EXTENDED LIVING ARRANGEMENTS IN CHILE:

AN ANALYSIS OF SUBFAMILIES

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January 2018

This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

Extended households are far from a rare phenomenon in Latin America and their prevalence does not seem to be in decline. In Chile, they accounted for about a quarter of all households over the 1990–2011 period. This persistence contrasts with the dramatic transformations that have taken place in other dimensions of family life, such as the fall in fertility and marriage rates, and the increase in cohabitation and out-of-wedlock births. Recent studies on extended living arrangements in the region have mainly understood household extension as a strategy to face economic deprivation, giving little attention to other factors affecting it, such as gender inequalities and changing needs for support over the life course.

In this dissertation, I contribute to the understanding of extended households Chile through the analysis of adult women living in family units over the 1990–2011 period. Unlike most other studies, I recognise the unequal positions that individuals and families occupy within the extended household, by distinguishing between women that head an extended household and those that join it as subfamilies. Using quantitative methods, I analyse a nationally representative household survey: the CASEN survey. This is the most complete data source on demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the Chilean population, and allows us to identify all couple and parent-child pairs within the household.

This dissertation offers a new assessment of the relationship between extended living arrangements and economic deprivation. Its findings only partially support the hypothesis of household extension as a family strategy to face economic hardship. Other key factors emerge when explaining extended living arrangements, including mothers' full-time employment, the vulnerability of informal family structures, and other needs of support connected to the life course. Importantly, these factors are closely related to the position that women and their family units occupy within the extended household (as head-families or subfamilies).

There has been an increasing trend across 1990–2011 for young women who have started their family life to live in extended households. Multivariate analyses reveals that this increase was mainly influenced by the rising prevalence of cohabitation and single lone motherhood among younger generations, and to a lesser extent by the increase in young women's full-time employment. These findings raise important theoretical issues for the Chilean context and show that patterns of social modernisation and family change in Chile have gone hand-in-hand with an increasing importance of the support provided by the extended family.

This dissertation fills an important gap in the research on intra-household gender inequalities by addressing the issue of women's economic dependence on extended household members. It shows that women in subfamilies are more likely to be economically dependent than those in head-families. Full-time employment, as well as marriage and cohabitation, emerge as highly protective factors against economic dependence. Special attention is paid to lone mothers, who are often excluded from research on women's economic dependence. Lone mothers in subfamilies benefit economically from being in an extended household. Yet overall they have decreased their likelihood of being economically dependent over the 1990–2011 period. I argue that this reflects the increasing social protection towards lone mothers and recent legal reforms aimed at the equalisation of rights among couples and children irrespective of the marriage bond.

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I could not have written this thesis without the unconditional support of my family. My husband Dante and my son Vicente left their lives in Chile to be with me on this journey. I have no words to thank Dante for the intellectual, emotional and domestic support he gave me all these years. He took the time to read every line of this thesis, always offering me his critical view on my work. My mother and my grandfather have also been very important during this process, and I am extremely grateful to them.

I am also very grateful for the support of my supervisor, Jacqueline Scott, who trusted in my project and gave me key insights to develop this research. I also appreciate her invaluable help in teaching me to work in a rigorous and systematic way. David Lehmann, my faculty advisor, who took the time to discuss my work. I also thank in a very special way those who influenced and motivated me to enter in the field of family studies. Raúl Urzúa, my first mentor, who taught me the profession of sociology and showed me for the first time the relevance of family demography, and Irma Arriagada, for her constant support and pertinent comments to my work. I also thank Alejandra Mizala and Omar Aguilar for their support in the process of applying to the University of Cambridge and obtaining funding for my studies.

I would also like to thank all my friends in Cambridge, who were my family during these years: Nicolás Fleet, Annie van Klaveren, Franco Pesce, Ana Calderón, Sara Valdebenito, Cristobal Weinborn, Carla Moscoso, Catalina Droppelmann, Javier González and José Miguel Ahumada. I appreciate our talks, the comments to my first versions of chapters, our lunches at Darwin College, and especially the company and love they gave to me and my family. I also thank my other friends, who, despite the distance, were an important pillar these years: Mónica Díaz, Alina Donoso, Heidi Fritz, Rocío Ferrada, Pamela Bernabé, Patricio Olivera and Verónica González. The latter, I thank not only her friendship, but also her infinite patience to teach me English as an adult. Especial thanks to Holly Williams for proofreading this thesis.

Finally, I thank Conicyt-Becas Chile, which funded my doctoral studies.

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Aim of this Dissertation

Extended households are domestic groups that include, in addition to a nuclear family, other coresident relatives, or even other nuclear families. This is a widespread living arrangement among Latin American families, whose prevalence does not seem to be in decline. Although there is evidence of a generalised trend towards a decrease in household size in Latin America, the evolution of extended households has not followed a common pattern, showing increases in certain countries and decreases in others (Arriagada, 2001, 2002, 2007a; Bongaarts, 2001; Brígida García & Rojas, 2001, 2002).[1]

Overall, according to information from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), extended and composite households represented about 28% of all urban households in Latin America between 1990 and 2013 (www.cepal.org).[2] In Chile – the case analysed in this dissertation – they accounted for a little more than a quarter of all households over the 1990–2011 period. This apparent lack of change contrasts with the dramatic transformations that have taken place in other dimensions of family life in the region, such as the fall in fertility and marriage rates, and the sharp increase in cohabitation and out-

[1] The coexistence of such patterns has been possible because the reduction in household size in Latin America has been mainly explained by a decrease in the number of children per household – associated with falling fertility rates – rather than by a reduction in household complexity as measured by the proportion of non-nuclear household members (Bongaarts, 2001).

[2] The official statistics provided by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) grouped extended and composite households in a single category. However, they have different characteristics. As noted, extended households refer to those where, along with a nuclear family, there are other relatives of the household head living in the household. Composite households, however, are those where, along with a nuclear family, there are other individuals unrelated to the household head (although they may also include other non-nuclear relatives).

of-wedlock births (Binstock & Cabella, 2011; Binstock, 2010; Castro-Martín, Cortina, García, & Pardo, 2011; Esteve, Lesthaeghe, & López-Gay, 2012).

Despite the high prevalence of extended households in Latin America, research on the subject has been scant in the region. Available studies mainly understand household extension as a family strategy when facing economic deprivation (Benería & Feldman, 1992; Brígida García & Rojas, 2001; González de la Rocha, 1995; Moser, 1997), giving little attention to other factors such as gender inequalities and the changing support needs of an individual over their life course. Moreover, most of these analyses are based on qualitative research on urban poor households, leaving the study of extended living arrangements and their determinants among other population groups under-examined.[3]

The limited availability of statistical information was a critical factor in the scarcity of quantitative studies in the past. However, from the 1990s onwards, there has been a periodic implementation of national-representative household surveys in the majority of Latin American countries. As a result, the increase of available data opens up new possibilities for research on this subject.

The scarcity of current research on extended households in Latin America has left important issues related to inequalities across different family groups unexplored. Inequalities in the distribution of resources prevent some individuals and families from living independently. Yet the role played by economic, gender, ethnic and life-course inequalities in living arrangements is often disregarded as a result of the belief that 'decisions about whom to marry, how many children to have, and with whom to live are deeply personal and individual' (Cohen & MacCartney, 2004, p. 182).

The role played by economic inequalities in residential independence has been extensively addressed in research carried out in the United States. This has shown that a shortage of economic resources affects the residential independence of individuals, making them more likely to live in extended households (Angel & Tienda, 1982; Cohen, 2002; Kamo, 2000; Tienda & Angel, 1982; Tienda & Glass, 1985). In Latin America, however, in addition to the qualitative case studies mentioned above, there is only limited evidence showing a higher

[3] Most of the quantitative analyses on households in the region have been limited to presenting general trends on household composition change (Arriagada, 1997, 2001; Brígida García & Rojas, 2001). The only systematic quantitative study on the socio-economic and demographic determinants of extended households in the region is very outdated, based on data from the 1970s. (See De Vos 1995:31–104).

prevalence of extended households in low-income groups compared to high-income groups (Arriagada, 1997, 2001; Brígida García & Rojas, 2001).

Gender inequalities may also have an impact on living arrangements, as women face more barriers than men when seeking residential independence. The traditional gender division of paid and unpaid work limits the economic autonomy of women, and thus their chances of maintaining an independent residence. Indeed, in Latin America, women report significantly lower rates of labour force participation than men, and women who are employed have lower skilled and lower paid jobs than men (Ñopo, 2012). Moreover, the high prevalence of lone motherhood in Latin America (Castro-Martín et al., 2011), along with the limited social protection for women and children in the region, increases the financial burden among women and further reduces their chances of maintaining an independent household. As a result of such circumstances, lone mothers are more likely to live in extended households than married or cohabiting women (Buvinic, Valenzuela, Molina, & Gonzalez, 1992; Esteve, García-Román, & Lesthaeghe, 2012).

The little consideration that extended households have received in current family research also limits our understanding of intra-household inequalities. The view of households as functional units has been widely criticised in feminist literature, because it obscures the relations of economic dependence and the unequal distribution of resources between men and women within the household.[4] However, these criticisms have been primarily focused on the relations between husbands and wives in the context of nuclear households. How women's economic dependence on their husbands is affected by the presence of other relatives in extended households is an issue that has not yet been explored. Other inequalities and relations of dependence within extended households have also yet to be fully examined. If the unequal distribution of resources determines which individuals and families can or cannot afford independent living, they should also affect the power position they have when living in extended households.

Such questions become more complex, yet also more pertinent, when one considers that non-nuclear household members are not always single individuals. Some Latin American scholars have suggested that extended households are concealing other secondary nuclear families, which are formed by offspring that are not able to constitute their own independent households (Arriagada, 2002; Cabella, 2007; Cerrutti & Binstock, 2009; Jelin & Díaz-Muñoz,

[4] See Bennett 2013 for a review of the recent research on within-household distribution.

2003). Unfortunately, the available statistical information does not facilitate the identification of these family units in all Latin American countries. Although research on the subject and official statistics have made progress in identifying different types of nuclear households, extended households remain grouped under a generic category. This is a limitation important to highlight, because it reflects, in one way or another, the models of family that are being recognised by the state and in scholarly debate. By ignoring the existence of those family units, families that are unable to live independently are rendered invisible when it comes to family research and public policy.

I refer to these family units that are hidden within extended households as 'subfamilies'. A subfamily is understood as a family unit that shares the household (lives in the same dwelling and has a common food budget) with other nuclear families, or other relatives, and in which none of its members is identified as the household head.[5] As I show in this dissertation, subfamilies are a particularly important living arrangement among lone mothers, who are statistically over-represented within extended households.

Female-headed subfamilies have been considered in the discussion of female headship because they represent the potential number of women-headed households in an specific society (Buvinic et al., 1992; Chant, 1997; Falú & Curutchet, 1991; Jelin, 1998). For this reason, female-headed subfamilies are also being called hidden women-headed households (Falú & Curutchet, 1991), which 'tell us something about women's scope in different societies to live independently' (Chant, 1997, p. 25). Lone mothers face material, cultural and institutional constraints to living independently, which vary from one society to other and among different social classes (Buvinic et al., 1992, p. 278).

Against this backdrop, in this dissertation I investigate the factors that explain extended living arrangements in Chile and their persistence over the 1990–2011 period. In order to do that, I will address three main objectives and the following research questions:

[5] In the CASEN survey, the data source of this dissertation, household headship is based on a self- or proxy-reporting criterion. That is, the household head is the person designated as such by other household members.

Objective One

The first objective of this dissertation is to evaluate the role played by economic and life-course factors in extended living arrangements among women living in family units. In particular, I seek to answer the following research questions:

- How is the likelihood of living in extended households affected by economic needs? In particular, to what extent do economic needs explain whether women in family units head an extended household, live in subfamilies or live independently in a nuclear household?
- How is the likelihood of living in extended households affected by the changing needs for support and privacy over the life-course? In particular, at which stages of the life course are women more likely to live in extended households, either in subfamilies or heading a household? And what kinds of family structures are more likely to be associated with extended living arrangements?

Objective Two

The second objective of this dissertation is to investigate the relationship between the process of family formation and extended living arrangements in Chile, and how this relationship has changed over the 1990–2011 period. In particular, I seek to answer the following research questions:

- Have the patterns of economic modernisation and cultural change in Chile gone hand-in-hand with a decreasing prevalence of extended living arrangements among young families?
- How have women's new productive roles affected the living arrangements of young families over the 1990–2011 period?
- How are trends in the living arrangements of young families related to the transformations in the process of family formation that have taken place in Chile in that period?

Objective Three

The third objective of this dissertation is to explore the relations of economic dependence within extended households and what they can tell us about the flows of support that underlie the formation of extended households. In particular, I seek to answer the following research questions:

- To what extent, in the context of extended households, are women in family units economically dependent on other household members (excluding their husbands or cohabiting partners), and how this has changed over the 1990–2011 period?
- How is the situation of economic dependence related to the position that women occupy within the extended household, e.g. if they are household heads or live in subfamilies?
- What are the factors that explain women's economic dependence on other extended household members, and how they have changed over the 1990–2011 period?

The analyses carried out in this dissertation are focused on adult women living in family units. As noted above, adult women are more likely to live in extended households than adult men. Along with that, given the importance of single lone motherhood in Latin America, by focusing on women in family units I am able to give account of the majority of Chilean families: that is, women who live in unions (marriages or consensual unions) and lone mothers. Unlike most other studies, I recognise the unequal positions that individuals and families occupy within the extended household, by distinguishing between women that head an extended household and those that join it as subfamilies. Using quantitative methods, I analyse a nationally representative household survey: the National Socio-economic Characterisation Survey – CASEN. This is the most complete data source on demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the Chilean population, which allows us to identify all couples and parent-child pairs within the household.

1.2 Extended Households in Latin America

A relatively high prevalence of extended households has been highlighted as one of the key features of the Latin American family system (de Vos, 1987, 1995; Brígida García & Rojas, 2002). It has been shown that the level of household complexity in Latin America – considered

as an indicator of the prevalence of extended households – was higher than that prevailing in the pre-industrial North America or Western Europe, but lower than that registered in Japan during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (de Vos, 1987).[6] Such differences remain similar today. Latin America continues to have a level of household complexity slightly lower than that observed in Asia (Bongaarts, 2001, p. 11). However, the proportion of extended households in Latin America is significantly higher than that of most European countries, which ranges from an average of 3.2% in Southern countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece, up to just 0.2% in the Scandinavian countries (Iacovou & Skew, 2011).

Extended households, although common, do not register a similar prevalence in all Latin American countries. In 2013, the average level of extended and composite households in the region was around 28%, ranging from 15.7% of all households in Uruguay up to 41.6% in Honduras (see Figure I.1). Countries below the regional average are Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia and Costa Rica. As shown in Figure I.2, most of these countries are located in the eastern part of South America, which suggests a geographical pattern that needs to be explained by future comparative research on the subject. By contrast, Central American countries, such Honduras, and Nicaragua, along with Venezuela, are characterised by levels that exceed 35% of households. Chile, meanwhile, is near the regional average: between 26–28%). This differentiates Chile from its neighbours in the Southern Cone (Argentina and Uruguay, which have the lowest prevalence of this type of households in Latin America), despite the fact that they share a similar level of economic development and demographic characteristics.[7]

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[6] Household complexity refers to the degree to which non-nuclear household members – i.e. members other than the household head, his/her spouse or cohabiting partner, and children – are also included in the household (Bongaarts, 2001, p. 12).

[7] It is important to note that the prevalence of extended living arrangements at the individual level is expected to be greater than that at the household level, as shown in these statistics. Extended households are underestimated when counted as households rather than in terms of the population that these households represent, because they group a higher number of individuals than other household types. Moreover, assessing the extent of the phenomenon from cross-sectional measurements will provide a misleading picture of its pervasiveness as long as it underestimates the actual proportion of individuals that at some point in their life course are in this situation. Therefore, from a longitudinal perspective, there will be an even greater proportion of people who are or have at some point been living in extended living households, than is revealed by cross-sectional data that refers only to a single point in time.

Alongside the between-country differences shown above, it is important to highlight the lack of substantial change in the prevalence of extended and composite households over the 1990–2013 period. Figures I.3 and I.4 show the evolution of extended and composite households for the urban areas of thirteen Latin American countries.[8] It is observed that most countries registered small variations over the period. The exceptions to this trend are: El Salvador, Paraguay, Uruguay, and to some extent Panama. The cases of Paraguay and El Salvador are worth noting, as they moved from a high prevalence of extended and composite households to levels near the regional average. The decrease of extended and composite households in Uruguay is a case to highlight among the group of countries with a low prevalence of this type of households. Uruguay became the Latin American country with the lowest prevalence of this household type after 2005.

[8] Figures I.3 and I.4 include fewer countries than Figures I.1 and I.2 because of the lack of statistical series for the 1990–2013 period in some Latin American countries. In order to include the largest possible number of countries in the analysis, Figure I.3 and I.4 only consider information for urban areas, for which there is more information available.

Figure I.1. Proportion of extended and composite households by country. Latin America (18 countries), circa 2013*



Source: Elaborated from data provided by CEPALSTAT (Databases and Statistical Publications) from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).

** Argentina 2012 (only urban areas), Bolivia 2011, Brazil 2013, Chile 2013, Colombia 2013, Costa Rica 2013, Ecuador 2013, El Salvador 2013, Guatemala 2006, Honduras 2010, Mexico 2012, Nicaragua 2009, Panama 2013, Peru 2013, Paraguay 2013, Dominican Republic 2013, Uruguay 2013, Venezuela 2013.*

Figure I.2. Level of extended and composite households by country. Latin America, circa 2013*

Source: Elaborated from data provided by CEPALSTAT (Databases and Statistical Publications) from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).

** Argentina 2012 (only urban areas), Bolivia 2011, Brazil 2013, Chile 2013, Colombia 2013, Costa Rica 2013, Ecuador 2013, El Salvador 2013, Guatemala 2006, Honduras 2010, Mexico 2012, Nicaragua 2009, Panama 2013, Peru 2013, Paraguay 2013, Dominican Republic 2013, Uruguay 2013, Venezuela 2013.*

Figure I.3. Proportion of extended and composite households by country. South America (8 countries), 1990–2013



Source: Elaborated from data provided by CEPALSTAT (Databases and Statistical Publications) from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).

Figure I.4. Proportion of extended and composite households by country. Central America (4 countries) and México, 1990–2013



Source: Elaborated from data provided by CEPALSTAT (Databases and Statistical Publications) from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).

In the Latin American context, Chile is an interesting case in the study of extended households. As noted above, Chile has a high prevalence of extended households compared to other South American countries with similar levels of economic and social development, such as Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. This situation challenges theoretical approaches that expect a decline in the prevalence of extended households as a result of modernisation. Indeed, the persistence of extended households in Chile has taken place in a context of improving levels of welfare, expressed by a reduction in poverty, rising educational levels, and improvements in access to housing, among other factors.

Moreover, extended households in Chile have endured in a context of significant transformations in family life. A fall in marriage rates, an increase in cohabitation, and an unprecedented rise in out-of-wedlock births have taken place from the 1990s onwards. Thus, as the clearest example of these transformations, two out of every three children were born out of wedlock in Chile 2013 (Registro Civil e Identificación, 2015). These changes have been accompanied by an increase in marital dissolution, and a fall in fertility rates below replacement levels. Surprisingly, there are no studies in the region exploring the way in which

the current changes in the process of family formation and dissolution have affected household structures.

Finally, it is important to note that in Chile there have been observed significant changes in gender roles. Women have gained greater economic autonomy in recent decades as a result of increasing educational levels and labour force participation. Recent changes in social protection have also tended to favour women, especially those who have small children or are household heads. A series of legal reforms aimed at equalising the situation of families, regardless of the marriage bond, have taken place, which have also improved the economic autonomy of women. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate how the improvement in the situation of women in Chilean society has affected their living arrangements, and in particular, their chances of maintaining an independent residence.

1.3 Dissertation Outline

After highlighting the importance of studying extended living arrangements in Chile in Chapter I (Introduction), Chapter II (*Family, Household and Social Change in Chile*) examines the main socio-political and economic changes that have taken place during twentieth and early twenty-first century in Chile, and how they have affected families and households. Firstly, I analyse the role that the state has played in shaping family relations in different historical periods, by identifying the models of family and gender roles that underlie social policies and family laws. Secondly, I analyse the major economic transformations over the last century, by focusing on the implications of the neoliberal restructuring of the economy since the 1970s in women's labour force participation and education. Finally, I review the main changes in the demography of families and households, which are analysed in the light of the transformations in the state–family relations and the socio-economic sphere of society throughout the twentieth century.

Having examined the historical context of the persistence of extended living arrangements in Chile, Chapter III (*Understanding Extended Living Arrangements in the Latin American Context: A Literature Review*) surveys the relevant literature on intergenerational coresidence and extended living arrangements. Its aim is to establish a theoretical framework for the empirical examination of extended living arrangements in Chile. Firstly, I discuss two main interpretations of the factors that make some individuals and families more likely than others to live in extended households. One is related to the role of economic deprivation in household extension, while the other understands extended living arrangements as a result of

the changing needs for privacy and support over the life course. Secondly, I critically discuss those theories that suggest a decrease in the prevalence of extended households as a result of economic modernisation and cultural change. Finally, I discuss the literature on economic dependence within the family in order to shed light on the economic support structures that underlie extended living arrangements. Here, I draw some insights from two bodies of research focused on intra-household economic dependence. The first is related to intergenerational dependence, and the second refers to women's economic dependence on their husbands.

Chapter IV presents the research design, providing information on sources of data, measures, samples and data analysis that are utilised in each of the empirical chapters of this dissertation.

Chapter V (*Living in Extended Households: Economic Needs or Life-course Factors?*) addresses the first objective of this research, by providing an empirical analysis of the determinants of extended living arrangements among adult women in family units in 2011. This chapter analyses how the likelihood of living in extended living arrangements (both in head-families and subfamilies) is affected by economic deprivation and the changing needs for support and privacy over the life course.

With the economic and life-course determinants of extended living arrangements identified in Chapter V, Chapter VI (*Why is the Prevalence of Extended Living Arrangements Not Decreasing among Young Families?*) addresses the second objective of this research. It analyses the relationship between the process of family formation and extended living arrangements, and how this relationship has changed over the 1990–2011 period. Firstly, this chapter analyses whether the patterns of social modernisation and family change in Chile have gone hand-in-hand with a decrease in the prevalence of extended living arrangements among the younger generations. Then, it analyses how living arrangement changes are related to the transformations in the process of family formation and in women's productive roles that have taken place in Chile in recent decades. Finally, this chapter examines how other factors explaining extended living arrangements among women starting a family have changed over the 1990–2011 period.

In order to better understand the flows of support underlying the formation of extended households, Chapter VII (*Who Depends on Whom Within Extended Households?*) examines the relationships of economic dependence within extended households and how they have changed over the 1990–2011 period. Thus, this chapter addresses the third

objective of this research by analysing to what extent, in the context of extended households, women in family units economically depend on household members other than their husbands or cohabiting partners, and how this has changed over time. Alongside this, the chapter examines how the situation of economic dependence is related to the position that women occupy within the extended household, e.g. if they are household heads or live in subfamilies. Here, special attention is paid to lone mothers, who are often excluded from research on women's economic dependence within the family. Finally, this chapter deals with which factors explain women's economic dependence on other extended household members and how they have changed over the 1990–2011 period.

Finally, in Chapter VIII, I summarise the main findings of this research and discuss its contribution to the contemporary literature on extended living arrangements and gender inequalities within the family. Along with that, I discuss the implications of this research in terms of policies related to social protection, female labour force participation and childcare. In the last section of Chapter VIII, I discuss the limitations of this research and the new questions that are posed for future research on the subject.

CHAPTER II: FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN CHILE

In Chile, as in Latin America in general, the last three decades have seen important transformations in family life. The process of family formation has faced profound changes, illustrated in a fall in marriage rates and a dramatic increase in consensual unions.[9] In the field of reproduction, fertility rates have decreased below the replacement level, while there has been an explosion in the number of out-of-wedlock births, to the extent that they have exceeded those from marriages in recent years. Gender relations within the family have also undergone changes, albeit more incipient ones. There has been a rise in women's labour force participation and a systematic increase in female-headed households, both of which suggest a weakening of the male-breadwinner family model. As far as residential practices are concerned, household structures have diversified, although the high proportion of extended households has persisted.

These trends have been analysed in recent research on family and household change in Chile and Latin America. The limited availability of data, however, has meant that most of these analyses have assessed change in relation to family patterns that prevailed during the early 1990s. It is worth asking to what extent the prevailing family patterns of the 1990s deviate from those that have been historically important in Chilean and other Latin American societies. The lack of historical perspective has led to misleading interpretations of the novelty of certain family behaviours, and has hampered the identification of the social processes that bring about those changes. Thus, to the extent that available information permits, the revision I carry out in this chapter adopts a long-term perspective of family change.

This chapter examines the main socio-political and economic changes that have taken place during twentieth and early twenty-first century in Chile and their effects on Chilean families and households. On the one hand, I survey the changing role of the state in

[9] In this dissertation, the term 'consensual unions' is used as synonym of cohabitation.

contributing to the shape of family relations. On the other, I explore the role of economic transformations in household livelihood strategies, gender roles and family relations. In particular, I analyse the implications of those changes for household structures, women's economic autonomy and the process of family formation and dissolution, as these three dimensions of family life allow us to better understand the persistence of extended households and sub-families in Chile.

2.1 Historical Background

In this section, I emphasise three features of the Latin American family system that need to be taken into account in an analysis of recent family and household change in Chile. One of them is the informality that characterises family relations, which is expressed in a low prevalence of formal marriage and a high proportion of consensual unions and children born out of wedlock. A second, closely related, characteristic is the matrifocal character of family and domestic relations, whose most distinctive demographic expression is a high prevalence of single lone motherhood and female-headed households. Finally, a further historical precedent is the importance of the extended family in an individual's life, which can be traced in the relatively high proportion of extended and other complex households in the past in Chile.

I show that these three features are all rooted in the processes of conquest and colonisation, which took place from the late-fifteenth century to the eighteenth century. Those processes led to an unequal encounter and interaction between a ruling class of European colonisers and a subjugated native population. I also argue that, in the case of Chile, the frequent territorial movements of the male population during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – brought about by wars of territorial expansion, the crisis in the agricultural economy of the late nineteenth century, and the development of a mining economy in northern regions of Chile – further reinforced the three main features of the family system.

2.1.1 Consensual Unions, Lone Motherhood and Out-of-wedlock Births

The characteristics of the European conquest in Latin America played a central role in shaping the family relations that today distinguish the region (de Vos, 1995; Montecinos, 2007; Therborn, 2004; Valdés, 2004, 2007). European (male) conquerors mostly arrived in Latin

America alone, which resulted in a substantial amount of 'intermarriage' between white/European men and Indian or African women in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century (de Vos, 1995, p. 7). As De Vos noted, this intermarriage was rarely formal, either because many of these relationships were based on violence and the subjugation of women, or due to social and legal constraints that prevented marriage between people from different ethnic and social groups (de Vos, 1995, p. 7).

With the subsequent arrival of European women, a dual family system began to emerge in Latin America (Therborn, 2004, pp. 34–37). On the one hand, there was the Creole model of informal relationships, characterised by little-controlled sexuality, unstable consensual unions, male absenteeism, and matrifocality. On the other hand, the model for the ruling class of European colonists was predominantly that of the traditional Western Christian family, characterised by patriarchy, male domination and female obedience. As a result, aside from this ruling class, consensual unions and illegitimacy were common in most of the Latin American population.

The Chilean anthropologist Sonia Montecinos has highlighted two social institutions that enable us to better understand those practices during the colonial period in the Spanish America: *amancebamiento* and *barraganía* (Montecinos, 2007, p. 51). The first, *amancebamiento,* refers to an agreement between a man and a woman to live together without legalising their union through the church. *Barraganía*, in contrast, refers to a particular type of cohabitation between an indigenous or Creole woman of low social status and a Spanish or ruling-class man who had a legitimate family in parallel. As Montecinos noted regarding the latter, 'all Spanish males exercising their masculinity had, along with their wife, one or more Indian or Creole concubines of low socio-economic condition' (Montecinos, 2007, p. 51, translation mine). These unions, and their resultant offspring, constituted a kind of a second-order family, with fewer privileges than the legal one. For example, the offspring of these unions were sometimes added to the father's family – although in a lower rank than the offspring of the legitimate family – as land managers or trusted employees.

Instability of consensual unions and male absenteeism also meant that mothers often had to survive and rear their children without the support of a husband or a male partner. This implies, and continues to imply, that mother-child relations have a central importance in the configuration of Latin American family system, what is referred to as a matrifocal character of family and domestic relations. It is important to note that the concept of matrifocality (Smith, 1996) refers more to a quality of familial and domestic relations than a demographic

prevalence of lone motherhood or female headship. Indeed, as noted by Smith, matrifocality is 'a property of the internal relations of male- as well as female-headed households' (Smith, 1996, p. 42). It refers to the centrality of women – in their role as mothers – in family and domestic relations. This is related, on the one hand, to the fact that in societies with a marked differentiation of gender roles, the domestic sphere is a mainly female place, and on the other, to the weakness of conjugal solidarity that characterises family relations (Smith, 1996, pp. 54–55).

The influence of mother-child relations on gender-identity formation is also noteworthy. As Montecinos argues (2007, p. 54), the construction of female identity has been strongly marked by the condition of motherhood, while the construction of male identity has been affected by the condition of being sons:

> How did a 'huacho' (male), whose father was absent, find his masculine identity? How was the identity of a Creole 'huacha' (female) constituted in front of a mother, who was the core of family life? We think that the answer is, for women, in the unambiguous construction of their identity as a mother (a reflection of their own mothers, grandmothers and all the female relatives) and, for men, in being inevitably a son, not a man, but the son of a mother. (Montecinos, 2007, p. 54, translation mine)[10]

Historical analyses confirm those family patterns, at least for the period in which there is available information. Firstly, there was a significant proportion of out-of-wedlock children during the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Figures range from 21% to 34% of all baptisms in different cities and localities across the central zone of Chile over the 1700–1850 period (Mellafe & Salinas, 1988, pp. 151–52, 347; Muñoz, 1990, p. 36). From 1850 until the enactment of the first law of civil marriage in 1884, out-of-wedlock births represented about 23–25% of the total births at a national level (Ponce de León, Rengifo, & Serrano, 2006, p. 68). Then, they increased from 25.5% in the period between 1885 and 1889 to 37.7% in 1920. Secondly, marriage rates during the second half of the nineteenth century were lower in Chile than in other countries. For example, in 1860 there was one marriage in every 147 inhabitants in Chile, while in England there was one in 120 between 1855 and 1860 (Ponce de León et al., 2006, p. 65). Moreover, marriage rates decreased towards the end of the nineteenth century (Ponce de León et al., 2006, p. 65; Valdés, 2007, p. 5).

[10] In Chile, a popular appellative for out-of-wedlock children is "huacho", which has a negative connotation.

In Chile, informality of family relations and the importance of matrifocal families have both been explained as the result of the frequent movements of the male population throughout the country. The factors that led to these displacements during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries include: wars of territorial expansion; the crisis of the grain economy at the end of the nineteenth century and the consequent rural-urban migration; the decomposition of an independent peasantry, and the development of a mining economy in the north of Chile (Valdés, 2007, p. 5). It has also been argued that the displacement of men was associated with the precarious labour and economic conditions in which a substantial part of the population lived during the nineteenth century. As Salazar noted, men without property could work the land as *inquilinos* (tenant farmers), and endure exploitation and abuse from the landowner, or they could seek a more independent life as a *peón-gañán* (day labourer), which meant a life of migration and poverty (Salazar, 1990, pp. 57–60). According to Salazar, historical evidence shows that most men opted for the latter, resulting in a high proportion of abandoned children and the predominance of a family model characterised by an absent father and a lone mother with her children.

The high prevalence of out-of-wedlock births, consensual unions and lone motherhood at that time had a significant impact on the economic wellbeing of women and children. Until well into the twentieth century – through the Spanish colonial law, initially, and then the Civil Code of 1857 – Chilean regulations recognised three types of children: *legitimate*, *natural* and *illegitimate* (Ponce de León et al., 2006, p. 49). The *legitimate* children were those born within marriage, and they therefore enjoyed full economic and hereditary rights. The *natural* children were those who, although born out of wedlock, were legally recognised by both parents. They were entitled to financial support from their parents but could inherit only if it was the will of the father. Finally, *illegitimate* children were born out of wedlock, but were not legally recognised by both or one of their parents. In the latter case, it was usually the mother who recognised the child. Illegitimate children had no inheritance or any other rights. The above also illustrates the differences in economic protection between married and cohabiting women, to the extent that the latter were not entitled to support from their cohabiting partners or their children's fathers. Only at the end of the twentieth century were these historical forms of discrimination and inequality among women and children removed from Chilean family law.

Despite these rigid inequalities between formal and informal families, it has been suggested that the social and economic consequences of having children out of wedlock and of lone motherhood varied depending on the social origin of the individuals involved. For

example, elite women in Spanish Colonial America who became pregnant while unmarried could resort to private pregnancies or extended engagements, without affecting their honour or the honour of their families (Twinam, 1992, pp. 125–142). Moreover, despite social norms condemning illegitimacy, out-of-wedlock children from elite families were often raised and educated with other legitimate children of the same social rank (Twinam, 1992, p. 142). The evidence further suggests that illegitimacy did not result in strong discrimination against such children when they grew up. In the area known as the Doctrina de Malloa (San Fernando), in the central zone of Chile, 38.7% of all marriages conducted between 1744 and 1799 were between an illegitimate individual and a legitimate one (Muñoz, 1990, p. 43). In addition, many illegitimately-born women married men who had economic power and even belonged to the upper class, despite having no dowry as a result of their condition of illegitimacy (Muñoz, 1990, p. 41).

2.1.2 Residential Practices: Some Historical Evidence

In Latin America in general, and Chile in particular, there are very few historical studies focused on household structure. The reconstruction of family life in the past has been limited by the scant availability of parish records of baptisms, marriages and funerals. Thus, the available evidence has allowed Latin American scholars to describe some family patterns – such as those presented in the previous section – but the residential practices of different social groups are still under-researched.

In one of the most systematic studies of household composition in Latin America, Susan De Vos noted that the little historical evidence we have for the region does suggest that families tended to live in nuclear households in the Colonial period (de Vos, 1995, p. 8). She observed that nuclear households were dominant, despite there being grounds for considering the extended family household the ideal model, it being preferred by well-off families. As De Vos explains:

> Upper-class families in Latin America emulated those of the ruling class in Spain in many respects other than propensity toward marriage […] Families of the Latin American landowning class often tended to be patrilineal, patriarchal and patrilocal. A wealthy married couple in Latin America might have married sons and grandchildren under the same roof. (de Vos, 1995, pp. 8–9)

According to De Vos, people with fewer resources – without land or other assets to inherit – were unable to maintain an extended family household and hence could not realise such an ideal.[11] It is important to add, however, that the ideal of the patriarchal extended family household was also unlikely to be predominant given the spread of female-headed families in the region. Therefore, when analysing the historical prevalence of extended households, one needs to consider the importance of matrifocality in the region.

In Chile, the available historical evidence supports the idea of the predominance of nuclear households, although it also points to a relatively high proportion of extended and other complex households (Goicovic, 2009; Pérez, 2012; Salinas, 2005).[12] For example, some evidence for the city of Illapel – in the central-north zone of the country – shows that households were predominantly nuclear in 1854. Extended households, as well as single-person households, represented about 10% of households (Goicovic, 2009, p. 448). Analyses for the cities of Concepción and Talcahuano, and the surrounding rural areas in the south of Chile, show higher levels of household complexity. Pérez, for example, using the household typology of Laslett, found that in 1854 extended and multiple households accounted for 19.6% of all households in Concepción, and 18.2% in Talcahuano. In the rural areas the figure was higher, reaching 30.9% (Pérez, 2012, p. 104).

There are two other important characteristics of nineteenth-century Chilean households. Firstly, a considerable proportion of households were composed of unrelated individuals. Indeed, households composed of unrelated individuals accounted for 30.6% of all households in Concepción and 20.2% in Talcahuano in 1854 (Pérez, 2012, p. 104). It is

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[11] Interestingly, this argument is the opposite of that implicit in current economic interpretations of household extension, which assume that the ideal type of residence is the nuclear family. Thus, better off families are able to afford independent households, while poor families are more likely to live in extended households. In opposition to De Vos's argument – regarding the need for economic resources to maintain a large household – it is currently assumed that the possibility of pooling resources is what leads people to live in extended households.

[12] In Chile, there was an early development of population censuses in comparison with other Latin American countries. Indeed, the first general population census was carried out in 1834–35. However, the majority of the original census registers were destroyed after processing by the government officers, probably to protect confidentiality (Pérez, 2012, p. 11). The oldest records that remain, at least for some regions, correspond to the population census of 1854. The studies included here are based on this information.

important to note, however, that these households could have been formed by relatives – although with a less direct relationship (for example, a grandmother with her grandchildren, or two unmarried siblings) – which could also be considered a kind of extended household.

Secondly, many households would have no adult male, which was expressed in a high prevalence of female headship. The previously mentioned study of Goicovic found that in the city of Illapel in 1854 there was a high proportion of female headship, reaching to almost one third of all households (Goicovic, 2009, pp. 445–446). In Pérez's study, female headship amounted to 47.6% in Concepción and Talcahuano 42.9%. In both cities, about 25% of these households were headed by a married woman whose husband was absent (Pérez, 2012, p. 108). It is unclear whether women headed these households temporarily – due to, for example, seasonal male migration – or permanently. The historical evidence discussed above, however, suggests that given the nomadic life of working-class men, they were not eager to form a stable and formal family (Ponce de León et al., 2006, p. 58).

It should be noted that the prevalence of extended households observed in these studies could be significantly underestimated due to limitations in their data. The census of 1854 does not include information on kinship relations among household members, which is a key variable in classifying the composition of households. Therefore, these studies build this variable from the list of names and surnames of household members. Such approach makes it difficult to identify certain types of relatives (parents-in-law, grandparents, or more distant relations) because of the mismatch of surnames with those of other household members, thus underestimating the proportion of extended household members and overestimating that of individuals unrelated to the household head.[13] Another weakness of these studies is that they included in the category of nuclear households those that, in current Latin American methodology, are classified as 'composite households': households where there are individuals unrelated to the main conjugal unit. The predominance of nuclear households, therefore, may be magnified by these analyses.

The explanations of the residential practices discussed so far are closely related to those of the informality of family relations and matrifocality discussed in the previous section. Thus, the constant movement of population due to political and economic reasons may be considered an important determinant of nineteenth-century household structure. For

[13] In Chile, married women do not lose their maiden surname. People use two surnames: firstly, the father's surname, and secondly, the mother's surname.

example, in the 1830s, the city of Illapel faced significant male displacements due to the mining boom in the northern regions, which would explain the high proportion of female-headed households at the time (Goicovic, 2009, p. 452). Male migration also favoured the formation of lone-mother family units that were grouped into extended households (Mellafe, 1986, p. 242). Moreover, economic migration among young people – not only men, but also young women – resulted in a high prevalence of households composed of unrelated individuals in the urban areas of Concepción and Talcahuano (Pérez, 2012, p. 108).

The historical evidence discussed in this section provides valuable insights into the analysis of recent changes in household structures and patterns of household formation. Firstly, it shows that extended households were common living arrangements, not only among the elite (as an expression of their attachment to Spanish traditions and as a representation of patriarchal power), but also in other social classes. Secondly, the informality that characterised family relations in the colonial period and the early republic, as well as the importance of matrifocality and female headship, suggests there was a low level of dependence of women on their husbands or cohabiting partners as far as survival and raising children were concerned. It is likely that, as long as men were not permanently at home, women had to manage their family subsistence and domestic organisation without relying on a stable economic contribution by men. Thirdly, it seems to be clear that, for a long period of time, the process of family formation did not assign marriage as a condition for starting family life. Consensual unions and single motherhood were common entries into family life, and family instability resulting from frequent male displacements further contributed to the spread of lone mother families. As will be discussed later, these characteristics continued to be present over the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, although they were affected by the changing actions of the state and the transformations of the economy.

2.2 Families and the State

In this section, I describe the role that the Chilean state has played in regulating family relations over the twentieth and the start of the twenty-first centuries. In order to do that, I distinguish three main socio-political periods. The first corresponds to the development of a welfare state, and spans the beginning of the twentieth century to 1973. I argue that this period is characterised by the promotion of a model of family based on formal marriage and the legal recognition of children, and by the construction of a family wage system that positioned men as breadwinners and women as housewives and mothers. The second period

covers the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet, which began in 1973 and ended in 1990. I posit that the dramatic reduction of social protection in this period resulted in a transfer of the burden of welfare provision from the state to families. This period also sees the introduction of targeting in social policy, which resulted in the end of the promotion of the formal family as a means of access to social welfare. The third period covers post-dictatorship democratic governments from 1990 onwards. I argue that, in this period, legal reforms aimed at achieving greater equality between and within families, along with an expansion of social protection, reinforced the declining importance of marriage and improved the situation of women and children regardless of the marital bond.

2.2.1 Social Welfare and Families

The Construction of a Welfare State (from the Beginning of the Twentieth Century to 1973)

In Chile, the state's intervention in social matters was motivated by the demands made by different social groups at the beginning of the twentieth century. Indeed, the first three decades saw intense political upheaval, which derived from early stages of industrialisation and urbanisation in the country. The social, economic, labour, and ideological consequences of these processes were known as *la cuestión social* (the social question). This formed a set of problems relating to the development of a new wage workforce; the living conditions of workers (housing, medical care and sanitation); the formation of organisations representing the interests of these new working-class groups, and the frequent acts of violence and police repression arising from strikes and street demonstrations (Morris, 1966).

As a result of this upheaval, the first decades of the twentieth century saw significant progress made in the social protection of workers, particularly those from the formal sector of the economy. This was achieved through the enactment of a series of laws, including housing for workers, in 1906; establishing the responsibility of employers in case of work accidents, in 1916; the obligation of companies employing over fifty women to provide childcare facilities, in 1917, and the labour laws from 1924, which regulated employment contracts, trade unions, the right to strike, and compensations in case of occupational accidents, among other things. Interestingly, it has been argued that concern regarding the negative consequences of employment on women, both in their reproductive capabilities and domestic responsibilities,

also paved the way for the enactment of the labour laws of this period (Godoy, Díaz, & Mauro, 2009, p. 80- quoting Hutchison 2006).

From the beginning of the twentieth century to 1973, there was a progressive increase in both coverage and quality of social benefits granted by the state through social policies. Those policies followed two lines: the regulation of labour relations, working conditions, remuneration, and social security, on the one hand, and the provision of education, health, nutrition, and housing, on the other (J. Palma & Urzúa, 2005, p. 11). In the first line, two important milestones were the enactment of the labour code in 1931 – which granted significant protection to workers – and the creation of the *Servicio de Seguro Social* (Social Security Service) in the field of social welfare in 1952 (Arellano, 1988, pp. 31–32). In the second line of policy, a series of initiatives increased provision in health and education: the creation of regional health services in 1938 and of the *Servicio Nacional de Salud* (National Health Service) in 1952, the expansion of primary and secondary school enrolment, and the creation of the *Junta Nacional de Auxilio Escolar y Becas* (National Board of Student Aid and Scholarship) to support food and school supplies for the poorest in 1953 (Arellano, 1988, pp. 31–32). The positive impact of these labour and social policies on the wellbeing of the population is observable in the decline of general and infant mortality rates, and the consequent increase of life expectancy, and in improvements in literacy and increased primary education enrolment (S. Valenzuela, 2006, pp. 107–123).

Housing policy requires special attention here because of its role in shaping living arrangements. Throughout this period, industrial development in urban centres triggered a process of rural-urban migration that had important implications for housing demand. The traditional dwelling places of the working class, called *cités* and *conventillos*, could not meet such growing demand (Hidalgo & Sánchez, 2007, p. 49). Newcomers settled on the outskirts of cities, in so-called *poblaciones callampas,* shantytowns formed by dwellings of light construction (*ranchos*), with no sanitation or electricity. Except for the successful attempt by the Salvador Allende's government to revert housing shortages by building around 70,000 dwellings in 1971, the state's reaction was modest, resulting in a widespread housing shortage during the period (Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo, 2004). Such limited public provision of housing, along with the precarious housing conditions of low-income families, certainly resulted in limitations in the residential autonomy of families, contributing to a high prevalence of extended households.

It is important to note that access to social protection during the period was not uniform across the population. The first beneficiaries of social protection were industrial workers; then public servants and private employees, and only towards the end of the period, were such protections granted to the most marginalised sectors of society. And despite almost universal protection in terms of social security, basic health care and primary education, there was a strong stratification of benefits, conditions of access and level of protection (Filgueira, 2005, p. 13).[14] Such differences in access to social protection raise a question about the inequalities that social policies generated in an already unequal Chilean society. The state action in the social area mainly benefited middle-income groups, linked to formal employment in industry or in the civil service. It is, therefore, worth asking: what was the impact of the social policies of the period in shaping family relations?

During this period – particularly in the governments of the *Frente Popular* and the *Partido Radical* (1938–1952)[15] – state action was characterised by a systematic attempt to promote a model of family based on marriage and the legal recognition of children (Godoy et al., 2009; Mauro, Godoy, & Díaz, 2009; Rosemblatt, 1995; Valdés, 2004). The political and the economic elite, as well as the labour movement, supported this aim. It was assumed by these reformers that marriage provided stability for the family and economic protection for women and children. In addition, it was thought to promote work-discipline among men – as long as they were expected to be the economic providers of the family – and to secure women's exclusive dedication to housework and reproduction (Godoy et al., 2009, p. 81). As Rosemblatt explains: 'According to these reformers, the most important task for women should be raising healthy and productive citizens and workers. As long as working outside of the home might

[14] This differential access to social protection granted by the state has been called 'stratified universalism', and was shared by Chile, Argentina and Uruguay (Filgueira, 1997, 2005). It is important to note that Filgueira argued that in Chile – and in Latin America in general – there was not a welfare state, but rather a system of social policies related to transfers, subsidies and services 'that resemble a social safety net and a set of redistributive transfers and services' (Filgueira, 2005, p. 9).

[15] The *Frente Popular* (Popular Front) was a left-wing coalition formed in 1936, which won the presidential election of 1938 with the candidacy of Pedro Aguirre Cerda, from the *Partido Radical*, the Chilean Radical Party. The coalition was dissolved in 1941, but the next two governments were also led by a member of the Chilean Radical Party, with the support of a similar group of left-wing parties.

force mothers to abandon their children, they concluded that it should be avoided' (Rosemblatt, 1995, p. 184, translation mine).

The state effort to formalise family relations and promote certain gender models was carried out through institutional mechanisms that restricted the access to social benefits to couples formally married and with legitimate children, and whose behaviour was consistent with the gender models that the state sought to promote. As Rosemblatt notes, 'the state offered services and economic support of substantial amounts, but it used such economic support to encourage certain sexual behaviours and certain types of family relationships, and to discourage others' (Rosemblatt, 1995, p. 191, translation mine). For example, to access low-cost food, women had to become members of the *Association of Housewives* (established 1947), in which they were taught home-economics and instructed in the role of the 'good mother' (Rosemblatt, 1995, p. 184). Men also received greater benefits when they were married. The law on *Preventive Medicine* from 1938 stated that married or widowed male workers were entitled to an allowance of 75% of their salary during sick leave, while single men were entitled to only 50% (Rosemblatt, 1995, p. 190). Furthermore, the incorporation of family allowances for the spouse and legitimate children of workers in 1952 also promoted the formalisation of family relations.

Models of family and gender roles promoted by the state through social policy had clear implications for the economic autonomy of women. During the first half of the twentieth century, concerns around female workers focused on the incompatibility of female employment and motherhood, rather than on the poor working conditions of women (Godoy et al., 2009, p. 81). Eventually, the socialist government of the *Unidad Popular* in the early 1970s did show a greater interest in the working conditions of women, and the difficulties they faced due to the unequal distribution of work within their families (Godoy et al., 2009, p. 86). This initial consideration was abruptly interrupted, however, by the military coup of 1973. In addition, social protection was not directly granted to women. As most social benefits – in the field of social security, for example – were channelled through formal employment, women – usually out of the labour market – could not therefore be direct beneficiaries. And so the state channelled an important part of social protection for women and children through men. The ensuing increase in women's economic dependence on men – when compared to the colonial and early republic period – probably limited the residential autonomy of women, particularly if they were unmarried.

Institutionalised gender inequalities also placed single mothers in a precarious situation. Although the majority of benefits were directed at legally constituted families, there were some initiatives that sought to protect children in general, and single mothers. In 1942, the *Dirección General de Protección de la Infancia* (General Office for Child Protection) was created. In 1952, the *Servicio Nacional de Salud* (National Health Service) was formed, as well as a breastfeeding aid equal to 25% of the salary of the female worker over an eight-month period. In 1954, a law stating that female workers receive full pay as maternity allowance was enacted. Finally, in 1959, a law that provided prenatal family allowance from the fifth month of pregnancy was introduced.

Access to housing programmes was, like other state benefits at the time, limited to workers from low- and middle-income groups, of which those married and with children were privileged (Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo, 2004, pp. 95–104). Interestingly, during the brief period of Allende's government (1970–73), formal marriage was not a requisite for accessing to housing; consensual unions were allowed to apply, on equal terms with married couples, for those benefits. Moreover, other non-nuclear family groups also had access to the state offer of housing (Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo, 2004, pp. 147-57). Despite this change in Allende's government, during most of the period, the state favoured residential autonomy among the main beneficiaries of social policy, that is, legally constituted families from low- and middle-income groups.

