The EU’s Approach to Peacebuilding in Common Security and Defence Policy Missions and Operations

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Summary

The main purpose of this thesis is to provide an understanding of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding in its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations. The thesis explores why EU missions carry out mainly post-conflict peacebuilding tasks and whether the shift towards peacebuilding is about a substantial change of EU norms. The research analyses how peacebuilding in CSDP actions is framed, designed and operationalised through the complex decision- and policy-making processes within the CSDP. In particular, the thesis assesses how the EU’s approach to peacebuilding in the CSDP was influenced by the UN’s conceptualisation of peacebuilding and how the EU has developed its own distinctive approach to peacebuilding. While looking at the examples of civilian missions and military operations in Mali and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the thesis provides insights into the operational dynamics of peacebuilding under the CSDP.

The thesis argues that CSDP missions and operations reflect a normative and practical commitment of the EU to international peacebuilding. CSDP actions deployed in post-conflict scenarios follow the logic of liberal peacebuilding strategies while aiming at the stabilisation, reconstruction and building of the institutions of a functioning state, in particular the military, police and justice sectors. The EU pursues its peacebuilding activities under the CSDP in a comprehensive, case-specific and geopolitically strategic way as demonstrated by case studies of Mali and Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time, the research reveals that, although the shift towards peacebuilding in CSDP actions has been underpinned by a change of normative approaches, driven by the reform process of the UN peacekeeping, it also reflects the EU’s preferences, pragmatic limits and capability-expectation gaps in crisis management.
Declaration

I declare that this dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text.

It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. I further state that no substantial part of my dissertation has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text.

It does not exceed the prescribed word limit for the relevant Degree Committee.
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List of Abbreviations

ACP  African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
AFBiH  Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina
AFISMA  African-led International Support Mission to Mali
AMIS  African Union Mission in Sudan
AQIM  Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb
AU  African Union
BiH  Bosnia and Herzegovina
CAR  Central African Republic
CARDS  Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation
CBSD  Capacity-Building for Sustainable Development
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIGEM  Centre d’Information et de Gestion des Migrations (Centre for Migration Information and Management)
CIMIC  Civil-Military Cooperation
CivCom  Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CIVMIL  Civil-Military (coordinating group)
CM-FPR  Coordination des mouvements et Front patriotique de résistance (Coordination of Movements and Patriotic Resistance Forces)
CM-A  Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad (Coordination of Movements of Azawad)
CMC  Crisis Management Concept
CMCO  Civil-Military Coordination
CMPD  Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
CPA  Coalition du peuple pour l’Azawad (Coalition of People of Azawad)
CPCC  Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability Directorate
CROC  Crisis Response and Operational Coordination
CSCs  Country Specific Configurations (of the PBC)
CSDP  Common Security and Defence Policy
CSDPCR  Common Security and Defence Policy, and Crisis Response
CSDPCR.PRISM  Common Security and Defence Policy, and Crisis Response, and Prevention of Conflicts, Rule of Law/ SSR, Integrated Approach, Stabilisation and Mediation (division)
DDR  Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFS  (UN) Department of Field Support
DG  Directorate-General
DG DEVCO  Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DG RELEX  Directorate-General for External Relations
DGE  Directorate-General for External Relations and Political-Military Affairs
DPA  (UN) Department of Political Affairs
DPKO  (UN) Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC  Democratic Republic of the Congo
DSG  Deputy Secretary-General
DSG-CSDPCR  Deputy Secretary-General for CSDP and Crisis Response
EBCG  European Border and Coast Guard Agency
ECHO  Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian
Aid Operations

ECMM European Community Monitoring Mission
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EDA European Defence Agency
EEAS European External Action Service
ENP European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
EPC European Political Cooperation
ESDC European Security and Defence College
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
ESS European Security Strategy
EU European Union
EU NAVCO European Union Naval Coordination Cell
EUAM Ukraine European Union Advisory Mission in Ukraine
EUAM European Administration of Mostar
EUAVSEC European Union Aviation Security Mission
EUBAM European Union Border Assistance Mission
EUCAP European Union Capacity Building Mission
EUFOR European Union Force
EUGS European Union Global Strategy
EUJUST European Union Rule of Law Mission
EULEX European Union Rule of Law Mission
EUMAM European Union Military Advisory Mission
EUMC European Union Military Committee
EUMM European Union Monitoring Mission
EUMS European Union Military Staff
EUNAVFOR European Union Naval Force
EUNAVFOR MED European Union Naval Force Mediterranean
EUPAT European Union Police Advisory Team
EUPM European Union Police Mission
EUPOL European Union Police Mission
EUPOL COPPS European Union Police Mission for the Gaza Strip
Europol European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation
EUSEC European Union Security Sector Reform Mission
EUSR European Union Special Representative
EUSR BST European Union Special Representative Border Support Team
EUSSR European Union Security Sector Reform Mission
EUTF EU Emergency Trust Fund
EUTM European Union Training Mission
FAC Foreign Affairs Council
FBiH Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
FLNA *Front de libération nationale de l’Azawad* (National Liberation Front of Azawad)
FPU Formed Police Unit
Frontex see EBCG
FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GS Sahel *Le Groupe des Cinq du Sahel* (The Group of the five Sahel countries)
GAC General Affairs Council
GATIA *Groupe autodéfense touareg Imghad et alliés* (Self-defence Group of Imghad Tuaregs and Allies)
HCUA High Council for the Unity of Azawad
HQ  Headquarters
HR/VP  High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/ Vice-President of the European Commission
IBM  Integrated Border Management
ICG  International Crisis Group
ICJ  International Court of Justice
IcSP  Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
ICTY  International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IDPs  Internally displaced persons
IFOR  Implementation Force in BiH
IFS  Instrument for Stability
INTCEN  (EU) Intelligence and Situation Centre
IOM  International Organization for Migration
IPA  Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance
IPTF  (UN) International Police Task Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
ISAF  International Security Assistance Force
ISF  (Malian) Internal Security Forces
MAA  Mouvement arabe de l’Azawad (Arab Movement of Azawad)
MaAF  Malian Armed Forces (in French FAMA = Forces armées du Mali)
MDSF  Malian Defence and Security Forces
Medevac  Medical Evacuation
MIA  Mouvement islamique de l’Azawad (Islamic Movement of Azawad)
MINURCAT  Mission des Nations unies en République centrafricaine et au Tchad
(United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad)
MINUSMA  Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation au Mali (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali)
MNA  Mouvement national de l’Azawad (National Movement of Azawad)
MNLA  Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad)
MPCC  Military Planning and Conduct Capability
MSU  Multinational Specialised Unit (within SFOR)
MUJAO  Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest Movement (Movement for Unity and Jihad in Western Africa – MUJWA)
MUJWA  see MUJAO
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation
OC  Organizational Committee (of the PBC)
OHR  Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina
OIC  Organization of Islamic Cooperation
OSCE  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PARSEC  Programme d’Appui au Renforcement de la Sécurité (Programme of Support for Enhancing Security [in the Mopti and Gao regions])
PBC  (UN) Peacebuilding Commission
PESCO  Permanent Structured Cooperation
PIC  Peace Implementation Council
PMG  Politico-Military Group
PRC  Police Restructuring Commission
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRISM</td>
<td>Prevention of Conflicts, Rule of Law/ SSR, Integrated Approach, Stabilisation and Mediation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCA</td>
<td>République centrafricaine (see CAR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>Republika Srpska</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAA</td>
<td>Stabilisation and Association Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Stabilisation and Association Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBS</td>
<td>State Border Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECOPOL</td>
<td>Security Policy and Conflict Prevention Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilisation Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG/HR</td>
<td>Secretary General of the Council of the EU/ High Representative for the CFSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHIRBRIG</td>
<td>Standby High-Readiness Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPA</td>
<td>State and Information and Protection Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom (of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UN HQ</td>
<td>United Nations Headquarters</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>UNLOPS</td>
<td>United Nations Liaison Office for Peace and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIBH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force in BiH</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States (of America)</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War II</td>
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Preface and Acknowledgements

The idea to write this thesis has three origins. The first thoughts go as far as my university studies in Bratislava where I met students from various corners of former Yugoslavia. While listening to their stories of coping with their experiences of war, I attempted to understand how peace can be built. Later, I became involved in volunteering activities with youth and civil society organisations in the Western Balkans. While engaging with young Bosnians, Croats, Macedonians, Serbs and Slovenians in conflict resolution and peacebuilding workshops, I became convinced about the importance of choosing right and ownership-sensitive intervention strategies to end conflicts and build lasting peace. Through these activities, I also realised the potential and responsibility of the European Union (EU) in international conflict management.

My second inspiration traces back to my master’s studies in International Peace Studies at Trinity College Dublin, through which I became acquainted with the role of both the EU’s and UN’s approaches to conflicts as well as the theories of peacebuilding. The role of both organisations in international relations was re-affirmed during my studies in Public and International Affairs and in Conflict Studies in Ottawa. These courses inspired me to write my master’s thesis on the role of the UN Peacebuilding Commission in the governance of peacebuilding. I benefited from the guidance of my master’s supervisor Dr Etain Tannam and other scholars in the programme. Studies at universities in Göttingen, Erlangen, Tübingen and Bratislava provided addition background in other disciplines, helping me to shape my perspectives in a more holistic way.

The day after submitting my master’s dissertation, I left to New York where I worked with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS). It was there where my third inspiration for this thesis originated. This experience exposed me to policy-making aspects of peacebuilding and peace operations in the UN system. While I wanted to study more about UN peacebuilding and peacekeeping, through my everyday work, interactions and meetings, I became intrigued by the role of the EU in shaping the normative framework of UN peacebuilding and peacekeeping practices. While attending UN meetings, including the meetings of the First Committee of the General Assembly and the meetings of the PBC, I noticed that the EU was regarded not only as one of the most crucial actors in policy- and decision-making at the UN but also as the key actor in international conflict management, especially peacebuilding. This experience inspired my decision to further study the EU’s approach to peacebuilding in EU missions and operations.

This thesis could not have been completed without the valuable support of many people who offered advice and time during my doctoral studies. Above all, I would like to express my utmost gratitude to my principal supervisor, Dr Geoffrey Edwards, for his most valuable guidance, continued encouragement and support during my research in a manner that made my studies and research enjoyable, inspiring and passionate. In particular, I appreciate his thoughtful and insightful advice on the analytical shaping of my thesis. His expertise and knowledge in the area of the CSDP aided my understanding of the interrelation between policy-making processes and theoretical frameworks. I am thankful to him for sharing his precious ideas and thoughts, as well as important contacts on high-level practitioners and scholars in the field. He always provided critical comments and constructive suggestions on both my fieldwork and thesis. During my research and writing process, he encouraged me to focus on the essential issues as to ensure the coherence of the thesis. He always found time for a meeting, even at a short notice. He was highly supportive not only in academic but also in personal matters. I am also grateful to him for his encouragement to engage in various activities at the European Centre, which broadened my horizons.

My gratitude also goes to Prof. John Loughlin, my second supervisor, for his advice
and guidance. I am thankful to him for helping me to understand my topic within a broader picture of European affairs. He wanted me not only to excel and improve but also to think critically about the theme as to make the most valuable contribution to scholarship as well as society. I am grateful to him for pointing me to many opportunities and many of his academic contacts as well as for involving me in the activities of the Von Hügel Institute. I would like to thank Prof. Christopher Hill for his feedback in the first year exercise, which helped me to improve methodological and conceptual aspects of my dissertation. I enormously benefited from his advice and his research seminar on foreign policy analysis. I express my sincere gratitude to my examiners, Prof. Sven Biscop and Dr Mette Elistrup-Sangiovanni, for their constructive comments and questions which helped me to improve the final version of this thesis. Their suggestions are going to guide my further research and work on publications. In addition, I am thankful to Dr Sara Silvestri, Dr Julie Smith, Dr Devon Curtis, Prof. Brendan Simms, Dr Duncan Bell and other scholars at the Department of Politics and International Studies (POLIS) for constructive conversations which prompted me to think more critically about my theme. I would like to express my gratitude to all academic and administrative staff at POLIS for their assistance in all administrative matters. Special thanks to Ms Cantu for her always encouraging, supportive and welcoming approach.

Peterhouse, my college, was a particularly unique place to study; it is not only an academic institution but also a place of friendship and collegiality. I am thankful to Dr Stephen Hampton, my college tutor, for his warm tutorial and spiritual support. I am grateful to my college for awarding me the Peterhouse Postgraduate Studentship and the Greta Burkil travel awards, which allowed me to carry out this research. I am also thankful for funding provided by my department and the University of Cambridge for fieldwork and conferences. Academic activities organised by POLIS, the European Centre and the Von Hügel Institute as well as other departments and colleges of the university provided flourishing ground for new intellectual interactions. Supervising in the module International Relations II offered a unique space to discuss the matters of international peace and security with highly enthusiastic students. As the coordinator of the summer school programmes in politics and international relations at Jesus College, Downing College and Trinity Hall, I enjoyed interacting with diverse groups of students from all over the world. In addition, interactions with graduate students during seminars in Politics of Peace and Conflict at Trinity College Dublin and in Religious Fundamentalism and Violence at the University of Groningen which I taught helped me to broaden my perspectives.

Writing this dissertation without the encouragement and support of other students and scholars from POLIS and other disciplines would have been unthinkable. While I cannot name all, I would like to give special thanks to Njoki Wamai, Alexandra Maria-Bocse, Sebastian Steingass, Molly Krasnodebska, Elif Cetin, Marc Ozawa, Olivier Mayeux, Samuel Trizuljak, Karel Kabelik, Tobias Cremer and the late Giulio Regeni. Many thanks to academic and administrative staff at universities in Berlin, Groningen and Dublin where I spent some time while carrying out and finishing this research. Academic work and productive interactions with colleagues, especially with Prof. Jennifer Todd and Prof. Ben Tonra, at these universities inspired me for new ideas. While presenting at conferences, summer schools and workshops, I had the opportunity to meet and talk to many excellent scholars, including Prof. Sven Biscop, Prof. Joachim Koops, Prof. Arne Niemann, Prof. Thomas Diez, Prof. Frédéric Mérand, Prof. Hanna Ojanen, Prof. Wolfgang Wagner, Prof. William I. Zartman, Dr Amelia Hadfield, Dr Philip Cunliffe, Dr Tomas Weiss, Dr Severine Autesserre, Dr Marina Henke, Dr Kseniya Oksamytna, Dr John Karlsrud and many others, who shared their ideas with me and who provided valuable comments on my papers. Their inputs enhanced my knowledge in studies on the CSDP, peacebuilding, EU foreign policy and UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Interactions with scholars and colleagues from other disciplines, including
migration research, sociology and religious studies, helped me to understand the studied theme within a broader perspective.

I am also thankful to editors and peer reviewers of the *Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* and journals *International Peacekeeping* and *International Negotiation* where some data and ideas from this research have been published. I also had the opportunity to contribute with my research, especially on Mali and Bosnia and Herzegovina, to a Department of International Development policy report *The Role of Religion in Conflict and Peacebuilding*, edited by Dr Sara Silvestri and Prof. James Mayall, and commissioned by the British Academy. Some ideas and data from this thesis appear in the article ‘The Establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission: Reflecting Power Shifts in the United Nations’ published in *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 24 (2) 2017. While these publications build on the research that forms the basis of this thesis, they are not identical with it.

Most importantly, I would like to extend my gratitude to those in Brussels, Berlin, Paris, London, Bamako, Koulikoro, Segou, Sarajevo and elsewhere who agreed to be interviewed for this project and who navigated me to potential interviewees for their availability, patience and trust. For reasons of confidentiality, I cannot acknowledge their names. Countless informal conversations over coffee, lunch or dinner provided me with the opportunity to deepen my knowledge and gain valuable information. Whether in the canteen of the European External Action Service (EEAS), in cafés around the Schumann roundabout, in the bar of the EU training mission in Mali or at our place, conversations with policymakers and practitioners formed a vital cornerstone of my research. These interviews and conversations provided me not only with the data but also with new perspectives on EU foreign policy-making.

The writing of this dissertation took place at many places around the world. Whether in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Belgium, Mali, Germany, the Netherlands, Slovakia or other countries, many friends and my family were part of this project and offered invaluable time, support and friendship. Without their encouragement, this thesis would not have been possible. I am especially thankful to my partner who provided not only personal support, but, as a policymaker working directly in the CSDP structures, he was also an advisor, offering first-hand insights into everyday policy-making in the CSDP and critical review of my arguments. Our household has regularly been a place of critical discussions, which provided me not only with new insights but also urged me to reconsider my arguments and craft them in a more meaningful and pragmatic way.
1 Introduction

Outline of the theme

Since the end of the Cold War, multiple security challenges have led to the development of new ways of dealing with conflicts. The surge of intrastate conflicts and the recurrence of violence have emphasised that neither military intervention nor peacekeeping alone can prevent a country from sliding into a war. Traditional peacekeeping utterly failed in Rwanda and Srebrenica. The rise of transnational terrorism further underlined the importance of new approaches to post-conflict states which can easily become breeding grounds of terrorism. Besides, the US-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq cast a shadow of doubt over the ability of military actions to achieve lasting peace.

In this environment, peacebuilding has emerged as a new practice of international assistance to states recovering from conflicts in their quest for sustainable peace. Peacebuilding is a form of post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction aimed at preventing the relapse of a post-conflict society back into conflict. It addresses both the immediate consequences and root causes of conflicts. Peacebuilding that focuses on the stabilisation, reform and building of state institutions has become the dominant approach of state actors and intergovernmental organisations (Richmond 2011; Richmond and Mitchell 2012). This form of peacebuilding addresses structural causes of conflict while building social, political, judicial, economic and security state sectors (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; 2006).

While peacebuilding has been mainly associated with the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) also identified it as one of the priorities of its foreign policy (Council of the EU 2008). The EU contributes financially and with civilian and military expertise to the peacebuilding activities of the UN and other organisations. The EU also undertakes its own peacebuilding policies and programmes. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has become the EU’s most significant contribution to international peacebuilding efforts. Launched as an instrument for managing conflicts outside the EU’s borders, the CSDP stands primarily for civilian and military missions in third countries. It covers the full range of crisis management tasks, also known as Petersberg Tasks: “joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and

1 The EU is used in this work to also denote its predecessor, the European Community, unless it is indispensable to refer to previous terms.

2 CSDP was initially framed as Common European Security and Defence Policy and, shortly after, as European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The Lisbon Treaty renamed ESDP to CSDP (Howorth 2014, 19). CSDP is used in this work to refer to all the three unless it is necessary to refer to previous names.
peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation” (TEU Art. 23(1)).

Initiated by the Franco-British agreement at Saint-Malo, the CSDP was envisioned as a tool for strengthening all aspects of the security of the Union, including the EU’s capacity for autonomous military actions in international crises (Joint Declaration 1998). The original Petersberg Tasks were designed for military crisis management: “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking” (Treaty of Nice Art. 1(2.2)). The CSDP was supposed to empower the EU as a military actor and strengthen the EU’s military capabilities (Salmon and Shepherd 2003).

Despite this vision, and despite the fact that the CSDP includes the full range of crisis management tasks, EU missions and operations are mainly utilised in post-conflict scenarios rather than open conflicts. CSDP actions have, for the most part, been deployed to promote post-conflict stabilisation, reforms and the rebuilding of state structures. They comprise activities in the areas of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); security sector reform (SSR), which includes the reform and capacity-building of military and police sectors; and the reform of the rule of law. These activities fall within the scope of peacebuilding.

Since 2003, the EU has deployed several missions and operations to stabilise and build peace in third countries. Through these deployments, the EU established itself as an actor in international peacebuilding (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006; Stewart 2011). As Biscop and Whitman noted, the emergence of the CSDP, in particular its military component, was the key aspect in the gradual development of the EU “as an autonomous actor in the field of security, aiming to safeguard European security by improving global security” (Biscop and Withman 2013a, 1). Tardy noted that CSDP missions and operations “are the most visible manifestations of EU activity in fragile states and the most tangible expression of the EU’s contribution to international peace” (Tardy 2015a, 7). It could be argued that CSDP actions reflect a normative and practical commitment of the EU to international peacebuilding.

EU missions and operations are part of a broader spectrum of international peace missions carried out by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the African Union (AU) and the UN (Missiroli 2015). Peace support operations have become a central activity of

3 These tasks may be utilised in the fight against terrorism and in the support of third countries in combating terrorism in their territories as outlined in Art. 43(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The CSDP also includes provisions for the progressive framing of a common EU defence policy, actions of solidarity and mutual assistance if an EU state is the object of an armed aggression, and the framework for Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) (TEU Art. 42). Sanctions, mediation and conflict prevention support, and the early warning mechanism are institutionally under the authority of the Deputy Secretary-General for CSDP and Crisis Response (DSG-CSDPCR). However, they do not fall under the CSDP decision-making based on Art. 42 and 43 of the TEU. Sanctions are regulated by Art. 30 and 31 of the TEU.
international organisations since the 1990s. While the UN has been the main actor in conflict management since the end of WWII, regional organisations assumed a similar role only after the end of the Cold War.\footnote{Ojanen has argued that NATO, the Western European Union (WEU) and later the EU had to find new activities after their traditional defence function ceased after the end of the Cold War (2006b, 68).} Short-term military peace-enforcement operations have been NATO’s main activities. In contrast, the UN has been at the forefront of peacekeeping. Since the end of the 1990s, the UN has expanded its peacekeeping operations, the task of which was to merely observe peace agreements and keep peace, into comprehensive missions with peacebuilding components and pioneered peacebuilding missions.

The role of the EU in peacebuilding has been mainly shaped by the UN. The UN provided a source of legitimacy for the EU’s CSDP (Kurowska and Seitz 2011). At the same time, the EU was the main supporter of the shift towards peacebuilding at the UN (Blockmans, Wouters and Ruys 2010, 2). The EU’s peacebuilding activities under the CSDP resemble those of the UN as they aim at the stabilisation and rebuilding of state institutions. Howorth has argued that, in their scope and range, CSDP missions and operations are comparable only “to the United Nations as a peacekeeping body” (Howorth 2014, 13). Nevertheless, in contrast to robust and multidimensional UN missions, CSDP actions are modest, small in size and usually focused on one aspect of peacebuilding. One of the questions explored therefore is how peacebuilding within the CSDP fits the UN framework and norm of peacebuilding. A second question is how the shift towards peacebuilding at the UN has impacted on the identity of the EU as a peacebuilding rather than military actor.

At the same time, the CSDP is an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In this sense, EU peacebuilding is an outcome of EU foreign policy. The unique nature of EU foreign policy-making, which combines both the member states and the EU institutions, has inevitably influenced the character of EU peacebuilding. So, to understand the EU’s approach to peacebuilding under the CSDP, it is important to examine how peacebuilding is orchestrated as EU foreign policy. This can help to explain the extent to which the EU’s approach to peacebuilding is influenced by self-centred preferences of member states or their normative commitment.

Despite primarily involving post-conflict activities, the CSDP has not been analysed from a peacebuilding perspective. The peacebuilding literature focuses on the UN and NGOs as main international peacebuilding actors (Newman 2013). The conceptualisation of EU peacebuilding is widely absent in peace studies. Before the launch of the CSDP, scholars highlighted the EU’s potential in conflict prevention and in tackling root causes of conflicts (Cottey 1998; Bonnen 2003; Debiel and Fisher 2000; Hill 1992; 2001; Rummel 1996). While
analysing the international role of the European Community, Christopher Hill (1993) identified a ‘capability-expectations gap’ between what the Community aspired to do and what it was actually able to deliver. He determined three components of this gap: the ability to agree, resource availability, and the instruments at the Community’s disposal, all of which were lacking at that time. The CSDP was seen as a crucial step towards the narrowing of this gap (Cameron 2002; Freire 2008; Toje 2008).

Initially, the debate centred on whether the EU needed a CSDP and whether this instrument could ever be good for the EU. While some criticised the establishment of the CSDP, in particular its military component, as the wrong policy for the EU (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2003; Menon 2003), others defended it (Howorth 2003). Lindley-French was pessimistic about the prospects for a more united and active use of the CSDP (Lindley-French 2002). Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2003) argued that the EU should focus on strengthening its capacity for what it does best, namely non-military crisis-management and post-war reconstruction, instead of attempting to build an autonomous military capacity since EU states fundamentally disagree about where and when to deploy troops. In contrast, others saw the CSDP as a quest by EU countries for autonomy in security and defence. This pursuit led to fears about the competing ambitions, contrasting visions and trans-Atlantic tensions between the CSDP and NATO. Scholars debated whether the CSDP would strengthen or undermine the Alliance and how it would affect the relationship between the two (Cimbalo 2004; De Wijk 2004; Howorth and Keeler 2003; Ojanen 2006b).

Scholarship on the CSDP has, however, grown exponentially, focusing predominantly on the evolution, procedures, structures and roles of the CSDP from the perspectives of security, actorness or integration (Bonnén 2003; Cameron 2012; Gnesotto 2004; Grevi, Helly and Keohane 2009; Howorth 2014; Kurowska and Breuer 2012; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006; 2008; Meyer 2006; Pohl 2014; M.E. Smith 2017; Tardy 2015a). While some scholars argued that the CSDP was created to balance the US (Pape 2005; Posen 2004, 2006; Jones 2007), others questioned this assumption (Howorth 2014; Howorth and Menon 2009). Some have emphasised the importance of a strategic vision for the CSDP (Biscop 2002; 2009; 2015b; Biscop and Coelmont 2010; 2011a; 2011b; Biscop and Norheim-Martinsen 2012; Biscop et al. 2015; Howorth 2004; 2009); others have criticised the CSDP for its political and institutional gaps (Menon 2009; 2011; Salmon 2005; Shepherd 2012).

The CSDP has been situated within the frameworks of conflict prevention and/or crisis management (e.g. Blockmans 2008b; Galantino and Freire 2015; Gross and Juncos 2011b; Pohl 2014). Some studies have focused exclusively on the military component of the CSDP.
Engberg 2014), with some hopes being evoked for an increased EU military involvement and a common European defence (Andersson et al. 2016; Cooper 2003; Kagan 2003; Treacher 2004; Salmon 2005). Other works have been dedicated to civilian missions (Nowak 2006a; Tocci 2007). Some scholars have seen civilian conflict prevention in danger due to an increased militarisation of crisis management (Debiel and Fischer 2000; Stewart 2006; 2008; 2011; K.E. Smith 2008). The Routledge Handbook of European Security (Biscop and Whitman 2013b) and Handbook on CSDP Missions and Operations (Rehrl and Glume 2015) provide a comprehensive overview of different aspects of the CSDP, including actors, structures, decision- and policy-making processes, and missions and operations.

Respective CSDP missions and operations have been analysed extensively (Asseburg and Kempin 2009; Celador 2005; Emerson and Gross 2007a; Galantino and Freire 2015; Grevi, Helly and Keohane 2009; Gross 2009; Merlingen and Ostroauskaitė 2005a, 2005b, 2008; Martinelli 2008; Osland 2004; Seibert 2010; Whitman and Woff 2010). These works mostly focus on particular aspects of CSDP actions. Some authors use the term conflict prevention for civilian missions and crisis management for military operations, while others refer to both elements of the CSDP as to crisis management. However, as Ginsberg and Penska (2012) and Freire and Galantino (2015) argue, most works on CSDP missions and operations lack a comparison with other cases and a link to an overall framework or theory.

When EU peacebuilding has been studied, it has usually concerned the development activities of the Commission (Castañeda 2014, Newman 2013; Spernbauer 2014). Only a few scholars have looked at peacebuilding within the CSDP, even then only from specific points of view. The Routledge Handbook mentioned above does not refer to peacebuilding, while the Handbook by Rehrl and Glume contains brief references to it. In the Routledge Handbook, Gourlay (2013) discusses the potential and limitations of civilian CSDP as a tool for state-building in countries recovering from war. Merlingen and Ostroauskaitė (2005a; 2005b; 2006), for example, study the policing component of the CSDP within a peacebuilding framework. While concentrating on one aspect of the CSDP only and on two particular missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), they link EU peacebuilding to the international construction of liberal peace. They conclude that CSDP missions “are designed for short-term crisis management, rather than long-term peacebuilding” (Merlingen and Ostroauskaitė 2005a, 233), despite the fact that the missions in the Balkans carried out long-term post-conflict peacebuilding tasks.

Richmond, Björkdahl and Kappler (2011) have looked at the evolution of the emerging peacebuilding framework of the EU. They mainly focus on the normative level and
lack a reference to the CSDP mechanism. Whitman and Wolff’s edited book (2012) analyses the EU’s role as a global actor in conflict management. Although the work does not build on the framework of peacebuilding, it refers specifically to those EU activities which fall under the category of peacebuilding. The work by Aggestam and Björkdahl (2013) which discusses the EU’s peacebuilding practices in the Middle East and the Western Balkans links peacebuilding with justice theories. While the contributors argue that the EU peacebuilding framework is based on liberal peacebuilding, they observe that the EU is moving towards a less state-centric approach. While these scholars criticise the liberal nature of EU peacebuilding, others argue that peacebuilding in the CSDP is not liberal enough (Osland 2004; Dobbins et al. 2008).

The European Union and Peacebuilding by Blockmans, Wouters and Ruys (2010) provides a comprehensive overview of the whole spectrum of the EU’s different peacebuilding activities. This volume perhaps best analyses the EU’s peacebuilding policies and activities. CSDP missions and operations are depicted as a short-term dimension of the EU’s peacebuilding activities. They are discussed only as part of other activities such as development and human rights promotion. Respective chapters outline the CSDP structures and procedures but lack an analysis of the dynamics behind peacebuilding policies. Contributors discuss different CSDP missions and operations in connection to other peacebuilding activities under broader frameworks such as good governance and economic development. However, due to its focus on a wide range of the EU’s peacebuilding activities, CSDP actions are not given very much attention.  

Despite the contribution of these studies, the nexus of the peacebuilding framework and the CSDP practice has not been addressed profoundly to date. The studies discussed above have focused on specific aspects of peacebuilding or CSDP tasks, such as policing or justice sector separately, or discussed the role of the CSDP as part of other frameworks. The literature has not examined the relationship between the CSDP peacebuilding practice and the international peacebuilding model, in particular the UN framework of peacebuilding. Scholarship has not analysed why CSDP actions carry out primarily peacebuilding tasks and how these tasks are negotiated, designed and formulated through decision- and policy-making processes at the EU level. Lastly, comparisons of different case studies on peacebuilding practices through the CSDP have been absent in the academic literature.

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5 The collection is the last part of a trilogy on the EU’s approaches to conflicts. The first volume looks at the EU and conflict prevention (Kronenberger and Wouters 2004), and the second analyses the EU and crisis management (Blockmans 2008b). The CSDP is discussed in the second book within the framework of crisis management, whereas the last book analyses the CSDP from the perspective of peacebuilding.
Research aims and questions

Given this relative lack of attention to EU peacebuilding, this dissertation analyses the EU’s approach to peacebuilding through the CSDP by investigating how the CSDP fits the peacebuilding framework. The questions of how the peacebuilding paradigm shift is reflected within the CSDP and the extent to which the EU adopted the international peacebuilding framework have not been explored. Contemporary scholarship has not investigated why the CSDP mainly involves peacebuilding and what the main characteristics of EU peacebuilding are. This thesis aims to help fill this gap by exploring why and how the EU has adopted and institutionalised the norm of peacebuilding. The research analyses how peacebuilding under the CSDP is conceptualised, designed, governed and implemented. The central research question examines the extent to which CSDP missions and operations reflect a normative and practical commitment of the EU to international peacebuilding – that is to say, the extent to which CSDP missions and operations have been shaped by international peacebuilding norms and/or by EU foreign policy-making. The analysis of these two dimensions of the research question as well as the extent to which they influence each other is undertaken through competing perspectives from three interrelated angles:

- The relationship of the CSDP to the international peacebuilding paradigm shift: To what extent have international peacebuilding norms, as articulated through the UN, influenced the EU’s CSDP? To what extent is the EU’s understanding of peacebuilding compatible with that of the UN? How did the two entities influence each other’s conceptualisations of peacebuilding?
- The conceptualisation and governance of EU peacebuilding within the CSDP: To what extent is the EU’s approach to peacebuilding in the CSDP shaped by member states and EU institutions? What interests, preferences and considerations do these actors pursue in the design of CSDP peacebuilding?
- The operational dynamics of peacebuilding under the CSDP: What can actual missions and operations tell us about the EU’s approach to peacebuilding? To what extent is the implementation of peacebuilding in CSDP actions conditioned by the EU’s political and practical capabilities and/or constraints?

These research questions and perspectives can generate meaningful conclusions for the role of the EU in international peacebuilding. The analysis of peacebuilding within the CSDP helps to determine what kind of international peacebuilding actor the EU is. The analysis of these aspects requires asking further questions: What does the focus on peacebuilding in the
CSDP tell us about the EU’s capability-expectations gap? Has the shift towards peacebuilding in the CSDP led to a renewed broadening or further narrowing of this gap? Does this extensive focus on post-conflict stabilisation and peacebuilding prove right Eilstrup-Sangiovanni’s (2003) argument that the EU should focus on strengthening its capacity for what it does best, namely non-military crisis-management and post-war reconstruction, instead of attempting to build an autonomous military capacity?

This thesis also asks how the shift towards peacebuilding in the CSDP corresponds with arguments by those who call for an enhanced EU’s involvement in the full range of crisis management tasks. Sven Biscop noted that, due to close proximity and the interests at stake, it is not an option but that it is “Europe’s responsibility to take the lead in maintaining peace and security” in its close and broader neighbourhood (Biscop 2013a, 4). He has argued that the EU has three responsibilities as a security provider outside its territory:

“In (1) crisis management, Europeans must be able to act across the full spectrum of expeditionary operations, from evacuation, support to humanitarian relief, and assistance and training, to peacekeeping, peace enforcement and indeed war. But a military strategy also encompasses (2) prevention, by way of maintaining a permanent forward presence in priority areas, and (3) deterrence, by maintaining a credible power projection capacity at all times” (Ibid., 2).

Post-conflict stabilisation and peacebuilding are indeed the indisputable component of this responsibility. According to Biscop, “[w]hether it intervened or not, Europe definitely has a responsibility to stabilize any post-conflict situation, including through peacekeeping, SSR/DDR, and training and assisting local armed forces (as well as the security and justice apparatus)” (Ibid., 3). However, he argued that some situations may require the use of other instruments, such as combat operations. The EU should therefore be more ambitious, and develop its capabilities further (Ibid., 5). This level of ambition is also important, if the EU wants to prove its credibility as an actor in international conflict management. As Biscop and Whitman have argued, the capacity to be an effective global actor does not translate only in terms of normative influence as a model. Instead, “the EU must be a power, an effective strategic actor. […] Attractiveness alone does not generate soft power – the EU must be seen to act upon its strategy. […] its agenda entails a commitment to proactively shape the environment” (Biscop and Whitman 2013a, 1).

Through my own participation in peacebuilding activities in the Western Balkans, I experienced how particular strategic frameworks shape peacebuilding on the ground. While working later at the DPKO and UNMAS at the UN HQ, I observed how international
peacebuilding efforts were influenced by multilateral processes. I noticed that one actor stood out of the crowd – the EU. In my every-day work, the EU was regarded not only as the most significant donor to UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding but also as the key promoter of UN norms and the most significant partner in international conflict management. I became intrigued by the role of the EU in peacebuilding. Hence this thesis.

Research design

To answer the research questions, this work looks at the conceptual understandings, governance (decision- and policy-making) and implementation of peacebuilding within the CSDP framework. The conceptual level of the CSDP is explored through an analysis of the link between peacebuilding and the CSDP. The procedural level of decision- and policy-making analyses the role of member states and EU institutions in the conceptualisation, design and governance of peacebuilding under the CSDP. The analysis of the implementation phase is undertaken through an examination of particular operations and missions with peacebuilding scopes in Mali and BiH. This analytical framework takes into account two dimensions of analysis: the dimension of international norms and that of foreign policy. These dimensions are key to the understanding of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding in the CSDP. On the one hand, the CSDP peacebuilding practice resembles the international normative framework of peacebuilding. On the other hand, peacebuilding activities carried out within the CSDP are outcomes of EU foreign policy.

The normative dimension

The CSDP can be seen as a demonstration of the EU’s role in the world and the expectations that arise from this role. It represents a norm-driven set of actions that contribute to international peace and security. The aim of CSDP peacebuilding actions is to rebuild institutions of a functioning state. According to Hill, ‘a well-functioning state’ comprises a set of institutions representing res publica. These institutions “include the machinery of justice, the police and armed forces, public administration and the institutions of political life. Their purpose is to ensure continuity, order and common purpose” (Hill 2003, 33). By building state institutions, CSDP actions seek to contribute to a more stable international order. According to Hill, working towards a more stable international order is one of the main expectations of foreign policy (Ibid., 45). CSDP peacebuilding activities pursue a particular set of norms; they transfer a European vision of a well-functioning state.
Norms are central to the understanding of EU foreign policy (Tonra 2001, 16). European studies have focused on the extent to which European norms shape the EU's international behaviour. The EU has been described as a ‘civilian power’ (Duchene 1972), a ‘superpower’ (Galtung 1973; Leonard 2005; McCormik 2006; Reid 2005; Whitman 1998), a ‘normative power’ (Manners 2002), an ‘ethical power’ (Aggestam 2008) and a ‘positive power’ (Biscop 2005a). Manners’ notion of normative power Europe provided the most popular conceptualisation of the EU as a foreign policy actor. Manners argued that the CSDP is one of three main areas – in addition to the EU membership and cooperation - through which the EU promotes peace. With their focus on “peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security”, CSDP actions contribute to sustainable peace (Manners 2008, 49). The EU norm of sustainable peace that addresses the root causes of conflicts mirrors the European experience of ensuring that war “becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible” (Ibid., 48). This normative approach is embedded in peacebuilding efforts pursued through CSDP actions that seek to build sustainable peace by reforming and building institution as to make the return of violence impossible.

While the normative role of the EU in international affairs has been studied extensively, the impact of international norms on EU policies is underdeveloped in the literature. De Franco, Meyer and K.E. Smith (2015) have investigated how the EU accepts and internalises international norms, in particular the responsibility to protect (R2P) norm. Similarly, peacebuilding within the CSDP could be seen in relation to the international peacebuilding norm. While states are not required to adopt international norms, they still respond to them and consider choices that result from them (Tonra 2001, 50). Norms that guide international regimes are doctrines that evolve and are accepted as a result of political processes. They provide frameworks within which political actors act (Björkdahl 2002, 22).

The realist and rationalist traditions understand norms as instruments that purely serve state interests. International norms remain “a reflection of the self-interested calculation of great powers and they have no independent effect on state behaviour” (Mearsheimer 1994-5, 7). From a neoliberal perspective, norms influence state behaviour – their preferences and the way they link their preferences to policy choices (Keohane 2002, 2012). Constructivists define norms as shared expectations about appropriate behaviour of actors in international relations (Katzenstein 1996a; 1996b; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Norms become standards when they consistently impact on state behaviour, are historically conditioned, institutionalised, and taken for granted (Katzenstein 1996b, 18-19).

International institutions provide a platform for the reconciliation of national and
international norms (Keohane 2012). They are major promoters of norms in world politics; they advocate and formulate regulatory norms (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 33). This research uses these frameworks to explore how the international norm of peacebuilding has shaped the conceptualisation of peacebuilding in the CSDP. Studying EU peacebuilding from a normative perspective requires analysing the extent to which the EU’s approach to peacebuilding was influenced by the UN’s understanding of peacebuilding. Since the EU is the key actor in the UN, we also need to understand the extent to which the EU influenced the UN’s understanding of peacebuilding.

At the same time, states also behave according to their own norms that reflect state interests; they provide justifications for preferences and strategies for pursuing these preferences (Finnemore 1996). They motivate foreign policy development and implementation as they help to define goals and offer a vision and direction for foreign policy actions (Björkdahl 2002, 20). They shape instruments of foreign policy (Kowert and Legro 1996, 463). In this sense, EU foreign policy is an intersection of member state preferences and pre-existing EU commitments and norms (Thomas 2011a, 10). EU member states pursue their foreign policy preferences within an institutionalised setting that is demarcated by EU norms. Thomas argues that once member states have committed themselves to particular norms, they are unlikely to take actions that do not reflect their original intention (Thomas 2011c, 6).

As a result, EU missions and operations transfer not only the international normative standards but a European vision of a functioning state. While the promotion of EU-centred norms through the CSDP seeks the establishment of stable and functioning states, it also runs risks of undermining national ownership in countries of deployment. Tocci has observed that EU foreign policy has been realist, imperialistic and status quo-oriented in many cases (Tocci 2007). In the pursuit of its own interests, the EU has often behaved as a post-modern imperial power when imposing ready-made Western models of state institutions in post-conflict societies through CSDP activities (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006).

Studying the normative side of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding requires exploring the extent to which the international norm of peacebuilding is embraced by EU states which subsequently negotiate this norm with their own preferences, interests and concerns at the EU level. It is important to understand how the EU’s approach to peacebuilding is constructed as a norm that is shared by member states. When states coordinate their foreign policies, such as in the case of the EU, norms may collide. In the EU, institutions have been established to pursue a harmonisation of different norms. The institutional framework of the CSDP provides a platform where national and international norms can be reconciled.
To understand how this institutional framework allows for a synergy of different norms in the CSDP, this thesis also reflects on the convergence of strategic cultures of EU states with regard to peacebuilding. Meyer observed that, although still distinct, the national strategic cultures of EU states in the area of defence and security have converged substantially since the end of the Cold War. This convergence has led to the emergence of a European strategic culture (Meyer 2006). Cornish and Edwards defined European strategic culture “as the institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force as part of the accepted range of legitimate and effective policy instruments, together with general recognition of the EU’s legitimacy as an international actor with military capabilities” (Cornish and Edwards 2001, 587). This thesis analyses how member states’ norms with regard to peacebuilding converge to make a coherent EU policy on peacebuilding within the CSDP.

The foreign policy dimension

The second dimension of the analysis assesses the EU’s approach to peacebuilding in the CSDP from the perspective of foreign policy-making. Traditional understandings of foreign policy centralise on the state as an actor of foreign policy. Allen defines foreign policy as “an attempt to design, manage and control the external activities of a state as to protect and advance agreed and reconciled objectives” (1998, 43-44; see also Manners and Whitman 2000, 2). Foreign policy analysis has primarily built on the discourses about the relationship between agency and structure (Hill 2003, 25-26; Tonra 2001, 8-10). According to Hill, agents are actors “capable of decisions and actions” – “of the exercise of independent will and decision-making” (Hill 2003, 27). Structures constitute environments in which agents operate and which shape actors’ choices (Hill 2001, 26). Structures refer to institutions defined either as bureaucracies or as formal rules and procedures (Gross and Juncos 2011c, 10).

Hill prefers the term actor to that of agent when referring to foreign policy. Foreign policy actors are decision-makers, such as the head of government, foreign minister and the cabinet, who execute foreign policy. Hill substitutes structures with agents - staff and bureaucratic entities, in particular foreign ministry, working under the control of political actors (Hill 2003). While agents (actors) and structures (agents) tended to be seen as irreconcilable (see Tonra 2001, 6-10), Anthony Giddens suggested that they are mutually constitutive (Giddens 1984). States are not only actors; they also comprise bureaucratic structures. Similarly, institutions possess actor-like qualities (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Hill 2001, 28). Taking into account the interrelationships between agents and structure, Hill

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6 Strategic culture refers to norms, ideas and patterns of behaviour that are shared among actors in a given political community (Meyer 2006, 20).
specifies foreign policy-making as “a complex process of interaction between many actors, differentially embedded in a wide range of different structures” (Hill 2003, 28).

Hill’s definition reflects the nature of EU foreign policy-making which includes the coordination of the economic, political and military tools of foreign policies of member states through common institutions (Exadaktylos 2012, 196; Tonra 2001; White 2001; 2004). Hill perceives the EU as “an independent actor” similar to a sovereign state, capable of making decisions on foreign issues, and possessing structures to deliver its external actions (Hill 2003, 3). The boundaries between structure and agency are blurred in EU foreign policy-making due to the institutional context in which this policy is produced (Aggestam 2006, 24).

In this sense, peacebuilding in the CSDP is shaped by the EU’s multilevel process of governance. On the one hand, the CSDP is intergovernmental; it is controlled by the member states which authorise and oversee CSDP actions. On the other hand, the intergovernmental decision- and policy-making takes place through common institutions – the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) and its preparatory bodies, in particular the Political and Security Committee (PSC), European Union Military Committee (EUMC), the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CivCom) and the Politico-Military Group (PMG). In addition, the European External Action Service (EEAS), under the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who is also the Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), is involved in the design and coordination of the CSDP. EEAS officials mediate between the states, draft documents, advise and coordinate planning and operations. Howorth’s notion of ‘supranational intergovernmentalism’ describes most appropriately this complex process of decision- and policy-making in the CSDP. In this process, the lines between supranational EU institutions and intergovernmental negotiations among the member states become blurred (Howorth 2014, 69).

Decision- and policy-making in the CFSP is generally characterised by cooperation. As argued by Tonra, cooperation in foreign and security affairs is, indeed, nothing unusual; the UN and NATO provide striking examples. What makes the cooperation of EU states in foreign and security policy unique is the fact that this process supports “the progressive integration of the foreign, security and defence policies of the member states” (Tonra 2001, 3). EU foreign policy influences national foreign policies, resulting in adjustments and changes of national preferences (Bulmer and Radaelli 2013; Exadaktylos 2012; Meyer 2006; Tonra 2000; 2001).

Indeed, cases such as Libya, Darfur and Iraq remind us that the CSDP is not always characterised by cooperation. Some scholars refer to these cases to point to the incoherence
and ‘consensus-expectations gap’ in the CSDP (Menon 2009; 2011; Toje 2008). Nevertheless, other scholars observe that CSDP decision- and policy-making is generally coordination and consensus-oriented (Cross 2010; Juncos and Pomorska 2006; Juncos and Reynolds 2007; Howorth 2010; 2014; Meyer 2006). This consensus-driven approach has contributed to the emergence of a trans-European strategic culture on EU foreign policy (Howorth 2010; 2014). One of the tasks of this research is therefore to analyse the extent to which EU peacebuilding is affected by consensus and/or disagreement and how disarmaments are overcome.

The analysis of peacebuilding within the CSDP considers these various aspects of policy-making through which CSDP peacebuilding is constructed. In particular, this thesis investigates the role of actors and structures in the formulation and governance of CSDP peacebuilding. Applying the actor-structure perspective can help to reveal the interrelationship between the member states and the EU institutions. With the help of this framework, it is possible to analyse the extent to which the CSDP reflects the EU’s normative commitment to peacebuilding and the extent to which it reflects the EU’s self-centred interests.

**Components of the analysis**

To analyse the EU’s peacebuilding approach within the CSDP through these two dimensions, I resort to a framework proposed by Exadaktylos who defined four interrelated variables of foreign policy analysis: beliefs, actors, decision-making procedures and instruments (Exadaktylos 2012). In this research, beliefs refer to international norms that underpin the international peacebuilding practice and norms that underpin the CSDP, i.e. beliefs agreed at the EU level that reflect a convergence of national preferences. These two sets of norms help to define the normative foundation of the EU’s peacebuilding approach. On the one hand, the research observes how the UN normative framework has impacted on EU peacebuilding in the CSDP. On the other hand, the research investigates how EU member states’ preferences are orchestrated together to form a common normative framework for peacebuilding in the CSDP. The thesis analyses how the norm of peacebuilding is used in making decisions and policies on particular EU missions and operations.

The second component of the research design refers to the EU as an actor capable of deploying CSDP peacebuilding actions. In the CSDP, the EU as an actor is comprised of the member states and the EU institutions. The intergovernmental nature of CSDP decision-making postulates the member states as the key actors in the CSDP as they have powers to decide on CSDP actions. But, the extent to which an EU state becomes a stakeholder in a

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7 Exadaktylos’ model is similar to those by Hill and Tonra, which identify actors, agents/structures, resources and instruments as variables of foreign policy analysis.
peacebuilding process and has leverage over it depends on stakeholders’ sources of power, such as the influence in the country or within the EU; the control of resources; the possession of relevant knowledge, experience and negotiating skills; and status and representation. For instance, due to historical, economic, cultural and political ties, France has been a key actor in peacebuilding in Mali. Nevertheless, other states without historical or economic ties may also become stakeholders. For example, Germany has gradually become a crucial player in Mali.

Procedures, the third variable, refer to institutional frameworks and structures that accommodate decision- and policy-making processes in the design, management (strategic and operational), oversight and implementation of CSDP peacebuilding. The European Council and the Council of the EU, in particular the FAC, are the highest decision-making bodies responsible for the CSDP. Nevertheless, the decisions are mainly shaped through the four preparatory bodies of the Council: the PSC, the EUMC, CivCom and the PMG (Howorth 2014). In addition, the CSDP directorates and divisions within the EEAS are involved in the design, coordination and implementation of the missions and operations. To trace how peacebuilding evolves and is governed, the research analyses policy assumptions and the mind-maps of policymakers in these bodies. The study investigates whether there is a convergence in terms of policy formulation with regard to peacebuilding, which would indicate the presence of a strategic framework at the systemic level of the CSDP or whether peacebuilding is pursued in an ad hoc manner.

In CSDP policy-making, the lines between actors and structures have become blurred. Not only are member states actors in the CSDP, the intergovernmental structures and the EEAS represent both actors and structures on behalf of which they act. The CSDP is therefore examined here through the prism of the interrelationship between structures and actors. The focus on actors investigates intentions, meaning and choice of policymakers in developing peacebuilding policies. The focus on structures analyses peacebuilding as a part of the policy-making procedures and processes located in established EU structures.

The final variable of the analytical framework represents resources, tools and capabilities which are studied in this thesis to explore how peacebuilding within the CSDP is implemented in practice. Capabilities and tools include instruments of foreign policy which may be financial, informational and organisational (Exadaktylos 2012; Salamon 2002). The nature and amount of resources in the CSDP depend on the capabilities and willingness of national political actors. The ability of the EU institutions to grasp the existing opportunities and develop best practices is also important, though it often depends on resources and instruments. This research does not evaluate the effectiveness of the CSDP as such. Instead, it
seeks to understand how the decisions and preferences on capabilities and tools made by the EU shape the nature of the CSDP and the EU’s approach to peacebuilding.

To understand how these components interact to make a coherent policy, I employ Hill’s framework of foreign policy-making, and Tonra’s adaptation of Hill’s framework of the EU’s capabilities: “its ability to agree, its resources, and the instruments at its disposal” (Hill 1993, 315). According to Tonra, an application of this framework to the CFSP means considering 1) the extent of cohesion in the decision- and policy-making in the CFSP, 2) the instruments deployed in its support, and 3) resources that states provide for actions (Tonra 2001, 44). The EU’s ability to agree on its CFSP depends upon the extent to which agreement can be reached between the member states; the ability to ensure the coherence of the established common position; and the sustainability of the common position. The ability to act represents the instruments employed in support of positions agreed in the CFSP. This requires considering what tools are negotiated and what institutional mechanisms can ensure coordination. The resources needed to achieve agreed goals include financial, diplomatic, political and military capabilities of the member states, the institutional capacity of the CFSP itself, the EU policy competences and the level of political will (Tonra 2001, 44-45).

In this thesis, I apply this model to the study of peacebuilding under the CSDP at the levels of decision-making, coordination and implementation:

- In terms of the EU’s ability to agree, the research investigates how a normative convergence of EU member states’ peacebuilding approaches is achieved in the CSDP. I look at the relevant Council preparatory bodies involved in CSDP policy-making. This analysis is guided by these questions: Do member states and EU institutions have the same understanding of peacebuilding? How do they overcome a disagreement and reach a common position? Is the common position maintained over the time? Instead of looking at individual states, this thesis analyses the interaction among states.
- In terms of instruments, the dissertation looks at different elements of operations, such as training of police and military forces, legal advice, and diplomatic relations. I ask what instruments are employed for particular missions and why these instruments are considered to be the most appropriate.
- Finally, the research asks what resources member states provide for particular missions. The dissertation seeks to understand how member states decide on particular tools and the extent to which this decision impacts on the nature of missions.

This research focuses on the EU structures at the expenses of the impacts of domestic and

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8 Hill pointed to the European Community’s lack of these capabilities. Although the establishment of the CSDP was seen as a step towards closing this gap, this model remains useful for studying CSDP policy-making.
global developments. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse the impacts of domestic politics and global affairs on the EU’s approach to peacebuilding, these influences are reflected in respective decisions and, when relevant, discussed in the thesis.

**Methodology**

**Methods and rationale for choice**

To address the research questions, the dissertation takes an eclectic approach that combines relevant methods and theories. Analytic eclecticism integrates different stories and addresses the problem in its complexity. Methodological pluralism allows for a triangulation in data and analysis, leading to compelling arguments (Della Porta and Keating 2008; Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2012; Sil and Katzenstein 2010). Since peacebuilding in the CSDP is a policy produced through a multilevel process, an eclectic approach can provide a comprehensive understanding of its complexities. It can help to interpret the relation of this policy to the international normative framework.

This research is situated at the nexus of the theories of foreign policy analysis, neo-institutionalism and peacebuilding. These theories aid the understanding of the norms, actors, structures and processes that shape EU peacebuilding and shed light on the relationship among them. This research adopts qualitative interpretive approach that combines document analysis, expert interviews and observations. These methods can be applied in researching organisations, bureaucracies, and policy- and decision-making (Brians et al. 2016; Della Porta and Keating 2008; Bryman 1988; Neyland 2008). They allow for an in-depth analysis of actors, structures and procedures in the CSDP. This combined methodological approach influenced my sources, which are manifold. Primary sources comprise: a) documents, including EU legal documents, such as treaties, conclusions, decisions and communications; UN documents; and other policy reports; b) interviews with officials in EU institutions and missions; and c) personal observations of operational and policy-making settings. The thesis also draws from secondary sources, such as academic literature, and media and policy reports.

Interpretive document analysis was used to analyse the conceptualisation of peacebuilding in relevant EU and UN documents. Document analysis traces discursive categories (Bowen 2009). Discourse analysis has been widely used in European studies with the aim of uncovering ideas, concepts, norms and policy frames that may suggest causal

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9 Discourse is a set of “ideas, concepts, and categorizations [...] through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer 1997, 44). Discourse helps decision- and policymakers to combine preferences to produce, enable or constrain a specific policy and choice (Lynggaard 2012).
relationships (Diez 2001; Lynggaard 2012). It is useful in mapping how peacebuilding has evolved in a discourse of concepts. When analysing documents, I trace peacebuilding as an idea that translates into a policy produced by an interplay of the EU institutions and the member states. I look for relevant information which points to ideas, norms, preferences and interests of the EU with regard to peacebuilding. I explore who proposes these ideas - whether member states or EU institutions - and the reasons for their preferences.

Expert (elite) interviews and observations were employed to analyse processes within CSDP structures. Interviews and observations help to interpret phenomena from a perspective inside the organisation and that of policy makers (Della Porta and Keating 2008). They shed light into the dynamics of decision- and policy-making, which would be hard to detect in official documents. They reveal hidden meanings behind actors’ behaviour (LeCompte and Schensul 2010, 12–14; Neyland 2008, 2). Interviews are vital in researching the CSDP because the decision-making processes in the Council are not public. Official documents do not necessarily spell out the reasons behind the policies.

For the purpose of this research, I carried out semi-structured interviews with member states’ representatives in relevant Council preparatory bodies, with officials of the CSDP directorates of the EEAS and with officials in the missions in Mali and BiH.

Fieldwork procedure

Fieldwork was carried out at different intervals and in different places from October 2013 to June 2016.10 The selection of the research sites was guided by a combination of pragmatic reasons and purpose-oriented criteria, such as accessibility, permissibility, location and familiarity (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007, 37-60; LeCompte and Schensul 2010, 154-156). The preliminary informal interviews with officials from foreign ministries in London, Paris and Berlin revealed that decision- and policy-making on CSDP takes place primarily in Brussels. Juncos and Reynolds already observed that national preferences of EU states are not defined in isolation in capitals but in an institutional context in Brussels (2007). The core fieldwork then focused on Brussels-based structures and case studies. The PSC, CivCom, the EUMC, the PMG, and the EEAS are the key policy-making structures with regard to CSDP matters. Officials in Brussels were easily approachable and generally open to interviews. Carrying out interviews in Brussels was unproblematic, whereas security aspects and distances were considered when conducting research in case studies. In total, I carried out 52 formal (elite) semi-structured interviews: 24 interviews with member states’ representatives, 10 Nevertheless, I continued in following new developments during the writing phase as well as in meeting with EEAS officials, which was also encouraged through the fact that I have lived in Brussels.
21 interviews with EEAS officials and seven interviews in Mali (See Annex).

