The spectrum of lefts and rights (to the centre) that provides classification in the sphere of 'real politics' is not clearly visible here, and although such ideological positioning might be assumed, there is clearly more to the genre of 'political culture' in archaeology. However, a language that changes and 'adapts', features uniquely in various traditions, and the most immediate symbol of changing political culture! Yes, certainly! 'Ideology', 'Power', 'Consciousness', 'Praxis' have loomed up and been used variously. This nexus of concepts, derived from Marxist, Critical Theoretical and other Social Scientific thinking, embodies a change which is both substantive and effecting the constitutive premises for the practice of archaeology. 'Praxis' and 'Ideology' occur in Olsen, Ray, Sinclair and Hodder's contributions and clearly they are used as concepts for analysis. For Olsen, the distinction between and the origin of a 'Norwegian' (normal) and Saami (abnormal) past is inexplicable without reference to ideology, which is the active medium of attitudes, beliefs and assumptions situated in social asymmetry, giving rise to the politics of the Saami past. Fawcett's concern with the politics of the assimilation of the Ainu past into Japanese history is also only explicable in terms of the ideology embodied in the national image, and the economic and social consequences of that for an ethnic minority. For Ray and Sinclair, 'Praxis' assumes a key position since their work is situated in Third World contexts. This has led them particularly to examine the relevance and potential of their own active contributions and hence the increased focus in their work on the gap between what is said, intended, and what in fact is done.

If these form the thesis of political culture, what is, at least linguistically, the anti-thesis? We would locate this in the now prolificate practice of using the same keywords in a manner that is both 'pop' and de-politicised. It is for seminar-buffs to attest that catchy titles like 'Symbols of Power', 'Archaeology of Power', 'Power in the Bronze Age' and others, may in substance make Michel Foucault turn in his grave. 'Power in the Bronze Age', for instance, may be merely about the formal study of distinctive headgear of 'chiefs'. This de-politicised use of keywords, an accepted and popular practice, is as symbolic of cultural appropriation as the Punk safety-pin.

References

5. In the later part of the nineteenth century, with the growth of science and developments in university education, archaeology began to be recognised as a 'discipline'. It became more and more accepted as a proper field for practical and intellectual research, and because it had something to contribute in the grand 'search for truth', it edged its way out of dilettantism and into academic respectability.

If one is to understand the course of archaeology (and its politics), in the twentieth century, it is necessary to remember these powerful nineteenth century strands and to keep in mind how extraordinarily persistent and influential they have been.

**Archaeology Goes Academic**

If we consider the last of the five nineteenth-century trends enumerated above, we can see at once how far it has carried archaeology in the present century. Archaeology developed alongside the developing rôle of 'the academic'. Until the later part of the nineteenth century, fulfillment of the duties of a university teacher was rarely regarded as a full-time occupation, and such offices were often held in plurality with other duties. But soon after the rôle of the full-time academic was established, there was enough of archaeology to occupy the position of an academic discipline — although to start with, university posts were few, and the age of the wealthy dilettante, financing excavations and expeditions and employing archaeologists, persisted for some time. (Perhaps Alexander Keilier, using profits from the sale of marmalade to finance the excavations of Windmill Hill and Avebury from 1725 to 1739, was the last of the breed. Even in 1936 my supervisor, Miles Burkitt, asked if I thought I was going to make a living out of archaeology and added "You need to have a private income of at least a thousand pounds a year, my boy.")

Archaeology is now an accepted and respected member among other older and younger academic disciplines; its importance has grown tremendously and no one questions its right of place among intellectual activities and academic pursuits. Thus it partakes of the values which all established academic subjects enjoy and to which academics devote themselves.

And why do academics devote themselves to these pursuits? There are a variety of reasons. In some cases it is an accident; for bright young men and women it seems the natural thing to do after a successful undergraduate career. They are, as it were, trapped into it by not seeing anything better to do. It is a fair criticism of much university education that it often unintentionally hides the alternatives to an academic career from its ablest. Once channelled into it, the narrow paths of the maze may be blindly followed in the desperation of the academic rat-race, and, as someone remarked, the trouble with the rat-race is that even if you win, you remain a rat. Academic pursuits do not have to be like that. They do not have to be carried out in a spirit of cut-throat competition and in fact in academic circles they seldom are, because the academic conventions insist that scholarly throats are slit with the greatest urbanity. There may be some, however, for whom their academic pursuits are not the satisfying ambition to overtop their colleagues or fulfill the lusts of a domineering ego, and to whom successful scientific or academic work brings the happiness of an elegant solution, or a nobly-wrought masterpiece — almost, an aesthetic satisfaction.

An academic with a fairly high level of self-knowledge and honesty would not readily admit to one or more of the reasons for following his academic pursuit. Others quite simply, 'love their subject', and can say so. Most peoples' motives are mixed. But there is one motivation that many academics would admit to, even if individuals phrase it differently. It would add up to something like, 'the pursuit of truth'. By some this would be said rather bashfully, hesitantly and humbly, by others confidently and arrogantly. For some it is a conscious goal, for some it is a sub-conscious one, for some the once-consciously-held goal has been replaced by ambition. In any case, they all feel it gives a value to what they do.

