Limits of the real
A hypertext critical edition and translation of Bhartṛhari’s Dravyasamuddeśa, with the commentary of Helārāja

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Abstract

This dissertation is divided into two parts. The first is a critical study of the Dravyasamuddeśa, a chapter from the Vākyapadiya of Bhartṛhari, a 5th-century Sanskrit philosopher of language. It also deals with the 10th-century commentary of Helārāja, which was highly influential in shaping the interpretation of the text by later authors. Although the Vākyapadiya is a treatise on Sanskrit grammar, and this particular chapter purports to deal with the grammatical category of dravya, in the Dravyasamuddeśa, Bhartṛhari is mostly concerned with establishing a non-dual theory of reality. Helārāja, five centuries later, defends this theory and attempts to re-interpret other schools of thought, namely Buddhism and Sāṃkhya, in its terms. The second part of the dissertation is a critical edition and annotated translation of the Dravyasamuddeśa and the commentary. It also describes the making of the edition – for this project, an open source software package was developed to automatically collate diplomatic transcriptions of manuscript witnesses in order to generate an apparatus variorum. The resulting apparatus forms part of an interactive, online digital edition of the text, from which the printed edition is generated.
Preface

This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as specified in the text.

It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution. I further state that no substantial part of my dissertation has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution.

It does not exceed the prescribed word limit for the Degree Committee of the Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies.
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Thanks are owed to a number of people whom I met during my time at Cambridge, without whom this dissertation would not have been possible. My supervisor, Vincenzo Vergiani, read through many drafts of this dissertation and provided continuous comments. During the Sanskrit Manuscripts Project, Daniele Cuneo and Camillo Formigatti initiated me into the study of interlinear spacing, aksara counting, and marginal frame lines, and taught me the beauty and value of pedantry. Hugo David suffered through an early draft of the translation, and, surprisingly, still consents to being interrogated on questions of Indian philosophy. Margaret Cone read Pali with me for four years, which is a privilege that I deeply regret leaving behind.

I would also like to thank the friends and colleagues who participated in various reading groups and seminars in Cambridge, among them Varun Khanna, Sibylle Koch, Prow Pangsrivongse, Alessandra Petrocchi, Aleix Ruis-Falqué, Shishir Saxena, Yiming Shen, Saran Suebsantiwongse, and Paolo Visigalli.

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The Dravyasamuddeśa of Bhartṛhari

ātmā vastu svabhāvaś ca śarīraṃ tattvam ity api |
dravyam ity asya paryāyās tae ca nityam iti
smṛtam || 1 ||

It is also called: ātman, vastu, svabhāva, śarīra,
and tattva. These are synonyms of dravya, and it
is traditionally taught that it is permanent.

satyam vastu tadākārair asatyair avadhāryate |
asatyopādhibhiḥ śabdaḥ satyam evābhidhi-
yate || 2 ||

The real entity is determined through its unreal
forms; only the real is denoted by words, which
have unreal delimiters,

adhruveṇa nimittena devadattagrhaṃ yathā |
grhitam grhaśabdena śuddham evābhidhi-
yate || 3 ||

just as Devadatta's house is grasped by a tempo-
rary mark, but only the bare house is denoted by
the word "house",

suvarṇādi yathā yuktaṃ svair ākārair apāyibhiḥ |
rucakādyabhidhānānāṃ śuddham evaiti väcyat-
tām || 4 ||

just as gold, etc., is endowed with its own, tran-
sient forms, but it is really the pure gold that is
expressed by denotations such as "ring".

ākāraṃ ca vyavacchedāt sārvārthyam avar-
dhyate |
yathaiva caṣṭurādīnāṃ sāmarthyaṃ nāḍikādi-
bhiḥ || 5 ||

And the capacity of a word to mean everything
is restrained because the object is differentiated
by its forms, in the very same way that the capa-
bility of the eyes, etc. is restrained by a hollow
stalk, etc.

teṣv ākāreṣu yath śabdas tathābhūteṣu vartate |
tattvātmakatvāt tenāpi nityam evābhidhi-
yate || 6 ||

The permanent substance is denoted even by a
word that expresses solely forms of such a kind,
since those forms are identical with the real.
There is no difference between the real and the unreal, according to the tradition passed down from the elders. What others think is "the unreal" is really the real which has not been properly examined.

It is really the unconceptualized real which assumes the form of conceptualization. And there is no temporal difference in it, yet temporal difference is grasped, just as the properties of the object of cognition absolutely do not belong to cognition itself, and, although seemingly identical, it is established that they are absolutely non-identical,

just as transformations of the real absolutely do not belong to the real, and, although seemingly identical, the real is absolutely non-identical with its transformations.

That reality which remains at the end, when all forms are destroyed, that is permanent, that is expressed by the word, and that is not different from the word.

It does not exist nor does it not exist, it is not singular, it is not separate, it is not connected nor divided, it is not transformed nor is it otherwise.

It does not exist and it does, it is singular, it is many separate entities, it is connected and divided, it is transformed, it is otherwise.

That singular reality is seen as the word, the object, and their relationship. It is what is seen, the seeing, the seer, and the purpose of the seeing.
vikārāpagame satyaṃ suvarṇaṃ kuṇḍale yathā |
vikārāpagame satyāṃ tathāhuḥ prakṛtiṃ parām || 15 ||

Just as, when the transformations go away, only
the gold in the ring is real, in the same way, they
say that, when the transformations go away, only
the absolute, primordial matter is real.

vācyā śa sarvaśabdānāṃ śabdāś ca na prthak tat-
tathā |
aprthaktve ca saṁbandhas tayor nānātmanor iva || 16 ||

That primordial matter is expressed by all
words, and words are not separate from it. And
even though they are not separate, there is a
relationship between words and the primordial
matter, as if they were distinct from one another.

ātmā paraḥ priyo dveṣyo vaktā vācyam prayojana-
mand |
viruddhāni yathaikasya svapne rūpāṇi cetas-
sah || 17 ||

Self and other, friend and adversary, speaker,
spoken and purpose of the speaking: just as, in a
dream, a single mind takes these contradictory
forms,

ajanmani tathā nitye paurvāparyavivarjite |
tattve janmādirūpatvam viruddham upalabhyate || 18 ||

in absolute reality – unborn, permanent, and de-
void of sequence –, contradiction, in the form of
birth, etc., is perceived.
Introduction

What is real? This seems like an unlikely question for a grammarian to address, and yet, it is precisely what the 5th-century Sanskrit grammarian Bharṭṛhari sets out to do. Embedded in the Vākyapadiya – a vast technical and philosophical tract dealing with words and sentences, parts of speech, number, grammatical gender, and complex formation – is the Dravyasamuddeśa, the chapter on substance. This short chapter purports to deal with the grammatical category of dravya, but there is not much grammar discussed here; early on, the third and fourth verses refer to grammatical points discussed in the Mahābhāṣya, the 2nd-century BCE commentary on Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī, but those discussions are re-purposed to a philosophical end: as similes for the relationship between the transient – and ultimately unreal – forms that we perceive in the world and the absolute, immutable, non-dual reality that Bharṭṛhari asserts is real. Then, immediately after establishing this point, he demolishes the linguistic categories of real and unreal, being and non-being, for non-duality could never admit such distinctions.

Perhaps it is because so many ideas are expressed so concisely in this chapter that it was so useful for the author of the Sarvadarśanasamgraha, a 14th-century doxography, when it came to describing the philosophy of the grammarians. Four verses from the Dravyasamuddeśa are quoted there, which, given the length of the chapter, is exceptional. The Sarvadarśanasamgraha is, by far, the most influential of Sanskrit doxographies, and it is most likely because of that text that Bharṭṛhari is, today, the de facto representative of what has become known as the Pāṇinidārśana. Although the Sarvadarśanasamgraha is a highly idiosyncratic representation of philosophy in India, as Andrew Nicholson has pointed out, it has “often been considered an accurate depiction of the Indian philosophical schools, so much so that Deussen’s volume on India in his Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie is largely based on [it]” similarly, Max Müller’s The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, in its short sections devoted to language, seems to be discussing passages from the Pāṇinidarśana chapter of the Sarvadarśanasamgraha. Thus, the influence of the Dravyasamuddeśa can be felt even in shaping early Western ideas about the philosophy of language in India.

But the Sarvadarśanasamgraha does not only quote Bharṭṛhari’s verses; it also reuses large passages

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1The Sarvadarśanasamgraha is traditionally attributed to Mādhava, although newer scholarship attributes it to Canni Bhāṭṭa, a younger contemporary of Mādhava (see Yamashita 1998, 22-32 and K. Kunjunni Raja’s preface to Klostermaier 1999).
22013, 159. See Deussen 1914, 190ff. Deussen translates Vākyapadiya 1.14 as it is quoted in the Sarvadarśanasamgraha, without recognizing its source (1914, 399).
from Helārāja’s 10th-century commentary on them. Helārāja takes a very active role in delineating Bhartṛhari’s doctrinal position – he rejects the theory of pariṇāma twice in his commentary on the Dravyasamuddeśa, both times insisting that Bhartṛhari is a vivartavādin; he also takes care to specify which Buddhist beliefs are compatible with the kind of Advaita that Bhartṛhari espouses, and which are not. Writing five centuries after Bhartṛhari, Helārāja had to contend with Buddhist epistemologists who radically transformed Bhartṛhari’s ideas as well as with Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas who staunchly rejected them, and his interpretation of the Dravyasamuddeśa is, evidently, shaped by the centuries of debate that preceded him. His particular take on the philosophy of Bhartṛhari is then filtered through the Śaṅkarite lens of the Sarvadarśanasamgraha and translated into English in 1882 by E. B. Cowell and A. E. Gough, making its way into the still-nascent western Indological discourse of the late 19th century.

This dissertation is divided into two parts. The first is a critical study, outlining the philosophy of Bhartṛhari’s Dravyasamuddeśa and how Helārāja uses the text to engage with the doctrines of other schools of thought. I am greatly indebted to earlier foundational studies on the Vākyapadiya, such as K. A. Subramania Iyer’s A study of the Vākyapadiya in the light of the Ancient Commentaries, and Ashok Aklujkar’s doctoral dissertation, in which he argues that the text – consisting of three kāṇḍas – which scholars consider to be the Vākyapadiya is more accurately known as the Trikāṇḍū. I also draw on the Mahābhāṣyadīpikā, Bhartṛhari’s commentary on the Mahābhāṣya, which helps to provide a fuller picture of his attitude towards issues such as the permanence of the linguistic referent. In contrast to Bhartṛhari, comparatively less scholarship has been devoted to Helārāja as a philosopher in his own right; it is hoped that this study will contribute to the understanding of Helārāja’s intellectual and historical context and the ways in which he leverages the text of the Dravyasamuddeśa to bear on the philosophical concerns of his own time.

The second part is a critical edition and annotated translation of the text. This edition improves upon the text of Subramania Iyer, thanks to a number of additional manuscripts which have shed new light on the transmission of the text. Major differences are listed in the preface. This thesis is the first attempt – of which I am aware – to study systematically the relationship between the extant manuscripts of the text and to hypothesize a stemma codicum. This is also the first translation of the Prakīrṇaprakāśa on the Dravyasamuddeśa into any European language. The Dravyasamuddeśa is the second of fourteen samuddeśas in the Prakīrṇakāṇḍa. Five other translations, focusing on different samuddeśas, have been published previously: the section on the Saṃbandhasamuddeśa was translated by Jan Houben; the section on the Saṃkhyāsamuddeśa was translated by Pascale Haag.

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Subramania Iyer 1969.
It has been argued that there once existed up to sixteen samuddeśas (Aklujkar 1969, 548); conversely, what is currently known as the Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa may have originally been part of the Guṇasamuddeśa (see Houben 1995, 85 & 100).
Houben 1995.
Haag 2005.
the section on the *Kālasamuddeśa* was translated by Peri Sarveswara Sharma\(^9\) and the sections on the *Kriyāsamuddeśa* and the *Puruṣasamuddeśa* were translated by Giovanni Bandini\(^10\). These earlier translations have been immensely helpful in the study of Helārāja’s distinctive vocabulary and prose style.

The second part also includes a chapter on methodology: for this project, an open source software package was developed to automatically collate diplomatic transcriptions of manuscript witnesses in order to generate an apparatus variorum. The resulting apparatus forms part of an interactive, online digital edition of the text, from which the printed edition is generated. More information on the online edition can be found in chapter 5.2 as well as in the appendix.

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\(^9\)Sharma 1972.
\(^{10}\)Bandini 1980, 1982.
Part I.

Critical study
1. Bhartṛhari on *dravya*: the real as delimited by the unreal

1.1. The semantics of the term *dravya*

The word *dravya* has a very wide semantic scope and denotes an important concept in virtually all genres of Indian literature. In the Vedas, the material offering used in a ritual is called *dravya*. In narrative literature and Dharmaśāstra, it can mean worldly goods, gold, wealth, or property. In Āyurveda, it means medicinal herbs or medicine in general.

Pāṇinian derivations

According to the grammatical tradition, the word *dravya* could be derived either from a verb or a noun. In the first case, it is derived from the verb *dru*, meaning "to flow" or "to dissolve", via A 3.1.97 acocayat, which states that the kṛt affix yaT can be used with a verbal root ending in a vowel to form a future passive participle (*kṛtya*). The resulting *dravya* would mean something like "to be dissolved", and this might be connected to the use of the word in the sense of "medicinal ingredients" or "spirituous liquor". In the second case, it is derived from the noun *dru*, meaning "wood" or "tree", via the taddhita affix yaT, as specified in A 4.3.161 droś ca. As the Kāśikāvṛtti explains it, the resulting *dravya* has the meaning of "a modification of a tree" (*vikāra*) or "a part of a tree" (*avayava*). This particular use of

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1. Manfred Mayrhofer suggests a possible connection between *dravya* and *havya* (1992, 757).
the word is rare, but attested in the Kauśitaki Brāhmaṇa. A third meaning, considered irregular, is the sense of "suitable" or "worthy", which is given by A 5.3.104 dravyam ca bhavye. As examples, the Kāśikā gives dravyo 'yaṁ rājaputraḥ, “the prince is worthy”; and dravyo 'yaṁ māṇavakah, “the youth is worthy”.

These three Pāṇinian derivations give rise to quite disparate meanings, but that has not stopped some later grammarians from heroically attempting to reconcile some or all of the meanings of the word dravya; for example, in Vardhamāna’s Gaṇaratnamahodadhi – a 12th-century metrical arrangement of the nominal bases in the Gaṇapāṭha – the author’s commentary on the word dru reads:

drur iva dravyam ayaṃ rājaputraḥ | yathā dru- maḥ phalapuṣpapallavādibhir arthinaḥ kṛtārthayati sa hi bhavanam arhatiti bhavyo bhavyatvātmaṁ vicit iti dravyam ucayate | kriyā hi dravyaṁ vinayati nādravyam iti | puruṣārthasādhakatvād hiranyādikam api dravyam

This prince is worthy (dravya), like a tree (dru). Just as a tree realizes the purpose of the purposeful through [the production] of fruits, flowers, and shoots etc., for it is worthy (bhavya) – that is, worthy of being – thus it is called dravya, that is, self-possessed. For action [can only] govern dravya, not a non-dravya. Because it is a means for attaining human goals, gold, etc. is also dravya.

In this passage, Vardhamāna is fairly comprehensive in explaining the meaning of dravya as defined in various lexicons as well as by the Pāṇinian rules where dravya is specifically derived, and he also incorporates an important semantic field that has not yet been mentioned: dravya as substance, substrate, substantive, or individual thing. This is by far the most dominant use of the word dravya not only in grammatical literature but also in other philosophical schools – from Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṁsā, to heterodox traditions like Buddhism and Jainism. In the Astādhyāyī, there is one occurrence of the word dravya where it seems to be used in this sense: A 5.4.11 kinettiṅavyayaghād āmv adravyaprakarṣe. This rule governs the use of the affix āmU after certain words formed with gha, which is the technical term for the comparative taraP and superlative tamaP affixes. The condition adravyaprakarṣe stipulates that āmU cannot be used in cases where the comparative or superlative is applied to drayyas. According to the Padamańjari, the word dravya seems to be used here in contrast to guṇa, quality, and kriya, action, which are valid conditions for the use of the affix, since those categories can be differentiated in terms of degree – examples given in the Kāśikā includeuccais-tarām, “louder” or “higher”, and pacatitamām, “cooking the best”. On the other hand, a dravya, which here seems to mean a substance or an individual thing, does not have degree; an individual thing cannot be more or less itself. It is only the qualities which inhere in an individual, its guṇas, which

9 A 1.1.22 taraptamapau ghaḥ.
A substance and its qualities: *dravya* and *guna*

Although this use of the word *dravya* is not derivable via the rules of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, it became such an important concept in the grammatical tradition that later grammarians seem to feel the need to retroactively read it back into the Pāṇinian derivation of *dravya*; for example, Haradatta, glossing *dravya* in his commentary on A 4.3.161 *dros ca*, does not follow the *Kāśikā* in understanding it as meaning "a part or modification of a tree", but rather gives an alternative definition: *guṇasaṃdrāva*, "a confluence of qualities". This is, in fact, an etymology given by Patañjali in the *Mahābhāṣya*, using the common root *dru*, from which both *drāva* and *dravya* are derived, as the basis for his analysis. As Pierre-Sylvain Filliozat remarks, this is not a Pāṇinian derivation; Patañjali, instead, calls it a *nirvacana*, an etymological analysis modeled on Yāska’s *Nirukta*.

The definition *guṇasaṃdrāva* appears in the commentary on A 5.1.119 *tasya bhāvas tvatalau*. This rule governs the formation of abstract nouns using the *tva* and *taL* affixes. According to Kātyāyana, these affixes express *guṇa*, qualities, which inhere in a *dravya*. Patañjali defines the *guṇa* as sound, touch, appearance, taste, and smell, then he asks, how is *dravya* different from *guna*? If the *guṇa* encompass all that can be perceived of an object, what else is there?

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1. Bhartṛhari on *dravya*: the real as delimited by the unreal

A substance and its qualities: *dravya* and *guna*

Although this use of the word *dravya* is not derivable via the rules of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, it became such an important concept in the grammatical tradition that later grammarians seem to feel the need to retroactively read it back into the Pāṇinian derivation of *dravya*; for example, Haradatta, glossing *dravya* in his commentary on A 4.3.161 *dros ca*, does not follow the *Kāśikā* in understanding it as meaning "a part or modification of a tree", but rather gives an alternative definition: *guṇasaṃdrāva*, "a confluence of qualities". This is, in fact, an etymology given by Patañjali in the *Mahābhāṣya*, using the common root *dru*, from which both *drāva* and *dravya* are derived, as the basis for his analysis. As Pierre-Sylvain Filliozat remarks, this is not a Pāṇinian derivation; Patañjali, instead, calls it a *nirvacana*, an etymological analysis modeled on Yāska’s *Nirukta*.

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Given the same width and height, the weight of iron is different from that of cotton; that which causes the difference is *dravya*. Similarly, something cuts just by touching, and something else, pressed in, doesn’t cut; that which causes the difference is *dravya*. Something makes a split after a single blow, while something else does not after two blows; that which causes the difference is *dravya*.

While the *guṇa* are defined as properties that can be directly perceived by the five senses, *dravya* is something that can only be inferred and differentiated in comparison. As B. K. Matilal points out, *dravya*

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1. There is one more occurrence of *dravya* in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*: A 5.1.51 *vasnadravyābhyāṃṭhankanau*. This rule specifies the *kaN* affix for the word *dravya*, forming the word *dravyaka*, meaning “one who carries/procures (harati) *dravya*”. In this case, the context would suggest, for *dravya*, a meaning such as “thing” or “money” (Sharma 2002–2003, IV, 464).

2. Rama Nath Sharma states that *dravya* in the sense of *vastu* is considered *aryutpanna*, underived (2002, IV, 350).


5. 1998, 46–47.


8. *ananyat sabdādibhyo dravyam. na hy anyad upalabhyate* (Ibid.).

9. Ibid.
this is one of the earliest extant examples of this kind of inferential reasoning, which he compares to sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa from the Nyāya tradition.

Patañjali then goes on to give yet another definition of dravya: as something whose essence (tattva) is not changed when different guṇa(s) become manifest in them, like a mango that changes colour but remains a mango. This example leads him to give the etymology of dravya as guṇasaṃdrāva, a confluence of qualities – it is the aspect of an object which is permanent, which gives it its identity, even when its qualities change.

1.2. Patañjali on the jāti and dravya views on word-meaning

This definition of dravya, and the associated notion of permanence, becomes crucially important in the discussion over whether a word denotes a jāti, a generic property, or a dravya, an individual. This is one of the most debated questions not only in the grammatical tradition, but also in any philosophical school that deals with language. It is mentioned in various places in the Mahābhāṣya, but the lengthiest discussion occurs around rules A 1.2.58 jāṭyākhyāyām ekasmin bahuvacanam anyatarasyām and A 1.2.64 sarūpānām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau. According to Kātyāyana, these two rules support two opposing views on the question: respectively, that of Vājapyāyana, who held that a word denotes jāti, and that of Vyāḍi, who held that a word denotes dravya.

Rule A 1.2.58 states that the plural inflection can be used optionally when jāti is being expressed. For example, one could say sampanno yavaḥ in the singular or sampannāyavāḥ in the plural, referring to “excellent barley” in general in both cases. This rule seems to support the jāti view of word meaning. On the other hand, rule A 1.2.64 states that when two or more words with the same form are reduced to one word, that form need only appear once, with its inflectional ending reflecting its number. So, for example, in order to express “two trees”, instead of saying vrksaś ca vrksaś ca, one could say vrksa, reducing the two identical nominal bases vrksa to a single occurrence, with a dual ending. In the same vein, vrksaś ca vrksaś ca vrksaś ca could be reduced to vrksaḥ, with a plural ending. The very existence of this rule seems to show that Pāṇini thought of a word as denoting an individual thing, since, if the word vrksa denoted the class or genus of “tree”, then this rule would not be needed. But, to illustrate an unintended consequence of this assertion, Patañjali provides two injunctions as examples: brāhmaṇo na hantavyah, “brāhmaṇas should not be killed”, and surā na peyā, “alcohol should not be drunk”. In these cases,
the words *brāhmaṇa* and *surā* clearly denote brāhmaṇas and alcohol in general, as *jātis*, rather than individuals; otherwise, these sentences would mean that a particular brāhmaṇa should be spared, but leave open the possibility that all other brāhmaṇas could be killed; that some particular unit of alcohol should not be drunk, but that alcohol consumption in general is not prohibited.

Naturally, this seems like a false dichotomy; why should a word denote only *jāti* or *dravya* in all cases? Even while discussing A 1.2.58, which purportedly supports the view that it is *jāti* that is denoted by words, Patañjali acknowledges that the choice between using a noun in a plural or singular inflection depends on the speaker’s intention – when a genus is intended, the singular is naturally used; when a group of individuals is intended, the plural is naturally used. Near the end of the discussion, having presented both sides of the argument, Patañjali presents a pragmatic solution to the problem:

It is not that, for one who holds the word-meaning to be the generic property, an individual is not [also] meant; nor is it that, for one who holds the word-meaning to be an individual, the generic property is not [also] meant. Both meanings hold for both. [The question is] which is primary and which is subordinate and for whom. For one who holds the word-meaning to be a generic property, the generic property is primary and the individual is subordinate. For one who holds the word-meaning to be the individual, the individual is primary and the generic property is subordinate.

As is also shown elsewhere in the *Mahābhāṣya*, in this passage Patañjali makes it clear that both positions are acceptable. This becomes an axiom for later grammarians; Bhartṛhari, in the *jātisamuddeśa*, codifies it as *jātirvādravyamevavāpadārthausarvaśabdānām.*

As Peter Scharf has shown in his exhaustive study, his frequent use of the words *jāti* and *ākṛti* as synonyms. As Peter Scharf has shown in his exhaustive study, the two words are often used interchangeably in the *Mahābhāṣya* to mean “genus” or “class property.”
The gold simile

However, ākṛti has a broader semantic field than jāti; it is also used in the sense of the physical shape or form that an object takes. This becomes important in the Paspaśāhnika when, again, Patañjali is discussing whether a word denotes dravya or ākṛti. The main consideration here is which of the two is nitya, permanent; since the vārttika siddhe śabdārthasambandhe states that the word, its object, and their relation are permanent, then whichever of the two is permanent must be the object of a word:

\[
\text{dravyam hi nityam ākṛtir anityā | kathaṃ jñāyate | evaṃ hi drśyate loke | mṛt kayacid ākṛtyā yuktā pīṇḍo bhavati | pīṇḍākṛtim upamṛdya ghaṭikāḥ kriyante | ghaṭikākṛtim upamṛdya kuṇḍikāḥ kriyante | tathā suvarṇam kayacid ākṛtyā yuktam pīṇḍo bhavati | pīṇḍākṛtim upamṛdya ruca kāḥ kriyante | ruca kākṛtim upamṛdya kaṭākāḥ kriyante | kaṭākākṛtim upamṛdya svastikāḥ kriyante | punar āvṛttah suvarṇapīṇḍaḥ punar aparayākṛtyā yuktāḥ khadira-gāraśarve kuṇḍale bhavataḥ | ākṛtir anyā cānāy ca bhavati dravyam punas tad eva | ākṛtyupamardena dravyam evāvasiṣyate}
\]

For dravya is permanent while ākṛti is impermanent. How is this known? It is thus seen in the world. Mud, associated with a certain ākṛti, is a lump. When the lump ākṛti is destroyed, pots are made. When the pot ākṛti is destroyed, jars are made. In the same way, gold, associated with a certain ākṛti, is a lump. When the lump ākṛti is destroyed, necklaces are made. When the necklace ākṛti is destroyed, bracelets are made. When the bracelet ākṛti is destroyed, svastikas are made. The gold, again reverted to a lump, again associated with another ākṛti, becomes two earrings having the colour of embers of khadira wood. The ākṛti is always different [in each case] while the dravya is the same. It is the dravya that remains upon the destruction of the ākṛti.

Earlier in the Paspaśāhnika, Patañjali has defined ākṛti as sāmānyabhūta, being a universal or genus, but here, it is clearly used in the sense of the different shapes that a substance, like gold, can take – a bracelet, a ring, or even just a lump. The word dravya here also takes on a different meaning; rather than an individual object, it clearly has the sense of the underlying substance of which the object consists, as in the discussion on A 5.1.19, when it was defined as guṇasamdrāva. As a result of the different senses in which ākṛti and dravya are used in this passage, the terms of this debate have a strikingly different character from the one in the discussion of A 1.2.58 and A 1.2.64; the evidence is not drawn from analyzing sentences and deducing the speaker’s intention, but rather from thinking through the ontological import of dravya and ākṛti. This passage hinges not so much on the question of what is meant, but rather on what is there.

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31 tadbhinneṣvabhinnaṃchinneṣvacchinnaṃsāmānyabhūtaṃ (ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 1).
1. Bhartṛhari on dravya: the real as delimited by the unreal

1.3. Bhartṛhari’s treatment of jāti and dravya

In the Vākyapadīya, Bhartṛhari generally keeps the ambiguity of the terms ākṛti, jāti, and dravya as they are presented in the Mahābhāṣya. In some cases, jāti and ākṛti are taken as synonymous, while in other cases ākṛti means the shape or form of an object while jāti refers to a universal property that inheres in an object. The word dravya inherits all the connotations it had in the Mahābhāṣya, and it also gains two more definitions: firstly, as an individual object, dravya is defined as anything that can be referred to by a pronoun; secondly, as substance, it is given an Advaitin interpretation – as the underlying, monistic substance of reality, synonymous with brahman.

As Jan Houben points out, “if the main theoretical division in the second Kāṇḍa is the division between the acceptance of either the sentence or the word as primary, the main theoretical division within the third Kāṇḍa is no doubt that between the ‘universal’ and the ‘substance’ view. The opposition between these two is pointed out at the beginning of the first or Jāti-samuddeśa, and plays a role, sometimes more manifest, sometimes more at the background, also in the other chapters.”

As in the Mahābhāṣya, both views are acceptable, since a word denotes both, but either jāti or dravya will be primary depending on the circumstances. This position is echoed by Bhartṛhari in the Vṛttisamuddeśa, in a passage that paraphrases Patañjali’s conclusion in his discussion on A 1.2.64 – whichever of the two is primarily denoted by a word, the other, unexpressed aspect nevertheless acts in a subordinate capacity. In addition, both in the Vākyapadīya – especially in the third kāṇḍa – and in the Mahābhāṣyadīpikā, Bhartṛhari elaborates upon the statements made by Patañjali and theorizes different models to account for how words are related to objects, starting from the premise of a word expressing a jāti or a word expressing a dravya.

Jāti as the primary referent

As Patañjali objected in the Mahābhāṣya, in the sentence gaurjātaitisarvāmbhūtamanavakaśāṃsyāt, “the cow is born”, the word gauḥ clearly refers to an individual; how could it stand for a jāti in this case? The Dīpikā gives an answer: as S. D. Joshi and J. A. F. Roodbergen summarize it, "words stand for an ākṛti or jāti in the first place, and are used to refer to individuals through a process called tādrūpyāpādana. This process consists in particularizing the ākṛti or jāti by connecting the word expressing it with words which express a guṇa, kriyā or saṃjñā." For example, the word go on its own would refer first to gotva, cow-ness; then, it might be particularized by the word śukla, which refers to śuklatva, white-ness. In the case of gaur jātah, the cow is particularized by an action, that of being born. In this way, words that refer

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32 For example, in the Vṛtti to 1.93 (ed. Subramania Iyer 1966, 159), ākṛti is used to explain jāti in the verse; on the other hand, in the Vṛtti to 2.256 (ed. Subramania Iyer 1983, II, 223), ākṛti is used in the sense of the physical form that a substance takes.

33 Houben 1995, 132.


35 gaur jātaitisarvāmbhūtamanavakaśāṃsyāt (ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, 244).

36 Joshi and Roodbergen 1986, 132.
to class properties are particularized in order to refer to individual objects. But what makes the recognition of the individual object possible in the first place is that the object possesses a particular ākṛti – we always recognize different individual cows as a cow because of the “permanence” of the gotva that inheres in each one.

**Dravya as the primary referent**

On the other hand, if the main referent of a word is a dravya, how can these individual objects be distinguished from one another, i.e., how can one cow be distinguished from another cow? The answer, given both in the Dīpikā and in the Guṇasamudēśa, is almost identical to the jāti-model: a dravya is particularized by differentiating features such as jāti and guṇa. As explained above in relation to A 5.4.11, a dravya cannot admit of degree in and of itself in order to differentiate one cow from another, one must rely on the qualities – for example, whiteness – that inher in each cow, which do admit of degree, i.e., one cow might be more white than the other. As Helārāja says, when dravya is defined in this way – as something to be qualified or differentiated – then even a jāti or a kriyā could be thought of as dravya, presumably following the logic laid out in the Dīpikā above.

As Madhav Deshpande points out, this notion of dravya has no particular ontological status. It is a functional definition that is flexible enough to allow language to refer to things that may or may not exist; it is even broader than Patañjali’s notion of guṇasamudāya. But this is not the final word on dravya; as Wilhelm Halbfass puts it, “this functional and empirical concept of substance is superseded by the idea of an absolute substance, which coincides with the nondual brahman, the ultimate ground of language and the world.” But how does the notion of dravya as the referent of a word become transformed into the notion of dravya as the all-pervasive substance of reality? In other words, how does the question of meaning become answered, eventually, with a notion of existence?

If we look at Bhartṛhari’s functional definitions of jāti and dravya, we find that he has taken Patañjali’s four categories of words – jāti, guṇa, kriyā, and yadṛcchā – and essentially distilled them into two: bhedya and bhedaka. In the definition of jāti as bhedya, it is something that is definable in and of itself; it can admit of degree in and of itself. In the definition of dravya as bhedaka, it is something that is definable in and of itself; it cannot admit of degree in and of itself.
express an individual), the \textit{bhedakas} are qualities, actions, and names. In the definition of \textit{dravya} as \textit{bhedya}, according to Helārāja, the \textit{bhedya} could also be \textit{jāti} or \textit{kriyā}, and the \textit{bhedakas} are whatever qualifies them – in the case of \textit{kriyā}, the agent of the action, its object, or an adverb like \textit{sādhu}. Whatever is to be differentiated is \textit{dravya}; this is a crucial condition in Bhartṛhari’s definition of \textit{dravya} as something that can be referred to by a pronoun:

\begin{quote}
\begin{verbatim}
vastūpalakṣaṇaṃ yatra sarvanāma prayujyate | 
dravyam ity ucyate so ‘rtho bhedyatvena viva-
kṣitaḥ ||
\end{verbatim}
\end{quote}

That, for which a pronoun is employed to mark a particular object (\textit{vastu}), is said to be the substance (\textit{dravya}). [Its] meaning is expressed as something to be differentiated.

Helārāja refers to this definition, given in the \textit{Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa}, as \textit{sāṃvyavahārika}, a definition of \textit{dravya} that is transactional or worldly, perhaps in the sense that it is functional, and contrasts this to the definition of \textit{dravya} as absolute, undifferentiated reality, given in the \textit{Dravyasamuddeśa}, which he terms \textit{pāramārthika}. But although these two notions serve different theoretical purposes – one is linguistic, the other ontological – the process of meaning-making by distinguishing a thing – be it an object, a genus, or even an action – via its properties mirrors the way in which, in the non-dual philosophy of Bhartṛhari, an undifferentiated reality is conceptualized by segmenting and differentiating it.

\section*{1.4. \textit{Dravya} in the \textit{Dravyasamuddeśa}}

\textbf{The gold simile revisited}

If one posits that reality is ultimately undifferentiated, then the question naturally arises as to the nature of the differences that appear in the world. For Bhartṛhari, who famously asserts that all cognition manifests through language\footnote{\textit{Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa} 3, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 187.}, this question can be answered by trying to understand what is really expressed by words. Again, the gold simile from the \textit{Mahābhāṣya} is referred to: since, in all of its different transformations, even as it is melted down and re-shaped into a different form, the gold persists, then logically, it must be the gold, the \textit{dravya}, that is expressed by the word “ring” or “bracelet”:

\begin{quote}
\begin{verbatim}
suvarṇādi yathā yuktaṃ svair ākāraip apāy-
ibhīḥ | 
rucakādyabhidhānānāṃ śuddham evaiti vā-
cyatām ||
\end{verbatim}
\end{quote}

Just as gold, etc., is endowed with its own forms, which are transient, [but] it is really the pure [gold] that is expressed by denotations such as “ring”, etc.

Again, this simile treads a fine line between epistemology and ontology; it assumes that what really exists must be what is really, ultimately, meant. But Bhartṛhari goes even further than Patañjali – he

\footnotetext[43]{\textit{anuviddhamiva jñānaṃ sarvam sabdena bhāsate} (1.115, ed. Subramania Iyer 1966, 188).\footnote{\textit{Dravyasamuddeśa} 4.}
1. Bhartṛhari on dravya: the real as delimited by the unreal

asserts that *only* the pure gold is expressed by the word “ring”. The different forms of the gold are only *upādhis*, limiting qualifications, and since they are not permanent, they cannot be what is expressed by a word. The pragmatic concession that Patañjali made in the *Mahābhāṣya* – that, according to the view that *dravya* is denoted by words, ākṛti is also secondarily denoted – is notably absent here. As Bhartṛhari says in the second verse of the *Dravyasamuddeśa*, “only the real is denoted by words, which have unreal *upādhis*.”

The crow on Devadatta’s house

To illustrate this, Bhartṛhari furnishes another example, also taken from the *Mahābhāṣya*. In a discussion on rule A 1.1.26 *ktaktavatūniṣṭhā*, a question arises as to the function of the anubandha *K* in the affixes *Kta* and *Ktavatu*, which are used to form past participles. Kātyāyana points out that, in verbal usage, these anubandhas are discarded — when *Kta* is applied to the verb *kṛ*, in the resulting participle, *kṛta*, the anubandha *K* is absent. If this is so, then how can one still recognize that the *ta* in *kṛta* marks a past participle? There are similar-looking words, such as *garta*, meaning “cave”, which are not past participles – without the anubandha, how can the *ta* in *kṛta* be distinguished from the *ta* in *garta*? Patañjali illustrates this problem with a scenario:

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tad yathā | katarad devadattasya gṛham | ado yatrāsau kāka iti | utpatite kāke naṣṭaṃ tad gṛhaṃ bhavati | evam ihāpi lupte ‘nubandhe naṣṭaḥ pratyayo bhavati
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For example: “Which one is Devadatta’s house?” “That one, where that crow is.” When the crow has flown away, his house has disappeared (i.e., can no longer be distinguished). In the same way, also in this case, when the anubandha is dropped, the affix disappears (i.e., can no longer be distinguished).

If someone were to describe Devadatta’s house as the house on which the crow is perched, and the crow flies away, it would be impossible to find the house; in the same way, since the *K* anubandha is dropped in verbal usage, there is no way to tell that the *ta* in *kṛta* marks a past participle.

But the anubandha is not the only thing which distinguishes the affix; the context in which it appears also gives clues to its function:

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46 *Dravyasamuddeśa* 2.
47 anubandho ‘nyatvakara iti cen na lopāt (ed. Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī and Šukla 1965–1967, 1, 74).
1. Bhartṛhari on dravya: the real as delimited by the unreal

kārakakālīvīśēvā upādeyau | bhūte yas taśādv- |
| itaratrāpi ya eṣa manusyaḥ prekṣāpūrvvakāri |
bhavati, so dhruvena nimittena dhruvam |
nimittam upādattē, vedikāṃ puṇḍarikaṃ va |

[Only] a particular capacity (kāraka) and a particular tense are admissible. The ta expresses the past tense and [one of three capacities –] active (kartr), passive (karman), or passive intransitive (bhāva). For example: in another circumstance as well, this man who acts with foresight perceives a permanent mark through an impermanent mark, [such as] a platform or a white lotus (puṇḍarīka).

That is to say, one knows that the word kṛta expresses the past tense as well as the passive voice; therefore, from that context, one can recognize the ta affix in kṛta as Kta. Those two pieces of contextual information are not impermanent, like the anubandha K. In the same way, although a man recognizes Devadatta’s house, for the first time, because he is told that a crow is perched on it, the next time he looks for the house he will not rely on the crow to recognize it – rather, he will look for a more permanent distinguishing mark, like an architectural feature. In later literature, the example of the crow becomes codified as a typical case of upalakṣaṇa, an inessential property of an object that is nevertheless used to distinguish it.

As he did with the gold simile, Bhartṛhari takes the example of Devadatta’s house and draws a different conclusion from it. First of all, for him, the crow on Devadatta’s house is akin to the different forms that gold can take; both are impermanent. Therefore, in the same way, the word “house” can only express the bare house, excluding any of its impermanent attributes, like the crow temporarily perched on it. Moreover, Bhartṛhari does not seem to distinguish between impermanent attributes, like the crow, and more permanent ones, like architectural features, as Patañjali does – in the Dīpikā, Bhartṛhari repeats the example of Devadatta’s house, except that, instead of a crow, the house is recognized by “things like a svastika.” For him, any attribute that is used to distinguish an object is unreal, because the object is really an undifferentiated whole.

Everything is everything

But if we follow this reasoning to its logical end, then we would argue that even the word “house” simply expresses an unreal attribute of an underlying, undifferentiated, non-dual reality, which Bh...
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rṛhari calls – borrowing from Sāṃkhya terminology – prakṛti parā, the absolute, primordial substance. All words denote this, and, consequently, it would seem that all words would ultimately become synonymous. That is plainly not the case; otherwise, language would be useless. Bhartrhari’s solution is to posit that, while the object itself that is denoted by a word is undifferentiated, the form through which that word operates restricts the perception of the object:

ākāraś ca vyavacchedat sārvārthyaṃ avarudhyate |
yathaiva ca kṣurādināṃ sāmarthyaṃ nāḍikādhibhīḥ ||

And the ability [of a word] to mean everything is restrained because [the object] is differentiated by [its] forms, in the very same way that the capability of the eyes, etc., [is restrained] by a hollow stalk, etc.

When one perceives an object through a hollow tube, the tube serves to artificially mark the boundaries of the object. But one’s perception is directed at the object itself, not at the tube. This simile could be understood on two different levels. On a pragmatic level, it points out that a word always restricts one’s perception of an object to a specific conception of it. A form through which a word operates, such as a “ring”, serves to artificially restrict the object, but ultimately the word denotes the object itself, and not its form. The fact that one can change the shape of the object, melting it down and re-forming it, shows that the word expresses something beyond a mere form. But on the level of absolute reality – if we take seriously Bhartrhari’s assertion that, when all forms have been destroyed, all that is left is the primordial substance – then this simile points out that each word is like a hollow tube, through which one perceives an undifferentiated, non-dual reality.