In addition, I conducted informal interviews with more than 50 officials in Brussels, Mali, BiH and other EU capitals. Informal conversations were key to gaining most relevant insights into CSDP policy-making. They often provided more valuable data than official interviews. Such interviews have become common in interviewing groups and individuals, including public officials, who fear that their identity could be revealed through recording (Bendixen 2013; Dexter 2006). While I was socialised within the diplomatic circles in Brussels, I did not seek to misuse my position: officials were aware that I was undertaking research. Informal interviews were used to shed light on particular themes. Conversations with former practitioners and scholars further expanded my perspectives. The access to officials in the EEAS and Council committees was facilitated through official channels, existing contacts and informal conversations. For the selection of interviewees, I adopted a combined criterion-based and snowball (convenience) sampling (For details, see LeCompte and Schensul 2010, 154–172; Schensul and LeCompte 2013, 280–318).¹¹

To gain member states’ perspectives, I focused on representatives in the PSC, CivCom, the PMG and the EUMC. I also interviewed a representative of Athena.¹² I organised member states into four categories, namely 1) the three large states: France, Germany and the UK; 2) other Western European states: Belgium, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain; 3) non-NATO members of the EU: Ireland, Finland and Austria; and 4) Eastern European EU members: the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. Before commencing my fieldwork, I already knew representatives from three member states. I obtained contact details of other representatives from the websites of the member states’ delegations to the EU or upon a suggestion from another country’s representative.

Previous research followed the tradition, prevalent in the studies of European foreign policy, of focusing on most powerful EU states (e.g. Pohl 2014) or on a group of similar states (e.g. Tonra 2001). The categorisation used in this research generates a more inclusive analysis of member states’ preferences. It includes countries which are mostly involved and influential in the CSDP while paying attention to geographical balance. It includes both powerful states and smaller countries. France, Germany and the UK are regarded as the key actors in the

¹¹ Most interviewees were approached via email. I received responses from all the contacted persons. In two cases, interviewees declined my request as they were made aware by their colleagues that I already interviewed people in their division. One interview was cancelled due to interviewee’s unavailability. I maintained effective relationships with interviewees as this is important for gaining in-depth views on the subject (Duke 2002; Neyland 2008, 15). Preserving rapport increases the credibility of the researcher (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007, 80–83), and eases the access to information (Schensul and LeCompte 2013, 9–13). To build rapport and trust with interviewees, I used informal conversations and networking.

¹² Athena is a mechanism for the financing of common costs relating to military operations under the CSDP.
CSDP in terms of defence spending, contributions and political influence. However, although the input of smaller states may be marginal, their vote and contribution is often essential for enabling a particular action. This selection acknowledges that the CSDP is a policy which is decided not only by the powerful states, but which involves all the member states. Since the aim of the research is to analyse the EU’s approach and not the member states’ approaches, it was not necessary to interview the representatives of all the member states.

In determining potential interviewees from the EEAS, I followed the organisational chart of the EEAS. With the use of criterion-based sampling, I aimed at interviewing at least one official from each division of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability Directorate (CPCC) and the six directorates of the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). I also conducted interviews with officials responsible for the coordination of missions and operations in BiH and Mali. In addition, I interviewed officials from the Security Policy and Conflict Prevention Directorate (SECPOL) and from geographical desks, one European Union Special Representative (EUSR) and one high-level official. I approached approximately one third of interviewees through informal channels. Through these connections, I obtained contact details on other potential interviewees from the EEAS. Sometimes, I was recommended to interview a particular official (snowball sampling).

Carrying out interviews with officials in missions was difficult due to the restricted access to sites and strict rules which officers in the missions must follow. Military personnel referred me to public relations officers. As a result, I mostly gathered information through informal conversations with officials in missions, officials in Brussels and representatives of embassies of EU states in Mali and BiH. During my two stays in Mali in 2013 and 2014, I conducted formal interviews with seven officials from the military operation and the EU delegation. Since the civilian mission was still in planning during my fieldwork, I relied on information from conversations with planners and EEAS officials. In BiH, I was not able to conduct recorded interviews. Nevertheless, informal conversations provided sufficient insights in the dynamics of the operation in BiH. For information on the completed civilian mission in BiH, I interviewed officials in Brussels. I also engaged in informal conversations with two former army officers who served in BiH.

While researching how the EU member states overcome their divergent preferences to reach agreement on issues in the CSDP, Thomas argued that not only the agreement of the most powerful states is critical for the EU to achieve consensus. Most conservative (seeking the smallest departure from the status quo), ambitious (seeking a great departure from the status quo and unwilling to accept less), committed (with the most intensive commitment to its preference) and interested states (with the most at stake in this policy area) are also likely to play a veto card (Thomas 2011a, 13). Smaller states are often more active in the CSDP than larger and wealthier states. For instance, in 2011, Romania had the largest number of civilian experts in civilian missions out of all EU states (Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
The interviews were semi-structured and followed a context-appropriate topic guide with preselected questions focusing on different elements of the research and reflecting the interviewees’ area of policy. Since most interviewees refused to sign a written consent, I mainly used verbal consent, supported by the email communication with respondents’ agreement to be interviewed. Some interviews were recorded. However, I was not always allowed to take a recorder to the premises of the EEAS/ CSDP. In particular, the use of a recorder in the EEAS buildings on the Avenue de Kortenberg was prohibited. In such cases and when participants refused to be recorded, I took notes.14

Participant observations formed an important part of my fieldwork, especially in Mali and BiH. While I was not allowed to participate in the meetings of the Council committees and the EEAS, I used informal interactions to explore the dynamics of such meetings. In the missions, I was not granted access to the everyday work either. However, I participated in training sessions and demonstrations for representatives from contributing countries. I was given guided tours through the facilities. Informal interactions allowed me to get a perspective into the everyday work of the missions. The analysis of interviews and fieldnotes was undertaken with the use of an inductive coding approach. I followed a coding scheme of different items sorted into units of concepts and ideas such as peacebuilding, interests, preferences and actions. I considered which codes are shared among actors and which differ.

Case studies

The conceptual and procedural map of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding in the CSDP is applied to the analysis of particular missions and operations in BiH and Mali. These have been selected out of 34 CSDP missions and operations (see table 2, p. 67) that the EU has deployed so far. This selection was guided by the following criteria: 1) missions/ operations with peacebuilding tasks; 2) ongoing missions/ operations; 3) countries with civilian and military instruments; 4) geographical balance; 5) the duration of deployments; 6) the

14 Interviewees were informed about the confidentiality of their identity, the aims of the project and the purpose of the interview. I asked my respondents for their approval to record the interview (or take notes), and to use their responses for academic purposes. At the start of my research, I attempted to use written informed consent. However, this did not work since many interviewees hesitated to sign any form and I had to use verbal consent. Written signed form consent is usually not required in sensitive cases where there is an atmosphere of fear of the misuse of the data, such as in the research with individuals who distrust signed forms (Bendixsen 2013) and in elite interviewing (Dexter 2006; Duke 2002; Powner 2015). To ensure the anonymity of interviewees, I replaced names by numbers for the formal interviews and by letters in the case of informal interviews. The analysis does not refer to particular member states or officials from particular divisions. I refer to the above mentioned groups of states, except of cases when a reference to a specific country is unavoidable or where respondents agreed with a reference to their country. Interviewing was concluded once I collected sufficient number of interviews which provided a confident level of understanding of the subject. When analysing the collected data, I often contacted my interviewees for further clarification.
Selecting missions and operations with peacebuilding tasks was crucial as to explore the operational dynamics of the EU’s peacebuilding approach. To reveal how CSDP peacebuilding policies work in practice, it is essential to study missions with peacebuilding mandates. As a result, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations, such as current Atalanta and Sophia operations or border monitoring missions in the Palestinian Territories and Georgia, were excluded as they would not have provided required information on the dynamics of peacebuilding in the CSDP.

Studying all types of missions could help to better explain why the EU chooses to intervene in some countries with peacekeeping, while in others with peacebuilding. However, including peacekeeping and combat operations in my selection would go beyond the scope and timescale of one piece of research, particularly one that explores the EU’s peacebuilding approach in the CSDP and not the EU’s approach to the entire spectrum of crisis management instruments. A comparison of all types of EU missions would require redirecting the research question to the study of differences between the EU’s different types of missions. Besides, the analysis in chapter four explores the reasons behind the EU’s decisions for particular types of missions, revealing the rationale of the EU’s preference for peacebuilding over other types.

Including case studies with ongoing CSDP actions was key for generating empirical evidence with first-hand data that would be impossible to gain through an analysis of completed cases. While completed missions, such as those in FYROM, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) or Guinea Bissau, could provide important insights into the early stages of EU peacebuilding efforts, conducting research on such cases would be limited to an analysis of archival sources and existing literature. In this thesis, the case study of BiH, with the first EU mission and the longest ongoing operation, provides for such insights.

Indeed, completed peacebuilding missions in countries that have not reached full stability and where violence often reoccurs, for instance in Afghanistan, Iraq, South Sudan and the DRC, are important reminders of the limits of the CSDP. They raise questions about the EU’s sustained commitment and the appropriateness of the EU instruments at that stage of the conflict. Especially the DRC is an appealing example where the EU has deployed four missions to stabilise the situation, protect civilians and carry out SSR of the military and police sectors. This case highlights that EU peacebuilding missions were not able to achieve sustainable peace; violence has often re-emerged, requiring a return of the UN and the EU. However, due to high security risks, it would have been problematic to undertake fieldwork in these countries. Most importantly, while my research did not look at such countries, it
discussed these aspects in the analysis of the two selected cases. One of the reasons of the continuation of the operation in BiH is the fear of some member states that the departure of the EU would lead to a recurrence of violence. The Mali case provides further insights into the aspects of appropriateness and effectiveness as the north of the country is still exposed to the threat of terrorism.

In terms of ongoing peacebuilding missions, Kosovo, Ukraine, Libya, Niger, CAR and Palestine could be considered. During my fieldwork, these countries were examples with one type of missions - either military or civilian. Cases such as Ukraine and Palestine could point to the limits of the EU’s commitment which is also dependent on international politics and major players. However, selecting cases with one type of missions would limit the focus of my research that seeks to provide a comprehensive view on both elements of the CSDP. I looked for case studies with both civilian and military instruments with a view of ensuring a comprehensive analysis of both elements in relation to the EU’s peacebuilding approach. Studying both types of missions can expose the advantages and limits of such actions, whether both elements reflect the EU’s commitment to peacebuilding, and how they interact with each another in a particular country as they seek to contribute to sustainable peace.

In this sense, Central African Republic (CAR), Somalia and Libya in which the EU has deployed the whole spectrum of CSDP instruments could fit this criterion. However, at the start of my research, CAR was still in the peacekeeping stage. The EU deployed an operation with peacebuilding elements to CAR only in 2015 upon the approval of the UNSC. Somalia is a particularly gripping case with military and civilian, as well as peace-enforcement and peacebuilding instruments deployed simultaneously. Libya has become a more complex case with the EU extending its CSDP activities and taking a proactive role in peace efforts in this country only since 2015. However, practical considerations, namely the accessibility and security of the research sites, were crucial factors which led me to exclude cases such as Somalia and Libya.

Geographical distance in the selection is an important factor that can reveal the level of the EU’s commitment and ambition on the one hand and geostrategic preferences on the other hand. It would be expected that the EU’s commitment to peacebuilding is strongest in countries in Europe, whereas deployments outside Europe may be driven by factors other than those found in missions in the EU’s close neighbourhood. A comparison of the oldest and most recent CSDP engagements is another criterion that helps to trace key dynamics in the development of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding. Taking into account differences and similarities of conflicts is useful as to understand how CSDP peacebuilding policies work in
different countries or similar situations. In addition, access to research sites, including technical and travel arrangements, security considerations and familiarity with countries were taken into account in the case selection. For instance, fieldwork in countries such as Libya or Somalia would have not been allowed by the University for security and safety reasons.

This research focuses on missions and operations that have taken place. It excludes actions that have been considered but never launched, such as a military operation with peacekeeping tasks in Libya in 2011. The research could have gone further as to study the entire universe of conflicts, including those where the EU has not deployed any CSDP action, especially in countries where the UN, NATO or the AU engage. It is important to ask why the EU has not deployed any CSDP actions to tackle the conflict in Syria or why the EU was slow in reacting to the crisis in Libya. Studying such cases would shed light on the reasons for the EU’s hesitation to intervene in such situations. It would provide a more realistic assessment of the EU’s aspirations as an actor in global security, thus exposing potential conflicts between the EU’s normative commitment to peacebuilding on the one hand and EU foreign policy on the other hand. However, it is beyond the scope, purpose and timescale of this research to study such cases. Studying the EU’s approach to peacebuilding in conflicts in Syrian or the ISIS-occupied territories would be less relevant at this stage as the conflicts are ongoing and have not yet reached a post-conflict phase. These crises require primarily a national, regional and international political solution at this stage.

Based on these criteria, the EU missions and operations in Mali and BiH were therefore identified as the most suitable case studies for this research. The missions and operations in BiH and Mali have carried out peacebuilding tasks. While rebuilding state structures has been the priority for post-conflict reconstruction in both countries, they have taken on different pathways. BiH has become one of the most paramount state-building projects in the post-Cold War era. The military operation in BiH has been the largest CSDP undertaking. In contrast, post-conflict Mali does not need to build a new state; instead, the EU supports the stabilisation and reform efforts of existing structures. In BiH, with CSDP missions replacing NATO and the UN, the EU stepped in the position of the key actor. In contrast, the CSDP actions in Mali complement one of the largest UN peace operations with the UN being the major player.

Both civilian and military instruments have been deployed in Mali and BiH, thus allowing for the exploration of differences and similarities of EU peacebuilding with the use of both types of CSDP actions. The deployments in Mali are among the most recent CSDP activities, whereas the EU’s involvement in BiH dates back to the origins of the CSDP.
Comparing the oldest and one the most recent cases can demonstrate an evolution of and a potential shift in the understanding and design of EU peacebuilding in the CSDP.

In terms of geostrategic interests and proximity, Mali and BiH are located in the EU’s immediate and broader neighbourhood. BiH was selected as an example of CSDP actions in Europe, while Mali represents a case of a deployment outside Europe. Both countries have different relations with the EU and its member states. BiH is a neighbouring country of the EU and part of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) the aim of which is to prepare the Western Balkans for future membership. As a result, the CSDP actions in BiH have been guided by an EU accession process. In contrast, Mali as a non-European state is not a prospective member of the EU. Nevertheless, Mali has maintained strong ties with the EU, especially with France. The country has been a significant receiver of the EU development and humanitarian aid. France and Germany are among the top five countries in terms of imports to Mali. The selection of the cases from two different regions illustrates how the EU’s different relationships with and different geopolitical interests towards these countries influence the nature of CSDP actions. This selection also allows assessing the level of the EU’s ambition in the CSDP.

By selecting Mali and BiH as case studies, this dissertation attempts to provide a comprehensive overview by including European and non-European, and military and civilian missions. The purpose of these cases is to provide an insight in the operational dynamics of the EU’s peacebuilding approach in the CSDP. Instead of looking at particular missions separately, I analyse the role of the EU in the country while considering the full range of CSDP activities, including current and previous missions and operations, EUSRs, negotiation processes and other activities.

**Structure of the thesis**

After this introduction, the next chapter addresses concepts and frameworks that describe peacebuilding and peace missions. The chapter analyses the role of the EU in the evolution of the international peacebuilding framework as adopted by the UN, while, at the same time, tracing the impact of the UN’s institutionalisation of peacebuilding on the EU’s understanding of peacebuilding. The analysis shows that the EU embraced the UN’s understanding of peacebuilding while playing the key role in the UN’s shift towards peacebuilding. Chapter three attempts to explain the link between the peacebuilding framework and the CSDP by discussing the development of the CSDP as well as the peacebuilding capabilities and
potential that the CSDP embodies. The analysis of the categories of the CSDP actions highlights the point that most CSDP actions are deployed in post-conflict scenarios and in the peacebuilding capacity. Despite the UN’s impact on the EU’s understanding of peacebuilding, the autonomous nature of the CSDP has enabled the EU to develop its own approach to peacebuilding. This approach is explored in chapter four which focuses on the decision- and policy-making process that shape peacebuilding activities within CSDP actions. In these processes, peacebuilding as a normative framework loses its relevance and becomes a pragmatic and politicised outcome of foreign policy-making. Peacebuilding is one of a few areas that reflect member states’ ability to agree on peace operations. EU peacebuilding missions are a result of pragmatic and rational choices as member states are more likely to agree on peacebuilding actions rather than combat and peacekeeping operations.

Chapters five and six focus on the operational dimension of the CSDP by analysing particular cases of EU missions and operations in BiH and Mali. Both chapters highlight the tension between the normative and pragmatic underpinnings of CSDP actions. This tension makes CSDP missions different from missions of actors such as the UN. These case studies demonstrate that the EU’s peacebuilding approach through the CSDP is not homogeneous, but that it differs from case to case. In BiH, the EU membership dimension has defined the conditions and dynamics of the entire peacebuilding process. In Mali, peacebuilding has become a tool of the externalisation of the EU’s security measures aimed at the protection of the EU borders and EU citizens. In chapter seven, the normative, procedural and operational elements are brought together to describe the EU’s approach to peacebuilding through the CSDP. The chapter emphasises the double-sided nature of this approach. CSDP actions with a peacebuilding mandate reflect the normative and practical commitment of the EU to international peacebuilding efforts. At the same time, they reflect the strategic interests and self-centred preferences of the EU, including concerns and constraints of the member states.
2 The Role of the EU in the Evolution of the International Peacebuilding Framework

The chapter outlines the conceptual framework of peacebuilding in general and, more particularly, in the context of the UN-EU relationship. It traces the doctrinal shift from traditional peacekeeping to peacebuilding as a process of a mutual influence between the two organisations. It explores the evolution of the consensus between the EU and the UN on the need for and the understanding of peacebuilding while investigating how the two organisations shaped each other’s understandings of peacebuilding. The UN and the EU accustomed peacebuilding as part of their approaches to conflicts almost simultaneously. At the time when the UN expanded its peacekeeping missions into peacebuilding tasks and established a specific body dedicated to peacebuilding, the EU launched its CSDP. The chapter starts with a discussion on multifaceted understanding of peacebuilding and peace operations in the scholarly literature and by the UN. It then moves on to explore the evolution of peacebuilding at the UN as well as the role of the EU in the institutionalisation of peacebuilding at the UN. The chapter then discusses the relevance of the UN’s shift towards peacebuilding for the conceptualisation of the EU’s own approach to peacebuilding.

Peacebuilding and peace operations: Conceptual frameworks

Peacebuilding emerged in a reaction to an unprecedented outbreak of intra-state conflicts after the end of the Cold War. A growing number of conflicts demonstrating that violence can re-emerge and become protracted if efforts are not made to build sustainable peace has led to a consensus among scholars and practitioners on the importance of peacebuilding (Crocker et al. 2001; 2007; Paris 2004; Stedman et al. 2002). These developments led to a shift in the conception of security from national security to human security that emphasises the individual rather than state as the subject of security. These challenges highlighted the need for comprehensive approaches which peacebuilding became to represent. As Gross noted:

15 Peacebuilding was not a new idea. Internationally assisted post-war reconstruction was characteristic also for the post-WWII recovery of Germany and Japan (Tschirgi 2004, 2).

16 Intrastate conflicts are often the result of failed states characterised by the weakening or breakdown of state structures incapable of solving the conflict on their own. Intrastate conflicts increasingly involve non-state actors. Some conflicts remain local, while others have global effects, e.g. transnational terrorism and flows of refugees (Weiss 2012; UNDP 2008). Ethno-religious and identity conflicts have been on rise since the end of the Cold War (Kaldor 2013; Svensson 2012).

17 The paradigm of human security created a ground for the development of the R2P doctrine which emerged in a reaction to the failures to prevent the genocides of Rwanda and Srebrenica (Bellamy 2009; Baranyi 2008; Gross 2013). R2P consists of three pillars: responsibility to prevent, to react, and to rebuild. Peacebuilding is part of the responsibility to rebuild post-conflict societies (Evans 2009).
“peacebuilding mirrors the simultaneous focus on a comprehensive approach to conflict management that has emerged as a guiding paradigm for the EU, individual countries and other international organisations in their respective attempts to align civil and military instruments. Such an approach combines defence, diplomacy and development” (Gross 2013, 9).

The term peacebuilding was coined by Johan Galtung who distinguished it from peacemaking and peacekeeping. Emphasising that mere absence of direct violence does not necessarily lead to sustainable peace, he referred to peacebuilding as an activity aimed at creating positive peace through the establishment of non-exploitative structures that seek to remove structural and root causes of war. In contrast, peacemaking and peacekeeping seek the cessation of direct violence, which he defined as negative peace (Galtung 1975).18

Nevertheless, it was the former UN Secretary-General Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali who introduced peacebuilding to the international community. Building on Galtung’s ideas, he defined peacebuilding as an “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Boutrous-Ghali 1992, Art. 21). He adopted Galtung’s categories of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and added preventive diplomacy. He understood peacebuilding as one of the “instruments for controlling and resolving conflicts between and within States” (Boutrous-Ghali 1995, Art. 23). In intrastate conflicts, the focus of peacebuilding is on “rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife” (Boutrous-Ghali 1992, Art. 15).

The definition of peacebuilding, however, varies depending on the actors involved and on the nature of activities. Peacebuilding generally refers to post-conflict activities that seek to prevent a relapse into violence.19 Peacebuilding addresses “both immediate consequences and the root causes of a conflict” (de Coning 2008, 53; see also Newman 2013). It includes negative and positive peace. Negative peace refers to the cessation of direct violence. Positive peace means the elimination of structural violence through the establishment of non-exploitative social, economic, civil and political structures. This includes economic development, the reform of security and justice sectors, and the strengthening of good governance and civil society (Atack 2005).20 Peacebuilding is based on the assumption that

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18 Before Galtung, similar ideas were discussed by Immanuel Kant in his Perpetual Peace which outlined conditions for achieving lasting peace (Kant 2008), and Baruch Spinoza who claimed that peace is not a mere absence of war but a virtue - a disposition for benevolence and justice (Spinoza 2004).
19 Post-conflict countries are societies that have emerged from war but remain susceptible to the recurrence of conflict. They are characterised by destroyed, devastated, weak or malfunctioning infrastructure, economy, political structures and state institutions (Licklider 2001, 715).
20 Peacebuilding can also include reconciliation, indigenous dispute resolution, peace education, human rights promotion, capacity-building, justice processes, building of collective security and cooperation arrangements, and resources cooperation (Shepherd 2012; Mac Ginty 2013a). Some distinguish between short-term and
functioning state structures will prevent violence (Doyle 2006, 11). From the perspective of state actors, peacebuilding is a form of international assistance to post-conflict societies. Both Galtung (1975) and Boutrous-Ghali (1995) understood peacebuilding as an enterprise of the international community to support countries emerging from conflicts.

Peacebuilding is part of peace operations undertaken by the international community to maintain international peace and security. It supplements other peace supporting measures, namely conflict prevention, peace-enforcement, peacemaking and peacekeeping. The idea of peace missions evolved after WWII alongside the assumption that such missions shall follow common norms and procedures (Battistelli 2015, 25). Initially, it was understood that peacebuilding should follow after peacekeeping. Development would proceed after peacebuilding which terminates when a society has developed a capacity to manage and sustain its peace process without external assistance (UN 2011; de Coning 2008).

Due to increasingly complex conflicts, peacebuilding no longer follows after peacekeeping, however. The different elements of conflict management “overlap, are interlinked, mutually support each other and often take place simultaneously” (de Coning 2008, 53). Many conflict situations require the deployment of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding simultaneously. Peacekeeping operations have become increasingly multidimensional, including a great portion of peacebuilding tasks. Scholars and practitioners agree that peace, security, development and good governance are interlinked and need to be pursued in tandem (Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin 2010; Gowan and Johnstone 2007).

Peacebuilding has developed into a complex process combining both positive and

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21 In addition to states and intergovernmental actors, external actors in peacebuilding can be non-governmental organisations and foreign businesses. Typical internal actors usually include national authorities, businesses, communities and civil society (Serwer and Thomson 2008). Peacebuilding can also be an internal processes at the national and grass-roots level without the involvement of international actors (Lederach 1997).

22 The distinction between these actions depends on their aims and timing (whether they are deployed before, during or after a conflict). Conflict prevention includes activities, such as preventive diplomacy and development, aimed at preventing conflicts from breaking out or escalating. Peacemaking facilitates mediation and seeks to bring the conflict to an end through a negotiated settlement. After a peace agreement or a cease-fire, peacekeeping maintains security and monitors the implementation of peace agreements. Peace-enforcement refers to combat operations that seek to establish security in cases when all peaceful means fail to reach a peace agreement (UN ‘Peace and Security’). Crisis management is another term used by scholars and practitioners with reference to “the settlement and containment of violent conflict” (Ramsbotham et al. 2011, 107). Scholars in European studies understand crisis management as short-term actions, such as sanctions, mediation, combat operations, peacekeeping and post-conflict stabilisation, which deal with an open conflict or its consequences (Gross and Juncos 2011c, 6; Whitman and Wolff 2012, 6). UN and scholars in peace studies use conflict management as an overarching term to depict all peace supporting measures at different stages of a conflict cycle.

23 UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) is the first ever and the oldest, still ongoing, peacekeeping operation, establishment in 1948 (UN “The Early Years”).
negative peace. The UN’s understanding of peacebuilding has become a generally accepted conceptualisation of peacebuilding. According to the UN, the objectives of peacebuilding are:

a) to restore the state’s ability to provide security and public order, b) to strengthen the rule of law and respect for human rights, c) to build legitimate political institutions and participatory processes, and d) to promote social and economic recovery (UN 2008, 25). To achieve these objectives, UN-led peacebuilding can include a wide range of activities, such as:

- Support to basic safety and security, including mine action, protection of civilians, DDR, strengthening the rule of law and SSR
- Support to political processes, including electoral processes, promoting inclusive dialogue and reconciliation, and developing conflict-management capacity at national and sub-national levels
- Support to the provision of basic services, such as water and sanitation, health and primary education, and support to the return and reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees
- Support to restoring core government functions, in particular basic public administration and public finance, at the national and sub-national levels
- Support to economic revitalisation, including employment generation and livelihoods particularly for youth and demobilized former combatants, as well as rehabilitation of basic infrastructure (UN General Assembly and UN Security Council 2009, Art. 17).

Peacebuilding brings these different aspects under one roof (Reychler and Paffenholz 2001). As de Coning framed it, peacebuilding “provides for parallel, concurrent and interlinked short-, medium- and long-term programmes that work to prevent disputes from escalating, or avoid a relapse, into violent conflict by addressing both immediate consequences and the root causes of a conflict system” (de Coning 2008, 53). Security, peace, humanitarian assistance and development - previously separate paradigms - have become interconnected within peacebuilding (de Coning 2008). Combined civil-military approaches have also emerged as an integral element of peacebuilding (Ankersen 2008; de Coning 2008).

Various peacebuilding strategies, emphasising different aspects, have been developed. Considering the diversity of peacebuilding strategies, Richmond distinguished

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24 Already Boutrous-Ghali argued that peacebuilding should involve “demilitarization, the control of small arms, institutional reform, improved police and judicial systems, the monitoring of human rights, electoral reform and social and economic development” (Boutrous-Ghali 1995, para. 47). A report by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) extends peacebuilding into “return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs); establishing the foundations for a functioning state; [and] reconciliation and societal integration” (UNDP 2008, xviii, 3).

25 In contrast, peace-enforcement and peacekeeping missions deploy a limited number of civilian personnel. Diplomatic and development activities rely on civilian capabilities exclusively.

26 For example, Annan observed that different peacebuilding strategies deal “with secession and partition; with spoilers; with transitional justice, truth commissions, and reconciliation; with elections and power-sharing; [...] with economic liberalisation, reconstruction and development” (Annan 2004, para. 8). Peacebuilding strategies are generally dominated by liberal optimism which takes for granted that societies and state
between four generations of approaches (2011). First-generation approaches refer to top-down practices through which peace is enforced, often by military means rather than negotiated agreement, such as military interventions and peacekeeping. The second-generation approach addresses human needs and promotes peacebuilding at a grass-roots level. The third approach aims at the construction of a liberal state while promoting the Westphalian/Weberian model of state institutions, democracy, civil society and the market economy. Liberal state-building has become widely accepted by democracies, the EU and the UN (Richmond 2002; 2011; Richmond, Björkdahl, and Kappler 2011; Richmond and Mitchell 2012). A fourth-generation approach supports comprehensive, contextual and case-specific approaches. This ‘hybrid’ peacebuilding involves local, regional and international levels of legitimacy (Richmond 2011; Richmond and Franks 2011; Richmond and Mitchell 2012).

What Richmond frames as the third-generation peacebuilding - peacebuilding with a focus on post-conflict stabilisation, reconstruction and building of state institutions - has become the dominant approach pursued by state actors and intergovernmental organisations (Call and Wyeth 2008; Mac Ginty 2013a; Richmond 2011). Paris has argued that international organisations even prioritise the strengthening of state institutions over liberalisation (Paris 2004). Non-exploitative state institutions are seen as a fundamental condition of sustainable peace (Attack 2005; Barnett et al. 2007; Doyle 2006; Galtung 1964). State institutions, representing “res publica”, are the core elements of “a well-functioning state” (Hill 2003, 33). If state institutions are ineffective, exploitative or even non-existent, the likelihood of war increases. Weak and failing states lose their authority functions in maintaining the rule of law, order and justice and in providing basic services and security to their citizens (Englehart 2009; Rotberg 2004). State-centred peacebuilding seeks to empower such states by rebuilding “the country’s institutional capacity for self-sustaining peace” (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 46). This form of peacebuilding is regarded as liberal state-building: “the externally-assisted construction and reconstruction of the institutional infrastructure” of a state (Kurowska and Seitz 2011, 17). State-building involves the reform and/or construction of legitimate and effective state institutions that are key to good governance (Ibid., 25 and 29).

Liberal peacebuilding has been a subject of criticism. By creating institutions similar institutions can be perfected (Mac Ginty 2013a). Some scholars promote liberal peacebuilding (Crocker, Hampsons and Aall 2005), while others criticise it (Richmond 2005; Roberts 2011; Chandler 2010). Peacebuilding strategies reflect particular political values. For instance, the US-led projects promote market-oriented structures and democracy. International NGOs tend to emphasise the strengthening of civil society and indigenous structures (Barnett et al. 2007; Paris 2004). Some stressed that successful peacebuilding requires a balanced approach to competing demands of justice, order and security (Hyde-Price 2013).

27 This approach corresponds with Lederach’s notion of peacebuilding as not only a structural change but also a transformation of relationships. According to Lederach (1997), peacebuilding shall encompass psychological, spiritual, social, economic, political and military levels.
to their own, international actors promote particular ideologies and models of governance (Kurowska and Seitz 2011, 25; Mac Ginty 2013a; Richmond 2010). According to Paris, peacebuilding activities “have effectively ‘transmitted’ standards of appropriate behaviour from Western-liberal core of the international system to the failed states of the periphery […] or have supported the transformation of war-shattered states into liberal market democracies” (Paris 2002, 637). Yet, as Kurowska and Seitz claimed, condemning liberal peacebuilding and state-building is questionable if such assistance is welcomed by the receiving country and if it proves effective in preventing failed states (2011, 30).

While academic research has led to the development of idealistic peacebuilding frameworks with complex meanings, it is the practice which defines the character of peacebuilding. In particular, it was the UN that shaped both the conceptual and operational basis of peacebuilding as an instrument of conflict management. In the field, peacebuilding is less defined through its theoretical frameworks; often, the term peacebuilding is even missing in documents, such as UN resolutions. In practice, peacebuilding refers to particular activities, such as the reform or rebuilding of security, justice and political institutions. Ultimately, the aim of these practices is to build sustainable peace. This thesis adopts this understanding of peacebuilding.

The UN’s shift from traditional peacekeeping to peacebuilding

Peacebuilding has become a normative framework in international approaches in post-conflict reconstruction and an integral part of peace operations (Gross 2013, 10). Tardy has noted that the UN and the EU were particularly well positioned to undertake peacebuilding tasks as their policies were designed to cover the entire continuum of crisis management (Tardy 2012, 197). The international community, in particular the UN, was not prepared to deal with complex intrastate wars and new security challenges after the end of the Cold War. Peacekeeping proved inadequate to deal with intrastate conflicts and to prevent failed states. These

28 Critics have argued that liberal models tend to perpetuate socio-economic inequalities, political competition and divisions (Sens 2004, Paris 1997; 2004). Scholars have also emphasised that state-building often promotes Western hegemony by imposing prescribed solutions of powerful states and international institutions (Kurowska and Seitz 2011; Sens 2004). International actors are in the position of power as they control peacebuilding budgets and the design of projects. They may underestimate the ability of local actors and weaken their role. Focusing on institutions can also empower new governments to an extent that they hinder peace (Mac Ginty 2013a; Paris 1997). In addition, peacebuilding can suffer from the proliferation of international actors who often compete among each other. This incoherence derives from the pursuit of divergent goals by international actors in peacebuilding (Jeong 2005, 19; Krasner 2008, 662; 2009, 243; Sens 2004; Reychler 2000, 57). At the same time, local agency should not be romanticised. Local approaches can often perpetuate patriarchy, the dominance of one group, and non-transparent forms of governance (Mac Ginty 2013a, 5).
challenges emphasised the need for a more effective management of violent conflicts and situations of failed states without the rule of law. They highlighted that traditional approaches to peace and security, in particular peacekeeping, do not work in such environments (Cooper 2000; 2003; Gross 2013; Hannay 2008; 2013).

Peacebuilding at the UN emerged from efforts to reform peacekeeping. Based on the principles of impartiality, state sovereignty and territorial integrity, peacekeeping missions were intended to keep order and peace, and observe ceasefires. Peacekeepers were mandated to use force for the protection of UN and humanitarian workers only. The re-establishment of order after violence is indeed cardinal for post-conflict reconstruction (Aggestam and Björkdahl 2013). However, peacekeeping alone is not as sufficient as for sustaining the peace. Peacekeeping operations failed to prevent mass atrocities in Rwanda and Srebrenica. Violence often recurred even if peace settlement was reached (Bellamy 2009; Baranyi 2008). The imposition of order by international actors does not guarantee lasting peace; the country needs to develop its own capacity to sustain peace (Aggestam and Björkdahl 2013).

Failures in peacekeeping led to a re-consideration of traditional approaches to peace and security. With the outbreak of civil wars after the end of the Cold War, the UN also found itself with an overload of peacekeeping operations. Increased capabilities and expertise were needed to make operations successful. Peacekeeping lacked the civilian peacemaking and peacebuilding capacities, such as police and legal advisors, to conduct complex missions (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2010; Hannay 2008; 2013). As a long-term and comprehensive approach, peacebuilding was believed to overcome recurring difficulties in peace operations, such as expedient agreements, the lack of coordination between agencies, the lack of sustained attention by the international community, and the failure by the parties to the conflict to fulfil their agreements (Stedman and Rothchild 1996).

Peacebuilding was introduced by former Boutrous-Ghali in his *An Agenda for Peace* as a new approach in addition to preventive diplomacy, development, peacemaking and peacekeeping. Boutrous-Ghali understood these approaches as constituent elements of conflict management – a range of UN activities to maintain international peace and security (Boutrous-Ghali 1992). *The Supplement to An Agenda for Peace* elaborated the conceptual elements of peacebuilding and recommendations for its practical realisation. It highlighted the changing nature of conflicts and an increase of intrastate wars characterised by “the collapse of state institutions, especially the police and judiciary, with resulting paralysis of governance, a breakdown of law and order” (Boutrous-Ghali 1995, para. 10-14). The Supplement recommended the creation of a rapid reaction force consisting of national units to prevent
atrocities such as those in Somalia and Rwanda (Ibid., para. 99).

Boutros-Ghali’s recommendations, including the idea of peacebuilding, were supported by the Security Council (UNSC), though the UNSC reaffirmed “its primary responsibility […] for the maintenance of international peace and security” (UN Security Council 1998, 1). The UNSC acknowledged the need for developing new means “based on the Charter of the United Nations and generally recognised principles of peacekeeping, and which would incorporate post-conflict peace-building as an important component” (Ibid., 1). It also encouraged the Secretary-General to explore the possibilities “of establishing post-conflict peace-building structures as part of efforts by the United Nations system to achieve a lasting peaceful solution to conflicts, including in order to ensure a smooth transition from peacekeeping to peace-building and lasting peace” (Ibid., 2). One of the outcomes of Boutros-Ghali’s proposals was the establishment of the Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), a multinational standby military force for UN operations.29 The Executive Committee on Peace and Security, led by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), was established to promote the coordination among the UN departments and programmes on peace and security, humanitarian assistance and development (UNDP Annex 6).

An Agenda for Peace was followed by the so-called Brahimi Report which undertook a thorough review of UN peace and security activities and made functional recommendations to peacekeeping operations.30 The Report determined conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding as the principal elements of the UN peace operations. It emphasised peacebuilding as key to the success of peacekeeping operations and the need to build the UN capacity to pursue peacebuilding in an integrated manner. Although the report identified UNDP and DPA as best placed to implement peacebuilding, it acknowledged that the UN already shifted from traditional peacekeeping mandated with observing ceasefires to more complex mission with peacebuilding tasks. It recommended a further doctrinal shift, namely that peacekeeping operations should include civilian police, rule of law elements, human rights experts and other peacebuilding aspects. For the realisation of this shift, the report proposed institutional adjustments, including the establishment of a peacebuilding unit within the DPA (UN General Assembly and Security Council 2000).

The UNSC embraced peacebuilding as a norm of the UN in its efforts to maintain

29 This rapid intervention tool was initiated by Denmark in 1996, largely as a result of the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica. It was founded by Austria, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Sweden, with the Czech Republic as an observer, and Ireland and Finland joining without committing Officers to the Planning Element. During its existence, the brigade had 23 members (Koops and Varwick 2008).
30 The report was drafted by a High-Level Panel chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi and adopted as the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (UN General Assembly and Security Council 2000).
international peace and security adopting Boutrous-Ghali’s and Brahimi’s definition:

“peace-building is aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanism. This requires short and long term actions tailored to address the particular needs of societies sliding into conflict or emerging from it. These actions should focus on fostering sustainable institutions and processes in areas such as sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law and the promotion of culture of peace and non-violence” (UN Security Council 2001, 1).

Following the Brahimi Report, the UN continued in the reform of its peacekeeping. The 9/11 attacks further heightened the threat of state failure, underdevelopment and weak governance in creating conditions for transnational terrorism. Kofi Annan appointed a High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change to examine new threats and challenges and to propose structural improvements of the UN system.\(^{31}\) The report of the High-Level Panel made numerous references to the 9/11 events, the deadlock in the UNSC on the situation in Iraq, and the failure of the UN to act in the conflicts in the Western Balkans and Rwanda (UN 2004a). The report identified “a key institutional gap: there is no place in the United Nations system explicitly designed to avoid State collapse and the slide to war or to assist countries in their transition from war to peace” (Ibid., 83). For these reasons, the Panel recommended establishing a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), an advisory UN body tasked with peacebuilding. In addition to post-conflict peacebuilding, the PBC was also supposed to be responsible for conflict prevention, early warning and transition processes between conflict management and post-conflict peacebuilding (Ibid., 83).

In his report entitled *In Larger Freedom*, Annan included the recommendation of the Panel to establish the PBC (UN General Assembly 2005c). The proposal was accepted by the 2005 World Summit. The role of the PBC is to support post-conflict peacebuilding in countries emerging from conflict and ensure sustained international attention (UN General Assembly 2005a; UN Security Council 2005a). The General Assembly (UNGA) and the UNSC established the PBC as a body responsible for peacebuilding only, excluding the three additional tasks proposed by the High-Level Panel. Peacebuilding has also become an important element of operations managed by the DPA (peace-making) and the DPKO (peacekeeping). The summit endorsed the creation of an operating capability for a standby

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31 The Panel consisted of 15 members and was chaired by former Prime Minister of Thailand and included former heads of government and foreign ministers, replicating the membership pattern of the UNSC. In particular, the UK, France, USA, China, Russia, Thailand, Brazil, Norway, Ghana, Australia, Uruguay, Egypt, India, Japan, Tanzania, and Pakistan were represented in the Panel (UN General Assembly 2004).
police capacity in peacekeeping. In addition, the summit supported the efforts of the EU and other regional actors in developing their own capacities, especially for rapid deployment and standby and bridging arrangements (UN General Assembly 2005b).

The doctrinal shift in UN peacekeeping necessitated a clarity of standards and policies. In 2006, the reform strategy *Peace Operations 2010* sought to enhance the effectiveness of the planning and management of peace operations. It focused on five areas: a) personnel; b) the definition of concepts and doctrine; c) partnerships, in particular with the UN Peacebuilding Architecture, to improve integrated peace operations; d) resources; and e) the establishment of integrated organisational structures at the HQ and in the field, incorporating political, military, police, civilian, logistical and financial expertise (UN General Assembly 2006, 7). This strategy led to a restructuring of the DPKO and to the creation of the Department of Field Support (DFS) in 2007. Building on this reform, the *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, known as the Capstone Doctrine, presented modalities for the planning and implementation of integrated and multidimensional peace operations (UN 2008). The reform of UN peacekeeping has continued with the policy document *New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping* (DPKO and DFS 2009) which has assessed the major dilemmas facing contemporary UN peacekeeping in dialogue with UN member states and other partners, including the EU. UN peace missions have developed into multidimensional and integrated enterprises incorporating a range of peacebuilding, peacemaking and peacekeeping elements. Most missions continue to be framed as peacekeeping missions since they are coordinated by the DPKO.

The reform of peacekeeping initiated by the Brahimi Report has led to a transformation of UN peacekeeping operations which have expanded in their scope and mandate. Operations have become more robust, complex and multifunctional, involving not only military but also political, humanitarian and civilian activities. While first-generation peacekeeping operations were deployed after the ceasefire, second-generation operations intervene in unstable situations often with the conflict still ongoing. Second-generation peacekeeping has been increasingly mandated to use the force for the protection of civilians. As a result, the boundaries between peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace-enforcement have become blurred. Today, peace operations are rarely limited to one type of

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32 Operations with narrow mandate (monitoring of peace agreements) are framed as ‘traditional’ or ‘first-generation peacekeeping’, while complex operations that have been carried out since the Brahimi reform are depicted as ‘second-generation peacekeeping’ (UN “History of Peacekeeping”).

33 The military dimension can include the monitoring of the ceasefire, DDR, de-mining and civilian protection. The humanitarian dimension involves humanitarian aid and the management of refugees. The political dimension covers administrative support; SSR, justice and electoral reforms; and human rights promotion. The economic part includes reconstruction and development (Battistelli 2015, 32-33; UN “Missions”).
activity. Comprehensive mandates have led to integrated and multidimensional peace operations in which different UN bodies, such as DPKO, DPA, UNMAS and UNDP, work under one chain of command (UN “Missions”; see also Battistelli 2015; Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2010; Sens 2004). Second-generation missions have been continuously deployed to remote and dangerous environments (Kmec 2017; Osterrieder, Lehne and Kmec 2015). While first-generation peacekeepers kept a low profile, second-generation peacekeepers have been subjects of armed attacks and of critique by local populations and national governments due to their involvement in internal matters (Battistelli 2015, 38).

This reform has led to the proliferation of actors involved in peace operations. Contributing with their troops, financial resources, equipment and expertise, many states and regional organisations have shown an increasing interest in developing their role as security actors (Battistelli 2015, 32-33; Kmec 2017). The reform of peacekeeping provided the EU with an opportunity to become a credible international security actor. Many scholars have argued that the CSDP was created for this purpose (Giegerich 2008; 2009; Tardy 2006; 2009). As Tardy puts it: “peacekeeping has been a key objective in the EU’s quest for fully-fledged security actor status. It is what the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is all about” (Tardy 2009, 27-28). In the light of this reform, operations not managed by the UN but by regional actors, such as NATO, the EU and the AU, became more common (Battistelli 2015, 34). This proliferation of new security actors played , which was the key player in the shift towards the institutionalisation of peacebuilding at the UN.

The EU’s role in the UN’s shift towards peacebuilding

EU member states played a fundamental role in the evolution of peacebuilding at the UN and the reform of UN peacekeeping. As the key supporter of the UN system, the EU actively promoted and advocated the idea of peacebuilding internationally. Hannay noted that Boutros-Ghali’s idea of peacebuilding was welcomed by the EU, whereas the US was more hesitant (Hannay 2008, 77, 184). EU member states supported the practical implementation of the recommendations proposed by the Supplement while taking an active role in the establishment of SHIRBRIG. The EU’s influence in this arrangement was obvious with 16 of 23 member states and observers of SHIRBRIG being EU member states (Koops 2011).

Nowhere was the EU’s inclination towards peacebuilding as apparent as in the EU’s

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34 International NGOs, governmental agencies and civil society organisations have also become involved in peacebuilding processes. Second-generation peacekeepers have to interact with these new actors. The proliferation of actors can sometimes lead to tensions (Battistelli 2015, 38; Kmec 2017).
support of the establishment of the PBC. This support became evident already during the work of the High-Level Panel. Only two EU countries, in particular the two permanent members of the UNSC, the UK, through David Hannay, and France, through Robert Badinter, were represented in the Panel. As a former ambassador and permanent representative to the European Economic Community, a representative to the UN, and a special representative for Cyprus, Hannay possessed significant knowledge of EU and UN matters. Badinter was former minister of justice, president of the Constitutional Council, president of the Arbitration Commission for former Yugoslavia and a member of the Convention for the European Constitution. According to Hannay, he and his French colleague sought to represent the EU’s interests. They held regular consultations with EU institutions and EU capitals. According to him, they, together with Gareth Evans, former Australian minister for foreign affairs, made the most significant contribution to the Panel’s work (Hannay 2008, 213).

The active role of these representatives led to a harmony between the Panel’s and the EU’s objectives. Hannay noted that

“the fit between the Panel’s proposals and EU objectives is astonishingly close, a remarkable fact since only two of the 16 panel members came from the EU. This fit suggests potentially widespread support for the EU’s aim of effective multilateralism” (Hannay, 2005).

According to Hannay, EU member states, were best prepared to help the UN to solve the institutional crisis it faced. The UK played a special role in this process due to its “combined position as a country which understands and influences the evolution of US foreign policy and as one of the two Permanent Members from a European Community which is groping its way towards a more united approach to foreign and security policy” (Hannay 2013, 183).

The conflicts in Yugoslavia had a significant impact on the evolution of post-conflict engagement of both the UN and the EU. According to Hannay, the failure to prevent the conflicts in Yugoslavia that led to mass-killing was also caused by the divide between the UN and the EU (Hannay 2008, 93). The Yugoslav conflicts led to an enhanced cooperation between the UN and the EU in post-conflict conflict management. Hannay understood that “the Europeans, Britain prominent amongst them, must share a good deal of the responsibility for failing to take those opportunities” (Ibid., 163). He noted that the intention of reforming UN peacekeeping supported the strengthening of regional peacekeeping and peacebuilding (Hannay 2013, 253-4). The overload of peacekeeping and the increase of the UN’s costs of peacekeeping provided justification for the involvement of regional organisations. The EU came to be seen by the UN as an important partner in peacekeeping and post-conflict
reconstruction (Hannay, 2008). Similarly, Tardy claimed that regionalisation of crisis management became inevitable after the end of the Cold War. In addition to the difficulties that the UN peacekeeping was facing, Tardy also noted that regional organisations offered advantages, such as proximity, local expertise and flexibility, which the UN did not possess (Tardy 2012, 198).

The intention to provide a long-term support to countries slipping towards failure and countries emerging from hostilities was the main driver behind the Panel’s proposal for the establishment of a PBC (Hannay 2013; Hannay 2008). The EU’s support for the establishment of the PBC was driven by the Yugoslav wars, while the 9/11 terrorist attacks were decisive to the US support, represented in the Panel through Brent Scowcroft, for the establishment of a PBC (Scowcroft 2008; Kessler 2004).

The EU fully supported the work of the High-Level Panel. In its contribution to the Panel, the Council referred to the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), in particular to new security challenges, such as ethnic conflicts and state failures, and the need for new approaches to tackle them. The paper stated that

“the EU recognises that none of the challenges can be tackled on its own, as they are often closely linked. They demand economic, political and legal instruments, as well as military instruments, and close co-operation between states as well as international organisations [...] The UN is uniquely placed to provide the framework for such co-operation” (Council of the EU 2004a, 2).

The EU recognised the need for comprehensive approaches in post-conflict situations. The Council referred to peacebuilding as an activity that addresses the root causes of a failure of state institutions. These thoughts are analogous to the understanding of peacebuilding presented by the Brahimi Report, the Agenda for Peace, and the Report of the High-Level Panel. The Council expressed hope for “measures to strengthen the UN system’s engagement in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, leading to enhanced cooperation between key departments within the UN Secretariat and intergovernmental bodies as well as to an effective allocation of resources amongst UN system actors” (Ibid., 7). Coordinating different actors in peacebuilding, both UN agencies and contributing countries, is one of the primary tasks of the PBC. Similarly, the European Commission (2005a) stressed the importance of a PBC in filling a gap in the UN system and supporting a holistic approach to peacebuilding.

The idea of a PBC was supported by the EU and its member states. Gowan argued that “the EU’s members were widely expected to be important drivers of the reform process of the United Nations” (Gowan 2007). The EU was expected to take a leading role in the UN reform
According to Gowan, the political relevance of the PBC was decided to a large extent by the EU states, which worked with the African bloc within the UNGA to advocate the new body (Ibid.). Similarly, Biscop (2005b) noted that the PBC provided the EU with a new era of engagement, including with its own military and civilian CSDP missions. The role of the EU was seen as crucial in the PBC in providing resources and capacities. The Outcome Document of the World Summit noted that the UN supports the efforts of the EU and other regional organisations to develop standby capacities and provide needed resources (UN 2005).

Once the idea of a PBC was presented, the EU advocated and welcomed the intention to establish it. A Communication from the European Commission stressed that the EU would contribute to the work of the PBC through its European Commission and CFSP instruments. The European Commission particularly understood its role to be well suited to contribute actively to the work of the PBC by emphasising its experience in peacebuilding around the world and the financial amounts at its disposal (European Commission 2005a). The EU saw the PBC as a platform for its engagement in post-conflict environments. In its statement, the EU Presidency highlighted “the EU’s role as a peacebuilder through actions throughout the world ranging through peacekeeping, reconstruction, institution building and support for fledgling democracies” (EU Delegation to the UN, 2005).

EU member states played a key role in ensuring the endorsement of the establishment of the PBC at the 2005 World Summit. They actively advocated the PBC and negotiated with other groups of states (interview A). Initially, the Summit made the PBC a subsidiary body of the UNGA only (UN General Assembly 2005b). This decision represented a significant change in power distribution in the UN system. Whereas the UNSC has traditionally had the main responsibility over the maintenance of international peace and security, the PBC, which deals with peace and security issues, was established by this resolution as a body under the control of the UNGA.

The EU’s support for the institutionalisation of peacebuilding was not merely altruistic. The EU backed the decision to retain the PBC under the control of the UNCS. EU countries voted for UNSC Resolutions 1645 and 1646 and UNGA Resolution 60/180 which made the PBC a subsidiary body of both the UNGA and the UNSC (UN General Assembly 2005a; UN Security Council 2005a; 2005b). EU member states coordinate their voting at the UN, acting together for up to 90 per cent of votes in UN organs, including the UNSC and the UNGA (K.E. Smith 2006; Telò 2009; Thomas 2011a, 12). Although many EU states are in favour of a reform of the UNSC, they also enjoy significant privileges within the current system while maintaining a relatively strong share of the seats in the UNSC. Keeping the PBC
under the responsibility of the UNSC could ensure a continued share of the EU in the control of UN peacebuilding (Kmec 2017).

The interest of the EU in controlling international peacebuilding actions is also demonstrated through the proposal of the European Commission that the EU participates in all meetings of the PBC (European Commission 2005a; 2005b). However, securing an EU seat in the PBC was not straightforward. A decision was held up by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) until it was also granted the same status. The tension over the Community’s representation in the PBC also arose at the EU level. The division of competencies between the European Commission and the Council’s CFSP generated debates as to who should represent the EU within the PBC. In the end, an agreement was reached that the European Community would be represented under one nameplate with two seats - one for the Presidency and one for the Commission (Tomat and Onestini 2010). With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, which granted the EU a single legal status, this problem was resolved; the EU is now represented by its Delegation to the UN. The PBC also provided the EU with an opportunity to enhance its influence in decision-making over matters of international peace and security at the UN. In the configurations of the PBC, namely the Organizational Committee (OC), Country Specific Configurations (CSCs) and the Working Group on Lessons Learned, EU member states have secured the largest share of seats (Kmec 2017).

The institutionalisation of UN peacebuilding, supported by the EU, created fertile soil for the development of the EU’s own role in international peacebuilding. The reform of peacekeeping and the shift towards peacebuilding at the UN coincided with the launch of the CSDP which has become the EU’s most important instrument in international peacebuilding. This link is evident for example through statements by Secretary-General of the Council of the EU and High Representative of the CFSP (SG/HR) Javier Solana who warmly welcomed the establishment of the PBC while stressing that the EU fully supported the UN concept of peacebuilding. He stated that “the idea of strengthening the link between early warning, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction was part of the EU’s submission to the High Level Panel” (Council of the EU 2005a). According to him, the creation of the PBC “is entirely consistent with the comprehensive approach in crisis management pursued by the European Union. We stand ready to fully and actively contribute to the work of the PBC” (Ibid. 2005).

35 In addition to the EU and the OIC, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank can take part in all the meetings of the PBC (Kmec 2017; Tomat and Onestini 2010).
The EU’s agreement with the UN’s understanding of peacebuilding

The EU’s active involvement in the shift towards peacebuilding at the UN suggests that the EU is in an agreement with the UN on peacebuilding. This involvement influenced the EU’s own understanding of peacebuilding and of the purposes of its CSDP with the UN-EU consensus on peacebuilding becoming apparent with the evolution of the CSDP. The UN’s response to the new ESDP was affirmative. While facing shortages of capacity and capabilities, the UN welcomed the introduction of the CSDP as a crucial instrument that could strengthened the UN peace efforts directly or indirectly. Yet, the UN stressed that conflict management actions by regional organisations, such as those under the CSDP, should take place with the approval of the UNSC (UN 2004b; 2004c).

The EU has recognised the primacy of the UN in the maintenance of international peace and security while attempting to keep a certain degree of autonomy. Summits in Nice and Göteborg recalled that the ESDP would contribute to international peace and security while recognising the primary responsibility of the UNSC for international peace and security (Council of the EU 2000, Annex VI; 2001a, Art. 47). As Ojanen noted, the EU acknowledged that it needed the UN since “the development of the EU as an international actor requires international acceptance, the only actual institutional source of which is the UN” (Ojanen 2006a). According to Ojanen, this is the reason why the EU has always emphasised the primacy of the UN in the maintenance of international peace and security (Ibid.). Similarly, Tardy has argued that the UN has provided a legal framework and legitimacy for the CSDP. Apart from this, the EU has a strategic interest in securing the backing from the UN for its missions, especially in situations where the EU might be seen politically biased (Tardy 2009).

The EU envisioned its CSDP not as an alternative but a contribution to the UN peacekeeping efforts. The 2000 European Council of Nice, which approved an enhanced cooperation between the UN and the EU, stressed that:

“the development of the European Security and Defence Policy strengthens the Union’s contribution to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. The European Union recognises the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for maintaining peace and international security” (Council of the EU 2000, Annex VI).