Philosophically, 'truth', or 'the truth', is a difficult concept; academics on the whole do not examine the concept with the rigour that they would employ to examine ideas in their own discipline. 'But as they are professional philosophers, academics do not spend their time thinking about the nature of the truth or its relationship to their activities, any more than doctors daily ask themselves what constitutes health and how it differs from illness' (Shils 1943, 4). If academics do embark on an attempt to define 'the truth', or 'the value of knowledge', more often than not they immediately find that they can't do it; they become philosophical problems. How should they not, seeing that philosophers themselves do? "I may have conceived theoretical truth wrongly, but I was not wrong in thinking that there is such a thing, and that it deserves our allegiance" (Russell 1905, 223).

**Academic Freedom**

It often happens that unexamined assumptions become enshrined in stock phrases, which are themselves repeated as if having some absolute, unassailable validity. Among academics, the phrase which allows their pursuit of truth and indicates that nothing must be allowed to interfere with it, is 'academic freedom'. Anything seen as an attack on academic freedom is seen as an attack on the pursuit of truth, and such action must therefore constitute behaviour to be castigated as a betrayal of the profession almost amounting to moral turpitude.

There are additional reasons for the outcry which ensures if it is felt that academic freedom is threatened. Academics dedicated to the pursuit of truth academics may be, "disinterested intellectual curiosity surely plays a smaller part in the pursuit of knowledge than we like to think" (Roberts 1985, 175). The regard in which academics are held in their societies varies greatly with time and place: in some countries, their contributions to society are highly valued, while at others and in
other countries they are regarded as something of a minor luxury, expendable when times are hard. This period is a time when academics themselves threaten: the swelling financial cuts on the universities, increasing the difficulty in obtaining permanent posts for young academics, and causing early retirement for many established ones, have created a climate of nervousness. This nervousness has been aggravated by fears of actual redundancy and the unprecedented threat to the principle of 'academic tenure', the idea that once an academic has established his or her intellectual competence in a discipline, he or she will make the best contribution if not continually worried about having to justify his or her position by producing a demonstrable 'output'. Academics are not factories. A single seminal paper may contribute far more to the gaining of knowledge than hundreds of mediocre and padding books put together to fill space and profit demand. Governmental and other Philistines, not understanding the way knowledge is advanced, are now attacking this very idea (Shils 1985); no wonder academics feel threatened. No wonder, therefore, that they rally to the cry to defend academic freedom; they are defending their very livelihood. Even if their actual jobs are not threatened, an attack on academic freedom is apprehended as an attack on their way of life, the way of life they have chosen and which they enjoy. They like doing what they do, they wish to remain free to continue doing what they do, and they do not want to tolerate any interference with their opportunities or resources.

Thus the arousal of academics when academic freedom seems threatened is not merely intellectual, it is also visceral -- it is a gut reaction -- hence also the extraordinary passion aroused and the rhetoric of the denunciations uttered. If any academic should be rash enough to place any other value higher than that of academic freedom, he is execrated as a traitor.

The Meanings of 'Academic Freedom'

'Academic freedom', however, is a concept that should be more closely examined, because it is a portmanteau phrase embracing a number of different things. It is one of those abstracts which "wrap a man's thoughts round like cotton-wool" (Quiller-Couch 1938, 79). In fact, in real life, there is no such thing as 'academic freedom', any more than there is such a thing as 'freedom'; to discuss the topic as if there was, is to subscribe to the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" (Whitehead 1926, 72-9). 'Freedom' is a useful concept for purposes of discussion, but in real life there are only a large number of different specific freedoms: freedoms 'to do' certain things, freedoms 'from' particular impositions. Similarly, there is no such thing as 'academic freedom', merely a number of different freedoms operating in the lives of academics. These are various:

1. The freedom to speak or write whatever you like, commonly termed 'the right of free speech'. This is regarded as an essential right associated with the concept of democracy. But even in the most liberal democracy it is not unlimited freedom, since individuals and institutions are protected from unwarranted defamation by laws of slander and libel. In some, also, freedom of speech is limited by laws concerning obscenity, and concerning the uttering of statements interpreted as constituting provocations to racial disharmony.

2. The freedom of university teachers to teach what they as a corporate body of teachers deem right, and to teach it in the way they think best. This is the strict meaning of 'academic freedom' per se.

The idea that scholars in universities ought to be free to teach and learn what they wish is not a recent development. It was formulated in Germany in the Middle Ages, but the custom of guaranteeing this privilege by popular consent only dates from the nineteenth century. It was formulated in Germany in universities which were directly under the state, as Lehre-freiheit (Ashby 1968, 291; see also Paulsen 1985; Paulsen 1988, Book 3, Chapter 3).

Academic freedom has not been defined in an English court of law... It has developed as a specially protected corner of intellectual freedom. It is not so much a personal privilege claimed by members of the academic community; it is a condition of work required because it is believed to be essential for teaching and learning the truth as scholars see it; it is a condition of work, a climate of academic freedom, the most efficient medium for research.

(Ashby 1968, 290; see also Polanyi 1947).

In the USA, as the academic profession gained in self-esteem in the later decades of the twentieth century, the idea grew that what was right for a German university was right for an American one, since it was to the German idea of a university that many American academics aspired. So the concept and value of Lehre-freiheit became firmly embedded in the American academic consciousness and scale of values (Hofstadter and Motsger 1955).

