The voyage of the 'Prince Albert', 1850

by

Ian R. Stone

Thesis submitted in part fulfilment of the requirements for the Diploma in Polar Studies

Trinity Hall, Cambridge

May 1978
DECLARATION

I certify that this thesis is between 10,000 and 20,000 words in length, exclusive of footnotes, references and appendix.

Jan R. Stone
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My first debt is to my supervisor, Clive Holland, for his unfailing assistance and patience both in the preparation of this thesis and also in the different essays that were part of the course. I am also very grateful to Harry King, Kristin Hollick and Carla Mason for assistance in the library, and to Pat Watson for the same in the University Library.

At the Royal Geographical Society Mrs Christine Kelly helped me to find my way around the Snow papers and duplicated many of them for me.

My greatest debt is to my wife, Elizabeth, for bearing the dual role of breadwinner and secretary during this year.
This expedition was the first of Lady Franklin’s private expeditions in search of her husband and the crews of H.M.S. Erebus and Terror lost in the islands of the Canadian Arctic. The aim was to winter in Prince Regent Inlet and explore the area to the west using two separate boat parties. These parties were to be commanded by C.C. Forsyth R.N., the captain of the ship, and W.P. Snow, his clerk. After a swift passage to Prince Regent Inlet Forsyth turned back because he was prevented from penetrating the inlet further than Fury Beach by what was regarded as unbreachable ice. Prince Albert then passed near Cape Riley where Snow obtained news of the relics that had been found by another expedition and which indicated that Franklin had wintered in that vicinity. Further relics were brought back to Britain by Forsyth. The return caused much disappointment to Lady Franklin and Sophia Cracroft. They determined to send Prince Albert out again with a different commander. Snow believed that he was to have that post, but it was allocated to William Kennedy on his arrival from Canada.

This thesis is an analysis of the events surrounding the voyage with reference to the light they throw on the different personalities involved. It is suggested that the main reason for the failure was that the preparation was mismanaged. No efforts were made to secure the appointment of people who had sufficient identity of interests to be an effective team. Forsyth found the situation on board such that he decided to conclude the voyage as soon as a reasonable excuse for returning presented itself.
NOTE ON SOURCES

Most of the information obtained about the voyage is derived from the Franklin papers in the Scott Polar Research Institute (abbreviated to S.P.R.I. in the bibliography). Further information has been gathered from the Snow papers held in the Royal Geographical Society archives (abbreviated to R.G.S. in the bibliography). In addition to letters and journal entries written by Lady Franklin and Sophia Cracroft, there are numerous letters etc. of other people that were transcribed by one or other of the two ladies. In these entries there are many spelling and grammatical mistakes. The quotations incorporated in this thesis are as written in the original and no use is made of the word 'sic'. Some of the entries are in pages that have not been numbered and in the bibliography no page number has been inserted for these items.
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PLATE I "Dangerous position of the Prince Albert" (Snow, 1851a).

PLATE II "The Arctic discovery ships - midnight" (Snow, 1851a).

FIG. 1 Map of Prince Regent Inlet and the surrounding area.

FIG. 2 Map of the area around Port Leopold.

FIG. 3 Forsyth's track map (Forsyth, 1850c)

FIG. 4 Snow's map of the voyage (Snow, 1851a)
... but as it must necessarily occur that men writing on the same subject, and truthfully giving an account of all they see, will almost echo each other's words,...

W.P. Snow, 1857b
CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION

The expedition which forms the subject of this thesis was one of the many sent out in search of Sir John Franklin and the crews of H.M.S. Erebus and Terror. Events of the period are reviewed by Cyriax (1939). The last contact with Franklin was in July 1845 and, in response to mounting concern, a relief expedition under Sir James Clark Ross was sent out in 1848. Its return in 1849 with no news catalysed anxiety into a public demand for action which resulted in the remarkable effort of 1850. It was, moreover, believed that Ross had shown insufficient devotion to the search, and prominent among those who subscribed to this view were Franklin's wife, Lady Jane Franklin, and her niece, Sophia Cracroft (Franklin, 1849a, 1849b, 1849c). These two redoubtable ladies were to take a leading part in subsequent events.

In 1850 six maritime expeditions were dispatched. The smallest

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1. The Admiralty, following the advice of a body of experts usually known as the 'Arctic Council', sent Ross's ships H.M.S. Enterprise and Investigator after a hasty refit to Bering Strait. They also sent two steamers and two sailing ships under Captain Horatio Thomas Austin, and, as a separate expedition, two brigs commanded by a whaling captain, William Penny, to Lancaster Sound, in which vicinity was the supply ship H.M.S. North Star which had gone there to support Sir J.C. Ross. From the United States two ships under Lieutenant Edwin Jesse de Haven departed for the same area. They were supplied from subscriptions raised by one of Lady Franklin's most assiduous correspondents, Henry Grinnell. Unlike the British private expeditions they were under full naval discipline as the vessels had been put at the disposal of, and taken over by, the United States Navy Department (Grinnell, 1850). The Hudson's Bay Company fitted out a small expedition commanded by Sir John Ross who was in his seventies at the time.
of these was that of **Prince Albert** under Commander Charles Codrington Forsyth R.N.¹ This vessel was supplied from Lady Franklin's own private funds and additional money raised by subscription.

Of this fleet **Prince Albert** was the last ship to leave and the first to return. The expedition is treated as little more than a footnote in the accounts of the period. Richard King regarded it with contempt, dismissing it as "altogether unsuccessful", failing "in establishing even a wintering" (King, 1855, p. 84). Brown was almost equally brief but took a more sympathetic view, stating that the relics of the encampment set up by the Franklin expedition on Cape Riley that were brought back by **Prince Albert** were of great value (Brown, 1858, p. 156). More recent historiography devotes little more attention to it: in Woodward's biography of Lady Franklin it receives just over a page (Woodward, 1951, p. 275) while Neatby (1970, pp. 126-127) and Wright (1959, p. 118) merely notice it. The most detailed published account of recent years is by Woodward (1950) but it is marred by considerable inaccuracy and is insufficient in detail.

Nevertheless, the voyage is of considerable interest. Of all the 1850 expeditions it alone was heading in the correct direction and if the plan, to examine Boothia Peninsula² and the area to the west of it had been carried through, it could have discovered Franklin's fate thus considerably abbreviating the search, but, on the other hand, reducing the amount of exploration that was incidental to it. It would not have been able to rescue any survivors, since

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¹ The next smallest expedition was that of **Ross**. **Felix** was of 91 tons, fractionally larger than **Prince Albert**, but had a subsidiary vessel, **Mary**, which was Ross's yacht. The total complement of Ross's expedition was 19 and that of **Prince Albert**, 18.

² For positions of localities named see Figs. 1 and 2.
they were almost certainly all dead by that time (Cyriax, 1939, p. 73), but it might have been able to recover documents that were destroyed before later searches reached the area. These documents could have served to remove much of the baffling doubt that continues to enshroud Franklin's fate.

The Prince Albert expedition threw into contact a number of people of greatly different personalities and attitudes, and the development of their relationships in the period during the expedition and after it constitute the main focus of this thesis. Among the points of interest in this respect are how much, if at all, Lady Franklin's attitudes changed as a result of this expedition. Did she adopt more objective criteria in selection of candidates for her later expeditions to ensure better performance than those chosen for this expedition? Additional problems revolve round the question of who was responsible for the outcome of the expedition and to what extent the aims were realistic under the circumstances and whether they would have been attained by different participants. The matter of motives is here important; there is no doubt that while both had ostensibly the same goal, namely the rescue of Franklin's crews, the two most prominent members of the expedition, Forsyth and William Parker Snow, his clerk, held widely divergent views and participated in the expedition for different reasons. What these were and how far they believed they were achieving their ends was important to their actions on the voyage and after it. The crew also take on a more positive role than was usually the case, especially on naval expeditions, in the accounts of which they are seldom mentioned. How far they were an influence on the decision making of those in command is also examined. This thesis attempts to provide some answers to these
questions. Assessments are made of the personalities involved and of their reactions to the relatively stressful situation on board. In contrast with many polar voyages these stresses were hardly at all due to the environment, but were the result of the juxtaposition of people who had so little in common that they were unable to effect the compromises that would have been necessary if the voyage was to be successful.
CHAPTER II - PREPARATION

The reason for the voyage was that Lady Franklin, then aged 58, did not believe that the government expeditions would cover all the area where the missing ships might be. In view of the central importance of Lady Franklin, it is necessary to give an outline of her character as hitherto presented. She is the subject of two biographies. The first, by W.F. Rawnsley (1923), who was related to the Franklins provides no relevant information, but the second, by F.J. Woodward, contains minute detail of every aspect of her career. It is frankly eulogistic and does not attempt to provide an objective assessment of her behaviour, but liberal extracts from her diaries and papers are given together with some astute comment.

Woodward's understanding of the relationship between the Franklins is that Lady Franklin was a "highly complicated personality, and the very profound love between her and Franklin, whose character was essentially simple, was largely an attraction of opposites." She lists three main characteristics of Lady Franklin: she was "acutely sensitive", "extremely intelligent" and "she knew how to get her own way". Woodward quotes her as disliking "'bold, masculine, independent' women". "In reality she was small and slight and spoke softly; and the arts she used to bend people to her will were very subtle ones." (Woodward, 1950, p. 533).

Woodward also gives a series of notes made for a biography of Lady Franklin by her niece. They give an impression of the epitome of all virtues and provide rather more insight into the writer than into her subject. It cannot be denied that Lady Franklin was a woman of great knowledge, industry and experience of the world. She was also devoted to her husband and appears to have had little difficulty in exercising her influence over a very large number of
different men. Her enormous correspondence indicates the wide extent of her acquaintance but at the same time gives evidence, denied obviously to her contemporaries, of the machinations to which she was a party. Of her merits there is little doubt, but the extent to which she was honest, scrupulous or principled affords considerable scope for conjecture. Neatby quotes Harold Nicolson as stating that she was a "conceited prig" and had a "horrible restless arrogance". He comments: "Such a judgement is impossible to justify and difficult to comprehend." (Neatby, 1970, p. 120).

This obviously begs the question and this study will reveal that she may have been quite capable of deliberate falsehood, if it suited her interests, that she was not the type of person who was able to recognise her mistakes and learn from them, and that her judgement of people was impulsive and subjective to the point of irresponsibility. Jane Franklin is a historical character of whom no impartial evaluation has yet been made. Commentators at the time were, of course, bound by the social mores of the period, not to mention by fear of legal action, while later writers have been either enthusiasts like Woodward, or polar historians, to whom the details of the different expeditions have been more interesting than the social developments that brought them into being, and these have accepted the usual view of her which was held during her lifetime. It was fortunate for her reputation that Lytton Strachey did not include her in his *Eminent Victorians.*

1. She may not have been so generally successful with women, however, and had acrimonious disputes with Franklin's daughter by his first marriage (Woodward, 1951, p. 282).

2. An intensive search has failed to find the original of this comment. In a letter to the writer Prof. Neatby explained that he had mislaid his notes and was unable to provide a reference.

3. An expression of this is in Clayton, 1960 or 1861, pp. 5-44. This book entitled *Celebrated women: stories of their lives and example...* is a more superficial female version in the genre of Samuel Smiles's *Lives of the engineers.*
It is also necessary to comment on Sophia Cracroft who acted as amanuensis for her aunt for much of the period under consideration. She was her constant companion both in Britain and on her various travels, and in her correspondence and diaries rarely appears to have had an original thought, constantly referring to what her aunt says or thinks. There is, though, at least a suspicion that she may have been a more forceful and less subtle character than Lady Franklin and may have had a more positive role in their relationship than would be apparent from a study of Woodward's book.

The plans of the official expeditions were based on the supposition that Franklin's progress had been halted somewhere in the region to the west of Melville Island and Banks Island. This was the conclusion of the 'Arctic Council' which supported its view by the belief that if Franklin had been beset further east or to the north, he would either have retreated to Lancaster Sound or Fury Beach where he or his reports would have been found by Ross. If close to the American mainland he would have proceeded to the Mackenzie (Cyriax, 1939, p. 78). However, the possibility that Franklin might have attempted to retreat to Fury Beach through a possible extension of James Ross Strait or Simpson Strait was raised, and the suggestion that Prince Regent Inlet should be searched was made by the 'Arctic Council' (Beaufort, 1849). By 1850 it was realised, as a result of the work of the Rosses, that the Boothia isthmus existed, but it was not known when Franklin sailed that there was no other channel, the feeling being that a boat journey to the stores at Fury Beach might have appealed to him more than an arduous foot journey to the continental shore and beyond. This indicated a search of Prince Regent Inlet, Boothia Peninsula and the area to the west.