The Military Dictatorship (1973 to 1990)

The incipient development of a welfare state came to an end at the beginning of the 1970s. On 11 September 1973, the military coup against the socialist government of the *Unidad Popular* inaugurated a dictatorship that was in power for seventeen years. The coup resulted, in political terms, in the dissolution of Congress, the assumption of legislative power by a military junta, the prohibition of political parties, the suspension of electoral mechanisms, the restriction of civil liberties, and the loss of independence of the judiciary (Garretón, 2002, p. 255). In line with the principles of the neoliberal model that the military dictatorship sought to implement, state action from 1973 to 1990 gave prominence to the role of the private sector and the market in driving the economy. Consequently, social policy was characterised by the privatisation of social services and welfare, and the targeting of social benefits at the poorest sectors of the population.

The privatisation of social services in Chile encompassed different areas. Larrañaga (2010, pp. 11–13) summarises the main transformations on this regard. Firstly, the old public pay-as-you-go pension system was replaced by another based on individual capitalisation. Thus, in the new regime, individuals receive benefits according to their individual contributions. The system was financed by a compulsory contribution of 10% of salary, as opposed to the shared tripartite responsibility (state, employer and employee) that characterised the old system. Secondly, the national health system was dismantled and divided between various sub-regional authorities. Along with that, a mandatory payment of 7% of the wage was introduced, affecting all salaried workers, to be paid to the public health system (*Fondo Nacional de Salud, FONASA*) or the private health system (*Instituciones de Salud Previsional, ISAPRES*) (the payee chooses between them). Thirdly, the administration of state schools was transferred to the local authorities (municipalities), and a voucher system was introduced, which allowed families to choose between public and private-subsidised schools.

A voucher system was also introduced in housing. This voucher needed to be complemented with family savings and a loan from private banks in order to access housing. Construction and financing of housing was the responsibility of the private sector. Direct state provision of housing was only given to sectors of society that had no access to private banks because of their lack of economic resources. This transformation resulted in a significant housing deficit during the period, an estimated shortage of nearly 850,000 dwellings in a country where, to provide context, the total number of dwellings was around 2,500,000 (Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo, 2004, p. 187). If the state provision of housing was already limited during the previous period, with the arrival of the military dictatorship this became critical, further curtailing the possibilities for residential autonomy of low- and middle-income families. In addition, a policy of eradication of *campamentos* (shantytowns), along with housing for low-income groups being built on the outskirts of cities, had substantial negative consequences on family networks and the survival strategies of the poor (Hidalgo & Sánchez, 2007, pp. 70–71).

On the other hand, targeting people in extreme poverty led to the creation of a set of social programmes and benefits aimed at the poor and the reorientation of existing benefits to this priority group. Among those programmes were: the *Subsidio Único Familiar (SUF),* introduced in 1981, which was a monetary allowance for children under 15 whose parents did not have access to social prevision, and for pregnant women; the *Pensiones Asistenciales (PASIS)* created in 1975, which were social pensions for people over 65, or with disabilities,

who did not have social security[16]; the kindergarten system run by the *Junta Nacional de Jardines Infantiles* (JUNJI), created in 1970, which was limited by the military dictatorship to children under six living in extreme poverty or with nutritional problems (it provided eight-hours of care daily, with food, medical and dental care included); the school feeding program *Programa de Alimentación Escolar (PAE),* which delivered food to school children aged between six and fourteen in extreme poverty; housing programmes for families in extreme poverty; and free health care to groups living in extreme poverty (Vergara, 1990, pp. 35-45).

With the introduction of targeting in social policy, the promotion of the formally established family as a means of access to social benefits came to an end. In contrast to the previous period, marriage was no longer a requirement for access to social benefits. By targeting the poorest groups, the state emphasised mainly the scarcity of resources of this group rather than their family situation. Social policy thus ceased to be an instrument to promote the formalisation of family practices.[17] This does not mean that the dictatorship did not adhere to the preferred models of family and gender roles that the state had previously promoted. In fact, the liberal ideology of the dictatorship was mainly restricted to the economic sphere, since its position on moral and normative practices of living showed significant influence from the conservative sectors of the elite and the Catholic Church.

The dramatic reduction of the social role of the state involved a transfer of responsibility in the provision of welfare from the state to the family. Middle-income groups, which previously enjoyed a situation of privilege in the field of social protection, were

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[16] Both the SUF and the PASIS were targeted at the population without access to social welfare through employment (private pensions).

[17] In order to illustrate how marriage ceased to be a condition for accessing social benefits, it is helpful to examine the main instrument for targeting introduced by the military dictatorship. This was a survey that allowed state agencies to identify the poorest groups, called the *Ficha CAS,* introduced in 1979, and then modified in 1987 into the *Ficha CAS–2*. The initial *Ficha CAS* classified households into five levels, according to their socio-economic needs, in the areas of housing, education and occupation. Subsequently, the *Ficha CAS–2* assigned a score to households according to the scarcity of resources in the same areas as the first questionnaire but adding income-assets (Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación, 2000, pp. 14–15). Among these indicators, the marital status of individuals was not considered relevant to access benefits.

undoubtedly among the most affected. This has important implications for this research, insofar as family support for vulnerable individuals and family units became extremely relevant in this historical context. In the absence of a strong welfare state, the family served as a buffer against economic hardship. Such developments are also likely to have had an impact on the structure of Chilean households. Evidence from other countries in the region shows that, as a result of the negative consequences of economic crises and the process of structural adjustment in the 1980s, households tended to extend as a survival strategy (González de la Rocha, 1994; Moser, 1997).

The Post-dictatorship Democratic Governments (1990 onwards)

With the return to democracy, new centre-left governments sought to repair the precarious situation which the low- and middle-income groups found themselves in as a result of the reduction in social protection during the military dictatorship. The first two democratic governments significantly expanded social protection, with social spending almost doubling during the 1990s (Larrañaga, 2010, p. 14). Targeting in social policy was maintained, but extended social protection to other vulnerable groups beyond just the poor, such as the elderly, ethnic minorities, people with disabilities, young people, and women (Raczynski, 1999, p. 132). More recently, in the 2000s, social policies have been redefined, and social spending has continued to increase. According to Larrañaga (2010, p. 1), social policies implemented during the 2000s have sought to tackle different socio-economic vulnerabilities faced by individuals and families by moving towards a social protection system.

In the area of housing, democratic governments began to address the spiralling housing shortages registered during the military dictatorship, making considerable progress in promoting access to affordable good-quality housing. Indeed, recent statistics from the *Ministerio de Desarrollo Social* (Ministry of Social Development) show that the 'housing deficit' – the number of households that live in sub-standard dwellings or live-in with relatives or friends – decreased from around 780,000 dwellings in 1990 to 495,304 in 2011 (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, 2013, pp. 103–104). Progress in reducing the housing deficit in Chile has been mainly driven by a decrease in the number of sub-standard dwellings and not by a decline in the number of households living-in with relatives or friends, which has actually registered a slight increase (Salvi del Pero, 2016).

Although Chile has a relatively low proportion of urban slums in comparison with other Latin American countries such as Brazil or Argentina, key shortages of housing and problems of affordability remain as a key policy issue, particularly for low-income groups (Murray & Clapham, 2015). Housing shortages were reinforced by the dramatic increase in the number of households in the 1990–2011 period from over three million to almost five million (authors' calculations from CASEN).

An additional problem faced by low-income families is related to the location of new dwellings. As noted above, since the military dictatorship period, the supply of housing targeted at the most vulnerable groups has been built on the outskirts of the city due to the increase in the cost of land in the most central areas of Chilean cities. For example, there was a 53% increase in the price of housing for low-income groups between 1994 and 2004 in Santiago, despite the fact that the average size of these dwellings remained unchanged and their average distance from the city centre increased from 20.6 to 25.4 kilometres (Blanco, Cibils, & Miranda, 2014). As a result, families accessing to new dwellings have been located not only far from their family networks, but also in neighbourhoods with high concentration of poverty, unemployment, lack of public transportation and public services, and low quality housing and amenities (OECD, 2013).

Home-ownership is the predominant housing tenure in Chile, accounting for almost three-quarters of total tenure (Blanco et al., 2014). This has been encouraged by democratic governments through the inclusion of state subsidies directed towards this tenure, both in new buildings and in the upgrading of existing properties (Murray & Clapham, 2015). Rental, instead, accounts for less than one-fifth of household tenure (18% in 2013) – proportion relatively low when compared to other OECD countries – and is entirely comprised of private rentals (Salvi del Pero, 2016). There is no social rental housing available in Chile.

Housing tenure is an element to take into consideration when analysing the persistence of extended households in Chile. There is some evidence that shows that the likelihood of living in rental housing is significantly lower among extended households than in nuclear households (Blanco et al., 2014). This suggests that home-ownership may generate the conditions for the extension of households, as families who own the dwelling they occupy may be more willing to share the household with members of their extended family.

When compared to other OECD countries, access to housing for Chilean families is affordable. Indeed, only 1% of mortgaged owner-occupant households and 10% of renter households are overburdened by housing costs, that is, households spending more than 40%

of their disposable income on mortgage or rent respectively (Salvi del Pero, 2016). The above does not mean that families of all socio-economic groups have similar chances of accessing to affordable housing. On the contrary, for low-income families the cost of housing represents a significant proportion of their budget. For example, it has been shown that in households belonging to the poorest 20% of the Chilean population, 33% of mortgaged owner-occupants and 43% of renters face housing costs above 40% of their disposable income (Salvi del Pero, 2016).

Finally, it is important to highlight that current housing policy in Chile is based on subsidies directed to low and middle-income groups, which have been mainly oriented to strengthen the ownership of housing. Only recently, a new subsidy has been introduced to promote the rental of housing, especially among young families. As follows, there is a brief description of the main housing programs in force in Chile, which were taken from Salvi del Pero (2016, p. 12), from the information collected through the OECD Questionnaire on Affordable and Social Housing (QuASH).

- **Subsidy to low-income households to promote access to homeownership** (Fondo Solidario de Elección de Vivienda D.S.49 de 2011). This is a grant for low-income families living in a situation of housing deficit (as defined above), which can be used to build a dwelling or buy an existing one. This subsidy covers most of the dwelling cost and recipients are expected not to take on a mortgage.
- **Subsidy to middle income households to promote access to homeownership** (Sistema Integrado de Subsidio Habitacional D.S.1 de 2011 Título I "Sectores Emergentes" and Título II "Sectores Medios"). This is a grant for households in the second and third quintile of the income distribution (middle-low income groups), which covers only a part of the cost of the dwelling and can be complemented by loans obtained by families (private loans). Similarly to the previous subsidy, it can be used to build a dwelling or to buy an existing one.
- **Rent-to-buy subsidies** (Subsidio Leasing Habitacional D.S.120 de 1995). This is a grant aimed to complement leasing payments in rent-to-buy schemes. With this subsidy, families could buy a share of a residential dwelling and pay rent on the remaining share, with the right to buy the property.
- **Subsidies for housing regeneration** (Programa de Protección del Patrimonio Familiar, DS 255 de 2006, Título II). This grant is oriented to improve the conditions of dwellings owned by families in low- and middle-income groups (the first three quintiles of the

income distribution). The subsidy can cover repairs or improvements of sanitary, walls, roof, floors, or energy efficiency.

- **Subsidies for housing expansions** (Programa de Protección del Patrimonio Familiar, DS 255 de 2006, Título III). This is oriented to low- and middle-income families to finance the construction of an additional bedroom in dwellings that were built with homeownership subsidies.
- **Rental subsidy** (Programa de Subsidio de Arriendo de Vivienda D.S. N° 52 de 2013) This is a recent kind of subsidy involving cash transfers to households directed at supporting rental costs for low- and middle-income young families.

The maintenance of targeting in social policy has continued to erode the state promotion of the formal family. The further question that arises is whether this targeting has particularly favoured certain family structures. It has been argued, for instance, that lone mothers have particularly benefited from such targeting (Ramm, 2013, pp. 63–64). As the current instrument of targeting in social policy, the *Ficha de Protección Social,*[18] assesses the income-generating capacity of household members, lone mothers with dependent children are prone to have low scores and hence are more likely gain access to social benefits (Ramm, 2013, p. 64). This has favoured the practice of '*esconder al marido*' ('hiding the husband'), which may explain the higher prevalence of female headship and the lower household size among families with the *Ficha de Protección Social* when compared to groups of similar socio-economic characteristics (Ramm, 2013, p. 63).[19] This has been understood as an opportunistic behaviour, with households splitting up in order to improve their chances of obtaining a lower score in the *Ficha de Protección* Social (by reducing the number of potential income generators).

[18] As noted above, during the first democratic governments, the instrument was called *Ficha CAS-2,* which remained the main mechanism for allocating social benefits until 2007. The new version of the *Ficha CAS-2* was called the *Ficha de Protección Social.* In 2016, a new instrument has replaced the *Ficha de Protección Social:* the *Registro Social de Hogares.*

[19] This hypothesis is based on the empirical evidence that shows inconsistencies between the information obtained through the *Ficha de Protección Social* and the CASEN Survey (R. Herrera et al., 2010, pp. 14–18). In particular, an over-representation of disability, female headship and a smaller size of households has been found in the information of the *Ficha de Protección Social* when compared with information for a similar group obtained by the CASEN Survey.

The hypothesis of '*esconder al marido*' ignores an important feature of low- and middle-income families – the main beneficiaries of social policy – which is the higher prevalence of extended living arrangements in these groups. Targeting the most vulnerable groups, rather than promoting opportunistic behaviours among families, might be making visible those vulnerable family units that are hidden within extended households, such as lone mothers. It seems to be a policy assumption that the family unit and the household are equivalent. However, this correspondence is only valid in the case of the nuclear family household, because an extended household may include more than one family unit. Thus, as the majority of lone mothers live in extended households, it would be striking if they were not over-represented among people with the *Ficha de Protección Social.* The problem, rather, is that the state does not measure the magnitude of female headship hidden within extended households.

Under the *Ficha de Protección Social,* lone mothers are more likely to be rendered invisible than under previous targeting instruments. This is because previous targeting instruments (*Ficha CAS* and *Ficha CAS–2*) regarded the family unit – as defined by its own members – as the intervention unit of social policy, while in the *Ficha de Protección Social*, it is the household – understood as the group of people who share food and a dwelling (R. Herrera, Larrañaga, & Telias, 2010, p. 8). The use of the household as the intervention unit for social policy might affect access to social benefits for the most vulnerable family units, such as lone mothers, who are frequently unable to live independently. This is because, by living in an extended household, other household members may contribute to an increase in their score on the questionnaire, and consequently, reduce their chances of accessing state benefits. It is, therefore, worth asking about the pertinence of using the household as the unit of intervention of social policy, as well as challenging the validity of the assumption of resource pooling within the household.

There is a second characteristic of social policy during the post-authoritarian period that is also important to highlight. Despite the end of the state promotion of marriage and a greater openness towards other family structures, social policies brought in by the democratic governments have continued to reinforce traditional gender roles. Some of the equity-oriented social reforms introduced during the 2000s have partly modified the gender bias that continued to be present in the neoliberal turn in social policy. As Staab (2012, p. 321) argued, using the words of Glass and Fodor (2007), it seems that a passage from a 'private maternalism' towards a 'public maternalism' has been taking place. This has been seen in a shift from a model in which the costs of maternity and childcare are almost exclusively the

responsibility of mothers, to another in which the state assumes an important role in this regard. Despite this progress, a more egalitarian conception about the distribution of domestic and care work between men and women is still absent in the Chilean welfare system (Staab, 2012, p. 321).

Interestingly, by recognising the traditional role of women and their dedication to the family, the equity-oriented reforms introduced during the 2000s have favoured the economic autonomy of women. Thus, women have emerged – in the eyes of the state – as the most suitable agents to manage household finances. They are the preferred agents for receiving financial transfers for the family. Along with that, insofar as maternity and care work are considered the main obstacles to women's employment (on the assumption that children are solely the responsibility of women), the state has sought to support them in these activities. Thus, despite the maintenance of a gender bias in the recent equity-oriented reforms, these reforms can still be seen as a step forward in addressing gender inequality in access to economic resources, either through favouring greater female labour force participation or via women's administration of financial transfers from the state. This paradox can be illustrated in some of the most emblematic programmes and reforms of the democratic governments of the 2000s.

One of these is the *Sistema Chile Solidario* (Chile Solidario System*)*, which was introduced in 2002 with the aim of incorporating families in extreme poverty into the social protection network of the state (Palma & Urzúa, 2005, p. 21).[20] The main criticism of the *Sistema Chile Solidario* has been the over-utilisation of women's time in meeting the requirements of the program, naturalising their role with regard to housework and childcare. Women are deemed responsible for personal well-being, family health care, household nutrition, supervision of school attendance, and homework monitoring, which overloads poor women and reinforces the patriarchal division of labour present in these families (Arriagada & Mathivet, 2007). Thus, this type of program does not support poor women in freeing themselves from family responsibilities in order to pursue participation in the labour market.

[20] The *Chile Solidario* is characterised by offering psychosocial support, along with a range of services, guaranteed cash subsidies, and preferential access to social programmes to those segments of the population living in poverty or extreme poverty. In order to access these benefits, families have to sign an agreement regarding the fulfilment of set minimum conditions, defined by the program, to overcome extreme poverty. These conditions are grouped in seven areas: identification, health, education, family dynamic, housing, work, and income.

However, despite the overload of work that women face and the strengthening of their traditional role within the family, it should be noted that the programme favours women in the allocation of financial resources. That is, the financial benefits that the program grants (the protection bonus for the family, pensions and other monetary subsidies) are awarded directly to the mother of the youngest children in the family (or the oldest woman in the family when there are no young children), whether or not she is the head of the family (see article 2 transitory, Law 19,949). Other examples of this paradox are the program of infant social protection *Chile Crece Contigo,* and the recent reform to the pension system.

2.2.2 Laws Regulating Family Relations

Laws regulating family relations in early twentieth century in Chile were based on the Civil Code of 1857 and the civil marriage law of 1884. These regulations encouraged a relationship of dependence of women on their husbands, and of children (under 25 years of age) on their fathers. Adult men, by contrast, had a duty to provide financially for their wives and dependent children. As explored in section 2.1.1, this legislation also established legal differences between children born in or out of wedlock with regard to economic and hereditary rights. Thus, it has been noted that this legislation encouraged the formally established family, based on legal marriage and legitimate children (Ponce de León et al., 2006, p. 49). Despite the important changes in the relationship between the state – through social policy – and families identified in the previous section, family laws were not reformed during almost all of the twentieth century.

The immutability of family law ended in the period of the post-dictatorship governments, when several laws seeking to regulate family relations were enacted. As Htun (2003, pp. 113–141) notes, the first group of reforms aimed at creating greater equality between and within families were inspired – in Chile and in other Latin American countries – by international agreements such as the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), as well as by reforms implemented in Western Europe. In particular, these laws aimed to control husbands' and fathers' authority within the family and promote more equal relationships among family members. Alongside that, they sought to provide greater economic protection to women and children, irrespective of the marriage bond. Thus, a more egalitarian marital property regime was introduced in Chile

in 1994.[21] In the same year, the first law against domestic violence was introduced (modified in 2005). However, the most important family reforms took place later, such as the *Ley de Filiación* (filiation law) of 1998, the subsequent *Ley de Matrimonio Civil* (law of civil marriage) of 2004, and more recently, the recognition of civil unions in 2015. This section is focused mainly on discussing the *Ley de Filiación* and the *Ley de Matrimonio Civil* because of their implications for recent changes in Chilean families.

An important milestone in the legislation regulating family relations took place in 1998, when Law 19,585, which modified the Civil Code and other legal bodies on filiation, was enacted (it was known as the *Ley de Filiación*). The main change introduced by this law was the elimination of the legal discrimination that prevailed between children born outside and within marriage – that is, among legitimate, illegitimate and natural children as noted above (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 1998, p. 6). This legal change implied that all children, regardless of their status, had the same rights to inherit and to be economically supported by their parents. This reform also ended the legal discrimination that illegitimate and natural children suffered in Catholic schools, the armed forces and the police (Htun, 2003, p. 139). A second change introduced by this law was the free investigation of paternity[22] and the use of all types of proof – including biological tests – in the process[23] (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 1998, pp. 6–9). A third change took place in the field of parental authority, in allowing women to share the *patria potestad*[24] that previously was exclusively

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[21] The marital property regime called *participación en los gananciales* (participation in acquests) was created as an alternative to the prevailing *sociedad conyugal* (community property). In the *sociedad conyugal* regime, the husband had the administration of his own property and that of his wife's. In the *participación en los gananciales,* the wife became a legitimate executor of her own property (Htun, 2003, pp. 137–138).

[22] Based on the Napoleonic Code, the law in Chile until 1952 expressly prohibited the investigation of paternity. The Law 10.271 of 1952 permitted the investigation of paternity, although in a very limited way, and at the discretion of the father (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 1998, p. 7).

[23] Indeed, in the Article 199 of the *Ley de Filiación*, it is stated that the refusal to undergo biological tests to determine paternity or maternity is considered as a presumption of them by the court (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 1998, p. 1339).

[24] The *patria potestad* is the set of rights and obligations that parents have with respect to their minor children, both regarding their own person and their property (Htun, 2003, p. 118).

exercised by men, even after separation (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 1998, pp. 8-9).

This law also regulated the rights and obligations between parents and children (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 1998, pp. 1344–1346, articles 222, 223, 230 and 232). It stated that parents were responsible for ensuring the best interests of the child, which meant bearing the expenses related to education and child rearing. If parents could not fulfil this obligation, the law could oblige grandparents to assume this responsibility. Interestingly, family rights and obligations regulated by this law are not limited only to the wellbeing of children. Indeed, it is determined that adult children are obliged to take care of their parents in old age or in any other circumstances in which they need support (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 1998, p. 1344). It thus seems clear that family obligations are embodied in Chilean family law.

By putting an end to the legal discrimination between children born within and outside of marriage, the introduction of the *Ley de Filiación* also removed an important incentive to marry. Alongside this, this law had important consequences on the economic wellbeing of children and their mothers. As noted above, the new law included the free investigation of paternity, which allowed women to demand the economic support of their children's fathers. Given the significant proportion of lone mothers in Chile, this law opened up possibilities for improving the economic situation of this group of women and their children.

Another important legal change took place later, when a new law of civil marriage was enacted in 2004 (law 19,947). As noted above, the law regulating marriage had not changed since 1884, despite the significant changes in marital behaviour observed since the 1970s. Previous legislation did not permit divorce, therefore couples facing marital breakdown had only two options. The first was to be *de facto* separated (by terminating cohabitation), but unable to legalise their marital status and, consequently, remarry. The second was to resort to a legal loophole that allowed people to annul the marriage by claiming a supposed incompetence of the civil registry officer.[25] In order to do that, the agreement of both spouses

[25] This loophole was based on the argument that the intending spouses did not reside where they stated at the time of the marriage, which meant that the officer who had performed the marriage was considered incompetent. It has been noted that the practice of annulments was 'institutional lying' (Cox, 2011, pp. 99–100), insofar as the witnesses of the annulment had to lie about the residence of the spouses and the judges were aware of this lie. On this point, see the arguments included in the civil marriage bill (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2004, p. 9).

was required, along with the participation of a private lawyer, since these cases were not accepted by organisations that provide free legal services (Cox, 2011, p. 99).[26] When the marriage was declared null, the previously married partners became single again. Although children born during the annulled marriage kept the condition of legitimate children (a matter of central importance before the enactment of the *Ley de Filiación* in 1998), the most vulnerable spouse was left without legal protection after the annulment (Cox, 2011, p. 99).

The new law incorporates the reality of marital breakdown, by including three legal figures: annulment, legal separation and divorce. The possibility of annulling the marriage is maintained, but the argument of the incompetence of the civil registry officer is no longer valid.[27] Legal separation, instead, has two main functions (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2004, pp. 11–12). The first is to regulate the rights and obligations related to parental relationships and conjugality when the marital cohabitation has been interrupted. The second is to function as a stage of transition, or prelude, to the final divorce. The new civil marriage law establishes that those under legal separation retain all the same rights and obligations as spouses, except those relating to cohabitation and fidelity (article 33) (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2004, p. 2492). Separated people cannot remarry while they remain in this situation. Finally, a divorce is granted when a 'marriage is irretrievably broken' (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2004, p. 12). Unlike separated individuals, those divorced can remarry. In contrast to previous regulations, the new law protects the economic wellbeing of the weakest spouse after divorce or annulment. As noted in article 61 of this law:

> If, as result of being dedicated to the care of children or to the work of the common home, one of the spouses could not develop a remunerated or gainful activity or employment during marriage, or did it to a lesser extent than they could or wished to, he/she shall have the right, when there is a divorce or a declared nullity of the marriage,

[26] The consequence of this was unequal access to annulment, depending on a couple's socio-economic situation. Cox's study found that the twenty municipalities of Chile with the highest level in the index of human development had on average eight times more annulments than the twenty municipalities with the lowest level (Cox, 2011, p. 117).

[27] Marriage can be annulled, but for different reasons, such as one of the spouses being under the minimum age for getting married (which the new law increased from 14 to 16 years for men and women), or the verification that any of the spouses acted under coercion (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2004, p. 11).

to be compensated for the economic damage suffered. (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2004, p. 2500, my translation)

The *Ley de Matrimonio Civil* has important implications for the economic autonomy of divorced women, particularly when considering the low level of female labour force participation among Chilean women shown in the next section. Although the economic protection of children was established with the introduction of the *Ley de Filiación* in 1998, women *de facto* separated, especially those who had annulled their marriages, had no guaranteed financial compensation for having devoted themselves to raising a family. A recent study on the implications of the new divorce law in Chile shows interesting results in this regard. The study is based on a sample of female heads of household who live with at least one child, and are separated, divorced or annulled. The results show that women who are divorced are more likely to receive transfers of money from their ex-husbands, and these transfers are significantly higher than those of women who are only *de facto* separated (Cox, 2011, p. 165).

However, it is important to note that the *Ley de Filiación* and the *Ley de Matrimonio Civil* do not guarantee that women and children actually receive economic support from their former husbands or their fathers. This is illustrated in the considerable claims for alimony that the courts receive each year; 155,587 claims for alimony were admitted to the family courts in 2011 and 8,468 claims for paternity (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, 2012b, pp. 75–76). Moreover, even if the court finds in favour of the protection of women and children, there are in practice more obstacles. This is reflected in the fact that the non-payment of alimony is the main cause of detention in Chile. According to statistics from the *Policía de Investigaciones de Chile* (the Police of Chile), 19,517 individuals (almost exclusively men) were arrested for breach of alimony in 2011 (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, 2011, p. 181). The economic protection of women following the breakdown of a consensual union is, therefore, still not guaranteed.

Finally, it is worth mentioning the recent passage of the *Acuerdo de Unión Civil* (Civil Partnership Law) in 2015, despite this having been introduced after the period covered by this dissertation (1990–2011). The *Acuerdo de Unión Civil* can be contracted either by individuals of the same sex, or by individuals of different sex. People who sign this agreement are regarded as civil partners, and are to all extents and purposes considered relatives (article 1). When this agreement is broken, either by the consent of both partners or unilaterally, individuals recover their previous marital status. Civil partners may also inherit, with the same rights as a spouse, and they have the right to use the property that was the family home of their partner if they

die. The right to compensation if one of the two members has been unable to work during the term of the agreement, due to housework commitments or care, is also considered by the law (Article 27). The civil partnership agreement is intended mainly to regulate equity and issues of compensation among couples who may not marry, such as same-sex couples.

In summary, I discussed in this section the changing role of the Chilean state in contributing to the shape of family and gender relations throughout the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century. I distinguished three main socio-political periods. The first period began in the early twentieth century and was associated with the attempt to build a welfare state. I argued that the development of the welfare state during this period went hand-in-hand with the construction of a family wage system, which positioned men as breadwinners and women as housewives and mothers. Consistent with this, the state action in this period was characterised by the promotion of the formal family, which was based on marriage and the legal recognition of children. The state intervention to formalise family relations was based on different institutional mechanisms that restricted access to social benefits to legally married couples and legitimate children. Regarding family law, no significant changes were recorded in this period. Regulations on marriage and filiation, introduced in the first law of civil marriage of 1884, remained in force during this period. These were characterised by the recognition of husbands and fathers' authority within the family, and unequal rights between children born within and outside marriage.

This period ends abruptly in 1973 with the Pinochet's military coup. Thus began a second period in which welfare state provision was severely reduced and targeting was introduced in social policies. Consequently, there was a significant transfer of the burden of welfare provision from the state to the family. Moreover, I argued that, with the introduction of targeting in social policy, the promotion of the formal family as a means of access to social welfare came to an end. No significant changes were recorded in family law during this period.

The third period corresponds to the democratic governments that followed the military dictatorship (from 1990 onwards). This period has been characterised by a re-orientation of social policies, moving towards increasing social protection. The level of benefits provided by the state to the most vulnerable groups within the population has been significantly improved, although without modifying the logic of targeting. A number of legal reforms aimed at regulating family relations were also introduced. As these reforms were aimed at promoting greater equality between and within families, they have contributed

further to the declining importance of marriage that began with the introduction of targeting. Finally, I asserted that legal reforms, along with the recent expansion of welfare, have contributed to women's economic autonomy and to improving the situation of children regardless of the marital bond, as well as supporting greater family diversity.

2.3 Economic Transformations and Household Livelihood Strategies

This section explores the major economic transformations that took place in Chile throughout the twentieth century, and their impact on household livelihood strategies and family relations. Firstly, I describe the emergence of an economic model based on import-substitution industrialisation in the early twentieth century and its transformation into a free-market economy during the 1970s. Secondly, I discuss the impact of such transformation on the deterioration of living conditions in the 1980s and the recovery from the 1990s onwards. Thirdly, I focus on how the shift to a free-market economy has been also accompanied by an increase in female labour force participation, whose specific characteristics have made achieving work-family balance extremely difficult. Finally, I draw together the likely implications of the transition to a free-market economy for the economic dependence of younger generations, particularly in relation to the extension of the educational stage and job insecurity.

2.3.1 Economic Restructuring in Chile over the Twentieth Century

In response to the First World War, Latin American economies began a process of industrialisation that was reinforced after the Great Depression of 1929. This emerged as a strategy of economic development for the region, which was seen as particularly necessary when trade with the developed world was limited. This strategy has been known as the Import-Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) model, and was later systematised by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) in the 1950s. The main objectives of such strategy were: industrialisation, domestic market integration, investment in infrastructure, and agriculture modernisation (Cardenas, Ocampo, & Thorp, 2000). The ISI period went hand-in-hand with an attempt to develop a welfare state – as discussed in the previous section – which sought to place social policy as a key priority within the strategy of development (Molyneux, 2008, p. 777).

In Chile, the transition from a mainly exporting model based on agriculture and mining production to one focused on the import-substitution industrialisation was also a response to the collapse of the nitrate industry at the beginning of the 1930s. As J. G. Palma has pointed out, the nitrate industry represented 80% of the country's exports and half of the tax revenue before the First World War (J. G. Palma, 1984, p. 63). The First World War did not affect exports of nitrate, as it was a material needed in the manufacture of explosives, but drastically reduced imports. The nitrate crisis came a few years later, when the First War World ended and, therefore, the international demand for the mineral declined. This situation worsened with the emergence of synthetic nitrate as a substitute. The international crisis of 1929 complicated the situation of the external sector even more, this time affecting not only imports but also exports, which dropped drastically. J. G. Palma shows that in 1932 the real value of exports and imports accounted for only one-sixth of what they represented in 1929 (J. G. Palma, 1984, p. 75).

The Chilean state played a central role in the process of industrialisation. Unlike the role that the state played in the period prior to the 1930s, where it was limited to simply capturing surplus of nitrate exports, during the governments of the *Frente Popular* and the *Partido Radical* (1938–52) the state played an active role in the production process and the promotion of development (Meller, 1996, pp. 57–58). To these ends, the *Corporación de Fomento de la Producción* (CORFO) was created in 1939, a state institution aimed at formulating a national plan for development and assigning resources for production (Meller, 1996, p. 58). The industrialisation process deepened during the Governments of Frei Montalva (1964–70) and Allende (1970–73), with the implementation a series of structural reforms in the economy. Frei began a program of industrial modernisation with a strong role for the state, a land reform, and the beginning of the nationalisation of copper mining (Ffrench-Davis & Muñoz, 1990, p. 134). In Allende's government, the state increased its role in the economy, seeking to act as a central planner. As a result of this new impetus towards industrialisation, the share of state enterprises in the gross state product (GDP) rose from 14.2% in 1960 to 39% in 1972 (Meller, 1996, pp. 59–60).

As noted in the previous section, a radical political and economic shift took place in Chile when a military dictatorship came into power in 1973. The process of economic restructuring carried out by the dictatorship was oriented towards establishing a free-market economy open to the outside world, where the private sector played a central role in market function. During this period, industrialisation as a strategy of development came to an end. The new focus was on the comparative advantages of the country, which favoured natural

resource-intensive exports. The decline of manufacturing is illustrated by its decrease from representing 26% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at the end of the 1960 to only 20% in 1980 (Ffrench-Davis & Muñoz, 1990, p. 126).

From the beginning of the military dictatorship until the early 1980s, the dictatorship applied neo-liberal economic principles in an orthodox way. As Sunkel has noted, this can be seen in the implementation of a series of actions, such as a drastic fiscal adjustment, which resulted in the reduction of social public spending and investment; an expansion of the tax base through the introduction of indirect taxes; the privatisation of the majority of public enterprises and some public services; external commercial and financial openness, and the deregulation of the markets for goods, services and factors of production (land, labour and capital) (Sunkel, 2006, p. 88). In this scenario, the public sector was reduced to playing only a minimal role in the regulation and monitoring of the necessary conditions for the functioning of individual freedoms.

The initial implementation of these reforms was affected by the economic crisis of 1975, which was the result of rising oil prices and the fall in the price of copper, the latter being the main Chilean export at the time. This crisis had a strong impact on the population, with a fall in real wages, increased unemployment and mass bankruptcy (Ffrench-Davis & Muñoz, 1990, p. 140). Then, the country was plunged into a debt crisis in 1982, when – as a result of a decline in the real exchange rate to one third of previous purchasing power – the (mainly private) external debt that had been incurred in previous years tripled in a short period. The crisis was of such magnitude that, in 1981–82, GDP fell by 15% with respect to the previous period (Ffrench-Davis & Muñoz, 1990, p. 141).

2.3.2 Economic Transformations and their Impacts on Living Conditions

The institutional changes carried out during the military dictatorship, along with the economic crises of 1975 and 1982, resulted in a significant deterioration in the living conditions of the general population. This situation began to reverse in 1990 with the arrival of democratic governments due to higher social spending and the beginning of an economic recovery. Ffrench-Davis (2002, p. 34) highlighted some indicators that illustrate this deterioration and the subsequent recovery during the first democratic governments. During the military dictatorship, the unemployment rate averaged 18.1% and real wages fell to 81.9% from their levels in 1970. These trends reversed during the first democratic governments. The GDP grew

7.7% during the government of President Aylwin (1990–93), 5.6% in the government of President Frei Montalva (1994–99) and 5.4% in government of President Lagos (2000–06). Along with that, unemployment fell (averaging 7.3%, 7.4% and 10.0%, respectively, in the first three democratic governments) and real wages increased over the levels of 1970 (98.8%, 124.4% and 134.4%, respectively).

The effect of these transformations was also reflected in the levels of poverty and extreme poverty. Available evidence for the period before the military dictatorship shows that, in 1969, 17% of the national population was living in poverty, and 6% in extreme poverty (see Table II.1).[28] Later, during the military dictatorship (1973–90), poverty indicators showed a deterioration in living standards. Ten years after the military coup, nearly a third of the Chilean population was in extreme poverty (there is no available information on the level of total poverty). In following years (1985 and 1987), figures for extreme poverty reached 25% and 17%, respectively, and total poverty figures stood at nearly half of the national population (45% in each year). During the democratic governments (1990 onwards), poverty and extreme poverty decreased significantly, from 38.6% in 1990 to 14.4% in 2011 (see Table II.1).

[28] In Chile, the official measure of poverty is based on poverty lines, which are calculated via the method of 'the cost of basic needs' (Feres & Mancero, 2001, p. 19).

Table II.1. Population in extreme poverty and poverty. Chile 1969–2011*

Years	Extreme poverty	All poverty**
1969	6%	17%
1983	30%	--
1985	25%	45%
1987	17.4%	45.1%
1990	13.0%	38.6%
1992	9.0%	32.9%
1994	7.6%	27.6%
1996	5.7%	23.2%
1998	5.6%	21.7%
2000	5.6%	20.2%
2003	4.7%	18.7%
2006	3.2%	13.7%
2009	3.6%	15.1%
2011	3.1%	14.4%

Source: Information for years 1969, 1983 and 1985 from Altimir 1979 and Rodriguez 1985 on Raczynski (1999, p. 148 Table 1). *Information for 1987 from Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación* (1998, p. 69). *Information for 1990-2011 period from Ministerio de Desarrollo Social* (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, 2011b, p. 3).

**Figures on poverty and extreme poverty from 1987 onwards come from the CASEN Survey and are therefore strictly comparable. The figures for previous years correspond to different sources. For 1969, the information is based on the same methodology (poverty lines) but from data on the Encuesta Nacional sobre Ingresos Familiares (National Survey on Family Income) of the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas INE (National Institute of Statistics) and the Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares (Survey of Family Budget)* (Altimir, 1979, p. 80 Annex E).

*** It includes extreme poverty*

2.3.3 Recent Increase in Female Labour Force Participation and its Impact on Family Life

In Chile, the shift to a free-market economy during the 1970s was accompanied by an increase in female labour force participation. It is important to note, however, that female labour force participation in Chile has been historically low in comparison with other Latin American countries (O. Larrañaga, 2006). Along with that, female labour force participation registered fluctuating trends over most of the twentieth century (Pardo, 1988). Figure II.1 shows a systematic increase in female labour participation from the 1970s onwards, which exceeded 40% among women aged 15 and older in 2011. Interestingly, in the dictatorship period and during the following democratic governments, male labour force participation remained lower than in the first half of the twentieth century. It seems that the neoliberal model has implied a gender transformation of the labour force, by favouring low paid jobs in commerce and services that have mainly been occupied by women.

Figure II.1. Labour force participation rates by sex. Chile 1907–2011

Source: Information for 1907 to 2002 based on population censuses: 1907 to 1982 from Pardo (1988, p. 34)*; 1992 to 2002 from Contreras, Puentes and Bravo* (2005, p. 174)*. Information for 2011 from CASEN Survey, from* (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, 2012a, p. 128)

**Participation rates for the 1907 to 1982 period considered people 12 and older, while those for the 1992 to 2011 period considered people 15 and older.*

The recent increase in female labour force participation has also been characterised by significant job insecurity. Available evidence shows that the informal sector generated 60.9% of female employment created in the past five years (2010–15), compared with 47.8% in the case of male employment (Brega, Durán, & Sáez, 2015, p. 15). Female unemployment has also been higher than that of men (2–4 percentage points) over the past two decades (Brega et al., 2015, p. 7). In addition, taking into account the economic sector, occupation, occupational category, region and company size, Chilean women's salaries are 17.2% lower than men in 2013 (Brega et al., 2015, p. 27).

Economic transformations discussed in the previous section are also reflected in changes in size of different economic sectors. Agriculture, for example, occupied a significant proportion of the (male) labour force at beginning of the twentieth century, which is consistent with a mainly agrarian economy based on the extraction of natural resources (see Figure II.2). This proportion gradually decreases throughout the century, first as a result of the import-substitution industrialisation, and then due to the development of the service sector that accompanied the process of economic liberalisation begun in the 1970s. In the case of women’s employment in agriculture, a slight increase can be seen during the last period (the

1980s onwards), due to the development of a modern agricultural export sector with a high proportion of female temporary employment (Valdés, Rebolledo, Pavez, & Hernández, 2014, pp. 28–29).

A second important aspect to highlight relates to the changing importance of industry (manufacturing) in male and female employment (Figure II.3). For men, an increase in employment in this sector is observed during the first three decades of the twentieth century, consistent with the process of industrialisation already described. Despite the neo-liberal turn, this remained relatively constant over the period, only to decline at the beginning of the twenty-first century. But for women, it is possible to observe a very different pattern. At the beginning of century, female participation in the manufacturing workforce reached more than 50% of female employment. Most of these women worked in the food and clothing industry, the *trabajo a domicilio* (sweating system) being a significant source of labour in this sector (Hutchison, 2001, p. 51). The participation of women in industry begins to decrease in parallel with the process of industrialisation. This decrease is consistent with what was discussed in the last section: the family and gender models driving state action, and shared by the economic and social elite, were seen as incompatible with the working conditions of a factory.

Finally, two other sectors of the economy that have gained importance over the century – in terms of employment for both men and women – are commerce and services. Trends for increasing employment in commerce have been similar between men and women, although this increase has been more marked among the latter (see Figures II.4 and II.5). Indeed, about 30% of women worked in commerce in 2011. In the case of service industries, there is a dramatic rise in the first three decades of the twentieth century, till they represent about 50% of female employment in 2011. This suggests that the decrease of female employment in manufacturing was replaced by employment in services. Recent evidence shows that this trend has continued: about 55% of all employed women worked in services in 2014 and 69.9% of service workers were women (Brega et al., 2015, pp. 10–13). Note that domestic servants represented a high proportion of female employment in the service sector.

Figure II.2. Participation in the agriculture workforce by sex. Chile 1907–2011

Source: Information for 1907 to 2002 based on population censuses: 1907 to 1930 from Gálvez and Bravo (1992, p. 16)*; 1940 to 2002 from Mauro et. al.* (2009, pp. 108, 159)*. Information for 2011 from CASEN Survey.*

Figure II.3. Participation in industry (manufacturing) workforce by sex. Chile 1907–2011

Source: Information for 1907 to 2002 based on population censuses: 1907 to 1930 from Gálvez and Bravo (1992, p. 16)*; 1940 to 2002 from Mauro et. al.* (2009, pp. 108, 159)*. Information for 2011 from CASEN Survey.*

Figure II.4. Participation in commerce, restaurants, and hotels workforce by sex. Chile 1907–2011



Source: Information for 1907 to 2002 based on population censuses: 1907 to 1930 from Gálvez and Bravo (1992, p. 16)*; 1940 to 2002 from Mauro et. al.* (2009, pp. 108, 159)*. Information for 2011 from CASEN Survey.*

Figure II.5. Participation in the service workforce by sex. Chile 1907–2011

Source: Information for 1907 to 2002 based on population censuses: 1907 to 1930 from Gálvez and Bravo (1992, p. 16)*; 1940 to 2002 from Mauro et. al.* (2009, pp. 108, 159)*. Information for 2011 from CASEN Survey.*

The recent increase in female labour force participation, mainly in services and commerce, has had important consequences on family life. In terms of work-family balance, a qualitative analysis of saleswomen noted that the most pressing problem was combining work

and childcare, due to their long working hours (Godoy, 2011, p. 355).[29] Nurseries do not have the same opening times as the retail and service sector; state childcare provision is still insufficient, and low salaries do not enable most families to afford private childcare. As a result, women working in these areas have to rely on the support of other women, taking care of their children. Therefore, in an important part of the labour market in Chile, the conciliation between (female) employment and childcare is only be possible with extended family support (i.e. the help of female relatives that are not in the labour market, as is often the case for grandmothers). A greater involvement of men in childcare and housework would help alleviate these problems.

Despite these difficulties, the incipient increase in pre-school education since 1990 – mainly during the second half of the 2000s – can be seen as a step forward in facilitating female employment. Availability of childcare for children under five years old[30] was very limited before 2006. In the case of employed women with children under two, labour laws established the obligation of providing childcare facilities in companies with more than twenty female employees.[31] This meant that the access to this benefit was limited to a low proportion of women given their low labour force participation and the fact that most of the formal workers (male and female) were concentrated in medium and small sized companies.

From the year 2006, when the *Programa Chile Crece Contigo* (Chile Grows with You Programme)[32] was introduced, there has been an increase in pre-school education enrolment, mainly at the level of nurseries (children under two) and intermediate-level (children aged two and three). Places in state nursery institutions (for children under two) increased 505% in the period immediately following the implementation of the programme, from 539 nurseries

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[29] Legal working hours in Chile are 45 hours per week, since 2005. Before this, it was 48 hours.

[30] The Chilean educational system considers compulsory primary education only from the age of five.

[31] The company can meet this obligation by enabling nurseries in the workplace or in conjunction with other companies, or through the paying the cost of childcare directly to the worker.

[32] This state programme has two main objectives. The first is to improve early childhood, given the importance of early stimulation in subsequent child development. The second was to encourage the employment of women through the provision of free childcare. The programme provides full-time childcare (nursery and reception) for children from low-income families when the mother is working, studying, or looking for a job, and part-time childcare with no requirements regarding the activity of the mother (Staab, 2012, p. 313).

towards the end of the year 2005 to 3,259 at the end of 2009 (Junta Nacional de Jardines Infantiles - JUNJI, 2009, pp. 9–10). Similarly, state offers of pre-school institutions for children aged two and three increased 100% over the same period, from 1,469 in 2005, to 2,944 in 2009 (Junta Nacional de Jardines Infantiles - JUNJI, 2009, p. 10).

It is important to note that the *Chile Crece Contigo* Programme cannot be considered progressive in terms of labour rights for women, or gender equality, as it associates childcare solely with the mother. However, the programme improves the economic autonomy of women by supporting their labour force participation. As Staab (2012, p. 315) has noted, the programme benefits a greater number of women, not only those employed in medium and large companies, but also those employed in small companies, the self-employed, women who are studying, and – to a lesser extent – housewives.

Figure II.6 shows that the coverage of pre-school education increased significantly between 2006 and 2011, from 16% of children under four in 2006 to 26% in 2011. In the case of educational coverage among children aged four to five, there was an increase in the same period, although of a lesser magnitude (from 75% to 83%). It is worth noticing that the increase in access to pre-school education has taken place in all income quintiles, although it has been particularly important in the 60% of population with the lowest income (Staab, 2013, p. 42). This has diminished the socio-economic gap in pre-school education, at least among the first four quintiles of income, who by 2011 had similar levels of access (Staab, 2013, p. 42).

Figure II.6. Pre-school enrolment rates. Chile 1990–2011



Source: Information based on CASEN Survey from Ministerio de Educación (2012, p. 4).

2.3.4 Education of Younger Generations

Educational indicators have improved consistently since the 1970s. The average years of schooling completed by the economically active population (aged 15 and older) increased from 4.5 in 1970 to 8.6 in 1990 (Bernasconi & Rojas, 2003, p. 14). By 1990, the population aged 18 and older had an average of 9.0 years of schooling, which increased to 10.6 in 2011 (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, 2011a, p. 2). In terms of primary and secondary education, enrolment rates have also increased over the 1970–2011 period. The enrolment rates of secondary education grew from 49.7% in 1970 to 80.0% in 1990 (Organización de Estados Iberoamericanos - OEI, n.d.). There have been further increases since 1990, particularly after 2003, when 12 years of compulsory education became enshrined in law. Indeed, between 2000 and 2003 there was an increase in secondary education enrolment rates from 89.9% to 94.9% (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, 2011a, p. 25). It is important to note that the highest increases in secondary education enrolment rates have taken place among low income groups, with increments of 14 and 16 percentage points between 1990 and 2009 in quintiles I and II, respectively (Gutierrez & Paredes, 2011, p. 40).

A detailed analysis of educational changes during the post dictatorship period in Chile is beyond the scope of this chapter. For this reason, as outlined above, this section focuses on one aspect that is closely related to the economic dependence of younger generations. That is the transition from a system of higher education oriented to a selective group of the population to a system of mass higher education, which has extended the dependent stage of the younger generation on their parents.

Towards the end of the 1960s, the Chilean system of higher education was relatively small (composed of only two state and six private universities) and homogeneous in terms of the social composition of students (Bernasconi & Rojas, 2003, p. 18). Most of the university enrolment was concentrated in state universities, and the state exercised a central role in the supervising and financing of the system as a whole (including private universities). The system had an enrolment of about 55,000 students in 1967, representing a gross enrolment rate of 7% of the population aged between 20 to 24 (Bernasconi & Rojas, 2003, p. 18). After the university reform, implemented in 1967, which introduced institutional changes aimed at greater internal democratisation and access to university, higher education enrolment increased to more than 146,000 students in 1973, with a significant increase of public financing (Bernasconi & Rojas, 2003, p. 19). It should be noted that during this period, higher education was free for students.

The higher education system was completely transformed in the early 1980s, a move consistent with the neoliberal model for the market in driving the economy. The creation of new private universities and non-university institutions of higher education – professional institutes and technical training centres – was allowed from 1981 (Bernasconi & Rojas, 2003, p. 21). Given the concurrent decrease in state funding, state universities were encouraged to charge fees to students, while private universities had to be fully financed though student fees (Bernasconi & Rojas, 2003, p. 22). As a result of the creation of such new institutions, higher education enrolment increased from about 262,000 in 1990 to over 753,000 in 2008 (Brunner & Ferrada, 2011, p. 160). This increase was mainly led by the private university sector. Thus, the enrolment rates of private universities grew more than 900% between 1990 and 2005, while among CRUCH universities (state universities plus traditional private universities) the increase was only 160% in the same period (Uribe & Salamanca, 2007, p. 13).

