with others is thus contaminated by this disconcerting thought: 'I cannot and should not trust anyone's words and actions because what anyone actually thinks or feels can never be disclosed to me'. This continually nagging thought produces an ineradicable feeling of detachment from others and from the world. As real human contact and real involvement in the affairs of the world are precluded, a gap opens between oneself and the world. And the recognition of the unbridgeable gap generates, understandably, the problem of depression, frustration and loneliness — the problem seems absolutely incurable for a redemptive higher being, a supernatural companion is no longer believed in. It should be noticed as well that the problem covers not only the impossibility of my reaching the other, but also the impossibility of the other reaching me. I am known completely and exclusively to myself. So even if I could somehow, say through extra-sensory means, reach the other, the problem will not have been resolved unless the other can similarly reach me. In order to be fully engaged with others and fully integrated in the world, I must know that I am
capable of fathoming another (though not necessarily always) and that he is capable of fathoming me (though not necessarily always). I want to know and I want to be known: both conditions have to be met. Now Ryle deals with both conditions, with both the doubt and the isolation under the topics of Knowledge of Other Minds and Privileged Access.

... an adherent of the official theory [dualism] finds it difficult to resist this consequence of his premises, that he has no good reason to believe that there do exist minds other than his own. Even if he prefers to believe that to other human bodies there are harnessed minds not unlike his own, he cannot claim to be able to discover their individual characteristics, or the particular things that they undergo and do. Absolute solitude is on this showing the ineluctable destiny of the soul. Only our bodies can meet. (p. 16)

If the doctrine of the ghost in the machine were true, not only would people be absolute mysteries to one another, they would also be absolutely intractable. In fact they are relatively tractable and relatively easy to understand. (p. 110)

A residual difference in the supplies of the requisite data makes some differences in degree between what I can know about myself and what I can know about you, but these differences are not all in favour of self-
knowledge. In certain quite important respects it is easier for me to find out what I want to know about you than it is for me to find out the same sorts of things about myself. In certain other important respects it is harder. But in principle, as distinct from practice, John Doe's ways of finding out about John Doe are the same as John Doe's ways of finding out about Richard Roe. To drop the hope of Privileged Access is also to drop the fear of epistemological isolationism; we lose the bitters with the sweets of Solipsism. (pp. 149-50)

The resolution of the problem requires, as Ryle points out, the rejection of the absolute primacy of self-knowledge. But less persuasively it also seems to require forfeiting the power of self-consciousness, that is, the difference that coming to know what one is might make to one's future self.

Ryle intends to secure our psychic well-being by restoring confidence in the 'wealth of information about minds, information which is neither derived from, nor upset by, the arguments of philosophers' by way of showing how the dualist distorts that information. But unlike, say, the phenomenologist who refutes Cartesianism by exhibiting its unfaithfulness to lived experience, to the experience of being in the world, Ryle attacks the doctrine for the absurdities it generates while at the same time arguing for a peculiar form of behaviourism: his indirect strategy does not mean that he is less determined to fuse mind and body. Still the revulsion
he feels for dualism repels him too far in the opposite direction. For Ryle there are no halfway houses. In rejecting one extreme philosophy of mind he adopts another, indeed one that also suffers from an unfaithfulness to and an undervaluing of the 'wealth of information about minds' that we possess.

The pattern of the argument is not subtle. The elevation of the mind to a spiritual realm makes bodily manifestations of mental items virtually irrelevant. But as the belief in such a realm is both false and incoherent, the mind must be solely a function of behaviour. 'I try to show that when we describe people as exercising qualities of mind, we are not referring to occult episodes of which their overt acts and utterances are effects; we are referring to those overt acts and utterances themselves' (p. 26). Behaviourism is the only viable alternative. But it would be wrong to identify Ryle's theory with mechanism or crude behaviourism. When we describe people in mental terms

... we are describing the ways in which those people conduct parts of their predominantly public behaviour. True, we go beyond what we see them do and hear them say, but this going beyond is not a going behind, in the sense of making inferences to occult causes; it is going beyond in the sense of considering, in the first instance, the powers and propensities of which their actions are exercises. (p. 50)
Our inquiry is not into causes (and *a fortiori* not into occult causes), but into capacities, skills, habits, liabilities and bents. (p. 45)

Further, reinforcing the behaviourism is a 'literalist theory of language',* whose roots we have already scanned. According to Ryle the dualist has fallen into error and confusion by taking the common reports of mental phenomena too strictly. Ryle's scheme of things permits existence only to that which can be observed directly or indirectly (with the aid of instruments) and little else; sensation, which does not come into the favoured position, becomes problematic, an oddity which lies on the fringe of what matters. Thus since our experience is delimited by what is ordinarily observable, we must expect and demand that our language, when it meets the basic requirements of precision, will reflect that homogeneity — a homogeneity still incorporating diversity — and not make reference to fictional realms of existence. There is one homogeneous world, so there is or ought to be one range of cohesive descriptions that articulate that world. The view and the demand for linguistic rigour accompany an inordinate sensitivity to metaphor, yet a sensitivity founded on a very narrow conception of metaphor. That is, Ryle thinks that the genesis of a metaphor determines its nature or meaning. Whether a supposed metaphorical term could be justifiably construed in a manner opposed to its history is a consideration that does not cross his mind.

Ryle seems greatly impressed by the fact that reports or descriptions of mental phenomena frequently include terms which have

---

*I borrow the phrase from Stuart Hampshire, 'Ryle's *The Concept of Mind'.*
been transferred from a primary application to physical phenomena. Now why is he so bothered by, for example, the innocuous phrase 'in the head', used normally to locate thoughts, images and some sensations? The explanation lies with the opinion — which he expresses only implicitly — that the use of a transferred term (or metaphor) should, in order to be legitimate, correspond to the use of the original term in a point-for-point parallel. Obviously, a perfect analogy is impossible here, and any attempt to follow out the suggested parallel demonstrates the absurdity. 'No one thinks that when a tune is running in my head, a surgeon could unearth a little orchestra buried in my skull.' And the implication is that only such a bizarre discovery could possibly warrant the use of the phrase when just minimum accuracy is demanded. However, he suggests that 'in the head' does in fact mean nothing more than 'metaphorical nearness' or 'imaginariness'. So apparently, 'I saw it in my head' is equated with 'I visualized it'. But the proposal does not satisfy, for the two expressions are clearly dissimilar in meaning. Anyway Ryle states that whether or not it does satisfy is unimportant. The general argument stands. The phrase 'in the head' (and others like it) 'can and should always be dispensed with' for their use inclines their 'employers to the view that minds are queer "places", the occupants of which are special-status phantasma' (p. 40). Evidently for Ryle all metaphors of the mind are conceits.

The position gets its force from the opinion that a metaphor or transferred term entails a perfect analogy between, in this case,
the psychological and the physical, and from the opinion that the unreflective man is unable to resist the resulting, preposterous consequences. But what reason do we have for believing that there are no metaphors based on one or a few analogous features? Is it so implausible that terms were transferred and metaphors introduced on the slightest resemblance and suggestion? As for the second opinion: If Ryle's view of metaphor were right, each of us would be responsible for fostering absurd ideas of the nature of mind, when such ideas are neither intended nor found credible. Perhaps the fact that we do persist in our linguistic habits is evidence that we do not share his view of metaphor.

But he goes so far as to claim something much bolder. He denies that there are any points of contact, however tenuous, between the mental and the physical, or that there exist experiences and states of mind that genuinely invite the use of such transferred terms. Consider the following. 'The statement "the mind is its own place", as theorists might construe it, is not true, for the mind is not even a metaphorical "place"' (p. 50). This sentence says more than what he immediately goes on to say, namely, that there are not covert performances which cause or prefigure overt performances and which exist in their own space. Indeed the final clause, I feel certain, can be read only as an outright denial of a real analogy between the psychological and the physical. Any experience which seemingly inspires a metaphorical description must be illusory, because such metaphors entail absurdity: no mental state whatsoever
could thus be portrayed by a metaphor: metaphor precludes accuracy. Now this exposure of the alleged meretriciousness of a large class of mental states gives impetus to the rejection of the notion of an inner life.

But to say that Ryle denies the inner life, however, is not to say that he also denies the existence of inner items. 'It is part of the function of this book to show that exercises of qualities of mind do not, save per accidens, take place "in the head", in the ordinary sense of the phrase, and those which do have no special priority over those which do not' (p. 40). When Ryle surveys the inner, as we have been prepared to expect, he finds only the relatively tangible, the relatively discrete, the relatively obvious. He finds feelings, sensations, images and frames of mind (i.e. thoughts), which together, he thinks, exhaust the inner dimension of the mind. And the question implicit throughout is whether any or all of these can add up to an inner life as it is ordinarily conceived? The explicit, skeptical reply is No, not by any means.

The internal occurrences related to emotion include thrills, pangs, twinges, throbs and wrenches. But these feelings, we are often reminded, do not enter into nor are relevant to the explanation and understanding of intelligent human behaviour. At most they are signs of agitations (i.e. conflicting inclinations) and moods, but then negative signs: 'Roughly, we do not . . . act purposively because we experience feelings; we experience feelings, as we wince and shudder, because we are inhibited from acting purposively'
Thus feelings, it seems, are in the main indifferent by-products of acting and experiencing, except on occasion when they are made conscious because, normally, disagreeable; and when they are made conscious they always distract us from the real matter of experience, external objects. Emotion manifests itself in inclinations and moods as propensities, which are expressed in 'law-like propositions'; thus emotion is not episodic and occult but dispositional and overt. This indicates an important restriction. The mental covers those characteristics — capacities, inclinations, skills, habits, etc. — whose existence is determined on the basis of publicly observable evidence, behaviour, and so which are 'constituted' by such evidence, behaviour. In fact Ryle states unequivocally that internal occurrences lie outside the pale of the mind:

Those human actions and reactions, those spoken and unspoken utterances, those tones of voice, facial expressions, and gestures, which have always been the data of all the other students of men, have, after all, been the right and the only manifestations to study. They and they alone have merited, but fortunately not received, the grandiose title 'mental phenomena'. (p. 302)

Similarly sense impressions, while essential to perception, do not constitute perception. What is more, as they are not objects of observation they cannot be objects of consciousness or mind — this has consequences for the theory of mental imagery:

It makes sense to speak of someone refraining from watching a race or of his suspending his observation of
a reptile, but it makes no sense to speak of someone refraining from feeling a pain, or suspending the tingle in his nose . . .

Sensations then, are not perceivings, observings, or findings; they are not detectings, scannings, or inspectings; they are not apprehendings, cognizings, intuitings, or knowings. To have a sensation is not to be in a cognitive relation to a sensible object. There are no such objects. Nor is there any such relation. Not only is it false . . . that sensations can be objects of observation; it is also false that they are themselves observings of objects. (p. 204)

That a sensation fails to measure up to the requirements of an object of consciousness is shown by the absence of, in Ryle's words, a 'neat' sensation vocabulary. For it is evident that sensation terms are derived from perceptual contexts, while sense impressions themselves are bereft of sensory qualities. Moreover bodily sensations take their descriptions from their external causes, and those which do not allude to the subject's collateral responses. So exclusive sensation terms are somewhat aberrant. Ryle concludes the chapter on sensation and observation by expressing a doubt as to the validity of the notion of sensation which he has made great use of; but it is the kind of reservation which does not undermine his project — rather it supports the project. He asks whether the philosophical or technical concept of sensation might be artificial, considering that it is a quite sophisticated concept, and one that
is certainly remote from that applicable to ordinary accounts of experience. If the concept is only an artificial creation of those who think philosophically about such matters — and Ryle thinks that it is — then so much the worse for the view that experience or the mental life consists primarily of sensations. As reference to sensations (internal occurrences) need not, and normally does not, enter into adequate descriptions and explanations of mental characteristics, we have good reason to relegate them to a sub-mental rank. And the absence of a really adequate vocabulary of sensation demonstrates the less than central position of sensation in the composition of the mind. As internal occurrences are virtually indescribable so they are virtually irrelevant.

Thoughts too claim an inner location, but they are not reducible to inner occurrences. A thought is a feature of the organism as a whole; it is a state of readiness, a 'set', to do this or that. This state or frame of mind may be accompanied by feelings, sensations or images but it neither consists in these nor a special activity or episode existing along side them:

A person who thinks of something as something is, *ipso facto*, primed to think and do some particular further things; and this particular possible future that this thinking paves the way for needs to be mentioned in the description of the particular content of that thinking — somewhat as the mention of where the canal goes to has to be incorporated in our account of what this adjacent canal-stretch is. Roughly, a thought
comprises what it is incipiently, namely what it is the
natural vanguard of. Its burthen embodies its natural
or easy sequel. ('A Puzzling Element in the Notion
of Thinking', p. 403)

It is a mistake to think of thoughts as separately identifiable items
in the mind for thinking is a feature of those human activities,
actions and states which are conscious, non-mechanical and pur-
posive.

This account of thought and thinking is objectionable less for
what it says than for what it leaves out. Thinking is not a separate
event over and against ordinary human activities (exercises of in-
telligence), so it is not over and above them either. The poverty
of this view comes to the fore frequently but typically and reveal-
ingly in the description of vanity. While it is surely correct that
vanity does not consist in the having of specific feelings (e.g.
twings, thrills), even though we expect the vain man to have cer-
tain feelings in certain situations, it is just as surely wrong to
assert that this character trait as such amounts to no more than a
disposition or tendency to behave in various ways: '... no other
momentary actualizations of chronic vanity need to be postulated
than such things as boasting, daydreaming about triumphs and avoid-
ing conversations about the merits of others' (p. 84). The vain
man is prone to behave in just those ways, but the most salient
feature of vanity seems to have been omitted. To be sure the vain
man thinks himself unapproachably superior and thinks all others
more or less contemptible. He is so preoccupied with these thoughts,
they are so dominant and pervasive, that he is blind to his real merits and defects as well as the merits and defects of others. Above all he possesses a deficient and grossly distorted view of society and his place in it, a view greatly at odds with that of his vanity-free fellow man. It should be clear that Ryle's account of thought as inceptive is powerless to portray satisfactorily the vain man's state of mind, the pattern of his thinking, and the effects of such thinking on his behaviour. Although perhaps the 'vain man never feels vain' he does think vainly. Here is one instance of Ryle's having overlooked a piece of information about minds. But more importantly, this impoverished account of thinking infects the account of imagining.

Limiting the mental to tendencies, skills, habits and so on, all of which are manifested solely in behaviour, naturally affects the conceptions of the self and self-knowledge. An austere conception of the self joins a crude conception of the attainment of self-knowledge:

The ascertainment of a person's mental capacities and propensities is an inductive process, an induction to law-like propositions from observed actions and reactions. Having ascertained these long-term qualities, we explain a particular action or reaction by applying the result of such an induction to the new specimen, save where open avowals let us know the explanation without research. (p. 164)
And he goes on to remark that the appraisal of persons is straightforward (at least for the experienced observer); judgments of character can easily be definite, reliable and wholly objective. Accordingly dissemblers are reproached for providing the main obstacle to character assessment; without pretence there would never be any dislocation between how someone appears and how he is.