The EU emphasised that EU-led missions would be conducted in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. Yet, the Nice Council also noted that the CSDP would mean the development of an “autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international
The Conclusions presented the CSDP both as an instrument compatible with the UN principles and as an autonomous capacity of the EU.

The 2001 European Council in Göteborg recalled the conclusions from Nice by stressing that the ESDP “will also enable Europeans to respond more effectively and coherently to requests from lead organisations such as the UN or the OSCE” (Council of the EU 2001b, Annex, para. 7). The Council noted that the evolving ESDP should lead to “an intensified, mutually reinforcing co-operation between the European Union and other international organisations, including the UN, OSCE and the Council of Europe, without unnecessary duplication” (Council of the EU 2001b, Annex 1, para. 36). The Council adopted a Conclusion on EU-UN Co-operation in Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management with an aim of strengthening EU-UN’s “mutually reinforcing approaches to conflict prevention and by ensuring that the European Union’s evolving military and civilian capacities provide real added value for UN crisis management activities” (Council of the EU 2001a, Art. 53; see also Council of the EU 2001e, 3).

The UN and the EU share conceptions of conflict management. The original Petersberg Tasks, namely humanitarian, peacekeeping and peacemaking tasks, as well as the priority areas in the civilian crisis management, namely police, rule of law, civil administration and civilian protection, correspond with the UN framework for peace missions. The Göteborg summit brought the CSDP closer to the peacebuilding framework while stressing that civilian crisis management is a particularly important area for the development of co-operation with international organisations (Council of the EU 2001b, Annex V). The formulation and construction of the CSDP followed proposals outlined in the Agenda for Peace and the Brahimi Report. “Civilian and military aspects of crisis management”, “conflict prevention” and “regional issues” were seen as the main areas of cooperation between the EU and the UN in crisis management. In addition, the Göteborg Council endorsed the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts which brought a consolidated understanding of actions in conflict prevention, including peacebuilding (Council of the EU 2001a, Art. 53; 2001d). In this Programme, the EU examined practical implications of the ways of contributing to the evolving shift towards peacebuilding at the UN. It proposed to invite “organisations involved in conflict prevention in Europe to a meeting on how to improve preventive capabilities, in order to contribute to the dialogue on peace-building initiated by the UN Secretary-General” (Council of the EU 2001d, 8).

The Göteborg Council suggested that the development of a capability for planning and coordinating police missions to conduct conflict prevention and crisis management tasks
should pay attention “to the experience of the United Nations, in particular the conclusions of, and follow-up to, the Brahimi report” (Council of the EU 2001b, Annex, para. 6). In this sense, the inclusion of the civilian aspects in the CSDP, in particular police missions, corresponds with the ideas of the Brahimi reform. The reasons for the shift towards civilian aspects may indeed be the lack of political will resulting from military and peacekeeping failures as well as the domestic pressure that EU countries faced in the early 2000s. However, the evolution of civilian crisis management has not neglected the EU’s intention to support this change at the UN. High-level officials in Brussels actively called for the deployment of both civilian and military capabilities (see Solana below). Tardy (2005) noted that civilian aspects of crisis management became the most significant area of the EU-UN rapprochement.

The Göteborg summit recalled the intention to develop a strong EU-UN partnership that would be “strengthened by the mutually reinforcing approaches to conflict prevention and by ensuring that the European Union’s evolving military and civilian capacities provide real added value for UN crisis management activities” (Council of the EU 2001a, Art. 53; see also Council of the EU 2001b, para. 37; 2001d, 7; 2001e, 3). These Conclusions were prepared by the General Affairs Council (GAC), which also stressed the EU’s

“determination to develop and strengthen co-operation in the areas of crisis management and conflict prevention. The co-operation should develop progressively in close co-ordination with the UN, focusing on substantive issues and concrete needs. It will increase in scope and importance as the ESDP evolves” (Council of the EU 2001c).

The GAC acknowledged “the need for an integrated approach to conflict prevention and crisis management, encompassing also development co-operation and other measures addressing root causes of conflict” (Ibid.).

The EU understood that its support of the UN’s efforts to maintain international peace and security through the CSDP could not stay at the level of statements but needed to be translated into actions which required the willingness and commitment of EU member states. In his speech in Dublin in 2004, Solana noted:

“Ultimately, I believe that the best way that Europe can contribute to building a stronger UN is by building a strong and capable Europe; a Europe firmly committed to effective multilateralism. These are not alternatives. These are complementary. Last year, the European Union was able to respond quickly and decisively to the UN’s call for peacekeepers in the Great Lakes region. This is EU rapid reaction in practice. Without [the CSDP], the deployment of military capabilities, and the ability to take the necessary decisions, we could not have responded to this call” (Solana 2004).
Solana’s reference to military capabilities in a militarily neutral Ireland was significant as it stressed the attempt of Brussels to meet promises that the EU gave to the UN – in particular the contribution of military capabilities to UN peace missions. He understood that the support to the UN was not merely based on civilian crisis management. Solana referred to the EU’s role in peacekeeping and post-conflict management, especially in the Balkans, while understanding it as part of the comprehensive approach. He argued that “Bosnia will be the first case where the EU simultaneously deploys trade, humanitarian, military and civilian instruments on the ground in pursuit of a single objective - the stabilisation and transformation of a post conflict society into one which some day can be ready for EU membership” (Ibid.). Although Solana did not use the term peacebuilding in the draft ESS, he followed the UN language of integrated and comprehensive post-conflict management.

The ESS highlighted that “strengthening the UN, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively is a European priority” (Council of the EU 2003c, 7). The ESS emphasised the importance of complying with international institutions and international law. It highlighted that “the EU is committed to reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts, and to enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management situations” (Council of the EU 2003c, 11). The EU’s commitment to the UN had already been emphasised by Solana in the draft ESS:

“the fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively must be a European priority. If we want international organizations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security we should be ready to act when their rules are broken (Solana 2003,14).

According to Gowan, cooperation with the UN was not seen as the main priority by Solana prior to 2003. Gowan claimed that the UN has moved from an almost peripheral role in the ESS to its centre due to the 2003 Iraq crisis. The invasion of Iraq put more pressure on the EU states to restore the UN’s credibility. For Gowan, the ESS was a direct response to the Iraq crisis and an anti-pole to the US security strategy, in particular an increased unilateral peace-enforcement interventionism led by the US (Gowan 2007). According to Ortega, the reasons could go back to earlier interventionism, namely NATO’s operation in Kosovo in 1999. Although this intervention was later approved by the UNSC, it constituted a significant challenge to the international order. At the time when the EU was planning its CSDP, the new interventionism questioned what type of operations the EU would carry out (Ortega 2001).
While stressing its compliance with international law and its own contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security, the ESS emphasised the distinction between unilateral interventions and peace missions with the approval of the UNSC. In this way, the EU sought to ensure the legitimacy of its deployment of autonomous operations and missions so that they comply with the international legal system. The ESS was a crucial document in highlighting the linkage between the UN and the EU approaches to peace and conflict. The Strategy made the EU’s relationship to the UN one of the central themes. It brought the understanding of peace and conflict closer to that of the UN. It identified state failure as a key threat to international peace and security. It also noted that the EU should play a crucial role in strengthening the UN’s capacity for crisis-management and post-conflict reconstruction. It called for the EU to enhance its military assets and its “capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post-crisis situations” (Council of the EU 2003c, 11).

Biscop observed that the ESS came to correspond with the UN understanding of human security which he framed as ‘Global Public Goods’. He noted that the ESS contained elements based on the principle of Global Public Goods despite the fact that these were not mentioned in the ESS. The ESS interlinks peace and security with good governance, social and political reform, the rule of law and human rights (Biscop 2005b). Similarly, Bailes argued that the ESS combined the political, societal, economic and strategic dimensions of security, highlighted the need to tackle causes for conflicts from economic and social sources, and discussed non-state actors (Bailes 2005). This interconnection between peace and security, and between development, good governance, human rights and rule of law is central to the understanding of peacebuilding.

Solana made clearer references to the framework that corresponds with peacebuilding while emphasising the need to develop “a new paradigm. Let us develop more creative strategies for conflict prevention, crisis management, good governance, trade promotion and human rights protection” (Solana 2005, 3-4). He stressed the need for coherence in policies and long-term development in post-conflict crisis rebuilding (Ibid.). He argued that “peace building and conflict prevention lie at the heart of the European Union’s external action” (Solana 2007, preface). He emphasised that “Europe can and must take more initiatives is in developing new rules and institutions for a more complex and unstable world” (Solana 2008, 6). Solana’s statements suggest that the EU was closely following the reform of UN peacekeeping. Solana’s call for new inclusive and integrated approaches in post-conflict management matches with those made by the High-Level Panel.

The EU’s inclination to peacebuilding has been noted by Missiroli who anticipated
that the Report on the Implementation of the ESS would focus on what the Union could do better in the broader arena of peacebuilding. It was expected that peacebuilding would dominate the content of the Report. According to Missiroli, peacebuilding is “the term that resounds most favourably with European citizens” (Missiroli 2008). Unlike the 2003 ESS, the Report on the Implementation of the ESS: Providing Security in a Changing World, mentioned ‘peacebuilding’ and stressed its importance. It also highlighted the interconnection between peacebuilding, conflict prevention and development (Council of the EU 2008).

The consensus between the UN and the EU with regard to peacebuilding has led to a synergy between the two organisations in the conceptual formulation and understanding of peacebuilding. Both the EU and the UN came to see post-conflict peacebuilding as a crucial condition for rebuilding stability and peace in societies emerging from conflicts. This consensus was accompanied by the expansion of post-conflict activities into civilian aspects on both sides, i.e. in EU civilian missions and in UN peacekeeping missions. Most importantly, the EU stressed its commitment to the UN and to the principle of the primary responsibility of the UNSC in the maintenance of international peace and security.

**Peacebuilding as an objective in the EU-UN partnership**

The consensus between the EU and the UN on the need for peacebuilding resulted in a strong partnership in the area of conflict management. According to Hannay, it was the end of the Cold War that brought the two organisations to cooperate. He noted that, during the Cold War, the then Community and the UN “might have been living on different planets for all they knew” (Hannay 2013, 173). The relationship between the two organisations was characterised by the atmosphere of mutual ignorance and suspicion, as noted by Hannay (Ibid.). Following the fall of the Iron Curtain, they started to cooperate. Novosseloff argued that the EU-UN cooperation intensified after the Saint-Malo Summit of 1998 and the European Council of Cologne in 1999 that decided to institutionalise the ESDP. According to her, the EU intended to become a credible actor with new capabilities in crisis management. As the largest contributor to the UN general and peacekeeping budgets, the EU wanted to be perceived as something more than just a “lobby group”, a “funding organisation” or a “monetary weight.” This cooperation was also driven by the need of the UN to create effective exit strategies in post-conflict situations, for which the EU was seen as a credible actor offering a way of leaving a country in a sustainable way (Novosseloff 2012a). Tardy observed that the EU-UN

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36 According to Novosseloff, UN-EU cooperation is one of the most institutionalised forms of multilateral cooperation, covering the whole spectrum of conflict management (Novosseloff 2012a; Tardy 2006).
cooperation in the field of peace and security has been accompanied by simultaneous reform processes. This cooperation has brought both organisations closer to each other in terms of the conceptualisation and institutionalisation of their relationship and their approaches, characterised by an increased exchange of information and frameworks (Tardy 2005; 2012).

This cooperation has also been important for the understanding of the role of the CSDP and its development. As Gowan argued:

“cooperation with the United Nations has been essential to the evolution of the European Security and Defence Policy. Of the 23 ESDP missions launched between 2003 and 2009, 15 have been deployed in countries where the UN has a peacekeeping or peacebuilding mission. All EU missions in Africa have involved direct or indirect cooperation with the UN” (Gowan 2009b, 117).

The UN and the EU started to cooperate in peacebuilding already before the launch of the CSDP. The Presidency Report on ESDP adopted by the Laeken summit of 2001 had noted that

“the Union has begun to cooperate more fully with the United Nations in crisis management and conflict prevention concerning the themes and in the specific areas endorsed by the Gothenburg European Council. Regular contacts at different levels with the representatives of the United Nations have made it possible to keep up the necessary links on the main subjects of common interest. Those contacts have also led to examination […] of how the development of European capabilities in the ESDP could contribute to United Nations efforts in peacekeeping operations” (Council of the EU 2001f, 9).

The reference to EU-UN cooperation is important since the same summit declared the EU’s newly established ESDP operational. In 2003, the GAC Conclusions made crisis management a priority in the EU’s relations with the UN (Council of the EU 2003a). In the same year, the Joint Declaration on EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management initiated a platform for regular consultations between the two organisations in the field of crisis management. The Declaration identified four areas of cooperation in planning (including cooperation between mission planning units), training (joint training standards, procedures, planning for military and civilian personnel, and synchronisation of training), communication (liaison offices), best practices (exchange of information) (Council of the EU 2003b). According to this joint Declaration, the EU and UN peace missions were supposed to be not only compatible but also comparable while showing similarity in their concepts and mandate.

The Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice of Multilateralism (European Commission 2003a) stressed the EU’s contribution to the UN system and presented
practical guidelines for partnership between the EU and the UN. The *EU-UN Cooperation in Civilian Crisis Management Operations – Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration* (Council of the EU 2004f, Annex II) defined operational modalities of this partnership. Exchanges of information and cooperation between the two organisations at decision- and policy-making, training and operational levels have taken place regularly (Novosseloff 2012a; Tardy 2005). To enhance the effectiveness of this cooperation, a Steering Committee was established between the UN DPKO and DPA and the EU institutions covering the General Council Secretariat, the EUMS, and the Commission (Novosseloff 2012a).

In 2007, a *Joint Statement on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management* was signed by the UN and the EU. It called for a renewed EU commitment to the UN and cooperation by endorsing a number of operational measures. The Statement emphasised the need for an enhanced cooperation in the areas of support to African peacekeeping capacity-building and in the aspects of multidimensional peacekeeping, including police, rule of law and security sector reform (Council of the EU 2007a). The Joint Statement was adopted during the German Presidency. Novosseloff argued that the German government wanted to strengthen this cooperation based on lessons from their involvement in the second EU operation in the DRC, launched in July 2006 at the request of the UN. Germany wished to avoid the surprise element of a UN request, which would be difficult to refuse, by emphasising the need for the EU to have a better control over the EU-UN partnership (Novosseloff 2012b, 156). According to Gowan, Germany became frustrated with the experience in the EU operation in the DRC since the structures put in place “gave EU member States too little oversight of relations with the UN” (Gowan 2009b, 120).

The EU’s commitment to UN peacebuilding can be best seen through the EU’s financial contributions to the UN’s general budget and peacekeeping budget. The EU member states together make the largest financial contribution to the UN peacekeeping budget. The EU’s contributions to the UN can also be understood as an impetus for the EU to strengthen its position in the UN, including in the UN reform process. For example, a communication from the European Commission to the Council and the Parliament recommended that

> “the EU must increase its contribution with a view to adopting and applying multilateral policies and instruments. […] the EU must take a more active role in the institutional reform process of the UN in order to increase the effectiveness of the system [and …] to increase the role of EU delegations to the UN” (European Commission 2003a).

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37 The EU countries jointly fund around 40% of the peacekeeping budget and 38% of the regular budget (almost 50% with other contributions) to the UN family. The European Commission contributes over €1 billion to the UN annually (European Commission 2009, 2; UN “Committee on Contributions”).
The European Commission recommended that the cooperation in the area of peace and security should develop into a firm partnership. It noted that “political and technical cooperation must also be increased in the area of peace and security, whether for conflict prevention, crisis management or post-crisis reconstruction” (European Commission 2003a).

The recommendations of the Council and the Commission were translated into several practical modalities for cooperation between the EU CSDP and the UN peacekeeping operations. The PSC tasked the CMPD with discussing with the DPKO and other UN departments possibilities for enhancing the CSDP support to UN peacekeeping. In consultation with the DPKO and DFS, the CMPD prepared a list of actions in which CSDP could support UN peacekeeping - Actions to Enhance EU CSDP Support to UN Peacekeeping (Council of the EU 2011a). This list included not only the identification of civilian and military capabilities that the EU member states could put at UN disposal but also the provision of an entire CSDP mission or operation under UN command, and autonomous CSDP deployments in support of UN operations. This document provides a comprehensive and detailed overview of areas for cooperation and conceptual consistency between the EU and the UN in crisis management. The call for the establishment of actions for coordination between the EU and the UN during the planning and conduct of EU missions/operations deployed in support of UN operations is a major step which brings the CSDP to its original objective of supporting the work of the UN. It also reflects Council decisions, such as the 2003 Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management, which emphasised the need for cooperation and partnership between the two institutions in the field of international peacekeeping and peacebuilding (Council of the EU and the United Nations 2003).

Accepting these actions, the PSC tasked the CMPD to prepare a Plan of Action that set out modalities for the implementation of those actions. The Plan of Action identified areas of conceptual consistency and proposed technical arrangements for mutual support and operational aspects of cooperation in peacekeeping/ crisis management. For instance, it referred to potential areas of EU contribution to UN peacekeeping as identified by DPKO/DFS, such as mine clearance, explosive ordnance disposal, and/or ammunition management expertise. The Plan also stressed the need to further explore commonality between concepts and doctrine in the area of military and civilian capacities deployed in peace operations of both organisations in order to promote interoperability. For example, the Plan suggested that the EU should invite the UN to work together on the development of key EU concepts in the same field. It also recommended establishing arrangements to access each other’s concepts.
library to ensure mutual access to respective concepts (Council of the EU 2012a, 23).

Recommendations also included a call for the establishment of cooperation between the CMPD and the UN DPKO on updating the EU rapid response concepts, including in the contribution of the EU Formed Police Units (FPU) to UN peacekeeping operations. The CMPD was requested to establish technical arrangements with DPKO/DFS on cooperation in the area of lessons learned, including in the framework of the PBC (Ibid., 28). The Actions and the Plan of Action refer to peacekeeping and crisis management as identical concepts. Although peacebuilding is not mentioned explicitly, except for the reference to the PBC, both documents understand peacekeeping and crisis management in a broader sense as a practice that involves peacebuilding. The EEAS also participated in the UN Doctrine Development Group for Formed Police Units, facilitated by DPKO/DFS, which led to the revision of the UN policy *Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (UN DPKO 2010; 2017) that allows for EU-UN FPU interoperability (Council of the EU 2012a, 24).

These proposals for policy and institutional changes suggest that the strengthening of the partnership between the UN and the EU in conflict management was not only about working together for the same cause; it served an additional objective: to develop the CSDP as a tool at the disposal of the UN both under the UN command and as autonomous deployments in support of UN operations. While the EU intended to align its concepts and doctrine with those of the UN, it further developed its CSDP in its own way. Also, while the EU initially committed itself to support the UN efforts to maintain international peace with the whole range of CSDP tools, including with peace-enforcement and peacekeeping, it soon limited its actions to post-conflict peacebuilding.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has discussed the evolution of the consensus between the UN and the EU on the need for and understanding of peacebuilding. It has claimed that the EU supported and advocated the development of peacebuilding at the normative and policy level at the UN. It did so also through its own practice. During the period of the evolution of UN peacebuilding, the EU planned and launched its own CSDP. The EU’s support for peacebuilding at the UN was influenced by a number of events concerning the EU’s own security, such as the wars in

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38 This policy document was a revision of the 2006 UN DPKO policies titled Functions and Organization of Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO 2006a), and Guidelines for Formed Police Units on Assignment with Peace Operations (UN DPKO 2006b) which outline the conditions of deployment, potential, limitations and composition of the FPUs in UN peacekeeping operations.
the Balkans, the failure in Rwanda, terrorism, and the inability to act jointly in the Iraq war. These events encouraged EU member states to act more effectively in matters of international peace and security. Peacebuilding evolved as one of the practices to deal with such situations.

At the political level, both the EU and the UN stressed the compatibility and coherence of their peacekeeping and peacebuilding approaches. This consolidation of the UN’s and EU’s approaches to peace and security created a platform for a strong cooperation between the two organisations in peacebuilding. The EU-UN partnership provided a platform for the development of a common peacebuilding framework. Through this partnership, the EU became influenced by and embraced the UN’s new ideas and approaches to peacebuilding. The CSDP was influenced by the UN peacebuilding framework generated by the reform process at the UN. While establishing its own CSDP, at the conceptual and operational level, the EU followed the UN’s approaches by grasping the ideas of the UN reform initiatives such as the Brahimi report. At the same time, this partnership served as a doorway for the EU to contribute with its own CSDP to the UN peace efforts. The UN recognised the crucial value of the EU’s contribution to international peace and security through its own CSDP. The synchronisation of activities in post-conflict management was proposed by a number of agreements at decision-making and policy-making levels. Although the cooperation has not fully worked at the operational level, and although the CSDP has developed into a tool with narrow yet more specialised and focused capabilities, whereas the UN deploys robust and multidimensional missions, the UN’s conceptualisation and institutionalisation of peacebuilding has impacted on the EU’s own approaches to peacebuilding in its missions.

While the EU has understood its CSDP actions as a contribution to the UN’s efforts to maintain international peace and security, the Councils of Nice and Göteborg had already begun to emphasise the autonomous nature of its own policy. The autonomous character of the CSDP influences the nature of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding. While the EU’s approach to peacebuilding builds on that of the UN, the EU has further developed it with its decision to focus on specific aspects of peacebuilding in its missions and operations. The question therefore arises to what extent this autonomy can lead to a normative and practice change of the CSDP actions with peacebuilding tasks. Both organisations have developed distinctive peacebuilding styles. The following chapter analyses in detail how the CSDP has led to the development of the EU’s distinctive peacebuilding approach.
3 Peacebuilding and the CSDP

Having discussed the evolution of peacebuilding as a norm and practice at the UN and the role of the EU in that process, this chapter turns attention to peacebuilding actions within the CSDP. Although the EU stressed the contribution of the CSDP to the UN’s efforts to maintain international peace and security, the development of the CSDP has provided the EU with an autonomous capacity to launch missions outside the UN framework. However, since the launch of its first CSDP missions, the EU has moved its focus from what was intended to encompass a military approach within a full range of crisis management tasks to an approach that primarily involves post-conflict peacebuilding. While the EU’s conceptualisation of peacebuilding is based on the UN normative framework, the CSDP has evolved in a direction that reflects the EU’s own foreign policy preferences. The chapter starts with discussing how EU member states have turned their attention away from the UN to EU instruments with the development of the CSDP. After outlining how the EU frames peacebuilding, the discussion then moves on to explore the debates on the role of the EU in peacebuilding by presenting the normative, historical and institutional set-up of peacebuilding activities within the CSDP.

The EU’s turn away from the UN to its own CSDP

Despite the fact that the EU saw its own CSDP as a contribution to UN peace efforts, the creation of the CSDP enhanced the prospects of the EU’s independent actions. The CSDP provided the EU with full autonomy in international conflict management. This autonomy motivated the EU to shift its attention and resources from the UN to its own instrument despite its pledged commitment to the UN. The development of the CSDP logically encouraged the EU to revisit its relationship with the UN as it increased the EU’s independence from the UN in international conflict management (Ojanen 2006a; Tardy 2005). These efforts were strengthened by the EU’s attempt to increase its influence in the UN to a level that corresponds with its economic and political importance, including its share in the UN budget (Ojanen 2006a). Despite the cooperation, both organisations have struggled for their comparative advantages, visibility and identity as international actors. They have developed their own interests and objectives (Gowan 2009a, 52; Tardy 2009, 47).

For these reasons, EU countries prefer to participate in UN-mandated operations rather than in UN-led operations (Ojanen 2006a). Through the Council structures, CSDP actions are subordinated to the member states and not to the UN (Tardy 2005). In contrast to deployments
under the UN command, through the CSDP, the EU can deploy autonomous missions without a UN decision which is also dependent on non-EU states. The rules of engagement for EU missions are less strict than those for UN missions. They are decided by the contributing countries, whereas UN missions are planned and commanded by the UN Secretariat. EU member states govern their missions autonomously. CSDP deployments equip the EU with visibility. In contrast, UN missions exhibit UN signs and UN flag, and not national symbols, including on vehicles, aircraft and uniforms (Battistelli 2015, 25).

With the establishment of the CSDP, the EU states previously active in UN peacekeeping have shifted their attention away from the UN to their own instruments. Nowhere else is this more visible as in EU states’ decision to close down SHIRBRIG after the creation of the EU Battlegroups. Koops noted that, although the Battlegroups were designed to support the UN, the EU reserved the right to decide whether to launch an operation under the UN auspices or an autonomous operation without the UNSC approval. In contrast, SHIRBRIG was a tool exclusively at the disposal of the UN. According to Koops, the creation of the Battlegroups increased the likelihood of undermining the authority of the UN (Koops 2007). Already the first autonomous EU military operation Artemis in the DRC demonstrated the EU’s intention to engage autonomously instead within a UN operation. The EU dismissed the request of the UN to make the capabilities of Artemis available to the UN after the EU’s planned departure. Instead, the EU continued to be present in the DRC (Tardy 2005).

Although the EU is the top contributor to the UN’s general and peacekeeping budgets, European troop contributions to UN peacekeeping have significantly decreased over the last decade.40 While European states were main contributors until the 1990s, their contributions declined sharply after the 1995 termination of UN Protection Force in Bosnia (UNPROFOR). Koops and Terkovitch argued that it were the negative experiences in Rwanda, Somalia and the Western Balkans due to which EU countries shifted their political and military attention to NATO and, from 2003, the CSDP (Koops and Terkovitch 2016, 597). Even states with a strong UN-oriented tradition such as Finland, Sweden and Norway invested more in EU initiatives, or Denmark which increased its engagement in NATO (Ibid., 597).

Looking at institutional autonomy, Eckhard and Dijkstra (2017) have argued that the EU is the least autonomous actor as member states directly control the entire process of a mission, whereas the UN is an independent agent with autonomy on staff discretion, budget and operational dynamics. However, while, in the example of Kosovo, they claimed that the independence of the UN enabled the member states to unilaterally lobby the UN during the implementation to ensure policy outcomes closer to their preferences, they neglected the significant differences between the political importance of UN and EU missions. In Kosovo, the EU mission has allowed EU member states to ensure leverage over the process.

In terms of personnel, EU countries have contributed with less than 10% of the UN troops over the last twenty years. In 1990, Western EU countries dominated the troop contribution, while non-EU, mainly developing countries were increasing their personnel contributions to peacekeeping missions. See table 1 on p. 55 (UN 2014; UN “Troop and Police Contributors Archive”).
Table 1: Top Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Personnel in 2015 and 2012 compared

(Source: UN “Troop and Police Contributors Archive”)
It would be wrong to argue that small numbers cannot make a difference. As Koops and Terkovitch argued, peacekeeping “depends on the type and quality of troops” (2016, 600). Nevertheless, troop contributions “do matter as an important indicator for gauging a country’s concrete commitment to UN peacekeeping” (Ibid.). European contributions to the UN operation in Mali have been coined as an example of a ‘European return’ to UN peacekeeping (Koeps and Smith 2015). Yet, as Koops and Terkovitch note, “one mission on its own cannot serve as a reliable indicator for a systematic ‘return’ nor should it serve as a basis for wider generalizations” (Koops and Terkovitch 2016, 601).

The UN was concerned that the CSDP could have developed to the detriment of the UN peacekeeping needs. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, UN Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping, for example, expressed his concern over a tendency of regional organisations, such as the EU, to get increasingly involved in peacekeeping on their own. He stressed that, if regional organisations acted without respect for the authority of the UN, it could harm the primacy of the organisation: “you have to recognize that there is a unique legitimacy of the United Nations […]. It’s a source of legitimacy that cannot be compared to national affairs or with any other source of legitimacy” (Guéhenno 2002, 495). He emphasised the importance of enhancing the UN’s role and capacity in peacekeeping by calling upon developed countries to be more active in peace operations:

“I think there also have to be the developed countries, which were very much present in peacekeeping in the ’90s, and which had negative experiences in Yugoslavia. They still live on the memory of that negative experience, and I think we have to overcome that. Our reform efforts are designed, in part, to overcome those suspicions. It would be important for the authority of the UN. It’s important for the UN and for the international community that there be greater participation” (Ibid., 500).

To persuade European partners about the vitality of their contributions to UN missions, the UN has promoted inter-organisational initiatives. In 2011, the UN even established the Liaison Office for Peace and Security (UNLOPS) in Brussels to facilitate a dialogue with the EU and NATO (Koops and Tardy 2015; Hummel and Pietz 2015).

Nevertheless, as highlighted by Gowan, EU states not only reduced their manpower contributions to UN operations but also joined the US’s interventions without a UNSC mandate. Yet, Gowan argued that the UN has remained important to European strategies for global stability, especially in Africa where the UN has continued to be the main actor in the areas of conflict management and peace missions (Gowan 2007). Despite existing concerns, scholars have commented that the UN does not see the CSDP as a competitor but as a burden-
sharing partner (Tardy 2009). The UN is less worried about competition but more about the EU’s incapability of providing the required support (Jakobsen 2006).

The EU’s shift towards its own instruments has also affected resources. The more the EU countries use their resources in their own operations, the less these can be provided to the UN (Ojanen 2006a). Resource competition shifted the EU’s support from UN peacekeeping to the EU ‘peacekeeping’ structures (Juergenliemk et al. 2012, 20-21). Nevertheless, the EU still possesses sufficient resources. The UN missions are in need of modern and high-quality technical equipments and vehicles, all of which the EU could provide (Jaques 2014). The UN has not only aimed at increasing the numbers of European troops in UN missions; the emphasis has increasingly been placed on critical resources and high-quality capabilities, such as special vehicles, medical evacuation capacities, force protection, strategic airlift and rapid reaction units, the majority of which were, however, “tied up during the last decade in EU CSDP activities as well as NATO’s ISAF operation” (Koops and Terkovitch 2016, 598).41

The UN-EU relationship in conflict management is also hindered by political and structural tensions. While cooperation is recognised at political levels by both organisations, it comes second in everyday work in institutional settings of the DPKO and the EEAS (Tardy 2009, 52). Novosseloff claimed that, apart from the established formal contacts and desk-to-desk dialogues between the two Secretariats, most recommendations of the UN-EU joint statements have not been implemented. Both organisations are deploying their missions in the same countries but not necessarily coordinating with each other (Novosseloff 2012b). Most EU actions have technically not been deployed in direct support of the UN operations, with the exception of the EU operation in CAR and EU mission in Kosovo (Gowan 2012; Tardy 2005). Gowan noted that the absence of a full EU-UN cooperation is caused by the lack of political will at the Council level (Gowan 2009a).

Interviews with EU officials confirm that cooperation is mutually recognised but constrained by a sense of competition:

“We have an EU-UN action plan agreed. […] One point on the agenda is better coordinated planning. We just have finalised with them a modalities paper on how we want to do this. We are in early stages of fact finding […] It is improving, I would say. This is on paper. It is perfectly agreed. In practice, ... it depends sometimes on personalities and yes, there is always an element of competition, unfortunately” (interview 2).

The sense of competition between the two organisations’ approaches is especially present at the operational level. For example, an EU official compared the effectiveness of the EU and

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41 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was a NATO-led operation in Afghanistan.
UN missions in Mali:

“Look at the case of Mali. It is a mess – what the UN is doing. They have been unable to build the mission. They have been neither successful nor effective. And it is such a large mission. […] our mission is small but effective” (interview 3).

While EEAS and UN departments exchange information between each other, it is the PSC which decides on a substantive CSDP support to UN operations. The Plan of Action (see p. 49 of this thesis) stressed that implementation of cooperation requires an approval from the PSC (Council of the EU 2012a).

While EU and UN missions have many similarities, they also differ in many aspects. The UN has a robust structure to manage its missions which are also larger in terms of their size and personnel. In 2014, the UN deployed more than 97,000 peacekeeping personnel (UN 2014), whereas the number of EU personnel in CSDP missions and operations was around 4,000.42 In addition, the DPKO, the DPA and the PBC employ significantly more staff as the CSDP structure.43 The EU limits itself to small CSDP missions, while other organisations such as the UN, the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are putting far greater numbers of personnel into their missions (Gowan 2012, 2). EU missions are small in size and focused on particular tasks in contrast to large-scale UN missions. They are mostly deployed in countries already pacified to some degree by others. While the decisions to launch UN missions are taken by governments that do not necessarily intend to hazard their own soldiers, the EU has to carefully consider risks and political responsibilities for its deployments (Crane 2012, 188-192).

The establishment of the CSDP has equipped the EU with a great degree of autonomy in international conflict management. This autonomy has encouraged the EU to turn its attention away from the UN to its own CSDP. This EU’s focus on its own approaches reflects a shift in the world affairs from a system in which the UNSC has had the primary responsibility over the matters of international peace and security to one in which other states are increasingly interested in having a greater share of this responsibility. Peacebuilding, which does not necessarily require the deployment of combat forces, enables states such as EU countries to enhance their role in the maintenance of international peace and security (Kmec 2017). Consequently, this EU’s shift, by and large, influences its understanding of peacebuilding.

42 The number of the CSDP personnel is inaccurate due to flexible deployments in Somalia (EEAS 2014).
43 For instance, the DPKO that manages peacekeeping operations has almost 490 professional employees in the UN HQ and over 20,000 staff in its field operations, which excludes contributions by member states (UN General Assembly 2016).
The EU’s puzzling understandings of peacebuilding

The term peacebuilding has found its way into the EU’s lexicon, though it remains ill-defined and often confused with conflict prevention and crisis management (Duke and Courtier 2010). CSDP missions and operations have been increasingly highlighted as examples of peacebuilding (K.E. Smith, 2008; Blockmans, Wouters and Ruys 2010; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2005a; 2005b; 2006) and state-building (Stewart 2011) by many scholars. Duke and Courtier argued that the CSDP peacebuilding activities fit “nicely into the UN thinking on the implementation of post-conflict peacebuilding” (Duke and Courtier 2010, 28). Similarly as UN missions, CSDP peacebuilding actions support the stabilisation, reform or building of state structures. Referring to Richmond’s categorisation of four peacebuilding approaches, Richmond, Björkdahl, and Kappler argued that, although a fourth-generation peacebuilding has not yet fully evolved, EU peacebuilding has a potential to develop into such an approach due to the EU’s ability to bridge the international, national and grass-roots levels. Yet, they claim that EU peacebuilding in the CSDP, continues to reflect the third-generation category as it focuses on the stabilisation of state institutions (2011).

At the same time, CSDP continues to be framed under crisis management despite the fact that most CSDP actions carry out peacebuilding tasks. K.E. Smith argued even in 2008 that the term crisis management has been used for activities which “should [...] be more properly termed conflict prevention or peacebuilding, as in its ubiquitous use to describe all ESDP missions” (K.E. Smith 2008, 180). For her, the terminology of crisis management and CSDP did not reflect the reality of the EU’s engagement. CSDP operations/missions have been of peacebuilding and conflict prevention character rather than of peace-enforcement or peacekeeping character (Ibid., 180-181). According to scholars, this confusion of definitions could hamper the EU’s coordination with other international organisations, as there are no equivalents to the term crisis management in the UN, the OSCE or other organisations (K.E. Smith 2008, 181; Nowak 2006c, 17-18; Stewart 2011; Gross and Juncos 2011c).

This terminological confusion has its roots in the division of labour between the Commission and the Council with regard to international peace, especially under the pillar system which provided for the division of competences from 1993 to 2009. The Commission has seen its role in long-term conflict prevention and development, while leaving short-term crisis management to the Council (Gross and Juncos 2011c; Stewart 2011, 34). Peacebuilding, such as economic development and reconstruction, had a long history in the first Community

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44 Many scholars have noted that the definition of concepts used by the EU to address conflicts is notoriously problematic and elusive (Duke and Ojanen 2006; K.E. Smith 2008, Gross and Juncos 2011c).
pillar. Since 2003, peacebuilding has also significantly increased within the CSDP (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, 216–218). Stewart observed that EU conflict prevention, under which she also understands peacebuilding, shifted away from development to CSDP as CSDP actions became increasingly tasked with conflict prevention and peacebuilding rather than the management of open conflicts (2011). Peacebuilding has become an important part of the Council’s crisis management in addition to Commission’s activities.

At the same time, the EU also developed short-term conflict prevention instruments under the first pillar. The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and the Instrument for Stability (IfS)\(^\text{45}\) have supported peacebuilding activities in the areas of public administration, institution building, DDR, democracy building, and the promotion of human rights and the rule of law (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, 220). The EU also extended the Justice and Home Affairs pillar into external instruments for the crisis management and conflict prevention, especially the tasks related to the rule of law and the fight against terrorism (Kurowska and Seitz 2011; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, 220).

Before the launch of the CSDP, the Commission’s *Communication on the EU and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa: Peace-Building, Conflict Prevention and Beyond* (European Commission 1996) identified peacebuilding as the best approach to respond to the rise of intrastate conflicts in Africa. It referred to the inability of UN peacekeeping and humanitarian aid to ensure sustainable peace. The Communication understood peacebuilding in a comprehensive way by stressing the interrelationship between security, peace, development, justice and democracy. It determined peacebuilding as a measure suitable to three phases of conflict. 1) Peacebuilding in situations without a potential for conflict can include capacity-building, development, democracy-building, good governance, civil society and institution-building. 2) In situations of tension, peacebuilding can focus on political dialogue, sanctions, observation and humanitarian aid. 3) Peacebuilding in post-conflict situations includes DDR, de-mining, humanitarian relief, political dialogue, conflict resolution, and the establishment of viable governmental, political and socio-economic structures. Although understanding peacebuilding as a policy applicable to all the stages, the Communication already sensed that peacebuilding would be best suited to the post-conflict phase:

> “Activities of conflict prevention in a wider sense should be summarised under the term peace-building. Defined as such, a policy of conflict prevention would apply mainly in a situation of tension […]. Peace-building measures, by contrast, could apply in all phases of conflict and peace. However, as peace-building measures will generally embrace projects and programmes with the

\(^{45}\) IfS was succeeded by the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) in 2014.
longer-term aim of the stabilisation of societies, their impact will be greatest in non-violent situations” (European Commission 1996, part III).

The formulation of peacebuilding in post-conflict situations in this Communication resembles Boutrous-Ghali’s definition of peacebuilding (see p. 31 and 33 of this thesis).

The Communication was a response to Council Conclusions on the Role of Development Cooperation in Strengthening Peace-Building, Conflict Prevention and Resolution (Council of the EU 1995). The Conclusions focused on situations of open war and an imminent outbreak of violence, in which the EU’s contribution could take the forms of early warning, diplomacy and peacekeeping, including through the WEU (Ibid.). In contrast, the Commission’s Communication suggested that the EU should move beyond early warning, preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping by foregrounding peacebuilding as the most suitable approach to tackle conflicts.

The 2001 Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention put peacebuilding under the overall measure of conflict prevention. It described conflict prevention as both short-term and long-term measures, covering the stages before and after the outbreak of conflicts (European Commission 2001). The Communication stressed that the Commission “is closely following the implementation of the Brahimi Report and fully subscribes to the peace-building approach set out in the Report” (Ibid., 26). Gross and Juncos correctly noticed that only one aspect of a conflict cycle is missing in this Commission’s definition, namely the management of open conflicts. By excluding the activities of crisis management, the Commission demarcated clear lines between the responsibilities of the two organs (Gross and Juncos 2011c, 5). The exclusion of this phase is striking given the fact that the Communication from 1996 referred to measures in an open conflict.47

In contrast to the Commission, the Council saw its responsibility in the area of crisis management, primarily through the CSDP. The Council’s EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts (2001d) attempted to bring the understanding of respective actions closer to that of the Commission. It distinguished between long-term and short-term actions to prevent conflicts. It referred to long-term conflict prevention as activities that address root

46 Also titled as Preventive Diplomacy, Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa.
47 Between 2003 and 2011, scholarly and EU documents referred to the Commission’s distinctive definitions of peacebuilding, conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution outlined on the website of the Commission’s Directorate-General (DG) Development and Relations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP). After the 2011 restructuring to DG for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), the link ceased to exist. In this source, peacebuilding was defined as “actions undertaken over the medium and longer term to address root causes of violent conflicts in a targeted manner”; conflict prevention as “actions undertaken over the short term to reduce manifest tensions and/or to prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict”; conflict management as actions “to prevent the vertical or horizontal escalation of existing violent conflict”; and conflict resolution as “actions undertaken over the short term to end violent conflict” (in K.E. Smith 2008, 170; Bayne 2003, 19).
causes of conflicts and include “development co-operation, trade, arms control, human rights and environment policies as well as political dialogue” (Council of the EU 2001d, para. 11). Short-term prevention actions range from “diplomatic and humanitarian instruments for short-term prevention” to “structures and capabilities for civil and military crisis management, developed within the framework of the ESDP” (Ibid.). According to the Programme, CSDP missions and operations are instruments the aim of which is “to strengthen the EU’s capacity for action in the crucial field of conflict prevention” (Ibid., 2 para. 3).

As the previous chapter already noted, the ESS does not include any reference to the term peacebuilding. Nonetheless, it contains references that reflect general principles of peacebuilding. The Strategy identified five major threats to European security, including the threat posed by regional conflicts and failed states. It emphasised the need to tackle these challenges in a comprehensive way:

“In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations” (Council of the EU 2003c, 7).

The Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy directly referred to the need for peacebuilding to tackle root causes of conflicts before they break out with the use of a comprehensive approach, including the CSDP (2008).

However, the lack of a comprehensive approach to peacebuilding within the EU has added to the terminological confusion around peacebuilding. The EU has not developed a strategy specifically dedicated to peacebuilding, which has been acknowledged by the EEAS:

“if the EU is to play a role as an actor in international peacebuilding, a peacebuilding strategy should be set up. Such a strategy would seek to overcome both the conceptual diversity and the institutional fragmentation in view of coordinating the diverse instruments, providing for the appropriate resources and capabilities” (DG for External Policies 2010, 1).

EU peacebuilding consists of distinct activities carried out by different bodies. The CSDP stands for EU missions and operations. The Commission promotes democratisation and development. The HR/VP and the EUSRs are responsible for diplomatic and mediation tasks (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, 218; Richmond, Björkdahl, and Kappler 2011, 457). Nevertheless, Gross and Juncos have observed that, although the distinction between conflict
prevention and crisis management was sketched out in different EU documents, developments in practice have blurred it. With the rapid institutional and operational developments, crisis management and conflict prevention, as well as long- and short-term approaches have become treated jointly (Gross and Juncos 2011c, 4-5). Similarly, Blockmans observed that, while these definitions are terminologically distinguished in Articles 17(2), and 43(1) of the TEU, the dividing lines between different categories are in practice blurred (Blockmans 2008a).

The Treaty of Lisbon brought more coherence in policies and structures dealing with conflict prevention and crisis management. It included conflict prevention under the Petersberg Tasks (TEU, Art. 43). The Treaty refers to CSDP actions as “crisis management operations” (TEU, Art. 38). It does not use the term peacebuilding. However, “military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks” and “post-conflict stabilisation” fall under the category of peacebuilding. The concept of peacebuilding has also been mainstreamed in the EEAS working culture since the adoption of the Treaty. The idea of peacebuilding was particularly promoted by the former HR/VP Catherine Ashton who was strongly passionate about it and was pushing for its integration in the CSDP (interview 18).

The 2011 Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention emphasised the role of “long-term structural conflict prevention” in complementing “shorter term crisis management and peace support operations” (Council of the EU 2011d, 1). The document made a distinction between “prevention of conflicts” and “prevention of relapses into conflict” (Ibid.) with the latter standing for peacebuilding. With the creation of the EEAS, conflict prevention instruments previously situated in the Commission and crisis management tools previously located within the Council were merged into one structure.

Despite the many attempts to harmonise concepts, policies and institutions, the EU’s terminology related to instruments dealing with international peace and security remains confusing. Nevertheless, this confusion does not diminish the EU’s role in international peacebuilding through the CSDP. Despite the absence of the term ‘peacebuilding’ in the Lisbon Treaty, the mandates of CSDP actions, as well as the working culture of the CSDP directorates, EU missions and operations carry out a wide range of peacebuilding tasks. As the following chapters demonstrate, these tasks are spelled out directly rather than being framed under a single term of peacebuilding. Policymakers and practitioners focus more on the content of particular actions rather than the use of concepts and theoretical frameworks. At the same time, bringing the EU terminology in the line with internationally agreed concepts in the area of peace and security could prove beneficial for the EU and other actors.
EU peacebuilding and the evolution of the CSDP

The evolution of the EU’s autonomous approach to peacebuilding can be traced within the development of the CSDP itself. The forming of the CSDP reflects an attempt by the EU to gain independence in international conflict management from other actors, in particular NATO and the UN. Not only has the EU’s approach to peacebuilding been shaped by the particularities of the CSDP, but it has also impacted on the development of the CSDP itself. The CSDP emerged in a series of reactions to historical events rather than on the grounds of a planned design (Howorth 2014, 22-23; Petrov 2011, 49). It was built on its predecessors: the WEU and the European Political Cooperation (EPC)/ CFSP. These frameworks were designed to handle mutual self-defence of the Community rather than conflicts abroad (M.E. Smith 2004; K.E. Smith 2008; Petrov 2011; Hill 1992).

The ESDP was envisioned as an EU’s autonomous instrument for international military crisis management and peacekeeping rather than peacebuilding. In 1992, the Petersberg Declaration opened the way for the WEU to engage in military activities abroad. These activities, framed as Petersberg Tasks, included: “humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking” (Petersberg Declaration 1992, Art. II.4). WEU states agreed “to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks” (Ibid., Art. II.2). During this time, changes also took place within the European Community with the establishment of the CFSP in 1993 that superseded the EPC. While the CFSP remained intergovernmental, the Maastricht Treaty granted the Commission a right of initiative in the CFSP and envisioned further development of the CFSP which “shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy” (Maastricht Treaty 1992, Art. J.4; see also Edwards 1994). The Petersberg Tasks were incorporated into the TEU through the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997, Art. 17).

The wars in the Balkans accelerated the development of EU’s own arrangements for international crisis management (Petrov 2011). At a summit in Saint-Malo in 1998, the representatives of France and Great Britain declared that the EU “must have the capacity for

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48 For a detailed overview of the evolution of the CSDP, see Howorth (2014) and Petrov (2011).
49 Established in 1954, in the aftermath of the collapse of the European Defence Community, the WEU sought to safeguard the post-WWII recovery in Europe and mutual assistance in resisting any aggression. The EPC, established in 1970, coordinated foreign policy of the European Community through regularised meetings of officials and ministers. It was not part of the institutions of the Community (Tonra 2001).
50 The Petersberg Declaration was adopted during a ministerial summit of the Council of the WEU at Petersberg, the former Seat of Allied High Commission, in June 1992.
51 In the Petersberg Tasks, peacemaking means peace-enforcement. In contrast, in academic literature and UN vocabulary, peacemaking stands for mediation and conflict resolution (Tardy 2015a, 23). The term ‘peacemaking’ was considered by the WEU more sensitive than ‘peace-enforcement’ (EEAS 2016f).
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO’’ (Joint Declaration para. 1 and 2). This Franco-British agreement laid down a political path for a future CSDP (Keukeleire 2010; K.E. Smith 2008). Petrov argued that the results from Saint-Malo coincided with the growing popularity of the concepts of humanitarian intervention and conflict prevention. EU member states favoured the development of conflict prevention capabilities rather than a European army (Petrov 2011).

In 1999, the European Council at its summit in Cologne declared that the EU should be able to undertake Petersberg Tasks independently by replacing the WEU. The term crisis management was formally introduced to frame the EU’s reactive actions. The Council decided to establish an ESDP as a policy on conflict prevention and crisis management within the CFSP (K.E. Smith 2008; Keukeleire 2010; Gross and Juncos 2011c; Petrov 2011). The Helsinki Summit in 1999 reaffirmed the decisions from Cologne and agreed to create the ESDP and a Rapid Reaction Force for military crisis intervention. The summit set specific headline goals, including that by 2003, the EU should be able to deploy Rapid Reaction Forces of upto 60,000 troops within a period of 60 days capable of delivering the Petersberg Tasks. The summit agreed to establish structures to coordinate the ESDP – the PSC, the EUMC and the EUMS (K.E. Smith 2008). As argued by Howorth, European leaders were certain “that Europe, if it were ever to become a significant global actor in its own right, would need its own institutional framework, centrally located in a European capital city” (Howorth 2013, 16). The creation of central structures responsible for CSDP decision- and policy-making, coordination, oversight and implementation has led to “ever greater delegation of authority and responsibility away from the member states and towards the central institutions of the EU” (Ibid., 17). This ‘Brusselsization’ has enhanced the autonomous character the EU as an actor in international conflict management through its CSDP.

The Petersberg Tasks were designed for military crisis management similar to those of NATO and the first-generation of UN peacekeeping. Nevertheless, Sweden and Finland were in favour of civilian crisis management. Under their influence, the European Council in Santa Maria de Feira in 2000 agreed on the civilian dimension of the ESDP and set up a Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. The Council defined four priority areas in the civilian crisis management, namely police, rule of law, civil administration and civilian protection. In contrast to the Petersberg Tasks, these tools were designed to address peacebuilding rather than the management of ongoing crises (Freire and Galantino 2015, 4). The Council set concrete targets of generating 5,000 police officers by 2003, out of which
1,000 should be deployable in 30 days. A year later, the target also included 200 rule-of-law experts, a pool of civilian administration experts and up to 200 civilian protection personnel (Shepherd 2012). The Council also finalised the conceptual background of the ESDP and opened the way for its formalisation (Petrov 2011). The tasks of the Rapid Reaction Force were extended into humanitarian aid, rescue services, mine clearance, DDR, support for democratisation, monitoring of elections and human rights, and conflict mediation (Debiel and Fischer 2000, 17). This extension has coincided with and reflected the reform process of UN peacekeeping operations initiated by the Brahimi Report (see chapter two).

The ESDP was formally established as a policy for both conflict prevention and crisis management by the Treaty of Nice in 2003. The establishment of the CSDP for the purposes of both conflict prevention and crisis management tasks emphasises the comprehensive and all-inclusive character of this instrument. In other words, the aim of the CSDP is not only to manage open crises but also to support efforts and establish conditions that will prevent conflicts. The reference to both conflict prevention and crisis management in the founding treaties allowed for the inclusion of peacebuilding tasks.

With the establishment of the CSDP in 2003, the EU took over the role of the WEU in crisis management. The PSC, the EUMC and the EUMS were officially established as the institutional basis for the ESDP. In the same year, the EU launched its first missions (Petrov 2011; de Zwaan 2008). The launch of the CSDP coincided with the ESS which prepared a normative ground for this new instrument. The ESS represented a positive commitment of the EU to global engagement (Cooper 2003; Biscop 2005a). The CSDP, with its institutional arrangements, strengthened the EU’s actorness in international peace efforts. It provided the EU with an autonomous instrument to carry out independent peace missions.

The peacebuilding character of the CSDP was strengthened with the extension of the scope of civilian crisis management in the 2008 Civilian Headline Goal into integrated crisis management, monitoring missions, support for the EUSRs, and SSR/DDR programmes. The aim of this headline goal was to “[integrate] multifunctional resources, [to improve] the connection of conflict prevention and crisis management (…), [and to create] synergies [and better dialogue] between development cooperation and civilian crisis management experts” (Politico-Military Group 2005, 121–128). The Headline Goal called for the deployment of integrated civilian crisis management missions and for a coherence of the CSDP with long-term Community programmes (Council of the EU 2004c). The 2010 Civilian Headline Goal re-emphasised civil-military cooperation, readiness and employability. It identified the need for additional experts on transitional justice and conflict analysis, and the creation of Civilian
Response Teams, a pool of experts prepared for rapid deployment (Council of the EU 2007c). Developments took place also in the area of military goals; the 2010 Headline Goal called for a more coherence in deployments. It also adopted the EU Battlegroups concept with an aim of generating 1,500 reaction forces deployable within ten days (Council of the EU 2004d). These Headline Goals fostered the shift in the CSDP from classical military tasks to peacebuilding.

The shift towards peacebuilding and a comprehensive list of peace operations are reflected in the expansion of the Petersberg Tasks in the Lisbon Treaty. In addition to the three initial tasks, further tasks were added. The expanded list includes “joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation” (TEU Art. 43(1)). This expansion reflects the shift from traditional peacekeeping to comprehensive peace operations with peacebuilding components. However, the EU has not fully utilised these tasks. Despite encompassing also crisis management tasks to tackle open conflict, the CSDP comprises mainly post-conflict peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions (Missiroli 2015). As King noted, although the expanded “Petersberg tasks theoretically included potentially robust forms of engagement, they quickly became associated with softer forms of intervention, and indeed, these were the only missions to which the EU would commit itself” (King 2015, 256). EU operations have “been small-scale, relatively begin militarily and strategically peripheral” (Ibid., 261). The extensive focus on post-conflict peacebuilding and civilian crisis management rather than the management of open conflict has impacted on the perception of the EU’s international role.

Types of CSDP operations and missions

The objective of the EU’s international action is to “promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth” (TEU Art. 3(5)). For the purposes of preserving peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security, the EU shall pursue common policies and actions (TEU Art. 21(2)). The CSDP was designed for these purposes - as a policy for international conflict management, the ultimate aim of which is to protect the EU’s security (Biscop and Withman 2013a; Ginsberg and Penska 2012; Pohl 2014). The CSDP therefore intersects the security of the EU and external security, which, according to Biscop and

52 The Treaty of Lisbon has enhanced consistency in the ESDP by creating the EEAS under the authority of the HR/VP. The post of the HR/VP was created by merging the office of the High Representative for the CFSP and European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy.
Whitman (2013a), is best depicted in the title of the 2003 ESS ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’. They argue that the aim of the CSDP is “to safeguard European security by improving global security” (Ibid., 1). Nevertheless, in contrast to what the name ‘CSDP’ might indicate, the CSDP is not about the territorial defence of the EU; it stands for peace missions deployed outside the EU (Howorth 2014; Keukeleire 2010, 61; Mérand 2008, 3-5; Tardy 2015a).

The Petersberg Tasks, as expanded by the Lisbon Treaty, represent different peace missions that reflect the stages of international engagement in a conflict - from the time before the outbreak of a conflict to post-conflict reconstruction. The Treaty adds that “[a]ll these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories” (TEU Art. 43(1)). The Treaty distinctly formulated the function of the CSDP as providing the EU with an “operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets” that can be used on “missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter” (Ibid. Art. 42(1)).

In practice, the Petersberg Tasks are difficult to translate into particular missions. The mandates of missions rarely or ever refer to these tasks. Instead, they refer to actual objectives of missions. The EU refers to its CSDP actions as civilian missions and military operations usually bearing in their name their specific tasks. In particular, civilian missions include European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM), European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM), European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX and EUJUST), European Union Police Mission (EUPM and EUPOL), European Union Police Advisory Team (EUPAT), European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP), European Union Aviation Security Mission (EUAVSEC), European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) and European Union Security Sector Reform Mission (EU SSR and EUSEC). Military operations include European Union Force (EUFOR), European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR), European Union Military Advisory Mission (EUMAM) and European Union Training Mission (EUTM). EU missions should be understood in the sense of their purpose, i.e. what they actually do. They stand for peace missions (Howorth 2014, 144; Freire and Galantino 2015), or peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions (Tardy 2015a). As a result, the CSDP covers a range of different tools that the EU can use at its disposal to respond to any aspect of a conflict at any stage.

Scholars use different categories to depict particular CSDP missions and operations. Howorth distinguished between a) military, b) military training, c) police, d) rule of law, e) support and assistance, f) monitoring and g) border assistance missions (Howorth 2014, 144-
Building on these categorisations, I organise the CSDP missions/operations according to the stages of the conflict cycle while taking into account at what stage of the conflict they are deployed, in particular as peacekeeping, peacebuilding or peace-enforcement actions. CSDP missions/operations cover different aspects of international assistance in a conflict from its outbreak to post-conflict stabilisation. Missions with tasks such as capacity-building for and reform of police/ army sectors, the development of rule of law structures, and all other tasks aimed at the reform, reconstruction, and building of state structures were framed as peacebuilding. Peacekeeping refers to operations mandated with the maintenance of the safe and secure environment. Operations mandated to use combat forces are framed as peace-enforcement. This categorisation helps us to refer to EU missions and operations with the use of terms such as peacekeeping and peacebuilding, thus bringing them closer to the UN terminology. It also allows us to understand the nature and purposes of the missions.