Beyond real and unreal

So far, this analysis is based on the presumption that whatever is permanent must be real, and that only the real is denoted by a word. As Bhartrhari says, whatever remains at the end, when all forms have been destroyed, that reality is not only expressed by language, but it is also identical to it. For a grammarian, this is as far as the analysis of reality can go, since it is bounded by language, by the concepts of real and unreal, permanent and impermanent. But can any object really be said to be permanent? In both the examples, of gold and of Devadatta’s house, the denoted object can be destroyed; as Bhartrhari says in the Dīpikā, even a dravya is subject to destruction. When he talks about the permanence of the object of denotation, with regards to the question of whether it is a jāti or dravya, he is referring to a practical notion of permanence, or vyavahāranityatā. That is, he is not

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54 vikārāpagaṃ satyāṃ tathāḥukh prakṛtiṃ parām (Dravyasamuddeśa 15cd).
55 Dravyasamuddeśa 5.
56 See Dravyasamuddeśa 11.
58 yeṣāmākṛtaḥ abhidheyā sā nityā | dravye ‘pi padārtte vyavahāranityatā (ed. Bronkhorst 1987, 18). “For those [words] in which the genus is denoted, it is [the genus] which is permanent. Even when the substance is the meaning of a word, that is practical permanence.” The yeṣām... sā correlation here is not clear; Bronkhorst translates this sentence as “According to those who [hold that] the form (ākṛti) is the meaning, that [form] is what is denoted; it is eternal” (1987, 77).
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concerned with permanence in the sense of the smallest, indestructible atom of matter — that is what he calls absolute, or paramārtha, permanence. Rather, he is concerned with the fact that a word will consistently perform the function of denotation, no matter the speaker. In the final analysis, even the word, the object, and their relation are conventions that depend on a presumption of duality that, according to Bhartṛhari, is not the absolute form of reality; beyond that, language fails:

nityaḥ prthividhātuḥ | prthividhātāu kim satyam | vikalpaḥ | vikalpe kim satyam | jñānam | jñāne kim satyam | om | atha tad brahma | tad etad uktam bhavati | ataḥ param śabdārthavahāre nivartate | vyavahārātīto 'yam artha iti

The element of earth is permanent. In the element of earth, what is real? Conception. In conception, what is real? Cognition. In cognition what is real? Om. That is brahman. [But] this is said — beyond that, the convention of word and object ceases to operate; that object is beyond the convention [of language].

If we follow the framework that Patañjali establishes in the Mahābhāṣya — that is, using permanence as the criterion to determine the object of denotation — to its logical conclusion, then there is a point at which language breaks down. If we presume reality to be ultimately non-dual, then this point is where the categories that make language possible — real and unreal, permanent and impermanent — cease to apply, because they are subsumed into a non-dual whole. For Bhartṛhari, the highest reality that one can still name is brahman. This is what is ultimately expressed by words; this is what words ultimately are. But the non-dual reality of brahman — or perhaps, even, the non-dual reality that lies beyond the verbal concept brahman — cannot be accessed by words. It can only be hinted at by mutually contradictory statements, such as “it does not exist nor does it not exist”, etc.

This tension is deeply felt in the Dravyasamuddeśa. On the one hand, Bhartṛhari is concerned with what is permanent (nitya), real (satya), and essential (tattva) in the system of language. On the other hand, he also wants to make the point that there is no difference between real and unreal; even those distinctions are just linguistic conventions. This point, which seems to be a fundamental tenet in his philosophy, also has practical implications: it is what allows elements that he considers unreal, such as forms, to participate in the process of denotation. As Helārāja explains it, a form itself has no independent nature; it is entirely dependent on the object that it qualifies. In that sense, it is not

50As mentioned above, Helārāja, on the other hand, interprets dravya in the Dravyasamuddeśa in a paramārtha sense.
51nityātā cāpi dvividhā | vyavahārārṣaya paramārthārṣaya ca | paramārthārṣaya ca vaśeśikādaśaṃ paramānāvāḥ ākāśādi ca | vyavahārārṣaya nāgaritivājāmustakāvāhyā syād āmāpācana iti na ca karakavacanād esām āmāpācana-tvam | kim tarhi | svabhāvāt | evam iti pāṇiniṁāyena vā śabdāḥ [smṛtā] eva svato 'ṛthapatyāyākā iti vyavahāra-nityatavepokāriṇī | (ed. Bronkhorst, 1987, 17). “And there are two kinds of permanence: in the practical sense and in the absolute sense. According to the Vaśeśikās, atoms and space, etc., are [permanent] in the absolute sense. [The statement,] ‘a concoction of nāgara, ativiṣa, and musta herbs assist in digestion’ is [permanent] in the practical sense, since it is not only because of Caraka’s words that [those herbs] are able to assist in digestion. Then how? Because of the nature [of the herbs]. Also here, in the same way, words taught by Pāṇini or by someone else convey their meaning on their own; thus in this case, only permanence in the worldly sense is useful.” The quotation is from the Cikitsāsthāna of the Carakasaṃhitā (15.98, ed. Āchārya, 1941, 529).
53As Helārāja says, even brahman is a word which relies on upādhi to be expressive (Prakṛṇapraṇāśa ad Dravyasamuddeśa 16).
54See Dravyasamuddeśa 12-13.
real. But if we simply understand it as a qualification of a real object, then the form too could be considered "real" – not in and of itself, but as a way of framing reality\textsuperscript{3}.

\textsuperscript{3}\textit{tatracavicchinnānvayovi ca 'vadhāryata iti vicchinnapraśāh satyo vidyaiva} (\textit{Prakīrṇaprakāśa} ad Dravyasamuddeśa 7). “And in that case, if ‘interruption’ is understood as the persistence [of reality] being interrupted, then [even that] real, [albeit] interrupted manifestation is really knowledge.”
2. Helārāja on *dravya*: an all-encompassing doctrine

At the beginning of the *Dravyasamuddeśa*, Bhartṛhari presents a list of five synonyms of the word *dravya*. Whatever his own intention was, Helārāja interprets each of the words to refer to a specific school of thought: Ātmādvaita, Buddhism, Sattādvaita, Sāṃkhya, and Cārvāka, respectively. The two kinds of Advaita are presented as siddhāntas: Ātmādvaita is associated with the *Dravyasamuddeśa* and with the view that the object of a word is a substance, while Sattādvaita is associated with the *Jātisamuddeśa* and with the view that the object of a word is the summum genus, Being. Buddhists, Sāṃkhyas, and Cārvākas are presented as philosophical opponents. As Johannes Bronkhorst notes, Advaita was “conspicuously absent in listings of philosophical schools during Bhartṛhari’s time,” and yet here, in Helārāja’s 10th-century commentary, it is mentioned twice. His does not correspond to any common list of philosophical schools; some words, like *tattva*, naturally lend themselves to be associated with a certain school, but in general, the choices Helārāja makes are very idiosyncratic, and give us a sense of which philosophical opponents he was most concerned with. Moreover, unlike many other doxographies, Helārāja is not so much concerned with refuting rival doctrines as with showing that all of them can be subsumed by the kind of non-dual philosophy that Bhartṛhari proposes.

2.1. On the Cārvākas

Very little is known of the Cārvākas – also known as the Bārhaspatyas or the Lokāyatas –, the materialist school of thought that has served as the butt of criticism from almost every other school, and

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12001, 484.
much of what can be known of the Cārvākas is gleaned from the texts of these other traditions. In fact, the two aphorisms that are quoted by Helārāja, \textit{prthivy apas tejo vāyur iti tattvāni} and \textit{tatsamudāye śarīrendriyaviṣayasaṃjñā iti}, appear in over a dozen other texts, including doxographies like the \textit{Sarvadarśanasamgraha}.\footnote{Prakīrṇaprakāśa ad Dravyasamuddeśa 1.} They have been attributed to the original source text of the Cārvāka school, now lost, which scholars have named the \textit{Bārhaspatyasūtras} or the \textit{Cārvākasūtras}.\footnote{Vaiśeṣikasūtra 1.1.4, ed. Jambūvijayajī 1961, 2.} Since these two aphorisms are so commonly quoted, they do not say much about what Helārāja knew of the Cārvākas, nor of what he thought of them. In fact, his explanation of why they can also be considered non-dual philosophers – that with respect to pāramārthika dravya, even they agree that reality is non-dual – is half-hearted at best:

\begin{quote}
\text{tattvam iti caturbhūtatattvavādibhiś cārvākair}
\text{dravyam ucyate | prthivy āpas tejo vāyur iti ta-
ttvāni | tatsamudāye śarīrendriyaviṣayasaṃjñā}
\text{iti vacanāt | tad evam etaiḥ paramārthathā ekam}
\text{eva vastūcye}  
\end{quote}

The Cārvākas, proponents of the four elements, call the concrete entity \textit{tattva}, because it is said that “earth, water, fire, and air are the elements (tattva), [and] in the combination of those is what are termed the body, the senses, and the object”. In this way, they say that, with respect to the absolute, [tattva] is really a unitary reality.

This explanation is quite terse, but its equivalence of \textit{tattva} with \textit{dravya} perhaps relies on an unspoken parallel with a passage in the \textit{Vaiśeṣikasūtra} that enumerates the \textit{dravyas}: \textit{prthivy āpas tejo vāyur ākāśam kālo dig ātmā mana iti dravyāni}.\footnote{Vaiśeṣikasūtra 1.1.4, ed. Jambūvijayajī 1961, 2.} It also refers to the stereotype of the Cārvākas as radical reductivists and materialists – they completely deny the possibility of a soul that is separate from the physical body; that is, a soul that is distinct from physical phenomena. Therefore, as Helārāja’s reasoning goes, the Cārvākas also believe that the body and the soul belong to the same non-dual reality.

There is a single extant text that purports to follow the Cārvāka school: the 8th-century \textit{Tattvopaplavasiṃha} of Jayarāśi. There is some debate over whether Jayarāśi truly represents the Cārvākas; he certainly considered himself one, quoting the Cārvāka aphorisms with reverence and stating that they agree with his own position;\footnote{Franco 1987, 4.} in fact, the two aphorisms that Helārāja cites appear at the beginning of the \textit{Tattvopaplavasiṃha}.\footnote{Franco 1987, 68.} However, it is clear that Jayarāśi goes much further in his criticisms of the \textit{pramāṇas} than the doctrine generally ascribed to the Cārvākas, who, although rejecting the validity of \textit{anumāna}, seem to accept at least \textit{pratyakṣa} as a valid means of cognition; Jayarāśi rejects even that, transforming materialism into pure skepticism.\footnote{Franco 1983, 148. Franco notes that there seemed to be two schools of Cārvākas: one that granted inference a limited validity, and one that denied both perception and inference.}
Much of the criticism of the Cārvākas was directed at their supposed rejection of the validity of \textit{anumāna}. For this, some philosophers denigrated them as inferior to animals, since even animals use inference.\textsuperscript{9} However, as Ramkrishna Bhattacharya points out, whenever the pūrvapakṣa of the Cārvākas is presented, philosophers invariably quote from the \textit{Vākyapadiya}, without disclosing the source of the quote: Sāntarakṣita, Vādideva Sūri, Bhṛṭṭa Jayanta, and Vācaspati Miśra all quote verse 32 of the \textit{brahmakāṇḍa},\textsuperscript{11} while Śīlāṅka quotes verse 42,\textsuperscript{12} which is similarly critical of the reliability of \textit{anumāna}. It is a distinct possibility that the real target of their criticisms is actually Bhartṛhari, since many of these thinkers were opposed to Śabdādvaita and other aspects of his philosophy; as Bhattacharya notes, Jānasrībhadrā "brackets the Bārhaspatya and Bhartṛhari, urging both to accept the validity of inference."\textsuperscript{13} Another possibility is that they were simply not familiar with Cārvāka texts at all, and they picked a well-known verse from Bhartṛhari to stand in for the Cārvākas. Helārāja may have been aware of this practice, although nothing in his short note on the Cārvākas seems to suggest it. It is more likely that he, like other philosophers of his time, considered the Cārvākas as the most extreme example of a skeptical philosophy, and that by reconciling the Cārvākas’ materialism with his Advaitin metaphysics, he could claim to have disarmed even the most ardent of critics.

\section{Ātmādvaita}

As Helārāja says at the beginning of his commentary on the first verse of the \textit{Dravyasamuddeśa}, it is from the point of view of what he calls Ātmādvaita that he will be interpreting the rest of the chapter. Compared to the \textit{Jātisamuddeśa}, this chapter is much shorter, at only eighteen kārikās long. However, both the \textit{Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa} and the \textit{Guṇasamuddeśa} can be considered part of the exposition on \textit{dravya}. But still, as Houben notes, there is an important “structural difference” between the \textit{Jāti} and \textit{Dravyasamuddeśas}: while in the \textit{Jātisamuddeśa}, a number of different views on \textit{jāti} are given, the

\textsuperscript{9}Bhattacharya 2011, 118.
\textsuperscript{10}Bhattacharya 2011, 117.
\textsuperscript{11}avasthādeśakālānāṃ bhedād bhinnāsū sāktiṣu | bhāvānām anumānena prasisddhir atidurlabhā (ed. Subramania Iyer 1966, 88). “Due to differences in circumstance, place, and time, it is very difficult to prove, through inference, [the nature of] things in their different capacities.” Although, in the \textit{Tattvasamgraha}, Sāntarakṣita does not attribute this verse to Bhartṛhari, Kamalaśīla introduces the verse with \textit{tathā bhartṛharir āha} in his commentary (ed. Krishnamacharya 1921, 426). Vādideva Sūri embeds this verse in a discussion of the Cārvāka position that \textit{pratyakṣa} is the only valid \textit{pramāṇa} (\textit{Syādvādaratnākara ad Pramāṇanayattattvāvālokaśākāra} 2.1, ed. Osval 1988, 262). In Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s play \textit{Āgamaḍambara}, the Cārvāka character Vṛddhāmbhi utters this verse, along with 34 and 42, as part of his refutation of \textit{īśvara} (ed. Dezső 2002, 156-158). Vācaspati Miśra quotes this verse in the \textit{Bhāmatī}, in the context of \textit{Brahmasūtra} 3.3.53, which, according to Śaṅkara, presents the Cārvāka refutation of the \textit{ātman} as something separate from the physical body; knowledge of the \textit{ātman} relies on \textit{anumāna}, which is unreliable – \textit{na cāpratyaksam ātmataśtvam anumānādibhibhi śakyaṃ unnetum} (ed. Śaṅkara and Śaṅkara 1975, 851).
\textsuperscript{12}hasastpasārād ivāndhena viśāne pathi dhāvata | anumānapradhānena vininpō na durlabhah (ed. Subramania Iyer 1966, 98). “Just like a blind man, running on an uneven path with hands held out, it is difficult not to fall relying chiefly on inference.” Śīlāṅka quotes this passage in his commentary on the \textit{Śūtrakāṇḍa}, again in a presentation of the Cārvāka position that there is \textit{no ātman} that is separate from the four elements – \textit{na prthivīdīvyatirikta ātmaśti} (ed. Mahārāja and Jambūvijayajī 1978, 10).
\textsuperscript{13}Bhattacharya 2011, 115 note.
focus here is on presenting an Advaitin view, in which “all words express a single entity.” Moreover, although Helārāja interprets ātman, vastu, svabhāva, śārīra, and tattva according to different schools of thought, they are all ultimately made to agree with Advaitin ontology. Since all words express dravya, so the different words used by different schools of thought to express their own notion of fundamental reality all ultimately express dravya.

The term ātmādvaita is used by Advaitins themselves to denote a siddhānta; Vimuktātman uses it in contrast to Bhartṛhari’s śabdādvaita, which he rejects, following in the Śaṅkarite tradition. For him, words like ātman characterize brahman; on the other hand, a word like śabda is as banal as the word “pot”. For him, a term like śabdādvaita is as nonsensical as ghāṭādvaita, “pot non-dualism”. Helārāja, similarly, puts words into two classes – words like ātman, and words like “pot” –, but for him, they only differ in degree. All words ultimately refer to brahman; it is simply that the word ātman is closer to referring to its absolute nature.

For Helārāja, ātmādvaita is not just a general term for a non-dual philosophy centered on the ātman. His use of the word is much more idiosyncratic. In his commentary on the Dravyasamuddeśa, he leverages the polysemy of the word ātman in order to make the connection between dravya and brahman. As he says, the word ātman denotes brahman; this is well-established. But he points out that the word ātman can also be used in the sense of a substance, by referring to a passage in the Mahābhāṣya:

kathaṃ punar jñāyate bhedakā guṇā iti | evaṃ hi drṣṭya leke | eko 'yam ātmodakāṁ nāma 
| tasya guṇabhedād anyatvaṃ bhavati | anyad i-
| daṇḍa śitam anyad idam uṣṇam iti

Now how is it known that qualities are differentiators? It is thus seen in the world: “This single entity (ātman) is water; because of its different qualities, it becomes different – this is cool [water], this is warm [water].”

Helārāja leverages this passage in two ways. First of all, it provides a canonical precedence for the use of the word ātman in the sense of a dravya; this example of an ātman, water, being differentiated by its qualities (guṇa), brings to mind both Patañjali’s own definition of dravya as guṇasaṃdrāva as well as Bhartṛhari’s definition in the Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa of dravya as something which is differentiated. Secondly, he also wants to show that the word ātman, besides denoting an absolute reality, can also be used to refer to conventional, everyday things, such as water. This tendency – to relate

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14Houben 1995, 96.
15tasmāt ātmādvaitaḥ brahmātmanor laksyatvam yuktam, na tu śabdaśabdena... tasmāt ātmādvaitam eva sidhyati, na śabdaśabdena ghaṭādvaitam vetti Siddham (Iṣtasiddhi, ed. Hiriyanna 1933, 175-176.)
16‘ghaṭādvaitaḥpekeśaya tv ātmādvaitaḥ pratyāsannāḥ (Prakīrṇapraṇāsa ad Dravyasamuddeśa 16). “However, words like ātman are closer [to brahman], compared to words like ‘pot’.
17‘tad evam ātmaśabḍaḥbhidheyaḥ brahmaṇaḥpadārthaparamārtharūpatvād... (Prakīrṇa-prakāśa ad Dravyasamuddeśa 16). “In that way, because brahman, which is denoted by the word ātman, is the absolute form of [all] things [expressed by] words...”
19‘satya pita tadabhdhiḥyitvē vakṣyamānānätmaśabḍāpaṃ eva sarvatva ghaṭādv ayuḥatapasaratvam (Prakīrṇa-prakāśa ad Dravyasamuddeśa 1). “Even though words like ātman denote [the absolute], it will be shown later that their scope is not obstructed at all when it is applied to [things like] pots, etc.”

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absolute reality to the conventionally experienced world – runs throughout his commentary on the Dravyasamuddeśa.

2.3. Sattādvaita: a brief history

The two schools of Advaita Vedānta

Traditionally, scholars divide early Advaita into the schools of Śaṅkara and Maṇḍana Miśra. Śaṅkara's doctrine is sometimes called ātmādvaita, while Maṇḍana is said to espouse bhāvādvaita or sattādvaita.\(^{20}\) But this characterization is problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, as Paul Hacker notes, Śaṅkara and Maṇḍana are not, in fact, very different doctrinally; rather, he attributes their rivalry to "sociological differences" – conjecturing that Śaṅkara came from a Vaiṣṇava background, while Maṇḍana came from a Śaiva background.\(^{21}\) But regardless of sectarian affiliation, the rivalry between the two later became a doctrinal one as it was amplified by Śaṅkara's followers, such as Sureśvara. Therefore, to understand what the terms ātmādvaita, bhāvādvaita and sattādvaita really refer to, we must consider them in the context of the doctrinal debates of later philosophers, rather than Śaṅkara and Maṇḍana themselves; indeed, neither of them refers to his own philosophy in those terms, and it is only in the works of their followers, commentators, and detractors that they are used. Helārāja, when he uses the terms ātmādvaita and sattādvaita, does not seem to be alluding to this rivalry between Śaṅkara and Maṇḍana, but rather to the dichotomy between the Dravyasamuddeśa and the Jātisamuddeśa.

Secondly, despite its seeming semantic equivalence, sattādvaita is not a synonym of bhāvādvaita, although many scholars have taken this for granted.\(^{22}\) In fact, the two words differ both in what they denote and also in the dialectical context in which they are employed. The term bhāvādvaita seems generally to be used by opponents to describe a pūrvapakṣa; specifically, it is used in the Nyāyāmṛta of Vyāsatīrtha – a 16th century Dvaita Vedānta tract – to refer to a certain Advaitin doctrine which allows for the reality of both existent (bhāva) and non-existent (abhāva) entities, while not contradicting the ultimate non-duality of brahman.\(^{23}\) The term is then echoed in the long line of Dvaita and Advaita commentaries that follow, and the doctrine is eventually attributed to Maṇḍana.\(^{24}\) In this theory, brahman is the only ultimately real existent entity, but prapañcābhāva – the non-existence of the phenomenal world – and avidyādvaṃsa – the cessation of ignorance – are also ultimately real, albeit as negative realities.\(^{25}\) However, as S. S. Suryanarayana Shastri shows, this theory does not have


\(^{21}\)Halbfass and Hacker 1995, 39.

\(^{22}\)See note 20 above.


\(^{24}\)“yaś api mithyātvaghaṭako ‘bhāvo yadi na tattvikāḥ, tadā śiddhasādanādī | atha yadi tattvikāḥ, maṇḍanaṃate bhāvādvaitasvādikrān nādevaitānānūr iti... (Gurucandrikā, ed. Srinivasachar and Venkatanarasimha Sastry 1933, 190).

\(^{25}\)Hiriyanna 1923, 260-261; Kuppuswami Sastri 1937, xlii.
2. Helārāja on drvya: an all-encompassing doctrine

anything to do with Maṇḍana – nowhere in the Brahmamsiddhi does Maṇḍana describe prapañcābhāva or any other negative entity as ultimately real, rather, he merely points out that for “one and the same entity there is verbal usage both as existent and non-existent (i.e., positive and negative), e.g., ‘when the pot is destroyed, the potsherds are originated” The term bhāvādvaita, then, does not refer so much to a school of Advaita Vedānta than to a stereotype that is useful for dialectical purposes. It does not even refer to a system of thought but merely to a single doctrinal issue, used as a way to contrast Maṇḍana with Śaṅkara, who, by that time, had become representative of orthodox Advaita Vedānta.

While bhāvādvaita appears in Vedantic philosophical tracts from the 16th century onward, sattādvaita appears in much earlier texts, such as Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s 9th century Nyāyamārījari, and it is used to contrast Advaitins with Buddhists. Moreover, as scholars such as Hacker have pointed out, at least until the 10th or 12th century, it was Maṇḍana and not Śaṅkara who was held as the main proponent of Advaita Vedānta and, accordingly, it was Maṇḍana who played the part of the Advaitin pūrvapakṣin for Mīmāṃsakas, Naiyāyikas, and even Jaina logicians. Moreover, as a pūrvapakṣa, the debate in which sattādvaita is brought up – on whether sattā can be considered the summum genus – is present already in Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika, and his opponent there seems to be Bhartṛhari.

Bhartṛhari and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa: philosophical framings

satyāsatyau tu yau bhāgau pratibhāvaṃ vyavasthitau
satyaṃ yat tatra sā jātir asatyā vyaktyaḥ
saṃbandhibhedāt sattaiva bhidyamānā gavādiṣu
jātir ity ucayate tasyāṃ sarve śabdā vyavasthitāḥ
tāṃ prātipadikārthāṃ ca dhātvarthaḥ ca praicaoṣate
sā nityā sā mahān ātmā tām āhus tvatalādayāḥ
prāptakramā viśeṣeṣu kriyā saivābhidhīyate
kramarūpasya saṃhāre tat sattvam iti kaṭhyate

Of the real and unreal parts residing in each thing, that which is real is the universal, and it is taught that the particulars are unreal. It is sattā, differentiated according to [its own] correlates, which is called the universal in cows, etc.; all words are based on it. They declare it to be the meaning of the nominal base and the meaning of the verbal base; it is permanent, it is the great ātman, and the tvā and taL affixes, etc. express it. When it assumes sequence among particulars, it is called action. When its sequential forms have been reabsorbed, it is declared to be a substance.

26Suryanarayana Shastri1936, 64, a rendering of ekasyāpi vastuno bhāvābhāvarūpeṇa vyapadesāt, yathā – ‘yadā ghato nasīyati taddā kapūrāṇī jávante iti (Brahmasiddhi, ed. Kuppuswami Sastrī1937, 122).
29Helārāja glosses sattvam here as drvya (Prakāśa ad Jātisamuddeśa35, ed. Subramania Iyer1963, 43).
In these verses from the *Jātisamuddeśa*, Bhartṛhari seems to employ the Vaiśeṣika system of a hierarchy of universals, with *sattā* as the highest universal in order to argue that all words ultimately refer to *sattā*. For the Vaiśeṣikas, *sattā* is all-pervasive and inheres in everything, including substances (*dravya*), qualities (*guṇa*), and actions (*karma*). Logically then, as Bhartṛhari argues, no matter whether it is a noun – denoting a substance – or a verb – denoting an action –, every word ultimately expresses *sattā*. And by equating *sattā* with ātman, he neatly reinforces the Advaitin point of view that runs throughout the *Vākyapadiya*; in this way, Bhartṛhari seems to have laid the foundation for what becomes known as Sattādvaita.

Kumārila refutes Bhartṛhari’s notion of *sattā* in three different aspects: *sattā* as the referent of a word, *sattā* as a summum genus, and *sattā* as the object of perception. Although the first two of these is discussed by Bhartṛhari, the last one seems to make its earliest appearance in Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika.

**Against *sattā* as the referent of a word**

In the *Tantravārttika*, Kumārila’s criticisms are directed at a verse in the second kāṇḍa of the *Vākyapadiya*, which begins with *astyarthāḥ sarvaśabdānām*. As Toshiya Unebe points out, there seems to have been a tradition of interpreting *astyarthāḥ* in the verse as a compound, with the *asti* glossed as *sattā* by the Jaina philosopher Mallavādin; in that case, it would echo the verses from the *Jātisamuddeśa*, stating that the referent of all words is *sattā*. Although Kumārila glosses *asti* with *vastu* rather than *sattā*, his criticism of this verse is nevertheless directed at the notion of *sattā* as a summum genus. For him, it makes no sense to postulate a summum genus that subsumes all other categories as the referent of all words; in the most naïve interpretation of this theory, it would be impossible to express anything specific, since all words would simply denote *being*. If, on the other hand, words denote the universal *sattā* as differentiated by, as Bhartṛhari puts it, “its own correlates” (*saṃbandhin*), then the question arises as to what these correlates are. As Kumārila argues, if these correlates are the lower universals, then the denotation would be circular, since the lower universal itself already denotes *sattā*; that is, since *gotva* itself already denotes *goḥ sattā*, then it makes no sense to say that *go* really denotes *sattā* as qualified by *gotva*. And even if, rather than the universal *gotva*, *go* denotes

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30 *sāmānyaṃ dvividham param aparām cāṃnuṛtpratayakāraṇam | tatra parama sattā mahāvīṣayatvāt sā cānuṛtṛta eva hetuṇvāt sāmānya eva | dravyatvādy aprām aprāpaviṣayatvāt* (Padārthadharmasaṃgraha, ed. Dvivedin, 111). Bhartṛhari also uses the terms *sattā* and *dravyatva* in the specifically Vaiśeṣika sense of higher and lower universal in *Sambandasamuddeśa* 14 (see Houben, 1995, 491-498). It must be noted, however, that Bhartṛhari is chronologically earlier than Praśastapāda. Johannes Bronkhorst believes that the *Vākyapadiya* “may shed light on the early history of Vaiśeṣika” (1994, 75).


32 *Vākyapadiya* 2.119, ed. Subramania Iyer, 58.

33 2009, 416-419.

34 According to Helarāja, the possible correlates of *sattā* are listed in verse 40, but the list is vague, including, for example, *āśraya* (substratum) and *vyatirekinaḥ* (things different from *sattā*) (*Jātisamuddeśa* 40, ed. Subramania Iyer, 46).
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sattā as qualified by the particular, individual cow, the same argument applies.

Against sattā as the summum genus

In the Ākṛtivāda of the Ślokavārttika, Kumārila again addresses this problem, further strengthening his argument. According to the commentator Bhāṭṭaputra Jayamīśra, Kumārila’s criticism is aimed at a sattādvaitavādin:

atra kaścit sattādvaitavādy āha – On this point, a certain proponent of Sattā-dvaita has said:

sattvagotvādisāmānyaṃ parasparavilākṣaṇam | Universals like existing and cow-ness are different from one another,

varṇadrutādivanmithyā pratībhāty eva kintv | But this [difference] is really only an erroneous appearance, like in the fast, [medium, or slow pronunciation] of a phoneme.

idam || iti

Although this quote has not been traced, the ideas presented in it are strongly reminiscent of Bhaṛṛhari. According to this opponent, the difference between universals is similar to the difference between pronouncing a phoneme quickly or slowly in both cases, there is no difference in what is denoted. All universals really denote sattā, and the differences between them are merely a result of how sattā is manifested; in the same way, a phoneme denotes the same phoneme no matter if it is spoken quickly or slowly. According to this theory, difference lies at the level of the vyañjaka, the manifestor, and not the universal that is manifested. Kumārila, however, insists that the universals themselves – cow-ness and horse-ness – are by nature different from one another, and that the difference between them does not depend on their manifestors. His reasoning is similar to the line of argumentation he used in the Tantravārttika: if the difference between universals is really due to their manifestors being different, then how would you account for the difference between the manifestors themselves? If you argue that the difference between the manifestors is natural, then the same could be said of the universals.

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36 Sarkarika ad Ślokavārttika Ākṛtivāda 48, ed. Kunhan Raja 1945, 15. This quote does not appear in Sucarita Miśra’s commentary on this verse (Adyar Library MS TR 66, 2587-2588). I am greatly indebted to Kei Kataoka for sharing facsimiles of this manuscript.
37 druta is listed as one of the defects of speech in the Paspaśāhnika (ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 13; see Joshi and Roodbergen 1984, 199). It is regarded simply as a mode of recitation (vyrtti or prayoga) in the Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya (13.19, ed. Deva Shastri 1931, 397) along with madhyama and vilambita. See also Vyasasiśa 475 (ed. Paṭṭābhirāma Sāstrī 1970, 177).
38 It is important to note that the opponent uses the term druta rather than hrasva; hrasva, dirgha, and pluta do create a semantic difference, i.e., a short a versus a long ṝ, while the speed of recitation, whether druta, madhyama, or vilambita, does not. Kumārila notes this difference in Sphoṭavāda 56-57 (ed. Dvārikādāsa Sāstrī 1978, 455).
Against sattā as the object of perception

Perhaps Kumārila's most influential critique of Sattādvaita occurs in the Pratyakṣapariccheda of the Ślokavārttika. In this section, one of the principal debates is centered on the object of perception. For the Buddhists, perception produces a non-conceptualized cognition of an individual, and this thesis functions as the main pūrvapakṣa. However, before launching into a detailed refutation of the Buddhists, Kumārila briefly presents two other pūrvapakṣas that seem to represent polar opposites to the Buddhist view: the first, that even perception always produces a conceptualized cognition (savikalpa pratyaya), and the second, that the object of perception, although non-conceptualized, is not an individual but a universal, namely, the summum genus. The first of these non-Buddhist pūrvapakṣas has been attributed by commentators to Bhartṛhari. As Sucarita Miśra explains it, since, for a śabdādvaitin, all cognition is infused with language, it is necessarily already conceptualized.

But it is said by others that [the object of a non-conceptualized cognition] is the summum genus, called “substance” and “the existing”, and thus, the object of perception has the universal as its basis.

Distinctions, on the other hand, are cognized by conceptualized cognitions.

Although this pūrvapakṣa has not been attributed explicitly to Bhartṛhari by commentators, the influence of the Vākyapadiya can be seen in it. Both Bhaṭṭa Umbeka and Pārthasārathi Miśra have replaced sat with sattā in their commentaries. Umbeka, in glossing this passage, says that some call the summum genus, which is the object of a non-conceptualized cognition, sattā, and others call it dravya. Pārthasārathi, similarly, says that vedāntins refer to it using the words sattā and dravya. This mirrors the division of the Jātisamuddeśa and Dravyasamuddeśa in Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadiya: in the Jātisamuddeśa, the object of words is said to be the universal, which, ultimately, is sattā, while in the Dravyasamuddeśa, the object of words is said to be dravya, although both sattā and dravya are, according to Helārāja, synonymous with brahman.
Kumārila, naturally, rejects both śabdādvaitin and sattādvaitin positions. In response to the first position, Kumārila states that cognition without language is apparently possible, giving the example of infants (bāla) and mute persons (mūka). In response to the sattādvaitin, Kumārila states that, in fact, distinctions really are cognized at the level of perception; it would be absurd to assert that one does not perceive the difference between a horse and a cow, even if those differences are not immediately conceptualized. This objection seems to hearken back to the arguments against sattā as a summum genus in the Tantravārttika and the Ākṛtivāda; for Kumārila, difference is natural and not an illusion produced by a manifesting agency which is superimposed on an ultimately non-dual reality. However, here in the Pratyakṣapariccheda, the debate is not centered on the referent of words nor the existence of higher and lower universals, but rather on the object of perception. While it is clear that Bhartṛhari considers sattā to be the ultimate referent of all words and that he considers it to be the summum genus in a hierarchy of universals, as John Taber notes, there is no indication in the Vākyapadiya that he understands sattā as the content of a non-conceptualized cognition by means of the faculty of perception. However, it is not unprecedented for Kumārila to take ideas from the Vākyapadiya and transform them slightly so that they form an ideal pūrvapakṣa; in his presentation of Śabdādvaita, which is clearly taken from Bhartṛhari, he similarly extrapolates the notion that all cognition is bound up with language and renders it into an argument claiming that even the content of perception is necessarily a conceptualized cognition. In the Pratyakṣapariccheda, both the Śabdādvaita and Sattādvaita aspects of Bhartṛhari’s thought have been transformed in order to function as opposing viewpoints to the Buddhist notion of non-conceptualized perception, and this particular framing of Bhartṛhari’s ideas endures for centuries to come.

Maṇḍana Miśra: in defense of sattā

As noted earlier, Maṇḍana Miśra is generally considered by scholars to be the main proponent of Sattādvaita, although he never uses the term himself. Certainly, in the Brahmasiddhi, brahman is characterized as the universal sattā, and both his imagery and language seem to owe much to Bhartṛhari. However, the arguments that he uses to defend Sattādvaita clearly show the influence of Kumārila’s critiques:

\[
\text{saṁhṛtākhilabhedo 'tāḥ sāmānyātmā} \quad \text{Because difference is completely withdrawn, it is described as a universal,}
\]
\[
\text{sa-varṇitaḥ} \quad \text{like gold is revealed by the withdrawal of different [forms], such as a bracelet.}
\]

\[\text{hemeva pārihāryādibhedasaṁhārasūcī-tam} \quad \text{[Slokavārttika Pratyakṣasūtra 112, ed. Śāmbaśiva Śāstrī 1926, 248]. On the other hand, as John Taber notes, Bhartṛhari considers even infants to have “an awareness of words based on past impressions, that is, impressions from previous lives” (2005, 203-204). See Vākyapadiya 1.113, ed. Subramania Iyer 1966, 186.}\]
\[\text{Taber 2005c, 95.}\]
\[\text{Taber 2005c, 206.}\]
\[\text{The masculine gender of the pronoun here suggests that it may be referring to ātman, or possibly to Prajāpati from the first verse. However, in the gloss of the verse, it is clearly brahman which is meant.}\]
yataś ca viśeṣapratyastamukhena tannirūpa-ṇaṁ, ato 'nyair brahma nirūpitaṁ — 'sa eva mahān aja ātmā sattālakṣaṇaḥ' tathā 'sattaiva sarva-bhedayoniḥ prakṛtiḥ pari' iti | yathā suvarṇat-tvaṁ kaṭakāṅguliyādiśeṣopasaṃhāreṇa ni-rūpyamānaṁ tat sāmānyam iti |

And since it is indicated by means of the cessation of particulars [as said in the previous verse], brahman is described as a universal by others well-versed in the Vedas – for example, “It is that which is the great, unborn ātman, characterized as sattā”, and “Only sattā is the origin of all difference, the absolute primordial substance.” In the same way, the reality of gold, indicated by the withdrawal of [its] particular [forms] such as a bracelet or a ring, is a universal.

ye vā – ‘nirvišeṣaṁ na sāmānyaṁ bhave cha-śaviśeṣavat ity abhāvam āhuḥ, tān praty u-cyate — śaṃbhūtakāhilabheda iti | yadi távad a-sāmānyatvaṁ sādhyaḥ siddhasādhanaṁ | višeṣaṁ abhāve keṣaṁ tat sāmānyam? sāmā-nyamāṁ tūktaṁ brahmavādibhir višeṣapratyastamukhena nirūpaṇād upacārataḥ | athābhāva eva sādhyaḥ, višeṣair evāsyā nirviṣeṣaṁ vyabhicāra iti |
ātmā sattālakṣaṇaḥ, seems to be from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, the Upaniṣadic version omits sattālakṣaṇaḥ; Thrasher traces this to the *Vṛtti* on *Vākyapadīya* 1.145, where mahān ātmā is qualified by sattālakṣaṇa. It could equally be an influence from verse 34 of the *Īṭīsatamuddeśa*, where sattā is described as mahān ātmā.

The opponent who argues that “a universal without particulars cannot exist” is, in fact, Kumārila, and the quote is from the *Ākṛtivāda*. It seems that either Maṇḍana was not entirely comfortable with the characterization of brahman as the summum genus or that Kumārila's argument was unsailable; in response, Maṇḍana concedes that the characterization of brahman as a universal is only figurative. But his main concern is not to precisely define sattā, but to prove that sattā – that is, brahman – is the object of perception. For Kumārila, Sattādvaita was only ever a briefly-mentioned pūrvapakṣa that was used to illustrate what he considered to be an extreme view; in the *Brahmasiddhi*, Maṇḍana develops it into a long and detailed siddhānta refuting the Buddhist theory of perception. In Maṇḍana's hands, the terms of the debate shift again – while Kumārila frames his arguments around the question of whether the object of perception is an individual or a universal, Maṇḍana asks whether perception can be a pramāṇa for brahman. As the Buddhist opponent argues, since perception cognizes different individual things, it cannot be a pramāṇa for brahman, which is undifferentiated by definition; therefore, it would seem that perception is contradictory to scripture, which declares the non-duality of reality. The main opponent here is Dignāga, who famously argues that the object of perception is a unique individual (svalaksana) and that its cognition is non-conceptualized. Maṇḍana agrees that the object of perception is non-conceptualized, but he asserts that the content of its cognition is existence and not difference – “the operation of perception cannot be solely differentiation, nor both [asserting existence and difference] simultaneously, nor differentiating before asserting [existence], since only an already established thing can be negated with respect to an established scope – in the sentences, ‘it is not here, this is not that’, an established pot [is negated] with respect to the established ground, or a horse [is negated] with respect to an [established] cow. Negation is not possible without [first positing] both what is to be negated and the scope of the negation.” In this way, Maṇḍana argues that perception cannot possibly cognize differentiation, and that, first and foremost, it establishes existence. However, ultimately, he believes that perception is tainted by nescience (avidyā) and imperfect.

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54 Thrasher, on the other hand, interprets this to mean that Maṇḍana is “not much troubled” by Kumārila's argument, and that he “does not admit the opponent's definition of 'universal'” (1993, 85).


56 na tāvat vyavachchedamatramaḥ pratayakṣavyāpāraṁ, na yugapad ubhayam, na vyavachchedapūrvarakaṁ vidhānām; yataḥ siddhe viṣaye siddhārpaṁ eva nīṣdhāyate – nedaṁ iha, nāyaṁ atyam iti siddhe bhūtale siddho ghaṭaḥ, gavi vā asvaḥ | na pratiṣedhyat pratiṣedhādīśayac ca vinā pratiṣedho vakalpate (*Brahmasiddhi*, ed. Kuppuswami Sastri 1937, 44).

made to refute the Buddhists and prove perception and verbal authority (i.e., the Vedas) are not in contradiction, since knowledge about brahman is based on the Veda.