3. The freedom of universities to conduct their own affairs, properly called 'university autonomy', that is, the freedom to appoint their staff, to elect their students, to determine standards and to design curricula. Ideas about academic freedom often get mixed up with ideas of university autonomy, and they are not the same thing. Attempts by the funding bodies of universities to shape the developments of the institutions to which they give financial support are sometimes decried as attempts to subvert academic freedom. Unless they try to dictate what individual teachers teach and how they teach it, this is not an attack on academic freedom. University autonomy is an idea related to academic freedom, because on the whole universities can do their jobs better if free from interference, especially political interference. The recent controversy over the teaching of Peace Studies at Bradford University is a case in point. Everything depends on the kind of direction a university receives from outside and what it is motivated to.
However, universities cannot remain totally isolated from the societies they serve and be a law unto themselves; they are not immune to the evils that are demonstrated by the state of Oxford and Cambridge before the mid-nineteenth century reforms. We can see now that those reforms were necessary, but at the time, the appointment of a Royal Commission to look into the affairs of Cambridge University in 1850 was regarded in the university as "an inexcusable infringement of rights" (Steeleman 1940, 89). Bodies which receive large amounts of public money must expect to have to satisfy those funding them that they are not only getting value for money but also that the money is going on what they want it to go on, within broad limits.

In all fields of the production of goods and the provision of services there has long been a movement of protest against the dictatorship of the producers at the expense of the consumers. Hence the establishment of the various consumer protection bodies, and the Office of Fair Trading, and the increase of 'parent power' in schools. Universities have not escaped this trend (yet another factor causing nervousness among academics), and have felt themselves under an obligation to resist it. They have to decide what are reasonable requests for the types of university education demanded, and what is improper interference. It is not always easy to draw the line between the two, and in any specific case, opinions are likely to differ. Interference on political grounds, certainly on party political grounds, is to be deplored whether it is by heavyweight local politicians in a substantial town or by dictatorial regimes in the developing countries of Africa. Probably the best defence for universities of this kind of freedom is a general appreciation in the community of the values of the democratic process.

The freedom of scholars and scientists to meet each other and to exchange information, for which the best term is 'scholarly freedom'. The phrases 'academic freedom of association' or 'internationalism in science' are sometimes used to express this idea, but it is better to distinguish it from any other form of academic freedom, and therefore 'scholarly freedom' is probably the best term. There has grown up among scientists the idea that the democracies and their scientists are not just partners, but belong to something called 'Science' as a whole. There follows from this, the ethic that researchers should publish their results, not in the popular press, in order to gain a cheap notoriety, but in the scientific journals where they can be scrutinised first by colleagues and scientific peers. Another part of the ethic of the Republic of Science is that a research worker will never plagiarise the work of another, or fail to give priority of discovery where it is due. A scientific discovery is regarded as different from an invention; it is not something from which the discoverer reaps to make money for himself or herself, but as a possession belonging to, and to be shared with, all humankind. When it comes to applied science, the drawing of the line between discovery and invention may be fraught with difficulty, and the way it is handled may lead to controversy.

An extension of this idea involves the freedom of scientists and academics not only to exchange their research findings in journals and papers and correspondence, but also to be able to move freely about the world to meet each other, either in conferences or individually (Weinberg 1978). This sort of freedom to move about internationally and to exchange research results is particularly important for archaeologists because archaeology is an international discipline. Prehistoric populations were under different kinds of constraints affecting their living areas and living habits from those of modern peoples. In prehistoric times ecological entities were meaningful, not the boundaries of today's nation states. The archaeological problems of today's countries are seldom to be considered with reference to the archaeological conditions of the same country; archaeologists from different countries need to cooperate on the solution of common or interlinking problems. This is a truism of modern archaeology, but the point here is that it makes scholarly freedom of greater significance for archaeologists than for scholars in some other disciplines.

Scientists who enjoy this scholarly freedom in their own countries have much more reason to exercise it, to protest to their international colleagues in other countries. A deeply thought out article on this topic makes the observation that the ethos of the development of this freedom was in order to examine the possibilities of exercising it to the full, and the historical elements in the situation have been completely ignored" (Ziman 1978, 4). The author continues:

In trying to decide how we ought to act, now and in the foreseeable future, we must look back several decades to observe these changes and to discover the influence of outdated simplifications and slogans. Briefly, we find that we must redefine the rational ethic of universalism in science, and reassert the social solidarity implicit in the concept of a "republic of science." This solidarity can no longer be cohered around the simplified goal of the "advancement of knowledge", but must be recognised as the social, political and legal conditions under which this goal is sought. To protect both the welfare of the individual scientist and the health of science itself, there must be a direct appeal to the international code of human rights, as a standard of justice, morality and corporate action. (Ziman 1978, 5)

In other words, you are not a good citizen of the republic of science unless you are an active supporter of the human rights code. The human rights code is not just a distant ideal. To give effect to the code is...much more than an aspiration: it has become a moral imperative, as emphatic as the obligation of every citizen to uphold the laws of his own country. This applies with particular force to scientists and scientific institutions, who belong as much to the world community of science as to their own societies" (Ziman 1978, 15). The final conclusion is
that "All the needs of scholarly freedom are explicitly covered by the universal code of human rights". In other words, the code of human rights and you defend the principle of scholarly freedom; it needs no special defense. And, indeed, it deserves none.

