EXPLORATIONS IN CLASSICAL SPARTAN PROPERTY AND SOCIETY

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the regulations for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

STEPHEN JOHN HODKINSON

Wolfson College
University of Cambridge

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This dissertation explores the relationship between property holding in Classical Sparta (c.550-c.360 BC) and the operation of Spartiate society, in order to illuminate both its longstanding stability and its crisis in the early fourth century.

Chapter 1 examines the character of the Spartiate social order and the tensions inherent in its value system. A complex balance existed between the high valuation attached to principles of uniformity, merit or seniority and the significant influence which derived from the deployment of wealth.

Chapter 2 tackles the controversial issue of the nature of land tenure and inheritance, concluding that it was subject to only minimal public control. Citizens had indefinite possession of estates which devolved to both sons and daughters and could be alienated through gift or bequest.

Chapter 3 discusses the Spartiates’ exploitation of the helot labour force, arguing that their extraction of produce was organized on a sharecropping basis and that differential degrees of intervention by individual Spartiates on their estates were a critical factor in inhibiting (in Lakonia) or permitting (in Messenia) the emergence of an autonomous helot communal organization capable of sustaining revolts and (ultimately) independence from Spartan control.

Chapter 4 explores the implication of Sparta’s system of universal female inheritance. Its long-term effect was to retard the emergence of the most severe inequalities, but at the expense of continual short-term changes in land ownership. As economic differentiation grew in the fifth century, however, and wealth became the main determinant of status, citizen families increasingly employed a variety of marriage practices which were intended to minimize the dispersal of their property. These factors help to explain the development of Sparta’s citizen manpower shortage, especially the failure of her leaders to tackle its fundamental causes.

Chapter 5 focuses on Sparta’s unprecedented involvement in continuous foreign warfare and empire between 431 and 371 BC. The claim of ancient writers that Spartan society was corrupted by the influx of imperial wealth is judged to be grossly overstated. But the emergence of independent foreign commands, which were acquired by a minority of leading citizens, served to transform Sparta’s socio-political system by intensifying the deployment of family influence and patronage, thereby accelerating the process of property concentration. Comparison with the Roman Republic suggests that the underlying framework of Sparta’s fourth-century crisis was determined by the longer-term, structural factors discussed in Chapters 1-4; but the shorter-term impact of foreign warfare conditioned the timing, circumstances and particular form in which that crisis evolved.
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This dissertation has been a long time in the making. My graduate research commenced in 1975 under the supervision of the late Sir Moses Finley on the subject of ‘A Systematic Study of Spartan Politics’. That work, however, was interrupted after two years by my appointment to a lectureship at the University of Manchester and by my involvement in other, non-doctoral research to which I had been urged to give more immediate priority (cf. Hodkinson & Hodkinson 1981). By 1981 Sparta had for so long taken a back seat that on the advice of Sir Moses (who was a consistent opponent of the ‘tyranny of the compulsory Ph.D.’) I took the decision to have my name taken off the Graduate Register.

There things might have rested for good, but for the gentle and persistent urging of a number of colleagues (among whom I would single out my former Professor at Manchester, Tony Birley) who gradually persuaded me of the merit of reviving the doctorate. Of particular encouragement was the willingness of Dr. Paul Cartledge to take over the role of supervisor following Sir Moses’ death in 1986. My research interest in Sparta had meanwhile moved on from the sphere of politics to issues of property and society, on which subjects I had published a number of articles; hence a change of title and subject-matter was appropriate. The Degree Committee of the Faculty of Classics agreed that about two-thirds of the dissertation might consist of already published work. Finally, in 1991 a sufficient space at last opened up among my research commitments to permit me to
apply for reinstatement as a graduate student with a realistic chance of completion within a reasonable period of time.

Of the main chapters below, earlier versions of Chapters 1, 2 and 4, which comprise about 49,000 words or about 62% of the dissertation, have already appeared in print (Hodkinson 1983; 1986a; 1989). The published versions have, however, all been thoroughly overhauled and updated in the light of recent work (my own and that of other scholars). Several sections have been radically revised in content and format. Consequently, the true proportion of already published material within the dissertation is probably closer to 50% than to 60%. In both the revised and the entirely new chapters I have sought to utilize all secondary works which had become available to me in Manchester before the end of 1991.

During the years of my research on Sparta I have contracted many debts of assistance to friends and colleagues. I would mention in particular Sue Alcock, Graham Burton, John Davies, Lin Foxhall, David Harvey, Robin Osborne, Anton Powell, Bjørn Qviller, John Rich, Tracey Rihll, Cosmo Rodewald, Robert Sallares, Richard Smith, David Whitehead and E.A. Wrigley. Sarah Davnall of the Manchester Computing Centre has given me invaluable assistance in programming the computer simulation in Chapter 4.

As probably the last of Moses Finley's former graduate students to submit a doctoral dissertation, it is a poignant
pleasure to pay tribute to his unwavering academic and personal support which is sorely missed by many Classical scholars. His inspirational and enduring influence upon the overall approach behind this dissertation is far greater than might initially appear from a simple scrutiny of its specific arguments. Since Sir Moses' death, Paul Cartledge has been all that could be wished for in a supervisor as a source both of intellectual stimulus and criticism and of encouragement and advice during the final period of writing up. My wife, Hilary Hodkinson, who has lived with the tortuous history of this dissertation almost as long as myself, has consistently provided the unconditional conjugal support which only she can; and our children (Christopher, David, Rosemary and Peter) have developed a finely-tuned sense of when to leave their father in peaceful study and when he requires interruption for his own and the family good! This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Bernard and Edith Hodkinson, as a token of thanks for their many years of commitment to my academic education.

Notwithstanding this variety of help, this dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration. It does not exceed 80,000 words, including footnotes, references and appendices.

All three-figure dates are B.C., unless otherwise stated.
ABBREVIATIONS

The abbreviations given for ancient works are those in common use in academic journals and monographs. The works of Plutarch have been cited according to the numeration of the Loeb edition.

Abbreviations of modern periodicals and other works of reference are given according to the usage of L'Année Philologique.

In addition, the following abbreviations should be noted:

**BAR**  British Archaeological Reports


**IG**  Inscriptiones Graecae. Berlin 1873 ff.


**Müller, PHG**  C. Müller, Fragmenta Historicum Graecorum, Paris 1841-70.


INTRODUCTION

My aim in this introduction is to define the subject and approach of this dissertation. A few words of explanation about the title may be a helpful starting-point. The 'explorations' referred to in the title represent a series of interrelated forays into some comparatively uncharted regions of the territory of property and society in Classical Sparta. By 'Classical' I mean, loosely, the period from c.550 to c.360; i.e. from the time for which we begin to get credible details of certain aspects of Spartan society through the enquiries of Herodotus to the termination of the Spartan-orientated works of Xenophon which ushers in a new period of ignorance about her internal affairs, by which time the crisis of Spartan society had resulted in her loss of hegemony and decline to the status of a second-rate power. I shall, however, sometimes have cause to consider the development of my subject in earlier and later periods.

Although the concern of this study is with property in the hands of individual Spartiate men and women rather than with 'public' property of the Spartan polis, I have refrained from using the description 'private property' in the title and text of the dissertation since, as is explained further in Chapter 2 in the context of land tenure, it fails to convey the fundamentally conditional nature of property rights in ancient Greece. The alternative terms which I now prefer to employ are 'individually-held property', 'individual possession' and similar variant formulations.
My choice of subject-matter for this dissertation relates to the most essential problem facing the historian of Classical Sparta, how to explain both the extraordinary success and longevity of her singular socio-economic system and its subsequent rapid transformation and crisis in the late fifth and early fourth centuries. That questions of property holding were central to the success and crisis of the Spartan system will hardly be doubted. The most distinctive feature of the Spartiate politeia from probably the seventh century onwards was that each citizen was securely established as the holder of an estate, cultivated by a helot labour force, which was sufficiently large to provide his family’s subsistence and his own mess dues, so that he could devote his time to the public way of life required of all Spartiates. Towards the end of our period it was the increasing impoverishment of poor citizens which underlay the Spartan crisis and the liberation of a major part of the labour force, the Messenian helots, which brought that crisis to its climax.

The factors outlined in the preceding paragraph have been noted in previous scholarship, but further study is required for at least two reasons. First, as will be discussed in detail in the dissertation, several aspects of existing interpretations of Spartiate property holding are far from satisfactory. Secondly, the key to understanding the Spartan property system cannot be confined to the realm of property holding, since developments in this sphere reflected and interacted with wider-ranging societal changes. Thucydides’ statement (1.6) that,
it was the Spartans who first began to dress simply..., with the rich leading a life that was as much as possible like the life of the ordinary people"

indicates that Sparta’s arrangements for the role of property rested on a compact between the different socio-economic strata which had ramifications throughout Spartiate life.

The distinctive approach of this dissertation is precisely its attempt to chart some central aspects of the interrelationship between Spartiate society and property (especially land). Chapter 1 examines the character of the Spartiate social order and of conflicts within the prevailing system of values, with an especial focus upon the central institutions of the public way of life, the agôgê, common messes and army. From this perspective it is possible to appreciate the magnitude of the attempt made by the polis to place a priority upon principles of uniformity and those (such as merit or seniority) which potentially privileged any Spartiate regardless of his level of property holding; but also the role that possession of wealth nevertheless continued to play.

In Chapter 2 attention is turned squarely upon the most important aspect of Spartiate property ownership, the controversial question of the nature of land tenure and inheritance. Uncertainty over this vexed issue has bedevilled attempts to interpret the role of property within the wider society. My discussion, in seeking to establish the character of Spartiate land tenure as subject to only minimal public controls, highlights the contrast with other spheres of Spartiate
life examined in Chapter 1 which were more heavily subject to state direction.

Chapter 3 scrutinizes a further aspect of this basic 'contradiction' and widens the perspective upon land ownership by examining the Spartiates' exploitation of the helot labour force. The interplay between citizens' relatively unfettered control over the utilization of their estates and the state-imposed limitations on their rights of mastery over helot cultivators is examined. Light is also shed upon a fundamental complementary weakness and strength of the Spartan system - the frequency of Messenian revolts which ultimately undermined Sparta's external power and the comparative acquiescence of the Lakonian helots which enabled her society to outlast that crisis.

Chapters 4 and 5 then return to Spartiate internal society and the development of its early-fourth-century crisis. The concern of Chapter 4 is with long- and medium-term socio-economic trends. It explores changing patterns of Spartiate marriage patterns in the context of the system of universal female inheritance advocated in Chapter 2 and of the increasing significance of wealth as the major determinant of status among the various competing influences discussed in Chapter 1. Examination of the impact of these factors upon the processes of property concentration and manpower decline and the hardening of boundaries around a wealthy social elite is seen to be essential to understanding the long-term breakdown of the 'social compact' referred to above.
Chapter 5, finally, examines the shorter-term effects of Sparta’s involvement in continual foreign warfare from 431 to 371. It focuses upon the impact of imperial wealth and the ways in which new opportunities for overseas posts altered the traditional socio-political system sufficiently to intensify existing trends towards property concentration and to strengthen the resistance of the elite to the possibility of radical change to alleviate the impoverishment of poorer citizens. A brief comparative analysis of the socio-political implications of the overseas expansion of the Roman Republic is made as a means of assessing the relative roles of the longer- and shorter-term factors discussed in the final two chapters.

The sources upon which this dissertation draws are largely literary. Some, such as Thucydides and Xenophon, are contemporary to the late-fifth or early-fourth centuries; and others, like Aristotle, are near-contemporary. But several (for example, Polybius, Diodorus and Plutarch) are much later writers whose works are secondary in character. There is no extant literary work written by a Spartiate in the Classical period. Discussion of the reliability of this literary evidence looms large (especially in Chapters 2 and 3), particularly owing to the ‘mirage Spartiate’. There is little Spartan epigraphy; but where relevant reference is made to a few private inscriptions, especially tombstones and victory dedications. Similarly, published studies of archaeological excavation or survey have as yet been few; but evidence for religious cult has been utilized in Chapter 3. Finally, the ‘sociological’ character of this
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dissertation has led me to make use both of computer simulation and of comparative evidence from other societies which can render opaque aspects of Spartan society more readily transparent.

Through these integrated approaches to Spartiate property and society this dissertation hopes to contribute some original insights into and to advance current understanding of both the long-term stability and ultimate crisis of the Classical Spartan polis.
CHAPTER 1

SOCIAL ORDER AND THE CONFLICT OF VALUES

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the nature of social relationships among the citizens of Classical Sparta, the Spartiates, by examining different areas of their lives, focusing upon the values, principles or criteria which brought about either uniformity or differentiation within the citizen body. An important underlying concern will be the means by which Sparta's political and military leadership was selected. In this chapter I shall treat Classical Spartiate society as a static system without attempting at this stage to introduce the additional variable of social change. Spartiate society was continuously subject to evolution and adaptation, as is evidenced, for example, by the progressive decline of Spartiate manpower and the changes resulting from extensive involvement abroad from the Peloponnesian war onwards (cf. Chapters 4 & 5). This, however, is not to question the underlying elements of continuity which enable one to speak with justification of a single social system spanning the fifth and early fourth centuries as a whole.

I. The Spartiate social order and way of life

The details of the Spartan citizen organization in the Classical period can be summarized under three headings: first, a
political system in which power and decision-making were divided among the kings, ephors, elders and assembly; secondly, a military and economic system according to which full citizenship was extended to a body of several thousand men who all became full-time hoplites supported by produce delivered by the helots who worked their lands (cf. Chs. 2 and 3); thirdly, a social and 'ritual' system as part of which every citizen (except the two kings and their immediate heirs) was compelled, especially during his upbringing, to accept a common, public way of life. It is the social and 'ritual' system which lies at the centre of my analysis in this chapter. In order to provide a clear background for the following discussion it is worth outlining the main stages of the Spartiates' life-cycle.

From age seven until between his 18th and 19th birthdays a young Spartiate had to undergo the full-time state education, the agógè, as described in Xenophon's Polity of the Lakedaimonians (Xen. Lak. Pol. 2) and Plutarch's Life of Lykourgos (Plut. Lyk. 16.4-18). The generic term for a boy between these ages was pais (pl. paides). Either straightaway, or possibly from the age of 12 (cf. Plut. Lyk. 16.6-7), he had to sleep away from home with his contemporaries in the barracks, a practice which continued until he reached the age of 30. Between his 18th and 19th birthdays he completed his initial training in the agógè. From this point until his 20th birthday he remained under strict control and was kept fully occupied with duties (Xen. Lak. Pol. 3), especially perhaps as a reservist for the army. (The term
applied to this age group was probably paidiskoi; see Section IIa below.)

At 20 he became a full member of the army and, probably also at this time, of a common mess, or syssition, (cf. Plut. Lyk. 12.4-7, esp. 5) in which, failing good reason, he was obliged to eat his evening meal (Plut. Lyk. 12.2; Antiphanes, apud Athenaios 143A). The term for a Spartiate between his 20th and 30th birthdays was hebôn (pl. hebôntes; cf. Xen. Lak. Pol. 4.1-6). During this period of his life he could probably attend and vote at the assembly. But he remained under the ultimate authority of the paidonomos, the adult who had overall responsibility over the upbringing of males aged between seven and 30 (Xen. Lak. Pol. 4.6; cf. 2.2; Plut. Lyk. 17.2). He was allowed to marry; indeed there were strong pressures upon him to do so (Xen. Lak. Pol. 9,5; Plut. Lyk. 15.2-3; Mor. 228A). Only when he was 30 years old, however, was he allowed to leave the barracks and live at home with his wife and family and take care of the management and supply of his own household (Xen. Lak. Pol. 1.5-6; Plut. Lyk. 15.4-10; 25.1). He now became eligible to hold major state offices (Xen. Lak. Pol. 4.7). Although no longer under the continuous direct control of any official, he was still required to keep fit for military service, for example, through hunting. He was obliged to serve in the army until he reached the age of 60, and to dine in his syssition. At 60 he became eligible, at least in theory (Ste. Croix 1972, 353-4), for election to lifelong membership of the gerousia, the council which consisted of twenty-eight elders or gerontes and the two kings (Plut. Lyk.
10

This way of life put into effect at least three socio-political principles: first, uniformity, an innovation highlighted by Thucydides (1.6.4), who commented that it was the Spartans who first began to dress simply and that in general the rich as far as possible adopted an equal style of life with the many; secondly, the priority of collective interests over private ones, enshrined in the compulsory nature of the common way of life as well as in the particular regulations enforced within it; thirdly, an insistence upon conformity to those regulations, involving adherence to specified types of action and standards of behaviour.

The ideology underlying these principles is summed up by the term by which the Spartiates were known, the *homoioi*, variously translated as Equals, Peers or Similars.

The establishment of this new ideology, probably amidst the crises of the seventh century, did not, however, entirely undermine the significance of other, contradictory values. Part of the compromise which underpinned the stability of Spartiate society was the retention during the Classical period of several influences which served to distinguish one citizen from another. Four of these are especially worthy of attention.
First, wealth. There are numerous references to the existence of Spartiates of superior wealth in the Classical period. Ownership of landed property was never equal and became more unequal over the course of time.⁵

Secondly, birth. The distinction between those Spartiates who were descendants of Herakles and the rest was of sufficient importance that it was used as an argument against Leotychidas’ claim for the kingship in the succession dispute of c.400 (Xen. Hell. 3.3.3; Plut. Ages. 3.5); and that, according to one version, Lysander intended to make only the former eligible for his proposed elective kingship (Plut. Lys. 24.3-5). Among the Herakleidai the kings were especially distinguished by their birth (Thuc. 5.16.2; Xen. Ages. 1.2; Isokrates, Ep. 9.3). Sperthias and Bouilis, who volunteered to atone for the murder of Darius’ heralds, were noted as being both of good family and among the first in wealth (Herodotus 7.134). The privileged birth of certain other Spartiates is detectable in their connections, typically hereditary, with leading men from other states.⁶

Thirdly, personal merit. Success in warfare, games, counsel and debate was always important among Greek aristocracies in establishing a man’s ranking. Differences of personal ability were not only impossible to eradicate but were also brought into sharper relief in Classical Sparta by the emphasis upon competition from the earliest years of the agôgê right up to the contest for election to the gerousia.
Fourthly, seniority. Sallares' recent study (1991, 160-92) has highlighted the significance of the criterion of age as a principle of social organization in the Greek polis. Nowhere was this more evident than at Sparta, as shown by the prominence of the gerousia, the complex system of age classes and the deference or leadership habitually accorded to the eldest of any group (e.g. Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 12.6; 13.7; *Hell.* 5.3.20). Sparta was not of course a 'pristine', acephalous age class society in which the age classes themselves are autonomous, self-regulating entities which set their own behavioural norms. Not only was every aspect of the Spartan age classes controlled by the sovereign polis, they were also tightly defined and all-embracing only in the formative years up to age 30, becoming more attenuated in adult life. Moreover, the functioning of the age classes was influenced by a variety of non-age-related principles such as the universal socio-political values and alternative criteria of ranking described above. The criterion of seniority was, nonetheless, a significant source of distinction, in part precisely because of the mixing of age classes which obtained in several compartments of Spartiate life, such as the common messes and the army.

II. The conflict of values in Spartiate institutions

I shall now examine the interplay between the influences which emphasized distinctions among the *homoioi* and the equalizing
principles of the Spartiate way of life within three different areas of the social system: the upbringing, the common meals and the army. In doing so one must take account of the fact that it was not merely these two sets of values that were in opposition. The different 'distinction-forming' values were themselves mutually conflicting, since each, taken on its own, would have produced a different order of hierarchy within the citizen body. Similarly, the citizen organization of the homoioi was itself not free from contradictions, since the social and 'ritual' system required a hierarchy to run it. Leaders were also needed for the offices of the ephorate and the Council of Elders and for various levels of command within the army. How these leaders were chosen will be the subject of the final part of this chapter.

(a) The upbringing

One of the most striking features of the Spartiate upbringing was the effort made to assert collective over private interests through dissociating the boys, especially those between seven and 18/19 years of age, from their households and socializing them into a peer group. Not only were they kept away from home, but even in public the possibility of an exclusive relationship between father and son was prevented. According to Xenophon, "Lykourgos ... gave each man equal authority over his own children and those of others" (Lak. Pol. 6.1; cf. Plut. Lyk. 15.8; 17.1).
Alternative emotional relationships to the family were also
provided in the form of institutionalized pederasty. One of the
duties of the young adults, probably those aged 20-29, was to
become the lovers (erastai) and surrogate fathers of boys who had
reached the age of 12. These relationships were intended to be
both close and enduring. The young adult erastēs (eispnēlas in
local terminology) was responsible for the conduct of his boy
(paidika or erōmenos; locally aitas), shared his honour or
disgrace; and, together with the latter's kinsfolk, supplied the
material needs of his household (presumably after the latter had
married) until the paidika reached age 30 and was allowed to go
to the market himself (Plut. Lyk. 25.1). This bond, consequently, cut across the marriage relationship of both partners. For the erastēs it commenced precisely at the time when he became eligible to marry. Until he was 30 the erastēs
was probably able to spend more time with his paidika than with
his wife. For the paidika, not only did his erastēs initially
supplant his father; but later, when he was married but not yet
30, it was not he who provided for his wife and children but his
erastēs.

The other male groupings, the age classes, the shared
barrack life until age 30 and the common messes, also acted as
counterweights to the household. In all this the collective
interest was reinforced by the multiplicity of male groupings,
each of which, as Finley (1986, 166) has rightly said, was "one
more way of strengthening the structure as a whole against its
individual parts".
The principles of uniformity and conformity were also evident in the upbringing. Aristotle (Pol. 1294b22-4) cites the uniform rearing and education of the boys of the rich and the poor as (in the view of some commentators) the first democratic feature of the Spartiate system. Even more revealing is the detailed attention paid to ensuring conformity among the paides (7-18/19 year olds), as Xenophon (Lak. Pol. 2.10-11) records:

"In order that the boys (paides) might never be without a ruler even if the paidonomos was away, he [Lykourgos] laid it down that any citizen who happened to be present had authority to instruct the boys to do whatever he thought right and to punish any misconduct. By this means he made the boys more respectful; in fact the boys and men alike respect their rulers above everything. In order that, even if no adult happened to be present, the boys might never be without a ruler, he put the keenest of the eirens in charge of each company (iłê). Therefore the boys there are never without a ruler."

As this passage suggests, a range of different individuals or groups within the state had a role in ensuring that the boys conformed. Each eiren led a company of boys on a daily basis, controlling the provision of their food and commanding them in mock battles. He supervised them at the evening meal, making them serve him and putting them through tests and questioning after the meal (Xen. Lak. Pol. 2.5; Plut. Lyk. 17.2-3; 18.2-3). Apart from the eirens, other young adults in the 20-29 age group (hēbontes) had a role in controlling the boys. The paidonomos, who organized the upbringing, was given a group of hēbontes as whip-bearers to provide floggings (Xen. Lak. Pol. 2.2). This was also the age group from which the boys' erastai came. Apart from the formal hierarchy, we have seen that any adult could take control when necessary. In particular, the old men were expected to be present, egging on the boys into fights, giving out praise
or censure and observing each one's merits (Plut. Lyk. 16.5; 17.1; 25.1-2).

This multiple supervision was also applied to the hébôntes themselves. Besides being under the control of the paidonomos, they were subject to the scrutiny of three other adults, the hippagretai. The task of the hippagretai was to select the elite squad of 300 hippeis from among the hébôntes. The hippeis were subsequently under their command (Xen. Lak. Pol. 4.3; Hesychius, s.v. hippagretas; cf. Xen. Hell. 3.3.8-9). The hippeis could also be brought under control by more mature adults (Xen. Lak. Pol. 4.6) and no doubt the old men also kept an eye on them. Even the young girls exerted pressure toward conformity by playfully chiding wayward young men and singing the praise of worthy ones in the presence of the other citizens and the kings and gerontes during their ritual festival dances (Plut. Lyk. 14.3).

The pressure towards conformity was reinforced, at least for the paides, by the use of corporal punishment, as has already been mentioned (cf. also Xen. Lak. Pol. 6.2; Plut. Lyk. 17.3). Furthermore, the effect of the multiple supervision of behaviour was intensified by the fact that those responsible for supervising would be under supervision themselves, as Plutarch (Lyk. 18.3) informs us:

"Often the eiren punished the boys in the presence of the old men and the magistrates, thus showing whether his punishments were reasonable and proper or not. While he was punishing them, he suffered no restraint, but after the boys were gone, he was brought to
account if his punishments were harsher than necessary or, on the other hand, too mild and gentle."

This was "the noblest of all lessons", as King Agesilaos is reputed to have told Xenophon (Plut. Ages. 20.2), "the lesson most studied at Sparta, how to rule and be ruled" (Plut. Mor. 215D)." Note once again the role of the old men in supervising the eirens. With the eirens and hēbōntes guiding the boys, the hippagretai commanding the young men and the paidonomos, the old men and the rest of the citizens supervising everyone, it is evident that the enforcement of conformity imposed its own hierarchy based on the criterion of seniority.

Conformity was not always imposed from above. Plutarch (Lyk. 16.8) tells us that from the earliest years of the upbringing outstanding individuals were chosen from among the boys themselves to command their contemporaries in each pack (agela). The rest of the boys had to obey the leader’s orders and submit to his punishments. The spirit of rivalry among contemporaries could also enforce conformity, as Xenophon (Lak. Pol. 4.3-6) recounts, when describing the selection of the hippheis from among the hēbōntes:"

"The ephors pick three men in their prime who are called hippagretai. Each of these selects 100 men, stating his reasons for choosing some and rejecting others. Those who do not achieve this honour are at odds with both those who rejected them and those chosen instead of them, and they keep a close watch on one another for any lapse from the accepted standards of honour ... each group strives separately to be always at its best, and if need arises, they individually protect the polis with all their might. They are compelled to keep themselves fit, for their strife leads to scuffles wherever they meet. But anyone present has the right to separate the combatants. If someone refuses to obey the mediator, the paidonomos takes him to the ephors; they punish
him severely, wishing to ensure that his passion never becomes stronger than obedience to the laws."

This passage illustrates some of the tensions inherent in the Spartiates' system of values. The required standard of behaviour involved not just discipline but personal achievement. Achievement was one of the yardsticks by which one's standard of behaviour was measured. Conformity involved competition and rivalry for the good of the polis; but excessive rivalry was a threat to discipline and to the laws.

The rewarding of personal merit was obviously fundamental to the upbringing. It was "the boy who excelled in judgment and was most courageous in fighting" who became the leader of his contemporaries in the agela (Plut. Lyk. 16.5). It was the "keenest of the eirens" who were given charge of the ilai of the boys (Xen. Lak. Pol. 2.11). Presumably the hippagretai had to use the merits of the candidates as their reasons for choosing some and rejecting others for the hippeis. A young Spartiate's personal merit was assessed and reassessed by means of continual tests and competitions such as trials of physical endurance (Xen. Lak. Pol. 2.9; Plut. Lyk. 18.1), mock battles (Plut. Lyk. 16.5; Pausanias 3.14.8-10) and questioning to discover whether he had internalized the Spartiate code of honour (Plut. Lyk. 18.3-6). According to Agatharchides (apud Athenaios 550C; cf. Aelian, Varia Historia 14.7), the ephors used to inspect the young men every ten days and observe their clothing and bedding every day. It is implicit in Xenophon's remarks upon the hippeis that there were possibilities for promotion or demotion depending upon one's subsequent performance. Presumably there was a periodic re-
selection, perhaps annually when the hippeis who had reached age 30 had to stand down. The continual reassessment must have been yet another influence strengthening the pressure towards conformity.

It is clear that the assessment of merit and choice of an elite marked a limit to the maintenance of uniformity. It seems that the selection of outstanding individuals during the upbringing, culminating in the choice of the hippeis, was also an important step in the process of choosing the next generation of political and military leaders. This appears to be demonstrated by the case of Sphodrias, who as harmost (or governor) at Thespiai in Boiotia in 378 made an unauthorized attack upon the Peiraieus. He was brought to trial, but acquitted through the personal influence of King Agesilaos on grounds which Xenophon (Hell. 5.4.32) reports through the words of one of Agesilaos' friends, a certain Etymokles:

"He says that it is impossible that Sphodrias is innocent; but, on the other hand, it is hard to put to death someone who as a boy, youth and young man (παις ὄν καὶ παιδίσκος καὶ ἡβόν) has consistently performed all his duties, for Sparta needs such soldiers".

The three terms pais, paidiskos and hebón by which Etymokles describes the stages of Sphodrias' upbringing are especially significant because they are the same terms which Xenophon uses for young Spartiates in the three broad stages of their training described in Lak. Pol. 2-4.6. Chapter Two of that work deals with the paides, the boys in the first stage of the upbringing. At the start of Chapter Three (3.1) he writes, "ὅταν γὰρ μὴν ἐκ
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παιδών εἰς τὸ μειρακιοῦσθαι ἐκβαίνωσιν. The rest of Chapter Three then describes the second stage of the upbringing. Because of the phrase εἰς τὸ μειρακιοῦσθαι in the passage quoted above, several scholars have thought that Xenophon’s term for youths undergoing this second stage was meirakia. Cobet (1868, 147) argued that this phrase should be deleted as a latter addition, a view supported by Tazelaar (1967, 147) and Cartledge (1987, 30). MacDowell (1986, 166) has pointed out that this is not strictly necessary, since Xenophon’s reason for inserting the phrase was not to indicate the term for the second stage, but to reinforce the point that emergence out of the paides did not signify arrival at adulthood. Xenophon’s term for youths in the second stage appears in fact at 3.5 when he concludes his account of that stage as follows: "καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀδ παιδίσκων οὖν ἐπεμελήθη" ("such then was the care he bestowed upon the paidiskoi"). Both this sentence and the description of Sphodrias’ upbringing in the Hellenika have usually been passed over in scholarly discussion of the age classes, which often dismiss Xenophon’s evidence as vague. The occurrence of the words paidiskos and paidiskoi in the two passages demonstrates clearly, however, that this was Xenophon’s consistent term for those in the second stage of the upbringing. In the first sentence of Chapter Four (4.1) he continues: "περὶ γε μὴν τῶν ἡβόντων πολὺ μάλιστα ἐσποῦδας" ("he took by far the greatest care of the hēbontes"), and proceeds to describe the third stage of the upbringing. In both the Hellenika and the Lak. Pol., therefore, Xenophon uses the same successive terms paides, paidiskoi and hēbontes for young Spartiates aged 7-29. This
consistency and the use of these terms in the directly reported speech of a prominent Spartiate surely indicate that they are drawn from technical Spartiate terminology.\(^{17}\)

In this light Etymokles’ words about Sphodrias take on an added significance. Sphodrias appears to be a clear example of a man whose display of merit in the upbringing marked him out as someone fit for the important governorship of Thespiai. His merit was certainly important enough for it to be used as a reason for his acquittal. At this point, however, one must ask precisely how Sphodrias gained his governorship. The answer is by the direct appointment of King Kleombrotos I (Xen. Hell. 5.4.15). One must also note that the friends of Kleombrotos, men who were members of the court which tried Sphodrias’ case and were therefore either \textit{gerontes} or ephors, are said to have been the \textit{hetairoi} of Sphodrias (ibid. 25).\(^{18}\) Seven years later, in 371, Sphodrias appears as a tent-companion of Kleombrotos at the battle of Leuktra (ibid. 6.4.14). These revelations of Sphodrias’ close connections with the king and other leading Spartiates should not necessarily lead us to doubt that his success in the upbringing was important in helping him to rise to his high command. It is possible that the king only developed his connections with Sphodrias because he had already proved his merit throughout his youth. But the king’s role in the appointment suggests that merit on its own may not always have been sufficient and makes us look towards factors outside the upbringing which contributed to the formation of the political and military leadership.
The evidence suggests that most young Spartiates, however successful they may have been, would have had to wait some years after the end of the upbringing before they gained a major post of command.\textsuperscript{19} Sphodrias himself must have been 40 or over when he received his governorship in winter 379/8, since at the time of his trial his son, Kleonymos, had just come out of the paides (Xen. \textit{Hell.} 5.4.25) and was therefore probably between his 18th and 19th birthdays.\textsuperscript{20} There was consequently a gap of several years during which, on the principle of continual reassessment, young Spartiates would have to continue to demonstrate their worthiness for high positions. From the age of 20 young Spartiates became members both of a syssition and of the army. Since their behaviour in both institutions is likely to have affected their prospects, it is these which I shall next examine.

\textbf{(b) The common meals (syssitia)\textsuperscript{21}}

The organisation of the common meals was linked to that of the army, since it seems certain that the men who dined together in a syssition also generally fought together in the smallest unit of the army, the \textit{enomótia}.\textsuperscript{22} Hence one’s interpretation of some details of its evolution in the Classical period will depend upon one’s views of certain putative developments of the fifth-century Lakedaimonian army, in particular the question of the existence of the ‘obal army’ to be discussed in Section (c). If there was indeed such an ‘obal army’, organised according to the five obes (or villages) of the Spartiates, then it follows that each
syssition will have contained men from the same village, although it is unclear how members of the same household were distributed. Be that as it may, it is clear that by the year 390, and probably from the mid-fifth century onwards, the army was not organized according to the villages (Xen. Hell. 4.5.10-11). Fathers, sons and brothers were enrolled in different regiments (morai) and hence, by definition, in different syssitia.

As this separation of members of the same household and village suggests, the syssition was from one angle the embodiment of collective interests, uniformity and conformity. If it is true in general, as Murray (1990, 7) claims, that the Greek symposion "became in many respects a place apart from the normal rules of society, with... its own willingness to establish conventions fundamentally opposed to those within the polis as a whole", then the Spartan syssition is the exception that proves the rule. As Bowie (1990, 225, n.16) has pointed out, "Sparta will have had symposia comparable to those in other Greek states for some generations after Tyrtaeus... and these will have been refashioned [my emphasis] into messes of homoioi in the 6th cent." [sic].23 Whereas the symposion in other states was a voluntary association, daily attendance at the syssition was compulsory, the only permissible reasons for absence being the performance of sacrifices to the gods or delay at the hunt (Plut. Lyk. 12.2-3). Whereas symposia were held in private houses, the syssitia were located along the public space of the Hyakinthian Way (Xen. Lak. Pol. 5.2 & 7; Demetrios of Skepsis, apud Athenaios 173F; cf. Polemon, apud Athen. 39C). Moreover, whereas members
of the symposion were normally from the same age group, each syssition comprised Spartiates of widely differing ages (Xen. Lak. Pol. 5.5), thus cutting across ties established in the age classes. The mixing of ages instilled conformity, as Xenophon indicated when he explained that its purpose was "that the younger might learn from the experience of those older".

Excessive drinking and the kind of hybristic behaviour stimulated by symposia in other Greek states were also strictly controlled (Fisher 1989). The food in the syssitia was the same for all, whether rich or poor (Arist. Pol. 1294b25-7). Conversely, each member, regardless of wealth, was required to make an equal contribution of food (Xen. Lak. Pol. 7.3; Plut. Lyk. 12.2; Dikaiarchos, apud Athenaios 141C). Initially each Spartiate household must have been given sufficient land to provide this contribution. By the late fifth and early fourth centuries, however, this strict uniformity was having harmful effects which undermined collective interests. Some Spartiates’ holdings had become so reduced that they found it impossible to sustain the contribution. Failure to do so meant that a man lost his citizen rights; many poor Spartiates thereby dropped out of the ranks of the homoioi and the number of Spartiates declined dramatically (Arist. Pol. 1270a15-b6; 1271a26-37; 1272a12-16; cf. 1330a6-8).24

Even if one focuses solely upon those Spartiates who maintained their status, it can be seen that the procedures of the syssitia introduced distinctions among the homoioi. Young
Spartiates of the requisite age were not distributed among the syssitia by lot. Each had to apply for membership of a particular mess. The existing members voted on his entry. If a single vote was cast against him, he was rejected (Plut. Lyk. 12.5-6). This procedure obviously opened up possibilities for ensuring that the best young men were admitted to the more exclusive syssitia. The decision concerning which young men should enter which syssitia may often in practice have been determined before the formal vote. We know that youths under the age of 20, particularly the paidiskoi, sometimes attended the syssitia (Xen. Lak. Pol. 3.5; Plut. Lyk. 12.4). During this period their suitability could be assessed. It is a pity that we are not better informed how it was decided which youths should attend which mess. One possibility is that a youth was normally introduced into the syssition of his erastês, as in fourth-century Crete. This may be the implication of Xenophon’s information that Kleonymos went to the mess to speak to his erastês, Archidamos, who was heir-apparent. If this were the case, it will have been possible to manipulate the future composition of the syssition through the judicious choice of paidika. Some historians have already argued that the choice of paidika may often have been politically motivated.

These considerations indicate that the syssition was probably a nucleus for political activity and the formation of attitudes, as Lewis (1977, 34f.) has suggested. Persaios (apud Athen. 140F) called it "a little polity". According to Xenophon (Lak. Pol. 5.6), "the custom was for any citizen’s
honourable deeds to be recounted in the messes". Plutarch mentions "political discussions" (Lyk. 12.4). Already in the boys' messes the eirens were accustomed to test the boys with questions such as "Who is the best among the adults?" or "What do you think of this man's conduct?" (ibid. 18.2). Although Fisher (1989, 398 n.73) is right to point out that the opportunity to engage in such discussions may have palliated ordinary Spartiates' sense of exclusion from the inner counsels of Sparta's leadership and helped maintain a consensus, it is equally not difficult to envisage how such politically-oriented conversations might aid the formation of political groupings.

It is important, therefore, to examine the character of social relationships within the syssition. There is one particular difficulty here: much of our evidence comes from post-Classical writers, many of whom are quoted briefly in an informative section of Athenaios' Deipnosophistai (139B-141E). This evidence must be used with caution, since there is reason to believe (cf. Phylarchos, apud Athen. 141F-142B) that the character of the syssitia altered somewhat as part of the general transformation of Spartiate society during the third century, taking on a new role "more as forums for luxurious display by the sympotic rich than as arenas of political.... solidarity for the citizenry as a whole" (Cartledge & Spawforth 1989, 42). To take one example, the contemporary evidence of Xenophon that younger members were supposed to be guided by their elders is a reliable indication that in the Classical period seniority in the syssition was as important as in the upbringing. But how, on the
other hand, are we to assess the account of Persaios (c.306-c.243 B.C.), which suggests that the syssition contained its own hierarchy when he refers to certain persons being appointed to lie down in first or second place or to sit upon the couch (skimpodion)? The differentiation between those reclining and sitting may relate to the longstanding contrast throughout the Greek world between the banqueting postures of men and boys (cf. Bremmer 1990, 139); but of how great antiquity is the indication of institutionalized differentiation of placing among the adults?

A problem of evidence also arises concerning the question of extra donations to the syssition. The fact of equal compulsory contributions did not eliminate the opportunities for rich or talented men to gain prestige by means of extra donations served as part of an additional course to the meal. The existence of this practice is attested in the Classical period by Xenophon, who, writing in the early fourth century, notes that "many unexpected additions come from hunting and the rich in turn contribute wheat bread (arton)" (Lak. Pol. 5.3). Dikaiarchos, writing towards the end of the fourth century (floruit c. 326-296 B.C.) also indicates (apud Athen. 141B) that the messmates "may even get something especially added, a fish or a hare or a ring-dove or something similar".

In the original publication of this chapter (Hodkinson 1983, 254) I assimilated this fourth-century evidence to several passages from later sources. Sphairos, the adviser of King Kleomenes III in the 220s, notes (apud Athen. 141 C-D) that,
"The messmates also contribute epaikla to them. Sometimes the common people (polloi) bring whatever is caught in the chase; but the rich contribute wheat bread and anything from the fields which the season permits".

Polemon (apud Athen. 139B-C), writing around the beginning of the second century B.C., informs us about the way in which these extra donations were advertised,

"In Lakedaimon the so-called aiklon comes after the dinner, ... being wheat breads (artous) in baskets and a piece of meat for each. The attendant who accompanies the distributer of the meat announces the aiklon, adding the name of the donor". 

Another Hellenistic writer, Molpis, states (apud Athen. 141 D-E) that,

"they contribute (the epaiklon) ... to give evidence of their own prowess in the hunt. Many of them, too, who keep flocks, give a liberal share of the offspring. So the dish may consist of ring-doves, geese, turtle-doves, thrushes, blackbirds, hares, lambs and kids. The cooks announce to the company the names of those bring in anything for the occasion, in order that all may realize the labour spent upon the chase and the zeal manifested for themselves".

Finally, according to Athenaios (140D-E), drawing upon an unidentified, but probably late, source, whereas the epaikla provided for the boys consisted simply of alphita (barley meal) mixed with oil, that for the men’s messes

"is prepared from certain definite animals which are given as a present to messmates by one, sometimes even several, rich members".

Although there is much in common between the Classical and later evidence, there is an interesting difference concerning additional donations of meat for the epaiklon. In the Classical evidence the origin of meat donations for the epaiklon, wherever stated, is from hunting, fishing or trapping."
of the later sources depict rich men contributing meat from animals reared on their private estates. In the Classical period the prestige gained from making extra donations accrued primarily to men of talent at hunting, rich or poor. (Poorer citizens were permitted to borrow hunting-dogs belonging to rich men: Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 6.3.) Wealthy men obviously attempted to corner a share of this prestige by donating special wheaten bread to eat with the meat. Only they had sufficient land to devote some fields to wheat cultivation after having ensured the production of the basic items, especially the barley meal, required by the mess. There is no evidence, however, of the provision of meat dishes directly from private farms and there may even have been a prohibition against such a practice. In later periods there was clearly no such restriction and wealthy landowners could translate their animal resources into prestige in a more direct fashion, in keeping with the more open and explicit general use of animals for reinforcing social divisions which developed during the Hellenistic period (Hodkinson, 1990 [1992]).

Another feature mentioned only by the later sources is the explicit announcement of the donor’s name. In this case, however, the silence of the Classical sources, Xenophon and Dikaiarchos, is less significant, since neither is concerned with the procedures surrounding the additional donations, merely with the variation in diet. In any case, whether ceremonially announced in the Classical period or not, the identity of the donor will hardly have been lost upon his messmates.
Before leaving this subject it remains to consider one distinctive and problematic piece of evidence which has already been mentioned. The distinct impression created by the sources considered above is that contributions to the *epaikla* were voluntary additions to the meal. Persaios (*apud* Athen. 140F), however, followed by Dioskourides (possibly of Tarsus, *floruit* probably c. 100 B.C.: Jacoby 1955, 629-30), claims that the rich were assessed for a sum sufficient to pay for *epaikla* of barley meal (*alphita*) mixed with oil, while the poor were required to contribute a reed or rush or laurel leaves. The whole minute proceeding, he continues, had become a matter of governmental administration. The compulsory nature of the system described by Persaios conflicts with that depicted in the other evidence, both Classical and later. The date of Persaios' death c.243 might just allow the system described to be one which may have come temporarily into force during the reforms of King Agis IV in the mid-240s (cf. Plut. *Agis* 8.2 for his proposed rearrangement of the *syssition*). If not, the tightly-controlled arrangements sound more like measures deriving from the Classical period than new introductions during the period when standards were relaxed following Sparta's mid-fourth century decline in international status. One might attempt a reconciliation with the other evidence through the suggestion that Persaios' *epaikla* of *alphita* mixed with oil (not meat and wheaten bread, as in the other sources) could be a variant of the serving of barley cakes (*maza*) which Dikaiarchos mentions between the main course (*deipnon*) and the additional course of game.
Whatever may be the correct solution to this puzzle, the evidence of Persaios should not be taken to negate the evidence for voluntary donations of hunted game and farm produce discussed above. Such displays of talent or wealth must have exalted certain members of a syssition above others. They must also have stimulated competition among members for a high place in the syssition hierarchy, not to mention competition between different syssitia over the quality and quantity of their extra donations. Since talent at hunting did not necessarily coincide with possession of wealth, their respective claims will have conflicted with each other, and both with claims to precedence based upon seniority. Fisher (1989, esp. 38-9) has recently questioned whether such conflicts should be viewed as indications of grave tensions, suggesting that the effect might equally have been a "fruitful and beneficial competition for honour" (ibid. 39) which would not seriously have upset the cohesion of the community. His interpretation is not incompatible with the approach developed here - indeed it recalls Xenophon's remarks concerning strife following the selection of the hippeis quoted earlier (Lak. Pol. 4.3-6) - but it should be noted that the result of such competition was the continual formation (and reformation) of hierarchies among the citizen body.

(c) The army

There has been a great deal of controversy concerning the organization of the army in the Classical period, with some
scholars arguing for continuity while others have postulated up to three reorganizations, one at an unknown date in the mid-fifth century, another between the battle of Mantineia in 418 and the early fourth century and a final one after the battle of Leuktra. Fortunately, for our purposes, only the first of these putative changes would have had a significant effect upon the overall structure of command and the composition of the smallest fighting unit, the enomótia, which are the features most relevant to an assessment of the army’s influence upon Spartiate social relations. Several scholars believe that the army of the early fifth century, as described by Herodotus at the battle of Plataia in 479, was an ‘obal army’ organised according to the five obes (or villages) which each furnished one regiment. Others (e.g. Kelly 1981, Lazenby 1985, 41ff.) dismiss its very existence. Since this is not the place to review the complex arguments on both sides, the following discussion will, for the sake of argument, assume the existence of the obal army and discuss the nature of its social relations; these will be seen in practice not to differ greatly in most respects from those operative during the remainder of the Classical period.

In general, the structure of the army cut across some of the pre-existing groupings of Spartiate society. The most important exception to this principle was that in the obal army members of the same village fought in the same regiment. How they were organized into smaller units within the regiment, in particular whether members of each family were grouped together or separated at the level of the enomótia, is not known. It seems, however,
that the composition of each enomótia cut across the age classes, containing (theoretically, at least) one man out of every age class from ages 20 to 59 (cf. Toynbee 1969, 263ff.). In practice probably only those aged 20-44 were normally called up.

In the later army the age-structure of the enomótiai was the same, except that the normal levy included those aged 20-54. The main difference in the organization of the later army was that the members of each regiment no longer came from a single village. In 390 the men from Amyklai, one of the villages, were spread across the different morai (Xen. Hell. 4.5.11). Furthermore, the army also separated family members into the different regiments. The troops of the mora which suffered the disaster at Lechaion in the same year had sons, fathers and brothers in the rest of the army (ibid. 10).

Both before and after its reorganization the Lakedaimonian army shared some characteristics common to hoplite armies throughout the Greek world. In other respects it was far from typical, principally because the Spartiates’ full-time hoplite status engendered a professionalism lacking in other states in their approach to almost all aspects of warfare (Xen. Lak. Pol. 13.5; Cartledge 1977). Many of the values and influences pertaining to the nature of hoplite warfare in general were in the Lakedaimonian army particularly intensified. This is evident immediately in regard to what might be called the ‘egalitarian’ tendencies of hoplite warfare. Among the Spartiates, though not
among the *periolkoi* who also fought in the army, preparation for hoplite warfare was, as we have seen, achieved through a uniform training from age 7 onwards possessed by no other Greek *polis*. Since their armour and weapons were probably supplied by the state, they were more uniform than those of other armies. All hoplites, regardless of rank, were also required to wear the standard short red cloak and hair grown long specially for the occasion. Collective discipline was paramount. In contrast to their opponents the Lakedaimonians advanced into battle to the accompaniment of flutes in a slow, steady rhythm which enabled them to keep in step and avoid breaking rank (Thuc. 5.70; cf. Cartledge 1977, 16 & n. 43). The penalties for abandoning one’s shield in battle, and particularly for deserting one’s rank and fleeing, were more severe than elsewhere (Cartledge 1977, 13 & n. 20; 16 n. 47).

Once again, however, things were not quite as equal as they might seem. In the first place, the army had its own elite, the 300 *hippeis*, who fought as a group around the king. Secondly, although information is lacking for the obal army, the later Lakedaimonian army, as described by Thucydides (5.66.3-4) before the battle of Mantinea in 418, had a remarkably stratified hierarchy for a hoplite force (cf. Garlan 1975, 160):

"When a king is leading the army, everything is governed by him, and he personally issues the necessary orders to the *polemarchoi*, they to the *lochagoi*, they to the *pentekonteres*, they again to the *enomotarchoi* and they to their *enomótia* ... for almost the whole army of the Lakedaimonians, except for a small part, consists of officers commanding subordinate officers and the executive responsibility is shared by many".
The same structure of command, though with discrepancies of detail, is described in the early fourth century by Xenophon (Lak. Pol. 11.4). In the passage from Thucydides we see in operation the principles of multiple supervision and 'rule and be ruled' which were evident in the upbringing. It is interesting that, although Thucydides' remarks start by emphasizing the complete authority of the king, his final comment stresses the division of responsibility throughout the army which the stratified hierarchy produced. He also notes that each lochagos had some discretion concerning the depth of the phalanx in his part of the line (Thuc. 5.68.3).

The enomotia, at the bottom of the chain of command described by Thucydides, had its own internal hierarchy. This arose out of the sophisticated Lakedaimonian drilling organization possessed by no other contemporary army:

"At the word of command, they are drawn up from these regiments, with the enomotiai sometimes in ... file, sometimes in threes, sometimes in sixes. The common opinion that the Lakonian hoplite drill is most complicated is the very reverse of the truth; for in the Lakonian drill the front-rank men are officers (archontes) (and each file is a self-contained unit). The formation is so easy to learn that nobody who can recognise men could make a mistake; for it is given to some to lead and the others are ordered to follow" (Xen. Lak. Pol. 11.4-5).

This passage indicates that within each enomotia there were six men who each led a file when the enomotia was lined up six abreast. These six men were obviously themselves hierarchically ordered so that it would be known who would lead the files when the enomotia was lined up fewer than six abreast. These six were the archontes, the others in the enomotia were ordered to follow.
Who were these archontes? Obviously the enomótarchoi and higher officers fighting at the head of their units would take precedence.\textsuperscript{40} Otherwise, the archontes were the best soldiers, hoi kratistoi, mentioned in Lak. Pol. 11.8, whom the Lakedaimonians considered so important that they devised a special counter-marching drill in order that these men should still be in the front rank even if the enemy appeared at the rear when they were marching in column (ibid. 8-9). This distinction between officers and followers according to fighting ability applied in every enomótia in the army and therefore throughout the entire body of citizens in the ranks. The precise information provided by Xenophon relates to the late Classical army, but probably the obal army also possessed a similar drilling organization and a similar hierarchy.\textsuperscript{42}

This basic hierarchy was not limited to times when the army was assembled because it seems certain that the men who fought together in the enomótiai also dined together in the syssitia. The distinction according to fighting ability will consequently have been one more conflicting influence, along with those of seniority, wealth and talent at hunting, in the competition for precedence in the syssitia.\textsuperscript{43} It is true that, since in the obal army men over 44, and in the later army men over 54, rarely fought in the ranks, they will have remained largely outside the division into leader and followers. Nevertheless, memories of their past ranking within the enomótia may have influenced the extent of their prestige as senior members of the syssitia.\textsuperscript{44}
A final issue relating to hierarchies embedded in the army structure concerns the position in which each enomôtia, and therefore each syssition, was placed within the phalanx. Lack of evidence prevents a complete discussion, but it would seem likely that positions on the right wing and near to the king would be more prestigious than those elsewhere. But how was it decided which regiments should have the more prestigious positions and which enomôtiai should be assigned to which regiments? Could those enomôtiai which contained the more exclusive syssitia somehow obtain the more prestigious positions?