The increase in higher education enrolment rates by socio-economic groups can be observed in Figure II.7. It shows that higher education enrolment rates have dramatically increased since 1990 in Chile, from 14.3% in 1990 to 45.8% in 2011 at the aggregate level. The increase has been particularly pronounced among the lowest income groups, although there are still important differences between the richest and the poorest income groups. Another important aspect that Figure II.7 shows is that during the 1990s, the increase in higher education enrolment rates benefited mainly individuals from higher income groups. Thus, it is possible to observe that the income deciles VI to X (50% of the population with the highest income level) increased their participation in higher education considerably during the 1990–2000 period, then more slowly between 2000 and 2011 (the richest 10% even decreased their participation in higher education between 2000 and 2011). Conversely, the lowest income groups (especially the poorest 40%) showed very little increase in their participation in higher education during the 1990s. These groups were incorporated massively into the system only during the 2000s.

Figure II.7. Higher education enrolment rates* by income decile. Chile 1990, 2000 and 2011



Source: Information based on CASEN Survey from Ministerio de Desarrollo Social (2011a, p. 37).

**Gross higher education enrolment rate is the total number of students attending higher education divided by the population aged 18–24.*

In summary, the economic transformation that took place during the 1970s had important implications both on living conditions and in family relations within the household. It appears that the increase in labour force participation by women has gone hand-in-hand with women's greater economic autonomy. However, the specific characteristics of this participation (mostly jobs in commerce and services sectors, characterised by long working hours; more job insecurity and lower wages than men) leads us to interpret these changes less optimistically that might be at first anticipated. Finally, the transition to a mass higher education system that went hand-in-hand with the privatisation of the education system since the 1980s has resulted in an extension of the dependent stage of the younger generation. The need for private investment that characterises higher education in Chile today has probably resulted in greater economic dependence of young people on their parents. This is a point that should be taken into account when analysing changes to the process of family formation and living arrangements of the younger generation.

2.4 Changes in Family and Household Demography

In this final section, I review the main changes in the demography of families and households in the light of the transformations in the economy and state-family relations over the twentieth and the beginnings of the twenty-first century. Firstly, I focus on the changes in the process of family formation and dissolution, showing that the promotion of the formal family during the mid-twentieth century went hand-in-hand with high marriage rates and the lowest proportion of out-of-wedlock children of the century. I also show that the transformations in state-family relations, as well as rising female labour force participation, from the 1990s onwards have taken place in a context of increasing informality in family relations. Secondly, I address the changes and continuities in household composition and female headship, analysing their relation to transformations in the process of family formation and dissolution, and greater women's economic autonomy.

2.4.1 Marriage, Cohabitation and Marital Dissolution

The decrease in marriage rates and the rise of consensual unions have been highlighted as being among the most important recent changes to Latin American families. It has been pointed out that these trends suggest that a shift towards post-modern family patterns is taking place in the region (Esteve, Lesthaeghe, et al., 2012). However, this phenomenon occurs in a family context that is very different from that of falling marriage rates and rising cohabitation in Europe and North America. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, consensual unions have been historically important in Latin America and marriage has not been predominant in all social classes.

In Chile, available information on marriage rates shows important changes over the twentieth century.[33] Figure II.8 shows that marriage rates increased from the beginning of the twentieth century until 1930, then remained relatively high until the 1970s. This is consistent

[33] A common indicator of nuptiality is the crude marriage rate, which considers the total number of marriages in a specific year among people of all ages and marital statuses. The problem with this indicator is that it is affected by the demographic structure of the population, as the number of people of marriage age determines the number of marriages. For this reason, in this analysis I also include the specific marriage rate for the population aged 15–65, which considers the total number of marriages occurred in a specific year among 1,000 people aged 15–64.

with the attempt of formalisation of family relations during the development of a welfare state (from the early twentieth century to 1973) discussed in section 2.2. However, marriage rates also remained high over the dictatorship period (1973–89), despite the fact that marriage was no longer a condition for accessing to social benefits during this period.

Marriage rates decreased sharply during the democratic governments. It is possible that part of this decrease was due to the institutional changes carried out by the democratic governments of the 1990s onwards. Family equality reforms carried out in 1998 (*ley de filiación*) and 2004 (*ley de matrimonio civil*), as well as the systematic increase in social protection for women and children, probably played an important role in this. As these reforms were aimed at providing greater legal and economic protection to women and children irrespective of marriage, it seems likely that they have discouraged marriage in a context where consensual unions have been a firmly rooted family practice. However, note that a significant decline in marriage rates took place between 1990 and 1997,[34] that is, before the introduction of the main family reforms. It is possible that the greater economic autonomy of women as a result of their increasing labour force participation also helped to push down marriage rates during the 1990s.

[34] Yearly information not included in this dissertation is provided by the *Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas de Chile* (National Statistics Institute of Chile) (www.ine.cl).

Figure II.8. Marriage rates. Chile, 1900–2011 period



Source: Information for years 1890 to 1900 from Anuario Estadístico 1920, Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas de Chile (www.ine.cl); for years 1910 to 2000, from Herrera and Valenzuela (2006, p. 227)*, for year 2011: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas de Chile and Encuesta CASEN 2011 (www.ine.cl).*

Along the same lines, we might expect that the increase in marriage rates over the mid-twentieth century had been accompanied by a decrease in the proportion of consensual unions in Chile. Unfortunately, there is no statistical information for this from the first half of the twentieth century. In Chile, statistics on cohabitation were collected for first time in the Population Census of 1952. Previously, population censuses registered cohabiting people as singles. Nevertheless, information for the 1952–70 period seems to confirm that hypothesis, showing a decrease in the prevalence of consensual unions. Thus, Figure II.9 shows that the proportion of cohabiting women among all in-union women aged 15 and over remained around 5–7% between 1952 and 1970. The prevalence of consensual unions started to increase in the dictatorship period, but only slightly, which is consistent with the hitherto high marriage rates. The most important increase took place during democratic governments, in line with the dramatic decrease in marriage rates over this period.

Figure II.9. Women in consensual unions (proportion of all in-union women aged 15 and older). Chile, 1970–2011



Source: Information for 1951 to 2002 elaborated from Population Censuses. Census of 1952 (Servicio Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos, 1952, p. 134)*; Census of 1960* (Dirección de Estadística y Censos, 1960, p. 147)*; Census of 1970* (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, 1970, p. 6)*; Census of 1982* (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, 1982, p. 87)*; Censuses of 1992 and 2002, own calculations from Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas. Information for 2011 elaborated from CASEN Survey.*

It has been noted that the recent increase in the prevalence of consensual unions in Latin America has been driven by the younger generations (Binstock & Cabella, 2011; Esteve, Lesthaeghe, et al., 2012). In the case of Chile, Figure II.10 provides evidence in this respect for the 1970–2011 period. The proportion of cohabiting women among the total number of women of each age group (in all marital statuses) rose since 1992, but this increase was particularly high among young women (aged 20–34). This seems to indicate that new generations prefer consensual unions to marriage, probably as a result of a series of cultural and institutional changes that have made marriage less important when starting family life. However, it is also possible that young women start their family life in this type of partnership to then later formalise it through marriage, or that the subsequent unions acquire a more formal character. This would be in line with interpretations that highlight the rise of post-modern family patterns, but more information is needed to support such claim.

Figure II.10. Cohabiting women among all women of each age group. Chile, 1970-2011



Source: Information for the 1970–2002 period was adapted from United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2009), World Marriage Data 2008 (POP/DB/Marr/Rev2008). Information for 2011 from CASEN Survey.

The weakening of the family institution posited by post-modern interpretations of family change would also be expected to result in an increase in divorces and separations. The analysis of marital dissolution is particularly difficult in Latin America. Firstly, because there are important differences between the legal regulations of different countries. For example, the first divorce law in Uruguay dates from 1907, while in Argentina divorce was possible since 1987 and in Chile only from 2004. Secondly, despite the importance of consensual unions in the region, official statistics have only collected information on marital dissolution among individuals who were legally married. This means that statistics on marital breakdowns among people in consensual unions have been generally undocumented. Thirdly, there is also an additional limitation in most contemporary Latin American censuses and household surveys: cohabitation is considered a marital status. Therefore, an individual who is legally divorced, but is part of a consensual union at the moment the data is collected, is only registered as cohabiting. As a result, the proportion of people who have faced a marital breakdown is substantially underestimated.

In Chile, establishing long-term trends in marital dissolution is affected by the same limitations. Additionally, population censuses prior to 1940 only registered three possible

marital statuses: single, married or widow/widower.[35] This implies that people who were *de facto* separated were counted as married. In the census of 1940, individuals who had annulled their marriages were counted for the first time, although those who were *de facto* separated continued to be considered married. Only since the census of 1952 were *de facto* separated included along with those who had annulled their marriage.

Considering these limitations, Figure II.11 shows the proportion of individuals aged 15 and older who were *de facto* separated, annulled or divorced over the 1952–2011 period. It shows an increasing trend for marital dissolution throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Unlike the case of marriage rates and cohabitation, in which dramatic changes are observed over the post-dictatorial period (from 1990 onwards), the increase in marital dissolution seems to be more gradual over the period. The enactment of the divorce law in 2004 does not seem to bring about a change in this trend.

Figure II.11. People aged 15 and older who are annulled, de facto separated or divorced*. Chile, 1952–2011 period



Source: Information for 1952 to 2002 from Population Censuses. Census of 1952 (Servicio Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos, 1952, p. 134)*; Census of 1960* (Dirección de Estadística y Censos, 1960, p. 147)*; Census of 1970* (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, 1970, p. 6)*; Census of 1982* (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, 1982, p. 87)*; Censuses of 1992 and 2002, own calculations from Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas. Information for 2011 from CASEN Survey.*

**As divorce law was enacted in 2004, divorced individuals are only included in 2011*

[35] With the exception of the 1895 census, in which the category of 'divorced' was included (a category in which there were very few people).

Indeed, the divorce law did not produce a turning point in the gradual upward trend in marital dissolution, despite the fact that in the years following the enactment of the law there have been a considerable number of divorces. This can be observed in Figure II.12, which shows that the total number of annulments remained more or less constant between 2000 and 2005 (around 6,000 to 7,000 cases per year). After the new divorce law came into effect in 2004, the annual number of divorces increased sharply, representing in 2009 more than seven times the average number of annulments observed before 2005. In recent years, it is possible to see a stabilisation in this tendency. The significant increase in the number of divorces after 2004 and its almost null effect on the general trend for marital dissolution suggests that the divorce law has allowed people who were already *de facto* separated to legalise their marital status, rather than prompting an increase in marital breakdown.

Figure II.12. Number of annulments and divorces. Chile, 2000–2011 period



Source: Adapted from Service of Civil Registration and Identification, Chile. www.registrocivil.cl

2.4.2 Fertility and Out-of-wedlock Births

Closely related to the changes in marriage and consensual unions is a sharp increase in out-of-wedlock births over recent decades in Latin America (Binstock, 2010; Castro-Martín et al., 2011). As noted at the beginning of this chapter, Latin American societies have historically exhibited high proportions of births outside of marriage. However, over the past four decades these levels seem to have increased beyond historical averages.

In the case of Chile, the higher marriage rates and the lower levels of cohabitation observed during the development of a welfare state (from the beginning of the twentieth

century to 1973) resulted in a significant reduction of children born out of wedlock. Figure II.13 shows that the proportion of out-of-wedlock children between 1901 and 1920 accounts for over a third of the total number of births. In the 1930s, the proportion of out-of-wedlock children began to decrease, reaching its lowest level in 1960, when only 15.9% of births occurred outside marriage. After that, it increased over the dictatorship period (1973–89), returning to the levels observed at the beginning of the century. During the democratic governments, the percentage of out-of-wedlock children continues to grow but at a faster rate, far exceeding the levels recorded at the beginning of the century. Indeed, in the 2010s, two out of three children were born out of wedlock in Chile. The ending of legal differences for children born outside marriage, due to the introduction of *Ley de Filiación* in 1998, probably had an impact on the intensification of these trends in the first decade of the twentieth century.

Figure II.13. Proportion of out-of-wedlock children. Chile, 1901–70



Source: Information for 1901 to 1920 from Anuario Estadístico de la República de Chile (Oficina Central de Estadística, 1920, p. 1415). *Information for 1930 to 1948 from Demografía y Asistencia Social año 1948* (Dirección General de Estadística -Chile, 1952, pp. 2–4). *Information from 1960 to 2000 from Larrañaga* (2006, p. 139). *Information for years 2010 and 2014 from Registro Civil de Chile (www.registrocivil.cl).*

Fertility rates are another important area that should be taken into account in analyses of recent changes to the processes of family formation and dissolution. Figure II.14 shows that

the median level of total fertility[36] remained high between 1930 and 1965. High fertility rates over this period coincided with the state's promotion of the formal family during the development of a welfare state. After that, the total fertility reduced to a third of what it was within 50 years, from 5.4 children per woman in 1960–65 to 1.8 in 2010–15 (below the replacement-level of fertility). It is important to note that this downward trend in the fertility rate in Chile was mainly driven by the behaviour of married women (O. Larrañaga, 2007; Osvaldo Larrañaga, 2006). The specific fertility rates for married women decreased from 258.9 births per 1,000 married women in 1960 to 59.4 in 2003. Conversely, the fertility rates for unmarried women slightly increased from 48.5 to 53.1 over the same period (Larrañaga, 2006, p. 139).

Figure II.14. Total fertility. Chile, 1930–2015 period



Source: Information for 1930 and 1940 from Gutiérrez (1974, p. 22). *Information for the 1950-2015 period from data provided by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).*

Despite this decrease in fertility rates, adolescent fertility remains high. Between 1950 and 2005, the fertility rates dropped in all age groups, but this decrease was less marked among adolescent women (aged 15–19) (United Nations, 2011b). While the decline in age-

[36] Total fertility is 'the mean number of children a woman would have by age 50 if she survived to age 50 and were subject, throughout her life, to the age-specific fertility rates observed in a given year' (United Nations, 2011a). The total fertility is expressed as the number of children per woman.

specific fertility rates of older women were much more pronounced, the relative contribution of adolescents to the total fertility rate has tended to increase in recent years. Between 1950 and 1975, the relative contribution of adolescent fertility to total fertility increased from 8.1% in 1950–55 to 12.7% in 1975–80, levels that remained relatively stable until the end of the 1980s (I. Palma, 2006, p. 3). Moreover, the proportion of births by adolescent mothers rose from 13.8% in 1990 to 16.2% in 2001 (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, 2006, p. 10). It was still high in 2012, representing 14.3% of all births (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, 2012a, p. 30).

2.4.3 Household Size and Composition

Analyses on household structures and people's living arrangements for the Chilean case are scant. Most of the available information on household change has been presented in broad analyses covering the whole region and primarily focused on the past two and half decades.[37] Although Chile has carried out national censuses of population since the mid-nineteenth century, old national censuses collected information at the individual and not the household level. It was only in 1952, when the first census of population and housing was conducted, that information concerning the kinship relations of individuals residing in the same household was collected. Unfortunately, in the case of the 1952 census, it is not possible to obtain the datasets that allow us to examine the characteristics of households during this period. There is no research on household composition based on the information provided by these two population censuses either. Thus, this section seeks to analyse the main changes in household structures and living arrangements over the 1960–2011 period. In order to do that, census data for 1970 and 2002 – provided by the Minnesota Population Center – has been tabulated. This information is complemented with data from the CASEN Survey for 2011.

Research on household change in Latin America has been influenced by major theories about the impact of modernisation on household size and composition. Accordingly, it has been predicted that Latin American households would become smaller and simpler as a result of the processes of industrialisation and urbanisation that have taken place over the second half of the twentieth century in the region. Nevertheless, research has not been conclusive in this respect. Although a decline in household size has been documented in all countries in the

[37] The period after 1990 has been most often studied, mainly due to the greater availability of comparable data across countries in the region.

region, there is not a consistent trend of decreasing household complexity (Arriagada, 2001, 2002; Bongaarts, 2001; Brígida García & Rojas, 2001, 2002).

The level of household complexity refers to the degree to which non-nuclear household members – i.e. members beyond the household head, his/her spouse or cohabiting partner and children – are present within the household (Bongaarts, 2001, p. 12). Thus, complex households include other relatives of the household head, such as parents, parents-in-law, grandchildren, siblings etc. Complex households may also include other individuals who are not related to the household head. The socio-demography provides different measures to evaluate the level of household complexity (de Vos, 1995, pp. 35–39).[38] The one used in this analysis is based on the frequency with which individuals with different relationships to the household head reside in the household (Bongaarts, 2001).

Table II.2 shows the average household size and distribution of the average number of people per household according to their relationship to the household head during the 1960–2011 period.[39] There is a reduction in the average Chilean household size over the period, which decreased from 5.40 to 3.41 individuals per household. In order to discover whether or not Chilean households have experienced a reduction in their level of complexity over the past forty years, it is necessary to observe what happened to the average number of non-nuclear relatives. Row D shows that the number of other relatives of the household head (non-nuclear relatives) decreased from 0.76 in 1960 to 0.47 in 2011. Although these figures decrease on

[38] The simplest indicator of the level of complexity of households is the average household size. As De Vos (1995) noted, its main advantage is simplicity, since to calculate it the only information needed is the total population and number of households in a given year. However, the main weakness of this indicator is that it could include very different kinds of household structures in the same average household size (de Vos, 1995, p. 36). This is because, as Burch and Gendell (1970) argued, household size is more a function of the prevailing level of fertility than the level of complexity of households. Therefore, while this indicator is included in the analysis of this section, it is not considered as an indicator of the level of complexity of the households, only of its size.

[39] Census data in Chile only includes information concerning the relationship of individuals with regard to the household head. This has been grouped into six categories: head; spouse; children; other relatives; other unrelated individuals; and a residual category that includes other situations (e.g. pensioners or people whose relationship with the household head is unknown). Household headship is based on a self- or proxy-reporting criterion in Chilean censuses. That is, the household head is the person designated as such by other household members.

average, their significance within the household remained constant over the period because this reduction is proportional to that of household size. This is observed in the row H, which includes the ratio of non-nuclear relatives with respect to household size. This shows that non-nuclear relatives contribute 14% of the household size most of the period (except in 1970).

Another indicator of changes in the level of household complexity is the average number of unrelated individuals with respect to the household head (row E). However, this indicator has some limitations in the Chilean census data. Censuses of 1970 included individuals in very different situations within the category of 'unrelated to the household head': household members who are unrelated to the household head, domestic servants, lodgers, and people who were visiting the household when census information was collected.[40] The population census of 1982 onwards and the CASEN survey instead only include information from individuals that permanently reside in the household (domestic servants residing within the household are surveyed but not included in analyses). These differences make the information about individuals unrelated to the household head not strictly comparable over the period. In spite of that, it is possible to see a significant decrease in the average number of unrelated individuals over the whole period. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, historical evidence for the nineteenth century shows that a significant proportion of households included individuals unrelated to the household head. This was associated with the process of rural-urban migration that started during the last decades of the nineteenth century and continued over part of the twentieth century. Following the same interpretation, the decrease in the number of individuals unrelated to the household head may be linked to the decline of internal migrations.

Finally, there are two other interesting changes in the composition of Chilean households that can be observed in Table II.2. The average number of spouses/cohabiting partners per household shows a decreasing trend over the period (row B). In 1970, on average, 71% of household heads had a spouse/cohabiting partner residing within the household, a percentage that decreased to 61% in 2011. This decrease is closely related to changes in family formation and dissolution presented above, especially regarding the increase in separations and divorces. Row C shows a significant decline in the average number of children (of all ages) of the household head (from average 2.50 children in 1960 to 1.31 in 2011). This trend is

[40] In the Chilean population census, everyone who spent the previous night in the household is surveyed, whether or not these individuals reside permanently in the household.

related to the significant reduction in fertility that occurred over the second half of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

Table II.2. Average number of members per household by relationship to head. Chile, 1970–2011

	Relationship to head	1960	1970	1982	1992	2002	2011
(A)	Head	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
(B)	Spouse/cohabiting partner	0.72	0.71	0.70	0.69	0.65	0.61
(C)	Son/daughter	2.50	2.44	1.99	1.62	1.35	1.31
(D)	Non-nuclear relatives	0.76	0.65	0.64	0.55	0.50	0.47
(E)	Nonrelatives	0.42	0.37	0.17	0.12	0.08	0.03
(F)	Without information	0.00	0.01	0.10	0.07	0.07	0.00
(G)	**Household size**	5.40	5.18	4.59	4.05	3.65	3.41
(H)	**Ratio other relatives to household size**	0.14	0.12	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14

Source: Own calculations from: information for years 1970 and 1982 from Minnesota Population Center. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 6.3 [Machine-readable database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2014. Information for 1990–2011 period from CASEN Survey.

The analyses of Table II.2 leads to the conclusion that although Chilean households have significantly decreased in size over the 1960–2011 period, this pattern cannot be explained by a reduction in the level of household complexity (particularly when considering the continuing importance of non-nuclear relatives within the household).[41] These findings show that the transition from the predominance of a family model based on formal marriage – which was still observed in the 1970s – towards one characterised by more informal family practices was not accompanied by a reduction in the level of household complexity.

As far as household composition is concerned, recent Latin American research has shown that there has been a process of diversification of household structures since 1990 (M Ariza & Oliveira, 2007, p. 94; Arriagada, 2007a, p. 10, 2007b, p. 127, 2014, p. 90; Rico &

[41] In Chile, the decrease in household size seems to be more related to the drop in the fertility rates, which is reflected in a decline of the number of children per household. However, it is important to note that a better indicator for supporting the above would be the average number of young children (under 18, for example) and not of any age as in Table II.2. In a comparative study of developing countries, Bongaarts (2001) provides some evidence on this point. By analysing the cases of Mexico, Panama and Costa Rica, Bongaarts found that the decline in household size over the 1960–90 period was explained by a reduction in the number of children per household rather than a decrease in the number of adults per household (Bongaarts, 2001, pp. 28–29). In fact, the number of adult per household slightly increased in these countries.

Maldonado, 2011, p. 31; Valdés, 2004, p. 15). These studies have indicated that households composed only of a couple with their children have become less prominent over this period. In contrast, households that previously represented a minority of Latin American households, such as single-person, couple-only and lone-mother households have increased. Interestingly, despite such transformations, the proportion of extended households has not changed over this period. Indeed, most Latin American countries have registered small variations in the proportion of extended households.[42] Unfortunately, there is no research analysing a longer time period for the region.

In Chile, the analysis of household types for the 1970–2011 period is consistent with the findings of recent research at the regional level. Table 3 includes information from the population censuses of 1970 and 2002, complemented by data from the CASEN Survey 2011. The information in Table II.3 is based on the household typology proposed by the United Nations, which includes the following household types: a) single-person households (households consisting of only one person); b) non-family households (i.e. without a conjugal unit or parent-child relationship, although other kinship ties may exist); c) nuclear households (one or both parents present, with or without children); d) extended households (one or both parents present, with or without children, and other relatives); and e) composite households (one or both parents, with or without children, with or without other relatives, and including non-relatives) (Arriagada, 2002, p. 143).

In assessing the extent and characteristics of household composition change in Chile, the household typology proposed by the United Nations offers major benefits for the purpose of this analysis. Firstly, it facilitates comparability with the results of other studies on the subject, and with official statistics, as it is used in most national statistics for Latin American countries. Secondly, this typology suits well the information collected by the Chilean population censuses. Census data only includes information about individual's relationship with the household head, thus other possible relationships that household members have among themselves are not considered. This is a limitation that makes it difficult to use other household typologies (Laslett typology, for example). The use of census data is central because

[42] These trends have been observed even in countries at advanced stages in the demographic transition (such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Costa Rica). The exceptions to this trend were four countries showing a decrease in the prevalence of this type of household: El Salvador, Panama, Paraguay and Uruguay.

it allows us to assess a period of time (since 1970) longer than that possible when using the information provided by the CASEN survey (since 1990).

A first aspect to highlight from Table 11.3 is that the proportion of extended households stays fairly constant over the 1970-2011 period, with a slight increase from 22.5% to 24.8% between 1970 and 1982, to then decrease and remain at about 22–23% over the 1992–2011 period. The slight increase in 1982 could be associated with the worsening economic conditions of the population during the military dictatorship (1973–89), which was reflected in a dramatic increase in poverty levels as discussed above. However, it should be noted that the decline in poverty recorded since 1990 was not accompanied by a similar decrease in the prevalence of extended households.

While the proportion of extended households was stable, composite households declined over the period. According to census data, these households decreased from 13.0% in 1970 to 3.3% in 2002, to then represent about 1% of all households according to CASEN 2011.[43] According to historical evidence discussed at the beginning of this chapter, an important proportion of households in the mid-nineteenth century included individuals that were unrelated to the household head. Given migrants were often received in the households of acquaintances, it is likely that the decline in rural-urban migration that has taken place in recent decades had an impact on reducing composite households.

[43] It should be noted that data from the CASEN survey recorded considerably lower levels of this type of household for the entire period from 1990 to 2011. This difference is probably explained by the CASEN Survey's more rigorous criterion for inclusion of individuals within households than the population census. Despite these problems of comparability, it seems clear that the inclusion of individuals unrelated to the household head within the household has decreased over the period.

Table II.3. Households by type. Chile, 1970-2011

Household types	1970	1982	1992	2002	2011
Single person households	5.8%	7.0%	8.5%	11.6%	11.3%
Non-family households	7.5%	6.4%	5.9%	6.3%	4.8%
All nuclear households	51.4%	51.7%	57.5%	56.9%	60.2%
Couple with children	38.0%	37.8%	*41.6%*	*38.1%*	*34.6%*
Couple no children	6.1%	6.1%	*7.4%*	*9.3%*	*11.4%*
Lone mother	6.0%	6.5%	*7.3%*	*8.1%*	*12.6%*
Lone father	1.3%	1.3%	*1.2%*	*1.4%*	*1.6%*
Extended households	22.3%	24.8%	23.7%	21.9%	22.6%
Composite households	13.0%	10.1%	4.4%	3.3%	1.1%
Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**

Source: Own calculations from: information for years 1970 and 2002 from Minnesota Population Center. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 6.3 [Machine-readable database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2014. Information for year 2011 from CASEN Survey.

Table II.3 also shows that nuclear households, as a whole, increased from about a half of all Chilean households in 1970 to 60% in 2011. And within nuclear households, it is possible to observe important transformations. Firstly, households composed of a couple with children remain relatively stable until 2002. In 2011, this type of household decreased, a trend also observed in the rest of Latin American countries. Secondly, it is possible to observe an increase of households composed of a couple without children, particularly from 1990 onwards. Thirdly, there is a marked increase of households composed of lone mothers especially since the 1990s. These changes are probably associated with the increase of marital dissolution that has taken place over the last decades. Finally, it is possible to see an increase in single-person households. This trend is in line with Latin America as a whole and is particularly marked in countries located in the South Cone.[44] The rise of separations and divorces could be associated with this phenomenon.

[44] Recent research addressing the question of household composition change in Latin America has focused on the evolution of single-person households. Early analyses showed an incipient increase in the prevalence of single-person households over the 1990s in Latin America (Arriagada, 2001, 2002; Jelin & Díaz-Muñoz, 2003). Subsequent analyses confirmed this upward trend and estimated that single-person households rose from 6.7% to 9.7% of all households between 1990 and 2005 at the Latin American level (Arriagada, 2007a).

2.4.4 Female Headship

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, female-headed households have been historically important in Latin America. Their prevalence has been associated with the widespread practice of consensual unions and family instability that characterised the marriage system in the region. Despite the traditional importance of female-headed households in Latin America, an increase has been observed in recent decades (Arriagada, 2002, 2014; Brígida García & Rojas, 2002). Considering the standard definition of household headship used in census and households surveys in Latin America, which refers to the person in the household who is recognised as such by other household members, female-headed households increased in all Latin American countries between 1999–2002 and 2007–09 (ranging from 25.5% in Guatemala to 37.8% in Uruguay around 2007–09 (Arriagada, 2014, p. 91).

In Chile, the available evidence for the 1970–2011 period shows a systematic increase in the proportion of households headed by women, particularly since the 1990s. Figure II.15 shows that the proportion of households in which a woman was identified as the household head increased from 20% and 21% in 1970 and 1982, to about 40% of all households in 2011. The recent changes in family formation and dissolution discussed above have doubtless had an impact on the increase of female headship. The weakening of marriage bonds seen in the increase in separations and divorces, and the fall in marriage rates, have contributed to the increase in lone-mother households. The increase in female labour force participation is also been related to the rise of female-headed households in Latin America.

Despite lone-mother nuclear households seeming to be the biggest group of female-headed households both in Latin America and in other parts in the world, there are other types of female-headed households that have been identified in the literature on the subject. Among them are: female-headed extended households; lone female households; single sex/female only households; female-predominant households and grandmother-headed households (Chant, 1997). In particular, extended households represent an important part of female-headed households in Latin America as female-headed households are more likely to contain one or more non-nuclear members.

Figure II.15. Households headship by sex. Chile, 1970–2011



Source: Own calculations from: information for years 1970 and 2002 from Minnesota Population Center. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 6.3 [Machine-readable database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2014. Information for year 2011 from CASEN Survey.

Table II.4. Households headed by women by type. Chile, 1970–2011

Household types	1970	1982	1992	2002	2011
Single-person households	12.3%	14.8%	15.4%	16.7%	15.9%
Non-family households	19.1%	17.2%	13.0%	11.2%	7.7%
Couple with children nuclear households	4.5%	2.6%	8.0%	13.5%	13.5%
Couple no children nuclear households	1.0%	0.7%	1.9%	3.8%	4.9%
Lone-mother nuclear households	29.6%	30.2%	29.0%	25.8%	32.5%
Extended households	22.4%	25.8%	27.8%	25.4%	24.4%
Composite households	11.0%	8.7%	4.9%	3.6%	1.1%
Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**

Source: Own calculations from: information for years 1970 and 2002 from Minnesota Population Center. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 6.3 [Machine-readable database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2014. Information for year 2011 from CASEN Survey.

In the case of Chile, Table II.4 shows the distribution of households headed by women throughout the period 1970–2011 by household type. It is possible to see that about 30% of households headed by women throughout the period correspond to lone-mother nuclear households. It is also worth noting that nuclear households consisting of couples with or without children are marginal among female-headed households. Nevertheless, there has been an increase throughout the period.

Interestingly, Table II.4 shows that the proportion of female-headed households that are extended is also high, especially in 1992, when it reaches 28% of total households. In the case of extended households, it is likely that they correspond to lone mothers or women without a coresident partner who live with other relatives. However, as has been highlighted by Chant (1997, pp. 24–26), extended households may be hiding other family units formed by young lone mothers. Since these units are not considered heads of household, they are hidden female heads.

To sum up, evidence presented in this section shows that the informality in family relations and the high prevalence of matrifocal families, which have historically been an important part of Chilean society, altered during the mid-twentieth century (particularly, from the 1930s to the 1970s). This was expressed in an increase in marriage rates, low levels of cohabitation, and an unprecedentedly low proportion of children born out of wedlock. This process went hand-in-hand with high fertility rates, and probably low levels of marital dissolution (evidence is limited in this regard). During the last four decades, and particularly since the 1990s, a return to the family patterns that historically prevailed in Chile has been observed. During the dictatorship, there was not a decrease in marriage rates, although consensual unions and out-of-wedlock births began to increase. During the democratic governments, however, there has been a decrease in marriage rates, a steady increase of cohabitation and a dramatic increase of children born out of wedlock. These patterns have also been accompanied by an increase in separations and divorces, and a significant fall in fertility rates.

The dramatic transformations in family demography that have taken place during the last four decades have had a strong impact on the structure and composition of households. Closely related to the decline in fertility, household size has significantly decreased. The decline in fertility, along with the already noted changes in the process of family formation and dissolution, have resulted in an increase in single-person households and those formed by lone-mother and childless couples. Interestingly, extended households have not lost importance over the period. They have continued to represent about a quarter of Chilean households, at a similar – or even slightly greater – level than that recorded in the mid-nineteenth century (the only available historical evidence in this regard).

2.5 Changes in attitudes about gender roles and family values

After presenting the main changes in family and household structures that have taken place in Chile over the last decades, it is worth asking whether they have gone hand in hand with value shift. As Chile has become increasingly global and open to the world since the 1980s, it is possible to expect that a process of secularization and some erosion of the traditional values regarding gender and family relations have occurred. To shed light on changes in social norms related to gender roles and family, I relied on available data from the World Values Survey (WVS) for Chile.[45]

Figure II.16 shows a decreasing trend regarding the importance attributed to religion in individual's life. In 1989–1993, more than a half of respondents say that religious is very important in their lives, proportion that fell to less than a quarter in 2010–2014. This is an indicator of a greater level of secularization among Chilean population, which support the idea that Chile is one of the most secular countries in Latin America (E. Valenzuela et al., 2008).

Another important point shown in Figure II.16 is the great relevance attributed to the family institution in the lives of Chileans, which even increases throughout the period analysed. This is consistent with the 'familism' that characterises the Latin American family system, where the family not only provides emotional and affective support, but also acts as an important source of welfare provision. As has been pointed out throughout this dissertation, this is expressed, for example, in the high prevalence of extended households in Latin America.

[45] The World Values Survey (WVS) is a global research project whose aim is to examine people's values and beliefs and how they change over time. It is carried out since 1981 and currently surveys more than 100 countries around the world.

Figure II.16. Importance of family, friends and religious in individual's life*



Source: World Values Survey – Chile
**Base on the question 'For each of the following, indicate how important it is in your life. Would you say it is "very important"'.*

In order to assess changes in traditional family values, an important aspect to consider is related to intergenerational relationships. Figure II.17 shows the evolution of perceptions on the qualities that children should learn at home. It is possible to observe a marked decrease in the importance given to religious faith (from 52% to 28%), which would be in line with the trend presented in the previous figure. Along with this, there is also a decrease – although less marked – in the value of obedience and an increase in the value of independence, both indicators that would be accounting for attitudes towards a less vertical and more democratic form of upbringing Valdés (2005) points out that in Chile a family culture with democratic and egalitarian traits has been installed, which finds its basis in the processes of individuation. This scholar argues that the democratization of family has been accompanied by the erosion of the authority of the father within the family, which has resulted in a search for greater involvement of men in the upbringing (search for greater closeness).

Figure II.17. Qualities of children that are important to be learnt at home*



Source: World Values Survey – Chile
**Base on the question 'Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important?'*

With regard to attitudes about divorce, abortion and homosexuality, it is also possible to observe a departure from traditional values in this area (see Figure II.18). In fact, the proportion of people who consider divorce, abortion and homosexuality never justifiable (scoring 10 on a scale of 1 to 10) has decreased significantly throughout the period examined. The case of homosexuality is the one that registers the most pronounced fall, from 76% in 1989–1993 to only 13% in 2010–2014. The lowest levels of acceptance are registered in the case of abortion, despite the fact that there is also a tendency to decrease in its rejection.

Figure II.18. Attitudes about divorce, abortion and homosexuality*



Source: World Values Survey – Chile
** Proportion of people considering divorce, abortion and homosexuality never justifiable (score 10 in a 1–10 scale)*

As Therborn (2004) indicates, to understand family values, it is important to understand sex and power relations in a particular cultural setting. Figure II.19 shows some indicators that can shed light on changes in attitudes related to traditional gender roles. For example, the degree of agreement with the question 'when the jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women', decreased from 37% to 18% over the period. Something similar is observed in the case of the assessment of the role of housewife for women, by 2010-2014 only 41% considered that it was a role as fulfilling as having a paid job. Along the same line, attitudes about working mothers also suggest a transition towards greater acceptance of the productive role of women (see Figure II.20).

Figure II.19. Attitudes about women's roles



Source: World Values Survey – Chile
**Base on the question 'Do you agree, disagree or neither agree nor disagree with the following statements?'*

Figure II.20. Attitudes about mother's employment (When a mother works for pay, the children suffer)



Source: World Values Survey – Chile
**Base on the question 'For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?: 'When a mother works for pay, the children suffer'.*

Finally, it is worth examining how attitudes towards the value of the traditional family composed of two parents have changed over time. The WVS asked adults if they approved of a woman seeking to have a child as a single parent without a stable relationship with a man. In relation to this, Figure II.21 shows a clear increase in the proportion of people who approve

this type of maternity form (from 59% to 73%). This is related to the historical importance that has had the lone motherhood in Latin America.. The characteristics of the process of colonisation, added to the constant displacements of men through the territory (due to economic or political issues) have resulted in a high prevalence of families composed of single mothers with their children. While this was temporarily altered by the state's attempt to formalise family relations in Chile, it is not surprising that attitudes towards lone motherhood have been favourable even in the early 1990s. In fact, Chile registers the highest approval rate among the Latin American countries for which information is available, being also higher than the rate of most of the European countries participating in this study (only exceeded by Spain).

Figure II.21. Attitudes about lone motherhood*



Source: World Values Survey – Chile
**Base on the question 'If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent but she doesn't want to have a stable relationship with a man, do you approve or disapprove?'*

This is complemented by changes in attitudes related to the value of a two-parent household, where a decrease in the percentage of people who agree with the statement "If someone says a child needs a home with both a father and mother to grow up happily' (see Figure II.22).

Figure II.22. Attitudes about the value of a two-parent home*



Source: World Values Survey – Chile
**Base on the question 'If someone says a child needs a home with both a father and a mother to grow up happily, would you tend to agree or disagree?'*

2.6 Summary and Conclusions

Evidence presented in this chapter provides key insights for understanding the recent changes in families and households in Chile. Trends related to the fall in marriage rates, increase in cohabitation, and the unprecedented increase in out-of-wedlock children that have taken place since the 1990s are not as new in Chile as in other countries (such as those from Europe). In this chapter, I showed that informality in family relations, as well as the high prevalence of lone motherhood and female headship, have been two historical features of Chilean families. These features were partially altered in the mid-twentieth century (mainly between the 1930s and 1970s) as a result of a systematic attempt by the state, and the political and economic elites, to formalise and stabilise family relations. Recent changes in the process of family formation and dissolution in Chile should, therefore, not be interpreted only in the light of the family patterns of the mid-twentieth century; such approach misunderstands the long-term characteristics of Chilean families. Instead, recent trends in family and household demography need to be understood in relation to the historical prevalence of family practices in Chile and Latin America.

Taking this into consideration, recent decades have also witnessed a decline in marriage that exceeds historical levels. The best example of this transformation may be that, at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, two out of three children were born out of wedlock in Chile. Such a trend has been accompanied by an increase in marital

dissolution and a fall in fertility rates below replacement levels. All this shows how profoundly the process of family formation has been transformed.

The weakening of state incentives towards marriage has undoubtedly played a central role in the recent changes in the process of family formation and dissolution. On the one hand, the introduction of targeting in social policy during the military dictatorship, which was then continued by the democratic governments, ended the link between the legal constitution of families and access to social benefits. On the other hand, the equalisation of rights among couples and children – irrespective of the marriage bond – has also led to the decline of the institution of marriage, particularly since the 2000s. However, it is important to note that the legal equalisation among families has not necessarily guaranteed greater economic wellbeing to the weakest family members. As noted in this chapter, fathers and ex-husbands' failure to comply with financial obligations in respect to women and children has become common in today's Chile.

These processes have also been influenced by the greater economic autonomy that Chilean women have achieved over the past three decades. In this chapter, I argued that the weakening of the family wage system – where women no longer depend on their husbands for access to social benefits – along with improvements in educational levels and labour force participation have contributed to a further decrease in the economic importance of marriage for women. Moreover, greater economic autonomy has probably enabled women to leave unsatisfactory marital relationships and head their own households.

Considering these substantial changes in the process of family formation and dissolution that Chile has experienced over the past four decades, it is striking that extended households have maintained their importance over the period. It is worth asking whether this continuing significance is related to recent trends for the informalisation of family relations and increasing matrifocality. Since we have seen an increase in family arrangements that make living independently more difficult – such as lone mothers – it is worth asking whether extended households have continued to play a key role in supporting vulnerable family members. There are no studies in the region exploring the ways in which current changes to the process of family formation and dissolution may be affecting or interacting with household structures. For this reason, this is a key area to be investigated in this research.

All these elements lead us to rethink the ways in which extended households have traditionally been understood in Latin America. Extended living arrangements have to be analysed in the light of current changes in Latin American families and also in a context of

sharp gender and socio-economic inequalities. This highlights the importance of understanding the factors that lead to the persistence of extended households in a context of the informalisation of family relations and the demise of the traditional model of the patriarchal family.

CHAPTER III: UNDERSTANDING EXTENDED LIVING ARRANGEMENTS IN THE LATIN AMERICAN CONTEXT: A LITERATURE REVIEW

This dissertation aims to investigate the factors that explain extended living arrangements in Chile and their persistence over the 1990–2011 period. In Chapter II, I showed that a significant proportion of Chilean families have remained living in extended households during the last four decades. That chapter also revealed that the persistence of extended household structures has taken place in a context of economic modernisation, increasing social and legal protection – particularly for women and children – and dramatic transformations in the process of family formation and dissolution. Taking these insights into account, I now review the literature related to the three research objectives of this dissertation.

Firstly, in relation to the main determinants of living in extended households, I discuss two explanations of the factors that make some individuals and families more likely than others to live in extended households. I review both the studies that emphasise the role of economic needs in household extension; and also those studies that suggest extended living arrangements are a result of the changing needs for privacy and support over the life course.

Secondly, in regards to the relationship between the process of family formation and extended living arrangements in Chile and how this has changed over time, I critically discuss those theories that suggest there has been a decrease in the importance of extended households as a result of economic modernisation and cultural change. I argue that some of the transformations resulting from these developments – such as increasing female labour force participation and changes in the process of family formation and dissolution – may have produced, instead, a greater reliance on extended living arrangements in current Chilean society.

Finally, I discuss the literature on economic dependence within the family in order to shed light on the relations of economic support that underlie extended living arrangements. In order to do that, I draw insights from two bodies of research focused on intra-household economic dependence. The first is related to women's economic dependence on their husbands, while the second refers to intergenerational relations of dependence. Both approaches, however, have limitations in fully explaining the dependence relations within the family in the Latin American context, because they have overlooked the role that more complex household structures play in shaping the relations of economic dependence within such households.

3.1 Main Determinants of Extended Living Arrangements

The literature review carried out in this section is oriented by the first objective of this dissertation, which is to evaluate the role played by economic and life-course needs in explaining extended living arrangements. I examine the literature on intergenerational coresidence and extended households in search of the factors that help to explain variations in the prevalence of extended living arrangements at the micro level. I discuss two main explanations: the first highlights economic needs as a central factor influencing extended living arrangements; the second is focused on the changing needs for support and privacy over the life course and how these affect extended and intergenerational coresidence.

3.1.1 Economic Needs and their Impact on Extended Living Arrangements

Economic deprivation has a central place in research on household structure in Latin America. During the 1980s and early 1990s, an important body of qualitative research on poverty and vulnerability sought to understand the ways in which urban poor households managed to survive during the debt crisis and the subsequent process of structural adjustment. In these studies, the composition of households, as well as their stage in the domestic cycle, were considered central variables in accounts of the household and its income generating strategies. Although the economic and social context of these studies was different to the present moment, their findings are still relevant in helping to understand some of the micro-level mechanisms that lead to the formation of extended households.

In the light of the survival strategy approach,[46] this body of research shows that economic needs are linked to household extension in two main ways. Firstly, households include additional members in order to improve their livelihoods, as non-nuclear members are able to contribute income or domestic work. Secondly, vulnerable people seek shelter in the households of more well-off relatives when they cannot afford independent living.

Exploring this area in her studies in Guadalajara, Mexico, González de la Rocha (1994, 1995) identifies various responses of poor households to the macro processes of economic and institutional change. Among them are: a) intensification of wage work by increasing the number of people working per household, particularly through the incorporation of women into the labour market; b) adjustments in consumption patterns, referring to housework intensification and the reduction in the level of consumption in areas such as education, health and clothing; c) participation in networks of mutual assistance; and d) changes in the composition of households. In relation to household composition, the author highlights household extension in particular as a strategy that enables families to save on housing costs and to bring able-bodied members into the household in order to increase salaried and domestic work (González de la Rocha, 1995). Thus, as extended households are better equipped to cope with economic hardship than nuclear households, they are by necessity more common among poor families than families with greater economic resources.

González de la Rocha also notes that extended living arrangements are particularly important for young couples. The author proposes the following scheme to account for the changing living arrangements over the life course (González de la Rocha, 1994, p. 88): young couples begin their family life residing in the home of one of their parents or another close relative, then they become independent by forming a new nuclear household. Later, when this family reaches a stage of consolidation and one or more adult children form their own family, the nuclear household extends to include a new couple. This specific type of household extension illustrates the close relationship that exists between the domestic cycle and the dynamic of household composition and, at the same time, between these and the income

[46] In Latin America, the survival strategy approach was used to understand the economic behaviour of poor households in the context of a model of dependent capitalist development, which was characterised by the exclusion of broad sectors of society from the benefits of development (Schmink, 1984, p. 88). This approach also emerged as an analytical bridge to connect macro-structural views of social change with theories that gave more attention to individual behaviours (Schmink, 1984, pp. 87–88).

generation strategies available for different types of households. Therefore, the ability of a household to face external constraints and organise its resources accordingly (e.g. when facing an economic crisis, as in the case studied by González de la Rocha) largely depends on its composition and stage in the domestic cycle. During the phases associated with household extension, families have a larger number of able-bodied individuals available for employment or to contribute to domestic work and childcare.

This schematic view of the process of household extension, however, seems to oversimplify the phenomenon. Firstly, it does not take into account other kinds of family units that may join a household – such as lone mothers. This distinction has important implications for the income-generating strategies of households for several reasons. Different family units vary in the number of able members that may contribute income or housework to the household, and – as a result of their varied gender and age composition – are also affected unevenly by the unequal conditions of salary and workload in the labour market. In addition, different family units may vary in terms of the duration of coresidence, because those more vulnerable – such as lone mothers – may face greater barriers to living independently than other family arrangements. Secondly, it is plausible to think that the incorporation of other family units into the household is not limited to the case of young families (even if we take that to include young lone mothers, although the author refers only to young couples). Unexpected events or a variety of changes in circumstances, such as job loss, serious or disabling illness, marital breakdown, or widowhood may lead individuals to seek refuge in an extended household at different points in the life course.

Along similar lines, Moser (1997, 1998, 2006) explores the responses of households to changes in economic circumstances and labour market conditions during the 1980s, in four poor communities located in different parts of the world. One of them is Cisne Dos in Guayaquil, Ecuador, which I will explore in this section. In her studies, Moser uses the concept of vulnerability rather than poverty. Vulnerability is considered as a dynamic situation referring to negative outcomes on the socioeconomic well-being of individuals, households or communities (Moser, 1997). The possibilities for such agents to resist negative changes in their environment (e.g. economic shocks or long-term economic crises) is related to both their initial assets and their ability to mobilise these assets: 'the more assets people have, the less vulnerable they are' (Moser, 1997, p. 2). The assets identified by the study are labour, human capital, productive assets, social capital, and household relations (particularly, household composition and the possibilities for transforming it). The different types of assets enable,

ultimately, poor households to generate income, food or other basic goods necessary for survival.

Regarding household relations, Moser highlights how household restructuring can be an asset among poor families. Analysing the case study of *Cisne Dos*, she points out that the household changes observed in the community illustrated how 'renegotiating domestic living arrangements allows the urban poor to adjust to wider economic stresses' (Moser, 1997, p. 67). Similar to what González de la Rocha proposes, certain household structures are found to be less vulnerable than others. In particular, extended structures allow households to better cope with unfavourable changes in economic conditions. For this reason, households became extended as a strategy of 'asset mobilisation' in order to deal with economic shocks.

Contrary to what was stated by González de la Rocha, in Moser's findings not every type of household extension decreases the vulnerability of the household. The forms of household extension that decrease vulnerability are those that increase the ratio of employed to non-employed within the household. This is because the underlying assumption is that labour (and particularly, mobilising additional labour) is the main asset of the poor. Consequently, certain forms of household extension can even increase the vulnerability of a household. In order to illustrate this point about household restructuring, Moser identifies three main strategies of household extension among poor households that are important to mention:

- **Household extension among older women as a way to cope with poverty** (Moser, 1997, pp. 63–64). Moser's findings show that household extension is more common among unmarried older women (separated, divorced or widowed) than among men in the same situation, as the former are less able to survive alone. Unmarried older women tend to include other relatives into their households, such as their own adult children with their respective nuclear families, or siblings, nephews or nieces. In these cases, the main rationale behind household extension is to take advantage of economies of scales and to pool resources among household members. It also results in extra help in the provision of care for the elderly.
- **Hidden female heads within extended households among younger women to avoid poverty.** The opposite situation is observed among young women facing separation and single lone motherhood. The coping strategy adopted by them is to return or remain in the parental household or move into another relative's home, becoming hidden female heads. Moser points out that this type of living arrangement was very common in Cisne

Dos and its formation is related to a lack of financial resources and the need for domestic support and childcare.

- **Nesting.** Nesting is not properly a type of household extension, but rather a housing-sharing strategy among the poor in Cisne Dos. In general, nesters are adult children residing with their own family, who live independently in a different household but share their parents' plots. 'Although they sometimes share the same living space while running independent households through cooking and eating separately, more often nesters live in a separate space either on another floor of the house or in a separate structure on the back or side of the plot […] It acts as an intermediary strategy between household extension, where assistance is provided on a daily basis, and the formation of totally independent households' (Moser, 1997, p. 67).

The author notes that the first two forms of household restructuring have very different results in terms of the level of vulnerability of the host household. In the first case, the incorporation of employable members reduces household vulnerability, while in the second the incorporation of hidden female heads increases it. As Moser concludes 'nuclear households expand to larger, extended households – with lower per capita income and higher dependence ratios – either to provide a refuge or safety net for vulnerable individuals or in a conscious strategy to pool more effectively resources such as food, space, income, and childcare' (Moser, 1998, p. 11).