This possibility does not appear to have been present in the

1. Where Parry's ship H.M.S. Fury had been abandoned in 1825.
The mind of Lady Franklin at the end of 1849 as she wanted search of "the channels which lead out of Barrow Strait Northward & Westward - Wellington Channel... has not been looked at" (Franklin, 1849b). Also, the possibility of a private expedition had not been decided on at that time (Cracroft, 1849). Shortly afterwards, however, in a letter to John Rae she suggests the mouth of the Great Fish River "and the so-called James Ross's Strait" as essential areas to cover (Franklin, 1849c), and made similar comments to Charles Gerrans Phillips (Woodward, 1950, Pl. op. p. 538). She was also the recipient of advice as early as March 1848 from Richard King, who wished her to support his projected land expedition to that area, but the intemperance of his language alienated her and she refused his proposal (Neatby, 1970, p. 102). The significance of this is that at this early date she rejected one of the few people who had actual exploratory experience in the area with which she was concerned. She did, in fact, select for the Prince Albert expedition two men who had never been to the Arctic, and this early decision casts doubt on the reality of her reputation for sound business management.

Lady Franklin mentioned the possibility of a private expedition in January (Franklin, 1850a) and it appears that the initial concept was based on a suggestion of John McLean who proposed that "a small schooner of some 30 or 40 tons burthen,... be despatched from England in company with the Hudson's Bay ships". It should be directed to Wager River "until interrupted by insurmountable obstacles" when it should become the base for two shore parties which would search the required area when "winter travelling became practicable" (McLean, 1850). That Lady Franklin had accepted this idea is evident from a letter dated in March 1850 to Snow, who was in the United States, and who had written to her with his own search plan and offer
to join any expedition. In it she states: "I am in hopes an auxiliary expedition chiefly in boats and on foot may be arranged according to the plan which I herewith enclose...". However, as there was no time to copy "Mr. McLean's plan", she referred him to Silas Burrows in New York who knew its contents (Franklin, 1850c).

Snow's own suggestion had been made in January, and he proposed a land expedition which, on approaching the coast, would be divided into three for a thorough search of the region. Snow evidently believed that the missing expedition would be found in the same area as that advocated by Lady Franklin as he wanted the "central party" to "shape a course as near as possible to the position of the Magnetic Pole; and the eastern-most division direct to Prince Regent's Inlet ".

By May, Lady Franklin's plan had been modified:

"The idea being that a small vessel should descend Regents Inlet to Brentford Bay, or wherever the land of Boothia is narrowed into an Isthmus of only a few miles across, cross this point with boats & go along the unexplored coast S. of James Ross's furthest of last year to the entrance of his Strait then reentering Regent Inlet by the Isthmus of Boothia." (Franklin, 1850e).

Lady Franklin approached a number of experts to obtain information and advice for the commander of the expedition and these present a series of conflicting views that would confuse anyone without first hand experience of the area. Frederick William Beechey, despite misgivings about the expedition (Cracroft, 1850a), proposed that if, after a careful examination of Prince Regent Inlet, no traces were

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1. This letter contains an example of the unworldly ethos of much of Snow's writing in that he believed a useful source of labour for the expedition would be found by employing "picked men from convicted criminals," as they are "possessed of almost inexhaustible mental resources " (Snow, 1850a). Despite this somewhat bizarre suggestion, Lady Franklin was attracted to him and selected him for her expedition.

2. There is no direct evidence of what caused the change of plan but it may have been the belief that the use of Wager River would have imposed much more stress on the land parties due to the longer distance to march with the boats before reaching the area of search.
found, then the expedition should communicate with Austin's expedition and return home (Beechey, 1850). He obviously did not place much faith in land searches and his suggestion does bear the closest comparison of all of them with what actually took place. 1

William Edward Parry noted Lady Franklin's idea and insisted that the ship be secured on the west side of Prince Regent Inlet despite the fact that this was the coast most likely to be iced up, because then the boats would not have to be dragged over the ice of the inlet (Parry, 1850). The advice of John Barrow is full of homilies about the need for schools for the men and drinking essence of spruce etc. (Barrow, 1850a), and he recommended Forsyth to secure the ship at the mouth of Prince Regent Inlet in order to avoid the risk of it being permanently trapped and to proceed south by boats before crossing over to the western side of the land (Barrow, 1850b).

Captain R.H. King on the other hand, believed that Prince Albert should enter Prince Regent Inlet as soon as possible "short of crippling the ship...". King, disagreeing with Beechey, stated that the expedition should not leave the area until all its stores were exhausted or until it had accomplished what it set out to do (King, 1850a, 1850b).

J.C. Ross was decisive on the need to ensure that retreat should "never be a matter of uncertainty" and noted that as there was no harbour between Batty Bay and Brentford Bay great care would need to be exercised. The ship should under no circumstances be taken south of the latter point. He too advocated the use of boats

1. It was not suggested by Forsyth, however, on his return that his course of action was influenced by Beechey, or indeed by any of the advisors.
in proceeding further into the inlet towards the strait to the western sea "which I think will probably prove to be the case" (Ross, J.C., 1850).

It is clear that some of these opinions were submitted to Barrow as he felt it necessary to write to Forsyth just before his departure to stress that he did not believe that the vessel should winter in Batty Bay and emphasised that if Port Leopold were used, there was much less danger of being trapped (Barrow, 1850c). Despite this, it appears that the final plan for the expedition, which is not given in any existing manuscript, envisaged wintering at Brentford Bay with the land parties setting out from there. This is referred to in Simmonds's book (Simmonds, 1851, p. 358) and as his proofs were read by Lady Franklin and Sophia Cracroft it is probably an accurate statement of their intentions (Cracroft, 1851).

However, not all the acknowledged Arctic experts believed in the expedition. George Back refused to contribute to it and others were influenced by his opinion (Back, 1850; Weld, 1850). It is likely that such feelings were only held by the minority and the chivalric element was coming to the fore: "indeed Franklin and his party had an aura of the Holy Grail, Lady Franklin of the fair Elaine and those searching for Franklin of the knights of the court of Sir Arthur." (Wallace, 1975, p. 285).

A more ill-assorted collection of champions never set forth on a courtly quest, but before considering personnel it is necessary to describe how the expedition was organised and funded. The first

1. The other advice transcribed in Sophia Cracroft's notes was from Frederick Leopold McClintock, who was on Austin's expedition, and it was on the methods of sledging. The various suggestions reflect each person's own experience and ignore that of others. Thus Parry advises against ice travel following his experiences in the 1827 attempt on the pole, while McClintock stresses sledge travel, the technique of which he had experimented with in 1849 and was now perfecting.
Mention of it in private correspondence was apparently in January 1850 when, in a letter to Burrows, Lady Franklin raised the possibility of organising one from New England although that may have been an attempt to induce the Americans to act (Franklin, 1850a). The expedition first came into public view in spring with notices in the Athenaeum and other journals. The former reported on the 13th April that another expedition "in connexion with that of Sir John Ross" was being promoted to search Prince Regent Inlet and adjacent areas by "walking and boating parties" on the belief that Franklin might have made for Fury Beach (Athenaeum, 1850a). A fortnight later the same magazine was able to give many more details stating that Prince Regent Inlet would be searched because of the belief of the "Arctic officers" and "Beechey in particular" that it ought not to be neglected, that Forsyth had obtained leave from the Admiralty to command it and that Lady Franklin and others had devoted private funds for the purpose (Athenaeum, 1850b).

Public subscription was invited by means of newspaper advertisements and a printed broadsheet. This reviewed the reasons for the expedition stating that on Franklin's charts there was a channel from the west to Prince Regent Inlet. It also mentioned the existence of the stores at Fury Beach and Victory Harbour\(^1\) and that this would be a likely route for his retreat to Lancaster Sound. The statement concluded by stressing that the official expeditions would not cover all the possibilities and that "the third scheme, that which is now pleaded for, must be neglected unless an independent provision be made for it." The costs would "scarcely exceed £4000" and the printed list of subscriptions already received was headed by the name of Lady Franklin for £1,000 (Branch Expedition..., 1850).

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1. At this place Sir J. Ross had abandoned his ship, the Victory, in 1832.
Unlike many such subscription efforts, the result of this one is known. Snow published the list of subscribers as an appendix, and the authenticity of it is beyond doubt because he was given it by Lady Franklin's bankers while his book was in preparation (Cracroft, 1850i). There were 198 individual or corporate donors, and donations ranged from £100 downwards. A large number of the donors were either naval officers, clergymen or maiden ladies. Excluding the donation of Lady Franklin, the total sum contributed was £1601-3-9 (Snow, 1850a, pp. 387-392).

This was, however, insufficient. In May Sophia Cracroft wrote to J.B. Horsfall, a wealthy Liverpool businessman, that Lady Franklin was disappointed "at the result of the benevolent & most liberal dispositions of yourself & others, yet she has scarcely been surprised at it." This obscure remark would indicate that Snow's list may not be complete as Horsfall's name is not on it, but it is possible that he made his contributions direct to Lady Franklin with a request for anonymity. Sophia Cracroft also noted that a bill had been received from the Admiralty for £95 for pemmican, despite the view of Parry and others that it would not be charged for, and this letter is, in fact, a clear hint that Horsfall might pay the bill (Cracroft, 1850c). Later also, after the expedition had sailed, Lady Franklin was driven to make a direct appeal to the Mayor of Birmingham for funds as she had insufficient money to meet the expenses incurred and noted that if she subscribed, others would follow his example (Franklin, 1850f). In the end, despite this:

"it is understood that Lady Franklin sold out of the funds all the money which she could legally touch, and that the remainder of the expenses not met by voluntary subscriptions, of about 1500l., and which amounted altogether to between 3000l. and 4000l., have been made good by the same estimable lady." (New Monthly Magazine, 1851).
Additional sources of support were also tapped and various donations of equipment were received. Barrow gave a "Seaman's library" (Cracroft, 1850b), while a series of bills for such items as furs and preserved potatoes were reduced by the suppliers. Lady Franklin did not, however, manage the money herself: the bills were all sent to W. Hogarth, a prominent Aberdeen ship and whaler owner, "who has the entire settlement of all the accounts connected with it." (Bills..., 1850). Boats were donated by Messrs. White of Cowes (from whom Prince Albert was purchased) and by Messrs. Searle of Lambeth (Snow, 1851a, p. 392) who provided one of gutta percha and who must have been satisfied at the excellent publicity they received from the accounts of its use in Snow's book.

From all this one would gain the impression of Lady Franklin's total financial involvement in the search. Indeed, in a series of letters written on her behalf, and doubtless at her instigation, by the Rev. Moses Marcus to wealthy Americans, this impression is reinforced. She "has spent nearly the whole of her private means & she ought to be assisted in her noble efforts." (Marcus, 1849), while she "has saved & scraped together all she could, & impoverished herself long ago", even being in a state of "actual self denial." (Marcus, 1850a). Of course, the definition of "actual self denial" in Victorian England depended on what class of society was concerned, but there is no doubt that Lady Franklin was in severe financial difficulties for much of this period, and these were exacerbated by the reluctance of Franklin's other relatives to involve themselves as completely as she did (Woodward, 1951, pp. 263-264).

A vital part of the planning of the expedition was the acquisition

1. This included such unlikely volumes as Paul and Virginia and Life of Mahomet.
of a suitable ship. An initial suggestion was that a vessel might be cheaper in the United States (Franklin, 1950b). Snow states that Prince Albert was bought from Messrs. White though he does not give a price. After purchase she was sent to Aberdeen "for the requisite fittings and strengthening to be put upon her" and he goes on to state that Hogarth superintended this as he had done for the vessels of Penny's expedition (Snow, 1851a, p. 7). Prince Albert was built in Cowes in 1848 and had been engaged in the fruit trade to the Azores. She was 89\frac{3}{4} tons, and had a length of just over 72 feet and a beam of approximately 17\frac{1}{2} feet (Snow, 1851a, p. 21). She was rigged as a topsail schooner though she was also referred to as a "ketch" (Snow, 1851, p. 388). The plates in Snow's book certainly reveal a fairly diminutive craft (Plates 1 and 2). She appears to have been well equipped with essentials\(^1\) but Elisha Kent Kane had the impression that:

"Their little vessel was much less perfectly fitted than ours to encounter the perils of the ice; but in one respect at least their expedition resembled our own. They had to rough it: to use a Western phrase, they had no fancy fixings - nothing but what a hasty outfit and a limited purse could supply." (Kane, 1854, p. 154)

The personnel were recruited in the haphazard and disorganised fashion characteristic of Lady Franklin's private expeditions. Forsyth, the captain of the ship and leader of the expedition, was one of a large number of naval officers who had volunteered their services for the Franklin search. He was not accepted for any of the official expeditions but, as he had known the family while Franklin was Governor of Van Diemen's Land, he was doubtless able to make direct

\(^1\) Forsyth approached Prince Albert to present an organ to the ship but sailed before the news of his agreement reached Aberdeen. Lady Franklin stated to the Prince's private secretary that she believed Forsyth would have waited for it if he had known of this, despite the fact that the season was far advanced (Phipps, 1850; Franklin, 1850h).
contact when the expedition was mooted. An additional incentive for Lady Franklin accepting him was that he volunteered his services free (Woodward, 1951, p. 272). At all events, he had obtained Admiralty permission by 27th April (Athenaeum, 1850b) and by the 1st May his command of the expedition was obviously widely known since he received a letter from Captain Harding, one of his previous commanding officers, expressing admiration for his volunteering (Harding, 1850). He also appears to have been well known to Barrow whose letters of advice are written in a conspicuously friendly tone, and, as Barrow was a confidant of Lady Franklin, this may have acted as an additional factor in his favour. Barrow believed him to be "in all respects a gentleman" though "not overpolished" (Barrow, 1850d).