But clearly the truth of the matter is just the reverse. Judgments of character, even those formulated by sensitive experts, are nearly always tentative, partial and difficult. As Ryle fails to be fully alive to the complexity of character and the problems of its definitions, so his account of self-knowledge tends to the ludicrous. For he argues that acquiring knowledge of oneself is almost equivalent to acquiring knowledge of others — the chief difference lies in the unequalled acquaintance that one has of oneself. Since, the argument seems to go, there are no inner, occult occurrences forming the mental life, all mental characteristics should be discoverable in the same manner: I become aware of my sleepiness by noticing my yawns; I find out that I am bored by observing that I say to myself and others that I feel bored (p. 99). So the relationship between me and my body (behaviour) is essentially the same as the relationship between me and you. I am of course in a better position to monitor my own private acts. 'We eavesdrop on our own voiced utterances and our own silent monologues. In noticing these we are preparing ourselves to do something new, namely to describe the frames of mind which these utterances disclose ... I can pay heed to what I overhear you saying as well as to what I overhear
myself saying, though I cannot overhear your silent colloquies
with yourself (p. 176). But certainly my awareness of myself and
my body is hardly like my experience of you. Suppose, however, it
is. Suppose that in order to determine my own character and the
particular states of my body, I must weigh the evidence and make
appropriate inferences from my "unstudied" talk and behaviour, from
the words and movement that issue from my ingrained dispositions.
Now suppose too that my character consists of some traits which
upon reflection I consider thoroughly undesirable. What can I do?
Going from Ryle's remarks, the answer seems to be Nothing. The
picture of man that emerges — it can be best expressed in non-
Rylean terms — divides him into a natural self (that which is the
individual in essence, the body and its dispositions manifested in
behaviour) and a reflective self (that attitude of mind adopted occa-
sionally when the individual becomes conscious of his natural self).
Now it appears that the reflective self is confined to mere discovery,
for no room is allowed for it to be active or action-propelling. On
matters of dictating policies of character revision, it must remain
impotent. Since dispositions are extensive, non-particular and
thereby intractable, they must be beyond the control of reflective
decision — anyway the decision itself will be just an instance of
another disposition. And how can one disposition extinguish or
generate another? I can modify your behaviour and, by the same token,
your dispositions by my own, but I do not understand how to apply
these same methods to my own case. Thus we are asked to believe,
as I understand it, that whereas correction and guidance of others
exists, self-correction and self-guidance do not. '... knowledge
of what there is known about other people is restored to approximate parity with self-knowledge' (p. 149). But we can add: 'at the expense of neglecting radical differences so as to defeat the proposed restoration'.

In the endeavour to equalize self- and other-knowledge, Ryle claims that what is inner or unobservable by another is no impediment to intimacy. He tries to reassure us that we lack no skills of penetration because there is, first of all, nothing to penetrate and because, further, anything that is pushed or kept behind the scenes will, in the right circumstances, be released. Indeed to be unforthcoming requires special, sophisticated techniques; we have to be always on our guard to prevent disclosure; great efforts are needed. 'To be reticent is deliberately to refrain from being open ... the natural thing to do is to speak one's mind, and the sophisticated thing to do is to refrain from doing this ... We have to take special pains to keep things back, only because letting them out is our normal response' (p. 173). If vigilance is interrupted, if one relaxes, the floodgates open. Thus we have nothing to fear: treated with proper tact and sympathy, anyone can become an open book. Now if this is right, not only have absolute loneliness and isolation been ruled out, but even loneliness and isolation of lesser magnitudes. The tone, if not the words, of the following passage says as much.

There are respects in which it is easier for me to get such knowledge about myself than to get it about someone else; there are other respects in which it is
It is hard to see how, once loneliness is eradicated in this manner, other critical problems and disturbances can invade the mind. But it is quite a bit easier to understand why the reflective self is capable of only discovery and interpretation; it need only discover and not improve for when the nature of the individual self is properly perceived, all problems dissolve. As all philosophical problems are solved (or dissolved) by laying bare the categorical structures of language, so all (non-trivial) problems of the soul vanish when it is recognized that they rest on an incorrect theory of mind. And, so I wish to contend, when such problems no longer obtain, the demands made on the imagination diminish correspondingly. The conception of mind as uncomplicated and 'exterior' makes for a quite modest conception of the imagination.
Psychic well-being is thus attained by removing the source of all such psychic problems: the inner life. The evacuated, decentralized self leaves insufficient room for substantial problems to enter; and what remains inside is unimportant and susceptible of only the most meagre descriptions. 'If you do not divulge the contents of your silent soliloquies and other imaginings, I have no sure way of finding out what you have been saying or picturing to yourself. But the sequence of your sensations and imaginings is not the sole field in which your wits and character are shown; perhaps only for lunatics is it more than a small corner of that field. I find out most of what I want to know about your capacities, interests, likes, dislikes, methods and convictions by observing how you conduct your overt doings, of which by far the most important are your sayings and writings. It is a subsidiary question how you conduct your imaginings, including your imagined monologues' (p. 60).

The poverty and insignificance of the supposed inner life are demonstrated by the unremarkableness of feelings, sensations, frames of mind, and — though somewhat recalcitrant — images. Now the error of this thesis stems from this argument. If 'inner' can be construed accurately (i.e. literally), then it should refer to that which lies inside unobserved, namely feelings and the rest. But since they do not add up to anything approaching what is thought to be an 'inner life', the expression is vacuous.

As the picture of sensations (especially pain) that Ryle presents suggests that they are never more than minor annoyances, so the picture of imagining, as we shall see, suggests that images are
always inconsequential interruptions in the matter of living. But just as pain can envelope one in intense suffering, so images can become objects of an obsession — Madame Bovary represents a not uncommon type. The similarity stops here, for while every one is capable of undergoing intense suffering, only a few have, and need, a developed imagination. He who has little use for an imagination is one whose psychic core is a passive function of environmental factors, one who is wholly subject to external influence. Such a person differs in nature from one whose source of life derives from independently arrived—at thoughts and feelings, whose identity depends upon continual reflection and analysis of principles and projects, themselves the products of a strong self-determination. Thus if there is any truth in Ryle's account of imagining, it will not be true of every one.

Now the account of imagery and imagination is circumscribed by this ambivalence: mental images are always negligible items, but yet certain exercises of the imagination crucially involve the having of certain images. Accordingly Ryle undertakes to demonstrate that even when a certain exercise of the imagination does involve having a certain image, the image itself commands only peripheral interest, if any at all. The virtual irrelevance of the image becomes evident after the usual metaphorical reports of imaging experience are replaced with correct, literal ones. First, imaging experiences are shown not to be susceptible of unconditioned, perceptual descriptions; thus images are claimed to be illusory
objects of consciousness, so hardly worthy of attention. Second, it is argued that having an image is an unextraordinary instance of imagination or make-believe, where mental images play no part. The chief difficulty for Ryle, which he fails to overcome, is that mental images — as distinct from other internal occurrences — compel recognition and representational descriptions. They cannot be so easily pushed aside.

We have been prepared for the argument that perception verbs are wildly inappropriate to reports of imaging experience. Visualizing is totally different in kind because visualizing takes place when the object in question is not an object of sight. Moreover, it is incoherent to speak of an internal likeness being perceived by the mind’s eye; whatever images are, they are not privately viewed pictures. Therefore — since the preceding can be generalized — it is preposterous to maintain that imaging is a species of perceiving, by, in particular, describing an imaging experience as a kind of perception. But if the concept of imaging cannot be subsumed under the concept of perceiving, it can nonetheless be subsumed under a related concept so as to allow a fairly rich stock of descriptions:

I want to show that the concept of picturing, visualizing, or 'seeing' is a proper and useful concept, but that its use does not entail the existence of pictures which we contemplate or the existence of a gallery in which such pictures are ephemerally suspended. Roughly, imaging occurs, but images are not seen. I do have tunes running
in my head, but no tunes are being heard, when I have them running there. True, a person picturing his nursery is, in a certain way, like that person seeing his nursery, but the similarity does not consist in his really looking at a real likeness of his nursery, but in his really seeming to see his nursery itself, when he is not really seeing it. He is not being a spectator of a resemblance of his nursery, but he is resembling a spectator of his nursery. (p. 234)

As I understand it, the visualizer resembles the seer insofar as both think of the nursery and in thinking exercise their knowledge of the nursery. But in saying that we have anticipated.

The arguments that shift the focus of attention away from the mental image are the same that associate imaging experiences with apparent perceiving. And the narrow conception of metaphor — prominent here too — serves to relegate mental images to that limbo of the (virtually) ineffable, already populated by sensations and feelings.

Ryle assumes that the use of unqualified verbs of perception in reports of imaging experience entails the 'doctrine' that imaging involves the perception of immaterial objects. But it is simply absurd to postulate such internal replicas; and besides no allusion to an image or internal occurrence is ever required in the report of an imaging experience. For instance, when a child imagines that her doll is smiling, neither does a smile form on the doll's lips nor
does a picture of the smile mysteriously become attached to the doll's face. There is only a doll and a child fancying (or picturing — Ryle equates them) that it is smiling, nothing more. And nothing forces us to talk of mental images, internal occurrences, when describing her fancying. But clearly, to take this example as representative already prejudices the issue. These one-sided considerations inspire this announcement. 'There is not a real life outside, shadowily mimicked by some bloodless likenesses inside; there are just things and events, people witnessing some of these things and events, and people fancying themselves witnessing things and events that they are not witnessing' (p. 235). (As Stuart Hampshire has noted and Bernard Williams demonstrated, this claim is as it stands false, for not all imaging is imagining that one perceives. It is false unless, of course, 'witness' is given a very charitable reading indeed.)

However, this dichotomy of human activity does not amount to a refusal to admit the existence of (what we normally refer to as) mental images. Indeed the position is more complex and less categorical. Though somewhat obscure and difficult to formulate precisely, it comes to this. If images are objects of consciousness, they must display properties of objects of perception. As they do not they cannot be described, and so cannot be referred to in the articulation of the imagination, and by the same token cannot participate in the determination of the mental. They, the je ne sais quoi, exist as raw material, as the foundation for some exercises of the imagination. But the foundation is subterranean, not ascertainable and so not relevant to the apprehension and appreciation, or indeed com-
position, of the superstructure. They are essential ingredients for some imaginative acts, but can always be safely ignored; they can be alluded to but never directly talked about. (A curious reticence.) Therefore, Ryle advises, we should not assert 'there are mental images' for this sentence implies the existence of perceived, immaterial copies; instead we should say 'imaging occurs' for this carries no such implication. It is a telling feature of Ryle's argument that some common, innocuous expressions are given biased, controversial interpretations. Perhaps that is why, ironically enough, one is constrained to employ an analogy, a metaphor when explicating his position.

The incoherence of postulating mental images as internally perceived, immaterial copies, then, disallows the description of imaging as a seeing, hearing or smelling. Hume mistakenly subsumed both 'impressions' and 'ideas' under 'perceptions'. There are not experiential data and their mental copies. The distinction resides not in the raw material of experience but rather between different forms of behaviour and thought, between what is really done and that which simulates what is really done. The distinction embraces the difference between the genuine and the counterfeit. Now since imaging and imagining in general fall into the latter category, the relevant descriptions will incorporate verbs of perception as they occur there. If 'perceive' lies on one side, then 'seeming to perceive' lies on the other. Thus imaging, because it demands articulation in perceptual terms but is not a kind of perception, must be an example of 'seeming to perceive'. To understand what this
means, we have to look at the other phenomena associated with apparent perception. Visualizing, so the argument goes, is seeming to see but so too is seeing something in a photograph; hearing a sound in the mind's ear is seeming to hear but so too is hearing a recording of the sound. In fact, visualizing a friend, say, is so closely related to seeing his photograph that they differ only inasmuch as the latter imagining is aroused by a particular item. 'The genus is seeming to perceive, and of this genus one very familiar species is that of seeming to see something, when looking at an ordinary snapshot of it. Seeming to see, when no physical likeness is before the nose, is another species. Imaging is not having shadowy pictures before some shadow-organ called 'the mind's eye'; but having paper pictures before the eyes in one's face is a familiar stimulus to imaging.' (p. 240). (Remember that Sartre, in the end, also denied a difference in kind between visualizing and apprehending a picture.) If that is the only real difference between seeming to see X in a photograph and seeming to see X in the mind's eye, then it is puzzling to think how anyone could still seem to see X when the photograph of X is withdrawn from view and nothing else happens — or does there remain an invisible stimulus in the space vacated by the photograph? What could incline the subject to assert 'I seem to see X' when no representation of X is present? Nothing, apparently. But then what distinguishes the experience of visualizing X from the experience of visualizing Y? Just the appropriate expressions. So I discover whether I am visualizing and what I am visualizing by attending to what I say. Now even if the imager
need not refer to an internal occurrence when reporting his experience, there are cases where others must refer to such an occurrence when accounting for his claim of having such an experience. The 'analogue' (Sartre's term) cannot always be ignored.

A question too can be raised against the immediate success of the proposal. Is the subsumption of imaging (or even apprehending a likeness) under apparent perception free of metaphor, at least metaphor as Ryle conceives it? Granted the dichotomy of fancying and perceiving, do all phenomena which are correctly referred to by 'seeming to perceive' reside on the fancying side? Consider, for example, situations where a person spots an object in the middle distance, which looks to him to be such-and-such, but he is uncertain. He might report his experience by saying 'I think I see such-and-such'. And finding the identification wrong, he may well be unwilling to withdraw either assertion; 'There was no such-and-such to be seen, but still I did seem to see one'. If such a defence is acceptable — how could it not be? — it is likely that the original application of 'seem to perceive' is to just such phenomena: the mere fact that verbs of perception are the chief components suggests as much. Besides the use of 'seem to see' in reports of visualizing or viewing photographs feels somewhat odd, and far less natural than its use in reporting actual perception. Indeed, doesn't the phrase 'seem to perceive' normally indicate uncertainty about the content of a perception? If this is so then the availability of 'seem to perceive' for reporting imaging experience results from the transference of it from the domain of perception to the domain of fancy. And it is
Ryle's contention that such transference invariably produces metaphor. The primary application of 'seem to perceive' and its near relatives, then, has been misplaced, with the effect that no literal benefits obtain when their use is preferred to the use of unconditioned verbs of perception — some muddles and metaphors. When used to report a visualization both 'see' and 'seem to see' become metaphorical and so subject to the same complaint. Ryle may indeed have recognized — unconsciously — how unsatisfactory the proposal is, for 'seem to perceive' does not appear in the climactic part of the discussion of imagination.