Elitism within the phalanx did not necessarily arise only out of the army structure. Despite the levelling influences discussed above, it was still possible within the ranks of any Greek hoplite phalanx to achieve individual glory (cf. Lonis 1979, esp. 25ff.) and the Lakedaimonian phalanx was no exception.45 Citizens who died in battle for the collective good were given the privilege denied to other Spartiates of having their names inscribed on their tombstones.46 Spartan songs were mainly praises of men who had died for the polis (Plut. Lyk. 21.1). Some who had shown exceptional bravery were given even greater honours, occasionally extending even to heroization.47 Hymns or paeans were sung at the festival of the Gymnopaidiai in honour of the 300 men who died in the ‘Battle of the Champions’ at Thyrea c.545 (Bölte 1929, 130 n.6; Wade-Gery 1949, 80 n.4). Prizes of valour (aristeia) were awarded to outstanding Spartiates who died fighting against the Persians in 480/79 (Pritchett 1974, 285, Table 12). Alpheios and Maron, who
were foremost among the 300 who died at Thermopylai, had a sanctuary at Sparta (Paus. 3.12.9). Their commander, King Leonidas, also had a monument, and a stone tablet there bore the names of all the 300 (ibid. 14.1). The deaths of the 300 were commemorated annually, probably from a date soon after the event (Ball 1976). Brasidas, who died at Amphipolis in 422, also had a monument at Sparta (Paus. 3.14.1). Heroization was the honour Tyrtaios had recommended for dead warriors in the seventh century (fr. 9.31-2 Prato; Fuqua 1981). It is not without significance that in the Classical period his poems were sung in the king’s tent during campaigns and probably also in the syssitia (Lykourgos, Against Leokrates 107 & Philochoros FGrH 328F216, apud Athen. 640F, as interpreted by Bowie 1990).

Dead warriors also brought prestige to their relatives and erastai. The prestige gained by the lineage of a dead warrior is emphasized already by Tyrtaios (fr. 9.29-30 Prato). After the defeat at Lechaion the relatives of the dead went about "like prizewinners" (νικηφόροι: Xen. Hell. 4.5.10). That comparison is revealing about Spartiate mentality, evoking as it does the atmosphere of a contest. The relatives of the dead at Leuktra in 371 reacted in a similarly joyful manner (ibid. 6.4.16; Plut. Ages. 29.4-5). The noble death of Kleonymos in the same battle brought honour to his erastês, Archidamos (Xen. Hell. 5.4.33).

There were also rewards for the warrior who performed outstanding deeds and survived. His deeds were not only talked about in the syssitia, but might also be officially commended.
Brasidas, who saved the town of Methone in S.W. Messenia from the Athenians in 431 when in command of a small detachment of troops, became the first person during the Peloponnesian war to be commended by the state (Thuc. 2.25.2). Thucydides' words imply that other Spartiates later received this honour. Isadas received a wreath for his personal exploits in defence of Sparta in 362 (Plut. Ages. 34.6-8; Aelian, VH 6.3; cf. Polyainos 2.9). In the same year Antikrates, the man who killed Epaminondas in the battle of Mantineia, was voted honours, gifts and exemption from taxes for his descendants (Plut. Ages. 35.1-2). The rewarding of personal merit in the upbringing was thus continued into the lives of adults in the army.

(d) Promotion to high office

Military distinction could lead to promotion to higher posts. The most outstanding case would appear to be the career of Brasidas. Shortly after his exploit at Methone and official commendation he was elected eponymous ephor for the year 431/0, presumably on the strength of his prestige. In 429 he was sent as the second of three advisers to the undistinguished nauarchos (or admiral), Knemos (Thuc. 2.85.1). In 427 he was sent as sole adviser to the even more incompetent nauarchos, Alkidas (ibid. 3.69.1). In 425 he was in command of a trireme in the fleet making an assault on the Athenians at Pylos, again distinguishing himself in the action (ibid. 4.11.4-12.1; Diod. 12.62). Then in 424 he was given the major command in Thrace
which lasted until his death in 422 (Thuc. 4.70 - 5.11 passim). At the time of his appointment to this command Thucydides records that he was "a man who in Sparta had a reputation for being energetic in everything" (ibid. 4.81.1).

The case of Brasidas, like that of Sphodrias, would seem to be an excellent illustration of the significance attached to personal merit in the choice of Spartiate leaders. His advancement was, however, rather cautious and gradual, and after 431 it took place, as far as we are informed, outside the normal ranks of the army. He was chosen for the Thracian campaign more because it was his own wish and because the Chalkidians wanted him than through the positive choice of the Spartiates. An examination of the careers of other Spartiate leaders in the Peloponnesian war suggests that Brasidas' advancement may not have been typical.

The clearest example is that of the nauarchos Alkidas. It hardly seems likely that Alkidas was appointed for displaying the same sort of merit as Brasidas since his performance as nauarchos (Thuc. 3.26-33, 69-81) was so lacking in distinction. His fleet was despatched in spring 427 to bring help to Mytilene. The fleet dawdled on the journey and failed to arrive before Mytilene's revolt had been ended. Rejecting alternative stratagems for harming Athenian interests in eastern Greece, Alkidas retreated hastily to the Peloponnese in fear of pursuit. It was then that Brasidas was sent to direct him to Kerkyra. In the ensuing operations Alkidas this time had to commit his fleet
to battle. It was partly victorious but, overruling Brasidas’ advice, Alkidas failed to follow this up by attacking the town of Kerkyra and the episode concluded with another hasty and ignominious retreat as a large Athenian fleet approached. This was not the only time in Spartan history when a man of ability was thwarted by someone with a superior constitutional position.52

Alkidas’ career has an interesting sequel. His poor performance must have been noted in Sparta for Brasidas to have been sent out as adviser, and upon his return Brasidas is likely to have made an unfavourable report. Nevertheless, in the following year Alkidas was chosen as one of the founders of the colony of Herakleia Trachinia (Thuc. 3.92.5). A few years later there is another example of the reappointment of a failed commander. In summer 419 Agesippidas, a harmost at Herakleia, was expelled by the Boiotians for misgovernment (ibid. 5.52.1).53 Within a few months he was given command in winter 419/8 of the garrison installed at Epidauros (ibid. 56.1).

It seems that merit was only one of the factors which could influence a man’s career. Considering the paucity of our information about individual Spartiate magistrates, commanders and ambassadors, it is remarkable how many examples there are of members of the same lineage holding high positions in different, often successive, generations.54 For example, several men who were prominent immediately before or during the Archidamian war had sons who gained important posts during the Ionian war or soon
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afterwards. Sthenelaidas (PB 664), ephor in 435, was the father of Alkamenes (PB 57), who was selected by King Agis for a governorship in 413/2. Sthenelaos (PB 665), whom Lysander appointed harmost of Byzantion and Chalkedon in 405, may have been another son of Sthenelaidas (or grandson, according to Rahe 1977, 168 n.125). Ramphias (PB 654), who was diplomat in winter 432/1 and commander in 422, was the father of Klearchos (PB 425), who exercised important commands in the Ionian war from 412 onwards. This family had foreign connections, since Klearchos was proxenos of the Byzantines. The fact that he was twice appointed harmost of Byzantion was surely influenced by his proxeny. One of Ramphias' colleagues as diplomat in winter 432/1 was Agesandros (PB 6) whose son, Agesandridas (PB 5), was also commander during the Ionian war. If, as Poralla suggests, this Agesandros is the same man as the Hegesandros mentioned elsewhere by Thucydides (4.132.3), he had another son who had already achieved high command, Pasitelidas (PB 592), who in 423 had become harmost of Torone while still a hēbōn.

Another example, though more complex, is that involving Pedaritos (PB 599), the harmost of Chios in 412, and Antalkidas (PB 97), who was four times envoy to Persia, nauarchos and ephor in the early fourth century. (For the following details, Lewis 1977, 35 n.65; Whitehead 1979, 92f.; Gomme et al. 1945-81, V.69; Cartledge 1987, 145f.) Both men had a father named Leon. Leon is also the name (PB 482) of an Olympic victor of 440 or 424, a founder of Herakleia in 426, an envoy to Athens in 420, an ephor of 419/8 and the successor to Pedaritos at Chios. It is probably
excessive to believe that these were all the same man; but Antalkidas is likely to have been the son of the Olympic victor, since the latter’s father was named Antikleidas (PB 98). The founder of Herakleia was probably also the same man because Antalkidas’ name was probably designed as a variant on Antikleidas in order to honour Leon’s co-founder, Alkidas (Whitehead 1979, 193). Pedaritos may well have been the brother of Antalkidas. The fact that Pedaritos achieved high command is interesting because, according to Plutarch (Lyk. 25.4; Mor. 191F; 231B), he had earlier failed to gain selection to the 300 hippei. Indeed, the name of his mother, Teleutia (PB 688), suggests a connection by marriage with Teleutias (PB 689), the prominent commander of the late 390s and 380s, who was himself linked to the Eurypontid royal house through his mother’s second marriage to King Archidamos II which made him the half-brother of King Agesilaos II. (For a possible stemma, Cartledge 1987, 146.)

Several other instances could be cited from different periods, particularly in connection with Spartan diplomacy. For example, Perikleidas (PB 608), the envoy to Athens in 464, was the father of Athenaios (PB 32), who had an important role in the armistice of 423 and later conducted negotiations during the Ionian war. Kleandridas (PB 420), the adviser to the young King Pleistoanax in 446, was the father of Gylippos (PB 196), who was sent to Syracuse in winter 415/4 and was later an officer under Lysander. Naukleidas (PB 548), son of Polybiades, one of the ephors who accompanied King Pausanias’ Athenian expedition in
403, was probably the father of the Polybiades (PB 625) who was commander against Olynthos in 380/79. Timokrates (PB 699), who was the leading adviser sent to Knemos in 429, may well be an ancestor of the Timokrates (PB 700) who was envoy to Athens in 369. Euthykles (PB 301), envoy to Persia in 367, was probably the father of the Euthykles (PB 302) who was also envoy in 333; (cf. Mosley 1972). Mosley (1973, 51ff.) also notes that in their selection of envoys the Spartiates usually picked men from distinguished families, especially those whose ancestors had previously conducted diplomatic relations with the state in question.

In the light of this evidence it is worth noting that even Brasidas' advancement may have depended partly upon hereditary factors. It may be unwise to draw a conclusion about his family's social status solely from the appearance of his father, Tellis, on the board of ten Spartiates who negotiated the peace of Nikias and subsequent alliance with Athens in 421 (Thuc. 5.19.2, 24.1; Andrewes & Lewis 1957). One's suspicions are, however, aroused by the fact that Brasidas had xenoi in Pharsalos in Thessaly in 424 (ibid. 4.78.1, 4).

Although most of the examples above concern non-royal military commands, which developed in number only from the 420s onwards and stimulated (as I shall argue in Ch. 5) additional oligarchic tendencies within Spartiate society, the principles by which these commanders were selected were traditional. As Finley has pointed out, the primary principles used for selecting
leaders both in the upbringing and later on in life were those of appointment and co-optation, never selection by lot and, apart from the ephorate and gerousia, not even (as at Athens) election in open competition (Finley 1986, 166). Within the traditional army hierarchy, for example, leading officers such as the kings and polemarchoi could no doubt influence the appointment of lower ranking officers. The primacy of appointment and co-optation obviously provided opportunities for the dispensation of patronage.

Patronage probably exercised a profound influence upon Sparta society (cf. recently, Cartledge 1987, 139ff.). As usual, most of the evidence comes from Xenophon and therefore concerns King Agesilaos, who built up his following by means of calculated generosity (Xen. Ages. 4-5.1; 11.8; Plut. Ages. 4.3; Mor. 482D). He took pleasure in being accessible to all and in granting the requests of all his suitors, both friends and enemies (Xen. Ages. 8.1; 9.1-2; cf. 1.17-18; Plut. Ages. 5.1-2; 20.4). Xenophon depicts a seemingly typical day in the life of the king when he went down to the River Eurotas and made himself available to speak first with any Spartiate, then with any foreigner and finally with any servant (Hell. 5.4.28). Agesilaos, however, was not the only person who dispensed such patronage, as is evident from what Archidamos had earlier told Sphodrias: "If I want to get something done in the polis, I go with my request to anyone rather than my father" (ibid. 27). Sparta then was a place where those with influence arranged things upon request.
Patronage might of course sometimes raise a promising young Spartiate from an ordinary background to a high position and thus preserve some level of social mobility within the society. What influential men could do for potential supporters, however, they could also do for their own younger relatives. Finley (1986, 169f.) has already suggested that "there were families who were able to influence the appointment procedures in favour of their own members, beginning at the first opportunity, among the children". There was probably scope for favouritism even in the assessment of an individual's abilities. The system was one in which the existing generation of leaders chose the men who were going to replace them. In this context it is perfectly intelligible that Aristotle should have characterized the election of the gerontes as dynasteutikē ("favouring the interests of a narrow range of families"). Although there was fierce rivalry for vacancies to the gerousia (Xen. Lak. Pol. 10.1-3; Plut. Lyk. 26), it will surely have been mostly among men from distinguished lineages who had already held major positions in their earlier careers (cf. Arist. Pol. 1270b24). It seems therefore that these distinguished lineages were able to turn to their own advantage all the factors which contributed towards establishing an order of precedence among Spartiates. High birth and wealth were inherited. Seniority was controlled through their monopoly of the gerousia and merit through manipulation of the appointment procedures. Only the ephorate continued to be open to a majority of poor Spartiates (Arist. Pol. 1270b7-10; 1272a27-33).
None of this should really surprise us for, despite the various devices to distract Spartiates from the interests of the household, they still remained strong, rooted (as will be argued in Ch. 2) in a system of individual land tenure and inheritance. As Redfield (1977/78, 158) has noted, the Spartan polity, including the upbringing and the Spartiate way of life, was "a super-structure built on the normal Greek sub-structure .... of private property" based upon the household. A revealing comment by Xenophon links the household's interest in property, inheritance and power, when he is explaining why Spartiate men were in favour of certain wife-sharing arrangements which were encouraged by the state (Lak. Pol. 1.7-9; Plut. Lyk. 15.7; Mor. 242B). At first glance these might seem to have been another set of relationships cutting across those of the household; but Xenophon explains that "the men want to get brothers for their sons, brothers who are part of the kin and share in its power, but claim no part of its property" (Lak. Pol. 1.9). Wife-sharing consequently extended the household's sphere of relationships; and so probably did institutionalized pederasty, which brought the erastês into a relationship with the kin of his paidika and with the latter's household, when they jointly provided its material needs. Xenophon's casual assumption in the passage quoted above that a prime concern of a Spartiate was to increase the size and power of his lineage and to preserve its property is a measure of the influence which the household retained. The following chapters will focus more closely upon the nature of individual property ownership, its socio-political impact and its role both in sustaining Sparta's longstanding stability and
success and in leading to her early-fourth-century crisis and international decline.
Footnotes to Chapter 1

1. For the different stages of the Spartiate upbringing in the following paragraph I have followed the most satisfactory scheme advocated to date, that of Tazelaar (1967), who discusses and gives references to previous studies. Cf. also, more recently, MacDowell (1986, 159ff.), though his procedure of fitting the contemporary evidence of Xenophon into a scheme derived from later sources is faulty historical method. I have supplemented Tazelaar’s account with direct references to the ancient sources, including Plutarch’s Life of Lykourgos which occasionally both here and elsewhere in this thesis provides our sole evidence. On the intractable problems posed by this work as a historical source, see especially Kessler (1910), Tigerstedt (1965-78, II.77ff., 89ff. & 231ff.), Piccirilli in Manfredini & Piccirilli eds. (1980, esp. XLff.). As these studies indicate, it is rarely possible to discern the source, and therefore the reliability, of information which is original to the work, except when it derives from the excerpts of the Apophthegmata Lycurgi = Moralia 225F-229A (in which case it is suspect because of the taint of third-century revolutionary propaganda) or when Plutarch names his authority. When neither of these circumstances applies, as is often the case with the original Plutarchean information used in this study, rather than decline to consider the information, it seems better to attempt to make cautious use of it with due regard to its general degree of plausibility and its consonance with other relevant evidence. Sometimes, as in Chapter 2, this procedure will lead to Plutarch’s evidence being rejected. I
have attempted to follow the same procedure with other late sources whose reliability is uncertain.

2. White (1964, 142 n.11) claims that Plut. Lyk. 25, which states that Spartiates under 30 could not enter the market-place to purchase items needed for the household, proves that such young men were not allowed to marry and establish a household. This goes beyond the text which proves only that such necessities were provided by others. The clear implication of Plut. Lyk. 15.2-3 and Mor. 228A is that Spartiates could marry at a time when they still slept at night in the barracks and were therefore under the age of 30.

3. Cf. the comments of Perikles (Thuc. 2.37.2) that the Athenians did not interfere in one another's private lives, obviously directed against the opposite practice of the Spartiates. On the all-pervasive sanctions in Spartiate life, see Lewis (1977, 30f., with refs.).

4. For ancient testimony to the term, Busolt & Swoboda (1926, 659 n.4).

5. On differences in wealth and growing inequalities, cf. the evidence collected by Ste. Croix (1972, 137f. and Appendix XVI). The wealthiest men were the kings (Ps.-Plato, Alkibiades I 122C-123A; cf. Xen. Lak. Pol. 15.3).

6. Spartiate xeniai feature prominently in the recent study of ritualized friendship by Herman (1987, esp. 143ff. & the cases catalogued in his Appendices A & C). Leaving aside the numerous
guest friendships of Spartan kings or regents, note, for example, Thucydides' reference to the friends of the Boiotians and Corinthians (5.37.1, 3-4; 38.3). For the close links of Spartiates with leading men from Samos, see Cartledge (1982). The clearest individual example, however, is the hereditary friendship between the lineages of the Spartiate Endios and the Athenian Alkibiades mentioned by Thucydides (8.6.3; cf. Herman 1987, 146ff.). Since the Athenian lineage received the name Alkibiades from the Spartiate lineage, this friendship must go back at least to 550 or even earlier, the time when the earliest known Athenian Alkibiades, attested by Isokrates (16.25), received his name (Davies 1971, 12 & 15f.). The inscription IG I² p.272, 90, a dedication to Apollo at Delphi (525-500?), possibly for a chariot-race victory, which was also thought to attest to this Alkibiades, is now realized to be Lakonian (Daux 1977, 51ff.; cf. Jeffery 1990, 447 no.47a & 448). Daux now restores the name of the dedicator as Alkibiadás. He is therefore possibly an ancestor of Endios. Another indicator is the proxenies held by certain Spartiates, listed in Mosley (1971). Cf. also Spartiates with names suggesting foreign links: Poralla and Bradford (1985, nos. 32, 47, 141, 175, 367, 490, 658, 659, 743).

7. Finley (1986, 166).

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7. Finley (1986, 166).

Cartledge (1987, 20ff.). I have omitted works which deal only with the nomenclature of the age classes.

9. Plut. Lyk. 17.1; Aelian, Varia Historia 3.10.2; cf. Xen. Lak. Pol. 2.13-14. On Spartan pederasty, see Cartledge (1981a) with reference to earlier studies. Both Plutarch and Aelian appear to claim that only young men who were "reputable" (Plutarch) or "fine and upstanding" (Aelian) could become **erastai**; Aelian adds that only boys "of fine character" received **erastai**. Cartledge, on the contrary, argues cogently (21ff.) that the relationship was compulsory for every young man and boy. Plutarch’s statement may in fact support this view. If one were to accept the suggestion of Den Boer (1954, 284ff.), that the word Plutarch uses (**eudokimos**) means in effect "one who has passed the tests of the **agoge**", it would follow that Plutarch intends to signify that all those who had successfully reached the status of young Spartiates became **erastai**, not just the better sort. (I agree with Den Boer (246 & 286) that Plutarch’s **eudokimoi neoi** refers to the young men, not to the boys as Cartledge (21) suggests.) MacDowell (1986, 65) argues against the idea that pederasty was institutionalized on the grounds that Xenophon and Plutarch refrain from saying so; but this is to place too heavy a reliance upon the wording of these writers and upon the degree of their concern to provide a systematic analysis of the subject. As Fisher (1989, 46 n.37) points out, "even if it may be correct that there was not a law or strict allocation system assigning a lover to each youth,... this is not necessary
for it to be the norm, or a crucial part of the educational structure".

10. MacDowell (1986, 64-5), arguing that an erastès was not legally responsible for the conduct of his paidika, is inclined to dismiss entirely the evidence of Plutarch and Aelian concerning the sharing of honour and disgrace. The phenomenon, however, was not dependent upon legal enactment and is attested by the contemporary evidence of Xenophon (Hell. 5.4.33) when he remarks that Kleonymos brought Archidamos honour not shame through the manner of his death at Leuktra.

11. It is uncertain whether the hippagretai had any direct responsibility for those who were not selected for the hippeis; but they may well have maintained some supervision if those not selected were eligible for selection in subsequent annual appointments of hippeis. It is normally thought that the neôteroi and neoi of Xen. Hell. 3.3.8-9 refer solely to the hippeis: e.g. Pareti (1958, 156 f.); Busolt & Swoboda (1926, 706 and n.4). Cozzoli (1979, 95ff.) argues that they should be equated solely with the neôteroi of Thuc. 5.64.3, 75.1, who are normally thought to be 18 and 19 year olds: e.g. Toynbee (1913, 263); Gomme, Andrewes & Dover (1944-81, IV 93); Tazelaar (1967, 148). Cozzoli’s view, however, is bound up with his unacceptable opinion that the hippeis comprised Spartiates of all ages between 20 and 60 (cf. n.14 below); but there is a different way in which Xenophon’s neôteroi and neoi might overlap but not coincide entirely with the hippeis. In a military context hè neotès may be the Spartan technical term for men aged 20-44 (Hdt. 9.12.2
with Wade-Gery 1958, 73 & 82; Cartledge 1987, 21). Hence in the episode related by Xenophon the ephors and gerontes decided to send Kinadon to Aulon with some of the neôteroi (i.e. 20-44 year olds); and when Kinadon asked which of the neoi he should take, the ephors directed him to the senior hippagretês, who had been primed to assign him a number of men under his command who will have come from the 20-29 year-old hippeis.

12. Cf. Xen. Ages. 2.16; Anab. 1.3.15; but note ibid. 2.6.15. See the illuminating remarks of Redfield (1977/78, 154).

13. Cozzoli (1979, 86) believes that the hippeis comprised not just hēbôntes but men up to the maximum age for military service, i.e. age 60. He argues this on the basis of Hdt. 1.67, which states that the five eldest men who retired from the hippeis each year became agathoergoi, men who spent the subsequent year in special service of the state in whatever employment was required of them. Cozzoli’s view, however, is unacceptable, since there is nothing in Herodotus’ account or elsewhere to suggest that the agathoergoi were aged 60 rather than 30, as is normally thought. It runs counter to the careful sequence of Lak. Pol. 2-5.1 in which Xenophon describes separately the institutional arrangements peculiar to each age group and which he concludes with the statement that now he will describe those arrangements which applied to everyone. Cozzoli’s view also compels him to argue that the purpose of the selection process described by Xenophon was to choose not the entire squad of hippeis but only those places which had become available through retirements (he accepts that this choice was made among only the hēbôntes). This
contradicts Xenophon's clear statement that each of the hippagretai chose 100 men.

14. It is uncertain whether the 18-19 year olds who participated in the krypteia (Plato, Laws 633B-C; Aristotelian Lak. Pol. fr. 538, apud Plut. Lyk. 28) were a select group or represented every member of these age classes (Cartledge 1987, 30-2, with references to earlier studies). If the former, it will have marked an important preliminary choice of an elite in advance of the selection of hippeis; if the latter, it will have formed the most significant test of merit in determining which young men were fit for selection for the hippeis.

15. E.g. Ollier (1934, 32); Diller (1941, 501); Marrou (1946, 217); Brelich (1969, 119).

16. E.g. Marrou (1946, 217); Den Boer (1954, 260). Even Tazelaar (1967) fails to notice both pieces of evidence. Den Boer noticed the sentence in the Lak. Pol., but he drew the erroneous conclusion that the term paidiskoi referred jointly to both the paides in the first stage and those in the second stage. He did not notice the passage in the Hellenika. Since my argument was originally published (Hodkinson 1983, 250), it has been endorsed by Cartledge (1987, 30).

17. My suspicion is strengthened by the emendation to IG V 1,213 suggested by Schwartz (1976, 177f.) In line 39 he restores kai hēbōn in place of Woodward's earlier restoration kai ephēbōn. Xenophon often uses technical Spartan terms without properly
explaining their meaning, e.g. eirens, hypomeiones (Hell. 3.3.6), syntetagmenoi (ibid. 7) and mikra ekklesia (ibid. 8).

18. On the restricted composition of courts which tried major cases, Ste. Croix (1972, 132ff. with Appendix XXVI); the contrary view is expressed by Lewis (1977, 39) & David (1985).

19. Lysander, as the erastès of Agesilaos (Plut. Lys. 22.3; Ages. 2.1), will have been over 40 when he became nauarchos in 408 or 407, since he must have been several years older than Agesilaos, who himself was born probably in 444 (Plut. Ages. 40.2; Cartledge 1987, 21). Klearchos, who was about 50 when he was killed in 401 (Xen. Anab. 2.6.15), will have been about 39 when he was appointed to his command in the Hellespont in 412 (Thuc. 8.8.2). If Klearchos was born c.451, his father, Ramphias, will have been over 40 when he makes his first appearance in the historical record as an envoy to Athens in 432/1 (ibid. 1.139.3). Antalkidas was perhaps 34 or 35 when he was envoy to Tiribazos in 392/1 (Xen. Hell. 4.8. 12-16; Whitehead 1979, 193). Thucydides (4.132.3) stresses how exceptional were the appointments of Klearidas and Pasitelidas as harmosts of Amphipolis and Torone in 423 at a time when they were still hébôntes. Diodorus' claim (13.76.2) that Kallikratidas was a neos when he became nauarchos in 407 or 406 need mean no more than that he was not over age 44 (cf. n.11 above).

20. The reasons for placing the transition out of the paides at this age are given by Tazelaar (1967, 139f. & 147f.); Cartledge
(1987, 30). Note also that Xenophon calls Kleonymos *eudokimētatos* (see n.9 above).


22. The abundant evidence for this link is cited and discussed by Bielschowsky (1869, 32ff.); cf. also Nilsson (1912, 315f.); Toynbee (1913, 267f.); Busolt & Swoboda (1926, 698f.).

23. Bowie’s account of the development of the Classical *syssition* is preferable to that of Bremmer (1990, 136), who, as part of his argument that the *symposion* proper was the successor of the common meals of archaic warrior clubs, claims that "we can still observe these meals as a living institution in Doric Sparta and Crete". Bremmer’s account over-emphasizes the degree of survival and continuity from early forms of social organization at the expense of the massive changes and institutional restructuring which took place during the development of the Spartan *polis* in the Archaic period.


25. In addition the kings had their own *syssition* in which they dined together. Each king had the right to choose two mess companions called Pythioi who conducted Sparta’s relations with Delphi (Hdt. 6.57; Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 15.5). It is not certain
whether the three tent-companions of a king on campaign (Xen. 
Lak. Pol. 13.1) also messed with him at home. The six 
polemarchoi would appear to have done so, if the evidence of 
Plutarch's excerpt in the Apophthegmata Lycurgi can be trusted 
(Plut. Mor. 226F; Lyk. 12.5; cf. Xen. Lak. Pol. 13.1). The kings 
could also invite other Spartiates to their mess to share the 
double portion of food which was one of their privileges (Hdt. 
6.57; Xen. Lak. Pol. 15.4; cf. Ages. 5.1).

26. Ephorus, FGrH 70F149, apud Strabo 483C; that this also 
applied in Sparta is hinted at by Cartledge (1981a, 36 n. 78). 
On the general Greek connection between pederasty and the 
symposion, Bremmer (1990, esp. 142ff.).

27. Hell. 5.4.26-8. One might have doubts about the typicality 
of this instance involving an immediate heir to the kingship, but 
the context does suggest that Archidamos belonged to an ordinary 
mess not that of the kings. The implication of ibid. 29 is that 
Kleonymos did not attend the mess every day. The evidence of 
Xen. Symp. 8.35, according to which a youth might be stationed 
next to xenoi and not in the same battle-line as his erastês, 
does not prove that they were not in the same syssition, since 
even though members of a syssition fought within the same 
enomôtia any two given members might be stationed in different 
ranks or files.

28. See esp. Cartledge (1981, 27ff.). The only two 
relationships which we can document, those between Lysander and
Agesilaos and between Archidamos and Kleonymos, lend themselves naturally to this interpretation.

29. Cf. the remarks of Plato on the potential factional dangers of common messes (Laws 636B-C).

30. Persaios, FGrH 584F3, apud Athen. 140F; cf. Dioskourides, FGrH 594F3. Nilsson (1912, 317) attempts to equate the leader implied in this passage with the kreonaides (carver of meat) whom Pollux 6.34 and Plut. Mor. 644B designate as an important official, the latter on the basis that Lysander was once appointed to the post by Agesilaos. The importance of this office could be called into doubt, on the grounds that Plut. Ages. 8.1 and Lys. 23.7, neither of which is cited by Nilsson, claim that Agesilaos' appointment of Lysander to this post was intended as an insult. The point here, however, might be not that the post was shameful in itself, but that it represented a 'come-down' for the previously influential Lysander.

31. Wheat was a superior cereal to the barley supplied in the normal syssitia contributions (Plut. Lyk. 12.2; Dikaiarchos, apud Athen. 141C).

32. The other authors cited by Athenaios call this dessert course epaiklon, but this seems to be no more than a difference of terminology (cf. Athen. 140C).

33. The term phatta used by Dikaiarchos in the passage quoted above signifies a ring-dove or wood pigeon, usually a wild bird (Thompson 1895, 177-9; Pollard 1977, 57).

35. For the details of the 'obal army' below, see Wade-Gery (1958).

36. For criticism of the argument of Lazenby (1985) that until after Leuktra perioikoi were not included in Spartan regiments and not used against Peloponnesian enemies, see Hodkinson (1986b) and Tuplin (1986, 27f.).

37. On uniform equipment, see the discussion and refs. in Cartledge (1977, esp. 13, 15 and 27). It included a standard shield faced with bronze which was introduced by 425 at the latest. It was, however, permitted for this to bear a personal emblem in addition to the official and compulsory initial Lambda (Anderson 1970, 18ff.). On the role of dress more generally in Spartan society, David (1989).

38. Cf. esp. Thuc. 5.72.4 and the discussion by Anderson (1970, 245ff.). Olympic victors also had the right to fight around the king (Plut. Lyk. 22.4; Mor. 639E), but perhaps not those winners of chariot-races who did not actually compete personally. The three Spartiate tent-companions of the king (Xen. Lak. Pol. 13.1) may also have fought around him, to judge from Xen. Hell. 6.4.14. This last passage suggests that the polemarchoi also had their special aides.
39. A number is missing from the text; either single or double file must be meant.

40. The text and exact translation of the last clause of this sentence are doubtful.

41. Anderson (1970, 299 n.37) is surely correct in thinking that these officers will have fought at the head of their units, rather than in 'blank files' on the right as suggested by Ollier (1934, 59).

42. Unfortunately, it is not easy to draw more precise conclusions about the impact of this hierarchy. To do so it would be necessary to know how many Spartiates there were in an enomòtia, and thereby out of what number the leaders were selected. In practice there may have been 25 Spartiates in the enomòtia of the obal army, but the number of leaders is uncertain. The figures for the later army are more intractable still because from the late fifth century various non-Spartiate elements, especially perioikoi, were brigaded into the Spartiate regiments in the army. Since the number of Spartiates was rapidly declining, the ratio of Spartiates to others in the army must have been constantly changing. Only for the period c.425, when Thucydides' figures (4.38.5) for the numbers captured on Sphakteria may make it possible to extrapolate a rough ratio of two Spartiates to three non-Spartiates, and for Leuktra in 371, when Xenophon (Hell. 6.4.15; cf. 17) says that there were 700 Spartiates at the battle, is there any indication of Spartiate numbers. But even then calculations of the number of Spartiates
in an *enomótia* are obstructed by uncertainty over two basic questions: first, whether the number of *enomótiai* in the army was 96 or 192; secondly, whether non-Spartiates were brigaded into the army by dividing them more or less evenly among all the *enomótiai* or by concentrating them together and thereby attempting to keep certain *enomótiai* as purely Spartiate as possible.

43. In view of the close connections between hunting and hoplite warfare discussed by Lonis (1979, 31ff.), it seems that the criteria of fighting ability and talent at hunting may have been more complementary than conflicting. The evidence of Xen. Hell. 4.5.16 suggests that the best soldiers were among those aged 20-34.

44. Again a more precise assessment is difficult because of our ignorance of the exact numerical relationship between the *syssition* and the *enomótia*. Plutarch's figure (*Lyk.* 12.2) of about 15 men in the *syssition* fits badly with that of 40 in the *enomótia*. Plutarch's number may, moreover, include men of 60 or over who were not in the army. The problem of the ratio of Spartiates to non-Spartiates within the *enomótia* is also relevant. For the figure of 25 men in the *enomótia* given by Suidas, s.v. *enomótia*, see Wade-Gery (1958, 84 n.2).

45. The issue of the nature of hoplite warfare is of course extremely controversial. The possibility of individual glory, however, remains whether one adopts the view of those scholars (e.g. Krentz 1985; Cawkwell 1989) who argue for a considerable
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degree of fighting in open order; or the account of someone like Hanson (1989, 152ff.) which, although it adopts the alternative view of a tight scrum of dense *en masse* fighting, indicates the requirement and opportunities for the display of individual qualities (cf. esp. 166f.).

46. Plut. *Lyk.* 27.2; *Moralia* 238D. Some of these inscriptions survive, e.g. IG V 1, 701-3 and 706-7.

47. On the subject of the Spartan noble death, see Loraux (1977).

48. According to Lewis (1977, 42 n.102), Thucydides' language suggests some formal institutionalized commendation. Cf. the prize of valour earlier given to Eurybiades, the victorious admiral at Salamis in 480 (Hdt. 8.124).

49. Lonis (1979, 31ff.) demonstrates how this practice was consistent with the duty imposed on Spartiates over 30 to maintain their fitness in peace-time by engaging in hunting (Xen. *Lak.* Pol. 4.7; 6.3), an activity which emphasized individual performance.

50. Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.10; cf. Lewis (1977, 42). The action at Methone took place in late June or July 431. The Athenian expedition probably set sail between June 2 and 15 (Thuc. 2.23.2; Gomme et al. 1945-81, II.79f.) and the action took place before the solar eclipse of August 3 (Thuc. 2.28). The date on which Brasidas was commended in Sparta is not known. It is likely that the ephoral elections took place in the late summer; the ephors
probably entered office in late September or early October (cf. Ste. Croix 1972, 320f.). It is not known how it was decided which of the ephors became the eponymous ephor. May it have been the man elected with the loudest acclaim? Rahe (1980) has argued that the ephors were not elected directly by the assembly but chosen by lot out of an elected pool of candidates; note, however, the cogent criticisms of Rhodes who concludes (1981, 502) that "the method of appointment was direct election and there is no need to suppose that the electing body was any other than the assembly".

51. Cf. also the case of Arimnestos (or Aeimnestos) who killed the Persian general Mardonios at Plataia in 479. He is later found in command of an elite contingent of 300 men which fought against the entire forces of the Messenians, probably during the Messenian revolt of the late 460s (Hdt. 9.64; Plut. Aristeides 19.1).

52. The obvious examples are the thwarting of Lysander's policies by King Pausanias in Athens in 403 and by King Agesilaos in Asia Minor in 396.

53. Cf. Thucydides' remarks (3.93.2) on the harsh and unjust government of Spartiate harmosts at Herakleia.

54. To avoid excessive citation of references in what follows I have given after each name the number accorded to that person in the prosopography of Poralla & Bradford (1985; henceforth PB) which provides exhaustive references to the ancient sources.
"The problem of Spartan land tenure is one of the most vexed in the obscure field of Spartan institutions." Walbank's remark (1957, 728) is as true today as when it was written thirty five years ago. Controversy surrounding this subject has a long tradition going back to the nineteenth century and the last thirty years have witnessed no diminution in the level of disagreement, as is demonstrated by a comparison of the differing approaches in the recent works by Cartledge (1979), Cozzoli (1979), David (1981), Marasco (1981) and MacDowell (1986). Although another study runs the risk of merely adding one more hypothesis to the general state of uncertainty, a fundamental reassessment of the question is required, not least because of its significance for the historian's interpretation of the overall character of Spartiate society. Through the introduction of a new perspective it may be possible to advance our understanding of the subject.

In Section I of this chapter I shall attempt to review several influential scholarly theories and to examine their feasibility and the reliability of the evidence upon which they are based. Section II will begin to construct a more plausible alternative account which is based upon more trustworthy evidence. Finally, Section III will discuss a comparatively underemphasized aspect of the topic, the property rights of
Spartiate women, which suggests a rather different interpretation of the character of land tenure and inheritance from those more usually adopted.

I. Some standard views of land tenure and inheritance: a critique

Before entering into the detailed controversies surrounding Spartiate land tenure it is worth placing them briefly within a wider context. Rihll (1991, 104ff.) has recently reminded us of the dangers of anachronism in our approach to the issues of land ownership in ancient Greece. In her words, "the Greeks' attitudes to rights over land were much closer to the social, conditional rights common to 'primitive' societies than they were to Roman dominium" (p.104). Greek thought and practice assumed that all land within the territory of a polis belonged in principle to the social group, the whole body of politai. The tenure of land by individual citizens was always potentially subject to the polis' ultimate ownership or control; although the actual degree of public intervention varied from minimal to maximal at different times and places.

Much of the controversy surrounding Spartiate land tenure concerns this last issue, the extent to which public control was exercised over landholdings in the hands of individual citizens. What rights of use did the individual Spartiate have in practice over the estates which supported his family and provided his
means of paying the contributions to the common meals necessary for the maintenance of his citizen status?

Until recently at least, the majority opinion has argued in favour of a considerable degree of public control over Spartiate landholdings. This view usually gives prominence to the late evidence of Plutarch, who in his biography of Lykourgos (8.3-6) claims that the mythical Spartan lawgiver

"persuaded his fellow citizens to make one parcel of all their territory and divide it up anew, and to live with one another on a basis of entire uniformity and equality in their means of subsistence.... Suiting the deed to the word, he distributed the rest of the Lakonian land to the periolkoi thirty thousand lots, and that which belonged to the city of Sparta, in nine thousand lots (kléroi), to as many Spartiates. Some say, however, that Lykourgos distributed six thousand and that afterwards Polydoros added three thousand; others, that Polydoros assigned half of the nine thousand and Lykourgos the other half".

Later he adds that

"a child was not reared at the will of the father, but was taken and carried by him to a place called Leschē, where the elders of the tribes officially examined the infant; and, if it was well-built and sturdy, they ordered the father to rear it, and assigned it one of the nine thousand lots of land" (16.1).

In his biography of King Agis IV, the third-century reforming king, however, Plutarch gives a somewhat different account when writing of the decline of Sparta in the early fourth century.

"Since, however, the number of households instituted by Lykourgos was still preserved in the transmission of lots (kléroi), and father left to son his inheritance, to some extent the continuation of this order and equality sustained the state in spite of its errors in other respects. But when a certain powerful man, Epitadeus by name, who was headstrong and of a violent temper, came to be ephor, he had a quarrel
with his son and introduced a law permitting a man during his lifetime to give his household (oikos) and lot (klēros) to any one he wished, or in his will and testament so to leave it" (5.2-3).

Those scholars who emphasize this Plutarchean evidence differ among themselves concerning the degree of reliance to be placed upon one or other of the above passages. Some, stressing the evidence of Lykourgos 16, envisage a Spartiate as being merely the life tenant of his klēros which reverted to the state on his death. Others follow Agis 5 in arguing that the klēros passed down hereditarily from a man to his eldest son. Some of those who hold the latter view (e.g. Ziehen 1933, 218ff.; Asheri 1961 & 1963) incorporate the evidence of Lykourgos 16 to the extent of postulating a state controlled reserve of klēroi available for distribution to younger sons who did not inherit their fathers’ lots. Others (e.g. Busolt & Swoboda 1926, 633ff.; Hooker 1980, 116ff.; David 1981, 46ff.) dismiss Lykourgos 16 and the notion of the state endowing a young Spartiate with a klēros, except as an occasional measure when a citizen died heirless or needed to adopt an heir before his death, in which case, according to this hypothesis, a landless younger son could be nominated to succeed. Despite their differences, common to all these views is the belief that the transmission of land on a Spartiate’s death was governed by (variously defined) strict state-enforced rules which were designed to ensure that the estate remained undivided and which denied the individual landholder any power of testament. Common also is the belief that the landholder had no right to alienate the estate during his lifetime by gift or sale.
Those scholars who adopt the view that the klēros was transmitted hereditarily and that there was no regular reserve of land do, it is true, sometimes distinguish two types of land, drawing upon a passage in the second-century B.C. writer, Herakleides Lembos (fr. 373.12 Dilts), which probably derives from the Aristotelian Polity of the Lakedaimonians (fr. 611.12 Rose):

"It is shameful for the Lakedaimonians to sell land; and it is illegal to sell the ancient portion (archaia moira)".4

Some of these scholars (e.g. Pareti 1917, 197ff.; David, 1981, 46ff.) attempt to identify this ‘ancient portion’ with land in the politikê chôra which appears in a passage from the second-century B.C. historian, Polybius. Referring to the constitution of Crete, he remarks

"How was it that the most learned of the ancient writers - Ephorus, Xenophon, Kallisthenes and Plato - first, state that it is one and the same with that of the Lakedaimonians...? As to its dissimilarity, the peculiar features of the Lakedaimonian constitution are said to be, first, the land laws by which no citizen may own more than another, but all must possess an equal share of the politikê chôra...".5

It is suggested that the rule concerning the indivisibility of a Spartiate’s estate applied only to the ancient portions, identified with the klēroi allotted in the Lykourgan redistribution, and that many Spartiates held other land less subject to state interference which might be divided up among all a man’s sons. Even on this view, however, the more important category of land was still subject to strict regulation.
The above views can be criticized on a variety of counts. One general weakness is the reliance placed upon the evidence of later writers like Polybius and Plutarch at the expense of alternative earlier accounts, particularly that of Aristotle's *Politics*, consideration of which is often relegated to the tail-end of modern discussions. A related problem is that the sources of information upon which these later writers drew are not such as to inspire confidence. In these late accounts there are three main elements: first, the ascription of an equal redistribution of *kléroi* to Lykourgos (sometimes also to King Polydoros), which is common to all accounts; secondly, the claim that this equality was maintained into Classical times, explicitly stated in the life of Agis and implicit in that of Lykourgos and in Polybius; thirdly, the description of a system of land tenure and inheritance which was supposedly responsible for the maintenance of this equality. As has already been seen, two different versions of such a system are found in the lives of Agis and Lykourgos. Although it is the last of the above elements which is of most concern to our discussion, it is also necessary to investigate the sources of the other two elements because all three are closely interlinked.

The first element, the idea of an equal redistribution of *kléroi* by Lykourgos, is clearly the basis upon which the other elements rest; yet all the evidence suggests that it did not originate before the late Classical period. There is no sign of it in fifth-century writers. It was not known to Hellanikos, who attributed the whole Spartan polity to Kings Eurysthenes and
Prokles (fr. 91, apud Strabo 8.5.5, 366C); nor is it mentioned in Herodotus' account of Lykourgos' reforms (1.65-6). In the fourth century, it is absent from Xenophon's Polity of the Lakedaimonians, which claimed instead that Lykourgos' measures were designed to ensure that the poor were not in want and the rich not able to employ their wealth (6.4-7.6). Plato (Laws 684D) and Isokrates (Archidamos 20) wrote of an equal distribution of land in a much earlier era after the original Dorian conquest of Lakonia, but never hinted at any later similar measure. Indeed, Isokrates (Panathenaikos 259) denied that there had been any subsequent redistribution in Spartan history. Aristotle not only does not mention the idea in connection with Sparta, but states (Pol. 1266a39-40) that Phaleas of Chalkedon was the first to propose equality of landholding, thereby excluding Lykourgos.

Consequently, when Polybius in the passage quoted above attributes the idea of landed equality to Ephorus, Xenophon, Kallisthenes and Plato, there is considerable reason to doubt his evidence. David (1981, 69; 1982/83, 82 n.52) has claimed that the unanimity of these writers affords proof of the authenticity of the idea of equal kléroi. This supposed unanimity, however, is specious. This is not the only occasion when Polybius ascribes a certain view erroneously to earlier writers; and in this instance it appears to be the view of Ephorus alone which he is describing. Of Kallisthenes' work little is known; but, as we have already seen, there is no trace in the works of Xenophon or Plato of any belief in an equal distribution of
kléroi in historical times and good reason to doubt that they shared such a belief.\textsuperscript{10}

The evidence suggests that Ephorus, who ascribed all Sparta's institutions to Lykourgos, was either the first writer to transfer the idea of an equal redistribution of land from the time of the Dorian conquest to that of Lykourgos or at least the first to popularize this new ascription.\textsuperscript{11} It is possible that he took the idea from the pamphlet which the exiled Spartan king, Pausanias, wrote in the early fourth century;\textsuperscript{12} but even if this were so, the likelihood of its authenticity would not be increased. An exile bent upon discrediting his opponents, whose pamphlet constituted, in David's words, "an important stage in the idealisation of 'Lycurgan' Sparta", is not to be depended upon as a trustworthy source.\textsuperscript{13} The notion in later writers of an equal redistribution of kléroi by Lykourgos is, consequently, to be regarded not as historical reality but as a product of fourth-century invention and as an idea which even in that century was far from generally accepted.

It is far from clear whether the views of Ephorus had any direct influence upon the only detailed account of the supposed Lykourgan redistribution of land, that in Plutarch, \textit{Lykourgos} quoted above. Recent studies by Marasco (1978b; 1979; 1981, i. 248ff., ii. 584ff.; cf. Manfredini & Piccirilli 1980, 246ff.) have suggested that none of the three versions which Plutarch cites antedate the third century B.C. He argues that the supposed Lykourgan distributions of 4,500 and 6,000 lots reflect
the attempts of propagandists of the late-third-century Spartan revolution to justify, respectively, the numbers involved in the projected reform of King Agis IV and the size of the citizen body finally achieved by King Kleomenes III (Plut. Kleom. 11.2, 23.1, 28.8). The inventors of both versions added a subsequent Polydoran distribution to bring the figures into line with the 8,000 and 10,000 Spartiates mentioned by Herodotus (7.234) and Aristotle (Politics 1270a36-8). Finally, it seems from Plutarch’s wording that his account of the different versions came from a single source, possibly the third-century writer, Hermippos of Smyrna, who, noting the agreement on the total figure of 9,000 klēroi, simplified matters by ascribing them all to Lykourgos. He probably also doubled the number of 15,000 perioikic klēroi projected by Agis IV, in order to bring them into apparent agreement with the 30,000 potential hoplite population referred to by Aristotle (Politics 1270a29-30).

The other two ideas identified above, the belief that equality in land was maintained into the Classical period and, closely linked to it, the description of a system of tenure and inheritance supposedly responsible for the maintenance of this equality, are similarly the products of later invention. There is of course no suggestion of equality of landholding in any of the historical sources from the sixth century down to Aristotle; they all testify to marked differences in wealth (refs. in Grote 1854, ii. 549f.; Ste. Croix 1972, 137f.). Whether the idea antedates the third century is uncertain. Polybius seems to imply that Ephorus believed that landed equality survived into
the Classical period, to judge from the fact that landed equality is mentioned immediately before such longstanding elements of Spartiate life as denigration of money-making and the offices of kings and gerontes; but, as Cozzoli (1979, 21) has pointed out, there is no independent means of demonstrating that this really was Ephorus' view. It is possible that, since the system of life tenancy of the kléros described in Plutarch's Lykourgos 16, which implicitly assumes the maintenance of equality, appears in a different context from the account of the Lykourgan and Polydoran redistributions in Chapter 8, it may derive from a different source from the third-century ones behind the latter account (Cozzoli 1979, 23). It has been suggested independently that much of Plutarch's information in the Lykourgos may have derived from the early Peripatetic writers of the late fourth and early third centuries; such a source could lie behind the passage in question. Even if this is correct, however, the general character of the Peripatetics' approach to Sparta is not such as to inspire confidence in the reliability of their evidence. 

Whatever antecedents there may have been, the most notable source of the view that landed equality was preserved into the Classical period was the third-century Spartan revolution, chronicled by its supporter and propagandist, the historian Phylarchos. 17 In order to validate their attempts to sweep away the existing system of land tenure and replace it with a scheme of equal kléroi, the revolutionaries claimed that it was a return to the landed equality established by Lykourgos which had been maintained throughout the era of Spartan eminence until it was
ruined by the rhêtra of the ephor, Epitadeus, sometime after the end of the Peloponnesian war. This is the historical reconstruction given in the passage cited earlier from Plutarch’s Agis which probably reflects the ideology of the revolution as described by the partisan Phylarchos.  

This view has been disputed by Marasco (1978a), who claims that Plutarch derived his account of land tenure in the lives of Agis and Kleomenes from information in the largely lost Aristotelian Polity of the Lakedaimonians whose contents are reflected in Aristotle’s Politics (1270a15-b6). The supposed similarities between the Politics and the two lives (Marasco 1978a, 174) do not, however, stand up to scrutiny. Despite the oft-repeated assertion that the wording of Plutarch’s description of freedom of gift and bequest (Agis 5.3: "ἐξείναι τὸν οἶκον αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν κλήρον ἐὰν ἔθελοι καὶ ἑώντα δοθῆαι καὶ καταλίπειν διὰ τοῦθέμενον") resembles that of Aristotle (Pol. 1270a21: "διδάναι δὲ καὶ καταλείπειν ἐξουσιαν ἐδωκε τοῖς Βουλομένοις"), there is no real correspondence in terminology between the two passages, apart from their unsurprising common use of the verbs διδάναι and καταλείπειν. Above all, there is little similarity between the sophisticated analysis in the Politics, in which the concentration of land and decline in manpower are explained in terms of a variety of contributory factors, and the simplistic account in the life of Agis which ascribes the bulk of the responsibility to a single person. Schütrumpf (1987) has indeed argued cogently that the Phylarchan-Plutarchean tradition derives not from Aristotle but from a
fictional account (possibly that of Sphairos) based on Plato’s theoretical discussion of the breakdown and overthrow of oligarchy in the Republic (esp. 555C-E; cf., in more detail, Section II below).21

An integral part of Plutarch’s account is his description of a system of land tenure and inheritance, according to which each father passed down his kléros intact to a single son over a period of centuries. This system, designed to explain the maintenance of equality over such a long period, is an integral part of the reconstruction of Spartan history effected by the revolutionaries. As Cozzoli (1979, 22) has pointed out, there was little precise information in the works of earlier writers to justify this historical reconstruction, although there were sufficient general ideas about an earlier equality in land to lend it some degree of superficial credibility when combined with the traditional belief in the stability of the Spartan constitution.

The sources of these late accounts are therefore not of the highest quality. One’s misgivings about their reliability are not allayed when one examines the inherent practicability of the systems of tenure and inheritance which they describe or which scholars have constructed upon the basis of their evidence. First of all, it is highly improbable that the Spartan state possessed the bureaucratic machinery necessary to keep records of all the kléroi in order to administer a system of continuous
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reallocation of land or a state-controlled reserve as envisaged above (Toynbee 1969, 302; Buckler 1977, 258).