After entering the navy on the 28th December 1826, Forsyth's career was reasonably conventional except that he had much time in detached small vessels both in surveying and in operations against the slave trade. He received several commendations from, among others, Franklin himself, and was promoted after only five years as lieutenant. He had, however, seen no service in polar areas, nor with merchant seamen (O'Byrne, 1860, pp. 410-411).

1. A far more realistic appointee to the command would have been a whaling captain, but for reasons of cost this does not appear to have been considered after Penny was taken over by the Admiralty for one of its expeditions. The same policy was adopted later in the preparation period for the second Prince Albert expedition when Sophia Cracroft stated to William Scoresby that a naval officer would be cheaper and "we could hardly expect a Commander in the Navy to serve under a Whaling master." (Cracroft, 1851w). Lady Franklin, however, noted that naval officers had "nobly" volunteered to serve under Penny (Franklin, 1860c). At all events, they endeavoured to obtain a whaler for the second expedition and eventually secured the services of John Leask who, however, despite his experience and a positive assurance that he would have "the entire charge of the vessel" (Cracroft, 1851aa) eventually was required to serve under a landsman, William Kennedy who was to be captain of the ship (Cracroft, 1851e) and under a totally inexperienced French naval officer, Joseph René Bellot, who was second in command.
The most interesting member of the expedition was Snow. His duties were ill defined, but he:

"not being a nautical man by profession, took service as store keeper and superintendent of the civil department, to which he added the duties of doctor, and partly of chaplain, and otherwise made himself useful even in the navigation of the vessel." (John Bull, 1851).

However, his main work was to start on arrival since he was to take charge of one of the two travelling parties (Snow, 1851a, pp. 12-13). As will be seen, misunderstandings resulted from Lady Franklin's failure adequately to define Snow's position and no doubt these would have been worse if the expedition had wintered. He considered himself to be second in command with charge of the second travelling party and this was stated in unambiguous terms by Lady Franklin when she mentions "his chief officer who from his ability and energy is a man who will have great influence over Captain F." (Franklin, 1850g). This is a tacit admission of the fact that Snow was to command the second party and was regarded as competent to do so. Moreover, his account of his position as noted above is certainly correct since the manuscript of his book was scrutinised and approved by Lady Franklin (see p.42.).

Snow, however, was not considered to be second in command of the ship, nor, according to Forsyth, ever "went away in charge - he being a non-executive I could not give him the command over the mates" (Forsyth, 1851a). Sophia Cracroft expressed the same opinion after the expedition:

"your authority on board could not of course rank higher than that of the Mates, upon whose professional experience rested the responsibility of conducting the vessel, under circumstances wh. would make the Commander necessarily and exclusively dependant upon them." (Cracroft, 1850e).

She went on in the same letter to confirm that the intention was that Snow should be the advisor of Forsyth "upon the general question". It is obvious from this that Snow's position was of considerable difficulty. While the expedition and the ship had the same commander, the second in
command of the expedition was not the second in command of the ship. Also, Snow does not appear to have been an inexperienced sailor, and later commanded his own vessel with success (Snow, 1857b). There was no attempt to fix where Snow's responsibilities as second in command of the expedition were to start.

As noted, Snow volunteered for the search and sent his plan to Lady Franklin in January. She enquired about him in the United States (Marcus, 1850b) and this appears to have annoyed Snow as in a later letter she apologised, stating that she had believed him to be an American citizen. As he was English, "your noble and disinterested sentiments do honor to the land of your [?] birth". In this letter, Lady Franklin expresses her "satisfaction" if he would join one of the expeditions, and notes that a "friend at the Admiralty" (probably Barrow) suggested that he might be employed with Penny as "Seaman's Schoolmaster" and "as leader of an exploring branch of the expedition" if he could arrive on time. However, if he could not, there would be a possibility of his going on her own private expedition of which she was "in hopes" (Franklin, 1850c).

In April she wrote that he would receive £20 for his expenses when he called at her residence with the assurance that she would do her best "to procure you some post in Capt'n. Forsyth's expedition"

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1. Snow's career both prior to the expedition and after it was one of kaleidoscopic variety. He was born on the 27th November 1817. His father died when Snow was nine, and being the orphan of a naval officer, he was educated at the Royal Naval School, Greenwich. He became an apprentice on a merchant vessel at thirteen and later spent much time at sea, having enlisted into, and deserted from, the Royal Navy. He eventually obtained his discharge after saving one of his fellow seamen who was attacked by a shark while bathing (Review of Reviews, 1893). After this, he emigrated to Australia where he managed a hotel but returned to Europe and, after residing in Italy, became clerk to W.J. Neale, author and barrister, and later to W.B. Macaulay for whom he transcribed the first two volumes of his History of England (Laughton, 1898).
if it should take place, the difficulty being lack of funds. Towards this end it would help if he could bring his references which "would tend to confirm the favourable impression which I have received from the noble sentiments expressed in your letters." (Franklin, 1850d). This letter is of considerable significance as possibly indicating, because Lady Franklin said she would do her best to procure him a post, that she did not regard herself as being in control of personnel selection. The second quotation, however, would suggest that she was in control of it. Unfortunately, it is impossible to be precise on this point and there are no records of early meetings between Forsyth and Snow which would probably have been mentioned by the latter. Therefore it was not simply a case of Snow having to satisfy Forsyth as to his credentials.¹

Snow was employed and, despite the fact that he had never been to the Arctic and had not had leadership experience elsewhere, was expected to take a land party over unknown country, leading a group of merchant seamen who were equally inexperienced. This is an indication of the impracticality of Lady Franklin's thought that she could allow such a situation to come to pass.

¹ These references are informative documents. They are all laudatory of the work Snow had undertaken for his different employers: it appears that he was a competent store keeper capable of keeping accurate accounts (James, 1841), while in his duties as librarian and general manager of the English Club at the Baths of Lucca in Italy he had been "most willing, attentive & obliging". Here, however, was an early indication of Snow's combative nature, as one of the signatories "having a complete knowledge of all the facts of the case certifies that Mr. Snow's conduct has been most perfectly correct." The case was a misunderstanding which "ultimately compelled" Snow to resign his office (de Bourbon). Macaulay testified to his "intelligence, diligence & uprightness" while Neale was equally appreciative (Macaulay, 1849; Neale, 1849). Snow had an offer to enter the employment of a bank in Rome (Pakenham, 1846). He also had a note from the Archbishop of Canterbury complimentary of a work that had been submitted to him (Archbishop of Canterbury).
Clearly, a good deal of responsibility would devolve on the crew of the ship and especially on the mates who, in view of the lack of experience of the captain, should obviously have been experts in ice navigation. Despite the excellent certificates of one R. Robertson (Certificates, 1850) who had obviously applied for the post of ice-master, he was not taken. The problem here was the two-fold one of money and the fact that many whalers were men of long experience in command, and frequently of affluent circumstances. The more successful of them would hardly be expected to view in a favourable light an appointment at low wages subordinate to a navy officer of infinitely less experience but higher social pretensions: "all the men from this place [Hull] give the government officers a very bad character, who have been Ice Masters under them" (Jackson, 1851). Of the recruitment of the two mates, William Kay, aged 53, and William Wilson, aged 37, virtually nothing is known. However, from their future conduct it is obvious that they were of doubtful competence and, even worse, may have had little interest in the expedition. They were, moreover, mutually antagonistic and were also very insubordinate to the captain, which obviously made an already difficult situation worse.

The only member of the crew who achieved promotion as a result of the voyage was John Smith, the steward. He was "sent on board by Lady Franklin" who had probably met him on her trip to the Shetlands, of which he was a native, the year before (Woodward, 1951, pp. 267-269). He joined the ship ostensibly as blacksmith:

"Our occasion for the services of any individual in that capacity was likely to be but trifling: accordingly, we placed him as cabin steward, an office which he had never filled before, but in which he proved himself faithful and trustworthy." (Snow, 1851a, p. 46).

However, Smith at least had some Arctic experience. He had served in
Hudson Bay and had some knowledge of the Eskimo language, the possession of which was to bring him into prominence, to Snow's annoyance, at a later date.

The mates and the crew, of whom there were thirteen were all recruited in Aberdeen, and some had long ice experience though they probably would not have undertaken land journeys. The crew appears to have been an excellent set of seamen, and despite the fact that there was a misunderstanding about payments due to them on their return, which affords evidence of faulty preparation (Cracroft, 1851i, 1851j), several of them sailed on the ship's second voyage.

Therefore, Prince Albert was to depart on an expedition under the command of a Royal Navy officer who had never worked with merchant seamen, much of whose experience had been in the tropics and who had never been in the Arctic or undertaken a long surface journey anywhere in his life. The "chief officer" was enthusiastic, had an unstable temperament, an ill-defined position and was equally inexperienced in the Arctic. The mates were certainly not the most successful of their trade and, apart from Smith, not a single member of the crew appears to have had any experience of land travel in the Arctic.

How much Smith's previous experience would have counteracted the ignorance of Forsyth and Snow if surface journeys had been undertaken will never be known.

1. The crew's names were as follows: Charles Rees, Peter Mitchell, James Glennie, Robert Brown, James Watt, A. McCullum, William Duguid, Alexander Anderson, James Fox, George Massie, Robert Grate, Henry Anderson, Alexander Mathieson. (Snow, 1851a, p. 416)

2. This is clear from his actions on the second Prince Albert expedition. See p. 60.
CHAPTER III - THE VOYAGE

Richard King dismisses the expedition by stating that Forsyth "merely made the voyage to the Polar Sea and back." (King, 1855, p. 84). No geographical discoveries were made and no indication of the passage of Franklin's expedition were found that had not been discovered before. The expedition was, however, the means by which news of Franklin's first wintering on Beechey Island (discovered by Austin's expedition) reached England and it allayed fears that the ships had been destroyed in Baffin Bay without ever reaching Lancaster Sound.

The real interest of the voyage lies in the light it throws on the characters of the people constituting the party. The sequence of events provided the substratum for a whole series of allegations, recriminations and manoeuvrings that took place subsequently, and these provide evidence towards answering the questions posed in the introduction.

To elucidate their printed accounts both Forsyth and Snow

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1. The major sources for the voyage are: 1) Forsyth's journal, transcribed by Sophia Cracroft. It gives evidence of the disillusionment that overtook him and suggests that he realised that he had taken on a task that he came to believe was incapable of completion with the means and personnel available. It also shows what an inappropriate selection Lady Franklin had made (Forsyth, 1850a). 2) The manuscript Forsyth read at the Royal Geographical Society on 11/11/1850 (Forsyth, 1850d). 3) An official letter to the Admiralty on the arrival of Prince Albert at Aberdeen (Forsyth, 1850c). 4) Snow's Voyage of the Prince Albert... published soon after the expedition. See Chap. IV. This is a readable account and gives insight into the personality of its author together with several indications of the intractability of the difficulties which faced Forsyth (Snow, 1851a). 5) Snow's letter to his wife, Sarah, written during the first part of the voyage. It has an affectionate tone and one gains the impression that for all his enthusiasm and apparent self-assurance, he was a sensitive, insecure person who relied greatly on his wife. It gives a more intimate insight than does the book in that his ostensible self-confidence is revealed as a cover for a nature distrustful of others (Snow, 1850b). 6) Snow's article in the Nautical Magazine on the difficulties encountered in passing through Baffin Bay. This is written in a balanced, matter-of-fact style, lacking the pseudo-heroism of the book and might not be by the same person (Snow, 1851f). 7) Various memoranda written by Snow which throw light on different incidents of the voyage. As these were written on the spot they provide evidence of events as they actually happened without the introduction of subsequent self-justification.
prepared track charts of the voyage and these are presented as Figs. 3 and 4 respectively. In this account incidents are dealt with in chronological order and the localities at which they occurred may be seen on these charts and on the general maps (Figs. 1 and 2).