The same conclusion was reached by a concerned study group of academics:

It is easy to condemn an individual to condemn all or any forms of persecution and oppression on moral grounds. But that is not our collective purpose. It is well to hold strong rights against cruelty, either we, or the Council for Science and Society, nor the Governors of the British Institute of Human Rights, or any of the other groups are competent to sit in judgment on the conduct of States, public authorities or even private corporations, especially those of countries other than our own, merely on the basis of our moral views. But what we can do today is to base our judgments — once the facts are clearly established — on an existing body of international law, or internationally accepted norms and principles, which enshrine a view of morality that is now accepted throughout the world (Aliyah et al., 1978, 290).

The study group also included 'scholarly freedom' the idea of access to scientific knowledge and education:

While it may be regrettable that a country may not have, or may choose not to have, an economic means to promote the scientific activity within its territory, that is not a threat to scientific freedom. But matters stand differently other than our own, merely on the basis of our moral views. But what we can do today is to base our judgments — once the facts are clearly established — on an existing body of international law, or internationally accepted norms and principles, which enshrine a view of morality that is now accepted throughout the world (Aliyah et al., 1978, 290).

Conflicting Principles

In the foregoing examples, we see the two principles in conflict with each other. In the case of the Government research scientist, 'scholarly freedom' comes up against 'national interest'. National interest is given a higher value than scholarly freedom, so considerations of national interest are made paramount, and scholarly freedom has to take a more lowly station; it is placed lower in the hierarchy of values. Similarly, with the industrial scientist: scholarly freedom comes up against the competitive profit-principle 'the free-enterprise economy, and the profit-principle wins. That also is ranked higher in the scale of values than scholarly freedom. Managements of industrial concerns are sometimes scared about their scientists having too much contact with those from rival firms, afraid that they may sell off trade-secrets, and therefore they place restrictions on this kind of activity on the part of their scientists. Government scientists, particularly in Defence establishments, are often under the surveillance of M15, with all the loss of personal freedom and privacy which that entails.

Ethics is a complex field, as for the philosopher. The trouble is that the ordinary man or woman has to take decisions in daily life, without the benefit of a training in philosophy; they have to decide what is a right course of action in real life situations. Because such decisions are not made on the basis of over-deliberation and most intelligent, it is a very human temptation to fall back on self-made rules derived from some authoritative source. But this is really an abnegation of the individual's moral responsibility:

A judgement as to what is right has to be made in a situation...the moral judgement has to take account of the facts of the situation. A purely autonomous ethics...would be an ethics of a priori principles, which would have to be both self-authenticating and incapable of conflicting. (Emmet 1966, 44)

Furthermore, it is admitted that "we may find the situation is one to which more than one principle is applicable" (Emmet 1966, 49).

So, principles are not absolute; and they can conflict:

Far from calling for a simple morality rule and rote, the pressures of different claims and interests will for even the most intelligent man a problem that seems too difficult, demanding also too much moral toughness, we may find instead an amoral ingenuity. There is a need for intelligence as well as a high sense of responsibility. (Emmet 1966, 200)
I am not sure about 'amoral ingenuity' among archaeologists, although it may be recognised in some quarters, but there is certainly among some of them a high incidence of a special kind of unworldliness. This takes the form of a touching innocence in believing that there are absolute principles, that 'academic freedom' is one of them, that this principle will not conflict with other moral principles, but that if it does it must have precedence. In fact, where the principle of 'academic freedom' conflicts with other moral principles, there is imposed upon us a much more exacting exercise than that of standing rigidly on a single principle. How do we decide which principle has priority? Can we find any principle or principles which will guide us to determine these priorities? Such principles would appear to lie in higher order principles, such as 'human life is sacred' or 'one should respect other persons', or other such overriding values, often enshrined in the statements of religions or declarations of human rights.

The principles of academic and scholarly freedom are not among the Ten Commandments. They are not included in the Koran. They are not among Clyde Kluckhohn's list of ethical ideas necessary for living in some sort of ordered society (Kluckhohn 1955), nor among H.L.A. Hart's list of 'natural necessities' for this purpose (Hart 1961). Whence, then, do they derive? I have tried to show earlier the historical circumstances which gave rise to them, and how it is still necessary to uphold them whenever possible. But their position in a hierarchy of values has to be decided by each individual on the basis of his or her own fundamental values, not in isolation from them as if they were unrelated.

Another touching belief of archaeologists is the faith that politics can be kept out of archaeology. Why do politics come into this discussion at all? Because we have been talking about freedoms. Issues of freedom are issues of politics. Politics are about power: about who says what is to happen. Academics are deeply concerned about who says what they are to teach and research and how they are to carry out these activities, about who determines the character and conduct of their universities, and about who controls their intercourse with each other. How can politics not come into all this? It is an unrealistic dream to suppose that they cannot.

What academic archaeologists often mean when they say 'keep politics out of archaeology' is 'keep politicians out of archaeology', perhaps a more understandable aim. But as we have seen, if the society which funds universities and archaeology is to have its proper say, the voices of the elected representatives of that society have to be heard -- up to a certain limit. And if one is dealing with scholarly freedom on a global stage, the voices must be heard, not just from a limited portion of the globe, but from all over.