As of July 2017, the EU has launched 34 CSDP missions and operations: there were fifteen ongoing and nineteen completed actions. Civilian missions – nine ongoing and thirteen completed (including civil-military missions) – are in the majority as there have been only twelve military operations. Table 2 (p. 70) provides an overview of ongoing and completed missions and operations. A considerable number of EU missions/operations has been deployed to post-conflict situations. More than two thirds of missions and operation (27) have contained peacebuilding tasks. They include missions such as EUAVSEC in South Sudan, EUMM in Georgia and EULEX Kosovo. Military missions such as EUFOR Althea in BiH, EUTM in Somalia and EUTM Mali have also included peacebuilding tasks. These actions address structural causes of conflicts by rebuilding and reforming state institutions.

Peacebuilding and peacekeeping overlap in some cases such as EUFOR Althea in BiH. While some actions were deployed to countries with ongoing conflicts, their mandate was responding to a previous conflict. For example, the EU mission in Ukraine has responded to the Maidan Revolution and not to the ongoing conflict in the east. It is tasked with the reform and rebuilding of the country’s civilian security sector (Council of the EU 2014d). Operations in CAR and Afghanistan were deployed to post-conflict situations. Despite the fact that violence broke out again in these countries, their mandates were not changed to address the new situation. In the early years of the existence of the CSDP, the EU was more active in deploying to ongoing conflict situations in a peacekeeping capacity. Recent deployments have been mainly of peacebuilding nature and in post-conflict situations.

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53 Other scholars use similar or slightly amended categorisations (see Grevi et al. 2009; Tardy 2015a).
54 This number excludes a new planned civilian CSDP mission in Iraq to support post-conflict the stabilisation and civilian SSR, established by the Council on 19 July 2017 (Council of the EU 2017c).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission type</th>
<th>Mission name, country</th>
<th>Mission mandate</th>
<th>Stage of the conflict at the deployment</th>
<th>Scope of the mission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military operations</td>
<td>EUFOR Althea BiH</td>
<td>Executive: monitor the peace agreement and maintain security; Non-executive: train military forces and advise the Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>Post-conflict</td>
<td>Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUTM Somalia Somalia (and Uganda)</td>
<td>Security sector development and training of Somali soldiers</td>
<td>Post-conflict</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUNAVFOR Somalia known as Operation Atalanta</td>
<td>Executive: protect vessels of the WFP and other ships, and deter and disrupt piracy off the coast of Somalia</td>
<td>Ongoing crisis</td>
<td>Peacekeeping/Peace-enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUTM Mali Mali</td>
<td>SSR, DDR and training of military forces</td>
<td>Post-conflict</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European Union Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED) known as Operation Sophia</td>
<td>Executive: capture vessels and enabling assets used by migrant smugglers and traffickers Non-executive: capacity-building and training of the Libyan Coastguard &amp; Navy</td>
<td>Ongoing crisis</td>
<td>Peacekeeping/Peace-enforcement/Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUTM RCA CAR</td>
<td>SSR, training of military forces</td>
<td>Post-conflict/recurrence of violence</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

55 This categorisation is based on the analysis and coding of the tasks of the mandates of the CSDP missions and operations contained in Council decisions for each mission/operation. Howorth and other scholars consider the EUMM in Former Yugoslavia, EU Special Representative Border Support Team (EUSR BST) in Georgia, European Union Planning Team (EUPT) for Kosovo, and the European Union Naval Coordination Cell (EU NAVCO) in Somalia as CSDP missions. The last two actions were operated directly by the General Secretariat of the Council and preceded an actual CSDP mission/operation (EU Council Secretariat 2007a; 2008). EUSR BST was part of the structure of the EUSR for South Caucasus (EU Council Secretariat 2007b). The EUMM in former Yugoslavia is often considered as the first ever CSDP mission as former SG/HR Solana referred to it as the pioneering EU mission (EU Council Secretariat 2007c). However, the EUMM was launched in 2001, before the operationalisation of the CSDP. It was coordinated by the SG/HR and never included into the CSDP. EUMM succeeded the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), which had operated in the Western Balkans from 1991 until the end of 2000. It was closed in December 2007. Due to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the mission operated in different countries. In the last year of its operation, EUMM operated in BiH, FYROM, Montenegro and Serbia. The mission was also active in Albania, Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary and Bulgaria (EU Council Secretariat 2007c). European Administration of Mostar (EUAM) was another important non-CSDP mission between 1993 and 1996 (Juncos 2013, 99-101). EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine is often listed as a CSDP missions. Nevertheless, the mission is managed by the Commission and not the CSDP structures. In addition, the EU military operation in support of humanitarian assistance operations in Libya (EUFOR Libya) was established but never launched (Council of the EU 2011c). For an overview of different aspects of civilian and military operations, see Howorth 2014, 144-187; Keukeleire 2010; Shepherd 2012; Duke 2008; Tardy 2015a).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Mission name, country</th>
<th>Mandate</th>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Scope</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civilian missions</strong></td>
<td>EUBAM Rafah, Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>Monitor and assist with border crossing (related to the Agreement on Movement and Access between Israel and the Palestinian Authorities from 2005)</td>
<td>Post-conflict</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU Police Mission for the Gaza Strip (EUPOL COPPS) Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>Establish police, criminal justice and rule of law apparatus (including training and advice)</td>
<td>Post-conflict</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUMM Georgia, Georgia</td>
<td>Monitor the peace agreement (including advice to state authorities)</td>
<td>Post-conflict</td>
<td>Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EULEX Kosovo, Kosovo</td>
<td>Executive: adjudicate and prosecute constitutional, civil and criminal cases; Non-executive: reform of the rule of law and the justice system</td>
<td>Post-conflict</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUROPOL COPPS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUCAP Sahel Niger, Niger</td>
<td>SSR, including training to police and security forces</td>
<td>Post-conflict</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUCAP Nestor, Horn of Africa (Somalia, Djibouti, the Seychelles and Tanzania)</td>
<td>Regional maritime capacity building</td>
<td>Post-crisis/</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUBAM Libya, Tunis</td>
<td>Support the Libyan authorities in improving and developing the security of borders</td>
<td>Post-conflict</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUAM Ukraine, Ukraine</td>
<td>Civilian SSR – advise and train agencies responsible for law enforcement and rule of law</td>
<td>Post-conflict</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUCAPEU FOR Artemis/DRC, DRC</td>
<td>Civilian protection, stabilisation of the security, humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>Continuing humanitarian crisis</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUFOR Concordia, FYROM</td>
<td>Post-conflict stabilisation</td>
<td>Post-conflict</td>
<td>Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUFOR DR Congo, DRC</td>
<td>Support MONUC during elections</td>
<td>Post-conflict</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUFOR Chad/ RCA, Chad, RCA</td>
<td>Protect civilians, refugees and humanitarian staff; facilitate humanitarian aid</td>
<td>Continuing conflict</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Completed**

<p>| Military               | EUFOR Artemis/DRC, DRC | Civilian protection, stabilisation of the security, humanitarian assistance | Continuing humanitarian crisis | Peacekeeping |
|                       | EUFOR Concordia, FYROM  | Post-conflict stabilisation                                               | Post-conflict              | Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding |
|                       | EUFOR DR Congo, DRC     | Support MONUC during elections                                            | Post-conflict              | Peacekeeping               |
|                       | EUFOR Chad/ RCA, Chad, RCA | Protect civilians, refugees and humanitarian staff; facilitate humanitarian aid | Continuing conflict        | Peacekeeping               |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Type</strong></th>
<th><strong>Mission name, country</strong></th>
<th><strong>Mandate</strong></th>
<th><strong>Stage</strong></th>
<th><strong>Scope</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>EUFOR RCA CAR</td>
<td>Stabilise security, protect civilians, facilitate humanitarian aid</td>
<td>Continuing conflict</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>EUMAM RCA CAR</td>
<td>Preparation for SSR (advise state authorities)</td>
<td>Continuing conflict</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>EUPM BiH BiH</td>
<td>Establish a functioning police sector</td>
<td>Post-conflict</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>EUPOL Proxima FYROM</td>
<td>Monitor, mentor and advise police</td>
<td>Post-conflict</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>EUPOL Afghanistan FYROM</td>
<td>Rule of law and SSR; train police forces</td>
<td>Post-conflict</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>EUPAT FYROM FYROM</td>
<td>Develop a police service</td>
<td>Post-conflict</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>EUIJUST Themis Georgia</td>
<td>Rule of law reform: mentor and advise Ministers, officials and relevant bodies at the governmental level</td>
<td>Post-conflict</td>
<td>Peacebuilding (refers to the revolution in 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>EUIJUST LEX Iraq</td>
<td>Rule of law reform: establish a criminal justice system; train and advise authorities</td>
<td>Post-conflict</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>EUPOL Kinshasa DRC</td>
<td>Mentor, advise and train a police unit</td>
<td>Post-conflict</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>EUPOL RD Congo DRC</td>
<td>SSR in the fields of policing and the justice system</td>
<td>Post-conflict</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), Aceh/Indonesia</td>
<td>Monitor the peace agreement</td>
<td>Post-conflict</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>EUAVSEC South Sudan</td>
<td>Train, mentor and advise security services on aviation security</td>
<td>Post-conflict</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil-military</td>
<td>European Union Support Mission to AMIS Darfur/Sudan</td>
<td>Financial, personnel and political support to peace talks; technical and training support to African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)</td>
<td>Post-conflict</td>
<td>Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian missions, extended into military aspects</td>
<td>EU SSR Guinea Bissau Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>SSR, capacity-building, training, advice (police, army, naval forces, air forces, prosecution services)</td>
<td>Post-conflict</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian missions, extended into military aspects</td>
<td>EUSEC RD Congo DRC</td>
<td>SSR: reform of the army</td>
<td>Post-conflict</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Military operations address security issues and use military capabilities. One group of military operations, which are of a peacekeeping nature, tackle the immediate consequences of conflict. These missions can be mandated to monitor peace agreements, protect civilians, ensure security and assist with humanitarian tasks. They can be authorised to use force. Peacekeeping operations, such as Artemis in the DRC in 2003 and EUFOR in the DRC in 2006, were deployed to stabilise the situation before the arrival of the UN troops and UN election observers. The current operations Atalanta and Sophia are the only two operations that can be categorised under ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks’ and/or ‘tasks of combat forces in crisis management’. Nevertheless, even these operations are not typical military interventions as they are not intended for combat purposes in war. The use of direct fighting in both operations is minimal and casualties unlikely (Tardy 2015a). Military operations with peacebuilding tasks address structural causes of conflict by focusing on the capacity-development (training) of military forces, the reform of the military sector, and mentoring and advisory functions. Some operations have combined peacekeeping and peacebuilding tasks such as DDR, humanitarian relief, assisting with the return of refugees and IDPs. Tardy noted that military operations are seldom the final solution to the conflict. Their aim is to create a platform for a political settlement (Ibid., 23).

Civilian missions deploy civilian (non-military) personnel from civilian institutions of EU member states and address issues of non-military character, such as monitoring the political and security situation, policing, assisting with humanitarian aid, public administration, the reconstruction and setting up of institutions, providing legal protection, strengthening and reforming the rule of law and justice, border assistance, and police and the SSR. Civilian capabilities are deployed to train police personnel, judges, custom officers and prosecutors; to provide expertise in policy-making and legal advice; to monitor the reform processes and peace agreements; and to stabilise and reconstruct state institutions of justice, rule of law, border management and security sector. According to Tardy, civilian missions correspond to the ‘military advice and assistance tasks’, or ‘conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks’ enshrined in Art. 43 of the TEU (Ibid., 23). The vast majority of these missions are deployed in post-conflict scenarios. The 2008 and 2010 civilian headline goals outlined an ambition to develop capabilities with regard to policing, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection. The goal was to provide a pool of 6,000 policemen, a couple of thousand judges, civil servants and other experts at the disposal of civilian missions.

Civilian missions by far outnumber military operations. The transformation from an initially military-driven focus to civilian one also includes the shift from military operations
with combat forces to military training and reform of defence sectors. According to Shepherd, this has also been driven by the 2003 ESS which outlined new threats and emphasised that these complex threats could not be tackled by purely military means. The EU has understood that the CSDP should be used in a coherent manner, alongside political, diplomatic, development, trade and economic instruments. To enhance the coherence of the EU external action in conflict situations, the EEAS and the Commission published a *Joint Communication on the Comprehensive Approach to External Conflict and Crises* (European Commission 2013). The Communication proposed the adoption of a common strategic vision for conflict situations, mobilising resources, ensuring long-term commitment in peacebuilding, and linking internal and external policy areas. In practice, this means that missions and operations should work in cooperation with EU Delegations, EUSRs, EU regional policies (such as European Neighbourhood Policy [ENP] or the Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel) as well as member states’ embassies.

In line with the comprehensive approach, the EU intended to launch integrated civil-military missions (Council of the EU March 2011e). Civil-military coordination (CMCO) has become the key framework to represent these efforts. The CMCO “covers internal EU coordination of the EU’s own civil and military crisis management instruments, executed under the responsibility of the Council” (Council of the EU 2009c, 6). It represents an attempt to coordinate the EU’s response to a crisis in an integrated manner. Some scholars have emphasised the importance of CMCO within the CSDP as a necessary element of successfully addressing the complexities of post-conflict environments (de Coning 2008; Stewart 2011; Rietjens and Bollen 2013). Other scholars, such as K.E. Smith, viewed the combination of civilian and military instruments as dangerous, with the military component potentially taking over the civilian component (2008). In practical terms, this coordination means creating integrated peace missions with a use of civilian or military capabilities; a synergy in training for personnel; the sharing of tools, logistical support and spaces; and combined procedures to compile lessons learned (Council of the EU 2009c; 2011e; EEAS 2011b). Although the EU called for integrated civil-military missions, deployments with combined civilian and military elements have not been launched except the EU Support Mission to AMIS.

Despite the absence of integrated civil-military missions, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) exists between EU military forces and civil-based actors. In countries, such as BiH, the DRC, Mali and Somalia, both civilian missions and military operations have been deployed simultaneously or consecutively. Some civilian missions, such as EU SSR Guinea Bissau, EUSEC RD Congo and Support to AMIS, involved military advisers and personnel
alongside civilian staff; they are thus often framed as civil-military missions. As chapter six shows, military operations, such as EUTM Mali, also comprise civilian personnel, in particular training officers on human rights, gender aspects and legal issues.

Although CSDP actions have been designed as short-term instruments, most missions and operations have assumed a long-term character as they have been extended several times (Duke and Courtier 2010, 27; Tardy 2015a). Tardy has claimed that civilian mission have an average duration over five years and tend to last longer than military ones. According to him, civilian missions are at the heart of the tension between the long-term needs of countries in transition and the short-term commitments of EU member states. This applies especially to missions that focus on reform processes, such as the SSR, which by nature require a long-term engagement (Tardy 2015a, 25; see also Malešič 2015, 161).

The variations in the strength, duration and country of deployment depend on case-specific factors, such as the needs by and geopolitical strategic importance of the host country, as well as the concerns and willingness of member states. Past relations of member states with host countries can influence decisions whether a member state intervenes, such as in the case of France which pushed for a CSDP operation in Mali, or not intervene, such as Belgium which decided not to play the leading role in the CSDP action in the DRC (Freire and Galantino 2015, 7). Military operation Althea is the longest ongoing operation which has received enough political support from most member states for its continued extension. Recent military missions in Somalia, Mali and CAR have assumed a long-term character.

Most importantly, a military mission is sometimes accompanied or followed by a civilian mission, as it is the case of BiH, FYROM, Mali, Somalia and CAR. Even the shortest of all missions, EUPAT in FYROM, was part of the series of three different missions which contributed to peacebuilding in the country. Further, while operations and missions usually start as actions with a modest mandate focusing on specific dimensions of peacebuilding, they often extend their scope into new areas. For instance, the mandate of the operation Althea was extended from peacekeeping and stabilisation to capacity-building and training to BiH’s security forces.

The expansion of the civilian aspects of the CSDP has led to the introduction of what Kurowska and Seitz frame as state-building activities which include assisted construction or reconstruction of the institutional infrastructure of a state. They have emphasised that the

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56 Established in 2004 and still ongoing, operation EUFOR Althea is the lengthiest CSDP operation. EUPAT FYROM was the shortest mission, deployed for six months only. Althea has also been the most numerous military operation in terms of personnel. EULEX Kosovo has been the largest civilian mission in terms of personnel with over 2,000 staff, whereas EUAVSEC South Sudan, with only 13 people, was the smallest (see Howorth 2014, 150; Freire and Galantino 2015, 7).
CSDP should be seen against the broader EU’s state-building repertoire, while their understanding of state-building is an equivalent of peacebuilding (Kurowska and Seitz 2011). State-building activities promote good governance and the SSR. These practices focus on systemic reforms with the use of civilian projects (or military in soft terms) rather than state-building with the use of ‘hard’ military instruments. EU state-building practices have become the most dominant feature of the CSDP. Yet, Kurowska and Seitz claim that, through these practices, the EU has become invasive while prescribing regulatory practices and norms in post-conflict societies in the pursuit of its own security and according to its own vision (Ibid.).

CSDP actions with peacebuilding tasks resemble the characteristics of what Richmond frames as a third-generation approach to peacebuilding (2011). The primary task of these actions is to stabilise and/ or reconstruct the institutions of a functioning state. These missions and operations support structural reforms in the areas of the rule of law, security sector and jurisdiction apparatus (DG for External Policies 2010). This does not mean that the stabilisation of state institutions has been the sole task of EU peacebuilding. Peacebuilding carried out under the CSDP is part of a wider variety of different EU peacebuilding programmes which run in parallel or in the aftermath of missions. These activities include development, humanitarian assistance, promotion of human rights, support to elections, diplomatic activities, conflict resolution and mediation.57

For these reasons, CSDP actions should be better understood as coming within the realm of peace missions or peace support operations (Missiroli 2015; Tardy 2015a). The CSDP is a comprehensive toolbox of different instruments of conflict management, including peacemaking, peace-enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Freire and Galantino add preventive diplomacy as another tool in the CSDP since mediation, conflict prevention and early warning are part of the CSDP (Freire and Galantino 2015, 2). The CSDP comprises a broad range of instruments for peace support actions. With these instruments at its disposal, the EU is a unique actor in international conflict management (Gross and Juncos 2011c, 5). The question here is not why CSDP peacebuilding actions are not framed within the realm of peacebuilding, but rather why most CSDP missions and operations are of peacebuilding character and what CSDP peacebuilding actions stand for.

57 DGs, EU Delegations, EUSRs and agencies have been responsible for these activities. For instance, DG for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) is responsible for humanitarian aid and DG Enlargement for promoting peace in candidate countries. DG Development and EuropeAid Cooperation Office were responsible for development. The IcSP provides financial help for short and longer-term responses to conflict. Peacebuilding projects under this instrument focus on various issues such as mediation and interim administrations. The Development Cooperation Instrument and the European Development Fund coordinate funding for development projects. The ENPI and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights are other instruments that the EU uses in peacebuilding (Blockmans, Wouters and Ruys 2010).
Institutional competence: The complexity of CSDP decision- and policy-making

The EU’s approach to peacebuilding through the CSDP is defined by the autonomous character of CSDP decision- and policy-making. These processes make CSDP peacebuilding actions not only normative commitments but also results of EU foreign policy, which distinguishes them from the UN. The CSDP is an intergovernmental area of EU decision- and policy-making. As a body that decides on the directions of the CFSP and defines its main principles, the European Council is the main actor with regard to CSDP decision-making (TEU Art. 21, 26 and 42). Decisions to launch missions/operations are taken by the FAC by unanimity.\(^{58}\)

However, while these decisions are taken by EU foreign ministers in the FAC, it is Council’s preparatory bodies, namely the PSC, CivCom, the EUMC and the PMG, which plan and oversee these actions. The actual negotiations on the CSDP take place within these bodies. Representatives in these bodies are delegated by their capitals to decide on the launch, agenda, planning and management of missions and operations (Klein 2011, 74). Insights into the CSDP structures help us to understand how peacebuilding activities in CSDP missions and operations are decided, designed and planned as foreign policy actions.

The PSC is the most important committee in the CSDP decision-making process. Under the responsibility of the Council and the HR/VP, the PSC exercises the political control and strategic direction over the CSDP actions. It assesses the international situation and defines policies within the CFSP and the CSDP, and prepares the EU’s response to a crisis. It meets at ambassadorial level. Many scholars noted that it is not the FAC but the PSC where decisions on CSDP are made (Bickerton 2011; Duke 2005; Juncos and Pomorska 2006; Juncos and Reynolds 2007; Howorth 2010; 2014; Meyer 2006). Howorth refers to the PSC as the “key policy-shaping instrument”, “script-writer for CSDP” and “a major decision-shaping and even decision-making agency of the CSDP” (Howorth 2014, 45; see also Howorth 2010). According to Meyer, the PSC represents the “workhorse” of the “ESDP decision-shaping and control” (Meyer 2006, 116). Juncos and Reynolds name the PSC a “government in shadow” since PSC ambassadors are given powers to decide in the manner of governments. PSC ambassadors actively shape the definition of national foreign policy preferences rather than simply bring them to the table to be bargained over (Juncos and Reynolds 2007).

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\(^{58}\) Exception are decisions implementing a previous EU decision or for decisions related to European Defence Agency (EDA) and PESCO, where decisions are taken by qualified majority voting (TEU Art. 42). When establishing an operation or mission, the Council formally adopts two decisions. The first one ‘establishes’ the operation on the basis of the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) prepared by the CMPD and marks the beginning of the operational planning phase. Once planning and force generation are completed, the Council formally launches the operation/ mission through a second decision (Tardy 2015a, 25-26).
Many scholars explain the role of the PSC in EU decision-making through the lens of the socialisation theory (Howorth 2014, 2010; Juncos and Reynolds 2007; Meyer 2006, 112-135). These scholars have observed that social interaction among the ambassadors contributes to the alternation of national preferences and an increased commitment to cooperation within an EU framework. Their research has revealed that PSC ambassadors do not bargain over their national positions settled by their capitals and then brought to Brussels. Instead, by adopting a problem-solving and consensus-oriented approach, they look for solutions and compromise. Decisions in the PSC are shaped by international norms and rules, as well as routine interactions that build confidence and trust. Ambassadors do indeed report directly to their capitals; nevertheless, they possess significant leverage to influence opinions at home.

The PSC is supported by the EUMC, CivCom and the PMG. The EUMC provides advice to the PSC on all EU military matters. It is composed of the Chiefs of Defence of the member states, who are represented by their permanent military representatives. The EUMC monitors the execution of the EU military operations. CivCom, the equivalent of the EUMC, is responsible for overseeing civilian missions. It provides advice to the PSC on the development of strategies for civilian crisis management. The PMG carries out preparatory work covering the political aspects of EU military and civil-military issues, including concepts and capabilities. It prepares Council conclusions and provides recommendations for the PSC. It contributes to the development of horizontal policy and partnerships with third states and other organisations. The Chairmen of the EUMC and CivCom are the primary contact points for the commanders of the operations and missions.

Similarly as in the PSC, scholars studying CivCom and the EUMC have argued that socialisation is the key factor in consensus-building in these bodies (Cross 2010; Howorth 2014, 49). They have claimed that, although the officials in the two committees are answerable to the decision-makers in their capitals, their ability to persuade as a group plays an increasing role in the development of the CSDP. In the case of the EUMC, ‘esprit de corps’, namely the similar level of expertise, seniority, common recruitment patterns, the intensity of meetings, shared professional norms and the ability to persuade the capital, makes it possible to reach agreements and overcome political obstacles generated by the capitals. Scholars have observed that, although CivCom representatives lack the common recruitment patterns and seniority characteristic for the PSC and the EUMC, they share a common desire to move the EU forward, which helps to generate a shared mindset and consensus.

My research confirms previous findings that policy-making in the four committees is consensus-oriented. National representatives seek to compromise. They work in cooperation
not only with diplomats from other delegations but also with officials from the EEAS who are in charge of the planning and conduct of missions. They try to get an understanding of what can and what cannot work in a mission to feed this information back into the strategic thinking in the capital. They attempt to bridge positions between the capitals and the EEAS, and signal to the EEAS where the capitals stand. Personal contacts, communication with other countries’ representatives and attempts to get early information help to shape the consensus.

Interviews further reveal that, while communicating with their capitals, representatives from Council committees from larger countries tend to receive precise instructions from their capitals, whereas representatives of smaller states enjoy more independence in making proposals on behalf of their countries. Representatives play a crucial role in forging the views of their capitals. All interviewed representatives noted that, when reporting back to their capitals, they rarely write a verbatim report of the meeting. Instead, they provide an interpretation of what was discussed. They are often creative and propose possible solutions back at home. These insights into the operational dynamics of the Council preparatory bodies help us to understand how member states’ representatives design and plan peacebuilding actions and why they opt for particular activities.

The major weakness of the research that focuses on socialisation in the Council committees is that it is based explicitly on interviews with officials in institutions and not with politicians. The overemphasis on the socialisation effect overlooks some important aspects. First, national governments take the final decisions. Council preparatory bodies are indeed crucial, yet not as decisive as governments. Representatives in committees are part of a larger hierarchical system; they receive instructions from their ministries. They represent the opinion of their ministry, even if this opinion deviates from their own position. They would not agree on any issue which would be against the interests of their capitals. Second, it is obvious to expect a consensus when representatives tend to avoid issues which are known to be incompatible. Yet, there are many issues on which it would be difficult to agree. Third, while socialisation plays well for officials in committees, it does not necessarily translate to the political level in member states. Facing their electorate, the heads of governments have often different positions even if a mission is launched. Representatives in Council committees have similar characteristics to officials in national ministries. As Hill observed, officials’ agency plays a substantial role in policy-making; yet, it is dependent on the government. Officials in ministries prepare policies in the line with their government’s interests (Hill 1993).

This thesis therefore understands the Council preparatory bodies as agents who are important for CSDP policy-making but whose role depends on their governments. In this
sense, peacebuilding activities within the CSDP are generated through a policy-making process that combines the supranational and intergovernmental levels. This process is best described through Howorth’s term ‘supranational intergovernmentalism’ when he used it to describe decision- and policy-making in the CSDP. Howorth refers to the EUMC and CivCom to demonstrate that “the distinction between intergovernmental negotiating and supranational consensus-building becomes blurred to the point being virtually meaningless” (Howorth 2014, 49). In this process, the lines between supranational institutions and intergovernmental negotiations among member states have been blurred (Ibid., 69). It remains unclear to what extent the EEAS is considered a part of Howorth’s framework. The scholarship tends to keep the EEAS away from the discussions on the CSDP decision-making. Howorth himself only describes the work of the EEAS which, according to him, should represent a unified diplomatic corps of the EU, in the service of both CFSP and CSDP (Ibid., 63).

Despite the intergovernmental nature of the CSDP policy-making, the EEAS and the HR/VP are crucial actors in these processes. The Lisbon Treaty has reinforced and enhanced the role of the HR/VP who chairs the meetings between EU foreign and defence ministers. As a result, the HR/VP, representing the supranational level of the EU, plays an important role in coordinating the decision-making on CSDP matters and in building consensus between the member states. The HR/VP, assisted by the EEAS, is responsible for proposing and implementing CSDP decisions (TEU Art. 22, 27, 42). Also, chairpersons of the PSC, CivCom and the EUMC are officials from the EEAS and the PMG is chaired by a representative of the HR/VP, thus linking the intergovernmental structures to the EEAS (Council of the EU 2010a). Chairpersons have their offices located in the EEAS. As highly experienced senior member states’ diplomats, they play a significant role not only in coordinating the committees but also in shaping outcomes of the negotiations.

Furthermore, respective directorates of the EEAS are involved in policy formulation, planning and coordination as any other foreign ministry. The EEAS structures directly involved in CSDP policy-making are the CMPD, the CPCC and the EUMS. The CMPD is responsible for the political-strategic planning of missions and operations by ensuring their coherence and effectiveness and by developing CSDP partnerships, policies, concepts and capabilities. It prepares the CMC for the launch of an operation or mission. The CPCC is responsible for the planning and operational conduct of civilian missions. The EUMS coordinates military operations and missions that require military support as well as the creation of military capabilities. Its areas of work include early warning, situation assessment,
strategic planning, communication and information systems, concept development, training and education, and support of partnerships. The EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN) and SECPOL directorate provide support to relevant missions and operations if they are asked to do so, but are not directly involved in planning and command.\textsuperscript{60}

The CSDP structures have been gradually expanding with the rise of new demands. This development also reflects the shift towards more comprehensive approaches which combine military, civilian and political tasks. The creation of the ‘CSDP and Crisis Response: Prevention of Conflicts, Rule of Law/ SSR, Integrated Approach, Stabilisation and Mediation’ (CSDPCR.PRISM) division, also abbreviated as PRISM, in 2016 directly under the DSG-CSDPCR demonstrates the strong determination to realise the integrated approach.\textsuperscript{61} PRISM covers the political dimension of the CSDP, including missions and operations. It has been linked to the work of the EUMS and the Political Affairs Secretariat, which were previously separated from other CSDP directorates. The division is supposed to be a focal point for the coordination of an integrated approach to the EU responses to conflicts and crises while interlinking EU delegations, EEAS and Commission’s services, and possibly activities of the EU member states. In 2017, the EU decided to establish a Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) within the EEAS tasked with the planning and conduct of non-executive military missions (Council of the EU 2017b).

In contrast to the Council preparatory bodies, the role of the CSDP directorates of the EEAS has not been studied in depth so far. The role of the EEAS has not been seen as decisive in CSDP decision- and policy-making.\textsuperscript{62} The absence of research on the role of the EEAS in CSDP policy-making is understandable from the point of view that the EEAS is a relatively young institution. Nevertheless, scholars have acknowledged the role of the pre-Lisbon institutions in CSDP policy-making. For example, Grevi pointed out that not only the member states but also the Council Secretariat formed the core of ESDP decision- and policy-

\textsuperscript{60} Other CSDP structures include EDA, European Security and Defence College, the EU Satellite Centre and EU Operations Centre (For more details on these structures see EEAS 2016g).

\textsuperscript{61} The division is a result of the restructuring of the previous division ‘Coordination and Crises Response’, later renamed to ‘Coordination and Support (CSDP 1)’, then to PRISM and now to CSDPCR.PRISM. The division replaced the dissolved managing directorate Crisis Response and Operational Coordination (CROC) during the restructuring of the EEAS. CROC was responsible for a swift response to crises and conflicts. However, CROC was not linked to the CSDP structures. With the restructuring, one of its three divisions titled ‘Crisis Response, Planning and Operations’ was shifted directly under the DSG and renamed to Coordination and Crises Response. The two other divisions, namely EU Situation Room and Consular Crisis Management, were shifted to INTCEN which was also incorporated into the CSDP. CSDPCR.PRISM changed its focus and extended the areas of activity as well as the number of staff (interview 21).

\textsuperscript{62} Studies on the EEAS have mainly focused on the legal and institutional dynamics of the service, the modes of its establishment, the performance of the EEAS in the implementation of EU foreign policy and the EEAS officials’ attitudes to the new body (Duke 2011; Juncos and Pomorska 2013; 2014; Spence and Bátora 2015; Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2013; Vanhoonacker and Reslow 2010; Wouters and Duquet 2012).
making. He especially emphasised the role of the SG/HR in impacting on the ESDP through his engagement in crisis diplomacy (which often preceded ESDP instruments) and by shaping a consistent discourse about the purposes and requirements of the ESDP. These observations also apply to the EEAS. With the Lisbon Treaty, many Council units became part of the EEAS with enhanced functions in policy-making (Council of the EU 2010a, Annex).

The agency model of foreign policy-making prosed by Hill (2001; 2003) and bureaucratic politics introduced by Allison (1971) as re-adopted by Barnett and Finnemore (2004) can also aid our understanding of the role of officials in policy-making. According to Hill, bureaucracies – professionals in foreign ministries – are a key part of foreign policy-making. As agents, they perform three important duties: information-gathering, policy-making and expertise, and record-keeping (Hill 2003, 72-77). Nevertheless, ministries and bureaucrats “are constrained by their terms of reference, their superiors and the culture (or ‘expectations’) of their group”, while at the same time, they are enabled “to interpret their given roles in new ways on the basis of their personalities and particular circumstances” (Ibid., 89). In a similar way, Barnett and Finnemore (2004) assert that international organisations are not only intergovernmental bodies where states would dominate decision-making; they are also bureaucracies with authority to make rules and so exercise power.

But, other scholars have pointed to the limited role of the EEAS in the CSDP policy-making processes. Using the principal-agent model, Furness, for example, has depicted the EEAS as an agent acting on behalf of several principals, namely the member states, the President of the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council Presidency. While these principals have attempted to establish controls over the EEAS, Furness has claimed that the service has indeed sought to build its autonomy. Yet, its autonomy will vary across policy areas. According to him, the EEAS is more likely to accomplish autonomy in the EU development policy, whereas in the area of the CSDP, “[t]he EEAS does not have a strong agency role in the mission, but rather facilitates coordination and acts as a link between Member States” (Furness 2013, 121).

In spite of these limitations, my research confirms the central role of EEAS officials in the formulation of policies. Officials are part of the policy-making process and can influence

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63 The participation of the SG/HR in the European Council provided scope for channelling ESDP dossiers at the highest political level. The Secretariat’s Policy Unit, the DG E for External Relations and Political-Military Affairs, the EUMS, the CPCC and the SG/HR provided policy advice and coordination for ESDP. The DG E also played a fundamental role in the development of ESDP by contributing to the formulation of policy priorities, supporting coordination, steering the evolution of military and civilian CMCS and capabilities, running exercises and providing input at the political strategic level on EU crisis response. The Coordination Unit of DG E was tasked with supporting the proceedings of the PSC and the Commission’s DG RELEX Counsellors working group by providing input on dossiers and functions of the Secretariat. The Director General of DG E chaired the Crisis Management Board and attended PSC meetings (Grevi 2009).
policies to a certain degree by introducing new ideas and by formulating the wording of drafts. With the inclusion of member states’ diplomats in the EEAS, officials have learnt to see themselves not as rivals to member states’ officials but as a part of one system. Diplomats sometimes move from Council committees to work in the EEAS or vice versa. They have learnt to consult on policy drafts with diplomats in their own or other national delegations or directly with member states’ ministries. Similarly, national representatives tend to also perceive the EEAS officials as their colleagues.

In short, the CSDP is an area that intersects the role of the member states and the supranational institutions. Both member states and EU institutions are involved in the multi-level governance process of the CSDP. Member states pursue their preferences within the Council committees. Nevertheless, they do not act only as independent entities; through the Council, they are part of established procedures which assist them in reaching a consensus. Although member states are directly involved in policy-making in the CSDP, their influence is mediated by the EU’s institutional setting (Gross and Juncos 2011a, 147). Also, the EEAS represents an influential actor as it can propose ideas and initiates actions. The direct involvement of the member states in all the stages of policy-making on CSDP actions makes the CSDP a truly autonomous instrument. The character of CSDP peacebuilding actions is therefore defined by this independence in policy-making that combines both the EEAS structures and the Council preparatory bodies and which allows the pursuit of individual bureaucratic agency and national preferences. This process differs from that of the UN where member states are key decision-makers but are not directly involved in policy design, planning and implementation, which is the responsibility of the DPKO. The question therefore arises to what extent the autonomous character of the CSDP is responsible for EU peacebuilding missions being narrowed to specific aspects of post-conflict peacebuilding.

**Conclusion**

The chapter has discussed how the CSDP allowed the EU to shift its attention away from UN frameworks to its own instruments in the area of international conflict management. It outlined the evolution of the EU’s own peacebuilding practice within the CSDP as well as terminological problems with regard to the EU’s conceptualisation of peacebuilding. It discussed different types of CSDP missions and operations and CSDP decision- and policy-making processes and structures. EU peacebuilding within the CSDP represents a novelty in the international system. Although the CSDP was initiated to deliver military crisis
management tasks, CSDP missions and operations carry out mainly peacebuilding tasks.

CSDP missions and operations have increased the EU’s leverage and visibility in third countries. The autonomous character of the CSDP influences the nature of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding since the EU can decide on and change its own modalities of its activities under the CSDP. From this perspective, EU peacebuilding carried out within the CSDP has developed into an approach with narrowed focus, centring on primary state-building activities. This approach stands in contrast to that of the UN which has developed multidimensional peacebuilding policies and missions. UN continues in deploying peacekeeping tasks (such as protection of civilians, monitoring and keeping peace) alongside peacebuilding tasks, such as the rule of law reform, justice reform, human rights and development. As a result, while the EU’s approach to peacebuilding builds on the UN’s approach, the EU has decided to focus on specific aspects of peacebuilding only in its missions and operations.

The chapter has generated some important questions for further analysis: What are the reasons for deploying substantively more missions with peacebuilding tasks than operations in open conflicts? Why has the EU been almost inactive in peace-enforcement, when these tasks are one of the core elements of the Petersberg Tasks? On the one hand, the inclination towards deployments in post-conflict situations may be a result of the reluctance of some member states to engage in certain stages of the conflicts, in particular in the peace-enforcement and peacekeeping capacity. It may also reflect the capabilities shortages and the reluctance of the states to expose their civilian and military personnel to risky situations and dangerous environments. On the other hand, it may reflect the increasing commitment of the EU to international peacebuilding which is based on the understanding that stable and functioning state institutions are central to the solidification of a sustainable peace. The following chapter analyses these questions by looking at how and to what extent the CSDP decision-making structures shape the EU’s approach to peacebuilding under the CSDP.
4 The Decision- and Policy-Making Level of CSDP Peacebuilding

The previous chapters have demonstrated that, although the EU has embraced the normative shift towards peacebuilding, it has developed its own autonomous peacebuilding approach within the CSDP. This chapter explores how this approach is constructed through the CSDP policy-making processes. The chapter analyses how policymakers in the Council preparatory bodies and the EEAS develop CSDP peacebuilding activities as actions of the EU’s foreign policy and why they decide on actions that mainly deliver peacebuilding tasks. These processes have generated a particular peacebuilding approach that the EU pursues in its CSDP: in everyday policy-making, peacebuilding as an international normative framework loses its relevance to a certain degree. It becomes a pragmatic and political part of EU foreign policy which reflects the EU’s autonomy in international conflict management and which is shaped by member states’ preferences. But, this autonomy also reveals political, policy-making and operational constraints and capability-expectations gaps in CSDP actions. The chapter starts with analysing how policymakers in CSDP structures understand peacebuilding in everyday policy-making. It then explores the reasons for EU states’ preference for post-conflict and peacebuilding actions. The second part analyses the dynamics of policy-making that generate peacebuilding missions and operations by looking at the aspects of the duration, objectives and purposes of missions. The analysis establishes that CSDP peacebuilding actions reflect not only the EU’s normative commitment to international peacebuilding but also its self-centred preferences, concerns and constraints.

CSDP peacebuilding: Focus on content rather than concept

In the expanded list of the Petersberg Tasks, peacebuilding could stand for “military advice and assistance tasks,” “conflict prevention” and “post-conflict stabilisation” (TEU Art. 43(1)). Conflict prevention is understood in the Treaty both as a prevention of conflicts before their outbreak and as a prevention of another conflict in a post-conflict situation. Similarly, “military advice and assistance tasks” can be delivered before, during and after a conflict. The EU has deployed mainly in post-conflict situations – after parties reached a ceasefire and/or signed a peace agreement. Indeed, many post-conflict situations continue to be affected by fighting and insurgencies despite the fact that the parties agreed on a ceasefire. However, even in such situations, CSDP actions are not directly tasked with the management of an open
conflict; they focus on stabilisation, and capacity- and institution-building measures.

As discussed in the previous chapters, in spite of the EU embracing the idea of peacebuilding and in spite of the majority of CSDP actions having carried out peacebuilding tasks, the EU has not framed these actions as peacebuilding missions. Peacebuilding as a term is also rarely used by EU policymakers in reference to CSDP actions in their everyday work. On the one hand, as one EEAS official put it: “the ethos of peacebuilding, even if it is not named, is at the centre of debates. It is a shift towards a more coherent policy, more responsive action, the need to identify actors and to use more tools. The ethos of peacebuilding is valued” (interview 4). On the other hand, EU documents frame CSDP instruments under the term ‘crisis management’. However, EU officials and representatives do not use this term either; they tend to refer to CSDP instruments simply as (civilian) missions and (military) operations and to particular activities with which these actions are tasked.

A definition of concepts, such as those characteristic for academic discourses, is difficult to maintain in everyday policy-making. In the policy-making world, concepts mean policies, policy instruments and technical words. An EEAS official explained: “We talk here about civil-military concepts. But, the EU does not have a clear definition of a concept” (interview 4). Member states’ representatives and EEAS officials work with political documents that refer to principles, instruments and actions rather than ‘abstract’ concepts. The absence of the word ‘peacebuilding’ in policymakers’ vocabulary is also a result of the specialised focus of missions. Missions are designed to achieve countable objectives outlined in their mandate. Besides, the lack of institutional coherence explains the absence of peacebuilding in the working language of policymakers. Parts of the CSDP are physically disconnected from the EEAS. Geographical desks do not have enough contact with the CSDP, while there is a lack of understanding among CSDP staff on the work of geographical desks.

Further, the difference between civilian missions and military operations in terms of their origin and purpose is another reason for the lack of a clear definition of CSDP concepts. Military concepts were already in place when the CSDP was launched since EU member states had been active in military operations of the UN or NATO. There has been a consensus of what the concept of a military operation should include, such as combat actions, peacekeeping, force protection and humanitarian tasks. The Petersberg Tasks reflect these military concepts. In contrast, civilian concepts evolved from scratch. The EU launched its civilian missions at the time when the UN was expanding its missions to civilian tasks. The concept of a civilian mission was a novelty. Civilian concepts have been influenced by the military ones; SSR, border control, justice reform and training missions have been deployed
as missions with modalities similar to those of military operations. The differences between civilian and military instruments lead to a disparity in conceptual understandings. This influences the understanding of peacebuilding by the two sides. The military regards the term ‘peacebuilding’ as a civilian concept hardly applicable to military operations. Staff in civilian mission are more supportive of the peacebuilding terminology.

When it comes to missions, the CMPD is responsible for political-strategic planning of CSDP actions, including the development of CSDP policies and concepts. The CMPD conceptualises CSDP activities with an aim of producing a coherent understanding of concepts used in civilian and military approaches. The directorate develops concepts in cooperation with the CPCC for civilian missions and the EUMS in the case of military operations. It also organises an inventory of policy concepts – which policies are used, which are not needed any more and which are missing. While such an inventory is useful, the real impetus comes not from systematic approaches but from member states. The content and design of concepts is a political process, accompanied by an intra-institutional fight. Interviews suggest that other directorates and Council committees are reluctant to be guided by the CMPD. As one official claimed:

“there is no real top-down management. The development of concepts is rather an ad hoc process. Military staff do not recognise our [CMPD] work of creating concepts for them. They work according to their own rules. CPCC [staff] do not follow the CMPD but develop their own concepts. They work together by good will but not by direction” (interview 5).

Interviews suggest that EU policymakers understand peacebuilding as a term linked more with the UN rather than the EU. One member of CivCom argued when referring to peacebuilding that

“It is not the language that is used. It is UN language. It is very vague – you can define anything and everything under peacebuilding. It is very academic to discuss the definition for peacebuilding, peacekeeping and etc. Everybody comes with different things” (interview 25).

An officer of a CSDP division in the EEAS provided a similar perspective:

“We do not use this terminology in civilian CSDP, although it is not de-linked from it either. […] We speak of capacity-building in post-conflict reconstruction. And we do it through security sector reform, training, mentoring [and] advising. These are the terms we use” (interview 2).
Instead of using terms such as peacekeeping or peacebuilding, the EU refers to particular tasks of respective missions.

By avoiding UN language, the EU has attempted to build its own identity independent from the influence of the UN. The previous chapter stressed that the establishment of the CSDP has led to a sense of competition between the two organisations. The avoidance of UN language corresponds with this argument as it allows the EU to contrast its work with that of the UN. EEAS officials are indeed aware of the cooperation with the UN in peace missions. Some officials compare what the EU does with the work of the UN or ask advice from their colleagues responsible for the partnership with the UN. Some EEAS officials also have previous experience of working with the UN and bring UN ideas to the EEAS. An official noted that “certain ideas of the DPKO structures are ‘floating’ around” (informal interview C). Some also worked at their national foreign ministries in divisions dealing with UN matters. Nevertheless, EEAS officials concentrate on the EU and refer to EU language.

The little attention given to the UN in the EU’s conceptual development is also a result of the complex process that involves the CPCC, the EUMS and the CMPD preparing draft concept notes submitted to Council committees. Through their involvements in the drafting process, they can shape the decisions by proposing respective actions. The extent to which these proposals are accepted is a matter of an agreement by the Council committees which actively work with the draft and often reformulate ideas. Once the draft is returned back to CSDP directorates, they make only slight amendments.

Although officials agree on the importance of clearly defined concepts, including that of peacebuilding, they focus more on actual policies. Peacebuilding as a concept makes sense only in connection to actual policies and activities that it represents. The term crisis management is also rarely used by policymakers in their everyday policy-making. Policymakers rarely refer to particular Petersberg Tasks, except of stabilisation. They refer to specific actions and activities carried out in missions and operations. In case of peacekeeping and crisis management, the reference is made to monitoring of borders and military assets, or civilian protection.

Representatives themselves acknowledge that, although the CSDP was set up to deal with all the Petersberg tasks, it mainly focuses on post-conflict stabilisation. For example, a representative of CivCom claimed that: “CSDP was designed and conceptualised as a crisis management instrument. But neither was it set up nor is it used in this way. It has never been crisis management” (interview 29). He continued:
“I think out of all the [civilian] missions have had, only three could qualify as crisis management missions: Georgia, Aceh and EUBAM Rafah. Those are missions where the EU intervened at a certain stage of a crisis, in particular at the moment of ceasefire, where the EU tried to do a specific task as part of crisis management. But all others can be qualified as post-conflict capacity- and institution-building, which [...] is a very different kind of work. [...] CSDP cannot be a crisis management instrument” (interview 29).

A representative of the PSC highlighted that the rarity of the use of the term peacebuilding reflects the fact that peacebuilding is a very broad term. In some contexts, it also includes development, which the CSDP does not do. Instead, he explains that the CSDP is narrowed to concrete areas, such as the SSR or justice reform, which are part of the peacebuilding domain where the CSDP can have an added value (interview 28). A representative from the EUMC noted that:

“We are contributing to stabilisation efforts. We are trying to make the security structures in the host country more robust. We do Petersberg tasks – vast area of different things that CSDP can do. But in fact, we are very narrow. Peacemaking [understood here as peace-enforcement] is not something we could not do… we have an article in the treaty on the coalition of willing [...] We could go further. But, are we willing to do it?” (interview 36).

EEAS officials understand the CSDP in a similar way. As one official put it:

“CSDP is about crisis management. But, it is peacebuilding and post-conflict stabilisation in fact which we do mostly. After the crisis is solved and stabilisation achieved, then the EC can step in and do development for example” (interview 5).

Stabilisation has become part of the CSDP to such an extent that representatives use the term to encompass all the Petersberg Tasks. While policymakers understand stabilisation within the CSDP either as the first phase of or synonymous to peacebuilding, they generally agree that stabilisation focuses on the areas of security, order, rule of law and justice. This is done through capacity-building and reform programmes aimed at the reconstruction or building of state structures that can ensure the sustainability of order and peace.

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64 The three mentioned missions have been deployed in situations of status quo – frozen conflicts; Nevertheless, they have also been tasked with peacebuilding in addition to peacekeeping.
The EU’s preference for post-conflict peacebuilding engagements

This research identified six main reasons why CSDP missions and operations engage more in post-conflict activities rather than crisis management. First, member states’ preference for peacebuilding is driven by the positivist nature of peacebuilding insofar as it is based on the belief that the reconstruction and/or building of functioning state institutions prevents further violence and conflict. An increasing number of cases of countries that relapsed into violence after reaching a ceasefire have led the EU to acknowledge that merely keeping peace or intervening militarily does not guarantee the sustainability of the peace and order. Peacebuilding is needed to ensure that the country regains its institutional capacity for sustaining order and peace on its own. These purposes are embedded not only in official documents and treaties, as discussed in two previous chapters; they are also reflected in decision- and policy-making processes that lead to CSDP deployments. Representatives highlighted the need for post-conflict reconstruction, stabilisation and capacity-building activities in order to build sustainable peace as to prevent further violence. In this sense, the logic of CSDP actions with peacebuilding tasks complies with the international peacebuilding framework and the UN’s understanding of peacebuilding.

The second reason for the focus on post-conflict peacebuilding is pragmatic. The CSDP is a result of political will – an agreement among 28 member states. The ability to agree on peacebuilding actions, however, reflects the lack of the political will of member states to agree on peacekeeping or peace-enforcement actions. As the above quote highlighted, the EU has great difficulties in agreeing on peace-enforcement and peacekeeping actions (interview 36). Peace-enforcement is out of question for most EU countries due to negative experience with such engagements and due to the lack of capabilities. Although many EU countries, even non-NATO members, are, to some extent, willing to provide their troops for peacekeeping tasks, their readiness is still limited and determined by their geopolitical preferences, lack of capabilities and security concerns. Launching civilian missions in crisis management mode is even more difficult due to the lack of civilian experts, security concerns and technical constraints. Peacebuilding deployments often remain the only options for the EU to show its actorness.

The preference for peacebuilding could therefore be seen as a result of the member states’ ability to agree on an action. Edwards noted that reaching an agreement among the member states is rarely easy. And yet, when the members agree and research a consensus, the EU’s influence can be significant, especially if it is known that it had been difficult to arrive at the consensus (Edwards 2013, 76). The ability to agree on such actions, which also involve
military assets, reflects the emergence of an EU strategic culture. The EU is unlikely to be expected to use the CSDP for peacekeeping or peace-enforcement deployments to end direct fighting or to protect civilians. The understanding among member states is that these tasks could be pursued within PESCO which was proposed by the Lisbon Treaty. Yet, this invention remains in its early stage and requires a concrete realisation. Biscop commented that, to reach a decision on a policy such as this, and to turn it into an action, the right mindset of states is needed. He argued that the creation of such a mindset requires participating states to subvert their national defence planning by the commonly agreed capability targets and to adapt their national defence industrial interests to multinational priorities (Biscop 2017a, 13; 2017b).

Third, post-conflict peacebuilding activities are easier to launch because of the legal conditions which make it difficult to launch crisis management operations. CSDP military operations are legally launched on the basis of a combination of an EU Council decision and either an invitation by the host state or a UNSC resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. International actions with the use of force require an approval of the UNSC.\textsuperscript{65} Ongoing operations Althea and Atalanta as well as past operations EUFOR RCA, two operations in the DRC (2003 and 2006) and one in Chad (2008-9) were established on the basis of a UNSC resolution. The mandate of the operation Sophia was extended to include tasks that required an approval of the UNSC. However, obtaining UNSC approval can be difficult. For instance, the EU struggled with the opposition of Russia at the UNSC when seeking to extend the mandate of Sophia beyond European waters (interview 31; see also Tardy 2015b). It took until June 2016 for the UNSC to adopt Resolutions 2278 (2016a) and 2292 (2016b) which enabled the EU to extend its operations on the high seas off the coast of Libya (Council of the EU 2016c). In contrast, deployments without combat forces do not require approval of the UNSC. EU military training and monitoring operations as well as civilian missions have been established at the request and with the consent of the host states.\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{65} The UNSC, under powers granted to it by the UN Charter (Chapter VII), is responsible for the authorisation of collective actions with the use of force to restore or enforce international peace and security (UN 1945).

\textsuperscript{66} The first two phases of the EU NAVFOR Med operation (Sophia) are an exception as Sophia operated in territorial (European) waters and on the high sea in accordance with applicable “international law, in particular with the relevant provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the 2000 Protocols against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants) and to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR), the 1976 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean (Barcelona Convention), the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the principle of non-refoulment and international human rights law” which allows such operations (Council of the EU 2015, preamble at 6). In 2016, the EU secured the consent from the Libyan authorities to extend the operation’s mandate to training of the Libyan coastguards and navy (Council of the EU 2016c).
Fourth, activities in the post-conflict phase are more likely to receive political and public acceptance at home, across the EU and in the receiving country than actions that use force. The presence of a foreign military in peace-enforcement and peacekeeping missions is not always positively embraced neither by the sending country nor the receiving one. In contrast, post-conflict activities, such as training, mentoring and advice, tend to be positively perceived by the host government and the public. The EU deploys its missions by consensus not only from the side of the member states but also from the side the host country. Such a consensus is often possible only after the ceasefire when consent can be granted by a recognised political authority. For these reasons, EU member states generally prefer deployments after a ceasefire is reached – in a post-conflict phase. Peacebuilding therefore often remains the only option for the EU in such situations.

To ensure the acceptance of an EU mission by the receiving state, the EU undertakes a careful assessment of the needs of the country in the planning phase. This includes a fact-finding mission during which, the EU team meets the receiving country’s governmental officials. The team asks what the country needs and what the EU is expected to do, and clarifies what the EU can deliver. The result of these discussions forms an agreement on what the CSDP should do. This agreement is sealed with a letter of invitation to the EU, which provides a basis for a mission. Then, the operational planning team undertakes another field trip to plan details and practical modalities. While the EU has an established procedure, the aim of the planning phase is to ensure national ownership or at least effective partnership.

Fifth, the way EU member states decide on and set up missions, makes it difficult to deploy CSDP actions in crisis management. One representative explained this in terms of “having 28 member states to decide how to proceed in a fast-moving and politically charged environment means that you cannot have a crisis management, because you are too late” (interview 28). The CSDP does not have at its disposal a set-up and personnel who are ready for an immediate deployment. A mission and operation has to be set up from stretch. The EU needs first recruit personnel and arrange logistical, technical and medical practicalities. The planning and recruiting period can take from six months to a year and half from the moment when the member states agree on a mission. As one representative argued: “[t]hat’s not crisis management. […] We pretend that we are doing crisis management, whereas in fact we are doing post-conflict capacity-building” (interview 29). Although the EU has Battlegroups, CSDP procedures make a rapid deployment difficult. The provisions for PESCO could solve this problem by accelerating the procedures and planning (see Biscop 2017a; 2017b).

Sixth, post-conflict engagements are also preferred by the member states due to
security concerns. Every state wants to ensure the highest possible standard of security for their personnel to sell CSDP actions back home to their public and parliaments. There are costs to this, however. Deployments in crisis management require high financial and operational (e.g. force protection) costs. Political costs of sending a person to a mission which may end into deadly casualties are much higher (interview 29, 31). Yet, peacebuilding as interpreted through security concerns has also constraints as peacebuilding deployments are increasingly taking place in complex security situations. Even if peace agreement is reached and order established, small-scale fighting or terrorist attacks may reoccur.

There is a growing awareness among both national representatives and EEAS officials that the EU has to think strategically about what the CSDP is for. Since the CSDP does mainly post-conflict capacity-building, stabilisation and reconstruction, then the EU perhaps needs to rethink the ways of engagement through the CSDP. Post-conflict peacebuilding is a different area. Interviewees highlighted that the EU has to rethink the relationship to the European Commission because there is an overlap in post-conflict engagement. As one representative claimed: “We pretend there is no such overlap, because we do crisis management and they do long-term stuff. But this is not true; we are involved in long-term activities. We have to better define ourselves and rethink some of the procedures, especially the connection to development” (interview 29). The reasons for the EU’s preference for peacebuilding demarcate boundaries of the aspirations of EU peacebuilding missions. These missions are examples of the EU’s evolving strategic culture as they represent the commonly acceptable range of legitimate policy instruments for international conflict management. These instruments encompass both normative positions (the norm of international peacebuilding) and patterns of behaviour (the existence of the instrument, and the willingness of member states to act and to provide resources). These findings therefore confirm research by Cornish and Edwards (2001, 2005) and Meyer (2006) on EU foreign policy (see chapter one).