Prince Albert departed from Aberdeen at 7 p.m. on the 5th June 1850. Very little time had been allowed for preparation which was done "in the extraordinary space of 2 days" (Forsyth, 1850d) due partly to the efforts of Hogarth: "I don't know what I should have done without him" (Forsyth, 1850b). It is clear that Forsyth had not assessed, or possibly even met, the mates until immediately before departure since it seems hardly likely that he would have consented to sail with them if he had known of their incompetence and mutual antagonism which became apparent within a week (Forsyth, 1850a, p. 109). Prince Albert did not sail alone but was escorted to the Orkneys by Hogarth in his yacht. On the first evening Forsyth found it possible to go on board the yacht as "after the tumult of this busy day was over I felt too glad to be near a friend to arouse my spirits." (Forsyth, 1850a, p. 108). This was the first of many occasions when Forsyth left the ship to visit others. The motive for this was probably that of sheer loneliness. Forsyth was a man acutely aware of his own social position as an officer of the Royal Navy and a gentleman, which he does not appear to have considered anyone else on board to have been. Therefore he seldom lost an opportunity to consort with others of his class. He later stated: "On this voyage I had not a soul that I could associate with without my condescension being imposed upon, nor could I leave anyone in charge of the vessel." (Forsyth, 1851a). If indeed the mates were as incompetent as Forsyth makes them out to be, then it was grossly irresponsible of him to leave Prince Albert to go to other vessels which he did frequently and for long periods. He
also notes that Snow "begged [me] not to put him to mess with the ship's company - I allowed him unfortunately to sit at my table & thus does he show his gratitude for my condescension." (Forsyth, 1851a). This concluding remark refers to Forsyth's feelings on learning of the contents of Snow's book. He described the mates as "certainly people who it is not very pleasant to sit down to table with" (Forsyth, 1850a, p. 109), but from Snow's account, it is unlikely that this social mixing ever took place and that Forsyth was merely expressing a theoretical position.

Snow's version of the arrangements is that he and Forsyth lived together and apart from the rest of the crew: "we go along together admirably." They apparently indulged in long conversations "over a glass of good brandy grog" about the merits of their respective wives (Snow, 1850b). Snow agreed about the mates: "I also assist the Captain in Navigating the Ship, neither the Mate nor 2nd Mate being able to do so, they only being accustomed to the Ice." (Snow, 1850b). Forsyth did not even concede them this: after having mentioned that the "stupid old Mate" could not follow a course (Forsyth, 1850a, p. 112) nor work a chronometer (Forsyth, 1850a, p. 111), he discovered that "they differ as wide as the Poles on ice subjects" (Forsyth, 1850b).

The person of whom they were both laudatory was Smith. Snow lays great stress on the fact that he, Snow, ordered the meals from Smith and generally superintended his duties. Smith's competence is also commented on by Forsyth in his letter to Lady Franklin (Forsyth, 1850b). What Smith thought of the personalities with whom he had to work is not clear, but he did comment later that "Mr Snow went for fame" (Cracroft, 18511) and this is an accurate assessment of at least one of Snow's motives. In the events following the expedition Smith emerges as a cool, calculating person and there is a suggestion that,
like Snow, he was anxious for upward social mobility. When William Kennedy was trying to secure his services as clerk and interpreter for the second Prince Albert expedition he felt it necessary to hold out as a final inducement that he "wd. let him mess at the Cabin table." (Cracroft, 1851j).

Prince Albert made "rather a long passage" (Forsyth, 1850b) to Greenland as there was a series of storms. On 11th July an incident occurred which demonstrates how difficult the situation must have been. The ship approached an ice stream and the problem arose as to whether to heave to or run through. The mate was approached:

"He advised heaving to, to windward of it, and waiting. The second mate... strongly urged the necessity of running through at once... Captain Forsyth, using his own judgement, very wisely decided upon the latter..." (Snow, 1851a, p. 63).

Forsyth was obviously disgusted and wished he "had two respectable men instead of two such low fellows as these." (Forsyth, 1850a, p. 116). The tone of Snow's description is characteristic of the book and the knowledge that Snow, a civilian and social inferior was assessing his actions must have been infuriating to Forsyth and probably contributed to his desire to conclude the expedition as soon as possible.

Following this, Forsyth tended to disregard the mate's opinion and this caused delay after 28th July when, having met Sir John Ross, and having agreed to keep company with him, two leads presented themselves

"The Felix took the northern lead, and this decided us, though against the half expressed opinion of our mate, who was for the other. A reference to my published journal will show the result. In a fortnight we made only twelve miles direct progress: in a fortnight the Americans by taking that south east lead, made the entire circuit of the bay to Cape Melville." (Snow, 1851f).

Another incident occurred which must have been new to Forsyth. He sent Snow ashore and on the boat's return "I had a very unpleasant misunderstanding with the 2nd Mate who was exceedingly insolent because the vessel did not come close in to pick him up." (Forsyth, 1850a, p. 117).
Snow appears to have supported Wilson as he comments that while they were rowing they saw the ship "standing away under all sail..." (Snow, 1851a, p. 92). Forsyth later pointed out that it was "dead calm" at the time and thus implied that Snow's opinion was worthless (Forsyth, 1851a). For a naval officer, used to unquestioning deference from his subordinates, this must have caused considerable strain especially in the absence of any acknowledged system of punishment.

On 21st July, Felix was sighted. Forsyth lost no time in going to dine "with the old gentleman" (Forsyth, 1850a, p. 120). Snow was also included in the invitation and his attitude was that "not being one of the navy, as the other three gentlemen were, I could not follow my commander's example in putting on an uniform cap and coat to meet Sir John." (Snow, 1851a p. 113).

From then until 10th August the two vessels were together most of the time for "mutual protection" (Forsyth, 1850a, p. 121), both ships' companies being engaged in tracking through the ice. Much exhausting labour was involved and Snow loses no opportunity to stress his own part. He also emphasises that he was a person of different interests from those of the crew. On 8th August, for instance, while the men played games, he occupied himself with taking triangular measurements of ice-bergs. More seriously, he insinuates that he was more interested in the voyage than was Forsyth. On 5th August Forsyth went on board Felix while:

"I took the dingey, and for curiosity, as well as for our advantage, I pulled... myself some short distance ahead, to observe what chances there were in our favour. I found that, after passing one little difficulty we should be able to go on for probably several hours " (Snow, 1851a, p. 157).

At this time Austin's squadron came into view and from Clements Markham

1. As well as Sir John Ross, Commander Charles Gerrans Phillips was on board Felix.
comes evidence of Snow's activities: "then it was that I first saw Parker Snow working away at our ice-saws with tremendous energy: full of zeal and enthusiasm, cheery and obliging." (Markham, 1895). It thus appears that the heroic picture that emerges from Snow's book may not be without substance.

On 13th August occurred the incident of Adam Beck, Ross's interpreter and his story about the massacre which he obtained from Eskimos at Cape York. The first revelation took place on board Prince Albert when Phillips and Beck had called after being on shore communicating with Eskimos. Forsyth's version was that Beck "informed John Smith..." of the tale (Forsyth, 1850a, p. 126). Snow, however, stated that while he was conversing with Forsyth and Phillips, Smith reported that Beck had been telling "a dreadful tale". Snow then:

"having an Esquimaux vocabulary in my pocket, began questioning him from the book, and through the steward. The poor fellow was evidently pleased that I had come to him, for... I was the first officer who had chanced to talk with him" (Snow, 1851a, pp. 205-6).

The story caused a stir and Beck was interrogated by Forsyth and Phillips after which Captain Erasmus Ommanney came on board from H.M.S. Assistance and the process was repeated. The whole party departed for Austin's ship, H.M.S. Resolute, where there was a further inquest. Snow took notes and had his opinion sought. Most of the participants were satisfied when it transpired that one of the crew of North Star had been killed by a fall in Wolstenholme Sound. There had also been internecine strife among the local people and it was believed that the two stories had become mixed. Beck was branded a liar, the tale being regarded by Sherard

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2. In 1860 Snow threw doubt on this accepted explanation by stating that Beck told two stories. He marred the coherence of this account by complaining about the undue prominence given to Smith in official reports of the incident (Austin, 1850a; Ross, J., 1850; Phillips, 1850; Snow, 1860). Of modern writers only Wright appears to believe in the massacre of some of Franklin's men (Wright, 1959, pp. 152-164).
Osborn as "the pure coinage" of his brain (Osborn, 1852, p. 86) despite the fact that Ross believed in him.

Forsyth and Snow remained on board Resolute for the night as that ship was some distance from Prince Albert\(^1\). While they were away the mate and cook became "inebriated" (Forsyth, 1851a) but despite this indication of poor discipline, they dined with Austin on 15th and 16th August as the ships were close due to both being towed by a steamer. At the latter meeting plans for the search were coordinated. Forsyth states that he would "undertake the examination of the south side of Lancaster Sound and Barrow Strait from Cape Liverpool to Port Leopold " (Forsyth, 1850c) while Snow comments that Forsyth "promised" to search "the coast beginning at Cape Hay to Leopold Harbour." (Snow, 1851a, p. 234)\(^2\).

The ships separated on 17th August and two days later Prince Albert arrived at Cape Hay from whence she proceeded westwards. Snow went ashore to examine cairns seen on the Wollaston Islands, but "A gale had now set in from the East with a heavy sea which made it difficult to steer clear of the quantities of heavy drift Ice, a thick fog came on with drizzling rain" (Forsyth, 1850d). Due to the weather it was necessary to stand away from the coast which appears to have been unseen from the ship. Forsyth states that he was "induced to heave the vessel to" but he does not say by whom (Forsyth, 1850a, p. 129). Snow, however, notes that Forsyth wished to do this but Snow "volsntered... to remain upon deck all night, looking out myself (as he said he had no confidence in his mate), if he would run on." (Snow, 1851a, p. 246). Forsyth did so and they arrived at Port

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1. Snow was pleased when Austin "with the courtesy which distinguishes that noble-hearted sailor, invited me to occupy an arm-chair in his own cabin." (Snow, 1851a, p. 216).

2. Ross records that Forsyth "subsequently assented to" arrangements made on the 12th (Ross, J., 1850). Austin also recorded the agreement, commenting on the "earnestness and readiness" of Forsyth (Austin, 1850a). He proposed a similar coordination of effort to de Haven and Penny in September (Austin, 1850b).
Leopold towards the end of the 20th (Forsyth, 1850a, p. 129). The stretch of coast had not, therefore, been examined at all and Forsyth did not return to it after the weather had improved because the expedition was intended to go to Brentford Bay "and commence operations from that place" (Forsyth, 1850c). He proceeded into Prince Regent Inlet. It is significant that after, according to Snow, he had decided to return to Britain, he did pass along this coast observing carefully. There is, therefore, a suspicion that Forsyth failed to return to it immediately so that he would have an excuse for proceeding in an easterly direction if he decided to return. If true, this incident shows that Forsyth placed considerable trust in Snow and throws doubt on his later comments on Snow's poor seamanship (Forsyth, 1851a).

Snow went ashore at Port Leopold and collected a message left by North Star a few days previously. Assistance arrived and "I had now the gratification to know altho' we were the last & smallest vessel that left England & the first in Barrow St." (Forsyth, 1850a, p. 130). At the Royal Geographical Society Forsyth commented that the date of arrival of North Star compared with Prince Albert was "plain proof that vessels wintering here might almost as well be in England" and, due to the ice in Port Leopold, any wintering ship would still be there. Forsyth's manuscript has a significant marginal addition: "and here was our little vessel, fresh from England at the same spot which the North Star had taken fifteen months to arrive at, after being locked up some ten months in the Ice." (Forsyth, 1850d). This is an obvious attempt to justify Forsyth's action in returning to Britain without wintering as it completely ignores the opportunity for surface travel while the ship was iced in.

Prince Albert entered Prince Regent Inlet and on 22nd August was
stopped by ice off Fury Beach. Both mates agreed that there was no chance of breaking through and Forsyth was "most perplexed what to do" both "Batty Bay & Port Leopold being closed, & apparently Ports Bowen & Neill on the opposite shore." Forsyth could not have known about the latter since he had not been to either place and neither had North Star when the message was left at Port Ieopold. He sought written opinions as to the possibility of a change from the mates and Snow who had the idea of travelling by boat to Cape Walker which Forsyth "would not entertain... for one moment." However:

"as we had several intelligent men amongst the crew, I called the people aft - they said it would be much better to go home at once than to hold on here without a port to put into - After having collected all their opinions, I determined to try & get to the Westward of Boothia to push for Cape Walker. I did not mention this... fearing as it had all along been the intention of the expedition to winter in Regents Inlet, if I deviated from that course, there might be some grumbling" (Forsyth, 1850a, pp. 130-131).