The archaeological world has been seething like a disrupted termite's nest, as a result of the principle of scholarly freedom coming into collision with the principles of human rights. This is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, the debate began with the National Committee meeting on 20 November 1985, when the London Congress was scheduled to meet in Paris on 17 January 1986. The meeting was attended by 15 people, all from western Europe and the USA. No Committee member from the Third World or Eastern Europe was present, and no consideration was allowed of their written or telephoned views on the matters under consideration.

The outcome of that meeting was that the UISPP International Executive Committee withdrew its recognition of the World Archaeological Congress and sought to set up an alternative Congress at Mainz/Frankfurt in 1986 if the British did not lift the ban on South African/Namibian participation by 15 February 1986. It also insisted on written guarantees from the Southampton groups opposing South African participation that they would not interfere with the Congress. Members of the Permanent Council of the UISPP were to be informed of the decision by letter, with approval or disapproval to be sent to the Secretary General by 15 February -- an almost impossible condition knowing the usual overseas postal delays and from remote parts of the world. Absence of any reply would be taken by the International Executive Committee to indicate approval of their decision. At this time Professor John Evans resigned as President of the UISPP.

Following a meeting of the British Executive Committee, the National Secretary, Professor Peter Ucko, made further strenuous efforts to find an acceptable compromise that would satisfy all parties and allow the conference to go ahead, but unfortunately he was unsuccessful. During the period of negotiations, Professor Evans also resigned from the British Executive Committee. The National Committee was informed of the failure to find a solution on 8 February 1986. That meeting was therefore faced with two alternatives only: one to cancel, the other to go ahead without South African/Namibian participation. The meeting was advisory only and no vote could be taken, but opinion seemed slightly in
favour of continuing. The acting chairman, Sir David Wilson, noted the feelings of the meeting, and at the Executive Committee meeting which followed, it was decided not to cancel the Congress. Three members of the British Executive Committee then resigned because they considered that with the withdrawal of the UISPP affiliation, the Congress could not be as they had originally anticipated. The other members of the Executive, Mr. Derek Hayes (Treasurer) and Professor Peter Ocko (Secretary) remained in office, and were subsequently joined by Dr. Timothy Champion, Dr. Juliet Clinton-Brook, Professor Michael Day (subsequently succeeded by Dr. Ian Hodder), Dr. Michael Rowlands, Professor Thurstan Shaw, and Dr. Stephen Shenan, in a new and enlarged Executive Committee. Following a meeting of this new committee on 13 February 1986, it was announced that the World Archaeological Congress would take place in Southampton as scheduled, in the first week of September 1986; that the academic programme would proceed as planned with the major themes largely unchanged; and that the 11th UISPP Congress in Mainz would not be held until September 1987. One of the three members who resigned from the old Committee, Professor Leslie Alcock of Glasgow University, rejoined the Committee in March 1986. He and Sir David Wilson (a member of the original Executive Committee) are organising the symposium on ‘Problems and Developments in Medieval Archaeology’. Both are members of the Conseil Permanent of UISPP.

Academics Outraged

When the ban on archaeologists from South Africa/Namibia was announced, large numbers of academics were outraged. Three out of six British Vice-Presidents of the Congress resigned, there were letters in the Times, both from archaeologist and non-archaeologist academics, using such phrases as ‘failed totally to realise’, ‘glaring error’, ‘erosion of international scholarship’, ‘shameful’, ‘widespread anger’, ‘subliminal to blackmail’, ‘profound concern’, ‘depressing’, ‘deeply resented’, ‘no sense, logical or otherwise’, ‘abdicate responsibility’, ‘vital principle of academic freedom’, ‘disappointed and ashamed’, ‘politicised’, ‘scholarship subordinated to politics’, and so on. Many of these were genuine expressions of feeling, and of powerful emotions at that, even if some utterances may have been motivated more by personal interests of the writers, especially when their research opportunities appeared threatened. Finally the Times itself, either under pressure from the outraged academics or under the impression that it must be jumping on a respectable bandwagon, carried a leader urging the organisers of the Congress to cancel it, and declaring that if the Congress went ahead it would only be a rump congress at which ‘a disreputable group of British, Communist and other “World” archaeologists’. One expects the Thunderer to fulminate, but not to descend into the gutter.

Why the reaction of so many academics so violent, even hysterical? The sound and fury tended to suggest it was intended to do, more realism in reactions of numbers of less vocal academics. In the USA there was tremendous lobbying on behalf of South African/Namibian participation in the Congress, and there was even a rumour that a junior academic was told that his chances of achieving tenure would be jeopardised if he failed to withdraw from the Congress once the ban on South African/Namibian participation had been imposed.

What were the reasons for these emotional reactions, as instinctive as the reflexes of a boxer? I think they are fivefold:

1. Failure to have reflected adequately about the nature of “academic freedom” and to distinguish it from “scholarly freedom”; the acceptance of “academic freedom” as a self-evident unexamined ‘good’, with the phrase employed as a slogan. (I myself was guilty of this until the present dispute caused me to look into the concepts more closely.)