While Kumārila positioned himself as a moderate and rational alternative to three extreme pūrva-pakṣas – Vijñānavāda, Śabdādvaita, and Sattādvaita, arguing that even in a non-conceptualized cognition, both the individuality of the object and its general features are manifest, Maṇḍana takes up the position of Sattādvaita, at the extreme opposite end from Vijñānavāda. Hugh Nicholson argues that Maṇḍana is forced into this position because his main aim is to defend Advaita Vedānta against comparisons with the Buddhists, and by foregrounding the contrast of sattā against svālakṣaṇa he is able to obscure the substantial similarities between Vijñānavāda and Advaita Vedānta. However, Maṇḍana does not seem to be adverse to comparisons if they are favourable to his defense of the validity of Sattādvaita – in one passage, Maṇḍana makes the Buddhist opponent argue that even difference is ultimately unreal (niḥsvabhāva) and merely a product of conceptualization (vikalpa); Maṇḍana replies that this is precisely what Advaita Vedānta posits as well, that difference is an unreality produced by nescience (avidyā). Moreover, Nicholson neglects to take into account the influence of the conceptual framework that Kumārila set up in the Pratyakṣapariccheda that underlies the discussion in the Brahmasiddhi. The sides of the debate were already established by Kumārila, with the Buddhists on one end and Advaita Vedānta, as represented by a creative interpretation of Bhartṛhari's ideas, on the other. Since Kumārila portrayed both of those views as pūrva-pakṣas, Maṇḍana must still contend with Kumārila's criticisms against Sattādvaita even after he has argued for the superiority of Sattādvaita over Vijñānavāda. To this end, he explicitly rejects Kumārila's argument that in perception, there is always the cognition of a specific form, even if that form isn't immediately conceptualized. Maṇḍana states that this view was disproven already; he may be referring to the above-mentioned passage in which he rejects the possibility that perception simultaneously establishes the existence of a thing and also differentiates it from other things, which recalls Kumārila's assertion in the Pratyakṣapariccheda that even the object of a non-conceptualized cognition has a dual nature (dvātmaka), with both specific and general properties.

Bhaṭṭa Jayanta: in the footsteps of Kumārila

In 9th century Kaśmīr, Bhaṭṭa Jayanta again takes up the question of non-conceptualized cognition in a long discussion in the second āhnika of his Nyāyamañjarī, where he investigates perception. The Buddhists are, again, the main opponent, although, just as in the Pratyakṣapariccheda, other pūrva-pakṣas are briefly explored. But in addition to the three perspectives that Kumārila lists – Vi-

\[\text{\footnotesize 58} \text{2002, 583.} \]

\[\text{\footnotesize 59} \text{yadi niḥsvabhāvo bhedah – na hi vastusthīyāsti, vikalpair eva kevalam upadarśyate.... vayam api etad eva brūmah – na bhedo bhāvato 'sti, anādyavidyāvibhāsat etad iti (Brahmasiddhi, ed. Kuppuswami Sastri 1857, 48).} \]

\[\text{\footnotesize 60} \text{yetvāhuḥ—darśanādevabhāvānāṃbhedaḥsidhyati|tathāhi—nirvikalpasyapratyakṣasya sāmānyaviṣayatvam apākurvatoktam—'tadayuktaṃpratidravyaṃbhinnarūpopalambhanād' iti.... teprāgevapratyuktāḥ (Brahmasiddhi, ed. Kuppuswami Sastri 1857, 58). The quote is from Ślokavārttika Pratyakṣasūtra 117, ed. Dvārikādāsa Sāstri 1978, 123.} \]

\[\text{\footnotesize 61} \text{nirvikalpakabodho 'pi dvātmakasyāpi vastunāḥ (Ślokavārttika Pratyakṣasūtra 118, ed. Dvārikādāsa Sāstri 1978, 123).} \]
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jñānavāda, Sattādvaita, and Śabdādvaita – Jayanta appends a fourth view, inspired by Kumārila:

kiṃ ca kiṃ nirvikalpakaṃ grhyata ity etad eva na jānimaḥ ||

mahāsāmānyam anye tu sattā tadviṣayaṃ vi-duḥ |
vāgrūpam apare tattvam prameyam tasya ma-nvate ||

bhaveṇa nirvikalpaṃ viṣayaṃ saṃpracakaṃ |

vagratam anye tu sattā tadviṣayaṃ vi-duḥ |
vāgrūpam apare tattvam prameyam tasya ma-nvate ||
sajātiyavijātyaparāṛttam svalaṅkṣaṇam ||

But what [exactly] is grasped by a non-conceptualized [cognition]? This we really do not understand.

[The Buddhists] explain that the object of a non-conceptualized [cognition] is the unique individual, distinct from other [individuals] which are similar and from those which are dissimilar.

By others consider its object to be Being, understood as the summum genus, while [still] others think that language itself is ascertained by it.

Some think that the scope of a non-conceptualized [cognition] is a mixed-up thing, in which quality, action, substance, genus, etc. are smeared together.

Although the basic distinctions between the different views remain intact, much has changed since Kumārila wrote the Śloka-vārttika. Most prominently, the Mīmāṃsaka view on non-conceptualized cognition, represented here by the term śabalaṃvastu which Jayanta takes from the Ākṛtivāda is no longer a siddhānta, but yet another pūrvapakṣa. More subtly, Śabdādvaita plays a different role here: in the Pratyakṣapariccheda, Kumārila used it as a pūrvapakṣa that asserted that all cognition is necessarily conceptualized because it is infused with language, but Jayanta re-interprets it to mean that language is the very object of a non-conceptualized cognition. This has the effect of making Śabdādvaita seem completely absurd – as Jayanta counters, how is language perceived by the eye? Moreover, language relies on the relation between word and object; how can language be expressive if, presupposing the non-duality of word and object, this relation is not cognized?

In the case of Sattādvaita, Jayanta's explanation is fairly straightforward and closely mirrors Kumārila's – that the object of a non-conceptualized cognition is Being, the summum genus. However, it is clear that Jayanta also relies heavily on Maṇḍana in order to furnish the voice of the Sattādvaita pūrvapakṣin, and, in doing so, he shows his deep knowledge of Maṇḍana's philosophy; in fact, he quotes directly from the Brahmaśāsiddhi when he presents the thesis that perception can only posit existence

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and not difference. Because of Maṇḍana, Sattādvaita is no longer merely a peculiar perspective on non-conceptualized cognition, as it was for Kumārila, but an entire system of Vedāntic thought. In the Pratyaksapariccheda, Kumārila's sattādvaita explained that differences are manifested in conceptualized cognitions. But in the Nyāyamañjarī, – when Jayanta asks, if perception only grasps an undifferentiated Being, then how can individual objects ever be cognized? – Jayanta's sattādvaita gives a more Vedāntic answer: differences are a product of nescience (avidyā).

The final refutation of the sattādvaitin does not occur until the ninth āhnika, devoted to investigating liberation (apavarga), where Jayanta offers a thorough rebuttal that – as the Vedāntins contend – the removal of nescience leads to liberation, attacking the very notion of nescience from multiple angles. Firstly, he asks, if nescience is distinct from brahman, then how could non-duality hold? The Vedāntin answers that nescience is a non-thing, an illusion, whose nature is the manifestation of error. Moreover, the locus of nescience is not brahman but the individual souls, the jīvas. But Jayanta has no patience for the subtleties of Advaita Vedānta; for him, there is either identity or difference, and the notion that the jīvas are both different and not different from brahman is preposterous – “it is not that sparks glowing differently from the flame do not have the nature of fire.

As the Granthibhaṅga commentary points out, Jayanta is employing an Upaniṣadic image here – just as sparks shooting out from a fire are nevertheless of the same nature (sarūpa) as the fire, diverse beings are born from brahman and are reabsorbed into it. It seems that even the Vedāntin's authoritative texts do not support the special status of nescience. And, having invalidated the claim that difference is produced by nescience, Jayanta claims that he has refuted not only Sattādvaita, but Śabdādvaita as well.

Jayanta seems to consider both Sattādvaita and Śabdādvaita as species of Advaita Vedānta – since they concur that brahman, whether characterized as the summum genus or as language, is the nature of reality –, and therefore, even though he devotes a section to refuting Śabdādvaita specifically, he also has opportunities to attack them simultaneously. As in the Ślokavārttika, these are

67) Defined in the Nyāyasūtra as final liberation from suffering: bādhanālakṣaṇaṃ duḥkham iti | tadvatāntavimokṣo 'pavargaḥ (Nyāyasūtra 1.1.21-22, ed. Tailangā 1896, 2).
68) "avidyā tv iyam avasturūpā, māyā, mithyāvabhāsasvabhāvā'bhidhīyate.... jīvātmanām avidyā, na brahmaṇaḥ (Nyāya- mañjarī 9, ed. Varadacharya 1969–1983, II, 466). This characterization of the locus of avidyā is often used to distinguish Maṇḍana's Advaita Vedānta from Śaṅkara's.
69) "nānā! ke te jīvātmānaḥ? te ‘pi brahmano ‘yānanyatayā cintyā evāḥ! kṣudratārkika! sarvatrānabhiṣiṇo ‘si | brahmaiva jīvātmānaḥ, na tato ‘rye | na hi dahanapīṇḍad bhedenāpi bhāntaḥ sphuplingāh agnisvarupā na bhavanti" (Ibid.).
70) "na hi dahanapīṇḍad iti tathā śrūtiḥ – "tad etat satyam – yathā sudiptaḥ pāvakaḥ vipalhingeḥ sahasraṣaḥ prabhavante sarāpiḥ | tathā aṣṭaśaḥ vīvidhiḥ somya bhāvāv prajāyante tatra caiva vanti" (Granthibhaṅga ad Nyāya- manjarī 9, ed. Shah 1972, 219). The quoted verse is Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad 2.11 (ed. Olivelle 1998a, 442).
73) For example: avidyāmāyaṁśaṁ śivanirātmataḥ prabhavatharmacalpaḥ ca sattādvaitādāśānāvāsara eva nivārita iti śabdā-
portrayed in opposition to the Buddhist *vijñānādvaita*, which posits that emptiness is the ultimate nature of reality. However, Jayanta also finds possibilities to group all three of them together, as doctrines of Advaita which are all ultimately erroneous, and in one such list of Advaita *darśanas*, he mentions “*vijñāna*, *sattā*, *ātman*, *śabda*, etc.” It would seem that Jayanta also knew of a fourth kind of Advaita, Atmādvaita, although that term does not appear in the *Nyāyamañjarī* except as part of the above-mentioned list. In contemporary literature, Atmādvaita brings to mind the school of Śaṅkara, but this does not seem to be what is meant here. As Alexis Sanderson and others have noted, there do not seem to be Kaśmīri sources from this period that betray knowledge specifically of Śaṅkara's philosophy, and it is rather Maṇḍana who seems to be the source for the Advaitin pūrvapakṣin in the *Nyāyamañjarī*. Moreover, Jayanta does not refute Sattādvaita and Atmādvaita separately, as two schools of thought. It is more likely that, for him, they represented two doctrines of the same Vedantic school – the first, that perception can be a *pramāṇa* for *brahman*, since its object is the undifferentiated *mahān ātma*, and the second, – which he sometimes calls *ekātmavāda* – that there is only one *ātman*, which is not different from *brahman*. Both of these, as well as Sābdādvaita, are doctrines defended in the *Brahmasiddhi*.

### Setting the stage for Helārāja

By the time Helārāja comes to comment on the verses in the *Vākyapadīya* that gave rise to Sattādvaita, there has already been five centuries' worth of debate on it. Even though the foundations of Sattādvaita are found in the *Vākyapadīya*, where Bhartṛhari conflates the Vaiśeṣika notion of *sattā*, the summum genus, with the ultimately undifferentiated *mahān ātma*, it is not until Kumārila transforms those ideas into a pūrvapakṣa that it becomes a definitive doctrine. This was, in turn, developed into a siddhānta by Maṇḍana, who uses it to attack the Buddhist notion of perception, incidentally making *avidyā* an important part of Sattādvaita doctrine. It becomes a pūrvapakṣa again for Jayanta, whose spirited refutation is used as a model for later thinkers like the Jaina logician Prabhācandra. It is through this complex dialogue between philosophers of opposing schools that those nascent ideas, barely hinted at in the *Vākyapadīya*, become a system of thought – passed back and forth between Vaiśeṣikas, Grammarians, Mīmāṃsakas, Buddhists, Advaitins, Naiyāyikas, Jainas, and others, almost every major branch of Indian philosophy has had a hand in creating what we now understand as Sattādvaita.
2.4. Casting Sāṃkhya as Sattādvaita

In contrast to the other thinkers who have expounded on Sattādvaita, Helārāja is not interested so much in refuting other doctrines as in bringing them into agreement with the *brahmavāda* that is expounded upon in the *Vākyapādīya*. In Sattādvaita, expressed, as in the *Jātisamuddeśa*, as a doctrine in which all things resolve into an undifferentiated Being, Helārāja finds a fruitful ground for comparison with the Sāṃkhya notion of *prakṛti*, a primordial, undifferentiated substance.

**Uniting *prakṛti* and *puruṣa***

Although Sāṃkhya is a fundamentally dualist philosophy, based as it is on the duality between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, with a little creative interpretation, many philosophers have claimed that Sāṃkhya, too, espouse non-dualism. For example, Abhinavagupta, in his commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā*, argues that, since all matter has its origin in *prakṛti*, a single, primordial, substance, Sāṃkhya philosophy can also be said to be a kind of Advaita. Even *puruṣa*, with a little effort, can be subsumed into *prakṛti* – if the *puruṣa* is interpreted as an individual soul (*jīva*), then in Advaitin terms, it is also a manifestation of a non-dual whole.

In glossing the word *śarīra* in the first verse of the *Dravyasamuddeśa*, Helārāja makes a similar move:

The sentient person is part of the primordial matter – in that way, since there is no distinction between the body and the embodied, the body (*śarīra*) is substance, namely, the primordial; thus it is said by the proponents of the primordial matter (*prakṛtika*), those embodied selves for whom the unitary Self is really the body.

The term *śarīrātman* is not used in Sāṃkhya literature; however, it does appear twice in the *Mahābhāṣya*, and the problem which is raised by that term is very much something that Helārāja is concerned with. The first occurrence is in the discussion on A 1.3.67 *nēraṇauyatkarmaṇaucetsa kartānādhyāne*, which governs passive constructions with causative verbs. As examples, Patañjali gives the sentence *darśayatebhṛtyairājā*, “the king lets the servants see him”, which corresponds to *paśyantibhṛtyārājānam*, “the servants see the king”.

In the first sentence, with the verb in the causative, the king is the agent; in the second sentence, he is the object. At the end of the discussion, Kātyāyana raises the objection that the self cannot be used as an object in this situation, since, as

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78 ekapraṇaḥ ṛ-bhṛtya kṛtām pradyutvād eva sat prakṛtvād iva advaitam pradarsitam (Gītārthasaṃgraha ad Bhagavadgītā 7.5, ed. Sankaranarayanāna 1983, 125).

79 saivajīvatvaṃ puruṣatvaṃ pārāś manyaṃ parāmanyasa ca (Ibid.).

80 *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* ad Dravyasamuddeśa 1.

2. Helārāja on dravya: an all-encompassing doctrine

Patañjali points out, the sentence *hanṭy āṭmānām*, “he kills himself”, would have the corresponding causative sentence *ghāṭayaty āṭmā*, “the self causes the self to be killed” – in this case, which āṭman is the killer, and which āṭman is killed? In response, Patañjali states that there are, in fact, two selves:

dvā āṭmanau | antarātmā śarīrātmā ca | antarātmā tat karma karoti yena śarīrātmā sukhaduḥkhe 'nubhavati | śarīrātmā tat karma karoti yenāntarātmā sukhaduḥkhe 'nubhavatiti There are two selves: the inner self (antarātmā) and the bodily self (śarīrātmā). The bodily self experiences joy and suffering via the actions that are performed by the inner self. The inner self experiences joy and suffering via the actions that are performed by the bodily self.

Patañjali does not elaborate, but this passage appears identically in the discussion on A 3.1.87 *karma-vat karmanā tulyakriyāḥ*, which states that, when the agent is related to a given action in the same way as when it is the object, then the verb requires passive morphology. This rule was formulated to allow for passive sentences such as *bhidyate kusūla*, “the granary breaks”, which corresponds to *bhidyate kusūlā*. An objection is raised that this rule would not be needed if the word āṭmanā were assumed to be understood in the sentence – *bhidyata āṭmanā kusūlā* could easily be transformed into āṭmā bhidyate kusūlena. Again, the exemplar sentence that Patañjali chooses is “he kills himself”, this time formulated as *hanṭy āṭmānam āṭmānaḥ* and āṭmā hanṭyata āṭmāḥ. Again, in order to explain how these sentences can have two selves, he repeats his explanation of śarīrātmā and antarātmā.

It is difficult to understand why Patañjali would posit two selves in order to understand the sentence, “one kills oneself”; the most obvious interpretation would be to assume the same self to be both the agent and the object of the action. Perhaps he is simply pointing out that, in common experience, there seems to be a distinction between the physical body and the mind that controls it. There is an echo of this dualism in verse 55 of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*: “in [the world], the sentient being (cetanāḥ puruṣah) experiences suffering caused by old age and death. As long as the subtle body does not cease, suffering is naturally [experienced].” As in Patañjali’s account, there is a body which acts and an inner self which experiences the suffering that results, although it must be noted that the Sāṃkhya dualism between puruṣa and prakṛti is radically different from mind-body dualism, since the puruṣa has no agency. But for Helārāja, any distinction between the physical body and con-

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86utra jārāmāriṣakṛtam duḥkham prāptoti cetanāḥ puruṣah | līṅgasāvānīrttasy tasmiṇā duḥkham svabhāvena (ed. Srinivasan 1967 162). As Ellwood A. Welden has pointed out, early commentators on the Sāṃkhyakārikā have distinguished between the līṅga, the threethenfold organ, and the līṅgasārīra, the substratum or subtle body that accompanies the līṅga as it transmigrates through re-birth (Welden 1910). However, in this particular verse, līṅga seems to refer to the līṅgasārīra (See Larson 1979 189-191).
87Kaiyaṭa gives two interpretations of the antarātmā mentioned in the Bhāṣya: for the Naiyāyikas, it is the puruṣa,
2. Helārāja on dravya: an all-encompassing doctrine

sciousness – whether endowed with agency or not – is untenable, both from an absolute, Advaitin point of view, and also from a grammarian's point of view. As Bhartṛhari says in the Sādhanasamuddeśa, the attribution of a grammatical role to a thing is only a mental state; the thing itself does not inherently possess the role of agent or object. Helārāja, commenting on this point, refers back to the sentence hanty ātmānam ātmanā: in that sentence, "a single ātman, subject to the different [conceptions] resulting from the speaker's intention, is seen in three different capacities (kāraka) [i.e., as agent, object, and instrument]." Moreover, for him, the sentence "he kills himself" does not only illustrate a linguistic problem; it also illustrates the unreal differences that are attributed to the universal that remains when all differences have been re-absorbed – sattā.

As in the example above from the Gitārthasaṃgraha, Helārāja wants to argue that the puruṣa is actually a part of prakṛti. But in doing so, he is very close to casting the Sāṃkhyas as materialists. He says that, for them, the ātman is really the body, glossing śarīrātman as śarīramevaikaātmā; this is almost exactly the same doctrine that Yamuna, in his Ātmasiddhi, ascribes to the Cārvākas: deham evātmetibārhaspatyāh. In order to make Sāṃkhya a kind of Advaita – specifically, in Helārāja's case, Sattādvaita –, it is not enough to just reduce the conscious self to being part of the physical world. A further step is required: he must show that prakṛti is identical to sattā.

Interpreting prakṛti as sattā: A falsified quotation from the Pātañjalyogaśāstra

Verses 32 to 35 of the Jātisamuddeśa seem to be the locus of the discussion on what Helārāja calls sattādvaita. Although initially, the purport of these verses is linguistic – that is, they are concerned with what words mean –, they also make ontological claims about reality. Verse 34, in particular, shows this quite clearly: firstly, it states that sattā is "the meaning of the nominal base (prātipadikārtha)" and "the meaning of the verbal base (dhātvartha)"; then, it makes ontological claims – "it is permanent (nitya), it is the great ātman". Helārāja glosses each of these statements: all things

the soul; but for the Sāṃkhyas, it is the antahkaraṇa, the mind as an inner organ, since the puruṣa has no agency – sāṃkhyapakṣe 'ntahkaraṇam antarātmā tasyaiva kartriṃvasambhavat puruṣasyākārtriṃvāt. nāyāyikādīnāṃ tu mate puruṣasya kartriṃvāt sa evāntātmāṃ vivaśkāthā. ātmanātma evaiva kāraka tīyaśarīraṃ sambandhiyata itī vyākhyeyam (ed. Bhikaji Josi 1987, II, 173).

ekasyaiva buddhyavasthitā bhede ca parikalpate | kartriṃvam karṇatātvam ca karmatātvam copajīyate (Sādhanasamuddeśa 104, ed. Subramania Iyer 1953, 313). “The nature of agent or instrument or object of a single thing arises when a difference is conceived [in its capacities] to it according to [different] states of the mind” (trans. Vergiani, forthcoming).


dṛṣṭaḥ ca kālpaviko bhedāh yathā hanty ātmānam ātmanā ity na hy ātmavatāhāro pātṛiṣṭropāyovāpāyovāpyāt (Pra-kīrṇaprakāśa ad Jātisamuddeśa 43, ed. Subramania Iyer 1953, 47). ‘And the difference that is perceived [in sattā] is fictitious, as in [the sentence] “he kills himself”; for no killer distinct from the self manifests at all’. In the verse, Bhartṛhari gives different possibilities for how difference is seen in sattā (sattāyā bhedadārśanahavah).

Śiddhārthīna, ed. Ramanujacharya 1972. 12. See also the Cārvākadarśana of the Sarvdarsanasamgraha (ed. Śāstri Abhyankar 1924, 3).

See above.
depend on Being, and therefore all nominal bases (*prātipadika*) express Being; every action depends on the existence of the things involved in the action, and therefore even verbal bases (*dhatu*) depend on Being to be expressive; Being is permanent (*nitya*), because even while individual beings come and go, the notion of Being itself, the summum genus, persists. Up to that point, Helārāja’s glosses are quite banal. But when it comes to *mahān ātmā*, he makes the surprising move of quoting a passage from the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* that uses the terms *mahat*, *ātman*, and *sattā*:

> “These are the six particular transformations of *mahat*, which is the *ātman*, which has the nature of mere Being. That essence of *mahat*, mere signifier, beyond the particular [transformations] — it is in that *mahat*, mere Being, *ātman*, that those [six transformations] rest, and in which they experience the upper limit of their development. And when [those six transformations] are involuting, resting in that *mahat*, mere Being, *ātman*, it is in that [mahat], without being or non-being, without real or unreal, unmanifested, unsigned, to which they return.”

In this way, according to the Sāṅkhya philosophers, the essence of *buddhi*, expressed by the word *mahat*, primordial, causing the world, is taught; thus the doctrine of Sattādvaita is supported even according to the Sāṅkhya.

As Helārāja says, this quote seems to show that the Sāṅkhya believe *sattā* — which is also called *mahat* or *ātman* — to be the originary cause of the world. This would seem to make Sāṅkhya ontology very similar to the idea expressed in *Jātisamuddeśa* 34, where Bhartṛhari qualifies *sattā* as *mahān ātmā*. According to this quote, *mahat*, which is described as *sattā*, is the first cause, and it has six particularized transformations, which, while abiding in *mahat*, reach the upper limit of their development. When these transformations are being re-absorbed, they are, again, abiding in *mahat*.

However, this is a very peculiar distortion of Sāṅkhya ontology. *Mahat* is definitely not the first cause; it is, in fact, the first product of *prakṛti*, which is the primordial essence of reality. The quotation that Helārāja uses, then, does not seem to be a faithful description of Sāṅkhya philosophy. In fact, when

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94. Philipp Maas has argued that the *Yogasūtra* together with its Bhāṣya commentary is a single text, which, in manuscripts, is titled the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* (Maas 2013). Federico Squarcini, on the other hand, argues for the *Yogasūtra* as an independent text (Squarcini 2015, cxi; an English summary of his arguments, by Elisa Freschi, is available at [http://elisafreschi.com/2017/06/20/squarcini-on-the-authorship-of-the-yogasutra/](http://elisafreschi.com/2017/06/20/squarcini-on-the-authorship-of-the-yogasutra/)).
95. *Tasmin pratiyanti* is grammatically awkward here, since the verb *prati* does not usually take the locative.
96. *Prakīrṇaprakāśa ad Jātisamuddeśa* 34, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 42. See the appendix for a collation of this passage from available manuscripts.
the quotation is compared to the passage in the Āgāśe edition of the Yogaśāstra, there are significant differences:

_ete sattāmātrasyātmano mahataḥ śaḍ aviśeṣaparināmāḥ, yat tatparaṃ avišeṣebhyo līṅgamātraṃ mahattattvam, tasminn ete sattāmātrey mahaty ātmany avasthāya vivṛddhi-kāṣṭhām anubhavanti_ | _pratisāṃsṛjyamānāś ca tasmin eva sattāmātrey mahaty ātmany avasthāya yat tan nihsattāsattāṃ niḥsadasan nirasad avyaktam aliṅgaṃ pradhānāṇṭ tat pratiyanti._

These are the six _unparticularized_ transformations of _mahat_, which is the _ātman_, which has the nature of mere Being. That essence of _mahat_, mere signifier, beyond the _unparticularized_ [transformations] — it is in that _mahat_, mere Being, _ātman_, in which [those six transformations] rest, and in which they experience the upper limit of their development. And when [those six transformations] are involuting, resting in that _mahat_, mere Being, _ātman_, it is to that _primordial essence (pradhāna)_ , without being or non-being, without real or unreal, without unreal, unmanifested, unsigned, which they return.

This passage comments on sūtra 2.19, which states that there are four levels in the transformation of the undifferentiated primordial essence into the multiplicity that is seen in the world. The primordial essence itself is said to be _aliṅga_, which has been translated variously as “indistinctive”, “the undifferentiate”, or “the signless”. In this state, the three _guṇas_ — _sattva_, _rajas_, and _tamas_ — are in equilibrium. The first evolute of the primordial is called _mahat_, and it is said to be in the state of _līṅgamātra_. As Georg Feuerstein notes, this term does not occur anywhere else in the _Yogaśāstra_, making it difficult to translate; he understands the _-mātra_ part of the compound in the sense of “substance” or “material”, as in the words _tanmātra_ or _asmitāmātra_. As the quotation itself suggests, this seems to denote a state of pure, undifferentiated Being, _sattāmātra_. From this state, the six unparticularized (avišeṣa) evolutes arise – which are the five _tanmātras_ of sound, touch, sight, taste, and smell, along with _asmitāmātra_, the sense of self. From these, sixteen particularized (višeṣa) evolutes arise – mind (_manas_), the ten _indriyas_, and the five _bhūtas_.

In Helārāja’s version of this passage, the four levels have been reduced to two: _sattā_ and its particularized evolutes. This suits his purposes perfectly; it aligns Sāṃkhya ontology with the process described in _Jātisamudddeśa_ 32 to 35, in which _sattā_, the highest universal, is differentiated into particulars. However, in Sāṃkhya terms, his version makes no sense. This does not seem to be a case of Helārāja having a different recension of the _Yogaśāstra_; the quotation as he presents it would not fit in the context of the original passage. In Helārāja’s version, there are six particularized evolutes; how-

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97 _Bhāṣya ad Yogasūtra_ 2.19, ed. Āgāśe 1904, 84. Relevant differences are marked in bold.
98 Bryant 2009, 638; Feuerstein 1983, 42-43.
99 Feuerstein 1983, 43.
100 _tatra kāśavāyvanyudakabhumayo bhūtāni sabdasparśārūpaprasagandhadanmitrānāṃ avišeṣānāṃ višeṣāḥ | tathā śtrotratvakoṣurjīvāhṛtrāni buddhīndriyāni, vākpāṇipādāpāyāpasthāh karmendriyāni, ekādaśaṃ manāḥ sarvārthham, ity etāny asmitīlaksiṇasyāviveśasya višeṣāḥ_ (ed. Āgāśe 1904, 74).
Figure 2.1: The different models of material evolution in the *Pāṭaṅgalyogasastra* and the *Prakīrṇa-prakāśa*. 
ever, in the *Yogaśāstra*, these are numbered sixteen. More importantly, Helārāja omits the word *pradhāna*, making *sattā* the most primordial state and the first cause of the evolution of the material world. Helārāja does, however, retain the word *aliṅga*, which, in a Śāṅkya context, would clearly refer to *pradhāna*. But out of context, the term is more ambiguous – in the *Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad*, for example, it is used to refer to the *ātman*.

**Helārāja’s use of quotation**

The question of textual quotations in Sanskrit is a thorny one, and its study is complicated by the paucity of comprehensive, critical editions of key texts. But even given this uncertainty, there is a notable discrepancy between Helārāja’s quotations and the source texts from which he quotes. This is especially pronounced in his quotations of the *Mahābhāṣya*, which are particularly abundant in the *Prakīrṇaprakāśa*; in fact, in the commentary to the *Dravyasamuddeśa*, Helārāja’s quotations rarely correspond to the text as printed in the editions of the *Mahābhāṣya*. However, the meaning and intent of the quoted passages always remain intact, no matter whether the textual differences are considered as genuine variants or as the result either of quoting from memory or of contextualizing the quote to better fit the discussion at hand. This kind of “loose quotation” is not unprecedented, and can be found in a wide variety of texts across the Sanskrit tradition. But in this case, in Helārāja’s quotation of the *Pātañjalyogaśāstra*, the meaning of the passage has been dramatically altered in order to provide a textual proof for the alignment between Śāṅkya ontology and Sattādvaita. This seems very much to be a deliberate alteration; there is no way in which Helārāja’s version of the passage could fit in the original context of the *Pātañjalyogaśāstra*. Perhaps the temptation to use this quote was too great to pass up; the qualification of *mahat* with *ātman* and *sattāmātra* seems to perfectly echo *Jātisamuddeśa* 35. It simply required a few small modifications in order to remove *pradhāna* and to make *sattā* the state in which all differences are re-absorbed.

### 2.5. Casting Buddhists as *dravyavādins*

In earlier texts, Buddhists have been depicted as taking the polar opposite view from Sattādvaitins – while Sattādvaitins are said to believe that the object of perception is, not only a genus, but the summum genus, Being, Buddhists believe that the object of perception is a *svalakṣaṇa*, a unique individual. This contradistinction is also taken up by Helārāja, and in this respect he is still using the

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101 Raghunāth Śarmā, commenting on the passage in the *Prakīrṇaprakāśa*, names the six particularized evolutes as *ahaṃkāra* and the five *tanmātras* (1991, 77). However, in the *Yogaśāstra*, these are the unparticularized evolutes.

102 *katama ātmeti | yo 'yam sūd dah ādibham suṇayaḥ santādilaksānoktaḥ svakārī ādibhāvāyaḥ | tasya tūl ādibham aliṅga- sūgner yak ausnaya avıśtāt cāpām yāḥ śivatamo rama ity eke* (6.31, ed. Cowell [1935], 167).


104 See Freschi 2015.

105 In other cases, Helārāja does not ignore *pradhāna* – for example, in his commentary on *Dravyasamuddeśa* 1, where he glosses *dravya* with *pradhāna* (see above).
same, basic argumentative frame that Kumārila presents in the Pratyākṣasūtra, although again, the debate has shifted slightly: Helārāja applies this debate to the object of a word rather than to the object of perception. But in his commentary on the Dravyasamuddeśa, he leverages the polysemy of the word dravya to argue that, since dravya and svalakṣaṇa are synonymous, Buddhists are proponents of the dravya model of denotation. This is not a difficult connection to make; as Richard King has pointed out, the scope of svalakṣaṇa is quite similar to the Abhidharmic notion of dravyasat – something that is substantially real, as opposed to prajñaptisat, something which is only nominally real. Moreover, this argument is also aided by the clear echo of Nāgārjuna’s Acintyastava in the first verse of the Dravyasamuddeśa – Nāgārjuna uses dravya as a synonym for absolute reality, the knowledge of which leads to enlightenment.

Moreover, unlike earlier thinkers, Helārāja does not reject Buddhist epistemology outright; in fact, he embraces some aspects of it, such as using the criterion of arthakriyā in order to validate an object of cognition. But what really sets him apart from the other thinkers discussed so far is that, rather than rejecting both Sattādvaita and Buddhist epistemology – as Kumārila and Jayanta do – or taking the side of Sattādvaita – as Maṇḍana does – he endeavours to prove that these two seemingly opposite doctrines are ultimately not contradictory, since both sattā and dravya are synonymous with brahman.

Dravya and arthakriyā

In the Mahābhāṣya, the word dravya often means simply an individual thing, as opposed to a genus. This seems to be how it is understood at the beginning of Helārāja’s commentary on the Dravyasamuddeśa, where he argues that it is the dravya, the individual thing, which is real: “Since, in the world, it is the dravya that is employed in purposive action (arthakriyā), it is that which impels purposeful people. Therefore, it is that which is expressed by words." This is the same formulation that Dharmakīrti uses to argue that only the unique individual (svalakṣaṇa) is real – because it is only that which effects purposive action (arthakriyākārin). Helārāja repeats this in his explanation of the word vastu in the first verse, this time explicitly glossing it as svalakṣaṇa, again giving Dharmakīrti’s definition of “that which effects purposive action”, and this time, directly attributing this definition to the Buddhists. Since the Buddhists believe in the reality of the svalakṣaṇa, and since svalakṣaṇa and dravya are both synonyms of vastu – a concrete object that effects purposive action –, then logically, the Buddhists are proponents of the dravyapakṣa, the view that dravya is denoted by a word.

For Dharmakīrti, the question of what exists is bound up with the question of the means by which reality is cognized, and so the validity of the means of cognition, the pramāṇas, is a central concern. Since for him, direct perception and inference are the only two valid means of cognition, there can

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107 See note on the translation of Dravyasamuddeśa 1.
108 ihārthakriyāyāṃdravyamevopayujyata iti tad eva pravartakam arthinām | atāḥ śabdāna tad evocayate (Prakīrṇaprakāśa ad Dravyasamuddeśa 1).
110 vastu svalakṣaṇam arthakriyākāri dravyam iti śākyair uktam (Prakīrṇaprakāśa ad Dravyasamuddeśa 1.)
be only two kinds of cognized objects that correspond to them: the unique particular (svalakṣaṇa) and the universal (sāmānya). The particular is cognized by direct perception, and the universal is cognized by inference. But Dharmakīrti goes even further than his predecessor Dignāga and argues that, of the two, only the particular is real, because only the particular possesses arthakriyā. 111 This term has been variously translated as “purposive action”, “causal efficacy”, and even “telic function”, and is complicated by Dharmakīrti’s various usages of the term artha, but what emerges clearly from the argument is that the particular is real because it has the capacity to participate in an action that fulfills some goal or need. The scope of these goals is always conceived of as practical and human – bounded by vyavahāra. 112 Moreover, not only does the validity of a cognition as prameya depend on the validity of the instrument of cognition as a pramāṇa, but the validity of the instrument also depends on the validity of its object, and it is precisely this worldly practice, vyavahāra, that is the means by which one ascertains whether a cognition is valid. 113 Consequently, the criterion of arthakriyā is not applicable when proving the validity of doctrinal beliefs that are inaccessible to both direct perception and to inference, nor is it useful for reasoning about abhāvas, non-entities. As Pascale Hugon argues, what is striking in Dharmakīrti’s discussion of abhāvas as prameya is that he never mentions arthakriyā: “One can see here a parallel between the context of cognitions pertaining to abhāvas and that of Scriptures: supersensible objects and non-existent entities have in common that the knowledge pertaining to them cannot be tested by a means that would presuppose direct access to the object. One can thus understand why their reliability is not evaluated via arthakriyāsthiti, but rather, through non-opposition.” 114 In other words, the criterion of arthakriyā has a very specific domain of applicability: vyavahāra.

Reconciling Buddhists and Advaitins

At the beginning of his commentary on the Dravyasamuddeśa, Helārāja states that dravya can be understood in two senses – absolute (pāramārthika) and conventional (sāṃvyavahārīka). In the conventional sense, it seems to mean an individual thing – it is something that can be referred to by a pronoun. 115 On the other hand, the absolute sense of the word – which, according to him, is what is being described in the Dravyasamuddeśa – is synonymous with ātman, with absolute reality. The conventional sense of dravya can be reasoned about, using such criterion as arthakriyā; but when it comes to thinking about non-duality, reasoning breaks down.

For Helārāja, these two senses of the word dravya really represent two levels of the same reality. On the level of vyavahāra, it makes sense for Buddhist epistemologists like Dharmakīrti to employ

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111 Hugon 2011, 369-370. Matilal also makes this point: “The main thesis of the Diṅnāga school was that ‘The world consists of unique particulars (svalakṣaṇa): universals belong to imaginative construction, to language’” (Matilal 2005, 37). See also Herzberger 1983, 82.
113 pramāṇyaṃ vyavahārenā (Pramāṇaviniścaya 2.5, as quoted in Hugon 2011, 373).
114 Hugon 2011, 381.
115 Helārāja quotes the Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa on this point (Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa 3, ed. Subramania Iyer 1964, 187).
logical criteria to determine the validity of their knowledge about the world; but absolute reality, which is beyond what can be directly perceived or even inferred from perception, cannot be evaluated with arthakriyā.\textsuperscript{116} The way in which Bhartṛhari hints at the nature of this absolute reality bears a noteworthy resemblance to Buddhist doctrine – as Hajime Nakamura notes, verses 12 and 13, which describe absolute reality in mutually-contradictory terms, very closely mirror passages from the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and also from the Mahāyānasūtraśāstra, “one of the most essential and central passages in all Mahāyāna literature”\textsuperscript{117} Other verses of the Dravyasamuddeśa are also strikingly Buddhist in character – as mentioned previously, the first verse seems to be modeled on a verse from the Acintyastava, attributed to Nāgārjuna, with the addition of the word ātmā.\textsuperscript{118} Helārāja is not adverse to pointing out the Buddhist tone of the Dravyasamuddeśa – in fact, he attributes the ninth verse to a doctrine held by the Vijñānāvādins, quoting a verse from Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika in support.\textsuperscript{119} Even so, he is unable to subsume some of the core tenets of Buddhism into his system; at the end of his commentary on the first verse, still insisting that all schools teach the reality of dravya, he concedes that the Buddhists would not admit the permanence of dravya, since they argue rather for the radical impermanence of all things.\textsuperscript{120} Nevertheless, his overall aim is clear – to show that all schools of thought, no matter how heterodox, are compatible with the ideas expressed in the Vāykapadiya, which, like grammar itself, is universally applicable (sarvapārṣada).

\textsuperscript{116}Lindtner argues that when Dharmakīrti uses arthakriyā as a criterion for an object of valid cognition, he has verses 1.33 to 35 of the Vākyapadiya in mind (1994, 214). In contrast to Dharmakīrti, Bhartṛhari uses arthakriyā to argue that anumāna is not always reliable, and that one must ultimately accept āgama, scripture, as a valid pramāṇa.

\textsuperscript{117}Nakamura 2004, 494.

\textsuperscript{118}Lindtner 1994, 199. See the note on the translation of Dravyasamuddeśa 1.

\textsuperscript{119}As noted in the translation, Helārāja’s quotation takes a different form from the original verse (Prakīrṇaprakāśa ad Dravyasamuddeśa 9). Nakamura, working with the editio princeps of the Prakīrṇaprakāśa, also sees the “adoption of Buddhist doctrine” in Helārāja’s commentary on Dravyasamuddeśa 4, where the editio princeps reads sākyasamakṣayatāyā rather than sādhyasamakṣayatāyā (Nakamura 2004, 289).