A dilemma over short-term versus long-term missions

The increasing involvement of the CSDP in post-conflict peacebuilding and stabilisation has raised questions about the duration of missions. The mandates of most CSDP missions tend to be extended. Missions and operations in the DRC, CAR, FYROM and Georgia, the mandates of which were not extended, were replaced by another CSDP action.67 Peacekeeping

67 While it could be argued that EUFOR Tchad/RCA is an exception, the operation focused on the protection of refugees escaping the conflict in the DRC, thus forming part of CSDP actions in the DRC. The operation was also replaced by a UN force of the UN Mission in CAR and Chad - MINURCAT (Council of the EU 2009a).
operations tend to be generally shorter, while military training and civilian missions are longer. This is not surprising given the fact that stabilisation and the reconstruction of state structures needs time. Officials and representatives agree that, although missions and operations are planned as short-term engagements, most develop into long-term enterprises. As one official noted:

“CSDP missions and operations have been going for a long time. So yes, they are not really short-term. But member states are concerned about long term commitments. They push for missions and operations which have short-term perspectives, which are doable and achievable” (interview 5)

Nevertheless, while member states understand the need for long-term approaches, they agree that CSDP deployments should remain short- or medium-term and not long-term for political and pragmatic reasons even if missions are prolonged. Short-term mandates enable the EU to estimate the achievements of missions. They allow for the prediction of countable results and outputs. Once a mission has achieved these goals, it can exit the country and leave the work to other actors such as the Commission. CSDP missions are target-oriented. As short-term missions, they can easily achieve their targets, whereas it is difficult to identify targets for long-term missions. In this sense, short-term missions serve political interests at home. As interviews with national representatives suggest, member states’ governments are aware of the need to justify CSDP actions, including the financing and the deployment of personnel, before their legislature and electorate. It is easier to convince national parliaments and the public about a two-year rather than ten-year deployment.

The tension between short-term and long-term approaches originates in the division of labour between the Council and the Commission. The Council has had a preference for short-term crisis-management through the CSDP, whereas the Commission has opted for long-term capacity-building engagement (Anesi and Aggestam 2008). The CSDP aims at strengthening state structures, whereas the Commission orients its activities towards the wider society. This division was clearly visible in the case of the DRC, where the PSC proposed to divide the EU’s activities into two parts: one to be implemented by the Commission with a Community approach and the other by the Council with an ESDP approach (Ibid.). The operation in the DRC was then criticised for a “failure to better link military crisis management with wider peace building” by keeping security and development compartmentalised, and for the inability to integrate the military operation in a political strategy (Saferworld and International Alert 2004, 7–8).

Importantly, member states’ hesitation for long-term deployments is linked to security
concerns – their willingness to put their people at risk. Countries such as Syria or Libya pose a challenge to many member states as to whether they are willing to deploy a mission with the consent of one party only, to one region only and to a highly insecure environment (interview 25). Security and protection of personnel deployed in missions is important for the EU institutions and member states for political reasons. Short-term missions are less likely to have casualties, thus granting the EU a high degree of political legitimacy. CSDP actions have not suffered many casualties despite recent missions in Afghanistan and Mali being targets of terrorist attacks. The EEAS does not keep a public record of causalities in the CSDP actions. The personnel in missions are not EEAS staff but personnel from the contributing countries. It has even tended to keep information on casualties less noticeable. I identified three fatalities in CSDP actions, though the nature of the contract of the persons killed and the circumstances under which they were killed leaves room for interpretation to what extent these casualties count as CSDP casualties.  

Nevertheless, for countries such as Libya, with an unstable political and security environment, the understanding is that the EU needs to stay involved and to contribute in stabilising the situation. At the same time, member states understand that there are practical limits to such engagements. Ministries of interior, which provide police personnel, are not willing to deploy to environments with high security risks. For these reasons, the EU training is carried out outside Libya – in Tunisia. Similarly, basic security requirements are necessary to create conditions where other actors can act and where long-term activities, such as development, can take place. For instance, a development, in places such as Kabul, without force protection would not be possible (interview 25, 31). Due to the increasingly deteriorating security conditions in countries of deployment, missions and operation continue to have short-term mandates, yet increasingly embedded within long-term perspectives. Missions’ mandates are generally extended several times, making these deployments part of a long-term peacebuilding.

Finally, member states’ hesitations for long-term deployments are linked to financial issues; long-term deployments require considering the impact on the efficiency of the mission.

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In 2013, a Lithuanian officer serving in EULEX Kosovo was shot dead. It remains unclear whether this was a political or criminal attack since perpetrators remain unknown (EEAS 2016h). In 2015, a British citizen was killed and other persons injured after a suicide car bomber rammed a vehicle of the EU mission in Kabul. Both the EU and the UK did not count this death as a CSDP casualty, claiming that the person was a contractor (Ward 2015). Yet, this casualty could be considered as ‘official’ since contractors have become a critical part of the civilian missions, making almost a third of the personnel (interview 29 and 31). According to one interviewee, the deteriorating security conditions were the main reasons behind the decisions of the EU to close the EUPOL mission in Afghanistan in 2016 (interview 29; see also Wellman 2016). In June 2017, a Portuguese serviceman of EUTM Mali was killed in an attack on a leisure centre located in the suburbs of Bamako (EUTM PAO 2017).
in terms of the budget. Short-term missions help the EU to manage its capabilities. Long-term missions would be constrained by financial aspects as funding is foreseen for short-term actions. Financial aspects are also linked to security concerns since deployments in high-risk environments require high costs for security arrangements.

**Peacebuilding in CSDP missions as part of a comprehensive approach**

Policymakers understand CSDP activities as a contribution to peacebuilding within a comprehensive approach. Within EU foreign policy, a comprehensive approach has two connotations. The first refers to a coordinated and coherent CFSP, which involves an application of all relevant instruments in a consistent manner and the coordination among the relevant EU institutions. The second understanding refers to CMCO/CIMIC (see p. 74 of this thesis). This double-meaning has its origin in the difference between the UN’s and NATO’s understandings of a comprehensive approach, which provided the basis for the development of the EU’s own comprehensive approach.\(^6^9\)

The call for more coherence in EU external action, particularly in crisis management, has been stressed by the ESS and the Report on the Implementation of the ESS. The Civilian Headline Goal 2008 specified that coherence should be in the use of Community activities and ESDP instruments to improve the effectiveness of the EU crisis management (Council of the EU 2004c). Earlier, the Commission had identified disaster response, crisis management and CSDP as areas that needed to be pursued in a more coherent way. It proposed better strategic planning and enhanced cooperation in joint assessments, strategies and actions with the Council (European Commission 2006a).

The Treaty of Lisbon laid down the foundations for the realisation of the comprehensive approach. It pointed to the need for consistency in its external actions and between external policies and internal policies with external dimension at several places (for example Articles 13(1), 16(6), 18(4), 21(3) of TEU). From this perspective, a comprehensive approach means coordinating EU foreign policies and actions. The Treaty has emphasised that the EU’s conflict prevention, crisis management, development and humanitarian aid operations should be coordinated and consistent with those of international organisations, in particular those forming part of the UN system (TEU Art. 2, 21, 42, 212, 214). The reference to the UN system implies both consistency with the UN’s approaches to conflicts, including

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\(^{69}\) The UN understands comprehensiveness in the context of human security, whereas NATO refers to it in terms of civil-military synergies (Pirozzi 2013, 5-6). Since the Brahimi reform process, the UN also refers to civil-military synergies, but does not understand this as a comprehensive approach.
The idea of a comprehensive approach has been mainstreamed in references to the EU’s approaches to conflicts and crises. ‘The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to External Conflict and Crises’ (European Commission 2013; Council of the EU 2014e) clarified the understanding of the EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises and set out practical steps for the implementation of the recommendations of the Lisbon for coherence in the EU’s actions in external conflicts and crises. The EU’s comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises therefore:

“covers all stages of the cycle of conflict or other external crises; through early warning and preparedness, conflict prevention, crisis response and management to early recovery, stabilisation and peace-building in order to help countries getting back on track towards sustainable long-term development” (European Commission 2013, 2).

A comprehensive approach in this particular area means applying the whole range of different tools – political, diplomatic, security, development, humanitarian, economic and trade – in a coordinated manner to tackle the entire conflict cycle (Gross 2008; Pirrozi 2013).

For policymakers, a comprehensive approach means the deployment of different military or civilian tools which do not require the use of combat force. As one official said:

“Peacebuilding as such is much more complex; it involves civil society, economic development, [and] social issues. This is what we try to do through comprehensive approaches. The UN proposed integrated planning. We do comprehensive approach, which means that we accept civilian CSDP mission [in addition to other components]. We must ensure that we talk to the Commission and that we know what they are doing and how far we can be in synergy with them. Then, the whole package, the whole EU engagement e.g. in Mali, in Horn of Africa, is peacebuilding. But I cannot say civilian CSDP is peacebuilding – it is one contribution to it and we do not use that term” (interview 2).

Many scholars have pointed out that the CSDP, as a set of different tools of foreign policy, has enhanced the EU’s actorness (Rieker 2006, 513). Mace has concluded that “the ‘added value’ of EU crisis management is the Union’s ability to deploy a range of instruments, financial, civilian and military, in a coordinated manner” (Mace 2004, 474). Nowak has argued that “the projection of ‘lasting peace’ and stability abroad requires that the EU uses a variety of instruments in a coherent manner, and deploys an appropriate mix of instruments in order to address pre-crisis, active crisis and post-crisis situations” (Nowak 2006b, 9).

Based on this perspective, peacebuilding is complementary to other measures. It is one
of the tools used to address the entire conflict cycle. CSDP peacebuilding actions often follow up on previous crisis reactive and management measures undertaken by other actors. For example, the missions and operations in the Western Balkans replaced UN and NATO missions. The CSDP actions in Mali followed as stabilisation measures in the peacebuilding phase after the termination of the Serval operation. Operations Atalanta and Sophia, which serve in a crisis reaction mode, are also deployed with a simultaneous use of other missions and tools that address the root causes (see chapter three). In other words, comprehensive approach in crisis management is about different instruments being made available. Nevertheless, the EU does not always make other instruments and resources available. The overwhelming use of peacebuilding tools and the absence of other instruments in conflict management is hardly a demonstration of comprehensiveness. Rather, it is a result of the lack of political will and resources being made available to tackle international conflicts.

The Joint Communication, mentioned above, also mentions coherence between the work of the EU Delegations, diplomatic expertise in the EEAS, EUSRs, and CSDP missions and operations. It stresses that “comprehensiveness refers not only to the joined-up deployment of EU instruments and resources, but also to the shared responsibility of EU-level actors and Member States” (European Commission 2013, 3). The Communication emphasises the role of member states in achieving the comprehensive approach: “the EU’s comprehensive approach is a common and shared responsibility of all EU actors in Brussels, in Member States and on the ground in third countries” (Ibid., 4).

Further, the development and security nexus are seen not only as a core of a comprehensive approach but also serve as a justification for it:

> “Sustainable development and poverty eradication require peace and security, and the reverse is equally true: fragile or conflict-affected countries still remain the furthest away from meeting the Millennium Development Goals. The connection between security and development is therefore a key underlying principle in the application of an EU comprehensive approach” (Ibid.).

Even earlier the 2004 Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP suggested that in order “to contribute to coherence between security and development, synergy between EU development assistance activities and civilian crisis management under ESDP should be elaborated and better developed, including in post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction” (Council of the EU 2004b).

To achieve a full comprehensiveness in the EU’s actions towards conflicts, the Communication from 2013 proposed a number of practical steps: 1) develop a shared analysis
and understanding of the situation; 2) define a single, common strategic vision for a given conflict situation; 3) focus on conflict prevention before a crisis emerges or violence erupts; 4) mobilise the different strengths and capacities of the EU; 5) commit to the long-term engagement in peacebuilding, state-building and sustainable development; 6) link different policies and external and internal actions; 7) make better use of EU delegations; and 8) work in partnership with other actors such as the UN (European Commission 2013). The Communication emphasised the need to address the underlying causes of conflict in order to build peaceful and stable societies, for which long-term strategies are essential. The Communication noted that the “objectives of sustainable peace and development must be at the core of the EU’s response from the outset – the EU must also have a long-term vision for its short-term engagements and actions” (Ibid., 8). For these purposes, the Communication recommended establishing coordination systems between long-term and short-term objectives through dialogue among EU stakeholders to coordinate and, where possible, combine EU instruments, such as political dialogue, conflict prevention, reconciliation, development, CSDP missions and operations, and stabilisation activities under the IcSP (Ibid., 9).

Enhancing coherence between long-term and short-term objectives requires linking security and development instruments. In their revision of the EU policy on the SSR, submitted as a joint communication to the Council and the Parliament, the 2016 Dutch and Slovak Presidencies saw the SSR as a platform for a realisation of the development and security nexus (European Commission 2016a). The Council endorsed the joint communication while understanding the SSR as a key component of all the stages of a conflict cycle. The Conclusions describe the objectives of the SSR as “reinstating accountable security institutions and restoring effective security services to the population, thus providing the environment for sustainable development and peace” (Council of the EU 2016e, 2). Officials and representatives understand this nexus as a step-by-step approach in sequences in which security precedes development. Development requires a secure environment. This approach corresponds with state-oriented peacebuilding theories which emphasise that it is cardinal to first stabilise the situation before development (informal interviews).

Consistency between short-term and long-term approaches also includes ensuring that the country is capable of self-governing its capabilities after the completion of the mission/operation. Freire and Galantino argued that, to make a successful exit, the EU needs to ensure “a smooth downgrading of the EU’s presence sustained on long-term peacebuilding goals” (Freire and Galantino 2015, 9). For these reasons, short-term goals of a mission need “to be accompanied by a longer-term strategy in terms of sustainability of the efforts
developed from that EU presence” (Ibid.). While missions and operations fulfil their mandates in training police, military and judges, and reforming state institutions, the country often does not have the ability to sustain this status due to the lack of resources. After soldiers, police officers or judges who received the training return to their work, they are underpaid and under-equipped. The EU has been considering moving beyond capacity-building in the SSR and considering to provide the host countries with equipments. In this sense, the concept of ‘train and equip’, known as capacity-building for sustainable development (CBSD), has been promoted, meaning that the EU could provide the host country with military and civilian assets. This concept is understood as a realisation of the security-development nexus. This provision would require legal and structural changes (informal interviews).

The Global Strategy (EUGS) has (re-)introduced the concept of an integrated approach. Building on the concept of the comprehensive approach, the integrated approach represents an enhanced level of ambition that requires a further strengthening of the way in which the EU brings together expertise and institutions in conflict prevention, resolution and stabilisation (EU Global Strategy 2016). As already discussed, the recent restructuring of the CSDP part of the EEAS, especially the creation of the CSDPCR.PRISM division, can be seen as an attempt to realise this integrated approach. The creation of the post of the HR/VP with a responsibility for both conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation was hoped to be a remedy for the lack of coherence in the EU crisis management as it merged the relevant work of the Commission and the Council Secretariat (Nowak 2006a, 11; Rummel 2005). The HR/VP and the EEAS were established to ensure consistency in the EU’s external action (TEU Art. 18(4)). This institutional change has increased the potential of the EU “to make its external action more consistent, more effective and more strategic” (European Commission 2013, 2). The EEAS has brought different tools of crisis management, geographic desks and the EUSRs together under one ‘roof’. Relevant departments of the General Secretariat and the Commission were transferred en bloc to the EEAS (Council of the EU 2010a, Annex). However, this has not led to an actual interaction among directorates despite that the Council insisted that “[f]ull coordination between all the structures of the EEAS shall be ensured” (Council of the EU 2010a, Art. 4(3)). The effectiveness of the structural changes depends on the willingness of directorates to cooperate.

70 CSDP directorates SECPOL, INTCEN, the CMPD and the CPCC are directly responsible to the DSG-CSDPCR. The EUMS is a managing directorate with its six directorates reporting directly to the HR/VP. Through CSDPCR.PRISM, the EUMS has been also linked to the DSG-CSDPCR (see p. 81 of this thesis).
CSDP peacebuilding missions and civil-military synergy versus cooperation

The civil-military synergy tends to be seen from a narrow perspective of the comprehensive approach. This understanding originates from NATO’s approaches (see Pirozzi 2013, see the section above). Civilian-military synergy/coordination (abbreviated as CMCO) has been seen as an added value of the EU’s approaches to tackling conflicts, and especially suitable to post-conflict peacebuilding (see p. 74 of this thesis). Due to security concerns, carrying out civilian tasks is possible only after ceasefire, and in most cases, only after reaching a peace settlement. For instance, Shepherd commented that “it is particularly this type of civilian-military synergy where the EU could develop its unique approach to the current security environment” (Shepherd 2006, 85). In other words, “this synergy could also take the form of a mixture of paramilitary units that are structurally not geared to war-fighting but could operate effectively in conflict prevention or post-conflict reconstruction and state-building environments” (Ibid.). However, other scholars, such as Bickerton, have observed that civil-military synergies have been used as a justification for the CSDP and the EU’s performance in crisis management (Bickerton 2011, 60). He argues that the invention of civil-military synergies, which puts the emphasis on performance in the CSDP, is a result of an arbitrary policy-making process and intra-institutional rivalries between different actors within the EU. It is a result of a fight of competencies between the Council and the Commission over the civilian dimensions of crisis management, which were formerly under the responsibility of the Commission (Ibid., 67). Nonetheless, this perspective neglects important political and practical constraints, such as those elaborated in this chapter, which hamper the realisation of civil-military synergies.

To make the more ambitious CMCO operational, the EU adopted the Comprehensive Planning Concept with the aim of delivering a coordinated and coherent response to a crisis on the basis of an analysis of the situation which would consider all the relevant aspects. Such situations often involve more than one EU instrument. During the comprehensive planning, officials are supposed to identify interdependencies, priorities and sequence of activities and make use of resources in a coherent manner. The CMCO requires all the respective CSDP directorates to work together in a coordinated way. This approach applies to all phases of the planning process for an operation conducted under the political control and strategic direction of the PSC (Politico-Military Group 2005). Elaborated by the British Presidency, the Comprehensive Planning Concept represents a “systematic approach designed to address the need for effective intra-pillar and inter-pillar co-ordination of activity by all relevant EU actors in crisis management planning” (Council of the EU 2005b, 15).

Despite the significant emphasis put on civil-military synergies, the EU’s record of
such joint missions is very poor. In more than ten years of the existence of the CSDP, there
have not been many situations where a joint civil-military mission would be seen as a
possibility. Only one mission has been planned and deployed jointly as a civil-military
mission - the EU Support to AMIS in Darfur. This mission was launched by a single joint
action and was coordinated by a joint civil-military coordinating group, CIVMIL in Brussels,
consisting of both military and civilian officials who met regularly to discuss the progress of
the mission. However, the coordination in the field was still difficult since civilian and
military personnel had not been used to working with each other; as one official noted: “I
know that, in the field, they would not talk to each other at all. It was those of us here in
Brussels among the commanders who talked to each other, but not on the field – there were
two different missions basically” (interview 8). According to one interviewee, Chad was
another case when a joint civil-military mission was suggested by the CPCC (interview 11).
However, this proposal was not accepted. The other missions, which are framed as civil-
military missions, EU SSR Guinea Bissau and EUSEC RD Congo missions, were missions
with civil-military components but coordinated by the CPCC for the former and by the EUMS
for the latter. The mission in Guinea Bissau was a very small mission consisting of military
and civilian advisers who advised and trained the security sector authorities (EU Council
Secretariat 2010). EUSEC RD Congo attempted to replicate what was done in Guinea Bissau
with a stronger focus on the military side (EEAS 2015). However, the coordination of the two
elements was problematic since the command of the two aspects of the mission was not sorted
out. The legal service claimed that EUSEC RD Congo was a civilian undertaking and
therefore falling under the authority of the CPCC. Yet, the CPCC was not responsible for the
coordination of the mission. At the time when the mission was still active, an EEAS official
noted that

“[i]t hangs in the air. There is no chain of command. It is not a military
mission, it is not a civilian mission. It is sort of loosely connected to some of
liaison officers who are located here in Brussels. This is a huge mistake, I think
it is not right and it also does not make sense. The other argument against this
merge, which institutionally would make sense, is political. [...] Police makes
good progress; it is well received. As the military touches up their own issues,
they want to have their freedom of actions in the East, which is not the right
thing. But anyway, this is why we have much more reluctance. And therefore,
sometimes, we accepted it while saying: if we merged the two, we might put
the police success at risk, because of problems on the military side. This is a
good reason, I think, to leave them in parallel [as separate missions]”
(interview 1).
Launching joint civil-military missions would be complicated because civilian and military missions are different in their nature, source of funding, structures, command and control. Designing a set-up that serves both requirements – military chain of command and civilian chain of command – brings further organisational challenges. As another official argued: “Civil-military synergies look good at the conceptual and paper level, but in practice civil and military work separately” (interview 10). Bringing different tools in one mission would mean one main point of contact, control and command. Civilian and military instruments have different processes and different lines of financing. The Commission, which covers financially civilian missions, has its own budget and operates on different procedures and processes as compared to the military instruments. This is not unusual as different chains of command or financing also occur at the national level. Nevertheless, there are several instances where military and civilian elements work together at the national level despite the fact that the ministry of interior and the ministry of defence are operating differently. Similarly, civilian and military components have worked together under one chain of command in most UN missions since the Brahimi reform.

In contrast to joint civil-military missions, officials and representatives are supportive of the idea of civil and military instruments deployed in parallel as separate missions. They referred to cases of FYROM, BiH, Palestine and Mali where civilian missions and military operations were in place simultaneously. The co-location of two missions, one military and one civilian, in these cases has been very smooth. They complemented each other and coordination took place at the stages of planning and conduct. Mali is the latest example of a civilian mission launched alongside a military operation. When the civilian CSDP mission was planned, a merged scenario was not considered. Both the member states and the EEAS accepted that two different missions should be deployed. The planning and coordinating team for EUCAP Sahel mission included also advice of officials from the military side. The coordinating and planning team built on the work, expertise and advice of EUTM Mali. Considerations were made about a potential use of assets used by EUTM Mali, in particular in terms of logistical, security and medical arrangements.

Furthermore, most civilian missions, especially those dealing with the SSR, tend to have military advisers or experts. Civilian experts and police officers are often integrated into military mission. The recognition of the need for the deployment of different experts within one mission has developed gradually within the civilian CSDP. First civilian missions were purely police missions. However, the EU (at the level of CivCom and the CPCC) has realised that police was not enough. For example, the EU had to combine policing with prosecutor
services to ensure that evidence-based policing would be interlinked with courts. Currently, there is no single police mission which does not have a link to the justice element.

The composition of personnel in a mission or operation depends on the mandate. If the mandate is about monitoring to be carried out by police experts, then it would be difficult to include other experts, such as from public administration or legal sectors. Nevertheless, monitoring missions have often expanded into capacity-building. EUBAM Rafah monitoring mission in Palestinian Territories has included capacity-building. It also depends on the needs of the receiving country and on what the EU can offer. In South Sudan, the EU proposed much more activities for the civilian mission, but the member states were not able to fulfil these promises. The initial plan covered aviation security of the entire palate of activities. However, this was too ambitious for the EU states which struggled to provide sufficient experts and resources. The mission engaged in a limited number of activities at the end. As in many other cases, the main objective was to ‘show the flag’ (informal interview D).

These observations only partially correspond with Bickerton’s arguments that “there is no clear strategic understanding of what civil-military cooperation actually means for the EU, nor is there any effective implementation of the concept in practice” (Bickerton 2011, 67). Representatives and EEAS officials indeed agree that the realisation of joint missions is difficult. As a result, the EU now refers to cooperation (CIMIC) rather than coordination (CMCO) in civil-military issues (Council of the EU 2016d). Nevertheless, the push for civil-military cooperation in the CSDP in the latter sense (as separate missions deployed in parallel) is another way the EU attempts to realise this approach. The increasing tendency in civilian and military deployments in parallel is possible only after ceasefire. It reflects the EU’s shift towards deployments in post-conflict peacebuilding scenarios.

**CSDP peacebuilding missions: Reflecting the EU’s common preferences**

Peacebuilding activities within the CSDP are not only about normative ideals; as the Lisbon Treaty states, the aim of external action is also the protection of the Union’s citizens and the EU’s security. Stabilisation, reform and rebuilding of state institutions through CSDP peacebuilding missions and operations in third countries, especially those in the EU’s close and broader neighbourhood, indirectly contribute to stability and security of the EU. Nevertheless, the recent migration crisis in the aftermath of conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa as well as the growth in transnational terrorism has encouraged the expansion of the CSDP to serve the EU’s common interests, in particular to enhance the security of the EU
and its citizens, in a more pronounced way. These developments have blurred the lines between external and internal security policy. Scholars have already assessed the impact of external security challenges on internal security as well as internal security challenges on the EU foreign policy (Aggestam and Hill 2008; Hill 2007; Hill 2013). The 2003 ESS indeed highlighted that “the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked” (Council of the EU 2003c, 2). Being launched in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the ESS identified transnational terrorism as one of the most serious security threats to Europe (Ibid., 3 and 6).

The ESS referred to migration as a future challenge for the EU security in two instances. First, the ESS claimed that global warming would encourage competition for natural resources and thus “create further turbulence and migratory movements” (Ibid., 3). Second, the ESS mentioned migration in reference to failed states and organised crime (Ibid.). The Internal Security Strategy acknowledged “the growing links between the European Union internal and external security” (Council of the EU 2015a, 8). These new security challenges were reflected by policymakers who, under the current CSDP provisions, did not see much room for the CSDP in these areas, including illegal migration and refugees (Lindstrom 2015).

With the increasing pressure on European leaders to solve the refugee crisis, the CSDP has been used to tackle illegal migration and the refugee crisis. Frontex,71 the EU’s border management agency, has been mainly responsible for tackling the immigration of illegal migrants to the EU through coordination and through individual operations and projects (Council of the EU 2006).72 However, these efforts were not sufficient in preventing the mass flow of refugees and migrants to Europe. In addition to Frontex, the CSDP has been activated to tackle this crisis. The current migration crisis is an example that demonstrates the shift in the focus of the CSDP from external to homeland security.

In May 2015, the Council established an EU military operation, EU NAVFOR Med Operation, the first of its kind to address the challenge of migration. The Sophia operation has

71 Frontex is a commonly used name for the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG).
72 In 2006, the Operation Poseidon Sea (renamed to Poseidon Rapid Intervention in 2015) became the first joint surveillance operation conducted by Frontex. The operation has been patrolling the eastern Mediterranean Sea with the aim of controlling irregular migration flows towards the EU and tackling cross-border crime. In 2010, Frontex Joint Operation Poseidon Land was launched to control border migration flows at the borders between Turkey and Greece and between Turkey and Bulgaria (Frontex 2014). The Italian government was the first country to react to increased immigration to Europe, in particular to the Italian shores. After failed attempts to convince European partners to launch an EU operation, it deployed its own naval and air operation Mare Nostrum between October 2013 and October 2014. The operation commenced in October 2013 and lasted for a year. But, by the end of 2014 and during 2015, the migratory flows increased rapidly with large numbers of migrants arriving in the EU not only through the Mediterranean Sea but also overland through south-eastern Europe. In a response to the rising numbers of migrants, the FAC launched Operation Triton in 2014 conducted by Frontex. Unlike Mare Nostrum, Triton focuses on border protection rather than search and rescue of migrants. The operation also operates closer to the Italian coast.
implications for both external and internal security policy of the EU. The operation fights and disrupts the business model of human smugglers and traffickers. It systematically identifies, captures and disposes vessels as well as assets used or suspected of being used by migrant smugglers and traffickers (Council of the EU 2015c). As a result, the Sophia operation contributes to the protection of European borders. It signifies a watershed for the CSDP as it brings the idea of collective defence to an operational momentum that has not been seen before in the history of the CSDP. The operation has also extended its activities to peacebuilding; it provides capacity-building and training of, and information sharing with, the Libyan Coastguard and Navy (Council of the EU 2016c). The operation therefore intersects crisis response and peacebuilding tools.

In addition to Operation Sophia, EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUCAP Sahel Mali missions have been adapted to address the flow of migrants in the countries of origin and transit. The Council agreed to reinforce these civilian missions to provide support in preventing irregular migration and combating associated crimes (Council of the EU 2015c). The EU is preparing to adapt the mandate of the EUCAP mission in Mali in a similar way (interview 7). The EU also decided to deploy Frontex liaison officers to every country in the Sahel region and to grant the HR/VP (the EEAS and the missions) access to Frontex documents (Council of the EU 2016b). Other civilian missions and military operations could follow the pattern. This is significant change in the scope of training and stabilisation missions. Post-conflict peacebuilding, which aims at the reconstruction and building of stable state structures, is also a vehicle in the service of the protection of EU external border by halting migration flows already in countries of origin and transit. The CSDP has indeed had a double purpose – the contribution to international peace and security, which ultimately shall lead to the security and protection of EU citizens. Yet, before the migration crisis, the EU did to use the CSDP to directly protect its borders.

Also, the attempts of some member states to launch a CSDP mission in cooperation with Frontex in the Western Balkans to tackle the flow of refugees in 2015/2016 demonstrate that the nexus of external and internal security challenges can be operationalised within the CSDP.73 Although the Council decided to leave this issue to Frontex, the European Asylum Support Office and member states, the external dimensions of the ongoing migration crisis has been acknowledged by the Council (Council of the EU 2015d). Earlier, the expansion of

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73 Eastern European member states and Austria were discussing a possibility of launching a CSDP mission in FYROM to assist the country with the flow of refugees. The realisation of such a mission was not welcomed by FYROM. Some Western EU states also opposed the idea. Instead, the countries decided to send police troops to FYROM and other countries in the West Balkans on the basis of bi-lateral agreements (interviews 23 and 32).
the resources for and increased cooperation within Frontex in 2011 suggested that the member states prioritise the defence of EU borders over remote peace missions. The new operational rules for Frontex were adopted during the time of defence budget cuts in many member states. It was a surprise to many that the CSDP did not undergo a similar change (Fiott 2013). The Visegrad Group countries have called for an expansion of the CSDP. They have stressed that more synergy is needed between the CSDP and the area of Freedom Security and Justice since the links between external and internal security are strengthened. Such an intensified cooperation is important to tackle “contemporary and emerging horizontal issues such as hybrid threats, terrorism, organized crime, foreign fighters and irregular migration, border management, energy security and cyber security” (European Council 2015).

The launch of the Operation Sophia and the expansion of the mandates of missions in the Sahel signify a shift from a traditional approach to the CSDP to a new form of the CSDP that focuses on the security and defence of the EU borders. These developments in the CSDP can encourage the exploration of new ways of using the CSDP in other contexts. The EU may turn away from peacebuilding within the CSDP or use peacebuilding activities for the sole protection of its security. The Mali case study will discuss this tendency in depth. This expansion of CSDP activities confirms arguments by Cornish and Edwards (2001), and Meyer (2006) of an evolving EU strategic culture; EU member states agree on common actions, including military operations, to tackle issues which combine the member states’ commonly perceived normative commitment and self-centred preferences (in this case concerns). By launching missions to tackle migration flows, the member states have demonstrated that they have developed institutional confidence to deploy military force as part of a commonly acceptable policy instrument (i.e. CSDP) based on the recognition of the EU’s legitimacy as an international actor.

**CSDP missions: Building peace or pursuing EU member states’ preferences?**

CSDP peacebuilding missions and operations as actions of EU foreign policy reflect the preferences, concerns and constraints of EU member states. The CSDP is one of the few areas of the EU’s foreign policy which remains highly intergovernmental, thus primarily in the hands of the member states. Member states’ preferences pursued in the CSDP shape the character of missions and operations. The previous chapter highlighted how socialisation processes within the Council committees has led to a convergence of member states’ preferences despite the fact that the EU member states represent different political traditions.
Nevertheless, member states continue to pursue their own priorities, often driven by their internal politics and historical ties. For example, the French Government takes a strong interest in the conflict in Mali due to its close political, economic, cultural, and historical ties as well as because of the large Malian diaspora in France (Gebauer and Hengst 2013). Freire and Galantino have claimed that political and cultural differences continue to affect the progress of the CSDP. Member states lack a common perception on policies and the means required to accomplish them as they have different perceptions of threats, different views on the use of force and instruments, different defence traditions and diverging geopolitical interests. They have argued that divergences in member states’ positions impede a more integrated EU defence and security strategy and thus the decision-making in peace operations. EU countries have different normative frameworks for missions, different levels of ambition and willingness, and different provision of capabilities (Freire and Galantino 2015, 3-8). As a result, the aspirations that the EU with the use of its CSDP has are short-lived and oriented towards actions on which member states agree and for which member states are capable to act and provide their resources and capabilities.

Despite these limitations, the Lisbon Treaty and the subsequent structural changes have enhanced the coherence in policy-making in the CSDP. When authority is consolidated and institutionalised at the EU level, the member states become bearers of those policies and maintain their commitment to the common foreign policy goals (Exadaktylos 2012). Nevertheless, Edwards and Rijks have reminded us that a single institution for the CFSP and the CSDP cannot be automatically regarded as an ultimate path to a common policy. They have pointed to other limits of the EEAS:

“a new institution in itself is unlikely to bridge fundamental differences of opinion on issues of foreign policy. Common procedures can neither replace nor (on their own) create common policies. Political agreement on the means and objectives of the EU’s external relations will remain the ultimate and critical factor for success of the European External Action Service” (Edwards and Rijks 2008, 20).

Although the EEAS can influence policies by providing its input, the member states, through the Council, maintain the primary responsibility for the shape of the Union’s CSDP. This ultimately affects the coherence in peacebuilding policies which continue to be shaped by member states’ preferences.

Situating the CSDP in an overall, coherent and comprehensive strategy requires prioritisation of policies and objectives. Scholars have highlighted that priorities for the CFSP,
including the CSDP, should be realistic (Andersson et al. 2016; Biscop 2016; Biscop and Coelmont 2010). The reality of the EU deployments reflects the nature of the capabilities of the EU. Considering the capabilities of the member states, a more divergent picture appears in relation to what priorities the EU should pursue in its CSDP. Furness argued that the big three, France, Germany and the UK have strong policy preferences and a global presence. Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Poland, Denmark, Belgium and Portugal have strong interests and influence in specific policy areas and regions. In contrast, smaller member states delegate specific functions and focus on a limited number of issues (Furness 2013, 111). France, the UK and Germany continue to understand their role in foreign policy as global players. They are often supported by member states from the Mediterranean. As such, they wish the EU acted as a truly global actor. Nevertheless, they find themselves often limited in their capacities too, as clearly demonstrated by the case of Libya.

In contrast, Eastern European countries and smaller EU states, especially non-NATO members, emphasise the need to focus on certain aspects of the CSDP and on particular regions. Scholars have observed that Eastern Europeans concentrate their foreign and security interests around four geographical regions: the Eastern Neighbourhood, the Western Balkans, Russia and Central Asia (Tulmets 2014). Austria and the Visegrad Group countries are primarily concerned with the Western Balkans, with the Visegrad Group also dealing with Eastern Neighbourhood countries. Baltic states focus on Russia and Ukraine. This geographic prioritisation originates not only from historical and cultural ties but also from geographic proximity and economic ties between Central-Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans and/or Eastern Neighbourhood (Ibid.). Currently, the prioritisation of the Western Balkans is especially in the focus for Eastern Europeans and Austria due to the refugee crisis:

“the Western Balkan is the epicentre of our contemporary discussions, as we are considering whether it is possible to manage the current flow of refugees with a CSDP operation” (interview 33).

This prioritisation leaves Eastern-Europeans and Austria limited room for an involvement in CSDP actions in Africa or the Middle East. Austria and Eastern European states are indeed aware of the need to participate in missions in Africa. However, deployments to African countries lack any significant political support. Eastern Europeans and Austrians do not have any particular political or economic interests in Africa. Eastern Europeans often lack clearly defined foreign and security policies in this region. Their contributions to CSDP actions in Africa are often results of bureaucratic efforts of respective ministries rather than
political priorities of their governments (see Weiss 2014). Such involvements also face practical problems, including the lack of appropriate language skills, especially in French-speaking countries, and are also driven by security concerns of deploying in countries with terrorist threats. As one representative of CivCom argued:

“Even if we sent personnel to an African country, granted that they would have interpreters there, we could not do this because of security reasons. Imagine only, how our staff would communicate with locals in case of an emergency or a terrorist attack” (interview 22).

Nevertheless, neither Eastern European states nor Austria have opposed decisions to launch new missions in Africa or in the Middle East. Eastern Europeans tend to remain passive when it comes to decision-making and planning on CSDP actions in Africa, and follow the majority, or larger states (interview 34). In contrast, larger states tend to be more decisive and active in shaping both decisions and policies in the CSDP. For example, France and Germany were strongly opposed to a CSDP involvement in Ukraine. Germany was keen to expand the civilian mission and the military operation in Mali to ensure that their staff is deployed in Mali rather than in more dangerous CAR (interview 24 and 29). Yet, Germany tends to follow French interests when it comes to deployments in French-speaking Africa.

The EU has launched more civilian missions than military operations. On the one hand, this reflects demands and needs of countries of deployment. On the other hand, this also shows the limits of the military power of the EU. This limitation is caused by different views on civilian and military approaches among member states. France and the UK remain key players in military operations. Civilian missions take priority over military operation in case of non-NATO member countries which believe that civilian approaches to post-conflict reconstruction are fundamental in ensuring lasting peace. At the same time, these countries do not neglect the importance of military operations. In fact, non-NATO EU countries also provide military personnel to military operations. For other states, civilian approaches to conflict management may be prioritised due to limited military capabilities. For example, the historical reasons for Germany’s reluctance to engage in executive operations is no longer the only concern. Expertise and preparedness to engage in direct fighting in remote areas such as northern Mali, as compared to the quality of the French and British armies, is of main concern. In contrast, Eastern European countries contribute with personnel to military operations more than to civilian missions. This is due to the lack of expertise in respective areas such as judicial and police reform, as well as due to the lack of language skills (interviews 22, 23, 26, 27, 30, 34).
CSDP peacebuilding actions require strategic prioritisation. The prioritisation of geographical interests would be welcomed by policy makers at the EEAS who claimed that the EU strategy needs to be specific. Strategies with a focus on particular regions or areas would be more helpful in guiding the planning, coordination and implementation of CSDP missions and operations. An official said that the EU needs:

“more systematic strategies and conflict analysis. And strategy because that is what we really need. I would like to go to Afghanistan with an EU strategy, or CAR EU strategy, or Sahel EU strategy. That is what we need for planning and what is not systematically done. I need a guideline. What is it what the EU wants to do in order to plug my planning into it” (interview 3).

Geopolitically focused strategies for particular regions would also allow for a more realistic planning and design of CSDP actions. Such strategies could help to resolve the dilemma of short-term versus long-term missions since short-term CSDP missions/operations could be planned and deployed as part of a long-term strategy.

The EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel is a model example of a coherent and comprehensive strategy for a particular region; it incorporates the vision of what a comprehensive approach should look like (see pp. 96-100 of this thesis). The strategy adopts a holistic and regional approach to multidimensional, cross-border and interrelated problems in the Sahel region (Council of the EU 2011b; 2015c). The EU uses all the instruments in the Sahel in the context of its comprehensive approach. In the Sahel, the EU deploys three CSDP missions and operations, namely EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUCAP Sahel Niger, with different peacebuilding tasks, in parallel at the same time. The work of the CSDP missions and operations is complemented by activities of the EUSR for the Sahel and the EU Delegations in the Sahel countries.

As the Sahel strategy demonstrates, a particular strategy can lead to new developments in the CSDP. The Sahel strategy has encouraged the regionalisation of the CSDP missions and operations in the region (see chapter four). Nevertheless, these new developments raise new security concerns as the northern areas are potential to terrorist threats. Deployments in remote regions of the country with poor infrastructure and no paved roads may most likely increase the costs of the operation and the mission. It may be challenging for the EU to secure not only its staff in such remote areas, but also to ensure regular supplies. While it is planned that the EUTM staff will not be involved in executive tasks, the deployment of trainees in protection activities will shift the scope of the mission from capacity-building to a “harder” engagement (interview 10). The design of firm objectives needs to take into account the
problem of the contemporary unstable and constantly changing international environment with regard to international peace and security. Deployments in increasingly insecure remote areas need to be considered before the EU commits itself to an engagement.

A conflict varies from case to case, and requires a case-specific approach. This seems to be a paradigmatic problem of CSDP missions and operations. The agenda, mandates and operational parameters of CSDP missions and operations have not changed significantly since the launch of the first operations in 2003. Reassessing the scope and mandates of the CSDP will be necessary in the light of the contemporary challenges. These developments suggest a further shift in the evolution of peacebuilding practices, namely that peacebuilding activities may need to continue alongside other combat and protection activities. With increasing security challenges, in particular the threat of terrorism, training and capacity-building need to be accompanied by peacekeeping and peace-enforcement measures. However, it is unlikely that the CSDP is going to be used for the latter two tasks.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has explored how CSDP peacebuilding actions are understood and governed through the multilevel processes of policy- and decision-making that involves both member states, represented in the Council preparatory bodies, and the EEAS. CSDP peacebuilding activities are designed by policymakers of the Council preparatory bodies and the EEAS. As a result, peacebuilding under the CSDP is an outcome of a combined intergovernmental and supranational policy-making. On the one hand, it projects the preferences of member states which seek to shape the CSDP according to their interests. On the other hand, it is a product of complex bureaucratic processes within the EU institutions. Despite the fact that the EU adopted peacebuilding as an international normative framework, its own practice and political and policy-making processes have enabled the EU to pursue peacebuilding activities in an autonomous manner. The autonomous character of CSDP policy-making and the expansion of CSDP instruments into new areas have changed the conceptualisation of peacebuilding.

Peacebuilding is understood by policymakers in four interrelated modalities: as stabilisation efforts, as part of the comprehensive approach, as a tool to enhance the EU’s common priorities (such as the EU’s own security) and as a result of member states’ national preferences. The findings of this chapter present EU peacebuilding as a result of policy-making processes that are guided by a consensus-oriented approach. Although member states seek to pursue their own preferences, they do not tend to cross red lines; they wish to reach an
agreement on common objectives and actions for the sake of their common policy. Peacebuilding represents a policy on which the member states can agree - a part of the EU’s evolving strategic culture. It expresses the political will of the 28 – their ability to agree on the need to tackle violent conflicts. While the EU possess the full-range of tools to tackle all the stages of the conflict cycle, post-conflict peacebuilding (in addition to conflict prevention) comprises a set of activities on which the member state can agree. Member states generally agree on the content and normative underpinnings of peacebuilding and its understanding as post-conflict stabilisation and as part of the comprehensive approach. Major differences lie in the area of geopolitical priorities as countries tend to focus on particular regions.

The EU set up structures and instruments for international crisis management and peacebuilding. Nevertheless, there are limitations of the instruments themselves defined by political, policy-making and operational concerns, constraints and capability-expectations gaps. The autonomous character of CSDP policy-making and practice has generated the major limitations of this instrument; in theory the CSDP is designed to carry out the full range of crisis management tasks. In practice, it mainly focuses on specific areas of post-conflict peacebuilding. Peacebuilding missions and operations are often pragmatic and rational choices since they are easier to agree on and politically less controversial compared to operations which use combat forces. Engagements to stop an ongoing conflict with the use of force and military peacekeeping operations with the mandate to protect civilians are options that are difficult to agree on.

The EU’s approach to peacebuilding is affected by different sources of tension. First, there is a general tension between two normative frameworks: ‘hard power’ approaches and ‘soft power’ approaches embedded in the CSDP. But, the general assumptions that some states, such as France, push for hard and military approaches, whereas other countries, such as Austria, prefer non-military approaches, proves fallacious here. As the case of Austria’s change of preference shows, the approaches of member states are contextual. Second, intra-institutional tensions within the EEAS continue to be part of the everyday work of the EU. Yet, they seem to have little negative impact on the actual policy-making. Different actors have different priorities. Yet, the analysis of policy assumptions carried out in this research suggests that a consensus on peacebuilding is evolving incrementally among various actors, thus framing the conceptual maps of policymakers in the CSDP structures. These tensions highlight the limitations of the intergovernmental system in CSDP policy-making. It is therefore important to look at the level of operations to understand how peacebuilding designed through complex policy-making sustains in particular scenarios and how member
states and the EU pursue peacebuilding in different cases.
5 Peacebuilding through CSDP Actions in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The case of BiH illustrates the operational dynamics of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding within the CSDP. This case marked the transformation from the first- to second-generation peacekeeping and from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, accompanied by a transfer of the leadership from the US to the EU. BiH provided a laboratory for the EU’s CSDP and a place for the realisation of its first autonomous CSDP mission. While the EU failed to resolve the open conflict in BiH, it became the leading actor in post-conflict peacebuilding. The EU’s military operation and civilian mission in BiH have served as instruments of peacebuilding aimed at building state institutions according to the state-centred peacebuilding model. The two CSDP actions in BiH have demonstrated not only the EU’s normative commitment to international peacebuilding; they have also been part of the accession process which strengthened the influence of the EU in peacebuilding in the country. BiH therefore shows the contested politics and policy-making of the EU’s peacebuilding approach that spans between the promotion of norms and member states’ preferences. Peacebuilding activities carried out through the two CSDP actions depict the autonomy and dependence as well as strengths and constraints of the CSDP. The chapter starts with a brief overview of the conflict and post-conflict developments in BiH. It then moves to analysing peacebuilding activities in the two CSDP actions while exploring how they reflect the EU’s capability as a foreign policy actor. The chapter traces the normative foundation of the missions and the role of the EU member states and structures in their design and delivery. The last part discusses the relationship between the EU’s peacebuilding approach and the membership perspective.

Overview of the conflict and the response by the international community

The war in BiH was the bloodiest in the post-Cold War European history, and with the first case of genocide in Europe after WWII. Caught in Yugoslavia’s dissolution, BiH’s three large ethnic communities disagreed about the republic’s future. While Bosniaks aspired for independence, Serbs sought to remain in Serb-dominated rump-Yugoslavia and Croats wanted to be part of Croatia. Minor clashes soon erupted into large-scale fighting. The conflict raised discussions about new drivers of intra-state wars, in particular the role of ethnicity and religion. The armed conflict involved three parties demarcated alongside ethno-religious lines: Muslim Bosniaks, Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats. Although the conflict was about

74 Together with Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia, BiH was one of the six constituent federal republics that formed the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia.
75 The collapse of communism brought Yugoslavia’s religions new freedoms, resulting in a religious revival
power and territorial issues, ethno-religious and nationalist identities, exploited by political leaders, became dominant drivers of the conflict (Kmec and Ganiel forthcoming; Kivimäki, Kramer and Pasch 2012; Silvestri and Mayall 2015). Group identity formed the cornerstone of the political discourse and the mobilisation of popular support for war (Kaldor 2013).

For the EU, this was not a distant conflict; it was an acrimonious conflict on the EU’s doorstep. The EU attempted to resolve the crisis through diplomacy, mediation and political pressure, which were, however, rejected by Milošević (Gow 1997). Yet, the Bosnian war demonstrated the EU’s weakness to prevent and stop the violence. The Yugoslavia’s conflicts occurred at the time when the EU was still transforming from an economic association to a union and developing its international actorness through its CFSP (Mühlmann 2008). The EU member states’ inability to agree on means and the absence of a common instrument contributed to the EU’s failure to get a grip on the situation. Although the European Community recognised Bosnia as an independent state in 1992, member states disagreed over strategies and options, including the use of military force, to tackle the crisis. This European discord highlighted the perception of a weak EU and a strong US with the latter as the only actor capable of decisively intervening to end the violence in the Western Balkans (Glaurdic 2011; Keil and Perry 2016; Simms 2002). Yet even in 1991, the US had indicated its willingness to see the Community taking the lead on the Yugoslav crisis (Almond 1994).

At the beginning of the breakup of Yugoslavia, the European Community supported the preservation of the unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. Tonra noted that any independence by Slovenia and Croatia was not acceptable for the Community’s member states. As Serbian military actions intensified, Germany began discussing the recognition of Croatian and Slovenian independence, which was, however, viewed with a dismay in Paris and elsewhere (Tonra 2001, 223-224). The member states sent the Troika76 on an emergency mission to Yugoslavia to secure a cease-fire (Commission 1991a) which was agreed between Yugoslav forces and Slovenia in July 1991. The Community also asked the WEU to draw up a plan for a peace process in BiH (Commission 1991b). In the same year, the European Community established a Monitor Mission (ECMM) in Western Balkans to monitor political and security developments.77 Nevertheless, these instruments failed in the case of BiH as the Bosnian Serb Army and Milosevic’s regime pursued their interests by violent means (Glaurdic 2011).

76 Until 2009, the ‘Troika’ represented the EU in external relations within the scope of the CFSP. It referred to a group composed of the Foreign Affairs Minister of the member state holding the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, the SG/HR and the European Commissioner for External Relations.
77 In 2001, the mission transitioned to the EUMM and closed in BiH in 2007 (EU Council Secretariat 2007c).
Nor was the UN able to resolve the conflict - through diplomatic or coercive attempts, including mediation, political pressure, arms embargo, mandate for a no-fly zone enforced by NATO and the United Nations Protection Force operation (UNPROFOR). It was indeed UNPROFOR, in particular the Dutch battalion, which was blamed for failing to prevent the ethnic cleansing in Srebrenica. Supported mainly by European troops, UNPROFOR was tasked with the delivery of humanitarian relief and monitoring no-fly zones and safe areas. However, it was not mandated to use the force for civilian protection (UN 1996). Although General Philippe Morillon initially acted to defend civilians, UNPROFOR failed to avoid the disaster (Battistelli 2015, 36-37). UNPROFOR revealed the limits of the first-generation peacekeeping to either achieve peace or protect civilians. Following the failure of this peacekeeping operation, NATO launched its Operation Deliberate Force against the Bosnian Serb Army. The air campaign was key to convincing the Serbs to take part in negotiations that resulted in the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also know as Dayton Accords, signed by the presidents of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia and BiH, which ended the Bosnian war.

The Dayton Accords set a number of internationally assisted post-conflict stabilisation and peacebuilding objectives, including the provision of a safe and secure environment, the establishment of a unified and democratic BiH, the creation of vital state structures, the rebuilding of the economy, and the return of displaced persons and refugees to their homes. Dayton created a new constitutional order for BiH with two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) comprising mostly Bosniaks and Croats, and the Republika Srpska (RS) with overwhelmingly Serbian population (The General Framework Agreement 1995). This reorganisation created a de-centralised state with each entity governing its own territory. Scholars have noted that this reorganisation has never been fully accepted by the political elites of BiH and has continued to be the main source of political division. While Bosniaks have longed for a centralised state, RS has preferred to maintain the two entities and even hopes for separation from BiH, eventually joining Serbia. Bosnian Croats have viewed this reorganisation as discriminatory, seeking either the abolition of the two-entities system or the creation of a third entity corresponding to the war-time Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna. Besides, the Brčko District remains an unresolved issues as a self-governing administrative

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78 UNPROFOR operated from 1992 until 1995. In 1993, the UNSC established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and mandated NATO to enforce a no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina (ICJ 2007).

79 The Dayton Peace Agreement was initialled at the Dayton air force base in Ohio in November 1995 and signed in Paris in December 1995. Scholars and Practitioners concluded that the Dayton was in essence an “imposed” peace, mandated by the US with the parties who consented to the agreement having little say over the content of the agreement (Chandler 2005a; Holbrooke 1998).
unit of BiH and a condominium of both the FBiH and RS (Keil and Kudlenko 2015, 480; see also Sisk 2001, 788; UNDP 2007, 49).

Based on the Dayton Accords, NATO established the operation Implementation Force (IFOR) in 1995, tasked with separating warring armies, collecting weapons, destroying artillery, creating conditions for elections, managing the return of refugees and protecting civilians. Unlike UNPROFOR, this operation was of a mixed peace-enforcement and peacekeeping nature with an executive mandate. IFOR was replaced by the Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) between 1996 and 2005, which continued in ensuring security and order. In addition to military personnel, SFOR also included civilian staff and a 600-strong Multinational Specialised Unit (MSU) – an armed police unit with executive mandate, made up primarily of Italian carabinieri and Austrian, Hungarian, Slovenian and Romanian policemen. IFOR and SFOR represented second-generation peacekeeping operations with an executive mandate, including the protection of civilians, and civilian elements of conflict management. They focused on the immediate consequences of the war - the elimination of direct violence - whereas the tasks of addressing structural issues and reconstruction waited to be carried out by the UN and subsequently by the EU.

In addition to these activities, the UN launched its own mission - United Nations Mission in BiH (UNMIBH) - in 1995, which lasted until December 2002, to contribute to the establishment of the rule of law. The mission was tasked with assisting in the reform and restructuring of the local police, assessing the judicial system, and auditing the performance of the police and others involved in the maintenance of law and order (UN “United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina”). UNMIBH included the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) - a police mission which monitored, observed and inspected law enforcement activities, including associated judicial organisations and proceedings. It trained law enforcement personnel and police forces, supported the authorities in BiH in the construction of law enforcement agencies, provided equipment, advised law enforcement agencies on democratic policing principles and human rights, and investigated and assisted with investigations of human rights abuses by law enforcement personnel (The General Framework Agreement, Annex 11, Art. III; UN Security Council 1995; 1996).

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80 At its high, IFOR had around 80,000 soldiers.
81 SFOR was deployed with 31,000 soldiers. This number was reduced to 7,000 by 2003 (NATO 2004a).
82 The IPTF had about 2,000 staff. The mission carried out registration and vetting of police officers with a view to eliminating those unqualified and guilty of war crimes. It downsized the number of BiH policemen from 60,000 to 16,000, and included staff from minority backgrounds. At a later stage, the mission assisted with the establishment of police academies, the State Border Service (SBS) and the State and Information and Protection Agency (SIPA). Despite this progress, further reforms were needed to transform the police to a democratic and ethnically unbiased service (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006; Mühlmann 2008).
The design, coordination and implementation of internationally assisted peacebuilding in BiH has been facilitated through the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in BiH, represented by the High Representative for BiH, the highest political authority and the country’s chief executive officer responsible for overseeing the implementation of civilian and political aspects of Dayton. The OHR reports to the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), an ad hoc international body charged with implementing the Dayton Agreement (General Framework Agreement 1995; OHR “General Information”). The High Representative became the embodiment of supreme power in the country, being granted the so-called ‘Bonn authority’ to impose and invalidate legislation as well as to appoint and dismiss any Bosnian officials obstructing the implementation of the Dayton (OHR “Peace Implementation Council”). The international community has acted as an ultimate decision-maker via its High Representative (Pohl 2014, 48; Chandler 2000, 65). Through the OHR, BiH has become a model of post-Cold War international administration of post-war territories. The OHR, equipped with absolute powers, represented a new form “trusteeship” (Caplan 2002, 2005; Chandler 2000, 2005b). This provision has made it impossible for the country to govern itself without the direct oversight of the High Representative and foreign officials. As Caplan commented:

“[n]ever before has a mission had to make and enforce local laws, exercise total fiscal management of a territory, appoint and remove public officials, create a central bank, establish and maintain customs services, regulate the local media, adjudicate rival property claims, run schools, regulate local businesses and reconstruct and operate all public utilities” (Caplan 2002, 9).

The OHR has no equivalent in other post-Cold War post-conflict scenarios. Even Kosovo possesses more independence in the governance of its own matters, despite the arrangements of the international supervision of Kosovo through the International Civilian Office and the EU’s EULEX mission, which were granted powers over legislative and executive actions. The OHR became the key channel for the implementation of international peacebuilding policies. BiH has been a template of the post-Cold War internationally administered state-building and peacebuilding (Caplan 2002; Chandler 2005a, 2005b). The OHR was the key institution for the EU in assuming the leadership role in post-conflict peacebuilding.