Moser's conclusions illustrate the conflicting character of the strategies that may propel household extension among deprived families. Thus the incorporation of hidden female heads into the household is not, perhaps, a strategy resulting in higher income when considered from the point of view of individuals belonging to the host household; it could, however, lead to a higher income for those who join the household. It is conceivable, therefore, that there are different and even conflicting strategies within the household depending on who is joining. This brings to light one of the main criticisms of the concept of family strategies, casting doubt on the notion that the family (or household) is an entity with a single intentionality, interest and rationality, independent of the individuals who compose it (Saraceno, 1989, p. 2; Schmink, 1984, pp. 95–96). In a nuclear household, the concept of family strategy has to respond to the conflicting interests of family members according to sex and generation (Folbre, 1987). In an extended household, however, considerations regarding the unequal distribution of power between different family units within the household need also to be taken into account.

Interpretations of household extension as a survival strategy among poor families have continued to be present in research carried out from the 1990s onwards in Latin America. The fact that extended households have a higher prevalence among low-income groups is considered as evidence for such hypothesis (Arriagada, 2001, p. 23, 2014, p. 97). In addition, it has been found that extended households have the highest levels of poverty when compared to other household types; however, this relationship is less clear in the case of extreme poverty (Arriagada, 1997, pp. 21–24). Evidence from Chile has confirmed the latter pattern, by showing that extended households are less common among extremely poor households (Raczynski, 2006, p. 305). Such lower prevalence among extremely poor (rather than poor) families is considered to be evidence supporting the hypothesis that household extension is an efficient strategy for mitigating the most severe shortages (Arriagada, 1997, pp. 21–24; B. García & Rojas, 2001, p. 13). However, it might also be possible that the very deprivation of such families makes sharing the few resources available with potential new household members impossible.[47] It is clear that other evidence is needed to support a conclusion of this kind.

Research carried out in the United States provides additional support to the survival-strategy hypothesis of household extension. During the 1980s, some studies suggested that the inclusion of non-nuclear members is the result of the search for additional income to compensate for the insufficient earnings of the household head (Tienda & Angel, 1982; Tienda & Glass, 1985).[48] Additionally, it highlighted the fact that the inclusion of non-nuclear members also increases the flexibility of domestic organisation in adjusting to changing economic circumstances. Thus, household extension is found to be a way to facilitate nuclear members' entry into the labour market through freeing them from care and domestic work (Tienda & Angel, 1982; Tienda & Glass, 1985). More recent studies have also highlighted the role of

[47] A recent study on grand families (households composed of children and their grandparents, without coresident parents) provides some evidence in this regard. It shows that non-resident parents are far more disadvantaged than the grandparent caregivers (Pilkauskas & Dunifon, 2016). This suggests that households hosting extended family members (in this case, grandchildren) have the financial means to support other members of the extended family.

[48] This conclusion is based on two main findings. Firstly, full-time employment status of the household head decreases the likelihood of household extension. Secondly, earnings of non-nuclear members are found to be positively related to total household income, although only in the case of Black and Hispanic American female-headed households and Black American husband/wife households.

extended households in family survival, by showing that extended living arrangements are a response to economic shocks of different kind, such as unemployment (Wiemers, 2014) or economic crises (Mykyta & Macartney, 2011).[49]

The literature discussed so far understands household extension as a response by families to economic deprivation. In particular, in mostly urban and modern societies, extended households are the result of families' income proving insufficient to cover living costs and an independent residence. It is important to note that the underlying assumption of this body of research is that there is a preference for independent living amongst individuals: people live in extended household mainly because of economic constraints and not because they prefer 'togetherness'. Based on this body of research, it is possible to expect that *family income will be negatively associated with the likelihood of living in extended households, with family units with higher income being less likely to live in extended living arrangements than those with lower income.*

Along with the survival-strategy hypothesis of household extension, education has been another socio-economic factor highlighted in research on extended living arrangements. The rationale for this is that people with lower educational levels are more likely to have lower earnings and face job instability and, therefore, are more likely to have to resort to household extension than people with higher educational levels. Surprisingly, one of the most complete studies on extended households in Latin America concludes that education does not have a consistent negative effect on the likelihood of living in complex households among ever-married women aged 15–49 in the six countries analysed (de Vos, 1995).[50] A higher educational level reduces the likelihood of living in extended households only in Mexico and Costa Rica, having no effect in Colombia, Panama and the Dominican Republic and no clear effect in Peru. The complex relationship between education and extended living arrangements is also shown in a recent study of twelve Latin American countries. Contrary to what expected, this study shows that single mothers aged 25–29 with full secondary school or further

[49] Along this line, a recent study has calculated the economic importance of doubling up, showing that the estimate rental savings is significant. It represents more than a quarter of a mother's earnings per year, which is an amount comparable to other public and private transfers (Pilkauskas et al., 2014, p. 1674).

[50] The analysis carried out by Susan De Vos included information on six Latin American countries (Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Panama, and Peru) and was based on the World Fertility Survey.

education have the highest prevalence of extended living arrangements (Esteve, García-Román, et al., 2012).

These findings suggest that the relationship between education and household extension is not straightforward. On the one hand, when analysing the effect of education on extended living arrangements, it is necessary to consider cohort differences in educational levels. This is particularly important in societies that have experienced a rapid expansion in secondary and higher education, as has been the case in most Latin American countries over the last two decades. As long as more people have access to higher levels of education now than in the past, it is possible to expect that education has lost some of its capacity to determine the material well-being of individuals. Therefore, high educational levels among people from older generations could have a different impact on the likelihood of living in extended households when compared with the same levels among people from younger generations. On the other hand, living in extended households might enable individuals – particularly younger generations – to improve their education levels, because they do not have to use their resources to maintain an autonomous household. Longitudinal research could help to better understand the relationship between education and people's living arrangements. However, from a cross-sectional perspective, I expect that in Chile *education will not be associated with the likelihood of living in extended households, with adult women with secondary and higher education being as likely to be in extended living arrangements as those without secondary education.*

3.1.2 Changing Needs for Support and Privacy over the Life Course and their Relationship with Extended Living Arrangements

Influenced by life course theory, research on extended households and intergenerational coresidence[51] has shown that living arrangements change across the life span. This is the result

[51] When considering these two bodies of research, it is important to take into account that household extension and intergenerational coresidence are different phenomena. While the former refers to the incorporation of non-nuclear family members within the household, the latter corresponds to parent/adult-children coresidence. Consequently, both phenomena only overlap in the case of three-generational households, or when adult children have a coresident spouse or cohabiting partner. Despite this limitation, research on intergenerational coresidence sheds light on how living arrangements change over the life course and as a result of family transitions.

of the changing needs for support and privacy of individuals according to their age or family situation. This research has also highlighted that living arrangement patterns are affected by transformations in historical contexts, which alter the opportunities available for different generations and population groups. In this section, I survey the main findings in research on this subject. Although most of these studies were focused on the United States, they provide valuable insights for understanding the life-course factors influencing extended living arrangements in Chile. The similarities between Chile and the United States in terms of their limited welfare state benefits, targeting on social policy, and the role of families in the provision of welfare, make this research pertinent for the analysis of the Chilean case.

In Western societies, independent living is usually considered an important benchmark in the transition to adulthood (Goldscheider & Goldscheider, 1999). After the fall in the age of leaving the parental home observed from the Second World War onwards, recent research has shown that this transition is being postponed by younger generations in the United States. Moreover, young adults are increasingly more likely to return to their parental home because of events that limit their ability to maintain an independent residence (e.g. marital breakdown or unemployment).[52] As a result, during the last decades of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, there has been an increase in the propensity of young adults in the United States to live in the parental home (Kahn, Goldscheider, & García-Manglano, 2013, pp. 1457–1459; Messineo & Wojtkiewicz, 2004, p. 74). In Europe, however, research has shown large differences in the age of leaving home between countries. The Nordic countries are characterised by an early departure from the parental home when compared to Southern Europe, a fact explained not only by economic differences but also by children and parents' preferences (Iacovou, 2010, pp. 158–159).

Increasing intergenerational coresidence among young adults also implies a higher prevalence of these arrangements among middle-aged individuals. Research carried out in the United States has shown that individuals in their fifties are more likely to provide support through coresidence than those younger or older, because they are more likely to have children in the family formation stage, and also have greater economic stability and accumulation of assets (housing, in particular) than young people (Aquilino, 1990, pp. 410–411; Cohen & Casper, 2002, pp. 9–10).

[52] Recent studies have also shown that young people are more likely to live in double-up households than older people (Mykyta & Macartney, 2011, p. 9; Wiemers, 2014, p. 8).

From a life-course approach, age differences are not only important because age significantly affects the social roles of individuals, but also because they provide information related to a cohort[53] and the life experiences and opportunities associated with it (Moen, 1995, p. 171). In this way, the increasing likelihood of today's young adults living in the parental home has been seen as the result of a deterioration of the economic situation of younger generations, which has worsened with the recent economic crisis in the United States.

Intergenerational coresidence has also been increased by population aging. Older generations are now more likely than in the past to survive into their children's adulthood. This has led some scholars to predict an increase in intergenerational coresidence led by old-age dependence. However, it has been consistently shown that, at least in the case of the United States, coresidence is more determined by the needs of adult children than the needs of their parents (Aquilino, 1990; Choi, 2003; Kahn et al., 2013).

In Latin America, young people also face important difficulties in affording independent living because of their lower employment rates and earnings when compared to older individuals. This is particularly important when considering that the process of family formation takes place at a relatively early age. As noted in the previous section, according to González de la Rocha, the protection offered by the extended household is relevant for young couples, who can have a better standard of living if they start their family life residing in the parental home of one of the two partners. Starting marital life in an independent household is a decision that involves significant expenses that poor young couples are not always able to afford. In addition to paying rent (as the purchase of a dwelling may be beyond economic capacity of a young couple), one of the most significant expenses is related to the purchase of furniture (González de la Rocha, 1994). Thus, when incorporated into a household that is already equipped with these goods, couples postpone one of the most significant costs of living independently. This gives young couples the opportunity to access goods that they could not otherwise afford, while saving money to achieve independence in the future (González de la Rocha, 1994).

The hypothesis concerning younger adults' greater need for support – particularly during the stage of family formation – is thus plausible in the current Latin American context. This is reinforced by the coexistence of important changes in the educational and labour

[53] I understand cohort as being what Hareven defines as a 'specific age group that has shared a common historical experience' (Hareven, 1999, p. 132).

integration of younger generations and a certain stability in patterns of family formation. On the one hand, entrance into marital unions (both consensual unions and marriage) continues to occur early in the life course, without showing significant changes during the second half of the twentieth century in the region (Fussell & Palloni, 2004, p. 1201). On the other hand, there has been an extension of the economic-dependence stage among younger generations as a result of the expansion of secondary and higher education, as well as job insecurity resulting from neoliberal economic restructuring (see Chapter II, where this point is illustrated by the case of Chile). Such context makes it more likely that young adults that have started their family life need family support through extended living arrangements. As a result, I expect that *different life stages will be associated with the likelihood of living in extended living arrangements, either in subfamilies or heading an extended household. The former will be young women in the family formation stage and the latter will be middle-age women who are more likely to have the assets to support their adult children living with them.*

Along with the focus on age, research on the subject has also considered the impact of family transitions on residential patterns, in particular, those related to changes in marital status and childbearing. From a life-course approach, transitions are understood as the movement of individuals from one role to another within their life trajectory, changes which take place in an individual life but that are related to external events (Hareven, 1999, pp. 129–130). As this research has stated, social roles have implications on individual's financial resources, and most importantly, on the social expectations regarding financial and residential independence. As Treas and Batalova note: 'Apart from their income implications, being a student or a spouse or a parent is apt to involve different cultural assumptions about the acceptable degree of parental dependence or the desirable level of residential privacy' (Treas & Batalova, 2011, p. 21).

The transition into marriage is strongly associated with independent living in neolocal family systems. Research carried out in the United States has shown that married people are less likely to live both in extended and in intergenerational households (Aquilino, 1990; Cohen & Casper, 2002; Pilkauskas, 2012). This is explained by married couples having a higher preference for privacy, and lower needs for kin support. Even in family systems with a high prevalence of extended households, marriage is a key transition to independency. An example is found in a study of Chinese urban families carried out by Treas and Chen (2000). It shows that although marriage does not ensure independent residence, it is a turning point in terms of

the independent management of resources by the newly formed couple, who keep separate budgets from their coresident parents or parents-in-law.

Despite clear evidence from existing research in the United States regarding marriage, it is less obvious whether cohabitation plays a similar role on the likelihood of living in extended or intergenerational households. This point is particularly relevant in Latin America, where cohabitation has been historically important. The recent increase in the prevalence of consensual unions in Latin America, particularly in the economically advanced countries of the Southern Cone, has been associated with the emergence of a 'modern' form of cohabitation (Cabella, 2009; Esteve, Lesthaeghe, et al., 2012; Valdés, 2004, pp. 16–17). Following the second demographic transition and individualisation theories, it has been argued that this new form of cohabitation is taking place among young people with higher levels of education, and is associated with a rejection of the normative imperative to marry and an emphasis on the quality of the relationship between partners. Modern values that characterise this new form of cohabitation are also reflected in a higher valuation for residential independence. From this perspective, modern forms of cohabitation should therefore be less likely to live in extended households

Despite such an incipient trend of increasing cohabitation among educated and well-off individuals, the available evidence suggests that most of consensual unions in the region are closer to being considered 'second order marriages' than 'trial marriages' (Castro-Martin, 2002). That is, consensual unions are a common pathway of union formation and a regular context for childrearing, although they are less stable than formal marriages and provide less economic and legal protection for the most vulnerable members in case of separation. Consensual unions in the region would more likely be the result of practical considerations and economic constraints than the outcome of a reflexive rejection of the institution of marriage.

The fact that consensual unions are less stable and protected than formal marriages might increase the sense of obligation of the extended family to support cohabiting couples through coresidence. Some evidence in this respect can be found in a recent study of living arrangements among lone mothers and in-union women aged 20–29 over the 2000s (Esteve, García-Román, et al., 2012). This study showed that childless cohabiting women were more likely to live in extended households than childless married women in eleven out of the thirteen Latin American countries analysed; the exceptions are Cuba and Chile. In the case of Chile, childless cohabiting women are as likely as married women to live in extended households. In the case of women with children, cohabiting women are equally or more likely

to live in extended households than married women in twelve out of thirteen countries, the exception also being Cuba (Esteve, García-Román, et al., 2012, p. 716). The authors of this study drew attention to the fact that cohabiting partners are accepted into extended households to an even greater extent than married spouses. However, they did not propose a hypothesis that explains this pattern.

Lone motherhood has been considered a situation that particularly requires family support through coresidence, either because of economic or childcare needs. Research conducted in the United States has shown that never-married, separated and divorced women with children have the highest rates of extended living arrangements and intergenerational coresidence (Cohen & Casper, 2002; Pilkauskas, 2012; Single-Rushton & McLanahan, 2002; Sweet, 1972; Tienda & Angel, 1982). On the one hand, when lone mothers head their own household, they have a greater likelihood of household extension than women in marital unions (marriages or consensual unions). This is because the inclusion of non-nuclear family members allows them to compensate, at least partially, the lower resources they have as a result of the lack of a partner (Angel & Tienda, 1982; Tienda & Angel, 1982). On the other hand, it has been shown that lone mothers are more likely than women in marital unions to live in other people's home as a subfamily (Buvinic et al., 1992; Chant, 1997; de Vos & Richter, 1986; Single-Rushton & McLanahan, 2002; Sweet, 1972).

Latin American research has also shown a strong relationship between extended living arrangements and lone motherhood. Recent evidence from thirteen Latin American countries showed that a considerable proportion of women aged 25–29 live in extended households, with this proving particularly high in the case of single lone mothers (ranging from 66.1% in Costa Rica to 86.7% in Bolivia over the period 2000–2007) (Esteve, García-Román, et al., 2012). However, such broadly defined measures of household extension do not enable us to know what position these women occupy within the extended household, that is, if they are household heads or live in subfamilies.

Both quantitative and qualitative evidence has shown that young single mothers face more difficulties in heading their own household. In fact, Buvinic et al. (1992) found that an important section of poor adolescent mothers in Santiago, Chile, without partners, lived as female-headed subfamilies when their first child was born (91%), and were still doing so six years later when they were re-interviewed (73%). Unfortunately, little is known about the timing and events that characterise the transition of adolescent mothers from extended to independent households.

Based on these findings, it is possible to expect that *non-traditional family forms will be positively associated with the likelihood of living in extended households and with subfamily living in particular, with lone mothers and consensual unions being more likely to live in extended living arrangements than married couples.*

Additionally, having small children has been associated with a higher likelihood of living in extended living arrangements. Among Latino immigrants in the United States, it has been shown that families with small children sacrifice some privacy in favour of childcare arrangements, which are facilitated by living in extended households (Blank & Torrecilha, 1998, p. 16). A recent study on Taiwanese mothers also showed that the presence of children under the age of three significantly increases the likelihood of living with elderly parents or extended kin (Chang, 2015). Along this line, evidence on married Asian immigrant women in the United States shows that female employment is favoured when living in households with older adults, because such older adults (mainly women) help with housework and childcare (Kang & Cohen, 2015).

In Chile, childcare support is particularly important for families with small children. This is because despite the recent increase in the state provision of childcare, access to nurseries and kindergartens is still limited. Alongside this, privately provided childcare is expensive, making them accessible only to higher income groups. Moreover, the need for childcare support has probably increased in recent decades as a result of growing female labour force participation. This leads us to expect that *family units with children under school age will be more likely to live in extended households than those without children or with older children.*

To sum up, two central ideas are common to economic and life-course explanations of extended living arrangements. The first is that extended living arrangements and intergenerational coresidence are influenced by needs of different types. The importance of economic needs in the formation of extended households is widely highlighted. But literature on the subject also highlights other needs for support and privacy that have to be considered. Crucially, it is shown that those needs change over the life course, thereby modifying the likelihood of living in extended or multigenerational households.

The second idea holds that coresidence facilitates the exchange of support and the pooling of resources among household members. It is true that flows of support from non-

coresident family members can be fundamental in determining household welfare (as in the case of remittances from migrants to their families, or, in the case of separated parents, the financial and emotional support from the non-coresident parent to her/his children). Likewise, it is also the case that household resources are not equally distributed among its members. However, the physical proximity that is involved in living in the same household facilitates the provision of support and resource sharing on a daily basis.

Finally, it is worth adding an important limitation of research on intergenerational coresidence. By focusing only on parent–adult child relationships, research on intergenerational coresidence has overlooked the presence of other family members within the household. This neglect is striking when considering the high prevalence of extended households among ethnic minorities in the United States. Thus, an intergenerational household can be a nuclear one in a more advanced stage of the household cycle, as well as an extended or three-generational household. Moreover, adult children in intergenerational households may or may not have formed their own family, which substantially affects their needs for privacy and their economic capacity. This suggests that the factors influencing coresidence are different for single and partnered individuals, and for childless individuals and parents. This limitation should be taken into account explaining extended living arrangements in societies with a high prevalence of extended households.

3.2 Family Formation and Extended Living Arrangements: Changes over Time

In this section, I review the literature related to the second research objective of this dissertation, which addresses the relationship between the process of family formation and extended living arrangements in Chile, and how it changes over time. Here, I critically discuss modernisation theory on the one hand, and the individualisation and second demographic transition theories on the other, which have suggested a decrease in the importance of extended households as a result of economic modernisation and cultural change. I evaluate alternative interpretations suggesting that increasing female labour force participation and changes in the process of family formation and dissolution may result in a greater prevalence of extended living arrangements.

3.2.1 Economic Modernisation and the Nuclearisation of Households

The idea that economic modernisation results in a decrease in the prevalence of extended households is well established in social theory. It goes back to the studies of Frédéric Le Play during the second half of the nineteenth century. According to Le Play,[54] in traditional societies, property was a determining factor in linking generations. In these societies, one or more children remained in the parental home until reaching adulthood, working the family land, and inheriting family property after their parents' death.[55] With industrial development, this situation changed because most parents did not have land to pass to their children, and children were in turn less economically dependent on their parents because of labour opportunities resulting from economic development. As a consequence, in industrial societies children were more likely to leave the parental home on reaching adulthood, which implied that nuclear households became more common.

In the mid-twentieth century, this thesis of a shift from extended to nuclear households became widely accepted in social theory due to the development of functionalism. This approach argues that greater social differentiation in societies results in the increasing importance of the nuclear family and a lower relevance of kinship (Parsons & Bales, 1956). The isolated nuclear family is, according to this approach, functionally appropriate for urban modern societies because it is compatible with the geographic and occupational mobility required by the industrial system.

With the influence of functionalism on the one hand, and modernisation theory on the other, the thesis that economic modernisation diminishes the importance of the extended family began to be used to explain family change worldwide. This prompted what has been called the convergence theory, one of whose leading exponents was William J. Goode (McDonald, 1992). In the book entitled *World Revolution and Family Patterns* (1963), Goode argues that wherever industrialisation takes place, the independent conjugal family model

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[54] The central ideas of Le Play on family change were obtained from the following literature in English: Mogey, 1955; Ruggles & Heggeness, 2008.

[55] Le Play distinguished between two types of families in traditional societies (Mogey, 1955, pp. 312–315). The first was the 'patriarchal family', in which all children remain in the parental home. The second was the 'stem family', in which only one child remained in the parental home to inherit family property and the others leave to form their own nuclear families. Le Play also identified a third family type, the 'unstable family', in which all children leave the parental home when forming their own nuclear families.

tends to predominate. This means that the importance of kinship ties would decrease as a result of the development of an economy based on market relations that reduce the authority of parents over their children. As Cherlin summarised:

> If, therefore, both functionalist and modernization theories demonstrated that the marriage-based, single-earner, relatively independent conjugal family was optimal for economically developed societies, and if modernization theory further postulated that all societies were moving on the same path to economic development, then it followed that the conjugal family would spread around the world – not because it was morally superior but because it fit the needs of industrialized societies. (Cherlin, 2012, p. 582)

In Latin America, scholars have also been influenced by functionalism and modernisation theory, which has been reflected in their expectations regarding family and household change. Gino Germani (1969), who was one of the most important exponents of modernisation theory in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s, identified three interrelated processes of change in the transition from a traditional to a modern society: economic development, political modernisation and social modernisation. As far as social modernisation was concerned, the expected shift was from extended to nuclear households. From this approach, the modernisation of Latin American societies should have gone hand-in-hand with a process of nuclearisation of households.[56] The influence of these approaches on family research is still present at the beginning of the twenty-first century. García and Rojas (2001, 2002), for example, also expected a decline of extended households as a result of the process of economic development experienced in most Latin American countries towards the end of the twentieth century.

The thesis of the transition from extended to nuclear households has been empirically criticised in historical research on family change in Europe and the United States. It is noted that extended households were not as common as Goode thought in pre-industrial Western societies. Laslett shows that, in England, households were predominantly nuclear long before industrialisation (Laslett, 1983, op. 91–105). Strong neo-local rules governing the process of

[56] It is important to note that Germani recognised that the process of modernisation was far from linear. Latin American societies were characterised by dualism, which implied that traditional and modern institutions and patterns of behaviours coexisted (Germani, 1969). Thus, the persistence of extended households among some population groups was understood as a result of their lack of integration into the modern sectors of Latin American societies.

family formation, along with a late entrance into marriage and childbearing – which implied that generations tended not to overlap – prevented most pre-industrial English families from living in extended households. In the case of the United States, Ruggles shows that the proportion of extended households actually increased from the preindustrial period to the late nineteen century (Ruggles, 1987, op. 4–6). Additionally, neither urban development nor manufacturing were significantly associated with independent living arrangements of elderly people in the 1880–1910 period (Ruggles, 1994, op. 126). High mortality rates, along with a late entrance into marriage and childbearing were also important demographic constraints to a more widespread presence of extended households in the United States society (Hareven, 1999, p. 133; Ruggles, 1994, pp. 109–10).

Recent comparative research on developing countries has also questioned the relationship between economic modernisation and a decrease in extended households. In a study of changes in intergenerational coresidence among 15 developing countries, Ruggles and Heggeness (2008) found no consistent trend towards household nuclearisation: some countries experienced an increase and others a slight decrease in intergenerational coresidence. Importantly, they found a positive, instead of negative, association between indicators of economic development and older-head intergenerational households (Ruggles & Heggeness, 2008, pp. 269–270).

From functionalism and modernisation theory, the process of economic modernisation experienced in Chile over recent decades leads us to expect that *the prevalence of extended living arrangements among women starting a family would have decreased between 1990 and 2011 in Chile.* If not, the explanation for the persistence of extended living arrangements needs to be sought in the conjunction of various factors, not just in the economic development of societies. In the next section, I discuss other interpretations that reveal the role of cultural and ideational changes in the transformations of family and household structures.

3.2.2 The Impact of Cultural and Ideational Changes on the Process of Family and Household Formation

New theoretical approaches have emerged to explain the dramatic changes experienced in family life over the second half of the twentieth century, both in Europe and North America. These new perspectives have highlighted the impact of cultural and ideational transformations

on patterns of family formation and dissolution. I will refer briefly to the Individualisation approach, as well as the second demographic transition theory.

The theory of individualisation postulates that post-industrial societies have experienced a weakening of traditional social relations, ties and belief systems, while a new individual's dependence on modern institutions – such as the labour market, the education system, or the welfare state – has taken place (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995, 2001; Beck-Gernsheim, 2002).[57] As a result, the importance of class, gender, religion and the family in shaping individual lives has fallen. This means that individuals now have to build their own life trajectories, based on individual decisions, rather than follow an externally defined path. In particular, this transformation of family life has implications for the weakening of kinship ties and marriage, and the search for freedom that goes along with that. Family relations are, therefore, based more on individual fulfilment and consensual love now than in the past, although this also implies an increasing fragility of such ties.

Trends for declining marriage and fertility rates, postponement of marriage and childbearing, as well as increasing divorce and cohabitation, would all be expressions of these cultural and ideational transformations. Importantly for this research, the individualisation of family life is also reflected in an increasing number of people choosing to live alone, as well as in a rise of lone-parent living arrangements. These trends have been interpreted as reflecting the erosion of the nuclear family. As Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (1995, pp. 1–2) noted, 'the nuclear family, built around gender status, is falling apart on the issues of emancipation and equal rights, which no longer conveniently come to a halt outside our private life'. Consequently, the renewed significance of the extended family and extended living arrangements is far from anticipated by individualisation theory.

Along similar lines, another interpretation of recent changes in family life is the second demographic transition (SDT) theory (Lesthaeghe, 1985, 2010; van de Kaa, 2002, 2004). This theory postulates that those societies that have reached a high level of economic security and living standards – through economic development or welfare state provision – have seen higher-order needs emerge. These include 'self-actualization in formulating goals, individual

[57] These modern institutions are focused on the individual rather than the family. This has resulted in a clear tension between both spheres, which is reflected, for example, in the incompatibilities between the requirements of the labour market and the demands of family life (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995, p. 6).

autonomy in choosing means, and recognition by others for their realization' (Lesthaeghe, 2010, p. 218). This new stage of development is characterised by the primacy of individual choice, which leaves behind the strong normative constrains of the 'family ideology' promoted by the church and the state (Lesthaeghe, 2010, p. 217).

As far as family life is concerned, the SDT theory postulates that there has been a deep change regarding attitudes towards the family. Van de Kaa notes that the fall in fertility rates observed in developed societies was not only propelled by a change in attitudes towards having children, but by a more general weakening of family values that affects different dimensions of family life (van de Kaa, 2002, p. 6). Along with the fall in fertility rates below the replacement level, the weakening of the family has also been reflected in the postponement of the mean age for first parenthood, the growth of out-of-wedlock fertility, the rise in cohabitation and the declining importance of marriage, and the increase in divorces and separations (Lesthaeghe, 2010, p. 246). A greater plurality of living arrangements is also expected and increasingly tolerated, which is the result of a transition towards unconventional patterns of household formation (such as childless cohabitants, people living alone, or lone-parent households) (Lesthaeghe & Surkyn, 2002, pp. 20–23, 26–27).

The validity of SDT theory has been strongly criticised in the European context (Coleman, 2004; Esping-Andersen & Billari, 2015). Some of the main criticisms are as follows: firstly, no clear evidence has been found regarding changes in family preferences, except in the area of sexuality. Secondly, a reversal of some trends highlighted by the SDT theory has been observed in recent years, especially with regard to fertility rates, which have started to recover in countries that led the downward trend. Thirdly, there has also been a reversal of fertility patterns at the micro level, showing that education now has a U-relationship with fertility (i.e. higher fertility in the least and the most educated). This reversal matters because of the association between higher levels of education and individualistic values of self-fulfilment and career-oriented attitudes. Fourthly, it has also been criticised for the lack of coherence of the empirical and theoretical expectations related to SDT behaviours, in the sense that those countries with a lower fertility rate are also those that have a lower prevalence of non-traditional family arrangements, such as cohabitation. Finally, it has questioned the assertion that the demographic trends in Central and Eastern European countries can be explained as an expression of a post-materialist sensibility. Instead of experiencing greater material security, these countries experienced a dramatic reduction in material standards of living in recent decades.

Despite criticism, some scholars have used the hypotheses provided by the second demographic transition theory to explain changes in the process of family formation in other regions across the world, such as Asia and Latin America.[58] In the case of Latin America, it has been argued that the dramatic increase in cohabitation during recent decades accounts for the convergence of Latin American societies towards the family patterns predicted by the second demographic transition theory (Esteve et al., 2012).[59] However, this study has overlooked the historical importance of cohabitation in the Latin American family system, by taking as a reference point in its analysis the marriage boom of the 1970s (see Chapter II, which illustrates this point to the Chilean case). Furthermore, in a study on the living arrangements of single mothers and cohabiting women (aged 25–29) in thirteen Latin American countries, it has been shown that the process of family formation does not necessarily go hand-in-hand with the transition to an independent household (Esteve, García-Román, et al., 2012). Most single mothers and a significant proportion of married and cohabiting women live in extended households. Despite such findings, the higher levels of independent residence between cohabiting women without children in Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico and Argentina in comparison with other Latin American countries were interpreted by the authors as indicating a convergence towards European patterns of second demographic transition.

As a result, from individualisation and second demographic transition theories, current cultural and ideological changes expressed in the process of family formation lead us to expect

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[58] This universalistic claim has led some scholars to compare the second demographic transition theory with the nuclearisation hypothesis defended by Goode and others. According to Cherlin (2012), the second demographic transition theory can be considered a variant of the developmental paradigm, because it postulates a convergence towards certain family patterns as a result of economic and cultural development (Cherlin, 2012, pp. 585–586). In Cherlin's words: "it therefore predicts the rise of post-modern family patterns focused on individual autonomy and self-fulfillment, rather than modern family patterns focused on stable marriage" (Cherlin, 2012, pp. 585–586).

[59] This conclusion is based on two main findings. Firstly, despite the negative relationship between cohabitation and education, the increase in educational levels over the period analysed (1970–2000) has not resulted in a decrease in cohabitation. That is, the negative effects of education on cohabitation were neutralised by other factors, which resulted in improvements in education going hand-in-hand with the rise of cohabitation. Secondly, the increase in cohabitation in countries that had relatively low levels in the past, such as Argentina, Brazil and Chile, has been accompanied by attitudinal changes towards 'greater secularism, non-conformist family arrangements, and more egalitarian gender relations' (Esteve, Lesthaeghe, et al., 2012, p. 76).

that *the prevalence of extended living arrangements among women starting a family would have decreased between 1990 and 2011 in Chile.*

3.2.3 The Impact of Changes in Women's Roles and the Process of Family Formation on Extended Living Arrangements

The persistence of a significant proportion of extended households in Latin America, and in Chile in particular, challenges conventional theories of household structure change at the macro level. As a result, new – geographically and historically situated – interpretations are needed. In searching for such interpretations, I consider two complementary hypotheses that account for a positive relationship between economic and social modernisation and extended living arrangements. That is, explanations suggesting that the characteristics produced by the modernisation of Latin American societies may have resulted in the maintaining, or even the increase, of the prevalence of extended households. The first is related to changes in women's roles, particularly regarding increasing female labour force participation. The second refers to recent changes in the process of family formation and dissolution, and the effects on household structures.

In relation to the first point, increasing female employment can be considered an indicator of economic modernisation, as well as a reflection of cultural transformations towards greater gender equality. Some scholars have found in women's new productive roles (and the difficulties of men and the institutional frameworks to adapt to these new roles) an explanation for the recent transformations in the patterns of family formation in the developed world (Esping-Andersen & Billari, 2015; Esping-Andersen, 2009; Razavi, 2013). Esping-Andersen & Billari (2015), for example, have criticised the hypothesis of ideational change as the main explanatory factor for the recent changes in family life in Europe and the United States. They argue that the maintenance of high levels of gender inequality in the distribution of work within the family comes into conflict with the new roles of women in the productive sphere. This has formed, as a result, a disincentive for women to start family life, because women see the responsibilities associated with family life as incompatible with their professional careers. This would explain the fall in fertility rates below the replacement level, as well as the postponement, or even abandonment, of marriage in several European and other developed countries. Thus, these trends reflect adaptations to the new productive role of women. As a consequence, the authors posit that progress towards a more egalitarian distribution of work between men and women would result in a reversal of these trends.

In the case of Chile, changes in women's roles, although incipient, do not seem to have discouraged women from starting families. As noted in Chapter II, family relationships have become less formal in the last decades (dramatic increases in cohabitation and out-of-wedlock births have taken place), and also less stable (resulting in increasing divorces and separations). However, these changes have not prevented people from forming marital unions (either marriages or consensual unions), and having children at an early age, although they are having fewer children than their parents and grandparents. Thus, changes in women's roles in Chile have taken place in the context of the continuing importance of the family in the lives of individuals.

Despite the differences between family trends in Chile and those observed in other developed countries, the hypothesis that family change is the result of conflicts arising from women's new roles could be useful in understanding the persistence of extended households in Chile. The extended family might be playing a central role in providing the necessary support in conciliating the new productive roles of Chilean women with the continuance of their traditional reproductive roles. That is, the conflict resulting from increasing female employment and the persistent gender inequalities within the family and in other spheres of social life has not discouraged women from starting families, mainly because of the support provided by the extended family. Along these lines, it is possible to expect that extended living arrangements will be strengthened as a result of increasing female labour force participation. This is because living in an extended household might facilitate women's employment, insofar as other women within the household (for example, their mothers) can act as substitutes for them in their domestic and childcare responsibilities. The new productive role of women thus becomes compatible with the persistence of an unequal division of reproductive work between men and women. Reproductive work is redistributed among women of different generations, but not between men and women, perpetuating the notion that housework and caring work are women's responsibility.

Based on new interpretations of the impact of changes in women's roles on the process of family formation, it is possible to expect that *the prevalence of extended living arrangements among women starting a family would have increased between 1990 and 2011 in Chile.* This hypothesis seems more plausible when considering that increasing women's employment in Chile has taken place in a context of a neoliberal economic restructuring and weak welfare state provision. As noted in Chapter II, the recent increase in female employment has been mainly concentrated in low-skill jobs, and despite women's increasing education, there still persists a significant wage gap between men and women. Moreover,

there is still insufficient state provision of childcare, which has only begun to increase in recent years.

A second hypothesis to explain the persistence of extended households in Chile is related to the recent changes in the process of family formation and dissolution.[60] As noted in the previous section, new interpretations of family change in the developed world have emphasised the emergence of post-material values associated with growing individualism and the loss of centrality of the family in individuals' lives. Such cultural transformations have been considered the reasons for current patterns of family formation and dissolution. Moreover, it was observed that this could lead us to expect a decline in the prevalence of extended living arrangements. However, as is questioned by Emily Grundy in an analysis of intergenerational coresidence in England and Wales (2000, p. 195), the same transformations in the process of family formation and dissolution that have been considered a response to growing individualism and weakening family orientation could instead lead to an increase in intergenerational coresidence. This is because they result in an increase in single and separate individuals, as well as lone mothers, all of which are more likely to live in multi-generational or extended households.

Chapter II showed that despite the fact that consensual unions have been historically important in Latin America, during the last few decades their prevalence has increased in Chile. It also showed a fall in marriage rates, which has gone hand-in-hand with an increase in separations and divorces. The question, then, is what impact have these changes had on the prevalence of extended households? Following the questions raised by Grundy, it is worth asking whether recent changes in the process of family formation and dissolution in Chile have gone hand-in-hand with an increase in the importance of the support provided by the extended family.

As noted above, research on the subject has shown that certain family structures are strongly associated with extended living arrangements. Studies focused on people of different age groups concur in finding that married people are less likely to live in extended living arrangements than people of other marital statuses (Aquilino, 1990; Cohen & Casper, 2002;

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[60] There is an important body of research showing recent trends in family change in Latin American countries. See: Ariza & de Oliveira, 2001; Arriagada, 2002; Binstock & Cabella, 2011; Cabella, 2007, 2009; Esteve, García-Román, et al., 2012; Esteve, Lesthaeghe, et al., 2012; Fussell & Palloni, 2004; García & Rojas, 2004; Jelin & Díaz-Muñoz, 2003; Jelin, 2007.

Pilkauskas, 2012). Moreover, single lone mothers, particularly those of younger ages, are more likely to live in extended living arrangements than women in unions (Buvinic et al., 1992; Cohen & Casper, 2002; Esteve, García-Román, et al., 2012; Pilkauskas, 2012; Single-Rushton & McLanahan, 2002; Sweet, 1972; Tienda & Angel, 1982). Additionally, evidence from Latin American countries shows that women in consensual unions are more likely to live in extended living arrangements than married women (Esteve, García-Román, et al., 2012). Taking into account these differences, and considering the recent changes in the process of family formation in Chile, it is expected that *the prevalence of extended living arrangements among women starting a family would have increased between 1990 and 2011 in Chile.*

So functionalism and modernization and individualisation and SDT all lead to same conclusion about decrease of extended families (see pag. 129). While recent changes in family formation and women's roles (see pag. 133) lead to the prediction that prevalence of extended families would increase.

3.3 Flows of Support and Relations of Economic Dependence Underlying the Formation of Extended Households

In the previous sections, I surveyed the literature on factors influencing extended living arrangements and intergenerational coresidence and their changes over time. At this point, it is worth asking whether the unequal opportunities for living independently discussed above are also reflected in relations of economic dependence within the household. Identifying who depends on whom within the household allows us to understand the relations of economic support that underlie extended living arrangements. This also reveals the relations of power and authority within the extended household, and the position that individuals with different characteristics occupy in this structure.

Little has been written about the relations of economic dependence within extended households. Nevertheless, some insights can be drawn from two different bodies of research. The first is the analysis of women's economic dependence on their husbands, which is part of a more general concern about gender inequalities and power relations within the family. The second refers to studies on intergenerational relations, particularly those focused on the relations of economic dependence within parent/adult-child households. Thus, the aim of this section is to discuss the main findings of both areas of research in the light of their insights into understanding economic dependence within extended households.

3.3.1 Some Insights from the Literature on Women's Economic Dependence within the Family

Women's economic dependence within the family is a key issue in gender relations. Feminist scholars have highlighted the implications of women's dependence not only in terms of their power position within the household, but also in the reinforcement of their condition of subordination in society as a whole (Balabanova, 2007, p. 12). As far as family life is concerned, women's economic dependence impacts women's power within the household in different ways. From Hirschman's theoretical framework, Hobson (1990) argues that women's access to independent earnings increases their power within the household in two main ways: firstly, economic autonomy allows women to have an influence on family decisions, that is, to have a 'voice' within the household. Secondly, it enables them to end problematic or unsatisfactory relationships, which means they have the ability to 'exit' such relationships.[61]

Regarding the first point, there is evidence that shows that there is a close relationship between women's economic autonomy and their ability to make decisions in different dimensions of domestic life. For example, in Britain, it has been shown that women are more likely to have the 'final say' on big financial decisions if they have a higher income contribution to the household than their partner (Bennett, Henau, & Sung, 2010, p. 220).[62] Women's income contribution to the household also affects the division of housework, although this pattern is less straightforward.[63] From a rational decision-making perspective, the allocation of domestic work is the result of the distribution of marital power, as expressed in economic resources. Therefore, it is expected that women reduce their number of hours of housework as their share of household income increases. However, studies conducted in the United States and other developed countries have shown that when women contribute more than their husbands to the household income, the deviation from the male-provider model is counterbalanced by a traditional division of housework (Bittman, England, Sayer, Folbre, &

[61] Hirschman's theoretical framework has been also used by Gershuny et. al. (2005), who identified three possible outcomes among dual-earner couples: exit (marital dissolution or wife leaving her job), voice (marital conflict) and suffering (women that suffer the dual burden of paid and unpaid work, without modifying the unequal division of domestic labour).

[62] Evidence based on the analysis of male/female couples of working age (Bennett et al., 2010).

[63] See Treas and Drobnič (2010) for an excellent view on the different theoretical perspectives and empirical results regarding the division of domestic labour and its determinants.

Matheson, 2003; Brines, 1994). That is, housework is a way to affirm individuals' gender identity in the case of gender a-typical economic arrangements within the household (Gupta, 2007).

In relation to the second point, it has been shown that economic autonomy enables women to leave unsatisfactory relationships. There is a large tradition in both economics (Becker) and sociology (Parsons) considering how women's economic autonomy increases marital instability, as women's capacity to support themselves lowers their interest in marriage (Sorensen, 2004, p. 286). However, this does not mean that women's economic autonomy increases marital instability in general. There is a great deal of empirical research that challenges the hypothesis that women's economic autonomy is a threat to marriage.[64] It has been argued, instead, that marital unhappiness is the main cause of divorce, and women's economic independence only makes it possible. Indeed, it has been shown that women's economic independence is a factor in 'ending unhappy marriages but does not affect happy marriages' (Schoen, Astone, Kim, Rothert, & Standish, 2002, p. 658).

The Concept of Women's Economic Dependence

In the well-known essay, *A Genealogy of 'Dependency': Tracing a Keyword of the US Welfare State*, Fraser and Gordon (1994) undertook a review of the changes in understanding of the concept of dependence, from the preindustrial period until the end of the twentieth century. They argue that the idea of dependence transited from referring to a condition of generalised subordination in preindustrial times, to a more specific condition of economic, socio-legal and political dependence with the development of industrial capitalism. Such a transition was related to the increasing importance of wage labour in industrial economies. As a result,

[64] For example, it has been argued that women's earnings may improve couples' gains from marriage by raising family income and the standard of living (Oppenheimer, 1997). Empirical evidence for Germany, the United States, and Great Britain shows that couples where the man is the sole breadwinner and the woman is out of the labour market are not more stable than those where the woman has full-time or part-time employment (Cooke & Gash, 2007, p. 24). This occurs despite the three countries analysed having different welfare systems, with different levels of support regarding the reconciliation between female employment and family life. Moreover, evidence for the United States in 2000 showed that female labour force participation and divorce rates are negatively related at state level (Neeman, Newman, & Olivetti, 2008).

dependence became an accepted condition for women and children – those excluded from wage labour – but a degrading condition for adult men (1994, p. 91). Fraser and Gordon point out that the acceptance and promotion of women's dependence in the industrial period contrasts with its current status in post-industrial societies, where all forms of dependence are considered as 'avoidable and blameworthy' (1994, p. 99). They argue that this transformation is related to the weakening of the family wage ideal, which resulted from the massive entry of women into the labour force and the decline in highly-paid jobs among men (1994, p. 100).

As far as the economic dimension of dependence is concerned, the literature on gender inequalities within the family has given special importance to women's own income. In this line, it has been noted that 'the direct cause of a woman's dependence within the family is either that she does not have her own income or that her income is very low' (Balabanova, 2007, p. 12). As noted by Ward, Joshi and Dale, 'income dependency is said to exist if some or part of a person's livelihood depends upon access to income received by someone else in the first instance' (Ward, Joshi, & Dale, 1993, p. 2). Based on this definition, Ward, Joshi and Dale identify two main sources of income: the state and the market. Therefore, married women without a source of income from the market (via employment) are economically dependent on their husbands for their survival. In societies with developed welfare states, women may also be dependent on the State, through social benefits. This situation is particularly important for lone mothers.

The question of women's economic dependence leads us to the issue of the pooling and distribution of resources within the household. Married couples can be considered as economic equals only under the assumption that there are transfers of economic resources between husbands and wives. Such transfers have been traditionally expected to flow from husbands to wives. This is because of the effects of a traditional sexual division of labour within the family, as well as the predominance of gender inequalities in the labour market, which negatively affect the economic position of women. Thus, under such circumstances, the condition for intra-household economic equality is the economic dependence of wives on their husbands (Sorensen & McLanahan, 1987).

It is important to note that this equal-sharing assumption has been strongly criticised by feminist scholars, as it obscures the unequal distribution of resources between men and women within the household (see Bennett, 2013 for a review of the recent research on within-

household distribution).[65] However, if income pooling does not take place, women without a source of income would not have sufficient income for their survival. Therefore, as Ward et. al. noted: 'among married women receiving much less income than their husbands, 'hidden poverty' and 'dependence' are to some extent alternatives. If resources are fully pooled hidden poverty is averted but dependency is established' (Ward et al., 1993, p. 3).

The economic dependence of women, expressed in income inequalities between husbands and wives, has been commonly addressed in relative terms. This means that dependence is measured in terms of the women's share of the couple's total income.[66] Thus, women are considered economically dependent on their husbands if their contribution to the family income is lower than their husband's. Nevertheless, such a concept of relative economic dependence has been challenged by recent research. Analysing the relationship between women's economic dependence and the distribution of domestic work, Gupta (2007) shows that the relative earnings of women do not explain the amount of housework they carry out – but that what matters more is their absolute income. In Gupta's words:

> If women's housework time is unaffected by their husbands' earnings, the degree of their economic dependence as captured by their relative earnings is irrelevant. It could be argued, however, that this unimportance of husbands' earnings is consistent with a modified version of the dependence model, one that derives its explanatory power from women's absolute rather than relative earnings. (Gupta, 2007, p. 413)

Although these results look specifically at the relationship between economic dependence and the distribution of domestic work, they suggest the importance of addressing the issue of dependence of women in absolute terms. That is, it is necessary to rethink the concept of women's economic dependence in terms of a minimum threshold that allows women to live independently in case of separation.

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[65] It has been argued that supporting an equal-sharing assumption has important consequences when determining the level of economic well-being of individuals. For example, traditional measures of poverty based on equal sharing can lead to biased estimates of poverty rates as well as to minimised gender inequalities in terms of living standards (Cantillon, 2013; Falkingham & Baschieri, 2009; Jenkins, 1991).

[66] Later, in Chapter IV, this point is discussed in detail, pointing out the various measures through which this concept has been operationalized.

Predictors of Women's Economic Dependence

Women's economic activity is the most important factor influencing their economic dependence within the family. An early study carried out in the United States shows that a sharp increase in women's economic activity was the main factor influencing the decline in the level of economic dependence of married women on their husbands between 1940 and 1980 (Sorensen & McLanahan, 1987). Studies that include other industrialised countries come to the same conclusion, despite the variations in the welfare regimes among the countries in their samples (Huber, Stephens, Bradley, Moller, & Nielsen, 2009; Sorensen, 2004; Ward et al., 1993). For example, an analysis of fifteen OECD countries shows that female labour force participation explains 56% of the variation in women's share of couples' total income (Huber et al., 2009).

Among employed women, the number of hours they spend in paid work is the main predictor of their level of economic dependence. In Britain, women who work full time are much less likely to be dependent on their husbands' income than those who work part time or are housewives (Ward et al., 1993). A more recent study, which analysed married women in the United States between 1970 and 2001, arrived at similar conclusions. It shows that women who work less than full time are more likely to be secondary providers than equal or main providers (Raley, Mattingly, & Bianchi, 2006). Yet the number of hours that women spend in paid work is clearly affected by their stage in the life course. Women with children are less likely to out-earn their husbands than women without children, but this difference disappears when controlling for the number of hours worked (Winslow-Bowe, 2006, p. 838). This suggests that family responsibilities affect the type of labour force participation of women (full- or part-time), and through it, their economic dependence within the household.

At the institutional level, evidence from European and other industrialised countries has shown a strong relationship between family policies and decreasing women's economic dependence. Policies aimed at facilitating the reconciliation between women's employment and family life, such as those related to the provision of childcare and the extension of maternity leave, ameliorate women's economic dependence by raising their labour force participation (Huber et al., 2009; Mandel, 2014; Stier & Mandel, 2003). Moreover, the effect of

family policies in reducing women's economic dependence has been particularly important among less educated women (Mandel, 2014).[67]

Finally, it has been argued that although access to paid work has been one of the main factors in improving the economic independency of women within the household, it is also important to consider the occupational and earning attainments of women in the labour market (Mandel, 2014). Thus, an important part of the economic dependence of women within the household is also due to the constraints that women face in obtaining high-paid jobs. As Mandel noted, 'working women contribute less to household income mainly because they receive lower returns for their work hours' (Mandel, 2014, p. 488).