\textsuperscript{120}yady api śākyādīdarśane nityaṁ na bhavati dravyam tathāpi tattvatasāyānabhivyapagamād adosāḥ | kevalaṁ yad ast mākāṁ dravyam anyair evam abhidhiyata ity evam atropanyasaḥ (Prakīrṇaprakāśa ad Dravyasamuddeśa.1). On the other hand, Bhartṛhari, in the Mahābhāṣyāpādaṃśa, has argued that even Buddhists accept the permanence of reality (See the translation of the Prakīrṇaprakāśa passage).
3. Epilogue on dreams

The *Mahābhāṣya* begins with, perhaps, the most important axiom of the grammatical tradition: *siddhe śabdārthasaṃbandhe*, a word, its object, and the relationship between the two are established. Patañjali interprets *siddha* in that vārttika to mean *nitya*, permanent. For if the referent of a word were impermanent and constantly shifting, how could language be effective? At the beginning of the *Dravyasamuddeśa*, Bhaṭṭṛhari affirms this axiom – the *dravya*, the reality that is denoted by a word, is permanent, no matter whether this reality is called the *ātman*, a *vastu*, *svabhāva*, *śarīra*, or *tattva*. In fact, all words ultimately refer to the same, absolute reality; even the very duality of the word and its object can be subsumed into that singular reality. Paradoxically, by affirming the permanence of reality, Bhartṛhari comes to conclude that the permanence of the word, its object, and their relationship – the permanence that grammarians speak of – is itself merely a convention that is part of the system of language. It is only because the word and its object seem distinct from one another that one can even say that there is a relationship between the two at all. These distinctions exist as if in a dream, where an expression and what is expressed by it seem to be two different things, even though they are merely the product of a single mind. This is how Bhartṛhari ends the *Dravyasamuddesa*; he does not elaborate. If, in absolute terms, distinctions such as being and non-being or permanent and impermanent are untenable, then are we to understand that, for Bhartṛhari, the system of language is as illusory as a dream?

And what about for Helārāja – what can be said of his philosophy? Throughout his commentary, he is very much concerned with mapping out distinctions between his philosophy and other schools, specifying points of agreement and disagreement. He agrees with the Buddhists that *arthakriyākārīta* can define a valid object of cognition, but disagrees that those objects are ultimately impermanent; he agrees with the Sāṃkhyas that all of the multiplicity seen in the world is the product of a single mind, but disagrees that those products are real transformations of that substance, rather than unreal manifestations. Yet, if even self and other or friend and adversary are unreal, dreamlike distinctions, how can those doctrinal differences be any more real? At the end of his commentary on the *Dravyasamuddeśa*, Helārāja begins by distinguishing a dream from waking reality: quoting a passage from the *Vṛtti* to the first kāṇḍa, he argues that a dream is the creation of a single mind, and thus confined to a single perceiver, while the waking world, which is a divine creation, is shared by everyone. The dreamer seems to have an independent, creative power, but that power is restricted to the dream itself; their dream creations are phantom projections of the individual soul. But even before Helārāja has made this distinction between a dream and the waking
3. Epilogue on dreams

world, he has already refuted it – both dreaming and waking are states in which unreality is per-
ceived, since nothing that is seen in either of those states persists into the fourth state, turīya. Even
the waking world is merely an illusion based on nescience. No wonder, then, that the Śaiva exegete
Yogarāja, commenting on the same Vyrtti passage, claims that, for brahmavādin, the independence
of brahman itself only exists at the level of a dream.1

1See the note in the translation of the commentary on Dravyasamuddeśa 17-18. Although there are echoes of Śaiva
terminology in Helārāja’s work, his philosophy does not seem to betray Śaiva influences. A parallel can be made
with the Mokṣopāya, a non-dualistic text from the same period in Kaśmir; as Jürgen Hanneder notes, “the author
was undoubtedly fully aware of the Śaivism of his time, and he would probably have subscribed to some positions of
the more radical monistic Śaiva cults, but this... must not seduce us into assuming the author being a crypto-Śaiva”
(2006, 143-144).
Part II.

Edition and translation
4. Methodology: Towards a hypertext critical edition

4.1. The dream of the total library

Todo estará en sus ciegos volúmenes.... Todo, pero por una línea razonable o una justa noticia habrá millones de insensatas cacofonías, de fárragos verbales y de incoherencias.

Jorge Luis Borges, La biblioteca total

For Borges, the notion of a “total library”, a compendium of all texts that could possibly exist, is a sort of hermeneutic nightmare. A library of every possible text is also a library of every variation of every text; in such a Hell, as he describes it, facts are indistinguishable from falsehoods, and the promise of total knowledge becomes a twisted parody of itself. The scenario he sketches out is comparable to the task faced by the editor of an ancient text, grappling with dozens – sometimes hundreds – of witnesses, full of variations most of which seem like meaningless cacophonies – spelling mistakes, incomprehensible readings, inexplicable gaps. In a way, the critical edition is the editor’s valiant effort to shield the reader from this anarchy – having spent months, perhaps years, sifting through the available evidence, the editor emerges with a critical text, along with an apparatus that has already been refined to screen out any useless information. But in the past decade, faced with the possibility of and desire for total knowledge, scholars have begun to create digital editions that, rather than presenting an editor’s interpretation of the text, present an archive of all witnesses. No one variant is privileged over another; even a trivial spelling mistake might have consequences for the textual
4. Methodology: Towards a hypertext critical edition

tradition, if, for example, it was copied from one witness to another. But such an archive without signposts seems like a step towards the utopic Library that Borges describes – there is a fine line between problematizing a text and obscuring it.

In fact, the choice between the traditional, critical edition and the diplomatic document archive is a false dichotomy. The digital medium, with its capacity for vast amounts of storage and its possibility for fast and sophisticated search, does not dictate the way in which a text ought to be presented. A patient and knowledgeable editor is needed more than ever, if not to produce a critical reading, then at least to critically curate the available witnesses. But, in contrast to a print edition, where only the end result of a long and laborious editorial process is presented, a digital edition allows an editor to “show the work”, as it were; by presenting diplomatic transcriptions of the sources, as well as, in some cases, digital facsimiles of the manuscripts used in the edition, the editor opens up each editorial decision to the scrutiny of other scholars and readers.

This ideal has been discussed and theorized in countless articles and conferences, but scholars usually come to the conclusion that we do not yet have reliable tools that are up to the task. For the edition of Bhartṛhari’s Dravyasamuddeśa with Helārāja’s Prakīrṇaprakāśa commentary, I have developed an open source software package with this kind of digital edition in mind, tailored to the presentation of Sanskrit texts. It consists of a backend which performs automatic collation based on diplomatic transcripts and a frontend which displays the text with the automatically-generated apparatus, with each variant linked to the full transcription of the manuscript from which it derives.

4.2. The method of collation

Martin West, in his 1973 landmark monograph on textual criticism, lays out the basic method for editing a text: begin with a good printed edition, or at least the best witness you can find. Then, each manuscript “is compared with a printed edition word by word, and the differences written down. Some people write them in the margins of the edition, but even if the copy is interleaved this does not give one room for more than a few manuscripts’ variants, and I usually use a separate notebook.” He then goes on to give advice on using ink instead of graphite, and different coloured inks for different manuscripts. Although most editors now use word-processing software to achieve this, the basic method has not changed. In fact, even when editors, in the 21st century, use tailor-made editing software like Classical Text Editor or use sophisticated computer programs to analyze variants and produce stemmas, the work of collation is still methodologically the same. For example, take this recent project at the University of Vienna that aims to produce a critical edition of the Carakasamhitā Vimānasthāna:

In the first phase of our still-ongoing editorial work, the “collation,” all textual witnesses are compared with the widely known edition of Trikamji, that we chose as our

\[1\text{For example, see Buzzetti and McGann 2007.}\]
\[2\text{West 1973 66.}\]
4. Methodology: Towards a hypertext critical edition

standard version. In the course of this comparison all differences in readings between
the manuscripts and the text as edited by Trikamji are noted with very few exception,
like, for example, sandhi-variants, variants of punctuation, variants of consonant gem-
ination after “r,” variants of homograph and semi-homograph akṣaras.

Even though, in this case, cladistic computer software was applied to the collated data in order to
aid in the production of a stemma, the collation itself is essentially the same task that West outlines.
Notably, some editing is already done at the collation stage; some information is already being dis-
carded even as variants are recorded, such as sandhi variants and punctuation. This is a standard
editorial practice – not all information is useful, and, especially when there are a large number of
witnesses, the critical apparatus would become unmanageably large and unreadable if every sandhi
variant were recorded. However, it would be better if this information were retained in some way;
for studying the transmission of a text, even punctuation might be a vital clue.

Ultimately, the decision to retain or discard a piece of information depends on how an editor assumes
the text will be used. In some cases, editors have tried to minimize these assumptions, and, instead
of creating a critical reading, produce what Elena Pierazzo calls “digital documentary editions” – that
is, diplomatic transcriptions of the witnesses themselves. The emergence of the TEI standard has
enabled extremely detailed transcriptions that are nonetheless machine-readable, and also easily
transformable to be human-readable. But these editions aim to be uncritical; they do not present
a text but rather a document, and, for many Sanskrit texts, their corrupted versions as preserved in
the documents we have are simply unreadable. Ideally, a digital critical edition would provide both
a critical reading as well as diplomatic transcriptions of all the documents used in the edition. In
this project, this ideal is pushed a few steps further: the critical apparatus is generated automatically
and on-demand, and the reader is able to configure the shape of the apparatus based on a number
of options, such as which witnesses to include and what level of detail should be presented in the
variants. The reader is able to generate an apparatus not only for the critical reading, but for any
witness.

Computer-aided collation

If provided with suitably prepared transcriptions of the manuscripts, purged of coinci-
dental errors, a computer could draw up a clumsy and unselective critical apparatus....
the very considerable trouble involved in submitting them to a computer does not ap-
pear worth while.

Martin L. West, Textual Criticism and Editorial Technique

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3Maas 2013b, 32.
4Pierazzo 2011
51973, 71-72.
Interestingly enough, the algorithms and fundamental techniques described in this chapter were already available when West produced this statement. What may have changed, since the 70’s, is the general scholarly attitude towards what an edition could be. In this edition of the *Dravyasamuddeśa*, the transcriptions are not purged of coincidental errors; instead, each witness is transcribed as diplomatically as possible, and then, at the collation stage, an editor or reader can selectively decide what an “error” is, using algorithms. This has the advantage of giving us the ability to change our minds later, since the diplomatic transcriptions themselves will not be affected. Moreover, all of the transcriptions are available and included along with the critically edited text; perhaps this alone makes this approach worthwhile. But the main aim of this method will be to refute West’s most serious allegation – that the resulting apparatus would be clumsy and unselective.

There have been two notable open source projects aimed at the task of computer-automated collation: *CollateX* and *Juxta*. The developers behind both projects met in 2009 and collaboratively developed what they call the “Gothenberg model” of the collation process, which consists of three steps: tokenization, collation, and visualization. Each of these three steps is handled separately. Tokenization is the subdivision of the text into tokens, or units of comparison. In many texts, tokens are delimited by whitespace, i.e., each word is a token. In that case, the collation software would perform a word-level comparison. In the collation step, an algorithm is applied to compute the difference between two texts; *Juxta* uses the Myers diff algorithm, as implemented in *java-diff-utils*, whereas *CollateX* offers three different possible algorithms – Dekker, Needleman-Wunsch, and MEDITE. Finally, in the visualization step, the computed data is transformed for display to the user. Both projects offer visualizations that differ significantly from a traditional print edition: *CollateX* offers “variant graphs”, and *Juxta* offers “heat maps”.

My approach differs in a number of important respects. Firstly, no tokenization is done before the text is collated; the Myers diff algorithm is used at its most fine-grained level, performing a character-by-character comparison. The “tokens” – or, in more traditional terminology, the lemmata – are determined only after the comparison is made, which offers a bit more flexibility. Secondly, in visualizing the differences, no attempt is made to devise a wholly new and unfamiliar interface for the text; instead, the standard format of a Sanskrit edition is used, and it has only been modified to make it more legible, using hyperlinks and some interactive elements to reduce the amount of visual clutter that often afflicts editions that provide a great deal of information on every page. Thirdly and perhaps most importantly, there is an additional step at the beginning of the process: a filtering stage, in which the witnesses are transformed so that certain elements, such as punctuation, are filtered out before the text is collated. This step is dependent not only on the editor’s input, but also on the reader’s; the user interface of the edition includes options for selectively enabling or disabling all of the text filters, in order to dynamically modify the level of detail in the apparatus. The software consists of two parts: *upama.php*, the backend which performs the collation, using Myers diff as implemented in *google-diff-match-patch*; and *saktumiva*, a plugin for the *DokuWiki* content...
management system, which comprises the frontend, rendering the resulting text and apparatus in HTML.

Diplomatic transcriptions → Filters for orthography, etc. → Automatic collation → Apparatus of variants

Figure 4.1.: Generating a critical apparatus.

4.3. Diplomatic transcription and its limits

Inevitably, the shape of a critical edition depends on the question that is asked about the text. The editor might ask, “What did the author mean here?” and tailor both the critical text and the apparatus to answering that. But the reader may have a different question in mind: especially in the case of Sanskrit texts, with their rich layers of commentaries and sub-commentaries, separated by periods of hundreds of years, a particular reader may be more interested in what text a particular commentator was reading rather than what the author had intended. Some scholars may not even be interested in the content of the text, but only in the use of punctuation in the manuscripts. In this digital edition, I hope to accommodate such possible uses of the data, while still presenting a critical text that attempts to get as close as possible to the “authoritative” original.

As Pierazzo has pointed out, in TEI, there is virtually no limit to the amount of detail that can be included in a transcription. For a modern, printed book with no annotations, it may be enough just to transcribe page breaks, but for a hand-written draft of a novel, with notes and corrections by multiple editors, the editor may choose to describe even the precise position of each note on the page. One of the goals of TEI is to allow for such diverse use cases; its flexibility is its greatest strength. However, critics have noted that the high degree of customization of TEI schema to fit each particular project has led to a fragmentation of the standard – as Tara Andrews writes, “this idiosyncratic interpretation and insistence upon customization, wherein exception becomes the rule, is a misunderstanding of the nature of a digital data model that effectively prohibits large-scale interchange or machine analysis across different projects.” However, the wide array of applications for which TEI has been used seems to naturally prevent the establishment of a single, standardized interpretation of TEI tags. One possible solution is to have standards for specific genres of documents; for this project, I have followed the schema developed by the Sanskrit Manuscripts Project at the University of Cambridge. But to a degree, the fear that Andrews raises, that the flexibility of TEI markup prohibits machine analysis, is unfounded. As long as each dataset has a consistent standard, then it is possible to apply an XSLT stylesheet to the entire set in order to make it conform to another schema, as might be needed for a large-scale project employing multiple datasets.

—Andrews 2013, 63.
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But even if there are no limits to the amount of information that can be encoded in a diplomatic transcription, there are certainly limits to how useful the information is, especially if a digital facsimile of the document is available. For example, while TEI allows us to meticulously describe exactly where each element is situated on a page, the exactitude of that information still pales in comparison to what could easily be achieved using computer vision techniques. In the present transcriptions, I have taken a diplomatic, but not “ultra-diplomatic” approach: I try to reproduce the orthography as precisely as possible, and note additions, deletions, and marginal annotations, page breaks and line breaks, as well as any lacunae or illegible areas. Most Sanskrit manuscripts are written in scriptio continua, and I have followed the common practice of inserting spaces where possible between words. Where an actual space occurs in the manuscript, they are indicated with the <space> tag.

4.4. Expressing text-critical principles as algorithms

By using diplomatic transcriptions as the basis for a critical edition, some processing needs to be done before the source material is passed on to the collation algorithm. In general, a reader does not want every orthographic variant to be listed in the critical apparatus, and in order to filter out unnecessary information, unwanted variations are identified and replaced with their normalized versions before the texts are collated. Moreover, the more similar two texts are, the shorter the time it takes for the Myers diff algorithm to complete; this is partly due to a number of pre-processing optimizations implemented by Neil Fraser in the google-diff-match-patch library.

There are a number of advantages to this method. Firstly, the collation can be automated without the need to manually normalize orthographic variations; the diplomatic transcription remains faithful to the orthography of the source document and can be consulted at any time. Secondly, the normalization step is much more precise than if done by hand. And finally, the formulation of the rules that dictate what and how to normalize forces the editor to be more rigorous and transparent; these rules then act as an explicit and precise description of the text-critical principles that are followed in the collation of the witnesses.

For this task, regular expressions are used to replace one spelling with another. Regular expressions are a way of describing a search pattern in a text, which can then be compiled into a computer algorithm. When an editor selectively ignores certain orthographic variations during the collation of a witness, they follow certain rules, and these rules can be formalized as search patterns. For example, consider one of the principles for excluding a variant cited above from the study of the Carakasamhítā:

...variants of consonant gemination after “r”...

which can be observed in words such as vartate/varttate and kartum/karttum. This principle can

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8D’Iorio 2013, 52.
9Fraser 2006.
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easily be expressed as a regular expression. For example, if we wish to replace all instances of doubled consonants after \( r \), we might search for

\[ /r([kgcjtṛṭd])\1/ \]

and replace it with

\[ /r\1/ \]

However, we can be much more specific than that. In our case, the only consonant gemination observed is \( tt \); therefore, we can reduce our expression to

\[ /rtt/rt/ \]

which will replace all instances of \( rtt \) with \( rt \). But \( r \) is not the only character that causes the gemination of \( t \), and in order to capture more cases, we can broaden the scope of our search. In the manuscripts of the Dravyasamuddeśa, not only do we find the geminated \( t \) after \( r \), but also after vocalic \( ṛ \), after \( i \), and after \( pa \). We can use a look-behind\(^{10}\) in order to make the expression cleaner and also more efficient, resulting in

\[ /(?<=[rṛi]|pa)tt/t/ \]

This final regular expression searches for \( tt \) and then checks if it is preceded by \( r \), \( ṛ \), \( i \), or \( pa \); if so, it replaces it with \( t \). Whenever it encounters \( varttate \), it will replace it with \( vartate \); whenever it encounters \( prakṛtti \), it will replace it with \( prakṛti \). Not only can we automate the filtering process that was previously done manually by the editor, but we have also expressed the text-critical principle, “ignore consonant gemination after \( r \)”, in a more precise and formal manner.

As another example, let us consider the variation among semi-homograph nasals. In Sanskrit manuscripts, the nasals \( ṅ, ñ, ṇ \) and \( n \) as well as the labial \( m \) are often written as \( ṁ \). In order to regularize this spelling across all of the transcriptions, we might use the expression

\[ /[ṅñṇnm]/ṃ/ \]

which would replace all nasals as well as \( m \) with \( ṁ \). However, we can again be much more specific. Each of these characters is written as \( ṁ \) only when they are followed by certain consonants – usually consonants in the same varga. We could then come up with a different expression for each one, using look-aheads\(^{11}\):

\[
\begin{align*}
/ṅ(?=[kg])/ \\
/ṅ(?=[cj])/ \\
/ṅ(?=[ṭḍ])/ \\
/n(?=[tdn])/ \\
/m(?=[pbd])/ 
\end{align*}
\]

and then combine them into a single expression:

\(^{10}\)A look-behind states a pattern to look for that precedes the pattern to be replaced, and is expressed as (?<=).

\(^{11}\)A look-ahead states a pattern to look for that follows the pattern to be replaced, and is expressed as (?=).
4. Methodology: Towards a hypertext critical edition

/ṅ(?=[kg])|ṅ(?=[cj])|ṇ(?=[ṭḍ])|n(?=[tdn])|m(?=[pbd])/ṃ/

In English, this expression could be rendered as:

Replace

ṅ if it is followed by k or g,
ṅi if it is followed by c or j,
ṅ if it is followed by t or d,
n if it is followed by t, d, or n, and
m if it is followed by p, b, or d

with ṁ.

Generally, the more specific the expression is, the faster it will run; however, there are also certain patterns that run more quickly than others, and in this case, the heavy use of the alternator "|" is computationally expensive. It is possible to re-write this rule more generally so that it runs faster, and since we are developing software that collates on-demand, speed is an important consideration. However, there may be certain trade-offs regarding the precision of the expression. More detail on the optimization of these regular expressions is provided in the appendix, as well as a full list of text-critical principles used in the collation of the text. In the user interface, each of these filters can be turned on or off, depending on the requirements of the editor or the reader.

Some normalization rules only apply to certain scripts; for example, in Malayālam script, word-final m is replaced by a nasal that corresponds to the same varga as the following consonant, rather than by an anusvāra – a Malayālam manuscript will read tatvam tu rather than tatvam tu. For these script-specific rules, the software checks the script of the witness that is declared in the mainLang attribute of the <textLang> tag of the file; for example, since manuscript T (University of Kerala MS Paliyam 329) is in Malayālam script, the XML transcription includes the tag <textLang mainLang='sa-Mlym'>, which indicates that the text was originally written in Sanskrit in Malayālam characters.

4.5. Filtering XML tags

The diplomatic transcripts have been extensively marked up using TEI-compliant XML tags. For example, text that has been deleted is marked <del>[deleted text]</del>, and text that has been added is marked <add>[added text]</add>. In the online user interface, four options are provided for the display of each tag: include, hide, ignore tags only, and ignore all.

- Include will cause the tag to be collated and reported if it is a variant.
- Hide will cause the tag and its content not to be shown at all.
- Ignore tags only will show both the tags and their content, but the tags will not be collated.

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- *Ignore all* will ignore both the tags and their content, but they will continue to be shown.

For most XML tags, the default option is to *ignore tags only*. For example, consider two witnesses, one which reads:

jātir vā dravyaṃ vā padārthāv ity uktam

and another which reads:

jātir vā <unclear>dravyaṃ</unclear> vā padārthāv ity uktam

which indicates that when the text was being transcribed, the word *dravyaṃ* could not be clearly discerned from the source document. If the `<unclear>` tag is set to *ignore tags only*, then the word *dravyaṃ* will not show up in the apparatus as a variant, since, if the tag is ignored, there is no difference between the two readings. However, if the `<unclear>` tag is set to *include*, then *dravyaṃ* will show up as a variant, marked as `<unclear>`.

We can also deal with a number of stereotyped TEI constructions that involve nested tags. For example, consider a witness in which a word has been crossed out and corrected in the margin, transcribed like so:

jātir vā dravyaṃ <subst><del>ca</del><add>vā</add></subst> padārthāv ity uktam

This indicates that the *ca* was deleted in the manuscript and replaced with *vā*. In this case, the default options have been set in order to take the replacement text into account while ignoring the deleted text:

- `<subst>` set to *Ignore tags only*
- `<add>` set to *Ignore tags only*
- `<del>` set to *Ignore all*

With these settings, the collation algorithm will effectively read the sentence as

jātir vā dravyaṃ vā padārthāv ity uktam

taking into account only the corrected text, ignoring the deleted text, and also ignoring the fact that a correction was made. On the other hand, we might use these settings instead:

- `<subst>` set to *Ignore tags only*
- `<add>` set to *Ignore all*
- `<del>` set to *Ignore tags only*

In this case, the collation algorithm will read

jātir vā dravyaṃ ca padārthāv ity uktam

taking into account only the deleted text, and ignoring the correction.
4. Methodology: Towards a hypertext critical edition

The *hide* option has been provided in case a reader finds certain transcribed elements distracting, such as line breaks and page breaks. While the default option is simply to ignore the tags so that they do not get collated, they can also be hidden from view. A full list of XML tags used and their default options is given in the Appendix.

4.6. Output

When the editor or reader has selected the texts to be collated and adjusted the collation options, the collation can be performed on demand. The resulting XML is transformed to be displayed as HTML via XSLT. The main text is displayed in a column in the centre, flanked by the apparatus on the right. The text is hyphenated and formatted in order to approximate the experience of reading a printed edition. In addition, the resulting apparatus can also be exported to LaTeX format for printed output.

Since the web is an interactive medium, we do not need to rely on traditional typographic devices such as line numbers, underlining, or reference symbols that have been used in printed editions in order to show where the variant corresponds to in the main text being displayed. Instead, when the user moves the cursor over a variant, the lemma in the main text is highlighted.

As stated earlier, the aim of this hypertext edition is not to radically re-imagine what a critical edition and a critical apparatus might look like in a digital medium; rather, interactivity is employed to improve the experience of reading and to offer the editor and the reader the ability to customize the display of the edition and the apparatus. The different text filters and XML tag options are available in the sidebar on the left (Figure 4.4). Moreover, while the transcriptions are made in IAST, the text...
4. Methodology: Towards a hypertext critical edition

and apparatus can be displayed in a variety of South Asian scripts, such as Devanāgarī. This feature is important not only for readers who may be more familiar with other scripts, but it is also useful for the editor, when checking the transcript against the document, to read the transcript in the same script as the document.

Since all of the witnesses have been transcribed diplomatically, the variants in the apparatus are displayed as they appear in the witness, that is, without orthographic normalization. Again, this is useful both for the editor and the reader; for example, if a word is spelt with an anusvāra ṇ rather than m in a Devanāgarī manuscript, then it is more plausible that it may have been a transcription error, since the anusvāra is usually represented as a simple dot above the śirorekha. Moreover, punctuation that has been ignored during collation is restored in the display; for example, in one instance, the main text reads bhedyabhedakaprastāvena while another witness reads bhedyam | bhedhakapratstāvena. Even though it was only the anusvāra m that caused the collation algorithm to consider this a variant, the daṇḍa between the two words gives the reader further evidence that the m was not merely a scribal error. Line and page breaks are similarly useful. One variant might read ta<1b/>tatvam; here the line break lends credibility to a hypothesis of dittography, so that it should be read tatvatvam rather than tat tatvam.

4.7. Afterword

When Martin West stated that a machine-collated critical apparatus would be clumsy and unselective, the notion of what variants the editor should “select for” was predicated on a number of editorial
4. Methodology: Towards a hypertext critical edition

_assumptions that have since been called into question. A new generation of scholars no longer view the critical edition as authoritative, and some have championed the primacy of the document over the artificiality of a critical text, which has no physical evidence to prove that it had ever existed as a text before it was compiled by the editor. However, at least for Sanskrit texts, there is a clear need for critical editions; without the groundwork laid by textual criticism – so-called “lower criticism” – it would be impossible for higher criticism – poetics, philosophical studies, comparative work – to proceed. Simply put, scholars need a text in order to read, and, in the absence of autographs, we are unable to access the text without comparing its witnesses, which, individually, often contain incomprehensible readings or extensive lacunae. Nevertheless, there is scope for improvement in terms of how we curate the witnesses, and machine collation allows us much greater flexibility in this regard, compared to manual collation – we can be as selective as West demands or as unselective as many contemporary scholars now require. That is not to say that a machine-collated apparatus would not still benefit from some manual fine-tuning by a good editor. But that almost goes without saying; how could we justify presenting a text to readers that we have not painstakingly read over many times ourselves? What we have shown in developing machine collation software for Sanskrit texts is that interfacing with a machine forces editors to think carefully about exactly what text-critical principles they are applying when they edit a text. When these principles are expressed precisely and formally, the machine can do much of the work.

Figure 4.4.: The different types of filters can be configured from the sidebar.
5. Prefatory material

5.1. Transcription and apparatus conventions

All Sanskrit text has been transcribed into Roman script using the IAST standard. However, a number of additional glyphs are also used:

- explicit hiatus (halant or virāma)
- half-letter (i.e., a Devanāgarī consonant missing a vertical bar)
- line filler (i.e., a vertical bar at the end of a line)
- empty śirorekha
- oṁ oṃkāra sign
- oṃ Jaina oṃkāra sign
- l retroflex lateral approximant
- ṛ Telugu valapalagilaka

In the printed apparatus, the following abbreviations and typographical conventions have been employed:

(L. X) line break; X denotes the line number
(F. Xx) page break; X denotes the folio number, and x is either "r" for recto or "v" for verso
text identifies the text either as sic erat scriptum or as unclear
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| text | identifies the text as deleted. A double-underlined space indicates the deleted text is overwritten or illegible. |
| text | in a variant reading, identifies the text as inserted; in the edited text of the commentary, identifies the text as a quotation from the verse |
| X | in a critical note, an underlined siglum indicates that the variant reading in that manuscript may have some orthographic differences from what is shown |
| [OM] | indicates the lemma is omitted in the witness |
| [OM] °text | indicates part of the lemma is omitted in the witness |
| [ADD] text | indicates additional text after the lemma |

Some details have not been reproduced in the print edition – for example, prṣṭhamātrās have not been marked, and the reasons for when a reading is marked as “unclear” have not been printed. This data is preserved in the digital transcriptions, and they are reproduced in the digital apparatus.

Four levels have been included in the apparatus – sources, parallels, testimonia, and variants. These follow, roughly, the guidelines established by the Union Académique Internationale:

- **Sources** provide references for quotations, text re-use, and allusions to earlier texts. These are footnotes marked with arabic numerals.
- **Parallels** record parallel passages in the Prakīrṇaprakāśa as well as other, roughly contemporaneous texts. For verses from the Vākyapadiya, this apparatus records parallel passages in the Vākyapadiya kārikās, the Vṛtti on the first and second kāṇḍa, and the Mahābhāṣyadīpikā. These are footnotes marked with upper-case roman numerals.
- **Testimonia** present quotations of the Prakīrṇaprakāśa and the Vākyapadiya in later texts. These are marked with lower-case roman numerals.
- **Variants** record variant readings in other printed sources and manuscript witnesses. They are not marked in the text, but are keyed by line number.

5.2. Using the online, hypertext edition

This printed version of the critical edition has been automatically generated from the online version, which is available at [https://saktumiva.org/wiki/dravyasamuddesa/start](https://saktumiva.org/wiki/dravyasamuddesa/start).

Positive and negative apparatus

For the critical text with the full apparatus, click on the link labeled “with full apparatus”. The critical text with a full apparatus will be displayed. The following actions are possible:

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1In practice, it is difficult to establish a single standard that fits the needs of all editions across text traditions; see Giannouli 2015 for an overview of different apparatus standards.
5. Prefatory material

- Move the cursor over a variant in order to see the lemma highlighted in the text.

- Click on the variant to make the lemma stay highlighted.

- Text that has been marked by colour, underlining, or other effects have notes attached. Move the cursor over the text to see the note.

- Click on a siglum to go to the transcription of that witness.

- A siglum with a dotted underline indicates the presence of a minor orthographic variation. Move the cursor over an underlined siglum to display it.

- In the text, click and drag to highlight a passage in order to show a positive apparatus.

- In the positive apparatus, click on the symbol to display a cladistic tree.

Generating a new apparatus

In addition, an apparatus of variants can be automatically generated for any witness. In order to do this, first select any manuscript transcription or printed text from the start page as mentioned above. Then:
5. Prefatory material

- Click on the sidebar on the left in order to display a list of other witnesses.

- Select one or more witnesses from the list.

- Click in order to display an apparatus of variants from the selected witnesses.

- A number of additional options are available. See chapters 4.4 and 4.5 for more information.

- In the transcriptions of $K^{Ed}$ and O, page breaks have been linked to digital images of the witness. Click on the page break to go to the image of the corresponding page or folio.

5.3. Witnesses

The critical text is edited from twelve manuscripts and four printed editions. The information presented here has been redacted from the TEI metadata attached to each transcription file. For full details, see the digital edition.

Printed Editions


_script_: Roman (IAST)

Extent: XXI + 338 pages

This book contains a comprehensive critical edition of the verses of *Vākyapadiya*. It does not contain any of the commentaries. After its publication, Rau continued to find manuscripts of the *Vākyapadiya*, and he published articles detailing additions to his critical apparatus:


5. Prefatory material


**Script:** Devanāgarī

**Extent:** 746 pages

**Namaskāra:** || śrīḥ || śrīyaśodānandanāya namaḥ | atha saṭīke vākyapadiye tṛtyakāṇḍārambah | śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ |

This is the earliest published text of the third kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadiya, including the commentary. It is not known from what manuscripts this text was composed, but, as K. A. Subramania Iyer has pointed out, the text is very close to that of V (MS 38824 from the Sarasvati Bhavan Library); however, that particular manuscript contains a number of lacunae which are not reproduced in the edition. Nevertheless, it is clear that the editor was working from one or more manuscripts from the northern branch of the textual tradition, to which V belongs. A digital facsimile of the edition is available at [https://archive.org/details/VakyapadiyaPadakanda1905](https://archive.org/details/VakyapadiyaPadakanda1905). The page breaks in the digital transcription of this manuscript have been linked to the corresponding image.


**Script:** Devanāgarī

**Extent:** 427 pages

**Namaskāra:** śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ | || oṁ namaḥ śrībhagavatpāṇinikātyāyanapatañjalibhyāḥ ||

K. A. Subramania Iyer was the first person to critically edit the Prakīrṇaprakāśa, Helārāja’s commentary on the third kāṇḍa. In preparing his critical text, Subramania Iyer collated the manuscripts V, P, H, T, and C, as well as COL 2393 from the University of Kerala, which no longer seems to be available. As Jan Houben has pointed out, Subramania Iyer’s readings are not always consistent with what appears in the manuscripts themselves. This is possibly due to the fact that Subramania Iyer was often working with transcriptions, which may have included errors. He also seems to have made

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3With some caveats; see the entries for each manuscript for details.

some errors himself; for example, in the case of H, he sometimes misinterprets pṛṣṭhamātra vowels. Despite this, his edition is an important achievement and a vast improvement over the editio princeps, mainly because he had access to southern manuscripts, which often have better readings. Corrections which appear in the Errata at the end of the book have been incorporated into the variant readings as additions and deletions.


Script: Devanāgarī
Extent: 10 + 4 + 6 + 4 + 358 pages
Namaskāra: śrīgaṇeśāmbikābhyāṃ namah ||

Raghunātha Śarmā’s text does not contain a critical apparatus, but it does contain the editor’s commentary, the Ambākartrī. The text adheres closely to the critical edition of K. A. Subramania Iyer, with some additional avagrahas, some silent emendations, as well as some explicit emendations appearing in brackets.

Manuscript Sources

The manuscripts have been divided into a number of branches, based on a provisional stemma (see below).

The “northern” branch

D Delhi University Library MS 5954.29
Script: Devanāgarī
Extent: 341 folios
Material: Paper
Layout: 8-10 lines per page
Date: 19th century

The transcription of this manuscript is based on a black and white facsimile of the manuscript held in Delhi University Library. Due to the poor quality of the facsimile, some readings remain unclear. The facsimile begins on the recto side of the second folio, near the beginning of the jātisamuddeśa until the end of the Kriyāsamuddeśa on folio 341. This manuscript seems to be based on at least two archetypes. Many corrections have been made — possibly by a different hand — which transmit
5. Prefatory material

readings which are common to manuscripts M and P, whereas the ante correctionem readings are preserved in manuscript A. These corrections have, in turn, been transmitted to manuscripts K and V, which seem to be based on D. In addition, some avagrahas have been added in the interlinear space to clarify certain negative words and compounds. Daṇḍas have been inserted just above the line. The corrections are thoughtful and learned, and show an active engagement with the text.

This manuscript is not included in the New Catalogus Catalogorum and was not known to Rau.

K  Asiatic Society of Bengal MS G1114

Script: Devanāgarī
Extent: 239 folios
Material: Paper
Layout: 12 lines per page. Triple black lines framing the left and right margins.
Dimensions: 12.1 cm x 26.7 cm
Date: 19th century
Namaskāra: śriyaśodānandanāya namaḥ

This manuscript, held at the Asiatic Society in Kolkata, extends from the beginning of the Jātisamuddeśa to the end of the Kriyāsamuddeśa. It is very closely correlated with the manuscript from Delhi University Library (D) — it incorporates a marginal gloss from D, āryā, into the body of the main text. Not much is known with regards to the provenance of the manuscript, which forms part of the Government Collection – Haraprasāda Shāstrī, in the preface to the first volume of his manuscript catalogue, writes that the collection began “under the order of Lord Lawrence’s Government in 1808.”

This manuscript is known as RASB VI 4320 in the New Catalogus Catalogorum and F[5] in Rau’s list.

V  Sarasvati Bhavan Library MS 38824

Script: Devanāgarī
Extent: 262 folios
Material: Paper
Layout: 9 lines per page. Impressed guidelines.
Dimensions: 11.6 x 27.4 cm
Date: 19th century
Namaskāra: śriganeśāya namaḥ

4Shāstrī 1917, iii.
The transcription of this manuscript was made from a black and white photocopy of the manuscript, which is held in the Sarasvati Bhavan Library of Sampurnanand Sanskrit University in Varanasi. It is designated as “D” in Subramania Iyer’s edition. It extends from the beginning of the Jātisamuddeśa to the end of the Kriyāsamuddeśa; however, only the first 100 folios were made available for this project. In the manuscript, va and ba are not distinguished, and ī is often mistaken as ā. The consonant cluster dbha is often written as bhda. This manuscript is very closely correlated with the manuscript from the Asiatic Society of Bengal (K); they both seem to descend from the manuscript from Delhi University Library (D). In fact, in one place, this manuscript omits one full line from K, which may indicate that this manuscript was copied directly from K. However, it also has some readings which are more correct than K, namely vākyapadīye where K has vokyapadiye.

This manuscript is listed as SB New DC. X. 38824 in the New Catalogus Catalogorum and F[43] in Rau’s list.

**A**  Rajasthan Oriental Research Institute (Alwar branch) MS 4781  
**Script:** Devanāgarī  
**Extent:** 301 folios  
**Material:** Paper  
**Layout:** 9 lines per page.  
**Dimensions:** 11.3 x 26.5 cm  
**Date:** 19th century  
**Namaskāra:** || śrīganeśāya namaḥ || śrīpataṃjalaye namaḥ || niraṃtaśayasnāvatt_ śrīr

This manuscript is held at the Alwar branch of the Rajasthan Oriental Research Institute. It formed part of the library of the Mahārāja of Alwar, which was catalogued by Peter Peterson in the late 19th century. As Peterson notes, the collection originated with Banni Singh, who ruled Alwar in the first half of the 19th century. The manuscript extends from the beginning of the Jātisamuddeśa until near the end of the commentary on the Kriyāsamuddeśa, breaking off just a few sentences before the end. The manuscript does not seem to be complete. There are a few peculiarities to this scribal hand – ma is often written as nya, and rā as śa.

This manuscript is listed as RORI XXI 4781 in the New Catalogus Catalogorum, F[1] in Rau’s list, and 1170 in Peter Peterson’s Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Library of His Highness the Maharaja of Ulwar from 1892.

**The “European” branch**

**O**  University of Oxford, Chandra Shum Shere MS d. 247

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5Peterson 3884. 3.
5. Prefatory material

**Script:** Telugu

**Extent:** 125 folios

**Material:** Paper

**Layout:** 22 lines per page. Left and right margins framed by double black lines.

**Dimensions:** 10 x 24 cm

**Date:** 19th century

**Namaskāra:** śrīganeśāya namaḥ | śrīpataṃjalaye namaḥ | niraṃtarāyo stu | (Gambier-Parry reads nirantarāyāstu.)

This paper manuscript, written in Telugu script, is part of the Chandra Shum Shere collection at the Bodleian libraries. The text extends from the Jātisamuddeśa until the end of the Kriyāsamuddeśa, although folios 109 to 111 (as indicated by the original Telugu foliation) are missing. As Dominik Wujastyk notes, the manuscript was bought in Varanasi, as part of a private collection of 6330 manuscripts, by the Maharaja Sir Chandra Shum Shere in 1909, and presented to the University of Oxford. The manuscript was bound into book form by the library, and the folios were numbered by Thomas Gambier-Parry in pencil. Gambier-Parry’s foliation differs from the original, Telugu foliation – he begins numbering at the first flyleaf of the book, so that the first manuscript folio is numbered “3”. Moreover, his foliation does not take into account the missing folios.

The different scripts that have been used in the manuscript give an indication both of its provenance and also of the different cultural contexts through which it traveled. Although the text is written in Telugu script, at the end of the manuscript, on the last folio, there are some additions in Devanāgarī script – the title of the work has been written in Devanāgarī on the otherwise-blank verso side, and on the recto side, at the bottom, the last sentence of the manuscript – the section final rubric – has been transcribed from the original Telugu into Devanāgarī script. These additions were, perhaps, made by the scholar who owned the manuscript in Varanasi. Finally, when the manuscript was acquired by the University, Gambier-Parry made a number of additions at the beginning of the manuscript – for example, transcribing the opening invocation of the text into Roman script, writing it in pencil on the flyleaf facing the recto side of the first folio.

For this edition, I have commissioned the digitization of a microfilm of this manuscript (colour images were prohibitively expensive). The images are available at [http://digital.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/inquire/p/809a5212-276f-487f-96ca-17a7d939ac1b](http://digital.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/inquire/p/809a5212-276f-487f-96ca-17a7d939ac1b). The page breaks in the digital transcription of this manuscript have been linked to the images of the corresponding folio.