Later Forsyth stated that he was intending to "try some other plan of operations that would make our Services more useful". His next action was to despatch a boat "towards Port Leopold to try if there was a possibility of landing anywhere on the coast thro' some opening in the Ice" (Forsyth, 1850d). Snow, however, states that this trip was made "at my request" following his suggestion that it would be necessary to deposit a fresh message there (Snow, 1851a, p. 261).

From this it is clear that while Forsyth did not regard Prince Regent Inlet as being likely to afford winter anchorage, he was intending to try elsewhere. There is no suggestion that he had decided to return to Britain, and, according to his official letter, only made up his mind to do so after the relics had been found (Forsyth, 1850c).

Snow gives a contradictory version of these events. He states that he "entreated" permission to attempt to get ashore at Fury Beach
according to the book, or, at Lord Mayor Bay or Cape Walker according to a manuscript. (Snow, 1850d). He then says that Forsyth "told me that he purposed to return to England". It was, however, agreed that Capes Riley, Hotham and Walker should be examined first. Snow "coincided with him in his opinion... deeming that it would indeed be better to return to England." The reason is obscure, Snow alludes to "several circumstances which it would only be irrelevant here to speak of" (Snow, 1851a, p. 260). The exact truth of the matter will never be known but Snow's opinion, referred to by Forsyth, is available in copy and it does not appear that his opinion was then asked about returning to Britain but only on the probability of proceeding further in Prince Regent Inlet (Snow, 1850c).

After this Snow's opinion was sought as to "the most advisable course for us now to pursue" and he gave it as being that "our wintering here would in reality be of not the slightest service." The "here" refers to "at the entrance of P. R. Inlet instead of halfway down." This would be futile as "With our small means we could do no more than tread upon the ground already trodden by that officer" (i.e. J.C. Ross). Therefore, "If it should not be right to winter here it will be... not well to remain out at all in any place." Moreover, wintering would involve extra expense to Lady Franklin (Snow, 1850d).

The date of this later document is obviously important. Snow refers in his book to another opinion being sought on the 23rd, and supporting this date is mention in the opinion of the two visits to Port Leopold. The second visit took place while the ship was leaving the inlet and it is obvious that the two opinions were sought at different times. According to Forsyth, Snow, on his return to the ship on the 23rd, brought some "books & letters" that had been left for J. Ross "supposing that if we were not able to winter in the vicinity I should return to
England." (Forsyth, 1850a, p. 131). In his account Snow waxes lyrical as to the possibility of the ship not being able to take his party off, noting that if they were left for the winter "We shall be at hand to render assistance should any drooping stragglers arrive; and we shall be prepared, perhaps, to do something ourselves next spring and summer". These musings led him to declare: "I had a sort of half wish that it might be so." According to him, the men expressed similar sentiments (Snow, 1851a, pp. 280-285). In Forsyth's opinion this was because they would "have liked nothing better than to have remained at Port Leopold living on the excellent provisions... with the addition of double pay without doing any earthly service to the cause." (Forsyth, 1851a).

Support for Snow's version of events comes from a biographical article written in 1893¹. This was based on an interview and on documents, some of which have been preserved. One of these is a suppressed passage from the proofs of his book² in which Snow gives an account of his volunteering, significantly on 21st August, to take a boat party towards Lord Mayor Bay. Forsyth apparently approved, providing volunteers could be obtained and this was done, according to Snow, without difficulty. The attempt never took place, however, due to Forsyth's vacillation. A part of Snow's original journal was also printed in the article and in it he seems to have proposed the boat journey in order to attempt a part of the original plan "as he was doubtful of safety of wintering here" which would indicate, if

¹ This article was probably written by W.T. Stead, editor of Review of Reviews.

² This passage was removed at the instigation of Sophia Cracroft because Snow's proposed journey was merely part of the original plan and to publish it would reveal that Snow was "completely in ignorance of the design of the voyage... And from such an imputation every true friend would desire to guard you." (Cracroft, 1850h).
authentic, that Forsyth had already, by the 21st, expressed unease. On the 22nd Snow renewed his application "But he angrily and offensively replied he was not going to send a boat away with chance of a fog coming on". The day after, there were further "Unpleasant words." (Review of Reviews, 1893).

It is, thus, apparent that even if Forsyth had made no actual announcement of his intention to return on the 22nd, it must have become common knowledge. The writer's opinion is that Forsyth realised very soon that his task was impossible with such a ship and crew and, moreover, he found the voyage an unpleasant experience. He was merely looking for a circumstance to present itself that would justify his return home. This was the impenetrable ice wall across Prince Regent Inlet. His remark about proceeding further west was probably not a statement of intention to winter in that area but was produced to make his return more palatable at home. What he would have done had the passage to Cape Walker been clear is not known.

Unless Snow was a complete charlatan he must have been surprised and disappointed at Forsyth's decision. To him the voyage was a chance to obtain fame and fortune\(^1\). He must have seen an early return as a shattering of his hopes. However, Snow was a buoyant personality and it appears probable that during the journey home he decided to turn the failure of the expedition to his own advantage by publishing his book and in it emphasising his worthiness and sincerity in an attempt to obtain command of a second expedition.

On the afternoon of the 23rd Prince Albert sighted Advance and Forsyth and Snow went on board. Both admired the solid construction of

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\(^1\) He mentions the latter possibility in his letter to his wife (Snow, 1850b).
Advance, so much better than Prince Albert, and Snow accepted letters from the Americans for posting but commented that "We had not told them we were returning" (Snow, 1851a, p. 298). Forsyth did not admit that they were on their way home and one or other of them did not scruple to mislead the Americans about their intentions: "They were now bound for Cape Rennell, after which they proposed making a sledge excursion over the lower Boothian and Cockburne lands." (Kane, 1854, p. 154).

By 25th August Forsyth attempted his westward penetration and had abandoned it due to the "heavy nature of the pack" and the fact that six other vessels were also attempting this. Forsyth still had not made up his mind on "the final course to pursue" and resolved to "bear up & run back towards Prince Regent Inlet" before finally deciding (Forsyth, 1850a, p. 131).

Then occurred the incident that, in the writer's opinion, gave Forsyth reason for belief that the inevitable opprobrium consequent on his early return could be reduced to acceptable levels. On passing Cape Riley "a signal-post was discovered on the point" and Snow immediately proceeded ashore. He found a note from Ommanney stating that traces of "'some party belonging to her Majesty's ships'" had been found there and also on Beechey Island (Snow, 1851a, pp. 311-315). Snow's group discovered evidence of five encampments and a piece of rope "with the Woolwich naval mark in it (yellow)." (Forsyth, 1850a, p. 132).

Prince Albert then proceeded to the mouth of Prince Regent Inlet where Forsyth was satisfied that the ice would still be impenetrable further down. From there he moved slowly eastwards examining the coast that he had agreed to examine while sailing in the opposite direction. It is certain that Forsyth had, by this time, firmly decided to return and this is indicated by an incident that took place on the 31st.
Prince Albert met North Star in Possession Bay and Forsyth went on board. He learnt the state of Forts Bowen and Neill and, "Mr. Saunders also stated that he thought it... the wisest plan I could pursue to return to England under the present circumstances." Forsyth gave Saunders the impression that he had been to Port Neill (The Times, 1850a) and noted that Saunders promised to keep company with Prince Albert for the passage through Baffin Bay (Forsyth, 1850a, p. 133). Saunders merely remarked that Forsyth was "on his way to England" and explained that despite their agreement keeping together was not possible because "he sailed so badly" (Saunders, 1850).

There was another witness of these proceedings. This was Leask who was on board North Star. He gave his version of events in a letter to Lady Franklin in which he volunteered for the 1851 Prince Albert expedition:

"Last year, ... we chanced to meet the 'Prince Albert' on her return voyage & heard from Commander Forsyth that the principle reasons which induced him to return was the conduct of her Ice mates. I at the same time satisfied myself that there was little or no difficulty in effecting a passage across Davis Strait homeward for the North Star. I accordingly requested as a favour of Commander Saunders to allow me to join the Prince Albert. I even proposed to serve without pay, & if Commander Saunders is in England, he will bear testimony to the truth of this statement. His reply... was that the 'Prince Albert' not being a government vessel, my wishes could not be complied with, & the proposition was never mentioned to Commander Forsyth." (Leask, 1851).

Forsyth discovered that this offer had been made and wrote to Lady Franklin that Saunders did the search "a very great piece of injustice when he refused Mr. Leask permission to join the 'Prince Albert'" (Forsyth, 1851b). The insinuation is that if Saunders had released Leask Forsyth would have returned westward with the renewed intention of wintering. However, based on Forsyth's actions, one is entitled to doubt this and there is reason to believe that he would have greeted Leask's offer with something like dismay had he known of it
as it would have either reduced the validity of his reasons for returning or, if he had accepted it and wintered, it would have lengthened his incarceration in the ship. It is also clear that Forsyth did not tell Saunders about the discovery of the relics and his motives for this secrecy are possibly that he, realising that North Star would make a swifter passage home than Prince Albert, wanted to retain in his own hands the news of the only progress in the search made by that time. This suggests a certain deviousness in Forsyth's character.

The homeward voyage started on 2nd September:

"as the season was now advancing, and should the young ice form, we should be doomed men, as this little craft has not the slightest power to bore thro' it except she has a strong breeze" (Forsyth, 1850a, p. 134).

Prince Albert made a rapid run to south Greenland, Snow commenting that this "will remain a most notable instance of the extraordinarily clear season in those regions this year." (Snow, 1851a, p. 365). He thus suggested that other reasons than the ice were responsible for the return.

North Star arrived at Spithead on 28th September bringing news of the imminent return of Prince Albert and that vessel docked at Aberdeen on 1st October. Forsyth and Snow must have been acutely aware that difficult times lay ahead. Each would have to justify his own actions to Lady Franklin and to the public and each was conscious that he did not stand on very secure ground. Forsyth almost certainly did not want to have any more to do with the Arctic and, one imagines, especially not with civilians. He did, however, have one achievement to his credit,

1. An indication that the return voyage was fraught with tension was that on 14th September there was an altercation between the two mates. Forsyth commented that "The 2nd Mate... is a thorough faced villain & would be a most mutinous fellow if he dared." (Forsyth, 1850a, p. 136). Even Snow admitted that Forsyth had "to interfere officially." (Snow, 1851a, p. 367).
that of returning with the news that relics had been discovered at Cape Riley and Beechey Island and specimens of the same, which would prove that Franklin's ships had not been destroyed in Baffin Bay. Snow was determined to return to continue the search, if possible in command of his own expedition, and his purpose was to establish his competence for this task in the eyes of prospective sponsors. The period of manoeuvring had begun.
CHAPTER IV - AFTERMATH

Forsyth was condemned before he arrived. Sophia Cracroft learnt the details of the meeting with **North Star** and explained to Mrs Snow that Forsyth had given "the very insufficient reason that his two mates disagreed" for his return. She stated that Forsyth had spoken "very highly of your husband to Mr Saunders" (Cracroft, 1850d).

Snow wrote to Sophia Cracroft at the time of the meeting with **North Star** noting "We are on our return". He had supported this decision because he did not believe "we should effect anything though we remained 50 years here organised and constituted as we are". Expense would be saved and to stress his virtues and denigrate Forsyth he commented that he had agreed "in a far far different way, & from very different motives". He also complained about his position. Despite the fact that he was "wholly powerless" he had done all he could. The visit to Cape Riley was made "at my earnest entreaty" (Snow, 1850e).

Sophia Cracroft replied expressing "the bitter disappointment & mortification" that was felt in the Franklin menage. She recognised that Snow's irritation was caused "mainly by the unmingled pain you must experience in being about to return". In this connection, the ladies did not "subscribe to the belief that you would not by waiting a little have got further down the Inlet." They did not believe in the ship's frailty: "the Prince Albert... might have cut her way in and out of any place." She then held out an inducement that Snow was probably not the man to resist:

"should you feel compelled by any sense of justice to yourself, to make any observations to me respecting him [Forsyth] which, if known, might tend in any degree to injure him, such shall be considered strictly confidential." (Cracroft, 1850e).