Now that we have denied both verbs of perception and verbs of apparent perception to reports of imaging experience, we may begin to wonder in what state that leaves the articulation of fancy. 'To visualize', 'to picture', 'to image', 'to fancy' and 'to imagine' remain and together comprise the maximum literal vocabulary for the expression of imaging acts. Once it is realized that for the sake of Ryle's idiosyncratic view of literalness we must forfeit expressive power, we may also begin to wonder whether things have gone too far. No longer should we say, for example, 'I hear him in my mind's ear' and 'I am listening to him on record'; to avoid absurdity we must say 'I fancy I hear him, but I am not listening to a reproduction of his voice' and 'I fancy I hear him as I listen to a reproduction of his voice'. The unappealing quality, the awkwardness of the latter pair call for an appraisal. Waiving Ryle's charge of metaphor, what real advantage do the latter have over the former? Are they clearer, more precise? Do they accurately
display the nature of the phenomena? When the former are properly understood (as they are commonly understood, or anyway after certain alleged and crass implications are shown to be wrong) the supposed differences in precision and intelligibility surely disappear. Once we rid ourselves of the idea that imaging consists in the mental perception of immaterial copies and, for that matter, the temptation to think in these terms, we have to my mind no good reason not to employ the former, and good reason to prefer them for brevity and ease of expression. That being so, it is hard to see what adverse effects the alleged metaphorical expressions actually do have. If from the context it is clear that the assertion 'I see such-and-such' articulates an imaging experience, then the person who realizes that fact will not be misled in the slightest degree. Furthermore, if one has a problem about the nature of imaging constant use of the latter expressions by itself will not solve it. The use of verbs of perception to describe perceptual experiences does not make evident the nature of perception — Ryle's view notwithstanding. Why should it be different with the imagination? Yet, Ryle argues, the right descriptions point the way to the explication of the nature of the imagination of which imaging is a characteristic instance. Naturally the positive theory of imagination will complete the theory of imaging.

Either images in the mind matter (are crucial) or they matter not at all. They would matter only if it could be shown that they meet the requirements of being copies of things and events in the world, i.e. that they are actual objects of consciousness. But
this cannot be shown for the thesis is absurd. Hence no description of an exercise of the imagination need refer to anything other than that which is expressible in terms pertaining to overt behaviour. (If an exercise of your imagination centrally involves the occurrence of an internal item, then your mental life is to that extent enigmatic.) Now since imaging is not intrinsically different from all other exercises of the imagination, its nature will be uncovered in the process of uncovering the nature of all the various exercises of the imagination. And Ryle presents a very broad list of examples from which the general theory is to be extracted:

The mendacious witness in the witness-box, the inventor thinking out a new machine, the constructor of a romance, the child playing bears, and Henry Irving are all exercising their imaginations; but so, too, are the judge listening to the lies of the witness, the colleague giving his opinion on the new invention, the novel reader, the nurse who refrains from admonishing the 'bears' for their sub-human noises, the dramatic critic, and the theatre-goers. (p. 243)

By treating all of these on the same footing, Ryle commits the error of assuming, it seems, that each exhibits the imagination to the same degree. We should not be surprised then by the rather weak analysis advanced. Those elements that link such diverse examples will not yield the desired incisiveness.

While no nuclear (= internal) operation is common to these various examples of imagination or make-believe, some general
features are. A study of pretence sheds light on make-believe. First, in pretence, as in make-believe, the pretender may be deluded in varying degrees, or not at all, by his own performance. The reason people imagine they see things without realizing they are only imagining, is that not everyone is 'as judicial or critical as could be wished'. Second; 'To describe someone as pretending is to say that he is playing a part, and to play a part is to play the part, normally, of someone who is not playing a part, but doing or being something ingenuously or naturally' (p. 245). So talk of pretending involves talk of that which is ingenuous. Consequently acts of pretence are of a higher order than ordinary acts, for the description, or execution, of the former requires the description, or thought of, the latter — but not vice versa. Thus an analogy is drawn: pretence is to the ingenuous as the imagination or make-believe is to the 'factual' or 'ordinary'.

How closely associated are pretence and imagination? Very, for they both belong to the uniform category of higher-order behaviour. Ryle mentions three differences. (1) '... we use words like "play", "pretend", and "act the part", when we think of spectators finding the performance more or less convincing, whereas we use words like "fancy" and "imagine" when we are thinking of the actor himself being half-convinced'. (2) '... we use words like "play" and "pretend" for deliberate, concerted, and rehearsed performances, whereas we are more ready to use words like "fancy" and "imagine" for those activities of make-believe into which people casually and even involuntarily drift.' (3) '... we apply the words "pretend" and "act the part", where an overt and muscular representation is given of what-
ever deed or condition is being put on, while we tend, with plenty of exceptions, to reserve "imagine" and "fancy" for some things that people do inaudibly and invisibly because "in their heads", i.e. for their fancied perceptions and not for their mock-actions' (p. 250). Thus Ryle contends that any difference between pretence and imagination or make-believe is due to merely superficial, verbal contingencies: indeed the phenomena referred to by both belong to the same class. This is fortunate for whereas the concept of imagination or make-believe alone seems impregnable, the concept of pretence is readily amenable to inspection. So we understand the nature of imagining by virtue of understanding the nature of pretending. However, there is one important difficulty. Unlike (1) and (2) above, (3) suggests that a 'more radical difference' separates imagining from pretending, the difference adduced when the uniqueness of imaging is argued for.

To begin with, it is wrong to suppose that imaging involves sensation or quasi-sensation, for imaging occurs when no appropriate perception occurs and, by the same token, when no appropriate sensations impinge; and further, there is, Ryle states, nothing akin to sensations. If we were to believe in quasi-sensations, we could not avoid Hume's error; and such an error is fatal to the belief in the activity of human intelligence as manifested in behaviour. This denial of quasi-sensations does not conflict with the view attributed to him above, but it does indicate how much Ryle wishes to suppress all mention of mental images. As the description of my perception does not include a description of, or reference to, my
sensory states, so the description of my imaging never requires the reference to an internal occurrence. Besides, there is no adequate vocabulary for describing some such raw material, either sensory or 'mental'. (The question, of course, is whether we are as oblivious of the latter as we seem to be of the former.) Perceiving entails having sensations and thinking, but it is thinking which primarily constitutes the experience. Imaging too entails thinking, but it cannot be said to entail more because we completely lack, it would seem, the means for referring to anything else without immediately falling into nonsense. And what is beyond language must be unimportant; suspected deficiencies in language merely register the insignificant.

So nothing of an internal character divides imaging from other varieties of imagining. It remains, then, to show that the covert aspect of imaging can be exaggerated, and that the covert instances of imagining are closely associated with overt instances. When this is accomplished, the characterization of imaging and the other varieties of imagining as sophisticated (higher-order) capacities will bind them firmly together. Thought and knowledge are the key elements in all such higher-order acts. Imaging is simply one way of thinking about, and using one's knowledge of, the world, so as to 'realize' what one would be getting if one were genuinely behaving, or, in this case, genuinely perceiving.

At first glance, the difference between, say, acting a part and imaging might appear to be due signally to the difference between a physical manifestation and a mental manifestation, between what is
done with the body as opposed to what is done in the mind. Rather the difference is 'nothing but a consequence of the difference between perceiving something and bringing something about'. All variation in higher-order phenomena stems from the inherent qualities of 'lower-order' phenomena. That is as it should be, for higher-order phenomena are wholly dependent on 'lower-order' phenomena. Now as perceiving is not a performance, so neither is fancied perceiving:

... perceiving is not bringing anything about. It is getting something or, sometimes, keeping something; but it is not effecting anything. Seeing and hearing are neither witnessed nor unwitnessed doings, for they are not doings. It makes no sense to say 'I saw you seeing the sunset', or 'I failed to watch myself hearing the music'. And if it makes no sense to speak of my witnessing, or failure to witness, a piece of hearing or seeing, a fortiori it makes no sense to speak of my witnessing, or failing to witness, a piece of fancied hearing or fancied seeing.

No hearing or seeing is taking place. (p. 253)

Even though there is a distinction (for what it is worth) between getting something and bringing something about, it does not divide one kind of imagining from another. The connection is provided by instances where imaging contains the inhibition of an inclination to perform.

Some exercises of the imagination involve overt behaviour; and some which do not, Ryle argues, occur as deliberate abstentions from behaving overtly. In particular, fancying that one is hearing a tune amounts to a 'utilization of the knowledge of how the tune goes'.
And knowing a tune is in part being able to follow it, which in turn includes having the appropriate expectations. It involves, too, the 'thought of following or producing the tune', but does not require the awareness of an internal reproduction of the tune. 'It is not humming very, very quietly, but rather it is deliberately not doing those pieces of humming which would be due, if one were not trying to keep the peace' (p. 255). Now Ryle thinks that this account can be extended to the other forms of imaging. Visualizing such-and-such is a utilization of how such-and-such looks; 'it is thinking how it should look':

The expectations which are fulfilled in the recognition at sight of Helvellyn are not indeed fulfilled in picturing it, but the picturing of it is something like a rehearsal of getting them fulfilled. So far from picturing involving the having of faint sensations, or wraiths of sensations, it involves missing just what one would be due to get, if one were seeing the mountain. (p. 255)

(To forestall obvious counterexamples, Ryle describes the imagining of an unknown or imaginary thing or event as a 'piece of double imagining'. As well as fancying that one is witnessing the thing or event, one fancies that one possesses the relevant knowledge and expectations.)

If we need make no reference to internal occurrences, then imaging can be construed as an unextraordinary instance of imagining, or pretending. And thus imaging can be characterized in this way:
Imaging requires the utilization of perceptual knowledge in the form of a thought of the thing or event in question, so as to furnish the imager with the means of pretending (to himself) that he is perceiving when (he is aware) he is not. But clearly, this characterization is extremely inadequate, because, for one, it is much too broad, and broad because vague. It provides insufficient detail for it does not enable us to distinguish between instances of make-believe and instances of imaging. I can, can I not?, pretend (to myself), without imaging, that I see before me a mountain I know well. Indeed I can supply such vivid descriptions of it and its setting in words and gestures that I even begin to get the 'feel' of being in its vicinity. But at no time do I rely on visualizing the mountain; I frame no mental images. Now the difference between this kind of picturing and picturing in the mind's eye, where words, gestures and open eyes tend to interfere with the imagining, has to be accounted for. Ryle seems to sense, I think, that he should say more, for he employs the suggestive notion of realizing to capture the peculiar quality of imaging; to wit: 'A person with a tune running in his head is using his knowledge of how the tune goes; he is in a certain way realizing what he would be hearing, if he were listening to the tune being played' (p. 252). The use of 'realizing' here — despite the rider 'in a certain way' — sounds all too metaphorical, that is, metaphorical to a Rylean-sensitive ear. On the other hand, if 'realizing' is taken to mean (as Ryle would surely declare it to mean) 'something like a rehearsal of getting one's expectations of seeing something fulfilled', then the word is hardly effective in conveying what is so distinctive
about imaging. In fact, this 'literal' meaning seems more applicable to the example of make-believe just sketched. For if the 'literal' meaning is equally appropriate to imaging, we still find the description of visualizing as 'something like a rehearsal' perplexing. In what sort of rehearsal does one neither speak the lines, nor gesticulate, nor grimace? And does not this use of 'rehearsal' sound also like a metaphor Ryle wishes to avoid? Needless to say, Ryle can clarify neither 'realize' nor 'rehearse' as he exploits them: the respective riders, 'in a certain way' and 'something like', betray the bluff. Moreover, it should be clear enough that the account of imaging depends on an oblique allusion to mental imagery as exhibited by both these words. It is equally clear that Ryle is not entitled to this unacknowledged allusion. The account purports to remove the supposed mystery of imaging by showing how it is one exercise — and an unextraordinary one at that — of the imagination. Though in treating imaging as so unextraordinary, he is quite unable to explain why imaging yet remains so distinctive.

The weak account of imaging reflects the impoverished account of the imagination. But the account of the imagination is unsatisfactory for more (though not unrelated) reasons than the generality stemming from indiscriminate application. The denial of the inner life has the effect of eliminating features of a serious and deeply personal nature, and so of restricting the problems and issues in life to those responding to practical ('external') activity. The activity of the imagination then, consists variously in playing, supposing, inventing, acting — sophisticated behaviour which augments and enhances quotidian reality.
But apart from this platitudinous conclusion, no significant, positive thesis emerges from Ryle's discussion. However, it has a major negative consequence. The imagination, certainly each man's most personal and private possession, becomes, as it fails to find a self or inner dimension to operate on, estranged from the individual.

* * * * * * * * *

NOTE

Although Ryle undertakes to steer away from the mental image (the internal occurrence) in order to free the analysis of imaging of all metaphor (as he conceives it), he is forced to employ in the analysis important terms which, when interpreted literally, are both unclear and inadequate to his purposes. Responding to Ryle's failure, some have advanced the opinion that the metaphor imputed to reports of imaging experience is removed by paying closer attention to the reports, and, so, to the image itself.

Influenced by Wittgenstein's random and inconclusive remarks on aspect-seeing, Hidé Ishiguro argues that aspect-seeing (e.g. seeing the person in the portrait) is continuous with visualizing, and thus the familiar association of visualizing with seeing is justifiable. Instances of aspect-seeing can be described with the formula 'X's seen as Y's'; 'In the case of mental images the X's disappear, as it were, and we are left with activities of "seeing as Y".' This baffling claim is supported by a phenomenological argument:
... suppose one sees a person in a photograph and next imagine that half of it fades away. I can still see the remainder of the photograph as an image of a person. Suppose that more and more of the photograph vanishes, and I continue to see the person in the remaining traces. Finally I can find myself seeing the person in my mind's eye when I perceive nothing before me. ("Imagination", 1967, p. 50)

Now to say that there is a resemblance between aspect-seeing and perception is one thing; to say that they differ only in degree is quite another. And the fact that seeing the person in the mind's eye follows so easily and so naturally from seeing the person in the vanishing photographic traces proves, to my mind, no more than that very fact itself. I shall be persuaded of a continuity only when a real experiential 'slide' is shown to exist between an experience essentially involving sensory stimulation of the eyes and an experience where no such stimulation takes place. Sartre, remember, argues for continuity by treating the 'analogue' as a debasement of knowledge: elements of perceptual consciousness become dominant in imaging consciousness. But, despite the great elaborateness of his work, the alleged continuity is not made less obscure. It should be noticed, too, that Ishiguro uses a tactic similar to Sartre's. To show that the second sense of 'see' (i.e. that which covers aspect-seeing and visualizing) is a legitimate sense, she maintains that all seeing consists in aspect-seeing:
Obviously the two senses of 'see' are not different from each other in the way in which, say, the verb 'draw' could mean either 'pull' or 'depict'. I would like to suggest that we understand the two senses of 'see' because under normal conditions when I claim 'I see X', 'X' gives both kinds of object of sight. I am using 'X' both extensionally and intentionally. I am as it were claiming to 'see X and X' where the first 'X' is used purely referentially, and the second 'X' to describe how I see the object. In other words, in normal conditions when I say 'I see X' I am making a claim both about the presence of X (which I believe has causal links with the visual experiences I am having), and also about my mental state or visual experience which makes me describe or identify the object I see as 'X'. It is precisely because it is, as it were, a logical truth that 'see X' means 'see X as X' in normal conditions, that 'see ... as X' gets the meaning it does have and can get detached and be used to make claims of the form 'see Y as X'. Not only can I claim to see Y as X when I am unsure whether Y is X, and even when I know perfectly well that Y is not X, but I can, as in mental imagery, claim to see X where there is no X that I claim to see as X. (p. 54)

Thus, to display a relationship between imaging and perceiving, we must assume that all perceiving is aspect-perceiving. But even if this dubious extension of aspect-perceiving were correct, it would
not help us to cope more effectively with the very puzzling nature of imaging. It would merely allow the problem to be enunciated in a special way.