Secondly, the property systems described in Plutarch’s separate accounts in Agis and Lykourgos are, as they stand, incompatible (Busolt & Swoboda 1926, 636 n.3; pace Fustel de Coulanges 1888, 851ff. = 1891, 62ff.). According to the former, one son inherited the klēros of his father; according to the latter, each son was assigned a klēros by the state. The accounts are reconciled only by the sort of modern invention mentioned above, such as the claim that state allocation applied to younger sons whom the inheritance system in Agis leaves out. This supposed reconciliation distorts the evidence of both accounts. Since Plutarch either did not appreciate or was unconcerned that his accounts were incompatible, a saner approach would be to doubt the reliability of his evidence.

Taken separately, however, both systems are impracticable. Cozzoli (1979, 28) has already indicated the weakness of the system postulated in the life of Lykourgos, namely, that from the very start it would have meant either a continual need for young men to wait for klēroi to become available before they could exercise citizen rights or that there were consistently far fewer warriors than the available number of klēroi. The difficulty with the account in the life of Agis is that, although Plutarch insists that landed equality was maintained for several centuries, he does not explain how younger sons were catered for or what arrangements were made under a regime of hereditary
transmission to prevent accumulation of land by kinsmen or others when there was no son to inherit. The system is made workable only through the liberal application of modern conjecture outlined above: by the forced ‘reconciliation’ with the account in the life of Lykourgos, by the unsupported speculation that uninherited estates were always diverted to landless younger sons, or by the claim that, although he fails to say so, Plutarch is referring only to one of the two categories of land mentioned by Herakleides Lembos.\textsuperscript{22}

This last conjecture illustrates clearly the problems of relying upon the life of Agis. On the one hand, modern studies are compelled to modify Plutarch’s evidence in order to remedy the fact noted above that the complete equality of landholding assumed in his account is inconsistent with the testimony of all the historical sources from the sixth to the fourth centuries. On the other hand, their claim that besides the ancient portion there was other land of a more private nature which was owned unequally contradicts the idea of strict equality in Plutarch’s account.\textsuperscript{23} Furthermore, one of the main supporting arguments for this view, the suggestion that the ancient portions of Herakleides and Plutarch’s equal inheritances are identical with the equal shares in the \textit{politikê chôra} referred to by Polybius, involves a misrepresentation of Polybius’ evidence. Unlike Herakleides, he does not distinguish two types of land. The implication of his equal shares in the \textit{politikê chôra} is that this meant complete equality in landholding, a point repeated shortly afterwards (6.48.3), and that the \textit{politikê chôra} was the
only type of land held by citizens. The politikè chôra means not "civic land" in contrast to another type of citizen-held land more private in character, but simply the "land divided among the citizens" (Walbank 1957, 728ff.; Busolt & Swoboda 1926, 634 n.2; Cartledge 1979, 166). Polybius, therefore, is not describing the same system as that referred to by Herakleides Lembos or as that which some scholars have conjecturally extrapolated from the account in Plutarch's Agis.²⁴ His remarks do not offer any support for their attempts to rescue its evidence. Polybius' own account is merely one of complete equality, itself offered without explanation as to how that equality was sustained.

The final major weakness of these late accounts and of modern studies which accept their evidence is that they do not adequately explain the serious decline in Spartiate numbers in the Classical period which, whatever one's precise explanation of its causes, was in some way connected with the increasing concentration of land in a few hands and the impoverishment of many citizen households. Although the exact rate of the decline in different periods is the subject of debate, there is sufficiently wide agreement that it was a long-term process which had begun by the mid-fifth century at the latest (e.g. Andreades 1933, 53ff.; Jones 1967, 134ff.; Toynbee 1969, 297ff.; Ste. Croix 1972, 331ff.; Cartledge, 1979, 307ff.; Forrest 1980, 134ff.; Cawkwell 1983, 385ff.; Lane Fox 1985, 221f.). Plutarch's Lykourgos provides no framework at all for explaining these developments. Those studies which rely upon its evidence, since they cannot explain the decline in terms of inherited
poverty, are forced, rather implausibly, to account for it in terms of either widespread personal mismanagement and misfortune or a general increase in luxurious living which supposedly led to extensive poverty and consequent failure to reproduce (Michell 1964, 207ff. & 228ff.; Forrest 1980, 136). Plutarch's Agis provides an explanation of widespread poverty only from some unspecified date after the end of the Peloponnesian War when the supposed rhêtra of Epitadeus wrecked the system of equal kléroi which had prevailed until then.25 Those studies which follow this version, in so far as they do not simply ignore the earlier decline in the number of Spartiates, are able to explain it only by the poverty of deprived younger sons who then supposedly became a drain on the kléros of the eldest son or by the natural extinction of citizen families.26 The manifest inadequacy of these explanations has already been pointed out by Buckler (1977, 259). It is indeed impossible to reconcile the evidence for citizen population decline with the testimony of the life of Agis, since Plutarch insists that until the law of Epitadeus the number of households instituted by Lykourgos remained undiminished.

II. Towards an alternative account

It is possible to provide a more satisfactory explanation of the decline in citizen numbers upon the basis of a different system of land tenure and inheritance according to which the rights of
individual Spartiates over their landholdings were considerably more exclusive, indefinite and inheritable. This point of view has been argued in the past by a number of scholars, but in the light of the continuing debate it is necessary to develop the argument somewhat further than has previously been attempted. This alternative system can be founded more securely upon the evidence of reliable sources than the theories already discussed. It relies first and foremost upon the evidence of Aristotle, who in Book II of his Politics provides our earliest detailed account of Spartiate land tenure:

"one might next go on to attack the inequality of property-ownership. For we find that some have come to have far too many possessions, others very few indeed; hence the land has fallen into the hands of a small number. Here there have been errors in the legal provisions too. For he [the lawgiver] quite rightly made it dishonourable to buy or sell land in someone's possession, but allowed those who wished to give and bequeath it; and yet this inevitably leads to the same result. Moreover, approximately [or "nearly"] two-fifths of all the land is possessed by women. There are two reasons for this: heiresses (epiklêroi) are numerous and dowries (proikes) are large. It would have been better to have regulated dowries, prohibiting them altogether or making them small or at any rate moderate in size. But, as it is, an epiklêros may be given in marriage to any person whatsoever; and, if a man dies without making a will, the man who is left as klêronomos gives her to whom he likes. So although the land is sufficient to support 1,500 cavalry and 30,000 hoplites, the number fell to below 1,000. The sheer facts have shown that these arrangements were bad: one single blow was too much for the polis and she succumbed owing to the shortage of men. It is said that in the time of their early kings they gave others a share in their constitution, so that in spite of long continuous wars there was not then any shortage of men. It is also said that at one time the Spartiates had as many as 10,000. However, whether these statements are true or false, it is far better to keep up the numbers of males in a state by a levelling out of property. But the law on the begetting of children tends to militate against this reform. For the lawgiver, intending that the Spartiates should be as numerous as possible, encourages the citizens to beget many children; for
they have a law by which the father of three sons is exempt from military service, and the father of four from all taxes. But it is obvious that, if many are born and the land distributed accordingly, many must inevitably become poor" (1270a15-b6).

Aristotle’s evidence offers a reasoned account of the causes of the concentration of land and of widespread impoverishment which, when linked with his further remark (1271a26-36) that those who were too poor to contribute their syssitia dues were excluded from citizenship, explains the long-term decline in Spartiate numbers. Unlike the account in Plutarch’s Agis, it does not rely on a single cause but provides a sophisticated analysis which lays stress on a variety of contributory factors: the rights of gift and bequest, the number of heiresses and lack of controls over their marriages, the size of dowries, the failure to extend citizen rights to outsiders, the law on procreation and the system of partible inheritance.

Above all, Aristotle presents an account of the Classical Spartiate system of land tenure and inheritance which differs significantly from those in Plutarch or Polybius or in modern accounts which follow them. This has been denied by David (1982/83), who argues that Aristotle’s criticisms of Sparta are mainly directed not against the Lykourgan regime as such but against contemporary corruptions of Lykourgan institutions, including the system of land tenure and inheritance which he describes. David claims that this system, in particular such elements as freedom of gift and bequest, partible inheritance, the absence of strict control over the marriage of heiresses and the role of large dowries, resulted from the law of Epitadeus and
other associated changes in the early fourth century. Full
discussion of his arguments concerning Aristotle's general
approach to Sparta lies outside the scope of this
dissertation; and is indeed unnecessary, since Schütrumpf's
recent critique of David's argument (1991, 295f. & forthcoming)
has demonstrated that the notion that Aristotle intended to
differentiate between the original character of the Spartan
constitution and its contemporary condition is incompatible with
the text of the Politics (cf. esp. 1260b29; 1269a30ff.; 1270b11
& 1271a26ff.). The subject of Aristotle's enquiry was "die
bestehende Gesetzgebung.../die einmal erlassen wurden und noch
gültig sind" (1991, 295). I hope to show below that none of the
elements specified above were the result of fourth-century
innovations, but constituted fundamental aspects of the system
of land tenure and inheritance in operation throughout the
Classical period.

Although Aristotle provides the most penetrating analysis
of all our sources, his is by no means a complete account of the
practices of land tenure and inheritance, the operation of which
is discussed only in so far as they shed light upon the failings
which Aristotle identifies, and then only in the briefest of
terms. Consequently, there remain several points which require
elucidation.

The first point concerns his remarks about purchase, sale,
gift and bequest. The regulations on these subjects are
included within the same sentence and are all ascribed, through
the use of the verbs ēποίησεν and ἔδωκε without any corresponding subject, to an individual whose identity is not specified. (This will be discussed below.) Aristotle states that he made it dishonourable to buy or sell land. This testimony is not incompatible with the passage of Herakleides Lembos quoted above, which derives from the Aristotelian Polity of the Lakedaimonians. Although the Politics does not distinguish two types of land, its statement that the purchase or sale of land was dishonourable can be interpreted, in keeping with the nature of this tightly argued work, as a compressed account corresponding to the Lak. Pol.'s more detailed elaboration that the sale of any land was shameful and the sale of the ancient portion illegal.

In the original publication of this chapter (Hodkinson 1986, 388 n.45) I cited as comparison Politics 1263a35-7 (a summary of the details in Xenophon, Polity of the Lakedaimonians 6.3-4) which might seem to suggest, if only by implication, that I viewed the account in the Politics, Book 2, as postdating that in the Aristotelian Lak. Pol. Recently Schüttrumpf (1991, 296-7) has cogently restated the case (for which see earlier Keaney 1980) for the reverse sequence of composition, on the grounds that the imprecision of some of Aristotle's comments about Spartan institutions in Book 2 compared with those in later books is a sign that it predates the completion of the detailed research for the composition of the Lak. Pol. Arguing against the compatibility of the descriptions of land tenure in the Politics and the Lak. Pol., Schüttrumpf (1991, 311) finds it problematic to treat the information in the former as covering
a category of land (the ancient portions) of whose existence Aristotle shows no knowledge in the passage.

This is, however, to beg the question. That Book 2 predated the Lak. Pol. does not mean that it was written in total ignorance of specific details about Spartan society, which may either have been part of a pre-existing fund of knowledge within the Aristotelian school - Schütrumpf himself notes elsewhere (1987, 448-9) that Book 2 was "based on some source material, probably local chronicles" - or have been acquired from the initial stages of research for the Lak. Pol. which may have begun before the composition of Book 2. Aristotle's statement that "nearly", or "approximately", two-fifths of the land lay in female hands and his knowledge of the rules that applied concerning the marriage of heiresses are testimony to some body of exact information in the field of Spartiate landownership.

It seems more likely that at the time of writing Book 2 Aristotle was already aware of the existence of such a basic element of landownership as the ancient portions, but chose (just as in the comparison of Pol. 1263a35-7 with Xen. Lak. Pol. 6.3-4) to give a more generalized summary of the state of affairs. An all-embracing statement about the dishonour attached to the sale of any land was sufficient (without adding distracting qualifications about the ancient portions) for the main point of contrast which he wanted to make, namely, that the legality of gift and bequest undermined the effect of restrictions on sale. Hence Aristotle is not ignoring the
ancient portion and "discussing only one category of land, legally alienable property", as Cartledge suggests (1979, 166). Rather, for the sake of brevity and the effectiveness of a simple, direct contrast he stresses the dishonour attached to the purchase or sale of any land.

Acceptance of Aristotle's testimony regarding sale is, therefore, consistent with the belief that there were two categories of Spartiate land, one of which was termed the 'ancient portion', precisely as the Lak. Pol. states. The significance of the distinction between them, however, is unclear. Older studies have typically viewed the ancient portions as klēroi in the original Spartiate heartland of the Eurotas valley distributed among the whole citizen-body, as distinct from land which some citizens acquired elsewhere; and, as noted in Section I, they have often been equated with the politikē chôra of Polybius and the equal klēroi of Plutarch. The error of this identification with such fictional entities of land has, however, already been demonstrated. This does not exclude the possibility that the distinction between the two categories may have originated at a time of a distribution of land; but precise historical situations need to be found for such an occurrence. Obvious possibilities are the late eighth century, after the initial conquest of part of Messenia, or during the seventh century, when it is likely that there was some fresh allocation of land, whether a partial redistribution of older land or a distribution of new land acquired after the second Messenian War, in order to bring poor Spartiates up to the level
required to maintain themselves as full-time hoplites (Cartledge 1979, 135 & 168). These contexts are of course very different from that of the wholesale equal redistribution of land described by Plutarch and do not imply the kind of state control over the distributed land envisaged in his accounts (Toynbee 1969, 301 n.1).

If one is correct in seeking the origin of the ancient portion in such a context, it is still uncertain whether the term refers to the land thus allocated, which might later have been regarded as the original citizen portions of newly-established Spartiates, or, as Cartledge (1979, 168) has argued, to ancestral private estates mostly in the possession of wealthy citizens. Some scholars, however, would disassociate the distinction between the ancient portion and other land from the context of a past distribution. They view it largely in contemporary terms, with the ancient portion being merely land thought of as having passed down within the family from of old as opposed to land recently acquired by various means (Jones 1967, 43; Cozzoli 1979, 8). Owing to these prevailing uncertainties, it is impossible to make any reliable judgment on precise issues regarding the ancient portions, such as their likely extent relative to other land or the proportion of the citizen body which owned them. The best that can be achieved is to form some general impression of their nature and significance through consideration below of other aspects of Spartiate land tenure.
In the second part of the sentence referred to above Aristotle states that those who wished to give or bequeath land were allowed to do so. The identity of the unspecified individual who permitted these actions has been hotly disputed. Many scholars believe that the person in question here, and also when he refers to "the lawgiver" elsewhere in this chapter, is Lykourgos and that this passage provides clear evidence against the historical reconstruction in Plutarch's *Agis*, according to which free gift and bequest were introduced only in the early fourth century by the ephor, Epitadeus. Others have maintained that Epitadeus himself is the person to whom Aristotle is referring and that the passage reinforces Plutarch's account.

If one is to make a choice between these two putative individual lawgivers, on the basis of Aristotle's text the balance of argument favours Lykourgos. Since the person's identity is not specified in the sentence in question, one can reasonably expect that it is to be found earlier. There are two relevant earlier contexts in this section, 1269b19-22 and 1270a6-8. The former passage states that "the lawgiver" neglected to control the women; the latter reports the tradition that Lykourgos tried to bring them under control but abandoned his attempt, an obvious reference to a statement in Plato's *Laws* (779E ff., 804E ff.). It seems that Lykourgos and "the lawgiver" are to be equated; and it would therefore appear to follow that the unspecified individual responsible for the regulations
concerning purchase, sale, gift and bequest, in what is the next comparable context, must also be Lykourgos.34

Consideration of other parts of Aristotle's account also favours this conclusion. Throughout the remainder of the section devoted to Sparta he refers to "the lawgiver" on seven different occasions, at least four of which refer to Lykourgos, since they concern fundamental aspects of the Spartan system which all ancient traditions attributed to him.35 The only apparent contrary example is 1270b19 where "the lawgiver" responsible for the ephorate may be King Theopompos, to whom the creation of the office is ascribed in Book 5, at 1313a25-33. The latter passage may well represent a change of opinion from that in Book 2, reflecting the fruits of subsequent research for the Lak. Pol.; but even if one grants this exception, it concerns an institution founded several hundred years previously. It therefore constitutes no parallel to the supposed reference to Epitadeus' recent law - a point also made by Schütrumpf (1987, 447 n.37), who rightly adds that Epitadeus, who merely proposed a bill passed by the Spartans, could hardly be regarded as a nomothetēs in the Lykourgan sense. That Aristotle has Lykourgos in mind as the Spartan lawgiver is suggested by his remark at 1273b32-5 that Lykourgos framed the Spartan laws and constitution of which he has already spoken.36 His normal practice of avoiding mentioning the lawgiver by name seems to follow that of Plato (Laws 806C; cf. 692A) and carries no implication that he is thinking of anyone other than Lykourgos.
A more effective counter-argument against a positive identification of the lawgiver responsible for freedom of gift and bequest as Lykourgos is to be made not by asserting the claims of Epitadeus, but through the argument that the phrase "the lawgiver" is used not to specify a particular individual but more generically to denote simply the author, whoever it may be, of whatever law Aristotle is discussing at the time. However, although this formulation does not formally exclude the possibility that in discussing gift and bequest Aristotle may be referring to a recent law, equally it does nothing to advance that possibility. In particular, it does not alter the cardinal point that, since Aristotle ascribes the disapproval of purchase or sale and the freedom of gift and bequest to the same unspecified subject (within a sentence whose two halves are deliberately paired), they must both in his view be either longstanding Lykourgan rules or recent innovations. Since the disapproval of purchase and sale of land was for Aristotle a characteristic of archaic states (Pol. 1266b17-21; 1319a10-11), it is unlikely that he believed it was a recent innovation in Sparta. It is impossible to maintain, as David (1982/83, 82) tries to do, that the law on purchase and sale was an archaic attitude but that the law on gift and bequest was a product of an early-fourth-century change of law. As Schütrumpf (1987, 448) points out, the idea of decadence and corruption with which freedom of gift and bequest is associated in Plutarch’s Agis is unknown to Aristotle, who does not contrast the fourth century with an earlier period when Sparta enjoyed sounder conditions but praises the stability of the Spartan system. Consequently,
whether or not he intended to attribute it specifically to Lykourgos, Aristotle must have regarded freedom of gift and bequest as a traditional right.

Given the amount of detailed knowledge about Spartiate property rights which Aristotle displays, it is unlikely that he was mistaken and was somehow ignorant of Epitadeus’ supposed recent law. In fact there is positive evidence for the legality of gift at the very beginning of the fourth century. We learn of King Agesilaos II that at the start of his reign,

"when the polis pronounced him heir to all the property of Agis, he gave half to his mother’s kinsfolk because he saw that they were in want" (Xen. Ages. 4.5; cf. Plut. Ages. 4.1).

This passage disproves the historical reconstruction in Plutarch’s Agis. According to the chronology of that account, the Spartan state began to suffer corruption soon after the end of the Peloponnesian War in 404 and then there was a period of length unspecified during which the traditional system of land inheritance preserved the social order before it was ruined by Epitadeus’ law introducing free gift and bequest. It is hardly possible for all this to have happened before Agesilaos’ accession, which took place most probably in 400 (Funke 1980, 36 n.31). This evidence refutes the idea that it was the law of Epitadeus which instituted freedom of gift. The combined testimony of Aristotle and Xenophon indicates that this supposed law is as fictional as the account of land tenure and inheritance with which it is associated.
Since the original publication of this chapter (Hodkinson 1986), the argument above has been further strengthened by Schütrumpf's demonstration (1987; cf. 1991, 312) that Plutarch, Agis 5 derives from a fictional account adapted, possibly by Sphairos, from Plato's Republic (especially 555C-E). This is clear from the almost exact parallelism in motifs (conflict between father and son, legally conceded rights, voluntary alienation of land and opposition between rich and poor), in psychological qualities, in the technique of individualization and even in the order of exposition. In one respect only does Plutarch's account depart significantly from its ultimate model, in that rights of gift and bequest are substituted for Plato's emphasis on rights of purchase and sale. The artificiality of this substitution is indicated by the fact that the Laws (922E-923A) shows that Plato viewed the concession of the right of bequest as a failing not of recent lawgivers but of those of earlier times (Schütrumpf 1987, 449). The substitution should also dispel any thoughts that the relevant section of Plato's account might itself constitute a sound basis for authentic comment on Sparta's decline, since there has never been any question of ascribing that decline solely to rights of purchase and sale. Indeed, Plutarch, Agis 5 derives not from the portion of the Republic Book 8 which may genuinely be modelled on Sparta, the discussion of timarchy and its decline (547C-552E), but from Plato's theoretical account of the breakdown and overthrow of oligarchy in its transition to democracy. The chosen model is singularly inappropriate to the conditions of early-fourth-century Sparta in which oligarchy was becoming more entrenched.
As Schütrumpf (1987, 447) rightly remarks, "the account in Agis 5 is a mere fiction in a Platonic spirit and is therefore historically useless".

It seems clear then that freedom of gift, and probably also of bequest, had long been an established practice. Just as Aristotle's remarks concerning purchase and sale were seen to apply to all land, so logically should those of gift and bequest. In other words, there is no indication of restrictions on gift and bequest of the ancient portion (Cartledge 1979, 166). This view has recently been challenged by Schütrumpf (1991, 311), who suggests that we should conclude from Aristotle's remarks that the rights of gift and bequest may have applied only to land whose sale was dishonourable, not the ancient portions for which sale was forbidden. His opinion, however, depends upon the assumption criticized above that Aristotle was ignorant of the ancient portions when he wrote Politics, Book 2. Given the forthright manner in which Aristotle's remarks are made and the fact that he gives the rights of gift and bequest as the first reason for huge disparities in landed wealth, it seems improbable that there was any significant proportion of Spartiate land to which those rights did not apply. Moreover, the very fact of a legal prohibition on sale of the ancient portion may presuppose the principle that other forms of alienation were permissible (Finley 1968, 28).

This suggestion that the extent of public control over the Spartiates' capacity to dispose of their landholdings was
relatively limited is supported by the evidence for adoption. The role envisaged for the procedure of adoption by scholars who follow the account in Plutarch's *Agis* is one whereby the state ensured that the person adopted was a landless younger son without an inheritance, with apparently little attention being paid to the wishes of the person who was to adopt him. The evidence, however, lends no weight to this interpretation. Our only source, Herodotus (6.57.5), reports that "if anyone wishes (ἡν τίς ... ἔθελη) to adopt a child, he must do it in the kings' presence". Although the precise implication of the verb ἔθελη is uncertain, the passage does not suggest state intervention of the sort envisaged above. It affords no grounds for assuming that the kings determined whom the man was to adopt, as Grote pointed out long ago. It is natural that such adoptions should take place before official witnesses such the kings and there is no necessary implication that they interfered with the choice of adoptee. On the contrary, the primary emphasis here is upon the voluntary nature of the adoption and the kings' role as witnesses suggests simply state confirmation of an otherwise private transaction. As Lacey (1968, 201) has remarked, "the right to adopt a son is... characteristic of a family-based society, a society which thinks in terms of inheritance through the family". The right to choose a successor through adoption is a further indication of the control of the individual Spartiate over the disposal of his own estate.

A further respect in which the character of Spartiate land tenure was not markedly different in quality from that of
individually-held property in other Greek states is that land was hereditarily transmitted from one generation to the next by means of partible inheritance. Aristotle states that, "if many are born and the land divided accordingly, many must inevitably become poor". His remarks are confirmed by Xenophon (Lak. Pol. 1.9) when he explains that the reason why Spartiate men were willing to lend their wives to produce children for other men who did not want permanent wives of their own was that they "want to get brothers for their sons, brothers who are part of the kin and share in its power, but claim no part of its property (τὸν χρέματόν)". The implication is that the property would be divided among the recognized sons.

This custom of wife-sharing, mentioned in addition by Plutarch (Lyk. 15.13; Comp. Lyk.-Numa 3.3; Mor. 242B) and Polybius (12.6b.8), should be interpreted as a method of reducing the excessive division of estates inherent in the system of partible inheritance. Polybius implies as much in his remark that it was when a man had begotten enough children by his wife that he would give her to a friend. The man who borrowed the wife could also of course use this custom as means of limiting the number of his heirs. In the light of the evidence of the first-century A.D. Jewish scholar, Philo (On Special Laws 3.4.22), that the Spartiates allowed marriage between uterine half-siblings (homométrioi, i.e. children of the same mother but different fathers), it has been noted that this cooperation could then be continued through the intermarriage of the sons and daughters of the two men, thus concentrating their properties for
the benefit of the succeeding generation." In the passage above Polybius mentions another practice, polyandry, which had the same purpose, saying that it was a longstanding custom and quite usual for three, four or even more brothers to have one wife. The practices of wife-sharing, uterine half-sibling marriage and polyandry (on which see further Chapter 4 below) all make sense on the supposition that land was transmitted hereditarily by means of partible inheritance.

It has been claimed that the system of partible inheritance applied only from the fourth century after the supposed law of Epitadeus annulled a previous system of 'single heir' inheritance (Asheri 1961, 66; 1963, 5; David 1981, 102 & 221f. n.49; 1982/83, 87). The arguments for the existence of such a previous system, however, are not strong: the evidence of Plutarch's Lykourgos criticized above and the use of the terms despotēs, desposynos and hestiopamōn by various writers with reference to Sparta. Most of these passages tell us nothing about land tenure or inheritance. The passages cited from Tyrtaios (fr.5 Prato) and Plutarch (Lyk. 28.6) refer only to Spartiate mastership over the helots. Those from Pollux (1.74, 10.20) show only that each household had just one master. Finally, the reference in Xenophon (Hell. 3.3.5) indicates no more than that on each estate there was only one master, which would equally be the case under a system of partible inheritance; the other persons on each estate will have been helots. It is also hard to see how the change allegedly introduced by Epitadeus would have brought such a 'single heir' system to an end, since the purpose of the law
was, according to Plutarch, to permit free gift and bequest, which is totally different from a change to partible inheritance. Finally, it is implausible to believe that Xenophon, Aristotle, Polybius and Philo, who directly attest, or describe practices associated with, the system of partible inheritance, are all referring to some period after the early fourth century rather than to the period of Sparta’s Classical eminence. It is perhaps indicative that when Plato (Laws 740A-741A) set forth his system of indivisible kléroi, he did not point to a Spartan precedent.

There is, consequently, no reason to doubt that the common Greek practice of partible inheritance was the basic system which operated in Sparta throughout the Archaic and Classical periods. Moreover, Aristotle’s evidence has important implications for the nature of the ancient portions. It would be difficult to make sense of his remarks, and to explain the severe decline in Spartiate numbers, if a significant proportion of the land remained indivisible. Accordingly, either the ancient portions must have been subject to partible inheritance or they must have comprised so small fraction of citizen land that they did not affect Aristotle’s generalizations.

III. The property rights of Spartiate women

The final respect in which Aristotle’s analysis differs markedly from later accounts concerns the ownership of landed property by
women. This factor is absent from Polybius' and Plutarch's account of Classical land tenure, appearing only in the description of the supposedly degenerate third-century system described in the life of Agis. For Aristotle, however, the role of women as landowners, both as heiresses and as the recipients of landed dowries, was a crucial part of the traditional system, as is shown by the fact he portrays it as an important factor in the decline in the number of citizens to below 1,000 shortly after the battle of Leuktra. Since the property rights of women are an important touchstone for assessing the character of Spartan land tenure and inheritance in the Classical period, they are worth considering in detail.

(a) Women as heiresses

In many Greek states in the Classical period the position of a daughter (or daughters) whose father had died without male issue was governed by special regulations specifying who had the right to marry her (Schaps 1979, ch.3). Three texts inform us about the position of such women in Sparta. The earliest forms part of Herodotus' list of royal prerogatives (6.57.4):

"The kings are the sole judges of these cases only: concerning an unmarried heiress to whom it pertains to have [her], if her father has not betrothed her..." (πατρούχου τε παρθένου πέρι, ἐς τὸν ἰκνέεται ἐχεῖν, ἣν μή περ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτῆς ἔγγυηση).

Herodotus' source for this list of prerogatives has recently been illuminated by Carlier (1984, 250ff.). Its style and
vocabulary suggest that it probably derived directly from a more or less official Spartiate list. Its manner of presentation implies unchanging prerogatives, accorded definitively in the distant past, which the kings continued to exercise in Herodotus' own day. These prerogatives are, however, described with extreme conciseness, sometimes to the point of ambiguity - a perhaps deliberate obscurity which allowed constitutional practice to alter without the kings' rights seeming to be infringed. These points should be borne in mind below, especially when we compare Herodotus' evidence with that of Aristotle.

Three points in the above passage require attention. First, the heiress is called by the term *patrouchos*, meaning "holder of the patrimony", a combination of πατρόφα and εἰχείν. It seems to correspond to the term *patröiökos* in the law code of Gortyn. A *patröiökos* in Gortyn, as long as she conformed to the laws specifying whom she was to marry, remained the legal owner of her father's property throughout her life, in contrast with the Athenian heiress, the *epiklêros*, whose rights over her father's estate were considerably fewer and whose sons became its owners when they came of age. The similarity of terms suggests that the Spartiate *patrouchos* enjoyed legal rights of ownership over the patrimony comparable to those of her Gortynian counterpart. This is illustrated by the case of Lysander's daughters (Plut. *Lys.* 30.6; *Mor.* 230A; Aelian, *V.H.* 6.4; 10.15). The fact that they were courted when their father was thought rich, but deserted when on his death in 395 his poverty was revealed, suggests that they were heirs to whatever wealth Lysander
Accordingly, when Herodotus gives Leonidas' marriage to Kleomenes I's only child, his daughter Gorgo, as one reason why he succeeded to the throne c.490 (7.205.1; cf.5.48.7, 7.239.4), the most likely explanation is that the marriage bolstered Leonidas' claim because Gorgo had inherited Kleomenes' property.

Secondly, there is the question of the nature of the kings' jurisdiction. It is sometimes assumed (e.g. Asheri 1961, 61; 1963, 18; Cozzoli 1979, 7) that their role was to allocate the heiress to a landless citizen. On the contrary, however, the verb ἴκνεστοι denotes that the potential husband had some right to the heiress' hand and was not selected upon the arbitrary initiative of the kings. It seems likely that, as in other Greek states (cf. Schaps 1979, 44), the right to marry an heiress who came within the kings' jurisdiction belonged to the nearest male relative. The circumstance of an old man with a young wife described by Xenophon (Lak. Pol. 1.7) and Plutarch (Lyk. 15.12) may often have been the outcome of just such a situation. The kings' role was probably to adjudicate between the competing claims of different kinsmen, as did the dikastérion of the eponymous archón at Athens (Harrison 1968-71, i. 10f.).

Finally, the kings' jurisdiction applied only to the case of an unmarried patrouchos not betrothed by her father. One already married or even merely betrothed was apparently permitted to retain her existing or intended spouse instead of having to marry her next-of-kin. This is confirmed by the case of
Lysander's daughters. On their father's death the men to whom they were betrothed, far from being expected to give way to the next-of-kin, were fined when they disowned the girls. This contrasts with the law in both Athens and Gortyn where the next-of-kin had the right to marry the heiress unless she was married and already had a son (in Athens) or child of either sex (in Gortyn). There was evidently less control in Sparta over the possibility of the property passing to descendants who were not kinsmen and over the father's right to alienate his estate by marrying his heiress outside the kin.

Aristotle's testimony quoted in Section II refers to the heiress by the Athenian term *epikleros* and mentions a person called the *kléronomos* who had control over her marriage when her father died intestate. The word *kléronomos* often means "heir"; but Aristotle clearly believed that the heiress herself was the legal owner of (at least most of) her father's estates, since he specifies the number of heiresses as one reason why approximately two-fifths of the land was owned by women. Aristotle's use of the term *epikleros* appears, therefore, to be a case of loose, untechnical phraseology (Wolff 1957, 166f.; Cartledge 1981, 97).

As for the *kléronomos*, since the father had died intestate, he must logically be the heiress' male next-of-kin; but to interpret his position more fully is difficult. In the original version of this chapter (Hodkinson 1986, 396) I suggested that the term *kléronomos* should strictly mean the "taker of the lot" -
or "he to whom the lot is distributed" (from nemein). One possible interpretation of his position - which in the original publication I did not discuss at this point but mooted later in the concluding section (Hodkinson 1986, 405 n.120) - is that he was the person who inherited the ancient portion with the rest of the estate going to the heiress. (This idea would imply that the ancient portion was a symbolically important but relatively small plot of land; cf. Section IV below.)

The problem with such strict readings is that, since Aristotle's use of the term epiklēros does not reflect Spartan reality, there seems little reason to accept that the literal meaning of the word klēronomos accurately describes his role. Moreover, even on a strict reading, weaker interpretations of the phrase are also possible. It could mean "he who has the management of the lot" (from nemesthai) or, on analogy with the official called the paidonomos, "he who (shep)herds the lot". Either of these meanings would tie in with Aristotle's statement that the klēronomos decided whom the unbetrothed heiress should marry, and thus into which lineage the parental property would ultimately descend. This would be compatible with the view that the heiress retained all the property in question.

In my original version I also followed Newman's suggestion (1887-1902, ii. 329; cf. Asheri 1961, 55 n.29) that as next-of-kin the klēronomos did inherit the right to marry the heiress, if he wished. This interpretation has recently been questioned by Schütrumpf (1991, 313), who states, without supporting
argumentation, that Aristotle’s phraseology makes the notion that the klēronomos could himself marry the heiress very unlikely. I remain unconvinced by this argument. I can see nothing in Aristotle’s phraseology to forbid the possibility of marriage between klēronomos and heiress; and it is in any case shortsighted to consider the wording alone outside its context. Aristotle’s subject is the concentration of land. His remarks focus on how the marriages of heiresses could bring this about and it is in this connection that he refers to the giving of the heiress outside the kin by the klēronomos. Aristotle is not, in his tightly-compressed exposition, attempting to give a full statement concerning who has the right to marry the heiress. Nothing in his account excludes the possibility that the klēronomos might marry the heiress himself. Aristotle does not mention it because it is not the concern of his argument.

It would often of course be expedient for a klēronomos to choose not to wed the heiress but to pass her outside the kin, particularly if he himself was already advantageous married. But on other occasions matters will have been different. Such liaisons between an heiress and her father’s brother (the most common next-of-kin) are the most natural explanation of the phenomenon of marriages between older men and younger women recorded by Xenophon (Lak. Pol. 1.7). The phenomenon was indeed sufficiently significant for the state to permit the introduction of a younger man for reproductive purposes. None of this should seem surprising given how common such uncle-niece marriages were elsewhere in Greece; and the comparative
perspective also supports my argument in another respect. MacDowell (1986, 108) notes that the only Athenian instance known to him of a man called a kléronomos in a case in which a woman is an epikléros concerns a relative who expected to marry the girl himself. Since Aristotle appears to be drawing upon Athenian terms in his exposition, the parallel is a further indication that the Spartiate kléronomos was able, if he chose, to marry the heiress.

Aristotle's statement that an heiress could be given in marriage to anyone (in the context this means by her father) agrees with the evidence of Herodotus. His following remark that, if a man died intestate, the person left as kléronomos gave the heiress to whom he likes, appears to indicate that a father could validly betroth his heiress not only during his lifetime but also in his will.62 This right may already be implicit in the evidence of Herodotus, although it is not specific enough to permit certainty. A man's right to pass on his property in this way to descendants outside the kin, certainly during his lifetime (attested by both Herodotus and Aristotle), and perhaps also in his will, fits perfectly with his freedom to alienate his property by gift or bequest discussed in Section II.

Aristotle's remarks concerning the kléronomos have usually led scholars to conclude that he is reporting important changes in law and practice since the time of Herodotus. It is argued, first, that the kings had lost their jurisdiction over the unbetrothed heiress, who now automatically came under the
guardianship of her male next-of-kin; secondly, that the rules
governing the marriage of the heiress had been relaxed so that
the next-of-kin could, and usually did, freely give her in
marriage outside the kin.  

The procedures described by Herodotus and Aristotle may not,
however, be as different as these views suggest.  Aristotle’s
testimony does not necessitate the conclusion that the kings’
jurisdiction had disappeared or that it differed greatly from the
adjudicatory role recorded by Herodotus. He does not specify the
precise procedures followed when the father died intestate. The
kings may well have adjudicated between competing claimants to
the position of kléronomos, which was probably much sought after
because of the potential for personal advantage and patronage
afforded by control over the marriage of the heiress.

It is not even certain that the role of the kléronomos
differs significantly between the two passages. In comparing
their testimony one must take into account the different nature
of their evidence. Herodotus is recording the legal prerogatives
of the kings, drawing without comment upon a Spartiate source
which portrayed the law as traditional and uncontroversial
without detailed reference to its practical application.
Aristotle’s sharp criticisms, on the other hand, are intended to
highlight controversial aspects of Spartiate practice whose
effects he judged to have been radical. It is not impossible
therefore that their seemingly divergent evidence results as much
from their totally opposite standpoints as from significant
differences in either law or practice. Herodotus' brief statement of the official procedure does not specify the exact obligations upon the man to whom an heiress was adjudicated. Was he obliged to marry her himself? If not, did the right of marriage pass to the next nearest male kinsman as at Athens and Gortyn? Or was he at liberty to betroth her to any citizen, as at the time to which Aristotle refers? Equally, I have already argued that Aristotle's kléronomos, although free to dispose of the heiress' hand, could also choose to marry her himself. The most that one can reasonably say about the process of change, if any, between the time of Herodotus and that of Aristotle is that it was considerably more subtle than has usually been thought.

The final piece of evidence is Plutarch's description of King Leonidas' treatment of Agiatis, widow of King Agis IV whom he had executed in the year 241:

"Leonidas took his [Agis'] wife, who had a new-born child (paidion), from her home and compelled her to marry his son, Kleomenes, who was not quite at the age of marriage. He did not want to give the woman to anyone else because Agiatis was an epikleros of the large estate of her father, Gylippos" (Kleomenes 1.1-2).

Two points deserve attention. First, if Plutarch is to be believed, the fact that Agiatis had a new-born child, a son probably named Eurydamidas (Pausanias 2.9.1, 3.10.5), did not alter her status as an heiress. It is uncertain, however, whether Leonidas was using, and of course abusing, the kings' traditional role of adjudication (an interpretation which would lend support to the suggestion that the evidence of Aristotle
does not necessarily prove its demise) or simply acting arbitrarily. Secondly, there is the question of inheritance. The episode suggests that any sons born of Agiatis' remarriage would have had an equal claim to the inheritance as the son of her first marriage. The interests of his potential grandchildren will therefore have been an important reason why Leonidas was determined to marry Agiatis to his son.

(b) Dowry, marriage-settlements and inheritance

Next we must consider Aristotle's statement concerning the existence of large dowries (*proikes*), which he saw as partly responsible for the fact that women possessed about two-fifths of the land. Some later writers claimed that there were no dowries in Sparta. None of their evidence is, however, of any great reliability. The earliest reference, by Hermippos (fr.87, *apud* Athen. 555C), is associated with his incredible portrayal of the supposed custom of marriage by capture in a dark room. Justin's evidence (3.3.8) is connected with the false notion of Lykourgan landed equality. Plutarch had no consistent view about dowries. Although one of his Lakonian Sayings (Mor. 227F) attributes a prohibition of dowries to Lykourgos, elsewhere he recounts a saying and a love story which imply their existence (Mor. 242B, a passage which, though sometimes cited as evidence against dowries, indicates the opposite; 775C-E). Finally, it is unlikely that Aelian (V.H. 6.6) was drawing upon a tradition independent of the above writers.
The testimony of Aristotle is sufficient evidence for some kind of transfer of land at the time of marriage by the parents of the bride. This need not, however, have been the same as the institution of dowry as it operated in Classical Athens. Aristotle may be using the term proix in a loose, untechnical sense to describe an analogous but not identical social practice (cf. Schaps 1979, 85ff. & Appendix II). It is not necessary, therefore, to believe that any property thus transferred came under the management of the bride’s husband as at Athens (Harrison 1968-71, 52ff.; Schaps 1979, 75). The fact that Aristotle saw dowries as partly responsible for female possession of two-fifths of the land suggests that the bride retained control of the gift just as the patrouchos did of her inheritance. This is the interpretation of Cartledge, who argues that "what Aristotle calls 'large dowries' were really... marriage-settlements consisting of landed property together with any movables that a rich father (or mother) saw fit to bestow on a daughter" (1981, 98).

The issue raised by this formulation is whether the amount of property transferred was solely at the discretion of the bride’s parents or whether it was predetermined in any way. The Gortyn Code, for example, also refers to the transfer of property to a bride by her father and indicates that, as in Sparta, it remained under her control (6.9-12; cf. Willetts 1967, 20; Schaps 1979, 88). The property in question, however, was not merely a voluntary gift but the daughter’s rightful inheritance which, if it was not given at marriage, she would receive ultimately on her
father’s death (4.37-5.9). A daughter was entitled to share in the inheritance of all her father’s (and mother’s) property, apart from certain specified items (town houses, the contents of untenanted country houses and livestock), even when there were surviving brothers, her portion being half that of a son. This was the maximum amount that could be given to her on marriage, to judge from the evidence of the Gortyn Code (4.48-51) that "if the father, while living, should wish to give to a daughter upon her marriage, let him give as prescribed, but no more" and Ephorus’ statement (FGrH 70F149, apud Strabo 10.4.20) that "the dowry, if there are brothers, is half of a brother’s portion". The question is whether a Spartiate daughter had the same rights of (anticipated) inheritance as her Gortynian counterpart. If she was not a patrouchos, was the amount of property transferred to her on marriage dependent solely upon the generosity of her parents and the strength of their desire to secure a desirable husband for her? Or did the settlement reflect her right to inherit a portion of the parental estates even in the presence of surviving brothers?

The normal assumption has been that Spartiate women did not have any rights of inheritance in the presence of brothers. There is, however, some evidence which suggests the contrary. Aristotle states that approximately (or nearly) two-fifths of the land was in the possession of women. This statement has to my knowledge never been satisfactorily explained. There are two aspects to the problem. First, how did Aristotle discover the proportion of land in female hands? His use of the verb ἐφα"
suggests that it was obtained empirically rather than by a theoretical calculation based upon knowledge of the rules of Spartiate inheritance. Yet it is unlikely to be derived from a register of Spartiate landholdings, since Greek states typically did not keep such records (Finley 1952, 13f. & 207f. nn. 18f.). More probably, it reflects the kind of informal local knowledge about property-ownership which circulated orally in Sparta as in modern small-scale village communities.\(^7\)

Secondly, is it possible to explain how or why this particular proportion of land should have been in female hands? Now, a system of inheritance like that at Gortyn, according to which a daughter is entitled to a landed inheritance half that of her brother will tend to produce a distribution of land between the sexes such that the proportion owned by women is about 40%. The reason is that the 33.3% of land inherited by females in households with both surviving sons and daughters (on the assumption of an equal sex ratio across the population as a whole) is increased by several per cent by the fact that in households with surviving daughters only, the female inheritance is treble the normal share, whereas in those with only surviving sons, the male share is increased only one and a half times.\(^2\) The existence of such an inheritance system at Sparta would, consequently, explain Aristotle’s figure.

Furthermore, Aristotle’s remarks concerning partible inheritance (Politics 1270b1-6) are not incompatible with the thesis that all children inherited, daughters as well as sons.
His statement (lines 5-6) that, "if many are born (πολλῶν γενομένων) and the land distributed accordingly..."", appears to refer back to lines 2-3, where he comments that the lawgiver encouraged the citizens "to beget many children" (δὴ πλείστοις ποιεῖσθαι παιδᾶς). There is no indication here that only sons inherited. It may be significant that Aristotle uses terms which carry no obvious differentiation between the sexes when he writes about division of the inheritance, despite the fact that he could easily have indicated such a differentiation. Although in lines 3-4 he mentions the alleviation of public duties which was granted to fathers of three or more sons, he does so only in order to illustrate his general remark about the lawgiver's intentions. He does not continue this explicit reference to sons into the following sentence in which he discusses division of the inheritance.

There are also several historical instances which suggest female inheritance in the presence of brothers. Some concern marriages to close consanguineous kin contracted by members of the royal houses, unions which Cartledge (1981, 99) has already interpreted as having been made with the aim of concentration of property. One is the mid-sixth-century marriage between King Anaxandridas II and his sister’s daughter, a union which the king refused to dissolve despite his wife’s initial childlessness and the insistence of the ephors that he send her away and marry again to perpetuate the royal lineage (Hdt. 5.39-41). Although Herodotus indicates that Anaxandridas was devoted to his niece, it is likely that material considerations were also involved.
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Had he sent her away, her property would have gone with her and would almost certainly have been lost to his descendants. Only when he was permitted to retain her as well, did Anaxandridas agree to take another wife; and even after his second wife had borne him a son, he still ensured that his niece subsequently bore him children (three sons) to inherit her property. All this suggests that she was of some wealth. There are several aspects of this case which we should like to know about, in particular her father’s level of wealth (probably considerable for him to have married a king’s daughter) and how much of it she received (we do not know whether she was a patrouchos). Under the hypothesis suggested above, however, her wealth would be explicable on the grounds that her mother, Anaxandridas’ sister, would have inherited a portion of the estates of her father, King Leon, and his wife, to which she would then have been sole or joint heiress in addition to inheriting from her own father. This episode makes more sense on the view that daughters inherited in the presence of brothers than otherwise.

A second example is the early-fifth-century marriage between the future King Archidamos II and his step-aunt, Lampito (Hdt. 6.71). This match originated from the fact that King Leotychidas II had married twice. His first marriage produced only a son, Zeuxidamos, who in turn fathered Archidamos before dying prematurely without further issue. Lampito was the only child of Leotychidas’ second marriage to a certain Eurydamé, sister of
Menios and daughter of Diaktoridas. Since Archidamos’ position as heir to the throne would not seem to have been in doubt, it seems likely that the purpose of the match, which was arranged by Leotychidas himself, was to concentrate the royal property for the benefit of his descendants. Now, if daughters did inherit in the presence of brothers, this marital manoeuvre would be very understandable: first, because Lampito, having only one step-brother, would be due to inherit one-third of Leotychidas’ estates; secondly, because there would also be a probably substantial property due to her from her mother, Eurydamē, who would herself have inherited possibly as much as a third of the estates of her father, Diaktoridas, and his wife. Such an inheritance would also explain why Leotychidas chose Eurydamē as his second wife. 75

A third example concerns Kyniska, daughter of Archidamos II. Although she was not a patrouchos, she owned sufficient land and other resources to breed horses of a quality to gain two victories in the four-horse chariot race at Olympia. 76 It seems more likely that her great wealth stemmed from a right to inherit a portion of the estates of Archidamos and her mother than that she was voluntarily given a dowry of such great proportions. 77 Nor was Kyniska alone. Pausanias (3.8.1, 17.6) informs us that Olympic chariot-race victories were subsequently won by several other Spartiate women, such as Euryleonis, victrix in the two-horse chariot race, probably in 368 (Moretti 1957, no. 418). In view of the evidence regarding Kyniska’s position, it would be special pleading to claim that these other women must all have
been *patrouchoi*. The fact that such considerable amounts of land could come into the hands of these women adds further strength to the proposition that they possessed inheritance rights to a significant portion of their parents’ property.

In the original publication of this chapter (Hodkinson 1986, 402f.) I also discussed one further case, that of Agesistrata and Archidamia, respectively the mother and maternal grandmother of the mid-third-century king, Agis IV. According to Plutarch (*Agis* 4.1), Agesistrata and Archidamia owned the most property of anyone in Sparta. Taken at its face value, this statement would mean that the two women were richer not only than Agesilaos, Archidamia’s son and Agesistrata’s brother, who, although in debt, was a large landowner (*ibid.* 6.6 & 13.1-2), but also than Agis himself. Plutarch does not specify that they were richer in land than their two male relatives; but their landed estates must have been not too much smaller for them to be wealthier overall. I argued that this seemingly improbable situation would in fact be possible under a system according to which a daughter could inherit half a son’s portion on marriage, especially if a son might have to wait until his mother’s death to gain her property.78 Utilizing a family tree of the Eurypontid royal house from the reign of King Eudamidas I onwards based upon the prosopography of Bradford (1977, Appendix 6), I hazarded a set of hypothetical calculations of the relative number of units of land in the hands of each of the relevant persons, according to which the landed property of the two women was indeed greater or not significantly smaller than that of their male relatives.79
Recently, however, McQueen (1990, 163ff.) has argued the case for a different configuration of Eurypontid family relationships, adoption of which would alter the calculations such as to deflate the landholdings of Archidamia and Agesistrata in relation to those of Agesilaos and Agis. What the disagreement seems to show is that a definitive reconstruction of the family tree lies beyond our reach. McQueen’s arguments against Bradford’s reconstruction – the improbability of the cross-generational marriages of Kings Eudamidas I and II to Archidamia and Agesistrata, respectively – are plausible but by no means certain given the evidence discussed above for similar royal marriages in earlier periods. There may indeed have been other members of the Eurypontid royal house unknown to us whose existence would further alter the calculations in either direction. In any case, even the deflated calculations of the women’s landed estates based upon McQueen’s family tree are not so unfavourable (at a time when the relative importance of non-landed property was evidently greater than in earlier periods) as to exclude compatibility with Plutarch’s statement about their overall property holdings, even if we take his evidence at face value rather than as understandable hyperbole.

In spite of some uncertainties surrounding each of these examples, cumulatively they lend support to the proposition that a daughter could normally expect to receive a portion of her parents’ property as an inheritance even in the presence of surviving brothers. In a society without a written law code the application of the convention that daughters inherited half the
amount of property that went to a son need not have been rigid, especially as it affected the size of marriage-settlements. Under a property regime which permitted transfer of land through gift or bequest, the size of the parental estate might frequently have differed at the time when a son succeeded on the death of one or both parents from the earlier time of his sister’s marriage. Similarly, one should not assume either that marriage-settlements were compulsory (they were not at Gortyn) or that they had to be to the full value of a daughter’s inheritance entitlement. No doubt rich households could better afford to make such settlements than could poor ones for whom every scrap of land needed to be retained for as long as possible to sustain the syssitia contributions of its adult male members. Nevertheless, I would suggest that the knowledge that a daughter would ultimately expect to receive a significant portion of her parents’ estates by way of inheritance exercised a pronounced influence upon the size of marriage-settlements offered by those families which could afford them. That was why Aristotle named large dowries as one of the two reasons for the ownership by women of approximately two-fifths of the land.

Whether or not one accepts this hypothesis, it is apparent that among the richer families marriage-settlements were often large. They were obviously designed not merely to provide support for the bride in her new household, but to settle either the whole or the bulk of her claim to her parents’ estates, thus ensuring that a significant part of the parental property was ultimately passed on to her own children. It is clear that
the Spartiate inheritance system operated on the basis of a diverging pattern of devolution, according to which the property of an individual (in the Spartiate case, either male or female) was distributed to children of both sexes and hence diffused outside the kin (Goody 1973; 1976b, 6f.). Indeed, the characteristics of Spartiate marriage patterns (such as uterine half-sibling marriage and royal unions with other close blood relations) closely parallel those found in other societies in which diverging devolution operates. Such societies often have a high level of endogamy and other forms of in-marriage as a means of restricting diffusion of property outside the kin (Goody 1973, 27). Adelphic polyandry, another practice evidenced in Sparta, is also associated in many societies with property ownership by women as well as by men (Leach 1955 = 1971). This combination of ethnographic parallels with the evidence of royal marriage manoeuvres going back to the mid-sixth century provides a firm indication that the system of diverging devolution and the significant amount of female land ownership to which it gave rise were basic aspects of Spartiate land tenure and inheritance from at least the late Archaic period onwards, if not before.