This manuscript is not included in the New Catalogus Catalogorum and was not known to Rau. It is listed as no. 3800 in the original handlist that arrived with the collection and is numbered 35 in Wujastyk’s Handlist.

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6 Wujastyk 1978, 1.
7 Wujastyk 1978, 2
8 Wujastyk 1994, 167.
5. Prefatory material

L  British Library MS IO SAN 329

Script: Devanāgarī

Extent: 222 folios

Material: Paper

Layout: 12 lines per page. The written area is framed by a border of black, red, and yellow lines. There is an additional, larger black frame that includes the foliation.

Dimensions: 15.2 x 28.6 cm

Date: saṃvat 1862 (1805 CE)

Namaskāra: oṁ śrīganeśāya namaḥ || śrīpatāṃjalaye namaḥ || oṁ

Colophon: || || oṁ || || || śubham astu lekhapāṭhakayoh || || || oṁ || || || saṃvat 1862 jyeṣṭha-su-ddhaikādaśyāṃ samāptikṛtam idam || || || ||

This manuscript was part of the private collection of H. T. Colebrooke, who then presented it to the East India Company Library in 1819. It is now held in the India Office collection at the British Library. The manuscript extends from the beginning of the Jātisamuddeśa to the end of the Kriyāsamuddeśa. The writing is very neat and legible, boxed in by a carefully rendered red, yellow, and black border. Corrections have been made using yellow paste. The manuscript has been bound into book form. The colophon dates it to the third month of saṃvat 1862; this is the only dated manuscript that has been consulted for this edition.

In a letter to E. B. Cowell, dated November 5th, 1895, Colonel G. A. Jacob states that Franz Kielhorn had collated this manuscript “with others in his possession”.

This manuscript is listed as IO 707 in the New Catalogus Catalogorum and F[10] in Rau’s list.

G  University of Göttingen MS SAN 194

Script: Devanāgarī

Extent: 32 + 30 folios

Material: Paper

Layout: 11 lines per page. Left and right margins are framed by two to four red lines.

Dimensions: 16.3 x 21 cm

Date: ~1874

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9Rocher and Rocher 2011, 139.
10This letter has been bound into a copy of the editio princeps of the Vākyapadīya, held in the University Library at Cambridge, available in the rare books room. The letter does not seem to be signed, but it is likely to be from Colonel G. A. Jacob – it is marked “Oakridge, Redhill”, which is listed as his place of residence in the List of Members of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland (Bendall et al. 1924, 15).
5. Prefatory material

Namaskāra: || śrīganeśāya namaḥ || śrīpaṃtajalaye nama || niraṃtarāvamnāvat_

This manuscript is held at the University of Göttingen. It was commissioned by Franz Kielhorn and received in 1874 from Nānā Shāstrī at Sāgar. It is documented in a letter between government officials, dated the 15th of August 1876; in the letter, it is stated that “two copies of the Harikārikāvyākhyāna by Helārāja (grammar)” have been sent to Kielhorn. The archetypal manuscript from which this manuscript was copied is listed as having 74 folios, with 10 lines to a page and 2000 ślokas. The text is incomplete, starting from the beginning of the Jātisamuddeśa and breaking off in the middle of the commentary on the 15th kārikā of the Dravyasamuddeśa. The manuscript contains two copies of the text; the first (G₁) is clearly a copy of the second (G₂). G₁ omits a large section of text corresponding precisely to the verso side of folio 27 in G₂. Each copy is foliated separately, but both of them are bound together in book form; in addition, a page of notes in Kielhorn’s hand has been pasted into the beginning of the book, listing the different sections of the Vākyapadiya and the number of verses in each, along with the manuscripts that were either known to him or that he had surveyed. From these notes, it seems that, in 1874, Kielhorn only knew of two manuscripts of the Dravyasamuddeśa – this one, and the one held at the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.

Both copies contain many errors. Avagrahas at the end of a section of commentary are often rendered as a long ā, frequently resulting in the reading āhā for āha. Anusvāras are often displaced one akṣara to the left of where they should be, and retroflex consonants are sometimes written as dentals.

This manuscript is listed as Gottingen 194 in the New Catalogus Catalogorum and F[16] in Rau’s list.

The “Mahārāṣṭra” branch

M Bhau Dāji Memorial MS 56

Script: Devanāgarī

Extent: 94 folios

Material: Paper

Layout: 13 lines per page.

Dimensions: 11.4 x 24.1 cm

Date: 19th century

Namaskāra: || śrīgopījanavallabho vijayatetarām || oṁ namaḥ śrībhagavatpāṇinikātyāyanapatam-jalibhyah ||

This manuscript is held in the Library of the Asiatic Society in Mumbai. It was formerly held at the Bhau Dāji Memorial until 1882, when it was transferred to Oliver Codrington at the Bombay Branch.

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10 Gough 1878, 203.
12 Kielhorn 1874, 90.
of the Royal Asiatic Society by Vishvanath Naravan Mandlik and Ardaseer Pramji Moos. The text is incomplete, breaking off after the 50th verse of the Sādhanasamuddeśa at the bottom of the recto side of the last folio, leaving the verso side blank. The transcript of this manuscript was made from a monochrome microfilm.

On the top line of each page, the \(i\) and \(ī\) vowel signs, some anusvāras, and clustered rephs are hyper-extended upwards as a decorative element.

This manuscript is listed as Bhau Dāji 56 and BBRAS 53 in the New Catalogus Catalogorum and F[3] in Rau’s list.

P Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute MS 109 of 1881-82

**Script:** Devanāgarī

**Extent:** 76 folios

**Material:** Paper

**Layout:** 18 lines per page.

**Dimensions:** 12.7 x 26.7 cm

**Date:** 19th century

**Namaskāra:** || śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ || oṁ namaḥ śrībhagavatpāṇināyānapatamjalibhyah ||

This paper manuscript was acquired by Franz Kielhorn in 1881 for the Government of Bombay, a government stamp appears twice on the last folio. The text extends from the beginning until a few lines into the commentary on verse 51 (counted as 67 in this manuscript) of the Sādhanasamuddeśa. It is strongly correlated with the manuscript from the Bhau Dāji Memorial, which suggests that they descend from the same archetype. This transcription was made from grayscale photographs.

Often, when the scribe has not left enough space to write the vertical bar for the short \(i\) vowel, he puts a small slash under the akṣara to indicate that it should be read as \(i\). Subramania Iyer, in his collation, misreads this as an \(e\) vowel.

This manuscript is listed as BORI 109 of 1881-82 and P 22 in the New Catalogus Catalogorum and F[24] in Rau’s list.

**The “southern” branch**

H Śrī Hemacandraścārya Jaina Jñāna Mandira MS 7312

**Script:** Devanāgarī

**Extent:** 55 folios

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\(^{13}\)Naravan and Moos \(^{1882}\) clix-clx.

\(^{14}\)Kielhorn \(^{1881}\), 22.
5. Prefatory material

Material: Paper

Layout: 17 lines per page. Left and right margins framed by double lines.

Date: 19\textsuperscript{th} century

Namaskāra: oṁ namo bhagavate rghajñālaśvara śrīmadivya nṛ lakṣmi nṛ sahiyāya || śrīgurubhyo namaḥ ||

This paper manuscript is held at the Śrī Hemacandrācārya Jain Jñān Mandir in Patan, Gujarat. It is written in a Devanāgarī script which alternates between śiromātrā and pṛṣṭhamātrā vowels; this inconsistency led to some misreadings in the critical edition of Subramania Iyer. There are also a number of peculiar glyphs – stha is written as scha, and jya is written as cha; but since these glyphs are quite consistent, the text is very legible. The text extends from the Jātisamuddeśa until the end of the Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa, breaking off after a few words from the beginning of the commentary on the Guṇasamuddeśa. The transcription of this manuscript has been made from black and white printouts of digital images.

This manuscript is listed as F[23] in Rau’s list. It is not listed in the New Catalogus Catalogorum.

T University of Kerala MS Paliyam 329

Script: Malayālam

Extent: 100 folios

Material: Palm leaf

Layout: 12 lines per page. Two stringholes.

Dimensions: 4.5 x 30.5 cm

Date: 19\textsuperscript{th} century

Namaskāra: hariḥ śrīgaṇapataye namaḥ avighnam astu

This is a palm-leaf manuscript held at the Manuscript Library in the University of Kerala, Thiruvananthapuram. It is listed in a Supplemental volume of the catalogue, in Volume VII. It was previously part of the private collection of the Paliyam family, before it was acquired by the University. It seems to be the same manuscript K. A. Subramania Iyer consulted, which he designated as L, since the readings match up almost exactly. However, Subramania Iyer writes that his manuscript only extended until the end of the Saṃbandhasamuddeśa, whereas this manuscript extends from the beginning of the Jātisamuddeśa to the beginning of the commentary on verse 139 of the Sādhanasamuddeśa. Since Subramania Iyer was working with a transcript, it is possible that his transcript did not cover the full extent of the manuscript. There are some signs that this manuscript has been previously collated or transcribed – at arbitrary points in the text, there are slashes and X marks drawn in with a green highlighter, possibly by a transcriber marking waypoints.
On the recto side of the first folio, in the left margin, vākyapadīya has been written at the top and śaṅkarasya has been written at the bottom.

This manuscript is listed as Trav. Uni. Sup 14680 in the New Catalogus Catalogorum; the manuscript that Subramania Iyer used is F[40] in Rau’s list.

Cₜ Adyar Library MS 555

Script: Devanāgarī

Extent: 1108 pages

Material: Industrial paper

Layout: 14 lines per page. The text is handwritten in a notebook with a red border on all four margins. There are 15 ruled lines per page, but the top line has been reserved for page numbers and a running title: vākyapadiyavyākhyāyām on left-facing pages, and dravyasamuddeśa on right-facing pages.

Dimensions: 21 x 16.5 cm

Date: 20th century

Namaskāra: || avighnam astu ||

This manuscript is held in the Adyar Library in Chennai. MS 555 is a Devanāgarī transcript of MS 554, which is a Malayālam palm-leaf manuscript. The transcript has been written with a pen in four bound notebooks filled with lined pages. The commentary is written in black, while the verses are written in red. It covers the whole of the Prakīrṇaprayakāśa, albeit with significant gaps, most likely due to the palm-leaf archetype being severely damaged. The gaps in the text are represented by blank lines with interspersed dots. In K. A. Subramania Iyer’s edition, a different transcript of MS 554 was used for editing the Dravyasamuddeśa.

This manuscript is listed as Adyar D. VI 555 in the New Catalogus Catalogorum and F[17] in Rau’s list. The transcript of MS 554 that Subramania Iyer used is represented by the siglum B in his edition.
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5. Prefatory material

Manuscripts not consulted

The following manuscripts, which are known to contain the Dravyasamuddeśa and Helārāja’s commentary, were not consulted for this edition:

- University of Kerala: COL 2393 is a Devanāgarī paper manuscript that was collated by Subramania Iyer, but as of 2015, it could not be located in the library.
- Asiatic Society, Kolkata: no. 675 in the old catalogue contains the entire Prakīrṇakāṇḍa.
- Oriental Institute, Baroda: no. 315 is a fragmentary paper manuscript that contains verses 7-15. Wilhelm Rau acquired a copy of this manuscript.
- Sarasvati Bhavan Library, Varanasi: According to Rau, no. 40179 extends from the Jātisamuddeśa to the middle of the Sādhanasamuddeśa. The extent of no. 38652 is unknown.

5.4. Stemmatic analysis

A preliminary stemma was constructed based on observations made during the transcription process. It was immediately clear that the manuscripts consulted fall into two main groups – one northern and one southern. In addition, manuscript D shows clear evidence of contamination, with some words from one branch crossed out and replaced by a reading from another branch – for example, where A has sarvavidyānāṃ and T has sarvaśabdānāṃ, D has sarvaśabdānāṃśabdānāṃ. K and V seem to be descended from this contaminated archetype – they both read sarvavidyānāṃśabdānāṃ.

After creating a preliminary draft of a critical text, cladistic analysis was performed using all the transcriptions – including those of the printed editions and my own critical text – as data. The process is as follows:

- The transcriptions were exported as a string of characters, in SLP1 encoding, with spaces removed.
- The strings were aligned using MAFFT.
- The aligned sequences were imported into SplitsTree, where a network was created using the NeighborNet algorithm. Only parsimony-informative characters were considered.
- A tree was created from the network using the neighbor-joining method.

The resulting unrooted tree (Figure) re-enforces conclusions made during the preliminary stemmatic analysis – there is a clear bifurcation between the northern and southern witnesses. In addition, it shows the three manuscripts that are held in European libraries as one branch. The editio princeps, K\textsuperscript{Ed}, is interpreted as an archetype of the northern branch; it is clear that the editor did not have access to southern manuscripts. The three other editions – those of Subramania Iyer, Raghunātha Sarma, and myself – are much closer to the southern witnesses.

\textsuperscript{15}Rau 1971, 35-36.
\textsuperscript{16}Rau 1974, 42.
5. Prefatory material

Figure 5.1: The unrooted tree.

Figure 5.2: The rooted tree.
5. Prefatory material

The tree was then rooted (Figure 5.2), using my own edition as the root text, since I hypothesize that my critical text is the one closest to the earliest archetype. Then, based on observations made in the preliminary stage, a stemma was constructed (Figure 5.3).

Dissenting evidence

While, in the stemma, O, L, and G are a sub-branch within the northern branch, they have some occasional congruences with the southern branch. For example, in the commentary to verse 6, O, L, G, C_T, and T all read *upādhimaddravyam*, while all other manuscripts read *upādhimallīnatā tadā dravyam*. This would indicate a more complex relationship between the southern and northern branches that has not yet been captured by the current stemma. Further study, including a cladistic analysis of other sections of the manuscripts, may yield a more accurate stemma.

5.5. Major differences from K. A. Subramania Iyer’s edition

A number of corrections and minor differences which do not significantly impact the meaning of the text have been omitted here. A full collation of all variants between my critical edition and the
5. Prefatory material

printed editions of Subramania Iyer, Rāmacandra Śāstrī Koṭibhāskara, Raghunātha Śarmā, and Wilhelm Rau can be consulted using the digital edition: https://saktumiva.org/wiki/dravyamuddesa/00-edition?upama_ver=ffwk6x3a6k. The aim of the edition was to reconstruct the text of Helārāja's commentary; Bhartṛhari's kārikās are of secondary concern, since they were thoroughly studied by Rau. Nevertheless, I have occasionally departed from Rau's edition where both the manuscript evidence as well as Helārāja's commentary suggest a different reading; that is, I have tried to reproduce the mūla text that Helārāja was reading in the 10th century.

- p. 90, ln. 7, ātmādvaitavādibhiḥ: Subramania Iyer reads ātmā advaitavādibhiḥ, understanding ātmā to be a pratika from the verse. This seems to be an error carried over from the editio princeps, which reads ātmā | advaitavādibhiḥ.... sattā | dvaitavādibhiḥ....

- p. 93, ln. 6, tadrūpāliṅganaṃ: Subramania Iyer reads tadrūpāliṅganaṃ, following the editio princeps. He does not record the reading tadrūpolliṅganaṃ, which is found in H, T, and C. M reads tadrūpāliṅgānāṃ – the geminated l could be a vestigial trace from -ōlliṅga-. All other manuscripts read -āliṃga-.

- p. 95, ln. 1, atraniyatasvāmika...: Subramania Iyer reads atrāniyatasvāmika..., following the editio princeps. This reading is not attested in any manuscript.

- p. 96, ln. 5, prthakśabdavācyaṃ: This is my emendation, which has no manuscript basis. See the note in the translation. Subramania Iyer reads aprthakśabdavācyaṃ, along with all manuscripts.

- p. 97, ln. 5, suvarṇam ity eva: Subramania Iyer omits this, although it is present in the editio princeps.

- p. 98, ln. 2-3, kṛtapadabandhāḥ: Subramania Iyer reads kṛtapadasambandhāḥ, following the editio princeps. See the note in the translation.

- p. 102, ln. 1, vyāpakatvāt: Subramania Iyer reads vyāvartakatvāt. His reading is not attested in any manuscript, although H reads vyāparttakatvāt.

- p. 103, ln. 6, vicchedo: Subramania Iyer reads 'vacchedo here, along with the editio princeps and the northern manuscripts.

- p. 103, ln. 6, satyo: All printed editions read satyā here, which is not attested in any manuscript.

- p. 103, ln. 8, atattvāṃ: Subramania Iyer reads tattvāṃ here, which is not attested anywhere.

- p. 104, ln. 8-9, vikalpyamānāṃ: Subramania Iyer reads vikalpamātram, which is not attested anywhere.

- p. 106, ln. 7, yathā: Both Rau and Subramania Iyer read tathā here, but I have followed Raghunātha Śarmā's reading, which fits better with Helārāja's commentary.

- p. 107, ln. 8, tac chadbāt tac ca na bhidyate: Subramania Iyer reads tac chabdatattvāṃ na bhidyate, following the editio princeps. I have followed Rau's reading of the verse, which is also clearly what Helārāja is commenting upon.
5. Prefatory material

• p. 111, ln. 8, *tadātmeva*: This is my emendation, which has no manuscript basis. See the note in the translation. Subramania Iyer reads *tadātmaiva*, along with all manuscripts.

• p. 112, ln. 6, *vedyamānaṃ vedyatvād*: Subramania Iyer reads *vedyamānaikavedyatvād*. There does not seem to be any justification for this reading.
6. Critical edition
jātir vṛtvai prakāri...|' iti śuddham upāttam, vṛttau tu 'sarvesām' i...|' iti pi D G, āpi i...|' iti ca ('Iśvarapratyabhijñāvīrtīvimarśinī', ed. Kaul Shāstrī 1983–1984, III, 78-79).
6. Critical edition

ihārthakriyāṃ dravyam evopayujyata iti tada eva pravartakam arthinām | ataḥ sabdena tad evocaye | anabhidyāyamānā tu jātir avacchedikā guḍaśabde mādhuryādaya itevi | ātmāvadāniṁ darśanam | dravyam ca dvividham, pāramārthikham sāṃyavahārīkam ca | tatra dvitiyam bhedyabhedakapratāpaṇe guṇasamuddeśe vāksyati —
vastupalaksanam yatram

ityādinā | anena ca dravyeṇa vyāḍīdārśane sarve śabdā dravyābhidhīyino bhavanti |

iha tu pāramārthikam dravyam nirūpyate | tathā hy ātmādvaitavādibhir ātmaśabdena tad dravyam uktam | ātmaiva hy upādhibhinnaṃ prātiḥāśasāmanāṃ dravyam padānāṃ artha iti teṣāṃ darśanam ihaiva vāksyāṃgam |

vastu svvalaṇakaṃ arthakriyākāari | dravyam iti sākyaṃ uktam |

svabhāva iti sattādvaitavādibhir svabhāva ātmabhūtā satteti kṛtvā | tathā hi kramārūpaṇopasamāhare

iḥārthakriyāṃ | kriyāṃ A | ataḥ | tataḥ O; [ADD] ca M P H; evocaye | evocaye G Gs. anabhidyāyamānā | anadhīdhi G Gs; anadyānī(1.n)dhī G Gs; nabhivyāya H. guḍaśabde | (M)Śś; guḍasabde M; gūḍasabde P; bdena Cṛ. mādhuryādaya | mādhurādaya K V; iveti | raveti A. dravyāvināṃ | dinā P Cṛ. darśanam | da G Gs; dravyam | dravyam G; ca | va G Gs. dvividham, dvividhaka K V; dvividha K V; dvividhama H. darśanaṃ | sāṃyavahārīkam | Ī (OM) Ī sāṃyavahārīkam | sahyā H. ca | va G Gs. tatra | ta A. dvitiyam | [ADD] dravyam H. bhedyabhedakapratāpaṇa | bhedyam bhe M P; (L.3)bhedyabhabdraprapraprapra Cṛ; bhadhyadhabhakapratāvama G Gs; kamalāhyayema V; prahyayema K. guṇasamuddeśe | mudeśe A. vāksyati — vāksyate Śś Ī ś. vastupalaksanam | vasturūpa P; vastturupa G Gs. yatram | (OM) M P. ityādinā | na G Gs; [ADD] darśanam dravyam ca dvī(1.9-1.9)vidham pāramārthikam sāṃyavahārīkam | ca tatra dvitiyaiḥ bhedyabhedakapratāpavatena guṇasamuddeśe vāksyati vastupalala(L.2)ksaṇam yatretyādinā | D. ca | (OM) L; va G Gs. vyāḍīdārśane | vyāḍīdārśane G Gs; vyāḍīdārśa T Cṛ. dravyābhidhīyino | dravyābhidhīyino K V; yinoma A; yine G Gs. bhavanti | bhavati G Gs; pāramārthikam dravyam | pāramārthikam Cṛ. dravyam | draiva P; (OM) T. ātmādvaitavādibhir | ātmā advai Śś Ī Ī kṛtā | tad | ta A G Gs. P T; [OM] H. dravyam uktam | dravyayuktam K V O L G Gs. ātmāvai | ātmāvai P. ātmāvai matamāṇam | matamāṇam (L.8)(SPACE OF 1 LINE)(L.9)(SPACE OF 1 AKSHA)am Cṛ. pratiḥāśasāmanāṃ | pratiḥāśasāmanāṃ G Gs; pratiḥāśasāmanāṃ K. dravyam | dravya K V. padānāṃ | padānān M P. teṣāṃ | neṣām G Gs. vāksyāṃgam | vāksyāṃgam G Gs; vaḵsyāṃga H. vastu | vasta G Gs; [OM] H. svvalaṇakaṃ | svalaṇakaṃ H; svalaṇakaṃ H. svvalaṇakaṃ arthakriyākāri | svvalaṇakaṃ T Cṛ. šakair | šakair K Kair V; śrāukair M; ślokair P. svabhāva | svabhāva D K V A O L G Gs. sattādvaitavādibhiḥ | satādvaiś P; sa cādvaiś H; sattā | dvaiś K. svabhāva | svabhāva G Gs; svabhāva T Cṛ. satteti | sattenti K; satantri V; samteni G Gs; sateti P; satte H. kṛtva | kṛtā K kṛtvā H. krama Upopasamāhre | kramasta l.11)poḥ H; popaṃsahāre G Gs.}

[Add]
sattaiva sattvam iti □ svasambandhibhir upādhibhir upahitabhedā saiva dravyam | prakṛter ekadesaḥ cetanaḥ puruṣaḥ, □ taddvārena śarīrāsaṁścāya avyayakac charīram | pradhānam eveti prakṛtikaiḥ, □ śarīram evaika ātmā □ yeṣaṁ, tait śarīratabhāh | tattvam iti caturbhūtatattvavādibhīśī cārvākāvacya dravyam | prthivy āpas tejo vāyur iti tattvān; □ tatsamudāye śaṁrendriyavīṣayasanjuṁṇeti vacanat | tadv evam etai paramārthata ekam eva vastucyate | dravyam ity asyetai | dravyam nāma yaḥ padārthaḥ, tasyaita eva paryāyāḥ | eteśaṁ eva pārāmnthi-karupāpābhidhāyitvāt | nānye ghatādaśabhādāḥ | saty api tadābhidhāyitye vaksyamānaṁyanayātmādaṁ-


6. Critical edition

bdānām eva sarvatra ghaṭādāv avyāhataprasaratvam | tathā ca bhāṣyam—
eko 'yam ātma uḍakānām nāma

ittyatrātmaśābda uḍake prayuṣyāmano dravyavacanaḥ ākṛtidvāreṇa cānaye śabdā dravye vartante ime tu tatparityāgena mukhyayā vṛttyeti viśeṣaḥ |

siddhe śabdārthasaṃbandhe

ittyatra dravyaṃ nityam ākṛtir anyā cānaye ca bhavati

ittyavadāt bhāṣyakāreṇa nityaṃ dravyaṃ śabdāṃ tatrārthasya nāpattibhavati ity aha |

yadyapi śākyādidarśane nityaṃ na bhavati dravyaṃ
tathāpi tanmatasyānabhāṣyānubhavyapagamād adoṣaḥ kevalaṃ yadasmākām dravyaṃ tad anyair evam abhidhiyata ity evam atropanyāsah ya vā bhāṣyānuṣāreṇa svarūpānāt vikārabhede 'pi nityatvam vivakṣitam eveti sarvatra tatsiddhiḥ || l ||


ākṛtir anyā cānaye ca bhavati dravyaṃ punas tad eva (Mahābhāṣya Paspaśāhnika, ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn, 1972, I, 7).
saṅghrāha etat prādhiyānena pariṣkṛtaṃ nityo vā śāyā kārya vetti tātṛkoṣaḥ pravojanāṇy apy uktiṇi tatra tv eṣa nirnayo yatthe vānye vairābhāpya ubhyathāpi laksanāṃ pravartyam iti || (Mahābhāṣya Paspaśāhnika, ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn, 1972, I, 6).

6. Critical edition

evaṃ darśanāntarāśrayaṇenoddiṣṭeṣv api dravyabhedeṣu svasiddhāntāśrayena sārvatritiṃ dravyapadārthhavyavasthāṃ kartum āha—

satyaṃ vastu tadākārair asatyayai avadhārayate |
asatyopādhibhiḥ K II XIII XV II šabdaiḥ satyaṃ evabhidhiyate || 2 ||

iha sarvasabdānāṃ pāramārthikam tattvam sākṣāt sprāṣṭrum asākṣāt anekopādhiṣayayanihitapadānāṃ tadrūpapadānāṃ vyavahāre samālakṣayate | upādhiṃ cāgamaṃpāyaṣaśāvīdhiratjīvanirvāṇarāṇāṃ arthisārthasamāśāsarapraṣṭutvā cākāradvāreyo | nirākārasya buddhyupāraṇābhyaṃ yathāpratyayam bhīm-
asatyopādhiḥ yale satyaṃ tad va sābdanibhandhanam (Vāpyapādiya 2.127ab, ed. Subramania lyer 1926, 61).

anye tu āhūḥ— yad asatyopādhiḥ satyaṃ sa sābdarthā iti | tatra sābdārthāvane satayayai upādhiyo vīrāṣa vaśāvagudīvikuṇḍa vaya yaṃ sarvasbhedāyūrāyiṃ svavāhādāyūrāyiṃ sāvāmānyātmanah, tat satyasatyayopādhiḥ | sābdaprajñanimittaṃ abhidheyaṃ iti arthe (Panjika ad Tatvasamgraha 889ab, ed. Krishnamacharya 1926, 1. 284).

dravyapadārthavādino pi naye śaṃvitīśaṃvatīṃ tattvam eva sarvasābdārthā iti sambhandhasamuddes śamārthitam— satyaṃ vastu... (Sarvadarśanasamgraha, ed. Śāstri Abhyankar 1924, 3:96).
6. Critical edition

dāvasāyasya bādhyamānatvād anuyāyy abhinnam eva rūpaṃ paramārthataḥ | tad eva brahmārūpaṃ satyam || 2 ||
syād etat | upādhiṣu śabdānāṃ viśrāntyabhāve śabdārthopādhitvam teṣaṃ na syāt | avācyasya tadupādhitvāyogād ity etad vicārayitum āha—

adhruruṇa nimittena devadattagṛhaṃ yathā | 23 XIV vii
grhitam grhaśabdena uddham evābhīdhiyate || 3 ||

ado devadattasya grhaṃ yatrasau kākaḥ pratisvasati

6. Critical edition

ity atra niyatasvāmikagṛhopalakṣaṇāyopalakṣaṇaṅabhūtasya niyātasvāmikagṛhopalakṣaṇaṅabhūtasya kakasyotpātī pī, tasmān upalakṣaṇasya kṛta tva-adhruvatvam anityatvat iti | tadanādarenāva tadupalakṣitaṃ grham abhidhiyate gṛhasabdēṇa yathā tatha prakṛtisambhandhād asatyopādhyupalakṣitaṃ satyaṃ upādhirūpānādareṇa śabdād abhidhiyata ity anabhidhiyānāṁśasyāpy abhidhiyānāṁśayāmakaṭvād upalakṣāntāvate saty upādhiṛtvām nīdārśanaṇaṃ saṃarthtitam | tatha hi—
ktaktavatī niṣṭhā

ity anubandhāṣyāparyaghasamavāyītvaṃ adhruvasypalakṣaṇatva tadrahitasya śuddhasya pratyaya-

kākavadupalakṣaṇamātratvāt iti cet, na, paryāvatvāt | upalakṣaṇam viśeṣaṇam vyavacchedakam iti paryāya eva | devadattagṛhāṃ kāktiti pratītipraṇāṅgī iti cet, na, uktavatvā | yathāsāmayam pratītī iti daṇḍena parībhajakah, kākena devadattagṛham iti nāṇayor vyavacchedakāte viśeṣo ‘sti (Naẏabhisāṇa, ed. Yogīndrānanda 1933, 175). bhaktiś ca dhva-niś cetī kīṃ paryāvava tadṛśyam ? atha prthivītvaṃ iva prthivyā mantra vyāvartaktadharmanupatayā laksanaṃ | uta kākā devadattagṛham saṃbhavvabhāvād upalakṣanām ? (Locana ad Dhvayālokā 1.14, ed. Paṭṭābhirāma Sāstri 101, 140). viśeṣaṇaṃ caturvīdhāṃ vyāvartakviśeṣaṇam upaṇājaṃkavīśeṣaṇam upaṇāḥkavīśeṣaṇaṃ upadhānāḥviśeṣa-
6. Critical edition

rūpasya saṁjñāḥ prasaṅgaḥ  | ity atredaṁ bhāsye nidarśanam uktaṁ || 3 ||
nanu kāko 'tivilakaṇḍān grhād bhedenaśvadhyārayaṁāno mā bhūd grhasabdaṁbhidheyaḥ | ghāṭādasyas
tv ākāraḥ prthaganupalabhyāmānaṭatvāḥ, katham iva tachcabdaṁ nābhidhiyeran | anyoḥ hy upādhir
upalakṣaṇabhūtaḥ sāmānādhikaranayāvacchedakaḥ | tad yathā drītihāras ity atra pāṣuḥ | 4 anyat
tu viśeṣanām prthaksabdavācyam uparaṇjakam | tad yathā vāneyay udayakam ity vanasaṁbandho
pāḍhīyamānarūpaviśeṣam udayakam abhidhiyata iti vanasaṁbandho viśeṣanām uparaṇjakatayābhid-
dheyakam āpadyata iti | tathā coktam—
arthaviśeṣa upādhis tadantavācyāḥ saṁnāsabdo yaḥ |

abhyankar and kielhorn 1972, i, 75). charater drītihārayoḥ pāṣau (āśṭādhyāyī 3.2.25, ed. bohtlingk, 95).
anupādhir ato 'nyāḥ syāc chlāghādiviśeṣaṇaṃ yadvat || [ VII XI XIX XXIII XIX ]

ito āsāṅkya saḍṛṣṭaram atra nidarśanam āha—

svuarnaḍi yathā yuṣṭaṃ svair ākārair apāyibhiḥ | rucakādyabhidhānānāṃ sudddham evaiti vācyatām || 4 || [ XXI XXI XXIV XXII ]

rucakakunḍalādyākāraviṣeṣopādhīyamanānapuṭpahedam api suvāraṃ ity eva sarvatrānapaṭiyuṛpaṃ
yathā soṣayakena lohasmānāṃ sarvaṃ lohaṃ ayaṃ vijñātāṃ syāt | vācārmbhaṇaṃ vikāro nāmadheyaṃ lohaṃ ity eva satyaṃ (Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.1.5, ed. Olivelle 246).
yathā suvāraṃ kayacid ākṛtya yuṣṭāṃ piṇḍo bhavati | piṇḍākṛtya upamṛda rucakāḥ kriyant | rucākāṛtāṃ upamṛdya kātakāḥ kriyante | kātakāṛtāṃ upamṛdya svastikāḥ kriyante | punar āyīṭhā svuarnaṇi-ṇḍaḥ punar aparāyākṛtyā yuṣṭāḥ khāḍiraʒgārasvarvāne kuṇḍāle bhavhatā (Mahābhāṣya Paspaṣṭānika, ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 357 I, 7).

ad tadattvāt tadvācyāḥ samāṇasabdō 'yam-itī ca smaraṇāt (Vidhiśivēka , ed. Gosvāmi 38).

ad vidvihdo 'yupādhir upahitaṃsamāṇaḥdikaraṇas tadvadyādikaraṇaṃ ca | tad yathā | dṛtharāḥ paśū, gṛhīkāya ślāghate iti ca | tatra yathā samāṇaḥsaṃbhādhaḥ sa samāṇādikaraṇo śuṣṭaḥ | tadattvācyāḥ pratyaṣyantavācyo dṛtharāpāyavādhiḥ | na tv asamāṇasabdō samāṇādikaraṇo gṛhīkāya ślāghate iti ādiḥ | na hi gṛhīkātyaślāghādyādikaraṇāvhitē vunī tadantena samāṇādikaraṇaḥ, gṛhīkāya ślāghā 'bhādhiyata ity arthaḥ (Nyāyavedāntād at Vidhiśivēka, ed. Gosvāmi 38).

upāḍīdhābhedānāṃ cēha tulyānyāyavād vīsēṣaṇam apya uṣyate | kvacit tu, tathāḥ bhedaṃ vyaṣṭe bhṛyate | yathā 'nopādhār āyīṭhā bhavati vīsēṣaṇasya vā vīsēṣaṇam iti | 'arthaviśeṣaḥ upādhis tadattvācyāḥ samāṇasabdō yaḥ | anupādhir atonyaḥ syāc chlāghādi vīsēṣaṇaṃ yādvat || iti (Pradīpa at Mahābhāṣya ad Aṣṭādhyāyī 3.11, ed. Bhikaji Joshi III.1).

gotvam ca jātī upādhābhavīyaḥ | tena nāṭịprasaṅgaleḥ | na copādhā abhiḥdhanām | abhiḥditaṣyāpi taccabhodenopahavacchhedakatvadarsanāt | yathā gṛhākāya ślāghate ity eva ślāghopādhābhivito bhūn na ślāghām āhete bhāvāḥ | ....seyām vyadhikaraṇe 'nu-pādhau gathāḥ samāṇādikaraṇaḥ na tv paśvāvāvauṣṭāḥ ardha-prāyaṭāśabdhāvācyatvam eva, yathā dṛtharāḥ śveti | ....yathā ca smaraṅ ca bhaggānaḥ kātyāyanāḥ — tadattvācyāḥ samāṇasabdō 'yam-itī ca samāṇaḥsaṃbhādhaḥ samāṇādikaraṇanāṃ, ya upādhār asau prāyaṭāṣaṃbhāṣaḥvācyāya ity arthaḥ | tasmād vyātikiṇyāya apratisāṭhā jātī asāṣṭāḥ | na ca gośābdād anyad asaṣṭāḥ prāyaṭāyaṃ carītī sāḥ 'pi tena prāyaṭāyayīyēti siddham na vyātikāṭāṃ padārtha itī (Nyāyāvārttikatātparyāyaścād at Nyāyaśītra 2.2.6-3.6, ed. Thakkura 432-433).

tad yathā — katarat suvāraṃ, ya esa rucakaḥ svastiko vārdhamānaka iti | na hy atra rucakādyākāravāde evam pravrīttaḥ suvāraṃśabdo rucakādyākārābhubhatre, uparāteṣu pya rucakādyākārēśu tadyāvacinnavarāṅgatparantām paryāṣayāti | tad uktam — adhruvane nimmātā devadattaṃgūḍhyāṃ yathā | gṛhātaṃ grhasābdenāṃ suddham evābhīdhīyate | suvāraṇḍi yathā yuṣṭaṃ svair ākārair apāyibhiḥ | rucakādyabhidhānānāṃ suddham eve(vai)ti vācyatām | tāthopalaṣaṇe jātāvākṣaṃ atiṣṭhaḥ samāṣṭriye | vyākṣtyā yānti śabdāṃ suddham evābhīdhīyate || (Śrṅgāraprakāśa 6, ed. Raghava 1993.329).

The page contains a passage from a critical edition of a Sanskrit text, discussing the nature of words and their meanings. The text is difficult to translate due to its complexity, but it appears to be analyzing the relationship between words and their meanings in the context of a philosophical or linguistic discussion.

The passage includes references to various sources, such as dictionaries, grammars, and commentaries, indicating a scholarly approach to understanding the text.

The text also includes references to specific Sanskrit works, such as the Mahabharata and the Astadhyayi, as well as the works of prominent scholars like Prakīrṇaprakāśa and Hetuvinda.

Overall, the passage is a detailed and technical analysis of linguistic concepts, likely intended for scholars or advanced students of Sanskrit.
akāraīś ca vyavachhedat sāvārthyaṃ avavadhyate | yathaiwa caśuṣrādīnāṃ sāmartyaṃ nāḍikādibhiḥ || 5 ||
sarvabhāveṣu brahmaṇo dravyalakṣaṇasyābhidhāt tadabdhaidhyātive śabdāṅam sarvatra tasya bhāvat sāvārthyaṃ śabdāntarābhidhiyāmārthatvaṃ sāṅkaryoḥ prasajyetet atredam ucyate | pratiniyaṃ
yadi ky ekānto bhinnam viśeṣayā _syād_ viśeṣaṃ | svānurūpāṃ sādā buddhiṃ viśeṣeyā janayet katham (Ślokavārttika 142, ed. Dvārīkādāsa Śaṭrī 1978, 128). Ṣvānurūpayāṃ iti | viśeṣaṇavartīpurāparatam | yato viśeṣaṇoparatam viśeṣayaṃ grahyayād viśeṣaṃ ucyate, anyathā viśeṣaṃ (tva)svānupapannatvād iti bhāvaḥ | yathoktam – svabuddhyāḥ yena rajyeta viśeṣaṃ tad viśeṣaṃ iti (Paṇiṣṭhā ad Tattvasamgraha 1296, ed. Krishnamacharya 1926, 1, 387), which is a quotation of Ślokavārttika Pratyacitation āṣeṣaṃ | na hy ākṛtipadārthikasaṃ vyavyṣaṃ na padārthoro dravyapadārthikasaṃ vyākṛtāṃ na padārtho | ubhayor ubhāyaṃ padārthoḥ | kasyacit tu kincit pradvānabhitam kincid guṇabhāvam | ākṛtipadārthikasaṃ pradbhāvābhāvam | dravyapadārthikasaṃ dravyam pradvānabhitam ākṛtip guṇabhāvā (Maḥābhāṣya ad Vārttika 53 ad Aṣṭādiḥvyā 1.2.64, ed. Abhyankar and Kilhorn 1974, 1, 246)

ekam āhur anekārtham śabdam anye pariśkāraḥ | nimittabhedaḥ eksaṃ sāvārthyaṃ tasya bhiyate (Vākyapadīya 2.250, ed. Subramana Iyer 1932, 103).

akṛtaṃ ca— akāraīś ca vyavachnedat sāvārthyaṃ | yathaiwa caśuṣrādīnāṃ sāmartyaṃ nāḍikādibhiḥ || (Śriṇāparakāśa 6, ed. Raghava 1906, 329-332).


tākāraparicchinnnavṛttitvāt sarvāranyakāpaṇitabhādnd asāṅkara ity arthaḥ |
ghaṭākārapadānarpurāḥsaram ghaṭāsabdaṇa brahmadravyam abhimukhikriyate, paṭākārapadān-
nena tu paṭāsabdenetādy upādhirūpopahitavivektivam abhidhvāniyam | tad yathā nādiśksuṣirava-
rtmanihitavanānās tavadavākāśāvasthītām evārthabhāγam pāsyānti, tathāvidvācchinnadṛksaktibhir
akārabhedair eva vastūpalakṣyate | tathaiva ca yathādvhyavasāyaṃ śabdānīveśāc chadbād bhi-
yata ity arthaḥ |
yathāvāraṇānīndevanīraiva prakāśāsaktiḥ pratibhadnādi, na viṣayō viṇkriyate, tathānādyavīdī-
vedacchedapralapitatīvibbāgānāṃ jivānām eva sanvedanāsaṅkāt nivrāmyate, yena vicchinnārthabh-
dhvāṇena bhedaviṣayāvabhidhvāṇāni prajyuyante, na tu tattvam abhidvāyavīlikyata iti nādiśks-


6. Critical edition


śabdaniveśāc chadbād |


śabdānīveśāc chadbād
rṣanena sūcayati | nādiṣādibhir ity ādiṃgraṇaḥ avadhānapratigātmatyābhijanādyavardhaḥ | yatraiva hy avadhānaṃ tad evāvadhyāte | mūrtyabhijano rūpasundarṇyam tenāpṛahṛto 'nyam na paśyati || ||

ye tarhy ākāramātraṇiveśaḥ sanniveśādīsabadbāvadhyāte | dravyapadārthavavasthā viśiṣyety etān̄kyāha—

tevā kārēṣu yah śabdas tathābhūteṣu vartate |
tattvātmakatvāt tenāpi nītyam evābhidhyāte || ||

upādhyāmātrasvabhāvēsy api sanniveśādīkārēṣa sanniveśādīsabda vartamanāḥ, paramārthathas tattvād avyayikād upādhyānam tannīṣkāre śvarūpayasyavupātpatvāt taddātmanaiva sattvāt tad eva nītyam upādhyāmad dravyam, evam api abhidhāne 'bhihītam bhavati | tattvam ātma hy upādhyān, nityo vā sanniveśavivaśaḥ saṃyogaviveśanāṃ ca hastyādīśvivaśa hy sākṣīr eva (Dīpakā ad Mahābhāṣya Paspaśāhānika, ed. Bro-nkhoro) (pg 15).