In a similar fashion, Alastair Hannay maintains that imaging is a kind of perceiving because their structures correspond. The argument depends on a distinction which is virtually identical to the one Ishiguro makes between features of verbs, namely, the distinction between perceiving materially, which demands the presence of a certain material object, and perceiving intentionally, which makes no such demand. Hannay uses the same distinction, but it has the reverse effect: whereas Ishiguro tends to ascribe the workings of imagination to perception as a whole, Hannay makes imaging into a perceiving. '... there is no linguistic strain or loss of point whatever in calling imaging a kind of seeing. Indeed I shall argue that imaging is simultaneously two kinds of seeing: seeing the imagined and seeing the image ... seeing something in imagination, or "in the mind's eye", is a way of really seeing it ... it is unintelligible to suppose that one could see something in imagination without also seeing something not in imagination ... one cannot see something merely intentionally without at the same time seeing something else materially' (Mental Images – A Defence, p. 145). Imaging, too, is associated with aspect-perceiving, but with the difference that the 'Y's' are kept in. For

... if in picturing, hallucinating and dreaming one is seeing something intentionally, it would seem wholly inexplicable that one saw nothing materially. Without a
'mental' analogue of the pictorial property that allows us to see something when it is perceptually absent one could no more picture or imagine something to oneself than one could see something represented without seeing a representation. 'Imaging' and 'seeing things represented' denote analogous visual experiences, and both require a 'material' object. If there were no mental images there would be no imaging. (p. 173)

Imaging occurs, there are mental images, and we see them. (p. 175)

But in forcing this gross conclusion through, Hannay introduces more problems than he pretends to solve. And is the only way of justifying the ordinary reports of imaging experience — if they need justifying — to assume that imaging is perceiving (or, for that matter, perceiving is imaging)? What is gained by such a manoeuvre?
V

IMAGINATION AND THE INNER

A potent assumption, underlying the various accounts of imaging and imagination so far examined, which has been encountered but not yet enunciated or faced up to, is that in general and ultimately language remains — despite some naive practices — wholly adequate to the articulation of all imaginative exercises. Linked with this assumption is one more pervasive and deep-seated, from which the former derives its force, that what we experience, what we know, can always be made explicit in accurate linguistic terms. The dominant traditional conception of the imagination, then, understandably engendered a regard for imaginative exercises as quite fruitless endeavours. For if perception is the only procedure by which to acquire knowledge of reality (a knowledge which is always conscious and definite), pale, impoverished copies of perception provide just mere reminders of what is already known and succinctly expressible. Moreover it was thought self-evident that mental images, because so impoverished, were not always reliable indicators of what presents itself in perceptual experience.

Now even though the traditional theory of experience has been recently attacked and rejected, the associated beliefs concerning the adequacy of language, the explicitness of knowledge and the poverty of imagination have been retained in large measure. Ryle, for instance, denies that imaging consists in the apprehension of copied sensation:
rather imaging involves the imitation of a perceptual experience — a pretence that one is perceiving, doing or being. Part of the motivation for this change is the desire to remove certain defective and misleading terms in the description of the mind, and so to find that language which is truly and most rigorously adequate to that description. Previously it was agreed that any image which does not reproduce a perception tends to the fantastic, and as such becomes an obstruction to clear, productive thinking. Thought is at its best when the ideas, consisting of images, are exact representations of the real world. The point where ideas become fantastic coincides with the boundary of coherent thought and the break-down of language. Acutely sensitive to linguistic features, Ryle argues that the point where language breaks down must be redrawn: there can be no really acceptable talk of internal copies. Consequently the restrictions on the imagination become most severe. Imaging or imagining is always a pretending, a playing with experience. For that reason it may be interesting and diverting, but it cannot enter into the serious matters of living. To be sure, if imagining consists entirely in the utilization of knowledge, it is the expression of knowledge already possessed consciously and unproblematically, and hence static. There is no movement forward, no actual thinking; imagining involves the thought of ... but no progress beyond that which has been assimilated in perception. Imagining is like marching on the spot — it may have its value (exercise) but it gets one nowhere.

Sartre, the other chief respondent to the traditional conception, does not concentrate on the relationship between (imaginative) experience and linguistic description but takes it for granted that
language contains no obstacle to the 'description' of 'transcendental consciousness'. Thus it would seem reasonable to maintain that if language manages to completely grasp the strangely apprehended 'essences' of consciousness, then ordinary experience itself ought to pose no difficulty. (But this is not to imply that every linguistic formulation is automatically satisfactory; absurd uses of language are all too apparent.) The phenomenological method should be the final corrective, for the 'reduction' cannot but determine true representation in language. Sartre, too, has no doubt that the imagination cannot supersede the knowledge possessed prior to the onset of imaginative consciousness. The animating intention is a function of the transparent knowledge which defines the object aimed at. As the image contains no more than what one consciously puts in it, the imagination must be essentially impoverished in relation to inexhaustible reality. Nonetheless, poverty in this instance becomes a virtue for it permits one to extract features of the world by employing a method of sublimation so as to counter miserable reality with delightful and tantalizing imaginative selections.

Both Sartre and Ryle attempt to resolve the apparent problems in the description of imaginative acts by fashioning imaging as an act whose focus is primarily (for Ryle, exclusively) outward. The objects of the imaginative consciousness reside outside oneself in the world — or perhaps could reside there. Most importantly, it is claimed that in imaging one is not attending to an internal something but rather focussing on an external (or transcendent) item. To say otherwise, to accept the traditional view, is intolerable for it implies that man
exists on two separate planes, physical and mental, when the truth is that man is essentially embodied — he is one kind of physical object among others. And to deny man's grounding in the world is tantamount, it seems, to a denial of each man's responsibility to himself and others as physical beings. This groundedness is found reflected in language, for language is a social phenomenon, an instrument for articulating commonly experienced objects, events and situations. Thus to speak of private, internal objects and events is to abuse the purpose of language and to use words in a peculiar, aberrant manner. Now it is claimed that language, when so exploited, becomes metaphorical. And metaphor, we should recognize, harbours vagueness, extravagance, gross exaggeration. By ridding language of this undesirable sort of metaphor, we encourage an outward-looking, engaged attitude to life and discourage a dreamy self-indulgence.

While the attack on 'bovarizing' (i.e. aspiring after a dream-world) is to be surely endorsed, the concomitant restriction of imagining to external awareness clearly has its drawbacks. For if, when imagining, my attention is invariably directed upon the world by means of the specific knowledge acquired through experience of it, there may at some time be an instance where the inclination to sustain the outward direction of awareness would cause a distraction from the actual purpose of the particular imaginative act, indeed a kind of distraction for which imagining formerly was thought to be the antidote. But if it is assumed that we know fully what we are doing, what is on the mind, when imagining, then the world could not possibly
be a source of distraction: being certain of the object of one's attention ensures that one has a measure of control over the range of things that claim notice. This element of control likely characterizes most imaginative acts. (We should remember here that the imagination can be used aimlessly, and that some images can tyrannize the mind. But I shall say nothing about these.) Now the question to be considered is whether this control and vividness of purpose characterizes (barring the few exceptions) imaginative acts, whether the content of the imagination is determined always by awareness of items external to consciousness. If on occasion we imagine because our problem is to become aware of what we are not aware of, or to discover what we have only the vaguest hunch about, then for such an exercise of imagination the world may well interfere with the effort to achieve the aim of the endeavour.

My proposals require a change of perspective. I have introduced the change in an earlier chapter by considering the question of language, that is, the description of the imaging experience. And now I can say more about that.

I have already argued that we need not be forced to assume that, because the reports of imaging experiences involve transferred terms, these terms are necessarily metaphorical. Transference does not entail metaphor; but on the other hand it appears impossible to establish conclusively that such reports are void of metaphor. So it would seem reasonable to conclude, tentatively, that both the decision to ascribe metaphor to such reports and the decision not to, are arbitrary, and as arbitrary, representative of biases. If, then,
this issue is to be in some way settled, we must investigate where each bias leads. A comparison should indicate the value of each impelling assumption.

It is evident that Sartre and Ryle see language as unalterably focussed outwards: the subject matter of speech is naturally the material world. Accordingly, when language purports to describe some private, inner reality, a serious and fundamental error is committed. To maintain that language can be used with an exclusive inner focus is, they argue, to radically misunderstand the fixedness of linguistic reference. Thus to talk of an inner world is to talk nonsense.

The simple contrast between inward and outward focus suggests that as language is based upon the latter it cannot ever legitimately acquire the former. But perhaps the contrast is too simple. Indeed I shall contend that when it is alleged that language has been distorted inwards, this turning inwards ought to be interpreted as compatible with real outward focus. What happens when experience moves inwards is that a hitherto subordinate element becomes manifest — the self. And as the entry of this new element affects the character of experience, so it affects the working of language.

We need not wonder why others have overlooked the entry of the self as a salient element in the imaginative act; by failing to realize that the self has a discernible, if provisional, content, they have misconceived the significance of the inclination to imagine (at least in an important minority of cases). For example, Ryle finds the self, beyond the human body that acts and reacts, systematically elusive;
Sartre thinks of the self as necessarily empty: it is but a force that constantly asserts its freedom by breaking out of definite categorizations. If the self is considered empty or non-existent, then the imagination itself will be viewed as providing not much more than a respite from, and normally a pleasant adjunct to, perceptual experience.

In those instances of imagining where the self enters as a central factor we may suppose that the language used to articulate the experience and so to fix the content of the experience undergoes strain. Compare the difference in the demands made on language in the following two reports.

I visualize an indifferent object and report the experience by, say, 'I see the house on the corner'.

I visualize a person, the thought of whom arouses confused feelings of affection and resentment, and report the experience by, say, 'I see father just after mother's funeral'.

If the aim of the first imaginative act is, as declared, simply to resuscitate a particular neutral, visual experience, then we should not expect that the accompanying report will be inadequate to circumscribe the subject matter, at least not less adequate than the report would be of the corresponding perceptual experience. If the aim of the second is to achieve more than that of the first, if the aim — but expressing it in this way makes the act seem too deliberate, too calculated — is to locate the associated thoughts and emotions in order to come to grips with them, then the report by itself can be singularly
misleading. For by treating the report as the proof of the experience, we fail to recognize the significance of that experience. Detaching the report from the experience leads to an abstracting of one feature from the complex and detailed original. That is, using the detached report as the means for determining the nature of the experience produces a mere shadow of the content. This much should be evident. Now the fact that the report itself is usually paid exclusive attention may help explain why many overlook the complexity of some imaginings.

Still, a defender of the adequacy of the reports, who accepts how the scope of imagining has been enlarged, might raise an objection. 'The argument is unfair, for the second report is just inappropriate to the experience suggested. A complete report, one that articulated the emotion and attitudes, would indicate the whole content of the experience. The difficulty is to make certain that the reports are not misleading.' But the objection does not succeed because, although the difficulty is admitted, it minimizes that which interferes with the attainment of full articulation. There are two factors preventing the ideal of full articulation from being reached, one concerning the impact of the thoughts and feelings and the other the fabric of the experience.

An ambivalent state of mind, characterized by the conflict of intense feelings, will be disordered and fluctuating. It follows that a person who suffers from such inner turmoil is incapable — unless he possesses extraordinary powers — of describing his state of mind at all coherently. He does not know what he feels because he cannot
make sense of the conflicting feelings; he is perplexed as he cannot come to terms with them. In order to supply a faithful representation of his state of mind, he would have to have, at least, a firm grip on his thoughts and feelings. But it is precisely this which he lacks. For to have a firm grip means that the thoughts and feelings have stabilized to such an extent that they are amenable to an organizing inspection.

Now when the person becomes comparatively settled, when he is no longer tossed and turned by his emotions, but has some degree of control over what things will claim his attention, will he thereby be better equipped to produce a satisfactory account of his thoughts and feelings? The answer must often be No. To be sure, he should be able to describe the ambivalence in general terms and to locate the competing emotions and their objects (but even this is not always possible for the calmest). Perhaps he could have done much of this while distraught, but the difference is that now he can distance himself somewhat from his feelings and reflect on their constitution. However, although he might be in a better position to analyse his state of mind, the advantage does not make easier the specification of the thoughts and feelings and their objects. For the thoughts and feelings, which carry no mean significance, are not susceptible of declarative pinpointing. To understand why this is frequently the case, we need to examine the texture of some feelings.

If the main object of a set of feelings is someone who has had not a little influence over a period of years on the direction of one's life, then the attitude that one has toward that person will certainly
depend upon the innumerable actions and reactions which make up the life of the relationship. (Of course a complete account of such feelings would have to include much more.) That the facets of the relationship (the mass of subtle details, the complexity of apparently simple interactions that are built upon so many others) are inexhaustible means that there is far more in the make-up of the feelings than one could possibly hope to represent within the limits of ordinary speech and comprehension. We face the problem of not being able to articulate all that we know and all that we know has to be articulated, for we realize that what we are now conscious of amounts to only a very small part of what we must be conscious of so as to get in touch with the expanse of the feelings. And, to add a complication, we are not certain that our present feelings will not undergo alteration when consciousness of them is heightened.

Once we accept the strength of these considerations, we should see that the ideal of exact and complete articulation of the emotions is upset: emotions of some importance are not straightforwardly communicable. The attribution of metaphor, then, if it means in part that the utterances are deficient, carries some weight; but the mistake is to misapply this truth. Now if the utterances we make in attempting to articulate a feeling are, when it really matters, hopelessly inadequate, why should we be so bothered about discovering the 'correct' representation? What value do such utterances have?