It is important to note that this body of research, which mostly has a Western focus, has not considered the role of more complex household structures in the analysis women's economic dependence. The very concept of women's economic dependence, its implications and causes, becomes problematic in societies with a high prevalence of extended households. Firstly, in extended households, women may well be economically dependent not only on their husbands or cohabiting partners, but also on other male relatives, such as their fathers or older brothers. Some women may even be financially dependent on other women (note, for example, the high prevalence of female headship among extended households). This is especially relevant in the case of lone mothers, who are more likely to live in extended households than women in marital unions and are also often excluded from research on women's economic dependence within the family.[68] Secondly, a high prevalence of extended households makes it questionable that the position of women in the social structure relies solely on their husbands or cohabiting partners. Extended household members might make significant contributions to women's economic wellbeing, or, conversely, might negatively affect it. Thirdly, transfers of economic resources within extended households might alter the relation of economic dependence between women and their husbands or cohabiting partners.

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[67] The analyses are based on data for couple-headed households (married or cohabiting), aged 25–60 years, from twenty-one countries (mainly European countries, plus the Unites States, Canada, Australia and Israel).

[68] Studies examining the economic dependency of lone mothers are primarily focused on their welfare dependency. This means that, in the absence of a male breadwinner, the state, and not the extended family, is considered as the main economic provider for single mothers and their children. See for example the study of Huber et al (2009), which addresses the greater economic vulnerability of single mothers in their analysis of women's economic independence.

This leads us to consider the role that household structures (nuclear or extended) play in determining the degree of women's economic dependence on their husbands/cohabiting partners. Such complexities raise the question of to what extent women are economically dependent on other members of the extended household, and what factors make them more likely to be in that situation.

Despite such limitations, research on women's economic dependence is clear in demonstrating that women's employment plays a protective role against their economic dependence within the household. In the context of extended households, it is expected that employment contributes to the economic independence of woman and their family units in respect to other household members. Therefore, *women's employment will be negatively associated with economic dependence within the extended household, with family units including women in full-time employment being less likely to be economically dependent on non-nuclear household members than those in which women are part-time employed or non-employed.*

3.3.2 Economic Dependence in Studies on Intergenerational Coresidence

The second body of research that has addressed the issue of economic dependence within the household is that focused on intergenerational coresidence. Studies conducted in the United States and other developed countries have emphasised the ability to sustain an independent residence as the main indicator of economic autonomy among coresident adults (see for example: Aquilino, 1990; Choi, 2003; Cohen & Casper, 2002; Ruggles & Heggeness, 2008; Ruggles, 2007; Smits et al., 2010; Speare & Avery, 1993). This ability is used as a criterion for distinguishing between those who provide support through coresidence and those who receive it. That is, given coresidence, individuals who live in the home belonging to someone else (or having moved to live in someone else's home) are considered economically dependent on those who provide the place to live. Nevertheless, this does not mean that individuals considered economically dependent are not able to provide other types of support or assistance to the individuals that host them, but those who retain their own home maintain, at least, a central aspect of their independence (Cohen & Casper, 2002, p. 4).[69]

[69] The flow of economic support from parent to adult children, however, does not seem to be compensated with flows of other kind of support in the opposite direction. For example, evidence from the United States shows that adult children do not significantly contribute to housework in

These studies have concluded that coresidence disproportionally benefits adult children (the younger generation), who are economically dependent on their coresident parents (the older generation). In an early study in the area, Aquilino (1990, p. 409) found that 97% of parents who live with an adult child were residing in their own household in the United States. A similar conclusion was reached by Casper and Cohen (2002). They distinguished two different roles within intergenerational households on the basis of the householder status: those people who are 'hosts' and those who are 'guests' within the household. They showed that the 'guest' status (that is, people who live in other people's household) peaks in the late twenties, while the 'host' status peaks mainly in the fifties (Cohen & Casper, 2002, pp. 9–10). Such findings have challenged the idea that intergenerational coresidence is mainly driven by the needs of vulnerable elders that seek support from their adult children.

The ability to maintain independent living is not the only aspect that needs to be considered when examining economic dependence within extended and multigenerational households. Although housing is an important asset for sustaining independency at different stages of the life course, it is also necessary to have permanent income in order to afford other needs such as food, clothing and basic services, and health and education in societies where these services are only minimally covered by the state (such as the United States or, as in the case analysed in this dissertation, Chile). Unlike the literature on women's economic dependence discussed above, research on intergenerational coresidence has often failed to consider the income contribution to the household when analysing intra-household economic dependence. Some evidence in this regard – although not very up-to-date – can be found in a study carried out in the United States by Speare (1993), based on longitudinal data from the 1980s. This study analysed the proportion of adult children living with their parents that contribute their share or more to the household income. Such contribution is considered as an indicator of who benefits most from coresidence. More recently, and also in the United States, Kahn et al. (2013) compared the income received by the members of each generation within intergenerational households in order to establish which generation is financially dependent

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intergenerational households (Spitze & Ward, 1995). As the authors of this study noted: 'At best, many adult children are probably doing the extra housework that they generate, but are probably not relieving parents of any substantial amount of other housework in exchange for living in the household' (Spitze & Ward, 1995, p. 369).

on the other, and how this has changed over the last fifty years.[70] Similarly to the findings of those analyses focused on the control over the dwelling, both studies found a greater economic dependence among the younger generation when compared with the older one.[71]

It is important to note that none of the studies discussed above tested the correlation between economic dependence based on the 'guest' status and that based on a lower contribution to household income. If living in someone else's home is an adequate indicator of economic dependence in the case of Chile, one would expect that *subfamily living will be positively associated with the likelihood of being economically dependent within the extended household, with women in subfamilies being more likely to be economically dependent on non-nuclear household members than women heading the household.* Along with that, it is worth asking whether the greater economic dependence of the younger generations observed in the United States can be also expected in Chile. If so, it is possible to expect that *young adult women in family units will be more likely to be economically dependent on non-nuclear extended household members than older women.*

Other Predictors of Economic Dependence within Multigenerational Households

As might be expected, having fewer socioeconomic resources is also associated with greater economic dependence on other household members. Research on intergenerational coresidence shows that income, education and labour force participation play an important role in explaining economic dependence within multigenerational households. In the United States, Cohen and Casper (2002, pp. 14–16) found that, given coresidence, and after taking age into account, individuals with lower levels of income, education and employment are more

[70] The authors define financial dependency as contributing less than 40% of multigenerational income, among young and older people living in multigenerational household only.

[71] Kahn et. al. (2013) show that the greater economic dependency among the younger generation represents a reversal of the patterns observed in the 1960s. Income dependency rose sharply for adult children who lived with their parents (from 19.2% in 1960 to 47.7 % in 2010) and fell also sharply for parents who lived with an adult child (from 54.4 % in 1960 to 26 % in 2010). This has been understood as the result of the improvement in the economic wellbeing of the older generation and the greater economic difficulties faced by the younger generation over the past fifty years.

likely to be 'guests' than those with higher levels; that is, they are more likely to be economically dependent on the other generation. Similarly, Choi (2003) analysed who moves in with whom, and their reasons for moving, among parents and adult children who coreside in the United States. This study shows that coresidence motivated by the needs of adult children is associated with the non-working status of the adult child.

The available analyses of intergenerational economic dependence based on income contribution to the household have arrived at similar conclusions. For example, the previously mentioned study carried out by Kahn et al. (2013) in the United States shows that individuals with fewer economic resources have a higher likelihood of being financially dependent on the other generation, regardless of the year analysed (1960–2010). In particular, higher education equally protects both the younger and the older generation from being dependent on each other, and its effect has become stronger over time (controlling for the education of the other generation). However, the effect of education on economic dependence within the household could have an inverse relationship in the case of young people who are currently studying. That is, it is possible to expect a prolonged financial dependence among the younger generation as a result of increased school and higher education attendance (Schneider, 2000, p. 9).

Employment also protects against dependence in both generations, especially when the other generation is unemployed, and this is an effect that has remained strong over time (Kahn et al., 2013). The protective role of employment against economic dependence is in line with the evidence provided by studies of women's economic dependence on their husbands/cohabiting partners.

The similarities between Chile and the United States in terms of welfare state benefits lead us to expect *that family units with fewer economic resources will be more likely to be economically dependent on non-nuclear household members than those with greater economic resources. The former will be family units with lower income and adults with less than secondary education, and the latter will be family units with higher income and adults with secondary or higher education.*

Along with looking at age and socioeconomic resources, research conducted in the United States highlights the marital status of individuals as an important predictor of their dependence within intergenerational households. Being married is consistently associated with lower economic dependence in intergenerational households when compared to being single or divorced. This has been interpreted as being indicative of the greater sense of

obligation of parents towards unmarried adult children, which results in greater support for them. For instance, Cohen & Casper (2002, p. 14) showed that in the three groups analysed (White, Black, and Latino individuals), married people were less likely to be guests – that is, to live in a household that is not of their own (except in the case of married men and women with children under the age of six). Similarly, Choi (2003) found that coresidence to help the parent, as opposed to a coresidence in which the parent and adult child had always lived together, was positively associated with the child's married/cohabiting status. Additional evidence is provided by Speare & Avery (1993), who found that between 62% and 64% of married children and only between 22% and 29% of unmarried children contribute their share or more of the household income.

In spite of taking into account the effect of marital status, the more general impact of family structures is neglected by the aforementioned studies. This is an important omission when determining economic dependence within the household, because having or not having a coresident partner and children affects the ratio of economic contributors/dependants within the household, as well as within family units. Lone mother households, for example, have a smaller number of potential employable members compared to married and cohabiting couples. This fact, along with the greater sense of obligation from parents towards unmarried adult children noted above, leads us to expect that *lone mothers will be more likely to be economically dependent on non-nuclear household members than married and cohabiting women*.

Research on intergenerational coresidence provides important evidence on the factors affecting economic dependence within multigenerational households, which helps to orientate the analysis carried out in this dissertation. However, as noted above, it is necessary to take into account that these studies are mainly focused on parent/adult-child coresidence; therefore, they tend to overlook the presence of other individuals (sometimes other generations) within the household. This is a similar limitation to that observed in studies on women's economic dependence, which might restrict the understanding of economic dependence within the household insofar as it produces a partial picture of the needs and relations of household members. It is fair to acknowledge that extended households are much less common in Western Europe than in Latin America or Asia. Yet they are common in the United States, where most of the research discussed in this section took place. Moreover, recent evidence shows that extended households have increased in the United States as a

result of the deterioration of the economic opportunities following the recent economic crisis (Pew Social and Demographic Trends, 2010; Pilkauskas, Garfinkel, & McLanahan, 2013, 2014; Pilkauskas, 2012).[72]

3.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses

As noted in Chapter I (*Introduction*), this dissertation is aiming to investigate the factors that explain extended living arrangements in Chile and their persistence over the 1990–2011 period. I address three main objectives in this dissertation, and for each of them I have defined specific research questions that have guided this literature review. In this last section, I have elaborated a set of hypotheses that emerged from the literature review conducted in this chapter.

<u>Linked to research objective one:</u> The first objective of this dissertation is to identify the main determinants of extended living arrangements among women living in family units.

1.1 Family income will be negatively associated with the likelihood of living in extended households, with family units with a higher income being less likely to live in extended living arrangements than those with a lower income.

1.2 Education will not be associated with the likelihood of living in extended households, with adult women with secondary and higher education being as likely to reside in extended living arrangements as those with less than secondary education.

1.3 Different life stages will be associated with the likelihood of living in a subfamily, as opposed to heading an extended household. The former will be young women in the family formation stage and the latter will be middle-aged women who are more likely to have the assets to support their coresident adult children.

[72] Household structure may play a role in the relations of dependency among household members. Recent evidence in India, for example, shows that household structures significantly affect the autonomy of women (in terms of their power of decision-making and freedom of movement). Thus, women living in nuclear households are more likely to have decision-making power within the household and freedom to work for pay, and less likely to need permission from other members to perform routine activities, than women living in joint households (Debnath, 2015).

1.4 Non-traditional family forms will be positively associated with the likelihood of living in extended households and with subfamily living in particular, with lone mothers and consensual unions being more likely to live in extended living arrangements than married couples.

1.5 Family units with children under school age will be more likely to live in extended households than those without children or with older children.

Linked to research objective two: The second objective of this dissertation is to investigate the relationship between the process of family formation and extended living arrangements in Chile, and how this relationship has changed over the 1990–2011 period.

2.1 In accordance with either modernisation theory and second demographic transition theory the prevalence of extended living arrangements among women starting a family would have DECREASED between 1990 and 2011 in Chile, OR based on the changes in family formation and women's roles, the prevalence of extended living arrangements would have INCREASED.

Linked to research objective three: The third objective of this dissertation is to explore the relations of economic dependence within extended households and how they inform us about the flows of support that underlie the formation of extended households.

3.1 Women's employment will be negatively associated with economic dependence within the extended household, with family units in which women are in full-time employment being less likely to be economically dependent on non-nuclear household members than those where women are part-time employed or non-employed.

3.2 Subfamily living will be positively associated with the likelihood of being economically dependent within the extended household, with women in subfamilies being more likely to be economically dependent on non-nuclear household members than women heading the household.

3.3 Young adult women in family units will be more likely to be economically dependent on non-nuclear extended household members than older women.

3.4 Family units with fewer economic resources will be more likely to be economically dependent on non-nuclear household members than those with greater economic resources.

3.5 Lone mothers will be more likely to be economically dependent on non-nuclear household members than married and cohabiting women.

CHAPTER IV: METHODS

As previously stated, the aim of this dissertation is to investigate the factors that explain extended living arrangements in Chile and their persistence over the 1990–2011 period. In Chapter III, I reviewed the literature related to the three objectives of this research, which allows me to raise a set of hypotheses for the empirical analysis of the research questions related to these objectives. Such research questions are answered using a quantitative approach, which is based on the statistical analysis of a cross-sectional socio-economic household survey. As introduced at the beginning of this dissertation, the analytical strategy of this research is to approach the analysis of extended households by focusing on adult women in family units – that is, married and cohabiting women, and lone mothers. This allows me to account for the majority of family units in Chile.[73] Among those living in extended households, I distinguish between women who head the household and those who join it as a subfamily.

In this chapter, I present the methodology used in this research. I start by describing the main characteristics of the CASEN survey. Then, I define the measures used in the different analyses. Some of these measures are common for all the analyses carried out in this dissertation, while others are specific for one particular analysis. After that, I present the working samples for each of the research objectives of this dissertation, to finish with a description of the data-analysis strategy.

4.1 Data

The source of data for this dissertation is the National Socio-economic Characterisation Survey (CASEN) 1990–2011. The CASEN survey is carried out by the *Ministerio de Desarrollo Social* (Ministry of Social Development) for Chile, and its main aim is to characterise the socio-

[73] Family units composed of lone fathers are excluded from the analyses; however, these only represent 2.5% of all family units at national level in 2011 (data from the CASEN survey).

economic conditions of the Chilean population and evaluate the impact of social policy (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, 2011c). Along with demographic characteristics, it provides information on income, education and the employment status of all household members, as well as detailing the level of access to health provision, housing, subsidies, and social programmes. The CASEN survey has a cross-sectional design, which involves the use of data recorded in a succession of surveys at different points in time, with a new sample analysed on each occasion. The CASEN survey is the most nationally representative data source to analyse living arrangements in Chile and the demographic and socio-economic factors associated with them.

In the CASEN survey, data is gathered from individuals within households through personal interviews. Information is available on a household and individual level. One methodological advantage for the purposes of this research is that this survey also provides information at the level of the family unit, which allows us to identify all couple and parent-child pairs within the household. This is an advantage compared with information from population censuses, which – in considering only kinship relations in respect to the head of the household – does not allow us to identify all the family units that may exist within an extended household.

The CASEN survey has national coverage, but some extremely isolated places are excluded. It surveys people living in private households; people who reside in communal establishments are not included in the sample. The CASEN survey is representative at national, regional and municipal level (except the CASEN 2011, which ceased to be representative at the municipal level, keeping only their national and regional representation). The dates of fieldwork are the November and December of each year in which it has taken place.

Table IV.1. Complete samples available in CASEN Survey*

Year	Households	Family units	Individuals
1990	25,793	30,805	104,653
1992	35,948	42,196	142,703
1994	45,379	54,031	177,340
1996	33,636	40,425	133,886
1998	48,107	57,829	187,809
2000	65,036	78,905	252,217
2003	68,153	82,363	256,447
2006	73,720	88,930	268,508
2009	71,460	84,818	246,782
2011	59,084	70,754	200,160

**Excluding live-in domestic workers and their family unit.*

CASEN survey includes weights to adjust for its complex sampling design. Weights are calculated from three components (for more information on the methodology for developing weights, see Ministerio de Desarrollo Social 2012b): a) Base weights, which are the inverse of the probability of selection of a dwelling, conditional on the selection of the cluster that contains it; b) Non-response adjustments, which compensate for fact that not all individuals respond the survey (patterns of non-response that are corrected by an analysis of propensity score stratification); and c) Post-stratification adjustments, which seek to correct failures in the coverage of subpopulations of interest and adjust population estimations obtained from the survey with the actual population. The final weights are: (Final wt) = (Base wt) * (NR adj) * (poststrat adj).

4.2 Measures

In this section, I present the variables used in the analyses carried out in this research. Firstly, before referring to the dependent and independent variables included in the models, I discuss the definitions of 'household' and 'family unit', which are at the core of the analyses conducted in this research. Secondly, I describe the dependent variables used in each of the following empirical chapters. I present the definitions of extended and nuclear households, and subfamily and host-family living arrangements, which are the dependent variables of the first two empirical chapters of this dissertation (Chapters V and VI). Along with this, I explain the measure of economic dependence for family units within extended households proposed in this dissertation, which is the dependent variable used in the analyses of Chapter VII. Finally, I define the predictors and control variables used in the analyses. Some of them are common to all empirical chapters, while others are specific for one of them. It should also be noted that in the case of Chapter VII – which addresses the issue of economic dependence within extended households – variables referring to subfamily and host-family living arrangements are used as predictors of economic dependence instead of as dependent variables.

4.2.1 Household and Family Unit

Following the recommendations of the United Nations, a household is usually defined as a single person or a group of people, related or unrelated, who live in the same dwelling and have a common food budget (CELADE/ECLAC, 2011; United Nations, 2008). As far as family research is concerned, this definition of household emphasises coresidence rather than kinship

ties. Thus, the household differs from the family as the latter refers to a group of kin, that is, a group of persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption, which may or may not share the same household (Burch, 1979).

It is worth noting that using the household as the unit of analysis for family research neglects the broad family structure in which individuals are embedded, that is, the importance of non-coresident family members in family life (Hill, 1995). Relationships between persons living apart may play a significant role in the provision for the basic needs of household members. The increase in divorces, separations, and re-marriages in recent decades made this limitation even more significant, because the interchange between people living apart may play a central role, for example, in the economic and emotional situation of children and their socialisation (Hill, 1995). The same consideration is also valid in the case of fictitious kin relations – as the case of '*compadrazgo'* in Latin American societies – which could also be an important source of economic and childcare support for families. Despite such limitations, the household serves as the basis of reproduction and survival for individuals and families (González de la Rocha, 1995). The physical proximity involved in living in the same household facilitates the provision of support and the sharing of resources among household members on a daily basis.

Along with the household, another important conceptual and analytical unit in this research is the family unit. I rely on the concept of 'conjugal family unit' (CFU) proposed by Hammel and Laslett (1974). Following their definition, I consider a family unit as a coresident family group composed of one or both parents with their unmarried children, or a couple without coresident children (Hammel & Laslett, 1974, p. 86). For these purposes, a child is an unmarried individual of any age who lives with their parent(s) and has no children living in the same household. Because of the high prevalence of consensual unions in Latin America, in this dissertation I understand 'unmarried children' as those not married, and also those not taking part in a consensual union.

I opted for the use of the CFU concept instead of the 'Minimal Household Units' (MHU) proposed by Ermisch and Overton (1985) because the focus of this research is on the family unit rather that on the individuals that compose it. Indeed, this research is focused on 'family units' rather than 'household units'. The concept of MHU emphasises the economic dimension of residential units; as a result, the MHU is understood as a unit of economic decision-making. Thus, it is considered that a couple constitutes one of these units to the extent that both partners make decisions together to maximise the welfare of the unit. Similarly, lone fathers

and lone mothers form a MHU insofar as they make decisions for their dependent children. However, since the dimension of decision-making is emphasised, only dependent children are considered part of the same unit as their parents. All unmarried individuals over the minimum school leaving age are considered as forming an independent MHU: 'In contrast to earlier models, individuals were considered, at least potentially, able to make their own decisions as soon as they were able to leave school and earn their own living' (Ermisch & Overton, 1985, p. 36). In this research, however, an unmarried adult without co-resident children is not considered an independent family unit.

In this research, I opted for a definition of family unit that considers all unmarried children without children of their own part of the same unit as their parents, because I seek to emphasise the dimensions of family structure rather than those of economic decision-making when explaining living arrangements. However, it should be noted that given the young age profile of the phenomenon under study (subfamilies), this distinction becomes less relevant. In fact, data from the CASEN survey shows that only 2.9% of subfamilies include at least one adult child aged 25 or over in 2011.

To sum up, the definition of family unit used in this research can involve women in cohabiting or marital unions with or without children, as well as lone parents (see Figure IV.1). It is worth noting that the definition of the family unit used in this dissertation excludes other family units that can be formed by relatives with less direct relationships, such as a grandmother with her grandchildren, or two unmarried siblings. Although they could be considered as family units insofar as their members are kin (de Vos, 1987),[74] for the purposes of this analysis they are not considered.[75]

[74] Households composed exclusively of this type of family unit are commonly defined as "no family" households, for example, as in the case of the UN/ECLAC household typology (See Arriagada, 2002; The United Nations-ECLAC, 2007). However, some scholars have highlighted the importance of recognising these types of households as family households, in particular, as extended households (de Vos, 1987, p. 508).

[75] These family units represent 4.5% of all family units in Chile in 2011 (data from the CASEN survey).

Figure IV.1. Different types of family units for adult women

MNC	•Married couples no children
CNC	•Cohabiting couples no children
MC	•Married couples with children
CC	•Cohabiting couples with children
SLM	•Single lone mothers
D/SLM	•Divorced/separated lone mothers
WLM	•Widowed lone mothers

4.2.2 Dependent variables

Defining extended households – as opposed to other household types – is of central importance in this dissertation. In order to do that, I will start by briefly describing two influential household typologies used in research on family sociology and demography. One of them is that proposed by Hammel and Laslett (1974) for the comparative study of household composition. This typology is based on the relationships between different household members and includes five categories: 'solitary', 'no family', 'simple family', 'extended family', and 'multi-family' households (Hammel & Laslett, 1974). As far as family households are concerned, simple families consist of one or both parents with their unmarried children, or a couple without coresident children, that is, only one conjugal family unit (CFU) as defined above. Extended families include, in addition to one CFU, other related individuals who do not belong to the CFU. A special case for extended families is that of multi-family households, which contain two or more conjugal units.

Another household typology is that elaborated by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) following the recommendations of the United Nations (UN) (Arriagada, 2002; United Nations, 2008). This typology has been broadly used in Latin American research on families and households, because it fits the data available in population censuses. Unlike the typology developed by Hamel and Laslett, this builds its categories on the basis of the relationships of household members with respect to the household head, the

household head being identified as such by other household members. Firstly, this typology includes two types of households that are identified as non-family households: 'single-person' (households consisting of only one person) and 'non-nuclear households (those composed of two or more individuals who do not form a conjugal couple or parent-child unit, although they may have other kinship ties). Then, among family households, this typology includes three more types. These are 'nuclear families' (one or both parents with their children, or a couple without coresident children); 'extended households' (one or both parents with their children, or a couple without coresident children, plus other relatives); and 'composite households' (one or both parents with their children, or a couple without coresident children, with or without other relatives, but including individuals unrelated to the household head).

In this dissertation, a household is considered as nuclear when it is composed of only one family unit, as defined above. Such classification is the same as that included in the UN/ECLAC and the Hammel and Laslett typology. A household is classified as extended when, in addition to the family unit, there are other individual relatives or other family units, or both. This definition of extended households is similar to that proposed by Hammel and Laslett (1974), but groups together the categories of 'extended family households' and 'multiple family households'. At the same time, this definition of extended households is different from that commonly used in official statistics from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) as it is not conditional on the existence of a main family unit, which is that of the individual who are defined as the household head (Arriagada, 2002; The United Nations-ECLAC, 2007).

The main advantage of a definition of an extended household as proposed in this research is that it identifies all family units within the household, which does not occur with the UN/ECLAC typology. In that typology, it is possible to know if a household is extended to the extent that it includes other non-nuclear relatives of the household head. However, it is unclear whether those relatives have their own family units or not. This limitation results in the invisibility of those family units that live in a household headed by someone else. Making visible those family units is one of the main contributions of this dissertation to research on extended households.

This study distinguishes two different positions that family units can occupy within extended households, which are based on household headship. Thus, a family unit can head an extended household or join it as a subfamily. A head-family unit is that of the individual or couple who are defined as the household heads. In the CASEN survey, as in most Latin

American censuses, household headship is based on a self- or proxy-reporting criterion. That is, the head of household is the person recognised as such by other household members. In this dissertation, when such person has a spouse or cohabiting partner, both are considered household heads. The CASEN survey does not provide a measure of householder status, which refers to whom owns the dwelling. Nevertheless, the measure of household headship used in this dissertation is strongly related to owner-occupancy; indeed, data from the CASEN 2011 shows that in 93.3% of owner-occupied households, the head of household or his/her spouse or cohabiting partner are the owners of the dwelling. Similarly, the measure of household headship used in this dissertation is strongly related to an economic measure of household headship (the head of household as the person earning the major income within the household). Data from the CASEN 2011 shows that 79.5% of household heads are also the main income earners in the household.

Following the definition of extended households presented above, a head-family unit can share the household either with other relatives (extended family members) or with other family units (subfamilies), or a combination of both. A subfamily unit is that in which none of its members are considered household heads. A subfamily unit can be hosted by both a family unit or by a relative who does not have their own family unit.

Figure IV.2 presents a diagram of the possible family arrangements that can be found in an extended household, which considers the presence of head-families and subfamilies as defined above. Family units (both head-families and subfamilies) considered in this diagram can adopt any of the types presented in Figure IV.1. As previously noted, the definition of the extended household used in this dissertation excludes households that can be composed by relatives with less direct relationships, such as a grandmother with her grandchildren, or two unmarried siblings. That is, households in which there is no family unit – as defined above – are not considered as extended even though they may be composed of relatives.

Figure IV.2. Family arrangements within an extended household

TYPE I	Head-family unit	1 or more subfamily units		e.g. A middle-aged cohabiting couple living with their two adult children, one of which is a single lone mother.
TYPE II	Head-family unit	1 or more subfamily units	1 or more individuals*	e.g. A middle-aged married couple living with their married son and their daughter in law, plus the mother of women in the head-family unit.
TYPE III	Head-family unit	1 or more individuals*		e.g. A divorced lone mother hosting her two unmarried children and her elderly father.
TYPE IV	Individual household head	1 or more subfamily units		e.g. An unmarried woman hosting her brother and his wife.
TYPE V	Individual household head	1 or more subfamily units	1 or more individuals*	e.g. An elderly widow hosting her daughter and grandson, plus her nephew.

** Individuals that do not belong to any family unit.*

The decision to differentiate between head-families and subfamilies follows that carried out by other studies, which highlight the different positions that individuals occupy within an extended or a multigenerational household. Thus, it is similar to that used by Kamo (2000), who differentiates between “primary family members” and “extended family members” within an extended household. It is also similar to that carried out by Cohen & Casper (2002), who distinguish between “hosts” and “guests” within a multigenerational household. Using a strategy of this type allows us to better understand the flow of support that underlies the formation of extended households and how these change over the life course. Such issues are poorly addressed in analyses based on undifferentiated measures of household extension, which do not consider the unequal position individuals occupy within these households (see for example, Angel & Tienda 1982; De Vos 1990, 1995).

In Latin America, there is very little quantitative research unpacking the extended household. As noted at the beginning of this dissertation, some scholars have highlighted the importance of recognising those family units that are hidden within extended households, as well as the limitations of available data (population census and national household surveys) for their identification and analysis (Arriagada, 2002, p. 142; Cerrutti & Binstock, 2009, p. 31; Jelin & Díaz-Muñoz, 2003, p. 5). An interesting contribution to unpacking the extended household is

found in two analysis of the Argentinean case carried out in 2005 (Ariño, 2005; Street, 2005), which provide some descriptive evidence of secondary family units.[76] Ariño found that about 800,000 Argentinean urban households contained other secondary family units, which accounted for 9% of all households and 43.7% of extended households (Ariño, 2005, p. 265). The fact that nearly one tenth of all households included at least one secondary family unit is all the more striking when considering that Argentina has one of lowest proportions of extended households in the region (see Chapter I). Such findings highlight the importance of considering non-nuclear members of extended households as family units rather than individual members.

Finally, an important aspect to highlight with regard to the composition of extended households in Chile is their three-generational character. Unlike other family systems that also have a high prevalence of extended households (for example, in the case of some areas of Africa, where is common that extended households are composed by siblings living with their own nuclear families), in Latin America extended households tend to be vertically extended. Thus, a typical form of household extension is the permanence of newly formed families in the parental home (either young couples or single lone mothers). Moreover, it must be added that, at least in the case of Chile, this situation takes place mainly in the woman's parental home. Table VI.2 clearly shows that most of the subfamilies in Chile live in the woman's parental home.

Table IV.2. Adult women in subfamilies by relationship with the household head. Chile, 1990, 2000 and 2011

Relationship with the household head	1990	2000	2011
Daughter	63.9%	68.7%	70.3%
Daughter in law	19.1%	16.4%	14.5%
Granddaughter	2.5%	2.7%	3.4%
Other family relationship	12.9%	11.1%	10.6%
Non-family relationship	1.6%	1.1%	1.2%
Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**

Notes: Samples weights applied.

[76] This analysis was made possible by a survey developed in 2001 by the Argentinean Ministry of Social Development: the *Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida* (Survey of Living Conditions), which included information about the relationships between all household members and not only in respect to the household head.

Having defined the dependent variables for the analyses carried out in chapters V and VI, which refer to extended living arrangements, I turn now to the dependent variable used in the models conducted in chapter VII. This is an indicator of economic dependence based on the degree of income contribution of each family unit to the extended household.

Research on women's economic dependence on their husbands has used two main measures of economic dependence. One is proposed by Sørensen & McLanahan, who measure economic dependence as the difference between the husband and the wife's earnings, divided by their combined earnings (Sorensen & McLanahan, 1987). Such measure ranges from 1 to −1, 1 being when the woman makes no income contribution to the household and, therefore, is completely economically dependent on her husband, and −1 being when the man is completely dependent on his wife. Total equality is reached when the measure is 0. This measure has been broadly used in studies on the subject (see, for example, Berkel & Graaf, 1998; Bittman et al., 2003; Brines, 1994; Evertsson & Nermo, 2004; Hobson, 1990). Another measure is the woman's relative contribution to the couple's total earnings, which ranges from 0% to 100%, with 50% indicating economic equality between husbands and wives (Gupta, 2007).

Measures of economic dependence in multigenerational households are similar to those mentioned above. In a recent study of coresidence and financial dependence in the United States, Kahn et. al. (2013) propose a measure of intergenerational income dependence that considers whether the individual (plus his/her spouse, in the case of those married) contributes less than 40% of the total income of the two generations within the household. This calculation also considers the combined income of the two-coresident generations and not the total household income (in the case of those households where there are other members who are not part of the two generations analysed). The problem with this measure is that it does not take family composition into account. That is, it compares the income contribution of individuals who may have very different family situations (for example, an older generation composed of a married couple and a younger generation composed of a single individual without children, or an older generation composed of a divorced lone mother and a younger generation composed of a married couple). This could result in a misleading indicator of economic dependence, as individuals with different family situations vary in terms of their income earning possibilities.

Such measures of economic dependence based on income contribution could, however, be adjusted to analyse dependence of family units within extended households.

Because of the heterogeneous composition that characterises both extended households and the family units within them, it is necessary to develop a measure that takes into account the composition family unit and its weight within the household. In order to do that, the measure of income contribution of family units to the extended household that I use in this dissertation is based on an equivalence scale. The aim of equivalence scales is adjusting household's income according to its composition. The rationale behind this is that the needs of a household do not grow proportionally with each new additional member because of economics of scale in consumption (needs for housing space or basic services are not three times as high for a household with family of three members than for a single person household). I used the Modified OECD Equivalence Scale, which assigns a value of 1 to the household head (main adult in the household); 0.5 to each additional adult member (individuals aged 18 and older) and a value of 0.3 to each child (individuals under 18). The value 1 is assigned to the household head, and not the head of each subfamily within the household, because the head is more likely to own or be the tenant of the dwelling. Equally, it is highly likely that she or he remains as household head if the subfamily leaves the home. As a consequence, such a measure is expected to result in lower levels of economic dependency than a measure based on per capita income.

The measure used in this dissertation is based on the relationship between the actual share of household income contributed by each family unit to the extended household, and the share that it would be expected if each family unit contribute income in the same proportion of its 'equivalised' family-unit size within the extended household. In particular, the measure of economic dependence proposed here is the proportion of the expected share of income (equivalised) that each family unit actually contributes to the extended household.

In order to compute this measure of income contribution, the following steps are required.

- Firstly, the expected share of household income of each family unit is calculated as: the number of 'equivalent adults' in the family unit divided by the total number of 'equivalent adults' in the entire extended household.
- Secondly, the actual share of income of each family unit is calculated as the sum of the incomes of all family unit members from wages, pensions, investment interest, and other sources (before taxes, plus government transfers), divided by the total income received by all of the members in the extended household. I use a measure of income before tax because the CASEN survey does not provide information on disposable

income. In any case, the percentage of the population that pays personal tax is low in Chile. Indeed, 81.2% of the population receives income below the tax threshold, so they are exempt from paying taxes. Likewise, 12.3% of the employed people pay only 5% of their personal income as tax (Servicio de Impuestos Internos, s/f).

- Finally, the measure of income contribution is estimated as the actual share of income divided by the expected one for each family unit. A value of 100% means that the actual share of income of the family unit is equivalent to the expected one. A value lower than 100% indicates that the family unit contributes, in terms of income, in a lower proportion than what would be expected according to its number of members.

Following a strategy similar to that used in other studies on the subject, I elaborate a dependent variable that categorises the continuous measure of income contribution in order to identify those women who are economically dependent on other household members (see Kahn et al., 2013 and Speare & Avery, 1993, in the case of multigenerational households, and Sorensen & McLanahan, 1987, in the case of women's economic dependence).[77] Thus, those family units that contribute less than 80% of their expected share of household income are considered economically dependent on the rest of the extended household members (that is, those who do not belong to their own family unit).

4.2.3 Independent variables

In the following, I define the independent variables used in the different analyses conducted in this research. Depending on the hypothesis they are designed to assess, these variables are included in some models as predictors, while in others are incorporated only as controls. Likewise, quantitative variables are included in some cases as continuous variables, while in others are categorised for the purposes of examination. There are two variables that are only included in a specific analysis of this research, a model based on a subsample of women in marital unions that is included in Chapter VI. These variables correspond to the employment

[77] For example, using a similar measure of income contribution within intergenerational households, Kahn, Goldscheider, and García-Manglano (2013) assume that when one of the two generations in the household contribute less than 40% of the total two-generation household income, that generation is likely to be the recipient of financial support from the other generation.

arrangements of the couple and the age difference between the members of the couple. Tables of descriptives for the independent and dependent variables for the different analyses are included in the respective empirical chapters.

Variables referring to economic needs:

- Income as a continuous variable. Income (logged) will be obtained from the per capita autonomous income of the family units to which the woman belongs (the CASEN survey collects information on income received by all household members from external sources). People without autonomous income (incomes of 0) were set to 0 in the logarithmic variable.
- Income quintile. In some analyses, income is categorised into quintiles, without logarithmic transformation. Each quintile corresponds to one fifth of family units ranked in ascending order according to the per capita autonomous family-unit income, where the Quintile I represents the poorest 20% of family units and Quintile V represents the richest 20% of family units. This is included through five dummy variables: a) quintile I, b) quintile II, c) quintile III, d) quintile IV, and e) quintile V.
- Education will be based on the original variable of 'years of education', which is recoded into three dummy variables: a) incomplete high school education, which includes people who have not finished the obligatory curriculum of 12 years of schooling; b) complete high school education, people who have completed the obligatory curriculum only; and c) some or complete higher education.

Variables referring to life-course factors:

- Age will be included through the following dummy variables: 15–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64 and 65 and over. The decision to categorise the variable age was made in order to capture the nonlinearity observed in previous examinations of data (in particular, the rates of extended living among women by age are bimodal). In the specific analysis of a subsample of women aged 20–29 living in subfamilies, in chapter VI, I include ages as a continuous variable.
- Family status will be measured according to a combination of family structure and marital status. It will consider the following dummy variables: a) single lone mothers; b) divorced/separated lone mothers; c) widowed lone mothers; d) married couples; e) cohabiting couples. It is necessary to note that the CASEN survey codes cohabitation as a marital status. Thus, it is impossible to know from this information the exact legal status of cohabiting women included in the sample. I do not distinguish between married and

cohabiting couples with or without children because the number of children is controlled for separately.

- Number of children. I differentiated children of three age groups: children aged under 5, children aged between 5 and 15 and children aged 16 and over, due to the differential care burden that implies having children of these different age groups. After separating controls for each number of children of each age group, I found that the coefficients of two, three and four or more children were very similar, so they were grouped in a single category. As a result, six dummy variables are included to control by the number of children: a) having one child under 5; b) having two or more children under 5; c) having one child aged 5 to 15; d) having two or more children aged 5 to 15; e) having one child aged 16 or older; f) having two or more children aged 16 or older.

Variables referring to support needs:

- A dummy variable identifying whether or not the woman is full-time employed (45 hours or more per week, which represents the legal working hours in Chile). This dummy variable seeks to contrast full-time employment with no employment and part-time employment not only because part-time work represents less than one fifth of employment in Chile (Rau, 2010), but also because full-time work involves greater challenges for reconciling work and family responsibilities.
- A dummy variable indicating whether or not the woman is studying some level of formal education.
- A dummy variable will measure the presence of people with disabilities within the family unit of women.[78]

Demographic controls:

- Geographic zone of residence (urban and rural areas).
- Ethnicity. A dummy variable will indicate whether the women consider themselves part of one of the seven native peoples recognised by the Chilean state.

It is important to note that the definition used in the CASEN survey for urban areas corresponds to a settlement with a population greater than 2,000 inhabitants, or between 1,001 and 2,000 inhabitants, provided that at least 50% of the economically active population

[78] This includes the following conditions: physical and/or mobility disabilities; speech-impaired; psychiatric illness, mental or intellectual disabilities; deaf or hearing impaired; blind or partially sighted.

is engaged in secondary or tertiary activities. Table IV.3 shows the distribution of Chilean population by zone of residence.

Table IV.3. Rural and urban population. Chile, 1990, 2000 and 2011

Zone	1990	2000	2011
Rural	17.0%	13.6%	12.8%
Urban	83.0%	86.4%	87.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Notes: Samples weights applied.

As a complement to the previous information, Table IV.4 shows the distribution by zone of residence of the sample of adult women in family units for the years 1990, 2000 and 2011. It is possible to see that there are very little differences in the proportion of nuclear and extended households by zone of residence, with a slightly higher prevalence of extended households in urban areas.

Table IV.4. Adult women in family units by zone of residence and living arrangement. Chile, 1990, 2000 and 2011

Zone	Living arrangement	1990	2000	2011
Rural	Nuclear households	65.4%	61.5%	65.3%
	Extended households	34.6%	38.5%	34.7%
	Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**
Urban	Nuclear households	63.5%	63.7%	61.6%
	Extended households	36.5%	36.3%	38.4%
	Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**
Total	Nuclear households	63.8%	63.4%	62.0%
	Extended households	36.2%	36.6%	38.0%
	Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**

Notes: Samples weights applied. Differences by living arrangement and zone are significant at $p < .05$ for 1990 and at $p < .001$ for 2000 and 2011.

With respect to the control variable of ethnicity, it should be noted that the population that defines itself as belonging to indigenous peoples in Chile reaches 8.1% of the country's total population (own calculations from CASEN survey). Tables IV.5 and IV.6 show the proportion of indigenous people within the sample of adult women in family units, by family status and living arrangements.

Table IV.5. Adult women in family units by family status, living arrangement and ethnicity. Chile, 2011.

		Ethnicity (% row)			Ethnicity (% column)		
Family status	**Living arrangements**	**No**	**Yes**	**Total**	**No**	**Yes**	**Total**
Lone mothers	Nuclear	92.8%	7.2%	100.0%	45.5%	43.2%	45.4%
	Host	93.0%	7.0%	100.0%	19.0%	17.4%	18.9%
	Subfamily	91.7%	8.3%	100.0%	35.5%	39.3%	35.8%
	Total	**92.4%**	**7.6%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**
Cohabiting couples	Nuclear	91.0%	9.0%	100.0%	63.2%	64.0%	63.3%
	Host	90.8%	9.2%	100.0%	16.0%	16.5%	16.1%
	Subfamily	91.5%	8.5%	100.0%	20.8%	19.6%	20.7%
	Total	**91.1%**	**8.9%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**
Married couples	Nuclear	93.5%	6.5%	100.0%	71.2%	68.5%	71.0%
	Host	92.8%	7.2%	100.0%	24.4%	26.3%	24.5%
	Subfamily	92.1%	7.9%	100.0%	4.4%	5.2%	4.4%
	Total	**93.2%**	**6.8%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**
Total	Nuclear	92.8%	7.2%	100.0%	62.2%	59.9%	62.0%
	Host	92.5%	7.5%	100.0%	21.2%	21.3%	21.2%
	Subfamily	91.7%	8.3%	100.0%	16.6%	18.7%	16.8%
	Total	**92.6%**	**7.4%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**

Notes: Samples weights applied.

Specific variables for the sub-sample of couples:

- Couple's employment arrangements. It will consider the following dummy variables: a) couples where the man is employed (full- or part-time) and the woman is not; b) couples where the man is employed (full- or part-time) and the woman is full-time employed (dual earners, women employed full-time); c) couples where the man is employed (full- or part-time) and the woman is part-time employed ("modified bread winner model"); d) couples where the man is not employed while the woman is full-time employed; e) couples where the man is not employed while the woman is part-time employed; and f) couples where neither is employed.
- Age difference between the couple.

4.3 Working samples

In this section, I detail the working samples for each of the three research objectives of this dissertation.

- *Working samples for research objective one*

As the first objective of this dissertation is to identify the main determinants of extended living arrangements among women living in family units, the first working sample includes women aged 15 and older who coreside with their children[79] and/or their husbands or cohabiting partners in 2011. There are two groups of women in the sample: those who live in nuclear households and those who live in extended households. Among the latter, I distinguish between those who head the household and those who live in subfamilies.

I excluded from the analysis 456 cases of women aged 15 or older who are the main adults in their own family units living in 'composite households'. This means that the family units to which the woman belong share their households only with unrelated individuals. As this household type is not extended in the sense defined here, it was excluded from the working sample. Along with that, I excluded from this analysis 185 cases of women who were married but whose spouse was absent. The decision is based on the fact that the information available in the CASEN survey does not allows us to know whether these women were de facto separated or if their husbands were only temporarily absent from the home. The resulting working samples are as follows:

Table IV.6. Working samples for research objective one. Women aged 15 and older who are married, cohabiting or lone mothers (single, divorced/separated, and widowed lone mothers) by living arrangement. CASEN, 2011.

Living arrangements	Lone mothers	Cohabiting	Married	Total
Nuclear	6,830	7,667	19,946	34,443
Extended, head-family	2,843	1,781	6,926	11,550
Extended, subfamily	5,665	2,089	1,174	8,928
Total sample	**15,338**	**11,537**	**28,046**	**54,921**

[79] As I note above, a child is an unmarried individual of any age who lives with their parent(s) and has no children living in the same household.

- *Working sample to research objective two*

As the second objective of this dissertation is aimed at investigating the relationship between the process of family formation and extended living arrangements in Chile, in this case I worked with a sub-sample of young women who have started family life; that is, married or cohabiting women residing with their husbands or partners, and single lone mothers living with their children. Given the focus on the family formation stage, the working sample includes women aged 20–29. Despite other scholars having worked with a minimum age of 25, assuming that women have by then completed the nest-leaving process and the education stage, the relatively early age of family formation in Latin America – which changed very little during the second half of the twentieth century (Fussell & Palloni, 2004, p. 1204) – leads us to work with a younger sample. Women under 20 are not included in this analysis due to the particularities of their situation, such as the legal dependence of those under 18 on their parents, or the fact that most adolescent women are enrolled in secondary education.[80]

Table IV.7. Working samples for research objective two. Women aged 20–29 who are married, cohabiting or single lone mothers by living arrangement. CASEN 1990, 2000 and 2011

	1990	2000	2011
Single lone mothers			
Nuclear	37	142	482
Extended, head-family	15	59	99
Extended, subfamily	789	2,408	2,563
Total	841	2,609	3,144
Cohabiting			
Nuclear	466	1,711	2,152
Extended, head-family	54	183	264
Extended, subfamily	127	852	1292
Total	647	2,746	3,708
Married			
Nuclear	3,277	4,497	1,333
Extended, head-family	301	438	170
Extended, subfamily	956	1361	335
Total	4,534	6,296	1,838
Total sample			
Nuclear	3,780	6,350	3,967
Extended, head-family	370	680	533
Extended, subfamily	1,872	4,621	4,190
Total	6,022	11,651	8,690

[80] Evidence from CASEN Survey shows that about 11–12% of all women under 20 have started family life over the 1990–2011 period.

- *Working sample to research objective three*

The third objective of this dissertation is to explore the relations of economic dependence within extended households and how they inform us about the flows of support that underlie the formation of extended households. Samples are presented in the table below. Each year, there are few cases in which none of the household members have income of any type. As in these cases it is not feasible to estimate the income contribution of family units, they were excluded from the sample.[81] Then, in the multivariate analyses, I also excluded 132 missing cases in the variable education in CASEN 1990 and 284 in 2000.

Table IV.8. Working samples for research objective three. Women aged 15 and older who are married, cohabiting or lone mothers (single, divorced/separated, and widowed lone mothers) living in extended households. CASEN 1990, 2000 and 2011.

	1990	2000	2011
Lone mothers			
Head-family	871	2,419	2,840
Subfamily	1,981	6,231	5,657
Total extended	2,852	8,650	8,497
Cohabiting			
Head-family	307	1,419	1,780
Subfamily	240	1,543	2,086
Total extended	547	2,962	3,866
Married			
Head-family	3,817	9,599	6,915
Subfamily	1,630	2,963	1,173
Total extended	5,448	12,562	8,088
Total sample			
Head-family	4,995	13,437	11,535
Subfamily	3,851	10,737	8,916
Total extended	8,847	24,174	20,451

4.4 Data analysis

In chapter V (research objective one), I evaluate the role played by economic and life-course factors in explaining extended living arrangements among women in family units. In order to do that, I use a multinomial logistic regression technique to investigate the odds of living in head-families and subfamilies (instead of in nuclear households) for adult women in family units.

[81] These are as follows: 18 cases in 1990; 29 cases in 2000; and 27 cases in 2011.

Other authors have followed a different strategy to carry out this type of analysis, which consists of running sequential binary logistic regressions. In this case, the first model is aim to determine the likelihood of living in multigenerational households instead of nuclear households. In the second model, and given coresidence in a multigenerational household, the aim is to determine the position that individuals occupied within the household. This two-stage analytical strategy was proposed by Cohen and Casper in their analysis of multigenerational households in the United States, who consider that "the process of landing in any multigenerational household differs from the subsequent process that differentiates hosts and guests within multigenerational arrangements" (Cohen & Casper, 2002, p. 11). That is, whether multigenerational living arrangements are driven by economic or life-course needs, people who need residential support will resort mainly to their kin network. This implies that, as in the case examined by them, there is a group of people who are more likely to live in multigenerational households, either hosting or joining them as guests.

In chapter VI, I investigate whether the trend for the increasing prevalence of subfamily living arrangements over the 1990–2011 period was driven by the greater access of women to employment on the one hand, and by the rise in consensual unions and single lone motherhood on the other hand. In order to do that, I use binary logistic regression techniques to estimate the likelihood of living in subfamilies, based on a pooled sample of women aged 20–29 who have started family life from 1990, 2000 and 2011. After that, to analyse whether the determinants of subfamily living arrangements have changed over time, I run a new set of binary logistic regressions predicting subfamily living arrangements among women aged 20–29 who have started family life for three time periods: 1990, 2000 and 2011 (separately).

As it is not possible to compare the odds ratios for similar models across time points, I perform an analysis to determine whether the factors affecting extended living arrangements have significantly changed over time. That is, I test the hypothesis that the regression coefficients are different in the different years analysed. This analysis of significant change is based on year interactions with the predictors, which are tested on pooled samples combining observations for pairs of years: 1990–2000, 2000–2011 and 1990–2011. In addition, and following the recommendations of Mood (2010), I ran linear probability models (i.e. linear regression used with binary dependent variables) with the same set of variables in order to make coefficients comparable over models. These results are consistent with those based on year interactions with the predictors.

In Chapter VII, firstly I carry out a descriptive analysis of trends in economic dependence of women in family units who live in extended households over the 1990–2011 period. I compare trends between women living in sub-families and those living in host-families, by age group and family arrangements. After that, I conduct logistic regression models to examine the change in the factors affecting the economic dependence of adult women (aged 15 and over) in family units on the rest of the extended household members for three years: 1990, 2000 and 2011. Models are run separately for women in head-families and women in sub-families. In addition, to test if the effects of the predictors significantly change over time, I also calculate year interactions with all predictors in pooled models comparing 1990 with 2000, 2000 with 2011 and 1990 with 2011.