śucayati | sūcayati K V; sūcayati G G; sūcayati (SPACE) P. śucayati | nādiṣādibhir | nālikāṃ M P H T. ityādī | gacā M. ādiṃgraṇaḥ...avardhaḥ | ādiṃgraṇaḥavadhānapratigātmatyābhijanādyavardhaḥ | evavardhaḥ | evatadātmanaiva V; tanni śabdo M P H. nityem A. nityam vartate |

ākāreṣu yah | viśārya° K. nirddeśataḥ K. ōghā | rtyabhijanādyavarodhaḥ | martyabhi ityādi | gra° M. 135 tattvād avyatirekād paśyati || 5 || yatraiva | yatraiva O L; yatraiva | rūpaṃ K V A. 6. Criticaledition

\[\text{Mahābhāṣya Paspaśāhānika, ed. Bro-nkhoro (pg 15).}\]
na tu te tasyātmāna iti vyāpakatvā sarva evopādhayas tadātmāna santas tathaivābhidhiyante | yadā hy upādhamallinatā tadopādhaya upādhyaya na bhavanti | tatas tu niṣkārṣe dharmāntarāśrayatayā svātāntryād upādhiṁattvam eva nopādhitvam XXXII ity āśayaḥ || 6 ||
yady evam dharmānām apy avasthāntare dharmārputvān nityatve satyatve cākāraṇām asatytvam, dravyasya tu satytvam ity etasya niyamasyānupaptattir ity āśaṅkyāha——


6. Critical edition

na tattvātattvavārtha bheda iti vṛddhebhya āgamaḥ | atattvam iti manyante tattvam evāvicāritam || 7 ||
ayam aṭrāṛthaḥ | nehādvaṁtāyane satyatve dve rūpe stāḥ, advaitaḥānāṁprasāṅgāt | kiṁ tu pārāmarthikam ekam evādvayaṁ tattvam | tac cānādīśiddhāvīdāvīlasitasahasam prāmātṛviṣayatayā ya—
thātattvam anavabhāsānām ity anekavikalparighaṅtākārārūpatayā vyavahāram atavatari | tattvāḥ ca tad evākārānātvyānāmavyāpātāvakāśābhāvaḥ |

10 tatra ca yo 'yaṃ prakāśaḥ sā vidyā | aprakāsās tu tamo 'vidyā | na ca prakāśābhāvo 'prakāsā nāma kaścit prāmāṇasiddho nirūpyaḥ | tata ca yo 'yaṃ bhedaprakāśaḥ saivaikaghaṇaprakāśābhāvaḥ prakāsāvichedo 'vidyā | tatra ca vicchinnānayo vyicchedo vadhāyata iti vicchinnaprakāśaḥ satyo vy-|

dayaiva | vicchhadāmātraṃ tv apradhānasyābhāvaḥ na kicmīd avidyety paramātṛthavvacire na kicmīd atavattvam vyavatiṣṭhate | tattvam eva yathāpratibhāsaṃ bhedena cakasad avicāritaramaṇīyaṃ prapaṅco 'tattvam iti vyavahiṣyata iti bhrāmahideḥ | tathā cāvicāritaramaṇīyaṃ parikṣayya vyavasthā-

pitam tattvam evābhinnan tirthikā bhedadarśanavyavasthitā bhedātmakam atattvaṃ manyanta iti

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103 ekama eva brahma sarvasaktitī prāmāṇeṇa siddhe 'smīn arthe 'vidyāparikalpigysa bhāvabhedaṣyāpamārthikata-

tvā kṛyāṇātvyānāmānānaṃ saṅkīdha evaikṣya yukto na tu svarūpbhedaḥ (Prakṛita-prakāśa ad Jātisamuddesa 22, ed. Subramania Iyer kṛṣṇa 34).
6. Critical edition

vicārenāvidyāvilaye brahmaikaniṣṭhatā darśanānāṃ | tad uktam—
satyā viśuddhis tatroktā vidyaiva

ityādi || 7 ||
evaṃ tena rūpeṇa brahmaiva vikalpitaṃ bhavatitī sarvaśabdānāṃ tattadupādhimukhaṃ tad
eva viṣayaḥ saddhaḥ ity aha—

vikalparūpaṃ bhajate tattvam evāvikalpitaṃ |
na cātra kālakhaṇḍḥ 'sti kālakhaṇḍḥ ca grhyate || 8 ||
paramārthato 'vikalpitaṃ vikalpānāṃ avishayo yat tattvaṃ
tad eva vyavahāre 'nyasyābhāvād vikalyaṃ
tvikalpaṃ nānāvidhabhedāvabhāsām anādisiddhiāvidyāvaṣāt samavallambate, jivā-
tmabhedenāvaṭiṣṭhamanāṃ tadgatatveneti mūrtivivartāśrayaṅsaktipravibhaktadesanānātvam ni-

8. vikalparūpaṃ bhajate tattvam evāvikalpitaṃ |
na cātra kālakhaṇḍḥ 'sti kālakhaṇḍḥ ca grhyate || 8 ||
paramārthato 'vikalpitaṃ vikalpānāṃ avishayo yat tattvaṃ
tad eva vyavahāre 'nyasyābhāvād vikalyaṃ
tvikalpaṃ nānāvidhabhedāvabhāsām anādisiddhiāvidyāvaṣāt samavallambate, jivā-
tmabhedenāvaṭiṣṭhamanāṃ tadgatatveneti mūrtivivartāśrayaṅsaktipravibhaktadesanānātvam ni—

9. vikalparūpaṃ bhajate tattvam evāvikalpitaṃ |
na cātra kālakhaṇḍḥ 'sti kālakhaṇḍḥ ca grhyate || 8 ||
paramārthato 'vikalpitaṃ vikalpānāṃ avishayo yat tattvaṃ
tad eva vyavahāre 'nyasyābhāvād vikalyaṃ
tvikalpaṃ nānāvidhabhedāvabhāsām anādisiddhiāvidyāvaṣāt samavallambate, jivā-
tmabhedenāvaṭiṣṭhamanāṃ tadgatatveneti mūrtivivartāśrayaṅsaktipravibhaktadesanānātvam ni—

10. vikalparūpaṃ bhajate tattvam evāvikalpitaṃ |
na cātra kālakhaṇḍḥ 'sti kālakhaṇḍḥ ca grhyate || 8 ||
paramārthato 'vikalpitaṃ vikalpānāṃ avishayo yat tattvaṃ
tad eva vyavahāre 'nyasyābhāvād vikalyaṃ
tvikalpaṃ nānāvidhabhedāvabhāsām anādisiddhiāvidyāvaṣāt samavallambate, jivā-
tmabhedenāvaṭiṣṭhamanāṃ tadgatatveneti mūrtivivartāśrayaṅsaktipravibhaktadesanānātvam ni—


yathā viṣayadharmanāṃ jñāne ‘tyantam asambhavaḥ |
tadātmeva ca tat Siddham atyantratmakam || 9 ||
vijñānavaide viṣayākārasya bhāvato ‘satyatvān nilādis tadgato dharmo jaḍo jñāne ‘sambhavi

tam asya lokayantrasya sūtradhāram pracakṣate | pratiṇambhanyanībhāyanāṃ tana visvāṃ vibhajyate (Kālasamuddeśa 4, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 42).  
jaḍ bhāvābhāvaḥ bhavanti iti vāṣya-visible | jāyate ‘sti viparīnāṭame vārdhate ‘pakṣayate vinaśayīti (Nirukta 1.2, ed. Sarup 1929, 29).

ata eva śvātāntarāśaktiḥ kāla iti vākyapadīye siddhāntitam (Prakīrṇaprabhakāsa ad Kālasamuddeśa 14, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 14).  
6. Critical edition

yatāḥ vikāraraūpāṇāṁ tattve 'tyantam asaṃbhavaḥ |
daṭātmeva ca tat tattvam atyantam atadātāmakaṁ || 10 ||


asaṃbhavaḥ grhaḥvataṃ iti cet, aṃśanīhito 'pi nilārtho nilājñānagrahyāḥ sāyē | kim ca kathāṇcita saṃbhavaḥ sarva-jañānānāṃ sarvārthaḥ aviṣṭaṃ, sarvēṣāṃ kṣaṇikatvāt; tatā ca saiva sarvaṃjñātāṭāṭāḥ; sarvātmanā tu sārūpye 'rthaṅ-
jañānasyāpya jaḍatvam sāyē | yathāhūḥ — "ekadesāna sārūpye sarvāḥ sāyē sarvaṃvadanaṃ | sarvātmanā tu sārūpye jñānam ajñānatām vajret" || (Itātpravāṭikā ad Slokaṇāvadikā Śāvyadāva 20, ed. Ramanatha Sastri et al. 1926, 246). sarvātmanā ca idam ekena vā kenacid atmanā jñānārthayoh sarvātmanāvadanaṃ vā | ekadesāsāryāpya nilam api pitaṃvadhā sar-
rūpam ubhyoh kṣaṇikatvāt asādhārāṇavāc ceta tad api grhaḥvam bhavet | evam ca sarvo sarvāsūṭi sāyē | atadupatāt aṃśaṅghatvam iti ced; na | pramāṇabhāvād nīlabuddhir nīlapīṭāḥ api nālabuddhir nīlād evotpadyata iti na naḥ pramāṇam kramate | api ca nālāḥ api utpattau na pramāṇam ity anantaram eva vākṣyāḥ | samaṃ ca sārūpyam iti na grha-yetaravivekāḥ | sarvātmanā tu sārūpyam atiśṭhamāno jaḍatvam apy arthasva buddhāv adadhyāt | evam cāndhyam eva jaga-
taḥ | yathāhūḥ — "ekadesāna sārūpye sarvāḥ sāyē sarvaṃvadanaṃ | sarvātmanā tu sārūpye jñānam ajñānatām vajret" || (Kāśikā ad Slokaṇāvadikā Śāvyadāva 20, ed. Śāṃbāsvara Śāstri 1927, 101). kīt ca, kathaṇcīt sārūpyaṃ sarvaṃjñāṇāṃ sarvārthaḥ aviṣṭaṃ, sarvēṣāṃ kṣaṇikatvāt, tatā ca saiva sarvaṃjñātāṭāṭāḥ | sarvātmanā tu sārūpye 'rthaṅjañānasyāpya ja-
ḍatvam sāyē | yathāhūḥ — "ekadesāna sārūpye sarvāḥ sāyē sarvaṃvadanaṃ | sarvātmanā tu sārūpye jñānam ajñānatām vajret" || (Nyāyaratnakara ad Slokaṇāvadikā Śāvyadāva 20, ed. Dvārikādāsa Śāstri 1972, 196).
sāṃkhyaśāvīkṛtam pradhānātattvam sarvavīkārgranthi bijāvastham abhinnam anupaśṛṣṭam eva mahādāvīkārārūpāiḥ paramārthaḥ | tad dhī mahādāvīkārārāṣṭaikṣyuktam guṇasāmyavasthātma-kāṃ guṇavaśayayamāvindaravāsopajāyamāvakārārānānātvaḥ vilakṣaṇam eva | atha ca vyavahāre mahādāvīkārārūpāvadhāraṇena vinā tadupalāmbhashāṃbhava iti sarvardārānāt evadhyāvāyayyina | evam asatayākāropadhānena tattvapratiṣṭhānaḥ siddha iti sādhānyavayo 'ṛthagraḥitah | 10 ||
katham punar etad avagamyaṭe, ākāra asatyaḥ, tato 'nyat satyaḥ ity āha—

satyaṃ ākṛtisamāḥre yaḥ ante vyavatiṣṭhate | 11 ||
tan nityaṃ śabdavyācyaṃ tāc chadbāt tāc ca na bhidyate

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tad eva hi nityaṃ yasmiṃs tattvaṃ na vihāyate | 12 ||
guṇavaśayayamāvindaravāsopajāyamāvakārārānānātvaḥ | tad api nityaṃ yasmiṃs tattvaṃ na vihāyate (Mahābhāṣya Pasupāśānāka, ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1977a I. 7).

atha cādṛṣṭaṃsthānabhedopādavāvekaṃ api buddhyā bhedopādavāvekaṃ svaym pratiṣṭaye, parasmai ca pratiṣṭaye, sa eva pratipattikramāḥ śrutayaiva darśitaḥ— "sa eva neti neti" iti, tathāyaḥ— "sātyam ākṛtisamāḥre yaḥ ante vyavatiṣṭhate" (Brahmasiddhi, ed. Kuppuswami Sastri 1937, 26).

6. Critical edition

sāṃkhyaśāvīkṛtam | sāṃkhyaśāvīkṛtapradhānātvaṃ | || sāṃkhyaśāvīkṛtapradhānātvaṃ | M | sāṃkhyaśāvīkṛtapradhānātvaṃ

pradhānāttaṃ | pradhānāttaṃ ta-(l. 5) tvam C | sarvavīkārgranthi | sarvavīkārgranthi

bijāvastham | thecijāvastham G, Gc. | bijāvastham | bijāvastham

nijā T | abhinām | abhinām Gc., Gc.

anupaśṛṣṭam | anupakṣaṇasṛṣṭam Iād; | nupakṣaṇasṛṣṭam Pr | nupakṣaṇasṛṣṭam Pr

anupakṣaṇasṛṣṭam | anupakṣaṇasṛṣṭam Iād; | nupakṣaṇasṛṣṭam Pr | nupakṣaṇasṛṣṭam Pr

mahādāvīkārārūpāiḥ | śopajāmaa Gc.; | mahādaa D K; | dirūpāiḥ M P.

paramārthaḥ | || || (l. 16) thrata P; | thrataṁv P; | mahādāvīkārārūpāiḥ...dhi | [om] V. | mahādāvīkārārāṣṭātikṣyuktam | mahādaa V; | rasyāṣṭikṣyuktam K-ed; | yuktak Gc.; | yuktam P.

guṇasāmyavasthātmakaṃ | guṇasāmyavasthātmakaṃ | mupa Gc., Gc.; | guṇasāmyavaa L H; | "vaśyātmakaṃ V. | guṇavaśayayamāvindaravāsopajāyamāvakārārānānātvaḥ | guṇavaśayayamāvindaravāsopajāyamāvakārārānānātvaḥ C; | guṇavaśayayamāvindaravāsopajāyamāvakārārānānātvaḥ M; | guṇavaśayayamāvindaravāsopajāyamāvakārārānānātvaḥ C;

mahāṃdaa V; | mahādārūpāvī P; | mahādārūpāvī (l. 4) vīc M; | pad adhārāeṇa H; | 20 dhino na Gc., Gc.

vīna | vīna | pinā A; | [om] M P H. | tadupalāmbhashāmhava | tadupalābhaa H; | "sāṃkhyā K.

sarvadārānāeṣv | sarvadesēṣv K-ed A O; | sarvadesēṣv D; | savedēṣv K; | savedesē v; | sarvedesē I; | sarvede Gc., Gc.

avidhyāvāyīnī | tha vidyātuvinī V; | avidyā ca vinā A; | avidyātattvinī L; | vyāhīyāttradhini Gc., Gc.; | "nvāvinī D K; | "yini C;

evam | yavam Gc., Gc. | asatayākāropadhānena | āpay ākāro pradhāa Gc., Gc.; | āsayākāropadhāa O; | āpay ākāro pradhāa L; | "ro pradhānena K-ed D K V A; | "ro pradhānena ca M P. | tatvapratiṣṭhābhās | "timāsāh Gc., Gc.; | bhāyaḥa H.

sādānyavayo | sa(space of 1 akṣara) | adhyā; | T; | sādāhyācayo A; | sārthtthānvayo O L Gc., Gc.; | sādānya(l. 6) yo. | 'ṛthagraḥitah || || || grithaāḥ Sādāl K-ed D K V A O L Gc., Gc., Gc., M P; | rthām grithaā H. | katham | katha Gc., Gc. | etad | etadpaunād H; | [om] T C. | avagamyaṭe; | anugamamyaṭe L; | anyāmamyaṭe Gc., Gc.; | "myaṭe T. | 'nyat | nyata P. | satyaṃ | satvam Gc., Gc.

ity | [ADD] ato A. | satyaṃ | satyaṃ C. || ākṛtisamāḥre | "ätta(2) ti A; | ākṛmisa Gc., Gc.; | "hāro P. | vyavatiṣṭhate | vyavatiṣṭhate K A P H; | vyavatiṣṭoto Gc., Gc.; | tan nityaṃ | täni Gc., Gc.

nitya O. | nitya O. | nityaṃ śabdavyācyaṃ | nisājāvācyaṃ L. | tac chadbāt | tacchabdānt K; | tacchadbān O. | tac chadbāt tac ca | tacchadattavam Sādāl K-ed; | tacchadāntavam V; | tacchadāntavam P; | tacchadbādhvla Gc., Gc.; | tac ca | tatvam D K M; | nityaṃ O. | sat...bhidyate || || [om] C. | bhidyate | | vidyate L M; | vidyato Gc., Gc.; | vidyatai l || [space] P. | eva | eva | nityaṃ | nityaṃ A. | nityaṃ || nityaṃ... | nityaṃ A. | nityaṃ... || (l. 5)(space of 10 akṣaras) || yasmīs | yasmīs | yasmīs A P H; | yasmīs Gc., Gc. | tavam | sūtvam Gc., Gc. | na | nya P. | vihāyate || vihīnyata P.
6. Critical edition

iti bhāṣyānusāreṇaśāta ucyate | tathā hi tatroktam—
kanakam ity eva satyaṃ punar aparayākṛtyā yuktaṃ khadirāṅgarasavarne kuṇḍale bhavataḥ

ity anenaiva dṛṣṭāntena vikārāpekṣayā bhinnasya brahmaṇaḥ satyatocayte | yathā hi tatra rucakādyā-kāropamardena suvarṇam ity eva satyam, evam anantavikāragrāmāpyaye sarvānte vatiṣṭhamānam
anapāyī brahmarūpam satyam, tad eva ca bhāvato nityam | āpeśikam tu jātyādinām vyahāhre nityatvam ucyate | tathā hi vyaktyapaye jātir avatiṣṭhamānāṃ gotvādikā nityā | tatrāpy āsvatāvibhdapaye prthivy eva eva satyam | tatrāpy abādhibhdapaye vasty ity eva satyam sarvānāmprayātāyam |

tatraṃ sanvīdṛūpasyānapayino 'nugamād viṣayākārabriveke tad eva pāramārthikam satyam iti neti

kaṭakākṛtīm upamṛdaḥ svastikāḥ kriyante | punar avṛttaḥ suvarṇapinḍaḥ punar aparayākṛtyā yuktaḥ khadirāṅgarasavourne kuṇḍale bhavataḥ (Mahābhāṣya Pasparāṇīka, ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn [107] I, 7).
6. Critical edition

nety upāśīteti bhāvānayā codyate | saṃvic ca paśyantirūpā parā vāk śabdabrahmamayīti brahma-tattvaṃ śabdāt pāramārthikān na bhidyate | vivartādāśayām tu vaikharyātmanā bhedāḥ | tatra ca tad eva nityam jātyārūpena śabdāvacyam | tatrāpy āntaropādānaviśrāntyā śādārthasambandharūpam ekasya drśyate iti || 11 ||
yad uktam—
tatātmeva ca tat tattvam atyantam atadātmakam
iti tatrātyantam atadātmakatām tāvad vyācāṣṭe |

na tad asti na tan nāsti na tad ekam na tat prthak |
na saṃśrṭam vibhaktam na vikṛtam na ca nānyathā || 12 ||

athāta ādeśo netī neti | na hy etasmād iti nety anyat param asti | atha nāmadṛṣṭaḥ yat satyasya satyam iti (Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.3.6, ed. Olivelle 1982, 66.). athāhāyam āntaro jātā ātīṃ Śūkṣme vāgātmanī sthitāḥ | vyaktye svasya rūpyaśa śa-bdatvena vivartate (Vṛtti ad Vākyapadiya 1.1.77, ed. Subramania Iyer 1966, 174). Verse 1.1.15 in the edition of Wilhelm Rau (47.). idam ity asya vicchinnavimarṣasya kṛtāḥ | ya vassavarāpe viśrīrntāt vimarṣāḥ so 'ham ity ayam (Ātadāprāmā-trśiddhi 15, ed. Kaul Shāstri 1933, 6.).
tasya śādārthasambandharūpam ekasya drśyate (Dravyasamuddeśa 14a).

tāṇi ca vākyāni pratsīkham sarvopādabhyo 'vagantavāyāni | pramāṇānātāram kē pravatpratidipāganaparātavād eva grahiṇāḥ pratyakṣāsya misrañāḥ kṛta eva klesāḥ | uktam ca vākyapadiye 'na tad asti ca tan nāmītāḥ ityādī | vidiyavagmatyāt ca śārīrāvakād avasātavyāt (Manuśhyaṇa ad Manusmṛti, ed. Jha 1932, 490.).

na tad asti na tan nāsti na vāggocaram eva tat (Yogavāṣiṣṭha Nirvāṇapraṇakarana Uṭtarārṇa 31-36cd, ed. Śāstri Pāṇaśikara 1933, II, 1129.).

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[Notes and references are omitted for brevity.]
vaikārikasavaryayavahārāttvatāt pāramārthikena rūpēṇa vikārātmakaṁ tattvām na bhavati | tathā hy āstīti na śakaye vyavahartum | sattvopādhihīkṣaya svarūpasya tattvasvabhāvāyogāt, tenātmanā vyavahārānavatārāt | nāpi nāstity abhāvopādhihīkṣayāyāy atattvāt pramāṇena bhāvātakaṁsakṣaḥ tattvasvāyāvaditattvāt

ekasamkhypādhihīyamānasvarūpiśeṣaṁ tattvām na bhavati | nirupādhihīnaṁ tattvāya vastuto bhinnatvāt | tathā ca—ekam ity apratīteḥ | nāpi prthaktvāhītavīṣeṣaṁ, tadbhinnāsvāsāyatvatvāt | nāpi sāmṣargopādhihīkom bhāvātvmādiḥkam vā, tato dvitiyāṣaya pramāṇenāṇupapattetē | kuto bhinnam vibhaktam ca, kena va sāmṛṣṭam syat

parināmanisedhena vivārtabhūpadgagānām na vibṛṭtām | anekabhāvāgrāmarupatayā cādbhūtāya vṛttyāḥ vivarataṁ avikṛtam ity api na śakaye vyavahartum iti sāravyapadesāṭītaṁ tattvaṁ padaṁ brahma || 12 ||


vaikārikasavaryayavahārāttvatāt | caikāḥ (l.6) rikasavaryayabhaḥ A ; vaikārikasavaryayavahārāttvatāt pāramārthakam tattvatvām bhūtāḥ O ; hāramatīgatvām L G G, pāramārthikena (l.10) pariś cē. tattvaṁ tvatvām A, na na (om) H. āstīti āstāti K V ; āstīti G G, śakaye śakatve L, vyavahartum | vyavahartu L ; vyavahārhu G G, sattvopādhihīkṣaya sattapō T Cē ; sattapō H. svarūpasya svarūpasma G G, rūpasya H. tattvasvabhāvāyogat, tattvasvabhāvāyogat K V ; tattvasvabhāvāyogat pādhihīkṣayamānārauṣṭe K V ; pādhihīkṣayamāna rūpāvibhaktaṁ muḥ K V ; pādhihīkṣayamāna vibhaktaṁ G G, bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē, bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē.

bhāvātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē, bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātvaṁ K V ; bhavātvaṁ Cē ; bhavātva资讯。
atha ca tadātmevāvidyāyām avadhāryata ity āha—

tan nāsti vidyate tac ca tad ekaṃ tat prthak prthak |
saṃsṛṣṭaṃ ca vibhaktaṃ ca vikṛtaṃ tat tad anyathā || 13 ||
bhāvābhāvavākārabhāsajanaṃ āsakti tād eva ‘asti nāsti’ iti ca sattasattopādhiṅkavyanvāhārasyaḥ, bhāvatas tu niḥśattāsattāṃ niḥśadasat pariḥ brahma | vyāvahārīkaṃ caikānekavyavahāraṃ jāti-
vākyātyātmanā tād eva vartaṭi | saṃkhypādhiṃkam api ca | evaṃ saṃyogāpādhiṃkam api anyasaṃ-
sargitayāvābhāsānāt | evaṃ vivekāvasāyas tatra | tathā samastavikārātmanā janyamāṃśānām ivākā-
śādyātmanā kūṭasthatayaḥ tad evāvabhāsata iti tadātmeva tatvam ity uktam || 13 ||
evaṃ ca kṛtvā sarvasya tanmayatvaḥ virodhino ‘pi vyāvahārāṣ tatraśākyopādhiṃkam ity āha—

tasyā śabdārhasambandharūpam ekasya dṛṣṭaye |
tad dṛṣṭyaḥ darśanam draṣṭaḥ darśane ca prayaojanam || 14 ||
vācyavācakasambandhānāṃ bhāvato 'dvayarūpataḥ | tatrō hi āntare tattve śrūtyarthāsakti sāṃsṛjyeta iti bhāvato 'dvayarūpataḥ | tatrō hi āntare tattve śrūtyarthāsakti sāṃsṛjyeta iti bhāvato 'dvayarūpataḥ | tatrō hi āntare tattve śrūtyarthāsakti sāṃsṛjyeta iti bhāvato 'dvayarūpataḥ | tatrō hi āntare tattve śrūtyarthāsakti sāṃsṛjyeta iti

vedyānāṃ vedyatvād eva vedanikaparamārtham, aprakāśasya prakāśamānaśatayogād iti pūrvakāṇḍe 'dvayasiddau paramārthasya tvād bhāvajātaṃ K V. jāvātmā K V. jīvātmā pra pūrvakāṇḍe 'dvayasiddau paramārthasya tvād bhāvajātaṃ K V. jāvātmā K V. jīvātmā pra

3 aparā āha— kramāvān akramanimittam | akramai tvād bhāvajātaṃ sāṃsṛjyeta (Vṛtti at Vākyapadīya 1.44, ed. Subramania Iyer 1922: 102).

apara āha— kramāvān akramanimittam | akramai tvād bhāvajātaṃ sāṃsṛjyeta (Vṛtti at Vākyapadīya 1.44, ed. Subramania Iyer 1922: 102).
6. Critical edition

rmarūpakārakaniṛdeśena kārakāntarasyāpy ākṣepat śiddharūpo vivarthaḥ pratipāditaḥ |

darśanaśabdena ca pradhānakriyānirdeśakena kriyāntarasākṣepat śādhyasvabhāvākriyāvivarto 'py uktaḥ | kālaśaṭṭhayacchinnha hi kriyāvivartah, diśaṭṭhayacchinnnaḥ ca mūrtivivarta iti mūrtikriyāvivartarūpam viśvaṃ pratipāditaḥ |

prayojanaśabdena ca samastakriyāphalanirdeśe ca ṣṭhitih | bhoṭhṛbhoktavrūpeṇa bhogarūpeṇa ca ṣṭhitih ||

iti bhramakaṇḍe pratipāditaḥ | tatraiva ca satattvanirṇayā 'smābhīr vyadhāyī | prakhypākhyātma...
6. Critical edition

kaṃ ca vyavahārasya dvitve śabdārthasambandhaṁ | tad dṛṣṭam ṣaḍāraṇaṁ

ceti bhedenātra nirdeśaḥ | etac cāvidyāmyaṁ rūpaṁ kathyahe | pāramārthikam tu praśāntaprapa

çarūpam vakṣyaati—
yatra draṣṭa ca dṛṣṭam ca ṣaḍāraṇaṁ cāvikalpaṁ |

tasaiavārthasya satyatvaṁ śrītās satyāṁ trayaṁ |

itī || 14 ||
uktam idam—

ākṛtisamāḥre 'nte yad avatiśṭhate tat satyaṁ
itī | tatraśīlā satyānte | ante na kiñcid avatiśṭhate | asad apadam evaitad viśvam āvirbhavatity āsāṅkyāpi
hetunābhinnāraṇapūrpavatvaṁ anavāyukhenā drṣṭāntopakramaṁ sādhayitaṁ āha—

vikārāpagaṁ satyaṁ suvaṁṣaṇaṁ kuṇḍale yathā |

\[1\] yatra draṣṭa ca dṛṣṭaṁ ca ṣaḍāraṇaṁ cāvikalpaṁ | tasaiavārthasya satyatvaṁ śrītās satyāṁ trayaṁ |

(itī || 14 ||
uktam idam—

ākṛtisamāḥre 'nte yad avatiśṭhate tat satyaṁ
itī | tatraśīlā satyānte | ante na kiñcid avatiśṭhate | asad apadam evaitad viśvam āvirbhavatity āsāṅkyāpi
hetunābhinnāraṇapūrpavatvaṁ anavāyukhenā drṣṭāntopakramaṁ sādhayitaṁ āha—

vikārāpagaṁ satyaṁ suvaṁṣaṇaṁ kuṇḍale yathā |
vikalpaganma satyam tathauh prakritam param ||
hundvalavsthantmakavikalpayate hundale suvarnam ekam satyam avatishhate yathah, tathah prthivyav-
divikalpravigame 'nayini prakrit abhinna satyavatishthate ity upayam ||

ekam eva yad amnatam

iti ||

atiinvedam satyam

iti hi srutih | upodbalamatran cunumam | tathah hi nirupakhayad asato 'padad vikaraupradurbhavo na yuktah, abhavasya bhavarpatatvavidhdhat ||

nabhavo jayate bhavo 'nupakhayatam | ekam satyam.

tathah hi nirupakhayatam | cakshri avatithata H.

cakshri avatithata M.

tathah hi nirupakhayatam | cakshri avatithata G.

vikalpaganma satyam suvarnam kundale yathah | vikalpaganma yatra tama ahuh prakritam param ||

iti (Sarvadarusahaan-samgraha, ed. Sastri Abhyankar 1922 309).

vikalpaganma satyam suvarnam kundale yathah | vikalpaganma yatra tama ahuh prakritam param ||

iti (Sarvadarusahaan-samgraha, ed. Sastri Abhyankar 1922 309).
vācyāḥ sarvaśabdānāṃ śabdāḥ ca na prthak tataḥ | 
aprthakte ca sambandhas tayor nānātmanor iva || 16 ||
tattadupādhiparikalpitabhadabahulatyā vyavahārasyāvidyābhūyastve pratiniyatākāropādhīyamāna- 

ānātmanārūpabhadanāḥ brahmaiva sarvaśabdāvādyatvaḥ fasyaiva nigamayitum hi —

vaiśeṣaś brahma, tattvam ityādayo ‘pi hi śabdāḥ samavalambitopādhayo ‘pi dravyātmānāṃ anu parivartante, nirupādhino vāgviṣayātītatvāt |
vāṃmanāsātitaṁ hī tattvam ity upadiśanti brahmavideḥ | ghaṭādiśabdāpekṣayā tv ātmādiśabdāḥ
pratyāsannāḥ | sarvasya ca tannayatvāc chabdā api tadātmakāḥ, yathāvibhaktam prāk | abhede ‘pi
cia pāramārthike sāṁvṛto lokayātrāyāṁ bhedo ‘satya iti ivāsadbhaḥ | ata eva
dviśṭhasambandhopapatthiḥ || 16 ||
nanu cendrajālam idam, yad avadhṛtarūpabhedānām api bhāvānam anādṛtva tattvam anavāsyamā
nābhadedaramārthopadesanām ity āśaṅkya dṛṣṭāntenaitat sādhayitum āha—

ātmā paraḥ priyo dveṣyo vaktā vācyam prayojanam |
viruddhāni yathaikasya svapne rūpāṇi cetasah || 17 ||

ajjanani tathā nitye paurvāparyavivarjite |
tattve janmādirūpapatvam viruddhām upalabhyate || 18 ||

svapnāvasthāgataḥ prapaṇcō jāgaraṇā bādhyaamānāt vā atsya iti sarvāvyādhyapagamaḥ | tenaiva

janmanaranādīkam tadvat_prapaṇcā ca tatrāvidyākalpita iti vedāntatattvam asākam apiśita evam | utkam hi vā-
nyapadiye—’ajjanani tathā nitye paurvāparyavivarjite | tattve janmādirūpapatvam viruddhām upalabhyate ||’ iti | tasmād
avidyādāsāyām uktarītā jātir eva sphoṭaḥ (Vāyūkaraṇabhūṣaṇa, ed. Trivedi कृ 259).

6. Critical edition

vāṃmanāsātitaṁ | vā ma° D K V A O L M. | hi | [ADD] | tat H. | viṣayātityatvāt...tattvam | vā viṣayāti-
tahitavat P. | hi tattvam | vittavat Cṛ. | ity | [OM] | H T. | upadiśanti | upapā O. | brahmavideḥ ||
brahmaviddaḥ A; brahmavi O. || ghaṭādiśabdāpekṣayā | kyayadi° O L; tu ya/(L 6)di sa° M; kyayadi sa° D; yadi sa° KEd A; tu yadi śabdop e° P; yadi śabdāpekṣeyā K V. | sarvasya | sarva O. | ca | va K V; [OM] Cṛ. | tā-
nayatvāc chabdā | tannayatvāt tadiātmatāt H; tannayatvāc śabdā T. | tādiātmaḥb | tādiātmikāv D K V O L M. | tathāvibhaktam | yathācits C M P. | prāk | abhede | ṣaktyabhede M; ṣaktyabhede P. ca | va K V. | pāramārthike | 6ṛtikaṃ K M P. | pāramārthike śaṁvṛto | 6ṛtikasamvaṃ K V. | śaṁvṛto | samsṛṣṭato M P; samsṛṣṭo H. | pāramārthike...lokayātrāyāṃ | (SPACE OF 18 AKṢARAŚ) yam Cṛ. | lokayātrāyāṃ | traika° M P; lokālayāy V. | bhedo | bheda P. | dviśṭhasambandhopapatthiḥ || dviśamp° P; dvisasam° O; dvisasam° L; dviśāsām° K V A H. | cendrajālam | cedra O; cedrājālam K V; cendrajālam L. | idam, | idraṃ L. | yad avadhṛtarūpapabhedānām | padavivṛta° L; padavavyṛta° O. | avadhṛtarūpapabhedānām | avavṛta° D K V A; avadhṛtam upa° M P. | bhāvānām | sambhāvanāsādhyasambhāvanām M P; bhāvanān H. | anādṛtya | anāvṛtya KEd D K V A O L H; anādṛśya T. | anādṛtya tattvam | anādṛtattvam O. | tattvam | tatām Cṛ. | anavāsyamānābhadedaramārthopadesanām | ava° H; avanīyamānāpa° O; avasīyamānapa° KEd D K V A o L M; avasīyamānāpamārthopadopanade° P; mārtōhopadesanām SEd Kd; rhikopadesanām Cṛ. | dṛṣṭāntenaitat | dṛṣṭāntenetat V; ṣaivaḥ H. | paraḥ | para K V; pari O; yadi L; pārah T. | priyo | priyau A. | dveṣyo | dveṣyau p. | vaktā | vaktā O. | vaktā vācyam | vakāvyaṃ L. | ātmā...prayojanam | [OM] ātmā...prayo Cṛ. | prayojanam | prayojanā(SPACE) P. | yathaikasya | yathyi O P; yathākasya H. | svapne | sāpne K. | viρuddhāni | ...cetasah || [OM] V. | 8 cetasah || vetāsah K A; cetasa || H. | ajjanani | ṣaiva H. | atanmatti K; ajjananī H. | paurvāparyavivarjite | paurvāparye vivakṣite O; vaktise L. | tattve janmādirūpapatvam | [OM] V. | janmādirūpapatvamJanmādirūpapatvam T. | jānmaśūryapatvam viρuddhān | pataviruddhām T. | upalabhyate || upalayate(SPACE) A. | svapnāvasthāgataḥ | svupnā° A. | svapnāvasthāgataḥ prapaṇcō | gataprapaṇcō Cṛ. | jāgarayā | jāgara(L 10)ṇa T. | bādhyaamānāt | bādhyaamānāt L; bādhyaamānā H. | asatya | satya P. | sarvāvyādhyapagamaḥ | sarvādhyābhīyuo M P. | tenaiva | [ADD] | ca H.
drśṭāntena jāgarāyam api bhāvabhedas turiyadaśayām ananuvṛtta satyo 'vasthāpaye | yat kila sarvāvasthāv saṃvinnātmāṇaṃ bhavān | tathā hirāgadayaḥ sakhādayaś cāsvabhāvatvāt
saṃvinnātmāṇaṃ na vi kuvanti | tathāvasthābhedo 'py anekākārakālukṣyopahatoh |
tatra svapne viruddhākārolekho vaikalpiki ḍṛṣṭiḥ pratīpramāṇīyataḥ | vaikalpiki hi manovyāpāra
nusāri saṃsāri bhoktā, sa ca bhāvata cetanatvād brahmaiva | tathā ca tāvati svātāntreṇāṃ nirmitāv iśvaro 'nanyopādānāt, bhavān ābhāsyopabhuṅkete priyāpriyārūrapatayā gādveśādmāyena saṃsārama
mohena svaparivibhāgānusāri parasaṃkathādiṣu | tad āhur vedāntattavānupuṇāḥ—
pravbhājyātmānātmāṇaṃ śṛṣṭvā bhavān prthagvidhān |
6. Critical edition

sarveśvārah sarvamayāḥ svapne bhoktā pravartate || 5

itī | bhokteti vacanāt pratyaṅgatāṃsrṣiṣṭi iyam uktā | tasya ca sarveśvaratvāt brahmārūpatvāte srṣṭi-sā

marthāyam uktam | sarvamayatvāc cānanyopādānavicītrabhāvāravacānām atmopādānām āhuḥ | atā eva pravṛbhajyātmanātmānām itī kārtkarmabhadhābhāvāc va caikalpiktavam asyaḥ srṣṭiḥ spuṭṭam uktam | bāhyopādānā tu jāgārayām aśivari srṣṭi viśvaśabdavācāyā sarvaprāmatṛsādhiḥraṇā | 6

sthiravāsthiravatvagrāvāśeṣāṁni mītāna bhedaḥ | 7

anvīya pravṛttirūpā NAVĀT punar asyatātī samā
daiva | kevalam satyam anvīya vām apo mohaḥ cichakhter āvārako nada | 8

dvāsāda tādvaśād atraia

| 9


bhābīhrprajāḥ vībhūḥ vīvo hy antahprajānaḥ tu tajjāhaḥ | ghanaprajāḥ sarthā prajāja iti eva eva śīhyārādhaṃ (Āgamaśāstra (Gauḍapādākārikā) 1.1, ed. Bhattacharya 1943). 

ānyathaḥ grihyaḥ svapno nidrā tāttvam ajānataḥ | viparyāyā tayoh kṣiṇe turiyaṃ padam asūte (Āgamaśāstra (Gauḍapādākārikā) 1.15, ed. Bhattacharya 1943-7).

**Note:**
a tasya svapnapadārāthī bhāvāntyena pravartamānāḥ sarvakarītvvalaṃsaṃsaṅgaśattīpratibandham udhīvavantī a-
saṃsaritī | kṣiṇu svatantarāṃ svāsaṅkāya yathāṁ tān srjāti | yathāḥ bhartrihārīḥ 'pravṛbhajyātmanātmānāṃ srṣṭvā bhāvān prthagvadhānā | sarveśvārah sarvasaktīḥ svapne bhoktā prapadyate || itī | ita eva svapnasvāntṛtyāṃ etat — ity uktam | tasya svapnejajagārayor viśeṣo niṣṭi, — itom vaṃsaḥvarniṃbhāvāḥ dasa evaṃtā (Vṛtti ad Spandākārikā 4.4, ed. Chatterji 1903. 102). 