2. Differential experience. The values we place depend upon our experience of life; different life experiences lead to the holding of different values. European and American academics belong to a tradition which has had to defend the conditions necessary for the pursuit of truth, in particular to defend freedom of enquiry against limitations imposed by religious or political authorities. This tradition has entered deeply into Western academic consciousness. On the other hand, very few Western academics have had any personal experience of being denied the fundamental human freedoms; that danger has not entered into their experience. This is for them a fortunate accident of history, but it makes it very difficult for them to enter into the feelings of South African blacks, denied those fundamental freedoms on the basis of colour, and who feel far more threatened by South African apartheid than by restrictions on scholarly freedom. As a retired lecturer in Aeronautics has written: When I read, in a contribution to the debate on the exclusion of South Africans from the A rchaeology Congress, the clause ‘Of course I am opposed to Apartheid’, I know that the next word will be ‘but’. What that really means is that there is literally nothing about it lies on everybody else. The dockers at Southampton, where at least one sixth of the trade passing through the port is still with South Africa, are expected to place their jobs in jeopardy, grocers, green grocers and fruit sellers to sacrifice a portion of their livelihood, sport and entertainers to forgo lucrative tours, but academic freedom must remain sacrosanct.

Psychologists of perception have demonstrated very clearly that what you perceive depends upon where you are standing, where you are perceiving from. This applies equally to physical perception and to the material world within which we exist and with our instruments (and indeed it is a cardinal principle of modern physics), as well as to mental perception of people and the social and political world around us. Archaeologists are familiar with this ideal in their fieldwork insomuch as they know that their
observations have to be as objective as they can make them, but that there is a sense in which they can only 'see' what they already have a theoretical framework to see. So the present crisis among archaeologists over the World Archaeological Congress is not so much a crisis of principles as a crisis of perceptions.

3. As far as Britain is concerned, the current threat to academic life, the cuts in university financing, the proposed threat to tenure in a profession with a great deal of insecurity and uncertainty 'already in its lower echelons, the general devaluing in society of the role of the teacher, have all made British academics feel severely threatened. As a senior archaeologist in England wrote in a letter to a newspaper (in 1984) "Our colleagues in the universities are so shell-shocked by the events of the last five years that they have a highly-developed instinct for self-preservation which understandably excludes the wider issues." Yet another threat, to that established part of their way of life labelled 'academic freedom', rouses not only resentment but fear. How else can the violence of the reaction of so many academics be explained? What other emotion beside fear could have been so powerful? But no one likes to admit to fear, so a psychological displacement occurs, and the anger and fear come out in the form of indignation that the 'noble ideal' of 'academic freedom' should be trampled upon. The Disney Professor of Archaeology at Cambridge has twice publicly expressed his disgust at the positively 'Victorian self-righteousness' of so many academics unhesitatingly taking 'a holier than thou' attitude in expostulating against the ban on South African/Namibian participation. All the indignation is justified in the name of the pursuit of truth, but, as has already been suggested, there may be hidden motivations for this pursuit which have less to do with a pure quest for knowledge than we care to admit.

4. Confusion in handling the philosophical problem of two conflicting moral principles, particularly when one of these is elevated to an absolute, and lack of relevant experience makes the other seem somewhat theoretical and remote. Archaeologists are not particularly reprehensible in finding themselves impaled on the horns of such a dilemma. They cannot help having had the experience they have had, and it is always hard to escape from the assumptions of your own cultural traditions. If the two conflicting moral principles have grown out of the different experiences and perceptions of Europe on the one hand and of the Third World on the other, one would expect that people would, by and large, support the principle that has grown out of their own group's experience and tradition. So those coming from one tradition tend to sanctify one principle, those coming from the other tradition are most likely to elevate the other. Doctors face a comparable kind of dilemma to that of the archaeologists. One in their case in prescribing the contraceptive pill to young girls who ask for it. Doctors are finding it not to find the right way to sustain the values both of the doctor's confidence and that of parents' responsibility for their children. In these kinds of situation, it is the elevation of a single moral principle to paramountcy that creates difficulties. When another moral principle is similarly elevated, and this principle cannot in a particular situation be reconciled with the other, a problem is created. There is no 'solution' to such a 'problem'. The best that can be done is to 'manage' it; and probably the best way to do that is to follow the homely wisdom of 'choosing the lesser of two evils' in that particular situation.

In this case, the lesser of the two evils would seem to be the banning of archaeologists from South Africa/Namibia (and it is an evil rather than the greater evil of doing anything which could give comfort and a spurious respectability to a regime practising a legal denial of human rights. On the other hand, it is easy to imagine that we would be getting more scholarly freedom if some 250 archaeologists from the Third World and eastern Europe attended the Congress, rather than 25 from South Africa/Namibia.

5. Personal loyalties. Naturally many archaeologists in Europe and America have friends among the archaeological community of South Africa and feel it is 'a shame' that they should be excluded from the World Archaeological Congress. Much play is made of the fact that those attending the Congress are individual 'scholars', and it is unfair to penalise them. But what is forgotten is that the UISPP statutes also make provision for national Governments to appoint official representatives on the Council Permanent of the UISPP, and to see that official delegates to congresses. The plight of white South Africans naturally also makes them extremely sensitive to having apartheid practiced against them, so they overreact and call upon their friends in the rest of the archaeological world to support them. Professor Tobias, of Witwatersrand University, travelled to Europe specially to influence the meeting on 17 January and lobbied its members intensely. He concluded his article in the South African Journal of Science with an impassioned plea for "free access to knowledge by men and women irrespective of race, nationality or philosophical conviction" (Tobias 1985). That comes ironically as an argument not to make a protest against apartheid.