For Lady Franklin and Sophia Cracroft, Forsyth began to fade out of the picture. The latter stressed the inadequacy of his reasons for
returning and blamed him using such expressions as "incapacity & want of judgement in the Commander." (Cracroft, 1850g), "Capt. F. has wholly failed in judgement & ability.", and noted with reference to Snow's narrative "inferentially it condemns Captn. F." (Cracroft, 1850g). Lady Franklin was more circumspect and indeed, the two ladies appear to have had rather different personal feelings about Forsyth. She recognised that dealing with the mates must have been difficult and "I do not like expressing any disparaging feeling towards a young man who offered me his gratuitous services" (Franklin, 1850).

They had little communication with Forsyth. He did write in April 1851 commenting that he had heard of the second expedition but that he had not been told by Lady Franklin about it. He also complained that Snow had been made too much of and that he had boasted to Forsyth of his correspondence with Sophia Cracroft (Forsyth, 1851b). That lady replied in a glacial tone:

"I do not feel disposed to pass over an observation wh. you make with respect to myself... as to my having corresponded with Mr Snow, wh. you decline believing. I have to assure you that the statement is strictly true & is one wh. can need no explanation on my part." (Cracroft, 1851dd).

On the publication of Snow's book Forsyth wrote to Charles Richard Weld, who was to review it, to refute the allegations against him implicit in the text. This letter is soberly written and conveys much conviction. He points out that naval men would "immediately understand the spirit in which it is written" (Forsyth, 1851a).

Despite the calumny which was spread, the ladies did not ignore Forsyth's experience. They suggested that Kennedy should contact him.

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1. Forsyth's private life also came under Sophia Cracroft's critical eye. One correspondent was informed that he had "jilted young lady at the Cape" (Cracroft, 1851ee).

2. C.R. Weld was an intimate of Lady Franklin.

3. Forsyth's career was not affected by the failure of the expedition or by Snow's book (see p. 60). His application to the Admiralty for full pay for the voyage was, however, refused (Cracroft, 1851v), despite Lady Franklin's written support (Franklin, 1850).
about Snow's nautical credentials conceding that Forsyth was "considered a good Seaman... and has certainly seen a great deal of professional service." (Cracroft, 1851k). Kennedy in turn suggested that Forsyth be consulted as to the rigging which he believed needed alteration (Kennedy, 1851d). However, they did not refer to Forsyth on the subject of the ship's sailing qualities (Forsyth, 1851b) which caused unease before the second expedition.

The return of Prince Albert engendered much public interest despite the all-consuming excitement of the day, which was the papal 'aggression' against England. The Times gave a leading article on the Beck story and complained that the despatches "are so loosely worded that it is, ... extremely difficult to make them yield an intelligible and consistent narrative." (The Times, 1850b). On 4th October it gave an account of the movements of Prince Albert (The Times, 1850c) and a day later it presented extracts of a letter written by Forsyth. The addressee of this letter is not known but Forsyth probably sent it directly to The Times and its publication seems to have increased Lady Franklin's annoyance (Cracroft, 1850f). It gave a detailed account of the voyage but even at this early date the facts appear to have been altered as Forsyth stated that he had examined the coast, agreed upon with Austin, on 17th August, "most effectively, keeping close to the shore within quarter of a mile, ... without seeing any marks of the missing expedition." In fact most of it was not examined until Prince Albert was on her way home. Forsyth states that he only decided to return after having entered Possession Bay (thus agreeing with the account in his journal,(see p.35)) because no port "in the vicinity of our operations [was] open". He concluded by commenting on the search of an "immense extent of coast, ascertaining that they are nowhere on the South side of Lancaster Sound or Barrow Strait." He also mentioned
that "our returning will save an immense expense to Lady Franklin." (The Times, 1850d).

The production of evidence that Franklin's expedition had reached Lancaster Sound appears to have diverted public opinion from the question of Forsyth's success or failure. He noted that this information had "given fresh hopes to many an aching heart. I have received great approbation from the highest quarters & the warmest thanks from some of the friends of the missing parties." (Forsyth, 1851a).

The press was generally favourable. Typical comments were those of the Illustrated London News: "the voyage ... has been the means of keeping alive our hopes" (Illustrated London News, 1850) and the Athenaeum which stated:

"Considering the small means at Capt. Forsyth's disposal, it is impossible not to be struck with what he has effected; and he will have a high and honourable place in the story of the restoration of the lost Expedition" (Athenaeum, 1850c).

Compliments were also paid to Forsyth's courage and discretion. The relics would not have been obtained:

"if Captain Forsyth had not boldly ventured across to the entrance of the Wellington Channel, putting his vessels head, indeed, into the lion's mouth, but wisely withdrawing it in time." (Morning Herald, 1850b).

This public adulation, despite what may have been privately said, was obviously wormwood to Snow and Lady Franklin. The latter determined straightaway to send Prince Albert again in 1851 as she mentioned it as early as 22nd October (Franklin, 1850k). A ready means of publicity lay to hand. This was Snow's memoirs¹. He decided to publish them and he made the suggestion to Lady Franklin who replied that she would be glad to see his manuscript, agreeing that "its value will be much

¹ e.g. "Some time since my Aunt at the request of Mr. Horsfall sent a copy of Mr. Snow's book to the Free public library now establishing at Liverpool. He thought it might awaken a degree of interest which wd. prove active." (Cracroft, 1851x).
increased by immediate publication." (Cracraft, 1850f). It is probably
the case that Snow believed that by being in such close cooperation
with Lady Franklin he would obtain command of the next expedition and
to this end he worked unremittingly at his book. He was subject to
fairly ruthless editing by Sophia Cracroft and Barrow. On 20th October
he was told that the former "has not scrupled to erase many parts which
for one reason or another appear inadmissable, or at least very
undesirable". Lady Franklin commented on the fact that Barrow had
written to him to get "some kind & able friend to rewrite for you the
opening pages" and it seems that Snow had missed the point of the
expedition and required reminding that the ship was fitted out "as a
means of transport + place of refuge" for an expedition based on boats.
However, some things were unalterable: "No one can attempt to meddle
with your style" while the criticisms made "are strictly limited to
such statements as may be considered injurious in their tendency or
savouring too much of egoism" (Franklin, 1850i). This letter is of
interest not only for its contents but also for the way in which it is
written. It does not have the abrasive tone of Sophia Cracroft.

There is absolutely no doubt that Lady Franklin and especially
Sophia Cracroft were closely involved with the book. Following their
advice Snow did, for example, omit a plan which "you propose in such
lengthy detail" (Cracraft, 1850h) while Barrow's opinion was sought
on how to present the subscription list (Cracraft, 1850i).

By November it is possible that Snow had become uneasy at this.
Proof sheets ceased to arrive at the Franklin residence and for Barrow

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1. He was also recommended to obtain advice, presumably legal, about
his comments on the mates. Lady Franklin hoped that he would receive
a liberal sum for the manuscript from Longmans who were to publish it.
2. See p.32, footnote.
and this obviously caused anxiety as Sophia Cracroft wrote to enquire why. She noted that:

"While each sheet has received some changes which we considered indispensable as respects the renewal of the Expedition - for if an opinion gets abroad that either the vessel was unsuitable, or the difficulties insurmountable, such an one cannot but materially influence that renewal." (Cracroft, 1850j).

Snow took the threat implicit in this letter and by the end of November the book was ready. He was told that "I think you will like the concluding sentence" and received the accolade of being invited to take tea (Cracroft, 1850k). As the sentence, obviously written by Sophia Cracroft finishes with "my earnest desire that I may again have the happiness of finding myself on board of her, and be able to write a better book than this, at the close of a happy and successful voyage." (Snow, 1851a, p. 383) there is good reason to suppose that Snow was able to look forward with confidence to the future.

The book did in fact have two functions. For Lady Franklin it was a method of raising interest and hence funds for the second expedition while for Snow it was a way of placing himself on the quarter-deck of Prince Albert. That one aim succeeded and one failed is a measure of the adroitness of the two parties.

It was published early in 1851 and was widely reviewed. The reviews were all favourable and they avoided the question of the success or failure of the expedition, giving lengthy quotations and precis from the book. Most stated, no doubt to Snow's satisfaction, that he had wished to remain behind and some were positively laudatory:

1. Copies reached the press before the end of the year (Morning Herald, 1850b).

2. The Saturday Review commenting on the book in 1859 made a statement that will surely be received sympathetically by polar historians: "to make out precisely where the different expeditions went, what they wanted, and what they effected, is no easy task." (Saturday Review, 1859).
"In the discharge of the arduous duties intrusted to him by Capt. Forsyth he manifested a degree of heroism and endurance which entitle him to take a high rank among our renowned Arctic voyagers" (Athenaeum, 1851).

The Eclectic Review credited Snow with a "mastery over language" (Eclectic Review, 1851) but John Bull, among others, alluded to the unprofessionalism of Snow's pen, but agreed that the account was nonetheless very valuable (John Bull, 1851). Most referred to the reasons for return. In the matter-of-fact tone of one:

"The reasons for this proceeding are not given; but they seem to have had reference to the state of the crew. The chief mate was somewhat advanced in life, and cautious even to timidity; the men, though active, daring, willing, and most of them thorough whalers, were not men-of-war's men, practised in naval discipline, or subject to its laws; and ... Captain Forsyth stood alone, ... The commander probably thought it too riskful an undertaking to winter in the Arctic regions under these circumstances. He might possibly think that his remaining would be of little real use; and we think so too." (Spectator, 1851).

Forsyth thus obtained credit from the reviews of Snow's book. This reviewer had missed the point of the expedition, namely that the ship was a base for boat and land travel, despite Lady Franklin's efforts to ensure that this was clearly stated in the book (Franklin, 1850i). There is no evidence that Snow resorted to such subterfuges as he used later to ensure favourable reviews ¹. It simply appears that the book, which was the only volume of topical Arctic interest as none of the other 1850 expeditions had returned, was regarded as worthwhile reading ².

1. Snow himself reviewed Charles Francis Hall's Life with the Esquimaux after having prepared it for publication (Loomis, 1966).
2. 1025 copies were printed and Snow received £50 for the copyright. It is not known how many were sold to the public but Snow was offered the unsold copies at 6s each in 1854. The book appears to have been a success since Snow had no difficulty in getting Longmans to publish his second work (Longman Group, 1850-1854).
In January 1851, Snow approached the Admiralty with his own plan. He had not discussed the matter with Lady Franklin and he received a reprimand (Franklin, 1851a). This proposal was a serious mistake. Lady Franklin was not a woman who condoned her agents having independent plans and with the publication of the book and the resultant favourable publicity for her fund raising efforts, Snow's usefulness was declining. However, she could hardly abandon him immediately, but it does appear likely that the ladies began considering the possibility of doing so eventually. The difficulty was that some influential people thought highly of Snow, Barrow being one (Barrow, 1851), while a further complication was that Snow had been undoubtedly efficient in performing his duties during the voyage. Even Kennedy admitted that the stores of the ship were in excellent condition and well accounted for when he took over (Kennedy, 1851c). Unfortunately for Snow, it appears that mere prosaic performance of duty was not a deciding factor where Lady Franklin was concerned. If, therefore, Snow was to be jettisoned, a certain obliquity of approach would be necessary and this was forthcoming when the opportunity arose.

On the other hand, it is very probable that Snow gained a grossly inflated idea of his own importance with the publication of his book and probably considered that he no longer needed Lady Franklin for his advancement: hence the offer to the Admiralty. There is evidence of a souring of relations: on 28th January he had a minor altercation with Sophia Cracroft which led him to state, according to that lady, that "he wd. feel unable to accept any situation... since he could not perceive that his services would be required in any post not beneath that he formerly held." (Cracroft, 1851f). This is certainly not an insistence on Snow's part that he command or he would not participate, but it may have suggested a method of ensuring that Snow would withdraw
voluntarily if it be decided to dispense with him. Snow's miscalculation was that the chances of the Admiralty accepting his offer were negligible and, as he wished to develop his Arctic career, it would have been better to remain on good terms with Lady Franklin.

The situation between Lady Franklin and Snow was complicated by the arrival of Kennedy from Canada on 14th January. This Hudson's Bay Company officer had volunteered his services with McLean's support "when it was unhappily too late to accept them" (Cracroft, 1851a), for the 1850 expedition. He was appointed to the 1851 expedition while still in Canada (Kennedy, 1853, p. vi) and part of the reason for Lady Franklin's enthusiasm for the unseen Kennedy was that he had as an infant known her husband (Shaw, 1970). An additional reason was that as Kennedy had volunteered the year previously:

"I am the more inclined to adopt this course because it saves me from any embarrassment in case Captn F. shd offer me his services again" (Franklin, 1850).