**Note:**

athāh 'svapnā' tejo'vasthā brahmaḥ | kutaḥ ? ity āha 'prakāśamāhātmyāt' iti... idam arthā-

dalādā ayataṃ yat sa eva bhagavān svavabhāvo devaḥ tattatpramātṛtāṃ samavīśtaḥ svapnayāmānaḥ svātmānam eva prakāśasvāntṛtyāḥ grha-narāṭṭādi-anepkṣamātṛtvacītṛyāṃ pataya pravṛbhajya pratiprāṃtṛ svapne asādhaṇaṃ eva viṣṇuṃ prakāśāyayat eva, — iti bhavāntyena svāntṛtyena svapna eva brahmaśvābhāvābhāvābhāvābhāvavat | yata dvedantē uktam | pravṛbhajyātmanātmānāṃ srṣṭvā bhāvān prthagvadhānā | sarveśvārah sarvamayāḥ svapne bhoktā prakā-

śate || iti prakāśāmāhātmyātmya eva atra hetuḥ, ataḥ svapne bhoktā pravibhajyātmanātmānaṃ sarvamayaḥ sarveśvaraṃ āyātaṃ yat sa eva bhagavān svavabhāvo devaḥ tattatpramātṛtāṃ samavīśtaḥ svapnayāmānaḥ svātmānam eva prakāśasvāntṛtyāḥ grha-narāṭṭādi-anepkṣamātṛtvacītṛyāṃ pataya pravṛbhajya pratiprāṃtṛ svapne asādhaṇaṃ eva viṣṇuṃ prakāśāyayat eva, — iti bhavāntyena svāntṛtyena svapna eva brahmaśvābhāvābhāvābhāvābhāvavat | yata dvedantē uktam | pravṛbhajyātmanātmānāṃ srṣṭvā bhāvān prthagvadhānā | sarveśvārah sarvamayāḥ svapne bhoktā prakā-

śate || iti prakāśāmāhātmya eva atra hetuḥ, ataḥ svapno bhraṃnaḥ tejo'vasthā — iti (Vṛtti ad Paramārthasāra 35, ed. Chatterji 1904. 77-78).

**Note:**

manu svapnakārapatī 'pi jāgaritavastunā na svapnavadavastuttvam | atyantacalo hi svapno jāgaritam tu sthīram lakṣayate (Śaṅkarabhāṣya ad Gauḍapādākārikā 4.38, ed. Röer 1845. 547).
6. Critical edition

bhṛntavābhīmāno 'ṛvagṛḍśām | paramārthadṛśām tu jananamaraurahite 'prāv bhakte kūṭaṣṭhe parasmin brahmaṇi cidānandarūpe sarvam eva jagā jāgratsvapnādyavasthāghataṃ mūrtikriyāvivartarūpaṃ asatyam | anavayīcitāmānātmāṃ tu paramārtha iti siddham | viruddham upalabhya iti vadān avidyāyāṃ virodham abhyupaiti | etad eva hy avidyāyāḥ svarūpaṃ yad anupapa-dyamānam apy ābhāsopagamam nayati, upapannatve vidyaiya svat | tasmād asatpraṇapaṇcaprakāśanaṅakti brahmaṇo 'nādisiddhā grāhya-grāhākayugalam svānurūpaṃ uparacayya jagannātyām ātanotity avicārītaramaniyāṃ imām apanayanti tattvadvāraḥ | 17-18 | iti bhūtrājatanayahelāraṅkṣetra prakāśapraṃśe dravyasamuddeśo dvitiyāḥ ||

[yathā hi kalpanāmātrasāraṃ tata evanavasthiitakārūpaṃ kṣaṇena kalpanāsatasahasrasaham svapnādvilakṣaṇaṃ apy susūltauraṃ hṛdayagrahnidānam atyatkasvalambanabrahmakalpanaḥpracāritam rāmarāyanaiḍi cetitaṃ asatyam kuto 'py abbhitāt bhātvātīṛtyā bhāti | tathā bhasanam api ca pumaradhupadesopāyataṃ eti | tathā tādrg eva visvam idam asatyamanāmupapraṇapracāritam (Ābhinaivaḥbhārati, quoting from a lost work by Bhāṭṭanāyaka: Fragments of Bhāṭṭanāyaka, ed. Chintamanī 268). Pollock reads atyakṣaśvālambanāṃ (2316, 458, note 17).

7. Annotated Translation
Preliminary remarks

Square brackets enclose words which are supplied by myself; round brackets indicate the Sanskrit word which is being translated. Sources and parallel passages mentioned in the footnotes to the translation can be found in the relevant apparatus of the critical edition.
It was said that the object of a word can be a genus (jāti) or a substance (dravya). Of the two, it has already been established [in the Jātisamuddeśa] that, according to Vājapyāyana, the object of a word is a genus, i.e., a qualifier; [now,] in order to establish that, according to Vyāḍi, the object of a word can also be a substance, i.e., that which is qualified, [Bhartrhari] will declare what, according to different schools of thought, is, in fact, substance, using [different] synonyms [for dravya].

It is also [called]: ātman, vastu, svabhāva, śarīra, and tattva. These are synonyms of dravya, and it is traditionally taught that it is permanent.

Since, in this [system of thought], only a substance can be employed in purposive action (arthakriyā), it is only [the substance] which impels purposeful persons (arthin). Therefore, only [the substance] is expressed by a word. The genus, on the other hand, which serves [only] to differentiate, is not expressed [by a word], just as the [qualities of] sweetness, etc. [are not expressed] by the word “jaggery” (guḍa) – [this is] according to those who say that the substance [is expressed by a word].

Moreover, this verse seems to echo verse 45 from Nāgārjuna’s Acintyastava (1994, 199). In the Acintyastava, the phrase ity api refers back to the preceding verse: “it has been called [by you] ‘the dependent (reality)’; but the supreme reality is non effected. Also (it could be) called: an own being, the primary matter, the truth, the substance, existing entity” (trans. Tola and Dragonetti 1985, 33, emphasis mine). As Tola & Dragonetti note, using these positive descriptions to denote absolute reality is surprising “in the context of Mādhyamika philosophy” (1985, 49). This verse, in particular, has raised questions about the authorship of the Acintyastava, although Tsuda Akimasa’s recent review of the scholarship on this topic concludes that it was composed either by Nāgārjuna in his later years or by someone else just after his death (2016, 173). Verse 41 is even more forceful: “That is regarded as the truth, the supreme reality, the suchness, the substance [dravya]; that is the not deceiving element; through its knowledge (bodha) one is called buddha” (trans. Tola and Dragonetti 1985, 32).

The source for this example is probably the Mahābhāṣyadīpikā (ed. Bronkhorst 1987, 15). The Yuktidīpikā also has a similar example (ed. Wezler and Motegi 1998, 73). In his commentary to the Vṛttisamuddeśa, Helārāja reverses the simile – it could also be said that dravya is not expressed, and that it is only a differentiator (bheda) for the jāti (ed. Subramania Iyer, III, ii, 305). This is perhaps why Helārāja emphasizes that this example here is presented according to the dravyavādins; for a jātivādin, it would be equally valid to use this same simile to come to the opposite conclusion – that only the genus is expressed by a word.
the substance is of two sorts: absolute (pāramārthika) and conventional (sāṃvyavahārika). The second one of these will be elaborated upon in the Guṇasamuddeśa, with reference to “the differentiated” and “the differentiator”, [in the verse] beginning with

“That, for which [a pronoun], to mark a particular object,...”

It is with reference to this substance [in the conventional sense] that, according to Vyāḍi, all words denote the substance.

But here [in this chapter], the substance in the absolute sense is examined. That is to say – according to the proponents of the non-duality of the Self (ātmādvaita), the substance is conveyed by the word ātman. For it is really the Self – that is, the substance, manifesting as differentiated by delimiters – which is the object of words; this view of [the ātmādvaitins] will be explained in this very [chapter].

The Buddhists say that vastu, that is, the object characterized only by itself which is the instrument of purposive action, is the substance.

Svabhāva: according to the proponents of the non-duality of Being (sattādvaita), svabhāva, which is [really] the Self, is Being. That is, since “when its sequential forms have been withdrawn, Being is a substantive,” it is really [Being] – to which difference is attributed by delimiters, which are its own adjuncts – which is the substance.

The sentient person is part of the primordial matter – in that way, since there is no distinction between the body and the embodied, the body (śarīra) is the substance, namely, the primordial; thus it is said by the proponents of the primordial matter (prākritika), those embodied selves for whom the unitary Self is really the body.

The Cārvākas, proponents of the four elements, call the substance tattva, because it is said that “earth, water, fire, and air are the elements (tattva), [and] in the combination of those is what are

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5In extant manuscripts, this verse is in the Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa. See Houben 1992, 85 & 100.
6“That, for which a pronoun is employed to mark a particular object (vastu), is said to be the substance (dravya). [Its] meaning is expressed as something to be differentiated” (Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa 3, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 187).
7This is an echo of Dharmakīrti’s well-known assertion that only the concrete object (vastu) can be an instrument in purposive action (arthakriyā). See the Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti (ed. Gnoli 1963, 84).
8“In things such as cows, it is really [the universal] Being which is differentiated according to [its] different adjuncts.... when its sequential forms have been withdrawn, it is called a substantive” (jūtisamuddeśa 33-35, ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 42).
9Helārāja seems to be referring to the Śaṅkhyaśas here. However, the Yuktidipikā lists prākritikas as opponents of Śaṅkhya doctrine (ed. Wezler and Motegi 1998, 2). Kumar & Bhargava understand this to be a reference to materialists, i.e., Cārvākas (Bhārgava and Kumar 1982-1994, 1, 2). The term sarātman, which Helārāja uses here, also seems to point to a sort of materialism, in which the soul is really the body; for example, compare Helārāja’s formulation, sarāra evaika ātma, with a similar one in Yamuna’s Ātmasiddhi: deham evīmeti bārhaspatyāh (Śūdayatra, ed. Ramanujacharya 1974, 12), which names the Cārvākas as the proponents of that view. The Jain philosopher Śīlāṅka has referred to Śaṅkhyaśas as ātmaṣaṣṭhavādinās, proponents of the ātman as the sixth element, and grouped them with the Cārvākas (Bhattacharya 1980, 35). For him, the difference is that the Śaṅkhyaśas consider the ātman to be distinct from the bhūtas, while the Cārvākas consider them to be identical – yathā tīmāsāṣṭhavādinaḥ sāṁkhyādanyo bhū-tayatiriktam ātmānam abhyupagatavanto yathā ca cārvāka bhūtāyatiriktam caitanyakhyam ātmānam isṭavantācathā... (Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtravṛtti, ed. Mahārāja and Jambūvijayajī 1978, 17). Here, Helārāja clearly intends for prākritikas and Cārvākas to be different groups. He seems to be using the term prākritika in the sense of prakṛtivādin, which is attested as referring to the Śaṅkhyaśas.
termed the body, the senses, and the object. In this way, they say that, with respect to the absolute, [tattva] is really a unitary reality.

“Of dravya”: the object of a word is the substance, for which only these [words] are synonyms, because only these [words] denote the absolute. That is not the case for other words like “pot”, etc. Even though words like ātman denote [the absolute], it will be shown later that their scope is not obstructed at all when it is applied to [things like] pots, etc. For example, when it says in the Bhāṣya, “this single entity (ātman) is water,”1 the word ātman, used in the sense of “water”, expresses the substance. And by means of a genus, other words can [also] express the substance. But the difference is that these [words like ātman], having abandoned [the genus], [denote the absolute] as their primary function. In [explaining] the Vārttika “the word, its object, and their relation are permanent”, [Patañjali,] the author of the Bhāṣya, saying that “the substance is permanent while the form changes again and again,”12 teaches the substance to be permanent. Because [Patañjali] is reiterating the notion of [substance] as it was spoken of in the Samgraha [of Vyāḍi], [Bhartṛhari] says that it is “traditionally taught” (smṛta).

Even if, according to the Buddhists, etc., the substance is not permanent, even then there is no fault [in our argument], because [we] do not accept their doctrine. What is being stated here [in this verse] is that it is really our [notion of the] substance which is denoted by others [using those synonyms]. Or alternatively, if we follow the Bhāṣya, [there is also no fault, since] something cannot really be different from its own nature; even in the case of different transformations [of a thing], it is permanence that is really intended, and therefore [permanence] is established in all cases.

2

While, in this way, the different [senses of the word] dravya [can] also be described according to other doctrines, in order to establish that, in all cases, based on our established doctrine, the substance is the object of words, he says:

2 The real entity is determined through its unreal forms; only the real is denoted by words, which have unreal delimiters.14

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10 These two phrases are attributed to the Cārvākas in many texts. In Bhattacharya’s reconstruction of the Cārvākasūtras, he lists them as sūtras I.2 and I.3 (2011, 78). It is also very similar to a passage in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra which enumerates the dravyas (1.1.4, ed. Jambūvijayaji 1952, 2).
11 “Now how is it known that qualities are differentiators? It is thus seen in the world: ‘This single entity is water; because of its different qualities, it becomes different – this is cool [water], this is warm [water]’” (Mahābhāṣya ad Aṣṭādhyāyī 1.1.1, ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, 1, 41-42).
12 Mahābhāṣya Paspaśāhnika (ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, 1, 7).
13 In the Mahābhāṣyadiṭīkā, Bhartṛhari displays quite a different attitude to the Buddhist doctrine of impermanence: “According to those who adhere to the doctrine that [all is] momentary (i.e. the Buddhists) eternity is uninterrupted continuation” (trans. Bronkhorst 1957, 81). Rather than rejecting the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness, like Helārāja does, Bhartṛhari interprets the notion of an unending progression of moments as a sort of permanence. Moreover, it has been argued that Bhartṛhari does not exclude heterodox traditions, like Buddhism, in his contention that the science of grammar is applicable to all schools of thought (Houben 1993, 306-307).
14 asatyopādhibhiḥ śabdaḥ is translated by Rau as “durch Wörter benannt, welche das Irreale zum Substitut haben”,
7. Annotated Translation

In this [doctrine], [although] all words are unable to directly touch absolute reality, [and although] their basis is fixed in objects which have numerous delimiters, in the world (vyavahāra), it is observed that they manifest absolute reality by its characteristics. Because the ability of delimiters – whose own independent nature is suppressed because of their ephemerality (āgamāpāya) – to completely fulfill the wishes of multitudes of people (arthisārtha) is impeded, [the operation of words] does not cease at the level [of the delimiter]; thus, words are established as dependent (prṣṭhapātin) on the object that is marked [by the delimiter]. And because they are based on a determined object (avadhṛtarūpa), the operation of words with respect to their object is in accordance with how [that object] has been determined (avadhāraṇa), and determination (avadhṛti) takes place by means of forms (ākāra). This is because something without form cannot arise as a cognition. When the ascertainment of difference, according to [one's own] conceptions, is obstructed, what follows after [this obstruction] is precisely the undifferentiated entity, in the absolute sense; that very reality is brahman.

3

This [objection] is possible: if words do not stop [operating] at the [level of] delimiters, then they would not be able to delimit the object of a word, since what is unexpressed is not able to delimit [the object]. In order to dispute this [objection], he says:

3 just as Devadatta's house is grasped by a temporary mark, [but] only the bare [house] is denoted by the word “house”

[When someone says,] “That one is Devadatta’s house, the one on which that crow is perched”, because [the crow] has been made into a marker for [the house], even when the crow, which is a marker – in order to mark the house of a given owner –, has flown away, it is temporary, i.e., impermanent. Just as, precisely because we disregard [the crow], [only] the house which is marked [by indicating that words have unreality as their delimiter. However, if we follow the Mahābhāṣyadipikā, Bhartṛhari seems to understand delimiters (upādhi) as universals (jāti) (ed. Bronkhorst 1987, 15). Hideyo Ogawa, similarly, translates the phrase as “through its forms which are unreal” (2000, 9).]

15 nihitapada, here interpreted in the sense of padaṃ nidadhāti, literally “to set foot in”, or metaphorically “to make an impression on” [Eindruck machen] (Böhtlingk and Roth 1855, IV, 445). Possibly in a similar sense as kṛtapadabandha in the commentary on verse 4 below, which seems to mean “having a firm footing on something”.

16 Instead of tadrūpolliṅganam, Subramania Iyer reads tadrūpāliṅganam, following the editio princeps. Hideyo Ogawa translates this as, “Although all words cannot directly touch on ultimate reality, they can embrace it (tadrūpāliṅgana) if they get a footing in the domain of its various delimiting factors” (2017, 14). For ullingana, cf. ullaṅgay, °yati, “aus Merkmalen erschliessen” (Böhtlingk 1879, I, 253) and Pāli ulliṅgeti, “makes manifest, shows by its characteristics” (Cone 2003, 512).

17 arthisārtha is often understood as a group of petitioners or supplicants. This compound is often used with reference to the mythical Kalpa tree, which is said to grant every wish. For example: sakalārthisārthakapradramah (Pancatantra ed. Edgerton 1924, 3), sarvārthisārthakalypānakalpana (Avadānakalpatātra 3,55, ed. Chandra Das and Vidyābhūshana 1943, 75), kalpavṛkṣo ‘rthisārthānāṃ (Yogavāsiṣṭha 5.8.2, ed. Śāstrī Paṇaśīkara 1937, I, 562).

126
7. Annotated Translation

the crow] is denoted by the word “house”, in the same way, because of the relationship [of words] to
the primordial matter. reality, which is marked by unreal delimiters, is denoted by words, because
we disregard the delimiter itself; therefore, since even what is not denoted can restrict the scope of
the denotation, [we have established] the function of [the crow] being a marker; thus, the function
of a delimiter [even if it is ultimately disregarded] is established by that example. To illustrate, in the
sūtra
ktaktavat nisṭhā

[it is explained that] since the anubandha [k] – which is temporary because it does not persist in
verbal usage – is [merely] a marker, there would be no over-extension (prasāṅga) in applying the
technical term [nisṭhā] to the bare form of the affix [ta or tavatu], separated from [the anubandha];
this example is given in the Bhāṣya.

4

Objection: the crow, being determined as different from the house which has completely different
features [from it], would never be expressed by the word “house”; but [conversely], how could [you
possibly say that] forms such as a pot, whose substance (tattva) is not perceived separately [from
its form], should not be expressed by those words [like “pot”]? For on the one hand, a delimiter,
i.e. a marker, delimits [the substance] by being co-referential [with the substance] – for example,
the [delimiter] “pack animal” (paśu) [which restricts the scope of the word] “bag-bearer” (dṛtihari).

viśeṣaṇa (ed. Veṅkaṭanāthācārya 1969, 132), whereas in the Advaitasiddhi, it is defined as opposed to viśeṣaṇa (ed.
Nārāyanaswami Sastri 1937, 31-32). Here upalakṣaṇa and viśeṣaṇa are in opposition. As Hideyo Ogawa points out,
Helārāja seems to imply that upalakṣaṇa is an adventitious qualifier, while viśeṣaṇa is an essential qualifier (2017, 16
note). An objection will be raised below, reversing these terms.

20See Dravyasamuddeśa 16.
21Aṣṭādhyāyī 1.1.26. This sūtra states that the technical term nisṭhā applies to the affixes kta and ktavatu, which form
past participles. In the Mahābhāṣya, a discussion ensues over whether these affixes can be recognized even without
the anubandha marker k, since, for example, when kta is applied to the verb bhū to form bhūta, the k is absent. But
there are words, such as garta, which seem to have the same affix, but which are not past participles. How, then,
would someone recognize when kta is really the kta affix? As Patañjali argues, the context in which the affix can be
used – in this case, to form the past participle – helps one to recognize it (ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 75).

22Sāmānādhikaraṇyena, literally, because they share the same locus. The grammatical meaning of sāmānādhikaraṇa,
“grammatical agreement in case”, does not seem to apply here, since the counterexample that follows, vāneyam
udakam, also features both words in the same case.

23This argument is also presented in the Nyāyavārttikatātparyatikā of Vācaspati Miśra (ed. Thakkura 1996, 432-433).
There, the thesis that the particular individual (vyākta) is the object of a word is examined. In that case, the genus
(jāti) would be a delimiter, and although unexpressed, it could still delimit the individual. The example given is
gārgikayā ślāghate – according to rule A 5.1.134 gotracaraṇāc chālghūtyākāratadaveteṣu, the affix vuṇ can be applied
to words that signify a lineage, such as garga, to form gārgika, but only on the condition that it is used in the context
of praise (ślāgh), etc. In that way, the upādhi “praise, etc.”, even though it is not expressed by the affix vuṇ, delimits
its usage. But a counterargument is raised – in the case of rule 3.2.25 harater dṛtānāhāyok paśau, which prescribes
the IN affix to form words such as dṛtihari, “bag-bearer”, the delimiter, paśu, “pack animal”, is expressed by the affix.
That is, when one says dṛtihari, one is using it as a synonym for paśu. Therefore, it cannot be true that a particular
individual is expressed by a word, whereas the genus, which delimits it, is not expressed.
On the other hand, a qualification (viśeṣaṇa), which is expressed by a separate word, is something that colours (uparañjaka) [the object]. For example, in “forest water” (vāneyam udakam), water is denoted as a particular object that is delimited by its connection to the forest; thus the connection with the forest becomes a qualification, which denotes [that connection] as a colouration. Thus it is said:

A delimiter, which is a characteristic of the object [of the word], is expressed by the affix [of the word] and is co-referential with the word. On the other hand, a non-delimiter is different from that, like qualifications such as śālgh, etc.

Thus having raised this objection, he now presents [another,] more apt example:

4 just as gold, etc., is endowed with its own, transient forms, [but] it is really the pure [gold] that is expressed by denotations such as “ring”, etc.

Although it [appears] differently as it is delimited by specific forms such as ring, bracelet, etc., it is really the gold that is, in all cases, the intransient reality; thus, since the purposive action that should be accomplished [by the substance gold] cannot be effected by those specific forms, [since they are] transient, words like “ring”, etc., are not based (kṛtapadabandha) solely on [forms like ring, etc.]. Rather, [those words] equally apply (samāviśanti) as denotations, to [the same] concrete object, which surpasses [its forms]; in the same way, because of the relationship [of words] to primordial matter absolute reality, even though multiplicity is attributed to it by its forms, is the scope of words. That is what is meant. And [in the verse], the word “transient” points out that the reason [given by the opponent, arguing that forms really are expressed] is itself yet to be proven [and thus

24 Although all available manuscripts read aprthakśabdavācyam here, I have emended it to prthakśabdavācyam, following the sense of the passage. Bhartrhari uses the term aprthakśabdavācy in the Vṛttisamuddeśa to say that both jāti and dravya can be “expressed by the same word”. Helārāja glosses it, in one instance, as ekasabdopādānātve, and, in another instance, as dvayor api sabdopādānātve (ed. Subramania Iyer 1972, 313).
26 This verse, in āryā meter, is untraced, although it is attributed to Kātyāyana in Vācaspati Miśra’s Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā, where it is partially quoted (Thakkura 1996, 433). It is also partially quoted in Maṇḍana Miśra’s Vidhiviveka and Vācaspati Miśra’s Nyāyakanikā commentary thereupon (ed. Gosvāmī 1984, 318). It is quoted in full in Kaiyaṭa’s Pradīpa commentary on the Mahābhāṣya (ed. Bhikaji Josi 1987, III, 1).
28 See the parallels in the Prakīrṇaprakāśa to the Sambhandhasamuddeśa and the Vṛttisamuddeśa. Houben understand this compound to mean, literally, “by which a footstep is made”, understanding padabandha as a “footstep” (1990, 403 and 413 note 927). However, it is more likely to mean “planting one’s feet”, as in devadattena padabandham kṛtvā nārācaḥ kṣiptaḥ (Sanīghbhēdevavastu, ed. Gnoli and Venkatacharya 1977–1978, I, 63), “Devadatta, having planted his feet [firmly on the ground], loosed the arrow”. Ingalls et al. have translated padabandha as “foothold” (Locana ad Dhvanyāloka 3.29, 1990, 487–488). Subramania Iyer reads krtapadabandha here.
29 In the Pāṇinian tradition, samāvesa means the application of multiple designations to a single object. This is discussed in the Mahābhāṣya on A 1.4.1 – Patañjali, giving an example of samāvesa, says that Indra, Śakra, Puruhūta, and Purandara all apply to the same object (ekasya dravyasya) (ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 296). Here, Helārāja seems to be saying that different words, such as “ring”, or “bracelet”, all ultimately refer to the same piece of gold.
30 See Dravyasamuddeśa 16.
invalid], and therefore, the unexpressedness (avācyatva) and unreality (asatyatva) of delimiters is established. [That is,] because purposive action is not effected [by delimiters] precisely because [delimiters] are unreal (asatyatva), and because verbal communication has [purposive action] as its aim, [delimiters] are not expressed (avācyatva). That is what is meant.

Objection: [if delimiters are not expressed], in [a word] such as “ring”, only the persistence of the original substance (prakṛti) would be determined [by the word]. [Reply:] even in this case there is no fault, because objects exist inasmuch as they are cognized (jñāyamānatvena), cognition (jñāna) cannot have its foundation in forms which are conceptual constructs, and therefore the persistence of mere formless, pure consciousness is established through one’s own awareness [of it] (svasaṃvit-siddhi).32

Objection: since the denotation of the qualified as coloured (uparakta) by the qualifier is correct, what is the mistake in [considering that there is] the denotation of a subordinate element? There is none whatsoever; with a view towards the true import (tātparyadṛṣṭi) of [the argument], it is merely [the view that words have] their basis (padabandha) solely in delimiters themselves that is refuted [by the objection]. But let [delimiters] be denoted as a secondary feature; as long as [the operation of denotation] does not cease [at the level of the delimiter], [the fact of all words] referring to the substance is established.

31 Helārāja seems to be arguing that the objection stated in the introduction to the verse – that delimiters are co-referential with the delimited object – is invalid because those delimiting forms, such as ring, etc., are not permanently associated with the object, since gold can be melted down and reformed into a different shape. On the topic of the logical fallacy sādhyasama, see Matilal 1974.

32 This argument seems to be based on a passage from the Mahābhāṣya, where someone objects that one should not be able to use the word “pigeon” (kapota) to refer to the corpse of a pigeon, since “pigeon” should refer to a living thing. Patañjali replies that “according to the view that the original substance (prakṛti) persists in its transformations, even in this case there is no fault” (ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1974, II, 325). Albrecht Wezler calls this doctrine sarvasarvātmakavāda, “according to which everything that represents a prakṛti, whatever the position it occupies in a given causal chain, does not cease to exist as such when it passes out of visibility”, disputing the interpretation of Hartmut Scharfe, who argues that Patañjali is referring to satkāryavāda (Wezler 1986, 166, see also Scharfe 1961, 155). In any case, Helārāja has modified the argument so that the prakṛti that persists in all things is really consciousness.

33 This objection echoes Kumārila Bhaṭṭa’s argument against the Buddhist view that the object of perception is an unqualified particular (svalakṣaṇa). In the Ślokavārttika, Kumārila argues that a qualifier (viśeṣaṇa) always produces a cognition of the qualified that conforms to the qualifier itself (svānurūpa) (Ślokavārttika Pratyakṣasūtra 142, ed. Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī 1973, 128). In the Tattvasaṃgraha, Śāntarakṣita quotes this verse, and Kamalāśila, in his commentary, glosses svānurūpa as “coloured by the nature of the qualifier (viśeṣaṇasvarūpoparakta) – since a qualifier is said to cause the qualified thing to be grasped as coloured by the qualifier, otherwise there would be no such thing as a qualifier” (ed. Krishnamacharya 1974, I, 387). While both the Tattvasaṃgraha and the Ślokavārttika raise counterarguments, Helārāja accepts this objection, with a caveat – that the qualifier is grasped as a secondary feature, rather than as the primary referent of the word. This recalls Patañjali’s pragmatic solution to the jāti/dravya problem: “For one who holds the word-meaning to be the individual, the individual is primary and the generic property is subordinate (guṇabhūta)” (ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1974, I, 246). This concession will also prove useful in refuting the argument raised in the next verse.

129
Following from that [argument] – because [the object of denotation] is coloured by qualifiers, he is able] to refute the fault of confusion [that might arise otherwise]; he says:

And the capacity [of a word] to mean everything is restrained because [the object] is differentiated by [its] forms, in the very same way that the capability of the eyes, etc., [is restrained] by a hollow stalk, etc.

Because there is no difference between brahman – which is characterized as the substance – and all [other] entities, [all] words would denote [brahman] (tadabhidhāyitve śabdānām), therefore [brahman] would be present in all cases [of denotation] (sarvatra tasya bhāvāt); and thus the capacity [of a word] to mean everything, that is, the confusion which is the state of having its object being denoted by [all] other words, would result as an unintended consequence. This is what is said in [the verse]. [But] since the activity [of each word] is restricted by the form [that is secondarily de-noted] in each particular case, [words] are prevented from meaning everything, and thus there is no confusion. That is what is meant.

The substance that is brahman is presented by the word “pot”, attended by the form of the pot as a support. In the same way, with the form of a cloth as a support, the word “cloth”... etc.; thus, the discrimination imposed by the delimiter is meant to be expressed. Just like [people] whose eyes are directed through a hollow tube see only that part of an object which is contained by the scope of [the tube], in the same way, the real object (vastu) is marked precisely by those different forms, [by people] whose capacity of perception is restricted by nescience. And therefore, because the basis of verbal usage (śabdānivesa) is in accordance with [one’s own] mental apprehension (adhyavasāya) [of the real object], it is denoted by words. That is what is meant.

When only the ability of a sense faculty to manifest [an object] is blocked by something such as a covering, the object [of perception] does not change. In the same way, when only the capacity for consciousness (samvedanaśakti) of the individual selves (jīva) – who are conceptualized as distinct [from brahman] through the delimitation [brought about by] beginningless nescience – is blocked, so that [multiple] expressions, which each have difference as their content, are employed [in the

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34This argument, besides referring to the objection directly preceding, also recalls the objection raised in the introduction to verse 4. There, the opponent states that a qualifier operates through colouration (uparañjaka), and that it is not expressed by the word that it qualifies.

35The metaphor being employed here is, perhaps, that of an attendant (puraḥśara) who leads someone ahead to present them before an audience. See also Abhinavagupta’s use of unmukhābhavati in the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī (Ratié 2010, 470-471).

36dṛkśakti is usually understood as the capacity of the perceiving agent, although the syntax here (…dṛkśaktibhir ākāra-bhedair) seems to suggest that it is the different forms which possess this capacity. Raghunātha Śarmā interprets this as tathāvidvīdhāḥ paricchinnadṛksaktayāḥ puruṣaḥ ghatādyākārabhedair eva vastuto ‘bhinnam api vastu brahmariṣṭam bhinnam iṣṭa paśyanti’ (Śarmā 2013, 214). “Individual beings, in such a way [i.e., as if their eyes were looking through a tube], whose capacity for perception is restricted, see the real object, that is, brahman – even though it is really undifferentiated –, through different forms such as pot, etc., as if it were differentiated”. I have followed his interpretation in my translation.
place of] a [single] expression for a [single] object that has been divided (vicchinna)\(^37\) the essence [of reality itself] is not defiled by nescience; this is what he indicates by the example of the hollow stalk. [When he says in the verse,] “through a hollow stalk, etc.”, because of the word etc., [one understands] an obstruction, such as something born of beauty (mūrtyabhijana), which blocks one’s attention (avadhāna); for where there is attention paid towards an object alone, it is only that object which is ascertained (avadhāryate). “Something born of beauty”\(^38\) means the beauty of a [particular] form; someone who is distracted by it does not see another [object].

6

[Objection:] in that case, words like “configuration” (sanniveśa)\(^39\), which are based solely on form [and not on substance], would denote solely a property [and not the property-possessor], and thus the fact of substance being the object of words in all cases would be demolished. Having raised this objection, he says:

6 The permanent [substance] is denoted even by a word that expresses [solely] forms of such a kind, since [those forms] are identical with the real.

Words such as “configuration” express forms such as a configuration, even though their real nature is merely [to act as] delimiters. [But] because delimiters are ultimately not separate from reality, when they are extracted from [reality], their real nature has no [independent] real nature, and thus they are real only in as much as they are identical with [reality]; therefore, it is really that permanent substance, the substrate of delimiters, which is denoted, even when such a denotation [in which a word like “configuration”, expressing only a form,] is used. For delimiters have reality (tattva) as their identity (ātman), but they are not the identity of reality; because of this pervasion [of reality in all delimiters, existing through their identity [with reality], [can be] denoted precisely in that sense. For when the substrate of delimiters (upādhimat) is concealed, delimiters are not delimiters [of anything]. However, when [a delimiter] is extracted from [its substrate], because it is independent in so much as it is a substrate for other properties (dharmāntara), it is really a substrate for [other] delimiters, rather than a delimiter itself\(^40\). That is the intention [of the verse].

\(^{37}\)That is, the term brahman, which denotes a universal self, is expressed using multiples of the term jīva, which denotes individual selves. See the commentary on verse 7 where Helārāja glosses vicchinna and viccheda, which has been translated there as “interrupted” and “interruption”.

\(^{38}\)Here Helārāja gives a gloss for mūrtyabhijana, suggesting that mūrtyabhijana is a technical term that is quoted from another source. However, I have yet to find this term elsewhere. It is also possible that this sentence was originally a marginal gloss in a manuscript, which was eventually incorporated into the text itself.

\(^{39}\)In the Mahābhāṣyadīpikā, Bhartṛhari defines a genus (ākṛti) as a specific configuration (sanniveśaviśeṣa) that is qualified by connection (saṃyogaviśeṣana) (ed. Bronkhorst 1987, 15).

\(^{40}\)A parallel example is given in the Prakīrṇaprakāśa to verse 3 of the Guṇasamuddeśa. A quality (guṇa) in and of itself, when it is extracted from the substance that it qualifies, does not have degree; it is only when the quality acts like a substance, in that it is a substrate for other qualities, that it has degree (ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 204).
[Objection:] If, in that way, even properties – since [you say] they are [really] property-possessors in this alternate state – are permanent and real, then this principle – that forms are unreal, and [only] the substance is real – is untenable. Having raised this objection, he says:

There is no difference between the real and the unreal, [according to] the tradition [passed down] from the elders. What [others] think is “the unreal” is really the real which has not been [properly] examined.

This is the meaning here: in this non-dualist system of thought, real and unreal are not two things, because consequently (prasaṅgāt), the [doctrine of] non-duality would fail. In fact, absolute reality is really singular, i.e., non-dual. And that [absolute reality], which supports the manifestation [brought about] by beginninglessly-established nescience, does not appear according to its true nature as an object of cognition for [any given] perceiver; thus, in the guise of forms that are agitated by multiple conceptual constructions (vikalpa), [reality] becomes fit for worldly transactions. And therefore, it is really that [absolute reality] which appears as having differences in its true nature which are inferred from the manifoldness of [its] forms, not anything else, because there is no other thing that is distinct from it.

And among [the real and unreal], that which is manifestation (prakāśa) is knowledge. That which is non-manifestation, i.e. darkness, is nescience. [But] non-manifestation – that is, the absence of manifestation – cannot be established by any valid means of cognition at all. And therefore, nescience – the manifestation of difference – is really just the interruption of manifestation, that is, the absence of the manifestation of [reality] as a single entity. And in that case, if “interruption” (viccheda) is understood as the persistence [of reality] being interrupted (vicchinnā), then [even that] real [albeit] interrupted manifestation (vicchinnaprakāśa) is really knowledge. However, nescience, [if it is understood as] only interruption (vicchenedamātra), whose own nature is subordinate [to that which it interrupts], [then it] does not exist whatsoever; therefore, when considering the absolute truth, no such thing as the unreal is tenable at all. According to those who know the Vedas (brahmanda), it is really the real, appearing differently according to [one's own particular] representation [of it], which is termed the unreal – captivating if left unexamined –, that is, the proliferation (prapañca) [of phenomenal reality]. And therefore, [the unreal], which is captivating if left unexamined, is established through analysis as really the real; it is this undifferentiated real which our
opponents, who maintain the doctrine of difference, think is the unreal, which is difference; by reflecting upon this, nescience is dissolved, and [all] doctrines are established in the singularity of brahman. Thus it is said:

Only the true, pure [knowledge] taught [in the Vedas]... etc.

8

In that way, it is really brahman that is conceptualized by this or that form; thus it is established that all words really have [brahman] — by means of delimiters proper to this or that [form] — as their object. Thus he says:

8 It is really the unconceptualized real which assumes the form of conceptualization. And there is no temporal difference in it, yet temporal difference is grasped,

It is really the ultimately unconceptualized – that is, not within the scope of conceptual constructs – real, which – being conceptualized in ordinary [verbal] transactions, because nothing else exists – embraces (samavalambate) conceptualization – that is, manifesting as manifold differences under the influence of beginninglessly-established nescience, [and] taking the form of different individual souls, in a way that corresponds to [each individual]; thus, the manifoldness of space, divided by the power of spatial extension (dik), which has material proliferation (mūrtivivarta) as its substrate, is capable of supporting causal succession. In that way, although not impelled by time, the real, which is without beginning or end, manifests [temporal] succession – referred to as the transformations of existence such as birth, etc. – under the influence of [the powers of] obstruction and permission, which rely on the power of independence called “time”. That is what is meant.

9

Objection: there should be no manifestation, in reality, of something that is not existent. Having raised this doubt, he settles it with [this] example:

9 just as the properties of the object of cognition absolutely do not belong to cognition itself, and, although seemingly identical, it is established that they are absolutely non-identical,

He says that, according to Vīñānavāda, because the form of the object of cognition is essentially unreal, a property which belongs to [the object], such as blue, which is insentient, absolutely does
not belong to the cognition [of blue], which is sentient; therefore, the sentient and the insentient cannot be identical, [even] in part. Thus it is said:

In the case of partial identity, every [cognition] would cognize every [object]. But in the case of full identity, knowledge would become nescience.

10

And therefore, a cognition, tinged by properties which do not belong to it, manifests in the ordinary world where nescience operates, even though its real nature is pure consciousness; thus he also gives another valid example:

just as transformations [of the real] absolutely do not belong to the real, and, although seemingly identical, the real is absolutely non-identical [with its transformations].

The untransformed primordial reality of the Sāṃkhyas, a knot of all transformations, in a seed state, [and] undifferentiated, is, ultimately, not burdened by [its] transformations like mahat, etc. For, possessing the power to transform into mahat, etc., [when it is] in the state in which all qualities (guna) are equalized, [primordial reality] is completely different from the manifoldness of [its] transformations which arise by force of the conflict [that occurs] when the qualities [of sattva, tāmas, and rajas] are unequal (gunaśāmāsīvyāyavimardha). And since, in the world, the perception of [reality] is impossible without the ascertainment of [its] transformations such as mahat, etc., in all doctrines, nescience is always present. Since, in this way, the manifestation of the real as supported by unreal forms is established, the concomitance between what was to be proved (sādhyā), [that the real manifests as unreal forms, and the reason (hetu), that perception is affected by nescience,] is understood from the meaning [of the verse].

11

Now how is this understood, that forms are unreal, while what is different from them is real? [In reply,] he says:

That reality which remains at the end, when all forms are destroyed, that is permanent, that is expressed by the word, and that is not different from the word.

This [verse] is stated according to the Bhāṣya:

46Pramāṇavārttika 3.4.34 (ed. Tosaki 1988, II, 115). As Birgit Kellner points out, there are two versions of this verse – one which was transmitted within Buddhist tradition, and another, with the verse halves reversed, which was transmitted outside the tradition (Kellner 2009, 180 note). The version Helārāja cites is the latter, corresponding to the verse as it is quoted in the commentaries on the Ślokavārttika.

47Both Rau and Subramania Iyer read tathā here. However, Helārāja’s reading seems to be yathā, since he considers this verse to provide another example for the principle stated in verse 8.