CHAPTER V: LIVING IN EXTENDED HOUSEHOLDS: ECONOMIC NEEDS OR LIFE-COURSE FACTORS?

This chapter addresses the first research objective of this dissertation, which is to evaluate the role played by economic and life-course factors in explaining extended living arrangements among women in family units. In particular, the analyses carried out in this chapter seek to answer the following research questions: how is the likelihood of living in extended households (both in head-families and subfamilies) affected by economic needs? Is the likelihood of living in extended households affected by the changing needs for support and privacy over the life course? More specifically, at which stages of the life course are women more likely to live in extended households, either in subfamilies or heading a household? And what kinds of family structures are more likely to be associated with extended living arrangements?

In order to answer these questions, I I use a multinomial logistic regression technique to investigate the odds of living in head-families and subfamilies (instead of in nuclear households) for adult women in family units. I run a multinomial model to estimate the effect of a set of predictors of economic needs, as well as life-course factors and other needs of support, on the likelihood of living in both head-families and subfamilies among the whole sample of adult women in family units.

5.1 Prevalence of Extended Living Arrangements among Women in Family Units

Among all adult women in family units, 38% lived in extended households in 2011: 21.8% in head-families and 16.8% in subfamilies (see Table V.1 for detailed information on the prevalence of extended living arrangements by specific groups). The prevalence of extended living arrangements varies greatly across the life course. Figure V.1 shows that about three-quarters of women aged 15–24 that have formed their own family unit live in extended

households. The prevalence of extended living arrangements decreases in the 25–34 age group, to reach its lowest point in the 35–44 age group. After that, it slightly rises again to reach a new peak among women aged 55 to 64.

A very different picture emerges when the position of women within extended households is taken into account. Figure V.1 also shows the differential age pattern of extended living arrangements among adult women in family units as they head an extended household or join it as a subfamily. When differentiating these situations, two life-course patterns are observed. The proportion of women heading extended households increases with age, peaking at 55–64, while the opposite pattern is observed in the case of women living as subfamilies. The highest rate of subfamily living is found in the group aged 15–24, and it then decreases sharply until it represents less than 3% of those aged 55 and older. Such evidence provides some initial support for Hypothesis 1.3, which expects that different life stages are associated with the likelihood of living in a subfamily, as opposed to heading an extended household. Indeed, young women in the early stages of the process of family formation live mostly in subfamilies, while middle-age women – who are more likely to have the means to provide support via coresidence – have a higher likelihood of living in head-families than young women.

Figure V.1: Adult women in family units who live in extended households by position within the household. Chile, 2011

Notes: Samples weights applied. All differences by living arrangements are significant at p < .001

Figure V.2 shows the proportion of adult women in family units who live in extended households by age and income quintile. At any age group, women in the poorest income quintile (quintile I) are more likely to live in extended households than those in the middle-income quintiles (II, III and IV) and, particularly, than those in the richest one. These results provide some initial support to Hypothesis 1.1, which postulates that income is negatively associated with the likelihood of living in extended households. However, the prevalence of extended living arrangements observed in the three middle-income groups is also considerable, indicating that this is a practice that is not only limited to low-income groups. This finding reinforces the importance of examining the other variables that may be playing a role in explaining household extension.

Figure V.2: Adult women in family units who live in extended households by age and income quintile. Chile, 2011



Notes: Samples weights applied. All differences by income quintile are significant at p < .001

When differentiating by women's position within the household, the contrast in the prevalence of subfamily living arrangements between women in the richest and the poorest income quintile is particularly marked. Almost 90% of women aged 15–24 in the poorest income quintile live in subfamilies, while this figure drops to only 30% among women in the richest income quintile. Among women heading an extended household, the differences are less marked. This provides additional support to Hypothesis 1.1, showing that low income is particularly associated with subfamily living arrangements.

Figure V.3: Adult women in family units who live in extended households by position within the household, age and income quintile. Chile, 2011



Notes: Samples weights applied. All differences by income quintile are significant at p < .001

Living arrangements of adult women in family units also vary by family status. Figure V.4 shows that lone mothers are more likely to live in extended households than married and cohabiting women, at any age. These results are consistent with previous research that shows a higher prevalence of extended living arrangements among lone mothers than among in-union women. In the case of cohabiting women, it is observed that they are more likely to live in extended households than married women, but only when they are under 55. Older cohabiting women (aged 55 and over) have a lower prevalence of extended living arrangements than married women. This provides some initial support for Hypothesis 1.4, which anticipates that non-traditional family forms (lone mothers and cohabiting couples) are positively associated with living in extended households. However, because of the interplay between income and family structure, the effect of women's family status on extended living arrangements needs to be explored further in the multivariate analysis. For example, family units composed of lone mothers have fewer potential income earners, and are concentrated in low-income groups, which may result in fewer opportunities for affording an independent residence. Thus, it is necessary to examine whether the likelihood of living in extended households among lone mothers remains high once socio-economic factors are controlled.

Figure V.4: Adult women in family units who live in extended households by age and family status. Chile, 2011



Notes: Samples weights applied. All differences by family status are significant at p < .001

When differentials for the positions within extended households are considered in Figure V.5, age patterns of women in head-families and subfamilies remain similar to that observed in Figure V.3. The proportion of women heading extended households increases with age in the case of lone mothers, and it peaks at 45–64 among cohabiting women and at 55–64 among those married. An opposite pattern is observed in the case of women living in subfamilies. Regardless of family status, the highest rate of subfamily living is in the group aged 15–24, then decreasing sharply towards the group of those women aged 65 or over. The higher prevalence of subfamily living arrangements among lone mothers and cohabiting women when compared with married women provides additional support for Hypothesis 1.4.

Figure V.5: Adult women in family units who live in extended households as head-families and subfamilies by age and family structure. Chile, 2011



Notes: Samples weights applied. All differences by family structures are significant at p < .001

Table V.1. Adult women in family units living in extended households (all), as head-families and as subfamilies, by income quintile, family status and age group. Chile, 2011

		Age groups						
		15–24	25–34	35–44	45–54	55–64	65+	Total
Quintile I	Extended households (all)	88.3%	51.5%	39.0%	39.3%	40.8%	38.7%	51.5%
	Head-families	0.9%	6.0%	15.7%	27.3%	37.2%	34.4%	16.6%
	Subfamilies	87.4%	45.5%	23.3%	12.0%	3.6%	4.3%	34.9%
	Cases	*2,175*	*2,500*	*2,577*	*1,764*	*1,163*	*1,663*	*11,842*
Quintile II	Extended households (all)	67.0%	40.4%	29.5%	33.8%	40.4%	33.0%	38.3%
	Head-families	4.5%	8.0%	16.3%	28.4%	36.7%	29.5%	19.9%
	Subfamilies	62.5%	32.4%	13.2%	5.4%	3.7%	3.5%	18.4%
	Cases	*1,186*	*2,322*	*2,918*	*2,395*	*1,256*	*1,422*	*11,499*
Quintile III	Extended households (all)	60.8%	41.8%	31.5%	38.9%	41.4%	33.8%	39.1%
	Head-families	4.6%	10.0%	18.4%	33.3%	38.8%	31.7%	24.5%
	Subfamilies	56.4%	31.8%	13.1%	5.6%	2.6%	2.1%	14.6%
	Cases	*820*	*1,877*	*2,431*	*2,611*	*1,535*	*1,439*	*10,713*
Quintile IV	Extended households (all)	54.8%	36.6%	31.3%	36.5%	35.9%	34.4%	35.9%
	Head-families	9.2%	9.3%	19.9%	30.0%	33.5%	33.5%	25.1%
	Subfamilies	45.6%	27.3%	11.4%	6.6%	2.4%	0.9%	10.8%
	Cases	*615*	*1,697*	*2,280*	*2,999*	*1,871*	*1,369*	*10,831*
Quintile V	Extended households (all)	34.6%	22.4%	20.5%	26.7%	27.8%	25.8%	25.0%
	Head-families	4.5%	7.2%	14.9%	25.2%	26.3%	25.2%	19.8%
	Subfamilies	30.1%	15.2%	5.6%	1.5%	1.5%	0.6%	5.2%
	Cases	*305*	*1,725*	*2,023*	*2,776*	*2,110*	*1,097*	*10,036*
Lone mothers	Extended households (all)	92.6%	66.4%	46.6%	43.6%	38.7%	39.9%	54.6%
	Head-families	1.5%	5.9%	15.8%	28.2%	31.5%	37.2%	18.9%
	Subfamilies	91.1%	60.5%	30.8%	15.4%	7.2%	2.7%	35.7%
	Cases	*2,310*	*3,196*	*3,346*	*2,968*	*1,519*	*1,999*	*15,338*
Cohabiting couples	Extended households (all)	60.1%	32.8%	27.2%	33.7%	33.3%	24.0%	36.7%
	Head-families	4,0%%	9,5%	18,7%	30,4%	30,5%	21,9%	16,1%
	Subfamilies	56,1%	23,3%	8,5%	3,3%	2,8%	2,1%	20,6%
	Cases	*2,239*	*3,420*	*2,508*	*1,924*	*911*	*535*	*11,537*
Married couples	Extended households (all)	36.3%	20.9%	22.7%	30.9%	36.1%	30.7%	29.0%
	Head-families	9,8%	8,3%	17,0%	28,8%	34,8%	28,8%	24,5%
	Subfamilies	26,5%	12,6%	5,7%	2,1%	1,3%	1,9%	4,5%
	Cases	*552*	*3,505*	*6,375*	*7,653*	*5,505*	*4,456*	*28,046*
Total	Extended households (all)	72.2%	39.4%	30.6%	34.5%	36.3%	33.1%	38.0%
	Head-families	3.4%	8.0%	17.0%	28.9%	33.7%	30.9%	21.2%
	Subfamilies	68.8%	31.4%	13.6%	5.6%	2.6%	2.2%	16.8%
	Cases	*5,101*	*10,121*	*12,229*	*12,545*	*7,935*	*6,990*	*54,921*

Notes: Samples weights applied. All differences by living arrangements are significant at $p < .001$

5.2 Socio-economic and Demographic Characteristics of Women in Different Living Arrangements

Having shown the economic and life-course differences in the prevalence of extended living arrangements among women in family units, here I briefly compare the three groups of women analysed in this chapter: women living in nuclear households, women heading an extended household, and women living in subfamilies. Table V.2 shows that women in extended households have lower incomes than those who live in nuclear households. This provides additional support for Hypothesis 1.1, which postulates that the likelihood of living in extended households increases among people with greater economic needs.

Interestingly, when differentiating women's position within the household, it is observed that this pattern is mainly driven by the low incomes of women in subfamilies, who are overrepresented in the poorest income quintile (see Table V.2). This suggests that economic needs better explain the fact of living in someone else's home than that of hosting other relatives in own household. It is worth considering the implications of this finding for the literature on household extension and family strategies discussed in Chapter III (section 3.2.1): household extension would not be a strategy for household heads to improve their livelihoods, but rather a way of providing support to the most vulnerable family members. Although for those living in subfamilies, joining someone else's home could be a strategy for coping with economic deprivation.

Contrary to Hypothesis 1.2, which anticipates that education is not associated with the likelihood of living in extended households, Table V.2 shows important educational differences in women's living arrangements. Women in subfamilies register higher educational levels than those in nuclear households and those hosting an extended household. This might be related to the younger age profile of this group, as younger Chilean generations have benefited from the dramatic increase in secondary and higher-education enrolment rates over the last two decades (Ministerio de Educación, 2012). However, this pattern needs to be evaluated through multivariate analysis. Women in subfamilies also have the highest rates of full-time employment.

Regarding family status, Table V.2 also shows that almost 60% of women living in nuclear households are married, with or without children. This proportion reaches only 38% among women in extended households. When separating women by their household role, those who head extended households appear to be similar to those living in nuclear households. Conversely, women in subfamilies emerge with a clearly different family-status

pattern: more than a half are single lone mothers and only 13.5% are married with or without children, which strongly supports Hypothesis 1.4.

Finally, it is important to note that half of women in subfamilies have children under five, a proportion significantly higher than that observed among women in nuclear households (18.5%) or heading an extended household (7.9%). Such findings provide initial support for Hypothesis 1.5, which predicts that family units with children under school age will be more likely to live in extended households than those without children or with older children. However, this pattern could be related to the younger age profile of women in subfamilies, so the effect of having children under school age needs to be reconsidered in multivariate analysis. In the case of having children aged 5 to 15, Table V.2 shows that women in nuclear households have the highest proportion with children of this age (48.5%) and women in head families are those with the highest proportion with children aged 16 and older. These findings are suggesting a life-course pattern associated with living arrangements.

These findings are conclusive in showing that women living in extended households are not a homogeneous group. Instead, the position that these women occupy in the extended household (as heads or subfamilies) is closely linked to their stage in the life course, the structure of their family unit, and the economic resources they have.

Table V.2. Adult women in family units by socio-economic and demographic characteristics and living arrangements. Chile, 2011

	Nuclear households	Extended households		
		All	Head-family	Sub-family
Socioeconomic characteristics				
Income quintile				
Quintile I (the poorest)	15.6%	27.0%	15.6%	41.5%
Quintile II	19.9%	20.2%	18.8%	22.0%
Quintile III	19.6%	20.7%	23.2%	17.4%
Quintile IV	20.7%	18.9%	23.6%	12.9%
Quintile V (the richest)	24.2%	13.2%	18.8%	6.2%
	100.0%	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**
Average per capita monthly income of women's family unit (Chilean pesos)	265,329.0	166,048.2	213,122.0	106,551.4
Education				
Incomplete high school education	47.5%	48.4%	62.7%	30.3%
Complete high school education	30.6%	33.8%	24.9%	45.0%
Some or complete higher education	21.9%	17.8%	12.4%	24.7%
	100.0%	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**
Women full-time employed	24.4%	27.2%	23.7%	32.6%
Life-course characteristics				
Age				
15–24	4.0%	16.8%	1.4%	36.3%
25–34	17.9%	19.1%	6.9%	34.4%
35–44	24.3%	17.5%	17.4%	17.6%
45–54	24.5%	21.1%	31.8%	7.7%
55–64	15.3%	14.2%	23.6%	2.3%
65 or more	14.0%	11.3%	18.9%	1.7%
	100.0%	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**
Family status				
Single lone mothers	7.6%	27.4%	8.6%	51.4%
Divorced/separated lone mothers	8.8%	9.1%	9.0%	9.3%
Widowed lone mothers	4.8%	5.2%	8.4%	1.2%
Cohabiting without children	5.5%	5.6%	4.7%	6.8%
Cohabiting with children	14.9%	13.7%	10.5%	17.8%
Married without children	14.0%	14.2%	22.5%	3.5%
Married with children	44.4%	24.8%	36.3%	10.0%
	100.0%	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**
Number of children				
Number of children under 5				
No children	81.5%	73.3%	92.1%	49.5%
One child	15.9%	23.7%	7.1%	44.7%
Two or more children	2.6%	3.0%	0.8%	5.8%
	100.0%	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**

Table V.2. Continued				
Number of children aged 5 to 15				
No children	58.9%	67.3%	73.7%	59.1%
One child	27.4%	25.1%	19.1%	32.6%
Two or more children	13.7%	7.7%	7.2%	8.3%
	100.0%	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**
Number of children aged 16 and older (mean)				
No children	51.5%	62.9%	45.0%	85.5%
One child	30.9%	26.0%	37.2%	12.0%
Two or more children	17.6%	11.1%	17.8%	2.6%
	100.0%	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**
Cases	34,443	20,478	11,550	8,928

Notes: Samples weights applied. All differences by living arrangements are significant at p < .001

5.3 A multivariate analysis of the factors affecting the living arrangements of women in family units

In this section, I assess the role played by economic and life-course factors on the living arrangements of women in family units through a multivariate analysis. As noted above, women in family units can live in nuclear households, in head-families or in subfamilies within an extended household. Thus, I carried out a multinomial logistic regression to predict these three possible living arrangements. The analysis is based on a sample of adult women in family units (n = 54,921). I use 'living in a nuclear household' as a reference category, with which I compare the two other categories of living in head-families or in subfamilies. Table V.3 shows the coefficients, the standard errors of B and the odds ratios of the multinomial logistic regression model carried out.[82]

[82] Complementary to the analysis presented in this section, I carried out an analysis based on the use of sequential binary logistic regressions: in a first stage, to predict the likelihood of living in extended households instead of in nuclear households; and in a second stage, to predict the likelihood of occupying a subfamily position among the sub-sample or women living in extended households (See Tables V.3a and V.3b in the annexes. The results of this analysis allowed me to arrive at similar conclusions to those derived from the use of a multinomial logistic model. However, the strategy of using a multinomial logistic model allows me to distinguish more clearly the differences between the two positions that a woman can occupy within an extended household (head-family or subfamily) with respect to living in a nuclear household. The main methodological finding that emerges from the evaluation of these two strategies is the importance of differentiating the position that women occupy within the household in order to better understand the factors that explain the formation of extended living arrangements. Head-families and subfamilies have a very different profile (especially in regard to

The model includes two predictors of economic needs (women's family income and education), as well as three sets of predictors accounting for life-course characteristics (age, family status, and having children of three different age groups[83]). I also add to these variables three other predictors of support needs: whether or not the women take part in formal education, whether or not the women have a family unit member with disabilities and whether or not the women are in full time employment. The model also includes a set of interaction terms between women`s full-time employment and having children of different age groups. Finally, two controls for ethnicity and zone of residence are also included in the model.

As far as the predictors of economic needs are concerned, Table V.3 shows that family income has a negative effect on the odds of living in head-families instead of nuclear households (net other factors). That is, as a woman's family income increases, their likelihood of living in a head-family, instead of a nuclear household, decreases. Something similar occurs when evaluating the likelihood of living in subfamilies over nuclear households. The negative effect of income on the odds of living in subfamilies is even stronger than that found in the comparison between head-families and nuclear households. These results provide support for Hypothesis 1.1, which indicates the close relationship between economic needs and the likelihood of living in extended households, particularly in subfamilies.

In the case of the effect that education plays in accounting for living arrangements, some contrasts are observed when comparing living in head-families and subfamilies with those living in nuclear households. Having incomplete high school education (instead of complete high school education) increases the odds of living in head-families over nuclear households, while having higher education diminishes them. This finding shows that the higher the level of education of women, the lower their likelihood of living in head-families (instead of nuclear households); a result that contradicts to what is expected by Hypothesis 1.2. Also contrary to the expectations of Hypothesis 1.2, either having incomplete high school education or some or complete higher education (instead of complete high school education only) decreases the odds of living in subfamilies over nuclear households.

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their life course characteristics), so the use of undifferentiated measures of extended living arrangements makes it extremely difficult to identify the factors that explain this situation.

[83] I included these variables in the multivariate models by using two dummy variables for each age group: having one child of the age group and having two or more children of the age group. The reference category in each case was not having children of the respective age group.

Table V.3 also shows that life-course factors such as age and family status emerge as strong predictors of extended living arrangements among adult women in family units. In particular, the results confirm what was expected by hypothesis 1.3, showing that being young positively affect the odds of living in subfamilies instead of nuclear households (women aged 15–24 and 25–34), while being middle and older age (45 and over) increases the odds of living in head-families instead of nuclear households. These findings show a clear life-course pattern with regard to women's living arrangements, where the early stages of the family formation process are closely related to subfamily living, while older ages go hand in hand with hosting other relatives within the household. The coefficients of the model clearly show the bimodal distribution of extended living arrangements that were observed in the descriptive analyses.

As expected by Hypothesis 1.4, Table V.3 shows that non-traditional family forms are positively associated with the likelihood of living in extended households and with subfamily living in particular. Lone mothers, regardless their marital status, are more likely to live in head-families instead of nuclear households than married women. This effect is stronger when comparing living in subfamilies versus living in extended households. Indeed, single lone mothers are ten times more likely than married women to live in subfamilies instead of in nuclear households. The exception to this pattern is the case of cohabiting women, who are less likely than married women to live in head-family living arrangements over nuclear households. However, when comparing subfamilies with nuclear households, it is possible to see that the odds of cohabiting women are 76% higher than the odds of married women. Such findings are in line with previous research that shows that married people are less likely to live both in intergenerational and extended households (Aquilino, 1990; Cohen & Casper, 2002; de Vos, 1990, 1995; Esteve, García-Román, et al., 2012; Pilkauskas, 2012; VanWey & Cebulko, 2007).

Contrary to what is expected in Hypothesis 1.5, having one or two or more children under five decreases the odds of living in both head-families and subfamilies over nuclear households when compared to women without children of this age. Something similar occurs in the case of having children aged 5–15 or 16 and older. This finding suggests that childcare needs do not favour extended living arrangements among Chilean women, but this has to be evaluated in the light of the interaction effects of having children and women's full-time employment.

In relation to predictors of other needs of support, the presence of a person with disabilities in the same family unit reduces the odds of living in both head-families and subfamilies when compared to nuclear households. This finding is similar to that found by

Cohen and Casper (2002), whose analyses show that White and Latino individuals with work-limiting disabilities were less likely to live in multigenerational households.

Being a student increases women's chances of living in subfamilies (instead of nuclear households) by 25%. This is not surprising, as the expansion of secondary and higher education has undoubtedly prolonged the period of economic dependence of young people on their families. Even more so if, as in the case of women in this sample, students also have family responsibilities. However, there is no significant effect of being student on the odds of living in head-families when compared with nuclear households.

Interestingly, full-time employment among women does not have a significant effect on the odds of living in both head-families and subfamilies over nuclear households. Nevertheless, there is a positive and significant effect of some of the interactions between women's full-time employment and having one child of different age groups. Almost all the interactions between full-time employment and having children of different ages have also a positive and significant effect on the odds of living in subfamilies instead of nuclear households (the exception is the interaction between women's full time employment and having two or more children aged 5 to 15). This shows that it is not women's employment itself, but the employment of mothers, what increases the likelihood of living in subfamilies instead of nuclear households. This suggests that living in subfamilies may help women to combine their productive roles with their traditional reproductive roles related to caring and domestic chores. The positive effect of the interaction between women's full-time employment and having children of different ages is less marked when comparing head-families with nuclear households. There is a positive effect of the interaction between full-time employment and having children under five and 5–15 (one or two or more). Note that although some of the interactions are not significant, the odds ratios are greater than 1 (suggesting a positive effect). The non-significance stems from a relatively higher standard error.

Finally, in order to illustrate the life-course patterns of extended living arrangements, Figures V.6, V.7 andV.8 plot the predicted probabilities of living in head-families and subfamilies for different groups of women. It clearly shows the two-peak age pattern of extended living arrangements: irrespective of family status, women are more likely to live in subfamilies when they are younger (15–24) and more likely to live in head-families when they are middle and older age (55–64). Figure V.6 also shows how, at any age, single lone mothers are much more likely to live in extended households than married and cohabiting women. The close relationship between single lone-motherhood and extended living arrangements is particularly important among young women: 82% of single lone mothers aged 15–24 are expected to live in subfamilies.

Figure V.6. Predicted probabilities of living in head-families and subfamilies for hypothetical women in different age groups: SINGLE LONE MOTHERS



**Women with average family income (227,641 Chilean pesos), complete high school, having one child aged 5 to 15, not in full-time employment, not in formal education, not having a family unit member with disabilities, living in urban zones, not from an ethnic minority group.*

Figure V.7. Predicted probabilities of living in head-families and subfamilies for hypothetical women in different age groups: COHABITING WOMEN



**Women with average family income (227,641 Chilean pesos), complete high school, having one child aged 5 to 15, not in full-time employment, not in formal education, not having a family unit member with disabilities, living in urban zones, not from an ethnic minority group.*

Figure V.8. Predicted probabilities of living in head-families and subfamilies for hypothetical women in different age groups: MARRIED WOMEN



**Women with average family income (227,641 Chilean pesos), complete high school, having one child aged 5 to 15, not in full-time employment, not in formal education, not having a family unit member with disabilities, living in urban zones, not from an ethnic minority group.*

Table V.3. Multinomial logistic regression for living arrangements among women in family units (reference category: nuclear family household). Chile, 2011

PREDICTORS	Extended head-family vs. Nuclear family β	SE	OR	Extended sub-family vs. Nuclear family β	SE	OR
Economic needs						
Income (Ln)	-0.041***	0.005	0.960	-0.201***	0.006	0.818
Education (Ref: Complete high school education)						
Incomplete high school education	0.308***	0.027	1.361	-0.313***	0.037	0.731
Some or complete higher education	-0.374***	0.037	0.688	-0.112**	0.042	0.894
Life-course factors						
Age (Ref: 35-44)						
15–24	-0.902***	0.092	0.406	1.556***	0.060	4.741
25–34	-0.621***	0.049	0.537	0.500***	0.045	1.648
45–54	0.370***	0.036	1.448	-0.681***	0.055	0.506
55–64	0.316***	0.042	1.371	-1.447***	0.085	0.235
65 over	-0.016	0.048	0.984	-1.843***	0.103	0.158
Family status (Ref: Married)						
Single lone mothers	0.290***	0.042	1.337	2.326***	0.044	10.236
Divorced/separated lone mothers	0.087*	0.041	1.090	1.478***	0.056	4.385
Widowed lone mothers	0.412***	0.048	1.509	1.372***	0.115	3.944
Cohabiting	-0.075*	0.033	0.928	0.563***	0.044	1.755
Number of children						
Number of children under 5 (Ref: no children)						
One	-0.334***	0.054	0.716	-0.277***	0.048	0.758
Two or more	-0.671***	0.132	0.511	-0.591***	0.090	0.554
Number of children aged 5 to 15 (Ref: no children)						
One	-0.444***	0.037	0.642	-0.590***	0.048	0.554
Two or more	-0.739***	0.054	0.478	-1.199***	0.068	0.301

Table V.3. Continued

PREDICTORS	Extended head-family vs. Nuclear family β	SE	OR	Extended sub-family vs. Nuclear family β	SE	OR
Number of children aged 16 and older (Ref: no children)						
One	-0.150***	0.031	0.860	-0.842***	0.060	0.431
Two or more	-0.416***	0.039	0.660	-1.559***	0.103	0.210
Other needs of support						
Women in formal education	0.115	0.110	1.122	0.226**	0.075	1.254
Family unit member with disabilities	-0.102**	0.031	0.903	-0.408***	0.063	0.665
Women full-time employed	0.082	0.052	1.086	0.114	0.068	1.121
Women full-time employed*One child under 5	0.192*	0.092	1.212	0.215**	0.078	1.239
Women full-time employed* Two or more children under 5	0.259	0.239	1.296	-0.089	0.184	0.915
Women full-time employed*One child aged 5 to 15	0.118	0.063	1.125	0.313***	0.073	1.368
Women full-time employed*Two or more children aged 5 to 15	0.224**	0.092	1.251	0.453***	0.107	1.573
Women full-time employed*One child aged 16 and older	-0.092	0.062	0.912	0.362***	0.085	1.436
Women full-time employed*Two or more children aged 16 and older	-0.007	0.074	0.993	0.385**	0.148	1.470
Demographic controls						
Urban zone	0.293***	0.034	1.340	0.041	0.050	1.042
Ethnicity	0.103*	0.043	1.109	-0.147*	0.057	0.863
Intercept	-0.743***	0.083		0.658***	0.098	
Sample size						54,921
Cox & Snell R Square						.347
Nagelkerke R Square						.412

*Notes: Samples weights applied. OR = odds ratio. *p< .05. **p< .01. ***p< .001.*

5.4 Summary and Conclusions

The findings of this empirical chapter provide support for the hypothesis that considers household extension as a family strategy for facing economic deprivation. After controlling for women's demographic and other socio-economic characteristics, having a higher income has a negative effect on the likelihood of living in both head-families and subfamilies (instead of in nuclear households). Interestingly, the negative effect of income is stronger when predicting the likelihood of living in subfamilies over nuclear households than in head-families over nuclear households. This suggests that the hypothesis of economic necessity is mainly valid for those seeking refuge in the home of someone else. Family units who head an extended household seem to be less prone than subfamilies to live in these arrangements as a strategy to improve their livelihoods. The provision of support to the most vulnerable family members seems to be a sensible explanation of why some households host subfamilies. This highlights the importance of differentiating the position that people and family units occupy within extended households, in order to have a more accurate understanding of the factors behind this phenomenon.

Another important finding of this chapter relates to the life-course dimension associated with extended living arrangements. Among women in family units, two different life stages show the highest likelihood of living in extended households: youth (15–24) and middle age (55–64). The majority of young women live in extended households as subfamilies. Among middle-aged women, however, it is common to live in extended households as household heads, hosting young couples or single lone mothers. These findings suggest that the processes of family formation in Chile do not necessarily have a neolocal character, and coresidence is an important form of support for young families (coming from their own parents or in-laws). Future longitudinal research on the topic should address the question of the duration of extended living arrangements among young families, and the factors associated with the dynamics of long/short periods of coresidence.

Also important to note is the strong association between extended living arrangements –subfamilies, in particular – and lone motherhood. This finding is consistent with qualitative research in Latin America that has highlighted the greater difficulties of lone mothers in residing independently. As long as variables such as income, age and other socio-economic information have been taken into account in the statistical models conducted in this chapter, it is not plausible to attribute this association to a scarcity of economic resources due

to the lack of a partner. The higher likelihood of living in extended households among lone mothers could be related to other needs for support that are not included in the model, such as feeling emotionally supported by the extended family, or receiving practical help with housework or childcare. The strong relationship between lone motherhood and extended living arrangements could also be a response to gender inequalities of various types that prevent lone mothers from living independently. Future research on the subject should evaluate such hypotheses.

Along with the above, it is important to note that lone mothers living in subfamilies can be considered a hidden form of female headship (Chant, 1997, pp. 24–25). That is, if these women had the means to maintain an independent residence, the percentage of households headed by women would certainly increase. Thus, the magnitude of lone-mother subfamilies should be taken into account when analysing the increase of female headship in Chile and Latin America in recent decades.

There is another finding of this chapter that is important to highlight: the effect of mothers' full-time employment on the likelihood of living in extended households. Neither woman's full-time employment nor having children of different age have in themselves a positive effect on the odds of living in head-families and subfamilies when compared to nuclear households. It is the combination of employment and motherhood (full-time employment of women who are mothers) what makes more likely to live in extended living arrangements rather than in nuclear households. That is, the interaction effect of full-time employment and having children of different ages is positive and significant in most of the cases (particularly when comparing living in subfamilies to living in nuclear households). This can be understood as the result of the persistence of a traditional sexual division of labour within the household and a weak public system of childcare. As discussed in section 2.3.3, employed women in Chile – particularly those who have dependent children – face severe difficulties in reconciling family and work, leading them to rely on the support from the extended family (mainly other women) to meet their duties within the household. In such cases, co-residing in an extended household could be a beneficial arrangement, allowing families to reduce transportation costs and have economies of scale in the fields of care and housework (for example, in the case of grandmothers who care for their grandchildren while the mother works). This finding is further examined in Chapter VI.

CHAPTER VI: WHY IS THE PREVALENCE OF EXTENDED LIVING ARRANGEMENTS NOT DECREASING AMONG YOUNG FAMILIES?

This chapter addresses the second objective of this dissertation, which is to investigate the relationship between the process of family formation and extended living arrangements in Chile, and how this relationship has changed over the 1990–2011 period. In particular, I seek to answer the following research questions: have the patterns of economic modernisation and cultural change in Chile gone hand-in-hand with a decreasing prevalence of extended living arrangements among young families? How have women's new productive roles affected the living arrangements of young families over the 1990–2011 period? How are trends in living arrangements of young families related to the transformations in the process of family formation that have taken place in Chile during the last decades?

In order to answer these questions, this chapter focuses on the living arrangements of young women (aged 20–29) who have started their family life; that is, married or cohabiting women residing in family units with their husbands or cohabiting partners, and single lone mothers living with their children. Firstly, I evaluate whether there was a tendency towards residential independence among young women over the 1990–2011 period or if, on the contrary, extended living arrangements increased their prevalence in this group. Secondly, I examine how these trends are related to the recent transformations in the process of family formation on the one hand, and women's new productive roles on the other. Finally, this chapter examines how factors explaining extended living arrangements among women in the early stages of family formation have changed over the 1990–2011 period.

6.1 Trends in Marriages, Consensual Unions and Lone Motherhood among Young Women

Before analysing the transformations in the residential patterns of young families in Chile, it is necessary to examine how family formation behaviours have changed over the past two

decades. As general trends for marriage and cohabitation were presented in Section 2.4 of Chapter II, this section focuses only on the situation of the sample of women examined in this chapter. In particular, it analyses the changes in the prevalence of marriages and consensual unions, as well as single lone motherhood, among women aged 20–29 over the 1990–2011 period.

It should be noted that CASEN Survey only collects information about the current marital status of respondents. Therefore, it is not possible to determine from it whether the current family status of young women corresponds exactly to that in which they started family life or not. That is, it is unknown whether or not cohabiting or married women are in their first marriage or consensual union. Similarly, in the case of single lone mothers, it is not possible to know whether they were part of a previous consensual union with the fathers of their offspring, which implies some underestimation of the prevalence of consensual unions as a path of family formation. As the analyses of this chapter are focused on women aged 20–29, for whom the assumption that their current family status reflects their route to family formation is more likely to be correct, it is possible to overcome such limitations of the data.

Having pointed out the limitations of the data, Table VI.1 shows important changes in family formation patterns over the period. It shows a decrease in the proportion of married women as well as an increase in the proportion of women in consensual unions and single lone mothers throughout the 1990–2011 period. Single lone mothers doubled their weight within the group of women aged 20–29, while cohabiting women tripled.[84] The proportion of married women in 2011 is only a quarter of the size represented in 1990 in the 20–29 age group. These trends can be observed in the two age groups differentiated in Table VI.1 (20–24 and 25–29).

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[84] An analysis conducted by Fussell and Palloni from census data for nineteen Latin American countries showed that in Chile the percentage of women aged 20–29 years in consensual unions remained at values of 3–4% over the 1970–1990 period, and then increased to 7.5% in 2000 (Fussell & Palloni, 2004, p. 1203). Figures obtained from the CASEN Survey and presented in Table VI.1 are higher than those presented these authors: 6.1% in 1990 and 13.5% in 2000 for the very same age group. Unfortunately, the article of Fussell and Palloni does not indicate whether their analyses were based on the entire population censuses of 1992 and 2002 or on samples from them. Therefore, it is not possible to determine the source of the differences between the results obtained by the authors and those included in this chapter. Nevertheless, note that the results presented in Table VI.1 are consistent with figures provided by the United Nations in the World Marriage data 2008 (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2009), which are also obtained from census data.

As a result, while in 1990 the majority of women aged 20–29 started family life through marriage, two decades later the main paths to family formation are consensual unions and single lone motherhood. These transformations are consistent with the evidence presented in Chapter II.

Table VI.1. Women aged 20–29 by family status. Chile, 1990, 2000 and 2011

Family status	1990	2000	2011
Women aged 20–24			
Single lone mothers	8.3%	12.9%	17.0%
Cohabiting	5.6%	12.8%	17.6%
Married	33.0%	19.2%	5.2%
*All women in the early stages of family formation**	*46.9%*	*44.9%*	*39.8%*
Other lone mothers**	1.7%	2.2%	0.7%
Single women no children	51.4%	52.9%	59.5%
Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**
Women aged 25–29			
Single lone mothers	7.2%	11.1%	18.9%
Cohabiting	6.6%	14.1%	25.6%
Married	53.8%	43.4%	19.2%
*All women in the early stages of family formation**	*67.6%*	*68.6%*	*63.7%*
Other lone mothers**	4.0%	4.7%	2.6%
Single women no children	28.4%	26.7%	33.7%
Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**
All women aged 20–29			
Single lone mothers	7.8%	12.0%	17.8%
Cohabiting	6.1%	13.5%	21.1%
Married	43.2%	31.5%	11.4%
*All women in the early stages of family formation**	*57.1%*	*57.0%*	*50.3%*
Other lone mothers**	2.8%	3.4%	1.6%
Single women no children	40.1%	39.6%	48.1%
Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**

Notes: Samples weights applied. All differences by family status are significant at p < .001
** This includes only single lone mothers, as separated/divorced and widowed lone mothers cannot be assumed to be in a stage of family formation.*
*** This includes separated/divorced and widowed lone mothers.*

Table VI.1 also shows another important change in the process of family formation: the decline in the proportion of young women who have entered into marriage, cohabitation or childbearing before the age of 30. Of all women aged 20–29, 57.1% had started family life in 1990, a figure that drops to 50.3% in 2011. Interestingly, this decrease is mainly driven by the fall in the proportion of women in unions (either married or cohabiting), which accounted for 49.3% of all women aged 20–29 in 1990, to then represent 32.5% in 2011. Thus, the rise in the proportion of women in consensual unions – although significant – did not offset the decline in the proportion of women in formal marriages.

To have more detailed picture of the changes in the process of family formation in Chile, Table VI.2 examines the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of young women in different family statuses – and how they have changed over the period – in comparison with single women with no children. In the case of single lone mothers, there are little changes in terms of age profile and average number of children. The educational improvements among younger generations in Chile can be observed in this group of women. Indeed, single lone mothers with complete high school education double their participation over the period, and the proportion with some level of higher education in 2011 is 2.4 times higher than 1990. Despite increasing educational levels – or perhaps precisely because of the extension of the educational stage among youth – full-time employment slightly decreases among single lone mothers. Finally, in spite of the strong concentration of single lone mothers in the lowest income groups (quintile I and II), a slight attenuation of this pattern is observed throughout the period. Thus, these results show that the increasing prevalence of single lone mothers over the period has not been accompanied by a deterioration in their economic circumstances. This suggests that this family arrangement is no longer limited to the most deprived sectors; it is spreading to different social groups.

Table VI.2 also shows that young women in consensual unions have an age profile similar to that of single lone mothers, with no changes over the period. However, there is a reduction in the average number of children they have (from 1.60 in 1990 to 1.07 in 2011). This decrease is mainly explained by the growth of the proportion of cohabiting women without children, which increased from 10.4% of all women in consensual unions in 1990 to 23.5% in 2011 (analyses not shown). The general improvement in the level of education of the young population is clearer among cohabiting women than in single lone mothers and married women. In fact, cohabiting women have the largest increase amongst those with complete high school education (3.5 times between 1990 and 2011) and higher education (3.7 times between 1990 and 2011). While participation in the labour market is lower for cohabiting women than for single lone mothers, the former registers the highest rate of increase during the period. It is likely that their lower number of children and their better educational levels have had an effect on the greater participation in the labour market among this group. As in the case of single lone mothers, a transition is observed toward a lower concentration of women in consensual unions in the poorest income groups. It is worth noting that such change is consistent with studies that highlight the increasing prevalence of consensual unions in the most educated and well-off groups. In the next section I explore whether this improvement in

socio-economic characteristics of cohabitating women results in a greater likelihood of living in independent living arrangements.

Married women differ from women in other family statuses in terms of age. They are on average two years older than cohabiting and single lone mothers in 2011. The average number of children of married women also decreases during the period, although to a lesser extent of that of cohabiting women. Married women have greater socio-economic resources than women in consensual unions and single lone mothers. Moreover, they moved toward a middle and upper income profile throughout the period. Regarding their educational levels and participation in the labour market, although an increase is observed in both dimensions (higher proportions with higher levels of education and full-time employment), this is less marked than in the case of cohabiting women. This might suggest that the improvement in terms of income levels could also be associated with the educational and occupational status of their husbands.

Finally, single women with no children are younger and more educated than women who have initiated family life. Indeed, they are the group with the highest rates of higher education, observing further increases over the period (from 44.3% to 67.0%). It is likely that an important part of this group of women are actually in higher education, what may be related to the decrease observed in the proportion of them working full time. In terms of their distribution by income quintile, single women with no children have an even higher income level than married women, which is consistent with their higher educational levels.

Table VI.2. Women aged 20–29 by family status and demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Chile, 1990, 2000 and 2011

Family status	1990	2000	2011
Single lone mothers			
Age (mean)	24.3	24.3	24.3
Number of children (mean)	1.31	1.22	1.31
Full-time employed (%)	34.4%	31.5%	30.7%
Some or complete higher education (%)	12.1%	23.1%	28.4%
Complete high school education (%)	24.4%	35.9%	49.3%
Income quintile I (%)	62.1%	61.1%	56.4%
Income quintile II (%)	22.8%	22.6%	23.7%
Income quintile III (%)	11.6%	9.9%	13.7%
Income quintile IV (%)	2.5%	5.1%	4.4%
Income quintile V (%)	1.0%	1.3%	1.8%
Cohabiting			
Age (mean)	24.7	24.6	24.7
Number of children (mean)	1.60	1.25	1.07
Full-time employed (%)	11.5%	20.1%	28.7%
Some or complete higher education (%)	6.8%	17.0%	25.5%
Complete high school education (%)	13.1%	30.7%	45.8%
Income quintile I (%)	31.3%	27.9%	19.5%
Income quintile II (%)	30.4%	29.7%	26.4%
Income quintile III (%)	21.6%	18.1%	20.7%
Income quintile IV (%)	11.0%	13.9%	18.5%
Income quintile V (%)	5.7%	10.4%	14.9%
Married			
Age (mean)	25.2	25.7	26.0
Number of children (mean)	1.54	1.42	1.32
Full-time employed (%)	13.8%	20.5%	22.4%
Some or complete higher education (%)	19.0%	25.4%	33.2%
Complete high school education (%)	23.2%	36.0%	44.5%
Income quintile I (%)	23.3%	21.6%	15.4%
Income quintile II (%)	27.7%	28.1%	25.1%
Income quintile III (%)	20.0%	20.7%	22.1%
Income quintile IV (%)	14.3%	15.8%	18.0%
Income quintile V (%)	14.8%	13.9%	19.4%
Single women no children			
Age (mean)	23.5	23.4	23.3
Number of children (mean)	0.0	0.0	0.0
Full-time employed (%)	32.3%	28.6%	24.9%
Some or complete higher education (%)	44.3%	51.9%	67.0%
Complete high school education (%)	28.4%	31.4%	24.4%
Income quintile I (%)	12.9%	13.5%	11.8%
Income quintile II (%)	15.9%	17.0%	16.3%
Income quintile III (%)	22.4%	19.8%	22.1%
Income quintile IV (%)	24.9%	24.3%	24.6%
Income quintile V (%)	23.9%	25.4%	25.2%

Notes: Samples weights applied. All differences by demographic and socio-economic characteristics are significant at p < .001.

**The "income quintile" variable is elaborated from the autonomous income of the woman and her family unit. In the case of nuclear households, it corresponds to the total household income. However, this is different to the total household income in the case of women living in extended household (see Chapter IV on methodology).*

6.2 Trends in Living Arrangements among Young Women Who Have Started Family Life

This section seeks to examine changes in the residential patterns of young women who have started family life and how they differ according to women's family status. Data presented in this section allows us to make a first assessment of Hypotheses 2.1, which tests the predictions of two theoretical approaches regarding trends in household patterns of young families. In particular, according to Modernisation Theory and Second Demographic Transition Theory, it is expected that the prevalence of extended living arrangements among women starting family life will have decreased between 1990 and 2011 in Chile. Conversely, based on changes in family formation and women's productive roles, it is expected that the prevalence of extended living arrangements will have increased over the same period.

Figure VI.1 shows the changes in the living arrangements of women aged 20–29 who have started family life between 1990 and 2011. These women may live independently in a nuclear household, head an extended household, or live in a subfamily within an extended household (see Chapter IV for definitions). As observed in Figure VI.1, a significant proportion of young women reside in extended living arrangements, in particular, in subfamilies. Moreover, it is observed that the proportion of women living in subfamilies increased over the period (from 32% to 50% of the all women in family units between 1990 and 2011). The fact that young women in family units have seen diminished their chances for living independently over the period leads us to explore the hypothesis that changes in family formation and women's new productive roles in Chile have resulted in an increase in extended living arrangements among women in the early stages of family formation.

Figure VI.1. Women aged 20–29 who have started family life (single lone mothers, cohabiting and married women) by living arrangements. Chile, 1990, 2000 and 2011



Notes: Samples weights applied. All differences by living arrangement are significant at p < .001

The decrease in the proportion of women who have started family life during the period observed in Table VI.1 opens up the question of whether young women who have not postponed family formation are precisely those that are most vulnerable and, therefore, the least able to maintain independent residence. However, information presented in Table VI.2 does not provide support for such idea. On the contrary, regardless of women's family status, they do not seem to have faced a deterioration in terms of their socio-economic resources. Consequently, the question remains open: why, despite the improvement in their socio-economic resources and a fall in their number of children – meaning a lower economic and caregiving burden – are young women and their family units less likely to live in independent living arrangements during the period? The next section attempts to answer this question, by testing Hypothesis 2.1 through a multivariate analysis.

Having shown general trends, it is necessary to examine whether the increase in subfamily living arrangements has taken place among women of all family statuses. Consistent with previous research on the subject, Table VI.3 shows that young women are more likely to live in extended living arrangements – particularly in subfamilies – when they are single lone mothers than when they are in a union (either consensual unions or formal marriages). However, unlike the general trend observed in Figure VI.1, the high prevalence of subfamilies among single lone mothers decreased over the period. This decrease in the prevalence of

extended living arrangements is also observed among separated/divorced and widowed lone mothers (see Table VI.3a in the annexes).

An interesting phenomenon occurs in the case of cohabiting and married women. Young women in consensual unions had a similar likelihood of living in subfamilies when compared to married women in 1990. However, cohabiting women then increase their chances of living in subfamilies, with instances doubling between 1990 and 2011 (from 20.8% to 40.1%). In contrast, the likelihood of married women living in subfamilies decreased throughout the period, drawing further away from the situation of women in consensual unions. The prevalence of extended living arrangements among cohabiting women increases both in those without children and in those with children. In contrast, in the case of married women, the decrease in the prevalence of extended living arrangements is mainly driven by those without children (see Table VI.3a in the annexes).

The results presented so far suggest that consensual unions are at the core of the upward trend in extended living arrangements. The increasing likelihood of living in subfamilies among women in consensual unions, along with the spread of cohabitation as a means of family formation, seems to be driving the rise in the prevalence of subfamilies among young women. However, the situation of single lone mothers also seems to be playing a role in this respect. Specifically, as single lone mothers are more likely to live in subfamilies than married and cohabiting women, their increasing prevalence among women in family units may have also favoured the rise of subfamily living arrangements. Such initial findings are examined further in the next section through a multivariate analysis.

Table VI.3. Single lone mothers, cohabiting and married women aged 20–29 by living arrangement. Chile, 1990, 2000 and 2011

Living arrangements	1990	2000	2011
Lone mothers			
Nuclear	4.5%	5.7%	15.5%
Extended, head-family	2.1%	3.9%	2.9%
Extended, subfamily	93.3%	90.4%	81.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
N	**841**	**2,609**	**3,144**
Cohabiting			
Nuclear	70.9%	59.8%	53.5%
Extended, head-family	8.2%	6.5%	6.4%
Extended, subfamily	20.8%	33.7%	40.1%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
N	**647**	**2,746**	**3,708**
Married			
Nuclear	70.8%	69.3%	73.8%
Extended, head-family	6.6%	7.0%	7.6%
Extended, subfamily	22.6%	23.7%	18.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
N	**4,534**	**6,296**	**1,838**
Total sample			
Nuclear	61.8%	53.7%	44.6%
Extended, head-family	6.2%	6.3%	5.4%
Extended, subfamily	32.1%	40.1%	50.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
N	**6,022**	**11,651**	**8,690**

Notes: Samples weights applied. All differences by living arrangement and family status are significant at $p < .001$

6.3 Family Formation Changes, Women's New Productive Roles, and their Impact on the Upward Trend in Subfamilies

This section analyses the impact of recent transformations in the process of family formation and women's productive roles on the living arrangements of women who have started family life. In particular, it seeks to investigate whether the general trend for the increasing importance of subfamily living arrangements shown in the previous section was driven by women's greater access to employment on the one hand, and by the rise in consensual unions and single lone motherhood on the other.

Table VI.4 presents the odds ratios from logistic regressions predicting the likelihood of living in subfamilies, based on a pooled sample of women aged 20–29 who have started family life, from 1990, 2000 and 2011. As I seek to differentiate the net influence of changes in family formation and women's productive roles on trends in subfamily living arrangements, the analysis includes three models. The first is a baseline model (Model 1), which includes a measure for the year plus socio-economic and demographic controls. Then I evaluate the

impact of controlling for women´s full-time employment (Model 2) and women's family status (Model 3).

Consistent with descriptive analysis, Model 1 shows that when changes in family formation and women's productive roles are not taken into account, the odds of living in subfamilies are significantly higher in 2000 and 2011 than in 1990. Thus, Model 1 confirms the upward trend over the 1990–2011 period in subfamily living arrangements once standard demographic and socio-economic variables are controlled.

After including a measure for women's full-time employment in Model 2, it is possible to observe that the upward trend in subfamily living arrangements continues over time. Women in 2000 are 12% more likely to live in subfamilies than women in 1990, and 44% more likely to do so in 2011. Living in extended households may help women to combine their new productive roles with their traditional reproductive ones related to caring and domestic chores. This can be seen in the positive effect of women's full-time employment – and the interaction of full-time employment and number of children – on the odds of living in subfamilies in Model 2. However, the increase in young women's full time employment over the period was not sufficient to drive the upward trends in subfamily living arrangements.

It is important to note that the main effect of full-time employment becomes non-significant once women's family status is taken into account in Model 3. However, the interaction effect of full-time employment and having one or two or more children continues to be significant, showing that it is not women's full-time employment by itself, but rather the employment of mothers, which increases the likelihood of living in subfamilies.