I suggest that these utterances act as stepping stones; they are used to locate the objects and describe the content of feeling, but the locating and describing is always provisional. For, providing the person makes efforts to understand his state of mind, each utter-
ance along the way will be some advance on its predecessor. To illustrate: we can envisage a progression from the initial 'Father's behaviour after mother's funeral disturbed me' to the later 'His perfunctory manner made me cold' and to the much later 'I understand now how much he suffered and how much he so foolishly suppressed his grief'. The changes in description reflect the differing feelings that the incident arouses. Such a development reveals an awareness of greater complexity and a corresponding deepening of response. This is not to say that the original feelings have remained unaltered throughout and have only become more evident. But it will not be easy to determine whether the development marks a clarification of the original feelings, or whether the constant efforts of appraisal were instrumental in affecting the character of the feelings themselves. That the attempt to understand and clarify will surely change somewhat the feelings under inspection seems an unavoidable result of inducing a response, a response which, coming some time after the incident in question, cannot be immune to the changes in belief, apprehension and feeling that have come about in the meantime. But the change in response is not a result to be regretted because it alienates one's true feelings; on the contrary, a more developed response, a more mature response is a truer response. We should think that growth, rather than distancing us from our feelings, brings us closer to our real feelings; the more we become aware of, the more we respond to, the more integrated and sure the emotional life can become. To think that one's true feelings are forever lost, because they disappeared with the passing of the correlated situation, never to be recovered, is to succumb to a sentimentality.
Throughout the development of response to an incident which continues to impinge on consciousness, there is something that remains constant, namely, the incident itself which is returned to again and again. One is compelled to relive and reinvestigate it so as to measure the soundness of the developing response and the accompanying articulations. Indeed so intimately are the incident, response and articulations related that attention to the latter two demands attention to the former. For one gives meaning to the others; the response and articulations without consciousness of the incident remain empty, attention to the incident alone serves to make it uninteresting and insignificant. Keeping faith with an important incident means to never banish it, to always keep it alive, for one can never be certain that its significance has been exhausted, that its emotional status has been frozen. Furthermore, to take the utterance that we are inclined to make (most often to ourselves alone) as containing the whole experience would have the effect of making our imaginings, not to say the rest of our inner lives, entirely baffling, or, if not baffling, recalcitrant annoyances. Someone who believes that the utterance is the sole criterion of the experience would tend to consider inner feelings and imaginings at best embarrassing and at worst things to be exorcised.

The danger, then, of abstracting the report of an imaginative act from the act itself is that it alienates the person from his feelings, feelings which can be effectively reached only through imagining. Concentrating on the utterance by itself will not ensure awareness of all that underlies it. Faith in the utterance blinds one to the weight of
the experience, and allows only a superficial comprehension of it, since the ordinary utterance is incapable of encapsulating more. If such a faith characterizes both Ryle and Sartre (despite his phenomenology), it explains their failure to integrate the imagination with one's vital concerns. For some the imagination is more than a luxury; rather it is that which furnishes the material upon which they thrive, it is that which provides the means by which to inhabit one's vital thoughts and feelings so as to make one's responses whole.

Thus the utterances act as guides and supports for the matura-
tion of feeling. Why then is there a general reluctance — I do not think I overstate — to articulate one's deeper feelings, to make them known? Could it be that the assertion of feeling couched in definite terms appears final and incontrovertible? And we know, we have learned not once, that the declarations of a feeling change so unexpectedly. Are we embarrassed by the patent inconsistencies? We must be if we demand and expect — as we undoubtedly do — a person's character and behaviour to remain steadfast. Are we not suspicious of those who frequently alter their opinions? So we are suspicious and uncertain of ourselves when we find that an inclina-
tion to describe a particular feeling conflicts with a previous and equally strong inclination. A quick way of dealing with the divergent utterances (and so the self-doubt) is to disown them altogether; they can be easily got rid of by labelling them metaphors. But not every one will be so labelled; we can accept and feel comfortable with those utterances which are tantamount to neutral descriptions. Per-
haps we have come across the motivation for rejecting all talk of
the experience, and allows only a superficial comprehension of it, since the ordinary utterance is incapable of encapsulating more. If such a faith characterizes both Ryle and Sartre (despite his phenomenology), it explains their failure to integrate the imagination with one's vital concerns. For some the imagination is more than a luxury; rather it is that which furnishes the material upon which they thrive, it is that which provides the means by which to inhabit one's vital thoughts and feelings so as to make one's responses whole.

Thus the utterances act as guides and supports for the matura-
tion of feeling. Why then is there a general reluctance — I do not think I overstate — to articulate one's deeper feelings, to make them known? Could it be that the assertion of feeling couched in definite terms appears final and incontrovertible? And we know, we have learned not once, that the declarations of a feeling change so unex-
pectedly. Are we embarrassed by the patent inconsistencies? We must be if we demand and expect — as we undoubtedly do — a person's character and behaviour to remain steadfast. Are we not suspicious of those who frequently alter their opinions? So we are suspicious and uncertain of ourselves when we find that an inclina-
tion to describe a particular feeling conflicts with a previous and equally strong inclination. A quick way of dealing with the divergent utterances (and so the self-doubt) is to disown them altogether; they can be easily got rid of by labelling them metaphors. But not every one will be so labelled; we can accept and feel comfortable with those utterances which are tantamount to neutral descriptions. Per-
haps we have come across the motivation for rejecting all talk of
internal images; after all to grant an effective status to internal images is one short step behind pondering the effect they have on the soul.

It may be asked why we should consider inner thoughts and feelings when examining mental imagery, for it can be doubted that inner thoughts and feelings are more than irrelevant accessories. It may even be asserted that a discussion of the inner life will only steer us away from the aim of the inquiry; if we want to uncover the nature of mental images we must investigate them alone. But I wish to argue that just this view is responsible for retarding real understanding of the nature of the imagination. Certainly Sartre and Ryle endorse it, each in his own way.

The view is an instance of this assumption concerning the discovery of truth. It is claimed that to expose the nature of a thing, each of its features which can be eliminated without harm ought to be suppressed. Thus the more that is stripped away, the purer the thing becomes — and the purer object is the truer object. This denuding procedure clearly benefits the logician and physicist, but it most certainly disadvantages the moralist, aesthetician and psychologist. For the latter require the richest, most powerful specimens in order to assess what the thing can effect; for them the barest should be the most impoverished, and the least interesting. Now just as we come to recognize what art actually means when we respond deeply to the greatest works, so we encounter true humanness when we communicate with those whose inner life is most fully developed, for
they are more alive and, hence, we might say, more real. Similarly, when examining a feature of the mind we want to know it — if we are to know it at all — in all its richness, complexity and power: what is on this account the richest, most complex and of greatest importance is the most deserving of attention and the most real. If we think and operate otherwise we are likely to end up with results that fail to penetrate and illuminate. Here Sartre and Ryle are good illustrations: they choose unquestioningly the simplest, least potent examples of mental imagery and imagining but yet expect that such examples will reveal characteristics which offer essential insight into the significance of the imagination. There should be no doubt that such examples of imaging as visualizing a friend and hearing a tune in the mind's ear, which are meant to display the minimum of features, naturally yield only the paltriest details. The mistake is to presume that images which are summoned up for their qualities of simplicity and indifference will somehow furnish the key to intense imaginative experiences which grip the innermost thoughts and feelings. If phenomenology has a value then it ought to advise that the most important and far-reaching examples be faithfully revived and scrutinized, for they above all suggest the magnitude of the imagination.

Now how does the self enter the imaginative act? It enters when the questions What do I think and feel? and What should I think and feel? circumscribe the mental processes undergone, even if these questions rarely appear in this form — or at all. For these questions are normally addressed unconsciously, when awareness is engaged with that which strikes the senses. But, even though we
are not always conscious of our thoughts, feelings and problems, we cannot fail to be aware of the signs of mental and emotional activity. We know that mental and emotional stress and excitement manifest themselves in physical symptoms, from, say, mere tension in the solar plexus in minor cases to severe illnesses in extreme ones. It is possible however not to see the meaning of these physical signs, not to see that the physical signs are embodiments of the mental activity, and possible to consider them negligible or annoying effects of an activity that takes place at a much higher level. But to believe that as physical symptoms interfere with coherent and efficient resolution they ought to be suppressed and eliminated, and to apply this injunction ruthlessly to oneself amounts to a policy which is the source of a special but not uncommon psychosomatic condition. We readily recognize the absence of freshness and spontaneity, the numbed sensibility of the man who finds the physical aspect of his inner life a chronic nuisance. (One writer calls such symptoms 'liability conditions'.) Now, the man who attempts to refine, purify and make greater his thoughts and feelings by suppressing the internal symptoms kills the very potential for having finer thoughts and feelings, for thoughts and feelings of some consequence are born (and could appear in no other manner) out of stress and excitement expressed internally. This insight regarding the unforeseen effects of suppression belongs to Nietzsche (The Gay Science, § 47); but, while it is expressed by him in relation to the language and gesture of emotion, it applies as well to the suppression of internal symptoms.
The reason that the questions guiding the imaginative act are crucial and difficult is that our response to people and situations is seldom so straightforward as to permit immediate and adequate articulations. Indeed as sensitivity expands and deepens each novel experience or later experience of a person or situation will tend to activate ever more thoughts and feelings, and more than can possibly come to awareness in a few contemplative acts. Most of the thoughts and feelings aroused by a particular situation will remain, if they ever rise to the surface, inchoate for a considerable time: we have the familiar experience of being disposed to some thing in a way that defies introspection. But although introspection fails, there may be another method for exposing the extent and quality of response. If we assume that the response, including both conscious and unconscious elements, establishes itself in the form of internal sensation, then we may be able to measure the extent and quality of the response by that which manages to relieve in some instances and strengthen in others the internal, sensational components. To be sure, if a thing has even the smallest influence on sensibility, it will make a contribution to the intensity and complexity of the response, and by the same token to the constitution of internal sensation: otherwise, supposing the connection to have no physical basis, our reactions to the world would be mysteriously detached and autonomous. That being so, it should be possible to mine a response by presenting to oneself various items in relative isolation, items which serve to probe the central or nearly central features of the response. The mark of a successful exploration will be the power that a particular item has of arousing inner sensation, which forms part of the total response. When that
is accomplished, when the objects of the response have been clarified, the real work can begin, of scrutinizing, testing and revising the response in light of the articulations.

I have spoken of the inner life all along; perhaps I can now make what is so perplexing somewhat clearer. It should be agreed that a man who has an inner life has to the same degree depth; a man possessing a rich and developed inner life reacts sensitively to many more features of the world and reacts to them with greater intensity than one, shallow, bereft of such inwardness. And very many of the features to which he is finely sensitive inhabit the undercurrents of experience more often than the large conspicuous areas. The depth of the inner is, then, a function of percipience, of the capacity to detect and react to the unobvious and underlying characteristics of what is given in experience: the greater the capacity to probe the outer, the deeper the inner. But to attribute acute sensitivity to a man, or a deep inner life, is not at the same time to imply that everything he responds to can come quickly and definitely to mind, nor to imply that the expression of a deep response in words and actions is the outcome of a conscious appraisal of the relevant factors. For the assimilation and organization of a deep response occurs normally without reflective interference; anyway in most cases such interference would not be effective or useful, even if possible. The process of coming to grips with a response is one that often appears to be undergone rather than initiated or directed, for it is not an uncommon experience to have reached some sort of settled and developed state of thought and feeling without being aware of having gone through
the intermediate stages. It is as though the inner forces that are
activated by that which impinges on sensibility interact, intensify
and diminish according to inscrutable mechanisms. At least we
sense that our deepest thoughts and feelings lie beyond the range of
our introspective powers; we seem lost, with no solid ground to
stand upon, when the inner, after a dormant period, comes to life
and fills consciousness, e.g. in some imaginative acts. We know
too that whatever we attempt by way of exerting conscious and arti-
culate control will fail utterly to capture and contain the inner pro-
cesses; and what is more, a strong, unyielding persistence to under-
stand — prematurely — will likely retard the attaining of some stage
at which something firm can be extracted, and will just as surely
introduce a complicating tension to an already complex and highly
charged condition. Such persistence to manipulate one's inner life
may result in an induced numbness and obliviousness through an
unremitting attack on incipient feeling.

Now when the inner forces are activated and the process of
development begins, a need arises for a means of presenting relevant
experience and so securing substantial progress, or in other words,
a means of increasing and improving the data upon which thought and
feeling can operate. The need is satisfied — as much as it can be — by
the origination of the imaginative act.

Although in talk of perception it is familiar to refer to the parti-
cipation of all the senses at once in the texture of experience, there
has been a neglect of an analogous participation in the composition
of the imaginative act. The usual procedure in investigating the imagination is to isolate one kind of imaging (nearly always visualization) and to discuss its features as though the imaginative act is not made more complete or more imaginative by the addition of the other kinds, that is, providing it makes sense to suppose that they can exist together. But again reduction is a mistake. An act of imagining can involve more than one form of imagery; the imagination may engulf consciousness as perception engulfs it, for there are indeed imaginative acts — of the highest order — in which a whole experience is created or recreated, where sights, sounds, thoughts and feelings are unified, if only for brief moments. If the purpose of an imagining is not just to picture a certain object but rather to represent in the fullest detail all that went into the composition of an experience, what was experienced and how it was experienced, then the resulting presentment should be appropriately expansive and variegated. I am not interested in those imaginings which are merely the summation of the various forms of mental imagery; rather I am concerned to show that the character of such imaginings is radically altered by the impulse to self-discovery and self-development.

The function of the imaginative act, then, is not simply to recreate an experience or invent possible ones, but to employ such presentments as data for thought, feeling and insight to operate on. Now a full presentment demands a high degree of application and concentration; what things supply the energy to accomplish this? The imagination is engaged because there is a matter of some urgency, whether potentially beneficial or harmful, which normal thinking
remains unequipped to treat. The matter will be of a kind which touches and brings into question the structure and meaning of one’s life, of a kind which is so large-scale and fundamental as not to be amenable to easy reflection: the matter is such if it involves what I shall call life projects. They include deciding to marry, pursuing a career, cultivating certain interests, adopting ideals—all overriding determinants of the course and content of a life. The body of any one project is complex and far reaching; thus its meaning and influence are not susceptible of simple explication. To see this, consider how much a close friend has affected, for good or ill, every facet of one’s character. The remark ‘So-and-so means very much to me’ hardly conveys how he has modified and enlarged some desires and interests, and extinguished others, how he has helped one attain, say, security of mind and feeling. Now in order to understand the significance of one’s relationship, the imagination has to be called upon to furnish the material needed to bring to mind all that should be represented, for the only avenue to encountering the underlying import of experience lies in fully realized imaginative acts. We may be able to say ‘This person has had such-and-such an effect on me’, but find it impossible to articulate the felt quality of the impact. There comes a time when it is just this impact which we want to represent, which we want to scrutinize and assess, for if we are to make progress in thought and feeling we have to approach and to come to grips with the concrete factors from which the thoughts and feelings are generated. Words alone, we know, will never be adequate: we require the presentments of many imaginative acts.
The problem of self-discovery and self-development which brings a life project into question sustains the impulse to represent to oneself the fundamental parts of one's life. But the impulse by itself cannot be sufficient to guide the imagining, since the general problem of establishing the meaning of, say, a particular relationship is too indefinite to provide a path to the most relevant and fruitful imaginative renderings. Often we are at a loss to specify what we want to accomplish. What gives direction to the energy is a vague sense of something to be uncovered, the expectance or presentiment of a hitherto unrecognized and unencountered aspect of one's vital thoughts and feelings. It is this anticipatory apprehension — itself inarticulate — that guides the selection of certain data to which imaginative reflection can best be applied.