83 The PIC comprises 55 states and other organisations. It clarifies the responsibilities of the High Representative in the implementation of the civilian part of the Dayton Agreement. The Steering Board is the executive arm of the PIC with the US, Canada, Russia, Germany, the UK, France, Italy, Japan, the EU Presidency, the European Commission and the OIC represented by Turkey as members (OHR “Peace Implementation Council”). The establishment of the PIC was a compromise between the EU and the US. As the US refused a UN involvement, Europeans proposed the PIC with an aim of providing not only international legitimacy in the absence of the UN but, more importantly, ensuring their inclusion in the process (Chandler 2005a).
Peacebuilding - the golden opportunity for an EU-led involvement in BiH

While the EU remained largely excluded from peace-enforcement and peacekeeping operations in BiH, it grasped the opportunity to engage in the post-conflict peacebuilding stage. After NATO and UN operations established conditions for security, the main European powers began focusing on post-conflict reconstruction. To ensure the sustainability of security and peace, it was cardinal to establish functioning political and state institutions and rebuild the infrastructure. While it was uncomplicated to reconstruct the infrastructure with EU financial aid, establishing effective central state institutions and a political system that would bring Bosniak, Serb and Croat leaders together seemed more difficult to achieve (Keil and Perry 2015, 464). The EU used two main avenues in pursuing peacebuilding in BiH. According to Pohl, the international actors were ‘pushing’ for state- and nation-building by means of the Bonn powers via the OHR, which in fact meant imposing ready-made solutions on BiH, on the one hand. On the other hand, potential membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions was supposed to serve as a ‘pull’ factor for Bosnians to actively support state-building and to inspire them for domestic reforms (Pohl 2014, 49).

Nevertheless, the EU was not the only actor in peacebuilding in BiH. The EU had to negotiate its position with the US which played the pivotal role in bringing the fighting to the end and assuring the Dayton Agreement. The US also took the leading role in the immediate post-agreement implementation phase; it held key positions and contributed with the largest national contingent to IFOR/ SFOR troops. But, Europeans soon realised that they could not rely on the US support forever (Gow 1997, 320; Pohl 2014, 49). EU countries also wanted the leading role in the peacebuilding process in BiH. They successfully lobbied for the job of the High Representative to go to a European (Daalder 2000, 157). From 2000 onwards, the oversight of the administration of post-conflict BiH transferred from the US to the EU. The EU moved from its previously subordinate to leading role within the PIC. With the transfer of powers under the OHR to the EU, the Union determined almost every aspect of policy-making in BiH (Chandler 2005a). Between 2002 and 2011, the HR was ‘double-hatted’ as EUSR for BiH. Lord Ashdown became the first EUSR in BiH while also assuming the position of the High Representative in 2002. The creation of Ashdown’s ‘double-hatted’ position as both EU and PIC representative symbolised the transition to an EU’s ownership in the post-conflict peacebuilding of BiH (Chandler 2005a; see also Council of the EU 2002a).  

The EU’s peacebuilding policy towards BiH has been driven by mixed motives – both

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84 The “double hatting” between the EUSR and the OHR was discontinued in 2011, after the creation of the EEAS when the post of the EUSR was fused with the head of the EU delegation. Yet, the post of the High Representative has continued to be occupied by a representative from an EU state.
self-centred and altruistic. The EU has a vested interest in the stability of BiH and the Western Balkan, supported by the historical ties and moral obligations. The stability of the region has direct security implications for the EU itself. Referring directly to the Balkan conflicts, the ESS stated that neighbouring countries which “are engaged in violent conflict [...] pose problems for Europe” and highlighted the need for building a “ring of well-governed countries to the East of the European Union” (Council of the EU 2003c; 7-8). Failing states after the breakup of Yugoslavia posed serious security concerns for the EU as they generated the flow of refugees, drug and weapons trafficking, and a potential ground for terrorism. These concerns have guided the EU’s involvement in peacemaking and peacebuilding in BiH as to promote the security of the EU (Merlingen 2013, 146). Moreover, by building a viable Bosnian state, EU governments attempted to compensate for their appearance as incompetent to deal with a crisis on their doorstep (Pohl 2014, 49). The EU wanted to improve its reputation and credibility as a security actor in BiH as well as its international identity (Merlingen 2013, 146-7). Last but not least, the EU’s actions in BiH have been driven by the EU’s solidarity with the Balkans - with the victims of genocide and refugees - and moral commitment to the promotion of European norms, including peace and the rule of law (Ibid.).

These mixed motives are reflected in the CSDP actions in BiH which formed an important element of the transition towards the EU’s ownership in BiH. Scholars have argued that the previously unsatisfactory EU involvement and the failure of European battalions under the UN operation provided the main reason for the CSDP engagement (Pohl 2014; Mühlmann 2008). This motive also became part of the EU’s branding strategy, with an objective “to show to EU publics and the world that the EU has finally got its act together and that, therefore, it has to be taken seriously as an international security provider” (Merlingen 2013, 147). By launching a CSDP mission in BiH, the EU sought to establish itself as a credible security actor, to improve the EU’s damaged self-image and to prove that its foreign policy is as ethical as effective (ICG 2004, 1; Emerson and Gross 2007b, 146; Pohl 2014, 65). The EU missions in the Balkans were equally a rational response to security threats that the EU perceived in the destabilised Western Balkans, motivated by the objective to promote security of the EU citizens (Merlingen 2013, 146). According to Pohl, the US intention to withdraw from BiH, was another reason, in addition to the growing ambitions of the EU, for Bosnia to appear on the agenda of the CSDP. The Iraq invasion led the US to shift its focus, troops and resources away from the Balkans (Pohl 2014, 49, 65).85

85 The US was not enthusiastic about an EU operation in BiH initially since the EU plan was not pre-agreed and since the EU did not want to run its mission through NATO. This ambiguity was also related to the US fears that CSDP represented a French plot to organise European resistance to the US leadership in European
The Balkans offered a prime opportunity to make the CSDP operational. Such an involvement was seen by the European powers as doable due to

“a relatively stable security environment, geographic proximity, extensive knowledge of and (military) experience in the region, and therefore less uncertainty with respect to potential risks. Since NATO was present in [the] theatre, time horizons for planning could moreover be generous when compared to true crisis management” (Pohl 2014, 67).

The EU entered the theatre of BiH in the post-conflict phase at a point when the security situation was already stable and benign and the peacebuilding process initiated. The timing of the CSDP involvement in the crisis in BiH reflects the EU’s limited capability in international conflict management. This capability applies to all the three aspects of Hill’s capabilities of a foreign policy actors. Before the end of the Bosnian war, the EU was unable to agree on a common military action, which seemed necessary; it lacked instruments such as the CSDP; and it was not willing to provide resources. It indeed agreed on some measures, in particular diplomatic actions and sanctions; however, none of these were effective against Milošević’s regime. Once the situation became relatively stable, the EU was capable of agreeing on stabilisation and peacebuilding operations, possessing a policy for this purpose (i.e. CSDP) and providing required resources.

The CSDP military operation and civilian mission launched in BiH have been the avenues for the delivery of internationally administered peacebuilding in the country. They have focused on military and police aspects of peacebuilding – two elements of peacebuilding in addition to political, economic and judicial sectors which the international community identified as priorities in the Dayton Agreement. The establishment of peace, security and rule of law in BiH required the creation of functioning state institutions, especially the judiciary, police and military sectors. Reforms of the military and police sectors were needed since both military and police forces had acted as repressive instruments of ethnic warfare during the war (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006, 57).

These elements have also been identified by international peacebuilders as fundamental cornerstones of post-conflict reconstruction to avoid the cases of failed states. BiH has become the paradigmatic example of a post-Cold War state-building that required not a reconstruction but building of new state institutions, a new state, from scratch. BiH has

security affairs (Pohl 2014, 51). Indeed, France was keen to use BiH to demonstrate the EU’s independent actoriness and to show the EU’s brand-new ESDP (Howorth 2014; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006, 60). Yet, Pohl found little evidence for the assumption that the EU’s decision to launch its own operation was intended to balance the US. Germans and British saw a CSDP action in BiH as a chance to help the US rather than to push the US out (Pohl 2014, 51, 70).
become a laboratory for international state-builders, notably the EU, seeking to establish state structures capable of managing ethnic relations and democratic governance. It has provided a testing ground for the EU to apply its new CSDP and to test the strength of the transformative promise of EU membership (Keil and Perry 2015, 463). These actions have followed the logic of the peacebuilding model that focuses on building functioning state institutions.

By 2003, when the EU launched its CSDP, significant progress not only in peacekeeping but also in peacebuilding has been achieved. Keeping peace between the conflict parties was no longer the main task. Instead, new security issues, particularly criminality, youth crime and corruption, were the main problems (Solana 2002). The state of BiH was corrupt, unable to run its matters on its own – its institutional incapacity was a major obstacle to peace, fostering economic and social instability, which make a return to an open conflict more likely (Edwards and Tošić 2008, 209). While the EU has engaged, in essence, in all the spheres of state-building in BiH, including the constitutional, judiciary, social and economic reforms, the CSDP has focused on the SSR, in particular the police and military reform. The two CSDP actions have been part of a comprehensive peacebuilding package that the EU has delivered in BiH.

**EUPM: Civilian peacebuilding through a police reform**

The EU’s autonomous approach to peacebuilding within the CSDP is best demonstrated on the example of the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in BiH, the first ever CSDP mission. The EUPM replaced the previous UN IPTF. The idea of the EU taking over the UN mission took shape in 2001. The EUPM was established in March 2002 (Council of the EU 2002b). The mission was launched in January 2003 and terminated in June 2012. Since the European Commission Delegation and the EUMM were already present in BiH, the planners of the mission could rely on their advice. Yet, it took almost nine months to launch this mission. The problem was with member states’ hesitation and slow pace in providing required personnel and equipment and civilian experts. The EU planners lacked expertise and experience with planning such a mission, which required the development of new procurement and programme policies (interview 3; Mühlmann 2008). The prolonged planning of this mission reflects that the CSDP was not the most suitable instrument for the management of an open conflict or an immediate post-conflict stabilisation. Protracted

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86 The mission was established after the PIC accepted the offer by the EU, after BiH invited the EU to launch its own mission, and after the UNSC welcomed the PIC decision to transfer the responsibility over police reform to the EU (UN Security Council 2002).
planning is better suited to post-conflict peacebuilding tasks.

It was the police aspect which made this mission a tool of the EU’s autonomous peacebuilding approach. The EUPM was not only new as a first CSDP mission but also still a novelty as an exclusively police mission with training and advisory functions. Stand-alone police missions were rare in international peacekeeping and peacebuilding before the launch of the CSDP.\(^{87}\) Traditionally, the mandate of police components was limited to monitoring and reporting. Only since the late 1990s, have advisory, mentoring and training functions been added. The EUPM included not only police but also other civilian personnel, which reflects a strong peacebuilding dimension of this mission and the fact that such a deployment was possible due to stable and secure conditions. The focus on the police sector in the EUPM corresponded to the ideas of the UN Brahimi reform process which emphasised the inclusion of civilian components, including police, in peace missions.

Nevertheless, compared to a 2,000-personnel strong IPTF, the EUPM was a mission with a moderate personnel strength.\(^{88}\) Also, this exclusive focus on police was not fully in harmony with the UN concept of multidimensional and integrated missions. The UN had advised the EU about the importance of linking police with the rule of law sector, in particular prosecutor services, investigative judges, judiciary and prison administration. The EU excluded these areas since the rule of law sector and other peacebuilding activities were the responsibility of the OHR. Further, the CSDP was established to focus exclusively on four priority areas of civilian crisis management at that time. In addition, an integrated mission would have been too demanding for the start of the CSDP (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006, 61). With the newly established CSDP, the EU had a full autonomy in launching its own mission and according to its own vision.

The mandate of the EUPM corresponded to the logic of liberal peacebuilding focused on building functioning state institutions capable of exercising the rule of law and internal security tasks. The mission was tasked with establishing sustainable, professional and multi-ethnic policing arrangements, which was one of the objectives of the Dayton Agreement. Unlike the IPTF, however, it lacked executive powers of law enforcement. The first mandate of the mission concentrated on the institution- and capacity-building, mainly through mentoring police forces on best practices, monitoring and inspecting their conduct, and

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\(^{87}\) Although police officers have been deployed in UN peace operations since the 1960s, policing became an integral part of UN peacekeeping only with the adoption of the Brahimi reform. The first formed police unit was deployed to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in 1999.

\(^{88}\) The initial strength of the EUPM was 478 international policemen and 296 national staff. At its peak, it had 556 police officers and 333 national staff. At the time of its closure, the mission had 34 international staff and 47 national staff. The common budget of the mission was over € 32 million (EEAS 2012).
providing them with strategic and policy advice (Council of the EU 2002b). The aim of the mission was to create a modern police force “trained, equipped and able to assume full responsibility and to independently uphold law enforcement at the level of international standards (EEAS 2012, 1). The mission equipped police officers with competencies and skills to high professional and EU standards. It enhanced the effectiveness and accountability of police forces. It modernised the sector, including the technical, logistical and IT aspects. It developed policies, guidelines, a new educational system and teaching curricula for police training, and other elements required for a modern police. It restructured the country’s police and criminal investigation sector (Merlingen 2009; 2013; Mühlmann 2008).

The mandate intermittently extended into tasks of fighting organised crime, corruption, misconduct and political interference in policing matters. It sought to develop the financial viability, operational capacity and accountability of the police; the capacity of the police and the criminal justice system in the fight against organised crime and corruption; a link between the police and prosecutor sectors; and the criminal investigative capacities of BiH (Council of the EU 2005c; 2007b; 2009b; 2010b). After the war, police forces in BiH had remained under the influence of politicians who saw the police as a partisan instrument of power projection. The law enforcement agencies of RS were reluctant to cooperate with the ICTY with regard to war criminals. A dysfunctional organisational culture, ethno-political interference and the absence of unified policing governance created a ground for organised crime. The country became the main route and base for drug, human and arms trafficking (Mühlmann 2008, 45).

The mission also touched upon the issues of fourth-generation peacebuilding (see p. 24 of this thesis); it addressed the problem of ethnic and political division while having the task to build a centralised and consolidated police system (Council of the EU 2009b). With the construction of the two-entities system by Dayton, policing arrangements became the competency of each entity, resulting into an ethnically divided and fragmented police sector. While RS had one centralised, regionally subdivided police body, the fragmented FBiH established eleven independent police agencies and the Brčko District had its own police force. The federal level had only two police units – judicial and financial police. These 15 law enforcement agencies were different in size and operated under different rules and management models (Mühlmann 2008, 44-45). The creation of a countrywide unified system with common standards and procedures, which required fundamental reforms, became the central task of the EUPM. The mission sought to achieve coherence and cooperation among the 15 police agencies as well as between law enforcement agencies and the judiciary. It
aimed at creating joint strategic and operational capacity of the police system.

The state-centred peacebuilding nature of the EUPM is noticeable in the task of building state-level institutions. The EUPM continued with the transformation of the SIPA into the State Investigation and Protection Agency and the formation of the SBS, which were initiated by the IPTF. The mission also contributed to the introduction of a new unified legislation, the programming of the policy-making and executive work, the enhancement of the competencies and expertise of the staff, and the consolidation of inter-institutional relations. The mission advised and supported the Ministry of Security and the Bosnian Interpol office, including in the drafting of new laws (Mühlmann 2008, 50). From this perspective, the mission was significantly involved in state-building and state administration despite the fact that it did not have executive mandate. The provisions of the SAP, especially the conditionality of funding, allowed the EUPM to influence the legislative and executive parts of the establishment of central state institutions.

To implement the objectives of the mandate, the EUPM identified four strategic priority areas: institution- and capacity-building; combating organised crime and corruption; developing financial viability and sustainability; and building police independence and accountability. Based on these priority areas, the mission developed seven reform capacity-building programmes divided into about 120 projects. These programmes included: the development of the SIPA and the SBS; modernisation and strengthening of the capacity of the crime police; police education; internal affairs; police administration; criminal justice; and public order policing (For details on different programmes and projects, see Merlingen 2013; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006; Mühlmann 2008, 48-49).

What was important was that the objectives of the EUPM had a strong EU-dimension. The mission did not only aim at building a functioning police system but, more precisely, establishing policing arrangements compatible with the European practice. The mission supported not only the implementation of the Dayton Agreement but also reform and institution-building activities under the EU’s Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) regulations89 and the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). Projects were designed according to the standards and best practices of the EU. However, due to the absence of guidelines for European best practices, the standards were those derived from national practices and the personal experience of mission staff in addition to the requirements of the Commission as outlined in the SAA (Mühlmann 2008, 49).

The EU-dimension meant an intensified focus on reforms, essentially the creation of new

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89 CARDS was the EU’s main instrument of financial assistance to the Western Balkans; it was replaced by the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) in 2007 (European Commission 2006b; EUR-Lex 2007).
structures and the adoption of new laws in the area of the rule of law and the internal security according to the EU system. The police reform became a requirement of the SAA. It was supported by the OHR who established the Police Restructuring Commission (PRC) tasked with devising a plan for creating a coherent police sector.\footnote{The PRC consisted of EU and BiH political representatives and police chiefs, and the head of the EUPM (Mühlmann 2008, 52).} In the reform package, the EU proposed the creation of units that would cross entity boundaries. This proposal was initially opposed by BiH, especially the leaders of RS who sought to maintain the control over their own police arrangements. Under the pressure of the conditionality-driven SAA, the parties in BiH consented in the end to the proposed changes (Edwards and Tošić 2008, 215-216). Although the EUPM was sidelined by the OHR in the PRC and failed to mobilise the right expertise for this task, it still played a key role in facilitating the reform. It contributed to the deliberation of the PRC through EUPM staff serving in the PRC Secretariat in the areas of technical support, legal advice and liaison with police unions (Mühlmann 2008, 52).

The mission was an example of a coordinated approach. It worked closely with the Commission, which funded many of its 120 projects, while being directed by the Council (Merlingen 2013, 148). The Head of Mission reported to the Union’s SG/HR through the EUSR/OHR. This arrangement allowed for a ‘unified chain of command’ on the part of the EU, making the EU action comprehensive and coordinated (Council of the EU 2002b; 2005c). This approach enabled the EU to be perceived as a united actor. The coordination was not always perfect. At times, the EUPM struggled with being accepted by the staff of the OHR and with avoiding duplication of competing projects by other actors, including the EU military operation (Mühlmann 2008, 53, 57). Nevertheless, the unified chain of command contributed to an efficient delivery of actions in cooperation with other peacebuilding instruments of the EU. The mission was not perceived as a separate actor but as a central element of the EU’s foreign policy towards BiH. This approach enhanced the coordination among the EU member states which acted in a very unified way (interview 18). It reflected the new policy by the UN which introduced integrated peace missions with a joint chain of command. However, this way of coordination inaugurated by the EUPM did not become a rule. For instance, the EU actions in Mali lack a unified chain of command, giving an impression of multiple EU actors competing for attention.

Local ownership was a crucial element of the EUPM. Projects were designed in consultation with local police officers. The mission established steering boards which provided an opportunity for local police officers to discuss the reform programmes. Although the mission’s headquarters was in Sarajevo, the mission also had regional offices in Banja...
Luka, Mostar and Tuzla. Mission staff were co-located with their local counterparts and respective agencies across the country (EEAS 2012). The deployment across the country to local areas showed the EU’s domination in the process and its determination to reform the police throughout the entire country. This approach was crucial for ensuring local ownership and the inclusion of local actors in the process. This approach is different from civilian missions in Mali, Niger, Libya or Afghanistan where the deployment throughout the country was not possible due to security and logistical reasons. The relatively benign security conditions and the favourable logistical arrangements enabled the country-wide deployment in BiH. An official noted that housing was available even in remote urban centres and the supplies of required resources were manageable due to the existing infrastructure (interview 20). This approach demonstrated the limits of the EU’s civilian peacebuilding; the civilian CSDP is more suitable for post-conflict peacebuilding activities in environments with a stable security and a functioning infrastructure.

This EUPM was an example of the EU’s peacebuilding action which demonstrated both the EU’s normative commitment to international peacebuilding and the EU’s geopolitical preferences. This mission reflected the ability of the EU member states to agree on a mission and to provide resources and personnel for its realisation in a post-conflict peacebuilding phase. The exclusively police-oriented focus of the mission corresponded to the newly evolving UN normative framework of peacebuilding (see chapter two). At the same time, the autonomous character of the CSDP allowed the EU to design and operate its mission according to its own procedures and preferences; the objective was to build not only a functioning police sector but one that would be consistent with the EU standards. The EUPM therefore enhanced the prospects for an EU’s autonomous approach to peacebuilding within the CSDP.

**EUFOR Althea: Transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding**

The European Union Force (EUFOR) Althea is the second CSDP action in BiH which reveals the operational dynamics of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding through the CSDP. Launched in December 2004 and continuing until today, this military operation deployed in a post-conflict mode has demonstrated both the EU’s autonomous capacity for carrying out stabilisation and peacebuilding tasks with the use of a military instrument as well as the constraints of the CSDP. The idea to deploy a military operation in BiH was driven by a mix of overlapping preferences of the EU which are similar to the motives of the overall EU’s
engagement in BiH (see above). Domestic and international pressure had crucial impact on
the decision. Having faced accusations of the failure to prevent the crisis in Srebrenica, the
EU had considerable incentives to build instruments for collective crisis management. Pohl
inferred that, through military action, the EU was keen to demonstrate its responsibility for
security in its own backyard and its credibility as an international security provider
independent from the UN and NATO, including the US. At the same time, Washington wanted
the EU to take over responsibility in Bosnia since it became overstretched with its military
engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. Promoting liberal values by pulling the country into the
“community of liberal states” was another reason (Pohl 2014, 70-71). Similarly, Juncos
asserted that the EU wanted to test its newly established crisis management capabilities, and
this in a relatively secure environment. These efforts were linked to the EU’s desire to
strengthen its global role. The decision to launch a military operation was also driven by a
shared responsibility towards the future of Bosnia, with the prospect of EU membership. After
the European fiasco in UNPROFOR, Althea epitomised the EU’s desire to rebuild its
credibility in the region and in the world. Juncos concluded that the deployment of Althea was
justified by the pursuit of collective rather than national interests (Juncos 2011, 96).

EU member states had different reasons for the involvement in Bosnia. There was
disagreement between the European capitals over the modes of post-conflict activities even
after the end of the war (Malcom 2002, 246; Gow 1997, 166-174). Germany’s and Italy’s
initial enthusiasm can be explained by geographic proximity and history. France was not
enthusiastic, but it remained engaged because it knew that Bosnia was the place where the
CSDP could not be allowed to fail (Pohl 2014, 59). The operation was launched almost nine
years after the end of the war. Similarly as in the case of the EUPM, Althea was deployed
once the conditions on the ground were secured. Informal interviews with officers who were
deployed in the operation in its first years confirm that the situation was viewed as stable and
peaceful. There was little probability of the recurrence of violence. Officers admitted that
already at the end of the NATO mission, it was evident that criminality rather than inter-ethnic
tensions were the main security concern. After their deployment, EU soldiers did not have to
keep the war parties apart, but had to fight criminal networks. Also, the local conditions,
including the lodging, technical arrangements and a relatively good infrastructure, which the
military troops enjoyed, were far from difficult. Many officials were housed in rented houses
rather than in military barracks, which is typical for military operations (informal interviews
F; G). The secure and stable environment was an important reason for the EU’s decision to
launch Althea with which the EU was assured it could avoid a failure.
The planning of the operation started immediately after the 2002 Copenhagen European Council indicated its willingness to deploy a military operation in Bosnia. The Council invited the SG/HR to convene consultations with Bosnian authorities, the OHR/EUSR, NATO and the UN (Council of the EU 2003f, 8). The two years period of planning was caused mainly due to the disagreement between France and Britain with regard to EU-NATO arrangements in the mission and the need to satisfy the US demands (Juncos 2011, 96; Meyer 2006, 135). To soothe US concerns about European autonomy, it was understood that the EU mission would rely on NATO command, capabilities and assets through the Berlin Plus framework. Since Washington saw the Berlin Plus framework as insufficient, an agreement was reached allowing NATO to maintain a small headquarters with around 200 staff (Pohl 2014, 55).

The planning of the EU operation was also hampered by internal EU issues. Member states disagreed on the role of the MSU, the EU-staffed paramilitary police unit of SFOR, after the closure of the NATO Operation. In particular, the Nordic countries, Spain and France considered transferring the MSU to the EUPM as a logical step as, after nine years after the war, the main emphasis had shifted to the building of civil institutions. However, other states, such as Italy, were keen to pursue policing under the command of the military operation for purely pragmatic reasons; they already deployed their officers to the MSU under SFOR. They succeeded in retaining the MSU under the military command as other states agreed on the integration of the MSU into the EU military operation (Bertin 2008, 63-4; Juncos 2011, 92). Shortly before the handover, the MSU was transformed into an Integrated Police Unit, a paramilitary police contingent with similar tasks to those of the MSU (NATO 2004b). The unit then gradually integrated into EUFOR Althea.

Despite the autonomous character of the CSDP, the UNSC has been another actor key to both the launch and the mandate of Althea. The operation was launched and has operated under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This means that the operation has to be authorised

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91 The EU has later argued that the Berlin Plus framework applies only to military questions that are directly related to the EU’s use of NATO’s assets, such as operations conducted through NATO’s headquarters (Pohl 2014, 52-53). The EU heads of state and government declared that “the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements and the implementation thereof will apply only to those EU member states which are either NATO members or parties to the ‘Partnership for Peace’, and which have consequently concluded bilateral security arrangements with NATO” (Council of the EU 2003f, 13).

92 NATO HQ Sarajevo has contributed to peacebuilding efforts while working in close cooperation with EUFOR Althea. It has supported defence reform, counter-terrorism, intelligence gathering and the detention of persons indicted for war crimes. The defence reform has aimed at creating a single defence sector and military force in BiH. It has assisted in building transparent and ethnically inclusive Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH) and in ensuring their democratic and civilian surveillance. The defence reform has been seen not only as a key element of national security but also as a pre-requisite for the integration of the country into the EU and NATO (NATO Headquarters Sarajevo; Defence Reform Commission 2005).

93 EUFOR was authorised by UNSC Resolution 1575 (2004) on 22 November 2004 as a legal successor of
by the UNSC. This provision has remained in place as the operation has continued to be mandated with the maintenance of a safe and secure environment for which the use of force is possible, although it has not been activated in recent years. The operation maintains this status despite the fact that it has been reconfigured four times, safe environment has been established, and the military tasks shifted from peacekeeping to post-conflict institution- and capacity-building (EEAS 2016e). The UNSC welcomed the EU’s intention to deploy its own mission, including a military component, in BiH (UN Security 2004b). After the Council of the EU adopted a Joint Action establishing a military operation in BiH under the name ‘ALTHEA’ in June 2004 (Council of the EU 2004e), the UNSC authorised the operation in November (UN Security Council 2004a).

The technical planning of the deployment was very smooth as EU military planners benefited from NATO’s experience, assets and capabilities already present on the ground (Merlingen 2013, 149). The handover from SFOR took place then on 4 December 2004 with an aim of re-orienting the country from ‘the road to Dayton’ to ‘the road to Brussels’ (Chandler 2005a; Pohl 2014, 56-57). This change of the scope from peacekeeping to peacebuilding had already been formulated by NATO Secretary General in 2002 as he noted that the presence of SFOR “has helped create the necessary pre-conditions for important nation-building activities” (NATO 2002), which stands here for peacebuilding. In other words, he argued that SFOR accomplished its peacekeeping tasks, therefore creating the room for peacebuilding activities. After the flags were swapped, the operation’s structure and force composition remained largely the same as before. EUFOR Althea replaced SFOR and was modelled on it, relying initially on NATO assets, technical support and headquarters. It also had the same operational design and tasks (Juncos 2011). The US was the only significant contributor that left the operation.94 Nevertheless, from the onset, the EU member states were determined to make their own operation different from that of NATO. The autonomous character of the CSDP, including in the decision-making, planning and command phases, has allowed the EU to achieve this distinctiveness. General David Leakey, the Commander of EUFOR Althea, played a key role in carving out an EU distinct profile of the operation (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006, 57). EUFOR Althea has so far been the largest military operation of the EU, initially deploying 7,000 troops. However, this number is significantly small compared to the initial strength of SFOR, demonstrating that the major peacekeeping

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94 Some 80 per cent of the 7,000 SFOR personnel from EU member states were taken directly over by Althea. Canada, Turkey, Norway, Romania, Bulgaria and other EU countries (NATO members), and six other non-NATO countries stayed. Of NATO members, only the US, Iceland and Denmark have not participated. Cyprus and Malta have been the only EU member states which have not deployed in BiH (Pohl 2014, 58).
tasks have been accomplished. The shift in the mandate was the main aspect which distinguished EUFOR Althea and the EU’s approach to this post-conflict situation from NATO: the NATO operation carried out peacekeeping tasks, whereas the EU operation shifted towards peacebuilding.

Indeed, the EU operation acted initially as a peacekeeping operation. Modelled on the mandate of SFOR, it was mandated to guarantee the compliance with the Dayton Agreement, notably to contribute to the maintenance of a safe and secure environment and to provide deterrence of possible spoilers of the agreement. The main tasks were to provide a strong military presence, maintain security and implement the peace agreement. In particular, the operation engaged in the collection of weapons, the disruption of underground military facilities, the management of weapons storage sites and airspace (control over lower airspace), mine-clearance and the control of military movement. EUFOR continued in providing support to the ICTY in the search of persons indicted for war crimes, while leaving the responsibility for the cooperation with the ICTY to the BiH authorities. In addition, Liaison and Observation Teams were located in hot spots providing an early-warning system (Council of the EU 2004e; EU Council Secretariat 2009). Althea’s initial tasks were both executive and non-executive, though essentially non-military in their nature. The only executive task of EUFOR Althea was related to fighting organised crime through anti-organised crime operations. In this task, Althea complemented the institution- and capacity-building role of the EUPM.

As the capitals realised that the work of the operation focused mainly on non-military tasks, they judged the security environment as safe and stable. As a result, the operation shifted from peacekeeping to peacebuilding tasks. The mandate of the operation expanded from the maintenance of a safe and secure environment to providing support to the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces and capacity-building to the AFBiH. The operation assisted especially with the national defence reform which established an ethnically unified and democratically accountable defence sector. The capacity-building function has included specialised training on aspects such as fight against terrorism, medical evacuation and weapons training. Other functions involved prosecuting individuals accused of war crimes and resource operations. Similarly as the EUPM, EUFOR Althea has developed a local approach; it established liaison observation teams, small groups of soldiers, which were co-located to local communities with an aim of building relationships with locals (Juncos 2011; Merlingen 2013, 149-150).

The shift from peacekeeping to peacebuilding is especially noticeable through the
reconfiguration and reduction of the personnel in the operation. The EU downsized the force to 1,600 in 2007 and to approximately 600 in 2012 (EEAS 2016e). This restructuring was mostly due to unilateral decision to withdraw by the UK and later France and Finland based on their view that the military tasks in Bosnia were completed. Peacekeeping tasks, for which a robust force is needed, were accomplished. Instead, peacebuilding tasks became the priority. Domestic interests of EU member states also played a role – the French defence minister needed to prove that he was closing down something for “domestic consumption”, while the UK was preoccupied in other countries for which it needed its forces (Pohl 2014, 60-62).

The 2012 reconfiguration fully changed the focus of Althea to the capacity-building and training of the AFBiH. Despite the fact that it retained its obligations to support the BiH authorities in maintaining safety and security (UN Security Council 2012d), the aim shifted to peacebuilding. According to Juncos, one of the reasons for the proliferation of the operation’s activities into peacebuilding tasks was the fact that the establishment of a secure environment made resources left available to expand activities to other domains, especially fighting illegal activities, such as weapons smuggling, drug trafficking and illegal lodging. These activities generated some criticism amongst EUPM and other EU officials; EUFOR activities in the area of policing, such as closing borders, controlling cars and arresting people, conflicted with the mandate of the EUPM (Juncos 2011, 94).

The extension into peacebuilding tasks was driven not only by the needs on the ground but also by the EU’s desire to make Althea different – from both NATO and the UN. As Juncos commented, while the operation mimicked SFOR in terms of its tasks, the EU also wished to make EUFOR ‘different’ by adding new tasks (Juncos 2011, 92). These activities have followed the logic of peacebuilding focused on building liberal state institutions. Pohl has commented that, “whereas the installation of operation Althea did not follow a specifically liberal impetus, it formed part of a wider effort (albeit not one restricted to the EU) that can be characterised as liberal and normatively inspired” (Pohl 2014, 70). The inclusion of peacebuilding tasks into the mandate of the operation has increased prospects of a successful establishment of sustainable peace and order in the country.

Althea has been influenced by the complexity arising from different EU actors involved on the ground and different activities carried out. The Council Joint Action which established Althea required the operation “to achieve core tasks in the OHR’s Mission Implementation Plan and the SAP” (Council of the EU 2004e, Art. 1(1)). The Joint Action also noted that “[t]his operation shall be part of the overall ESDP mission in BiH” (Ibid.). From this perspective, the EU envisioned Althea as part of a unified EU approach. However,
Annex 1A of the Dayton Agreement provides that the operation does not have to answer to the OHR but only to its own chain of command. In the case of NATO operations, this was the North Atlantic Council; in the case of the EU, it was the Council of the EU - Council of Ministers. With this provision, Althea has been granted a considerable freedom of action. For these reasons, Althea was less connected to other EU actors on the ground. This hampered the cooperation with the EUPM and the EUSR with which Althea had to coordinate activities related to the fight against organised crime. The cooperation improved gradually with the adoption of Common Operational Guidelines for both the EUPM and Althea (Bertin 2008). Coordination between EUFOR and the EUPM in the area of the fight against the organised crime became crucial. In theory, the mandates of the two missions did not clash. While the mandate of the EUPM focused on long-term capacity-building of the police forces, Althea involved short-term deterrence. The EUPM had a non-executive mandate – it only monitored, mentored and inspected, whereas Althea had an executive mandate with enforcement tools (Juncos 2011, 94).

The operation has also demonstrated the constraints of the CSDP decision-making. In particular, Althea has become a source of disagreement among member states which have different opinions on a possible closure of the operation. Germany, France and the UK have regularly called for an end of the operation while highlighting that operation’s goals, including stability, security and peace, have been achieved. The UK has sought to divert the attention and resources of its European partners to conflicts in the Middle East and English-speaking African countries. These calls intensified with the EU’s involvement in Mali where France and Germany have taken leading roles in terms of personnel and resources contributions. They have argued that Althea has been going for too long, whereas other countries require the EU’s attention (interviews 31 and 41). However, Eastern Europeans and Austria have opposed the closure of Althea on the grounds that the country is not yet able to manage its security matters on its own. They fear that, although very unlikely, violence could occur again if the EU withdrew its military presence (interviews 31, 32, 33 and 41). These are indeed justified concerns as ethno-religious and political divisions remain and the country has not yet achieved the full level of societal reconciliation (Kmec and Ganiel forthcoming). Other European countries have also continued to perceive the political transition in Bosnia towards Euro-Atlantic integration as risky. For instance, Greece has regarded the stability of the Balkans as more important than deploying to Afghanistan (Pohl 2014, 63).

In addition to these reasons, concerns over the relocation of their personnel and resources to missions and operations in Africa also play a decisive role in the hesitation by
Eastern Europeans and Austrians to close the operation. These countries fear that when leaving the Balkans, they could be asked to contribute more to operations in Africa, most of which are French-dominated (interviews 27, 31, 33 and 41). Eastern Europeans and Austrians have remained the main troop contributing countries in Althea. Since 2009, the operations’ commanders have only been Austrians. The reasons of these countries are self-centred; they see BiH as a place where they can demonstrate their commitment to the CSDP. In the Balkans, they can deploy their troops in a stable, secure and familiar environment. In contrast, deployments in Africa or the Middle East are characterised by high security risks and unfamiliar environments. Each year, when member states such as France and Germany seek to achieve the closure of Althea, they agree on the extension of the operation, to please Eastern Europeans and Austria, only after these members promise to provide their troops and resources to other missions, particularly in Africa (interview 31, 33). This disagreement demonstrates that the EU’s approach to peacebuilding is driven not only by normative considerations but also by member states’ preferences. In other words, CSDP peacebuilding actions are not only results of a normative peacebuilding framework but also a part of EU foreign policy which is characterised by a complex process of bargaining among member states’ preferences.

These perspectives shed light on the EU’s capacity to agree on actions and to engage militarily. Not all EU member states are capable of peace-enforcement and peacekeeping engagements in unstable environments. The existence of an operation is a subject of political negotiation between the preferences of member states. In addition, Althea reflects the EU’s capability to act militarily only once the situation is stabilised and secure conditions established. In other words, it portrays the constraints of the EU’s military combat capability through the CSDP. Instead, Althea demonstrates that the CSDP has a more far-reaching potential to contribute to the establishment of positive peace through its post-conflict peacekeeping and peacebuilding tools, especially advisory and capacity-building support. Through its civilian tasks, Althea has kept peace, improved public security and built a professional and unified AFBiH. At the same time, this perspective does not diminish the importance of combat operations in open conflicts to prevent fighting and mass killings, such as those witnessed in Bosnia, or peacekeeping operations with executive mandates in the immediate aftermath of a war to protect civilians. As this case has demonstrated, the EU has a vital role as a military and peacekeeping actor in such scenarios, especially if these crises unfold in the EU’s neighbourhood. As a result, the EU needs to develop capabilities and provide resources for such engagements.
Peacebuilding through EU membership-building

The normative and foreign policy dimensions of the EU’s peacebuilding approach within the two CSDP actions in BiH are best demonstrable through the EU membership perspective. The EU missions in BiH have been carried out as part of a potential accession of the country to the EU. BiH was offered the prospects of EU membership long before the deployment of the CSDP actions. In 1997, the EU adopted the SAP - a regional approach to the Western Balkans, which included BiH and which focused on economic and political aspects of the development of the region. Through the SAP, the EU has offered Western Balkans countries a mixture of trade concessions, economic and financial assistance and contractual relationships with a view to preparing them for a potential accession to the EU. The European Council in Feira in 2000 brought about the first prospect of EU membership for these countries. At its meeting in Thessaloniki in 2003, the Council officially confirmed the potential candidacy of BiH for EU accession. Since 2003, the European Council has regularly stated that “the future of the Western Balkans lies in the European Union” (Council of the EU 2003e, 11; 2003g, 1; European Parliament 2011). The integration of new countries into the EU has been a powerful foreign policy tool that has enabled the EU to extend its zone of peace across the European continent. The prospect of a membership is seen as an instrument in promoting incentive for reforms, thus contributing to the stabilisation and peacebuilding in the country. This provision has been fundamental for the success of both CSDP mission which concentrated on reforms.

When presenting the decision to launch the first CSDP mission in BiH at the UNSC meeting, Solana made a clear link between the CSDP and a potential EU membership. In particular, he stated that the EU “has provided BiH and the wider region the prospect of eventual integration with the EU” (Solana 2002, 2). The EU membership perspective, coinciding with the launch of the CSDP, marked the transition from the Dayton process to an EU-led process: “[w]hile the Dayton/Paris Accords were designed to guide the country away from war, the prospect of an eventual Stabilisation and Association Agreement offers a clear route towards a European future” (Ibid.). The SAA between the EU and BiH, which sets common political and economic objectives, served as a basis for the accession process. However, negotiations on the SAA, which started in 2005, were held back by a disagreement over the police reform carried out by the EUPM, in particular over the standards being transmitted and solutions proposed. While the EU insisted on the decentralisation of the

95 The SAP is a policy framework for the EU’s relationships with Western Balkan countries, in particular Albania, BiH, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. It is linked to a membership perspective. Before joining the EU, Croatia was also part of the SAP. Through the SAP, the Western Balkan countries have undertaken efforts to meet the political and economic requirements to be considered for EU membership.

96 Before the opening of the negotiations, BiH had to fulfil 16 reform requirements set out by the European
police sector away from the two entities of BiH by creating a centralised state-level ministry responsible for the police sector, RS wished to keep its police forces under their own control.

The SAA was initialled by BiH in December 2007 after the successful negotiations by the High Representative for BiH, Miroslav Lajčák, who convinced the representatives of BiH to make a commitment to implement the police reform. Following the adoption of these reforms, the SAA was signed in June 2008, following the adoption of the police reforms. Further political, economic and constitutional reforms were promised by the so called Prud Agreement, which was seen as a base for “the ability of the State to meet the requirements of the EU integration process” (OHR / EUSR 2008). It took until 2011, with France, the last EU state, to ratify the SAA. However, the SAA was then frozen because BiH did not comply with its obligations and promises on reforms conditional to the Agreement. The SAA entered into force finally in June 2015 after it had been approved by the Council of the EU in March. In February 2016, BiH applied for EU membership.

The EU membership perspective and EU funding, based on compliance and conditionality, played a significant role in achieving the objectives of the two CSDP actions. As Edwards and Tošić noted, the EU used persuasion and norm promotion through the provision or denial of rewards on the one hand and conditionality and coercion on the other hand as the main means of the EU’s post-conflict engagement in BiH (Edwards and Tošić 2008). EU conditionality has replaced international trusteeship in BiH. Conditionality, assertively communicated by the ‘double-hatted’ OHR/EUSR, was linked to the perspective of EU membership. This conditionality-driven membership perspective has led to the adoption of major political, administrative and economic reforms without straightforward international imposition (Recchia 2007).

However, the interconnection of the accession-inspired process and the Dayton-driven post-conflict stabilisation is problematic. According to Edwards and Tošić, this interconnection created confusion as it put significant demands on the population of BiH by requiring a double transition: a transition from communism to liberal market-based democracy and a post-conflict stabilisation process which required a transition from conflict-driven thinking to a peaceful coexistence. The integration process guided by the Copenhagen criteria necessitated the adoption of significant reforms, democratic norms, liberal economy and the entire acquis communautaire, including an administrative capacity to implement reforms and make domestic rules compatible with those of the EU. This heavy load of demands faced the opposition of political elites and local population in BiH (Edwards

Commission’s Feasibility Study, which was part of the SAP, and which came after BiH completed 18 other priority reform steps outlined in the Commission’s ‘Road Map’ (European Commission 2003c).
The membership dimension, through conditionality, has given the EU significant powers and leverage over the peacebuilding process. The OHR has often resorted to coercive measures. Through the OHR as well as through the accession process, the EU has had a considerable bargaining power over BiH. The EU has acted as the dominant power and from a position of influence with the use of political conditionality, thus hollowing-out local democratic capacity and ownership (Chandler 2005a; Edwards and Tošić 2008). But, this conditionality and pressure also faced local and national resistance: “the greater the pressures for change, the more reluctance has been displayed in embracing it; that has then engendered the greater need for enforcement mechanisms, which in turn has often inhibited policy compliance and acceptance of the desired norms” (Edwards and Tošić 2008, 205). Edwards and Tošić have argued that this reluctance on the part of the leaders in BiH to implement legislation reflects the difficulty of continuous monitoring. They have claimed that “if the process of non-compliance simply results in action by the OHR in order to keep processes going, then the normative significance of the reforms begins to lose its impact and adaptation becomes regarded with little more than indifference” (Ibid., 218-9). Coercive measures have led to the rejection of ownership by local actors and thus to a dependency syndrome. Policies, such as those on police reform, have been prescribed to be accepted by BiH, leaving no room for the involvement of decision- and policymakers from BiH (Ibid., 206-8).

Scholars and practitioners agree that the emergence of the EU as the main international peacebuilding actor in BiH since 2003 has led to significant changes in the country. Recchia observed that the EU’s increased peacebuilding role in BiH, carried out especially through the CSDP, has accelerated progress towards making Bosnia’s common state institutions self-sustaining and self-functioning (Recchia 2007). Similarly, Edwards and Tošić assert that the EU has brought about changes in the values and standards aimed at building peace and stability. The EU has attempted both to tackle the root causes of the conflict and to bring BiH into line with the conditions required for EU membership. To achieve these objectives, the EU used the means of persuasion and coercion. On the one hand, the imposition of the state-building measures, which are necessary for functioning and democratic governance, in the face of opposition from elected leaders, undermines the credibility of the EU in pursuing these same values. There are limits to the powers of coercive “inappropriate” measures. On the other hand, it remains improbable whether corruption and criminality would have been combated in the interests of adapting to the Copenhagen criteria and future EU membership in the absence of Bonn powers (Edwards and Tošić 2008, 219).
Despite the fact that peace has been established, a return to violence seems unrealistic and the country is making efforts towards European integration, several systematic challenges remain. According to Keil and Perry, while the country has undergone a number of critical reforms under the international pressure, political elites often continue to exercise power over the state for their own individual, financial and political ambitions. BiH “is neither a functioning state nor a democratic one” (Keil and Perry 2015, 464). Keil and Perry have argued that the dysfunctionality of the state of BiH is related to the conditionality aspects linked to the SAP and the EU accession process. With this provisions, the democratic promotion has been elusive. The EU has prioritised keeping and building liberal peace over democracy-building. The country has limited competencies at national level since it hugely depends on the will of the EU (Keil and Perry 2015). Also, Tocci has observed that Western Balkans countries show certain level of scepticism towards the EU’s capability. Mistrust is also linked to the perceptions of the EU’s incapability largely due to EU’s legacy of passivity during the unfolding Balkan tragedy in the 1990s and its ‘Balkan fatigue’ since the 2004 enlargement (Tocci 2007, 163). A previous High Representative Christian Schwarz-Schilling was doubtful about Brussels’ ability to transform Bosnia into a democratic constitutional state in the near future (Flottau 2006). His successor Lajčák, who was supposed to be the last High Representative, stated that BiH did not meet the conditions and objectives for the transition, which meant that the OHR continued with its mandate (Delegation of the EU to BiH 2008).

Nevertheless, Edwards and Tošić remind us that any success of international institutions in peacebuilding is dependent not only on the ability of international institutions themselves, the EU in this case, to bring about a change in the values and norms. The local circumstances and the will of people and politicians of the target state are equally important. It matters whether the state “is failing, frail, rogue-ish, or post-conflict – and the obduracy or responsiveness of its authorities, the strength and capacities of its domestic institutions, its economy, its geo-strategic positions and its conceptions of itself” (Edwards and Tošić 2008, 202). Making the peacebuilding activities workable requires a constructive cooperation between the three Bosnian factions and a development of more democratic arrangements at the national level which would move away from the situation where every policy area is divided between the representatives of each ethnic group.
Conclusion

This chapter has provided insights into the operational dynamics of peacebuilding carried out within two CSDP actions in BiH. The case of BiH offered the EU with a first operational experience under the CSDP. The EU used both civilian and military instruments of crisis management in BiH. These two deployments demonstrated that the EU was serious about its responsibility for building peace in its neighbourhood and about its commitment to play a greater role in the maintenance of international peace and security. At the same time, negative peace had already been established, in terms of both the absence of direct violence and the threat of violence. The potential for violence was in terms of a police action but not a military one. The two CSDP actions were launched in the post-conflict phase when the situation was stabilised and secure. Yet, positive peace had to be built.

The two EU missions in BiH have focused on building positive peace by engaging in peacebuilding tasks. The EUPM sought to establish democratic, centralised and sustainable policing arrangements in BiH. It developed a joint strategic and operational capacity of law enforcement agencies. Although continuing to be mandated with peacekeeping tasks, EUFOR Althea has engaged primarily in peacebuilding activities, in particular the capacity-building of the AFBiH. These tasks proved not easy to convene, however. The EUPM had indeed a harmonised decision- and policy-making process. Member states were able to agree on the objectives of the mission and provide required resources and personnel. Linking the chain of command to the EUSR who, at the same time, was the High Representative for BiH allowed for a thoroughly comprehensive approach. Yet, this process took longer than initially expected and was only successful due to the EU’s commitment and a unified coordination with other EU actors on the ground. In contrast, Althea has been accompanied by a number of struggles, in particular the disagreement over the modes, content and duration of the operation. The special relationship with NATO and the requirement of UNSC approval have made the operation more complex. The cooperation with the EUSR/ EU Delegation and the EUPM was also not smooth. Althea, as the largest and longest ongoing operation, has been perhaps the most strategic CSDP action in terms of the EU’s commitment to peacebuilding.

The two cases of CSDP actions in BiH present the EU’s approach to peacebuilding as a result of both foreign policy-making shaped by member states’ preferences and international standards of state-centred peacebuilding. Although both CSDP actions have been seen as a demonstration of the EU’s common action and political will, member states have maintained different positions over the political and operational objectives of the missions. Seeking to reconcile European and US positions, the UK took the leading role in the post-conflict
rebuilding in BiH in the initial phase. Germany and France saw the CSDP actions in BiH as an opportunity to enhance the EU’s credibility. In later years, Eastern Europeans and Austria have assumed the leadership in BiH while supporting the prolongation of Althea in order to avoid the deployment of their troops in more insecure regions.

The EU’s engagement in BiH through the CSDP therefore confirms the argument that the EU’s CSDP is better suited for post-conflict peacebuilding rather than actions aimed at the management of an open conflict that require prompt reaction. CSDP actions are also better suited to deliver peacebuilding tasks due to a prolonged planning of the mission/operation and the lack of personnel at the immediate disposal for the CSDP. NATO and the UN were better equipped to deliver peace-enforcement and peacekeeping tasks in BiH. Protracted planning, such as that found in both CSDP actions in BiH, is better suited to post-conflict peacebuilding tasks. Nevertheless, Bosnia is, at the same time, a reminder that the EU needs to develop an autonomous capacity for engagements in open conflicts and all other stages of a conflict cycle, which may also necessitate a military deployment.

The case of BiH emphasises the importance of strategic, long-term and comprehensive approach to make peacebuilding within CSDP missions and operations successful. BiH has been on the priority list of strategic interests of the EU and EU member states. The EU pursued its actions in BiH with both altruistic and self-centred motives. The duration periods of the EUPM (nine and half years) and EUFOR Althea (over 13 years) demonstrate that peacebuilding is a long-term enterprise and that the CSDP actions with peacebuilding objectives are long-term rather than short-term instruments. The short-term time-frame envisioned for both CSDP actions in BiH was underestimated. The variety of tools that the EU has used to build peace in this country highlights the character of the EU’s peacebuilding approach within the CSDP. The comprehensive approach that the EU has pursued in BiH has contributed to successful achievements in both missions. This approach shows how important the EU-dimension has been in this process; peacebuilding through membership has encouraged important reforms. Peacebuilding, when interlinked with the membership process, takes a different character – it seeks to construct a system that complies with the EU state model. Nevertheless, BiH is an example of a dominant EU’s intervention in which most of the peacebuilding policies have been directed by the EU rather than decided by the local national actors. BiH has no self-sustaining political authority, since the OHR is the supreme legislative and executive power. While this intervention was crucial in preventing direct violence, it has struggled with building societal peace and national ownership.

Finally, the dimension of EU membership in the two CSDP actions is also linked to the
EU’s overall approach to the Western Balkans. The success of peacebuilding projects in BiH was crucial not only for BiH and the EU themselves but also for the stability and peace in the region. Peacebuilding in BiH has been part of peacebuilding efforts in Kosovo and Macedonia. Despite its limitations and more progress to be done, the EU’s approach to peacebuilding within the CSDP actions in BiH has been successful in achieving the creation of stable and functioning institutions of the state, in particular the police and military sectors. Due to the EU-membership dimension, the EU’s peacebuilding approach used in BiH is different from that in countries, such as Mali, which are not prospective EU members.
6 Peacebuilding through CSDP Actions in Mali

As Mali emerged from a series of conflicts and terrorist occupation, the EU’s intervention epitomised the dilemmas of an external actor in international stabilisation and peacebuilding efforts. The EU’s decision to deploy CSDP instruments to carry out peacebuilding tasks in Mali was influenced not only by a normative commitment but also by French strategic interests, the opportunity to demonstrate the EU’s actorness and the EU’s own security concerns. While the situation on the ground required an urgent response, the EU opted for peacebuilding tools. In Mali, the EU has deployed one military training operation and one civilian mission. With their focus on the reform of state institutions, both missions fall within the liberal peacebuilding framework. At the same time, the expansion of CSDP actions into the tasks of migration and border management highlights that CSDP peacebuilding does not have to be merely about building peace; it can also meet other areas that reflect the EU’s self-centred interests. This broadening of the tasks highlights the extent to which the CSDP is shaped by the EU’s own preferences and autonomy which allow the EU to redirect its peacebuilding tools to serve its own visions. After an overview of the conflict, the chapter traces the dynamics of the EU’s peacebuilding approach in Mali through an analysis of the EU’s reaction to the crisis in Mali, the two CSDP missions and the EU’s regional strategy. Attempting to understand how these actions demonstrate the EU’s capabilities of foreign policy, the analysis explores the extent to which the international norm of peacebuilding and EU member states’ preferences, policy-making and resources shape the design and delivery of the EU peacebuilding missions in Mali.

Overview of the conflict and the response by the international community

In 2012 - 2013, Mali experienced three interlinked conflicts: 1) the constitutional crisis in which a democratically elected president was overthrown by a military coup, leading to political instability; 2) the threat to the unity of the state driven by self-determination movements, mainly Tuareg rebellions, seeking autonomy for northern Mali which led to armed conflicts between groups in the north and the authorities in the south; and 3) the

Tuareg, or Kel Tamasheq (the Tamasheq speaking people), are a nomadic people. Mali has a diverse ethnic and linguistic demography. Bambara are the largest ethnic group. Together with Sininke, Khassonke and Malinke, they are part of Mandé people (around 40 per cent of the 15 million large population). Mandé are followed by Fula, (17 per cent), Voltaic (12 per cent), Tuareg (ten per cent), Songhai (six per cent) and other ethnic groups, 90 per cent of the population lives in the south and is sedentary, whereas people in the north, mainly Tuareg, are largely nomadic. While French is the official language, Mali has 12 national languages with Bambara the most spoken language. More than 40 other languages are spoken by ethnic groups (Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung 2013; Fisas 2015, 28; Hofbauer and Münch 2016).
religiously motivated terrorist occupation in the north. Conflicts between Tuaregs and other
groups in the Sahel date back to pre-colonial times. During the colonial period, Tuaregs
sought autonomy from their French rulers. Various rebel groups in the north continued the
struggle after Mali’s independence in 1960 while waging rebellions against the government in
Bamako. Numerous attempts to resolve the Tuareg question failed. These conflicts were
accompanied by constitutional crises, coups d’état and coup attempts, which provided a
thriving ground for rebels (France Diplomatie 2016a; Fisas 2015, 28-29; Morgan 2012).

In January 2012, another Tuareg rebellion broke out in northern Mali when the
Tuareg-led National Liberation Movement for the Azawad (MNLA) took up arms against the
government, seeking autonomy for northern Mali. 98 After failed attempts to suppress the
rebellion, the government recalled its military from the north. Accusing the President of his
inability to stop the Tuareg rebellion in the north, the military launched a coup d’état in
March 2012. US-trained Captain Amadou Sanogo who led the coup established a military
junta and a transitional government (Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung 2013, 16).
Benefiting from a power vacuum of the central government due to a coup d’état, national self-
determination movements took control of major population centres in northern Mali,
including Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. In April 2012, the MNLA proclaimed an independent
Azawad (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2012; Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung 2013, 15).
However, this secular Tuareg movement saw its power rapidly declining due to the rise of
jihadist armed groups, in particular Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Dine,
the Islamic Movement of Azawad (MIA), and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in Western
Africa (MUJAO, also abbreviated as MUJWA). 99 Terrorists took over control and drove the
MNLA out of its positions of power very quickly, imposing their terrorist rule based on an
extremist interpretation of Islam. 100

The local population opposed this occupation and the strict Sharia law, allowing for a
support for an international intervention. 101 As early as April 2012, ECOWAS decided to send

98 Although Azawad is a cross-border region which also includes parts of Algeria and Niger, the MNLA sought
autonomy only in northern Mali (CBC News 2013). Other militias, such as the Arab Movement for Azawad
(MAA), were also formed. These groups included veterans of former rebellions and soldiers who left Libya
after Gaddafi’s fall (Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung 2013, 15; Fisas 2015, 28).
99 Ansar Dine and the MIA appeared as formations seeking the proclamation of the Sharia law in the region in
2012. The AQIM operated under the name Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat prior to 2009. MUJAO
broke off from the AQIM in 2011 (Fisas 2015).
100 Ansar Dine conquered Timbuktu and expelled the secular MNLA already in April 2012. While Ansar Dine
aimed at imposing Sharia law only in Mali, MUJAO and the AQMI sought to establish an Islamic state over a
larger part of North-West Africa (Fisas 2015, 30). The imposition of Sharia law in northern Mali by terrorists
led to a massive deterioration of the human rights situation and to a mass humanitarian and refugee crisis.
101 Mali’s long history of laïcité and moderate Islam has made it difficult for Islamists to gain a stronghold in the
country. Although 90% of its population is Muslim, predominantly Sunni, Mali is essentially a laic country.
Terrorists realised that they could not win the hearts and minds of people by imposing an extremist version of
3,000 soldiers to stabilise the situation. However, the Malian military junta rejected any intervention (Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung 2013, 15). ECOWAS initiated a mediation process and sanctions against Mali which resulted in a Framework Agreement with Captain Sanogo. This agreement set a transitional roadmap for a political dialogue with an aim of restoring constitutional order and national unity, including through inclusive presidential and legislative elections (UN Security Council 2012c, para. 1). In July 2012, UNSC Resolution 2056 expressed support for ECOWAS and AU peacemaking efforts. It stressed the territorial integrity of Mali by demanding the cessation of hostilities by rebels and by calling upon rebel groups, including the MNLA and Ansar Dine, to renounce all affiliations incompatible with the rule of law and Malian territorial integrity as well as to cut off ties with terrorists, notably the AQIM and MUJAO (UN Security Council 2012a).