Interestingly, once women's family status is controlled in Model 3, the upward trend in subfamily living arrangements changes dramatically. There can be observed no significant differences in the odds of living in subfamilies for women in 2000 compared to 1990. Moreover, a clear reversal of the effect of the coefficients is observed in 2011 (the odds of living in subfamilies for women in 2011 are only 86% of those in 1990). Therefore, the upward trend for subfamilies between 1990 and 2011 can be explained by family formation changes. The increase in the proportion of women in consensual unions and single lone mothers – who are more likely to live in extended households than married women – has driven the rise of subfamily living arrangements. That is, the upward trend in subfamily living arrangements results from compositional changes among the group of young women, rather than an increase in their propensity to live in extended living arrangements. On the contrary, the

likelihood of living in subfamilies would have decreased between 1990 and 2011 if there had not been such compositional changes in the family status of young women over the period.

In addition, it is important to note that the positive association between education and the likelihood of living in subfamilies shown in Table VI.4 is not anticipated by either Modernisation Theory or Second Demographic Transition Theory. Access to higher educational levels is associated, in this approach, with modern values of independence and personal autonomy, which we might expect to be reflected in a preference for an independent residence. The reverse effect observed in Table VI.4 leads us to consider some alternative explanations. Pursuing this, future research needs to explore, for example, whether living in subfamilies allows young women to improve their educational levels, as they do not have to assume the financial responsibility for maintaining independent residence.

Table VI.4. Odds ratios from logistic regressions predicting sub-family living arrangements among women aged 20–29 who are living with partners and/or children, Chile, pooled years 1990, 2000 and 2011

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
PREDICTORS	**β**	**SE**	**OR**	**β**	**SE**	**OR**	**β**	**SE**	**OR**
Year (Ref: 1990)									
2000	0.167***	0.039	1.182	0.113**	0.039	1.119	-0.015	0.043	0.985
2011	0.462***	0.049	1.587	0.364***	0.042	1.439	-0.157**	0.050	0.855
Employment									
Women full-time employed				0.245**	0.090	1.278	0.067	0.088	1.069
Family status (Ref: Married)									
Single lone mothers							2.516***	0.050	12.377
Cohabiting							0.428***	0.039	1.534
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTROLS									
Income (Ref: Income quintile V)									
Income quintile I	2.865***	0.069	17.551	3.265***	0.072	26.167	2.216***	0.077	9.167
Income quintile II	1.824***	0.066	6.197	2.033***	0.069	7.636	1.579***	0.072	4.848
Income quintile III	1.407***	0.066	4.085	1.451***	0.069	4.266	1.228***	0.071	3.416
Income quintile IV	0.689***	0.068	1.992	0.665***	0.069	1.945	0.587***	0.071	1.799
Education (Ref: Complete high school education)									
Incomplete high school education	-0.485***	0.035	0.615	-0.473***	0.036	0.623	-0.418***	0.039	0.658
Some or complete higher education	0.356***	0.041	1.428	0.380***	0.042	1.462	0.299***	0.046	1.348
DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS									
Woman's Age	-0.148***	0.006	0.862	-0.163***	0.006	0.850	-0.161***	0.006	0.851
Urban zone	0.353***	0.043	1.424	0.357***	0.044	1.429	0.235***	0.048	1.265

Table VI.4.. Continued	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
Number of children (Ref: no children)									
One	-0.006	0.050	0.994	-0.342***	0.061	0.711	-0.649***	0.060	0.522
Two or more	-1.213***	0.057	0.297	-1.526***	0.068	0.217	-1.487***	0.067	0.226
INTERACTIONS									
Women full-time employed*One child				0.895***	0.099	2.447	0.520***	0.101	1.683
Women full-time employed*Two or more children				0.940***	0.114	2.560	0.476***	0.119	1.609
Intercept	1.561***	0.160	4.761	1.819***	0.167	6.166	2.222***	0.180	9.224
Sample size			26,358			26,358			26,358
-2 log-likelihood			28,567.085			27,726.477			24,522.628
Cox & Snell R Square			.219			.244			.333
Nagelkerke R Square			.295			.328			.448

Notes: Samples weights applied. OR = odds ratio. *p< .05. **p< .01. ***p< .001.

6.4 Changes in the Factors Affecting the Likelihood of Living in Subfamilies

In the previous section, I revealed the close relationship between the recent changes in the process of family formation and the increase in the prevalence of subfamilies. The growth of single lone motherhood and cohabitation as a path of family formation pushed up the overall prevalence of subfamilies among young women, as such family units are less likely than married couples to live independently. Now, it is worth asking whether the determinants of subfamily living arrangements have changed over time. In particular, this section focuses on the changing impact of women's employment and family status on subfamily living arrangements over the 1990–2011 period.

Table VI.5 shows the odds ratios for logistic regressions predicting subfamily living arrangements among women aged 20–29 who have started family life in three time periods: 1990, 2000 and 2011 (columns 2–4). In order to test if the coefficients significantly change over time, I calculate year interactions with all predictors in pooled models comparing 1990 with 2000, 2000 with 2011 and 1990 with 2011 (models not shown). I report the significant levels of these interactions in columns 5–7.

Table VI.5 confirms the positive effect of the full-time employment of young mothers on the odds of living in subfamilies, net of other factors. There is no significant effect of women's full-time employment on the odds of living in subfamilies in any of the years analysed. However, the interaction effect of full-time employment and having one child is positive and significant in 2000 and 2011. This evidence suggests that, in spite of the growth in female labour force participation and the incipient expansion of childcare services in recent decades (see Chapter II), mothers in full-time employment highly depend on coresidence in extended households during their family formation stage. As discussed previously, living in extended households may help employed women to reconcile their new productive roles with the maintenance of a traditional distribution of work at home.

Regarding the effect of women's family status on the likelihood of living in subfamilies, the descriptive analysis presented in Table VI.3 showed a decrease in the proportion of single lone mothers and married women living in subfamilies over time. This trend is the opposite of that observed among women in consensual unions, among whom the share living in subfamilies increased over the 1990–2011 period. The results of Table VI.5 are consistent with these descriptive analyses, showing that – net of other factors – the strong positive effect of being a single lone mother on the odds of living in subfamilies significantly decreased over the period. The odds of living in subfamilies for single lone mothers in 1990 are 38 times higher

than the odds for married women. This effect decreases to 9.5 times in 2011. The tests presented in column 5–7 show that these changes are statistically significant. Conversely, while in 1990 there was not a significant difference in the odds of living in subfamilies for women in consensual unions as compared with married women, by 2011 the odds for the former were more than twice those of the latter. Tests included in columns 5–7 show that this change is also significant.

Table VI.5. Odds ratios from logistic regressions predicting subfamily living arrangements among women aged 20–29 who have started family life (single lone mothers, cohabiting and married women). Chile, 1990, 2000 and 2011[a]

	Years			Significant change[b]		
Predictors	**1990**	**2000**	**2011**	**1990–2000**	**2000–2011**	**1990–2011**
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Employment						
Women full-time employed	1.251	0.916	1.137			
Family status (Ref: Married)						
Single lone mothers	38.015***	16.017***	9.523***	***	***	***
Cohabiting	0.898	1.229***	2.138***	*	***	***
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTROLS						
Income (Ref: Income quintile V)						
Income quintile I	3.517***	15.281***	10.883***	***		***
Income quintile II	3.024***	8.102***	4.327***	***	***	
Income quintile III	2.039***	5.228***	3.412***	***	*	**
Income quintile IV	1.384*	2.683***	1.573***	***	**	
Education (Ref: Complete high school education)						
Incomplete high school education	0.563***	0.745***	0.617***	**	*	
Some or complete higher education	1.378**	1.311***	1.369***			
DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS						
Age	0.873***	0.854***	0.837***			*
Urban zone	1.345**	1.321***	1.231*			

Table VI.5. Continued

Number of children (Ref: no children)				
One	0.665**	0.440***	0.537***	**
Two or more	0.305***	0.201***	0.224***	*
INTERACTIONS				
Women full-time employed*One child	1.161	1.848***	1.880***	
Women full-time employed*Two or more children	0.911	2.202***	1.436	*
Intercept	7.060***	5.940***	10.760***	
Sample size	6,022	11,646	8,690	
-2 log-likelihood	5,244.502	10,368.310	8,541.153	
Cox & Snell R Square	.297	.343	.333	
Nagelkerke R Square	.416	.463	.444	

*Notes: Samples weights applied. *p< .05. **p< .01. ***p< .001.*

[a] *See statistical appendixes, Table VI.5a, for the complete logistic regression results (coefficients, the standard error of B, and odds ratios)*

[b] *Based on year interactions with the predictors, which are tested on pooled samples combining observations for pairs of years: 1990–2000, 2000–2011 and 1990–2011.*

Figures VI.2 and VI.3 plot the predicted probabilities of living in subfamilies for women of different family statuses. They show that the likelihood of living in subfamilies as single lone mothers decreases over time, and that happens whether or not the woman is employed full-time. The process of differentiation in the likelihood of living in subfamilies between cohabiting and married women over the period is also observed in Figures VI.2 and VI.3. Cohabiting women increase their likelihood of living in subfamilies, independently of whether they are full-time employed or not. In the case of married women, there is a reduction in their likelihood of living in subfamilies only among those who are not in full-time employment. Full-time employed married women show no changes as far as their likelihood of living in subfamilies is concerned.

Figure VI.2. Predicted probabilities for living in subfamilies for hypothetical women in different family statuses: women not in full time employment



**Women aged 24, one child, complete high school education, income quintile III, urban zone, not in full time employment*

Figure VI.3. Predicted probabilities for living in subfamilies for hypothetical women in different family statuses: women in full time employment



**Women aged 24, one child, complete high school education, income quintile III, urban zone, in full time employment*

In order to further explore the differences between cohabiting and married women, I adapted the models reported in Table VI.5 for a subsample of in-union women. This analysis aims to incorporate the effect of the husband and partner's characteristics on the likelihood of living in subfamilies (see Table VI.6). Among these characteristics, I consider the educational level of the husband or cohabiting partner, the age difference between partners (expressed in relation to the husband or cohabiting partner), and employment arrangements within the couple. Regarding this last point, the focus is on comparing the traditional model of a sexual division of labour where the man is employed and the woman is not (assuming that the woman does the housework and is responsible for the care of children and other dependents), with other arrangements that deviate from this model. In order to do that, along with a measure of women's full-time employment, I included an additional measure that identified women who work part-time.[85]

[85] These include couples where the man is employed and the woman is in full-time employment (dual earners, women employed full-time); couples where the man is employed and the woman is part-time employed ("modified breadwinner model"); couples where the man is not employed while the woman is employed on a full- or part-time basis, and finally, couples where neither is employed.

Table VI.6 shows that after including men's characteristics, the results are similar to those obtained in the full sample of women. In 1990 there was not a significant difference between the odds of living in subfamilies for cohabiting women as compared with married women. By 2011, however, the odds of living in subfamilies for cohabiting women were twice those for married women. Tests reported in columns 5–7 show that this change is significant. More research is needed to understand why women in consensual unions are increasingly likely to live in subfamilies.

An unexpected and interesting finding of the analyses reported in Table VI.6 relates to the role played by the couple's employment arrangements on the likelihood of their living in subfamilies. The odds of living in subfamilies for couples where the man is employed and the woman is in full-time employment are significantly higher than the odds for couples that have a more traditional division of labour (male breadwinner couples, which are the reference category of the models). Moreover, this effect becomes stronger over time (tests reported in columns 5–7 show that 1990–2011 change is significant). Something similar can be observed with couples where the man is employed and the woman is part-time employed (although its positive effect begins only in 2000). Additionally, note that even less traditional employment arrangements, where the woman is the sole provider of income within the couple (couples where the man is not employed and the woman works full-time) are also positively associated with living in subfamilies.

Table VI.6. Odds ratios from logistic regressions[a] predicting sub-family living arrangements among in-union women aged 20–29, years 1990, 2000 and 2011

	Years			Significant change[b]		
Predictors	**1990**	**2000**	**2011**	**1990–2000**	**2000–2011**	**1990–2011**
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Cohabiting (Ref: Married)	0.938	1.244***	2.040***	*	***	***
Employment arrangements (Ref: Men employed – Women no employed)						
Men employed - Women full-time employed	1.291*	1.795***	2.105***	*		**
Men employed - Women part-time employed	1.022	1.591***	1.717***	**		**
Men non-employed - Women full-time employed	1.651	2.004***	2.259**			
Men non-employed - Women part-time employed	1.241	2.054**	1.215			
Men non-employed - Women non-employed	1.763***	2.193***	4.964***		***	***
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTROLS						
Women's Education (Ref: Complete high school education)						
Incomplete high school education	0.675***	0.871*	0.645***	*	**	
Some or complete higher education	1.311*	1.168	1.090			
Men's Education (Ref: Complete high school education)						
Incomplete high school education	0.842	0.748***	0.645***			**
Some or complete higher education	1.085	0.962	0.722**		*	**
Income (Ref: Income quintile V)						
Income quintile I	2.702***	12.958***	6.576***	***	**	***
Income quintile II	2.694***	8.525***	4.866***	***	**	**
Income quintile III	1.893***	5.567***	3.945***	***		***
Income quintile IV	1.332	3.008***	1.514**	***	***	

Table VI.6. Continued

DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS					
Women's age	0.864	0.011***	0.831***		*
Couple's age difference	0.934	0.006***	0.919***	**	
Number of children (Ref: no children)					
One	0.727**	0.573***	0.626***		
Two or more	0.362***	0.298***	0.364***		
Urban zone	1.307*	1.236*	1.200		
Intercept	11.279***	5.676***	15.429***		
Sample size	5,181	9,038	5,540		
-2 log-likelihood	4,817.629	8,891.591	5,687.037		
Cox & Snell R Square	.100	.142	.221		
Nagelkerke R Square	.152	.207	.309		

*Notes: Samples weights applied. *p< .05. **p< .01. ***p< .001.*

[a] *See statistical appendixes, Table VI.6a, for the complete logistic regression results (coefficient, the standard error of B, and the odds ratios)*

b Based on year interactions with the predictors, which are tested on pooled samples combining observations for pairs of years: 1990–2000, 2000–2011 and 1990–2011.

6.5 Summary and Conclusions

The persistence of extended living arrangements is not expected either by the Modernisation Theory or by the Second Demographic Transition Theory. From these approaches, the economic and social development experienced in Chile during the last twenty-five years should have led us to a family formation process increasingly associated with independent living arrangements. In particular, from these perspectives, the prevalence of subfamily living arrangements among women in the family formation stage would have been expected to decrease between 1990 and 2011 in Chile. However, this chapter shows that, on the contrary, there has been a trend towards an increasing prevalence of subfamilies. This led me to explore the hypothesis that changes in family formation and women's employment played a role in the increase of subfamily living arrangements.

Regarding the role of women's employment, this chapter shows that the upward trend in female labour force participation in Chile has not been the main factor responsible for the rise in the prevalence of subfamilies. While it is true that women who work full-time are more likely to live in extended households than non-employed women (particularly when they have children), the recent increase in the proportion of women working full-time has not been large enough to result in a compositional shift that pushes up the prevalence of extended living arrangements. In Chile, as noted in Chapter II, the labour force participation of women is still low compared to other Latin American countries, and even more so compared to European countries. Thus, it is possible to expect further increases in the prevalence of extended living arrangements as female labour force participation continues to grow. Therefore, in the absence of major institutional and cultural changes that facilitate the reconciliation of women's employment with domestic and care responsibilities, future generations of women will continue to use coresidence in extended households as a way to reconcile their work outside the home with their responsibilities within it.

Conversely, the analyses in this chapter show that the upward trend in subfamily living arrangements among young women are closely related to the transformations in the process of family formation that have taken place in Chile during the last decades. As shown in Chapter V, single lone mothers are more likely to live in extended living arrangements – mostly in subfamilies – than married women. Similarly, there is evidence of a higher likelihood of living in extended households among cohabiting women when compared with married women. Therefore, the compositional shift resulting from the dramatic increase in these family

arrangements during recent decades has contributed to the rise in subfamily living arrangements over the 1990–2011 period. This can be seen in the fact that once family status is controlled, the temporal increases in subfamily living arrangements cease or are even reversed. That is, women in 2011 are less likely to live in subfamilies than women in 1990 when changes in family status are taken into account.

When it comes to changes in the predictors of subfamily living arrangements over time, it is important to note the evolving situation of single lone mothers. Despite single lone mothers having the highest likelihood of living in subfamilies among the group of women, the strong positive effect of being a single lone mother on the odds of living in subfamilies significantly decreased over the period. Possible explanations for such a decrease should be sought in the socio-political and cultural changes observed in Chile during recent decades. As shown in Chapter II, marriage rates were still high in 1990 and out-of-wedlock births were just starting to increase. Alongside that, there was an institutional context characterised by very limited social protection for women and children, and family laws that reinforced social discrimination against unmarried mothers and their children. As a result, women who were single lone mothers in 1990 were probably highly vulnerable, with little chance of maintaining an independent residence. The spread of single lone motherhood from 1990 onwards has meant that women with greater resources of different types have entered into this situation. Moreover, recent reforms in family law and social protection have improved the economic situation of unmarried mothers. All these changes lead us to expect that single lone mothers are more likely to be able to live independently now than at the beginning of the 1990s. Future research on the subject should explore further such hypothesis.

Regarding the relationship between cohabitation and extended living arrangements, this chapter shows that cohabiting women were as likely to live in subfamilies as married women in 1990. However, these two groups differentiated during the period, which ended with cohabitating women being twice as likely to live in subfamilies than married women. This trend persists even when controlling by the characteristics of men, as shown in the models for the sub-sample of in-union women. The question that these findings raises is why the sharp increase in the spread of cohabitation (with the consequent diversification of this group of women) and recent reforms in family law and social protection favouring unmarried mothers do not result in a decrease in the likelihood of living in subfamilies, as they do in the case of single lone mothers. Establishing the reasons for such trend is beyond the scope of this chapter; one can only suggest some hypotheses. One consideration is the greater social acceptance of cohabitation: cohabiting couples are increasingly recognised by the extended

family, which is further expressed in their incorporation into extended households. This becomes more plausible if one considers the important changes that have taken place in Chile with regard to attitudes related to gender roles and family values. As noted in Chapter II, during the last decades, it is observed an erosion of traditional values related to family and gender relations that may have led to a weakening of the importance given to marriage and a greater acceptance of cohabitation. The greater acceptance of cohabiting couples by the extended family may also be influenced by a perception of greater vulnerability of the family unit, given its informal nature. This could lead families to be more willing to provide support to these couples through co-residence.

Beyond this possible explanation, what is clear is that the relationship between cohabitation and extended living arrangements contradicts the predictions on new forms of cohabitation raised by the adherents of Individualisation approach and Second Demographic Transition Theory. The growing importance of cohabitation among young couples in Chile has not gone hand-in-hand with a rise in independent living arrangements, which casts doubt on the transition towards unconventional expected patterns of household formation expected by these approaches. Moreover, the significant prevalence of extended living arrangements challenges assumptions about the weakening of kinship ties: the support provided by the extended family is, on the contrary, increasingly important for young couples and single lone mothers in Chile.

Finally, another interesting finding of this chapter refers to the role of couples' employment arrangements on the likelihood of their living in subfamilies. There is a clear association between independent living arrangements (mainly nuclear households) and a more traditional division of labour within the couple, which has gained in strength over the period analysed. When compared to male breadwinner couples (couples where the man is employed and the woman is exclusively dedicated to domestic and care work), couples in all other employment arrangement are more likely to live in subfamilies, net other factors. One could seek an explanation for this relationship in the perception of vulnerability of the economic position of men (couples where the man is not employed). Thus, the 'failure' of the traditional male role as the main provider for his family can lead these couples to seek support in coresidence with the extended family (and make host families more willing to provide support via co-residence to these couples). However, such a hypothesis does not seem plausible in the case of dual-earner couples, which are also less likely to live independently as compared to male breadwinner couples. This suggests that the explanation for couple's living arrangements

is not related to the employment situation of men; it must be sought in women's productive roles.

One possible hypothesis in line with what has been outlined above is that the higher likelihood of living in subfamilies for couples where the woman is employed is due to support needs related to childcare that are not captured by the variables of the models. Similarly, living in an extended household may facilitate women employment as they receive help with housework from extended household members: probably from other women who are not in the labour market. Given the enduring inequality in the distribution of housework between men and women, Chilean women working for pay may have gained economic independence, but this has not translated into a residential autonomy from the extended family.

CHAPTER VII: WHO DEPENDS ON WHOM WITHIN EXTENDED HOUSEHOLDS?

This chapter addresses the third research objective of this dissertation, which is to explore the relations of economic dependence within extended households. As discussed above, identifying who depends on whom within the household allows us to understand the relations of economic support that underlie extended living arrangements. In particular, this chapter analyses to what extent women in family units are economically dependent on household members other than their husbands or cohabiting partners, and how this has changed over the 1990–2011 period. It also examines how economic dependence is related to the position that women occupy within extended households – that is, if they are household heads or live in subfamilies. This chapter also identifies the factors that lead to women's economic dependence on other extended household members, and how they have changed in Chile over the 1990–2011 period.

The analyses carried out in this chapter are focused on adult women in family units living in extended households. Firstly, I present the trends in women's economic dependence within extended households for the 1990–2011 period, arranged by women's position within the household, family status, and age group. Secondly, I analyse the factors associated with women's economic dependence within extended households and their changes over the 1990–2011 period, by distinguishing between those affecting women in subfamilies and women in head-families. Finally, I present a brief analysis of the situation of the economic dependence of lone mothers, who have been often excluded from research on women's economic dependence.

7.1 Patterns and Trends in Women's Economic Dependence within Extended Households

Table VII.1 shows that women in subfamilies are more likely to be economically dependent on extended household members than those heading their own household. There are a significant proportion of women in subfamilies – ranging from 13.9% to 20.4% over the period – whose family unit makes no income contribution to the extended household, making them completely dependent on the financial support of other members of the extended household for their livelihood. This figure does not exceed 2% in the case of women in head-families. At the other end of the distribution, the proportion providing 80% or more of their expected share to the household income exceeds 70% in head-families, but is only around 50% among subfamilies.

These marked differences in the degree of economic dependence between women living in subfamilies and head-families provide initial support for Hypothesis 3.2, which anticipates that women in subfamilies are more likely to be economically dependent on non-nuclear household members than women heading their households.

Despite the greater level of economic dependence among women in subfamilies, Table VII.1 also shows a slight improvement in their situation over the 1990–2011 period. There is a decrease in the proportion of those who make no income contribution to the household, from 19–20% in 1990 and 2000, to 13.9% in 2011.

Table VII.1. Adult women in family units by income contribution to the extended household. Chile, 1990, 2000 and 2011

	Head-families		
	1990	**2000**	**2011**
No income contribution	1.5%	1.6%	0.8%
From 1% to 79% of the expected share	28.4%	27.8%	27.8%
From 80% to 120% of the expected share	48.5%	45.5%	50.1%
More than 120% of the expected share	21.6%	25.1%	21.3%
Total	*100.0%*	*100.0%*	*100.0%*
	Subfamilies		
	1990	**2000**	**2011**
No income contribution	19.7%	20.4%	13.9%
From 1% to 79% of the expected share	28.5%	30.2%	30.0%
From 80% to 120% of the expected share	23.2%	23.0%	24.4%
More than 120% of the expected share	28.6%	26.4%	31.7%
Total	*100.0%*	*100.0%*	*100.0%*

Notes: Samples weights applied.

Having shown an overview of the income contribution of women and their family units to the extended household, the analysis that follows focuses on those women whose family unit contributes less than 80% of its expected share of household income, which – for the purposes of this chapter – are considered economically dependent on extended household members. Based on this indicator, Table VII.2 shows that the proportion of women who are economically dependent decreased over the period among subfamilies, particularly between 2000 and 2011, from 48–50% to 43.9%.

Economic dependence is clearly associated with women's age. Table VII.2 shows that women aged 15–24 and 25–34 are more likely to be economically dependent on extended household members than older women (particularly those aged 45–64), both in subfamilies and in head-families. These results provide some support for Hypothesis 3.3, which states that young adult women in family units (under 35) will be more likely to be economically dependent on extended household members than older women (35 and over). The exception to this pattern is the case of women aged 65 and over in 2011, among whom there is an increase in the proportion who are economically dependent (both in subfamilies and in head-families).

Table VII.2 also shows interesting trends in economic dependence by age group. Among women in subfamilies, there is an increase in the proportion of younger (15–24) women who are economically dependent over the 1990–2011 period. The opposite trend is observed among women aged 25 to 64; decline is particularly marked between 2000 and 2011. This implies that the general trend for decreasing economic dependence among women in subfamilies noted above is mainly driven by women aged 25–64, that is, women of working age. In the case of head-families, the proportion of women who are economically dependent on extended household members over the period decreases or remains consistent, with the exception of the increasing trend among those aged 65 and older.

Table VII.2. Adult women in family units who are economically dependent* on extended household members by age group. Chile, 1990, 2000 and 2011

	Head-families		
Age group	**1990**	**2000**	**2011**
15–24	56.6%	37.2%	39.9%
25–34	48.6%	40.7%	35.8%
35–44	31.0%	34.4%	25.2%
45–54	23.4%	26.0%	24.6%
55–64	24.0%	25.4%	26.0%
65 and over	29.7%	26.1%	38.3%
Total head-families	*29.9%*	*29.4%*	*28.6%*
	Subfamilies		
Age group	**1990**	**2000**	**2011**
15–24	55.9%	60.8%	60.5%
25–34	45.0%	47.5%	39.1%
35–44	42.5%	43.6%	29.3%
45–54	31.8%	40.3%	27.3%
55–64	43.1%	33.1%	23.3%
65 and over	40.6%	32.6%	39.7%
Total subfamilies	*48.2%*	*50.6%*	*43.9%*

Notes: Samples weights applied. All differences by age group and economic dependence are significant at p < .001

** Proportion of women in family units that contribute less than 80% of the expected share of the family unit to the household income*

When figures on economic dependence are disaggregated by family arrangement, additional differences emerge. Table VII.3 shows that, as expected by Hypothesis 3.5, lone mothers are more likely to be economically dependent on extended household members than married and cohabiting women in each of the years analysed, and in the case of both subfamilies and head-families. Interestingly, the proportion of lone mothers in subfamilies who are economically dependent decreases over the period, from 60% in 1990/2000 to 50.6% in 2011. However, this reduction is not observed in the case of lone mothers in head-families, among whom the likelihood of being economically dependent remains relatively constant between 1990 and 2011.

In the case of married and cohabiting women, differentiated trends are observed over the period. Among the subfamilies, the proportion of women who are economically dependent decreases among those married (from 35–36% in 1990/2000 to 25.6% in 2011), but not among cohabiting women, for whom there is an increase between 1990 and 2000, before falling back in 2011 to slightly higher levels than those recorded in 1990. This results in a gap between the two groups of women over the period, from similar levels of dependence in 1990 to a situation where cohabiting women are more likely than married women to be economically dependent on extended household members in 2011. Among the head-families, a decline is observed in

the proportion of women who are economically dependent for both married and cohabiting women, but particularly among the latter.

Table VII.3. Adult women in family units who are economically dependent on extended household members by family arrangement. Chile, 1990, 2000 and 2011

	Head-families		
Family arrangement	**1990**	**2000**	**2011**
Lone mothers	37.2%	36.3%	37.4%
Cohabiting	35.6%	29.9%	26.3%
Married	27.6%	27.3%	25.4%
Total	29.9%	29.4%	28.6%
	Subfamilies		
Family arrangement	**1990**	**2000**	**2011**
Lone mothers	60.9%	60.3%	50.6%
Cohabiting	34.9%	42.0%	37.0%
Married	35.0%	36.6%	25.6%
Total	48.2%	50.6%	43.9%

Notes: Samples weights applied. All differences by family arrangement and economic dependence are significant at p < .001

7.2 Changes in the Factors affecting Women's Economic Dependence within Extended Households

This section focuses on the factors associated with women's economic dependence within extended households and their changes over the 1990–2011 period. Tables VII.4 and VII.5 present descriptive statistics for the key independent variables included in the multivariate analysis, for adult women in host-families, and women in subfamilies. In particular, these tables provide statistics about the proportion of women in family units contributing less than 80% of their expected share of household income by women's and household's characteristics.

Regarding women's family status, Tables VII.4 and VII.5 provide additional detail to the information included in Table VII.3 for the case of lone mothers. When differentiating by the marital status of lone mothers, it is possible to see that the decrease in the proportion of economically dependent lone mothers living in subfamilies observed in Table VII.3 is particularly sharp among those who are divorced or separated (from 54.9% to 31.7% over the period). Economic dependence also decreases among single lone mothers living in subfamilies, although this reduction is less marked than in the case of separated or divorced lone mothers.

Tables VII.4 and VII.4 also show that women's education levels and employment status are strongly associated with their degree of economic dependence within an extended

household. Among subfamilies, better-educated women have a lower likelihood of being economically dependent than those who have not finished high school. This is consistent with Hypothesis 3.4, which proposes that women in family units with fewer economic resources will be more likely to be economically dependent on non-nuclear household members than those with greater economic resources. Nevertheless, such differences become smaller over the period, with a decrease in economic dependence of women with incomplete and complete high school education and an increase among women with some or complete higher education.

A different situation is observed in the case of women living in host-families. In 1990, women who had not finished high school as well as those with higher education were equally likely to be economically dependent within the household, being both less likely to do so than women with complete high school education. This pattern changes in 2011, when highly educated women have the lowest likelihood of being dependent, which is in the line of Hypothesis 3.4.

Finally, as expected by Hypothesis 3.1, women's employment status has a strong impact on their economic dependence within the extended household. Among subfamilies, full-time employed women are much less likely to be economically dependent than women not in full time employment, and this difference became stronger over time. A similar pattern is observed among host-families, although the differences are less marked.

Table VII.4. Descriptive statistics on women's economic dependence within extended households. HEAD-FAMILY SAMPLE. Chile, 1990, 2000 and 2011

	Proportion of women in family units contributing less than 80% of their expected share of household income		
	1990	**2000**	**2011**
Women's Age			
15–24	56.6%	37.2%	39.9%
25–34	48.6%	40.7%	35.8%
35–44	31.0%	34.4%	25.2%
45–54	23.4%	26.0%	24.6%
55–64	24.0%	25.4%	26.0%
65 or more	29.7%	26.1%	38.3%
Women´s Family Status			
Single Lone Mothers	50.4%	55.4%	36.9%
Divorced/Separated Lone Mothers	42.9%	37.3%	33.0%
Widow Lone Mothers	31.0%	25.6%	42.6%
Cohabiting	35.6%	29.9%	26.3%
Married	27.6%	27.3%	25.4%
Women's Education			
Incomplete High School education	28.9%	28.7%	30.2%
Complete High School education	36.4%	31.1%	28.0%
Some or Complete Higher Education	29.2%	31.6%	21.9%
Women's Employment			
Women in full-time employment	24.9%	23.3%	18.9%
Women not in full-time employment	30.6%	30.9%	31.6%
Number of children			
One child under 5	43.5%	39.3%	32.5%
Two or more children under 5	60.8%	35.3%	31.0%
One child aged 5 to 15	31.9%	33.0%	21.4%
Two or more children aged 5 to 15	39.4%	37.5%	27.1%
One child aged 16 and older	27.9%	26.1%	20.7%
Two or more children aged 16 and older	20.3%	23.9%	19.0%
Total	**29.9%**	**29.4%**	**28.6%**

Notes: Samples weights applied. All differences by women's characteristics and economic dependence are significant at $p < .05$, except by having two or more children under 5; one child aged 5 to 15 and two or more children aged 5 to 15.

Table VII.5. Descriptive statistics on women's economic dependence within extended households. SUBFAMILY SAMPLE. Chile, 1990, 2000 and 2011

	Proportion of women in family units contributing less than 80% of their expected share of household income		
	1990	**2000**	**2011**
Women's Age			
15–24	55.9%	60.8%	60.5%
25–34	45.0%	47.5%	39.1%
35–44	42.5%	43.6%	29.3%
45–54	31.8%	40.3%	27.3%
55–64	43.1%	33.1%	23.3%
65 or more	40.6%	32.6%	39.7%
Women´s Family Status			
Single Lone Mothers	65.1%	63.5%	54.4%
Divorced/Separated Lone Mothers	54.9%	53.7%	31.7%
Widow Lone Mothers	39.1%	34.5%	33.6%
Cohabiting	34.9%	42.0%	37.0%
Married	35.0%	36.6%	25.6%
Women's Education			
Incomplete High School education	52.5%	54.8%	50.8%
Complete High School education	43.1%	47.3%	40.4%
Some or Complete Higher Education	38.3%	46.3%	41.7%
Women's Employment			
Women in full-time employment	23.0%	24.0%	16.5%
Women not in full-time employment	56.0%	60.7%	57.0%
Number of children			
One child under 5	53.7%	59.0%	39.9%
Two or more children under 5	58.6%	53.6%	32.5%
One child aged 5 to 15	49.7%	46.3%	26.5%
Two or more children aged 5 to 15	47.1%	53.5%	27.7%
One child aged 16 and older	38.9%	44.1%	20.7%
Two or more children aged 16 and older	33.7%	41.9%	16.7%
Total	**48.2%**	**50.6%**	**43.9%**

Notes: Samples weights applied. All differences by women's characteristics and economic dependence are significant at p < .05, except by having two or more children under 5; one child aged 5 to 15 and two or more children aged 5 to 15.

Regression models

Table VII.6 presents the odds ratios from logistic regressions predicting women's economic dependence within extended households by their position in the household (head-families and subfamilies) and year (1990, 2000, and 2011). The models predict whether the women's family unit contributes less than 80% of its expected share to the total household income. The first set of models corresponds to adult women living in head-families for 1990, 2000 and 2011

(columns 2–4), including year-interaction tests for each predictor (columns 5–7). The second set of models presents the results for adult women living in subfamilies for the years 1990, 2000 and 2011 (columns 8-10), with year-interaction tests for each predictor (columns 11–13).

Regarding women's age, it is possible to find partial support for Hypothesis 3.3, which expected that young adult women (under 35) in family units would be more likely to be economically dependent on extended household members than older women (35 and over). Young women (15–24 and 25–34) were found more likely to be economically dependent than women aged 35–44 in the case of subfamilies (except by women aged 25–34 in 1990), but only in 1990 and 2011 in the case of head-families.

Important differences arise when analysing the effect of women's family status on their odds of being economically dependent on extended household members. Among women living in head-families, being a single, divorced/separated or widowed lone mother, instead of a married woman, has a significant positive effect on the odds of being economically dependent during the three years analysed. A similar effect can be observed in the case of women living in subfamilies (except in the case of widowed lone mothers in 1990 and 2000), and it is particularly strong in the case of single and divorced/separated lone mothers. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 3.5, which anticipated that lone mothers would be more likely to be economically dependent on extended household members than married and cohabiting women. However, there is not a significant effect on economic dependence in cohabiting rather than married women, suggesting that there are no significant differences between in-union women based on marital status.

Interestingly, among women in subfamilies, the strong positive effect on economic dependence of being a single lone mother as compared to a married woman decreased over the period. Tests presented in columns 11–12 show that these changes are statistically significant. For example, single lone mothers living in subfamilies are 7.3 times more likely to be economically dependent on the rest of the extended household members than married women in 1990, a figure that decreases to 4.4 times in 2011. The positive effect on economic dependence of being a divorced/separated lone mother as compared to being married also decreases over the period, particularly between 1990 and 2000, which shows significant changes in the odds of being economically dependent, from 5.3 times more likely in 1990 to 2.7 times in 2011.

As expected by Hypothesis 3.1, women's employment has the strongest negative effect on the odds of being economically dependent on extended household members, both

among head-families and subfamilies. Controlling for other factors, women in full-time employment living in head-families are between 43% and 54% as likely to be economically dependent when compared to women not in full-time employment. In the case of subfamilies, the effect is even stronger than in head-families: women in full-time employment are only between 12% and 13% as likely to be economically dependent compared to women not in full-time employment.

Education is also protective against economic dependence, particularly for women in subfamilies. This provides some support for Hypothesis 3.4, which expects that family units with fewer economic resources – as expressed in lower education levels – will be more likely to be economically dependent on non-nuclear household members than those with greater economic resources.[86]

[86] Along with the predictors related to the different hypotheses evaluated in this analysis, I included in the models information on household income quintile as a control variable. Note that unlike previous analyses, this variable refers to household income, and not the income of the family unit. It seeks to control for the effect of the general level of economic resources of the household in which women and their family units are inserted.

Table VII.6. Odds rations from logistic regressions[a] predicting economic dependence within extended households, by year and position within the household, for adult women in family units (likelihood of contributing less than 80% of the expected share of the family unit to the household income). Chile, 1990, 2000 and 2011

	Women living in head-families						Women living in subfamilies					
	Years			Significant change [b]			Years			Significant change [b]		
Predictors	**1990**	**2000**	**2011**	**1990–2000**	**2000–2011**	**1990–2011**	**1990**	**2000**	**2011**	**1990–2000**	**2000–2011**	**1990–2011**
Age (Ref: 35–44)												
15–24	2.526***	0.934	1.432*	***			1.664**	1.772***	3.074***		***	***
25–34	1.572***	1.145	1.520***	*	*		1.059	1.244**	1.557***		**	*
45–54	0.763**	0.758***	0.942		*		0.792	1.020	0.902			
55–64	0.768*	0.712***	0.900		*		1.239	0.624*	0.682*			
65 and older	0.897	0.659***	1.220*		***		1.458	0.711	1.087			
Family Status (Ref: Married)												
Single Lone Mothers	3.224***	3.938***	1.823***		***	**	7.334***	4.836***	4.400***	***		***
Divorced/Separated Lone Mothers	3.117***	2.107***	1.650***	*	*	***	5.380***	3.850***	2.731***	**	*	***
Widowed Lone Mothers	1.775***	1.264**	1.511***	*			1.538	1.251	1.745*			
Cohabiting	1.053	1.034	0.993				1.055	1.110	1.110			
Number of children												
Number of children under 5 (Ref: no children)												
One	1.138	1.115	1.239*				1.734***	1.660***	1.318**		*	*
Two or more	2.070**	0.984	1.171	**			2.624***	1.376**	0.729	***	**	***
Number of children aged 5 to 15 (Ref: no children)												
One	1.092	1.087	0.798**		**	*	1.566***	1.234**	0.977			**
Two or more	1.543***	1.297***	1.110			*	1.910***	2.060***	1.067		**	**

Table VI.6 Continued

Number of children aged 16 and older (Ref: no children)											
One	0.756**	0.684***	0.658***			0.773	1.113	1.062			
Two or more	0.538***	0.638***	0.624***			0.732	1.225	0.844			
Education (Ref: Complete high school education)											
Incomplete high school education	0.806*	1.034	1.094	*	**	1.443***	1.272***	1.596***		**	
Some or complete higher education	0.663**	0.978	0.752***	*	*	0.856	0.754***	0.977		**	
Employment											
Full-time employed	0.545***	0.449***	0.438***			0.123	0.134***	0.125***			
Household Income Quintile (Ref: Quintile V)											
Quintile I	0.766*	0.986	0.742**		*	0.369***	0.268***	0.288***			
Quintile II	1.108	1.639***	1.297**	**		0.286***	0.217***	0.205***			
Quintile III	1.385**	1.476***	1.345**			0.479***	0.270***	0.224***	**		***
Quintile IV	1.209	1.612***	1.342**			0.764	0.428***	0.523***	**		*
Intercept	0.507***	0.414***	0.390***			0.492***	1.211	0.927			
Sample size	4,995	13,437	11,535			3,851	10,737	8,916			
-2 log-likelihood	5,739.067	14,784.027	13,255.234			4,320.963	11,901.223	9,910.756			
Cox & Snell R Square	.078	.056	.059			.237	.225	.257			
Nagelkerke R Square	.110	.079	.084			.316	.300	.344			

**p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001.*

[a] *See statistical appendixes, Tables VII.6a and VII.6b for the complete logistic regression results (coefficient, the standard error of B, and the odds ratios)*

[b] *Based on year interactions with the predictors, which are tested on pooled samples combining observations for pairs of years: 1990–2000, 2000–2011 and 1990–2011.*

In order to illustrate the results concerning the situation of subfamilies, Figures VII.1 and VII.2 show the predicted probabilities for hypothetical women of different family statuses and their changes over the period. The profile considered corresponds to women in subfamilies, aged 24–35, with complete high school education, with one child under 5, and from households belonging to income quintile III. For this profile, I compared women who are in full-time employment to women not in full-time employment in four family statuses. The predicted probability for each hypothetical person was computed using logistic regression coefficients for the subfamily sample (fully reported in Table VII.6b, appendixes).

Given these characteristics, Figure VII.1 shows that among full-time employed women, both single and divorced/separated lone mothers decrease their probability of being economically dependent on the rest of the extended household members between 1990 and 2011 (from 28% to 19% in the case of those single, and from 22% to 13% among those separated/divorced). Despite such falls in their probability of being economically dependent, lone mothers are still far from reaching the lower probability of cohabiting and married women with similar characteristics. Figure VII.2 shows higher predicted probabilities for women who are not in full-time employment. In particular, there is a marked decrease in the probability of being economically dependent among divorced/separated lone mothers (from 70% to 54% over the period). However, when single lone mothers and in-union women are analysed, not only a much higher probability of being economically dependent is observed, but such probability also remains stable or even increases between 1990 and 2011. This suggests that female employment has played an important role in reducing women's economic dependence within extended households, especially among divorced/separated lone mothers.

Figure VII.1. Predicted probabilities of being economically dependent for hypothetical women living in subfamilies: Full-time employed women



**Women living in subfamilies, aged 25–34, complete high school education, household income quintile III, having one child under five.*

Figure VII.2. Predicted probabilities of being economically dependent for hypothetical women living in subfamilies: Women not in full-time employment



**Women living in subfamilies, aged 25–34, complete high school education, household income quintile III, having one child under five.*

Despite this improvement in the level of economic dependence of lone mothers, their situation remains far more disadvantageous compared to that of married and cohabiting women. Even though lone mothers may not be economically dependent on husbands or cohabiting partners, most of them have to rely on extended family members for their livelihood. The high level of economic dependence of lone mothers within extended households leads us to expect that they would be under a high risk of falling into poverty if they were living independently.

To demonstrate this point, I present a brief analysis of the *observed* and *potential poverty* faced by lone mothers living in extended households and how this has changed over the 1990–2011 period. Firstly, I calculated the proportion of lone mothers living in extended households whose per capita *household* income (assuming household income pooling) is below the national poverty line for each year. This measure is the one used in official statistics on poverty, and I refer to it as *observed poverty*.[87] Secondly, to estimate the impact of coresidence in protecting lone mothers from poverty, I calculate the proportion of lone mothers whose per capita *family-unit* income (women's income plus the incomes of other members of their family unit if applicable) would be below the national poverty line if they were living independently. This is a measure of *potential poverty* that does not assume household income pooling. Unlike the rest of the analyses carried out in this chapter, which are based on a measure of equivalised income, this specific analysis uses per capita income to be able to make the measures compatible with the official poverty measures in Chile.

Figure VII.3 shows that lone mothers in head-families have levels of *observed poverty* only slightly higher than those registered at the national level.[88] Interestingly, when considering only

[87] In Chile, the official measure of poverty is based on poverty lines, which are developed via the method of calculating the cost of basic needs. This means that the per capita household income is compared to the cost of a nutritionally adequate diet measured in a minimum bundle. The value of this bundle is used to define the lines of poverty and extreme poverty. Thus, those households whose per capita income is not enough to cover the cost of this bundle are defined as 'extremely poor', while those households whose per capita income ranges between the cost of one and two bundles are considered 'poor' (Feres & Mancero, 2001). The values of poverty lines are adjusted by rural and urban areas and are expressed in Chilean pesos of the respective year (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, 2014).

[88] Poverty declined significantly between 1990 and 2011 in Chile, from 38.6% to 14.4% at the individual level (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, 2011b).

the income of women's family units, lone mothers living in head-families show no increase in their level of poverty in any year. That is, extended household members do not contribute to protecting lone mothers in head-families from falling into poverty. This suggests that, for these women, the inclusion of extended household members is not motivated by the need to improve their livelihoods, as has been suggested by some studies (Angel & Tienda, 1982; Moser, 1997; Tienda & Glass, 1985).

Figure VII.3 shows a very different picture in the case of lone mothers in subfamilies. On the one hand, the level of poverty in households that include lone-mother subfamilies is higher than the national average. Indeed, considering *observed poverty* levels, 50.9% of lone mothers in subfamilies lived in poor households in 1990, when national poverty was 38.6%. In 2011, when national poverty had decreased to 14.4%, 20.9% of lone mothers in subfamilies lived in poor households. On the other hand, the *potential poverty* levels of lone mothers living in subfamilies are considerably higher than what they experience according to official measurements. For example, in 1990, 79.1% of lone mothers living in subfamilies would have been poor if they had had to live independently from the extended household, on their own incomes. This proportion, although lower by 2011, was still worryingly high at 53.6% (more than twice the *observed levels of poverty* for lone mothers in subfamilies in 2011). This evidence shows that coresidence in extended households serves as a buffer against higher levels of poverty among vulnerable family units, such as lone mothers.

Figure VII.3. Observed and potential poverty among lone mothers living in extended households, by position within the household and year. Chile, 1990, 2000 and 2011



**Proportion of women whose per capita household and family-unit income are below the national poverty line for each year*

7.4 Summary and conclusions

This empirical chapter shows the unequal income contribution of family units within extended households. In all years analysed, subfamilies are more likely than head-families to be economically dependent on extended household members.[89] This suggests that financial support within extended households flows from those who head the household to those who join it as subfamilies. Thus, subfamilies are not only supported by the extended family through coresidence, but they are highly likely to also be supported financially (e.g. with regard to the cost of food and basic services, among other things). Unfortunately, the information available in the CASEN survey does not allow us to confirm this hypothesis directly, since it does not provide information on the financial flow within the household. The CASEN survey does not have information on intra-family relations, both economic and domestic, neither. This information would allow us to better

[89] This pattern is clear even though the dependence measure used in this dissertation – based on an equivalence scale that assigns a greater weight to the head of household and not to the head of each subfamily – tends to underestimate the levels of economic dependence of the subfamilies within of the extended household. In fact, when running the analyses with a measure of economic dependence based on per capita income, the levels of economic dependence recorded by the subfamilies are much higher.

understand the phenomenon of extended living arrangements. However, given the high level of economic dependence shown by subfamilies (it is worth noting that a significant proportion of subfamilies make zero, or a very low, income contribution to the household), one may expect that they would find it difficult to meet their survival needs if some degree of income pooling within the household did not exist. Nevertheless, this does not mean that subfamilies considered economically dependent are not able to provide other types of support or assistance to the individuals that host them. Subfamilies may pay back residential and financial support in the form of help with housework, or in caring for children or older family members. Future research on the subject would greatly benefit from information on the exchanges that take place inside the households.

Regarding the factors behind economic dependence within extended households, the findings of this chapter show the changes in economic dependence over the life course. As women's age increases, the odds of being economically dependent on extended household members declines. However, unlike the expectations of Hypothesis 3.3, higher levels of economic autonomy seem to occur at about the age of 40, and not before. This evidence is consistent with the results of research on intergenerational coresidence, which show that the flows of financial support within households go from the older to the younger generation and not the reverse, as might be expected given population aging. In the case of Chile, the question of whether this pattern of generational dependence will persist over time remains open. This is because older generations in Chile will probably experience a worsening of their economic situation as a result of low pensions, arising from the new pension system based on individual capitalisation (see Chapter II, where I describe the shift from the old public pay-as-you-go pension system to the new regime, in which individuals receive benefits according to their individual contributions).

Another important finding of this chapter is related to the high level of economic dependence of lone mothers within extended households. Lone mothers are far more likely to be economically dependent on extended household members than women in couples (married or cohabiting), despite a reduction in the level of dependence over the 1990–2011 period. This shows the high economic vulnerability of lone mothers in Chilean society. Indeed, without residential and financial support from the extended household, lone mothers would be at a high risk of falling into poverty, as shown by the analysis of *observed* and *potential poverty* for this group of women.

This is an important contribution to research on both intergenerational dependence and women's economic dependence within the family. In the case of the former, this is significant because one of the main limitations previously within this area of research is a lack of consideration of an individual's family situation when analysing dependence relationships within the household. This chapter shows that family situation plays an important role in the relations of dependence among household members, as is illustrated by the differences between lone mothers and women in couples, or by the positive effect of having children on economic dependence. When it comes to the latter – women's economic dependence within the family – lone mothers are commonly excluded from the analysis, because of the focus that on husband-wife relations. Thus, the findings of this chapter show that single mothers may not only depend on welfare, but may also heavily depend on their extended family. This is particularly important in societies with weak welfare states and where the family plays a central role in welfare provision.

Regarding the economic dependence of lone mothers, it is important to highlight the differences between single and divorced/separated lone mothers. The latter are those that registered the greatest reduction in their level of economic dependence over the 2000–2011 period. This could be related to the increasing economic support from their ex-husbands, as family laws give them greater economic protection than single mothers. As noted in Chapter II, since 1998 there has been no legal discrimination against children born out of wedlock, so all children have the right to demand economic protection from their fathers. However, this benefit is limited to the children's situation, and not their mothers'. Since 2004, with the introduction of the divorce law, women begin to be entitled to financial compensation after marital breakdown, especially when they had put aside their labour participation to take care of their children. This legal transformation may have favoured the reduction in the levels of economic dependence of separated/divorced lone mothers in the 2000–2011 period. However, more research is needed to test this hypothesis.