IV. Implications

The picture of Spartiate land tenure and inheritance suggested in this chapter is markedly different from those postulated by Plutarch and his modern followers. In place of a schema governed
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The picture of Spartiate land tenure and inheritance suggested in this chapter is markedly different from those postulated by Plutarch and his modern followers. In place of a schema governed
by public controls and dominated by indivisible, inalienable, male-owned and equal klēroi, with reversion back to the state at death or succession by primogeniture, we have witnessed a system in which individual citizens had indefinite possession of landholdings which were transmissible by partible inheritance and diverging devolution and open to alienation through lifetime gifts, testamentary bequests and the betrothal of heiresses.

Inevitably, some uncertainties remain, especially concerning the enigmatic 'ancient portions'. Yet even here some advancement of our understanding has been possible. It was noted in Section II that, apart from the legal prohibition on purchase or sale, the ancient portions must either have been subject to the same rules as the rest of Spartiate land (namely, freedom of gift and bequest, partible inheritance and - if one accepts the arguments of Section III - inheritance by women) or they cannot have comprised more than a small fraction of Spartiate estates. It seems clear that the ancient portions are either no exception, or no significant exception, to the character of land tenure advocated above.

Given the paucity of evidence, we have been able to view the system of tenure and inheritance only in its crudest outlines, without the possibility of considering the many subtleties and complexities of law and practice to which the variety of individual circumstances no doubt gave rise in everyday life. Moreover, this study has focused solely upon rights of ownership, alienation and transmission, to the exclusion of rights and
duties concerning the use of land and its produce, as well as consideration of other forms of property.

Nevertheless, the interpretations suggested in this essay have important implications for our understanding of the character of Classical Spartiate society. Anthropologists have emphasized the significant repercussions of female tenure of land, whether gained through inheritance or dowry, in particular the drastic reorganization of ownership every generation and the accentuation of demographically-induced inequalities (Goody 1976; Leach 1955 = 1971). Demographic studies of pre-industrial societies marked by high mortality rates have stressed the dangers and difficulties inherent in strategies of heirship by which individuals might attempt to ensure the survival of a male heir whilst avoiding excessive division of the inheritance (Wrigley 1978; cf. Lane Fox 1985, 214). The fragility of such heirship strategies must have been significantly greater when daughters could inherit portions of the parental landholdings even in the presence of sons. Finally, the evidence from Classical Athens, in which women possessed considerably fewer property rights than in Sparta, indicates, nevertheless, the covert household influence of the dowried wife and the potential dominance of the wealthy epiklēros. The evidence from Hellenistic Sparta (Plut. Agis 6.7, 7.6) demonstrates the pervasive influence of women whose property rights were similar to those of their Classical counterparts. It may be significant that Aristotle, the single writer properly to emphasize the role of women as owners of land, is also the one who takes pains to
point out the important influence they exercised within the Spartiate state (Politics 1269b12-1270a33; cf. Redfield 1977/78, 160; Kunstler 1983, ch.13).

Thus the conclusions of this chapter direct us to two basic and related contradictions within Spartiate society: first, between the facade of a seemingly stable society marked by an unchanging system of government and the reality of an unceasing movement of significant tracts of landed property and continual shifts in the fortunes of a declining number of citizen households; and, secondly, between the narrowly political demands of the male-centred hoplite polis, which overtly minimized the importance of material considerations, and the fundamental economic needs of female-influenced households upon whose survival the polis depended. These insights into the nature of Spartiate society which are gained from a study of its system of land tenure and inheritance will be explored further in Chapter 4 in an examination of some important aspects of the success and decline of Spartiate society. Before undertaking that exploration, however, I shall attempt in the following chapter to widen the perspective on Spartan landholding by considering the relationships between Spartiate landowners and their helot cultivators.
Footnotes to Chapter 2

1. For an example of 19th-century controversy, Grote (1854, ii. 530ff.) with refs. to earlier views. For refs. to other discussions, cf. Walbank (1957, 731); Michell (1964, 205ff.); Oliva (1971, 32ff., 48ff. and 188ff.).

2. E.g. Michell (1964, 205ff.); Oliva (1971, 36ff.); Forrest (1980, 135ff.); Figueira (1984, 96f). Both Michell and Oliva, however, waver somewhat in their accounts, saying that a man’s klēros must often have been passed on by the state to his eldest son.

3. Dilts (1971); see also the works cited by Tigerstedt (1965-78, i. 566 n.412).

4. Cf. also Plut. Mor. 238E-F, which refers to "the anciently established portion, which it is illegal to sell".

5. 6.45.1-3; cf. 6.48.3, where this equality is attributed to Lykourgos.

6. This procedure, denounced by Grote (1854, ii. 555f. note) in the last century, is most obvious with regard to belief in the indivisibility of the Spartiate klēros. Some examples: i) Michell (1964) accepts the evidence of Plut. Lyk. 16 on pp.207ff., without mentioning Aristotle’s account, which is not introduced until p.219. Aristotle’s crucial comment on the divisibility of Spartiate estates (Politics 1270b4-6) is not quoted until p.229 and is then ignored in the subsequent
discussion. ii) Hooker (1980) pronounces on p.116 that estates were indivisible, does not quote Aristotle until p.142 f. and ends the quotation one sentence before the comment upon divisibility. iii) David (1981, 46ff.) conducts his discussion without a reference to Aristotle in the main text, mentioning his testimony only in later sections (68f., 102ff.) as evidence for the new system supposedly introduced by the law of Epitadeus. His earlier discussion (50ff.) of a number of other fourth-century sources does not include any precise evidence about the nature of land tenure and inheritance.

7. In addition to those cited above, cf. Plut. Comp. Lyk.-Num. 2.6; Solon 16.1-2; Kleom. 18.2; Mor. 226B; Justin 3.3.3.

8. MacDowell (1986, 89) makes the incredible claim that, when Plato says that of the three Dorian states Argos and Messene later destroyed their constitution and laws, and only Sparta persisted with the arrangement, "this appears to imply that equality of landholdings in Sparta still obtained in Plato's time"; but Plato's phraseology gives no indication how long he thought it persisted. MacDowell is equally cavalier in his assertion (1986, 92) that the idea that equality of landholding was invented in the late fourth or third century "can be dismissed at once, because we have already seen that it goes back as early as the time of Plato". He ignores the fact that Plato's equal distribution, unlike that ascribed to Lykourgos, is not located in the historical period.

9. Walbank (1957, 727); cf. his comment on Plb. 6.5.1, where
"the anacyclosis, which is probably the work of some writer of the third or second century, is said to have been set forth by 'Plato and certain other philosophers'". See also Gabba (1957, 205).

10. Walbank ibid.; cf. Jones (1967, 40f.); Cozzoli (1979, 18ff.). Xenophon's view that the Lykourgan reforms were approved by Delphi and that they were unique (refs. in Cozzoli 1979, 20) further demonstrates the inaccuracy of Polybius' claim that he identified the Lakedaimonian constitution with that of Crete.

11. Walbank (1957, 728); Barber (1935, 116). Cf. the judgment of Tigerstedt (1965-78, i. 210) that Ephorus' biography of Lykourgos "has no historical value, but.... shows how quasi-scientific history in combination with political propaganda fashioned a consistent picture of the organization of the Spartan state and its mythical lawgiver".

12. A hypothesis discounted by Kessler (1910, 38); but for the considerable influence of this pamphlet on Ephorus, cf. Barber (1935); David (1979, 109ff.).

13. David, (1979, 116); I accept his thesis, following Ed. Meyer (1892, 233ff.), that Pausanias' pamphlet contained not an attack on Lykourgos' laws but a eulogy aimed at convicting his opponents, who he claimed had violated those laws.

14. And possibly also with the 9,000 strong citizen body achieved in Athens in 322 by a limitation of the franchise which was portrayed as a return to the ancestral constitution (Diod.
18.18.5; Plut. Phokion 27.5) and may have been viewed as the archetype of a balanced constitution.

15. This explanation of Plutarch’s first version seems preferable to the alternative argument that the 9,000 citizen kléroi represent an arbitrary doubling of the kléroi in Agis’ projected reform designed to reflect Sparta’s former control of Messenia (see the refs in Marasco 1981, i. 115 n.1, to which add Cartledge 1979, 169f.), because the tradition about Lykourgos uniformly places him before the conquest of Messenia. The opposite theory that Plutarch’s first version was in existence before the third century and was halved by the revolutionaries (Ehrenberg 1924, 44; Ziehen 1933, 223) fails to explain the 30,000 perioikic kléroi. Since there is no reason to believe that the Spartiates (re)distributed, or were thought to have (re)distributed, perioikic land before the third century, the revolutionaries’ figure for the perioikic, and therefore also for the Spartiate, kléroi must have existed first (Cartledge ibid.; Jones 1967, 40). MacDowell’s assertion (1986, 28) that Plutarch’s statement about the perioikic kléroi does not imply a systematic distribution is hard to credit, since their allotment is covered by the same verb (eneime) as the allotment of citizen kléroi. In addition, Marasco’s studies show that MacDowell’s conclusion (1986, 91) that "Plutarch had several sources of information available to him, and they agreed that the total number of lots... was 9,000" is altogether too ingenuous.

16. For the suggested influence of the Peripatetics on Plutarch
and their unreliability, Tigerstedt (1965-78, i. 304ff.); Aalders (1982, 64).

17. On the effect of the revolution in propagating an idealized vision of Lykourgan Sparta, Africa (1961); Starr (1965/1979); Tigerstedt (1965-78, ii. 49ff.).


19. E.g. 1) the reference to conflict between kings and ephors in Plut. Agis 12.2 goes far beyond Arist. Pol. 1271a 24-6, esp. the idea that the two kings together could outweigh the ephors; 2) in Agis 9.1, 11.1, despite the fact that an assembly was called when the Gerousia was divided, it was still the Gerousia which made the final decision, not the assembly as in Pol. 1273a6ff. - whichever one prefers of the two possible interpretations suggested by T.J. Saunders (in Sinclair, trans. 1981, 156 n.3); 3) in Kleom. 10.2-3 the ephors gradually usurp power after initially being assistants to the kings, whereas in Pol. 1313a25ff. and in Plut. Lyk. 7.2 they are a check on royal authority from the start. This last example demonstrates the error of Marasco’s general assumption that Plutarch’s sources for the lives of Agis and Kleomenes were the same as those for the life of Lykourgos. Plutarch’s use of Aristotle in the Lykourgos does not prove that he was a significant source for the other two lives.

20. Marasco (1978a, 179, with refs. to earlier works); David (1982/83, 80).
21. This contradicts David's implicit claim (1981, 59ff., esp. 66) that the remarks of Plato, *Republic* 547D-552E on the decline of (Spartan) timarchy and the evils of oligarchy corroborate the account of Phylarchos. The link which Schütrumpf has established between Plutarch, *Agis* and Plato's *Republic* does not indeed relate to this part of Plato's work, in which he says nothing of changes in the nature of land tenure. His general statement that under an oligarchy a man is allowed to sell all he has to another and become a pauper (552A-B) is unlikely to be a reference to such a measure as the supposed law of Epitadeus, which concerned not sale but gift and bequest.

22. The most recent example of arbitrary conjecture is that of MacDowell (1986, 94ff.), who is compelled to postulate the existence of no fewer than three different unattested laws in order to explain how Plutarch's lots were passed on in approximately the same number over the generations.

23. For this claim, see e.g. Michell (1964, 207ff.); David (1981, 46ff.); Marasco (1981, i. 211); MacDowell (1986, 93ff.). Marasco attempts to avoid this contradiction by claiming that Plutarch's account is not one of complete equality. He argues that the phrase ἀμῶς γἐ πῶς in *Agis* 5.2 indicates that the equality was only partial. For this to be so, however, one would expect the phrase to be placed either before or after διἀμένουσα. As it stands, the more natural interpretation of the meaning of the sentence is that other defects in the state were partially corrected by the complete equality.
24. Hence MacDowell’s attempt (1986, 91) to use Plut. Agis 8 to clarify the meaning of the politikē chōra must be ruled out of court.

25. Cf. von Pohlmann, (1906, 275 n.1). It is no defence to argue, as does Marasco (1981, i. 209ff.), that Plutarch was concerned not with the concentration of land but with the freedom to alienate the klēros which led the poor into destitution. Plutarch himself states that equality existed before Epitadeus’ law and that concentration of land and widespread poverty were its consequences.

26. Poverty of younger sons: David, (1981, 48); both he (at 92) and Hooker (1980, 143) fail to discuss the question of manpower decline before the battle of Mantinea in 418. Natural extinction: Marasco (1981, i. 211); the implausibility of this explanation is increased by the fact that it is supposed to account for the entire manpower decline down to the 360s, since Marasco believes that each Spartiate possessed by right of birth a lot sufficient for his maintenance until the law of Epitadeus, which he dates after the loss of Messenia (214).

27. Refs. to older works in Toynbee (1969, 301 n.1); cf. more recently Cartledge (1979, 165ff.); Cozzoli (1979, 1ff).

28. Note, however, that Rhetoric 1398b17-18, which David cites to underpin his argument (1982/83, 85ff.; 1979, 69 with 213 nn.98 & 100ff.) that the objects of Aristotle’s criticisms were departures from Lykourgos’ laws, not the laws themselves, will hardly bear the weight placed upon it. The statement that the
Spartans were happy as long as they obeyed the laws of Lykourgos appears merely as a commonplace saying cited as an example of argument by induction, a counterpart to the vague statement that the Athenians were happy as long as they observed Solon’s laws and the ascription of Theban success to their leaders’ becoming philosophers. It is not even certain that the statement is by Aristotle himself, rather than a continuation of the quotation from Alkidamas which precedes it (Cope 1877, II. 233).

29. 1270a18-21: τούτο δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν νόμων τέτακται φαύλως· ὄνεισθαι μὲν γὰρ ἡ πωλεῖν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἐποίησεν οὐ καλὸν, ὅρθως ποιήσας διδόναι δὲ καὶ καταλείπειν ἐξουσίαν ἔδωκε τοῖς βουλομένοις.

30. The argument of Michell (1964, 220f.), that Aristotle ignores the Spartan prohibition against sale of the ancient portion, on the grounds that at 1319a10-19 he gives examples of such prohibitions without mentioning Sparta, is incorrect. The cases of Oxylos and the Aphytaians to which Michell refers are not examples of prohibition against sale, nor did Aristotle intend them as such; he gives no such examples at all.


32. Ed. Meyer (1892, 258 n.3); Busolt (1893, 523); Newman (1887-1902, ii. 325f.); Meier (1939, 56); Jones (1967, 41); Cartledge (1979, 165ff.); Cozzoli (1979, 6); Forrest (1980, 137); Schütrumpf (1987 & 1991, 312).

34. Cf. also Schütrumpf (1987, 447; 1991, 312). Marasco (1981, i.179) claims that the phrase διὰ τῶν νόμων indicates that Aristotle is referring not to the original Lykourgan constitution but to the contemporary situation. This is far from clear, however, especially since at 1270a7 he uses the phrase ὑπὸ τοῦ νομοῦ with reference to Lykourgos' attempt to control the women. (I owe this last point to Dr. J.F. Lazenby.)

35. The four references are: 1270b42, concerning the elders; 1271a13, ambition; 1271a32 (cf. 26-8), the common meals; 1271b13, intention to instil disdain for money. The other refs. are: 1270b1; b19; 1271a22.

36. Although the authenticity of the whole chapter from 1273b27 to 1274b26 has long been the subject of debate (refs. in Susemihl and Hicks 1894, 318), one should distinguish 1273b27-1274a21, which seems to be a genuine Aristotelian account of Solon's legislation, from the more dubious section on other lawgivers which follows: cf. Newman (1887-1902, ii. 372f.). The fragment from the Lak. Pol. (Dilts 1971, fr.9), which implicitly criticizes those who attributed the whole Spartan politeia to Lykourgos, bears no necessary implications for Aristotle's view in the Politics (pace David 1982/83, 81), since it could be another instance of a change of opinion (Keaney 1980, 52).
37. Von Holzinger (1894, 61); Weil (1960, 244); MacDowell (1986, 103f.).

38. His attempt (1982/83, 86) to evade this point by arguing that, because the law was passed several decades before the Politics was written, Aristotle already regarded it as an integral part of the Spartan law code is unconvincing. For an almost identical argument to that in the text, Schüttrumpf (1987, 447 n.37).

39. The earliest date at which most scholars who accept the authenticity of Epitadeus would place his law is the mid-390s; e.g. David (1981, 67), who supposes that it was enacted towards the end of Pausanias' reign in 395, or shortly afterwards. Other scholars place Epitadeus after the battle of Leuktra: e.g. Marasco (1980, 132). Attempts, such as that of MacDowell (1986, 105), to date his law before 404 or to equate Epitadeus with the Epitadas who died on Sphakteria in 425 violate the chronology of Plutarch's account upon which they rely and are justly criticized by David (1981, 211 n.88). The irreconcilably contradictory views of those scholars who have attempted to pinpoint a chronological location for Epitadeus' law are criticized by Schüttrumpf (1987, 449-52).

40. The fact that Xenophon's evidence concerning Agesilaos' gift was repeated by Plutarch in his own biography of the king (Ages. 4.1), further demonstrates the latter's lack of awareness of contradictions between his accounts in different biographies and casts additional doubt upon the veracity of the account in the
life of Agis. Note that Agesilaos' freedom to alienate this land was not restricted by the fact that his son, Archidamos, must already have been alive at the time. Since Archidamos' paidika, Kleonymos, was about 18 in the year 378 (he had just come out of the paides: Xen. Hell. 5.4.25; cf. Tazelaar 1967, 139f. & 147f.), he must himself have been then in his late twenties or early thirties (there was probably normally at least 8 years between erastēs and paidika: Hodkinson 1983, 245 & 251 n.28) and will therefore have been born several years at least before the incident in question.

41. Grote (1854, ii. 558f. n.1). The verb ἐθέλη could imply either the initiative of the adopter or his consent to what someone else has requested or proposed; cf. the usages in LSJ. The majority of Herodotus' uses of (ἐ)θέλω in hypothetical conditional clauses are of the former type (2.11.4, 13.3, 14.1, 99.3, 173.4, 3.12.1; cf. Powell 1960, s.v., Section 7) and this meaning is also frequent in other contexts (e.g. 1.141.1, 2.2.1, 3.1, 6.52.6, 56). Since, however, the passage in question is part of a list which may derive directly from a more or less official Spartan source (Section III, below), it may be that normal Herodotean usage is not relevant. The clause is perhaps deliberately imprecise, but it need imply no more than that a man with too many sons might approach another man to request adoption.

42. Plutarch (Lyk. 15.12) refers to adoption when describing the custom whereby an old man with a young wife procured the services of a younger man to beget children by her, a passage clearly
derived from Xenophon, *Lak. Pol.* 1.7. Plutarch claims that the older man would then adopt the offspring; but, since this is not mentioned by Xenophon, it is possible that he is mistaken. Since some of the occasions when the custom applied may have been marriages between an heiress and her next-of-kin (see Section IIIa below), adoption would not always have been appropriate.

43. On partible inheritance as the general Greek pattern, cf. most recently Lane Fox (1985, 211ff.).

44. MacDowell’s claim (1986, 95) that *tōn chrēmatōn* "probably refers to other forms of property" than land is extremely forced. Why should we think that Xenophon means to exclude the most important form of property, land?

45. Cartledge (1981, 103 n.118); Lane Fox (1985, 223). Philo’s evidence seems reliable since his accompanying statements that the Athenians permitted marriage between non-uterine half-siblings and the Egyptians full brother-sister marriage are both correct: cf. Harrison (1968-71, i. 22-3); Hopkins (1980, 303ff.).

46. I have adopted the interpretation of this passage by Lane Fox (1985, 222), who suggests that the clause ἀδέλφους δύνας should be taken with all the preceding accusatives. On the relevance of polyandry to the concentration of property, Kunstler (1983, 475 & 593 n.990), who, along with Lane Fox (1985, 223), stresses that avoidance of division was as much a strategy of the rich as of the poor upon whom Aristotle concentrates. This is,
indeed, suggested in the context of wife-sharing by Xenophon's reference to the power (dynamis) of the kin.

47. Asheri's additional references (1961, 66; 1963, 5) to privileges within the royal houses deriving from primogeniture (Hdt. 6.52; Paus. 1.1.4) are no support for a supposed system of indivisibility. Indeed, his general perspective (for which, cf. also 1966, 71 & 77), which involves the claim that primogeniture was the traditional practice of moderate constitutions, is fundamentally mistaken. Partible inheritance was the invariable practice throughout Greek antiquity; the unique regulations of Plato's Laws (740B-D, 923C-D) and the frequently misunderstood advice of Hesiod concerning the desired number of sons (Works and Days 376-80) offer no support to Asheri's view: cf. Lane Fox (1985, 211 & 216).

48. Cf. also the criticism of Asheri's interpretation of this last passage by Cozzoli (1979, 7 n.2).

49. David (1981, 102f.; 1982/83, 87) suggests that families used the new freedom of bequest to divide their estates among all their sons and that this became the common practice, with deleterious effects on the heirs, who each inherited too little land to remain citizens. This, however, involves the implausible view that families throughout Spartiate society voluntarily adopted this practice even when it was detrimental to their heirs.

50. For further arguments, Buckler (1977, 258ff.).
51. The clearest case concerns the wording of the kings’ prerogative to wage war (6.56), which was sufficiently imprecise to accommodate both their collegial right to declare war before 506 and their subsequently reduced role whereby one of them merely conducted a war declared by the polis.

52. MacDowell (1986, 96), indeed, follows some editors in emending Herodotus’ text to read patróioukou. As he notes, the term the Spartiates themselves used is uncertain.

53. Gortyn Code 7.52ff.; 9.8ff.; text & English trans. in Willetts (1967). Cf. Cartledge (1981, 97f.), who notes that a case can be made for a parallelism of development between some aspects of the Spartan and Cretan social systems. My approach here, however, will be to use the evidence of the Gortyn Code, as also of the law of Athens, solely where it provides a useful analogy, not for alleged developmental inferences. On the Athenian epiklēros, Harrison (1968-71, i. 132ff.); Schaps (1979, 25ff.). The discussion of this issue by Karabelias (1982, 476) is vitiated by his view that a Spartiate held only a life tenure over an inalienable klēros until the time of Epitadeus (471 n.7).

54. There is no evidence that Lysander had any sons. The episodes in which Dionysios of Syracuse twice offered him gifts for his daughters (Plut. Lys. 2.7-8; Mor. 141F, 190E, 229A) suggest that they were his only children.

55. Karabelias (1982, 473 n.14 & 474f.); Grote (1854, ii. 558f. n.1); Roussel (1939, 122); cf. the usages of ἰκνεόμωι recorded by Powell (1960, 171).
56. Ollier (1934, 23); Lacey (1968, 199 & 203), although I do not agree with his line of reasoning; Karabelias (1982, 479). The marriage of Leonidas and Gorgo may be a case in point, although it is not known whether it had been arranged by Kleomenes himself, or took place only after his death or during the possibly extended period of his flight from Sparta in winter 491/0. On the problems surrounding the marriage, Harvey (1979, 253ff.). MacDowell argues (1986, 97) that there were other criteria besides proximity of relationship. These criteria, however, such as the non-ownership of a lot of land, are his own inventions designed to make Herodotus' evidence fit that of Plutarch. This methodologically unsound procedure strains credibility.

57. For a similar interpretation of the evidence of Herodotus to that given in the text, Karabelias (1982, 474). Note that the passage lends no weight to the interpretation of Lacey (1968, 203) that marriage extinguished a girl's claim to her father's estate. It merely specifies which patrouchoi came within the kings' jurisdiction.

58. Harrison (1968-71, i. 11f. & App. I); Schaps (1979, 28); Gortyn Code 8.20ff. At Gortyn a childless heiress was allowed to avoid the obligation only if she ceded half the inheritance to the next of kin (7.52ff.).

59. Cf. the usages cited in LSJ, s.v.

60. Contra Schaps' idea (1979, 44) that the girl's relative was the true heir and that he simply gave her a dowry. I do not
imagine that any serious information about Spartan inheritance law underlies the remark of Plut. Mor. 775C, during his account of the love story of Damokrita, that her exiled husband’s property was confiscated so that his two daughters, his only children, might not be provided with dowries. The possible existence at Sparta of the _kyrieia_ (the legal guardianship of a female by her male next-of-kin, on which see Cartledge 1981, 99f., with refs. to earlier work) does not as such effect the question of female _ownership_ of property; cf. Foxhall (1989).

61. The date of the composition of the _Lak. Pol._ is uncertain. Higgins (1977, 65ff.), suggests the 350s and this is accepted by Cartledge (1979, 302). Other scholars have preferred earlier dates going back to the mid-390s; see, for example, the works cited by Tigerstedt (1965-78, i. 461 nn.526 & 530). In addition, it is difficult to relate Xenophon’s evidence to a particular historical period because the ambiguous present tense used throughout the work may refer at different points to a past situation or to an ideal state of affairs as well as to the actual present: Momigliano (1936, 171).

62. Karabelias (1982, 478); cf. the translations of this phrase by Newman (1887-1902, ii. 329: "without having disposed of her hand by will") and by Asheri (1963, 19).

63. See e.g. Asheri (1961, 62); (1963, 19); Jones (1967, 135); Lacey (1968, 204f.); Andrewes (1971, 125); Cozzoli (1979, 7); David (1982/83, 88f.); Carlier (1984, 271); MacDowell (1986, 107).
64. Note that the adverb ἕως used by Aristotle signifies not a contrast between present and past laws but the antithesis between the actual state of the law and that which Aristotle himself deemed more expedient: Grote (1854, ii. 554 note).


66. There is no reason to doubt the authenticity of this incident, which was contemporary with the period about which Plutarch was writing, in contrast to those sections of the lives of Agis and Kleomenes which refer back to earlier periods. This is not, however, a guarantee of the accuracy of the evidence about Agiatis' status. Like Aristotle, Plutarch mistakenly uses the Athenian term epikleros. On Eurydamidas, see Bradford (1977, s.v.), who notes that Pausanias may have given his name incorrectly; cf. also Marasco (1981, ii. 347f.).

67. Even MacDowell (1986, 80), who is "inclined to believe that the blind-man's-buff device was used on some occasions", agrees that "it cannot have been the invariable method of making marriages; the passages from Herodotos show that many marriages, perhaps nearly all, were arranged individually".

68. Again, even MacDowell (1986, 81f.), who accepts the evidence of Plut. Mor. 227F, concedes that, "although the law forbade a formal contract of marriage including an undertaking to give a dowry, in practice a father would often give a large gift to his daughter as soon as she was married" (82).
69. I say 'assumption' advisedly because the question of female rights to inherit in the presence of brothers is seldom even raised. The account of Michell (1964, 205ff.), for example, contains no discussion of female property rights at all. Most modern works assume without question that transfers at marriage were voluntary gifts, e.g. David (1981, 103); (1982/83, 89).

70. ἐστι δὲ καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν σχεδὸν τῆς πάσης χώρας τῶν πέντε μερών τὰ δύο (Pol. 1270a23-4). It is not clear whether σχεδὸν should be translated here as "approximately" or "nearly"; for general Aristotelian usage, Bonitz (1870, 739), which does not, however, refer to this passage.

71. Lin Foxhall pers. comm.; such knowledge can often be remarkably detailed and accurate.

72. Take, for example, the demographic calculations of Goody & Harrison (1973, 16ff.) = Goody (1976b, 133f.), which they deem to correspond most closely with the situation in pre-industrial societies. According to these calculations, in a self-reproducing 'natural fertility' population marked by high mortality, averaging six children ever born per family, and with only a one in three chance of a child surviving its father, roughly 41% of families would have both son(s) and daughter(s), 21% son(s) only, 21% daughter(s) only and 17% no surviving heirs. The resulting proportion of land inherited by females would be 38.91% \[\frac{41}{3} + (21 \times 1) + (17 \times 1/4)\]. (The figure used for calculating the proportion deriving from heirless families
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70. ἐστι δὲ καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν σχεδὸν τῆς πάσης χώρας τῶν πέντε μερῶν τὰ δύο (Pol. 1270a23-4). It is not clear whether σχεδὸν should be translated here as "approximately" or "nearly"; for general Aristotelian usage, Bonitz (1870, 739), which does not, however, refer to this passage.

71. Lin Foxhall pers. comm.; such knowledge can often be remarkably detailed and accurate.

72. Take, for example, the demographic calculations of Goody & Harrison (1973, 16ff.) = Goody (1976b, 133f.), which they deem to correspond most closely with the situation in pre-industrial societies. According to these calculations, in a self-reproducing 'natural fertility' population marked by high mortality, averaging six children ever born per family, and with only a one in three chance of a child surviving its father, roughly 41% of families would have both son(s) and daughter(s), 21% son(s) only, 21% daughter(s) only and 17% no surviving heirs. The resulting proportion of land inherited by females would be 38.91% [(41 x 1/3) + (21 x 1) + (17 x 1/4)]. (The figure used for calculating the proportion deriving from heirless families
is conservative, bearing in mind the prior claim to inherit of the brother(s) of an heirless person.)

These calculations assume a sex ratio of 1:1. The exact proportion of land in female possession will of course vary according to the precise percentage of households with, respectively, both surviving sons and daughters, surviving children of one sex only and no surviving children at all. But even quite significant changes in these percentages do not lead to deviations far from the figure of 40%. Take the extreme case of the calculations given by Goody and Harrison which postulate the greatest degree of continuity in family succession, those at the top right-hand corner of their Table, which assume a population marked by low mortality, averaging six children ever born per family, but with more than a two in three chance of a child surviving its father. According to these calculations, roughly 74% of families would have both son(s) and daughter(s), 10% son(s) only, 10% daughter(s) only and 6% no heirs. The resulting proportion of land inherited by females would still be as high as 36.16% \[(74 \times \frac{1}{3}) + (10 \times 1) + (6 \times \frac{1}{4})\].

73. It might be objected that royal marriage customs may have been exceptional rather than representative of those of ordinary citizens, as was the case in some other societies, including ancient Persia and Egypt: Hopkins (1980, 306f.). The Spartiate kings, however, were not monarchs distanced from their subjects like the kings of Persia, who referred to their subjects as 'slaves' (e.g. Hdt. 7.39.1, 8.102.2, 3, 7.11.4) or those of Egypt, who received divine worship, but merely leading citizens.
74. Had she remarried and had children, they would have inherited. Had she remained childless, her property would then have been claimable by her father’s kinsfolk.

75. Her family may well have been of some substance. There is a possibility that her father, Diaktoridas, was the Olympic four-horse chariot victor of 456 (Moretti 1957, 53ff., no.278). In addition, Herodotus’ gratuitous mention of Eurydamé’s brother, Menios, perhaps suggests that he was a man of note.

76. Xen. Ages. 9.6 & Plut. Ages. 20.1 describe her as the sister of Agesilaos, probably his natural sister and a daughter of Archidamos’ second wife, Eupolia, rather than a daughter of Lampito. For her chariot-race victories, perhaps in 396 and 392, Moretti, ibid. nos. 373 and 381. Xen. Ages. 9.6 is testimony to Kyniska’s wealth. On the huge expenses of chariot-racing, see the collection of material in Davies (1971, xxv-xxvi n.7). Note also the costly dedications which Kyniska made to celebrate her victories (Pausanias 3.8.1-2, 15.1, 5.12.5, 6.1.6; IG V. 1.1564a; Palatine Anthology 13.16).

77. Assuming that she was indeed married; the sources are silent on the point. Under the hypothesis of female rights of inheritance Kyniska will have been entitled to one-fifth of Archidamos’ property, since the latter had another son, Agis II, and to no more than one-fifth of her mother’s, since in addition to Agesilaos Eupolia had at least one other son, Teleutias, born of a second marriage (Xen. Hell. 4.4.19; Plut. Ages. 21.1). The fact that on Agis II’s death, Agesilaos, as step-brother,
inherited all his property (Xen. *Ages.* 4.5; cf. Plut. *Ages.* 4.1), with Kyniska, as step-sister, apparently not sharing in the inheritance, is not incompatible with the hypothesis that daughters inherited in the presence of sons. In the Gortyn Code, for example, in the absence of sons or daughters, a man’s or woman’s property went first to any brothers, next to their children or grandchildren, and only in the absence of all these to any sisters or their descendants (5.9-22).

78. Cf. the Gortyn Code (4.23-31), according to which both mother and father could retain ownership of their property until death, with the exception that a son was entitled to receive his paternal inheritance prematurely in order to pay a fine.

79. The actual figures were: Archidamia 72 units; Agesistrata 54; Agesilaos 72; Agis 63.

80. The amended calculations would read as follows: Archidamia 56 or 33 units; Agesistrata 78 or 50; Agesilaos 100 or 66; Agis 125 or 75. Two figures are given because McQueen’s text (168ff.), as opposed to the family tree in his Appendix (181), suggests alternative possibilities for the father of Agesistrata. Since the different nature of the calculations necessitates an alteration in the numerical base-line of property units, it is the relative landholdings rather than the actual figures which should be compared with those in the previous note.

81. Besides the examples in the text, note also the late-third-century marriage of Agis IV’s brother, Archidamos V, to the daughter of his cousin Hippomedon (Plb. 4.35.13).
82. These different functions of dowry are clearly distinguished by Saller (1984, 195ff.), following the work of Goody (1973, 17ff.).

83. On the latter alternative, house and garden land in the five villages of Sparta would be an example of a category of land of the appropriate scale which might well have been regarded as a family's ancient portion - I owe this suggestion to Bjørn Qviller. Compare the idea of some Roman legal experts (Pliny, HN 19.50) that the heredium was the hortus, the kitchen-garden, as opposed to agricultural land. The heredium is a good example of a minute plot of ancestral land; at the size of two iugera, or slightly over half a hectare (Varro, De Re Rustica 1.10.2; Pliny, HN 18.7), it was clearly insufficient to keep a family.

84. Refs. in Schaps (1979, 76f.); cf. Plato, Laws 774C & Foxhall (1989), who stresses that the wife possessed the ultimate sanction of withdrawing herself and her dowry from the household.
CHAPTER 3

SPARTIATES AND HELOTS:
ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION AND LABOUR RELATIONS

I. Defining the problem

Although scholars have been considerably exercised by the political relationships between Spartiates and helots, especially the extent of the threat posed by the helots and the brutal Spartan response, and although they have focused attention upon the Spartiates' exploitation of the helots through the enforced system of economic support, there has been little investigation of the way in which the specific organization of the agricultural economy affected Spartiate-helot relationships at both an individual and community level. As a complement to my investigations into the nature of the Spartiates' tenure and inheritance of their landholdings and its implications for the longstanding stability and ultimate collapse of their social system (chs. 2 & 4; originally Hodkinson 1986 & 1989), I here turn my attention to this question of the relationships between Spartiate landowners and their helot labour force.

Fundamental to the existence and operation of Spartan society was the fact that the Spartiate citizen elite lived as full-time hoplite warriors supported economically by produce delivered by the helots who cultivated their landholdings. Agricultural labour was the distinctive feature of helot
servitude. Although a significant minority of helot men and women were employed in other sectors such as service in Spartiate households and in the messes, the essential servile function of the vast majority of helots was to work their masters' lands. Upon this basic role of agricultural production the few chattel slaves who may have been present in Spartiate society did not impinge.¹ The helots were, consequently, the indispensable mainstay of Sparta's activity in the Eastern Mediterranean world for at least half a millennium from the early Archaic period on into the Hellenistic age, although my concern here does not extend beyond the early/mid-fourth century with the liberation of the helots of Messenia in 370/69.²

The precise status of the helots has perplexed commentators since antiquity, owing largely to the mixture of communal and personal elements in their servitude. The most common modern approach has been to regard them as in a position of collective servitude to the Spartan polis. This approach has taken several forms from the 'collective slavery' of Lotze (1959), through Garlan's 'intercommunal servitude of tributary type' (1988, 93ff.) to the 'state serf' definition of Ste. Croix (1981, 149f.) and Cartledge (1988, 39). Recently, however, Ducat (1990, 19ff.), following a line suggested by Cozzoli (1979, 158ff.), has argued that, although the helots were typically viewed as a collectivity, that does not necessarily mean that they were collective property. The Classical sources, he argues, view the relationship of individual helots to the particular Spartiates whose landholdings they worked as essentially one of private
ownership. Only with the attempt of the late-third-century reformist kings to impose a system of state-controlled equal kléroi did there emerge a parallel conception of the helots as a kind of public property such as is found in later writers such as Pausanias (3.20.6) and Strabo (8.5.4, except where he explicitly quotes Ephorus).

Ducat’s approach is a valuable corrective to the more communal definitions of helot status above; but it perhaps underemphasizes the conditional nature of all property rights within the Greek polis. Moreover, it should not obscure the fact, which Ducat himself admits, that individual tenure of helots was qualified by a number of community regulations which meant in practice that Spartiate masters did not possess rights of mastery as full as owners of chattel slaves. The polis established the overall terms of social relations between citizens and helots, regarding the latter as enemies against whom they were waging a truceless fight, as is attested by the ephors’ annual declaration of war against them (Plut. Lyk. 28.7 = Arist. fr.538 Rose). The harshest treatments were often applied, most notoriously arbitrary murder (Thuc. 1.128.1; 4.80.2-4; Plut. Lyk. 28). These by definition ruptured a citizen’s private exploitation of his labour force. The polis also restrained the freedom of action of Spartiate masters in other, more mundane respects. For example, only the polis could manumit a helot (Ephorus, FGrH 70F117, apud Strabo 8.5.4; cf. Thuc. 4.80.3; 5.34.1; Xen. Hell. 6.5.28), private sale was restricted (cf. Section II below) and for certain purposes a Spartiate had to let
other citizens make use of his helots (Xen. Lak. Pol. 6.3-4; Arist. Pol. 1263a35-7). Spartiate landowners were also personally responsible before the authorities for preventing the helots under their control from becoming sturdy (Myron of Priene, FGrH 106F2, apud Athen. 657D). The range and importance of these measures indicate that public control over the helots in the hands of individual citizens was exercised far more strongly and fundamentally than over their landholdings.

It is the economic aspect of this combination of private possession of helots with lack of complete individual rights of mastery that I wish to explore in this chapter. As I shall argue, Spartiate masters were able to decide and vary the ways in which they utilized their labour force; but both Spartiates and helots had to conduct their relationships within a framework laid down by the polis which gave the helots some limited rights. The effect was to create a form of exploitative but nevertheless interdependent labour relations which, I believe, we can fruitfully study from the perspective of the richly documented and intensively studied systems of dependent labour systems found in many other societies. The benefits of the comparative study of different types of unfree or peasant labour systems have been advocated in recent years in the field of modern socio-economic history, especially in Kolchin’s comparison (1987) of American slavery with Russian serfdom. The benefits are twofold, both methodological and empirical. Not only, as Kolchin stresses, does comparison enable one "to weigh the impact of different variables and hence to distinguish the specific or incidental
from the general or inherent" (1987, ix); but also, as Hoch (1986, 1) has noted, despite the differences between the forms of exploitation of free peasants, serfs and slaves, "the key problem of establishing and maintaining authority determines much peasant behavior and accounts for the similarities of behaviour and attitude in many peasant societies". This is not to deny the primary phenomenon of helot servitude described above, but simply to recognize that complete analysis of the complex nature of the helots' position requires the application of a variety of approaches. No single model can claim a monopoly of insights or of truth.

II. Helots, Spartiates and the land

The exact relationship of the helots to the landholdings they worked is an important initial issue, since the degree of the farmers' security of cultivation rights is invariably a major determinant of landlord-peasant interaction. In the region of Tuscany in post-unification Italy, for example, tenants' rights were weak. The landlord's control over his tenants was ensured by terms of contract which specified that the labour capacity and subsistence needs of the tenant's family should match the labour requirements and size of the holding. To achieve this balance landlords were able to disperse members of their tenants' families elsewhere or order the adoption of living-in help, could give or withhold permission for marriage, could vet the appointment of new heads of households and could ensure that
tenant families never amassed sufficient saleable surplus to achieve independence (Gill 1983, 147).

How secure was the position of the helots? A passage from Strabo (8.5.4) concerning the Lakedaimonians' treatment of the helots ("κατοικίας τινάς αύτοίς ἀποδείξαντες καὶ λειτουργίας ιδίας") might be thought to provide a definitive answer to this question. MacDowell (1986, 24) translates the passage as follows: "fixing for them certain places of residence and particular duties", an arrangement which would appear to provide the helots with a security of continuity in cultivating particular plots not possessed by Tuscan tenants. There are, however, two difficulties here. The first is one of translation. Does κατοικίας τινάς mean "certain places of residence" or, as Ducat (1990, 63) would have it, "des sortes d’habitations particulières", i.e. specific kinds of dwellings? Secondly, this clause of Strabo’s text is not part of his quotation from Ephorus, but his own addition. It is a subordinate clause following immediately upon his statement that the Lakedaimonians possessed the helots as "douloi in a way of the community". Hence, on Ducat’s interpretation it would stand convicted of being late evidence, related to Hellenistic theories of state-controlled equal kléroi, which has nothing to do with conditions in the Classical period.

Earlier in the same passage Strabo reports Ephorus’ statement (FGrH 70F117) that "it was not permitted for the [Spartiate] holder either to liberate them or to sell them
outside the boundaries”. MacDowell (1986, 35) has suggested that the phrase "outside the boundaries" (ἐξω τῶν ὄρων) might be a reference not, as normally interpreted, to the borders of Lakonia and Messenia, but to the boundaries of a particular landholding, signifying that "the Spartiate could not sell a helot and thus remove him from his land". He thus extends the view of several scholars (e.g. Jeanmaire 1939, 478) who, although following the normal interpretation of the phrase, have argued that owing to its juxtaposition with the prohibition of private manumission the ban on sale should be viewed as applying inside as well as outside Spartan territory. Ducat (1990, 22 n.13) argues, however, that MacDowell’s interpretation of the phrase seems unlikely, since in the comparable case of the Mariandynoi of Herakleia Pontika (whose status is frequently compared to that of the helots) the distinction made was precisely between sale inside and outside the territory. He claims (ibid., 21f.) that, as in the case of the Mariandynoi, helots could be sold within Spartan territory. Nevertheless, he envisages that such private sales took place when land under helot cultivation was transferred from one citizen to another. Consequently, even on Ducat’s view it seems probable that a helot farmer (and his family) was in practice attached to a given landholding where he would remain regardless of changes of Spartiate owner.

Such an arrangement would fit well with what little we know of the origin and general nature of helotage. The case of Messenia is the clearer. Before its conquest most Messenians will have been farming specific landholdings as
owner-cultivators, dependent peasants, landless labourers and so on. After its conquest they were presumably kept working roughly the same fields in a servile capacity. Concerning the origins of Lakonian helotage there is more dispute (cf. Ducat 1978, 5ff.; 1990, 65ff.), but all theories accept that most of those thus enslaved were working farmers, who in their new state of servitude simply continued to farm for the Spartiates' benefit. The nature of the helots' position as a self-reproducing group with their own families (cf. Thuc. 1.103) and "in general, all the normal human institutions except their freedom" also suggests a population with a stable existence and subsistence derived from secure cultivation of particular landholdings rather than one subject to continual movements from estate to estate as the property holdings of their individual masters' lineages altered through the generations. The latter arrangement would have produced an extraordinary level of disruption under a Spartiate inheritance system which operated on the basis of 'diverging devolution', a system of partible inheritance in which women were also landowners (Arist. Pol. 1270a23-4). When not only men inherit land but women also, and those women receive at least a portion of their inheritance on marriage, land changes hands both down the generations and between the sexes at almost every adult death and at every marriage (Goody 1976a, 10). The ownership of specific holdings is drastically reorganized every generation and continually reallocated from one patriline to another. Self-perpetuating helot families could hardly have maintained themselves over several centuries, let alone some accumulate wealth to the value of five minas (500 drachmas), as the 6,000
Lakonian helots who purchased their freedom in 223 had been able to do (Plut. *Kleom.* 23), had the location of the lands they cultivated been continually subject to such arbitrary alterations outside their control. Helot families must, consequently, have normally remained attached to particular plots of land regardless of fragmentation and changes of Spartiate ownership.

There remain, however, important consequences to consider concerning the impact of Spartiate inheritance practices and of demographic realities applying to both Spartiates and helots alike. The image, all too seductively conjured up by Plutarch (*Lyk.* 8.4; 24.2; *Mor.* 239D-E), of an enduring relationship between an unchanging group of helot farmers and a single Spartiate owner is deceptive. The reality is more likely to have been a complex web of relationships in which changing helot personnel owed their obligations to a number of different Spartiates. To appreciate this situation a brief discussion of the impact of inheritance customs and demographic factors is necessary.

On the Spartiates' side, given the low probability of the owner having only a single male heir, division of plots between a number of male and/or female heirs will have been a frequent possibility. This is a complex issue (Bentley 1987, esp. 35ff. & 40). In some societies, such as modern Greece, systems of partible inheritance have been responsible for the widespread fragmentation of individual fields, especially when strict equity between siblings or considerations of risk management, crop
scheduling or use of multiple ecozones have been overriding considerations (Herzfeld 1980, esp. 93 & 96f.). This is not, however, a universal phenomenon. In other societies this outcome has been avoided, at least below a certain 'minimum threshold size', often because absolute sameness of inheritance and claims for tiny shares of small fields have not been insisted upon. This happens more frequently in areas of lesser environmental diversity and it is relevant that the Spartiates generally avoided landownership in the more mountainous regions.

Some studies have suggested that overpopulation may be a more potent factor in leading to fragmentation than partible inheritance and a mathematical model has been employed to demonstrate that without population growth land becomes no more fragmented over time (McCloskey 1975). This has obvious implications for Spartiate landownership patterns. There is some evidence to suggest that up until the later sixth century Spartiate citizen numbers were at least buoyant and possibly increasing, although from the fifth century onwards they rapidly declined (Ch. 4 below & Hodkinson 1989, 100ff.). Even here, however, complications arise, since the model assumes that a family owns sufficient discrete fields to distribute without requiring internal fragmentation; when the number of fields is fewer, equitable division without splitting becomes more difficult. The decline in Spartiate citizen numbers was largely the result of the demotion of many persons to the status of 'Inferior' owing to their impoverishment, a process in which the extent of real demographic decline is uncertain. There still
existed many poor citizens and Inferiors whose number of discrete plots of land will probably have been limited.

It is true, as Lane Fox (1985) has pointed out, that for families with little land, for whom division of the inheritance would have meant the splitting of individual fields, there existed various means of delaying or modifying its application. One of these was temporary or permanent fraternal cohabitation and there is evidence for the practice in Sparta of adelphic polyandry (Plb. 12.6b.8). This tactic itself, however, substituted a corporate for a single landlord and did not prevent some portion of the land going to any sisters. It was perhaps for this reason that close-kin marriage and the combination of wife-sharing with uterine half-sibling marriage were probably also practised in Classical Sparta (Cartledge 1981, esp 99 & 103; Lane Fox 1985, 222f.; Hodkinson 1986, 392f. & 400ff.; 1989, 90ff. = Chs. 2 & 4). In the latter arrangement two brothers could produce children by the same woman who could then intermarry to reunite their paternal grandparents' original properties. But even this manoeuvre, though it concentrated overall property holdings, did not eliminate boundary alterations and changes of ownership between the sexes even as regards the paternal grandparents' holdings, still less with the property belonging to the shared wife.

In fact, in addition to the phenomenon of estate fragmentation, ownership of part of or all the estate will have changed between the sexes in the overwhelming majority of cases.
each generation.⁶ This too may have meant frequent changes in the nature of Spartiate-helot relations, owing to the probability that a female owner had to conduct transactions through the proxy of a male kyrios or guardian (Cartledge 1981, 109f.), frequently her husband, who would often be a non-kinsman. Often ownership will also have been transferred to another lineage, owing to the high proportion of families without surviving heirs as in most pre-industrial societies.⁷

In sum, helot farmers may have experienced considerable and continuous changes in the identity, and possibly number, of Spartiate masters or mistresses for whom they worked, even during the period of marked property concentration from the fifth century onwards. There is also likely to have been considerable variation in the ratio of Spartiate to helots on different landholdings. On larger holdings, particularly as property concentration advanced, there will have been several helot families. This is exemplified in Xenophon’s account of the conspiracy of Kinadon in the early 390s when the latter pointed out to the informer that each master on the estates near to Sparta itself was outnumbered by his helots (Hell. 3.3.5).⁸ On the other hand, the phenomenon of plot fragmentation and the increasing number of landowners who, as either poor Spartiates or Inferiors,⁹ owned comparatively little land may have meant both that many helots were farming for more than one landlord and that some helots even cultivated more land than their masters owned.¹⁰
As this last remark suggests, the changes just discussed will not have been all on one side, for helot families will themselves have experienced widely differing demographic histories. The number of male cultivators on a given plot of land will have been constantly fluctuating. Furthermore, in each generation a large proportion of families (over 40%) will have produced no son to continue the cultivation. We have no evidence about such basic matters as who took over the cultivation of specific plots of land on the death of a helot household, whether there were surviving children or not. There must, however, have been some arrangements for the devolution of non-landed property which helots are attested as owning (Hdt. 9.80; Thuc. 4.26; Plut. Kleom. 23). My inclination is to believe that a system akin to the practice of partible inheritance found throughout ancient Greece probably operated regarding the devolution of ‘cultivation rights’, with kinsmen having the normal residual claim in the case of sonless or heirless families. On this view differential reproduction and mortality will necessarily have led to the development of considerable inequalities among the helots in their access to land. On the other hand, assuming that helot women did not have ‘rights of inheritance’ comparable to those of their Spartiate mistresses (as discussed in Ch.2, Section III), transfers of possession will have taken place less frequently and division will have been less severe. Consequently, helot lineages will generally have had a more continuous association with the plots to which they were tied than will their masters. The dual relationship of the helots to
the land they cultivated and to the Spartiate(s) who owned it was clearly far from straightforward.

III. Economic exploitation: fixed rent or sharecropping?

I turn now to examine the nature of the economic support which the helots provided for the Spartiates. The ancient sources disagree about whether the Spartiates extracted a proportional or a fixed share of the crops.

Plutarch refers to the extraction of a fixed share. In his *Moralia* (239D-E) he states that,

"the helots worked the land for them, paying over an amount of the proceeds (apophora) which was settled from the start. A curse was laid on anyone who charged more, in order that they might serve gladly because they were making a profit and [the Spartiates] themselves might not try to get more".

The term *apophora* is often used of fixed sum payments. Plutarch repeats it twice in his life of Lykourgos: at 24.3, in a general reference to the helots' tribute, and at 8.4, in connection with the 70 and 12 *medimnoi* of barley and proportionate quantity of tree crops supposedly produced annually for a Spartiate and his wife, respectively, by each of the 9,000 equal plots (*klēroi*) distributed by Lykourgos (and Polydoros). Plutarch clearly intended to identify these amounts of produce with the fixed rent in kind due from the helots to each Spartiate
family (Busolt & Swoboda 1926, 641 & n.4; Kiechle 1959, 61; Buckler 1977, 253; MacDowell 1986, 33).