As the situation in the north continued to worsen, the Malian transitional authorities agreed to military support from ECOWAS. The UNSC in its Resolution 2071 established a UN Special Envoy for the Sahel\textsuperscript{102} and declared its readiness to respond to Mali’s call for international military support by \textit{taking note} of ECOWAS’ request for a UNSC resolution authorising its stabilisation force in Mali. The UNSC asked the Secretary-General to provide military and security planners to assist ECOWAS-AU plans for this operation. It called upon UN member states, regional and international actors to provide support to these preparations, “including through military training, provision of equipment and other forms of assistance in efforts to combat terrorist and affiliated extremist groups” (UN Security Council 2012b, para. 8). The Resolution expressed concerns over the consequences of instability in northern Mali on the region and beyond, the continuing deterioration of the humanitarian crisis and the rise of terrorist activities (UN Security Council 2012b).

Resolution 2071 also called upon UN member states and regional organisations to provide support to the Malian Defence and Security Forces (MDSF)\textsuperscript{103} through coordinated assistance, expertise, training and capacity-building support, as well as with equipment and other forms of assistance in efforts to combat terrorists as to restore the country’s authority over its territory (UN Security Council 2012b, para. 8, 9). The need for training and capacity-building of the MDSF was stressed by the inability of the Malian Armed Forces (MaAF) to tackle the rebellions and the terrorist occupation in the north. These crises revealed the fragility of the Malian state, namely the structural weakness of its security sector - the military

\textsuperscript{102}Romano Prodi, former Italian Prime Minister, was appointed to this position.

\textsuperscript{103}MDSF include armed forces and internal security forces (Police, Gendarmerie and national Guards).

Sharia law. In a letter found in 2003, the leader of the AQIM cautioned his supporters not to impose Sharia too brutally, given the resistance from the population (Al-Qaida Manifesto; Callimachi 2013).
and police forces. Despite previous military training and support by the USA, Germany and France, the MaAF suffered from structural deficits, such as broken chains of command, unbalanced ethnic composition of staff, insufficient training, lack of practical application, lack of equipment, corruption and nepotism. Soldiers were often left in harsh conditions in the north without sufficient resources, dependent on supplies from locals (interview 47). The UN’s call for training support for the MDSF occurred when the EU already started exploring options for a possible training mission to Mali to train the MDSF. This reference became crucial for the justification of the CSDP actions in Mali.

The adoption of this resolution increased the prospects for an international military intervention in support of the MaAF to fight the terrorists in the north. The likelihood of an intervention was further strengthened by the internal tensions among the leaders of the military junta. The transitional authorities did not act according to the Framework Agreement of April 2012. In December 2012, Captain Sanogo imprisoned Prime Minister Diarra who, when resigning, dissolved the government. Django Sissoko became the new Prime Minister. The continuing political vacuum played into hands of terrorists who carried out attacks and took hostages with an aim of raising funds or gaining political concessions. In the meantime, ECOWAS was preparing a deployment of its soldiers (Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung 2013, 16).

On 20 December 2012, UNSC Resolution 2085 demanded that the Malian transitional authorities were consistent with the Framework Agreement and “put in place a credible framework for negotiations with all parties in the north of Mali who have cut off all ties to terrorist organizations” (UN Security Council 2012c, para. 3). The resolution authorised the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) organised by ECOWAS. Its task was to support “the Malian authorities in recovering the areas in the north of its territory under the control of terrorist, extremist and armed groups and in reducing the threat posed by terrorist organizations, including AQIM, MUJWA and associated extremist groups” (UN Security Council 2012c, para. 9). The mission was also tasked with helping the Malian authorities in transition to stabilisation activities, protection of civilians and the return of IDPs and refugees. The resolution stressed that the consolidation and redeployment of the MDSF throughout the Mali’s territory was vital to ensure the country’s security and the protection of its people. For these purposes, the UNSC urged

104 The USA and Germany provided training and capacity-building for the MDSF in Mali prior to the 2012 conflict. While the USA focused on combat training, Germany provided pioneer training. Some higher-ranked Malians received military and police training directly in France, the USA and Germany (interview 50; see also Jalloh 2015).
“Member States, regional and international organizations to provide coordinated assistance, expertise, training, including on human rights and international humanitarian law, and capacity-building support to the Malian Defence and Security Forces, [...] in order to restore the authority of the State of Mali over its entire national territory, to uphold the unity and territorial integrity of Mali and to reduce the threat posed by terrorist organizations” (UN Security Council 2012c, para. 7).

In this resolution, the UNSC also took note of the international community’s commitment to the rebuilding of the capacities of the MDSF, in particular “the planned deployment by the European Union of a military mission to Mali to provide military training and advice to the Malian Defence and Security Forces” (Ibid., para. 8). Already at this stage, the EU was expected to deliver training mission only, with the task of fighting terrorists being left to ECOWAS.

However, in early January 2013, the terrorist were quickly advancing towards the south. On 9 January, the terrorist groups captured Konna and marched towards Mopti and Sevare which are the gateways to the south. Sevare has also a major military base and an airport. Fearing that the seizure of these centres would have opened the terrorists the way to the capital and due to the slow progress in the deployment of AFISMA, the Malian government requested help form the French government for immediate military support on 10 January 2013 (France24 2013; Diallo 2013). The day after, France launched Operation Serval with the help of African troops. Within less than a month, this military operation helped to dismantle the terrorist rule and regained partial control of the north, even though terrorist cells have continued to exist (Hofbauer and Münch 2016; 244-245). First AFISMA troops were deployed in the middle of January 2013. In April 2013, the UNSC authorised the establishment of United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), tasked with peacekeeping and stabilisation of the country, with a continuing presence of the French troops (UN Security Council 2013). MINUSMA took over the responsibility from AFISMA in July, incorporating most of its 6,300 African troops.

The French-led intervention, and the consequent African and UN missions opened a path to peace negotiations. In June 2013, the MNLA, the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA) and the interim government in Bamako signed the Ouagadougou Interim Peace Agreement brokered by Burkina Faso. The MAA and the Songhai militia Coordination des mouvements et Front Patriotique de résistance (CM-FPR) also adhered to the agreement (Fisas 2015, 33). Further peace talks were facilitated by Algeria, with the UN, the AU, ECOWAS, the OIC, the EU and other states as co-mediators, in Algiers. This mediation led to
the ‘Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali’ signed by the Malian government and rebel groups represented by the Platform and two groups of the Coordination of Movements of Azawad (CMA) on 15 May 2015. The remaining CMA groups signed the agreement on 20 June 2015 (Accord pour la paix 2015; Nyirabikali 2015).^{105}

**The EU’s reaction: Peacebuilding rather than peace-enforcement or peacekeeping**

Mali is a case where the EU deployed its CSDP actions in a peacebuilding mode with a focus on the reform of state institutions. These CSDP peacebuilding activities have been carried out alongside peacekeeping and combat operations conducted by other actors. The CSDP deployments in Mali demonstrate both the normative commitment of the EU to support the peacebuilding efforts in the conflict-driven country as well as political, policy-making and operational constraints of the EU’s CSDP capability.

The EU closely followed the developments in Mali. In July 2012, the Council Conclusions on Mali/Sahel recognised that, while the EU should continue to work within the framework of its Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel,^{106} the deteriorating situation in Mali required a review of the actions the EU should undertake to support the restoration of the rule of law in Mali. The FAC requested the HR/VP and the Commission to make concrete proposals for an EU action to respond to the changing situation. This included the EU’s support for the planned ECOWAS mission and their mediation efforts. The FAC also requested the HR/VP to prepare options, including within the CSDP, with a view to contributing, upon the agreement of the Malian authorities and in coordination with the UN, the AU and ECOWAS, “to the restructuring of Mali’s security and defence forces, under civilian control in line with the Sahel Strategy” (Council of the EU 2012b, para. 9). The Conclusions set up a roadmap for a possible CSDP mission in Mali.

The decision to launch an EU training mission in Mali was favoured by a number of factors. Rouppert argued that a training mission was deemed promising taking into account the successful results from a similar mission EUTM Somalia, low financial and human costs for the mission, and the fact that the Malian authorities requested training support (Rouppert 2015, 238). Other factors, such as the deteriorating humanitarian, human rights and refugee crisis in the north, brought to public attention by the media, also urged the EU to take action.

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^{105}The CMA included the MNLA, the HCUA, the MAA, splinter groups of the *Coalition du peuple pour l’Azawad* (CPA) and the CM-FPR. The Platform is comprised of the CM-FPR, the *Groupe d’Autodéfense Touareg Imghad et Alliés* (GATIA), and groups separated of the CPA and the MAA (Nyirabikali 2015).

^{106}Known as the EU Sahel Strategy, adopted in 2011 (Council of the EU 2011b; EEAS 2011a).
EU member states understood that the collapse of Mali would have resulted in a chain reaction with unpredictable consequences for Europe, in particular the migratory flows and the rise of terrorism (interviews 40; 42; 44). France was the key initiator of a CSDP action and strategically the key actor in Mali with strong interests in the country. Mali and France have enjoyed close relationships not only for historical and cultural reasons but also because of the large Malian diaspora in France (France Diplomatie 2016a). According to a representative of a smaller Western European country in the PSC, it is very characteristic for some states such as France, Italy and Poland to initiate missions, whereas

“other countries would not initiate missions on their own [...]. They would follow suit. As it was the case with France in Mali; there, we were strategically different player than France which was unilaterally engaged with a particular country and then tried to draw the EU along. This is clearly not how we operate. We like to work with partners. We can be an active partner in discussion. But for [our country] to unilaterally forge ahead and push for a mission, this has not happened so far and is very unlikely” (interview 28).

Rouppert noted that the French Minister of Defence, Jean-Yves Le Drian, built a strong political basis for an EU mission while visiting and searching support from European partners (Rouppert 2015, 238).

Further, at this stage, an EU military combat operation in support of the Malian forces was not seen as a priority. The Malian government and the UN had agreed on the military support by ECOWAS. The restructuring of the MaAF was seen as the primary objective of the attempt to reconquer the north since the MaAF was expected to lead the offensive against the terrorist regime with support of AFISMA's support (Ibid., 237). UNSC Resolutions 2071 and 2085 called upon other regional organisations to provide support to the planned ECOWAS operation and to the MaAF in the form of training and advice. The UNSC request coincided with a decision to launch a CSDP mission to support the fight against organised crime and terrorism in the Sahel region: EUCAP Sahel Niger mission in July 2012. Although the mission was focused on Niger, the EU envisioned its possible extension to Mali and Mauritania. For these reasons, liaison officers for that mission were sent to Nouakchott and Bamako. The mission was deployed as part of the EU Sahel Strategy in a reaction to an increased terrorist activity and the consequences of the conflict in Libya, which heightened insecurity in the Sahel (Council of the EU 2012d). These factors enabled the affirmative

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107 The mission strengthens Niger’s capacity in fighting terrorism and organised crime by providing training and advice to the Niger’s security authorities on improving their control of the territory and the implementation of their security strategy, supporting the regional cooperation in the fight against terrorism and organised crime, and assisting in developing rule of law-based penal processes (Council of the EU 2012d).
decision of the EU member states in favour of a mission in Mali.

Responding to the call by Resolution 2071 to provide training support to the MDSF and to the requests by the Malian government for such a support from the EU, the EU started with the preparation of its training mission.\textsuperscript{108} In October 2012, the FAC requested that work on the planning of a possible CSDP mission is pursued “as a matter of urgency”. The first draft of the CMC was prepared in October (Council of the EU 2012c). However, between October and December, France conducted its own operational planning. It sent a field investigation team to evaluate the MaAF as to determine conditions for a possible deployment. The French own planning accelerated the EU’s preparations as France provided relevant information on the situation of the ground (Rouppert 2015, 239). Member states welcomed this French initiative emphasising that France possesses better knowledge about the country and that the mission was supposed to be French-led (interview 39). Already in December 2012, the planning of the mission had progressed to the stage that the EU was ready to deploy trainers in the first quarter of 2013. On 10 December 2012, the Council approved a CMC on a possible military CSDP training mission in Mali while stressing that the mission in Mali would be part of the Union’s comprehensive approach as elaborated in the EU Sahel Strategy. The plan was to train four battalions of up to 3,000 soldiers tasked with combat, force protection, supply and support as to prepare them for an immediate deployment in the fight against the terrorists in the north (Council of the EU 2012c). Despite the ongoing crisis in the north, the security situation in the south was calm and stable. Even the CMC referred exclusively to the conflict in the north of Mali (Ibid.). These conditions encouraged EU member states to agree on this mission and provide their personnel for it.

The preparations of the mission were, however, interrupted by an advancement of the terrorists towards the south of Mali. The EU also lacked a credible partner on the Malian side due to the political fight in the transitional government (Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung 2013, 16; Rouppert 2015, 237). When the Malian government requested help form France for an immediate military support, France would have wished an EU-led combat operation. Yet, interviews revealed that France was also aware that other member states would only hardly agree on such an operation and at such a short notice. The EU member states were able to agree on a training mission only due to their hesitation, based on concerns over security and resources, to deploy their troops to a combat operation (interviews 28; 42). The EU therefore did not intervene to contain the open conflict, but waited for other actors to manage it while planning a CSDP action in the relatively secure south.

\textsuperscript{108}The Malian transitional government requested the assistance of the EU on 18 September 2012. The EU responded to this request on 17 October proposing a CSDP mission (Council of the EU 2012c).
The EU’s decision to plan a training mission during the time when a crisis management operation was needed reveals the constraints of the CSDP – the limits of the EU’s capability to agree on a combat CSDP action in an open conflict. As Eilstrup-Sangiovanni noted, although many EU members offered their strong vocal support to France in its military action in Mali, “none were willing to join France in combat” (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2013). The military mission itself was a small gesture, built heavily on French personnel, and “came rather too late, as the bulk of Malian government troops were by then headed into combat alongside the French soldiers” (Ibid.). The request of the Malian government for military assistance and the fact that this help was needed to fight the terrorists in the north would have made such an intervention different from those led by the US in Iraq and Afghanistan. Interviews suggest that those EU member states which hesitated to launch a joint military combat operation perceived an African- or French-led military involvement in Mali as a more credible option, leaving the training of the MaAF to the EU. They took into account the possibility of adverse attitudes by the native population towards an EU-led military action in an African country, the lack of experience in fighting terrorists as well as security concerns over a deployment in the north. They saw the EU’s strength in providing military training to the Malian army rather than fighting the terrorists directly (interview 28; 42). This case, similarly as the case of Libya, demonstrates that, although the CSDP has provided the EU with an autonomous capacity, this capacity has been constrained by the capability-expectations gaps, in particular the lack of political will, the fear of harming the EU’s image, lack of operational capability and security concerns.

Due to a rapid defeat of the terrorists in the north and a speedy re-establishment of the order by the French-led Operation Serval, and due to the relatively stable conditions in the south, the EU was able to proceed with its plans for a training mission. Already on 16 January 2013, only five days after the deployment of Serval, the FAC authorised the opening of negotiations with Mali for an agreement for a mission (Council of the EU 2013a). On 17 January 2013, the FAC formally established European Union Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali (Council of the EU 2013c). The Council appointed Brigadier General François Lecointre from France as EU mission commander and invited him “to speed up the plans and preparations so that the EUTM can be launched by mid-February at the latest” (Council of the EU 2013b, para. 3).109 On 18 February 2013, within a month, the FAC launched EUTM Mali with a mandate for 15 months within the framework of UNSC resolutions 2071 and 2085 (2012) and upon the request of the Malian government (Council of the EU 2013d; 2013e).

109The concept of operations was submitted to member states on 15 January 2013 and approved by the PSC on 28 January. The mission plan was approved by the EUMC on 18 February 2013.
This speedy progress suggests that the EU is capable of rapid deployments if there is a political will. EU member states were strongly determined to deploy this training mission as soon as possible. This rapid deployment was possible due to the willingness of member states to deploy this mission and due to the speedy policy-making process in Brussels, including the French preparations. General Lacointre initiated contacts with the Malian military commanders even before the official launch of the operation (Rouppert 2015, 239-244). Also, the EU wanted to demonstrate its rapid reaction potential. Interviews revealed that, since the French-led military operation in northern Mali was progressing, EU member states sensed the opportunity to engage in a post-conflict stabilisation phase through the EUTM in the south. They believed that the post-conflict stabilisation and rebuilding of Mali will be a fast and short process: “there was a strong belief that Mali will be neither Afghanistan nor Iraq” (interview 51). The EU did not see itself in a peacekeeping role; instead, it wished to contribute in a peacebuilding capacity. The Council Conclusions from 17 January stressed that the EU supported the rapid deployment of AFISMA and reiterated its commitment to providing financial assistance for this mission through the African Peace Facility. The Council requested the HR/VP to accelerate preparations for the provision of financial and logistical support “as a matter of urgency” (Council of the EU 2013b, para 2). These references suggest that the EU preferred to engage in the post-conflict phase while supporting other organisations in peacekeeping tasks.

The peacebuilding rather than crisis management character of the operation is strongly apparent in its medium-size strength. 550 personnel, including 200 instructors, support staff, force protection and medevac personnel is a relatively small number compared to troops deployed in Serval and MINUSMA. 23 member states and four non-EU states have contributed with their personnel (EEAS 2016a, 13). The mission has been located in a relatively secure environment. The headquarters of the operation is in Bamako and the training has taken place in Koulikoro, 60 km north-east of Bamako. The capital and other areas in the south were declared a “safe zone”. The mission was indeed deployed in a situation of an ongoing crisis and subsequent peacekeeping in the north. Yet, the south of the country, not seriously affected by the conflict, has been regarded as stable. The Malian armed forces and military objects as well as MINUSMA have been regular targets of terrorist attacks, especially in the north (France Diplomatie “Events”). Since 2016, individual terrorist attacks targeting hotels and resorts in the capital have raised the concerns about the security situation in the south. The EUTM has become a target of terrorists only recently.110 On 18 June 2017, a Portuguese serviceman of EUTM Mali was killed in an attack on a leisure centre located in the suburbs of Bamako (EUTM PAO 2017). In March 2016, the mission’s HQ in Bamako was attacked by

110On 18 June 2017, a Portuguese serviceman of EUTM Mali was killed in an attack on a leisure centre located in the suburbs of Bamako (EUTM PAO 2017). In March 2016, the mission’s HQ in Bamako was attacked by
security of the personnel has been the priority for the member states (see chapter three). These developments highlight that the EU’s capability to demonstrate its commitment to peacebuilding is dependent on the security of the environment.

**EUTM Mali: Peacebuilding through a military reform and training**

EUTM Mali is an example of a peacebuilding mission with a strong normative commitment; it is a military mission with the objective of contributing to the restoration of lasting peace in Mali through capacity- and institution-building (EEAS 2016d, 1). At the same time, the operation reflects the constraints of the EU’s foreign policy-making within the CSDP. The EUTM was planned during the time of the terrorist occupation in the north with the aim to train the MaAF to enhance their capability of fighting terrorists. Once Operation *Serval* defeated the terrorists, an explicitly combat-oriented training was no longer needed (Rouppert 2015, 237). As a result, the mission changed its focus to the reform and reorganisation of the MaAF. The mission is tasked with training, educating, advising, reforming and reorganising the MaAF. It attempts to improve the military capability of the MaAF as to enable them to conduct their own operations, which ultimately aims at restoring the Malian territorial integrity under civilian authority and reducing the threat posed by terrorist groups. The operation seeks to strengthen conditions for political control by legitimate civilian authorities of the MaAF (Council of the EU 2013c, Art. 1). The mission aims at the reorganisation and reform of the military structures. The mandate follows the logic of a peacebuilding framework that emphasises the cardinal role of functioning state structures for lasting peace and stability.

The main activity of EUTM Mali has involved (a) training for military personnel of the MaAF, and (b) training and advice on the reorganisation of the structures of the MaAF, including the areas such as command, control, logistics, human resources, international humanitarian law, basic military principles, the protection of civilians and human rights (Ibid.). These objectives reflect the liberal nature of these efforts according to the Weberian state model. The training involved practical demonstrations related to combat activities, such as the use of weapons and vehicles, fighting, and distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants. The curricula included training on de-mining, technical assistance and pioneer assistance. In addition, the training was concerned with human rights, gender and legal issues. Rouppert has claimed that the Malian army was modelled on the French army. The entire planning and managing programme was done by the French personnel who also wrote a gunman (Diallo and Diarra 2016).
training modules and curricula. This was accepted by other member states which recognised the special role of France in Mali (Rouppert 2016, 244). Similarly, the reform and reorganisation of the military structures and the necessary legal adjustments, as part of the advisory function of the mission, has followed the French system. French advisers have directly advised the ministry and authorities. EUTM Mali has provided advice to the Ministry of Defence, MaAF authorities and military headquarters in the military region garrisons at strategic and regional level in support of the structural reforms encompassed in the Malian Defence Programming Law (EEAS 2016a, 13; 2016d).

When it comes to actual training tasks, member states have provided training in their own area of expertise. In this sense, the French trainers have explicitly focused on fighting and combat activities, while personnel from other countries have been better in providing training in technical and pioneer support. For instance, the German Parliament decided that its personnel should carry out exclusively planning and technical supervision at the level of mission management, medical assistance to the mission, and pioneer and medical training for Malian soldiers (Deutscher Bundestag 2013, 1). Yet, as countries, such as Germany, gradually assumed more responsibilities in the mission, they have become more interested in shaping the nature of the activities of the operation. This has led to a disagreement between France and Germany over the restructuring of the institutions. Germany has emphasised pioneer and technical matters, while the French have focused on weapons and combat training. This tension has also translated into the political level - the reform of political power-sharing, which includes the reorganisation of the MaAF. Germany has pushed for a more devolved system, whereas France has focused on building a centralised system of governance (interview 49). This disagreement originates in German and French different systems of governance. This case shows that, although EU member states agree on the need for post-conflict engagement, their visions of particular actions can differ. At the same time, the differences between German and French activities can be seen as a division of labour: France is better suited to provide training in combat actions, whereas Germany is stronger in pioneer and technical support. In the case of Mali, Germany and France have developed strong cooperation. Both countries organised several joint ministerial visits. In 2016, French and German foreign ministers also delivered a joint message of support for the peace process in the country and for the efforts of the UN and EU missions (France Diplomatie 2016b).

Similarly as in the case of BiH, the training mission was launched as a short-term action. However, it extended into a long-term peacebuilding activity. After the first 15 months, the mission was extended until May 2016 (Council of the EU 2014b). With this
extension, the operation expanded to another training facility in the north of Segou, which is four hours drive away from Bamako. This facility was previously used by a German-run training mission which provided training on technical and rescue issues for the MaAF before the outbreak of the crisis. The inclusion of this training facility into the EUTM was not straightforward. During the visit of the German delegation to investigate the possibility of a German operation, German officials expressed their intention to operate Germany’s own training in parallel to the EU operation. They highlighted that Germany already trained the MaAF in this facility and that their equipments were still stationed there.\textsuperscript{111} The possibility of a bi-lateral operation could have also enhanced the image of Germany as an independent actor. The operation would have been under a German and not EU flag. However, this proposal was not realised since the German government did not want to risk undermining the Franco-German partnership, even if it saw the advantages of a German-only mission in enhancing its international image (informal interviews). This case demonstrates how ‘labelling’ and visibility are important factors for member states when they consider their contributions for CSDP actions. Member states seek to push for their own actions and policies that would enhance their own visibility at the expenses of a common EU action.

The long-term peacebuilding approach in this CSDP operation has prevailed. In March 2016, the EU further extended the mandate of the EUTM until May 2018. This extension included two new aspects. First, the operation expanded its activities to train personnel in the Niger Loop, including in Gao and Timbuktu. In 2016, the member states were also discussing the expansion of the mandate into mentoring as to allow the deployment of soldiers in training as protection force in the building project of a paved road from Mopti to Timbuktu (interview 39).\textsuperscript{112} This extension raises security concerns as the northern areas are potential to the terrorist threat. Deployments in remote regions with poor infrastructure may most likely increase the costs of the operation for security, technical, evacuation and medical arrangements. It may be challenging for the EU to not only provide security for its staff in such remote areas, but also to ensure regular supplies. While it is planned that the EUTM staff will not be involved in executive tasks, the deployment of trainees in protection activities could shift the scope of the mission from capacity-building to a “harder” engagement (interview 10).

Second, the mandate of the mission has been revised and expanded. The task of training has shifted to “train the trainer” and “monitor the trainer” approach while training the

\textsuperscript{111}Military technical equipments provided by Germany remained on the site during the crisis (informal interview E; interview 52).
\textsuperscript{112}Currently, there is only unpaved road. The construction was suspended in 2011 because of the terrorist threat.
leaders of the MaAF and those who are responsible for training the MaAF. This training has been conducted in regional military headquarters garrisons, Malian military schools and the EUTM Training Centre in Koulikoro. The mission provides leadership education for the junior and middle leadership to enhance the leadership skills of the MaAF. It helps to develop a military education system by integrating EUTM Mali instructors into the officer and non-commissioned officer schools.

In addition to training and strategic advice, the mission’s mandate extended into two other tasks: DDR and support for the Group of the five Sahel countries (G5 Sahel) process.\(^{113}\) The first new task is to contribute, in coordination with MINUSMA, to the DDR process framed by the Peace Agreement, through the provision of training in order to facilitate the reconstitution of inclusive MaAF (Council of the EU 2016f, para. 1). DDR programmes have been mainly done by MINUSMA. They can primarily be conducted in the north where rebels were operating. They bring the EU closer to its commitment to peacebuilding. Yet, although the rebel groups accepted to move forward, the progress is slow and the reintegration of former combatants from rebel groups, which are estimated at 18,000 in the new MDSF will be a test case for the EU (informal interview H).

The support for the G5 Sahel process includes the creation of a deeper cooperation in the area of defence, security, migration, terrorism and development among G5 Sahel, within the activities of EUTM Mali in support of the MaAF. The EUTM contributes to the coordination and interoperability among the national armed forces of G5 Sahel (Council of the EU 2016f, para. 1). The group is modelled on the EU cooperation in the area of security and defence. It is based on the idea that such a cooperation will not only strengthen the resilience of the region against terrorism but also lead to further cooperation among these countries, peaceful relations and resolution of internal ethnic divisions, including the demands by Tuareg groups who live across the region.

The extension in March 2016 was also shaped by the Paris terrorist attacks in November 2015. Following these attacks, France invoked Article 42(7) of the TEU, the first ever activation of the mutual assistance clause, requesting aid and assistance from other member states. EU member states contributed to this French request by increasing their contributions to the EU and UN actions in Mali (European Parliament 2015). The 2016 extension of the EUTM reflected these developments. Brigadier General Eric Harvent, from Belgium, was appointed the commander of the operation.\(^{114}\) With Belgium taking over the

\(^{113}\)G5 Sahel (Le Groupe des Cinq du Sahel) was created in December 2014 to strengthen regional security cooperation among the five countries of the Sahel region: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.

\(^{114}\)He was replaced by Brigadier General Peter Devogelaere, also Belgian national, in December 2016.
leadership of the EUTM, the Belgian government deployed an extra 30 soldiers to the mission and increased its military presence in MINUSMA to 175 personnel. Similarly, Germany, Spain and other EU countries increased their personnel contributions to the EUTM and MINUSMA (European Parliament 2015; Koops and Tercovich 2016).

By October 2016, EUTM Mali trained eight Malian Battlegroups, each consisting of 650 to 700 personnel, mainly soldiers (EEAS 2016a, 13). Soldiers trained in the EUTM have been already sent to the north to contribute to stabilisation and restoration of the state integrity in cooperation with MINUSMA. Yet, the ethnic divisions continue to hinder the peacebuilding process. To increase the ethnic composition of the MaAF, the EUTM has expanded its training activities into urban centres in the north, including Gao and Timbuktu. Despite the extension of the mission’s mandate and the will to train further battalions, the decision of the Malian government in spring 2016 to recruit 5,000 new soldiers for the MaAF and around 2,000 new police, gendarmes and national guards came as a surprise to the EU. This decision posed a new challenge in the SSR process as it increased demands for training, equipment and space left for ex-combatants reintegrated to government forces. The EUTM, as well as EUCAP, had to adapt to these new demands to assist with training of new officers (informal interview I). This hesitation of the EU to agree to further training highlights the limits of the EU in terms of willingness and capabilities. The mission served in the first instance as a demonstration of the EU’s reaction to the conflict. The actual objective of the capacity-building is oriented towards force generation, meaning that the EU seeks to train a specific number of officers.

Since the Sahel action plan foresees its activities until 2020 and since the Malian army is not yet fully prepared to tackle the terrorist threat on its own, another extension of the operation is highly probable. The two extensions of the EUTM suggest a long-term character of the activities carried out under by this CSDP operation in Mali. The prolongation of the mission’s activities brings further challenges in terms of costs and human resources. The common costs of the first mandate were € 12.3 million (Council of the EU 2013c, Art. 10). The costs for the second mandate are estimated at € 27.7 million, while the costs for the third mandate are estimated at € 33.4 million (Council of the EU 2016f). These costs exclude costs that member states bear for their own personnel. The increase in costs was due to the regionalisation of the mission and the extension of the mandate which required enhanced security, technical, medical and evacuation arrangements (interview 47). At the same time, the total sum is still relatively low compared to other non-CSDP projects.

The relatively secure environment of the mission and its low profile compared to the
UN mission increase the chances for the continuation of the mission. The EUTM, as well as the civilian mission, enjoy less public visibility compared to MINUSMA which has repeatedly been a target of terrorist attacks.\textsuperscript{115} MINUSMA has also been a subject of criticism by Malian authorities and public. In April 2016, a demonstration against international forces broke into the airport compound in Kidal, operated by MINUSMA, ransacking and setting fire to security facilities. The protests mark a deterioration of relations between foreign forces and the local community in Kidal, which are sympathetic of rebel movements (informal interview H). In contrast, EU staff reside mainly in their training facilities or in the HQ, whereas UN peacekeepers are deployed to public areas to monitor the situation and ensure order. This comparison also demonstrates the peacebuilding rather than actual crisis management nature of the EUTM. The mandate stated explicitly that the operation shall not be involved in combat operations and mentoring. Mentoring in real situations, for example at check points on main roads between respective constituencies, has been considered by the EUCM and the PSC. However, these suggestions have not been realised due to security reasons and the fact that this has been seen as a task of MINUSMA (interview 43). In addition, mentoring and combat actions, as well as training in support of the AFISMA mission, were rejected by the German Parliament (informal interview K; Deutscher Bundestag 2013, 1). From this perspective, the EU is a crucial actor in the stabilisation and peacebuilding process in Mali, while it could be argued that MINUSMA and France are the main actors responsible for security and combat operations, including the civilian protection.

**EUCAP Sahel Mali: Civilian peacebuilding through a police reform**

The interrelationship between the EU’s normative commitment to peacebuilding and its pragmatic approach that reflects the self-centred nature of the EU’s foreign policy-making is also apparent in the civilian mission in Mali. Soon after the launch of the EUTM the need for a civilian mission to tackle internal security problems became evident. Already in May 2013, the Council reiterated its readiness to discuss CSDP options “for urgent support for the Malian authorities in the area of internal security and justice, including the fight against terrorism and organised crime” (Council of the EU 2014a, preamble). Both, Mali and the EU wanted a civilian mission. While France and Germany were the main initiators of the mission, some

\textsuperscript{115}MINUSMA has been a subject of more than twenty terrorist attacks. For instance, in 2014, 28 MINUSMA peacekeepers were killed, which is the highest number of fatalities in a single peacekeeping operation in a given year since the UN Operation in Somalia in 1994 (informal interviews H and J). The EUTM has suffered two terrorist attacks with one deadly casualty since 2016.
member states were less supportive of a second mission; they saw the danger of relocating EU resources to the French sphere of interest at the expenses of other CSDP actions, especially those in Europe (interviews 26 and 33). Considerations that Malian security issues were directly linked to the EU’s security and migration problems, and the understanding that France and Germany would take the lead in the mission, the member states agreed to favour the decision to launch a civilian mission. While the EU was initially considering its contribution to the reform of both SSR and justice sectors, the choice was narrowed to the SSR due to the EU’s limited capacities. This selective approach was also influenced by the rise of migration and smuggling activities in the Sahel which the EU saw as a priority and a threat to its own security.

After Mali’s official request for an EU mission in support of the Malian Internal Security Forces (ISF), the Council decided to establish a civilian CSDP mission in Mali - European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) Sahel Mali in April 2014 (Council of the EU 2014a). The mission was launched nine months later, in January 2015, and was endowed with a budget until January 2016 (Council of the EU 2015b). The funding was extended until January 2017 (Council of the EU 2016g). Following the Strategic Review of the mission in 2016, the PSC recommended that the mandate of EUCAP Sahel Mali be adapted and extended for a period of two years (Council of the EU 2017a). Compared to the EUTM, the preparation period for the launch of EUCAP took longer. The planning of civilian missions is usually longer than that of military operations. Civilian missions follow a complex procedure with the planning and recruitment of personnel. While military mission can rely on soldiers who are ready to be deployed at short notice, civilian staff have to be first recruited. In Mali, the recruitment was further complicated by language issues; states had difficulties in finding civilian personnel competent in French. Security concerns and unfamiliarity with the environment also played its role in hindering a speedy recruitment of civilian personnel.

EUCAP Sahel Mali is framed as a further contribution, in addition to the EUTM, to the EU’s efforts to the restoration of the authority and legitimacy of the Malian state by means of an effective redeployment of its administration. It allows the Malian authorities to restore and maintain constitutional and democratic order and the conditions for lasting peace in the country, as embedded in the 2015 Peace Agreement. EUCAP provides assistance and advice to the ISF, in particular the Police, the Gendarmerie and the National Guard in the implementation of the SSR with a view to:

– Improving their operational efficiency
– Re-establishing their respective hierarchical chains
– Reinforcing the role of judicial and administrative authorities with regard to the management and supervision of their missions
– Facilitating their redeployment to the north of the country (Council of the EU 2014a, Art. 1, 2).

The implementation of these objectives is done through training and strategic advice.

Compared to other civilian missions, such as those in BiH or Kosovo, EUCAP Sahel Mali is relatively modest in terms of personnel given the large scale of the objectives of the mission and the size of the country. The authorised strength of the mission is 140 staff, mainly civilian police officers. This relatively small number reflects the operational limitations of the CSDP. At the same time, the budget of the mission has been significantly increased since its deployment, affirming the constraints of many member states of the rising costs of CSDP deployments in dangerous and logistically complicated scenarios such as Mali (see chapter four). The mission common costs were € 5.5 million between April 2014 to January 2015 – in the preparation phase. The expenditure increased to € 11.4 million from January 2015 to January 2016 and to € 19.7 million in the following year. The extended mission budget for the next two years was boosted to 29.8 million (EEAS 2016a, 12; Council of the EU 2017a). This means that the entire mission during the period of 4 years is expected to costs almost € 74.5 million. The costs for this medium-size mission are justified by the high costs for lodging, security, evacuation, medical and technical arrangements. The headquarters are in Bamako, though some activities are carried out in other areas. Despite a number of terrorist incidents in the last two years, security risks or terrorist threat are still low compared to other countries. One officer who was in the mission in Afghanistan said that the security environment is significantly better than that in Afghanistan (informal interview L). In fact, the personnel can move relatively freely in certain areas of the capital. Yet, the logistical, lodging, evacuation, force protection and medical arrangements increase the costs of civilian missions.

Similarly as the EUTM, the police mission is an example of the EU’s contribution to stability and sustainable peace in Mali and the region. It depicts the EU’s approach to peacebuilding based on the understanding that a country can be capable of self-governing its security and sustain peace if it possesses required capabilities and skills. Peacebuilding in this mission is carried out through three main activities: advice, training and projects. The advice element of the mission focuses on advising ISF and relevant departments in the implementation of SSR in Mali. The EUCAP advisers assist their Malian counterparts to improve their national strategy for human resources, to modernise management practices and control of their services, and to effectively recruit new staff within the ISF. The advice is
mainly conducted at the level of the Ministry of Security, the Ministry of Defence and the level of the commanders of the forces. The aim of the EUCAP expertise and advice is to develop effective policies and infrastructure, including the creation of a human resources database; an employment policy and staff management database; a baseline for staffing; a skills-based staff recruitment policy; operational management methods to help restore hierarchical links; audit and inspection units within the general forces inspectorate; and a master plan for training, overhaul initial training (structures and content) and relaunch continuing training (EEAS 2016c). The reform of the entire system of the ISF fits the logic of a state-centred peacebuilding doctrine according to which the EU supports the creation of functioning state institutions responsible for the internal security domain. Such restructuring also requires certain legal changes which further strengthen the state-building project.

Peacebuilding is strongly reflected in the training component, the second element of the activity of EUCAP Sahel Mali. The mission provides training for all the three components of the ISF. In 2015, the mission trained about 600 officers from all the three forces. The ultimate goal of the mission is to train a third of the staff of the ISF. The training covers subjects such as management and command, professional ethics, human rights, gender equality, intelligence techniques, professional intervention, criminal policing, counter-terrorism and public order. The training is primarily addressed at senior and intermediate staff. Each member of staff also receives individual training lasting 100 hours over four weeks. In order to promote local ownership, the mission also trains trainers who, in turn, can pass on the training outcomes to future trainees. Similarly as advice at the ministry and commanders levels, training follows the logic of liberal peacebuilding by training the members of the ISF according to European standards.

In addition, the EU’s approach to peacebuilding is characterised by small projects which seek to support the sustainability and which accompany training and advice activities. For instance, EUCAP donated sport and office equipments for and financed the renovation of offices and training facilities of the National Guard (EEAS 2016b). Such projects seek to ensure the continuity of training for the National Guard after the end of the EU mission. These activities are dependent on financial resources provided by EU member states, however. Interviews suggest that the case of Mali strengthened the call for the realisation of the CBSD (see p. 100 of this thesis) as the financial support and provision of equipment are seen as conditional to the successfullness of the EU both CSDP actions. The implementation of the CBSD would allow for an enhanced bridging between the activities of the CSDP missions and the implementation of reforms and training. With the latest extension of EUCAP Sahel Mali,
what was planned as a short-term engagement has become a long-term commitment. The extension of the mandate highlights that short-term missions can only hardly achieve the sustainability of peace and order. The situation in Mali is complex. While the south of the country and the urban centres in the north are under control, the threat of terrorism continues to undermine the stability of the country. Within the first two years of its mandate, the mission fulfilled its set of tasks of training police forces and reforming the security sector. Yet, this has not been sufficient. Bridging the CSDP with the CBSD will be necessary for the effectiveness of the EU’s actions in Mali.

Despite the strong normative commitment to peacebuilding, the mission is also a tool of the EU’s foreign policy serving the EU’s interests. Indeed, these are no longer of economic nature. For instance, France is no longer Mali’s largest foreign investor. Instead, non-EU countries have taken the lead in economic investments in Mali (France Diplomatie 2016a). The EU’s interests in Mali concern the EU’s own security, in particular preventing illegal migration from Africa. The new mandate of the mission has intensified the cooperation with Frontex by giving the EEAS access to the Frontex EU classified information and documents generated for the purposes of EUCAP Sahel Mali. The mandate called for the establishment of arrangements between the HR/VP and Frontex.\(^{116}\) This nexus of Frontex and CSDP is not only an example of a realisation of the comprehensive approach to crises but also of a shift in the focus in priorities. The post-conflict peacebuilding and stabilisation activities in this CSDP mission have become a subject of the EU’s security and protection of its external borders. Illegal migration has been the dominant theme of the agenda of several high-level visits of European leaders (heads of government, ministers and EU Commissioners) to the countries of the Sahel region as well as the visits by high-level representatives from the Sahel region countries in European capitals and EU institutions in 2016. The visits have been coordinated with European partners. The discussions have focused on projects and initiatives addressing trafficking and smuggling, and on root causes and the creation of economic alternatives in the regions most affected by irregular migration. The EU has extended its advice and support to new areas such as the development of biometric population registry, reintegration for returnees, awareness raising campaigns on the risks of irregular migration. The EU has offered the countries support of Europol and Frontex. For instance, the EU decided to deploy Frontex liaison officers to Sahel countries in summer 2017 (Council of the EU 2016b).

These activities have already showed their results. Both missions have made progress in tackling illegal migration in the Sahel region. The flow of irregular migrants transiting the

\(^{116}\)Due to different legal arrangements for the EEAS/CSDP and FRONTEX, the two institutions do not have access to each others’ internal documents.
countries of the Sahel was reduced in 2016. With the support of the EU, the governments in Niger, Mali and other countries conducted effective actions against smuggling during which they seized equipments and arrested smugglers. In Niger, more than 4,000 migrants were redirected to the IOM for repatriation to their home countries. However, potential abuses and the assurance of the protection of refugees and asylum seekers remain a challenge for the EU. While migration to Europe has always been securitised, with the extension of the mandates of CSDP missions in the Sahel, the CSDP has been utilised for these purposes. These developments indicate that the EU’s approach to peacebuilding is shaped by the EU’s own concerns, namely the attempt to halt the flow of refugees and migrants from Africa and to protect the EU’s borders.

**Small CSDP missions as part of a broader strategy**

The case of the two EU actions in Mali supports the argument that peacebuilding through CSDP missions and operations should be carried out within a broader strategy. Unlike BiH, Mali is indeed a non-European country without the prospect of EU membership. As such, the EU’s leverage on the stability as well as the EU’s role in peacebuilding in the country might be seen as limited. Nevertheless, as Tocci claimed, this does not necessarily have to mean that accession is an indispensable requirement for an EU’s involvement in conflict management (Tocci 2007, 159-175). She pointed to the cases of Israel-Palestine conflict and conflicts in Georgia, where the EU has been able to offer valuable benefits different to the goal of EU membership. In these cases, financial and humanitarian aid has secured the EU a place in the peace process, which shows how EU benefits need not be membership-related to be influential. Although these countries are excluded from the remit of EU enlargement, EU assistance has contributed to shaping the domestic environment in a manner that could foster reform and conflict resolution. Financial assistance delivered conditionally triggered important reforms in the constitutional, fiscal and judicial domains (Ibid.). From this perspective, Mali represents a scenario in which the EU could play an important role in contributing to lasting peace despite the fact that Mali is not a prospective EU-member. The country’s location in the EU’s broader neighbourhood and its historical ties to France provide sufficient reasons for an EU’s involvement. The EU has indeed become a key player in the country while using a regional approach to the multiple crises in the Sahel.

CSDP activities in Mali are part of the EU’s wider peacebuilding engagement; they are part of the EU Sahel Strategy. The strategy is a practical realisation of the EU’s
comprehensive approach. It is based on the assumptions that development and security are linked and mutually reinforcing as well as that a solution to the complex crisis afflicting the Sahel demands a regional response (EEAS 2016d, 1).\(^\text{117}\) The strategy mirrors the UN comprehensive and integrated approach to crises in the Sahel region, coordinated by the Special Envoy for the Sahel (UN Security Council 2012b, para. 10). In a similar way, the EU established a position of its own EUSR for the Sahel.\(^\text{118}\) The EUSR for the Sahel is mandated to coordinate and foster a regional approach and to ensure political backing of the EU’s activities in the region. The EU and its member states have actively supported the political process which involved high-level mediation as well as nation-wide reconciliation projects. The role of the EUSR for the Sahel in the peace talks and the implementation of the peace agreement has been crucial for the success of the CSDP actions in Mali. The Sahel region has become the EU’s broader neighbourhood in which the EU can promote stability as to prevent crises. The restoration of lasting peace in Mali is an essential condition for the stability in the Sahel, which ultimately contributes to the security in Europe (EEAS 2016d). This strategy underlines that the Union has a long-standing, and self-centred, interest in reducing insecurity and improving development in the Sahel.

The new conflict in 2012 led to a revision of the EU Sahel Strategy: Regional Action Plan 2015-2020 (Council of the EU 2015c). This plan defines a common strategic vision for the Sahel. It focuses on four key domains: a) preventing radicalisation, b) creating appropriate conditions for youth, c) migration and mobility, and d) integrated border management (IBM) which also includes fight against illicit trafficking and transnational criminality. Although this action plan intensively focuses on the stabilisation of the Sahel region, its real objective is the control of borders as to prevent migration and smuggling. Mali, like Niger, has been a major transit country for irregular migrants from western and southern parts of Africa. Assisted by traffickers, migrants and refugees seek to cross the borders with Mauritania, Algeria and Niger on their way towards the north coast of Africa. Malian northern borders are virtually impossible to control. Council Conclusions of 22 November 2013 called for a development of CSDP as to provide support to border management in order to help third states and regions better manage their borders. The FAC requested the finalisation of the concept for CSDP

\(^{117}\)The financial aid is a profound element of the EU Sahel Strategy. The EU is the largest contributor to development in the Sahel. The EU allocated over € 1.5 billion to Mali, Mauritania and Niger for development between 2007-2013. The Sahel Strategy has additional financial resources of € 167 million for projects on development and security. The EU and EU member states have financed CSDP missions and operations in Mali and Niger. In addition, the donor conference for Mali in Brussels in 2013 committed aid worth € 3.2 billion, including € 523 million from the European Commission (EEAS 2016d, 2).

\(^{118}\)Michel Reveyrand-de Menthon was appointed as the EUSR for the Sahel in March 2013. He was replaced by Angel Losada in November 2015.
support to the IBM, recognising its possible application to ongoing and future CSDP activities. The Council acknowledged the need to support Sahel-Saharan border management, building on the concept for CSDP support to the IBM in the context of the African peace and security architecture, as well as the EU Sahel Strategy (Council of the EU 2013g, 10).

The intense focus on tackling the migration flows and controlling borders in the Sahel, with the use of the CSDP, is expressed in several Council Conclusions (Council of the EU 2013f; 2014c). The use of term ‘stabilisation’ itself by EU officials and representatives in the Council committees with regard to EU activities in Mali, including the CSDP actions, demonstrates that the EU prioritises the establishment of order and security rather than positive peace. The EU’s turn to border and migration management through the CSDP is supported by the UN which already in 2012 stressed the need for regional and international organisations as well as bilateral partners to tackle transnational organised crime, including illicit activities and trafficking, in Mali (UN Security Council 2012b). Indeed, trafficking and terrorist threats provide the EU with a strong justification for the extension of its CSDP activities into migration and border control tasks. Having failed to meet the problem with previous tools, the EU has taken on new tasks to address the issues of post-conflict and conflict-driven societies. Yet, the question remains to what extent this shift comes at the expense of stabilisation and peacebuilding aspects.

Furthermore, the EU has also created new policy instruments and tools which generally fall under the CSDP but are not administered by it. These new instruments support CSDP activities, but merge tasks of peacebuilding, migration and border control, and fight against terrorism. The EU Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF) for stability and for addressing the root causes of irregular migration in Africa adopted at the Valletta Summit in November 2015 is one of these instruments. The EUTF is part of the EU comprehensive approach in tackling crises in the Sahel. It has four strategic objectives: 1) creating greater economic and employment opportunities, 2) strengthening the resilience of communities and the most vulnerable groups, including refugees and displaced people, 3) the improvement of migration management in countries of origin, transit and destination, and 4) improved governance and conflict prevention, including the reduction of irregular migration. Ten different programmes were approved in February 2016 and 20 other programmes in April 2016. The EU’s non-CSDP peacebuilding and stabilisation activities in Mali have also extended their focus to migration management. For instance, the EU has launched Programme d’Appui au Renforcement de la Sécurité (PARSEC) – a programme of support for enhancing the security of nine countries in the Sahel and Lake Chad region: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, the Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal.
and the management of borders in the regions of Gao and Mopti. PARSEC seeks to improve the control of the territory by assisting with the development of a management system of border areas, the flows of transport and persons as well as cross-border cooperation as to prevent irregular migration, smuggling of migrants and human trafficking (European Commission 2016b).

Projects with funding of more than €12 million from the EU’s IcSP are another example of the merger of migration/ border control and the CSDP. This merger has allowed the private sector to assume tasks under the CSDP. Among the four projects, the most recent is exclusively dedicated to the SSR (crisis management) in Mali. It is conducted by Civipol Conseil, a consulting and engineering company of the French Ministry of the Interior providing expertise in homeland security, civil registers, civil protection and governance. With the funding of five million Euro for the period between January 2017 and July 2018, the programme aims to contribute to training and reform of the SSR (Peace Direct). Although the project resembles the civilian CSDP mission, it has taken over the task of tackling the migration management, initially foreseen to be implemented by EUCAP. Civipol Conseil provides technical support to the management of the information centre and management of the migration. It covers programmes on the integration of migrants and strengthens the capacity of analysis and operational strategic planning of the Centre for Migration Information and Management (CIGEM - Centre d'Information et Gestion des Migrations) which is based in Bamako. The Centre was created in 2008 through an agreement between the EU and the Government of Mali. The overwhelming attention paid by the EU to the management of migration signals that the EU’s considerations for a sustained contribution to peacebuilding in Mali have been driven by the need to ensure a permanent stabilisation of the country so that migratory movements do not take place at all.

Unlike BiH, the case of Mali shows a significant degree of multilateralism and practical cooperation and complementarity. The EU’s autonomy in the CSDP has been limited in this case since the EU is not the only actor in Mali. By and large, the UN with its MINUSMA mission is the most significant player. In addition, ECOWAS and the AU are crucial African actors. Countries such as the USA, Canada and China are also involved in Mali’s stabilisation. The Council Decisions establishing the EUTM and EUCAP emphasise that the missions ought to be conducted in close coordination with other actors involved in the support to the MaAF, in particular the UN, the AU, ECOWAS, the USA and Canada (Council of the EU 2013c, Art. 1, 7; 2016a). The CSDP mission and operation are indeed the autonomous actions of the EU. Yet, the EU does not only recognise the role of other actors,
but it is also dependent on their support. For instance, some activities and travel by the EUTM and EUCAP would not have been possible without the logistical support and force protection provided by MINUSMA. The two CSDP actions are complementing the work of MINUSMA. The EU has also increased its personnel and equipment contributions to MINUSMA to such an extent that it was described by scholars as a European return to UN peacekeeping (see Koops and Tercovich 2016). Nevertheless, the contributions by the EU states still represent a relatively small share of the entire strength of more than 13,000 military personnel, almost 1,900 police personnel and more than 1,180 civilians of MINUSMA. In addition, most personnel from EU member states is stationed on compounds, as force protection for important sites, such as airports, and as technical support rather than directly engaged in combat operations or civilian protection. Since violence has occurred only occasionally in the form of small insurgencies and small-scale terrorist attacks, the security risks for EU personnel in the UN mission are low.

EU countries present in Mali have also pursued their own projects. For example, Germany has contributed to the strengthening of the rule of law in northern Mali by improving access to legal services, by supporting the constitutional reform through advice and training, and by promoting cultural and social cohesion. Germany has financially supported the activities of the Ministry for Reconciliation as well as the Truth, Justice, Reconciliation Commission, established after the conflict. In addition, Germany has advised and financed training courses for West African police as well as the training of trainers at the School of Peacekeeping (Ecole de Maintien de la Paix), a training facility in Bamako in support of peace, in particular of the ECOWAS Standby Force for its three components - military, police and civilian - in preparation of their deployment in peace missions. This activity aims at strengthening the self-relying capability of ECOWAS forces. Other member states, such as Denmark or Italy, support similar projects. While such activities ultimately contribute to peacebuilding and stabilisation efforts in the country, they also demonstrate the lack of a united approach of the EU. Instead of delivering these activities under the roof of the EU, member states wish to control their actions. This multiple engagements of EU actors show that the visibility of member states is given priority over a common action despite the fact that member states attempt to act through a common approach.
Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the EU lacked the political will to involve itself in the Malian conflict in a crisis management capacity. Instead, it planned a peacebuilding action, in particular a training mission, from the onset of the crisis while leaving the room for other actors to enter the open conflict in a crisis management capacity. The military operation and the civilian mission are results of the EU’s capability to agree on peacebuilding actions in this particular situation, respectively the EU’s inability to pursue operations with combat forces and peace-enforcement instruments. The EU’s involvement in Mali through these two CSDP actions shows that CSDP instruments are better suited to carry out peacebuilding tasks. Under current provisions, CSDP deployments such as those in Mali are dependent on the member states’ political will, protracted planning, and logistical and security arrangements.

Both CSDP missions in Mali have demonstrated the EU’s normative commitment to peacebuilding. Training and reform of the MaAF and the ISF as well as advice to the Malian authorities have been designed according to the blueprint of a state-centred peacebuilding model with an aim of building functioning state institutions. Nevertheless, the EU’s approach to peacebuilding does not only aim at the stabilisation of the country. By deploying its CSDP actions, the EU pursues its own objectives, in particular the protection of European borders and security at home. The Sahel region has become a wider EU neighbourhood. Criminal and terrorist activities as well as the flow of migrants and refugees in this region have direct consequences for the security of the EU. The EU assumes its responsibility in the stabilisation and reconstruction of peace in Mali with an aim of contributing to the protection of its own borders and security. With the expansion of the activities of EUCAP to tackle migration flows, the EU has prioritised stabilisation efforts over the building of positive peace. The EU has not only extended its focus to migration and border control activities, its new security concerns, but has also activated new policy instruments to pursue these activities. The EU links the prevention of migration flows to peacebuilding (i.e. efforts to build functioning state institutions) based on the understanding that a dysfunctional and fragile state leads to such flows and to a worsening of the security situation.

The CSDP actions in Mali are indeed expressions of the EU’s autonomy. At the same time, unlike the EU missions in BiH, CSDP actions in Mali show a degree of multilateralism and practical cooperation. The EU’s activities have been dependent on the technical and political support of other actors. They have also complemented the activities of the UN, ECOWAS, the AU and other states. The EU missions have focused on peacebuilding, avoiding combat and peacekeeping tasks. However, recent developments suggest that the
terrorist threat in Mali will continue to pose a challenge to the country’s stability. The situation where terrorist threats continue after the end of the violence, such as in Mali, require the EU to reconsider its approach even in the area of peacebuilding if it wants to maintain its role as an international actor. These new security developments have blurred the lines between post-conflict and conflict phases, and between peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and peacebuilding. Peacebuilding activities in such situations can be carried out only alongside combat actions against terrorists, which can ensure security. EU missions and other activities, in particular MINUSMA, may be in place for a longer run as initially foreseen. The growing number of terrorist attacks provide strong arguments against deploying large missions to such theatres. What is needed in such scenarios is a readiness to deploy rapid counter-terrorist forces. The EU might be asked to amend its activities in the light of these demands, meaning that it either would need to be prepared to step in a combat operation or redesign its training activities for the MaAF as to make them self-capable of fighting terrorists. Counter-terrorism should include broader development activities aimed at education, awareness raising and prevention. The EU has already adjusted to the challenge of continuing ethnic divisions and the unresolved Tuareg question by expanding the area of action to urban centres in the north. Sustainability after the end of the mission is another challenge that the EU needs to address. The realisation of the CBSD concept will provide an important step forward in increasing the effect and successfulness of the CSDP actions.