This is a further example of Lady Franklin's eccentric methods of personnel selection, but her opinion, derived from Kennedy's letters, was reinforced when they met:

"I have had much gratification in making Mr. Kennedy's personal acquaintance which has confirmed all the confidence I require to have in the officer who takes command of my little auxiliary expedition." (Franklin, 1851c).

From then on the ladies referred to Kennedy in adulatory terms and it

1. Snow's plan was to obtain information from the "Arctic squadron" by taking a small schooner to Lancaster Sound. He elaborated on the need to obtain intelligence of the doings of the other expeditions and emphasised the cheapness of the enterprise suggesting that he be "permitted to take charge" (Snow, 1851b). It is not known what comments, if any, the Admiralty made on this proposal.

2. After arrival in England he did offer to serve in a subordinate capacity if another prospective commander was in view. However, "his integrity and earnestness were so impressive that Jane and her advisors were blind to his defects" (Woodward, 1951, p. 277).
is clear that whatever chances Snow had of obtaining the command, and it is the writer's belief that they never existed, though he certainly received hints that could have induced him to believe so, were completely removed.

Some of the ladies' acquaintances commented on Snow's book. One of these was John Ballenden, who stated that he had "thrown it down in disgust," "it was 'I' from one end to the other. He had seen some passages from which you would conclude that he was 'the Expedition.'" (Cracroft, 1851). Ballenden hoped that Kennedy would not take Snow with him. Despite her involvement with the book, Sophia Cracroft does not appear to have remonstrated with Ballenden on his comments but Lady Franklin did when she heard that the book had been "discussed & much abused for its reflections upon the Commander". She was "sorry to hear the book had produced this impression" (Franklin, 1851).

Kennedy's first occupation was to choose personnel for the next expedition. He condemned Forsyth in round terms and "he thought he understood Mr Snow from Mr Grinnell's account of him. He Mr S. had been in constant correspondance with Mr. G." He was particularly interested in Smith, "the man I had described" (Franklin, 1851) and it is clear that the oddities of personnel selection were being compounded. Kennedy was offered a post without having been seen and he, in turn, was favourably disposed towards Smith without knowing anything directly about him.

As Snow's desire to participate was well known, it was necessary for Kennedy and Snow to meet. Kennedy was then secure in command while Snow was unsure of his position, and was probably still hoping

1. A Chief Factor of the Hudson's Bay Company.
2. This is one of the few indications of a differing opinion between Lady Franklin and Sophia Cracroft. See p. 39.
for a favourable reply from the Admiralty. The meeting was arranged by requesting Snow to call on Kennedy who wanted to collect information "& thus spare him the trouble of wading through books to obtain it." (Cracroft, 1851c). The meeting took place on 23rd January and Kennedy noted that Snow was "intelligent, looks active, & I think would answer his own particular department." (Kennedy, 1851a). Snow was equally impressed with Kennedy (Snow, 1851c) but being now aware of Kennedy's place on the expedition he could hardly have been otherwise. Next day, however, Kennedy informed Sophia Cracroft that "He was sure he [Snow] would not be competent to command the second party, & for one reason among others - that he seemed to think the management of a kayak, an insurmountable difficulty." This, if true, is rather out of character for Snow for whom the interview held more than one surprise:

"He told Snow that if he had been in his place in Port Leopold, he would not have changed places with the Commander of the Arctic Squadron... Kennedy said he would have hid himself and his men & so have forced the ship to leave them behind" (Cracroft, 1851d)

Kennedy made these curious comments more than once (Cracroft, 1851b) and they reveal his state of mind and those of the ladies who apparently did not remonstrate with him about this opinion by which he would seem to be encouraging indiscipline but, at the same time, criticised Snow for allegedly having an "insubordinate disposition" (Cracroft, 1851x).

If, indeed, Kennedy really meant this, then it is quite understandable that he was reluctant to take Snow and, in view of his belief in Snow's incapacity for commanding the second boat party, the question arose of what position, if any, Snow could fill. The ladies do not appear to have mentioned that Snow had been commander designate of this party in the first expedition but seem to have been so spellbound by Kennedy that they were quite prepared to accept his judgement. It was quite understood that Snow could not command the vessel, Kennedy being
referred to as the captain nor could he be navigator as letters were written seeking someone suitable for that position (Cracroft, 1851e). On Sophia Cracroft pointing out that Snow had served an apprenticeship, Kennedy suggested that he be first mate. He commented that Snow, if appointed, "would have to remain by the vessel" not having command of a travelling party (Cracroft, 1851g). Two days later Kennedy elaborated:

"which post will probably give him extra duty on shore, when the vessel is docked for the winter. He will have to convey depots of provisions to advanced posts, in order to meet the boat and walking parties on their return" (Cracroft, 1851h).

Kennedy drew up a memorandum on this suggesting that Snow be required to produce "such certificates of capacity & experience as may warrant the entrusting to him an Office of such responsibility" and that, if, "in Lady Franklins judgement he is qualified for this Office" he should also have the duty of transporting provisions. Lady Franklin replied that if Snow could not satisfy Kennedy as to his credentials "the responsibility of engaging him as First Mate wd. be too great."¹ She suggested reference to Forsyth (Cracroft, 1851k). Forsyth was not approached at this time (Cracroft, 1851r) but later, in April, he wrote declining to give Snow certificates in seamanship or astronomy (Forsyth, 1851b). Sophia Cracroft also suggested that Kennedy should ask Snow for his certificates (Franklin, 1851d) and in order to leave him under no illusions about Lady Franklin's present attitudes Kennedy was "enjoined to shew his power not merely his own (individually) but that given him by my Aunt". Also:

"My aunt also distinctly & emphatically assured Mr. Kennedy that she had no desire for the employment of Mr. Snow, & spoke strongly of his intense self love" (Cracroft, 1851j)².

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1. At this time there was some opinion about Kennedy's promotion. According to Penny: "influence brought a N.W. traper and placed him on board an Expedition and called him Capt'n" (Holland, 1900).

2. At this time Kennedy was attempting to recruit Smith but he insisted on higher pay before he would consider it. He was not going to "quit the present comfortable situation which I hold to be used like a dog... The same as last voyage." (Smith, 1851).
On 6th February Snow called but was only seen "in the passage". He was told that Kennedy wanted to see him and he, in turn, stated that he had received an offer of employment (Cracroft, 1851m) which he later explained was "to proceed to Central America & personally explore the district in the Isthmus" (Snow, 1851d). Snow never went there (Review of Reviews, 1893) and it is possible that this "offer" was a tactic to stimulate action on fixing his future position. Kennedy met Snow on the 9th with his offer. Kennedy's version is that he told Snow:

"he believed him 'incapable of taking command of one of the boat parties in conjunction with the duties of First Mate. In such a service, everything might depend upon the meeting of two parties according to previous arrangement being effected. Did he think himself capable of such responsibility. Snow admitted that he was not!". Kennedy then gave him time to decide. He warned Snow "against assuming a responsibility wh might have the most serious consequences" and discussed the salary of the post. Kennedy told Sophia Cracroft that he did not think Snow would accept (Cracroft, 1851n).

If this be accurate it is surely obvious that a person would have to have had much less self respect than Snow had to accept. After all, Kennedy, if he or Sophia Cracroft who recorded it is to be believed, was offering Snow a position which he had stated to his face that he did not think him competent to perform. In view of the agreement made between Lady Franklin and Kennedy that, if appointed, Snow be allocated the duty of taking out provisions, it is unlikely that even if Snow had regarded himself as capable of leading a party that he would have been allowed to do so.

In declining the offer Snow reveals that Kennedy's version was probably not truthful and that Sophia Cracroft must have known it was not as he states that he learnt of the "new arrangements" from her before the meeting. These were that: "the position offered me...

1. This meeting took place in the unusual venue of the British Museum.
precludes my doing more for that cause (which alone I care for) than any other Shipped Seaman." (Snow, 1851d), but he does not explain what this position actually was. However, Snow would surely not have used this phraseology if he had first been browbeaten by Kennedy into admitting that he was not capable of commanding the second party, and had then received an offer of it, especially when he had been regarded as capable of that duty on the first expedition. The quotation above supports the belief that he had only been offered the post of first mate, possibly with the duty of taking provisions out. Snow also wrote to Kennedy giving as his reasons for declining that "the arrangements and plan contemplated... are so different to any I have heretofore been engaged in" (Snow, 1851e) while to Barrow he allegedly stated that "he considered himself as fit to command the expedition as Mr Kennedy."

Sophia Cracroft "was not slow to convict Mr Snow of double dealing because he had said three different things on the subject of Kennedy's merits (Cracroft, 1851r). When Kennedy called and was shown the letter he expressed his "'perfect disgust'" and "Mr Kennedy has now, no regrets about Snow" (Cracroft, 1851p).

After this Sophia Cracroft wrote a whole battery of letters on the same theme. To William Coppin she wrote:

"With respect to navigation he is not a thorough seaman, & as regards the land search, which... forms the chief part... he has had no experience, & has given no proof whatever of having any independent resources of thought & arrangement for managing it."

Despite these disqualifications:

"My aunt made him an offer through Mr. Kennedy to be First Mate, & have charge of the 2nd boat party... and this offer he rejected - writing to Mr. Kennedy that he did not consider himself capable of carrying out his plans" (Cracroft, 1851x).

Nowhere is the fatuity of much of the Franklin/Cracroft writing revealed so clearly as in this letter. Snow had been entrusted with command of the second party on the first expedition. Sophia Cracroft now states that he is regarded as incompetent for the duty and yet in
the same paragraph informs Coppin that Snow was offered that very post. Similar statements were made to Sir Edward Belcher (Cracroft, 1851y) and to Lady Inglis who had "noticed the egotism of the book" (Cracroft, 1851bb). To Grinnell an elaboration was made as he was informed that Snow would not participate because Lady Franklin did not believe him fit for command (Cracroft, 1851z).

Snow was entitled to better treatment than he received from Lady Franklin. The subterfuge resorted to to remove him is quite incompatible with the character ascribed to her and, by extension, to her niece. To Snow it must have appeared grossly unjust. He had returned from the expedition with high hopes for the future, secure in the knowledge that he had done his duty. He cannot be blamed for the failure to winter, though, as noted, he was criticised by Kennedy for his actions and for giving the written opinion (Cracroft, 1851d). On return he devoted himself to writing the book, in his own interests, but his labours served Lady Franklin's also. With Kennedy's arrival he was swiftly relegated to a minor position in Lady Franklin's planning. For Kennedy

1. In this letter Sophia Cracroft states: "your thoughtful proposal as respects Mr. Snow proves that you have anticipated this means of assisting the cause." There is no indication, however, of what this was.

2. Belcher replied: "I should think it would not be wise to have anything to do with those who came home with their feathers tarnished." (Belcher, 1851). One wonders if Belcher remembered this comment in 1854 on the return of his own expedition.

3. At the same time preparations for the second expedition were being made. Smith was appointed to Snow's previous position, that of clerk, despite the fact that he was acting badly and had been "spoilt by over-kindness." (Duncan, 1850). Several of the previous crew were reappointed because of Kennedy's approval and possibly their statement that the return "was not called for, but that they might have got thro' the ice had it been attempted." (Franklin, 1850j). Sophia Cracroft reminded Kennedy that the ladies knew the crew better than he did, remembering what she regarded as their attempted extortion after the return (Cracroft, 1851v). She did concede that "They were generally, a very good set." (Cracroft, 1851i). The personnel was completed by Leask and the quixotic appointments of Bellot and John Hepburn. The ship required modification in the light of the first voyage and, as a final irony, Sophia Cracroft suggested that Snow's plan for it be considered (Cracroft, 1851t).
to offer him one position which represented a great demotion, and for Sophia Cracroft then to announce that he had refused a higher position was dishonest. The question arises as to how far Lady Franklin herself was aware of all this. She was ill at the time and even Sophia Cracroft does not appear to have been too sure of what took place between Snow and Kennedy as she wrote to Snow:

"having rejected the offer made to you to be First Mate, with the charge of one of the boat parties. If you speak of the actual proposal made to you, I think your friends will hardly join in your assertion, that 'the position offered you precludes your doing more for that cause than any other Shipped Seaman.' We expect much more than you appear to do from the occupant of the Post."

She continued: "You consider yourself as you have said, as fit to command the Expn. as Mr. Kennedy, therefore you decline going out" stressing that Snow had refused "the highest post that remained next to himself". By this she meant that of first mate as Snow was not qualified to be captain of the ship.

The possibility never appears to have occurred to Sophia Cracroft that Kennedy had not offered Snow command of a boat party at all, though it ought to have done, from Kennedy's opinions as to Snow's ability. She concludes by dilating on "my aunts kindness in permitting Mr. Kennedy to make you an offer, after you had cancelled all claim upon her by your independent offer to the Admiralty" (Cracroft, 1851q).