Finally, the results of this chapter confirm that women's employment is highly protective against economic dependence. Women working full time are far less likely to be in family units that are financially dependent on extended household members. The role of female employment has been central in reducing the likelihood of being financially dependent on other household members in the case of lone mothers. This is observed in the fact that only lone mothers in full-

time employment have reduced their likelihood of being dependent between 2000 and 2011, with lone mothers not in full-time employment maintaining high levels of dependence over this time.

CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSIONS

8.1 Summary and key findings

This dissertation aims to investigate the factors that explain extended living arrangements in Chile and their persistence over the 1990–2011 period. The more general motivation for this research arises from the apparent contradiction between the significant changes in the process of family formation during that period (declining fertility and marriage rates, and a dramatic increase in cohabitation and children born out of wedlock, among others) and a certain stability in the prevalence of more traditional household structures, such as extended households.

Unlike the transformations in family demography, the persistence of extended living arrangements was not anticipated by the main theoretical perspectives on the subject – these being modernisation theory and, more recently, the individualisation approach and the second demographic transition theory. Given that these approaches predict the declining importance of the extended family – and even the family in general – in the lives of individuals, recent transformations in the process of family formation in Chile would have been expected to go hand-with-hand with a decreasing prevalence of extended living arrangements.

Family research in Latin America has paid little attention to the persistence of extended living arrangements. By focusing mainly on recent transformations in family life, current family research has almost entirely neglected those aspects that have proved resistant to change, such as the persistently high prevalence of extended households among middle and low-income families. The few studies that address the topic in Latin America are qualitative analyses of urban poor households carried out during the 1980s and early 1990s, which focus only on the economic determinants of household extension. There is no research that addresses the relationship between the recent changes in the process of family formation and the residential patterns of Latin American families.

This dissertation aims to help fill the gap in research on this subject by studying extended living arrangements in Chile. In the following sections, I present the main results of each of the three empirical chapters of this dissertation.

- *First research objective (Chapter V)*

The first objective of this dissertation is to evaluate the role played by economic and life-course factors in explaining extended living arrangements among women living in family units. In particular, it seeks to answer the following research questions: How is the likelihood of living in an extended household (both in head-families and subfamilies) affected by economic needs? How is the likelihood of living in an extended household affected by changing needs for support and privacy over the life course? In particular, at which stages of the life course are women more likely to live in extended households, either in subfamilies or as household heads? And what kinds of family structures are most likely to be associated with extended living arrangements?

Literature on this subject suggests that economic needs are one of the main determinants of extended living arrangements. The findings of Chapter V provide some support for the hypothesis that household extension is a family strategy when facing economic deprivation. Indeed, women in family units with lower income are more likely to live in extended households than those with a higher income, once women's demographic and other socio-economic characteristics are taken into account. However, lower income is particularly associated with a subfamily position within an extended household. That is, the negative effect of income is stronger when predicting the likelihood of living in subfamilies over nuclear households than in head-families over nuclear households.

Such findings have important implications for the understanding of the process of extended household formation. They suggest that economic needs are an important driver for those seeking refuge in someone else's home, but they seem to be less important for those hosting other relatives within their household. Family units who head an extended household do not seem to include other relatives into their household as a strategy for improving their livelihoods; on the contrary, a more likely explanation for their behaviour is a desire to provide support to vulnerable family members. This is a significant contribution to research on extended households, because it highlights the importance of differentiating the positions that people and

family units occupy within the household, in order to have a more accurate understanding of the factors that lead them to household extension.

The findings of Chapter V also highlight the importance of taking a life-course perspective in order to better understand extended living arrangements. As predicted by life course theory, the likelihood of living in an extended household changes over the life span. Women in family units are more likely to live in extended households at two different life stages: youth (15–24) and middle age (55–64). Crucially, women's stage in the life course is closely associated with the position that they occupy within the extended household. Young women in the family formation stage are more likely to live in subfamilies, while middle-aged women living in extended households usually occupy a head-family position, hosting young couples or single lone mothers who are starting family life. Such patterns suggest that the process of family formation in Chile does not necessarily imply a separated (neolocal) residence, at least among a significant number of families. Coresidence is an important form of support for young families, particularly for those who are vulnerable, such as lone mothers.

By taking family transitions into account, the findings of Chapter V reveal a strong association between extended living arrangements – subfamilies, in particular – and lone motherhood. This association has previously been highlighted in qualitative research on poor households in Latin America, which notes the greater difficulties of lone mothers in residing independently. Going a step further, the findings of this chapter shows that this association persists even after variables such as income, age, and other socio-economic factors are taken into account in the statistical models. This suggests that it is not plausible to attribute the greater residential dependence of lone mothers solely to a scarcity of economic resources due to the lack of a partner. Among lone mothers, those who are single are the most likely to live in extended living arrangements – and in subfamilies, in particular – when compared to married women. This suggests that single lone mothers are a highly vulnerable group of women that strongly rely on the residential support of the extended family.

Such findings have important implications for research on gender and families. It seems that lone mothers face material, cultural and institutional constraints to living independently, which need to be examined further in future research on the subject. Moreover, the lack of residential independence of lone mothers results in their invisibility for official statistics, which gives a misleading picture of the prevalence of female headship in Chile. As noted at the beginning

of this dissertation, lone-mother subfamilies are important to research on gender and families because they represent the potential number of women-headed households in a specific society.

Importantly, Chapter V provides new evidence on the role played by cohabitation on the likelihood of living in extended households. Cohabiting women are more likely to live in subfamilies (instead of nuclear households) than married women. The fact that consensual unions are less stable than formal marriages and offer less economic and legal protection to their more vulnerable members in case of separation may produce a greater sense of obligation within the extended family to provide residential support for cohabiting couples. Indeed, recent legal changes offer partial economic protection of cohabiting mothers (via filiation law), but childless cohabiting women have no such protection, if the couple split up. By living as subfamilies, cohabiting women may increase the economic and social support available to them. However, further research is needed to investigate what goes on within the 'black box' of the household, in terms of exchanges of both intra- and inter-generational support.

An unexpected finding of Chapter V concerns the relationship between education and extended living arrangements. Consistent with a view of education as an indicator of socio-economic resources, higher levels of education among women are *negatively* associated with their odds of living in head-families. However, in the case of women in subfamilies, either having incomplete high school education or some or complete higher education (instead of complete high school education only) decreases the odds of living in subfamilies over nuclear households. Some of the positive association between complete high school education and subfamily living could be explained by a cohort effect, as the younger age profile of women living in subfamilies makes them more likely to be affected by the recent expansion in secondary education. However, the question of to what extent living in subfamilies enables individuals to improve their education levels remains open; it is worth considering that individuals may be able to direct their resources to studying rather than attempting to maintain an independent household.

Finally, a significant – and not anticipated – finding of Chapter V is the positive effect of mothers' full-time employment on the odds of living in subfamilies in particular (via the positive effect of the interaction between women's full-time employment and having children of different age groups). The *promise* of economic autonomy, expected to be ushered in by an increase in female employment, has not yet resulted in greater residential independence for women with children. The persistence of a traditional gendered division of labour within the household,

extremely limited work-family reconciliation policies, and the characteristics of the labour market (long working hours and insecurity) are probably behind this positive effect of mothers' full-time employment on extended living arrangements. As employed women in Chile face severe difficulties in reconciling their family responsibilities and paid work, they often have to rely on the support of their extended family. This support comes from other women, most of the time their own mothers or mothers-in-law. As a result, living in an extended household could be a beneficial arrangement for women, allowing them to reduce transportation costs and operate economies of scale in the fields of childcare and housework. However, when unpaid care work and household chores are redistributed among women of different generations this helps to perpetuate the notion that domestic labour is women's responsibility. It does nothing to mitigate the ongoing gender inequalities in the distribution of paid and unpaid work.

- *Second research objective (Chapter VI)*

The second objective of this dissertation is to investigate the relationship between the process of family formation and extended living arrangements in Chile, and how this relationship changed over the 1990–2011 period. In particular, it seeks to answer the following research questions: Have the patterns of economic modernisation and cultural change in Chile gone hand-in-hand with a decreasing prevalence of extended living arrangements among young families? How have women's new productive roles affected the living arrangements of young families over the 1990–2011 period? How are trends in the living arrangements of young families related to the transformations in the process of family formation that have taken place in Chile in that period?

Chapter VI shows an increasing trend in the prevalence of subfamily living arrangements among young families (from 32% to 50% of all women aged 20–29 in family units between 1990 and 2011). Such a trend was not anticipated in the literature of any of the main theoretical approaches to family and household change over time (the modernisation theory, the individualisation approach, and the second demographic transition theory). According to such theories, the economic and social development experienced in Chile during recent decades should have led to a family formation process that is increasingly associated with independent living arrangements. That is, the prevalence of subfamily living arrangements among women in the family formation stage would have been expected to decrease between 1990 and 2011 in Chile.

In order to understand this upward trend, Chapter VI evaluates both the role played by rising female labour force participation and recent changes in the process of family formation in the residential patterns of young women who have already started family life. Regarding the role of women's employment, this chapter shows that increasing female labour force participation in Chile has not been the main factor responsible for the rise in the prevalence of subfamilies. Women who work full-time are more likely to live in extended households than non-employed women. However, the recent increase in the proportion of women working full-time has not been large enough to result in a compositional shift that would push up the prevalence of extended living arrangements. As women's labour force participation is still low compared to other Latin American countries, it is possible to anticipate that further increases in female labour force participation will positively affect the prevalence of extended living arrangements. Yet such a trend could be reversed if major institutional and cultural changes facilitate women's employment via a redistribution of domestic and care work.

The upward trend in subfamily living arrangements among young women is, instead, closely aligned to the transformations in the process of family formation that have taken place in Chile during recent decades. As shown in Chapter V, single lone mothers are more likely to live in extended living arrangements – mostly in subfamilies – than married women. Similarly, there is a higher likelihood of living in extended households among cohabiting women compared to married women. As a result, the compositional shift resulting from the dramatic increase in single lone motherhood and cohabitation in recent decades contributed to the rise in subfamily living arrangements over the 1990–2011 period. The models included in this chapter show that once family status is controlled (as well as other demographic and socio-economic factors), the temporal increases in the likelihood of living in subfamilies are cancelled out or even reversed. Indeed, women in 2011 are less likely to live in subfamilies than women in 1990, once family status and other controls are taken into account.

Chapter VI also shows interesting changes in the predictors of subfamily living arrangements over time. Despite the strong positive effect of single lone motherhood on the odds of living in subfamilies, such effect significantly decreased over the period. Single lone mothers in 2011 are less likely to live in subfamilies than single lone mothers in 1990. Possible explanations for this change can be found in the socio-political and cultural transformations observed in Chile during recent decades. As shown in Chapter II, in 1990 marriage rates were still high, and out-of-

wedlock births were just starting to increase. Alongside that, there was very limited social protection for women and children, and family law reinforced social and legal discrimination against unmarried mothers and children born out of wedlock. Such a context leads us to conclude that single lone mothers in 1990 were a highly vulnerable group of women, whose chances of maintaining an independent residence were very limited. The increase in single lone motherhood from 1990 onwards has meant that more women with greater socio-economic resources are now in this category. Moreover, recent reforms in family law and social protection have improved the economic situation of unmarried mothers. All these changes help explain why single lone mothers are more likely to live independently now than at the beginning of the 1990s.

The association between cohabitation and extended living arrangements also changed over the 1990–2011 period. Young cohabiting women were as likely as young married women to live in subfamilies in 1990, but the two groups began to show substantial differences during the period. In 2011, cohabitating women were twice as likely as married women to live in subfamilies. This trend persists even when controlling for the characteristics of women's husbands or cohabiting partners. This raises the question of why, given both the sharp increase in cohabitation (with the consequent diversification of this group of women), and the recent reforms in family law and social protection for unmarried mothers, there has not been a decrease in the likelihood of living in subfamilies among cohabiting women – as seems to be the case for single lone mothers.

One possible explanation is the increasing social acceptance of cohabitation, which may result in cohabiting couples being more welcomed by extended families into extended households. This becomes more plausible if one considers the important changes that have taken place in Chile with regard to attitudes related to gender roles and family values. As noted in Chapter II, during the last decades, it is observed an erosion of traditional values related to family and gender relations that may have led to a weakening of the importance given to marriage and a greater acceptance of cohabitation. This is reinforced by the fact that marriage in Latin America has not been historically as important as in the case of other regions of the world, which was also discussed in Chapter II. Along with the greater social acceptance of cohabitation, the association between cohabitation and extended living arrangements may also be influenced by the perception that – given their informal character – consensual unions are more vulnerable than marriages, which could lead to families being more willing to provide support to these couples through coresidence.

Chapter VI also reveals the role of couples' employment arrangements on their likelihood of living in subfamilies. There is a strong association between independent living arrangements (mainly nuclear households) and a more traditional division of labour within the couple, and this has become stronger over time. When compared to male breadwinner couples (couples where the man is employed and the woman is exclusively dedicated to domestic and care work), couples in all other employment arrangements are more likely to live in subfamilies, net of other factors. A possible explanation for this is the perception of vulnerability in relation to the economic position of men – in particular, in couples where the man is not employed. This means that the *failure* of men to fulfil their traditional role as economic provider may lead these couples to seek support – via coresidence – from extended families and, at the same time, make families more willing to provide support to these couples. However, such a hypothesis does not seem plausible in the case of dual-earner couples, which are also less likely to live independently compared to male breadwinner couples. This suggests that the explanation is not to be sought only in the employment situation of the man in a couple; consideration also needs to be given to the woman's employment.

As proposed in Chapter V, the fact that couples where the woman is employed have a higher likelihood of living in subfamilies may reflect their need for greater support with childcare and housework – considerations that are not fully captured by the variables included in the models. Living in an extended household may facilitate women's employment, as they may receive help with housework from extended household members, probably other women who are not in the labour market. Chilean women working for pay may have gained economic independence, but this has not translated into a residential autonomy from the extended family.

- *Third research objective (Chapter VII)*

The third objective of this dissertation is to explore the relations of economic dependence within extended households, and look at what they can tell us about the flows of support that underlie the formation of extended households. In particular, it seeks to answer the following research questions: To what extent, in the context of extended households, are women in family units economically dependent on other household members (excluding their husbands or cohabiting partners), and how this has changed over the 1990–2011 period? How is economic dependence

related to the position that women occupy within the extended household, e.g. if they are household heads or live in subfamilies? What are the factors that explain women's economic dependence on other extended household members, and how they have changed over the 1990–2011 period?

Chapter VII shows the extent of the inequality of income contributions by family units within extended households. In all years analysed (1990, 2000, and 2011), subfamilies are more likely to be economically dependent on extended household members than head-families. This suggests that financial support within extended households flows from those who head the household to those who join it as subfamilies. Subfamilies are not only supported by the extended family through coresidence, as shown in previous analyses, but are also highly likely to be supported financially by extended household members. The high degree of economic dependence of subfamilies – a significant proportion of subfamilies make zero, or a very low, income contribution to their household – suggests that they would experience difficulties in meeting their basic needs if some degree of income pooling within the extended household did not take place.

The findings of Chapter VII also show changes in economic dependence over the life course. As women's age increases, the odds of being economically dependent on other extended household members declines (higher levels of economic autonomy seem to occur at about the age of 40). This evidence is consistent with the findings of research on intergenerational coresidence, which show that the flow of financial support within households goes from the older to the younger generation and not the reverse, as might be expected given population aging. In the case of Chile, whether or not the observed pattern of generational dependence will persist over time is less clear, given that older generations will probably experience a worsening of their economic situation as a result of low pensions. This is due to the pension system introduced in the 1980s by the military dictatorship, in which individuals receive benefits according to their individual contributions, and whose first cohort are now beginning to claim their pensions.

The residential dependence of lone mothers shown in Chapter V and VI goes hand-in-hand with their economic dependence within extended households. Lone mothers are far more likely to be economically dependent on extended household members than married or cohabiting women, despite a reduction in their level of dependence over the 1990–2011 period. This illustrates the economic vulnerability of lone mothers in Chilean society; they would be at a high risk of falling into poverty without residential and financial support from their extended families. This is clearly

observed in the analysis on *observed and potential poverty* carried out in Chapter VII, which shows that most lone mothers in extended households would be living in poverty if they lived independently.

There are important differences between single and divorced/separated lone mothers, however, the latter being those that registered the greatest reduction in their level of economic dependence over the 2000–2011 sub-period. Such improvement in the economic situation of divorced/separated lone mothers could be due to increased economic support from their ex-husbands, as recent reforms in family law have given them greater economic protection than single mothers. As noted in Chapter II, the filiation law of 1998 ended the legal discrimination against children born out of wedlock, and states that all children have the right to economic protection from their fathers. Nevertheless, this benefit applies only to children, and not to their mothers. The introduction of the divorce law in 2004, however, meant that women became entitled to financial compensation after marital breakdowns. This legal transformation may be behind the reduction in the levels of economic dependence of separated/divorced lone mothers in the 2000–2011 sub-period.

Finally, the findings of Chapter VII confirm that women's employment is an effective means for preventing economic dependence within the household. Women working full-time are far less likely than women not in full-time employment to be in family units that are financially dependent on extended household members. The role of female employment has been of particular importance in reducing economic dependence among single lone mothers living within extended households. Single lone mothers in full-time employment have reduced their likelihood of being dependent between 1990 and 2011, while those who are not in full-time employment maintained high levels of dependence over this time.

8.2 Implications for family research and further work

The findings of this research show the importance of considering the different positions that individuals and family units occupy within extended households when explaining their persistent prevalence in current Latin American societies. This approach allows us to understand the flows of family support underlying extended households, in which better-off individuals and families provide residential and economic support to their more vulnerable relatives. Given the significant

differences observed between women who live in head-families and those living in subfamilies, not to consider these different positions could result in misleading interpretations of the factors that make some individuals more likely than others to live in extended households.

Alongside this, the findings of this research show the importance of looking at intergenerational coresidence beyond just parent-adult child relationships. As noted in this dissertation, by focusing only on parent-adult child relationships, research on intergenerational coresidence has overlooked the presence of other family members within households. As a result, intergenerational coresidence is analysed without considering the very different household structures behind it (for example, a nuclear household in a more advanced stage of the household cycle and a three-generation household may both contain parent-adult child relationships). This limits the understanding of the relations of residential and economic support that lead to intergenerational coresidence, as households with different structures vary in terms of their income contributors and number of dependants, as well as their care and housework needs. Future research on intergenerational coresidence should take into account the particular characteristics that parent-adult child relations assume in extended households, and how they differ from those in nuclear households. Such a distinction is important, considering that extended households have a high prevalence not only in Latin America and Asia, but also in the United States, where most research on intergenerational coresidence has been carried out.

This research addresses a topic that has been theoretically central to family sociology: the relationship between the process of family formation and household structures. As noted above, the findings of this research show that recent transformations in the process of family formation in Chile have had clear impacts on the residential patterns of young families. In particular, the increase in non-traditional family forms – such as cohabitation and lone motherhood – has resulted in a rising prevalence of extended living arrangements among women starting family life. Such findings have significant implications when theorising about family change, as theoretical approaches that interpret recent changes in family formation as being a result of increased individualisation and a decline in the importance of the family in individual lives would not lead us to expect that these changes would go hand-in-hand with an increase in the significance of the extended family.

Indeed, this is particularly clear when we consider the fact that cohabiting women are more likely to live in extended living arrangements than married women. Such a finding

contradicts the thesis on new forms of cohabitation raised by the adherents of the individualisation approach and the second demographic transition theory. Recent increases in cohabitation among young couples in Chile has *not* gone hand-in-hand with a rise in independent living arrangements, which casts doubt on the transition towards more unconventional patterns of household formation predicted by these theoretical approaches. Moreover, it challenges assumptions about the weakening of kinship ties: the support provided by the extended family is, on the contrary, increasingly important for young cohabiting couples in Chile.

Future research on the subject will have to inquire more deeply about the strong economic and residential dependence of lone mothers found in this research. It is true that a significant degree of this dependence is due to economic factors; family units composed by lone mothers have fewer income contributors, and are also concentrated in low-income groups. However, this relationship persists even once the socio-economic characteristics of women are taken into account. In this dissertation, I hypothesise that the higher likelihood of lone mothers living in extended households could be related to other needs for support that are not included in the models, such as feeling emotionally upheld by the extended family, or receiving practical help with housework or childcare. Future research should evaluate such hypotheses and also explore whether the strong relationship between lone motherhood and extended living arrangements is a response to gender inequalities that prevent lone mothers from living independently.

Another significant finding of this research, which needs to be further examined in future research on the subject, is the positive effect of women's full time employment – particularly among mothers – on the odds of living in subfamilies. This is an important contribution to research on family and gender relations, despite the fact that the rise in female labour force participation in Chile has not been the main driver for the increase in the prevalence of subfamilies, as shown in Chapter VI. Indeed, the increasing economic independence that women have achieved through employment has not gone hand in hand with greater residential independence. The insecure and poorly paid jobs that an important part of Chilean women have to take are probably related to this situation. Yet the persistence of a traditional gendered division of labour within households, as well as extremely limited work–family reconciliation policies, cannot fail to be considered in this explanation. Employed women with children in Chile seem to need a great deal of support from their relatives – particularly their mothers – if they are to succeed in juggling family responsibilities and paid work.

If coresidence in extended households turns out to be the way to make female employment compatible with family responsibilities, this means that unpaid care work and household chores are redistributed among women of different generations and not between women and men. This perpetuates a traditional gender division of work within the family. Along with that, feminist aspirations about the capacity to form autonomous households that are free from dominance and dependence in families (Orloff, 1993) remain unfulfilled for twenty-first century family life in Chile. For employed mothers, better public childcare programmes could help reduce such reliance on intergenerational family support, along with flexible working hours and family-friendly policies.

Finally, the results of this dissertation open up a topic for research that has not yet been explored, with regards to the economic dependence of women within extended households. Given the characteristics of the Latin American family system, the study of women's economic dependence in Latin America must examine the impact of the formal or informal nature of couples' relationships (marriages or consensual unions) on the economic dependence of women on their husbands or cohabiting partners. Similarly, as a result of the high prevalence of extended households in Latin America, the impact of household structures on the relation of economic dependence between spouses or cohabiting partners also needs to be further examined – that is, looking at how the presence of other relatives in extended households impacts on the economic dependence of women on their husbands or cohabiting partners.

8.3 Policy implications

Perhaps the most important contribution of this research for public policy is to make subfamilies and their vulnerabilities visible. Official statistics on families and households, by working with a generic category of extended household, conceal those family units that are not able to maintain an independent residence. This particularly affects lone mothers, who mostly live in subfamilies, but it also affects a significant number of young cohabiting couples. Along with their youth, a common characteristic of subfamilies is a low-income level when compared to those living in head-families or nuclear households.

Making visible lone mothers living in extended households has important implications for public policy. On the one hand, lone mothers living in subfamilies can be considered a hidden form

of female headship (Chant, 1997, pp. 24–25); if these women had the means to maintain an independent residence, the percentage of households headed by women would certainly increase. Thus, the magnitude of lone mother subfamilies should be taken into account when analysing the increase in female headship in recent decades. On the other hand, making lone mothers more visible is important as it highlights the need for developing specific support programmes for this group. Lone mothers – particularly those who are single – are a highly vulnerable group, a fact that is reflected in their strong residential and economic dependence on the extended family. Alongside this, the precarious situation of lone mothers reflects the necessity of further eliciting effective financial support from the fathers of their children, a process that began with the reform of the law of filiation, but is still far from guaranteed.

The lack of subfamilies' residential independence poses significant challenges for housing policy. It is worth asking whether this is the result of barriers to accessing housing among certain groups of families – a lack of savings and the long waiting time when receiving state housing subsidies being two examples. Special attention should be paid to the geographical proximity of families in housing policy. Housing policy in Chile has frequently resulted in state-provision of housing for middle- and low-income families being built on the outskirts of cities. This leads to many new families being housed far from their original family homes, thus hindering their access to daily support (e.g. childcare or domestic help). This is particularly important in a context of increasing female labour force participation and may be affecting young families' decisions to stay in the parental home.

Another important implication of this research for public policy is to be found in the relationship between female employment and extended living arrangements – and subfamilies in particular. As noted above, the economic autonomy won by women in accessing paid work appears not to be consistent with their lack of residential dependence. As proposed by this dissertation, this could be the result of employed women having greater needs for support with childcare and housework, needs that are met by the extended family. Better public childcare programmes could aid the residential autonomy of women, especially those that are locked in to the working hours and requirements of the Chilean labour market.

Finally, the findings of this research have implications for the official measurement of poverty. These findings show that extended households are a buffer against higher poverty levels among vulnerable family units (as shown in the analysis of the observed and potential poverty

among single lone mothers). It is not known, however, whether the distribution of resources within extended households is in line with the assumptions of income pooling present in official measures of poverty. If not, a significant number of family units – particularly those living in subfamilies – would be facing a situation of hidden poverty within extended households. If the assumptions are correct, however, it could be stated that the reduction of poverty experienced in Chile in recent decades and the current relatively low levels are, to a significant degree, due to the role of families in providing welfare for their more vulnerable relatives. Therefore, both the official poverty measures and policies in this field should consider the situation of extended households more carefully. Measures for estimating potential poverty among subfamilies should be carried out along these lines. This would allow us to quantify the contribution of families to poverty reduction.

8.4 Limitations and constraints

The use of secondary data in family research has been widespread internationally in recent decades, mainly due to its advantages in terms of cost, access, sample size, and population representation (Hofferth 2005:892–894). However, it has sometimes been used without due consideration being given to the strengths and weaknesses of official statistics, such as unexamined assumptions and the political interests lying behind its design (May 2001:71). As noted in Chapter IV, the analyses carried out in this dissertation are based on the CASEN survey, which is carried out by the Chilean government, with the aim of characterising the socio-economic conditions of the Chilean population and evaluating the impact of social policy (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, 2011c). Despite the strengths of the CASEN survey for the purposes of this research, it is worth considering that the measures it contains reflect, one way or another, the family model that is being recognised and promoted by the state.

Along these lines, an important limitation of this research is its lack of information on relationships outside of the household. The analyses of this dissertation are focused only on information on household members, excluding the role of other family relationships that may exist outside the household. There is evidence that suggests these relationships are important, both in terms of the decision-making within the household and in the provision of the basic needs of household members. For example, the upward trend in divorces and separations in recent decades leads us to expect that the interchange between people living apart may play a central

role in children's development and their economic support (Hill, 1995). There is also evidence of an increase in non-cohabiting relationships, which are especially important among young people. Some studies show that a good deal of young mothers identified as single lone mothers by household surveys in reality do maintain a relationship with the father of their child (Olavarría and Palma 2007; Salinas 2011). Support flows in terms of housework and care by grandmothers or other non-coresident relatives can also be decisive in making independent living a possibility for some family units.

This research also lacks information on intra-family relations. The CASEN survey does not provide direct information on the degree of assistance or exchanges within the household, which could be important for understanding the formation of extended households and the relationships of economic dependence within them. For example, the analysis of economic dependence carried out in Chapter VII is based on information on income received by all household members from external sources, but the distribution of this income within the household is unknown. This leads us to an assumption of income pooling, which has been strongly criticised in research on the subject. Also, this disregards the possible counterpart provided by subfamilies in exchange for residential and economic support. It is perfectly possible that subfamilies pay back residential and financial support in the form of help with housework, or in caring for children or older family members. Thus, information on intra-family relations, both economic and domestic, would allow a greater understanding of the phenomenon of extended living arrangements.

Finally, future research on the subject will benefit from the availability of longitudinal data. At present in Chile, there are only two recent longitudinal surveys, but neither offers the advantages and national representation given by the CASEN survey for the analysis of living arrangements (one focuses on early childhood, while the other focuses on the social protection of workers). Moreover, neither of them continue to be carried out. The availability of longitudinal data would allow us to investigate other aspects of extended living arrangements that this research could not address. One aspect to explore further would be the duration of these subfamily arrangements, and the factors that make some families more likely than others to stay in these arrangements for longer periods. Another is to further examine the process of formation and dissolution of subfamily arrangements, and the living-arrangement trajectories followed by individuals over the life course.

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STATISTICAL APPENDIX

Table V.3a. Binary logistic regression for living in extended households among all women in family units. Chile, 2011

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
PREDICTORS	**β**	**SE**	**OR**	**β**	**SE**	**OR**	**β**	**SE**	**OR**
Economic needs									
Income (Ln)	-0.175***	0.004	0.839	-0.112***	0.004	0.894	-0.121***	0.004	0.886
Education (Ref: Complete high school education)									
Incomplete high school education	-0.091***	0.021	0.913	0.083***	0.023	1.087	0.102***	0.023	1.107
Some or complete higher education	-0.163***	0.026	0.850	-0.215***	0.028	0.807	-0.276***	0.029	0.759
Life-course factors									
Age (Ref: 35-44)									
15–24				0.999***	0.047	2.715	0.971***	0.048	2.640
25–34				0.112**	0.033	1.119	0.087*	0.034	1.091
45–54				0.106**	0.031	1.112	0.125***	0.032	1.134
55–64				-0.018	0.037	0.982	0.025	0.038	1.025
65 over				-0.400***	0.042	0.670	-0.331***	0.043	0.718
Family status (Ref: Married)									
Single lone mothers				1.329***	0.030	3.775	1.262***	0.031	3.534
Divorced/separated lone mothers				0.507***	0.034	1.661	0.469***	0.034	1.599
Widowed lone mothers				0.670***	0.046	1.954	0.640***	0.047	1.896
Cohabiting				0.034	0.027	1.034	0.018	0.027	1.018
Number of children									
Number of children under 5 (Ref: no children)									
One				-0.251***	0.031	0.778	-0.282***	0.037	0.754
Two or more				-0.667***	0.065	0.513	-0.620***	0.074	0.538
Number of children aged 5 to 15 (Ref: no children)									
One				-0.451***	0.026	0.637	-0.514***	0.031	0.598
Two or more				-0.907***	0.037	0.404	-0.984***	0.044	0.374

Table V.3a. Continued

PREDICTORS	Model 1 β	Model 1 SE	Model 1 OR	Model 2 β	Model 2 SE	Model 2 OR	Model 3 β	Model 3 SE	Model 3 OR
Number of children aged 16 and older (Ref: no children)									
One				-0.361***	0.026	0.697	-0.322***	0.029	0.725
Two or more				-0.624***	0.032	0.536	-0.587***	0.037	0.556
Other needs of support									
Women in formal education							0.361***	0.063	1.435
Family unit member with disabilities							-0.171***	0.030	0.843
Women full-time employed							0.132**	0.044	1.141
Women full-time employed*One child under 5							0.230***	0.061	1.258
Women full-time employed* Two or more children under 5							0.045	0.150	1.046
Women full-time employed*One child aged 5 to 15							0.237***	0.050	1.267
Women full-time employed*Two or more children aged 5 to 15							0.338***	0.074	1.402
Women full-time employed*One child aged 16 and older							-0.109*	0.053	0.897
Women full-time employed*Two or more children aged 16 and older							-0.096	0.067	0.909
Demographic controls									
Urban zone	0.260***	0.028	1.298	0.225***	0.030	1.253	0.219***	0.030	1.245
Ethnicity	0.058	0.034	1.060	-0.009	0.036	0.991	-0.001	0.037	0.999
Intercept	1.317***	0.051	3.732	0.673***	0.065	1.959	0.748***	0.066	2.113
Sample size			54,921			54,921			54,921
-2 log-likelihood			69,997.285			65,160.320			64,921.393
Cox & Snell R Square			0.055			.135			.138
Nagelkerke R Square			0.075			.183			.188

*Notes: Samples weights applied. See Table V.2 for description of data sample. OR = odds ratio. *p< .05. **p< .01. ***p< .001.*

Table V.3b. Binary logistic regression for subfamily living arrangements among women in family units living in extended households. Chile, 2011

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
PREDICTORS	**β**	**SE**	**OR**	**β**	**SE**	**OR**	**β**	**SE**	**OR**
Economic needs									
Income (Ln)	-0.259***	0.006	0.771	-0.135***	0.008	0.874	-0.141***	0.008	0.868
Education (Ref: Complete high school education)									
Incomplete high school education	-1.534***	0.037	0.216	-0.644***	0.050	0.525	-0.621***	0.051	0.537
Some or complete higher education	0.245***	0.044	1.277	0.118*	0.060	1.126	0.099	0.062	1,104
Life-course factors									
Age (Ref: 35-44)									
15–24				2.470***	0.103	11.821	2.439***	0.105	11.461
25–34				1.078***	0.064	2.939	1.087***	0.065	2.966
45–54				-1.159***	0.063	0.314	-1.168***	0.063	0.311
55–64				-1.854***	0.092	0.157	-1.836***	0.093	0.159
65 over				-1.937***	0.109	0.144	-1.883***	0.113	0.152
Family status (Ref: Married)									
Single lone mothers				2.053***	0.060	7.793	2.006***	0.061	7.434
Divorced/separated lone mothers				1.477***	0.071	4.379	1.399***	0.072	4.052
Widowed lone mothers				0.851***	0.126	2.342	0.886***	0.127	2.426
Cohabiting				0.554***	0.060	1.740	0.534***	0.060	1.707
Number of children									
Number of children under 5 (Ref: no children)									
One				0.023	0.062	1.024	0.043	0.075	1.044
Two or more				-0.175	0.139	0.839	-0.047	0.165	0.954
Number of children aged 5 to 15 (Ref: no children)									
One				-0.070	0.054	0.933	-0.164*	0.068	0.848
Two or more				-0.371***	0.075	0.690	-0.415***	0.093	0.660

Table V.3b. Continued

PREDICTORS	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	β	SE	OR	β	SE	OR	β	SE	OR
Number of children aged 16 and older (Ref: no children)									
One				-0.551***	0.058	0.576	-0.690***	0.070	0.502
Two or more				-1.062***	0.088	0.346	-1.245***	0.113	0.288
Other needs of support									
Women in formal education							0.052	0.135	1.054
Family unit member with disabilities							-0.140	0.078	0.869
Women full-time employed							-0.076	0.096	0.927
Women full-time employed*One child under 5							0.004	0.120	1.005
Women full-time employed* Two or more children under 5							-0.374	0.302	0.688
Women full-time employed*One child aged 5 to 15							0.258*	0.103	1.294
Women full-time employed*Two or more children aged 5 to 15							0.158	0.146	1.172
Women full-time employed*One child aged 16 and older							0.400***	0.109	1.493
Women full-time employed*Two or more children aged 16 and older							0.540**	0.171	1.716
Demographic controls									
Urban zone	-0.147**	0.051	0.864	-0.168*	0.070	0.846	-0.164*	0.070	0.849
Ethnicity	0.178**	0.059	1.195	-0.238**	0.080	0.788	-0.234**	0.080	0.791
Intercept	3.293***	0.087	26.933	1.168***	0.131	3.216	1.275***	0.133	3.577
Sample size			20,478			20,478			20,478
-2 log-likelihood			23,377.189			14,287.392			14,240.009
Cox & Snell R Square			.225			.498			.499
Nagelkerke R Square			.301			.667			.669

*Notes: Samples weights applied. See Table V.2 for description of data sample. OR = odds ratio. *p< .05. **p< .01. ***p< .001.*

Table VI.3a. Women aged 20–29 by family status and living arrangement. Chile, 1990, 2000 and 2011

Family status	Living arrangement	1990	2000	2011
Single women with no children	Non-extended households	43.9%	52.7%	70.0%
	Extended households	56.1%	47.3%	30.0%
	Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**
Single lone mothers	Non-extended households	4.5%	5.7%	15.5%
	Extended households	95.5%	94.3%	84.5%
	Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**
Divorced/separated lone mothers	Non-extended households	9.6%	19.1%	44.3%
	Extended households	90.4%	80.9%	55.7%
	Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**
Widow lone mothers	Non-extended households	36.4%	48.1%	9.1%
	Extended households	63.6%	51.9%	90.9%
	Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**
Cohabiting women without children	Non-extended households	67.2%	57.8%	48.6%
	Extended households	32.8%	42.2%	51.4%
	Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**
Cohabiting women with children	Non-extended households	71.4%	60.2%	55.0%
	Extended households	28.6%	39.8%	45.0%
	Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**
Married women without children	Non-extended households	56.9%	59.9%	69.9%
	Extended households	43.1%	40.1%	30.1%
	Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**
Married women with children	Non-extended households	72.6%	70.4%	74.6%
	Extended households	27.4%	29.6%	25.4%
	Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**
All adult women aged 20–29	Non-extended households	58.3%	51.7%	46.3%
	Extended households	41.7%	48.3%	53.7%
	Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**

Notes: Samples weights applied. All differences by living arrangement and family status are significant at $p < .001$, except the case of widow lone mothers.

Table VI.5.a Coefficients, the standard error of B, and odds ratios from logistic regressions predicting subfamily living arrangements among women aged 20–29 who have started family life (single lone mothers, cohabiting and married women). Chile, 1990, 2000 and 2011

	1990			2000			2011		
PREDICTORS	**β**	**SE**	**OR**	**β**	**SE**	**OR**	**β**	**SE**	**OR**
Employment									
Women full-time employed	0.224	0.196	1.251	-0.088	0.146	0.916	0.128	0.140	1.137
Family status (Married Ref. Cat)									
Single lone mothers	3.638***	0.159	38.015	2.774***	0.082	16.017	2.254***	0.084	9.523
Cohabiting	-0.108	0.112	0.898	0.206***	0.056	1.229	0.760***	0.073	2.138
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTROLS									
Income (ref. cat. Income quintile V)									
Income quintile I	1.258***	0.151	3.517	2.727***	0.130	15.281	2.387***	0.127	10.883
Income quintile II	1.107***	0.140	3.024	2.092***	0.125	8.102	1.465***	0.119	4.327
Income quintile III	0.713***	0.138	2.039	1.654***	0.124	5.228	1.227***	0.117	3.412
Income quintile IV	0.325*	0.146	1.384	0.987***	0.122	2.683	0.453***	0.114	1.573
Education (Complete high school Ref. Cat.)									
Incomplete high school	-0.574***	0.087	0.563	-0.295***	0.059	0.745	-0.483***	0.068	0.617
Some or complete higher education	0.320**	0.108	1.378	0.271***	0.073	1.311	0.314***	0.070	1.369
DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS									
Age	-0.135***	0.014	0.873	-0.158***	0.010	0.854	-0.178***	0.010	0.837
Urban Zone	0.297**	0.101	1.345	0.278***	0.074	1.321	0.207*	0.084	1.231

Table VI.5.a Continued

Number of children (Ref: no children)									
One	-0.408**	0.125	0.665	-0.821***	0.096	0.440	-0.622***	0.102	0.537
Two or more	-1.187***	0.137	0.305	-1.603***	0.105	0.201	-1.496***	0.117	0.224
INTERACTIONS									
Women full-time employed*One child	0.149	0.237	1.161	0.614***	0.165	1.848	0.631***	0.158	1.880
Women full-time employed*Two or more children	-0.093	0.279	0.911	0.790***	0.189	2.202	0.362	0.192	1.436
Intercept	1.955***	0.379	7.060	1.782***	0.286	5.940	2.376***	0.304	10.760
Sample size			6,022			11,646			8,690
-2 log-likelihood			5,244.502			10,368.310			8,541.153
Cox & Snell R Square			.297			.343			.333
Nagelkerke R Square			.416			.463			.444

*Notes: Samples weights applied. *p< .05. **p< .01. ***p< .001.*

Table VI.6.a Coefficients, the standard error of B, and odds ratios from logistic regressions predicting subfamily living arrangements among in-union women aged 20–29, years 1990, 2000 and 2011

	1990			2000			2011		
PREDICTORS	**β**	**SE**	**OR**	**β**	**SE**	**OR**	**β**	**SE**	**OR**
Cohabiting (ref. cat. Married)	-0.064	0.114	0.938	0.218***	0.057	1.244	0.713***	0.075	2.040
Employment arrangements (ref. cat. Men employed – Women no employed)									
Men employed - Women full-time employed	0.255*	0.118	1.291	0.585***	0.079	1.795	0.744***	0.091	2.105
Men employed - Women part-time employed	0.022	0.141	1.022	0.465***	0.091	1.591	0.541***	0.109	1.717
Men no employed - Women full-time employed	0.501	0.290	1.651	0.695***	0.188	2.004	0.815**	0.254	2.259
Men no employed - Women part-time employed	0.216	0.584	1.241	0.720**	0.229	2.054	0.194	0.282	1.215
Men no employed - Women no employed	0.567***	0.152	1.763	0.785***	0.107	2.193	1.602***	0.164	4.964
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTROLS									
Women's Education (ref. cat. Complete high school education)									
Incomplete high school only	-0.393***	0.096	0.675	-0.138*	0.066	0.871	-0.438***	0.089	0.645
Some or complete higher education	0.271*	0.114	1.311	0.155	0.083	1.168	0.086	0.093	1.090
Men's Education (ref. cat. Complete high school education)									
Incomplete high school only	-0.171	0.090	0.842	-0.290***	0.065	0.748	-0.439***	0.083	0.645
Some or complete higher education	0.082	0.123	1.085	-0.039	0.085	0.962	-0.326**	0.099	0.722

Table VI.6a. Continued

Income (ref. cat. Income quintile V)									
Income quintile I	0.994***	0.173	2.702	2.562***	0.153	12.958	1.883***	0.176	6.576
Income quintile II	0.991***	0.154	2.694	2.143***	0.142	8.525	1.582***	0.149	4.866
Income quintile III	0.638***	0.146	1.893	1.717***	0.135	5.567	1.372***	0.137	3.945
Income quintile IV	0.287	0.149	1.332	1.101***	0.129	3.008	0.415**	0.132	1.514
DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS									
Women's age	-0.146***	0.015	0.864	-0.159***	0.011	0.853	-0.185***	0.013	0.831
Couple's age's difference	-0.068***	0.010	0.934	-0.059***	0.006	0.943	-0.085***	0.008	0.919
Number of children (Ref: no children)									
One	-0.318**	0.110	0.727	-0.557***	0.084	0.573	-0.468***	0.093	0.626
Two or more	-1.017***	0.127	0.362	-1.210***	0.096	0.298	-1.011***	0.117	0.364
Urban Zone	0.268*	0.108	1.307	0.212*	0.084	1.236	0.182	0.104	1.200
Intercept	2.423***	0.405	11.279	1.736***	0.312	5.676	2.736***	0.383	15.429
Sample size			5,181			9,038			5,540
-2 log-likelihood			4,817.629			8,891.591			5,687.037
Cox & Snell R Square			.100			.142			.221
Nagelkerke R Square			.152			.207			.309

**p< .05. **p< .01. ***p< .001.*

Table VII.6.a Coefficients, the standard error of B, and odds ratios from logistic regressions predicting economic dependence within extended households by year, for adult women in HEAD-FAMILIES (likelihood of contributing less than 80% of the expected share of the family unit to the household income). Chile, 1990, 2000 and 2011

	1990			2000			2011		
PREDICTORS	**β**	**SE**	**OR**	**β**	**SE**	**OR**	**β**	**SE**	**OR**
Age (Ref: 35–44)									
15–24	0.927***	0.205	2.526	-0.068	0.147	0.934	0.359*	0.177	1.432
25–34	0.452***	0.120	1.572	0.135	0.079	1.145	0.419***	0.097	1.520
45–54	-0.270**	0.103	0.763	-0.277***	0.063	0.758	-0.059	0.070	0.942
55–64	-0.265*	0.119	0.768	-0.339***	0.074	0.712	-0.106	0.078	0.900
65 and older	-0.109	0.134	0.897	-0.418***	0.083	0.659	0.199*	0.084	1.220
Family status (Ref: Married)									
Single Lone Mothers	1.171***	0.188	3.224	1.371***	0.093	3.938	0.600***	0.083	1.823
Divorced/Separated Lone Mothers	1.137***	0.140	3.117	0.745***	0.076	2.107	0.501***	0.083	1.650
Widow Lone Mothers	0.574***	0.114	1.775	0.234**	0.079	1.264	0.413***	0.080	1.511
Cohabiting	0.052	0.136	1.053	0.034	0.068	1.034	-0.007	0.066	0.993
Number of children									
Number of children under 5 (Ref: no children)									
One	0.129	0.119	1.138	0.109	0.079	1.115	0.214*	0.105	1.239
Two or more	0.728**	0.212	2.070	-0.016	0.164	0.984	0.158	0.271	1.171
Number of children aged 5 to 15 (Ref: no children)									
One	0.088	0.093	1.092	0.083	0.058	1.087	-0.226**	0.077	0.798
Two or more	0.434***	0.108	1.543	0.260***	0.072	1.297	0.104	0.111	1.110
Number of children aged 16 and older (Ref: no children)									
One	-0.280**	0.084	0.756	-0.380***	0.050	0.684	-0.419***	0.062	0.658
Two or more	-0.621***	0.095	0.538	-0.450***	0.062	0.638	-0.472***	0.082	0.624

Table VII.6.a Continued									
Education (Ref: Complete high school education)									
Incomplete high school education	-0.215*	0.099	0.806	0.034	0.057	1.034	0.089	0.054	1.094
Some or complete higher education	-0.411**	0.146	0.663	-0.022	0.083	0.978	-0.285***	0.080	0.752
Employment									
Women full-time employed	-0.607***	0.105	0.545	-0.801***	0.060	0.449	-0.826***	0.061	0.438
Household income quintile (Ref: Income quintile V)									
Income quintile I	-0.266*	0.133	0.766	-0.015	0.091	0.986	-0.299**	0.091	0.742
Income quintile II	0.103	0.124	1.108	0.494***	0.086	1.639	0.260**	0.086	1.297
Income quintile III	0.325**	0.121	1.385	0.389***	0.086	1.476	0.296**	0.086	1.345
Income quintile IV	0.190	0.122	1.209	0.477***	0.085	1.612	0.294**	0.089	1.342
Intercept	-0.680***	0.154	0.507	-0.882***	0.104	0.414	-0.942***	0.110	0.390
Sample size			4,995			13,437			11,535
-2 log-likelihood			5,739.067			14,784.027			13,255.234
Cox & Snell R Square			.078			.056			.059
Nagelkerke R Square			.110			.079			.084

Table VII.6.b Coefficients, the standard error of B, and odds ratios from logistic regressions predicting economic dependence within extended households by year, for adult women in SUBFAMILIES (likelihood of contributing less than 80% of the expected share of the family unit to the household income). Chile, 1990, 2000 and 2011

	1990			2000			2011		
PREDICTORS	**β**	**SE**	**OR**	**β**	**SE**	**OR**	**β**	**SE**	**OR**
Age (Ref: 35–44)									
15–24	0.509**	0.148	1.664	0.572***	0.083	1.772	1.123***	0.081	3.074
25–34	0.058	0.130	1.059	0.218**	0.070	1.244	0.443***	0.077	1.557
45–54	-0.233	0.238	0.792	0.020	0.117	1.020	-0.103	0.114	0.902
55–64	0.214	0.326	1.239	-0.472*	0.226	0.624	-0.383*	0.190	0.682
65 and older	0.377	0.323	1.458	-0.341	0.189	0.711	0.083	0.203	1.087
Family status (Ref: Married)									
Single Lone Mothers	1.993***	0.100	7.334	1.576***	0.059	4.836	1.482***	0.104	4.400
Divorced/Separated Lone Mothers	1.683***	0.126	5.380	1.348***	0.076	3.850	1,005***	0.130	2.731
Widow Lone Mothers	0.431	0.252	1.538	0.224	0.188	1.251	0.557*	0.237	1.745
Cohabiting	0.053	0.159	1.055	0.104	0.070	1.110	0.104	0.096	1.110
Number of children									
Number of children under 5 (Ref: no children)									
One	0.551***	0.100	1.734	0.507***	0.059	1.660	0.276**	0.086	1.318
Two or more	0.965***	0.148	2.624	0.319**	0.104	1.376	-0.316	0.192	0.729
Number of children aged 5 to 15 (Ref: no children)									
One	0.449***	0.104	1.566	0.210**	0.062	1.234	-0.023	0.104	0.977
Two or more	0.647***	0.139	1.910	0.723***	0.085	2.060	0.065	0.174	1.067
Number of children aged 16 and older (Ref: no children)									
One	-0.258	0.181	0.773	0.107	0.095	1.113	0.060	0.201	1.062
Two or more	-0.312	0.294	0.732	0.203	0.159	1.225	-0.170	0.336	0.844

Table VII.6.b Continued									
Education (Ref: Complete high school education)									
Incomplete high school education	0.367***	0.095	1.443	0.240***	0.053	1.272	0.468***	0.059	1.596
Some or complete higher education	-0.156	0.123	0.856	-0.283***	0.068	0.754	-0.023	0.066	0.977
Employment									
Women full-time employed	-2.097***	0.104	0.123	-2.010***	0.058	0.134	-2.080***	0.064	0.125
Household income quintile (Ref: Income quintile V)									
Income quintile I	-0.997***	0.163	0.369	-1.319***	0.117	0.268	-1.244***	0.117	0.288
Income quintile II	-1.253***	0.155	0.286	-1.529***	0.113	0.217	-1.583***	0.115	0.205
Income quintile III	-0.736***	0.149	0.479	-1.308***	0.112	0.270	-1.494***	0.114	0.224
Income quintile IV	-0.269	0.150	0.764	-0.849***	0.114	0.428	-0.648***	0.117	0.523
Intercept	-0.710***	0.193	0.492	0.192	0.133	1.211	-0.076	0.150	0.927
Sample size			3,851			10,737			8,916
-2 log-likelihood			4,320.963			11,901.223			9,910.756
Cox & Snell R Square			.237			.225			.257
Nagelkerke R Square			.316			.300			.344