The case of Mali supports the belief that CSDP activities should be situated within a geographically and horizontally broader strategy. Whether other peacebuilding, stabilisation and development measures are activated after or in parallel to CSDP actions depends on particular circumstances. In Mali, the relatively stable environment in the south, which has not been directly affected by the conflict, has allowed for the continuation of other peacebuilding activities, including the political process and development alongside the CSDP actions. The case demonstrates that the EU’s peacebuilding approach cannot be applied to particular crises as a static concept and doctrine. It has to be context-specific and strategic as to create stable conditions by the time the activities of the mission cease.
CSDP missions and operations represent a significant contribution to international peacebuilding efforts. Most CSDP actions have been deployed to post-conflict situations to deliver peacebuilding tasks. Through these actions, the EU has helped to stabilise, reform and build judiciary, administrative and security institutions of several countries emerging from violent conflicts. CSDP actions follow the logic of peacebuilding that focuses on the reform and building of Weberian state institutions with a view to strengthening a country’s institutional capacity for self-sustaining peace. This approach has become the dominant peacebuilding model pursued by states and intergovernmental organisations. As a form of international assistance to post-conflict societies, this model builds on the understanding that functioning state institutions can prevent the recurrence of violence and ensure durable peace.

The purpose of this dissertation has been to provide an insight into the EU’s approach to peacebuilding through CSDP missions and operations so as to understand the extent to which the CSDP reflects a normative and practical commitment of the EU to international peacebuilding. The thesis has argued that peacebuilding has become a norm and a practice in the CSDP. Peacebuilding has become the main sphere of action for the CSDP reflecting the EU’s commitment to tackling the structural causes of war in post-conflict societies. EU peacebuilding missions make the CSDP a distinctive instrument in international conflict management. They use ‘soft’ military and civilian tools, such as capacity-building, training, legal support and political advice, to pursue reforms and restructuring of key state institutions. This approach stands in contrast to militarised actions of the US and NATO. According to Smith, what makes the EU’s conflict prevention efforts so unique is that they are mostly based on the EU’s own history and experience. Compared to NATO, the EU uses primarily civilian power and a comprehensive toolbox of instruments (Smith 2008, 202).

The analysis of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding in the CSDP has been conducted through an examination of three aspects: conceptual understandings of peacebuilding, the decision- and policy-making processes that generate CSDP peacebuilding actions, and two case studies where CSDP peacebuilding missions and operations have been deployed. Chapter one identified the framework of international norms and the theories of foreign policy analysis as best suited to explore the nature of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding through the CSDP. The thesis drew on these frameworks to investigate why most CSDP actions carry out peacebuilding tasks and how this peacebuilding is conceptualised, designed and operationalised. Chapter two attempted to understand the extent to which the
conceptualisation of EU peacebuilding has been influenced by the international normative peacebuilding framework through the UN. The thesis then addressed the questions of how the EU has developed its own approach to peacebuilding within the CSDP. The analysis of CSDP decision- and policy-making showed how EU peacebuilding activities are designed as foreign policy actions that reflect the preferences of member states. Finally, by looking into the dynamics of the CSDP actions in BiH and Mali, the dissertation outlined how peacebuilding under the CSDP has been operationalised. This concluding chapter summarises and discusses the main findings of this research, deduces the implications for theories and policies, and outlines prospects for further academic research.

**Shift towards peacebuilding**

Most CSDP actions carry out peacebuilding tasks despite the fact that the CSDP enables the EU to deliver the full range of tasks of crisis management, including combat operations. The shift towards peacebuilding in the CSDP had already occurred with the extension of the original, militarily oriented Petersberg Tasks into civilian tasks of crisis management. The tendency to deploy missions and operations with peacebuilding mandates to post-conflict scenarios has prevailed. The first sub-question of this thesis has explored the relationship between the CSDP and the international norm of peacebuilding. The dissertation identified two groups of factors that explain this shift towards peacebuilding within the CSDP.

First, the introduction of the CSDP and its subsequent focus on peacebuilding have been part of the adjustment of the international community to new security challenges after the end of the Cold War. These new security challenges highlighted the need for new strategies that could ensure not only the absence of violence but also ‘positive’ peace by addressing the root causes of conflicts. Peacebuilding emerged as a new practice of the international assistance to post-conflict societies to enhance their capacity to build peace. Many of these conflicts occurred at the EU’s doorstep. While being increasingly called upon to tackle these conflicts, the EU embraced peacebuilding as one of its foreign policy priorities.

Chapters two and three have revealed that, in formulating its peacebuilding approach, the EU has been influenced by the UN’s normative shift towards peacebuilding. The UN’s traditional approaches to peace and security, namely peacekeeping mandated to monitor ceasefire agreements, did not work in civil wars where violence was constantly re-erupting. The UN has therefore carried out a reform of its peacekeeping which resulted into the extension of peacekeeping operations into peacebuilding tasks and the establishment of the
PBC. It has adopted peacebuilding as a new norm and a practice in its approaches to conflicts.

The EU embraced the UN’s framing of peacebuilding, namely as a form of assistance to post-conflict countries focused on the reform and building of state institutions. The introduction of peacebuilding at the UN coincided with the launch of the CSDP which was seen as a contribution to international peacebuilding efforts; in addition to the UN missions, the CSDP represented a new institutional framework through which peacebuilding could be delivered. Although the CSDP evolved out of the WEU and resembled NATO’s practice in its origins, the extension into the peacebuilding scope has moved this EU’s conflict management instrument closer to the UN. The formulation of the objectives, purposes and tools of the CSDP has conformed to the reform of the UN peace missions. As members of the UN, the EU countries played a key role in this reform process, and subsequently in the institutionalisation of peacebuilding as a new practice at the UN, marked by the establishment of the PBC in 2005.

Since then, the EU has continued in presenting its CSDP actions as contributions to UN efforts to maintain international peace and security. EU countries have continued in playing their key role in the design and promotion of new peacebuilding policies at the UN, including in the introduction of integrated and multidimensional peace missions. The EU has also undertaken important policy and institutional changes within its own structures, such as the establishment of the EEAS, which have enhanced its common approach to peacebuilding. The orientation of the EU towards peacebuilding has impacted on the context in which the member states formulate foreign policies and interests. It has enhanced their understanding of the importance of peacebuilding as an instrument to prevent the recurrence of violence and the necessity of a common approach and joint actions to increase the successfulness of peacebuilding. As a result, this normative orientation shaped the image and self-perception of the EU as an international peacebuilding actor, as formulated in EU and UN documents.

As chapter three has shown, the CSDP equipped the EU with its own instrument with which it could deploy autonomous missions and operations. This autonomy has encouraged the EU to develop its own approach to peacebuilding. While the UN has continued in reforming its operations, resulting into the development of integrated and multidimensional missions, the EU has shifted to specialised missions with narrow mandates. The UN has developed its peacebuilding framework further by embracing an understanding of peacebuilding as an activity that is often carried out simultaneously alongside other instruments. In contrast, the EU has continued in the practice that conditions peacebuilding by a political solution and a secure environment. While EU countries agree that the conduct of
combat actions and peacekeeping is often necessary during the peacebuilding phase, they, except of a few, have been less willing to pursue such actions through the CSDP. This stance challenges the EU’s credibility as an international actor. Although recent policy and institutional changes in the CSDP, such as the launch of PESCO, have enhanced the level of ambition of the EU, it remains open to what extent such changes can prompt the EU to be more proactive.

Second, chapter four and the case studies revealed that political and pragmatic reasons have been behind the EU member states’ preference for peacebuilding over operations in open conflicts or peacekeeping deployments. Although the strategic cultures of the EU member states on defence and security have converged to an important extent, the EU is not yet fully united on possible justifications for deployments of combat operations. Many EU states vociferously oppose peace-enforcement for humanitarian purposes on ethical grounds. Differences between member states’ geopolitical preferences contribute to this dissonance; states may oppose combat operations because they do not see such deployments as their national priority. The cases of Libya and Mali where the EU was unable to reach an agreement on a full-scale combat operation showed that this attitude will not alter soon.

The thesis has established that peacebuilding with the focus on the stabilisation, reform and rebuilding of state institutions remains one of the few areas that reflect the member states’ common vision on peace operations. Since member states are not always capable of agreeing on combat or peacekeeping operations, peacebuilding often remains the only option for the EU – if it wants to make any feasible contribution and to be seen as a credible international actor. Agreeing on post-conflict peacebuilding tasks is easier than on operations that require a deployment of military forces to an open conflict. Peacebuilding is the area on which the EU member states are able to agree, therefore reflecting the convergence of the member states’ foreign and defence policies. Indeed, these actions are often symbolic gestures and come too late; CSDP missions generally enter the scene after the conflict is over and in environments with relatively secure conditions. Nevertheless, they form a part of the entire package of conflict management and are essential for the establishment of sustainable peace.

As chapter four and the case studies have pointed out, this shift towards peacebuilding in the CSDP is a result of pragmatic reservations and limits of the EU member states’ capabilities. Most member states see themselves as actors without adequate capacities, such as sufficient and qualified personnel, sufficient resources, and required military and civilian assets, to engage in combat and peacekeeping operations. Some states are not willing to send
their personnel to countries that are unfamiliar to them. Such deployments require the personnel to acquire additional competencies, including language, management and intercultural skills, which military and civilian personnel often lack. States are not only hesitant to send but also to find personnel, especially civilian staff, who are willing to move to countries with unstable security conditions and with malfunctioning infrastructure. Missions in such countries are demanding in terms of financial resources, force protection and medevac. Deploying personnel to secure environments runs low risks of human casualties and keeps financial and human costs low. Peacebuilding actions are therefore a reasonable option preferred over combat operations as they enable the contributing country to avoid overspending, casualties and failure, and with this connected domestic public humiliation.

The preference for peacebuilding over combat and peacekeeping operations in the CSDP has also been based on the understanding of the division of labour; member states have seen NATO, other regional organisations (e.g. ECOWAS) or ad hoc coalitions to be responsible for peace-enforcement actions, and the UN as a peacekeeping actor. This understanding of the division of labour raises the question of whether the EU would do more in combat operations if there were no NATO (or ECOWAS and France) or UN. The cases of Libya and Mali were indeed examples where Europeans took the lead in initiating and commanding peace-enforcement actions. Yet, it was not the EU. As Biscop has argued: “[t]he interventions in Libya in 2011 and in Mali in 2013 already were European, though not EU, initiatives” (Biscop 2015a, 5). Some member states, such as Germany, have contributed to these interventions by providing logistical and technical support. Nevertheless, member states oppose combat actions through the CSDP in conflicts that do not threaten the EU as a whole. This applies not only to countries which did not participate in the French-led operation in Mali; as chapter four has shown, if Eastern-Europeans requested for a military action with combat forces in Ukraine, France would oppose it under current circumstances.

**The characteristics of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding within the CSDP**

These two facets of the shift towards peacebuilding define what the EU’s approach to peacebuilding stands for. The EU’s conceptualisation of peacebuilding has a two-fold nature: EU peacebuilding carried out within CSDP missions and operations is a normative commitment and an action of foreign policy. The research therefore confirms the hypothesis which has been at the centre of this study, namely that CSDP missions and operations reflect the EU’s normative and practical commitment to international peacebuilding efforts. EU
peacebuilding within the CSDP has become a norm, embedded in the framework of international peacebuilding. At the same time, CSDP peacebuilding missions are a result of the EU’s autonomous foreign policy. The two aspects are mutually reinforcing. This combination of the normative commitment and the foreign policy contributes to a unique character of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding within its CSDP missions and operations. Indeed, in some situations, the EU’s normative commitment becomes silenced by political and operational limitations, as discussed in chapter four. Nevertheless, these limitations do not disconfirm the normative dimension of the EU’s commitment to peacebuilding as such. While the foreign policy dimension of the CSDP affects the EU’s normative commitment to international peacebuilding, either by enabling or restricting CSDP actions, the normative dimension impacts on the realisation of the CSDP by reminding the EU about its commitment. The extent to which one or another dimension becomes stronger depends on the contextual circumstances of a given case.

*The EU’s normative commitment to international peacebuilding through the CSDP*

The normative perspective portrays the EU’s approach to peacebuilding as the EU’s commitment to international peacebuilding. Based on various EU documents and statements, the EU understands peacebuilding in normative terms as a commitment to international peace efforts. In accordance with the international peacebuilding framework, CSDP peacebuilding missions pursue their objectives according to the state-centred peacebuilding model. Missions and operations reform and build functioning state services, such as police, justice and military sectors, according to the blueprint of the liberal state system. By seeking to develop the country’s institutional capacity for self-sustaining peace and stability, they promote specific values and norms. Missions and operations perform more than just reforms, capacity-building and institution-building; through these activities, they attempt to contribute to a more democratic and accountable state.

CSDP peacebuilding missions are part of the family of international peace missions carried out by international organisations. While the idea of the CSDP evolved mainly in relation to NATO, the EU’s approach to peacebuilding has been underpinned by the UN’s understanding of peacebuilding, which also focuses on the rebuilding of state institutions. The EU presents its CSDP actions as a contribution to the UN efforts to maintain international peace and security. Yet, the UN approach is broader and all-encompassing with UN missions mandated to deliver a wide range of tasks. In contrast, each EU mission or operation with a peacebuilding mandate focuses on one particular area – one of the six priorities of the civilian
While a typical UN mission includes the DDR, the SSR, military and police training, civil administration, and other tasks, a typical EU mission would perform only one of the tasks.

This narrow focus does not mean that the EU’s understanding of peacebuilding is incompatible with international norms. EU missions and operations follow the logic of the international peacebuilding framework, as discussed above. The difference is that they focus on specific areas as a result of political and operational considerations. According to some officials, this limited focus and the prioritisation of certain key areas increase the successfulness of achieving the effective functionality of a particular sector. The EU supports this claim by the completion of successful missions and operations. For example, the EUPM mission in BiH has helped to build a functioning police sector. The CSDP actions in FYROM were fundamental to the establishment of peace and stability in the country.

While the EU deploys its CSDP peacebuilding actions in post-conflict situations that have been stabilised to some extent, the UN has shifted from the original understanding of peacebuilding as an activity that follows after peacekeeping to one that is often deployed simultaneously with other instruments. The EU’s narrow focus runs the risk of neglecting or not connecting the respective sector to other important areas. For instance, the EUPM, despite the advice of the UN, did not initially link police reform to the reform of the justice system, and added the justice sector perspective only at a later stage. While viewing EU missions as a key contribution to its own peace efforts, the UN has called upon the EU to deploy its missions in a direct support of the UN missions and to become more active in other tasks of conflict management, including through Battlegroups to manage open conflicts or to stabilise post-conflict situations.

Indeed, the EU’s normative commitment appears weak in conflicts in which the EU did not intervene with a CSDP action. However, the absence of a CSDP action in such cases does not reflect the EU’s lack of commitment to peacebuilding but the lack of commitment to peace-enforcement, political tools and other instruments required in such scenarios. What the EU needs is the political will and readiness to deploy the whole range of instruments from peacemaking, peace-enforcement, peacekeeping to peacebuilding, or robust, multidimensional missions with all the required instruments. In such constellations, the EU could realise its commitment to peacebuilding alongside other tasks. A rapid or multidimensional commitment was deemed necessary for instance in Libya and Mali at the beginning of the crises where the EU was hesitant to act, and entered with peacebuilding instruments only once the countries were pacified by other actors to some extent.
It is difficult to expect the EU to conduct military interventions when some member states oppose such interventions for ideological and political reasons. The EU also continues to be committed to such countries through other forums, such as the UN, where it campaigns for international support for relevant actions. Many conflicts, such as those in Syria or in the ISIS-occupied territories, require not only a national but also regional and international political solution (mediation and other peaceful solutions) or the use of force in their current stage. To reach a political solution for Syria, an agreement among the USA, Russia and other players in the region, and their sustained commitment are necessary. The case studies of BiH and Mali have demonstrated that, although peacekeeping and combat actions have continued during the peacebuilding phase, peacebuilding was possible only after prospects for a political solution and a certain degree of stability were guaranteed. To conduct its peacebuilding activities, the EU also needed a liable partner at the governmental level in the host country.

The EU’s commitment to international peacebuilding therefore depends on the preconditions of a political solution and a certain level of stability in the given post-conflict country. This means that the EU deploys peacebuilding actions not only where it is deemed necessary but where the political and security situation allows it. This approach is compatible with the peacebuilding frameworks that emphasise either the necessity of a political solution and basic stability or a simultaneous deployment of all necessary instruments. The UN, the bearer of international norms, has embraced the latter, whereas the EU continues in the practice of the former. These two modes represent different methods, but the objectives and contents of peacebuilding remain identical. The fact that the EU is less willing to engage in conflicts with peacekeeping and combat actions does not undermine the EU’s commitment to peacebuilding. Instead, it reflects the EU’s political and pragmatic restraints resulting from the autonomous nature of the CSDP which highlights the limits of the level of the EU’s ambition as an international actor in the entire spectrum of conflict management.

**The autonomous character of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding within the CSDP**

The EU’s approach to peacebuilding within the CSDP also reflects the EU’s autonomous capacity in international relations. EU member states perceive peacebuilding activities within the CSDP as actions of EU foreign policy - outcomes of EU common decision- and policy-making. EU missions are actions that reflect member states’ strategic interests, preferences, concerns and constraints. They are an integral part of the EU politico-military foreign affairs. They are decided, planned, designed and delivered as foreign policy actions of member states. While the EU adopted peacebuilding as a normative framework, through its own practice and
political processes, it pursues peacebuilding activities in a pragmatic and political way. From the perspective of foreign policy analysis, the EU’s approach to peacebuilding in the CSDP therefore corresponds with Hill’s framework of the ability to agree, the resources and the instruments which are necessary for the EU if it wants to be a credible foreign policy actor. While in 1993, Hill argued that the EU lacked these capabilities, the deployment of more than 30 CSDP missions and operations has shown that the EU is capable of agreeing on external actions, has instruments for these purposes, and is willing to provide resources.

Nevertheless, this autonomous character of the CSDP is indeed one of the causes of the narrow focus of the EU missions. It is characterised by the EU’s capability-expectations gap, i.e. the inability of the EU to deploy more robust missions with an extended or fully comprehensive approach due to the lack of political will, instruments and resources. The majority of missions that have carried out peacebuilding tasks suggests that peacebuilding within the CSDP remains subject to the gap between expectations that arise from these capabilities. Peacebuilding, in particular the building of state institutions, is what the EU is mostly capable of and where its strength rests – on which member states are able to agree and for which they are able to provide required resources.

Indeed, this does not undermine the importance of peacebuilding or the role of the EU in contributing to international peacebuilding as compared to combat operations and peacekeeping. On the contrary, as demonstrated by past failures, peacebuilding is essential for achieving peace and stability in post-conflict societies. CSDP missions and operations are deployed in countries and regions which are in the sphere of the EU’s geopolitical priorities. The EUGS locates the areas of the EU’s geopolitical priorities for crisis management clearly in the EU’s immediate and broader neighbourhood. Despite a few exceptions of missions in remote regions, such as Aceh, almost all missions have been deployed in Europe, the Caucasus, the Near East and Africa. Deployments in remote regions may depend on whether the crisis poses a direct harm to the EU vital interests.

Peacebuilding activities that are delivered through the CSDP are designed and governed through complex decision- and policy-making processes that involve the EU member states and the EU institutions - the Council preparatory bodies and the EEAS. The former represents member states (actors) and the latter refers to institutions (agents and structures). Yet, processes of decision- and policy-making in the CSDP have blurred the lines between the actor-structure distinction. The design and governance of peacebuilding activities within respective missions is shaped by the involvement of both member states and EU institutions at multiple levels.
Common institutions through which member states negotiate their preferences and concerns provide a platform where differences are being increasingly converged. Council preparatory bodies and the EEAS encourage a coordinated approach to decision- and policy-making on CSDP matters. CSDP actions therefore contribute to the development of an EU identity in international relations; they present the EU abroad as a coherent actor. They are adopted and undertaken by the EU as a distinct legal entity (Art. 28 and 47 TEU). As a result, these actions serve a broader purpose of enhancing the integration of the EU since they require a high degree of cooperation and solidarity between the member states. Peacebuilding is a result of consensus-searching processes aimed at reconciling member states’ different preferences. Although member states seek to pursue their own interests, they wish to reach an agreement on common objectives and actions for the sake of their common policy.

While member states control and govern every stage of the peacebuilding action from its planning to delivery, the EEAS has increasingly become involved in CSDP policy-making. The EEAS seeks the coherence of the foreign policies of the EU member states. The EEAS has indeed developed its own priorities. Nevertheless, the member states remain directly involved in every aspect of the policy-making process - not only in the decision-making but also in the planning, management, command and implementation phases. As Edwards has framed it: “the assumption that a High Representative even with an EEAS will make a qualitative difference is an optimistic one; there remain too many hands on the wheel” (Edwards 2013, 75). This intense involvement of the member states makes the EU’s approach different from that of the UN, where the gap between the UN institutions and the UN member states is considerably deeper. At the UN, decision-making on matters of international peace and security is concentrated in the hands of the UNSC. However, planning, coordination, oversight and conduct of particular missions is carried out by institutions.

**The operational side of the EU’s two-fold approach to peacebuilding within the CSDP**

The implementation phase of peacebuilding in CSDP actions is case-specific. Although the forms, contents and objectives of missions and operations are similar, CSDP actions differ from country to country depending on the nature of the EU’s relations with the host country and the EU’s strategic priorities. The peacebuilding activities in CSDP actions in BiH have been influenced by a membership dimension. The EU did not only aim to build capacities, institutions and sectors of a functioning state; the aim of the CSDP mission and operation has been to build institutions according to the EU model as to ensure the country’s compliance with the EU’s *acquis communitare*. The ultimate aim of these activities has been to prepare
the country for EU membership. The civilian mission and the military operation have been fundamental elements of this accession-driven process. This comprehensive approach, through the SAP and later the SAA, accelerated peacebuilding efforts. It has formed a cornerstone of the EU’s peacebuilding approach based on a belief that regional integration and interdependence can establish sustainable peace. The case of BiH demonstrates that peacebuilding through membership-building has credible chances of achieving durable peace.

In BiH, the EU has significantly impacted upon the implementation of peacebuilding policies. As chapter five has shown, this approach runs the risk of undermining the national and local ownership. In the case of BiH, the EU has used conditionality in a coercive manner through the OHR. Nevertheless, the case of BiH also demonstrates that the prospects of EU membership can generate not only push but also pull factors on the side of the host country. While such an interventionism into the domestic affairs of third countries may be perceived as a form of ‘Western hegemony’, it proved essential for not only ensuring security but also making the return to violence in BiH unthinkable. As this case study shows, to avoid an opposition of the EU peacebuilding policies by local actors in the host country, the cooperation with local stakeholders and acknowledgement of their interests are essential.

In contrast, Mali, as a non-European country, has no prospect of EU membership. The peacebuilding activities in the two CSDP missions have focused on the capacity-building and reform of the police and military sectors. These activities have aimed at the establishment of security arrangements that would ultimately enhance the security of the EU. Peacebuilding in Mali, and in the Sahel, can be framed as ‘security-building’ or ‘protection of EU borders’. Both missions aim at the establishment of a stable Malian society, which ultimately contributes to the security of Europe. It is too early to assess the successfulness of CSDP activities in Mali. Soldiers who received CSDP training have been deployed to the north of Mali to fight terrorists. The military and police sectors have undergone a number of reforms. The CSDP activities have also contributed to the creation of effective arrangements to tackle illegal migration and trafficking. Nevertheless, the security situation in the north remains apprehensive with potential asymmetric threats of terrorism. Most importantly, further economic, social and political reforms are necessary to ensure sustainable and all-inclusive peace. Regional cooperation between the Sahel countries is a crucial step towards this goal.

The foreign policy dimension of CSDP actions with peacebuilding mandates is also evident through the extension of the scope of some missions to cover issues which concern the EU’s own security. As the Mali chapter has shown, the missions and operations in the Sahel which were initiated as peacebuilding actions with capacity- and institution-building
tasks have become security missions mandated to protect the EU, its borders and its citizens. The mandates of these missions have been extended to tackle illegal migration, refugee issues, trafficking and terrorism, which are seen as threats to the EU security. The missions tackle these threats through capability- and institution-building activities aimed at ensuring that these countries are capable of controlling their borders. The EU maintains that this will ultimately help to protect its borders against terrorism and irregular migration.

Certainly, post-conflict peacebuilding and stabilisation contribute inevitably to the enhancement of the EU’s own security. Yet, this recent shift raises the questions of the EU’s underlying interests that determine the nature of these engagements. These developments demonstrate that EU peace missions are an outcome of EU foreign policy-making. The profound involvement of the member states in all the phases of CSDP missions has contributed to this shift away from the altruistic purposes of peacebuilding to the self-centred focus on the EU’s own security. The EU uses its peacebuilding missions as instruments to enhance the security of its borders and citizens. As a result, EU peacebuilding through the CSDP embodies the interconnectedness between external and internal security.

The Mali and BiH case studies prove that the two sides of EU peacebuilding are not contradictory. EU peacebuilding actions are normative, as they promote norms and standards of a well-functioning state. At the same time, as outcomes of EU foreign policy, they also serve Europe’s strategic interests. While peacebuilding scholars tend to criticise this side of the EU’s peacebuilding activities, claiming that the EU merely pursues its own interests, the altruistic effects of this approach are equally evident. Peacebuilding projects through CSDP actions have been deployed to serve the interests of both the EU and the host countries. As Biscop argues, “[f]oreign policy is about interests […] it is neither good nor bad […]. It is the way in which these interests are then pursued which can be “good” or “bad” (Biscop 2015a, 4). In this sense, stability and peace in Mali and the Western Balkans, and the stability and peace in Europe are not exclusive but mutually reinforcing. The nexus of external and internal security in the EU’s peacebuilding policy through the CSDP, as well as other instruments, requires acknowledging that EU foreign policy is pursued with interests.

**Theoretical and policy implications**

**Implications for theoretical approaches**

This thesis has shown that international peacebuilding theories have two major inherent weaknesses. The first weakness is that they continue to be discussed as idealistic concepts
without a proper consideration of political and international links. The theories provide descriptive accounts of respective conceptual understandings and objectives of peacebuilding activities and set idealistic blueprints for the establishment of sustainable peace. They lack more realistic considerations as they tend to neglect the role of state actors and institutions. State actors are often not taken into account by scholars who study peacebuilding theories. However, peacebuilding does not occur in a vacuum; it is affected by and has an effect on political processes in a country of deployment as well as on international affairs. This thesis has shown that state-centred peacebuilding is a set of activities and policies which are shaped by political decisions of state actors. In terms of actors, peacebuilding theories tend to focus on the UN, international NGOs or local/ national actors. The EU as an actor in peacebuilding is absent in scholarly literature on the subject of peacebuilding. As this work has demonstrated, political decision-making and policy-making, and preferences and interests of state actors directly influence the shape of peacebuilding, and thus its effects. Peacebuilding activities are designed, shaped and implemented as subjects of foreign policies of states. Peacebuilding theories should consider wider political and international links to be more feasible and realistic.

The second weakness is that peacebuilding theories are highly critical when it comes to assessing peacebuilding actions delivered by international governmental actors. The successfulness of peacebuilding missions, such as CSDP missions and operations, in contributing to durable peace in a receiving country is difficult to measure. The success of a particular mission is measured in terms of achieving its objectives. But often, even if a particular task or a set of tasks are delivered and achieved according to the peacebuilding blueprint, sustainability cannot be guaranteed. In this respect, peacebuilding theories often neglect the role of host countries which also play their own important role in the post-conflict stabilisation and peacebuilding. Their willingness to build a peaceful society and commitment to peace are fundamental conditions for any successful peacebuilding. Most importantly, external factors, such as economic dependence, threat of international terrorism or climate issues also influence conflict dynamics. The case studies of Mali and BiH demonstrate that the extent to which the host country is ready and willing to cooperate on peacebuilding projects influences the successfulness of missions and operations.

The decision- and policy-making process on peacebuilding within the CSDP confirms the relevance of Howorth’s framework of supranational intergovernmentalism to the attempt to explain peacebuilding under the CSDP as an outcome of a combined intergovernmental and supranational policy-making. On the one hand, decision- and policy-making processes that
produce peacebuilding in the CSDP are highly intergovernmental. In this sense, CSDP peacebuilding projects the preferences of member states which seek to shape the CSDP according to their interests. On the other hand, EU peacebuilding within the CSDP is a product of complex yet structured institutionalised processes. Supranational intergovernmentalism is a framework that fuses realism and liberalism into one theoretical system. It could be therefore argued that the EU is a rare political entity in the international relations which balances the tension between realism and liberalism.

CSDP peacebuilding missions reflect the attempt by member states to reach an agreement on common actions despite the fact that they often pursue different preferences. The insights into the structures of the CSDP confirm previous research on the role of socialisation in decision- and policy-making within the Council preparatory committees and the EEAS (Cross 2010; Howorth 2010; 2014; Juncos and Pomorska 2006; Juncos and Reynolds 2007). Peacebuilding represents a policy on which the member states can agree. As a result, this cooperation contributes to the convergence of member states’ foreign policies and therefore to a formulation of an EU strategic culture. While arguing that peacebuilding within the CSDP is part of the continuation of the evolving EU strategic culture, the thesis confirms previous research by Meyer (2006) and Cornish and Edwards (2001; 2005).

The analysis of CSDP decision- and policy-making processes, and particular missions and operations in BiH and Mali confirms Eilstrup-Sangiovanni’s (2003) argument that the CSDP is better suited to address non-military tasks of conflict management and post-conflict rebuilding rather than military combat operations. At the same time, this research establishes, in accordance with Biscop’s argument (Biscop 2013a), that the EU needs to be capable of the full spectrum of conflict management operations, including rapid military combat operations, to step into situations of open conflicts. It is in Europe’s responsibility to assume the leadership “in maintaining peace and security” in its close and broader neighbourhood (Ibid., 4). In many conflict situations outside the EU, such as that in Mali, neither the USA nor NATO will take the lead. At the same time, the UN or African actors such as ECOWAS and the AU are often too weak to tackle terrorist threats like those in Mali or CAR. For now, the CSDP is less likely to be used in such situations. Nevertheless, the EU could be more ambitious and explore other options such as that provided in the provision of PESCO. The readiness of the EU member states to agree on military operations Atalanta and Sophia and to contribute to these actions with personnel and resources suggests that the EU is capable of such actions. Indeed the agreement for these actions has been driven by a common understanding that they tackle crises which represent imminent threats to the EU’s security.
and harm the EU’s economic interests. Nevertheless, the threat of transnational terrorism and the recent refugee crisis have highlighted that even ‘remote’ conflicts such as those in Mali, Somalia, or Sudan have implications for the security of the EU and its citizens.

**Implications for the CSDP**

The implications for CSDP policy-making and practice from the analysis provided in this thesis are that the CSDP is less suitable for use in open conflicts or immediate post-conflict stabilisation for dogmatic and pragmatic reasons which follow the logic of Hill’s capability-expectations gap. As far as dogmatic reasons are concerned, member states do not have a common view on liberal interventionism and combat operations in third countries. While France and the UK, and to some extent Southern and Eastern European countries, have favoured combat operations in third countries for humanitarian purposes, Germany, Austria and other countries have opposed such interventions for normative reasons. Some countries do not feel compelled to intervene in countries which are not of strategic interest to them; they expect other EU members or non-EU countries and international organisations to act. For these member states, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement deployments under an EU flag in a third country are possible if a member states takes the leading role in command, and the supply of military assets and personnel, given that the deployment is requested by the host country and complies with international law. This was the case of CAR (2014-2015) where France took the leading role in command and the mission has been almost exclusively staffed by French military forces. The deployment was indeed limited to Bangui and direct military combat engagements were almost absent. However, as the Atalanta and Sophia operations demonstrate, the EU member states are capable of peace-enforcement and peacekeeping deployments with the objective to contain situations which member states perceive as direct threats to their national or collective security and where it is clearly apparent that no other international actor assumes this role.

In terms of practical reservations, member states are not always willing to provide military and civilian assets that are required and do not possess sufficient expertise for combat and peacekeeping operations. As a result, member states tend to agree on peacebuilding activities which are less demanding in terms of instruments and personnel. Yet, discrepancies arise also here. While civilian and military training missions could be seen as less demanding, they are more difficult to launch due to a lack of qualified and sufficient personnel. The lack of resources and instruments therefore does not only concern military combat operations; training and capacity-building missions also require the provision of instruments, equipments,
knowledge and skills. Missions and operations with a peacebuilding mandate require new or additional skills and competencies. Capacity- and institution-building activities are different from ‘classical’ peacekeeping tasks in which military staff involves in fighting, civilian protection, observation or monitoring. Civilian staff also requires new skills and competencies. Abroad, military, police and civilian personnel engage in tasks that are different from those they would usually engage in at home.

Further, policy-making and technical constraints impede rapid deployments in situations of open conflicts. Protracted planning that characterises CSDP actions is better suited to post-conflict peacebuilding tasks. Since the launch of the first mission, the time between the political decision and the deployment has not been reduced. In 2017, a group of member states and the EEAS have prepared concept papers for the realisation of reactive, fast-track and more flexible civilian missions. This proposal includes ‘modular missions’ for fact finding composed of a standing capacity (15 to 20 stand-by officials) or specialised teams (20 to 30 experts), and reinforced by the CPCC or the Mission Support Platform (informal interview M). However, the limited scope and capacities of these proposals are relevant essentially for scenarios where a sufficient level of security has been achieved or where required security arrangements are in place.

The EU’s capability-expectations gap generates important questions of who should be tasked with combat operations and peacekeeping (with the mandate of civilian protection). Despite the fact that NATO is seen as an organisation that is capable of rapid deployments for combat operations and the UN for peacekeeping in the immediate aftermath of a conflict, the EU will continue to be requested to launch rapid response operations, including combat operations. Biscop has noted that EU states will have to assume more responsibility as they can no longer count on the US in taking the proactive leading role on Europe’s doorsteps. As the US has re-shifted its focus to Asia and the Pacific, the EU is left to cope with crises such as those in North Africa (Biscop 2015a). Similar implications have been drawn from the EU taking over NATO in Bosnia. The EU assumed the leadership in post-conflict peacebuilding in BiH very late. An early involvement, with peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities could have speeded the process of the post-conflict recovery in the country and the region.

As the case of Mali has demonstrated, rapid response actions are especially needed to tackle the threat of terrorism. There are strong arguments against deploying large missions to highly insecure and unstable theatres, especially those with asymmetric threats. What is needed in scenarios such as Mali is a readiness to deploy rapid counter-terrorism force. It is indeed questionable whether the EU is able to agree on counter-terrorism operations through
the CSDP and whether it is capable of rapid deployments. Moreover, counter-terrorism actions as part of peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions may run the risk of undermining the legitimacy and impartiality of the EU. This is the case of the UN missions in Mali, the extension of which into counter-terrorism tasks, according to some scholars, could undermine the legitimacy of not only the mission itself but also peacekeeping in general and the UN as an impartial actor (Avezov 2015; Karlsrud 2017).

Despite these reservations, the EU would need to adapt to these challenges and develop ways for deploying counter-terrorism actions – most probably as short-term rapid response operations through a coalition of willing and with the full support of the host country. Since it is unlikely that member states agree on such deployments through the CSDP, alternatives must be found to match the expectations. The possibility of differentiated integration through PESCO, introduced by the Lisbon Treaty offers an opportunity for those member states who are capable of combat operations. However, as Biscop has argued, in order the match the level of ambition, the EU member states need to further develop this idea. This requires the willingness of those member states which want to pursue these project to move from cooperation to effective integration in defence, which ultimately necessitates the creation of permanent multinational frameworks (Biscop 2017a; 2017b).

Moreover, rapid deployment is sometimes required for civilian missions too, especially in cases of humanitarian crises, civil administration and monitoring. These are reflected in the respective Petersberg Tasks, such as humanitarian and rescue tasks, and in the priorities of civilian crisis management, such as civil administration and monitoring missions. Yet, EU civilian actions aimed at conflict prevention or peacebuilding in third countries do not necessarily have to be carried out under the CSDP. The EUMM in former Yugoslavia has never become part of the CSDP. The EU mission in Moldova-Ukraine has been governed by the European Commission. Before the CSDP, the EU launched its EU Administration of Mostar - a civil administration mission from 1994 to 1997 which supervised the reconstruction of the heavily destroyed city, the reintegration of communities, and the establishment of a shared framework of government (Bose 2002). Article 28 of the Lisbon Treaty, on the basis of which Council decisions on all crisis management operations and missions are adopted, does not specify which instrument the EU must use when deciding on an operational action.120 The use of this article indeed remains a subject of legal interpretation

120Article 28.1 states that: “[w]here the international situation requires operational action by the Union, the Council shall adopt the necessary decisions. They shall lay down their objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union, if necessary their duration, and the conditions for their implementation” (TEU Art. 28(1)). EU operational action, which replaced “joint action” is a legal instrument of the EU CFSP and means an operational action required by the international situation by the EU for which the EU can use
and obscurity. Yet, this article could provide the EU with a faster decision-making procedure under which the EU could launch a civilian action. By using this article, the Council could delegate the EEAS with planning, command and oversight of the mission. Again, any such action would require resources from the member states. At the time of writing of this thesis, the EEAS was drafting a concept paper on the possibility of launching ‘civil administration’ missions under this article under the responsibility of the EEAS (see p. 185 of this thesis).

Institutions-oriented peacebuilding requires economic and social development to ensure its perpetuation. Sustainability of reforms after the end of the mission is another challenge that the EU needs to address. The realisation of the CBSD concept will provide an important step forward in increasing the effectiveness and successfulness of CSDP actions. This equally applies to counter-terrorism. Tackling the problem of terrorism requires more than combat operations. What it more needed are prevention activities on the ground that would address underlying factors of religious radicalisation and recruitment, such as identity issues, economic deprivation, and ethnic and social marginalisation, especially among young people. The EU lacks prevention strategies to tackle religious radicalism and fundamentalism among young people and young adults in countries emerging from conflicts. These challenges highlight the importance of security and development nexus – the need for continued and committed attention of the EU to economic and social development. This requires investing in programmes oriented towards education, awareness raising and employment.

EU peacebuilding missions have faced the challenge of preventing the perception of interventionism and ensuring local and national ownership. The extent of the involvement of the host country depends on case-specific circumstances and on the nature of the relationship that the EU has with the country. In countries in which CSDP actions are part the EU’s contractual agreements, such as the SAA in the case of BiH, the EU has a significant room for exercising its influence and power over the host country. At the same time, contractual agreements require the host country to cooperate with the EU. But, the EU can also support local and national ownership by introducing participatory methods and activities. For instance, local police officers in BiH have been involved in the formulation of programmes and projects run by the EUPM through the co-location and other participatory arrangements that the mission established. At the same time, the mission used the OHR and the EUSR to influence and impose certain reforms. The initial phase of the operation Althea, with executive mandate, provided less room for local and national ownership. The situation in Mali is different. Mali is not a prospective EU member and the EU does not have a contractual
agreement with the country. As result, the power and leverage of the EU over the peacebuilding process is limited. This may affect the effectiveness of the EU actions as the host country may not feel compelled to reforms according to the blueprint provided by the EU. Yet, even in this case, France has significant leverage over its former colony, which the EU has used to pursue its perspectives and visions.

Also, the member states’ day-to-day involvement in and control of the every stage and aspect of each CSDP mission and operation hampers the efficiency and speed of the CSDP activities, thus impacting on the overall effectiveness of missions and operations. Compared to UN missions, this procedure is excessive. Despite the fact that the UN deploys more robust missions, member states which decide on and contribute to the operations have limited involvement in their planning, coordination and oversight. Giving more rights to the EEAS – CSDP structures, especially in planning, would make the process more effective and efficient in terms of timing, and financial and human costs.

**Future research**

The discussion on the EU’s approach to peacebuilding in the CSDP raises broader questions about the roles and functions of the EU in building peace in third countries. While the thesis examined CSDP missions and operations as a normative and practical commitment of the EU to international peacebuilding, it was beyond the scope of this research to assess the wider impact, performance and effectiveness of the CSDP as a peacebuilding tool. An assessment of these factors is needed to understand why some countries, such as FYROM, have been successful in achieving peace, while others, such as BiH, need a longer period, and some countries, such as CAR, where previous missions seemed to achieve peace, relapsed into violence again. The assessment of the performance of the CSDP would reveal what the EU did differently in achieving sustainable peace in some countries and what went wrong in other scenarios. Such an assessment could aid our understanding of the role of CSDP missions and operations in contributing to the establishment of durable peace. It could offer recommendations for improvements in CSDP policies and for the development of conceptual and operational frameworks that reflect the reality.

During my fieldwork, I collected a large amount of data which I have not used in this dissertation due to the thematic and word count limits. Interviewees raised the questions of new developments in security, such as cyber security, which the EU will have to tackle in the future. Research suggested that environmental issues, climate change and energy security may
become increasingly incorporated in CSDP actions in the future. These aspects are becoming key challenges to the maintenance of security and rule of law in the countries of deployment. EU officials have started to think about possible policies that would address these issues within the CSDP. Energy security and climate change issues have also a direct impact on the EU. Already the 2009 Russia-Ukraine gas dispute, during which Russia interrupted all gas supplies passing through Ukrainian territory with the subsequent disruption of gas supplies to a half of the EU, showed how conflicts abroad directly affect the energy security of the EU. The rising flows of refugees from Sub-Saharan regions are also caused due to climate changes. These developments encourage research on the impact of energy security and climate change on EU foreign policy, in particular the CSDP.

The CSDP is facing ineluctable challenges with regard to its ability to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances and security conditions in conflict-driven and post-conflict societies. Countries emerging from conflicts experience different levels of security and stability. As the case of Mali demonstrates, violence may continue in some parts of the country, while other areas may be stable. Due to these increasingly complex crises, many conflict situations often require deployment of different crisis management tools simultaneously. But, deployments in such volatile situations raise new security concerns. Will the EU be able to continue in deploying its peacebuilding missions and operations in such complex environments? How can the CSDP adapt to these circumstances? The threat of terrorism and asymmetric attacks on peacekeepers and peacebuilders are becoming serious issues and put even stable and secure areas at risk. Could CSDP missions operate in environments that pose the risks of asymmetric threats? Will the EU involve (and be capable of involving) in counter-terrorism combat tasks, through CSDP or other instruments, or will it rely on other actors in this area? What would be the consequences for the CSDP if the EU involved in counter-terrorism operations?

Furthermore, CSDP missions and operation with peacebuilding mandates focus on the stabilisation and reconstruction of state institutions while often omitting other aspects which may be key to the achievement of sustainable stability and security. For example, many missions are deployed in conflicts that are ethnically and religiously driven, such as the conflicts in BiH or Mali. However, the missions and operations do not sufficiently address the issues of ethnic and/or religious division. Engaging in institution- and capacity-building without a wider political and societal resolution may therefore not be fully effective. BiH and Mali provide promising cases where the EU has attempted to pursue inclusive inter-ethnic and comprehensive approaches. What could the EU do to further advance political settlement in post-conflict societies which lack direct violence but have not yet been able to achieve
positive peace? How could missions and operations in ethnically diverse societies further develop inclusive- and conciliatory approaches in training and capability-building?

The ongoing transformation of CSDP missions and operations from missions centred on capacity- and institution-building to ones that focus on the security of the EU and its citizens marks a new era of international conflict management. Refugee and migration issues will most likely continue to dominate the political and scholarly debates as flows of refugees and migrants are not going to settle soon. The CSDP may be utilised to tackle these issues more frequently and directly. The interlinkage between internal and external security, as demonstrated through the increasing cooperation between Frontex and CSDP activities, is becoming a reality. We need to understand what this means for the CSDP and how the CSDP will and shall adapt to these new tasks. At the same time, this will require new considerations of the implications of such actions for the host societies.

Nevertheless, crises in Georgia and Ukraine remind us that traditional international conflicts between states, such as that between Ukraine and Russia, have not disappeared. The CSDP is not prepared to be able to tackle conflicts such as this. The EU missions in Ukraine and Georgia have limited effect when it comes to actual resolution of the conflicts. Both missions contain peacebuilding (capacity- and institution-building) and conflict prevention aspects. Nevertheless, is it sufficient and effective to deploy such tasks when the conflict has not been resolved yet and violence continues? The EU training mission in Ukraine is viewed with scepticism by Russia. The EU has indeed used this mission not only as a capacity-building instrument but also as a tactic of its political engagement with Russia and as a symbolic gesture of support to Ukraine. The re-emergence of such conflicts and wars will have an impact on the future development of the CSDP and its purposes.

In recent years, the growing diversity of Western societies, driven by migration, has blurred lines between foreign policy and domestic society. Only a few scholars have explored the impact of multiculturalism on foreign policy of EU countries. As European societies are becoming more ethnically diverse, with significant share of people with non-EU migration background, governments can no longer assume a national consensus in their relations with the outside world, let alone the firm homogenisation of the world. This interlinkage impacts on foreign policies of European states (Aggestam and Hill 2008; Hill 2013; Hill 2007). While scholars have analysed the relationship between foreign policies and multiculturalism of EU states, we need to further study how the increasingly multicultural societies of Europe impact on the nature of common policies such as the CSDP. Many EU countries have become homes to different ethnic groups which are transnationally attached to the countries of their origin.
and of their ancestors. These are often countries in which the EU deploys its missions and operations. We need to understand the extent to which the presence of groups with migration background impacts on decisions about and character of CSDP actions.

Further research on multilateral cooperation in conflict management is needed to explore how the continuing focus of the CSDP on post-conflict actions and peacebuilding affects both the cooperation and distribution of labour among the EU, the UN and NATO. Koops and Tercovich argued that, as a result of their negative experiences in Rwanda and the Balkans, European countries shifted their political and military attention to alternative fora, such as NATO and, subsequently from 2003, the CSDP. However, the intention of NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan and the slowing down of CSDP activities in 2010 has offered a potential ‘window of opportunity’ for a ‘European return’ to UN peacekeeping (Koops and Tercovich 2015). The crisis in Ukraine and the rise of ISIS have also re-emphasised the role of NATO. We have to continue monitoring how the contributions of EU member states to UN and NATO operations impact on the capacities of CSDP actions.

While the UN and NATO will remain natural EU partners in conflict management, we need to explore the role of emerging powers and new regional actors, such as China, India, Brazil or the AU, and potential spheres of cooperation between the EU and them. Can these actors become new partners in the CSDP? Will rising powers assume more responsibility in international conflict management, thus complementing or competing the CSDP? The CSDP has already become a platform for multilateral cooperation. Numerous non-EU states have participated in CSDP operations, especially in missions with peacebuilding tasks. The participation of non-EU states in CSDP actions has strengthened the overall legitimacy of the EU role as an international security actor (Tardy 2014). Further analysis of the reasons and incentives of non-EU states in participating in EU missions would aid our understanding of the EU’s role as an international actor in peacebuilding.

Brexit poses a further challenge for the future of the CSDP, and thus the EU’s approach to peacebuilding. While scholars differ on the question of how the EU will address this challenge, they generally agree that Brexit will provide the 27 with a strong motivation to reach closer integration in defence (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2017). The cooperation will most likely also continue with the UK after it leaves the Union. While the thesis has not considered potential implications of Brexit for the CSDP in full detail, many officials, including British ones, touched upon this aspect. We need to further monitor the political developments as to better understand the impacts of Brexit on the future development of the CSDP.

The impact of Brexit on the CSDP can be analysed in quantitative and qualitative
terms. Quantitatively, it is important to ask how the departure of the UK will affect the contributions towards the CSDP in terms of personnel, financial resources and other military and civilian assets. As far as personnel is concerned, Brexit should not pose any significant challenge to the CSDP as the UK has generally contributed only around five per cent of personnel to CSDP actions. Moreover, as Biscop has argued, there is no explicit need for the remaining EU member states to replace British troops, for the CSDP is not an expansionist policy; the EU states are not keen on deploying troops for the CSDP either (Biscop 2017c). A gap in financial contributions will not obstruct CSDP actions given the relatively modest budget for the CSDP, compensated by other significantly boosted instruments. In addition, Germany, the largest EU economy, started to assume a more active role in matters of security and defence (Rynning 2017). However, military assets and intelligence services are crucial areas where the CSDP is still dependent on countries such as the UK.

From a qualitative perspective, a member states’ contribution involves not only personnel and assets but also political decision-making capabilities, strategic planning and policy development. It is important to ask whether the departure of the UK would mean a weakened political profile, less skilled officials capable of planning and strategic design, lack of information and know-how, and lack of individuals who can bring a mission and the CSDP forward. Informal conversations with representatives and officials in Brussels in late 2016 and early 2017 revealed that, since the referendum, UK officials have radically shifted their focus from the CSDP to NATO. The UK has sought to emphasise the importance of NATO and marginalise the role of the CSDP. This shift has been driven by political pressure from London, despite the fact that many officials profoundly disagree with their government at home. Yet, UK officials acknowledged that Britain will most likely continue in participating in the CSDP given the affirmative acceptance, international recognition and relative successfulness of the CSDP compared to NATO actions (informal interviews). Similarly, Biscop assumes that the UK will most likely be part of actions in the case of a military threat to European interests, as well as in Europe’s periphery or beyond (Biscop 2017c).

It would, indeed, be the UK which would suffer more if it left the CSDP and other instruments that the EU uses to tackle conflicts abroad. Algar-Faria and Juncos have argued that the UK will lack much of a peacebuilding and conflict prevention capability if it stands alone. Brexit will make the UK less influential globally in the area of peacebuilding. The budget that the EU spends on conflict prevention and crisis management activities abroad is significantly larger than that of the UK. The UK used the EU to project its power in the world through conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts. It benefited from the CSDP which
allowed the UK to intervene in places with a colonial past and countries on its priority list much more easily, and also allowed it to benefit from the EU development policy (Algar-Faria and Juncos 2016). The UK was the initiator of several CSDP actions, including in Aceh, Darfur and Palestine (Gourlay 2013). This corresponds with Biscop’s argument that “it would be logical for the UK to keep the CSDP option open, for there will be contingencies in which this will be the best suitable framework” (Biscop 2017c, para. 3). The CSDP has become an avenue for many non-EU countries keen to join and contribute to EU missions (Tardy 2014).

The Brexit debate has reminded me of my time in New York when, during my work at the UN, I became intrigued by the role of the EU in peacekeeping and peacebuilding. I admired how diplomats from EU member states, including the UK, not only voted, but also acted in a united and coordinated way, even when dealing with UN officials. I observed how EU states played the key role in initiating and supporting policies in matters of international security and peace with a normative commitment of making the world a better place. At that time, I would not have thought that the UK may change its mind towards this approach. The last years of my research took place in the wake and aftermath of the Brexit referendum. This vote shaped my perception about the sustainability of European collectivity, including in the CSDP. I hope that the discussion on the EU’s approach to peacebuilding through the CSDP presented in this thesis may contribute to the ongoing debates about the EU’s commitment to international peacebuilding and its role in contributing to a more stable and peaceful world.
Annex

Formal Interviews

Interviews with EEAS officials

Interview 1 with an EEAS official, Brussels, 8 December 2013
Interview 2 with an EEAS official, Brussels, 9 December 2013
Interview 3 with an EEAS official, Brussels, 12 December 2013
Interview 4 with an EEAS official, Brussels, 1 March 2016
Interview 5 with an EEAS official, Brussels, 2 March 2016
Interview 6 with an EEAS official, Brussels, 16 January 2016
Interview 7 with an EEAS official, Brussels, 24 February 2016
Interview 8 with an EEAS official, Brussels, 12 February 2016
Interview 9 with an EEAS official, Brussels, 3 February 2016
Interview 10 with an EEAS official, Brussels, 25 February 2016
Interview 11 with an EEAS official, Brussels, 29 April 2016
Interview 12 with an EEAS official, Brussels, 15 February 2016
Interview 13 with an EEAS official, Brussels, 22 November 2013
Interview 14 with an EEAS official, Brussels, 25 November 2013
Interview 15 with an EEAS official, Brussels, 23 February 2016
Interview 16 with an EEAS official, Brussels, 16 February 2016
Interview 17 with an EEAS official, Brussels, 4 February 2016
Interview 18 with an EEAS official, Brussels, 22 April 2016
Interview 19 with an EEAS official, Brussels, 18 April 2016
Interview 20 with an EEAS official, Brussels, 19 and 20 April 2016
Interview 21 with an EEAS official, Brussels, 30 May and 15 December 2016

Interviews with representatives of Council preparatory bodies

Interview 22 with a representative of a Council preparatory body, Brussels, 19 February 2016
Interview 23 with a representative of a Council preparatory body, Brussels, 19 February 2016
Interview 24 with a representative of a Council preparatory body, Brussels, 16 November 2015
Interview 25 with a representative of a Council preparatory body, Brussels, 22 February 2016
Interview 26 with a representative of a Council preparatory body, Brussels, 28 April 2016
Interview 27 with a representative of a Council preparatory body, Brussels, 29 April 2016
Interview 28 with a representative of a Council preparatory body, Brussels, 20 February 2016
Interview 29 with a representative of a Council preparatory body, Brussels, 25 February 2016
Interview 30 with a representative of a Council preparatory body, Brussels, 17 February 2016
Interview 31 with a representative of a Council preparatory body, Brussels, 18 February 2016
Interview 32 with a representative of Athena, Brussels, 9 February 2016
Interview 33 with a representative of a Council preparatory body, Brussels, 10 February 2016
Interview 34 with a representative of a Council preparatory body, Brussels, 12 February 2014
Interview 35 with a representative of a Council preparatory body, Brussels, 19 February 2014
Interview 36 with a representative of a Council preparatory body, Brussels, 4 March 2016
Interview 37 with a representative of a Council preparatory body, Brussels, 21 October 2015
Interview 38 with a representative of a Council preparatory body, Brussels, 29 October 2015
Interview 39 with a representative of a Council preparatory body, Brussels, 11 March 2016
Interview 40 with a representative of a Council preparatory body, Brussels, 15 March 2016
Interview 41 with a representative of a Council preparatory body, Brussels, 3 May 2016
Interview 42 with a representative of a Council preparatory body, Brussels, 17 May 2016
Interview 43 with a representative of a Council preparatory body, Brussels, 24 May 2016
Interview 44 with a representative of a Council preparatory body, Brussels, 31 May 2016
Interview 45 with a representative of a Council preparatory body, Brussels, 14 June 2016

Interviews with officers/officials in Mali
Interview 46 with an official of the EU Delegation, Bamako, 8 January 2014
Interview 47 with an officer of EUTM, Bamako, 10 January 2014
Interview 48 with an officer of EUTM, Bamako 15 January 2014
Interview 49 with an officer of EUTM, Bamako, 17 January 2014
Interview 50 with an officer of EUTM, Bamako, 9 April 2014
Interview 51 with an official of the EU Delegation, Bamako, 11 April 2014
Interview 52 with an officer of EUTM, Bamako/Segou, 12 April 2014

Informal interviews mentioned in the thesis
Informal interview A with a former Representative of an EU member state to the UN serving in New York during the 2005 World Summit, 11 December 2009
Informal Interview B with a former official of an EU member state serving in EU institutions, Cambridge, 29 October 2014
Informal Interview C with an EEAS official, Brussels, 30 October 2015
Informal Interview D with a representative of the PSC, 15 March 2016
Informal Interview E with an official of the EUTM Mali, Bamako, 5 January 2014
Informal Interview F with a military personnel who served in EUFOR Althea, Slovakia, 9 July 2015

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Informal Interview G with an official who served in EUFOR Althea, Brussels, 5 February 2016
Informal Interview H with an EEAS official, Brussels, 19 October 2016
Informal Interview I with an EEAS official, Brussels, 21 December 2016
Informal Interview J with an EEAS official, Brussels, 21 December 2016
Informal Interview K with an official of the German Foreign Office, Brussels, 20 October 2016
Informal Interview L with an officer of EUPM, Brussels, 27 February 2016
Informal Interview M with an EEAS official, Brussels, 6 April 2017
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