There is, however, reason to doubt the reliability of this evidence. The authenticity of the fixed rents in kind cannot be separated from that of the Lykourgan/Polydoran *klêroi* from which Plutarch says they were produced. But, as I have argued above (Ch. 2 = Hodkinson 1986, 382), these equal *klêroi* bear no relation to the reality of the Archaic or Classical periods, but are rather the product of later, probably third-century, invention. The same conclusion must necessarily follow for the amounts of fixed rent specified by Plutarch and almost certainly for the idea of a fixed rent itself. As Ducat (1990, 57-9) has noted, the notion of an *apophora* and that of helot agricultural labour are mutually contradictory. The "système réel de l'apophora" operated in the sphere of craft activity in the context of more developed forms of chattel slavery in societies with a substantial degree of wage labour. The contrast with the underdeveloped agrarian economy within which helot labour operated cannot be overemphasized. At best such a rent was introduced only during the revolution of the late third century (cf. Lotze 1959, 29; Kessler 1910, 38ff., esp.40; Cartledge 1985, 43).

There is indeed an air of unreality both in Plutarch's accounts and in most modern discussions which rely upon them. First, there is the naive assumption of the helots' willing service which presumes a profit with no hint of any danger of
crop failure, which, as we shall see below, was considerable. Ducat (1990, 57ff.) has plausibly identified this as an element of the Hellenistic notion of a 'contract of servitude' which sought to give Lykourgos' institution of helotage a favourable image.

Secondly, even within their own terms of reference, namely the acceptance of a system of state-controlled equal kléroi, Lotze has rightly questioned whether every kléros could realistically have grown the same crops in the same proportions (Lotze 1959). Practical issues like this are left unaddressed. What rules, for example, governed the extraction of produce either from more privately-held non-kleric land (which, in most modern accounts, existed alongside the kléroi) or during the period from the fourth century onwards when, on Plutarch's view (Agis 5.2-3), the kléros system broke down? Most importantly, however, once one abandons the idea of state-controlled equal kléroi as the invention that it is, the problems with the notion of a universally fixed rent multiply. Fixed rents can operate within a system of private landholdings of variable size in which the rent due for each holding is individually fixed by the landlord (and tenant). But a system of variable private holdings in which the state imposes an overall limit for the amount of rent per family - the rent in kind is fixed per Spartiate man and wife in Plutarch's account (Ducat 1978, 41) - raises problematic questions. How was such an amount apportioned between different plots among a Spartiate's holdings? What rent was due when the landowner was not an adult male Spartiate with wife, but a woman
or a minor? Could wealthier landowners receive no more from their larger estates than could ordinary citizens from theirs? And if so, how can one reconcile this with their known additional expenditure, such as their provision of the luxury of wheaten bread to their messes (Xen. Lak. Pol. 5.3) and their participation in the elite sport of chariot racing with its high levels of expenditure?

What then of the evidence for a proportional (or sharecropping) quota? The earliest evidence is a fragment of Tyrtaios from the mid-seventh century (fr.4-5 Prato):

"Like asses oppressed with heavy burdens; bringing to their masters (δεσποσάλωσι) under grim compulsion, half... of what the soil bears as fruit; (ἡμίσυ πάνθ' ὄσσων καρπῶν ἀρουρα ψέρει)".

This passage is quoted by the second-century A.D. travel writer Pausanias (4.14.4) in his account of the conditions the Spartans imposed upon the Messenians after their initial conquest in the later eighth century; scholars have generally accepted that this was indeed what Tyrtaios was referring to. Pausanias and Aelian (VH 6.1) interpreted Tyrtaios to be saying that the Messenians had to render half the produce to their Spartan masters; and this sense is also adopted by most historians.

There is one difficulty with this interpretation of the passage. Our manuscripts appear to be defective at the critical phrase ἡμίσυ πάνθ' ὄσσων and the word πάνθ' has been judged ungrammatical (cf. MacDowell 1986, 33). Textual critics have suggested various emendations which preserve Pausanias'
interpretation of the passage's meaning such as ημίσυ παντός and, perhaps most frequently, ημίσυ πᾶν, "an entire half".17 The emendation, however, which remains closest to the manuscript readings is ημίσυ πᾶν θ', which gives a slightly different sense, "half and all" or "half and the whole" (Allen 1936, 202; Rocha-Pereira 1973, ad loc.). MacDowell (1986, 33), interpreting this to mean that "some helots handed over half and some the whole of their produce", suggests that it is poetic rhetoric which makes it "doubtful whether the passage can be used as evidence that a half was a legal figure". He argues that Tyrtaios is saying that a fixed rent in practice often amounted to a half.

Although these arguments introduce an element of uncertainty, they are far from conclusive. First, Allen, who seems to have been the first to suggest this emendation, admitted that it was, to his knowledge, a singular usage. Secondly, the ancient interpretation given by Pausanias and Aelian ought to be given some weight. As Habicht (1985, esp. ch.6) has recently demonstrated, Pausanias was a most careful and sensible researcher whose accurate verbatim first-hand copying and reliable interpretation of hundreds of inscriptions, often written in old and unfamiliar alphabets and dialects, is abundantly substantiated. The fact that he felt sufficiently secure to offer an interpretation of the passage suggests that its sense was not ambiguous. Even if one prefers Allen's reading and MacDowell's translation, however, the passage is still capable of bearing an interpretation in favour of a proportional share. Sharecropping arrangements frequently contain different
provisions for different crops (e.g. Warriner 1962, 27; Reid 1973, 118 & 128f.; Delano Smith 1979, 79; Valensi 1985, 109) and the passage could reflect a situation in which staple cereal crops were shared equally, but others went mainly or entirely to the Spartiate owner; or it could reflect flexibility in the exact proportion extracted by different landlords, an issue to which I shall return shortly.

What relationship does this information concerning the terms of servitude imposed upon late-eighth-century Messenia bear to the situation in both Messenia and Lakonia throughout our period? There are two basic issues: first, whether within Messenia itself the initial terms of servitude were significantly altered in later centuries; secondly, whether the same terms of servitude applied in both regions. Kiechle (1959, 57ff.) has suggested that only after the major revolt known as the Second Messenian War sometime in the seventh century were the Messenians subjected as defeated rebels to full helotization and that a fixed levy was then imposed in place of the sharecropping arrangement mentioned by Tyrtaios (cf. Lotze 1959, 28f.; 1971, 72; Cartledge 1979, 170). His view, however, depends upon Pausanias' portrayal of the Messenian position between the two Messenian wars as that of a vassal state which accepted an oath of loyalty to Sparta rather than a fully servile people (4.14.4). In this aspect - to be distinguished from his direct interpretation of the authentic lines of Tyrtaios - Pausanias' account is heavily influenced by the pseudo-historical Messenian tradition which developed after its liberation in 370/69. The idea that they remained
semi-independent after the original conquest is one means by which the Messenians created an 'early history' for themselves; as historical reality it is highly suspect (Oliva 1971, 110ff.; Pearson 1962).

Ducat (1990, 60f. & 141ff.) has recently, however, argued for an extended version of this idea, namely, that Tyrtaios' sharecropping arrangements tell us nothing about the form of Classical Sparta's economic exploitation of the helots because the Messenians were not helotized until after the war of the 460s. He maintains, first of all, that the distortions evident in Pausanias' interpretation of the lines of Tyrtaios were not false to the latter's portrayal of the Messenians' position. In an argument whose course is not always clear, Ducat claims that both Pausanias and Tyrtaios have in their different ways added the colouring of a servile vocabulary (the noun desposynoi in the latter's case) to their account of the payment of agricultural tribute which (for an unexplained reason) "n'est pas un critère de servitude au sens propre" (ibid. 60f.). The status of the Messenians described by Tyrtaios is consequently not one of helotage, for the existence of which there is no contemporary proof; there is accordingly no source which presents helotage in terms of a sharecropping arrangement.

His second argument is that the evidence both of Herodotus (who, he claims, consistently treats the Messenians as an entity which he never confuses with the term 'helots') and of late-sixth-/early-fifth-century Messenian dedications provide an image
of an ethnic group still at least partly free and fighting for its survival. Only after the defeats of the 460s did the Spartans apply a "solution véritablement définitive" to the Messenian problem, a "nouvelle politique" by which they were dealt the same combination of repression and degradation as the helots of Lakonia to whom they now became more nearly assimilated.

Ducat's theory, however, suffers from several flaws. The idea that Tyrtaios' use of the noun *desposynoi* is artificial servile colouring rather than an integral part of his account is both subjective and forced. The implication that the Archaic poet added extraneous elements to his account in a manner comparable to Pausanias, a distant observer encumbered by centuries of accumulated baggage of the 'mirage Messénien', is singularly implausible. As noted already, no reason is given why the sharecropping system which Tyrtaios describes should be dismissed as a criterion of servitude or of helotage. Indeed, Ducat's implied concept of what constitutes helotage remains not only undefined but also impervious to historical circumstance. His employment of the correct observation that the term 'helot(s)' makes no appearance in Tyrtaios' work to suggest the non-existence of helotage implies a simplistic notion of the relationship between the emergence of an institution and of the concepts and terminology through which to express it.

Ducat's vision of the exact position of "une ethnie encore au moins partiellement libre" (1990, 143) before the 460s is also
vague. Does he mean that only the richest parts of Messenia had been properly subjugated, an idea with which he toys at one point (143 n. 43)? In that case how was the status of the inhabitants of those regions different from that of the Lakonian helots? Or does he mean that all the Messenians were under Spartan control but "seulement partiellement hilotisés" (144)? - a view in contradiction with his openness elsewhere (100f.) to the hypothesis "qui voit dans l’hilotisation des Messéniens... le modèle de celle des Laconiens".

These uncertainties need not, however, trouble us overmuch, since Ducat’s use of the evidence of Herodotus has been effectively criticized by Whitby (forthcoming), who points out, first, that there is no reason to suppose that all the historian’s references to ‘helots’ denote only Lakonians and, secondly, that his use of the term ‘Messenian(s)’ is, with one mythical exception, confined to the context of military conflict with Sparta (Hdt. 3.47; 5.49; 9.35 & 64; exception: 6.52). 

Herodotus used the specific term ‘Messenian(s)’ where it was appropriate, otherwise the generic term ‘helot(s)’. He provides no grounds for a belief in Messenian independence. Nor is there any solid evidence for the supposed "nouvelle politique" after the 460s. None of the evidence for Spartiate (mal)practice towards the helots is sufficiently specific for it to be identified as part of a new policy applied to a freshly-subjugated, later-fifth-century Messenian population. None of this is to deny that there were certain distinctive features of communal organization among the Messenian helots, as exemplified
by their capacity to revolt and their offerings at shrines; but these are best explained, as in Section V below, in terms of the differential practical operation of common terms of servitude shared with the Lakonian helots.

In sum, there is no compelling reason to follow Ducat's professed agnosticism ("on ne sait rien sur les formes économiques de la dépendance hilotique": p. 62) or to believe that the sharecropping arrangement attested by Tyrtaios was merely an ephemeral phase in the early history of Messenia. Moreover, as Cartledge (1979, 97) has noted, "there is nothing in the ancient literary sources to suggest that the status of the Lakonian helots differed from that of the Messenians". It is a priori likely that, whatever their diverse origins, the Spartan state would have spared no effort to assimilate the Lakonian and Messenian helots to a single set of conditions, in line with their "vision unitaire" which is evident above all in the officially-correct terminology of Thucydides (Ducat 1990, 13ff.). Sharecropping has been termed "probably the most widespread form of economic organization in the world" (Warriner 1962, 59). Definitive assertion is out of the question, but it seems warranted to adopt as a working hypothesis the proposition that the basic principle of the sharecropping arrangement mentioned by Tyrtaios applied in both Messenia and Lakonia during the Archaic and Classical periods.
IV. The practicalities and suitability of sharecropping

In this section I shall examine some practical aspects of the application of a sharecropping system for Sparta’s exploitation of the helots and also the system’s suitability for that purpose. Some scholars have thought a 50% quota too large to be a regular levy; but it is in fact common practice in many societies, as is suggested by the etymology of the standard French and Italian terms for sharecropping, métayage and mezzadria.\(^{21}\)

Sharecropping quotas are attested historically as varying considerably, with landlords taking anything from about 10% to 80% of the main crop (Delano Smith 1979, 79; Valensi 1985, 107f.), depending on a variety of factors, such as density of population, alternative employment opportunities, quality of land and especially the relative proportions of the factors of production supplied by landlord and tenant. Several of the above conditions favouring higher quotas applied in Spartan-dominated Lakonia and Messenia. Even Figueira’s recent conservative estimate (1984, 102ff.) of the number of helots assumes considerable pressure upon landed resources in the Classical period (though numbers were no doubt lower in earlier centuries) and they possessed no independent access to alternative employment.\(^{22}\) The Spartiates also appropriated the best lands in the two regions, which have been noted for their fertility from antiquity to modern times (Plb. 5.19.7; [Plato], Alkibiades I 122D; Euripides, apud Strabo 8.5.6; Thiersch 1833, I 303f.).
The one area of uncertainty concerns the relative production inputs of Spartiates and helots. The Spartiates provided the land and the helots the labour; but who supplied the seed, draught animals and equipment such as ploughs, pressing beds and milling installations? No direct evidence exists and it may be rash to expect a single answer, owing, first, to the considerable inequalities in access to landed resources among both the Spartiate and helot populations and, secondly, to the significant differences in distance for their Spartiate owners between plots close to Sparta and those in remoter parts of Lakonia and especially Messenia. The question is whether, given likely variations in landlord production inputs, we should envisage the development of some degree of flexibility in the extraction of an exact 50% or other proportional quota. The issue has important implications. To pose them in extreme terms, either the polis, in contrast to norms of landlord-cultivator practice which have operated frequently throughout history, imposed a rigid, artificial general quota for political reasons (in the interests of equality for those citizens less able to contribute production inputs and for the purpose of impersonalizing Spartiate-helot relationships); or it followed the same policy of non-interference as in the case of Spartiate land tenure, leaving individual citizens free to make their own arrangements but also more vulnerable to the consequences of personal failure.

At first sight most of the sources appear to assume the existence of a standard norm imposed by the polis which determined the amount of extractable produce. Plutarch
explicitly asserts that there was a fixed maximum; Pausanias and Aelian write of the precise figure of a half. Myron of Priene too states that the Spartiates "fixed the portion (moira) which they [the helots] should always render to them" (FGrH 106F2, apud Athen. 657D). This seeming unanimity, however, is less impressive than it first appears. We have already seen that, if Plutarch's evidence has any historical authenticity, it belongs to the period of the late-third-century revolution, not earlier; Myron's evidence may also relate to the same period or even later. Pausanias and Aelian are simply interpreting the evidence of Tyrtaios and it is uncertain whether the latter's words will bear the full weight of an argument in favour of a state-imposed standard norm. Not only is there the uncertainty already noted as to whether Tyrtaios is referring to an invariable half, but there is also room for doubt whether in his brief reference in verse composed for the purpose of exhorting his fellow citizens to battle one should expect to find a complete statement of the details of the Messenians' economic exploitation.

Nevertheless, the central point of Tyrtaios' evidence cannot be ignored. He states plainly that the Messenian helots had to surrender half the crops and, if there is any variability about this proportion concealed within the ambiguity of the text, it tends in the direction of a greater Spartiate share. It appears that, however few production inputs Spartiates were able to contribute to their distant Messenian estates, they were guaranteed at least 50% of the produce. Variation above this
minimum, however, may have occurred; and, even if the 50% was supposedly a maximum, whether it was rigorously enforced is another matter. Spartiates who were able to provide more inputs or to exert sufficient pressure upon their helots may have been able to extract more of the produce. Tidy as it would be to believe that a neat 50/50 division of produce was the invariable practice, historical practice as opposed to theory is rarely neat and tidy. We should perhaps more realistically accept the possibility of variations, particularly concerning non-subsistence items, and especially during the period of severe property concentration from the later fifth century onwards when, with the increased significance of wealth as a determinant of status (see Ch.4), both rich and poor citizens probably came under increased pressure to maximize the incomings from their estates. From this perspective it is still further evident that a sharecropping system was inherently more viable and realistic in allowing for such flexibility than the supposed fixed amount described by Plutarch.\textsuperscript{24}

The suitability of sharecropping for Spartiate-helot economic relations can perhaps best be appreciated by comparing it schematically with alternative possible arrangements, utilizing an illustrative table from Scott’s classic study of peasant rebellions and subsistence in southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{25}
Table 3.1. Distribution of Risk in Tenancy Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Landlord assumes risk (A)</th>
<th>Risk shared (B)</th>
<th>Tenant assumes risk (C)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>e.g., Traditional (feudal) systems of tenure</td>
<td>e.g., Equal shares sharecropping</td>
<td>e.g., Fixed rent tenancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivator’s minimal return fixed &amp; guaranteed</td>
<td>Cultivator’s return a fixed proportion of the crop</td>
<td>Cultivator assumes risk - and profit - of enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landowner assumes risk - and profit - of enterprise</td>
<td>Landowner’s return a fixed proportion of the crop</td>
<td>Landowner’s return fixed &amp; guaranteed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table indicates that the two key distinguishing factors concern which party, landlord or tenant, assumes (i) the risks of crop failure, and (ii) the potential profits of crop surpluses. Under a fixed rent (C in Scott’s table) both are assumed by the tenant; under sharecropping (B in the table) both are shared. Sharecropping was consequently the most secure arrangement in the Spartiate-helot relationship, which was characterized by a long-term mutual interdependence. Owing to the high degree of interannual variability of weather conditions, crop yields will have fluctuated considerably from year to year; alternation between surplus and shortage will have been a basic fact of life.

The threat of shortage is often forgotten by those who believe that the Spartiates extracted a fixed rental from the helots. As was noted above, this error is evident in the views of Plutarch, who, following the post-Classical tradition of
ameliorating the image of Lykourgos' measures, naively postulated helot contentment with their opportunity to profit from the surplus. Yet, as Scott (1976, passim, esp. 7 & 46ff.) amply demonstrates, modern peasants typically prefer to avoid fixed rents in favour of sharecropping contracts, even if the former are more profitable in most years, precisely in order to escape the risk that in bad years the fixed rent will leave them with little or nothing to live on. Recent studies have suggested that "the vast majority of communities of the [ancient] Mediterranean were endemically vulnerable to food crisis" (Garnsey 1988, with quotation on p.45; Gallant 1989 & 1991). Besides sharing the risk, sharecropping may also contribute to overall risk reduction by permitting a more flexible response than is possible under fixed rent to the emerging and variable conditions of each agricultural year.26

Of course, Scott's 'moral economy' approach does not in itself explain Sparta's employment of sharecropping for the exploitation of her helot populations. The preferences of helot cultivators would have been of little avail had sharecropping not also suited the 'political economy' of the Spartiates, to borrow the phrase adopted by Popkin (1979) in his argument against the peasant-centred approach of Scott.27 As he notes, "exchanges, while... constrained by the subsistence needs of the weaker party, are based on the relative bargaining power of the parties" (1979, 27). We need not credit the Spartiates with any philanthropic concern for the helots' well-being; but the uninterrupted maintenance of helot farming and production was
crucial to their own position, both collectively and as individuals who to retain citizen rights had to produce fixed quantities of produce to the common messes. Sharecropping would have served this end better than fixed rent.

At the same time sharecropping is not ineffective as a means of producing a surplus. The criticisms traditionally made by neoclassical economists, that it is inefficient and that a tenant who is paid only half the crop has a strong incentive to stint his efforts at a point when the marginal product of his labour and other inputs is still twice as high as the marginal costs, whereas the owner-cultivator will labour on until the costs are as high as the product, have been effectively undermined by recent studies within both the neoclassical and Chayanovian schools of thought. First, marginal productivity under sharecropping can be as high as, if not higher than, under alternative regimes. Secondly, it is now widely regarded as a means of maximizing labour input, total land productivity and surplus, particularly when the holding worked by each tenant is relatively small. The 'whip of hunger' forces such sharecroppers to work as hard and as long as is necessary to ensure family survival. The considerable difference in population between helots and Spartiates will have worked to the latter's advantage here. Quantitative analysis of the exact size of the helot population relative to the amount of available land is problematic; but, as was noted above, considerable pressure upon landed resources seems assured at least from the Classical period onwards. In providing their own subsistence the numerically
superior helots will under an equal sharecropping system necessarily have produced an abundant surplus for their masters. Only the severely increasing disparity in land between rich and poor Spartiates from the late fifth century ruined this system by diverting too much of this surplus into too few hands.

Sharecropping would accordingly have been a most effective means of maintaining the long-term economic relationship between Spartiates and helots. It was also most appropriate given the singular circumstances of the Spartan polis and its citizen body. For a start, in maximizing labour input it will have helped keep the helots occupied with farming at the expense of subversive activities. Furthermore, modern studies have emphasized that it is the location and extent of political power that usually determine whether landlords are able to extract a fixed rent from their tenants in bad years as well as good or must be content to share the deficits of poor harvests for the sake of their tenants' subsistence (e.g. Scott 1976, 65 & 175). Since the Spartan polis held ultimate control over both the lives of its citizens and the citizen body's overall relationship with the helots, it was able to limit the acquisitiveness of its citizens and to preserve helot subsistence. It is therefore readily intelligible that individual Spartiates had to accept a sharecropping arrangement.

From a practical point of view too, sharecropping will also have tied in better with individual Spartiates' responsibility to keep their helots from becoming sturdy. Since they themselves
would gain at least part of the product from every plot of land, they could, by influencing choices about its use, control the foodstuffs available for helot consumption more effectively than if they had no rights beyond a limited rent. Finally, many Spartiates had the problem of extracting rent from distant parts of Lakonia and especially Messenia which were not easy of access. At times of crop failure tenants in other societies, when faced with rents which would take the bulk of the crop, have often simply appropriated whatever was needed for their subsistence (e.g. Scott 1976, 124, 126f., 139 & 146). As the younger Pliny complained of his own distant fixed-rent Italian tenants, "they even seize and consume the produce of the land in the belief that they will gain nothing themselves by conserving it" (Letters 9.37). Sharecropping eased this problem because by leaving the helots with some crops it was more likely to avoid the growth of grievances induced in such circumstances by fixed rents and to increase the likelihood of helot compliance. The interests of the ‘political economy’ of the Spartiates and of the ‘moral economy’ of the helots coincided to make sharecropping the most practicable economic arrangement for their mutual interaction.

V. Lakonians and Messenians: acquiescence and revolt

These last remarks direct our attention to the overall nature of the landowner-cultivator relationship, in which the arrangements for crop-sharing were just one element. Once again wide
variations are attested at different times and places and even within particular societies. The landlord may intervene to a variable extent in the making of decisions about the practice of cultivation and stock rearing. He may accept a greater or lesser share of the production costs, in providing the instruments of cultivation, seed and other necessary equipment. He may also establish varying degrees of personalized links of paternalism or patronage with his tenants, potentially involving such things as subsistence help in times of crisis (e.g. gifts of food, remission of his share of the produce and long- or short-term loans), physical protection, legal and mediation services, subsidies to social or ritual events of farming communities and representation of their interests to higher authorities. Or he may maintain an impersonal relationship without obligation to his cultivators, but also without the prestige deriving from the performance of such obligations.

This last point merits further discussion. Scott (1976, 174ff.) has identified a spectrum of landlord-tenant relationships, ranging from those involving a considerable degree of landlord involvement and support and of reciprocity between landlord and tenant to those in which the landlord provides nothing beyond the land at a high and invariable rent. The different consequences of these contrasting relationships are significant:

"Towards the more reciprocal end of the spectrum, the status of the elite is more willingly granted and the attitude of subordinates more closely approaches genuine deference. Towards the less reciprocal end of the spectrum, by contrast, there is less patronage and
more force; status gives way to power and deference to submission." (Scott 1976, 176).

A graphic illustration is provided in Johnson’s study (1971) of plantation sharecroppers on the Fazenda Boa Ventura in northeastern Brazil. The tenants there expressed a near-unanimous preference for their previous landlord, the ‘General’, a stern, somewhat feared master, who intervened directly, often harshly, in his tenants’ private lives but provided benefits and subsistence help in hard times, rather than the current landlord, who imposed milder conditions, disliked giving orders, refused to interfere in his tenants’ lives and provided little subsistence help. The more exploitative and interventionist landlord was more popular and treated with more deference than his more lenient but disengaged successor.

The above example illustrates the priority placed by peasants on obtaining the assurance of subsistence help at the expense of other considerations. As Gallant (1991, 168) has convincingly shown, despite the multiplicity of risk-buffering mechanisms available to peasant households, their utility is normally circumscribed by limited overall resources. Security has to be sought from members of the elite. To ensure a guarantee of subsistence help peasants have typically been willing to forge enduring bonds of dependence upon wealthier patrons. These insights can shed light not only upon the nature of Spartiate-helot relations in general but also upon an important difference between the Lakonian and Messenian helots.
With whom could helots establish reliable ties of clientism which would ensure subsistence help? The fact that the polis imposed overall rules governing their relationships in itself limited the extent of personal reciprocity or patronage between Spartiates and helots, as did the prevailing Spartiate ethic of solidarity and exclusiveness. Instead, the polis maintained a state of war against the helots and enforced a systematic series of degradations aimed at sustaining an unbridgeable gulf between the two groups (Ducat 1974; 1990, 105ff.). One of the aims was surely to undercut the possibility of the creation of clientelae of helots which might have become a source of status distinctions and, worse still, a catalyst of private strife among the citizen body. The example of Menon of Pharsalos, who could mobilize a military force consisting of 200 or 300 of his private Penestai (Dem. 23.199; [Dem.] 13.23), was one which Sparta had to avoid. By appropriating the exclusive right to manumit helots the polis also eliminated the possibility of patron-freedman ties which were so important elsewhere in the ancient world. Furthermore, as Scott's table on the distribution of risk indicates, the rules concerning sharing of the crops offered no absolute subsistence guarantee, no guaranteed minimal return, to the helots. A minimum of reciprocity and patronage and a preponderance of force, power and submission were the official prescriptions of the polis.

The potential for the development of personal ties between Spartiates and helots may also have been hindered by the very structure of helot society. Historians have noted signs of a
helot elite in the fifth and fourth centuries (Ducat 1978, 36f.; 1990, 159ff.). It may always have been there. It seems unlikely that during their helotization of Lakonia and Messenia the Spartiates took pains to remove existing inequalities among their subjects. More probably, they simply imposed their demands for rent on top of a pre-existing system of land exploitation already full of inequalities (which, even among the Messenians, were not necessarily entirely eliminated by their leaders' flight abroad: Paus. 4.14.1). The different demographic histories of helot lineages will also have led to the continual development of differential access to land. The extent of such economic differentiation cannot be documented, but the possibility was suggested earlier that some helots may even have come to have cultivation rights to more land than was owned by some poorer Spartiates. Poorer helots are likely to have turned to such wealthier helots for assistance when the resources of kinsmen and friends were insufficient, just as modern south-east Asian peasants expected to receive help from richer village neighbours (Scott 1976, 40ff.). One should not even exclude the possibility that the richest helots, those with cultivation rights over more land than was manageable by their available family labour, will themselves have become quasi-landlords, using members of the poorest families as labourers or tenants. Consequently, patronage and deference within the helot body may have been a potent factor.

Despite these obstacles, there probably remained some room for patronal relations between individual Spartiates and helots.
Precisely because the sharecropping arrangements did not offer the helots an absolute subsistence guarantee, there will have been more scope for individual Spartiates to intervene in times of hardship. The existence of patron-client ties among the helots need not have excluded similar relations between helots and Spartiates, since prudent helot farmers may have deemed it wise to cultivate both. Spartiates had the potential to be more effective suppliers of subsistence help than wealthy helots. When crop failure struck not just locally but across a region, thus limiting the capacity even of richer helot neighbours, many Spartiates could have drawn upon the resources of their lands in other parts of Lakonia or Messenia. Leading Spartiates could even have tapped external sources through their foreign ties of xenia. There were also several non-economic avenues for Spartiates to exercise patronage: for example through their selection of particular helots as household servants or army batmen and in the choice of helot women as sexual mates whose sons (nothoi) would be integrated into central polis institutions such as the state upbringing and the army (cf. Xen. Hell. 5.3.9).

Certain important limitations to such relations of patronage should, however, be borne in mind. Gallant has emphasized (1991, 143ff., esp. 160f.) that even when patron-client ties do exist, one of their defining and limiting aspects is that they are in themselves merely particularistic and face-to-face. For clientism to operate as a reliable guarantee of subsistence help, the bond has to be added to and perpetuated in such a way as permanently to bridge the social gulf between patron and client.
This bridging was achievable for citizens in ancient Greek poleis owing to their common participation in a variety of 'associations', such as demes, genê, phratries, orgeônes and thiasoi, and through the prevailing ideology of social equality and reciprocity among citizens, regardless of economic differentiation. Between Spartiates and helots, however, there could be none of these things; and this state of 'disassociation' will have been reinforced by the continual personnel changes of Spartiate landowners and helot farmers discussed in Section II. Any reciprocal relationships between Spartiates and helots will therefore necessarily have remained short-term and tenuous, dependent entirely upon ongoing face-to-face contact.

The fact that Spartiate-helot clientism was unable to transcend the character of a particularistic and face-to-face relationship meant that it could only be an effective, ongoing instrument when there was regular personal contact between the two parties. Hence the distance to his estates is likely to have exercised an important influence upon the extent of a Spartiate's paternalistic relations with his helots. In areas close to Sparta citizens will have been able to intervene more actively in the lives of their helots. In his account of the conspiracy of Kinadon in the early 390s, Xenophon (Hell. 3.3.5) depicts Kinadon as taking the informer from the agora into the streets of Sparta and then out to the Spartiates' estates where the individual citizen masters were to be found outnumbered by their helots whose work they will no doubt have been supervising. The
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account suggests that these estates lay somewhere in Lakonia not too far from Sparta. One doubts whether such active supervision would have been frequent further afield, especially in Messenia. This was owing not only to the factor of distance, including the time-consuming crossing or circumvention of the Taygetos range, but also to the probability that an individual Spartiate in Messenia would have been isolated and vulnerable away from the support (psychological as well as physical) of his fellow citizens in what was effectively a world of helots - even more isolated than Russian noble pomeshchiki evidently felt in the peasants' world of their provincial estates (Kolchin 1987, passim, esp. 51ff. & 98ff.).

The problem of how absentee Spartiates effectively supervised their Messenian estates leads one to ask whether, like Russian pomeshchiki who employed stewards drawn from among the serfs themselves (Kolchin 1987, 62), they relied upon local helot agents. Several scholars (e.g. Cartledge 1987, 174; Talbert 1989, 30; and, with qualifications, Ducat 1990, 63) have recently argued that this was the case. The choice of crops, organization of labour, timing of sowings, management of animals and, above all, the collection and delivery of the harvest are just a few examples of important operations for which a Spartiate landlord, encumbered by citizen duties in Sparta or on campaign, may well have required an agent to ensure their satisfactory performance. There were admittedly other subordinate groups, such as Messenian perioikoi, who might in theory have been utilized for this purpose; but it is hard to see how even individual perioikoi,
whose communities were (to the best of our knowledge) located around the peripheries of, rather than intermingled with, Spartiate-owned territories could have occupied a niche sufficiently close to provide effective supervision.

The Spartiates' selection of helot agents may well have been implicated in the existence of the helot elite referred to above, whether it was a question of promoting a new elite or (perhaps more frequently) of reinforcing existing social differentiation through the selection of helots already wealthy. A gloss of Hesychios, "μονομοιὸτέν Εἰλότων ἄρχοντες" (μ 1626, ed. Latte, II, p.676), which has been plausibly emended to read "μνησιόμοιοι τῶν Εἰλότων ἄρχοντες", may be relevant here. Despite Wilamowitz's view (1924, 273), followed by Talbert (1989, 30 n.51), that this passage relates solely to Crete since the term mnōia is otherwise found only there, the mention of helots must indicate that the point of reference is Sparta, as both Gschnitzer (1964-76, II. 81 & n.117) and Ducat (1990, 63) have pointed out. Who were these mnōionomoi, the "leaders of the helots"? Drawing upon the evidence of the poem of Hybrias (apud Athenaios 695F-696A), Ducat argues (1990, 63 & 74) that the mnōia was a group of slaves living and working on an estate; the mnōionomos was either their manager or customary chief, the kind of figure through whom a Spartiate owner would be likely to work. Hesychios' gloss makes no distinction between Lakonian and Messenian helots and it may be that this social structure existed in both regions. On my argument above, however, the system will have had more significance in Messenia, where mnōionomoi will have had more
independence and the communal structures which they headed a more important role in organizing the everyday lives and guaranteeing the subsistence needs of their members. Indeed, in so far as Spartiates themselves attempted to provide crisis subsistence help for their helots in those regions which were too remote for them to be active direct patrons, they may have operated through, and thereby reinforced, such local structures.

This suggestion of variations in degrees of supervision and personal interaction does tie in with observable differences between the relationships of Lakonian and Messenian helots to their Spartiate masters. It is important neither to exaggerate the extent of the Lakonian helots' acquiescence, nor to underestimate the Spartan authorities' capacity to enforce it by terror, nor yet to forget their skill in concealing sensitive information about events in both regions. But, despite Talbert's claim to the contrary (1989, 31f. & 36f.), it is nevertheless clear that the helots of Messenia generally caused the Spartans far more trouble than did the Lakonians (Roobaert 1977; Ducat 1978, 28ff.; 1990, 129ff.; Cartledge 1979, 40ff.). For example, although Lakonian helots close to Sparta may have initiated their own part of the revolt of the late 460s, it was the Messenian contribution which was the longer-lasting and more effective (cf. Thuc. 1.101.2; Diod. 11.63-4; Ducat 1990, 131ff., who notes that the version in Plut. Kimon 17, which gives the sole initiative to the Lakonian helots, is tainted with Hellenistic elements). Moreover, whenever we know the place of origin of those helots who, especially in the late fifth and
early fourth centuries, undertook military service for Sparta in return for their personal freedom, it is Lakonia not Messenia. In spite of Talbert’s argument (1989, 31) that willingness to undertake such service was widespread, there is no firm evidence of Messenian involvement.  

These contrasting reactions came into sharpest relief when during the Theban invasion of 370/69 more than 6,000 Lakonian helots volunteered to defend Sparta, while the Messenians accepted the opportunity for their liberation (Xen. Hell. 6.5.28-9; Diod. 15.66; Paus. 9.14.5). The extent to which some of the Lakonian helots had internalized Spartiate values was demonstrated when those captured by the Thebans declined to sing the poems of Terpander, Alkman and Spendon on the grounds that their masters had forbidden it (Plut. Lyk. 28.8-10). This is not to suggest that the Messenian helots were daily on the brink of revolt. Talbert may be right to draw attention to the relative ignorance and limited horizons of most helots in a countryside closed off from the outside world. But this makes it all the more remarkable that when destabilizing situations arose the Messenians are sometimes known to have exploited those opportunities with a degree of organization not evident among those Lakonians close to Sparta. This phenomenon demands explanation.

Cartledge (1985, 46) has recently identified the Messenians’ "ethnic and political solidarity which provided... [them] with the appropriate ideological inspiration and organizational
cohesion" as the key factors which distinguished them from the Lakonian helots, as well as from other servile groups in Greek antiquity who never appear to have revolted outright. His study, which examines helot revolts in the comparative context of slave revolts (or their absence) in the Americas and Classical Greece, draws in particular upon the work of Genovese (1979, 11f.), who has suggested a list of eight factors conducive to revolts. Of these the most decisive factor, in Cartledge's judgment, is the development of the master-slave relationship "in the context of absenteeism and depersonalization as well as greater cultural estrangement" (1979, 39). Here Cartledge's conclusions concerning the master-slave aspects of Spartiate-helot relations converge with my examination of them as landowners and cultivators. The fact that the extent of absenteeism, depersonalization and cultural estrangement are precisely the variables which differentiated the relationships of Spartiate landowners with their Lakonian and Messenian cultivators enables us to augment Cartledge's explanation of the Messenians' capacity to revolt.

If more direct and frequent Spartiate intervention in the productive process on their Lakonian estates was often accompanied by a more personalized, paternalistic relationship with the helot cultivators (even if by proxy of an adult Spartiate guardian in the case of female and child owners), then it is likely to have been a powerful agent in sustaining deference to the Spartiate elite. Moreover, some studies (e.g. Herring 1984, 136f. & 144) suggest that landlord provision of
critical production inputs, such as seed, may be decisive in increasing yields and thereby the cultivators' well-being. These factors would be especially strong if, as seems probable, the central Spartan plain was dominated by the ancestral estates of the wealthiest and most well-born Spartiates, those landlords best able to provide effective patronage and subsistence help. Paternalistic relationships involving Spartiate subsistence help would also reduce the significance of helot self-help and hinder the emergence of an autonomous leadership, another factor of importance in both slave and peasant revolts. Would-be leaders of Lakonian helot revolts came normally not from among the helots themselves but from the ranks of the master (or ex-master) class, from men such as the Regent Pausanias and the 'Inferior' Kinadon (Thuc. 1.132; Xen. Hell. 3.3.4-11). 38

Conversely, in Messenia landlord absenteeism and indirect management will have constrained their capacity to provide production inputs, maintained the depersonalization of Spartiate-helot relationships and intensified their cultural estrangement. If in times of subsistence crisis Messenian helots were thrown upon their own resources, and local self-help and intra-community patronage were their main source of protection, 39 local community organization is likely to have been highly developed. It is of course concerning this aspect of helot life that the ancient sources fail us most completely, so that it is difficult to construct a plausible image of the internal structures of Messenian society; but the evidence for the mnōionomoi suggests the existence of permanent associations
linking different social strata such as could not exist between helot and Spartiate.

Another suggestive sphere is that of religion (Roebuck 1941, 34ff.). Despite their servitude, the Messenian helots seem to have maintained their sanctuaries, such as those of Zeus at Ithome, the Andanian mysteries in the Stenyklaros plain, Apollo Korythos in the Akritas peninsula - and possibly the river god Pamisos in the southern Messenian plain. These were all major sanctuaries, and no doubt fuller information would provide evidence for numerous, more localized, shrines. Surface survey of the 'Five Rivers' area in the immediate environs of Nichoria has indeed yielded one probable and two possible examples of such small Archaic and Classical shrines. The sanctuaries of Zeus at Ithome and Apollo Korythos, however, are particularly interesting cases in that the use of the former as the Messenians' place of refuge in the 460s revolt and of the latter as a location for the dedication commemorating their victory over the Athenians (Jeffery 1990, 206 no. 3; Bauslaugh 1990), probably in the same revolt, marks them both out as places of pan-Messenian focus.

It is relevant to consider also the evidence for tomb cult, "rituals aimed at linking contemporary society with the powerful beings perceived to be associated with ancient tombs" (Alcock 1991, 448 n.3) - beset though it is with difficulties of identification and dating resulting from the less than ideal quality of data from early investigations. Although the most
striking example of tomb cult in eighth-century Messenia, that at Volimidia (Coulson 1988) seems not to have continued into the following century, other cases can - albeit sometimes tentatively - be identified in the early years of Spartan domination: through Proto-Corinthian pottery at Vasiliko at the Eastern end of the Soulima valley near the N.W. corner of the Stenyklaros plain, the initial region of Spartan conquest; and through Corinthian pottery at Ano Kopanaki: Akourthi only about 12 km. W.N.W. up the valley (refs. in Coldstream 1976, 11 n. 26; Alcock 1991, nos. 30 & 23).

Three other Archaic sites of tomb cult mooted in the modern literature all lie within about 5-8 km. of one another in inland West-Central Messenia: (i) Papoulia, which "yielded black-glazed pottery, probably going back to the late seventh century" (Coldstream 1976, 10 n.24; Alcock 1991, no.28); (ii) Soulinari: Tourliditsa whose "offerings include wine amphorae from Archaic times onwards" (Coldstream, ibid.; Alcock 1991, no.5); (iii) Koukounara: Gouvalari 1 which, according to Coulson and Wilkie, "contained pottery from the 7th century B.C. onward, accompanied by animal sacrifices, particularly deer" (1983, 333; Alcock 1991, no.26). It should be noted, however, that recent reassessments of the Koukounara cult have suggested alternative explanations for some of the finds (Korres 1981/82, 381ff.; cf. Alcock 1991, 465 with refs.). Morris (1988, 756 & 759, Table 1) classifies it as an eighth-century cult which soon died out.
The vagueness concerning terminal dates in the above information makes for considerable uncertainty about the extent of tomb cult in the Classical period of Spartan rule. Three out of five examples of Classical cult proposed by Coulson and Wilkie (1983, 333) seem rather dubious: (i) the case of Koukounara discussed above; (ii) that of Voïdokoilia/Boupras where there are no associated dateable finds (Coldstream 1976, 11); and (iii) that of Dafni where the finds appear to be late Classical (i.e. presumably post-370) in date (Alcock 1991, no.24, with refs.). This leaves just two cases, both in the 'Five Rivers' area: the Vathirema chamber tomb (Lukermann & Moody 1978, Appendix, Feature 1; Alcock 1991, no.6), which produced a sizeable group of black-glazed Classical pottery; and the tholos tomb at Nichoria whose cult usage is dated from the last quarter of the fifth century to the end of the first quarter of the fourth (Coulson & Wilkie 1983, 334ff.; Alcock 1991, no.3).

Even on a maximal interpretation this evidence for tomb cult in the period of Spartan domination is dwarfed by the upsurge of the phenomenon in the post-liberation era (Alcock 1991). The evidence is, nevertheless, perhaps minimally sufficient to lend some credence to Coulson and Wilkie's suggestion (1983, 333) that Messenian tomb cult served as "a way of perpetuating local traditions in the face of Spartan occupation". Their interpretation assumes, perhaps rather too easily, that the cults were indeed maintained by helots rather than by other social groups. It seems that the early cults in the Soulima valley should be explained differently (perhaps in terms of resistance...
to Spartan expansion), since there is reason to doubt that its inhabitants were ever helotized (Ernst Meyer 1978, 192f.). The assumption of helot agency seems inherently more probable, however, in the other cases itemized above. In neither the West-Central nor the ‘Five Rivers’ region is there any evidence of perioikic settlement. The spasmodic occurrence of the cult seems to rule out the hypothesis of activity by the Spartan state. Moreover, although the agency of individual Spartiate landowners cannot entirely be eliminated, the doubt whether Spartiate citizens would have so intimate an involvement in these distant areas, combined with the absence of attested tomb cult from any region of Archaic and Classical Lakonia, makes it more likely that we are dealing with another distinctive feature of the Messenian helot community. The change of regions from which the evidence comes in the different periods suggests precisely the kind of localized, fluctuating expression of identity which one might expect in their circumstances of subjugation.

The Classical tomb cult at Nichoria, for which we possess by far the best documented evidence thanks to careful excavation and close study by the Minnesota expedition (Coulson & Wilkie 1983, 332ff.), contains some suggestive features. First, there are the intimations that the horizons of the cult participants or controllers were more than purely Messenian. Of the 23 recorded items of fine ware (which forms some 52% of the total recorded assemblage) at least 13, or 56%, have been identified as either foreign imports or local imitations of foreign work, with especial links to Olympia and Attica. Secondly, finds of
pithoi and amphorae indicate the storage of surplus foodstuffs and liquids for use in the cult offerings. These features might be interpreted along a line of thought recently suggested by Morris (1988, 756ff.), that while tomb cults cemented the community as a whole, they also proclaimed the superiority of leading families who traced their pedigrees back to the heroic age. In the Messenian case cults such as that at Nichoria are likely to have been administered by leading helots (such as the mnōionomoi), men with supra-local horizons and the capacity to extract the required surplus produce from their own or others' holdings.

Cult organizations based on the sanctuaries of divinities or the tombs of 'ancestors' could, therefore, have provided an important vehicle for communal institutions and action. Moreover, Gallant (1991, 175ff.) has outlined the role that ancient Greek religious cults often played as food redistribution mechanisms, based either on the resources of the cult itself or on donations by wealthy individuals. To be effective in alleviating crises which affected all social strata in a particular locality such cults would need as wide a catchment as possible, as is suggested by the evidence for the sanctuaries of Zeus Ithomatas and Apollo Korythos and (in a different way) for the tomb cult at Nichoria. The factor of religious unity may help to explain the maintenance of Messenian solidarity over the three and a half centuries between its late-eighth-century conquest and its liberation in 370/69.
Scott has noted that such grass-roots initiatives may "form the potential nodes of class leadership and organization" (1976, 207) and that in circumstances in which there is a general absence of landlord assistance "the collective legitimacy of landlords as a class may be called into question" (1976, 51). This point is reinforced by the case of the Russian serfs (Kolchin 1987) whose servitude shared many parallel points with that of the Messenian helots (in contrast with the position of slaves in the American South). Like the Messenians, Russian serfs were numerically preponderant, experienced only infrequent interference from their impersonal noble masters and had their own local autonomous culture. They also provided their own subsistence and played a considerable role in the administration of their own villages by means of peasant communes led by elected representatives. The commune's scope included maintaining a reserve of money and grain to help the needy in times of crisis. It played a dual role as an instrument both of estate administration for the landlord and of defence and protection of peasant interests. In the latter capacity it often organized collective peaceful resistance to excessive noble demands, but also became the foundation for the highly-organized military operations of the four 'Peasant Wars' of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Russian serfs, unlike American slaves, entertained continuing ideas of ultimate liberation and of their rightful place as free subjects of the Tsar.

Russian serfs and American slaves may, as Kolchin (1987, 237) stresses, represent two extremes of the spectrum of servile
communal behaviour; but the contrast between them highlights in essence many of the differences between Messenian and Lakonian helotage for which I have argued in this chapter. This suggests that, mutatis mutandis, comparable factors connected with the role of Messenian communal institutions may help to explain both their continued absence of acceptance of Spartiate rule and, when given the opportunity (as in 464 and, even more clearly, in 370/69), their capacity to create and sustain a credible community organization and military resistance to Spartan offensives under their own autonomous leadership - with in 370/69 the additional assistance of highly-motivated returning exiles, themselves in part the descendants of participants in the 460s revolt. It may be that when Spartan domination was secure richer Messenian helots were relatively content to lord it over their poorer fellows; but this is not inconsistent with their organization of mass liberation movements at certain times when opportunity knocked. Landowner absenteeism, local self-help and intra-community patronage may thus have played their part in the undermining of Spartan domination and the origins of the Messenian polis in the early fourth century.
Footnotes to Chapter 3

1. Arist. Pol. 1271b40-1272a2; Livy 34.27.9; Plut. Lyk. 24.3; Aelian, VH 13.19; Kahrstedt (1919, 288f.); Ducat (1978, 14f. & 38f.; 1990, 53ff.); MacDowell (1986, 37ff.). On Busolt & Swoboda’s interpretation (1926, 639) of [Plato], Alk. I 122D, they may have been more prominent in herding; but this interpretation is necessarily uncertain.

2. Hence there is no need here to enter into the debate about the date and circumstances of the end of helotage, concerning which see most recently Ducat (1990, 193ff.). More pertinent is Ducat’s argument (1990, 141ff.) that the Messenians were not helotized until after the revolt of the 460s, discussion of which I shall reserve until Section III below. For the purpose of this analysis of Spartiate exploitation of helots, I leave aside the controversial question whether helots may also have been in the possession of perioikoi.

3. The quotation is from Finley (1985, 63). The fact that some helots were taken off the land from time to time, to serve in a Spartiate’s household, for example, does not invalidate the general proposition in the text.

4. Ducat (1990, 64) notes, however, that the sum of five minas was a standard price paid for liberation in the third century.

5. See Ch.4, Section I = Hodkinson (1989, 84) for one set of theoretical calculations of the comparative probabilities of the various combinations of heirs mentioned below in the text. They
derive from the work of demographers of pre-industrial societies and employ a common assumption of a stationary population in which any child born has a 0.5 chance of surviving beyond its parents' death. According to these calculations, the probability of only a single male heir is just under 12% compared with nearly 70% for more than one child. Although these theoretical calculations are intended to indicate orders of magnitude only, these figures and those in the following notes are interestingly similar to real findings from some historical societies, e.g. Wrightson & Levine (1979, 96).

6. On the calculations referred to in the previous note some transfer of land between the sexes will have occurred in almost 90% of cases.

7. Over 21% of families have no surviving heir according to the calculations above.

8. On the implications of the Xenophon passage, Cartledge (1985, 43); and see Section V, below.

9. There is no evidence that when Spartiates were degraded to Inferior status through (inter alia) failure to produce their mess contributions they ceased to own land. Given the nature of Spartiate land tenure, it is unlikely that the polis intervened to take away their remaining holdings. The fact that Inferiors continued to serve in the army and that one of them, Kinadon, was frequently employed in state service (Xen. Hell. 3.3.7 & 9) implies that they retained their means of support, namely, landholdings worked as before by helots. It is a further
complication of Spartan-helot relations that the masters of an increasing number of helots in the late fifth and early fourth centuries will have been men who were no longer full citizens.

10. Cf. the statement of Archemachos of Euboia (apud Athen. 264B; fl. first half of the 3rd century B.C.? ) that many Penestai were richer than their Thessalian masters. Although "many" is no doubt an exaggeration and the passage is distorted by an over-favourable image of the institution (Ducat 1990, 70f.), the reality of the phenomenon should not be entirely dismissed.

11. Greek texts and translations (which I have largely followed below) of the main sources are conveniently presented by MacDowell (1986, 32f.).

12. E.g. Aeschines 1.97; Plut. Theseus 23.3. It was the regular word in Classical Athens for the payments which a slave working independently delivered to his master.

13. Women owned approximately two-fifths of the territory, according to Aristotle (Pol. 1270a23-4). Regarding minors, Osborne (1988, 309) estimates that in Classical Athens more than 20%, and possibly closer to a third, of fathers died with sons under 18 or daughters only under 13.

14. See Ch. 4 below = Hodkinson (1989, 96ff.); on the expense of chariot racing, cf. the refs. collected by Davies (1971, xxv ff., esp. n.7). Cozzoli (1979, 162f.) also notes some of the contradictions outlined in the text.
15. Exceptions are Chrimes (1949, 290f.), who argues that the "masters" in the passage are the Messenian aristocracy, and Den Boer (1954, 73f.), who interprets it as a warning to the Spartans of their possible fate if defeated. These hypotheses have been convincingly criticized by several scholars: e.g. Diesner (1953/54, 220 n.7); Kiechle (1959, 13 & 62f.); Lotze, (1959, 33); Oliva (1971, 109); Figueira (1984, 104 n.54); Ducat (1990, 60).

16. E.g. Busolt & Swoboda (1926, 641); Lotze (1959, 28); Jones (1967, 9); Figueira (1984, 103f.).

17. Cf. the emendations listed by Prato (1968, 27).

18. Ducat's picture of early-fifth-century Messenia is of "un peuple en guerre quasi permanente avec Sparte" (141). But this view is achieved only by separating the battles of the Isthmos and Stenyklaros from their most probable context within the 460s revolt and by over-reliance upon the reported argument of Aristagoras (5.49, a piece of advocacy, not a dispassionate statement) that the Spartans should suspend their wars against the equally-matched Messenians in order to campaign against Persia. As Whitby notes, although the dramatic context is the year 499, the argument probably reflects the fighting of the 460s; it does not provide evidence of continual conflict in the later sixth century.

19. But note that Ducat's attempt to date Ageladas' statue of Zeus at Ithome to the late sixth century and to designate it as local work - in contrast to Pausanias' statement (4.33.2) that it was made for the Messenians at Naupaktos - on the grounds that
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the sculptor must be the artist responsible for several victory monuments between 520 and 508, ignores the existence of another Ageladas active in the late fifth century (Schol. Aristophanes, Frogs 504; cf. Pliny, N.H. 34.49).

20. One may not want to lay too much emphasis on the evidence of Myron of Priene (quoted in Section IV below), infected as it is by the notion of a contract of servitude - though not necessarily by the idea of a system of equal kléroi; but it is worth noting that his term moira is capable of interpretation as a proportional share of the crops.