Other Considerations

There have been many adventitious elements obscuring the basic issue in the present dispute over the World Archaeological Congress: the personal friendships with South African archaeologists, the fact that the British Executive Committee appeared to allow itself to be blackmailed by a threat to withdraw the Executive Committee if the UISPP agreed to the record of some South African archaeologists in undermining apartheid by talking up the falsity of the myths upon which it is based, the imposition of the state of emergency in South Africa, and so on. These have been the smaller stones thrown into the pond, making their own disturbances and obscuring the pattern of the ripples from the one big rock thrown in. As the waves subside, perhaps it will be easier to separate out the major issue from the minor ones.
Another of the smaller pebbles thrown into the pool is the doubt about the effectiveness of the ban in having any influence on the South African Government. It is legitimate to consider this, since most philosophers hold that it is right, when weighing up the rival claims of competing moral principles, to consider what will be the consequences of a given course of action. The ban has already caused anger in South Africa (Tobias 1985), and division among archaeologists world-wide. The quantitative consequences of the ban in terms of the resulting amount of scientific interchange and international academic intercourse are difficult to calculate; the loss appears to be some 25 archaeologists and others from South Africa/Namibia and some 300 individuals from USA and other countries who have withdrawn in sympathy; the gain is about an equal number from the Third World and eastern Europe; another gain is a much more genuinely world-wide gathering, with some 30 countries represented who have not been represented before.

It is difficult to estimate the probable results of the ban in South Africa: while South Africans as a whole are likely to care very little about whether their archaeologists are allowed to attend an international conference, certainly far less than about the exclusion of their sportsmen and women from international sport. Archaeologists must also be much smaller beer as far as the Government is concerned, and they are probably flattering themselves if they think their actions have much political weight. Apartheid will be the result of internal pressures; external pressures are unlikely to be decisive, but they may shorten the inevitable period of disorderly transition by undermining the will of the white South Africans to resist change. Of all the sanctions asked for by the black population, not even the feared economic ones would produce a result by themselves. The only group outside South Africa with power to do that are the international bankers — but for the time being they have decided to back apartheid South Africa. So it is over-optimistic to hope that the ban will have much influence on the South African Government, even if they might flaut the absence of a ban as a testimony to their international repectability. On the other hand, failure to operate a ban will be a bad public relations support for apartheid, especially when they have called for sanctions of all kinds, including cultural and academic ones, as indeed has UNESCO, the Commonwealth, and the European Community. It would also be seen in the same light by the majority of archaeologists and other academics in the Third World.

The absence of South African representation at the World Archaeological Congress may result in some delay in the advance of archaeological knowledge, but, since it will not be a loss, that may not matter very much. Certainly it will matter far less than the actual loss of knowledge resulting from the failure to finance a particular piece of rescue archaeology.

Another consideration might be called ‘Where do you draw the line?’ Real fears have been expressed that if a precedent is created in which academics (as opposed to governments) exclude South Africans/Namibians, what is to stop the exclusion of other national groups, e.g. Israelis as a result of Arab pressure? The world is full of conflicts, but these should be confined to the political arena and not imported into academic activities. Where would the exactness of the disapproval stop? There are many tyrannical regimes which, morally, ought to be resisted. These ‘thin-end-of-the-wedge’, ‘top-of-a-slippery-slope’ warnings need to be considered. However, the answer to these is clear: however repressive, even genocidal in some cases, some regimes are, there is none outside South Africa which has not, in its laws and its constitution, disfranchises two-thirds of its citizens and is disapproved of many human rights organisations on the basis of skin colour. This does make South Africa a pariah among nations and justifies special treatment — as is recognised by the international bodies already mentioned. So the special treatment of South Africa/Namibia does not form a precedent for the exclusion of citizens of any country under a ‘tyrannical’ government, but merely of any regimes which in the future adopt a system with the same basis as that of apartheid.

The Future

Is there a future for a congress of archaeologists from all over the world? Is the expense, and the Brobdingnagian organisation it demands, worth it? What are the gains? After the Nice Congress in 1978 many of us had our doubts. Would it not be more profitable, more cost-effective, to hold smaller conferences on a more limited topic or theme basis? These doubts found expression in an Antiquity editorial:

Because we say that archaeology is the study of the many remains of men’s past, we do not expect all aspects of that past to be mutually understandable. The Nice Congress demonstrated that such very large conferences may have come to an end; there is already a Pan-African Conference on Prehistory. Should the successors to Nice like not be several them many human rights organisations on the basis of skin colour. This does make South Africa a pariah among nations and justifies special treatment — as is recognised by the international bodies already mentioned. So the special treatment of South Africa/Namibia does not form a precedent for the exclusion of citizens of any country under a ‘tyrannical’ government, but merely of any regimes which in the future adopt a system with the same basis as that of apartheid.