So far we have surveyed, very broadly, some of the issues bearing on the problem of the imaginative act, as a preliminary to proposing a distinctive example of the imagination. The next step is to apply and fill out the results obtained, and in so doing describe the imaginative act.
VI

IMAGINATION AND CREATIVITY

It has been suggested that the imagination as a centrally creative force arises most potently in response to problems pertaining to the constitution of the self. That is, the problems consist in an inner conflict not immediately specifiable, where the feelings and attitudes involved are engendered and sustained by factors lying beyond the pale of ordinary consciousness — the consciousness that typically finds expression in the ordinary spoken and written word. The role of the imagination, then, is to furnish, frequently by means of mental imagery, the material with which the amorphous texture of experience is given to reflection. Thus the traditional assumption that the imagination reproduces, but badly, perception and no more is overturned in favour of a view of imagination which allows that attention to imagery can make apparent the subtle dimension of experience, the unconscious thoughts and feelings of which ever-changing perception makes us oblivious. That bringing to consciousness the full import of experience is not a simple matter stems partly from the extraordinariness of demanding its recognition. We habitually neglect its exploration if only because it would hardly further our most pressing interests to do so. If language shapes consciousness, if what we say defines how we assess our experience and discriminate that which gives rise to it, then, keeping in mind that language as a social instrument contains that
which is most useful to communication, it follows that consciousness is trained to register particularly those things having public significance and utility. An unusual effort of mind is therefore required to heighten awareness of that which normally eludes attention.

It is time to make good these general remarks and justify the emphasis placed on one sort of imagining. The word 'imagination', we all know, covers a very wide and very diverse range of phenomena, from mistaken perception ('He only imagined that someone was at the door') to outstanding artistic achievements ('The novel displays an imaginative rendering of character'). Indeed the phenomena are so diverse that to find some significant connection between mistaken perception and artistic rendering appears an impossible task. Perhaps the coupling is due to historical accident: various regional speech habits became, through contact of social groups over a long period, general practices. If something like that is the case then there is no conceptual explanation for their association. And it may be assumed that 'imagination' conveniently came to fill certain linguistic gaps because no other term seemed quite suitable, or was chosen for a vague suggestiveness. An analysis of the imagination based on this assumption would take the form of allocating each use of the term to its rightful place in the conceptual scheme by finding the appropriate synonym. Thus 'imagine' in 'Imagine being two feet tall' is equivalent to 'conceive'; in 'His answer showed imagination' the word means novelty. When complete the analysis will have produced a list of synonyms and alternative expressions.
A conclusion might be that the term 'imagination' is properly applied only to mental imagery, to which the other phenomena bear no real connection.

On the other hand there is analysis based on the more credible assumption that divergence in application is not gratuitous but is generated by a general trait. It is plausible to hold that the phenomena possess a common feature, perhaps very abstract, for it would be very strange indeed if such an important term were just arbitrarily exploited. So the term does contribute something of its own. The task is to discover the common denominator, the nature generally shared. Accordingly some go on to argue that 'imagination' means something like going beyond the given, apprehending the absent as though it were present, or pretending to perceive, be or do. But while this latter approach remains for many the more rewarding philosophically, for unity is extracted from diversity, its advantages do not preclude limitations.

The extraction approach is without doubt superior to the equivalence approach inasmuch as the concept of imagination assumes in its hands an independent existence. However, the concept achieves independence at the expense of undergoing a distancing from the phenomena it peculiarly articulates. The linking feature, and so the conceptual core, must inevitably be, due to the obvious diversity, abstracted from the particularity of each phenomenon. Now the equivalence approach at least tends to accommodate and to respect the variety of detail and individual quality. Thus if the extraction approach is adopted, conceptual unity and strength is
offset by remoteness from the phenomena. What should be done?
If we wish to discover the distinctive character of the imagination we forfeit the more intimate investigation leading to significant understanding. If we decide to consider each phenomenon separately we are not likely to be able to perform the grand synthesis at the end, the synthesis that may have inspired the endeavour. To satisfy our aims we require a way of combining experiential closeness with the forging of conceptual authority. As method dictates to content, it is important to follow the most promising method so as to secure the best possible results. How then should we proceed?

We might begin by canvassing actual cases, which can be taken as uncontroversial, in a Wittgensteinian-derived look-and-see style. The attention and openness to complexity and detail should produce an appreciation for the richness of the phenomena and the crudity of the intellectual apparatus that articulates it. But this receptiveness is unlikely to result in the formulation of definite and determining characteristics; the detail will be immense and because so complicated not amenable to sorting into coherent patterns. Disorder and increased perplexity will be the consequence of allowing the world to have too large a hand in conceptual instructions. For if we do not take the initiative, if we do not offer improved orderings of experience, we cannot expect to arrive at greater understanding of that experience. I suggest that we forestall being overwhelmed by the jumble of detail by inventing examples so as to confront actual phenomena with analytical patterns. If bits of reality do not reveal themselves in neat array we shall have to begin the arranging ourselves.
Rather than wait on reality for sudden illumination we shall have to construct a plausible ordering which may yield philosophical understanding.

What I have in mind may well be charged with a two-fold artificiality: contrived examples tend to say more of their author than of the phenomena, and simple patterns unavoidably fail to include a great deal that is, or might turn out to be, important. Now both points are valid insofar as they warn of very real dangers. Nevertheless these pitfalls can be circumvented, at least to a degree that has a minimal detrimental effect. We must always guard against abstraction that alienates the concrete, and so we should be conscious of the relation between the analysis which is necessarily abstract and the concrete items which the analysis aims to encompass. It is a mark of a successful analysis that it will never allow us to forget — but bring more vividly and comprehensively to consciousness — the rich character of the phenomena in question. No doubt my proposals as to the way in which the phenomena should be ordered are, since the ordering emerges from invented examples, personal. But I hope that the reader will come to agree with the main points of the argument, and will offer qualifications to help improve the rest.

The undeniable and ineliminable artificiality of fabricated examples is not unique to this investigation. We find it in the work of the fabler and the moralist (Hans Andersen, Jesus of Nazareth), who embody ideas and ideals in tales and parables. These stories hold their fascination because, even though they may be unbelievable
in detail, they vividly convey some deep matter of human experience, a matter not easily kept before the mind unaided. The stories are ones returned to again and again not because they may represent actions that must be imitated or avoided — though I do not deny that imitation and repulsion can play a part in their acceptance — but rather because they encapsulate a way of concretizing a notion or value. The stories become touchstones of experience. The comparison of actual candidate actions with those fictionally described assists us in comprehending the nature of human behaviour and its value, they assist by highlighting the crucial features. Thus the artificiality of these stories, such as it is, remains innocuous; indeed the simple, naive fictions pinpoint the heart of our concerns so surely and strikingly as no documented incidents could. Now if such stories enable us to recognize the nature and merits of some actions, then comparable stories, invented for a different purpose, should enable us to cope more effectively with the description and analysis of some complex mental states. I am inclined to think that there are a number of psychological concepts whose analysis is best achieved in this fashion, prominent among them is the concept of imagination.

Any story invented for this purpose has to satisfy two main conditions. It must impress as a significant and striking example of the phenomena the concept articulates; otherwise the analysis will lack focus and direction. And it must exhibit enough salient features so as to suggest how the range of diverse phenomena can be coherently ordered; otherwise the thrust of the analysis will fall short. But we
should not expect that every common use will be assimilated. We want to locate the distinctive character of the imagination, and so its real power. Any attempt to include all without discrimination, as if all are on a par, serves only to weaken a vital concept. My strategy, then, is to tell a story from which will emerge a set of characteristics, which in turn will reveal connections among associated phenomena, and so display the scope of the imagination.

From adolescence Paul has had two overriding desires which have remained constant throughout his life. For him the good life consists in a career, challenging and creative, demanding acuity and stamina, and in the love of a woman with whom he can build a home and share the job of raising children and with whom he can find mutual support and a balance of interests and activity. He sees the two, the career and the marriage, as complementary and interdependent. For unless his talents are applied to a rewarding profession, unless he becomes a complete man by reaching a level of individual achievement and personal strength he cannot possibly love as he ought; and without the warmth, understanding and affection given and received, and the concern for the happiness of his wife and children, he will lack the emotional strength to sustain the taxing and frequently uncongenial work; indeed the family will make his efforts meaningful. Paul has such faith in his joint ideal that it influences and shapes all his more particular desires and decisions. But he is realistic enough to recognize that constant application and very good luck are needed to attain some state answering to the ideal.
And he realizes too that even when that state is reached, it will, as is to be expected, fall short of his, perhaps fanciful, ideal.

Soon after Paul is called to the bar he marries. The marriage — not free of problems — is close, and deepens as the family grows. He becomes a successful lawyer, and prospers as the quality of his work improves. But, although Paul is fully aware of his good fortune and knows that the continued happiness of his family is secure, he does begin to experience, as he enters middle age, the nagging weariness of routine at work and at home. It bothers him for a time, but eventually, after reflection, he comes to the conclusion that he has after all attained what he set out to attain; so the appropriate attitude for him now is relaxed satisfaction. Is not that the form of happiness he had in mind all along? With a disappointment that puzzles, he resigns himself to a contented but monotonously stable future.

Later he meets an old acquaintance, now an official in a major political party, who suggests that, as the representative of their constituency has decided not to contest the next election, Paul, a well-known, highly qualified and respected citizen of the region, might think of entering his name as a candidate. The seat is a safe one, and if Paul acts now he is bound to generate sufficient support to win the party's nomination. Now the prospect of entering politics excites him to a degree that he no longer thought possible. The offer has awakened desires and aims that have lain dormant for a considerable time; and Paul quickly realizes that the ground of his malaise must be that these desires and aims have remained inoperative for so long.
He had somehow forgotten the emphasis he placed on challenge and risk, if the rewards are great, when his career began. So now he is presented with an opportunity to make something significant out of this latter phase of his working life, a chance to secure great achievements. Delighted, he sets to thinking and considers how best to employ his talents in politics. But suddenly his train of thought is jolted by the awareness of the effect such a decision would have on his wife and children. The duties of a dedicated politician necessitate repeated absences from home, which will over an extended period damage irreparably familial well-being.

He is caught in a dilemma. If he pursues this new career his wife and children and he himself will suffer the pain of estrangement. If he decides to preserve the emotional cohesiveness of the family he will drift into boredom and become, especially as he is now conscious of greater possibilities, deeply frustrated. In either direction the disadvantages, what is suffered or missed, seem to counterbalance the benefits, what is achieved or retained. From the present standpoint there appears no way out of this intolerable state of affairs. And he finds himself unable to cope with the range and complexity of the thoughts and feelings involved. To be sure, if he is to begin to reconcile himself to one of the alternatives by, in part, extinguishing the other, or to somehow pass over the dilemma and to establish new bearings, he requires some grasp of these vital factors, some way of comprehending and holding them together so that any solution arrived at will not have been reached by neglecting an item which later might prove to be of the utmost importance to the
conflict. The problem he faces, as a preliminary to resolving the pervasive conflict, concerns the difficulty in finding a method of representing as completely as possible the content and meaning of the two life projects. At the moment he has a strong feeling of being inadequate to the task.

Naturally enough Paul cannot help being totally preoccupied with the conflict. And he withdraws from responsible application in his work and from responsive family activity. But the withdrawal is not an outcome of deliberation, not a consequence of decision. It is the characteristic accompaniment of total absorption in thought. If the greater part of a man's intellectual and emotional energy is deployed in a concentrated reflection then he has little to expend in normal, everyday circumstances. For Paul it is as though the conflict possesses the mental life. He has lost command of the sequence and content of thoughts and feelings. Now he must at all times attend to the processes activated and the energies discharged to deal with the conflict: the competing life projects take control. This should not surprise, for as Paul's state of mind is extremely confused he is unable to frame an objective by which to conduct reflection. He does not know what he wants, let alone what might solve the problem.

Even though his successive ponderings appear disconnected and incoherent overall, several themes recur, and they recur in the form — which all his thought seems to take — of mental imagery. If he is not reliving some memorable experience or a half-forgotten episode in the first days of marriage, he is envisaging the rewards
of an active political life or the deterioration of a once happy family. Gradually he vividly encounters the kind of life he has had, and the kinds of life he could have. And in moments of respite from the turmoil he re-enters the state of harmony and contentment just left behind. Then he thinks that the distress is merely a temporary aberration. But no sooner does he frame the consoling thought than he recoils at the prospect of a dreary and unceasing equilibrium. And when he dwells on various ways that his talents might be fulfilled in government he usually ends with — as the vividness of envisagement fades — the awareness of the consequences on those nearest to him. He wants the new career but having it entails shirking responsibilities and severing deep attachments; whatever he does he cannot abandon those who have given most. But, on the other hand, if he fails to revitalize himself through more challenging and rewarding work, how will he, in such a miserable state, contribute to their happiness? His frustration will introduce a disruptive tension and coolness. Yet might this view be unduly pessimistic, a result of overestimating the influence of the new career? Not a little time is spent in picturing a future that is a happy extension of life to date.

Paul is utterly bewildered; as things stand there seems no solution available. But he does not sink into despair, for he is not unaware that there is work to be done, work that must be done — the alternative is disintegration. His reflection consists in the presentments of past episodes and future contingencies, but presentments that amount to explorations of the significance of what he has
experienced and what he could yet experience. At such times, in such explorative attitudes, he sustains a concentrated responsiveness to the actual content and meaning that his family and career have for him, and what he contributes in return. It is only in the form of fully realized mental images — one so quickly loses hold of words alone — that he is able to make vivid and real to himself the matter of his life. In dwelling scrupulously on aspects of endeavours and relationships he comes in conscious contact with the value of his life projects. Thus by means of representing in images he makes concrete those elements that are peculiarly difficult to keep in focus, and so provides himself with a personal critique. This kind of critique has a compelling impact because there is all the difference between it and a self-critique formulated in accordance with rational judgment: the difference in effect on the soul between deliberate, analytical reasoning and actual or re-lived experience implying judgment is seldom taken account of. Now the method, the creating and the repeating of imaging experiences, amounts to 'assembling reminders for a purpose', although the purpose does not occupy a position in the forefront of consciousness. The purpose is realized at the end, when it confers sense and order on that leading to it.

The purpose (inasmuch as we can speak of one) plays no actively conscious role in the critique because the aim of the activity is a change in what set the critique in motion. That is, the critique involves alternation or modification to the beliefs, desires and interests comprising the self; and so the self too is altered and modified. If Paul is to resolve the inner disharmony, a solution
will not be achieved by opting for one side of the conflict and banishing the other: he must somehow retain both in order to prevent disintegration. But a reconciliation is not a clear possibility, that is, not a possibility for him as things are at present. If it were a clear possibility he would be able to express it, and it would become a conscious, articulated goal. But Paul cannot state what he is up to, he is not equipped to comprehend a true reconciliation. For the reconciliation, if there is one, can be reached only after a dramatic change in the self has been undergone. And the self reborn is not a coherent and thinkable outcome of a transformation of the present self. Just as there is no coherent thought answering to the description of willing or imagining oneself being another person,* so there is slight content in the thought of wanting to become fundamentally different. The reconciliation necessitates an alternation of determining factors in Paul's psychic make-up. But if the reconciliation required is so fundamental and so large-scale, then the articulation of a solution covering all that the transformation implies would be, if indeed possible, so long and cumbersome as not to qualify as an animating purpose at all.