21. Powell (1988, 249) notes some scholars' doubts about the 50% quota. Societies in which it is common practice include 16th century Castile: Vassberg (1984, 212); 20th century Egypt and southern Iraq: Warriner (1962, 27 & 139); Japan: Dore (1959, 42-3); late 19th century southern U.S.A.: Reid, (1973, 110 &: 115ff.; early 19th century Greece: Thiersch (1833, I 303). Even fixed rentals often approximate a 50% share under the kinds of conditions which applied in Lakonia and Messenia in our period: cf. Clark (1968, 65f.).

22. Cartledge (1987, 174), noting a modern estimate of 170-200,000 helots, comments that "most helots could have been living at or near the margin of subsistence".

23. Although Myron is normally dated by reference to his fr.6 (apud Rutilius Lupus, De Fig. 1.20, who quotes him to illustrate points of rhetoric), in which he appears to mention his friendship with a certain Cremonides, probably the prominent
Athenian politician Chremonides (floruit c.270-240), Pearson (1962, 411) notes that it does not necessarily follow that the two men were contemporaries, since the passage may be a purely academic oration or illustration in a rhetorical handbook. He could have lived at any time in the second century, since the only certain terminus ante quem appears to be the citation of a Myron in the Lindos temple chronicle of 99 B.C. (fr.4-5); even this depends upon the (plausible) assumption that this Myron is the same man.

24. Another sphere in which we should expect a variety of individual arrangements is that of animal husbandry, the economic organization of which is unknown. It is likely that a helot herdsman might have been granted a proportion of the offspring and other products from a Spartiate’s herd and that he might be able to build up a herd of his own which he could tend alongside his master’s. But the extreme riskiness of pastoral enterprises compared with arable farming, as exemplified by the twin extreme, but ever-present, possibilities of rapid increase or sudden loss through disease, would surely have rendered impracticable the strict application of unvarying proportional shares.

25. Scott (1976, 45). The table is reproduced by the kind permission of the copyright owners, Yale University Press.

26. Reid (1975/76, 549ff.). Reid has questioned the superiority of sharecropping over pre-agreed rent as a means of risk sharing or dispersal; but his critique relates to situations in which percentage shares and levels of rent are mutually and
competitively determined by the ability of landlords and tenants to seek alternative labourers or masters or to opt for alternative contractual arrangements. Neither of these applied in Lakonia and Messenia. Cf. also Reid (1977, 403ff.).

27. For a brief attempt to harmonize the two approaches, but with priority accorded to 'political economy', see Gallant (1991, 7ff.).

28. Ducat (1990, 64) is mistaken therefore when, in reacting against Plutarch's overfavourable image, he asserts that the helots' rent was calculated to produce as much as possible to their Spartiate masters. His phraseology elsewhere, "de son travail l'hilote ne pouvait garder que ce qui était nécessaire à son double fonction de production et de reproduction" (181), although more practical in conception, shows no awareness of the fact that one such necessity would be the capacity to produce a sizeable surplus for storage against future crop failures. Gallant's recent compilation of the ancient Greek evidence concludes that peasants "aimed at having anywhere from 10 to 16 months' worth of food in their storerooms" (1991, 97).

29. Marshall (1890) defines the traditional neoclassical position. For the neoclassical revision, Cheung (1969); Reid (1973; 1975/76; 1977), with refs. to traditional views. For the Chayanovian interpretation, Herring (1984, 133ff.).

30. Cf. Herring (1984) & several of the essays in Byres ed. (1973), esp. those by Byres, Bhaduri and Caballero. These effects counteract the standard Marshallian principle that
sharecropping will be inefficient where there is 'practical fixity of tenure' (such as the helots possessed) because the landlord has no instrument for increasing the output of labour. It is in any case well attested that long leases are a source of increased productivity because they encourage improvements by tenants: cf. Parker (1955, 158); Herring (1983, ch.9). Note that in my discussion productivity is used as a measure of efficiency because, although the latter should technically and properly be defined by relating returns to costs, in land reform policy literature, which dominates modern economic debate of sharecropping, inefficiency usually means low returns per unit of land, i.e. yields (Herring 1984, 145 n.1).

31. Note, for example, the attempt of the Russian serfs of Riazan to establish a bond with Prince Leonid Mikhailovich Golitsyn in order to obtain an amelioration of their harsh conditions: "we consider you forever as our father"; and contrast the instrumental nature of his response: "How am I a father to you?... I am just your pomeshchik, I have legal authority over you" (quoted in Kolchin 1987, 307).

32. Xen. Hell. 3.3.5. The wording connotes physical movement into the countryside rather than just cogitation and can therefore be used as direct evidence for the situation on Spartiate estates. This is shown by the use of the aorist optative mood in the phrase "καὶ ὅσοι δὴ ἐν τοῖς χωρίοις Σπαρτιατῶν τύχοιεν ὀντες" ("as many as happened to be [i.e. actually at that time] on the estates of the Spartiates"). The optative mood is used because the clause is governed by ἐφη in
the previous sentence, in which Kinadon was pointing out specific individuals in the streets of Sparta. I am grateful to Paul Cartledge and Robin Osborne for helpful discussion of this passage.

33. For the form of the terminology, compare the *paidonomos* (Xen. *Lak.* Pol. 2.2) who had charge of Spartan youths in the *agôgê*.

34. These caveats are stressed by Cartledge (1979, 177) & Powell (1988, 218 & 250).

35. One illuminating exception may be the helots who revolted and fled from Malea to Koryphasion (Pylos) during the Dekeleian war (Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.18). The Malea peninsula is another area distant from Sparta. Were these helots located in the modern plain of Molaoi, which is second only to the Eurotas valley in terms of size and which lacks any identified perioikic site east of Goulas (anc. Kyparissia?) at the plain’s western extremity? One should note, however, that a more natural interpretation of Xenophon’s text (Kiechle 1959, 108 n.3; Ducat 1990, 137) would put the helots’ movements from Koryphasion to Malea.

36. For example, the helots who served with Brasidas from 424 and the *neodamôdeis* with whom they were stationed on their return in 421 must both have been from Lakonia, since they were stationed in the extremely sensitive territory of Lepreon not too far from the northern borders of Messenia (Thuc. 5.34). This would have been an extremely improbable place to have located
ex-helots of Messenian origin whose neighbours and kinsfolk would have been in servitude not far away.

37. In general Talbert’s argument stressing helot acquiescence in Spartan rule suffers from a failure to appreciate the distortions of perspective produced by the chronic lack of evidence. Despite his citation of Kolchin’s comparative work (1989, 32 nn.57 & 61), he fails to appreciate the latter’s essential point (1987, 244f. & 255ff.) that servile revolts (which tend to occur only at times of severe crisis) are less satisfactory indicators of bondsmen’s mentality than flight and small-scale confrontations, which are many times more frequent. Because details of this level of activity are only rarely mentioned in the ancient narrative sources Talbert’s argument that Spartiate-helot tension was limited is the weakest of arguments ex silentio. On the distortions evident in generic ancient statements about helot tension, see Ducat (1990, 145ff.). For further criticism of Talbert’s argument, Cartledge (1991).

38. Many scholars (e.g., recently, Welwei 1974, 122; Ducat 1990, 129ff.) reject the authenticity of Pausanias’ plan to give helots the citizenship as the fabrication of his enemies; if so, it remains indicative of the Spartiates’ view of what was possible.

39. Such a tendency may have been exacerbated by a higher proportion of arable holdings belonging to ordinary Spartiates, estates originally allocated in the late eighth century to all those who participated in the original conquest and/or in the
seventh century to bring poorer citizens up to the level required for the exercise of their civic duties.

40. A general problem underlying the following discussion is the question of determining whether any given cult site lay within territory inhabited by helots or by *perioikoi* - always assuming, as most scholars have done, that helot and perioikic areas of residence were largely separate. My discussion here must necessarily be summary; but cf. Ernst Meyer (1978, 253ff.) for an almost identical set of conclusions. The sole contemporary evidence concerning boundaries comes from a comment of Euripides (*apud* Strabo 8.5.6; 366B) that the border between Lakonike and Messenia was formed by the River Pamisos. Since there is reason to believe that Classical writers reserved the term ‘Messenians’ for the helot population (Niese 1891, 18f.; cf. Ernst Meyer 1978, 253), this comment appears to set an eastern boundary to helot territory.

There seems little doubt that the Stenyklaros (or upper Messenian) plain formed the heart of helot arable cultivation. In view of Euripides’ evidence above it seems, contrary to the judgement of some scholars (e.g. Toynbee 1972, 190), that the Western part of the lower plain, known as Makaria, was also helot territory. Furthermore, it seems likely (especially given the emphasis of [Plato], *Alk.* I 122D upon the Spartiates’ use of Messenia for large-scale pasturage) that the huge region between the eastern plains and the west coast, south of the Soulima valley, was in Spartiate rather than perioikic hands - although there may have been significant variations in the density of the
helot population (cf. Thuc. 4.3 on the neighbourhood of Pylos; Busolt & Swoboda 1926, 639). The status of the Akritas peninsula is less certain. Some scholars (e.g. Niese 1891, 19; Busolt & Swoboda 1926, 639), relying in part upon Euripides' characterization (ibid.) of Messenia as being "far from the navigators", have taken the view that the entire southern coast of Messenia was perioikic territory. Euripides' remark, however, which is an accurate comment upon the bulk of inland Messenia, need not mean that no portion of helot territory was coastal. We should note Thucydides' reference (4.26) to the helots who owned their own boats; his statement that they put to sea from various parts of the Peloponnese suggests that these helots were not exclusively Lakonian. The sole attested pre-370 perioikic settlements in the Akritas peninsula are Methone and Asine (mod. Korone) at its extreme S.W. and S.E. points. I would therefore view most of the peninsula as a helot-settled area, especially in view of the Messenians' use (discussed below) of the sanctuary of Apollo Korythos which lay only a kilometre or so from the east coast and less than 10 km. north of Asine.

41. Roebuck (1941, 34); Cartledge (1979, 193). Cartledge wonders whether a helot could have afforded the bronze figurine of Hermes dedicated there c.525 (Lamb 1926, 138 no.9). In view of probable helot economic differentiation this may not be such a problematic issue; but in any case the dedication could have been communal.

42. Valmin (1930, 92ff.); Roebuck (1941, 35f.); McDonald & Rapp (1972, 316f. no. 607); Jeffery (1990, 206 nos. 6 & 9).
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42. Valmin (1930, 92ff.); Roebuck (1941, 35f.); McDonald & Rapp (1972, 316f. no. 607); Jeffery (1990, 206 nos. 6 & 9).
43. Versakes (1916); Jeffery (1990, 206 nos. 3, 7, 10 & 11); Bauslaugh (1990). Cartledge (1979, 193) suggests that the sanctuary may have pertained to a perioikic predecessor of the town of Kolonides founded nearby in the 360s; but there is no evidence for such a predecessor, nor is there for any predecessor of late-Classical Korone, further north along the coast (MacDonald & Rapp 1972, 312f., no. 502).

44. Valmin (1938, esp. 424f.); MacDonald & Rapp (1972, 314f., no. 530); Jeffery (1990, 206 no. 1). Located hard against the eastern bank of the river, the sanctuary lay just outside Messenia, and hence probably within the territory of one of the perioikic towns located along the Western foot of Mt. Taygetos.


46. Alcock (1991, 450) whose catalogue numbers I shall use to identify the cults cited below and whose flexible approach I prefer to the over-rigid and dismissive approach of Korres (1981/82). I have been unable to gain access to the work of C.M. Antonaccio, 'The archaeology of early Greek "hero cult"' (Diss. Princeton 1987), referred to by Alcock, since the author has now withdrawn it from general use.

47. I have also omitted the cult at Peristeria where the "later offerings" mentioned by Coldstream (1976, 11) are "now dated
primarily to the fourth and third centuries B.C." (Alcock 1991, no.4, with refs.).

48. Talbert (1989, 39) rightly notes the initial weakness of the new polis of Messene in the years immediately after 369. Since the vast majority of Messenians were new to the role of citizen, this is hardly surprising and does not imply any supposed previous loyalty to Spartan rule. On the contrary, their enthusiasm for their new status is suggested by their prompt participation in their allies' campaign outside Messenia in 368 (Xen. Hell. 7.1.28-32).
CHAPTER 4

INHERITANCE, MARRIAGE AND DEMOGRAPHY

The internal reasons for Sparta’s crisis and decline in the early fourth century have long been the subject of debate. Already in antiquity widely differing opinions were expressed by contemporaries such as Xenophon, Isokrates and Aristotle, as well as by later writers like Polybius and Plutarch. Modern scholarship has been equally divided, and the controversy has continued unabated in recent years with the divergent interpretations of David (1981), Cawkwell (1983), Figueira (1986), Cartledge (1987) and Hamilton (1991). The fact that the Spartan polis appears, in the face of various tensions which I analysed in Chapter 1, to have maintained an underlying viability for over a couple of centuries from perhaps the mid-seventh century onwards and then to have undergone a more rapid period of transformation and crisis in the later fifth and early fourth centuries must form the essential backcloth for the interpretation of any particular aspect of the social system. The subjects of this chapter - inheritance, marriage and demography - are closely linked with the question of the viability of Spartan society in ways which I shall hope to demonstrate.

In most societies whose economies are dependent primarily upon sedentary agriculture the distribution of land and the rules governing its tenure and inheritance exercise a fundamental
influence upon the nature of the social system, and there is every indication that the same was true of classical Sparta. It is abundantly clear from evidence in Herodotus (6.61.3; 7.134.2), Thucydides (1.6.4), Xenophon (Lak. Pol. 5.3; 6.4; Hell. 6.4.10-11) and Aristotle (Pol. 1270a18) that throughout the classical period there were marked inequalities in Spartiate ownership of land (cf. Ste. Croix 1972, 137f.). These passages, among other evidence, include specific references to activities which required larger than average estates. One example is the maintenance of horses for chariot racing (Ste. Croix 1972, Appendix XXVII) and the cavalry. Another is the provision by the rich to the common messes of extra donations of bread made from wheat, a higher status and less reliable additional cereal crop compared with the barley which all citizens grew to provide the alphita (barley meal) for their compulsory mess contributions.

Beyond this point, of course, we move into highly controversial areas concerning the nature of land tenure and inheritance discussed in Chapter 2. I argued there that the character of Spartiate land tenure was essentially one of indefinite individual possession and that, unless a landowner exercised his (or her) rights of gift or bequest, the estate would be divided among his surviving children (or their heirs). The issue of female inheritance was seen to be less certain; but I argued that daughters probably shared in the inheritance even in the presence of sons (at a rate of half a son’s portion), not just in their absence. (I shall henceforth refer to these alternative systems as ‘universal female inheritance’ and
'residual female inheritance', respectively.) The Spartiates consequently operated a thoroughgoing version of 'diverging devolution', according to which the property of both father and mother passed into the hands of children of both sexes.

I. The cohesive influence of universal female inheritance

Before turning to the implications of these practices of land tenure and inheritance, it is relevant to comment briefly upon the genesis of the overall system of landownership of which they were a part. It seems likely that this system in its fundamentals went back to the seventh century when so many aspects of Spartan society seem to have been reshaped as part of the compromise between different interests which was involved in the creation of a united body of citizen homoioi (Equals, Peers or Similars). In the sphere of landholding this compromise must have involved bringing the property of poorer citizens up to a basic minimum level at which they could have been expected to provide their compulsory mess contributions (failure to provide which meant loss of citizenship) and feed their families. This basic minimum may have been set quite high; but, apart from this, the compromise involved the retention of existing inequalities. The practices of indefinite individual tenure and partible inheritance I would also view as a matter of the retention of previous usages comparable (though of course not necessarily identical) to those evident elsewhere both in the early Archaic period (e.g. Hesiod, Works and Days 37-9, 341, 379-80; cf.
Odyssey 14.199ff.) and throughout Greek antiquity (Lane Fox 1985, 211ff. & 216; Van Bremen 1983, 231). These practices were now applied, I suggest, to newly-distributed holdings as well as to pre-existing estates. A compromise of this sort is a much more plausible product of the crises of the seventh century than the unrealistic schemes in Plutarch; and it was made more acceptable for ordinary homoioi by the practice of institutionalized sharing (Xen. Lak. Pol. 6.3-5; Arist. Pol. 1263a35-7), by the distributive mechanisms which operated within the common messes (see Ch.1, Section IIb), by the restrictions upon ostentatious expenditure by the rich (for example at funerals: MacDowell 1986, 120ff.) and by the uniform clothing, equipment and, to a large extent, lifestyle shared by all citizens (Thuc. 1.6; Cartledge 1977, esp. 13, 15 & 27; David 1989).

The achievement of a workable compromise in this crucial field must have been important psychologically in sustaining the unity of the homoioi; but what about its long-term practical effects? Here I want to examine in some detail the implications of the inheritance system, focusing in particular upon the effects of the system of universal female inheritance, in order to suggest some ways in which it may have contributed both to Spartan society's long-term stability and to its ultimate decline. I shall in the remainder of this section and in Section II, respectively, stress two related but conflicting implications.
The first implication is that a system of universal female inheritance tends \textit{in itself} to produce less inequality among both individuals and families than a system of residual female inheritance only. Or, to express it more precisely, the inequalities generated by the former system are more graded and less sharp. The reason is that when all daughters as well as sons inherit at least some land, it is divided more evenly among more persons; and when those daughters marry, the combined husband-wife landholdings show less marked inequalities from one family to the next.

The correctness of these observations can be tested by a computer simulation designed to make a systematic comparison of the theoretical implications of these two inheritance systems: residual female inheritance and universal female inheritance in which a daughter's portion is half that of a son. A few introductory words concerning the purpose of simulations are perhaps necessary. "Computer simulation is easy to misunderstand, for it is easy to jump to the false conclusion that an experiment must propose to recreate some particular historical reality inside a computer, rather than to recreate and test the ideas that scholars have" (Wachter, Hammel & Laslett eds. 1978, xix). The simulation is designed to evaluate my hypothesis about the inherent implications of the different systems of inheritance, not to construct a hypothetical Spartan reality. It also employs several simplifying assumptions, since, as J.E. Smith (1987, 250) has noted, "experience with scientific models in general, and computer simulation models in particular,
has shown that attempts to produce more and more realistic results usually lead to unwieldy models which contain many ad hoc assumptions and which are impossible to verify and replicate.

The algorithm (that is, the set of procedural statements specifying the operations to be performed by the computer) behind the simulation postulates a model population of 10,000 married couples in which each couple owns one unit of land in what I shall call Generation One. It also employs a Family Composition Distribution model (see Table 4.1) which specifies the numbers of surviving sons and daughters produced by each of the 10,000 couples). This model was calculated by means of binomial expansion on the simplifying assumptions of a stationary population with an equal sex ratio in which the replacement of all members of one generation by the next takes place simultaneously and in which each child born has a 0.5 chance of surviving beyond the deaths of its parents.
<table>
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<th>II Number of Daughters</th>
<th>III Number of families</th>
<th>IV Numbers of Sons</th>
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| Total                  | 10000                  | 10000                 | 10000             |
On the basis of the Family Composition Distribution each family’s single unit of land is first divided among their surviving children according to the different rules of the two inheritance systems. Secondly, land belonging to families with no surviving children is reallocated to some of the other families on a ‘selective proportional basis’. (There are 2,126 units of such land to be distributed among 7,874 families with surviving children; consequently, 27% \( \frac{2126}{7874} = 0.27 \) of these families each receive one extra unit. So, for example, of the 16 families with 4 sons and 4 daughters, four families will receive an extra unit of land in addition to their original holding \( 16 \times 0.27 = 4.32 \).) This additional land is then divided among the children of these families in the same way as the families’ original landholdings. The individual men and women who form Generation Two of the model population are now grouped (separately) into different male and female ‘landholding sets’, each set comprising those holding identical amounts of land.

The following operation pairs off these men and women to form Generation Two families. (The assumption is made that all individuals will marry, but only once.) This pairing is also performed on a selective proportional basis, such that an identical proportion of women from any given landholding set is partnered with the members of any given landholding set of men, and vice versa. (To examine the inherent logic of the inheritance systems it is of course necessary to avoid introducing such ‘real life’ factors as the tendency towards
marriages between persons of similar wealth.) It is then possible to calculate the combined landholdings of each new Generation Two family and to group these families into landholding sets. The cycle now recommences with the application of the Family Composition Distribution model, again on a selective proportional basis, to each of these family landholding sets, in order to produce the individual men and women of Generation Three whose personal landholdings are then calculated and ranked in landholding sets as before.

The routines described above have been applied across a number of generations as far as Generation Thirteen. The results are demonstrated in the graphs below. (Their scope is restricted for the sake of clarity to holdings up to two units in size; this restriction omits only the very richest members of the population.) Figure 4.1 indicates the outcome of land distribution among families at the stage of Generation Thirteen. It shows for the two inheritance systems the number of families (on the horizontal axis) who possess holdings equal to or less than the numbers of units of land on the vertical axis. Under both systems the majority of families own holdings smaller (many much smaller) than their ancestors' original one unit of land. The higher starting-point and the flatter graph of universal female inheritance, however, indicate a less unequal distribution of land than the sharply-rising one of residual inheritance only.
FIGURE 4.1.

FAMILY LANDHOLDING IN GENERATION 13

- UNIVERSAL FEMALE INHERITANCE
- RESIDUAL FEMALE INHERITANCE

NUMBER OF FAMILIES (in 1,000s)

FIGURE 4.2.

MALE LANDHOLDING IN GENERATION 13

- UNIVERSAL FEMALE INHERITANCE
- RESIDUAL FEMALE INHERITANCE

NUMBER OF MEN (in 1,000s)
This picture is reinforced by Figure 4.2 which shows that among the male population (considered on its own) universal female inheritance produces not only less relative inequality, but also fewer very poor men in absolute terms. This latter result is at first sight unexpected, since males own considerably less land under universal female inheritance (57.6% of the total as against 74.9%). The key to the paradox seems to be that, among the poorer sections of the population, men generally gain more land through inheritance from their mothers (most of whom would own no property under residual female inheritance) than they lose by sharing the parental holdings with their sisters.

Although a simulation is a fiction, "like a good fictional story... it does claim to be understandable in terms of the real world and to be useful in shedding light on the operation of that world" (J.E. Smith 1987, 250). The results of the simulation lend support to the idea that the existence of universal female inheritance rights was a force for stability. In comparison with other possible inheritance systems it helped to reduce the diminution of the landholdings of poor families, and thereby the number of Spartan citizens, and also to restrict the rate of development of an excessively large wealth gap with all its implications for social disunity. If, moreover, one were to take account of one variable expressly excluded from the model, the fact that in real life there is normally at least some tendency towards marriages between partners of comparable wealth, this conclusion would be reinforced. When daughters inherit only in the absence of sons, only a minority of women receive any land
and these would tend to be acquired as wives by men of greater wealth; poorer men would normally have to take brides from among the large majority of landless women. But when all daughters inherit something, even the poorest men gain some addition of land with their wives. The implications of these model inheritance systems are, therefore, not mere theory, but would apply with even greater force in real life. Acceptance of the hypothesis of female inheritance in the presence of sons would, consequently, help to explain the longevity of the Spartan socio-economic system, how and why it achieved two centuries or so of comparative stability before property concentration and the decline in citizen numbers became serious problems in the later fifth century.

II. The problems of diverging devolution and Spartiate marriage practices

The other, contrasting implication of universal female inheritance, however, is that, although it tended to lessen long-term inequalities in landownership, it did so at the cost of considerable continuous short-term instability. As already noted in Chapter 3, when not only men inherit land, but women also, and those women receive at least a portion of their inheritance on marriage, land changes hands both down the generations and between the sexes at almost every adult death and at every marriage (Goody 1976a, 10). The ownership of specific
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holdings is drastically reorganized every generation and may be continually reallocated from one lineage to another because daughters are constantly inheriting land from both father and mother and ultimately bequeathing it to children whose father may be from an entirely different lineage. In addition, the parental landholdings are subject to far greater division when daughters inherit in the presence of sons, a division which varies considerably in its effects from family to family, according to not only the total number of children but also the ratio of sons to daughters. For example, the grandchildren of couples with only sons stand to gain increased inheritances as those sons marry propertied wives without losing any of the parental property to sisters; whereas families with more daughters than sons give away more land with those daughters than is brought in by the wives of their sons.

These phenomena of continual movement of land, its constant reallocation among different lineages, multiple division of the inheritance and extreme short-term variability in property levels, all of which arose directly from Sparta's particular system of diverging devolution, must have been important preoccupations for Spartiate families concerned for the well-being of their descendants. There was, moreover, a lack of direct mechanisms for remedying their most serious effects. In some societies the landholdings of families without children would lapse out of cultivation and become available for exploitation by families with too many children; but in Sparta the helots maintained the cultivation for whomsoever inherited
on grounds of kinship, not of need. There is no evidence that the kings, in their role of adjudication between claimants to the hand of unbetrothed heiresses, provided any help by allocating such women to sons from larger families (Ch.2, Section IIIa, above). Nor is there evidence for a reservoir of public land for such sons to exploit, such as existed in Ptolemaic and Roman Egypt which practised an even more extreme form of universal female inheritance.\(^5\) Furthermore, whereas the Egyptians utilized purchase and sale of land as a means of adjusting property holdings affected by partible inheritance (Rowlandson 1981, 377; 1983, 176ff.), these activities were in Sparta restricted by a combination of legal prohibition and social disapproval. Only through adoption (Hdt. 6.57.5) could some evening-out of property be achieved, though probably largely within kin groups rather than between them. Consequently, it was in the sphere of marriage that Spartiates had to seek solutions to their problems.

The anthropologist, Jack Goody (1976b, ch.2, esp. 13ff.), in a statistical analysis of several hundred societies, has noted a high degree of association between inheritance systems of diverging devolution and specific kinds of marriage practices which seem designed, from the viewpoint of individual households, to minimize the various difficulties described above. In many respects marriage customs at Sparta accord well with the general pattern pointed out by Goody. He notes, for instance, the frequent coexistence of diverging devolution with the practices of monogamy and polyandry, as opposed to polygyny,\(^6\) and this is
precisely what we find in Sparta. Herodotus (5.39-40) indicates that when King Anaxandridas II in the mid-sixth century took a second wife in addition to his first one, who was thought barren but whom he was unwilling to divorce, it was a very un-Spartan practice which he performed only on the express orders of the ephors and gerontes, who themselves adopted this counsel only as a measure of last resort for fear that the Agiad line would die out. When Anaxandridas’ fellow king, Ariston, voluntarily took a third wife, he adopted the more usual practice of divorcing his second spouse (Hdt. 6.63.1). Polyandry is attested by Polybius (12.6b.8), who says that it was a longstanding custom and quite usual for three, four or even more brothers to have one wife. 7

Both monogamy and polyandry can be interpreted as practices designed to limit the number of legitimate children that a man sired and hence the division of the inheritance. Other Spartiate customs tended in the same direction. It seems that a woman typically married at a later age than in most Greek states, perhaps between ages 18 and 20, thus reducing her years of potential fertility. 8 The practice of wife-borrowing (Xen. Lak. Pol. 1.8-9; Plb. 12.6b.8; Plut. Lyk. 15.7; Comp. Lyk.-Numa 3.3; Moralia 242B) also enabled one woman’s fertility to be divided between two men; Polybius specifically remarks that it was when a man had begotten sufficient children by his wife that he would give her to a friend.

Goody also notes a significant correlation between the existence of diverging devolution and a high degree of control
over female marriage aimed at ensuring that one's womenfolk marry persons of similar status (the practice of homogamy). When women are owners of property it is indeed important for the families on both sides of the marriage that their son or daughter does not marry someone of markedly inferior wealth. Once again we see control over female marriage and a strong tendency towards homogamy in Sparta. A woman's marriage was decided by her male kyrios, or legal guardian. Herodotus (6.57.4) implies that it was a father who normally betrothed his heiress; and Aristotle (Pol. 1270a26-9) states that, if the father did not do so, that right fell to the kléronomos, in my view, her male next of kin. Although matrimonial rites may have included a symbolic marriage by capture (Plut. Lyk. 15.3-5), which was on one infamous occasion exploited by King Damaratos, who carried off the woman betrothed to Leotychidas (Hdt. 6.65), it seems that it was Leotychidas' method of acquiring a wife which was the orthodox one and that normally marriages were preceded by a betrothal approved by the bride's parents or next of kin (Cartledge 1981, 99f.; MacDowell 1986, 77ff.).

The tendency towards homogamy can be seen through a variety of evidence. One illustration is the episode (Plut. Lys. 30.6; Mor. 230A; Aelian, VH 6.4; 10.5) in which Lysander's daughters were deserted by their suitors when the poverty of their inheritance became known. Such a marriage would have meant a drop in status and wealth for the suitors and for their potential children, despite the fact that the girl's father had been one of the most prestigious and influential men in Sparta. Homogamy
can also be seen in the practice of wife-sharing. Xenophon’s remarks about the kind of wife a man would request to borrow imply that she would be of similar status. Furthermore, Philo (On Special Laws 3.4.22) informs us that the Spartiates permitted marriage between uterine half-siblings (homométrioi, children of the same mother but of different fathers). This would have allowed the woman’s sons and daughters by her different partners to be exchanged in marriage. The whole complex is clearly one of homogamy, with the added bonus of concentrating the parents’ properties for the benefit of their grandchildren.

Another form of homogamy was the practice of marriage between close kin. Several examples are attested within the royal houses: the marriages of Anaxandridas II to his sister’s daughter (Hdt. 5.39), of Kleomenes I’s daughter, Gorgo, to her step-uncle Leonidas (Hdt. 7.205.1) and of Archidamos II to his aunt Lampito (Hdt. 6.71). Close-kin marriage had the advantage that not only did it ensure that the amount of property brought by the bride was consonant with the status and wealth of the groom and his parents, but it also retained the property of a kinswoman within the kin. Close-kin marriage was especially important to the royal houses which were the richest and most prestigious lineages in Sparta. It was often their best option to avoid marriages below their station and the dispersal of their property and therefore their power.

Often of course close-kin marriage was not possible. In those circumstances the royal houses typically contracted
marriages with spouses from leading non-royal families who were nearest to being their social and economic equals. When King Ariston in the mid-sixth century wanted to replace his wife, he selected a woman from a prosperous family who was the spouse of his closest friend (Hdt. 6.61-2). Similarly, the future king Agesilaos II, although at the time without a definite prospect of succeeding to the throne, was married to Kleora, daughter of Aristomenidas (PB 134), a leading Spartiate with connections in Boiotia (Paus. 3.9.3).

Such matches were of course attractive propositions for the leading families concerned. The mid-sixth-century episode mentioned above in which King Anaxandridas II was compelled to take an additional wife provides the most vivid illustration of the passion with which such alliances with the royal houses were sought and jealously guarded by the girl’s kin. Anaxandridas’ first wife was his own niece (his sister’s daughter); but his second wife came from a different lineage, being the daughter of Prinetadas and granddaughter of a certain Demarmenos. The second wife produced a male child; but then the first wife straightaway became pregnant, whereupon the kinsfolk of the second wife expressed with such vigour their suspicions concerning her fortuitous conception of a prospective rival for the throne after several years of barrenness that the ephors were obliged to attend the birth to guarantee that the pregnancy was genuine and a false baby was not smuggled in. The value this same kin group put upon achieving distinguished marriages for their womenfolk is further indicated by the fact that another granddaughter of
Demarmenos, Perkalos, daughter of Chilon, was betrothed to Leotychidas, the leading member of the junior branch of the Eurypontid royal house (Hdt. 6.65). Perkalos was indeed such an attractive match that, as we have seen, Leotychidas’ senior kinsman, King Damaratos, stepped in and seized her for himself before the marriage was consummated. Here we see a leading Spartiate lineage attempting to further the status of its descendants by marrying two of its womenfolk into the two royal houses, and two royal males keen to establish a liaison with such a prominent family, which was perhaps related to the famous ephor Chilon.¹⁰

III. Problems of interpretation

At this point we must confront the problem of the limitations of our evidence. Some of the marriage practices considered above, such as homogamy and close-kin marriage, are attested through episodes dating as early as the mid-sixth century. Others, however, such as wife-sharing and polyandry, become apparent only in sources writing in the fourth century or later. It is important to consider whether the whole range of marriage practices should be viewed as longstanding concomitants of inheritance by diverging devolution or whether some came into prominence rather later than others. For example, Sallares has claimed that wife-sharing probably developed from much earlier Dark Age practice whereby unmarried members of an age class had
sexual access to the wives of members already married (1991, 169ff.; cf. Baxter & Almagor 1978, 18). Even if this is so, questions remain: when did such a development take place? and how and why did it become both a matter of private agreement to be negotiated between two individuals and a general practice, no longer tied to a particular phase in the development of an age class? An important aspect of course is not just the date at which a specific practice began, but how common it was at specific stages of its history. Did Xenophon, for example, highlight wife-sharing for its symbolic significance out of all proportion to its frequency? Or was its frequency in the early fourth century the reason why he drew attention to it? (Note his claim that Lykourgos "permitted many such arrangements".) And if so, for how long had it been frequent? Unfortunately, the sheer paucity of prosopographical information concerning Spartiate marriages imposes severe limits upon our capacity to answer such questions from the evidence of the sources alone. Similarly, although we see the royal houses practising close-kin marriage as far back as the mid-sixth century, lack of evidence prevents us from knowing whether it was already then a widespread practice or whether the royal houses with more property at stake were exceptional in this regard.

These questions are important because of the tendency of these marriage practices to counteract the inheritance system's moderating influence upon the development of inequality. If implemented by a significant number of individual households, the impact upon the delicate balance between levels of population and
of landownership was potentially disastrous. Here we begin to touch upon the subject of Spartiate demography because limitation of family size, marriage of like to like and concentration of property are all factors which have justifiably been invoked by historians as both symptoms and causes of the citizen manpower shortage (oliganthrōpia) which destroyed Sparta, according to the famous account of Aristotle (Pol. 1270a33-4). The decline in Spartiate numbers was closely connected with the increasing poverty of many ordinary citizens and with their potential and actual inability to provide the monthly mess contributions necessary for the maintenance of their citizen status. The issue of the precise timing and rate of decline has been the subject of considerable disagreement among historians, linked as it is with problematic calculations of the size of the citizen body at certain dates based upon extrapolations from the size of Lakedaimonian armies. The debate over whether we should double Thucydides' figures for the forces at Mantineia in 418, for example, has long been notorious. Critical scrutiny of army figures is clearly necessary; but, equally clearly, that alone is not going to resolve the continuing controversies, and I would suggest that consideration of the wider issues of inheritance and marriage patterns may open up a helpful perspective upon the subject.

Constraints of space prevent full exposition here of the variety of opinions concerning the development of Spartiate oliganthrōpia. Most interpretations, however, fall within a few broad categories. There is the 'gradualist' approach which views
the decline in citizen numbers as a long-term process extending over more than a century at least, with an ever firmer tightening of the screw as the inherent deficiencies of the system of land tenure and inheritance, exploited by the acquisitiveness of leading citizens, reduced more and more Spartiates to a level of poverty at which they failed either to maintain their mess contributions or to reproduce themselves through attempting to limit the number of their heirs. Within this approach there is disagreement between those (e.g. Cartledge 1979, ch.14; 1987, esp. 168) who view this process as accelerating under the impact of the Peloponnesian war and its aftermath and those (e.g. Cawkwell 1983, 385ff.; Flower 1991, 88f.) who argue that the rate of decline was steady throughout the fifth and fourth centuries. In contrast to the gradualist position stand interpretations which view the decline as taking place more dramatically, the key event being for many scholars (e.g. Toynbee 1969, Ch.4; Lane Fox 1985, 220ff.; Figueira 1986, 177ff.) the earthquake of c. 465 in which losses are judged to have been sufficiently large to have caused a sudden permanent drop in Spartiate numbers. Other historians (e.g. Bommelaer 1981, 231; David 1981, 5ff.) would lay greater emphasis upon the acquisition of empire in 404 which is said to have led to the passing of the supposed law of Epitadeus which, it is claimed, wrecked Sparta’s inheritance system; there are even those who implausibly ascribe all Sparta’s problems to this putative law.
IV. The significance of wealth as a determinant of status

As presented so far, my analysis of the implications of the system of inheritance could in principle be adduced to support any of these broad approaches. The moderating effect of the inheritance system might seem to support the gradualist position whereby inequalities increased slowly from the seventh century onwards until they began to have a serious impact in the fifth century. On the other hand, several of the marriage customs aimed at limiting family size and achieving the concentration of family property could be viewed as later developments stimulated by the consequences of the earthquake and/or the acquisition of empire.

This brings us back to the problem already mentioned, that a direct answer to questions concerning the age and frequency of these marriage customs is not possible from the evidence of the sources alone. We can, however, make some progress by considering the conditions under which these marriage practices would be most likely to flourish. Here Goody's work is once more illuminating because it suggests that it is the degree of social stratification based upon inequalities in property ownership which is the key underlying factor (1976b, chs.1-4; cf. Morris 1986, 112). In societies heavily influenced by such economic stratification families are typically very concerned about the level of wealth of potential spouses for their children, since that will affect the status of the family and its descendants. One could further hypothesize that this in turn might lead to the
practice of family limitation. This perspective is helpful, first, because it suggests that at least some of the marriage practices in question should be viewed not as indissolubly-linked concomitants of inheritance by diverging devolution, but rather as customs whose frequency, and even existence, might be altered by the socio-economic context; secondly, because the degree of stratification based upon unequal ownership of wealth is a factor about which it is possible to make some assessment, however imperfect.

In Chapter 1 I attempted to assess the relative importance of a variety of factors in the determination of a man’s status. It seems clear that some lineages had long been more important than others and that differential ownership of land was a major factor in their importance. This was certainly the case in the early seventh century (Arist. Pol. 1306b36-1307a2, referring to a non-surviving part of Tyrtaios, fr.1 Prato) and it seems to have remained true even after the seventh-century reforms, to judge by the comments of Alkaios (fr. Z 37, Lobel/Page),

"For so they say Aristodamos once spoke in Sparta no foolish saying: 'Money maketh man; no poor man can be noble or held in honour'".

The Spartiates' self-imposed restrictions upon involvement in other economic activities ensured that land was the only form of property through which substantial wealth could be accumulated. Landed wealth must also have enabled leading Spartiates to sustain the guest-friendships with leading men from other states which are attested throughout the classical period (refs. in Ch.1 n.6). Land-rich Spartiates could gain status through patronizing
their messmates with extra donations of produce from their estates (Xen. Lak. Pol. 5.3) or by lending their horses and hunting dogs for the use of poorer men (Xen. Lak. Pol. 6.3; Arist. Pol. 1263a35-7).

As Goody (1976b, 13) has noted, however, "criteria of ranking are rarely single-stranded", and this was especially true in Sparta where the significance of differential landownership was restrained within certain limits by the new social order of citizen homoioi which emerged out of the compromises of the seventh century. This social order entailed a common life cycle within which there was a large degree of uniformity in lifestyle for all citizens (with the exception of the kings and their immediate heirs) supported by an ideology which stressed the priority of collective interests over private ones. Within this system status was acquired partly through seniority, partly through the display of civic virtue through conformity to specified types of action and standards of behaviour required in different situations, ranging from absolute obedience to vigorous competition with one's peers.

For much of the late Archaic and Classical periods the competing claims of uniformity, seniority and merit are likely to have been significant countervailing influences against the monopoly of high status by the rich. The role of differential landownership as a source of status distinctions does seem, however, to have developed considerably from the mid-fifth century onwards. This is suggested, above all, by the evidence
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that the overwhelming majority of Spartiate victories in the four-horse chariot race at Olympia fell in the period from c. 450 onwards: 10 out of 15 victories won by 8 out of Sparta's 11 victors (see Table 4.2). This is a phenomenon to which one should give full weight because not only was chariot racing, with its high costs of breeding and maintaining horses, a most expensive sporting activity within the capacity of only the wealthiest of men (Davies 1971, xxv ff., esp. n.7), but the Olympic four-horse chariot race was the most important equestrian event at the most significant Panhellenic gathering. Expenditure and success on this scale carried with them an unmistakable claim to social and political influence, using large-scale property as a power base, as Davies (1981, 98ff.) has demonstrated with reference to Athens.

TABLE 4.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<td>110</td>
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<tr>
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<td>113</td>
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<td>Damaratos</td>
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<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>448</td>
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<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Arkesilaos</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>440</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>428</td>
<td>Anaxandros</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>388</td>
<td>Xenarches</td>
<td>386</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The pattern of Spartiate victories outlined above is worth elaborating in a little detail. The main expansion of interest in regular Panhellenic chariot-racing competitions on the part of the elite of the Greek poleis seems to have taken place in the first third of the sixth century (Davies 1981, 103f.). Between this time and the second Persian invasion of 480-79 three Spartiate Olympic victors are known, a record second to that of Athens (four victors). From this period there is also the evidence of a Panathenaic amphora dated c.525-500 and dedicated in the temple of Athena Chalkioikos on the Spartan akropolis, a prize for a four-horse chariot victory in the Athenian games.15 After the Persian wars, according to Pausanias (6.1.7), the Lakedaimonians became the most ambitious (philotimótata) of all the Greeks in the breeding of horses, an interest perhaps stimulated by the distribution of captured Persian horses among the army after the battle of Plataia (Hdt. 9.81). But there is no record of any definite Spartiate Olympic victories until 448 when Arkesilaos’ first victory initiated the unparalleled string of seven victories out of eight Olympiads, achieved by no fewer than six different Spartiates, which Moretti places between 448 and 420. After 420 the Spartiates were banned from competing until they disciplined Elis at the end of the Peloponnesian war (Xen. Hell. 3.2.21-31). But then further victories followed in the first third of the fourth century, not only those listed in Table 4.2, but also one by Eurybiades in the four-horse chariot race for foals in 384 and by Euryleonis, a Spartiate woman, in the two-horse chariot race of 368 (Moretti nos. 396 & 418).
On its own this evidence suggests that participation in competitive horse breeding for chariot racing became more widespread and enthusiastic among leading citizens from the mid-fifth century. How reliably can the evidence for Olympic victories be used as an indicator of more general trends? It is true that some of the details of Moretti's catalogue are uncertain and that Olympic victors probably represent only a small subset of a larger field of competitors in both Panhellenic and purely local festivals. There can be little doubt, however, concerning Moretti's overall schema which places the bulk of Spartiate victories after 450; and it is hard to believe that the their sudden virtual monopoly of victories in this period does not reflect some significant deep-rooted development.

Further evidence of such a development comes from the uniquely rich testimony of the dedication to Athena set up by Damonon which records 47 four-horse chariot-race and 21 horse-race victories won by himself and his son at nine different local festivals in Lakonia and Messenia over a period of at least twelve years. The dedication has normally been dated to the 440s or 430s (cf. Jeffery 1961, 196f. & 201 no. 52); but more recently a date in the early fourth century was suggested by the late Miss Jeffery (1981; 1988; 1991, 448) on the grounds of the style of its relief as well as of the letter forms. One aspect of the uniqueness of the Damonon inscription deserves emphasis. Although Jeffery (1990, 196) claims that it is "the crowning example" of a type of local Lakonian inscription of which there are many incomplete examples from the mid-sixth century onwards,
it should be noted that none of the victory lists or dedications in her catalogue (1990, 198ff. & 446ff.) definitely relates to chariot racing. A number concern athletic events, and of a further eleven whose event is unknown (nos. 30, 41-48, 50 & 51b) only four certainly come from Sparta itself. Evidence for Spartiate forerunners of Damonon in the period before 450 is at present lacking.

If the lower dating is correct, Damonon’s activities may fit into the context of the criticisms which King Agesilaos II made against those who bred horses for chariot racing (Xen. Ages. 9.6), arguing that such studs were a mark only of wealth not of manly virtue (andragathia). Agesilaos’ criticism is a clear indication that in the early fourth century many leading Spartiates were exploiting their wealth in this way to enhance their status. Damonon himself boasts no fewer than three times that his victories were won with fillies bred from his own mares and his own stallion (lines 15-17, 20-3 & 27-9). His self-advertisement was, however, only a particularly blunt version of a practice already developed by Sparta’s Olympic four-horse chariot race victors. The victory dedications of ten of these eleven persons are known to us; and again a change is evident in the period after 450. It was then that Spartiate dedications at Olympia commenced the custom of including a statue representing the victor in place of the previous practice of dedicating only a model of the chariot. The culmination of this increased emphasis upon the personal prestige of the owner came with the dedications of Kyniska. These dedications included
model bronze horses in the pronaos of the temple of Zeus at Olympia and a statue group outside (consisting of chariot and team, driver and Kyniska herself) with an inscription acclaiming the first female Olympic triumph (Paus. 5.12.5; 6.1.6; IG V 1.1564a; Greek Anthology 13.16). A fragment of a small inscribed Doric capital and abacus (IG V 1.235) found at the Menelaion which bears her name and once supported a votive offering, probably dedicated (according to a plausible restoration of the inscription) to Helen (Woodward 1908/09, 86f.; Levi 1979, II 28 n.45), seems to be another of Kyniska’s victory offerings. That she was posthumously honoured in Sparta with a hero shrine (Paus. 3.15.1) demonstrates the prestige that chariot-race victories could bring.

Kyniska’s involvement in this self-glorification was doubly ironic: first, because her brother Agesilaos had supposedly urged her to emulate Spartiate male chariot owners precisely in order to discredit the sport; secondly, because he also scorned the making of personal statues as being appropriate to wealth rather than virtue (Xen. Ages. 11.7; Plut. Ages. 2.2). Behind Agesilaos’ criticism of chariot-horse breeding and personal statues there clearly lurked a fear that his rivals might outstrip him in prestige. To this threat he himself responded not by spurning horse breeding but by rearing many horses for the army (Xen. Ages. 9.6). He thus took advantage of another avenue for gaining status by horse breeding which had opened up in 424 when Sparta began to use a cavalry of its own for the first time (Thuc. 4.55). By the early fourth century the cavalry, some 600
strong, was a regular part of the army and the horses were provided by the very rich (Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.11).

In view of this evidence for the late-fifth-century development of competitive breeding of horses, whether for chariot racing or the cavalry, it comes as no surprise that almost 9% of adult Spartiates known to us by name in the period 432-362 have names incorporating the words *hippos* (horse) or *polos* (foal), compared with less than 3% in the preceding period from c.600 to 433;\(^{18}\) or that horses were one of the main topics of conversation between Kings Agesilaos and Agesipolis II (Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.20); or that the early-fourth-century (Platonic) dialogue *Alkibiades I*, after highlighting the size of Spartiate estates, should single out their horses for special mention among all the other livestock grazing in Messenia (122D). Equally noteworthy is Isokrates’ criticism (6.55) that citizens were still devoting their resources to "feeding teams of ravenous horses", even when Sparta was in dire straits after the loss of Messenia in 370/69. Attitudes and behaviour in late-fifth- and early-fourth-century Sparta are a perfect exemplification of Aristotle’s generalization (*Pol.* 1289b33-5) that among wealthy Greeks the number of horses a man kept was a determinant of social differentiation.

In sum, the evidence for the increased concentration upon horse breeding as a source of prestige suggests that, although disparities in wealth had long been one important factor among several determinants of social differentiation, their
significance had increased considerably by the mid-fifth century and continued to develop thereafter. This picture of Sparta’s development reminds one of the transition from the timocratic state to the oligarchic state described in Plato’s Republic (547A-555B). Although an artificial construct, Plato’s ‘ideal type’ of the timocratic state is clearly influenced by the Sparta of real life (cf. esp. 547B-D). It is essentially a compromise between virtue and wealth which changes towards oligarchy as new ways of expenditure are invented, and wealth and wealthy men become esteemed more highly than virtue and men of merit. Eventually status becomes equated with the possession of wealth. Plato’s model of the changes occurring within his ideal timocratic state, based upon his perception of contemporary political realities, provides a valuable corroboration of the developments suggested above.

V. Spartiate population trends: causes and effects

We are now in a position in the following two sections to investigate two related hypotheses which are suggested by the evidence just considered. The first hypothesis, already suggested by some earlier scholars (e.g. Burckhardt 1898-1902, IV. 102; Busolt & Swoboda 1920-6, II. 602) is that the upsurge of ambition in horse breeding was connected with the twin processes of decline in citizen numbers and concentration of property. If our picture of the increasing importance of
economic stratification from the mid-fifth century onwards is correct, there should be some evidence of parallel developments in these spheres. The second hypothesis, which will be treated mainly in Section VI, concerns the significance of Spartiate marriage practices. Given the high degree of association which Goody has detected between economic stratification and several of the marriage practices discussed earlier, it is plausible to suggest that they increased in frequency as the fifth century progressed.

These hypotheses fit in well with certain trends observable in Sparta’s demographic history. As Figueira (1986, 178) has pointed out, Spartiate population trends up to the Persian wars appear to have been rather different from those evident from the later fifth century onwards when the citizen body was declining in numbers. Herodotus (1.66) connects the Spartans’ aggression against Tegea in the early sixth century with their strength in numbers. The purpose of their campaign was to divide Tegean territory among themselves with the natives as helots. They may have put this into effect in the Thyreatis after winning it from Argos in c.545. In the ‘Battle of the Champions’, which was part of this successful campaign, the Spartiates were prepared to face the loss of 300 warriors in a fight to the death against an equal number of Argives (Hdt. 1.82). C.520 Dorieus, disgruntled that the kingship had been given to his half-brother Kleomenes I, was permitted to take a body of Spartiates with him on his colonial expedition (Hdt. 5.42). This evidence for the period up to c. 520 suggests a need for additional land, which may be an
indication that impoverishment of poorer families was perceived as at least a potential danger; but otherwise there is no hint that citizen numbers were anything but buoyant.

Recently, Sallares (1991, 213f.; cf. 170f.) has criticized the idea that Archaic Sparta had a populous and stable social and demographic system, partly in line with his general thesis that human population dynamics are inherently unstable, partly on the grounds that Sparta’s age class system had the effect of restricting population growth throughout her history. It is a particular weakness of Sallares’ argument that he fails to consider the literary evidence outlined above, and his general arguments can also be combatted. ‘Populous’ and ‘stable’ are not the same. His argument about population instability is indisputable, but does not rule out a Spartan population increase in the Archaic period. Nor do the regulatory effects of the age class system. Sallares himself (150f.) notes that Sparta’s marriage pattern (late marriage for males, early marriage – relatively – for females) lay at only an intermediate level of demographic restriction, being less restrictive than those of early modern England and France which themselves attained an average completed family size as high as 8.42 children for women who married at age 20. As Sallares emphasizes both throughout his book (esp. Part II, ch.2) and specifically with reference to Sparta (170f.), it was the combination of a regulatory marriage pattern with limitations of resources (in Sparta’s case owing to excessive property concentration) which led to population decline, not the former alone. In the lengthy period before
property concentration started to have a serious impact upon poor Spartiates (cf. Section I above) there was potential for moderately steady demographic growth.

At the time of the second Persian invasion the homoioi were said to number as many as 8,000 (Hdt. 7.234) and in 480 the Spartiates despatched 300 men to Thermopylai, men whom Leonidas was ultimately willing to sacrifice in battle. The selection of only men with sons suggests some concern to preserve lineages from extinction; but whether this betokens a concern about declining citizen numbers is unclear. By the later fifth and early fourth centuries, however, the trends evident in the sixth century had clearly been reversed. In 425 when considerably fewer than 300 citizens were trapped on Sphakteria and about 120 of them subsequently captured, the Spartans were demoralized and went to great lengths to ensure their survival and return (Thuc. 4.14-41, 108, 117; 5.15). The figures for Lakedaimonian armies, however precisely one interprets them, and (pace Lazenby 1985; cf. Hodkinson 1986b) the incorporation of perioikoi into formerly exclusively Spartiate regiments show that citizen numbers were in decline. Aristotle, viewing the whole process with the benefit of hindsight, attests the phenomenon of widespread impoverishment and loss of citizen status (Pol. 1270a15-b6; 1271a26-37).