48For gunavaśāmyavimardha, see Sāṃkhyakārikā 46 (ed. Prasad Sarma 1924, 4).
For it is that, whose essence is not destroyed, which is permanent.\footnote{Mahābhāṣya Paspaśāhnika (ed. Abhyankar and Kielhorn 1972, I, 7).}

Moreover, it is said there [in that passage in the Bhāṣya]:

That reality which is really the gold itself, endowed again with a different shape, becomes a pair of earrings the colour of khadira embers.\footnote{Ibid.}

Through this very example, the reality of undivided brahman is expressed with respect to its transformations. For, just as when forms like a necklace (rucaka) are destroyed, it is only the gold in it that is real, in the same way, when the multitude of endless transformations have perished, it is the intransient brahman, remaining at the end of everything, that is real, and it is only [brahman] which is really permanent. In contrast, it is said that, in worldly [verbal] transactions, the permanence of entities such as universals (jāti) is relative. That is to say, when the individual instances (vyakti) [of a cow] have perished, the universal, such as cow-ness, which remains, is permanent. But even in that case, when distinctions [between elements] such as water have perished, the only thing that is real, which can be made known by a pronoun, is the concrete thing itself.\footnote{See Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa 3 (ed. Subramania Iyer 1963, 187).}

And even then, because [only] consciousness (samvīt), which is intransient, persists, when the form of the object of cognition is analyzed, it is only [consciousness] which is [found to be] the absolute reality; thus, one is enjoined [to follow the precept,] “one should acknowledge that [absolute reality] is neither like this nor like that,”\footnote{For a discussion on the translation of neti neti, see Acharya 2013, 3 note.} through meditation (bhāvanā). And since consciousness is the highest speech – consisting of śabdabrahaman – in the form of paśyantī, the essence of brahman is not different from the absolute word. But at the level of the manifestation [of the everyday world], there is difference, which takes the form of manifested speech (vaikhāri). And [even] at that level, it is really [brahman] which is permanent, expressed by words in the form of universals, etc. But even in that case, it is because a verbal expression is established when it has come to rest in [its] inner source, [i.e., śabdabrahaman,] that the object [of the expression], which is contained within the nature [of that expression], can be expressed;\footnote{Bhartṛhari is generally thought to have three levels of language in his system of philosophy – paśyantī, madhyamā, and vaikhāri, while later Kāśmīri thinkers like Somānanda advocate a fourth, higher level, parā vāk (Dwivedi 1991, 96). However, George Cardona argues that Bhartṛhari recognizes four levels of language, including a supreme form of paśyantī – param paśyantarūpam (Cardona 1994, 188 note). Helārāja’s wording here, paśyantarūpā parā vāk, is somewhat ambiguous. Houben argues that Helārāja seems to think of parā vāk as the same as paśyantī (Houben 1995, 166-168).}

therefore it is established.

\footnote{Bhartrihari argues that Bhartrihari recognizes four levels of language, including a supreme form of paśyantī – param paśyantarūpam (Cardona 1994, 188 note). Helāraja’s wording here, paśyantarūpā parā vāk, is somewhat ambiguous. Houben argues that Helārāja seems to think of parā vāk as the same as paśyantī (Houben 1995, 166-168). This is possibly a reference to the Vṛtti on Vākyapadīya 1.137: “Now, this inner cognizer, abiding in the subtle nature of speech, comes forth as language in order to manifest its true nature”. (ed. Subramania Iyer 1966, 174). In the edition of Wilhelm Rau, this is listed as verse 1.115. This passage also recalls verse 15 of Utpaladeva’s Ajāḷapramātṛsiddhi, which is frequently quoted by Abhinavagupta: “The accomplishment of purpose [kṛtārthatā] of the separated cognitive apprehensive [vicchinnavimarsā], ‘this’ – is the cognitive apprehension [vimarsā] of rest [vīsrānti] in its own essential nature, [expressed] ‘I am he’” (trans. Lawrence 1999, 647).}
that there is no difference between the expression and what is expressed, as it was settled in the first kāṇḍa. Thus he will say:

That singular [reality] is seen as the word, the object, and their relationship.

12

[In verse 110,] it was said, “and, although seemingly identical, the real is absolutely non-identical [with its transformations].” Firstly, he expounds upon the absolute non-identity [that was mentioned there]:

It does not exist nor does it not exist, it is not singular, it is not separate, it is not connected nor divided, it is not transformed nor is it otherwise.

Because it transcends all worldly transactions which are transformations [of it], in its absolute form, the real is not identical with [its] transformations. That is, it cannot be said to exist. This is because a thing which is delimited by existence is not the true nature of the real, because it does not descend into the world in its [true] form. Nor does it not exist: this is because – since something delimited by non-existence also has no reality – the real, if it were understood to be identical to existence (bhāvātmaka) could not be discerned by [any] valid means of cognition.

The real is not a particular entity that is delimited by the singular number, because the real, which is not delimited, is, in fact, undifferentiated, and because, consequently, one cannot conclude that it is singular. Nor is it qualified as being comprised of separateness, because its parts have no reality.

Nor is it delimited by connection or division, since [any] second element is not admissible by [any] valid means of cognition. From what would it be differentiated or divided? Or to what would it be connected?

By rejecting [the doctrine of] real transformation (pariṇāma), we accept the doctrine of apparent manifestation (vivarta); thus it is not transformed. And because of the manifestation (vivartana) [of the world] due to the wondrous activityi (adbhutā vṛttyā) taking the form of multitudes of different beings [in the world], it is not even possible to say that it is “untransformed”; therefore the real, which transcends all representation, is absolute brahman.

55 Dravyasamuddeśa 14.
56 Raghunātha Śarmā emends bhāvātmaka to abhāvātmaka (1991, 223). In that case, the sentence would read, “the real, if it were identical to non-existence, could not be discerned by any valid means of cognition.” However, it is also possible to read the sentence as it is – that is, existence and non-existence are mutually dependent entities, and thus existence presupposes non-existence. As Helārāja says below, brahman is devoid of both.
57 T and C read atyadbhutāvīrtti here. Bhartṛhari uses the term atyadbhutā vṛtti once in the Saṃbandhasamuddeśa and adbhutā vṛtti twice in the Kālasamuddeśa. Houben understands vṛtti in the sense of a “process” rather than “activity”, by which previously non-existent things become manifest, a process for which “no logical explanation can be found” (Houben 1995, 301-302). Peri Sarveswara Sharma translates it as “a miraculous course of action” (1972, 52 and 58). Note that in the two passages in which adbhutā appears, kuto’pyadbhutāyā... (Kālasamuddeśa 17, ed. Subramania Iyer 1973, 46) and yathaivādbhutāyā... (Kālasamuddeśa 26 ed. Subramania Iyer 1973, 49), the reading could easily be atyadbhutā without any metrical deficiencies.
And now, since [it was also said in verse 10 that] it is ascertained as seemingly identical [with its transformations], [when considered] in terms of nescience, he says:

It does not exist and it does, it is singular, it is [many] separate [entities], it is connected and divided, it is transformed, it is otherwise.

It is really [brahman] which has the ability to produce the appearance of the transformations of being and non-being, and which is subject to conventional [verbal usage] delimited by existence and non-existence, [expressed in terms of] “it exists” and “it does not exist”; but by its very nature, absolute brahman is without existence or non-existence, without being or non-being. And it is really that [absolute brahman] which produces the pragmatic convention of singular and multiple, in the form of universals and particulars, and [so] it can even be [thought of as] delimited by number. In the same way, it is also delimited by connection, since it manifests as connected to something else. In that way, the ascertainment of distinctions within it is possible. Therefore, it is really [brahman], seeming to come into being as the aggregate of [all] transformations, that appears as stable, in the form of space, etc.; thus it was said that the real seems to be identical [to its transformations].

And that being so, since everything consists of [brahman], those worldly manifestations (vyavahārāḥ), even when they are mutually contradictory, merge in that very [brahman]. Thus, he says:

That singular [reality] is seen as the word, the object, and [their] relationship. It is what is seen, the seeing, the seer, and the purpose of the seeing.

The expressed, the expression, and [their] relationship are really non-dual. For, in the inner reality (āntare tattve), the powers of sound and meaning are united and thus at the level of the apparent manifestation [of everyday reality] – because it is really [the absolute real] which branches out as sound and meaning – [the two powers] have different manifestations, in the form of the expressed and the expression. That is to say, nescience [arises] in the form of the cognition and what is cognized. This topic has already been settled by us in detail in the Brahmakāṇḍa, and it can be understood from there.

Also, it is really the [absolute real] which manifests itself (vivarta) in the form of seer and what is seen. That is – firstly, what is seen [refers to] the totality of all beings, which is cognized as something which
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has been brought within the scope of consciousness; precisely because it is cognized, [the object of cognition] is ultimately one with the cognition [itself], since what is unmanifested is incapable of manifestation; thus it was laid out and explained in the previous kāṇḍa and in the Advayasiddhi. Even the seer, who is an individual soul (jīva), whose delimitation is effected by nescience, who is limited, a transmigrator, an enjoyer, [even he] is really brahman, since, because [the jīva] is conscious, a difference [between them] cannot really be justified. This is what is communicated [by the word “seer”]. And by pointing out the [two] main participants of the action (kāraka) – the agent and the object –, [all] the other participants of the action are also hinted at (ākṣepa); thus, the apparent manifestation of reality (vivarta), complete in itself, is explained.

And since by the word seeing, which points out the main action, the other actions [which are involved in seeing] are hinted at, the apparent manifestation of action, the nature of which is something to be accomplished, is also expressed. For the apparent manifestation of action is differentiated by the power of time, and the apparent manifestation of matter is differentiated by the power of space; therefore the whole world is explained as the apparent manifestations of fixed forms and actions.

And by the word purpose, the result of the aggregated actions is pointed out; thus, brahman is explained, conforming [to the theory of] apparent manifestation, as the structure of the whole world – that is, [in terms of] action (sādhyā), factors of action (sādhana) and its result (phala). Thus [it was said],

[It is brahman] who is the single seed of all [things], by which this state of multiplicity [is produced], [who] abides as enjoyer, enjoyed, and enjoyment,

in the Brahmakāṇḍa. And it is there that the teaching about reality was settled by us. And because it takes the form of a cognition and an expression (prakhyopākhyā), conventional reality is dual, and thus [reality is seen as] the word, the object, and [their] relationship. There [in the verse], [the duality] is pointed out by those [two] different [terms] – it is what is seen and the seeing. And thus this form [of reality], which consists of nescience, is described. But [in the Sambandhasamuddeśa,] absolute [reality], in which the proliferation (prapañca) [of ordinary reality] has been extinguished, will be explained:

The knowers of Vedanta abide by the only object which is real, [namely], that in

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60 This seems to be another text by Helārāja, no longer extant. It is mentioned again below as well as in his commentary on Saṁkhyāsamuddeśa 26 (ed. Subramania Iyer 1973, 111).

61 As Bhartṛhari explains in Kriyāsamuddeśa 5, when one refers to an action, that single action can be understood as a sequence of related actions. As Helārāja says in his commentary, an action such as “cooking” (pacati) is, in fact, composed of other actions, such as “putting the vessel on the fire” (adhiśrayaṇa). However, all of these intermediate actions really have cooking as their purpose (Subramania Iyer 1974, 8-9; Bandini 1980, 72).


63 Perhaps the earliest occurrence of this term is at the beginning of Utpaladeva’s Ajāḍapramātṛsiddhi, where it is used to qualify sattā (ed. Kaul Shāstrī 1921, 1). In his study of the Ajāḍapramātṛsiddhi, David Peter Lawrence has translated prakhyā as “basic knowledge” and upākhyā as “expressed knowledge”, following Harabhatta Shastri who glosses the two words as prakāśa and vimarśa (Lawrence 2006, 642). Here, Helārāja seems to understand them in the sense of a cognized object and the verbal expression of that object.
It was said that, at the end, when all forms have withdrawn, that which remains is real. In that case, this objection is possible: at the end, nothing remains. Having raised another doubt, that this whole world manifests as non-existent – that is, as having no foundation –, in order to establish causally (hetunā) the pre-existence of an undifferentiated origin, starting with an example (drṣṭāntopakrama-mam) that shows the persistence [of a substance when its transformations disappear], he says:

Just as, when the transformations go away, [only] the gold in the ring is real, in the same way, they say that, when the transformations go away, [only] the absolute, primordial matter is real.

Just as, in a ring, in which the transformation, that is, the state of being a ring, has gone away, the gold remains as the one reality, in the same way, when the transformations such as earth, etc., have gone away, the primordial matter that persists [in them] remains as the undifferentiated reality. That is accepted. [When he says, in the verse,] “they say”, he means that brahman is established by scripture (āgama), which is a valid means of cognition. And thus it was said, “it is taught as singular” for [it is taught] in scripture (śruti), “this reality is only the ātman”. And inference [serves] merely to confirm this. That is, transformations cannot manifest out of [a reality that is] without expression, non-existent, [and] without foundation, since non-being is incompatible with being; for nothing is seen to originate from a hare's horn. And since, in the form of cognition, [the primordial matter] persists in the world, [the world] was really preceded by [the primordial matter]. Thus it will be said:

Non-being is not produced as being, nor does being ever reach a state of inexpressibility.
The power of consciousness of [brahman], which is consciousness, is not really transformed (aparīṇāma); thus, because of the absence of transformation, [this verse] does not [express] the doctrine of true transformation (parīṇāma), which is the point of view of the Sāmkhyas; rather, [it expresses] the view of apparent manifestation (vivarta). Since the difference between the two is explained by us in [the commentary on the first two kāṇḍas of] the Vākyapadiya, it can be ascertained from there. It will also be explained here [in the Prakīrṇakāṇḍa] in the Saṃbandhasamuddeśā. Moreover, it is declared in the Advayasiddhi that other causes [for the transformations seen in the world] are rejected; if someone is interested, [that argument] can be learnt from that very place.

16

In that way, having proven that brahman, which is denoted by the word ātman, is the substance because it is the absolute form of [all] things [expressed by] words, in order to sum up [the argument] that it is really [brahman] that is expressed by all words, he says:

That [primordial matter] is expressed by all words, and words are not separate from it. And [even though] they are not separate, there is a relationship between [words and the primordial matter], as if they were distinct [from one another].

Due to the preponderance (bhūyastva) of nescience in the everyday world, which takes the form of the abundance of differences that are framed (parikalpita) by this or that delimiter, it is really brahman – which takes on different aspects as delimited by any given particular form – that is the object of all words. That is the meaning expressed [in the verse]. For words, even ones like ātman, brahman, and tattva – even though the delimiters [through which they operate] are embraced (samavalambita) [by brahman] – operate according to the substance, because that which is undelimited transcends the scope of speech; for those who know the Vedas point out that reality transcends both speech and mind. However, words like ātman are closer [to brahman], compared to words like “pot”. And since everything consists of [brahman], even [all] words are identical to it, just as, originally, there was no distinction [between words and brahman]. Also, the word as if (iva) means that, even though they are ultimately non-different, there is a conventional difference [between them].

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70 This is perhaps a reference to the commentary, now lost, that Helārāja mentions in one of the introductory verses on the Prakīrṇaprakāśa (ed. Subramania Iyer [1963, 1]).

71 Although Helārāja claims the following verse demonstrates that all words express brahman, the feminine gender of the pronoun in the verse would indicate that Bhartṛhari is really referring to prakṛti, from the previous verse.

72 Raghunātha Sarmā glosses śabdāḥ samavalambotādhyāyat as śabdās tattvadupādhiḥ svasvapratītātmatatāyā vácyatvena samavalambayan (1991, 233), indicating that śabda is the subject of the verb samavalamb – that is, "words rely on delimiters". However, in his gloss of verse 8, Helārāja states, avikalpitaṃ... tattvam... vikalpariṣam... samavalambate, "unconceptualized reality embraces conceptualization"; with this in mind, samavalambotādhyāyat could be understood as delimiters which are embraced – or manifested by – an ultimately undifferentiated reality.

73 Although Raghunātha Sarmā prints yathāvibhaktaṃ, in his commentary, he seems to understand it as if it were yathā vibhaktam, glossing vibhaktam as vyākyāyam: sarvasya ca brahma vibhaktaḥ śabdā api svapraśkritibhiḥbrahmaḥbhinnā eva yathā vyākyāyāṃ prāk (1991, 231). I read yathā vibhaktam here.

74 I read sāṃvṛtyo here, which is the reading chosen by Subramania Iyer, although it is only attested in manuscript T. All other manuscripts read saṃ-. On the difference between sāṃvṛtyo and sāmṛtyo, see Nagao and Kawamura (1993, 13ff.)
in worldly affairs, which is unreal. This is precisely how a relationship between the two [that is, between words and brahman,] can be justified.

17-18

Objection: this [teaching] is a delusion, that is, [you advocate] disregarding the reality of beings, whose different forms are [evidently] ascertained, [and] teach that the highest reality is non-difference, which is not ascertained; having raised this objection, in order to establish this [doctrine of non-difference] with an example, he says:

17 Self and other, friend and adversary, speaker, spoken and purpose [of the speaking]: just as, in a dream, a single mind takes these contradictory forms,

18 in [absolute] reality – unborn, permanent, and devoid of sequence –, contradiction, in the form of birth, etc., is perceived.

The proliferation that accompanies the dream state is unreal, because it is disrupted by waking; this is accepted by all theoreticians. By this very example it is established that, even when awake, different beings are unreal, because they do not persist into the fourth state [of consciousness], since, indeed, it is only that which persists in all states that is real, and that is pure consciousness, which is not disrupted. But [even] the different states [of sleeping and waking], which are disrupted because they are ephemeral, do not [really] exist, like [the states of] happiness and despair [do not exist]. That is, [states] such as love, etc. and happiness, etc., because they have no essence of their own, do not transform the nature of pure consciousness. Therefore, even those different states are afflicted by the impurity of different forms.

In a dream, the manifestation of contradictory forms is a conceptualized (vaikalpiki) vision, which is restricted to each individual perceiver. For the enjoyer – that is, the transmigrator, conforming to the activity of [his own] mind – is conceptualized; but [even] he is brahman, because he is conscious by nature. And therefore, he, a lord because of his independence [only] in so far as it is in [his dream] creation – since there is no other material cause [of his dream] – having appeared as [dream] beings, enjoys [them] in the guise of friend and foe, through the illusion of saṃsāra which consists of passion, hatred, etc., having conversations, etc., with others. Thus those who are skilled in the essence of Vedānta say:

Having divided himself by means of himself, having created varied, individual beings, the lord of all, of which all things consist, the enjoyer, engages in the dream.

\[\text{Yogarāja, commenting on the same verse below, says that, for the brahmavādins, the independence of brahman exists only in dream:}\]
\[brahmaṇaḥ svātantryaṃ svapna eva brahmagāndhike abhyapatam \ (ed. Chatterji 1916, 76). \text{Helārāja, on the other hand, seems to understand the enjoyer (bhoktṛ) in the verse as the individual soul (pratyagātman).}\]

\[\text{Rau lists this as verse 1.140 of the Vākyapadīya, whereas Subramania Iyer considers this to be part of the Vṛtti on verse 1.119 (ed. Subramania Iyer 1966, 195).}\]
By the word “enjoyer”, the creation by the individual soul [that is, the dream,] is expressed. And because he is “the lord of all”, in the form of brahman, he is said to be capable of creation. And, they say, because “all things consist of him”, the arrangement of multifarious beings, which have no other material cause, has the self as its material cause. And thus, [when it says in the verse that] “he divides himself by means of himself”, because there is no difference between agent and object, the imaginariness (vaikalpikatva) of this creation is clearly stated. On the other hand, divine creation (aiśvarī śṛṣṭi), expressed by the word “everything” (viśva) [as opposed to the word “all” (sarva)], which has its material cause outside [the individual soul], [experienced] in the waking state, is common to all perceivers.

Objection: [waking and dream realities] are different, due to the possession (grahāveśa) of stability [in waking] or instability [in a dream]. [Reply:] Nevertheless, because [waking reality] is impelled by nescience, it is equally unreal. While nescience exists, [the world] is merely another illusion, a veil (āvāraka) over the power of consciousness, called sleep (nidrā). By force of that [illusion], those [who understand reality] from a lower point of view (arvāgdrk) have a fallacious conception of erroneous [cognition] with regards to [dreams]. But for those [who understand reality] in the absolute sense, with respect to absolute brahman – free from birth and death, undivided, stable, and consisting of consciousness and bliss (cidānanda) –, it is really the whole world – in the states of waking, sleeping, etc., taking the form of the apparent transformations of matter and action –, that is unreal. On the other hand, it is established that what is ultimately [real] is the mere universality...

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7Gauḍapāda, in his commentary on the Māṇḍūkyopanisad, refers to the waking state as viśva (ed. Bhattacharya 1943, 1). In Māṇḍūkyopanisad 3.5, the waking state is called vaisvānara, the dream state is called taijas, and the state of dreamless sleep is called prajñā (ed. Olivelle 1994, 474). There, the self in the dreamless state is called sarvesvara, while here, Helāraṇa interprets sarvesvara as the self in the dream state. Abhinavagupta also refers to these three states in Paramārthasāra 35 (ed. Chatterji 1943, 76), and Yogarāja, in his commentary, quotes this same verse from the Vāsyapadīya when he explains the dream state (78). Evidently, there was a tradition of understanding this verse in the context of Gauḍapāda’s states of consciousness. Abhinavagupta’s verse is a reworking of Ādiśeṣa’s Paramārthasāra 31 (ed. Danielson 1980, 22; see also Bansat-Boudon and Tripathi 2001, 2ff).

8The term grahāveśa generally refers to demonic possession, although in philosophical discourse, it has been used as a metaphor or simile for an erroneous belief. For example, in Acintyastava 16 – bhāvagrahaḥ grahāveśaḥ pratantro ’sti kas tadā, “What [kind of] seizure (grahāveśa) of materialism (bhāvagraha) is then [the concept of an independent] dependent nature?” (ed. & trans. Lindtner 1982, 144-145). This possession is then cured by the “medicine” of a true teaching – etat tat paramam tattvam niḥsvabhāvāh tathātām | bhāvagrahaḥ bhūteṣaḥ citkītseyan antarāra, “The ultimate truth (tattva) is the teaching that things (artha) are without own-being. That is the unsurpassed medicine for those possessed by the fever of positivism (bhāvagraha) (Acintyastava 52, ed. & trans. Lindtner 1982, 156-157). Similarly, in the Śaṅkara’s commentary on the Gauḍapādukārikā 4.55, yadā punar mantrasadvādyaviveṇa grahāveśo yathoktad-vaitadāriṇāṃ viśvānāṃ rṣirnavād bhūteṣaḥ (ed. Röer 1982, 560), “When the possession (āveśa) of cause and effect, produced by nescience, is removed, by the teaching of nonduality as said [previously] – just as demonic possession (grahāveśa) [is removed] by the potency of mantras and medicinal herbs – then, when that is destroyed, there is no production of cause and effect.”

7 Śaṅkara presents the same pūrvapakṣa in his commentary on Gauḍapādakārikā 4.38 (ed. Röer 1982, 547). See also Mokṣopāya Sthitiprakāraka 4.19.9 (ed. Slaje 1972, 147). This argument was employed by Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas against Buddhist idealism (1994, 42).

8Gauḍapāda contrasts nidrā (sleep) with svapna (dream), each associated with a different kind of perceptual error: “Dream is for him who takes the truth otherwise, and sleep is for him who does not know Reality. The error in these two (svapna and nidrā) being destroyed one attains the stage of Turiya” (trans. Bhattacharya 1943, 7). Thrasher correlates these two types of error with āvaraṇasakti (in the case of nidrā) and viksepaṇa (in the case of svapna) (1993, 72).
7. Annotated Translation

of consciousness, which [always] persists. By saying that "contradiction is perceived", [Bhartṛhari] admits that contradictions arise in nescience. For that is the very nature of nescience: that is, even though it is not accepted [as something which really exists], it leads to the perception of [a certain] appearance, [since] what[ever] is accepted [to exist] should really be knowledge. Therefore, the beginninglessly-established power of brahman to manifest the proliferation [of the ordinary world], which is unreal, having constructed the duality of the perceived and the perceiver according to itself, plays out the world-drama (jagannāṭya) those who see reality [as it is] dismiss this superficially charming [nescience].

81 As Vincenzo Vergiani and Isabelle Ratié have pointed out, Maṇḍanamiśra makes a similar point in the Brahmāsiddhi – if māyā were to be accepted to exist, then it would not be an illusion at all (Vergiani 2016, 599).

82 The metaphor of a deity as an actor and the world as a drama is well-known from the Śivasūtra and has echoes in other Kaśmīri texts (Cuneo 2011, 43ff). But this image is by no means confined to Śaiva texts; for example, in the Sāmkhyakārikā, prakṛti is compared to an actress (nartakī) (59, ed. Prasad Sarna 1922, 74). Samsāranṛtya appears in the Pañcapādikā (ed. Bhāgavatāchārya 1929, II, i, 35), while the ātman is described as a drama (nṛtta) in the Naṅkarmyasiddhi (2.58, ed. Jacob and Hiriyanna 1925, 70). What is less common is to find both the metaphors of the world as a drama and of the world as a dream in the same place, with an emphasis on the illusory nature of the world as it is perceived; one interesting parallel is a quotation from Bhaṭṭanāyaka in the Abhinavabhāratī (ed. Chintamani 1927, 268): “That is to say, drama is exemplary in enabling us to grasp the barren, dualistic perception produced by our innate nescience. Consider the doings of Rama and Ravana. These are in essence merely imaginary, and precisely for this reason they do not have one single stable form, but rather can all of a sudden produce countless new imaginings. Although they are indeed different from a dream, just like a dream, they can be the source of profound emotional attachment without giving up their illusory character. When produced by an actor—and herein the actor is like the supreme being—these doings, however unreal, seem as if actually coming into existence out of some source, albeit a nonexistent one. And though in this way they remain mere appearance, they can become a means of understanding the true ends of man. The same applies to the universe as a whole, which functions in precisely the same way. It consists of a vast elaboration of nothing but names and forms...” (trans. Pollock 2014, 457-459).
Part III.

Appendices
8. Collation of *Jātisamuddeśa* 34, with Helārāja’s commentary

Two additional manuscripts have been consulted for this collation: C₉ (Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Chennai, MS D 15366) and LA (DAV College, Chandigarh, MS 6u8).
tāṁ prātipadikārthaṁ ca dhātvarthaṁ ca pracakṣate |  
sā nityāṁ sā mahāṁ ātmā tām āhūs tvatālādayāḥ || 34 ||

sarvabhāveṣu sādṛpam sāmāṇyam anugatam | abhāvasyāpi buddhyākārenā nirūpāṇaṁ, mahāsatta- 
yānayāviyogyat prātipadikamātravācyā sattā | tad uktam —
prātipadikārthāḥ sattā
itī | dhātubhir api sādhanādhiṅalabdhajananmaṁ kriyāyāviyuktī samavētā yathopādhyupaghṛitanā- 

nātvā sattaivābhidhāyatvam apāyate | siddhasādhyarūpaṁ saṅkhyaṁ sarvabhāveṣu |  
sattāsattāmātrasyātmānaḥ | sā sattāvābhidhāyāṁ sattā | pratyayabhāgenāpy api yathāyathāṁ saṅkhyaṁ 
akākāryupādhiṅvisīṣṭā sattāivābhidhāyat | sā codayavayarahitavatī nityāḥ, satpratyayasya sarvadānu- 
vṛtteḥ |

ete sattāmātrasyātmano mahatāḥ sat viśeṣaparīṇāmāḥ, yat tat param viśeṣebhyo liṅgamātmaḥ mahattattvām, tasminn ete sattāmātṛte mahatī ātmany avasthāya viṇḍdhikāṣṭhām anubhavanti | pratisaṁśryamānāḥ ca tasminn eva sattāmātṛte mahatī ātmany avasthāya yat tan niṣhatsattātman niḥsadasad avyaktaṁ alāṅgaṁ tasmin pratyayi

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8. Collation of Jātisamuddeśa 34, with Helārāja’s commentary
8. Collation of Jātisamuddeśa 34, with Helārāja’s commentary

ity evaṃ sāṅkhye buddhitattvam mahacchadbavacyam adyam jagatkāraṇam nirdiṣṭam ity ato ‘na-
ntarasya vikāragraṃsaya kāraṇarūpaṃpunistattārūpatvam aviruddham iti sattārūpam sarvaṃ ja-
gadākhyātāṃ bhavatīti sattādviśaivadāh sāṅkhyanayenāpy upabr̥mhitāḥ | evaṃ ca sarvāsadbvacyā
tsā šabdaprārttinimittabhūteti yathāyathāṃ bhinnopādhir bhāvapratyayābhidheyā saiva | nanv
evaṃ gotvam iti prakṛtiprathyayor ekārthatāprasangāḥ | naitat | upādhibhedena sattāyā bhedāt |
prätipadikena gavāsrayāyās tasyā abhidhānam, pratyayena tu niṣkṛṣṭāśrayasya sāmānyasyābhidhety
doṣaḥ | prakṛtyarthanimittaḥ ca bhāvapratyayabheda iti na sāṅkaryaprasangāḥ || 34 ||

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\[\text{sāṅkhyanayenāpy...} \text{prakṛtiprathyayor...} \text{prakṛtyarthanimittat} \]

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\[\text{pratī° L C}_{\text{G}}. \text{sāṅkhye OM} \text{M P.} \text{buddhitattvam suci° L ; °mattvam M P.} \text{mahacchab-}
davacyam (space of 2 akṣaras)śa° H. \text{adyaṃ āna° L; āva° D.} \text{vikāragraṃsaya} \text{vikāra° C ; vikārāna° M ; (SPACE OF 3 AKṢARAS)rah° C T ; vikārānām asya A.} \text{sattārūpatvam} \text{satī LA ; satā P ; satāṃ LA.} \text{avicuddham...sattārūpaṃ} \text{avicuddhasatī° P.} \text{saṃrva} \text{K ; saṃrva A ; sarve H.} \text{vikāragrāmasya} \text{vikāra° C ; vikārāna° M ; (SPACE OF 3 AKṢARAS)rah° C T ; vikārānām asya A.} \text{sattāyā} \text{satāyā P.} \text{yathāyathāṃ yathā(SPACE OF 2 AKṢARAS) C T ; yathām LA.} \text{bhāvapratyayābhidheyā} \text{vābhidhe}yā H. \text{nanv} \text{na tv D A.} \text{bhinnopādhir...evam} \text{dhibhāvapratyayābhī(SPACE OF 8 AKṢARAS)vaṃ C T.} \text{prakṛtiprathyayor} \text{pratayor P ; pra(SPACE OF 8 AKṢARAS)r C T ; yārtthayor T.} \text{ekārthatāprasangāḥ} \text{saktāṭh P.} \text{upādhibhedena} \text{upāyme° C ; kriyāvi° K T.} \text{sattāyā} \text{satīyā P.} \text{gavāsrayāyās} \text{gavāśrayās C T ; ye nyās P.} \text{tasyā} \text{tasyām L.} \text{tasyā abhidhānam,} \text{bhīvādānaṃ H.} \text{pratyayena} \text{yaina H.} \text{niṣkṛṣṭāśrayasya} \text{niṣṛ° L ; niṣṛya° A.} \text{sāmānyasyābhidhety} \text{tety S T C.} \text{ca} \text{va A.} \text{bhāvapratyayabheda} \text{ye bheda T C T ; daḥ I T.} \text{sāṅkaryaprasangāḥ} \text{saṃkarye° P ; OM.} \text{pra...C T.} \]
9. Digital resources

- All of the code that runs the online edition and the machine collation algorithm can be found on GitHub: https://github.com/chchch/upama. This also includes the fonts used to display Devanāgari, Malayālam, and Telugu. The Devanāgari font is Sanskrit 2013, which has been modified to include the prṣṭhamātṛā vowel character, the śirorekha character, and the puṣpikā character. The Malayālam font is Rachana, which has been modified to include some additional consonant conjuncts that appear in manuscripts, such as cś. The Telugu font is Pothana 2000, which has been modified to include the valapalagilaka character.

- All of the transcriptions, in TEI XML format, of the manuscript witnesses and printed editions used to generate the apparatus of variants are available as part of the critical edition: https://saktumiva.org/wiki/dravyasamuddeśa/start. They can be downloaded by using the export button on the right side of the page.
10. TEI XML file format

A subset of the TEI standard has been used for document encoding, following most of the standards developed for the Sanskrit Manuscripts Project at the University of Cambridge. Each document consists of at least the top-level <TEI> tag, a <teiHeader> tag, and a <text> tag:

```xml
<TEI xmlns="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0">
  <teiHeader>
    <fileDesc>
      <sourceDesc>
        <msDesc>
          <msIdentifier>
            <idno type="siglum">
              [Siglum to be used in the apparatus]
            </idno>
          </msIdentifier>
          <msContents>
            <msItem n="1" defective="false">
              <textLang mainLang="sa-Deva">
                [Sanskrit in Devanagari script.]
              </textLang>
            </msItem>
          </msContents>
        </msDesc>
      </sourceDesc>
    </fileDesc>
  </teiHeader>

  <text xml:lang="sa-Latn">
  </text>
</TEI>
```

1See Formigatti 2018.
The siglum used to indicate the witness in the apparatus is identified with an `<idno>` tag under `<msIdentifier>`. If this tag is not present, then the filename will be used instead.

Since the collation software has been designed to work with Sanskrit texts transcribed in IAST, the `xml:lang` attribute of the `<text>` tag, under which the transcription will be inputted, is `sa-Latn`, i.e., romanized Sanskrit. On the other hand, the `mainLang` attribute of the `<textLang>` tag describes the language and script of the original document, which might be Devanāgarī (sa-Deva), Malayālam (sa-Mlym), or Telugu (sa-Telu).
11. Filtering the transcriptions

Three types of filters have been implemented, which have been grouped under the headings XML tags, Punctuation, and Orthographic variants.

**XML tags**

Below is a list of XML tags used in the transcriptions. This does not include tags that define text structure – such as `<div>`, `<p>`, and `<l>` – which do not reflect features in the source document, and therefore are not taken into consideration by the collation algorithm.

- `<add>`: text added to the main text
- `<choice>`: The construction `<choice><orig><corr></corr></orig></choice>` records an original reading `<orig>` and the transcriber's correction `<corr>`
- `<corr>`: correction by the transcriber
- `<del>`: deleted text
- `<gap>`: text that was not readable
- `<hi>`: text that is marked in some way (e.g., underlined)
- `<lb>`: line break
- `<milestone>`: marks the folio or page, along with the line number, where the transcription starts
- `<note>`: notes added in the margin or between the lines
- `<pb>`: page break
- `<ptr>`: points to text that has been transposed
- `<unclear>`: text that is not clear to the transcriber
- `<g>`: marks an unusual glyph
- `<anchor>`: used as a footnote/endnote marker
- `<locus>`: the locus of a transposed section
n. Filtering the transcriptions

- `<metamark>`: additional, non-textual marks, such as an X-mark
- `<orig>`: original reading (that was corrected by the transcriber)
- `<sic>`: marks the text as sic erat scriptum
- `<space>`: blank space left on the page
- `<subst>`: The construction `<subst>`<del>`</del>`<add>`</add>`<subst>` marks text that was deleted and replaced
- `<supplied>`: text supplied by the transcriber
- `<surplus>`: text that the transcriber believes is superfluous
- `<caesura>`: caesura

Punctuation

These filters pertain to textual elements that can be either included or ignored in the comparison. By default, they are ignored:

- abbreviation sign 「●」
- avagrahas 「」
- brackets
- commas
- daṇḍas
- empty śirorekha 「─」
- explicit hiatus 「_」
- hyphens and dashes
- line fillers 「▁」
- middot 「・」
- numbers
- puspikās
- periods/ellipses
- quotation marks
Orthographic variants

These filters pertain to common variations in Sanskrit orthography, across different scripts, that are usually ignored in collation. Each filter is governed by a regular expression, which is presented descriptively here:

- **geminated t**
  - replaces tt with t if it is preceded by r, ṛ, i, or pa; replaces tt with t if it is followed by r, v, or y

- **geminated consonants after r**
  - replaces doubled g, j, t, n, d, n, b, m, y, or v with a single letter if it is preceded by r, ṛ, or a space

- **geminated aspirated consonants**
  - replaces jḥ with jh; replaces ṭṭh with ṭh; replaces tṭh with th; replaces ddḥ with dh

- **visarga ṛḥ + voiced syllable**
  - replaces -ṝḥ with -ṝ if followed by a word-initial vowel or voiced consonant

- **visarga ṛḥ + voiced consonants**
  - replaces word-final -ṛr, -ṛṛ, or -ṛ with -ṝḥ

- **visarga ṛḥ + vowels**
  - replaces -ṝḥ, before a vowel with -ṝ

- **other visarga variants**
  - replaces word-final -(ḥ)r, -(ḥ)s, -(ḥ)s, or -(ḥ)s with -ḥ

- **internal visarga variants**
  - replaces -uṣ- with -uḥ-; replaces -ṣk- with -ḥk-; replaces -ss- with -ḥs-

- **final nasal variants**
  - replaces word-final -ṃl, -ṃs, -mś, or -nn with -n

- **internal nasal variants**
  - replaces m, n, ṅ, ṇ, or ṇ with m if followed by p, b, m, t, n, ṭ, Ṇ, c, j, k, or g

- **final au/āv**
  - replaces word-final -āv with -au

- **final anusvāra variants**
n. Filtering the transcriptions

- replaces word-final -m, -ṅ, or -ṃm with -ṃ; replaces kan followed by word-initial t- with kaṃ; replaces kin followed by word-initial t- with kiṃ; replaces -n with -ṃ; replaces -ṅ followed by word-initial j- with -ṃ

• final anusvāra variants (Malayālam)
  - replaces word-final -m, -ṅ, or -ṃm with -ṃ; replaces -n with -ṃ if it is followed by word-initial -t, -d, or -n; replaces -ṅ with -ṃ if it is followed by word-initial j- or c-

• kcch/kś
  - replaces -kṣ-, -kch-, -kcch- with -kś-

• cch/ch
  - replaces -cch-, -cś-, -cch-, or -tś- with -ch-

• final t + voiced syllable
  - replaces -d with -t if it is followed by a word-initial vowel or voiced consonant; replaces -d at the end of a paragraph with -t

• final t + n/m
  - replaces -t with -n if it is followed by word-initial n- or m-

• final t + c/j
  - replaces -j followed by word-initial j- with t-; replaces -c followed by word-initial c- with -t

• sya, tra, ma before iti
  - replaces -sya iti with -syeti, -tra iti with -treti, and -ma iti with -meti

• a a/ā
  - replaces -a a- with -ā-

• -ena, -sya + u-
  - replaces -ena u- with -eno-; replaces -sya u- with -syo-

• i i/i
  - replaces -i i- with -ī-

• ā + iti
  - replaces -ā iti with -eti

• e/a + i
  - replaces -e with -a, if it is followed by word-initial i-
n. Filtering the transcriptions

- $i/y$ + vowel
  - replaces $y$ with $i$, if it is followed by a word-initial vowel
- $l$
  - replaces $l$ (retroflex lateral approximant) with $l$

Optimizing the filters

In order for the apparatus to be dynamic, the collation algorithm must be fast enough so that when a user changes an option and re-generates the apparatus, the wait time is not too long. Since both the punctuation and orthographic filters are effected through regular expressions, there is a degree of optimization that is possible.

For the punctuation filters, all of the elements that are to be ignored are simply merged into a single regular expression using a character class. The resulting expression would simply be something like `/\[\d\|_\-\'.,''\]/`. Any character found by this expression would then be ignored.

The orthographic filters, unfortunately, need to be run one at a time. The general technique is to pick the most common spelling as the replacement and then use a regular expression to find every occurrence of every other variant. For example, in the case of visargas after non-\(a\) vowels, the most common spelling is \(h\). Therefore, in our expression, we search for all of the more uncommon spellings with `/\[rsśṣ\](?=S)/` which would find, for example, \(-ir\), \(-is\), \(-iś\), or \(-iṣ\). They can then be replaced by \(-iḥ\).

Other general principles that have been followed are being as specific as possible and using more efficient syntax where possible, such as character classes instead of alternations. However, the principle of specificity can sometimes conflict with efficiency; for example, the expression

/\(n(?=[kg])|n(?=[cj])|n(?=[td])|n(?=[tṇ])|m(?=[pbd])/\m/

for finding semi-homograph nasals with $m$ is more specific than

/\[mnñṇ\](?=pbdtnṭdc\kg])/\m/

since the former expression pairs each nasal with the consonants in its own varga, whereas the latter expression searches for all nasals followed by consonants in any varga. However, the use of alternations in the former expression is computationally expensive, and since, in the documents, we never find cases of, for example, $ṅ$ followed by $ṭ$, we may consider using the second, more efficient expression without fear that it will capture unwanted cases.
Part IV.

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