The consequences of Paul's repeated explorations come gradually, virtually without conscious recognition. Each session of self-absorption has the effect of lessening the hold of present beliefs, desires and interest, which permits him to try out variations that might lead the way through the dilemma. In the period of transition nothing stands fast. Slowly, little by little, the conflicting beliefs, 

---

desires and interests lose their grip on the psyche; at the same time their replacements, tenuously held, begin to form themselves more definitely and begin to germinate in consciousness. Thus as the supplanting projects establish themselves, as Paul feels more secure and at home with them, the new self emerges.

The acid test of the reformed self clearly is whether it can cope effectively and constructively with the problem that Paul still faces. Not only must he be able to make confident decisions, but the decisions must be of a kind which, while acknowledging the process of change and appreciating the former self, cause no regret, nor suggest that something of value in his character has been forfeited. Rather, if the period of reflection, suspension and emergence has been successful then he should be prepared to recognize that, if anything, he has gained. He has gained in power and pose; he can now consider the problem with composure while before it caused distress.

Without reluctance Paul decides to turn down the offer of candidacy. Before his mind is the picture of a more fulfilling alternative, more fulfilling because it incorporates where the others exclude. It allows him to be fully himself, although now a markedly different self. He sees a way of satisfying the urge to revitalize his work while preserving and enriching familial love and cohesiveness. He sets himself the task of acquiring a greater understanding of politics and government — after all he is still a novice in these matters — by study, discussion and experience in party organization and local affairs. By proceeding conscientiously in his political
education he can allow his views time to mature, time to cohere into a well-founded programme. Moreover, this painstaking method has the advantage of making it possible for the family to adjust to the expected career. They too can develop interests in these and related areas, and can participate with Paul in his public activities. In this manner they will be prepared, as he will be prepared, for the attempt at political office and the different pattern of life entailed by its success. The aim of entering politics has been retained but it now inhabits a refurbished domain. It is now enmeshed in a different set of aims where it does not occupy the most powerful position. Since it formerly ruled above and alone whenever acknowledged, its character has been drastically altered. Similarly, his wish for a stable and happy family has not been abandoned; it has become subordinated to the desire to enhance family life by giving more of himself and so binding the family more closely. If Paul has not removed all the problems, he has nonetheless fashioned, after experiencing a cul-de-sac, new projects which have emerged from his own energies and which express the critical features of his personality.

The structure of the story is this:

(1) After achieving a state of contentment, after satisfying his ideal, he experiences a vague feeling of incompleteness. But, thinking that such misgivings are idle, he tries not to trouble himself.

(2) The unanticipated prospect of improving his situation by changing careers casts away the doldrums, and upsets, what seemed to be, a strong mental and emotional balance. He is thrown into
deep confusion.

(3) If the turmoil incapacitates and prevents judgment and deliberation, it does not eliminate every resource. He is too enfeebled to direct his ponderings. But he does register a host of imaging experiences. The succession of affecting images serves to induce a dissociation from the desires and aims, held so firmly, which are the source of the conflict. A city under siege becomes less attached to its treasures as it struggles for survival.

(4) What has given life meaning is explored with disinterestedness, as he is bereft of unquestioned aims and desires. And the establishment of meaning leads to an experimenting with suitable aims and desires, an experimenting which is conducted through mental images. Candidate replacements are tentatively assimilated, until some reconciliation appears, until some revised psychic structure begins to take hold.

(5) As the revised self congeals so he regains the conscious and considered command over his mental and emotional life. He recovers the strength and energy to enact the dictates of the self. He succeeds in resolving the conflict by removing its causes; the transformation justifies itself and the old self is hardly missed. In fact he is inclined to assert that nothing has been lost, all is growth.

Whether this story exemplifies the imagination shall not be argued, it shall be assumed. And if it does not immediately impress it may do so when the yield is inspected.
1. Materials. The story presents a succession of states: relative harmony, irresolvable conflict, disordered imaging, transformation and resolution. The imagination is indispensable to the attainment of the end. But need the imagining always be conducted through mental imagery? Imagery is an important ingredient of the transformation, but is it always required to introduce the imagination?

It is common to maintain that some artists of stature display in their works qualities of imagination to the highest degree. And this cannot be denied. But this truism, however, may prove vacuous if what is meant by the attribution of imaginative excellence comes only to the praising of artistic talent. For then the only power the term 'imagination' possesses is that of abbreviating a set of characteristics — it contributes nothing of its own. And if that is so then the imagination is not distinctive, hence of no particular interest. But, even if the reduction of the imagination to artistic talent is avoided and application of the term is reserved for those exhibiting specific skills — not just any work of art deserves to be called imaginative, but there are some which plainly do, and it is with them that the analysis should begin — it appears that a mistake has been made in claiming certain very special and very rare skills as a prerequisite for the imagination. For surely mature artistic talent consists in exceptional skills of expression, articulation and execution, in word, pigment or clay. But why should the total absence of such artistic skills, or a mere average endowment, debar a man from having a fully developed imagination? That the imagination properly accompanies great artists seems an inordinately stringent condition. And,
anyway, to make the imagination the exclusive property of artistic genius may lead back to a view of the imagination that adds nothing of moment to what we already ascribe to genius.

But from the denial that the imagination is exclusive to artistic creation it does not follow that it is exclusive to that consisting in internal images. Rather it seems reasonable to suppose that as artistic expression derives from and extends ordinary expression so the distinctively imaginative elements in art depend upon more widely based and easily accessible ones: imagination in art is founded on an imagination requiring no extraordinary powers of expression. Now if the imagination as a creative force is to exist generally, unaided by exceptional gifts, then it must naturally express itself in mental imagery. For the framing of mental images requires no training or special talent: the ability to image is a consequence of the ability to perceive. Thus, inasmuch as we can summon up internal images we share a basic feature of the imagination. If we do not have the benefit of artistic skill at least we have within ourselves the means to participate in the kind of thing achieved by the gifted few. So the imagination, while its greatest exemplifications occur in the greatest artists, is grounded generally in the ability to image.

The material of the imagination varies: writing novels, composing music, painting pictures as well as framing internal images all manifest the workings of the imagination. It is characteristic of such activities that their completion culminates the laborious pursual of an end. Since the end is not one that could be achieved immediately,
the imagination must needs be called upon. And for that reason a material is employed to provide something to generate and sustain the process and to register each error and correction and the stages of development. It is difficult to conceive how, without such material, a result could be worked out. But now why should the goal be reached by a working out?

For example, consider a man, totally lacking in artistic talent and not inclined to dwell on internal images, who, after being presented with a seemingly intractable problem and brooding for a time, suddenly produces a solution. Not only did no images enter his mind during the period of brooding, but no thoughts of the problem either. Still he was preoccupied with the problem throughout. He had the feeling of being oppressed by it and of making efforts to solve it (a feeling he could not articulate) but he followed no method, took no steps. And then quite spontaneously an idea of the solution formed from elements that seemed to come into existence as soon as they came together.

This story is certainly plausible. But its plausibility depends upon assumptions as to the nature of the problem and solution. That is, as the problem and solution approach in depth and quality that of Paul's, the story becomes less believable. It is easy to conceive of this man finding, say, an ingenious technique for assessing a chemical substance, or a procedure for answering a mathematical poser, but immensely hard to think that he could arrive at a regenerated self in a similar way. But surely, an objection runs, it can happen that a brilliant solution to an engineering problem, say, entails a major
alteration to the inventor's beliefs, etc., an alteration which amounts to a real change in him. Thus there is not a significant difference between the two sets of problems and solutions, and by the same token no reason to separate them with respect to the imagination.

A reply to this objection is registered in the distinction between what happens to one and what changes one. Certainly each change in a man's beliefs, desires and plans is a change in how he sees, and conducts himself in, the world. And so it can be said, trivially, that each change in a man's beliefs, etc. amounts to a change in him; he is to that extent different. But it has to be recognized that there is a great difference between a revision to an inconsequential belief and the abandonment of a belief that lies near the centre of his basic concerns. Admittedly the extremes differ in degree; but with the former there is warrant for maintaining that he undergoes no change, that the self alters so slightly as to remain intact, while with the latter it must be acknowledged that the change is so radical that a new self has been born, he has been transformed. Change in the basic constituents of the self involves alteration and modification on a large scale, just because that which occupies the central location generates or colours all of the rest.

If, then, this picture of change in the self is right it remains very difficult to understand how a radical revision to beliefs, desires and interests could be brought about by the imagination while in a state of psychic equilibrium. For such an imaginative transformation must in fact manifest itself in doubt, confusion and insecurity, which cannot but be suffered. The change involves, directly or indirectly,
every concern so it requires the application of him whose condition it is. Stability is recovered by promoting and guiding as best he can the process leading to reconstitution. Otherwise, without this attentive coming to grips with the problem, there is every likelihood of going under.

Attentiveness is important for another reason. We find the story of a man emerging from a period of blankness with a solution to a problem about his deepest projects as a result of imagination hard to understand for the strong reason that in order for the man to accept the new self as truly and imaginatively his, he should be able to trace the development as one involving the progressive realignment of his inmost beliefs, desires and interests. Unless he is able to recognize the continuity of the new self with the old, he need not be committed to accepting responsibility for effecting the later condition. He may not accept responsibility because he has not taken an active part in encouraging the development of some aspects and the quashing of others, and so has not experienced the new self emerging from the old. Dramatic transformations of the self can take place without active working out, as for instance in the Damascus road conversion. But it is in just such cases that we are not tempted to attribute the change to the workings of the imagination. We are not tempted because the transformation is instantaneous and due wholly to the interference of an external force. Now this interference contrasts with the aid provided by someone who, appreciating the problem, contributes to the subject's imagination with more or less detailed suggestions. In cases of such contribution,
where not all the work is done internally, the imagination so activated is credited with a diminished participation. The less the person's imagination takes part in the process, the less responsibility he has for bringing about the result.

2. Consciousness. In arguing that a working out with the material is required for the imagination to deal with certain deep problems, particularly those concerning the basic aspects of the self, we have come to argue for the view that as a consequence the imaginative process must involve conscious awareness. The difficulty is to describe what this awareness means.

The case of the man who produces a solution to a not uncomplicated problem after a period of mental blankness shows that the imagination may be evidenced when no conscious attentiveness obtains. But blankness is no more than an accidental feature. There seems nothing to prevent him or another from following a step-by-step procedure which will lead to the right result. Indeed it may be more efficient in some instances to set a concrete stimulus for the imagination by carefully traversing the ground up to and around the problem, be reviewing, say, all the data so as to circumscribe the problem. With the problem clearly in focus adjustments to the attendant items can be tested in a trial-and-error fashion until everything falls into place.

Thus there are, calling upon the imagination, problems that are susceptible of more or less full articulation and consequently problems whose solutions can be prefigured. It is often possible to picture,
however sketchily, the kind of condition that would satisfy the problem, while lacking the means of achieving a particular realization of the solution. The role of the imagination here becomes, after the solution is framed, one of keeping the end-product vividly present so as to act as a guiding influence on the efforts mustered to attain it. We can conclude that some imaginative processes involve prefigurement and others do not; and that where prefigurement obtains so does conscious attentiveness. But the converse does not hold. Not every imaginative process involving conscious attentiveness includes prefigurement of the solution, for in some important instances (such as Paul's case above) prefigurement can even be an impediment to reaching the solution.

We have to consider those cases in which, for one, the problem is not clearly apprehended and, for another, there is no hint of what the solution might be. Because the matters in question overwhelm in range and depth, neither the problem nor the solution is amenable to articulation. Still the individual may express his dejection and upset and complain of great troubles; but each expression will fall far short of adequate articulation. For in order to grasp completely the nature of his problem he would have to have already attained the solution. And, although for that reason he is incapable of prefiguring the solution, he can (and must) envisage as an important part of the imaginative process the likely extensions of certain aspects of his present state.

When the problem is the problem of overcoming that which gives rise to it then the solution is not one that can be a possible
extension of that which requires it. And if the problem fails to be comprehended because as a problem of the self it lies outside the self then the solution also falls outside the pale of conscious awareness.

The limits of consciousness are not, we might say, the limits of the imagination, for the imagination outstrips them. It outstrips them because it can deal with matters that exceed the grasp of ordinary discursive reasoning. What a man can represent to himself is shaped by his experience, by his beliefs, interests and desires. On the other hand he can make vivid a life altered in certain respects by suspending some of his beliefs, etc. and adopting improving replacements. But there are firm limits to such suspension and experimentation. Such limits exist for two reasons. First, the process of suspending less and less superficial beliefs, desires and interests becomes increasingly difficult because, as deeper items support ever more subordinate ones, an attempt to dissociate oneself from a relatively deep item demands exceptional powers of concentration. The point where the inability to simultaneously hold in abeyance the wealth of establishing mental features engenders the inability to maintain a grip on the new persona is all too quickly reached in the course of methodical dissociation. In the suspension of deep items what must be attended to far exceeds what consciousness can effectively handle; as the task becomes greater the chances of success diminish. Second, there is a question about the subject of such a suspension of deep items, providing we assume for the moment that no restrictions hold on what can be brought under conscious
control. Even if the most important and most basic of one's beliefs, etc. may be truly suspended, one might yet doubt whether a value attaches to the performance of that operation, whether in fact anyone could have an interest in the outcome of divesting himself of his mental and emotional constituents. He might find no attraction in that operation since he is certain that with each dissociation he himself must suffer a reduction, until, in the extreme case, he (the person who set out) has vanished altogether. He cannot think that if he were to suspend the adherence to a life project (consisting of beliefs, desires and interests) it would be he himself contemplating the replacement. For he is not merely a subject of awareness, a contentless point of apprehension, and no force of willing could reduce him to it. After all, even if such a state were entered, what impact could the adopted persona have? If his actual life design is set aside then how might the unusual experience stimulate a critical scrutiny of the self? Thus any attempt to deny that, or a part of that, which defines the self as a means of contending with certain deep problems must be idle.