This outline of Sparta’s demographic trends appears to indicate that both gradual and dramatic change were involved. The implications of the sixth-century population buoyancy are
well summarized by Wrigley’s observation (1978, 149) that at normal pre-industrial mortality levels there must always be a substantial number of large families if demographic decline is to be avoided. The evidence that for a considerable period, up to at least the late sixth century, this did not lead to such significant poverty as to cause a widespread loss of status and decline in citizen numbers is compatible with the argument in Section I that under a system of universal female inheritance landed inequalities would develop at a comparatively more moderate rate with a lesser degree of impoverishment of the poor. But even under this system, as inequalities gradually deepened, the requirement of compulsory mess contributions made it unavoidable that in the long run Spartiate numbers would either decline through family limitation or shrink through economic disqualification. By the later fifth century one or (more probably) both of these processes were fully under way.

The concentration of property suggested by the upsurge in competitive horse breeding developed, therefore, as part of a gradual long-term process. We should not, however, ignore the question whether short-term contingent events may have dramatically exacerbated the impact of long-term demographic trends. The quarter century from the second Persian invasion to the battle of Tanagra in 458 (or 457) was an extremely difficult period militarily during which Spartiate manpower is bound to have suffered. After the loss of almost 300 men at Thermopylai, 91 Spartiates were killed the following year at Plataia (Hdt. 9.70). At some time during the 470s and 460s, in
addition to a campaign in Thessaly (Hdt. 6.72), the Spartans had to meet two serious challenges in the battles of Tegea and Dipaieis (Hdt. 9.35). At the latter battle they had to fight against great odds - in a single line, according to the exaggerated account of Isokrates (6.99) - against almost all the Arkadians; although victorious, they may have suffered significant losses. Then in the helot and Messenian revolt of the 460s at least one contingent of 300 men was wiped out and there was a major battle at 'the Isthmos' or Ithome (Hdt. 9.35, 64). Finally, there were great losses at the battle of Tanagra in which 1,500 Lakedaimonian troops were involved (Thuc. 1.107-8).

In addition, there was the great earthquake that struck Sparta c.465 which several scholars have seen as a turning-point in Spartan demographic history, although most recent accounts have been inclined to minimize its importance (e.g. Ste. Croix 1972, 331f.; Cartledge 1979, 307ff.; Cozzoli 1979, 59ff.). Of the main sources, Thucydides (1.128.1; 3.54.5; cf. also 1.101.2; 2.27.2; 4.56.2) suggests that the earthquake had a major impact, but is restrained concerning details. Diodorus (11.63; 15.66.4), probably following Ephorus, claims that more than 20,000 Lakedaimonians perished, including most of the male citizens, many of them through the collapse of their homes during the course of a prolonged series of shocks. Plutarch (Kimon 16.4-5) states that only five houses remained undemolished and he narrates a suspiciously dramatic story in which the neaniskoi fortuitously escaped the deaths suffered by the ephēboi through
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dashing out in pursuit of a hare just before the collapse of the stoa inside which they had been exercising.

In my original publication of this chapter (Hodkinson 1989, 103ff.) I attempted, following the example of Toynbee (1969, 346ff.) and Figueira (1986, 177ff. & 181ff.), to model statistically the possible impact of deaths in the earthquake and in the following helot revolt upon subsequent Spartiate demographic trends. Assuming, in particular, the elimination of the 18-19 year old ἐφέβοι and heavy casualties among women, girls and boys under age seven trapped in their homes while their menfolk were outdoors, I concluded that the disruption of fecundable marriages would have been such as to cause future fertility levels to be appreciably lower than mortality levels, thus fixing a considerably lower ceiling for Spartiate numbers.

I am now, however, considerably less sanguine concerning the feasibility and fruitfulness of that exercise, partly on empirical, partly on theoretical grounds. My empirical doubts concern not so much the extent of destruction and loss of life caused by the earthquake as the difficulty of knowing - or even guessing - which sections of the population were most affected. Although Diodorus' figure of 20,000 deaths seems an exaggeratedly round number, Thucydides - as noted above - indicates the magnitude of the event and Plutarch's precise statement about the number of surviving houses suggests access to a carefully-informed Hellenistic source (Ducat 1984, 78f.). Plutarch's story of the fortunate escape of the neaniskoi and deaths of the
ephēboi, however, is in a different category. As Ducat has pointed out, its ethical paradox (the saving of the undisciplined neaniskoi, who acted contrary to Spartiate standards) and the implausible presence of a Hellenistic-style gymnasium building in fifth-century Sparta, plus the use of non-Classical terms for the age classes, all point to subsequent invention. Although the collective tomb named Seismatias mentioned by Plutarch presumably did exist, that it contained an entire age class of ephēboi, as he claimed, is open to doubt. (I was in error in stating (1989, 103) that Plutarch himself saw the tomb; the text does not authorize such a conclusion.) No less problematic than the elimination of the 18-19 year olds are the supposed heavier than average casualties among females and young boys, which are not mentioned in any ancient evidence and are a product of modern guesswork. Plutarch makes no mention at all of persons being trapped in their homes. Diodorus, who does, fails to specify precisely whom and writes in general only of the large number of deaths among adult males. If there is any truth in his picture of a series of separate shocks, several might have taken place at night when adults of both sexes would have been at home. Our ignorance of the precise categories of persons most affected means, consequently, that previous attempts at model calculations, including my own, are built upon sand. 

Theoretically, too, there are problems in utilizing presumed earthquake deaths to deduce the parameters for subsequent Spartiate demographic trends. This is not just because of the difficulty of choosing an appropriate model life table and the
fact, recently stressed by Sallares (1991, 415f.), that model
life tables are static constructs which can be used to make only
linear predictions, whereas the dynamics of human populations are
inherently non-linear. Even more fundamentally, as he has also
pointed out (e.g. 114f.), the determining factor in human
population dynamics is not levels of mortality but rates of
fertility, and these latter may change rapidly in response to
altered conditions; hence the correct observation that
"populations recover quickly from such natural disasters unless
there are inherent factors independently causing decline" (Ste.
Croix 1972, 332; cf. Le Bras 1969, with a more nuanced approach
to the question of perturbations in a population’s age
structure). This means that to argue that the deaths caused
during the earthquake and subsequent helot revolt had a lasting
impact upon Spartiate population levels, one must identify ways
in which those mortalities could have hindered the acceleration
of fertility and birth rates which one might expect after these
disasters. In his examination of the Athenian epidemic of 430-27
Sallares (1991, 258ff.) was able to establish a link with
fertility rates, owing to the known effects of smallpox in
causing high rates of spontaneous abortions, miscarriages and
damage to male reproductive organs. In spite of these effects,
Athenian population levels relatively soon recovered, although
with some short-term distortions of age structure (Thuc. 6.26.2,
qualified by Sallares ibid. 259f.). Sparta’s earthquake and
battle casualties will have had no such direct impact upon
fertility rates - at most a marginal impact through trauma
effects upon pregnant women and a certain reduction in frequency of coitus owing to increased campaigning!

If one is to discover a longlasting impact of the increased mortalities of the 460s, it must be sought in its effects on the distribution of property. Thucydides (2.53) states that during the Athenian epidemic,

"Seeing how quick and abrupt were the changes of fortune which came to the rich who suddenly died and to those who had previously had nothing but now inherited their wealth, people now began openly to venture upon acts of self-indulgence which before then they used to keep dark".

In his concern to delineate the moral decline caused by the epidemic Thucydides concentrates upon public perceptions, which, as usual, focused upon the exceptional rather than the ordinary event. But the passage draws attention to the effect that increased and unexpected mortality has in accelerating the normal ongoing process of property devolution and in doing so abruptly and prematurely, often before property owners have had chance to found families or make planned arrangements for its disposition.

So too in the late 460s many Spartiates will have inherited additional land which would not otherwise have come their way. For example, many will have gained larger inheritances, either immediately or later, through, for example, the sudden death of siblings, nephews or nieces who would have been entitled to a share in the parental property or of parents who would otherwise have produced more children. The essential points for our purpose are threefold. First, the gradual development of inequalities discussed in Section I will have been powerfully
accelerated by the premature replacement in many cases of one generation (and sometimes more) of landowners. Secondly, although citizens of all levels of wealth will have benefited from such random mortality, the overall result will have been increased economic differentiation. Richer persons with deceased relatives will have gained considerably more property in comparison not only with those whose relatives survived but also with beneficiaries from poorer backgrounds, simply because their deceased relatives will themselves generally have had a greater actual or potential inheritance. No doubt there were some exceptionally fortunate poor men who inherited great wealth, as in Athens; but in general the greater cohesion of the wealthy elite in Sparta's more exclusively land-based economy is likely to have reduced the frequency of this phenomenon. Thirdly, there will have been an increased number of wealthy heiresses. This is likely to have stimulated both a higher level of movement of wealth between different lineages (to the advantage, doubtless, of the rich) and a greater than normal competition for securing economic advantageous marriages. These factors would tie in with the evidence for the increased importance of wealth as a determinant of status in the following decades. It is in this economic context that the casualties of the 460s may have had an impact upon future levels of fertility, a suggestion which will be explored further in the following section.
VI. Changing marriage patterns: causes and effects

It was the increasing concentration of property resulting from the combined impact of the above long- and short-term factors which, I suggest, enabled and stimulated leading Spartiates to develop their passion for horse breeding; and their very success and the status it brought probably exercised reciprocal effects by promoting an increased acquisitiveness at the expense of poorer citizens. It is in this context that I would posit the increasing significance of the marriage practices discussed earlier (homogamy, close-kin marriage, wife-borrowing, uterine half-sibling marriage and polyandry) which served to retain land within the kin group and to limit the number of heirs. These were all means by which wealthy families could seek to ensure that the property of their descendants was maintained in a society in which their status increasingly depended upon it. These methods could also help poor families to avoid slipping still further into impoverishment in an age in which marriage above one's station is likely to have been harder than ever to achieve.

Other factors may also have contributed to these developments. In some societies increased levels of in-marriage or systematic exchange of siblings between families have been known to occur as a response to a perceived need for solidarity in situations of 'environmental stress' (Rosenfeld 1976, 126; Okely 1983, esp. 175ff.). The crises of the 470s-450s were indeed serious - loss of leadership over the eastern Greeks,
serious disaffection from her Peloponnesian allies (Andrewes 1952), an internal threat to her way of life from the regent Pausanias (or at least one advertised as such by the Spartan authorities), the major helot revolt whose deep-rooted effect on Spartiate mentality is emphasized by Thucydides (5.14.3), a dangerous war with newly-democratic and imperialist Athens and the disfavour of the god Poseidon manifested in the shattering earthquake. These combined stresses may have developed a general sense of insecurity in a universally hostile environment and a psychological need to 'marry-in'. Moreover, close-kin marriage could in part have resulted from attempts to restore the size of the holdings of one's descendants at a time of economic crisis, as in areas of early modern Cumbria (M.T. Smith & Challands, unpub.). The long helot revolt of the late 460s may have caused difficulties for many citizens in getting sufficient produce from their estates, especially among poorer Spartiates a greater proportion of whose estates may been in Messenia, making close-kin marriages appear a prudent means of guarding against future crises by ensuring that existing holdings remained within the kin group and did not have to contribute to the upkeep of spouses (and their children) drawn from outside the kin.

This variety of potential influences suggests that there were strong reasons in mid-fifth-century Sparta for the growth of marriage customs aimed at concentrating property and limiting the number of heirs. These may also have been supplemented by more direct efforts at family limitation within marriage, although the evidence is not clear on this subject. Sallares
I. has argued that the populations of Archaic and Classical Greece were 'natural fertility populations' which did not in aggregate practice family limitation. The evidence is, however, either too generic or too specific to Attica to exclude exceptions among particular Greek populations at particular times. Some of the main motives for high fertility which he mentions - the need for more large families who could work for their parents' subsistence in old age and provide additional family labour and income - did not apply among citizens who lived off helot labour. The situation in late-fifth- and early-fourth-century Sparta appears more similar to the general conditions of Hellenistic Greece which Sallares (1991, 101f.; 158ff.) argues were responsible for the emergence of widespread voluntary family limitation - namely, shortage of land for poorer citizens and among richer families a desire to save wealth for lifetime consumption and to prevent estate subdivision (cf. Plb. 36.17.7). The incentives for Spartiates to bear additional sons (Arist. Pol. 1270a39-b6) may also suggest perception on the part of the authorities of a tendency to limit family sizes. There is also the possibility that among some families struggling on the borderline of citizen status the need to give priority to maintaining the mess contributions led to a decline in nutritional provision for female and younger members of the household which may have affected rates of fertility and child mortality.

When added to the long-term effects of the inheritance system and the dramatic short-term increase in mortality of the
460s, all these developments are likely to have made a major contribution to Sparta's demographic problems. At this point my analysis differs from that of Figueira (1986, 177 & 180f.), who suggests that Spartiate numbers may have resumed a slow increase after the earthquake until the disaster at Pylos in 425. He doubts whether a fall in the birth rate could account for the extent of Sparta's citizen decline.\(^2\) I would argue, however, that it is within the context of the combination of factors discussed above that the growth of marriage practices which concentrated property and limited the number of heirs became of critical importance in helping to bring about a decline in Spartiate numbers which cannot all be dated after the start of the Peloponnesian war. Wrigley (1978, 149) has pointed out that at normal rates of mortality in pre-industrial communities, a society

"would run into great difficulties if any significant proportion of the population was so moved by concern for solving its immediate problems of heirship that it kept family sizes down to a level that appeared rational in the local context of the immediate nuclear family".

Among the Spartiates, a closed elite with virtually no recruitment from outside and an economic qualification for continued membership, the difficulties created by the combination of factors referred to above must have been considerably more serious than even those posited by Wrigley.

In the original publication of this chapter (Hodkinson 1989, 107ff.) I suggested, basing my arguments on modern genetic theory, that the above difficulties might have been compounded by higher child mortality and (I might have added) reduced
fertility deriving from the deleterious effects of increased levels of inbreeding known as 'genetic load' (loss of fitness in terms of disease and survival). As I stressed, such genetic effects do not in themselves lead to population decline and, if population size is increasing, the long-term effect of increased mortality among the offspring of consanguineous marriages may be beneficial because recessive mutations will thereby tend to be selectively eliminated. Nevertheless, I suggested that within a population like that of Classical Sparta which was already in decline the genetic and demographic effects of higher levels of inbreeding could only have proved harmful.

Although not impossible, this analysis requires modification, since the situation is more complex than originally stated. First of all, as Khoury et al. indicate (1987, 252), "the concept of genetic load has been controversial in the literature... [and] this concept does not provide a clear picture of the importance of inbreeding as a determinant of mortality in human populations". Secondly, even assuming that the theory of the genetic ill-effects caused by inbreeding is basically correct, studies of the demographic impact of inbred marriages have led to divergent results (Khlat 1988, with refs.). Some report a significant reduction in fertility compared with non-consanguineous marriages; but others show elevated levels of fertility, and yet others no significant pattern. Elevation of fertility with inbreeding has, it is true, often been interpreted either as a reproductive compensation mechanism, a response to higher child mortality, or as attributable to reduced
maternal/fetal incompatibility as a result of accrued genetic homogeneity; but even these explanations have not always been found to apply.

Similarly, although some studies have indicated higher mortality among the offspring of consanguineous couples, others have reported no difference at all. Population genetics theory in fact predicts that progressive elimination of deleterious genes - and consequently a diminished impact of inbreeding - will occur not just in circumstances of population increase but generally under conditions of prolonged high levels of inbreeding (Coralli-Sforza & Bodmer 1971, 34ff.). It is also the case that many of the earlier studies (including some on which my original discussion in part relied) produced results which are now thought to have been considerably exaggerated owing to the inadequacy of their control groups, somewhat arbitrary modelling and failure to apply appropriate statistical techniques (Bittles & Makov 1988, 164). Finally, the fact that recent studies (e.g. Khoury et al. 1987, 259 & 261; Khlat 1988, 188) stress the variable effects of inbreeding on different populations according to varying genetic constitutions or environmental conditions indicates, as Sallares (1991, 235) has commented, that one cannot securely extrapolate from the theoretical possibility of deleterious genetic effects to their actuality in the specific case of Classical Sparta. As a recent general survey has concluded, "with the exception of incest and families known to carry deleterious recessive mutants, the risks to the offspring
of inbred unions generally are within the limits of acceptability" (Bittles & Makov 1988, 164).

Despite these reservations on the genetic issue, my analysis has uncovered a significant combination of other reasons why the apparently buoyant population trends of the sixth century were dramatically reversed from the fifth century onwards. From this perspective it becomes possible to comprehend the astonishing rate of decline in Spartiate numbers from 8,000 in 480 to a maximum of 1,500 in 371.

VII. The failure of Sparta’s leaders

It is possible not only that Sparta’s leaders were aware of the problem of the declining number of citizens, but also that they tried to counteract it by stimulating the birthrate in a variety of ways. First, the institutional controls upon the timing of male marriage seem to have been altered. In the fourth century Spartan males normally married in their twenties; but until age 30 they were severely restricted in performing the normal roles of a husband. They could not reside with their wives, meetings were limited and furtive, and they were prohibited from entering the market to obtain their family’s household necessities (Xen. Lak. Pol. 1.5; Plut. Lyk. 15.4; 25.1). These restrictions were, I suggest, developments from an earlier period when men were not permitted to marry until age 30 when they finally left the agōgē.
and became fully adult (cf. Sallares 1991, 176). At some point in Sparta's history, however, the male age of marriage was lowered; and in addition an upper age limit (perhaps 30) before which a man had to get married was imposed (Xen. Lak. Pol. 1.6; Plut. Lys. 30.4; Moralia 228A; Pollux 3.48; 8.40; cf. MacDowell 1986, 73ff.). Compulsory marriage (or, perhaps more accurately, compulsory procreation) was now enforced by elaborate sanctions against offenders (Xen. Lak. Pol. 9.5; Klearchos, fr.73 Wehrli; Plut. Lyk. 15.1-2; Moralia 227E-F; cf. Cartledge 1979, 310).

Secondly, incentives were introduced to encourage greater numbers of sons. Fathers of three sons were given exemption from military service and fathers of four exemption from all public duties (Arist. Pol. 1270a39-b6). In addition, older men with younger wives were permitted, and probably encouraged, to bring in younger men for the purpose of procreation. (Xen. Lak. Pol. 1.8; Plut. Lyk. 15.7). Even the practice of wife-borrowing may have been officially encouraged as a device to ensure that when a couple had decided to have no more children the woman's remaining fertile years should not be wasted.

Of course, we do not know the date(s) at which these various changes were introduced. Daube (1977), followed by Cartledge (1979, 309f.), suggested the period around 500 as the time when Sparta took legal steps to stimulate the procreation of embryonic warriors. This view has been criticized by MacDowell (1986, 76); but his argument that the sources almost invariably attribute the above measures to Lykourgos is a very weak reason for ascribing
them to a much earlier date. His discussion provides no historical context for their existence. Sallaress' argument (1991. 171) for an early date for their introduction manages to avoid this weakness. He argues that a stigma on bachelorhood may arise within an age class system when most members of a class have married and pressure grows upon bachelors to rectify their anomalous position. On this view such a stigma could have existed in early Sparta without reference to any manpower shortage. There is an important difference, however, between this type of pressure, however strong, and the state-imposed penalties attested in the Classical period; it is the introduction of the latter which we need to explain.

The dating of Daube and Cartledge certainly provides a plausible context. It was in the late sixth century that Sparta several times had to recognize the limitations of her capacity to campaign abroad (Hdt. 3.148; 5.49; 6.84; cf. also 6.108; Thuc. 3.68). I myself, however, would prefer the hypothesis that most of the changes itemized above were introduced during the mid- or late fifth century following the troubles of the 460s. I would place them alongside other reforms of this period which were intended to combat the growing threat of declining citizen numbers such as the brigading of perioikoi within the Spartiate ranks and the creation of the new military force of the neodamodeis (freed helots).

The problem was that these changes attacked only the symptoms of the malaise and ultimately failed. The incentives
for fathers of several sons were, as Aristotle (Pol. 1270b4-6) pointed out, positively harmful, since they led to still greater division of holdings and consequent impoverishment. The practice of wife-borrowing could, as we have seen, be turned into an instrument of family limitation and property concentration. Even the sanctions against failure to marry could be ignored by a leading citizen like Derkylididas (PB 228) without his forfeiting his prestigious overseas commands (Plut. Lyk. 15.2).

The one cardinal aspect of Sparta’s decline which requires explanation is the failure of Sparta’s leaders from the mid-fifth century onwards to tackle not just the symptoms but the roots of the malaise — namely, the economic difficulties facing poorer families. The problem required radical solutions such as a redistribution of land or a restructuring of the economic basis of the common messes and the link between mess membership and citizenship. Such solutions were never embraced and Sparta’s leaders chose, whether consciously or not, to take instead the soft options which led to the destruction of her hegemony.

This striking failure is of course partly explicable by the developments already discussed (particularly the concentration of landed property and its increased importance as a determinant of social status, with the associated patterns of attitudes and behaviour to which these gave rise), all of which gave rich, leading Spartiates a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. Their importance was still further increased by the impact of the Peloponnesian war and the resulting Spartan empire,
especially from c.412 when harmostships and other foreign posts became available in significant numbers for the first time. The process by which competition for these attractive positions is likely to have strengthened still further the influence of status-defining wealth and the pressures towards its concentration will be examined in detail in Chapter 5.

Quite apart from these developments, however, there are two further factors, closely connected with the themes of inheritance and marriage, which merit consideration in explaining the failure of leading citizens to tackle the roots of Sparta's problems. The first is the influence of women which has been the subject of increasing debate in recent years with different scholars adopting minimalist (Cartledge 1981) or maximalist (Kunstler 1983; 1986; Bradford 1986) interpretations of the independent role of women within Spartan society. The Spartan polis was of course a male club which excluded women from most of its public institutions. Their primary role was, as Plato (Laws 805E) observed, to be active in running the home and managing the household. Plato was referring to married women, whose personal influence within the household may often have been significant owing to their husbands' frequent absence performing their many compulsory and time-consuming public duties, such as residence in the barracks until age 30, daily commitments in the gymnasium and common messes and periodic absence on campaign.

This influence will have been augmented considerably by female ownership of a not insignificant proportion of the
property belonging to the household. The woman’s position was further enhanced by several of the marriage practices considered above, especially those whose significance increased during the fifth century. Her comparatively late age of marriage combined with the lowering of the male age at marriage made her less unequal in terms of seniority to her husband. Furthermore, not only was she secure from the possibility of the importation of additional wives owing to the practice of male monogamy, but there were circumstances in which she could legitimately take on additional partners. When describing the custom of wife-borrowing, the first motive which Xenophon (Lak. Pol. 1.9) stresses is that "the women want to take charge of two households". Similarly, polyandry should be seen as a practice by which the status of the woman was underlined, not undermined. The background to polyandrous marriages must usually have been that the woman was wealthier than any of her male partners and that the sons of the marriage were dependent upon the inheritance of her property for the maintenance of their status. The development of these marriage practices in the fifth century, therefore, probably meant an increase in the influence of rich married women. Studies of Classical Athens where women were less advantaged than in Sparta have noted several examples of female initiative and influence in the affairs of their households (Schaps 1979, 76f.; Gould 1980, 49f.; Foxhall 1989). One would expect such initiatives in Sparta to be both more frequent and more effective. Redfield (1977/78) has indeed pointed to the reputation of the women as fierce enforcers of their menfolk’s observance of the Spartiate code. The rationale
for this was that the public performance of its male members
influenced the prestige of the household, and thereby the status
of its womenfolk, not least because it affected the capacity of
the household to contract advantageous marriages for its
daughters.

Traditionally, therefore, there was an identity of purpose
between the polis and the female-influenced household which
reinforced official codes of conduct. During the later fifth
century, however, this identity of purpose between women and the
polis may have been seriously weakened by the increasing
importance of wealth rather than adherence to the Spartiate code
as a determinant of status. This happened precisely at the time
when the influence of women was increasing. The two developments
were in fact closely linked, since it was greater economic
differentiation which led to the changes in marriage practices
which increased female influence; and for the benefit of their
children women (or at least wealthy ones) probably supported
these new practices which themselves fuelled the growth of
economic differentiation. Aristotle was obviously aware of this
link when he pointed to the connection between female influence
and the esteem given to wealth (Pol. 1269b23-4). Wealthy women
now had both the motive for promoting the interests of their own
households to the detriment of poorer families and also more
authority to make their wishes effective through their influence
upon the behaviour of their husbands. This is precisely what
Aristotle complained about in his rhetorical question: "in the
time of their empire many things were controlled by the women;
and indeed what difference does it make whether the women rule or the rulers are ruled by women?" (Pol. 1269b31-4). In the long run it was the wealthy female descendants of these women who were among the chief beneficiaries of the breakdown of the Spartiate code which followed the decline of Sparta's hegemony. This is vividly illustrated in the description of life in mid-third century Sparta in Plutarch's biography of King Agis IV (4; 6.4; 7.3-5), in which we see them holding great wealth and wielding considerable informal public influence in obstructing Agis' proposed redistribution of land which would have robbed them of their status and power. In explanations of Sparta's failure to make fundamental reforms in the late fifth and early fourth centuries the role of wealthy women should similarly not be overlooked.

Secondly, I would draw attention to the direct social implications of the new marriage patterns themselves, and in particular the emphasis upon homogamy and the exchange of sons and daughters in the context of wife-sharing and uterine half-sibling marriage. Here we can contrast the situation in modern Greece, as analysed by Ernestine Friedl (1962, 64f.). As in ancient Sparta, children of both sexes inherit from both father and mother, and daughters typically receive their portion at marriage. But the rules of the Greek Orthodox church and the Civil Code of the Greek state prohibit exchange marriages; and this prohibition "prevents the transfer of property at marriage from resulting in either a series of equal exchanges between two sets of kin groups or in regular pattern of circulation through
several generations among particular sets of such groups”. In Sparta, which lacked such restrictions, I suspect that the opposite may have occurred, with huge landholdings circulating among networks of wealthy families who became closely associated through exchange marriages. In this way, I suggest, an elite was maintained and the social hierarchy hardened.

The net effect, I submit, was the formation of separate interest groups within Spartiate society. This is our final clue to the failure of Sparta’s leaders to remedy the economic problems facing poorer families. The social distance between rich and poor, firmly entrenched by the patterns of marriage which arose out of the need to cope with inheritance by diverging devolution, particularly in the changed conditions from the mid-fifth century onwards, sowed the seeds for the development of two poleis, a polis of the rich and a polis of the poor, as Plato (Republic 551D) expressed it in his account of the degeneration of the timocratic state into oligarchy - a description influenced, as we saw earlier, by his perception of contemporary Sparta. As in Plato’s theoretical state, so also in Classical Sparta, the first polis had no interest in alleviating the distress of the second. As with the influence of women, we can see these two poleis clearly differentiated in the mid-third century, when of the 700 remaining Spartiates there were only a hundred with large estates (Plut. Agis 5.4, following the interpretation of this passage by Fuks 1962) who throughout Agis’ brief reign were implacably opposed to the reforms desired by the other 600 poorer citizens.
For these reasons, therefore, leading Spartiates ignored the economic problems of poorer citizens, and the unity and identity of purpose among the *homoioi* created by the seventh-century compromise over landownership finally broke down. The rich became richer, while poorer families lost their citizen status and Spartiate numbers continued their rapid decline. After her defeat at Leuktra Sparta had insufficient manpower to prevent the Thebans from liberating Messenia or to regain it afterwards. From being the leading power in sixth-century Greece, a position created and sustained by her large population among whom land was shared with a modicum of fairness such that each family possessed at least an adequate sufficiency, Sparta dropped in the fourth century to the level of a second-rate *polis* with a minute citizen body rent by socio-economic divisions. In this transition from hegemon to local wrangler we have seen that the roles of the inheritance system and of changing marriage patterns were critically important. In these ways the subjects of inheritance, marriage and demography can be seen to shed light upon both the reasons for Sparta’s long-term success and the problem of her ultimate decline.
Footnotes to Chapter 4

1. Cartledge (1987, ch.21) provides a convenient analytical summary of the most important ancient and modern interpretations of the Spartan crisis.

2. Barley is a more reliable crop than wheat, and was consequently the staple cereal for much of Greek antiquity, because it can tolerate a greater degree of drought. The critical minimum amount of precipitation during the growing season (roughly October - May) is around 200mm for barley, 300mm for wheat: Halstead (1984, Section 2.8).

3. This initial equal distribution of land is of course an entirely fictional construct whose sole purpose is to depict in sharper relief the different degrees of inequality generated by the two inheritance systems. The figure of 10,000 couples is simply a convenient round number of the approximate order of magnitude for the size of the Spartiate citizen body at its apogee, being the factor of 10 closest to the figure of 8,000 homoioi put by Herodotus (7.234) into the mouth of King Damaratos in 480. It does not imply belief in the veracity of the figure of 10,000 Spartiates which some fourth-century writers mentioned with reference to former times (Arist. Pol. 1270a36-7).

4. The distribution used in this study derives from the work of Professor E.A. Wrigley and Dr. R.M. Smith, who have produced a number of distribution tables employing varying assumptions regarding fertility and mortality rates and rising, stationary
and declining populations: cf. Wrigley (1978, 135ff., Tables 3.1-3.3); Smith ed. (1984, 44ff., Tables 1.2-1.7). Table 4.1 represents my own extrapolation from these published tables, which I have extended to cover combinations of surviving daughters as well as sons. This extrapolation has been cross-checked against similar, unpublished calculations made by Dr. Smith, then subjected to minor adjustments to render the population stationary.

5. Rowlandson (1983, chs.2-3, esp. 155), where she notes that the Egyptians' reputation for casualness about their numbers of offspring may stem from the availability of public land. Contrast the incentives Sparta had to offer to fathers of several sons (Arist. Pol. 1270b3-4). The comparative lack of public land in Sparta is evident from Aristotle's contrast (Pol. 1272a13-21) between the Spartan and Cretan methods of supporting the public messes.

6. On the association of polyandry with "systems in which women as well as men are the bearers of property-rights", Leach (1955, 185).

7. As I have pointed out (Hodkinson 1987, 232), MacDowell (1986, 86) confuses Polybius' attestation of polyandry with the practice of wife-sharing which he mentions immediately afterwards. MacDowell is consequently wrong to state that Polybius' evidence should be rejected.

8. Xen. Lak. Pol. 1.6; Plut. Lyk. 15.4; Cartledge (1981, 94f.); MacDowell (1986, 72f.). Note, however, that a delay in marriage
can sometimes have beneficial effects on fertility, since "women who marry young... will be particularly at risk because of the strains already made on their resources during puberty": Higgins (1985, 115).


10. Of course every typical pattern has its exceptions, and one such seems to have been the second marriage of Eupolia (PB 312), daughter of Melesippidas, to an otherwise unknown Theodoros. In view of the fact that Eupolia's first marriage had been to King Archidamos II (Plut. Ages. 1.1) and that her new kinsfolk were poor (Xen. Ages. 4.5; Plut. Ages. 4.1), it seems likely that Eupolia remarried down the economic scale - although probably still within the social elite, since the name of the son of the marriage, Teleutias, suggests a link with the family of the well-born commander Pedaritos (PB 599; for further discussion, see Ch.1, Section II (d)). What is of interest, however, in this case is the fact that King Agesilaos II, her son from her first marriage, was concerned to redress this economic imbalance by giving these kin a generous gift of property. (There is no evidence for the assumption of Hamilton (1991, 13) that Eupolia herself was from a poor background; Xenophon states that it was her kinsmen who were poor.)

11. The account which brings out most clearly the many complexities involved in this controversy is the judicious
discussion of Andrewes (in Gomme et al. 1945-81, IV. 111ff.), who ultimately reaches his own conclusion only "with misgiving".

12. This table is based upon the catalogue of Olympic victors in Moretti (1957 & 1970); cf. Hönle (1972, ch.5, esp. 129f.). I have omitted the victory of Diaktoridas in 456 (Moretti no. 278). Moretti suggests that he may have been Spartiate owing to the identity of his name with that of the father of King Leotychidas' second wife. His state of origin, however, is not known and the name is also found in Thessaly and elsewhere.

13. There is some doubt about the date of Lykinos' victory, since Pausanias (5.8.10) states that he won the chariot race for full-grown horses only after one of his animals had been disqualified from entering the race for teams of foals. This race was not introduced until 384. Since most scholars, however, have disputed the authenticity of this story and decided in favour of a fifth-century date for Lykinos' victory, I have adhered to this dating. For the arguments, Frazer (1898, I. 588; IV. 4); Hyde (1921, 24 & 259f.).

14. I have retained Moretti's original (1957) dating for Xenarches' victory, even though he subsequently (1970) acknowledged the doubts concerning this dating raised by Hönle in her dissertation of 1968 (1972, 154 n.3). Hönle argued that an earlier date would better suit the context of Pausanias' reference to Xenarches and that, since Pausanias does not state which equestrian event he won, it could have been one of the other contests of 428, such as the horse race whose victor is
given as unknown in Moretti's catalogue. It is more likely, however, that Xenarches achieved his success in the four-horse chariot race than in any other event because his name stands at the head of a list of known chariot-race victors.

15. Beazley (1956, 369: 'Leagros group' no. 112). Cf. also the dedication of Alkibiadas at Delphi, possibly for a chariot-race victory, discussed in Ch.1 n.6.

16. IG V 1.213; I know of no published translation of this important inscription. I have calculated the minimum period of twelve years by adding the eight victories at the festivals of Poseidon at Thouria and of Arintia mentioned in lines 18-19 & 24-5 to the four different ephoral years specified in lines 66, 73-4, 81 & 90.

17. Compare the chariot dedications of Euagoras and Polypeithes (Paus. 6.10.8; 16.6) with the statue dedications of Anaxandros and Polykles (6.1.7), Xenarches, Lykinos, Arkesilaos and Lichas (6.2.1-3); Leon (Polemon Periegetes, apud scholion on Euripides, Hippolytos 231 = Müller, FHG iii. 122; Eustathius, Comm. on Iliad 2.852).


19. Such a combination of "raisons accidentales" and "raisons permanentes" has been suggested by Andreades (1931).
20. Contrast the precise age- and sex-specific mortality rates derived from research into the epidemiology of smallpox which Sallares (1992, 258ff.) was able to use to deduce the likely demographic impact of the Athenian epidemic of 430–27.

21. One reason for Figueira’s view is the importance he attaches to a putative change in the inheritance system in the late fifth century. According to him (184ff. & 193ff.), the supposedly traditional life tenancy of a klēros was abandoned in favour of partible inheritance and rights of alienation over one’s land. For the spurious historicity of life tenancy, however, and the existence of rights of individual inheritance and of alienation throughout the classical period, cf. Ch.2 above.

22. The position of married women should be contrasted with that of unmarried girls whose marriages may have been subjected to increasing control in the same period as the trends towards homogamous and close-kin marriages developed. This contrast is a common phenomenon in societies with female property ownership; as Goody (1976b, 21) notes, "where they are more propertied they are initially less free as far as marital arrangements go, though the unions into which they enter are more likely to be monogamous (or even polyandrous)."
The outbreak of war with Athens in 431 marked for Sparta the beginning of an extended period of warfare outside her traditional sphere of influence within the Peloponnese which lasted, with only temporary interruptions, for a period of 60 years. This prolonged external engagement was a new factor in Spartan history. Her earlier campaigns outside the Peloponnese had been spasmodic and brief; but in this period Spartiate officers (a term I shall henceforth use to embrace men with various kinds of military responsibilities outside the regular citizen army under the command of a king) were involved in continual military activity abroad. In the central years of the period (412-386) Sparta created an unprecedented foreign empire. The effects of this prolonged foreign engagement are worthy of investigation, especially because the end of the period witnessed her rapid decline to the status of a second-rate power.

The particular concern of this chapter is with the impact of war and empire upon the Spartiate citizen body whose social system had by the end of the 370s reached a dual state of crisis. Not only had the number of citizens become so few that they were unable to prevent the "single blow" - as Aristotle put it (Politics 1270a33) - of defeat at Leuktra from leading on to more permanent catastrophes; but also at the very height of enemy invasion, when Sparta itself was under attack, some of those
citizens were secretly plotting revolution (Plutarch, *Agesilaos* 32.6; David 1980). For a citizen body which had long maintained a remarkable and genuine political cohesion, this latter crisis was a real setback which limited Sparta’s ability to defend her core territory. These twin crises of Spartiate society lay at the heart of her international decline; how much did they owe to the impact of prolonged foreign warfare and empire?

I. The limits of modern discussion

Surprisingly, there has been no sustained discussion of this question in most specialist books on Sparta. The most informed comment is to be found in the works of Moses Finley (1986) and Paul Cartledge (1987). It is worth quoting the relevant parts of Finley’s seminal article (1986, 168 & 177),

"Presumably a sufficient equilibrium could be maintained despite the pressures so long as the Spartans remained safely cocooned within their own world. But not when they were drawn abroad";

and again,

"Sparta’s tragedy thereafter stemmed from a familiar cause: she did not live in a vacuum.... Sparta was drawn into extensive military activity, genuinely military. That entailed... unprecedented opportunities for ambitious individuals, extensive travel abroad and a breach in the traditional xenophobia, the impossibility of holding the line against the seductions of wealth. The system could not and did not long survive. And so the final paradox is that her greatest military success destroyed the model military state".

Two typically trenchant Finleyesque passages which, however, beg some important questions: first, in the picture of a society
which, despite its tensions, remained in balance until its transformation proceeded only through the intervention of external factors; secondly, in the failure to indicate the precise linkage between foreign involvement and social collapse, the exact constituents of which are left unspecified.

Whilst endorsing Finley's "final paradox", Cartledge takes the argument a stage further. He surveys (1987, 34ff.) several areas of change associated with war and empire which, he suggests, precipitated the Spartan crisis: manpower shortage and changes in army-organization, changes in strategy and tactics, finance, individual Spartiates' involvement abroad and increased domestic conflicts. Locating these changes within the broader context of the problems of shortage of citizens (oliganthròpia) and of increasing concentration of property which, he argues, were the underlying components of Sparta's crisis, he contends (p. 168) that,

"the Athenian War registered a watershed. By bringing significant numbers of elite Spartans into sustained and intimate contact with hitherto unimaginined amounts of coined silver and gold, this war accelerated and gave a new twist to a process that had been underway since at least the mid-fifth century".

This account has the merit that it connects the impact of the war with longer-term internal developments, but the precise causal links between access to coinage and the concentration of property still remain unclear.

One reason for the elusive quality of even the best modern accounts is the lack of explicit statement of the precise
constituents of Sparta's internal crisis. Cartledge has correctly identified the twin developments of property concentration and *oliganthrôpia* as the central long-term phenomena. What processes, however, lay behind these developments? Following the discussion in Chapter 4 at least four factors can be identified.

First, there was a slow but steady trend towards inequality of landownership among citizens embedded in the combination of differential reproduction with a system of partible inheritance among both sons and daughters. By means of computer simulation it has been possible to demonstrate how this intrinsic trend was produced regardless of conscious human intention.

Secondly, inequalities were increased by the actions of richer Spartiates. As early as the mid-sixth century wealthy families can be observed conserving and extending their property through advantageous marriage practices; and Aristotle's comments (*Politics* 1307a35-7) on the notables' grasping at wealth hint also at the pressurized acquisition of property.

Thirdly, Sparta's leaders failed to counteract these dangerous property and population trends. The symptoms of manpower shortage were tackled, for example, through efforts to stimulate the birth rate and by drafting non-Spartiates into the armed forces; but the roots of the malaise - the economic difficulties of poorer citizens - were left untouched.
Finally, underlying these developments was a fundamental breakdown in the solidarity of the citizen body, especially in the longstanding compact between rich and poor upon which Sparta’s successful social system had been based.

The first factor, which operated in a manner independent of external events, must obviously be set apart. Although it had severe effects in Sparta in the context of a closed citizen body with a concealed property qualification, these effects might have been counteracted but for the operation of the other three factors - in other words, had there been less individual property accumulation, more strong-minded action by Sparta’s leaders and greater solidarity between rich and poor. It is upon these three factors that we must concentrate.

What role then did foreign warfare and empire play in these developments? The following discussion will be divided into four main parts. In Section II I shall look at the answer to my question given by some of the ancient sources. Section III will examine the methods and personnel through which Sparta organized and conducted her foreign campaigns. In Section IV I shall consider their socio-political impact and the implications for the concentration of property. Finally, Section V will compare Sparta’s experience of warfare and empire with that of the Roman Republic as a control for assessing its significance in the development of the Spartiate crisis.
II. The influx of wealth

Several ancient writers claim that the Spartan social order was ruined by the influx of foreign wealth, especially the gold and silver coinage sent home by Lysander after the defeat of the Athenian empire in 404 (refs. in David 1979/80, 38 n.24). The clearest statement is in Plutarch's *Life of Lysander* (17.1-4) which, drawing upon Ephorus and Theopompos, reports the debate concerning how to deal with this wealth. According to his account, there was considerable opposition to allowing the coinage into Sparta. It was finally agreed, however, to permit its introduction for public use but not for individual possession. Plutarch criticizes this compromise on the ground that its consequence was to stimulate private greed.¹

Plutarch's account implies that the acceptance of foreign coinage for public use was something new, a point he states directly in another passage (Lyk. 30.1): "during the reign of Agis coined money first came into Sparta through the agency of Lysander". This seems to have been the view of at least one of his sources, Ephorus, as reflected in the comments of Diodorus (7.12.8),

"as they little by little began to relax each one of their institutions and to turn to luxury and indifference and as they grew so corrupted as to use coined money, they lost their leadership".

Ephorus' view, however, can hardly be correct (Cawkwell 1983, 396; Cartledge 1987, 88). Although it did not mint coinage of its own, the polis will long previously have needed foreign coinage, for instance, for the use of its ambassadors and for
hiring mercenaries - whose employment goes back at least to 424 (Thuc. 4.55).

A strong case can indeed be made that until 404 individual possession of gold and silver had also been permitted (Michell 1964, 298ff.; MacDowell 1986, 119; Noethlichs 1987). The probable or actual use of currency appears in a variety of contexts in Spartiate life. The mess contributions included the sum of 10 or so Aeginetan obols (Dikaiarchos, apud Athen. 141C). Thucydides (5.34) indicates that the right to buy and sell was one of the privileges of citizenship, although these activities need not strictly necessitate coinage. Cases involving contracts were among those judged by the ephors (Arist. Pol. 1275b9-10; cf. Plut. Mor. 221B). Dioskorides (s.v. skytalè, Müller, FHG ii. 193) attests the practice of lending between citizens. Herodotus (6.56) refers to private citizens’ owing debts to the king or to the state - debts which were remitted on a new king’s accession. Money fines were levied after legal convictions (e.g. Ephorus FGrH 70F193; Thuc. 5.63 - not actually implemented).

Noethlichs, whose study itemizes the considerable number of alleged cases of bribery by or of Spartan citizens before 404, emphasizes the important point (1987, 165 & 170) that, despite their unprovability, no contemporary source expresses any doubts that such bribery could plausibly have taken place. Sparta was not seen as any different in this regard from other Greek states. Gylippos’ theft of part of the coinage sent home by Lysander (Plut. Lyk. 16) - the act which prompted the decision of 404 -
suggests that possession and use of coinage per se was a normal part of Spartiate life; otherwise why did he bother to steal it? (It was the manner of his acquiring it which forced him into exile.) On this view the innovation introduced in 404 was that it was now banned for the first time because of fears about the sheer quantity of wealth being brought into Sparta—in total 1,500–2,000 talents plus a sizeable quantity of non-coined moveable wealth, according to the estimate of David (1979, 38ff.).

So the compromise of 404 may well have marked a tightening-up of previous practice or, if not, was simply a reaffirmation of existing law. Either of these interpretations undercuts the claim of ancient writers that it was the new acceptance of foreign wealth which undermined the Spartiate social order. Plutarch's evidence shows that the application of this explanation to Spartan history originated with Ephorus and Theopompos, both of whom were writers known for their moralizing interpretations of historical events. As Flower (1991, 93ff.) has recently pointed out, the use of moralizing explanations of luxury and idleness to account for military defeat had long been a commonplace in Greek thought; the application of such an explanation to the history of Sparta has no independent historical value. Plato, moreover, provides a corrective to Plutarch's moralizing about the corrupting effects of public use of coinage because in his Laws (742A) he recommends for his Cretan state the same compromise as Sparta applied in 404.
Extending his criticism of moralizing explanations of the impact of foreign wealth, Flower (1991, 89ff.) also denies the very existence of the phenomenon of foreign wealth finding its way in any quantity into the possession of individual citizens in Sparta itself. He plausibly reinterprets Xenophon's famous statement (Lak. Pol. 14.3: "I know that previously the Lakedaimonians were afraid to appear to have gold, but now there are those who pride themselves in possessing it") as a reference only to the behaviour of commanders abroad. He brings it into relation with Theopompos' allegation (FGrH 115F237) that Archidamos III went abroad in order to live luxuriously and (more dubiously) with Poseidonios' claim (FGrH 87F48c) that Spartiates deposited their gold and silver in Arkadia.

It should be noted, however, that, even assuming Flower's interpretation of Xenophon's statement to be correct, the latter's restriction of his criticism to Spartiate vices abroad may not be free of distortion. By so restricting his criticism, Xenophon would have avoided any hint of criticism of his patron Agesilaos, whose personal probity when abroad he stresses in his other works (e.g. Hell. 4.2.3; Ages. 1.36; 4.6; 5.4-5), but whose deployment of wealth at home was well known (Xen. Ages. 4; 11.8; Cartledge 1987, 132ff.). Moreover, one should not place as much weight as Flower does upon Xenophon's statement earlier in the Lak. Pol. (7.6) which implies the effectiveness of the ephors' searches for gold and silver, since the chapter in which it occurs is a most transparently ingenuous assertion of the unimportance of wealth in Spartiate life. Indeed, if private use...
of coinage had been permissible in Sparta before 404, it would be surprising if age-old habits of possession could have been effectively and speedily eradicated, especially when Spartiate commanders abroad now had greater opportunities for self-enrichment. One extremely suggestive episode is Agesilaos' manipulation of booty during his Asian campaign to make profits for his friends (Xen. Agesilaos I. 17-19); unfortunately, Xenophon does not specify whether those friends were solely Asian Greeks or included his 30 Spartiate companions.

Whether or not one accepts Flower's denial of the private acquisition of foreign wealth, in one sense does not matter too much for the purposes of this discussion. Even if one believes that foreign wealth found its way into private hands, one could still accept Flower's doubts that (at least of itself) it abruptly widened the gap between rich and poor citizens or caused a dramatic alteration in Spartiate lifestyles, since it is clear that private greed for wealth was nothing new. As noted above, the alleged susceptibility of leading Spartiates to bribery had long been notorious. Noethlichs has catalogued no fewer than 11 instances recorded in the sources concerning the period before 431 (1987, 136ff.: nos. 9-19). In his Republic (548A-B) Plato treats the avid private possession of gold and silver as an essential characteristic of his Spartan-based timarchic state. The same picture appears in the possibly pseudo-Platonic dialogue, Alkibiades I (122E-123A), in which Sokrates comments that there was more gold and silver privately held in Sparta than in the rest of Greece since it had been passing in to them over
many generations. Gylippos' theft of coinage and Thorax's suicidal act (Plut. Lyk. 19.4) in bringing money home so soon after the introduction of the death penalty for private possession are surely to be explained in terms of the advantage they thought they could gain by making use of it.

The above evidence implies that mobile wealth was already important as a determinant of status and influence. That the significance of wealth generally had already developed markedly against other criteria of ranking during the course of the fifth century is of course a proposition I have already argued in Chapter 4 (= Hodkinson 1989, 95ff.). Even if it is true that individual Spartiates were able to acquire greatly increased amounts of foreign wealth for use at home, we should view the impact as exacerbating current trends rather than as initiating something new. To uncover its real role in the Spartan crisis we would still need to explore the socio-political context in which the acquisition of imperial wealth was important for leading citizens and to examine the impact of foreign warfare and empire upon that scenario. In order to do both these things we need first to investigate the nature of Spartiate involvement in foreign military activity.

III. The organization of military campaigns

In this section I shall examine the organization and personnel through which Sparta conducted her foreign campaigning. Let me
first briefly outline the main known facts (cf. Parke 1930; Bockisch 1965; Sealey 1970). During the central years of empire (412-386) Sparta fought her overseas wars by means of a dual system of forces, the beginnings of which can be seen during the Archidamian war in the 420s. The first element was the Peloponnesian fleet under the admiral (nauarchos) and his staff of supporting officers, often with subordinate commanders in charge of subsidiary naval contingents in regions distant from the main force. The second element was a variable number of harmosts (harmostai), who operated usually on land, but sometimes with a few ships and whose sphere of action might vary from the territory of a single Greek polis to an ‘area command’ over a large region. In addition individual Spartiates were sometimes sent out, with or without supporting forces, to bring aid to independent allied communities. The essential point is that this command system allowed Sparta to conduct simultaneous campaigns in different regions whilst committing abroad only a small minority of Spartiates almost all of whom acted as commanders. The vast majority of citizens were retained at home to ensure security against the subject helot population. The rowers in Lakonian ships within the fleet were either helots or mercenaries (Xen. Hell. 7.1.12; Myron, FGrH 106F1) and the harmosts’ land forces contained varying combinations of freed helots (neodamodeis), allies and mercenaries (e.g. Thuc. 8.5.1; Xen. Hell. 3.1.4-6, 4.2, 15). After the end of overseas campaigning in 386 harmosts continued in use on a reduced scale for mainland campaigns outside the Peloponnese, although during the 370s they were largely restricted to out-of-season garrison duties. Later
in the same decade their forces were replaced by regiments of the Lakedaimonian army led by the polemarchs.

Scholars have often pointed to the obvious contrast between the position of the Spartiate citizen at home living under the austere and strictly regimented, state-controlled system and the same Spartiate as an independent officer abroad separated from the 'Big Brother' of the home authorities. But to evaluate the significance of this contrast we need to ask some specific questions, such as: how many men were involved? for how long were they typically abroad? of what social status were Spartiate commanders? how were they chosen? how much contact was there with, and how much supervision by other commanders and the home authorities? how much scope was there for the exercise of personal ambition?

(a) The number of Spartiate officers abroad

There is no easy answer to the question how many Spartiates were employed abroad. One can set a baseline through the number of officers known by name, as represented in Table 1. (For the full lists of names and discussion of the criteria used in compiling the statistics, see below, Appendix 1 & Note to Appendices 1 & 2.)
These figures have some value in indicating that foreign postings were already developing apace in the 420s and in confirming that their peak came in the 400s and 390s when Sparta’s overseas campaigning was at its greatest extent. But in those central decades in particular they are a very poor guide to global numbers, not only because they omit cases where we know of the presence of Spartiate officers but do not know their names; but, more fundamentally, because the sources fail to cover all the theatres of war and to give full details of the personnel involved even in those theatres they do cover. For example, during the Ionian war the sources’ heavy focus on the Eastern Aegean means that only through a passing mention (Xen. Hell. 1.4.22) of a Lakonian garrison on Andros, presumably under a harmost, do we glimpse the possibility that there were otherwise totally unmentioned harmosts stationed throughout the Aegean during the 400s (Parke 1930, 49f.; cf. Dunant 1978, 47f. no.124, for a Lakedaimonian grave stèle at Eretria (PB 220a), possibly evidence for a garrison on Euboia). Similarly, only in a few, semi-retrospective general references does Xenophon reveal the presence of numerous harmosts on both the Asian and European mainlands whose existence he otherwise completely ignores in his account of Sparta’s campaigns between the years 400 and 389 (Hell. 4.8.1, 5, 39; cf. Diod. 14.84.4). Likewise, a single
reference in a speech set in the year 369 (Xen. Hell. 7.1.12) provides the invaluable information that the trierarchs of ships from Lakonia were normally Spartiates, and possibly some of the marines too.