Therefore, either Snow was so determined to be in command that he would not accept anything less, which was the declared belief of the ladies, or Kennedy had lied saying one thing to Lady Franklin and another to Snow. The only evidence in favour of the former possibility is Snow's alleged statement to Barrow that he thought himself as fit to command as Kennedy (Cracroft, 1851r). This is very different from saying that he would not go unless he were in command, although Kennedy cannot be blamed for being suspicious of a person who had
expressed that attitude. The writer's opinion is that Snow deluded himself into believing that he was to command and the arrival and appointment of Kennedy was a bitter blow. However, it is held that had Snow received a genuine offer of the position he was allegedly offered, then he would have accepted it. The second alternative is also unlikely since Snow might well have approached Lady Franklin direct to tell her the details of the offer actually made and this might have caused difficulties for Kennedy. There is, however, a third possibility, that Kennedy, Lady Franklin and Sophia Cracroft were all quite well aware that Snow was not to be offered a separate boat command but resorted to Kennedy pressing on Snow his belief in his incompetence in an effort to urge this fairly weak willed man to admit it and withdraw. This is what happened. The ladies were then able to blame Snow for not accepting an offer he had never had and did not deserve due to his approach to the Admiralty, both to him in a direct letter containing a deliberate misunderstanding of Snow's reasons for rejection but, more important, to their friends who might have wondered why so useful a person had been dropped.

1. Immediately after Snow's removal from the planning of the expedition, Belcher was approached for a recommendation for someone to command the second boat party: "we do not care for his being a gentleman, nor whether he is in the Navy or not (Cracroft, 1851). A notice was inserted in the press stating that Kennedy was searching for a person "of sufficient enterprise, knowledge and perseverance" (Morning Chronicle, 1851).
CHAPTER V - CONCLUSIONS

It is now necessary to attempt to provide answers to the questions posed at the outset. For some of the problems no definite answer is possible. One of these is when Forsyth decided to return. The conflicting evidence on this has been noted as has the writer's belief that he realised very quickly that he had made a mistake in taking on the expedition with the means at his disposal. A further problem is about the attitudes of Lady Franklin and Sophia Cracroft to Snow after the voyage. There is no evidence that they ever considered him for command of the second expedition but, following the hint of Sophia Cracroft's comment on the last sentence of his book which she wrote, one can believe that Snow was misled. The attention he received from his book may have inflated his already considerable ego to the point of believing himself indispensable. Whether Forsyth or Snow had the more realistic assessment of Wilson will never be known. According to Snow: "He was worth his money, if we take the labour he performed and his zeal only into consideration." (Snow, 1851a, p. 16). Forsyth, however, condemned him as a mutinous character. Could there have been a Snow/Wilson cabal against Forsyth? If so, this certainly would have reinforced Forsyth's sense of isolation.

More accurate answers can be given to some other questions. The voyage was a failure since it did not achieve any of its objectives; the only success was bringing back the relics found at Cape Riley, and this was completely incidental, but it distracted the public. One can imagine that Forsyth was delighted at the finding of the relics for otherwise he would have had to return empty handed.

Forsyth was blamed for the failure but the reasons he adduced for returning do bear examination. With such a difficult situation as
regards officers and men, wintering would probably have been a dangerous undertaking and, as pointed out by Snow, completely worthless away from the area they were intended to cover. Lady Franklin was, in truth, saved much expense by the early return, though she gave no credit for this. It is surely the case that the task was impossible for Forsyth to fulfil. If he deserved censure at all, it is because he agreed to embark on a voyage to a completely strange area with a crew he had never seen until shortly before sailing. Having agreed, he had to see it through or expose himself to public ridicule and he was not a sufficiently strong character to have the courage of his convictions and turn back when it became apparent, as it must have done very early, that little was possible.

Still less can Snow be blamed. His department was run efficiently and he was willing and enthusiastic, perhaps exasperatingly so, but it is most important to remember that, through no fault of his, he never attempted his main duty, that of commanding one of the travelling parties.

Kay was undoubtedly incompetent and there is evidence that he had previously lost a ship (Morning Herald, 1850a) which may have accounted for his timidity. Wilson was probably not much better. These men were selected by Hogarth in Aberdeen, who chose all the personnel except Forsyth, Snow and Smith. One of the unanswerable questions is why he chose Kay and Wilson of whose competence and attitudes he must have known.

The responsibility for the failure of the expedition is Lady

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1. There was much nonsensical talk as to how Forsyth should have treated the mates. Saunders believed that they should have been put in "irons" (Forsyth, 1851b) but the most absurd suggestion was that of Captain McMurdo who, according to Sophia Cracroft, stated that: "were the lives even of two men to be sacrificed to the object of the Expedition?" he wd. not have hesitated to put those two men ashore, anywhere if they stood in the way of the object, & let the Country say what it would on his return." (Cracroft, 1851cc).
Franklin's. Her initial concept was a good one: the plan was appropriate to the task that needed to be undertaken. Where she is culpable is that she allowed Hogarth to recruit a crew while she herself selected Forsyth whom she had known before but in a different context, and Snow, who was a complete stranger both to her and to the Arctic. They were both chosen in an implausible way as were Kennedy, Bellot and Kane in turn. It would have been better to have obtained the services of an efficient and experienced whaling captain. This would certainly have been possible as she was later in correspondence with William Scoresby about it and he stated in forthright terms that if Thomas Jackson had been in command "the Prince Albert would not have made so useless a voyage last season" (Scoresby, 1851). After Penny was taken over by the Admiralty she does not appear to have reconsidered the idea and Forsyth was appointed. However, if he had had a free rein, he would have been able to organise the vessel to his own satisfaction, and there would certainly have been more harmony and possibly more success. As Forsyth had only obtained Admiralty permission to command the expedition by the end of April, that only left May for him to make personal arrangements and this was obviously insufficient time to take an active part in the preparation of the voyage. Subsequent events thus become more understandable.

Lady Franklin may have learnt from this. For the second expedition she ostensibly laid the organisation firmly in the hands of Kennedy: "my Aunt, having given him all the responsibility of selection." (Cracraft, 1851) although she appears to have taken the leading part

1. Kane was offered the command of Isabel in 1856 despite his poor health (Woodward, 1951, p. 291). Neatby's comment on this is: "The generosity with which she offered the command... to Kane, who was neither a professional seaman nor a first-rate commander, shows her warmth of temperament." (Neatby, 1970, p. 120-121).
2. Scoresby's brother-in-law.
in appointing Bellot and Hepburn. The three of them had constant conferences about personnel and Kennedy made reference to the ladies. It appears that, while Lady Franklin made the statement quoted above, and may even have thought she meant it, she nevertheless had the final decision. She only entrusted total selection to a captain in the case of McClintock on the *Fox* expedition (McClintock, 1860).

As to the question of whether the task was possible with different personnel, the answer is almost certainly yes. The *Fox* expedition was successful having, admittedly, a larger vessel, but more importantly, a strong leader of great experience. McClintock did not, however, choose the vessel which was bought by Lady Franklin without his advice (McClintock, 1860, p. 5). In fact it appears that Lady Franklin's expeditions were successful in inverse proportion to the amount of involvement she had in them.

The final point is the relations between Lady Franklin and Sophia Cracroft. The latter's diary notes and correspondence are written in a more decisive style. Whenever there was a reprimand to be handed out she did it, either face to face as in the case of Snow (Cracroft, 1851f) or in a letter as to Forsyth (Cracroft, 1851dd). Lady Franklin was ill for much of the time after Prince Albert returned, and even though Sophia Cracroft constantly refers to writing on her aunt's instruction, one would like to know how much she took upon her own responsibility. It is, for example, at least possible that the question of Snow's reappointment was decided by her and Kennedy, resolving that he was not to participate and manufacturing a situation to bring this about.

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1. The most independent of all the expeditions with which she was active was that of Edward Augustus Inglefield in *Isabel* in 1852. She suggested that he take over a vessel equipped by D. Beatson and he agreed "on the clear understanding that I should be allowed to prosecute the search on any ground I might think fit, and... as I should deem most suitable to my own views" (Inglefield, 1853, p. vii).
To sum up, the expedition was a failure because its preparation was mismanaged. Lady Franklin selected incompatible people as leaders and did not secure a careful choice of executive officers. Though the ladies were lavish with their allocations of blame to Forsyth and the mates, later by implication including Snow, there is not one single reference written by them which contains even a suspicion that they themselves might have had some of the responsibility. It may have been the case that so many others had, like Kennedy and Grinnell (Cracroft, 18510), told them of their good business talent that they had started to believe themselves infallible.
APPENDIX

Subsequent developments in the Franklin search are well known. The second Prince Albert expedition was little more successful than the first, but it did afford opportunity for the excess sentimentality and impractical idealism that Lady Franklin appears to have relished so much (Hodgson, 1974; Woodward, 1951, p. 149). On it Smith was a success, tempering Bellot's enthusiasm with his own experience (Bellot, 1855, p. 337), but apart from the discovery of Bellot Strait, little was achieved. Details of the later life of Lady Franklin and Sophia Cracroft are also familiar (Woodward, 1951) but Forsyth and Snow lapsed into obscurity.

Forsyth returned to an orthodox naval career and never again ventured north. Barrow stated that he had accomplished "one of the most extraordinary voyages ever performed in the polar seas." (O'Byrne, 1860, p. 411). He spent no more than the usual time on half pay, having been Inspecting-Commander of the Coast Guard at Berwick and Brighton before receiving command of H.M.S. Hornet on the China station. He served with distinction there and was promoted in 1857 (O'Byrne, 1860, p. 411). He was then on half pay until receiving command of H.M.S. Valorous at the Cape following which he had a very short period of half pay in 1867. His final commands were H.M.S. Dauntless and Wivern which were coast guard vessels on the Humber. He retired on 1st April 1870 and received the Companionship of the Bath in 1871. He died in 1873 (Navy List, 1858-1874). Despite the brevity of his Arctic career there are two localities named after him: Forsyth Bay and Forsyth Point on Prince of Wales Island (White, 1911, p. 336).

There is good reason to believe that the voyage completely altered Snow's life. It gave him a moment of glory and he spent the rest of his
days trying to recapture it. After the expedition, he obtained command of Allen Gardiner, acquired by the Patagonian Mission Society to act as tender for stations they intended to establish in Tierra del Fuego (Snow, 1857b; Shipton, 1973, pp. 117-125). He navigated in the area of Cape Horn without mishap for two years and so must have been a more competent seaman than Forsyth believed. This appointment ended in the law courts as Snow was discharged at the Falkland Islands for disobeying the Society's orders. According to Snow, these consisted of kidnapping native children for indoctrination but he lost his case.

By this time Lady Franklin was engaged in raising funds for the Fox expedition. With the optimistic enthusiasm characteristic of Snow, he offered his services for this purpose, his remuneration being a percentage of the proceeds (Snow, 1857a). News of his acceptance came through Barrow, but he was offered a flat salary of two guineas a week (Barrow, 1857). How successful this fund raising was is not known.

After the return of Fox, he attempted to organise an expedition of his own, and he still believed that some of Franklin's men might have survived. He read a paper on this to the British Association at Oxford in 1860 (Snow, 1860). This failing, he returned to the United States where he met Hall and was deeply involved with the preparation of Hall's book Life with the Esquimaux (Loomis, 1966). This venture also ended in acrimony. There is evidence that with the American Civil War he was offered a commission in the Confederate Navy, which, unfortunately for the connoisseur of the unusual, he declined. However, he did write a book on the Southern generals and eventually returned to Britain to devote the rest of his life to writing, collecting data on Arctic exploration for a biographical Role of Honour which he never completed, and a number of other projects (Review of Reviews, 1893). He lived in penury, supported by a small pension from a charity and aid
from "a few true friends". One of these was Clements Markham, then President of the Royal Geographical Society (Markham, 1895). He died on 12th March 1895 (Laughton, 1898). He has two enduring monuments: in the Thule district of Greenland is Parker Snow Naes named by Inglefield in 1852 while adjacent to it is Parker Snow Bugt named by Robert Peary who seems to have believed that Snow was an American (Laursen, 1972, p. 312).
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Plate 1. Snow, 1851a, facing p 147.
Plate 2. Snow, 1851a, facing p 186.
Fig. 1 Map of Prince Regent Inlet and the surrounding area.
Fig. 2 Map of the area around Port Leopold.
Fig. 3. Forsyth's track map (Forsyth, 1850c).
Fig. 4. Snow's map of the voyage (Snow, 1851a).