As the defining components of the self cannot be abandoned or entertained at will, a problem about the tenability of such components is precluded from a consciously directed inquiry. The calamity that befalls the one who ignores these conditions attests to their truth. Consider a man who, victim of a deep conflict (e.g., career versus marriage) and efficient to the core, is impatient to have the solution without delay. Rather than submit to the slow, unmanageable and unpredictable psychic forces and endure the upset
and confusion that are bound to result, he decides to expedite matters by weighing alternatives and plumping for that displaying the more beneficial prospects in the long run. The conflicting projects are irreconcilable; but he is not prepared to give up either if that means giving up both. And if one has to go it will be the less advantageous. He cannot afford, he thinks, to run the risk of forfeiting all of what he now holds dear by submitting to an unknown process. So by dint of will he tries to at once banish the less desirable project and, till a replacement presents itself, increase the power of the survivor in order to close the gap. He pictures a future bereft of the offending project, and suppresses each manifestation of it. But if indeed the project is a defining component of the self then failure to rid himself of it is certain. Deep beliefs, desires and interests neither fall away through disregard nor disappear of their own accord. This does not mean, however, that a man may not induce a state in which he remains oblivious of factors he refuses to acknowledge. All that he can accomplish by bullying a project out of consciousness is simply that: he no longer acts under its influence and does not have thoughts associated with it. But it stays, choked beneath a complicated layer of mental tangles. Thinking it out of existence does not make it so; for projects respond to a subtle approach, an approach respecting their position in the psyche. Now it is clear that the artificial reform leaves the self enfeebled and vulnerable, for each occasion that would formerly have activated a certain response having deep connections threatens the tenuous equilibrium. Consequently he is less able to deal adequately and sin-
cerely with crucial elements in his (and anyone's) life. All this results because he demanded a conscious control, because he refused to allow the imagination to run a natural, disciplined course. A misused imagination brings about a disintegrated self.

3. Problems. While it is possible to scrutinize the most banal of items with utmost meticulousness and to glance cursorily at the most demanding of works of art, while it is possible to feel extremely touched by the simplest of gestures and to be left cold by the noblest of human acts, it is not possible to extract from the imagination in excess of the demands made on it, or to satisfy it with less. Unlike perception and emotion, the imagination yields, when it does succeed, in proportion to that which exercises it. If the appearance of a problem is, as has been argued, a distinctive feature of the imaginative process then for the process to be consummated a solution corresponding to the problem in complexity must be reached. The solution, a genuine solution, must encompass or revise the elements comprising the problem; but it cannot transcend that which requires it, for the simple reason that no solution would thereby be secured — a solution should be assimilable. This is why the imagination has bounds and, as solutions generate further problems, a history.

The problem in its way defines what the imagination can accomplish: the greater the problem the greater imaginativeness needed. Without problems the imagination remains still and empty. This establishes the view that aimless picturing exemplifies only the most
attenuated form of imagination. But more of this subsequently.

Not all problems activating the imagination are of the same kind. We can roughly distinguish between those about the self and those about the world, and in addition between those about the individual self and those, we might say, about the collective self. The former pair can be distinguished by contrasting deep problems of the person with fundamental problems of nature in terms of prefigurement. Whereas a reconciliation of a deep conflict is not susceptible of prefigurement (to the subject), fundamental scientific, economic and sociological problems are often solvable with the invention of a satisfactory model. To fashion a model or pattern is to discover the solution for (we assume) whatever holds true of the macrocosm does analogously hold true of the microcosm. Indeed the structure of a thing must generally be represented in manageable form if it is to be understood. And the test of an alleged discovery is whether the model or pattern can be coherently articulated and justified: a state of the world is often comprehensible only if the relevant model is. Now this search for comprehension characteristic of problems of nature and society is not found in problems of deep personal conflict, problems which require, not understanding of a fixed state, but revision of a self no longer able to adequately cope. But as the distinction lies in the difference between understanding and growth, between fabrication and generation, it should be clear that some problems of the self do amount to the problem of comprehending the elements of a personality; and such problems might be solved by formulating a suitable model
or pattern. How are these two sorts of problem and solution related?

The problem of the self, of which models and patterns play no part in the solution, is the problem stemming, not from a need for more and better information, but from a need for an improved programme of action so as to make a life more congenial, satisfying or challenging. Although there is a great difference between a problem whose solution requires a model and a problem whose solution involves regeneration, they have this much in common. Each kind of problem derives from a deficiency in unity and cohesiveness; the solution to one promises greater coherence and comprehensiveness, to the other renewed strength of purpose. Thus both problems arise from a need for integration, of data or of projects; but in light of their differences we speak of one aiming at truth and the other health.

We have distinguished between the problems whose solutions are and are not susceptible of prefigurement, and have aligned them with the fabricative and the generative. Now, to be sure, after the growth has been effected in the case of man who has overcome a conflict of defining projects, it should be possible, provided the growth is attributable to the imagination, for the individual to follow the development, a procedure which might involve the invention of a pattern. And the pattern formed would be made up of or embodied in personal representations. So, although a man in the throes of a deep conflict is incapable of prefiguring successful emergence, he should be able to represent (if only to himself), when the end-point
has been reached, the state achieved and the process leading to it. He should be able to comprehend the continuity of the later and earlier selves as a condition of endorsing the change as imaginatively his.

So far attention has been restricted to an individual and his personal projects. Certainly there are defining projects common to many, the projects of a society or a culture. And there is no reason to suppose that common projects are immune to conflict and free of inadequacy, nor indeed that a society never has need of regeneration. Now problems of this sort are of such a magnitude that, as expected, only the man who possesses extraordinary sensitivity and intelligence can even begin to consider them at all. The man must be exceptional because in representing the problems of common projects he cannot rely solely on his own experiences as an individual dealing with a personal issue may. In order to achieve an expression of a social matter at once immediate and widely accessible he must articulate that presentment which derives from a genuinely individual experience but which remains impersonal in character. The pitfalls are two: becoming subjective, where the commentator offers his idiosyncrasies as though they were ours; and becoming detached, where the material is so commonplace as to deny that shared projects are after all shared by individuals to whom, if they do matter, such things matter at a profound level and matter with corresponding feeling.

If the preceding adumbrates the truth then there ought to be illustrations of those, deeply responsive to the collective self, those
artists who promote human growth and portray growth already achieved.

A most impressive example of a work that articulates a substantial change in a people is King Lear. Once, the king, ordained by God, enjoyed absolute authority. But as the belief in divine association weakened so the supreme ruler sustained a reduction in the foundation of his power. The drama centres on the fact that Lear is the victim of a radical transformation that takes place too late in him. We find him at the outset, oblivious of the erosion of faith in divinely supported power, demanding a public demonstration of honour and affection warranted only by the formerly exalted office and preparing to divest himself of all that which constitutes his present authority. We follow him through the suffering of rejection and contempt to the 'madness' of trauma, which has as its climax the repudiation of majesty:

... unaccommodated man is no more but such a poor, bare, forked animal as thou art. Off, off, you lendings! Come, unbutton here. (III, iv)

The attempt to remove the trappings of office indicates that awareness has come albeit belatedly.

The tragedy of Lear depicts the drastic change that occurred in the conception of political power. The drama carries such impact because Lear himself undergoes the transformation in a convulsive suddenness. In him is dramatized both the nature of the change and the ruins of it. Lear as fallen king and Lear as the end of an idea are
images drawn together in the final lines of the play spoken by Edgar:

The oldest hath borne most; we that are young
Shall never see so much, nor live so long.

The old man Lear has suffered all; the tradition of power that he represents invested the ruler with greatness; subsequent leadership will never have comparable authority and durability.

It surprises no-one that a great play by a great artist records a fundamental change in belief and social organization. Shakespeare has enabled us to appreciate the seismic force of the change by enacting it in an intensely moving drama of pain and death, which, by its closeness and convincingness of action, brings the larger scheme strikingly near. Now if one great artist can represent a change of such dimension that has occurred then another can inaugurate a development that needs to occur.

In Women in Love the reader meets an intense and incisive diagnosis of human relationship, but he may feel when the book closes that nothing positive has been gained. The mechanically willed and possessive love between Gerald and Gudrun fails and Gerald dies in the snow, but the question of what should replace it seems left finally unanswered. The novel ends with stark inconclusiveness:

'Did you need Gerald?' she asked one evening.

'Yes,' he said.

'Aren't I enough for you?' she asked.
'No,' he said. 'You are enough for me, as far as a woman is concerned. You are all women to me. But I wanted a man friend, as eternal as you and I are eternal.'

'Why aren't I enough?' she said. 'You are enough for me. I don't want anybody else but you. Why isn't it the same with you?'

'Having you, I can live all my life without anybody else, any other sheer intimacy. But to make it complete, really happy, I wanted eternal union with a man too: another kind of love,' he said.

'I don't believe it,' she said. 'It's an obstinacy, a theory, a perversity.'

'Well —' he said.

'You can't have two kinds of love. Why should you?'

'It seems as if I can't,' he said. 'Yet I wanted it.'

'You can't have it, because it's false, impossible,' she said.

'I don't believe that,' he answered.

Birkin's acknowledged dissatisfaction and the puzzlement it causes Ursula might be thought enough to establish the overall failure of the novel. Lawrence gives Birkin a lot to say about fulfilment and the reform of human relationship, but he does not substantiate those words, for to do so would consist in presenting their realization. At best there is only a sketch of a programme. However, this view misinterprets the absence of an embodiment of the leading pronouncements as it misses the subtlety of Birkin's (and so in this instance Lawrence's) predicament.
Birkin envisages schematically how human relationship could be, how for instance men and women could improve their union by reorganizing it under the idea of balanced polarity of the sexes. He makes exiguous advances in the realization of his penetrating and far-reaching thoughts because the accomplishment of his proposals implies a quite major transformation in human living, which, needless to say, cannot happen overnight, not even in Birkin. The nature of an individual life depends on other individual lives. Fundamental human growth therefore cannot occur isolated; individual growth of this kind must form part of a development in the collective spirit. This explains why Birkin encounters incomprehension and opposition, and why he seems to get no nearer his goal. Birkin grows only if some attuned to his spirit and direction grow with him. Because no-one responds sympathetically and Birkin is incapable of initiating the process alone, his own growth remains inhibited. But that does not, as it should not, shake his confidence in the kind of growth required. That he does not, and cannot, supply a fully detailed account of what his proposals come to, either for the skeptical or for himself, provides no reason for doubting their promise. For the inability to give a complete spelling out is a condition of the deep and pervasive regeneration desired. To attempt such an account would be to betray the imagination: any prefigurement would necessarily be bound by the present state of things, and as such would distortedly influence development. In the face of the severest incredulity Birkin rightly stands his ground. Thus to fault the novel for not delivering what it holds up as the promise, to be disappointed when the disconcertion it effects only increases at the
close, is to misunderstand this artistic imagination.

This contrast of Shakespeare's imaginative rendering with Lawrence's serves to illuminate another contrast. There is a marked difference in our approach to each artist and his works. For, while it matters little to the appreciation of his work that there is only scanty information about Shakespeare the man, Lawrence's letters, essays and travel books, as well as the memoirs written by others, are an invaluable asset in the understanding and appreciation of his work. Indeed the reader who intends to come to grips with the novels feels almost driven to explore the man himself. Full biographical description is important for the appreciation of one oeuvre and not for another on account of the differences in the problems that exercise the imagination. If one work enacts a human development already complete, and another sows the seeds of regeneration, a regeneration that cannot be at all adequately depicted, then our interest in the author of the latter must certainly be greater. Providing the works are borne of integrity, the life of the artist who expresses the need for regeneration should be the natural complement of the art, for the life will, to a degree, concretely illustrate the meaning of the art, and thereby instruct on the merits and defects, the difficulties and achievements of the promptings. The life is a test of the work, for if the work sincerely urges a fundamental development then the life itself contains the source, and manifests the beginnings, of regeneration.
4. Connections. The convincingness of the account depends upon how well it provides an ordering of the diverse phenomena collected as imagination. If there are reasons for the phenomena to be associated then the account of the most distinctive features should suggest what the reasons might be.

We began with the imagination as exhibited in the problem of regeneration of the self. The discussion yielded a distinction between problems whose solutions can be prefigured or fabricated and those whose solutions cannot, and so a difference in how the imagination is activated. Thus a connection was established between the imagination of the self and the scientific imagination, that is, between the human and the non-human. But, acknowledging that not every problem of the self is a problem of regeneration, for there are problems of comprehension, we found that there can be imaginative presentment of individual growth already attained. And, as each individual self has its collective side, these problems of the self were seen to have a collective dimension, a dimension which the artist especially explores. The artist possesses the skill of moving from the personal to the impersonal imagination, a move involving the articulation of publicly accessible material.

To return to our story. The imaginative process went through these two stages: the registering of a host of imaging experiences and the emerging of the reborn self, first kaleidoscopic confusion and then understanding. Such a process does not occur unless originated by a problem of consequence. So far we have investigated the imagination as a response to deep problems. But let's set prob-
lems aside to see what remains.

The capacity to frame images may be exploited, of course, when no problem impinges. But as the matter of the problem diminishes, or the problem disappears altogether, so the images produced become interesting more for their phenomenal properties. The desideratum is that they should have the effect of pleasing, exciting or confounding. Thus we speak of the imagination being manifested in images (internal, or of words, sounds and pigments) which please, excite or confound in a fresh manner. Novelty is important for with each repetition of an image the sensuous impact lessens. The familiar tends to dull, and eventually bore, sensibility. What quickens it is the surprising and ingenious. Sensibility craves the new delight or horror because the frisson once subsided can be recovered only in the stimulus of the yet to be experienced. As the stimulus is used up it is discarded. But compare this extreme with another, with the imaginative rendering that never completely satisfies because it has too much to give. Those works we return to again and again overwhelm, for they overflow sensibility. What sustains their hold on consciousness is a deeper grip. If the works are deep then they are about growth, and growth needs cultivation. Works about growth have to be grown into. If the work has to be grown into then it is the work itself — and much besides — that nourishes, ever more with each ingestion.

Eliminating materials and problems of a deep character leaves the imagination as the spring of insight and ideas. The perspicacious man, the man who understands others, understands their circumstance and point of view, exhibits, we say, imagination; so too the man
who invents ways of making life more comfortable, safer and more efficient. Now one might be led to think, when reflecting on the general necessity for such imagination and its widespread effects, that the significance of the imagination lies there. But this would be to confuse the greater in number with the greater in nature.

As the subtlest imagination touches the deepest reaches it pervades all consciousness. And as the soundless is invisible it is easy to overlook.
WORKS CITED

Aquinas, St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1265-74.

Coleridge, S.T., Biographia Literaria, 1817.

Descartes, R., Meditations on First Philosophy, 1641.


------ 'Disposition and Memory', 1960, in same.

------ 'Feeling and Expression', 1960, in same.


Hobbes, T., Leviathan, 1651.


Husserl, E., Logical Investigations, 1900.

------ Ideas, 1913.


Kant, I., *Critique of Pure Reason*, 1781 & 1787.  
trans. N. Kemp Smith, 1929.

——— *Critique of Judgement*, 1790.  
trans. J.C. Meredith, 1928.


Lucretius, *On the Nature of the Universe*.  


——— *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 1887.  
trans. same, 1967.


——— 'A Puzzling Element in the Notion of Thinking', 1958, in same.


——— *Ésquisse d'un théorie des émotions*, 1939.  

——— 'Une idée fondamentale de la phénoménologie de Husserl: l'intentionnalité', 1939.  

**———** *L'Être et le néant: essai d'ontologie phénoménologique*, 1943.

Strawson, P.F., 'Imagination and Perception', in *Experience & Theory*,


Wollheim, R., 'The Mind and the Mind's Image of Itself', 1968,

**———** 'Reflections on *Art and Illusion*', 1961, in same.