These considerations do not advance the cause of accuracy very much because to estimate throughout our period the likely number of poleis under a Spartiate harmost or the number of Lakonian ships in Peloponnesian fleets are both problematic tasks; but I should not be surprised if we should have to triple the number of named Spartiates to get the right order of magnitude for the total numbers abroad during the 400s and 390s - possibly up to 100 separate individuals in each decade. This is, however, still a very small proportion out of a total citizen population of perhaps some 2,000-4,000.

(b) The frequency and duration of posts abroad

To determine the significance of these figures we need to ask how often and how long Spartiates were normally abroad. We know the names of 67 Spartiate extraordinary, non-royal officers active during the peak years of empire (412-386) whose careers are not known to have been terminated by premature death (other than by execution). Of these officers 67% (45 men) are attested in only a single post, but at least 33% (22 men) were given a second. (Full lists and discussion of problems of inclusion and categorization are given in Appendix 2 & Note to Appendices 1 &
2.) This figure for two-time officers is a minimum, since several men are likely to have held additional commands unrecorded in the evidence. The careers of the 22 men attested as holding at least two posts are itemized in Table 5.2. At least four had their careers prematurely terminated by death after their second post; but at least 10 of the remaining 18 men (56%) were given a third position. Of these three-time officers, at least one died prematurely; but at least six out of the remaining nine men received a fourth post. The evidence suggests that among the limited number of men chosen for foreign service a relatively high proportion were given multiple periods abroad. Sparta had indeed long pursued a similar policy of iteration of posts in the case of diplomatic personnel by often selecting the same men or their descendants as envoys to particular states (Mosley 1973, 50ff.).
For how long were Spartiate officers committed to service abroad? As Table 5.2 indicates, sometimes a person’s foreign posts were separated by a significant intervening period when he will have returned to Sparta. In at least 15 of the 22 cases, however, the close temporal juxtaposition of certain posts suggests that officers often served continuous (or near-continuous) spells abroad, moving from one post to another. The most extreme case is that of Eteonikos, who seems to have served as a kind of all-purpose, often subordinate, officer loyalty
fulfilling a variety of tasks. In addition, tenure of a particular post could sometimes last for a number of years, as in the cases of Gylippos, Hippokrates, Klearchos, Derkyldidas, Herippidas and Teleutias. As a consequence several commanders spent significant periods abroad in relation to their time in Sparta - Eteonikos, for example, at least 8 years out of 24; Hippokrates seemingly continuously abroad for the 4 years preceding before his death; Klearchos 6 years out of 10 before his exile; Teleutias 5 out of 11 years; and, above all, Derkyldidas abroad for at least 14 years out of 22 between the years 411 and 389.

(c) The social background of officers

The comparison made above between the patterns of employment of military and of diplomatic personnel raises the question whether Sparta's officers, like her ambassadors, typically came from the leading families. What can we say of the social backgrounds of these men?

A major obstacle to answering this question is the paucity of prosopographical information about individual Spartiates, especially the frequent failure of the sources to provide patronymics. Consequently, several of the more prominent officers (for example, 14 of the 22 men listed in Table 5.2) are to us just names whose family affiliations are unknown. In Tables 5.3 & 5.4, however, I have collected some suggestive
evidence which can, I would argue, stand proxy for the large number of cases in which evidence is lacking.

**TABLE 5.3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commanders</th>
<th>Family affiliations &amp; status indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gylippos</td>
<td>Son of Kleandridas (PB 420), adviser to King Pleistocanax.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klearchos</td>
<td>Son of Ramphias (PB 654), ambassador &amp; commander; [K. himself was proxenos of Byzantion].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agesandridas</td>
<td>Son of Agesandros (PB 6), ambassador.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lysander</td>
<td>Son of Aristokritos (PB 129) &amp; brother of Libys (PB 490); family claimed descent from hero Herakles &amp; had links with Libyan King of the Ammonians (Malkin 1990).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharax</td>
<td>Grandson of Pharax (PB 717), adviser to King Agis II; [the younger Ph. was proxenos of Thebes].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peisandros</td>
<td>Son of Aristomenidas (PB 134), judge at Plataia &amp; ambassador; brother-in-law of King Agesilaos II.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teleutias</td>
<td>Half-brother of King Agesilaos II; cousin of Antalkidas (cf. below).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antalkidas</td>
<td>Son of Leon (PB 482), colony founder, ephor &amp; Olympic victor.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3 shows that of the eight men listed in Table 5.2 whose family affiliations are known all have indications of high social status. Table 5.4 provides evidence (based largely upon those few passages in which Thucydides provides patronymics) concerning several men prominent in the late 430s and 420s whose sons later appear as military commanders. (There are a few overlaps with Table 5.3.)
TABLE 5.4

Father-son roles in the late 5th & early 4th centuries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Father</th>
<th>Son(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sthenelaidas (PB 664), ephor</td>
<td>Alkamenes (PB 56), harmost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sthenelaos (PB 665), harmost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agesandros (PB 6), ambassador</td>
<td>Pasitelidas (PB 592), harmost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agesandridas (PB 85), vice-admiral &amp; naval commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramphias (PB 654), ambassador &amp; commander</td>
<td>Klearchos (PB 425), harmost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leon (PB 481), colony founder, ephor &amp; Olympic victor</td>
<td>Pedaritos (PB 599), harmost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Antalkidas (PB 97), admiral, ambassador &amp; ephor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.B. For fuller discussion of these cases, Ch.1, Section II(d).

The kinds of prominent family affiliations indicated in these tables can be documented in several other cases outside the central period selected for detailed scrutiny. The foreign connections of Brasidas (PB 177) have already been noted (Ch.1, Section II(d)). The brothers and fellow-commanders Eudamidas (PB 295) and Phoibidas (PB 734) appear to have been connected by patronage and later by marriage to the Eurypontid royal house (Cartledge 1987, 147f.). Similarly, Sphodrias (PB 680), harmost of Thespiai in 378, was a close associate of King Kleombrotos I. The names of several officers also provide clues to their high status, even when their family affiliations are unknown. Names derived from foreign places, such as Chalkideus, 'the Chalkidian' (PB 743), Samios, 'the Samian' (PB 659), and Skythes, 'the Skythian' (PB 686), indicate ties with leading families in other states. Names which include the word hippos (horse) suggest a
wealthy, horse-breeding background; for example, Gylippos, Philippos, Hippokrates and Herippidas (all four of whom appeared in Table 5.2), not to mention Kratesippidas (PB 456), Lysippos (PB 506), Mnasippos (PB 538), Orsippos (PB 582) and Pasippidas (PB 591), as well as Polos, 'the foal' (PB 653).

Limits of space prevent discussion of several other cases of officers for whom there are indicators (of varying degrees of certainty) of high social status. Solely on the basis of the evidence considered above, however, the conclusion that foreign posts were generally dominated by men from the leading families seems inescapable.

(d) Methods and criteria of appointment

How were these commanders chosen? Appointments to foreign commands are likely to have been normally ratified by an official body, but the significance of that procedure is another matter. Only occasionally are we able to glimpse the formal appointment procedures, but those few glimpses are suggestive. One occasion on which the procedure for the choice of a nauarchos is described is when King Agesilaos, on campaign in Asia Minor, was given the power to select an admiral of his choice (Xen. Hell. 3.4.27-9). The situation was unusual, but it does indicate the absence of a principle of popular election, or at least the temporary suspension of effective ratification. Already in 403 Lysander, seemingly speaking at an official meeting in support of the
ambassadors from Eleusis and Athens, had managed to arrange a harmostship for himself and the appointment of his brother Libys as nauarchos (Xen. Hell. 2.4.28).

Evidence for the selection of harmosts, indeed, parallels that concerning nauarchoi. King Agis II's proposal to send a force to Chalkedon and Byzantion in c.410 under the command of Klearchos seems (to judge from the tenor of Xenophon's account: Hell. 1.1.35-6) to have been made in an official meeting. The reference to the fact that Klearchos was proxenos of Byzantion sounds like a reason given by Agis for suggesting his appointment, which implies that his name was advanced as part and parcel of the overall plan. So, despite the formal opportunity for genuine choice of personnel, in practice the available options were circumscribed by the influence of the king who proposed the expedition. An even more blatant example of the manipulation of an appointment is that worked in 389 by Anaxibios, who "owing to the fact that the ephors had become friends of his, succeeded in getting himself sent out to Abydos as harmost" (Xen. Hell. 4.8.32). Similarly, in 382 the commander Eudamidas, according to Xenophon (Hell. 5.2.24), persuaded the ephors to give an auxiliary command to his brother Phoibidas - Diodorus (15. 19.3; 20.3) gives a different account, but it is at the very least indicative that Xenophon should believe in the possibility of such family influence.

In these instances the decisions were taken in Sparta; but on many occasions harmosts were selected by commanders in the
field from among their own associates or staff officers. For example, in winter 413/12 King Agis II at Dekeleia summoned Alkamenes and Melanthos from Sparta on his own initiative (Thuc. 8.5). A few months later, however, the commanders of the Peloponnesian fleet appointed Philippos, one of their own number, as harmost at Miletos (Thuc. 8.28). After the victory at Aigospotamoi in 405 Lysander had a free hand to appoint his aides as harmosts of several important cities: Sthenelaos as harmost at Byzantion and Chalkedon; Eteonikos to an area command in Thrace; and Thorax, later, as harmost at Samos (Xen. Hell. 2.2.2, 5; Diod. 13.106; 14.3). In the early fourth century Kings Agesilaos and Kleombrotos both took advantage of their foreign campaigning to leave favoured supporters behind as harmosts when they themselves returned to Sparta (e.g. Euxenos in Asia Minor in 394; Sphodrias and Phoibidas at Thespiai in 378 and 377, respectively: Xen. Hell. 4.2.5; 5.4.15, 41).

In spite of the formality of public ratification, the dominant principles of selection were not election but appointment and co-optation (cf. Finley 1986, 166). Royal patronage, for example, might influence entire careers, (Cartledge 1987, 139ff.). The rise of Lysander up to his appointment to the nauarchy was probably due to the support of the Eurypontid royal family with whom he had been associated since the time (no later than the early 420s) when as a young man he had become the erastès of Agesilaos (Plut. Lys. 22.3; Ages. 2.1; Cartledge 1987, 28f.). Lysander was a suitable candidate for the exercise of patronage, owing to the reputed poverty of
his family (Plut. Lys. 2.1) and his possible mothax status while young (Phylarchos FGrH 81F43). A similar case is that of Agesilaos' half-brother, Teleutias (PB 689). The poverty of Teleutias' family led the king to give them half the estates he had inherited from his elder brother, King Agis (Xen. Ages. 4.5; Plut. Ages. 4.1). Owing to the influence of Agesilaos, Teleutias rose to the position of nauarchos and held several subsequent commands (Plut. Ages. 21.1; Cartledge 1987, 145f.).

Some men of course were sufficiently influential in their own right to attain positions without the help of patronage and regardless of merit. Anaxibios' cultivation of the ephors' friendship shows one means by which it could be done. The well-born Pedaritos achieved his harmostship at Chios, despite failing in his twenties to gain selection to the elite corps of 300 hippeis (Plut. Lyk. 25.4; Mor. 231B). The roles of patronage and of inherited social status will have been important reasons for the tendency observed above towards the limitation of access to foreign positions and the iteration of posts for those few men who were selected.

(e) Competing sub-imperialisms and personal ambitions

The pattern observed above according to which officers from prominent backgrounds frequently spent several years abroad provided the optimum conditions for the exercise of personal ambitions. There were some restrictions, to be sure, since the
home authorities were evidently alert to the dangers of over-independence. On receipt of the first complaint about the actions of Astyochos, the nauarchos of 412/11, a high-powered commission was sent with powers to replace him - the fact that the complainant was the well-born Pedaritos is no doubt relevant (Thuc. 8.38-9). So too in the early 390s the authorities intervened at least three times to redirect or check upon the activities of the area harmosts in Asia Minor, Thibron and Derkylidas (Xen. Hell. 3.1.7; 2.6, 12). In addition by no means all Spartiates abroad operated independently. Fellow commanders often had to co-ordinate their activities; trierarchs, staff officers and sometimes even harmosts had to work under the command of admirals or other superior officers. We should not overdraw the picture of the autonomous Spartiate abroad.

These restrictions did not, however, prevent officers from initiating their own 'sub-imperialisms' (a phenomenon whose importance is well attested in the history of modern imperialism), attempting to exert their own stamp upon the direction of military strategy and policy in the pursuit of personal ambitions. The most notable example is of course that of Lysander who exploited his naval commands to create a personal following among his fellow Spartiate officers and partisans in the Greek states of the Eastern Aegean. Following his decisive victory at Aigospotamoi he was able, albeit temporarily, to impose his personal settlement upon Athens' former allies and wielded great influence over Spartan policy-making until his death in 395 (Rahe 1977; Bommelaer 1981). But Lysander's
independent exploitation of his military commands was exceptional only in its scale and degree of success. Many more petty subordinate imperialisms can be observed throughout Sparta’s period of foreign engagement. Despite the interventions from Sparta, Derkyldas in Asia Minor was able to pursue his personal revenge against the Persian satrap Pharnabazos and he even used information gained from a Spartan supervisory commission to preempt the home government’s intended expedition to the Thracian Chersonese by mounting his own privately-planned campaign (Xen. Hell. 3.1.9-27; 2.8-11; Diod. 14.38.7). Similar unauthorized action is evident in the notorious cases of Phoibidas’ seizure of the Theban Kadmeia in 382 and Sphodrias’ attack upon the Peiraius in 378. (It is possible, however, that they had the covert support of, respectively, Kings Agesilaos and Kleombrotos: discussion and refs. in Ste. Croix 1972, 134ff.; Cartledge 1987, 156ff.)

Furthermore, precisely because officers were not always autonomous, there was frequently a clash of ambitions. For the insight it provides into the endemic conflict between officers, the most illuminating episode concerns the varying reactions of Spartiate officers to the appearance of the mercenary army of the ‘Ten Thousand’ in North-Western Asia Minor (Xen. Anab. 6.6-7.2). Kleandros, the harmost at Byzantion, would but for unfavourable sacrifices have taken them into his service. But the nauarchos Anaxibios adopted an antagonistic attitude. Acting in collusion with the Persian satrap Pharnabazos in return for the promise of personal favours, he compelled the Ten Thousand to depart from
Asia into Thrace. He also ordered that any mercenaries remaining in Byzantion be sold as slaves. Kleandros ignored this order, but it was later carried out by Aristarchos, Kleandros' successor as harmost. Then Anaxibios altered his policy after being snubbed by Pharnabazos on the expiry of his term of office. Despite his lack of authority, Anaxibios ordered the people of Perinthos to transport the Ten Thousand back into Asia; but then Aristarchos, who had himself now entered into collusion with Pharnabazos, came in person to prevent this manoeuvre. Finally, however, when Thibron arrived a few months later as the new supreme regional harmost, he brought the Ten Thousand into Asia and recruited them into his forces. In this episode we see in microcosm the kind of personal ambitions and conflicts and the consequent twists and turns in policy which characterized much of the Spartan war effort.

Such competing sub-imperialisms became evident at the very start of the Ionian war with the "private empire-building" of Pedaritios on Chios (Andrewes in Gomme et al. 1981, v. 83f.) and his challenge to the authority of the nauarchos Astyochos. They flared up again over much larger issues in the clash of personalities and policy towards Persia between the retiring and succeeding admirals Lysander and Kallikratidas (Proietti 1987, 11ff.; Gray 1989, 22ff. & 81ff.), in the conflict between Lysander and King Pausanias over the settlement of Attica in 403 (Ste. Croix 1972, 144), and then between Lysander and King Agesilaos in Asia in 396 (Cartledge 1987, 151ff.). In the late 380s and 370s this type of conflict became institutionalized as
there developed a permanent policy struggle between the kings of the two royal houses (cf. esp. R.E. Smith 1953/54) who used their prerogative of commanding the regular citizen army to implement their mutually contradictory sub-imperialisms. The final consequence of this conflict came in 371 when King Kleombrotos was compelled to fight the battle of Leuktra, despite unfavourable religious omens, for fear of condemnation to death (Xen. Hell. 6.4.4-8; Cicero, De divinatione 1.34.76; 2.32.69).

IV. The impact of overseas campaigning

(a) Socio-political transformation and property concentration

In this section I shall draw upon the insights of the previous section to examine precisely how involvement in foreign warfare and empire contributed to Sparta’s internal crisis.

Several interconnected developments can be identified. The fighting of a new type of war, major controversies regarding policy and the choices involved in the maintenance of empire all raised fresh issues of a significance and difficulty surpassing any that Sparta had previously had to tackle. These entailed fundamental and often new sources of domestic strife which raised the temperature of political conflict to an unparalleled level, as is attested by the number of ‘political trials’ in this period: seven out of nine known trials of non-royal citizens in the Classical period fall between the years 404 and 378 (lists
Overseas campaigning also meant an unprecedented extension of influential and independent positions open to leading citizens. Although there were traditionally many officerships within the regular Lakedaimonian army, these operated within a strict chain of subordination under the king in which independent action was effectively squashed (cf. Thuc. 5.71-2). In contrast, some officers abroad could take independent military and even political decisions which diverged from the reactions of home authorities. Indeed, as we have seen, for many officers the chance to enhance their reputations before returning to the relative anonymity of life at home proved irresistible.

The effects were especially destabilizing because these extraordinary officers came from a different age grade from that which had traditionally exercised the most important collective influence upon Spartan political life. Traditionally, political debate was heavily influenced by the powerful conservative lobby of old men, especially through the Council of Elders, the Gerousia, whose members were aged 60 or over (cf. Pindar, fr. 199 Maehler, *apud* Plut. *Lyk.* 21.6; Forrest 1980, 113; Ste. Croix 1972, 137). Extraordinary officers, however, were typically younger men - usually in their 40s or 50s, but sometimes even younger (Chapter 1, n.14 = Hodkinson 1983, 251 & n. 28). Although the 30-59 years age grade was the one from which what Xenophon calls "the greatest offices" were filled (*Lak. Pol.* 4.7;
cf.2.2), there was a large number of eligible men. The most important office, the ephorate (and possibly others too), was distributed across a wide social spectrum (cf. Arist. Pol. 1270b6-34) and was only a temporary, non-repeatable position (Westlake 1976). This must normally have meant that there was little opportunity for even prominent persons to perform more than spasmodic political roles.

Xenophon’s comment (Lak. Pol. 14.4) that the ambition of leading Spartiates was continuous harmostships abroad makes perfect sense for prominent men in this age grade who had the opportunity for foreign commands. The attitude of Derkyldas (Xen. Hell. 4.3.2), who "always liked being abroad", is not surprising; but it is striking that he was prepared thereby to incur the disgrace deriving from his failure to marry and have children which, among other things, forced him to forfeit his right to deference from younger men (Plut. Lyk. 15.2). Part of the tension between commanders and home authorities was probably a more overt conflict between age groups as the overall control of Spartan policy by a gerontocracy was threatened by the decisions of younger officers abroad and also by the increased influence at home of men of military prowess. The consequent partial undermining of traditional deference to the elders may also have led to an increased role for other sources of influence, such as patronage and wealth.

A related point is that the traditional political system involved a natural rotation of office-holding. There were always
many leading families taking a temporary 'back seat' because they lacked males over age 60 to be eligible for the Gerousia. Excessive competition was thereby reduced and access to office shared more evenly. The availability of foreign posts for men in their 40s and 50s will have upset this natural regulation of competition because leading families were considerably more likely to have males in their 40s or 50s than over age 60. The importance of family influence is also likely to have increased. Family influence upon elections to the Gerousia must always have been limited by the elementary biological fact that a candidate aged 60 or over would only rarely have had elder relatives alive to provide support. Supporting senior relatives will have been available far more frequently for men in their 40s or younger competing for foreign positions. This may in part explain the pattern observed earlier in which sons of prominent men are frequently found holding important posts.

The availability of commands for younger men thereby exacerbated two weaknesses of the political system identified by Finley (1986, 168f.): first, the absence of a unified leadership principle, the outcome of which was permanent rivalry, now broadened by the increased numbers of individuals and families involved in competition for positions; and, secondly, the conflict between men of energy and ambition and the rest, now intensified by the greater opportunities available for officers abroad, including opportunities for extended tenure of foreign posts which meant the possibility of monopoly in place of rotation.
In addition, the selection of officers through appointment and personal influence stands in stark contrast to the procedure used for the Gerousia - and probably for the ephorate also - whose members were elected in open assembly through shouting for each of the candidates (Plut. *Lyk.* 26.2-3; Arist. *Pol.* 1270b26-7; 1271a9-10). It is true that the democratic appearance of this procedure gives a somewhat misleading impression in that, as was noted in Chapter 1, Section II(d), most of the candidates were probably men from the most distinguished lineages who had already held major positions in their earlier careers, having benefited from the advantages of birth, wealth and the operation of patronage. Nevertheless, the development of foreign commands was an oligarchic trend which worked against the cohesion of the citizen body. The traditional ambition of leading men to gain election to the Gerousia must have restrained their behaviour towards their fellow citizens, since it was upon such men that their election depended. The ambition for foreign posts, however, made no such demands, but depended rather upon the possession of influence or a patron's goodwill. There was less need for moderate behaviour towards ordinary Spartiates; on the contrary, there was a built-in incentive for would-be officers and patrons to increase their personal status through the acquisition of additional property, even at the expense of poorer citizens.

Solidarity within the citizen body probably also suffered from the exclusion of ordinary citizens from the forces of officers abroad. Cartledge (1987, 40) is right to emphasize the
importance of this "serious breach in the principle of the citizen militia". In traditional Lakedaimonian warfare individual glory could be gained by rank-and-file soldiers as well as by commanders (Chapter I, Section II(c) = Hodkinson 1983, 259f.). The absence of rank-and-file citizens from most of Sparta's overseas campaigning meant that military glory now accrued solely to a few leading men. The classic example is that of Lysander and his fellow commanders who vaunted themselves through personal statues on the victory monument at Delphi after the victory at Aigospotamoi (Paus. 10.9.4; Meiggs & Lewis 1989, no.95). Moreover, the fact that it was upon non-citizen troops or rowers that commanders depended for their ambitions may have contributed to the attitude that their fellow citizens were irrelevant and dispensable in the scramble for personal position.

The developments discussed above can be linked to the three causes of property concentration and oliganthrōpia referred to earlier in this essay - individual property accumulation, the failure of Sparta's leaders to provide remedies and the breakdown in solidarity between rich and poor. The traditional political system had through its varied checks and balances acted as a powerful force in restraining the destabilizing potential of growing inequalities in wealth. But the aforementioned developments added powerfully to the transformation of the socio-political context discussed in Chapter 4 whereby the pressures towards the acquisition of status-defining wealth and its deployment through patronage increased in significance.
Existing trends towards the concentration of landed property in a few hands are likely to have been intensified by the heightened level of competition for foreign positions. Aristotle's comment (Pol. 1307a35-70) on the Spartan notables' grasping after wealth is perfectly intelligible in this context. As he implies (Pol. 1270a21-9), leading men could acquire land through manipulation of ordinary citizens' rights of gift and bequest and the freedom of guardians to choose any husband for an heiress. This could have been achieved without any necessary use of coined wealth, through channels of patronage and offers of subsistence help to citizens whose reduced holdings put them in a difficult position in years of poor harvests. But, if the ban in 404 on individual possession of currency was not completely effective and quantities of foreign wealth did come into the hands of leading men, it is likely to have stimulated and facilitated a higher volume of transactions in landed property. Purchase and sale of most land, although traditionally deemed dishonourable, were not illegal (Herakleides Lembos fr. 373.12 Dilts = Aristotelian Polity of the Lakedaimonians, fr. 611.12 Rose; cf. Hodkinson 1986, 388). Currency could also be employed in transactions which were nominally ones of gift, bequest or the betrothal of an heiress. We must be cautious about the danger of over-speculation; but, I would contend that even on a minimal interpretation, there are sufficient reasons to conclude that the developments discussed above will have accelerated the process of property concentration and hastened the decline in citizen numbers.
Some scholars (e.g. Cawkwell 1983, 385ff.; Flower 1991, 88f.) would dispute this conclusion on the grounds that Sparta’s manpower decline took place at a steady rate between 480 and 371, with no dramatic drop in the 50 years before Leuktra. This view depends upon the assumption that Thucydides did not inadvertently halve the number of Spartiates at the battle of Mantineia in 418; but even, if it were correct, it would not afford reliable grounds for challenging my conclusion. Knowledge that more Spartiates became Inferiors through deepening poverty in one period than in another would not necessarily indicate a more rapid concentration of land. This is partly because of the intrusion of extraneous factors such as the earthquake of c.465 and differential mortality in warfare. More fundamentally, the precise relationship between the degree of property concentration and the extent of citizen population decline would be likely to vary from period to period, depending upon unknown factors, such as the numbers of men at the start of each period who were already close to the 'poverty line' and differential degrees of subsistence help offered by richer citizens. It would be perfectly possible for there to be a smaller drop in citizen numbers in a period of greater property concentration.

The key issue is not whether the rate of citizen manpower decline after 431 was more rapid than before that date, but whether it was faster than it would otherwise have been without the impact of war and empire. This latter point seems securely established by the powerful combination of factors discussed in this section. Furthermore, the transformation of political life
which I have outlined helps to explain the breakdown in the solidarity of the Spartiate citizen body and the consequent lack of intervention by Sparta’s leaders who were themselves the beneficiaries of the new developments.

(b) Agesilaos and the crisis of Spartiate society

The momentum of these developments seems to have been maintained, if not intensified, during the 380s and 370s by the personal dominance of King Agesilaos II. Agesilaos’ dominance was a product of Sparta’s crisis. He represented a backlash against the independence of foreign commanders. Indeed, he did much to resolve tensions between commanders abroad and the home authorities, especially between harmosts and Gerousia, by bringing both under his control. Most of the harmosts after 386 were his personal associates - Eudamidas (PB 295), Phoibidas (PB 734), Teleutias (PB 689) and Herippidas (PB 349); and his mediation between harmosts and Gerousia is demonstrated, appropriately enough, in his successful interventions at the trials of two errant harmosts, Phoibidas and Sphodrias (PB 680), both of whom would otherwise probably have been condemned to death (Ste. Croix 1972, 134ff.; Cartledge 1987, 156ff.). His austere personal life (Xen. Ages. passim) and deferential attitude to officials (Xen. Ages. 6.4; 7.2; Plut. Ages. 4.2-4) seemed to restore traditional Spartan values. Unlike other commanders he identified his career interests with those of the state, cushioned by the fact that he could rely upon the
traditional power base of his kingship. In this way his power increased, and he was no doubt supported by those Spartiates who yearned for a return to old ways after the upheavals of recent years.

The problem was that, although his values were traditional, Agesilaos' political methods followed the new circumstances of power. As Cartledge (1987, 140f.) has reminded us, social scientists have often observed that at times of change and crisis networks of patron-client relationships tend to coalesce into more solid factions. Without accepting the rather mechanistic view (Hamilton 1970; 1979; 1991) according to which Spartan political life was permanently dominated by a conflict between three enduring factions, the emergence of more solid groupings can be identified as a genuine development during this period. The emergence of the faction around Lysander (e.g. Xen. Hell. 1.6.4-6; Ages. 20.2-4) is of particular importance. The influence of Lysander's faction and its persistence even after his death (Plut. Ages. 20.4) meant that Agesilaos' rise to dominance was by no means unopposed. He achieved it only through his own faction-building which relied upon the deployment of large amounts of wealth (Xen. Ages. 4; 11.8; Plut. Ages. 4.4; Cartledge 1987, 132ff.).

Agesilaos was also affected by his own experience as the first Spartan king to command mercenary armies during his campaigns in Asia Minor. In Sparta he cemented and increased his personal following through gift-giving, just as in Asia he had
built up his army through abundant supplies, incentives, prizes, pay and plunder (Xen. Ages. 1.18-20, 25, 33; Hell. 3.4.16; 4.2.5-8; cf. Hamilton 1990, 59ff.). The episode in Asia (Xen. Ages. 1.17-19) in which he made huge profits for his friends through the manipulation of booty stands as a model for his wealth-based patronal politics at home. One might say without too much exaggeration that he applied the politics of commanding a mercenary army to the politics of leading his fellow citizens.

Despite his claim to be a loyal servant of the polis, Agesilaos' politics were fundamentally divisive of the solidarity between rich and poor which had traditionally underpinned the polis' survival and success. Relying, as it did, upon the deployment of significant economic resources, his mode of politics probably intensified the growing pressures towards individual acquisition of property and deflected still further the attention of the authorities from the plight of poor citizens.

In addition, the magnitude of his personal power led to a sharper polarization than ever before among leading men, with a clustering of opposition around the kings of the other royal house, especially King Kleombrotos whose partial success in frustrating Agesilaos' anti-Theban policies during the 370s (R.E. Smith 1953/54) provoked in turn severe counter-opposition, as evidenced by the threat of judicial condemnation which forced him into fighting the fatal battle of Leuktra. The revolutionary plotting of Spartiates during the Theban attack on Sparta in
winter 370/69 (Plut. Ages. 32.6; cf. David 1980, 304ff.) is intriguing. Were they poor Spartiates desperate for an escape from the threat of loss of citizen status? Or leading men, including former associates of Kleombrotos, frustrated after the death of the one leader who had challenged the dominance of Agesilaos? How many persons were involved outside the small core of those executed is unknown; but the alienation of the conspirators was symptomatic of a widespread malaise of disunity then current among the citizen body (Plut. Ages. 30-31). There was outrage among the older men and many citizens called to mind the oracles which had warned them about appointing a lame king. Agesilaos’ personal role - dominant, but deleterious for Sparta’s interests - was at the fore of the complaints of a citizen body ill at ease with itself. This prevalent mood of disunity and conspiracy must have exacerbated Sparta’s inability to defend her territories and to resist the dismantling of her power.

V. Sparta and Rome: comparative considerations

This chapter has attempted to define more precisely than has been hitherto attempted the ways in which prolonged foreign warfare and the experience of empire precipitated the crisis of Spartiate society in the early fourth century which led to her decline to the status of a second-rate power. But how important were the factors of war and empire in relation to the longer-term,
underlying developments which were already threatening the Spartiate social order?

Comparative analysis is often helpful not only in highlighting trends shared by societies undergoing comparable experiences but also in isolating distinctive features which are of critical significance. Comparison with the Roman Republic, another society in which prolonged foreign warfare and imperial expansion - in this case over several centuries - culminated in socio-political crisis, may illuminate important aspects of the Spartan crisis. (For the Roman comparandum I have drawn especially upon Hopkins 1978, 1ff.; Harris 1979, 9ff.; Hopkins & Burton 1983; Rich 1983; Astin 1989; Cornell 1989; Staveley 1989). Similarities with Sparta abound: the resort to iteration of office at times of emergency, the creation of new positions (principally the promagistracy) for the maintenance of empire, the emergence of talented individuals who gained unusual terms of command and extraordinary fame during periods of exceptional warfare, tensions between senior senators and younger generals, endemic political prosecutions, the destabilizing impact of new foreign wealth and the concentration of land in the hands of the rich.

The contrasts between the internal impact of Spartan and Roman imperialism are equally, if not more, significant. As their empire expanded over the long period from the fourth to the first century B.C., the Romans made important adaptations to their social structures, especially in the extension of
citizenship. Consequently, in spite of certain fears about a decline (real or supposed) in the numbers of the free population, Rome did not have a serious shortage of assidui (Rich 1983). The Spartiates proved less adaptable, attempting to preserve unchanged their exclusive citizenship with its ever-diminishing numbers of men who were able to meet the concealed property qualification of the mess contributions. Furthermore, there was at Rome always a fair degree of mobility into and out of the office-holding elite, partly in response to the weight of military and administrative responsibilities incurred during imperial expansion. In contrast, at Sparta the evidence suggests a greater limitation of military posts to men from the highest backgrounds. An important reason for this was the allocation of such posts to appointees rather than, as at Rome, to men who had to achieve their positions through continuing success in competitive popular elections.

Other structural differences had equally powerful effects. In the more tightly-controlled Spartan society, in which prohibitions against ostentatious living and display could be more effectively enforced, a larger proportion of foreign wealth may have been channelled into the acquisition of land. Since Spartan territory was also more modest in extent than that of Rome and all private land was citizen-owned, such acquisition was even more directly at the expense of poorer citizens, especially given the concealed property qualification of compulsory contributions to the messes. Again in contrast with Rome, no compensatory material benefits of empire were passed on to
ordinary Spartiates. Moreover, in spite of the resulting hardships and loss of rights, there is no evidence that in the Classical period the concentration of land and impoverishment of the poor ever became a live political issue as it did at Rome owing to the role of the tribunes and the popular influence upon elections and (to a lesser extent) upon legislation.

Although overshadowed by the dominance of the senatorial oligarchy, the significant level of popular influence in Roman politics is an important point of differentiation from the character of Spartiate political life. This is signalled by the fact that none of Sparta's foreign commanders displayed any tendency towards espousing populist causes against the established leadership as did several Roman generals in the late second and early first centuries. Nor did the Lakedaimonian army become a political force in the hands of independent military leaders, owing to the exclusion of rank-and-file citizen troops from most foreign campaigns due to the position of the Spartiate citizen body as an elite dominating a much larger servile population.

Another point of differentiation was that the Roman socio-political system was not as sharply divided along age class lines. Roman commanders had a permanent political position as members of the leading official body, the Senate. This meant that susceptibility to adaptation and change in response to the experience of foreign warfare and empire was embedded in Roman political life to a far greater extent than at Sparta where
returning commanders had no political roles and formal authority lay, until the time of Agesilaos, with men without direct imperial experience. The power of the hereditary dual kingship, another factor alien to the Roman Republic, was also crucial in the hands of Agesilaos as a source of authority in inhibiting tendencies towards change and in imposing collective cohesion.

For all these reasons the divergent outcomes of Roman and of Spartan imperialism were that Rome's empire expanded and her society adapted and survived at the expense of a fundamental change in her political system; whereas Sparta lost her empire and her territorial integrity, and her social institutions (the upbringing, the common meals and her austere way of life) went into decay while her formal political structures survived for another century and a half.

This comparison suggests two complementary points: first, that the character of Sparta's response to involvement in foreign warfare and empire diverged from that of Rome because of fundamental differences in her social and political structure; but, secondly, that the particular nature of that response itself had important implications for the future development of her society. Involvement in war and empire should not be seen as the root cause of Sparta's crisis. As has been indicated in earlier chapters, several components of the crisis were developing strongly beforehand. In particular, the ever-present potential helot threat combined with the decline in Spartiate numbers led to the government's resort by the 420s at the latest to the
cosmetic solution of solving army manpower problems through increased reliance upon non-citizen troops (cf. Thuc. 4.38, 80; 5.34). The fact that these prior developments helped condition the character of Spartan warfare and imperialism means that we should not treat Finley’s striking aphorism (1986, 177) that “her greatest military success destroyed the model military state” as literal truth. We should not, however, fall prey to the determinist view that these prior developments would have destroyed the model military state regardless of the experience of war and empire. That would be counterfactual history at its most pointless, since (owing to the heavy concentration of late-fifth- and early-fourth-century sources) the only Sparta we know in any detail evidentially is the one which was undergoing that experience. As we have seen, involvement abroad introduced important socio-political changes with significant implications for Spartiate landownership and manpower. Sparta’s sixty years of foreign warfare and empire were a major factor which accelerated the onset of her internal crisis and conditioned the particular form in which it evolved. Without that prolonged external engagement and the consequences it produced, the timing, the circumstances and the international repercussions of the Spartiate crisis would surely have been considerably different.
1. In his *Life of Agis* (5.1-3) Plutarch further claims that this greed impelled the Spartiates to pass the so-called law of Epitadeus' which supposedly ended a previous system of inheritance by unigeniture and led to the concentration of land. Despite the attempt of David (1979/80, 44f.; 1981, 71f.) to treat this as authentic history, it is merely a house of cards since, as has recently been demonstrated (Ch.2 above = Hodkinson 1986, 379ff.; Schütrumpf 1987), the supposed system of inheritance by unigeniture and the law of Epitadeus are both pure fiction.

2. Whether or not the ban included bullion as well as coinage is uncertain; the sources are vague on the point. Criticizing the view of Finley (1986, 168) that the ban applied to coinage only, Flower (1991, 92) asks, "would it not have been pointless to ban coinage and allow bullion, when the latter easily could have been melted down into the former?" But how would an individual Spartiate easily obtain the stamp of a foreign polis upon his melted down bullion to transform it into coinage?

3. Hamilton (1990, 82f.) has recently advanced an idiosyncratic version of the deleterious impact of foreign wealth. The increased supply of capital, following on from the disruption to the system of distribution of material goods during the Peloponnesian war, supposedly led to price increases, especially in imported raw materials and manufactured goods. Taking the example of the basic commodity of iron, Hamilton argues that a steady annual increase in its price would have had a severe
impact on all the homoioi, thereby reducing a sizeable number to the position of Inferiors.

This account, which Hamilton admits is hypothetical, is hard to credit. First, his assumption that the "normal laws of supply and demand" operated in the singular conditions of the Spartan state is highly dubious. Secondly, he assumes a level of private dependence upon imported items which is neither proven nor plausible. Thirdly, why should we believe that there were in 404 serious problems with the distribution of materials or goods when Spartan territory had not been subject to significant incursions and the Athenian navy had ceased to control the Aegean for several years? Fourthly, his assumption that Spartiates had to supply their own iron weapons is hazardous, since public supply is a distinct possibility (cf. Cartledge 1979, 184f.). Finally, Hamilton acknowledges the abundance of iron available locally; but his claim that "local availability does not mean that the commodity would not be affected by general changes in the local economy more broadly conceived" is the vaguest of assertions. It founders on the failure to specify how increased costs of imports would affect the price of an abundant local resource.

4. Ollier (1933, 270f.), followed by Flower (1991, 89), claims that Plato's timarchic state is not a realistic depiction of fourth-century Sparta on the grounds that contemporary changes in Spartan history are not reflected in his account. The conclusion, however, does not follow. Quite apart from the specific references to the Spartan politeia at 544C and 545A, the central point about this part of Plato's account is that he
concentrates upon the essential long-term nature of Spartiate society.

5. Even here there is some ambiguity because the word used, 'Lakedaimonios', can include perioikoi; but the context suggests that it is Spartiates the speaker is concerned with. Note that Brasidas appears as a trierarch already in 425 (Thuc. 4.11) and in 388 the eight Spartiates who "happened to be with" the harmost Gorgopas on Aigina probably represent most of the trierarchs from the 12 ships under his command (Xen. Hell. 5.1.6 & 11). Spartan practice was not always consistent. Perioikic naval commanders are attested during the Ionian war (Meiggs & Lewis 1989, 289 no. 95 (K)). Thucydides' specification (8.22.1) that Deiniadadas, the commander of the 13 ships that attacked Lesbos in 412, was a perioikos may, however, indicate a departure from the norm; and the fleet he commanded was Chian rather than Lakonian.

6. The marines (epibatai) referred to here are not to be confused with the individual epibates who appears in Thuc. 8.61.2; Xen. Hell. 1.3.17; Hell. Oxy. 22 (17).4. The latter appears to be a technical Spartan term for a detachable subordinate officer of a nauarchos (Gomme et al. 1981, 150). I am grateful to the late Professor A. Andrewes for his advice on the substance of this footnote.

7. Men whose careers were terminated through exile or execution by the Spartan authorities are included in the figures below because what is at issue is the Spartans' reactions to their
officers in terms of the likelihood of reappointment to subsequent posts.

8. Some additional cases of multiple posts might also have been added with a less strict attitude to the evidence. For example, Aristos (PB 135) and Aristoteles (PB 137), both sent on missions to Syracuse within a space of eight years (Diod. 14.10.2 & 78.1) may be the same person - as claimed by Cavaignac (1914) - given the Spartans' frequent habit of sending the same man back to particular locations and Diodorus' capacity for misrepresenting exact names. In this case Aristos is clearly the dubious name, especially as Diodorus at one point (14.70.3) calls him Aretes.

9. The ancient evidence for these men's careers may be consulted via the Lakedaimonian prosopography of Poralla-Bradford 1985 (henceforth PB). My reconstruction of the military career of Pharax (PB 717/18) follows that of Mosley (1963).

10. Fieldhouse (1973, esp. 80f. & 98f.); cf. the definition of 'sub-imperialism' given by the Japanese historian Beasley (1987, 198): "initiatives taken by men in positions of responsibility overseas, confident that a successful fait accompli would be ratified by their government at home". The activities of Japanese commanders in the 1930s - especially the independent actions of the Kwantung Army, the rivalry between it and the Tientsin garrison (later renamed the North China Army) and the conflicts within the North China Army - could provide interesting comparative material for a more extended study of Spartiate sub-imperialisms.
11. I have deliberately omitted reference to Lysander's alleged machinations to obtain the kingship, the authenticity of which is doubtful (cf., most recently, Flower 1991, 81ff., with refs. to earlier studies).

12. Plutarch refers to this conspiracy as being meidzon in comparison with an earlier conspiracy of non-citizens which involved 200 persons. He probably means "more serious" rather than "larger". As Flower (1991, 87 n.46) argues, "given that... the Spartiate population had dropped to as few as 800, it is prima facie impossible that more than 200 Spartiates were involved in this second conspiracy which met 'in a house'". We should bear in mind, however, that the number at the core of the conspiracy tells us nothing about the overall scale of disaffection. Most conspiracies, however widespread, rely upon a small organizational core; and what other, larger venues than a private house were there in Sparta for an illicit, secret meeting? Moreover, it would be wrong to conclude with Flower (1991, 88) that the failure of the conspiracy signifies that "the majority of Spartan citizens were either satisfied with the status quo or, for whatever reasons, did not desire change or reform". However widespread the sympathy for the aims of the conspiracy, it would have been surprising if it had continued without its leaders.
Repetition of the detailed conclusions in the body of this dissertation would seem otiose. The Introduction has already outlined the general purpose of each chapter and its place within the overall scheme of argument; and the concluding section of Chapter 5 has discussed the relative significance of the specific long- and shorter-term factors examined earlier in the dissertation in the development of the Spartiate crisis. Definitive 'conclusions' are also inappropriate because of the provisional, exploratory character of the research presented here. It may, however, be helpful to suggest a few brief general points which emerge from the above chapters and to outline some directions in which future work might develop these exploratory studies.

This dissertation has emphasized a dual but integrated approach to its subject-matter. For the purpose of analysis 'property' and 'society' have been treated as separate categories. This distinction has been justified, at least in part, by the fact that public controls upon property ownership, although not non-existent, appear to have been significantly fewer than upon other aspects of the lives of Spartiate citizens. Yet this study has also revealed the interpenetration of the two spheres. Issues of property ownership, especially of differential levels of wealth, have been seen to affect not only the operation of public institutions (such as the choice of pederastic partners, the functioning of the messes and the
emergence of military leaders), but also the patterns of more personal activities such as marriage-making and procreation. Conversely, the prescriptions of the Spartan state and the character of Spartiate society exercised an important impact upon the role of property and especially upon the economies of citizen households, influencing such basic elements as the extraction of a surplus from their labour force and the use of produce extracted from their estates. It was state policies too which contributed to the increasing deployment of wealth through the intensification of patronal relations between citizens.

It is hoped that the confrontation and integration of these two spheres has illuminated some of the diverse interrelationships between different aspects of Spartiate life and the complicated processes of continuity and change which characterized Sparta’s historical development in the Classical period. In modern scholarship Sparta is often treated either as an ultra-conservative society or (more analytically) as a surviving exemplar of a relatively undifferentiated ‘archaic’ polis (e.g., with qualifications, Austin & Vidal-Naquet 1977, ch.4). This dissertation may serve to suggest that, though clearly less pluralistic in character, Sparta’s internal society was in its own way as internally complex and subject to transformation as those of most other contemporary Greek states.

These explorations into the field of Spartiate property and society do not as yet constitute an exhaustive survey. First, my discussion of the character of land tenure in Chapter 2
requires extension in two directions: through more explicit consideration of the tenure of other forms of property, such as livestock and other types of moveable wealth than gold and silver, and of communal rights of use over individually-held property (cf. esp. Xen. Lak. Pol. 6.3-4; Arist. Pol. 1263a35-7).

Secondly, there is need for a systematic examination of the 'balance sheet' of Spartiate household economies, embracing such factors as the composition and subsistence requirements of citizen households, including the range and scale of agricultural production required for the provision of the mess dues. Issues concerning the location and productivity of Spartiate estates constitute a thicket of unknowns which are more difficult to penetrate; but the forthcoming publication of the Laconia Survey and the work of the newly-commenced Pylos Survey in Messenia may begin to shed some additional light upon the agrarian exploitation of the different regions under Spartiate control, including the currently unresolved question of the residential patterns of helot communities. A more thorough discussion of the geography and archaeology of those regions under Spartiate landownership and helot cultivation is indeed another desideratum.

A further new area of investigation would concern the engagement of citizen households in exchange and other economic activity, building upon my brief remarks in Chapter 5, Section 2. The need for each Spartiate to deliver an exact and unvarying quantity of specified items of produce monthly to his mess must
surely have meant that in most months a number of men were lacking in one product or another (quite apart from those sufficiently impoverished to be suffering from a general shortfall). This must have drawn many citizens into market or other exchanges with those fortunate enough to be in possession of surplus produce. Such exchanges might of course have a range of social as well as purely economic implications, as was suggested towards the end of Chapter 5. Similarly, one might also consider the polis’ need for livestock and arable products, especially for purposes of sacrifice (e.g. Hdt. 6.57), and the potential role of Spartiate estates in supplying this requirement. Such studies would also necessitate close reexamination of the precise scope of the ban on citizen participation in money-making and banausic activities (cf. Xen. Lak. Pol. 7.2).

If the above topics seem to lie mainly on the ‘property’ side of the dual approach advocated in this dissertation, there are also several ‘societal’ issues in need of further examination. The suggestive article of Holladay (1977) ought to be extended into a more systematic analysis of state controls over the use of surplus wealth, including study of prohibitions of specific forms of consumption, of the channelling of expenditure and display into officially-sanctioned spheres.

In this context greater use could be made of the limited, but as yet historically unexploited, range of surviving material evidence which, covering the entire period of this study, can act
as a partial control on the literary sources, which date from the late-fifth century and later (cf. Fitzhardinge 1985, for an art-historical study). Analysis of the published material evidence in different media might illuminate more clearly certain restrictive patterns imposed by the state to complement my value-oriented discussion in Chapter 1, as well as indicating a wider range of permitted expenditures than are known from the literary sources. Through the exploitation of non-Spartan literary and epigraphic material, there also remains more to be said than is attempted in this dissertation concerning a range of attested socio-political uses of wealth: such as the likely costs of the dedications of Spartiate chariot victors, the extent of Spartiate xeniai and their material implications (cf. Herman 1987) and the role of bribery in political life (cf. Noethlichs 1987).

Finally, no thorough study of the role of property holding in the Spartan early-fourth-century crisis would be complete without a concluding analysis of its enduring aftermath in the later fourth and third centuries. The recent publication of illuminating general studies of this period (e.g. David 1981; Cartledge & Spawforth 1989) merely highlights the need for more specialized analysis of significant issues such as the impact on Spartiate landowners of the loss of Messenia and the formation of the stratified citizen body of the Hellenistic period.

As these brief programmatic statements indicate, several of the above topics for further study emerge from issues raised in the course of this dissertation. If my explorations into
Classical Spartan property and society can lead on to a more systematic appreciation of the socio-economic character of the Spartiate polis, then the long years involved in the making of this dissertation may yet prove to have been time well spent.
# APPENDIX 1

Named Spartiate extraordinary officers (with PB No.)
grouped according to decade (cf. Table 5.1)

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N = 32
APPENDIX 2

Extraordinary officers, 412-386, (with PB Nos.) grouped by number of posts held

A = Only one attested post & no evidence of premature death.
B = Only one attested post, but career known to have been prematurely terminated by death (other than by execution).
C = More than one military post.

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N = 22
The above lists aim to include in principle all named, non-royal military officials in positions of responsibility in campaigns outside Lakonia and Messenia which were not under the command of a king at the head of regular Lakedaimonian forces. Such positions of responsibility include harmosts, nauarchoi, staff officers under the above (and those under Agesilaos in Asia Minor), officers sent to command forces of foreign communities, non-royal commanders of Lakedaimonian and Peloponnesian forces (including, for example, officers at various levels in the expedition against Olynthos in the late 380s and early 370s, and polemarchs and hipparmosts of detached Lakedaimonian morai). Such an all-embracing compass is justifiable on the grounds that all such officers had, at least to a limited degree, either the capacity for personal policy or military initiatives or the susceptibility to foreign influences beyond the regular control of the Spartan polis.

Nonetheless, construction of the above lists is to a certain extent an arbitrary affair. First, certain individuals have necessarily had to be excluded from one or both Appendices on a variety of grounds:

(i) Melanchridas (PB 517) & Melanthos (PB 518). These men were initially appointed to positions but did not in the event ever exercise their office. They are omitted from both Appendices.
(ii) Leonymos (PB 485) & Hippokratidas (PB 393). The former was a soldier who died at Kunaxa (Xen. Anab. 4.1.18), but it is unclear that he held any responsible position. The evidence concerning the latter (Plut. Apophth. Lak. 222A-B) leaves it uncertain both whether he was in office abroad or in Sparta and whether he should be dated within our period or not. Both are omitted from both Appendices.

(iii) Aristomenes (PB 133) & Euphratas (not in PB; Aineias Tacticus 27.7; cf. Whitehead 1990, 175f.). These men’s posts are dateable with certainty neither to a particular decade nor, more generically, to the period 412-386. They are omitted from both Appendices.

(iv) Lysippos (PB 506) & Nikandros (PB 556). There is uncertainty concerning the exact decade of tenure of these men’s posts, but they lie certainly within the period 412-386. They are hence omitted from Appendix 1, but included in Appendix 2.

(v) The identity (all one person or more?) of the several Leons (PB 482) known in the late fifth century is notoriously uncertain (Ch.1 Section II(d)). This causes no problems for Appendix 1 which is not concerned with problems of identity; but the uncertainty makes it necessary to omit him/them from Appendix 2.

Secondly, certain men held annual posts which commenced in the last few months of one decade and continued into the first few months of the next (e.g. a post held in the year 410/09).
It was judged excessively inflationary to include such men under both decades in Appendix 1. Instead, they have been allocated only to the decade within which they were appointed. The men (and years of office) in question are as follows: Xenares (420/19); Aristarchos; Bion; Nausikleides; Polynikos; Polos; Charminos (all 400/399); Polybiades (380/79).

Finally, it should be noted that the seer Agias (PB 22) is included in both Appendices owing to the significance of this office in Spartan military campaigning (cf. Hdt. 9.33).


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