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The persistence of many of the strands of nineteenth century archaeology outlined at the beginning of this article can be seen in the present situation. Influencing it in a dead-hand sort of way is the fact that archaeology was almost exclusively a European activity; the influence of the ideas of certain individuals and the structural arrangements of certain countries; and the development of archaeology as an academic discipline. The enormous interest in Europe in the study of 'the native heritage of antiquities' has grown into the elaboration of modern archaeology throughout the world, while the opportunities for the study of the 'exotic' remains outside Europe have in many cases become more restricted. It is now the Americans who more often have the resources for the foreign expedition. What is quite new, really only coming on the scene in the second half of the present century, is the idea of 'world archaeology': Gregory Clark's pioneering World Prehistory was not published until 1961, and could not have been attempted so soon (Clark 1961). Today's archaeological world has some adjustments to make. One way of looking at the contentions over the World Archaeological Congress is to see the dispute as a rent in the fabric of the archaeological world arising out of the stresses accumulated over many years as the result of inadequate adjustments to new conditions. Out of the rending of the old fabric one hopes that a new and sounder one may be woven.

If future world congresses are to be held, the UISPP has demonstrated that, as at present constituted, it is not fit to run them. It is in name international, but in practice dominated by Europe. It has a Permanent Council, which meets only at congresses, and it has only once held a congress outside Europe. By statute the proceedings of the Permanent Council have to be conducted in French, as also those of the Executive Committee, which meets in Europe. No expenses are paid to members of either body, so non-European attendance is minimal. The academic business of its congresses has been overwhelmingly European, and structured around European perceptions of the past. It seems to have operated on the principle that nothing of any importance ever happens outside Europe or the Near East. It recently managed to establish a commission to investigate the Iron Age of America, where no Iron Age ever occurred (Champion 1966). The writer continues:

The special international nature of UISPP is clearly specious. It has in practice defined the content and scope of archaeology, and the concepts and structures within which the discipline should be studied, in such a way as to exclude most non-Europeans. The subject thus becomes a means of reinforcing the divisions in the modern world between North and South, developed and underdeveloped, by excluding the most important area of intellectual activity. It was precisely to overcome such gross misunderstanding of the rest of the world and those who study it in this country that we thought it important to establish an academic framework to appeal to a truly international gathering. But if we have to rethink our conceptualisation of what is important in

archaeology, should we not also have to rethink the social context within which international gatherings are held? If we sincerely wish our colleagues from the Third World to attend, do we have the right to dictate the terms of attendance by insisting on our European ideal of an absolute right to free academic association in full knowledge that many will thereby be excluded? (Champion 1966)

Out of the present turmoil there is arising the beginning of a recognition of a continuing need for a forum for European specialists, and of a new need for another forum in which themes of world interest can be discussed. UISPP might become fitted to carry on its traditional role as the former if it revises some of its statutes. The basis of membership of the governing body, the Conseil Permanent, would need to be reconsidered, and the position of representatives from countries outside of Europe. More importantly, the manner of election to the Conseil Permanent needs to be looked at afresh: the original members were those who were suggested at the formation meeting in Berne in 1931; from these there has been a sort of 'apostolic succession', since the Conseil Permanent became a self-perpetuating body, adding fresh members or filling gaps by its own nominations; thus the members of the Conseil Permanent never had any 'constituency' in their own countries, except perhaps in the case of those members nominated by their national governments. Another statute which needs looking at afresh is that whereby the language, in which the business affairs of the UISPP are conducted, is French; this was a provision inherited from the old Congrès International d'Archéologie et d'Anthropologie Préhistoriques, arising in the cultural conditions of the Europe of 120 years ago. Is it still the most appropriate medium of business intercourse for UISPP in the days of the 160 nations of the United Nations and of simultaneous translation?

We should now be thinking about the other need -- for an archaeological forum in which themes of world interest can be discussed and about the best way in which such a forum can be established.

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Introduction

As in many of the newly liberated states of the Third World, the concern of aboriginal minorities with self-identification and claims to rights over land have come to involve archaeology in different parts of the world today. To a certain degree this is also the current situation in Norway, despite its varied history, due to the Saami minority's struggle for political and legal rights as the indigenous population of the northernmost areas of Norway. The scientific legitimacy of this involvement is, however, widely debated especially when this takes place in academically respectable Western Europe where a 'true' science is not expected to lend itself to pressure from such particular interests. Despite this, it is a well known fact that this so-called 'political abuse' of archaeology played an important role in establishing national identities in many European nation-states. By claiming this positivist ideal of a 'value free' and 'objective' science in the present-day context of Third and Fourth World struggle, Western archaeology is in fact serving the dominant social and political powers in the contemporary world. Moreover, it is precisely this positivistic delusion of a politically neutral science which makes it into a mainstay for these interests, just as it serves to conceal its own partisanship.

Working from the premise that the past does not entail any absolute, given truths, but is shaped largely by the image of the political present, this article deals with the situation of ethnic bias in Norwegian archaeology. Its outspoken neutrality and concern with political 'abuse' notwithstanding, a strong ethnic bias in favour of the past of the dominant group has already been documented (Seach and Olsen 1983). Thus, despite the fact that the culture-historic situation in Norway entails the presence of two ethnic groups, the Norwegian and the Saami (the Lapps), it is only the former who has been honoured with a History, while the Saami have 'disappeared' into the domain of ethnography — and have thus become 'people without history'.

A major point in the paper is that this concealment of ethnic pluralism mirrors the ideological Utopia of the modern bourgeois nation-state — uniformity; the presentation of an image of social and national

(Archaeological Review from Cambridge 5:1 [1986])